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TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE MSU Is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution c:\clrc\dataduer pmstpj .— THE MADERO REVOLUTION: OVERCOMING OBSTACLES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER By Kevin William Boggs A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of History 1992 ABSTRACT THE MADERO REVOLUTION: OVERCOMING OBSTACLES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER By Kevin William Boggs This thesis examines Francisco I. Madero's rise to power in Mexico. Drawing mainly from secondary sources as well as published primary material such as Hanrahan's Documents on the Mexican Revolution and Records 9: the Department g£ investigate the combination of factors and circumstances which enabled him to triumph over Porfirio Diaz. Moreover, I intend to prove that the Madero uprising-—although its leaders plotted, planned and manuvered for several months on American soil--did not owe its success to a hostile American government. In conjunction with the how and why of Madero's success, then, I will probe our government's reaction to the Maderistas--particularly when their leader resided in exile in the United States from October 6, 1910 to February 14, 1911. To my parents, John and Rita ii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION....................................... 1 MADERO TURNS DON PORFIRIO'S LOSS INTO HIS GAIN..... 13 IMAGE IS EVERYTHING............ ...... .............. 30 THE PRECURSOR MOVEMENT: DIAZ'S WAY OF DEALING WITH DISSENT... ....... ....... 44 THE BIG MISUNDERSTANDING.... ..... . ..... . ....... .... 55 OLD METHODS PUT TO A NEW TEST.......... ..... . ..... . 73 THE FINAL ACT ............. . ....... . ....... .... ..... 115 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......... . .......... . .................. 130 APPENDIX ............. .. .. .......... . ............ ..134 iii INTRODUCTION On May 25, 1911, Porfirio Diaz was forced to resign the presidency of the republic of Mexico, a post he had held almost continuously since 1877.1 The following October, the person who had engineered Diaz's resignation was elected president of Mexico by an overwhelming margin.2 His name was Francisco I. Madero, a man who several months earlier was scoffed at and seemed at best an inconsequential threat to Diaz's grip on power.3 Madero and his supporters--known collectively as the Maderistas—-succeeded against a regime that appeared unassailable as 1910 drew to a close.4 They pulled off one of the biggest political upsets of the century in spite of the fact that the legalistic William Howard Taft administration was working devoutly against them. Madero spent the final three months of 1910 and the first six weeks of 1911 as an exile in various American communi- ties (primarily San Antonio, Texas) where, under significant duress, he directed and coordinated a much maligned move- ment to oust Diaz and restore liberal democratic principles to dictatorial Mexico. While the Maderistas were covertly marshaling men and material and relaying information across the international border to be used by their soldiers against the Mexican army, they were also trying to sustain ‘1 2 that effort by staying on the right side of the American law.5 Both the Mexican and American governments attempted to catch the Maderistas in violation of international as well as U.S. neutrality laws so that they could be arrested and sent to federal prison. It had happened before with other Mexican exiles operating in the United States, most notably to the radicals in the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) whose leaders spent the years 1907—1910 under lock and key in American jails. In addition, the American authorities at different levels made a concerted if flawed effort to stem the flow of rebel contraband into Mexico. That the effort proved arduous and failed in many instances does not mean, however, that the United States government was disenchanted with Diaz and sought his political demise via the Maderistas. Rather, the Taft administration preferred the status quo in Mexico; with few exceptions, the American machinery of govern- ment had been geared to uphold the president's version of the neutrality laws which, in-turn, undoubtedly did more to cramp the Maderistas than assist them. Some very eminent historians--Dr. Friedrich Katz among them-~have concluded that the legalistic or strict construc- tionist stance taken by the United States in 1910/1911 was little more than a convenient smoke screen for what amounted to a Pro Madero/Anti Diaz policy.6 According to this thesis, Taft (and the powerful interest groups he represented) had soured on Diaz for economic as well as diplomatic reasons. 3 To wit, in an attempt to regain his waning domestic popularity, Diaz was taking positions late in his administration that collided with American interests in Mexico: He nationalized the railroads, thereby disappointing American entrepreneurs. Diaz then awarded a lucrative petroleum contract to the British rather than to the Americans. Ergo, the supposition is that Diaz's increasing disregard for American business interests could well have angered a government that operated under the premise of Dollar Diplomacy.7 On the foreign policy side, Diaz infuriated the United States when he befriended Nicaragua's Jose Zantos Zelaya. Diaz also refused to renew our government's lease at Magdalena Bay. There were unfounded rumors that he planned to turn around and lease the naval base to our Pacific rivals, the Japanese. Historians who subscribe to the Pro Madero/Anti Diaz thesis use the above mentioned incidents to buttress their argument.8 They interpret Taft's actions towards the Maderistas as a further indication that the United States was punishing Diaz for his recent transgressions. Some scholars have gone so far as to claim that the Maderistas operated free of the interference of government officials. Katz, for example, maintains that the United States set up no important obstacles of shipment of arms to the revolu- tionists; the American government, in short, acted as "generous hosts" to Madero.9 Why, they may ask, did not Madero get the same kind of rough treatment that Ricardo 4 Flores Magon and the PLM got while they were operating in the United States? The implication is that Madero should have been arrested and the entire rebel organization in Texas shut down in ultra-quick fashion; that Taft, moreover, waited too long to seal the border, and when he finally did so it was in an effort to discredit Diaz. This analysis, however, does not adequately account for a number of factors. It does not, for example, consider the vagueness of the neutrality laws which had at least two members of the Taft administration disagreeing, perhaps even arguing, among themselves.10 If anyone in the administration was scheming to have Diaz tossed out, it was the president's secretary of state, Philander Knox. Historians who have reached the conclusion that the Taft administration was something other than Pro Diaz seem to base it, at least to some extent, on the vociferous opinions which were coming out of the State Department.11 But the influential Knox was certainly not an island when it came to shaping policy-- much less implementing it. Knox's interpretation of the muddled neutrality laws held, but only to a certain point. When the secretary of state began to issue statements that were obviously at variance with the facts as they were being played out along the border--i.e. grossly contradicted the reality of the situation--he was reproved by Attorney General George Wickersham.12 In many ways, then, the State Department was wildly out of step with the rest of the Taft administration. The Mexican government was at least as loud as the State Department and it, too, tried to tell the administration what the laws were and how they were to be applied to the Maderistas. As far as the Mexican government was concerned, American law was to be used merely as a pretext to suffocate the Maderistas. From the beginning, Taft had to disappoint them as well. As much as he favored Diaz, Taft was not about to run roughshod over the law to satisfy him. When one considers how Taft chose to interpret the ambig- uous neutrality laws--in effect disappointing either extreme-- it is apparent that he was not trying to employ them as a tool to get what he (or anyone else) wanted. He could have, in other words, stacked the deck in favor of either Diaz or Madero. What Taft did instead was in keeping with his make- up and, while it gave the Maderistas a certain amount of breathing room (which Taft felt they were legally entitled to), it did not give them the absolute freedom that Knox thought they should have had. Furthermore, anyone who thinks that Taft was manipulating the law to neatly coincide with an ulterior motive does not know the twenty-seventh president very well. To suggest that President Taft's high regard for the law and the American legal system was anything but genuine--or that he disregarded it in this particular instance--is to suggest that the man's entire life was based on a fabrication. The truth is that 6 the law meant everything to Taft who in 1921 would go on to fulfill his life's ambition by becoming chief justice of the United States Supreme Court. He believed the law to be sacro- sanct--i.e. that it was not to be compromised in favor of a short-term foreign policy goal. In fact, insofar as Taft (and his secretary of state) were concerned, the first priority of foreign policy was that it should be in accord with the law.13 As president, Taft was noted for his determi- nation to give legal effect to Theodore Roosevelt's reforms. He was fond of reminding Americans of their duty to obey and uphold the laws of the land.15 Whereas the subtleties of the law may not have concerned his predecessor-—for Roosevelt was a man who cared more for what he regarded as the country's welfare than for the strict intent of the law-~such was not the case with Taft. Taft was cut from different timber; he looked to the law as his guiding light.16 It is evident, moreover, that Taft admired Diaz and on balance thought of him as a dependable ally of the United States--especially when it came to all important financial matters.17 To believe, therefore, that he worked to rid Mexico of Diaz and install Madero in his place is not only inconsistent with the facts, it is also incongruous from a purely ideological standpoint. Again, the facts show that the Maderistas got anything but a free ride from the American authorities who nevertheless were charged with respecting their basic constitutional rights. The American 7 officials, in other words, were ready to pounce when and if the Maderistas stepped out of line. As far as comparing U.S. treatment of the Maderistas versus that of the PLM (often referred to as the Magonistas after their leader, Ricardo Flores Magon), all such a comparison really does is indicate, among other things, that Uncle Sam did not favor either organization as a substitute for Diaz. Francisco Madero and his Maderistas only managed to ggt by for four months in the United States for the following reasons: Madero was as under-rated as Diaz was over-rated by the United States whose secretary of state was not cooper- ating with the rest of the administration--an administration, moreover, known for its lack of cohesiveness and therefore almost destined (one would have to think) to disagree on the less than clear-cut neutrality laws. In a similar vein, by the time President Taft had gained a clear understanding of the situation inside Mexico--which came about on March 6, 1911 when he was visited by Henry Lane Wilson--it was probably already too late to rescue the decrepit Diaz regime. Arguably, then, the drastic measures of March 6 should have come about sooner--and probably would have-~had Taft been cognizant of Maderismo's true strength and Diaz's weakness. Prior to his forced departure from the United States, the highly circumspect Madero oversaw a well-focused, thoroughly professional organization that fought the Diaz regime on its own devious terms. It was this surreptitious organization so adroitly shielded by Madero and Abraham Gonzalez, that made the war against Diaz not only possible but ultimately successful as well. Finally, Madero--who had been such a popular figure in Mexico--used the overwhelming good graces of the common people living along the border to maximum advantage. These ordinary people, far removed from official government circles, helped the Maderistas fulfill their various missions undetected.18 Any discussion of why Madero succeeded must begin with why Diaz failed, which is to say-~the former could not have triumphed had not the latter been in a position to fall. Diaz was extremely vulnerable in 1910-1911 because his base of support had shrunk to practically nil.19 1Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Bad Yankee: American Entre ren- eurs and Financiers in Mexico Vol. 1 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Documentary Publications, 1985), p. 135.Diaz was named president in May 1877. From 1881 to 1883 he served as secretary of national development. Thereafter, he continued uninterupted as president until his forced resignation. . 2Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 256. Although "far from an exercise in mass democratic participation," the on-schedule elections were peaceful and the most democratic in Mexican history. Knight states that the degree of genuine popular participation is hard to establish. At any rate, Madero received 98 percent of the votes cast by the electors (the ballot being indirect). 3New York Times, November 12, 1910. "It is well to remember,ll the Times editorial ran, "that the entire Mexican political party of which Francisco Madero is the head is now resident in San Antonio...The aim of these feeble revolu- tionists and their allies (for the time being in Los Angeles) is to stir up feeling against the Mexican government...They can injure the mountains as easily as they can injure Don Porfirio and his ministers." Editorials of this nature were common in the New York Times during November and December. In his memoires, Henry Lane Wilson called Madero, among other things, a disorganized dreamer-~"more of a mountebank than a messiah." See Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico Bel ium and Chile. (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 19715, p. 205. 4Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Euro e, The United States and the Mex1can Revolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 3. Katz quotes Karl Bunz, the German envoy in Mexico, as saying on the eve of the revolution: "I consider general revolution to be out of the question as does public opinion and the press." Bunz reiterated his opinion a month after the outbreak of the revolution. That is, no one thought the Madero revolution would amount to much in the end. Bunz's View, Katz says, "was in fact shared by most other foreign and domestic observers." 5Peter V.N. Henderson, Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands 1910-1913 (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 19795, p. 17. Henderson sti ulates that the Maderista exiles had three basic objectives: 1 The recruitment of troops. 2) The purchase of munitions. 3) The relaying of information. Another important activity was propagandizing against the Diaz regime——i.e. exposing it as dictatorial, repressive and corrupt. 10 For a discussion as to why the United States suddenly wanted Diaz out of the way, See Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, pp. 21-27. To round out his argument, on. p. 46 Katz surmises that the United States--at least initially-- viewed Madero as a suitable successor to Diaz because he would "perpetuate the Diaz system while favoring U. S. capital over European investors." 7Henderson, Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands, p. 34. 8Ibid., pp. 34-35. 9Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, p. 39. Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democrac (New York: Columbia Universit Press, 1955), p. 143. Ross (and other noted historians have come to the determination that the White House did not make common cause with the revolutionists, but the Taft admini- stration's neutral position nonetheless had the effect of strengthening the Madero movement morally and materially. P. Edward Haley argues much the same as Ross: Since the diplomatic and commercial policies of the Taft administra- tion were shaped by the State Department, "the formal neutrality of the United States benefitted the Maderistas and undermined Diaz." See P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Di lomac of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917 iCambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1970), pp. 24-25. Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 186. My own thesis comes much closer to Knight's who summed up his position this way: "For Diaz, as for subsequent Mexican regimes, accusations of American connivance with the rebels served as useful alibi; but it cannot be maintained either that the U. S. government worked for the fall of Diaz, or even that the de facto implementation of American law tipped the balance in favour of the rebels. The rebels fought and won their own battles, and, as the best analysis of the problem reveals, 'the Diaz regime fell because of its own corruption and its inability to defend itself or enforce its laws, not as a result of American su ort for the re ime's o onents. PP g PP 'H 10W. Dirk Raat, Revoltosos: Mexico's Rebels in the United States 1903- 192 33(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1981), pp. 232- 23 11Ibid., pp. 228-229. 11 121bid., pp. 232-233. 13Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Di lomac of An lo-Amerlcan Confllct (CamBrldge: Cambrldge University Press, 1968), p. 35. 14Paolo E. Coletta, William Howard Taft: A Bibliography (Westport: Meckler, 1989), p. xviii. 15New York Times, January 3, 1911. The headline in this edition read: ”Taft's 1911 Greeting, 'Obey the Laws.'" In the article, Taft reminded all Americans of their duty to be law-abiding citizens. "He has expressed his concern about the matter in public speeches since he has been president, as he did frequently during the campaign for election." The article concluded: "The same steady and quiet, but persistent, effort to enforce the law all around will mark the Taft administration in 1911." 16References to Taft's love of the law abound. For a mere handful of examples, see Ralph Eldin Minger, William Howard Taft and United States Forei n Polic : The A ren- ticeshi Years 1900-1908 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 19755; Judith Icke Anderson, William Howard Taft: An Intimate History (New York: Norton, 1981); Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft 2 vols. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939), p. 129. Pringle states uncatagorically: "Taft worshiped the law; no understanding of him is possible without appreciation of that fact." 17Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 184—185. 8As with the other points made in this paragraph, I will of course address the issue of Madero's popularity in some depth later in the thesis. For now, evidence of Madero's high esteem among border residents may be found be referring to Gene Z. Hanrahan, Documents on the Mexican Revolution (Salisbury, North Carolina: Documentary Publications, 1976), vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 351-357. In a letter to the attorney general on May 5, 1911, United States Marshall C.G. Brewster noted the following: "I deem it necessary to state that both the military patrols and the cordon of civil officers from the mouth of the Rio Grande to the California lines are badly handicapped in successfully performing the arduous duties assigned them in preventing the crossing of munitions of war 12 and other violations of neutrality laws, because in southwest Texas and all frontier states of Mexico, fully eighty to ninety percent of the citizens are in full sympathy with the revolutionists and at all times keep the contrabandistos, carateros and others that transport arms and ammunition for the insurrectos and merchants at the many fords, towns, and ranches on the Rio Grande, well informed of the marches, scouts and movements of the civil and military forces up and down the river..." 19Diaz's problems are recounted in any number of scholarly works. For a discussion of his rapidly declining popularity, see Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 78- 170; Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 19525, pp. 26 28. ONE MADERO TURNS DON PORFIRIO'S LOSS INTO HIS GAIN Maderismo was not a spur of the moment uprising that miraculously succeeded against overwhelming odds. Contrary to what informed opinion was wont to believe in the fall and winter of 1910, Diaz's position as lord and master of 1 Maderismo was certainly Mexico was anything but secure. not the "joke" the New York Times accused it of being. Neither was the Diaz regime--the Porfiriato--the citadel of Mexican society. Madero versus Diaz only seemed (particularly to outside observers) like a rematch between David and Goliath. In point of fact, Madero—-even though he did not begin his movement with scads of active supporters nor an overabundance of money--was nonetheless a worthy opponent for the likes of Diaz.3 As for Diaz, the once mighty Porfiriato was more like a house of cards than a stout fortress on a hill. Unbeknown to a world still infatu- ated with Diaz's past successes, the Porfiriato was just begging for someone with the right credentials to come along and topple it. Madero, of course, was that someone.4 Madero was born in 1873, the scion of wealthy northern elites. A vegetarian and Spiritualist who at an early age became convinced of the efficacy of Anglo-Saxon democracy and Gallic egalitarianism, he dedicated the latter part of 13 14 his life to rescuing Mexico from despotism a la Porfirio Diaz. He believed, in other words, that Mexico would never join the ranks of first class nations until it became vastly more democratic.5 Even though he did not cause the revolution, Madero nevertheless made himself readily available to the droves of dissatisfied Mexicans in need of a leader. Madero, then, served as a rallying point for literally hundreds of groups with different agendas.6 Not all of these groups were as democratically inclined as Madero. In any event, all of them believed that Diaz should be replaced.7 In sum, Diaz was a highly unpopular figure by 1910. Henry Lane Wilson was Taft's ambassador to Mexico and one of Diaz's many foreign admirers. 8 Wilson, however, was well aware of Diaz's unpopularity. It disturbed him that the "deep- " he witnessed toward the seated antipathy and antagonism government permeated every sector of Mexican society. Although Wilson did not consider Maderismo as such, the American ambassador feared that a "formidable movement"--one under the aegis of a "popular and highly esteemed leader"--could spell serious trouble for the Diaz regime. 9 Several months later in March of 1911 (after Maderismo had proved him wrong by maturing into the formidable movement he dreaded), Wilson paid a visit to the White House. He told a stunned President Taft that his 80-year—old counterpart in Mexico City enjoyed the support of roughly ten percent of his people.10 Naturally, Diaz did not start out his long tenure as the res... 15 man nine out of ten Mexicans wanted out of office. In fact, Diaz was widely recognized as the person responsible for bringing political peace and a measure of economic prosperity to his troubled country. By bringing order out of chronic chaos,11 Diaz made Mexico attractive to foreign investors. The p31 orfiriana, in short, was based on the cientifico plan which enticed billions of dollars of foreign capital into Mexico.12 Most, though certainly not all of it, came from U.S. coffers.13 Diaz, who realized that Mexico did not have the wherewithal to finance its own industrial revolution, accommodated American and European investors to a spectacular degree. The promise of a cheap, docile labor force and generous tax concessions as well as other pro-business considerations made Mexico a veritable foreign investor's paradise.14 Porfirian Mexico adopted the reputation among foreign businessmen and government officials as one of the most well-behaved backward nations in the world.15 In short, within a generation Diaz saw to it that the Mexican economy was transformed as foreign money made pos- sible the building of an impressive railroad network, a host of internal improvements (public utilities, paved roads etc.), improved government finances and the expansion of commerce, industry and mining.16 In typical Latin American fashion, the Porfirian economic miracle relied on foreign- owned companies extracting raw materials for the benefit 16 of secondary industries in the United States and Europe.17 That is, while many Mexicans were employed at low wages, virtually all of the profits left the country. At any rate, it all seemed like a vast improvement as "a world enamored with order, progress and prosperity was quick to praise Diaz for his work."18 Diaz also encouraged the commercialization of agriculture which led to the concentration of land into fewer and fewer hands. Huge haciendas became the norm as traditional Indian ejidos--community farms--were squeezed out. It has been estimated that no more than three percent of the total rural population in this predominantly agricultural country owned any land whatsoever at the end of the Diaz period. By 1910, less than one percent of the families owned 85 percent of the land.19 Forced to work, then, on the haciendas as virtual wage slaves, these former small farmers not only lost land but most of the personal dignity that went with an independent lifestyle.20 As far as the millions of displaced and disenfranchised agraristas were concerned, Porfirian economic policy was to blame for their blighted condition. It is perhaps easy to see why the landless masses--the recently dispossesed peasants--were thoroughly disenchanted with Diaz.21 Diaz never tried to curry the favor of Mexico's large Indian population. If anything, he held them in utter contempt--a hinderance to European-style progress. Diaz 17 was prepared to exploit and if necessary even eliminate the Indians in the name of material progress.22 For these reasons, historians from Frank Tannenbaum to Alan Knight have held that the Mexican Revolution was primarily popular (Indian) and agrarian. Yet Diaz's fall from popularity did not stop with the agrarista . Porfirian economic advances were made at the expense of constituted government and were accompanied by 23 In the process of building monopoly and special privlege. a more modern economy, Diaz's political style--or his way of getting things done--eventually managed to alienate whole segments of the Mexican population. It is not an over— simplification to state that Diaz was the alpha and the omega 1.24 Diaz used stealthful of Mexican politics at every leve cajolery and political manuvering to attain his ends; he used repressive measures, moreover, "only when all else failed." One way or another, then, Diaz always got what he wanted. If pan (bread or favoritism) did not work, then Diaz resorted to pale (the stick or force.) Such things as separation of powers and checks and balances-—not to mention a free press and honest elections-—were farcical.25 Henry Lane Wilson described the totality of Diaz's authority very well in this dispatch to the secretary of state. Theoretically, Mexico is a federal Republic similar in form to ours...Like ours, the Central Government is divided into three branches...but this is a nominal division only, as, practically, the legislative and judicial branches are subordinate to and in a very large measure the creatures of, the executive. The members of both branches of the Legislature must be in political 18 accord with the executive and it is not the least wise controverted that in order to be elected either a deputy or a senator, executive approval is an absolute essential; the law making power is thus virtually in the hands of the Executive. The control of the Executive over the judiciary is even more absolute and more clearly defined than that exercised over the legislative branch. Though a form of election is gone through, the President actually names the fifteen judges of the Supreme Court and all the judges of the minor Federal Courts. Having thus control of the initiation and enactment of the laws of the Repub- lic, through representatives of his own choosing, and of the interpretation of the laws and of the administra- tion of justice, through an attached and subservient judiciary, it is not difficult to see that the President of the Republic is really an autocrat ruling and governing through republican forms and maintaining his role by the use of these instrumentalities which inherently belong to the Executive, namely: the army and the police. The same system which maintains the Central Government is extended to the State Government, whose chief executives are appointed by the President, but whose powers and ambitions are guarded and circumscribed by a retinue of personal agents of the chief executive, called "Jefes Politicos," whose influence and power is sometimes greater than that of the Governor. In other respects the State Governments are exact copies of the Central Govern— ment, the Governors exercising the same powers over the State legislatures and courts which is exercised by the President over the Federal legislature and Federal courts.26 Local elites--people like the Maderos who either made or enhanced fortunes in Porfirian Mexico—-did not appreciate their status as political outs. They, in common with the middle classes, resented not being able to participate, much less control, politics at the state or even the local level. Diaz, more often than not, brought in outsiders to be his governors and jefes politicos. The message was all too clear: Accept the government that is given you; it is the price you must pay for order and prosperity.27 And the middle classes—-which the Porfirian economic miracle 19 had ushered into existence in the first place-~were also dismayed that the best government jobs in the bureaucracy were off limits to them. No matter how qualified they might be to fill these jobs, they had been reserved for Diaz's hand-picked favorites. Since Diaz did not trust new faces, the fossilized system was often closed to men of real talent.28 Even so, Diaz might have gotten away with his policy of mucha administracion y poca politica (much administration and little politics) had he been able to sustain the economic miracle. But after 1900, the economy went downhill. The global depression of 1907 hit Mexico extremely hard as the foreign-owned companies either reduced wages or layed off workers en masse.29 When industrial workers struck-— most spectacularly at Cananea (1906) and Rio Blanco (1907)—- Diaz had to choose between Mexican labor and foreign owners. He chose the latter. When the government seemed to subordi- nate itself to the foreign capitalists, "the state lost its legitimacy among the industrial workers, the general public, and its own cadres and therefore the ability to rule."30 At best, the labor unrest at Cananea and Rio Blanco was symptomatic of the increasing discontent with Diaz.31 Thanks to crop failures and the commercialization of agri- culture with its emphasis on cash crops like sugar and cotton, Mexico resorted to importing food. This contributed to the rise in the price of staples and other essentials just as real wages were falling. Real income for the masses 20 fell drastically during the course of the Porfiriato.32 Not only was the economy sick, the kind of corruption that Henry Lane Wilson bemoaned in his communiques to Washington was becoming worse than ever.33 For whatever reason or reasons-- poverty, utter neglect, an exclusion from politics, resent- ment against local officials or simple bad government-- the system was not working for the vast majority of don Porfirio's citizens. Concepts such as justice, security and opportunity were the prerogative of the few.34 At this juncture, Mexicans of all stripes were undoubtedly questioning Diaz's ability to lead the country much farther into the twentieth century. Diaz, however, did not help him— self when he tried to use the Creelman interview to his own political advantage. In this 1908 interview published in an American magazine, Diaz encouraged the formation of opposition political parties saying, furthermore, that he planned to step down when his current six-year term ended in 1910. Diaz, still believing himself above reproach, reneged 35 Nevertheless, Madero took Diaz up on his offer on the promise. by forming the Anti-Reelectionist party which was based on the democratic principles enunciated in his book, Thg Presidencial Succession in 1910--i.e. freedom of suffrage and no reelection.36 Madero ran a spirited campaign and, despite official repression,37 the popular response he garnered was impressive. Prior to the June election, Diaz had Madero jailed on essentially trumped up charges. The 21 election was rigged and Diaz--who had refused all of Madero's previous offers of compromise and accommodation--was declared the overwhelming winner. To no avail, Madero's supporters appealed the election results to Congress. Madero, out of legal options, had no choice but to try his hand at something he long wanted to avoid--a violent insurrection to unseat Diaz. While out on bail, Madero escaped San Luis Potosi and on October 6, 1910, he slipped into Texas.38 That nearly everyone he left behind—~from the agrarian masses to the middle classes and a portion of Mexico's elite-—were against Diaz goes a long way toward explaining the dictator's political demise less than eight months later. Coupled with the fact that the Mexican army was weak, even by Latin American standards,39 Diaz's unpopularity facilitated a successful rebellion. Even though Maderismo was modest in terms of sheer numbers and financial backing, it had advantages which helped it to survive in the less than hospitable environment of the United States. Moreover, the Madero revolt proved how dotering the Diaz regime had become circa 1910—1911. The confidence that the Taft administration (and many others like the New York Times) had in it was decidedly misplaced. The mere fact that Diaz was unpopular did not necessarily entail his political undoing——it only paved the way for another's success. Madero was no mere newcomer whose timing 22 happened to be good. His timing Egg good, but that should not obscure the fact that Madero was a highly competent candidate in his own right--someone who had the fortitude to place himself squarely in the political arena with a program that attracted Mexicans of virtually every social and economic background. Unlike the PLM, for instance, that was too radical to attract the kind of broad support needed for a successful revolution, Madero seemed to have something for nearly everyone.40 Middle and upper class Mexicans who were fed up with the workings of mucha administracion y poca politica and the evils it had brought were particularly attracted to Madero's message of good government and an open, decentral— ized political system. Madero could give them their rightful "place in the political sun." Whether their penchant for open, responsible government was an end in itself or a means to achieve economic interest is debatable."1 What is clear is that Madero was widely recognized as the person who could fix the outdated system that had fallen under its own weight. He would replace the aforementioned Porfirian motto with: . . . . . 4 mucha polltlca y buena administrac1on. 2 Although the middle classes constituted the "backbone" of Maderismo, it also attracted so called working-class Mexicans--particularly literate, skilled artisans. Free elections, individual rights and public education appealed to this group as well as to the more affluent--i.e. higher 23 status—-middle classes. Working class Maderistas, however, must have perceived a connection between political reform and economic betterment as Maderista recruitment was most noticeable in factories with a history of labor problems."3 Although Maderismo was primarily an ideological crusade to reform Mexican society via the ballot box, it had another dimension which boded well for Madero as the leader of a truly popular movement. Madero's Plan of San Luis Potosi contained but one paragraph on the all- important agrarian problem. The agrarian problem was nothing less than the "critical question in the country, soon to become the pivotal issue of the revolution." Madero's curt one paragraph pledge, whereby he promised to return despoiled lands to the original owners, was enough to attract those suffering from land hunger. Cursory though it was, "it won for Madero the support of many agrarian 4 . . groups." 4 The agraristas were important to Madero because they provided the rank—and-file of the revolution; the men who shouldered guns and fought the Mexican army in Madero's name came largely from this segment of society. 24 1Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Stru le for Peace and Bread (New York: Knopf, 19625, p. 48. Tannenbaum notes that just as the regime seemed strongest, when it seemed most admirable to foreigners, and when people both inside and outside Mexico were talking as if it were eternal--"it proved shallow and weak, ready to be knocked down by the first strong wind that blew against it."; Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, p. 3; New York Times editorials for October 18, 1910 and November 12, 1910. 2New York Times, November 12, 1910. 3Paul J. Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt: The Counter- Guirrilla Strategies of Porfirio Diaz," Hispanic American Historical Review 56 (November 1976): pp. 553-579. Vanderwood concludes that only a few thousand rebels were actually fighting for Madero at the onset of the revolution in the fall of 1910. Although the Maderistas would raise enough money to fulfill their goals, they did not begin their ambitious movement with a substantial amount of cash. In fact, after the utter failure of the November 20 revolution, Madero confided to a close associate that he had exhausted his financial resources. See Ross, Francisco I. Madero, p. 128. 4Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, pp. 28—29. Cumberland explains why Madero fit the bill almost perfectly as the man to successfully challenge Diaz. Ross, Francisco I. Madero, p. 10. David LaFrance, "Many Causes, Movements, Failures, 1910—1913: The Regional Nature of Maderismo," in Provinces of the Revolution: Essa s on Re ional Mexican Histor 1910— 1929 Edited by Thomas Benjamin and Mark Wasserman. (Albu- querque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990): pp. 35—36. 7Michael C. Meyer, Essays on the Mexican Revolution: Revisionist Views of the Leaders Edited by George Wolfskill and Douglas W. Richmond. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979): p. xiv. In his introductory remarks, Michael Meyer concludes that the revolutionary coalition--i.e. those who wanted Diaz replaced and rallied around Madero for that purpose--was very diverse. There were those who simply sought the overthrow of a despotic regime and nothing more; some 25 wanted a modest reorientation of society. Others (like the PLM) desired a complete restructuring of the social order. 8Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, p. 190. Wilson compared Diaz to San Martin, O Higgins and Bolivar. He also wrote that Diaz "has a remarkable record as a soldier, and as an admini- strator, and the history of the Republic during his admini- stration has been in the direction of better things, of saner methods and of peaceful conditions...and it has been the policy of the Government to encourage and protect the invest— ment of foreign capital." See Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 22. 9Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, pp. 106-108. loIbid., I, pt. 1, p. 225. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 6. During the first 55 years of Mexico's national existence, it experienced three major revolutions and approximately one hundred minor movements. Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914, pp. 16-17. The cientifico doctrine to make Mexico a modern state became the official program of the Porfiriato around 1892. It was basically authoritarian, scientific and optimistic. The cientificos--i.e. Diaz's closest advisers, most notably Jose Yves Limantour as secretary of finance--believed that financial stability could be obtained through a program of economic development financed by foreign capital. This capital could be retained permanently by confidence in the political stability it produced. 13Marvin D. Bernstein, ed. Forei n Investment in Latin America: Cases and Attitudes (New York: Knopf, 19665, p. 18. By 1914, Mexico had received just over $2 billion worth of foreign capital--second only to Argentina in Latin America. More than half of it came from the United States. Americans purportedly had more capital invested in Mexico than the Mexicans. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale Un1versity Press, 1968), p. 309. 14Hanrahan, The Bad Yankee vol. 1, p. 136. "There is ‘—.‘-fl— . . no record," Hanrahan wr1tes, of any American bus1nessman ‘ 26 disliking Porfirio Diaz, and only a few came away from the National Palace disappointed. Not only did Diaz give each his full support, the Mexican president made it clear to all that he would personally intervene to solve their problems. Records of American businessmen in Mexico are replete with instances marked by the personal intercession of the Mexican president, settling disputes and matters hindering their enterprises."; James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution 1900-1913 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 19685, p. 18. Cockcroft states that by 1911 foreign investments accounted for two-thirds of Mexico's total investment outlays outside of agriculture and the handicraft industries; Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 9. 15W. Dirk Raat, "The Diplomacy of Suppression: Los Revoltosos, Mexico, and the United States, 1906-1911," Hispanic American Historical Review 56 (November 1976): p. 531. 16Ross, Francisco I. Madero, p. 21. 17Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, pp. 3-4; Anita Brenner, The Wind That Swe t Mexico: The Histor of the Mexican Revolution of 1910—1942 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 19435, p. 21. Ross, Francisco I. Madero, p. 21. 19Ibid., pp. 29-31; Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, pp. 21-23; Knight, The Mexican Revolutlon, pp. 96—97; Frank Tannenbaum, Peace b Revolution: An Inter retation of Mexico (New York: Columbia University Press, 19335, pp. 190-195. 20Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 168—169. Knight addresses the "psychological" or "moral" aspects in the gestation of the revolution. That is, when peasants were robbed of their land, they lost everything including dignity and independence. In short, they rallied around Madero before it was too late. 21This is not to suggest that all dispossesed Indians were equal when it came to revolutionary fervor. As Tannenbaum maintains, some Indians--the ones already inured to working on haciendas as peons—-were already too subservient to revolt. The free Indians--those who were still living in :4 . 27 the dwindling number of ejidos as the Porfiriato drew to a close--were the ones most likely to rebell. "They rose in rebellion," Tannenbaum writes, 'and saved themselves from the fate of becoming peons upon the large plantations-- peons without a voice, without land, without a community, without hope..." See Tannenbaum, Peace b Revolution, p. 193. 22Ibid., p. 192; Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 6. 23Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 7. 24Ross, Francisco I. Madero,pp. 22-23. 25Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 7. 26Hanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, pp. 20-22. 7For a discussion of this aspect of political centrali- zation, see Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 24-28. 28For a discussion of middle class grievances and their motives for supporting Madero, see Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, The Great Rebellion: Mexico 1905—1924 (New York: Norton, 19805, pp. 44-57; Wilson also discussed the "danger" that the middle class represented to Porfirian Mexico. See Hanrahan Documents, II, pt. 1, p. 25; Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 8. Diaz's system of favoritism, Cumberland writes, led him to "distrust men whom he did not know personally, and encouraged him to depend on men of his own generation." 29Ruiz, The Great Rebellion, pp. 120-122. Ruiz terms the financial crisis of 1907 ”the watershed of the rebellion" as the "welfare of the Mexican economy was determined by decisions made by outsiders." 3OJohn Mason Hart, Revolutionar Mexico: The Comin and Process of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 19875, p. 73. 1Ross, Francisco I. Madero, p. 33. 28 32For a succinct overview of the many shortcomings of the Porfirian economy, see Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, pp. 12-14. 33Hanrahan, Documents;'II, pt. 1, pp. 25—27; In his memoires, Wilson stated: "The most difficult problem the embassy had to deal with while I was in Mexico, and the greatest cause of general complaint in the republic, was the lame, incompetent, and corrupt judiciary." Wilson added that the ordinary Mexican who did not have access to influential associates was held hostage to the judiciary. See Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, pp. 200-201. 34Ross, Francisco I. Madero, p. 28. 35Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 48. Knight agrees with most every other historian when he concludes that Diaz never intended to keep any of the promises he made in the interview. 36Ross, Francisco I. Madero, pp. 60—61; Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, pp. 62—65. 37Besides Madero, at least 5,000 of his supporters were in jail on election day. See Ross, Francisco I. Madero, p. 107; Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, pp. 109—112. 38The points made in the final portion of this para— graph--from Madero's popularity as a candidate to his escape into Texas are all documented by Cumberland, Mexican Revolu— tion, pp. 108-119. 39Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, pp. 27-29. 40LaFrance, "Many Causes, Movements, Failures, 1910-1913," pp. 35—36. The author implies that what Madero had going for him far in excess of anything else was good timing. But as Cumberland correctly maintains, Mexico's many malcontents were not just looking for ppy leader, but one like Madero whose qualifications were impeccable. For different reasons, a Flores Magon or a Bonilla just would not do. See Cumber- land, Mexican Revolution, pp. 28-29. 41Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 63—71. Knight's conclusion is that Maderismo was a profoundly political and ideological movement—~and that is what primarily attracted 29 the middle and upper classes. 421bid., pp. 70-71. 431bid., pp. 62-63. 44Ross, Francisco I. Madero, p. 116. 45Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 169-170. TWO IMAGE IS EVERYTHING Madero's domestic appeal was lost on the powers-that-be in America. The fact that they dismissed him as negligible would work to Madero's advantage, however. One does not send 20,000 troops to the border in the fall of 1910 when everyone worth listening to is saying that Madero is a fly who will either buzz away or die once winter sets in. By the time Henry Lane Wilson realized that Madero represented a grave threat to Diaz and alerted his superiors to this fact, it was a bit like closing the barn door after the horses have already escaped. It is interesting to say the least that Wilson could be so right about Diaz and yet so wrong when it came to gauging the strength of Maderismo. Wilson placed his finger on the source of the revolution when he determined that it sprang "from the natural discon- tent with the system and administration of the Diaz regime." And it is hard to disagree with Wilson's conclusion that Maderismo "gained its strength from the weakness of the government." Wilson, however, paid Madero the ultimate in left-handed compliments when he wrote in his memoires that the revolutionary leader "appeared at a psychological moment and reaped a harvest which might have gone to stronger and 30 31 abler men had any such been then prominent in the public eye."1 That the government was weak and unpopular is undeniable. Yet Wilson was wrong in concluding that Maderismo succeeded pply because of that weakness. Madero, the future inept president of Mexico, was not inept when it came to fashioning Diaz's downfall. Not just anyone could have done what Madero managed to do; it was not a foregone conclusion that in the spring of 1911, Diaz would have to sail to Europe in favor of a new leader. Wilson was of course guilty of not giving credit where it was certainly due. Wilson believed that the revolutionary forces-—whom he referred to as the "chieftans on both sides of the border" (Madero, Abraham Gonzalez, Pascual Orozco et al.)--should have been smashed right away. "But the (Mexican) government," Wilson lamented, "remained inert and were either delayed or lacking in energy." It seemingly never occured to Wilson that Maderismo was resilient--that it enjoyed some (positive) advantages apart from the government's weakness. Moreover, Wilson himself thought that the revolution had been pl; pp; smashed; in the last two months of 1910, he gave every indication that--insofar as Maderismo was concerned—-the situation was well under control.3 Wilson's judgement cannot be faulted as rash or even premature since Madero was on the verge of quitting. The too well-publicized date for the start of the revolution (November 20), in which Madero himself crossed back into 32 Mexico, proved to be an unqualified fiasco. Madero limped back to Texas, wondering what his next move should be. He spent most of December in New Orleans where he decided to forge ahead despite the fact that the fighting was not going well and most knowledgeable observers had written his move— ment off as moribund.4 Despite Wilson's optimism, his messages to Washington were nonetheless tinged with warnings and misgivings: Not only was the government visibly unpopular, the federal army which Wilson once touted as adequate in the hands of a "determined and sagacious autocrat,"5 was beginning to show its ineffectiveness. Wilson, in other words, was wondering aloud why the regime—-i.e. army--had not been able to completely stamp out thus far "an unorganized and leader- less movement."6 As early as November 22, Wilson was telling the State Department that the domestic situation could get ugly-—and if it did, the United States should be prepared. "I believe," Wilson wrote, "the Government will successfully cope with the situation but in view of the possibility of damage to American life and property energetic precautionary action should be taken."7(my emphasis) So while Wilson considered the Madero rebellion as dead or dying--due to the fact that it lacked intelligent leader— ship etc.-—he was nonetheless concerned that the underlying causes for the general unrest in Mexico remained unaltered. In a statement that would prove prophetic, Wilson declared 33 on December 10 that the damages caused by the "recent disturbances in the North"-—i.e. the Maderista insurrection which, again, Wilson had already given up for dead-~"did not result from the strength or the respectability of the movement but from the circumstances that a few successes by the revolutionists would have brought about a serious and active movement in all the great centers against the present government."8 Translation: Any revolutionary movement that gained the slightest bit of momentum would be difficult to stop. Did this mean, then, that Wilson thought Diaz was losing his grip? No. According to the ambassador, if it were not for Diaz, the country would have been experiencing much greater difficulties than it had heretofore endured. It was as if Wilson thought Diaz an innocent Victim of his own inner-circle of advisers--the so called cientificos. Wilson implied that they were largely to blame for the government's unpopularity.9 Diaz, of course, could have dismissed the cientificos had he wanted to do so; they were his minions, not vice-versa. And given the fact that it was the president who had to resign in May of 1911, it is highly doubtful that the masses of dissatisfied Mexicans held Diaz less account- able than the men who surrounded him in the National Palace. The fact that Wilson made this good guy/bad guy distinction seems to show that he still saw Diaz as the one man on horseback with the unique ability to hold Mexico together. 34 There is a deep animosity on all hands to Vice-President Corral and to the "Cientifico" group which surrounds the President and in my opinion it is only respect for and fear of the President which at this time restrains a formidable movement.10 As for President Taft, the only quarrel he might have had with Madero was that he was attempting to overthrow someone who for decades had been a tried and true friend of the United States. Taft, like his ambassador, had tremendous confi- dence in Diaz. When Mexico experienced a bout of anti-Ameri- can riots in the fall of 1910--ostensibly triggered by the lynching of a Mexican (Antonio Rodriguez) in Texas--Wilson of course expressed concern. Originally, Wilson feared that perhaps the government was not doing enough to quell these loud demonstrations, and were also not taking adequate steps to protect the 40,000 Americans living in Mexico.11 Taft, though obviously alarmed at the reports, revealed just how much he believed in Diaz as the omnipotent guardian of American interests. While en route to Panama, Taft wired Knox: "I cannot conceive a situation in which President Diaz would not act with a strong hand in defense of just American interest. Answer." His earlier misgivings notwithstanding, Wilson was quickly reassured by President Diaz that his government was in the process of stopping the anti-American demonstrators dead in their tracks.13 Reporting on an interview he had conducted with Diaz, Wilson related the following to the State Department: 35 The President said that he had always looked with satis- faction upon the friendly relations of Mexico and the United States and that there is nothing he will not do to bring the countries to a still closer understanding.14 Diaz did not disappoint, either. Wilson informed Washington that the dictator was backing up his words with substance: The Mexican government was said to be "acting vigorously throughout the Republic"15 until, on December 2, Wilson declared the unrest to be at an end.16 The answer that Taft had requested was thus answered in the affirmative: Yes, Diaz is doing what is necessary to protect just American interests. Furthermore, Wilson appreciated Diaz's delicate situation vis-a—vis the anti-Americanism in Mexico. That is, Wilson thought Diaz was doing the best he could under the volatile circumstances. Thorough investigation convinces me that recent anti- American demonstrations are simply a convenient cloak for attacks on the Diaz government...Nearly all of the rioters in this city are opponents of the government and their utilization of the Rodriguez incident makes it difficult for the Government to procede with the vigor which it otherwise could.17 In short, if Diaz were too quick or too oppressive in his methods, he would have been portrayed as an American stooge. At any rate, the anti-American riots were subdued and they did not damage President Diaz's vaunted image in the eyes of the U.S. government. Quite the opposite as a matter of fact; the episode which could have done so much to harm him only proved once again that Diaz was a man the United States could always rely on. 36 President Taft's incredulous response to information he received from a prominent American living in Mexico was indicative of the way he felt about Diaz. L.R. Wilfley's second letter to the president arrived in late November. If Taft had no inkling of Diaz's vast unpopularity prior to this time--which is to say if he was not cognizant of Wilson's messages regarding the domestic situation in Mexico--he at least heard of it now thanks to Wilfley's letters. Wilfley's remarks were reminiscent of Wilson's: "I indicated (on September 10) that the country at large was dissatisfied with the state of things," Wilfley wrote. "My impression is that the feeling against the present government is general and permeates ninety percent of the population." Wilfley stated that the middle class was clamoring for a voice in govern— ment. The people, Wilfley said flatly, "are tired of the semblance without the substance of political liberty." He warned that " some change in the old policy of absolutism and repression will have to be made, or there will be no permanent peace here." Finally, it is significant that Wilfley made the same error that Wilson (and everyone else) made when he declared that Madero's uprising had been put down. "But the feeling," he said ominously, "against the admini- stration remains unchanged."18 Taft, however, placed little credence in Mr. Wilfley's letter. He passed it on to the secretary of state with this belittling note: "I do not know that Wilfley is a very 37 accurate observer. He is very much affected by the relations of conditions to his own circumstances. (Wilfley was embroiled in a dispute with the Mexican government over some valuable mining property.) But I send it to you for what it is worth."19 Wilfley's observations did not jibe with Taft's opinion of Diaz, so he dismissed them and went right on believing in the efficacy of the Porfiriato. Wilson was not wrong when he asserted in his memoires that Taft had always been a "firm n20 believer in Diaz. On January 19, 1911, for example, Taft wrote his brother that "Diaz has done more for the people of Mexico than any other Latin American has done for any of "21 Taft once said--and he wanted to believe-- his people. that Mexico would be stable as long as Diaz lived. He feared for Mexico--and America's dominating presence there--once the octogenarian died. Taft expressed the hope, moreover, that Diaz would not die until he was out of office.22 Getting involved in Mexico's internal affairs, then, was something that Taft did not relish. Taft's short but sweet personal relationship with Diaz dated back to the fall of 1909 when, for a few hours, the two men exchanged pleasantries at the border. Diaz requested the meeting to "strengthen himself among his own people through a colorful demonstration of international friend- "23 ship. Taft was only too happy to oblige since he clearly sympathized with Diaz's authoritarian regime--and the benefits that had accrued to the United States from it.24 38 Taft did not know much about Mexico. He did know, however, that the United States had vast sums of money invested in the country-—an economic bonanza that neatly, and not coincidentally-—paralleled Diaz's thirty plus years in power.25 Despite the fact that in the last years of the Porfiriato the regime had indeed been encouraging more European capital as a counterweight to heavy U.S. influence, Ameri— can investment in Mexico continued to rise.26 American policy-makers still thought of Diaz as the patron and protector of U.S. economic interests.27 Diaz was not perfect, but he was still meeting all three of Taft's foreign policy objectives: stability, trade and continued opportunity for further American investment.28 Taft must have known that all three objectives would have been jeopardized if the "tiger" of revolution were unleashed on Mexico.29 Better, then, to keep the unpredictable beast in its cage-~which is just what Diaz had in mind, and why Taft supported him. To reiterate, Taft had neither the desire nor the motive to intercede on Madero's behalf; he was on Diaz's side, and until March 6, 1911, the American president believed that the old man in Mexico City could and would rule his country as long as he wished. President Taft must have been feeling pretty good about Diaz's chances as 1910 drew to a close. Madero was still at large, but his revolution seemed to be getting nowhere-- or much ado about nothing. Wilson attested that, militarily, 39 the "leaderless" rebels were in extreme danger of being scattered to the four winds and ultimately exterminated.30 As the New York Times editorialized, no one in their right mind was even entertaining the thought that this mouse of a movement would ever seriously challenge, much less defeat, a regime that stretched proudly back to 1877.31 If Diaz was in any kind of trouble at this point, Wilson was the only influential person in the administration to acknow- ledge it. How much influence he had with the unconcerned higher—ups at the State Department is unclear. At any rate, even Wilson was disparaging Maderismo——giving it no chance to topple Diaz. 40 1Wilson, Di lomatic E isodes, p. 205. 21bid., p. 205. 3Hanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, p. iii. Hanrahan writes that Wilson's memoires stand up well against the historical evidence in U.S. archives. "Understandably he does not admit to his mistake in November 1910 when, accepting the reports of Diaz officials at face-value, he cabled the secretary of state that the revolution had been put down." In mid-December, Wilson stated that federal troops had routed the revolutionists and organized resis- tance against the government was practically dead. See Hanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, pp. 113-114. 4Ross, Francisco I. Madero, pp. 127-130; New York Times, December 19, 1910. 5Hanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, p. 22; The New York Times on November 17, 1910, described Mexico's military capability this way: "Mexico has an army of about 30,000 effectives and would be formidable in the guirrilla war- fare that she could maintain with her excellent force of Rurales with their tough and enduring horses." In addition to overestimating both the size and the quality of the army, the newspaper did much the same with Mexico's national police force. The Rurales consisted of only 2,400 men. Although loyal to Diaz, they were plagued by dessertions, drinking and insubordination. The Rurales were made up of poor, semi-skilled people with "no particular qualifica- tions, training or background for police work." See Paul J. Vanderwood, "Mexico's Rurales: Image of a Society in Transition," His anic American Historical Review 61 (February 19815: pp. 52-62 6Hanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, p. 107. 7Ibid., II, pt. 1, p. 94. Wilson had learned of an alleged conspiracy to assasinate the cientificos. Apparently, he was worried that such an event--coupled with the general unrest-~could trigger a very dangerous situation for Americans in Mexico. 8Ibid., II, pt. 1, p. 108. 41 91bid., 11, pt. 1, pp. 20-31. 1°1bid., II, pt. 1, p. 107. 111bid.,11, pt. 1, p. 39, 43-49, 71, 81 & 82. 121bid., II, pt. 1, p. 40. The following day, Taft wired Knox who was to get word to Diaz that the President of the United States had "the utmost confidence in his desire to allay all trouble between the two countries and his determination to sup ress unlawful violence or insults to Americans in Mexico.' See Ibid., II, pt. 1, p. 72. 131bid., 11, pt. 1, p. 70, 76, 85-86. 14Ibid., II, pt. 1, p. 89. During this interview, incidentally, Diaz pledged Mexico's continuing loyalty to the United States in the event of trouble with Japan. 15Ibid., 11, pt. 1, p. 76. 16Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1929--hereafter cited as RDS--(General Services Administration, Washington D.C.: Nafional Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy no. 274, 1959), vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/526. After declaring the country normal save for Chihuahua, Wilson added: "Termina- tion of difficulties growing out of Rodriguez case." 17Hanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, p. 75. 18Ibid., I, pt. 1, pp. 84-87. 19Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. 83. 20Wilson, Di lomatic E isodes, p. 207. 21Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, vol. 2, p. 700. Taft, undoubtedly, knew that Diaz was a 42 dictator whose methods were often harsh. But given the nature of Mexico--i.e. still largely poor and ignorant--Diaz, in Taft's estimation, had accomplished a great deal for his country. Democracy would have to wait for education and further economic development to take hold. Taft, then, believed in evolutionary change--not revolutionary. P. Edward Haley's analysis of how the American president could support a dictator over a democrat makes a good deal of sense, and it is why I cite it here. In short, Taft's comment to his brother about Diaz was sincere. See Haley, Revolution and Intervention, pp. 11-15. 22Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, vol. 1, p. 462. 23Walter V. Scholes and Marie V. Scholes, The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 19705, p. 82. Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft: A Conserva- tive's Conce tion of the Presidenc (Ithaca: Cornell Univer- sity Press, 19685, p. 265. 25Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, vol. 1, p. 462. Taft erroniously believed that the United States had $2 billion invested in Mexico--almost twice the actual amount. 26Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 184-185. In addition, Knight claims that economic nationalist measures like the Mexicanisation of the railways posed no real threat to American economic hegemony. Even Katz admits that "some measures designed to weaken U.S. influence on the railroads do not seem to have been implemented." See Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, p. 26. There is no doubt that U.S. investment vastly increased during the last ten to fifteen years of the Porfiriato. Cockcroft states that U.S. invest- ment in Mexico quintupled between 1897-1911. See Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors, p. 18. Hanrahan, using figures compiled by the consul-general, concluded that American investment in Mexico rose from $250 million in 1897, to slightly more than $500 million in 1902 and were $1 billion as of 1911. See Hanrahan, The Bad Yankee vol. 1, pp. D-1 & D-75. "——— 27Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 185. 43 28Scholes, The Foreign Policies of the Taft Admini- stration, p. 247. 29As he boarded the ship that took him into exile, Diaz purportedly said: "Madero has unleashed a tiger; let us see if he can control him." 3OHanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, p. 118. As late as January 10, 1911, W1Ison was reporting that the "malcon- tents" had nearly exhausted their ammunition. "Revolution- ists," he informed Knox, "will probably split into small bandit groups to be hunted later by cavalry and police." 31New York Times, November 25, 1910. THREE THE PRECURSOR MOVEMENT: DIAZ'S WAY OF DEALING WITH DISSENT The Diaz government did not particularly care how sickly Maderismo was-~or seemed to be--as 1910 ended. As long as the Madero movement remained active, it represented a threat to a regime whose military was clearly inadequate for any type of sustained challenge. Unlike their northern neighbors, then, the Mexican government could ill-afford to relax until Maderismo was dead. The Porfiriato had a successful history of dealing with rebel movements that tried to use the United States as a home base to foment revolution inside Mexico.1 In short, their method of snuffing out exiled revolutionists involved much more inter—govern- mental collaboration and subterfuge than it did brute force. It had always been a case of rooting out revolution- ary movements before they had a chance to grow into anything the Mexican army might have trouble dealing with. Again, Diaz simply did not have the army to put down anything formidable; if it ever got that far, he knew that his political career (or even his life) might very well be over. Even though the current administration in Washington was still staunchly Pro Diaz--and in point of fact cooperated to a large extent the way past administrations had--it did 44 45 not respond to official Mexican pressure quite the way Diaz assumed it would. Unfortunately for Diaz, he was to learn that not all American administrations--nor all rebel movements for that matter--were created equal. Well-behaved though it was, Porfirian Mexico knew dissent many years before Madero arrived on the political scene. Beginning in 1900, Mexico's disaffected established collec— tively what historians refer to as the Precursor Movement.2 W. Dirk Raat and James Cockcroft contend that the Precursor Movement more or less set the stage for the successful Madero revolt.3 In and of itself, however, the Precursor Movement was on the fringe and an ineffective agent of meaningful change.4 The best organized and most extensive of the revoltosos in the Precursor Movement was the PLM whose leadership roster was headed by Ricardo Flores Magon, his brother Enrique, Librado Rivera, Antonio I. Villareal, Antonio Diaz Soto Y Gama as well as Juan and Manual Sarabia. The Magonistas rather quickly evolved from a mainline liberal, anti-clerical movement into an ultra-radical crusade to transform society.5 The Magonistas were forced out of Mexico in 1903 and arrived in Texas as unwelcome guests shortly thereafter. In 1904, they re-established their newspaper, Re eneracion, which advocated violence as the only way to achieve a new order in Mexico.6 By 1906 with the publication of its 52—point party platform and revolutionary manifesto, the PLM's transformation was not 46 only complete, but systematically documented as well.7 In brief, what the Magonistas had in mind was the violent overthrow of the Porfiriato and the introduction of profound socio—economic changes in its stead. 8 Among other things, the Magonistas advocated that the rural proletariats seize all the means of production--land and machinery included.9 Their nationalist, anti-capitalist agenda was also strongly oriented toward urban labor, and they had a hand in insti- gating the major strikes at Cananea, Rio Blanco and San Luis Potosi. 10 The Magonistas even sponsored two ill-fated revolts inside Mexico in 1906 and 1908.11 They were doomed from the beginning because the Diaz regime learned of them ahead of time. Not only did Diaz take the Magonistas seriously--he also convinced the United States that it should, too. It did not take a genius to see, after all, that the Magonistas posed a threat to America's vast financial stake in Mexico. The 1906 and 1908 revolts were doomed, therefore, because the Mexican government had the active cooperation of the 13 In addition, United States government at every level. the Diaz regime employed the crack services of American private detectives--most notably the Thomas Furlong Agency. Enrique Creel, who held a number of high level positions in the Diaz government, was the central figure in all of this. As such, he "directed and coordinated Diaz's attack against first, the Magonistas, and subsequently, the Maderistas."14 47 The so called Creel International Detective Agency was just that; as its informal head, Creel oversaw an assortment of Americans and Mexicans from the public as well as the private sectors.15 Perhaps no one was more important to this quasi-official operation than the numerous consuls on either side of the border. U.S. consuls, in particular Luther Ellsworth at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz, worked under- cover with other federal officials from no fewer than seven government organizations in a combined effort to gather intelligence data for their respective superiors. At significant cost, President Diaz supported consuls in practically all of the smaller American border towns. These individuals worked as spies, infiltrators, legal advisers, investigators and special police agents. Their assignments ranged from general surveillance of the revol- tosos to outright intimidation and harassment.17 Private detectives were no less effective or vital to the Creel conglomerate than their public sector counter- parts. The Furlong Agency alone, in the four years it worked for the Mexican government, was credited with seizing over 180 revolutionaries .18 Besides the State Department and other government functionaries, Creel passed on Furlong's reports to judges, attorneys and influential private citizens--anyone, in short, who was part of the 19 far reaching organization. The Creel International Detective Agency, then, expended a great deal of time, 48 effort and of course money to protect and preserve the status quo in Mexico. Much more than the Mexican army (which was a last line of defense), it stood in the way of anyone with designs on overthrowing Diaz and the cientificos. Thanks to Creel and his international network of spies and informants, the Magonistas found life in the United States extremely difficult. They were forced out of Texas in favor of St. Louis, Missouri where on October 12, 1905, private detectives (without warrants) confiscated Regeneracion and had Ricardo Flores Magon jailed. Magon was released on bail, at which time he and some of his followers sought refuge in Canada.20 In 1907, they returned to the United States and were re-arrested. Ricardo Flores Magon, Rivera and Villareal stood trial, were convicted of conspiracy and spent 1907 to 1910 in various prisons.21 When the trio were released in August of 1910, the Magonistas picked up right where they left off in 1907. This time from Los Angeles, they renewed publication of Regeneracion. Once more, the newspaper was filled with articles advocating violence as a means to achieve the PLM's radical socio—economic objectives. On September 3, 1910, Regeneracion declared: "Our electoral ballots will be bullets from our guns." On November 12, the newspaper condemned the imperialism of the United States, saying it was impossible to deny that all of Latin America was threatened by it. In December, Regeneracion told Mexicans their best friend 49 was a gun. "Violence which frees is no crime," "22 the paper declared. "It is a virtue. Even though the Magonistas were violently opposed to everything the United States stood for and would have kicked every last American capitalist out of Mexico, what must be noted is that--despite all of the harassment-—it took some three years for our government to put Magon behind bars for a lengthy prison term. For three years, then, the Magon- istas managed to foment two rebellions, several major strikes and churn out a multitude of newspaper articles before being put out of commission. Moreover, all of this rancorous activity took place during Roosevelt's tenure~—not Taft's. If Roosevelt was willing to have the PLM harassed extra- legally, this is not to say that Taft would have done like- wise. In fact, it is doubtful that Taft would have allowed the PLM's free speech to be curtailed as Roosevelt did.23 For these reasons, comparing U.S. treatment of the PLM to Maderismo is problematic and only seems to prove that neither group met with favor in official circles. Although Taft did not support him as a successor to Diaz, Madero nevertheless had to be more attractive to the American president than the wild—eyed Magonistas. Madero, the avowed democrat, made no attempt to hide his Pro U.S. feelings. It was no secret that he admired our system of government and saw it as inseperable from American economic dynamism. "We must imitate American practices," Madero wrote, "above 50 all that adherence to the law which her rulers display, if we are to become as great as they."24 Despite all of these points in his favor, Madero was not the constituted govern- ment of Mexico—-not in Taft's eyes: He was a usurper, an outlaw and, unlike Diaz, something of an unknown quantity in that he had never proven himself as the champion of American interests. The Taft administration would expend no mean effort to ensure that the Maderistas conformed to the neutrality laws, or else face the consequences thereof. When it could be proved to Taft's satisfaction that Madero was indeed breaking the law, a warrant was issued for his arrest. This occured only four months after Madero first set foot in the United States as an exile. If the United States were the "generous hosts" that Katz and other historians claim, how is it that the PLM leaders avoided prison for three years--and Madero by contrast was forced to flee the country after only four months? The answer is that the United States was not generous unless one considers loyalty to the Constitution and working diligently within the confines of the law as such. Despite these handi- pppp, the Taft administration managed to short-circuit Maderismo sooner than anyone had a right to expect. That it was not fast enough to save Diaz only proves that the Mexican army was as decrepit as the regime as a whole. The comparison between Flores Magon and Madero looms even larger (for the purposes of this thesis) when one considers 51 that of the two exile groups operating more or less concur- rently on U.S. soil circa 1910-1911, the leader of the one that was violently anti-American lasted longer than his democratic counterpart.25 While Madero was forced out in mid-February, Ricardo Flores Magon was not arrested again until the following June. Madero, the man who cherished American- style values, was issued his arrest warrant first because he was sufficiently incriminated well in advance of Flores Magon. Not even the Magonistas were subject to arrest until it had been brought about in the proper legal fashion. Madero or Flores Magon—-the Taft administration persued both accord- ing to the book. It did not play favorites because the president's brand of justice--reflected of course in his attorney general--really was blind.26 52 1Raat, Revoltosos, pp. 92-199. 2Cockcroft states that the Precursor Movement "is commonly defined as all political precedents of the Revolu- tion of 1910—1917, including manifestos, strikes, and armed uprisings, dating from the founding of the San Luis Potosi's Club Liberal Ponciano Arriaga' in 1900 to the outbreak of the Revolution in 1910." See Cockcroft, Intel- lectual Precursors, p. 4. 3Ibid., pp. 234-235. Cockcroft contends that the Precursor Movement helped lay the ideological groundwork for the substantial social and economic changes that were incorporated in the 1917 Constitution, specifically articles 27 & 123 which provided for agrarian and labor reform. Raat goes even further. He maintains that the Magonistas were no mere prelude to Madero--in conjunction with other revoltoso groups, they were the Revolution of 1910. See Raat, Revoltosos, p. 18. 4Whereas Cumberland dismissed the PLM as too radical to attract enough support to seriously challenge Diaz—-see Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 28--others, like Cockcroft and Raat are decidedly more sympathetic. Cockcroft writes: "When PLM influence on the labor movement and on the 1917 Constitution is considered, there remains little doubt that not only as a Precursor movement but also as an active force in the 1910-1917 Revolution, the PLM, like the Maderistas, played an extremely important role." Therefore, despite their "many political divisions and setbacks," the PLM could point to the 1917 Constitution as an indicator of success. See Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors, p. 181 & 235. 5Raat, Revoltosos, p. 21. 6CHmberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 25. Re eneracion was the most outstandlng" anti-D1az newspaper, ut there were many others published during the Precursor period; Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors, p. 87. On December 31, 1900, Regeneracion added to its masthead the words: "Inde- pendent Newspaper of Combat." 7Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors, pp. 130-133. Cockcroft outlines the PLM program here. 8Ibid., p. 5. 53 9Ibid., p. 51. 1OIbid., p. 134. 11Charles C. Cumberland, "Precursors of the Mexican Revolution," Hispanic American Historical Review 22 (May 1942): pp. 344-356. When Flores Magon, Villareal and Rivera were in prison, leadership fell to Praxedis G. Guerrero who led the unsuccessful 1908 revolt against the Porfiriato. 2Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors, pp. 145-151. 13Ibid., pp. 150-151; Henderson, Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands, p. 6. 14Raat, Revoltosos, p. 179. For a discussion of the Creel International Detec- tive Agency, see Raat, Revoltosos, pp. 175-199. 16Ibid., p. 194. These organizations were: Division of Post Office Inspectors, Treasury Department (Secret Service Division), State Department, Treasury Department (Customs Agents), Justice Department (Bureau of Investigation), Navy Department (Office of Naval Operations) and War Department (Military Information Division). 17lbid., p. 182. 18Ibid., p. 194. 191bid., p. 179. OCockcroft, Intellectual Precursors, pp. 125-129. 21Lowell L. Blaisdell, The Desert Revolution (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 19625, pp. 8-9. 22Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors, p. 175. 54 23It seems apparent that Roosevelt was more than willing to look the other way when local officials and private detectives infringed on basic rights, as happened to the PLM in St. Louis. His pressure on the Post Office to increase the mailing rates on Regeneracion is another indication of the Roosevelt way of doing things. See Henderson, Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands, p. 37. 24Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 70. 25Without question, part of this was due to the fact that Wickersham was operating under the false assumption that Madero and Flores Magon were partners. The Mexican government, of course, encouraged this erronious belief. Not until early March were Ellsworth and Wickersham made completely aware of the schism between the two revoltoso groups. See Raat, Revoltosos, p. 231. At any rate, it is difficult to believe that these high ranking government officials did not recognize the fundamental differences—-and that if Flores Magon and Madero were allies, it had to be a highly temporary marriage of convenience. 26Blaisdell, The Desert Revolution, pp. 170-172. On March 1, 1911, Wickersham wrote the U.S. District Attorney for the Southern District of California to proceed cautiously against the Magonistas because he feared the "disasterous effects of a possible defeat." Accordingly, California officials moved circumspectly in an effort to accummulate enough solid evidence with which to file a neutrality charge. After three months, the district attorney was ready to prosecute--"if the Attorney General so desired. The next week, Wickersham informed Knox that he had wired California to institute grand jury proceedings, with a View to indicting the Junta and any others active in violating the neutrality laws." In June 1911, Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magon, Librado Rivera and Anselmo Figueroa were indicted. Ricardo Flores Magon protested that the Junta's arrest was discrimina- tory, 'or else Madero should have been arrested on the same charge. "In so arguing," Blaisdell notes, "he again forgot that the easiest way for him to have avoided neutrality law trouble would have been to go to Mexico and to throw himself in the revolution, as his rival had." On June 22, 1911, after a two week trial, the Junta leaders were found guilty of violation of the neutrality laws. FOUR THE BIG MISUNDERSTANDING To the uncritical and prejudiced eye, however, it may have appeared as if the United States were working toward a change of government in Mexico. Even before the revolution officially began, Francisco de la Barra (the Mexican Ambassa- dor to the United States) was registering complaints with the State Department about alleged Maderista violations of the neutrality laws. The Mexican government would issue more than one hundred such complaints before it was all over.1 De la Barra, in short, labeled free speech that was anti- Diaz in content as unlawful.2 He wanted the U.S. government, therefore, to take prompt action.3 Theodore Roosevelt who was not the strict constructionist that Taft was had been amenable to similar arguments during his presidency. In 1905, for example, Roosevelt had brought pressure on the Post Office to increase mailing rates on Regeneracion from fourth class status to second, thereby doubling the cost of the newspaper.4 Even though rebel propoganda was having a profoundly undesirable impact on the local population,5 the United States was nonetheless constitutionally restrained from stopping it. The neutrality laws, in other words, could not be construed to supercede the right of free speech. Secretary of State Knox had to tell the Mexican government 55 56 as much on more than one occasion. In a country where the law was never allowed to interfere with the president's wishes, and using the previous American administration as a measuring stick, Mexico took this type of response to mean that Taft was not solidly behind Diaz-- that he had gone soft on the revolutionists.6 In reality, all it signified was that Taft's way was not Roosevelt's way. American presidents, moreover, are not interchangeable; they may have the same goals, and yet go about achieving them in different ways. The Taft administration, as we shall see, happened to be responsive to Mexican pressure--it would take what it thought at the time were effective measures to circumvent Maderismo and thus save Diaz in the process. (It did the first, but through no fault of its own, could not manage the second objective.) It would not, however, compromise the bill of rights as a means to a desired end. To surmise that Taft's way was ineffective does not bear close scrutiny. To conclude, furthermore, that his way involved something devious and underhanded is certainly conspiratorial, but it is also simplistic and nonsensical in light of the oft repeated observation that both Taft and Diaz were bedrock conservatives. To reiterate a highly important point, there was no good reason for Taft to risk an unpredictable revolution to replace a man who was on his own end of the political spectrum--a man who had proved his worth to the United States many more times than not. 57 In the battle to win the hearts and minds of the local populace, Mexican officials understood the value of image and public relations. They did not want the Maderistas to get sympathy, much less aid and comfort, from the thousands of residents (both Mexican and non-Mexican) living close to the border. Having these people on Madero's side only made their job that much harder. Little wonder, then, that Mexico tried to muzzle the rebels' generous use of free speech. The war of words was not limited to newspaper articles, either. As far as the Mexican hierarchy was concerned, Madero had proved his revolutionary status and therefore they insinu— ated that he had broken the neutrality laws when his Plan of San Luis Potosi was published and made widely available in the United States.7 In the Plan, Madero declared the recent elections null and void. He assumed the title of provisional president with the power to appoint provisional governors. 8 Accompanying the Plan was an appeal to the army to defect. "The triumph of the revolution is certain, but with you it rests whether it shall be quickly or slowly gained," Madero told the army. "I therefore invite all the soldiers and all the chiefs and officers, deserving and patriotic, to unite with us in this movement."9 Although compiled in the United States, the Plan (and the appeal to the army) was dated October 5 to coincide with Madero's last day in Mexico. Madero was playing it typically safe--trying to avoid, as it were, possible 58 international repercusions.10 But even if the Plan had been called the Plan of San Antonio and dated November 5 instead of October 5, the United States was making it clear that free speech--even of the revolutionary variety--was not going to be abridged. As he was wont to do in these months, Knox informed de la Barra that mere words were not enough to convict someone in the United States. Knox wrote on December 1, 1910: It should be observed that under these statutes (the neutrality laws) no offense is commited and no legal action looking to punishment can be instituted until and unless the parties in question carry out some of the specific acts named and prohibited in the statutes; and as bearing upon this point it should be recalled that, since the American constitution liberty of speech and press is guaranteed, mere propoganda in and of itself would probably not fall within these statutes and would not therefore be punishable thereunder.11 Mexico's numerous formal requests and complaints, however, were about more than just the way the Maderistas were abusing the free speech clause. In Mexico's less than studied opinion, just about everything the Maderistas did--or were purported to have done--was an obvious violation of the neutrality laws. (The mere act of buying guns, for example.) At times, the accusations were entirely vague as when de la Barra informed the secretary of state that two of Madero's "active agents" were in Presidio, Texas where they "continue stirring up trouble and constantly violating the neutrality laws of the United States." On the strength of these nebulous charges, de la Barra requested that the United States either arrest these men "or at least keep them under 59 strict surveillance."12 Three days earlier, on November 25, the Mexican embassy merely informed the secretary of state that Madero was somewhere "within the territory of the United States, and since he has clearly violated the neutrality laws,' it was now incumbent upon the United States to prove its friendship "by ordering the arrest of said person."13 Mexico also tried to incriminate Madero based on second- hand information: i.e. someone said that Madero was going to overthrow the Mexican government--ergo, he should be arrested on that basis.14 On the eve of the November 20 revolution, for instance, Madero's father granted an interview to a San Antonio newspaper. The headline in the Light & Gazette read: "Father of Madero Tells For First Time of Plans of His "15 The elder Madero disavowed the Son to Overthrow Rule. interview, and even though the reporter swore to the effect that it was all true, it was apparent that the United States was not going to try to take legal action against the son based on the alleged words of his over-anxious father.16 Sometimes, the charges leveled against Madero were a bit more specific. On November 19, Mexico claimed that bands of rebels were being recruited for military service at various points along the Texas frontier;17 on November 23, Mexico charged that Madero was illegally recruiting Americans to fight for him in Mexico;18 on December 30, Mexico fingered a man by the name of McQuarters who they said was shipping 19 rebel arms between El Paso and Eagle Pass; also on 60 December 30, Mexico reported that the "rebel, Abraham Gonzalez, had been for more than a month preparing a revolu- tionary movement in the town of Presidio, Texas" and, toward that objective, has been "endeavoring to procure more men and ammunition."goon December 31, Mexico dutifully reported that a group of armed men had gathered near the border for 5;21 an attack that was to take place on January on January 11, Abraham Gonzalez and other "well known agitators" were said to be in El Paso "engaging in revolutionary propoganda and organizing an armed force with the object of invading some part of the Mexican territory."22 Mexico, in short, was feeding the United States a lot of interesting, but hard to prove inuendo. What is apparent, though, is that Mexico must have considered all of this information as useful grist for the mill of American justice when, in fact, it was more 23 than likely not bonafide evidence at all. Their idea of admissible evidence and the American idea of it did not mesh. Mexico persisted, but it did not seem to understand what it took to arrest, much less convict, someone in the United States. Diaz's officials, in other words, could only view the American law through their own political frame of reference. They assumed that an official request would be enough to secure the prompt arrest and imprisonment of the 24 revolutionaries. In late November, general instructions . 25 were nevertheless 1ssued for Madero's arrest. However, 61 on December 2, the U.S. attorney for the western district of Texas had to disappoint his boss in Washington by admitting that there was not sufficient evidence to meet the "technical requirements" to have Madero arrested.26 Even though the warrant had to be rescinded, the Mexicans kept up their efforts to have Madero put out of action. And the attorney general, unlike the secretary of state, continued to lend them a sympathetic ear. What the United States sought but was not getting at this point was a link--something substantive that would connect words with deeds and thus implicate Madero with instigating p revolution against 3 friendly government (the gist of the neutrality laws).28 For over three months, about the best anyone could do was uncover a lot of suspicious activity which by itself would not hold up in court.29 On January 11, for instance, two Mexicans were caught by local San Antonio officials loading arms and ammunition onto wagons. They refused to say who they were working for.30 Since loading guns was not a crime anymore than buying them--or anymore than writing a negative news- paper article or freely assembling in someone's home--there 31 If one of the was not much the officials could really do. men had signed orders in his pocket from Madero--to the effect that he needed the guns to use against Diaz-—then Madero probably would have been arrested for Violating section 5286 of the neutrality statutes which, in a nutshell, 62 prohibited persons from preparing the means for any mili- tary expedition to be carried on from the United States against a friendly foreign power.32 Mexico continued to believe, however, that mere suspicious activity was enough to do-in the Maderistas. On December 14, Knox cabled Wilson in response to a conversation the ambassador had had with President Diaz in mid-November.33 Besides section 5286, Knox recited the other statutes which seemed to apply to the Maderista controversy. What prompted this refresher course in the laws was a complaint Diaz registered with Wilson during their mid—November interview.34 Diaz complained to Wilson on that occasion to the effect that Madero was getting away with too much. Specifically, some alleged Maderistas had bought a quantity of guns which were confiscated by the American authorities. Diaz considered this--the simple act of buying guns--a violation of the neutrality laws and asked the American government (through Wilson) to take "energetic action...to stop this unlaw- ful practice of men who seek refuge in the United States for no other purpose than to conduct a relentless revolu— tionary campaign against the government of a friendly nation."35 Wilson was to tell the Mexican president that the incident he related did not constitute a violation of any laws. The implication was that Diaz should learn the laws before he or anyone else in his government made any more noise about what the United States should do with the 63 rebels. Mexico, moreover, thought it was carrying its share of the burden by providing this type of information to the U.S. authorities. It is apparent that Mexico expected the United States-—if it insisted on more evidence or more convincing proof—-to go ahead and get it on their own. That is, as Mexico had supplied the Taft administration with the raw material for arrest--i.e. had got the ball rolling so to speak--it was now up to the United States to investigate what were basically crude allegations, prove their validity, and in no time at all obtain a conviction.36 De la Barra, on another occasion, took it upon himself to remind the secretary of state that it was much less difficult for the American authorities to gather evidence than it was for Mexico. The Mexican ambassador was of the opinion that if only the United States were more dogged, it would "find it easy to prove the punishable character of the acts commited" by the rebels operating along the border. De la Barra closed this particular note with the usual request that the U.S. take "duly energetic and speedy action...against such men as may be guilty of breaking the neutrality laws." Going into the new year, then, the two governments seemed to be having what amounted to a lover's quarrel on the international level: Mexico could not understand why the Americans had not arrested Madero; they implied, furthermore, 64 that the United States was not doing enough to shutdown the Maderistas. The Americans, in turn, undoubtedly felt that the ungrateful Mexicans had no appreciation for either the laws, or U.S. efforts to enforce them. Late in 1910, a Mexican official (who was on Madero's payroll) wrote an indignant letter to a Deputy U.S. Marshal. Antonio V. Lomeli was the Mexican consul in El Paso, Texas. Even though he was a Maderista spy involved in a misinformation campaign,38 Lomeli's letter is nevertheless indicative of the strained relationship which existed between the two nations as they approached the Maderista problem from two different perspec- tives.39 The United States Marshal shot back a meticulous letter of his own which dismantled all of Lomeli's accusa— tions point-by-point. Marshal Eugene Nolte's long letter of December 31 provides an excellent snapshot of where the 40 two governments stood heading into 1911. Here is most of Nolte's letter to Lomeli: Sir: I am in receipt, through the hands of deputy Marshal H. R. Hillebrand, of a copy of your letter addressed to him under date of the 24th instant, and regret to state that the statements contained therein are a great surprise to me, as I do not feel that they are entirely warranted by the facts. Replying to the strictures contained therein, I have the following to say: I. The public and private meetings of which you complain are not of themselves an offense against the laws of the United States, nor do they in any way Violate the 65 neutrality which this Government is most anxious to maintain between this country and Mexico. As you are well aware, the laws of the United States provide for free speech and no one is so humble that they cannot with impunity, express their views as to another person, providing, always, they do not utter a scandal...Under the laws conveying conspiracy, an overt act must accompany the oral or written agreement which has been entered into to complete such conspiracy. The mere conspiring together and not actually doing anything does not admit of punishment. II. Regarding your statement to the effect that Antonio I. Villareal and Praxedio G. Guerrero have been in El Paso, my information does not seem to bear this out... My representatives have been warned of their possible appearance in this District, and more especially when we received word that they were in Presidio a special investigation was made along that line and it was found that they were not there and that the men who were mistaken for them were not working in their interests and had nothing to do with them... III. Regarding the meetings at Toyah, Big Springs, and other places in Texas, the same statement as in I., above, applies to any meetings that may be held at these points. There is no doubt that numbers of Mexicans have left this District and gone to Mexico, but they have done so, in a large majority of cases, openly, and not being armed nor having any semblance of military organization, there is not breach of neutrality in such acts. That any large bodies have so crossed into Mexico, we have been unable to show. With reference to the statement as to one Guerra, who is suppose to be Encarnacion Diaz Garza, I beg to inform you that my reports show that Guerra is living quietly at Del Rio, and he states positively that he has nothing whatever to do with the present movement... IV. Regarding your statement that a large amount of arms and ammunition has been smuggled from this country into Mexico, I beg to state that while this may be true, we have no evidence of any such smuggling. It is quite possible that, in small quantities, such arms and ammunition may have been smuggled across the river. I have been informed that in one instance a number of 30:30's were taken across the river at Juarez, about the beginning of the present movement. This seems to have been well known in El Paso and it is not understood why the Mexican customs officers did not take any action in connection therewith. 66 Regarding the question of restrictions as to the selling of arms and ammunition, there are no laws upon the statute books of this country which prohibits their sale to anyone who has the price to pay for same...The Government is watching several lots of arms and ammunition, and if evidence can be obtained that they are about to be moved across the border for the aid and comfort of the revolutionists, action will be taken immediatly, but until this is clearly shown, we have no course for action. V. Regarding the information furnished by you that there was a party of men at Flores ranch, near the city of Juarez, I beg to state that an investigation of this matter failed to show any such party had crossed the river from this side... This office is in constant communication with its deputies, of which we have two at El Paso, one at Presidio, two at Del Rio, and one at Eagle Pass, and they are persistently engaged in running down rumors that are reported to us as to movements and their possible action leading toward a violation of neutrality, and we have not yet received any evidence of any information thereof. All of these men that are immediatly on the border are in close connection with other officers of the United States and the state of Texas, and they receive not only the benefit of their own observations, but of the observations of the other officers referred to. They are all men in whom I have the greatest confidence and who faithfully perform their duties and I am convinced that they have done so in this case. Personally, upon any evidence which can be furnished, or which may be discovered, that will show an infraction of neutrality, I assure you that action will be taken at once, but mere rumor of such infractions is not a sufficient warrant for arrest. I am willing to use the full scope of my authority in these matters. I assure you that the representatives of this office will immediatly act upon any definite information, showing a violation of the neutrality laws, and that rumors of violations will be investigated promptly in the future, as well as in the past. In addition to the men under my supervision, the Department of Justice also has a number of other representatives watching this matter and both forces are cooperating in every move. In conclusion, Mr. Lomeli, I will add that I am of the opinion that you should furnish me with a list of witnesses to violations of the neutrality laws to which 67 you refer or, if you find you have been misinformed, that it is due me that you write to me to that effect. Respectfully, 41 United States Marshal ,.. fly. Jude's-H until, 68 1Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. iii. 2Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. 98. 3de la Barra was not the only one who wanted the U.S. government to act quickly. On November 18, Wilson reassured Knox that the conspiracy to overthrow Diaz "will be quickly suppressed by the Government, which is vigilant and well informed. Numerous commissions," he added, "have been found signed by Madero, who seems to be acting in conjunction with Magon." Wilson then asked Knox: "Cannot American Government, without transgressing constitution, secure proper evidence to prosecute these men for attempting to subvert Government of a friendly nation from American soil." See RDS, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/388. The answer was a familiar one: The United States could only act when and if violations of the neutrality laws occured. "Department of Justice," the Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee informed Wilson on November 19, "had already issued instructions prior to your telegram, directing its agents in Texas to watch matters carefully and prosecute vigorously persons commiting acts contrary to the neutrality statutes." Thus far, Adee concluded, they had not been able to secure evidence for such Violations. See RDS, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/427. Henderson, Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands, p. 37. 51f Luther Ellsworth had had his way, the Magonistas would have been silenced in short order. On October 6, 1910, he enclosed a copy of an article written by Enrique Flores Magon and Parexedes G. Guerrero whom he referred to as "live wires" whose influence on the American side of the border was indeed powerful. "For that reason alone," Ells- worth said, "they should not be allowed to be at-large longer." See RDS, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/350. A month later, he merely said that the many articles written by Madero et al. "have reached the many thousands of Mexicans to be found all along the American Side of the Border, and their effect has not been quieting." See Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, pp. 51-52. 6The contention that Taft was conniving to help Madero was also expressed by many of the higher-ups in the Diaz government. Jose I. Limantour, for one, was thoroughly convinced that Taft no longer supported the Diaz regime as of 1911. His version of events, Ramon Eduardo Ruiz states, probably mirrored the opinion of many of his Mexican contempo- raries. See Ruiz, The Great Rebellion, pp. 388-390. 69 7Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 56, 93-94; Cumber- land, Mexican Revolution, p. 127. 8Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 121. 9Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, pp. 59-62. 10Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 121. 11Pa ers Relatin to the Forei n Relations of the United States, 1911——hereafter cited as FRUS--(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918), pp. 370-371, 812.00/499, no. 353. 121bid., p. 368, 812.00/499, no. 362. 13lbid., p. 367, 812.00/512, (memorandum). 14Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, pp. 93—94. 15Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. 95. 16Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. 96. 17FRUS, p. 364, 812.00/476. 18Ibid., p. 366, 812.00/511. 191bid., pp. 380-381, 812.00/604, no. 354. 2Olbid., p. 381, 812.00/607, no. 535. 21Ibid., p. 381, 812.00/605, no. 536. 22Ibid., p. 385, 812.00/632. 70 23Hanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, p. 93. On November 21, 1910, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs was already proclaiming that sufficient evidence for the arrest of Madero had been transmitted to the Mexican embassy in Washington. 24Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. iii. 25RDs, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/515. 26FRus, p. 371, 812.00/519. 27After being advised that there was not sufficient evidence to have Madero arrested, Wickersham asked Knox to get in touch with the Mexican embassy and have it forward any evidence it had which might help strengthen the case against Madero. See RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/519. On December 10, de la Barra replied that he would be glad to comply. He was confident that with the two governments working together, they would be able to prove the criminal acts of the rebels. See RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/559. 28William H. Beezley, Insur ent Governor: Abraham Gonzalez and the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 19735, p. 55. Although this was the gist of the laws, Beezley correctly points out that it really was not as straightforward as all that. "What constituted inciting a revolution," he says, "remained open to interpretation." Hence, the members of the Taft administration--primarily Knox and Wickersham--would wage a battle royal over the question. 29On November 24, Ellsworth informed Knox that, according to Secret Service agent Joe Priest, a female relative of Madero's had shipped thus far more than twenty large, seemingly very heavy, trunks from her San Antonio home. Priest suspected that the trunks contained rifles and cartridges and he was having one of Ellsworth's Mexican informants watch the house for further developments. See RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/504. These types of incidents were rather common: i.e. American officials knowing what was going on, but the Maderistas being too smart to get caught. 3OFRUS, pp. 385-386, 812.00/633. 71 31Beezley, Insur ent Governor, p. 56. The rebels could buy guns as legal commerce, Knox successfully argued, since the Mexican government did not recognize them as belligerants. If they had been recognized as belligerants, Knox concluded the laws required only the confiscation of captured supplies, not the suspension of the traffic. As will be see, Knox was unsuccessful in his attempt to declare that the delivery of war material (to Mexico) was also legal. Of course, probably nothing could ever stop the buying of guns in small quanti- ties. As much as federal officials may have wanted to, they could not prevent individual Mexicans from purchasing Winchester rifles and sufficient cartridges for what Ellsworth termed "alleged hunting purposes." Such transactions, it was admitted, were "hard to attack." See RES, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/413. And how could officials stop Americans from buying guns-~albeit on the sly for the rebels? In short, about all the U.S. government could hope to do was seize weapons as they were about to cross into Mexico. 32FRUS, p. 376, 812.00/447, no. 167. 33lbid., pp. 374-376, 812.00/447, no. 167. 34Ibid., pp. 359-360, 812.00/450 (enclosure) 35Ibid., p. 361, 812.00/447 (enclosure, memorandum) 36Ibid., pp. 393-394, 812.00/665, no. 694. On January 23, 1911, de la Barra wrote Knox: "I avail myself of the occasion to say that the Government of Mexico has no doubt that the proper authorities will make all the investigations necessary to prove the frequent violations of the neutrality laws...by individuals who use every means to disturb the normal conditions of life in a neighbor country...This embassy believes that by conducting the investigations...with the purpose of exhausting every means of conviction, the American authorities would soon bring to light legal evidence of the unlawful character of the acts reported by our consuls to which I have had occasion to refer in the notes relative to the subject herein considered." 37Ibid., pp. 383-384, 812.00/613, no. 539. 72 38Charles Cumberland, "Mexican Revolutionary Move- ments from Texas, 1906-1912," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 52 (January 1949): pp. 301-324. Lomeli's letter to Hillebrand may be found in FRUS, pp. 389-390, 812.00/625 (subinclosure 2) 40In a letter to Wickersham, Nolte described Lomeli's charges as "preposterous." He said he was sick of all the rumors, "given by irresponsible parties, which seem to be absolutely believed in every instance by the representatives of the Mexican Government." Nolte professed to be coopera- ting with General Hoyt and all civilian officials--"and, in fact, I am ready to exercise my full authority in the premises." Thanks in no small part to Lomeli, then, Nolte was a frustrated man at this stage. See RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/625. 41Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, pp. 110-114. FIVE OLD METHODS PUT TO A NEW TEST From the moment Madero launched his insurrection from American territory, Mexico was after the United States to guard the frontier—-"mobilizing the necessary forces in order that the reunion of the revolutionists and the impor- tation of arms into Mexico may be avoided."1 In the absence of huge quantities of troops to assist them, civilian officials——some of whom were mentioned in Nolte's less than friendly letter to Lomeli--were kept busy running down leads and rumors of every kind. Given the enormity of their task--i.e. watching an expansive border and trying to keep tabs on any number of Maderistas and lots of ammunition-- they were undoubtedly stretched thin. Yet, it cannot be said that they were amateurs waiting for rebel contraband to fall into their laps. In short, U.S. officials at this early stage were ready, willing and to some extent able to do Mexico's bidding. On November 19, the same day Mexico made the above mentioned request for the U.S. to mobilize the "necessary forces" to effectively patrol the border, Luther Ellsworth at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz cabled the State Department with this cogent update: There is evidence on both sides of the border line of serious unrest and intrigue. Have situation on American 73 74 side well in hand and with assistance of federal officers of Customs, Immigration, etc., United States Marshals, Bureau of Investigation agents, United States Secret 2 Service men, and United States Cavalry will keep it so. Ellsworth followed up this note with another one the very next day. In it, he said that "eternal vigilance" was the word all along the American side. "I am in constant touch with all federal officers by wire and telephone," Ellsworth .3 said, "and cooperation exists.' He was absolutely certain that the neutrality laws were being enforced by this "excel- lent" team of federal officers and soldiers.4 If Ellsworth is any indication, then, officials from sundry government agencies were working together to thwart the Maderistas. The person largely responsible for seeing to it that this ever-growing group of officers functioned efficiently was none other than Ellsworth himself.5 Ells- worth was a man in the know. As an "appointed special representative of the Departments of Justice and State in ' as well as a vital cog in the all neutrality matters,' Creel International Detective Agency, Ellsworth made it his business to know what was going on in and around the border. He (and the other American consuls in Mexico of which there were a total of twenty-five), were important allies of the Bureau of Investigation and the Treasury's Secret Service. However, probably no one was more gung ho about containing the Maderista movement than the peripatetic Ellsworth. Unlike Knox, Ellsworth and his army of soldiers, secret agents, and customs officials were more concerned with 75 stopping the smuggling of arms and men into Mexico than with either protocol or legal niceties. Toward that end, and equipped with that mindset, many of Knox's formal declarations were never heard or were ignored. At times, they were simply 7 never understood. Whatever the case, while the State Department was saying one thing, Ellsworth and company were often doing much the opposite. Ellsworth mentioned the cavalry in his first note. In a somewhat confusing manner, he concluded by saying that he would not ask for the cavalry until circumstances warranted it-—"but have arranged with the commander (General Hoyt of the Department of Texas) to have them ready to answer my call."9 That same day, at any rate, the War Department instructed General Hoyt to "send troops to threatened localities (and) to aid civil authorities in enforcing the neutrality laws of the United States."10 So in addition to the aforementioned civil authorities from Customs, Immigra- tion et al., the army that was normally stationed along the border was made available for patrol duty.11 On November 22, Major General Leonard Wood (Chief of Staff of the War Department) directed Hoyt (at the president's behest) to "send an additional troop to Del Rio, Eagle Pass and other points in the vicinity, in order that there may be ample forces for patrolling frontier." He also advised Hoyt not to hesitate to send tr00ps to other points if he thought it necessary. Wood closed his memo by asking Hoyt 76 if he thought he had enough troops in his department to meet the existing conditions. "Important," General Wood concluded, "that our patrolling be effective."12 General Hoyt, who thought that the border situation was d,"13 replied in a curt telegram to the "much exagerate Adjutant General: "We have sufficient troops for present conditions."14 For approximately three weeks, then, the only military personnel patrolling the Texas-Mexico border consisted of two cavalry tr00ps sent from Fort Sam Houston and one company of infantry detailed to Minera. The cavalry, however, was withdrawn on December 11 due to the fact that Hoyt did not think they were needed.15 Practically the only troops doing patrol duty after this were in Arizona. Even though Hoyt took this action, it did not seem to bother Ellsworth. On December 15, he informed Knox: "I now have the situation...so well cared for by efficient Federal Officers that I am confident that all attempts to violate our neutrality laws will be quickly frustrated."17 The border patrol would not be significantly bolstered until the following year. In response to "representations from the Mexican embassy," the American military presence along the border tripled as of late January. It was then that two mobilizations occured. First, eight cavalry troops and three infantry batallions from forts in Texas, Arizona and New Mexico were ordered out on reconnaissance duty.18 Specifically, these troops--"equipped for field 77 service"--were sent to Brownsville, Laredo, Del Rio and Eagle Pass "with instructions to patrol as far as necessary country intervening between those places, with view to aiding civil powers in enforcing the neutrality laws of the "19 United States. Regarding the civil powers, the New York Times reported that "besides the reinforcement by troops, orders were issued today for a concentration of the Treasury Department's Secret Service on the Mexican border with the detective service of the Department of Justice and Customs Service cooperating."20 On February 3, additional military personnel were rushed to the border-~bringing the total number of cavalry troops performing patrol duty to twenty-two or perhaps twenty— three. In addition to the cavalry, several more detachments of mounted infantry, coast artillery and three companies of the signal corp were also ordered to the border. Troops from as far away as South Dakota and San Francisco were involved in the transfer. The New York Times claimed that the entire international boundary was now being looked after by American troops. Carlos Pereyra, the Mexican charge d' affaires in Washington, was well pleased with America's latest efforts to patrol the border. "With the neutrality of the United States strictly enforced by American troops along the border," Pereyra said, "the trouble will "21 come to an end speedily. The Mexican ambassador submitted his appreciation as well, "for the strict vigilance being 78 exercised along the border to prevent violations of the neutrality laws on the part of the Mexican revolutionists."22 The War Department was also confident that the border assemblage would "be in a position to enforce rigidly the neutrality laws." That confidence was buoyed due to the fact that federal officers were said to be "actively aiding the army by informing them of any revolutionary movement within their knowledge."23 In the Department of Texas alone, fourteen cavalry troops and five companies of infantry occupied eighteen regular stations and a large number of substations along the seven hundred miles of border that they patrolled.24 In his February 6 communication to Knox, the Secretary of War included a memo showing in detail where all of the troops came from and where they were dispersed. (See next page.) By early February, then, the American side of the border was described by a Texas newspaper as a "solid, living mass of troops, marshals and officers of every description. The Mexican side of that same border is one vast blank spot."25 The Eagle Pass News & Guide certainly felt that Uncle Sam was not only doing more than enough, but more than he should to accommodate President Diaz. In addition to all of the troops and the hodgepodge of federal and state officials, the newspaper took exception to the cloak and dagger activity the United States government was doing on behalf of Diaz: 79 Memorandum showing movement of troops to the Mexican border to February 6, 1911. 3rd Cavalry From Fort Sam Houston From Fort Wingate lst Cavalry From Presidio, Cal. 4th Cavalry from Fort Meade 8th Cavalry From Fort Huachuca 23rd Infantry 18th Infantry Whipple Bks. Coast Artillery from Fort Rosecrans Signal Corps troop troop troop troop troop HHHHHNN H troop troops Del Rio troops Eagle Pass Brownsville Fort Hancock Sam Fordyce Minera patrolling from Marfa to Presidio and up and down river. patrolling from Marathon to Boquillas and up and down river. 2 troops at Douglas-—detachment at San troop troop troop t—‘l—‘H 1 troop .I.\ troop troop I—‘H troop troop to?" ~\"' Mounted Bernandino Ranch 17 miles east of Douglas. to go to Calexico, Cal. to go to Yuma to go south to Tucson covering route into Altar district. to go to Nogales troops to go to El Paso (3 troops east of El Paso, 1 troop west of El Paso.) to go to Naco to go to Douglas at Naco at Douglas (Mouth Piedro Pinta Creek detachments(Laredo (Clint (Fabens) From Forts Clark, Bliss, McIntosh. 2 companies from Fort Bliss and 1 from Fort Clark in vicinity of El Paso Mounted detachment at Nogales 1 officer, 30 men at Calexico, Cal. 1 officer, 15 men at Campo, Cal. 1 officer, 50 men on border of Cal near Tia Juana. Co. E to go to Yuma from Presidio S.F. Co. I to go to Nogales from Fort Russell 26 Co. A to go to Texas from Fort Leavenworth 80 By what right the United States officers spy upon and search out rebels against the Mexican Government, and report their findings to the Mexican Government is not clear. To attend meetings of persons opposed to the Mexican Government, to keep a string of Secret Service men all along the border, to spy into everything that is going on and reporting the same to Mexican officials is not maintaining Neutrality. In Uncle Sam's anxiety to help the Mexican Government it appears he is setting a bad precedent.27 This newspaper and many others published on the American side of the border were merely reflecting the Pro Madero sentiments of their respective readers. Like the vast majority of their subscribers, they felt that the United States government was wrong on two counts: 1) The U.S. was doing far too much and Mexico by contrast far too little along the border. 2) In any case, the effort in and of itself was unjust as the U.S. had chosen to assist the wrong side. The Del Rio Herald, for example, wondered disparagingly why their "dear old Uncle Sam" was expending so much man- power "for the purpose of keeping a few Mexicans from this side crossing over to aid their brothers in a just fight for representation in government."28 The San Antonio Light wrote: "The point that rankles is that while the guardians of Uncle Sam's liberty and peace are patiently and thoroughly patrolling this immense stretch of border, the soldiers of the country vitally interested are allowed to follow more pleasant persuits."29 Finally, the Texas Republic stated unhesitatingly that the active assistance being given the Diaz government was holding the revolutionists back: "Since American troops were placed on the Rio Grande border to do 81 patrol duty, the Mexicans have withdrawn their forces into the interior."30 As January turned to February and the border area became increasingly congested, Madero's days as a roving exile were dwindling to a precious few.31 What is significant about Madero's second arrest warrant (issued in late January) and subsequent flight back into Mexico is that it might not have happened if Knox had gotten his way.32 By the end of January, the secretary of state had definitely developed a most formal and "legalistic" position on neutrality--one that, if followed, would have given Madero a free hand in the United States. Knox drew a distinction between a commercial and a hostile expedition. The latter was forbidden while the former was allowed. Knox contended that the Maderistas were above reproach because they were involved in a commercial expedition.33 "The policing of the Mexican border," Knox added in a letter to the American consuls in Mexico, "is a matter for the Mexican Government, and not this Govern— "34 And for de la Barra, Knox had this to say: ment. It is not an offense against the United States to trans- port arms, ammunition, and munitions of war from this country to any foreign country, whether they are to be used in war or not; nor is it an offense against the United States for individuals to leave this country with intent to enlist in foreign military service; nor is it an offense against the United States to transport persons out of this country and land them in foreign countries, although such persons have an intent to enlist in foreign armies; nor is it an offense against the United States to transport from this country persons intending to en- list in foreign armies and munitions of war in the same ship.35 82 Obviously, Knox was stretching the applicable statutes to their limits. Attorney General Wickersham thought the secretary of state had ruptured the entire fabric of the neutrality laws--and he would not stand for it. It was one thing to have to prove that the Maderistas were breaking the law with evidence which would stand up in court--quite another matter to claim, as Knox did, that the laws as written did not apply to the Maderistas. That is, if Wickersham went along with the notion that the Maderistas could say what they wanted and, more importantly, buy all the guns they could afford in the United States, that did ppp give them the right--in the attorney general's View-- to move those same guns across the border. In other words, Wickersham did not subscribe to Knox's argument concerning a difference between a commercial and a hostile expedition. Wickersham's "hardline" position was that persons supplying arms and munitions from the United States and affiliated ip ppy pay in a hostile plot or with hostile purposes against a friendly government were involved in a military, not a commercial enterprise, and were therefore in viola- tion of international law and American statutes.36 In a February 13 letter to Knox, Wickersham blasted the secretary of state for his lack of cooperation and in particular criticized him for the note he had written to the American consuls stating that the policing of the border was wholly Mexico's responsibility. Wickersham took 83 it upon himself to remind the recalcitrant Knox that it was the president's wish that the border be effectively patrolled to prevent hostile undertakings against the existing Mexi- can government. Therefore, over Knox's objections, neutrality enforcement against Madero would remain vigorous.37 Even though Wickersham won out over Knox, it is not clear how the president reacted to this conflict within his inner- circle of advisers. If he did not actively side with his attorney general, he obviously did not interfere with him, either. W. Dirk Raat claims that in this particular instance Taft, as he was wont to do, merely reigned above the confusion and chaos of cabinet politics.38 But since Taft gpyp pyppy indication that he wanted the neutrality laws enforced and the border to be "policied as effectively as our forces will permit,"39 it is hard to imagine how he could have taken Knox's maverick interpreta- tion to heart. That is, it would have been nonsensical for Taft to have said in effect: I want the border adequately patrolled, but on the other hand the secretary of state is right--the Maderistas can do pretty much whatever they please. The State Department, in other words, was trying to single-handedly steer policy in an entirely new direction. While evryone else within the administration--i.e. the consuls, the Justice Department, the War Department etc.-- was carrying out Taft's directive to enforce the neutrality laws in the prescribed manner, Knox and his underlings 84 at State were trying to undercut the entire effort with a policy of their own.40 That Wickersham put his foot down, and Taft did not intercede on Knox's behalf, is thus entirely understandable. As a champion of the law, the president was nevertheless not bound to take Knox's extreme View. When the rebel Colonel, Martin Casillas, was apprehended on February 12 trying to cross the border near Ysleta, Texas, the United States government felt it had what it needed to arrest Madero. The Justice Department could at this point instruct federal marshals to go ahead and arrest Madero and provisional Vice President Abraham Gonzalez based on the "incontrovertible evidence" found on Casillas. Casillas, who was attempting to get across the river to rejoin his command in Chihuahua, was apprehended with a Winchester rifle and 150 cartridges in his possesion.41 Although Knox begged to differ, this was deemed a violation of the neutrality laws. More importantly, Casillas was carrying dispatches for the guerillas in the field which purportedly incriminated Madero and Gonzalez. Casillas' capture thus provided the link; America's border vigilance had paid off. An already antsy Madero, however, had been tipped off by none other than Antonio Lomeli. On February 14, he and Gonzalez left El Paso sooner than planned for Mexico.42 If U.S. persistence proved too little too late to save the highly vulnerable Diaz regime, part of the explanation 85 goes back to Madero's lack of stature as a bonafide revolu- tionary and Diaz's inflated reputation as a strongman. Once the United States was persuaded to take Madero a bit more seriously, it took less than six weeks to obtain the evidence for his arrest. As will be argued later, this probably would not have transpired had the United States not been prevailed upon to strengthen the border patrol. Without a corresponding loss of confidence in Diaz, then, the United States upgraded Madero's status and responded accordingly. There was still no need to push the panic button, but there seemed to be a need to turn up the pressure on Maderismo. Just as Madero's meager stature was beginning to grow, the secretary of state decided to run stiffened interference for him and thus may have delayed the pressure which was subsequently applied to the rebels. This division-~this period of in-fighting which was charac- teristic of the Taft cabinet43--may have retarded but certainly did not kill U.S. efforts to strangle the Maderistas. Still, the feeling persists among certain historians that four months was an inordinate amount of time for Madero's (second) arrest warrant to come down—-that it took this long because the U.S. was buying time for the Mader- istas. But despite a disjointed cabinet and its preconceived notions regarding Diaz and Madero, the Taft administration managed to overcome these built-in handicaps. The neutrality laws, however, were an additional stumbling block; they 86 were not written to stop posthaste the kind of activity the Maderistas were adroitly engaged in. One can say this about the neutrality laws because they were, as we have seen, open to varying interpretations. If Roosevelt had been president at the time, or someone more amenable to Wicker- sham's point-of—view had been in charge of the State Department instead of Knox, the Mexican government may have received the immediate satisfaction it thought it deserved. But in point of fact, the laws were now being interpreted by an entirely different set of individuals who did not happen to see them in the same light. If we could plot where the various interested parties stood in relation to the neutrality statutes and the type of activity the Maderistas were engaged in, it would be safe to say that the Mexican government wanted them arrested for merely being rebels. As rebels, virtually everything they did was to be declared illegal and their breathing privileges suspended. Even if Wickersham had succumbed to this point-of-view, as he apparently did in late November only to be rebuffed by the U.S. attorney in western Texas, it is highly doubtful that President Taft would have ultimately allowed such a debasement of the Constitution to stand. Secretary of State Knox, on the other hand, could point to an 1896 court case which said that the neutrality laws did not prohibit revolutionaries from shipping arms etc. 87 into a foreign country. Knox's interpretation was thus at the other end of the continuum. Knox could also have cited a well-known 1908 case (U.S. vs. Espinosa) whereby it was ruled that for a crime to be commited under the neutrality statutes, an "overt act" to organize or set on foot a military expedition had to be proven. An intention to commit a crime, "mere words written or spoken, though indica- tive of the strongest desire and the most determined purpose to do the forbidden act," did not constitute an offense.44 Knox, therefore, was not entirely off-base when he decided that the Maderistas could do virtually as they pleased in the United States without fear of legal reprisal. For what it is worth, at least one Latin American historian concurs with Knox. Michael Dennis Carman states flatly that the neutrality laws did ppp proscribe the export of war supplies to Mexico."5 President Taft, as previously indicated, was destined to steer a middle course: He rejected the Mexican interpre- tation without swallowing Knox's viewpoint whole. He agreed, for the most part, that "mere words" were not enough to arrest someone. Yet, what was to constitute an "overt act"? Unlike Knox, Wickersham believed that transporting a gun across the border qualified as an overt act. The nation's top lawyer also believed that the type of information found on Casillas was an overt act in the sense that it sufficiently linked Madero to a hostile expedition to 88 overthrow a friendly foreign government. In both cases, Taft either agreed with or at least did not contravene the attorney general. Therefore, the true nature of the neutrali- ty laws--while interesting and highly debatable--is quite irrelevant. What is relevant is that they were ambiguous enough to cause dissension within the cabinet, and when the dust finally settled, the American government continued along a course aimed at interdicting war supplies pp ppg border. It should come as no surprise that the neutrality laws meant different things to different people. Knox could justifiably interpret them one way, Wickersham another way. The Mexican government could construe them in yet another manner because justice in Diaz-controlled Mexico always came down to what the dictator thought it should be. Thus, if the Mexican government had trouble understanding the hazy nature of the neutrality laws, especially in the hands of a legalistic president and his divided cabinet (or corporate lawyers), perhaps they can be forgiven. For anyone else, however, who wonders why the existing laws were not immediatly applied to put the Maderistas out of business, some appreci- ation of these circumstances is absolutely essential. When the New York Times reported somewhat euphemistically that the United States was placing additional troops on the border in response to "representations from the Mexican 89 embassy,' it meant that the Diaz regime was unrelenting throughout January about the unsatisfactory state of affairs on the frontier.46 In short, Mexico continued to believe that the U.S. was letting too many rebels and too much rebel contraband get through to the insurgents in the northern tier of states. American officials always denied this, of course, but that did not stop the Mexicans 47 Ambassador Wilson's from making their numerous claims. January 24 letter to the State Department is reflective of Mexico's critical attitude: I have the honor to enclose to the Department herewith in translation, for its information, a copy of a letter from General Villar, who is at present operating in the northern part of the country, to President Diaz, in which he complains somewhat bitterly of a fancied laxness of the American authorities along the Texas border in permitting Mexican malcontents to carry on operations of various kinds from the American side... During an interview with President Diaz a few days ago he expressed himself in the same vein, intimating that a stricter patrol should be enforced.48 So in response to heightened Mexican pressure which was itself triggered (or at least assisted) by the specter of rebel successes in January against the crumbling federal army, the United States issued a second arrest warrant for Madero and sent enough troops to the border to patrol it from one end to the other."9 Not only did this please the Mexican government, it also paid palpable dividends. With- out the increased military presence, for example, the chances of capturing Casillas would have been significantly reduced. Therefore, it can be argued that it was responsible 90 for forcing Madero and Gonzalez out of the country before they wanted to leave. Further evidence indicates that the American build up had a negative impact on Maderista activities. In January, rebel commander Pascual Orozco was planning an attack on Ciudad Juarez, across the Rio Grande from El Paso. As Orozco's rebel army approached Juarez, he called on the junta in El Paso for an infusion of recruits and provisions. Despite the fact that Gonzalez had organized a ring of contraband artists to assist him in getting munitions from small border towns in Texas to the guerillas in the Chihuahua mountains, his prodigious efforts to resupply Orozco in this instance proved minimally successful: He could only manage to send Orozco twenty-five men and three mules loaded with weapons. Although Gonzalez worked incessantly to obtain enough guns and recruits, he made little headway as the U.S. government tightened its grip along the border.50 In the meantime, the Mexican army was reinforced and as a result Orozco had to postpone his much anticipated attack on Juarez. Besides Casillas, several other Maderistas were eventually arrested and held for grand jury examination.51 Further- more, U.S. border officials were forever adamant that very little large scale smuggling was going on under their noses. On occasion, U.S. vigilance along the border paid off big. In late January, for example, a Third Cavalry patrol happened upon a "well constructed underground arsenal" capable of 91 storing "several thousand guns and an immense quantity of ammunition." The army actually confiscated a total of 675 guns and 7,000 cartridges. The arsenal was located three hundred yards from the Rio Grande, twenty—five miles south of Del Rio, Texas. The New York Times reported that the arsenal had been in place for some time but had fallen into disuse due to the fact that the area was being closely guarded by American patrols. The guns and the ammunition had been packed in boxes which looked as if they had been in the underground passage for many weeks.52 This incident points to two things: While the government was trying to patrol the border effectively, it was not an easy chore. The newspaper account of this discovery said that the arsenal probably would have remained undetected had it not been for what amounted to a piece of blind luck-~i.e. one of the horses put its hoof through a rotted timber which happened to be part of the roof of a passageway leading to the dugout. One can only wonder how many such well-concealed arsenals the cavalry did not find.53 And for every Colonal Casillas who was apprehended, who can say how many insurgents slipped through to fight again in Mexico.54 In other words, despite U.S. efforts to arrest Maderistas and choke off their supplies, border enforcement was undoubtedly a hit-and-miss proposition. A number of factors accounted for this. Even though the United States had deployed some 1,500 troops to watch and 92 guard the border,55 this still only averaged out to one man per mile. Obviously, prior to March 6 when the president ordered no fewer than 20,000 troops to the frontier, this meant that there were gaps which the Maderistas could exploit.56 The Maderista cause was also an extremely popular one among the people who lived in close proximity to the border.57 While the New York Times was running down the rebels as a gang of cowardly crackpots, the local citizenry was embracing the Maderistas as heros. Crowds often gathered on the lawn of the Mexican consulate to shout vivas to Madero and mueras to Diaz. On New Year's eve in El Paso, Americans and Mexicans alike staged an exuberant demonstration on Madero's behalf. Such incidents happened frequently in 1911.58 Ellsworth, for one, complained bitterly about the assistance the rebels were getting from the local people.59 And in February, General J.W. Duncan stated that he was "convinced that the populace...on both sides of the river, not only Mexican but to some extent American, are in sympathy with the revolutionary move- ment in Mexico." Duncan, who was surveying conditions along the border, concluded that these people would not hesi- tate to give aid and comfort to the rebels so long as it did not entail any special risk.6O Practically speaking, the locals helped the rebel cause in a number of ways. One reason the 150 Customs' agents (and the cavalry for that matter) made so few arrests 93 was because smugglers were often well-informed of their locations and movements by sympathetic Maderista collabora- tors.61 The smugglers themselves were often relative un— knowns recruited from the indigenous population. They were used by Madero's agents to get contraband past government officials and troops who spent most of their time watching more well-known revolutionists.621n response to yet another Mexican complaint, Luther Ellsworth confirmed that a lot of Mexicans were indeed crossing the border--but what of it? Ellsworth maintained that they were common laborers merely returning to Mexico after having worked for a time in the United States.63 But these were the kind of innocuous looking people that could be used by the junta in the afore- mentioned ways. (They were also crossing the border to join the ranks of the rebel army as it increased in size through- out the first half of 1911.) In addition to more elaborate schemes, lone individuals could contribute to the rebel cause by getting small amounts of contraband across the border. Presumably, cartridges and small arms could be hidden in ubiquitous knapsacks and under loose fitting clothing. Even a simple wagon could surreptitiously transport something more sizable, as when Gonzalez employed a farm family to smuggle a cannon (stolen from in front of El Paso 64 Finally, City Hall) past unsuspecting border guards. there is this letter from Eugene Nolty to the attorney general which tells of Maderismo's popularity and the 94 practical difficulties it was causing the government: I believe it is a conservative estimate to say that 90 percent or more, of the citizens of El Paso are avowed declarants of their sympathy for the revolutionary movement in Mexico, and the same percentage, I should say, exists all along the border. An outspoken sympathizer of the Mexican government is almost unheard of...Myself and deputies are constantly exercising the vigilance your letter above referred to admonishes, and in addition there to we have worked in conjunction with the Army and Bureau of Investigation representatives, affording them all the assistance at our command. But, universal sentiment practically approving of the landing assistance to the Insurrection Movement in Mexico, and assisting in the secrecy thereof, it approaches well nigh impos- sible for any officers, or any number of officers, to procure the evidence necessary to afford affirmative proof of the final destination this ammunition finds.65 The Maderista high echelon was thus playing a well-thought out shell game with the local people acting as their invalu- able assistants. In order to avoid detection, Gonzalez used a variety of slight-of—hand methods to move supplies-— first to El Paso, and from there ship them illegally and circuitously into Mexico. His inability to reprovision Orozco notwithstanding, Gonzalez had success--at least in terms of getting smaller arms and ammunition into the hands of his comrades fighting on the other side of the frontier. At times, he shipped contraband (always camouflaged in tool chests or the like) to remote parts of southern New Mexico where they could be hauled across the border into western Chihuahua. Smaller loads he often managed to carry into Mexico by himself.66 What it boils down to is that there were ways to get guns and ammunition past the watchful Americans--and Gonzalez sought them out.67 95 While Magon and his PLM cohorts came out of jail in 1910 breathing fire and advocating violence, Madero by contrast only asked to be afforded-"the hospitality which all free peoples have always accorded to those from other lands who strive for liberty."68 Unlike the Magonistas, then, both he and Abraham Gonzalez had the good sense to endear themselves to an American populace that had already caught wind of the foul stench emanating from Porfirian Mexico.69 In addition to Madero's own highly effective propoganda campaign to discredit Diaz, outside books and articles began to appear which did nothing but tarnish don Porfirio's image in the United States. Diaz's good press began to erode late in his regime with the publication of Herman Whitaker's The Planter (a novel) and Carlos de Fornaro's, Diaz, Czar pf Mexico. Barbarous Mexico, by the socialist author and activist John Kenneth Turner, was another blatantly anti-Diaz book that came out in late 1910. Beginning in October of the previous year, installments of Barbarous Mexico were seria- . . . . 70 . llzed 1n American Magaz1ne. Not only was Turner certain that Taft was solidly behind Diaz, he also believed that his book had a profound impact on American public opinion.71 President Madero purportedly told him as much in January of 1913: "I haven't time to tell you what he said at all, though I might say he said that Barbarous Mexico had helped him verv much in the Revolution of 1910, as it gave the 96 American people the knowledge that he was fighting for liberty."72 Not only was Madero endearing himself to a border popu- lation that was rather easily won over, he was also doing his best to pass himself off as something far less than the leader of an armed insurrection to overthrow Diaz. Prior to November 20 at least, Madero publicly predicted a revolution to overthrow Diaz, but tried to distance him- self from it. Referring to the rebels not as his followers, but rather as "independents" whose only quarrel was with Diaz, Madero said that he did not know who was furnishing them with the money to buy arms and ammunition--"if such "73 Madero, things are being bought outside the republic. then, was just a guy working-—in his own quiet way——to make Mexico free. It is highly doubtful that any know— ledgeable person was fooled by Madero's dumb act. But like his hospitality plea, it was indicative of the Madero modus operandi-—an m.o. that served his organization well.74 In a word, the revolutionary leaders were cautious--or, better yet, they were exceedingly circumspect. Unlike the Magonistas with all their bravado, Madero and Gonzalez realized that if they wanted to extend their stay in the United States, the last thing they could afford to do was throw caution to the wind. Whereas the Magonistas were angry at the whole capitalist world and consequently lashed out at it whenever possible, Madero's only grievance 97 was with the dictator in Mexico City. Uncle Sam's laws, therefore, were not to be flouted--but treated (at least outwardly) with deference and respect. Publicly as well as privately, Madero and Gonzalez promised to be good, law—abiding temporary residents of the United States.75 Every move they made, then, was with at least one wary eye peeled on the ambiguous neutrality laws. They seemed to understand that the neutrality laws were a double-edged sword: capable of either protecting them or, if mishandled, equally adept at cutting their movement to pieces. As a result, the Maderistas hired prominent (and expensive) lawyers to help them stay legal. Madero's cautious attitude was manifested in a number of different ways: In addition to calling his revolutionary program the Plan of San Luis Potosi and back-dating it October 5, Madero waited until he was back on national soil to proclaim himself provisional president.76 And when rebels crossed into Mexico to do battle with the federal army, they were enjoined to do so unarmed--or at any rate to make an armed crossing either inconspicuously or at an unguarded location.77 To cross any other way (as Colonel Casillas apparently did) was an open invitation to arrest. Rebel recruitment was done discretly; and when lots of ammunition were found, Madero did all he could to ensure 78 that they could not be tied to him. In November of 1910, for instance, federal officials found high-powered rifles seen 98 purchased by a Hugo Griesenback. Despite being a well-known "friend of Francisco Madero's," Griesenback claimed that the rifles were bought for speculative purposes and denied that they were intended for a revolutionary movement. Madero, moreover, denied having any connection with the purchase.79 Under the circumstances, the government was powerless to arrest anyone.8O Government agents could and did discover munition lots but because Madero was mindful not to leave a paper trail, they could not prove that he was involved. If possible, the government seized the material on the spot. Failing or disdaining that strategy, they instead tried to follow it on a winding path to the border where it could be confiscated as contraband--hopefully with prominent Maderistas in tow as a bonus for all their efforts. Francisco Madero, then, did not make himself an easy target for law enforcement officials seeking his arrest. Men like Ellsworth and the attorney general who were all too eager to incarcerate Madero would have to stay vigilant and be ready when he or someone else in the organization slipped up. This is exactly what happened. In the meantime, the Maderistas went about their business with the knowledge that they were under close scrutiny. They knew, in short, that the Creel International Detective Agency--among others-— had been assigned the task of bringing them down. The Maderistas either had to cope with the forces arrayed against them, or else go the way of the Magonistas in 1907. 99 In addition to providing legal advice--i.e. keeping his clients clear of the neutrality laws—-Washington attorney Sherburne G. Hopkins acted as counsel and director of Madero's scret service in the United States. As such, Hopkins performed a variety of vital functions: He countered Diaz's propoganda campaign against Madero in the United States; protected the Maderistas from the Mexican govern— ment's on going "campaign of deportation"; kept many of Madero's followers out of jail or arranged for the release of others; funneled monies to various operatives and super- vised their covert activities; dispatched agents to Mexico on sabotage and espionage missions; acted as an inter- mediary in arranging for the transportation of arms and munitions from New York and St. Louis to Texas; hired others to transport munitions on Madero's behalf (men like Hugo Griesenback); coordinated the activities of Madero's agents with private investigators hired in the U.S.82 In short, Hopkins was Madero's answer to Enrique Creel.83 Abraham Gonzalez had given up his short-lived career as an inept field commander to work more or less behind the 84 Most of scenes as Madero's right-hand man in El Paso. his time there was spent disarming the American authorities with an upfront attitude which gave him the latitude he needed to ppm his fellow rebels on the other side of the river.85 Gonzalez was also responsible for hiring a shadowy figure by the name of C.F.Z. Caracristi who in 100 turn managed to subvert Mexican consuls--including the one stationed in El Paso, Antonio Lomeli.86 In exchange for $3,000, Lomeli provided information about federal troop movements in Chihuahua. He also conducted the aforementioned misinformation campaign which exasperated U.S. officials who wasted precious time, resources and patience running down Lomeli's pipg. As already noted, when Lomeli charged the U.S. with laxity and incompetence late in 1910, it engendered a sharp rebuttal from Eugene Nolty. In sum, Lomeli's activities were undertaken to divide the authori- ties, generate confusion, undermine credibility and overtax the manpower resources of the United States government.87 He seems to have succeeded on all counts. Lomeli was not the only consul compromised by Caracristi. San Antonio based consul Enrique Ornelas and four of his subordinates were also successfully bribed.88 All of these purchases-~whether of men (Hopkins, Caracristi, Lomeli, Ornelas etc.) or material to fight the war--cost a great deal of money. Some historians (and others who were close to the situation such as Henry Lane Wilson) have speculated that Standard Oil financed Madero's operation.89 In all probability, however, Madero's financial backing came from other sources, principally from his brother Gustavo who acquired $500,000 in an embezzlement scheme involving a French construction company. The entire Madero family, for that matter, was in a position to chip-in with large 101 90 . . . sums of money. The 1mportant p01nt to be made here 18 that with or without Standard Oil, Madero had the wherewithal (albeit by the skin of his teeth) to finance his revolution. According to Hopkins, the entire effort cost between a million and a million and a half dollars92 In short, while Madero himself was often living hand-to-mouth, he had the resources to buy a professional organization--"an operation that had none of the amateurism characteristic of other revoltoso groups."93 Madero's efforts to match the opposi- tion spy for spy, lawyer for lawyer and informant for informant were successful enough to keep him in business until the rebel fighters in the field were of sufficient strength to carry the day against Diaz's army. 102 1Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 66. 2Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. 67. 31bid., I, pt. 1, p. 69. "RDS, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/504. On or about November 26, Ellsworth cabled the State Department that the Madero revolution was "slowly terminating." But just the same, he asked that federal officers along the border maintain their vigilance. It was, Ellsworth said, "absolutely necessary" for them to do so. See RDS, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/483. 5If anything, Ellsworth's team of rebel—busters got too big for its own good. In late December, Ellsworth asked Wickersham for officers from the Department of Justice to assist him. His request was granted. See Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, pp. 103—104. According to Michael Dennis Carman, there were about 150 Customs agents patrolling the inter- national boundary. See Michael Dennis Carman, United States Customs and the Madero Revolution (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 19765, p. 4. Nolte's letter indicates perhaps a dozen or so marshals doing border patrol work in Texas. There were an undetermined number of Bureau of Investigation and Treasury Secret Service agents assigned to the border-- plus up to eighty Texas Rangers, and occasionally the National Guard was pressed into service by Governor O.B. Colquitt. See Don M. Coerver and Linda B. Hall, Texas and the Mexican Revolution: A Stud in State and National Border Policy (San Antonio: Trinity, 19845, pp. 21-24. This is in addition to local law enforcement officials, private detectives and dozens of Diaz's own Mexican agents. At this stage, there were not many troops assigned to the frontier, but by late January they would start adding to the border congestion. It became so confusing that in March, Ells- worth--who was still doing his best to coordinate border espionage--cried out that nothing could get done until the number of agents was reduced. See Beezley, Insurgent Governor, p. 57. 6Raat, Revoltosos, pp. 188-190. Ellsworth's role is discussed here. In conjunction with other federal officials, for example, he conducted numerous undercover assignments which culminated in the idea of a special frontier secret service as well as a police network that stretched from Brownsville, Texas to Nogales, Arizona. 103 7Ibid., p. 235; In terms of not understanding the neutrality laws, Carman maintains that Ellsworth, like so many other U.S. officials, confused the neutrality laws with the customs laws. In other words, American officials along the border always assumed—-erroniously according to Carman—-that the neutrality statutes prohibited munitions exports. Customs laws, on the other hand, merely required that all exports pass through ports of entry. Therefore, CarmaHTE contention is that U.S. border officials mistakenly thought that the two laws overlapped and since the rebels were breaking them on both counts, they went after them with a vengeance. So while Ellsworth and his colleagues may well have been confused, they were nevertheless going after the rebels as if their duty was clear. See Carman, United States Customs, p. 33. 8No thanks to their superiors, the men from the various departments--e.g. Customs, Justice and Immigration-~were by Ellsworth's own estimation fiercely loyal to him. Ellsworth's complaint was not with them, rather it was with their superiors because the latter did not properly instruct the former. Ellsworth wanted complete cooperation all along the line-—from the top as well as the bottom. See RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/611. 9Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 67. 10Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. 68. 11R0s, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/472. The Departments of California and Colorado were also authorized to use troops to aid civil officers in enforcing the neutrality laws. 12Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 70. 13RDS, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/472. 14Ibid., vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/472. 15Ibid., vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/570 (enclosure). Hoyt explained his decision to the Adjutant General this way: 104 "Upon receipt of the statement from the Mexican authorities to the effect that the revolutionary movement in Northern Mexico was practically at an end, except in Chihuahua, and also in accordance with the results of my own investigation, I concluded to concentrate the two troops at the Rio Grande-- at Del Rio and Eagle Pass--at Fort Clark, for convenience in supplying them. Unless some emergency intervenes I intend to return the troops at Fort Sam Houston at an early date." Arthur Thayer, Captain of the Third Cavalry, writing to the Adjutant General on November 24 regarding the activities of Troop K assigned to the Del Rio area, said as follows: "It seems to me that the situation here up to the present time could have been very easily and thoroughly handled by six or eight special deputies of the U.S. Marshals, and I believe that that situation will probably continue for some time to come." Thayer was convinced that the troops were on hand as a "preventive" measure. "Whether later developments will change 'preventive' to 'corrective' remains to be seen.’ Other officers assigned to the border echoed Thayer's senti- ments. See C.B. Hagadorn's letter to Knox of November 24 and Lieutenant Matt C. Bristol's letter to Hoyt of November 21, RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/507 (enclosures). As for the infantry detached to Minera, they were recalled to Fort McIntosh on or about January 7, 1911. The commanding officer of the 23rd Infantry noted that while "the people of this section generally favor the revolutionary party...thus far we have been unable to discover any real violation of the neutrality laws." He also said, "should the Mexican authorities call upon me for further assistance I shall continue to respond in order to impress upon them our desire to faithfully enforce the law." See RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/651 (enclosure). 16RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/487, 812.00/489, 812.00/614. As General Hoyt and his officers also concluded, the American consul in Nogales (Sonora) did not consider the troops stationed in his area at all necessary. "The international line," he said, "is constantly patrolled by mounted customs inspectors of both the Mexican and American customs services and it is not believed that any contraband arms are passing into Mexico." Conditions, he said, were ordinary. See RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/528. 17Ibid., vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/582. 18New York Times, January 29, 1911. 19FRUS, p. 395, 812.00/672. 105 20New York Times, January 29, 1911. 21Ibid., February 4, 1911. 22FRUS, pp. 401-402, 812.00/744. 23New York Times, February 4, 1911. Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 180. On his inspection tour, General Duncan (who had replaced Hoyt as the Depart- ment commander) reported that these men were "performing their duty with intelligence and enthusiasm." 251bid., I, pt. 1, p. 165. 26Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. 143. 27Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. 164. 28Ibid., 1, pt. 1, pp. 182-183. 291bid., I, pt. 1, p. 190. 3°Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. 190. 31Right around the time that the second arrest warrant was issued--January 26--Madero, who was fearful of being taken into custody, left San Antonio for Dallas where he remained until he was ready to return to the border. Once in El Paso, Madero shaved off his beard in anticipation of having to elude authorities as he escaped back into Mexico. He was not acting like a man among generous hosts. See Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 126. 320m January 24, 1911-—a couple of days before Madero's second arrest warrant was issued--Knox told de la Barra that, contrary to what the Mexican ambassador believed, there was no way the United States could seek Madero's 106 arrest: "This Government," Knox said, "has spared and will spare no effort in its endeavors to see that its interna- tional obligations are fully met, but, as you are aware, notwithstanding the numerous charges which have been here- tofore made against various persons regarding their unneutral conduct on American territory, it has, so far, been impossible for this Government to secure evidence of such unneutral conduct sufficient to justify putting the accused parties upon trial, to say nothing of securing a conviction." See RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/655. Little did Knox know that the attorney general was about to put him in his place! 33Raat, Revoltosos, pp. 231-233; Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 133. Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson made reference to this distinction in a February 11, 1911 note to the Mexican embassy: "Inasmuch as commercial trading in arms and ammunition is forbidden neither by the rules of international law nor by the so-called neutrality statutes of the Federal Government, it is not possible for the Federal Executive to prohibit such transactions." 34Raat, Revoltosos, p. 232; FRUS, pp. 398-400, 812.00/672a (no. 915. 35Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, pp. 126-128. 36Raat, Revoltosos, p. 233. 37lbid., pp. 232-233. 38Ibid., p. 233. 39Ibid., p. 233. Wickersham is quoting Taft here. Knox replied that he had been present at the cabinet briefing to which Wickersham had referred, but that he did not under- stand that the president intended to exceed the legal limita- tions of the neutrality laws. Knox did pp; dispute Wicker- sham's assertion that Taft wanted to cut off the flow of guns and ammunition to Mexico, but insisted that enforce- ment of the neutrality laws would not accomplish that objective. See Carman, United States Customs, p. 40. One wonders, then, what Knox had in mind as an alternative to the neutrality laws. An 1898 congressional resolution allowed the president to embargo arms at his discretion. Taft, however, doubted the legitimacy of applying the law to the 107 Mexican situation because it was intended to prevent the export of war supplies to an enemy of the United States. Since the U.S. had no declared enemies in this instance, the legalistic Taft disdained use of the 1898 measure. See Ibid., p. 46‘ 40Anderson, William Howard Taft, p. 132. This and other biographers maintain that President Taft allowed his cabinet heads a tremendous amount of leeway--to the point, Anderson says, that "each department grew into an independent fief— dom which aggravated the political turmoil." Cabinet appointees often harassed and bullied Taft who rarely if ever retaliated. Besides the secretary of war, Knox was the only member of the cabinet whom the president truly liked. Carman states that Taft encouraged Knox to conduct State Department business without interference from anyone, including the chief executive. They had agreed, more or less, that the State Department was Knox's show to run as he saw fit. See Carman, United States Customs, p. 39. 41Beezley, Insur ent Governor, p. 52; Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 160. 2Beezley, Insurgent Governor, pp. 52-53. 43Anderson, William Howard Taft, p. 132. 44Raat, Revoltosos, pp. 152-153. 45Carman, United States Customs, p. 33. 46FRUS, p. 386, 812.00/647, no. 659. On January 16, 1911, the Mexican embassy wrote a particularly biting note which set forth the activities of the rebels on the U.S. side of the border. It alleged flagrant violations of the neutrality laws and again requested that the guilty parties be prosecuted. Three days later, the Mexican embassy wrote another note protesting Madero's activities. De la Barra, in short, thought the United States had all the proof it needed to have Madero arrested. See Ibid., p. 392, 812.00/655, no. 677. 47lbid., p. 380, 812.00/586, no. 371. On December 29, 108 1910, for instance, the secretary of state told de la Barra that the "proper American authorities" on the frontier—- i.e. Ellsworth, the commander at Fort Bliss and the repre- sentatives of the Departments of Justice and Treasury-~were certain that no infractions of the neutrality laws had taken place, and all of the rumors to the contrary had so far proven groundless. On January 5, 1911, Ellsworth once again denied that the neutrality laws were being broken in connec- tion with the shipment of arms and ammunition to Mexico. See Ibid, p. 384, 812.00/630. There are actually numerous examples on file of American officials saying, in effect, that they were vigilant and no large-scale smuggling was going on. 48Ibid., p. 395, 812.00/684, no. 340. Carman maintains that the second mobilization in early February occured due to the impending invasion of Ciudad Juarez. See Carman, United States Customs, p. 31. 50Beezley, Insurgent Governor, p. 52. 51Raat, Revoltosos, p. 234. 52New York Times, January 27, 1911. 53Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 2, pp. 351-357. U.S. Marshal C.G. Brewster reported to the attorney general on May 5, 1911 that they had found seven cases of Springfield rifles and 40,000 cartridges which were stored in a railroad station in Laredo, Texas. As was customary--i.e. pertaining to administration policy--instead of confiscating it, the officials kept the stash under surveillance until it crossed illegally into Mexico. On a second occasion, Brewster and his men found eight cases of Mauser rifles (192 in all) and 61,000 Mauser cartridges which were being kept in a railroad warehouse. Again, the highly suspicious freight was followed to the border. Brewster's men found three different shipments in Brownsville, Texas of arms and ammunition--and once again they kept a sharp eye on them. 54Carman, United States Customs, pp. 32-33. Carman reports that besides Casillas, the army managed to 109 occasionally arrest other armed revolutionaries. A patrol guided by a mounted Customs inspector (the latter often served as guides and scouts for the army) arrested five armed insurgents in February north of Presidio, Texas and subsequently charged them with violation of the neutrality laws as well as smuggling. The highly identifiable army patrols, however, do not appear to have made many such arrests. 55Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 188. This figure of 1,500 was supplied by the San Antonio Light newspaper. 56Ellsworth conceded that certain, highly remote, areas with its mountainous terrain were "ideal for revolu- tionary purposes." He was referring to the Big Bend section of Texas. See RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/547. 57Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 156. Perhaps in response to the rebel's overwhelming popularity, the governor of Texas was moved to issue a roclamation on February 11 calling upon the citizenry to 'refrain from, in any manner, encouraging, aiding abetting or participating in the Viola— tion of the neutrality laws of the United States." All railways etc. were directed "not to accept for transportation any contraband goods." Governor Colquitt was very enthusiastic when it came to stopping the Maderistas. In a letter to the president, he assured Taft that he was cooperating fully with the special ambassador to the United States from Mexico in the enforcement of the neutrality laws. "I have directed Captain Jno. R. Hughes, of the State Rangers, to keep a sharp lookout for Francisco I. Madero...I have also asked Captain Hughes to take Madero in custody for the violation of neutrality laws if he can locate him in Texas." Whether he knew it or not, Madero was by this time (February 23) back in Mexico--and not coming back. Colquitt also wondered if it might be possible for the United States to cross into Mexico "with sufficient force" and apprehend the rebels there. See Ibid., I, pt. 1, pp. 171-172. Taft, however, had to disabuse him of this idea. See FRUS, pp. 414-415, 812.00/854. 58H anrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, pp. 118-119. 59RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/549. 110 60Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 179. 61Carman, United States Customs, p. 24. 62Ibid., p. 59. 63Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 105. 64Raat, Revoltosos, pp. 216-217. 65Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 2, pp. 336-337. 66Beezley, Insur ent Governor, pp. 44-47. See this for a fuller account of Gonzalez's methods. 67Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, pp. 149-150. Gonzalez did not take these extreme precautions for nothing. As the following from Luther Ellsworth attests, the American authorities were on guard: "The efficient corps of Special Agents of the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice in this city and the towns of the American border, are following up very closely considerable, apparently very important, Revolutionary matters that may disclose viola- tions of the Neutrality Laws by the chief members of the Revolutionary Junta in San Antonio, Texas, but I can at the present time say nothing of that work because of the secrecy absolutely necessary to success in such matters. However," Ellsworth continued on February 10 to Secretary Knox, "I do know that those agents are doing effective work and that as 'Special Representative for the Department of Justice,’ I am consulted with and fully cognizant of all their movements. We are carefully going over the bills of lading of all shipments of Freight, Express etc., leaving this city (San Antonio) and other towns in the Border, for Border points, and think we have things so systemized as to frustrate any attempts to move Munitions of war over the LIne into the Mexican Border." For another indication of U.S. vigilance and the lengths to which American officials sought out contraband, see C.G. Brewster's letter to the attorney general, Ibid., I, pt. 2, pp. 351-357. 68RDs, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/353. "Manifesto Issued by Madero to the People of the United States." 111 691bid., vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/583. Ellsworth noted on December 17, 1910, that the revolutionists in Texas were comporting themselves very well toward all. 70John Kenneth Turner (Introduction by Sinclair Snow), Barbarous Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), p. xxii. Eventually, Turner's articles were discontinued as the magazine stopped publishing them after only three installments. Nevertheless, the book was "enthusiastically received" in the United States and obtained mostly favorable reviews in many noted publications. In June of 1910, the House of Representatives looked into Turner's charges that the U.S. was cooperating with Diaz to persecute Mexican political refugees. The publicity given the hearings "enhanced the fame of Turner...and created sympathy for the Mexican rebels in the approaching conflict." 711bid., pp. 232-233. 72Ibid., p. xxvi. 73New York Times, November 19, 1910. 74Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 120. Cumberland states that Madero never tried to hide the fact that he had come to the United States to lead a movement to overthrow Diaz. Cumberland paraphrases Madero as having said in early October that his only mission in the United States was to organize a revolution against the dictatorial government. Stanley Ross, on the other hand, states that Madero had to deny he was organizing a revolution, although everyone knew he was. He took this tact, according to Ross, to avoid an open challenge to the neutrality laws and also for the protection of those who remained in Mexico. See Ross, Francisco I. Madero, p. 113. A careful reading of Madero's Manifesto which he issued in early October reveals the fol- lowing: First of all, Madero vilified Diaz as a corrupt dictator who stole the election from him. Secondly, as the rightful president of Mexico, it was now incumbent upon Madero to do something about the fraud that was imposed upon Mexico. Thirdly, as the popularly acclaimed guardian of Mexico's liberty, Madero declared that he came to the United States to "secure refuge where I may prosecute my efforts towards Liberty, where I may comply with those obligations imposed on me by love of Country and by the 112 confidence which my compatriots have reposed in me, with the hope that I may save them from the burden of that dark dictator- ship which, for more than thirty years, has been superimposed above them." Madero then told his American audience that he came here--not looking for aid--just hospitality. Madero concluded by saying that he was sure that the American people would understand his ambition to "conquer for my dear Country that happiness which they, themselves, enjoy." Lastly, Madero stated that he did not necessarily wish to be president as much as he desired to be Mexico's "savior from the tyranny with which she is oppressed." See RDS, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/353. All Madero really said was that he intended to restore liberty etc. to Mexico. He did not offer any specifics; that is he did not sa ppy--merely what. There are, after all, a lot of (nonviolent ways one can further the cause of liberty. He could therefore maintain-— as he did in this instance to the American people via the New York Times--that the armed insurrection to topple Diaz was not part of his effort to "conquer" happiness for his people. And future historians--Cumberland and Ross being prime examples--could interpret his carefully chosen words in sharply divergent ways. 75Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 123. 76Beezley, Insurgent Governor, p. 41. This tactic, Beezley says, reduced the chances of prosecution under the neutrality laws. 77New York Times, January 1, 1911. 78Henderson, Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands, p. 15. The author explains a bit more fully Madero's cautious dealings-—"which no doubt saved him from an early arrest." For example, Henderson cites how Madero chastized careless operatives like Eugenio Rodriguez who "sent a telegram describing his activities. Madero 'found it strange that the telegram was addressed in my name, because it is highly inconvenient,' and added that all communications should be addressed to Bruno, at 309 Dwyer Avenue." 79New York Times, November 17, 1910. 80At any rate, Griesenback's "war material" was placed under surveillance by officers of the Bureau of Investigation 113 and U.S. marshals. See RDS, vol. 1, roll 10, 812.00/504. In January, Ellsworth told Knox that since the United States District Attorney advised against seizing Griesenback's property, "the referred to munitions of war may eventually reach the Rebels and they may not, all depends on who is the purchaser." See Ibid., vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/650. 81C.G. Brewster's letter to Wickersham illustrates how U.S. officials handled munitions lots. See Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 2, pp. 351-357. 82Raat, Revoltosos, pp. 214-215. 83Senate Documents, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 10, "Investigation of Mexican Affairs" (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), pp. 2520-2574. Hopkins described his job this way: "I spent the most of my time for eight months in giving them the best advice I knew how to give in regard to the best manner of deposing the Diaz government." 84Beezley, Insurgent Goverppp, pp. 43-44. Gonzalez led two unsuccessful attacks against federal forces in December--one at Ojinaga and the other at El MUlato. "After his unsuccessful military venture, Gonzalez decided he could best fulfill his military-administrative obliga— tions by directing the revolutionary movement from El Paso." 85Ibid., pp. 44-45. A good example of Gonzalez's upfront attitude can be found in the discussion he had with Special Agent J. Herbert Cole. Gonzalez told Cole that he had "taken consel of eminent lawyers both of Mexico and the United States, and that it was the intention of the so- called revolutionists to avoid in every possible way any charges of violating our Neutrality Laws." In the same vein, Gonzalez informed Cole that the revolution was a matter of principle and it was the "wish of every revolu- tionary patriot to maintain the friendliest feelings with the government of the United States and with American citizens in Mexico." See Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, p. 123. 86Beezley, Insur ent Governor, pp. 46-47. Rebel success in creating a clandestine intelligence apparatus "was counterbalanced by the system of spies and informers 114 working for the Mexican and U.S. governments. Luther Ellsworth had enlisted five Mexican informers who joined the Madero organization in San Antonio and provided regular reports of the junta's activities." 87W. Dirk Raat, "The Diplomacy of Suppression: Los Revoltosos, Mexico, and the United States, 1906-1911," Hispanic American Historical Review 56 (November 1976): pp. - O. 88 . W1ckersham found out about Ornelas' turncoat status in December when a certain Judge Griner informed on him to a Bureau of Investigation agent. See RDS, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/535. 89The reference is rather cryptic, but Wilson says that Madero was aided by "American and European capital-- enlisted in the cause by promises of concessions or preferential favours." See Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, p. 205. 90Raat, Revoltosos, pp. 223-224. 91It is readily apparent that Madero was not lavishing money on himself as he had to resort to such measures as eating one meal a day and having his laundry done on credit. See Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 125. 92Raat, Revoltosos, p. 224. Hopkins also testified that to the best of his knowledge (which was substantial) the revolutionary party in the United States garnered absolutely no money from any American interests--neither companies, corporations nor individuals. Toward the end, the Maderistas sought a loan from a French concern, but according to Hopkins it never materialized. See Senate Documents, pp. 2527-2537. 93Raat, Revoltosos, p. 224. SIX THE FINAL ACT By the time Madero was forced to cross back into Mexico sooner than planned,1 his growing movement was nonetheless showing signs that it would triumph over the smallish, ineffective Mexican army. The rebels could claim around 10,000 fighters as spring began, which meant that the conventional army of Porfirio Diaz only outnumbered them by a two to one ratio. When the revolution began, by contrast, the ratio was more like ten to one in favor of the federals.2 The rebels, moreover, were disrupting and/or destroying enemy communication and supply lines which made combat all the more miserable for an already beseiged federal army.3 Several small towns in Chihuahua belonged to the rebels upon Madero's return. Indeed, they controlled the Sierra Madre Occidental from the United States border to Tepic and Zacatecas.4 Even though things were looking up for the Maderistas, the military issue as of March was far from settled. Madero still needed a convincing military accomplishment to establish cohesiveness in his movement and also to convince the majority of fence—sitting Mexicans that his side was superior. Madero disdained an attack on Ciudad Juarez and instead turned his attention to Casas Grandes where, on March 6, 115 116 he made his debut as a military leader. The attack failed, and in the process Madero proved his ineffectiveness as a field commander.6 Having repulsed the ill-advised rebel attack, the federals nevertheless squandered a golden opportunity to score the kind of resounding military success that Diaz so badly needed as reinforcement for his faltering government.7 What should have been an utter debacle for the rebels became instead a temporary setback which they could and did recover from.8 After the near disaster at Casas Grandes, Madero wisely relinquished military authority to the more capable hands of Pascual Orozco. In the mean- time, President Taft was hearing the bad news from his ambassador to Mexico. In a knee-jerk reaction, massive numbers of American troops were ordered to take up positions along the border. But by then, it was too late to have much of an impact on the outcome of the war. When Madero and Gonzalez fled the United States on February 14, most of their colleagues left right along with them. Only a skeleton crew remained behind in Texas to recruit troops, smuggle munitions and the like.9 The Maderistas, in short, had already done the bulk of their behind-the-scenes work and now it was a question of who had the means to win on the battlefield. By May, the means to win had definitely shifted in favor of the rebels: Their army had swelled to around 40,000; Orozco and Pancho Villa, moreover, once again threatened 117 Ciudad Juarez. Revolutionists in other parts of Mexico were also making significant progress. Emiliano Zapata, for example, had won several important victories in Morelos. The deciding victory came on May 10 when the rebels finally captured Juarez. For all intents and purposes, this signi- fied Diaz's defeat. President Taft admitted as much when he recognized Ciudad Juarez as a legal entrepot for the importation of munitions and other material.10 With the capture of Juarez, then, the United States gave up on Diaz. Short of committing U.S. troops, Taft had no choice but to recognize Diaz as the outgoing president of Mexico and Madero as the heir apparent to his job. It was a fait accompli. It has been argued that Taft gave up on Diaz long before the fall of Ciudad Juarez. According to this argument, the troops he assigned to the border on March 6 were intended to embarrass the Diaz regime and in effect weaken it to the point of no return. In reality, however, weakening Diaz did not even figure into Taft's thinking as the prospect of an abattoir with Americans caught in the middle of it was made painfully aware to him. In his annual message to 11 Congress, this is how the president explained his actions: On the 6th of March last, in the absence of the Secretary of State, I had a personal interview with Mr. Wilson, the ambassador of the United States to Mexico, in which he reported to me that the conditions in Mexico were much more critical than the press dispatches declared; that the small outbreaks which had occured were only symptomatic of the whole condition; that a very large 118 percent of the people were in sympathy with the insur- rection; that a general explosion was possible at any time, in which case he feared that the 40,000 or more American residents in Mexico might be assailed, and that the very large American investments might be injured or destroyed.12 We know how the president responded: with astonishing rapidity--without even notifying the vacationing heads of the State Department-—he ordered some 20,000 troops to the border. Taft felt it was his responsibility as commander- in-chief, "to place troops in sufficient numbers where, if Congress shall direct that they enter Mexico to save American lives and property, an effective movement may be made."13 Taft's number one concern, then, was the safe- guarding of Americans resident in Mexico.14 The troops that were already at the border—-the 1,500 or so soldiers who were carrying out surveillance duties-~would not have been enough to fulfill such a lifesaving mission. Now that the president had finally gotten the word--the word being that Porfirian Mexico was a powderkeg, a disaster waiting to happen--he literally wasted no time mobilizing one-fourth of the army to move in and rescue Americans should the need arise. One may reasonably ask why the president did not pull out all of the stops sooner-—why, moreover, it took a personal visit from Ambassador Wilson to ram home a point which should have been made months earlier. After all, Wilson knew as early as 1910 that urgent precautionary measures" might be needed. He knew what was brewing in Mexico for 119 a long time, but for whatever reason, Taft remained ill- informed until March 6. In his message to Congress, Taft alibied that he remained ignorant for so long because the "press dispatches" were not forceful enough-—i.e. that they had not given him a clear enough picture of the actual situation. If by press dispatches, Taft was referring to Wilson's own communiques, the ambassador maintained in his memoires that he consistently kept "the government at Washington fully informed of the progress of events and had recommended an active observance of developments and some preparation for contingencies which might eventuate."15 Indeed, Wilson's messages to Washington did get progressively gloomier as time wore on. For instance, the Mexican army which Wilson thought adequate in 1910 was by February 6, 1911, judged by the ambassador to be decidedly inept.16 But even Wilson was not saying flat out that massive numbers of American troops were needed at the border--only that some form of deterrent migpp be needed. It must also be remembered that Wilson had gainsayed the Maderistas as much as anyone else. One thing the Maderistas did not lack was detractors. What all of this suggests is a fluid situation compressed into a matter of only months; in an extremely short time span, Maderismo went from being a nonentity to a more serious 17 threat to what it eventually became--a dagger to the heart. The Taft administration responded logically. That is, when 120 the rebel's status was upgraded, Taft sent more troops to the border. At the time, it was seen as a measured response applauded by all who sided with Diaz. (Those who sided with Madero were aghast at the way the United States government was helping Diaz stay in power.) In the weeks to come, Wilson became convinced that-~despite the fact that Madero had been forced out of the United States--the situation was not improving. Rather, it was becoming more explosive. When Wilson communicated the brunt of this conviction to Taft face-to-face, an astonished president reacted accord— ing to form.18 If by press dispatches Taft was referring to the news media, again an examination of the New York Times strongly suggests a progression of events which nonetheless changed faster than the administration anticipated. Beginning in late January, the New York Times was no longer dismissing the rebels as inconsequential. After nearly three weeks 19 of scant coverage, the Times did an abrupt about-face:20 On January 27, it reported that the Mexican uprising was continuing to grow-—that the Diaz government was experiencing many defeats. On February 3, Ciudad Juarez was said to be "in a panic as rebels close in." Madero was still a weakling, and the only reason his movement was experiencing success had to do with the administration's inactivity. Since munitions were getting across the border, the Times facilely concluded that Taft was entirely to blame for it. (That is, 121 rather than admit that it had erred, the Times preferred to critisize the government for making the same mistake it had also made.) Besides being simplistic and hypocritical, the Times on February 3 once again betrayed its own glaring 21 ignorance. The very next day, at any rate, the New York Times was singing the praises of the Taft administration when it learned that for the second time in a week the United States was sending more troops to the border. The newspaper finally had to admit that the rebellion was serious enough to warrant the kind of attention the administration was giving it. "As a matter of fact,’ the Times said, "the belief has been growing in the U.S. that the rebellion in Mexico has become more dangerous than it seemed to be at first."22 Unfortunately for their many readers, the Times was slow to realize this. Owing to the fact that the newspaper ppg Wilson's reports were getting progressively gloomier, the ambassador's personal message of March 6 should not have shocked Taft the way it apparently did.23 In terms of the popular press, Taft may well have dismissed their accounts as self-serving attempts to boost circulation. But what about Wilson's efforts to enlighten his superiors? Even though the worm turned fast in Mexico, the handwritting so to speak was already on the wall: The Diaz regime was not doing at all well in the winter of 1911. One has to wonder, then, if 122 Taft ever read Wilson's (or anyone else's) dispatches, or was he merely relying on secondhand information from the State Department-~and if he was, something was definitely being lost in the transmission. If Knox and his under- secretaries were shielding Taft from the unvarnished truth-- i.e. telling him that far from being an active volcano ready to explode, Mexico was still under the firm control of Porfirio Diaz--then perhaps they had negligible faith in Wilson's judgment. It is possible that Knox knew all along that Diaz was in an increasingly tenuous position, but for reasons of his own preferred to keep the president in the dark. When one considers how blatantly Pro Madero Knox was when it came to interpreting the neutrality laws, this is an idea that makes some sense. At any rate, both Knox and Assistant Secretary Huntington Wilson went on vacation prior to the ambassador's arrival at the White House. They were obviously not concerned with what was happening in Mexico. If we choose to believe that Taft was not as ignorant as he appeared to be on the eve of Wilson's visit--i.e. that Wilson's news was really no surprise to him--then the president was playing a dangerous game that could have cost an untold number of American lives and set back Mexican- American relations for years. That is, if Taft was well aware that Diaz was in grave trouble and that he could not protect American lives in the accustomed fashion, then he 123 also must have realized that Americans were in a position to be slaughtered. From the demonstrations that took place in the fall of 1910, Taft knew that anti-Americanism existed in Mexico. But, of course, he believed that Diaz could and would keep it in check. His confidence in the old dictator suddenly shattered, the now enlightened Taft did what any responsible president would have done pp; moment he realized that his countrymen were in harm's way. The troops had their intended effect in that they acted as a deterrent to any hostile moves towards Americans in Mexico.25 The troops had another psychological impact as well: They could not help but undermine confidence in the Diaz regime. If the President of the United States had to send 20,000 of his soldiers to the border because he did not think that the long time dictator of Mexico could be counted on to handle the situation, this sentiment was obviously not lost on other interested observers--not to mention participants.26 At this point, Taft--although he still wanted Diaz to come out on top—-could not worry about the dictator as much as the safety of his own people. Taft's secondary purpose in sending the troops was to seal the frontier--"to prevent the use of our border-land for "27 the carrying on of the insurrection. This, of course, was a moot point by March. With or without munitions from the United States, as it turned out the Maderistas were poised for victory in the spring. But Taft did not 124 necessarily know this to be true. He must have thought, or at least hoped, that the border was still vital to rebel aspirations and that his actions would be a boon to the struggling Diaz. In conclusion, for the purposes of safeguarding American lives and property and, secondly, to strangle the Maderistas, President Taft acted as he did on March 6, 1911. To say that he acted decisively on this date would be to imply that he was indecisive on previous occasions. But such was not the case. Throughout the crisis, Taft behaved as a proper ally of the Diaz regime. That he did not take the measures of March 6 sooner was due to the factors enunciated in this thesis. At bottom, the president was not as well- informed as he should have been. Why he remained ignorant for so long is something that needs to be investigated in greater depth. 125 1Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 129. The only point I wish to make here is that Madero did not want to leave the United States in mid—February. Madero had originally planned to return to Mexico on February 5-- contingent upon Ciudad Juarez falling to the rebels. When Juarez was reinforced and the attack was postponed, Madero decided to wait for a more auspicious moment--i.e. some type of rebel military success. But he had to forget that when it became apparent that his arrest was imminent. 2Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt," pp. 558-560. The author concludes that Diaz's conventional army needed a ten to one manpower advantage in order to beat the rebels, and once they lost it-di.e. once the war was allowed to drag on--they also lost their chance to defeat the rebels. He estimates that the Mexican army numbered between 14,000 and 20,000. 80 in addition to being poorly led, poorly trained and poorly equipped, "the small size of Mexico's federal army...seriously, if not fatally, handicapped the government's response to Madero's rebellion." The fact that the United States was patrolling the border for Mexico was thus a big help, but not enough for the federals to triumph over the rebels. 3lbid., p. 572. 4LaFrance, "Many Causes, Movements, Failures, 1910- 1913," p. 28. 5Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt," p. 575. 6Knight, Ipp Mexican Revolution, p. 187. The attack at Casas Grandes failed because the federal forces were reinforced in the nick of time. Also, the Maderistas, according to Knight, could not match the federal's fire- power. That is, they lacked the machine guns and heavy artillery that the opposition enjoyed. This seems to prove that the rebels were not getting anything across the border save for small arms such as Winchester rifles, pistols etc. Ergo, America's border vigilance was effective in that the weapons the Maderistas were able to smuggle into Mexico were no match for the federals when it came to conventional—type warfare. Casas Grandes was a conventional encounter--and the results were not good for the rebels. Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt," p. 577. 126 8Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 187. Knight cites an American who visited Madero's camp three weeks after Casas Grandes. He "found their numbers increased, their spirits high, their discipline exemplary." Henderson, Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands, . 17. Whether Henderson is right or not (see following note5, the fact remains that Taft's bold actions could not save Diaz at this point because his army was so dreadfully ineffective. 10Cumberland, "Mexican Revolutionary Movements," p. 315. The capture of Ciudad Juarez on May 10, Cumberland writes, "was of extreme importance to the revolutionaries for it gave them a customshouse and the right to import materials which their forces badly needed.' Two scenarios thus come to mind: 1) If Henderson is right about there being only a skeleton crew in Texas after February 14, then perhaps the rebels miscalculated and were bailed out on May 10 none too soon. 2) If Henderson is wrong and the Maderistas were still very much in business after Madero's forced departure, perhaps they simply could not get much contraband across the boundary once the border patrol was increased on March 6. I believe the plausible answer lies somewhere between these two extremes: After March 6, the increased American military presence in conjunction with a scaled down rebel organization in the United States had the effect of slowly strangling the Maderista war effort. At any rate, who knows how the war may have turned ppd the Mexican army been able to hold Ciudad Juarez, denying the rebels the customshouse they so badly needed? In reality, however, the Mexican army was collapsing; it was in dire need of a knockout punch, not slow strangulation. Taft himself recognized that the possesion of a port of entry would give the Madero forces a tremendous advantage, but concluded that this regrettable circumstance grew "out of the weakness or the misfortune of the Mexican government, for which we are not responsible." Taft, of course, was right. Short of fighting the war for him, the president had done about all he could for Diaz. 11Taft's confidential letter to General Wood may also be consulted. See Hanrahan, Documents, I, pt. 1, pp. 225-229. 12FRUS, p. xi. 13Ibid., p. xii. 127 14Anderson, William Howard Taft, p. 204. To a friend, Taft confided: "I am not going to intervene in Mexico until no other course is possible, but I must protect our people in Mexico as far as possible." The troops, the so called "Manuver Division," was in place, then, as a deterrent to aggressive acts against Americans in Mexico. See Coerver and Hall, Texas and the Mexican Revolution, p. 23. 5Wilson, Di lomatic E isodes, p. 207. Wilson went on as follows: "As the situation became more complex I went north for a consultation with President Taft and gave him in detail the story of the events which were occurring and the probable tendencies. The President manifested the deepest interest, and reviewed all the phases of the revolu- tion fully and intelligently. Taft was a firm believer in Diaz, and I think it is not misstating history to say that the action he subsequently took was inspired not only by a desire to afford protection to Americans living along the border by the actual presence of our troops and those in the interior by the wholesome warning conveyed, but to sustain, as far as our obsolete neutrality laws would permit, the government of Diaz against attacks directed from across the border." 16Hanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, pp. 127-128. In addition to disparaging the federal army, Wilson reported to Knox on February 6 that Juarez was awaiting an attack by a "superior force of revolutionists." Outbreaks were reported in several states. "Business is suffering greatly," Wilson lamented, "and unless the Government deals more successfully and energetically with the revolution a general depression may follow." As gloomy as this report is, Wilson still felt that the Diaz regime was capable of reversing the negative trend. On February 8, Wilson reported to Knox a "decided recrudescence of the revolutionary movement throughout Mexico." Wilson once again denounced the Maderistas as "lacking in organization" et., but this was offset in Wilson's view by a federal army which was "badly officered and lacking in spirit, courage and discipline." Even then, Wilson believed that the army might be able to deal with the revolutionary forces. He concluded it "will depend largely on the continuance and force of the disturbances which no safe prediction can be made as the situation changes from day to day." Regarding the latter, Wilson reiterated that he could "only report the events as they occur, trusting that the Department will understand that events are moving rapidly and that the situation of one day may be flatly contradicted by the occurrences of the day following." See Ibid., II, pt. 1, pp. 131-135. Eight days later, on February 16, Wilson told Knox that the "revolutionary situation in a general way is becoming worse. 128 In fully one-half of the Mexican states there is greater or less revolutionary activity." See Ibid., II, pt. 1, p. 148. 17Wilson's reports were not the only ones that went from optimistic to pessimistic in a short period of time. The rapid progression of events may also be seen in the periodic reports American Vice-Consul C.M. Leonard submitted to the secretary of state. On January 7, 1911, the vice- consul in Chihuahua could cheerfully state: "It is the general opinion among those best informed that the govern- ment has the situation well in hand and that the revolution, as such, will and very soon." See RES, vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/646. Scarcely more than two and a half weeks later, Leonard was slightly less sure of the way things were going in Chihuahua. Some Americans who were in rebel territory said they were plentifully supplied and had no intention of giving up the struggle; other Americans, Leonard reported, had said the opposite—-that the revolu- tionists were now "hopelessly beaten." Leonard maintained that the "latter opinion seems more worthy of belief." See Ibid., vol. 2, roll 10, 812.00/656. On February 11, it was Leonard's sad duty to report that the "entire western part of this Consular district is still without military protection and the revolutionists are in possesion of all the towns of importance. Whatever authority is exercised lies in their hands." See Ibid., vol. 3, roll 11, 812.00/832. 18Hanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, pp. 179—181. In addition to sending one-fourth of the army, Taft issued a proclamation similar to the one Governor Colquitt issued. In stern language, Taft admonished all American citizens to avoid Violations of the neutrality laws. 19New York Times, January 3, 1911. The newspaper conceded in this issue that reliable information was hard to come by. 20Ibid., January 1, 1911. In this issue, the newspaper declared that the much ballyhooed revolution in Mexico was really only a glorified riot. "And most of the accounts we get of it,‘ the paper admitted, "are colored by the wishes and the prejudices of the exiles of former revolutions. Mexico begins the year 1911 with a large measure of peace within its borders as its people often enjoy, and we believe that nearly all the world will join with us in wishing a Happy New Year to President Diaz." 129 21New York Times, January 27 & February 3, 1911. 22Ibid., February 4, 1911. 23Wilson, Di lomatic E isodes, pp. 212-213. Wilson claimed that the engagements at Casas Grandes and Agua Prieta "revealed something already known to the embassy and communicated to Washington, viz., that the federal army was in a state of hopeless disorganization and that in effect it numbered only about 14,000 men mostly commanded by incompetent generals." The question is who, specifically, in Washington was privy to this knowledge? The State Department obviously was. Apparently, Taft was not clued in until Wilson encountered him face-to—face on March 6. 24Scholes,tTl_'1_e Foreign Policies of the Taft Administra— tion, p. 84. 25Hanrahan, Documents, II, pt. 1, p. 200. Wilson, back at his post in Mexico City, informed Knox on March 23 that President Taft's "military precautions" had had a "sobering effect upon Mexican public opinion but singular to say are modifying anti-American feeling in this locality.’ 26Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, p. 702. Initially, Taft tried to portray the March 6 mobilization as primarily a training mission for the army. In attempting to mask the real reasons for the mobiliza- tions, Taft, I think, was trying to save the Diaz regime from not only embarrassment but also the ill effects which were bound to reverberate from his decision. It did not work, but at least Taft made the effort. See also Raat, Revoltosos, p. 237. 27FRUS, p. xiii. It should be noted that not all 20,000 troops were assigned to the border. Carman writes: "Despite the president's contention that the troops mobilized near the Mexican border would form a solid wall to prevent gun smuggling and violations of the neutrality laws, the number of soldiers on border patrol did not exceed 3,500 during the Madero revolution. While almost all of the troops received training, only 1,296 soldiers were added to the 1,500 men who had been patrolling the international boundary since early February." See Carman, United States Customs, p. 48. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Hanrahan, Gene Z. Documents on the Mexican Revolution. vols. 1 & 2. Salishury, North CaroI1na: Documentary Publications, 1976. New York Times, 1910-1911. Pa ers Relatin to the Forei n Relations of the United States 1511. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918. Records of the De artment of State Relatin to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929. reels 10 & 11. Washington D.C.: National Archives Microfilm Publications, Micro- copy no. 274, 1959. Senate Documents, 66th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 10. ”Investigation of Mexican Affairs" Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920. pp. 2520-2574. Secondary Sources Anderson, Donald F. William Howard Taft: A Conservative's Conception of the Presidency. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968. Anderson, Judith Icke. William Howard Taft: An Intimate History. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981. Beezley, William H. Insurgent Governor: Abraham Gonzalez and the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973. Bernstein, Marvin D., ed. Foreign Investment in Latin America: Cases and Attitudes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Blaisdell, Lowell L. The Desert Revolution. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962. Brenner, Anita. The Wind That Swe t Mexico: The Histor of the Mexican Revolution of 1910—1942. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943. 130 131 Calvert, Peter. The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict. Cambridge: Chmbridge University Press, 1968. Carman, Michael Dennis. United States Customs and the Madero Revolution. El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1976. Cockcroft, James D. Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution 1900-1913. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968. Coerver, Don M., and Hall, Linda B. Texas and the Mexican Revolution: A Study in State and National Border Policy. San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1984. Coletta, Paolo E. William Howard Taft: A Biblio ra h . Westport: Meckler, 1989. Cumberland, Charles C. Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero. Austin: University‘of Texas Press, 1952. Cumberland, Charles C. "Mexican Revolutionary Movements from Texas, 1906-1912.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 52 (January 19495: pp. 301-324. Cumberland, Charles C. "Precursors of the Mexican Revolu- tion." Hispanic American Historical Review 22 (May 1942): pp. 344-356. Haley, P. Edward. prolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy pf Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1970. Hanrahan, Gene Z. The Bad Yankee: American Entrepreneurs and Financiers in Mexico. vols. 1 & 2. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Documentary Publications, 1985. Hart, John Mason. Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution. Berkely: University of California Press, 1987. Henderson, Peter V.N. Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands 1910—1913. El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1979. Huntington, Smuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Katz, Friedrich. The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, The United States and the Mexican Revolution. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981. 132 Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution. vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. LaFrance, David. "Many Causes, Movements, Failures, 1910- 1913: The Regional Nature of Maderismo" Thomas Benjamin and Mark Wasserman, eds. Provinces of the Revolution: Essays on Regional Mexican History, 1910-1929. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990. Meyer, Michael C. Essays on the Mexican Revolution: Revision- ist Views of the Leaders. George Wolfskill and Douglas W. Richmond, eds. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979. Minger, Ralph Eldin. William Howard Taft and United States Foreign Policy: The Apprenticeship Years, 1900-1908. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1975. Pringle, Henry F. The Life and Times of William Howard Taft. vols. 1 & 2. New York: Ferrar & Rinehart, 1939. Raat, W. Dirk. "The Diplomacy of Suppression: Los Revoltosos, Mexico, and the United States, 1906-1911" His anic American Historical Review 56 (November 19765: pp. 529-550. Raat, W. Dirk. Revoltosos: Mexico's Rebels in the United States, 1903-1923. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1981. Ross, Stanley R. Francisco I. Maderd:A ostle of Mexican Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Ruiz, Ramon Eduardo. The Great Rebellion: Mexico 1905- 1924. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1980. Scholes, Walter V. and Marie V. The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970. Tannenbaum, Frank. Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Tannenbaum, Frank. Peace by Revolution: An Interpretation of Mexico. New York: Columbia University Press, 1933. Turner, Juohn Kenneth. Introduction by Sinclair Snow. Barbarous Mexico. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969. 133 Vanderwood, Paul J. "Mexico's Rurales: Image of a Society in Transition" His anic American Historical Review 61 (February 19815: pp. 52-83. Vanderwood, Paul J. "Response to Revolt: The Counter- Guerrilla Strategy of Porfirio Diaz" His anic American Historical Review 56 (November 1976): pp. 551-579. Wilson, Henry Lane. Di lomatic E isodes in Mexico Bel ium and Chile. Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1971. APPENDIX APPENDIX THE NEUTRALITY STATUTES Section 5281. Every citizen of the United States who, within the territory thereof, accepts and exercises a commission to serve a foreign prince, state, etc., in war, by land or by sea, against any prince, state, etc., with whom the United States are at peace shall be fined not more than $2,000 and imprisoned not more than three years. Section 5282. Every person who enlists or enters himself or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince or state as a soldier or seaman on board of any vessel of war, etc., shall be fined not more than $1,000 and imprisoned not more than three years. Section 5283. Every person who, within the limits of the United States, fits out and arms, or attempts to fit out and arm, or procures to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly is concerned in the fitting out or arming of any vessel with intent that such vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign prince or state, etc., to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or state, etc., with whom the United States are at peace shall be fined not more than $10,000, and imprisoned not more than three years. And every such vessel, her tackle, apparel, etc., together with all materials procured for the equipment thereof shall be forfeited. Section 5284. Every citizen of the United States, without the limits thereof, who fits out and arms, or attempts to fit out and arm, or procures to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly aids or is concerned in furnishing, fitting, or arming any private vessel of war, or privateer with the intent that such vessel shall be employed to cruise or commit hostilitiesupon the citizens of the United States or their property shall be fined not more than $10,000 and imprisoned not more than ten years. Section 5285. Every person who, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, increases or augments, or procures to be increased or augmented, or knowingly is concerned in increasing or augmenting the force of any ship of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel which at the time of her arrival in the United States was a ship of war or 134 135 cruiser or armed vessel in the service of any foreign prince or state, etc., or belonging to the subjects or citizens of any such prince, or state, etc., by adding to the number of guns of such vessel or by changing those on board of her for guns of larger caliber, or by adding thereto any equip- ment solely applicable to war shall be fined not more than $1,000, and be imprisoned not more than one year. Section 5286. Every person who, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States begins, or sets on foot, or provides, or prepares the means for any military expedi- tion or enterprise to be carried on from the United States against the territory of any foreign prince or state, etc., with whom the United States are at peace, shall be fined not exceeding $3,000, and imprisoned not more than three years. v“ ‘4 ,.. r. .lm--.c- -, . ; 1, Isl illslllllllllill]lllllllllllllllillllllllillllllllllll 2930079291 14