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,~ Michigan State
University

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dissertation entitled

AN EXAMINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING
AND REGIME CHANGE IN LOCAL EDUCATION POLITICS

presented by
CHELSEA LYNN HARING

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for the

DOCTORAL degree in POLITICAL SCIENCE

 

 

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AN EXAMINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING AND REGIME
CHANGE IN LOCAL EDUCATION POLITICS

By

Chelsea Lynn Haring

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
For the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Political Science

2008

ABSTRACT
AN EXAMINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING AND REGIME
CHANGE IN LOCAL EDUCATION POLITICS
By
Chelsea Lynn Haring

It is well recognized that state authorities direct the actions of local policymakers through
the use of a variety of direct intervention strategies, such as, mandates, ﬁnancial
incentives, sanctions, and takeovers. These traditional intervention strategies are used to
either encourage or discourage the activities of local actors. In this research, it is argued
that state actors have used another intervention toll that aims not simply to inﬂuence or
coerce behavior of existing actors within existing institutions, but instead state actors
have challenged the status quo by restructuring institutions and introducing new policy
actors. This research further explores this restructuring by addressing the following
question:

0 To what extent do external actors change local policy through the creation of new

institutions and regimes?

In order to measure institutional change and regime change, the charter school movement
in Michigan is used as a case study. Using the charter school movement in Michigan, the
following questions are explored:

0 What impact has the creation of charter schools had on local education politics?

0 What impact has the introduction of new policy actors had on the traditional

education regime?

0 How does institutional and regime change impact the policy environment?

A theoretical model is developed to explain institutional and regime change. According
to this model, state intervention occurs when state actors enact policy change that leads to
the creation of a new set of institutional arrangements that bypass traditional institutions.
These new institutions restructure elements of the existing policy regime by introducing
and empowering new actors and disempowering traditional regime members. The
argument put forth is that local education has been transformed not through the
enactment of a new state program or through other “traditional” intervention strategies
but rather though an intentional restructuring of local institutions and regimes.

In order to test this theory, regime theory is used as a framework for explaining how
governing arrangements and capacity relate to policy change. A targeted, time series
content analysis of newspaper articles is used to identify regime change and a change in

the policy paradigm.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to those who believed in me, supported me, forgave me
when l procrastinated or created distractions, and continued to push me despite my
resistance. Specially, I would like to dedicate this to my mom, Marsha F ranke, and my
dad, Ed Haring. Thank you for all of your unconditional support. I could not have done it
without you. Also, a special thank you to my mentor and advisor, Richard Hula.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................. vii.

LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................. viii.

CHAPTER 1

A THEORY OF IN STITUTIONA, REIMGE AND POLICY CHANGE .................... 1
Introduction .................................................................................. 1
Deﬁning Change ............................................................................ 2
Policy Change ............................................................................... 9
Theoretical Argument / Research Questions .......................................... 12

CHAPTER 2

COMPETING THEORIES OF POWER AND GOVERNANCE ........................... 16
Elite Theory ................................................................................. 19
Pluralism .................................................................................... 23
Advocacy Coalition Framework ......................................................... 26
Policy Networks and Entrepreneurs .................................................... 28
Regime Theory ............................................................................ 30
Discussion of Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Networks, and Regimes .............. 34
A Further Examination of Regime Theory ............................................. 37

CHAPTER 3

INTERGOVERNEMTNAL RELATIONS AND TRENDS IN EDUCATION REFORM

IN MICHIGAN ..................................................................................... 42
Federalism .................................................................................. 42
State and Local Government in the Federal System .................................. 46
Education in the Intergovernmental System ........................................... 49
Standards and Accountability .............................................. . .............. 57
School Choice .............................................................................. 61
Education Reform: A Case Study ........................................................ 69
School Finance Reform: Setting the State for Policy Change ....................... 72
School Choice and the Transformation of Local Politics ............................ 76
Introduction of New Institutions ......................................................... 80
Introduction of New Actors .............................................................. 85

CHAPTER 4

CHARTER SCHOOLS AND REGIME CHAGNE .......................................... 91
Measuring Regime Change ............................................................ . 91
Identifying Issues and Actors ............................................................ 94
The Creation of a New Educational Establishment ................................... 97
From Finance Reform to The Expansion of Choice ................................. 103
A Realignment of Public Opinion ...................................................... 115

CHAPTER 5
CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE CREATION OF NEW EDUCATION

REGIMES .......................................................................................... 123
Charter Schools Defy Traditional Coalitions ......................................... 123
Detroit: The Successes and Limitations of Restructuring ........................... 126
New Institutional Arrangements as a Tool for Regime .............................. 137

APPENDICES .................................................................................... 139

APPENDIX A: State of the State Survey Questions: 8088 26, Summer 2002 .......... 140

APPENDIX B: State of the State Survey Questions: 8088 38, Spring 2005 ............ 144

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................ 146

vi

TABLE 1.1

TABLE 2.1

TABLE 3.1

TABLE 3.2

TABLE 3.3

TABLE 3.4

TABLE 3.5

TABLE 4.1

TABLE 4.2

TABLE 4.3

TABLE 4.4

TABLE 4.5

TABLE 4.6

TABLE 4.7

TABLE 4.8

TABLE 5.1

LIST OF TABLES

Traditional Intervention Strategies .............................................. 3
Overview of Competing Theories of Governance ............................ 35
Types of School Choice Programs ............................................. 64
State School Aid Funding Over Time .......................................... 75
Overview of Michigan Charter School Law .................................. 78
Timeline of School Choice in Michigan ....................................... 79
Support for Charter Schools in Michigan ..................................... 90
Summary of Media Search: Number of Articles ............................. 94
Actors Who Support and Oppose Charter Schools in Michigan ........... 96

Summary of Media Search: Key Actors ...................................... 99
Summary of Media Search: Issue Salience .................................. 105
Public Opinion of Charter Schools In Michigan ............................ 118
Differences in Public Opinion by Race ...................................... 119
Differences in Public Opinion by Party Identiﬁcation ..................... l 19
Differences in Public Opinion by Region ................................... 120

Support for Vouchers in Michigan .......................................... 135

vii

FIGURE 1.1

FIGURE 1.2

FIGURE 2.1

FIGURE 3.1

FIGURE 3.2

FIGURE 3.3

FIGURE 3.4

FIGURE 3.5

FIGURE 3.6

FIGURE 3.7

FIGURE 3.8

FIGURE 4.1

FIGURE 4.2

FIGURE 5.1

FIGURE 5.2

FIGURE 5.3

LIST OF FIGURES

Theoretical Model .................................................................. 3
Types of Regime and Policy Change .......................................... 11
Theories of Power and Governance ............................................ 18
Choice Programs by State ....................................................... 65
School Funding: Pre Proposal A ............................................... 74
School Funding: Proposal A .................................................... 74
Number of Charter Schools in Michigan, 1993-2007 ....................... 81
Charter School Enrollment in Michigan, 1993-2007 ........................ 82
Location of Michigan Charter Schools ........................................ 83
Percentage of Students Enrolled in Charter Schools by Race .............. 84
Number of Charter Schools by Agency Type ................................. 88
Charter School Issue Salience, 1993-2005 .................................. 104
2005 English and Math MEAP Scores ....................................... 112
Grading Schools in Detroit and Michigan ................................... I30
Enrollment Trends in Detroit Public Schools ................................ 131
Enrollment Trends in Detroit Charter Schools .............................. 132

viii

CHAPTER ONE: A THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL, REGIME, AND POLICY
CHANGE

“The problem of the policy change literature is that different studies focus on
different dimensions of the change process. They highlight one dimension but
ignore others. Political process and decision making studies highlight the role of
policy makers and interest group process but generally ignore the positional
advantage of businesses, impact of changing power arrangements, the influence
of policy paradigm and the role of the dominant class. Most studies that focus on
the state and institutional actors overlook exogenous factors like inﬂation,
demographic changes, and urbanization. They ignore factors impacting

institutions and acting as a catalyst for change” (Wilson, C., 2000, p.255).

Introduction

The task of understanding policy change is one that dominates policy studies.
Much of the policy literature can be characterized in one of three ways: those studies that
focus on the role of ideas and information; policy subsystems and communities; or
institutional rules and arrangements. Institutional rational choice and structural choice
theorists focus on the role of institutional arrangements (i.e. rules, procedures, etc.) as the
catalyst for change. In both frameworks, policy change is the result of policy actors who
seek to enhance their situations and secure the best outcome by altering institutional
arrangements (Ostrom, 1990, 1991a, l991b;Moe, 1984, 1990a, 1990b). Policy
subsystem scholars focus on the role of coalition building or networking as central to
policy change. Policy change, from this perspective, occurs as a result of a change within

or to the acting coalition, and occurs when the beliefs of the coalition. change or the

existing coalition is challenged and replaced (Sabatier, 1988, 1991; Mintrom, 1997)
.Ideas and information also play pivotal roles in explaining policy change. For scholars
who focus on information and ideas, policy change occurs as a result of a redeﬁnition of
problems and solutions, or the emergence of new ideas that reshape the existing policy
debate (Kingdon, 1984; Baumgartner& Jones, 1991, 1993). While each of these
approaches adds to the understanding of policy change, they do so in a limited way. By
focusing on only one source of inﬂuence at a single stage in the policy making process,
they do not offer an interactive understanding of policy change. Policy change must be
examined and understood in a more dynamic way.

With this research, policy change is examined as a result of the interaction
between institutions, regimes, and issues. Policy change is examined outside the limits of
the policy studies literature and in the context of power and governance arrangements.
Using the urban regime literature as a framework for explaining regime formation and
capacity, it is argued that policy change occurs as the result of the interaction between
external actors, institutions, and regimes. Regime theory “combines a perspective on

exogenous factors with a focus on political process” (Wilson, 2000, p.255).

Deﬁning Change

This research offers another way of thinking about policy change that synthesizes
existing explanations of change and challenges the status quo. The argument is that
policy change has occurred as the result of external action that has restructured
institutional and governance arrangements. A model of this argument is presented in

Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1
Theoretical Model

 

 

INTERVENTION CHANGE

STATE —> INSTITUTIONAL —->REGIME ——> POLICY
CHANGE CHANGE

 

According to this model, state actors facilitate policy change by intervening to create new

institutions that restructure elements of the existing policy regime. These new institutions

empower a new set of actors who work to transform the existing policy environment.

Before further examining this theoretical argument, a more complete explanation of each

variable is necessary.

State Intervention: State ofﬁcials have a variety of intervention tools or control

strategies that can be used to exert inﬂuence over local government. There are ﬁve broad

categories of traditional state intervention strategies as outlined in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1

Traditional State Intervention Strategies

 

State
Government

 

Intervention Strategy

Financial Penalties/ Rewards

Regulatory

Informative

Privatization

Takeover

Local
Government

Impact at Local

Level

Taxes, fees, grants, or ﬁnancial
assistance used to change or
encourage behavior

Economic or social regulation

used to control or restrict
behavior

Information used to
shape behavior and inﬂuence
opinion

Public / private arrangement used
to change the delivery of a service

Suspension of local government
authority and operations

 

 

 

 

 

The most common tools state authorities have for inﬂuencing local behavior are
ﬁnancial penalties and rewards. Such assistance can come in the form of shared taxes,
fees, or grants and are typically used to support projects or speciﬁc local services
(Stephens & Wilstrom, 2007). Providing ﬁnancial incentives or sanctions, allow states to
induce local action. State actors can guide local policy by making a desired course of
action particularly attractive or unattractive by attaching ﬁnancial incentives or sanctions
to it. The objective is to make state desired action the most rational course of action for
local decision makers.

Regulation is another fairly common strategy used by state governments.
Regulation can be either economic or social. One of the most widely implemented
regulatory tools is a mandate, which can be used to dictate the rules for institutional
behavior, set standards and benchmarks, and determine appropriate sanctions (Salamon,
2002). Mandates require local governments to meet a minimum standard of service.
Berman (2003) noted, “mandates often reﬂect the recognition of the need for minimum
standards of service levels” (p. 78). All states have set some level of minimum standards
in terms of education, health care, welfare, and waste disposal (Stephens & Wikstrom,
2007).

State authorities can also exert inﬂuence over local governments through the
provision of information. Policymakers can frame an issue in such a way as to inﬂuence
what the public should think about a policy. They can also use technical assistance and
information to shape the behavior of local policy implementers. The use of information

and framing can effect how people respond to an issue (Salamon, 2002). This external

tool is particularly relevant to small towns and rural counties due to their limited capacity
and resources.

Privatization or contracting with a private entity is another tool used by extemal
policymakers to inﬂuence the delivery of public goods or services. A government agency
can hire a private organization to deliver a service in exchange for money in order to
enhance efﬁciency and ﬂexibility (Salamon, 2002). This type of tool is often used in
health and human services, such as job training or public transportation. The objective is
to ultimately reduce costs while maintaining or increasing the delivery of services.

A more recent and much more extreme state intervention strategy is a takeover.
States have the authority to remove local ofﬁcials from power as well as to take direct
control over local government. Takeovers occur when state governments suspend local
authority and take direct control over local activities. The primary reasons for a takeover
of local government are ﬁnancial distress or academic failure. There are currently twenty—
four states that have adopted policies that allow state takeovers due to academic failure or
ﬁscal mismanagement (Education Commission of the States, 2002). While such
takeovers are rare and are only used in extreme cases, they have occurred in a number of
cities facing severe ﬁnancial distress, including New York, Philadelphia, and Cleveland.
States have also assumed direct control over local school districts where local ofﬁcials
failed to provide an acceptable level of education. Recently East St. Louis (1994),
Cleveland (1995), Newark (1995), Baltimore (1997), Detroit (1999), and Philadelphia
(2001) have experienced takeovers of their respective school districts.

These traditional mechanisms for state intervention can be applied to a number

of policy areas. State grants are often given to help local governments provide social

services, improve roads and highways, or to help fund capital projects. Mandates are
handed down to ensure local compliance towards environmental regulations, equal
protection laws, and educational standards. Information and technical assistance are often
provided by states for law enforcement, ﬁre ﬁghting, construction, and economic
development. Privatization can be found in the provision of a number of social services.
Takeovers have occurred in regards to allegations of governmental corruption,
mismanagement, or poor performing schools.

Figure 1.1 challenges, these traditional mechanisms for eliciting policy change.
Traditionally, external actors work within the existing institutional arrangements to
promote change using the aforementioned strategies. Local actors respond by either
complying or resisting such actions. The important thing to note is that the status quo is
not challenged by these traditional intervention strategies. The institutional arrangements
and key policy players remain in tact. State intervention, as it is conceptualized in this
research, involves more than measures of control and coercion. Instead, state actors
intervened by passing legislation that created a new set of institutions, bypassing the
existing institutions. This type of intervention allows state actors to operate within an
alternative institutional arrangement thus establishing their own rules and procedures and,
more importantly, their own policy goals. State intervention, in this case, is not simply
the enactment of a new program or mandate to inﬂuence or coerce behavior, but rather an
intentional restructuring of institutional arrangements. This type of state intervention

allows state actors to redeﬁne the governing regime and ultimately change the policy

paradigm.

Institutional Change: According to Peters, “institutions are political actors, just
as individuals. They can use the policy process to achieve their collective goals, as well
as those of the interests and individuals with which they are associated” (as quoted in
Salamon, 2002, p.558). Institutions, as a result, are not ﬁxed, but rather they evolve as a
result of pressure from external and internal demands (Jones, 2001). They can be used to
shape policy implementation and policy outcomes. Institutional change, as a catalyst for
policy change, can be brought about in a variety of ways. The actions and discretion of
street level bureaucrats, a change in the formal or informal rules and operating
procedures, a change in ideas, or a reorganization can all lead to institutional change
(Lipsky, 1980; Brehm & Gates, 1999; March & Olsen, 1989). These types of institutional
changes represent more incremental, endogenous change. Institutions are essentially
altered from within but their overall structure remains in tact. This is not the type of
institutional change conceived of here. While these types of changes may be occurring
within existing institutions, there is another type of institutional change that can that is
outside of existing institutional arrangements.

Institutional change can occur through the creation of alternative, yet parallel
institutions. In this case, new institutions are created with their own set of rules,
procedures, and implementers. These new institutions do not replace or necessarily alter
existing institutions so much as they operate parallel to them. This type of institutional
change, instead of challenging actors, ideas, or rules from within, simply empowers a
new set of actors, deﬁnes new ideas, and creates a new set of rules. The new institutions
operate simultaneous to the traditional institutions. The argument behind this type of

institutional change is that institutions can be used to restructure policy by redeﬁning

policy priorities in a way that empowers a new and unique governing regime. Institutions,
in this way, are not neutral and can have a lasting and substantive impact on policy.

Regime Change: Regimes can be deﬁned in a number of ways depending on
the origin or purpose of the regime. For example, there are international regimes
(Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1997), policy regimes (Esping-Anderson, 1993), regulatory
regimes (Harris & Milkis, 1996), and urban regimes (Stone, 1989). The speciﬁc
deﬁnition may vary depending on the scope and purpose of the regime. However, there
are several elements that provide the foundation for a regime. Clarence Stone (1989) best
summarized a regime as “the information arrangements by which public bodies and
private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing
decisions” (p.6). At the heart of any regime is the cooperation among a diverse group of
actors who come together to act. Regimes speak both to the coalition of actors as well as
their capacity to act.

Just as there are multiple deﬁnitions of regimes there is a wide array of
explanations for regime change. Most regime theorists agree that regime change does not
happen spontaneously, but rather is the result of more incremental challenges to the status
quo. Wilson (2000) identiﬁed ﬁve catalysts to regime change:

(1) Stressor/ enabler: the existence of an external factor that puts stress on or
enables change, thus weakening regimes capacity to act

(2) Paradigm shift: a change in thinking that discredits the dominant
paradigm and elevates an alternative paradigm

(3) Legitimation crisis: the loss of conﬁdence in the existing regime

(4) Power shifts: a change in leadership, defection within the regime,
mobilization of an alternative regime, emergence of new sources of
power, consolidation of dominant groups

(5) Organization and Policy change: a change in the organization of the

policy implementation process or policy goals (p.260)

According to Wilson (2000), regime change often occurs as several of these catalysts
interact with one another to undermine the existing regime and its policy goals, “Regime
change occurs when regimes become stressed, alternative policy paradigms arise,
legitimacy crisis occur, and shifts in power become evident” (p. 266).

The type of regime change that is the focus of this research is based on Wilson’s
ﬁfth stage for change: a change in the organizational and policy process. The argument
put forth in the following chapters is that new institutional arrangements were created
that opened the door to a new set of actors who came together to challenge the existing
regime. While the existing regime was not replaced or dismantled, a new regime emerged
simultaneously that redeﬁned the policy goals and shifted power. What resulted was the
empowerment of a new regime and the marginalization of the existing regime. As Wilson
(2000) noted,

Substantial policy change generally involves the expansion of the decision making arena
within government and the opening up of new venues of policy making. ....This
reorganization is accompanied by changes in policy goals, shifts in the policy paradigm,

and changes in power arrangement. (p. 265).

Policy Change: Policy change is not simply the result of the enactment of new
legislation. Although the passage of a new legislation can facilitate policy change,
authentic policy change is more about what happens after legislative change has
occurred. Policy change depends on the process of implementation and decision-making
as well as on power arrangements. As noted previously, there is often a great deal of
ambiguity in policy that allows those implementing policy a signiﬁcant latitude in
interpreting policy based on their own preferences, self- interest, and organizational
interest. As a result, new policies do not necessarily translate to policy change. Policy
change is more a product of institutional and power arrangements. When legislation is
passed and moved to the implementation stage, the inﬂuence of policymakers tends to
decrease signiﬁcantly as those entrenched in bureaucracies interpret and carry out the
legislation as they see ﬁt. However, if policymakers can create new institutional
arrangements that allow them to establish the rules and procedures and, more
importantly, empower actors who share their vision, they have the potential to completely
change the policy paradigm. Carter Wilson (2000) deﬁned the policy paradigm as, “A
paradigm is like a lens that ﬁlters information and focuses attention. It embodies
particular assumptions about the policy problem- it’s cause, its seriousness, its
pervasiveness, those responsible for creating it or ameliorating it, and the appropriate
governmental response” (p. 257).

He went on to argue that:
The policy paradigm plays a powerful role in producing long-term stability. It structures

perception in a ways that obstruct the emergence of alternative policy deﬁnitions and

10

policy solutions. It promotes the belief that existing arrangements are rational and
natural...It legitimizes the regime. (p. 259).

In this sense, those involved in deﬁning the problem and posing policy solutions are able
to create institutional and power arrangements that are aligned with their policy goals.
This allows policymakers to facilitate real change by altering the way policy is delivered,
who is involved in the delivery, and how the delivery is assessed by the pubic. In essence,
they will not only be able to inﬂuence how policy is implemented, but they will also be
able to shape public perception of the policy problem, causes, and solutions. Authentic
policy change results from control over the policy process, the regime, and the policy
paradigm. The institutional arrangements and regime matter as they shape the policy
paradigm and thus have the potential to redeﬁne policy goals, the policy dialogue, and
ultimately create a new policy environment. Figure 1.2 provides an illustration of the

types of regime and policy change.

 

 

Figure 1.2
Types of Regime and Policy Change
Regime Change
Yes No
Policy Change
I. 11.
Yes Regime Change Policy Change
Policy Change No Regime Change
111. IV.
Regime Change No Policy Change
N0 N0 Policy Change No Regime Change

 

 

 

 

ll

According to Figure 1.2, there are four types, or levels, of regime and policy change.
Quadrant I captures authentic policy change, in that there is a change in actors and power
arrangements resulting in the emergence of a new regime. That regime challenges the
status quo in such a way that redeﬁnes the policy paradigm. Quadrant II can be
considered normal policymaking, where there is change in legislation or change to
existing policy, but not real change in the regime or the policy paradigm. Change in this
case is more incremental. Quadrant 111 represents a change in power arrangements but no
change in substantive policy. A new regime may emerge or come to power but may not
have the capacity to act or carry out its agenda. Quadrant IV represents the status quo, as
there are no changes to the regime or to policy. The type of change that challenges
traditional institutions, regimes, and policy is the type found in Quadrant I and is the type

of change that is examined in this research.

Theoretical Argument / Research Questions

The central argument of this research is that policymakers have reshaped
important elements of local politics in the state of Michigan through the implementation
of charter schools. External policy actors were able to successfully create a new set of
local institutions dedicated to the implementation of a new policy agenda. Furthermore,
these new institutional arrangements created opportunities for new groups and interests to
get involved in shaping and implementing education policy. Using the charter school
movement in Michigan, empirical evidence illustrating how state actors used the

enactment of school choice policy as an instrument to undermine the educational

12

establishment, to empower a new educational regime, and to reshape education policy is
provided.

While a great deal of research has been conducted on school choice policy and
charter schools, very little of it has addressed the political impact of such policies on local
institutional arrangements and regimes. Instead, the school choice policy debate has
centered on three major issues. The ﬁrst area of research has focused on the descriptive
characteristics of charter schools (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, 1999;
Finn, Manno & Vanourek, 2000; Miron & Nelson, 2002). The fundamental questions
asked by researchers in this area include: What are charter schools? What philosophy
drives them? What do they look like? Who attends them? Where are they located? The
second area of research has been concerned with the educational and policy outcomes
generated by charter schools (Mintrom & Vegari, 1997; Mintrom, 1998, 2000; Manno,
Finn, Bierlein & Vanourek, 1998; Horn & Miron, 2000; Solomon, Paark, & Garcia,
2001; Hoxby & Rockoff, 2004). The key questions posed are: Are charter schools more
innovative than traditional public schools? Do they provide a better quality of education?
Do they improve student outcomes (i.e. test scores)? The third set of issues focus on the
consequences of choice on schools and school districts (Henig, 1994; Plank & Sykes,
1998; Orﬁeld, et a1. 2001; Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, 2002; Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke,
Moser, Henig, 2002; Bulkely & Fisler, 2003). The types of questions put forward in this
set of research are: How do traditional public schools respond to the presence of charter
schools? How has competition impacted local school districts? How have local schools/

districts responded to school choice?

13

Understanding school choice and the educational outcomes produced as a result
of the creation of charter schools deﬁnes critical policy questions. Therefore, it is hardly
surprising that most of the research has focused on the operation of charter schools and
the evaluation of student outcomes. However, this literature fails to address the political
impact of charter schools. There is a developing body of literature that begins to examine
the political issues surrounding the school choice movement (Bulkley, 2005; Kirst, 2006;
Wong & Langevin; 2006; Wong & Shen, 2006). The focus of this new research goes
beyond the descriptive qualities of charter schools by asking about the impacts of charter
schools. Questions addressed in these studies include: How have charter schools
impacted the overall policy environment across states? How do state politics promote or
constraint school choice? How do charter school actors impact the implementation of
charter schools? The research presented here seeks to make a contribution to this
literature. Speciﬁcally, it raises the question of how the charter school movement has
been used as a political mechanism to restructure local education institutions and
governing regimes. Where this research differs from current literature is: it goes beyond
looking at the general politics behind the choice movement by examining the speciﬁc
institutional mechanisms for creating new educational alliances; it focuses On one
particular state, the state of Michigan, in order to provide an in-depth case study analysis
of the politics behind charter schools; and it incorporates a unique methodology for
capturing institutional and regime change.

The charter school movement in Michigan is used as an illustration of the
changing relationship between state and local governments by introducing new

institutional arrangements, changing the distribution of power, and empowering new

14

stakeholders. Local school districts have become increasingly dependent on state
governments for support, while states have looked to local districts to implement speciﬁc
education reform initiatives. This redeﬁnition in state and local relations has resulted in a
shift or transference of authority from traditional local policy regimes to a new coalition
of actors that expands beyond the district limits. To understand how policymakers were
able to drive institutional and regime change, the issues and actors deﬁning the school
choice movement are examined. The broad question posed is: to what extent has external
intervention changed local education policy?
More speciﬁcally,
o What impact has the creation of new institutions (i.e.. charter schools) had on
local education policy?
0 What impact has the introduction of new policy actors had on the traditional
education regime?
o How does a change in institutional arrangements and the regime impact the

education policy environment?

15

CHAPTER TWO: COMPETING THEORIES OF POWER AND GOVERNANCE
“Policy making is political, produced by the interactions of a myriad of
participants in a setting of shared power. Hence, what counts most is whether
social processes and power relations are set up to promote intelligent inquiry,
debate, and mutual adjustment among those with stakes and insights concerning
the broad spectrum of social problems and possibilities.” (Lindblom &
Waterhouse,1993, p.141)

Fundamental to the study of politics is identifying and understanding the
distribution of power and the outcomes of that distribution. More speciﬁcally, it
involves identifying those who have the power to make decisions, the ways in which
decisions are made, and the impact each has on policy outcomes. In the broader context
of the American political economy literature, there are two dominate theories that explain.
the structure of power and policy making in the United States; elite theory and pluralist
theory. While elite theory and pluralist theory are not the only frameworks for explaining
power and policy making in the broader political- economic context, they are the most
widely discussed and applied. Other theories include Marxist or class theory, neo-
institutionalism or statism, public choice theory, and welfare economics. While each of
these offers an explanation of how individuals, groups, or institutions gain power and
inﬂuence policymaking, they do not all apply to the discussion at hand.

Drawing on the work of Paul Peterson (1981), it is argued that cities are not mini-
nation states and cannot be treated as a reﬂection of national politics. Local governments
do not have the same power, authority, or resources and are not necessarily autonomous

decision-making organizations. Furthermore, cities are limited in their ability to

16

effectively address the same types of issues or perform the same functions as higher
levels of government. As a result, it is necessary to examine the local power structure and
the nature of local policy making in a different way than national governance and
policymaking. In response to this critique of the traditional power debate, scholars have
further narrowed or reﬁned the study of governance to address the structure of power and
decision-making at lower levels of government as well as within speciﬁc policy arenas.
The most prevalent paradigm in examining local or urban governance is regime theory.
Several frameworks have also emerged in policy studies to explain the organization of
power and governance within the policy making process. These include the Advocacy
Coalition (AC) framework and the policy network framework. While the advocacy
coalition and policy network frameworks are not exhaustive literature on policy making,
they do capture the group dynamic that is the focal point of this research. This research is
primarily concerned with the formation of, maintenance of, and outcomes of local
governing arrangements. While important in policy studies literature, what is not being
included here is a discussion of the formal policy process (i.e. policy formation, agenda
setting, implementation, and policy'evaluation). This is not meant to discount the value of
policy process literature, but the aim of this research is to identify the actors involved,
how they come together, and what the impact is of the governing coalition formed by this
coming together.

The following chapter provides an overview of the dominant competing theories
of governance, including elite theory, pluralist theory, the advocacy coalition framework,
the policy network framework, and regime theory. Understanding who is involved in

governing, what brings them together, and how they interact are key to understanding

l7

policy making and, more importantly, policy outcomes. While not exhaustive in their
discussion of governance or the policy making process, these theories do capture key
components of the emergence, distribution, and outcomes of power. Each framework
offers an explanation of who has power, how power is achieved and distributed, and how
that power inﬂuences policymaking. The primary areas of contention between each
center on which actors are involved in the governing structure, whether power is ﬁxed or
variable, and what impact the governing structure has on policy outcomes. The various
theories are discussed in further detail below. The discussion begins with the broader
theories of power and moves towards the more speciﬁc frameworks of power and
policymaking.

Figure 2.1
Theories of Power and Governance

 

 
   
     

Elite Theory, Pluralist Theory

Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Networks,
Regime Theory

Elite Theory
Developed in the mid- twentieth century, elite theory provides a framework for
explaining the distribution of power in local governance. The questions posed by elite

theorists include: who rules? And who sets the agenda? The answers to these questions,

18

according to the elite perspective, are that power is centralized in the hands of a small
group of elites who exert inﬂuence over government and policymaking in the United
States (Hunter, 1953; 1980; Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 1967, 1983). Elite theory asserts that
society is divided into the few individuals who have the power,and the many who do not.
Those who do have power do not represent those who are governed. While there is some
internal conﬂict in the interpretation and application of elite theory, there are three key
components that appear universal:

0 Power is centralized in the hands of the few

0 Power is hierarchical with elites at the top and ordinary citizens at the bottom

0 Power disproportionately represents those from the upper socioeconomic strata

The impact of governance by the elite is that it is these few who get to set the
values for society and who determine public policy. Public policy is a direct reﬂection of
the values of the elite. Dye and Zeigler (1981) explained that elites strive to preserve the
system, particularly the values of private property, limited government, and individual
liberty. Public policy, therefore, reﬂects these values and not the values of the masses.
Policy decisions and outcomes are made from the top down. The masses have little direct
inﬂuence on policy decisions or on the power structure overall, “active elites are subject
to relatively little direct inﬂuence from apathetic masses. Elites inﬂuence masses more
than masses inﬂuence elites” (Lester & Stewart, 2000; p.55). Policy change only seems
to occur incrementally as issues are redeﬁned or tweaked. Signiﬁcant policy change is
rare in the elite perspective as elites seek to maintain the status quo.
Key elite theorists, including Mills and Hunter, offer more in-depth

interpretations of elite theory to further illustrate the role of power elites in governance

l9

and decision-making. As Mills (1956) argued in his pivotal piece, The Power Elite, while
not a natural or particularly desirable part of society, elites are a product of historical
necessity. He further argued that with increased bureaucratization and modernization,
power has become more concentrated. This concentration of power involves those in the
corporate world, central government, and the military. These institutions, according to
Mills, came to dominate the ﬁnancial, political, and intellectual resources. As society
became more and more complete, elites became seen as necessary for the management of
society (Lester & Stewart, 2000).

In his study of Atlanta, Hunter (1980) offered the ﬁrst attempt to apply elite
theory to an urban community He identiﬁed that those in the community with the most
inﬂuence were those individuals in business, government, and civic associations. After
listing and ranking those with inﬂuence, Hunter found that inﬂuential community
members tended to cluster together, particularly those in the business community and in
government. He also found that the elite were not always visible to the general public.
Rather, they are from groups of inﬂuential business leaders who controlled the power
structure behind the scenes. He concluded that elites are not necessarily elected ofﬁcials
who hold public ofﬁce. As a result, governance can take place outside of the formal or
public realm. For example, Hunter found that nothing happened in Atlanta without the
approval of the business community. Because of this local politics was dominated by
economic interests. The ultimate implication of Hunter’s application of elite theory in
Atlanta is, only a small fraction of the population was involved in the governing structure
or beneﬁted from the policy outcomes of that structure. The greater community was

largely neglected and separated from the political process.

20

Growth machine theorists (Logan & Molotch, 1996; Swanstrom, 1985) have
further deﬁned elite theory. Growth machine theory is an extension of elite theory that
goes beyond simply examining local decision- making. Growth machine theorists attempt
to reﬁne elite theory by focusing on the broader ﬁeld of urban development and honing in
on the role of business in the elite structure. Growth machine theory perceives the
business community as a key player in governance. Within the business community,
growth theorists focus on three groups of actors: developers, producers, and local
agencies. These actors, it is argued, exert a great deal of inﬂuence over decision making
because they control the resources and material within the community. The rationale
behind growth theory is that development and access to investment are the keys to power.
It also rests on the assumption that growth is good for all, and as a result, those who have
the capacity to enhance growth have the ability to dominate the power structure and
inﬂuence policy outcomes.

Growth theorists, such as Logan and Molotch (1996) and Swanstrom (1985)
found that business elites are the key players in local governance. Business elites hold
this privileged position because they hold the power over urban development by
controlling the material and intellectual resources necessary for development. Molotch
(1976) argued that local politics is rooted in economic development, particularly land
exchange. Elites work to secure the conditions of urban growth and drive politics by their
desire to enhance the local economy. Molotch’s growth theory views local governance as
being dominated by pro-growth elites who want to attract investors to the city. Growth
theorists expand elite theory by offering a motive for organization and cooperation.

According to growth theory, elites collectively organize to inﬂuence the local

21

government in pursuit of a shared economic development agenda, speciﬁcally one that is
geared towards land development. What growth theory adds to elite theory is the notion
that local governance is more than just who is in power, it is about the politics of
development.

While elite theory, in general, continues to be one of the dominant theories in
the study of local politics, it has been criticized on several grounds. One of the biggest
challenges to the elitist perspective is that it does not allow for much ﬂexibility.
Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) argued that elite theorists assume that the power
structure is stable over time. There is no explanation for whether or how power changes
over time. Elite theory is also exclusionary and does not account for the role of external
actors or inﬂuences. For example, Hunter has been criticized for predeterrnining his list
of inﬂuential actors based on his preconceived notions about where power was
concentrated. Hunter also neglected to address why certain individuals became part of the
elite. While elite theory offers an explanation of who governs, it does not provide insight
into how elites come to power and how this power structure evolves or changes. By
claiming that economic interests and development are the dominant goals of local
government, elite theorists do not allow room for competing interests or policy agendas.

Growth theory is also limited. One major criticism of growth theory is that it is
too localized and the discussion of property development is too limited. Growth theory
suffers the same challenge as elite theory in that it neglects to address the impact of
competing agendas and interests within cities. For example, anti-growth movements have
emerged, particularly in areas of high education, high income, and professional

occupations. Anti-growth movements work to counter development as the guiding value

22

of local government by emphasizing social and environmental issues. Neither elite theory
nor growth theory accounts for this type of challenge to the status quo nor does either

consider the importance the individual’s place in social equity as a guiding value.

Pluralism
Pluralism is an alternative to elite theory and is considered a dominant
paradigm in urban studies. Pluralists reject elite theory and offer a broader perspective of
the distribution of power. Key to pluralist theory is the view that power is fragmented and
decision- making disaggregated. In general, pluralists argue that the dispersion of power
and resources is desirable in order to ensure that authority and inequities are more evenly
distributed (Dahl, 1961,1984,1986; Braybooke & Lindblom, 1963). Counter to elite
theory, pluralism rests on the notion that no one group has ultimate power or control over
decision making. Instead, institutions, groups, organized interests, individuals, and voters
interact with one another. As a result, participants are more invested and bound to the
process of governance. As Judge, Stoker, and Wolman (1995) noted, “the system is
differentiated. Different groups and elites wield different degrees of inﬂuence in different
policy areas at different times” (p.21). All players have some level of inﬂuence in a
pluralistic society and it is govemment’s role to referee, manage, enforce, and legitimize
this group interaction.
The key components of pluralism are as follows:
0 Power is fragmented and inequality dispersed
0 Decision-making is disaggregated

0 Policy outcomes differ by sector based on the process and mix of actors

23

The pluralist perspective does not perceive of a ﬁxed or stable governing structure.
Instead, actors come and go in the process as interests supply the sources of authority.
Different policy areas bring together a different mix of actors, which leads to a
redistribution of power. According to pluralist theory, the dispersion of power is desirable
and the uncertainty of the governance and decision-making bring people together.

In his study of New Haven, Dahl (1961) used pluralism to explain how decisions
are made. He examined the decision-making process in three areas (urban redevelopment,
education, and political nominations) by focusing on patterns of inequality, inﬂuence,
voting, and adherence to democratic ideology. Dahl found that over two centuries, New
Haven gradually evolved into a pluralist society. More speciﬁcally, he found that while
only a small number of individuals had direct inﬂuence on local politics, most citizens
had a moderate degree of inﬂuence. Decision-making in New Haven was stratiﬁed and
there was no evidence of a power elite. He also found that each issue area had a different
decision making process with different participants. Through his examination of local
governance, Dahl concluded that no one group or elite held all of the power and/or
resources. Instead, he found that power was dispersed among actors and differed based
on issue areas. Unlike elite theory, Dahl found that there existed a plurality of
institutions, participants, organized interests, and voters that were involved in governing
and decision-making.

A number of other scholars have applied pluralist theory to additional topics in
political science, including urban politics (Banﬁeld, 1961), Presidency and Congress
(Polsby, 1984), and the budgetary process (Wildavsky, 1964). Each has concluded that,

to some degree, decision making is shared and power is distributed across different

24

groups and across policy areas. Those involved in decision making and how decisions are
made varies depending on the issue arena and the balance of those involved.

Overall, pluralists reject the notion that power is highly stratiﬁed in the hands of a
few insiders. Governance is seen as a much more inclusive process that involves different
groups of actors. Based on this diversity in decision making, political outcomes are not
ﬁxed; rather they differ based on the mix of players involved in the process as well as the
issue at hand. Political outcomes reﬂect the community context and, as a result, they will
vary depending on the type of process used, the actors involved, and the distribution of
power. Within this perspective, political power extends beyond formal institutions by
incorporating the overall community context into the process.

While pluralism offers a more inclusive explanation of power, it has its
limitations. Pluralists do not adequately explain how diverse groups of actors come
together to make decisions or inﬂuence politics. It does not account for how certain
issues win out over others or how collective action problems are addressed. More
speciﬁcally, how do diverse interests come together to cooperate? How is coordination
achieved? How does this change as certain issues change? Studies of pluralism also face
criticism. For example, in Dahl’s study of New Haven he focused on three issue areas. He
did not explain why he chose those areas and neglected to address how the policy agenda
is set. How do certain issues emerge for discussion and action? Pluralists do not
adequately explain agenda setting. Is the agenda setting process also pluralistic? Who sets
the agenda? These are key questions in understanding governance and its impact on

policy outcomes.

25

Both elite theory and pluralist theories lack insight into how individuals are
empowered and how decision-making actually happens. In the elite perspective, power
is ﬁxed. It is not discussed in the context of conﬂict. For example, within the elite
governing structure, if conﬂict emerges over values, who’s point of view dominates?
How is this conﬂict resolved? The following two theoretical frameworks examine these
issues by focusing on why actors come together to govern and how cooperation is
achieved. Instead of simply asking on “who governs?”, the Advocacy Coalition
framework and Regime theory ask a new set of questions in order to develop a more
thorough and dynamic perspective of governance and decision—making. These
frameworks pose the following questions:

0 Who cooperates?
0 How is cooperation achieved?

0 How is it maintained?

Advocacy Coalition Framework
While anchored in a pluralist perspective, the Advocacy Coalition (AC)

framework, examines the role of coalition building as central to policymaking. AC
examines the participation of multiple actors (i.e. legislature, executive, bureaucracy,
courts, interest groups, media, the general public) at various levels of government. In
developing the AC framework, Sabatier (1987, 1988, 1991, 1999) emphasized the need
for a more dynamic and multi-dimensional approach to understanding how actors impact
policy outcomes. Traditional approaches (i.e. elite theory, pluralism) focus on single

institutions or levels of government, which does not adequately capture the process.

26

Sabatier’s AC framework incorporates actors at various levels of government and in
various outside organizations across policy types.

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) argued that policy coalitions organize around
common core beliefs and policy goals that are stable over time. Coalitions compete for
control as policy brokers mediate this competition in order to ensure system stability (i.e.
structure, rules, etc.)'. Typically, one dominant coalition emerges from this conﬂict and
becomes central to the policy process. The dominant coalition seeks to manipulate the
system in order to achieve their goals and ensure their policies remain in tact over time.
However, policy change can occur when there are changes to the external subsystemz,
modiﬁcations in belief systems, or changes to the acting coalition. Changes in the
external subsystem can shift coalitional power, resources, and policy information3
resulting in policy change. Michael Kirst (2006) applied the advocacy coalition
framework in his research on charter schools. Kirst argued that, “charter schools are part
of political competition between two competing advocacy networks and coalitions that
want to expand or constraint school choice.” (p.2). By identifying who supports and
opposes charter schools across states, Kirst found that there is no clear political pattern of
state or local charter school contexts. He conceded that, because of the state- to -state

variation, it is unclear which of the competing advocacy coalitions will prevail.

 

' Policy coalitions are made up of actors from both public and private organizations at various
levels of government who share policy beliefs and goals. Policy brokers are members of the
policy community who posses knowledge about and a commitment to the policy process.

2 External subsystem includes the greater socioeconomic environment as well as other goveming
coalitions and subsystems.

3 Policy information is the substantive information about policies that shapes the preferences and
beliefs of coalitions. It is key to the process of policy change.

27

What the AC framework provides is a more dynamic explanation of how different
actors come together to make policy decisions. It takes the speciﬁc policy context into
consideration as well as the interaction between different levels of government and
different governing structures. However, what the AC frameworks does not provide is an

explanation for how coalitions evolve, change, or are dismantled.

Policy Networks and Entrepreneurs

Policy networks, according to Mintrom and Vergari, “consist of a group of
actors who share an interest in some policy area and who are linked by their direct and
indirect contacts with one another” (1998, p.128). Informed by Heclo’s (1978) concept of
“issue networks”, the notion of policy networks was developed to further the
understanding of how groups of actors come together to inﬂuence or change policy.
Michael Mintrom (1997, 1998, 2000) developed and applied the role of policy networks
and policy diffusion. He argued that, “policy networks comprise a vital resource for
policy entrepreneurs who seek to articulate their ideas for policy innovation onto the
legislative agenda” (Mintrom and Vergari, 1998, p.131). He further argued that policy
change is the result of the activities conducted by “policy entrepreneurs“. Mintrom
(1997, 1998, 2000) and Mintrom and Vergari (1998) contended that policy change occurs
when a policy entrepreneur helps deﬁne and promote policy. Possessing the following
qualities, a policy entrepreneur has signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the policy environment.

0 Creativity

0 Social Perception

 

4 A policy entrepreneur is a person who promotes policy innovations and sells their ideas to the
legislature and those in and around government.

28

0 Versatility
o Persuasiveness
0 Team Building
0 Leadership
According to Mintrom (2000), policy entrepreneurs take an active role in
promoting policy change by using the above characteristics to persuade others that
change is both possible and necessary. These entrepreneurs help identify policy problems
and introduce new and creative policy solutions. By networking in prominent policy
circles, they are able to shape the issues on the policy agenda and build coalitions to
support their policy goals. Essentially, policy networks provide a resource for
entrepreneurs to get their policy innovations onto the legislative agenda, which increases
the likelihood that new policies will be adopted
Through his examination of school choice in Milwaukee, Mintrom (1997)
identiﬁed African American state Assembly Woman, Polly Williams, as a policy
entrepreneur. According to Mintrom, Polly Williams played a key role in gaining public
and bipartisan support for a voucher initiative in Wisconsin. Former Republican Governor
Tommy Thompson wanted to create a public voucher system in the Milwaukee school
district, but faced intense opposition from liberal democrats. Polly Williams wanted to
address the racial and economic inequities in the Milwaukee schools. Taking on the role of
a policy entrepreneur, she took control of the debate and was able to forge a cooperative
relationship between urban liberal democrats and conservative republicans. By listening to
the various perspectives and understanding the issues involved, Polly Williams was able to

incorporate the Govemor’s desire for vouchers with the urban community’s desire for a

29

more equitable educational system. Williams put together a voucher plan that would be
administered by the state but that would speciﬁcally target low income families. The plan
was supported by Governor Thompson, the Republican legislature, and the urban
community. Mintrom (1997) argued that without the social skills, charisma, and
commitment of Polly Williams the Wisconsin voucher debate would have remained split
along political and social lines. In their exploration of policy networks and policy diffusion,
Mintrom and Vergari (1998) concluded that the existence of a policy network enhances the
emergence of a policy entrepreneur, which supports the diffusion of policy innovation.
More speciﬁcally, Mintrom (1997) found that policy entrepreneurs served as advocated of
school choice in 26 states and their role signiﬁcantly raised the probability school choice

legislation and policy.

Regime Theory
Regime theory offers a paradigm shift by examining the capacity of governance
. (i.e. how governance occurs) versus simply identifying who is involved in governing.

Regime theorists concentrate on the notion that individuals have the capacity to create
coalitions and to inﬂuence policy based on the make up and resources of that coalition
(F ainstein & Fainstein, 1983; Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989). Key to regime theory are the
following characteristics:

0 Regimes facilitate action, empower actors, respond to conﬂict

0 Regimes share a purpose

0 There is no formal hierarchy

o Regime participants must posses knowledge and resource

30

Unlike the previous theories, regime theory emphasizes the interdependence of
governmental and non-governmental forces. Local politics are inﬂuenced by a diverse
mix of individuals from the political arena, business sector, and community. Regimes are
to act and respond to social change. Under regime theory, no one group dominates.
Instead, actors come together based on a shared purpose and agenda. These actors form a
governing coalition that shapes local politics. According to Stone,

Power lies not in the hands of some distinct group (who), but rather inheres in

how people are related. The power structure is not a small body of exceptionally

important individuals; power depends on how relationships are structured as the

community responds to major issues. (as cited in Pelissero, 2003, p.126)

Regime theorists examine how interests are brought together to cooperate and how that
cooperation is achieved and maintained. In general, public interests, business interests,
and political interests are coupled in order to create a political environment that can
adequately address policy problems. These interests join together to form a regime5 in
order to pursue a shared goal. The regime empowers groups to cooperate in order to
mobilize resources and facilitate coordination. Regime theorists argue that policies are
shaped by the composition of the governing coalition and the resources coalition
members bring to the table’. Regimes, therefore, directly impact policy outcomes. The
governing coalition shapes policy and policy also shapes the regime. Stone asserts that

policy change emerges from the regime’s capacity to act and take on the direction of that

 

5 A regime is deﬁned by Stone as an informal yet stable group that has access to institutional
resources and that is created and maintained to make and carry out decisions.

6 A coalition includes actors from different sectors of a community’s institutional environment,

speciﬁcally from government, the business community, and civic associations. It is a
representation of people in the community and the different institutional capacities they control.

31

action, “Common purpose provides a basis around which cooperation can occur, but for
energetic problem-solving activity to take place, the various players must make it a
priority” (Pelissero, 2003, p.129).

Several theorists have applied regime theory to different levels of government
and issue areas. For example, Leo (1998), Clark (1999), and Hamilton (2002, 2004)
looked at regime formation at the regional level, while Stone (1989, 1993 2001), F erman
(1996), Davies (2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004), Orr and Stoker (1994) examined regime
theory in the context of urban government, DiGaetano (1997; 2002) and John and Cole
(1998) applied regime theory in a comparative perspective. Regime is also applied to
speciﬁc policy issues, including economic development (Immergluck, 2005; Rast, 2005),
urban education (Stone, 1998; Henig, 1999; Burns, 2003), and racial politics (Bennett,
1993; Afﬁgne, 1997). While all of these works have contributed to the understanding and
application of regime formation, maintenance, and the impact on politics, perhaps the
most inﬂuential remains Stone’s study of Atlanta.

In his study of Atlanta, Stone (1989) examined the relationship between local
government and other local institutions to see how certain ideas and interests prevail. He
observed a single regime in Atlanta. Stone illustrated how policy choices are shaped by
the composition of the coalition and the resources brought by coalition members. He
found that the White business community in Atlanta wanted to redevelop the downtown.
However, they did not have the political inﬂuence to pursue this agenda: the Black
governing structure held that power. The Black leadership wanted more housing options
for the community. Instead of opposing one another, Stone found that the White business

community formed a coalition with the Black community in order to pursue local

32

redevelopment. The business community combined its wealth with the voting power of
the Black community to pursue an economic development plan that included both
downtown redevelopment and housing. Instead of opposing one another or ﬁghting for
sole power, both groups committed to the plan and formed a coalition based on a
common interest. By combining unequal resources, an unlikely governing coalition
emerged in Atlanta that transcended racial barriers. Stone concluded that several factors
were crucial to the formation of the Atlanta regime. The bi-racial composition of the
regime and the unequal distribution of resources served to destabilize opposition and
encourage an unusual alliance.

Barbara F erman (1996) expanded Stone’s work by applying regime theory in a
comparative perspective. She examined local politics in Pittsburg and Chicago and
concluded that regime makeup and overall level of engagement did indeed have an
impact on how each city was governed.

By drawing our attention to institutional structures, patterns of resource

distributions, and underlying political cultures, the incorporation of urban arenas

into the analysis allows us to identify the opportunities for political mobilization

and the form that such mobilization will take. (p. 136)

However, Ferman (1996) found regime theory in its original form limiting. She expanded
its utility by looking at the context that regimes operate within and the impact that
context has on the decision- making process and political outputs. She developed a
ﬁ'amework that consists of arenas in which regimes are situated. These arenas can be
deﬁned by their civic, business, or electoral characteristics. Ultimately, F erman argued

that regimes have certain arenas they prefer to operate in and that context explains why

33

regimes exhibit different processes and produce different outputs. F erman also argued
that regimes are shaped by the larger political culture, including the economic, political,
and social environment. Regimes must ﬁnd a balance between these arenas and contexts.
In her examination of regime politics in Chicago and Pittsburg, F erhman (1996)
found that the two cities operated within completely different arenas, which played a
pivotal role in deﬁning the regime. For example, she found that the Pittsburg regime was
formed based on an economic development agenda, whereas the Chicago regime came
together on the basis of political and electoral goals. The Pittsburg regime operated in the
civic arena, while the Chicago regime operated in the electoral arena. As a result, each
regime was made up of a unique and different mix of actors that produced very different

policies.

Discussion of Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Networks, and Regimes

Each of the aforementioned theoretical frameworks provides an explanation of
how power is distributed and the impact that distribution of power has on decision
making. While there is a clear contrast between elite theory and pluralism, there is less of
a clear distinction between advocacy coalitions, policy networks, and regimes. The most
obvious distinction is in their empirical application. Both advocacy coalitions and policy
networks are primarily found in public policy literature as they are used to explain the
make up and impact of issue speciﬁc policy coalitions. Regime theory, on the other hand,
is grounded primarily in urban politics literature and applied to the study of urban
governance. However, beyond their orientation in the literature, there are further

differences that should be highlighted. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the key

34

characteristics of each framework, including the source of power, goals of governance,

and impact of governance.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 2.1
Overview of Competing Theories of Governance
Theory Source of Power Goals of Impact of
Governance Governance
Elite Concentrated Preserve the Elites set agenda,
Theory among small status quo, determine policy,
group of wealthy, economic not representative
privileged in development (ﬁxed)
business,
government, civic
associations
Pluralist Dispersed among Reﬂect Differs based on
Theory various community issue area, mix of
competing context actors (variable)
interests from
government and
community
Advocacy Mediated by Manipulate Changes as
Coalition policy brokers, system to challenges to
Framework dispersed among achieve subsystem result
coalition dominant in new coalitional
members from coalitions power, resources,
public and private goals and or policy
organizations and policy information
various levels of preferences
government
Policy Dispersed among Shape F acilitatespolicy
Networks actors who share agenda, build innovation and
interest in policy coalitions to diffusion
area, facilitated facilitate
by policy policy
entrepreneur change
Regime Shared among Pursue Reﬂects circular
Theory those from shared relationship
government, vision, pool between regime
business, and resources to and policy
community act, respond
to social
change

 

 

 

 

 

35

 

The AC framework, policy networks, and regime theory, while oriented in
different bodies of literature, all recognize the important of coalition building and the
dispersion of power among various interests. The AC and policy network frameworks
attribute more to the role of policy mediators or entrepreneurs than does regime theory.
They also give the role of beliefs more signiﬁcance than regime theory. The role of a
policy broker and a set of share beliefs do not seem to necessarily explain how or why
certain actors come together to cooperate and facilitate policy change. Do actors have to
share a belief about policy goals or simply be motivated to act towards a larger vision of
change? Is the presence of a policy broker a necessary component of group formation and
cooperation? Regime theorists would argue that regimes have formed without meeting
these criteria. Regimes form more from a desire for change without necessarily a shared
set intentions or goals behind that desire. What elicits regime formation is more about the
desire and capacity to act towards social change. For example, Wells, Grutzik, and
Camochan (1999) identiﬁed three very divergent themes that are common among
supporters of charter schools:

0 Those who view public education as a failure, and see charter schools as a way to
dismantle the traditional public education system.
0 Those who are dissatisﬁed with public education and see charter schools as a way
to create a change within public education.
0 Those who believe in public education and see charter schools as a way to
strengthen and revitalize the current system
As it is further discussed in the upcoming chapter, those that supported charter schools

came together in Michigan to work collaboratively towards change in public education.

36

What brought these groups together was not a shared intention or belief about what
charter schools would accomplish as much as it was the desire for some sort of change

and the capacity to make it happen.

A Further Examination of Regime Theory
Regime theory provides a useful foundation for explaining how actors come
together to govern, set the agenda, make policy, and facilitate policy change. As Stone
(2001) explained:
The identifying agenda of a regime and the capacity to act on that agenda rests on
the governing coalition and the nature of the relationships among coalition
members. ...Because the coalition is not a naturally cohering group, its existence
depends on its agenda and the agenda is meaningful only if the coalition has
collectively the resources to act on it. (p.22)
Central to the notion of a political regime is the argument that a variety of interests must
come together for effective governance. By focusing on who cooperates, how such
cooperation is achieved and maintained, and the impact of such cooperation, regime
theorists show how individuals in and around government have the capacity to create more
stable and enduring coalitions in order to implement policy change. Explicit policy
interventions that seek to restructure local governing regimes are, of course, not new.
Recognizing the limited capacity of electoral coalitions to implement a broad policy
agenda, political and community leaders have crafted numerous efforts to induce the
development of the sort of broad-based governing coalition outlined by Stone. Regime

theory provides the context for deﬁning regimes, coalitions, and power as they impact

37

policy. In its most simplistic terms, regime theory explores the linkage between local
government and other local institutions and how such relationships are formed in order to
facilitate action and respond to conﬂict and social change.

However, there have been some practical limitations to regime theory thus far.
Identifying stakeholders is essential to understanding local governance, and while regime
theorists agree that private interests, namely economic interests, have a privileged
position in local regimes, the role of other community or external interests are less
understood. This is particularly true for state actors. As Burns (2003) noted, “Regime
theorists understate the role extra local actors, in general, and state government, in
particular play in urban politics and policy development” (p.286). Stone (2001) further
explained:

Most of the time policy is made through semi-autonomous subsystems- The most
active players tend to be the ones most directly affected. . ..and the ones likely to
direct the day-to-day activities of these subsystems. If change is to occur and
reform is to stick then subsystem relations need to be altered in a lasting
way. . ..the old subsystem had to be replaced by a new or remade one. ( p.7)
The shortfall of regime theory is that theorists typically concern themselves with the role
and impact of local interests and actors on local policy. State government is seen as
playing only a modest role, particularly in education reform. According to Danielson and
Hochscheld (1998):
Partly due to their unusual structural arrangements, the educational establishment
typically has enjoyed more autonomy than have other government functions.

Schools are more insulated from the usual governmental controls. Despite

38

growing outside involvement, up to this point at least insiders retain substantial

advantages in school politics. (p.278-279)

They go on to say that, “In most cases, governors and state legislatures are largely absent
and state education departments have made little different to school or district policies.”
(Danielson & Hochscheld, 1998, p.290).

Overwhelmingly, regime scholars have underestimated the role that state actors
play in shaping local policy (Gittell & McKenna, 1999; Burns, 2002, 2003). In his work
on takeovers in Newark, New Jersey and Hartford, Conneticut, Burns (2002; 2003)
illustrated how state governments have the ability to become part of an urban regime by
using their resources and constitutional powers. He argued that not only can state actors
join an existing local regime but they can also re-shape and change regimes by
introducing new actors, typically business interests. Gittell and McKenna (1999) posed a
similar argument. They asserted that state governors are more active in education policy
regimes since the 1990’s, particularly when it comes to promoting market based reforms.
They discuss how governors have gained new powers in education as they form
coalitions and overcome resistance by other interest groups, “They are part of a new state
education regime that includes the business community and, in several states, religious
groups,” (Gittell & McKenna, 1999, p.289).

Providing a powerful metaphor to explain the dynamics of local politics, regime
theorists argue that changing institutions can impact policy outcomes. Theorists have
made two major claims about local politics. The ﬁrst is that elected ofﬁcials need to build
coalitions across the community to successfully govern. The second claim is that policy

outcomes depend on the speciﬁc makeup of the governing coalition. Existing case study

39

literature suggests that the regime framework has merit. However, the literature provides
relatively little attention to the institutional context in which regimes are created and
function. In order to take regime theory further, the linkage between regime makeup and
local policy outcomes need to be explicated. To date, very little empirical work has
actually identiﬁed the link between regimes and policy.

This research extends regime theory by offering empirical evidence of how
existing regimes are challenged and ultimately replaced a new regime. By examining the
impact of institutional arrangements, it is argued that these arrangements can actually
restructure local politics by redeﬁning the policy agenda in such a way that a new
governing coalition is formed. The restructuring of local institutions may not only impact
short-term policy outcomes, but may also produce a long-term restructuring of the local
political environment. As the state intervenes to reorganize institutional arrangements and
players within the education policy sector a new regime is empowered. This research
responds to the empirical challenge facing regime theory by testing regime formation,
change, and stability. Regime theory is further expanded through an examination of
institutional restructuring. The creation of new institutional arrangements is offered as a
key component to regime change. Evidence is provided that this regime change ultimately
leads to substantive policy change as new actors come to control the policy agenda. The
research offered in the following chapters offers a more explicit link between issues of
governance and policy outcomes. More speciﬁcally, governance is conceived of beyond
the local limits and extends beyond the boundaries of formal political institutions. The

discussion of regime change and policy outcomes is placed in the context of education

40

reform. Education reform is used to illustrate the empowerment of a new regime and the

impact on local education policy.

41

CHAPTER THREE: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND TRENDS IN
EDUCATION REFORM IN THE US. AND MICHIGAN

The American political system is deﬁned by the separation of powers between
the different levels of government. Each level of government has authority independent
of the other levels of government, as expressed by the US. Constitution and state level
constitutions. The level of independence and authority has shifted overtime as different
levels of government exert more or less power over policyrnaking and implementation.
The federal government’s interactions with state and local governments has changed over

time as the nature of federalism has been redeﬁned.

Federalism

Federalism is a key attribute of American government in United States and has
been since the ratiﬁcation of the US. Constitution. Federalism outlines the relationship
between levels of government, particularly between federal and state government. The
nature of federalism is an area that is well documented in the ﬁeld of political science
(Riker, 1964; Elazar, 1984, 1987; Ostrom, 1991; Peterson, 1995). While the names and
exact timeframe of the different periods of federalism are debatable, the characteristics
that deﬁne them are similar. Each period of federalism represents a speciﬁc time in US.
intergovernmental relations that captures the dynamic between levels of government.

Dual federalism captures the role of federal government prior to 1937 (Corwin,
1950; Zimmerman, 1992). Under dual federalism, state governments and the federal
government were considered largely independent of one another. The federal government

only had authority over the states as directly granted by the US. Constitution. Beyond

42

these direct powers, each level of government essentially operated in separate realms.
This trend in federalism was most evident during the civil war era, particularly as
southern states wanted to protect their rights and interests. During this time, cities were
largely isolated. The federal government paid little to no attention to cities before the
1930’s and vice versa ( Judd & Swanstrom, 2004). However, with the passage of key
constitutional provisions including the abolishment of slavery, equal protection, and
voting rights and the onset of the Great Depression, the concept of dual federalism
quickly gave way to the next phase of intergovernmental relations: cooperative
federalism.

Cooperative federalism emerged from 1937 to the mid-1960’s transforming the
relationship between state governments and the federal government from one of
separatism to one of cooperation (Zimmerman, 2001). This change in federal and state
relations was particularly evident during the Great Depression and the Great Society eras.
Responding to a host of economic and social challenges and the lack of ability to address
such problems by lower levels of government, the federal government played an
extremely active role in passing a plethora of redistributive and regulatory policies. This
era of federal intervention included the following federal policies and programs: Civil
Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, Economic Opportunity Act, Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, Head Start, Medicare, the War on Poverty, and the creation of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). Within the few years span in the mid-1960’s Congress
authorized 219 new federal initiatives (Judd & Swanstrom, 2004). This period of
federalism marked signiﬁcant activity from the federal government in terms of domestic

policy and aid. With the enactment of new federal programs came the provision of

43

federal grants to state and local governments. While state and local governments
welcomed ﬁnancial assistance from the federal government during these times, such
support changed the nature of intergovernmental relations. Both state and local
governments came to heavily rely on the federal government. As state government
became more ﬁnancially dependent on the federal government, the federal government
was able to exert more inﬂuence over state policy.

As power shifted the perception of federalism changed from one of cooperation
between levels of government to one of coercion by the federal government (Kincaid,
1990, 1991). Zimmerman (2001) discussed the coercive nature of federal and state
relations,

1965 was a turning point in the nature of the federal system. In that year,
Congress decided that water quality throughout the United States must meet
minimum standards. Subsequently, Congress came to rely heavily on its
preemption powers to foster implementation of national policies, and it enacted
more than 250 preemptive statues. (p.22)
During this period, the federal government took a much more active role in mandating
state and local governments to implement policies or meet standards instead of working
cooperatively with lower levels of government. An example of such a mandate includes
the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, which made job discrimination by
state and local government illegal. Stephens and Wikstrom (2007) claimed that before
coercive federalism the imposition of federal mandates was relatively rare. However,

during this time federal mandates became the norm. Paul Posner (1998) noted:

44

In the 1970’s and 1980’s, mandates came to be embraced by both parties as an
efﬁcient tool to achieve national objectives that leaders felt compelled to promote.
The shift from voluntaristic to coercive tools of federal action marked a
signiﬁcant departure in our federal’system. (p.21 1)
Beginning with the election of President Nixon and continuing on through the Clinton
administration the federal government shifted its role yet again. During this time New
Federalism was established. New federalism was characterized by the federal
govemment’s desire to delegate authority to lower levels of government and shift aid from
categorical to block grants. According to Peter Eisinger (1998), the Nixon administration
sought to devolve authority from Washington to sub-national government through block
grants and general revenue sharing and this trend continues today as Congress, the
President, and the governors combine to contract the role of federal government in
domestic policy (p. 309).

By moving from categorical grants to block grants and implementing revenue
sharing, the federal government was able to step back from policymaking, thus allowing
greater state and local discretion in program development and spending. Revenue
sharing grants were given to state and local governments and to be used at their discretion
in the areas of education, welfare, and urban development (Stephens & Wikstrom, 2007).
Through New Federalism, the federal government devolved a vast number of policy
responsibilities to state and local governments. By the early 19903, block grants became
the norm resulting in a decreased federal role in education, social services, job training,

community development, and environmental clean up. The impact of this was that state

45

governments increased their formal and informal powers in all policy areas (Gittell &
McKenna, 1999).

Devolution has deﬁned the trend in intergovernmental relations since the 19805,
particularly in terms of the relationship between the federal and state governments. As the
federal government devolved greater authority to states, the relationship between the
federal and local governments began to collapse. Throughout the 19803 and 19903, not
only did federal aid to cities decrease but the importance of cities in national politics also
declined. This became particularly true with the boom in suburbanization (Judd &
Swanstrom, 2004). With federal decentralization, state governments experienced a
resurgence. Ronald Reagan’s desire to limit government coupled with Bill Clinton’s
welfare reform initiatives paved the road for much more active state governments. In this
era of devolution, the relationship between state and local governments has become more

important.

State and Local Government in the Federal System
Federal devolution has been accompanied by a changing relationship between

state and local governments. What devolution has done is to raise questions about how to
allocate government authority by forcing state and local governments to assume new and
different responsibilities (Berman, 2003). As states have been given greater authority and
discretion, state governments tend to rely more heavily on local governments to
implement policies and programs (Boruit, 1996; Eisinger, 1998; Nice, 1998). At the same
time, local governments have come to be more dependent on the state as the source of

ﬁscal power (Sokolow, 1998; Johnston, 1998; Agranoff & McGuire, 1998). The idea

46

behind the transfer of power is that the governments closest to the people are more
effective and responsive (Bennett & Resnick, 1990; Oates & Schwab, 1988; Stein, 1999).
Federalism has typically been discussed in terms of shifting power from the
federal to state government, but not a lot of attention has been given to the relationship
between federal and local government. According to Stein (1999), “Local governments
have largely been ignored.” (p.22). Absent in the United States Constitution is any
mention of local government. It has been the responsibility of state governments to
provide the structure for local governments. According to Daniel Elazar (1961):
State government is the source and central authority for all the local governments
within boundaries, even for those special districts created by the State virtually at
the behest of the Federal Government. It has very deﬁnite powers of coercion
over these creatures of the State, “home rule” notwithstanding. (p.24—25)
Local governments are products of the state and cannot exist or operate without the
authority of state government. The relationship between state and local governments
varies by state, although there does appear to be a general framework that outlines the
general makeup of state and local relations. Dillon’s rule, developed by Iowa Judge John
Dillon (1868), states that:
It is a general and undisputed proposition that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: ﬁrst,
those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied
in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation

not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial

47

doubt concerning the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against
a corporation, and the power is denied (City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and
Missouri Railroad Company, 1868).

Dillon’s rule gave states ultimate authority over local governments thus limiting
local power and autonomy. States have exercised this power by different types of local
governments including counties, cities, townships, school districts, and special districts.
As the organization and powers of local governments may differ but state home rule
serves as a common feature that provides an outline for local authority. Brooke Graves
(1964) described home rule as, “the power of local self government” (p.700). Home rule
can be established by constitutional provision or statutory act and allows for greater local

control over four key areas:

1. Structural — power to choose the form of government, charter and enact charter
revisions

2. Functional — power to exercise powers of local self government

3. Fiscal — authority to determine revenue sources, set tax rates, borrow funds, and
other related activities

4. Personnel — authority to set employment rules and conditions ranging from
remuneration to collective bargaining (National League of Cities, available at

http://www.nlc.org/about_citics/citicsil01/153.cfm).

 

The enactment of home rule has established local governments as more signiﬁcant

institutions in the intergovernmental system.

48

Local politics have traditionally been treated as a reﬂection of state and/or
national politics (Banﬁeld & Wilson, 1963; Frug, 1980; Shultz, 1989). It is argued that
this is a misleading representation of local government (Peterson, 1981). In City Limits,
Peterson asserted that local government is not a microcosm of national government and
should not be treated as such. Cities do not have the same power, capacity, or resources
that states and the federal government do. Local governments are thus limited in their
ability to perform certain functions, particularly those functions that involve the
allocation and redistribution of goods and services. Peterson argues that cities are simply
not equipped to efﬁciently implement redistributive policies and such issues should be

leﬁ to higher levels of government (i.e. state or federal government).

Education in the Intergovernmental System
The federal government has, traditionally, assumed a very small role in public

education. However, in 1965 the federal government took a much more active role in
public education. Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA) reﬂect such changes. The ESEA targeted low-income schools as a
way to close the growing income gap between wealthy and poor students and schools by
equalizing funding across the states (Lester & Stewart, 2000). The rationale behind
ESEA was that if funding across schools was equal than student performance would
improve. However, that did not seem to be the case. The next major wave of federal
intervention came in the 1980’s under the Reagan administration. The release of A Nation

at Risk in 1983 highlighted systemic failures in pubic education. According to the report:

49

Our nation is at risk. . ...The educational foundations of our society are presently
being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our future as a nation
and a people. . .We have, in effect, been committing an act of unthinking,
unilateral educational disarmament. (National Commission on Excellence in
Education, p.l).

Following A Nation at Risk, the federal government began promoting greater
standards and accountability in schools as a way improving academic achievement. In
2000, President Bush created America 2000. America 2000 set a national education
agenda that called for greater standards in education. America 2000 was renamed Goals
2000: Educate America Act, under President Clinton in 1993. The Goals 2000 act created
a set of eight goals for students to achieve by the year 2000. Speciﬁc goals included:

0 School readiness: all children will start school ready to learn

0 School completion: 90% of students will graduate

0 Student achievement: students in grades 4, 8, and 12 will be competent in all
subject areas

0 Teacher education and professional development: teachers will have access to
programs and opportunities to improve their skills

0 Math and science: students will be number one in math and science globally

0 Adult literacy and lifelong learning: every adult will be literate

0 Safe schools: every school will be free of drugs, alcohol, violence, ﬁrearms

0 Parent participation: every school will promote partnerships with parents7

 

7 For more on Goals 2000: Educate America Act go to the Department of Education Archives at
http://wwwcd.gov/pubs/GZKReforming/indcxlitml

 

50

President Clinton also created the Improving America’s Schools Act in 1994, which
amended and reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. This act
introduced charter schools in federal legislation. The presence and federal push for
charter schools and school choice was further solidiﬁed in 2001 with President Bush’s
No Child Left Behind Act, another reauthorization of ESEA.

The implementation and reauthorization of ESEA set national priorities in
education, but those priorities tend to be loosely regulated and implemented. The federal
government has, traditionally, left the responsibility for establishing, implementing, and
overseeing education reform and improvement to the states. Public education falls under
the jurisdiction of state government as a reserved power under the 10th amendment.
Approaches to education vary from state to state. The dominant role appears to be that
states simply deﬁne the basic institutional structure, to set the limits of authority, and to
provide a portion of operating revenue. Beyond these functions, the state has largely
delegated responsibility for public education to local governments.

Public schools have traditionally been creatures of local politics. However,
following increasing federal demands for standardization and accountability and growing
public concern over education, direct state intervention became common. Such
intervention included more rigorous student achievement standards, tougher teacher
certiﬁcation systems, improved teacher compensation, and enhanced accountability
standards (Fuhrman, Clune, & Elmore, 1989). Almost every state developed new policies
in each of the above areas and state aid to support such efforts drastically increased.
Fuhrman, Clune, and Elmore asserted that the reforms of the 19803 were largely political

with state legislatures and governors playing signiﬁcant roles in educational reform.

51

State governors have become active participants in setting the direction of
education reform in their states (Gittell & McKenna, 1999). Berman (2003) noted,
“Localities have been losing control over education, in part because of unhappiness with
local property taxes. Many states have responded by shifting the burden of ﬁnancing
education to state taxes” (p.33). This increased role is evident in recent policy trends,
including changes in school funding formulas, takeovers of poorly performing schools,
and the adoption of school choice and charter schools. In more recent years state
governments have become much more aggressive in designing and implementing
educational policy.

During the 19903 widespread public concern coupled with growing pressure
from state courts led a number of state legislatures to seriously review how their schools
were being funded. Deﬁning the appropriate level and source of school funding became
critical issues for many state governments. Many states questioned the utility of local
property tax as the primary source of school funding. Several states responded by shiﬁing
school ﬁnancing to the state level including Wisconsin, Minnesota, Vermont, New
Hampshire, and Michigan. By taking a leading role in ﬁnancing education, state actors
have become more focused on enhancing the overall quality education (DiLeo, 1998;
Berman, 1995; Seder; 2000). As states’ ﬁnancial role in education has increased, so has
the overall public demand for policymakers to improve the quality of education. As
Berman (2003) noted, “Increased state funding has been accompanied by greater state
meddling in the details of policy” (p.33).

State governments have become more aggressive in addressing the quality of

education by exploring alternative policy options. School choice represents one such

52

policy option. Providing greater choice in the provision and delivery of public education.
is seen by many as a way of creating competition in education that, in turn, forces overall
improvement. For the past two decades, choice programs, varying from intra-district
choice to public vouchers, have become quite common. Of the choice programs, charter
schools have become the most popular form of school choice. As publicly funded yet
autonomous schools, charters are seen being more responsive to parents and students in
terms of both academics and opportunity. Currently, forty states and the District of
Columbia have adopted some type of charter school legislation (Education Commission
of the States, 2008; National Center for Education Statistics, 2007).

The charter school movement has transformed the relationship between state
and local government by changing the distribution of power and the stakeholders
involved. As local districts have become more dependent on state government for
ﬁnancial support, and as states have looked to districts to implement speciﬁc policies, the
parameters of state and local relations education have been blurred. There has been a shift
or transference of inﬂuence from traditional local policy regimes to a new coalition of
actors that expands beyond local school district limits.

Education reform can be characterized by two key trends: a shift in control from
local to state government and increased accountability. Over the last two decades states
have taken greater responsibility for education, both ﬁscally and academically. With this
shift in responsibility has come an increased demand for accountability at the local level.
Using “traditional” mechanisms for encouraging cooperation (i.e. ﬁnancial incentives,
mandates, informational/ technical assistance) states have pushed local school districts to

implement higher standards. In some cases, as local school districts have resisted state

53

control or failed to meet state expectations, state actors have responded using more
extreme measures to elicit compliance (i.e. privatization or takeover). State and local
governments have struggled to navigate this new relationship as the locus of control has
shifted and as increased accountability in education has created a high stakes
environment. Recent federal legislation highlights this new environment.

On January 8th, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB). This new legislation became the most sweeping and
far-reaching piece of federal legislation since the original adopted of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965. NCLB contains four basic education reform
principles: 1.) stronger accountability for achievement, 2.) increased ﬂexibility and local
control, 3.) expanded educational options for parents, and 4.) researched-based teaching
methods. The principles outlined in NCLB represent the convergence of two very
different trends in educational reform: standardization and accountability and school
choice. While these reforms may not seem to be at odds with one another, they are based
on very different theories about educational reform.

This effort to increase standardization and accountability is based on the
premise of centralized control and uniformity across schools, districts, cities, and states.
In general, policymakers who advocate for establishing higher standards and increased
accountability, particularly at the national level do so with the goals of creating shared
expectations and methods of measuring student achievement so that schools, districts,
and states can be compared in order to determine their success or failure. To achieve this
end, control over education is often centralized at the state level, or in the case of NCLB,

the federal level. School choice, on the other hand, is based on the idea of

54

decentralization and increased local control of education. Generally speaking, those who

support school choice cite the need to give control back to local districts and parents.

Contrary to standardization and accountability, school choice advocates want to leave

decision making up to local school ofﬁcials, teachers, parents, and students.

While these two trends seem contradictory they have actually been coupled under the

No Child Left Behind Act. One of the key components of NCLB is an emphasis on

greater accountability through the establishment of uniform assessments and standards.

The following provides a brief overview of accountability under Title I, Part A of the No

Child Left Behind Act:

Standards: States must develop challenging academic standards for all students in
reading, math, and science.
Assessments: States must administer assessments to all students in the state.
States will assess reading and math every year from 3“’-8‘h grade, as well as one
year in lO"’-12th grade.

0 NAEP: Every state must participate in the 4th and 8th grade reading and

math sections of the National Assessment of Educational Progress.

Adequate Yearly Progress: Each state must deﬁne adequate yearly progress, and
each state must establish a starting point for proﬁcient that must be raised every
year thereafter.
Rewards & Sanctions: Each state must develop its own system of rewards and
sanctions to hold schools accountable for progress. Federally mandated sanctions

also apply for those districts receiving Title I funds that fail to make AYP.

55

Sanctions include mandated technical assistance, withholding funds, mandated
school choice, restructuring, and school takeovers.
The other component of NCLB focuses on increased local control and parental choice. The
legislation encourages school choice in the following ways:

0 Parents who have a child in a school that has been identiﬁed as needing
improvement will have the opportunity to send their child to a new school.

0 Children who attend schools identiﬁed as needing improvement have the
opportunity to enroll in charter schools located in their district.

0 Districts will be required to use federal funding to provide meaningful choices as
well as to provide transportation to the schools of choice.

0 After several consecutive years of failing to make AYP, districts maybe forced to
convert schools to charter schools or hire a private management contractor to run
the school.

Under NCLB, these two philosophically opposing trends have come together creating one
of the most comprehensive federal approaches to educational reform. Understanding the
evolution of the standards and accountability movement is critical in understanding the
context for school choice. Standards and accountability have opened the door to greater
external intervention in local education. Prior to this movement, education was primarily
left to local government. Standards and accountability represent the ﬁrst wave of external

regulation in education by states and the federal government.

 

8 For more informationon No Child Left Behind go to the US. Department of Education website
at http:l/www.ed.gov/policyr’elsec/leg/escaOQgZ.html

56

Standards & A ccountability

The standards and accountability movement is based on the ideas of setting
clear, high standards for what children should learn and then holding schools and districts
accountable to those standards. The standards and accountability movement is not new.
These concepts have been around and have evolved over the past several decades.
According to Gratz (2000),

Standards have grown out of the century old debate over tracking, the 50 year old
discovery of the impact of teacher expectations, the 40 year old struggle for
educational quality, and the timeless desire for high skilled (but compliant)
workers to drive the national economic engine. (p.682)

Early versions of standardization and testing emerged at the state level in the
19503 in response to growing public anxiety over the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnick
and the growing nuclear threat. Seen as lagging behind the Soviets, policymakers wanted
to develop a method of identifying talented individuals who could be trained in critical
occupations (Bond, 1994). It was out of this fear and desire to outperform international
competitors that the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and Iowa Basic Skills Test (IBST)
were created. The purposes of these early standardized tests were to measure intelligence
and mental capability. The rational behind the original standardized testing programs was
to identify and promote those with technical expertise and leadership skills in an attempt
to put America in the forefront of scientiﬁc innovation.

Following these initial standardized testing programs came the enactment of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the creation of the National

Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test. These are signiﬁcant pieces of

57

legislation because they ultimately redeﬁned the federal governments role in education
policy. Prior to these policies education policy had primarily been left to state and local
governments. The ESEA was passed in 1964 shortly followed by the passage of NAEP in
1969. Both played a critical role in setting the sate for a national dialogue on standards
and accountability. The 19703 experienced the ﬁrst wave of large-scale standardized
achievement tests designed to hold students and schools accountable, particularly in
terms of promotion and graduation (National Research Council, 1999). Throughout the
19703, standardization and assessment became the trend in educational reform and
received a great deal of national attention.

In the 19803 with the release of A Nation at Risk, the emphasis on standards and
assessments was further strengthened. In 1983, the Reagan administration published A
Nation at Risk, which highlighted the importance of setting national educational goals
and establishing high educational standards and assessments. The push for standardized
testing grew based on the desire for a more competent and productive workforce that
would be capable of maximizing economic prosperity and further enhancing the United
States status as a global competitor. Fuhrman, Clune, and Elmore (1988), asserted that
the 19803 was a decade of major educational reform and state policy activity, particularly
as states began to increase student achievement standards, revise teacher certiﬁcation
systems, improve teacher compensation, and develop statewide accountability systems.
They claimed that during this time almost every state developed new policies in each of
the above areas and state aid to support such efforts increased drastically. F uhrman,

C lune, and Elmore went on to say that reform efforts in the 19803 were largely political

with state actors playing signiﬁcant roles in setting educational reform agendas. State

58

policymakers increased course requirements, implemented new exit exams and statewide
assessment programs, developed statewide competency requirements for each core
subject, and developed new curriculum guides (National Research Council, 1999).
Several states created monitoring and assessment techniques that allowed them to oversee
the progress of individual students, schools, and districts. By the mid-19803, over half of
the states mandated some form of testing that examined the achievement of students and
schools. This trend represented a signiﬁcant increase in the use of regulation as a state
intervention strategy.

Linda Bond (1994) discussed assessment trends in the late 19803 and early
19903, arguing that student assessment became the centerpiece of educational
improvement efforts. Policymakers latched on to the idea of statewide assessment
programs as a way of encouraging teachers and schools to do things differently and to be
accountable for achievement. Bond asserted that much of the emphasis behind
standardization and accountability was the desire to set more appropriate achievement
targets to students, to focus staff development, to encourage curricular reform, and to
improve overall instruction for all schools. As states and the federal government have
continued to emphasize and rely on assessment scores to determine the quality of
education, the push for greater standardization and accountability have increased,
particularly as more and more schools have been categorized as failing.

As more and more schools have been described as failing to meet standards as
measured by test scores, higher stakes have been attached to assessments. The rise of
high-stakes testing and increased standards, at both the state and federal level, has created

a great deal of pressure for schools to improve and be able to demonstrate students’

59

academic achievement. While schools should be accountability for learning, Kohn (1999)
and Popham (2001) argued that, in reality, the standards with which schools are being
held to and the assessments they are being measured by have been detrimental. In The
Schools Our Children Deserve, Kohn (1999) further examined the standards and
accountability movement. He claimed it has created a “kill and drill” approach to
instruction that is too teacher-directed and too heavily based on learning meaningless
facts. Kohn found that children are not being taught critical thinking skills, which have
consequently left them unable to extract deeper or relevant meaning of what is being
taught. Kohn further criticized the standards movement by arguing that is has had the
opposite effect intended. He claimed that the standards movement has actually lowered
standards for students because it stresses only basic skills rather than higher order
thinking and depth of understanding. Ultimately, Kohn asserted that the standards and
accountability movement have forced teachers to spend their time preparing students for
assessments and not on authentic instruction. He claims the movement has essentially
created an educational environment that bases student achievement on test scores and not
actual learning.

Popham (2001) shares this view and says that standardized testing Should never be
used to evaluate the quality of education. He identiﬁed three critical shortcomings of
standardized assessments:

0 There is a mismatch between what is tested and what is taught.
0 Important content is missing from standardized tests.
0 There are external factors, beyond instruction, that inﬂuence students’ test

performance.

60

While the standards and accountability movement has generated bi-partisan support over
the years, there is a great deal of criticism among others who fear that standards
accompanied by high-stakes assessments will have a negative impact on students,
schools, and districts that fail to meet expectations. However, even with these challenges
to standards and accountability, the movement has found a place on both state and
national education agendas. Under the No Child Left Behind Act it has become a pivotal

part of educational reform.

School Choice
Similar to the standards and accountability movement, the schools choice

movement is not new. While it has recently received a great deal of political attention and
public support, the debate itself has been around for ages. School choice theories can be
traced back to the 17003 with Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, and Thomas Paine’s The
Right of Man. The concept reemerged in the 19503 with Milton Friedman’s argument to
introduce a market-based approach to public education by providing unregulated school
vouchers to all families. Friedman’s idea did not capture much political or public support,
but the issue re-emerged in the 19703. In 1972, school vouchers were implemented in a
single school district in Alum Rock California. What resulted was a school choice
program that began in the fall of 1972 involving six schools. Through this program,
students were given the option of attending mini-schools, which were public schools that
were free to budget and run their programs with greater autonomy and additional federal
funding. Soon the number of mini-schools in Alum Rock grew to fourteen and eventually

maxed out at forty-ﬁve. With little local support and non-renewable federal funding, the

61

program ended after only ﬁve years. Although the Alum Rock school choice program
failed, it did succeed in sparking a new debate about school choice.

During the 19703 and 19803 as the population of public schools became more
integrated, some white families began exploring alternatives for their children. Many
middle-class, white families moved out of the public schools system to more
homogenous private schools. Recognizing this trend educational reformers and
policymakers used the opportunity to re-introduce choice programs. Magnet schools and
alternative schools began to emerge to address thediverse student population and
increased educational needs and interests of students. The objectives behind the ﬁrst
choice schools were twofold: 1.) to reach those students who were “turned off” by their
current educational environment, and 2.) to address issues over racial integration. Early
choice programs, such as the East Harlem plan, focused on offering programs to minority
students in an attempt to shift attention away from the White ﬂight that was taking place
to private and suburban schools. The idea was that if choice programs, such as magnet
and alternative schools, weren’t introduced than the movement of white students out of
racially integrated schools would create controversy that may put increased pressure on
the federal government further equalize schooling. The Reagan administration wanted to
avoid such a situation and thus focused on public school choice programs as a way to
table a debate on equity in education. As a result, early choice programs became effective
avenues for public ofﬁcials to gain political support, on one hand, and alleviate political
pressure, on the other. Jeffrey Henig (1994) found that school choice has been used by
public ofﬁcials to “muddle” their way through a number of policy dilemmas, particularly

issues involving racial justice and desegregation.

62

The ties between neighborhood schools and segregation initially deﬁned the
choice debate. Neighborhood schools offer parents a way of segregating through
residential choice. For many parents, neighborhood schools were the only defense against
public school integration. Before school choice, students and parents only had two
choices in education: public or private. For many families only one choice was feasible-
public education. Until the early 19903, public schools students had to attend their
neighborhood school. Parents, particularly low income and minority parents, had little or
no choice when it came to where to send their children and almost no control over the
quality of education provided. These parents and students were tied, for better or worse,
to their neighborhood schools. Some parents could move to a neighborhood with a better
school, but often that option was limited by income. As concern grew over declining
student outcomes and as some parents became more dissatisﬁed with their schools, the
idea of options became very appealing, particularly to those parents and students who
were conﬁned to the schools within their neighborhood boundaries. Proponents of school
choice sold the idea that competition in public education would result in the improvement
of underperforrning schools thus resulting in higher quality education for all students.
School choice was also marketed on the notion that all parents and students should have a
choice in where to attend school, not just those who can afford private schools or who
can afford to move to another neighborhood. Choice offered a way of breaking the ties
between neighborhoods and schools and, more importantly, the segregation that
accompanied this tie.

Choice programs became more publicized and their institutional presence began

to grow. Magnet schools and alternative schools caught on and by the early 19903 new

63

choice programs emerged. Milwaukee became the ﬁrst city in the country to implement a
public voucher program for low-income students in 1991. In 1992, California and
Minnesota adopted charter school legislation. Since then, a handful of publicly sponsored
voucher programs have been implemented and forty states have adopted charter school
laws. Magnet schools and alternative schools are now commonplace in school districts
across the country.

Since the early 19903, choice programs, varying from intra-district choice to
vouchers, have become quite common. Table 3.1 provides a brief overview of the various

types of choice programs while Figure 3.] illustrates choice programs by state.

 

 

 

Table 3.1
Types of Choice Programs

Type of Description
Choice
Magnet Magnet schools: thematic schools within a traditional district.
School Each school subscribes to a particular educational philosophy or

curricular specialty, drawing students who share that interested.
Alternative Alternative schools: public school having a special curriculum,
School offering a more ﬂexible program of study than a traditional

school. They are often geared towards students whose needs
cannot be met in the traditional school.

Open Inna-district choice: open enrollment that allows choice within a
Enrollment school district’s boundaries

Inter-district choice: open enrollment that allows choice across
district boundaries

Mandatory: open enrollment that requires districts to allows
students to attend the school of their choice

Voluntary: open enrollment that allows districts to choice whether
or not to allow students to attend the school of their choice
Charter Charter schools: semi-autonomous public schools, founded by
School educators, parents, community groups, educational organizations,
or private organizations, operate under a written contract with a
state, district or other entity

Voucher Voucher: publicly funded payment the government makes to a
parent, or an institution on a parent’s behalf, to be used for a
child's education expenses

(Source: Education Commission of the States (2007), School Choice State Laws: 50
State Proﬁle. Available at http:.«7mb2. ecs. org’remrts Report. aspx? id =205 )

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

64

Figure 3.1

Choice Programs by State

'. ‘ if
a . .- g .
“ " t : *1 ' . '_. .'
.‘ O 34“
4, ._ ..v—~ " ryr . .
“ it. , ‘* _i 0'
. ._ m '. . 0" 1,2,0:
- i , . r. in;
g _,.ﬁ ' 4':
t L ' . . "
.. w... . of 7,.
O . _- i O
' .._ i . i "i
__ . . f
. ‘ A.
- --—»-~. r.
1" i..." F. |
3' “s‘ -
.f ._s :
I: ’31
«‘5‘
iii-”'4.
‘ ~— Publrc School Chorce

1. Charter school law

‘ Voucher program

i Dual enrollment

1' Tax credit, deduction

(Source: The Heritage Foundation and the Education Commission of the States, 2003.
Parental choice in education: facts, figures, and recommendations.)

Charter schools are the most prevalent and fastest growing reform in the school
choice movement. Charter schools are public schools that are governed by appointed
school boards and authorized through colleges, universities, school districts, or by the
state. They are funded through tax dollars and open to all students on a ﬁrst come ﬁrst

serve basis. While they are granted greater ﬂexibility and autonomy in curriculum and

65

instructional practices, they are still required to adhere to state regulations and
assessments.

The central idea behind school choice programs, in general, and charter schools,
in particular, is that competition will lead to greater efﬁciency and performance as
schools are forced to compete for students by providing a high quality education at a
lower expense. School choice programs infuse free market concepts into public education
with the expectation that families will serve as consumers and choose schools that
provide the best products. Chubb and Moe (1990) argued that a deregulated, free market
system where schools are run with greater autonomy and less bureaucracy will better
meet the needs of individual parents and students. Choice programs rely on the
assumption that when given options parents will rationally compare schools and choose
the schools and program that best serves their child’s needs. Schools compete for the
support of parents, and students, and they are free to choose among schools.

In general, choice proponents argue that charter schools will improve public
education by enhancing the following:

0 Accountability: By being accountable to parents and charter authorizers, charters
will be forced to perform and meet their goals.

0 Efﬁciency: By being free from bureaucratic restrictions, charters will be able to do
more for less.

0 Competition: By introducing competition, charters will force changes in traditional
schools.

0 Innovation: Charter schools will serve as models for innovative teaching and

learning.

66

0 Choice: Charters will provide parents with a wider range of choices, thus giving
families control over education (Bracy, 2002).

In addition to market theory, school of choice is also seen as a path to education equity.
Advocates of choice often claim that low-income students are the ones being impacted
most by failing public schools, while hi gher-income students have more opportunities to
leave low performing schools (Billingsley, 1994). The hope behind school choice is that
all students and families will have the option to leave schools that aren’t satisfactory, thus
enhancing equity.

While proponents of choice cite accountability, efﬁciency, and equity as key
objectives of choice, opponents fear that introducing market concepts into education will
undermine the democratic premises of public school resulting in further social and
academic stratiﬁcation not to mention the possible demise of public education all together
(Engle, 2000). Opponents are also extremely skeptical of the claims that choice will
improve academic achievement. While many critics do not oppose the concept of choice,
they do express concern over the realities of choice, i.e. the impact on public education
and students. As Henig (1994) explained,

The problem is not choice per se. . .the danger comes, rather, from the ideological
rationale on which market-based conceptions of educational choice are based.
Many of the individuals and groups that favor educational choice are attracted by
ideas that have little to do with market theory. (p. 124)

Skeptics question the extent to which a market-based educational system will

actually hold schools accountable for achieving the public purposes of schools.

67

Essentially, they question whether or not schools should be accountable solely to
consumers (i.e. parents and students) or to state standards and expectations.

According to Arsen and Plank (2001), the state does have an obligation to ensure
that schools are at least accountable for their use of public dollars. Charter schools, as
publicly funded schools, must, at minimum, be held accountable to provide a certain
quality of education to students as well as to ensure that other students aren’t harmed by
the choice of others. However, it is difﬁculty to assess whether or not these conditions
are actually met. When it comes to accountability and schools of choice, it is important to
rely on both market forces and external standards in order to promote quality in education
as well as responsiveness to consumers and state requirements. A number of education
scholars (Plank eta], 2000; Mintrom, 2000; Horn and Miron; 2000) are also skeptical
about the promises of innovation and improved academic achievement made by choice
advocates citing that a lot of choice programs, charter schools in particular, are not
innovative and have not produced higher levels of achievement. Mintrom (200) claimed
that “charter schools are typically acting like traditional public schools” (p.24).

While school choice has become quite prevalent as an educational reform
strategy, there remains a great deal of discussion and disagreement about the purposes,
impact, and outcomes of choice. There is little consensus about the details of school
choice programs. As a result, school choice policies have been largely determined by the
political climate of each state. However, with the adoption of No Child Left Behind,
school choice has extended beyond the conﬁnes of individual states and local districts to
become part of the national education reform agenda, particularly as choice is being

mandated for those in perpetually failing schools and districts under NC LB.

68

The standards and accountability movement coupled with the school choice
movement have set the stage for major change in public education. What the standards
and accountability movement has done is indicate problems in public school performance

thus opening the door for greater regulation.

Education Reform: A Case Study
Michigan has followed a similar trajectory as national education reform. In fact, it
has been considered a national leader in implementing statewide standards, assessments,
and school choice policies. Michigan seeks to hold public schools accountable in three
key ways:
1. Public schools have publicly elected school boards that are accountable to local
voters.
2. Public schools are required to comply with state and federal laws governing how
money is spent, equity in education, etc.
3. Public educators are accountable to their peers and professional norms and
standards. (Education Policy Center, Fall 2000)

Beginning in the 19703, Michigan began to develop state standards in core
curricular areas, speciﬁcally in reading, math, and science. Two key educational
initiatives came out of the 19703 in Michigan: the Michigan Revised School Code of
1977 and the Michigan State School Aid Act of 1979. These acts established the
foundation for educational standards and assessment measures, which have continued to
be updated to better ensure academic achievement. Alter state policymakers put together

a set of minimum objectives for each curricular area, they developed a statewide

69

assessment called the Michigan Education Assessment Program (MEAP). The MEAP
was developed to assess student learning at key checkpoints. Assessments are criterion
referenced, meaning the results are measured according to students’ performance as
compared to pre-determined standards in math, science, language arts, and social studies.
Shortly after the implementation of the MEAP, the Michigan State Board of Education
approved the Michigan Accreditation Program (MAP). The MAP was originally
established as a voluntary program for elementary and middle schools. However, it
became a mandatory component of school reform with the introduction and passage of
Public Act 25 in 1990.

Public Act 25, 1990 provided a framework for reforming Michigan’s schools by
further emphasizing standardization and accountability. The framework consisted of four
key components: (1) School Improvement, (2) Model Core Curriculum, (3)
Accreditation, and (4) Annual Education Report. Together these components created a
system to guide school reform initiatives. Below is a brief overview of each:

0 School Improvement: Under School Improvement, schools must put together a
school improvement team to develop 3-5 year school improvement plans that
include an explicit mission statement, student outcome goals, strategies to achieve
students goals, professional development to support student goals, and an
evaluation process to measure progress.

0 Model Core Curriculum: The Model Core Curriculum provides a set of statewide
objectives for students in the areas of math, science, reading, writing, and social

sciences.

70

o Accreditation: The statewide accreditation system offers a set of standards that
dictate the minimum inputs needed for the provision of a quality education.
Accreditation is granted on three levels: summary, interim, and unaccredited.
Each status provides information on how well a school is performing and/or
meeting state standards.

0 Annual Education Report: The annual education report requires schools to
publicize information regarding performance and progress. Information reported
includes: school improvement plans, accreditation status, MEAP scores, etc.
(Education Policy Center, Fall 2000.)

Each of these components, while addressed separately in the law, comes together to
create a comprehensive statewide system of standards and assessments.

In 1993, the state further expanded this system of standardization and
accountability by adding student performance requirements to accreditation. Beginning in
1993, accreditation became directly linked to the MEAP. The Core Curriculum was also
strengthened when the Michigan Department of Education developed a statewide
curricular framework for language arts, math, science, and geography. The updated state
curriculum provided a framework for aligning classroom instruction With core curricular
content areas. In 1995, the State Board of Education continued to put pressure on schools
to focus on standards and accountability by adopted the Model Content Standards for
Curriculum. Under this program, benchmarks were established in the core content areas

at various developmental levels throughout elementary, middle, and high school. In 1999,

71

the accreditation program went through another transformation when the State Board
approved a new system of performance-based accreditationg.

With the establishment of statewide curricular standards and a statewide
accountability system, policymakers and the public began to realize that students were
not performing up to expectations. With this realization came serious debate over how to
foster school improvement. Two topics dominated the debate: school ﬁnance and school

choice.

School Finance Reform: Setting the Stage for Policy Change

The unequal distribution of schools funds has been a dominant policy concern
facing public schools across the country. All too often, school funding mirrors the
inequities of the surrounding community. Students who live in poorer communities are
most likely to attend schools with inadequate funding and low per pupil spending. In an
effort to level the playing ﬁeld for poorer districts and ensure a minimum standard of per
pupil funding, policymakers have focused on school ﬁnance reform. Much of that focus
has been on reducing the reliance on local property taxes as a major source of school
ﬁrnding.

Michigan has been at the forefront of school ﬁnance reform. As in many states,
local schools in Michigan traditionally relied heavily on local property taxes for school
revenue. Prior to school ﬁnance reform in 1994, about 80% of school district revenue
came from local property taxes (Carrasco & Summers-Coty, 2002). This heavy reliance

on local property taxes created enormous funding differences across districts. While the

 

9 For more information on School Accreditation and Accountability in Michigan see Arasim, Liz.
(2000). School Accreditation: An Overview. Senate Fiscal Agency, Issue Paper: September, 2000.

72

heavy reliance on local property taxes concerned some, efforts to reform the system were
extremely difﬁcult. Prior to the early 19903 the system seemed quite resistant to change.
Between 1970 and 1994 twelve separate ballot initiatives to reduce reliance on local
property taxes were defeated by voters (Citizens Research Council, 1994)”).

In 1993, the Michigan legislature decided to force a change in the funding
system by simply abolishing local property taxes as the main source of operating revenue
for public schools (PA 145, 1993). The legislature, with strong support from then
Governor John Engler, placed two replacement revenue initiatives on the ballot. Both
plans replaced the existing state equalizing formula with the same foundation grant
program to make up the difference between the per pupil foundation grant and the
property tax raised locally (Citizens Research Council, 1994). The two competing plans
were placed on a March 1994 special election ballot, and Michigan voters were forced to
approve one of the reform initiatives. The status quo was not an option. Both plans
shifted a large portion of school funding from the local to the state taxes. One plan (i.e.
Proposal A) relied on a state sales tax, whereas the second plan (i.e. Statutory Plan) relied
on personal income tax. Michigan. Voters ultimately chose to amend the state’s
constitution and support schools through an increase in the state’s sales tax (Proposal
A)” Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show percent of school funding by source before the

adoption of Proposal A and after.

 

'0 Obtaining support for school ﬁnance reform posed a particularly challenging problem to
policymakers in that it required a change to the state constitution (i.e. Articles 8 & 9 of the
Michigan Constitution.)

” The passage of Proposal A amended Section 3 of Article 9 to permit the Legislature

to authorize ad valorem property taxes on a non—uniform basis for school operating purposes and
superimposed upon the present system, a modiﬁed acquisition-value system of assessing
property. Beginning with 1995 taxes, instead of annual assessments of property at 50 percent of

73

Figure 3.2
School Funding Pre- Proposal A

 

 

 

 

 

 

I State
I Local
Figure 3.3
School Funding After Proposal A
l State
I Local -

 

 

 

 

(Source: Senate Fiscial Agency, 1994).
Before Proposal A, local governments provided 53% of school funding primarily through
the use of property tax. After the implementation of Proposal A the percent of school
funding by local governments was signiﬁcantly decreased to 22%. Proposal A

represented not only a shift from local to state taxes, but also a transformation in the

 

current market value, annual assessment increases on individual parcels of existing property would be
limited to the lesser of ﬁve percent or inﬂation.

74

School Choice and the T ransformation of Local Politics

Traditionally, students and parents have only had two choices when it came to
education: public or private. Unfortunately, for many families only one choice was
actually feasible- their neighborhood public school. The idea of introducing choice in
public education came with the growing dissatisfaction of neighborhood public schools
and a lack of parental control over the quality of local schools. Proponents of school
choice focused on the idea of competition and choice. The expectation was that
competition would force public schools to reduce expenses and enhance educational
quality (Patrinos, 1999). By allowing families to have control over which schools their
children could attend, policymakers saw school choice programs as a way to create a free
education market that would force unsatisfactory public schools to adapt. Proponents of
school choice assumed that when given the option parents would rationally weigh which
schools would best serve the needs of their children and choose accordingly”.

Of the different types of choice programs, Michigan has implemented both charter
school and open enrollment policies. Open enrollment in Michigan includes both
mandatory, intra-district choice as well as voluntary, inter-district choice. Students are
no longer limited to attend their neighborhood schools. As of 1996, students may transfer
to a school of their choice. However, school districts may choose whether or not to
participate in open enrollment. If they do participate, they may determine the number of
students they will accept, which must be on a ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-serve basis. Parents are

responsible for providing transportation. Of Michigan’s 554 school districts, about 64%

 

'2 Chubb and Moe argue that a set of deregulated autonomous schools with less bureaucracy will
better meet the needs of individual parents and students (Chubb & Moe, 1990).

76

accept students from outside their district (Michigan in Brief, 2003). Attempts to further
expand choice in Michigan through a publicly ﬁrnded voucher program have failed'3 .
Of the various choice programs, charter schools have emerged as the fastest
growing and most widely discussed form of school choice. Forty states, including
Michigan, have passed charter school policies. Charter schools differ from traditional
public schools in several ways. A traditional school is a publicly funded school with a
publicly elected school board. A charter school, on the other hand, is a tax funded public
school that is created under state law with an appointed school board. In Michigan,
charter schools are often chartered through colleges, universities, intermediate, or local
school districts. They are paid for through tax dollars and, in theory, are open to all
students on a ﬁrst come ﬁrst serve basis. While they are granted greater ﬂexibility in the
types of curricula and instructional practices they adopt, they are still required to adhere
to state regulations and assessments. Table 3.3 offers an overview of Michigan’s charter

school law and Table 3.4 provides a timeline of charter school activity in Michigan.

 

'3 In 2000, Michigan voters defeated a proposal to implement a publicly funded state voucher
program (Proposal 1). '

77

Table 3.3
Overview of Michiggr’s Charter School Law

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year Passed 1993, last amended 2003
Number of Unlimited, but state universities may only authorize a total of 150
schools charter schools between them and no single university may authorize
allowed more than 50 percent of university total.
Chartering Local school boards, intermediate school district boards, community
Authorities college boards, state public universities. State public universities may
authorize charter schools anywhere in the state, but others may only
do so in their service areas.
Types of Converted public, converted private, new starts. No home-based or
charter virtual schools
schools
Term of initial Up to 10 years, with mandatory review at least every seven years.
charter
Location Charters authorized by a local or intermediate school board or
community college must operate in their service area.
Governance Appointed board of directors, can not include charter school
employees
Management Charters may be managed by for-proﬁt organizations
Transportation Charters are not required to provide transportation for their students
Accountability Charter students must take the MEAP and Merit Exams. They are
also subject to the EducationYes! State accountability system and the
federal No Child Left Behind Act.
Collective Teachers in charter schools authorized by local districts must be
bargaining covered by the same bargaining agreement, teachers in other charters
may negotiate as a separate unit or work independently.
Certiﬁcation Charter school teachers must be certiﬁed, unless they are faculty of a
university or community collge.
Funding Charters receive per pupil fundingihrough the state fundingLformula
Fiscal Yes .
autonomy
Start up funds Federal funds are available but not state funds ,
Eligible Charters authorized by universities may serve all students in the state,
students others may only serve students in the area of the authorizing agency
Selection In case of over-enrollment, students are selected by lottery/ random
method selection. Urban high schools in Detroit may give preference to
siblings or children of employees.

 

 

(Source: Michigan Compiled Laws. Michigan School Code Part 6A, available at
www.1egislaturemi. gov.)

78

Table 3.4
Timeline of School Choice in Michigan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year Legislation

1993 Original charter school law enacted as part of a broader school reform
initiative, including a major revision of school ﬁnancing

1994 Charter school law challenged in court by MEA, court ruled law
unconstitutional, state appealed ruling, state offered revised charter
school legislation

1995 Legislation placed cap on the number of university authorized charter
schools

1996 Inter-district school choice legislatiorrpassed

1997 State Supreme Court overturns previous rulings, upholding original law

1999 University cap is reached

2000 Legislation allowed charter schools to be authorized by federally funded
Bay Mills Tribal Community College

2000 Ballot initiative for vouchers defeated by voters

2001 Attorney General ruled Bay Mills has authority to grant charters, MEA
ﬁled suit

2001-2002 Several legislative attempts to lift the cap fail

2002 Governor Engler and Detroit Mayor Kilpatrick proposed legislation for
15 new charter schools in Detroit

2003 Cap issue resurfaced with no resolution, Legislation to charter 15 more
schools in Detroit passes

2006 Bay Mills court challenge dismissed in Court of Appeals, Grand Valley
began process of charting urban high schools under 2003 legislation

2007 Legislation debated on eliminating prohibition of Wayne County
Community College from authorizing charter schools in Detroit

 

The important things to note from Table 3.3 are the limits placed on the number of
charter schools that can be authorized by colleges and universities. This issue continues
to be debated as the cap was reached in 1999. Other interesting components of
Michigan’s charter school law are that schools boards are appointed not elected, unlike
traditional public schools. This raises some questions about public accountability. Charter
schools authorized by local districts are covered by the same bargaining agreements as

traditional schools, however those chartered by other agencies are not required to be part

79

ofa bargaining unit. This also has signiﬁcant implications for union strength and
authority in charter schools, as most charter school teachers are not unionized.

Table 3.4 highlights charter school policy activity since the implementation of the
initial charter school law in 1993. Charter schools have faced several legal challenges
since their inception, including a challenge to their constitutionality by the MBA in 1994
and another regarding the ability of Bay Mills Community College to authorize charter
schools.'4 Both attempts to challenge the law were ultimately defeated and in 2006 and
2007 Bay Mills chartered over half of the new charter schools in Michigan (Michigan
Department of Education, 2007). Several attempts have emerged to lift the cap on charter
schools granted by colleges and universities. The cap debate continues to be an issue as
neither the legislature nor the Governor has taken action. The only successful attempt to
increase the number of charter schools in Michigan came in 2003 when the legislature
approved a proposal to authorize ﬁfteen new charter high schools in Detroit. While the
implementation of charter schools in Michigan got off to a slow beginning due to legal
and constitutional challenges, they have quickly become a prominent ﬁxture in school

districts across the state and the demand for more of them continues.

Introduction of New Institutions
“By delimiting behavioral choices, institutions reveal what actions the collectivity
believes are acceptable. They set new standards for behavior for both government

and citizens.” (Margaret Levi, 1998; p.94)

 

'4 Bay Mills is a tribal community college. Community colleges are restricted to grant charters in
their immediate jurisdictions. As a tribal college, Bay Mills’ jurisdiction expands statewide, so it
has been granted authority to charter schools statewide.

80

The most obvious outcome of charter school policy is the creation of new
educational institutions. Charter schools have been implemented across the state and
come in all shapes and sizes. They range from very small schools to very large schools.
Some maintain traditional methods of instruction, while others focus on thematic
curricula. Since their implementation, the number and enrollment of charter schools has
grown dramatically, as indicated in Figures 3.4 and 3.5

Figure 3.4
Number of Charter Schools in Michigan (1993- 2007)

250

 

zoo »- - ~ -~ ,__ ___-.-____- 9

150 W :NumberofCharterSchools
.51: 3 inMichigan

Number of Schools

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1993 1997 2001 2005 2007

81

Number of Students

100000

80000

60000

40000 ,

20000:

120000

Figure 3.5
Charter School Enrollment in Michigan (1993-2007)

 

 

 

  
 

; ENumber of Students ,

 

I993 I997 200] 2005 2007

(Source: Michigan Department of Education, “Michigan Public School Academics,
Report to the Legislature.” November, 2006. Available at
htt ://www.rnichi an. ov/docurnents/mde/PSA Le islative Re ort 180610 7. df)

 

As shown Figure 3.4 and 3.5 there are currently 230 charter schools operating in Michigan

with enrollment over 100,000. These ﬁgures represent about 5% of the state’s total

elementary and secondary public school enrollment. The number of charters has steadily

grown since 1993, although their growth slowed signiﬁcantly in 1999 when cap was

reached. Enrollment has followed a similar trajectory.

Of the charter schools in Michigan, most are in urban areas and with large

minority student populations. According to a 2006 national study, districts with higher

percentages of African Americans and growing income inequality had a substantially

larger number of students in charter schools than more homogeneous districts

82

(Stoddard& Corcoran, 2006). Charter school location and enrollment trends in Michigan
support this national trend. Figure 3.6 shows that the Detroit metropolitan area has, by
far, the most charter schools accounting for almost half of the total number of charter
schools in the state. Another 1/3 are located in Grand Rapids, Flint, and Lansing.

Figure 3.6
Location of Michigan Charter Schools

 

 

Detroit City
I Detroit Metropolitan
Area

:1 Mid-Size City

13 Large or Small Town

 

I Rural

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Source: Education Policy Center, “Charter School Enrollment in Michigan.” Data
Brief 1: December, 2000)

83

Figure 3.7
Percentage of Student Enrollment in Charter Schools by Race

 

 

38°/ African American
o} I Hispanic
55% :1 White

El Other

 

 

 

5%

 

 

 

(Source: Michigan Department of Education, “Michigan Public School Academies,
Report to the Legislature.” November, 2006. Available at
ij/vawmichigﬂrgov/documents/mde/PSA Legislative Report 180610 7.pdf)
Figure 3.7 illustrates that a majority of students enrolled in charter schools are minority
students, speciﬁcally African American. This ﬁnding is consistent with national trends in
charter school enrollment. According to the National Center for Education Statistics,
charter schools enrolled larger percentages of Black, Hispanic, and American
Indian/Alaska Native students and lower percentages of White and Asian/Paciﬁc Islander
students than conventional public schools (NCES 2007—O64), Indicator 32.)

In addition to being concentrated in urban areas and serving high percentages of
minority students, over half of charter school students (56.3%) qualify for free and
reduced lunch. What this means, is that, in terms of socio—economic factors, charter

school populations are very similar to the public schools in their host districts.

84

Introduction of New A ctors

Beyond their institutional impact, charter schools have also created an interesting
political environment. Support for charter schools has deﬁed early expectations with
support emerging across broad ideological perspectives. The way policymakers envision
charter schools in the larger context of public education can be very different, and this
has important consequences in terms of cooperation and regime formation. As Katrina
Bulkley (2005) explained, “Charter schools could easily be the “all things to all people”
reform, as the rhetoric of charter advocates can appeal to people with varied political
viewpoints” (p.527).

According to Gittell and McKenna (1999), the 19903 saw a number of state
governors become more active in state education policy, “Governors of the 19903 were
committed to promoting market based solutions for education” (p.269). While inﬂuential
in navigating the direction of educational reform, many governors faced resistance. In
their nine state study, Gittell and McKenna found that the politics of charter schools
revealed a great deal about the political strength of unions, business groups, governors,
policy specialists, and legislatures. In particular, they found that governors led state
regimes by setting the education agenda and successfully implementing it. Burns (2002)
also concluded in his study of intergovernmental regimes in Hartford, CT that the state
government and, more speciﬁcally, the governor used political assets to expand state
authority over urban areas, make local policy, and become powerful members in urban

regimes.

Michigan’s Governor Engler was no exception. The former Governor faced

intense opposition to charter schools from powerful opponents within the educational

85

establishment, including the Michigan Education Association, Michigan Federation of
Teachers, Detroit Federation of Teachers, Michigan Association of School
Administrators, intermediate schools districts, and local school districts. The most vocal
and politically active anti-choice group in Michigan has been the Michigan Education
Association (MEA), the state’s largest teachers union. According to a report by the
Mackinac Center for Public Policy (1999), “unions have powerful ﬁnancial incentives to
maintain the current barriers to school choice” (p. 1). “To union ofﬁcials, expanded
school choice may mean a reduction in their organizations’ income and political power as
greater numbers of low- and middle- income families choose to send their children to
charter and private schools with non-unionized workforces” (p.2). The rationale behind
this argument is that, in Michigan, 100% of public school teachers are unionized, while
only 3.6% of charter school teachers belong to a union (Mackinac Center for Public
Policy, 1999).

What is noteworthy about the charter school movement in Michigan is who was
empowered and what impact that had on local education policy. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that many in the traditional educational establishment were marginalized. For
example, in 2003 when the legislature was considering lifting the cap on the number of
charter schools granted by universities classes were canceled for all Detroit Public School
students and employees as teachers joined a Detroit Federation of Teachers rally in
Lansing. Their objective was to oppose more charter schools. Then President of the
Detroit Federation of Teachers, Janna Garrison, said, “Our neighborhood schools cannot
be sacriﬁced for a select few to have a better opportunity. Our goal is very simple. It’s

standing up for our children” (Associated Press, 2003). While teachers unions and public

86

school supporters expressed strong opposition of charter schools, they could not combat
the powerful linkages between the governor, business interests, and an emerging new
group of community activists.

Governor Engler framed the charter school debate in a way that drew a diverse
group of actors together. Engler was able to utilize the long-standing and well-established
linkage between Republican policymakers and business interests to further his school
choice agenda. A number of business interests became advocates of school choice,
including the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, Choice for Children, TEACH Michigan,
CMS Energy, Detroit Edison, Detroit Renaissance, and the Ford Motor Company. The
chairman of CMS Energy Willaim McCormick explained, “We’re upset. We’re tired of
all the excuses. We see an opportunity to make real change here” (as quoted in
Richardson, 1993). McCormick, along with a number of other business leaders, spent a
day in Lansing in 1993 advocating for Engler’s education reform plan. This activism
represented one of the ﬁrst times in Michigan that the business community took an active
role in lobbying for public education reform.

The charter school movement also created opportunities for new actors to get
involved in the actual implementation of charter schools. Higher education institutions
and for —proﬁt educational management companies have assumed an important and
active role in advocating and implementing charter schools (Henig, Holyoke, et.al, 2003).
As illustrated in Figure 3.8, colleges and universities have become key players in

implementing charter schools in Michigan.

87

Figure 3.8
Number of Charter Schools by Agency Type

 

160 ———-—~—_. a- ._ LL _

 

 

 

 

Number of Charter Schools

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

universities community colleges ISD's LEA's
(Source: Michigan Department of Education, “Michigan Public School Academies,
Report to the Legislature.” November, 2006. Available at
h_tp:x’/\x ww.michigﬂtgov/documents/mde/PSA Legislative Report 180610 7.pdf)
According to the Center for Education Reform, although local district can grant
charters, they only account for a very small portion of charter activity in Michigan.
Colleges and universities authorize the majority of Michigan’s charter schools. Of the
universities that grant charters, Central Michigan University is by far the most active
authorizer accounting for over 34% of the state’s charter school followed by Grand
Valley State University. Private management companies also play a key role in the school
choice movement, particularly in Michigan. Education management companies (EMO)
operate almost 75% of Michigan’s charter schools through the authority of the chartering
agency”. While EMO’s are not authorized to open a charter, they are often hired by the

authorizing agency to run the charter school. The most prominent EMO’s in Michigan are

 

‘5 EMO’s are more signiﬁcant in Michigan than in most states. Only about 10% of charter schools
nationwide were operated by EMO’s in 1999/2000. (Horn & Miron, 2000).

88

Educational Development Corp / National Heritage Academies (Grand Rapids), Leona
Group (Lansing), Helicon (Trenton) and Mosaica (Washington DC).

The concentration of charter schools in Detroit has empowered a new
constituency. A group of prominent Aﬁican Americans found themselves working
alongside state-level Republicans to bring increased choice to Detroit. Dissatisﬁed with
the condition of education in the Detroit Public Schools, a group of Detroit legislators,
ministers, and community activists joined the charter school movement. Reverend
Adams, a minister in Detroit, told the Detroit Free Press, “to dismiss an opportunity to
education our children by ascribing charter schools to the far right is negligent and
unfortunate” (as quoted in Christoff, 1994). Rev. Ellis Smith, pastor of the Jubilee
Christian Church in Detroit, added to this sentiment by saying, “Detroit needs more than
a token new charter school per year. When the demand exists among children, no matter
what their upbringing or where they live, they need to have educational options such as
charters” (as quoted in Smith, 2002).

The shifting coalitions around charter schools are reﬂected in available public
opinion data. In general, the data show that a majority of Michigan residents favor charter
schools, as do a majority of strong Republicans, African Americans, and residents of

metropolitan. Detroit.

89

Table 3.5
Supgort for Charter Schools in Michigan

 

 

 

 

Overall Support 62%
Strong Republicans 71%
African Americans 60%

Metropolitan Detroit 63%

 

 

 

 

(Source: Institute for Public Policy and Social Research, State of the State Survey, 38.
Spring, 2005.)

With the introduction of new actors, the empowerment of the business
community in education, and the concentration of and demand for charter schools in
urban districts Governor Engler recognized an opportunity to solidify a potentially
unstoppable political coalition that transcended traditional alliances. The speciﬁc
characteristics of this coalition and the political impact are the subjects of the following

chapters.

90

CHAPTER FOUR: CHARTER SCHOOLS AND REGIME CHANGE

The primary hypothesis of this research is that state policymakers have
restructured elements of the local political environment in the state of Michigan through
the creation of charter schools. While charter school policy and expansion have faced
intense resistance from powerful opponents, supporters were able to successfully create a
new set of institutions dedicated to the implementation of a new education policy agenda.
These institutions have not only provided a venue for the production and delivery of
public goods and services (i.e. education), but they have garnered support from a new and
diverse group of actors who have seldom been seen cooperating in a political capacity.

The focus of education reform studies, in general, and charter school studies,
speciﬁcally, has traditionally been concerned with measuring the impact of reform
initiatives on student outcomes (i.e. test scores). While the academic impact of charter
schools is mentioned brieﬂy in this research, the traditional ways of assessing the
outcomes of the charter school movement are not discussed. Instead, this research
examines the charter school movement and the structural outcomes that have resulted
from the creation of new institutional arrangements. Charter schools have changed the
local educational landscape in signiﬁcant and long-lasting ways. The outcomes of this

restructuring are discussed in further detail in the following sections.
Measuring Regime Change

“It is hard to generalize about charter politics because of the extreme variations

among the 50 states and thousands of school districts. There is not a cohesive

91

state or local charter political pattern given the variations in charter schools and

their contexts.” (Kirst, M., 2006, p.21)

The most critical empirical issues to be addressed here are whether or not the
creation of charter schools can be linked to long-term shifts in local political regimes as
well as substantive changes in policy. Measuring such change has long been a challenge
of regime theory. Regime change is measured here using two approaches: content
analysis and public opinion survey data. Content analysis is used to identify the
prominence of both actors and issues as they have emerged and changed over a ten- year
period. The use of media content analysis allows for a greater and more in depth
understanding of change in issue and actor saliency. A number of scholars have adopted
media content analysis to study a variety of public policy issues, including environmental
pollution, health care reform, AIDS, nuclear power (Ader, 1995; Jacobs and Shapiro,
2000; Rogers, Dearing, Chang, 1991; Weart, 1988). Drawing on the research approach of
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), a media search is implemented to determine the level of
attention of issues over time, the tone of those issues over time, and the role of policy
actors over time. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) studied media coverage of a number of
national policy issues (i.e. nuclear power, drug / alcohol/ child abuse, auto safety,
tobacco, pesticides, etc) over a period of 40-100 years. Their objective was to compare
the development of policy across issues over time. Media indicators were used to, “note
the degree to which an issue is on the broad public agenda and to assess the tone of elite
understanding at a given time” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, p.49). The use of media

content analysis served two key purposes:

92

0 To assess the level and nature of attention of particular issues
0 To assess the tone of those issues

According to Baumgartner and Jones, “the media plays an important role in
allocating attention” (p.125). The way in which issues are talked about in the media (i.e.
tone) is also important as it provides clues how issues develop and the surrounding public
discourse (p.51). Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) conﬁrmed this notion, “The overall pattern
of media’s reporting mirrors the intensity, content, and relative degree of dissensus in
ongoing policy debates” (p.60). Baumgartner and Jones (2002) expand their original
work by creating an extensive data set covering policy activity in telecommunications,
immigration, health care, and science and technology throughout the post World War 11
period. As part of their extensive data set, they sample articles from the New York Times
from 1947- 1994. This work links attention given to issues in the media with government
attention and activity. The basis of such analysis is that media coverage of issues does, to
an extent, correspond to the political agenda and policy action.

This research rests on a similar assumption. What issues are discussed, how
frequently they are discussed, and how they change over time correspond with public
discourse on speciﬁc policy issues. The media plays a role in what issues become salient
and it offers a venue for certain actors to deﬁne and interpret the policy agenda. This has
an impact on public opinion. While it may not dictate public opinion, how issues are
covered and how frequently they are covered may either conﬁrm or challenge public

perception.

93

Identifying Issues and Actors

A targeted media search of two of Michigan’s largest newspapers, the Detroit
Free Press and the Grand Rapids Press, was conducted over four time periods throughout
the charter school movement: time periods included in the content analysis are 1993,
1997, 2001, and 200516. Articles were coded to identify issues and actors and to examine
how issues and actors changed over time. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the number

of articles analyzed by year and by source.

 

 

 

 

Table 4.1
Summary of Media Search, Number of Articles

Source 1993 1997 2001 2005 Total
Detroit Free 39 67 37 15 158

Press17
Grand Rapids 27 36 32 26 121

Press]

Total 66 103 69 41 269

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Each article included in the content analysis was coded to identify actors and issues.
Speciﬁc actors and issues emerged from the coding and were not pre-determined. The

following coding scheme emerged during the analysis:

 

” 66

16 The media search included a keyword search for “charter schools , school choice”, and
“public school academies”. Once relevant articles were downloaded, they were uploaded into
Nudist Vivo for coding.

'7 Detroit Free Press archives are available for purchase on line through Newsbank at
http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-
search/we/Archives?s_site=freep&p_product=FP&g;theme=gannett&p_action=kevword, or for
free at the Library of Michigan.

18 Grand Rapids Press archives are available for purchase on line through MLive at
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/grpress/search.html.

94

0 Actors
0 In support of charter schools

0 In opposition to charter schools

Speciﬁc actors and groups were identiﬁed within each category of actors. Those in
support of charter schools were categorized as follows: Governor John Engler,
policymakers, the business community, associations/ advocacy groups, colleges/
universities, educational management organizations, parents/ community, business, and
charter schools. Categories for those in opposition to charter schools included: Governor
Jennifer Granholm, policymakers, associations/ advocacy groups, unions, parents/
community, and public schools.
0 Issues

0 Finance Reform

0 Innovation

0 Competition and Improvement

0 Choice

0 Accountability

0 Academic Achievement

0 Equity

0 Expansion

These issues were selected because they capture the set of goals of Michigan’s

charter school initiative. Miron and Nelson (2002) conducted a four- year study on
charter schools in Michigan. They identify a number of goals established under

Michigan’s charter school law. Those goals include: an improvement in student

95

achievement, greater school level accountability, greater market accountability (i.e.
competition, choice, equity, and efﬁciency), and innovative teaching methods. In
addition to these goals, expansion is also included as it has emerged as a reoccurring
theme in Michigan as charter schools reached the state imposed cap on the number of
charters that can be granted by colleges and universities.

Once issues and actors were identiﬁed, articles were coded by source and by year.
Actors and issues were counted once per article, not per citation. For example, an article
may mention the word innovation several times, but it would only be counted once for
that particular article. The purpose of coding per article is to gauge not how many times
an issue or actor is mentioned but rather to measure the percent of articles that cite a
particular issue or actor in relation to the total number of articles about charter schools.
By measuring the prevalence of issues the saliency of those issues and how it changes
over time is determined. Issue saliency is important because it goes beyond simply
determining positions on charter schools (i.e. for or against) to understand how charter
schools are talked about and how the issues change over time. The saliency of issues
within the charter school debate captures not only general support or opposition to charter
schools but, more importantly, what issues within the school choice context are
determined to be important and politically relevant (i.e. newsworthy). According to Laver
(2001), “Salience is important in political competition because we generally assume that
people take more notice of positions on issues they feel are more salient” (p.66).
However, saliency changes over time and can be manipulated (Laver, 2001). Identifying
how the saliency of issues changes over time and the impact that has on policy outcomes

and public opinion is important to note.

96

The Creation of a New Educational Establishment

What became evident through content analysis of the charter school movement

was the position of actors for or against charter schools. Table 4.2 provides a more

detailed list of the actors and groups that have taken a position either in support of or

opposition to charter schools in Michigan.

Table 4. 2
Actors who Support and Oppose Charter Schools in Michigan

 

Actors who Support Charter Schools

Politicians

Former President Bill Clinton

Former Governor Engler (R)
Republicans (in general)

US. Representative Hoekstra (R-
Holland)

Senator Dick Posthurnus (R-Alto)
Senator Glen Steil (R— Grand Rapids)
Senator Doug Ross

Rep. Wayne Kuipers (R—Ottawa)
Mayor Kwarne Kilpatrick (D- Detroit)
Detroit Board of Education members
Lawrence Patrick and David Olrnstead

Colleges/ Universities

Wayne State University

Grand Valley State University
Central Michigan University
Saginaw valley State University
Ferris State University

Bay Mills Community College

Associations/ Advocacy Groups
Mackinac Center

Urban League

NAACP

Great Lakes Education Project
Michigan Association of Public School
Academics (MAPSA)

Michigan Association of Charter School
Boards

Michigan Council of Charter Schools

 

Actors who Oppose Charter Schools

Politicians

Governor Granholrn (D)

Rep. Curtis Herte1(D- Detroit)

Rep. Karen Willard (D- Fair Haven)
Rep. Greg Kaza (R- Rochester Hills)
Rep. James Agee (D-Muskegon)
Rep. Joseph Divet (D- Bay City)

Educational Establishment
LEA’s (in general)

ISD’s (in general)

Detroit Public Schools
Kent Co Superintendents
Ottawa Co Superintendents
Kent Co School Board
Kent Co ISD

Grand Rapids Board of Education
Detroit Board of Education
Public School teachers

Associations/ Advocacy Groups
Michigan Education Association
Michigan Federation of Teachers
Detroit Federation of Teachers
National Education Association
American Federation of Teachers

AF L-CIO

Michigan Association of School Boards
Michigan Association of School
Administrators

Michigan Association of Intermediate

 

 

97

 

Table 4.2 Con’t

 

Authorizers School Administrators

TEACH

Choice for Children Community Groups/ Individuals

New Urban Learning Council of Organizations/ Others for
Education about Parachiaid Inc.

Community Groups / Individuals Mary Wood (charter watchdog)

Detroit parents

African American parents

Black Alliance for Educational Options
Reverend William Abney (Bethany
Pentecostal Church)

Reverend Marvin Winans

Rosa Parks

Detroit Ministries

Richard McLellan

David Bing

Robert Thompson

Marilyn Lundy

Richard DeVoss

Business Community

Skillrnan Foundation

Michigan Business Leaders for
Educational Excellence
Michigan Chamber of Commerce
Ford Motor Company

Private Education Management Groups
Educational Development Corp (EDC)
National Heritage Academies

Leona Group

Mosaica

Helicon

Edison

 

 

 

 

Table 4.2 highlights that Republicans, urban minorities, the business community, and
private education management groups have taken a position in support of charter schools,

while Democrats and local education institutions and associations stand in opposition to

98

charter schools. Table 4.3 provides data on the frequency that actors are cited in the
media over time regarding charter schools compared to the total number of articles on
charter schools per year. For example, in 1993 Governor John Engler was cited in 38 out
of 66 articles (57% of the articles on charter schools that year). In 2005 Governor John
Engler, who was no longer in ofﬁce, was not cited in any of the articles written on charter

schools that year.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 4. 3
Summary of Media Search, Key Actors
Actors 1993 1997 2001 2005
Governor Engler 38 14 8 019
57% 14% 12% 0%
Governor Granholm 0 0 0 5
0% 0% 0% 12%
Policymakers
In support 34 14 15 4
of charters 51% 14% 22% 10%
In opposition 46 24 6 l
to charters 70% 23% 8% 2%
EMO’s 4 22 15 7
6% 21% 22% 17%
Business community 18 6 2 22
27% 6% 3% 53%
Unions 48 12 10 ll
72% 12% 14% 27%
Colleges/ Universities 6 24 25 21
9% 23% 36% 51%
Total number of articles 66 103 69 41

 

 

 

 

Table 4.3 illustrates the signiﬁcant role played by Governor Engler, policymakers, the
business community, colleges and universities and unions (particularly the MBA) at

different periods in time. What is noteworthy is how these roles shift over time. When

 

'9 Governor John Engler served as Michigan’s governor from 1991-2002. He was no longer in
ofﬁce in 2005. Governor Jennifer Granholm took ofﬁce in 2003 and was reelected to a second

term in 2006.

99

charter schools ﬁrst emerged as a policy initiative in Engler’s 1993 education reform
package, the debate was dominated by Governor Engler and the MEA. For example, in
1993 Engler is cited in 57% of articles on charter schools, but by 2001 he is only cited in
12% of articles. The MBA follows a similar trend. The union is cited in 72% of the
articles on charter schools in 1993, but by 2005 that percentage fell to 27%. Several
headlines from the Detroit Free Press and Grand Rapids Press capture this early dynamic
calling the initial charter school debate a, “backstage ﬁght between business and labor”, “
brawl between MBA and Chamber of Commerce”, “assault on the MEA”, and “War on
Engler”.

As the most vocal critic of charter schools, the MEA often referred to charters in
the media as “anti-labor”, a way to “undercut unions”, a “backdoor attempt to fund
private schools”, the “ﬁrst step towards vouchers”, and a “gimmick that doesn’t address
the real issues”. NEA President, Bob Chase summarized the unions position on charter
schools arguing that, “Educating children is not like producing automobiles. Lots of
people think the proﬁt motive will create competition. But I think if dollars are saved
they should go back into education, not into the pockets of private investors” (Loechler,
B., 1997, A6). The MBA took several steps in 1993 to put their words into action by
protesting charter schools and those who support them. In August 1993 the MEA held a
large rally in Lansing as a show of opposition to ﬁnance reform, schools of choice, and
charter schools. As public educator Guy Sands said, “It’s time for us to ﬁght off the
insidious behavior of those in the state of Michigan who would destroy public education”

(Grand Rapids Press, 1993, A. 1). Others in the educational establishment, particularly

traditional public school educators, echo the MBA in their opposition to charter schools.

100

Those in public education most often viewed charter schools as a direct threat to the
public education system. As Grand Rapids Jeff Grotsky superintendent argued, “I think
we’re wasting a lot of time in trying to get people interested in something like choice,
instead of making the schools we have world class schools” (Grand Rapids Press,
October 7, 1993, AA).

Following the August rally, the MEA organized a December 1, 1993 “lights out”
protest against Consumers Power, who came forward as a supporter of charter schools.
According to then Chairman, Willilam McCormick Jr,, “We’re upset. We’re tired of
hearing all the excuses. We see an opportunity to make a real change here and we’re
going to jump into the fray. . .Right now, everything is on the table. We’ve never had that
situation before” (Detroit Free Press, November 12, 1993). Other members of the
business community also came out to show their support for charters in 1993 and to state
their claim in the debate.

We’re the most objective viewers of the success or the failure of our public

education system. We’re the ones that see the kids who come out looking for jobs

and we’re seeing a system that is not producing adequately trained people. (MCN

Corporation Chairman Alfred Glancy, Detroit Free Press, November 12, 1993).

Governor Engler, backed by the business community, responded to attacks by the
MEA by saying, “I think one problem in education has been to put the needs of the MEA
ﬁrst and kids come elsewhere down the line, so this does turn the focus around” (Grand
Rapids Press, October 12, 1993, Al). While the MBA and those in the educational

establishment were successful in blocking cross- district choice in the original legislation,

101

it was not able to stop the enactment and implementation of charter schoolszo. Many saw
this as the ﬁrst time the powerful union was unable to achieve its goals. According to
Jeffery Mirel (2004), “By the mid-1990’s, the unions had been beaten nearly into
submission by a Republican governor and a Republican controlled state legislature. This
development has changed the political landscape almost beyond recognition” (p.120).
Since the original charter school legislation, there MEA has mounted several additional
attempts to stop the expansion of charter schools by ﬁling a lawsuit against Bay Mills
Tribal College” and by organizing rallies in Lansing to stop legislation to raise or
eliminate the cap. While the cap has not been ofﬁcially lifted, Bay Mills has been
authorized to charter schools statewide and legislation has passed to allow 15 more
charter schools in Detroit.

The defeat of the MBA in the charter school debate represents a signiﬁcant
structural outcome of the charter school movement. The creation and implementation of
charter schools decoupled education policy and unions. Prior to this, unions dominated
education politics. However, unions have been 1.) unable to halt the implementation of
charter schools and 2.) unable to organize teachers in charter schools. According to
Brouillette and Williams (1999), “public sector unionization has allowed school
employee labor unions to monopolize the delivery of traditional government education in
the State of Michigan” (p.14). They go on to say, “Preservation of school employee union

power and inﬂuence therefore requires union ofﬁcial to defend the system they now

 

20 While, inter-district choice was removed from the 1993 legislation, t was later established
under PA 180 in 1996.

2' Bay Mills is a tribal community college that has been granted authority to charter schools
across the state of Michigan. Other community colleges are only authorized to charter schools in
their community college district. The authority of Bay Mills to charter schools statewide has been
widely criticized by charter school opponents who see it as a loophole around the university cap
that was reached in 1999.

102

dominate, and resist the growth of schools in which they have been unable to gain a
foothold” (p.15). Charter school legislation and the rapid growth of charter schools have
posed a direct challenge to union strength and inﬂuence in Michigan and this has
powerful structural implications.

However, the decoupling of unions from education policy was not the only
outcome of the charter school movement. A realignment of race and party politics also
emerged. While Engler tried to frame charter schools as a bi-partisan issue, it has not
been the case. Democrats largely oppose charter schools and have described them as an
attempt to “destroy public education” and as a way to “create an elite system.”
Examining roll call votes also illustrates that charter schools did not transcend party lines.
The 1993 legislation was passed by a ﬁnal vote of 65-34. Of those voting, those who
voted “yes” were 50 of 55 Republicans and 15 of 55 Democrats. While the actual vote is
not surprising, what is interesting is of those 15 Democrats that crossed party lines, 4
were from Detroit. While not a bi-partisan issue, charter schools have emerged as more of
a bi-racial issue as urban minority policymakers and community groups have joined

Republicans and the business community as allies in the charter school movement.

From Finance Reform to the Expansion of Choice

The substantive purpose of charter schools has been anything but consistent and
has changed several times since their original inception. Charter schools in Michigan
were not proposed as a stand alone initiative. They were, instead, part of a much larger
reform effort initiated by Governor John Engler. The primary objective f the 1993 reform

package was a complete overhaul of Michigan’s school ﬁnance system. Restructuring

103

the mechanism for funding Michigan schools from one based on local property taxes to
one based on state funding (i.e. sales or income tax) was the centerpiece of the state’s
legislative efforts. However, in addition to changing the funding structure, Governor
Engler also wanted to change how public education was being delivered. In particular, he
wanted to introduce an open market for public education that incorporated both schools
of choice and the creation of charter schools. While passed as just one piece of a state
education reform package, charter schools quickly emerged as their own policy issue,
completely separate from school ﬁnance.

The following section examines the evolution of issues and highlights the saliency
of different issues over time. Figure 4.1 provides a brief overview of the issues and how
they have changed over the last decade.

Figure 4.1
Charter School Issue Salience: 1993-2005

 

13:3

 

k4.)
O

 

M
L/u

 

..—
U!

 

Frequency of Issues
a '5

 

'Ji
1

 

 

 

 

 

o
r

1993 1997 2001 2005
Year
2 Innovation I Competitioo’ Improvement — Choice T Accountability
I Academic Achievement C Equity I Finance Reform 1. Expansion

104

Figure 4.1 illustrates how charter schools have been discussed over time and how this
has changed. Policymakers have redeﬁned the purposes and objectives of charter schools
throughout the years. While some issues have remained salient, other issues have fallen by
the wayside as new information has emerged about charter schools or as actors have
changed the discourse. To get a more accurate sense of the saliency of issues over time,

Table 4.4 captures the frequency of different issues over time as compared to the total

number of articles per year.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 4.4
Summary of Media Search, Issue Salience
Issue 1993 1997 2001 2005
Finance Reform 37 O O O
56%
Innovation 10 4 2 l
15% 6% 3% 2%
Competition/ 22 9 1 1
Improvement 33% 9% 1% 2%
Choice 6 12 4 7
9% 12% 6% 17%
Accountability 2 2 l 6 1
3% 20% 9% 2%
Academic O 7 O 8
Achievement 7% 20%
Equity 4 4 3 4
6% 4% 4% 9%
Expansion 0 O l 5 ' 12
22% 29%
Total number of 66 103 69 41
articles

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 4.3 and 4.4 show several changes in the way charter schools are perceived
over time. One ﬁnding is that charter schools were originally perceived as part of the
larger school ﬁnance reform package. Of the articles on charter schools in 1993, 56%
placed charter schools in the context of ﬁnance reform. By 1997 and beyond, none of the

articles on charter schools referenced ﬁnance reform. Charter schools have since emerged

105

as an independent issue. Since their implementation, charter schools have come to mean
many things. They have been described for their innovation, for the choice they offer
parents, and as a mechanism to improve public education through competition. They have
also raised several issues for concern, including lack of accountability, mediocre
academic achievement, and inequity in enrollment. The saliency of these issues is not
constant over time. Some issues are highly salient at the onset of charter schools, while
these same issues are barely mentioned ten years later

Perhaps the most cited reason for charter schools in Michigan is competition. 33%
of the articles on charter schools in 1993 discussed charter schools as a way of
introducing competition into a stagnate, monopolistic public education system. Charter
schools were seen as a way to serve as a “catalyst for change” and to “kick reform into
high gear.” By offering competition, charter supporters claimed charter schools would
enhance the overall quality of education, responsiveness to and communication with
students and parents, and accountability. However, charter school opponents do not feel
the same about competition. Instead, competition is seen as a detriment to existing public
schools as schools and districts loose students to charter schools. The loss of students is
accompanied by a signiﬁcant loss in funding since the per pupil foundation follows the
student to the charter school. As it has become evident that charter schools have not been
able to spark major changed in public education as a result of competition. Competition
as a deﬁning issue has declined. By 2005, competition was only referenced in 2% of
articles on charter schools. The following excerpts from the media search capture how

this issue has changed over time:

106

We need to try new approaches. Charter schools give professional educators the
opportunity, the ﬂexibility to take risks, to try new ideas, to adapt and to reach out
in ways that they ﬁnd difﬁcult to do under the current public school structure.

(Paul DeWeese, Detroit Free Press, October 4, 1993: 1B)

Charter schools would force public schools to become more competitive and
create the kinds of schools that parents want. (Richardson and Trimer-Hartley,

Detroit Free Press, October 3, 1993: F5)

In 1993, charters were perceived as schools that would shock the current system
by introducing competition and thus force traditional schools to improve. However, as it
became clear that charter schools weren’t necessarily offering a better quality of
education as much as providing a choice for parents, competition became less of a
deﬁning issue. By 2005, the issue was less about competition and improvement as much
as it was about choice. According to National Heritage Academy President, Peter
Ruppert:

Charter schools are marking ten years in Michigan. Once a controversial

educational experiment, the schools have become an integral part of the state’s

public education system. They offer another option for parents—a popular one, if
ﬁill classrooms and long waiting lists are any measure. That record should
convince state policymakers to expand charter schools. (Grand Rapids Press,

January 5, 2005, A.8)

107

The existence of choice and the popularity of charter schools became more of a measure
of success by 2005 than the concept of improvement through competition.

The issue of innovation follows a similar trend. Charter school supporters often
described charter schools as innovative institutions that are free from the politics and
bureaucracy that infest traditional public schools. Proponents often used phrases such as
“freedom to experiment”, “ﬂexibility to break the mold”, “opportunity to try new ideas”,
and “ﬂexibility to take risks”, when talking about charter schools. However, aﬁer several
evaluative reports came out showing that charter schools, overall, do not look or operate
much differently than traditional public schools (Public Sector Consultants, 1999; Horn
& Miron, 2000), innovation became less of a selling point for charter schools. By 2001,
innovation was only mentioned in 2% of articles on charter schools, whereas in 1993
innovation was cited in 15% of articles. As Engler claims in one article, “Consumer
choice creates a competitive atmosphere that drives innovation and improvement.”
(Grand Rapids Press, October 17, 1993: C.1). Charters were perceived as placed where,
according to a former Detroit Public School Board Member, “teachers have the ability to
change and shape schools.” (Detroit Free Press, November 18, 1993: 1A). However, by
2001 the perception was much different:

One reason charter schools have been created are to serve as "laboratories" in

which a school district can learn from new innovations in teaching and learning. If

Michigan's charter school classrooms are to serve as laboratories, they must strive

to further differentiate themselves from traditional public schools.

(Grand Rapids Press, June 22, 2001: A.7)

108

The most consistent issue deﬁning the charter school debate throughout the last
decade has been choice. Charter schools offer parents and students, who may have
previously had no other choice beyond their neighborhood school, an alternative. Choice
supporters argue that choice allows greater “educational freedom” and “parental control”.
The following two quotes illustrate how charter schools are seen as providing a necessary
choice to those in public education.

I’m all about choice. There is a demand for choice as evidenced by the waiting
lists. If this is what parents want, them we are obligated to do something about it.

(Wayne Kuipers as quoted in the Grand Rapids Press, June 1, 2001, A. 1)

This [choice] is part of the education system, an important part of it. People are

embracing the idea that charters are part of the system. (Dan Quisenberry in the

Grand Rapids Press, January 2, 2005, D.1)

As charter schools have been deﬁned by different issues over time (i.e.
competition, innovation, choice), they have also raised several issues for concern. Of
those issues, the most prevalent are accountability, academic achievement, and equity.
As public schools, charter schools are required to adhere to the same administrative
regulations that traditional schools must follow. As charters have become a prominent
ﬁxture in the education landscape, questions have surfaced regarding accountability.
More speciﬁcally, there has been growing concern over who charter schools are
accountable to, how they spend their money, and who they serve. In 1997, 20% of the
articles about charter schools discussed issues of accountability, particularly in terms of

Central Michigan University’s oversight (or lack of) of their charter schools. In 1997,

109

C MU authorized over half of the charter schools in Michigan. Following a 1997 audit by
the state, it was found that several of C MU’s charter schools were guilty of ﬁscal
mismanagement and MEAP violations. In an editorial piece, JoAnn Bird expressed her
concern over CMU’s accountability of charter schools.
Reality recently interrupted Central Michigan University's charter school fairy
tale. A state audit found CMU seriously lacking in supervision of its charter
schools. Some charters had not checked criminal records of employees, and eight
schools had not hired teachers with certiﬁcates. I question the competence of
CMU's charter school ofﬁce. I wonder why charter school proponents (in general)
ﬁnd following the law burdensome. Perhaps Central Michigan is trying to start
more schools than it can handle. The authorizing body should still be held

responsible for charters it promotes. (Detroit Free Press, October 20, 1997)

The concerns raised by Bird are typical of charter school opponent’s objections to
charter schools. Unlike public schools, charter schools do not have publicly elected
school boards. While it is argued that they are accountable to parents by market forces,
they are not accountable to the public in the same way that traditional schools are. They
are, instead, accountable to their authorizer. This system of accountability is further
complicated in Michigan by the presence of private educational management companies
(EMO’s). Although charter schools themselves must be organized as a nonproﬁt, almost
three-quarters of Michigan’s charter schools are managed by EMOs. According to Horn
and Miron (2000), slightly more than 71 percent of Michigan’s charters schools were

operated by private management companies compared to only 10 percent nationwide.

110

Academic achievement is also another major area of concern, particularly in
recent years. While academic achievement was a non-issue in the early years of
implementation, by 2005 it accounted for 20% of articles on charter schools. Following a
decade of implementation, it is not surprising that people want to know how charter
schools are performing compared to traditional public schools. As public schools, charter
schools are required to administer the MEAP test as a measure of student performance.
Based on MEAP results, charter schools have demonstrated what Governor Granholm
calls “a troubling pattern of performance” (as quoted in Putnam, J ., 2005). Charters have
been described as “lagging behind”, “far worse” and “generally lower” when compared
to traditional public schools.

Actual MEAP scores show a more mixed picture of academic achievement,
particularly as scores as further disaggregated by race. Assessment data illustrate that
overall charter schools do not necessarily provide a higher quality of education as
measured by the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP). Graph 4.2
provides a brief comparison of MEAP scores between charter schools, host districts, and

non-charter schools in English and math.

11]

Figure 4.2
2005 English and Math MEAP Scores: Grades 3-8

 

Percent Proﬁcient

 

 

l English
I Math

 

Charter Schools Non Charter Host Districts
Schools

 

 

 

(Source: Michigan Department of Education: MEAP test results. Available at
htt ://www.michi an. ov/mdc/O,1607,7—140-22709 31l68‘?40135---,00.html)

 

   

As illustrated above, charter schools fall somewhere in the middle of the overall
distribution of MEAP scoreszz. Charter schools have lower scores in math and English
relative to non-charter schools. When compared to their host districts, charter schools
have slightly higher scores. For example, in Detroit charters outperform Detroit Public
Schools in grades 4 to 6 (Mead, 2006). Similar patterns are found in Lansing and Flint,

while charter schools in Grand Rapids are doing better than their public school

 

22 For MEAP scores, see the Michigan Department of Education (2006): Public School
Academies: Michigan Department of Education Report to the Legislature. Lansing/Michigan:
Michigan Department of Education.

112

counterparts in all subject areas across grade levels (Michigan Association of Public
School Academics, 2004). 23

The one issue that has been most consistent as a concern among charter school
skeptics, as cited in the media, is equity. There has been on going debate surrounding
exactly who charter schools serve. Initially it was thought that charter schools would
“cream” the best and brightest students from public schools. However, that has not been
the case. As Dan Quisenberry, Director of MAPSA, noted:

About 58% of charter schools statewide are eligible for free and reduced lunch,

compared with 33% in traditional public schools statewide. More than half of

the state’s charter schools are minorities, compared with 10% statewide. (Detroit

Free Press, July 6, 2001, 10A)

Charter schools in Michigan serve high proportions of minority and low- income
students and are concentrated in inner city and urban areas. Almost 43 percent of
Michigan’s charter schools are located in metropolitan Detroit alone. Over two-thirds of
these schools are actually in the city of Detroit. (Arsen et a1. 1999) According to the
Grand Rapids Press, more than half of charter school students are black, Latino, or Asian
and about 60% are eligible for free and reduced lunch (2005). While charter schools do
seem to serve a racially and economically diverse student population, there is still
question over whether or not they provide equitable services to special education and
bilingual students.

While charters compare well in ethnic make up and, in some cases, in serving

economically disadvantaged students, meeting special-education needs presents

 

23 The academic outcomes of charter schools are not the focus of this research. However, it is
important to note that charter schools are not signiﬁcantly enhancing students’ academic
achievement as measured by MEAP scores.

113

greater challenges. Charter schools reﬂect minority populations. Traditional

public schools serve more disadvantaged students. (Williams, L., 1997, 32)

Charter schools at 10 years old do not promote better academic performance.
Charter schools regularly score lower than the neighborhood and public schools
they are competing against. They score lower even without the burden of the
many services public schools are obligated to provide and not always funded. For
example, bilingual and special education. (Grand Rapids Press, January 18, 2005,

A6)

What is most interesting about the results of the content analysis is that regardless
how charter schools are being talked about, they have been and continue to be in high
demand. As time has gone on, charter schools are rarely described as innovative
institutions that have improved the quality of education or outperformed traditional
schools. It is still questionable who exactly charter schools are accountable to or if they
are held accountable for poor performance through school closures, as originally thought.
What is clear is that charter schools do provide a choice. While they may not look much
different than traditional schools or perform any better than traditional schools, people
want to have choices. Something besides the status quo seems to be enough to keep the
public supportive of charter schools. The recent debate to either raise or eliminate the
cap captures this issue. In Michigan, the number of charter schools that can be authorized
by colleges and universities is capped at 150. Since the cap was reached in 1999, attempts

to raise or eliminate the cap have emerged in almost every legislative session since. Two

114

major initiatives to increase the number of charter schools in Michigan have been
successful; the authority of Bay Mills to grant charter school statewide and the passage of
legislation to create 15 charter high schools in Detroit. Since 1999, the expansion of
charter schools has accounted for 22-29% of articles on charter schools.
Charter schools are here to stay. . .Freezing out the charters and those who
authorize them won’t help students in either type of public school. (Grand Rapids

Press, November 15, 2001, A14)

A Realignment of Public Opinion

Understanding the role public opinion has played in the restructuring process is
one of the central theoretical questions posed in this research. As new institutions are
created and new policy actors empowered, what role does public opinion play in either
encouraging or discouraging policy change? Examining public opinion towards charter
schools over time becomes a measure of policy change. For example, if public support
for charter schools is sustained over time despite the performance of charter schools, does
this not represent a substantive outcome? If the public supports charter schools, demands
more of them, and continues to enroll in them regardless of academic performance
outcomes and lack of innovation in teaching, curriculum, or school structure, does this
not indicate a signiﬁcant challenge to the traditional local educational landscape? The
expectation is that, with the implementation of new institutions (i.e. charter schools), the
public has and continues to support charter schools on the basis of choice. Simply stated,

having a choice is better than not.

115

To further answer these issues, public opinion survey data is used to assess
whether or not patters of public support for charter schools can be distinguished from
“traditional” coalitions in education policy. More speciﬁcally, does public opinion reﬂect
“traditional” education regimes or does it reﬂect changes to this regime? The use of pubic
opinion data as an indicator of local policy regimes rests of four expectations:

0 There is an empirical link between concrete policy outcomes and expressions of
public opinion.

a The link between public Opinion and public policy, is, at least in part, the result of
political leaders ability to lead public opinion through their actions and decisions.

0 The public organizes policy preferences in terms of a coherent ideological
structure.

0 The public’s ideological structures are associated with speciﬁc political, social,
and demographic attributes. (Bartles, 1991; Erikson et.al., 1993; Erikson et.al.,

1989; Hinckley, 1992; Page, 1994; Page & Shapiro, 1983, 1992; Wright el. al.,

1987)

While each of these assumptions can be challenged, there is a good deal of support for
each. While the causal direction of this relationship is often difﬁcult to identify, the
ordering of changes in policy and public opinion in education seem to suggest that policy
change has garnered support for new institutions and regime change and that this
restructuring has created stability in this policy area (Feldman, 1988).

Carmines and Stimson (1982) lend support to the second assumption in their work
showing that political actors both respond to as well as mold public opinion. In their

examination of the formation of federal anti-discrimination policies, they ﬁnd that

116

Congress represents the partisan dispositions of the public in a way that leaves the public
responding to the issue cues of Congress. Bartles (2000) draws a similar conclusion
when looking at a long-term increase in partisanship across the American electorate. He
argues that this increase is the result of the public taking cues from the political elites.
Hetherington (2002) and Jacobson (2003) concur with Bartles arguing that public
partisanship had mirrored a parallel increase in Congress.

The extensive literature shows that citizen attitudes tend to cluster on speciﬁc
attributes. The evidence is particularly strong for race (Dawson, 2000; Kinder & Sanders,
1996; Tate, 1995) and partisanship (Campbell, 1960; Jacoby, 1988). Carmines and
Stimson (1982) argue that the increasing saliency of race has led to greater clustering of
policy attitudes on the basis of race. The association of policy preferences and citizen
attributes implies that citizens have an internally consistent set of policy preferences.

J acoby (1990, 1994) has also demonstrated that citizens, do, in fact, organize their
political attitudes and preferences within an ideological structure.

To further examine the public opinion on charter schools, I analyze public opinion
survey data. First, I look at support for charter schools overall, by race, by region, by
political afﬁliation and political identiﬁcation. These categories were selected for two
primary reasons: 1.) the availability of public opinion survey data in each category and,
2.) the alignment with traditional policy differences regarding race (Kinder and Sanders,
1996; Sears et a1, 1997; Gilens, 1999), party identiﬁcation (Campbell, 1960; Converse
and Marcus, 1979; Adams, 1997), and region (Lazarsﬁeld, 1968). Table 4.5 presents

public opinion of charter schools in each of those categories.

117

Table 4.5: Public Opinion of Charter Schools in Michigan

 

 

 

 

 

 

Favor (%) Oppose (%)
Overall 60% 27%
Race
White 61% 27%
Black 53% 30%
Region
Southeast urban 57% 25%
Detroit 63% 26%
Southwest 57% 30%
Central 63% 25%
North/ UP 51% 34%
Political Afﬁliation
Republican 72% 13%
Democrat 52% 37%
Political Identiﬁcation
Strong Republican 75% 11%
Strong Democrat 51% 39%

 

 

 

 

 

(Source: Institute for Public Policy and Social Research. State of the State Survey 38,
Spring, 2005.)
What is evident in Table 4.5 is the lack of difference in public support for charter schools
by race and region. There is a bit more variation in support by political afﬁliation,
particularly when further disaggregated by strong Republican versus strong Democrat.

Tables 4.6-4.8 provide further examination of the impact of charter schools on
public opinion. The analysis presents responses based on three sets of questions
disaggregated by party identiﬁcation, race, and region. Questions included in the survey
data include:

0 General political questions

0 Views on general education issues

118

' Views on charter schools
Indicators of general opinion include party identiﬁcation and support for the president
and state governor. These questions are followed by a set of questions targeted
speciﬁcally to education and charter schools. For each question, a one-way analysis of

Table 4.6: Differences in Public Opinion by Race for Selected Policy Issues

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Issues24 Mean Response Scores F Signiﬁcance
Difference of
Means
White Black Other
Ideology 3.14 4.16 3.92 16.204 .000
President 2.05 2.94 2.53 49.760 .000
approval
Governor 2.52 3.33 3.41 36.450 .000
approval
Favor state 1.70 1.35 1.51 6.926 .001
standards
Rate local 5.61 7.89 6.74 33.072 .000
schools
Favor charter 2.17 1.98 1.80 .778 .460
schools

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 4.7: Differences in Public Opinion by Party Identiﬁcation for Selected Policy

 

 

 

 

 

 

Issues
Issues Mean Response Scores F Signiﬁcance
Difference of
Means
Republican Independent Democrat
Ideology 1.92 1.92 1.92 54.659 .000
President 1 .58 2.02 l .58 124.249 .000
approval
Governor 2.18 2.59 2.18 134.479 .000
approval
Favor state 2.03 1.57 5.51 12.331 .000
standards

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2’ Ideology is measures on a seven-point scale with 1 being most conservative. President and
governor approval are measured on a four-point scale with 1 being the highest positive rating.
Urban issues are measured on a three-point scale with 1 being most concerned. State standards in
education and charter schools are measures on a ﬁve-point scale with 1 being most favorable.
Rating local schools is measured on a thirteen-point scale with 1 being “grade A+). See Institute
for Public Policy and Social Research (IPPSR), 2001 and 2002.

119

Table 4.7 (cont’d)

 

 

Rate local 2.73 1.55 5.47 1.536 .216
schools

Favor charter 1.69 1.92 5.11 20.986 .000
schools

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 4.8: Differences in Public Opinion by Region for Selected Policy Issues
Issues Mean Response Score F Signiﬁcance
Difference of Means

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Urban Rural

General Issues

Ideology 3.79 2.90 18.669 .000
President approval 2.68 2.08 49.625 .000
Governor approval 3.04 2.54 31.449 .000
Education Issues

Favor state standards 1.76 1.37 17.725 .000
Rate local schools 5.26 7.28 50.937 .000
Favor charter schools 2.12 1.99 .552 .458

 

 

 

 

 

 

The data presented in Tables 4.6-4.8 challenge the “traditional” coalitions that
typically drive policy debates. While some of the ﬁndings in public opinion data
surrounding charter schools are not surprising, others defy traditional expectations and
challenge existing literature. Partisan differences on education are consistent with
traditional literature and the content analysis provided above. Typically, those who
identify as Republicans are more supportive of charter schools than those who identify as
Democrats. Wong and Shen (2006) ﬁnd similar patterns in their work on charter schools.
They suggest that Republican Party strength is positively associated with the presence of
charter schools, particularly in states that have strong charter school laws25 (2006).

What is interesting in the above ﬁndings are the patterns of support by region and

race. These ﬁndings pose a challenge to traditional expectations. Ryan and Heise (2002)

 

25 For more information on strength of charter school laws see the Center for Education Reform
(2001) “Charter School Laws: Scorecards and rankings. Washington DC.

120

and Wong and Shen (2006) argue that those in suburban areas are not supportive of
school choice. Ryan and Heise claim that suburban parents see school choice programs as
a threat to well performing suburban school districts and therefore are not supportive of
school choice efforts. Wong and Shen conﬁrm this argument by asserting that suburban
residents have played a signiﬁcant role in slowing down school choice programs and
expansion. This argument may be misleading. While suburban parents may generally
oppose school choice programs, charter schools may be an exception. Charter schools are
a piece of school choice, but they tend to follow a different pattern of support than choice
programs in general (i.e. open enrollment).

Perhaps the most signiﬁcant ﬁnding from public opinion data is for race. For all
intents and purposes, race has served as a deﬁning characteristic of policy preferences.
This, however, is not the case for charter schools. There is not a signiﬁcant racial
difference in policy preferences regarding charter schools. This ﬁnding challenges
traditional notions about the differences in policy preferences by race. Racial differences
in public opinion are well documented (J ackman, 1994; Kinder and Sanders; 1996;
Kluegel and Smith, 1983, 1986; Shuman et a1. 1997; Sigelman and Welch, 1991; Tate,
1994). According to Kinder and Winter (2001), “opinion differences between blacks and
whites add up to more than a gap or a mere disagreement. They constitute a divide”
(p.440). In their research on public opinion, race, and national policy, they ﬁnd that there
is a signiﬁcant divide between blacks and whites on racial policies (i.e. equal
employment, school integration, preferential hiring, etc.). They also ﬁnd that there are
differences between blacks and whites on social welfare policy (i.e. spending on

education, services, ﬁnancial aid, unemployment, etc.). They conclude, “while the racial

121

divide is most pronounced over policies that bear unambiguously and differentially on the
fortunes of blacks and whites, it is also apparent on a wide array of social welfare
policies, where race seems much less present” (Kinder & Winter, 2001, p.441).

Recent ﬁndings by Henig (2004) and Wong and Shen (2006) further this claim by
examining racial preferences towards school choice policy. Henig asserts that the African
American community may see charter schools as a threat to the existing urban system,
both in terms of educational and employment opportunities. Wong and Shen ﬁirther
argue that urban schools are a large source of jobs for African Americans and as a result,
the presence of charter schools may be seen as a threat. These views are not supported in
Michigan public opinion data. Instead, there is a high level of support for charter schools
among the African American community, particularly in urban areas. For example,
approximately 60% of African Americans support charter schools. However, when you
look at support for charter schools in southeast urban Michigan, that percentage rises to
63%.

Public opinion data suggest that a new pattern in public opinion has emerged
around charter schools that may have an important impact on local politics. This pattern
deﬁes traditional expectations regarding racial and regional differences in public policy

preferences. The impact of these ﬁndings is further discussed in the following chapter.

122

CHAPTER FIVE: CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE CREATION OF NEW
EDUCATIONAL REGIMES

“Charter schools could easily be called the ‘all things to all people’ refomi, as the
rhetoric ofcharter advocates can appeal to people with varied political

viewpoints ....... Charter advocates include a ‘strange bedfellows’ combination of
political actors and policy-makers, from perspectives such as those above, that are

often at odds on many other educational issues.” (Bulkley, K., 2005, p.1)

Charter Coalitions Deﬁ/ Traditional Coalitions

The debate over charter schools in Michigan reveals a fundamental realignment in
Michigan educational politics. Despite intense opposition from powerful political actors,
such as the Michigan Education Association, Michigan Federation of Teachers, Detroit
Federation of Teachers, intermediate school districts, and local school districts, charter
school supporters were able to successfully frame the debate on school choice in a way
that garnered support from a new and diverse education coalition. This coalition was able
to marginalize traditionally powerful educational actors. In particular, the long-term
dominance of teachers unions and educational professionals was successfully challenged.
Some elements of this coalition had strong prior partisan afﬁliations. The state’s governor
John Engler utilized the long-standing and well—established linkages between Republican
policymakers and business interests to promote charter schools. Traditional business
groups such as Michigan Chamber of Commerce, CMS Energy, Detroit Edison, and
Detroit Renaissance, which were all active in Republican politics, took up the charter
issue. In addition, a number of new advocacy groups such as Choices for Children and

Teach Michigan that were ﬁnanced by these same business interests were established.

123

What is striking about the charter movement is that its strength was not limited to
the traditional Republican base. The concept of charter schools attracted new groups and
interests. Institutions of higher education and private education management companies
were particularly important. Central Michigan University and Grand Valley University
took an active and very important role in advocating school choice, and quickly became
the state’s two largest chartering agencies. Educational management companies also
became key important players in the school choice movement. Although charter schools
must be organized as a nonproﬁt, almost three-quarters of Michigan’s charter schools are
managed by for-proﬁt EMOs. According to Horn and Miron (2000), slightly more than
71 percent of Michigan’s charters schools were operated by private management
companies compared to only 10 percent nationwide. The prevalence of EMOs in
Michigan has created a “market for schooling” (Arsen, Plank, Sykes 2002; Henig,
Holyoke, Lacireno—Paquet, Moser 2003).

In addition to changing how education is delivered and the types of services
provided to students, EMOs have also redeﬁned the political role of schools both in the
community and in the larger policy environment. Henig et a1. (2003) report that charter
schools do not simply act as producers in an education market, but they have also become
major political actors. According to Henig et al. (2003):

In addition to market responses to supply and demand signals, they engaged in

political collective action to advance a public policy agenda to reshape the market

environment at multiple levels of government. The very act of making strategic
lobbying decisions regarding the appropriate venue for this political action

raises the question whether charter schools have decided that their best shot at a

124

viable future may come from changing this environment, not from changing

themselves. (p.51)

Charters and the EMOs have changed the internal dynamic between charter schools,
traditional schools, districts, and policymakers. Schools are no longer automatically seen
as creatures of the local community. Nor are they insulated from the larger policy
environment as they have been in the past. Traditional schools must decide whether or
not they will become active participants in this emerging system as they face both market
and political competition from charter schools.

The concentration of charter schools in urban areas and central cities has also
played a signiﬁcant role in redeﬁning traditional political coalitions. The fact that the
largest number of charter schools exist in Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing, and Flint gives
evidence of the key role played by urban and minority political and religious leaders in
the emerging charter school coalition. Dissatisﬁed with the condition of public education
in their city, a number of African-American leaders joined conservative Republicans in
becoming strong advocates for charter schools. For example, the original charter school
legislation introduced in the Michigan House of Representatives was favored by only
ﬁﬂeen Democrats - four of whom were from Detroit. The charter 'school movement also
gained important support from a group of Detroit ministers”.

The practical impact of such shifting coalitions can be observed in the on going
debate in the Michigan Legislature over efforts to raise the cap on the number of charter
schools that can be chartered by Michigan universities. Reverend Ellis Smith, pastor of

Jubilee Christian Church in Detroit strongly argued that what Detroit needed was more

 

2" For a more in-depth discussion about the signiﬁcant role that Black ministers play in local
politics see Henig, Hula et.al. (1999). The Color of School Reform. Princeton University Press.

125

charter schools. “Detroit needs more than a token new charter school per year. When the
demand exists among any children, no matter what their upbringing or where they live,
they need to have educational options such as charters” (Smith, E., 2002). In order to
show his continuing commitment to charter school expansion, Reverend Ellis Smith
joined President Bush in Washington DC. to celebrate National Charter School Week in
May 2002. Of course, not everyone in Detroit saw charter schools as a way to improve
public education. On September 25, 2003 classes were canceled for all Detroit Public
School students as their teachers joined a Detroit Federation of Teachers rally to express
opposition to more charter schools. The president of the 12,500-member teachers union,
Janna Garrison, said: “Our neighborhood schools cannot be sacriﬁced for a select few to
have a better opportunity.” “Our goal is very simple. It's standing up for our children."
(Associated Press, 2003) Once again, however, the traditional centers of power in local
education were unable to win the day. Although traditional education advocates have
been eclipsed by a new coalition of actors in the school choice debate, it is unclear how
general this restructuring is. In order to assess the stability and limitations of this

restructuring, a closer look at education reform in Detroit is necessary.

Detroit: The Successes and Limitations of Restructuring

While Detroit politics are often unique to the city, it does provide an interesting
case study of how charter school policy has changed traditional education coalitions and
how such changes have had a long-term impact on local politics. A variety of indicators,
including media analysis and public opinion data support the view that charter schools

have had a signiﬁcant impact in Detroit. Indeed, Detroit appears to have the highest

126

levels of support and demand for charter schools. At the same time, some of the strongest
resistance to charter schools also comes from Detroit public school teachers and the
Detroit Federation of Teachers (DTF). Detroit’s charter school story is similar to the state
as a whole. Strong opposition by traditional education coalitions has been severely
undermined by a powerful new alliance of minority residents, community advocacy
groups, the local business community, and urban Democrats.

This ﬁnding is most signiﬁcant considering the historical patterns of power in
Detroit surrounding education. Heni g, Hula, et. a1. (1. 999), in their study of school reform
in Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, and Washington DC. assert, “Teachers unions have been a
signiﬁcant forces in school politics since the later 19605 and early 19705” (p.127). More
speciﬁcally, in Detroit, unions have played a powerful role in city politics.

“Detroit is the birthplace of industrial unionism, and the power of unions is still felt
throughout the city. The schools are no exception ...... school employee unions form a
major force in setting education policy” ( Henig, Hula, et. a1, 1999, p.130). The Detroit
Federation of Teachers (DTF) has been the primary union player and former union
president, John Elliott, was the “undisputed education labor leader in Detroit” (Heni g,
Hula, et. al, 1999, p. 130).

In his case study of urban education in Detroit, Jeffrey Mirel (2004) supports this
claim. He argues that there are two groups in Detroit that have had signiﬁcant inﬂuence
in education politics: the Detroit Federal of Teachers and African American politicians.
Describing the Detroit Federation of Teachers, Mirel notes that, “ Although the union did
not win all of its battles, it was clear in the 1980s and 19905 that nothing would be

accomplished, either ﬁnancially or educationally without the agreement of the union”

127

(p.122). Mirel goes on to note that African Americans came to enjoy a great deal of
political power during this same time period. According to Mirel (2004), “Beginning in
1981, when John Elliott became the ﬁrst African American president of the DFT,
virtually every major local ﬁgure involved in educational issues were African American”
(p.122). These two groups came to deﬁne Detroit politics, that is until the early 19905.

As noted, several key political developments occurred in the 19905 that
completely restructured educational alliances. This is particularly clear in Detroit. With
the passage of Proposal A, which changed the distribution of education funding between
the state and local government, the responsibility for schools changed hands. Cities, like
Detroit, became completely dependent on state funding for local schools. This shift in
power not only redeﬁned the relationship between state and local govermnents, but it also
negatively impacted the power of teachers unions. A5 Mirel (2004) explains, “School
ﬁnance reform essentially ended what had become a routine pattern in DF T and Detroit
School Board relations; teachers demanding, and then striking, for raises, followed by
new mileage elections to pay for the increases” (p. 126). By shifting the source of ﬁtnding
from local property taxes to state sales tax, the union’s ability to petition local
government for increases was eliminated. With this, local educators also lost their power
to negotiate in order to better their situation. This was the ﬁrst step towards
disempowering the local educational establishment.

While the Detroit educational establishment vigorously resisted the charter school
movement, allegations of corruption and mismanagement in Detroit schools further
undermined their efforts. For example, in 1994 Detroit voters passed a $1.5 billion bond

initiative to ﬁx Detroit’s deteriorating school and build a dozen new schools. However,

128

after a few years little of the money had been spent and reports indicated that the bond
was grossly mismanaged. Following the bond controversy and several attempts to rectify
it through the hiring of new superintendents and through the election of new board
members, nothing was resolved. In response to the growing dissatisfaction and distrust of
Detroit Public Schools, Governor John Engler, with the support of Detroit’s Mayor
Dennis Archer, proposed and implemented Public Act 10. This act legislated a mayoral
takeover of Detroit Public Schools.

The takeover of Detroit schools was yet another shift in local power and
realignment in political alliances. This restructuring was further solidiﬁed in 2002 when
Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick joined forces with Governor Engler to propose ﬁfteen
new charter high schools in Detroit. This proposal was backed by a coalition of Detroit
business and community leaders, including philanthropist Robert Thompson, of the
Thompson Foundation David Bing, a former NBA player, who agreed to pay for the
charter schools, the Urban League and the NAACP. Once again efforts to expand charter
schools were met by intense opposition on the part of the MEA, DFT, and Detroit Public
Schools. In 2003, without the support of new Governor Jennifer Granholm, the
legislature passed legislation allowing the charter high schools in Detroit, and in 2006
Grand Valley State University authorized charters for those schools. This is yet another
striking example of how the traditional educational establishment and once powerful
teachers unions were unsuccessful in combating the new coalition of republicans, urban
democrats, the business community, and Aﬁican Americans.

With growing public dissatisfaction of public schools in Detroit residents

continued to look for and demand alternatives. A 1999 poll by the Detroit News found

129

that over 70% of Detroit residents were dissatisﬁed with the public schools their children
attended (Detroit News, February 21, 1999). A survey conducted by the Institute for
Public Policy and Social Research conﬁrms this ﬁnding that Detroit schools are graded
far worse than Michigan public schools in general. Detroit parents and students no
longer saw Detroit Public Schools as a viable educational option. Figure 5.1 below shows
how Michigan residents rate Detroit public schools compared to state schools overall.

Figure 5.1
Grading Schools in Detroit and Michigan

 

Percentage Grading an A or B

 

Detroit State

 

 

 

(Source: Plank D. (2001). School performance and accountability in Michigan.
Education Policy Center: Michigan State University).

What is clear from Figure 5.1 above is the low opinion of Detroit public schools as
compared to the rest of the public schools in Michigan. Less than half of those surveys
gave Detroit schools a passing grade, whereas 80% of public schools statewide are
perceived as performing above average.
Detroit Public Schools are falling apart. Students are ﬂeeing to the suburbs and
thousands are on charter school waiting lists, trapped in a system they don’t like

but can’t afford to leave. (Grand Rapids Press, August 27, 2005, A.12)

130

Claims of local corruption and mismanagement, and overall dissatisfaction with
public education in Detroit led many in the city to see charter schools as the only
effective alternative. This is evident in high levels of public support for charter in Detroit.
According to Angie Irwin of Central Michigan University’s charter school ofﬁce, “It’s
really hard to say why the majority of applications are for the Detroit area. Perhaps it’s
because the public schools in Detroit and the problems they’ve undergone. Parents are
looking for other educational options” (Grand Rapids Press, November 9, 2001, D.l).
Grand Valley State University has seen a similar pattern. Ed Richardson of Grand Valley
State explains, “We believe there is a high need in Detroit and want to be part of the
solution” (Grand Rapids Press, August 22, 2005, B4). This trend can be seen in
enrollment patterns in Detroit Public Schools versus charter schools as illustrated in
Figures 5.2 and 5.3

Figure 5.2
Enrollment Trends in Detroit Public Schools

 

Public School Enrollment 2001-2005
150000
148000
146000
144000 :
142000 E»
140000

Number of Students

138000

 

136000

2001 2005

 

Year

 

 

(Source: Michigan Center for Educational Performance and Information: Per Pupil Head

Count Data. Available at hgps/lwwwmiehigan.gov/cepi/O, 1607,7-1 13-
21423 30451 30460---,00.htm1.)

131

Figure 5.3
Enrollment Trends in Detroit Charter Schools

 

Charter school enrollment: 2001-2005

45000
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000

5000

 

Number of Students

 

2001 2005
Year

 

 

 

(Source: Michigan Center for Educational Performance and Information: Per Pupil Head
Count Data. Available at http://www.michigan.gov/cepi/0,1607,7-1 13-
21423 30451 30460---,00.html.)

 

As indicated in Figure 5.2 and 5.3, Detroit Public Schools have experienced a signiﬁcant
decline in enrollment since 2001, while charter school enrollment in Detroit has
continued to increase. This has resulted in a number of public school closures in Detroit,
while demand for more charter schools in Detroit remains.

High levels of public support for charter schools, demand for more charter
schools, particularly in Detroit, and the recent success by the Michigan Legislature in
passing legislation to allow ﬁfteen charter high schools in Detroit are all indicators that
charter schools have become a permanent part of public education in Michigan. While the
traditional educational establishment has enjoyed minor victories, overall their efforts
have been undermined by the cooperation between republicans, urban democrats,

minorities, and the business community. The once impenetrable teachers unions and

132

traditional public education coalition have been disempowered by a new coalition. This
restructuring has a substantive impact on local politics, particularly as debate continues
about lifting the charter school cap.

While efforts to generalize ﬁndings from the charter experience to other policy
areas is problematic and needs to be viewed with some skepticism, there are some
interesting conclusions that can be drawn from this case study. In general, this research
has shown that regime change is possible through institutional transformation.
Speciﬁcally, the research presented here provides evidence of the following:

0 There is an observable change in the institutional arrangements in pubic
education.

0 There is an observable change in how charter schools are deﬁned and discussed
over time.

0 There is an observable change in who is involved in and empowered through the
charter school debate, and who is excluded and disempowered.

0 Public opinion has played a signiﬁcant role in the charter school movement but in
ways that challenge traditional patterns of support.

0 Changes in educational institutions, how choice is deﬁned, who is involved, and

public support has lead to more substantive policy outcomes.

The charter school movement in Michigan has shown that institution building can be
used to bypass the traditional educational regime in order to reshape and regulate
education policy. This research provides an example of how such institution building can
be used as a tool to regulate policy and reshape the political landscape. Such ﬁndings

have signiﬁcant implications beyond the classroom, schools, and education policy. It

133

introduces institution building as a potential strategy for facilitating regime change,
redeﬁning policy, and inﬂuencing policy outcomes.

There are, of course, important limitations to those ﬁndings. While the changes
discussed above hold true when applied to the charter school movement in Michigan,
they have not necessarily been applied to all school choice initiatives. Although
traditional education advocates have been eclipsed by a new coalition of actors in the
school choice debate, it is unclear how far reaching this restructuring is. For example, a
voucher movement in Michigan shows the limitations of this new coalition. In 2000,
Michigan residents were asked to implement a public voucher program (Proposal 00-1)
targeted at students in failing schools. Proposal 00-1 would have amended the Michigan
Constitution in order to permit public vouchers for students in qualiﬁed or approved
districts to attend nonpublic schools. The proposal was overwhelming defeated on the
November 7, 2000 ballot by a margin of 2: 1.

While a number of school choice opponents have argued that charter schools are
the ﬁrst step towards vouchers or towards the privatization of education that has not been
the case in Michigan. Voucher supports have attempted to frame their claims for school
vouchers in language similar to those supporting charters. For the most part, public
support for vouchers, according to survey data, has followed that of charter school

support. Table 5.1 provides an overview of public opinion data on vouchers in Michigan.

134

Table 5.1: Public Support for Vouchers in Michigan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Support Oppose
Overall 59% 37%
Region
Urban 62% 3 1 %
Rural 59% 36%
Race
Black 65% 28%
White 57% 39%
Party Identiﬁcation
Republican 66% 33%
Democrat 54% 4%

 

(Source: Institute for Public Policy & Social Research. Public Opinion on K-12
Education in Michigan. Brief Paper No.98-36; May, 1998)

As with charter schools, the majority of those surveyed support the idea of vouchers.
There was also little regional variation for support. Partisan support followed a similar
patter with Republicans supporting vouchers more than Democrats. Where there is some
variation is with race. There is more differentiation in support for vouchers by race, with
African Americans supporting vouchers at a higher rate than whites.

However, while vouchers shared the same levels and types of support as charter
schools, the voucher movement was not able to bring together the same winning political
coalition that has propelled the charter school movement. This suggests that there are
limits to the observed restructuring that need to be further explored. In particular, is there
a speciﬁc mix of actors that has to be in place in order to create a successful governing
regime? Also, are there institutional limits on what the public will support? For example,
charter schools are still public schools, while vouchers include private schools. There

may be public versus private institutional constraints that need to be further explored.

135

 

There is initial evidence that this restructuring does apply to other policy areas. As
indicated by Hula and Haring (2006)1 a similar pattern of institutional and regime change
is found in examining Brownﬁeld Redevelopment policy in Michigan. Since the mid-
19905 Michigan has been considered a leader in promoting brownﬁeld clean up efforts.
With the creation of Brownﬁeld Redevelopment Authorities (BRA) in 1996 and their
rapid growth in the following years, a new set of local political institutions emerged. For
example, in the ﬁrst year of Michigan’s Brownﬁeld Redevelopment program only one
BRA was established. However, by 2006 254 eligible jurisdictions created BRAs (p. 14).
Beyond the creation of new institutional arrangements within environmental policy, the
most signiﬁcant ﬁnding is the impact on local politics and political coalitions. Michigan’s
Brownﬁeld initiative elicited cooperation from a group of democratic mayors from the
state’s core cities and then Republican Governor John Engler. By linking redevelopment
to clean up goals, Governor Engler garnered the support of agricultural interests as a way
of reducing development of agricultural land. According to Governor Engler:

The cornerstone of any urban revitalization strategy must be an aggressive

brownﬁeld redevelopment program. We have made brownﬁelds attractive

by reforming the cleanup laws and offering tax credits and low interest

loans to our communities. More than anything, our success comes from

making brownﬁeld redevelopment a top economic and environmental

priority in the state of Michigan. (Consumers Renaissance Redevelopment

Corporation, 1998)

 

' Haring, C. L. and Hula, R. (2006, Apr) "State Restructuring of Local Policy Regimes.”
Presented as the annual meeting, Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago Illinois.
(Unpublished manuscript)

136

New Institutional Arrangements as a Tool for Regime Change

The charter school movement in Michigan is examined in this research as an
example of how charter school policy was used as a tool by policy actors to restructure
the local education landscape. Through institution building, external actors were able to
empower a new set of policy actors and build a new governing coalition while, at the
same time, dismantling the traditional education regime. As Baumgartner and Jones
( 1993) describe, “actors who don’t like the policies being developed or how they are
discussed seek to alter the institutional arrangements in order to expand or contract
subsystem membership” (p.89). The outcomes of this restructuring have signiﬁcant
implications for understanding policy and regime change.

Through the creation of new institutional arrangements, the powerful linkage
between unions and education politics was broken. The charter school movement
represents the ﬁrst successful challenge to union opposition and continues to pose a threat
to union strength (as most charter schools are not unionized). These new institutions also
introduced a new set of actors in education policy, most notably for-proﬁt educational
management organizations, business organizations, and colleges and universities. Instead
of working with the existing structure with the traditional actors, state policymakers
bypassed local educators, schools, districts, associations, and unions and established a
new set of institutions, actors, and rules. These new institutions allowed external actors to
interpret and deﬁne inﬂuence public discourse surrounding charter schools. As charter
schools have become a permanent ﬁxture in Michigan, the issues that deﬁne them have
changed. What has remained constant though is public support and demand for charter

schools.

137

The charter schools movement in Michigan offers empirical evidence of authentic
policy and regime change. The changes noted in this research have long—term,
substantive outcomes. While this research is limited to one policy area in one state, there
is antidotal evidence that is applicable across policy issues and across states. There are,
however, limits to this restructuring, as illustrated through the school voucher initiative.

These limits need to be further explored.

138

APPENDICES

139

APPENDIX A
STATE OF THE STATE SURVEY QUESTIONS
$088 26, SUMMER 2002

140

ideology

PCT N VALUE LABEL
0.0 O 0 other
12.6 109 1 very conservative
32.4 281 2 somewhat conservative
17.3 149 3 lean conservative
7.9 69 4 middle
15 .9 138 5 lean liberal
9.5 82 6 somewhat liberal
4.3 37 7 very liberal

20 8 do not know

22 9 refused

26 . not Applicable

933 cases

POl Rate Bush — Overall

Overall, how would you rate the way George W. Bush is performing his job
as President — would you say excellent, good, fair, or poor?

PCT N VALUE LABEL

24.8 230 1 excellent
44.4 411 2 good
20.5 190 3 fair
10.3 96 4 poor
3 8 do not know
3 9 refused
933 cases

P02 Rate John Engler

Next, just a couple questions about our elected ofﬁcials and how things
are going for Michigan resident’s in general.

How would you rate the way John Engler is performing his job as Michigan’s
governor?

(Would you say excellent, good, fair, or poor)?

PCT N VALUE LABEL

141

10.7 98
39.5 364
27.9 257
21.9 202
7
3

933 cases

\OOO-DUJNr—

ED 12a Statewide Standards

exceHent
good

ﬁnr

poor

do not know
refused

Next, I’d like to read you a couple of statements and have you tell me
whether you strongly agree, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or
strongly disagree with the statement.

Children in my school district should be learning the same things as
children in other states so they can better compete for the jobs they

want.

Would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or
strongly disagree with the statement?

PCT N
53.8 492
35.5 325
0.1 l
8.6 78
2.1 19
ll
6

933 cases

VALUE

1
2
3
4
5
8
9

ED4a Grade Local School

LABEL

strongly agree
somewhat agree
neither

somewhat disagree
strongly disagree
don’t know
refused

Students are often given the grades, A, B, C, D, and F as well as a plus
or minus to indicate the quality of their work. Suppose the public
schools in your community were graded in the same way.

What grade would you give your local public schools?

PCT
2.2
18.2
3.0
8.8

N
18
151
25
73

VALUE
1

2
3
4

LABEL
A+

A

A-

B+

142

E4

31.6 262 5 B
3.9 32 6 B-
2.2 18 7 C+
18.5 153 8 C
1.8 15 9 C-
0.4 3 10 D+
5.5 46 1 l D
0.9 8 12 D-
3.0 25 13 F
96 98 don’t know
7 99 refused
933 cases
Favor/Oppose Charter Schools

Charter schools are independent public schools that are free from many of
the regulations placed on traditional public schools. Charter schools can
be organized by anyone, as long as they receive approval from a public
sponsor such as a school district or a university.

Do you favor or oppose charter schools in Michigan?

PCT N VALUE LABEL
72.1 589 I favor
27.9 227 5 oppose
103 8 do not know
13 9 reﬁrsed
933 cases

143

APPENDIX B
STATE OF THE STATE SURVEY QUESTIONS
$088 38, SPRING 2005

144

e4 Favor/ Oppose Charter Schools

Charter schools are independent public schools that are free from many of the
regulations placed on traditional public schools. Charter schools can be organized
by anyone, as long as they receive approval from a public sponsor such as a
school district or a university. Do you favor or oppose charter schools in

Michigan?
PCT N VALUE LABEL
60.6 536 I favor
12.9 1 l4 3 indifferent
26.5 234 5 oppose
56 8 do not know
8 9 refused

145

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146

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