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I. . 5.4.).(4 I !-J.r.tv (.5. {Irarr’xt a} .3 {II I: (6.; 1.: .I ix 9 r 21!. {pit}: .4 .t... A .- r» .21.: . . .r.» if .31.)...(1 $34! if .II..:!I . 4 It» . a: .1 .1 . . if... it to 1;. {If This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Political Voice in Rural Africa: Small-scale Communal Farmers in Zimbabwe presented by Stephen Franklin Burgess ; , has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Doctor of Philosophy Political Science degree in Major professor Date M MSU 1': III An‘irmufivc Action/Equal Opportunity Inltilulian 0-1277“! _ LIBRARY (Michigan State 3 University PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. To AVOID FINES return on or before date due. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity institution c:\circ\dnedue.pm3-9A POLITICAL VOICE IN RURAL AFRICA: SMALL-SCALE COMMUNAL FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE BY Stephen Franklin Burgess A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1992 ABSTRACT POLITICAL VOICE IN RURAL AFRICA: SMALL-SCALE COMMUNAL FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE Stephen Franklin Burgess Robert Bates' rational choice model explains the decline of African agriculture in terms of governing elites who form urban—based coalitions and use the state to promote urban and industrial growth at the expense of agriculture. While not rejecting the overall validity of Bates' model, the dissertation has demonstrated that two key assumptions — concerning the options available to small farmers and small farmer relations with the state — must not be treated as axioms but rather as variables. Bates assumes that small farmers are inevitably disorganized and incapable of influencing governments and that elites rationally include urban dwellers (who are more powerful) in ruling coalitions and exclude rural dwellers. The dissertation has demonstrated that small—scale African farmers can be organized, can exercise the option of expressing political voice, influence governing elites, and even participate in ruling coaltions. These findings were derived from a survey of small—scale communal farmers in Zimbabwe and from over a year of field research. The survey was stratified to include farmers with different socio—economic, agro—ecological and logistical conditions. Through the field research, it was discovered that a substantial proportion of small farmers were exercising political power and political voice by their membership in a diverse range of groups, by making demands for program and policy change, and by using a variety of organizations to make and fulfill demands. Small farmers were organizing themselves in farmer groups, cooperatives, the farmers' union and local government. Their political voice, combined with agricultural performance, initiated and sustained a small farmer agricultural revolution which cannot be accounted for by Bates' assumptions. To my wife and life-long colleague, Janet Claire Beilstein iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am greatly indebted to Michael Bratton for the inspiration and guidance he provided. I express my appreciation to R. James Bingen for helping to formulate the proposal and secure funding. Also providing assistance at Michigan State were David Campbell, Rick Bernsten, the African Studies Center, Marcus Cheatham, Harriet Dhanak and many others. I am grateful to the Government of Zimbabwe, particularly the Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Agriculture and AGRITEX, for facilitating the research. Thanks go to scores of local government officials as well as extension officers and workers. I wish to thank the National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe and Robinson Gapare for their generous assistance. I am especially grateful to Solomon Chigume who was a tremendous help in developing the survey. Thanks also go to my research assistants, Sydney Matambo, Phidelis Mpofu, Edward Kutadza, and Peter Gwenhure. I wish to thank the farmers of Hurungwe, Zaka and Mutoko who patiently answered our questions. Thanks are extended to the following individuals who were of particular assistance in Zimbabwe: Mandivamba Rukuni, Dzingai Chigiga, John Makumbe, Ben Cousins, Leonard Ndemera, Kingston Kajese, Kwesi Debra—Opoku, Father Karl Steffens at St. Boniface Mission, Father Franz Wirz at St. Anthony's Mission, Thom Jayne, Roger Mpande and Ishmael Sunga. Last but not least, I wish to thank Janet Beilstein for her unwavering support and assistance. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Number List of Tables ......................................... x11 1. Introduction and Literature Review .................. 1 1 1 Introduction ...................................... 1 1.2. Anti-rural Bias ................................... 3 1.3. A Rational Choice Model of Farmer-State Relations 5 1.4. Countering Anti-rural Bias: "Getting the Prices Right" ........................ 10 1.4.1. Countering Bias: Institutional Development ...... 12 1.4.2. Countering Bias: Policy Reform .................. 15 1.5. Governing Elites: Rational or Patrimonial? ........ 18 1.6. Beyond Capture: Exit, Voice and Loyalty ........... 21 1.6.1. Capture and Loyalty in Rural Africa ............. 27 1.6.2. The Exit Option ................................. 28 1.7. Political Voice in Rural Africa ................... 32 1.8. Political Voice in Rural Africa and State—Society Relations ........................... 35 1.9. Empirical Objectives and Structure of the Dissertation ..................... 37 2. Voice in Rural Africa: The Conceptual Framework ..... 40 2.1. Introduction ...................................... 40 2.2. Political Voice and the Demands of Small Farmers .. 42 2.2.1. The Content of Demands .......................... 44 2.2.2. The Scope of Demands ............................ 45 vi 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2.3. The Classification of Demands According to Content and Scope ............................ 47 2.4. The Scope of Demands that Farmers Make .......... 49 3. Organizations that Farmers Use to Make Demands .... 50 3.1. Organizational Dimensions and Typologies ........ 53 3.2. Voluntary Sector Organizations (VSOs) ........... 54 3.2.1. VSOs: Membership Organizations (MOS) .......... 56 3.2.2. VSOs: Service Organizations (805) ............. 59 .3.3. Public Sector Organizations: Central and Local Government ................. 60 3.4. Political Parties ............................... 61 4. Farmer Political Voice and Organizational Interaction ........................ 63 5. Rural Stratification and Small Farmer Demands ..... 66 5.1. Socio—economic Stratification ................... 67 5.2. Gender stratification ........................... 68 5.3. Agro Ecological and Geographical Stratification . 70 2.5.4. Hypotheses: Rural Stratification and Small Farmer Demands ......................... 70 2.6. Effective Political Voice: Hypotheses ............. 72 2.7. Political Voice and Effectiveness by Poorer Farmers 74 2.8. Conclusion ........................................ 75 3. Zimbabwe's Small Farmers: A Case Study .............. 77 3.1. Introduction ...................................... 77 3.2. Case Study Selection: Small Farmers in Zimbabwe ... 78 3.3. Zimbabwe's Small Farmer "Revolution" and Political Voice ................................... 82 3.3.1. Organizations Used by Zimbabwe's Small Farmers .. 87 vii 3.3.2. Political Voice and Agricultural Policy ......... 90 3.3.3. "Top-down" Explanations for Agricultural Policy Change ................... 93 3.3.4. The Limits of Zimbabwe's Small Farmer Revolution 96 3.4. Conclusion: Research Issues Raised by the Case Study 100 4. Data Collection and Analysis ....................... 103 4.1. Introduction ...................................... 103 4.2. Data Collection ................................... 103 4.3. Criteria for Site Selection and Sampling .......... 105 4.4. Field Survey Program, Timing and Content .......... 108 4.5. Survey Sample Location: Communal Lands and Sites .. 111 4.6. Survey Sample Selection ........................... 113 4.7. Stratified Sampling According to Gender and Marital Status ................................ 116 4.8. Hurungwe Communal Land and the Sites Selected ..... 117 4.8.1. Maumbe Ward ..................................... 119 4.8.2. Doro Ward ....................................... 120 4.8.3. Mudzimu Ward .................................... 121 4.8.4. Chimusimbe Ward ................................. 122 4.9. Zaka Communal Land and the Sites Selected ......... 123 4.9.1. Nhema North Ward ................................ 126 4.9.2. Nhema South Ward ................................ 126 4.9.3. Chidzurira Ward ................................. 127 4.9.4. Murembwa Ward ................................... 127 4.10. Socio—economic Stratification for Data Analysis .. 128 4.10.1. Cattle Holdings and Socio—economic Stratification ................ 130 viii 4.10.2. Correlates of Socio—economic Stratification 4.10.2.1. Land Use ..................................... 4.10.2.2. Farm Equipment and Draft Power ............... 4.10.2.3. Crops Marketed ............................... 4.10.2.4. Labor Hired .................................. 4.10.2.5. Roof Composition ............................. 4.11. Conclusion ....................................... 5. Political Voice Expressed: Small Farmer Demands ..... 5.1. Introduction ...................................... 5.2. The Agricultural Problems of Small Farmers ........ 5.3. The Survey of Small Farmers in Hurungwe and Zaka .. 5.4. Content and Scope of Needs ........................ 5.5. Rural Stratification and the Demands of Small Farmers ..................................... 5.6. Demands Made and Actions Taken to Fulfill Needs 5.7. Farmer Persistence and the Use of Unofficial and Informal Channels ................................. 5.8. Demands for Program and Policy Change ............. 5.8.1. Political Voice and Demands for Land ............ 5.8.2. Demands for Infrastructure, Credit and Markets 5.9. VSO Presence, Scope of Demands and Joint Action 5.10. Conclusion ....................................... 6. Organizations in Zimbabwe and Rural Political Voice 6.1. Introduction ...................................... 6.2. Organizations in Rural Zimbabwe and the Views of Farmers .............................. 6.2.1. VSOs: Membership and Service Organizations ...... ix 141 143 144 151 154 157 163 168 170 171 176 180 182 183 6.2.2. Central Government Agencies ..................... 191 6.2.3. Local Government Structures and Actors .......... 194 6.2.4. Political Parties ............................... 200 6.3. Small Farmer Knowledge of Organizations ........... 202 6.4. Small Farmer Perspectives on Organizations ........ 206 6.5. Evaluation of Organizational Performance .......... 213 6.6. Farmer Organizations: Membership, Leadership and Politics ........................... 215 6.7. How Organizations are Used to Make AgriculutralDemands .............................. 223 6.8. The Use of Alternative Organizations and Informal Channels ................................. 232 6.9. Rural Stratification and the Use of Organizations . 234 6.10. Conclusions ...................................... 239 7. The Effectiveness of Political Voice in Rural Zimbabwe 243 7.1. Introduction ...................................... 243 7.2. Effectiveness in Fulfilling Agricultural Demands .. 245 7.3. Degrees of Effectiveness .......................... 252 7.4. Demands Which Farmers Are Most Successful at Fulfilling ..................................... 254 7.5. Effectiveness in Securing Specific Demands ........ 259 7.5.1. Effectiveness in Obtaining Credit ............... 260 7.5.2. Effectiveness in Securing Land .................. 263 7.5.3. Effectiveness in Securing Markets ............... 266 7.5.4. Effectiveness in Obtaining Roads, Dams and Transport ................................ 267 7.6. Effectiveness in Improving the Quality of Life .... 268 7.7. Effective Political Voice by Female Farmers ....... 271 7.7.1. Mudzimu Ward Cases .............................. 7.7.2. Murembwa Ward Cases ............................. 7.8. Cases of "Optimal" Political Voice ................ 7.9. Conclusions ....................................... 8. Voice and Organizational Interaction in Rural Zimbabwe 287 8.1. Introduction ...................................... 8.2. Organizational Type and Interaction ............... 8.2.1. The Political Party and Conflict ................ 8.2.2. Central—Local Government Competition ............ 8.3. The Content and Scope of Demands and Organizational Interaction ........................ 8.3.1. Demands for Credit .............................. 8.3.2. Demands for Program Change: Assets .............. 8.3.3. Demands for Program Change: Services ............ 8.4. Demands for Projects and Organizational Interaction 8.4.1. Projects and Organizational Interaction in Murembwa Ward ............................. 8.4.2. Women's Cooperatives and Organizational Interaction ................... 8.5. Policy Change, NFAZ and the Political Voice of Small Farmers ..................................... 8.5.1. NFAZ and the Political Voice of Small Farmers 8.5.2. Demands for Change in Pricing and Transport Policy ............................. 8.5.3. Demands for Change in Land Policy ............... 8.6. Conclusions: Competition and Cooperation .......... 9. Conclusion: Political Voice in Rural Africa ......... 9.1. The Possiblity of Small Farmer Political Voice xi 288 291 293 296 305 306 313 315 315 321 323 325 329 329 1.0- Bibliography .........OOOOOOIOOOOOOOIU.....‘OOOOOOOO 354 Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table LIST OF TABLES 1 Options of Small—Scale African Farmers ........ 2 The Demands of African Small—scale Farmers 3 Organizations in Rural Africa ................. 4 Expected Interaction among Organizations in Rural Africa ................................. 5 Organizations Available to Small Farmers in Zimbabwe .................................. 6 Survey Site Selection ......................... 7 Marital Status of Females Sampled by Communal Land ............................. 8 Land Used for Farming by Communal Land ........ 9 Land Used for Farming by Cattle Holdings ...... 10 Farm Equipment by Communal Land .............. 11 Draft Power by Communal Land ................. 12 Draft Hire by Communal Land .................. 13 Levels of Crops Marketed ..................... 14 Levels of Crops Marketed by Communal Land 15 Levels of Crops Marketed by Natural Region 16 Levels of Crops Marketed by Access to Market 17 Labor Hired by Communal Land ................. 18 Farm Problems ................................ 19 Problems with Selling Crops .................. 20 Problems Raised by NFAZ Farmer Clubs ......... 21 Farmer Needs in the Hurungwe—Zaka Survey (1984—1989) .................................. 22 Needs/Demands of Small Farmers: Content by Scope ............................. 26 49 53 66 89 113 117 133 134 135 136 136 138 138 138 139 R 0101' C aidsT hojasqxfi b sLdsT coon-on. I'l ----- III ------ n-u Sgt-11A i'fiflli -""1‘Jlll'1:'-'T e u...: -.-_‘. Eii'lffilJI'if- err-‘- :- -.-: - -- ='- Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 3O 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 Content of Needs by Cattle Holdings .......... Content of Needs by Land Use ................. Content of Needs by Crops Marketed ........... Content of Needs by Area ..................... Content of Needs bv Natural Region ........... Scope of Needs by Crops Marketed ............. Actions Taken to Obtain Assets and Services Actions Taken to Get Assets and Services by Area ...................................... What Farmers Did If They Failed at First ..... Was Enough Land Available for Farming? ....... Were Farmers Able to Get Additional Land? Scope of Need by Presence of VSOs ............ Actions Taken by VSO Presence ................ Types of Organizations Used by Farmers in Zimbabwe ....................... Organizations Known by Farmers ............... The Number of Organizations Known by Respondents ............................... Number of Organizations Known ................ Helpfulness of Organizations ................. Helpfulness of Organizations by VSO Presence . Group Membership ............................. Number of Group Memberships .................. Levels of Group Membership ................... Master Farmer Status ......................... xiv 186 203 206 213 214 216 217 217 as old-T * io 1fl91flfl3 VS nIdaT ........... nofpefl [sauisv Id sheen fin 9nu13n? RA quLT Rat ........ ... anuahfgfi el:' 1 H -fiwufl * Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table 48 Type of Organization Asked by Sequence of Request ....................... 225 49 First Organization Asked ..................... 225 50 First Organization Used by Scope of Demand ... 227 51 First Organization Used by Scope, Controlling for VSO Presence ................. 228 52 Use of Alternative Organizations ............. 232 53 Type of Organization Used by Cattle Holdings . 234 54 Type of Organization Used by Crops Marketed .. 235 55 Type of Organization Used by Gender/Marital Status ..................... 238 56 Effectiveness by Content of Needs ............ 246 57 Effectiveness by Scope of Demands ............ 246 58 Effectiveness in Fulfilling Demands by Cattle Holdings ........................... 247 59 Effectiveness by Content of Demands, Controlling for Scope ........................ 248 60 Effectiveness by Content of Demands, Controlling for Scope ........................ 249 61 Effectiveness by First Organization Used ..... 250 62 Degree of Success in Fulfilling Demands ...... 252 63 Degree of Success in Fulfilling Demands by Area ...................................... 253 64 Demands Which Farmers Were Most Successful at Fulfilling (1984—9) ....................... 255 65 Content of Farmers' Most Successful Demand by Scope ..................................... 255 66 Most Successful Demand by Most Cited Need .... 256 67 Organizations Used by Sequence ............... 259 68 Credit Received in 1988—9 by Communal Land ... 260 69 Credit by Natural Region ..................... 261 XV ' ii Sin-in re 91:le [Ia-um!) -' ..‘L‘......J'..._eribtss:t.umo evtfl-ameJ'A 1r.- 98'.) se eldn'!‘ #CS . epntbfofl afflisb 2d has" Ufliibxinfigfo Tn wags ‘r uldrr RES .. bsienueM aqnij vfl inaH r rrra Arr-r xvi 025 75 125150 L_;1_1_1_.L_1_1_1 Kilometres Road --- Rail K... V" Natural V" \"v‘ I— II— Moderate rainfall m Moderate but erratic rainfall -l!m_ Low and erratic rainfall ZIMBABWE, with Agro-ecological Zones and Study Areas Hurungwe Communal Area Zaka District xvii Chapter 1. Introduction and Literature Review 1.1. Introduction A prevailing view is that African states have been used "I and exploit small—scale farmers, thereby to "capture rendering them politically marginal and powerless to make an impact on governments and the policy process. Taking issue with the view that small farmers are inevitably powerless and perpetually vulnerable to exploitation, a case is examined where they have acted effectively and have developed the political voice necessary to influence the state and the policy process. The central issues raised in this dissertation arise from the literature on markets, states and agricultural policy and their impact on farmers in Africa. The issue area which has received the greatest attention in the literature concerns African states and agricultural policies.2 A debate has been conducted between those who believe that governments can be reformed and developed to play a more positive role in agriculture and those who think that they are an irretrievably negative influence and who see little choice but to proceed 1The term "capture" is derived from Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantrv, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980. 2In adopting a rational choice model, Bates (1981) assumes that the state is a unitary actor led by rational elites. However, in attaining a more complete understanding of the role of states in agriculture, it is necessary to disaggregate the state into distinct sets of actors, including ruling elites, bureaucratic agencies and local government. r1rs aaeEtuafic W r.'.-'. '-i .a89301q 'TI‘ZGM'J I;_: I111 It»; A has "exuaqso“ o: yIIssrthOQ mod: pnr19hne1 singr..' . nu -WLuM! with the privatization of agricultural institutions and with market forces in order~ to revive agriculture. Thus far, insufficient attention has been devoted to the issue of how farmers act in relation to governments. Instead, the literature has referred to farmers as victims — vulnerable and politically anemic. In this dissertation, the focus is on small farmers as actors, and the principal issue area concerns the capabilities of small farmers and the options which they pursue in relation to African states. A case is studied where small farmers have demonstrated varying degrees of political and agricultural capabilities and have helped, through political voice, to prevent governing elites from turning away from support for agriculture and sustain a productive relationship with the state. Subsequently, the ways in which farmers acquire capabilities and exercise political voice are described and explained. In studying a case where small farmers possess capabilities and express political voice, a related issue is the content of the demands that they make for agricultural assets and services. In debates about state involvement in agriculture, privatization and "getting the prices right," the voice of small farmers is too often missing. What views would they express if given the opportunity? Would they make demands for greater government involvement in delivering agricultural services or would they demand higher prices, free at 0.0101 1011-- nnkanejjs ynetaiiiunnt .ainomn197ng oi ”briefs. c J”u eavm1s? fins sirimcirrfuv - Hal-[1:351 '-:'. ':.'."Iih..i :.-= I--' I . 351-41- -- .1." H: T.‘ -'|'-."- 39': “'1 -' -'.e.." markets and the withdrawal of government from agriculture? Or are most small farmers so poor that they care little about either private markets or state—run marketing boards? Or are differences in wealth between strata of farmers so substantial that some demand one set of policies while others request something totally different? 1.2. Anti—rural Bias The prevailing view that small farmers are incapable of counteracting the harmful agricultural policies of African governments has been articulated since the precipitous decline of agriculture in Africa during the 1970s, especially when compared to the slower decline of most urban centers. One explanation for agricultural decline and rural poverty in developing countries is the "urban bias" thesis of Michael Lipton (1976). According to Lipton, the flow of resources from agriculture to industry and from rural to urban areas in a range of developing countries can be attributed to the greater political power of urban classes and to efforts to achieve industrialization. Given the large range of countries which suffer from urban bias, more specific explanations have not been provided for its existence. Going beyond urban bias explanations, the "Berg Report" for the World Bank (World Bank, 1981) and a USDA/USAID study (1980) present extensive statistical evidence, demonstrating that monetary, fiscal and pricing policies as well as public It... 130- III 319313. alsvt1q 13fl1ts E In n=nu3a “594196 n:151~ a: ~y-iw~st‘.b 13:91:99 : LL' ”'1“: "'- --'- marketing institutions have been draining resources from Africa's rural areas and presenting severe disincentives to farmers. The Berg Report challenges notions that agricultural decline is caused by external factors by statistically demonstrating that international terms of trade for agricultural commodities did not worsen between 1960 and 1980 (World Bank, 1981). Given the weight of evidence, the Berg Report argues convincingly that African government policies and institutions systematically perpetuate the privileges of governing elites and are primarily to blame for the decline of agriculture. Consequently, the Report recommends that governments diminish their involvement in agriculture and that market forces and private trading concerns be relied upon to arrest the decline of agricultural production and commerce. The Berg Report has served as the intellectual cornerstone for reform policies which the World Bank has recommended to African governments, and its arguments have been supported in several studies (Ghai and Radwan, 1983; De Wilde, 1984). External pressures applied on African governments, coupled with a worsening economic climate and the need for continued financial assistance, have compelled many government leaders to reform macro—economic policies, devalue their currencies, lower trade barriers, phase out food subsidies and cut budgets. Marketing boards and other parastatals have been privatized or rationalized, and agricultural producer prices permitted to rise. Reforms have produced mixed results. On the one hand, they have helped to arrest the process of decline in several countries and resuscitate agriculture in Ghana (Ewusu, 1987). On the other, they have not proven successful at fulfilling promises for sustained agricultural growth. 1.3. A Rational Choice Model of Farmer~State Relations Drawing from several cases of agricultural decline, Robert Bates (1981) elaborates a political model, based on rational choice theory, to explain why African governments adopt policies harmful to farmers. In seeking to maximize the wealth and power of their states, governing elites rationally initiate policies to fuel industrialization through the practice of "levying" resources from agriculture and farmers.3 In building power bases to support these policies, the governing elites forge ruling coalitions dominated by urban interests. Part of the coalition—building process is to maintain low food prices for urban populations through subsidies and control of agricultural markets. In essence, government policies and state-controlled marketing boards are 3Historically, in most countries which have industrialized, resources have been extracted from agriculture for capital formation and food prices have been kept low for burgeoning urban populations (Moore, 1966). The strategy of using agriculture to fuel industry was promoted by the World Bank and other development agencies during the 19505 and 19605. Bates (1981, 119) assumes that it is rational for governing elites in Africa to employ such a long—standing, time—honored practice. used to "manipulate" African farmers who are already committed to agricultural marketing and who are unable to escape the levy of resources (1981, 6). According to Bates, African governments link support for industrialization and urban coalitions with systematic policies and actions against African farmers: We have seen how governments repress those who would champion the collective interests of agricultural producers; how they give "side payments" to influential members of the rural sector, inducing them to defect from the rural coalition and to ally with those who favor low prices for farm products; and how intervention in markets creates political resources which governments then use to build organizations (Bates, 1981, 119—120). In Bates' model, African farmers are rational, market— oriented and politically conscious. They possess the potential to participate in ruling coalitions; similarly, they were capable of taking part in pre-independence nationalist coalitions. However, farmers have been demobilized by governments and ruling parties which have co—opted rural leaders, suppressed opposition movements and restricted farmer access to organizations. The demobilization of the rural areas has marginalized small farmers, leaving them disorganized and incapacitated. Rural demobilization explains why African farmers can be controlled and manipulated by states, unable to escape engagement in unprofitable markets and the concomitant levy of resources. Two prospective solutions are presented by Bates which might end the bias of states against farmers. The first is for rural elites to engage in their own process of coalition formation. The second solution is for African governments to be persuaded by donors that economic benefits will accrue if marketing incentives are offered to agricultural producers. In regard to the first solution, Bates conceives of two types of coalitions, one domestically—oriented and the other export— driven, which rural elites might build in order to gain influence over African governments. Food producers might coalesce with industrialists who produce for the domestic market at the expense of exporters of raw materials (Bates, 1981, 130). The coalition would be bound together by the aim of building a self~reliant economy and by the need for protection from imports. The settler states (South Africa and Rhodesia) are cited as examples where governing coalitions of industrialists and agriculturalists have been forged and have benefitted rural producers. Secondly, export—oriented coalitions could be formed in which agricultural and industrial interests press for lower exchange rates and lower labor costs at the expense of the working class. Bates claims that this type of coalition is operating successfully in Cote d'Ivoire (Bates, 1981, 131). For Bates, coalition—building is to be undertaken by agricultural elites, such as Ivorian and Ghanaian large~scale in acid 9d: bun anot- ur nnnana =3 aeJrie ISIUI 1a! ' ‘: --.'.' . E1: VENTC-l cocoa growers, Zimbabwean and South African large—scale commercial farmers, and by government leaders who are attracted to commercial farming. Small farmers are restricted to the role of passive onlookers in the process of coalition— building. However, Bates (1983) asserts that small farmers should benefit indirectly from policy changes initiated by rural—based governing coalitions and that they will respond rationally to higher agricultural prices, free markets and other incentives by increasing production for market. Bates observes that the conditions for governing coalitions involving rural elites are present in only a few countries. The growth of a large—scale commercial farming class with close links to government is limited to a handful of cases. The alternative to coalition—building lies in governing elites rationally calculating the costs of pursuing anti- agricultural policies. Elites might respond to agricultural and economic decline by changing agricultural policies and by lessening discrimination against farmers: Alternatively, in response to the erosion of advantages engendered by shortfalls in production, the dominant interests may be persuaded to forsake the pursuit of unilateral short—run advantage, and instead to employ strategies that evoke cooperation by sharing joint gains. In the face of mounting evidence of the failure of present policies, people may come to believe that short—run price increases for farmers may in the longer run lead U3 more abundant supplies and less costly food; or that decreases in tax rates may lead to greater revenues as a result of increased production; or that positive incentives for greater production and lower prices and leave only the most efficient farms in production, thereby accelerating a shift of resources from agriculture to industry. The growth of an awareness that present measures offer few incentives for farmers to play a positive role in the great transformation may thus provide a foundation for attempts to reform the agricultural policies of the nations of Africa. (Bates, 1981, 132) Bates' model of farmer—state relations leads to the conclusion that the appropriate combination of internal and external pressures can emancipate Africa's farmers from anti— rural bias, bringing about price reforms and development of agricultural markets and institutions. In some countries, the impetus can come from the commercialization of agriculture and rural elites who join governing coalitions. In most countries, reforms must result from an alliance between enlightened governing elites and the World Bank, IMF and donors. Consequently, the actions of elites will create the price incentives and the institutions which will free small farmers to act in the marketplace. Bates' model and solutions raise a number of research issues. The first set of issues concerns markets and institutions; that is, whether price liberalization and privatization of institutions or the reform of existing institutions and markets best serve the interests of small farmers. The rationality assumption of Bates' model raises the issue of the motives and behavior of governing elites and the extent to which they are rational. However, the primary focus of the dissertation is not on governing elites, but on 10 small farmers as actors. Key issues include the behavior of small farmers in helping to maintain favorable government agricultural policies and the preferences of farmers; for instance, when faced with a choice between an increased supply of government services and improved prices. In conclusion, if the prevailing assumptions about small farmers and their relations with African states can be falsified, the door will be opened for modification of the rational choice model and for posing an alternative model of small farmer political voice. 1.4. Countering Anti—rural Bias: "Getting the Prices Right" Government pricing policies have been identified by Berg and others (De Wilde, 1980, 1984; Hart, 1982; Ghai and Radwan, 1983) as the principal cause of Africa's agricultural malaise. De Wilde (1980, 49; 1984, 118)) points to the pricing and marketing of food as the single most invidious policy adhered to by African governments. Ghai and Smith (1987) and Harvey (1988) demonstrate that poor pricing policies create disincentives for agricultural producers. They predict that the most likely outcome of "getting the prices right" will be increased production and improved conditions for Africa's farmers. Consequently, sweeping price liberalization and cuts in subsidies have been recommended as a step toward reviving African agriculture and making it competitive on world markets (Berg, 1985). ll Reservations have been expressed concerning the promotion of price liberalization as the sole solution to Africa's agricultural crisis. Ghai and Smith (1987, 167) agree with Berg that major price adjustments are necessary but also point out that improvement in infrastructure by governments and the intensification of production methods are also required. Studies of food security (Eicher and Rukuni, 1987; Rukuni and Bernsten, 1988; Mudimu and Bernsten, 1989; Rukuni, Mudimu and Jayne, 1990) have found that higher food prices provide incentives for richer farmers but may threaten the food security of a larger proportion of farmers who are unable to produce enough food for subsistence. The problems of poorer farmers and the limited effectiveness of price liberalization have been acknowledged in a major multi—country study by the World Bank (1989). In discussing pricing policy and small farmers in Africa, Harvey (1988, 240—241) cites Zimbabwe as an example of agricultural policies which favor small farmers and over which they have influence. Subsequently, he recommends that small farmers in Africa play an expanded role in pricing decisions and other policy matters, and he calls for an expanded flow of services toward the small-scale agricultural sector. The influence of Zimbabwe's small farmers over government pricing policy raises several research issues which are addressed in this dissertation. How have farmers been able to acquire and 12 exercise influence? Why did the government permit farmers to influence policy? If prices are largely satisfactory for farmers, do they cease influencing policy or do they make other demands? 1.4.1. Countering Bias: Institutional Development Government—controlled institutions and state—directed development strategies have been identified as the principal culprits in the mismanagement of African agriculture. Comparisons of successful free market capitalist countries, such as Kenya, and failed socialist states, such as Tanzania (Barkan, 1984; Lofchie, 1989), have provided evidence that excessive government intervention in agriculture causes decline, as well as the capture and exploitation of farmers (Hyden, 1980; McCall and Skutsch, 1983; Lele, 1984). In contrast, countries with less government intervention have maintained price incentives and permitted the growth of autonomous marketing and input supply structures which have helped agriculture to flourish. As the principal instruments for state bias against agriculture, marketing boards have been the main targets for proponents of privatization. Arhin, Hesp and van der Laan (1985, 26-28) find that state-controlled marketing boards extract a greater surplus from farmers than do private traders and parallel markets. Accordingly, Berg (1985) advocates a quick transition to private trade and free markets, confident that the institutional vacuum caused by the dismantling of government institutions will be filled. Hart (1982) recommends that agriculture be transformed through large-scale commercialization and improvements in labor productivity. In anticipating a wave of privatization, the problems and processess involved in instituting and developing private marketing enterprises in rural Africa have been identified and discussed (Abbott, 1987; E12, 1987). In many countries, small farmers have established their own markets, and these "parallel markets" have been identified as signals against poor pricing policies (Harvey, 1988, 249). Privatization has sparked debates about the future of government agricultural institutions and about the pace of reform (Glantz, 1987; Commins, 1988; Commander, 1989). Opponents of privatization have voiced fears that privatization, economic liberalization, and the commercialization of agriculture will further expose Africa to the vagaries of the world market and will harm millions of poor farmers (Barker, 1984; Luke and Shaw, 1984; Campbell and Loxley, 1987). The response of Africa's leaders to privatization and economic liberalization in agriculture has been to resist dismantling marketing boards and other parastatals, to reaffirm the importance of government institutions, and to cite the heavy investments which have - aloha-1 um um- od 9$u11u9i1an 35d: shag-.0901 n1 .Vikvtjoubb1q 1065! at E’Hfim43$1flfli LJh un"hVTFBLfi19nfioa has arm-1 [dc-'tq ‘ll‘.’ . :-:i r- . -- -' i -.i .. '-. i-- 'm. . _-.[., 59” h”! "I | | 14 been made in building state capacity to lead the development process (OAU, 1981; Economic Commission for Africa, 1983). The diversity of African economies and agricultural systems makes it difficult to prescribe privatization and price liberalization as universal solutions (Crook, 1988). In Kenya, Zimbabwe and COte d'Ivoire, marketing boards have been 4 While marketing boards in a part of agricultural success. cote d'Ivoire have been used to extract revenues from small farmers, the government also supports small farmers with infrastructure and assistance (Hecht, 1983). Using both case studies and macroeconomic data, Hinderkink and Sterkenburg (1987) find that the commercialization of agriculture by both the state and private concerns has failed to account for the diverse range of small farmer needs. Instead, farmers require a mix of policies and assistance from appropriate institutions. While economic reforms have helped to stabilize agricultural producticnl in a number of countries and has gained qualified support, questions of how to develop African agriculture and small farmers remain. The proposition that 4Blackie (1987, 196-202) contends that private markets would be more efficient than Zimbabwe's Grain Marketing Board. However, the World Bank (1991, 88—90) defends the GMB by pointing to large increases in participation by small farmers. The GMB provided infrastructure which enabled small farmers to enter the maize marketing system. The number of producers registered with the GMB rose from 28,160 in 1979 to 490,000 in 1989 (World Bank, 1991, 89). 15 development flows solely from privatization and price incentives has been widely dismissed as too facile (Commander, 1989), while the role of "non—price" factors and institutional development have been emphasized (Commins, 1983; Bingen, 1985; Ghai and Smith, 1987; Harvey, 1988). Robert Bates (1989) has emphasized that the "miracle of the market" must be accompanied by various forms of institutional development, both governmental and non—governmental. After a decade of reform, fewer scholars advocate a complete state withdrawal from agriculture, especially since the development of the private sector in agriculture has been a slow process. In many countries, the state possesses the greatest amount of potential to develop agricultural institutions and infrastructure, including extension, credit schemes and marketing outlets for small farmers. The privatization debate raises research issues about the relationship between small farmers and institutions. How do farmers perceive the performance of institutions and how do they act in relation to them? Can small farmers influence institutions and help produce favorable agricultural policies and programs? 1.4.2. Countering Bias: Policv Reform In a few African countries, governments have permitted small farmers to express political voice, to influence policy, and even to participate in ruling coalitions. However, in 16 most countries, governing elites have demobilized farmers in order to extract resources from them. In these countries, it is necessary for governing elites to reform anti—rural policies and cease demobilization if small farmers are to have the opportunity to express political voice and reverse rural decline. In the literature, views vary on the character of governing elites and their ability to enact policy reform without external compulsion. Bates notes that anti—rural bias has compounded the fiscal crisis facing most African countries and has "restructured power relations within African governments and has brought new players into the policymaking process" (Bates, 1988, 358). Consequently, urban—based coalitions are being replaced by finance ministers and directors of central banks who find allies among foreign donors and international creditors. These new coalitions are more receptive to the inclusirnl of rural elites, to the adoption of policies favoring agriculture, and to the cessation of demobilization. If new governing coalitions can be formed which include rural elites and small farmers, long— term adherence to reform can be ensured. Nelson (1989, 1990) observes that the adoption of reforms has threatened the very foundation of African states and that the building and maintenance of "fragile coalitions" in support of reform is a strenuous and long-term proposition. The reluctance of many governing elites to accept reform and 17 the difficulty of sustaining coalitions which are implementing reforms buttress the view that African elites often place political rationality before economic rationality (Leonard, 1977; 1982; Bienefeld, 1986, 6). While accepting the importance of political rationality, Bates (1988, 358) and Lofchie (1989, 55) counter that political and economic rationality merge when elites are confronted with fiscal crisis and other economic circumstances which threaten their hold on power. However, Callaghy (1990) asserts that, in confronting crises, it is politically rational for leaders to avoid reform and the social unrest which often accompanies it for as long as possible. The issue of how governing elites behave continues to be a source of debate and research. The dismantling of anti—rural coalitions and the reform of anti-rural policies raise a research issue; that is, the ability of small farmers to take advantage of such opportunities to express political voice, influence governments and participate in ruling coalitions. This issue can be approached by examining a case where anti—rural bias has already been eliminated or has been prevented from developing. Such an approach can also lead to an assessment of prospects for the emergence of a rural—based coalition. The ways in which farmers have organized, acquired political voice and interacted with governing elites may provide lessons for farmer organizations which are attempting to develop 18 similar capabilties and relationships in other countries. Finally, if a rural—based coalition is found to exist, the issue is to determine the extent to which governing elites are responding to the political voice of farmers as against the economic rationality of maintaining a strong agricultural economy. 1.5. Governing Elites: Rational or Patrimonial? The proposition that Africa's governing elites maintain anti—rural policies and demobilize farmers as a "rational choice" in favor of industrialization and urban—based coalitions has been challenged by those who contend that African states are primarily dominated by patrimonial elites (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Kasfir, 1984; Migdal, 1989). This alternative view holds that patrimonial elites are too self— centered and too weak to build class—based coalitions, to rationally transfer agricultural resources to the industrialization process, or to reform the state and agricultural policies. Instead, these elites use government control over resources to develop patron-client relations which ensure their hold on power. Sandbrook (1985, 94) provides an example of how patrimonial elites use the state to allocate resources: "Agricultural development corporations, for instance, may draw their resources from levies on peasant production, yet allocate their loans to the rich and powerful." Clearly, agricultural resources are not rationally 19 channelled toward industrialization or urbanization. Instead, resources are being drained from the rural areas for the sake of patrons and their clientelist networks. At the same time, industrial and urban resources as well as foreign assistance are also misused by patrimonial elites. The patrimonial model holds that governing elites use the state as a rent—seeking device and as a means of building enough patron—client relationships to sustain their rule. For Hyden (1983), patrimonial states are suspended above society and serve a relative few. The weak state is divorced from African societies and strongly-rooted "economies of affection.” African governments attempt to make the rest of the population, especially small farmers, pay for the patronage of governing elites. However, the reach of the state is limited, and Hyden (1980) asserts that farmers can "exit" or withdraw from the cash economy in order to avoid exploitation. In regard to reforms to counter anti-rural bias, the patrimonial model contends that governing elites do not act according to principles of economic rationality' and are, therefore, impervious to internal reform. Instead, elites maintain their patronage networks through whatever means necessary, including force. Collective action by farmers and the building of coalitions of interests are often viewed as a threat to the state and are discouraged. If governing elites 20 are not capable of economic rationality and if it is impossible for rural elites and small farmers to become part of ruling coalitions, the only recourse for supporters of agricultural reform is the application of sustained external pressure. However, weak states which undergo externally— induced reform are bound to slide back into patrimonialism and repression and into policies which are harmful to farmers. The solution to overcoming the patrimonial state is seen by Hyden (1983) as a long-term process of bourgeois development; a mature bourgeoisie can impose the rule of law and property rights upon the state and maintain boundaries between state and society.5 The behavior of governing elites and their relations with small farmers vary from country—to—country and, consequently, remain an issue for research. If it is found that small farmers can gain acceptance to ruling coalitions by demonstrating their value to the national economy and by the strength of their political voice, it can be concluded that governing elites are rational. However, if farmers demonstrate their loyalty to powerful patrons and primarily The problem of bourgeois development for small farmers is that the bourgeoisie have historically squeezed small—scale agriculture in order to finance industrialization (Moore, 1966). 21 use informal channels in order to fulfill their demands, governing elites are more likely to be patrimonial.6 1.6. Bevond the Capture of Small Farmers: Exit, Voice and Loyalty Thus far, the literature review has focused on anti—rural bias and the demobilization or capture of small farmers by governing elites. The focus now shifts away from capture and toward the options that African small farmers may exercise as social and political actors. What options might they be able to pursue in relations with states, firms and markets? Hirschman (1970) suggests that, in determining those types of relationships, individuals or groups may choose among the options of "exit, voice and loyalty." Loyalty is defined as an option of acquiescence which is maintained in the hope that firms, organizations and states will demonstrate appreciation by seeking to improve their performance or upgrade their products. Exit is defined as the termination of loyalty to either an entity or a product in dissatisfaction with poor performance and in order to compel improvement. In defining voice, Hirschman argues that it can be an effective means of bringing about change which has been overlooked by economists and rational choice theorists: 6The rational choice and patrimonial hypotheses apply in cases where anti—rural bias is not prevalent. 7'7 fl, 22 Voice is a far more "messy" concept because it can be graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest; it implies articulation of one's critical opinions rather than a private, "secret" vote in the anonymity of a supermarket; and finally, it is direct and straightforward rather than roundabout. Voice is political action par excellence (p. 16). Hirschman focuses on voice and its relationship with the exit and loyalty options and does not dwell on two key issues: the power and freedom to express voice and variation in the receptiveness of states, firms and organizations to voice. In choosing voice as an option, individuals or groups must possess the power and freedom to project their views or express demands; otherwise, their voice will be feeble. They must approach firms, organizations or states with the knowledge that their voice has a chance of making an impact of some kind; otherwise, their voice will be futile. Voice was brought into common usage by Hirschman in the wake of the growth of public interest groups, protest movements and "grass roots" civic organizations in the 1960s (Hirschman, 1982, 78—79). These organizations helped dissatisfied citizens protest to their government, consumers complain to producers or boycott their products, and subordinates challenge superiors in a range of organizations. In the process of expressing voice, individuals and groups have become more engaged with organizations in reciprocal relationships. These experiences have facilitated the 23 acceptance of voice as a more democratic, political and dynamic option than loyalty or exit. For Hirschman, exit, voice, and loyalty are not mutually exclusive and often interact. In the relationship between exit and voice, "The decision to exit will often be taken in the light of the prospects for the effective use of voice" (Hirschman, 1970, 37). If the prospects for the use of voice are good, individuals or groups will not exit. However, if the prosepcts are not good, boycotts or strikes may be used. As for voice and loyalty, voice is more effective from those who have demonstrated their loyalty, and loyalty gives more scope to voice. A member or supporter with a considerable attachment to an organization will often search for ways to make himself influential (p. 77). Individuals or groups often alternate between loyalty and voice. The decision to use the voice option involves a rational calculation of the expected utility of success which includes the capabilities of the individuals or groups concerned, their salience toward the issue at hand and the policy stance of the organization to whom voice is to be projected: The effort an interested party makes to put its case before the decisionmaker will be in proportion to the advantage to be gained from a favorable outcome multiplied by the probability of influencing the decision (Banfield, 1961, 333). While the probability of influencing an organization is important in the decision to use voice, it is not a necessary 24 condition for such a decision. The probability of success may be quite low, but the individuals or groups may feel strongly enough about the issue to engage in protest and combine voice with exit (resulting in a boycott or strike). Consequently, voice must be understood as 23 broader concept than mere influence. In attempting to broaden the concept of voice, Guillermo O'Donnell (1986: 251-252) has drawn a distinction between horizontal and vertical voice. Influence and. protest by citizens to higher authorities is defined as vertical voice. Horizontal voice is communicative, involving the exchange of information and ideas among peers, and can be important in building solidarity. Therefore, voice is communicative as well as purposive, generating interactions among citizens and associations and engagement with organizations and institutions.7 Hirschman's conceptualization of voice (in conjunction with exit and loyalty) is epistemologically broader than the structural functionalist formula of interest articulation (Almond and Coleman, 1960): (Habermas (1984) distinguishes between purposive and communicative rationality. While purposive rationality is widely used by economists and rational choice theorists to explain behavior, Habermas insists that communicative rationality is also significant. The exercise of "horizontal voice": (O'Donnell, 1986) is evidence of communicative rationality. 25 Voice is nothing but a basic portion and function of any political system, known sometimes also as "interest articulation." Political scientists have long dealt systematically with this function and its various manifestations. But in doing so they have ordinarily confined their attention to situations in which the only alternative to articulation is acquiescence or indifference (rather than exit), while economists have refused to consider that the discontented customer might be anything but either dumbly faithful or outright traitorous (to the firm he used to do business with). A niche thus exists for this book, which affirms that the choice is often between articulation and "desertion" — voice and exit in our neutral terminology. (p. 31). In Hirschman's conceptual framework, individuals or groups do not exercise voice (or articulate interests) as integral cogs within a closed political system, as conceived by structural functionalism. Instead, they are free agents who are capable of leaving the system or protesting against it if they are dissatisfied. Furthermore, voice is not an input function which always produces an outcome (Hirschman, 1982, 85).8 Hirschman has equated voice with political action, and, in the dissertation, that equation is emphasized through the use of the term "political voice." The term "political" is broadly defined as pertaining to the competition over the allocation and distribution of resources. Individuals or 8In emphasizing the political process of expressing voice and the collective activism of citizens, Hirschman's epistemology is closer to Freire's notion of agency (1970) and Habermas' concept of communicative rationality (1984) than to the confining systemic approach of structural functionalism. 26 groups make demands for a limited pool of resources, resulting in competition and conflict among organizations that represent farmers and rival interests. In this dissertation, political voice by small farmers is examined in the form of demands and protests projected toward the state and related institutions, but also in the form of communication among farmers in organizations. In formulating hypotheses about when small farmers are most likely to use exit, voice or loyalty, the option which they are likely* to choose is primarily determined fur the amount of power which farmers possess, but also by the content of policies which states adopt toward farmers — divided into anti~rural (or extractive) and not anti—rural (or non— extractive). Power is defined in terms of farmer organization; if small farmers are well~organized, they are more likely to act effectively than when they are not. Table 1 Options of Small—Scale African Farmers Low High Anti-rural None Exit (Captured) State Policies Not Anti—rural Loyalty Voice Where farmers are disorganized and demobilized by an anti—rural state, they are likely to be "captured" — without any options. When they enter into patron—client relations 'I ' '- 1!": an a... damn-n ' all)! all .8330191nl [wt-x but runs! H. m to no! em “I beams-w s: .21 _'-'u' : 1"...na vd aatov .Bflui'lfliijafli' bolt-I .t': "-:"- -H' -'-- i ' . "-"-J"Jn'1q Hi event-151 mum- '--’-~ 1nd 27 with state elites which are mutually beneficial, they choose to remain loyal. Where local farmer organization is strong and where the state is anti-rural (or extractive), exit is the option most likely to be chosen. Finally, where farmers are organized and where the state is not extractive, voice is most likely to be exercised. 1.6.1. Capture and Loyalty in Rural Africa As stated previously, small farmers are captured when they are disorganized and demobilized and when states are used to extract resources from the rural areas. In the rational choice model (Bates, 1981), farmers become committed to markets and to the cash econmoy and, consequently, lack the ability to withdraw decisively when markets are manipulated by states. Demobilization and repression prevents farmers from engaging in opposition coalitions or organizing to boycott unfair markets. With the capture of farmers, governing elites continue the transfer of resources from agriculture to allies and clients or to the industrialization process. The process of ending the capture of small farmers involves a combination of factors, including gradual withdrawal from markets, fiscal crisis and external pressure on states (Bates, 1988, 357—358). Loyalty was the option that many small farmers chose in the wake of the creation of independent African states. African leaders and their advisers assured farmers that loyalty would be rewarded by the diffusion of advanced 28 agricultural techniques and in the "trickle down" of benefits from industrial development (Morgan, 1983). Some farmers established vertical relationships with patrons in the state and continued to opt for loyalty. However, many farmers entered into markets without patrons and found that their loyalty was not rewarded. Instead, their commitment to markets, lack of organization and demobilization prevented them from opting to "exit" and led to capture. When anti— rural policies and the capture of small farmers are ended, farmers who had committed themselves to the market remain relatively powerless. Consequently, their only option is loyalty —to private traders or to rural elites which join governing coalitions. 1.6.2. The Exit Option Goran Hyden (1983, 71) uses Hirschman's concept of exit in analyzing an option which small farmers pursue when confronted by anti—rural bias and extractive states. In Hyden's model, farmers are able to exit from state—controlled markets or government programs, because they are an "uncaptured peasantry" and are powerful enough to revert to subsistence production when state policies and performance become unacceptable. Farmers remain rooted in the "peasant mode of production" and the "economy of affection" so that they maintain local forms of organization and are not inextricably committed to the market. Consequently, a return 29 to subsistence production is always possible.9 Just as consumers have the power to influence a manufacturer by refusing purchase of a deteriorating product (Hirschman, 1970), small farmers possess the power to exit from state— controlled markets: In a situation where the bulk of the rural producers possess their own land, use very simple technologies, and are only marginally incorporated into a market economy, their dependence on the macro- economic system ... is very limited. Participation by the state is not necessary for the tasks of production and reproduction at the level of the peasant household. Thus, it is possible for peasants in Africa to "exit" out of the system (Hyden, p. 71). Thus, uncaptured peasant farmers are not powerless. They remain well—organized at the local level and are capable of influencing the state, albeit in a negative manner. They are unable to act positively because of anti—rural governing coalitions which prevent small farmers from organizing at the national level and from forming rural-based coalitions. Exit occurs in rural Africa for two sets of reasons. First, small farmers exit from state programs and projects which aim to capture them and extract resources. When the Tanzanian government attempted to gain greater control over rural dwellers through a forced villagization campaign, farmers found ways to exit and return to their original 9Hyden's view is challenged by Bates and others who believe that the vast majority of African farmers are market- oriented commodity producers who respond positively to free markets (Bates, 1981; Lofchie, 1989). .Mlfl IIDIHIII"I m s in eudmnq patent-.1 I‘.!:.._, “ ' “a! ”19'4qu 911.! shaman.- :n-uns'r [lane .(OYQI .. 1-H:um fir.£<:3fluv 3O settlements (Hyden, 1980, 146). Participants in projects, such as integrated rural development schemes, have exited when the promised benefits were not delivered (Hyden, 1983, 92). Secondly, small farmers exit from the market economy when the state is used, often through marketing boards, to keep producer prices unacceptably low. The cases of cocoa farmers in Ghana (Mikell, 1988) and coffee farmers in Uganda (Bunker, 1987) are two primary examples of exit. Because these farmers produce highly—valued export crops, they have organized in cooperatives (Young, 1981) and have engaged in bargaining with state—controlled marketing boards. When bargaining has intensified, these farmers have been able to exit by boycotting official markets and by engaging in parallel marketing, through sales to private traders and by smuggling crops across national boundaries (Harvey, 1988, 249). Farmers are able to wield considerable influence as long as the form of exit they use does not bring total disengagement from the market and the state (Barker, 1989, 162—170; Chazan, 126-127). However, when bargaining with the state becomes futile, farmers may engage in more extreme forms of exit; for instance, by neglecting or damaging coffee and cocoa trees, and by retreating to subsistence (Bunker, 1987). In Zaire, farmers have completely exited from selling coffee to official markets, but instead, sell exclusively to unlicensed traders 31 with whom they establish patron-client relations (MacGaffey. 1990, 31—32). Farmers who can choose to exit are, by definition, better—organized than those who are captured. Consequently, governing elites seeking to capture farmers have undermined the organizations of cocoa, coffee and other cash crop farmers. Food crop producers may more easily return to subsistence, but they do not have the foreign exchange—earning potential of cash crop farmers. Hyden (1980, 1983) concludes that the failure of African states and the concomitant exit by small farmers means that more emphasis should be placed on action outside of the state by farmer groups and by non—governmental organizations (NGOs). He believes that NGOs can facilitate positive linkages between small farmers and the state (Hyden, 1983, 128-132), thereby reducing the necessity of exit and increasing chances for political voice. In building multiple linkages, the relationship between farmers and the state can eventually becoem positive. After years of research on Africa's development experience, Rene Dumont (1983) does not believe in the possibility of "reformed states" which could be of assistance to farmers. Instead, he believes that farmers should exit permanently from state control and that they should pursue development activities with organizations which have arisen 32 out of traditional commmunity structures and which remain divorced from the state and the market (Dumont, 1983, 247~50). The role of NGOs is to be supportive of community—centered development and to help protect farmers against inroads by the state. Dumont's model of self—reliant development has been implemented in NGO—backed self—help schemes where the futility of working with the state has been made apparent. 1.7. Political Voice in Rural Africa If Hirschman's concept of voice—as—an—option is to be exercised by small farmers in rural Africa, two conditions must. be present. Farmers must be organized at both the national and local levels so that they have the power to project their demands, protests and ideas. Without the power for projection, voice remains inaudible and irrelevant. Secondly, state policies must not work to demobilize farmers nor to extract an inequitable amount of resources. When farmers have the organizational power to express political voice, they also are able to choose to exit on occasions when policies deteriorate. If farmers are organized and the state is not biased, farmers will be able to express political voice and begin to influence governing elites to adopt policies that are favorable toward the rural areas. If farmers are able to demonstrate that they can significantly contribute to the national economy, their political voice will grow further. Eventually, a relationship can be established between farmers 33 and the state which features "productive reciprocities" (Hyden, 1988, 15). According to Hirschman's conceptualization, political voice projected toward states, firms or organizations is usually manifested as protest against declining performance and does not necessarily produce rectification or reciprocation. Hirschman has not explicitly considered what would happen if states and the like responded positively to voice, reversed their decline and improved their performance. Logically, a state which undergoes reform in response to the political voice of farmers could adopt policies favorable to farmers, and, eventually, farmers could develop a reciprocal relationship with the state and even become part of a ruling coalition. If the state's attentiveness to political voice increased, farmer complaints and protests would diminish and be replaced by demands for services and influence over policy. In countries with democratic elections, farmer citizens exercise political voice by making demands of their public officials and voting them out of office if their performance is unsatisfactory. A case of political voice in rural Africa is that of small farmers and the self—help movement in Kenya. Barkan and Holmquist (1989) describe how small farmers, organized in self-help projects, have been able to express political voice 34 and how office-holders have responded by using their positions to secure and distribute resources to rural constituents: Self—help projects have become the essence of grass-roots politics in Kenya — the principal activity by means of which political leaders seek to obtain power and to advance their political careers. Members and would-be members of local district councils establish reputations for community service by raising funds for self—help projects in the private sector and by lobbying appropriate state agencies to assist projects located in their areas. Members of Parliament and aspiring members likewise seek to "deliver the goods" on self-help; by so doing, they draw local self-help organizations and grass—roots political leaders into their personal political machines, and, in turn, attach their machines to the country- wide clientelist structures that dominate Kenyan politics and control patronage at the center of the Kenyan system (Barkan and Holmquist, 1989, 360). Although the Kenyan state features a patrimonial governing elite, a number of factors have made it possible for small farmers to go beyond loyalty to express political voice and to enter into reciprocal patron~client networks. First, through the self—help movement, small farmers have been able to successfully organize, work cooperatively and develop horizontal voice. The political space which the state allowed the self—help movement in the 1960s and 1970s helped determine its success (Holmquist, 1984). A second factor are elections which have provided farmers with the option of expressing voting out incumbent political officials if they do not respond to farmer demands. Finally, favorable agricultural policies, adequate institutions and resources, and the presence of favorable markets and infrastructure enabled small studIIJakb but e1aoto1q qud 11¢? - syn-mi m fl"'KJi:'I.x'; Hum «.95! I inf-n; .‘.!‘.‘.‘.'a in "qua-v.1 '1'!:1-.'--:-‘. iii-I"? -'s"-"‘.'-."-z- -f 3.1»: _‘.e - . .- -. [5311] ".-' 'Zh-JI- -=- -'- ' ' .':.-.. -' I'.“ 'r c. 35 farmers to develop the self—help movement and to secure a place in the national economy (Collier and Lal, 1984). The capabilities of Kenyan farmers have produced respect and appreciation within the governing elite and have enabled farmers to influence government policies toward the rural areas. Barkan and Holmquist (1989) conclude that the greater the democracy, the greater the chances for political voice by small farmers.10 Democracy provides freedom of action in which farmers can express voice, benefit from loyalty, and exit if necessary. Farmers are free to organize associations and work with other organizations in attempting to influence the state and agricultural and development policy. Thus, democracy and political voice are mutually beneficial, and they both contribute to the development of governance in Africa in which the state and farmers develop a reciprocal relationship and become effective in fulfilling their demands. 1.8. Political Voice in Rural Africa and State—Society Relations This study of small farmer political voice in rural Africa is associated with a growing body of research on the development of societal forces and their impact on governance by states. With the failure of African states to deliver 10Personalistic rule, vertical cleavages and other obstacles have prevented Kenyan farmers from acting more effectively, especially in the past decade (Barkan, 1989). 36 development in the 19705 and with the precipitous economic decline of the 19805, a number of scholars turned their focus away from the state as a purveyor of development and looked instead to a growing array of non—governmental activities and organizations11 which have promoted development, accountability and democracy (Hyden, 1983; Barkan, 1986; Bratton, 1989b). These organizations and activities, including those in which small farmers have been engaged, have emanated frOm outside of the African state and have been identified as signs of societal growth and strengthening (Rothchild and Chazan, 1988; Bratton, 1989a). As arenas for non—governmental organizations and activities, strengthened societies can provide the political space for small farmers to resist demobilization and creates conditions for the expression of political voice. When small farmers achieve the ability to express political voice and begin to influence governing elites on a sustained basis, the result is the establishment of a reciprocal relationship which can be mutually productive. The political development of small farmers and other societal forces and the realization of a reciprocal and democratic relationship between society and state have become normative goals for researchers who advocate the study of "best case 11In Chapter Two, the concept of "voluntary sector organization" is introduced as a more accurate term than non— governmental organization. 37 scenarios" (Hyden, 1988, 20) in which evidence of societal development, political voice and democratic governance is present. In the wake of volumes of research on Africa's decline and the capture and exploitation of farmers, the focus has shifted towards positive instances in which decline has been prevented or reversed and in which small farmers have been able to pursue different options, including the expression of political voice. In line with the current research agenda, the dissertation aims to contradict the prevailing view of the impotence of small farmers in their relations with the state and the policy process. A "best case scenario" is presented which investigates the possibility that African farmers are capable of expressing political voice and influencing the state to conduct relations based on governance. The case of Zimbabwe has been selected because the country's small farmers have been active, organized and vocal and because they have won a degree of acceptance from the state, secured significant government assistance, and influenced policy. 1.9. Empirical Objectives and Structure of the Dissertation The literature review has raised research issues which are to be purusued in this dissertation and which have determined the research objectives. The dissertation aims to accurately portray the expression of political voice by Zimbabwe's small farmers and the relations they have developed 38 with the state in the decade since independence. Focusing on small farmers as the units of analysis, survey results are used to identify and compare the actions farmers take to secure agricultural assets and services, the organizations used in making demands, and the factors which explain variation in effectiveness. Besides examining "vertical voice“ (the making of demands), attention is also given to "horizontal voice;" that is, communication of ideas and mutual problems among farmers and organizations that serve farmers. The dissertation also focuses on the interactions which occur when farmers use organizations to make demands, especially the patterns of cooperation, competition and conflict which emerge when organizations attempt to represent and serve farmers. Besides providing a representative picture, the dissertation presents "best case scenarios" of political voice by small farmers in which expectations are exceeded in regard to the types of demands made and actions taken. Among the cases are instances in which disadvantaged farmers (who normally are inactive) manage to act together in taking their demands above the local level in order to effect changes in programs or policy. Of particular interest are African women farmers who exhibit the ability to overcome obstacles to the expression of political voice, created by the 39 patriarchal mode of production.12 The dissertation is structured in such a way as to present the different aspects of the expression of political voice — from action to organizations to outcomes. Chapter Two presents the conceptual framework; that is, the operationalization of key concepts associated with political voice and the generation of hypotheses. Chapter Three explains the selection of the case of small—scale communal farmers in Zimbabwe, and Chapter Four describes the research methods which are employed. Chapter Five focuses on the expression of political voice in terms of the demands that farmers make. Chapter Six describes and explains the process of expressing political voice in terms of the organizations that farmers use to get what they want. Chapter Seven analyzes the effectiveness of farmer actions and demands and the impact of political voice. Chapter Eight examines the behavior of organizations in reponse to farmer demands. Chapter Nine presents the conclusion, containing lessons from the research, propositions, and policy recommendations. 12Literature on the patriarchal mode of production is discussed in Chapter Two. Chapter 2. Voice in Rural Africa: The Conceptual Framework 2.1. Introduction In chapter one, political voice was introduced as an option which small-scale African farmers might exercise if they possess sufficient capabilities to project their protests, demands and influence and if states do not seek to demobilize farmers, suppressing their activities and organizations. In the literature review, the viability of political voice in rural Africa was considered and justification for research on the subject was provided. In seeking to describe and explain political voice in rural Africa, the dissertation focuses on a case where small farmers have demonstrated agricultural, political and organizational capabilities and where they have influenced state elites to adopt and maintain favorable policies toward agriculture. When small farmers express political voice and when they are able to influence state elites, voice is manifested primarily in the form of demands for agricultural assets and services rather than in the form of protests, boycotts or strikes. Political voice produces influence over agricultural policy and can create productive reciprocities between farmers and the state and can improve governance. Farmers are engaged in the market, are capable of communicating their demands to the state, and are participants in the policy process. Under these conditions, the best indicators of the level of political voice is the level of demands that farmers make and 41 their effectiveness in fulfilling them, including demands for policy change. Additionally, by determining the demands that farmers make, it is possible to contribute to debates on the role of the state in agriculture by ascertaining if farmers are more concerned with securing advantageous prices or government services or simple assets. The purpose of this chapter is to outline a conceptual framework 50 that small farmers political voice can be described and explained. A model is elaborated using hypotheses which specify how varying levels of small farmer effectiveness might be explained by variables which indicate a range of farmer characteristics (especially rural stratification), the types of demands that they make and the organizations which they use. The model of small farmer effectiveness has been devised so that it can be applied to research in other African countries where small farmers have opportunities to influence state elites and agricultural policies. Much of this chapter is devoted to an explication of the model and hypotheses, as well as the definition of concepts and the operationalization of variables pertaining to the model. Besides explaining variation among small farmers, the dissertation also seeks to characterize the political voice of small farmers as a whole, especially regarding demands for program and policy change. 42 The focus of the dissertation is on the expression of political voice by small farmers in the form of demands for agricultural assets and services. However, attention is also given to other forms of voice, including protests against poor performance and abuses of authority, horizontal voice among farmers, and demands for non—agricultural services and assets, such as education or health care. It is also possible that some farmers may choose to exit, a possibility’ which is accounted for in the dissertation. 2.2. Political Voice and the Demands of Small Farmers When the state is influenced by farmers, "demands" for agricultural assets and services are the primary manifestation of political voice. Demands are defined as the expression of needs which farmers have and as actions in which requests are made to organizations, often associated with the state, in order to obtain assets or services. First, it is necessary to discover the needs which farmers have in order to describe and explain how they express their demands. In acting to get what they want, farmers begin with a set of needs and then either act and make their demands or fail to act. It is possible that a considerable number of farmers do not make demands, even though they have needs. The act of making demands ranges from the simple purchase of an asset or an application for a service to complex efforts to influence government policy. 43 In devising 23 model to explain the effectiveness of farmers, the demands which farmers have can be defined in terms of two variables, content and scope. Content is used to categorize demands into assets and services, whereas scope refers to the breadth of the demand. In rational choice theory (Olson, 1965), a distinction is drawn between private and public goods in explaining why collective action must be taken to obtain public goods which are indivisible and non— excludable. As the scope of the demand broadens, the "collective action problem" grows, and the need increases for "political entrepreneurs" who can organize collective action and can help impose sanctions on "free—riding" behavior (Frolich and Oppenheimer, 1978). The collective action problem results when more individuals become involved in procuring a public good and when some individuals consume the good without making a commensurate contribution to its provision. In operationalizing the content and scope of demand variables, a modified version of the rational choice distinction between goods is adopted. In terms of content, demands are divided into assets and services, and, in terms of scope, demands are divided into demands for available assets or services, for program change (or expansion of the pool of assets or services) and policy change in relation to assets and services. 44 2.2.1. The Content of Demands The "private—public" distinction is not readily applicable where private property rights are not prevalent. In most of rural Africa, land is not privately owned but is common property which community leaders allocate for use by individual families and exclude "outsiders" from use. Consequently, "assets" is a more appropriate term, because it encompasses both common and private property holdings, including grazing land and livestock. Conversely, the term "services" is more appropriate than public goods. Services refer to goods that are provided for the public and which are either non—divisible or divisible. In contrast, public goods are non—divisible and non—excludable and do not include divisible goods, such as credit, extension advice and transport. Because such divisible goods are non—excludable, they cannot be classified as assets. Assets are excludable, held and fixed. Services are non— excludable, delivered and variable. Assets are excludable — grazing land and other common property are supervised so that outsiders can be excluded from use. Services are non— excludable: where extension services are provided, every farmer has access in principle. Assets are held and fixed: they are either purchased (equipment) or allocated (land), and farmers can rely on using basically the same amount in the agricultural process every year. Services are delivered and 45 variable: farmers cannot rely on the same amount of services being made available at the same time every year. Most African farmers are asset—poor, lacking sufficient family labor, draft power and productive land (Hyden, 1983). Poor farmers experience the greatest difficulty in fulfilling their demands, because assets, such as land, are excludable, held and fixed and can only be distributed to a relatively few individual farmers. Also, the process of providing assets requires a greater governmental budgetary allocation. In contrast, services can be distributed to many more farmers, organized in groups, with less state investment per farmer. In Kenya, Barkan and Holmquist (1986) have identified "middle farmers" who hold sufficient assets and "rich farmers" who are wealthy enough to hire labor. It would be expected that the rich and middle strata of farmers would be less concerned with obtaining assets and more interested in procuring services. 2.2.2. The Scope of Demands The scope of a demand is defined as the level of action which is normally required to fulfill a farmer's need. This definition permits a more reliable classification without reference to instances of individual farmer action and includes in the analysis farmers who have needs but take no action to fulfill them. Demands for available services and assets are the narrowest in scope. Assets are available for purchase, and 46 services are available upon request or application. If farmers possess sufficient funds or are credit—worthy, they are able to buy assets, and if they make a request or meet the necessary qualifications for services, their applications will be granted. Demands for program change involve requests that agriculture~related programs be revised so that the supply of services or assets can be expanded. If farmers want an expansion of the pool of services or assets, they must ask representatives to persuade the state and other organizations to either expand an existing program or establish a new program. Demands for policy change entail requests that the state intervene to make agriculture—related policies more acceptable for farmers. Farmers and their representatives seek to influence the state to make changes in the ownership (or holdings) structure of assets through land reform and other policy measures. They seek to change the recipient structure for services so that they can be distributed more broadly and, in the case of producer prices, more advantageously. Achieving policy change requires the greatest amount of political voice. In order to influence an institution to alter both the destination and the form of service delivery, for instance in shifting the flow of credit away from commercial farmers and toward small farmers, small farmers and 47 their representatives need to influence the policyemaking process, as well as monitor and assist in the implementation process. Inducing the state to change policy in relation to the ownership and distribution of assets is the most difficult outcome to achieve and, in the case of land reform, may even require revolutionary action. 2.2.3. The Classification of Demands According to Content and Scope Using content and scope as the two means of categorization, specific demands that African farmers make are classified below.1 While most of the classifications are not problematic, questions arise about how to categorize credit, labor and inputs. Demands for new credit schemes or expanded credit programs have been categorized as demands for program change in the supply of services. Most credit is delivered to African farmers by governments which must expand existing programs or create new schemes in order to reach a larger number of farmers. In contrast, demands which farmers make for loans have been classified as demands for an "available service" which assumes that a credit program is already in 1Another way of operationalizing demands is to divide them into demands for short-term goods which must be periodically (e.g., annually) renewed (e.g., inputs, loans, extension, and transport) and long—term goods (e.g., land, dams, roads, markets and draft power) which are obtained once and are lumpy. Periodicity of demands helps to explain effectiveness of demands, because short—term goods are easier to obtain than are long—term goods. 48 place and that farmers merely need to make an application. In classifying labor, a distinction is made between family labor which is an asset maintained through reproduction. In contrast, hired labor is considered to be a service for which a user fee must be paid. Finally, a distinction is made between demands for agricultural inputs which are considered to be demands for available assets and demands for improved input delivery and new seed varieties which are classified as demands for program change in the supply of services. Basic agricultural inputs, such as seed and fertilizer are available assets, because they are purchased and excludable; they are held by farmers in the short term or even held in storage for a longer period. In contrast, new seed varieties and improved input delivery are services which are variable, delivered and non—excludable. 49 Table 2 The Demands of African Small—scale Farmers: Content by Scope Scope of Demands Available Program Change Policy Change Services: Loans Credit scheme Redistribution of Hired labor Markets Credit, Extension Extension program Extension, Transport, Roads Infrastructure Water Projects Price Reform Development Projects New seed varieties Content Input delivery of Demands ——————————————————————————————————————————————————— Assets: Community Resettlement land Land reform land Grazing schemes Change in tenure Equipment Tractor schemes Redistribution of Inputs Draft power, Draft Power Equipment Livestock Family labor 2.2.4. The Scope of Demands that Farmers Make In making demands, small farmers, like most rational individuals, try to obtain assets and services by making demands with the least effort and narrowest scope involved; that is, for available assets and services. If the assets and services are unavailable, they must proceed to make demands for program change in order to get what they want. Finally, if program change is unattainable, they must make demands for policy change or cease attempting to get what they want. For example, it is likely that a farmer who demands the establishment of a credit scheme first made a demand for 50 credit that was available but was unsuccessful. Farmers who demand land reform probably started by seeking community land and then proceeded to apply for resettlement land. An alternative scenario involves farmers who are successful at fulfilling demands of a narrow scope, and who might be encouraged by their success to expand the scope of their demands. For example, farmers who are successful at obtaining loans may demand assistance in establishing a credit union or savings cooperative. When farmers act jointly rather than individually to express a demand, they are capable of acting more effectively and are able to make demands that are broader in scope. For instance, farmer groups in Zimbabwe are more effective than individual farmers at obtaining extension and credit (Bratton, 1986a, 1986b). When pressing for policy change, such as improved pricing policies, one would expect farmers to be most effective when they act together and use organizations to make their demands. 2.3. Organizations that Farmers Use to Make Demands When expressing political voice in the form of demands for program and policy change in the supply of assets and services, it would be expected that small farmers attempt to use different types of organizations and channels available. Bureaucratic procedures dictate that farmers should begin by applying through "official channels" or organizations which 51 have been given the responsibility for processing applications and distributing services and assets. However, particular demands for program and policy change compel farmers to forgo official channels and begin by using "unofficial organizations" as well as "informal channels." Furthermore, it would be expected that farmers would turn to informal channels and unofficial organizations if official channels prove unfruitful. One would expect that farmers who make demands for policy change use a range of organizations and political officials in order to amplify their political voice and exert influence over policy—makers. Of particular interest are the conditions under which farmers choose one organization or channel over another. Since organizations are important transmitters of demands, the potential for political voice and effectiveness in fulfilling agricultural demands depends in part on the level of access which small farmers have to organizations. In the rural areas of developing countries, organizational presence varies widely (Leonard and Marshall, 1982). A key determinant of organizational presence and farmer access is the character of the regime. If the regime is non—democratic and unreceptive toward small farmers, restrictions are placed on organizational activity and on access to organizations. On the other hand, if farmers are able to influence the regime, farmers will be permitted to form organizations, govern 52 themselves and benefit from assistance by government and non— governmental agencies. If the state is also democratic, farmers should stand to benefit from competing political entrepreneurs and political parties. Since the dissertation's focus is on African states that have been influenced by small farmers, it can be assumed that the farmers in this study have access to a range of organizations. In conceptualizing the range of organizations that are present at the local level in developing countries, Esman and Uphoff (1984: 58) devised a one—dimensional diagram depicting the range of sectors (public—"voluntary"—private) and the range of organizations from authoritative to non— authoritative ones. Modifying Esman and Uphoff's diagram,2 the local—to—national—to—international dimension has been added in order to emphasize the variety of "homes" from which organizations in the rural areas operate. The two—dimensional diagram illustrates the proposition that farmers must act beyond the local level if they are to broaden the scope of their actions and acquire voice in policy matters (Leonard, 1982). 2In their one—dimensional diagram, Esman and Uphoff (1984, 58), place "political organizations" next to "private enterprises" as "non—authoritative". However, given the role of ruling parties in bolstering rural elites in many developing countries, it would appear more logical to classify parties next to government agencies as "authoritative". Local organizations or Voluntary Sector Organizations must be regarded as less authoritative than political organizations. 53 Table 3 Organizations in Rural Africa international international transnational development VSOs/NGOs corporations agencies central National Level private government ruling service membership firms parties organizations organs 805 M05 Public Sector < ——————— Voluntary Sector —————— > Private Sector district coop private central govt unions markets govt SO field local party field farmer family staff govt cells staff organs coops farms Local Level —— 2.3.1. Organizational Dimensions and Typologies The imposition of colonial state and capitalist structures upon cohesive and parochial peasant societies (Hyden, 1983) created a void between national and local levels and impeded the development of non—governmental (private and voluntary) sectors. In the years after independence, organizational underdevelopment presented small farmers with two options * loyalty to governing elites and their patronage or exit. However, in an increasing number of African countries, state barriers to non—governmental development and democracy are being lowered, permitting private enterprise and voluntary sector organizations (VSOs) to grow (African Governance, 1990). Linkages are being forged between national 54 and local levels. The growth of VSOs has provided farmers with alternative organizational access to the national level and to government policy—makers and has enabled small farmers to use organizations for expressing political voice (Bratton, 1989b; 1990). Small farmers are developing their own organizations, including national farmer unions, which act to link an array of local farmer organizations at national and regional levels. The types of organizations which are available and which farmers use affect the ability of farmers to express political voice and to fulfill demands. Located in the public and voluntary sectors,3 the four main types of organizations which are available in many African countries for small farmers to use are: Voluntary Sector Organizations (VSOs), central and local government agencies, and political parties. 2.3.2. Voluntarv Sector Organizations (VSOs) In Diagram 1, the voluntary sector is situated in the central space between the national and local levels and between the public and private sectors. Otherwise known as non—governmental organizations (NGOs), VSOs enable citizens at the local level to have greater access to the national level, its resources and decision—making power and to hold both 3As the private sector grows in rural Africa, it is likely that farmers may be able to express demands to the state through private agricultural firms. For instance, farmer demands for tractors and machinery may add impetus to the efforts of private firms to facilitate their importation. 55 public and private sector organizations accountable (Drabek, 1987).4 The modus vivendi of VSOs is to serve and protect citizens and citizen interests and to promote civic values, including voluntarism, service and reciprocity. VSOs are not constrained by bureaucratic regulations or the profit motive from serving citizen interests. With a robust voluntary sector, VSOs can act effectively and can represent the demands of small farmers to the public or private sectors. VSOs are autonomous from the state and provide alternative channels through which farmers can make their demands and influence policy. However, VSOs have less power and authority than do public and private sector organizations and must cultivate relations with governing elites. Consequently, VSOs operate most effectively if they avoid politicizing issues and if they seek policy change in a specific issue area while supporting government policies in other areas (Bratton, 1990). In rural Africa, VSOs are still spread thin on the ground and must concentrate their resources in area—specific projects rather than engage in more widespread programs. The scattered presence of VSOs means that farmers are more likely to use 4The term voluntary sector organization (VSO) is a more precise category for the group of organizations that have been commonly known as NGOs. In classifying organizations present at the local level, Esman and Uphoff (1984, 58) define NGOs as subsuming private enterprise and VSOs. 56 VSOs in some areas and public sector organizations in others to make demands. As a consequence, the ability of farmers to make demands and to express political voice varies with the presence of VSOs. It can be expected that the more types of organizations, including VSOs, which are available, the greater the scope of demands which farmers can make and the greater the effectiveness of farmers in fulfilling demands. VSOs can be divided into two categories: membership organizations (M05) and service organizations ($05).5 The distinction is significant in that 805 are managed by professionals and attempt to reach poorer farmers, whereas MOs are run by members or officials elected by members and operate in the interests of their members, many of whom are better—off farmers engaged in agricultural marketing. 2.3.2.1. VSOs: Membership Organizations (M05) M05 are defined by their relationship with members and constituents who share a common interest. MOs seek to retain or expand their membership by fulfilling demands at an acceptable level. The membership responds by providing financial support and by working on behalf of M05. In Africa, MOs exist at the national and local levels, and the number of regional M05 is growing. National M05 include farmer unions, 5Esman and Uphoff (1984, 66) refer to membership organizations as "interest associations" which are classified as local organizations along with local development associations and cooperatives. 57 cooperative unions, churches, trade unions, women's movements, and professional associations. Local M05 in rural Africa include a range of cooperatives, farmer clubs for extension and training, community development associations, savings clubs and credit unions. While local MOs enable farmers to make claims for available assets and services and demands for program change, national MOs provide channels for making demands for policy change. National M05 provide policy services by representing the demands of members to governments. Some also provide services to members at the local level; for instance, farmer unions and cooperative unions help farmers to obtain agricultural assets and services. The national MOs which are more effective are well—rooted at the local level and federated upwards (Bratton, 1989b, 1990). A federal structure enables national MOs to sustain financial contributions and to mobilize the MO in case mass support is needed to favorably resolve a policy issue. Conversely, national MOs often become over—extended when they attempt to span the national—local gap, represent their constituents on policy matters, and deliver services. Presently, national MOs are playing a significant role in the growing movement for democratizing African states and reforming failed policies and structures (Bratton, 1990). The membership base and domestic roots of national M05 provide them with the potential to develop both vertical and 58 horizontal linkages and to attract the attention of the state. Because of their multi—faceted nature and because of their membership base, many national MOs have the potential to become political movements. In Africa, churches are the largest and most influential national MOs, because of their large and devoted membership, the activism of many church leaders and the observance by most governing elites of the separation between church and state. The autonomy of churches as religious organizations makes them effective in campaigning against authoritarianism and for human rights. Because the interests of their congregations are the primary concern of churches, they attempt to protect their congregations from human rights abuses and to alleviate their poverty. Churches are involved in rural Africa, providing services to the poor and encouraging the state to pay greater attention to the needs of the rural poor. National farmer organizations (NFOS) are MOs with the greatest potential for the expression of political voice by small farmers.6The specific focus of NFOs on farmer interests and agricultural concerns enables them to devote full energy to working for farmers in influencing government policies. 6The Research Group on Agricultural Policy in Africa (RGAPA, 1989) at Michigan State University has investigated the role of national farmer organizations in several African countries, including farmer unions in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya, cooperative unions in Ivory Coast and Zambia, and organizations for empowering small farmers in Senegal and Burkina Fasso. 59 Linkages with local farmer organizations provide NFOs with a basis of popular support and for aggregating the demands and political voice of small farmers. With pressures for more favorable agricultural policies, greater democracy and competitive elections in Africa, it is likely that governments will permit NFOs to develop and, subsequently, will pay greater attention to farmer demands for policy change. NFOs have developed policy influence and substantial membership in Kenya and Zimbabwe (Bratton, 1990), where government policies are favorable towards farmers. The Kenya National Farmers Union (KNFU) and the National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ) have developed capacity, membership size as well as skill and sensitivity in relations with states and have been able to convince governing elites of their legitimacy with farmers and have been permitted to influence the policy process. Effective farmer unions are based on local farmer club or group membership, help to provide services to farmers, and are federated so that demands can be forwarded to the leadership and directives disseminated to the membership. 2.3.2.2. VSOs: Service Organizations ($05) 805 are organized and funded at the national level, though they concentrate on providing services at the local level in rural areas. While international 805 are established in rural Africa, national SOs experience difficulties in 6O funding and staffing which make rural work an arduous proposition. Some of the better-established churches fund service delivery organizations which do not directly benefit members of congregation and which act autonomously from the church. Through development projects, 305 deliver a range of services to the poor and to women which neither the public sector nor the private sector can provide. SOs interact with national governments in working against human rights abuses and in promoting the interests of poor farmers and other disadvantaged groups. Consequently, small farmers can make demands through 805 for policies which are more favorable for the rural poor. 2.3.3. Public Sector Organizations: Central and Local Government Central government agencies and local government structures are two distinct types of public sector organizations in rural Africa which farmers can use in making demands. Central government agencies deliver most of the agricultural services, including extension and credit, and farmers use these "official channels" to make demands for services and assistance in obtaining assets. Government officials are used to channel demands for program change up the administrative hierarchy. Bureaucratic norms prevent these agencies from being used to make demands for policy 61 change. The most accessible central government officials are extension workers who have the most information on farmer demands and who often assist farmers in fulfilling their demands. In rural Africa, central governments have maintained bureaucratic control over local government structures through decentralization or deconcentration strategies (Rondinelli, 1990). However, in African countries with a semblance of democracy, local government is run partly by elected officials. Democratic local government can be used by small farmers to make demands for program change and to channel demands to the national level. Local government can provide infrastructure to fulfill farmer demands for program change. However, a widespread problem for local government is to accumulate the budgetary power and resources to meet growing demands for program change. 2.3.4. Political Parties DuringAfrica's independencestruggles, parties mobilized small farmers and linked them with African political elites. At independence, many parties were well—positioned for use by small farmers in expressing political voice and in making demands. However, post~independence turmoil, military rule and "developmental dictatorships" (Barkan and Okumu, 1978; Sklar, 1987) either eliminated parties or converted them into instruments of governing elites (Bienen, 1978). The 62 activities of many parties have been reduced to maintaining state security, implementing policy and, occasionally, orchestrating mobilization (Lawson, 1980; Randall, 1988). Parties seek to monopolize political and organizational activity, and parties are used to build and maintain networks of patronage among constituents. As a consequence, parties often come into conflict with other organizations, including VSOs which deliver services. In African countries with a semblance of democracy, farmers can approach party officials, including legislators, in making demands. Political officials can arrange for the delivery of services to fulfill farmer demands and can work at the national level for program and policy change. Given the instrumental role of African parties, a shortage of resources, and the wide range of demands from diverse constituents, party officials cannot devote much attention to the demands of small farmers. Consequently, parties exhibit less salience than national farmer organizations in advocating the interests of farmers. With the recent rise of opposition movements and parties in many African states, questions arise about the consequences for political voice by small farmers. One hypothesis is that inter-party competition tends to distract the attention of parties away from meeting farmer demands (Barkan with Chege, 1989). Much depends on the behavior of ruling parties which 63 try to shield "their" constituents from opposition parties. Besides using coercion against members of the opposition, ruling parties may strive to fulfill farmer demands in order to maintain support and control in the rural areas. 2.4. Farmer Political Voice and Organizational Interaction When farmers use a number of organizations, besides officially authorized ones, to make demands and express political voice, they are using unofficial channels. In addition to applying through the appropriate government channel, farmers can use VSOs, alternative government channels and political officials to work to fulfill their demands. Demands for program and policy change can be complex to fulfill, obscuring responsibility and requiring the use of several informal channels. For instance, the process of securing development projects often involves more than application to one organization and may require approaching local government leaders, legislators and VSO representatives who are capable of bringing together the necessary authority, funding and organization. The use of informal channels and the interaction of various organizations produces competition and cooperation and even conflict. Competition emerges when organizations seek to represent farmers on the same issues and deliver the same services. Even if organizations are coordinated and cooperating, they still compete to take credit for best 64 representing farmer interests. Competition can be a positive force in propelling organizations towards producing a greater volume of services and political voice. Conflict occurs when there is excessive political competition and when ruling parties and government security agencies assert their authority over the rural areas through surveillance, coercion and co—optation. Cooperation emerges when organizations are coordinated and deterred from maximizing the returns from their own relationship with farmers. In efforts to avoid conflict, VSOs often cede coordinating authority to the responsible government agency in projects and other forms of service delivery. Even so, the representation of small farmer interests by VSOs still creates the potential for competition and conflict. Party and government officials often resent the intervention of "unauthorized" organizations in their affairs. Given the inclination of African political parties to control rural organizational activity, they often precipitate conflict with rival organizations in the rural areas, particularly with VSOs which maintain autonomy from governments and parties. In representing the interests of farmers, VSO leaders possess little formal authority and use informal relationships in lobbying with agencies which provide assets and services. Even though VSOs seek to avoid conflict and forge cooperation with government agencies and parties, the roles of VSOs in 65 service delivery and in representing small farmers create the basis for competition and friction. Another potential source of competition and potential conflict is between local and central government officials over small farmer demands for scarce resources, especially for projects to be located in their areas. Elected local government officials can direct scarce resources toward their constituents in spite of the directives of central government planners and administrators. Consequently, local political entrepreneurs may be a decisive factor in helping farmers secure their demands for projects and program change. In devising hypotheses about organizational interaction in rural Africa, the organizational characteristics discussed above are pertinent. Since farmers use VSOs in order to fulfill demands which official government channels have failed to do, it would be expected that competition would exist. However, since VSOs seek to accomodate official organizations and since central and local government organizations are given coordinating authority, cooperation should also be expected. The competition-cooperation dynamic should also be expected between central and local government organizations, especially where local governments are elected and where local officials seek to fulfill demands of their constituents. Given the tendency of political parties to seek control of the rural areas, it would be expected that parties would come into 66 conflict with "unofficial" organizations such as V805 and would cooperate with official central and local government organizations. Table 4 contains expected organizational interactions: Table 4 Expected Interaction among Organizations in Rural Africa Central Local VSOs Government Government VSOs ——- Competition/ Competition/ Cooperation Coooperation Central Competition/ --- Competition/ Government Cooperation Cooperation Parties Conflict Cooperation Cooperation 2.5. Rural Stratification and Small Farmer Demands Stratification among African farmers by asset holdings, gender, agro—ecological conditions and geographical location. The various forms of rural stratification affect farming practices, the demands which farmers make, and effectiveness in fulfilling demands. African farmers at higher levels of rural stratification are able to market a substantial surplus and accumulate assets, make demands for a range of agricultural services, and have access to extension and credit officers as well as farmer organizations. Farmers at lower levels struggle to subsist and must look beyond agriculture for any hope of development. They either seek employment or engage in income—generating activities, occasionally with the 67 assistance of project interventions from service organizations (SOs). Rural stratification raises several issues which are addressed in the dissertation. Do better—off farmers want government intervention in agriculture to increase or decrease? For the large number of poorer farmers who want assets, is there anything government agencies or the market can do to help fulfill their demands? Finally, are the number of poor farmers so overwhelming that the question of prices and markets versus governments and infrastructure is irrelevant? 2.5.1. Socio—economic Stratification Socio—economic stratification in rural Africa refers to differential categories in holdings of assets, especially land and livestock, and to the ability or lack thereof to hire labor. In the Sahel and other disadvantaged regions, small farmers are so universally poor that stratification is insignificant. However, significant soci0*economic stratification and variation in farmer effectiveness have been detected in regions where agricultural marketing flourishes, such as Kenya (Barkan and Holmquist, 1986). In those regions, the typology of rich—middle—poor farmers is applicable. Rich farmers possess more assets than necessary for production, market a surplus, and hire laborers; middle farmers hold enough assets for production, market enough for 68 cash to meet basic household needs, and use family labor; and the mass of poor farmers lack vital assets, market little or nothing, and hire themselves out as laborers. Socio-economic stratification raises the issue of the relevance of mode of production analysis. Private property ownership, the pervasive hiring of labor, and commercial farming, all signs of the capitalist mode of production, are not common in the small farming sector in African countries. While rural Africa is in transition from the peasant mode of production to the capitalist mode, unequal gender relations of production indicate that a "patriarchal mode of production" is also present. 2.5.2. Gender Stratification African women farmers are generally powerless and discriminated against by male farmers within the household, by government institutions in the rural areas, such as extension and credit agencies, and by private commercial interests. The source of discrimination, oppression and powerlessness can be explained by the patriarchal mode of production (Stichter and Parpart, 1988) which is defined as: Socio—economic relations that are characterized by differential assignment of labor tasks, control over decision—making and differential access to and control over resources, including land and income (Davison, 1988: 3). The patriarchal mode features a specific type of gender relations of production in which dominance by males in 69 kinship, the household and property ownership determines wider behavior and interactions within society and state institutions. African states, firms and leaders are influenced by the patriarchal mode and discriminate against women farmers, making it difficult for them to exert pressure on institutions which deliver credit, extension, and other services. While women in male—headed households are subject to dominance, female heads of households are in an even worse position. Most women in female—headed households are asset and cash—poor. Without a husband, women are forced to deal with patriarchal societies with few rights to land and other assets as well as poor access to government services. Divorced and widowed women are often subjected to harassment from the family of the ex-husband. Where matriarchal societies exist, women often are better—off. However, most every state in Africa is male—dominated, and even women in matriarchal societies have difficulties in obtaining services. Certain demands, including women's ownership of land or access to credit remain unfulfilled dreams for most African women (Savane in Moock, 1989: 131). The lack of basic assets, particularly draft power, land and labor, are the principal characteristics of female poverty. However, if women possess draft power, land and labor, but lack access to cash, it is likely that they will still be impoverished and 70 unable to produce enough for subsistence, much less to afford education for their children and improved agricultural inputs. 2.5.3. Agro—Ecological and Geographical Stratification Within the rural areas, stratification among farmers is also caused by rainfall levels and other agro~ecological factors as well as by geographical proximity to markets and government services. Most of African cultivation is rain—fed; consequently, the average farmer who lives in regions with adequate annual rainfall and who consistently produces subsistence crops and food for the market is bound to be better off than the average farmer who regularly suffers drought. Agricultural services are concentrated in areas where production and marketing of crops is most consistent and intense. For instance, the average farmer who lives close to a market is more likely, than a farmer who does not, to market crops, buy high-yielding varieties, and pay less transport costs. 2.5.4. Hypotheses: Rural Stratification and Small Farmer Demands The tendency of poorer farmers to want assets and richer farmers to demand services has already been discussed. However, the demands of richer and poorer farmers deserve further attention before hypotheses can be formulated about the levels of effectiveness (that is, political voice) of various small farmers. In regard to richer farmers who engage 71 in agricultural marketing, they have been viewed as "surplus optimizers" (Bates, 1981) or as "satisficers" (Hyden, 1983). If they are surplus maximizers (more like small—scale commercial farmers), richer farmers will make demands of a broader scope in order to become wealthier. As farmers become more involved in the market and become wealthier, they become less self-sufficient and more desirous of services and policy changes. If they are satisficers (more like peasant subsistence farmers), they purchase the things that they want and do not express the need for government services. They are more self—sufficient than poorer farmers. A factor which determines the behavior of richer farmers is the attitude of the government. If governments are antagonistic towards agriculture, richer farmers adopt satisficing behavior. However, this dissertation investigates farmer demands in a state where farmers are able to influence the government. Under these conditions, where richer farmers take advantage of government services, it is expected that richer farmers make a broader range of demands than poorer farmers. In terms of the scope of what farmers need, poorer farmers require policy and program change much more than richer farmers, but they have neither the organization nor the representation to translate needs into demands and actions. For instance, poorer farmers may need a land reform or a 72 credit program for purchasing assets, but they do not have the power, the representation or the ideas in order to achieve policy change or program change. A gap exists between what some farmers need to do and what they can do. Because richer farmers make demands of a broader scope, they are more likely to approach VSOs, particularly farmer unions and other MOs, than are poorer farmers. Richer farmers are more likely to be members of national farmer organizations and farmer clubs which promote agricultural marketing and which provide them with greater capability for making demands for policy and program change. However, where service organizations and development projects are present, poorer farmers are more likely to make demands of a broader scope than when they are absent. 2.6. Effective Political Voice: Hypotheses MAIN DEPENDENT VARIABLE = EFFECTIVENESS IN FULFILLING DEMANDS. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: scope and content of demands, rural stratification, and type of organizations and actions used. RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION: Small farmers strive to maximize the fulfillment of demands for assets and services. Richer farmers are willing and able to strive for maximization more than poorer farmers. STRATIFICATION, CONTENT, SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS H1. Stratification ————————— > Content ————————— > Effectiveness + .— H2. Stratification —————————— > Scope —————————— > Effectiveness HYPOTHESIS 1: Farmers with higher status make demands for services which are less difficult to fulfill than demands for assets. 73 H2. Farmers with higher status make demands which are wider in scope and higher in difficulty to fulfill. ORGANIZATIONS, ACTIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS + H1. VSOs/Collective Action/Informal Channels —————————— > Scope + H1. VSOs/Collective Action/Informal Channels ——> Effectiveness HYPOTHESIS 1. The use of VSOs, collective action and informal channels are associated with demands of a wider scope and greater effectiveness in fulfilling demands for program and policy change. H2. Demands of a narrower scope are made to central government; demands of a wider scope are made through VSOs. H3. Farmers who are more involved in groups are more likely to make demands of a wider scope. The level of effectiveness in fulfilling demands is used to indicate the level of political voice where the state is influenced by small farmers. In turn, effectiveness is defined in three ways. The principal definition is the degree of success enjoyed by individual farmers in obtaining agricultural assets and services. Effectiveness is also defined broadly as the ability to improve the quality of life. The third definition is the ability to exceed expectations in the exercise of political voice. Examples include farmers taking their demands beyond official channels, and women farmers making demands of a broad scope. The two hypotheses relating content and scope of demands to rural stratification and effectiveness are contradictory. On the one hand, poorer farmers are expected to have greater difficulties in fulfilling demands for assets than richer 74 farmers have in fulfilling demands for services. On the other hand, richer farmers are expected to have greater problems in fulfilling demands which are wider in scope than poorer farmers who make demands which are narrow in scope. If demands for simple assets prove to be more difficult to secure than demands for changes in programs and policies pertaining to services, this would indicate a serious gap in levels of political voice between rich and poor strata of farmers. In turn, this would lead to the question: are only richer farmers capable of expressing political voice? This issue will be resolved in a later chapter. 2.7. Political Voice and Effectiveness by Poorer Farmers The presumed difficulties which poorer farmers, and especially single women, must confront in expressing political voice and acquiring assets are a concern. The problem is approached by focusing on counter-intuitive cases, on the role which VSOs can play, and on alternative indicators of effectiveness, including improvements in the overall quality of life. Counter—intuitive cases include farmers who make demands for program and policy change and who have succeeded in improving the quality of life. The focus on counter— intuitive cases conforms with the "governance" research agenda which stipulates that research focus on "best—case scenarios" (Hyden, 1988). By identifying and explaining these cases, 75 ways are suggested in which small farmers might increase political voice. In seeking explanations for broader forms of effectiveness, the variables to be considered include the presence of VSOs, joint action by farmers and membership in farmer organizations. The importance of VSOs for small farmers includes project interventions and the provision of informal channels which enable farmers to make demands for program or policy change. While the role of service organizations (805) in assisting poorer farmers has been acknowledged, questions remain about the replicability of successful projects and the "reach" of 805. As for joint action and membership of farmer organizations, questions remain about the role which poorer farmers are able to play, given the tendency of wealthier farmers to dominate. In particular, should poorer farmers form their own organizations or do they benefit from their association with richer farmers? 2.8. Conclusion The conceptual framework of political voice in rural Africa which was outlined in this chapter can be used in research for a handful of African countries where governments are influenced by small farmers. Government policies in other countries discourage farmers from making demands, compelling them either to exercise voice by registering protest or to opt for exit. However, pressures for democratization and reform 76 of agricultural policies are creating greater prospects for small farmers to express political voice and for research on the subject. In explaining the conceptual framework, the use of informal channels, the problems of poorer farmers, and the role of VSOs in assisting them have emerged as important research issues in the dissertation which will be examined in forthcoming chapters. Chapter 3. The Case Study: Zimbabwe's Communal Farmers 3.1. Introduction From the literature review and conceptual framework, it is evident that research describing and explaining political voice in rural Africa should focus on a case or set of cases in which small farmers exhibit agricultural and political capabilities and in which government policies neither exploit agriculture nor demobilize farmers. In this chapter, the selection of the case of small—scale communal farmers in Zimbabwe is explained and justified. In Zimbabwe, the rapid development of the small-scale communal farming sector since independence has coincided with manifestations of farmer political capabilities as well as with the influence of farmers over government agricultural policies. Contending explanations for the rapid expansion of the small—scale communal farming sector are reviewed, including the proposition that political voice by small farmers has played a significant role in the transformation process. In addition, evidence for and against claims of a "smallholder revolution" is weighed. Given the dissertation's objective of describing and explaining a case of political voice, Zimbabwe has been selected more as a best—case scenario than as a representative one. This concern was also reflected in the sample of small farmers which, to an extent, was selected purposively, thereby guaranteeing that some of the farmers surveyed possessed the 78 agricultural and political capbilities necessary for political voice. The dissertation's methodology was adopted with the aim of demonstrating what rural Africa might become with the development of political voice by small farmers and with influence over governing elites and over the policy process.1 3.2. Case Study Selection: Small Farmers in Zimbabwe Research on political voice in rural Africa and on governance is in an initial phase; consequently, it is necessary to identify, describe and explain specific cases. Eventually, case studies should give way to cross—national analysis. The selection of a single case involves identifying the set of countries where small farmers have exhibited agricultural and political capabilties and where governments have not exploited agriculture and demobilized farmers. With the wave of agricultural and democratic reforms that have been sweeping Africa, it is likely that the number of countries 2 that can be studied is on the increase. However, at present, 1There were a number of practical reasons for choosing the Zimbabwe case study. The researcher has long experience with the country and is familiar with issues of rural development and agricultural policy in Zimbabwe. The researcher learned the principal vernacular language, Shona, and received funding from the U.S. Department of Education's Fulbright—Hays Dissertation Research Abroad Program to conduct research in Zimbabwe. 2Improving relations between African states and farmers can be attributed to democratization and increased freedom of action for small farmers and to the reform of agricultural policies which has provided incentives and institutions for farmers. Policy reform has been implemented in several countries since the mid—19805, whereas democratization is a 79 the set of countries with conditions for effective political voice is limited to Kenya, C6te d'Ivoire, and Zimbabwe. The three countries have witnessed productive small~scale farming, and the three governments have adopted favorable agricultural policies and permitted the development of farmer organizations. The case of small-scale communal farmers in Zimbabwe was chosen over the cases in Kenya and COte d'Ivoire because of the researcher's familiarity with Zimbabwe and its principal vernacular language, relatively fewer restrictions on rural research, relatively greater freedom for farmer political activities. Furthermore, measures were taken in both Kenya and Céte d'Ivoire during the 19805 to exercise greater control over small farmers, inhibit VSO activities, and advance patrimonial systems. While these reverses have not extinguished political voice by small farmers in those countries, Zimbabwe has forged ahead in terms of favorable conditions for voice. A further concern in selecting a set of small farmers for study was that their material conditions be roughly similar to those of farmers in other African countries. By controlling for material conditions, the possibility was created for using post—1989 phenomenon. While most African countries are engaged in either one or both processes, the impact on farmer capabilities and options is still uncertain. 80 findings on political voice in rural Zimbabwe to make generalizations which apply to the rest of Africa. Small— scale communal farmers in Zimbabwe are not considerably different from those in other African countries. Land tenure is not commercialized on a freehold basis, and quasi—permanent use rights for individual farming households are prevalent. Most small farmers in Zimbabwe lack assets such as draft power, tillage equipment and land. For instance, a national survey found that 70 per cent of households hold fewer than four cattle (Zimbabwe, Central Statistics Office, 1986). Farmers who hold less than four cattle can be judged as poor, because they have insufficient cattle to produce enough natural fertilizer for their relatively small plots of ten acres or less and because they do not have sufficient oxen with which to adequately till their fields. Even though families in rural Zimbabwe remain large, family labor is often insufficient to compensate for a lack of draft power and farm equipment. Consequently, richer farmers hire poorer farmers to perform casual labor, and poorer farmers hire themselves out to compensate for a shortfall of assets.3 Strata of landless laborers and commercial or capitalist farmers are 3Jennifer M. Adams, 1989, "Economic Differentiation and Wage Labour in Rural Zimbabwe," Department of Economics, Cambridge University, unpublished paper. From 72 interviews with farmers in Masvingo District, Adams reported widespread hiring of casual labor by richer farmers who were receiving a non~agricultural income. =—- —_L insignificant, partly because the communal land tenure system inhibits the alienation of land from poorer farmers (Cousins, 1990, 4). As in the rest of Africa, Zimbabwe's small farmers encounter a range of agro-ecological conditions, and most accept considerable risk by planting crops, including drought— prone varieties of maize, in regions with erratic rainfall patterns. Approximately 85 per cent of communal farmers live in Agro—ecological Zones III, IV and V, with average rainfall levels which, at best, are suitable only for semi—intensive cultivation, drought—resistant crops, and livestock. In sum, Zimbabwe's small farmers are similar to those in the rest of Africa, except that the conditions for the development of political voice have been promoted in Zimbabwe. A growing minority of African countries are developing large—scale commercial (LSC) farming sectors which are making a variable impact on small farming sectors. Zimbabwe possesses one of Africa's oldest LSC sectors which, for most of its history, negatively affected small farmers. The LSC sector was established by European settlers who seized most of Zimbabwe's best farming land. They also used the colonial state to aid their development, to inhibit small—scale farming and to ensure a plentiful supply of cheap labor from rural dwellers who were unable to produce sufficiently to pay taxes and meet subsistence needs. Consequently, small farmers in 82 Zimbabwe were more disadvantaged before independence than many of their counterparts in other African countries. 3.3. Zimbabwe's Small Farmer "Revolution" and Political Voice While the material conditions of small farmers in Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa are similar, a "revolution" has occurred in Zimbabwe's small—scale communal farming sector which is most evident in agricultural marketing and production. Since independence in 1980, the small—scale communal sector has been responsible for threefold increases in the production of maize, Zimbabwe's staple crop, and cotton. Small farmers now produce and market the bulk of these and other commodities, superseding the large scale commercial farming sector. Sales of maize by small—scale communal farmers grew from 48,600 metric tons in 1975—6 to 294,700 in 1983—4 (drought year) to 545,200 metric tons in 1984—5.4 Sales of cotton by both communal and small—scale commercial farmers rose from 32,059 metric tons in 1979-80 to 111,506 metric tons in 1984~5.5 The production and marketing 4Grain Marketing Board figures from Government of Zimbabwe, The National Land Policv. Harare: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, 1989, p. 12. The number of communal farmers registered with the Grain Marketing Board rose from 19,195 in 1979 to 217,189 in 1985 and to 490,000 in 1989 (more than 60 per cent of Zimbabwe's communal farmers). 5Cotton Marketing Board figures taken from L.M. Zinyama, "Agricultural Development Policies in the African Farming Areas of Zimbabwe," in Mutizwa—Mangiza, 1991, 109. The number of communal farmers registered with the Cotton Marketing Board rose from 51,706 in October 1980 to 114,295 in October 1985. 83 revolution in the communal farming sector has moved small farmers from the periphery of Zimbabwe's agricultural economy toward center stage, where small farmers and their representatives are better-positioned to influence agricultural policy. While the revolution in Zimbabwe's small—scale communal farming sector has increased the power of small farmers, they also developed political power, forgedzapositive relationship with the state elite and participated in governing coalitions. Small farmer power and influence originated during the anti- colonial war from 1972—9, when farmers and guerillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) initiated a symbiotic alliance. During the war, farmers organized themselves in ZANU(PF) committees which were perpetuated after independence and formed the basis for local government structures (Ranger, 1985, 292—301). During the anti—colonial war, small farmers used committees and mass meetings to communicate tc> ZANU(PF) cadres a range (of complaints and demands. Farmers objected to a variety of coercive measures 6 practised by the colonial state. Livestock control programs threatened their pool of wealth, and erosion control programs involved excessive amounts of family labor. They complained of discrimination by the colonial government in the provision 6Small farmers were not only subject to coercion and intimidation by the colonial state but by ZANU(PF) guerillas as well (Kriger, 1992, 107—8). 84 of extension, credit and markets. Small farmers who lived in the vicinity of large—scale commercial farmers were particularly concerned with the recovery of "lost lands" and with ending government favoritism toward large farmers. (Ranger, 1985: 317). Evidently, small farmer demands for the redistribution of assets and services were formulated well before independence and were taken into account by ZANU(PF). The symbiotic relationship between farmers and party carried into the pre—independence elections of March 1980, won handily by ZANU(PF) with overwhelming support from the communal lands. The formation of this relationship resulted in a shift by small farmers away from the "exit" option which they had exercised in response to the colonial regime and to the expression of political voice toward a favorable regime. Subsequently, small farmers were represented in the ZANU(PF) governing coalition and influenced government policies. In the 1985 and 1990 elections, ZANU(PF) depended on its rural 7 constitutents to further consolidate power. In the immediate post-independence period, the new government initiated a redistributive development strategy which has been associated with the ZANU(PF) policy document, Growth with Eguity (1981). The Growth with Eguity strategy was devised to redistribute 7With shrinking urban support, the ZANU(PF) government is currently falling back upon its rural base of support in order to maintain power. The new wave of land redistribution was initiated in order to appeal to small farmers. 85 government services and expenditures toward small—scale communal farmers and away from the beneficiaries of colonial rule, particularly large—scale commercial farmers. Agricultural institutions, including the extension service, parastatal marketing boards and the credit agency, were reoriented toward meeting the needs of small farmers, and programs of infrastructural development, including roads and markets, were initiated in the communal lands. For instance, the number of Grain Marketing Board (GMB) depots grew from 38 in 1980 to 70 in 1990, and most of the new depots served 8 small—scale communal farmers. Farmers also received and benefitted from non—agricultural services, such as education and health care. In 1980, improved seed and fertilizer were distributed throughout the communal lands in order to provide returning refugees and war-beleaguered farmers with the means to produce food crops. By 1982, the government was making credit available to small farmers (n1 a broad basis with minimal concern for rates of repayment in order to stimulate communal sector production and marketing — with dramatic results. As a consequence of the government's redistributive policies, a broad spectrum of small farmers were introduced to a range of 8 World Bank, Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector Memorandum, Volume II, May 31, 1991, p. 89. 86 agricultural services and assets and intensified the marketing of agricultural commodities. In explaining the smallholder revolution in maize production, Rohrbach (1988) found that 50 per cent of the "maize boom" was due to expansion of area planted after the war. The rest of the production increases could be attributed to new production methods, including improved seed, fertilizer, infrastructure and credit provided by the government. Small farmers made ZANU(PF) leaders aware of their needs during the war, and the political voice of small farmers has continued to play a significant role in the years after independence. In order to fulfill promises to small farmers and to maintain electoral support, the new government took the initiative and did as much as possible in regard to redistribution. However, it came up against obstacles in regard to the redistribution of assets; especially nettlesome were the entrenched clauses in the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution which stipulated that land for redistribution could only be bought in local currency on a "willing, buyer, willing seller" basis. Subsequently, while the government bought relatively more land than any other African country for redistribution (2.6 million hectares by 1989 for more than 50,000 resettlement households) (World Bank, 1991), the redistribution program fell well short of targets (10 million hectares for 162,000 families). The government compensated 87 for a lack of progress in fulfilling its promises on land by vigorously pursuing the redistribution of services. 3.3.1. Organizations Used by Zimbabwe's Small Farmers An additional sign of the growing conditions for small farmer political voice was the rise of organizations after independence which could be used to make demands and to influence programs and policy. Initially, from 1980—1983, organizational links between local and national levels were developing, and farmers were forced to make demands through members of parliament and other ZANU(PF) officials. The expansion of the extension agency, AGRITEX, and the communal farmers union, NFAZ, was accompanied by the formation of local farmer organizations. In 1984, a range of local government organizations were established which provided an official channel for small farmer demands and which supreseded ZANU(PF) committees. Farmers in Zimbabwe can now interact with a range of organizations and their representatives, and they also interact with each other in farmer groups. The principal types of organizations and actors which are available for use by farmers include: Voluntarv Service Organizations: NFAZ 2 National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe. A membership organization which represents small—scale communal farmers in "farmer clubs." Composed mainly of master farmers who have more training and who are more productive and wealthier than the average farmer, NFAZ has attempted to expand membership to poorer farmers. 88 NATIONAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS: Catholic Development Commission (CADEC), Christian Care, Silveira House and others. INTERNATIONAL 805: International Voluntary Service (IVS), Africare, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Save The Children, others. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES9 GTZ (Germany), SIDA (Sweden), USAID, DANIDA (Denmark), NORAID (Norway), Swissaid, UN—FAO, UNDP and others. central Government Agencies: AGRITEX = Department of Agricultural and Technical Extension within the Ministry of Agriculture (MLARR). AGRITEX workers are present at the ward level, and each extension worker is charged with contacting approximately 800 farmers in groups at least twice a year. AFC = Agricultural Finance Corporation. A parastatal company which disburses loans (mainly for fertilizer and improved seed) to farmers. Field agents tend to be concentrated in the most productive districts in Zimbabwe. Connected with the Ministry of Agriculture (MLARR). MCCD = Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development Local Government Structures: VIDCO = the Village Development Committee. As the basic unit of local government, the VIDCO serves approximately 100 households and 1000 people, usually in multiple village units. WADCO = the Ward Development Council. The WADCO serves six VIDCOs, 600 or more families and 6,000 or more people. DC District Council. The governing body for the district, representing 10,000—20,000 families, 100,000—200,000 people. Farmer demands are channeled to the DC from VIDCOs and WADCOS. 9International Development Agencies are linked to their respective governments, but when operating abroad, they are placed under the same constraints as VSOs. Consequently, they are classified as VSOs, operating under the scrutiny of the government of Zimbabwe. 89 DDC = District Development Committee. The administrative body for the district which decides on project placement and funding. The DC chair, District Administrator, and central government officials sit on the DDC. MLGRUD = Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development Political Parties: ZANU(PF) = Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front). The ruling party is present at the local level through Village Committees (or branches), the Women's League and Youth League. ZUM = Zimbabwe Unity Movement. The principal opposition party which contested the 1990 general election in most constituencies throughout Zimbabwe. ZANU (Ndonga) = An opposition party which confines its activities to Manyikaland Province. Table 5 Types of Organizations Available to Small Farmers in Zimbabwe National Level central . government ruling service farmer : party organs. organs. MLARR MCCD MLGRUD ZANU(PF) CADEC NFAZ o PIOV . . u Governor public sector < ——————— voluntary sector —————— > private sector : : : (civil society) ' : DDC/ DC : : : AGRITEX WADCO : z : field : ZANU(PF) SO farmer coops staff VIDCO commitees field staff clubs groups Local Level Small farmers in Zimbabwe can use several different organizations to make demands and channel them toward the 9O appropriate level. Farmers can make demands to AGRITEX extension workers, and those demands may eventually reach the AGRITEX director‘s office and may even be considered by the cabinet. Demands made through local government channels are accepted or rejected at the DC/DDC level, though many proceed for budgetary approval to the ministerial level. While local government is supposed to supersede ZANU(PF) as a primary organization for making demands, small farmers still approach party officials and attempt to influence members of parliament in order to seek fulfillment of their demands. In terms of VSO channels, farmers use NFAZ and service organizations to transmit demands. At the national level, NFAZ is most active in promoting small farmer influence on policy. The various organizations which farmers used will receive more detailed attention, particularly in Chapter Six. 3.3.2. Political Voice and Agricultural Policv Thus far, the agricultural and political capabilities of small farmers in Zimbabwe have been shown to coincide with favorable policies by the post-independence state. What evidence has been established of a correlation between farmer capabilities and the adoption of favorable agricultural policies? Is political voice being produced and has it been effective? In examining four policy outcomes related to agriculture, Michael Bratton (1987) concludes each has been determined by 91 the articulation of political rationality (concerning calculations of how best to retain power) and economic rationality (involving short—term considerations of economic efficiency). Political and economic rationality coincided in the case of producer pricing policy. Prices were consistently increased by the government due to the lobbying activities of farmer unions (principally, NFAZ and the Commercial Farmers Union), and because arguments were accepted that higher prices would increase cash crop production and export earnings. In regard to the redistribution of services and the reorientation of service delivery agencies, the government proceeded because of political pressure and popular demands by farmers, even though the initial economic costs greatly exceeded the benefits (estimated costs were six times greater than short- term returns) (Bratton, 1987: 196). Although economic efficiency considerations increased in importance during the 1982—1984 recession, the greater strength of "political rationality" guaranteed that most of the redistributive measures remained intact. In both cases, the political capabilities of small farmers were applied, and farmer political voice helped to bring about a favorable outcome.” 10The World Bank (1991) reports that the government has not yet reduced the supply of institutional services to small farmers, in spite of cuts in expenditures in other parts of the budget. In fact, the budgets for research and extension continue to increase (World Bank, 1991, 194) as well as for marketing (p. 105). Credit continues to be extended to small farmers whose repayment record is good (p. 173). 92 In regard to land redistribution, the degree of political pressure was less than expected, and economic rationality eventually prevailed. The government's program of land purchase and redistribution to land—hungry constituents was devised in response to a perceived need and pressure from landless refugees who had supported ZANU(PF). From 1980 to 1982, the government raised its estimates to the point where it was decided that 162,000 families needed to be resettled; it was inferred that approximately 20 per cent of the population was demanding land. However, when the economic downturn came, the land purchase program was slowed in 1985 due to high costs in relation to minimal benefits which were accruing to a small minority of farmers. The Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement suffered budget cuts and was eventually absorbed by the Ministry of Agriculture. It appeared that a lack of broadly—based popular pressure enabled the government to suspend the program. The hypothesized lack of widespread political support for land redistribution was reflected, for instance, in the relatively low priority accorded the issue by the NFAZ (Bratton, 1986). The subsequent renewal of land redistribution efforts in 1990 with the termination of the Lancaster House constitution indicates that popular support for land reform has actually remained stronger and more widespread than previously thought and that the ZANU(PF) government is attempting to tap that 93 support. If popular pressures indeed remain strong, it must be concluded that the land purchase and redistribution program was slowed in 1985 largely because it was much less efficient than programs which redistributed services and which reoriented service delivery agencies. Clearly, assets cannot be redistributed as cheaply or as broadly as services can. Since 1990, the government has been attempting to decrease the costs of land redistribution by switching from a "willing buyer, willing seller" basis to mandatory sale at a government-determined price. It is evident that small farmer political voice has contributed to favorable changes in government policy in several issue areas. One research issue is the extent to which farmer voice is being articulated by farmers themselves in concert with their representatives. A purpose of the dissertation is to determine the extent to which voice originates with the demands that farmers make and to describe how that voice is expressed through a variety of organizations. 3.3.3. "Top—down" Explanations for Agricultural Policy Change An alternative explanation for Zimbabwe's smallholder revolution is derived from statist theory. A main argument of statist theory is that industrialization and social transformation are only possible through the intervention of a strong state that remains autonomous from the pressures of 94 bourgeois elites who, in developing countries, remain dependent on foreign capital (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985). Accordingly, Zimbabwe's redistributive policies should be explicable in terms of the relative autonomy which the state maintains in relation to the bourgeoisie, including large— scale commercial farmers. However, this statist explanation is falsified by the dependence of Zimbabwe's post—independence government on the bourgeoisie, especially on the commercial farming sector, for export earnings. Furthermore, the Zimbabwe government's lack of autonomy from both large—scale commercial farmers and small~scale communal farmers has not hampered agricultural growth nor has it prevented the government from transforming agriculture through the redistribution of agricultural assets and services. In his study of Zimbabwean government politics and policies, Herbst (1990) presents a more sophisticated model of the relationship between state autonomy, interest groups and policy outcomes. Where interest groups do not have easy access to the appropriate decision—making agencies, the state is autonomous, and decisions are made without the input of those interest groups. The access of NFAZ and other lobbyists to agencies charged with purchasing and redistributing land was problematic and contributed to the slow—down in the program of resettlement. In contrast, the NFAZ and CFU had easy access to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of 95 Finance which decided on pricing policy, and this helps to explain a persistent pattern of price increases during the 19805. Herbst's findings contribute to an understanding of the conditions in which political voice will be more or less effective. Another plausible explanation for the smallholder revolution is derived from Bates' argument that small farmers can benefit from favorable government policies toward large— scale commercial farmers and that the development of a commercial farming sector is a primary means of improving smallholder agriculture. The commercial farming sector in Zimbabwe has been active in ensuring favorable agricultural policies for more than fifty years, primarily through the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). The close relationship between commercial farmers and the colonial state eventually produced "take-off" into sustained development for commercial agriculture. Consequently, few African countries possess such a vibrant sector, with a range of service institutions and infrastructure. Until independence, the influence of commercial farmers did not result in the "trickleedown" of benefits to small farmers. In fact, policies designed to hamstring small farmers were supported by commercial farmers. On the other hand, the impact of commercial farmers was positive in terms of the creation of research, extension and credit institutions which could be re~oriented by the post— 96 independence government toward the service of small farmers. After independence, the coalition of NFAZ and CFU contributed to improved agricultural prices. However, the interests of small and large farmers still tend to diverge on most issues. 3.3.4. The Limits of Zimbabwe's Small Farmer Revolution While the small farming sector's revolution in production and marketing is difficult to dispute, the argument has been made that the benefits, particularly in the "maize boom", have accrued to wealthier small farmers (Weiner, 1989; Amin, 1990). Rohrbach (1988) estimates that a quarter of Zimbabwe's 800,000 small farming households have benefitted substantially from agricultural production and marketing policy change since 1980. More than half of small farmer maize marketing is confined to the most favorable agro—ecological region (Zone II) where approximately 15 per cent of Zimbabwe's small—scale communal farmers live (Moyo, 1986; Stanning, 1987). Because these farmers are located in an agro-ecological zone with consistent annual rainfall, a disproportionate amount of agricultural services have been concentrated there since independence (Rohrbach, 1988; Truscott, 1984). Clearly, less than 120,000 households in Zone II possess sufficient draft power, equipment, family labor and other assets to take advantage of expanded production and marketing opportunities. Wealthier farmers who possess the assets to produce and market annually are able to repay loans and remain in the marketing 97 system. While improved seed and extension advice have led to widespread increases in production, the majority (of small farmers have not benefitted substantially from the revolution in agricultural marketing. While the maize boom may have primarily benefitted small farmers concentrated in Zone II, there is little evidence that a wealthy class of farmers is emerging in that zone which can invest substantially in hiring labor, mechanization, and non— agricultural enterprises (Cousins, 1990). In Zones III and IV, some farmers have been able to signifcantly expand marketing by growing more drought—resistant crops, especially cotton and sunflower. Furthermore, evidence exists that farmers in III and IV have significantly increased production when they have acted together and reached out to agricultural service agencies, including marketing boards, credit agencies and the extension service (AGRITEX) (Rohrbach, 1988, Truscott, 1984). Critics of Zimbabwe's small farmer policy advocate the resumption of accelerated land redistribution in Agro- ecological Zone II as the way to more widely distribute the benefits of the smallholder revolution. A number of researchers now argue that if small farmers were given appropriate technical inputs, they would be more productive in Zone II than their large—scale commercial counterparts (Weiner, 1985, 1989; Shumba, 1989). Within a few years of 98 being resettled, small farmers in government resettlement schemes have demonstrated that they can be productive, contributing to more than ten per cent of agricultural output and marketed maize (Central Statistic Office, 1986). The slowing of land redistribution in 1985 is pointed to as further evidence of an "illusory" smallholder revolution and the betrayal of a demand perceived as paramount for small farmers and nationalist politicians alike. The debate concerning the importance of land redistribution among small farmers constitutes a research issue for consideration in the dissertation. It has been argued that the slowing of land redistibution was just part of a major shift by the government away from redistributive policies intended to assist small farmers and toward market principles in order to revive business confidence (Weiner, 1989). As a consequence, any semblance of a smallholder revolution was brought to an end. The major example of the shift to austerity was the decision to curb widespread lending to small farmers by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), especially outside of Zone II, and to encourage the AFC to become much tougher on outstanding loans. After 1984, it is argued that only credit—worthy farmers in Zone II received a significant volume of services. Indeed, drought and recession led to cuts in some government programs; however, extension, marketing and other government- 99 provided services remained widespread throughout Zimbabwe. A research issue is whether or not government services are still being delivered to poorer farmers and outside of Zone II. Criticism has been made of the notions that small farmer political capabilities have increased and that more organizations are present to serve farmers. A wariness has developed toward local government structures on the grounds that they are intended more to control farmer political voice than to enhance it.11 Moves toward a one—party state have been interpreted as lessening the power of small farmers under a more authoritarian and patrimonial system. Under such a system, governing elites would become more concerned with building clientelist networks and less attuned to the political voice of small farmers. Because elections are still competitive, critics contend that ZANU(PF) has revived the "lost lands" issue in order to maintain its rural political base. In sum, critiques of the small farmer revolution in Zimbabwe persist and are based on a range of evidence. The issues raised by these critiques are addressed in the dissertation. 11Drinkwater (1991, 90) recounts the perception in the mid—19805 that local government structures, combined with villagization, would create excessive government control. A similar view was put forward by Dr. Conrad Brand of the Department of Rural and Urban Planning, University of Zimbabwe during lectures and discussions at Michigan State University in January 1988. 100 3.4. Conclusion: Research Issues Raised bv the Case Study The case of small farmers in Zimbabwe raises a number of research issues, including the perspective which should be taken toward the development of farmer political voice since 1980. Before 1980, Zimbabwe's small farmers rarely made demands to colonial state organizations, were concerned with obtaining simple assets, and were limited to exercising the options of loyalty or exit. With the independence war of the 19705 and the rapid growth of liberation movements, small farmers began to express political voice. Since 1980, farmers have been able to make a broader scope of demands, use a range of organizations and influence government policies. Consequently, the 1980 base-line must be kept in mind when assessing the scope of small farmer demands and political voice. The focus of research should, therefore, be directed especially toward demands which farmers have made after 1980 for program and policy change. Finally, evidence of a small farmer revolution is weiged through an analysis of farmer effectiveness in fulfilling demands and of the ways in which they use organizations. The Zimbabwe case raises research issues concerning the relationship between rural stratification and political voice. It has been hypothesized that wealthier farmers, especially those in Zone II, possess greater capabilities than most 101 farmers for the expression of effective political voice. At issue is the breadth of the chasm between the wealthier minority and the poorer majority in terms of capabilities, the scope of demands and effectiveness. If the chasm is broad, it would be expected that poorer farmers (including those in Zones III and IV) would not be capable of expressing and fulfilling demands for program and policy change. Also, agricultural services would not be provided by government agencies to poorer farmers and poorer regions. If the gap among farmers in terms of scope of demand is not so great, the content of demands becomes a more important issue. At issue is whether farmers who demand services want better prices, markets or institutional support. A second issue is whether farmers who have demanded better prices cease or continue to make demands once they become satisfied with pricing levels. If they cease, Berg's thesis about "getting the prices right" would tend to be supported. Debates about change in rural Zimbabwe raise issues about the distribution of government services, improvement in the quality of life, and the performance of organizations. The survey assesses changes in well—being, subsistence and incomes as well as the provision of schools, health clinics, markets and other infrastructure. A related issue concerns small farmer perceptions of the performance of government-related organizations and institutions. Performance pertains to the 102 relationship which farmers have established with organizations as well as the record established in deliverying demanded assets and services. From the side of the organizations, the issue is the extent of farmer interaction and influence as well as the use of informal channels. If influence has been established, a related issue is to determine how the relationship has been established and maintained. A final problem concerns the access of weaker and poorer farmers to organizations and institutions and whether VSOs can be of assistance in the process of acquiring access. Chapter 4. Data Collection and Analysis 4.1. Introduction In this chapter, empirical procedures for analyzing political voice by small—scale communal farmers in Zimbabwe are outlined and justified. In particular, justifications are provided for the use of survey data in generalizing about Zimbabwe's small farmers and in identifying "best-case scenarios" in which poorer farmers effectively exercise political voice. A comparative and cross—sectional research design and survey data are used to assess why some farmers express greater political voice and are more effective than others. Procedures are specified for site selection, sampling, and data collection and analysis in order to test hypotheses, evaluate explanatory propositions and examine counter—intuitive cases. Field research sites are described, and the stratification of the sample, using socio-economic indicators is explained and analyzed. 4.2. Data Collection As mentioned, the research design incorporates the case study of small farmers in Zimbabwe, comparison among respondents within the sample, and a cross-sectional model through which the degree of association among variables pertaining to small farmer attributes, demands and effectiveness can be assessed. Survey data collection is used, because data needed to compare small farmers and to determine the extent of correlation is limited and fragmented. 104 Existing data sources provide some information about the demands for assets and services which small farmers are making in Zimbabwe (NFAZ, 1989). Others describe the organizations and channels which small farmers use to get what they want (Bratton, 1986; GDI, 1988; ZIDS, 1990). However, data is not available for an analysis of effectiveness, demands, organizations and their interrelationship. Consequently, a survey is necessary to determine the degree to which various small farmers articulate demands, use organizations, and prove to be effective. A "one—shot" survey was adopted because of the nature of the data required. The demands which farmers make, organizations which they approach, and their success or failure in fulfilling demands could be ascertained through one interview with each of the sample respondents. A series of questionnaires could have been employed to pinpoint such factors as the amount of crops marketed, income levels, and land usage; however, such precise information was not essential for the purposes of the dissertation. Besides survey data collection, semi—structured interviews with farmer leaders and organizational officials were also employed to determine how farmer leaders represent their constituents and how officials and organizations act upon farmer demands. Information was obtained on the relationships among organizations; of special interest was how NFAZ representatives interact with party and local government 105 officials, as NFAZ attempts to represent small farmers, influence policy, and develop organizational structures. During the course of preparing and conducting the survey (from the beginning of April through the end of October 1989), semi- structured interviews were conducted in the field with farmer leaders, local government officials, extension agents and others. Follow-up interviews were also conducted in April and 1 In gathering May 1990, after the end of the rainy season. data on the impact of small farmer political voice on government policy, semi—structured interviews were conducted in the capital, Harare (especially from December 1989 to March 1990), with members of parliament, officials in the farmers association (NFAZ), ZANU—PF, the extension service (AGRITEX), the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Planning, the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development, and other agencies. 4.3. Criteria for Site Selection and Sampling Two principal objectives of the research design were to ensure variation within the key variables and to make the sample as representative as possible. Consequently, the sampling methodology was purposive, though randomization was employed in the sample selection process. Variation was 1A list of persons interviewed is provided in the Bibliography. 106 sought through site selection and through the method of compiling the sampling frame at the various sites. Variation in agricultural and political capabilities, scope of demands and effectiveness was ensured by choosing four sites in Hurungwe Communal Land where the "smallholder revolution" had occurred after 1980 and four sites in Zaka Communal Land (also a District) where farmers had become politically active during the independence war. Two sites in agro—ecological zone II were included, where chances of prosperity and success were greatest, along with zones III and IV where success and well— being were less certain. Zone V, where arable agriculture is scarcely viable, was excluded from the site selection process. In seeking variation in the use of organizations, the uneven distribution of VSO activity throughout rural Zimbabwe prompted the selection of two sites were where evidence existed of substantial VSO activity. Finally, variation in the use of organizations, the expression of demands and effectiveness was sought by compiling the sampling frame at ward meetings which were called by local government officials and extension workers. It was assumed that such meetings would attract at least some of the most politically active farmers in their respective wards. The advantages and drawbacks of this method are discussed later in this chapter. The sample was selected to represent the population of small—scale communal farmers in Zimbabwe's agro—ecological .l 107 zones II, III and IV and, more generally, the population of Africa's small—scale communal farmers in areas where arable agriculture is viable. The actual representativeness of the sample in terms of socio—economic stratification is considered later in this chapter. Excluded from the survey were farmers in agro—ecological zone V as well as small-scale commercial farmers who own land and resettlement farmers who lease land from the government's Department of Rural Development (DERUDE). The principal methods of seeking a representative sample were random sampling of farmers who attended meetings at each site and site selection sites which accounted for the range of agro—ecological conditions and differential access to transport, roads and markets encountered by small farmers. Stratified sampling was conducted to ensure representation variation among females in the survey. The three principal strata selected were: single female heads of household (widows or divorcees); married females with husbands at home; and married females with husbands away. The objective of stratification was to generate cases belonging to each strata at each site which could be compared. While efforts were made to achieve representativeness, one cannot over—estimate the difficulties of representing a population of small farmers in rural Zimbabwe or rural Africa through random sampling. Given the concentration of VSOs in 108 certain areas and absence in others, random site selection most probably would have produced a survey without VSO presence. Similarly, within a ward, the possibility existed that randomization would have produced a sample of subsistence farmers and would have missed farmers who made a wide scope of demands. Achieving both a high degree of representativeness and variation would have required more than eight sites, a sample size much larger than 200 farmers, far greater resources, and a longer time frame than seven months.2 However, resources were limited, and the survey had to be prepared and conducted within the seven month dry period in order to secure an equivalent quality of responses on the 1988—9 growing season and on demands made between 1984 and 1989. Given the constraints, the research methods employed produced the necessary variation and an adequate representation of small—scale communal farmers in agro— ecological zones II, III and IV of Zimbabwe. 4.4. Field Survey Program, Timing and Content The first four months of the survey period (April to mid— July 1989) were devoted to sharpening and adding to the research questions drafted before the field work, developing a thorough, yet concise questionnaire, conducting preetests of 2(Stanning, 1988, 333). Using random sampling, widely diverse figures were obtained for cattle holdings in different sites in Hurungwe, ranging from 3.9 head at one site to 12.8 head at another. 109 the questionnaire, and formulating a site selection and sampling strategy. Several different questionnaires with varying interview formats were studied. Previous survey data and findings were reviewed, and published and unpublished sources, including government reports and statistics were studied.3 Advice was sought from researchers at the University of Zimbabwe, in government, in V805 and at the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies. A "one—shot" survey design and reliance on a single questionnaire required rigorous pre—testing, revision and translation in order to sharpen the survey instrument. Before arrival in Zimbabwe, a draft questionnaire was devised. In May 1989, with the assistance of the extension director for a national service organization, Silveira House, the questions in the draft questionnaire were asked in Shona (the vernacular language) of small farmers who operate cooperatives within a 100 kilometer radius of the capital city, Harare in Mashonaland East, Central and West Provinces. From this experience, the questionnaire was revised and expanded with more questions about organizations. The first formal pre—test was conducted in June 1989 in Mutoko Communal Land, 120 3Among the unpublished surveys consulted were (Adams, 1988; Amin and Chipika, 1990; Chipika, 1985; Cousins, 1987; Govaerts, 1989; Rohrbach, 1988; Department of Rural and Urban Development (RUD), University of Zimbabwe, 1988; Truscott, 1984; Strengthening the Role and Work of Women, 1989; and German Development Institute, 1988). 110 kilometers northeast of Harare, where the University of Zimbabwe was already conducting a research project on food security. The pre-test involved the assistance of a researcher from the University; of Zimbabwe/Michigan State University's Food Security Project who helped ask questions in Shona. Consequently, parts of the questionnaire were shortened, and more questions about organizations and the quality of life were added. After revising the questionnaire, it was translated into Shona and pre—tested again in Mutoko in July 1989. As a result of the final pre-test, the questionnaire was readily understandable by farmers and could be administered in an hour—and—a—half or less. The final product provoked considerable interest among farmers, and many asked why they had never been asked these types of questions before. While local translators/research assistants administered the questionnaire, the researcher and his spouse (who were both trained in Shona) directly supervised each interview and recorded the answers. This procedure was followed in order to maximize the instrument's accuracy and the overall quality of the survey data, as well as to pursue interesting lines of inquiry. The survey was timed to commence with the end of the 1989 harvest and to conclude before planting for the 1989—1990 season. This ensured that questions about currrent crop production and marketing would all refer to the 1988-1989 111 season. More importantly, by holding the survey during a period of relative inactivity, farmer attendance at meetings to explain the purpose of the research project and to select a random sample would be maximized. Farmers were asked what were the three assets or services they demanded the most over a five year period (1984-1989). The five year time frame was adopted to enable farmers to focus on a fixed period when the flow of government services had stabilized, as opposed to the surge of services which occurred during the immediate post— independence years (1980—1982). 4.5. Survey Sample Location: Communal Lands and Sites Two "communal lands" were chosen for the survey. One was located in a higher rainfall region where farmers could be reasonably assured of consistent yields and where it could be expected that farmers would be relatively more successful in getting agricultural services and assets (excluding land). The other communal land was located in a lower rainfall region where the majority of Zimbabwe's population lives. Four sites were selected in Hurungwe Communal Land where agricultural production has grown markedly over the past ten years, and four in Zaka District and Communal Land where overecrowding and erratic rainfall have hampered increases in productivity. In both communal lands, a variety of organizations, channels and farmer groups exist which assist small farmers. Finally, little research had been conducted in the two locations. As 112 mentioned previously, rainfall levels and transport to markets are two rural stratification variables which affect agricultural productivity and marketing. Consequently, within each communal land, one site was chosen with relatively good rainfall and good access to markets, one with good rainfall and poor access, one with poor rainfall and good access and one with poor rainfall and poor access. The survey population in each site was based upon the ward, a larger unit than the village, because of the greater potential diversity in responses to the questionnaire than would be expected if samples were drawn from villages. Wards have been demarcated to contain approximately 600 families or‘ a population of 6,000, but they often hold many more people. A list of potential sites was provided by the government extension service (AGRITEX), and selection was carried out in consultation with local government (the District Council) and AGRITEX. The eight sites selected: 113 Table 6 Survey Site Selection 1. Hurungwe Communal Land (Good) Agro—ecological Conditions Good (Zone II) Average (Zone III) Distance Close (<10 kms) Maumbe Ward Mudzimu from Market Far (>30 kms) Doro Chimusimbe 2. Zaka Communal Land/District (Average) Agro—ecological Conditions Average (Zone III) Poor (Zone IV) Distance Close (<10 kms) Nhema North Chidzurira from Market Far (>30 kms) Nhema South Murembwa 4.6. Survey Sample Selection The method of sample selection was arrived at after four months of consultations with fellow researchers and with government officials. Given the aim of ensuring variation in political capabilities and organizational activity within the sample, it was decided to have local government officials and extension workers call for farmers throughout each ward to attend meetings (at the convenience of the farmers) at which the purpose of the research would be explained and questions answered. From the farmers present at the meetings, a sample of 25 farmers (15 males and 10 females) in each of the eight ward woulds be randomly selected for interviews, for a total sample size of 200. Those who attended and were not randomly selected were informed that they would not be interviewed, and 114 those who were selected scheduled appointments for interviews either on the same day or later in the week. The meetings were called on days in which farmers were relatively free so that those who were interested in the research project would be able to attend. As mentioned previously, it was expected that some of the farmers who were interested in attending would be relatively more politically active and would be more effective in making and fulfilling demands. As explained earlier, timing was another factor in deciding upon the method of sample selection. The process of sampling and interviewing had to be carried out between the end of July, after the end of the 1989 harvest, and the end of October, before 1989—1990 planting season totally consumed the attention of farmers. Sampling at meetings saved a considerable amount of time which would have been spent composing lists of ward residents. Subsequently, members of the sample were scheduled for interviews at the ward's business center so that the survey could be completed at each site in a week and so that confidentiality could be ensured. In pre-tests, female farmers were particularly reluctant to be interviewed within the homestead, and interviews at business centers enabled female respondents to be more open. The researcher was more than aware of the biases which could have been generated by such a method of sample selection. The trade—offs between the ability to make 115 statistical inferences from the sample to the population, on the one hand, and the need to ensure variation, on the other, have already been discussed. The socio—economic stratification of the survey, discussed below, includes a range of small farmers, from the very poor to the relatively wealthy which is largely reflective of the regions sampled. Although purposive sampling methods were used, it is not unreasonable to make statistical inferences using this sample. The other risk of bias posed by the sampling procedures was the risk of familiarity. The possibility existed that a ward meeting called by local officials and by extension workers would produce respondents who were close to those officials and thus uncritical of the agencies concerned. Judging from the extensive and sometimes probing comments that farmers made about organizations and officials, farmers in each ward did not appear to feel constrained from speaking about the problems which they experienced with agencies and officials. Another bias problem was the possibility that farmers from one village in a ward might be the overwhelming majority attending the research project meeting and, consequently, give the same answers tC) the questionnaire. However, in each ward, several different villages were represented, and there was considerable variation in responses. 116 4.7. Stratified Sampling According to Gender and Marital Status Attendance at the project meetings ranged from a high of 95 farmers in Nhema South Ward to a low of 42 in Maumbe Ward. With each ward having approximately 600 farming households, the meetings ranged from a high of sixteen per cent of households represented (in Nhema South) to a low of seven per cent (in Maumbe). As the farmers gathered, their names were listed. In addition, women were asked their marital status. After the purposes of the project were explained and questions answered, 15 male farmers were randomly selected from the list. After reading the names of the farmers selected, the farmers who were not chosen were thanked and those who were chosen were scheduled for interviews at a time during the week at their convenience. In order to account for the views and experiences of a range of female farmers, the survey aimed to select 80 females of which 40 would be single. Accordingly, at each site, five married and five single women were randomly—selected from lists composed at the project meeting. In Hurungwe, where relatively few men go away to work (Stanning, 1988), four married women with husbands at home and one with husbands away were selected at each site. In Zaka, where more men go away to work, two women with husbands at home and three with husband away were selected at each site. The only exception 117 to this rule was in Maumbe Ward, where only six single females attended the sample selection meeting and where all six were selected to be interviewed. The results of sample selection from among female farmers are tabulated below: Table 7 Marital Status of Females Sampled by Communal Land Hurungwe Zaka Total Married, Husband at Home 12 8 20 Marital Married, Husband Away 3 12 15 Status Single (widowed, divorced, unmarried) 21 20 41 Total 36 40 76 4.8. Hurungwe Communal Land and the Sites Selected Hurungwe Communal Land is situated ijl the north of Zimbabwe in Hurungwe District, Mashonaland West Province. Approximately half of Hurungwe is in Agro—ecological Zone IIa (with rainfall levels suitable for intensive farming), and the other half is in Zone III (suitable for semi—intensive farming). Hurungwe adjoins one of the best commercial farming areas in Zimbabwe (around the town of Karoi). Many farmers in Hurungwe once worked on commercial farms where some were able to accumulate funds to purchase agricultural assets and start producing for the market. Many farmers who were engaged in agricultural marketing expressed the desire to expand their small land holdings by resettling on the prime commercial farming land to the east. 118 Before the 19505, Hurungwe was sparsely populated by people speaking the Korekore dialect of Shona; the area was undeveloped and subject to invasions by wild animals. In the 19605, settlers speaking the Karanga dialect of Shona began moving in from Masvingo and Midlands Provinces to take advantage of less-crowded conditions. During the independence struggle, the guerilla army, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), and its political wing, Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), crossed the border from Zambia and operated in the area, winning over large numbers of supporters. After independence, ZANU(PF) established itself as the party of government in Hurungwe, but popular support for ZAPU persisted. Hurungwe was the site of considerable political contention between the ruling party and ZAPU during the election of 1985 and between ZANU(PF) and the Zimbawe Unity Movement (ZUM) in 1990. Hurungwe has been one of the communal lands where the "smallholder revolution" occurred, witnessing a boom in small farmer production of maize and cotton. Because of the area's productivity, governmental and parastatal activity have been strong. The extension agency (AGRITEX) and the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) have vigorously promoted the use of improved seed and fertilizer packages, obtainable through annual loans. The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) has concentrated considerable effort in Hurungwe, establishing two 119 depots and several collection points. In 1980—81, the GMB purchased an estimated 5,734 metric tons of maize from small— scale communal farmers; the following year, 1981—82, 33,534 tons were purchased; and by 1986-87, 96,392 were purchased (Stanning, 1988, 331) As a consequence of the smallholder revolution in Hurungwe, most farmers have had access to loans for fertilizer and improved seeds at one time or another and have been involved in agricultural marketing. Certified master farmers have been encouraged to diversify into the production of tobacco, soy beans and other cash crops. In spite of growing prosperity and the attention of agricultural institutions, there is a widely—held perception in Hurungwe that education, health and other social services as well as local government and VSOs have not developed as rapidly in Hurungwe as in other communal lands. Since Hurungwe has not been a stronghold of the ruling party, ZANU(PF), the area has not received attention from prominent members of parliament and other politicians. To the contrary, many ZANU(PF) leaders perceive Hurungwe to be a center of opposition. 4.8.1. Maumbe Ward Maumbe is a site with good rainfall (Zone IIa) and good access to market — the GMB depot at Magunje is less than 10 kilometers to the south. Agricultural production began to expand in Maumbe in the 19705 and is now a center of maize and 120 cotton production in Hurungwe. Consequently, a land shortage has developed in the ward, particularly among master farmers, and a nearby resettlement scheme (Nyamakate) is not large enough to satisfy demands for land. Most farmers interviewed in Hurungwe managed to get Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) loans in fertilizer and other assets, but many complained that they usually received half the amount for which they applied. One of the three AFC group—lending pilot schemes in Hurungwe was centered in Maumbe and was functioning well.4 NFAZ and the Catholic Development Commission (CADEC) were the only VSOs operating in the ward; CADEC was helping to construct dams. 4.8.2. Doro Ward Doro is a site with good rainfall (Zone IIa) but with poor access to market - almost 30 kilometers north of the GMB depot in Magunje. However, a new road was constructed in 1989 to Doro by the District Development Fund which improved the transport situation. In spite of improved infrastructure, farmers were still experiencing problems with locating transporters and with high charges. Transport fees of $1.00US 4AFC group lending operates through peer pressure in loan repayment. Loans are disbursed through groups of 10—20 farmers, and future loans are conditional upon repayment of exisiting loans by every member of the group. Farmers pay 10% of the interest to AFC and 3% to the group to cover administrative costs. In Mashonaland West, repayment rates for groups are approximately 85% as opposed to rates of less than 50% for farmers as a whole. 121 or 232.50 were charged in 1989 to haul one 91 kg. bag of maize to the Magunje GMB depot, and $.80 US or ZS2 were charged to transport a bag of fertilizer from Magunje to Doro. The area has been quite productive, and most farmers interviewed had, at one time, received fertilizer loans. However, requests for assistance in building a clinic, bridges and a better school had gone unheeded. Doro was a ward where farmers were improving production, but where non—agricultural service delivery was lagging behind. As in Maumbe, the only VSOs involved in Doro were NFAZ and CADEC. 4.8.3. Mudzimu Ward Mudzimu is a site with relatively poor rainfall (Zone III), but with excellent access to market — a Grain Marketing Board depot had been established at Mudzimu growth point. With the establishment of the GMB depot in Mudzimu, farmers had turned their attention to obtaining a Cotton Marketing Board depot. In 1989, transporters charged S8 US (2320) per bale to haul cotton to the Karoi CMB depot. Conditions for agricultural marketing in Mudzimu were good, and many farmers had received "fertilizer" loans through AFC. However, many farmers interviewed were not prospering and were unable to secure loans. It appears that many farmers had defaulted on their AFC loans largely because of a misappropriation of GMB checks by the Central Association of 122 Cooperative Unions — an umbrella organization for marketing and supply cooperatives. A number of VSOs were operating in the Mudzimu area, including the national service organizations, Zimbabwe Christian Council, Zimbabwe Project and CADEC, and membership organizations, NFAZ and the Organization of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe (OCCZIM). International service organizations involved in Mudzimu included Red Barna (Norway's Save the Children) and AFRICARE, and international development agencies (IDAs) included SIDA, USAID, and UNDP. The FAO/CIDA project, "Strengthening Women's Role and Work in Rural Development" was also operating in Mudzimu, among twenty other sites in Mashonaland West Province. An OCCZIM member, Mr. Kembo Mpofu, was quite active in the ward, helping to bring VSOs and IDAs to Mudzimu as well as raising the awareness of farmers about the range of organizations which could be called upon for assistance. 4.8.4. Chimusimbe Ward Chimusimbe is a site with relatively poor rainfall (Zone III) and with extremely poor roads which was more than 30 kilometers from Mudzimu GMB depot. A GMB collection point had been proposed for Chimusimbe but had not materialized. When the survey was conducted, there was no AGRITEX officer and few master farmer trainees. Local officials, including the ward councillor, were perceived by respondents to be ineffective. 123 Farmers in Chimusimbe were poorer than at other sites in Hurungwe (though not as poor as in other parts of Zimbabwe). and some were involved in "food—for work" projects to alleviate the effects of drought. Respondents felt that they were in a "remote" location and that agricultural services, organizations and social services were by-passing them. 4.9. Zaka Communal Land and the Sites Selected Zaka is located in Masvingo Province in the southeast of Zimbabwe. Zaka is one of the few communal lands in Zimbabwe which does not share a district with commercial farming land and white—run rural councils. Consequently, little commercial farming land is available in the vicinity, except for ranch land in the low veld (Zones IV and V). Approximately a third of Zaka is in Agro—ecological Zone III, suitable for semi- intensive farming, and the other two—thirds is in Zone IV, suitable for semi—extensive farming. Like most of Masvingo Province‘s communal lands, Zaka suffers from overcrowding and a land shortage. Since there are relatively few commercial farms adjoining Zaka, men either travel to major urban centers or to the sugar plantations to the south of Zaka to find work. Many families depend on income from outside of Zaka to survive. The people of Zaka were heavily involved in the liberation war during the late 19705, and the area strongly favors ZANU(PF). After independence, Zaka received its share 124 of new schools, health clinics, a GMB depot and collection points, and other services. Several severe droughts have set back hopes of agricultural development in Zaka, especially in Zone IV, and have contributed to a drop in the water table. The drying up) of wells has led residents to demand the building of dams and the sinking of new boreholes. The District Council has been unable to cope with the increased demand for water projects. Because of Zaka's inconsistent productivity, the AFC has become more careful in granting loans to farmers. In recent years, loans have been given mainly to master farmers with a proven record of productivity and marketing through the GMB. The marketing of maize at the GMB depot in Jerera has not exceeded 5,000 metric tons in any one season.5 The small deliveries of maize and other crops to GMB depots and collection points, such as those in Zaka, has led to proposals to close under—utilized markets. Overcrowding and poor soil quality have led AGRITEX, in coordination with NFAZ, to concentrate on teaching soil conservation methods and in establishing and preserving grazing schemes rather than encouraging the marketing of maize and cotton. The increasing tillage of land by communal farmers has led to shrinkage in the amount of land available 5This rough estimate was obtained discussions by the researcher with GMB officials at Jerera, Zaka District in September 1989. 125 for grazing which has led to decreasing availability of manure which has contributed to declining productivity. Another alternative to agricultural marketing, promoted by AGRITEX, NFAZ and other organizations in Zaka, have been a range of small—scaleedevelopment projects, including gardening, poultry and forestry cooperatives, other income—generating projects (e.g., fence-making and sewing), and grazing schemes. Zaka has numerous master farmer clubs, and NFAZ records show that 246 clubs have paid NFAZ dues (for a total of 6—7,000 members).6 As in Hurungwe, NFAZ in Zaka has pushed for improved marketing facilities, including GMB depots and collection points, better and cheaper transport and empty 91 kg. bags, and for the expansion of AFC lending for fertilizer—improved seed packages. Because of the land shortage, NFAZ is also involved in pressing for resettlement land. Zaka farmers do not appear to be as involved in AGRITEX training groups as their Hurungwe counterparts. They are more involved in labor pooling "nhimbe" groups and in gardening and poultry cooperatives at the village level. Some farmers market produce and buy inputs through the Masvingo Cooperative Union, a counterpart of CACU in Mashonaland. VSOs in Zaka include the International Voluntary Service, CADEC, and Swissaid. The 6NFAZ membership statistics were provided by Mr. Jacob Mufirakurewa, NFAZ Provincial Organizer, in Masvingo in May 1989. L 126 development of local government institutions in Zaka is proceeding; VIDCOs and WADCOs are functioning in most areas. The District Council is burdened by additional pressures for resettlement land and water development. 4.9.1. Nhema North Ward Nhema North has better average rainfall (Zone III) than the rest of Zaka and good access to market; a GMB Collection Point is located in the ward, though hardly—used. However, the advantages of good rainfall and proximate markets are negated by a severe land shortage and by poor soils due to hilly and stony terrain. Consequently, even though Mudzimu in Hurungwe and Nhema North in Zaka are both in Zone III, the latter is much poorer. Besides some NFAZ activity, VSO presence in Nhema North is not significant. 4.9.2. Nhema South Ward Nhema South has good rains (Zone III) for Zaka and somewhat better soils than Nhema North. However, transport is scarce and roads are extremely poor which have hampered the ward's access to markets and government services. Even with good roads, the GMB depot at Jerera is more than 30 kilometers away. Officials and farmers alike commented that Nhema South suffered from a land shortage. Contact with organizations was limited due to infrastructural obstacles. While NFAZ was present in Nhema South, there was little evidence of VSO activity. 127 4.9.3. Chidzurira Ward Chidzurira is less than ten kilometers from the GMB depot at Jerera Growth Point. However, most farmers are not taking advantage of the proximity of the GMB because of a shortage of water. Rainfall is poor (Zone IV), and the water table is falling. The ward is becoming over—populated due to an acute land shortage and by people's desire to be close to the growth point in order to take advantage of commercial opportunities. Organizations are active in Chidzurira, including local government (VIDCOs and the WADCO), AGRITEX and a number of VSOs. 4.9.4. Murembwa Ward Murembwa is potentially the worst site for marketing agricultural products, with poor rains (Zone IV) and poor access to markets (the Jerera GMB depot is approximately 30 kilometers away). As in other parts of Zaka, farmers in Murembwa did not have sufficient land, though the shortage is less acute than in other sites. Few farmers get assistance from the AFC, and few market substantial amounts of maize, sunflowers and cotton at the GMB. However, the ward has benefitted recently from the presence of V805 and a series of integrated development projects. International Voluntary Services (IVS), in cooperation with NFAZ, AGRITEX and Swissaid, established a multi—purpose project with gardening, poultry, and fence—making 128 cooperatives, a community training center, and grazing schemes. While the projects have experienced problems such as transporting products to market at Jerera growth point, the project and cooperative training have raised living standards and induced farmers to believe that their quality of life had improved and that the services offered by various organizations had improved. As one farmer commented, "Before, there was kwashiorkor, now there is none." 4.10. Socio—economic Stratification for Data Analysis The remainder of this chapter‘ is concerned with the socio—economic stratification of the sample, the degree of representativeness, and procedures for dividing the sample into rich, middle and poor strata for analysis purposes. Rural stratification in terms of variation in gender and marital status as well as agro-ecological zones, distance from markets, and communal lands was ensured through the process of site and sample selection. Of the total sample size of 200 farmers, 25 were interviewed in each of the eight sites, with 100 respondents in Hurungwe and 100 in Zaka, with 100 more than 30 kilometers from markets and 100 less than 30 kilometers, and with 50 respondents in agro—ecological zone II, 100 in zone III, and 50 in zone IV. Random sampling of farmers who attended research project meetings was intended to secure variation in socio—economic stratification. The principal indicator chosen to measure 129 socio—economic stratification was cattle holdings, with land utilization as a secondary indicator. Additional indicators were 1) labor hiring; 2) draft power; 3) farm equipment; 4) amount of crops marketed; and 5) roof composition. The farmers were classified in "rich—middle—poor" categories by using survey responses concerning cattle holdings, land utilization and other assets. A number of studies of rural Zimbabwe divide small—scale communal farmers according to the "poor—middle—rich" classification and find a high degree of correlation among cattle holdings, land use and crops marketed (Cousins, 1989, 1990; Amin and Chipika, 1990). The rich— middle—poor division still accurately represents socio- economic stratification in rural Zimbabwe, especially as there are few signs of the emergence of a commercial farming class or a rural proletariat in the communal lands. Labor hiring continues to be manifested through informal networks, rather than through a labor market (Adams, 1989). The absence of commercial farming in the communal lands is also related to limited land holdings, communal land tenure and a lack of title deeds for collateral. Because of the difficulty of obtaining land, rich communal farmers face obstacles in further expanding production, and farmers with off—farm incomes and businessmen are reluctant to invest in communal agriculture. 130 4.10.1. Cattle Holdings and Socio—economic Stratification Cattle holdings are one of the most commonly—used measures of wealth and stratification in studies of small farmers in Africa. Cattle are valued in many regions of the continent, including Zimbabwe, for their role in inter—family marriage arrangements, as well as for draft power, manure and other purposes. In the questionnaire, farmers were asked the following: "Does your family have any of the following livestock? If so, how many?"7 They were then asked how many cows, oxen, bulls, heifers and steers which they owned or held. In asking about the types of cattle held, greater precision was achieved in responses about the total number of cattle. Answers ranged from 37 respondents (18.5% of the sample) who had no cattle to one respondent with 40 cattle. Because of the skewedness of distribution of cattle holdings, the median is used to measure central tendency. The median is six cattle, with a median of seven for Hurungwe — with more land and greater productivity than average — and five for Zaka — with scarcity of land, both for grazing cattle and for cultivation. In deciding on a criterion to divide the sample into "rich, middle and poor" strata, the determination of the Central Statistics Office was accepted that less than four 7Shona translation: "Mhuri yenyu ine zvipfuyo zvinotevera here? Zvingani?" 131 cattle was an indication of household poverty. Holding less than four cattle is a sign of relative poverty, because farmers have few cattle to produce manure and do not possess enough oxen (at least two) to adequately till their fields. In the sample, 66 farmers or a third claimed to hold less than four cattle, while the other two-thirds claimed to hold more. Consequently, the sample was divided in thirds with 67 farmers holding between four and eight cattle coded as "middle farmers" and 67 who held more than eight characterized as "rich". In terms of representativeness, figures for cattle holdings in the sample compare reasonably to other studies. In Hurungwe, the mean for the sample's cattle holdings was 8.45 head and the median was seven. Stanning's survey (1988) arrived at a sample mean of 6.8 head for Hurungwe, with a wide variance in mean holdings from site to site, ranging from 3.9 to 12.8 head. Whereas the national survey found that 70 per cent of households held less than four cattle (Zimbabwe, Central Statistics Office, 1986), in the sample, 33 per cent held less than four. 4.10.2. Correlates of Socio—economic Stratification Land use, draft power, farm equipment, crops marketed, labor hire, and roof composition were used as correlates of socio—economic stratification. They were selected in order to confirm that cattle holdings was an accurate indicator of 132 socio—economic stratification and in order to test the explanatory power of cattle holdings during the process of data analysis. 4.10.2.1. Land Use In many agrarian societies, land ownership is a key indicator of wealth and status. In the communal lands of Zimbabwe, land is not owned so there is no basis for a landed elite which hires out land to landless or poor peasants. However, the growing shortage of land means that farmers who already hold land are in a more advantageous position than those, especially younger farmers, who do not. Those in need of land must ask the local headman (sabhuku) or the Village Development Committee (VIDCO) to allocate land for farming, or they must apply for resettlement land through the District Council. The size of land holdings per household is difficult to ascertain due to variable use of grazing land and the lack of title deeds. The most reliable measure is the amount of land used or "cropped area" in a particular year. Accordingly, farmers were asked: "Last year, how much land did you cultivate in order to grow crops?"8 Answers ranged from one acre (.4 hectares) to 25 acres (ten hectares), with a mean of six acres (2.4 hectares). Given the primacy of cattle holdings as an indicator and the correlation of other aShona: "Gore rapera, makarima munda wakakura sei?" 133 indicators with cattle holdings, it was decided to divide the sample into thirds when coding land holdings. Consequently, 68 farmers who claimed to have used one to four acres (.4 — 1.6 hectares) were coded as "poor"; 74 who used five to seven acres (two to 2.8 hectares) were coded as "middle" and 58 who used eight to twenty-five acres (three to ten hectares) were coded as "rich". In terms of representativeness, the sample mean for land use in Hurungwe was 3.4 hectares, compared with Stanning's mean of 3.3 hectares for "cropped area" and 3.9 for "field area". The table below illustrates land use in Hurungwe which is significantly higher than for Zaka: Table 8 Land Used for Farming by Communal Land Hurungwe Zaka Total 1—4 acres/.4-1.6 ha 22 46 68 5—7 acres/2—2.8 ha 30 44 74 8—25 acres/3.2—10 ha 48 10 58 Total 100 100 200 Zimbabwe's farmers have less access to land than most of their African counterparts, except in Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and a few other countries. In regard to Zimbabwe, the sample illustrates the discrepancy between land use in different regions of Zimbabwe. The discrepancy between land holdings in Hurungwe and Zaka is more extreme than the discrepancy between cattle holdings (and draft power) in the two communal lands. 134 A first impression in Zaka (and in most of Masvingo Province) is that the land problem (and over—population) affects most farmers and that the problem is more severe there than in any other province. In Hurungwe, while many farmers had access to more than four hectares, some of the farmers interviewed only managed to till a hectare due to a lack of draft power and other inputs. The degree to which sample respondents had the same levels of cattle holdings and land use was a concern in using socio—economic stratification as an explanatory variable. Table 9 demonstrates a fairly7 high degree (of correlation between the two indicators: Table 9 Land Used for Farming by Cattle Holdings Row 0—3 cattle 4—8 cattle 9-40 cattle Total 1~4 acres/.4—1.6 ha 41 17 11 69 2O 5% 8 5% 5 5% 34 5% 5~7 acres/2-2.8 ha 22 29 25 76 11 0% 14 5% 12 5% 38 0% 8—25 acres/3.2—1O ha 3 20 32 55 1 5% 10 0% 16 0% 27 5% Column Total 66 66 68 200 33 0% 33 0% 34 0% 100% Chi Square = 45.78 Significance = .0001 Measure of Association (tau b) = .413 135 4.10.2.2. Farm Eguipment and Draft Power The farm equipment and draft power which farmers possess are determinants of economic well—being in terms of the ability to cultivate and to produce enough for subsistence and the market. Farmers without farm equipment must rely on hoes for tillage which makes it quite difficult to produce even at a subsistence level. Those with one piece of equipment (usually a plow) often over—use it and are often faced with breakdown. Those with two to three pieces may own more than one plow, a scotchcart, or a harrow. Those with more than three pieces are well—equipped. Levels of draft power were measured by the number of oxen (or in a few cases, donkeys) held by a farmer and whether or not at least one plow was owned. Farmers with one ox or less or with no plow were considered to be "poorly—equipped." Farmers with two to three oxen and a plow were "adequately—equipped." Farmers with more than three oxen and a plow were "well—equipped." Table 10 Farm Equipment by Communal Land Hurugw ___________ 2 wk... _________ 38;; {Jiliééllppéé {o 111—Egg) ’ I; ________________ {6 ________ 5; Poorly—equipped (1) 20 38 58 Adequately—equipped (2—3) 26 30 56 Well-equipped (4 or more) 40 22 62 136 Table 11 Draft Power by Communal Land _______________________ QLEL;;;;—"____’_'_2;5;§__"_"_‘%;E;1 5;;;1;i;;;;gg;a ____________ 5% _______________ £6 —————————— é? Adequately-equipped 36 38 74 Well—equipped 37 22 59 """"""" 63E;{”""________3}£f'—_—___"______166_____—_"__§66‘ Compared to the 34.5 per cent of the sample who could be considered "poor" in terms of cattle holdings, 41 per cent of the sample were poor in terms of farm equipment, and 33.5 per cent considered poor in terms of draft power. Another measure of stratification in terms of draft power is whether or not farmers hired or hired out draft animals or tractors. The measure of draft hire is not as accurate an indicator of stratification, because some rich farmers hired draft power in the form of tractors, and some poor farmers without draft animals were forced to hire draft power. Nevertheless, it is significant that a majority of the sample either hired or hired out draft power. Table 12 Draft Hire by Communal Land __—___________—"_"“—“""”'QLLLLQL; __________ igfg """"""" iéééi élléé ________________________ $5 _________________ ii __________ ;g Hired Out 27 15 42 Did Neither 36 44 80 137 4.10.2.3. Crops Marketed Another correlate of socio—economic stratification and an indicator of agricultural capability are the amount of crops which farmers are able to market. Farmers were asked what types of crops they grew in the 1988—89 season and the types of crops which they sold. Farmers were‘also asked about the amounts of crops which were sold. Maize, sunflower, groundnuts, cotton and small grains were the principal crops sold. Producer prices for the 1989 harvest were used to compute a figure for the amount paid by the GMB to farmers for their various crops: Producer Prices for 1989: Maize = Z8215 per metric ton Groundnuts = ZS650/mt Cotton = ZS925/mt Soy beans = ZS462/mt Sunflower = ZS465/mt The resulting measure lacked precision, partly because of the different gradings given to crops. However, the resulting estimates were sufficiently precise for data analysis. In regard to the range, many farmers in the sample marketed none of their crops, while the highest amount marketed was 470 bags of maize (42.8 metric tonnes) or approximately 239,200. The sample was divided into thirds to reflect poor, middle and rich strata of farmers. A substantial gap in the sample distribution between those poorer farmers who marketed Z8500 or less and those who marketed more (ZS500—1600) was used as the dividing point 138 between poor and middle farmers. A smaller gap between those who marketed ZS500—1,600 and those who marketed more than ZSl,600 was used to separate middle and rich farmers. Table 13 Levels of Crops Marketed "mmm""m"""EQLELQEEEE ________ 15 (QC-.1155;— Zimdollars Bags of Maize Metric Tons of Maize LQIW'TZETJTQOB ___________ 02 5— "5;; __________ 6 T ‘2' 3:5,}; Middle ZS500 — 1,600 26 — 80 bags 2.4 — 7.4 tons High Z$1,600 — 9,200 81 — 470 bags 7.4 — 42.8 tons Table 14 Levels of Crops Marketed by Communal Land Hurunge ______________ £25.; _________ Total L2,; _______________________ 5 5— ________________ slim—”ITS Middle 28 26 54 High 47 6 53 TotallOOlOO __________ £66— Table 15 Levels of Crops Marketed by Natural Region I: ___________ f ff _________ Ex?" L2,; ______________________________ 5 2‘2.— ________ ééé __________ £892 Middle 24% 29% 26% High 54% 19% 8% The farmers in Hurungwe and Zone IIa who marketed crops worth more than ZSl,600 are atypical when compared to African 139 small farmers. Farmers outside those areas who market less than 231,600 are more representative. The discrepancy between levels of crops marketed in Hurungwe compared to Zaka illustrates the shortage of assets (land, draft power and farm equipment) for farmers in Zaka. It also reflects the substantially higher levels of loans for fertilizer which are available to Hurungwe farmers. Farmers in the relatively well—watered region II seem to market a significantly higher amount of crops. However, most of the region III farmers who market higher levels are located in Hurungwe. The fact that Hurungwe is a more productive communal area has attracted agricultural institutions, especially the AFC, and has widened the gap between Hurungwe and poorer areas such as Zaka. Distance from market was chosen as a measure of rural stratification. However, the following table illustrates the inapplicability of distance as a measure of rural stratification. Table 16 Levels of Crops Marketed by Access to Market __________________ c3555"{Uri—£135”—“”135?17:361.}; Middle 25 29 High 28 25 140 Market access does not explain the volume of crops marketed. Even though the sites with poor access were more than 25 kilometers away from a GMB depot or collection point, farmers who wanted to market their produce managed to secure transport after a struggle. The two sites in Zaka with good market access were poor agricultural areas, because of inadequate soils or insufficient water. Some transporters preferred to provide service to farmers who were farther from the GMB, because they could generally charge higher rates. Farmers in closer proximity could always look for other transporters if the rates were too high. 4.10.2.4. Labor Hired As mentioned previously, the hiring of labor is a widely~ used measure for class formation and rural stratification. In the questionnaire, farmers were asked if they experienced a labor shortage during the 1988-89 season - most replied that they had. They then were asked if they had hired labor and paid either in cash or kind. Excluded from the answer was labor acquired through nhimbe or labor-pooling. The following table contains the responses: 141 Table 17 Labor Hired by Communal Land Hurungwe Zaka Total Hired Labor 45 28 73 Did Not Hire Labor 55 72 127 Total 100 100 200 It could be concluded that more farmers in Hurungwe could afford to hire labor than in Zaka. However, labor hire is not a good indicator of economic status, because much of the labor was hired by poorer farmers (especially by single women) who were forced by a shortage of assets to hire draft power and labor. 4.10.2.5. Roof Composition It can be assumed that farmers who have installed roofs composed of corrugated iron sheets or asbestoes on at least one of their buildings are richer than their counterparts who rely exclusively on thatched roofs. From the sample, 149 (74.5%) had "all thatched roofs" on their dwellings, whereas 51 (25.5%) had some iron sheets or asbestoes roofing. Roof composition helps to differentiate between roughly one—third of the sample who were "rich" farmers and the remaining two— thirds. It confirms that the third of the sample with modern roofing were richer farmers who also held more cattle and land. However, roof composition does not differentiate between middle and poor farmers. 142 4.11. Conclusion The empirical procedures adopted to describe and explain political voice among small—scale communal farmers in Zimbabwe ensured both variation in the key variables as well as a sample which was fairly representative of the population of small farmers. Before going to the field, it was decided that variation was essential to achieve, and data collection procedures reflected that focus. At the same time, data analysis reveals that the sample is not excessively biased toward richer farmers. The sites selected were also representative of the varying agro—ecological and infrastructural conditions prevailing in Zimbabwe. In the succeeding chapters, the rural stratification variables, developed in this chapter, will be used tC) determine if political voice is the preserve of richer farmers or if a wide range of farmers are able to express voice. Cattle holdings will used as the principal measure of socio-economic stratification. r; .. I! f. 1... «.6... to. .r .: . 4;: 1.1.5.. 1. .. 1.... . . .. Is... 7:... 17‘ \r-(ca (on (its! .3. . 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Introduction A principal assumption of the dissertation is that, in countries where the state is non-antagonistic toward farmers and where farmers possess capabilities, political voice is manifested as demands for agricultural assets and services. The following chapter presents an analysis of political voice in terms of the demands that small farmers make in Zimbabwe. Especially indicative of political voice are demands for program and policy change; those demands are described and assessed in characterizing the level of political voice which farmers express. In seeking evidence of political voice, attention is given to efforts to expand the pool of assets and services and to change the patterns of distribution. In this chapter, explanations are sought for variation in the scope and content of demands. Of special concern is the possibility of a gap between richer and poorer farmers in terms of the scope and content of demands that they make. This concern leads to an examination of cases where less capable farmers express political voice. Also of concern are the steps farmers take in making demands, including multiple requests and joint action. More detailed analysis of the actions that are taken and organizations that are used by farmers is provided in Chapter Six. The survey of small farmers in Hurungwe Communal Land and Zaka District focuses on the 1984—1989 period. As mentioned 144 in Chapter Three, farmers were expressing political voice and making demands for program and policy change before 1984, especially in the post—independence period of 1980 and 1981. Farmer political voice during that period helped to bring about the redistribution and the availability of services and assets (Callear, 1982; Ranger, 1985, 296—299). An additional note is that small farmers made few if any demands to the colonial government for program and policy change in the pre— independence period before 1980. 5.2. The Agricultural Problems of Small Farmers The starting point in analyzing small farmer demands is to describe, through two existing data sources and through the survey, their agricultural problems and needs. A majority of small farmers in Africa are asset—poor and, in Zimbabwe, 70 per cent have been found to have less than four cattle — the most important asset. It is therefore expected that most farmers make demands for assets, first by attempting to purchase them and then by demanding government intervention to make them easier to obtain. A survey of farmers' problems, conducted by the University of Zimbabwe's Department of Rural and Urban Planning (RUP) and the Belgian VSO, COOPIBO, in Mutoko Communal Land, divides the problems that farmers experience into four categories — "Farm Problems," "Problems with Selling Crops," "Problems with Loans," and "Problems Securing Inputs" 145 — reflecting four stages of the farming process."1 Within each of the four categories, Farmers were asked to mention the problems which they experienced. Farm (production) Problems and Problems with Selling Crops are listed below according to the percentage of farmers who mentioned them. Table 18 Farm Problems Problem Percentage 1. Inputs inadequate ................................... 40.5% 2. Draft power ......................................... 38% 3. Money ... ............................................ 31% 4. Poor soils .......................................... 29% 5. Land shortage ....................................... 27% 6. Equipment inadequate ................................ 24% 7. Labor shortage ...................................... 9% 8. Poor farming practices .............................. 7% 9. Lack of extension ................................... 5% 10. Water shortage ..................................... % Table 19 Problems with Selling Crops Problem Percentage l. Poor'Iransport ...................................... 17.0% 2. Availability‘of Empty Bags .......................... 11.0% 3. No'Transport .. ...................................... 11.5% 4.‘Transport costs ..................................... 9.5% 5. Lack of roads ....................................... 7.5% 6. Low producer prices ................................. 6.0% lThe RUP Survey was used by the researcher as one of several references in preparing the list of assets and services which were included in the questionnaire and which were read to farmers during interviews. Of the farmers who mentioned "problems with loans,” 35.5 per cent mentioned repayment — far more than any other problem. Of the farmers who responded to the question concerning "problems securing inputs," 33 per cent indicated that they had no problems. Very few mentioned problems with securing inputs. 146 The problems mentioned by farmers are diverse, including problems with simple assets, such as draft power and equipment, as well as problems with services. A dichotomy exists between the content of production problems and that of crop—selling. When referring to farming problems, farmers mention problems with assets, including inputs and draft power. When asked about marketing, farmers complain of a shortage of services, especially transport problems. In Table 18, the average percentage of production problems mentioned by respondents was 21.5 per cent, while the average was 12.5 per cent for marketing problems. The relatively lower number of marketing problems mentioned indicates that relatively few farmers in the Mutoko sample are engaged in marketed agriculture and concerned with agricultural services. The higher number of farmers mentioning production problems indicates that more farmers want agricultural assets. The RUP survey also found that richer farmers tend to demand services whereas poorer farmers demand assets.2 The RUP survey provides some ideas about the actions that farmers might take and the demands that they might make in order to get what they want. When asked about solutions to 0 farming problems, farmers mentioned "work harder" (7%), Uhe RUP survey ensured richer and poorer farmers were represented by stratifying the sample according to draft ownership and labor availability (RUP, University of Zimbabwe, 1988). 147 "money" (14.5%), and "fertilizer" (10%). A quarter of the sample believed that nothing could be done to solve their problems. Farmers surveyed did not mention demands for program or policy change; nor did they mention such actions as "forming a group," "asking an organization," or "applying for a loan." The pattern of responses indicates that farmers in this sample did not believe that demands for assets could be satisfied through political voice but through individual initiatives at the farm level. The RUP survey illustrates the relative difficulty of obtaining assets as opposed to services. In regard to demands for services, the delivery of services involves considerably less cost and administrative entanglements. For instance, demands for closer markets can be met by the establishment of depots and collection points by the Grain Marketing Board and prompt delivery of inputs can be improved through distribution points. These services can serve thousands of farmers, while the purchase of a truck or a inactor might only serve a handful of farmers. Obtaining assets either government purchase and distribution or farmer applications for credit. While most farmers in Zimbabwe are in need of assets, the RUP survey indicated that many are also in demand of services. In Zimbabwe, where farmers have been engaged in a reciprocal relationship with the state and where a substantial number farmers are involved in agricultural marketing, the content 148 and scope of farmer demands can vary. This hypothesis is confirmed in a survey by the National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ) which sought the views of Zimbabwe's “farmer clubs" pertaining to agricultural inputs and marketing costs (NFAZ, 1989). These farmer clubs tend to be dominated by master farmers who engage in agricultural marketing. Consequently, the farmers in the survey are presumably richer than average. However, many clubs are located in poorer agro— ecological zones, particularly in Masvingo Province. At the conclusion of the survey, the clubs were asked about their problems, using an open—ended question: Table 20 Problems Raised by NFAZ Farmer Clubs Percentageof Problem Farmer Clubs 1.Transport ........................................... 80% 2. Late delivery of inputs ............................. 38% 3. Inputs too far ...................................... 31% 4. Lack of cash to buy inputs .......................... 29% 5. Empty bags .......................................... 27% 6. Markets too far ..................................... 24% 7. High input prices ................................... 9% 8. Low producer prices ................................. 7% 9. Late payment ........................................ 5% 10. Bad roads .......................................... 5% The vast majority of responses seem to indicate that the clubs were experiencing problems with services and problems which require program change or expansion of the pool of services. However, it must be kept in mind that the question about problems came at the end of a survey on agricultural rflfltidflfllm [filufiufiiwg 19d3r1 zldamvnuxq at. “TIDE ‘1-'-'- Mun: .' -" 149 inputs and marketing costs, so that the answers contain a bias towards services and away from assets. The NFAZ survey demonstrates that small farmers who are engaged in marketing want their inputs delivered on time in order to achieve the best yields, and many need to move a substantial amount of produce to market. In Zimbabwe, the missing link is a reliable source of transport which, in turn, has been primarily caused by a severe shortage of vehicles. The problem is compounded by the fact that most small farmers do not have the capital to band together to purchase transport of their own. Instead, they must rely on a small number of transporters with a few vehicles in a seller's market. A related problem for NFAZ farmer clubs is the inefficiency of government and parastatal agencies as well as private fertilizer and seed companies in serving small farmers. Farmers are often not paid on time so that they cannot quickly repay loans and qualify for credit for the following season; when credit is finally granted, the delivery of inputs is often too late. Even though farmers have formed groups to allow for greater coverage and efficiency, the large numbers of farmers who are demanding services has overloaded the system. These problems will be discussed in greater detail later. In Chapter One, Robert Bates' (1981)) rational choice model of farmer state—relations included the assumption of the 150 "rational farmer." It is assumed that pricing policy or "getting the prices right" is the principal concern of farmers, because they are engaged in agricultural marketing. From the NFAZ survey, pricing policy appears to be a secondary concern for market-oriented farmers in Zimbabwe. For the NFAZ clubs, the prices and packages offered are acceptable, while the main problems pertain to the transport of produce and inputs as well as the timing in which inputs are applied. The NFAZ survey was intended as a device for small farmers to make demands for program and policy change and for NFAZ to more accurately aggregate those demands. In effect, the survey permitted farmers, organized in clubs, to use NFAZ in order to express political voice. NFAZ has responded by articulating demands to government and the private sector on a number of issues; for instance, transport and markets. In the case of transport, NFAZ has been called upon by farmers to develop a transport strategy and to initiate negotiations with transporters, the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Finance in order to secure more vehicles and to provide a greater volume of transport. NFAZ has pressed the government as well as the Grain Marketing Board and the Cotton Marketing Board for more depots and collection points which reduce the distance required to transport crops.3 3The establishment of more distribution points for inputs might bring more timely delivery. 151 5.3. The Survev of Small Farmers in Hurungwe and Zaka In surveying small farmers in Hurungwe and Zaka communal lands, the questionnaire was devised so that farmers could identify three needs that they had, then refer to the demands they gage and the organizations they used, and finally discuss success and failure. After consulting other questionnaires and after pre—testing, a list of sixteen assets and services which might be demanded for farming was composed. When the survey was conducted, the list was read to the farmers, and they were advised that the list was by no means exhaustive and that they could mention other demands. After reading the list, farmers were requested to think of the assets and services that they wanted the most over the past five years (1984~l989). As mentioned previously, a five year time limit was set with the intention of focusing farmers' comments on a period when post—independence euphoria in Zimbabwe had subsided and when most organizations had become established in the rural areas. In reading the list of sixteen assets and services, respondents were advised that they may or may not have been successful in getting the assets and services that they wanted. Farmers were then asked, “Over past five years what were the three things which you wanted the most?"4 4"Zvinhu zvitatu zamainyanyodisisa pamakore mashanu apfuura ndezvipi?" -. 1 . P ..1r31 .- H'- ul- :el 152 Table 21 lists the needs that farmers mentioned as a percentage of the 600 total needs: Table 21 Needs Expressed in Hurungwe/Zaka Survey (1984-1989) (N=600) Needs / Percentage of Needs Needs % of Needs 1. Farm Equipment ..... 16.8% 9. Livestock .......... 4.8% 2. Land ............... 13.3% 10. Better Prices ...... 4.3% 3. Loans .............. 11.0% 11. Inputs on Time ..... 1.2% 4. Transport and Roads 10.5% 12. Labor .............. 1.2% 5. Inputs ............. 10.2% 13. Food—for—work ....... .7% 6. Draft Power ......... 9.8% 14. Extension/Education .3% 7. Water Projects ...... 9.5% 15. Better Maize Harvests .3% 8. Markets ............. 4.8% In terms of the assets that farmers wanted, draft power or land were not mentioned the most; instead, equipment was mentioned the most — 16.8 per cent of demands; 2.5 per cent of demands were for plows, while 14.3 per cent were for scotchcarts, harrows and cultivators.5 In mentioning farm equipment, farmers wanted scotchcarts for applying manure to their fields, for transporting crops to collection points, and for collecting water; and they wanted cultivators, harrows and planters to make tillage and maintenance of their fields easier. The poorest farmers in the sample wanted plows. Equipment. was available for purchase, and farmers either intended to sell crops to purchase what they wanted or apply for a loan. 5Equipment and draft power are closely related in that both are essential for tillage and the maintenance of fields. However, farmers who want tillage equipment may already have sufficient draft power. 153 The survey fails to confirm the hypothesis that markets are the service most wanted by farmers. Markets were not the most demanded service in the survey, partly because marketing depots and collection points had already been established in Hurungwe and Zaka, as well as other communal lands, in the 1980—1984 period — which was after independence and before the beginning of the survey time frame. Alternatively, the most desired service was for AFC loans, especially for short— term seasonal loans which could be used to acquire an inputs package of fertilizer and improved seed. Before independence, master farmers saw the improved yields brought by these inputs and came to demand them. Input packages had been widely distributed during the 1980—81 planting season, and the AFC had provided low interest loans, with little pressure for repayment before the l981~82 season. Consequently, demand for short—term seasonal loans rapidly expanded and persisted, even after the AFC toughened repayment standards and restricted qualifications for creditworthiness. Farmers had experienced the disparity in yields between fertilizer and manure and believed that maintaining higher productivity was their foremost concern. While repayment was a growing problem, many farmers were willing to risk the rather sporadic sanctions in their efforts to market more produce and earn more money. Farmers had more faith in their ability to repay smaller short-term loans than medium term loans for farm equipment and 910391! bas- e'~rls.‘:u-=--:r-Lsr:.r w: 1'. -"i--- 3|": I".':""FL'-i'|f‘3'..'""- "'I" 154 draft power. The presence of AFC and the activities of the input companies (Seed Coop, Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company, and Windmill, Ltd.) after 1982, especially in Hurungwe, but also in Zaka provides another explanation for the high demand for short-term loans. In contrast with the NFAZ and RUP surveys, the provision of transport was not the most demanded service in the survey. However, it was a significant concern, especially in Hurungwe where a substantial volume of crops had to be moved. In addition, the survey indicates that both demands for prompt payment and higher producer prices were overshadowed by demands for loans and infrastructure. 5.4. Content and Scope of Needs In Chapter Two, needs and demands were categorized needs according to content and scope. Assets were defined as excludable, held and fixed and services were defined as non— excludable, delivered and variable. Therefore, both individual and common property, including grazing land, were defined as assets, while public goods and "toll goods" (requiring a user fee), including the provision of transport, markets, dams and pricing policies, were identified as services. The scope of a demand was defined as the level of action which is normally required to fulfill a need which a farmer has. This definition permits a more objective and reliable classification without reference to instances of 155 individual farmer action and facilitates the inclusion in research of those farmers who have needs but take no action to fulfill them. The table from Chapter Two, classifying demands according to content and scope, is reproduced below and is followed by a cross-tabulation of the survey results: Table 22 Needs/Demands of Small Farmers: Content by Scope Scope of Demands Available Program Change Policy Change Services: Loans Credit scheme Redistribution of Hired labor Markets Credit, Extension Extension program Extension, Transport, Roads Infrastructure Water Projects Price Reform Development Projects New seed varieties Content Input delivery of Demands ——— ———— Assets: Community Resettlement land Land reform land Grazing schemes Change in tenure Equipment Tractor schemes Redistribution of Inputs Draft power, Draft Power Equipment Livestock Family labor 156 Table 23 Needs Expressed: Content by Scope Row Available Program Change Policy Change Total Services 186 64 29 279 43.0% 46.0% 100% 46.5% Assets 246 75 0 321 57.0% 54.0% 0% 53.5% Total 432 139 29 600 72.0% 23.2% 4.8% 100% The following discussion analyzes the results, including discrepancies between actual and hypothesized results, in regard to the content and scope of farmer needs. As expected, farmers wanted assets more than services, and most of their needs were narrow in scope. In interpreting these results, farmers were mainly concerned with attempting to sustain and improve their own agricultural production especially through assets that could be purchased but also through services which could be claimed. This does not mean that farmers were unconcerned about program or policy change. On the contrary, it was significant that a substantial minority of needs were for program change in regard to assets, including resettlement and grazing land and services, such as dams, markets, and roads; and better prices. This observation concerning the wide scope of many farmer demands was confirmed when farmers were asked what could be done to improve the quality of their lives (see the Appendix at the end of the dissertation). 157 5.5. Rural Stratification and the Needs of Small Farmers A key research issue is the role which rural stratification plays in determining the expression of political voice by small farmers. Research should determine whether political voice is the preserve of richer farmers or is expressed by a broad range of farmers. The set of variables for rural stratification include those which measure wealth - principally cattle holdings and land use — plus agro— ecological conditions, distance from markets, and the type of communal lands. In Chapter Two, it was hypothesized that rural stratification variables explain the content and scope of farmer demands, namely that the demands of poorer farmers tend to be for simple assets of a narrow scope and that richer farmers make demands for services which are broader in scope. Table 24 illustrates the relationship between wealth variables and the content of needs expressed in the survey: Table 24 Content of Needs by Cattle Holdings 0—3 cattle 4—8 cattle 9—40 cattle Total Services 83 78 118 279 41.9% 38.8% 58.7% 46.5% 115 123 83 321 Assets 58.1% 61.2% 41.3% 53.5% Column Total 198 201 201 600 33.0% 33.5% 33.5% 100% Chi—Square = 18.49 Significance = .0001 Measure of Association (tau-b) = -.13 10 19.: ml'!‘ sham-m": : fl '---_.,-;-_ -- :L' 3 . - . ' 158 The table demonstrates that the first concern of farmers who lack assets was to obtain more assets. Poorer farmers tended to want simple assets (that is, draft power, inputs, land and plows). Farmers with a greater amount of assets, reflected by cattle ownership, tended to want services. Richer farmers wanted services (loans, transport, markets, and higher producer prices), and they wanted tractors, planters and other more technical assets. For farmers with a moderate amount of assets, the picture is mixed. Only 38.8% of farmers with 4—8 cattle wanted services. The weak measure of association indicates that the disparity between the needs of poorer and richer farmers was not severe. The following tables corroborate the findings in Table 24: Table 25 Content of Needs by Land Use ————————————————————————————————— Row ———— 1—4 acres 5-7 acres 8-25 acres Total Services 74 117 88 279 36.3% 52.7% 50.6% 46.5% 130 105 86 321 Assets 63.7% 47.3% 49.4% 53.5% Column Total 204 222 174 600 34.0% 37.0% 29.0% 100% Chi—Square = 13.17 Significance = .001 Measure of Association (tau-b) = —.113 BIJiso yd‘hfllnnTTQI .ajhae: lfi Jflkrnt . w -n if in -- “it! hslnsw rimmwht .4. ' . - ,. in I 3’:'7-." '.'-I 159 Table 26 Content of Needs by Crops Marketed ——~— Row ————— 280—500 500—1600 1600~9,200 Total Services 106 83 90 279 38.4% 48.5% 58.8% 46.5% 170 88 63 321 Assets 61.6 51.5 41.2 53.5 Column Total 276 171 153 600 46.0 28.5 25.5 100% Chi—Square = 16.89 Significance = .0002 Measure of Association (tau—b) = —.158 The results from Tables 25 and 26 confirm the somewhat weak association between socio—economic status and content of needs. Farmers with a greater amount of assets, reflected by land use and crops marketed, tended to want services, and poorer farmers wanted assets. Of the farmers with a moderate amount of land use (5—7 acres), 52.7% wanted services, and of those with a moderate amount of marketed crops (28500—1600), 48.5% wanted services. The disparity between cattle ownership, on the one hand, and land use and crops marketed, on the other, in explaining content might be attributed to the fact that cattle ownership does not strongly indicate the degree of involvement with the market and with services, whereas crops marketed and land use are better indicators. The relationship in the survey between socio—economic stratification and the content of needs confirms the results of the RUP and NFAZ surveys. 160 Agro-ecological conditions and the type of communal land are two rural stratification variables which help explain variation in the content of needs, as illustrated in Tables 27 and 28: Table 27 Content of Needs by Area Hurungwe Zaka Total Services 159 120 279 53.0% 40.0% 46.5% Assets 141 180 321 47.0% 60.0% 53.5% Column Total 300 300 600 50.0% 50.0% 100% Chi-Square = 10.18 Significance = .01 Measure of Association (tau—b) = .13 Table 28 Content of Needs by Natural Region Row II III IV Total Services 81 138 60 279 54.0% 46.0% 40.0% 46.5% 69 162 90 321 Assets 46.0 54.0 60.0 53.5 Column Total 276 171 153 600 46.0 28.5 25.5 100% Chi-Square = 5.97 Significance = .05 Measure of Association (tau—b) = .094 The hypothesis that farmers want assets more than services applied in Zaka but not Hurungwe. The tendency did not hold true in Hurungwe, because of the higher average level 161 6 Another explanatory factor was the of asset holdings. greater productivity of Hurungwe and the correspondingly greater presence of AFC, AGRITEX and other service delivery agencies. The greater presence made it possible for more farmers to make demands for services. Similar explanations can be given for the relationship between agro—ecological zones and content of farmer needs. Like the majority of Zimbabwe's farmers, those farmers in the sample who resided in lower rainfall zones were poorer, wanted assets more than services and were less able to produce crops for market. In higher rainfall areas, where farmers are more confident of a good harvest, they are better able to obtain assets. Those farmers wanted services (for instance, loans for fertilizer and improved seed) so that they might further improve productivity. Loans and transport were most in demand by farmers in Region II and in Hurungwe Communal Land and least in Region IV and Zaka Communal Land. The greater volume of crops marketed in Region II and Hurungwe explains this relationship. Farmers wanted grazing and farming land more in Zaka than in Hurungwe which conforms to the pattern of greater land hunger in Masvingo Province. Basic inputs were wanted more in Zaka and in Region IV where many farmers are unable to achieve more 6See Chapter Four on the higher asset holdings in Hurungwe. 162 than subsistence. In Chapter Four, distance from markets was shown not to be associated with the amount of crops marketed. The same absence of a relationship applies to distance from markets, on the one hand, and the content and scope of demands, on the other. Indicated by cattle holdings, socio— economic status, is associated with the sggpe of needs: Table 29 Scope of Needs by Cattle Holdings Row ———— 0—3 cattle 4—8 cattle 9-40 cattle Total Available Assets 160 147 125 432 or Services 80.8% 73.1% 62.2% 72.0% 30 47 62 139 Program Change 15.2% 23.4% 30.8% 23.2% 8 7 14 29 Policy Change 4.0% 3.5% 7.0% 4.8% Column Total 198 201 201 600 33.0% 33.5% 33.5% 100% Chi—Square = 18.37 Significance = .001 Measure of Association (tau-b) = .155 The poorest strata of farmers, with less than four cattle, expressed needs in the survey which were narrower in scope than the rest of the sample. This relationship indicates that the poorest farmers are most concerned with obtaining simple assets in order to ease their subsistence, even though they should be making demands which are the widest in scope in order to seek alleviation of their poverty. Once again, the weak statistical association indicates that the gap 163 between richer and poorer farmers is not severe. Table 30 confirms the results in the preceding table: Table 30 Scope of Needs by Crops Marketed ——————————————— Row ——— 230-500 500—1575 1600-9,200 Total Available Assets 221 115 96’ 432 or Services 80.1% 67.3% 62.7% 72.0% 44 49 46 139 Program Change 15.9% 28.7% 30.1% 23.2% 11 7 11 29 Policy Change 4.0% 4.0% 7.2% 4.8% Column Total 276 171 153 600 46.0 28.5 25.5 100% Chi—Square = 18.80 Significance = .00086 Measure of Association (tau—b) = .154 The poorest strata of farmers, with less than 28500 marketed, expressed needs which were narrower in scope, while those who marketed more than Z1600 expressed needs which were wider in scope. 5.6. Demands Made and Actions Taken to Fulfill Needs Once the needs that farmers had were determined, questions could be asked about the demands that they made; in other words, the actions that farmers took and the political voice which they expressed in order to get what they wanted. The level of political voice could be ascertained by comparing the level of action taken in a particular instance and the level generally required to fulfill a demand. Respondents were asked, "In order to get the thing you wanted (for 164 instance, a scotchcart), give an example of what you did over the past five years." Farmers gave four different types of answers. Some did nothing, either because they did not have the means to purchase or because they saw action as pointless or because they did not know what to do. Some farmers acted alone, attempting merely (X) purchase cu‘ borrow what they wanted without asking an organization which could have helped. Other farmers approached an organization by themselves, usually to apply for a service. Most significantly, a large number of demands were made by farmers banding together and asking an organization, in an exercise in collective action and political voice. Table 31 contains frequencies and percentages for each type of action: Table 31 Actions Taken to Obtain Assets and Services Did Not Ask Organization: Asked Organization: Did Nothing 95 (15.8%) ACES—115;.“ T.— 771—5753;)" Acted Alone ... 184 (30.7%) Acted Together .. 154 (25.7%) Total 279 (Afifés ———————— ———— 321 (53.5%) A majority of needs in the survey (53.5 per cent) involved the use of organizations by small farmers to secure what they wanted. More than a quarter of the needs which were expressed (25.7 per cent) involved a combination of collective action and the use of an organization. The demands involving collective action were all for program and policy change and will be described in greater detail below. In expanding the Hm an an ‘m ' .9utfl10n bib o-oa .axouans "wsa we“: eeuesnd 1n ensdo1uq or ansem ed: heist arenas} AMfifl .05 *1 anv “hi3 -nn nib van: aareuu4 1n Zfii: isflw v.11“: 1- -.Wafin- 165 scope of demands to program or policy change, small farmers act as a group and channel their demands through the extension agency or through local government in order to obtain a dam or a grazing scheme. Collective action enables farmers to make their demands more forcefully and to influence organizations and institutions. Because program change and especially policy change involve competition over resources and policies, individual actions by farmers will most often be ignored. Those farmers who did nothing were usually poor, often single females, and either did not know how to get what they wanted or felt it was futile to try. This negative indicator confirms the concern that many farmers, especially single females, are hindered in their ability to express political voice. In Table 32, an explanation is sought for variation in the types of actions farmers take: Table 32 Actions Taken to Get Assets and Services by Area Hurungwe Zaka Row Total Did Nothing or Acted Alone 115 164 279 38.3% 54.7% 46.5% Asked Organizations 104 63 167 34.7% 21.0% 27.8% Acted Together and 81 73 154 Asked Organizations 27.0% 24.3% 25.7% Column Total 300 300 600 50.0% 50.0% 100% Chi—Square = 19.08 Significance = .0009 Measure of Association (tau—b) = —.120 "19'- u 19. 15901 deuo1d3 10 venues CUT-fin! notion awn-H.103 .9m9doa guise-m s mniasstnlmo eonaut’znlr .:' r125 - ’1 ...,.._ ---. .5: n-w‘v l {lIr=l"rcq:-:~i (1'19. '-:_mr-'.ri'.- mun-- .:'--U'.)'v‘:--: "m- --.=—::-- 166 In the more productive and prosperous communal land, farmers were more likely to ask an organization or act together and ask an organization to help fulfill their demands. It can be concluded that farmers in more prosperous communal lands are more capable of expressing political voice than their counterparts in poorer areas. However, agro— ecological conditions were not significant in explaining the scope of farmer demands. In higher rainfall zone II, 31% wanted program or policy change; in zone III, 24%, and in zone IV, 34%. This discrepancy can be explained by the presence of VSOs in a zone IV site (see below) and by the lack of organizations and poor productivity in some of the zone III sites. The preceding analysis again raises the distinction between the needs that farmers h§y§_and the actions they take in making demands. In particular, farmers who are poorer or who live in poorer areas should be making demands for program and policy change in order to improve their capabilities and well—being. Instead, they express needs for basic assets but are often unable to purchase them. The contradiction between needs and actions occurs because poorer farmers are constrained by the need for subsistence and lack incentives from markets and other institutions to organize and act collectively. Without organization and collective action, poorer farmers are unable to influence the government to make Obi new aim-I as fine: bun 19d30903 'saflfi nE a19u151 Saul Bebulanno ad and 3t .ahnnueb QOIOV lF'Ji .3 Nb"; [TIFF-139W? f“ 'l"! 41"}. ' -'i =- '.::." 'L .Immno ‘J'JXJE . £‘-.'-'- l.h . .. .'_r.. in" ... , 167 program changes so that a greater volume of assets can be provided which, in turn, would enable poorer farmers to enter the market. The wide scope of demands which poorer farmers should be making also deters them from taking action. Demands for program and policy change in the allocation of assets, such as land redistribution or land reform, are more difficult to fulfill than demands for services, such as changes in pricing policy or infrastructural development. The process of making demands for land reform, for example, requires a high level of capability and organization so that farmers and their representatives can apply sufficient political pressure on the government. Analysis of the survey results also demonstrates that richer farmers and farmers in good rainfall zones make demands which are wider in scope. Where farmers have sufficient draft power, equipment and labor to be productive and where they can be confident of a good harvest, they can turn their attention to making claims for short—term seasonal loans which they are confident of repaying, and they make demands for program and policy change in regard to agricultural services. The ability of the government to provide agricultural services provides richer farmers with incentives to organize and act collectively in order to obtain more and different kinds of services. Although poorer farmers may have needs which are alt~.dotlu bobIUOI. .Iexaol ed: toieoq-detflw ebnemsb To 90039 uhtu adT 103 abdlnhd :15 firms. .eJa:=..-:. In urn-mm :"r. - ;- =2? ' . . . .nnl'rue outfit-1 91911 mam -"‘.‘."I"“’b 'rie- mun-m 168 greater in scope, richer farmers are better—positioned to make demands for program and policy change. What are poorer farmers to do? A relevant finding was generated in the poorest site, Murembwa Ward, where, counter— intuitively, the greatest amount of demands were made for program and policy change. The wide scope of demands made by the poorer farmers of Murembwa can be explained partly because of the availability of VSOs. In the section on VSOs below and in succeeding chapters, this contradiction and possible solutions for poorer farmers and poorer areas are considered further. 5.7. Farmer Persistence and the Use of Unofficial and Informal Channels In many situations throughout Africa, where farmers feel that they are powerless to get what they want, they either do nothing or exit. However, in situations where farmers have capabilities and where a range of organizations can be used, farmers can try a number of strategies. If they are unsuccessful in getting what they want the first time they ask, the possibility exists for further attempts. They may persist by asking the same organization to helru perhaps choosing to apply once again through formal channels. Alternatively, they might expand the set of cmganizations which they are prepared to approach and ask unofficial channels for assistance or they might use informal channels, to! chm-I f;§b§.oi_hmeunn1 1.100q e1u Jadv .Btii-Efldnsibfl arre veevnnq ed? Li nulb19n90 O 163 sham 919w abnsmun In .hwnmw :--r- - .'7 r . :a;+n= ‘- Yd ebsm abnumnb In awn": --"u sin "':' 'n a . l u I - . -,_:--.. :. .r.r.| . _I._ 169 approaching individuals with power and influence. In surveying farmers about what they did and whether or not they tried again, they were asked, "If you did not get what you wanted the first time, what did you do?" The vast majority of farmers who did not get what they wanted the first time tried again: Table 33 What Farmers Did If They Failed at First Stopped 62 Tried Again 240 Waited 26 When trying again to get what they want, farmers who are capable of expressing political voice will often choose to escalate the scope of their demands. If a claim fails, the demand may be expanded to one for program change, and, subsequently, to a demand for policy change. The survey found that this trend applied to a number of demands for assets and services. For example, when farmers make demands for better land, they begin by applying to village authorities — the VIDCO or the headman - for existing land. If no land is available for cultivation, they apply to district authorities for resettlement land. If grazing land is needed, they ask extension agents to help to establish grazing schemes. In escalating the scope of demands, farmers first seek expansion of assets and services or a program change, then they may make demands for policy change. For example, farmers who fail to obtain resettlement land or grazing schemes may ask 591‘!) 5M1? 331:} 9d: DBTHE-n‘ -"!": "’1'" :"‘5 l“: - I '.:"- "1'3"! 5: 170 representatives of the ruling political party or the National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ) to press the government to obtain more land for resettlement or to initiate land reform. The escalating pattern of demands applies to other assets and services. However, in order to ask for program or policy change, only the most prominent farmers can ask as individuals. In demanding a dam or a grazing scheme, farmers act as a group and channel their demands through the VIDCO or AGRITEX. In requesting changes in pricing policy or land reform, farmers must channel their demands through NFAZ or a Member of Parliament, and they must hope that their demands are taken up at the national level. 5.8. Demands for Program and Policy Change Following the aggregate analysis of how farmers act to get what they want, this section focuses further on specific demands for program and policy change which require considerable capability, collective action and political voice to make and fulfill. Analysis continues regarding the dynamics of demand articulation and bargaining for assets and services which involves Zimbabwe's small farmers. It has already been demonstrated that a substantial number of farmers make demands for program change and that many expand the scope of their demands if they fail to get what they want. Also mentioned has been the fact that, in requesting pricing .fi' flint-nun em! 10! bus! non: nlszdo 03 . I910 19'! !' smear. 19.130 “1 aeiigqs 33m 'IIE'J 'I«- n . . . . ”4".) " [(1-1 '10 um If}. 1 " 171 changes, land reform, or other changes in policy, farmers channel their demands through organizations or their representatives, for example, NFAZ or a Member of Parliament; subsequently, they must wait until their demands and those of thousands of other farmers are taken up at the national level. Analysis of demands for policy change continues in Chapter Eight, when the focus shifts toward examining how organizations work to serve small farmers. 5.8.1. Political Voice and Demand for Land The survey in Hurungwe and Zaka indicated that land was the second most demanded asset or service or 13.3 per cent of total demands. The land shortage in Zimbabwe's communal lands has been at the heart of political and academic debates in the 7 For some in the debates, "land hunger" has been the country. major constraint on the development of small—scale communal farmers; for others, land has been part of a web of problems. For farmers, land redistribution was a promise born of the independence war. However, the government's policy of gradual resettlement and of resettling farm workers and displaced persons first during the early 19805 meant that relatively few communal farmers were able to resettle outside of the communal 7A University of Zimbabwe Seminar on Land Policy in Zimbabwe after Lancaster, February 13-15, 1990, provoked considerable debate both inside and out of the conference halls. The controversy escalated during the March 1990 election campaign, leading up to President Mugabe's announcement in July 1990 of renewed land reform efforts. fled: to“ __ (9‘1le 191 .nvtasaueu-xqe'l' '36 sleddi- baseman-1b xterm Hum 11be Jr-Jm (en! .IHn-sup‘mdua . [ever Fermijrsn :1: 7:. cm mafia: ears. h‘rsmvsl 1"..."2' . , - I -J-..{i'-II) IZL -:--. . 172 lands. By the late 1980s, the government had only resettled 50,000 of the targeted 162,000 families, and the promise of resettlement land receded for tens of thousands of applicants. Nevertheless, applications for resettlement land continue to flow to District Councils throughout Zimbabwe. The government's revived land redistribution policy, announced in July 1990, was bound to accelerate demand for resettlement land. Given the importance of the land redistribution question, the questionnaire also contained direct questions about land usage and availability. In trying to determine the degree of land shortage, the question of usage was asked in terms of the preceding growing season (1988—89). Farmers were asked: "Did you have enough land last season?” ("Manga mune minda yakakwana here?") The second question approached the land issue from the direction of availability; consequently, it was a more valid indicator of land insufficiency. Farmers were asked: "Are you able to get more land for farming?" ("Munogona kuwana pamwe pekurima here?"). Their responses: Table 34 Was Enough Land Available for Farming? " """ELELQQL; _______ if; __________ EL; 125-033113557 _____________ 4 —6 _____________ 163 Not Enough Land 43 54 97 Column Totals 100 100 200 1 on: to no.“ kid-lid 101 bubs-:91 but! mgr-91310.0! _ : 3“... I'Q .‘-_"".._. inf. - 'v ' a: (WW-1W filfirflumh'leasx '10! anruianrmqfi -*3!"-°|'-‘d-'“"”" '. QII'T .éwflhilr. 3;: tannin-Iv. .:'.-' -.i - 1:- .l ' ' ' - '1 ' “-' "Mn 11' IITIZAI'Iil'vIII'f.‘. .-"j'!'-': '1‘" yr" ' I I I I I I” ‘ 1:. l‘niJ' F - I 173 Table 35 Were Farmers Able to Get Additional Land? Hg ________ 226.; ________ $2.2; ALEXIS; 173;; IQQE“““EB ““““““““ 1 '3 """"""""" (23 Not Able 50 87 137 More than two—thirds of the farmers interviewed indicated that they were unable to get more land. In most of Zimbabwe's communal lands, the headmen and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) responsible for land allocation were either unable to distribute land or were running out of land to distribute. The land shortage was especially harmful to the prospects of younger farmers. The question regarding whether farmers had enough land to grow their crops must be understood in the context of general asset holdings. Respondents answered by taking into account their assets at hand, especially draft power, fertilizer and farm equipment. The amount of draft power, farm equipment and fertilizer which farmers have available was correlated with the amount of land which they are able to cultivate; the correlation among these factors was presented in Chapter Four. In conclusion, if more farmers had possessed sufficient assets for farming, more would have indicated that they did not have enough land. While 87 per cent of farmers in Zaka claimed that land was unavailable, half of those in Hurungwe said so. The 174 contrast between land availability in Hurungwe and Zaka demonstrates that land hunger is more severe in the over— populated communal lands to the south and east of the capital city, Harare. In Zaka, grazing land is increasingly being put into cultivation. The result is smaller areas for grazing, increasing erosion and decreased production of manure. Drought for consecutive years would raise the specter of famine for many communal lands. Some indication has already been given of what farmers in the survey did in order to get land. However, some farmers were not content to demand resettlement land through local government channels. For instance, a master farmer in Nhema North, who had applied for resettlement land, wanted land so much that he asked. a range of organizations besides the official channels to help. He asked representatives from NFAZ, ZANU(PF) and AGRITEX to assist him. He circumvented the VIDCO and WADCO and took his demand directly to the District Council in Zaka. Finally, he used informal chanels by seeking to contact the provincial governor in Masvingo - even asking the researcher to help. This case is a good example of how small farmers with relatively more political and agricultural capabilities are able to use a range of organizations and channels to express political voice. NFAZ representatives in Hurungwe and Zaka were asked about the organization's activities in helping farmers get 1' 'I!‘ k' u- bhol 301! I03- . l' _ _ - . . - - - ' Ina-gated ytnuiaseaonr e: onn: on,;n12 Link n: .ewhwsfl 1:13 9:13519 1e: :Entn v..w .uaJnem ”\ w' "1’7. 5 I. flluoh an: 01 ebuer [savanna bensluqoq' 175 resettlement land. One representative from Zaka mentioned that pressure from NFAZ farmer clubs and representatives had led the national leadership to pressure the government to shift its resettlement criteria toward favoring master farmers. Before 1986, resettlement policy had favored the land hungry. Several representatives noted that pressure from NFAZ farmer clubs and representatives to rapidly expand resettlement was quite strong at the time of the research project (1989-1990). This pressure induced the national leadership to become more aggressive in favor of land reform in early 1990. In regard to grazing land, demands were becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill, due to land scarcity. The survey in Hurungwe and Zaka, as well as other studies (CDT, 1988, Cousins, 1989), found that farmers were encountering collective action problems in attempting to set aside land for grazing. Grazing schemes were widely initiated in order to overcome these problems and to enhance cooperation at the village level. The process of establishing grazing schemes generally involved demands for assistance from AGRITEX, local government and VSO officials in locating the schemes, persuading farmers to rearrange their land use patterns, and providing fencing and paddocks. 176 5.8.2. Demands for New Infrastructure, Credit Schemes and Markets Before making demands for program change in regard to such services as transport, roads and water, small farmers generally started by trying to do something themselves, while seeking some form of assistance. For example, they came together to construct dams and dig wells, while the VIDCO and WADCO organized the provision of labor and materials and AGRITEX workers helped to plan the contours of the dam or the placement of the well. However, the makeshift dams and wells were usually inadequate, and farmers turned to the District Council and demanded an expansion of dam—building and borehole—drilling projects. Farmers at several sites were not content with letting the DC, DDC or Ministry of Local Government (MLGURD) ignore their request. They counted on the ward councillor to continue pressing for a response, asked the AGRITEX worker to take their request to the AGRITEX district office, and approached NFAZ representatives to intervene on their behalf. If VSOs were present, as in Murembwa Ward, farmers could approach them to seek assistance in borehole— drilling, dam construction and road building. VSOs responded more quickly, though administrative problems delayed the drilling of some boreholes. When demands for transport were made, farmers came to district centers to speak with transporters themselves to -'-"-- no“ in! aha-lib unifies 910398 Bififliii '.1915w Ens absnz .Ituqansri ea aeotv1ee done altdw .aevfeemdd: pnrfi'nmca ah u: criv"i =_ J-r:s:- "-1aqfip mun var“ “Afar-.2. : - . '- .. 177 alleviate short—term needs and asked the District Council to expand the number* of vehicles and transporters cm: to use District Development Fund vehicles. Farmers in Maumbe and Chimusimbe Wards even went to commercial farmers and procured transport at a more economical rate. In making demands for inputs to be delivered on time, farmers not only sought a reliable source of transport, but also approached the AFC and input companies as well as informal channels, such as NFAZ, AGRITEX and the ward councillor. Members of NFAZ farmer clubs made demands for transport and timely delivery of inputs to village, area and district representatives who presented the demands at the national level. Consequently, NFAZ made the provision of transport one of its highest priorities in the late 1980s. NFAZ worked out transport contracts between NFAZ clubs and transporters and approached government leaders, the Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Finance to bring about policy change in regard to the vehicle and transport situation in Zimbabwe. The process of making demands for markets primarily involved efforts to persuade the parastatal Grain Marketing Board (GMB) to establish either a depot or collection point in the ward. GMB depots were especially attractive because they facilitated relatively quick payment for crops at a guaranteed price, eased transport problems, and served as a magnet for business development. After Mudzimu was targeted as a growth .3 10“!!! Ill: m. 'm ans-Innhvoa Jet-13am Isia'zemmoc- :11 Juan new-e 52""th 1dm'reumM3 1o! abuaaeb Gable!" :rT miss. Itch:- n-‘e’v' -H:..*- ’1 - 1" h I:1.’_;LI‘I')'-2 '._-' .3 nu"- rm: 'I '-‘,'I." '--. ': ... .u 1 I. 178 point in 1984, farmers in Mudzimu made a concerted effort to secure a GMB depot. The process included asking NFAZ representatives, ZANU—PF officials, the MP Enos Nkala, AGRITEX officers, the ward councillor and others. One farmer claimed that his marketing and supply (AMS) and transport cooperative presented a request for a depot to Kurima House (GMB headquarters) in Harare. He and other cooperative members knew the GMB‘s head of operations, and they went as a cooperative to lobby him. After pressure was applied by farmers and their representatives, the GMB agreed to establish a depot in time for the 1987-1988 growing season. After helping to secure the GMB depot, Mudzimu farmers did not rest but turned to requesting a Cotton Marketing Board depot and a marketplace for animals. GMB depots were established to service an entire district (in Zaka) or a communal land (in Hurungwe). GMB collection points were established as sub—units of depots in the communal lands to further alleviate transport problems by serving two or three wards. In Chimusimbe and Nhema North Wards, farmers recounted their efforts to secure collection points. In both wards, farmers asked NFAZ representatives, ZANU—PF officials, AGRITEX workers and ward councillors in an effort to persuade the GMB. While applying less pressure than Mudzimu farmers, respondents in Chimusimbe and Nhema North both expressed considerable political voice in attempting to secure at... are a m . Eiffel fie fiq-UIAS . new I J 5 1 nene‘zqo: mild and .e-rs'rfao’b'ne 'ImImuuu-a [new at” .a-watfin 5V1351squu-1 -_' LIL-.II'TI? run. '-’.Z'i.' '--.._‘-._.-' °.--.- - MIN“ .;-.m Ind: f"': I:-,' .H :_ - :'_' _r 179 collection points. Farmers in Chimusimbe claimed that they had failed to obtain a collection point because of competition from a nearby ward and because their representatives were not sufficiently assertive. Farmers in Nhema North claimed that they had succeeded because of the efforts of the ward councillor and the AGRITEX worker and because their ward was far removed from the district centers at Zaka and Jerera. These accounts by farmers were corroborated by district government officials in Magunje (Hurungwe Communal Lands) and Zaka. In making demands for changes in pricing policy, farmers at several sites claimed that they had acted together in cooperatives and other groups, approached NFAZ representatives, GMB officials and Members of Parliament to take their demands to the appropriate authorities. Every year, demands for higher producer prices came from a variety of sources and reached the responsible ministries (Finance and Agriculture), the House of Assembly, and the cabinet. Farmer political voice played a significant role in pricing policy decisions and changes during the 19805 (Herbst, 1990, 82—109). Farmers expressed political voice in attracting credit schemes and securing loans during the early 19805. Farmers formed groups in order to qualify for and attract credit. Furthermore, farmers were demanding expansion of credit in the form of medium—term loans for equipment and draft power. Many hum-o3 com! I“. “routs-l has [new (durum 5 n1! an distal omen III aims-Is! .«z-vznwaae gi‘newiflue b11531 at“ 10 £3.11an 91‘“ 3:.- r-.."':--r' L"-'--:-"...‘ "‘!.--"- ."‘H!. 2353': .""'1.E.W ‘1' 1.1.? qr‘ilII-W-di .Ila. ‘ :-: ' .-. 180 farmers felt that insufficient credit was being granted to help purchase equipment and draft power, especially in comparison with the amounts loaned for obtaining inputs. Farmers in Hurungwe had formed AFC groups of five to ten farmers in order to qualify for tractor loans, but the rising costs of tractors meant that their efforts were in vain. 5.9. VSO Presence, Scope of Demands and Joint Action In Chapter Two, VSOs were conceptualized as organizations which could be used to make demands of a wider scope and to stimulate collective action. In Tables 36 and 37, the importance of VSO presence (NFAZ and one or more service organizations) in explaining the scope of needs and demands as well as the types of actions which farmers take is made apparent: Table 36 Scope of Need by Presence of VSOs Row Scope VSOs present VSOs not present Total Available 96 347 443 Assets and Services 64% 77% 73.8% Program/Policy Change 54 113 167 36% 23% 26.2% Total 150 450 600 25% 75% 100% Chi Square = 66.0 Significance = .0000 Measure of Assocation (tau—b) = —.193 _ ankle-(minted hm en: run: noel-1m iii a: sari! ,le". " 31A bums mm QHDUEITLH'T n'! e19n151 aria; .;:- .-'9 :‘-‘-“.-"- ".-' L:'Y‘-"-1'H1T Linker sun Jud .ensnl' min. :.' -_-._-..: 181 Table 37 Actions Taken by VSO Presence —— —————— Row VSOs Not Present VSOs Present Total Did Not Act Together 352 114 446 78.2% 62.7% 74.3% Acted Together 98 56 154 21.8% 37.3% 25.7% Column Total 450 150 600 75% 25% 100% Chi Square = 27.8 Significance = .0000 Measure of Assocation (tau b) = .097 Survey results show that, where VSOs were present — including the poorest site — farmers were more likely to make demands for program and policy change and to act together to use an organization to make demands. Where VSOs were not present, farmers who used organizations were more likely to approach those organizations as individuals. Farmers found that VSOs were the type of organization which encouraged them to give voice to their opinions and to articulate a wide range of demands. At the conclusion of the survey, farmers were asked what they needed in general to improve the quality of life. In the two wards with a VSO presence, they expressed 22 and 25 demands. In the other six wards, they mentioned 14 to 18 demands. The presence of VSOs provided farmers with organizations which were willing and able to help express their demands. Some VSOs were providing training in collective action, 182 decision—making and leadership which enabled farmers to act together and become more assertive in the types of demands which they made. In the two wards with significant VSO presence, many farmers were better able to work together and channel their demands to higher levels of the governmental structure. These findings are supported by the NFAZ survey which demonstrates that the demands made by farmer clubs, linked to a VSO, are wider than those made by the average small farmer in Zimbabwe. These issues are explored further in Chapter Six. 5.10. Conclusion Analytical and anecdotal findings provide evidence that small farmers are capable of expressing political voice, as opposed to Bates' assumption that small farmers are powerless and vulnerable to exploitation. Small farmers in Zimbabwe are making demands for program and policy change in regard to agricultural assets and services, and their political voice has reached a variety of representatives as well as officials of Zimbabwe's government. In making demands for program and policy change, small farmers act together, try again, use official and informal channels, and engage in bargaining. Their ability to make demands, express political voice and take collective action is enhanced by the presence of VSOs which provide them with alternative and informal channels. The presence of VSOs is especially important for poorer 183 farmers who are at a disadvantage in regard to their abilities to make a wide scope of demands. In making demands for policy change, it became clear that organizations and representatives are essential and that groups of farmers give greater voice to demands than individuals. In regard to the content of the demands that Zimbabwe's small farmers make for agricultural assets and services, "getting the prices right" clearly is not their main concern. Furthermore, they would be horrified at the suggestion that the GMB and guaranteed prices give way to private traders and that AGRITEX and AFC be replaced by private concerns. In Zimbabwe, small farmers make demands for greater government involvement in delivering agricultural services, not for privatization. They want guaranteed markets which minimize risk, not free markets which provide incentives for risk— taking. In no». 9qu a M IIHJ 1:9[9 sinned it .anulfll n: entov 151591b evfn awemrei lo ennui” '“fl’ A75 ifi‘inqena 91' .IL ' '. -'.I;' -.E'=I?F--F'*b -' .' uIrlh-‘IIIi'. '1an . aim: I-l :- Chapter 6. Organizations in Zimbabwe and Rural Political Voice 6.1. Introduction Preceding chapters have demonstrated that organizations are key instruments which enable small farmers to build political capability, project political voice and have their demands and protests considered. In this chapter, the organizations that Zimbabwe's small farmers use to get what they want and employ to influence government institutions, policies and programs are described and analyzed. Organizations which have established a presence at the local level and those which farmers have formed are evaluated by the farmers themselves through the survey conducted in Hurungwe and Zaka Communal Lands. From data analysis, explanations are given for the types of organizations which farmers use to make demands of a particular content and scope. Rural stratification variables are employed to determine if richer farmers tend to use different types of organization than poorer farmers. In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that farmers who approach one organization but fail to get what they want will try again. At issue are the types of organizations which they use to try again and if those organizations lie outside of official channels. Of particular interest are the organizations which farmers approach if they escalate the scope of their demands. If farmers possess the capacity for 185 making a wide scope of demands, they may start by asking an official channel, but, if they fail to secure what they want, they can act together in groups and committees, go to higher levels of the official organization, use unofficial organizations, and use informal channels. Two other research issues are of particular interest in this chapter. One issue concerns the presence of VSOs, the impact of VSO presence on farmer capabilities and the ways in which farmers attempt to use VSOs. A related issue pertains to the impact that rural stratification has on the use of VSOs; more specifically whether richer farmers tend to use membership organizations, including farmer unions, while poorer farmers use service organizations. The second issue concerns local government and how farmers use and perceive the system which was instituted in Zimbabwe in 1984. A larger, related issue is whether the local government system constitutes devolution of state authority to farmers and their representatives or deconcentration of central state control. 6.2. Organizations in Rural Zimbabwe and the Views of Farmers Before analyzing how Zimbabwe's small farmers use a range of organizations to make demands, a schematic diagram is presented, incorporating sectoral and national~local dimensions: '.l-I"'. I. . .‘ n .m woman Elton!!- .§m fine-m ni sermon": £55 no: you! Ibrahim“: q'eu .nef'rsxfusp'm ism-inn 9:21 lu stove! '.1!.!I‘I':-:l'- LillI'I' .'L' '1!!! f'.‘-.- - - l- -'.l|-I'.'-1'.’.' .13.: 'I'-3'.-:).I .:-i..:.-: .'v ' '- r 1 :. 1' 186 Table 38 Types of Organizations Used by Farmers in Zimbabwe National Level central VSOs government ruling service membership party organs. organs. MLARR MCCD MLGRUD ZANUPF (CADEC) (NFAZ) : Provinc. : : : : Governor ' : : public sector < —————— voluntary sector ——————— > private sector : : (Civil society) : : DDC / DC : : : AGRITEX WADCO : : : field : ZANUPF VSO farmer coops staff VCW VIDCO commitees field staff clubs groups Local Level A more comprehensive list of organizations and actors is provided below and is followed by an extended analysis, based upon semi—structured interviews with officials, the views of farmers in the survey, and unpublished and published sources. 6.2.1. VSOs: Membership Organizations NFAZ = National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe. A nation~ wide membership organization which represents small—scale communal farmers in "farmer clubs." Composed mainly of master farmers who have more training and who are usually more productive and wealthier than the average farmer, NFAZ has attempted to expand club memberships to more ordinary farmers. NFAZ farmer clubs elect village chairs, as well as area (ward) chairs and district chairs. Among the other membership organizations which are used by small farmers are OCCZIM, the Organization of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe, the Central Association of Cooperative Unions, CACU, and the Masvingo Cooperative Union, MCU. 187 Local membership organizations: (a) information groups, (b) labor groups, (C) marketing groups, and (d) multipurpose groups which include producer cooperatives (Bratton, 1986a, 367—384). VSOs: Service Organizations: Dozens of S05 operate in the rural areas of Zimbabwe and are scattered throughout the country. Below are listed a number of SOs which were operating in or around the survey areas: National 805 - Catholic Development Commission (CADEC), Movement to Support Rural Development (MOTSRUD), Christian Care, Silveira House, Zimbabwe Project, Zimbabwe Christian Council. International 805 — International Voluntary Service (IVS), Africare, Catholic Relief Serices (CRS), Redd Barna (Norway), Save The Children. International Development Agencies — USAID, Swissaid, GTZ (Germany), SIDA (Sweden), DANIDA, NORAID, UNDP, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). As indicated previously, the main VSO which small farmers use in Zimbabwe is NFAZ ~ a nation-wide membership organization based on village—level farmer clubs. NFAZ farmer clubs are multi—purpose in character, emphasizing agricultural training, linkages with agricultural institutions, and the expression of demands. They first came into existence as master farmer clubs in the 19605 as organizations which promoted communal farmer participation in agricultural marketing (Mutimba, 1981). Since independence and the dissemination of agricultural infrastructure and services throughout the communal lands, farmer clubs have sought to take full advantage of credit, extension, and marketing facilities, while pressuring for transport, resettlement land 1's; his: mum .rrsc-rac :anoxiggrgfipgg_gggvaea :aggy 91B hm. eudsdmtS-‘In east-:5 inn.“ «...-'1 II; -=:|n:-.«rI-1 :-="'E£ 2:.) ant-1:600 zedmuu 5 aneII 516 we. 1 -:"fnnnn Pfli :v:4nnn;¢» tn 4'1521 ...-”Her”. V'HI'IUE 9d? t?“lJ":'- __ I. . , IF-'.l--I"- ‘-".-'=. - .. ..l'. I. r-_ 188 for master farmers, further expansion of infrastructure, and more favorable pricing policies. In the first years after the establishment of NFAZ in 1980, farmer clubs had no alternative but to try to take their demands for policy and program change directly to the national leadership. With the establishment of a federated structure in the mid-19805, the process of channelling demands has become better—organized and less uneven. However, as indicated by the survey in Hurungwe and Zaka, the link between farmer club members and the NFAZ hierarchy is still in need of strengthening. Since 1980, NFAZ has claimed to represent the entire population of small—scale communal farmers in Zimbabwe and has, in recent years, been attempting to represent and recruit most of the million or so small—scale communal farmers in Zimbabwe. In an attempt to broaden NFAZ's membership base, farmer clubs have been expanded to include those without master farmer training. However, in most clubs, master farmers still predominate, and the interests of poorer farmers in obtaining assets and growing more for subsistence receive less attention than marketing issues. More evaluation of the role of NFAZ in expressing the political voice of small farmers is provided in Chapter Eight along with an analysis of NFAZ's interactions with other organizations. Besides NFAZ clubs, farmers have formed an array of local farmer organizations in Zimbabwe's communal lands. These '1" A'5 . _ main Okinawan-Fuel !” cum «I saw 10 1n9aflalld33|o mad: as1pox¢bns voila-1 10‘! ebmnmeb view an“: or 1n 0.: 1m! ‘mBIIldakldSIee mt! NH}! .:ItrI-31£;h5=u.’ .I'.-'n':'-I - --. =1 .:e:-.I,- . .J. 5' "r:- _-.:':-:I-1.:'-.'; or“ ...-.u-I':!_-'_'_-: .I. -- I . 'I. 189 organizations can be divided into four functional categories: a) information groups, (b) labor groups (c) marketing groups, and (d) multipurpose groups which include producer cooperatives (Bratton, 1986a, 367—384). Labor groups are widespread and enable farmers to perform labor~intensive tasks by calling on assistance from fellow villagers, but they are of limited utility in making demands. Both marketing and multipurpose groups emphasize collective action which often enables farmers to make demands for program and policy change and to become more effective in obtaining agricultural assets and services. In particular, agricultural marketing and supply (AMS) cooperatives have become widespread, and many are affiliated with umbrella cooperatives such as CACU, MCU or OCCZIM. In Masvingo Province and other parts of Zimbabwe, informal, unchartered multi-purpose cooperatives have become widespread, usually in the form of gardening and poultry cooperatives. "Information groups", such as AGRITEX training groups, are less cohesive and homogeneous than labor pooling, marketing and multi—purpose groups. However, they often are used by farmers in making demands, and they also help build horizontal linkages between farmers. In Zimbabwe, service organizations (SOs) tend to concentrate their efforts on a particular province or region and on a set of projects. Consequently, in the areas of SO activity, farmers can make demands to organizations with a 190 minimum of bureaucratic procedure and can rely on a reasonably quick response. For instance, if farmers demand program change, such as a new program of dam or borehole construction, they can circumvent local government channels and ask SO agents who can go directly to funding sources. Many SOs target project aid to poorer farmers and are positioned to listen to and act upon their demands and needs. Obviously, SOs can neither maintain a presence in every ward nor in a majority of wards in Zimbabwe. Consequently, small farmers who have access to an so are privileged in comparison to most of their counterparts. 305 can attempt to remedy this problem by trying to spread their projects over a wide area and by attempting to replicate their projects. This strategy was followed by a joint FAO/MCCD project, "Strengthening Women's Role and Work in Rural Development," which was encountered in Hurungwe. The project helped establish over 125 women's cooperatives of 20 or less members throughout Mashonaland West. Cooperation between an international VSO (FAO)1 and a central government agency (MCCD) assisted over 2,500 women farmers and provided them with a responsive channel through which political voice could be expressed. In addition, the prospects for replication by 1The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations is an international development agency (IDAs). In Chapter Two, IDAs were shown to have many of the same characteristics of VSOs, especially service organizations. 191 MCCD, with support from AGRITEX, promised to provide thousands more similar benefits. In Zaka, collaboration between NFAZ, IVS (an international SO) and AGRITEX in a single ward brought benefits Us hundreds of families through a. multi-purpose project. The prospects for replication by AGRITEX, with sponsorship from NFAZ, have created possibilities for reaching thousands of farmers in poorer regions of Zimbabwe and providing them with avenues for the expression of political voice. 6.2.2. Central Government Agencies: AGRITEX = Department of Agricultural and Technical Extension within the Ministry of Agriculture. AGRITEX workers are present at the ward—level, and each extension worker is charged with contacting approximately 800 farmers in groups at least twice a year. Village Community Worker (VCW) = the representative at VIDCO level of a range of ministries, including the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development and the Ministry of Health. Ward Coordinators = Community Development Worker (MCCD) and Child Spacer (Ministry of Health). Works with projects with outside funding and personnel. MCCD = the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development. Facilitates the establishment and development of cooperatives. Previously known as the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development and Women‘s Affairs. Parastatal Agencies Present at the District Level: AFC = Agricultural Finance Corporation. A parastatal company which disburses loans (mainly for fertilizer and improved seed) to farmers. Field agents are present in Hurungwe and other productive districts in Zimbabwe. 192 GMB = Grain Marketing Board. A parastatal company which buys grains (especially maize) from farmers and sells them to milling companies and other buyers. GMB depots are located in most district centers, except in Region V. GMB collection points are situated in smaller business centers. AGRITEX is the central government agency which posts the most workers in the field where they can work with farmers. Other agencies, such as MCCD and AFC, do not consistently channel farmer demands for agricultural assets and services and do little more than deliver a particular service. For instance, Agricultural Finance Agents (AFC) agents often depend on AGRITEX workers in order to liaise with farmer groups in the loan application and disbursal process. Village Comunity Workers (VCWs) and Ward Coordinators are supposed to maintain links with workers from MCCD and other ministries. However, VCWs do not represent MCCD interests unless a ministry worker is in regular contact through a project. Ward coordinators tend to gravitate toward projects where workers from MCCD, other ministries and VSOs are present. After independence, AGRITEX was charged with dramatically expanding delivery of agricultural technology and extension services to small farmers. Subsequently, AGRITEX broadened coverage and adopted new extension methods in order to serve as many farmers as possible, especially in the communal lands. With the training and posting of hundreds of AGRITEX workers to the communal lands, AGRITEX established a presence in most of the wards and villages in Zimbabwe. The formation of In out! Jeliekb 130- at a are aintoq noiJoslloo . on} aaaoq defflw’vembvs 3fl9mn19vnp [Laraun 4w: Hi “aqua‘ .a'mnfifii IIJIH '41-“: I:F.'- ; -I:1 --:‘--i" "- '- ' ' ”Mn If ' Hm :"'E'1'I'IP.I.'.'-III'. 7' f. "i 193 extension groups by farmers and AGRITEX workers has provided an organization which can be used to discuss common problems and make demands more effectively. AGRITEX groups often cooperate with NFAZ farmer clubs in training, credit schemes, and input delivery as well as in making demands. While the advised ratio of extension workers to farmers is supposed to be 1:750 and often exceeds 1:1000, AGRITEX groups have significantly reduced coverage difficulties. Even though groups have proven to be effective in improving coverage, a number of farmers have found groups to be too cumbersome. Female farmers often feel neglected in groups, and many have joined predominantly-female cooperatives to receive adequate training and advice and gain decision—making capabilities and political voice. While the brief of AGRITEX workers has been focused on teaching improved farming and conservation techniques, many have exceeded their brief — with acquiescence from the Director and the Ministry of Agriculture — by helping farmers establish micro—projects and by helping to channel farmer demands to the appropriate authority. Farmers have been able to approach AGRITEX workers with a range of requests, including demands for better producer prices, transport, grazing land, micro—projects and even adjudication. For example, a woman farmer, surveyed in Hurungwe Communal Land, received assistance from AGRITEX workers in protecting her 194 property rights and preventing seizure by her deceased husband's in—laws. 6.2.3. Local Government Structures and Actors: VIDCO = the Village Development Committee. The basic unit of local government. A VIDCO serves 100 households and 1000 people, whether in several villages or one village unit. WADCO = the Ward Development Council. The level above the VIDCO, a WADCO serves approximately 600 and 6,000 or more people. VIDCO chair = the elected head of the VIDCO who takes the demands of constituents to the WADCO and who also sits on the WADCO. Ward councillor = the elected head of a ward who sits on the DC and takes farmer demands to the DC. DC = District Council. The governing body for the district. Represents 10,000—20,000 families, 100,000—200,000 people. DC Chair 2 top elected local official, chosen by Ward Councillors. DDC = District Development Committee. As the administrative and planning body for the district, the DDC decides on project placement and funding. Composed of District Administrator, central government officials. District Administrator 2 chief executive officer of the district. LGPOs = Local Government Promotion Officers are charged with developing the use of local government structures and assist VIDCO and WADCO officials. Local government organizations were established in 1984 to provide the basis for greater popular participation in socio~economic development and self—government, as well as for more effective planning and project implementation. The local government structures were devised to allow farmers and other rural dwellers to make a greater impact on government and ‘A :".. . 4.13."... ‘1; , .3knu epsftiv eno 10 euperftv r519”*a "i tsunenJ .erqnoq — 1”] '.!'-'\"“--1b 1‘3""! 'E'I'” ..fl.':l.=l 'l 'IZ-II..- '.- - - '.-.r-: ' " II- (HM .fl-‘e IHII: -. --r' - I4 , --'-\, - '1 Ii'.".-.'.'I 195 other institutions. Before the current structures were created, ZANU(PF) village committees governed most localities in east and central Zimbabwe (Ranger, 1985, 291—292). ZANU(PF) committees were formed during the war of independence (1972—79) through the joint efforts of ZANU(PF) guerillas and local leaders. The committees provided rural dwellers with experience in self—government and democratic procedures, as well as the means to facilitate discussion about the objectives of independence. After 1980, local leaders used the committees to run their villages with relatively little guidance from the ZANU(PF) leadership in Harare. While ZANU(PF) committees remain important, the locus of civic and political activity in the communal lands has shifted to local government bodies — VIDCOs, WADCOs and DCs. Since local government structures have only been existence since the mid—19805, a comprehensive and definitive evaluation of their performance has yet to be conducted.2 In localities where farmers have already been organized in ZANU(PF) committees and where they have been engaged in micro-projects, such as grazing schemes and gardening cooperatives, the establishment of VIDCOs and WADCOs has Uhe German Development Institute (1988) and the Occasional Papers of the Department of Rural and Urban Plannning indicates that VIDCOs, especially, have contributed to governance and democracy at the local level. Drinkwater (1991) argues that local government structures are used to impose grazing schemes. 196 provided a structure which has enabled farmers to better make and channel demands. VIDCOs have been used in helping to organize grazing schemes, dam building and other community— level projects. However, in wards and villages which were less—organized and more heterogeneous, the record of local government has been less successful (German Development Institute, 1988, 119). Furthermore, many wards and villages have been wrestling with the issue of what exactly WADCOs and VIDCOs should do. As local government was being established in rural Zimbabwe, fears were voiced that the structures would be used in conjunction with plans for "villagization" to tighten central government's control, thereby producing mass "exit" as occurred in Tanzania during the 19705.3 However, villagization plans have not been implemented, and, in most provinces, local government has developed into a cooperative venture between local elected councillors and district—level ministerial officials.4 Debates concerning decentralization 3From Conrad Brand's presentations on local government and villagization in Zimbabwe, Michigan State University, February 1988. A thorough critique of villagization experiments is contained in: Goran Hyden, Bevond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980. 4 The central government has exercised much more control over local affairs in Matabeleland and Manyikaland where guerilla insurgencies persisted during the 19805. r r 'l .. -. """""-_:'.' .7 ' l-L- ‘.I- 'l'. _ "u',; lfnll" I- ' '.'l n !" i'l‘H-J'IJ.JG 197 and the impact of local government structures on Zimbabwe's farmers require considerable more time to elapse and research to be conducted before they are resolved. Local government has been organized in such a way that, in theory, a demand made at the village level can be channelled to the ward level, then to the district level and eventually to the national government. In the MLGURD (Ministry of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development) and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and Development (MFEPD), most requests are considered and either funded as projects or rejected. The District Council and the WADCO presently act as sounding boards for farmer complaints and conduits through which farmer requests are passed for consideration. Since the mid—19805, farmer demands for infrastructure — dams, markets, roads, etc. — started to come to the DC as formal requests, whereas before 1985 they came through ZANU(PF) or central government agencies in a more gg hgg manner. The DC, the DC Chair and ward councillors have been vested with the power to make requests for a range of development services, and they must approve the delivery of services before the DDC decides on the implementation of projects and programs. The power to express political voice for thousands of farmers and to request and accept development services presents the DC and elected local government 198 officials with considerable opportunities to establish patronage networks. However, the limited authority of DCs, the implementation authority of the DDCs have inhibited, and the shortage of resources have inhibited the growth of patronage. The demand-channelling process can be illustrated by the example of the "Food—for-Work" program. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Food—for—Work projects were instituted during seasons of drought in which many farmers were unable to grow enough for subsistence. The objectives of the program were to use farmer labor to build infrastructure, including roads, schools and dams, and to combat environmental degradation through tree—planting and gully reclamation in the rural areas in exchange for providing sufficient food for subsistence. The aim was to prevent farmers from becoming dependent on hand—outs. The Food—for—Work program has involved local government planning and implementation, combined with central government resources. Under the program, projects could range from gully reclamation to the construction of school buildings to road construction to dam—building. Project proposals pass through the following process (consuming approximately four to six months) before they are implemented: — VIDCOs list proposals for food—for—work projects. - The ward councillor prioritizes projects. The DC approves or rejects each proposal. — The provincial council submits to the MLGRUD and MFEPD. 5 — After two or three months, approved proposals return to DC and DDC for implementation. QWNH l ‘ iii-113115811“ mnemonic-t m ‘Io ditto-xi ' bandit!“ e-usII ammunee': Io «generic or!) AIL-Jaw?! Iaq 4.1.1 51 :IeJG'IJaIIIII: --'.' -..I.-~ .. .-.._.-~---I '.'i.-!' T. .' ' .' i‘F-IIII 199 6 — If necessary, provincial administrator provides physical glanard councillors recruit a temporary local work force. 8 — Materials arrive for the project (GDI, 1988: 69—70). The process of listing and prioritizing project proposals involves considerable political debate and competition. Proposals come from local leaders, including VIDCO and ZANU(PF) members, and will be listed if they aim to develop essential infrastructure or maintain environmental quality. While the DDC and other central government agencies would like to see the process of prioritizing projects take place according to criteria of need, equitable distribution and hunger alleviation, the process is open to political maneuvering. In fact, prioritizing the proposals involves the greatest amount of political leverage, including the clout of VIDCO and ZANU(PF) officials, as well as the interests of the ward councillor. Once the prioritized list of projects reaches the DC, it is usually approved, and the projects with the highest priority are the ones most likely to be promoted by the DC in passing them on to the provincial governor, the provincial council as well as the ministry (MLGURD). Once projects are approved, the implementation process can involve political patronage. For instance, local government and party officials can recruit loyal supporters for the work force. In the survey, two farmers at two different sites complained that they had demanded participation in Food—for—Work projects without success and that other farmers were recruited because unll - I'JI'Inhq has pm‘ Jail 10 aneoo'm od'l‘ .notiiieqmeo bus ewsdob InniIIlnq eids19h.annn eevlovak 53m“, H'XET': pITrhnfnu' _.'. .-:--'I -' ~i I-- -v" -: :--.I'-. I'uu‘r‘! n.- 200 they were close to party and local government officials. In sum, when small farmers make a concerted effort to use local government structures to channel, they usually reach the appropriate authority; however, when the probability is high that a service or asset will be delivered, the probability of patronage increases. Furthermore, the procedure for making, channelling and fulfilling demands for projects or program change is still long and circuitous. If the DC or provincial governor eventually secure more authority over budgets, manpower and materials, the demands of farmers can be acted upon more rapidly and efficiently. Chapter Eight covers this issue further. 6.2.4. Political Parties: ZANU(PF) = Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front). The ruling party is present at the local level through Village Committees (or branches), the Women's League and Youth League. MP5 = Members of Parliament. Some are top ZANU(PF) officials with strong patronage capabilities. Others are less powerful. ZUM = Zimbabwe Unity Movement. The principal opposition party which contested the 1990 general election in most constituencies throughout Zimbabwe. ZANU (Ndonga) = An opposition party which confines its activities to Manyikaland Province. ZANU(PF) committees and the ZANU(PF) Women's League continue to function in rural Zimbabwe, and farmers still ask MP5 and other party officials for help in getting what they want. ZANU(PF) committees are responsible for managing visits 201 by MP5 to their constituencies, and they still channel demands to MP5 who often have the power to expedite the delivery of services. The party remains involved in organizing Food—for— Work programs, and ZANU(PF) committees and Women's League branches work with local government in maintaining order and participation. The party is involved in the ajudication of disputes as well as in the process of mobilizing people to participate in VIDCOs and other activities. With the transfer of local government responsibilities to VIDCOs and WADCOs, farmers were uncertain about the purpose of ZANU(PF), especially where MP5 were not particularly effective in bringing projects. As a consequence, evidence existed for concluding that the party was atrophying in at least some of the communal lands. Respondents at the eight survey sites in Hurungwe and Zaka were asked if they were leaders of village organizations and groups. Six respondents who mentioned that they were members of ZANU(PF) committees or of Women's Leagues indicated that they were also officials of the VIDCO. Party leaders used their position to obtain the assets and services that they wanted. At several sites, party and VIDCO leaders controlled decisions regarding participation in and funding for sewing and gardening cooperatives, as well as Food—for— Work projects. Local officials were well—placed to gain the attention of AGRITEX workers and AFC agents. In sum, the 202 tendency for local government and party officials to use their positions was apparent and questions were raised in the survey about maintaining accountability. 6.3. Small Farmer Knowledge of Organizations The views of farmers in the survey about organizations have been incorporated to an extent in the preceding sections. In this section, a more systematic analysis is provided of the organizations which farmers in the survey knew and what they knew about them. A study of the Egg of organizations must first determine the organizations that farmers actually knew and how well they knew them. Knowledge of a greater number of organizations increases the probability that a range of organizations and channels could be used in order to obtain agricultural assets and services. If a farmer demonstrates the capability to consult multiple channels, he or she also indicates a greater capacity for expressing political voice. Similarly, greater knowledge of a particular organization increases the likelihood that farmers have worked closely with that organization. If an individual lacks knowledge of an organization, its purposes and problems, that individual's degree of involvement with or use of that organization is likely to be minimal. In sum, knowledge of an organization is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for an effective degree of use and involvement. anntnastnfiu10 funds YDVHUH 9d! at Lifiwrn‘ ‘u rHI.J eflf LJI159J pnibnosiq 9H1 r1 Jne'25 n. 1:- '111:.o'n. nfi-fi sued 203 In determining farmer knowledge of organizations, a statement was read from the questionnaire concerning organizations that were present in the rural areas and which were supposed to assist farmers when asked for help. A list of organizations was read which included NFAZ, Christian Care, CADEC, International Voluntary Service and other VSOs; AGRITEX, AFC, and the MCCD; the District Council and the VIDCO and WADCO; and ZANU (PF). After farmers indicated which organizations they knew, their responses were checked and re— checked by asking the repondents to define the purposes of the organizations and then to describe any problems which they had experienced with those organizations. If farmers were unable to define the purpose of an organization which they had named, that organization would be deleted from the list. Occasionally, when farmers were asked about the problems which they had experienced with an organization, their responses clearly indicated that they did not really know the organization which they had named; therefore, it was deleted from the list. Table 39 contains a listing of the number of respondents who knew a particular organization, while Table 40 lists how many organizations were known by farmers: Table 39 Organizations Known by Farmers VIDCO/WADCO .. 200 (100%) AFC .......... 157 (78.5%) DC ........... 200 (100%) NFAZ ......... 118 (59.0%) ZANU(PF) ..... 200 (100%) $05 ......... 75 (37.5%) AGRITEX ...... 196 (98%) 204 Table 40 The Number of Organizations Known by Respondents 18 .......... 1 (0.5%) 6 .......... 45 (22.5%) 10 .......... 1 (0.5%) 5 .......... 65 (32.5%) 9 .......... 13 (6.5%) 4 .......... 21 (10.5%) 8 .......... 15 (7.5%) 3 .......... 4 (2.0%) 7 .......... 35 (17.5%) It can be concluded from the tables that farmer knowledge of organizations varies considerably, ranging from 18 organizations known by one farmer to three organizations known by four - all widows. The depth of knowledge also varies, from those with intimate knowledge of organizations to those, usually widows, who could barely define three or four. A common denominator was that 200 farmers knew ZANU(PF), the VIDCO/WADCO, and the DC, and 196 knew AGRITEX. This widespread familiarity could be attributed to the presence of these organizations at the ward and village level, accompanied by promotional and educational campaigns during the 19805. The median farmer knew six organizations, usually AFC and NFAZ as well as ZANU(PF), the VIDCO/WADCO, the DC and AGRITEX. Many farmers, especially those above the median, also knew about cooperatives and farmer groups, about private firms such as Windmill, Seed Coop, and the Zimbabwe Fertilizer Corporation, and about the two cooperative unions, CACU in Hurungwe and MCU in Zaka. Practically every respondent in Hurungwe knew AFC, because the organization was very active “whom! ‘I-'.:"'I -'.~~..:': - -', ' 205 disbursing loans in the area, whereas fewer than 60 per cent knew of AFC in Zaka. In Chapter Five, a significant association was established between VSO presence and the scope of demands; where VSOs were present, 36 per cent of demands were for program and policy change versus 23 per cent in areas without VSO presence. Similarly, it has been assumed that knowledge of VSOs provides farmers with added capability for the expression of demands for program and policy change. In the survey, 59 per cent of the sample knew NFAZ, 36.5 per cent knew a service organization, and 15 per cent knew more than two $05. As expected, knowledge of $05 was concentrated in the two sites where there was a substantial VSO presence, in Murembwa and Mudzimu wards. Knowledge of NFAZ was more diffused among the various sites. Unexpectedly, members of NFAZ—affiliated farmer clubs in two wards, Nhema North and Nhema South, did not know NFAZ. Obviously, membership recruitment outstripped member education in a number of locations. For the purpose of analysis, the sample was divided into four parts, according to the degree of knowledge of organizations. Table 41 displays the distribution: 206 Table 41 Number of Organizations Known Moderately Moderately Low (3—4) Low (5) High (6—7) High (8—18) 25 65 80 30 12.5% 32.5% 40% 15% Farmers who knew three or four organizations were not familiar with AFC or NFAZ and were generally the least active of all the respondents. Those farmers who knew five organizations knew AFC in addition to AGRITEX, ZANU(PF), the VIDCO/WADCO and the DC. Those respondents who knew six to seven organizations knew NFAZ, and those who knew more than seven knew at least two service organizations. 6.4. Small Farmer Perspectives on Organizations In this section, the views of farmers in the survey about the purposes of organizations and problems experienced are considered, starting with VSOs. While almost 60 per cent of farmers surveyed knew about NFAZ, those who possessed intensive knowledge about NFAZ were synonymous with those farmers who use NFAZ to make demands — approximately 25 per cent of those surveyed. Farmers who knew NFAZ mentioned that it cooperated with AFC and AGRITEX in the process of organizing farmers in groups to apply for short—term seasonal loans, as well as assisting with disbursal and repayment. NFAZ was also known for lobbying for improved marketing facilities, including GMB depots and collection points, better 207 and cheaper transport and empty bags in which crops could be transported. Farmers also recognized that NFAZ membership provided them sales tax reduction and that NFAZ was working for lower input prices, higher producer prices, and cooperatives and development projects. In regard to problems, several farmers commented that NFAZ did not provide them with adequate services in return for membership. Farmers complained about the failure to provide transport, to control input price increases, and to deliver enough empty bags. Several farmers also knew cooperative membership organizations such as OCCZIM, CACU and MCU. In Hurungwe, several farmers mentioned that they were members of the umbrella marketing cooperative, CACU, in order to market their crops and to be paid more efficiently. CACU members, especially in Mudzimu, discussed the problems of mismanagement and misappropriation of funds by CACU officials after crops had been sold to the GMB. In regard to MCU, farmers in Zaka knew that the MCU sold seeds and farm equipment to farmers, sells crops for farmers, and provides empty bags and transport. They also complained that MCU caused delays in disbursing GMB checks, did not raise producer prices, did not lower input prices, and did not end automatic deductions by the AFC from checks. Because of problems with MCU and CACU, farmers were unable to repay loans, and relations with AFC deteriorated. 208 The service organizations which were known by farmers in most sites in Hurungwe and Zaka were CADEC and Christian Care. Farmers commented that their only problem with these organizations was a lack of accessibility. Several respondents knew that CADEC was helping to build dams and drill boreholes; and that Christian Care was helping the poorest farmers through donations in inputs, food, clothing and blankets. In wards with VSO presence, Mudzimu and Murembwa, farmers described several VSOs that they knew. In Mudzimu, several women respondents were involved with the project, "Strengthening the Role and Work of Women in Rural Development," in Hurungwe and Mashonaland West Province, which was a joint effort by FAO (replaced in 1990 by CIDA) and the MCCD. FAO and the MCCD were known through the project and its positive reputation for assisting poorer women farmers in cooperatives. In Murembwa, farmers singled out the field workers for IVS who were also cooperating with NFAZ and Swissaid and who were helping to improve the quality of life through a series of projects. IVS and Swissaid were known for the training and financial support which enabled farmers to become more decisive and which enhanced the success of a series of micro-projects. When asked about central government agencies, practically every farmer — 196 out of 200 — knew the purpose of AGRITEX. 209 Most farmers first mentioned "the teaching of farming methods." In Hurungwe, the adoption of improved seeds and fertilizer and agricultural prosperity were attributed to AGRITEX. In Zaka, farmers emphasized the role of AGRITEX in conservation, soil restoration, the use of manure, the building of contour ridges, the establishment of grazing schemes, and reforestation. In five of the eight wards, farmers commented that AGRITEX workers were going beyond the teaching of agricultural methods and had become involved in community affairs and in development projects. In terms of problems, farmers demanded that the number of extension workers be increased and that coverage be broadened and, eventually, individualized. In two cm the eight wards, complaints were made that AGRITEX workers were not meeting regularly with farmers, that they were not responding to farmer requests, and that they were favoring a few farmers over others. In the other six sites, there were few complaints about AGRITEX workers. Farmers identified AFC with the process of disbursing "fertilizer loans" which brought higher yields. While most farmers surveyed recognized that an AFC loan would benefit them, they understood the difficulties of repayment and the delays in input delivery which make credit a risky proposition. In Hurungwe, most farmers had received credit from AFC and knew about the benefits and problems, whereas 210 only a minority of farmers in Zaka had experience with AFC. Several farmers complained about the seizure of assets by AFC, and a number of farmers indicated that they had experienced difficulties in understanding the concepts of interest and repayment. The task of familiarizing farmers with the intricacies of credit had been made more difficult by rather lenient programs in the early 19805. In 1980, farmers had been supplied with loans and inputs as part of war relief with no expectations for repayment. In 1982, the AFC made widespread loans to small farmers, but forgave the loans in the wake of the 1983 drought. The other central government agency which a few farmers, involved in development projects, knew was the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development (MCCD). Those farmers knew that MCCD workers were assisting cooperatives in agricultural marketing, gardens, poultry, and sewing. Farmers were interested in forming small—scale cooperatives, and they demanded that the MCCD become much more active in assisting with cooperative formation and training. Female respondents in the survey who had received cooperative training by both the MCCD and Silveira House commented that the MCCD needed to improve in order to match the quality of training, especially in leadership skills for women, which was provided by Silveira House . 211 In commenting on local government in Hurungwe and Zaka, farmers referred to VIDCOs (and WADCOs) as distinguished from the District Council. Their knowledge of VIDCOs (and WADCOs) revolved the organizations' role in conflict resolution and demand—channelling, as well as micro-project management. Farmers acknowledged that VIDCOs were supposed to establish grazing schemes and organize the construction of dams and seek help from the DC and other agencies to complement local efforts. While a majority of farmers were positively-inclined toward VIDCOs and WADCOs, several respondents criticized their VIDCOs for lacking the ability to mobilize and coordinate the people for development projects. Some believed that VIDCOs and WADCOs were not channelling demands to the DC, and others complained that some local officials were involved in conflicts, corruption, and fights with traditional headmen. Farmers knew the purpose of their VIDCO and lived alongside VIDCO officials; consequently, farmers were often on personal terms with VIDCO members. However, knowledge of the Ward Councillor varied considerably. In Murembwa Ward, where the Ward Councillor was closely involved in the AGRITEX—IVS— NFAZ development project, the councillor was widely—known by respondents. At other sites, farmers knew at least something about their councillor, though they may not have known their names. In Doro Ward, a dispute had arisen over the replacement of the ward councillor; some respondents believed 212 that he had been corrupt, while others saw his replacement as the result of personal grudges against him. The District Councils are known in Hurungwe and Zaka as the local government body which is most responsible for acting on farmer demands for program change and for bringing development. Since farmers knew that the DCs were involved in tax and school fee collection, they expected the delivery of a full range of services. Farmers expected the DC to build and repair roads and dams, facilitate transport, help construct and improve schools and clinics, and provide other services. Subsequently, criticisms were made against the DC for the poor maintenance of roads and bridges, biases in employment, delays in the building of dams and boreholes, rising taxes, the lack of textbooks, and misappropriation of funds. While a few Civic—minded farmers knew that the DCs clearly lacked the resources, capacity and personnel to fulfill the wide range of demands, most farmers placed blame for the relatively slow pace of development at the doorstep of the DC. In commenting on ZANU(PF), most respondents remarked that its purpose was to maintain order and stability among communities. This perspective on ZANU(PF) can by explained in two ways: the role of ZANU(PF) committees in local government and ajudication before the establishment of VIDCOs/WADCOs/DC, 213 and the surveillance of the rural areas by party officials.5 Besides order, farmers knew that the party convened meetings, sold party cards, and were involved in arranging food—for—work projects. Several farmers complained that they were forced to go to meetings far away, buy party cards and pay to attend political rallies. Some respondents commented that ZANU(PF) should assume responsibility for providing more employment for school leavers and should work to end conflicts and corruption. 6.5. Evaluation of Organizational Performance Farmers were also asked about changes in performance of the organizations with which they came in contact. Had organizational performance declined, stayed the same or improved between 1984 and 1989? Farmers were asked to give reasons for their answers and to suggest ways in which organizations could do more to help improve the quality of life in their area. Their responses: Table 42 Helpfulness of Organizations ———_— More Helpful hfi Same ————————— D555—Helpful _________ 1 7175'753;?”"mil—119%.}— 31 <15 so.) The high percentage (57.5 per cent) of farmers who said that organizations were serving them better in 1989 than in 5On three different occasions, members of the research team encountered security personnel who showed credentials linking them with ZANU(PF). 214 1984 confirmed their answers by referring to particular organizations which were performing better. Many farmers who asserted that organizations were more helpful cited VIDCOs and AGRITEX, as well as VSOs and AFC, at some sites, as reasons for improved performance. The 15.5 per cent who claimed that organizations were less helpful referred to the District Council and ZANU(PF) as reasons for worsening performance. The presence of VSOs (sites with NFAZ and at least one service organization) was found, in the course of the survey, to be positively associated with favorable attitudes toward organizational performance. Table 43 illustrates this relationship: Table 43 Helpfulness of Organizations by VSO Presence ~~—— Row VSOs present VSOs not present Total 40 75 115 More Helpful 80% 50.0% 57.5% 5 49 54 No Change 10% 32.7% 27.0% 5 26 31 Less Helpful . 10% 17.3% 15.5% Column Total 50 150 200 25% 75% 100% Chi Square = 14.3 Significance = .001 Measure of Assocation (tau-b) = .23 Of the two sites with a VSO presence, 60% of farmers in Mudzimu Ward and 100% in Murembwa Ward said that organizations which were supposed to serve them were doing a better job as 215 against 39% in the other six sites where VSO presence was minimal. VSOs introduced projects which fulfilled farmer demands and improved the quality of life. VSOs often worked with AGRITEX and farmer organizations which helped improve their performance. VSOs trained farmers in organizational management and improved their ability to use organizations. Quite often, VSOs were more accessible at project sites than were other organizations. 6.6. Farmer Organizations: Membership, Leadership and Politics Earlier in this chapter, small farmer groups were categorized and their roles in providing farmers with the capability to express political voice were discussed. In this section, survey data is used to describe and analyze both membership and leadership by farmers in groups. It is expected that levels of group membership and leadership are positively associated with the ability to make and fulfill demands. If a farmer is active in a greater number of groups than average, it is likely that the farmer is more effective in making demands, using organizations and obtaining agricultural assets and services. In determining organizational membership, respondents were asked if they were members of the following groups: 216 1) an AGRITEX information and training group; 2) a labor pooling group;6 3) a marketing and supply group; 4) gardening, income—generating and other multipurpose groups; 5) a (master) farmers club; 5) a savings club; 6) AFC groups; and 7) any other group or cooperative which pertained to agriculture. Respondents were also asked if they were members of the NFAZ in order to determine if farmer club members indeed also belonged to NFAZ. After asking about membership, farmers were asked about their leadership role in farmer groups and in political bodies, such as the VIDCO and ZANU(PF) village committees. The number of farmers belonging to various groups and the number of group memberships by various farmers are listed in the following tables: Table 44 Group Membership AGRITEX group .. 127 (63.5%) NFAZ .............. 43 (21.5%) Labor pooling .. 123 (61.5%) Marketing coop .... 34 (17.0%) AFC group ....... 74 (37%) Women's coop ...... 31 (15.5%) Multipurpose .... 69 (34.5%) Savings Club ...... 24 (12.0%) Farmer Club ..... 59 (29.5%) 6Labor pooling groups in Zimbabwe perform "zvikwata" or "nhimbe" which usually involves the brewing of beer in exchange for labor. 217 Table 45 Number of Group Memberships 0 groups ....... 13 (6.5%) 4 ................ 29 (14.5%) 1 .............. 26 (13.0%) 5 ................ 26 (13.0%) 2 .............. 49 (24.5%) 6 ................ 13 (6 5%) 3 .............. 43 (21.5%) 7 ................ 1 (.5%) Table 46 Levels of Group Membership Low (0-1 groups) Medium (2—3) High (4—7) 39 92 69 19.5% 46% 34.5% Of the farmers surveyed, 6.5 per cent claimed that they did not belong to any groups, while an additional 11.5 per cent belonged only to a labor group. Most respondents were members of a labor pooling group (61.6 per cent) and an AGRITEX information and training group (63.5 per cent). The relatively high number of group memberships can be attributed to two principal factors. One was the sampling method in which meetings were called by ward councillors and AGRITEX workers. Another factor was the difficulty in confirming farmer claims about group membership. In Hurungwe, 67 farmers or two—thirds of those interviewed had been involved in AFC groups (also involving AGRITEX and NFAZ) for loan applications and the distribution of fertilizer and other inputs. In Zaka, 63 farmers or almost two—thirds were members of small multi—purpose groups, involving the cooperative production and marketing of 218 vegetables, poultry and other items; these small cooperatives had, according to respondents, significantly improved the quality of members' lives. The greater importance of grains and cotton marketing in Hurungwe explains why many more farmers there were AFC group members than in Zaka. The small multi—purpose groups in Zaka enabled farmers to market vegetables, poultry and other commodities besides grains and cotton. In response to questions about whether farmers were committee members, Chairpersons, treasurers or secretaries of any farmer groups or local political organizations, 105 respondents or 52.5 per cent of the sample claimed to be officials or leaders of groups. Most "leaders" were officials in small groups, usually with less than 20 members, such as gardening and poultry cooperatives. A few farmers were chairs of VIDCOs and ZANU(PF) committees, while a few others were traditional leaders (headmen). The large number of respondents who claimed to be leaders of groups or political organizations (52.5 per cent) and members of at least one farmer group (92.5 per cent) indicate that the sampling method was effective in securing a substantial set of farmers who possessed at least a modicum of political capabilities for expressing political voice.7 7In a study of farmer groups, Bratton (1986a) found that 44 per cent of the sample claimed to be group members. 219 Within the set of farmers who claimed to be members or leaders of organizations, there was considerable variation in capabilities — from those farmers who were merely members of a labor pooling group to those who were members and/or leaders of several groups. Variation in group membership was captured in Tables 44, 45 and 46. Master farmers possess both agricultural and political capabilities which provide advantages in the expression of political voice and in the fulfillment of demands. In Zimbabwe, master farmers are trained for a period of five years in intensive cultivation methods and are encouraged to market their crops. Subsequently, as master farmers, they are members of farmer clubs, they may join other groups, and they develop connections with AGRITEX, AFC, NFAZ and other organizations. For instance, receipt cm a master farmer certificate is an indicator that a farmer has been active in an AGRITEX group and received training from an AGRITEX worker. Many master farmers join farmer clubs and NFAZ at the same time and pay ZSS annual dues. As a result of their training, master farmers are expected to lead other farmers by example. Also, master farmers are more likely to take joint action through their groups to obtain agricultural services than the average small farmer. In sum, master farmer status should be a significant factor in explanations of political voice and effectiveness in demand fulfillment. 220 In the survey, respondents were asked if they were master farmers or not or if they were master farmer trainees. The number of farmers who indicated that they were master farmers amounted to 28.5 per cent of the sample, while 33.5 per cent claimed to be master farmer trainees, and 37.5 per cent said they were neither. In comparison to a study in Bikita District (bordering Zaka District on the east) where more than ten per cent of the sample claimed to be master farmers (GDI, 1988: 96), the number of master farmers in the Hurungwe—Zaka survey was higher. This result conforms with the expectations that the sampling method would generate a higher proportion of group leaders and members as well as politically—active farmers than was present in the population. Master farmer training, (master) farmer clubs and NFAZ all began in Masvingo Province. The survey sought to determine if the number of master farmers in Zaka Communal Land, Masvingo Province remained higher than in an area of concentrated activity by AGRITEX and AFC - Hurungwe Communal Land, Mashonaland West Province. If the number of master farmers in Zaka remained higher, this would be a sign of the strength of the program there. If the number in Hurungwe was higher, this would indicate the rapid growth (within ten years) of the program there. Table 47 contains the results: 221 Table 47 Master Farmer Status Hurungwe Zaka Total Master Farmer 22 35 57 22% 35% 28.5% Trainee 21 46 67 21% 46% 33.5% Neither 56 19 75 56% 19% 37.5% Considerably more respondents in Zaka (35 per cent) claimed to be master farmers than in Hurungwe (22 per cent) which stems from the fact that master farmer training and master farmer clubs were initiated in Zaka well before Hurungwe (Mutimba, 1981). Moreover, more than twice as many respondents in Zaka (46 per cent) claimed to be master farmer trainees than in Hurungwe (21 per cent). This result indicates that master farmer training in Hurungwe is lagging behind Zaka, even though agro—ecological, marketing and institutional conditions are more favorable in Hurungwe for the development of master farmers. Even though less Hurungwe respondents were master farmers and trainees, they marketed more and produced higher yields than their Zaka counterparts. From these results, it can be concluded that master farmers may not have played a dominant role in Zimbabwe's "smallholder revolution" in areas like Hurungwe. In addition, the results demonstrate the limitations of master farmer training in 222 overcoming the less favorable agro—ecological conditions in Masvingo Province. Previously, the linkage between master farmers, NFAZ and farmer clubs has been described. Master farmers had traditionally formed the basis of farmer clubs, and the clubs became the cornerstone for NFAZ (Mutimba, 1981). While NFAZ counted members of farmer clubs as NFAZ members, questions remain about how many club members actually paid the 285 dues which entitled them to NFAZ membership and to a waiver in sales tax on agricultural inputs. In the survey, 59 respondents were farmer club members, while 43 claimed to be paid—up NFAZ members. This discrepancy can be explained mainly by farmers in Nhema North and Nhema South who were not aware that farmer club membership also made them members of NFAZ. In regard to NFAZ's intention of broadening farmer groups, the survey found that farmer group membership was still composed primarily of master farmers with a few trainees. It would seem that the campaign to broaden and deepen NFAZ membership is progressing slowly if not declining. Through the survey, additional insights were acquired about the politics of farmer groups in Zimbabwe. Farmers believed that groups with a membership of more than 30 were too large to serve their interests; for example, there was widespread disenchantment with CACU and other umbrella—style cooperatives. Female and elderly farmers expressed a 223 preference for more traditional and informal groups, such as labor pooling groups or small gardening and poultry cooperatives, in which they could participate and even manage. ( These 32:8 farmers felt marginalized by more formal, market— oriented groups, including AGRITEX information groups as well as NFAZ farmer clubs and AFC groups. Master farmers tended to dominate those groups. Female farmers were also wary of male extension workers and other male officials and expressed a desire for more female officials. Besides feeling marginalized by VIDCOs and other local government structures, traditional leaders felt that they were excluded from formal farmer groups. Increasing government sensitivity to the complaints of traditional leaders has meant that both local government and farmer groups have attempted to be more accomodating. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Eight, small cooperatives, composed mainly of women and the elderly, provided a means of collectively approaching the more formal, market—oriented groups and male officials. In Murembwa Ward, training by VSOs provided women with assertiveness to approach officials collectively and individually. 6.7. How Organizations Are Used to Make Agricultural Demands When small farmers decide to use organizations to make demands for agricultural assets and services, they are faced with a number of constraints. A complete range of organizations which might be of use, such as VSOs, may not be 224 available, thereby preventing farmers from fully expressing political voice. Furthermore, one organization may be designated as an official channel in dealing with a particular demand or set of demands. Farmers may be directed to make requests to the official organization and to wait for a response. Consequently, they can be constrained from using the full range of organizations to seek to fulfill their demands. In rural Zimbabwe, central government agencies and local government have been designated as "official channels" to deal with demands and channel requests, and farmers can be expected to use central government then local government the most. However, it is also anticipated that politically capable farmers take the initiative to overcome constraints, seeking out and using unofficial channels, including VSOs, in making demands. In determining the organizations that were used, the following questions were asked: "Did you ask the representative of an organization?" "Which organization was represented by the first person asked? “What groups were represented by other people asked? Displayed below are organizations which were asked by the sequence in which a request was made: 225 Table 48 Type of Organization Asked by Sequence of Request — ———- ——— ————— Row First Request Second Third Total Central government 163 81 18 262 50.9% 46.8% 34.0% 48% Local government 128 72 28 228 40.0% 41.6% 52.8% 41.8% VSOs 29 20 7 56 9.1% 11.6% 13.2% 10.2% Column Total 320 173 53 546 58.6% 31.7% 9.7% 100% Chi Square = 9.914 Significance = .05 Measure of Assocation = .038 [ZANU(PF) was not included] Table 49 First Organization Asked AGRITEX ..... 106 (32.2%) NFAZ ......... 17 (5.2%) VIDCO/WADCO 83 (25.2%) 805 .......... 12 (3.6%) AFC .......... 55 (16.7%) ZANU(PF) ..... 9 (2.7%) DC ........... 42 (12.8%) AGRITEX was used first on 106 occasions out of a total of 320 occasions (33.1 per cent), and organizations as a whole were occasions (over 50 per cent). government which was used first on 128 occasions cent). central approached first government on 163 Following closely was local (38 per These results can be explained far the widespread presence of these organizations and their status as official channels. almost completely supplanted ZANU was being used by farmers tr) make demands. expected that ZANU(PF) (PF) A surprising result was that local government had as an organization which It had been would still be used by a large number 226 of farmers. These results indicate that farmers in Hurungwe and Zaka had come to accept VIDCO-WADCO channel as an official channel and ignore ZANU(PF) within a short period of time (between 1984 and 1989). Although local government regulations required that demands originate at the VIDCO level, the DC was reportedly asked first on 42 occasions, mainly in Zaka. This anomaly is partly explained by respondents who lumped the VIDCO, WADCO, and DC together. However, some farmers expressed frustration with VIDCOs and WADCOs and elected to take their demands, including demands for resettlement, infrastructure and "food— for—work" programs, directly to the DC. In using a second organization 173 times and a third 53 times, farmers who used organizations went beyond the official channels at least half of the time (53 per cent). Central government and local government were used for most of the second and third attempts. For instance, if AGRITEX was the first organization approached, it was likely that a VIDCO would be the second. The heavy reliance on central and local government as non— official channels is explained by their widespread presence. At the two sites where VSOs were present (that is, with NFAZ and at least one service organization), the use of VSOs was considerably higher. At those sites, VSOs were approached first 17 per cent of the time (see Table 51 below) as opposed to five per cent at the sites where their presence was 227 minimal; second 21 per cent with VSOs versus seven per cent without; and third 13 per cent with VSOs versus nine per cent without VSOs. In sites with VSO presence, NFAZ and service organizations were just as accessible as AGRITEX, VIDCOs and other government organizations. The VSOs were not official organizations, so they were used to either circumvent or complement official channels. Analysis of the relationship between the scope of demand and the type of organizations that farmers first approach sheds additional light on the issue of how small farmers use organizations. The results are contained in Table 50: Table 50 First Organization Used by Scope of Demand Available Assets Program Policy Row or Services Change Change Total Central 123 28 12 163 Government 69.5% 23.5% 50.0% 50.9% Local 44 79 5 128 Government 24.9% 66.4% 20.8% 40.0% 10 12 7 29 VSO 5 6% 10.1% 29 2% 9 1% Column Total 177 119 2 320 55 3% 37 5% 7.2% 100% Chi-Square = 62.72 Significance = .00000 Measure of Association (tau—b) = .26 Table 51 demonstrates that, when controlling for VSO presence, the relationship between the first organization farmers used and the scope of demands remains statistically significant: 228 Table 51 First Organization Used by Scope, Controlling for VSO Presence VSOs Present: Available Assets Program Policy Row or Services Change Change Total Central 29 10 4 43 Government 65.9% 24.4% 57.1% 46.7% Local 9 23 1 33 Government 20.5% 56.1% 14.3% 35.9% 6 8 2 16 VSO 13.6% 19.5% 28.6% 17.4% Column Total 44 41 7 92 47.8% 44.6% 7.6% 100% Chi—Square = 33.5 Significance = .00000 Measure of Association (tau—b) = .138 Claims made for available services, such as loans and extension advice, were made mainly through official central government channels. The two principal service providers in the rural areas are AGRITEX and AFC. A farmer could approach AGRITEX and AFC workers, most always in a group setting, and make an application or claim for extension advice and credit. These services were readily available as long as the farmer was qualified to receive them. The application process was brief for extension advice, requiring that farmers join an AGRITEX group and approach an extension worker. In contrast, the application process for credit was more circuitous, requiring farmers to join an AFC group and apply through an AFC worker, with references for credit—worthiness from AGRITEX 229 and NFAZ, then to wait for delivery of credit, usually in the form of inputs. In attempting to obtain available assets, farmers generally tried to purchase them, or they approached local government. in making claims for available land or other assets. However, land is becoming increasingly scarce, especially in Zaka and Masvingo Province, so that applications to VIDCOs usually end in failure or in demands for resettlement land. Demands for program change (that is, the expansion of the pool of assets such as resettlement land and services such as markets, boreholes and other infrastructure) were made mostly through local government. In requesting resettlement land, farmers were usually required to channel an application from the VIDCO to the District Council and the District Administrator. In demanding program change in regard to services, farmers acted collectively. Farmers placed great expectations on the DC to respond to their demands and laid the blame for failure at the door of the organization, even though it lacked both the authority and the resources to deliver a fraction of what farmers wanted. As expected, VSOs were used primarily to make demands for . Cg} ‘M'ir’fi program and policy change. NFAZ was used to make demands fork new markets, changes in pricing policy, new credit schemes, ”" and expanded transport, while service organizations were used to make demands for water projects, cooperatives, new markets ,. \ 10.21 t- » I‘ :_. .1 [1. '.K. ‘.‘v ?~wwn )._, 230 and training. On ten occasions, VSOs were used, instead of official channels, to make demands for available services. NFAZ was regarded by a significant minority of farmers as the organization which could best represent them at the national level in attempting to bring about policy change and at the district level to bring about program change. In the two sites where service organizations were present, farmers used them to make demands for program change. In regard to policy change, farmers approached VSOs but they also used AGRITEX and local government, especially in seeking to change pricing policy in favor of small farmers. Farmers were obviously not reluctant to use government organizations for "unofficial" purposes. When making demands for policy change, several farmers were also not inhibited from approaching Members of Parliament (MP5) and other political figures at political rallies and agricultural shows. The approaches which involved collective action by a farmers club or group were viewed as particularly effective in making an impression. In Table 48, it was demonstrated that, when farmers used more than one organization to make demands, they approached central government, local government and VSOs. Furthermore, farmers who acted together were particularly likely to use multiple channels, including AGRITEX, local government and V305, and they used these organizations to make demands for 231 program change or for the expansion of the pool of services, including boreholes, roads, transport and markets. In general, when a second channel was used, 75% of demands were for services, and when a third was asked, 82% of demands were for services. Thus, farmers perceived that "non—official" channels were useful in attempting to secure services rather than in persuading authorities to provide more land and other assets. It has been hypothesized that farmers escalate the scopeE of their demands. In the survey, when farmers seek better' land, they begin by applying to village authorities for existing land. If unsuccessful, they ask extension agents to help with grazing schemes or they apply to district authorities for resettlement land. Thus, they seek expansion of assets and services or a program change. A few farmers who LINK TO Ifi‘tr-"yb. “MR“ 06 l 4’le 11;."9‘. . (ANAL/g5 ':.\2. 6:21, $u1 HL-g I; fail to obtain resettlement land and who are prominent within the community ask representatives of the NFAZ to press the, government to buy more land for resettlement or to initiate? land reform (that is, to press for policy change). The same applies to producer price policy. The escalating pattern of demands applies to other assets and services. However, in order to ask for program or policy change, only the most prominent farmers can ask as individuals. In demanding a dam or a grazing scheme, farmers act as a group and channel their demands through the VIDCO or 'I 232 AGRITEX. In requesting changes in pricing policy or land reform, farmers must channel their demands through NFAZ or an MP, and they must hope that their demands are taken up at the national level. 6.8. The Use of Alternative Organizations and Informal Channels In Chapter Two, it was hypothesized that, if small farmers possess political voice, they will not stop trying to get what they want and will ask alternative or "unofficial" organizations when they try again. In this chapter, it has already been demonstrated that farmers use non—official channels. Table 52 indicates that those respondents who tried more than once to get what they wanted asked alternative organizations or unofficial channels: Table 52 Use of Alternative Organizations by Farmers Who Tried Again Alternative Organizations Same Organization 102 61 (62.6%) (37.4%) A majority of respondents who failed to get what they wanted the first time tried again, and those who tried again used at least one alternative organization. While respondents used another organization on the 102 occasions when they tried again, many farmers approached more than one organization when they first tried, and they continued to approach more than one organization if they tried again. 233 While the survey determined that small farmers used unofficial and alternative organizations, questions were asked to determine if they used organizations in an "informal" manner. Respondents were asked if they approached the representatives of organizations outside of meetings or offices and if those representatives reciprocated for the delivery of services and assets. Respondents were also asked if they used relatives in official positions for help. A surprising finding was that few farmers indicated that they had used organizations or officials or relatives in an informal sense. The low number of cases can be explained by the reluctance of farmers to discuss such matters and by the difficulty of investigating informal activities through a survey. Both central and local government officials were also reluctant to discuss the use of informal channels. Another possible explanation is that relatively few farmers are in the position to use informal channels and that government agencies in Zimbabwe are relatively less susceptible to informal activities than those in other African countries. In the survey, informal channels were used at the VIDCO level. Farmers approached VIDCO members and village headmen (sabhuku), asking for land. If land was allocated, the farmers reciprocated by performing a service, such as informal labor, for VIDCO members or headmen. In addition, farmer leaders, active in local government, the party, farmer clubs 234 and cooperatives, resorted to using informal channels to make proposals and present demands. These leaders possessed greater knowledge of organizations and channels and demonstrated greater political skills than the average farmer. For instance, NFAZ representatives established reciprocal relations with counterparts in the DC, AFC and AGRITEX. 6.9. Rural Stratification and the Use of Organizations It was expected that rural stratification would be related to the types of organizations used and that richer farmers were expected to use VSOs the most. That hypothesis is not conformed in Table 53: Table 53 Type of Organization Used by Cattle Holdings Low Medium High Row 0—3 4~8 8—40 Total Central Govt 41 59 63 163 56 2% 51 7% 47 3% 50 9% Local Government 29 41 58 128 39 7% 36 0% 43 6% 40 0% VSO 3 14 12 29 4 1% 12 3% 9 0% 9 1% Column Total 73 114 133 320 22.8% 35.6% 41.6% 100% Chi—Square = 5.13; Significance = .15 Measure of Association (tau~b) = .065 There is little statistical relationship between socio- economic stratification, measured by cattle holdings, and the type of organization used, and there was little difference 235 between middle and richer farmers in terms of the types of organizations used. Both used organizations, especially VSOs, more than poorer farmers. Richer and middle farmers used NFAZ to demand program change (for example, for better markets) and policy change (particularly for higher producer prices). Surprisingly, the relationship between a correlate of socio—economic status, the amount of crops marketed, and the type of organization used is statistically significant, though the measure of association weak: Table 54 Type of Organization Used by Crops Marketed Low Medium High Row 280—500 500—1575 1600—9200 Total Central Government 62 55 46 163 54 9% 55 6% 42 6% 50 9% Local Government 45 37 46 128 39 8% 37 4% 42 6% 40 0% VSO 6 7 16 29 5 3% 7.1% 14 8% 9 1% Column Total 113 99 108 320 35.3% 30.9% 33.8% 100% ChieSquare = 9.94; Significance = .05 Measure of Association (tau—b) = .115 In Table 54, there is a contrast between richer and middle farmers in terms of the types of organizations used, whereas middle and poorer farmers demonstrated similar patterns in the use of organizations. Richer farmers who marketed the highest amount of crops (251600—9200) consulted central government less and used VSOs more, especially NFAZ. 236 Poorer farmers who marketed little or nothing (230—500) used organizations considerably more than poorer farmers who had little or no cattle. In contrasting Tables 53 and 54, poorer farmers (with little or no cattle) used organizations significantly less than those who marketed little or nothing. Consequently, holding less than four cattle (which includes two—thirds of Zimbabwe’s small farmers) appears to impose constraints on the use of organizations to make demands. The lack of participation in the market does not impose the same constraints. Conversely, farmers who are heavily engaged in the market and those with more than three cattle (that is, with sufficient draft power) are particularly inclined toward using organizations, especially VSOs such as NFAZ. The farmers who had previous experience with NFAZ were most likely to use NFAZ to make demands. However, this pattern was contradicted in Murembwa Ward, where a wider range of farmers were using NFAZ to make demands. This can be explained by the fact that, in Murembwa, NFAZ co-sponsored a development project with AGRITEX and International Voluntary Services. In that ward, the NFAZ area and village representatives were more attuned to assisting a wide range of farmers, and non—master farmers were joining NFAZ farmer clubs. In regard to poorer farmers and 805, respondents in Murembwa and Mudzimu Wards used SOs in asking for program 237 change (see Table 51 above); for instance, in organizing the construction of boreholes and other infrastructure needed for development projects. In Murembwa Ward, organizations were used on 46 occasions compared to the remaining three sites in Zaka where only 94 organizations were used. In Murembwa, NFAZ was approached on five occasions and 805 four times compared to the other three sites where NFAZ was used once and 305 not at all. These findings are striking, demonstrating that the training and projects in Murembwa were enabling poor farmers in a poor location to express political voice. Similar interventions are needed throughout Zaka and Masvingo Province to help with problems of over-crowding, drought and underdeveloped infrastructure. In determining the combined effect of gender and marital status on the types of organizations used, the sample was divided into males, married females and single females: 238 Table 55 Type of Organization Asked by Gender/Marital Stratification Single Married Row Female Female Male Total Central Government 24 24 115 163 61.5% 46.2% 50.2% 50.9% Local Government 15 23 90 128 38.5% 44.2% 39.3% 40.0% VSO O 5 24 29 0.0% 9.6% 10.5% 9.1% Column Total 39 52 229 320 12.2% 16.2% 71.6% 100% Chi—Square = 5.48; Significance = .10 Measure of Association (tau-b) = .054 The 41 single females in the sample used organizations on 39 occasions - an average of less than one occasion per farmer to make their three demands. In contrast, the 124 male farmers used organizations on 229 occasions - an average of almost two occasions per farmer. The 35 married females used organizations on 52 occasions — an average of 1.5 occasions. Single female farmers did not use organizations with much frequency, and they never used VSOs (including NFAZ) for help in getting what they wanted. An additional observation is that single females did not take the initiative in approaching and using government organizations. Although one of the purposes of VSOs is to provide poor single females with the training to enable them to express political voice and make demands, the survey surprisingly indicates that even VSOs have 239 yet to provide single females with a channel for making demands. Although the survey demonstrates shortcomings in VSO realtions with single female farmers, several VSOs have acted in 'various parts of Zimbabwe to provide the training to amplify the weak political voice of single female farmers. In particular, the FAQ—funded project, "Strengthening Women's Role and Work in Rural Development," operated in conjunction with the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development and the Department of Women's Affairs, has targeted female farmers and provided them with the organization and training necessary for expressing political voice and taking collective action. In the survey in Mudzimu Ward where the project was operating, the five single female farmers who were interviewed were not associated with the project. However, two female farmers were interviewed whose husbands were invalids, who managed the affairs of the household, and who were participants in the project (their cases are described in Chapter Seven). The project had provided them with the training which enabled them to operate cooperatives and with greater ability to use a range of channels to make demands of a wider scope. 6.10. Conclusions In this chapter, it was demonstrated that small farmers use a range of organizations and channels (including unofficial and informal), particularly to make demands for 240 program and policy change. They made demands which were wider in scope, acted more collectively, and used a range of channels in areas in which 2: critical mass of VSOs were working together with local and central government organizations. Small farmers took the initiative in using V805, and VSOs brought training and projects which enabled farmers to further amplify their political voice. In addition, the presence of a critical mass of VSOs helped to improve farmers' perceptions of the performance of a range of organizations, including AGRITEX, VIDCOs and NFAZ. In contrast, the absence of service organizations and the weakness of NFAZ at several of the eight sites, as well as in large areas of Zimbabwe were associated with diminished political voice and organizational use. Obviously, it would be in the interest of small farmers to see the presence of VSOs expanded in the rural areas. However, since service organizations cannot establish a presence in every ward in Zimbabwe, or even a majority of wards, the key to replicating their interventions and expanding the political voice of small farmers lies in strengthening AGRITEX, local government, NFAZ and other organizations which are widely available and expanding their functions to include the initiation of and/or participation in development projects. The broadening of AGRITEX's brief from the technocratic functions of a central government agency 241 toward that of a multi—purpose development organization has added responsibilities to an over—burdened organization but has provided small farmers a channel through which demands for progam change can be made, as evidenced in Murembwa Ward. The devolution of power and resources to local government has provided small farmers with yet another channel through which they can make (and fulfill) demands, especially for program change, further diversifying farmer political voice. Local government was supplanting ZANU(PF) as the channel through which demands for infrastructure and projects were routinely made. In regard to the devolution versus deconcentration issue, local government was not perceived as an instrument for control but rather as a channel for making demands and an organization which was supposed to deliver services. While VIDCOs and WADCOs were seen as channels for making demands and delivering services, ZANU(PF) was perceived as the organization which maintained order and security in the respective wards. In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that farmers who approach one organization but fail to get what they want will try again. Many of those organizations which farmers use to try again lie outside of official channels. Of particular interest are the V805 which farmers approach if they escalate the scope of their demands. If farmers possess the capacity for making a wide scope of demands, they may start by asking 242 an official channel, but, if they fail to get what they want, they will use unofficial ones and go to higher levels of the official organization; and they will act together in groups and committees. Surprisingly, field research uncovered relatively few instances in which informal channels were used to make demands. This issue as well as questions of organizational bargaining, conflict and cooperation are considered further in Chapter Eight. Chapter 7. The Effectiveness of Political Voice in Rural W 7.1. Introduction In previous chapters, the expression of political voice has been described and explained in terms of the demands that small farmers make and the organizations which they use. This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of political voice. Effective political voice is defined as the ability to influence those organizations to which demands have been made and to elicit a positive response in terms of demand fulfillment.1 Effective political voice is central to the establishment of productive reciprocities between small farmers and the state which are a hallmark of democratic governance. The effectiveness of small farmer political voice in Zimbabwe as well as signs of productive reciprocities between farmers and the state were introduced and discussed in Chapter Three. Where small—farmers have demonstrated the ability to influence the state, the effectiveness of political voice can be gauged by the level of success which is achieved in fulfilling demands for agricultural assets and services. In Chapter Two, hypotheses explaining effectiveness were 1While the ability to influence organizations can be ascertained through field research, the impact of political voice on demand fulfillment is more difficult to determine, especially in regard to demands for policy change. Small farmers may assert that they have made an impact on pricing policy or land redistribution, but their voice is merely a small fraction of thousands of demands. 244 generated which pointed to the content and scope of demands, organizations used, and rural stratification as the most significant variables. Of particular concern was the size of the gap between richer and poorer farmers as well as the impact of VSOs on effectiveness. The effectiveness of political voice is examined in terms of the organizations which are used to express demands and protests. In the case of Zimbabwe's small farmers, the focus is on organizations which attempt to bring about policy and program change. In previous chapters, the importance of VSOs in making demands for program and policy change has been established. In this chapter, the effectiveness of V305, and NFAZ, in particular, receive attention. In this chapter, effectiveness is also examined from the broader perspective of perceived changes in the quality of life. If the quality of life has improved, at issue is the extent to which the political voice of small farmers has facilitated that improvement. Effectiveness is also analyzed in relative terms, especially in regard to the ability of poorer farmers to be able to express political voice and get what they want. Previous chapters have indicated that poorer farmers are expected to experience a low level of success. In this chapter, the focus is on cases of female small farmers who have been able to exceed expectations, make demands of a wide 245 scope for program or policy change, use a number of organizations, and even succeed in fulfilling demands. 7.2. Effectiveness in Fulfilling Agricultural Demands The analysis of effectiveness begins with an examination of survey results on small farmers' self—perception of success or failure in obtaining agricultural assets and services. Three different indicators have been used to measure effectiveness in fulflling needs. The first is success or failure in fulfilling the 600 needs which the 200 respondents had between 1984 and 1989; the second is the degree of success which the 200 farmers in the survey experienced in obtaining their three most important needs; and the third is the need which farmers were most successful in fulfilling. In analyzing the effectiveness of small farmers, respondents were first asked if they had been able to successfully fulfill demands for the three things that they wanted the most between 1984 and 1989. On the basis of 600 needs of the 200 respondents, small farmers perceived that 255 demands were claimed to have been fulfilled or 42.5 per cent of total demands. In seeking explanations for success in fulfilling demands, independent variables representing the content and scope of demands, rural stratification and organizations used were examined. In Tables 56 and 57, the relationship between effectiveness and content and scope of demands is exhibited: 246 Table 56 Effectiveness by Content of Needs — ——————————————————————————— Row Asset Service Total 197 148 345 Not Effective 61.4% 53.0% 57.5% 124 131 255 Effective 38.6% 47.0% 42.5% Column Total 321 279 600 53.5% 46.5% 100% Chi Square 2 4.23 Significance = .039 Measure of Assocation (tau—b) = .084 Table 57 Effectiveness by Scope of Demands Program Policy Row Available Change Change Total 221 105 19 345 Not Effective 51.2% 75.5% 65.5% 57.5% 211 34 10 255 Effective 48.8% 24.5% 34.5% 42.5% Column Total 432 139 29 600 72.0% 23.2% 33.5% 100% Chi-Square = 26.38 Significance = .0000 Measure of Association (tau b) = -.195 Results from the preceding tables confirm hypotheses that farmers are more successful in getting services than assets and in fulfilling claims of narrower scope than in securing program and policy Change. The most surprising result from Tables 1 and 2 is that farmers claimed to be more effective in securing policy change than program change. This result can be explained primarily by the central government's willingness to change producer prices and pricing policy and by local 247 government's inability to cope with a large volume of demands for infrastructural projects (e.g. dams, boreholes and roads). A number of rural stratification variables (for example, land use, marketed production, cattle holdings, and type of communal land) were used in attempting to explain effectiveness in terms of a gap between richer and poorer farmers. The main socio—economic stratification variable, cattle holdings, was found to have a significant effect, as demonstrated in Table 58: Table 58 Effectiveness in Fulfilling Demands by Cattle Holdings — Row 0-3 cattle 4—8 cattle 9-40 cattle Total 122 121 102 345 Not Effective 61.6% 60.2% 50.7% 57.5% 76 80 99 255 Effective 38.4% 39.8% 49.3% 42.5% Column Total 198 201 201 600 33.0% 33.5% 33.5% 100% Chi—Square = 18.37 Significance = .001 Measure of Association (tau b) = .155 In terms of socio—economic stratification, the significant difference in effectiveness was between richer farmers and the rest of the sample. These richer farmers were more effective because they demanded services more than assets and in spite of the wider scope of demands which they made.2 2Other indicators tend to confirm the relationship between cattle holdings and effectiveness. However, middle farmers fare better in fulfilling demands when cattle holdings are replaced by land use and other indicators. 248 The finding that richer farmers were more effective than poorer farmers, in spite of the fact that richer farmers made demands which were wider in scope, raises questions about political voice and the "smallholder revolution". Are richer farmers the only beneficiaries? Does an insurmountable gap exist between the effectiveness of richer farmers and the futility of poorer farmers? One way to address this question was to control for scope and see if richer farmers who made demands for program change in regard to services fared better than poorer farmers who made demands for available assets. The results are displayed in Tables 59 and 60: Table 59 Effectiveness by Content of Demands, Controlling for Scope Scope: Available Row Assets/Services Asset Service Total 171 50 221 Not effective 60.4% 33.6% 51.2% 112 99 211 Effective 39.6% 66.4% 48.8% Column Total 283 149 432 65.5% 34.5% 100% Chi Square = 28.2 Significance = .0000 Measure of Assocation (tau-b) = .27 249 Table 60 Effectiveness by Content of Demands, Controlling for Scope Scope: Program Change Row Asset Service Total 26 79 105 Not effective 68.4% 78.2% 75.5% 12 22 167 Effective 31.6% 21.8% 24.5% Column Total 38 101 139 25% 75% 100% Chi Square = 1.4 Significance = .23 Measure of Assocation (tau—b) = .10 Demands for available assets were more difficult to fulfill than demands for available services. Poorer farmers experienced greater difficulty in obtaining draft power, farm equipment and land than richer farmers encountered in claiming credit, extension and other available services. Surprisingly, content provided little or no explanation for the fulfillment of demands for program change. Farmers were actually more successful in fulfilling demands for expanding the pool of assets than in changing service programs. The explanation for this anomaly lies with the effectiveness which small farmers achieved in establishing grazing schemes. In achieving this success, farmers acted together to change land use patterns and obtained the assistance necessary to consolidate these changes.3 While a 3Cousins (1989, 361-366) finds that grazing schemes with high community commitment brought poorer and richer farmers together to preserve and develop common property resources. 250 gap exists between the effectiveness of richer and poorer farmers, the cases of grazing schemes demonstrate that, if poorer farmers cooperate, they can be successful in expanding assets, especially community assets. In Chapter Two, it was hypothesized that the type of organization used would explain effectiveness. Central government organizations were expected to bring the greatest success, because they are used to make demands which are narrow in scope. VSOs were expected to bring the least success because they are used as non—official channels to make demands which are wider in scope and have fewer resources than government to satisfy demands. In Table 61, the relationship between effectiveness and organization is analyzed: Table 61 Effectiveness by First Organization Used Central Local Row Government Government VSO Total 75 89 17 181 Not Effective 46.0% 69.5% 57.0% 57.5% 88 39 12 139 Effective 54.0% 31.5% 43.0% 42.5% Column Total 163 128 29 320 50.9% 40.0% 9.1% 100% Chi—Square = 16.25 Significance = .0000 Measure of Association (tau b) = —.199 As expected, the use of central government organizations brought the highest rate of success at 54 per cent. 251 Surprisingly, local government organizations were the least effective at 31.5 per cent. This anomaly is explained by the use of local government to make demands for program change, demands which proved to be the most difficult to fulfill. Another surprise was that the use of VSOs achieved a 43 per cent success rate. Although VSOs are non—official channels, farmers were rewarded by using them and even by approaching them first. These results are confirmed when farmers were asked about the second organization which they used. Central government brought a 72 per cent success rate; VSOs 55 per cent, and local government 25 per cent. Once again, farmers were successful when using V305 and non—official channels. Another set of hypotheses expected to explain effectiveness pertained to small farmer political capabilities, in terms of the number of organizations known, group membership and leadership, and master farmer status. However, cross—tabulation of these variables with fulfillment of demands for agricultural assets and services revealed no significant relationships. These results can largely be explained by the low success rate in Murembwa Ward (33 per cent versus 42.5 per cent for the entire sample) and by the fact that farmers in Murembwa knew more organizations than average and were members and leaders of more groups than the mean. In turn, the low success rate in Murembwa can be explained by the fact that 33 per cent of their demands were 252 for program change and 8 per cent were for policy change, compared to 23 per cent and 5 per cent for the sample as a whole. Consequently, the knowledge of organizations, group membership and leadership, and the presence of several VSOs all contribute to the greater expression of political voice, in terms of making a wider scope of demands. However, the difficulty in fulfilling a wider scope of demands means that the preceding variables are not associated with more effective political voice. On the other hand, the use of VSOs was associated with more effective political voice, enabling farmers to fulfill demands, as long as they were not for program or policy change. 7.3. Degrees of Effectiveness An alternative measure of effectiveness which was employed was the degree to which each farmer was able to fulfill all three demands made between 1984 and 1989. From the results, a scale of effectiveness has been constructed for the 200 farmers in the sample, ranging from no successes out of three demands to three out of three demands successfully fulfilled: Table 62 Degree of Success in Fulfilling Demands 0 out of 3 demands 1 out of 3 2 out of 3 3 out of 3 49 69 60 22 24.5% 34.5% 30.0% 11.0% 253 Most farmers (64.5 per cent) were successful in getting one or two out of the three things that they wanted the most. In explaining the degree of effectiveness, rural stratification, in terms of the type of communal land, was significant. The results are tabulated below: Table 63 Degree of Success in Fulfilling Demands by Area Hurungwe Zaka Row (Richer) (Poorer) Total Low (0 or 1 out of 3) 49 69 118 High (2 or 3 out of 3) 51 31 82 Column Total 100 100 200 Chi—Square = 8.27 Significance = .0000 Measure of Association (tau b) = —.169 Farmers in the richer communal land (Hurungwe) were significantly more successful than their counterparts in the poorer area (Zaka) in fulfilling demands for agricultural assets and services. The content and scope of demands are intervening variables which help explain why Hurungwe farmers experience a greater degree of effectiveness than their Zaka counterparts. Hurungwe farmers tend to demand available services, such as AFC loans, which proved easier to fulfill than demands for assets. Another intervening variable which helps explain effectiveness is the use of organizations which is greater in Hurungwe than in Zaka. 254 There was a relationship between one of the political capability variables (group leadership) and demand fulfillment. Leaders of farmer groups were more successful at fulfilling their demands than non-leaders. Out of the 3 most important demands made by each farmer, 84 per cent of group leaders fulfilled 1—3 demands, while 91 per cent of non—group leaders fulfilled 0—2 demands. The vast majority of group leaders were successful in fulfilling at least one demand. In regard to the relationship between political capability variables other than group leadership and degrees of effectivenes, the results were similar to those reported earlier in the chapter. Once again, the results are explained by the fact that farmers who are group members, master farmers and who are involved with VSOs tend to seek a greater scope of demand and ask for program or policy change. If "effectiveness" is defined in terms of the ability to project political voice, then farmers who act through groups, who use numerous organizations and who make demands of a broader scope are certainly more effective. 7.4. Demands Which Farmers Are Most Successful at Fulfilling A third measure of effectiveness in fulfilling demands was derived by asking farmers about the one demand which they were most successful at fulfilling. Respondents were asked, "Over the past five years, what thing for farming were you 255 most successful at getting?" The following responses were obtained: Table 64 Demands Which Farmers Were Most Successful at Fulfilling (1984—9) 1. Farm Equipment ..... 27% 7. Extension/education ... 4% 2. Loans .............. 19.5% 8. Livestock ............. 2.5% 3. Inputs ............. 13% 9. Water Projects ........ 1% 4. Better Harvests .... 8.5% 10. Labor ................ 1% 5. Draft Power ........ 7.5% 11. Food—for—work ........ 1% 5. Land ............... 7.5% 12. Transport and Roads 0.5% The most significant result from Table 65 is the virtual absence of demands for program change and the complete absence of demands for policy change. This result is confirmed in Table 65: Table 65 Content of Farmers' Most Successful Demand by Scope Available Program Change Policy Change Totgl Services 45 16 0 61 Assets 135 0 O 135 Column Total 180 16 0 196 The narrow scope of the most successful demands reflects the relative ease of fulfilling demands for available assets and services in comparison to demands which are wider in scope. In answering the question, farmers focused narrowly and often took for granted successes in fulfilling demands for program and policy change. For instance, farmers in Doro Ward had just succeeded in securing a new main road; those in Mudzimu had acquired a GMB depot as well as several projects; 256 those in Nhema North had received a GMB collection point; and those in Murembwa had secured a multi—purpose project. However, few farmers mentioned these achievements as the asset or service that they had been most successful at getting. They preferred to mention assets and, to a lesser extent, services which furthered the development of their own households. A further perspective on Table 65 is that of the pre—independence versus post—independence eras. If farmers had mentioned that they had been successful in fulfilling demands for loans or equipment in 1978, it would have seemed revolutionary, given the marginalized status of the vast majority of Zimbabwe's small-scale communal farmers. T h e cross—tabulation of survey responses regarding the most needed assets and services and the demands that respondents were most successful at fulfilling produces the following results: Table 66 Most Successful Demand by Most Cited Need Most Cited Need Moderately Cited Least Cited (lo—17% of Needs Cited) (4—10%) (O~4%) Most Equipment --— Improved Successful Loans Harvests (8—27% of Inputs Demands Cited) Moderately Land Draft Extension/ Successful Power education (158%) Livestock Least Transport Water Tractors, Labor Successful Roads Markets Inputs on time (0—1%) Prices Food-for—Work 257 Respondents had demanded equipment the most, and they were most successful in obtaining equipment, usually through purchase and occasionally on credit. A high volume of demands were for loans, and nearly 20 per cent of farmers claimed it was the demand which they were most successful at fulfilling. As mentioned previously, farmers were relatively more successful at obtaining farm equipment, loans and inputs because the scope of the demand was small. In contrast, water projects, transport, roads and resettlement and grazing land were not mentioned as the most successful demand, because the scope of those demands was wider. Existing programs were inadequate and required change (expansion mainly) in order to meet the demands of small farmers. Rural stratification variables are associated with variation in the types of assets and services which respondents were most successful at obtaining. Respondents residing in richer areas (Region II and in Hurungwe Communal Land) were most successful in securing loans (effectiveness in obtaining credit is analyzed in further detail later in this chapter). Also, farmers in Hurungwe were more successful in getting farming land and draft power than their counterparts in Zaka. Since farmers in Zaka and in Region IV could not claim successes in getting loans and other services or land and draft power, they were could only mention that they were 258 most successful at obtaining basic inputs and good maize harvests. Socio-economic stratification variables also are associated with the demand that farmers are most successful at securing. Richer farmers were equally successful at obtaining both services (such as seasonal loans) and assets (such as harrows, cultivators and scotchcarts). Poorer farmers were more successful at securing basic assets, usually through purchase. While a statistically significant association exists between land use and crops marketed, on the one hand, and content of farmers' most successful demand, on the other, cattle holdings do not demonstrate a similar effect. It may be concluded that richer farmers who cultivate more land and who market more crops demonstrate greater involvement in seeking and securing agricultural services than richer farmers who merely hold assets such as cattle. Since the scope of respondents' most successful demand was narrow, variables related to farmer political capabilities, such as the types of organization used and joint action, did not make a statistically significant impact. However, farmers who were most successful in obtaining services tended to act alone and use an organization. Those who were most successful in securing available assets, including equipment and basic inputs, tended to purchase them. As the scope of respondents' most successful demand was 259 narrow, the vast majority of farmers who used organizations approached central government organizations, especially AGRITEX and AFC, as demonstrated in Table 67: Table 67 Organizations Used by Sequence First Second Third Row Total Central government 78 41 6 125 Local government 19 10 3 32 VSOs 7 4 2 13 Column Total 104 55 11 170 A surprising result from Table 67 is that at least 55 farmers (27.5 per cent) used second channels to help secure the service or asset that they were most successful at getting, even though their demands were predominantly narrow in scope. Consequently, success for small farmers depended on repeated attempts at securing what they wanted. When farmers used second or third channels, they looked to a mixture of organizations, including VSOs. Not only did VSOs serve as unofficial channels, but seven farmers (3.5 per cent) actually used VSOs first to make their most successful demand. 7.5. Effectiveness in Securing Specific Demands This section evaluates the effectiveness of small farmers in securing specific types of demands, particularly those for program and policy change. For instance, small farmers in the survey who acted together, used organizations and informal channels, such as MP5 Enos Nkala and Simbi Mubako, felt that 260 they had been effective in helping to secure pricing policy changes which had been made at a number of junctures during the 19805. 7.5.1. Effectiveness in Obtaining Credit The analysis continues with a discussion of reasons for success and failure in obtaining credit. For most farmers interviewed, especially those in Hurungwe, seasonal loans for fertilizer and improved seed provided the opportunity to increase yields and marketing. Consequently, the reasons why some farmers received credit and others did not were of great interest to the farmers themselves. Previously, rural stratification variables were claimed to have explained credit effectiveness. In the following tables, the effect of type of communal land, natural region, and distance from markets are analyzed, based upon whether or not farmers had received credit during the 1988—89 growing season: Table 68 Credit Received in 1988—9 by Communal Land Row Hurungwe Zaka Total Yes 67 19 86 No 33 81 114 Column Total 100 100 200 Chi—Square = 47.11 Significance = .0000 Measure of Association (tau b) = .548 261 Table 69 Credit by Natural Region ——————————————————— Row IIa III IV Total 40 35 11 86 Yes 80% 35% 22% 43% 10 65 39 114 No 20% 65% 78% 57% Column Total 50 100 50 200 Chi—Square = 41.27 Significance = .0000 Measure of Association (tau b) = —.395 Table 70 Credit by Market Access Row Good Poor Total Yes 41 45 86 No 59 55 114 Column Total 100 100 200 In the four Hurungwe sites, two~thirds of the farmers surveyed received AFC loans in the 1988—89 season and even more farmers received credit at some time between 1980 and 1989. Many farmers who did not receive AFC loans in 1988—1989 had not been able to repay previous loans, due to drought or to a breakdown in the Central Cooperative Union's ability to repay AFC from the proceeds of crops marketed at the GMB. In contrast, only 19 master farmers in Zaka had been able to obtain fertilizer loans in 1988—89, and the vast majority of those interviewed had never received an AFC loan. Variation in natural region was also associated with credit 262 effectiveness. However, the type cm communal area was a stronger determinant of credit effectiveness than natural region. Whereas 46% of farmers in Region III of Hurungwe did not receive credit, in Region III of Zaka, 84% did not receive loans. This was due to the poorer soils in Zaka Region III and the subsequent inactivity of AFC and other agricultural institutions. Finally, in the survey, market access has no effect on whether or not farmers receive credit. In sum, AFC concentrates its lending activities in communal areas with good productivity and acts carefully in less productive areas. Small farmer collective action and political voice were associated with effectiveness at obtaining credit. Virtually every respondent who received an AFC loan had joined an AFC group through which credit applications were made and loans disbursed. The growing use of groups by farmers has eased the process of securing credit, because AFC has been absolved from the daunting task of keeping records on thousands of individual farmers. In addition, farmers used their ties to NFAZ representatives and AGRITEX workers as a means of persuading AFC officers to grant loans or to forgive temporary repayment problems. During the mid and late 19805, the AFC began the pilot phase of "group lending schemes" in which joint liability conditions were applied to lending. Farmers were to pay a 13 per cent rate of interest (as opposed to the commercial rate 263 of at least 18 per cent) with 10 per cent repaid to AFC and 3 per cent going to fund administration of the group. AFC could offer lower interest rates because of a reduction in administrative costs provided by the groups. In Maumbe Ward, seven AFC lending groups were engaged in the joint liability pilot program. Two farmers interviewed in Maumbe noted that interest rates were lower and the delivery of inputs more timely under the new arrangements. AFC officials in Chinoyi, capital of Mashonaland West Province, provided figures showing that the seven lending groups in Maumbe had a 85 per cent repayment rate versus a 40 per cent repayment rate for communal farmers in Hurungwe as a whole. These findings suggest that AFC groups with joint liability conditions were going to become widespread in rural Zimbabwe and that group membership would eventually become a prerequsite for receiving loans. The importance of group membership and joint liability in credit effectiveness confirm previous findings (Bratton, 1986b). 7.5.2. Effectiveness in Securing Land Before land scarcity became widespread, small farmers could be effective in obtaining land by approaching the local headman (or sabhuku). This method became less effective during the 19605 and 19705 as land became increasingly scarce. After independence, farmers were able to apply for resettlement land through the Department of Rural Development 264 (DERUDE) within the Ministry of Local Government (MLGURD). In the aftermath of independence, priority in resettlement was given to thousands of returning refugees and to farm workers on the basis of need. However, government policy soon shifted toward transferring the majority' of resettlement land to disadvantaged farmers from the communal lands; by 1990, 85 per cent of resettlement farmers were from the communal lands (World Bank, 1991, 48). In the wake of objections from NFAZ and small farmers who argued that the resettlement program could not be sustained unless the land was used efficiently, DERUDE's criteria for resettlement was altered in 1985 to include master farmers. This is a clear case of small farmer policy effectiveness. Consequently, effectiveness in getting land from 1984-1989 depended partly on the ability to impress DERUDE through the application process of need or of agricultural efficiency. The master farmer from Nhema North (see Chapter Five) who was seeking to influence the provincial governor was using the application process and informal channels to impress DERUDE of his efficiency. In the Hurungwe—Zaka survey, farmers who wanted land still started by asking the headman or the VIDCO chair, but most were unsuccessful. Respondents who proceeded to apply for resettlement land were unsuccessful, and many blamed the district council for not acting on their demands. Recognizing that the DC was not primarily responsible, the master farmer 265 from Nhema North was trying to influence the provincial governor and the Ministry of Local Government (MLGURD) as well as the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) which was within the same ministry. A VIDCO chair in Mudzimu Ward claimed that she was able to use her connections to help younger farmers to secure resettlement land. In determining if political voice and informal channels are important factors in explaining effectiveness in getting resettlement land, a systematic study of resettlement areas remains to be done. During the course of the Hurungwe and Zaka survey, visits were made to nearby resettlement areas. In conversations with resettlement farmers, several claimed that they had used ZANU(PF) and other informal channels during the application process. In particular, the brother of a research assistant in Hurungwe commented that he had obtained resettlement land near Mhangura (about 45 kilometers away from Mudzimu) for a Model "B" cooperative resettlement scheme, because he was able to use connections as a member of ZANU(PF) and because he had been involved in cooperative activities near Mudzimu (he helped to establish a brick—making cooperative). Cases of effectiveness in establishing grazing schemes were explained by respondents as a matter of overcoming a collective action problem, convincing farmers of the need for such schemes, and providing incentives for certain farmers to 266 move. This required collective action, a VIDCO that was supported and strongly led, and an active AGRITEX worker.4 VSO presence and a responsive district council were also important in locating the schemes, persuading farmers to rearrange their land use patterns and providing fencing and paddocks. 7.5.3. Effectiveness in Securing Markets In Chapter Five, the process of demanding GMB depots and collection points was explained. Of the three sites where demand for markets were greatest, Mudzimu Ward received a depot, Nhema North a collection point and Chimusimbe nothing. The farmers in Mudzimu claimed that they were successful in getting a depot because of the efforts of agricultural marketing and supply (AMS) cooperatives and because of interventions by NFAZ representatives, ZANU(PF) officials, Enos Nkala (MP and cabinet minister), and the ward councillor. Mudzimu was a logical choice for a depot because it served as a business center for the southern part of the Hurungwe Communal Land and because it was 30 kilometers away from the already—established depot at Magunje. 4Cousins (1989, 361—366) stresses that VIDCO leadership is crucial in convincing small farmers to participate in grazing schemes. Drinkwater (1991, 140—150) criticizes AGRITEX for attempting to impose grazing schemes without VIDCO and small farmer support. He also demonstrates that small farmers are resistant to the blanket imposition of grazing schemes. 267 In Nhema North, farmers claimed that the ward councillor and AGRITEX worker had helped to secure the collection point by approaching the DC in Zaka and the GMB in Jerera. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Nhema North collection point was woefully under—utilized, mainly because of shortfalls in production. Farmers in Chimusimbe marketed far more than their counterparts in Nhema North and deserved a collection point as well as major road construction. Farmers in Chimusimbe blamed the NFAZ area representative, the AGRITEX worker and the ward councillor for not pressing their case more assertively. In sum, effectiveness in getting markets depended partly on the political voice of farmers and the organizations which were supposed to represent farmers. 7.5.4. Effectiveness in Obtaining Roads, Dams and Transport Farmers were not very successful in securing an expansion of such services as roads and water. Where they experienced success, they did not wait patiently until the DC, DDC or Ministry of Local Government (MLGURD) decided on their request. In Doro, where a new road had been built, some farmers attributed success to the efforts of the ward councillor and the AGRITEX worker in taking their request to the DC; others claimed that the councillor had not done enough. Where VSOs were present, as in Murembwa Ward, farmers approached them and received assistance in borehole-drilling, dam construction and road building. The VSOs responded more 268 quickly, though administrative problems delayed the drilling of some boreholes. In securing transport in the short term, farmers either approached the transporters themselves or went directly to the DC and DDF. Some farmers succeeded by approaching NFAZ representatives who intervened on their behalf. Farmers in Maumbe and Chimusimbe Wards even went to nearby commercial farmers and procured transport at a more economical rate. 7.6. Effectiveness in Improving the Quality of Life Effective political voice was not analyzed solely in terms of the fulfillment of demands for agricultural assets and services, but also through a broader "quality-of—life" perspective. Consequently, respondents were asked questions concerning changes in the quality of life; whether life had improved, declined or remained the same. Respondents were asked to give reasons for their answers and to suggest ways in which organizations could improve the quality of life in their area. If they gave convincing reasons, responses were coded as a "better" quality of life: Table 71 Changes in the Quality of Life Better Same Worse 123 36 41 56.5% 18% 25.5% Well over half of respondents claimed that the quality of life had improved, and the reasons they gave centered on 269 increases in agricultural production and the expansion of education, health and other social services. When respondents asserted that life had stayed the same or worsened, they mentioned the rising costs of agricultural inputs and household goods in relation to slowly rising prices for their crops, as well as the failure of government to meet promises and to fulfill demands for program change. It has been previously demonstrated that the presence of VSOs enabled farmers to make a wider scope of demands, improved farmer perspectives of organizations, provided alternative, informal channels which farmers could use, and brought projects which helped improve living standards. The impact of VSO presence on changes in the quality of life is analyzed in Table 72: Table 72 Quality of Life by VSO Presence VSOs present VSOs Not Present Row Total 39 84 123 Better 78% 56% 61.5% 6 3O 36 Same 12% 20% 18% 5 36 41 Worse 12% 24% 20.5% Column Total 50 150 200 25% 75% 100% Chi-Square = 7.87; Significance 05 Measure of Association (tau~b) = .189 270 The relatively strong results in Table 72 can be partly explained by the fact that VSOs were targeting their projects to alleviate problems or bring improvement in a limited area, as opposed to government organizations which were charged with distributing their services equitably over the broadest possible area. Also, farmers were more satisfied with life because they were able to gain access to organizations more easily through VSOs. A major reason for the association between VSO presence and improved quality of life was because all 25 respondents in Murembwa Ward claimed that their lives had improved and that organizations were serving them better than in the past. In Murembwa Ward, an integrated development project had brought higher income and nutritional standards as well as greater community cohesion and leadership. This was due to a multi- purpose project (i.e., gardening and poultry cooperatives, grazing schemes, training in democratic decision—making, and a community center) in which International Voluntary Service, Swissaid, NFAZ, and AGRITEX were collaborating. Murembwa farmers universally felt that the quality of life had improved, even though Murembwa Ward was the poorest site in the survey, with poor access to the GMB and poor (Region IV) rainfall patterns. Also, farmers in Murembwa were the least successful in fulfilling demands, because they made demands of a wider scope. Even so, the interventions of VSOs 271 and projects helped farmers to overcome the immense obstacles which the community faced and promised long—term payoffs as against immediate rewards. The Murembwa farmer who was cited in Chapter Four placed the process in a longer-term perspective by commenting that "in the past, there was kwashiorkor; now there is none." 7.7. Effective Political Voice by Female Farmers In this section, cases of relative effectiveness are described and analyzed in which poorer farmers, especially female farmers, have been able to overcome obstacles to the expression of political voice. In Chapter Two, gender discrimination in rural Africa was conceptualized as a form of stratification which was generated by a patriarchal mode of production and which inhibited political voice. Chapter Five demonstrated how female farmers in Zimbabwe, and especially single females, have been unable to express as much political voice as their male counterparts. Consequently, individual cases of women farmers who exhibited political capabilities and expressed political voice are identified, described and explained in order to discover factors which produce relative effectiveness. From the Hurungwe—Zaka survey, seven cases were selected in which women acted assertively in local affairs and worked to obtain the assets and services that they required to become better farmers. Included among the cases were divorcees, 272 widows and poorer women as well as leaders of organizations and farmers who marketed significant amounts of crops. All seven cases resided in Mudzimu and Murembwa Wards, where there was substantial VSO presence. Both areas featured income- generating projects which also aimed to provide cooperative and leadership training to women. 7.7.1. Mudzimu Ward Cases In Mudzimu, the two cases were involved in the the FAO— funded project based in the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development (MCCD), "Strengthening Women's Role and Work in Rural Development". Among several projects which were active in Mudzimu, the MCCD/FAO cooperatives were the most significant in terms of facilitating women's political voice. The purpose of the project was to organize women into agricultural cooperatives, provide them with training in cooperative methods and leadership, and encourage them to engage in the production and marketing of maize, cotton, groundnuts and sunflower. Poorer women (especially, widows, divorcees or wives whose husbands were either incapacitated or away working) displayed the most interest in the project. A few men were permitted to join cooperatives in limited numbers to assist with heavy labor. The project has enabled women to acquire the inputs and assets necessary for expanding agricultural production and has supported income—generating activities — bee—keeping gardens, poultry and sewing. 273 M5. Beckian Taruvinga and Ms. Letnin Gondongwe were gg fggpg heads of large households, as their husbands had been incapacitated for many years. Unlike many female heads of household, the two women were permitted to maintain control of assets and, consequently, were not poor. In terms of political capabilities and activities, both women and other cooperants were trained by Silveira House and the MCCD/FAO project, and both had been in contact with Save the Children and Africare. Ms. Taruvinga was secretary of the Mudzimu women's cooperative, sponsored by FAO and MCCD and was a member of NFAZ. Ms. Gondongwe was chair and treasurer of the 18 member Mutambiranwa Women's Cooperative and the chair of a VIDCO in Mudzimu Ward. A5 VIDCO chair, she helped young men who had just married to find land and be resettled elsewhere, and she gave women, relatives and other villagers lessons in child development, cooking and health. In terms of demands made and organizations used, Ms. Taruvinga tried to obtain fertilizer, and she helped organize an AFC group with encouragement from her VIDCO, the AGRITEX worker, an NFAZ representative and the AFC agent. After initially failing to receive credit for fertilizer, the cooperative consulted with several different organizations until they succeeded in obtaining a loan. In addition, the FAO project officer provided some fertilizer free~of—charge. In demanding empty 91 kg. bags and the prompt delivery of 274 inputs, she went to the AGRITEX worker and to her AFC group, who collected money for the bags. She also consulted with the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Central Association of Cooperative Unions (CACU) in Mudzimu. She found the FAO and MCCD most helpful; for instance, they provided the women's cooperative with sewing machines and material so that they could produce school uniforms. Ms. Gondongwe helped organize a group of local farmers who held meetings with NFAZ, AGRITEX, the VIDCO and the GMB to request higher producer prices. She also helped organize a group which held meetings concerning the transport shortage which became problematic in 1986. They consulted with NFAZ representatives, the VIDCO, and eventually with the DC. The ward councillor and the NFAZ representative went to the Transporters Association about the transport problem. The villagers were told to collect their own funds to buy their own transport. The problem was resolved for the villagers with the construction of a GMB depot six kilometers away from her village at Mudzimu in 1987. She now uses an ox—drawn scotchcart to transport her produce to the GMB. In comparison with the other women interviewed in Mudzimu Ward, both women expressed considerably more political voice and were more effective in obtaining what they wanted. A major explanatory factor was the FAO/MCCD project and training in leadership and 275 cooperative methods they received from Silveira House and MCCD. The case of a male member of a women's cooperative, Mr. Edward Kandira, provides a male perspective on the FAQ/MCCD cooperatives. He was a poor farmer from Jengenja School near Mudzimu, a master farmer trainee, and a member of an AFC group for obtaining loans for improved seed and fertilizer. He had joined the cooperative in 1987, when project representatives called a meeting at Mudzimu Growth Point. The representative wrote the names anybody needing help, and, while a substantial minority of men applied, they were told that the cooperatives needed only a few men to perform heavy labor. A group of 10 women formed a cooperative and asked him to join as the male member. His cooperative was growing crops, cultivating gardens and engaging in income—generating activities such as beekeeping. He believed that FAO had been the most helpful organization, as their representatives had fulfilled promises of assistance once he and the women came together to form cooperatives. They were able to make requests for fertilizer and materials for their income-generating projects and receive them through FAO. Mr. Kandira commented that he had no problem working together with 10 women, especially since the quality of life had improved. The availability of donors, a GMB depot, health workers and schools also contributed to an improved quality of life. Mr. Kandira demonstrated that men 276 who were provided with incentives and training could willingly work with women and accept their leadership. 7.7.2. Murembwa Ward Cases The cases of women's political voice in Murembwa Ward were all involved with the multi—purpose development project, jointly sponsored by IVS, Swissaid, NFAZ and AGRITEX. The project involved the establishment of grazing schemes and cooperatives for gardens, poultry, trees, sewing and fence— making. Women were provided with training in leadership and cooperative methods, and a community center was built specifically for training purposes. The five cases were Ms. Evangelister Chizande, Ms. Plucky Bayai and Ms. Esinat Musundu, whose husbands were working outside of Zaka District; Ms. Berita Gwarinda who was a poor widow; and Ms. Clarissa Chiguvi whose husband was at home. All five women were poor in regard to cattle holdings, land use and agricultural marketing. In terms of political capabilities and activities, Ms. Chizande was a master farmer, secretary of the Bvumbura poultry and gardening cooperative as well as a member of an Agritex group, an NFAZ farmers club, a savings club, and the Mushandirapamwe women's club. Ms. Bayai was chair of a gardening and poultry cooperative, a master farmer trainee, as well as member of her village women's club, a savings club, and an NFAZ farmer club. Ms. Musundu was a master farmer and a member of an NFAZ farmer club and the Mukurenge gardening 277 cooperative. Ms. Gwarinda was chair of her village's ZANU(PF) Women's League and a member of a savings club and of a garden and chicken cooperative. Ms. Chiguvi was chair of the ZANU(PF) women's league in her VIDCO, a master farmer trainee, as well as a member of a savings club and the Gutsarazinyi garden and chicken cooperative. All five women knew local government organizations, ZANU(PF), AGRITEX, AFC, NFAZ, MCCD, IVS and Swissaid. In terms of demands made and organizations used, Ms. Chizande asked IVS for security fence for the garden and chicken cooperatives and received it. Also, she asked for wire and fence—making equipment in order to construct more security fences for poultry and gardening projects. In making demands for higher producer prices, she and fellow farmers in the AGRITEX group discussed their demand with the AGRITEX worker, and he took their demand to the GMB. In 1989, prices increased for maize and cotton, and she believed that her interventions with AGRITEX and GMB had helped. She had been involved in several attempts by the VIDCO to establish a grazing scheme. After considerable discussion, it was decided that there was not enough land available in the vicinity of their village, and farmers increased their demands for resettlement land elsewhere. Finally, she had been involved in obtaining food for work programs from the Zaka district council. 278 M5. Bayai attempted to obtain credit for fertilizer with the help of AGRITEX, but she had no basis for repayment. In trying U3 obtain water for their gardens, she and other cooperative members discussed the need for water and decided to build a dam. They went to the DC and DDF to ask for cement. They succeeded in getting cement through the DC and built the dam with help from cooperative members. She was involved in asking the AGRITEX worker and IVS agent to assist in developing vegetable marketing outlets, sewing machines and transport. Ms. Musundu was involved in demanding grazing land through the VIDCO chair, the WADCO, the AGRITEX worker, and IVS and Swissaid representatives. The villagers met, discussed, and agreed to set aside the land, and the organizations provided fencing and other materials. A similar process occurred in regard to water; she and other villagers discussed the matter with the AGRITEX worker, and borehole drillers came to survey. After some delays in paying the drillers, the borehole was constructed. Ms. Musundu commented that the quality of life had improved because of the cooperatives, better seeds and fertilizer for crops, money to send Ichildren to school, and the regular vaccination of cattle. M5. Gwarinda was involved in making demands for higher 279 producer prices. She helped the VIDCO organize a meeting with the AGRITEX worker and the villagers. Subsequently, the VIDCO chair went to the DC. In that year, prices were raised a little. They continue to complain to the VIDCO Chair, the AGRITEX worker, the DC and the GMB. She was also involved in making demands for closer markets for the purchase and sale of livestock. She went to the sabhuku (the village headman) and to the VIDCO chair who took the demand to the DC. They tried again by complaining to the VIDCO and DC. She was involved in demanding water for livestock. She first raised the problem with the VIDCO chair in 1987 and again in 1988, and the chair informed the DC. Subsequently, after persisting, boreholes were constructed in 1988. Ms. Chiguvi was involved in demanding grazing land from IVS, the VIDCO, and AGRITEX. Villagers and organizations recognized the need for a grazing scheme, and all were willing to support the idea and give up the necessary land. She was also involved in demanding water through the digging of boreholes. The villagers talked with the Swissaid representative about the need for a borehole and were given funds. A company was hired and dug the borehole. She commented that the quality of life in Marufu had improved with people forming cooperatives, earning money and growing more than enough food. 280 The Mudzimu and Murembwa cases demonstrate how female farmers can make demands for program and policy change, collaborate with other farmers, use organizations and fulfill demands. In acquiring the political capabilities to express effective political voice, the important factors were local organizations in which they could discuss and decide on a course of action, cooperative and leadership training, and a variety of organizations which they could approach for assistance. The intervention by VSOs such as IVS and FAQ, as well as assistance from AGRITEX and NFAZ, were important in promoting greater organization and assertiveness among female farmers as well as a greater awareness of the procedures necessary to fulfill demands. The three factors just mentioned were necessary conditions for the expression of political voice by female farmers and were demonstrated by the seven cases. However, for 69 of the 76 women in the survey, most or all of those factors were absent. As a consequence, the 69 female farmers were not as politically active and did little to try to fulfill their demands. T h e Mudzimu/Murembwa cases demonstrate that the presence of projects and a range of organizations in rural communities provide women with opportunities to acquire the skills necessary for leadership, management, community organizing and communication. The creation of cooperatives and local organizations, such as VIDCOs and the ZANU(PF) Women's League, 281 provide avenues for women to become more active and to organize collectively. For instance, leaders in the ZANU(PF) Women's League were generally assertive in community affairs and in trying to get what they wanted. Armed with these skills, women are better prepared to represent their communities and negotiate with external agents and organizations. In regard to participation in agricultural marketing, women must be able to control essential assets and must gain access to some form of cash or credit through cooperatives and income—generating projects. The role of local government and central government agents in assisting to maintain and extend property rights for women farmers is crucial for overcoming the oppression and discrimination perpetuated under the patriarchal mode of production. For example, a widow in Mudzimu had managed to fend off expropriation of her assets by her in—laws by going through local government channels to the DC which ruled in her favor and against her village's elders. 7.8. Cases of "Optimal" Political Voice A small farmer who is able to use the full range of groups and organizations in order to facilitate program change and to lobby for policy change is a case of optimal political voice. In this section, two such cases are described, both from Mudzimu Ward where VSO presence was substantial. Mr. Kembo Mpofu was a moderately wealthy farmer, with 10 cattle, 282 15 acres of land, and he marketed 60 bags of maize and 20 bags of sunflower. In additon, he was engaged in a number of off— farm activities. Mr. Mpofuo knew at least 18 different organizations, seven more than any other farmer in the survey.5 Mr. Mpofu was a member of OCCZIM (Organization of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe), led by and composed mostly of ex—combatants from ZIPRA (the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army) and ZANLA (the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army). He was an ex—combatant who had settled in Mudzimu after the war. He was also a master farmer trainee, as well as a member of NFAZ, an AFC group, and the Kubisha transport cooperative (which was financed by Small Enterprise Development Corporation loans). He formerly was involved with a chicken cooperative, but taking care of 500 chickens proved to be too onerous. Mr. Mpofu and some colleagues had been promised a resettlement farm, a "Model B" scheme, and they were still waiting for a response from the DC and DERUDE. The demands which Mr. Mpofu had made between 1984 and 1989 were for transport, a dam, a warehouse, and a GMB depot. In trying to obtain transport, he had helped to form a cooperative through which they approached SEDCO for a vehicle loan. The cooperative submitted a constitution, a member 5Among the organizations which Mr. Mpofu knew were Zimbabwe Christian Council, Zimbabwe Project, CADEC, CACU, and Christian Care; MCCD and SEDCO; Redd Barna (Norway), Save The Children, UNDP, FAO, SIDA, USAID, GTZ, and the US, UK and French Embassies. 283 list, and a price list. They approached SEDCO several times to try to secure a loan but were informed each time that the shortage of foreign currency made the purchase of a vehicle from abroad impossible. In seeking to obtain a dam, he and others asked the VIDCO which channelled the demand to the DC and the DA. After consulting the appropriate ministries and the UNDP, the DA and DDF agreed to assist financially and technically. However, Chief Mudzimu claimed that "spirits" lived in the spot where the dam was to be built. Subsequently, they tried again and began to use a large pool which never dries. They dug trenches for pipes for irrigation water and shared the costs with the nearby GMB depot. In trying to get a warehouse, they relied upon CACU, OCCZIM and GTZ (the German aid agency). CACU and GTZ had the funding and purchased an existing warehouse for OCCZIM. Thus far, the warehouse had not been fully used, especially by CACU. The demand which Mr. Mpofu had been most successful at securing was the Mudzimu GMB depot. Once Mudzimu was targeted as a growth point by the MLGURD in 1984, his cooperative and other groups began to make demands for a depot. The cooperative presented a request for a depot to Kurima House (GMB HQ) in Harare. He and other cooperative members knew the GMB's head of operations and went to lobby him as a cooperative. Subsequently, the depot was established in 1987— 284 1988. Another demand which Mr. Mpofu was successul at getting was fertilizer. Through sources in Harare, cooperative members were notified that the US embassy was disbursing fertilizer grants for farmers groups. His cooperative was able to obtain a grant for 961 bags for the cooperative. Mr. Mpofu beleived that the quality of life had improved because there were now GMB depots, boreholes, stores, and a growth point. In terms of the expression of effective political voice, Mr. Mpofu was well ahead of even the most politically capable farmers in the survey. He was able to make a wide range of demands approach a variety of organizations, and secure program and policy Change. The key distinguishing factor was his knowledge of organizations and politics, as well as his membership in OCCZIM and a dynamic AMS cooperative. The question is: can the average small farmer aspire to the detailed knowledge, the political capabilities and the political voice of Mr. Mpofu? From the survey findings, it appears that most small farmers will not. However, there were some indications that younger farmers may be able to surpass their elders in terms of political capabilities and political voice. The other case of optimal political voice involves a younger farmer, Mr. Christian Makanya of Mudzimu Ward, who had just returned from Zambia in 1987. From 1987 to 1989, he had 285 managed to obtain land from the VIDCO, use his Zambian savings to buy 15 cattle and market 16 bags of maize, 11 of sunflower, and 8 of soybeans. Mr. Makanya was secretary of the Wakura Transport Cooperative, as well as a member of an AFC group and NFAZ. He had joined the AFC group in time to receive a loan for fertilizer and improved seed for the 1989-90 growing season. He was part of a group which met the MP Enos Nkala in 1988 in order to press for higher producer prices. Although Mr. Makanya did not provide evidence, he felt that the farmers' appeal to MP Nkala had helped to bring about a change in pricing policy more favorable to small farmers. Subsequently, the price for a tonne of maize rose from $180 to 250. He was continuing to make requests for higher prices and had approached the District Chairman of NFAZ, Mr. Ndambakuwa. As secretary of the Wakura Transport Cooperative, he had been approaching SEDCO and the district council in order to obtain a vehicle. He had been involved in attempting to secure a vehicle and a grain miller through a program run by the US Embassy and USAID. They had made a request two months before the interview and were waiting for a reply. 7.9. Conclusions In this chapter, hypotheses explaining effective fulfillment of demands for agricultural assets and services in terms of content and scope of demand as well as rural 286 stratification and type of organization used were confirmed. However, the analysis went beyond those hypotheses and demonstrated the variety of ways in which small farmers effectively express political voice and overcome obstacles to fulfilling demands for program and policy change. Overcoming difficulties in securing assets, poorer farmers were able to act together, use organizations and organize grazing schemes. In obtaining changes in pricing policy, markets, land, credit and water, small farmers acted collectively and used multiple and informal channels, especially NFAZ and other VSOs. The use of V305 and the presence of a substantial number of VSOs were related with various forms of effectiveness. The use of VSOs helped farmers to be more effective in fulfilling demands than if they relied exclusively on government agencies. The knowledge of VSOs helped to produce the case of optimal political voice in which a small farmer knew how to organize collective action and secure what he and his colleagues were demanding. VSOs provided training and projects which enabled female farmers to markedly expand the expression of political voice. Finally, the presence of VSOs was shown to be related to an improved quality of life. Chapter 8. Voice and Organizational Interaction in Rural Zimbabwe 8.1. Introduction This chapter considers the forms of organizational interaction (cooperation, competition and conflict) that occur as small farmers express political voice. In previous chapters, it was demonstrated that small farmers use a range of organizations, besides official ones, in making and fulfilling demands, especially demands for program and policy change. In this chapter, the consequences of using alternative organizations, including VSOs, are analyzed. Of particular interest are the conditions in which the use of alternative organizations lead to competition, cooperation or conflict. Do certain "official" organizations insist upon monopoly control more than others? Do certain demands elicit greater competition among organizations and lead to conflict? How do VSOs balance the goal of assisting farmers while avoiding conflict? Can competition among organizations become a positive force in propelling organizations toward providing greater assistance to small farmers? Analysis focuses on the Hurungwe—Zaka survey and on the use of organizations to make demands for program and policy change and, subsequently, to fulfill those demands. In this chapter, the process of channelling farmer demands to the national level is also considered. With decision—making power and resources concentrated at the 288 national level, the potential for competition and conflict in assisting farmers to fulfill demands for program and policy change is great. However, governing elites uses the state apparatus to exercise central control over the process of allocation and distribution of resources. At the national level, the case of NFAZ is analyzed in order to further examine the process of aggregating demands from the local level as well as to demonstrate how a VSO can avoid conflict at the national level and create a "development partnership" with the government. 8.2. Organizational Type and Interaction In Chapter Two, hypotheses were presented pertaining to organizational type and the likelihood of conflict, competition and cooperation. It was anticipated that competition and cooperation would be prevalent, especially among V805 and central and local government organizations. VSOs seek to avoid excessive competition and conflict with other organizations, because they do not have official status. Central government organizations, such as extension agencies, have well—defined technocratic duties and do not seek to compete with other organizations. With their official authority, central government organizations are in the position to coordinate the competitive activities of alternative organizations which are used by farmers, thereby establishing a cooperative relationship. When the purpose of 289 local government is more to represent and coordinate rather than to control, competition (not conflict) is to be expected. The one exception to the non-conflictual rule are political parties. Given the inclination of parties to control rural organizational activity and to discourage competition for the allegiance of farmers, parties are bound to precipitate conflict with "rival" organizations. Since parties control organizational activity in the rural areas and since farmer unions and other VSOs provide farmers with alternative channels to express political voice, it is most likely that conflict occurs between political parties and VSOs. No matter how skillful VSOs may be at avoiding competition and conflict, their presence in the rural areas as alternative organizations is sufficient to arouse the suspicion of the party apparatus. Even though VSOs seek to avoid conflict and forge cooperation with government agencies and parties, the roles of VSOs in service delivery and in representing small farmers create the basis for competition and friction. Therefore, the propensity of organizations toward control is the key variable which predicts whether cooperation or conflict will emerge from competition among organizations which are used by small farmers. Given the propensity of the different types of organizations, the expected relations between the four types of organizations is displayed in Table 73: 290 Table 73 Expected Interaction among Organizations in Rural Zimbabwe Central Local VSOs Government Government VSOs Competition/ Competition/ Competition/ Cooperation Cooperation Coooperation Central Competition/ ——— Competition/ Government Cooperation Cooperation Parties Conflict Cooperation Cooperation From the Hurungwe—Zaka survey and from observations during other field visits, organizational interactions were generally cooperative in nature, with some competition. Central government organizations, such as AGRITEX and AFC, were able to coordinate their activities with those of other organizations and create cooperation. VSOs, such as NFAZ and the service organizations, sought to build cooperative relationships and took care to avoid excessive competition and conflict. As discussed later in this chapter, the rise of local government organizations and representatives injected an element of competition into the relationship with central government agencies. Patterns of cooperation and competition will be considered in greater detail, especially when the content and scope of demands are discussed. 291 8.2.1. The Political Party and Conflict As anticipated, the political party, ZANU(PF), attempted to control organizational behavior and precipitated conflict with organizations which it perceived to be in competition. In Hurungwe, the most visible cases of conflict came during by—elections in November 1989 and during the March 1990 general election. ZANU(PF) officials and, ZANU(PF) Youth League members were actively seeking out local leaders, officials, business people and anyone else suspected of sympathizing with the opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). Numerous AGRITEX workers and some NFAZ representatives complained of harassment by ZANU(PF), and Hurungwe District Council personnel and several ward councillors claimed that they had been accused of favoring ZUM. In Maumbe Ward, a businessman's store was burned, and in nearby Karoi, deaths occurred. During the March 1990 general election, similar incidents were reported in other parts of Zimbabwe where ZANU(PF) and ZUM were involved in intense competition. Farmer meetings were banned during the election campaign. The conflict precipitated by ZANU(PF) can be understood in terms of moves toward a one-party state in the wake of the Unity Agreement of December 1987 between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU. The rise of the opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in 1989 represented a challenge to those moves and threatened ZANU(PF)'5 efforts to monopolize power. 292 While these incidents were serious and widespread, questions must be raised about their impact on the development of small farmer political voice. Did they inhibit the operation of a variety of organizations in the rural areas? Did they block the use of alternative organizations by small farmers? Small farmers, NFAZ representatives, local government officials and AGRITEX workers interviewed in Hurungwe in May 1990 indicated that these incidents had temporarily dampened organizational activity, but that farmer meetings and other activities were in resuming.1 In Zaka, where ZUM was not a serious threat and where ZANU(PF) MP5 had helped to bring a new hospital and had helped deliver a range of services, few incidents of intimidation had occurred. Furthermore, the lifting of the twenty—five year state of emergency in July 1990 and the demise of plans for a one—party state have made it more difficult for ZANU(PF) to control or suppress organizational activity and political voice in rural Zimbabwe which is autonomous from the party. The prospects for opposition political activity in the 1995 general election and in earlier by—elections have also been enhanced. Another relevant point is that ZANU(PF) was in the process of transition from a multi—purpose local organization 1The researcher attended three different meetings in Hurungwe in May 1990 and found that both farmers and officials were speaking freely about the events of November 1989 and March 1990. 293 to one that was principally involved in maintaining order and support for the Mugabe government. ZANU(PF)'s representation and service functions had passed to VIDCOs and WADCOs and to the district council. This transition was noted by respondents in both Hurungwe and Zaka when they were asked to comment on organizations, and it was exemplified by the finding that ZANU(PF) had been used by respondents only on nine occasions between 1984 and 1989 to make demands. ZANU(PF) was used to make demands for Food~for—Work projects, one of the few services which the party was helping to provide. Furthermore, in the process of making and fulfilling demands for agricultural assets and services, there was little evidence that ZANU(PF) was attempting to control organizational activity. The one exception was the multi— purpose project involving V305 and AGRITEX in Murembwa Ward, a case which is examined later in this chapter. 8.2.2. Central—Local Government Competition In Zaka and Hurungwe, as well as other communal lands, competition and a potential source of conflict had developed between central government officials, associated with the District Development Committees (DDCs), and elected local government leaders who comprised the District Councils (DCs). The competition centered around the issue of how to respond to demands from farmers for assets and services. Particularly at stake was the placement of development projects (the 294 competition over projects in Hurungwe and Zaka is described later in this chapter). On the one hand, the District Council (DC) chairs and the most powerful ward councillors were aiming to please their constituents and place projects and infrastructure in their respective communities. While ward councilloers and other local government leaders were able to stand for election because they were ZANU(PF) members, their primary motivation has been to serve farmers in their communities, not to further the power of the party. On the other hand, the DDCs and central government agencies have been charged with identifying WADCOs and VIDCOs with the greatest need for projects and infrastructure and must take into account the demands of farmers from all parts of their districts. Consequently, disagreements have developed over which wards deserve the greatest attention. The competition between DDCs and DCs has been aggravated by uncertainty regarding decision-making authority. At the district level, the two bodies, the DDC and the DC, were given responsible for making decisions regarding the priority of each request for assistance and the placement of projects. As demonstrated in Chapter Six, the DC has been legally—vested with the power to request, accept or refuse development services and is eventually supposed to be vested with the authority and the resources to actually place and develop projects. However, with only five years of existence, DCs 295 were considered to be too inexperienced to take over budgetary functions from central government ministries, and the DC has neither the authority nor the capacity to implement projects and develop infrastructure. Thus far, only a few small—scale projects have been organized by the DC as the counterpart to funding agencies, and wards have only recently been made responsible for organizing food-for—work projects. The DC also must perform the onerous tasks of collecting taxes and school fees as well as engage in land use planning. As mentioned in Chapter Six, the District Development Committee (DDC) has become the principal decision—making body at the local level, is headed by the District Administrator and the District Council chairman, and contains district officials from various sectoral ministries. The DDC is a management forum where development programs and projects are coordinated and which determines how technical services are to be combined and coordinated in the implementation process. The District Administrator controls the District Development Fund (DDF) which has the manpower and equipment to build infrastructure. Budgetary and program decision—making are both still controlled by national-level ministries. These ministries have the planning expertise, the ideas on potential projects, the technology, and the funding authority. The relations between central government and local government raise an issue about the type of balance that 296 should be maintained between technocratic expertise and local democracy, especially a balance in which the interests of small farmers are best served. Presently, the competitive dynamic between central government planning and local government representation has created a balance in which the equitable delivery of services (including the fulfillment of poorer farmer demands) appears to take precedence over democratic procedures. If the sectoral ministries, the DDC and DA retain their powers and forestall transfer of budgetary and planning authority to the DC, small farmers will remain unable to fully express political voice in order to affect program change and service delivery. However, if the DC assumes greater control, patronage rather than planning will increasingly determine where development projects are to be situated, and poorer farmers with less powerful ward councillors are more likely to suffer. The solution to this dilemma lies in strengthening VIDCOs and other local organizations in poorer areas and seeking VSO intervention. 8.3. Content and Scope of Demands and Organizational Interaction As demonstrated in previous chapters, demands for program and policy change resulted in the greater use of alternative channels. Consequently, the wider the scope of demand and the greater the use of alternative channels, the greater the likelihood of competition and conflict. Demands for program 297 change involve struggle over the allocation and distribution of scarce resources and result in competition and conflict. When demands for policy change are made, the "official" channel is obscured, and political competition to represent farmers is intensified. In this chapter, the process of demanding and securing development projects will be used to examine patterns of organizational interaction. The process requires more than an application to a central government organization; instead, it involves farmers approaching local government leaders, legislators and VSO representatives who are capable of bringing together the necessary authority, funding and organization. The process of fulfilling demands can bring competition and conflict, as organizations compete with each other in delivering a service or asset and in taking credit for the accomplishment. Even if organizations are coordinated and are cooperating, they still compete to demonstrate that they best represent the interests of small farmers. 8.3.1. Demands for Credit In previous chapters, it has been demonstrated that the process of demanding and obtaining credit often involves more than an application to the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC). Farmers have joined AFC groups to secure loans, and many have used AGRITEX, NFAZ, other V805 and VIDCOs in order to influence the AFC to look more favorably at loan 298 applications. With AFC agents having to cope with representatives from a variety of organizations interceding on behalf of farmers, the credit application process should conceivably result in considerable competition and even conflict among organizations. However, AFC has maintained control over the lending process and has specified criteria for credit-worthiness and repayment. Consequently, AFC has not come into conflict with other organizations over demands for credit. Instead, AFC has been able to coordinate farmer groups, AGRITEX, NFAZ and VIDCOs in making the application and disbursal processes more efficient. The AFC's willingness to foster cooperation has led to a “development partnership" among organizations. While the application process was largely free of conflict, the use of multiple organizations to fulfill demands for credit caused conflict. For instance, in Hurungwe and other districts, AFC had arranged for NFAZ representatives — district and area chairs — to help disburse credit to groups which were based on NFAZ farmer clubs. The devolution of control over credit funds led to misappropriation, and the affected farmer clubs as well as AFC representatives called on the NFAZ district chair to account for the funds. As a consequence, the matter was brought before the district council for ajudication and resulted in the eventual removal of the NFAZ district chair and the diminution of NFAZ's 299 reputation in the district. However, NFAZ's participation in the application and disbursal process soon resumed because AFC required as much assistance as possible in lending to thousands of small farmers in the district. A related conflict in Mudzimu Ward resulted from the intervention of a VSO, the Central Association of Cooperative Unions (CACU), in the process of the GMB paying farmers and repaying the AFC on behalf of farmers with outstanding loans. Farmers in agricultural marketing and supply (AMS) cooperatives depended on CACU, as the umbrella organization, to facilitate the process of crop delivery to the GMB as well as the delivery of less expensive inputs. Farmers were especially interested in using CACU, because it could expedite payment from the GMB and the repayment of AFC loans. However, in Muzimu Ward, the GMB funds were misappropriated by CACU district officials, with the result that farmers defaulted on their loans and could not qualify for new loans for the improved seed and fertilizer which had brought prosperity. The subsequent crisis brought CACU into conflict with AFC, the GMB and the Hurungwe District Council. Once again, the problem which "official" organizations, the AFC and the GMB, had in servicing thousands of farmers and in coordinating and supervising the use of alternative channels led to conflict. The problems experienced with CACU in Mudzimu Ward were also encountered during research visits 300 to AMS cooperatives in the Harare region. Similar problems with the Masvingo Cooperative Union (MCU) were mentioned by farmers in the survey and in another study (GDI, 1988, 135- 136). Both CACU and MCU have grown too large, too quickly, rendering them unaccountable to AMS cooperatives and making management by an inexperienced staff difficult. The result is that a substantial number of Zimbabwe's productive and capable farmers have lost their credit status with AFC. More importantly, the reputation of cooperatives as viable alternative channels for making and fulfilling demands is being damaged by cases of mismanagement and misappropriation. The preceding cases indicate that V805 and, especially, membership organizations tend to suffer from problems of financial mismanagement. Membership organizations do not have the same accounting and budgeting procedures as central government agencies and other bureaucratic organizations. An additional problem is that hundreds of officers from NFAZ, CACU and other membership organizations are involved in handling dues and returns from crop sales for thousands of members or groups - monitoring the flows of these funds is difficult for even the most efficent VSO. In contrast, service organizations take in funds from fewer sources, disburse funds to a smaller number of subjects, and have fewer officials handling funds. 301 8.3.2. Demands for Program Change: Assets The use of alternative organizations in making demands for resettlement land was demonstrated in previous chapters. Alternative channels were used to expedite the process of applying for resettlement land and to circumvent stages in the channelling process which started with VIDCOs and led ultimately to the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE). Furthermore, master farmers felt that they could most productively farm resettlement land and admitted frustration with the application process. They favored transferring authority for resettlement decision—making to AGRITEX from local government channels, because AGRITEX could.designate the best farmers and provide them with resettlement land. This demand for policy change was being propagated by NFAZ at the national level. NFAZ and master farmers were expressing political voice which was intensifying competition at the national level between AGRITEX and the Ministry of Agriculture (MLARR), on the one hand, and the Ministry of Local Government (MLGURD) and DERUDE, on the other. However, there was little evidence that the resettlement issue was causing friction in Hurungwe or Zaka. In Chapter Seven, effectiveness in securing grazing schemes was shown to be related to the entrepreneurship and collaboration of AGRITEX, V805 and VIDCOs in helping farmers overcome a collective action problem. Farmers were unwilling 302 to move, especially those with few cattle, and coordinated action by the AGRITEX worker and the VIDCO played a significant role in persuading farmers of the collective benefits of grazing schemes. The AGRITEX worker assured farmers that the land would be fairly and efficiently demarcated, while the VIDCO brought various elements of the community together to support the project. Grazing schemes were not established in those areas where VIDCOs and AGRITEX workers were not working together, where AGRITEX workers were ineffectual, and where the VIDCO was neither well—led nor well—organized. The presence of VSOs in Murembwa Ward made the process of fulfilling demands for grazing schemes easier. The presence of VSOs facilitated simultaneous efforts in all six VIDCOs in Murembwa Ward to establish grazing schemes. The VSOs supplied materials for the grazing schemes and reached out to poorer farmers. NFAZ farmer clubs and representatives helped to educate farmers about the benefits of grazing schemes and gardening and poultry cooperatives. However, as described later in this chapter, the initial stage of establishing the project was not well—coordinated, resulting in conflicts between NFAZ farmer club leaders and leaders of VIDCOs and ZANU(PF) as well as traditional leaders. Conflict was defused when AGRITEX and VSO workers conceded to ZANU(PF) and VIDCO officials, permitting them to participate in the establishment 303 of grazing schemes as well as gardening and poultry cooperatives. The Murembwa case illustrates that the competition and conflict that the process of delivering public goods can create. Once grazing schemes were established in Murembwa Ward and other locations, they facilitated the planning and coordination of other activities by the VIDCOs and AGRITEX, such as gardening and poultry cooperatives. Grazing schemes created a tangible basis for cooperation among farmers as well as greater socio—economic homogeneity, especially in terms of the quantity and quality of cattle holdings. With a grazing scheme, farmers with little or no holdings found it easier to borrow cattle for draft power and other purposes. With access to draft power, poorer farmers were in a better position to take advantage of extension advice offered by AGRITEX workers. Grazing schemes as well as gardening and poultry cooperatives integrated communities and compelled them to cooperate in maintaining and developing common property resources, including streambanks and trees. 8.3.3. Demands for Program Change: Services The process of making and fulfilling demands for program change in regard to services has been analyzed in previous chapters. In making and fulfilling demands for markets, farmers used a variety of channels, including VSOs, to influence the GMB to establish depots and collection points in 304 their wards. Intense competition occurred between WADCOs in obtaining GMB depots and collection points. In Mudzimu Ward, where farmers used the greatest number of organizations, the process of obtaining a depot brought local government, NFAZ and AMS cooperative leaders together in a collaborative effort. Although the GMB possessed the authority to decide upon the most efficient placement of depots and collection points, the lobbying process was open to a wide range of influences and organizations. In Mudzimu Ward, competition only transpired after the depot was secured, when organizations rushed to take credit for best representing farmers' interests. In demanding water projects, farmers used local government channels, but also took advantage of VSOs when they were present. Procedures for cooperation had been established between local government and AGRITEX so that farmers could use either channel to make demands or turn to VSOs for assistance. The same procedures applied to demands for roads and other infrastructure. In building dams, DDF officials and AGRITEX officers cooperated in pegging and preparing for sites for construction. As previously mentioned, ward councillors have competed over the allocation of scarce resources for infrastructure. In regard to making and channelling demands for "Food—for—Work" projects, the importance of ward councillors and WADCOs in prioritizing project proposals was 305 described in Chapter Six. In addition, farmers at several sites described how ZANU(PF) had intervened in both the process of prioritizing as well as in the selection of farmers to participate in the projects. Eventually, WADCO members were supposed to replace ZANU(PF) officials in these processes, but the transition was slow. In making demands for transport, farmers could go through local government channels, including the District Development Fund, but they could also use other organizations such as NFAZ or CACU. Enterprising farmers in Hurungwe approached commercial farmers which created competition with members of the transporters association in Hurungwe who had been operating under monopoly conditions. The case of transport illustrates the importance of alternative and competing channels in enabling small farmers to become more effective in fulfilling demands. 8.4. Demands for Projects and Organizational Interaction In the following section, the process of making demands for development projects, as well as the process of fulfilling those demands, is analyzed in order to illustrate the types of organizational interactions which they engender. Small farmers know about the benefits which projects can bring, and they have used VIDCO and WADCO officials, as well as VSO representatives, party officials and extension workers, in order to attract them. The process is rarely smooth, and, as 306 will be demonstrated, the provision of such a valued public good as a project produces more competition than cooperation, and conflicts occasionally occur. However, cooperation is eventually required among various organizations if projects are to be a success. Two cases from Hurungwe and Zaka Communal Lands illustrate the process of intervention by V805 and government agencies through projects, as well as the competition and conflicts which pave the way to cooperation and development partnerships. 8.4.1. Projects and Organizational Interaction in Murembwa 1mg Described in previous chapters, the Murembwa Ward project involved the International Voluntary Services (IVS), Swissaid, AGRITEX and NFAZ in a multi—purpose development project to establish grazing schemes, gardening and poultry cooperatives, and other income—generating activities, as well as to train participants in cooperative leadership, management skills, farming and conservation techniques. In Zaka, the process of small farmers demanding projects and the resulting interaction of organizations intensified in 1984, with the establishment of local government structures. Ward councillors were elected in Zaka and expressed the demands of their constituents for projects. This influx of demands initiated a process of securing an integrated rural development project. The Zaka AGRITEX officer and the Zaka District Administrator (DA), in 307 consultation with provincial officials, decided that a project should be placed in a ward which would eventually be replicated in other wards. In searching for an appropriate project area, AGRITEX and the DDC decided that an impoverished ward that was "difficult" to develop (though not too difficult) should be selected. Sites in agro—ecological zone V and in mountainous areas were suggested but rejected as too harsh or too remote. A ward in zone IV was targeted which was poor but compact enough to permit successful implementation and coordination of micro—projects. The eastern part of Zaka and Masimbavanhu Ward, in particular, was judged to be suitable, but it was not selected because a survey was being conducted there for an irrigation scheme. AGRITEX and the DDC began to investigate southwestern Zaka and found that Bota South Ward met their criteria. They also encountered the ward councillor who was also the deputy chair of the district council and who was most persuasive in presenting the demands of constituents for a project. However, after working with the ward councillor , it was feared that the project would be "politically hijacked," meaning that the deputy chair would direct the project toward his ward and would use it as a source of patronage. AGRITEX and the DDC wanted wide a range of people to benefit, and AGRITEX officials felt that excessive interference by local political officials would prevent the project from developing 308 in a way which could assist poorer farmers. Subsequently, over the objections of the ward councillor, the district AGRlTEX officer and the DA used their prerogative to remove the planned project from Bota South Ward, in spite of the objections of the ward councillor. Subsequently, Murembwa Ward, adjacent to Bota South, was selected. This incident demonstrated the relative power of central government over local government officials. It also demonstrated how local government officials respond to the political voice of their constituents, while central government respond to demands from all parts of the district. Once the site was selected, AGRITEX officials met with Swissaid and IVS officers in 1986, and a commitment was made to collaborate and fund the proposed project. ESO (a Swiss VSO) and ENDA (an agro—environmental VSO operating in Senegal and Zimbabwe) were also interested in the project but failed to generate funds for a forestry component. At first, Swissaid and IVS weighed the alternatives of funding the project through AGRITEX or through NFAZ. However, funding the project through AGRITEX would have involved dealing with the government treasury and years of bureaucratic red—tape. The two donors were in the process of assisting NFAZ with multi- purpose training and a "farmer groups" project which would be 309 centered in Masvingo Province.2 The donors knew that NFAZ was interested in participating in an integrated rural development project and that a Zimbabwean VSO would stand a better chance than AGRITEX of securing quick approval and funding for the project. Subsequently, NFAZ was asked if they would be interested in sponsoring an integrated project that would involve more than the development of farmer groups. NFAZ agreed, and the project was initiated in 1987. The project soon encountered a crisis which was attributed to the narrow scope of the beneficiaries. At first, IVS, AGRITEX and NFAZ officials targeted the project at NFAZ members and those who were willing to join NFAZ farmer groups. This approach excluded the majority of farmers in the ward, including poorer farmers and local officials. Subsequently, the local AGRITEX worker, Mr. Musina, worked with the NFAZ area (ward) chair, Mr. Mureza, trying to get more people involved. However, the exclusion of local officials resulted in initial opposition to the project. When the project tried to obtain land for a training center in Cherechere, the business center of Murembwa Ward, the headman (sabhuku) refused to allocate the land, objecting to the fact that the NFAZ area chair had been made head of the project. 2International Voluntary Services, "Farmer Groups Training Project," concept paper, Harare, October 1985. A principal objective of the project was to develop groups that would, in turn, broaden the membership base of NFAZ beyond the master farmer clubs. 310 The area chair was not related to the sabhuku or other local leaders and was not widely~5upported by farmers in the ward. The VIDCO chair for Cherechere and the ZANU(PF) branch chairman also opposed the project. As a result of the conflicts in the ward, NFAZ could not mobilize enough people to build the training center. Subsequently, a larger committee was formed which added the ward councillor, the headman for Cherechere, and several other non—NFAZ members. The new committee and the local AGRITEX worker played a crucial role in responding to small farmer demands, maintaining harmony, leading the integrated project, and supervising the micro—projects. As the project gathered momentum and popularity, other government agencies became involved. In one interview, MCCD workers claimed that the Murembwa project was theirs, even though they had visited the ward on only three occasions. The IVS and Swissaid workers and the NFAZ provincial organizer were based in Masvingo, the provincial capital, and regularly visited the project site to provide supervision and to respond to requests. At the same time, the VSO workers attended to other projects involving NFAZ in Masvingo Province and assisted in building NFAZ‘s provincial administrative capacity. The VSO representatives emphasized specialized training, including cooperativelnanagement methods, collective decision—making, and leadership training for women which 311 enhanced political voice and which made the Murembwa project self—sustaining. In the initial stages of the project, farmers expected officials to make decisions about obtaining assets and services for the project. By 1989, VSO officials were commenting that farmers were able to meet and collectively decide on a course of action in order to secure essential assets and services, such as a borehole. The researcher attended meetings in Murembwa in 1989 and 1990 at which collective decision—making and the expression of political voice were in evidence. The community training center was constructed in Cherechere in 1989 in which most of the training activities were located and which provided a focal point for project activities in the ward. Training was provided in accounting and bookkeeping, and participants were transported to see other projects in Masvingo Province. Gardening and poultry cooperatives developed, grazing schemes were organized, and a fence—making cooperative was launched. With the establishment of gardening cooperatives and grazing schemes, Murembwa farmers intensified their demands for dams and boreholes. Swissaid and IVS provided the funding and arranged for the drilling of boreholes. The construction of dams involved local labor and competing government agencies. In building a dam near Cherechere, AGRITEX wanted the embankment built first, whereas the DDF focused on constructing the dam wall, 312 and the Ward Coordinator wanted rocks to be collected for the dam. While the District Administrator could have stepped in and resolved the differences among the three agencies, the AGRITEX worker overruled his counterparts from DDF and MLGURD and ordered the embankment built first. At the beginning of 1990, after more than three years of intervention, the last VSO official departed, and the Murembwa committee assumed full control of the project. Henceforth, when farmers made a demand, they asked the project committee, the ward councillor, the AGRITEX officer, or an NFAZ representative; they could no longer use IVS or other service organizations. Within the space of three years and after instruction in democratic decision—making and project management, the small farmers were able to more effectively express political voice. After initial conflict and despite continued competition, new working relationships were established across organizations, including NFAZ, AGRITEX, VIDCOs, WADCOs, and ZANU(PF). NFAZ learned that it could not exclusively use projects as incentives to induce farmers to join NFAZ groups. The projects had to include community leaders if they were to succeed. As a consequence of the adjustments that were made, the beneficiaries of the project included a range of farmers, poorer and wealthier, female and male, from all parts of Murembwa Ward. Subsequently, the DDC 313 and AGRITEX were making plans to replicate the project in other disadvantaged wards in Zaka District. 8.4.2. Women's Cooperatives and Organizational Interaction In previous chapters, the strength of small farmer demands for projects in Hurungwe, and particularly in Mudzimu Ward, was demonstrated. Through the initiative of farmers, such as Kembo Mpofu, and farmer groups, Mudzimu Ward became a center for VSO activities and projects, including those of Africare and CADEC. When officials from the FAQ/MCCD arrived in Mudzimu in 1987, dozens of farmers turned out to demand inclusion in the project and proceeded to form cooperatives. A similar process occurred throughout wards in Mashonaland West Province, where one hundred and thirty farmer groups were established in the pilot progam area from 1984 to 1989. The project — "Strengthening Women's Role and Work in Rural Development" — was initiated with the aim of developing "a methodology by which women could acquire the skills and confidence to participate in mainstream income~generating activities in economically viable, agriculturally—based enterprises" (FAO/MCCD, 1990, 1). The project organized women into small cooperatives of 15—25 members and provided a comprehensive range of training programs in group dynamics, participatory production planning, group record keeping and participatory evaluation. Training in farm management and agricultural production and marketing was conducted by AGRITEX 314 on communal plots. Income—generating cooperatives (including horticulture, bee—keeping, and sewing) were organized. Before they were established, conflict arose in the early stages of the project because of the broad approach of the project design which contradicted the more focused objectives of MCCD and AGRITEX in Mashonaland West Province. The project designers exerted considerable effort to convince MCCD to accept the broad pilot project approach as one which would become a permanent component within the ministry. At the time, project staff were being trained in the broad focus and were to be attached to MCCD. The pilot project would be expanded in the 19905 to the rest of Zimbabwe. Cooperation developed with AGRITEX, which agreed to provide agricultural training for the cooperatives, and with AFC, which helped to develop and manage group credit schemes for the cooperatives. The project leaders suggested forging closer links of cooperation with NFAZ which had established a Women's Affairs Office and which displayed interest in the project. In comparison with the Murembwa Ward project, the women's cooperative project was much more extensive and involved more staff. Consequently, access by the cooperatives to project staff has been limited and has inhibited problem—solving. In addition, the long—term aims of sustaining the cooperatives and replicating the project will be problematic to fulfill, especially given the weakness of the Ministry of Cooperative 315 and Community Development (MCCD). However, the cooperatives have amplified the political voice of women farmers to the extent that they can convey their demands to project staff or to other organizations. The project staff took care to build collaborative linkages among MCCD, AGRITEX, NFAZ, AFC and the cooperatives which will help to sustain them. Finally, the project has adopted a clear and simple methodology which will enable the MCCD to establish women's cooperatives in other provinces. 8.5. Policy Change, NFAZ and the Political Voice of Small Farmers In previous chapters, the process of making demands for policy change was analyzed. In this chapter, the focus is on the organizational interactions, particularly at the national level, which are precipitated by demands for policy change. As has been demonstrated, NFAZ is the principal organization which conveys demands for policy (and program) change to the national level. Consequently, the focus is on NFAZ and how the organization interacts with the government, political leaders, and rival organizations. The cases of policy change in regard to prices, transport and land are considered. 8.5.1. NFAZ and the Political Voice of Small Farmers Previous analysis has defined NFAZ as the principal agent for small farmer political voice in Zimbabwe. Founded in 1980, NFAZ has grown rapidly from a small federation of master 316 farmer clubs to a nation—wide organization which represents the interests of small—scale communal farmers — the majority of Zimbabwe's population — and which effectively lobbies the government for improved agricultural policies. The development of NFAZ into a force representing small farmers was primarily due to a strategy of cooperation and conflict avoidance with the government. The NFAZ was able to build on the favorable policy stance toward communal farmers which ZANU(PF) brought to the government in 1980 from the war of independence. NFAZ leaders established close relations with government ministers and officials, re-inforced the government's pro—small farmer stance, and effectively lobbied for policy change in a few selected issue areas, including prices, land and transport. In return, the NFAZ leadership was attentive to government advice. For instance, during the 19805, NFAZ complied with President Mugabe's request to explore unity with two competing farmer organizations, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), representing large—scale commercial farmers, and the Zimbabwe National Farmers Union (ZNFU), representing small—scale commercial farmers. Finally, NFAZ was developing the technical capacity to contribute to the agricultural policy—making process. The second factor in the development of NFAZ as the principal agent for small farmer political voice and policy change was the building of links with the organization's 317 membership base which was rapidly expanding during the early and mid—19805. The development of a federated structure, linking the leadership with farmer clubs, has enabled small farmers and local leaders to communicate their demands more effectively. NFAZ instituted an annual policy seminar at\ which distrigt and areaflghaips would forward the demands of farmers in their areas and at which NFAZ national officers and government officials responded. At the seminars, NFAZ leaders have provided farmers with information on policy issues and NFAZ initiatives. In addition, NFAZ has begun to administer surygys to discover the problems of small farmers and what they are demanding. In terms of membership base, the organization has grown to the point where 60—80,000 farmers pay dues annually and where more than 200,000 are associated with NFAZ through farmer clubs.3 NFAZ has sought to build support among farmers by demonstrating to farmers how the organization works for policy change and by assisting in the delivery of services, such as empty grain and seed bags, transport, loans, and markets. Also, NFAZ membership entitles farmers to an input and marketing card which enabled farmers to buy directly from wholesalers, to pay no sales tax for agricultural inputs, and to market directly to the GMB. The main beneficiaries of 3Membership figures were provided by NFAZ Central Office in Harare and by NFAZ Provincial Office in Masvingo. 318 these actions have been richer farmers, especially master farmers, who constitute approximately a quarter of the small— scale communal farming population. Two additional signs of NFAZ's inglinatigpmpgygpgwrigper 54313559119 ..SPTFPWa}. Esrm.ere.._§.r.e. its. positipnsen.,1...and. reggae and resettlement. NFAZ has favored a unitary system of freehold land tenure in Zimbabwe (NFAZ, 1989). A freehold system would benefit richer small—scale communal farmers who could buy land and use title deeds as collateral. However, freehold tenure would disrupt communal land use patterns, throw poorer farmers off the land, and contribute to landlessness in Zimbabwe. As mentioned previously in this chapter, NFAZ has advocated the selection of qualified master farmers as candidates for resettlement, rather than poorer farmers who need land the most. Since 1980, NFAZ has aspired to become the representative of all Zimbabwe's small—scale communal farmers, not just master farmers. Consequently, NFAZNhas deyeloped a second policy thrust to win the support of the majority of Zimbabwe's farmers who are primarily subsistence farmers. As demonstrated by the Murembwa Ward case, NFAZ has become a sponsormfigfvmdeyelopment projects which are intended to alleviate the poverty of poorer farmers and enable them to become more involved in the market. In sponsoring development projects, NFAZ leaders have paid regular visits to project 319 sites to assist with problem—solving, and local NFAZ officials have served on project committees. In addition, the NFAZ "farmer groups" training project was intended to increase the number of groups and to expand NFAZ farmer clubs beyond their base membership of master farmers. The broadening of NFAZ's membership base will lead the organization to focus further on the problems of poorer farmers. However, the difficulties of serving the interests of a increasingly diverse range of farmers may deter NFAZ from expanding its focus and membership too far. Since NFAZ cultivated close relations with the government after independence, it has been able to forge cooperative links with a range of government organizations, including the GMB, AFC, AGRITEX. As explained earlier in this chapter, NFAZ lobbied government leaders, the ministries, AFC and AGRITEX in order to become involved in the credit process and to increase its role in agricultural training. Master farmer clubs had been spreading throughout the country, and NFAZ was able to convince government agencies that the clubs provided a suitable organizational basis for training and credit schemes. The establishment of AGRITEX groups for teaching improved farming methods utilized master farmer clubs as a base. NFAZ became involved in the process of master farmer certification, and it established additional programs for women farmers and 320 for young farmers. NFAZ farmer clubs also were involved in the formation of AFC groups. NFAZ has developed cooperative relations with donors, such as IVS and Swissaid, in order to become involved in development projects and with the Swedish Cooperative Center (SCC) and the Ford Foundation in strengthening the organization's administrative and organizational capacities. In relations with donors, NFAZ leaders have tried to assert as much autonomy as possible. The Swedish Cooperative Centre (SCC) has played a substantial administrative role in NFAZ and organizes many of the seminars and courses which it offers. However, when government ministers and other officials deal with NFAZ, officials from the SCC have been ordered to maintain a low profile. As explained in the forthcoming sections, NFAZ has developed relations of competition and cooperation with the other two farmer unions in Zimbabwe, the CFU and ZNFU. Since 1980, NFAZ has competed with CPU and ZNFU for resources which the goverment distributes to farmers. After independence, the NFAZ helped to re-direct the bulk of government resources in the form of extension, credit, markets and other infrastructure to small—scale communal farmers. In contrast, the ZNFU's small—scale commercial farmers have been largely neglected, while the CPU has helped its members to turn 321 increasingly to non—governmental sources of credit, extension and markets. 8.5.2. Demands for Change in Pricing and Transport Policy In channelling small farmer demands for changes in pricing policy to the national level, NFAZ leaders have lobbied the government, mainly through the Ministry of Agriculture (MLARR) for higher producer prices, earlier annual announcement of price scales, and macro—economic policies that would be more favorable to small farmers. In this process, the NFAZ established a cooperative working relationship with the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), representing the large- scale commercial farmers, and the Zimbabwe National Farmers Union (ZNFU), representing the small—scale commercial (freehold) farmers. NFAZ has relied upon the CFU‘s superior analytical and lobbying capacities which were developed during decades of dealings with the colonial government. NFAZ cooperation with the CFU and the large-scale commercial commodity associations (especially the Grain Producers Association) has resulted in production cost data being submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture (MLARR) during the price—setting process. However, the decision is ultimately made by the Cabinet, with the Ministry of Finance (MFEPD). In years of budgetary difficulties, the interests of farmers and the agricultural industry take second place. The uneven impact of the farmer unions on the process, especially during 322 and after prices are set, has led some to argue that NFAZ has little influence over pricing policy (Herbst, 1988). Nevertheless, producer prices have continued to rise at a rate which has encouraged small farmers to continue growing increasing amounts of maize, cotton, sunflower and other crops. NFAZ has also cooperated with CFU in attempting to secure more transport at cheaper rates for communal farmers. Commercial farmers have been encouraged to dispatch vehicles to the communal lands to increase the volume of transport and to provide competition with transporter associations. NFAZ has engaged in negotiations with transporter associations in different provinces, with transport companies and with the Ministry of Transport. NFAZ has also encouraged farmers to organize to negotiate or to form transport cooperatives. However, the root of the transport crisis is the declining number of vehicles in Zimbabwe, and NFAZ has joined with CFU, ZNFU and the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) in lobbying with the Ministry of Finance (MFEPD) and top government officials to ease restrictions on the importation of vehicles. A pricing policy issue has precipitated conflict between NFAZ and CFU. With the development of a maize glut in the mid—19805, NFAZ and government leaders pressed for the introduction of a two—tiered price for maize for large—scale 323 commercial farmers. Once these farmers exceeded a ceiling for marketed maize, they would be paid at a significantly reduced rate for the excess. NFAZ supported this policy as a way of changing the agricultural division of labor so that small— scale communal farmers would come to grow the vast bulk of maize, cotton and sunflower. CFU opposed this policy as discrimination against commercial farmers. Subsequently, many commercial farmers left maize and cotton production for horticulture which was not regulated by the government and parastatals. 8.5.3. Demands for Change in Land Policy The shift in NFAZ's policy on land redistribution has been described previously. This shift precipitated a serious conflict between CFU and NFAZ. After years of downplaying the issue, NFAZ began to formulate a position on land reform in 1989, in anticipation of the 1990 expiration of the Lancaster House Consitution and its clauses protecting commercial farmer land rights. At first, NFAZ sought to advocate land redistribution in a manner which would not alienate the CFU. Consequently, NFAZ spoke of the need for freehold land tenure so that commercial farmers could buy in the communal lands and former communal farmers could purchase commercial farming land. However, as 1989 progressed, NFAZ began to conduct 324 strong behind—the—scenes lobbying for a sweeping new program of land redistribution.4 NFAZ attempted to keep its discussions, deliberations and policies about land as confidential as possible, partly to maintain its working relationship with CFU. However, in June 1990, NFAZ came out strongly in favor of President Mugabe's stated intention to intensify land redistribution, scrapping the constitutional clauses protecting commercial farming land, and ending the "willing seller, willing buyer" arrangements for land purchase. The new policy would allow the government to seize commercial farm land and compensate the owners at a rate much lower than the prevailing market rate. In December 1990, constitutional barriers to land reform were removed, and the government announced plans to redistribute six million hectares to communal farmers. To conclude this analysis of NFAZ, small farmer political voice and policy change, the farmer union has emphasized cooperation on policy issues, especially with the government. However, on crucial issues concerning its members and affecting its prestige, especially the land issue, the organization has engaged in competition with other organizations and even in conflict. The effectiveness of NFAZ 4The change in NFAZ's land policy and the intensification of lobbying activities became evident through the researcher's meetings with NFAZ officials and attendance at NFAZ conferences and seminars at which government officials were present. 325 in expressing the political voice of small farmers and in working with other organizations has attracted the attention of donors and scholars who regard the farmers union as one of the most exemplary representatives of small farmers in Africa. 8.6. Conclusions: Cgmpetition and the Emergence of Cooperation In the process of making demands and in securing assets and services, small farmers in Hurungwe and Zaka used several different organizations, engendering competition and occasional conflict. In most cases, organizations mananged to overcome conflict and curb competition by coordinating their activities and developing cooperation. As expected, the political party, ZANU(PF), provided the major source of conflict, challenging V305 and even government agencies while attempting to ensure that it remained the sole representative and benefactor of small farmers. Surprisingly, while ZANU(PF) was clashing with other organizations which may have sought to represent the demands of small farmers, the party was transferring its role of channelling demands to local government structures. Consequently, ZANU(PF) seemed to be relinquishing one of the key functions of a political party as a demand—aggregating organization. ZANU(PF) officials hoped to maintain the party's strength by controlling other organizations, including VIDCOs and WADCOs, and by taking credit for the delivery of assets and services. 326 It was found that most of the demands which small farmers made through VIDCOs were being channelled to WADCOs and district councils and that the new structures were producing competition with central government agencies and VSOs which was largely constructive. While differences emerged among organizations over the interests of small farmers and decision—making authority, the resolution of conflicts and the emergence of cooperation can be attributed to the acceptance by alternative organizations of the coordinating authority of official organizations as well as to the recognition by most official organizations of the positive contributions which could be made by "alternative" organizations, especially VSOs. For example, NFAZ was able to gain acceptance as a partner in the Murembwa project because it was willing to accept AGRITEX as the coordinating authority and the participation of ZANU(PF). NFAZ was helped in this process by the fact that the government and party have recognized NFAZ as the official representative of small farmers. In terms of the content and scope of demands, the higher the probability that a service, such as short—term seasonal loans, would be delivered, the greater the involvement of organizations in both demand—making and fulfillment and the greater the competition. Organizations could increase their support by being associated with the successful delivery of a service. Conversely, competition was not as great over assets 327 and services with a low probability of delivery, especially infrastructure. However, when a high utility was placed by farmers on a service, such as development projects, or an asset, such as resettlement land, competition was prevalent. In the case of project placement and implementation, conflict was avoided by the clear—cut designation of a coordinating authority and by the flexibility of that authority in including organizations and expanding the scope of the beneficiaries. In terms of resettlement land, once the issue of redistribution was placed on the national agenda, competition and conflict among organizations intensified. This chapter and previous ones have demonstrated that diversity, competition, and coordination enhance the political voice of small farmers; they also promote the development of civil society in the rural areas and democratic governance between farmers and the state. While it is important for farmers to have diverse and competing channels through which they make their demands, the role of effective leadership and organizations in expressing the political voice of small farmers is also indispensable. Without organizations and leaders willing to express the political voice of small farmers, they would achieve little. The case of NFAZ has demonstrated howzanational farmers organization can aggregate the demands of small farmers and effectively express their political voice at the national level. NFAZ has also shown :IrI -:' .- ‘-- - . - ' =-:- TI'. rh, Chapter 9. Conclusion: Political Voice in Rural Africa 9.1. The Possibility of Small Farmer Political Voice Robert Bates' rational choice model explains the decline of African agriculture in terms of governing elites who form urban-based coalitions and use the state to promote urban and industrial growth at the expense «of agriculture. In the model, it is assumed that the state is used invariably to demobilize small farmers and extract resources from them. While not rejecting the overall validity of Bates' model, the dissertation has demonstrated that two key assumptions — concerning the options available to small farmers and small farmer relations with the state — must not be treated as axioms but rather as variables. Bates assumes that small farmers are inevitably disorganized and incapable of influencing governments and that elites rationally include urban dwellers (who are more powerful) in ruling coalitions and exclude rural dwellers. The dissertation has demonstrated that small—scale African farmers can be organized, can exercise the option of expressing political voice, can influence governing elites, and can even participate in ruling coaltions. The political voice of Zimbabwe's small-scale communal farmers against the colonial regime and their support for the independence struggle won them acceptance by the post— independence governing elite and a place in the ruling coalition. Subsequently, the smallholder agricultural revolution and small farmer political voice expressed through 330 the farmers' union, a range of other organizations and elected officials has prevented the governing elite from diminishing their support for small farmers as was the case when many other African countries gained independence. While the composition of the ruling coalitions that won independence explains differences between Zimbabwe and some African countries which have long suffered from anti—rural bias, the ability of Zimbabwe's small farmers to sustain their political voice and influence must be attributed to their activities and behavior after independence. In the dissertation, small farmers demonstrated political capabilities and political voice by their membership in a diverse range of groups, by making demands for program and policy change, and by using a variety of organizations to make and fulfill demands. Small farmers have organized themselves in farmer groups, cooperatives, the farmers' union and local government. Their political voice, combined with agricultural performance, initiated and sustained a small farmer agricultural revolution which cannot be accounted for by Bates' assumptions. Dramatic increases in small farmer production of maize, cotton and other agricultural commodities have provided the governing elite with an economic rationale for maintaining support, while the political voice of small farmers and their electoral power have supplied a political rationale. The persistence of democracy and elections in 331 Zimbabwe and the alienation of many urban voters from the ruling party have continued to make political leaders accountable to small farmers — who constitute by far the largest voting block in the country. Consequently, small farmer political voice and influence have sustained their symbiotic relationship with the governing elite. The fundamental issue is the extent to which the Zimbabwean case can be replicated in other countries, an issue which is considered later in this chapter. 9.2. Research Findings and Political Voice in Rural Zimbabwe The survey of small farmers and other field research provided considerable evidence that small farmers express political voice. A substantial proportion made demands of a wide scope for agricultural assets and services, and their requests reached a variety of organizations. In making demands for program and policy change, small farmers acted together, persisted in demand—making, used informal channels, and engaged in bargaining. They were effective in fulfilling a range of demands, especially for services provided by central government agencies. In making demands for program and policy change, organizations such as NFAZ were essential in giving greater voice to these demands and in influencing the governing elite. The presence of voluntary sector organizations (VSOs) enhanced the ability of small farmers to make demands, use 332 alternative channels and take collective action. Where central government organizations and VSOs cooperated, small farmers made demands which were wider in scope, acted collectively, and used alternative and unofficial channels. The presence of VSOs was related with various forms of effectiveness. The use of VSOs helped farmers to be more effective in fulfilling demands than if they had relied exclusively on government agencies. In obtaining changes in pricing policy and in the provision of markets, land, credit and water, small farmers acted collectively and used multiple and unofficial channels, especially the farmers' union and other VSOS. The presence of VSOs was shown to be related to an improved quality of life. In addition, the presence of a critical mass of VSOs helped to improve farmers' perceptions of the performance of a whole range of organizations, including AGRITEX, local government and NFAZ. In contrast, the absence of service organizations and the weakness of the farmers' union were associated with diminished political voice. The knowledge of VSOs helped to produce the case of optimal political voice in which a small farmer was able to organize collective action by farmers and use a wide range of organizations in order to fulfill demands for program and policy change. The presence of VSOs was especially important for poorer farmers and female farmers who were at a 333 disadvantage in regard to abilities to fulfill demands for assets and make ea wide scope of demands. VSOs provided training and projects which enabled female farmers to markedly expand the expression of their political voice. It would be in the interest of small farmers for the presence of VSOs to be expanded in the rural areas. However, service organizations have been unable to establish a universal presence in the rural areas. The key to replicating the interventions of service organizations, therefore, lies with the extension agency and with the development of NFAZ and democratic local government. The two cases of project interventions demonstrated that AGRITEX, the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development, and NFAZ were capable of participating in and even initiating and replicating development projects. The extension agency has been transformed from a primarily technocratic body into a multi— purpose organization1 — which has helped to organize farmer 1Drinkwater (1991, 262-267) contends that AGRITEX remains too technocratic and insufficiently democratic to respond to the demands and ideas of small farmers. The approach of AGRITEX toward the imposition of grazing schemes and other farming techniques are cited as evidence. 334 groups, has channelled the demands of small farmers, and has promoted cooperatives and grazing schemes.2 The creation of local government structures has better enabled small farmers to make demands for program change and to amplify their political voice. It was found that VIDCOs and WADCOs were presenting the demands of small farmers and that district councils were receiving those demands. The slow process of devolving power and resources to local government has hampered the ability of local government to fulfill many of those demands. In regard to the devolution versus deconcentration issue, local government was perceived by farmers in the survey as a channel for making demands and a structure which was supposed to deliver services. There was little or no perception that local government was being used as an instrument of control. Especially in the case of Murembwa Ward, VIDCOs and WADCOs were playing an important role in organizing cooperatives and grazing schemes which, in turn, was playing a significant part in uniting and developing some rural communities. 2In one case, the broadening of AGRITEX's functions brought resistance, where local literacy agents from the Ministry of Education blocked AGRITEX workers from organizing literacy and numeracy training for small farmers. In another case, the opposite was true, when the Ministry of Health accepted AGRITEX's offer to distribute condoms and train farmers in their use in order to fight the AIDS epidemic. 335 In the process of making and fulfilling demands, small farmers were most effective when they could use a diverse range of organizations which were competing and cooperating. Competition among organizations to represent the interests of small farmers was more likely to result in demand fulfillment than compliance with the authority of one organization. While competition emerged among organizations over the interests of small farmers and over the delivery of services, the absence of conflict and emergence of cooperation can be attributed to; the acceptance of an "official" coordinating authority and the positive contributions which could be made by "alternative" organizations, especially the farmers' union and other VSOs. It is important for farmers to have diverse and competing channels through which they make their demands. Competition and diversity can enhance the political voice of small farmers and promote the development of state—society relations. In terms of the content and scope of demands, the higher the probability that a service, such as short—term seasonal loans, would be delivered, the greater the involvement of organizations in both demand—making and fulfillment and the greater the competition. Organizations could increase their support by being associated with the successful delivery of a service. Conversely, competition was not as great over assets and services with a low probability of delivery, especially roads, dams, and other infrastructure. However, when a high 336 utility was placed on a service, such as development projects, or an asset, such as re5ettlement land, competition intensified. In the case of project placement and implementation, conflict was avoided by the clear—cut designation of a coordinating authority and by the flexibility of that authority in including organizations and expanding the scope of the beneficiaries. In terms of resettlement land, once the issue of redistribution was placed on the national agenda, competition and conflict among organizations intensified. 9.2.1. Stratification and Political Voice in Rural Zimbabwe Variation in both the scope and effectiveness of small farmers in expressing political voice confirmed the thesis that richer farmers and farmers in better agro—ecological zones benefitted the most from the ability to express political voice and from the "small farmer revolution" in Zimbabwe. These farmers made demands of a wider scope and were more effective in fulfilling demands, because they had linked themselves to the system of markets, extension and credit which the government of Zimbabwe was helping to provide. They were less concerned with obtaining assets than poorer farmers and those living in poorer agro—ecological zones. Richer farmers used farmer unions and other membership organizations as alternative channels in making demands, while poorer farmers were restricted to using central and local 337 government. While a gap was discovered between the political voice of richer and poorer farmers, there were instances in which poorer farmers were able to act together, use organizations and fulfill demands for program change, especially in the process of organizing grazing schemes. For richer small farmers, privatization was not a concern, and "getting the prices right" was less of a concern than "getting the politics right" — meaning that farmers were demanding expanded political intervention in order to broaden and deepen the activities of parastatal marketing boards, to maintain guaranteed producer prices, and to increase agricultural services provided by the extension agency and the parastatal Agricultural Finance Corporation. Farmers were more interested in guaranteed markets which minimized risk than in free markets which provided incentives for risk— taking. Poorer farmers were demanding agricultural assets which government agencies found difficult to provide. However, it has been demonstrated that poorer farmers can be effective in fulfilling demands and improving the quality of life when they are organized in groups and acting collectively. When organized, poorer farmers can act together to create grazing schemes and a range of cooperatives as well as secure assistance from organizations. Grazing schemes lead to more effective local government, more equitable access to draft 338 power, better conservation, and more cooperative projects. Cooperatives lead to better nutrition and income—earning capacity. Consequently, farmers in poorer rainfall areas do not have to rely solely on the high risk strategy of growing maize and other crops for subsistence and the market. In better rainfall areas, poorer farmers can use cooperatives to accumulate assets and then engage in cash crop marketing. It was demonstrated that membership in groups and collective action, as well as leadership and literacy training, helped female farmers to overcome a range of obstacles and develop the political capabilities necessary to effectively express political voice, making and fulfilling demands for agricultural assets and services. In particular, women's cooperatives and savings clubs enabled female farmers to control assets, to present common demands, and to gain access to male—dominated organizations. However, female farmers were also confronted with the problem of gaining legal control over assets in a patriarchal society. The problem of gaining access to land was being solved through legislation, legal guarantees and state intervention on women's behalf. Even where women have gained sufficient power to influence the state and legislation, the problem of legal enforcement remains. 339 9.2.2. Research Findings and Policy Recommendations In higher rainfall regions (especially Zones 11a and IIb), the government has continued to respond to the political voice of small farmers by investing resources and developing agricultural institutions. Combined with the agricultural capabilities of small farmers, these policies contributed to the "small farmer revolution" during the 19805. The government has been well—advised to expand the marketing, extension and credit system in order to further develop Zimbabwe's agricultural industry and to enable small farmers to become increasingly prosperous. With a new drive to redistribute commercial farming land in Zones IIa and IIb for resettlement, the government will follow a similar strategy by providing resources and institutions to resettlement farmers with the aim of maximizing productivity and marketing. Since the government's resettlement policy favors master farmers and greater productivity, employment must be found for the massive population of school leavers who will not be able to farm productively. While the political voice of small farmers has resulted in a rapid expansion of a range of services and institutions, the development process has far to go, even in the most prosperous areas. In Hurungwe, for instance, farmers may be able to obtain fertilizer loans, but, even if they act together, they must persevere for months or even years to 340 secure dams, transport, roads, schools and clinics from local authorities. Either the farmers must be able to obtain the necessary machinery and other inputs at the WADCO or VIDCO level to implement their own projects or the District Council must be provided with more machinery and financial and human resources. The same principle applies to the processes of acquiring inputs and of marketing crops. Farmers need to go beyond group lending and form credit unions to process fertilizer loans more efficiently; they need their own transport cooperatives or VIDCO—operated transport to secure inputs and market crops in a timely manner; and they need marketing and supply cooperatives so that they do not have to travel long distances to purchase inputs and other goods. While gardening cooperatives, income—generating projects and, in some cases, grazing schemes have been helping to develop poorer regions, AGRITEX, AFC, the GMB and other institutions are still searching for an agricultural development strategy. Farmers want a drought—resistant maize package (not a small grains package) which will enable them to produce a surplus for market, except in years of severe drought. Given drought and the inconsistency of production in most of the communal lands, it is uncertain that agricultural institutions will be able to supply what farmers want. The GMB and AFC have even contemplated curtailing their operations 341 in poorer regions which are running at a loss. In poorer regions, short—term seasonal loans are not widely dispensed, though members of master farmer clubs appear to have a better chance of securing loans. AFC's group lending program may prove suitable for groups of master farmers in poorer regions, because master farmer groups are better able to absorb the costs of risk. Consequently, the best policy that small farmers in the poorer communal lands can hope for is one of maintenance of production levels and the environment. In decent rainfall years, maintenance entails obtaining inputs for subsistence production and having access to a marketing infrastructure for limited amounts of maize, cotton and sunflower. In drought years, it means securing social welfare through food—for-work programs in which maize stocks from richer areas are transferred to poorer ones. Maintenance also requires increased conservation measures. With growing population and over—crowding in the communal lands, small farmers, AGRITEX and local government are fighting an uphill battle to keep grazing land from disappearing and farming land from being over—utilized. The primary conservation measure which AGRITEX has been promoting are grazing schemes which have been successful in those locations where local government and farmers cooperate and take a leading role in establishing them. Incomeegenerating and nutrition—improving projects have 342 worked well in lower rainfall areas and for poorer farmers. The secret of success for these projects has been the collective action and group cohesion of the farmers, as well as guidance by AGRITEX, community development workers, and VSOs. However, water remains the primary concern in these areas, as the dropping water table has led to the exhaustion of wells and dams and has forced communities to dig deeper boreholes or to drill for water in alternative locations. Developing political capabilities hold the key to the continued advancement of Zimbabwe's small farmers. The development of cooperatives, VIDCOs, and links with a variety of organizations have been moving farmers away from atomized village societies toward a more integrated rural society where they can more effectively express political voice. In the process of moving away from insular village society in Africa's rural areas, the role of the people in developing organizations and institutions and in promoting economic growth cannot be over—emphasized. The development of local government and of grass—roots democracy has enabled farmers to manage their own affairs and build linkages with organizational channels. The growth of local democracy has begun to contribute, in places, to improved land management and less wasteful utilization of common property through conservation projects and grazing schemes. 343 A greater VSO presence is needed in the communal lands so that farmers have access to multiple channels and so that they might receive the necessary training for the more effective expression of political voice. VSOs can provide the projects and the training in cooperative management which are especially beneficial for poorer farmers and those in poorer areas. Local VSOs such as the Catholic Development Commission, Silveira House and Christian Care need greater funding to engage in projects. The new Zimbabwe Farmers' Union (ZFU) — unifying NFAZ with the Zimbabwe National Farmers Union (ZNFU) - must continue the work of NFAZ by broadening and deepening the membership base and by participating in development projects. While facing budgetary constraints, AGRITEX should continue to develop as a multi—purpose development organization and should continue to expand the presence of extension workers in the communal lands. Extension workers should continue to be given the mandate to engage in community development and to cooperate with Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development workers and with VSO operatives. Local economic growth is another element in the building of rural society and creating the conditions for more effective political voice in the communal lands. The diversification and decentralization of economic activities and institutions will provide the basis for further grass- 344 roots development. Already, the Zimbabwe government has invested resources heavily in the communal lands. Greater amounts of capital and economic resources must be put into circulation in the rural areas. The two-way flow of resources between the cities and the rural areas needs to be diversified into a flow within the rural areas. The growth of local marketing and supply outlets (e.g., agricultural marketing and supply cooperatives) and the decentralization of grain marketing should be part of this process of diversification of economic flows. Maize milling and oil extraction from sunflower can also be performed in rural areas. The sale of grain at GMB depots and local outlets would lower grain prices for poorer people, encourage milling in rural areas, and promote grain sales by cooperatives. As mentioned previously, the growth of credit unions and other local financial institutions would enable farmers to have greater access to financial resources. Credit unions and group—lending schemes will make the task of dispensing loans much easier for the AFC. Economic diversification and decentralization must also entail the devolution of budgetary control. The District Councils must be able to draw up and implement their own budgets with funds from district contributions, provincial tax collection and central government funds. VIDCOs and WADCOS must also be able to provide the funding and materials for 345 such services as dam and borehole construction. District Councils need greater funding, more equipment and a larger and better—trained staff if they are to perform their intended tasks. Much depends on the willingness of provincial governors and MP3 to press for greater allocations to DCs.3 In conclusion, policy recommendations, as well as lessons from Zimbabwe for the rest of Africa, can be divided according to rainfall zones. In the higher rainfall areas, the expression of political voice, the inflow of government resources and the development of institutions for farmers clearly serve as a model for other African countries. Farmers have been able to bring about a "small farmer revolution", create the basis for the development of rural society, and win acceptance into the governing coalition. Just as important have been the ways in which Zimbabwe promotes development in lower rainfall areas. In those areas, small farmers have been capable of expressing political voice, and some have been able to advance through collective action and projects. If pursued energetically and equitably, the poor rainfall model could eventually provide guidance in the development of Africa's poorer regions. 3From 1984 to 1990, Masvingo Province was fortunate to have an energetic governor who expressed pride at the amount of dams built, roads tarred, and projects intitiated. However, it is possible that the governor's replacement may not be as dynamic. The governor of Mashonaland Province was not as visible or energetic. 346 9.3. Political Voice in Rural Africa: Comparative Observations In this concluding section, a comparative question is raised: is it possible to replicate the conditions which produced small farmer political voice in Zimbabwe? By analyzing this question, cross—national comparisons can be made, and larger issues concerning political development can be considered. The dissertation has demonstrated that the political capabilities of small farmers and state—farmer relations must be treated as variables. If small farmers can increase their capabilities and political voice, there is a probability that state-farmer relations will improve and that small farmers might even become part of ruling coalitions. Consequently, the first condition for replicating the Zimbabwe experience is for farmers to increase their political capabilities by organizing unions and local groups and by participating in the formation of political parties. In this process, the development of VSOs, democratic local government and a multi—purpose extension agency would be helpful. The second condition for replication is the improvement of state—farmer relations. Until 1989 and the subsequent wave of democratization in Africa, small farmers were discouraged by most African states from taking measures to increase their capabilities and their political voice. Since 1989, constraints on political activity and farmer organization have diminished in many African countries as democratization has 347 occurred.4 With continued democratization and the development of political capabilities, the possiblity could increase that small farmers will join ruling coalitions in many African countries and overcome the effects of demobilization. Consequently, small farmers would be able to express political voice in the sense of making demands for agricultural assets and services and could use democratic states to re-direct resources toward the rural areas as well as to create and develop institutions for small~scale agriculture. At an initial glance, it would seem possible for small farmers in other African countries to replicate the Zimbabwe experience. However, three countervening constraints inhibit such a possibility — the limits to democratization, economic liberalization and agro—ecological conditions. In regard to democratization, small farmers in most African countries have not been involved in the democratization movement, and liberalization measures have yet to lead to create a new era in state—farmer relations (Bratton and van de Walle, 1992, 439). The prospects for small farmer participation in ruling coalitions remain dim as long as governing elites restrict 4Africa Demos, Volume II, Number 2, February 1992, p.1. 348 coalition—building and as long as small farmers remain poorly— organized.5 Economic liberalization has accompanied or preceded the wave of democratization that swept Africa after the latter months of 1989. Economic liberalization constrains the development of rural political voice, because it brings reduced government spending and privatization, thereby preventing the development of the types of state—run extension agencies, lending agencies and marketing boards which helped to bring about the "smallholder revolution" in Zimbabwe. Consequently, small farmers would have to rely on weaker and less stable private markets and firms in order to achieve a similar revolution. While economic liberalization will eventually impose constraints on small farmers, in the short run, it is a positive phenomenon. The imposition of liberalization measure has compelled African states to permit the emergence of private markets which free small farmers from state control, bring higher producer prices and provide farmers with non—governmental relationships. 5In Zambia and Benin, where ruling parties and presidents were voted out of power, the new ruling coalitions were dominated by urban groupings. In Zambia, conditions exist for the development of farmer organizations, such as the Zambia Cooperative Federation, and for the growth of farmer influence. However, Zambia is one of the few African countries where small farmers are in a minority. Consequently, small farmers may have to ally themselves with governing elites who are engaged in commercial farming activities. 349 The third constraint is agro-ecological; dramatic increases in small farmer production may require special agro— ecological conditions, such as relatively high rainfall and good soils. Hyden (1983, 196) has asserted that conditions for the intensification of small farmer agriculture in Africa were exclusive to the Kenya Highlands and that intensification would lead inevitably to a debilitating "agricultural 6 However, Zimbabwe's small farmer revolution involution." occurred on a semi-intensive basis, and research by the World Bank has demonstrated that the intensification of agriculture is occurring in various parts of Africa.7 Consequently, agro- ecological conditions are not as significant a constraint as limits to democratization and economic liberalization. From the preceding analysis, it appears possible that the convergence of small farmer political and agricultural capabilities, combined with the development of a reciprocal relationship between farmers and the state, will lead to small farmer political voice and a revolution in small—scale agriculture in other African countries. Standing in the way 6Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963. The intensification of agriculture did not lead to involution but helped to fuel Indonesia's industrialization process. See Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital. Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1986. 7Presentation by Dr. Shem Migot—Adholla of the World Bank at an African Studies Center seminar, Michigan State University, May 16, 1991. 350 is the slow process of empowering small farmers, the slow development of agricultural institutions, and agro—ecological conditions. This issue requires further research using comparative case studies and cross—national analysis. Larger issues must be raised when considering the issue of small farmer political voice. While intensive agriculture and small farmer revolutions may develop in various parts of Africa, an overriding issue concerns the sustainability of agriculture throughout much of the continent where rain-fed agriculture and fertilizer use are threatened by persistent drought and by desertification. Clearly, small farmer political voice will not produce the expansion of agriculture in a country like Mali, but can only hope to sustain farmers in the face of desertification. Given the precarious nature of agriculture in many parts of Africa, how important is the replication of the Zimbabwe model? Why should Africa's farmers be able to express political voice? Several hundred million small farmers in Africa constitute the majority of the continent's population, and the majority should become involved in the governing process. Furthermore, in the ongoing process which may eventually transform Africa into a continent of industrial democracies, small farmers should become participants and should be able to resist the type of victimization which occurred to farmers who were ruthlessly exploited in Britain, 351 Russia, and so many other countries. The case of Zimbabwe demonstrates that small farmer political voice and the intensification of small—scale agriculture can contribute to the process of national economic growth. Most African small farmers are rational and want greater prosperity for themselves and their children. The development of small-scale agriculture can also provide the social welfare buffer necessary to slow the process of rural—to—urban migration. For the short term, the international economy has marginalized Africa. Until African countries succeed in becoming significant economic actors, the small~scale farming sector can provide the anchor which can prevent those countries from disintegrating. The development of political voice in rural Zimbabwe leads to concluding thoughts about political development. The ability of Zimbabwe's small farmers to express political voice and to revolutionize agricultural performance brought them acceptance by the governing elite and the establishment of a productive relationship which exemplifies democratic governance. Therefore, political voice is not only a protest against declining organizational performance, as conceived by Hirschman. Political voice can also awaken both citizens and organizations, small farmers and states to new and mutually beneficial possibilities. The development of a diverse range of organizational channels, especially in the voluntary and smwmmmrwiaq— a mush here :sfifisétiré flimxéiszomwuam economic. development than reliance on; the - private .- sector; alone. 353 Appendix: Farmer Needs for Improving the Qualitv of Life In concluding the questionnaire, small farmers were asked about the assets and services which they needed which might improve the quality of their lives. Listed below (in no particular order) are the diversity of needs which were mentioned at the eight sites at which the survey was conducted: Table 72 General Assets and Services Wanted by Farmers 1. Health clinics 26. More transport and buses 2 Bridges and dip tanks 27. Literacy training 3 Dams and boreholes 28. Better schools/teachers 4. Grazing schemes 29. Nutrition programs 5. Cotton Marketing Board depots 30. Filling station 6. Irrigation schemes 31. Loans for fertilizer/seed 7 More cooperatives 32. Scotchcarts 8 Better feeder roads 33. Forexchange for projects 9 More AGRITEX workers/advice 34. Tarred roads 10. Help for widows 35. Sanitation 11. Conservation and more trees 36. Better seeds 12. Resettlement land 37. Better AFC loan rates 13. Better representatives 38. Easier repayment policy 14. Draft power 39. Industries and jobs 15. Creches 40. Electricity 16. Sewing machines 41. Drinking water 17. Higher producer prices 42. Population control 18. GMB depots/collection points 43. Wire for fencing gardens 19. Empty bags 44. More health workers 20. Improved soils/testing 45. Walls for wells 21. Shops for inputs and goods 46. Prompt delivery of inputs 22. Community center 47. Periodic markets 23. More visits by officials 48. Leadership/coop training 24. Farm equipment 49. Building materials 25. Grinding mill/maize shellers 50. Employment Biblio ra h Books and Articles: Abbott, John C. 1987. Agricultural Marketing Enterprises for the Developing World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 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Harare, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. |lp 370 Documents: German Development Institute. 1988. Development Management from Below: The Potential Contribution of Cooperatives and Village Development Committees to Self—Management and Decentralized Development in Zimbabwe. Berlin. Government of Zimbabwe. 1982. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Agricultural Industry. Harare: Government Printer. Government of Zimbabwe. 1986. Agricultural Census. Harare: Central Statistics Office. Government of Zimbabwe. 1985a. Delineation of Village and Ward Development Committees in District Council Areas of Zimbabwe. Harare: Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning. Government of Zimbabwe. 1985b. Intensive Resettlement Programme: Policies and Procedures. Harare: Department of Rural Development. Government of Zimbabwe. 1985c. Main Demographic Features of the Population of Zimbabwe. Harare: Central Statistics Office. Government of Zimbabwe. 1989. The National Land Policy. Harare: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe. 1989. The Report on the Postal Survey on Agricultural Inputs and Marketing Costs in the Communal Areas of Zimbabwe. Harare. National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe. 1989. President's Report to the Eighth Annual Congress. by R.L. Gapare, Harare: October 18—19,1989. Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies. 1987. An Evaluation of Agricultural Extension Services Support to Women Farmers in Zimbabwe with Special Reference to Makonde District. Harare. 371 Interviews: The following list contains the names of organizations and, where relevant, the positions of officials interviewed and the month(s) in which significant interviews took place. Not listed are departments and individuals at the University of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies. Voluntary Sector Organizations: National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ) President Robinson Gapare, June 1989, January, June 1990 S. Hungwe, Vice President, May, October 1989, June 1990 Provincial Organizer, Masvingo, May 1989 District Chairman, Hurungwe, July 1989, May 1990 District Chairman, Zaka, June 1989, June 1990 Area Chairmen in Hurungwe and Zaka were interviewed during the survey from July through October 1989 and again from April through June 1990. Silveira House, May, June 1989, March 1990 International Voluntary Service (IVS), June, December 1989, January, March 1990 "Strengthening Women's Role and Work in Rural Development," FAO/MCCD project, June 1989, March 1990 Catholic Development Commission (CADEC), January 1990 Christian Care, February 1990 Organization of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe (OCCZIM), January 1990 Catholic Relief Services (CRS), January, March 1990. Enda (Environmental Action and Development), April 1989, March 1990 COOPIBO, April 1989, March 1990 Lutheran World Federation, May 1989 Members of Parliament Nathan Shamuyarira, June 1989 Simbi Mubako, February 1990 Chen Chimutengwende, May 1989 Ministrv of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development LMLQBEDL= Masvingo Provincial Governor, D.C. Mavhaire, May, October 1989 District Administrator, Hurungwe District, July 1989 372 District Administrator, Zaka District, September 1989 Ward Councillors and other local government officials in Hurungwe and Zaka were interviewed during the survey from July through October 1989 and again from April through June 1990. Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MLARR): Permanent Secretary, Boniface Ndimande, March 1990 Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, June 1989, March 1990 Department of Research and Specialist Services, May 1989 Agricultural Technical and Extension Service (AGRITEX): S. Pazvakavambwa, Director, June 1989, March 1990 G. Tsododo, Field Director, May 1989, March 1990 Provincial Officer, Masvingo, May 1989 Provincial Officer, Mashonaland West, July 1989 Regional Officer, Hurungwe, July 1989, May 1990 Regional Agritex Officer, Zaka, May, September 1989, June 1990 AGRITEX Extension Workers in Hurungwe and Zaka were interviewed during the survey from July through October 1989 and again from April through June 1990. Agricultural Finance Corporation Mashonaland Provincial Office, Chinoyi, May 1990 Hurungwe District Office, Karoi, July 1989, May 1990 Zaka District Office, June 1990 Grain Marketing Board: Magunje Depot, Hurungwe, July 1989 Mudzimu Depot, Hurungwe, July 1989 Jerera Depot, Zaka, September 1989 MCCD = Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development Hurungwe District Office, Karoi, July 1989, May 1990 Zaka District Office, June 1990 “...... S E I R AH R B T. L H 111'. 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