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ALBANIAN MIGRANTS: EARNING A LIVING AND BUILDING A LIFE IN
GREECE

By

BRIKENA BALLI

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Sociology

2009

ABSTRACT

ALBANIAN MIGRANTS: EARNING A LIVING AND BUILDING A LIFE IN
GREECE

By

BRIKENA BALLI

The collapse of the communist system, along with the transition from a centrally-
planned to a market economy, triggered large-scale immigration from Albania to the
countries of Western Europe. During its four decades of communist rule (1945-1990), the
government of Albania imposed one of the strictest migration controls in the whole
former communist bloc, and perhaps in the world. Any attempt to leave the country
without prior authorization would be met with severe punishment, such as imprisonment
and forced labor from ten to twenty four years and, in some cases, even with capital
punishment. This state of no migration would come to an end in the 19903, when the
authoritarian regime in Albania, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, collapsed fostering a
large-scale flight of Albanians to Western countries, in particular Greece, where
Albanians are the by far the largest migrant group.

The establishment and development of migration from Albania present a unique
opportunity for scholars of migration for several reasons:

Migration from Albania is a new kind of migration: that from a country of the
former Eastern bloc to the capitalist countries of the West. There are few studies done in
this area. In addition, Albanian migration started out as forced migration and over time
was transformed into normal labor migration. Thus, migration from Albania will provide

us with the opportunity to examine the establishment and normalization of migrations

from former Eastern European countries to Western Europe, as well as the opportunity to
examine the transformation process of forced migration to labor migrations.

In addition, due to the isolation from the outside world, Albania to a greater extent
than any other societies of former communist bloc, was left behind its capitalist neighbors
technologically. As a result of this, Albanians lacked the skills required in a modern
capitalist society. The movement of a people from the least technologically developed
country in Europe, and the most isolated country of the former communist bloc, to the
industrialized capitalist democracies of the West creates challenges for immigrants as
they try to adapt to their host societies. Thus, Albanian migation provides scholars with
the opportunity to understand the human drama element in transition from a former
communist society to a Western capitalist society, which comprises one of the most
significant gaps in the European literature of migration.

In the light of these circumstances, the goals of this study will be framed on two
levels, more specific and more general: On a more specific level, this study examines
Albanian migrants’ experiences as they build their lives in one of the countries of the
West, namely Greece. These experiences will include motives for exit as well as
experiences in the Greek labor market. On a more general level, this research examines
the forces that underlie the process of perpetuation of migration and its transformation
from forced migration to labor migration. The research is based on 64 in-depth (face-to

face and telephone) interviews with Albanian migrants who live and work in Greece.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my special thanks and gratitude to my adviser Dr. Steven
J. Gold for his support and encouragement during all stages of my dissertation. I would
also like to thank all other members of my committee: Dr. Rene Rosenbaum, Dr. Toby
Ten Eyck, Dr. Tom Conner for their special contribution and valuable insights.

I also wish to express my gratitude to all those immigrants who gave their time
and shared their stories with me. In particular, I would like to thank Vladimir Prifti for
his invaluable help. Without his assistance this dissertation would have been impossible.

Special thanks go to Scott Barnes for reading, editing all chapters of this
dissertation, as well as providing insightful comments. I am thankfirl to my sister, too for
her support and understanding throughout my entire career as a graduate student.

Finally, a special thanks to my parents for their support, assistance and encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................... iv
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Introduction to the Study .................................................. 1
Structure of the Dissertation ............................................... 7

CHAPTERZ: LITERATURE REVIEW

Motivations to Migrate: Understanding Albanian Migration .......... 9
Refugees vs. Migrants ........................................................ 9
Scholarship on Motivations and Labor Migration Studies ............. 13
Scholarship on Motivations and Forced Migration ...................... 16
Motivation Literature and Albanian Migration ........................... 21
Role of the State in Migration ............................................... 24
Perpetuation of Migration and Transformation from Forced

Migration to Labor Migration ................................................ 30
Social Networks and Cumulative Causation of Migration ............... 30
The State and Legalization of Foreign Workers ........................... 35
Labor Market Incorporation of Immigrants ................................. 37
Gender and Labor Market Outcomes ........................................ 44
Albanian Immigrants: Labor Market Experience .......................... 49

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodology .................................................................... 59
Analysis of Data ............................................................... 66

CHAPTER 4: MOTIVATIONS AND MEANS OF LEAVING THE
COUNTRY: UNDERSTANDING ALBANIAN MIGRATION

Daily Life under the Communist Regime .................................. 72
Motives and Means of Leaving .............................................. 76
Images of Greece before Leaving ............................................ 76
Motives of Leaving ............................................................. 78
Role of the Authoritarian Albanian State in Controlling Migration... 82
Immigration Prior to the Communist Rule .................................. 83
The Communist Period and Migration ...................................... 84
Ways and Means of Coming to Greece ...................................... 103

CHAPTER 5: TRANSFORMATION OF ALBANIAN IMMIGRANTS:
FROM FORCED, ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS TO LEGAL

LABOR IMMIGRANTS
Social Networks and Perpetuation of Migration ........................... 109
Greece’s Migration Policies in Transforming Forced Immigrants to
Legal Immigrants ............................................................... 118

Why did Greece adopt one of the most liberal legalization policies in
Europe? ............................................................................................... 124

CHAPTER 6: EARNING A LIVING: EXPERIENCES IN THE GREEK
LABOR MARKET

Employment Concentration .................................................... 134
Immigrants’ New Experiences ................................................. 136
Finding Jobs ...................................................................... 1 51
Legal Status, Discrimination, Exploitation, and the Impact on

Immigrants ........................................................................ 1 56
Gender and Labor Market Experiences ....................................... 164

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Conclusions ...................................................................... 1 81

Contributions and Limitations ................................................ 189
APPENDICES

Appendix A: Interview Questions: Summer 2006 .......................... 192

Appendix B: Map of Greece ................................................... 194
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................ 195

vi

 

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: List of All Participants in the Study ........................................ 68

vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Introduction to the Study

The fall of the communist system, along with the transition from a centrally-
planned to a market oriented economy has produced massive migration of people from
Eastern to Western Europe. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Albania, a
country which in a space of a little over one decade has gone from having no emigration
to one in which 20% of its citizens live abroad. This makes Albania the world’s most
dramatic example of mass migration in recent times (King 2003: 119).

Migration from Albania, like the rest of Eastern Europe, is deeply embedded in
the process of transformation from a command to a market economy. During four
decades of communist rule (1945-1990), the government of Albania imposed one of the
strictest migration control in the whole former communist bloc, and perhaps in the world.
This state of no migration would come to an end in the 19903, when the dictatorial
regime in Albania, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, collapsed fostering a large-scale flight
of Albanians to Western countries. In the years to come, an unprecedented number of
Albanians would leave the country and move to the industrialized countries of the West.
The largest number of immigrants (443.550) would go to Greece, where Albanians are by
far the largest migrant group (Immigrant Census GR 2001), and Italy, where at 401.915,
Albanians constitute the second largest immigrant group (Caritas 2008).

The establishment and development of migration from Albania present a unique

opportunity for scholars of migration for several reasons:

 

Migration from Albania is a new kind of migration: that from a country of the
former Eastern bloc to the capitalist countries of the West. There are few (see for
example Markowitz 1993; Gold 1995; Orleck 1999; Remmenick 2007 for research on
Jews from the former Soviet countries) studies done in this area. In addition, Albanian
migration started out as forced migration and over time was transformed into normal
labor migration. Thus, rrrigration from Albania will provide us with the opportunity to
examine the establishment and normalization of migrations from former Eastern
European countries to Western Europe as well as the opportunity to examine the
transformation process of forced migration to labor migrations.

In addition, as previously mentioned, for forty years the communist government
of Albania had adopted the strictest entry and exit controls, even by comparison to other
communist bloc countries. Any attempt to leave the country without prior authorization,
which was impossible to obtain for the overwhelming majority of Albanians, would
result in imprisonment and forced labor from ten to twenty four years and, in some cases,
even with capital punishment (Hein 1998: 224). The result of this would be generations
of Albanians who have no experience with international migration. Moreover, due to the
isolation from the outside world, Albania, to a greater extent than any other societies of
former communist bloc, was left behind its capitalist neighbors technologically. As a
result of this, Albanians lacked the skills required in a modern capitalist society. The
movement of a people from the least technologically developed country in Europe, and
the most isolated country of the former communist block, to the industrialized capitalist
democracies of the West creates challenges for immigrants as they try to adapt to their

host societies. Thus, Albanian migration provides scholars with the opportunity to

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understand the human drama element in transition from a former communist society to a
Western capitalist society, which comprises one of the most significant gaps in the
European literature of migration.
In the light of these circumstances, the goals of this study will be framed on two levels:
more specific and more general:

On a more specific level, this study examines Albanian migrants’ experiences as
they build their lives in one of the countries of the West, namely Greece. The question
will be what happens when workers who lack the experience with a modern
industrialized economy, and a history of migration, become migrant workers? These
experiences will include motives for exit as well as experiences in the Greek labor
market.

Analyses of motives of exit are critical to understanding migrants’ experience,
since the decision to migrate is one of the most important decisions one makes in one’s
life time (Gold 1997). Besides, analysis of migrants’ motives provides us with an
understanding of the nature of migration in general. Thus far, studies have attempted to
explain migrants’ motives through micro, meso as well as macro perspectives. Micro
perspectives underscores individual’s willingness to optimize wages as a motive for
leaving (Harris and Todaro 1970; Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1969; 1976). Meso perspectives
highlight membership in a web of social networks that influences people’s decision to
move (Gold 2001). Macro approaches, on the other hand, underscore historical,
structural, economic, political and social forces that shape people’s motivations to move
to another country (Petras 1981; Portes and Borocz 1989; Sassen, 1981, 1988). While

these theoretical perspectives are significant in explaining migrants’ motives, they are

still incapable of fully elucidating the case of Albanian migrants. I contend that a full
understanding of Albanian migrants’ motives to leave need to take into analysis the role
of the Albanian communist state. Within this fiamework, I argue that the authoritarian
government of Albania, through its decisions of limiting economic development and
prohibiting immigration, created the very conditions for the current immigration climate.
Its deterioration and its final collapse, however, unleashed large-scale migration waves
from Albania to the countries of the West.

As noted earlier, the study of Albanians’ adaptation in the Greek labor market is
another goal of this dissertation. Existing theoretical models (i.e., assimilationist, human
capital, economic restructuring, segmented labor market, ethnic entrepreneurship,
informal economy) have established a rich literature one can draw upon to explain
migrants’ economic adaptation patterns. Yet, their significance is limited in that these
models have largely developed in the context of settler societies (i.e., United States,
Canada), countries with a long history of immigration, as well as societies of Northern
Europe who received millions of guestworkers. Albanians, on the other hand, move to
Greece, a country that was, for a long time, a country of emigration. More importantly,
however, I argue that in order to fully understand Albanians’ experiences in the labor
market in Greece, we need to examine the economic environment of their socialist past.
Indeed, Albanians, like their Eastern European counterparts (see Gold 1995) grew up in a
system, in which having a job was a state guaranteed social right. The process of looking
for a job, and the fear of losing a job, was virtually nonexistent. In Greece, however, for
the first time in their lives, these immigrants will encounter a free market economic

environment, in which job insecurity, and job instability, are a reality of daily life. These

 

new realities present unique challenges to Albanian immigrants. These experiences will
be examined along the lines of gender, ethnicity, and pre-migration social status
background.

On a more general level, my research examines the forces that underlie the
process of perpetuation of migration and its transformation from forced migration to
labor migration. I set out to carry out this task, first, by looking at the social forces that
sustain immigration and secondly, by investigating social forces that normalize
migration.

The examination of the mechanisms that underlie the perpetuation and
normalization of forced migration has been largely ignored in the scholarship of
migration. The existing scholarly work, in particular those that focus on North American
migration, and to a lesser extent research on European migration, have explored the
perpetuation of labor migration streams only. These studies have indicated that social
networks and cumulative causation of migration are two major social mechanisms
responsible for the continuation and perpetuation of migration (Massey et a1. 1987; 1993;
1994b; 1998). Albanian immigrants, given the condition of their exit (i.e., poverty,
insecurity, the fear of descent into anarchy) were forced migrants. In addition, while
Albanian state created the conditions of migration, successive Albanian governments, on
both sides of political spectrum, were not involved in migration at all, yet immigration
sustained itself and took on massive proportions. Drawing upon the work of Massey and
his colleagues (Massey et a1. 1987; 1993; 1994b; 1998), I argue that similar forces are

responsible for the perpetuation and promotion of Albanian immigration.

 

The sudden arrival of a large number of Albanians turned Greece from a
previously emigration country into a country of immigration. Its institutions, therefore,
were largely unprepared to respond to these new realities. Given the nature (illegal
crossing of the border, fraudulent visas and other documents, overstaying the visas) of
immigrants’ arrival to Greece, and an initial slow reaction on the part of Greek
government to respond to these situation, for about a decade or so, hundreds and
thousands of Albanian immigrants remained under the conditions of illegality.
Eventually, however, Greece, decided to address the new and pressing situation of having
such a large number of illegal aliens in its own borders. It did so by formulating and
implementing a series of amnesty programs, in which a large number of immigrants
obtained legal status. Thus, it should be said that while social infrastructure sustains and
promote migration, it was the Greek govemment’s immigration measures who
transformed hundreds and thousands of Albanian immigrants fi'om forced, illegal
immigrants into legal, labor immigrants.

The focus of this study are migrants from Albania. Data for this research study
were collected over the time of Summer 2006 until Summer 2007. For this research, two
kinds of qualitative interviews were used: face to face and telephone interviews. The
overwhelming majority of the latter data were collected using telephone interviews with
migrants in various parts of Greece (Thessalonikis, Athens and Crete), which is a very
useful instrument of data collection, given dispersed geographic locations of these

immigrants.

VT Ti'rfl_u—-w

In the light of the above mentioned review, the Main Research Questions for this
Dissertation are:

What are the forces that establish the migration from Albania?

I answer this question by looking at the motivations of Albanians and providing a macro
explanation for shaping the motivations

How is forced migration perpetuated and turned into labor migration?

I address this question by looking at the role of networks and cumulative causation of
migration as well as the role of the receiving state’s immigration policies.

What are the experiences of Albanians in the Greek labor market? How is it different
fiom their past? How is the experience of men different from women?

This question in answered through various ways: by asking them about their work
experience under communism and, secondly, asking about their work experience in the
labor market in Greece (i.e. how did you find jobs, what was the most difficult experience

they have encountered while trying to find jobs in Greece?)

Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter one maps out the theoretical
and empirical objectives that guide this study. Chapter two provides a review of the
literature, while in chapter three I lay out the research methodology used in this research
work. In chapter four, I provide a brief narration of daily life under the communist
regime. In addition, the chapter provides an analyses of Albanian migrants’ motivations
for leaving the country as well as the ways and means of undertaking their journey to

Greece. Chapter five examines social mechanisms that sustain and promote immigration

 

from Albania as well as the forces that underlie the transformation from forced, illegal
migration to legal, labor migration. Chapter six concerns labor market experiences of
Albanian migrants in Greece. It highlights how the past economic environment impacts
their working experiences in Greece. Chapter seven draws on conclusions of this research
work. It provides a summary of the findings of this dissertation. In addition it presents

the contributions and limitations of the study.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review for this dissertation will look at the scholarly work on
experiences of migrants, which, as stated in Chapter one, include motivations of exit and
experiences in the labor market. In addition, the literature on the perpetuation and
transformation of migration from forced migration to labor migration will examine the
social forces that underlie this process. For each part of the literature, I will point to the
gaps in the literature in order to outline the basis for addressing my research questions.

There will be several sections in this chapter: The first section presents a review
of the existing literature on the analysis of migrants’ motivation. The second highlights
existing scholarship on the main social mechanisms of perpetuation and transformation of
migration. This will be followed (third section) by an overview of the major approaches
in the scholarship on the incorporation of immigrants in host societies’ labor market. In
the end of the chapter, I present the main research questions that this project is trying to

address.

Motivations to Migrate: Understanding Albanian Migration
Refugees vs. Migrants
In general the academic literature and governments’ policies in the West have
looked at migration in terms of a dichotomy of social groups: “political” (refugees) and
“economic” immigrants. In this view, political refugees are those who leave to settle for
another country out of fear of persecution (Zucker and Zucker 1996: 3), and whose exit is

involuntary, while economic migrants, move to other countries for “economic reasons”

(i.e., better job opportimities, better wages, improving one’s life), and unlike refugees,
they leave their country on their own volition. Various scholars, however, disagree with
this kind of categorization. For Van Hear (1998: 42), for example, the “voluntary-
involuntary” categories may be misleading, in particular if they are conceived as discrete
(see Richmond 1994 too). Few migrants are wholly voluntary or involuntary. All
migrations involve some kind of compulsion as well as some choices. Economic migrants
make choices, but within certain constraints. Forced migrants also make choices within a
narrower range of possibilities, but even in the most desperate of situations, people make
some choice, since some decide to leave, while others stay behind.

In view of these problems, scholars (Faist 2000; Richmond 1994; Van Hear 1998)
have suggested that we see it as a continuum rather than as dichotomous categories.
Richmond (1994: 60) asserts that based on options available to migrants, they can be
placed on a continuum, from “proactive” to “reactive”. “Proactive” immigrants (i.e.,
retirees, transilients, returnees, reunited families and ordinary emigrants) have more
choice, while “reactive” immigrants (i.e., refugees, stateless persons and forced laborers)
have less or no choice, although, according to the author, there is no hard and fast line
dividing the two categories, even though proactive immigrants have more options open to
them. Van Hear (1998: 42) also conceives of migrants as lying on a continuum, with an
axis ranging from “choice” or “more options” (voluntary) at one end to “little choice” or
“few options” (involuntary) at the other end. The “more options” end comprises of
tourists, students, professionals as well as business travelers, while the “few options” end
includes refugees, displaced persons as a result of development and natural disasters.

Thus, the main variable of distinguishing is choice/option. Faist (2000: 24) argues that we

10

should look at the forced-voluntary distinction as a graded scale based on the degrees of
choice or freedom to potential emigrants, not as discrete categories.

Another group of scholars have underscored the difficulties of economic vs.
political dichotomy, in that it is difficult to separate economic from political factors in
migration (Castle 2003; Dowty 1987; Faist 2000; 2006; Kunz 1981; Menjivar 1993;
Portes and Bach 1985; Richmond 1994; Zucker and Zucker 1996). Dowty (1987: 183) for
example maintains that the so-called economic migrants often respond as much to
political repression as to material deprivation, in other words they have ‘mixed
motivations’ (Castle 2006: 9). Often individuals labeled political refirgees have been
found, on closer inspections, to have only economic reasons to migrate (Fortes and Bach
1985: 74). Furthermore, as Zucker and Zucker (1996: 82) have pointed out, refugee
flows are not a product of purely political forces only, since political instability itself
creates economic insecurity. For instance, the refugee flows from Nicaragua, Salvador
Guatemala, like those from Cuba and Haiti, were driven both by economic problems as
well as political turmoil. Menjivar (1993: 351) most aptly summarizes these blurred
boundaries between economic and political factors, when she writes, “if buses are
burned, bridges are blown up and people cannot go to work or school, or if the political
turmoil interferes with the means to earn a living, it becomes impossible to disentangle
political from economic reasons for migrating.”

Moreover, and most importantly, defining a group of immigrants as refugees is
based not only on the fact that they fled persecution or war-ridden zones, but also on
whether the receiving country recognizes them as deserving asylum and assistance

(Menjivar 2000 referring to Zolberg et al. 1989: 6). For example, during the Cold War,

11

ha l‘ju‘ .H‘Aw

the Western countries regarded people who escaped from the former communist
countries as “defectors,” a demonstration that Communist regimes lacked support
(Zolberg 1989: 414). Offering asylum to the escapee was a powerful source of
propaganda for the West, and the West could afford to welcome these “defectors”,
because only few were able to leave the countries (Castles and Miller 2003: 105). The fall
of the communist regime triggered large-scale movement of people, and as Zolberg
(1989: 414) would predict, it also lessened the propaganda value of ‘defection’, and
hence led to the treatment of people desiring to leave as ordinary immigrants.

Following the above logic, then, it could be argued that immigration from Albania
in its very original “bing bang” stage (Carletto et al., 2006), given the prevailing
conditions of economic plight, political instability, social unrest, and even extreme
circumstances of complete anarchy, and the fact that leaving the country was still
considered a criminal activity on the part of the government in power, was a forced
migration. Over time as Albania moved toward becoming more stable country, and with
the establishment of democratic rule, emigration took on massive proportions and
perpetuated itself in the form of labor migration. Exception here is the spring of 1997,
when a set of informal investment schemes, formally known as “pyramid schemes,”
which had sprang up in 1993 collapsed and millions of Albanians lost their life savings}.
The collapse of the pyramid schemes triggered wide protests, riots, even the looting of
military arsenals, causing the break down of law and order, leading to complete anarchy.

This situation sparked another wave of migration, reaching dramatic proportions within a

 

1The World Bank and IMF estimate the value of Albanians’ deposits lost in the pyramid schemes at $1.2
billion, the equivalent of half of Albanian’s GDP for 1996 (Olsen 2000: 24).

12

 

short period of timez, thus replaying the events that occurred in the early stages of
migration (King 2003: 288). The intensity of this situation, then, would give Albanian
migration a rather eclectic character. Barjaba and King (2005: 9-10) prefer the word
“economic refirgee” to highlight the inseparability of political from economic forces

underlying Albanian migration, especially in the early 1991 and the spring of 1997.

Scholarship on Motivations and Labor Migration Studies

The analysis of emigrants’ motives is crucial to understanding immigrants’
experience since the decision to move to another country is “one of the most drastic
social actions pe0ple may take during their lifetime” (Gold 1997: 410). In addition,
analysis of migration will provide us with an understanding of the nature of immigration
in general. According to Gold (2002), social scientists have attempted to explain
migrants’ motivation through three approaches: the micro or individual approach, the
macro or structural approach (world system theory) and the (meso) network approach.

Micro approaches argue that people undertake migration in response to the
differences in wages between the place of origin and destination. At the basis of people’s
motives to migrate lie individual’s goal to optimize his/her own income (Harris and
Todaro 1970; Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1969; 1976). Thus, according to this perspective,

people’s rational economic calculations are deemed to be the major factors that propel

people to emigrate.

 

2Only in a matter of six days in the early spring of 1997, 10,600 Albanians crossed the Adriatic Sea to land
in Italian ports (King 2003: 288). Between December 1996 and April 1997, alone, some 30,000 migrants
landed in Italy and some 40,000 entered Greece, the majority of whom, however, were repatriated (Martin
et al. 2002).

13

 

The macro sociological approaches, in particular the world system theory, the
most influential macro perspective, underscores large historical structural forces that
influence people’s decision to move to another country. More specifically, scholars in
this school of thought argue that contemporary immigration waves are a result of
socioeconomic, political, and cultural transformations that accompany the penetration of
capitalist markets into noncapitalist or precapitalist societies and the incorporation of
these societies into the global world-economy. In the context of globalization, the
penetration of markets and capital-intensive production technologies in noncapitalist
societies lead to the disruption of existing economic, social and institutional
arrangements. These changes, in turn, require many people to undertake their decisions
to move from their places and communities of origin to various places of destinations
(Massey 1988; Morawska 1990; Petras 1981; Portes and Walton 1981, Portes and
Borocz 1989; Sassen, 1981; 1988). In this model, then, migrants’ decisions are not seen
as the cause of international migration, but rather a result of much more fundamental
socio-economic and political changes (Stahl 1995: 212).

Closely related to this approach is Portes and Rurnbaut’s (1996: 12-13) argument
that contemporary immigration is a direct result of the dominant influence attained by the
culture of the advanced West. The diffusion of the Western culture of consumerism in
every corner of the globe creates expectations and aspirations for a new life-style that
would be impossible to fulfill in their countries of origin. The same process of global
diffusion has also taught increasing number of people about economic opportunities

available in the West, which would enable them to achieve their aspirations and

14

expectations. As a result of this, most of the people turn to migration to fulfill the dreams
for a new life-style.

The third approach focuses on social networks (to be discussed in details below).
This perspective emphasizes the ties that connect people and institutions between places
of origin and places of destination. Having ties to people who are migrants increases the
likelihood that one will migrate himself/herself (Massey and Espinoza 1997). Gold
(2001) for example showed how Israelis’ membership in the web of ties to people who
were immigrants in the United States influenced their motivation to leave Israel and
move to the United States.

In summary, we could say that scholars have attempted to explain ernigrant’s
motivation through three approaches: micro, macro and meso approaches. Micro
approaches highlight individuals’ desire to optimize their own income as a factor that
propels people to undertake migration to other countries. Macro approaches, on the other
hand, focuses on large historical, structural forces that shape people’s motives to
emigrate. The most influential of these, world system theory argues that contemporary
immigration is a result of penetration of capitalist markets into non capitalist ones and the
incorporation of these societies in the global economy. This process lead to disruption of
existing economic, social and institutional arrangements, which in turn encourage people
to move to other places. Some authors have argued that current immigration is a result of
the dominant influence attained by the diffusion of the culture of consumerism of the
capitalist West, which creates expectations among people that they cannot fulfill in their
countries of origin. Therefore, they turn to migration to realize their dreams. Finally,

social network perspective maintains that people’s motives to migrate are largely shaped

15

by their membership in the web of social ties. One’s ties to migrants increases the

likelihood that he/she will migrate.

Scholarship on Motivations and Forced Migration

The subject of mass exodus has been the focus of study by scholars and non
scholars alike of various disciplines, in particular political scientists. However, most of
the studies focus on the experiences and difficulties people encounter after they have
arrived in the host/asylum societies as well as efforts and challenges in assisting these
people, thus neglecting the explanation of the causes of these mass exoduses (Davenport
and Moore 2003: 29; Schmeidl 1997: 208). This is the case even with the discipline of
sociology, where one cannot find a developed body of empirical work and theory for this
particular area (Castles 2003: 14). The reason, in view of Schmeidl (1997: 285) may be
the fact that refugee flows have been considered a political phenomena and as a result,
their study have been largely neglected, or it may be that scholars believe that the
relationship between violence and migration is “simplistic and much less complex than
that between economic conditions and voluntary migration” (Davenport and Moore 2003:
29 referring to Massey et al., 1993).

While micro and macro perspectives have been advanced to try to understand
forces that shape forced migrants’ motives to flee the country, explanations in the macro
tradition have been, by far the dominant approaches in this particular field of scholarship.
Within micro approaches one can mention the work of Kunz (1973: 131-132), which is
among the earliest attempts among researchers to try to understand refugee movement.

Using “kinetic models,” the author distinguished between anticipatory and acute refugee

l6

movements. The anticipatory refugee is one who leaves his country of origin before the
situation in his country deteriorates. He is alert to the situation, and arrives in the host
country prepared. He knows the language and possesses some financial capital. By
contrast, acute refugee movements are a result of great political changes. The refugees
tend to flee either in mass or groups of individuals and their primary purpose is to reach
safety in the host society. The emphasis for this kind of immigrants is on escape from the
country of origin. The author also distinguishes between intermediate types of movement,
which embodies characteristics of both acute and anticipatory movements, such as the
examples among the Jewish refugees of the Second World War, when anticipatory
movements which led them to nearby countries, turned into acute refugee situations as
the receiving countries came under political or military pressure from Germany (Kunz
1973: 135). Kunz’s work, while rendering a significant contribution to the efforts of
explaining refugee behavior, places too much emphasis on individual behavior,
overlooking structural causes (Schmeidl 1995: 54).

Scholars in the macro perspective tradition highlight structural forces that underlie
people’s motives to flee the country. A group of researchers (Schneidl 1996; 1997, 2001;
Weiner 1996; Zolberg 1989) have maintained that intra-state conflicts are the most
important causes that motivate people’s exoduses from their countries. Zolberg, Suhrke
and Aguayo (1989: 236-245) identified four types of conflicts that generate refugee
flows. They include: explosion of ethnic hierarchies (i.e., social class coincides with
ethnic membership); target of minorities (i.e., when the state attempts to achieve a
national unity, and in the process forces minorities to assimilate into that unity);

communal conflict (i.e., conflict between social groups that are regionally concentrated or

17

 

spatially dispersed); separatism (i.e., regionally concentrated groups demand
independence from the center). These types of conflicts, often but not always3, entail
violence, therefore forcing masses of people to flee from violence. Weiner (1996) came
to the conclusion that secessionist or autonomous struggles as well as attacks against
ethnic minorities account for a large number of refugees. Schmeidl (200: 76) in her
quantitative analysis of data from UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees) and USCR (U .8. Committee for Refugees) found support for the argument that
intra—state conflicts in general and ethnic conflicts more specifically, increase the
likelihood of a refugee exodus.

Non ethnic conflicts", that is conflicts based upon “class, regional, or ideological
differences, or an armed struggle for political power by the military or by political
factions” (Weiner 1996: 10) can also force individuals to flee. Other forms of conflicts,
such as social revolutions that took place in Asia, Afiica and Latin America since the end
of World War II, as well as coups, countercoups and rebellions, can also lead to forced
movement of people (Zolberg et al., 1989).

Some researchers (Zolberg et al., 1989) have contended and empirical research
(Schmeidl 2001; Schmeidl 1997) has demonstrated that foreign intervention is also
important in the formation of refugee flows, not directly, but indirectly in the context of
civil war. Foreign intervention ranging from economic to military assistance (i.e., arms
trade; supply with weapons) has tended to prolong civil wars, which might have ended

for lack of resources (Schneidl 2001: 77-78).

 

3F or example demands for secessionism can also be realized peacefully, as the case of Quebec-Canada
indicates (Schmeidl 2001: 90).

4 . . . . . .

Schmeidl (2001: 75), however, contends that dIStlnCthIlS between “ethnrc” and “non-ethnic” may not be
as clear, since ethnic and civil conflicts often have their roots in the exclusion of groups from political
processes or in the excessive inequalities among groups.

18

1 I ’Ab? “RH-fl

More recently, Castle (2003; 2006) has suggested that forced migration must be
understood in the context of economic globalization and North-South divide.
Globalization as an unequal system of distribution of economic, social and political
resources creates and exacerbates economic, political and social inequality, as well as
human insecurity, the most significant expression of which is North-South divide.
Inequalities create conflict, which in turn forces people to flee.

Another group of authors have found a relationship between state/ government
sponsored repression and refugee flows. Studies by Adodaca (1998); Gibney, Apodaca
and McCann (1996); Hakovirta (1986); Moore and Shellman (2004); Schneidl (1996;
1997; 2001) have revealed that govemment/state sponsored human right violations were
responsible for refugee flows. Similarly, research has found a relationship between state-
initiated genocide/politicide5 and refugee flights (Davenport and Moore 2003; More and
Shellman 2004; Moore and Shellman 2006; Schmeidl 1996; Schmeidl 1997)6.

Keely (1996: 1056) places the source of refugee production in the nation-state. In
authors’ view, a nation-state tends to produce forced migration for three main reasons:

when the nation-state has many nations7 within its territories; when the public disagrees

 

5Genocide is extreme form of violence that target specific ethnic group. Politicide occurs in those cases
when political orientation is the predominant reason for singling out parts of population (Schmeidl 2001:
80).

6Shmeidl (2001), however, has suggested that a greater differentiation of government repression would be
useful to understand government actions and how it affects refugee flows. For this she distinguished
between government repression in the former Communist block (she calls this institutional human rights
violations), where people were denied political fieedom and rights, political dissidents were targeted, but
where physical safety of the majority of population was not threatened and on the other government
repression in other parts of the world which often involved a great deal of physical violence, such as
random killings, death squads and torture. Her data revealed that people are less likely to fly from
authoritarian regimes, such as former Communist government, than from countries that have reached a high
level of generalized violence.

Keely (19961052-1057) maintains that the existence of many nations within the same state conflicts with
the nation-state norm. In their efforts to build a nation-state, states resort to four patterned ways to deal with
multinational realities: developing a supranational identity, forcibly assimilating minority groups into the

19

 

with the existing structure of state and its social institutions (especially economy) and
tries to change them by way of revolution; when the state implodes due to lack of
resources (i.e., Afghanistan, Somalia, Angola, Liberia and Rwanda). These three sources
of refugee flows, according to the author are analytically distinct, but not mutually
exclusive. Within a multinational state, for example, there can exist simultaneously
conflict over nationality as well as over the type of state and social institutions. A
revolution can devolve into chaos and the state implodes. These situations can create
conflict, which most likely (though not always) will result in refugee movements.

In summary, we can say that scholars of forced migration have pointed to several
determinants that cause people to flee their country. The most important of these factors
include intra-state conflicts, in particular ethnic conflicts, although non-ethnic conflicts
also led to refugee flows. Foreign interventions in civil wars are also important
determinants of refirgee movement. These interventions have tended to prolong civil wars
which otherwise might have ended because of the lack of resources. Several authors have
also found a relationship between the govemment-sponsored human-right violations,
govemment-initiated genocidal violence and forced migration, as well as authoritarian
government (i.e., Castro’s regime). Keely (1996) has pointed to nation-state as the source
of refugee production. According to the author, nation state generates refugee flows in
three different ways: when they deal with the existence of multination within one
territory and state, when people use revolutionary movements to change the existing

order, and when state implodes because of lack of resources. All three tensions within the

 

dominant national identity, ethnic cleansing, and confederation. While establishing a supranational identity
and assimilating minorities into a dominant national mold are not inherently violent, each requires
suppression of national identity, which may (though not always/necessarily) lead to violent conflict
between suppressed minorities and dominant majority, a situation which is likely to generate refugee
flows.

20

' .r Il'f'nfl

 

nation-state lead to conflict, which in turn unleashes massive exodus of people. In sum, it
could be said that in the case of forced migrations, it is the conflict and the violence
which results from this conflicts that forces people to flee the country and move

somewhere else.

Motivation Literature and Albanian Migration

Analysis of migrants’ motives has been largely overlooked in the scholarship of
Albanian migration. When they are brought into discussion, most of researchers have
limited themselves to simply enumerating them (exception being Mai 2001; Barjaba and
King 2005). As a result, we learn that for Albanians, the most commonly cited
motivations for leaving the country are economic motivations, fear of violence, insecurity
and political instability (Arrehag, Sjiiberg and Sjéiblom 2006; Albanian Human
Development Report 2000; King and Vullnetari 2003). These micro-level explanations,
however, may, in Gold’s (2002: 44) view, be subject to limitations in that migrants’
personal accounts are post-migration reconstructions of reasons for exit and as such they
may be “distorted by these person’s current experience and context, selective memory or
various kinds of social influence.” Moreover, migrants may be unaware of larger
historic, structural, economic and demographic developments that influence their
motivations to move (Gold 2002: 45 referring to Mills 1940). Given these problems then,
we need to incorporate other perspectives (macro as well as meso) in order to obtain a
complete understanding of Albanian migrants’ motives. More importantly, a full
understanding of forces that shape Albanian migants’ motives, will, as stated in chapter

one, be crucial to our understanding of Albanian immigration in general, in particular its

21

beginnings after forty years of its cessation. In the following, I will lay out whether and
how the existing approaches apply to the Albanian case.

World system theory, significant as it is in that it emphasizes historical structural
forces that influence people’s motivations to migrate, is incapable of explaining Albanian
migration for the following reasons. First: large-scale immigration flom Albania did not
originate in the penetration of capitalist markets, or political interventions on the part of
core countries. Second: world system theory, given its focus on economic determinants,
is limited in its ability to explain migrations that are not economically determined, such
as forced migration, family unification, pursuit of education, religious yearnings, political
aspirations or romance (Gold 2001: 51).

In line with Portes and Rurnbaut’ (1996) argument, Mai (2001) has highlighted
the influence of a Western culture of consumerism in shaping Albanian migrants’
motives to leave. Under the communist regime, thousands of Albanians would secretly
watch foreign television programs, in particular Italian ones, in spite of the govemment’s
ban on any foreign channels of information and communication and the awareness of the
punishment that could be easily meted out to them, were they to be caught. The foreign
television exposed Albanians to a “flee and abundant” life in the West, which stood in
sharp contrast to the daily poverty, long queues, rationing, erratic electricity, poor
housing conditions and their human rights violation. This familiarity with the Western
”TV version” of life style build up expectations and dreams among its viewers, which
they knew would be unable to realize in their own country. Consequently, they embarked
on a journey to the West to fulfill their dreams. It could be said, however, that although

the influence of a Western culture of consumerism certainly played an important part in

22

 

shaping Albanian migrants’ decision to leave, it is still an insufficient explanation, in that
it cannot explain why immigrants did not leave in the 19703 and 19803, but at the
beginning of the 19903.

Social networks could also shape people’s motivations to migrate. We can
differentiate between two types of social networks: internal (networks within Albania)
and external (networks to people outside of Albania). Membership in each of these
groups could encourage people to move abroad. During the authoritarian regime, those
with ties to people (i.e., family, fliends, neighbors) who were viewed as suspicious and/or
were persecuted by the government, could themselves become targets of govemment’s
suspicion and persecution (i.e., demotion at work, denial of access to education, good
employment and in extreme cases even imprisonment or internal exile) simply because of
these ties. For example, entire families were sent to exile in remote villages just because a
close family member or relative had fled the country (Minnesota Lawyers International
Human Rights Committee 1990: 72-73). Distant relatives, acquaintances or at times even
neighbors were not spared this experience either. In addition, having ties to someone in
Greece, could also, in all its likelihood, be a cause for leaving the country. Research by
Sintes (2003, found in Rapper 2005) illustrates this point. The author noted that the
Vlachs (an ethnic minority group) in Lunxheri (Southern Albania) were the first to leave
their village on a large scale. They managed to do this because they were able to draw
upon their pre-existing ties with kin living in Greece, since all of them traced their origin
to the same village (Kefalovrisso) in Greece. Thus, membership in these webs of internal
as well as external ties could influence people’s decision to leave their country and move

somewhere else, yet it is an inadequate explanation since it cannot be applied to the

23

majority of the people who leave the country. Moreover, like in the case of world system
theory, it cannot account for the timing of leaving.

Literature on forced migration is not also incapable of explaining immigration
flom Albania, since Albanian migration did not originate in intra-state conflicts (ethnic or
non-ethnic), foreign intervention in internal wars, nation-state formation, nor did it
originate in interstate wars, or in state sponsored genocide. Even the violation of human
rights on the part of the government in power cannot explain initiation of migration. The
government of Albania was, indeed, one of the most repressive regimes in Eastern
Europe, and exercised this kind of repression for about forty years. Yet immigration on a
massive scale began in the 19903 and not earlier. In view of these circumstances, I argue
that a state-based approach provides a full understanding of the forces that shaped

Albanian migrants’ motives to leave the country and Albanian migration in general.

Role of the State in Migration

Until recently, however, the scholarship of international migration has paid little
attention to the role of the state in promoting or limiting migration. When the state is
brought in the discussion at all, most of the studies focus on the immigrant-receiving
countries of industrialized democracies (Fitzerald 2006; Massey et al., 1998; Massey
1999c; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Zolberg 1999). Fewer studies focus on the sending
societies (Fitzerald 2006; Hollifield 2006; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Zolberg 1978;
Zolberg 2007) “suggesting an implicit assumption that fleedom to exit the country
prevails worldwide” (Zolberg 1999: 71). Sending countries are usually viewed in the

context of migration problems that they pose for receiving countries and are often

24

 

portrayed as pawns rather than serious players in the issues of migration management,
since the receiving countries are seen as the ultimate deciders in setting up migration
rules and regulations (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 3). The existing studies, however, point
to the significance of the sending state policies in managing emigration flows
(Cannistraro and Rosoli 1979; Colomer 2000; Dowty 1978; see also articles in Green and
Wei] 2007; Fitzerald 2006; Zolberg 1978; Zolberg: 2007). The erection of barriers to exit
on the part of European states led to the prohibition of free movement of entire
populations during seventeenth and eighteenth century mercantilist times (Zolberg 1978).
Moreover, the state’s relinquishing of these barriers in the laissez-faire 19th century led to
the “Exit Revolution” (Zolberg 2007). Similarly, a century later, it was the draconian
measures on the part of authoritarian governments of former communist countries8 of that
managed to “lock up” entire populations inside their borders (Dowty 1978). Conversely,
the collapse of these very authoritarian governments unleashed a large-scale emigration
flom former communist societies. Even a liberal democratic society like that of Israel’s,
which cannot prohibit its members to leave, have undertaken various measures to counter
emigration, given the threat of exit of its Jewish population (Gold 2007).

States have used various means in their efforts to prohibit exit of its citizens.
Totalitarian regimes, like those of former East European block relied on repressive
measures including building walls and “shoot-to kill” policing if its citizens attempted to
leave (Dowty 1987; Green and Wei] 2007; Zolberg 1999). Others have used propaganda
campaigns against emigration, refusal to issue travel documents, material incentives to

repatriate, impose high sums of money and a lot of time on the obligatory emigration

 

8See Weiner (1995: 34) for a list of countries that restricted emigration during the Cold War era.

25

permit as well as moral and ideological pressures (i.e., condemning emigrants as
immoral) (Fahrmeir 2007; Fitzerald 2006;Gold 2007).

Frequently states have promoted emigration as a way to address unemployment,
receive foreign exchange, as well as diffuse people’s anger over worsening of economic
and political situations (Alcid 2004). Yet, while encouraging emigration, sending
countries also have attempting to control the volume, composition, duration and direction
of this emigration (Graeme and Stahl 2004; F itzerald 2006).

Once emigrants have settled abroad, the sending states, as the literature on
transationalism and migration tells us (Itzigsohn 2000; Landolt 2007; Levit and de la
Dehesa 2003; see articles in Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003b), through various economic,
political, and social measures (see Levit and de la Dehesa 2003), have tried to reach
across its territories to reincorporate immigrants and their descendants in their ancestral
homelands, even when they are legal citizens of another state (Schiller and Fouron 2001:
19). In these endeavors, however, the state does not look at all members as one
homogenous group of people. Landolt (2007: 15-17), for example, shows that the
Salvadorian government, in spite of the rhetoric of inclusion that every Salvadoran
emigrant belong to fifteenth diapsoric department and is a hermano Iejano (distant
brother)9, in reality, it has built a “differentiated and hierarchical map” of its emigrant
population. This is evidenced in the fact that while El Salvador’s government is very
active with the US. migrants and considers them as entrepreneurial, responsible remitters

and as (a) politically sensible, the same cannot be said for its role among its emigrants in

 

9Landolt (2007: 16) writes that the Fifteenth Diasporic and Hermano Lejano are two symbols around
which El Salvador’s govermnent has tried to organize its emigrants. According to the former, every
Salvadorean who lives outside the country can claim membership in the fifteenth department. The latter, on
the other hand, is used to portray the Salvadoran migrants as industrious and committed members of the
Salvadoran national family.

26

Canada. In the latter, the Salvadoran government is largely absent flom its emigrants’ life,
since it considers them as political opposition force that does not want to collaborate with
Salvadoran state, and not really entrepreneurial. Similarly, in the case of Haiti, the
government of Aristide set up the “Tenth Department” to organize its emigrants abroad.
However, as Itzigsohn (2000: 1135) argues, although the “Tenth Department” was set up
to represent the whole Haitian emigrants, it was based on economically better off
immigrants in the United States and Canada rather than labor immigrants in the
Dominican Republic and other Caribbean locations.

Thus, the existing literature demonstrate that states have been significant players
in managing immigration as well as refugee flows, whether in receiving10 or sending
societies. Significant as these studies are, however, in terms of highlighting importance
of the role of state and its policies in emigration and immigration, these studies cannot
still fully explain immigration flom Albania, since in both sets of studies, the arguments
are flamed along the questions of how states “manage migration”, the criteria (i.e.,
economic, ideological, ethnic) states use to let people in and let people out. Moreover, the
scholarship on the role of the state in forced migration, is inadequate to explain our
phenomenon under study, because in the case of Albania massive waves of migration in
the early 19903, was not, as mentioned earlier, a direct result of state-sponsored
repression, nor was it a result of multinationality within nation-state, revolutionary
movement, or state implosions.

Furthermore, the Albanian communist state did not simply “manage migration”,

but through its decisions created the very conditions for fostering migration. As Portes

 

loFor immigration policies in the receiving countries see for example: Calavita (1994, 1998); Cornelius et
a1. (1994; 2004); Martin (1994); Meyers (2000) for a review of the theoretical literature on this topic.

27

and Bach (1985: 74) have argued, the decisions on the part of states have major
consequences for the socioeconomic context in which individual decisions are made.
These decisions may turn out to induce migration, directly or indirectly, as they constrain
the economic opportunities available to its population (Portes and Bach 1985: 74).
Indeed, in the course of forty years of the communist regime, the government of Albania
pursued the path of economic self-reliance along side with a highly centralized economic
and political system. This policy led to severe shortages of consmner goods, a
deteriorating inflastructure, low agricultural and industrial production and a backward
technological development. Moreover, it drastically reduced economic opportunities as
well as the social mobility of people, and created an enormous gap in wealth between
Albania and its neighbors (Biberaj 1990). The highly centralized economic and political
system was simultaneously accompanied by a Soviet type control of people’s movement
according to which the entire population was “scaled up” inside the country. This
situation came to an end when the very authoritarian government that had prohibited the
exit of a whole population flom the country, disintegrated and finally collapsed and
triggered a massive outflow of Albanians to the Western countries. Thus between the
early months of 1991 until October 1992, whether by boat to Italy, or by foot via
mountains to Greece, amidst a situation of economic poverty11 (i.e., economic
impoverishment under communism, failure of neoliberal economic reforms), political
instability (i.e., repression under communism, failure of the new fledgling democratic
system), social unrest, insecurity and fear of outbreak of violence, about 300,000

Albanians had left their country and moved to Albania’s wealthy capitalist neighbors.

 

11During this time unemployment had reached 40 percent, wages were at about $20 per month, and
inflation increased at a rate of 260 % per month (Pime 2002).

28

In sum, we could say that the analysis of motivations in Albania migration has
been largely ignored. When the researchers bring them to the discussion, with few
exceptions, they limit themselves to simply enumerating micro-level explanations that
influence migrants’ motivations. While other approaches (macro-meso) provide a broader
scope of understanding of Albanian migration, they are still not well equipped to
providing a full explanation of this phenomenon. I argue that a state-based approach can
provide a fuller explanation. This approach posits that the Albanian state, by pursuing a
highly centralized economic and political system along with one of the strictest

prohibition of people’s exit, created the very conditions for large-scale migration.

29

 

Perpetuation of Migration and Its Transformation from Forced Migration to Labor
Migration

As stated earlier, Albanian migration in its very early stages started out as forced
migation. While the Albanian state was the major force in creating the conditions of
initiating migration, the state was no longer involved in migration, yet migration
perpetuated and sustained itself. Following work by Massey (1988; 1990a); Massey et al.
(1987), I argue that the major social mechanisms that perpetuate immigration consists of
social networks and cumulative causation. In addition, while Albanian migration started
out as a forced migration, over time it was transformed flom forced migration to normal
labor migration. In this dissertation, I contend that the major determinant underlying this

process is the role of the Greek state and its policies.

Social Networks and Cumulative Causation of Migration

Social networks are of paramount importance in international migration. In fact,
migration has been described as a network-driven process (Portes & Rumbaut 1996).
Insertion of migrants into such networks explains differential proclivities to move and the
enduring character of migrant flows (Portes and Borosz 1989: 612). Migrant networks
consist of social ties that “bind migrants and non-migrants within a complex web of
complementary social roles and interpersonal relationships,” through the bonds of
kinship, friendship, remote acquaintances and community based relations (Choldin 1973;
Massey 1988; Massey and Espana 1987; Massey et al., 1987; Massey et al. 1994b). They
become more important in international than domestic migration, because there are more
obstacles to overcome, like exit and entry permits, as well as often the costs of illegal

border crossing (F aist 2000).

30

 

Scholars of migration, including those of Albanian rrrigration, have recognized
and documented the existence and importance of networks in assisting people in the
process of migration (Boyd 1989; Choldin 1973; Drever and Hofflneister 2008; Garcia
2005; Gold 2001; Gold 2005; Hatziprokopioyu 2003; Hugo 1981; King, Mai and Dalipaj
2003; Lomnitz 1977; MacDonald and Macdonald 1974; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Tilly
1978). Networks provide information about places of destination, including places of
return, on the basis of which potential migrants make decisions to move. As a result of
this, costs (i.e. cost of transportation, earnings foregone while making the move,
psychological costs of moving and adjusting to a foreign country) and risks (i.e. risk of
being apprehended by the border authorities of the destination country) of international
migration are reduced, making the benefits of border crossing available to a wide range
of people in the country of origin, including persons who come flom lower socio-
economic background (Gold 2005). Since they lower costs and risks, the establishment
and operation of social networks increase the likelihood of migration. Persons or families
who possess ties to current or former international migrants increase the likelihood of
migrating themselves (Massey and Espinoza 1997; Massey 1987; Massey et al. 1998;
Massey et al. 1987).

Once in the place of destination, networks assist immigrants in the adaptation
process. They offer shelter and assistance with finding housing (Gold 2001; Garcia 2005;
Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). They also serve as channels of information about employment
opportunities. In the initial stages of settlement in the host country, the newcomers are
rather isolated flom the mainstream society, in that more often than not immigrants lack

the knowledge of host society, including the ability to speak the host society’s language.

31

 

This hampers their ability to pursue formal channels of looking for a job, such as
newspaper advertisement, for example. Social ties, therefore, provide new immigrants
with information about job opportunities (Choldin 1973; Drever and Hoffmeister 2008;
Hugo 1981; Massey et al. 1989;), whether in the mainstream labor market or in ethnic
economies. In addition, they reduce the likelihood of being abused or not being paid by
unfamiliar employers (Light and Gold 2000: 119). Once in the workplace, sponsors and
fliends help with training and even socialization to the new workplace (Chin 2005;
Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Margolis 1994). Moreover, social networks provide emotional
and moral support (Menjivar 2000), as well as offer protection to newcomers flom the
hostile enviromnent in the receiving country (Gold 2005). They also function as a link
between the migrant community at destination and the non-migrant community at origin
(Boyd 1989; Choldin 1973; Hugo 1981; Lomnitz 1977; MacDonald and Macdonald
1974; Massey 1989; Tilly 1978;). Furthermore, as mentioned above, social networks
serve as the major social mechanism for the perpetuation of migration.

According to Massey (1990b); Massey et al. (1994a; 1994b), in its very
beginning, given the high costs and risks, international migration is limited to a few
“adventurous individuals” who come flom the lower middle economic strata (see also
Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Once an individual has migrated, s/he is no longer the same
person. After gaining first-hand experience in an advanced industrialized economy,
migrants acquire a taste for consumer goods. They develop a new standard for upward
mobility that is extremely difficult to attain in his or her country. In addition, immigrants
acquire knowledge of the country’s language, employment practices, and cultural values.

Immigrants then use this knowledge to migrate again with fewer risks and costs than

32

before. This is due to the fact that once someone has migrated, sfhe is likely to migrate
again.

Every immigrant is connected to a set of fliends and relatives in the community of
origin. Once he or she leaves, the costs and risks of international migration are reduced
substantially for his friends and relatives. Given the nature of kinship and fliendship
structures, each new migrant creates a set of people with social ties to the destination
area. Migrants are inevitably linked with other migrants through networks of reciprocal
obligations based on shared understanding of kinship and fiiendship. The latter draw
upon these obligations to gain access to foreign employment (Massey 19903: 8; Massey
et al. 1994b: 733; Massey, Goldring and Durand 1994a: 1498).

Once the number of network connections in the area of origin reaches a critical
level, migration becomes self-perpetuating because it creates for itself the social structure
to sustain it. Every new migrant reduces the costs and risks of subsequent migration for a
set of fliends and relatives, thus, inducing more people to migrate. This further expands
the set of people with ties abroad, and in turn reduces costs for a new set of people to
migrate and so on. Following the work of Gundar Myrdal, Massey called this process the
cumulative causation of migration (Massey 19903; 1990b; Massey et al. 1994a; Massey et
al. 1994b).

In addition to changes in individual and social structure, migration brings about
changes in the culture of the communities of origin, changes which in turn increase the
likelihood of more migration. As Massey and his colleagues (Massey et al. 1994a; 1994b;
Massey et al. 1998) have shown, through their ability to buy goods and property in their

communities, migrants display an admired life styles that non migrants want to emulate,

33

thus increasing the odds of initiating more people into migration stream. Moreover, over
time, migration becomes deeply entrenched in the value system of the communities of
origin, and becomes a rite of passage for young men and in many settings young women
who contemplate entry into the labor force Massey et al. (1994a: 1500; Massey et al.
1994b: 738; Massey et a1. 1998: 47). For example, in their survey study of students in the
Mexican state of Zatecas, Kandel and Massey (2002) found that children who came flom
families who were involved in migration were more likely to aspire to work and live in
United States. These aspirations caused them to look northward rather than in Mexico for
opportunities, thus, lowering their chances that they will continue their education in
Mexico, and increasing the chances that they would eventually migrate north.

The cumulative causation of migration cannot continue indefinitely. According to
Massey (1990a: 8), if the process of migration continues for some period of time, then the
communities reach a point of “network saturation,” where almost all people in the
community are tied to someone with migrant experience. At this level of development,
the costs of migration stop falling with each new entrant, and the process of migration
then loses its dynamism. Meanwhile, the rate of out-migration reaches a point where
sending communities begin to experience labor shortages, and local wages start to rise.
These developments reduce the pressures for additional migration. As a result migration
rate decelerates until it finally falls off.

The cumulative causation of migration and network formation has been best

documented in North America, particularly in the case of Mexican-US migration stream12

 

les Fussell and Massey (2004) noticed, most of the research that has examined the cumulative causation

of migration has done so in the context of Mexican-US. migration, mainly migration flom rural areas. The
authors, however, did not find cumulative causation to operate in large urban areas. According to the
authors, these differences between rural and urban areas do not question the theory of cumulative causation.

34

(Massey and Espana 1987; Massey and Espinoza 1997;Massey et al. 1994a; Massey et al.
1987; Massey et al. 1994b). In the European context, studies on this topic are much fewer
in number (Massey et al. 1998: 132). Moreover, in general the studies (see for example
Heering et al. 2004), including the studies of Mexican-US. that we have seen so far, have
largely examined labor migration streams, while leaving out the examination of the
process of transformation flom refugee to labor migration. This study, then, will address

this gap.

The State and Legalization of Foreign Workers

As stated earlier, in this dissertation I argue that the Greek state, through its
legalization policies managed to transform a large number of immigrants flom a position
of forced illegal migrants to that of labor, legal migrants. Greece, however, is not unique
as far as these policies are concerned. In fact, legalization programs are one of the ways
receiving governments use to regulate large numbers of illegal immigrant in their
countries. They employ these particular measures to provide illegal immigrants with the
opportunity to acquire legal status.

One case in point, for example, would be that of France. In the post war period,
the French government, like other countries of Western Europe (i.e., Germany, The

Netherlands), in the face of its ever expanding economy, set up recruitment policies to

 

Instead the process may be deterred by the greater size of the city, social complexity, and economic
diversity of cities, which provide people with more complete markets for labor, insurance, capital, and
credit, and which in turn lessen many of the most powerful motivations for international migration. Curran
et al., (2005) however, found evidence of cumulative causation in the case of rural-urban migration in
Thailand.

35

 

 

attract foreign workers to fill in during severe labor shortages”. Recruitment policies
were organized by the state. The organization responsible for this task was the Office
National d’Immigration (ONI), even though over time, French private employers began
to recruit foreign workers directly in the sending country, eventually taking complete
control over the recruitment process. The normal procedure was to hire workers first,
then seek regularization (Hollifield 1992).

In 1973, as the energy crisis struck the world, France’s response, like the rest of
Europe (Geddes 2003; Van Amersfoord 1999), was to bring migration to a halt. The
ending of migration, however, did not mean that migration stopped. Immigration
continued in the form of family members as well as illegal workers (Hollifield 1992).
Meanwhile, as a result of the halting of immigration and stringent measures to control it,
the numbers of illegal immigrants grew large. In view of this situation, in 1981, the
Mitterrand socialist government offered amnesty to foreign workers and their families
living in an irregular situation who had lived in the country before January 1981, and who
were able to present evidence of employment, preferably for at least one year”. The
objective of this policy was to reduce the insecurity of foreigners residing in France,

while at the same time maintaining a strict ban on new immigration” (Hollifield 1992:

 

l3France, like other former colonial powers experienced another kind of migration. These were immigrants
flom former colonial countries, who in the process of decolonization entered their respective former
colonial countries such as that of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands. Colonial workers were citizens of
the former colonial power and thus had the rights to enter the country. Once they were in the country, they
were entitled to the same formal civil and political rights as other citizens. Most (though by no means all)
intended to stay permanently (Castle and Miller 2003: 77).

14Besides legalization, governments of Northwest Europe implemented another measure, that of
repatriation assistance, which took various forms in different countries (I-lollifield 1992; Van Amersfoort
1999; Geddes 2003). In France, for example, the government gave financial assistance to induce reuun of
migrants to their own countries of origin as well as retraining of workers. In addition, foreigners could
participate in retraining programs set up in cooperation with the sending countries. The repatriation
assistance however did not succeed. Only a relatively small number of people took up assistance, but they
would have left anyway (Hollifield 1992).

36

93). In this program about 150,000 aliens applied and 130,000 were legalized (Castle
and Miller 2003: 98).

Similarly, in the United States the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) provided a general amnesty program that allowed the legalization of
undocumented immigrants who had arrived in the United States before January 1, 1982,
and had been living there continuously ever since (Repak 1995: 134). In total, about three
millions applied for the legal status (about 1.8 million illegal immigrants applied for legal
status under the general legalization and about 1.3 million under the Special Agricultural,
Worker (SAW) programme (J oppke 1999: 37-3 8).

In summary, we could state that while immigration flom Albania was a result of
failed state policies, once immigration started, however, the state no longer participated
in the migration process. Yet, Albanian migration endured and over time took on massive
proportions. The existing literature (Massey 1988; 1990a; Massey et al., 1987) maintains
that migration’s tendency to perpetuate itself relies on two major mechanisms, social
networks and cumulative causation of migration. In addition, Albanian migration started
out as forced, illegal migration and over time was transformed into legal, labor migration.
It is my contention in this dissertation that the Greek government policies are largely
responsible for this process. In doing so, the Greek government follows in the path of
other governments of liberal democracies, who have been recipients of large number of
(many illegal) immigrants and have used similar policies in their attempts to move

foreign workers flom position of illegality to that of legality.

37

 

 

Labor Market Incorporation of Immigrants

Scholars have provided various explanations to understand the processes of
immigrants’ adaptation in the country of reception. For a long time, the most
predominant theoretical explanation of immigrants’ adaptation was the assirnilationist
one. In this view, immigrants enter the host society at the bottom of the social
stratification hierarchy and then slowly move up through its ranks. In order for
immigrants to successfully complete this process, they have to “shed” the culture (i.e.,
values, traditions, language, etc) of their original country and “embrace” the culture of
the host society (Gordon 1964; Warner and Srole 1945). This view, based on the history
of turn-off-the century European immigrants, portrays immigrant adaptation as “uniform
charted path” in which newcomers enter the bottom of labor market hierarchy and slowly
move up (Portes and Stepick 1985).

Another explanation is the one provided by the human capital perspective, which
focuses on how individual level variables, such as education, skills, experience in the
previous jobs, language of the host society, etc, affect performance of immigrants in the
host society’s labor market. This approach argues that initially irmnigrants have lower
earnings compared to those of the natives because of the lack of transferability of job-
related skills, credentials, and language. Over time, however, as immigrants gain labor
market experience, their earnings rise more rapidly and after 10-15 years their earnings
equal and then exceed those of the native born (Chiswick 1987).

This perspective has been criticized, because it has “failed to explain why workers
who are endowed with similar levels of human capital but differ in ascribed

characteristics experience unequal labor market outcomes” (Raijman and Tienda 1999:

38

I 0‘2? .1. LA

 

241) or why, as Repak’s study (1995; 1996) indicated, Central American men earned
significantly higher wages than Central American women even though women had better
education, better command of English language and had been longer in the United States.
Moreover, unlike the early 20th century immigrants, virtually all of whom were poor,
unskilled, and started off at the bottom of socio-economic system, as factory workers for
example (Research Perspectives on Migration 1997), newer immigrants “display a
bimodal pattern” in terms of social class, in that they are concentrated either at the upper
stratum of educational and occupational attainment or at the lowest stratum (Farley 1996;
Rumbaut 1991; 1997a; 1997b). These differential starting points, augur different modes
of incorporation outcomes (Rumbaut 1997b).

While assimilationist and human capital models have underscored migrants’
individual characteristics to explain economic adaptation, another body of scholarly
research, most notably, the research done on post-1965 immigration, point to broader
structural forces that account for this process. Several scholars in this tradition have
looked at the economic restructuring and how it impacts the economic incorporation of
immigrants. One of the earliest theoretical models that addresses structural forces,
although not developed specifically to address economic restructuring (Mahler 1995: 8),
is that of segmented labor market approach, whose major proponent is Michael Piore
(1979). The author advances the argument like this: The labor market in advanced
industrialized societies consists of two sectors of production, a “primary” sector and a
“secondary” sector. The jobs in the “primary” sector are skilled, secure, well paid, with
opportunities for mobility. By contrast, the jobs in the “secondary” sector tend to be

unskilled (but not always low paying), insecure, often involving unpleasant working

39

‘ .am: «29.. a: u. m .
3L___.

 

conditions, with little or no social mobility whatsoever. They are usually preformed in an
unstructured work environment and involve an informal, highly personalistic relationship
with supervisor and subordinate. These jobs also carry inferior social status. In view of
the characteristics of the jobs, natives are unwilling to take these jobs. Immigrants, on the
other hand, are willing to fill these jobs for several reasons. For one, unlike natives,
immigrants see themselves as “temporary” and “target earners”, and to them, work, like
migration itself is purely instrumental: income that can be taken home to his/her country
of origin. In addition, immigrants operate with a “dual flame of reference,” in that
immigrants will judge jobs in the receiving countries by comparing them with job
conditions in their own country (W aldinger and Lichter 2003; Waters 1999). As far as
this comparison remains relevant, then, low status, low paid work in advanced capitalist
countries does not rate badly (W aldinger and Lichter 2003: 8). Furthermore, immigrants
see their social status not tied up to the status system in the receiving country, but to the
status system in their country of origin (Piore 1979; Waters 1999).

Sassen (1988; 1990) locates segmented labor markets in the context of economic
restructuring and globalization of economic activities. According to the author,
globalization of economic activities have given rise to “global cities” (e. g., Los Angeles,
New York) which serve as centers for the control and management of global production.
This, in turn, has led to a new bifurcated service economy, with highly skilled, highly
paid professional and technical jobs that native elites occupy, and low wage, low-skilled
service jobs where immigrants concentrate.

While these authors underscore the structure of host society’s labor market as the

most important factor that impact economic adaptation of immigrants, another group of

40

scholars, however, argue that labor market is not the only factor that impact the economic
location of immigrants. Instead, according to these scholars (Cohen, and Kogan 2007;
Kogan 2003; 2007; Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; 2001; 2006;
Reitz 1998), it is an array of “institutional factors,” such as labor market structure and
regulations, immigration policies, welfare state, which are partly interdependent on, and
partly autonomous flom one another, and which might affect immigrant standing in the
labor market in various important ways (Reitz 1998: 6).

For example, in his book Warmth of Welcome, Reitz (1998) examined entry-level
earnings of the first cohort of immigrants who arrived in these countries after
immigration reforms of the 19603. The author found out that employment earnings of
immigrants flom similar backgrounds were substantially lower in the United States,
compared to that of Australia and Canada. The reason for this, according to Reitz
(19982226) rests in the structure of American institutions. In the words of the author in
the United States “The relatively laissez-faire immigration policy lowers immigrant skill
levels; immigrants encounter a native-bom population which has built up a massive store
of educational credentials as competitive resources; immigrants’ difficulties in
establishing an economic foothold are compounded by unregulated labor markets, more
extreme earnings inequality, and a comparatively weak and deteriorating social safety
net. The extent of this compounding depends on the interrelations among the various
components of the institutional system. Generally, each component of the US.
institutional system produces compounding effects, which magnify inequality and lower

immigrant entry-level status.

41

In a similar line of research, Cohen and Kogan (1997) found out that differences
in institutional characteristics between the host societies of Israel and Germany explained
the differential labor market outcomes for Jewish immigrants flom former the Soviet
Union (F SU) during the 19903. The greater rigidity of the German labor market
compared to Israeli’s combined with more generous material assistance offered to these
immigrants, allowed the FSU immigrants to be able to wait for jobs commensurable with
their education. On the other hand, F SU immigrants in Israel were forced to take any jobs
since their state benefits were less generous and of shorter period of time. Other studies
(Kogan 2003; Kogan 2007; Lewin-Epstein 2003) have pointed to similar findings in
terms of differences in institutional structures and their impact on immigrants’ labor
market outcomes.

An extensive research literature has documented the concentration of immigrants
in ethnic entrepreneurship (Barret et al. 2003; Collins 2003; Gold 2000; Haberfellner
2003; Light 1972; Light and Bonacich 1988; Light and Pang 2003; Mung and Lacroix
2003; Rath and Kloosterman 2003). Irnmi grants’ reasons for entrepreneurship have been
shown to vary. Many immigrants use it as a way to overcome various obstacles that they
may encounter in looking for a job, such as language barriers, discrimination in hiring,
the fact that their educational credentials are not understood or recognized by the
employers, or lack of sufficient access to relevant social networks for transmitting
information on job vacancies (Kloosterman and Rath 2003; Light 1979; Light and Gold
2000: 200). Others use it as a way to overcome unemployment caused by globalization
which has eliminated or marginalized manual and manufacturing jobs (Collins 2003).

Still others use it to fulfill the hopes for higher incomes as well as “gain social

42

recognition via the achievement of a higher social status,” (Wilpert 2003: 249 referring to
Goldberg and Sen 1997) or out of desire to “be one’s own boss” (Wilpert 2003).

If successful, immigrants can create jobs for others as well, which can help to
benefits relatives, friends and other coethnics (Rath and Kloosterman 2003: 2). Coetlmic
economies have been found to be beneficial to immigrants. They provide immigrants
with jobs, which they would not have been able to have in the general labor market
(Light et al. 1994) and when in jobs, research has found that they receive higher returns
on human capital variables than those immigrants who work in the secondary or even
primary labor market (Portes and Bach 1985). Moreover, co-etlmic firms can be a
“school for entrepreneurs” (Light et al. 1994: 72) in that through apprenticeship in these
firms, immigrants acquire skills that they can use to establish their own business (Portes
1995228)

In the classical countries of immigration, immigrants have tended to be more
entrepreneurial than members of dominant majorities (Wilpert 2003: 233). For example,
aggregate data flom the US decennial census reports show that on the whole the foreign-
bom have historically had a higher self-employment rate than the native born (a
phenomenon which can be also true of post-1965). The 1980 and 1990 US census both
show that this is also true of the post-1965 immigrants (Min and Bozorgrnehr 2003).
However, research conducted on this topic in other countries such as UK (Barret et al.,
2003), the Netherlands (Rath and Kloosterman 2003), France (Mung and Lacroix 2003),
Belgium (Pang 2003), Germany (Pecound 2003), South Aflica (Pederdy and Rogerson
2003) demonstrate that immigrant entrepreneurship is on the rise (Rath and Kloosterman

2003)

43

A group of researchers have observed high rates of immigrants’ insertion in
informal economy (Baldwin-Edwards 1999; Castells and Portes 1989; King 2000; Portes
1995; Sassen-Koch 1989; Stepick 1989; Stepick 1998). Informal economies refer to
those “income generating economic activities that are unregulated by legal codes in an
environment where similar activities are regulated” and that unlike criminal activities,
informal activities include goods and services that are legal, but whose production and
marketing is unregulated (Castells and Portes 1989: 12). Most workers in the informal
sector are self-employed (Light and Gold 2000: 40), yet a large numbers of immigrants
work for others. This is particularly the case with immigrants in Southern European
countries (i.e., Greece, Italy, Spain) (Iosifides and King 1999; Reyneri 1999; Veiga 1999)
where the overwhelming majority of immigrants are incorporated in the informal
economy, given the high rates of informal economy in these countries: 29 percent for
Greece, 27 percent for Italy and 23 percent for Spain of the country’s GDP (Baldwin-
Edwards 1999: 5 citing Corriere della Sera). Irmnigrants in Southern European countries
are mainly employed in several segments of Southern European labor market. These
include agriculture, construction, small manufacturing firms and artisan workshop where
work can be ‘hidden’ flom official scrutiny, tourism and catering sectors, domestic
service and street hawking (Baldwin-Edwardsl999: 7-9; King 2000). Workers in this
sector of economy performs jobs that are precarious, low-paid, with no prospect for
mobility, often with no social security or other benefits, and lead to multiple exploitation

and social exclusion (King 2000).

Gender and Labor Market Outcomes

Gender plays a crucial role in labor market incorporation of immigrants.
Scholarship on immigration and labor market indicates that men and women display
differences in terms of labor market outcomes in the host societies, with women being at
more disadvantaged position vis-a-vis immigrant men. This is seen in various aspects,
such as number of occupational concentration, wages, rates of return on human capital
levels, and so on.

For example, Wright and Ellis (2000) found out that among Los Angeles’ six
largest immigrant groups (Mexicans, Salvadoreans, Filipinos, Guatemalans, South
Koreans and Chinese), immigrant men occupied a greater number of occupational niches
than did women. Similarly, Hagan’s (2004) analysis of US census data revealed that
while a large number of women were concentrated primarily in domestic services, men
were concentrated in a more diverse number of occupations. Knocke (1999) noticed
similar trends in Sweden.

A3 a result of this, women receive lower wages and experience less mobility than
men (Foner 1986; Foner 2005; Knocke 1999; Repak 1994; 1995). In her study of Central
American immigrants in the United States, Repak (1994; 1995) noticed that men earned
higher wages and were more mobile than women, regardless of the fact that women had
higher human capital levels. Foner (1986; 2005)’s research reveals similar patterns for
Jamaicans in New York and London. Knocke (1999), in her analysis of data flom
Sweden, revealed that immigrant women who had come to Sweden as part of labor

recruitment efforts in the sixties, and were recruited to perform low-status, and physically

45

hazardous jobs, were still doing the same jobs three decades later. Moreover, very few
women were given any chance to attend training courses and to advance to better jobs.

Some scholars have also noted the impact of economic restructuring that began in
19703 on women. A shift flom manufacturing to service economy has meant that these
women have moved flom occupations in manufacturing, to those in the service sector.
Economic restructuring, however, has hit immigrant women the hardest, given the fact
that a great number of immigrant women worked in manufacturing labor intensive
industries such as garments and electronics (Morokvasic 2000: 103). And, while native
women have been able to enter the white collar jobs, immigrant women have moved into
the lowest rung of the service jobs (Morokvasic 2000; Phizaklea 1983b).

Various studies have also highlighted the gendered nature of co-ethnic economy
(Anthias 1983; Gilbertson 1995; Zhou 1992). In her research of Greek-Cypriot ethnic
economy, Anthia (1983) found out that women were the backbone of the clothing
industry, by serving as a source of cheap labor. And whereas both males and females
were exploited by their coethnic employers, males had more opportunities for social
advancement (i.e., starting their own business), compared to women. Similarly, Zhou
(1992) found out that although Chinese immigrant women provided the major part of the
Chinatown’s economy, they still received very low wages. Moreover, men experienced a
higher return on their human capital variables, something that cannot be said for women.
Gilbertson (1995)’3 findings showed that enclave employment provided Dominican and
Colombian women with very low wages, minimal fiinge benefits, and few opportunities

for social mobility.

46

Gender is also a crucial dimension of entrepreneurship and self-employment. For
one, the motivation to start a business is different for women than for men. While men
and women may share similar problems in the host society that push them toward self-
employment, such as discrimination and racism in the mainstream labor market, lack of
recognition of education, lack of the knowledge of the receiving society’s language,
research (Anthia and Mehta 2003)l5 found out that for women, unlike men, life crises
such as abusive relationships, ill health, and not being permitted to return to work after
childbirth by former employers, were important factors that drove them toward self-
employment. Furthermore, women who are married and have children, consider self-
ernployment as a flexible work option which would allow them to take care of their
childcare responsibilities, since women still carry their household duties themselves
(Hillrnan 1999). In addition, escaping the conditions of a domestic servant has been
found important motivation to start a business of their own (Morokvasic 1991). Finally,
women have been found to be much more motivated by symbolic factors (a sense of
empowerment) than the men, who are largely motivated by financial profits (Anthia and
Mehta 2003).

An increasing body of scholarship has demonstrated that domestic work is the

most common occupation among immigrant women16 in the labor market in the receiving

 

15These research findings in this paper are part of the projects called “Self-employment activities of
women and minorities: their success or failure in relations to social citizenship policies (SEM).” This was a
European Community funded project conducted in six European countries (Sweden, UK, Denmark,
Greece, Italy, Germany). For more results of this projects see a collection of articles published in
International Review of Socrology (13): 1

16Literature has offered examples where men also has worked as domestics. We should point out here
research by Margolis (1994) among Brazilian immigrants in New York, where she found out that Brazilian
men too did domestic work. However, as the author shows us, even in those cases when both women and
men are employed in domestic service, the division of labor in these jobs is along traditional lines: the

woman cleans, does the laundry, cooks and cares for children, while the man is a butler, gardener, and/or
chauffer.

47

countries (Andersen 2003; Ayse 2007; Constable 2003; Degiuli 2007; Escriva 2000;
Eihrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2000; Lutz 2007; see articles in
Momsen 1999). Domestic service is characterized by low-status, low wages, and in a few
exceptional cases, no benefits are involved. Women in this service, in particular, live-in
domestics, work long and unpredictable hours, performing a multitude of jobs such as
cleaning, taking care of children, the elderly and so on. The multiple jobs women have to
perform means “the extension of the subordinate role of women as unpaid family workers
to paid family workers” (Anthias 2000: 27). In addition to performing practical tasks,
domestic works, especially in the case of children and the elderly, involves a lot of
emotional labor, in that women have to give part of themselves, their emotions (Degiuli
2007; Lutz 2007). Furthermore, domestic women workers, in particular live-in ones are
subject to various kinds of physical and psychological abuses17 and especially young,
unmarried women who are easy prey of those who might take advantage of their
sexuality (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1997).

In sum, scholars have formulated various perspectives in attempts to explain labor
market outcomes among irnmi grants. The assimilationist and human capital theoretical
models have attributed economic adaptation to individual’s characteristics such as
education, knowledge of language, length of time in the country and so on. However,
these individualistic approaches have failed to explain why immigrants with similar
human capital characteristics receive lower rates of returns in the labor market.

Moreover, unlike the early 20th century migrants who were poor, unskilled and began at

 

17For example, Anderson (2003), citing figures flom Kalayaan (a British support organization) reported
that between 1996-1997, 84 percent of domestics reported psychological abuse, 34 percent physical abuse,
and 10 percent sexual abuse. Additionally, 54 percent were locked in, 55 percent did not have their own
beds, and 38 percent were not fed regularly (Anderson 2003: 108).

48

the bottom of job hierarchy, new immigrants display a bifurcated modal in terms of social
class, a situation, which bodes different modes of labor market outcomes. Scholars who
have focused in the post-1965 immigrants have looked at the structure of labor market to
explain immigrants’ location in the labor market. They have argued that internalization of
production and finance have led to a proliferation of a bifirrcated economic activities with
high paying jobs that native elites occupy and low skilled service jobs that immigrants
occupy. Others have contended that the labor market is not the only factor to impact
immigrants’ economic incorporation in host societies’ labor market. Instead, they have
suggested that it is the interaction of “institutional factors” such as labor market structure,
host society’s immigration policies, welfare states greatly impact immigrants’ economic
adaptation. A considerable amount of research has looked at entrepreneurship as another
mode of labor market incorporation, with immigrants, in particular those in the traditional
countries of immigration, having a higher rates of self-employment compared to natives.
Moreover, immigrants are highly represented in informal economies, which is the case
for most of the immigrants in the countries of Southern Europe.

Gender is a crucial factor in migration. Research has indicated that men and
women display differences in labor market outcomes, with women being in a more
disadvantaged position compared to men. This is evident in a number of factors such as
occupational concentrations, wages, mobility in the work place, rates of return on human
capital and so on. This situation, then, will impact women’s labor market experiences

different flom that of men.

49

Albanian Immigrants: Labor Market Experiences

According to Baldwin-Edward (2004a) official data on the situation of
immigrants in the Greek labor markets is non existent, nor there is any plan on the part of
the Greek Ministry of Labor to collect such data, or to commission any research. The
processed 2001 Greek Census Data, however, found in Baldwin-Edwards (2004a; 2004b)
provide some information regarding employment of Albanians. According to these data,
most of Albanian males work in construction (42%), followed by agriculture (23%),
industry and tourism at 12% each. In contrast, 52% of women declared the category
‘other’, mainly, presumably, housekeeping while 19% worked in tourism, 15% in
agriculture and 9% in industry. These are jobs that Greeks refuse to do, especially
construction, heavy industry and agriculture (Baldwin-Edwards 2004b: 55).

Various research studies have confirmed this trend (Hatziprokopiou 2003;
Iosifides and King 1998; Lazaridis and Romaniszyn 1998; Lazaridis and Psimmenos
2000;). Lazaridis and Psimmenos (2000) for example, show in their study that in rural
areas, Albanians (mainly males) work as seasonal workers during the peak of economic
activity, such as picking fluits and vegetables. They are hired on a daily basis and receive
some of their payments in forms of meals and lodgings (old barracks, barns and
dilapidated cottages). On the other hand, in urban areas such as Athens or Thessalonica,
Albanians (mainly males) are primarily employed in construction (Hatziprokopiou 2003;
Iosifides 1997) where they work in house-building or repair as well as in other much
larger and mainly public works projects (Iosifides, 1997; Iosifides and King 1999). In
addition, Albanians work in tourist areas, in restaurants and hotels (Lazaridis and

Psimmenos 2000).

50

Domestic service is another sector where Albanians are concentrated. The
overwhelming majority of Albanians in this occupation are females. Like males in
construction, Albanian females are mostly employed as domestics in big cities such as
Athens and Thessalonica, where, according to Lazaridis and Psimmenos (2000: 181),
demand for such a job is high due to rising levels of female employment, changes in
family structure, and the lack of adequate childcare provision. The job consists of
multiple tasks such as cleaning, cooking, baby-sitting, and caring for the elderly.18

The jobs Albanians perform in Greece are low status, low paid, unstable, insecure,
and often under very precarious conditions, and are mostly located in Greek owned small
firms in the informal economy (losifides 1997). Research has found that Albanians have
the greatest instability, highest employment insecurity, and the greatest degree of job
precariousness, even compared to other immigrant groups (i.e., Egyptians, Filippines)
(Iosifides and King 1998). They are perceived to be the group most easily to be exploited
by the Greek employers. To take but one example, the domestic service. Compared to
Filippinas, Albanian women are paid less, have no social security or entitlement to paid
holidays, are required to do the most menial and degrading tasks, and are more likely to
be exposed to physical and psychological abuse by their employers (Lazaridis and
Psimmenos 2000: 181).

Albanians, more so than other immigrant groups in Greece, face widespread
racism and discrimination, which according to King and Vullnetari (2003) are attributed
to factors such as their large numbers, lack of other prominent migrant nationalities;

rather antagonistic historical relations between the two countries, during and since the

 

l . . . . .

8Albaman females are also recruited to work in sex industry, as “entertainers” or “models” and then
forced into prostitution by “unscrupulous” agents or their fiiends (Lasaridis and Psimmenos 2000). This
research, however, does not deal with these types of employment

51

Ottoman empire, as well as the presence among immigrants of large numbers of ethnic-
Greek minorities who are treated better than the “real” Albanians (King and Vullnetari
2003: 38-39). Stereotypes of Albanians as “dangerous” and “criminal” are very prevalent
among Greek society. Greek mass media have played a major part in creating these
stereotypes (see Droukas 1998 for more on this issue). Furthermore, their legal status19
of six-month and one-year permits, or no legal permit at all, as well as cases when Greek
police tear up valid permits in order to humiliate Albanians (Baldwin-Edwards 2004b:
61) adds to their already difficult situation, in that it makes it much easier for Greek
employers to exploit them.

Even so, Albanian immigrants have found various ways to mitigate the effects of
this hostile environment. One of the ways is that of baptism of their children. This is
particularly the case with those Albanian families who are Muslims”. In these cases, the
Greek employers, fiiends, neighbors willingly acts as godmother/ godfather of the
irnmigrant’s child who is born in Greece (Hatziprokopiou 2003; Lazaridis and
Romaniszyn 1998). Another is the change of names flom Muslim names to Greek
orthodox ones. Albanians feel that these strategies will help them and their children in
their socioeconomic adaptation in Greek society (Hatziprokopiou 2003).

Significant as this scholarship is in terms of highlighting labor market outcomes

of immigrants, there are still gaps in the literature:

 

19For more on Greek State immigration policy see Baldwin-Edwards (2004b); Baldwin-Edwards and

Fakiolas (1999); Fakiolas (2003).

In terms of religious composition, Albania consists of three major religions: Muslims, Christian
Orthodox and Catholics. It should be noted, however, that during the communist regime, religion was
banned, and Albania was officially declared as an atheist country. After the fall of communism, people
were allowed to practice fleely their religion. The country is secular and no political party is related to any
particular religion. For more on the issue of religion in Albania, see Hall (1994: 42-49).

52

First: Most of the literature on migrants’ adaptation in host societies is conducted
in societies which are considered traditional countries of immigration, such as United
States, Canada, Australia, Israel, countries with a long history of immigration, such as
Great Britain, or those Northern European countries which received immigrants as part of
“guest worker” system, or as part of citizens of former colonies. Albanians, on the other
hand, move to Greece, a country that is very different flom these others in many respects.

To begin with, Greece, unlike traditional countries of immigration, or those with a
long history of immigration, was for a long time a country of emigration. In the period
between 1945-1973, nearly a million Greeks emigrated to the Western European
countries such as West Germany, as well as North America, Canada and Australia
(Fakiolas 2000). As such its institutions were not prepared to respond to the new situation
of immigration.

In addition, Greece is a Southern European country, and, as Baldwin-Edwards
(1999:2) has maintained, migrations to Northern Europe display different characteristics
flom those of Southern Europe: In the first case, migrants were generally legal (except
France), and were recruited by employment recruited state agencies and were
incorporated into the formal economy. Bilateral treaties which existed between two
counties gave them legal protection, as well as equality with nationals or specific legal
base. By contrast, migrants to Southern Europe are generally illegal
(entry/residence/and/or work), are recruited by private illegal “brokers”, and they are also
highly absorbed in the informal economy. Moreover, there are bi/multi-lateral treaty for
expulsion arrangements, and often immigrants have no social and few legal rights

(Baldwin-Edwards 1999: 2).

53

Moreover, the migration of Albanians to Greece is a movement of people flom
one Balkan country to another. The intra-Balkan migration is different flom other
patterns of migration, because the highly contested borders21 in the region “induce
feelings of nationalism” (Baldwin-Edwards 2004b: 51 citing Alkan 2002: 59) among the
inhabitants of the region. Thus while on one hand, Albanians fit in Greece culturally
because of their similar history and culture, on the other hand their historical and cultural
proximity means that they cannot be accepted as Albanians (Baldwin-Edwards 2004b:
62).

Furthermore, as Triandafyllidou and Veikou (2002) indicate, in Greece there is
the idea of “hierarchy of Greekness”, where different immigrants and refirgee groups are
organized in concentric circles around the ethnonational core. Those immigrant groups
closest to the ethnonational core are granted far more access and privileges than the ones
farthest flom the core. This hierarchy of Greekness is clearly reflected in the Greek
immigration policy, whereby special provisions based on co-etlmicity has privileged
certain groups over others. Pontic Greeks, who are members of Greek diaspora
“returning” flom the former Soviet Union and the group closest to ethnonational core, are
given full citizenship status and benefits that aim to facilitate their integration in the

Greek society. Greek Albanians”, the group next to Pontic Greeks to have Greek

 

2lBaldvvin-Edwards points to several important historic events that highlight this phenomenon: These
include the refusal of the Greeks of Northern Epirus (an area of Albania corresponding to southern-most
districts of Korcé and Gjirokastér) to become part of newly-formed Albania, who in turn formed a
provisional autonomous government; the failure of the Greek delegation at the Paris Conference of 1919 to
achieve annexation of the territory to Greece, which Greece had claimed for a long time (Baldwin-Edwards
2004: 51, summarizing Pentzopoulos 2002: 28; Veremis 1995: 16017; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002:
331)

22For Greeks, Greek Albanians are Albanian citizens, mainly flom southern Albania, of Greek ethnic
origin and Christian Orthodox religion (Trindafyllidou and Veikou 2003: 19). There is a lot of discrepancy
regarding the exact numbers of ethnic-Greek Albanians, as various sources quoted in Droukas (1998: 362)
reveal: the Albanian government census of 1989 puts the number of ethnic Greeks at 58,758. Leaders of the

54

nationality are not given full citizenship. Both of these groups, given their ethnic and
cultural ties with “real” Greeks, are not considered as a “threat” to the Greek cultural
homogeneity and their integration is thought to be much easier and less costly for the host
society. The last group in the hierarchy are the Muslim Albanians, whose “other” ethnic
origin and religion present a threat to the cultural homogeneity of Greek society
(Triandafyllidou and Mariangela 2002). As such they have become targets of widespread
racism and discrimination. Orthodox Albanians, while considered “better than Muslims”,
are subject to the same racism and discrimination directed against other Albanians, since
although they share a religion with the hosts, they are still thought of as immigrants who
come flom a backward country, not on a par with the standards of living of modern
European society (Rapper 2005: 191).

Second: Existing studies on economic adaptation. of Albanians in Greece are
important in that they provide an overall picture as to where Albanians are concentrated
in Greece’s economy. Yet, they are limited in their ability to fully explain experiences of
Albanians in the labor market, in that focus only on economic adaptation of Albanians in
the host society. However, as Gold (1995) argues for Russian Jewish migrants, in order to
fully understand employment experiences of Albanian migrants, we need to examine the

economic environment of communist Albania, under which the present immigrants

 

ethnic Greek community place this number at 260,000, whereas other sources argue that there are about
400,000 ethnic Greeks living in Albania. According to CIA World Fact Book 1994, ethnic Greeks amount
to 100,000, whereas the Greek Helsinki Committee places this number at 150,000. These discrepancies in
numbers, according to Hall (1994), partly arises flom the Greek practice of counting all Albanians with
Orthodox leanings as Greek, thereby imposing a cultural imperialism over Albanian (as well as Serbian)
Orthodox Church adherents within the country (Hall 1994: 190-191). It is true, many Orthodox are ethnic
Albanians belonging to the Autocephalous Albanian Orthodox Church (Droukas 1998: 362 referring to
Human Right Watch/Helsinki 1995). It is also important to note what King and Vullnetari (2003: 40) have
pointed out, that the divide between ethnic Greeks and ethnic-Albanian Albanians has become blmred
(through marriage, name change, false documents, tactical religious conversion etc.) so that it is very
diflicult for Greek government to determine the “true” Greek

55

worked and lived.23 In Albania, like elsewhere in former communist societies official
unemployment was non-existent. Employment in former communist countries was
deemed to be a state-guaranteed social right (Drobnié 1997: 72). In fact, full employment
was one of the fimdamental concepts and objectives of state socialism, and an important
factor of regime’s legitimation (Drobnié 1997: 72, referring to Ferge 1992). People,
however, did not have a job choice, since the government fully controlled peoples’
employment process. Upon completion of education, one was assigned a job, which
he/she had to take and could potentially work in it for the rest of his/her working life.

By moving to capitalist Greece, Albanians face a situation that is quite foreign to
them: looking and applying for jobs as well as going through interviews. In sum, then,
they lack skills required in modern industrialized society. In addition, even when they
find jobs, they have to constantly worry about keeping these jobs, since a flee market
society does not provide a lifetime “guaranteed job”. All of these have to be done in a
language and environment, which is very unfamiliar to immigrants, and very often a
hostile environment. Moreover, as previously mentioned, given four decades of
govemment’s ban on emigration, Albanians who grew up under communist regime
lacked a history of migration. As a result of these circumstances then, Albanians will face
great challenges in the labor market.

Third: Most of the literature so far has focused on migrant women who
experience regular paid employment for the first time in their life. Albanian women, on
the other hand, come flom a country, where, like elsewhere in former communist

countries of Eastern Europe paid employment was a norm (Einhom 1993: 113). Equal

 

23I am indebted to ideas in this part to the work of Gold (1995)

56

access to education and employment of women was central to the socialist state’s social
project. In fact, women’s employment was a state’s protected social right. In view of this
commitment, educational as well as employment opportunities improved significantly for
Albanian women during socialist regime. For example, toward the end of 19703 women
constituted 46 percent of the nation’s total labor force (Hall 1994: 84). This proportion is
higher than that of Greece, which by the 19903, women represented 35-36% of the total
working population in the country.24 In addition, the government had established
subsidized day-care centers, kindergartens and other social benefits to facilitate women-
mother’s work (Prifti 1978). By moving to Greece, Albanian women, like men will no
longer have the opportunity of the “guaranteed jobs”. Moreover, Albanian women, in
particular mothers with small children, will also lose the social benefits that they had
under socialist society, since being non-EU citizens, as well as being often illegal, they
cannot qualify for the limited Greek childcare facilities (Lazaridis and Psimmenos. 2000:
181). These factors then make for a unique environment, which will greatly impact the
experiences of Albanians in Greece.

In sum, we would argue that the existing scholarly research on experiences of
immigrants in the labor market has provided a great contribution to the understanding of
economic adaptation of immigrants in host society’s labor markets. In spite of this,
however, this literature has several limitations: Research has mostly focused on
immigrants in traditional countries of migration, countries with a long history of

immigration, or to Northern European countries, which received immigrants as part of

 

24We should be careful as not to “romanticize” the achievements of Albanian women. It should be
emphasized, that despite state socialism’s commitment to gender equality in the work place, and despite the
fact that women managed to enter several traditionally male-dominated occupations, professions (i.e.,
medicine, law) and sectors of economy, there was a marked and continuing occupational segregation of a
kind not dissimilar flom that obtaining in Western Europe (Einhom 1993: 121).

57

“guest worker” system or as part of citizens of former colonies. Meanwhile, little
research is done in countries, which for a long time were themselves countries of
emigration and which have, in the last decade or so been transformed to countries of
immigration. The literature, in particular European literature has largely ignored
experiences of migrants flom former communist countries, whose lack of exposure and
skills of modern capitalist society will affect their orientation and adjustment in the
capitalist West in various unique ways. Finally, literature on gender and migration has
focused mostly on women who for the first time have access to paid income, or regular
paid employment. For Albanian women, on the other hand, like women in other former
socialist societies, employment was a state guaranteed social right. Moreover women, in
particular women with small children had access to all social benefits provided by the
socialist state, which upon moving to Greece, because of their non-EU citizen status as
well as often their illegal status will lose these benefits. The existing literature, then, is
incapable of explaining these experiences. As a result of this, it is the task of this project
to address these existing limitations in the literature of migrants and labor market

experiences.

58

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodology

The data to be used for this dissertation were collected over the period of August
2006 until August 2007. This research employs the extended case method put forth by
Burawoy (1991) and has been successfully employed by other researchers in the field of
sociology (see readings in Burawoy 1991). The importance and the depth of this method
lies in the ability to identify “abnormal” or “anomalous” cases that have not been fully
accounted for by the exact theories and “allow original extensions and reforrnulations of
pre-existing theoretical understandings” (Kates 2006: 182). This method, thus, enables
researchers to use field work to test, challenge and reconstruct existing theories, given the
“exceptionalism” and “uniqueness” of the social situations to be analyzed and explained
(Burrawoy 1991). In view of the unique features of Albanian migration, I believe that the
extended case study is an excellent methodological tool to utilize in this research.

The research instrument used in this ethnographic study is that of the interview,
that “favored digging tool” of sociologists (Benney and Hughes 1956: 137), which is a
flexible way of asking people directly about what is going on and has the potential of
providing rich and highly illuminating material (Robson 1993: 229). More specifically,
this research study uses the open-ended/in-depth interview, in which the interviewer
gives little or no direction to the interviewee and there is no pre-specified sets or order of
questions (Robson 1993: 159). Unlike structured interview, open-ended interviews

provide a greater depth of the social phenomenon under study, given its qualitative

59

nature, without “imposing any a priori categorization that may limit the field of inquiry”
(Fontana and Frey 1994: 365-366). Moreover, unlike large-scale surveys based on
probability samples, qualitative interviews provides the researcher with an opportunity to
understand in depth, to capture the richness of the social phenomenon that is the object of
inquiry. Qualitative interviews have been extensively used by many researchers in their
work on immigrants, including undocumented immigrants (Chavez 1998; Chin 2005;
Delgado 1993; Gold 1995; Gold 2002; Hatziprokopiou 2003; Hondagneo-Sotelo 1994;
Kishinevsky 2004; Massey et al., 1987; Orleck 1999; Remmenick 2007; Waters 1999).

Two kinds of interviews were used, face-to-face and telephone interviews.
Telephone interviews, according to Berg (2001; 2007), although it may lack the face-to-
face interaction, is a very effective way of collecting data under certain situations, such as
dispersed geographic locations. This is the case with immigrants flom Southern Albania,
who live and work in various parts of Greece.

This research study consists of several level of sociological analysis: micro, meso
as well as macro. While in-depth interviews enable us to approach the micro as well as
meso levels of analysis, I draw upon of various historical materials, journalistic accounts,
existing socio-economic and political studies to provide the macro-based level of
analysis. This holistic approach, which has been used in earlier studies (Gold 2002;
Massey et al., 1987; Orleck 1999; Remmemck 2007) will, I believe, provide a
comprehensive view of the life and daily experiences of Albanian migrants in Greece.

The data were collected by two researchers, the research collaborator and myself.
The research collaborator is Albanian. She was born, raised in the town of Korea and

worked throughout all her life in the Korea region. She is currently retired. During her

60

career, she worked in education, as a teacher and as a principal of a high school in the
town of Korea. She was also active in various aspect of public life. Being a native of
Korea, as well as her work as an educator has provided her with an extensive familiarity
with the socioeconomic, cultural milieu of the town as well as most of the region. It has
also provided her with a wide web of social networks, which facilitated the outreach of
the subjects in this study. The research collaborator had previously collaborated with the
author of this dissertation in another project, therefore she was familiar with research
process.

I am a native of Albania as well. This is the second project I have been involved
with Albanian immigrants. I conducted the first research project25 with Albanian
immigrants flom Korea26 who lived and worked (mainly) in Greece during the summer of
199927. I interviewed about 120 immigrants. In addition, I carried out interviews with
officials of the local bodies. This experience provided me with initial insights into the life
of immigrants in Greece, their daily struggles, difficulties they encounter, their efforts to
adjust to life in Greece. It also provided me with a wealth of preparatory material which

was extremely useful when I conducted the field work for this dissertation.

 

25The title of the project was: “International migration flom Eastern Europe. An initial assessment of the
consequences of the gradual disintegration of the authoritarian systems in Central Eastern Europe and the
impact of this disintegration for the labor mobility, integration and economic development.” The project
was funded by Michigan State University “All University Research Initiation Grant.” The principal
investigator for this project was Dr. Brendan Mullan.

26Korea is the major town of the Korea district. The town had a long history of migration prior to
communist take over. In the immediate post-communist area, the town has experienced significant
migration flows as the population has moved to Tirana (the capital of Albania) and abroad in search of
better economic opportunities. Given the close proximity with Greece, the district and town has become the
“jumping off” place for thousands of Albanians flom Korea or surrounding areas who have migrated to
Greece (Atchison 1993).

61

The research collaborator conducted 12 interviews during August and September
of 2006 in the city of Korea. The author of this dissertation, on the other hand, conducted
telephone interviews with 52 people, in the time between December 2006 until July 2007.
The majority of the interviews were conducted with immigrants who live in Athens,
given that a large number of Albanian migrants, live and work in Athens. The rest of the
interviews were conducted in Thessalonica and Crete. One interview was conducted in
the United States via telephone. The subject was of significant interest to the study, since
he left Albania in the very early stages of migration. After spending a significant amount
of time in Greece, he moved to the United States where he has been working and living
ever since.

The sampling is that of snowball sampling, which is sometimes the best strategy
to locate people with the required attributes for the study. In view of Berg (2001; 2007),
the main strategy of snowballing is to first identify people with relevant characteristics
and to interview them. Then, the interviewer can ask them to provide names of other
people who possess the same attributes (Berg 2001: 33).

In the case when the research collaborator conducted interviews, she proceeded in
the following way: she first got in touch with people who had connections or knew
immigrants in Greece. She then gave a detailed description of the study and asked them if
they could get her in touch with immigrants who, at that time, were visiting Korea. Once
the first subjects were identified and agreed to be interviewed, the researcher asked them
if they knew of other immigrants who would like to be interviewed for the study, which
they did. Before the interview began, the interviewer showed them the letter of consent

which was translated in Albanian.

62

A similar procedure was followed in the case of telephone interviews.
Recruitment of interviewees was done through the use of the social networks as well as
through snowball sample referrals. Initially the research collaborator and myself
contacted people we knew in Korea and asked them if they knew people who were
immigrants in Greece. We explained to them the reasons I wanted to get in touch with
Albanian immigrants in Greece and if they could possibly help me to do so. When
everything was arranged, I called the subject (the telephone number was given to me by
the informer) at their home, explained in detail who I was, the reason I was calling and
provided a detailed description of the study. I also read to them on the phone the letter of
consent. After they agreed to be interviewed, I went ahead with the interview.

The research assistant was able to interview immigrants who hail flom the Korea
region. In the process of interviewing, however, I decided to include people flom other
parts of Albania, in particular Southern Albania, given that the largest number of
Albanians in Greece come flom the south. The purpose was to obtain a more
representative picture of Albanian migrants in Greece. This was made possible by the
diverse background of subjects/informants who were willing to be interviewed.

The first informant I contacted was an immigrant who comes flom Korea. He is
an active member of “Korea” organization, but is also actively involved in Albanian life
in Greece. This position has enabled him to establish “strong and weak” networks ties
with immigrants hailing not only flom Korea, but other parts of Albania as well. As a
result of his embededness in this web of multiple networks, I was able to include in my
sample participants flom various towns and villages of Albania (mainly south). Upon

completion of the interview, as mentioned earlier, I would also request the interviewee if

63

s/he could assist me in locating other participants. In such cases, the “new informers”
would activate their “weak” and “strong” ties to recruit other participants. For example,
on a few occasions, the “new recruiters” would refer me to their siblings and relatives
(strong ties). In other cases, they would refer me to people they had met and forged ties
on various occasions. They came either flom their communities of origin, or elsewhere in
Albania (interregional ties). For example, one of the interviewers gave me the telephone
number of another immigrant, whom she had met while at a Greek language learning
course (weak ties). In some occasions, after having being interviewed, people were so
enthusiastic about the project that they suggested that I interview either their spouses,
siblings, close fiiends (strong ties). Due to aid of these multifarious networks, I was able
to obtain a sample of participants hailing flom diverse geographic locations.

In doing telephone interviews, I had to overcome the difficulties that lies in the
nature of telephone interview, the lack of face-to-face interaction, which is important in
establishing rapport of trust between the interviewee and the interviewer. This becomes
more serious in the case of Albanians, who, for a long time, given the socio-political
realities under which they lived, many people were aflaid of the political repercussions of
giving out detailed information to outsiders. This is not to be taken lightly, given that
after forty years of a despotic regime, wherein torture and exile were flequently meted
out on the most capricious of pretenses, Albanians became naturally fearful of political
reprisals. In this process, my informers were an invaluable help in establishing much of
the trust needed in an interview like this. Without their assistance this research project

would have been impossible.

64

In addition, my status as a doctoral student in an American university, proved to
be highly useful during the interview process. Americans, for the most part, are viewed
with a combination of respect and admiration. Furthermore, any individual attending an
American university is granted a high level of respect and status among Albanians. In
many instances, it seemed that respondents felt very pleased and honored that a doctoral
student flom an American university was talking to them, hence a reason to trust a
faceless voice.

Finally, my status as community’s “insider” was another advantage in my work”.
I am Albanian, I speak Albanian fluently (it being my mother tongue), therefore I have a
deep insight into Albanian culture, life and events. Often during the interviews people
would discuss with me events that had occurred in Albania, aspects of daily life and
culture of Albania. That further eased the process of the telephone interviews and
encouraged people to be more open to express their stories.

The interviews ran anywhere flom forty minutes to about two hours. In some
cases, the interview was carried out in several sessions, since they had to attend to daily
chores, such as taking kids to sports activities, shopping, preparing food, or visiting their
fiiends and relatives. At the end of the interview, I asked the subjects if they knew of
other immigrants who like them, would be willing to be interviewed. In fact, at the end of
the interview, some of the subjects developed an interest in the subject that they

immediately suggested that I talked to their cousin or fiiend. Only three people, who had

originally agreed to be interviewed, refused to do so when I called them.

 

28Like me, various other researchers have conducted research work with their own communities
(Abusharaf 2002; Bernstein 2006; Kishinevsky 2004; Remmenick 2007).

65

The total sample for this research project consists of 64 subjects. There is an equal
number of men and women in the sample, thirty-two each. Of the participants in the
study, two respondents had left in 1989, three respondents had left Albania and moved to
Greece in 1990, twenty four had left in 1991, fourteen had come in 1992, four had come
in 1994, three had come in each year 1995 and 1996, five had come in 1997, three had
come in each year, 1998 and 1999, and only one had come in 2000.

As far as educational level is concerned, eight participants had eight years of
school, thirty-three had twelve years of education, one had only thirteen (had not finished
high school) years of education, one had finished one year of university while another
one had finished only two years of university, three immigrants possessed high school as
well as several years of vocational training/education, ten people had university degrees,
and seven had post graduate (one to three years) educational degrees. Twelve of the
participants were flom the rural areas, while the rest came flom urban areas. Only three
people were single, two of them women, and the rest were married. Their age ranged
flom 25 to 60 years old.

The interview questions obtained information on 1. Socio-Demographic
Characteristics: 2.Motivation3; 3.Social Networks; 4.Experience of Albanians in the
Labor Market (See Appendix C). All interviews were conducted in Albanian and were
later translated into English. All but three interviews were tape recorded. In the case of
three interviewees, who did not their interview to be recorded on the tape, detailed notes

were taken down.

66

Analysis of Data

For this research, data were analyzed through qualitative mechanisms. First, all
the interviews were written down in details, a process yielding a rather voluminous data
set. As a result, data reduction and simplification were necessary so that I could easily
access and understand the data, along with being able to educe various themes and
patterns (Berg 2001: 35). Memo writing in the margins of transcripts, for example, helped
in the initial process of examining data base (Creswell 1998). In addition, I also used
code, which is another widely used data reduction and transformation technique. Codes
consists are labels that are “attached to ‘chunks’ of various size-words, phrases,
sentences, or whole paragraphs,” (Miles and Huberman 1994: 56-57) of the transcribed
interviews. They helped me to pull out the information and organize it into various
categories, whereby I was able to elicit certain themes (subtlrernes) and patterns that are
used for this dissertation.

Particular attention was paid to the protection of participants’ identity. To
preserve the anonymity of the respondents I gave a pseudonym and a number to each
interview. In such a way, their real identities are not known. All names of respondents are
kept anonymous. Table 1 (see below) provides a list of all participants (with

pseudonyms) in the study.

67

Table 1 List of All Participants in the Study

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Name Age Sex Education Pre-migration Year Current
occupation left occupation
Endrita 59 F high school supervisor 1989 domestic worker
Veton 50 M high school Technician 1989 artisan in a store
Ilirjan 51 M eight year agricultural worker 1990 agricultural
worker and sale
Edona 54 F high school lab assistant, tailor 1990 domestic worker
Joni 40 M eight years agricultural worker 1990 construction
Klarenti 36 M high school did not work 1991 construction
Bardhyl 60 M high school mechanic 1991 construction
plus two years
of mechanical
training
Itena 44 F high school agricultural worker 1991 assistant nurse
Rezarta 46 F high school lab assistant, tailor 1991 agricultural
worker, domestic
worker
Ndricim 46 high school mechanic 1991 technician
Gerti 35 one year of did not work 1991 seasonal
college agricultural work,
restaurant,
construction
Briana 42 F high school small factory that 1991 cleaner in a
made clothes factory, supervisor
in a factory
Genci 53 M eight years agricultural worker 1991 construction
Samir 43 M high school Mechanic 1991 manual laborer in
a factory
Edlira 45 F high school Mechanic 1991 domestic worker
Indriti 52 M high school supervisor 1991 agricultural
laborer, cleaning
factory, self
employed
Arjeta 50 F post graduate in education 1991 domestic worker,
degree dishwasher,
babysitter, self-
employed
professional

 

68

 

Table 1 continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ylli 51 M post graduate formerly skilled 1991 skilled
degree professional professional
Petrit 51 M post graduate formerly skilled 1991 agricultural
degree professional laborer,
construction
Piro 40 M high school Mechanic 1991 construction
Kreshnik 57 M high school Supervisor 1991 agricultural
laborer, salesman,
loading and
unloading lorries,
construction
Ardita 33 F eleven years of did not work, 1991 domestic worker
school because she left the
country
Etina 46 F high school factory worker 1991 domestic service,
takes care of
elderly
Blerina 46 F high school tailor in a clothing 1991 tailor
factory
Fisnrku' 58 M high school Mechanic 1991 self-employed
Blerimi 35 M high school Mechanic 1991 construction
Rezarti 40 eight years factory worker 1991 construction and
as a carpenter
Erindi 59 M post graduate taught in higher 1991 agricultural
degree education laborer, gas
station, take care
of a building
Lulezim 60 M university Teacher 1992 construction,
degree gardener
Tom 41 M high school service industry 1992 construction, gas
station
Fatbardh 49 F university highly skilled 1992 non government
a graduate profession organization
Blerta 38 F university did not work 1992 works in a
degree restaurant
Flori 41 M eight years agricultural worker 1992 construction
Afc'rdita 37 F high school factory worker 1992 domestic worker

 

69

 

Table 1 continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Suela 43 high school assistant economist 1992 domestic worker
and two years
of vocational
school
J onida 40 university did not work 1992 domestic worker
degree
Genti 36 high school agricultural work 1992 Loading,
unloading lorries
in a business firm
Kastrioti 60 post graduate highly skilled 1992 small enterprise
degree profession factory
supervisory
Ardiana 52 high school teacher 1992 stays at home to
recover flom
illness
Aférdita 37 university did not work 1992 house cleaner,
degree high status
occupation
Erioni 56 high school mechanic 1992 construction
Fatjona 42 high school worked in state 1992 worked in a store,
farm domestic worker
Merlinda 42 high school worked in a factory 1994 domestic worker
Kreshnik 40 high school mechanic 1994 parking place
plus two years
university
Bukuros 38 high school mechanic 1994 domestic worker
he
Jetmir 52 post graduate highly skilled 1994 construction
degree profession
Elioni 60 university teacher 1 995 restaurant,
degree construction,
gardener
Zaimrr 59 post graduate highly skilled 1995 gardener
degree occupation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

70

 

Table 1 continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

F lorenca 50 F high school tailor 1995 tailor
and four year
of vocational
school
Albana 30 F high school Tailor 1996 domestic worker
Arjan 42 F high school mechanic 1996 construction
Marsela 42 F high school factory worker 1996 domestic worker
Drita 34 F university did not work 1997 stay at home and
degree raise kids
Rozafa 33 F high school worked in a 1997 domestic worker
warehouse
Gézim 52 M high school factory supervisor 1997 construction
Shkelqi 32 M university high status job 1997 high status job
m degree
Jeton 30 M eight year did not work 1997 mechanic in a car
repair shop
Bora 35 F high school teacher 1998 domestic worker
Klodiana 42 F high school factory worker 1998 domestic worker
Gj inovef 52 F eight years agricultural worker 1998 domestic worker
a
Valbona 41 F high school service industry 1999 works in a
restaurant
Andi 60 M university highly skilled 1999 daily manual
degree profession laborer, highly
skilled profession
Anxhela 46 F university highly skilled 1999 babysitter, works
degree profession in a hotel
Adelina 25 F eight years Tailor 2000 prepares food in a
take-away food
stand

 

71

 

 

CHAPTER 4
MOTIVATIONS AND MEANS OF LEAVING THE COUNTRY:

UNDERSTANDING ALBANIAN MIGRATION

The focus of this chapter is Albanian motives to leave their country. First, I
describe people’s everyday life under communist regime. Then I proceed to provide an
analysis of people’s motives of migrating to Greece. In the end, I give an account of

migrants’ ways and means of making the trip to Greece.

Daily Life under the Communist Regime

Albanian immigrants’ experiences in Greece will be largely shaped by life in their
country of origin. Albanians grew up under the most isolated society in the former
communist bloc, known as the “North Korea” of Europe. Individual fleedoms, such as
fleedom to express oneself, fleedom to assemble, fleedom of press, fleedom to practice
religion, and as it has already been mentioned, fleedom to leave the country”, were
severely repressed. The communist party and the state controlled every aspect of life in
Albania, including people’s most private sphere, the family. Children, spouses, relatives,
close friends, neighbors were used as informers by the Sigurim, the secret police,
reaching into every living room (Vickers and Pettifer 1997: 12).

Everyday life was characterized by a shortage of goods and various amenities, as
seen in the familiar long queues of Eastern European societies. One had to get up at two
o’clock in the morning and line up in queue for some of the basic food (i.e., meat, cheese,

milk), with the ordeal to continue later in the day, with people (most often women)

 

29 . . . .
Internal migration was kept at a minimum as well.

72

scanning the (often empty) stores for a kilo of vegetables, or a package of beans. In
addition, running water and electricity, became very erratic, a common occurrence in the
eighties. When asked what were the things that impressed them most when they arrived
in Greece, the overwhelming majority of immigrants cited: the multiplicity of stores, the
supermarkets and the multitude and large variety of consumer goods (i.e., food, clothes),
the lack of ration, lights, well lit roads. Ardita, for example, who left in 1991 and stayed
in a Greek refugee camp for its first month, told me that she was very surprised to see in
the camp that the staff would bring them different kind of soaps, since in Albania, she
said “we hadonly one soap for everything. Those that cost 15 leks.” Similarly, Endrita,
who went to Greece in 1989 as a tourist to visit her cousin, expressed her shock at what
she saw for the first time: “When I went to Greece, it was during Christmas time. And I
opened my eyes and was looking everywhere. I could see lights, everywhere lights, wide
boulevards, full of lights. I told to myself, “What a miracle”. I was so shocked. And then
the food at my cousin’s. It’s not that I lived bad in Albania. But this, I had never seen
anything like this. I saw coca cola for the first time. I had never seen coca cola in my life,
except on the TV. All those oranges, ice creams, various kinds of cheese. I said to myself
“Wow, how they live!” I was really shocked. I could not speak. I was tongue tied. I knew
the language well, but I could not speak. My cousin would talk to me, but I would not
respond at all. I started to mix up words, because I was so shocked.”

Housing was in short supply, too. Often two generations, or several families, had
to share a one, two, or three room apartment. For example, Rezarta, who came to Greece
in 1991, described the housing situation of her family in Albania: “I suffered so much

before I came to Greece. When I married, there were fourteen of us in two rooms and a

73

kitchen”. All of us were living there until we left. Three brothers lived in one apartment.
All of them were married and had families. We slept in the same room with my
mother-in-law. She would sleep in the couch in our room... It was really bad. What can I
say? I stayed at that apartment for six years. It was very bad. If I had stayed longer, I
would have died. I couldn’t handle it any longer.”

Not only were the daily life necessities in short supply, but access to them
depended largely on one’s standing in the power structure of the communist party and
bureaucracy. While communists claimed to have eliminated a system based on class
inequalities, inequalities based on wealth were replaced with inequalities based on power.
One’s standing in the hierarchy of communist party structure and bureaucracy meant
access to privileges. The top party leadership (politbureau and their families) enjoyed
access to special benefits, such as cars, houses (including vacation houses), trips abroad3 1,
much better quality food, Western consumer goods (i.e., blue jeans, colored TVs)
available in their “special store”. Other party and government officials would also have
access to consumer goods (i.e., colored TV, washing machines, refrigerators, bigger
apartments), which were beyond the means and reach of ordinary people. As one
immigrant said: “The first thing that impressed me when I went to Folorina was the
multitude of stores, the abundance of goods. In Albania, if we wanted to have a television
set, the first party secretary would get it. We the simple people could not get it.”

As mentioned in the previous chapter, in Albania, like elsewhere in Eastern Europe,

official unemployment was nonexistent. Everybody of working age had a guaranteed job,

 

30Often in apartments in Albania, the kitchen would be a room which would serve multiple purposes such
as a place to cook, living/reception room.

Cars, houses as well as trips abroad (organized for various reasons, including health reasons) were all
paid by the state.

74

assigned by the government, and for which ordinary people had no say. In addition, most
often than not, people would be in the same job until retirement. Fear of losing one’s job
was nonexistent. Employers were also entitled to benefits such as flee health care”, paid
vacations, paid maternity leave, vacation centers for workers and so on. Moreover,
Albania’s social security system extended literally flom “womb to tomb” covering
disability, old age pensions, and burial expenses (Jacques 1995: 539-540).

Wages were set by the government (Jacques 1995). There was little differential
between highest and lowest wages: the ratio being 1:2 so that in the mid-19803 a “factory
director would take home approximately 900 leks a month, and assembly worker 750 and
a roadsweeper 600” (V ickers and Pettifer 1997: 12). There were no material incentives
for people to work. People were paid, whether they worked or not. The joke was: “We
pretend to work, and the government pretends to pay us”. As a result, absenteeism flom
work became common. One immigrant recounted (with a sense of nostalgia) his
experiences with his work in Albania: “Whether I worked or not, I got paid. I was fiiend
with my supervisor. I used to tell my supervisor “I am leaving; I am not coming to work.
I have some business to attend” And I would go and have a good time with my fliends.
. My work was such that I did not have to fulfill any norms. So at about 10 o’clock, I
would leave work. My fliends used to tell me: do you work or not? Well, I am good
fiiend with my supervisor, I used to tell them. So I had fun. I used to go to the café. Here

in Greece, there is no going to café. You have to work”.

 

32Albania, like other countries in Eastern EurOpe had universal health care, whereby everybody was
covered.

75

There were few if any of the violent crimes33 that occurred in the West”. One
could walk flee in the street even during the middle of the night, without the fear of being
robbed or murdered. Several immigrants, in particular women and parents with young
children who live in Athens, alluded to this safety. Said Etina, who lives in Athens,
“There was one good thing in that system, you would come back flom work late in the
night, for example I was working in a factory, and nobody would dare to touch you.
While here in Greece, there are many people that do drugs, there are people that drive by
with a motorcycle and steal your bag. You understand me. You are aflaid to be alone in
the street when you come back flom your work at night. Things have happened here.
There is not much fear, but you still are aflaid to be alone. It is not like it was in Albanian

before, you could walk in the night and nobody would dare to say anything to you.”

Motives and Means of Leaving

Images of Greece before leaving

To begin with, all immigrants, with the exception of one, stated that they had
never thought of leaving the country before 1990. In their view, it would have been
unimaginable to leave the country, given the consequences their families would suffer.
Suela, for example who used to spend summers with her relatives in a village nearby
Greek borders, said that it never occurred to her to ever cross the border, “not even once.
It was unimaginable.” So deeply entrenched was the fear of emigrating in people’s lives

that even those immigrants who went to Greece in 1989 as tourists decided not to stay,

 

33Other kinds of crimes existed such as the theft of “socialist property” (i.e., head of a factory would use
the factory’s van/car to take his/her family to vacation), various forms of bribery and so on.

After the fall of communist regime, Albania, like the rest of Eastern European countries is beset by

crimes all too familiar to Western societies, including murder, drug and human trafficking, kidnapping of
children.

76

because they were aflaid of what would happen to their families in Albania. Endrita, for
example, went to visit her cousin in Greece, leaving her husband and three children
behind. After a month she came back to Albania, even though her cousin begged her to
stay and bring her family later. She did so, because as she put it: “I was aflaid, because it
was just the beginning. You know how it was. We had never been outside the country.
Who knew what would happen to my family. They could have been sent to some village
in exile.” The one immigrant, who said that he had thought of leaving before 1990, did
not do so because he was married and had a family. He said that if he had not been
married, he would have left.

Before moving to Greece, most of the immigrants thought of Greece as a country
that was much more affluent than Albania, that its people enjoyed a much higher standard
of living and, as some put it, Greece would give Albanians many, many things. For
immigrants who left in the early stages of migration, these images were largely shaped by
what people had seen on the foreign television channels. For example, Joni, who left in
1990, said, “more or less, I watched Greek TV, and I could see life there. And this pushed
me to leave. Also, I had heard other people talking about it. Listen, more or less, it’s not
that people did not talk at all about life abroad. They did talk in small groups, especially

the last years of communism, people began to talk more openly about things.”

Immigrants who left at a later time spoke of relatives and fliends who had been in
Greece and who had regaled them with stories about life there. Fatjona, who left in 1992
to join her brother, said: “All immigrants who had been in Greece, as well as my brother
who would come back flom Greece to visit us, said that life there is better than in

Albania. They told me that in Greece there are jobs, you will earn much more, it is better

77

than Albania.” Similarly, Genti, who left for Greece in 1992, stated: “I had heard and
seen people who had gone abroad. They told me, as soon as you cross Albania, excuse

me for saying this, but even a bathroom in the West is much better than living in

Albania.”

Motives of Leaving

For this study, immigrants were asked why they left Albania and moved to
Greece. Most of the immigrants stated economic reasons (unemployment, poverty,
deteriorating economic situation in Albania, and a desire to give their family a better life).
Another group pointed to family based reasons (reuniting with their spouses, relatives).
Others alluded to fear of instability, while some others referred to a desire or curiosity to
see the Western world. A few stated that they had left for tourist as well as health
reasons.

For example, Vjollca who left with her husband, said that they had to leave
because both she and her husband had “lost the jobs. My husband would sell things in the
market, but that earned him very little. We could not live on that.” Similarly, Erindi, who
worked in higher education, describes his reason for leaving in 1991: “I left for economic
reasons. I could not afford life any longer. My daughter was studying at the University of
Tirana. My entire wage went to pay for her expenses. It was that moment, when the
increase in prices was higher than the level of wages. So it was simply economic
reasons.”

Gerti, who interrupted his university studies to go to Greece, pointed to economic

reasons as well as to the fact that he saw that everybody was leaving: “I thought about

78

economic problems. I did not have any economic support. And at that time, everybody
had a psychology of leaving, meaning to see things, to find something better.”

Other immigrants, in addition to economic reasons, stated that they wanted to come to
Greece to see the Western world. This is the case with Klarenti and Ndrieimi, who left in
1990 and 1991, and were single at the time they left Albania.

Klarenti: I left for economic reasons. That’s understandable. To come and work
and make some money, because in Albania we were nothing, zero. But also, to see the
world. To see the women of the world, how they dress up, how much cream they put on
their face, what kind of make up they put on their face, like we had watched on the TV.”

In a similar way, Ndrieimi explained: “I left for economic reasons. Also, to see
what was going on in the flee world. I had watched on the Greek and Yugoslavian TV
how life was in the flee world, and I could see that we were very poor, especially when it
came to food.”

A group of immigrants cited family-based reasons for coming to Greece. Among
these, some immigrants, mainly women, said that they had come to reunite with their
husbands and their fiancées who were immigrants in Greece. Others explained that they
had come to join their parents, and siblings, while two others said that they had come to
join their children. Some immigrants, more particularly, those who belonged to the Greek

and Vllach35 minority stated that they left for Greece to visit their relatives living there.

 

35Vllachs (also known as Aromanians) are one of Albania’s minority ethnic group. They speak a dialect
akin to Romanians (Winnifiith 2002:22). The Vllachs (this part is based on the work of Schwandner-
Sievers 1999) belong to Orthodox religion, which automatically places them (along with those Albanians
who regard themselves as Orthodox) into the “Greek minority.” During the communist time, Vllachs were
not viewed as a separate ethnic minority group, and were officially considered as highly assimilated. With
the collapse of communist system, an Aromanian ethnic movement emerged in Albania. The movement is
split into two groups: a pro-Romanian group and a pro-Greek faction, with members switching flom one to
the other, depending on opportunities (i.e., scholarship to study in Romanian and Greek schools, visas for
Greece) that “allegiance” to the group offer to them. Many thousands of Vllachs live compactly in northern

79

It is important to note, however, that although the communist regime prohibited any form
of emigration, as well as communication between Albanians and their relatives abroad,
some form of communication, minimum as it was, was maintained, mostly via occasional
letters (highly censured by the government). Once the communist regime collapsed, these
ties were revived.

Endrita, for example, whose mother belonged to the Greek minority told her story:
“My mother’s brother was in Greece. He had left Albania and went to Greece before
World War II. My mother kept in touch with him through letters. She wrote Greek very
well, like the Greeks... Every six, eight or one year, I do not remember very well, she
would send and get a letter flom her brothers. Maybe the letters were checked by the
government, I do not know, but we got the letters flom him and my mother would write
back. She kept in touch with her brothers through letters until about 1968, when I
applied to become a member of the communist party. At that time, my mother stopped
sending letters. I put a pressure on her. I even destroyed all the letters they had sent us.

Interviewer: Why?

Endrita: Because I wanted to become a member of the communist party. And at
that time if you had somebody abroad, it was not good. I kept the pictures he had sent us,
pictures of his wife and children. After that she did not send letters any longer. But her
brother who lived in Tirana, he kept correspondence via letters. In 1986, my cousin’s son

came to Albania as a tourist. He went to Tirana hotel and had the old address of my

 

Greece (as well as Macedonia (FYROM) and southern Albania; traces of Vlach-Aromanians and pockets of
Aromanian population are to be found in Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia and Romania). Many of the pro-Greek
Aromanian families practiced a nomadic pastoralism well into the communist period, when mobility was
hindered by the impermeable political borders between Albania and Greece. During communist times,
however, Vllachs, like members of Greek minority were prevented flom communicating with their relatives
over the border (W inniflith 2002).

80

uncle. He asked the people there if they could find my uncle. The people found the
address of my uncle and called him at home and asked him: there are some Greek
tourists here, would you agree to meet these people? My uncle said “Yes, of course I
would meet them. They are my people.” Then they called me and asked me if I wanted
to come and meet them. My mother was dead at that time. So I went and met them. I met
them and I invited him to come to my house next time he would come to Albania again.
I sent him a letter of guarantee, so he came to my house next time. He had a good time
with me and my family. Then, he invited me to come and visit Greece. I got a Greek
tourist visa. So I left. It was 1989. ”

Some immigrants alluded to health issues as their reason for migrating, while one
said that he had come to pursue a training course in his field but given the deteriorating
situation in Albania, decided to stay, later bringing his family with him.

Another reason for emigration to Greece was conflict in the family. This is the case with
Blerim, who left in 1991. Blerimi “I had an argument with my father for political issues.
So I left with my fiiends. I did not have any economic problems ”

Interviewer: “What political issues?

Blerimi: “They (he means his parents) did not want me to leave Albania. I had
tried to leave during the time when the embassies opened. So they knew I wanted to
leave. They had different political opinions at that time. They did not have the same ideas
they have today. At that time, leaving the country was considered high treason. To leave
the country, to betray the country was very difficult.”

A group of immigrants cited fear of political insecurity and instability for their

families as the main reason for coming. This is particularly the case with migrants who

81

had left in 1997, although a few who left in the 1990 and 1991 alluded to this reason as
well. Said Gézim: “Mostly I came because of what happened in 1997. I could not bear to
see my children holding guns in his hands. I felt terrible about their life.”

These explanations, however, are micro as well as meso-based (networks)
explanations for reasons of exit. As mentioned above, the problem with micro-based
explanations is that they are post-migration reconstruction for reasons to migrate,
therefore they may be highly influenced by immigrants’ personal experience as well as
social environment he/she lives in. In addition, immigrants may be unaware of larger
structural, historical, economic, political and social developments that shape immigrants’
motivations to leave. Social networks, on the other hand, as our examples reveal, while
significant in shaping motivations to leave the country, cannot account for the majority of
migrants’ motives. More importantly, it could be said that both micro as well as macro
explanations cannot account for the timing of leaving. Concerning immigrants who left in
1997, while political instability provided the background that shaped irrrrnigrants’
motivation to leave, by this time, migration flom Albania was a well established trend. In
view of these considerations, I believe that a full explanation of forces that shape

Albanian migrants’ motives must take into consideration the role of the state.

Role of the Authoritarian Albanian State in Controlling Migration

In the first chapter, I argued that the authoritarian government of Albania, through
simultaneously limiting the economic development of the country and prohibiting
immigration, created the current environment of migration. Moreover, the fall of the

authoritarian state unleashed large-scale migration waves. In this section, I will lay out a

82

detailed analysis of these policies and their implications for migration flom Albania.
First, however, I will present a brief summary of pre-communist Albanian migration,
since I think this will provide us with a better understanding of the importance of the role

of the state in Albanian migration.

Immigration Prior to the Communist Rule
Prior to communist take over, emigration motivated by economic, social, and
political (i.e., foreign invasions, wars, dire economic conditions, political instability)
reasons was part of Albanian society. Historically speaking, the first massive wave of
migration of Albanians occurred between 15th and 18th century, where thousands of
Albanians fled the country as a result of Ottoman occupation, and moved to Italy
(Pipemo 2002: 1)36 and Greece. This migration has been described as ‘a religiously
motivated emigration, since the Turkish occupation forced the Islarnization of the
Christian Albanian population’ (Derherni 2003: 1017 In King and Vullnetari 2003: 21).
During the Ottoman Empire, various types of migration occurred. These included
the recruitment (often forcible) into Ottoman infantry and cavalry of young men; the
recruitment of Albanians into the elite guard, the J anisseries, whose main residence was
the High Porte in Constantinople; exiles and students who studied in France and
Romania, as well as Albanian Christians and the Vlachs flom southeastern Albania, who
were forced to flee the country to escape the repressive military campaign of the Ottoman

Turks (Barjaba and King 2005: 7).

 

36By 1886 there were recorded 181,738 Italo-Albanians, while the Italian census of 1907 revealed that
numbers had increased to 208,410 (Hall 1994: 50).

83

Throughout the 19th and the first half of 20‘h century migration continued, with
Albanians moving as far as North Aflica, the United States”, South America and
Australia (UNDP 2000), in addition to those who moved to Romania, Bulgaria, Egypt and
Turkey proper (Hall 1994: 50), as well as Greece.38 Migration reached its high levels in
the 20th century. Between 1923 up to 1944, for example, approximately 150,000 people
had left the country (about 13 percent of the population), with the overwhelming majority
of immigrants originating in the areas in the south of Albania, particularly the coastal
region and some of the main cities such as Gjirokastra, Korea, Kolonja, Skrapari, Vlora,
Durrés, Pérmet and Pogrades (UNDP 2000: 35). Thus, international migration flom
Albania, in particular flom southern regions of the country, was a well-established
phenomenon prior to the communist take over. In fact, as Barjabas and King (2005: 24)
put it, the 1944-1990 hiatus can be seen as “an artificial interlude within the long term
historical flarnework of the migration of the Albanian people.”39 The advent of the

communists to power marked a radical departure with the past.

The Communist Period and Migration

When the communists seized power at the end of the World Word II, Albania was
the least developed country in Europe. Eighty eight percent of its population was
engaged in agriculture, using the most primitive technology; industrial bases comprised

mostly of minor light industry; it had the highest birth rates and infant mortality rates in

 

37For immigration to United States before the communist era, see Duka, (2001); Nagi (1989).

38As far as late 19th century, Albanians would travel by foot via Greek mountains for seasonal work in

textile and agricultural business in Greece (Psimmenos and Kassimati, 2004 In Baldwin-Edwards 2004: 5).

39The idea of the link, the “continuities” between Albania’s pro-communist migrations and post Cold War
migrations were first brought to my attention by Berry Nicholson in a discussion on the H-Network on
Migration History (2005).

84

Europe; illiteracy rates were at about 80 percent (among women the figure was well
above 90 percent) and Albania was the only country in Europe without a university of its
own (Prifti 1978; Glenny 1993). The communist government led by Enver Hoxha (the
head of the Communist Party of Albania) realized that the best and the shortest way to
move the country from a backward agrarian country to a modern agrarian-industrial, and
eventually to a modern industrial-agrarian one was by following a Stalinist-based path of
industrialization and collectivization (Prifti 197 8; Biberaj 1990; Jacques 1995).

To this end, the communists, as early as 1944, began to nationalize all industry,
banks, the transportation system, trade and mineral resources, bodies of water, pastures
and forests (Prifti 1978: 53), confiscate all foreign property, and revoke all of foreign
concessions (Hall 1994: 107). In this process, no compensation was given to the former
owners of the property. By 1947, “capitalist industrial production” had been almost
eliminated and no private enterprise was now permitted (Hall 1994: 107). Agriculture
went through similar radical changes. The Law on Agrarian Reform of 1945, expropriated
the land formerly owned by private institutions, banks, religious bodies, “foreigners” and
other large landowners and was given to the landless peasants, on the principle that “the
land belongs to the tiller” (Hall 1994: 119; Prifti 1978: 66). Similarly, no compensation
was given to former owners of the land. Soon afterwards, however, the communists went
on to bring under collective control the means of agricultural production (Hall 1994: 120).
In view of the Party leaders, collectivization of agriculture was the only way to build
socialism in the villages (Prifti 1978: 66). In line with the Stalinist program of
development, heavy industry was given priority over other sectors of the economy,

including agriculture. The country adopted the pattern of five-year plans, wherein all

85

economic activity of the country was directed under centralized state planning. The highly
centralized economic system went hand-in-hand with a highly centralized political
system. Under Hoxha’s undisputed rule the communist party became the “sole leading
political force of the state and society.” (The Constitution of People’s Republic of
Albania 1976: 3) All institutions, including governmental, social, cultural and military,
were under absolute control of the Party, and the Party was under absolute control of

Enver Hoxha.

In their efforts to realize the modernization and industrialization of the country in
a short time, Albania had to rely on bigger and economically more powerful foreign
powers. In the early years, Yugoslavia provided assistance needed to finance the
reconstruction of the country. As part of this assistance, a series of economic agreements
were concluded between the two countries. As a result of these treaties, and other
agreements that followed, Albania became totally dependent upon Yugoslavia and plans
were underway for Albania’s “union” with Yugoslavia40 (Biberaj 1990: 20). In June
1948, however, Yugoslavia was finally expelled flom the Cominforrn and Albania was
the first country of the communist block to attack Yugoslavia. A month later, all
agreements with Yugoslavia were annulled and all the Yugoslavian experts and advisers
in Albania were ordered to leave the country. As a result of this sudden split, the Albanian
government was forced to reduce its investment plans for 1949 by 20 percent. Moreover,
the purges that followed the split between these two countries (about 6,000 of people,

representing about 8 percent of the party’s membership were expelled flom the party) did

 

40Yugoslavia intended to set up a Balkan Federation comprising Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and
Greece, a plan which did not go well with Stalin who opposed this plan and was firrious at such a show of
independent foreign policy-making by his client states, and more importantly by their lack of consultation
with him (V icker 1999).

86

much to dislocate the Albanian economy and shake the morale of its work force (Hall
1994:108)

Hoxha then turned to Stalin for help.41 The Soviet Union’s assistance to Albania
was crucial to Albania’s modernization efforts. In September 1948, right after the split
with Yugoslavia, Albania and Moscow signed their first economic agreement, with the
Soviets canceling a large indebtedness (Jacques 1995: 468). The USSR bought the
exports of Albania at doubled prices, and imports flom the Soviet Union were delivered at
half price. In addition, the USSR renewed all the credits previously given by the
Yugoslavs. After the establishment of CMEA in February 1949 the other Eastern
European countries also began to assist Albania (Griffith 1963: 21). In total, the Soviet
aid given to Albania amounted to $600 million (Lendvai 1969: 194). As a result of this
aid, impressive results were achieved in virtually all aspect of Albanian life,42 and by
1960 the communist government of Albania had declared that the “construction of
economic basis of socialism” was completed (Hall 1994: 109).

The situation, however, changed dramatically after Stalin’s death, particularly

after Nikita Krushchev’s speech in the Twentieth Congress of Soviet Communist Party,

 

41The Albania-Soviet alliance was a positive event for Albania, in that the Soviet Union was
geographically distant enough as not to present a threat for Albania’s physical absorption, and the Soviet
Union was in a better position than Yugoslavia to provide the technical and material assistance the country
needed to rebuild its economy (Pano 1968: 87; Prifti 1978: 78). On the other hand, Albania’s strategic
position provided Soviet Union with a direct outlet to the Mediterranean, an opportunity which the Soviet
government seized upon immediately, establishing a Soviet naval base and submarine facility off Vloré
(South Albania) (Hall 1994: 39).

“According to Griffith (1963: 28-29), labor force rose rapidly in size and technical know-how, crude oil
production tripled, iron and nickel ore extraction grew rapidly; production in the light and food industries
also improved; consumption standards, particularly of industrial materials, improved rapidly, by 1955,
illiteracy was eliminated among adults under forty; during 1950- 1959 the number of physicians increased
from 129 to 378 and medical institutions flom 67 to 125; university of Tirana (Albania was the only
country in Europe without a university) was established in 1957 and many Albanian students went to the
Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries to study; a system of pensions for old age and disability
was established in 1953 and was made mandatory in 1959.

87

where he denounced Stalin’s methods of terror. Hoxha was never going to accept an
attack on Stalin and a de-Stalinization campaign, since as Biberaj (1990: 22) aptly put it:
“An implementation of de—Stalinization campaign in Albania where Hoxha and his closest
collaborators... had developed an extensive personality cult and instituted a reign of
terror, threatened the very foundations of the regime.” Moreover, Nikita Khrushchev’s
rapprochement with Yugoslavia after Stalin’s death, and the pressure on Tirana leadership
to rehabilitate the pro-Yugoslav faction was perceived by the Tirana ruling elite as a
serious threat to the country’s independence (Vickers 1999: 181). In addition,
Krushchev’s pressure on Albania to grow horticulture instead of focusing on
industrialization clashed with Albanian leadership who were obsessed with the vision of
an Albania with a heavy industry (Prifti 1978: 79). In spite of Moscow’s attempt to
persuade Albanian elite to change its policies, Tirana did not how to the pressure.
Eventually, Moscow broke diplomatic relations with Tirana in 1961, withdrawing its aid
flom Albania and recalling its advisers and specialists. The relations between Albania and
other Eastern European countries were significantly reduced as well. As in the case of the
split with Yugoslavia, a series of bloody purges of the pro-Soviet elements followed.
Hoxha’s disobedience to Moscow, however, seriously disrupted Albania’s
economic planning, given that the planning for the third five-year plan (1961-1965) had
relied heavily upon the delivery of Soviet and East European industrial equipment and
spare parts and the majority of Albania’s commercial and agricultural imports and exports
were geared to Eastern-bloc countries. As a result, the government was forced to adopt a

policy of strict austerity (V ickers 1999: 187; 191).

88

Albania then turned to China for help, whose leadership shared a common
ideological position towards the Soviets on the issues such as the nature of imperialism,
revisionism as a threat to the communist movement, peaceful coexistence between the
socialist and capitalist camps, a peaceful transition flom capitalism to socialism, de-
Stalinization campaign.43 Thus, Maoist China provided assistance to Albania, which was
crucial to the continuation of economic development. However the Chinese assistance
could not match that of the Soviet Union (Prifti 1978: 81). China’s credits, for example,
amounted to only one-fifth of the previous Soviet credits (Vickers 1999: 190-191).

In the early 19703, however, China changed the course of its foreign policy,
apparent in the visit of Richard M. Nixon to Beijing. The Albanian elite did not welcome
this move, since Hoxha feared that a rapprochement with United States would expose
Albania to the outside world, which in turn would encourage forces at home to demand
economic, political and social changes (Biberaj 1990: 27). This ideological alienation led
to a decline in Chinese aid, with industrial projects grinding to a halt as the desperately
needed materials and machinery were not delivered (V ickers 1999: 202). Yet, Tirana
refused to follow China’s new policy. In turn, China terminated its aid in 1978. Following
the split with China, Albania “went it alone.” The country adopted the principle of “self-
reliance,” involving maximum utilization of internal resources, including manpower, and
implementation of a strict saving regime, (Vickers 1999: 202) a principle which was even

enshrined in the 1976 constitution of Albania.44 From this point on, then, “Albania was

 

4 . .
3For more details on this topic see Biberaj (1986: 42-43).

44According to Article 28 of People’s Socialist Republic of Albania: The granting of concessions to, and
the creation of, foreign economic and financial companies and other institutions or ones formed jointly with
bourgeois and revisionist capitalist monopolies and states, as well as obtaining credits flom them, are
prohibited in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania (Kushtetuta e Republikes Popullore Socialiste té
Shqiperisé: 1975: 14).

89

reduced to a degree of self-irnposed ideological and political isolation for which there is
hardly any modern parallel” (V ickers 1999: 203).

The project of “ultra-rapid” modernization as well as self-imposed isolationism
went hand in hand with a Soviet type of control of people’s movement according to which
the entire population was “sealed up” inside the country.45 The Albanian government’s
decision to impose a complete ban on immigration was determined by two major
concerns: economic and ideological.46 Under the conditions of a state-directed command
economy in which the country. rejects market mechanisms, the state must exercise greater
direct control over the factors of production, including population” (Zolberg 1978: 271).
Population becomes an invaluable resource, “wealth”. Intensive mobilization of the labor
force, as a way for securing contributions toward the production of public goods is
indispensable, and cannot be successfully realized if “people vote with their feet”

(Zolberg 1981: 23).

Economic concerns notwithstanding, however, it was the ideological concerns that
the regime was mostly concerned with. The Stalinist government of Tirana considered
Albania, particularly after the break up with Soviet Union and China, the only country
with a “real Marxist-Leninist” ideology. Like Soviet Russia, “the first modern state to
control international movement systematically,” (Dowty 1987: 63) Albania saw itself
“surrounded by enemies,” engaged in an ongoing, “uncompromising” ideological battle
with capitalist and revisionist countries. Were the Albanians, like Soviet citizens, to

choose to live in another country, in particular capitalist ones, that act would have meant

 

45See Dowdy, 1987, for an analysis of control of population movement in Soviet Russia

46I am indebted to the work of Dowdy (1978) and Zolberg (1978; 1981) for the ideas in analyzing the
economic and ideological reasons underlying Albanian state’s policies in managing migration in Albania

90

an “indictment of the entire political and economic system,” the loss of ideological battle,
which would undermine the very legitimacy of the prevailing faith in the system (Dowty
1987: 207, 73).

Draconian laws were passed as part of the efforts to implement this policy of no
emigration. None of the Albanian constitutions explicitly recognized the right to leave.
Albania’s Penal Code of 1958 (Article 64) considered flight flom the country and refusal
to return as betrayal of Fatherland punishable with imprisonment of no less than 10 years,
or by death (Gazeta Zyrtare 1958). Article 47 of a later Penal Code (1982), which was in
power until its official abolishment in 1990 was similar in this respect"7

To enforce this legislation, the Albanian government resorted to harsh
administrative measures, such as coercive means (terror and violence) as well as
propaganda. As early as 1946, the government used staged show trials, and passed death
sentences to people who were accused of attempting to flee the country.48 The 1984 report
by Amnesty International, maintained that “prison sentences imposed during the 19503
and 19603 under Article 64, on people convicted of attempting to flee the country have
varied between 12 and 25 years and similarly high sentences were reportedly being

imposed in the 19703” (Amnesty International 1984: 16).

 

47Article 64 of Penal Code 1958 states: “... escape outside the state, refusal to return to Albania of the
official Albanian person who is outside the state” is considered a treason toward the Fatherland and will be
punished with imprisonment of no less than 10 years or by death and with confiscation of the property.”
Article 47 of Albanian Penal Code (1982: 423) states: “Escape outside the state, as well as refusal to return
to the Fatherland by a person who has been sent to serve or has been permitted temporarily to go outside
the state are grounds for treason, punishable by imprisonment of not less than ten years, or by death.”

48h fact, measures such as death penalty for those suspected of fleeing the country were applied in the very
early years of the regime take over. For example, the article in the newspaper Korea Demokratike (June 15,
1996), wrote the story of a high ranking oflicer in the Albanian army who was caught in the border with
Greece. The authorities accused him of attempting to flee the country in order to go and see his wife and his
two daughters in Italy. (His wife was Italian. She and their two daughters had to leave Albania in 1945 at
the orders of the government). He was found “guilty” (he denied everything during his trial) in one of the
typical govemment’s “show trials” and was executed on September 11, 1946.

91

Moreover, in those cases when individuals managed to flee the country, their
property was confiscated.49 Their families and relatives would suffer serious
consequences as well. One such consequence would be internal exile. For example, entire
families were sent to exile in remote villages simply because a member of the family or a
relative fled the country. Other consequences included denial to higher education, or even
high school education, discrimination in employment such as being assigned to the most
difficult jobs, as a result of being related to the escapees (Minnesota Lawyers
International Human Rights Committee 1990: 72-73).

Albanian borders were highly secured, too. According to Zickel and Iwaskiw
(1994) Troops of Frontier Guards were assigned the official mission to protect state
borders and to prevent criminals, smugglers, or infiltrators flom crossing them. In the
process they were charged with the task of preventing Albanians flom leaving the country
illegally. In fact, it has been argued that their task was preventing Albanians flom
crossing the country illegally (Skendi 1956; Logoreci 1977).

Part of the communist regime’s strict control of emigration was the highly
fortification of the borders along Greece and Yugoslavia as well. For example, in an
interview given to Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, a former
border guard who had eventually escaped to Greece described the border situation as

follows:

 

49In addition, confiscation of property for those who had fled the country was a common measure
implemented by the government to punish the perpetrators of the “crimes against the F atherlan ”. For
example, the newspaper Gazeta Zyrtare (March 4, 1946) published a series of decisions issued by the
Executive Committee of Prefecture of Libohova (South of Albania) upon which the property of several
individuals and families was confiscated as a result of their flight abroad.

92

“An electrically-wired metal fence stands 600 meters to one kilometer flom the
actual border. Anyone touching the fence not only risks electrocution, but also sets off
alarm bells and lights which alert guards stationed at approximately one-kilometer
intervals along the fence. Two meters of soil on either side of the fence are cleared in
order to check for footprints of escapees and infiltrators. The area between the fence and
the actual border is seeded with booby traps such as coils of wire, noise makers
consisting of thin pieces of metal strips on top of two wooden slats with stones in a tin
container which rattle if stepped on, and flares that are triggered by contact, thus
illuminating would-be escapees during the night” (Minnesota Lawyers International
Human Rights Committee 1990: 69 In O’Donnell 1999: 137).

The strict no-exit policy was complemented by a similar type of entry-policy. The
number of foreigners visiting the country was kept at a small scale and most often, they
were followed everywhere by the members of secret police, called “Sigurimi”. Citizens
of Albania were not allowed to have any contact with foreigners.50

In addition, the government used a propaganda system as well. The party and the
government had exclusive ownership, as well as imposed strict control, over all media of
information and communication. There was no other independent or opposition media.
The mass media served the ideological and political objectives of the ruling party. It
extolled the virtues of Albania’s socialist paradise, and compared it to the misery and

wretchedness of everyday life for people in capitalist countries (Olsen 2000: 37). Like in

 

soLogoreci (1977: 192-193) recounted the experiences of a German and Swedish reporter while visiting
Albania. Harry Hamm, a West German reporter who went there in 1961 noted that security police was
present wherever people gathered in large numbers and made any attempts to prevent people flom having
any contacts with the foreigners. Bjém Hallstriim a Swedish reporter who had visited Albania on both
occasions in 1959 and 1966, (according to Hallstrdm, the presence of “sigurimi” was much more in
evidence during his latter visit) said that he was made to feel like a leper when people ran away flom him
as he sat on a bench in a public park.

93

other countries of the former communist bloc, in order to avoid the fact that domestic
information activity was discredited by hard facts flom abroad (Sik, 1981: 109), foreign
newspapers, magazines were largely banned or strictly censured and the limited number
of foreign movies or programs aired on the TV was severely curtailed as well. The main
Albanian TV channel would broadcast only those movies or programs that had“ sound
socialist” content and were stripped of any influence of “decadent” “Western”
“bourgeoisie” ideology and culture. Watching foreign television broadcasts and listening
to foreign radio channels was punishable with up to seven years in prison 5’ (Mai 2001:
100)”.

In April 1985 Hoxha died, and with him the end of his four decades of rule.
During Hoxha’s rule, Albania attained great achievements compared to its pre-WWII
years, the most remarkable of which is education. According to Glenny (1993: 149-150),
illiteracy was virtually wiped out in the country. An extensive system of general
education was established as well as a moderately impressive flee health system; infant
mortality had been significantly reduced; life expectancy among males had reached over
seventy years. In addition, Albania had created an economic basis flom heavy industry
(mainly steel production) to light consumer goods (largely textiles).

Yet the “dark side” of the system eclipsed all these achievements. Through
coercion and terror, Hoxha had built one of the most brutal regimes in the former

communist world. A whole population was “sealed” inside the country’s borders,

 

51T'he families of the individuals would suffer as well. Their entire family would be sent away in exile
(Vickers 1999: 190).

52m spite of these severe limitations on access to foreign information, which lasted until Hoxha’s death in
1985, thousands of Albanians would watch Italian and Greek TV. To many Albanians, foreign TV channels,
in particular the Italian ones, were a “window” to the Western world (For more on this and how TV shaped
the images of what “real life” is in the Western world see Mai 2001).

94

permitting no contacts whatsoever with the outside world. The extreme isolationist
policies and the highly centralized management system had led to many economic and
social ills: pervasive shortages of basic consumer goods, rapidly deteriorating
inflastructure, crumbling buildings, lack of modern technology, crippling shortages of
spare parts, a disheartened and apathetic population, malnourished and poorly clad
workers, peasants using primitive agricultural equipments and low industrial and
agricultural productivity (Biberaj 1990; 1998; Hall 1994; Vickers and Pettifer 1997).
Moreover, the gap in the living standard between citizens of the “the only real socialist
country in the world” and those of its prosperous capitalist neighbors could not have been
more striking.

Ramiz Alia, who took over after Hoxha’s death, faced with this critical situation,
slowly began to introduce some minor measures in order to remedy this grave situation.
From 1985 until 1989, he tinkered with changes in the highly centralized economic
system, relaxed the tight grip of the PLA in the cultural sector, and gradually expanded
Albania’s relations with other countries (Biberaj 1998: 28). In particular these reforms
were quite noticeable in the field of foreign policy, where Alia began to establish relations
with many countries abroad, Western and nonwestem alike.S3 Further, two general

Arnnesties, one in January 1986 and the other in November 1989, released many long-

 

53For example, in January 1985, the border between Greece and Albania at Kakavia, (south of Albania)
opened for the first time since 1940, where “Two thousands long-lost relatives flom both sides of the
mountainous border embraced and wept with joy upon meeting for the first time in 45 years.” (Jacques
1995: 629) As a result of this, the number of tourists traveling between two countries increased. For
example, 535 Albanians traveled to Greece in 1986 compared to 87 two years earlier and more than 6,000
Greeks visited Albania in 1987 compared with 1,265 in 1985 Minnesota lawyers International Human
Rights Committee 1990: 22).

95

term prisoners.54 Media became fleer to an extent that Hoxha would have barely
recognized (Brown 1991: 241). These measures led to the creation of a more liberal
atmosphere in the country, and set off a process of erosion of the isolationist atmosphere
that had suffocated the country under the previous regime. Indeed, various foreigners who
visited Albania after Hoxha’s death reported a relaxed atmosphere, with many Albanians
willing to engage in a wide-range of topics (Biberaj, 1990: 45).

Yet, most of the Albanians were dissatisfied with the scope of these measures. They
thought they were very limited and did not address the country’s problems in a
fundamental way. There was no debate about the future of the system or an admission
that the political and economic institutions of the country were malfirnctioning (Biberaj
1990: 49). In particular, in view of Biberaj (1998: 29-30), Alia did not reject the policy of
self-reliance, which meant that the prohibition of acceptance of foreign aid and
investments had a disastrous effect on the economic performance. The economy
continued to be plagued by overcentralization, persistent interference flom the center, a
tremendous waste of resources, distorted prices, inefficient enterprises, widespread
corruption, and pervasive shortages of basic goods. Moreover, the absence of private
property, “lack of material incentives, and poor working conditions had destroyed morale,
which was reflected most dramatically by a drastic decline in labor productivity and
widespread absenteeism,” massive thefts and misappropriation of state property.

More importantly, in the view of many Albanians, Alia’s measures did not tackle
what was seen by most people, especially the younger generation, “the fundamental

oppression: their inability to travel or work abroad, or to own a passport” (V ickers and

 

54Arr observer of Albanian affairs, in an interview given to Minnesota stated that there did not seem to have
been any political detentions under Alia, and that the number of political detainees was probably declining
(Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee 1990: 61).

96

Pettifer 1997: 25). In the borders, the troops were still shooting those people who were
attempting to leave the country.55 These “reforms flom above,” however, stimulated
peoples’ popular appetite for more fundamental changes (V ickers and Pettiffer 1997: 25),
which in turn mounted the pressure on the government for more liberalization and
eventual democratization of the country. Meanwhile, events in Eastern Europe, which led
to the collapse of authoritarian regimes and the establishment of multi-party democratic
system, while instilling fear in the Albanian leadership, further raised people’s hopes that
similar changes could be possible even in the “last bastion of Stalinism” in Europe.

In May 1990, right before a visit of the United Nations secretary general, Javer
Péerez de Cuéllar,56 the People’s Assembly of Albania approved a series of wide-ranging
measures, including among others the decision on the right to own a passport and to travel
abroad (V ickers and Pettifer 1997: 26). These new measures, however, “stopped short of”
allowing major changes similar to the ones in other countries of Eastern Europe, such as
such the abolishment of the leading role of the communist party in the society and the
establishment of a multi-party political democracy (Jacques 1995: 652).

Moreover, the implementation of these measures was very slow. In particular,

govemment’s failure to give the Albanians the much dreamt passports was a

 

55Between 1989 and 1990, at least eighty people were killed by border guards. The bodies of some of these
victims were paraded through villages and cities in order to terrorize and discourage others flom attempting
to flee the country (Gazeta Shqiptare, January 7, 1994 In Biberaj 1999: 76)

An article in The Independent (December 31, 1990), reported that according to Ionnina police more
than 650 people had crossed the heavily- guarded border on December 30, 1990. They had walked in groups
of 20 to 30 for up to 12 hours through mountain forests and deep snow. At the border, they dugged tunnels
tmder the barbed wire fences then crossed a free-fire zone half a mile wide which includes a river.
According to one of the leaders of one of these groups, who had served 14 years of forced labor in the
copper mines for political offences under the communist regime, ‘Even after wading or swimming through
the fleezing water and you’re on the other side in Greece, the guards keep firing if they see you,’ he said.
‘Everyone wants to leave. President Ramiz Alia is not trying to reform Albania.”

56Javer Péerez de Cuéllar was charged by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to investigate
alleged human rights violations in Albania (Jacques 1995: 650).

97

disappointment to many, especially to the young people who became angry at “what they
saw as the govemment’s broken promises” (Vickers and Pettifer 1997: 26). Eventually,
people lost confidence in the government to fulfill their promises. Aware of the “ferment
that had produced revolutions in other parts of Eastern Europe,” (Brown 1991: 242) and
“the growmg inefficiency of the internal security apparatus” (V ickers and Pettifer, 1997:
26) in an unprecedented event, on July 2, 1990, after an anti-government demonstration
was violently dispersed, a group of hundreds of Albanians stormed several of the
buildings of foreign embassies57 (Italy, France, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary
and Turkey). These numbers soon reached thousands (about 5,000). The scenes at the
Western embassies in Tirana were a reminder of the scenes in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia in 1989, when thousands of East Germans had entered Western
compounds in these countries (Hall 1994).

In the beginning, the government used coercive means, including firearms to
prevent people flom entering the embassy compounds. In the following days, though, the
police were merely looking rather than using force to stop them, an indication of a change
in the govemment’s response to the crisis (Hope et al., 1990). The foreign embassies
granted political asylum to the people in the embassies, given the fact that Albania was

still a communist country. Upon intense pressure flom abroad, including the intervention

 

57It should be noted that, prior to these events, various Albanians had successfirlly managed to enter the
buildings of foreign embassies (see Jacques 1995: 656 for examples) in Tirana, where they had asked for
political asylum, including in 1985 a family of six which had entered Italian embassy, an event which was
quite shocking and embarrassing to the Albanian government. Albanian government demanded “the
unconditional surrender” of the asylum seekers, but Italian embassy refused to accept Tirana govemment’s
demands and “insisted that they be allowed to leave the country.” This incident received worldwide
attention. Eventually, after five years, in May 1990, days after Javier Perez de Cuellar’s May visit, “in an
effort to create a favorable international image,” Albanian government allowed the family to travel to Italy
(Biberaj 1998: 50). These events and others like these, would have been unimaginable under Hoxha.

98

by the then UN. Secretary General Perez De Cuellar, the Albanian authorities decided to
issue passports to the asylum seekers and resettle them in their respective countries (Hein
1998: 221). With this act, Albanians were taking the first symbolic step towards asserting
their long-denied right to emigrate (King 2003: 287).

This incident caught the communist government by surprise, which used harsh
rhetoric to characterize the people who stormed the foreign embassies, calling them
“hooligans and misguided individuals who were manipulated by foreign forces interested
in the overthrow of Albanian communist regime.” In doing so, the government of Tirana
wanted “to counter any perception that the refugees’ anticommunist attitudes were
shared” by all ordinary people (Biberaj 1998: 53). Fearing a further radicalization of the
situation, then, the government at the Central Committee plenum of the communist party
on 6 July, undertook further economic and political measures. As parts of these measures,
the government “legalized small-scale private activity in the service sector.” This measure
was modeled after Hungary’s economic reforms of 19608 and the 19708, and was a
radical departure with the past. The plenum also dismissed several hard-line senior
communist officials (Biberaj 1998: 52).

Additionally, several weeks later, on July 31, according to Vickers and Pettifer
(1997: 29-34) the government also announced a revision of the penal code, making a key
concession to popular pressure for travel rights. Fleeing Albania would no longer be
considered treason, just illegal border trespassing. Alia also continued to further broaden
relations with the outside world, including paying a visit to the United States, Hoxha’s
“arch enemy”, where Alia addressed the UN General Assembly and met with Albanian

émigrés in New York and Boston. Another important reform was a draft law for new

99

elections to the People’s Assembly. This measure would allow organizations such as trade
unions and military veterans’ associations to put forward their own candidates, and
introduced the principle of voting by secret ballots. Yet, the communist party would not
allow the formation of opposition parties and the establishment of a multi—party system.

Meanwhile, the country’s economic situation, material and living conditions
continued to deteriorate. Hunger, food, and power shortages became common, while
unrest, disorder and protests were spreading everywhere in the country. Public buildings,
including the buildings of the communist party, which were in the view of many as
symbols of communism were increasingly becoming targets of attacks (Vickers and
Pettifer 1997: 34).

The measures undertaken by the government did not have a deep impact on ordinary
people, who, according to Biberaj (1998: 63), thought that these measures were aimed at
placating the regime’s criticism from abroad, rather than democratizing the economic and
political life of the country. Soon, however, it became clear that the government would
not be able to appease the people and “stem the growth of the dissen .” With the
economy in shambles, the inability of the Communist party to handle the situation, and
the “dwindling legitimacy of existing political institutions,” reform-minded intellectuals,
students and workers pushed for a radical change of the political system.

In December 12, 1990, widespread students protests and demonstrations led to the
formation of the first opposition party (the Democratic Party). For the first time the
Communist Party and the government had finally recognized the existence of another
political party that would soon challenge forty years of its own absolute rule. This

momentous event, which would have been inconceivable under Enver Hoxha regime,

100

meant that “the last Communist regime in Europe had lost its political monopoly.”
(Biberaj 1998: 65)

In spite of this major victory, however, popular protests continued, with people
being increasingly eager for more radical changes. In some cities people were expressing
their discontent and impatience, often with the looting of government food shops, stoning
of official buildings, setting fire to police cars and other act of vandalism, with local
police failing to stop rioting (Jacques 1995: 668). Amidst this desperate situation, the
government passed two decrees “legitimizing the right to strike after secret ballot, and
putting forward safeguards for historic monuments,” the latter being necessary because
people were increasingly focusing their attacks particularly on the symbols associated

with Hoxha (Vickers and Pettifer 1997: 45).58

In February 20, 1991, several thousands of people gathered at the center of Tirana
and toppled down the giant statue of Enver Hoxha in the Scanderbeg square. The
secmity forces fired blanks in an attempt to disperse the demonstrators, but many police
fi'aternized openly with the protestors. In a matter of hours, other Hoxha’s statuses of
Hoxha toppled down in other cities (V ickers and Pettifer 1997: 48). In that same day,
Albania’s prime minister gave in to the students’ demands that the name Enver Hoxha be
removed from their university, and the university be renamed simply the University of
Tirana (Jacques 1995: 669). These events and others similar to these, where ordinary
_ people openly and bravely challenged forty years of dictatorship, showed that the

government was not able to stop the stream of the revolutionary changes that was rapidly

 

58The government also initiated a program of de-Stalinization, which among others included “removal of

all statues and the renaming of all streets, institutions and even a city bearing his name.” (Jacques 1995:
668)

101

building up. Politically, February events “affirmed the bankruptcy” of the communist
system (V ickers and Pettifer 1997: 50).

Amidst the continuing unrest and insecurity, and aware of the rapidly
deteriorating coercive power of one-party state, many people wanted to leave the country.
In early February, an attempt by people to flee failed. Some tens of thousands of
Albanians, having heard rumors59 that ferry boats would take them to Italy, clashed with
the police in the port of Durrés city (Biberaj 1998: 88), who wanted to prevent people
fiom leaving. Police fired shots in the air. This enraged the crowds, which took to the
streets, smashing windows, raiding book stores, burning Enver Hoxha books (Jacques
1995: 669 citing Tampa Tribune 10 February 1991, 14).

In early March, however, right before Albania’s first democratic elections, in
which the communist party won, thousands of Albanians seized all ships and vessels at
the ports of Durrés and Vlora and sailed across the Adriatic to Italy. With thousands of
people at the harbor, the security forces gave up trying to exercise control, and allowed
people to take ships and sail to Italy (New York Times March 7, 1991). Several months
later, in August of the same year, following the June 1991 collapse of the communist led
government, at a time of rapidly deteriorating economic circumstances and increasing
food shortages in Albania, an additional 20,000 Albanians, crowded onto boats, were

allowed to land in the Bari port of Italy, but most of them were eventually repatriated

 

59In the absence of any media information on emigration, rumors and “watching” what the government
was doing was the main source of information for the people at that time. For example, one of the
interviewee, who had left in 1991, when asked if he were afraid when he left, he answered: “At that time,
there were other people who had lefi, and no measures were taken against them. I was always watching for
things. Because all the members of my family, my mother, father, sister, brother were members of the
communist party. This shows that we were so adjusted to the system. So I had seen that it was not like
before. Many people had left, but their families were not touched. It was not like before, so that their
families would be taken and sent to exile.”

102

(King 2003: 288; Hall 1994: 189). Thus, in the period extending from March to August
1991, a total of over 40,000 Albanians arrived in Italians shores.

In reality the flight to Italy of Albanian “boat people” was not the whole story:
there was an equally large-scale, but much less well-documented migration to Greece
(King and Mai 2002: 164), given much of the movement to Greece was illegal, via the
mountains, and therefore very difficult to estimate (King 2003).

In the years to come, given the “border control mechanism of the one-party state
had collapsed, and Albania’s physical isolation had ended” (Vickers and Petifer 1997:
40) an unprecedented number of Albanians would leave the country and move to the
West, in particular its two neighbors, Greece and Italy. In a matter of a decade or so,
from a country with virtually no international migration, successive migrant waves
brought the number of Albanians abroad at 1 million (about 20 percent of the

population).

Ways and Means of Coming to Greece

Immigrants reported using various ways of leaving Albania and going to Greece.
Those who belonged to Greek or Vllach ethnic minority, or whose spouse was of Greek
or Vllach ethnic minority mentioned that they had obtained Greek visas at the Greek
consulates or the Greek embassy in Albania, reflecting the “hierarchy of Greekness” (see
above) in Greek immigration policy, which privileges certain groups (i.e., Orthodox
religion) over others. A few immigrants said that they had managed to get their visas
through their fiiends who were members of Albanian political parties and had access to

bureaucratic officials in charge of granting visas in Greek consulates. Most of the

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interviewees, however, stated that after failing to obtain visas, or knowmg they would
never be able to get one, had to resort to other ways of migrating, including bribing
custom officers, purchasing their visas, obtaining false visas, or using passports of people
who were already in Greece. Florenca, for example, said that she had come with the
passport of her sister-in-law who was already in Greece. One immigrant, who had left in
1991, stated that he used some gold coins his parents had given him for the trip and
bribed the Greek custom officers, who after receiving the coins, were happy to let him
enter Greece.

The rest of the immigrants said that they had travelled on foot illegally, usually in
small groups with other people. Among this group of immigrants, some said that they had
used “professional guides” (referred by some as “mafia”) whom the immigrants had paid
substantial amount of money (about 50,000 dhrachma, an equivalent of $250 dollars),
which they had borrowed from family, relatives and fiiends and had later been paid back
with money they had earned by working in Greece. Others said that their fiiends and
relatives, who had previously been to Greece and knew the whereabouts, helped them
with their journey. In a few cases, immigrants themselves, or a member of the group they
were travelling with, had served as the guide, given they knew the area since they had
done their military service during the communist times. Immigrants who travelled on
foot, in particular immigrants, who left in 1990 and 1991, a time when Albanian soldiers
were still shooting at the borders, described the trip as very dangerous. Joni who left in
1990, described his trip:

“We crossed the border. There were four of us. We decided to go. So we said let’s

go. These were the last days. After a week, the electric wires at the border all came down.

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When we neared the border, we found some people from the village. We could even hear
some shootings. It was really scary. I think it was March 13 or 15, something like that.

Interviewer: Where did you meet the villagers?

Joni: About 5 kilometers away from the border. It was night. We crossed a bridge.
Some of the villagers were night watchers. They lived in that village. They knew that the
law to shoot at the border was no longer in use. But we were still scared of being shot at.
Nothing else. You understand? So we crossed the border. It was very difficult, because
the wires were still there. So we digged a hole under the wires. One of the guys who was
with us had done his military service in that area, so he knew the area well. He suggested
that the best way to leave was to dig a hole in the ground under the wires. There were
four or five of us. Two of us were digging the hole, the rest were on guard. It was a
moonless night. Two went to the wires, one was digging, the other was holding the wires
up. We digged the hole, deep enough so that we could crawl under the wires. That’s how
we crossed the border. After walking for about a quarter of an hour, we crossed the
border and stepped onto Greek land.

While immigrants who left in the 1990 and early 1991 pointed to the fear they had
of the Albanian border guards, those who left after 1991, when illegality of migration was
transferred from Albania to Greece (King, Mai and Dalipaj 1998: 165), talked of the fear
of Greek border guards and the police. Flori, who first came to Greece in 1992 and like
other immigrants had taken multiple trips to Greece, told his story of how Greek police
treated him when he entered the country in 1996, the year of “skoopa”6°: “The years 1995

and 1996 were terrible. I was going toward Greece. They caught me once I was inside

 

“Scoopa” or “broom” operations were operations undertaken by the Greek police, whereby illegal

immigrants were “swept up” by the police, imprisoned for a period of time and then deported
(Hatziprokopiou 2003: 1038).

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Greece. The military caught me. They had a campaign, I do not remember well. They
caught us. They kicked me many times. They kicked me in the chest. Like karate. For
other Albanians that I saw, it was terrible. What can I say. I cannot say it to you, things
that man carmot imagine. Tortures. I saw people in stretchers. They took them out in
stretchers. People were fainting. They would throw bucket of water to them. Then they
took us to the camp of Kostur. They kept us there for about two days, then they released
us. It was like a big hall. I do not know what that was for. I do know what they served
for. They kept us lying on the floor. There were about three hundred people there. All of
them. When the military team would catch people, they would send them there. Then
they took us to the custom. In military trucks. There were soldiers with rifles. It was
terrible. When I think of it now, it was terrible.”

Immigrants who came in 1997, the time Albania was engulfed in anarchy, also
described their journey as a harrowing experience. Said Rozafa “At first we went to
Tirana and bought a false visa. Then we left from Durres to go to Pater. We took the
ferry. I came with my sister. The trip was really a hell. Six hours. We were terrified. We
came wearing black clothes so that the gangs would not stop us. It was very difficult. I
had long hair and did not wear make up. We were so scared to leave.

Interviewer: Why were you wearing black clothes?

Rozafa: Because only women with black clothes were not stopped by the gangs.
They did not stop you if you had to go to a funeral. We would tell them, we have a death
in the family, we are going there. If they saw that you were wearing makeup, they would

take off all your clothes. It was a terrible time.”

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Another immigrant who also came during that time said that they were stopped by Mafia
and were taken all the money. He said, however, they felt lucky that they were not beaten
or even murdered.

In sum, when asked what motivated immigrants to migrate to Greece, respondents
pointed to economic reasons (i.e., unemployment, poverty, overcrowded housing
conditions, a desire to give their family a better life), family-based reasons, conflict in the
family, political instability, professional reasons, a desire to see the Western world. These
micro as well as meso explanations, however, for the reasons explained above, do not
fully explain what motivates people to leave. Therefore, a fuller explanation of people’s
motives to emigrate and Albanian migration in general is fully understood by taking into
account the role of the Albanian communist state.

Prior to communist ascent to power, migration from Albania, most notably from
certain regions of the Southern of Albania, was a well-established trend. Upon coming to
power, the government of Albania pursued the path of economic self-reliance along side
a highly centralized economic and political system. These policies limited the country’s
economic and technological development, reduced economic opportunities for the
majority of people and created an enormous gap between Albania and its prosperous
capitalist neighbors. In addition, the government of Albania, driven by ideological and
economic concerns, managed, through adoption of one of the strictest exit policies in
Eastern Europe, to virtually bring emigration to a halt. The fall of the very authoritarian
government triggered large scale emigration. Immigrants reported various means of
migrating. Those of Greek and Vlach ancestry were given advantages because of their

ethnicity and were able to obtain visas at the Greek consulates or embassy. Some had

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received their visas through their friends, who were members of the Albanian political
parties and had access to bureaucratic officials in charge of granting visas in Greek
consulates; and others used different methods, such as bribing custom officials,
purchasing their visas, obtaining false visas, or using forged passports. Finally, other
immigrants said that they had taken the trip illegally, crossing the borders and

overcoming many difficulties and dangers.

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CHAPTER 5
TRANSFORMATION OF ALBANIAN IMMIGRANTS FROM FORCED,
ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS TO LEGAL, LABOR IMMIGRANTS
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section will examine the social
forces that perpetuated migration from Albania to Greece after its initiation. The second
section will present an analysis of Greek govemment’s policies in transforming hundreds

and thousands of forced, undocumented immigrants into legal labor migrants. In

addition, it will highlight major factors that shaped these particular policies.

Social Networks and Perpetuation of Migration

As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the communist state of Albania through
its policies of limited economic opportunities and prohibiting migration, created
conditions for initiation of Albanian migration. Its final collapse triggered massive
migration waves. The Albanian state, however, was no longer involved in migration, yet
immigration persisted and over time took on massive proportions. Existing studies have
shown that one of the most important mechanisms for the persistence of migration is to
be found in the complex web of social networks (Hagan 1994; 1998 ; Massey et al. 1987;
Massey et al. 1990; Massey et al. 1994a; 1994b; Massey et al. 1998).

Indeed, as noted in chapter two, in its initial stages, migration is undertaken by
“adventurous individuals” who chart unknown paths. Over time immigrants acquire
knowledge of a receiving country’s language, employment, and cultural practices. Every
immigrant is connected to a set of relatives and fiiends in his community of origin. Once
the first immigrants leave, the costs of migration are reduced significantly for his/her

family, relatives and friends, therefore making migration easier and more manageable.

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Each new immigrant, given the nature of kinship and fiiendship structures, creates a set
of people with social ties to the destination areas.

Hagan (1998), for example, in her study of a Maya migrant community in Houston,
Texas, noticed that the migrant community traced its origin to Juan, the first “pioneer”
immigrant from San Pedro, Guatemala, who took his trip to Houston in search of wage
work. Over time, as he found a job and settled in Houston he managed to bring over his kin
and fiiends, and eventually, his wife and children. By the early 19808, many households in
San Pedro had relatives living in Huston, and by mid 19808, social networks extended
beyond San Pedro to include more neighborhood communities (Hagan 1998: 59). Repak
(1995), too, found that entire families and communities from Salvador had come to
Washington DC. following the trail of the initial pioneers. Massey et al., (1987)’s study
revealed similar patterns for Mexicans in the United States. Hatziprokopioyu (2003), too,
in his interviews with a group of Albanian migrants observed the extensive use of social
networks among Albanian migrants in the city of Thessaloniki, Greece. According to the
author, apart from the first wave of Albanians who immigrated to Greece in 1990 and 1991,
the rest seemed to have followed paths already opened by some pioneers. Like Mexicans in
Return to Aztlan (Massey et al., 1987), the first Albanians came back to their communities
of origin and initiated others into migration course. As one of the immigrants in the study
stated: “The basic reason is that, before I came to Greece, some other guys had come. They
said that Greece is fantastic... Relatives, people from my village, fiiend8.. And I said to

myself ‘Why don’t I go to try my luck there?” Hatziprokopioyu (2003: 1049).

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These general social network patterns are clearly revealed among participants of my
sample. Those few “adventurous” immigrants had taken their trip without knowing anyone
in Greece. Once they had settled, they asked their family, relatives, and fiiends to join them.
Bardhyl, for example, who was married and had two children, left for Greece with a
group of friends. He and his friends crossed the border with the assistance of
“professional guides,” whom they had paid (see also chapter four). He found a job in
agriculture in a Greek village close to the Albanian border. After some time, while he
gained some command of the Greek language and became familiar with Greek ways of
life, he decided to take his family with him to Greece. “1 came to Greece with a group of
friends. We did not know anybody in Greece. We did not speak a word of Greek either.
We paid a guy, somebody that knew the road who took us to Greece. He was doing these
things. We arrived in a village... I worked for three months in agriculture, different
jobs...I went back. I missed my children so much. I had tears in my eyes any time I
thought of them. I had spoken only one time on the phone from the house of my afendiko
(Greek word for boss). I did not have a telephone at home. I had to talk to my family at
my neighbor’s house. The beginning was so hard. I do not even want to think about it. It
gives me the creep. When I think of it now. .. I did not speak any Greek at all. The only
word I knew was dhulja (Greek word for work). In the beginning we slept in an
abandoned house. For two weeks. Then the afendiko gave us a shed. After agriculture, a
fiiend of mine and myself went to Thessaloniki, to find a better job. My fiiend knew
somebody in Thessaloniki. I had heard from other Albanians that in Thessaloniki you can
find jobs...There I found a job in construction, in building. We slept with my friend’s

friends. I stayed with them for three months and with the money I made, I had enough to

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find one apogjio (Greek word for the basement of the building). Once I found the
apartment, I decided to take my family. I had enough money to pay for them to come. I
went back to Albania. I paid a taxi person. He was going to take care of the visa for my
wife and my children. And he took us from Korea to the border. We waited there for a
while at the customs. And we were lucky we went through the customs. The same taxi
took us to Thessaloniki. My wife was excited, but also she did not like the house, because
it was a basement and no windows.

Interviewer: How did your wife find the job?

Bardhyl: My afendikoi helped me. He had a fiiend. His friend wanted somebody
to clean the house. So my wife began to clean. She works as a cleaner, in the houses.
Interviewer: Did you help anybody else to come to Greece?

Bardhyl: Yes, yes. My two brothers and my wife’s sister. Immigrants help each
other. All Albanians do that.

lnterviwer: How did they come?

Bardhyl: My brothers, they bought a visa, like all Albanians. They came and
stayed with us for six months.

Interviewer: Did they have families?

Bardhyl: Yes.

Interviewer: Did they bring their families with them?

Bardhyl: oh, yes, yes. After they found an apartment, they brought their families
too. Wives and children.”

Similarly, Joni, whom we introduced earlier, who like Bardhyl came to Greece

without knowing anybody, recalled how, after one year of working in Greece, he

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managed to bring his younger brother, a university student (through obtaining a false
visa) to Greece. Several years later, his parents joined both their children in Greece. He
mentioned that his brother also had helped two of his university fiiends (they all had
interrupted their university studies) to come to Greece.

Research studies (Drever and Hoffmeister 2008; Garcia 2005; Gold 2001; Hagan
1998; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Margolis 1994; Menjivar 2000;), including those on
Albanian migrants (Hatziprokopioyu 2003; Labrianidis et al. 2001 In Hatziprokopioyu
2003; Labrianidis et al. 2001) reveal patterns of assistance immigrants offer to their
coethnics during the process of immigration. For example Margolis (1994) noted that
most Brazilians who come to New York find shelter among fiiends and relatives. Their
compatriots also help them finding jobs. Hagan (1998) described how Juan’s (the
pioneer) wife managed to secure a job as a household cleaner and carer of young
children. She, then, later, helped other women fiom her own village in Guatemala to
obtain a job in the same occupation, who, in turn, helped others to make the entry in this
particular job niche. Repak (1995) observed similar patterns among Salvadorans in
Washington DC. Drever and Hoffmeister (2008) through their analysis of German
Socio-Economic Panel data, noticed that social networks were crucial to immigrants in
their labor market integration. In fact, according to the authors, in a labor market such as
Germany, where even the most basic jobs require formal qualifications, which the
immigrants lack, social networks serve as a firnctional equivalent to the formal degrees
and trainings.

Along similar lines, many immigrants in my study related how their relatives and

fiiends, who had been in Greece for some time, assisted them in all the stages of their

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nrigration process to Greece. They provided them with financial and social resources
such as paying for the trip (including paying for obtaining fraudulent documents),
offering shelter and assistance with finding housing, access to information about jobs,
and information about Greek society in general. Once the newly arrived immigrants
became familiar with Greek language and environment in general, they, in turn
encouraged and helped their kin and friends to take their journey to Greece.

Said Jonida: “In the beginning my husband and I came to his brother’s. His
brother had come here earlier. He had been in Greece for about one year. We stayed with
him for some time, some months. I think about five months... His brother took my
husband to work with him at the afendikoi My sister-in-law found a job for me. Taking
care of an old lady. . .We found a house. Then we moved out.

Interviewer: What about you? Did you help anybody else?

Jonida: Yes, yes. I helped my brother. He was unemployed in Albania. So I told
him to come to Greece. . .. He bought a visa and came here... He stayed with us for about
eight or nine months, I do not remember well...Then he found an apartment, close to us,
because he was planning to bring our parents.”

Interviewer: Did they come?

Jonida: Yes, they did come. It was a good thing, because I became pregnant and
when I gave birth to my daughter, they helped me raise her.”

Another immigrant said that her brother had helped her come to Greece. She told
me that it was her brother who had paid for the visa and the trip, and provided her with
information about Greek life in general. “My brother left first. He worked in Greece for

about one year. Then he came back to Albania to visit us. On his trip back to Greece, he

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took me with him. He arranged everything. He paid for a false visa. ...1 had no idea. I do
not know how these things are done... We left together. I stayed with my brother for
about three years... I wanted to come to Greece before, but if I did not have my brother, I
would have never come... Where would I go? I did not know anybody in Greece. I did
not know the language. Where would I go? I remember when I came first, I was lost. All
the cars, and wide streets, lights, everything... My brother showed me everything, how to
take the buses, where to go to shop.... I did not work immediately. I stayed with my
brother. I was afraid to find a job, because I did not speak the language. Then, my brother
talked to his boss. His boss’ fiiend wanted somebody to clean the house. So I started to
clean the houses... Now, I know everything.”

Several of the immigrants mentioned that their children helped them to come to
Greece. Said Zaimir: “My sons were here. They had left at the very beginning... I was
left without a job. So I had to leave... I paid the driver, contraband, clandestine, who took
me from Korca to Athens... My wife had left earlier than I did... We stayed with our
sons, like all immigrants. Stay together, work together...One of my sons found me the
job. I work as a gardener now.”

A few others mentioned that their fiiends from their school, town or village in
Albania had assisted them. Such is the story of Suela, who left with a fiiend of hers: “ I
left with a friend of mine. She was a fiiend from the place where I used to work in Korea.
She had a fiiend of hers in Greece... We went to her friend first. We stayed some time
with her and her husband... My fiiend had talked to her on the phone before we left. And
she had agreed to help us. And she waited for us, because where else would we go?

Where else would we stay/.7... She waited for us at the bus station. She was with her

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husband... They spoke the language, because they had been in Greece for some time...
She found us a job, with some Greek women, there in the neighborhood. So we started
working, cleaning the houses. Then my friend and I found a house. We began to live
together... My fiiend got married. So I had to find my own apartment. So, I told my
brother to come. He was unemployed in Albania... So he came with his family and
stayed with me. We stayed together for about three years... Then we brought our
parents... They now live with my brother... We live in the same apartment flat. I live on
the third floor; my brother and my parents live on the fourth floor.”

The stories of these immigrants are fairly typical of all the participants in my
study. The first immigrants arrive and after settling in Greece, they ask families, relatives
and fiiends from their country of origin to join them. Once the latter settle in Greece, gain
knowledge of the Greek society, they reach out to their own friends, relatives and
eventually whole communities are involved in migration. As one immigrant stated: “You
know what, my whole family is in Greece. 1 do not have anybody left in Albania, except
for the walls of the house.” Another one who lives in Thessaloniki commented: “There
are so many people fiom Korea here, that it looks like you are in Korea,” referring to the
large number of immigrants from the town of Korca, a town close to Greece (about 30
miles away from the Greek border). He then continued “If you walk in the street, you
surely will see a face that you know. Or if you are in a bus, you will definitely see
someone from Korea.” Over time, therefore, these networks serve to perpetuate and
sustain migration.

As noted in chapter two, in addition to changes in individual and social structure,

migration brings about changes in the culture of the communities of origin, changes

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which in turn increase the likelihood of more migration. Through their ability to buy
consumer goods, migrants display admired life styles that non migrants want to emulate,
thus increasing the probability that more people will join the migration stream (Massey et
al. 1994a: 1500; Massey et al. 1994b: 738; Massey et al. 1998: 47). The following story
illustrates this point:

“My fiiend fi'om Korea helped... We grew up together in the same apartment. He
had leit for Greece more than a year ago... After being in Greece for more than a year, he
came back one day and I saw him buying electronic stuff for his house... When I saw
this, I also wanted to go and work in Greece. I felt bad about myself. I talked to my fiiend
and I told him I wanted to go to Greece. He told me he would help me. So we set up a
date, the date we were leaving. So my fiiend, three of his fiiends and myself left for
Greece. We took a taxi up to the border. From there, we waited until dark and crossed the
border. My fiiend knew the road. After walking all night, we arrived in a small village in
Greece. I do not remember the name. There we took a cab. The cab dropped us in the
train station in Amindjo, a small village in Greece. From there we took the train to
Thessaloniki. There I went to my fiiend’s apartment. The other guys went to their
relatives in Thessaloniki. I stayed with my fiiend for almost two months.”

Moreover, as some of the stories above reveal, in addition to networks, a set of
migrant-supporting institutions tend to develop which perpetuate immigration (Massey et
al. 1993; Massey et al. 1998). F or—profit organizations and private entrepreneurs provide
a variety of services to immigrants in exchange for a fee in the underground market:
smuggling across borders; clandestine transport to international destinations; counterfeit

documents, visas and so on (Massey et al. 1998: 44). Many of the participants in my

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study, who were not able to obtain a visa through official channels, resorted to unofficial
channels such as: obtaining fraudulent visas, passports, or paying “the mafia” to help
them cross the borders illegally (see also examples in chapter four).

In summary, we would say that Albanian migration was a product of policies
pursued by the communist state of Albania, which in turn created an environment that
fostered large-scale migration waves. Yet, the Albanian state was not involved in
migration whatsoever, leaving Albanians to fend for themselves during the whole process
of migration. Once immigration started, social networks as well as migrant-supported

institutions helped to sustain and perpetuate immigration flows.

Greece’s Migration Policies In Transforming Forced Immigrants to Legal
Immigrants

The aim of this section concerns the analysis of legalization policies undertaken
by the Greek government which enabled hundreds and thousands of Albanian migrants to
move from the conditions of illegality to legality. As noted earlier, however, Greece is
not unique in pursuing such policies. Legalization programs are one of the ways
immigrant receiving governments use to regulate illegal immigrants in their countries.
What is unique in the present case is the character of Albanian migrants to Greece, by far
the largest immigrant group in Greece. Immigration flows of Albanians to Greece was
not organized and mediated by the state. In fact, as we have repeatedly stressed, the
Albanian government, for a longtime, was not involved at all in immigration. Moreover,
as we have already established in chapter two, given the context of exit (i.e., economic

plight, political instability, social unrest), Albanian migrants were forced migrants.

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Furthermore, as noted earlier in the paper, Greece, like other countries of Southern
Europe was for a long time a country of emigration. As a result of this, the country
largely lacked any institutional mechanism or administrative experience to deal with
immigration (Freeman 1995).

The initial response of the Greek government to the new situation of influx of
hundreds and thousands of (mostly) illegal migration was the enactment of a new aliens’
law (L. 1975/91) which was ratified by the Parliament in 1991 and which came into
effect in 1992 (Papantoniou-Frangouli and Leventi 2000: 950). The law which
determined all matters that had to do with the entry, work and residence of immigrants in
Greece (Hatziprokopiou 2003: 1036), established police rules for the control of
immigrants flows (Glystos 2005: 821) and made no provision for legalization of foreign
workers already in Greece. In addition, the government used repressive measures
whereby police expelled“, without legal process, immigrants who did not possess the
appropriate legal papers to stay in Greece (Baldwin-Edwards 2004a: 4). By the mid-
19908, however, despite the large number of expulsions, it was becoming clear that a
very large number of undocumented foreigners were going to stay in Greece (Baldwin-
Edwards 2004a: 4). In fact the number of illegal immigrants had reached 800,000,
whereby Albanians constituted by far the largest (57.5 percent) immigrant group
(Tsimbos 2008). Faced with this situation, the Greek government began to prepare the
first legalization program.

In July 1996, the Parliament passed law 2434/1996. Article 16 of the law

provided for legalization of aliens which would proceed in two stages: In the first stage,

 

61
By 1995, there were over 1 million expulsions (Baldwin-Edwards 2004a: 4).
1 l9

aliens would register with Greek authorities and acquire temporary resident permits
(called the “white card” and given for a period of six months). In the second, they would
receive limited duration residency permits (Papantoniou-Frangouli and Leventi 2000:
951). Further, immigrants had to prove that they had been in Greece before November
23, 1997 (Fakiolas 2003: 547). The legalization process began in January 1, 1998. By
May 31 1998, 372,000 applied for the “white cards”. All my informants who had been
working and living in the country illegally had applied for the white cards during this
time.

The white card was a prerequisite for a “green card” application, which included a
temporary residence and work permit for a period of one to three years (mostly one year)
(Glystos 2005: 826) and can be renewed. One of the requirements for the green card
application was that applicants were required to present a document proving they had
earned an income corresponding to at least half that earned by an unqualified worker for
40 days, although requirements varied according to the sector of employment
(Papantoniou-Frangouli and Leventi 2000: 953). The deadline for green card application
was extended several times (fi'om 7/98 to finally 4/99) because of unrealistic demands
made both on the immigrants, and the state (Baldwin-Edwards 2004: 4). For example,
applicants were required to provide a series of documents which included: attestations by
the Ministry of justice that they did not have criminal records; attestations by local police
stations that they were not on the list of persona non grata maintained by the Criminal
Investigation Police; certificates from a public hospital that they were not suffering from
any contagious disease as well as passports or certificates concerning their family

situations which proved their identity. In addition, each applicant was required to provide

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information about his or her address, family situation, educational level, length of stay in
Greece and employment situation (Papantoniou-Frangouli and Leventi 2000: 952). Out
of 200,000 applicants, by February 2000, only 107,000 cards had been granted, and most
of them only for only one year’s duration (Baldwin-Edwards 2004: 4). The onerous
bureaucratic procedures contributed to this low rate of processing.

The green card grants equal civil rights and the same rights as Greeks in the labor
market (it excludes tenured positions in the public sector), but it does not grant voting
rights (Fakiolas 2003). It can be renewed one or more times, but they are not easily
renewed. In order to renew the green card, one must have earned an income
corresponding to that of a typical unqualified worker for half of the period between
application for green card renewal and the date of receipt of the green card. Any card
holder who can prove that he or she has already lived in Greece for at least five years,
and who can provide evidence of self-support can apply for a five year residency permit.
Also, under Greek law, family members of aliens who have lived for five uninterrupted
years in Greece become eligible for family reunion (Papantoniou-Frangouli and Leventi
2000:953)

The green card does not, however, lead to naturalization and acquisition of
citizenship. The reason for this is that Greece citizenship is based on jui sanguinis law.
Even long-term immigrants rarely acquire citizenship and marriage to a Greek citizen
does not guarantee one’s chances of obtaining Greek citizenship or work permit. A
foreigner may apply for naturalization after a period of 10 years of legal residence,

although, there is often an additional wait of several years before authorities evaluate the

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application. From 1985 to 1995, 16,842 naturalizations were granted, of which 12,737
were to persons of Greek descent (Fakiolas 1999: 195).

Many of the participants in my study voiced their complaints about the lack of the
prospects of acquiring Greek citizenship, even after working and living in Greece for a
long time. Ylli, who has been working in Greece for about 15 years and has managed to
obtain a job somewhat similar to the one he had in Albania said: “I have been working
and living in Greece for 15 years. I have only a residency card that we renew every three
years. Even though I have been here for so many years, they do not give us citizenship,
because the laws in Greece are different. The Greek government does not have any laws
to give citizenship. We pay social security, taxes and we have cars with a Greek license
and Greek driving license. We have everything like the Greeks, except for citizenship.”
Immigrants also complained about the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the local officials, as
well as the high cost of renewing their green card, which posed a burden on their already
meager financial resources.

Klarenti: “I have a green card. I renew it once every two years. Every year we pay
150 evro. So if you want to get a two year green card, you pay 300 evro. I pay 150 evro
and my wife pays 150 evro, 300 evro. And the green card came two weeks ago. But it
had expired. It had expired since one year. After a year, they sent me the card. So why
did I pay? For nothing. The Greeks do these things. You pay, but you do not get a card.
You get the card, when it expires.”

Some immigrants who, given the instability of their jobs, are not able to work in
jobs that provide enough social security stamps required for the renewal of the green

card, are compelled to buy them. Blerta: “We have social security. But for my husband, it

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depends on his work. For example, if he does not work in the construction in one house,
they do not put him social security. When he works a lot, they give him social security.
We are obliged to buy them. We pay out of our pockets. We go to an engineer and buy
social security there, so that we can get the green card. It is expensive. It costs us a
fortune, but what can we do.”

By March 2001, however, in spite of the first legalization, hundreds of thousands
of immigrants were still undocumented in Greece. This was a result of several factors:
failure to apply for legalization, renew the temporary permit, or additional immigrants
who had arrived in Greece since after the first legislation. Moreover, the 1991
exclusionary immigration law remained the framework regulating immigration policy
(Lino 2003: 314). In view of these circumstances, the Greek government called for
another legislation program. The new law 2910/2001 replaced the 1991 law.

Legalization was open to all undocumented migrants who could prove that they
had been living in Greece since at least June 2, 2000. This included migrants who
registered with the Organization for the Employment of Human Resources (OAED) in
1998 during the first legalization process, but who did not obtain a Green Card, as well as
those who held a residence permit that had expired. If there was no stamp of entry on the
passport proving the applicant entered Greece before June 2, 2000, one should submit
other documents (i.e., electricity, water, telephone bill). Those applicants who lived in a
village or town of less than 20,000 residents, could request a document fiom the local
council verifying length of stay. Those who did not possess any form of official proof
indicating they have been in Greece since June 2, 2000, had one more option: They could

buy one year's worth of social insurance stamps (ensima) to cover the required period

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(Athens News, June 1, 2003). The law, however, restricted access of undocumented
immigrants to public services (i.e., local authorities, hospitals, clinics) (Fakiolas 2003:
542), a provision that drew heavy criticism from immigration activists, labor unions, and
the ombudsman’s office, although education became the right of all children, regardless
of their parents’ legal status (Lino 2003: 314). In spite of these problems, however, a
large number of immigrants managed to change their status from that of illegality to that

of legal migrants.

Why did Greece adopt one of the most liberal legalization policies in Europe?

Scholars have stressed various factors that shape immigration policies in the
countries of liberal democracies. Some authors (Sassen 1998; Soysal 1994) argue that
international human rights regimes are vital factors in hampering a state’s capacity to
control immigration, guaranteeing human rights regardless of one’s citizenship. Others
(Cornelius et al. 1994; 2004) contend that various agreements and resolutions undertaken
by international bodies, such as the United Nations, International Labor Organizations,
and the EU, significantly influence receiving countries’ immigration policies. Still others
suggest that sending states are capable of influencing immigration policies of receiving
countries (Rosenblaum 2004).

While this scholarship emphasizes international factors, another group of scholars
(Hollifield 1992; 2006; Joppke 1999), have highlighted internal factors, most importantly
the role of the laws and courts, in having significantly influencing liberal democratic

govermnents’ immigration policies. Germany presents a good case to illustrate this point.

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In the post war period, the German government, like that of France (see above), instituted
recruitment programs, known as “guestarbaiter” to fill in job vacancies created by
economic boom. As a result, millions of workers came to Germany. They were seen as
temporary workers who would go back to their own countries after a few years (Castle
and Miller 2003: 77). With the 1973 economic crisis, the German government stopped
recruitment and expected the guest workers to go home, something which did not happen.
Instead, immigrants were joined by their families and decided to settle in Germany
permanently. German authorities tried to prevent family immigration through various
ways62, such as refusing work permits to family members, or grant them only after a
specified period of residence (Hollifield 1992). The govemment’s attempts to prevent
immigrant workers and their families from settling in Germany, however, were
unsuccessful.

The reason for this, according to Joppke (1999: 69), rests with the activist courts,
which defended and expanded the rights of foreigners. They did so on the basis of two
principles of the German constitution: first, the subordination of state power to the rights
of individuals; and secondly, granting the most fundamental of these rights without
respect to nationality. In doing so the courts helped transform the precarious guestworker
status into a secure permanent-resident status, which equals that of citizens, forcing the
government into adopting an expansive immigration policy, undermining government’s
intent on pursuing a zero-immigration policy (Joppke 1999: 103). This is in sharp

contrast to Great Britain, where the government has successfully managed to pursue

 

62As noted above, the German government too, instituted repatriation programs in the hope that

immigrants would return to their countries of origin (see Hollifield 1992: 82-83). The repatriation attempts
did not succeed, however. While there were foreigners who took up financial bonuses, like in the case of
France, most of those who took up the bonuses, would have left any way (Martin 2004).

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perhaps, one of the most restrictive immigration policies in Europe. The reason for this
lies in the absence of the institutional constraints on restrictionist governments (Hansen
2000: 27). In Britain there has been little blockading of the political branches of
government by recalcitrant courts. Sovereignty is firmly and unequivocally invested in
Parliament, which knows no constitutional limits to its law-making powers.” (Joppke
1999:103)

Gary Freedman (1995) is another author who has underscored domestic factors in
shaping immigration policies. The author locates forces that influence governments’
decisions towards immigrants in what he calls “client politics.” According to this
argument, various social groups (i.e., private employers, ethnic advocacy groups, civil
and human rights organizations) prevent states to adopt and enforce restrictionist
immigration policies.

These approaches, however, are not capable of explaining Greece’s decisions to
undertake one of the most liberal legalizations in Europe. For one, while international
human regimes do exist, in view of Joppke (1998: 268), “the international human rights
regime is not so strong as to make states fear and tremble. In addition, according to
Linos (2003: 318), policies that are thought to be influenced by international
organizations, are usually restrictive in nature. Besides, in the case of Greece, the
evidence of EU pressure on any immigration-related issues is very scarce. Furthermore,
judicial systems cannot explain liberal legalization programs, because, the power of
courts in Greece is very small, and in fact the judiciary is directly influenced by the
executive (Linos 2003: 323). Moreover, the “client politics” model is suited to settler

societies, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States. The lobbies in the Greek case

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are much weaker and there are no established ethnic or immigrant lobby (Lino 2003:
318).

Finally, regarding the issue of the influence of the sending states on receiving
societies, it should be said that the existing literature on this topic, does indeed point to
the state’s involvement in migration. The state, for example has been active in
negotiating bilateral labor programs with receiving states, such as “guestworker”
programs in post World War Europe, or Bracero Program in the United States (Calavita
1994 ; Castles and Miller 2003). Moreover, as the literature on transnationalism tells us,
once emigrants have settled abroad, the sending states have tried to reach out across its
territories to their immigrants abroad (Guarnizo 1998; Itzigsohn 2000; Landolt 2007;
Levit and de la Dehesa 2003; see articles in Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Smith and Bakker
2008). The involvement takes various forms that range from allowing immigrants to
adopt dual citizenship or nationality (like in the Mexican case), providing immigrants
with the right to vote during sending countries’ election, use of state’s consulates abroad
to help immigrants with various issues (i.e., providing legal and other services), setting
up programs aimed at strengthening the migrant’s economic (i.e., programs to channel
remittances into income and employment-generating activities as well as productive
investment) and cultural ties (i.e., the Dominican state for example set up cultural centers
in United States in those cities where a large number of Dominicans immigrants reside)

as well as intervening on behalf of immigrants to protect their rights63 (Fitzerald 2006;

 

63h 2002, for example, president Vincente Fox of Mexico took a stance in favor of Suarez Medina, a
Mexican immigrant prisoner awaiting execution in Texas for killing an undercover police. The president
did so on Mexico’s opposition to death penalty. The efforts, however were unsuccessful, as Suarez Medina
was eventually executed. In response to this act, Fox cancelled a planned visit to Texas that included
meeting with president Bush as well as other trips to the US later that year (Martinez-Saldar'ra 2003: 55).

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Guarnizo 1998; Itzigsohn 2000; Levitt 2001; Martinez-Daldar’ra-Jesr’rs 2003; Ostergaard-
Nielsen 2003; Smith and Bakker 2008). States are keen to reach out to their immigrants
abroad because the current mode of incorporation in the world economy leaves these
countries dependent on migrants’ remittances. In addition, migration constitutes a
sociopolitical safety valve, mobilizes political support from abroad and provides
advocates of government agendas vis-a-vis the receiving societies (Itzigsohn 2000;
Guarnizo 1998; Portes 1999).

It is important to note, however, that the sending countries’ capabilities to
influence receiving countries’ immigration policies varies, with some countries being in a
more powerful position than others. The Mexican government, for example, is more
likely to be successful in this process than other less influential states because Mexico
sends such large numbers and plays such a significant role in US. economic and political
affairs. Countries that send fewer rrri grants and that are less important economically and
politically have much less bargaining power (Levitt 2001: 207-208).

In the case of Albania, however, it should be stated that the state has been largely
absent from the life of its own immigrants abroad. It was not until 2005 that the Albanian
government finally managed to adopt a national strategy of migration (Barjaba 2008;
National Strategy of Migration 2006). Instead, Albanian emigrants were left to fend for
themselves as they tried to build a life in Greece. All immigrants in my sample expressed
a sense of frustration at the lack of support from their own govermnent, as well as
mistrust toward the government.

Said Kreshniku: “We do not have a state. The Albanian state has given us

nothing... I mean, the Albanian state has not helped immigrants. Never. We do not have

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a state. Bulgarian government, Russian government complains about the treatment of
their citizens. Albanian state never.”

Similarly Jonida complained: “Our government does nothing for us. It does not
protect our rights. I have never seen our government to intervene to protect our rights. I
have never heard them talk about our rights.”

In addition, immigrants were of the opinion that not only did the Albanian
government not protect its own citizens’ rights in Greece, but that the perception among
immigrants was that the government exploits them.

Said Marcela; “Our government does nothing. On the contrary. When we go to
the embassy, just for a little thing, just to get a seal, a small paper, they take us 30 evro.
So I work one whole day for what, for nothing. And who. My embassy. But what can you
do. We need those papers.”

Likewise, Ylli stated: “Albanian state is zero. You do not feel the hand of
Albanian state in Greece. Albanian state does not protect our rights. An Albanian citizen
that is killed in Greece is not protected by Albanian state. Nobody protects you here.
Not only this, but the Albanian government wants to benefits fiom us, the immigrants.
Why do I say this? Because, look at this. The Albanian embassy is in Greece. It is part of
Albanian state. If we want to get a certificate at the embassy, you need to pay 20 evro. I
need four certificates. I pay 80 evro. So the embassy steals from me. It does not help
me... For example, I need a passport for my son now. It is quite a marathon to get it. I
need to get it at the Albanian embassy. I need a guarantee. But I do not have time. I am

an immigrant. I need to work. I cannot waste away my time.”

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Furthermore, the Albanian government’s influence on the Greek govemment’s
immigrant policy decisions has been very limited because of unequal power relation, with
the former being in a much weaker position vis-a-vis the latter. While Albanian
government has complained about allegations that Greek police discriminate against
Albanians, as well as offering apologies for the behavior of some Albanians, its demands
have been seriously limited by the fact that Albanians enter Greece illegally. In addition,
the Albanian govemment’s influence on Greek immigration policy was finther weakened
by Greece’s claims that the Greek minority in Albania was being mistreated64 (Linos
20032320)

Linos (2003: 326-327) attributes the decision of the Greek government to pursue
legalization of immigrants, in spite of hostility of the general public towards
immigrants“, and in the absence of other domestic and international pressures to three
main factors: First, economic benefits of migration, which the government deemed to be
significant enough to ignore the Greek public opinion (see also Fakiolas 1999). Second,

the government was able to distance itself from public opinion because the Greek

 

64One of the incidents that point to the mistreatment of Greek minorities in Albania occurred in April 1994.
In that year, amidst tense relations between the government of the two countries, ethnic Greece
paramilitaries, allegedly based on Greek soil, attacked a small military post near Gjirokastér, (a town
nearby Greece), killing two Albanian soldiers. In the same month, five of Omonia’s leaders (Democratic
Union of the Greek Minority) were arrested and tried for complicity in the attack, while Greece vetoed a
loan to Albania by the European Union of 35 million ECU in protest. Meanwhile, the government of Tirana
began to move landless Muslim peasants from the north of the country into empty Greek land and Greek
villages in the extreme south of Albania, a move that the Greek minority saw as the beginning of ‘ethnic
cleansing” in the area. A purge of ethnic Greeks in the professions in Albanian continued in 1994, in
particularly in the areas of law and military. The trial of Omonia leaders opened in September in which the
defendants were charged with treason and spying charges and convicted. The trial was popular with
Albanians, it caused outrage in Greece, with the international observers regarding it as deeply flawed in its
procedure. Greece responded to the trial verdict by expelling hundreds and thousands (about 115,000
between August-November) of Albanian migrants (mostly illegal, although legal immigrants were deported
too) (V ickers and Pettifer 1997: 198-199; Greek Helsinki Monitor 1994).

65According to 1997 Eurobarometer, 72 % of Greeks (the highest among the countries in EU) “tended to

agree” with the statement that “All illegal immigrants should be sent back to their country of origin without
exception.” (Linos 2003: 321 citing Melich 1999)

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political system has many elements of a cartel party system. These features strengthened
the ties of the ruling party to the state, lowered the risk of third-party emergence, and thus
weakened the link between policy and public opinion. Finally, immigration was an issue
on which this distancing was possible because it does not fit neatly on the right-left
political spectrum. Thus, the conservatives were not interested in politicizing the
immigration, because they were did not want to alienate economic liberals with a
restrictionist stance, and estrange social conservatives with a pro-immigrant position. As
the main parties did not politicize the immigration issue, and third parties had little
chance of rising to power, voters opposed to immigration were left with no voice for their
opposition (Linos 2003: 326-327).

In summary, we would say that immigration from Albania is a result of
communist govemment’s policies of limiting economic opportunities and prohibiting
immigration. The fall of the same state unleashed large migration waves. The Albanian
state, however, was not involved in immigration, yet immigration persisted. The major
reason for perpetuation of migration can be found in rrrigrants’ social networks in the
process of migration. Pioneer immigrants undertook their journey to Greece. As soon as
they settled, found a job, got acquainted with the new enviromnent, they asked their
families, relatives and fiiends to join them to Greece. The latter, in turn, given the
structure of network ties, drew others into the process. Soon, whole families and
communities are involved in immigration. In addition to networks, migrant-supported
institutions tend to develop to sustain migration. As the stories in my study revealed,

imrrrigrants, faced with the blocked official channels of obtaining visas, turned to “private

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entrepreneurs” to secure these services (i.e., obtaining fraudulent visas, passports, or
smuggling them through the borders).

The large influx of Albanians to Greece caught the Greek government largely
unprepared to respond to the new situation. The reason for this rests with the fact that
Greece, like other countries in Southern Europe, had, for a long time, deemed itself as a
country of emigration and therefore lacked any institutional mechanisms to deal with
imrrrigration. The initial response of Greek government was a 1991 law, which
determined all matters that had to do with the entry, work, and residence of immigrants in
Greece, established police rules for the control of immigrants flows and made no
provision for legalization of a large number of foreign workers already in Greece. In
addition, the government expelled many immigrants without legal process. In spite of this
kind of repressive policies, by the mid-19908, however, it was becoming clear that a large
number of undocumented foreigners (about 800,000) were going to stay in Greece. Faced
with this situation, the Greek government launched two legalization programs, in 1998
and 2001 respectively, providing a large number of Albanians with legal status. In doing
so, to a certain degree, Greece followed in the footsteps of Northern European countries,
which legalized thousands of post World War II “guest workers” after realizing that the
“guests” were not going to return to their countries of origin.

There are, however, differences between Greece and the countries of Northern
Europe. For one, migration of post WWII workers to Northern Europe was a state
organized migration and migrant workers were labor migrant workers. Conversely,
immigration from Albania was initiated and perpetuated by Albanians themselves, with

no state involvement. Moreover, given the situation of exit, they were forced migrants.

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The receiving country’s government, however, through a series of legalization programs,
intervened to transform Albanians from forced, illegal migrants into legal labor migrants.
Yet, the short term (one to three years) green card status, and the jui sanguinis basis of
Greek citizenship, leaves immigrants in a position of future insecurity, while allowing the
Greek population to fool itself that Albanians are temporary “guest workers,” who will
soon return to their own country (Baldwin-Edward 2004a: 11). However, as with
“guestworkers” in Europe, many of them will settle in Greece for good. In fact, one
irnrrrigrant best summarized this intention, so widespread among many of participants in
my sample: “In spite of problems, racism, discrimination we have, Greece is still better
than in Albania... Even if I want to go back, my children do not want to go back. The
future of my children is in Greece. They have a much better life here.”

Thus, after forty years of being “sealed off” in their country by their own
government, Albanians were forced to leave when the very state failed and collapsed.
They took the journey to the much dreamed Greece, a country they had never seen,
except on the Greek TV programs and commercials. They settled in Greece, overcoming
the initial shock, fears, insecurity and, along the way, many of the other hurdles
immigrants face in their host societies. In this difficult and complex process, aware that
their government has largely ignored them, Albanians have had to rely on their own

social networks and be at the mercy of the Greek state and its policies.

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CHAPTER 6
EARNING A LIVING: EXPERIENCES IN THE GREEK LABOR MARKET

In this section, findings with respect to labor market adaptation are discussed.
More specifically, this chapter focuses on the richness and ethnomethodology of
migrants’ experiences as they confiont the capitalist economies. Irnmigrants’ personal
stories will shed light on the multifarious and dynamic process of transition from the
labor environment of the socialist Albania to the labor milieu of capitalist Greece. At
first, however, I will provide a brief summary of the areas of employment concentration
of the study. This, I believe, will give a better framework in which to understand the

labor market experiences of Albanian migrant men and women in Greece.

Employment Concentration

With very few exceptions, all immigrants interviewed for this research project
worked in low-skill, low-wage, low-prestige jobs. The overwhelming majority of the men
were employed in construction. The rest worked in small factories, car repair services,
gas stations, parking places, cleaning and building maintenance, transportation,
agriculture, hospitals, stores, as gardeners, while only a few were self-employed. Most of
the women worked in domestic service (housecleaning, cooking, child-care provider,
taking care of the elderly). The others worked in small factories (i.e., clothing firm),
restaurants/tavema, hotel, hospitals and take-away places. Many said that they had also
worked in agriculture as seasonal laborers when they first came to Greece. Of all the
people with university and advanced degrees, only three had been able to obtain a job

commensurable with their educational level and training.

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The clustering of Albanians in specific occupational spheres is largely a reflection
of the Greek labor market. According to Fakiolas (2000: 60): “The demand for unskilled
and low-skill labor in Greece is high for two main reasons. First, a large part of the output
of the economy is still produced in small family firms and households which apply labor-
intensive production methods, use low-and middle-level technology and utilize mostly
indigenous resources. Employment in such units accounts for nearly half the total
employment in the private sector and consists primarily of unskilled labor and middle-
level skills acquired outside the formal school system. Secondly, the high incomes earned
by capital owners, managers, business personnel, and the well trained people employed in
high technology sectors generate a demand for hotel, catering, entertainment, domestic
and other services, largely based on unskilled and low-skill labor.” The natives reject
these jobs for various reasons.

As Hatziprokopiou (2003: 1042) explains, low fertility rates and an aging
population has led to a significant decrease in the growth rate of the total labor force.
Increased living standards and widespread participation in academic/professional
education have created high employment aspirations, enabling young people a later entry
into the labor market. F arnilies support the young until the time they find a job
commensurate with their skills. While young Greeks perform low—status informal jobs,
they do so only on a part-time basis or only temporarily. As a result of this, jobs are open

to immigrants.

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lmmigrants’ New Experiences

As mentioned earlier, immigrants fi'om Albania, like members of other former
socialist societies, lived under a system where a job was assigned to them by the
government upon completion of their education. Moreover, the job was guaranteed, and
more often than not a person would work in the same job until retirement. The process of
job searching, fear of losing a job, while experiences common to the citizens of Western
world, are foreign to Albanians. It is no surprise that the overwhelming majority of
immigrants said that trying to find a job, constantly being on the lookout for a job and the
fear of remaining unemployed have been some of the most difficult realities immigrants
have faced in their receiving society. Immigrants often used the word “stressful” to
describe this new experience.

Fatbardha: “Here the stress is too much. I can’t tell you how much it is. In
Albania, I never thought of it. I knew I would finish the university, and my job would be
waiting for me. I would put my mind to rest. You had a job, and you would retire in that.
You did not have the stresses that you have now. You were secure there. You were not
left without a job. Here, there is a lot of unemployment. There the job was guaranteed.
Even at this time, after living for such a long time in Greece, I am always anxious of
losing my job. You need to be on the lookout for work; one is constantly changing jobs.
You will not be in the same job all the time. You are always anxious, nervous. Today you
have work, tomorrow you may not. Today the boss hires you, tomorrow he fires you.
You can’t compare it with the past.”

Similarly, Ylli asserted, “The stress here is great. The anxiety people have every

day has ruined them psychologically. These things did not happen before. The work was

136

secure. You worked a set amount of hours. You finished work, and you did not have to
worry about looking for another job. After work, you would take an evening walk in the
boulevard. You returned home at about ten in the evening, watched a little bit of TV, and
then went to bed. Life was simple and without stress. Here, every day you have the
anxiety of losing your job. Every day you have the stress of being fired from your work.
This was one of the most difficult things I had to get used to.”

Valbona, who works as a waitress in a bar, recalled her feelings when she had lost
her job for the first time and was trying to find another job: “That was very difficult. You
do not have anything to live on. It’s not that I did not have some money. I had worked
for years, and I had some savings. But, it was not that I did not find work only for several
months. I kept asking myself: is this going to last for months, maybe a year? Am I going
to go several years without a job? This has been one of the most difficult things to get
used to”

Piro remembered the first time he was fired from his job in Greece: “The loss of
my job was something very difficult I got used to. I remember the first time I was fired. I
had just worked in the job for a month, and they fired me. It was very difiicult. It was
shocking. I was not used to this. In the past regime, you had a job and you would never
lose it. While here, it was so different.”

A number of researchers that focus on adaptation of immigrants fiom the
countries of the former communist bloc to the life in the West, have noticed similar
experiences. Gold (1995), in his research work with Russian Jewish immigrants in the
United States, showed how the entire process of a job search, for example, reading

newspaper advertisement for jobs, writing resumes, typing application letters, being

137

interviewed for the job, and following a dress code for the interview were entirely new
concepts for the immigrants. Likewise, in Bernstein’s study (2006), immigrants from
former Soviet Union who live and work in Germany expressed their frustration in trying
to cope with the new realities of the Western society. As one immigrant said“... Our
Soviet remnants are everything. For example, a concrete remnant—now I must change
my job. There, in Odessa, the capitalist situation was unthinkable—you never had to
change your job; everyone went to the same work his whole life. Here I need to make a
mental effort in order to understand that I am fired from the research project after seven
years of work not because people do not like me or because I am not suitable, but
because now is exactly the time when a permanent position in my department is no
longer possible economically. It is difficult for me not to take it personally and to
understand that economic circumstances also decide this” (Bernstein 2006: 10).

Sure enough, some of the participants in my study looked back nostalgically to
the lost days of job security. Endrita, who used to be a supervisor and now works in
domestic service said: “I am nostalgic about the past system. Why not? I did not have
much, but everything was secure. I had my job, and I would go and sleep at home,
without any worries. I knew that I would not lose my job. The next day the job would be
waiting for me. Now, my husband and myself are never employed at the same time.
Either he is employed, or I am employed. Before, when I was sick, and I needed to stay
home, the state would pay for it. I was not afraid that I would lose my job. Now I am
experiencing what I had heard about in Albania, the capitalist crises. They used to talk to
us about deep capitalist crises. The truth is that we are experiencing then now. Let me tell

you something else. I did not have a doctor for a year, because I was between jobs. I did

138

not have medical coverage because I did not have ensima (social security). Because if
you do not have ensima (social security), you cannot get a doctor. That whole year, I was
without insurance. I was always saying to myself: I hope I do not get sick. Thank God I
never got sick that year. Otherwise, I would have had to have gone to a private doctor.
And you needed to pay 50 evro66 just to see a doctor. Nowadays, I think it is 80 evro. I
started another job. But I needed to have 53 days of work in ensima, so that I could take a
doctor, and I would renew the book of “medical insurance.” I started my job in
November, but my employer, a real liar, did not register me for ensima for about three
months. So it looks as ifI had started work in February. I got sick. So I had to go to the
doctor. I told him, ‘I am sick’. He asked me for my medical insurance book. I gave it to
him, even though it had expired. I pretended I did not know it had expired. He told me,
‘This has expired’. I told him, ‘I do not know. I thought this book never expires.’ He said
‘no.’

Finally, he refused to see me. He told me to go to a idhjotiko (private doctor). I
told him, ‘why should I go to the private doctor, when you are my doctor?’ He said, ‘I
can’t see you because it is out of rules.’ If I would have gone to the private doctor, that
would have cost me 80 evro. I need to work three days for that. I remember, in the past,
it was for free. You would go to the doctor, and the doctor would see you instantly.”
Other immigrants also asserted that being without health insurance was very difficult
during the time they were working and living illegally in Greece. Some mentioned that

when they or their children became sick, they had to pay for medical services out of their

pocket. One immigrant, who is actively involved in the Albanian community, said that in

 

661 Euro is equal to $1.5

139

the very early stages of immigration,when the number of Albanians was not so large,
medical centers had offered free medical treatment to them. As their numbers grew,
however, the provision of these benefits dwindled dramatically. One said that when she
did not have health insurance, she had to go to the emergency room which was provided
free of charge. She had only paid a small amount for a few tests. She also knew of other
Albanians who had used these services. All but two of the participants at the time of
interview, had access to health care, either through their work or through their spouses’
work.

Several immigrants reported that one of the new experiences they had to get used
to in Greece was learning to work under new workplace rules and regulations, in
particular a rigid work schedule and supervision. Florenca: “The job here is much more
difficult than in the communist times. Under the Hoxha regime, we worked with norms.
We fulfilled the daily norm at about 12 Noon. That norm, according to my opinion, was
a lie. While here, it has been so hard. You must work until the end of the shift, at exactly
the same hour. If you go twice in the bathroom, the boss looks at you as if asking why did
you go the bathroom twice. You want to waste your time? It was so difficult to get used
to this at the beginning. It was so hard psychologically. But we got used to it. We had
to.”

Kishinevsky (2004: 58-59; 142) too, in her study of Russian Jews who had come
to United States in the early 19908, found similar reaction on the part of immigrants when
confronted with the new workplace environment. As one of the immigrants put it: “In

America, I work the same hours—from 9 to 5, but work here is more demanding... The

separation of work from personal life is much clearer. We used to know each other very

140

 

intimately, all 20 of us. We knew each other’s families, parents, children, closest friends,
but here it is not so. . .Work is more intense here; ...I would also say that there is much
more responsibility in your work. This intensity is not only physical; you feel it mentally
at times. Sometimes when I come home I not only lack strength to ‘do something, but I
don’t feel like moving a finger or saying a word.

While recognizing these difficulties and challenges, a group of immigrants stated
that they liked their work in Greece, because Greece as a capitalist country, offers
opportunities for people to move ahead. F atbardha, whom we introduced above, and is
one of the very few who has managed to work in her profession, contended that, “You
could not say that because you did not have stress, you would miss out on this life that we
have here. Yes, we had spiritual peace. No question about it. Now we have only stresses.
But I like it here. It is difficult, but I like it. Because you can see how capable you truly
are. While in Albania you did not know your abilities. Everybody was equal. No, I like
this. Really, it is difficult, but those who are good, move ahead. I like this system. For
me, this system is good.”

Along similar lines, G'e'zim, who used to be a supervisor in a factory in Albania,
and now works as a manual laborer in construction, said: “I like it here, because you
move ahead, because people try to work harder. While under socialism, it was different.
Let me give you an example. I was working as a supervisor in my job. If I wanted to fire
somebody, my boss would tell me, “Keep these workers at the job, because I say so.” I
used to tell him, ‘But they do not work.’ He would respond, “Where everybody eats,
they can eat too”. So, these were people that did not like to work, and thus did not. Our

society was such that everybody would eat. So, the parasites would work on the back of

141

 

others. They did not work and would live at the expense of others. In Greece, there is a
big difference. As we say in Albania, he who works live a better life, he who does not
work lives like a dog.”

Interviewer: What about the fact that your job now is not as good as the one you
had before?

Gézim: Yes. It is true. But if you look at the wages, I make much more now than
before.”

Blerina, who worked as a tailor under commrmism and now cleans offices in a
building, said “In the past, I worked in my profession. I worked and did not worry about
things. Like everybody else. I worked eight hours and would go home and put my mind
to rest. Now, I do any kind of work. Whatever job I find, whenever I find it, I will do it. I
am pleased with the economic side. I have some money left, live a better life and have
more stuff. If you compare this with the past, however, I liked that time only for the
peace of mind. That was a good thing. But the money is much better here.”

Several immigrants also saw as positive the fact that one has the opportunity to
work in multiple jobs, something which was not possible (at least legally) under the
previous system. Florenca: “ In the past there were good things. We had spiritual peace,
for example. But you could not work more. You could not work a second job. While
here, you can work a second job. This is very good. So everybody is trying so hard,

people are working, trying so hard. Their children live a better life.”

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“I used to teach students and I ended up washing cars, that professors use”:

Experiences of high status professionals

The highly educated immigrants are the ones who have had the most difficult time
adjusting to Greece. The largest part of the difficulties for this particular group of
immigrants has to do with the loss of their professional and social status. During the
communist regime, the university educated and skilled professionals (doctors, university
professors, engineers, journalists, teachers, engineers, economists, military officers)
comprised the intelligentsia, the pinnacle of country’s professional hierarchy, the “pride
of socialism,” to use Tony Judt’s (2005) words. Like the rest of the people in the labor
force, they would stay in the same occupation for their entire work career and their
position at the zenith of occupational hierarchy was rather well secured, a position which
would grant them high status and prestige as well as various privileges, not available to
members of the other two strata: the working class and the peasantry.

Immigration drastically changed this situation. Upon arrival to Greece, this group
of irnnrigrants soon realized that their university education, and their skills, were of little
or no value at all. As noted earlier, only a handful of the total of seventeen highly
educated immigrants in my sample have been able to achieve an occupational status
somewhat similar to the one they had in Albania. The majority, however, perform low-
status, low-wage jobs such as: taking care of gardens, working (mostly menial jobs,) in
the factory, working in construction (mainly men), domestic service (mostly women).
Thus, in addition to coping with job insecurity, an experience they share with the rest of

their fellow Albanians, this group of people has suffered a rather substantial occupational

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decline, and with it they have lost the high status and prestige that the occupational
position accorded them under the previous system. As one irnrrrigrant among this group
stated: “In emigration, the people that were worst hit are the professionals, because they
cannot find themselves. While a worker, a peasant, with low educational level, he can
easily find a job. He can take care of the garden, work in construction, earn a lot of
money. The intellectual cannot work like that. He cannot find work in his profession, so
he feels terrible.”

Arjeta, after recognizing the inability of the previous system to provide
opportunities to those professionals with vast knowledge to move ahead, alluded to the
decline of status: “In the beginning, when we could not find work, we looked for any
kind of job. So a person who has a university degree and lots of knowledge ends up doing
the most menial job, cleaning houses, working as a simple worker, the same job as
somebody who had only eight years of education...We had established a personality, we
had accumulated certain knowledge, we had a certain social circle. All of these were lost
in the capitalist world, because we were immigrants, and because all our knowledge was
left unused. Meanwhile, here we could not obtain contemporary information, because in
order to cope with difficulties of life, we needed to do the most menial jobs because we
needed to earn a living. Earning a living was not done based on using our knowledge, but
based on our physical labor.”

These quotations reveal the awareness these immigrants have of their situation in
the host society. Their previous skills and education became suddenly worthless, in
particular in its initial stages in the new market system. Moreover, resettlement has also

served as a leveler to the lowest point on the professional totem pole (Mahler 1995: 70).

144

Both ex-intellectuals/cadres and simple workers and peasants share similar position in the
professional and social hierarchy: that of physical laborers.

Several of the immigrants in this group described their feelings when faced with
the new reality of sharp decline in professional and social status. Andi said: “The first
moments, you are completely shocked. You judge things: ‘what is this?’ I have finished
university, and now what do I do? In this country, having a university degree does not
mean that you get a job.” Ardiana, who used to be a teacher, and has worked as a child
care provider and housecleaner in Greece, stated: “In the beginning, it was humiliating.
You were a teacher, and now you clean houses. Even now I dream of the job I had. ”
Another immigrant who had also been a teacher in a small 'town in Albania described her
feelings when for the first time she started working as a cleaner in a hotel: “In my
hometown I was a teacher. I was very well respected. Teachers at that time were well
respected. That is, the communist was ranked first, then the teacher. In Greece I ended up
as a cleaner. Imagine my tears when I got the broom and the bucket and started cleaning.
Imagine my tears. I was crying.” Similarly, for Zaimir, who used to have a high-status
job in Albania and is currently employed as a gardener, the beginning “was extremely
difficult. I felt something was choking me by the tlrroa .” Erindi, on the other hand, who
used to teach in higher education and now has a job taking care of a building, asserted:
“The most difficult thing for me in Greece has been the loss of personality. Coming to
Greece, job insecurity, and not knowing the language has forced me and other cadres to
beg for a job that was left by the Greeks. For example, one of the jobs I did was washing
cars. Think about it, fiom someone who taught and prepared pupils and students, I ended

up washing the cars that professors were using.”

145

Another former professional recounted his first work day in Greece which was to
carry bundles of newspapers from one place to another. That day, according to the
immigrant, was also the first day he had ever worked as a manual laborer. “That was the
first day in my life that I did strenuous physical labor. When I went home that day after
my work, my whole body was aching. All my muscles. The next day I did not go to work.
I was exhausted. I went back to work after four or five days.”

All the immigrants in this group affirmed that for them these new realities have
had a profound negative “moral,” “spiritual,” and “psychological” effect, and for some
like Erindi, this situation has caused him physical sickness. Not surprisingly, he said: “I
am nostalgic about that security of the past. Not only me, but all university graduates and
the cadres that are here.

Interviewer: Even though you were paid so little and you had no freedom?

Endriti: You could not say that you were paid little. We cannot say that. This is
because the cost of living was more or less in equilibrium with the wages. Nowadays,
especially after Greece has joined the European Union, and has adopted the Euro, the cost
of living is surpassing the basic wage of a simple worker. We are experiencing the
capitalist crises. For us immigrants, more than any other group, experience of these crises
has affected us so much. In the past, it was true that we did not have fi'eedom of speech
and thought, but life in general was more secure. By this, I mean we had secure work,
vacation, health and education. But most importantly, we had a peaceful family life.”

It should be noted, however, that many immigrants, including former
professionals, told me that when they came at the beginning, their intention was to stay

temporarily, for six months to a year. They only wanted to stay long enough to earn some

146

money and then return. However, as it is often the case with many immigrants, as Arjeta
put it: “The days rolled on, and here we are after so many years.”

Albanian former professionals are not unique in their experiences of downward mobility.
A number of researchers have documented this process for other immigrant groups
(Abusharaf 2002; Foner 1986; Mahler 1995; Margolis 1994; Markowitz 1993; Orleck
2001; Prieto I986; Remennick 2007; Sabogal 2005; Stafford 1984; Tress 1996;
Vinokurov et al. 2000).

Sabogal (2005), for example, found similar experiences for Peruvian
professionals who moved to South Florida beginning in the mid 19908. In spite of their
middle class status in their country of origin, g’ven their lack of legal status and lack of
knowledge of English, they were forced to take low status, low paying jobs such as house
painters, custodians, waiters, valets or other manual labor in the service industry.
Similarly, Sudanese former professionals in Abusharaf’s (2002) study told stories of
“rude awakening” after they arrived to United States and realized that their long years of
education and training in Sudan were insignificant in the US context. Margolis (1994)
observed the disjunction between middle and upper middle class background and their
employment status among Brazilian immigrants in New York City. Many Brazilian
immigrants, formerly members of the middle class (as well as a few from upper middle
class) who had obtained a college degree and worked in white collar jobs in their own
country found themselves working as parking lot attendants, street venders, cab drivers,
private chauffer, shoe shiners, construction workers, gardeners, domestic servants. A
majority of middle-class Brazilian women who worked as domestic servants in New

York had maids employed in their homes in Brazil. Research by other scholars reveal

147

similar experiences for highly educated Central Americans, i.e., Jamaicans, Cubans, and
Haitians living in the United States (Foner 1986; Mahler 1995; Prieto 1986; Stafford
1984), as well as immigrants from former communist societies (Markowitz 1993; Orleck
2001; Remenick 2007; Tress 1996; Vinokurov et a1. 2000), including research on
Albanian migrants (Lazaridis and Kournandraki 2007; Hatziprokopioyou 2003).

Like participants in my study, many of these studies showed that the loss in
professional status had resulted in many emotional problems for immigrants, such as, but
not limited to, resentment, bitterness and regret and sadness for the jobs they previously
held. As one of the ex-Soviet professionals in Remennick’s (2007) said: “My papers say,
‘N.N., Professor of Chemical Technology.” ‘Ha! Big Deal! It’s there that I was a
professor, and here I am dog shit!” (Remennick 2007: 333). In a similar manner, one of
the immigrants in Margolis’ study (1994) said that he ‘felt like a dog’ and another one
described the experiences as ‘downgrading,’ ‘humiliating’ and ‘distressing’. Margolis
(1994), Vinokurov et al. (2000) also found that those Russian Jews who had undergone a
downward mobility in their professions were much less satisfied with life in the US, and
had a considerable higher degree of alienation, than their counterparts who had been able

to work in a similar professions they held previously held in the Soviet Union.

“For me Greece is a paradise”: Experiences of immigrants from rural areas
Immigrants who hailed from rural areas were much more pleased with the

employment situation as well as life in general, in Greece. This is to be understood in

view of the situation of inhabitants in the rural areas under the communist regime. Under

the communist regime, in spite of communists’ intentions and policies (see Hall 1994 for

148

some policies) at reducing rural-urban inequalities, economic and living conditions in the
rural areas were much harsher than in the towns and cities. In addition, people from rural
areas were subjected to deeply ingrained prejudices and stereotypes of the urban
inhabitants, whereby the “civilized” town and city people looked down upon their
“uncouth, dirty, and ignorant” compatriots.67 Upon coming to Greece, this situation
changes, since in the receiving country, as one immigrant who came from a village in
Albania put it, “We are all alvanos68 now.”

Ilirjan and Gjinovefa, who used to work as manual laborers in agriculture, best
captured this reality. Ilirjan: “We, the peasants, suffered a lot. In the village, we did not
have any bread to eat. The village produced the grain, and the urban dwellers would eat
it. We in the villages would eat corn bread. In the villages you had nothing to eat. In a six
months period, we were given only a kilo of milk. It was a very difficult life... There
was a big difference between us in the villages and the people in the city. I remember my
mother; she would go to work barefooted. They did not have a car, like I have now. For
the people from the city, it is difficult here, because they left the factories and now work
in agriculture. For me, it is much easier. I still work in agriculture, but the conditions here
are much better. There is no comparison. The difference is like night and day. I have

everything here. For me, Greece is a paradise”

 

67Markowitz (1993) noted the existence of similar perceived hierarchies in the accounts of Russian Jews
who had moved to Brighton Beach, New York. Geographical location (as well as occupation) was an
important criterion upon which immigrants assessed and ranked each other. The highest prestige was
accorded to those who hailed from urban areas (mainly in Russia: Moscow, Leningrad) given that the living
conditions (i.e., housing, availability of consumer goods, and cultural amenities) in urban areas were much
better than those in towns and villages. Moreover, urban areas were equated with progress and
modernization.

68 . . . .
Alvanos rs a derogatory word Greeks use to refer to Albaman rmmrgrants.

149

 

Similarly, Gjinovefa, who like Ilirjan used to work in the field and now cleans
houses openly expressed her satisfaction with the new environment: “In Greece, I am a
hundred times better off than I was in Albania. In the village, we worked from morning
till night for nothing. I worked in agriculture. My job was very difficult. Do not even ask
me about it. I do not want to think about that. Even now, when I think about it, it gives
me the creeps. We worked in the snow and tilled the land. We ate only corn bread and
marmalade and we still worked and what did we earn? Nothing. I do not want to think
again about it. Now, I clean houses. I still work hard, but I earn much more money.”

Interviewer: How is your job now?

Gjinovefa: A hundred times better. They pay us well. I get 40 Euro per day. They
treat us very well. It is like night and day. For us from the villages, because for those
from the city from Albania, it was different. Life in the village was very, very poor. There
was no electricity. Not only that, but when we went to the city, they called us “the
peasant came with opinga (type of a shoe used derogatorily for people who lived in rural
areas). That was it. They insulted us, and now they ask: ‘Why do the Greeks call us
alvanos?’ Here I have everything, all the stuff needed to clean the house. Very good. I
work. I do not have a problem. Because in the village I worked very, very hard. For me
life in Greece is a paradise. I have everything here, all the conditions.”

The stories of Ilirjan and Gjenovefa point to the expanded opportunities for
immigrants who come from rural areas. Examples of these cases are also found, for
instance, among Mexicans in United States (Chaves 1998; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994;
Martinez 1994). Many rural Mexican migrants, including those who Worked in the

relatively steady employment of US. owned maquildaora, aware that conditions and

150

opportunities are far better on the US. side than Mexican side, found ways to enter the
US. labor market (Martinez 1994: 146). Such was the case of Héctor in Chaves’s study
(1998), who, left landless, with no regular work, and under the economic demands of his
family, immigrated to the United States, where he found work as simple laborer in an
avocado farm, eventually taking over the responsibility of the manager. Another
immigrant, in the same study, also related the story of better economic opportunities he
had found in United States as a bricklayer, opportunities, which according to him, would
not be found in Mexico. Despite the fact that both these immigrants were undocumented,
and received earnings which were low when compared to those of US. citizens, they
were rather pleased and proud of the position they had managed to achieve and stated a
preference for life in the United States to that of Mexico. Likewise, in Hondagneo-
Sotelo’s study (1994) one of the women immigrant remarked that while life in United
States had been pretty hard, she did not “regret coming to this country because it’s been

easier than if we had stayed there [in Mexico]” (Hondagneo-Sotelo 1994: 100).

Finding Jobs

The practice of looking for jobs assumed different forms. Those (mainly male)
immigrants who came in the early stages of immigration with no support from fiiends or
relatives, pursued the strategy of informal labor congregations”: the practice of looking
for work in an open-air informal markets such as street comers, parking lots, or

designated public spaces (Valenzuela 2003: 308).

 

69 Valenzuela (2003: 308) also talks about formal daily labor which consists of the practice of looking for

work mainly through formal temp agencies. None of my respondents, however, had looked for a job
through employment agencies.

151

Various research studies (Chavez 1998; Valenzuela 2003; 2001) have found
informal daily labor to be an important employment avenue for Latino immigrants in
California. hnmigrants in this sector of the economy perform an array of jobs found in
the construction sector (painting, carpentry, plumbing, roofing, electrical, masonry), as
well as gardening, nursery work, and trench digging (Chavez 1998; Valenzuela 2001;
Valenzuela 2003), and as my informants told me, jobs in agricultural sector. Most of the
day laborers are male, although occasionally, as Chavez (1998) indicates, the women also
participate in this market. They are usually recent immigrants, unauthorized to work in
the country, young (though not always) and strong, and usually have low levels of
education and poor command of the language of their host society (Chavez 1998;
Valenzuela 2003). Some of the workers engage in daily labor because of reasons of
entrepreneurial survival and/or believe that the wage market is not enough for them to
survive. Others, however, prefer this job because of certain advantages such as freedoms,
flexibility, a modicum of living standards, and the ability to negotiate a wage or
contractual price for their work (Valenzuela 2001: 347). My respondents, however,
asserted that their daily work was out of the need to survive, the only option they could
find when they arrived in Greece, given their lack of proficiency in the Greek language,
their unfamiliarity with the country itself, lack of their social networks and, most
importantly work permits. The following stories of immigrants in my sample, illustrate
this important strategy.

Ndrieirni, left in 1991. He left with a group of fi'iends, none of whom had ever
been in Greece before, and only one of the members in the group spoke any Greek. After

they crossed the border illegally, they entered a Greek village, where they ran into some

152

of the locals, who told them to go to Amindjo, where a camp was set up for refugees.
When they arrived in the camp, there were already about 200 Albanians. At the camp
Ndrieim had to go through certain procedures involving fingerprinting and filling out
some paper work. While he was in the camp waiting for his paperwork to be processed
so he could obtain the permit to leave the camp, he heard other Albanians who had been
in the camp for some time talking about work. “They said that if you go to the center of
the village, Greek employers will come and pick you up and give you employment.” In
the evening, he still could come back to the camp and eat and sleep at no charge. Two
weeks later, after his paper work was processed and he was free to go outside of campus,
him and his fiiends jumped at the opportunity of venturing to the center of the village in
the hope of finding work. While he was in the center of the village, still under the shock
of the abundance of Greek shops and the cleanness of the streets, one Greek approached
him and asked him if he wanted to come and work for him. Happy to find a job, he got
into the employer’s car and went to work. Since he was staying at the camp, the
employer had to go to the local police station and had to sign papers indicating that he
was employing Ndrieim. He worked in that job for about three months, mainly hoeing
grapes and unloading trucks. He had never worked in agriculture before. After he
finished working for this employer, he went to work for another Greek, whom he had met
while he was working in the first job. At the end of the season, given that there was no
more work, he and another Albanian immigrant moved on to other parts of Greece in
search for other jobs. Eventually, he ended up working in a restaurant, cleaning and later

cooking.

153

Kreshnik, who also came on his own, described his experiences like this: “When I
came to Greece the first time, I did not understand what was going on. I went to a hotel
and slept there the first night. The next day, I took my suitcase and went outside of the
hotel. A Greek came to me and asked: ‘Are you Albanian?’ ‘Yes,’ I said. ‘Come with me
and I will give you a job,’ he told me. I was confused. I could not understand what was
going on. We had never seen the world before. He told me to wait there. I was confused,
so I left to go somewhere else, and consequently I lost the job. Then I went to a place
where all Albanians would go and wait for jobs. A Greek guy came to me and said, ‘I
will give you a job. I have work for three months.’ So I left with him. I worked there for
three months. I worked in agriculture. After I finished my work there, another Greek
asked me to work for him. And then another. Then I decided to go back to Thesselarriki. I
did not like it there. In Thesselanik, I would go to the train station, where all Albanians
would go and we would wait for Greeks to come and give them jobs. When we found
jobs, we would work; when we did not find jobs, we would not work. Finally, after so
many different jobs, I managed to find a good job. I started working on some boats that
would come fi'om America. I worked there for five years. That job ended, and I was
unemployed. Then I started working in construction. I learned a trade, to paste walls.
Since then, I have always had jobs.”

In some other cases, irmnigrants looked for work in the villages they first arrived.
Such is the story of Blerim, who took his trip to Greece with a group of friends, none of
whom spoke Greek. After walking for many hours, they finally arrived at a Greek
village. “It was by accidence that we went to that village. That’s where the road took us.

They received us really well. We met a family in the village, and they gave us food to eat.

154

I asked them if I could take a shower since we had travelled for hours. They let me take a
bath in their house. We slept outside. The next day we went to work, in the field to till
the land. I had never worked in agriculture before.

Interviewer: How did you learn to work in agriculture?

Blerim: What could I do? I needed to eat. I needed to work so that I could eat. My
mother and father were not there.

Interviewer: How did you find the job?

Blerim: Two people from the village approached us as soon as they saw us. Given
that so many young people have left the remote villages and only the old have remained,
they liked it. Also they had seen other Albanians who had been there before us. Because
we do not get paid like a Greek person does, much less. So we did any job they could
give us.”

The stories of Blerim, Ndrieim, and Kreshnik are stories of those immigrants who
came to Greece with no social connections, and therefore, they had to pave their own way
in the Greek labor market. Many of the participants in my study, however, asserted that
they found jobs through social networks. Family members, relatives, kin, and friends
assisted new comers with job findings, in particular in the very beginning. These findings
corroborate findings of previous research studies on Albanians’ labor market adaptation
in Greece (Hatziprokopiou 2003; Lazaridis, 2000; Labrianidis et al. 2001 In
Hatziprokopioyu 2003) as well as findings for other imnrigrant groups (Hagan 1998;
Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Margolis 1994; Menjivar 2000). Only a few of immigrants said

that they had found the jobs through newspapers, but only after they had been in Greece

155

for a period of time and in the meantime, they had acquired some command of the Greek

language and environment in general.

Legal Status, Discrimination, Exploitation, and the Impact on Immigrants

The majority of the immigrants interviewed for this project were working and
living in Greece on a two year work and residence permit, which they had to renew every
two years, a procedure which, according to immigrants were rather costly, not to
mention the bureaucratic delays on the part of Greek officials in charge of this process.
The rest, those belonging to Greek and Vlach minorities, were under the status of
homogenia, and were given a ten year visas. Only two of the immigrants had received
Greek citizenship. Many immigrants, however, who had either crossed the border
illegally or were visa overstayers, had, until the 1998 legalization programs, worked and
lived illegally in Greece.

According to Portes (1978), undocumented immigrants are the most vulnerable of
workers, and the most easily abused, because their juridical situation, their legal
relationship with the host society’s state deprives them of their basic civil rights (Portes
1978: 474). First and foremost, undocumented workers are vulnerable to being caught
and deported. The available literature, including earlier research on Albanian migrants in
Greece, (Chavez 1998; Hatziprokopiou 2003; Martinez 1994; Massey et al., 1987; Repak
1995; Zlolniski 2006) has documented the apprehension and deportation of
undocumented workers. Repak (1995), for example, was told stories of how, after the
passage of Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, INS agents had

apprehended Central American irnnrigrants while they were working at their job sites

156

(mainly construction) and deported them after it was found out that they did not have
legal work permits. Chaves (1998) also noticed how frequent patrols by INS or Border
Petrol agents disrupted Green Valley’s Latino immigrants’ search for work. As soon as
government authorities would arrive in the places where immigrants clustered in the h0pe
of being recruited for daily jobs, undocumented immigrants would run. Moreover, fear of
government authorities forced farm workers to confine their lives within the places where
they lived, aware that they could be caught by the police if they would venture outside
the imposed “safe” zone. Zlolniski (2006) related similar cases in his book.
Hatziprokopiou (2003) too found examples of Albanians who were caught and sent back
to Albania by the Greek police authorities. The same authors also found out that in most
of the instances, immigrants who were deported would come back again, and in some
cases, to the great surprise of their employers, even within the same. day of deportation.
Irnrrrigrants in my sample recalled the anxiety they experienced during the time
they were working and living illegally in Greece: “It was very difficult when we did not
have papers,” said Zaimiri. “I feared the police, the operation the Scoop, everything. Job
insecurity. The inability to find work. Fear of being caught by the police, because I did
not have papers.” Several of the (male) immigrants in my study were caught and were
sent back to Albania. Ndrieim was one of them. He was caught by the police while he
was working as a manual laborer in a small factory that produced oil. He and a group of
other Albanian immigrants had found a place, an abandoned windmill away from the
village where the small factory was located. In this way, they would keep an eye on the
police. “If the police came, then we would run away in the hills, so that they could not

catch us.” After two months of working in the factory (in 1992), operation “the Scoop”

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began (the first among several operations organized by the Greek government). To his
bad luck, one of the days during the operation, while he was at work, the village police
arrived, about five of them. They blocked all entries of the factory. “Since they knew
where I was working, they came there.”

Interviewer: “How did they know where you were?”

Ndrieim: “It’s possible that they had seen me when I would go to work in the
morning. I had to walk through the village. So, they probably had seen me there. They
also could have seen me when I would go to the village store to buy groceries. I do not
know well.”

The police took him to the police station and put him in a small room with fifty
other Albanians. They kept them there all night, without any food or water. The next day,
they took them to buses and dropped them in Kakavije, at the custom with Gjirokastra.
While in the bus, he met another Albanian, and together they made plans to return as
soon as they arrived in Albania. Shortly after the Greek police dropped them off at the
Albanian side of the border, he and his two other acquaintances took the journey back to
Greece. After walking for many hours, he made it back safely to his workplace, to the
surprise of his boss. Later he was deported for the second time, and he still made the
journey back to Greece. This time, fearing the local police knew his whereabouts, he
decided to go somewhere else.

In addition to apprehension and deportation, undocumented immigrants are
vulnerable to discrimination and exploitation on the parts of the employers. The political
status of immigrants, and the legal relationship it entails with the state account for their

objective position of weakness vis—a-vis their employers (Portes 1978: 474). In view of

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these circumstances, undocumented irnrrrigrants, more often than not, occupy positions at
the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, mostly in the sector of informal economy,
performing jobs that are low status, low paid, with no prospect for mobility, often under
hazardous working conditions and with no social security benefits, unemployment
insurance or other worker’s benefit (Delgado 1993; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Lopez et
al. 1996; Stepick 1998).

Researchers have documented instances of abuse and exploitation of
undocumented immigrant workers on the part of the employers (Chavez 1998; Delgado
1993; Mahler 1995; Repak 1995; Samora 1971). For example, Samora (1971) in an
earlier study of experiences of Mexican undocumented immigrants in the United States
found out instances when employers would either pay workers much less than what
workers deserved or would not pay them at all. In some other cases, employers would
even turn undocumented immigrants to the Border Patrol. Cases of wage and other form
of abuses were also found by Repak (1995) and Mahler (1995). Delgado (1993) also
found that while bread-and-butter issues as well as excessive demands to increase
production were important concerns for undocumented workers in their drive to form
union in the factory they worked, their principal grievance was that of abusive treatment
by the supervisors (Delgado 1993: 29).

Many of the interviewees recalled that they worked in (often casual and
temporary) low-paid, unskilled, manual jobs, jobs overwhelmingly located in the
informal sector of the economy, such as agriculture, construction, tourism and the service
industry, and did not receive any social security benefits. In fact, for them, as one

immigrant put it, these were “lost” years. After the regularization of 1998, they managed

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to obtain better and more secure jobs, at least jobs that have partial or full benefits,
although as their employment concentration reveals, these jobs are still low-skilled, low-
status, low-prestige jobs. Moreover, as we will see below, almost half of my sample
(mainly women) still work in jobs (mainly domestic) that do not provide any benefits at
all.

The overwhelming majority of Albanian immigrants talked about the
discrimination and exploitation they have faced in the Greek labor market. This was

particularly the case with Albanian Muslims. In the “ethnonational” hierarchy of the

Greek society (see above Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002), Muslim Albanians occupy.

the lowest-ranking position, because they are “non Orthodox Christians”. Their religion
creates a psychological distance with Orthodox Greeks, since the Orthodox religion has
historically been a strong element of Greek ethnic identity, it is viewed as a sustainer of
Greek ethnicity (Lazaridis 2000: 64). As a result, Albanian Muslims pose a “real danger”
and “threat” to the very core of Greek identity, hence a reason these immigrants are
rejected.

The story of Gézim illustrates this point. Gézim: “When I would look for a job,
they would ask me ‘What is your religion?’ We used to say, ‘We are Orthodox.’ Despite
the fact that I was actually a Muslim. Otherwise, they would not give us a job.”

As a result, Albanian immigrants, as the already existing literature reveals, employ
various strategies to circumvent this situation, such as changing their real names to Greek
names, asking their employers to baptize them or their own children (Hatziprokopiou
2003; Lazaridis 1999; Lazaridis and Romaniszyn 1998), strategies which was mentioned

to me by several of my respondents.

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* _bo

 

Said Gézim: “At the beginning, when we used to go to work, they used to ask us:
‘You are from Vorioepiri, and orthodox?’ We used to say, ‘Yes, we are Vorioepiriots
fiom Korea. We are from Vorioepiri.’ In the workplace, they did not call me by my
name, but by a Greek name. They gave me a Greek name. ‘We cannot call you by your
narne,’ they told me. “So we are going to call you with this other name”. A few other
imrrrigrants also told me that they had asked their employer to baptize their children.
Discrimination is not confined to Albanian Muslims only. Immigrants of Greek, Vllach,
origin as well as Albanian Orthodox, also stated that they too had faced discrimination,
because, as stated earlier, they too had come fi'om Albania, their “backward” neighboring
country. Florenca, who is Orthodox, said “I work at a tailor shop. My boss is very nice.
But I see that often, she tries to hide the fact that I am an Albanian. She does not want to
tell them that I am Albanian. She thinks it will be bad for her business, that the customers
won’t come again .to the shop because I am Albanian. Sometimes, when the customers
learn that I am Albanian, they ask her “Couldn’t you have found somebody besides an
Albanian?”

Similarly, Edona who is of Greek ethnicity described her experiences while she
was working as domestic worker: “At the beginning they were terrible to me. She would
yell and scream at me, insult me. You Albanians do not know anything; you do not know
how to cook. What can I say? She would cook for her baby and would keep the meal for
three days. The meal then did not taste well. I told her, you cook for yourself, while I
will cook for the baby. Later I started cooking for the whole family.”

Immigrants also talked of their experiences of exploitation in Greece. Many of the

imnrigrants reported that one of the areas they have really felt exploited was wages. They

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said that they were paid much less than the Greeks, because they were Albanians. One
immigrant stated: “Rather than being paid ten thousand dhrahmas, I was paid two
thousand. Still I accepted. I had no choice. For Albanians, even two thousand dhrahmas,
was a large amount.” Then he continued jocularly: “At those moments I thought about
what I had learned in the lessons of political economy at school in Albania regarding the
surplus value theory and the exploitation of workers by the capitalists. And I asked
myself, “See how the capitalist exploits me?”

Another immigrant said “At the beginning we worked in fear. Because we were in
a foreign country. I worked so hard, so I could show the employer that I really work hard.
Because there were so many Albanians in that village. The afendikoi (Greek for the
boss), we looked him in the eye. We saw if he would fall, we would reach and hold him,
so that he would not fall. It’s not that I have done it. Others have. But they did it... At the
end of the day, the afendikoji would ask me to come and wash his car. What business did
I have to wash his car. I was exhausted. I had worked from morning till the evening.
Then, afendikoi would come and ask me: “Let’s go and wash my car, because I will go to
Theselaniki tomorrow.” Now it is different. If he would tell me now, I would say, go to
hell, go and wash it yourself. While at that time, it was the beginning. We did not know
anything. I used to wash the car. What could I do? I had no choice. I had to do it.”
Legal immigrants and the knowledge of Greek language, while important in adjustment,
did not spare immigrants from exploitation. Unfamiliarity with work environment, rules
and regulations governing this environment, unfamiliarity with Greek ways of life, was

also an important factor that affected people’s life.

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”in. . A? ~

Jonida, a member of the Greek minority told the story: “When I was working in
the beginning in a small shop that made clothes, the building I was working in had many
places where you could hide. So they used to tell me: “When we tell you go and hide in
the bathroom.”

Interviewer: “Why?”

J onida: “Because I was without ensima. I understood this later. People from the
government would come and inspect the place. They would ask ‘Who is she? Where are
her ensima?’ I found another job, where I would iron. There were about six of us. We
worked under very difficult conditions, from 7:30 in the morning till 6 o’clock in the
evening. He used to tell me, “If we see any unfamiliar person, we will tell you, and then
you are to go and hide in the bathroom.” And they used to look outside of the window. At
that time, I used to be very surprised. I used to ask myself, ‘What is this?’ Even here I
was without ensima. Three years, I was without ensima. When I found another job, the
new employer put ensima for my job. There I realized what they had done, and I said to
myself: “That’s why they used to tell me to go to hide in the bathroom. So I lost three
years of ensima.”

Interviewer: Did you have legal papers at that time in Greece?

Jonida: “Yes, of course, I was legal in the country. Once I had come to Greece, 1
had gone to the office for Greek minorities. They gave me a card that I am Vorioepiri.

What kind of Vorioepirioti? They would exploit you to the bone.”

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Gender and Labor Market Experiences

As seen from the aforementioned examples, both men and women shared many
similar experiences while trying to earn a living in Greece. As will be seen below,
however, interviews also revealed differences between immigrant men and women, once
again highlighting what researchers repeatedly have stated: the importance of gender in
shaping immigrants’ experience (Foner 2005; Hondagneo-Sotelo 1994; Hondagneu-
Sotelo 2003; Pessar 1999).

To begin with, labor market insertion was different for men and women. As
previously mentioned, unlike men, most of whom worked in construction, the
overwhelming majority of women in the sample were hired to work in domestic service,
performing tasks such as house cleaning, cooking, child-care and taking care of the
elderly. Of the rest of the women, one was working in the restaurant/tavema, one as a
privately employed nurse (in Greek: an apokalistiki), one as a tailor in a small family run
firm, and another one as a supervisor in the factory. Only two were working as
professionals. Both were self-employed: one was working full time, while the other one
was working part time. Three other women were not working at the time of the interview.
One, who had worked in a factory, had just lost her job. Another one had quit her job at a
store, because she became ill and was in the process of recovery. One was staying at
home to raise her kids. It should be noted, however, that even women who were not
currently working in domestic service, had (with one exception) done so for most of their
employment career in Greece. The employment concentration of immigrants in my
sample are consistent with results derived from surveys/census analysis on Albanians

immigrant performance in Greek labor market as well as various qualitative field studies

164

 

carried out with Albanian immigrants in Greece (Baldwin-Edwards 2004b;
Hatziprokopiou 2003; Iosifides and King 1998; Lazaridis and Romaniszyn 1998;
Lazaridis, and Psimmenos 2000).

The concentration of women in these particular occupations, in particular the
domestic service, has placed women in a more disadvantageous position than immigrant
men in several respects. To begin with, as Repak (1995) has argued the very nature of
the jobs domestic workers perform carriers a stigma as “degrading” work, since it
involves cleaning other people’s bathrooms and kitchens and picking up after employers’
families (Repak 1995: 102). Such work, is among others, low status, poorly remunerated,
involves long and indefinite hours, absence of formal contract, and with the exception of
few cases, (as my sample clearly indicates) absence of benefits such as health insurance,
paid vacation, sick leave (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1997: 109; Repak 1995: 102).

Indeed, several women who were working or had previously worked as domestic
in Greece, complained of the length and unpredictability of their work hours, as well as
the unpredictability of job demands. For example, women who were working as cleaners
mentioned that they had to work long hours at the time before and right after the
holidays (i.e., Christmas, Easter), often cleaning two houses in one day. In another case
one woman said that in addition to taking care of the children, a job for which she was
initially hired, she then started to do other jobs such as cooking for the whole family, and
occasionally cleaning; in other words performing multi-tasks an experience found among
women of other immigrant groups (Cheever 2003). The performance of a multiplicity of

such domestic tasks is nothing more but an extension of women’s tasks they perform at

165

 

home. As one immigrant told me: “Here I do every day, what I used to do in Albania
every Sunday: clean the entire house, all of it.”

The issue that immigrant women were highly concerned, however, was that of
social security benefits. As noted previously, under the communist regime, work was
secured and fear of losing the job was non existent. Moreover, people enjoyed various
fiinge benefits such as universal fi'ee health care, under which everybody was covered,
paid vacation time, consultation clinics, vacation centers for workers and their families
(Jacques 1995: 539). In addition, Albania’s social security system extending literally
from “womb to tomb,” covered disability, old age pensions, and burial expenses (Jacques
1995: 530- 540).

In my sample, however, a total of five women received work related benefits, such
as health insurance, sick leave days, vacation time, and pension upon retirement. Of
these five, only two of those who were working in domestic service, received such
benefits. Instead, married women asserted that they relied for these benefits through their
husband’s work. In addition, their residence permit depended on their husband’s, since he
was the one who had social insurance through his work, which is one of the main criteria
to live and work in Greece.

Klodiana: “Under Enver regime, I had a job. Yes, Yes. Work was secured. I worked
10 years. I made carpets. The work was very, very hard. The wage was very, very low. In
Greece, in the beginning, I took care of an old lady for three years. Then the lady died, so
I left. I had to find a job cleaning the houses. So I began to clean the houses. Even now I
clean the houses.

Interviewer: “How do you compare your past job with the present job?

166

 

:I
I.

Klodiana: “Compared with my past job, this job is much easier. Only that I do not
have social security benefits. Back then, I had a pension. When I would get old, I would
retire. While now, I do not have a pension, I am not secured. They do not give you
ensima in this job. Jobs with social security are in the tailor shops. But I do not know
how to do that job. So I clean houses... I am secured through my husband’s work. He has
ensima. He has a green card, and I depend on my husband. I do not get a pension. Only
my husband gets a pension.”

Women also complained that their husbands’ pension will not be enough when
they retire. One immigrant said: “The pension that the Greeks give you is very little, even
for the Greek themselves. I worry a lot, because my husband’s pension will not be
enough for him, let alone for me. It is very expensive to live and pay the rent; you cannot
live on that pension.”

Several women also mentioned the fact that while social security benefits through
their husbands’ work covered visits to doctors and medicines, it did not provide women
with days off in case they became sick. Fatjona said: “They do not pay me if I stay at
home. The doctor cannot give me days off. All medicines are free, because I am insured
through my husband. But if I get sick and I cannot work, they do not pay me.”

In addition to a lack of social security benefits, instances of which were found by
other scholars of Albanian migration (Lazaridis and Kournandraki 2007), fear of losing
the job, including jobs that provided no benefits, was also a grave concern for women.
For example, Etina, who is single, expressed a high degree of anxiety, given she had no
other means of support, and her employer did not provide any social security benefits:

“What was positive for me in the past was job security. The hospitals also were free. You

167

 

did not have the anxiety: ‘Now I do not have money, and I cannot go to the hospital. I
can’t pay the doctor. In Albania, you would go to the doctor, and you paid nothing. There
was security before... I work without IKA (social security), and I am obliged to pay in
Albania some money, so that I can get a pension. But, also you do not have the energy to
work. I am by myself, for example, and always worry about how I am going to pay the
rent. In the past, you could get a letter from the doctor saying that were sick and you had
to stay at home. If you were sick or not, if you knew somebody, you could get a letter
from the doctor, and nobody would say you anything. Here, if you do not work, you do
not eat. Nobody helps you. For example, I work for an older lady, and I always ask
myself, ‘What if she dies. Will I be able to find another job quickly.’ I am anxious about
that, because I say to myself, ‘Who is going to pay for the water and electricity and
telephone? Who will pay for these things?’ If something happens to me, I will be in the
middle of four roads. They can easily fire you. I am really anxious. What if I do not have
energy to work any longer? Because age plays its role. Before, you had your job and it
was there. Here, if you do not know somebody to find you a job, you are stuck... In
Albania, the work was much harder. I worked in a factory. I could do it. Now, I can also
do the job. But I am more scared, because I say, ‘What if the old woman does not want
me tomorrow. What am I going to do?’ The problem is that I do not want to expect things
fi'om a husband. Why should I put up with a husband?...Only few women work with IKA.
They do not give you social security. You need to work only in one house, so they can
put you social security’. Now, all these years passed, and we are left with nothing.”

For those few who had access to social security through their work, the fear of

losing the job loomed large, since the loss of a job meant the loss of various benefits.

168

 

Blerta said, “I work in a restaurant. My husband works in construction. I have social
secrnity. My husband’s social security depends on his work. When he works a lot he has
social security. Sometimes we have to buy ourselves the social security (stamps).

Interviewer: What about a pension?

Blerta: What pension? I need to work 18 more years to get a pension. Do I have
the security in this country that I will have a job? I do not have any security in my
country, let alone in Greece. Today they keep you in work, tomorrow they fire you. They
do not care. They do not hire you, especially when they hear you are Albanian. In the
past, I remember. My parents worked, my brother worked. You were not left without a
job. Now, who knows?”

One of the major issues immigrant women are faced in irrrrnigration is that of
childcare. Various researchers (Foner 1986; Foner 2005; Hochschild 2003; Hondagneu-
Sotelo 1997; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Ernestine Avila 1997; Mahler 1995) including
earlier research on Albanian immigrants (Lazaridis 2000) have observed these concerns
in their studies as well as strategies women employed to cope with these particular
situations: immigrant women often left their children behind under the care of their
mothers, grandmothers, neighbors, children’s fathers, other female relatives, sometimes
with paid caregivers, or in the worst case scenario in the orphanage. In a few cases, both
husband and wife would work opposite shift. In other instances, as research by Lazaridis
(2000) shows, parents are compelled to take the children out of school to look after
younger siblings.

Child care was a major concern for Albanian women with children as well. It

should be worth reiterating, however, what we have mentioned earlier. Unlike women in

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“9“”;

many parts of the world, working women hailing from former communist countries
enjoyed an array of benefits, such as paid maternity leave for women, free health care,
low-cost government provided-daycare and kindergarten. These benefits, while
inadequate and of lower quality by Western standards, greatly facilitated mother-worker
role of women, assuming that women were both expected to work and be solely
responsible for the domestic reahn, since Albanian men, like Russian men are famous
for not assisting with household tasks, regardless of their wives’ occupational
commitment (Gold 1995).70 In addition, like elsewhere, (see for example Foner 1986;
Zhou 2000) family members, in particular grandparents, often took care of grandchildren
when mothers were working. In some cases too, family’s relatives assisted in child
caring. In Greece, however, child-care responsibilities pose serious problem because of
several factors. To begin with, for a considerable amount of time, many women and their
families were working and living without papers. As such, they were not eligible for

state subsidized child-care.

 

7oThe communists, as part of socialist state’s project of emancipation of women, put a lot of efforts to
provide women with equal access to education and employment opportunities as those of men. While the
status in the educational and occupational sphere improved significantly for Albanian women during
socialist regime, the same achievements could not be said about family sphere, even though the most
extreme traditions that had historically characterized Albanian family were also challenged and partially
changed, yet the patriarchal mentality was never undermined (Mai 2001b: 268-269). As elsewhere in
Eastern Europe, “any development of women’s roles took place within a vacuum, by dint of communist
party diktat and largely without any commensurate comprehensive change in social attitudes.” (Hall 1994:
88) Women had to work as hard as men at work, only to go home and start the “second shift” of cooking,
washing, cleaning the house, taking care of kids. Surveys conducted with 450 Tirana residents in 1986
showed that “80 per cent of female workers spent more than two hours a day on housework compared to
only 20 per cent of male workers. During no-working days 63 percent of female workers spent more than
three hours on housework (with 30 per cent spending more than five hours), compared to 14 per cent of
male workers. Moreover, when it came to the division of responsibilities for the care of children, whereas
47 per cent of women in the sample spent between 1.5 and three hours a day looking after children, only 15
per cent of men devoted this amount of time to child care. This figure ranged from 12 per cent for manual
workers to 19 per cent for high-status professionals (Tarifa and Barjaba 1986; 1990 In Hall 1994: 86).

170

 

fir:

One woman recounted her difficulties of taking care of her newly born child
during the time she and her husband were working and living illegally in Greece. “1 gave
birth to my son, and I had to leave him at home after forty days. I left him with my
husband and my older son. I worked all night, and during the day I would take care of my
son. My husband would take care of my son during the night. When there was nobody at
home, then my older son would take care of his younger brother. A child would take care
of a child. Because we did not have papers. If you do not have emigration papers, they
could not take the child to day care, or kindergarten. They would not take it. It was very
difficult. I can’t even describe it.”

Moreover, even in those cases when women possessed legal resident papers, but
were working in domestic service under the conditions of informal employment, which
meant lack of social security benefits, they were not eligible for state subsidized day-care
centers. Such is the case of Afe‘rdita, who was not able take her newly born child to day
care, even though she was residing legally in Greece, because she was working “off the
books” as a house cleaner: “1 could not take my child to day care. According to Greek
law, if a mother is employed, she needs to show a document that verifies that she is
employed somewhere. I was not employed legally. 1 was doing “black” (illegal) work,
because I was cleaning houses. When you clean the houses, you are not registered
legally, because I did not have an employer. I was not employed in a job legally, so I
could not get a letter from social security. I worked daily, wherever I could find work...
It was too expensive to take my child to a private day care. In addition, the work
schedule was inconvenient. I was on the road, from job- to- job all day. I could not

manage to pick up the daughter from the day care. So I sent my daughter back to

171

we“. -mrmm'

Albania to stay with my mother. Many people have done this. This is very, very
difficult.”

Not all women I interviewed, however, had the good fortune of having relatives
taking care of their children. As a result, they pursued other alternatives, such as taking
children to private day-care, though these instances were quite rare. Drita, however, who
came to Greece with her husband upon finishing her university studies, decided to stay at
home and raise her Greek born children, while her husband works in two jobs. She
lamented the fact that she had come to Greece, considering it to be a big loss for her
professional career and life in general. “Under Enver, I would be better. Because I would
finish the university, and I would find a job. Now, I have ten years in Greece, and what
do I do besides raise kids? I have turned into a housewife. There at least, I would work.
Do you understand me? All those years of school are gone for me. I emigrated for what?
There I would have been better; not only would be better, but surely I would be much
better.”

The experiences of Drita, the university graduate turned stay-home mom, are
found among other immigrants of similar position. For example, Ho (2006) interviewed
women from Hong Kong and China, who, like Albanian women, have a strong history of
high level of participation in paid work. Upon moving to Australia, the challenges of
settling in a new society as well as lack of domestic support they had at home, pushed
these women to devote all their energies to facilitating family’s settlement in the new
country by completely withdrawing from the labor market, or limiting themselves to part-
time work. Gold (2002) too found similar patterns for Israeli immigrant women in the

United States.

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The experiences of Albanian immigrant women can be firlly understood in the
context of the Greek economic and social institutions. Hondagneu—Sotelo (2003) has
argued that gender is critical to the constitution of social institutions, not just farrrily and
household, but other institutions as well, labor market being one.71 Following this
argument, we would state, as others have remarked as well (Lazaridis 1996; Lazaridis
and Romaniszyn 1998), that the Greek labor market, is highly gendered too, where men
are clustered into “men’s job”, while women have been frmneled into “women’s job,” the
most common of which is that of domestic worker. Particular types of societies create
particularly gendered labor markets (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003: 8). In Greece, an ageing
population; changing family structure; rising participation of women in the labor force;
longer periods spent by females in full-time education; incapability of welfare state to
provide adequate care for the children (i.e., limited number of kindergarten), the elderly
and the sick as well as for people with special needs; continuous enlargement of housing
space; the still rather limited participation of males in housework and the prestige
considerations in many middle-class households to have a foreign domestic maid, creates
a demand for domestic service jobs (Fakiolas 2000: 60; Lazaridis 2000: 50).

The insertion of immigrant women in these jobs, has affected women on several
level: In addition to “degrading” nature of the job, low remuneration, lack of contract and
unpredictable and long hours, immigrant women have lost access to various social
security benefits, benefits which were taken for granted under the communist regime.
Married women have secured these benefits through their husband’s work, including the

right to residence, although none of them have the right to a pension upon retirement.

 

71Repak (1995), for example, found out that informal recruitment of Central Americans to serve as
domestic workers and child-care providers for Washington D.C.’s government, diplomatic and professional
employers, was a highly gendered process, whereby only women were hired to fill in these positions.

173

 

This situation will most likely increase the dependence of women on men. As one woman
irnnrigrant who had worked as domestics all her migrant life in Greece and did not have
retirement benefit, told me: “If tomorrow my husband divorces me, I do not know what I
am going to do.” These findings, therefore contradict the existing findings that women (in
particular women who obtain access to paid employment for the first time in their life),
gain from migration, while men lose. Instead, however, the findings show that women
have experienced a loss, which will, in all likelihood, increase the dependence of women
upon men, and therefore their subordinate status.72

In sum: A summary of occupational concentration of participants in this study
reveal the following picture: The majority of men work in construction, while the rest
work in small factories, various services, transportation, agriculture, taking care of
people’s gardens, or are self-employed mainly in building cleaning. The overwhelming
majority of women, on the other hand, are employed in domestic service (housecleaning,
cooking, child-care provider, taking care of the elderly). The rest work in small factories
(i.e., clothing firm), restaurants/tavema, hotel, hospitals. Many, however, said that they
had also worked in agriculture as seasonal laborers when they first came to Greece. Of all
the people with university and advanced degrees, only three had been able to obtain a job
commensurate with their educational level and training, while another one was self-

ernployed and was working part time.

 

72 Literature on gender and immigration has also talked about another negative experience that women
domestic workers, in particular live-in (young, unmarried) ones have faced: the vulnerability to sexual
harassment by their employers (Hondegnao-Sotelo 1997). None of the women in my sample, however,
reported instances of sexual harassment. While most of women worked as domestics, none of them was
working or had ever worked as a live-in domestic worker, a position which is much more likely to expose
women to sexual pursuit by their employer. Married women reported that they had followed their husbands
in nrigration, while single women had joined their brothers and had stayed with them for a period of time,
until they found a job and their own housing accommodations. This, then, may explain the lack of instances
of sexual harassment for migrant women in this sample.

174

Immigrants contended that trying to find a job, fear of losing the job, of constantly
being on the look out for a job, had been one of the most stressful and difficult
experiences they had to get used to in Greece, including getting used to rigid rules and
regulations of the work environment. In view of these circumstances, then, some even
recalled nostalgically the job security and the benefits it came with it (i.e., work related
benefits) of the past communist regime. Others, however, while recognizing these
difficulties, expressed satisfaction with work in Greece, because Greece as a capitalist
country provides opportunities for people to move ahead.

The people who had the most difficult time getting adjusted to the new labor
market realities in Greece were the former professionals and university educated people.
With few exceptions, all immigrants in this group worked in low status, low paid jobs.
Thus, in addition to losing job security, this group of immigrants had undergone
significant downward mobility, and as such they had lost the status their occupation
accorded to them in the previous system. The new situation had resulted in many
emotional problems for immigrants.

By contrast, immigrants who came from rural areas in Albania expressed high
satisfaction with their work and life in general in Greece. This is to be understood in the
context of the peasants’ lives under the previous regime. Under the communist
government, economic, working, and living conditions in the rural areas, in particular for
those who worked as manual laborers in the field, were much harsher than in urban areas.
Upon coming to Greece, this situation changes. Cleaning houses, working in

construction, or even agricultural work, hard as these jobs may be, in view of these

175

 

 

immigrants, they are still better that in Albania, at least because of the much higher
incomes they provide, as well as because of facilities in the workplace.

Immigrants reported various ways of finding their jobs. Those who came to
Greece with no social networks, had to pave their own way in the job market. Several of
these immigrants, given lack of ties, unfamiliarity with Greek environment, lack of
authorization to work in the country, pursued the avenue of informal labor congregation,
where they would gather in certain public centers and would wait for employers to come
and give them a job. Eventually, they had moved to more stable jobs. Most of the
immigrants, however, reported finding their jobs through social networks. Family,
relatives, and friends assisted them in their job finding process.

All immigrants talked about the discrimination and exploitation they had faced in
Greece. Legal status was closely related to these experiences. Until 1998, the year when
the first regularization was undertaken by the Greek government, many of the immigrants
had worked and lived illegally in Greece. As such they had performed jobs that were
overwhelmingly concentrated in informal sector of the economy, that provided no social
security benefits. Moreover, they were usually paid much less than Greeks were paid,
given their status of illegality, although this was not confined to the undocumented
immigrants only. Several of the immigrants also reported that they were caught and sent
back to Albania, while they were in Greece as undocumented immigrants, only to return
again, sometimes even within the same day. Albanian Muslims, in particular, told of
cases of discrimination and exploitation, although Albanians of Greek, Vllach origin, as
well as Orthodox Albanians were not spared either, because after all they too come from

Albania, the poorest country in Europe.

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Over time, however, immigrants has become more familiar with Greece and the
Greek ways of life. In its initial encounters with the “mythologized”73 Greece, Albanians
were understandably shocked and awed at the opulence of Greek society“. It seemed as
if they were, for the first time in their lives, living the “dream” they had created through
secretly watching foreign TV channels and programs. Soon, however, they encountered
the “real” Greece, very different from the one they had seen on the TV. Blerina, for
example, who came in 1991 described how disappointed she became, once she and her
family began to settle in Greece:

“At first, I was so impressed with the supermarket. Because we had never seen
supermarkets before. And the beautiful houses, and the clean streets. And the fact that my
husband made much more than in Albania. But when I first began to live. It was terrible.
We had to live in a room in an abandoned small house. This was a house of an older
woman who had died. The house was closed for about 30 years. They gave us a room. It
was about 100 meters away fiom the yard. The conditions were terrible... You see, in
Albania, I never lived in difficult conditions. I had good conditions in my house and at
my husband’s house.” Other immigrants, too, stated that they had encountered similar
difficulties with housing situation at the beginning of their life in Greece.

Some others highlighted the difficulty of raising their children in Greece, pointing
to problems such as drugs, demands for consumer goods, children’s rebellious behavior,
various “degenerate” TV programs, as their major concerns in child rearing. Said Edlira:

“I am afiaid for my children. Because they grow up like Greeks here. Very different from

 

73 I am paraphrasing here from the work of Bari aba and King (2005), who use the words “mythologized
West.”

74 Gold (1995) describes similar reactions on the part of Russian Jews from former Soviet Union when
they arrived in the United States

177

us. I do not dare to say anything to my son. I told him when he finished eight year school,
to attend a vocational high school. You think he would listen to me. I would not dare to
say anything. We almost got into a big fight. Different from my time. I would not dare to
talk back to my parents. They would not allow such a behavior. . .. Because here, you are
afraid. Afraid of drugs. Because they take drugs here. When he goes to a party, I got am
extremely concerned until he comes back. I stay awake. I call him at his cell phone. Very
different from us. We would not dare to do such a thing to our parents.”

In spite of the difficulties and hardships they have encountered, Albanians have
decided to stay in Greece since in the words of an immigrant “in Albania things are
worse. Here I have a job, back home there are no jobs, there is no security.” Moreover,
many felt that the firture of their children, difficulties notwithstanding, was better in
Greece than in Albania. This illustrates what Waldinger and Lichter (2003: 40-41) have
already suggested that immigrants should be understood as workers distinctively
characterized by a dual frame of reference, in which conditions in the host society are
always assessed relative to conditions in the home society. On the other hand, Greek
employers, while they may despise Albanians who have “invaded” their country, they
are, however, quite willing to hire them, since they too are cognizant of immigrants’ dual
frame of reference. And as long as the comparison “here” with “there” remains relevant,
employers are likely to see immigrant as more accommodating, if not necessarily happier,
workers than the native-born ones. As one immigrant related what her boss had told her:
“I don’t understand why you Albanians complain? We have brought you so many good
things. You live in a city full of lights. You live in houses. You don’t have jobs, we give

you jobs. We feed you. We support you. What more do you want?”

178

 

T ‘55..

Moreover, as the years have passed by, Albanians have learned their ways around
their host country. The world that was so alien, distant, that awed them at first, has
become a daily reality that they inhabit. The 1998 regularization amnesty provided
imrrrigrants with the ability to move from the position of illegality to that of legality, in
turn providing them with a sense of legal (though not permanent) security they largely
lacked. The acquisition of green card, short term though as it may be, enabled them to
improve their job situation, mainly in terms of obtaining work-related benefits, although
this cannot be said for majority of women. Yet, they still occupy low-status, low prestige
jobs, with not much upward job mobility.

Gender plays a vital role in shaping immigrant men and women experiences. For
one, unlike men, women were overwhelmingly concentrated in domestic service. The
clustering of women in this particular sector of economy has meant lack of work related
benefits such as health insurance benefits, vacations, sick leave days, right to a pension
when they retired, benefits that were taken for granted during the communist regime. In
addition, lack of formal job meant lack of the right to reside in Greece. As a result of this,
married women relied for these benefits through their husband’s work, although none of
them had the right to a pension upon retirement. This situation will most likely increase
the dependence of women on men. Moreover, women with newly born and small
children had encountered another disadvantage. The lack of legal employment, meant
they were not eligible for child-care facilities, a situation which forced women to resort to
other ways, such as putting their children under the care of their mothers in Albania, or

under the care of their older siblings, sending them to private day care, or even staying at

179

 

 

home and raising their kids. Contrary to what other researchers have found, therefore,

these findings reveal that women lose, rather than gain in immigration.

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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Conclusions

As stated in the introduction, this study aims at fulfilling two goals: First, the
study explores Albanian migrants’ experiences in Greece. These experiences include
motivations of exits as well as immigrants’ adaptation in the Greek labor market.
Analysis of motivations is vital to understanding immigrants’ experiences, because the
decision to migrate is one of the most important decision people make in their life time
(Gold 1997: 410). In addition, analysis of motivation provides us with the understanding
of the nature of migration in general. Second: the study examines the social mechanisms
that underlie perpetuation of migration after its initiation, as well as its transformation
from forced migration to labor migration.

Albania serves as a good example where economic and political factors that cause
migration are inextricably intertwined. Earlier researchers (Barjaba and King 2005) have
used the world “economic refugees” to describe Albanian rrrigrants. In this dissertation,
given the constellation of economic and political forces (i.e., the deteriorating economic
conditions, political and social instability, and the fact that escaping the country was still
considered an act of betrayal by the government officials) that propelled migration, I
define Albanian migrants as forced migrants.

Respondents pointed out economic reasons (i.e., poverty, high unemployment, a
desire to give their family a better life), family-based reasons (conflict in the family,
desire to join their spouses, siblings who were already in Greece), political instability,

professionals reasons, as well as a desire to see the Western world as their main reasons

181

 

for leaving Albania and moving to Greece. These micro as well as meso explanations,
however, are not fully capable to explain what motivates people to leave. For one, the
problem with micro-based explanations is that they are post-migration reconstruction for
reasons to migrate, therefore they may be highly influenced by immigrants’ personal
experience as well as the social environment he/she lives in. In addition, immigrants may
be unaware of the larger structural, historical, economic, political and social
developments that shape immigrants’ motivations to leave. Social networks, on the other
hand, as our examples revealed, while significant in shaping motivations to leave the
country, cannot explain the majority of nrigrants’ motives. More importantly, it could be
said that micro, meso as well as macro explanations could not account for the timing of
leaving Albania. In view of these considerations, it was argued that a full explanation of
forces that shape Albanian migrants’ motivations must take into account the role of the
Albanian communist state.

During their rule, the communist government of Albania pursued a highly
centralized economic and political system, which limited economic opportunities for its
citizens, while at the same time creating a gap between Albania and its prosperous
capitalist neighbors. This system went hand in hand with a Soviet type control of
people’s movement, in which nobody was allowed to leave the country. Any attempt to
do so, would meet with severe punishment, including, in some cases, the death penalty.
These rigid policies created the conditions for initiation of migration. The deterioration
and the final collapse of Albanian authoritarian government triggered large-scale
migration. Within a period of less than a decade, Albania went from a country with

virtually no emigration, to one in which about 20 percent of its own citizens live abroad.

182

 

Immigrants reported various ways and means of making the journey to Greece. Those of
Greek and Vlach ancestry, given their ethnic background, were able to obtain visas at
Greek consulates or the Greek embassy in Albania. A few immigrants managed to get
their visas through fiiends or acquaintances who were members of the Albanian political
parties and had access to bureaucratic officials in charge of granting visas in Greek
consulates. Many, however, given blocked official channels resorted to other ways,
including bribing custom officials, purchasing fraudulent visas, or even using forged
passports. Others crossed the borders illegally, walking through the mountains,
overcoming many difficulties and hurdles during their perilous journey.

While the communist government of Albania created the conditions for
immigration, once immigration took off, it continued and took on unprecedented massive
proportions. Social ties that connected immigrants and non immigrants lie at the basis of
this continuation. Pioneer immigrants recalled how they took their journey to Greece
without knowing anybody to receive and assist them upon arrival. Once they found a
job, housing, and became familiar with daily life in their new country, they encouraged
their family, and fiiends to join them. The latter, in turn did the same. Over time, given
the structure of networks, whole families and communities arrived and settled in Greece.
In the course of this process, the Albanian state has been largely absent from the life of
immigrants, leaving its own citizens to fend off for themselves as they try to get adjusted
to the new life. Ahnost all immigrants voiced their complaints about the lack of support
on the part of their own government.

This brings us to the issue as to what the Albanian government should do for its

citizens abroad. So far, the government has addressed the issue of emigration mainly in

183

 

 

terms of repressive measures: measures against trafficking and management of borders
controls (National Strategy of Migration 2006). As mentioned above, it has only been
recently that Albanian government in cooperation with lOM has managed to formulate a
National Strategy on Migration75 as well as an Action Plan on how to implement it. The
aim of this strategy is to provide Albania with a more comprehensive and holistic policy
of migration, a policy that is based on migration management of migration, in particular
emigration flows. This policy covers the following areas: “the protection of the rights of
Albanian emigrants abroad, building up and linking Albanian communities abroad,
driving remittances of emigrants into business investments, organizing an adequate
policy for labor migration, facilitating the travel of Albanian citizens confronted with
short-term visa requirements and finally, the development of the adequate legal and
institutional fi'amework.” (Albanian National Strategy on Migration 2006: 3)76 While this
plan address the major emigration issues, the rigorous implementation of these policies
remain of vital importance. This, above all, requires, intensive efforts to establish lots of
contacts with the Albanian community abroad (National Strategy of Migration 2006).

In addition, I would suggest that Albanian state should learn from immigration
strategies and policies of countries (i.e., Mexico, Dominican Republican) that have a long
history and tradition of emigration (see Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003 for an excellent
summary of emigrants’ policies of Brazil, Mexico, Dominican Republican, and Haiti).
For example, Dominican Republican has stuffed its consular services in United States

with Dominicans who are US. residents (and members of the governing party). Albanian

 

75National Strategy of Migration was fimded by Cards programme of the European Union.

76For a detailed outline of Albanian government’s strategy of emigration see National Strategy of
Migration (2006).

184

 

 

 

government could follow this example and appoint to its consular services, in particular
Greece and Italy, immigrants (permanent residents, or citizens of these countries) who
live and reside in these countries (Itzigsohn 2000). These immigrants, given their
membership in Albanian immigrant communities, are much more familiar with, and
sensitive to immigrants’ problems and are familiar with host society’s environment. As a
result, they will be in a much better position to help immigrants with difficulties they
encounter. Another important step also could be granting voting rights to its immigrants
abroad (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003 talk about immigrants’ voting right issues with
regard to Mexican and Dominican case). This will put Albanian political class and its
government much more attentive to the needs of its irnnri grants abroad.

The arrival of thousands of Albanians found Greece, itself a formerly emigrant
country, largely unprepared to respond to the new situation. The initial response in 1991
was the formulation and implementation of an “exclusionary” law, as well as repressive
measures, such as apprehensions and deportations. As a result of these policies, the
overwhelming majority of Albanians were left in the conditions of illegality. Eventually,
realizing that immigrants were not going to return soon, the Greek government
implemented two legalization programs, which enabled hundreds and thousands of
Albanians to change their status from forced, illegal migrants to legal, labor immigrants.
Yet, the short term (one to three years) legal status, coupled with the jui sanguinis basis
of Greek citizenship, leaves immigrants in a largely uncertain, unpredictable and
vulnerable position for the future.

Legalization programs undertaken by Greek government have certain implications

for United States. Certainly, Greece and United States have very different immigration

185

 

 

 

histories and traditions: Greece, as mentioned earlier, was, for a long time a country of
emigration; United States, on the other hand, is deemed to be a “country of immigration”
a “settler” society, although “the contradictory impulses to both welcome and exclude
immigrants have reflected and reinforced Americans’ long-standing ambivalence towards
imnrigration.” (Lee 2006: 29). These differences notwithstanding, there are certain
similarities between two countries as far as irnrrrigration is concerned. For one, Greece is
to Albania, like United States is to Mexico: both countries are hosts to large number of
migrants from their neighboring countries, even though Mexican migration to United
States has a much older history than Albanian migration in Greece. Moreover, a large
number of immigrants in United States, like Albanians until 1998, have, for a long time,
worked (in jobs that natives have shun away) and reside illegally. Some will return to
their countries, but many, like “guestworkers” in Europe (see above), and Albanians in
Greece, will settle in the US permanently. As a result of this, it is suggestive that US.
government look at the experience of Greece (as well as Italy) in the realm of
undocumented imrrrigrants’ legalization programs and learn how can these programs be
best applied to the US situation.

A summary of the occupational concentration of immigrants of my sample
revealed that the overwhelming majority of them work in low-paid, low-status jobs. The
majority of men work in construction, while the rest work in small factories, agriculture,
transportation, various services, landscaping, with a few being self employed, mainly
cleaning the apartment buildings. The overwhelming majority of women, on the other
hand, are employed in domestic service, while the rest work in small factories,

restaurants/tavern, hotels, and hospitals. Of all the people with university or post

186

 

university degrees, only three had managed to work in jobs commensurable with their
educational level and training.

Immigrants’ personal stories revealed the difficult process of transition from the
labor environment of the socialist Albania, where the job was guaranteed, and the fear of
losing one’s job was non existent, to the job insecurities of capitalist Greece. As many
immigrants stated, trying to find a job, fear of losing their job, and of constantly being on
the lookout for a job, had been one of the most stressful experiences they had to
overcome in Greece. A few of the participants in my sample, even looked nostalgically to
the job security and the benefits (work related benefits) of the jobs in the past regime.
Others, however, while recognizing these difficulties, expressed their satisfaction with
the opportunity capitalist market provides to people to move ahead.

The social status immigrants held prior to innnigration played an important role in
immigrants’ adaptation. Former professionals and university educated people, who, by
virtue of the low status jobs they performed in Greece, had undergone significant
downward mobility, had had the most difficult time adjusting to the new realities. On the
other hand, immigrants who hailed from rural Albania were much more content with their
work and quality of life in Greece. The reason for this is that people who lived in the
rural areas under communist Albania were subjected to conditions that were much
harsher than those who lived in the cities. Work and life in Greece, therefore, hard as it
may be, is still much better compared to the ones they left behind.

Gender influenced immigrants’ experiences in profound ways. For one, the
concentration of the overwhelming number of women in domestic service, meant a lack

of work related benefits, such as health insurance, vacations, sick leave days, right to a

187

 

 

pension when they retired, benefits which were taken for granted under the communist
regime. As a result of this situation, women have had to rely on their husband’s work to
obtain these benefits, although none of the women had the right to a pension. This
situation, then, will, very likely increase the dependence of women on the men.
Moreover, women with children, given their lack of formal employment, were not
eligible for child-care facilities. In view of these circumstances, often women had to
resort to other ways such as sending them to expensive private day care, leaving them
under the care of their older child, or even staying at home to raise their kids. These
findings, therefore, contrary to what other researchers have found, reveal that women
lose, rather than gain, in immigration.

Exploitation and discrimination were experiences that loomed large in
immigrants’ stories. Most of the immigrants were very critical and expressed anger and
bitterness about these encounters. Legal status was closely connected to these
experiences. As mentioned previously, until 1998, a large number of immigrants were
living and working illegally in Greece. As such immigrants were forced to work in the
“underground” economy, where jobs pay little and lack social security benefits.
Moreover, they were paid much less than their Greek counterparts. Several of the
immigrants also related their stories of how they were deported and sent back to Albania
while they were working illegally in their jobs. Albanian Muslims, in particular, faced
many more obstacles in Greece, because they are not “Orthodox Christians.” As such,
their religious status relegates them to the lowest position in the Greek “ethnonational”

hierarchy. They are perceived as a “danger” to the very essence of Greek ethnic identity,

188

 

 

orthodox religion. Moreover, like the rest of their compatriots, they hail from Albania,

the poorest country in Europe, hence a reason to be exploited and discriminated against.

Contributions and Limitations of the Study

This study contributes to scholarship on migration studies in several areas:

First: This study enables us to understand social forces that underlie the
establishment, perpetuation and normalization of a new kind of migration, that from the
former Eastern Bloc to the capitalist West. Few, if any studies are done in this area.
Moreover, given the fact that Albanian migration started out as a forced migration and
shifted on to normal labor migration, this research has provided an opportunity to explore
the social mechanisms that underlie the transformation from forced migration to labor
migration.

Second: This study expands our knowledge on the role of the state in migration.
The existing body of scholarship on migration and state focuses on how states “manage”
migration, that is, the criteria states use to let people in and out. In the case of Albania,
however, the state is not currently involved in migration. It was prior political and
economic decisions pursued by communist Albanian state that created the current
immigration environment, as it drastically reduced economic opportunities for its people.
Moreover, the fall of the very state unleashed large-scale migration. Thus, by shifting the
focus of study of the state and migration, this project firrthers our understanding of the
role of this important actor in migration.

Third: This study enhances our understanding of human drama element in
migration: how do immigrants make the transition from a tightly controlled society to a

free capitalist society? Human experience in transformation has not been studied much

189

 

 

 

in European literature. This research, then, has been able to address the gap in the
European scholarship and advance our knowledge on mi grant’s human experiences in the

migration literature in general.

Fourth: In the large body of literature produced on migration, the overwhehning
majority of studies focuses on the traditional countries of immigration (i.e., United States,
Canada, Australia, Israel), countries with a long history of immigration (i.e., France,
England) as well as countries of North Europe which received millions of workers as part
of “guestarbait system” in the post-World War Era, among which immigrants fi'om
Southern European countries (i.e., Greece, Italy, Spain) were well represented. Beginning
with the late 19808 and early 19908, the influx of large number of immigrants to Italy,
Spain and eventually Greece turned these previously emigration countries to countries of
immigration. Yet, little has been written about immigrants’ experiences in these
countries, even though the lack of a history of immigration of these countries will
certainly shape migrants’ experiences.’ The examination of Albanian migrants’
experiences, then, brings to light experiences of immigrants in countries which are not
used to immigration.

Despite these contributions, this study also has its limitations. For one, this is an
exploratory study, using the case method. The case study provides a rich body of
information on a certain topic and allows us to thoroughly and comprehensively
understand a certain social phenomenon. Yet, as is the case with the studies of this nature,
one cannot generalize for the whole population. Another limitation has to do with the
instrument used to conduct interviews. As previously mentioned, the telephone interview

is a highly effective tool to use in those cases where the population is geographically

190

 

dispersed, as Albanians are in Greece. The telephone interview shares many of the
advantages of face-to-face interviewing (i.e., a high response rate; correction to
misunderstandings; possible use of probes). In this respect, it enables researcher to collect
in depth details regarding the social phenomenon under study. Yet, it may be limited
because it lacks the visual cues resulting from face-face in interaction, which in turn, may
cause certain problems in interpretation (Robins 1993: 241).

The analysis of immigrants’ adaptation in Greece, provided, among other things,
an insight into the life and daily struggles of immigrants while they were working and
living in Greece under the conditions of illegality. Yet, this research has not included
those immigrants who are still illegal due to two reasons: their inability to legalize their
status during the two legalization programs, or given the onerous demands of maintaining
their (green card) legal status, they may have fallen back to the status of illegality.
Compared to people who managed to regularize their status, these immigrants have to
endure many more difficulties and obstacles, which in turn will impact their life in

Greece.

191

 

 

APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Summer 2006

Socio-Demographic Background

1. gender

2. age

3. region of birth

4. education

5. marital status

6. religion

7. ethnic group

8. occupation

9. # of children
Motivations

1. When did you leave the first time? (year)

2. Why did you leave? What were the reasons for leaving?

Networks and Cumulative Causation of Migration

1.
2.

How did you go the first time? Did you get a visa? What was your legal status

Did you know anybody in Greece when you left the first time? What were they,
Albanians or Greeks

Do you think you know more people now in Greece than you did when you left the first
time?

Where did you go the first time? Why did you go there?

Now, do you lmow many people in Greece? Are they your friends, relatives, and
acquaintances? How many people did you have

Have you helped other people with their trips in Greece?

How many people have you helped

Who are they, your relatives, your friends, people fiom your community?

192

 

 

9.

10.

How many people do you know in Greece now compared to the very beginning?

If you needed financial help, where did you go?

Labor Market Experiences

1.

909999939

10.

ll.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

What was your job before you moved to Greece (under communism)

What was your first job here?

How did you find the job?

Was it difficult to find the job? How did you find it?

What were your first experiences in the job?

What is your job now?

How many times have you changed jobs/employers?

Under communism the government gave you a job and you could be in it for the rest of
your life. In Greece, you had to look for a job? What was this like? What do you think of
the fact that you have to constantly look for job/ you have to change jobs in Greece?

How do you deal with this job insecurity?

What are some of your experiences at work? Have you ever-experienced discrimination
because you are Albanian?

Do you think you are discriminated because of your religion?

Have you ever experienced discrimination at your work because you are a woman? Do
you feel you are discriminated more as a woman or as an Albanian

Who makes more you or your spouse? Why do you think this is?

Did you have difficulty to find a job because you are a woman?

Do you think you had an easier time at work place in Albania than now in Greece?

Who is paid more, you or your spouse

Under communism, health care was free? What about in Greece? What are your

experiences with it.

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APPENDIX B
MAP OF GREECE

   

http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/greece.html

194

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