This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled

Partisan Ambivalence: Examining the Causes and Consequences, 1980-2004

presented by

Judd R. Thornton

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for the

Ph.D. degree in Political Science

William G. Jacoby
Major Professor's Signature

August 24, 2009
Date

PARTISAN AMBIVALENCE: EXAMINING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1980–2004

By

Judd R. Thornton

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Political Science

2009

ABSTRACT

PARTISAN AMBIVALENCE: EXAMINING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1980–2004

By

Judd R. Thornton

This project examines the possible causes and consequence of ambivalence—the state of experiencing conflicted thoughts—toward the American political parties. I intend to answer three questions. First, I wish to examine the common measures to see if it is more appropriate to conceptualize ambivalence to the parties separately or simultaneously. Relatedly, I intend to find how to best code the variables. As the measures have been coded several different ways I hope to offer resolution and offer guidance as how to do so in future research.

Second, by I look for evidence that prominent campaign messages can serve as sources of ambivalence. The goal here is to add to existing evidence that one should look to informational sources. While the idea of value conflict was useful in the formulation of ambivalence in the political science literatures, it now appears to be a secondary sources of ambivalence. If campaign messages are sources of ambivalence, this will be further evidence in favor of informational theories.

Finally, I wish to see to what extent ambivalence influences the definitive political act for most Americans, voting for the president. No previous studies have offered evidence if ambivalence influence the most important political act for a large number Americans: voting. If it does not ultimately alter an one's vote, this would be evidence in favor of partisanship as a powerful social identity and psychological attachment capable of shaping one's view of politics. At least, powerful enough to overcome a general sense of conflict. On the other hand, if it does influence one's choice, there will be new evidence as to what kinds of voters are likely to defect.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1

Background and Theory

Before developing a theory of partisan ambivalence, I first explore the current scholarly thinking on the subject of ambivalence generally, and partisan ambivalence more specifically. In doing show I hope to show three main points: first, the concept has been more rigorously defined over time, which aids in attempts to measure it directly and objectively. Second, while values have often been at the heart of explaining ambivalence, more recently it has been posited that information is the primary source. It is argued ambivalence should occur among those with a high level of contextual knowledge, those who are exposed to multiple points of view. Finally, as of now there is no definitive evidence that ambivalence alters voting behavior.

1.1 A History of Ambivalence

During the beginning of the behavioral revolution in political science, attitudes were often assumed to be bipolar and unidimensional. Political scientists were not alone in this assumption, social psychologists also characterized attitudes in such a manner (e.g., Allport 1935, Thurstone 1928). While this was certainly the prevailing view, it was recognized from even the earliest studies of voting and political behavior that individuals might experience competing and conflicting thoughts. The idea of attitudinal conflict has existed in the political science literature, in one form or another,

for quite some time. While there is currently a well agreed upon definition of the concept—something along the lines of when an individual has internalized competing arguments—this was not always the case. Indeed, the earliest discussion of what is now called ambivalence went by an entirely different name. Its origins date back to a concept termed cross-pressure.

Cross-pressure, as originally formulated in the *The People's Choice* (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944) and its followup *Voting* (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954) was defined as when one's "primary environment is internally divided" (1954:100). The concept was one that very much showed its sociological roots, focusing directly on the impact different and competing group identifications have on one's voting decision. The primary prediction was that an individual suffering from such pressure would have difficultly in making up his mind between the candidates and consequently delay his decision or drop out all together and abstain. The authors of *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960) also examined the roll of external conflict on partisan choice and one's decision to vote. Findings suggested individuals with conflicted group identities held less consistent partisan attitudes. The focus is again on social cross-pressure, in this case in the form of white-collar Catholics.

The matter was investigated in more detail in Chapter 6 of *Elections and the Political Order* (Converse 1966) where once again attitudinal conflict was found. However, in the end the findings suggested "Protestant Democrats were more likely to behave as Democrats than as Protestants, and Catholic Republicans were more likely to behave as Republicans than Catholics" (1966:123). Such non-findings began to bring an end to the study of cross-pressure (e.g., Davis 1982; Jackson and Curtis 1972; Pool, Abelson and Popkin 1965). Regardless, the concept remained influential. Social networks and interaction were long seen as potential catalysts for political behavior (Horan 1971; Verba and Nie 1972; Huckfeldt 1979). More recently, it has been suggested social networks have a greater impact on voting than even the media (Beck

et al. 2002). Recent studies make explicit the connection between social networks and partisan ambivalence (Huckfeldt, Mendez and Osborn 2004; Mutz 2002). In many ways, ambivalence is a descendent of the concept of cross-pressure.

The concept is even more closely related to that of attitude conflict (Campbell et al. 1960:81). In fact, Campbell et al. measured the concept with the same items from the National Election Studies as current measures of partisan ambivalence. Both use questions asking about likes and dislikes of the two parties. It was shown that voters who more consistently offered one-sided opinions made their minds up sooner and were more likely to vote a straight ticket. In this regard, contemporary measures of ambivalence are more nuanced versions of this measure of attitude conflict. Instead of summing the items, measures of ambivalence attempt to account for both the intensity and similarity of thoughts.

In the 1950s and 60s, social psychologists began to refer to individuals holding inconsistent beliefs as ambivalent (Brown and Farber 1951; Mowrer 1960). The original foundations of the definition now commonly used in both disciplines was set forth by Scott (1969:262), who suggested that individuals who held both desirable and undesirable beliefs about an object were ambivalent. It was also shown that negative and positive beliefs were often only moderately correlated (Abelson et al. 1982). Political scientists also began to more explicitly question the bipolar nature of attitudes, even more so than the authors of *Voting* and *The American Voter* did. For example, it was posited that conceptualizing of party identification as only one dimension might be incorrect (Weisberg 1980).

1.2 Ambivalence and Politics

Political scientists initially defined the concept of ambivalence rather broadly. Early definitions seemed to suggest it existed when there was any inability by an individ-

ual to articulate a position (Hochschild 1981). Such a definition is problematic as it defines the concept based on the observable manifestation of ambivalence without considering the underlying process. There are other processes that can lead to the same behavior in individuals. Most notably, an individual with a "non-attitude" (Converse 1964, 1970) would also have a hard time offering an opinion, but the result is the product of something quite distinct from ambivalence. Zaller (1992:59) adds nuance, suggesting ambivalence occurs when an individual "internalize[s] many contradictory arguments" which causes him to both favor and oppose the same issue. Alvarez and Brehm defined the concept somewhat more rigorously, noting the individual must have multiple values or predispositions that are recognized as being in conflict and relevant to the decision being made (2002). Simply holding alternative considerations does not necessarily lead to ambivalence—the considerations must be equal in importance and recognized as in being in conflict. As noted above, that is why contemporary measures account for the similarity of various attitudinal states.

A rigorous definition decreases the possibility of confusing ambivalence with related concepts. For example, there are other known properties of attitudes such as extremity (Krosnick and Abelson 1992; Krosnick 1988) and intensity (Krosnick et al. 1993) which could conceivably trump ambivalence, or be trumped by it. It has, however, been demonstrated, through experimentation, that ambivalence is distinct from these traits (Lavine et al. 1998). Furthermore, those who are ambivalent do not necessarily end up at the midpoint of a bipolar scale and oftentimes have stronger feelings about an object than those who are not (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Alvarez and Brehm (2002) similarly note that one must be careful to avoid conflating ambivalence with indifference and uncertainty. Namely, as as information increases individuals should become more ambivalent if one is to conclude that ambivalence is the source of attitude instability. This is compared to, for example, uncertainty, which would suggest that as information increases attitude stability would increase (Alvarez and

Brehm 1997, 2002).

The above discussion suggests that, regarding political matters, it should be more likely to happen to those who are relatively sophisticated politically. It is only those who recognize the conflict who will be affected by it. If what appears to be ambivalence occurs among those who are unsophisticated, it is possible it is indifference or apathy (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991). Some degree of contextual knowledge is necessary to recognize the conflict and the connections between various predispositions and party identification. There are other sources of ambivalence, such as ideology and values. Liberals, for example, are more likely to hold conflicted beliefs toward welfare as two values they rate highly, freedom and equality, are both related to welfare (Feldman and Zaller 1992). But again, the conflict must be recognized.

At first, political scientists did focus primarily on value conflict. Conflict that has been shown to decrease response stability toward policy choices (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Craig, Kane and Martinez 2002; Rudolph 2005) and partisan identification (Keele and Wolak 2006). Such findings are consistent with traditional theoretical reasoning regarding values and their impact on subsequent behavior. Values are said to provide individuals with a way of orienting themselves in different and varying situations (Rokeach 1973). The implication that value conflict might lead to ambivalence in the domain of political behavior seems intuitively reasonable.

However, it has been noted that the existence of value conflict is likely not common (Alvarez and Brehm 2002). It has also been posited that the impact of values on ambivalence is not as direct as often stated (Steenbergen and Brewer 2004). And, when individuals do experience value conflict, it can be resolved by relying on group affect (Grant and Rudolph 2003; Rudolph 2005) or value hierarchies (Jacoby 2002). One way value ambivalence might manifest itself empirically is through the existence of intransitive rankings of values. Studies of such intransitivity in the public show it is actually not particularly common, and that a lack of political sophistication

and education increases the likelihood of intransitive rankings (Jacoby 2006). Such evidence suggests it is not value conflict that leads to ambivalence, at least when it comes to political issues. The result is not entirely surprising—it has been known for some time that individuals are not always able to apply broad values to concrete situations (e.g., McClosky 1967). Consequently, one must look not only at value conflict to other additional sources of partisan ambivalence.

What kinds of stimulus objects might cause ambivalence in the realm of politics? Individuals might consider both sides of an argument about society in general (e.g., Feldman 1988, 2003; Jacoby 2002; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Rokeach 1973). Or, an object slightly more specific, such as ambivalence toward government in general (Cantril and Cantril 1999; Free and Cantril 1967) and specific institutions (McGraw and Bartels 2005). Scholars have also looked for eveidence of conflicted thoughts toward specific policies (Feldman and Zaller 1992), issues (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Craig, Kane and Martinez 2002; Craig, Martinez and Kane 2005), as well as toward candidates and parties (Basinger and Lavine 2005; Lavine 2001; McGraw, Hasecke and Conger 2003; Meffert, Guge and Lodge 2000).

One issue that has received a good deal of attention is abortion. This is understandable as both sides of the controversial issue have been presented to the public with each party taking a distinct stance in a relatively short period of time (Adams 1997). Craig et al. (2002) use an objective measure to show ambivalence exists for some people on the matter of abortion. This accords well with Alvarez and Brehm (1995, 2002) who show as information increases, issue positions become harder to predict in at least some cases. This coincides well with the definition above. When two considerations, in this case values, related to a choice or object, in this case a abortion policy, are both rated highly and in conflict, one should expect ambivalence. More recently, scholars have turned toward the political parties as objects inspiring conflicted feelings and beliefs.

1.3 Partisan Ambivalence

Partisan ambivalence is an attempt to measure the conflict an individual might have when thinking about the political parties, either simultaneously using a measure of comparative ambivalence (Basinger and Lavine 2005) or separately using the standard objective measure of ambivalence (Thompson, Zanna and Griffin 1995). It has been demonstrated that an individual suffering from partisan ambivalence alters his behavior: for example, he seeks out information in ways different from those who are able to rely on partisan cues. Along these lines there are currently several explanations for the existence of partisan ambivalence. The first is value conflict. It has been demonstrated that if two conflicting values are both highly rated by an individual he will show more response instability (Keele and Wolak 2006). The argument being, the individual is receiving mixed messages and as a consequence suffers from ambivalence.

More recently, it has been argued that one should look to informational sources of ambivalence. For example, there is evidence that individuals with a need for cognition—that is, those who enjoy systematically processing information—are ambivalent (Rudolph and Popp 2007).[1] There is evidence that when knowledgeable voters are encouraged to consider information, they hold less stable views (Barker and Hansen 2005). One should not, however, look only to internal sources. Campaign environments, for example, might induce ambivalence (Keele and Wolak 2008); similarly, evidence suggests informative campaigns decrease incumbent biases in individual's evaluations and increase open-minded thinking (Kam 2006).[2] Additionally, heterogeneous social networks might encourage deviation from one's partisan identi-

[1] Borrowing insights from social psychology regarding systematic processing it is noted those who engage in such thinking often end up with moderate views (Judd and Lusk 1984; Linville 1982).

[2] This is consistent with findings suggesting campaigns can potentially make perceptions clearer (Franklin 1991) by activating existing political predispositions (Finkel 1993).

fication when voting (Beck 2002; Beck et al. 2002). All of these explanations suggest that individuals who are more likely to be exposed to, and subsequently consider different points of view are more likely to be ambivalent. However, these conditions, while necessary for the existence of ambivalence, are not themselves direct causes. They allow for individuals to receive and possibly accept information but they do not offer evidence as to which messages are being considered.

The study of partisan ambivalence is important due to the primacy of party identification in political behavior research. If an individual is ambivalent toward one or both of the political parties, his other political beliefs and behavior are possible going to be affected. While ambivalence is often associated with attitude instability (Hill and Kriesl 2001; Zaller and Feldman 1992), a moderation of candidate evaluations (Meffert, Guge and Lodge 2000), and an alteration of information processing (Basinger and Lavine 2005), does it ultimately affect the final decision? If voters end up merely delaying their decision as opposed to changing it, perhaps the study of ambivalence is not an entirely useful endeavor, and like the study of cross-pressure, it will fade from the attention of political scientists.

The process of deciding to turn out and for whom is dynamic (Hillygus and Jackman 2003; Hillygus 2005). One's openness to campaign messages is influenced by if one has already decided for whom to vote (Fournier et al. 2004). It is known that an individual suffering from ambivalence toward the political parties alters his behavior: for example, he seeks out information in ways different from those who are able to rely on partisan cues (Basinger and Lavine 2005); he may moderate his evaluations of candidates (Meffert, Guge and Lodge 2000); furthermore, ambivalence influences the role issue positions play in the evaluation of candidate (Craig, Martinez and Kane 2005); and, it can influence patterns of political involvement (Mutz 2002).

If behavior is altered, it needs to be examined whether or not this is dependent upon the political environment. Elite behavior could influence the consequences of

ambivalence. Perhaps it makes its existence more or less likely. It has been argued that as elite polarization increases past a "tipping point" it should lead to an increase in ambivalence for many (Johnston et al. 2008). The impact of partisanship on voting has increased since its nadir in the 1980s (Bartels 2000); a phenomenon that has been attributed to elite polarization and clarity in the parties' messages (Hetherington 2001). Perhaps this is not entirely beneficial to voters. Although they are now able to see the difference between the two parties, the difference might now be too large. Voters might be unhappy with the extreme choices with which they are presented.

Below I introduce a theory of partisan ambivalence and vote choice. As previous findings on the subject all suggest it is those who are likely to be receptive to alternative arguments, I allow for campaign messages to play a central role. It is those messages that are likely to be heard by much of the electorate that are possible source of ambivalence. I then develop a theory as to how the existence of ambivalence will influence an individual's vote choice, allowing for elite behavior to greatly impact both existence and consequences of ambivalence. I examine ambivalence toward each party as well as toward the choice between the parties

1.4 Campaigns, Ambivalence, and Voting

I now outline an individual level theory of partisan ambivalence. What might explain the presence of ambivalent feelings toward the two political parties? From the above discussion it is clear ambivalence is a manifestation of an internal cognitive process. But what exactly is this process and when is it likely to result in ambivalent feelings toward one or both parties? I first expand upon informational theories of ambivalence by explicitly incorporating how campaign messages might increase ambivalence. I then explain how conflicted thoughts might influence subsequent behavior, both the actual electoral choice and the timing of the choice.

1.4.1 Campaign Messages as Sources of Ambivalence

In order for an individual to be ambivalent, he must have been exposed to both negative and positive statements about the parties. The probability of receiving negative statements about one's preferred party must be large enough so that the probability of being ambivalent is non-zero. Already, this should lead one to expect levels of partisan ambivalence to be low.

I assume individuals who identify with a party are likely to have some "stored" goodwill to the party, some built-in bias that would likely reduce the effects of negative messages (e.g., Fiorina 1981, ch. 4; Achen 1992). One way of conceptualizing this bias is think of partisanship as a "perceptual screen" (Campbell et al. 1960:133). This is crucial because it means the probability of accepting a negative message fundamentally different from the probability of accepting a negative message. Not all received messages are accepted (Zaller 1992), and evidence suggests individuals do not necessarily update their beliefs in an unbiased manner (Bartels 2002) as new messages must compete with the opinion the individual already holds (Achen and Bartels 2006; Bartels 1993). Because individuals may be unreceptive of negative messages, the focus should be on those messages that will be heard by the greatest number of voters. It is these messages that are most likely to cause ambivalence as many will be widely exposed to them.

Regarding causes of ambivalence, we know that awareness, cross-cutting networks, and a need for cognition certainly play a role as these make individuals more likely to be exposed to both positive and negative messages. I argue these are indirect sources of ambivalence—exactly which messages are getting through? Issues potentially directly relate to how individual think about the two parties, and are therefore potential sources of ambivalence. Issues might cause an individual to momentarily reconsider his long-standing identification. I do not argue that specific issues will always cause voters to be ambivalent toward the parties. Instead I expect different

issues will cause voters to be ambivalent to the Democrats as opposed to the Republicans. If information is a source of ambivalence, examining campaign messages may provide evidence as to the kind of information to which voters are being exposed.

1.4.2 Partisan Ambivalence and the Voting Decision

There is, as of yet, no evidence that ambivalence alters the final decision of voters. It could conceivably do so. No matter how one defines partisanship—as a standing decision, a psychological attachment, a social identity, etc.—conflicted thoughts could cause a voter to question his partisanship. Therefore, he would be reliant on other forms of information and might deviate from his previous voting patterns.

Just as the influence of messages depends on the political climate, so might the influence of ambivalence on vote choice. As the parties polarize, a voter might be forced to choose between one of two extremes. The alternative is even less palatable than if the parties were more similar. Polarized parties could therefore make ambivalent voters, whose conflicted thoughts result from the polarized choices and policy, more likely to side with their own party.

Of course, the possibility exists that ambivalence will not change a voter's mind. Conceptualizing partisan identification as a perceptual screen (Campbell et al. 1960) or a group identity (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002), it can be shown one should expect ambivalence to delay but not change one's voting decision. If over the course of a campaign individuals alter their views and perception to align with their party, conflicted thoughts should cause individuals to consider other information and therefore take longer to decide, but in the end they will not consistently defection is that, more often than not, they will vote consistently with their partisan identification. I examine the above scenarios in Chapters 4 and 5 for presidential elections in the years 1980 to 2004.

1.5 The Plan of the Dissertation

In the following chapters I have three primary objectives. First, I wish to examine the common measures. As they have been coded several different ways I hope to offer resolution and offer guidance as how to do so in future research. Relatedly, I seek to see if it is more appropriate to conceptualize ambivalence to the parties separately or simultaneously.

Second, I hope to elaborate on informational theories of ambivalence. One way to do so is by offering evidence that prominent campaign messages can serve as sources of ambivalence. The goal here is to add to existing evidence that one should look to informational sources. While the idea of value conflict was useful in the formulation of ambivalence in the political science literatures, it now appears to be a secondary sources of ambivalence. If campaign messages are sources of ambivalence, this will be further evidence in favor of informational theories.

Finally, I wish to see to what extent ambivalence influences the definitive political act for most Americans, voting in presidential elections. No previous studies have offered evidence if ambivalence affects vote choice. If it does not ultimately alter an one's vote, this would be evidence in favor of partisanship as a powerful social identity and psychological attachment capable of shaping one's view of politics. At least, powerful enough to overcome a general sense of conflict. On the other hand, if it does influence one's choice, there will be evidence as to what kinds of voters are likely to defect.

Chapter 2

Measuring Ambivalence

The measurement of key concepts is subject to scrutiny by methodologists and substantive researchers alike. The spotlight is justified: different measures of the same concept often lead to different conclusions; indeed, different coding of the same measure can lead to different conclusions. From interviewer assessments, and objective latent measures, to statistical techniques which infer the existence of ambivalence, there is no shortage of measurement options available to the researcher. There does, however, seem to be a growing consensus in the study of partisan ambivalence around the use of objective measures. Consequently, it is important the the properties of such measures are examined. Therefore, before moving on to empirically examine the causes and consequences of ambivalence, I empirically examine the properties these measures.

Ambivalence has been measured inferentially (Alvarez and Brehm 2002), using objective measures (Craig, Kane and Martinez 2002; Lavine 2001; Rudolph 2005), and subjective measures (Priester and Petty 1996; Tourangeau et al. 1989). Each of which has been argued as a superior way of measurement. That debate exists is good: the quality of measurement is often a yardstick as to the quality of research in a field (Kuhn 1977). Unwilling to settle on a single measure scholars are eager to look for

new and better ways to measure the concept.

At its most fundamental, measurement involves the assignment of numbers to objects according to a rule (Stevens 1951). Measurement is classification—classification that is up to the researcher. It is he who takes recorded observations, from a survey or otherwise, and turns this information into data. This necessarily means that any observed variance is potentially a result of both the concept being measured and the process of measurement (Cliff 1993). An additional implication is that there is no "correct" measurement for any given concept (Jacoby 1991). In fact, the measurement characteristics of a concept may depend on the empirical context (Coombs 1964).

It is then not only up to the researcher to choose what he thinks to be the best way to measure a concept, but also the appropriate level of measurement (Young 1987; Vellerman and Wilkinson 1993). Lord (1953) famously wrote of numbers—on football jerseys specifically, but a point that certainly applies generally—"the numbers don't know where they came from." Specifically, the data does not decide how the researcher interacts with it, the researcher does (Guttmann 1977). Because every decision potentially influences the final results, it is crucial the properties of commonly used measures are examined.

The results suggest the common objective measures can only place individuals into one of three categories: ambivalent, univalent (or one-sided), and indifferent. This is primarily a function of those individuals who offer no positive or negative statements about the two parties. Such individuals would traditionally be placed between ambivalence and univalence, but this appears to be inappropriate. The results also suggest that a measure of ambivalence between the choice of parties is appropriate and researchers can therefore use it or the more traditional measure of these ambivalence.

2.1 Measures of Ambivalence

While strengths of various measures of ambivalence have been examined elsewhere (e.g., Martinez et al. 2005), I take some time to compare and contrast each of three common ways of measuring ambivalence. By doing so, I intend to show that objective measures are superior. However, I also wish to caution that they must be used carefully.

The first alternative is to infer ambivalence through the relationship of error variance and a set of explanatory variables associated with ambivalence (Alvarez Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 2002). A clear strength is that the measure can be used when no other measures of ambivalence are available. However, there are drawbacks. First, it is computationally intensive and requires a relatively large sample size. Furthermore, there is evidence that heteroskedastic probit models suffer from fragile identification, potentially resulting in biased coefficient estimates (Keele and Park 2007). Another problem is such a measure fails to rule out other possibilities convincingly, which will necessarily be more likely when using an indirect measure. Also, it is not clear how this would be interpreted as an explanatory variable. Such a measure fails to rule out other possibilities convincingly, which will necessarily be more likely when using an indirect measure. Most important for the purposes of this dissertation, how would it be used to model ambivalence toward a party or candidate? The dependent variable could be a dichotomous choice between the two candidates.

In this case it would be possible to model:

$$\text{Vote}_i = \mathbf{x}_i'\boldsymbol{\beta} + \epsilon_i$$
$$\text{var}(\epsilon_i) = \exp(\mathbf{z}_i'\boldsymbol{\gamma})^2$$

Where $\mathbf{z}_i$ is a matrix of independent variables, including education, political sophistication, interest, and other variables that might cause ambivalence, and $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ is a matrix

of coefficient vectors. The problem however is that Vote_i would represent a choice between the two candidates. So, while it would indicate individuals are more difficult to predict it would not necessarily imply ambivalence.[1] For these reasons other options are preferable when measuring partisan ambivalence; options that go beyond looking only at theoretically implied consequences of ambivalence.

Subjective measures of ambivalence generally ask individuals whether or not they have mixed feelings about the stimulus object (e.g., McGraw, Hasecke, & Conger, 2003; Tourangeau et al., 1989). An advantage of such measures is that it demands less of the respondent and might pick up cases that other measures miss. On the other hand, a criticism of such measures is that they are more likely to be influenced by extraneous factors (Bassili 1996) and therefore might overestimate the existence of ambivalence. Or, they may conflate several sources of uncertainty such as indifference and equivocation. Interestingly, they are only correlated weakly with other measures of ambivalence (Priester and Petty 1996; Newbay-Clark, McGregor and Zanna 2002).

Finally there are objective measures of ambivalence. Most common is the Griffin Index (Thompson, Zanna and Griffin 1995), which is a modification of Kaplan's measure (1972). The measure uses responses to questions such as "Is there anything you like about the Democratic party?" to construct a numerical score of ambivalence. Such a measure meets two conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of ambivalence. Individuals must have both positive and negative beliefs and these must be of at least moderate intensity. That voting decisions are related to an individual's likes and dislikes toward a candidate (Kelley 1983) suggests that examining likes and dislikes is a useful endeavor. Objective measures force respondents to consider the question while also giving them an easy out (Bishop, Tuchfarber and Oldendick 1986), which is useful since people are willing to answer questions they

[1] An alternative would be to measure the volatility of one's partisan identification (Keele and Wolak 2006). Of course, once again instability does not necessarily imply ambivalence.

know nothing about (Schuman and Presser 1981). In that sense, objective measures offer a good balance between a natural setting while not being too reliant on the interviewee to spontaneously display signs ambivalence. The objective measure is less likely to incorrectly classify an individual as ambivalent.

2.2 Objective Measures of Ambivalence

I first focus on the standard, most often used, objective measure of ambivalence. It defines ambivalence as:

$$Ambivalence_j = \frac{P_j + N_j}{2} - |P_j - N_j|, \tag{2.1}$$

where P_j is the number positive feelings and N_j is the number of negative feelings toward object j, which are obtained through open ended responses to such questions as "Is there anything about the Democratic party you dislike?" If a person lists five things they dislike, N would equal five. Developed by Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995), and a modification of Kaplan's measure (1972), there seems to be a growing consensus around the use of the above measure (Armitage and Conner 2005; Miller and Peterson 2004). It has been shown to have desirable properties among all objective estimates of ambivalence (Breckler 1994).

I also focus on a modification of this measure: comparative partisan ambivalence. Initially developed to measure ambivalence toward candidates (Lavine 2001), it has also been used in respect to the political parties (Basinger and Lavine 2005). It is defined as follows:

$$\text{Ambivalence}_{\text{comp}} = \frac{D + R}{2} - |D - R|, \tag{2.2}$$

where $D = (P_D + N_R)/2$ and $R = (P_R + N_D)/2$. P_D is the number of likes an

individual gives for the Democratic party (N_R is dislikes for the Republican party, etc.).

I choose to focus on both measures of ambivalence because each has proved to be useful. Traditionally, ambivalence is used to refer to attitude conflict toward a stimulus object, not a choice. Therefore combining attitudes about two different stimulus objects, which is done when measuring comparative ambivalence, could be seen as problematic. I examine whether or not this is a problem below in Section 2.5.

2.3 Levels of Measurement: Observed and Latent Ambivalence

In previous research, the appropriate level of measurement is generally assumed and varies from study to study. It seems reasonable to imagine that several of the scores could be collapsed: people could be categorized as ambivalent, indifferent, or otherwise; or, perhaps a simple dichotomy is all that can be garnered from the measure. The important point is that the appropriate level of measurement has never been empirically investigated.

There are at least four reasons to suspect an interval level assumption might be inappropriate. The modal response to these open ended questions is zero (Craig 1985) suggesting there might be some people who simply do not answer this sort of question. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, this is the case for 2004. Second, for the comparative measure, there are multiple ways to achieve many scores, some of which seem to be contradictory. For example someone who dislikes both parties a great deal could very well receive the same score as someone who is ambivalent, somewhat, toward both parties. Are for example, all individuals with a score of 2.5 the same?[2]

[2]Imagine an individual who lists five dislikes for both parties. His comparative score would be 2.5 using the measure. Now imagine an individual who lists three likes and dislikes for the Republican party and two each for the Democratic party:



Figure 2.1: Total number of likes and dislikes toward the parties in 2004.

Third, examining the distribution of scores, Figure 2.2 for comparative partisan ambivalence in 2004, shows that many values cluster around zero, with few in the tails. About 70% of the observation are in the range of -1 to 1 (the distributions of Republican and Democratic ambivalence are in the appendix). The scores in the tails could possibly be measuring little more than noise. For the measures to be interval, one must assume that each reason listed be given the same weight as all others—is the fourth truly equal to the first?

Finally, the scales resulting from equations (2.1) and (2.2) assume a specific linear relationship. As one becomes more ambivalent the score increases, with zero as an intermediary state. The implication is that indifference is an intermediate state between one-sided thinking and ambivalence. If this assumption is incorrect, results treating the scales as linear may be misleading; evidence from the study of value ambivalence suggests the linear scales may result in unreliable results (Rudolph 2005). For these reasons, it is worthwhile to examine the levels of measurement.

his score would also be a 2.5. In the first case the individual clearly strongly dislikes both parties, while for the second some ambivalence exists toward both parties.



Figure 2.2: Distribution of comparative partisan ambivalence in 2004.

The appropriate level could be empirically examined using an alternating least squares, optimal scaling (ALSOS) approach (Young 1987). Indeed, the technique was introduced to the political science literature as a diagnostic tool (Jacoby 1999). Familiar to psychologists, the technique is rarely used in political science research. I therefore take some time to, briefly, describe the procedure. Developed by Young (Young, De Leeuw and Takane 1976; Young 1981), the procedure works as follows: starting with $\mathbf{Y}$ and $\mathbf{X}$, which would contain the original values as determined by the measurement processes being used for the dependent and independent variiables, two new matrices, $\mathbf{Y}^*$ and $\mathbf{X}^*$, are constructed.[3] In addition to determining the starting values the researcher sets measurement characteristics of the observed variables as well. The following model is estimated:

$$\mathbf{Y}^* = \mathbf{X}^*\boldsymbol{\beta}^* + \boldsymbol{E}^*. \tag{2.3}$$

[3]For a more in-depth discussion of ALSOS see Young (1981) and Gifi (1990); see Jacoby (1999) for political science examples.

The process is iterative and alternates between estimating coefficients and an optimal scaling phase that obtains better fitting values for the observed variables, subject to a function that conforms to the specified level of measurement for each variable. In each stage of the process the values from the other are held constant. For example, when values of the observation matrices are being optimized to improve the fit the parameter estimates are held constant. The process continues until the model fit is no longer improved, until the sum of squared residuals can no longer be minimized any further given the starting values and measurement characteristics specified in $\mathbf{Y}^*$ and $\mathbf{X}^*$. The primary difference between this and a standard least squares regression is that instead of only estimating values of coefficients to maximize fit, the values of variables are also changed.

Of interest to the problem at hand is that the procedure can be used as a diagnostic tool to examine the level of measurement. Starting with the assumption of ordinal data, one can simultaneously test both an interval and ordinal level assumption, and possibly a nominal level assumption as well. To show why this is the case I briefly, and for the most part informally, discuss how the new matrices are formed and show how different restrictions on the transformed variable, depending on the specified level of measurement, influence the new values. Specifically, how lower levels of measurement mean fewer restrictions and therefore are more flexible. First, to construct $\mathbf{Y}^*$ and $\mathbf{X}^*$ one sets the initial values, usually the original values in $\mathbf{X}$ and $\mathbf{Y}$. Then one determines the level of measurement of each variable $(y; x_1, x_2, ..., x_k)$. Once this is done we have for the dependent variable:

$$\mathbf{Y}^* = f_y^q(\mathbf{Y}). \tag{2.4}$$

Where f_y^q is an order preserving function and q determines the level of measurement

specified (nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio). For the independent variables:

$$\mathbf{X}^* = [f_0^q(\mathbf{x}_0) f_1^q(\mathbf{x}_1) f_2^q(\mathbf{x}_2) ... f_k^q(\mathbf{x}_k)]. \tag{2.5}$$

f_j^q is an order preserving function in that it conforms to restrictions that guarantee at least the specified level measurement is met. For example, imagine $\mathbf{x}_j$ is set to be an ordinal variable. The new variable would be a monotonic transformation of the original because of the restrictions in equations (2.6) and (2.7) that are placed on f_j^o (where $q = o$ represents that the function preserves an ordinal level). $f_j^o(\mathbf{x}_j)$ maps $\mathbf{x}_j$ to $\mathbf{x}_j^*$:

$$x_{ij} = x_{hj} \Rightarrow x_{ij}^* = x_{hj}^* \tag{2.6}$$

$$x_{ij} > x_{hj} \Rightarrow x_{ij}^* \geq x_{hj}^*. \tag{2.7}$$

It is the second restriction that forces the transformed variable to be a monotonic transformation of the original. If the second restriction is relaxed then one would not necessarily see such a transformation—indeed, only the first restriction is used when a variable is set at the nominal level. The empirical implications are that although $f_j^o(\mathbf{x}_j)$ and $f_j^n(\mathbf{x}_j)$ could result in the same transformed value, this is not guaranteed as the a nominal transformation is actually more flexible.[4]

Setting the variable to ordinal provides enough flexibility to examine whether or not the variable can be treated as nominal, ordinal, or interval. When plotting transformed values against the original values, one could see a line parallel to the x-axis if there's no discrimination between values, a 45° line if the variable can be treated as interval, and anything in between these two extremes. If an ordinal level

[4]Similar mapping functions, with different restrictions, are used depending on the level of measurement specified for a given variable (see Jacoby 1999); see Young (1981) for a discussion of how actual values are assigned to transformed variables, including a discussion of different algorithms.

assumption is appropriate, the spacing between different values would be unequal. It is also possible for several values to collapse to the same value. If such an occurrence is severe enough it could be the case that the variable can only be considered nominal. Treating an ordinal level variable as interval is problematic if the overall fit of the model is found to be quite a bit better after the values have been transformed. If, on the other hand, overall fit only improves slightly the violation probably can be viewed as posing little problems for other modeling assumptions.

I use the procedure to test the assumption that objective measures of ambivalence can be treated as an interval, ordinal, or nominal level variable. I test this on the standard measure as well as that of comparative ambivalence. I make no claims about the underlying process, as the procedure examines the empirical manifestation of the process. Two ALSOS regressions were performed. The first was a model of vote choice in 2004. The following explanatory variables were included: political awareness, education, party identification, ideology, issue positions, as well as measures of Republican ambivalence and Democratic ambivalence. Vote was measured by subtracting an individual's logged thermometer rating of Kerry from the logged rating of Bush, as suggested by Jacoby (1999), allowing the measure to be treated as a continuous interval level variable. Results for Republican and Democratic ambivalence are shown in Figure 2.3.

A similar approach was used examining the properties of comparative ambivalence. In this case the model of partisan ambivalence in 2004 from Rudolph and Popp (2007) was replicated, using an ALSOS approach.[5] As before, the transformed values of the measure are compared to the original values. The results are in Figure 2.4.

Both Figures 2.3 and 2.4 suggest the measures cannot be treated as interval level variables. The measure of comparative partisan ambivalence particularly violates

[5]The variables included are: political knowledge, education, need for cognition, caring about the election, a need to evaluate, the number of evaluative responses and measures of value conflict. The coding is described in the appendix. Similar coding is used in subsequent analyses, except where noted.



Figure 2.3: Transformation of original data values for Democratic and Republican ambivalence, obtained from ALSOS regression analysis in 2004. Both measures were specified at the ordinal level. Variables were used as explanatory variables.

such an assumption, scores collapse to -1, 0, and 1. While the results for Republican and Democratic ambivalence are not as striking, they too suggest there is not much discrimination possible beyond ambivalent or not. It was noted earlier that these findings would not be terribly problematic if the R^2 obtained from the ALSOS regression is only slightly higher than from the OLS regression. Examining Table 2.1 shows that this is not the case. The R^2 is twice as large after the values for comparative partisan ambivalence have been optimally scaled. On the other hand, when Republican and Democratic ambivalence are used as independent variables model fit is only incrementally improved. This is not a result of the different measures, but instead appears to be a function of whether or not the measures are used as dependent or independent variables; model fit vastly improves after the ALSOS regression when the measures are used as dependent variables.[6] Before settling on a final coding

[6]This suggests including the measures as control variables without recoding should not pose significant problems. However, if they are used as key explanatory variables, recoding is necessary.



Figure 2.4: Transformation of original data values for comparative partisan ambivalence specified at the ordinal level, obtained from ALSOS regression analysis in 2004. The variable was modeled as the dependent variable.

scheme one lingering question remains: what about those individuals who offer no likes or dislikes about either party? This topic is examined in the next section.

Table 2.1: R^2 before and after optimal scaling

	OLS	ALSOS
Comp. ambiv.	.127	.241
Vote choice	.380	.417

2.3.1 The Zero Responses

One of the primary concerns of treating the measures as interval level variables was that a large number of respondents offer no likes or dislikes for either party. It is unclear if such individuals can be treated the same as others. In order to see if this is the case, another ALSOS regression was run, this time specifying the variable comparative partisan ambivalence as nominal. The transformed values are no longer

restricted to be a monotonic transformation of the original values. If the zero responses are unproblematic then results should be similar to Figure 2.4. If not, the zeros should be distinctly different from all other values. The results in Figure 2.5 are unambiguous: zero responses should be treated differently. So long as zero responses are included, the measure is unquestionably only categorical and treating it at higher levels could lead to incorrect substantive conclusions.



Figure 2.5: Transformation of original data values for comparative partisan ambivalence when specified to be nominal level, obtained from ALSOS regression analysis in 2004. The variable was modeled as the dependent variable.

What if zero responses are excluded? The results, in Figure 2.6, are quite similar regardless of whether or not comparative ambivalence is originally specified as a nominal or an ordinal level variable. This provides some confidence that the measure is distinguishing between individuals who are ambivalent, those who are one sided in their evaluations, and those who offer no likes or dislikes.

Another way to gain leverage on such a question would be to model the total number of items listed using a zero inflated count model to see if there is a different process generating those individuals who list no like or dislikes compared to all oth-



Figure 2.6: Transformation of original data values for comparative partisan ambivalence excluding those who offered no likes or dislikes, obtained from ALSOS regression analysis in 2004. On the left the measure was specified to be nominal level, on the right ordinal. The variable was modeled as the dependent variable.

ers. To do, so I ran a zero inflated negative binomial count model (Gurmu 1991) as a function of the intensity of one's partisan identification, political awareness, education, and one's interest in politics. The results are in Table 2.2 with standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2.2: Zero inflated count model for likes and dislikes listed

	Count equation		Binary equation	
Party ID intensity	0.034	(0.023)	-0.836**	(0.117)
Political awareness	0.097**	(0.016)	-0.331**	(0.077)
Education	0.076**	(0.015)	-0.163*	(0.080)
Interest	0.046*	(0.019)	- 0.467**	(0.084)
N	975			
Log-likelihood	-2216.316			
$\chi^2_{(10)}$	176.076			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

The results support the idea that two processes are at work. The same variables that have an impact on how many items are listed also influences whether or not an

individual lists something at all. Political awareness and education increase the probability of listing more likes and dislikes, and as is indicated by the negative coefficient for the binary equation model, if someone lists anything at all. Partisan intensity only influences the binary portion of the model. Examining the effects graphically is indicative that across levels of awareness there are two different processes at work. In Figure 2.7 it is shown that while the two probabilities converge as awareness increases there are still some even at the highest level with a higher likelihood of never listing anything.[7]



Figure 2.7: Political knowledge and Pr(listing zero likes or dislikes) from zero-inflated count model.

The above results suggest two possible coding schemes. The first suggests individuals should be classified indifferent, ambivalent, or univalent. An individual is indifferent if he offers no likes or dislikes to the open ended questions.[8] If his score from equations (2.1) or (2.2) is less than zero he would be primarily one sided in his

[7]For Figure 2.7, predicted probabilities were calculated by holding all variables at their means.

[8]It should be noted that those classified as indifferent could conceivably be classified as having a "non-attitude" (Converse 1964), but it is unclear what exactly, in this case, the empirical distinction would be between the two.

thinking and would be coded as univalent. If the score is greater than zero, the individual should be coded as ambivalent. If one's substantive theory suggests there is no difference between univalent and indifferent individuals, coding individuals simply as ambivalent or not is appropriate.

2.4 Empirical Examples

The above findings are especially important if different measurement schemes lead to different substantive conclusions. To see if findings are robust to assumptions of the level of measurement, I model partisan ambivalence with the recoding suggested by the ALSOS regressions above. For the empirical examples I focus on comparative ambivalence as the dependent variable.

Rudolph and Popp (2007) argue that it is not only value conflict (e.g., Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Keele and Wolak 2006) that causes ambivalence; instead, one should also look to other, informational, sources of ambivalence. For example, an individual's ability and interest in seeking out multiple sources of information should influence the likelihood of experiencing partisan ambivalence: as one has more sources of information and therefore more points of view, one is more likely to experience ambivalence. Their analysis finds evidence for both explanations, I examine if such findings are identical under ways of coding the variable.

2.4.1 A Dichotomous Measure of Ambivalence

I first model comparative partisan ambivalence by coding individuals as ambivalent or not (indifferent and one sided thinking individuals are placed in the same category) using logistic regression. Included are variables associated with ambivalence: measures of value conflict, specifically conflict between egalitarianism and limited government and egalitarianism and moral traditionalism; one's need for cognition,

measured using two questions from the NES; a measure of one's need to evaluate; a measure of political knowledge using factual questions from the NES; education; the intensity with which one holds one's partisan identification; and an interaction between partisan intensity and political knowledge; and finally, a measure of the number of items listed. The results are in Table 2.3, where entries represent coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2.3: Partisan ambivalence

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Political knowledge	0.369**	(0.109)
Education	0.033	(0.057)
Need for cognition	0.221†	(0.121)
PID intensity	0.228	(0.184)
Care who wins	-0.383	(0.270)
PID Intensity×knowledge	-0.160**	(0.049)
Egalitarianism	-3.145*	(1.480)
Limited government	-0.838	(0.844)
Moral traditionalism	-2.087	(1.473)
Egalitarianism×limited government	2.044	(1.363)
Egalitarianism×moral traditionalism	3.201	(2.356)
Need to evaluate	0.095	(0.425)
# of evaluative responses	0.254**	(0.026)
Intercept	-1.141	(0.975)
N	970	
Log-likelihood	-496.315	
$\chi^2_{(13)}$	200.798	
Pseudo R^2	0.1683	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
Estimated using logistic regression

How one codes the variable affects substantive conclusions. For example, once coding the variable as dichotomous, value conflict plays no role in explaining partisan ambivalence in 2004. It is only measures that proxy contextual knowledge, political knowledge, education, and a need for cognition, that now best explain whether or not an individual is ambivalent or not. Whereas before the two explanations were viewed as both offering insight as to who will be ambivalent toward the parties,

now only one adds explanatory power. However, such a model treats indifferent and univalent individuals as the same, while in Section 2.3.1, it was clearly demonstrated that individuals who offer no likes or dislikes could, if the theory dictates, be treated differently.

In the case of information, value conflict, and ambivalence there is reason to suspect indifferent and univalent individuals should be treated differently. An individual who has an interest in seeking information is not likely to be indifferent; he may, on the other hand, be univalent or ambivalent depending on how he processes the information. Similarly, an individual experiencing value conflict probably will not be univalent, but the conflict might lead to ambivalence or indifference.

2.4.2 The Possibility of Indifferent Individuals

Based on coding in Basinger and Lavine (2005), those who offer no likes or dislikes are coded as indifferent, those with a comparative ambivalence score greater than zero are coded as ambivalent, and those with a score less than zero—individuals with primarily negative or positive reactions—are coded as univalent. Therefore, the appropriate model would be a multinomial regression, in this case I use a multinomial logistic regression. In Table 2.4, the columns represent indifferent and ambivalent, the base category is univalent.[9] The entries are coefficients showing the influence the variable has on leaving the base category, with standard errors in parentheses.

The findings strongly support the claim that the three categories are distinct. Political knowledge has an influence on whether or not one is indifferent, but not ambivalent. Similarly, education influences ambivalence but not indifference.[10] Most interesting are the coefficients for the variables representing motivational goals: inten-

[9]In this model I remove the variable # of items listed as it perfectly predicts indifference.

[10]The coefficient for education between the categories indifference and ambivalence is greater than zero and statistically significant.

Table 2.4: Partisan ambivalence

Variable	Indifferent		Ambivalent	
Political knowledge	-0.216	(0.186)	0.410*	(0.161)
Education	-0.210*	(0.100)	0.073	(0.067)
Need for cognition	0.102	(0.209)	0.222	(0.149)
PID intensity	-0.955**	(0.306)	-0.050	(0.277)
Care who wins	-1.182*	(0.479)	-0.713	(0.448)
PID Intensity×knowledge	-0.013	(0.095)	-0.111	(0.069)
Egalitarianism	-0.893	(2.838)	-1.513	(1.766)
Limited government	-1.001	(1.430)	-1.249	(0.977)
Moral traditionalism	1.240	(2.657)	-0.621	(1.752)
Egalitarianism×limited government	0.932	(2.432)	2.860†	(1.594)
Egalitarianism×moral traditionalism	-1.147	(4.289)	0.012	(2.776)
Need to evaluate	-1.500*	(0.761)	0.586	(0.520)
Intercept	5.438**	(1.901)	0.696	(1.300)
N	975			
$\chi^2_{(28)}$	198.605			
Pseudo R^2	0.1624			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
Estimated using multinomial logistic regression, base category is univalence

sity of partisan identity and if the individual cares who wins. Both variables predict indifference but not ambivalence. Another interesting finding is that value conflict now does predict ambivalence; furthermore, it does not predict a difference between indifferent and univalent individuals.

The relationship between partisan intensity and the probability of being classified in each of the three categories is examined graphically in Figure 2.8.[11] It has been argued that the intensity of one's partisanship should reduce one's likelihood of experiencing ambivalence. This is shown not to be the case in Figure 2.8; instead, it has no clear effect on ambivalence. However, it does reduce the likelihood of indifference, which makes intuitive sense: those individuals who are care strongly about the parties are unlikely to be indifferent. The finding is identical to the count model where

[11]Figure 2.7 was constructed by holding all other variables at their means except PID intensity×knowledge, which varies with the value of PID intensity while holding knowledge at its mean.

intensity was significant in the binary equations, but not the count equation.



Figure 2.8: The impact of partisan intensity on univalence, ambivalence, and indifference.

Clearly, substantive conclusions depend on how the variable is coded. Rudolph and Popp (2007) treated the variable as continuous and found partisan intensity to be a significant predictor of ambivalence. However, once coded as dichotomous the finding disappeared. This appears to be the case because intensity actually influences indifference, which was shown earlier to be qualitatively different from ambivalence. One could examine other substantive conclusions—for example the role value conflict plays, have depending on the coding scheme—the important point is they differ from one scheme to the next.

2.5 A Measure of Comparative Ambivalence

Traditionally, ambivalence is used to refer to attitude conflict toward a stimulus object, not a choice. Therefore combining attitudes about two different stimulus objects, which is done when measuring comparative ambivalence, could be problematic. Specifically, I examine whether or not it is appropriate to measure ambivalence *comparatively*, which instead of looking at two stimulus objects independent of one another comparative ambivalence measures to attitudinal conflict regarding the choice

between the two objects. Such a measure assumes feelings between the two parties are related. Only if negative feelings about one party are generated from the same process as positive feelings toward the other is such a measure appropraite. Many question the extent to which attitudes toward the two parties related (e.g., Alvarez 1990; Weisberg 1980). It has been argued once controlling for measurement error (Craig, Martinez and Kane 1999; Green 1988) or when using more psychologically grounded measurements (Greene 2005) attitudes about the two parties are related. While there is evidence positive and negative evaluations of the same object are often independent of one another (Abelson et al. 1982; Cacioppo and Bernston 1994), it has not been firmly established that positive and negative reactions toward two competing objects are related.

If the process that generates negative feelings toward party generates negative feelings toward the other, one would, for example, expect Democrats on average to list zero negative statements about the Democratic party and zero positive statements about the Republican party. Statements offered about each party, broken down by partisanship, are shown in Figure 2.9, where the plotted points corresponds to the average number of statements listed and the horizontal bars represent plus and minus one standard deviation. The patterns is as one would expect: each individual offers about 1.5 positive statements for his preferred party and 1.5 negative statements for the opposing party. However, at the 95% confidence level these are distinguishable neither from how many statements are listed about the opposing party nor from zero. So, while the picture looks as one might expect, it does not offer support for a measure of comparative ambivalence (it does not refute the notion either).

Another way to examine if listing positive statements about one party and negative statement of hte other are empirical manifestations of the same process is to perform a factor analysis. If this is the case, a two factor solution with negative Democratic statements and positive Republican statements on one factor and negative Republican



Figure 2.9: The average number of positive and negative statements listed toward the parties broken down by political party. The plotted points represent the mean number of statements and the horizontal bars represent one standard deviation.

statemtns and positive Democratic statements on the other should be found. The reasoning is as follows: in equation (2.2), D and R should be distinct in order for the first term on the right-hand side to measure intensity and the second term to measure similarity, as the Griffin index does for a single stimulus object (Thompson, Zanna and Griffin 1995); as each is made up negative statements toward one party, and positive toward another, these should be related. When performing the factor analysis included in addition to the likes and dislikes toward the parties were: partisan identification, ideology, and thermometer scores for the two parties. A two-factor solution was found (a scree plot is in the appendix). The results are presented below in Figure 2.10, after performing a varimax rotation on the solution. Positive statements about the Democratic party and negative statements about the Republican party have high values on factor 2 and are nearly zero on factor 1. Similarly positive statements about the Republican party and negative statements about the Democratic party have high values on factor 2 and are nearly zero on factor 1.



Figure 2.10: Results from factor analysis of positive and negative statements listed about the parties, as well as partisanship, ideology, and party thermometer scores.

Finally, I see how well each items scales with the others. If one takes the negative and positive responses for each party to form a scale, the scale in unreliable with a Cronbach's α of 0.124 for the Democratic Party and 0.121 for the Republican Party. However, if one forms a scale from the negative responses toward one party and the positive responses for the other—as the factor analysis above suggests appropriate—the resulting scales are indeed quite reliable: Cronbach's α=0.755 when including negative Democratic responses and favorable Republican; 0.742 for negative Republican and favorable Democratic responses. Each of the resultant scales correlate with party identification relatively highly (-0.4025 for positive Democratic and negative Republican responses; 0.4633 for negative Democratic and positive Republican responses). The two resulting indices seem to be unrelated, the correlation between the two 0.166. The marginal and joint distributions for pro-Republican and pro-Democratic responses for those who listed at least one statement are displayed in Figure 2.11.



Figure 2.11: Marginal and joint distributions of Pro-Republican and Pro-Democratic responses for those individuals who list at least one likes or dislike.

As can be seen in the far right portion of Figure 2.11—which is a two-dimensional histogram where darker shades indicate a greater number of respondents—there is no discernible relationship between pro-Democrat and pro-Republican responses. It therefore can be concluded that while one's thoughts about the two parties are related to one another, this is only the case in that pro-responses toward one party are related to negative responses toward the other party, the D and R terms in equation (2.2). And, because these two terms can be thought of as independent of one another, a measure of comparative ambivalence is valid. Therefore, measures toward each party as well as a measure of choice ambivalence can be used depending on what one's theory suggests is more useful.

2.6 Discussion and Conclusion

While the proceeding sections could be interpreted negatively, there is good news. Even though the best coding scheme appears to discard variance, at least some of the variance is a result of measurement error. Also, there is a clear difference between those who are ambivalent and those who are not. The measures are certainly able to

capture a difference between these two kinds of individuals. Furthermore those who offer no likes and dislikes are also clearly different. This is useful because such findings are tied to well developed theories and an established literature. Second, overall fit of the models are not considerably better when using the optimally scaled variables as explanatory variables suggesting including the measures of control variables should not be problematic. On the other hand, when using the measures as an dependent variable or the key explanatory variable, one should be skeptical.

This leads to some practical advice. The results of the ALSOS regressions offers empirical support for Basinger and Lavine's (2005) coding of individuals as ambivalent, univalent, or indifferent, with those offering no responses being indifferent. This means that depending on the research question, when modeling the variable as the dependent variable one should categorize individuals as ambivalent or not. Or, if the question of interest suggests that there should be a difference between univalent, and indifferent individuals then a trichotomous nominal dependent variable should be used. This suggests that binary or multinomial methods should be used when ambivalence is the dependent variable. If the variable is being used simply as a control variable including it as is, as a pseudo-interval level measure, without recoding will probably not result in biased or misleading results. If, on the other hand, it is a variable of interest in explaining some political phenomenon and will be used to calculate such things as predicted probabilities more reliable results will be obtained if the variable is recoded accordingly.

The above results also offer support for a measure of comparative ambivalence. If positive feelings about one party are related to negative feelings of another, the idea of choice ambivalence is appropriate. Therefore, depending on the question of interest either measure could be used, but one must be careful how it is coded. In conclusion, objective measures of ambivalence are useful in distinguishing between those with conflicted thoughts, but less so in measuring the intensity of such feelings.

Appendix to Chapter 2

Measures

Political knowledge was measured by asking a series of factual questions to create an index. For 2004 the questions were: knowledge of Tony Blair (v045164), of William Rehnquist's position (v045165), of Dennis Hastret's position (v045162), and the office of Dick Cheney (v045163), of which party controlled the House (v045089), and the Senate (v045090). For this index, Cronbach's α=0.801.

To measure *need for cognition* in 2004, I followed the coding in Rudolph and Popp (2007) using the following variables: "Which type of problem do you prefer to solve: SIMPLE or COMPLEX?" (v045221); and how much does the individual like responsibility for thinking (v045220a).

For value conflict, I used the coding in Keele and Wolak (2006) and included egalitarianism, moral traditionalism, limited government; and, the conflict between egalitarianism and moral traditionalism, and between egalitarianism and limited government.

To measure party identification intensity, I modified the standard measures of party identification by taking the absolute value of the the median subtracted from the respondents response, or $|x_i - 3|$, resulting in a variable that is coded 0 to 3, with 3 being most intense.

Education is measured on a 7 point scale.

Republican and Democratic Ambivalence



Figure 2.12: Republican and Democratic ambivalence in 2004.

Factor Analyis



Figure 2.13: Screeplot from factor analysis.

Chapter 3

Campaign Messages as Sources of Partisan Ambivalence

By the early fall of 1980, a year after the Iran hostage crisis began, inflation and unemployment were rising with no signs of slowing. Against this backdrop, Ronald Reagan asked the American people a simple, powerful question: "Are you better off now than you were four years ago?" While this question may have crystalized the doubts many people had, it was the culmination of months of negative coverage regarding the economy and foreign affairs. These major campaign themes compelled many Americans to pause and think about the direction of the country. Even long time Democrats may now have had negative thoughts about their party.

Recently, scholars of ambivalence have moved away from value conflict as the primary source of ambivalence and have begun to look to other, informational, sources. It could be those individuals who are subject to two-sided information flows who are likely to be ambivalent. To expand upon the example above, I argue the nature of campaign messages are such that they might cause an individual, and the electorate, to question long-standing identifications, even if only briefly. So long as messages are able to spread through the electorate sufficiently, they might consistently pre-

dict ambivalence. In this chapter I intend to elaborate on informational theories of ambivalence in two ways. First, I hope to show that one of the primary implicit assumptions in the theory is true: that accepting positive and negative messages about the parties leads to ambivalence. Second, I wish to offer some evidence as to what precise issues are leading to ambivalent individuals. The findings provide support for an informational theory of ambivalence. Campaign messages play a modest but consistent role in predicting ambivalence. Therefore, for the first time direct evidence of what messages might be causing ambivalence is found.

3.1 Campaigns, Information, and Ambivalence

Focusing only on political knowledge and reception for the moment gives insight as to what kind of messages are likely to be sources of ambivalence. As knowledge tends to be a prominent explanation of both receiving political messages and ambivalence, it seems a natural starting point. Furthermore, a simple model can quickly demonstrate the sort of messages that one should look to as potentially influencing ambivalence. Before moving on, I wish to explain more precisely what I mean by campaign messages. In this case, I am referring to the major campaign themes, those issues that are brought up again and again. How these messages, or themes, are dispersed through the electorate is not the primary goal of this chapter. Instead, I simply look to see if the kind of message—or theme, or issue—that might be considered prominent is associated with ambivalence.

Consider the following simple model of reception:

$$\Pr(\mathrm{R}_m = 1) = F(\alpha_m + \beta_m \mathrm{Knowledge}),$$

where α is function of how easy a message is to hear regardless of political knowledge, β is a discrimination parameter, m is the message in question (which can be classified

as either positive, p, or negative n), and F is a link function. It is those messages that would have low levels of α that would be most likely to be received by the greatest number of people. As α_m decreases, the probability that the message will be received is higher for all values of political knowledge. As it decreases enough, then one need not even worry about the value of β_m as $\Pr(\mathrm{R}_m)$ will be nearly the same for all individuals and therefore will not vary over values of political knowledge. Now, incorporating knowledge into the discussion, one would look to messages with high values of β because a small increase in knowledge would lead to a significantly greater chance of receiving the message.

Therefore, the focus should be on those messages that will be heard by the greatest number of voters: those messages most widely dispersed. This is especially true because most of the discrimination is probably happening at the reception stage (Dobrynska and Blais 2008), not at the acceptance stage. As an example to show the kind of messages I am referring to, Figure 3.1 displays a message likely to be heard by many (low values of α and high value of β) represented by the solid line, and one what is unlikely to be heard by all but the most informed, the dashed line. The picture makes clear how important the role of α_m is. Imagine if the solid line had a higher value of α, it would shift to the right, and although political knowledge would still be helpful, only a few individuals would hear the message.

Implicit in an informational theory of ambivalence is that individuals who are exposed to more information are more likely to accumulate both positive and negative beliefs, or whichever they do not already have. Regardless if it is the campaign environment, discussion networks, or some other source of information, the argument necessarily implies that individuals who are exposed to information must be hearing both positive and negative messages about the parties in order to be ambivalent. It follows that each individual has some latent probability of accepting and receiving positive and negative messages about the parties, and therefore some latent proba-



Figure 3.1: A message likely to be head by many represented by the solid line and one what is unlikely to be heard by all but the most informed, the dashed line.

bility of experiencing ambivalence. A theoretical model of the probability that an individual is ambivalent could be then expressed as:

$$\Pr(\text{Ambivalence}) = \Pr(\text{A}_n \ \& \ \text{R}_n) \times \Pr(\text{A}_p \ \& \ \text{R}_p). \tag{3.1}$$

Rather obviously, it is clear that for ambivalence to exist, $\Pr(\text{A}_n \ \& \ \text{R}_n) \times \Pr(\text{A}_p \ \& \ \text{R}_p) > 0$, meaning the value of each term on the right-hand side must be greater than zero. Equation (3.1) is not itself a measure, but a theoretical account of the underlying processes that empirical measures of ambivalence attempt to capture: the listing of likes and dislikes about the parties. In that regard, although model looks very familiar to measures that define ambivalence as the product of conflicting and thoughts, $P \times N$, this is actually not the case. It is just as related to the measure of ambivalence provided in equation (2.1).

In order for equation (3.1) to be an accurate representation of ambivalence, then $\Pr(\text{A}_n|\text{R}_n)$ must be independent of $\Pr(\text{A}_p|\text{R}_p)$. There is empirical evidence to sup-

port such an assumption: for example Kaplan (1972) found only an average correlation of -.05 between positive and negative beliefs; and, even when considering measurement error, there still appears to be only a modest relationship between positive and negative thoughts (Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995). I also empirically examine this assumption below.

Regarding causes of ambivalence, we know that knowledge, cross-cutting networks, and a need for cognition certainly play a role as these make individuals more likely to be exposed to bout positive and negative messages. I argue these are indirect sources of ambivalence—which messages are getting through? Issues potentially directly relate to how individual think about the two parties, and are therefore potential sources of ambivalence.

Issues, or messages, or themes of a campaign might cause an individual to momentarily reconsider his long-standing identification. Regarding various issues I have only general expectations: different issues will cause voters to be ambivalent to the parties depending on context. That is, different issues will be related to the two parties in different ways. I do not argue that specific issues will always cause voters to be ambivalent toward the parties. Instead I expect different issues to cause voters to be ambivalent to the Democrats as opposed to the Republicans. I use the measure of choice ambivalence to test the robustness of the findings.

3.2 Research Design

To examine the above theoretical account of ambivalence and campaigns, I first classify individuals as holding ambivalent feelings toward one of the two parties, both, or neither political party. Such a classification scheme allows the use of multinomial regression, which permits a direct test of whether or not topics important in campaigns can have different a impact on the probability of being ambivalent toward

the Republican and Democratic parties. Additionally, I test the hypotheses in two presidential elections, 1980 and 2004. I choose these elections as 2004 represents one of relative polarization of the two parties while in 1980 the two parties were relatively close. Results suggest campaign messages are sources of ambivalence, and influence the likelihood of being ambivalent toward the two parties in different ways.

In order to classify individuals as ambivalent I make use of a measurement scheme as suggested in Chapter 2 and equation (2.1). I dichotomize the variable so that any individual with a score greater than zero is classified as ambivalent toward the party in question. Those individuals who have a score greater than zero for both parties are categorized as ambivalent toward both parties. Coding is summarized in Table 1.[1] I use the measure comparative ambivalence to test the robustness of the findings.

Table 3.1: Ambivalence measures and categorization.

$\text{Amibv}_{\text{Rep.}}$	$\text{Amibv}_{\text{Dem.}}$	Categorization
>0	≤ 0	Republican ambivalence
≤ 0	>0	Democratic ambivalence
>0	>0	Both
≤ 0	≤ 0	None

3.2.1 Other Measures

I include other potential sources of ambivalence in the model. *Political knowledge* is measured using questions asking factual questions about the political system. Additionally, *education* is included using a 7 point scale from the NES. Similarly, *interest* is included using a question asking respondent's interest in the campaign. In all three cases we should expect increased contextual knowledge and an ability to assimilate

[1] For the few cases where a Republican would be classified as ambivalent toward the Democratic parties, I recoded these individuals as not experiencing ambivalence (I recoded Democrats similarly). This makes interpreting the results more straight forward. Very few cases need to be recoded and substantive results remain unchanged.

such knowledge to increase the likelihood of ambivalence. Because individuals who have a greater *need for cognition* and *need to evaluate* are more likely to experience partisan ambivalence a scale measuring such need is included (see Rudolph & Popp 2007 for more detail). Also included are measures of *value conflict* between egalitarianism and limited government, as well as egalitarianism and moral values (see Keele & Wolak 2006 for more detail). In 2000, I also include measures of *discussion network heterogeneity* (Huckfeldt, Mendez and Osborn 2004).

Included are measures of individuals' responses to prominent campaign messages. Included in each year are a domestic issue and a foreign policy issue, each which could be considered salient for the year in question. To reiterate, I hope to capture explicitly what other accounts of ambivalence imply: a source of ambivalence, not just the type of environment that makes being exposed to such a source likely. For 1980, the two issues are the individual's opinion on Carter's handling of inflation and his handling of the hostage situation. In 2004, Bush's taxcuts and one's opinion of the Iraq war are included. While there might be an issue with including items related directly to a specific president's performance, I do so for two reasons. The first is practical, in both years the only measures related to some of the prominent campaign issues ask about the president's performance. Second, it is not unreasonable to suppose an incumbent's performance will be a major point of discussion during a campaign, individuals might update their opinion based on the evaluation of previous performance (Fiorina 1981; Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau 1995).

3.2.2 Modeling Ambivalence

In the multinomial regression, the base category is holding no ambivalent feelings; the other categories are ambivalent toward the Democratic Party, ambivalent toward the Republican Party, and ambivalent toward both parties. This makes the interpretation of coefficients relatively straight forward: they represent the effect a variable has on

changing the probability that one holds no ambivalent feelings toward entering one of the other categories. Importantly, this allows for variables to have different effects for different categories. One could imagine that a different set of determinants influences the probability an individual feels ambivalent about both parties as compared to just one. It also seems possible there are different reasons why one might feel ambivalent about Republicans as opposed to Democrats.

A strength of modeling partisan ambivalence using multinomial regression is that it reflects the theoretical model presented above. It is possible for an individual to be ambivalent toward neither, one, or both parties, depending on which messages he has heard and accepted. Meaning, each term in equation (3.1) can be expressed as its own equation as a function of a set of explanatory variables. Those with high probabilities of accepting both positive and negative messages will have a high probability of being ambivalent.

Hypothesis 3.1a: *The predicted probability of listing a positive statement about a political party is unrelated to the predicted probability of listing a negative statement about the same party.*

Hypothesis 3.1b: *The predicted probability of listing a positive statement about a political party multiplied by the predicted probability of listing a negative statement about the same party should approximately equal the predicted probability of being classified as ambivalent.*

The main question posed in this chapter is whether or not including these messages and individual's opinions on them in the model adds any explanatory power. Additionally, including these should give insight as to which issues are likely to cause an individual to experience ambivalence. So, issues will predict ambivalence but coefficients will not be equal across outcomes. That is to say, the expectation is that $\beta_{kt,\text{Rep.}}$ will be different from $\beta_{kt,\text{Dem.}}$ for at least some of the campaign messages,

where t is the year being examined, and k is the issue, where $\beta_{kt,j}$ represents the impact variable k in year t has on entering category j from the base category, no ambivalence.

Hypothesis 3.2: *Different issues will impact the probability an individual is ambivalent toward Democrats, Republicans, or both parties.*

3.3 Empirical Results

3.3.1 Accuracy of Theoretical Model

To demonstrate the accuracy of the theoretical model, I run separate a logistic regression for each term in equation (3.1) for the both parties. Therefore, positive messages for the Republican party, for example, could be modeled as:

$$\Pr(A_{\text{Rep.}p,i}\&R_{\text{Rep.}p,i} = 1|\mathbf{x}_i) = \Lambda(\mathbf{x}_i'\boldsymbol{\beta}).$$

Where $A_{\text{Rep.}p,i}\&R_{\text{Rep.}p,i}$ is coded as 1 if the respondent offers at least one positive statement about the Republican party and Λ a function linking the underlying tendency to a probability, and is the cdf of the logistic distribution.

After running the model for positive and negative messages for both parties, I calculate predicted probabilities. If the assumption that the two probabilities are independent is true, the correlation between the two obtained probabilities should be low and there should be no discernible relationship between the two values. As can be seen in the left of Figure 3.2, which is for the Republican party in presidential election years 1980-2004, the two probabilities are unrelated.

If the theoretical model is accurate, not only should these two predicted probabilities be unrelated, when they are multiplied by one another the result should be



Figure 3.2: Testing assumption that $\Pr(A_p|R_p)$ is independent of $\Pr(A_n|R_n)$. Additionally examining the extent to which the theoretical model is empirically true, for presidential years 1980 to 2004.

approximately equal to the predicted probability obtained from a model of

$$\Pr(\text{Rep. Ambiv.}_i = 1|\mathbf{x}_i),$$

as this is the relationship suggested in equation (3.1).[2] This is shown in the right-hand side of Figure 1. As can be seen, the relationship is linear and appears to be quite strong. As noted earlier, the model in equation in (3.1) looks quite similar to measures of the product of conflicting and thoughts, $P \times N$. However, it states the latent tendency to be ambivalent is related to the latent tendency to receive and then

[2]We should expect $\Pr(\text{A}_n\&\text{R}_n) \times \Pr(\text{A}_p\&\text{R}_p)$ to slightly overestimate Pr(Ambivalence) because the model of receiving and accepting a message is actually of recalling at least one message. Some individuals who have recalled at least one positive and one negative item may have recalled more of one category and therefore are not ambivalent. This actually makes seeing a correlation between $\Pr(\text{A}_n\&\text{R}_n) \times \Pr(\text{A}_p\&\text{R}_p)$ and Pr(Ambivalence) less likely.

measures of the product of conflicting and thoughts, $P \times N$. However, it states the latent tendency to be ambivalent is related to the latent tendency to receive and then recall positive and negative messages about the parties. The cross-product measure is based on the actual number of items listed. Equation (3.1) is theoretical model of objective measures of ambivalence, not itself a measure. Also, while it has been shown that the cross-product model is correlated with the Griffin index (Priester and Petty 1996), this is somewhat misleading as the relationship between the two will almost always be non-linear: individuals with negative scores on the Griffin index will often have a zero on the cross-product measure—I show that this is the case for Republicans and Democrats in 2004 in the appendix. This demonstrates that the linear relationship shown in Figure 3.2 is distinct from correlations between different objective measures of ambivalence. Instead, the figure is evidence that the propensity to be ambivalent is a function of the product of the propensities of being able to recall both negative and positive messages about a party.

More important than simply a strong linear relationship between the two predicted probabilities, the loess curve shows that the two values are not a bad approximation for one another. This finding generalizes to the Democratic party, which is shown in the appendix. As an additional test to examine how similar the two probabilities are to each other, I calculated a concordance correlation coefficient (Lin 1989). The coefficient, r_C, looks not only for a linear relationship between two variables but how much agreement there is between observations across the two variables, that is does variable x equal variable z?[3] The coefficients, displayed in Figure 3.3, demonstrate that two probabilities are good approximations for one another for both parties. Because the two key assumptions of the theoretical model are met, running a multinomial regression is an appropriate method to investigate such a model.

[3]The coefficient is bounded between -1 and 1 just like Pearson's r; for example, if x_i=z_i for all i, r_C would equal 1. For a detailed discussion of the concordance correlation coefficient and some applications see Wittenberg (2008).



Figure 3.3: Concordance correlation coefficient, with 95% confidence intervals, for presidential years 1980 to 2004, between the relationship of $\Pr(A_p|R_p) \times \Pr(A_n|R_n)$ and Pr(Ambiv.).

Support is found for hypotheses 1a and 1b. Moreover, the support is found in all presidential election years from 1980 to 2004. Beyond the practical importance of these findings for the empirical analysis below, the fact that these two probabilities are found to be statistically independent of one another seems to have its own intrinsic importance. That individuals positive and negative thoughts about the two parties can be thought of as independent of one another has potentially large implications for other areas of research in political behavior. This finding coupled with those from Section 2.5 suggest examining in more detail how expressions of thoughts about the two parties are related is a fruitful area for further research.

3.3.2 Sources of Ambivalence

The results of the multinomial regression are in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, one for each year of analysis.[4] The columns in both tables represent each of three outcomes (Demo-

[4]Overall levels of ambivalence for all years are in the appendix.

cratic ambivalence, Republican ambivalence, and both). The entries are coefficients showing the impact the variable has on leaving the base category (no ambivalence), with standard errors in parentheses.[5] The control variables by and large behave as expected. Political information and interest predict ambivalence. Similarly, a need for cognition and a need to evaluate predict ambivalence.

The results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 sprovide support for Hypothesis 3.2. One's opinion of Carter's handling of foreign affairs and inflation influences if one is ambivalent toward the Republican party, but not the Democratic party. As individuals take a view more favorable to the Republican party, they are less likely to be ambivalent to Republicans. All issue variables were coded so that higher values correspond with pro-Republican responses. The findings are displayed graphically in Figure 3.4 and provide the same conclusion.[6]

Table 3.3 shows the results for the analysis performed on 2004. Looking first at one's support for the tax cuts, as one moves from strongly approving to strongly disapproving the tax cuts, he becomes less likely to be ambivalent toward the Democratic party and being ambivalent toward both parties. A clearer picture of this can be seen in Figure 3.5. This suggests, perhaps, that an individual who normally might be supportive of the Democratic party is unhappy with the extent to which the Democrats acquiesced. The figure also shows that as one becomes more approving of the war he is less likely to ambivalent of the Republican part. In both years, each issue has a different influence on Republican and Democratic ambivalence offering support for Hypothesis 3.2.

[5]In both years, both Hausman (1984) and Small- Hsiao (1985) tests suggest the assumption of IIA is not violated.

[6]Predicted probabilities for Figures 3 and 4 were constructed using *SPOST* (Long and Freese 2005).

Table 3.2: Predicting Partisan Ambivalence in 1980

	Dem.		Rep.		Both	
Party ID	0.049	(0.059)	0.114	(0.075)	-0.113	(0.070)
Ideology	-0.004	(0.079)	0.076	(0.102)	0.127	(0.095)
Issues						
Inflation	-0.100	(0.135)	-0.310†	(0.181)	-0.304†	(0.172)
Hostage situation	-0.074	(0.074)	-0.216*	(0.089)	-0.012	(0.090)
Sophistication						
Education	0.018	(0.016)	-0.004	(0.030)	0.020	(0.017)
Knowledge	0.175*	(0.085)	0.364**	(0.106)	0.499**	(0.100)
Interest	0.291†	(0.160)	0.011	(0.196)	0.509*	(0.199)
Intercept	-2.399**	(0.702)	-2.145*	(0.898)	-4.210**	(0.877)
N	821					
Log-likelihood	-589.375					
$\chi^2_{(39)}$	141.754					
Pseudo R^2	0.112					

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%



Figure 3.4: The impact of campaign messages in 1980.

Table 3.3: Predicting Partisan Ambivalence in 2004

	Democratic		Republican		Both	
Party ID	0.218*	(0.107)	-0.052	(0.114)	0.252*	(0.105)
Ideology	-0.221†	(0.134)	0.309*	(0.155)	0.241†	(0.130)
Issues						
Iraq war	0.063	(0.503)	-0.868†	(0.494)	-0.685	(0.466)
Tax cuts	-0.273*	(0.122)	0.136	(0.128)	-0.327**	(0.114)
Sophistication						
Knowledge	0.293**	(0.106)	0.308**	(0.114)	0.113	(0.100)
Education	-0.045	(0.095)	0.238*	(0.100)	0.075	(0.092)
Interest	-0.042	(0.120)	-0.279*	(0.135)	-0.154	(0.118)
Cognitive style						
Need for cognition	0.305	(0.213)	0.015	(0.206)	0.391†	(0.201)
Need to evaluate	1.668*	(0.703)	0.038	(0.749)	0.490	(0.678)
Value conflict						
Moral trad.	0.220	(1.546)	0.789	(1.621)	-1.860	(1.568)
Limited gov.	-1.245	(1.319)	-0.619	(1.359)	0.765	(1.251)
Egalitarianism	-0.031	(0.050)	-0.015	(0.050)	-0.060	(0.047)
Egalitarianism× Moral trad.	-0.439	(2.174)	-0.889	(2.442)	1.860	(2.296)
Egalitarianism× Limited gov.	1.672	(2.128)	2.858	(2.258)	-0.198	(2.038)
Intercept	-2.167†	(1.258)	-5.077**	(1.340)	-2.432*	(1.206)
N	556					
Log-likelihood	-589.375					
$\chi^2_{(39)}$	141.754					
Pseudo R^2	0.112					
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%			



Figure 3.5: The impact of campaign messages in 2004.

3.3.3 Trends

Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the influence of prominent campaign messages on the probability of being classified as ambivalent for presidential election years 1980 through 2004. As before, the x-axis ranges from the most liberal to most conservative response. In each year at least one policy predicts ambivalent toward at least one party. As can be seen, in some years the impact is small and in others, nearly non-existent. Importantly, as the theory suggested, the issues influence the probability of being ambivalent to the two parties in different ways in most years. The theory also suggested that foreign and domestic policies will have different effects in different years which can be seen in the figures.

The impact of these messages on ambivalence is modest. The change in probability is never much greater than 0.10 moving from the most liberal to most conservative position. These messages are necessarily measured with significant error; for example, only when scales are created of many issues can a strong relationship be found between issues and vote choice (Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, Jr. 2008), something much



Figure 3.6: The impact of foreign policy campaign messages. The solid line represents Democratic ambivalence, the dashed Republican. The x-axis moves from most liberal to most conservative position.



Figure 3.7: The impact of domestic policy campaign messages. The solid line represents Democratic ambivalence, the dashed Republican. The x-axis moves from most liberal to most conservative position.

easier to measure than ambivalence. It is then not that surprising that these messages do not have the same impact as other variables such as political knowledge. Indeed, in some respects when considering the small influence a single issue has on vote choice, it is impressive the effects are as large as found here.

The evidence supports an informational theory of ambivalence. Other informational explanations suggest the experience of hearing multiple sides of an argument increases ambivalence. What I have shown is evidence of the kinds of arguments are being considered. Certainly, I am not making the case these are the only, or perhaps even the primary, arguments. Instead, I suggest they are pervasive enough they should be considered as starting points. More than likely, while an issue that is very important to an individual is a more likely cause ambivalence, testing such a hypothesis would require specially collected data. The primary conclusion that can be drawn is that those issues which are brought up again and again in a campaign, what I refer to as campaign themes, are potential sources of ambivalence. I have also offered the first specific evidence of what takes place in environments that lead to ambivalence.

3.3.4 Alternative Measures of Ambivalence

To test the robustness of the above findings, I replicate the model above using the measure of comparative ambivalence. I dichotomize the measure so those with a score greater than zero are modeled as ambivalent and all others as not (there are no substantive differences for the variables of interest if I account for indifference). Several measures used above were altered for the study of comparative ambivalence: partisanship, ideology, and issue opinions are recoded as the intensity with which one holds the identification and attitudes. The results for 2004 are in Table 5, where the entries represent coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses.

The results provide support for the theory. The intensity with which a respondent

Table 3.4: Predicting comparative partisan ambivalence

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
PID intensity	-0.276**	(0.105)
Ideological intensity	-0.023	(0.112)
Issues		
Iraq opinion intensity	-1.392†	(0.722)
Tax-cuts intensity	-0.024	(0.188)
Political sophistication		
Political knowledge	0.169*	(0.073)
Education	0.125†	(0.067)
Interest	0.258	(0.174)
Cognitive style		
Need for cognition	0.221	(0.145)
Opinion	0.517	(0.510)
Value conflict		
Mortal traditionalism	-2.379	(1.707)
Limited government	-0.621	(0.940)
Egalitarianism	-2.755	(1.744)
Egalitarianism× moral traditionalism	2.957	(2.727)
Egalitarianism× limited government	1.960	(1.536)
Intercept	-0.296	(1.118)
N	555	
Log-likelihood	-337.202	
$\chi^2_{(14)}$	51.12	
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5% ** : 1%

holds his opinion on the Iraq war are associated with being less ambivalent. In this model, such a variable represents a motivational goal; as one cares more about the issue, one is less likely to be ambivalent between the two parties. Such a finding strengthens the argument that campaign messages are sources of ambivalence, as the finding is robust to how ambivalence is measured.

3.4 Conclusion

The analysis set out to examine the extent to which campaign messages, those topics widely discussed and covered, could be possible sources of ambivalence toward the American political parties. Specifically, in a given year issues impact the likelihood an individual is ambivalent toward the Republican party differently than it does the Democratic party.

The influence is modest. It certainly does not match that of political knowledge. In light of the crudeness of the measures, as well as measurement error, the findings presented can be thought of as adding to base of evidence that information is the source of ambivalence. Additionally, the findings offer strong support for the idea that the process driving ambivalence is a result of cognition and not affect. The strongest predictor is political knowledge which proxies the concept of contextual knowledge about the political system. Furthermore, that $\Pr(A_p|R_p)$ and $\Pr(A_n|R_n)$ are independent of one another suggests that positive messages messages are not received at the expense of receiving negative messages.

In conclusion, the findings suggest the theoretical formulation of partisan ambivalence is accurate. That is, conceptualizing ambivalence as the probability of receiving and accepting positive and negative messages is well represented by the empirical findings. Furthermore, the notion that issues are the messages receives empirical support as well. That the findings are conditional on both the party and the year conforms

with a general understanding of how issues impact the political system, suggesting they are related to the parties in different ways and over time the importance of a given issue changes over time. The findings in this chapter add to existing evidence that one should expect to see ambivalence among those most in tune with the political system as one must have a certain base of contextual knowledge to understand one's own inconsistent thoughts, should they exist.

Appendix to Chapter 3

Variables

Political knowledge was measured by asking a series of factual questions to create an index. For 1980 the questions were: did the individual express an opinion regarding the tax cut proposal (v800322)?; did the individual know the names and parties of Congressional candidates in his or her district (v800826, v800829)?, did the individual know which party was more likely to support a stronger national government (v801131)?, has the individual been paying attention to polls (v800129)? For 1980 the knowledge measure has a Cronbach's α of 0.5622.

Included in the 1984 scale were: Does respondent konw the names of candidates running for Congress (v840741)?; which party has house majority before (v841006) after election (v841007)?; and for Senate before (v841008) and after (v841009)? The scale has a Cronbach's α of 0.743.

For 1988: knowledge Rehnquist's position (v880873), Gorbachev's job (v880874), Jim Wright (v880877), and which party controlled the House (v880878) and which the Senate (v880879), and the names of the candidates runnig for congress (v880569). The scale has a Cronbach's α of 0.599.

The questions included for the 1992 scale were: does the respondent know which party ismore conservative (v9205915)?; what office Dan Qualye (v9205916), Rehnquist (v9205917), Yeltsin (v9205918), and Foley (v9205919) hold; if the respondent knows who is resopnsble for determining if a law is unconstitutional (v9205920); and if the respondent know which party controlled the House before the election n (v9205951). The Cronbach's α is 0.764.

Included for 1996: Al Gore's position (V961189), Rehnquist's position (V961190), Boris Yeltsin's position (V961191), Newt Gingirch's position (V961192), and and the who conttrolled House before election (V961072). Cronbach's α =0.827.

For 2000 the questions were: What job or political office does he NOW hold? (v001450); What job or political office does he NOW hold? (v001453); What job or political office does he NOW hold? (v00147); What job or political office does she NOW hold? (v001456); the names of the Candidates in running for office in the respondent's district (v000347,v000351). For 2000 the knowledge measure has a Cronbach's α of 0.680.

For 2004 the questions were the same as those used in the proceeding chapter.

To measure *need for cognition* in 2000, the same questions were used as in 2004.

For, I used the coding in Keele and Wolak (2006); moral traditionalism was not available until 1992. Similarly, for discussion networks, I followed the coding in Huckfeldt et al. (2004).

Campaign Messages

Included in each year were two issues, one domestic and one foreign, that were prominently involved in the campaign. For 1984 the issues were the two parties handling of war (created from a scale of three variables; V840247-840249 with a Cronbach's α of 0.651), and one's opinion about women's rights. For 1988, the included issues were crime—Bush made a large deal of Dukakiss handling of crime as governor of Masaschussetes, and Reagan's handling of the Contra situation. In 1992, the foreign policy question was whether or not we continue the war, the domestic was Bushs handling of economy. In 1996 Clinton's foreign policy and his handling of healthcare. For 2000, the two issues are if the budget surplus should be used to protecting social security and Clinton's handling of foreign affairs, that is if one approves of an active role for the U.S. in world affairs.

Testing Assumption for Democratic Ambivalence



Figure 3.8: Testing assumption that $\Pr(A_p|A_p)$ is independent of $\Pr(A_n|A_n)$. Additionally examining the extent to which the theoretical model is empirically true, for Presidential years 1980 to 2004.

Comparing Measures of Ambivalence

To demonstrate that the findings in Figure 3.2 are distinct from high correlations found between the cross-product measure of ambivalence and the Griffin index, I show the empirical relationship below, which is clearly non-linear (the plotted points are jittered). Intuitively, it is easy to see that this will generally be the case. Many individuals found to be univalent with the Griffin index will have scores of zero for the cross-product measure, which is what leads to the non-linear relationship.



Figure 3.9: Comparing measures of ambivalence.

Model Results: 1984-2000

Tables for results from 1984 to 2000 to be inserted here.

Table 3.5: Predicting Partisan Ambivalence in 1984

	Democratic		Republican		Both	
Party ID	0.000	(0.044)	-0.009	(0.051)	-0.026	(0.048)
Ideology	-0.013	(0.044)	0.042	(0.051)	0.060	(0.049)
Issues						
war_defense	0.031	(0.078)	0.064	(0.090)	0.094	(0.085)
Women's rights	-0.074†	(0.044)	-0.044	(0.050)	0.020	(0.045)
Sophistication						
Knowledge	0.151**	(0.043)	0.174**	(0.049)	0.216**	(0.046)
Education	0.247**	(0.052)	0.256**	(0.060)	0.373**	(0.056)
Interest	0.549**	(0.126)	0.282*	(0.141)	0.377**	(0.135)
Intercept	-4.247**	(0.430)	-4.461**	(0.481)	-5.434**	(0.470)
N	1800					
Log-likelihood	-1520.714					
$\chi^2_{(21)}$	232.259					

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.6: Predicting Partisan Ambivalence in 1988

	Democratic		Republican		Both	
Party ID	0.089	(0.068)	0.079†	(0.044)	0.087	(0.065)
Ideology	-0.086	(0.070)	0.025	(0.042)	0.000	(0.065)
Issues						
crime	0.336†	(0.173)	0.022	(0.108)	0.124	(0.162)
contra	0.124	(0.151)	-0.036	(0.100)	-0.080	(0.143)
Sophistication						
Knowledge	0.364**	(0.100)	0.313**	(0.065)	0.538**	(0.092)
Education	0.276**	(0.077)	0.255**	(0.050)	0.470**	(0.073)
Interest	-0.316**	(0.106)	-0.203**	(0.065)	-0.052	(0.093)
Value conflict						
Egalitarianism	1.214*	(0.572)	0.423	(0.333)	0.450	(0.514)
Limited gov.	0.652*	(0.292)	0.197	(0.168)	0.196	(0.266)
Egalitarianism × Limited gov.	-0.282*	(0.122)	-0.105	(0.072)	-0.084	(0.109)
Intercept	-7.810**	(1.487)	-3.796**	(0.829)	-6.912**	(1.336)
N	1319					
Log-likelihood	-1094.78					
$\chi^2_{(51)}$	266.36					
Pseudo R^2	0.109					

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.7: Predicting Partisan Ambivalence in 1992

	Democratic		Republican		Both	
Party ID	-0.126†	(0.066)	0.170*	(0.068)	0.152*	(0.073)
Ideology	0.075	(0.089)	0.233*	(0.098)	0.073	(0.103)
Issues						
continuewar	0.226	(0.212)	-0.021	(0.214)	0.128	(0.223)
economy	-0.105	(0.138)	-0.372**	(0.129)	-0.401**	(0.140)
Sophistication						
Knowledge	0.282**	(0.063)	0.227**	(0.066)	0.370**	(0.074)
Education	0.124†	(0.068)	0.217**	(0.070)	0.402**	(0.075)
Interest	-0.064	(0.083)	-0.138	(0.088)	-0.145	(0.092)
Value conflict						
Egalitarianism	-0.322	(0.366)	-0.514	(0.354)	-1.132**	(0.380)
limited	-1.600*	(0.808)	-1.190	(0.842)	-1.800*	(0.829)
Moral trad.	0.160	(0.319)	-0.281	(0.364)	-0.692†	(0.361)
Egalitarianism × Limited gov.	0.586†	(0.308)	0.338	(0.304)	0.536†	(0.315)
Egalitarianism × Moral trad.	-0.073	(0.131)	0.087	(0.137)	0.187	(0.144)
Intercept	-2.753*	(1.208)	-2.553*	(1.291)	-1.382	(1.288)
N	1350					
Log-likelihood	-1092.627					
$\chi^2_{(51)}$	266.992					
Pseudo R^2	0.108					

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.8: Predicting Partisan Ambivalence in 1996

	Democratic		Republican		Both	
Party ID	0.086	(0.085)	0.010	(0.082)	0.022	(0.081)
Ideology	-0.220†	(0.127)	0.069	(0.129)	0.109	(0.126)
Issues						
domestic	0.363	(0.456)	0.913*	(0.462)	0.535	(0.451)
clinton_foreign	0.105	(0.126)	0.282*	(0.124)	0.136	(0.123)
Sophistication						
Knowledge	0.211†	(0.121)	0.199†	(0.120)	0.327*	(0.129)
Education	0.020	(0.084)	0.117	(0.081)	0.172*	(0.082)
Interest	-0.064	(0.187)	-0.138	(0.187)	-0.189	(0.184)
Value conflict						
Egalitarianism	0.692	(0.693)	-0.565	(0.727)	-1.093	(0.722)
Limited gov.	2.460†	(1.458)	-1.981	(1.398)	-0.127	(1.367)
Moral trad.	-0.634	(0.535)	0.361	(0.517)	-1.301*	(0.535)
Egalitarianism × Limited gov.	-0.558	(0.402)	0.618	(0.414)	0.083	(0.396)
Egalitarianism × Moral trad.	0.180	(0.151)	-0.015	(0.155)	0.381*	(0.160)
Intercept	-6.282*	(2.659)	-4.320	(2.627)	-1.833	(2.596)
N	1164					
Log-likelihood	−779.283					
$\chi^2_{(51)}$	98.542					
Pseudo R^2	0.060					

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 3.9: Predicting Partisan Ambivalence in 2000

	Democratic		Republican		Both	
Party ID	-0.228**	(0.064)	-0.020	(0.066)	-0.063	(0.068)
Ideology	0.051	(0.070)	0.144†	(0.078)	0.117	(0.081)
Surplus	-0.003	(0.100)	0.235*	(0.095)	0.141	(0.102)
Foreign affairs	-0.060	(0.102)	0.178†	(0.101)	0.020	(.109)
Sophistication						
Education	0.225**	(0.069)	0.173*	(0.072)	0.392**	(0.078)
Political knowledge	0.251**	(0.063)	0.329**	(0.067)	0.329**	(0.069)
Interest	-0.037	(0.072)	0.139†	(0.077)	0.013	(0.080)
Need for cognition	0.113	(0.294)	0.001	(0.308)	0.720*	(0.337)
Need to evaluate	0.441**	(0.122)	0.385**	(0.126)	0.233†	(0.133)
Value conflict						
Moral trad.	-0.871	(1.417)	-1.831	(1.408)	-3.021*	(1.524)
Limited gov.	1.647†	(0.849)	0.127	(0.827)	0.219	(0.913)
Egalitarianism	-0.734	(1.295)	-3.593*	(1.522)	-3.462*	(1.478)
Egalitarianism× Moral trad.	2.672	(2.003)	4.586*	(2.210)	6.166**	(2.257)
Egalitarianism× Limited gov.	-1.634	(1.259	0.042	(1.297)	-0.317	(1.367)
Discussion network						
# Gore supporters	0.153	(0.120)	0.291*	(0.135)	0.000	(0.145)
# Bush supporters	0.349**	(0.105)	0.181†	(0.107)	0.043	(0.122)
# Gore supporters× #Bush supporters	-0.178	(0.116)	-0.044	(0.117)	0.274*	(0.119)
Intercept	-4.555**	(1.068)	-4.769**	(1.141)	-4.648**	(1.191)
N	1225					
Log-likelihood	-1139.8					
$\chi^2_{(51)}$	366.965					
Pseudo R^2	0.139					
Significance levels :	† : 10%	* : 5%	** : 1%			

Chapter 4

Partisan Ambivalence and Voting Behavior

Imagine a typical Democrat in the fall of 1980. It is once again time for him to consider politics. Will he rely, as he often has, on his partisanship to make sense of the political landscape? Recently, the country has suffered through the embarrassment of the Iran hostage crisis while experiencing both high inflation and unemployment. Such a voter might now be ambivalent toward his preferred party and consider sitting this election out, or possibly defecting to vote for the Republicans.

Now, consider a Democrat in 2004. Her party lost a close election four years ago, only to acquiesce to Republicans on several major issues as though a mandate for such policies existed. She too might be unhappy with her party. However, in a time of political polarization sitting this election out or defecting seems unimaginable. Her conflicted thoughts result from an understanding of the polarized parties and she might now be more likely to vote Democratic.

An individual experiencing ambivalence toward his preferred party may be influenced in different ways in different eras. When both parties are perceived as relatively similar, individuals may be more likely to vote based on competence and advantages

on valence issues. On the other hand, if one recognizes the large difference between the two parties, one is aware that the alternative is considerably further from his own preferred position than his party is. I argue that the increasing importance of partisanship on vote choice hides, for many voters, mixed feelings about the current political climate.

Examining trends from 1980 to 2004, limited evidence is provided that while ambivalence once predicted abstention, in 2004 it predicts the opposite. Although polarization may make differences between the two parties clearer, to some voters, this is not necessarily entirely good news. However, for the most part, partisan ambivalence toward a specific party does not predict either abstention or defection. In fact, it is only in 1980 and 2004 that ambivalence is related to voting, and only for Democrats.

4.1 Congressional Polarization

Recently, scholars began to question the consensus existing around the notion of the declining importance of parties to the mass electorate (e.g., Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1979; Wattenberg 1998; Niemi and Weisberg 1976). The impact of partisanship on voting has increased since its nadir in the 1980s (Bartels 2000); a phenomenon that has been attributed to elite polarization and clarity in the parties' messages (Hetherington 2001). As the two parties polarized, an increasing number of survey respondents began offering "one sided" opinions about the two parties. However, such a coding scheme ignores information. An individual who offers four likes and three dislikes would be classified the same as someone who offers five likes and no dislikes. This is precisely what measures of ambivalence try to capture. While individuals are now better able to see important differences between the two parties, many might view this as a mixed blessing. And though it is normatively desirable for voters to be

able to hold parties responsible (Ranney 1954), in a polarized environment, voters are forced to decide between extremes. This is particularly troubling to those voters who are not polarizing with elites (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).

Though split-ticket voting is on the decline (Hetherington 2001), and the impact of party identification on vote choice is on the rise (Bartels 2000), there might also be an increase in negative feelings as well if the parties have polarized too much. Even assuming no change in the opinions of voters, polarization can make it appear as though they are stronger partisans (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005). It has been argued that as elite polarization increases past a "tipping point" it should lead to an increase in ambivalence for many (Johnston et al. 2008). The trend is shown in Figure 4.1: as polarization increases, ambivalence seems to as well, once polarization increases enough. Individuals may be more apt to choose one side over the other, but that does mean they are entirely thrilled with their choice.



Figure 4.1: Congressional polarization and the percent of individuals classified as ambivalent toward one or both parties.

The non-linearity of this relationship is shown by plotting house polarization

against the percent of individuals who are ambivalent in Figure 4.2, the line is a loess curve (Cleveland 1979). As can be seen, initially elite polarization seems to have a slight negative impact on the percent of individuals who are offering conflicted thoughts on the parties. However, this quickly reverses itself and as the parties continue to polarize, the percentage of individuals experiencing partisan ambivalence increases. It is therefore quite possible the impact of partisan ambivalence on vote choice is conditional on the positions of the two parties relative to one another. If they are viewed as relatively similar, perhaps abstention and defection are seen as viable options. However, in an era where the choices are clear, ambivalent voters may be forced to choose the closest alternative.



Figure 4.2: House polarization and partisan ambivalence.

4.2 Polarization and Ambivalence

Is an ambivalent voter's final choice altered, or does it simply take him longer to make the decision he was likely to make anyway? Defection, abstention, or voting for

a third party candidate all seem like reasonable options for an ambivalent voter. For example, if an individual has negative feelings because of an issue position, perhaps the other party better represents him on this issue; if the issue is salient enough perhaps the individual might cross party lines. Similar logic would apply for voting for a third party: this option, long viewed as unrealistic to the voter, might now seem viable because neither major party represents his views, or he is tired of politics as usual. What if neither party represents the voter and there is no viable third party? In this case, one would expect the voter to be more likely to abstain.

While these three outcomes seem fairly intuitive, there is a fourth that is less so. I argue if the two parties are polarized enough, an ambivalent individual prefers his party over the other so much that he will turn out to vote. If ambivalence is related to political knowledge and interest (Rudolph and Popp 2007), it follows that an ambivalent individual is aware of his own views as well as the positions of both parties. He would know that although his preferred party is more extreme than he would like, it is considerably better than the alternative. To show why this is the case, first ignoring the importance of partisanship on issues and perceptions, I start with a simple, standard model of voter utility (e.g., Enelow and Hinich 1984). Each voter, i, can be represented by a single point θ_i which can be characterized as a summation of his issue positions:

$$\theta_i = \sum_{k=1}^{n} \text{Issue}_{ik}, \tag{4.1}$$

and receives utility U_{ij} for party j, represented by ϕ_j $\left(\phi_j = \sum_{k=1}^{n} \text{Issue}_{jk}\right)$:

$$U_{ij} = -\left(\theta_i - \phi_j\right)^2.$$

Therefore in a two party system, $j \in \{A, B\}$, voter i votes for party A if $U_{iA} > U_{iB}$.[1]

How might polarization influence ambivalence and voting behavior? First, imagine parties A and B where $|A - m|=|B - m|$, in which m represents the median voter, as seen in the top potion of Figure 4.3. In this case, for individual i, $U_{iA} < U_{iB}$. If parties A and B polarize in the same manner: $|A' - m| = |B' - m|$ and $|A - m| < |A' - m|$, the difference between U_{iA} and U_{iB} will necessarily increase, as seen in the bottom portion of Figure 4.3. While it remains the case that $U_{iA} < U_{iB}$, it is also true that $|U_{iA} - U_{iB}| < |U_{iA'} - U_{iB'}|$; although individual i is less pleased with his preferred party than he used to be, it is now relatively an even better choice. When both parties move from the center at the same time, partisanship's influence on voting decision increases even if individuals are now less pleased with their party than they once were. Meaning, the party differential (the distance between the two parties) should influence the behavior of the electorate, as predicted and demonstrated by Fiorina (1976).



Figure 4.3: Before and after elite polarization.

The above argument could be strengthened without adding much complexity. Most theories of opinion change suggest a topdown process (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989, Zaller 1992): as elites polarize, their own party identification sends a clearer signal to the electorate, perhaps even causing individuals to alter their own issue positions.[2] There is considerable evidence that partisanship can influence one's percep-

[1] Evidence suggests a single dimension is adequate for capturing preferences for voters (Bafumi and Herron 2007).

[2] "Classic" views of partisanship (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960) are consistent with

tion of presidential performance (Bafumi 2004), the economy (Parker-Stephen 2007) and issue positions (Layman and Carsey 2002*a*; Carsey and Layman 2006); this last relationship holds even when accounting for the non-recipricol relationship between issues and partisanship (Jacoby 1988). Perceptions track together by party identification but never converge, as implied by updating models (Bartels 2002). Furthermore, movement seems to be largest among those who are most aware of the parties' positions, but only for issues not held strongly (Carsey and Layman 2006); this finding suggests those paying closet attention are most likely to be aware that for at least some issues their party is now more polarized than they are.

If one's issue positions are determined at least somewhat by factors other than their partisanship, individuals will not polarize as quickly or as far as the parties. As before, if we assume parties are equidistant from the center and polarize at the same rate then $|U_{iA} - U_{iB}| < |U_{iA'} - U_{iB'}|$. The difference between the two parties relative to individual i are now even greater after polarization, making the choice even clearer—even if individual i would prefer for his party to be closer. Such a story is depicted in Figure 4.4, where i' represents individuals i's position after polarization. The alternative is now even farther from i than before. He is forced to choose between one of two extremes, and the alternative is even more so than if his position had remained constant.



Figure 4.4: Before and after elite polarization, with individuals moving with parties.

such a story. The notion is, however, at odds with revisionist models of partisanship (Franklin and Jackson 1983; Fiorina 1981) and Bayesian updating models (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Achen 1992).

4.3 Research Design

In order to see when and if ambivalence influences vote choice, including abstention, a model of vote choice as a function of partisan ambivalence and control variables is modeled using multinomial regression. I run the same model and present detailed results of the 1980 and 2004 elections, which allows examination of how polarization impacts the influence of ambivalence. Additional evidence from all elections from 1980 to 2004 is provided. I use similar measures and coding as in Chapter 3. I replace the specific issue variables with a scale of all 7 point domestic issue questions in each year.[3] Additionally, I include perceptions of the economy and personal finances. I also include demographic controls, including: gender, race, age, income, and interest.

4.3.1 Modeling Vote Choice

In order to examine the influence of ambivalence on voter behavior, I model vote choice as a function of partisan ambivalence and control variables. I make use of multinomial regression to account for abstention, as suggested by Lacy and Burden (1999), as it seems a likely consequence of ambivalence.[4] Such a specification makes it possible to see how ambivalence influences the decision to turn out and the choice between the two parties.

As suggested by the theory presented above, so long as an individual is not terribly concerned with which party is in power, defection or abstention is seen as an

[3] In each year a factor analysis suggested one dimension explained the variance, and Cronbach's α were all above 0.60.

[4] The analysis presented below is a multinomial logit. Although it has been suggested multinomial logit is undesirable for models of vote choice because the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives is restrictive (Alvarez and Nagler 1995), others have argued that the primary advantage of multinomial probit—that the choices need not be independent across alternatives—is outweighed by its own problem, namely weak identification; and, that the problem of IIA is not often violated in practice (Dow and Endersby 2004). In both years, both Hausman (Hausman and McFadden 1984) and Small–Hsiao (Small 1985) tests suggest the assumption of IIA is not violated.

option. As polarization increases ambivalent individuals will be more likely to vote for their preferred party. Therefore, for a Democrat, the choice between abstention and Republicans in 1980, one should expect a negative coefficient for the variable Republican ambivalence. However, if the choices are polarized, ambivalence will predict voting for one's preferred party.

Hypothesis 4a: In periods of elite moderation, ambivalence should predict abstention or defection.

Hypothesis 4b: As elites polarize, ambivalent partisans should be more likely to vote for their preferred party.

For example, in 1980 the expectation is $\beta_{k,\,\text{abstain}|m}$ should be negative, when k and m both represent the same party; in the above example k represents Republican ambivalence and m represents voting for the Republican candidate.[5] In 2004, we would expect $\beta_{k,\,\text{abstain}|m}$ to be positive when m and k represent the same party. For example, an individual experiencing Democratic ambivalence is more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate.

4.4 Empirical Results

The results of the multinomial regression are in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, one for each year of the analysis. The columns in both tables represent voting for the Democratic and the Republican candidates, the base category is abstention. The entries are coefficients showing the impact the variable has on leaving the base category, with standard errors in parentheses.

[5] $\beta_{k,\,\text{abstain}|m}$ represents the impact variable k has on entering category m from the base category, abstention; m represents the two choices other than the base category, either the Republican candidate or the Democratic candidate.

The control variables behave as expected. Partisanship predicts voting (although not for Reagan in 1980). Interest in politics is positively related to voting, although awareness and sophistication are not. As one believes the economy is improving, one is more likely to vote for the incumbent. Similarly, issues also predict voting as one expects: for example, positive thoughts about the Iraq war are associated with not voting for Kerry.

There is some support for the hypotheses laid out above. In 1980 partisan ambivalence, generally speaking, predicts abstention. The coefficients for all three of dummy variables are statistically significant from zero with a negative sign. Individuals who are experiencing mixed feelings about either or both parties are dropping out of the process, evidence that dovetails well with what was originally termed "cross-pressure" and its impact on abstention (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954). Voters who are not happy with one party or the other are deciding to forego voting, but not in the exact way the theory suggests. It is not only the case, for example, that Democratic ambivalence predicts defection or abstention away from the Democratic candidate, it has a similar effect on voting for Reagan. As presented in Table 4.1, the coefficients represent the impact on abstaining or voting for the party, $\beta_{k,\text{abstain|Dem.}}$ for column 1 and $\beta_{k,\text{abstain|Rep.}}$ for column 2. What is the impact on choosing between the two parties, $\beta_{k,\text{Dem|Rep.}}$? After altering the base category to one of the two candidates, the variables have no influences in 1980: in all cases the coefficients for the variables representing partisan ambivalence are not statistically significant from zero between the two parties. In 1980, ambivalence influences the choice to turn out, not the choice between candidates.

A different pattern emerges in 2004. In this case none of the measures of partisan ambivalence influence the choice between abstention and either candidates. The theory predicted individuals would be less likely to abstain if they were ambivalent, because it is only those individuals paying attention who are ambivalent, and it is

Table 4.1: Vote choice in 1980

Variable	Carter		Reagan	
Party ID	-0.606**	(0.166)	0.211	(0.162)
Ideology	0.233	(0.245)	0.438†	(0.245)
Issues				
Issue attitudes	-0.597†	(0.327)	-0.066	(0.333)
Personal finances perception	0.018	(0.151	0.189	(0.150)
National economy perception	0.036	(0.450)	-1.059*	(0.489)
Sophistication				
Political knowledge	0.332	(0.267)	0.440†	(0.264)
Education	0.000	(0.067)	-0.005	(0.070)
Interest	0.772†	(0.412)	0.859*	(0.410)
Partisan Ambivalence				
Republican	-0.718	(0.884)	-0.957	(0.886)
Democratic	-1.477*	(0.732)	-1.502*	(0.737)
Both	-1.701*	(0.808)	-1.326†	(0.785)
Intercept	3.646†	(2.066)	-1.212	(2.127)
N	517			
Log-likelihood	-248.611			
$\chi^2_{(22)}$	339.622			
Pseudo R^2	0.4058			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

these same individuals who are likely to recognize the large difference between the two parties. It was also predicted that ambivalence would influence the choice between candidates, as those who recognized the polarized environment would choose the side closest. Switching the base category, to see if ambivalence is influencing turn out or vote choice, shows that Democratic ambivalence is a significant predictor of the choice between parties, not between voting or staying home. The coefficient for $\beta_{\text{Dem. Ambiv, Kerry|Bush}}$ is 1.727 with a standard error of 0.552.

The findings offer support for the claim that polarizing parties are forcing individuals to choose between two extremes. In 1980, ambivalence is associated with not voting; while in 2004, those ambivalent about the Democratic are more likely to vote Democratic. In order to make sure these findings generalize beyond the years examined above, the analysis was also performed on all presidential elections from 1976 to 2004.[6] Until 2004, partisan ambivalence has little influence on vote choice, or predicts defection. In Figure 4.5, the coefficient for the variable Democratic ambivalence is plotted with 95% confidence intervals, when the variable has a negative coefficient, those experiencing Democratic ambivalence chose vote for the Democratic candidate.

The figure is evidence that, at least for those experiencing Democratic ambivalence, the position of elites affects the influence of partisan ambivalence on vote choice. When an individual is unhappy with his options, he will vote for the closest in a polarized environment. We would especially expect this from supporters of the party not in power: policy output is extreme and contrary to their preferences. When examining Republican ambivalence over time, the variable has no impact on vote choice. It is possible Republicans are more resistant to internal disagreements. But, any such conclusion would be speculation.

The findings for the theory are mixed. While the theory seems to explain the

[6]Only variables common to each year were included. There are: partisanship, ideology, personal finances, awareness, education, interest, and measures of partisan ambivalence.

Table 4.2: Vote choice in 2004

Variable	Kerry		Bush	
Party ID	-0.530**	(0.130)	0.632**	(0.122)
Ideology	-0.039	(0.169)	0.159	(0.164)
Issues				
Issue attitudes	-1.054**	(0.271)	-0.320	(0.238)
Personal finance perceptions	-0.005	(0.149)	-0.252	(0.155)
National economy perceptions	0.732**	(0.205)	-0.310	(0.192)
Sophistication				
Political knowledge	0.507**	(0.150)	0.432**	(0.143)
Education	0.256†	(0.151)	3.826	(4.885)
Interest	-0.561**	(0.151)	-0.519**	(0.145)
Values				
Egalitarianism	0.406	(4.961)	3.826	(4.885)
Limited government	1.510	(2.304)	0.745	(2.003)
Moral traditionalism	-5.499	(4.987)	2.721	(4.427)
Egalitarianism× limited government	-2.689	(3.930)	-0.613	(3.502)
Egalitarianism× moral traditionalism	6.620	(8.460)	-1.639	(7.761)
Partisan Ambivalence				
Republican	0.927	(0.860)	0.339	(0.848)
Democratic	1.038	(0.679)	-0.690	(0.654)
Both	-1.657	(1.199)	-0.926	(1.148)
Intercept	3.897	(3.189)	-2.288	(3.091)
N	724			
Log-likelihood	-255.383			
$\chi^2_{(32)}$	804.807			
Pseudo R^2	0.6118			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%



Figure 4.5: The impact of Democratic ambivalence on vote choice. The plotted points represent the coefficient from a model of vote choice with 95% confidence intervals. Negative values indicate an increase in the likelihood of voting for the Democratic candidate.



Figure 4.6: The impact of Republican ambivalence on vote choice. The plotted points represent the coefficient from a model of vote choice with 95% confidence intervals. Negative values indicate an increase in the likelihood of voting for the Republican candidate.

behavior of those individuals experiencing ambivalence toward the Democratic party, it does not do so for those experiencing it toward Republicans. Interestingly, in the years examined, ambivalence only influences vote choice in 1980 and 2004. This could be consistent with those suggesting much the time examined was in an era of "dealignment." While not direct evidence of the theory, it is indirect in the sense that the theory suggests the influence of ambivalence on vote choice is conditional on elites; if elites are not views as particularly partisan, partisanship, and by extension partisan ambivalence, will not exert much influence on vote choice.

4.5 Conclusion

The analysis set out to see how and when partisan ambivalence might have an impact on one's vote choice. Specifically, it was posited that in times of polarization, ambivalent individuals will actually be *more* likely to vote for their preferred party. When the two parties are both moderate, ambivalent individuals will be more likely to defect or simply abstain; if the other side is viewed as relatively similar, there is no harm in sitting an election out, or even helping that party to power. Polarized parties force voters to choose between two extremes.

Evidence was somewhat supportive of the theory. In 1980, when the two parties were relatively close to one another, partisan ambivalence predicted abstention—the decision was between turning out or staying home. In 2004, however, those experiencing Democratic ambivalence were more likely to vote for the Democratic party. Moreover, in 2004 partisan ambivalence is unrelated to the decision to turn out. The influence of ambivalence on vote choice is dependent on the political climate. The results offer support for a period of realignment in the 1980s, with partisanship strengthening in the 1990s.

Another implication of the above findings is that strong signals to voters are not necessarily only good news, so long as they result mostly from polarization. While voters are able to understand the differences between the two parties, this is of little use to voters who prefer more centrist policies, for which there is considerable evidence that many do (e.g., Stimson 2004). Individuals are now no longer able to vote for policies they want, only for their side. While the results might be seem reasonable for those whose party is in power, those on the other side are likely to have have negative view of the political system, as manifested by the increasing number of ambivalent individuals. That partisan ambivalence was once associated with abstention, but now predicts voting for one's party suggests polarization might lead to an artificial inflation of the relationship between voting and partisanship. Particularly, among those who

are not as quick to follow elites. Individuals who are aware of the changing landscape of American politics but who are not moving fully in step with elites must make a choice; and, although they are more inclined to vote with their party than before, masked behind such an inclination may be conflicted thoughts and mixed feelings.

Perhaps the most intriguing finding is that for the most part ambivalence toward the two parties rarely influences one's decision. Only in 1980 and 2004, and only for Democrats, does ambivalence affect one's choices. This suggests a few avenues for further analysis. Perhaps it is those experiencing *choice* ambivalence who are more likely to defect. Ambivalence toward one's preferred party may not be enough to alter vote choice, but perhaps conflicted thoughts about the choice is. Additionally, maybe the strength of partisanship is enough to overcome defection, but not so strong that it ambivalence might cause one to take longer to make up his mind. And finally, perhaps the methodology used in the above analysis did not appropriately take into account the recursive relationship between ambivalence and vote choice. I address all of these concerns in the following chapter.

Appendix to Chapter 4

Interaction Between Partisanship and Partisan Ambivalence

Is there an interaction between partisanship and ambivalence? Are stronger partisans more or less affected by ambivalence? It has been established that even if the coefficient is not statistically significant there could be an interaction in non-linear models along some portion of the variable (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006) or for some observations (Ai and Norton 2003). The magnitude of interaction effect depends on all the other included variables and therefore when looking for the presence of an interaction effect it one should look the t-statistic for each observation as well as impact of the interaction for each observation to see patterns. In Figure 4.7, I plot the t-statistic for each observation against the predicted probability for PID×Republican Ambivalence and PID×Democratic Ambivalence in 1980 and 2004. The results suggest that there is no consistent interactive effect between ambivalence and partisan identification.



Figure 4.7: Examining for interaction effects between Party ID and Ambivalence.

Model Results: 1984–2000

Table 4.3: Vote choice in 1984

Variable	Mondale		Reagan	
Party ID	-0.613**	(0.069)	0.246**	(0.050)
Ideology	-0.087	(0.055)	0.078	(0.050)
Issues				
Issue attitudes	-0.484*	(0.191)	0.306†	(0.170)
Personal financial perception	0.078	(0.063)	-0.013	(0.058)
National economic perception	0.216**	(0.072)	-0.158*	(0.068)
Sophistication				
Political knowledge	0.359**	(0.066)	0.286**	(0.057)
Education	0.269**	(0.078)	0.271**	(0.070)
Interest	0.735**	(0.160)	0.426**	(0.142)
Value conflict				
Egalitarianism	0.552	(0.417)	0.195	(0.409)
Limited government	0.483	(0.334)	0.414	(0.286)
Egalitarianism ×limited government	-0.098	(0.112)	-0.067	(0.099)
Ambivalence				
Democratic	0.084	(0.281)	0.300	(0.246)
Republican	-0.215	(0.288)	-0.108	(0.253)
Intercept	-2.868*	(1.338)	-5.334**	(1.264)
N	1203			
Log-likelihood	-770.496			
$\chi^2_{(22)}$	955.871			
Pseudo R^2	0.406			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 4.4: Vote choice in 1988

Variable	Dukakis		Bush	
Party ID	-0.471**	(0.050)	0.368**	(0.046)
Ideology	0.001	(0.036)	0.163**	(0.040)
Issues				
Issue attitudes	-0.239*	(0.117)	0.409**	(0.125)
Personal financial	0.134†	(0.075)	0.016	(0.080)
National economic perceptions	0.025	(0.059)	-0.036	(0.062)
Sophistication				
Political knowledge	0.423**	(0.075)	0.454**	(0.076)
Education	0.249**	(0.059)	0.280**	(0.059)
Interest	-0.493**	(0.064)	-0.417**	(0.066)
Value conflict				
Egalitarianism	0.498	(0.312)	0.975*	(0.381)
Limited government	0.454**	(0.170)	0.386†	(0.204)
Egalitarianism × limited government	-0.173*	(0.074)	-0.160†	(0.082)
Ambivalence				
Democratic	0.140	(0.312)	0.300	(0.300)
Republican	0.259	(0.230)	0.092	(0.225)
Intercept	-0.091	(0.747)	-6.290**	(1.001)
N	1440			
Log-likelihood	-1019.477			
$\chi^2_{(22)}$	1017.579			
Pseudo R^2	0.352			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 4.5: Vote choice in 1992

Variable	Clinton		Bush	
Party ID	-0.570**	(0.092)	0.408**	(0.101)
Ideology	-0.008	(0.122)	0.530**	(0.143)
Issues				
Issue attitudes	0.099	(0.186)	0.287	(0.208)
Personal fiances	0.134	(0.141)	-0.210	(0.155)
National economic perceptions	0.108	(0.185)	-0.415*	(0.195)
Sophistication				
Political knowledge	0.095	(0.084)	0.003	(0.095)
Education	0.234*	(0.108)	0.495**	(0.118)
Interest	-0.517**	(0.107)	-0.440**	(0.120)
Value conflict				
Egalitarianism	-0.691†	(0.420)	-0.215	(0.408)
Limited government	-1.559	(1.363)	-2.496†	(1.464)
Egalitarianism ×limited government	0.626	(0.508)	0.814	(0.530)
Ambivalence				
Democratic	0.856*	(0.434)	0.776†	(0.465)
Republican	0.163	(0.444)	0.432	(0.452)
Intercept	3.251*	(1.647)	-1.820	(1.731)
N	782			
Log-likelihood	-349.996			
$\chi^2_{(22)}$	751.023			
Pseudo R^2	0.518			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 4.6: Vote choice in 1996

Variable	Clinton		Dole	
Party ID	-0.443**	(0.121)	0.452**	(0.134)
Ideology	-0.137	(0.177)	0.325	(0.203)
Issues				
Issue attitudes	0.081	(0.306)	0.904**	(0.348)
Personal financial perceptions	-0.075	(0.214)	-0.027	(0.239)
National economy perceptions	-0.656**	(0.230)	0.656**	(0.253)
Sophistication				
Political knowledge	0.252†	(0.138)	0.213	(0.160)
Education	0.362**	(0.138)	0.505**	(0.154)
Interest	-1.150**	(0.318)	-0.991**	(0.346)
Value conflict				
Limited government	-6.502**	(2.436)	-0.261	(2.514)
Moral traditionalism	0.744	(1.055)	0.387	(1.060)
Egalitarianism	-1.950	(1.400)	0.062	(1.500)
Egalitarianism ×limited government	1.762*	(0.719	0.098	(0.759))
Egalitarianism ×moral traditionalism	-0.156	(0.314)	-0.073	(0.332)
Ambivalence				
Democratic	0.091	(0.534)	0.377	(0.564)
Republican	-0.573	(0.538)	-0.386	(0.574)
Intercept	12.054*	(5.303)	-8.874	(5.596)
N	502			
Log-likelihood	-214.508			
$\chi^2_{(22)}$	498.245			
Pseudo R^2	0.537			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Chapter 5

Ambivalence, Indifference, and Presidential Elections

What if an individual has conflicted thoughts not about just a party, but about the choice between the two parties? Extending the previous chapter's analysis, I seek to see if comparative ambivalence alters ones' choice. Furthermore, I examine the possibility that an ambivalent individual may be inclined to consider more information, and therefore take a longer time to decide. Using methods appropriate for the recursive relationship between ambivalence, timing of vote decision, and defection it is shown that while ambivalence between the choice of parties predicts individuals will delay their decision, it does not predict defection. Instead, it is indifferent individuals who are more likely to defect. The finding that ambivalence plays little role in presidential vote choice appears to be robust to different measurement of the concept and to different model specifications

5.1 Partisanship, Ambivalence, and Voting

Why might ambivalent voters delay their vote? The process of deciding to turn out and for whom is dynamic (Hillygus and Jackman 2003; Hillygus 2005). While it is

well documented that those who decide early are more interested in the campaigns (Chaffee and Choe 1980; Chaffee and Rimal 1996; Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous 1994), it is also known that one's openness to campaign messages is influenced by if one has already decided for whom to vote (Fournier et al. 2004)—Chapter 3 as well as does other research (Rudolph and Popp 2007) suggests ambivalent individuals are more receptive. While Nir (2005) shows cross-pressure is not associated with abstaining, it has been established that candidate ambivalence can have an impact on timing of vote decision, (Lavine 2001; Nir 2005; Nir and Druckman 2008). Certainly, if there is an issue which a person disagrees with his party, he will be more inclined to defect (Hillygus and Shields 2008). But, neither implies an individual with a more general state of attitudinal conflict such as partisan ambivalence will take longer to deliberate or, perhaps, defect.

To begin, imagine an individual who does not suffer from attitudinal conflict but is at least somewhat interested in the campaign: his attitudes align with his partisanship and we should thus expect him to have little trouble making up his mind and he should therfore make a decision relatively early on in the process. An indifferent individual will not tune into the process until later. Consequently, we should expect him to decide later. Indifferent individuals tend to not be very interested in the campaign and are less likely to identify with one of the two parties. As shown in Figure 5.1, indifferent individuals are considerably less likely to identify with one of the parties, espcially strongly identify.

Ambivalent respondents, in contrast, do tend identify with the parties, though not as strongly as those who are strictly one-sided in their thinking. They certainly are not uninterested. In fact, they are slightly less likely to report being uninterested than those classified as one-sided (see Figure 5.2). Unlike the one-sided individual, however, the ambivalent individual might be more willing to listen to the other side and to consider new information during the duration of the campaign. If this is the case, we

Figure 5.1: Attitudinal states and intensity of partisan identifcation.

should expect ambivalent individuals to take a longer time to decide. However, if the view that "for most people the tie between party identification and voting behavior involves subtle processes of perceptual adjustment by which the individual assembles an image of current politics consistent with his partisan allegiance" (Stokes 1962:691) is correct, ambivalent individuals should not consistently defect from their preferred party. Instead, we should expect that while the decision is delayed, the strength of one's partisanship should overcome a general state of attitudinal conflict. Such a conclusion is not inevitable, as "one may vote for a Republican candidate and yet feel part of a Democratic team" (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002:8).



Figure 5.2: Attitudinal states and interest in the campaign.

Two specific hypotheses can be derived from the above discussion. First, be-

cause ambivalent individuals are interested in the campaign but more open to new information, we should expect them to delay their vote choice.

Hypothesis 5.1: *Partisan ambivalence should lead to a delay in one's vote decision.*

Second, the process of perceptual adjustment should lead these individuals to vote for their preferred party. However, indifferent individuals, while also deciding late, should be more likely to defect as they are less tied to either party or the political system.

Hypothesis 5.2: *Indifference, not ambivalence, should predict partisan defection.*

5.2 Research Design

One problem with the findings from Chapter 4 is that perhaps the methods did not adequately account for the relationship between vote choice and ambivalence. Below, I utilize a method that does so. I examine the role ambivalence plays when an individual makes his final decision. Following this, I examine if comparative ambivalence predicts defection.

5.2.1 Measures

There are four primary variables of interest in this portion of the analysis. First, *partisan ambivalence* is measured using the measure of comparative ambivalence discussed in Chapter 2. When examining the role ambivalence can have on voting behavior, a measure of choice ambivalence may be appropriate. It is dichotomized so scores greater than zero are categorized as ambivalent. Those who offer no likes or dislikes about the parties are deemed *indifferent.* Third, one's *timing of vote decision* is coded so that those who knew all along are coded as one, those who decided from during

the primaries to the time of the convention are coded two, and those who decided after the conventions are coded as three. This splits the proportion of individuals into roughly thirds.[1] Past research suggests hat voters can recall and report reliable estimates of their times of decision (Fournier et al. 2001).

I include as control variables: demographic variables; *interest* in the campaign; *intensity* of party identification; how much the individual *cares about the election*; a *need for cognition*; as well as measures of *value conflict* between egalitarianism and moral traditionalism, and egalitarianism and limited government; and in 2000 a measure of *network heterogeneity.* The coding is the same as the previous chapters. As the expectations for these variables have been well documented previously, I avoid a discussion here.

5.2.2 Modeling Ambivalence and Timing of Vote Decision

Ambivalence and timing of vote decision could be modeled as a recursive system of equations:

$$y_{1i}^* = \mathbf{x}_{1i}'\boldsymbol{\beta}_1 + \epsilon_{1i} \tag{5.1}$$

$$y_{2i}^* = \mathbf{x}_{2i}'\boldsymbol{\beta}_2 + \gamma y_{1i} + \epsilon_{2i}, \tag{5.2}$$

where y_{1i}^* is the latent tendency to be ambivalent, y_{2i}^* is the latent tendency guiding the time of vote decision, $\mathbf{x}_{1i}'\boldsymbol{\beta}_1$ and $\mathbf{x}_{2i}'\boldsymbol{\beta}_2$ are a set of explanatory variables and coefficients for individual i, and γ is the influence of y_1 on y_2^*. The question of interest is what is the influence of y_1 on y_2, while taking into account the recursive relationship between the two variables. This would be considered a "semi-ordered" bivariate probit—in this case bivariate refers to the fact that there are two dependent variables—as only one of the two variables is ordered, the other is simply dichotomous

[1] This is the case for 2004, in each year, I split the respondents into thirds.

(Armstrong and McVicar 2000; McVicar and McKee 2002), which is an extension of the bivariate probit model, and a special case of the bivariate ordered probit model (Weiss 1993). The model treats the two equations as independent, except for modeling the underlying errors as jointly distributed (Greene and Hensher 2008:146) with a correlation parameter ρ. Because the system is identified, if ρ equals zero, one can estimate (5.2) alone.[2] A somewhat more formal discussion of the model is presented in the appendix.

If γ is greater than zero it would be an indication that individuals experiencing partisan ambivalence are more likely to make a decision later in the campaign. The results, for 1980 and 2004, are in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, with standard errors in parentheses.

The control variables behave, for the most part, as expected. For example, the intensity with which an individual holds his partisanship is associated with a reduction in the probability of being ambivalent and deciding early in the campaign. While the behavior of the variables is not identical in each year (or in other years, which are presented in the appendix), in no case are the results contrary to what one would expect. For example, while education plays no role in 1980, in 2004 it predicts ambivalence. The variables behave predictably and concord with previous findings and expectations.

Of interest to the research question at hand, in 2004 ambivalence predicts voting later in the campaign. It has no effect in 1980. Some support is found for hypothesis 1. To what extent to these findings generalize beyond 1980 and 2004? Figure 5.3 indicates that comparative ambivalence more consistently predicts delaying one's decision as compared to indifference; it has for the four most recent elections examined predicted voting later in the campaign. Although in all years, there is a bivariate

[2]In most years, a hypothesis that ρ equals zero is rejected, or nearly rejected. I use this model in all years for two reasons. First is for the sake of comparability. Second, I wish to demonstrate the relationship between vote choice and ambivalence is robust to model specification.

Table 5.1: Ambivalence and Timing of vote decision in 1980

	Ambivalence		Timing of vote decision	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			-0.578	(1.116)
Indifference			0.239†	(0.129)
Timing of vote control variables				
Issues	-0.061	(0.073)		
Gender	-0.009	(0.078)		
Minority	-0.027	(0.024)		
Age	-0.006*	(0.003)		
Income	-0.001	(0.007)		
Ambivalence control variables				
Government involvement	-0.018	(0.028)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.005	(0.007)	0.008	(0.007)
Interest	0.208**	(0.063)	-0.034	(0.078)
Political knowledge	0.219**	(0.033)	0.133**	(0.044)
Party ID intensity	-0.014	(0.044)	-0.092†	(0.047)
Care who wins	0.057	(0.088)	-0.429**	(0.107)
Intercept	0.686	(0.435)		
τ_1			-1.246**	(0.346)
τ_2			-0.302	(0.287)
N	569			
Log-likelihood	-1435.226			
$\chi^2_{(27)}$	173.088			

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Table 5.2: Ambivalence and Timing of vote decision in 2004

	Ambivalence		Timing of vote decision	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			0.601†	(0.356)
Indifference			0.255†	(0.136)
Timing of vote control variables				
Issues	-0.165**	(0.058)		
Gender	0.027	(0.089)		
Minority	0.107	(0.100)		
Age	-0.003	(0.003)		
Income	-0.009	(0.008)		
Ambivalence control variables				
Need for cognition	0.144*	(0.066)		
Opinionation	0.263	(0.232)		
Egalitarianism	-1.358	(0.868)		
Limited government	-0.280	(0.464)		
Moral traditionalism	-1.193	(0.823)		
Egalitarianism× limited government	0.884	(0.747)		
Egalitarianism× moral traditionalism	1.992	(1.335)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.079*	(0.031)	0.003	(0.032)
Interest	0.080	(0.076)	-0.273**	(0.073)
Political knowledge	0.114**	(0.031)	-0.023	(0.036)
Party ID intensity	-0.082†	(0.047)	-0.205**	(0.053)
Care who wins	-0.060	(0.149)	-0.585**	(0.188)
Intercept	-0.908†	(0.537)		
τ_1			-2.305**	(0.328)
τ_2			-1.269**	(0.313)
N	903			
Log-likelihood	-1308.784			
$\chi^2_{(24)}$	191.562			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

relationship between indifference and when one makes up one's mind, once controlling for other factors, the relationship is not statistically significant, save for 1980 and 1996.



Figure 5.3: Attitudinal states and time of decision.

There are a variety possible explanations for such a finding. One possibility is that an ambivalent individual may have a fundamental disagreement with his party. We would expect the individual to therefore have a difficult time making up his mind. Another possibility is that the individual is less reliant on his partisanship and therefore more systematically and thoroughly examines the available information, as suggested by Basinger and Lavine (2005). These are just two of many possible explanations. No matter the precise cause, which likely varies across individuals, evidence suggests ambivalent individuals take longer to make a decision.

5.2.3 Ambivalence and Defection

While it has been established that ambivalence is associated with individuals deciding later in the election cycle, it is still an open question as to whether or not ambivalence alters one's vote choice. In order to examine whether or not this is the case, vote is modeled as partisans defecting from their party (accordingly, independents are not considered in this portion of the anlaysis). In this case, vote choice is coded as 0 if a

partisan votes for his party, and 1 if the individual defects. Therefore, there are two dependent variables in a recursive system similar to equations (5.1) and (5.2), but in this case both are dichotomous. Thus, the model

$$\Pr(y_1 = 1,\ y_2 = 1) = \Phi_2(\mathbf{x}_1\boldsymbol{\beta}_1, \mathbf{x}_2\boldsymbol{\beta}_2, \rho)$$

is estimated using bivariate probit, where y_1 is ambivalence, y_2 is if the respondent defects, and $\Phi_2(\cdot, \cdot, \rho)$ is the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate standard normal distribution, with correlation parameter ρ. The results are in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, with standard errors in parentheses. Once again, the control variables behave as expected.

Ambivalence does not predict defection. In both years, indifference but not ambivalence is associated with partisans voting for the other party. Ultimately, this result is not terribly surprising. Individuals are not ambivalent due to a lack of interest. Indeed, the opposite is true: those variables associated with political sophistication have long been associated with ambivalence. So, while ambivalent individuals are aware that they may have some problems with their preferred party—or see virtues in the other—and therefore seek more information, in the end this conflict is not enough to overcome their partisanship. While specific instances of issue disagreement may alter one's vote choice (Hillygus and Shields 2008), a general state of attitudinal conflict does not. On the other hard, indifferent individuals are more likely to defect. These individuals tend not to identify as strongly with either party, generally have less political information, and are less likely to care who wins the election.[3] Therefore, it is unsurprising that they are more likely to defect as they are less interested in and know less about the political system.

The overall trend is presented in Figure 5.4. In every year besides 1980, indiffer-

[3]Evidence of indifferent individuals not caring who wins and having less information is presented in the appendix.

Table 5.3: Ambivalence and defection in 1980

	Ambivalence		Timing of vote decision	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			-0.414	(0.395)
Indifference			0.242	(0.180)
Timing of vote control variables				
Issues	-0.032	(0.107)		
Gender	-0.049	(0.141)		
Minorityaid	-0.069	(0.056)		
Age	0.004	(0.004)		
Income	0.014	(0.013)		
Ambivalence control variables				
govti	-0.031	(0.029)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.001	(0.008)	-0.029	(0.029)
Interest	0.222**	(0.068)	-0.013	(0.116)
Political knowledge	0.227**	(0.036	-0.012	(0.076)
Party ID intensity	-0.030	(0.048)	-0.120	(0.098)
Care who wins	0.042	(0.095)	-0.412**	(0.154)
Intercept	-1.570**	(0.220)	-0.006	(0.548)
N	569			
Log-likelihood	-767.947			
$\chi^2_{(20)}$	105.052			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 5.4: Ambivalence and defection in 2004

	Ambivalence		Defection	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			0.176	(0.339)
Indifference			0.591**	(0.162)
Defection control variables				
Interest			0.105*	(0.052)
Gender			0.279*	(0.135)
Minority			-0.068	(0.143)
Age			-0.005	(0.004)
Income			-0.017	(0.012)
Ambivalence control variables				
Need for cognition	0.180**	(0.065)		
Egalitarianism	-0.653	(0.827)		
Limited government	-0.046	(0.462)		
Moral traditionalism	-0.816	(0.839)		
Egalitarianism× limited government	0.532	(0.751)		
Egalitarianism× moral traditionalism	1.271	(1.345)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.072*	(0.031)	-0.054	(0.050)
Political knowledge	0.129**	(0.030)	-0.010	(0.042)
Party ID intensity	-0.079†	(0.046)	-0.362**	(0.088)
Care who wins	-0.011	(0.142)	0.097	(0.198)
Intercept	-1.124*	(0.521)	-0.590	(0.433)
N	703			
Log-likelihood	-810.884			
$\chi^2_{(21)}$	155.584			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

ence predicts defection. Conversely, only in 1992 does ambivalence predict defection. One's attachment to one of the two major parties is enough to overcome a state of attitudinal conflict. However, indifferent individuals, who are characterized by low levels of interest and attachment, are more likely to defect. Ironically, while these individuals are perhaps the easiest to persuade, they are the hardest to target. The evidence in the two figures offers support for the claim that partisanship, over the course of a campaign, may alter one's perception of events. More concretely, they are evidence that even if an individual has questions about his choice, these often are not enough to convince him to vote for the other side.



Figure 5.4: Attitudinal states and defection in vote choice.

5.3 Conclusion

While ambivalence is enough to give individuals pause, in the end it only delays the choice they likely would have made anyway. The findings therefore offer indirect support for the argument that one's vote choice is a function of a gradual adjustment of one's choice becoming aligned with one's party. More concretely, the findings provide support for the notion that partisanship is powerful enough to overcome mixed thoughts about the choice between parties. Ambivalent voters are, perhaps, more open to hearing multiple points of views and to considering more information, and consequently taking longer to decide. But, ultimately these individuals are not

any more likely to defect and vote for the other party. These findings coupled with those from Chapter 4 offer fairly compelling evidence that ambivalence does not have a consistent effect on vote choice in presidential elections, robust to measures of ambivalence and vote choice, and to different model specifications.

Indifference, on the other hand, is capable of altering one's choice. Indifference is an attitudinal state characterized by low levels of attachment and interest. As a consequence, these voters may be more likely to vote based on candidate characteristics, or based on the nature of the times. This fits in nicely with the evidence provided in Chapter 2 that indifference is a distinct attitudinal state. Not only is it different from ambivalence and one-sidedness, but it has consequences for political behavior.

Such findings are consistent with a growing body of research regarding ambivalence and political behavior. Specifically, it is known that ambivalent individuals are less reliant on partisanship (Basinger and Lavine 2005) and moderate candidate evaluations (Meffert, Guge and Lodge 2000). The finding is also consistent with research suggesting partisanship is a powerful psychological attachment capable of shaping and modifying attitudes (e.g., Bartels 2002; Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Perhaps not powerful enough to overcome disagreements over specific issues, (Hillygus and Shields 2008), but still enough to overcome a general state of conflict over the choice between parties. Furthermore, so long as the conflict is not great or specific enough, an individual's partisan identity should prevail, and while the voting decision is delayed, it is not altered. This and the previous chapter's findings offer clear evidence that ambivalence, like its forerunner cross-pressure, does not alter one's vote choice in presidential elections.

As in the proceeding chapter, it should be noted that these findings are only for presidential elections, and may or may not generalize to other elections. It is easy to conceive that ambivalence will have less impact on presidential vote choice as it is perhaps more centrally related to one's partisan identification and therefore

more immune to attitudinal conflict. Therefore, one might expect to see individuals to defect in Congressional elections, and therefore we would expect the effects of ambivalence to manifest itself as split-ticket voting. Or, maybe only under certain circumstances, as suggested by Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen (2009), should we see ambivalence influence vote choice. For now at least, there is no compelling evidence that a general state of attitudinal conflict is enough to make partisans defect in presidential elections.

Appendix to Chapter 5

Recursive System of Equations

In order to model equations (5.1) and (5.2) I use semi-orederd bivariate probit As is traditionally the case when estimating models with binary and ordered dependent variables,

$$y_{1i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y_{1i}^* > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad y_{2i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \tau_0 = -\infty \leq y_{2i}^* < \tau_1 \\ 2 & \text{if } \tau_1 = \tau_1 \leq y_{2i}^* < \tau_2 \\ 3 & \text{if } \tau_1 = \tau_2 \leq y_{2i}^* < \infty \end{cases} .$$

The goal is to then estimate,

$$\Pr(y_1 = 1,\ y_2 = j | \mathbf{x}_1\boldsymbol{\beta}_1, \mathbf{x}_2\boldsymbol{\beta}_2, \boldsymbol{\tau}) = \begin{cases} \Pr(y_1 = 1,\ y_2 = 1) & = \Phi_2[\mathbf{x}_1\boldsymbol{\beta}_1, (\tau_1 - \gamma y_1 - \mathbf{x}_2\boldsymbol{\beta}_2), \rho] \\ \Pr(y_1 = 1,\ y_2 = 2) & = \Phi_2[\mathbf{x}_1\boldsymbol{\beta}_1, (\tau_2 - \gamma y_1 - \mathbf{x}_2\boldsymbol{\beta}_2), \rho] \\ & \quad -\Phi_2[\mathbf{x}_1\boldsymbol{\beta}_1, (\tau_1 - \gamma y_1 - \mathbf{x}_2\boldsymbol{\beta}_2), \rho] \\ \Pr(y_1 = 1,\ y_2 = 3) & = 1 - \Phi_2[\mathbf{x}_1\boldsymbol{\beta}_1, (\tau_2 - \gamma y_1 - \mathbf{x}_2\boldsymbol{\beta}_2), \rho] \end{cases} , \quad (5.3)$$

where $\Phi_2[\cdot, \cdot, \rho]$ is the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate standard normal distribution, with a correlation coefficient between the two random elements, $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_2$, ρ,

$$\begin{pmatrix} \epsilon_{i1} \\ \epsilon_{i2} \end{pmatrix} \sim N\left[\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho \\ \rho & 1 \end{pmatrix} \right].$$

Because those terms in equation (5.3) are what would go into the usual likelihood function, unlike in linear simultaneous equations models, if the two dependent variables are jointly determined, the dependent variable can just be put each on the

right-hand side of the other equation and one can the estimate the model as if were no simultaneity problem existed (Greene 1998:295; Greene and Hensher 2008:146). Doing so treats the two equations as independent aside from modeling the underlying errors as jointly normally distributed. The models were estimated using the "cmp" routine in Stata (Roodman 2007).

Model Results: 1984–2000 for Timing

Table 5.5: Ambivalence and Timing of vote decision in 1984

	Ambivalence		Timing of vote decision	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			0.165	(0.313)
Indifference			0.112	(0.091)
Timing of vote control variables				
Issues			-0.102*	(0.050)
Gender			-0.043	(0.070)
Minority			-0.010	(0.024)
Age			-0.006**	(0.002)
Income			-0.015*	(0.006)
Ambivalence control variables				
Egalitarianism	-0.145	(0.129)		
Limited government	-0.048	(0.092)		
Egalitarianism × limited government	0.048	(0.032)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.125**	(0.024)	0.011	(0.028)
Interest	0.027	(0.030)		
Political knowledge	0.112**	(0.019)	-0.023	(0.024)
Party ID intensity	-0.066†	(0.037)	-0.173**	(0.039)
Care who wins	0.020	(0.029)	-0.007	(0.032)
Intercept	-1.235**	(0.392)		
τ_1			-1.821**	(0.227)
τ_1			-0.700**	(0.223)
N	1311			
Log-likelihood	-2033.367			
$\chi^2_{(27)}$	186.751			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 5.6: Ambivalence and Timing of vote decision in 1988

	Ambivalence		Timing of vote decision	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			0.510	(0.477)
Indifference			0.027	(0.030)
Timing of vote control variables				
Issues			-0.105*	(0.046)
Gender			-0.146†	(0.075)
Minority			-0.006	(0.112)
Age	-0.002	(0.002)		
Income	0.016*	(0.007)		
Ambivalence control variables				
Egalitarianism	0.248†	(0.150)		
limited	0.091	(0.075)		
Egalitarianism × limited government	-0.036	(0.033)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.140**	(0.023)	-0.042	(0.033)
Interest	-0.150**	(0.055)		
Political knowledge	0.186**	(0.029)	-0.026	(0.042)
Party ID intensity	-0.035	(0.039)	-0.242**	(0.042)
Care who wins	-0.037	(0.081)	-0.380**	(0.090)
Intercept	-2.127**	(0.351)		
τ_1			-1.321**	(0.247)
τ_2			-0.513*	(0.245)
N	1055			
Log-likelihood	-1905.091			
$\chi^2_{(27)}$	265.076			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 5.7: Ambivalence and Timing of vote decision in 1992

	Ambivalence		Timing of vote decision	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			0.840**	(0.302))
Indifference			0.231†	(0.127)
Timing of vote control variables				
Issues			-0.169**	(0.061)
Gender			0.086	(0.078)
Minority			0.017	(0.025)
Age			-0.004	(0.002)
Income			-0.006	(0.006)
Ambivalence control variables				
Egalitarianism	-0.322*	(0.142)		
Limited government	-1.320**	(0.311)		
Moral traditionalism	-0.067	(0.130)		
Egalitarianism × limited government	0.369**	(0.115)		
Egalitarianism × moral traditionalism	0.001	(0.052)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.099**	(0.027)	-0.027	(0.028)
Interest	-0.014	(0.033)	0.080*	(0.033)
Political knowledge	0.102**	(0.023)	0.001	(0.026)
Party ID intensity	-0.173**	(0.042)	-0.216**	(0.053)
Care who wins	0.018	(0.113)	-0.192	(0.122)
Intercept	0.292	(0.422)		
τ_1			-0.731*	(0.291)
τ_2			0.282	(0.283)
N	827			
Log-likelihood	-1524.132			
$\chi^2_{(27)}$	227.376			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 5.8: Ambivalence and Timing of vote decision in 1996

	Ambivalence		Timing of vote decision	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			1.201**	(0.235)
Indifference			0.611**	(0.164)
Timing of vote control variables				
Issues			0.012	(0.071)
Gender			0.053	(0.097)
Minority			-0.020	(0.036)
Age			0.000	(0.003)
Income			0.015†	(0.008)
Ambivalence control variables				
Egalitarianism	-0.599*	(0.264)		
Limited government	-0.497	(0.500)		
Moral traditionalism	-0.135	(0.205)		
Egalitarianism × limited government	0.204	(0.150)		
Egalitarianism × moral traditionalism	0.085	(0.062)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.099**	(0.027)	-0.027	(0.028)
Interest	-0.014	(0.033)	0.080*	(0.033)
Political knowledge	0.102**	(0.023)	0.001	(0.026)
Party ID intensity	-0.173**	(0.042)	-0.216**	(0.053)
Care who wins	0.018	(0.113)	-0.192	(0.122)
Intercept	0.042	(0.921)		
τ_1			-0.731*	(0.291)
τ_2			0.282	(0.283)
N	477			
Log-likelihood	-860.533			
$\chi^2_{(27)}$	201.795			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 5.9: Ambivalence and Timing of vote decision in 2000

	Ambivalence		Timing of vote decision	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			0.825**	(0.311)
Indifference			0.023	(0.124)
Timing of vote control variables				
Gender			0.027	(0.077)
Minority			-0.265**	(0.101)
Age			-0.005*	(0.002)
Income			-0.006	(0.010)
Ambivalence control variables				
Need for cognition	0.250*	(0.111)		
Egalitarianism	-1.182*	(0.516)		
Limited government	-0.015	(0.309)		
Moral traditionalism	-0.760	(0.536)		
Egalitarianism× limited government	0.365	(0.485)		
Egalitarianism× moral traditionalism	1.698*	(0.799)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.115**	(0.026)	-0.021	(0.031)
Interest	0.005	(0.026)	-0.070*	(0.034)
Political knowledge	0.097**	(0.025)	-0.063*	(0.028)
Party ID intensity	-0.139**	(0.037)	-0.293**	(0.057)
Care who wins	0.282**	(0.100)	-0.363**	(0.124)
# Bush supporters	0.036	(0.041)	-0.149**	(0.041)
# Gore supporters	-0.002	(0.050)	-0.037	(0.047)
# Gore supporters× # Bush supporters	0.052	(0.047)	0.072	(0.045)
Intercept	-0.854*	(0.372)		
τ_1			-2.526**	(0.289)
τ_2			-1.190**	(0.249)
N	514			
Log-likelihood	-1709.097			
$\chi^2_{(27)}$	294.982			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Model Results: 1984–2000 for Defection

Table 5.10: Ambivalence and defection in 1984

	Ambivalence		Defection	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			0.330	(0.349)
Indifference			0.586**	(0.129)
Defection control variables				
Issues			-0.031	(0.077)
Gender			0.061	(0.106)
Minority			0.071†	(0.038)
Age			-0.001	(0.004)
Income			0.003	(0.010)
Ambivalence control variables				
Egalitarianism	-0.186	(0.129)		
limited government	-0.069	(0.091)		
Egalitarianism × limited government	0.059†	(0.032)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.116**	(0.024)	-0.069†	(0.042)
Interest	0.232**	(0.056)	-0.107	(0.085)
Political knowledge	0.091**	(0.019)	-0.051	(0.034)
Party ID intensity	-0.095*	(0.038)	-0.073	(0.070)
Care who wins	0.003	(0.031)	-0.006	(0.046)
Intercept	-1.521**	(0.398)	-0.845*	(0.348)
N	1043			
Log-likelihood	-1222.955			
$\chi^2_{(20)}$	173.531			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 5.11: Ambivalence and defection in 1988

	Ambivalence		Defection	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			-0.368	(0.653)
Indifference			0.293*	(0.125)
Defection control variables				
ssuesi			0.031	(0.061)
Gender			-0.199*	(0.100)
Minority			-0.114	(0.136)
Age			0.006†	(0.003)
Income			-0.002	(0.009)
Ambivalence control variables				
Egalitarianism	0.288†	(0.149)		
Limited government	0.102	(0.075)		
Egalitarianism × limited government	-0.043	(0.033)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.136**	(0.023)	-0.016	(0.053)
Interest	-0.068*	(0.029)	0.000	(0.042)
Political knowledge	0.166**	(0.030)	-0.011	(0.063)
Party ID intensity	-0.039	(0.039)	-0.239**	(0.065)
Care who wins	-0.077	(0.082)	-0.313**	(0.104)
Intercept	-1.919**	(0.360)	0.465	(0.474)
N	1250			
Log-likelihood	-1232.638			
$\chi^2_{(21)}$	210.838			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 5.12: Ambivalence and defection in 1992

	Ambivalence		Defection	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			1.177**	(0.429)
Indifference			0.591**	(0.162)
Defection control variables				
Issues			-0.145	(0.102)
Gender			-0.062	(0.124)
Minority			0.080†	(0.044)
Age			-0.007*	(0.004)
Income			-0.006	(0.010)
Ambivalence control variables				
Egalitarianism	-0.378*	(0.147)		
Limited government	-1.301**	(0.315)		
Moral traditionalism	-0.116	(0.135)		
Egalitarianism × limited government	0.348**	(0.117)		
Egalitarianism × moral traditionalism	0.030	(0.055)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.101**	(0.027)	-0.061	(0.043)
Interest	-0.018	(0.033)	-0.034	(0.056)
Political knowledge	0.098**	(0.023)	0.003	(0.041)
Party ID intensity	-0.173**	(0.042)	-0.320**	(0.097)
Care who wins	0.026	(0.113)	-0.301†	(0.177)
Intercept	-0.616†	(0.350)	-0.301	(0.460)
N	761			
Log-likelihood	-909.206			
$\chi^2_{(21)}$	190.4			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 5.13: Ambivalence and defection decision in 1996

	Ambivalence		Defection	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			0.382	(0.311)
Indifference			0.662**	(0.156)
Defection control variables				
Issues			-0.058	(0.134)
Gender			0.047	(0.175)
Minority			0.078	(0.064)
Age			0.008	(0.005)
Income			0.016	(0.016)
Ambivalence control variables				
Egalitarianism	-0.277	(0.326)		
Limited government	-0.069	(0.659)		
Moral traditionalism	-0.095	(0.231)		
Egalitarianism × limited government	0.056	(0.197)		
Egalitarianism × moral traditionalism	0.064	(0.070)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.129**	(0.034)	0.012	(0.069)
Political knowledge	0.185**	(0.042)	-0.014	(0.071)
Interest	-0.152†	(0.084)	-0.060	(0.139)
Party ID intensity	-0.157**	(0.058)	-0.332**	(0.118)
Care who wins	0.156	(0.147)	-0.538*	(0.229)
Intercept	-1.032	(0.761)	0.343	(0.474)
N	503			
Log-likelihood	-546.734			
$\chi^2_{(22)}$	122.808			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Table 5.14: Ambivalence and defection decision in 2000

	Ambivalence		Defection	
Attitudinal states				
Ambivalence			0.382	(0.311)
Indifference			0.662**	(0.156)
Defection control variables				
Gender			-0.250*	(0.126)
Minority			0.141	(0.149)
Age			-0.002	(0.004)
Income			-0.010	(0.018)
Ambivalence control variables				
Need for cognition	0.285*	(0.111)		
Egalitarianism	-0.870†	(0.523)		
Limited government	0.100	(0.317)		
Moral traditionalism	-0.541	(0.547)		
Egalitarianism× limited government	0.193	(0.498)		
Egalitarianism× moral traditionalism	1.314	(0.815)		
Joint control variables				
Education	0.115**	(0.026)	-0.040	(0.045)
Interest	-0.001	(0.026)	-0.143*	(0.057)
Political knowledge	0.092**	(0.025)	-0.009	(0.043)
Party ID intensity	-0.143**	(0.037)	-0.337**	(0.078)
Care who wins	0.275**	(0.100)	-0.315*	(0.154)
# Bush supporters	0.038	(0.041)	-0.092	(0.074)
# Gore supporters	-0.003	(0.050)	-0.159†	(0.087)
# Gore supporters× # Bush supporters	0.050	(0.047)	0.050	(0.088)
Intercept	-1.052**	(0.375)	0.157	(0.352
N	579			
Log-likelihood	-1125.751			
$\chi^2_{(27)}$	252.894			

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Chapter 6

Conclusions

This study sought to achieve three primary objectives. Before examining substantive issues of partisan ambivalence, I first wanted to examine common measures. The next objective was to consolidate and elaborate on an informational theory of ambivalence. The final objective was to examine how and if partisan ambivalence influences voting behavior in presidential elections. In this chapter, I summarize and synthesize the findings from proceeding chapters. I will then document my perceived shortcomings in an attempt to shed light on future possible studies.

6.1 Findings

As there is a growing consensus around the appropriateness of objective measures, it is appropriate the properties of the measures be scrutinized to rigorous empirical examination. Specifically, I examined the level of measurement with the results quite clearly indicating that the measures are not continuous, or even ordinal. As was shown, substantive conclusions are altered if the variable is treated as interval rather than nominal. These findings result primarily from those individuals who, when given the opportunity to do, offer no thoughts about the two parties. Objective measures traditionally treat zero as a state in between one-sidedness and ambivalence; the

problem is that the vast majority of zeroes are made up individuals who offer no thoughts about the parties. These individuals appear to be qualitatively different from other respondents. While others have coded these individuals as indifferent (Basinger and Lavine 2005), this represents the first systematic empirical study of whether or not such a practice is appropriate. The measures are capable of categorizing individuals, but appear unsuited to gauge the intensity of conflicted thoughts.

Also examined was the appropriateness of a measure of comparative ambivalence. Specifically, the question of whether or not negative responses about one party can be combined with positive about the other. Just as with the proper level of measurement, this assumption can be empirically examined. As the measure tries to capture the intensity and similarity of conflicted thoughts, it explicitly assumes negative and positive thoughts are related. While several tests were inconclusive, the results of a factor analysis quite clearly indicate that a measure of comparative ambivalence is appropriate. Furthermore, scales created of positive thoughts of one party and negative thoughts were shown to be reliable, whereas expressed thoughts about the same party appear to be largely unrelated. With a clear idea of how to measure the concept I moved on to substantive issues.

The first substantive goal was to elaborate and offer further evidence for the informational theory of ambivalence. The theory suggests ambivalence is caused by exposure to multiple points of view. This suggests an ambivalent individual has accepted both positive and negative messages. Consequently, I modeled the probability an individual could recall at least one positive and one negative thought about the two parties (implied by recall are both the reception and acceptance of a message). The two probabilities were found to be independent. The independence of the probabilities allowed me to compare the product of the two with the probability of being classified as ambivalent toward that party. The two were shown to be very highly correlated with one another, providing compelling evidence that the acceptance of

messages about the two parties are causes of ambivalence and that the theoretical framework of Chapter 3 is appropriate. This dovetails well with the findings from Chapter 2, which showed it was knowledge that best predicted ambivalence and listing more than one statement about the political parties.

To further test the theory, I looked to see if potential messages in a given campaign were sources of ambivalence. I selected messages which were prominent in the campaigns, meaning they were most likely to be heard by many respondents. Although the substantive effects of the campaign messages selected are not large, this is not terribly surprising, as there is much error involved when measuring issue attitudes (Ansolabehere, Rodden and Jr. 2008). What was directly provided was evidence that these influence ambivalence. That the finding was robust to different ways of conceptualizing and modeling partisan ambivalence adds to the strength.

The next goal was to examine the extent to which partisan ambivalence might influence voting behvaior. I began first by using measures of party specific ambivalence. Indirect evidence was provided suggesting that as parties polarize, individuals become more ambivalent. The exact nature of this relationship needs to be addressed more fully, examining individual level results for all election years available from the inception of the NES. However, the indirect evidence is suggestive. More concretely, the evidence in Chapter 4 offers limited support for the hypothesis that as parties polarize, individuals experiencing ambivalence will actually be more likely to stay with their preferred party. The most interesting finding is that for the most part ambivalence plays little role in electoral decision-making.

This finding was replicated when running a different model as above this time using comparative ambivalence. While not influencing the final decision, I hoped to see how ambivalence might influence when one makes up one's mind during a campaign. The argument was that one should expect ambivalent individuals to delay but not alter their final decision. The findings were consistent with those from the

previous chapter. Specifically, from 1980 to 2004 ambivalent plays little role in the final decision of voters. Consistent with those who suggest a need for cognition and information cause ambivalence and people that say ambivalent individuals seek out and use information differently, it does delay the decision.

Indifference, on the other hand, is related to vote choice. Individuals who do not care are more likely to change parties. Decades of previous research has provided evidence there is a class of voters who are unaware about, uninvolved with, uninterested in, and could generally be described as lacking attachment to politics. A measure of indifference seems to be able to categorize these individuals quite well. Thus, it is not surprising these individuals, who for the most part do not feel connected to the system or the parties, are more likely to vote inconsistently with their party identification. More specifically, the measure of indifference appears to be a good proxy for these related concepts which try to capture those individuals who are inattentive yet open to persuasion.

A few general themes begin to emerge, which are largely consistent with previous research on ambivalence and electoral behavior more generally. There is a growing base of evidence that ambivalence regarding the political parties is largely related to information. Although ambivalence can be generated from emotional responses, this does not seem to be the case here. Over the last decade or so a growing body of literature is beginning to suggest that value conflict may not play as large of a role in determining political attitudes as originally suggested. More specifically, in the case of partisanship, it seems quite clear that value conflict plays at most a complimentary role to informational sources.

A second theme is that ambivalence does not influence voting behavior. Robust to different conceptualizations and measurements, and consistent with decades of research on political behavior and partisanship, one's attachment to one of the two parties is enough to overcome sources of paritsan conflict. As noted earlier, in many

ways, ambivalence is a more nuanced version of the concepts of cross-presssure and attitudinal conflict. Yet, with this new measure and more appropriate modeling techniques, it still appears the relationship between one's partisan identity and vote choice is for the most part unaffected by conflicted attitudes.

Finally, from the earliest studies of voting it was recognized that there is a certain class of voters who weakly identify with the parties, and politics more generally. Berelson et al. (1954) noted that although these individuals are most receptive to campaigns, they are least able to make use of the informational environment of a campaign. Interestingly, while the measures of ambivalence did not originally intend to categorize individuals as indifferent, they do just as well at this task as they do at categorizing individuals as ambivalent.

6.2 Future Directions

The finding that most begs further research is the lack of a relationship between ambivalence and voting behavior. As mentioned, presidential elections in the U.S. might be the least likely scenario in which one would expect ambivalence to influence behavior. For many, presidential voting is the primary political act, and likely the most related to their partisan identity. That no effects were found here does not mean the finding will be replicated in other situations. Work, therefore, should proceed to look at other scenarios where ambivalence could, perhaps more likely, influence the electoral behavior of citizens.

This means moving in a variety of directions. First, one could stay in the U.S. context and examine elections with a strong third party candidate. Ambivalent Southern Democrats in 1968, for example, might have opted for a third party candidate. Ambivalence might also be able to mediate the role of partisanship and vote choice in sub-presidential elections, and therefore we would expect to see split-ticket voting as

an empirical manifestation of ambivalence. There also exists the possibility of moving to a comparative context. Systems where there are more than two alternatives could give ambivalent voters a viable alternative. Especially those systems where there are two dominant parties and one fairly strong third party, such as the British political system. Certainly, the results presented in chapters 5 and 6 do not indicate that ambivalence will never alter behavior suggesting further research about the impact ambivalence has on voting is necessary.

Relatedly, as indifference turns out to be a key indicator of voting behavior, investigating these individuals in more detail would be useful. In this case, the primary objective would most likely be to see how well they correspond to those voters already identified by other scholars as unattached to the political system (e.g., Granberg and Holmberg 1990; Jacoby 2009; MacKuen 1984). Are there systematic patterns to how they defect, or is it largely random, meaning defection cancels out?

And finally, and somewhat unrelatedly, is to further investigate the process of listing likes and dislikes. The last section of Chapter 2 is just a starting point. For example, as it was shown that P_D and N_R are related, it could be possible this is a form of Democratic accessibility. If true, then scholars would have at their disposal a measure that does not rely on response latencies (e.g., Fazio 1990; Grant, Mockabee and Monson 2009; Huckfeldt, Sprague and Levine 2000) dating back to the inception of the National Election Studies.

To summarize, future work should move in three primary directions. Find and examine scenarios where ambivalence is more likely to influence vote choice. Second, to see if there are systematic implications of indifference. And, to see what other information can be extracted from statements listed by respondents.

Bibliography

Abelson, Robert P., Donald R. Kinder, Mark D. Peters and Susan T. Fiske. 1982. "Affective and Semantic Components in Political Person Perception." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 42(4):619–630.

Achen, Christopher. 1992. "Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and Linear Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research." *Political Behavior* 14(3):195–211.

Achen, Christopher H. and Larry M. Bartels. 2006. "It Feels Like We're Thinking: The Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy." Presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Adams, Greg D. 1997. "Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3):718–737.

Ai, Churong and Edward C. Norton. 2003. "Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit." *Economic Letters* 80(1):123–129.

Allport, Gordon W. 1935. Attitudes. In *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. Carl A. Murchison. New York: Russell and Russell.

Alvarez, R. Michael. 1990. "The Puzzle of Party Identification: Dimensionality of an Important Concept." *American Politics Quarterly* 18:476–491.

Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. 1995. "American Ambivalence Towards Abortion Policy: Development of a Heteroskedastic Probit Model of Competing Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(4):1055–1082.

Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. 1997. "Are Americans Ambivalent Towards Racial Policies?" *American Journal of Political Science* 41(2):345–374.

Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. 2002. *Hard Choices, Easy Answers: Values, Information, and American Public Opinion.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Alvarez, R. Michael and Jonathan Nagler. 1995. "Economics, Issues, and the Perot Candidacy: Voter Choice in the 1992 Presidential Election." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(3):714–744.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden and James M. Snyder Jr. 2008. "The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting." *American Political Science Review* 102(2):215–232.

Armitage, Christopher J. and Mark Conner. 2005. Attitudinal Ambivalence and Political Opinion: Avenues for Further Research. In *Ambivalence, Politics, and Public Policy*, ed. Stephen C. Craig and Michael D. Martinez. New York: Palgrave Macmillan pp. 144–166.

Armstrong, David and Duncan McVicar. 2000. "Value Added in Further Education and Vocational Training in Northern Ireland." *Applied Economics* 32(13):1727–1736.

Bafumi, Joseph. 2004. "The Stubborn American Voter." Presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois.

Bafumi, Joseph and Michael C. Herron. 2007. "Preference Aggregation, Representation, and Elected American Political Institutions." Presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Baldassarri, Delia and Andrew Gelman. 2008. "Partisans Without Constraint: Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion." *American Journal of Sociology* 114(2):Forthcoming.

Barker, David C. and Susan B. Hansen. 2005. "All Things Considered: Systematic Cognitive Processing and Electoral Decision-making." *Journal of Politics* 67(2):319–344.

Bartels, Larry M. 1993. "Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure." *American Political Science Review* 87(2):267–285.

Bartels, Larry M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1):35–50.

Bartels, Larry M. 2002. "Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions." *Political Behavior* 24(2):117–150.

Basinger, Scott J. and Howard Lavine. 2005. "Ambivalence, Information, and Electoral Choice." *American Political Science Review* 99(2):169–184.

Bassili, John N. 1996. "Meta-Judgmental Versus Operative Indexes of Psychological Attributes: The Case of Measures of Attitude Strength." *Journal of Personal and Social Psychology* 71(4):637–653.

Beck, Paul A. 2002. "Encouraging Political Defection: The Role of Personal Discussion Networks in Partisan Desertions to the Opposition Party and Perot Votes in 1992." *Political Behavior* 24(4):309–337.

Beck, Paul Allen, Russell J. Dalton, Steven Greene and Robert Huckfeldt. 2002. "The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational Influences on Presidential Choices." *American Political Science Review* 96(1):57–73.

Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinino Formation in a Presidential Campaign.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bishop, George F., Alfred J. Tuchfarber and Robert .W. Oldendick. 1986. "Opinions on Fictitious Issues: The Pressure to Answer Survey Questions." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50(2):240–250.

Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses." *Political Analysis* 14(1):63–82.

Breckler, Steven J. 1994. "A Comparison of Numerial Indexes for Measuring Attitude Ambivalence." *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 54(2):350–365.

Brown, Judson S. and I.E. Farber. 1951. "Emotions Conceptualized as Intervening Variables—with Suggestions toward a Theory of Frustration." *Psychological Bulletin* 48(6):465–495.

Cacioppo, John T. and G. G. Bernston. 1994. "Relationship Between Attitudes and Evaluative Space: A Critical Review of the Separability of Positive and NEgative Substrates." *Psychological Bulletin* 115(401–423).

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cantril, Albert H. and Susan Davis Cantril. 1999. *Reading Mixed Signals: Ambivalence in American Public Opinion about Government.* Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics.* Princeton University Press.

Carsey, Thomas M. and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2006. "Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2):464–477.

Chaffee, Steven H. and Rajiv Nath Rimal. 1996. Time of Vote Decsion and Openess to Persuasion. In *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*, ed. Diana C. Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman and Richard A. Brody. Ann Arbor, MI: Univ of Michigan Press.

Chaffee, Steven H. and Sun Yuel Choe. 1980. "Time of Decision and Media Use During the Ford-Carter Campaign." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 44(1):53–69.

Cleveland, William S. 1979. "Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smooth Scatterplots." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 74(368):829–836.

Cliff, Norman. 1993. What Is and Isn't Measurement. In *A Handbook or Data Analysis in the Behavioral Sciences*, ed. Gideon Keren and Gordon Lewis. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." *Ideology and Discontent* .

Converse, Philip E. 1966. Religion and Politics: The 1960 Election. In *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Converse, Philip E. 1970. Attitude and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialouge. In *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*, ed. Edward R. Tufte. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Coombs, Clyde H. 1964. *A Theory of Data.* New York: Wiley.

Craig, Stepehn C. 1985. "Partisanship, Independence, and No Preference: Another Look at the Measurement of Party Identification." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(2):274–290.

Craig, Stephen C., James G. Kane and Michael D. Martinez. 2002. "Sometimes You Feel Like a Nut, Sometimes You Don't: Citizens' Ambivalence About Abortion." *Political Psychology* 23(2):285–301.

Craig, Stephen C., Michael D. Martinez and James G. Kane. 1999. "The Structure of Political Competition: Dimensions of Candidate and Group Evaluation Revisited." *Political Behavior* 21:289–304.

Craig, Stephen C., Michael D. Martinez and James G. Kane. 2005. "Core Values, Value Conflict, and Citizens' Ambivalence about Gay Rights." *Political Research Quarterly* 58(1):5–17.

Davis, James A. 1982. "Achievement Variables and Class Cultures." *American Sociological Review* 47(5):569–586.

Dobrynska, Agnieszka and André Blais. 2008. "Testing Zaller's Reception and Acceptance Model in an Intense Election Campaign." *Political Behavior* 30(2):259–276.

Dow, Jay K. and James W. Endersby. 2004. "Multinomial Probit and Multinomial Logit: A comparison of Choice Models for Voting Research." *Electoral Studies* 23(1):107–112.

Eagly, Alice H. and Shelly Chaiken. 1993. *The Psychology of Attitudes.* Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.

Enelow, James M. and Melvin J. Hinich. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fazio, Russell H. 1990. A Practical Guide to the Use of Response Latency in Social Psychological Reseach. In *Research Methods in Personality and Social Psychology*, ed. Clyde Hendrick and Margret S. Clark. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Feldman, Stanley. 1988. "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of Core Beliefs and Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 32(2):416–440.

Feldman, Stanley. 2003. Values, Ideology, and the Structure of Political Attitudes. In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy and Robert Jervis. New York: Oxford University Press pp. 477–510.

Feldman, Stanley and John Zaller. 1992. "The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State." *American Journal of Political Science* 36(2):268–307.

Finkel, Steven E. 1993. "Reexamining the 'Minimal Effects' Model in Recent Presidential Campaigns." *Journal of Politics* 55(1):1–21.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1976. "The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects." *Journal of Politics* 38(2):390–413.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy Pope. 2005. *Culture War?: The Myth of a Polarized America.* Pearson Longman.

Fournier, Patrick, Richard Nadeau, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte. 2001. "Validation of Time-of-Voting-Decision Recall." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65(1):95–107.

Fournier, Patrick, Richard Nadeau, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte. 2004. "Time-of-Voting Decision and Susceptibility to Campaign Effects." *Electoral Studies* 23(4):661–681.

Franklin, Charles. 1991. "Eschewing Obfuscation? Campaigns and the Perception of U. S. Senate IncumbentsPolitical Science Review." *American Political Science Review* 85(4):1193–1214.

Franklin, Charles and John Jackson. 1983. "The Dynamics of Party Identification." *American Political Science Review* 77(4):957–973.

Free, Lloyd A. and Hadley Cantril. 1967. "The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion.".

Gifi, Albert. 1990. *Nonlinear Multivariate Analysis.* Wiley.

Gopoian, J. David and Sissie Hadjiharalambous. 1994. "Late-Deciding Voters in Presidential Elections." *Political Behavior* 16(1):55–78.

Granberg, Donald and Soren Holmberg. 1990. "The Berelson Paradox Reconsidered: Intention-behavior Changes in U.S. and Swedish Election Campaigns." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54(4):530–550.

Grant, J. Tobin, Stephen T. Mockabee and J. Quin Monson. 2009. "Campaign Effects on the Accessibility of Party Identification." *Political Research Quarterly* doi:10.1177/1065912909336269.

Grant, J. Tobin and Thomas J. Rudolph. 2003. "Value Conflict, Group Affect, and the Issue of Campaign Finance." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3):453–469.

Green, Donald, Bradkey Palmquist and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Patisan Hearts & Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Green, Donald P. 1988. "On the Dimensionality of Public Sentiment toward Partisan and Ideological Groups." *American Journal of Political Science* 32(3):758–780.

Greene, Steven. 2005. "The Structure of Partisan Attitudes: Reexamining Partisan Dimensionality and Ambivalence." *Political Psychology* 26(5):809–822.

Greene, William H. 1998. "Gender Economics Courses in Liberal Arts Colleges: Further Results." *Research in Economic Education* 19(4):291–300.

Greene, William H. and David A. Hensher. 2008. "Modeling Ordered Choices: A Primer and Recent Developments (June 15, 2008)." Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1213093.

Gurmu, S. 1991. "Tests for Detection Overdispersion in the Positive Poisson Regression Model." *Journal of Business & Economic Statistics* 9(2):215–222.

Guttmann, Louis. 1977. "What is Not What in Statistics." *The Statistician* 26(2):81–107.

Hausman, Jerry and Daniel McFadden. 1984. "Specification Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model." *Econometrica* 52(5):1219–1240.

Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." *American Political Science Review* 95(3):619–631.

Hill, Jennifer L. and Hanspeter Kriesl. 2001. "An Extension and Test of Converse's "Black-and-White" Model of Response Stability." *American Political Science Review* 95(02):397–413.

Hillygus, D. Sunshine. 2005. "Campaign Effects and the Dynamics of Turnout Intention in Election 2000." *Journal of Politics* 67(1):50–68.

Hillygus, D. Sunshine and Simon D. Jackman. 2003. "Voter Decision Making in Election 2000: Campaign Effects, Partisan Activation, and the Clinton Legacy." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4):589–596.

Hillygus, D. Sunshine and Todd G. Shields. 2008. *The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Hochschild, J.L. 1981. *What's Fair?: American Beliefs about Distributive Justice.* Cambridege, MA: Harvard University Press.

Horan, Patrick M. 1971. "Social Positions and Political Cross-Pressures: A re-Examination." *American Sociological Review* 4:650–660.

Huckfeldt, Robert, Jeanette Morehouse Mendez and Tracy Osborn. 2004. "Disagreement, Ambivalence, and Engagement: The Political Consequences of Heterogeneous Networks." *Political Psychology* 25(1):65–95.

Huckfeldt, Robert, John Sprague and Jeffrey Levine. 2000. "The Dynamics of Collective Deliberation in the 1996 Election: Campaign Effects on Accessibility, Certainty, and Accuracy." *American Political Science Review* 95(3):641–651.

Huckfeldt, Robert R. 1979. "Political Participation and the Neighborhood Social Context." *American Journal of Political Science* 23(3):579–592.

Jackson, Elton F. and Richard F. Curtis. 1972. "Effects of Vertical Mobility and Status Inconsistency: A Body o Negative Evidence." *American Sociological Review* 37(6):701–713.

Jacoby, William G. 1988. "The Impact of Party Identification on Issue Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science* 32(3):643–661.

Jacoby, William G. 1991. *Data Theory and Dimensional Analysis.* Newbury Park: SAGE Publications.

Jacoby, William G. 1999. "Levels of Measurement and Political Research: An Optimistic View." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(1):271–301.

Jacoby, William G. 2002. Core Values and Political Attitudes. In *Understanding Public Opinion*, ed. Barbara Noreandar and Clyde Wilcox. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press pp. 177–201.

Jacoby, William G. 2006. "Value Choices and American Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3):706–723.

Jacoby, William G. 2009. "Public opinion during a presidential campaign: Distinguishing the effects of environmental evolution and attitude change." *Electoral Studies* doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2009.05.011.

Johnston, Christopher, Howard Lavine, David Perkens and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2008. "Elite Polarization, Partisan Ambivalence, and a Preference for Divided Government." Presented at the 2008 Midwest Political Science Association Conference.

Judd, Charles M. and Cynthia M. Lusk. 1984. "Knowledge Structures and Evaluative Judgments: Effects of Structural Variables on Judgmental Extremity." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46(6):1193–1207.

Kam, Cindy K. 2006. "Political Campaigns and Open–Minded Thinking." *Journal of Politics* 68(4):931–945.

Kaplan, K.J. 1972. "On the Ambivalence-Indifference Problem in Attitude Theory and Measurement: A Suggested Modification of the Semantic Differential Technique." *Psychological Bulletin* 77(5):361–72.

Keele, Luke and David K. Park. 2007. "Ambivalent about Ambivalence: A Reexamination of Heteroskedastic Probit Models." Working paper.

Keele, Luke and Jennifer Wolak. 2006. "Value Conflict and Volatility in Party Identification." *British Journal of Political Science* 36:671–690.

Keele, Luke and Jennifer Wolak. 2008. "Contextual Sources of Ambivalence." *Political Psychology* 29(5):653–573.

Kelley, Stanley, Jr. 1983. *Interpreting Elections.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Krosnick, Jon A. 1988. "Attitude Importance and Attitude Change." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 24(3):240–255.

Krosnick, Jon A. and Robert P. Abelson. 1992. The Case for Measuring Attitude Strength in Surveys. In *Questions About Questions: Inquiries into the Cognitive Bases of Surveys*, ed. Judith M. Tanur. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.

Krosnick, Jon A., Savid S. Boninger, Yao C. Chuang, Mathew K. Berent and Catherine G. Garnot. 1993. "Attitude Strength: One Construct or Many Related Constructs." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 65(6):1132–1151.

Kuhn, Thomas S. 1977. *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lacy, D. and B.C. Burden. 1999. "The Vote-Stealing and Turnout Effects of Ross Perot in the 1992 US Presidential Election." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(1):233–255.

Lavine, Howard. 2001. "The Electoral Consequences of Ambivalence toward Presidential Candidates." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4):915–929.

Lavine, Howard, Christopher Johnston and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2009. "Ambivalence, Information Processing, and Behavior." Presented at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Lavine, Howard, Joseph W. Huff, Stephen H. Wagner and Donna Sweeney. 1998. "The Moderating Influence of Attitude Strength on the Susceptibility to Context Effects in Attitude Surveys." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 75(2):359–379.

Layman, Geoffrey C. and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002*a*. "Party Polarization and "Conflict Extension" in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4):786–802.

Layman, Geoffrey C. and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002*b*. "Party Polarization and Party Structuring of Policy Attitudes: A Comparison of three NES Panel Studies." *Political Behavior* 24(2):199–236.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet. 1944. *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign.* New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce.

Lewis-Beck, Michael .S, William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth and Herbert F. Weisberg. 2008. *The American Voter Revisited.* Ann Arbor, MI: Univ of Michigan Press.

Lin, Lawrence I-Kuei. 1989. "A Concordance Correlation Coefficient to Evaluate Reproducibility." *Biometrics* 45(1):255–268.

Linville, Patricia W. 1982. "The Complexity-Extremity Effect and Age-Based Stereotyping." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 42(2):193–211.

Lodge, Milton, Marco R. Steenbergen and Shawn Brau. 1995. "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation." *American Political Science Review* 89(2):309–326.

Long, J. Scott and Jeremy Freese. 2005. *Regression Models for Categorical Outcomes Using Stata.* Second ed. College Station, TX: Stata Press.

Lord, F.M. 1953. "On the Statistical Treatment of Football Numbers." *American Psychologist* 8(3):750–751.

MacKuen, Michael B. 1984. "Exposure to Information, Belief Integration and Individual Responsiveness to Agenda Change." *American Political Science Review* 78(2):372–391.

Martinez, Michael D., Stephen C. Craig and James G. Kane. 2005. Pros and Cons: Ambivalence and Public Opinion. In *Ambivalence and the Structure of Public Opinion*, ed. Michael D. Martinez and Stephen C. Craig. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

McClosky, Herbert. 1964. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics." *American Political Science Review* 58(2):361–382.

McClosky, Herbert and John Zaller. 1984. *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism and Democracy.* Cambridege, MA: Harvard University Press.

McGraw, Kathleen M. and Brandon Bartels. 2005. Ambivalence Toward American Political Institutions: Sources and Consequences. In *Ambivalence and the Structure of Public Opinion*, ed. Stephen C. Craig and Michael D. Martinez. Palgrave Macmillan.

McGraw, Kathleen M., Edward Hasecke and Kimberly Conger. 2003. "Ambivalence, Uncertainty, and Processes of Candidate Evaluation." *Political Psychology* 24(3):421–448.

McVicar, Duncan and Brian McKee. 2002. "Part-time Work During Post-compulsory Education and Examination Performance: Help or Hindrance?" *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* 49:393–406.

Meffert, Michael F., Michale Guge and Milton Lodge. 2000. Good, Bad, Indifferent and Ambivalent: The Consequence of Multidimensional Political Attitudes. In *The Issue of Belief: Essays in the Intersection of Non-Attitudes and Attitude Change*, ed. Willem E. Saris and Paul M. Sniderman. Amsterdam: The Amsterdam School of Communication Research, Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands pp. 60–100.

Miller, Joanne M. and David A.M. Peterson. 2004. "Theoretical and Empirical Implications of Attitude Strength." *Journal of Politics* 66(3):847–867.

Mowrer, Orval Hobart. 1960. *Learning Theory and Behavior.* New York: Wiley.

Mutz, Diana C. 2002. "The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4):838–855.

Newbay-Clark, Ian R., Ian McGregor and Mark P. Zanna. 2002. "Thinking and Caring About Cognitive Inconsistency: When and for Whom Woes Attitudinal Ambivalence Feel Uncomfortable?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 82(2):157–166.

Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik. 1979. *The Changing American Voter.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Cambridge, Mass.

Niemi, Richard G. and Herbert F. Weisberg. 1976. Are Parties Becoming Irrelevant. In *Controversies in American Voting Behavior*, ed. Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company.

Nir, Lilach. 2005. "Ambivalent Social Networks and Their Consequences for Participation." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 17(4):422–442.

Nir, Lilach and James N. Druckman. 2008. "Campaign Mixed-Message Flows and Timing of Vote Decision." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 20(3):326–346.

Parker-Stephen, Evan. 2007. "When Perception Polarize: How Motives and Information Shape Partisan Inference." Presented at the 2007 Midwest Political Science Association Conference.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, Robert P. Abelson and Saumel Popkin. 1965. *Candidates, Issues and Stragefies.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Priester, Joseph and Richard E. Petty. 1996. "The Gradual Threshold Model of Ambivalence: Relating the Positive and Negative Bases of Attitudes to Subjective Ambivalence." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71(3):431–449.

Ranney, Austin. 1954. *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government: Its Origins and Present State.* Urbana The University of Illinois Press.

Rokeach, Milton. 1973. *The Nature of Human Values.* New York: Free Press.

Roodman, David. 2007. cmp: Stata Module to Implement Conditional (Recursive) Mixed Process Estimator. Technical report.

Rudolph, Thomas J. 2005. "Group Attachment and the Reduction of Value-Driven Ambivalence." *Political Psychology* 26(6).

Rudolph, Thomas J. and Elizabeth Popp. 2007. "An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence." *Political Psychology* 28(5):563–586.

Schuman, Howard and Stanley Presser. 1981. *Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys.* New York: Academic Press.

Scott, William A. 1969. "Structure of Natural Cognitions." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 12(4).

Small, Kenneth A. Hsiao, Cheng. 1985. "Multinomial Logit Specification Tests." *International Economic Review* 26(3):619–267.

Sniderman, Paul, Richard Brody and Phillip Tetlock. 1991. *Reasoning and Choice.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Steenbergen, Marco R. and Paul R. Brewer. 2004. The Not–So Ambivalent Public: Policy Attitudes in the Political Culture of Ambivalence. In *Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error, and Change*, ed. Willem Saris and Paul Snideran. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Stevens, Stanley Smith. 1951. Mathematics, Measurement and Psychophysics. In *Handbook of Experimental Psychology*, ed. Stanley Smith Stevens. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Stimson, James A. 2004. *Tides of Consent: How Public Opinion Shapes American Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stokes, Donald E. 1962. "Party Loyalty and the Likelihood of Deviating Elections." *Journal of Politics* 24(4):689–702.

Thompson, M.M., M.P. Zanna and D.W. Griffin. 1995. Let's Not Be Indifferent about (Attitudinal) Ambivalence. In *Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences*, ed. Jon Krosnick. Erlbaum pp. 361–386.

Thurstone, Louis L. 1928. "Attitudes Can Be Measured." *American Journal of Sociology* 33(4):529–554.

Tourangeau, R., Kenneth Rasinki, Norman Bradburn and Roy D'Andrade. 1989. "Belief Accessibility and Context Effects in Attitude Measurement." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 25(5):401–421.

Vellerman, Paul F. and Leleand Wilkinson. 1993. "Nominal, Ordinal, Interval, and Ratio Typologies Are Misleading." *The American Statistician* 47(1):65–72.

Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wattenberg, Martin P. 1998. *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Weisberg, Herbert F. 1980. "A multidimensional conceptualization of party identification." *Political Behavior* 2(1):33–60.

Weiss, Andrew A. 1993. "A Bivariate Ordered Probit Model with Truncation: Helmet Use and Motorcycle Injuries." *Applied Statistics* 42(3):487–499.

Wittenberg, Jason. 2008. "How Similar Are They? Rethinking Electoral Congruence." Presented at the 25th Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology.

Young, Forest W. 1981. "Quantitative Analysis of Qualitative Data." *Psychometrika* 46(4):357–388.

Young, Forest W. 1987. Theory. In *Multidimensional Scaling*, ed. Forest W. Young and Robert M. Hamer. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Young, Forest W., Jan De Leeuw and Toshio Takane. 1976. "Regression with Qualitative and Quantitative Variables: An Alternating Least Squares Method with Optimal Scaling Features." *Psychometrika* 41(4):505–529.

Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zaller, John and Stanley Feldman. 1992. "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences." *American Journal of Political Science* 36(3):579–616.