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
CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT CONSERVATIVES:
STRUCTURES OF GENDER IDEOLOGY IN THE FORMATION OF
OPINIONS REGARDING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF POVERTY

presented by

Elisabeth Waeckerlin

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CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT CONSERVATIVES: STRUCTURES OF GENDER
IDEOLOGY IN THE FORMATION OF OPINIONS REGARDING THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF POVERTY

By

Elisabeth Waeckerlin

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ABSTRACT

CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT CONSERVATIVES: STRUCTURES OF GENDER IDEOLOGY IN THE FORMATION OF OPINIONS REGARDING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF POVERTY

By

Elisabeth Waeckerlin

Scholarly writing is inconclusive as to whether religious conservatives are also socially and politically conservative. Research has been done with respect to religious conservatives' dogma, family values, and gender relations in association with their political attitudes and behavior. This study however, investigates the association between the structure of the conservatives' religious beliefs and their ideologies about morals and gender relations and how this association translates into views about the causes of poverty.

This study accounts for the comparison of Catholic and Protestant religious dogma and moral ideologies on the one hand and views about the reasons for poverty on the other, in a new perspective. The association between dogma, moral ideology and economic attitudes is framed in the concept of ahistorical religiosity. This concept maintains that Catholic and Protestant conservatives' moral values, as the major component of their religious world views, are ahistorical and based on distinct ideological structures. The perspective of ahistorical religiosity proposes that Protestants' moral values are based on a hierarchical gender ideology while Catholics' moral values are based on sexual morality.

This project was carried out through a survey method. Data was collected by distributing questionnaires to Catholic and Protestant churches and Right to Life

pregnancy organizations, where volunteers for participation in the study were searched for and located. The churches and pregnancy organizations to which the surveys were distributed are all located in mid-Michigan.

This study finds that Catholic conservatives' sexual morality is associated with their abortion attitudes. It is then their abortion attitudes that are linked to their ahistorical religiosity. For Protestant conservatives, their gender ideology, in addition to their abortion attitudes, is linked to their frequency of Bible reading, and it is the frequency of Bible reading that is associated with their ahistorical religiosity.

In addition this study reveals that both Protestant and Catholic conservatives have the opinion that individualist responsibility is the cause for poverty - as against structural and political causes. Neither Protestants' or Catholics' views about the causes for poverty are mediated through their ahistorical religion, though; but in the case of the Protestant conservatives, their views about the individualist causes of poverty are associated with their hierarchical gender ideology. In relation to the Catholic conservatives, it is their sexual morality that is associated with their views about the individualist responsibility for poverty.

DEDICATION

Meinen Eltern zu Eigen

Anna Marie Hatt Waeckerlin
Oskar Waeckerlin-Hatt (1913 – 2005)

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INTRODUCTION

Research Statement

Over the last decade, new media coverage has been given to religious conservatives as major players in presidential elections. In the view of some of the scholarly writings (Saunders and Abramowitz 2007) it is argued that the religious Christians influence American politics towards political conservatism. Some newer research doubts this claim (Smith 2001). Furthermore, it has been argued that conservative religion does not always coincide with conservative politics (Johnson and Tamney 2001), and issues that have been linked to conservative religion—such as anti-abortion—have been considered to be not conservative at all (Hendershott 2006). Also, some literature has shown that women in religious conservative communities are not simply submissive to the men in their families and religious institutions but have managed to find niches within which they can empower themselves in their everyday lives (Brasher 1998). This study examines the role that gender ideology and sexual morality play in relation to the formation of economic attitudes of religious conservatives. The objectives of the study are to examine the concept of morality for Protestant and Catholic conservative dogmas. This work inquires the question: How are these dogmas associated with gender ideology and then transformed into opinions and interpretations about the causes of poverty?

Religious conservatives have been linked to conservative moral concerns in scholarly debates and through media coverage for several decades now. Their concerns are based on what they see as the production of a general sexual promiscuity that has advanced since the advent of feminist and other liberalizing movements that developed

starting in the 1960s (Marsden 2006; Stonecash 2007). These liberalizing movements have put power relations – not only between the genders but also between employer and employee, parents and children, government and their citizens – into question. As a consequence, religious conservatives and their moral concerns have stood out from the context of the portion of American society that is moving toward relative gender equality (Riesebrodt 1993).

Among the specific social phenomena that the religious conservatives protest against are high divorce rates, teenage pregnancy, sex education in the public schools, abortion and gay marriage. Especially, their struggle against legalized abortion has been representative for all of these moral protests (Ferree et al. 2002), and their stance against abortion is central in their defense of what they see as traditional values. Conservative Christians have portrayed the existence of legal abortion as the origin of the breakdown of the American nuclear family, which they insist has to be structured as a union headed by two parents with dependent children and which they define as the backbone of American society (Stacey 1994) .

It has been a long established fact that people who are against abortion are regular church attenders and testify to being more religious than those who are pro-choice advocates (Blanchard 1996; Granberg 1978). Most of the research debates find that anti-abortion is, in general, a conservative phenomenon. The stance against abortion, however, has also been associated with liberal policies, such as in Catholic social justice issues. James Kelly (1999) explains Cardinal Josef Bernardin' s life ethic as basically liberal. Bernadin requested an intervention from which results can be seen in policy application for both, the unborn life and the life in need of public support. "The hungry

and the homeless, the undocumented immigrant and the unemployed worker.”(Kelly 1999). Such an encompassing engagement for life that Bernardin followed makes for specific economic and political positions, such as tax, welfare or healthcare policies. According to the consistent life ethic of Bernardin, anti-abortion translates into public programs that are located on the political left. Also, the bishops’ opposition against nuclear armament was seen in line with the opposition against abortion since both attempt to protect innocent lives (Kelly 1999).

There are others who have participated in the discussion about the liberal features of abortion. Elizabeth Adell Cook and her colleagues (1992) link the anti-abortion activism of Catholics and African Americans with those groups’ opposition to the death penalty, and Cuneo (1989) found anti-abortion activists coincide with engagement in Civil Rights issues. Hendershott (2006) insists that anti-abortion is ethnocentric in the first place, since it is poor women of color who tend to be most advised to have abortions and abortion services are located mostly in inner cities or poor neighborhoods.

Purpose of the Study

My study focuses on an argument that seeks to answer why, in fact, moral and anti-abortion values in the current political context are conservative. For that, I examine religious conservatives’ view of the placement of the responsibility for poverty whether they consider poverty a problem caused by individual responsibility or traced back to structural, political and economic factors. The study focuses on how moral values are associated with strict dogma and the believer’s gender ideologies and how these are transformed into economic world views.

A large portion of studies about the religious conservatives was conducted in the

context of the evangelical surge that has occurred over the last three decades. Political action committees whose leaders and activists were often linked to the Republican Party, such as the Christian Round Table or Focus on the Family, surfaced in the political landscape during the 1980s and 90s (Himmelstein 1990). These political organizations consolidated the Christian conservatives in the movement of the Christian Right. The writings about the Christian conservatives found they are overwhelmingly Protestant evangelical and fundamentalist (Walsh 2000), and the follow up studies about these groups found them morally conservative with conservative views about gender relations.

Some research about the religious conservatives has assessed the relationship between conservative religious dogma, moral values and economic views about the causes of poverty in various ways. Protestant conservatism has mostly been assessed through literal Bible reading and born again status (Guth et al. 1996b; Hunter 1983), two distinct features of Protestant conservative dogma. In general, the work about the Protestant conservatives agrees with the finding that their social agenda focuses on moral politics about abortion, gay rights and public education. The social agenda with respect to legal abortion emphasizes the limitation and eventual elimination of abortion. In relation to gays, the agenda opposes laws that protect gays against job and housing discrimination or advocates laws that prevent gay marriage. In relation to education the agenda wants to alter the curriculum in the public schools to eliminate sex education (Smith 1997). Clyde Wilcox and Mark Rozell (2000: 129) found that Protestant evangelicals' and fundamentalists' social agendas were associated with a conservative economic agenda, in that the members of the religious conservatives were for the elimination of welfare and for scaling back government on anti poverty programs. Wilcox and Rozell (2000) linked

this appeal for individualist responsibility for economic conditions to the Calvinist heritage in which the Protestant evangelical dogma is rooted.

Additional research conducted about the religious conservatives has included other conservative religious groups. Some of the work done has analyzed Catholics' religious beliefs and sociopolitical views. Conservatism with respect to Catholics has been less assessed through specific conservative dogma, and has instead been assessed through measuring the believer's relationship to God through commitment to others or through the believer's claim to adhere to the religious truth (Jelen 1991b). Also here, adherence to truth claims was associated with social conservatism, even though some of the social values, like the anti-abortion, were not found to affect the Catholics' economic attitudes in political issues like job security and Republican voting, in contrast with the evangelicals (Wald 1997). Some research has put the preference for moral values over economic concerns in relation to voting behavior and has found Catholics' tend to align politically with the Republican Party (Rozell and Das Gupta 2006). Other research has measured religious dogma with personal commitment to ones' religious devotion and has found that strict religiosity and political conservatism are related, but more so for Protestant evangelicals than for Catholics (Green et al. 1996).

Still other studies have concretely used the context of abortion in order to examine the association between religious dogma, moral values and views about the causes of poverty. A.J. Blasi (2006) measured this association using religion, moral values and voting behavior and found that the frequency of church attendance and personal praying was linked to anti-abortion and anti gay values, which were both strongly linked to voting for Bush in the 2004 elections. Cook and her colleagues (Cook et al. 1992) also found an

association between gender hierarchical thinking and anti-abortion, even though they found Catholics were less conservative with respect to political opinions than white evangelicals. David Leege and Lyman Kellstedt (1993a) explored the individualist connection (through formal behavior like performing religious rituals) and communitarian connection to God (through the care for others) in order to identify the relationship between religious dogma, moral values and political views. They found that individualist religiosity was related to opposition to abortion, conservative women's rights and male-female family roles, and was generally associated with Republican voting preference.

All these studies, which compose in a larger sense the frame of evaluating the connection between conservative religious dogma, moral values and economic and political views, have in common that morality is understood as consisting of strong family values, or social traditionalism. And opposition to sexual permissiveness is based on women's roles as they are embedded in gender hierarchy (Balmer 1994).

Research so far has not dealt comparatively with the structure of the beliefs, on which the association between moral, gender relations and economic views about poverty is built. This dissertation compares the Protestant and Catholic conservatives' religious dogma to understand the structure of the religious beliefs on which moral ideology is built, and how both religious dogma and moral ideology are associated with the view about the causes of poverty. This comparison is done through a new perspective. The association between dogma, moral ideology and economic attitudes is framed in the concept of ahistorical religiosity. This work will discuss how the Protestant and Catholic conservatives' strict dogmas about gender relations are ahistorical and that the ahistorical

feature of the Protestant conservatives' beliefs is textual. In addition, the present work will argue that the ahistorical feature of the Catholic conservatives' beliefs is grounded in the bureaucratic structure of the Catholic Church.

In order to do this, this study will look at the Protestant belief in the inerrant Bible and the gender relations portrayed there and the Catholic Churches' teaching about sexuality. This study will compare the gender relations revealed from the Protestant inerrant Bible and the Catholic Church to get an insight in how these gender relations are transformed into the views about the responsibility of poverty.

Methods

Data were collected through survey methods. Questionnaires were distributed in Catholic and Protestant churches in the Greater Lansing Area. Furthermore questionnaires were distributed in Catholic Social Services Organizations and Right to Life Pregnancy Counseling Services located in the areas between Ann Arbor and Saginaw and between Grand Rapids and Detroit.

In relation to the churches where the questionnaires were distributed, focus was given to those religious organizations composed of mainly white members. Studies have shown, in relation to Protestant evangelicals (Gilens 1999; McConkey 2001; Stacey 1996), that both black and white evangelicals have the same orthodox social values regarding the protection of the family in opposition to sexual permissiveness, divorce, gay marriage and especially abortion. African American evangelical Protestants are concerned about the breakdown of the family, as white evangelicals are, but they do not search for the causes of the phenomenon entirely in feminism, secular humanism or the liberal elites. African Americans search for the causes first and foremost, in economic

and social problems (Green et al. 1996: 186).

Antiracist words have not been able to erase the Christian Right's long history of continuing support for a host of politics that disproportionately hurt African Americans (Berlet and Lyons 2000: 264). Despite similar gender ideology and religious dogma of African American conservative Protestants and the Christian Right, the former are demographically very distinct from the Christian Right (Park and Reimer 2002). Michael Emerson and Christian Smith (2000) investigated the reason why black and white evangelicals are not united. White evangelicals are more individualist and less structural in their explanations of black-white inequalities than other white Americans, and they cite lack of effort as the reason why individuals are not successful in the workforce or marketplace. With all the social traditionalism and religious rigor that African American evangelical Protestants share with their white counterparts, they directly feel the socio-economic implications of Christian Right policies align with the Republican Party. Most of the African Americans vote Democratic, and this is maintained for African American evangelicals (Wilcox and Rozell 2000). Betty DeBerg (1998) proposes that the Christian Right in the current political context is consolidated by and large as a white movement not only opposing government involvement with respect to welfare but also affirmative action at all levels. The principal target audience of the Christian Right remains the white community (Green 1995).

This focus regarding race was applied to Protestant conservatives in evangelical and fundamentalist churches, only. With respect to the Catholic Church there is no Church organizational distinction between parishes possible, as is the case with the Protestant counterpart, where most evangelical and fundamentalist churches are independent and

free of any overarching organization. Also, there are relative few African American Catholics in the United States. About three percent of all Catholics in the United States are African American (Backgrounder 2009). Also in relation to the distribution of questionnaires to Catholic Social Services and Right to Life Pregnancy Counseling Services located in Mid Michigan, no restrictions were applied as means of getting some phenomenological insight into the demographic composition of the service centers approached.

Findings

The results of this dissertation reveal that religious conservatives' views about the individualist responsibility for poverty, is based on distinct belief structures for Catholics and Protestants. For Catholic conservatives the structures are based on their sexual morality. For Protestants, structures are based on their hierarchical gender ideology. However, findings about the concept of ahistorical religiosity suggest that religious conservatives' values about sex and gender are not directly transformed into the views about the causes of poverty but through distinct beliefs that are rooted in the Catholic and Protestant religions. Catholic conservatives transform their sexual morals into their beliefs through abortion attitudes. For Protestant conservatives, their frequency of Bible reading is the means through which their hierarchical gender ideology is transformed into beliefs.

The findings suggest, however, that it is not the religious beliefs about abortion and the frequency of Bible reading that is associated with the view about poverty. Abortion ideology and frequency of Bible reading are the means through which sexual morality is made salient to the Catholics and that makes the hierarchical gender ideology salient to

the Protestants.

Results also indicate that the factual gender relations revealed from religious conservatives' domestic labor distribution does not influence their views about the responsibility for poverty. However, their views and beliefs about gender relations are distinctly structured for Catholics, in a different way than for Protestants. For Catholics, gender relations beliefs are based on their sexual morality, for Protestants on phenomena indicating hierarchical gender ideology. These findings are parallel to those of the religious conservatives' views about the individualist responsibility for poverty, indicating that the ideology about gender hierarchy and sexual morality influence Protestant and Catholic conservatives' economic view about the individualist responsibility for poverty more so than their actual gender relations.

Outline of the Project

Chapter One describes the association between the conservative Protestant and Catholic religious dogmas and the believers' moral values. The chapter explains how the most emphasized moral values of the faithful in the historical context of gender equalitarian tendencies are sexual morals. Sexual morals are examined in relation to specific Protestant and Catholic religious features. It also explains why the specific sexual morals of Catholic and Protestant conservatives are not traditional, but ahistorical and apart from an empirical development of religious dogma and morality. This chapter argues that it is sexual morality that makes the religion salient to the believer.

Chapter Two propounds that sexual morality is structured in an ideology of gender hierarchy that has its origin in the male bread winner model, which occurred as a result of the onset of the transformation of society from an agricultural to an industrial basis in the

19th century. This chapter puts the ideological structure of the male bread winner in ahistorical perspective and in relation to the specific Protestant and Catholic conservative dogmas. It proposes that the structure of moral beliefs for Catholic conservatives is their sexual morality and for Protestant conservatives their hierarchical gender ideology. The concept of neo-patriarchy sheds light on the difference between factual gender relations of the everyday situation of religious conservatives and their world view beliefs about the gender relations.

Chapter Three shows the relationship between the moral values of the religious conservatives and their economic world view. It proposes that Catholic and Protestant conservatives' ahistorical perceptions about morals are related to their views about the responsibility for poverty. It argues that the association between moral values and economic attitudes for Protestants is based on their hierarchical gender ideology, as compared to Catholics, for whom the association is based on their sexual morality.

Chapter Four presents the strategy and process of data collection. The chapter further describes the variables used in the analysis. Finally, the chapter presents the analytical tool used to interpret the data.

Chapter Five displays the results of the analysis from this thesis. It displays the analysis about the concept of ahistorical religiosity, the findings about neo-patriarchal gender relations, and the evaluation of the religious conservatives' views about the responsibility for poverty.

Finally, Chapter Six discusses the results and their implications. This chapter summarizes the results with respect to the hypotheses dealt with in this dissertation. The study's limitations as well as further research are also discussed.

Chapter 1

THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR

Strict Religious Dogma: The Fundamentalist Context of the Focus on Morality

In the next few pages I discuss Protestant fundamentalist and Catholic conservative dogma in order to develop the grounds to an insight into the association between strict dogma and moral values. In this chapter I present the fundamentalist background of strict Christian dogma, which provides a context for a discussion of how ahistorical¹ religiosity has sexual connotations, based on the current historical context of gender egalitarian ideology in the larger society. By ahistorical I mean there is nothing in the core of the Church's tradition of rites and sacraments that is produced by the human mind or configured by cultural and historical circumstances. The characteristics of ahistorical religiosity of the Catholic Church are that her traditions are unconstructed by human experience or time. In this respect the symbols of the ahistorical dogma are made changeless and errorless (Gilkey 1974). The features that make Protestantism ahistorical I see located in the claim of inerrancy of the Bible. The ahistorical character of inerrancy lies in the rejection of any hidden meaning of the Biblical words that could be interpreted in various historical perspectives and the perceived objectivity excludes a contested interpretation of the Bible (Barr 1978).

This background is essential to understanding my discussion of ahistorical religiosity in the following subchapters. For Protestant conservatives, sexual morality and the fight against moral decay are necessary for salvation, and for Catholic conservatives, these are indispensable to reach God's grace. The discussion shall be the grounds for

¹ The term "ahistorical" was suggested to me by Gene Burns in a conversation in May 2007.

understanding why the association between strict dogma and moral values is transformed into hierarchical gender ideology and opinions about the causes of poverty.

Moral values have become a political issue during the last 30 years, some literature says, as a backlash to the protest movements of the 1960s' (Sanbonmatsu 2002). Other writing (Dionne 2008) purports moral values have become politicized as a defense against the feared atomization of society that was seen as a consequence of the breakup of authority structures. There is no challenge to the argument, however, that the advent of moral values has come from people who follow conservative religious dogma (Brady and Han 2006; Campbell 2006; Evans 2003; Soper 2001). They consist of Protestant fundamentalists and evangelicals, as well as those from other conservative religions, such as the Catholic and Jewish religions. What they all have in common is a traditional heritage with respect to social values. They generally seek to limit legal abortion, eliminate all laws that protect gays from job and housing discrimination, and alter the curriculum in the public schools in a variety of areas ranging from sex education to biology to the latter to include creationism besides Darwin, and history (Green et al. 1996; Smidt 2001; Wilcox 2000; Woodberry and Smith 1998).

Among these traditionalists, doctrinal rigor is cited most often in empirical literature, as in Protestants reading the Bible literally and believing in the apocalypse and revivalism (Guth et al. 1997; Guth et al. 1996b; Legee and Kellstedt 1993a). Doctrinal rigor in Catholicism includes the belief in the infallibility of the Pope and the vertical male Church hierarchy as sole mediator of the sacraments (Evans 2002; Manning 1999). In order to understand why religious conservatives are attracted to moral values is to understand why people with strict religious dogma are against abortion, gay rights or sex

education in the public schools.

Early surveys about abortion (Ginsburg 1989; Granberg 1978; Luker 1984; Neitz 1981; Spitzer 1987) show that the more people were religious the more they revealed sentiments against abortion. Harold Grasmick and colleagues (1990) found that personal religiosity was too unspecific and not the determining factor related to values collected under the umbrella term “social traditionalism.” They found that specific doctrine, not commitment to one’s religion (church attendance, prayer), was important in determining support for social traditionalism—expressed in an ideology of a gender divided family structure and fundamentalist doctrine (measured as reading the Bible literally)—and showed the strongest positive direct effect on traditionalism. Others (Guth et al. 1996a; Jelen 2000; Tamney 2002) have revealed that people with fundamentalist beliefs show the strongest opposition to abortion, gay marriage, or other topics regarding moral values. Fundamentalists split from Protestant mainline church groups, like the Presbyterians and Methodists and later the Baptists at the end of the 19th century, and started to consolidate themselves into their own faiths. Modernists and fundamentalists disagreed about how to read the Bible and modernizers started to reinterpret the Bible (Barr 2002; Harris 2002). As I provide the discussion in the following subchapters, questions of social morality based on gender hierarchy were among the most important ones of this dispute.

Fundamentalists, the literature says (Dinges 1993; Marsden 2006: 235) are more radical in degree of applying religious dogma and social values literally than other Protestants, such as the evangelicals. The content of the fundamentalists’ religious dogma is basically not different of the evangelicals’. The literature finds this matter of degree reflected in the dogma of Protestantism in general and fundamentalism in particular

(Marsden 1987). An emphasis on sin is paramount in Protestantism, and in the stricter religious rigor of the fundamentalist tradition the focus is on the apocalypse which expresses the multitude of punishments for humans' sinful behavior (Berlet and Lyons 2000; Harris 1998; Vinz 1997). The social issues involved are linked to moral values over abortion, gay marriage and family traditions.

Protestant Conservative Dogma: Morality against Apocalypse and Sin

According to apocalyptic belief, social phenomena like high divorce rates, abortion and crime are testimony for the biblically predicted end of all times, indicating that moral values have been abandoned and the once hegemonic social traditions of the pious are endangered (Fischer 2006; Marsden 1991: 36, 162). In other words, sin is perceived in connection with "value" deterioration. In the pre-millennial² dispensational perspective, the advent of legalized abortion has the symbolic value that the reign of sin in society has reached crisis levels (Hunter 1983: 30) that can only be relieved through the second coming of Christ.

Even though apocalyptic world views have flourished in periods of world crisis since early Christendom, and in non-Christian religions as well, Ernest Sandeen (1978) shows in his historical comparative analysis that pre-millennialism is not a feature of early Christianity. It did not occur until after the start of the 19th century. Until that time, Christians in general, and more specifically evangelicals, had been taught not to expect the second coming during their lifetime. It would arrive after the biblically announced millennium and, therefore, be hundreds of years away with time to work for the social

² Pre-millenarian Protestant theology is eschatological and sees society sinking into disaster before the second coming of Christ, when he will install 1000 years of peace for the saved ones (Sandeen 1978).

betterment of society (Sandeem 1978: 4, 12)³.

Despite the end-times atmosphere seen in the pre-millennial dispensationalist worldview, the doctrine reveals a remedy for salvation: belief in living a life that conforms to the literal truth of the Bible through denouncing social decay and fighting the moral deterioration of society (Boyer 1992: 93, 97; Lawrence 1995). The doctrine requests the personal acceptance of Christ as one's savior. Conservative Christians are concerned only with the perfection of saved individuals, and this perfection is what leads those individuals through the struggle against moral decay (Kepel 1994 p.121).

Catholic Conservative Dogma: Moral Militancy for Grace through Obedience to Church Hierarchy

While the link between the Protestant conservative dogma and the urge to protect traditional values seems evident as a means to gain salvation, it cannot explain why other religious conservatives are committed to moral militancy. Though Catholicism does not emphasize apocalypse, sin and textual truth, Catholic conservatives, like the fundamentalist Christians, are ardent fighters against abortion (Cuneo 1989). They believe that, as an expression of activism for their faith, they are defenders of social traditionalism and especially of their Church's emphasis on a patriarchal hierarchy (Cuneo 1997). In contrast to the apocalyptic God who requires the perfection of saved individuals, Catholicism emphasizes grace through sacraments, which transports salvation through the mediation of the Church—a hierarchy that begins with God and is

³ Not all millenarian interpretations of Protestant theology see the end-times as disastrous. Another eschatology that is more optimistic emphasizes the continued success of the church, the steady improvement of men and society, and the eventual culmination of Christianity in the coming of a literal millennium (Sandeem 1978: 5), at the end of which Christ's second coming would occur. Post-millennialism often has a politically liberal connotation because it implies that the second coming will occur after people had been working on the betterment of society to improve it to divine kingdom-like conditions. The idea developed from Calvinism about the betterment of men and society within a theocratic state (Vinz 1997).

passed through the Church to the 'ordinary humans.' (Gilkey 1974) The dogmatic conservatism in Catholicism that is comparable to Protestant fundamentalism⁴ lies in the rituals and in the male Church hierarchy.

Catholic conservatives are loyal to Rome. They believe Papal teachings are inerrant and decisions are final (Hebblethwaite 1988). They believe it is essential to follow the Vatican's teachings in order to gain God's grace (Miller 1993). This rigidity starkly contrasts with mainline Catholic laypersons who do not strictly follow the Vatican, especially in matters of teaching moral values like *humane vitae* and the sacrament of marriage (D'Antonio et al. 1989).

Since the Second Vatican Council (1962 and 1965) the Catholic Church has officially started to deal with pluralism and liberal ideology. Liberal bishops and theologians participated in deciding which doctrine and ritual counted for salvation rather than the magisterial teaching of the Vatican alone (Hebblethwaite 1986). One of the major changes after Vatican II involved an incision in the vertical male hierarchy. Women were allowed to take over the functions of local church services that had been previously reserved only for the priests as the sole mediators of sacraments (Kelly 1999; Perl and McClintock 2001). Catholic conservatives say this is a misinterpretation of Vatican II. Richard Schoenherr (2002)⁵ propounds that the changes introduced through Vatican II resulted in a dramatic loss of the mystery and supernatural

⁴ There is a discussion in the literature about whether Catholic fundamentalism exists in the first place since fundamentalism has been linked to textual inerrancy (Cuneo 1995, Dinges 1993, Weaver and Appleby 1995).

⁵ The Vatican II council affirmed the fundamental freedom of men and women and the primacy of conscience in the process of moral decision-making. This replaced the customary preoccupation with objective norms and obligations. So, the Council gave implicit legitimacy to a degree of dissent from the moral strictures, sexual or otherwise, publicly proclaimed by the Church (Greeley 1985). Greeley insists, however, with or without Vatican II, obedience to Catholic moral teaching would not have survived the 1970s or 80s, when the sexual revolution reached the larger society.

power that the system had previously held of the clearly predicted mediation of God's grace and the way to salvation.

Catholic conservatives, believing in the righteousness of Vatican teaching, see their place in God's grace jeopardized by the liberal changes that the Church hierarchy has tolerated. These conservatives want to revitalize the Church through a campaign of moral militancy (Weaver and Appleby 1995b). They claim that the U.S. bishops focus most of their attention on unemployment and economic justice and, therefore, treat abortion as a secondary issue, diffusing their passion for fetal life. They make Catholic bureaucrats responsible for the liberalism in the Church and locate problems of moral disobedience within the laxness of bishops and priests who do not follow up with Papal teachings of religious catechism and sexual morality (Cuneo 1997: 48).

The reason why moral values are central in conservative Catholic and Protestant dogma is because they show the believer the way to salvation. For Protestant fundamentalists this is an individual matter, a personal relationship with God through his words in the Bible, as compared to the Catholic conservatives who reach God's grace through the mediation of Church bureaucracy.

Religious Salience in Ahistorical Religiosity: The Importance of Sexual Morality

We saw above that moral values are a means to reach salvation for the religious conservatives. Why is this so and what is the meaning of the moral?

Catholic Ahistorical Religiosity

Several authors have investigated how dogma is linked to the ideological structure of a particular religious tradition (Dinges 1986; Fiorenza 1993; Marsden 2006; Weaver 1993). They have compared Catholic conservative dogma with Protestant

fundamentalism. William Dinges (1986: 261) found that the main zeal for the Protestant and Catholic conservatives is the spiritual warfare for truth and righteousness. He shows that both religious groups profess to be objective. Focusing on Catholicism, he propounds that, according to the conservatives, there is nothing in the core of the Church's tradition of rites and sacraments that is produced by the human mind or configured by cultural and historical circumstances. The characteristics of ahistorical religiosity of the Catholic Church are that her traditions are unconstructed by human experience or time. In this respect the symbols of the ahistorical dogma are made changeless and errorless, and Langdon Gilky (1974: 28) argues that the nearly 500-year-old Catholic rites (established at the Council of Trent: 1545-63) are in this perspective autonomous or independent of experiential grounding and ultimately independent of philosophical questioning.

If we take into consideration that Catholic conservatives' way to God's grace leads through obedience to the Church hierarchy and moral militancy, John Paul's II philosophy about humans and the world, too, can be understood as ahistorical. Peter Hebblethwaite (1986; 1988) analyzed the religio-political decisions that John Paul II took and thinks the social justice pronouncements against wars and poverty for which he was known were clearly second in importance behind his policies on sexual morality. His reasoning about sexuality was, according to Hebblethwaite, lacking any historical dimension and was bare of any insight about the human consciousness. John Paul's II view of humans was constructed without consideration of any historical or natural experience. Hebblethwaite (1986: 46) insists that, according to the Pope's human philosophy, people do not experience a work situation or a relation to human rights, but he was viewing humans as if they were purely philosophical entities about whom he

could draw general conclusions about the proper conditions of work, the defense of human rights, or the errors of Marxist collectivism.

This ahistorical and abstract thought, however, is not simply a reaction to modernity. Catholic traditions were not dehistoricized by definition in pre-Vatican II rule. They also do not constitute original Catholic tradition. Rawlinson (1926: 117) already compared two visions of papacy eight decades ago: one in which the pope claims to be the organ of truth, who is responsible to God alone and the faithful are bound to obey, and the second in which the papacy is the organ for articulating the experience of the Christian body as a whole, where the Church's function is not to promulgate truth but to regulate the general line of Christian thought.

Sexual Morals as Power Structure of the Catholic Hierarchy

Ahistorical religiosity makes it clear to the individual Catholic conservative as to how to behave in order to reach salvation. The errorless character of the ahistorical rituals that mediate God's grace leaves no uncertainty in being included in the community of those saved for eternity. Above, we saw that the way to salvation leads through moral values. The question remains, why are moral values for Catholic conservatives based on sexuality and not, for example, on social justice?

The answer lies in the ideological structure of the American Catholic Church. In his analysis of the Vatican's religious ideology, Gene Burns (1992) determined that ideology is a power structure through which the Catholic Church maintains the authority that she derives entirely from religious and moral issues. Specifically, the Vatican's power is based on an ahistorical view about sexuality that becomes obvious if the Church's dealings with the laity's sexuality are put into a historical perspective. Burns (1992)

investigated the historical reason for this development and showed that, with the separation between church and state that occurred with the advent of the nation states in 19th century Europe, the Catholic hierarchy started to ideologically distinguish issues of faith and morals on the one hand, and issues of politics and social problems on the other. Until the 19th century, states had some say about Church internal personnel politics and, in turn, the Church had the right to be the priority religion in those states. When the nation states stopped enforcing these former rights, the Church could not be involved in state politics any more. As a consequence of this loss of state-based power, Rome increased its emphasis on the faith and morals of Catholic individuals and families to maintain the basis of its religious authority.

Burns (1999: 68, 74, 77) shows that Catholics' sexual morality is one of the few areas of Catholics' lives in which Rome can claim absolute authority. The Vatican derives this authority from its interpretation of Natural Law (in Catholic religion, God's will) in which sexuality must only have the intention of procreation, and any deviation from that intention is mortally sinful (Burns 1999: 78; Kissling 1999). The ahistorical character of the Vatican's interpretation of Natural Law regarding sexuality can be seen in that it is bare of any inclusion of the believers' consciousness. Vatican II, had after all, affirmed the fundamental freedom of men and women and recognized the importance of conscience in the process of moral decision-making. So, the Council implicitly gave legitimacy to a degree of dissent about the moral rules (Greeley 1985). Mary Jo Weaver (1999: 92) argued that the Vatican's refusal to give any weight to the belief that "God's revelation continues to unfold in human experience" is responsible for its logic in matters of sexuality. It precludes any change of the view of the Church hierarchy with respect to

contraception, abortion, homosexuality, divorce, or remarriage -- all issues linked to the range of sexuality. The reason, Weaver (1999) says, is the Church will not understand sexual pleasure that is not open to procreation. The hierarchy's refusal to see sexuality in the light of human experience is ahistorical because sexuality without taking human experience into consideration comes down to a philosophical entity (about which the Church hierarchy seems to draw conclusions as necessary for its power maintenance).

The visibility of sexism in organized Catholic religion is highlighted today by the relative decline of sexism in secular society (Martos and Hegy 1998: 19). Most American Catholics ignore Vatican teaching on matters of sexuality, specifically contraception, divorce or remarriage (Weaver 1999). The distance between lay Catholics and the hierarchy is most effectively visible in relations to controversies around abortion and homosexuality. Abortion is to the Vatican (including the American bishops) of such overwhelming importance that the hierarchy does not hesitate to condemn or endorse certain government policies, or to ex-communicate pro-choice Catholic politicians (Burns 1992: 109), as American bishops threatened to do in the 1990s. Interestingly, the Vatican does not interfere so strongly in other social issues about which its followers disagree with its stance, such as regarding economic welfare or issues of peace and war.

However the complementary view of women, as Weaver (2006) calls the Vatican's relationship to the other half of the Catholic community, is ahistorical because the Church cannot tolerate a plurality of moral orders but is fixed into a gender hierarchical ideology. Weaver (1994) goes on in her discussion to claim that the Vatican's view on sexuality is not traditional, because traditions are pluralist. Traditional views are the wisdom of the Church that has accumulated for ages and therefore allows for a historical comparative

perspective of events. History and experience as acknowledged in the principle of the individual's primacy of conscience in the process of moral decision-making, however, make salvation uncertain (O'Meara 1990). As against this, the unquestionable vertical male Church hierarchy promises a way to salvation that is authoritative and unambiguously sacred.

Ahistorical religiosity can be summarized on the individual level for Catholics with Richard Schoenherr's (1987) notion as to capture the spirit of faith through the strictly defined truth and correct religious celebration like rituals and sacraments that are believed to guide to the truth. Regarding the Catholic hierarchy, from which the believer is acted upon through the Church bureaucracy (Burns 1999) the ahistorical is embedded in the Church bureaucracy that teaches its truth about intentional procreativity of sexuality. This truth is absolute because it is the power base of the Church. From the angle of absolute truth of intentionally procreative sexuality any historical perspective about sexuality has to be abandoned. A tradition about it cannot develop with which the faithful would be able to apply their experience and evaluate it on the background of the learned Church tradition in the process of decision making. The inclusion of the believers' consciousness – permitted in dealing with Catholic rules since Vatican II (Greeley 1985) – is not allowed with respect to sexuality.

Protestant Ahistorical Religiosity

The features that make dogmatic truth in Protestantism ahistorical have their origin in the inerrant Bible. The ahistorical character of inerrancy lies in the rejection of any hidden meaning of Biblical words. The perceived objectivity excludes a contested interpretation of the readings. Faith on this background depends, according to James Barr

(1978), on the formal structure of the text. The belief in inerrant objectivity is essential because, if one part is questionable, others can be questioned, too, and the belief system breaks apart. Protestant fundamentalists have the desire to establish a firm, rational basis for Christian belief (Marsden 1991: 162,167). They regard the Bible as filled with scientific statements and interpret the scripture as referring to literal historical events that are being described exactly.

Thus, rather than the irrationality of emotionalism with which fundamentalism has often been identified, it is rationality upon which the conservative religious dogma is based (Tilley 1993: 194). The “super rationality” (Fiorenza 1993) of the inerrant Bible discounts human experience and any historical accounts. The strong emphasis put on the inerrancy of the scripture generates a negative attitude towards empirical interpretations and the historical development of theology in general. It upholds what is thought to be traditional orthodox Christian doctrine (Lazarus-Yafeh 1988: 27, 35), but lacking any development over time, the doctrine is ahistorical. The traditions of the ahistorical dogma are “invented” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) because they were created as a response to the novel situation of changing gender relations and because the lack of precedent for change or the resistance to change precludes the dogma’s social development.

The declination of social development of dogma that comes from the perception that the Bible is inerrant precludes any leverage in interpreting the Biblical text. Sandeen (1978: 13) shows that there was a pre-inerrant Bible reading of the early 19th century where spiritualized and figurative fulfillment was sought for every biblical prophecy. But in the inerrant Bible, mystical, metaphorical, and symbolical perceptions of reality have largely disappeared. There is no veil over the meaning of symbols. Dispensationalist

belief contends that allegorical and spiritualized interpretations of prophecy are a manifestation of unbelief and a denigration of the authority of the scripture (Marsden 1991; Sandeen 1978: 131).

The request for theological interpretation of the Bible as inerrant is not something pertaining to original Christendom but a consequence of the quarrel between theological traditionalists and modernists (Harris 1998: 29). The emphasis on the ahistorical inerrancy of the Bible started then, when liberalizing theological trends threatened the values of the traditionalists.

Biblical Control over Sexual Morality: Gender Hierarchy as Means of Salvation

The ahistorical interpretation of the Bible guides the believer to the absolute truth of a value system that is inerrant and therefore shows a clear objective in the beliefs that lead to salvation. Above, we saw that the way to salvation leads through moral values. Also, in the context of conservative Protestantism, we have to ask why moral values are linked to sexuality and not to other value systems, such as those framed from the social gospel. In the Catholic conservative context, morality is entirely intertwined with the power structure of the Church hierarchy and its view that sexuality has to be intentionally procreative. As will be proponed below, in the Protestant conservative context, sexual morality is also an important ground of religious authority.

The culture that gave rise to the ahistorical dogma of conservative Protestantism was deeply concerned with matters of scripture and gender. Margaret Bendroth (1993:33, 51) investigated the beginning of the biblical inerrancy movement at the end of the 19th century, led by Princeton Calvinist theologians, and their insistence that women's

subordination is inherent in the created order. The movement unified to resist liberalizing theological and social trends that started to move away from Biblical literalism and from the gender hierarchy that is linked to that literalism (Harris 1998: 21). It started at the time when the majority status of Protestant pietistic values began to be challenged by Catholic and other religious immigration and could not culturally reproduce themselves any longer under conditions of urbanization, industrialization and secularization.

Martin Riesebrodt (1993: 197), who studied Protestant fundamentalism and Iranian fundamentalist Shiism comparatively, argues that fundamentalism is a reaction to the structural transformation of interpersonal relationships in all social spheres: gender, labor, and race. The authority of interpersonal relationships in Protestant hegemonic times was based on unquestioned power structures that were ultimately rooted in “the personalistic principle of piety” (Riesebrodt 1993: 207). Personalistic is understood as religious individualism in which Protestant conservatives are, through the Bible’s word, in direct contact with the beyond (Kepel 1994: 114). Contrary to the principle of piety the structure of the interpersonal relationships had become a matter of legitimization based on performance. In the replacement of pietism with performance in respect to interpersonal relationships lies the frame for immorality. Adherence to ahistorical dogma is, following Riesebrodt’s (1993) fundamentalism analysis, a protest against the dissolution of patriarchal structures, not only in the family, but also in economics and politics. The perception of immorality has, then, to do with the changing structures of power that were previously rooted in the Bible, within which people have interacted in relatively uncontested ways. However, the erosion of patriarchal norms and structures takes place most visibly in the sphere of the family, in the relationship between the

sexes and, therefore, in the definition of sexual morality.

From her analysis of conservative Protestant magazines and books, Betty DeBerg (2000) came to the conclusion that the inerrancy of the Bible is so important for the dogmatically conservative Protestants because it was the major weapon for the convention of the separate gender spheres ideology. The separation between the gendered provider – care giver spheres is taken from the literally read Bible as divinely sanctioned and a pre-requisition to avoid the calamities of sin. In the times of assaulted patriarchal values, the theologians of the inerrant Bible read that women are naturally prone to insubordination and need to be regulated into salvation. What is considered “natural” is untouched by social development and individual human experience and becomes ahistorical. The inferiority of women, Bendroth (1993: 51) shows, is traced back to the Fall--Eve’s sin to seduce Adam into disobeying God by eating from the tree of wisdom. Behind this critique is the conception of woman as the potential seducer of man into sin.

Female sexuality was considered to be an instrument of Satan by the founders of the Biblical inerrancy movement (Ruthven 2004). The punitive meaning of Satan remains unchanged throughout theological history, thus with Satan the inerrant Bible has an ahistorical view of women’s sexuality. The solution has been to render this sexuality harmless and subdue it into motherhood within a gender hierarchical family structure (Gillis 1996). The reason why control over the family is so culturally important to the Protestant conservatives is because, in the patriarchal family, the values of their religion are reproduced. Control over the family is of primary concern since it has been jeopardized, specifically in the public schools, with values formed by historically influenced human experience instead of pietistic inerrancy, namely with liberalism in sex

education and Darwinism (Balmer 1994: 56-60). The Bible-infallibility believers maintain that outside of the hierarchical man-woman-child institution, women's sexuality poses a danger to the stability of the worldly order and to religious salvation. Therefore, sexual relations outside patriarchal marriage are forbidden and taboo because they do not serve the gender-based division of labor that the Bible portrayed through channeling female sexuality into motherhood (Bendroth 2001).

In summary, the focus on the formalism of the believer's religious behavior (Schoenherr 1987) is expressed in Protestant ahistorical religiosity with the behavior such as frequency of Bible reading (see chapter 5). With respect to Protestant conservative dogma, faith depends on the formalism of the specific Biblical words in which the inerrant truth is located (Barr 2002). Viewing the inerrant truth in the Biblical words makes the hierarchical gender relations portrayed there divine and the subsequent control of female sexuality sanctioned by God (DeBerg 2000). An empirically founded view of gender relations cannot develop at a time where also religious conservative women contribute economically or provide for the household income. The ahistorical maintains the inerrancy of the Biblical truth, which not only sees the lack of gender relations as sinful on the individual level, but excluding any empirical and historical facts from social analysis, also socially detrimental. This exclusion allows for a direct link between personal sexual moral as precondition of salvation and the restructuration of society (Sennet 1994, also see chapter 3 of this thesis). From the ahistorical focus on the pure Biblical word the lack of gender hierarchy is seen as stimulating the passions – because of Eve's seduction of Adam into disobeying God (Bendroth 1993) which is seen as hindering men, in particular, from adopting a moral way of life and thereby destroying

families and plunging them into poverty and misfortune.

The question I posed at the beginning of the chapter was how strict dogma and opposition to social issues like abortion, gay rights or sex education are associated, or why religious conservatives are attracted to moral values. Both Catholic and Protestant conservative faiths focus on the assertion that they provide the absolute truth about right and wrong, how to please God and gain space in eternal life or to provoke condemnation forever. The strict dogma of absolute truth in its either or condition is ahistorical because it excludes the consideration of changing human experience in different historical contexts. Instead it leaves a clear way to salvation, and hierarchical gender ideology and sexual morality are the means to achieve it. The fundamentalist Protestant Bible and the bureaucracy of the Catholic Church both describe the truthful way of life in the context of sexual morality in order to maintain patriarchal power relations. The truth they follow is built on different dogmatic structures: the textual emphasizing the personalistic (Riesebrodt 1993) relationship to God, where the individual is directly responsible for how to gain salvation, versus the bureaucratic, where the believer is acted upon (Burns 1992) by the Church hierarchy in reaching grace.

Religious Salience: A Conservative Factor in the Current Historical

Context

Ahistorical dogma relies on a static heritage that contains all the truth necessary for dealing with the ethical problems of life without including any discussion of human experience (Fiorenza 1993: 241). The conservative political effect of the ahistorical search for truth in the current political context of discussions of gender equality comes from the view of the separate spheres and natural differences between men and women to

which religious conservatives adhere. Holding right views is normative for all other aspects of religious identity for them (Marsden 2006), and they recognize this through the salience of their beliefs.

James Guth and John Green (1993: 159) reviewed the literature about the meaning of religiosity and how it relates to some aspects of modern political life. When they measured religiosity with respect to the American political party system, they figured that it is the *strength* of attachment to religious beliefs and traditions rather than their specific content that is vital to understanding the religious underpinning of political ideology (Guth and Green 1993). The core concept of religious strength, they found, is salience, the importance that religion has in a person's life. The link of salience to religious conservatism is that the more doctrinally conservative a religious tradition is the more members say their religion is important to them. Also, religious salience was directly linked to questions of sexuality, morality and abortion, or in general, to "family values" (Guth and Green 1993: 160), all issues which are components of both Protestant and Catholic current conservative dogmas and have sexuality as their underpinnings.

Salience: A Source of Meaning and Attitude Construction

Doctrines that have unambiguous standards of truth, like a clearly defined text or prescribed rites mediated through the organizational hierarchy, are capable of making the importance of the religion salient to the believers because the unambiguousness of the doctrine provides the faithful with meaning (Salzman 2008: 15). The source of meaning is limited through the frame of the dogma of absolute truth. The sacred text is the sole source of meaning for the Protestants. All concerns are subordinated to the ultimate concern of living according to the divine will prescribed there (Elliott 2006). Catholic

conservatives perceive their religious salience as being aware of performing the right rituals mediated through the ordained Church hierarchy (Greeley 2000). High religious salience is based on a closed ideological system. It provides certainty and clear and accessible standards to guide one through the confusion of modern life. Dinges' (1987: 146) finding about the resistance to the then new and liberal Mass rituals that were introduced as a consequence of Vatican II gives support to the notion that high religious salience gives meaning to a purposeful life. Rituals, he found, are core components of Catholic identity, and their timeless uniformity allows for a clear answer as to what it means to be a Catholic.

The salience of belief also is a feature that determines an individual's specific attitudes and decisions. If various issues are salient for someone, each of the issues is competing for the person's awareness and diverts him or her from acting decisively. The more salient an issue is for one's political philosophy, however, the stronger one's activism (Kaysen and Stake 2001). This link between the believer's religious salience and the salience of his or her political ideology can be seen with the role abortion plays in the conservative religious community. David Yamane and Elizabeth Oldmixon (2006) found that high religious salience influences legislative voting, specifically on the issue of abortion. Abortion is central for the defense of traditional sexual values and often stands as representative of all phenomena of morality that are a political issue. The impact of religion upon abortion is mediated by ideology (Emerson 1996), and sexual morality is the mediator of religion upon abortion.

Protestant conservatives' salience of their religion makes them read that male headship -- their verbal expression of hierarchical gender ideology -- in gender

relationships (Denton 2004; Gallagher 2004; Gallagher and Smith 1999; Grasmick et al. 1990) is essential for a Bible conforming life. Turning away from the Bible would be grounds for sexual permissiveness. If promiscuity is not negatively sanctioned by religion, they seem to believe, pregnancy is left with the option of abortion instead of resulting in marriage. *Humanae Vitae*, the Pope's request to avoid artificial contraception, is the context for Catholic conservatives from which they link religious salience to abortion. For them, artificial contraception is the first step towards abortion because the Natural Law requirement that sexuality has to serve procreation is violated. Catholic conservatives oppose artificial contraception even though the credibility of the sexual teaching of the Church has decreased and lost legitimacy for the general laity since Vatican II (Cuneo 1997: 18; D'Antonio et al. 2001)⁶. Also, the Church hierarchy itself provides a link between religious salience and abortion. Catholic conservatives claim that US bishops treat the abortion issue secondarily and that many keep silent about the laity's disobedience regarding *Humanae Vitae*. With this contradiction to the Vatican teaching, Catholic conservatives are reminded of what is important for their religious identity. Any dispute about contraception, let alone legal abortion, is a fundamental assault on Catholicism and means a struggle over Vatican authority (Burns 1999: 69).

In that sense, religious salience is a political activator. Michael Cueno (1997: 75-79) interviewed pro-life activists and found that their activism is primarily concerned with

⁶ The credibility of the Church's sexual teaching has not declined, however, because of Vatican II, who introduced the concept of consciousness in the process of moral decision-making. The Council did give implicitly legitimacy to a degree of dissent from the moral strictures, sexual or otherwise, publicly proclaimed by the Church. Greeley (1985: 18) insists that with or without Vatican II, obedience to Catholic moral teaching would not have survived the 1970s or 80s, when the sexual revolution touched the larger society. In addition, the concept of absolute truth is not simply a pre-Vatican II concept. Catholic orthodox tradition has left space for interpretation of dogma already in the 19th century, with Cardinal Newman taking into consideration laity consciences under God even when confronted by papal prohibition for teaching about artificial contraception (Miller 1993: 302).

expressing their religious convictions and solidarity. It means, for them, fighting the hedonistic consumerism of modern life in which the sacredness of created life is marginal. Activism against abortion may be understood, Cuneo maintains, as a protest against the moral softness of mainstream Catholicism in the United States. Kathy Rudy (1996: 55, 56) found for Protestants the same direct link between religious salience and abortion. She shows that participants of the anti-abortion activist group Operation Rescue believe salvation will be granted to those who have sacrificed by risking embarrassment and arrest when picketing in front of abortion clinics. The sacrifice they give, Riesebrodt (1993) proposes, is the eschatological context to prepare for salvation. Accordingly, the ideological grounds of the political salience of abortion are moral values, and anti-abortion cannot be separated from religious conservatism. At the same time, abortion has been given high public salience by the media (Ferree and Gamson 1999), so moral values have been of high political concern for religious conservatives.

The closed ideological system of ahistorical religiosity provides a clear structure for what it means to be a religious conservative and why this is important to the believer. Sexual morality is the object, the background of which makes religion salient to the conservatives, and the struggle with abortion is how they express their religious salience publicly. Fred Kerlinger (1984: 31) called this construct the critical referent. It is the object of an individual's attitude and is relevant for his or her everyday life. The object of public expression might change, or other political issues might be added to abortion, as it seems to be the case with gay marriage in the last few years (Nivola and Brady 2006; Suarez 2006: 91). The strength of attachment to their religious beliefs makes Christian conservatives aware of their religion's importance in their everyday life. Sexual morality

is a powerful base upon which the salience of their beliefs is nourished.

Chapter 2

THE FACTOR GENDER IDEOLOGY

The Transformation from Traditional to Negotiated Gender Relationships

During the Enlightenment the male-female hierarchy was called into question. The promise of the Enlightenment was that the God-given power structure of class and gender could be circumvented by the vision that humans can control the world through knowledge (McCarthy Brown 1994). What was thought to be natural had become social. God was being replaced through reason. Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pierson (1998) explain that the dwindling of traditions forces us to think in terms of risk. Tradition and nature structured landscapes of action in the past. As things became non-natural and non-traditional, more human decisions could and had to be made about the social and natural worlds. Reproduction changed from being a given in nature to a decision-making process about both starting a family and having sex. It should be understood that people in pre-modern times had to take risks, too. Giddens and Pierson's (1998: 111) argument rests on the assumption that the lack of absolute authority to turn to brings insecurity. So with piety being pushed into voluntarily following God's will in the secular society, we are simultaneously both experts and lay people in different areas of our lives. At one point we are just forced to make a decision without any ultimate authority to which we can turn. Some find this quite difficult, but that is the reality of modernity.

Giddens (1992) proposes that sexuality serves as a metaphor for the changes taking place in society. He argues that sexuality has been integrated into the ideals of love and

connected closely to the moral values of Christianity, as one should devote oneself to God (i.e., love him) in order to know him. Through this process, self-knowledge is achieved. This became part of a mystical unity between man and woman, and suggests a more permanent involvement with the love-object. Modernity replaced the arbitrary rule of mysticism and dogma (Giddens 1992: 40) because of the ascendancy of reason that promises an understanding of the physical and social processes in everyday life.

Sexuality ceases to have tradition and nature as its main reference but the more self identity is shaped by reflexivity, the more it becomes a property of the individual. All relationships can then be called into question by a partner when the situation is felt to be unfair or suppressive (Giddens 1992: 192). Giddens shows modernity needs a balance between openness, vulnerability and trust. The lack of socially accepted pietistic rules is problematic in the sense that it is personally demanding and forces the individual to be accepting and appreciative of the other.

This situation of risk that we experience in our everyday personal relationships⁷ in the United States pluralist society is contrary to the principle of religious salience that Christian conservatives perceive in the pietistic community. As I outlined in the last chapter, religious conservatives' sexual morality and gender ideology is a critical referent (Kerlinger 1984) for their religious salience. It helps for attitude construction and decisions in everyday life and through the clear and accessible standards that the strict dogmas provide religious conservatives' sexual morality is a closed ideological system and provides certainty about right and wrong. As such, sexual morality and hierarchical gender relations can be understood as a guide protecting against the confusion of modern life.

⁷ This includes not only private relationships but those we experience at the work place or see in public life.

Protestant and Catholic conservatives' high level of religious salience about their religious traditions and sexual morality also point to the discrepancy between what is important about who they are and what they see as social decay in the larger society. The discrepancy they envision in the larger society is jeopardy to their salvation because they fear the hedonistic values will intrude upon their own religious communities, through social institutions like the public schools or the work place, in which they necessarily participate for a living. They refer the social decay that they perceive to the role of women in society, specifically to their sexuality (Hawley 1999; Stacey 1996). Women's sexuality has been an aspect of control over the believer throughout the entire history of Christianity (Ranke-Heinemann 1990; Runkel 1998). However, as I intended to show with my discussion of salience of ahistorical religiosity in the previous chapter, it is religious conservatives' identity that is linked to this aspect of gender hierarchy in Christianity. There is a link between identity and belief in sexual morals and hierarchical gender relations because Protestant salvation and Catholic grace of the faithful depend on this link. This is specifically reflected upon the current context of relative descendant sexism as women in the larger society have moved into leadership positions in the workplace and in politics. From that discrepant perspective of gender hierarchy that the religious conservatives advocate and relative descendant sexism in the larger society, women's sexuality is considered potentially disruptive. On the grounds of these concerns, religious conservatives sense it is important to regulate (women's) sexuality through religious traditions.

Traditions implement quite specifically structured relationships and an ethical regulation of life conduct (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). A value system, where

“traditional” sexual morality is the critical referent, does necessarily have a hierarchical gender ideology. Within this gender ideology, the ethical regulation of life conduct is derived from patriarchal structural principles and from culturally specific patriarchal forms. This point of view necessarily implies an ideological power hierarchy between the genders, with men being allocated the lead. As I will explain below in the section of neo-patriarchy, the meaning of hierarchy has to be qualified in a pluralist society like the United States. Bendroth (2006) contends that the gender division of labor that fundamentalists extract from the inerrant Bible as indispensable for a religious life does not define the political or theological agenda of the recent evangelical movement. But she acknowledges that fundamentalists’ resistance to women in leadership positions and the equating of women’s issues as theologically liberal goes back to the ongoing influence of some fundamentalist ideological structures.

In what follows, I will give an overview of the theory of gender systems/gender relations that emphasizes the cultural background of the gender ideology that is analyzed. Sexual morality is the cultural background, on which religious conservatives’ gender relations are analyzed. In addition, I look at the specific Protestant and Catholic religious cultures of the faithful to see whether there is a difference between the two faiths with respect to gender relations on the grounds of their sexual morality. This distinction will provide a preview to the next chapter where the association between sexual morality and the view about poverty will be investigated. The relevant concern is whether the distinct Catholic and Protestant conservative cultures demonstrate a difference in the views about poverty. At the end of this chapter I review the empirical literature on what Riesebrodt (1993) calls neo-patriarchy. It refers to the fact that any social group that wants to

preserve specific traditions adapts to some of the social changes in the pluralist society and creates new forms of the traditions that they want to preserve. That section shall show how religious conservatives' gender relations reflect or not the gender relations in larger society and shall prepare for the next chapter in which I will follow the question regarding how religious conservatives' gender ideology is linked to their economic ideology.

The Theory of Gender Relations

Cultural and Interpersonal Factors of the Gender Systems Approach

The principles of patriarchy imply a general submission of women under men in all labor-based cultural settings. The theory of gender systems (Crompton 1999) sees patriarchy not as the totality of gender relations in a specific context but as one kind of many other possible gender relations in the totality of the gendered context. Patriarchy is only a part of the gender systems. It might be used to describe particular kinds of gender relations as, for example, the hierarchical relationship of men and women in fundamentalist churches or the Catholic Church as compared to similar employment situations in relatively egalitarian positions. The theory of gender systems (Crompton and Harris 1999: 1-9) recognizes that cultural and interpersonal factors structure gender relations. It will recognize that the different cultural contexts of church and employment situations draw along different interpersonal relationships between men and women.

I will talk about interpersonal factors when I describe the neo-patriarchal adaptation of gender relations at the end of this chapter. First I want to discuss the cultural context of domesticity with the application of the breadwinner model to the regulation of female sexuality. I will show how it shapes sexual morality and gender relations of the religious

conservatives into hierarchy, with an additional focus on how I see Protestant and Catholic conservative dogma structure their believers' sexual morality and gender ideology.

The Culture of Domesticity

The trade union movement negotiated a breadwinner wage for many years with the corporate world, with its peak in the years after the Second World War. The objective to ensure was that working men earn a salary sufficient to maintain a family (Humphries 1982). It split family work life in the middle class into a public sphere, with a salaried job market, and a private sphere, where caring for family members and domestic work was assigned to women. With the domestic organization of family life as a private sphere for women separated from the activities of the salaried work related public life of men, the ideology of women as morally superior to men started to take hold (Crompton et al. 2007: 2). This situation of the extreme division of spheres between men and women and the conceptual allocation of 'care' to women is described through the ideology of domesticity (Epstein 1981; Stacey 1996). Large parts of the ideology of domesticity come from the pietistic faiths that were a building bloc of the American culture at the end of the 19th century and which are carried on in the dogma of the religious conservatives today (Balmer 1994).

In the presentation below I want to trace the following questions: How is the factor of 'women's care' that structures the gender division of labor in the breadwinner model related to the religious conservatives' dogma? How is women's care related to unregulated sexuality's disintegrating force in conservative dogma? How much or not is the concept of women's care affecting the religious conservatives' factual gender

relations? Finally, how much is the concept of ‘women’s care’ relevant for the regulation of religious conservatives’ sexual morality today?

Protestant and Catholic conservative dogmas request for their believers’ salvation and grace requirement that women’s sexuality be regulated into motherhood as the defining female role (Balmer 1994). This has been possible only because the religious conservative culture created two very different character traits for the members of each sphere of what was, in the larger society, called the breadwinner model. DeBerg (2000) and (Sheerin 2001) present Protestant fundamentalist respectively Catholic pre-Vatican II women’s magazines where the theme of the necessity of women’s moral virtue runs through. The ideology of domesticity is structured around the context of women’s care. It contends for women to be absorbed in the persons they love while men are absorbed in the things they do. Both, the Protestant and the Catholic analysis of women’s magazines propose that domestic ideology could allocate such importance to women’s high moral status only because of the exalted role of motherhood. Motherhood is nurturing, empathic and selfless⁸.

Selflessness and even suffering for her family is portrayed as giving a woman the “dignity that best fits her dependence” (Welter 1966: 153). Women are compensated with high honor and prospective protection for their material and institutional powerlessness, if they behave normatively according to domesticated sexual morality. Religious conservative women’s reactions to abortion illustrate how their belief in domestication is an acceptance of dependency for protection. They reject the lack of morals in sexual

⁸Williams argues that the character traits describing women as “naturally” selfless lingers on in today’s time in women’s employment. She links the idea of women’s selflessness with the fact that they do the larger part of household labor in the dual earner family than their men. Crompton and her coworker’s empirical work confirmed this as recent as a few years ago.

accountability, the denial of possible motherhood, when they talk about abortion (Manning 1999: 199). Abortion reflects the ahistorical feature of the culture of “dignity form dependence on men” (Welter 1966: 153). This is because abortion rejects the principle of “male headship”(Denton 2004; Gallagher and Smith 1999) in a relationship that is so important for Protestant conservatives to gain salvation. Also, abortion denies the request of the Catholic Church that sexual relations have to be intentionally procreative in order for the believer to gain God’s grace (Weaver 2006).

In addition to being selfless in the culture of care women are responsible for controlling men’s sex drive (Division for the Advancement of Women 1994; Lienesch 1990). This feature, too, is implied from the inerrant Bible as necessary for the individual to reach salvation. If the control of men’s sex drive is not accomplished, the consequence is disruption of gender relationships. Conservative women of various religions insist that the reason for women having abortions is they are not being taken care of and are abandoned by their men (Ferree 2003).

The exaggerated imbalance between men’s economic value and women’s moral value is a modern phenomenon. Women had more economic value in pre-modern times with their labor on the farm or in the artisan shop. In the Puritan society of the late 18th century, all family members, including women and children, were expected to make an economic contribution with their skills and labor. A household was full of productive work that was supported by women, or they provided a share in the labor of their artisan men. Motherhood had been one among many of the tasks expected of women (Epstein 1981).

Biological motherhood as the norm-- and viewed as best for the child-- is a recent

phenomenon of belief. Before the 19th century, everyone who mothered was called a mother, regardless of biology. They included mistresses of brothels and the keepers of journeymen's hostels, older sisters who brought up their younger siblings, and slave women who nursed white children. Nurturing qualities were attributed to both men as well as to women throughout the medieval and early modern periods. Through the 19th century, the term to father still retained nurturing as well as generative connotations. Only in the 20th century has maternity come to bear all the weight of symbolic as well as practical meanings that once were attached to all who mothered. In the 20th century maternity became attached to the particular person who gave birth (Gillis 1996).

The emphasis of motherhood in order to explain sexuality makes deviant all desires that do not tend towards the consumption of controlled doses of domesticated heterosexuality. McCarthy Brown (1994) maintains that from the body and its appetites we glean moral codes that allow for the making of gender roles. They belong to the most basic social organizations and allow the construction of social differences between men and women. This creates the perception that passions and erotic feelings can be controlled and the belief that the world is orderly and manageable (Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2003; Siegel 2000).

Catholic and Protestant Cultural Context of the

Domestication of Sexuality

Even though both religious conservative groups talk about marriage as the only frame into which sexuality and motherhood shall be channeled, the structural grounds on which the ideology of domesticity grows is different for Protestant than for Catholic conservatives. Applying the principle of ahistorical religiosity to the domestication of

sexuality implies that the former is textual and the latter is bureaucratic. Will the different structures have an effect on the domestic ideology of Protestant and Catholic conservatives and if so, how will that ideology manifest itself? Should I expect that Protestant conservatives express their domestic ideology about sexual morality differently than Catholic conservatives? To get to an answer I examine the meaning of marriage and motherhood in the context of domesticity for the two conservative groups.

In Catholicism, the institution of marriage is sacramental since the Church declared it so at the Council of Trent (1545 and 1563). As a sacrament, marriage has been instrumental for the conservatives to be sexually active and reach God's grace. This was not always so. The council was held to make order in Church and society through the control of women and gender relations (Strasser 2004). Before the council in the 16th century, marriage was an agreement between families, corroborated through festivities, and no priest or state official had to be involved. There was no real distinction between sexual relations within marriage and outside of marriage. Only a consensus between partners was necessary (Leonard 1998; Strasser 2004: 34). The Council of Trent made marriage a sacrament. This is the reason why the cultural background upon which the Catholic conservative ideology of domesticity is based should be considered institutionally.

Since marriage is sacramental the sexual morality of the Catholic conservatives has to be looked at in the light of the sacramental institution. Pre- and extra-marital sex are a deadly sin. As a sacrament, marriage should stay unrepeatable and also institutions that are associated with sex outside marriage, like divorce, or the public schools with their curriculum offering sex education are from this view sinful. In this perspective, sex

education is not only unnecessary but harmful because it encourages potential sexuality outside of marriage (Kissling 1999; McCormick 2003). This indicates that an important part of the cultural background of Catholic conservatives' gender relations is regulated through the balance of sin and sacrament. Catholics are acted upon from the Church hierarchy and the conservatives want to follow Church teaching in order to gain God's grace. At the same time, the focus of the Church is to control sexuality through the sacramental institution of marriage that was created at the Council of Trent in order to control the parishioners' sexuality. It should be appropriate to conclude, then, that the gender division of labor that manifests the gender relations in the ideology of Catholic domesticity is secondary besides sexuality within the sacramental institution from which Catholic conservatives' view about sexual morality develops.

On the Protestant side, there is the word of the Bible which is the believers' direct connection to their God. As I outlined in describing the perspective of ahistorical religiosity in the last chapter, from the Bible comes the message that women are naturally prone to insubordination (Eve's sin to seduce Adam). The Biblical message with respect to sexual morality is that women's subordination is inherent in the created order, and thus gender division of labor is divinely sanctioned. Accordingly, it can be said that the emphasis of Protestant conservatives regarding their domestic ideology is on the gender hierarchy. That is, the religio-cultural background on which Protestant conservatives' control over women's sexuality and their view about gender relations should be looked at. That the gender hierarchy itself (less the institution of marriage) is the focus here is suggested by comments such as Ziegler's (2000: X) who insists that gender role identity was the bottom line of the development of conservative Protestantism at the end of the

19th century, and the Bible's spiritual authority was used to valorize the gender hierarchy. In this perspective, gender hierarchy is a tool against sexual promiscuity and therefore against sin and social calamities.

Protestants and Catholics consider that Phenomena of the social calamities, like high divorce rates, abortion, and gay marriage, but also other phenomena as shown from the discussion about ahistorical religiosity, like crime or unemployment, are associated with sexual promiscuity. With Protestant conservatives, those social phenomena are considered apocalyptic and growing under conditions of personal sinfulness. For Catholic conservatives they occur because the conservatives think that most Catholics do not follow the Church teaching of taking the sacrament of marriage seriously, and the middle hierarchy of the Church does not enforce this. While for Protestant conservatives, too, marriage seems to be the tool to channel sexuality in general and motherhood to regulate female sex in particular, it can be said it is a secondary cultural background of gender relations for them. The focus is the Bible's emphasis of women's submission under male leadership.

In both Protestant and Catholic conservative cultural contexts, sexuality is controlled within marriage and motherhood. But the Protestant conservatives' cultural background focuses on the gender hierarchy, the submission of woman under man. In addition, marriage and motherhood are the means to maintain this hierarchy. The Catholic conservative background emphasizes the institution of marriage in order to control female sexuality. The submission of women under men seems to be a side effect of marriage and motherhood. In one culture, the institution of marriage, in the other the ideology of women's submission or adherence to "male headship" (Bendroth 2001;

Denton 2004; Gallagher and Smith 1999) as it is called in the literature, can be implied to be the context of the regulation of their sexual morality.

Gender Division of Labor and the Concept of Neo-Patriarchy

The domestication of sexuality into a gender division of labor has been explained as a major ground for religious conservatives' regulation of sexual morality in the current historical context. The culture of 'care' allocating high moral virtues to women in the ideology of domesticity is the basis for the gender hierarchy. The roots of the concept of care come from the religious conservatives' urge to regulate women's sexuality. Before I go on to discuss how this affects economic ideology about the responsibility of poverty in the next chapter, the meaning of 'gender division' as a tool to regulate women's sexual morality has to be put in perspective of the global transformation of the United States into a postindustrial society. I will show how the gender relations of the religious conservatives changed during the last few decades. The question of whether this has affected their gender ideology and their sexual morality is examined.

Because the factual gender relations of the religious conservatives have changed, the male breadwinner model has to be considered an ideal typical of gender relations (see Crompton 1999: 205) for explaining the system of gender division in the domesticated setting. The cultural influence on gender relations from the global transformation of the division of labor makes it impossible to keep family structure and one's way of earning a living unchanged (Crompton 1999). All social groups have to adapt their lives to a certain degree to the societal forces that restructure gender relations and family life. One should not assume that religious conservative women accept the setting of domestication indistinguishably or accept gender power differentials in docility. Riesebrodt (1993: 202)

calls this the neo-patriarchal adaptation. The completely separate spheres of action that is allocated to men and women in the breadwinner model, is not realistic in Western societies like the United States. The ideology of domesticity is not physically possible and has to be understood as a conceptual separation of the sexes, not a physical one. The relations between men and women in the economic and cultural spheres and the nature of women's submission in these spheres have changed over time.

The change of the cultural context that occurred through the transformation of the gender division of labor goes along with changes in interpersonal gender relations. The theory of gender systems emphasizes the cultural context and interpersonal factors that unfold in gender relations. Cultural and interpersonal factors can structure gender relations in various ways not recognized by the implication of women's suppression from a general principle of patriarchy. Numerous studies have been conducted that show evidence of these changes in gender relations for religious conservatives. The research was conducted mainly in the field of Protestant faiths, with priority given to Protestant fundamentalists and evangelicals. There is hardly any research that looks at the gender relations of conservative Catholics, as I described them through their feature of ahistorical religiosity. This dissertation should give insight into the association of Catholic conservatives' gender ideology, their sexual morality, and their domestic relations. Also, it should provide the opportunity to compare the gender relations of Protestant and Catholic conservatives. The discussion that follows shows the literature and research done regarding the change of gender relations with respect to conservative Protestants.

Most of the Protestant conservative women contribute today to their families'

incomes with a job. They participate in the labor force in order to maintain a family standard of living. They need to earn in order to support families that have been undermined by the loss of jobs or real earnings by men, the same way as this has been occurred in the larger society. Women's paid work is, in general, followed by a changing domestic division of labor in the direction of more egalitarian gender relations (Crompton and Harris 1999: 16). However, the changes are not gradual. Women's move into the labor force has not been reflected with an equivalent share of men's participation in the household. International studies suggest women do more domestic and caring work everywhere (Crompton et al. 2007: 236). This pattern is reflected in the household of the religious conservative. Women of conservative Christian religions are not willing to exempt men from domestic labor. Fundamentalist men do participate in the household labor to the same extent as their non-fundamentalist counterparts. But fundamentalist wives have to carry the leftover of household labor from the "second shift" (Hochschild 1989). That labor is heavier for women among fundamentalists than for non-fundamentalists, because the fundamentalist women do more household work like cooking and cleaning than those not religious (Ellison and Bartkowski 2002).

An approach through general principles of patriarchy to analyze the consequence of the Christian women's labor force participation for their gender ideology would not allow account for the changes that have occurred. These women do still believe in the necessity of women to submit under men. Through looking at specific gender relations influenced from specific cultures, qualifications are possible. The theory of gender relations (Crompton and Harris 1999) makes it possible to see that the culture of the women in the paid labor force and the culture of the conservative Christian religion add up to specific

relations between man and women in the religious conservative household.

For example conservative Christian women do not reject women's submission under men, but put this principle of gender relations more in question than their husbands, and they are less supportive of patriarchal values than their husbands (Grasmick et al. 1990). As a consequence of the lesser economic dependence on men, an increase in divorce rates has occurred among them, too (Brasher 1998; Utter and Storey 2001). Their conditions are barely different from the women's domestic gender relations in the larger society (Stacey 1996: 27). The concept of care that is implied from the combination of the breadwinner model and the religious conservative dogma is not a way of life in the Protestant conservative households.

In addition to these women's changing gender relations, that is related to their participation in the labor force, the literature gives evidence of Protestant conservative women's application of power in their religious settings. They want and are able to carve out areas of power at home and in their religious institutions (Beaman 1999; Griffith 1997; Harris 2006). Also this can be analyzed applying interpersonal factors that structure the relationship between men and women in a certain cultural setting, as suggested by the theory of gender systems/gender relations (Crompton and Harris 1999). These women's urge for power and leadership in the specific cultural context of conservative Protestant gender hierarchy would not be recognized by the implication of women's suppression from a general principle of patriarchy.

Brasher (1998) and Griffith (1997) show that Protestant conservative women can retrieve power from the religious institutions they join, even though they are excluded from official positions of authority. Their adherence to submission and male authority

obtains meaning within the transition between the world in which women were largely confined to the home and a modern life in which they have to fully participate in business and public life (Griffith 1997). Brasher's (1998: 123) analysis reveals that the priority these Protestant conservative women give to religious life enables them to deal with the controversy of a modern society in which self esteem is advertised to be retrieved from paid work, but the workplace does not adapt to the needs of parenting that is still largely in the hands of women. With no paid maternal leave, commitment to parenting is not valued and childcare inadequate and barely funded. In this context, the doctrine of submission in the church network becomes a means of asserting power over bad situations (Ruthven 2004). The very emphasis on male authority in congregational and domestic life produces interpersonal conditions between men and women that have its advantages for these women. Ideologically, marriage is valued, sexual fidelity demanded, drinking discouraged. Men are expected to take an active part in bringing up their children. Female submission becomes empowerment in this frame of interpersonal relations (Brasher 1998: 199) and the concept of care is distributed to both men and women. The ideology of domesticity implies a gender division between 'care work' and 'paid work'. But with respect to both household labor and child care, there is no strict physical separation between the religious conservative men and women.

Sexual Morality within the Transformed Gender Relations

It is obvious that gender relations of the religious conservatives, as shown for Protestants, have changed towards a more egalitarian situation in the domestic setting, similar to larger society. In addition, conservative religious women do use the setting of their religious institution for empowering themselves with respect to the relations with

their husbands. I discussed in the previous chapter that religious conservatives' way to salvation is rooted in the ahistorical dogma about sexual morality and views about gender relations. In order to go about the question of how their sexual morality affects their economic ideology about the responsibility for poverty, I want to know how the transformed gender relations of the religious conservatives affect their views about gender ideology and sexual morality.

Conservative religion does influence the gender ideology of the believer towards a more gender hierarchical world view. Protestant conservative women have different *beliefs* from women who are not involved in religious institutions with strict dogma about submission to the gender hierarchy of their religious groups, sexual morality, marriage, and family oriented values (Bryant 2006; Carroll et al. 2000 / 2001: 202). Generations of fundamentalist women talk about the necessity of submission to men, and single women use terminology of submission in their courtship (Brasher 1998; Denton 2004). The gender hierarchy seems to be an important ideological concept in the worldview of conservative Christians today. They do believe in women's submission to men, which they describe as 'male headship' in the home (Bartowski 1997; Gallagher 2004; Gallagher and Smith 1999; Luckmann 1967).

The same attitude holds for sexual morality within the conservative religious context. Petersen and Donnerwerth (1997) found for conservative Protestants no decline in support for traditional beliefs about pre-marital sex between 1972 and 1993, while at the same time such beliefs declined significantly among Catholics and mainline Protestants. This opposition against sexual permissiveness held also for higher education. Schmalzbauer (1993) interviewed evangelicals with higher education and professional

jobs and saw that they adapt regarding civil liberties, gender roles and even abortion towards the mainstream, but they reveal a strict opposition against sexual permissiveness and this reaches from homosexuality to extramarital and premarital sex. Traditional sexuality, however, is linked in an intrinsic way to opposition against abortion and other issues of conservative concern about sexual carelessness (Becker and Eiesland 1997). With demographic variables controlled, Kennedy (1993) found traditional sexuality and motherhood ideologies had the strongest relationship with disapproval of legal abortion, and they are coupled with other issues of sexual concern, such as gay and lesbian rights and gender relations (Ferree and Gamson 1999: 51). Also, talk about sexuality is continuously fought through devoting major resources into sexual abstinence only curricula for the public schools (Rose 1999).

The empirical literature about Protestant fundamentalists and other conservative Christians suggests that the gender relations which the breadwinner model implies with the division of labor between women's care for her family and men's earning a salary in the market place is not a realistic way of life. The division of labor in the domestic setting is rather an ideology that prepares the grounds from which the political discourse on family values and moral ideology is structured. While gender relations have changed towards less hierarchical interaction between religious conservative men and women, the gender *values* of both men and women are influenced by the conservative religious doctrine. Conservative doctrine makes for a more gender divided *ideology* compared to those with no conservative religion. Also, the ideology of strict sexual morality has remained valid for those believing in Protestant conservative dogma. In the following chapter I will discuss how this reflects the economic ideology of the religious

conservatives.

Chapter 3

ECONOMIC ATTITUDES

Protestant Conservatives' View of Public Institutions

There is a large portion of literature that discusses the possible affinity or the lack thereof between the moral right and the fiscal conservatives. Cynthia Burack and Jyl Josephson (2002) reviewed this literature. They consider the “common wisdom that there is little affinity” (Burack and Josephson 2002:13) between the two doubtful. They find close affinities, though, between fiscal conservative and moral ideology on the political right, even though they admit there are many differences in the fundamental values of the world view of the supporters of fiscal and moral ideology.

In the 1980s Rebecca Klatch (1987) undertook the task to ascertain whether there is a common link between the two camps of right wing ideology. She found from her interviews of activist women of both the moral conservative and fiscal blocks that their beliefs had different ideological roots. The moral conservatives emphasize the “right belief” of their religion, centered on the family as the sacred unit of divinely hierarchical gender relations. The fiscal conservatives believe the rational individual is the primary element in society. They denounce any form of government intervention in the private realm as an illegitimate intrusion on individual liberty. The moral conservatives, however, want at least partial intervention. They request state endorsement for moral and religious issues, such as prohibition of partial birth abortion or gay marriage, since the strict dogma of their religion does not allow such a thing as moral neutrality about abortion or gay marriage (Marsden 2006).

Klatch (1987) did not find much convergence in the content of values between the moral and fiscal conservative factions. In fact, empirical analysis about social conservatism and economic laissez faire conservatism supports her finding that the two are minimally related (Johnson and Tamney 2001). Klatch found, however, that the two groups of conservatives converge in naming the forces responsible for their social distress. Both see American society in decline and state that regulation of the wealth of society by government is responsible. Both the fiscal conservatives and the moral conservatives hate 'big government' (Blumenthal 1986; Himmelstein 1990; Walsh 2000).

The conservatives assert that increase in the size of government has been combined with an increase in immorality. The moral conservatives' view is that one shall not force men's views (to regulate wealth) upon others if God's moral is not followed (Guth et al. 1997; Guth et al. 1996a; Kepel 1994). Welfare encourages, according to this view, immorality through rewarding illegitimacy, unwed parenthood and deviation from Bible oriented values. As outlined in the first chapter of this thesis, the Protestant ahistorical salvation history is dependent on hierarchical gender relations, because women's sexuality is seen as detrimental to men and society if not structured in marriage and motherhood. Not structured in gender hierarchy, sexuality is seen as stimulating passions that distract men from responsibility to their families and obligations in society (Balmer 1994). With values taught as those associated with sex education in the public schools, or welfare that allows motherhood without marriage, public institutions put the necessity of the gender hierarchy into question and compete with the values that the religious conservatives teach in their families. Under these conditions, the religious conservatives lose control over their families and communities (Riesebrodt 1993). The conservatives

request relief for the poor designed by the religious community, to insure that the Biblical values preparing for salvation are being followed as a condition for the economically unlucky to deserve the community's help.

Feminism also represents the extension of 'big government' at the expense of the traditional authority of the church, the neighborhood and the family (Klatch 1994: 139). Government funded progressive institutions like Planned Parenthood, the National Organization for Women, and labor unions are opposed by the religious conservatives because these institutions intrude upon gender, family and community values (Himmelstein 1990; Jelen 1991b).

In addition, the moral conservatives are in conflict with the public school system. Through the tax dependent public school with sex education and ban on religion, secularism's moral decay is maintained. The children of the religious conservatives are not only confronted with secular values and sexual issues, but religious instruction is prohibited. Because of the tax based public character of the educational system, the issue of sex education in the public school curriculum is a major component of moral politics (Irvine 2002). Regulation of society through public institutions is rejected exactly because public institutions are considered to be promoting the moral decay which the doctrinally conservatives battle against. The redistribution of wealth by the secular government is thus considered an issue of religious and moral malaise because economic success in the secular society is linked to education. The education system also includes public programs that promote feminist moral values (Sennet 1994).

The economically individualistic worldview does not mean a laissez faire ideology towards one's own poor. Rejected is bureaucratically organized welfare that construes

support as a right and is not combined with any kind of control of the religious community as to whether the prospective recipient is truly needy and deserves the help as a person who is saved and religiously and morally supervised (Riesebrodt 1993: 180).

The question of this thesis is whether religious conservatives find individualist irresponsibility or social structures the reason for poverty. Is there a difference between Catholic and Protestant conservatives with respect to their economic views? The comparison of the moral and the fiscal right suggests religious conservatives take an individualist approach.

Empirical Findings

The empirical literature does not reveal such a straightforward path. Some research found conservatism related to both social traditionalism or family values on the one hand and economic issues on the other (Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988). Others found conservatism of the religious orthodox only with respect to “family-related” issues (Davis and Robinson 1996a) but with some diversity for the doctrinally conservatives’ socio-political and economic views (Pyle 1993).

Empirical research does show consistency in two ways: in the Protestant conservatives’ political priorities for moral policy and in their activists’ unambiguously economic attitudes in addition to their moral preference. Activists who are engaged in one of the Christian Right organizations reveal that policy priority for moral values and economic issues must come secondarily. Such work in 2006 (Green et al. 2006; Petrocik 2007) found that Christian Right activists preferred moral issues eight times more than economic issues politically. Fifty nine percent of the Christian Right activists said moral issues are most important, compared to seven percent who said the economy is most

important. Their economic attitudes were based on government deregulation. Forty-six percent were strongly against more welfare spending.

The importance given to moral issues for policy application can be found, in general, throughout the Protestant conservative community. This is not surprising given the doctrinal necessity of proper morals in order to reach salvation and the idea that social problems are solved through individual moral behavior. The literature confirms that a significant portion of Protestant conservatives think that saving people's souls for Christ and converting them will solve the social malaise. David Legee and Lyman Kellstedt (1993a) and Guth with coworkers (1996b: 308, 314) revealed that focus on religious conversion and soul saving, as compared to activism and endorsement of social issues, is linked to an individualist perspective of the world. This is associated with the focus on moral problems under the umbrella of family values. Religious conservatives are against economic issues like welfare and do not endorse those who have a political agenda preferring those government regulated issues. The believers in conversion feel moral issues need more protection through the law. They are for strong pornography laws, teaching creationism in the public schools, eliminating birth control information given in schools and ceasing abortion, except for when bearing the child would threaten the mother's life (Green et al. 1996: 74, 76). Abortion seems still to be the phenomenon that most strongly represents their fight against moral decay. In that case, government regulation is advocated. Abortion is the policy issue that almost all conservatives (94 %) want to have dealt with through official restrictions (Green et al. 2006: 44).

The connection between moral and economic attitudes is not very clear for the non-activist religious conservatives. Their belief in an active-authoritarian God is strongly

related to abortion and sexual morality attitudes but only sporadically related to ideas about social and economic justice. Paul Froese and Christopher Bader (2008: 708) found that picturing God as an active and authoritarian supreme being involved in the world is partially associated to economic justice. In their study, the faithful believed that the government should help reduce income differences (Froese and Bader: 703). But these religious conservatives also proposed that the taxes are too high, and that they were in support of defense spending, topics generally not related to economic justice or government regulation. Also, the authors found no relationship between the figure of an authoritarian God and attitudes about government spending on education, the environment, health, or welfare.

A focus on moralistic views to save the individual also influences the institutional perspective of the believers. Guth, et al. (1997; 1998) asked whether the church should focus on social reform or individual morality. People who say that individual religious action like soul saving as compared to social justice action is the primary responsibility of their church is associated with individualist worldviews. Those with strong conservative dogma reveal, with respect to their economic attitudes that the society should function on the ground of self responsibility of the individual. Therefore, taxes should not be raised for distribution to the needy, to solve world hunger, or to provide health insurance (Jelen 1991b: 106). A comparison with Canadian evangelical Protestants suggests fiscal conservatism among the evangelicals in the US has to do with the larger number of the dogmatically strict in the US who are moral activists like the Protestant fundamentalists (Hoover et al. 2002).

In the United States, religious conservatives are politically associated with the

Republican Party, which is the stronghold of fiscal conservatism. However, moral issues have been the reason why religious conservatives have voted Republican, rather than social welfare issues or the economy (Petrocik 2007: 289; Rozell and Das Gupta 2006: 12). Conservative Christians voted Republican in the election of Bush in 2000 (Blasi 2006) as well as in 2004 (Dionne 2006) using morality as the major issue. While this may seem normal at this point in history, it has not always been the case. There have been several waves of changing in issues between the Civil War and the Reagan administration that show a changing affiliation of religion in the context of politics. A case in point is the impoverished Protestant evangelical South that had been, contrary to their religious individualism, the bastion of the heavily government regulated New Deal policy between the 1930s and the onset of the Reagan Politics in the 1980s, when the realignment of conservative Christian religion to the Republican Party started to show effects (Walsh 2000).

Historian Matthew Lassiter (2008) maintains that the working class among the religious conservatives has remained favorable towards economic government regulation, as they were before the onset of Reagan politics in the 1980s. But when in the context of the feminist and anti-war movements young people started to question patriarchal authority and divorce started to break up families, the Christian Right leadership guided its constituency with the promise to protect their families by ensuring free market values and deregulation. The lining up of the secular, fiscal right and the Christian Right eventually became a Republican strategy against the social regulation of wealth that had followed after WWII as an agreement of industry and labor (Himmelstein 1990).

There is empirical evidence that the Christian Right leadership has invoked towards

the Republican Party the political potential of the working class' cultural insecurity. Guth (1997: 86) and coworkers found that pastors of conservative denominations that have large working class participation guide their churches through moral agendas where abortion and gay rights have priority, compared to their counterparts of liberal churches who emphasize poverty, the environment and civil rights. And the Christian Coalition backed the agenda of economic conservatives, including support for a flat tax and privatization of the welfare system. In 1999 this coalition supported an end to the 'marriage penalty' of the federal tax code (Weissman 2000; Wilcox and Rozell 2000). Various other Christian Right organizations have supported sub-minimum wages, privatizing the welfare system, cuts in Medicaid and other public spending programs. They also opposed Clinton's national health insurance proposal. Many of these views would have hurt poor families while helping affluent Americans (Wilcox 2000: 129).

Nancy Davis and Robert Robinson (1996a; 1996b) and N. P. Barry (1987) found progressive opinions in the religious conservative community regarding some economic policies about welfare and minimum wage. Opinions were close to Lassiter's (2008) argument that the working class among the religious orthodox support economic policies for government programs to aid the economic disadvantaged. Also, Clyde Wilcox (Jelen 2000; Wilcox 1989) found that supporters of Jerry Falwell's political action group, Moral Majority, tended to favor government action to reduce income differences, while their leadership advertised free enterprise and least possible state involvement.

Especially for the economically less fortunate the struggle for economic survival is the main priority. When they are confronted with specific programs that describe their own daily concerns like increase of minimum wage or the reduction of real income

adjusted for inflation differences between rich and poor their preference for the regulation of wealth is not inconsequential. This was especially the case in the 1980s, and 1990s at a time when the conservative religious movement was not yet fully aligned with the Republican Party. Realignment between Republican Party and moral conservatives was found to be the case for the years after the second election of George W Bush (Saunders and Abramowitz 2007). The religious conservative elite, however, especially the pastors and preachers, have been socialized in Bible colleges for generations to adhere to the theological justification of capitalism. The highest value is individualism and freedom to act in God's grace. This includes the work and working conditions because capital and labor have according to the Biblical inerrancy believers at base the same interests. In the patriarchal relationship between entrepreneur and worker, the entrepreneur increases prosperity but lives modestly and gives money to his church to increase God's glory. The workers labor hard but get a just wage to feed their families. Both capitalist and worker fulfill the earthly task assigned to them by God (Riesebrodt 1993: 69, 77).

The writings on Protestant conservative dogma show a leaning towards individualist responsibility in the economic realm. Government regulation is rejected since it has been associated with immorality. For this, empirical work shows the Christian Right leadership has been fiscally conservative since it led its constituency into market deregulation. While the general population of the religious conservatives has often followed this lead, they have also supported some of the public programs that go towards redistribution of wealth and propounded the view that the government is responsible to prevent poverty.

Catholic Conservatives: Empirical Findings

Compared to Protestant conservative dogma with its individualist relationship with

God, Catholic conservatives' relationship with God is mediated through the Church hierarchy. Where Protestant conservative dogma requires personal conversion for salvation which provides saved individuals as a means for social regeneration Catholic dogma places less emphasis on the individual person. The central feature in the tradition of Catholicism has been the Church as an institution and the individual in the community (Rudy 1996). The individual is guided through the Catholic teaching office and Church hierarchy regarding matters of faith and socio-political views.

With respect to the distribution of wealth, Catholic dogma has had a different effect on Catholics than the Bible has had on evangelical or fundamentalist Protestants. When asked for sources of poverty, Catholics often report economic and political factors as grounds of poverty than evangelical Protestants who are more likely to blame individual failure (Brackley 1996; Dionne 2008; Wald and Smidt 1993; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007: 185). Peter Benson and Dorothy Williams (1982) applied these differences in dogma and religious structure and developed a measure of political ideology from individualist versus communitarian religious beliefs. These beliefs are strong predictors of a person's world view. The communitarian view points towards progressive ideology while individualist views lead towards political conservatism. Punishing the sinner for his or her own misfortune, as is the belief with Protestant fundamentalists, is not a Catholic characteristic. Langdon Gilkey (1974: 18) thinks that because of the several hundred years of continuous tradition and factually unrealistic strict religious rules prescribed for daily behavior in Catholic communal life, there is a deeper recognition for the inability to adhere to all of them. Before Vatican II and the introduction of the freedom of the individual's consciousness (Greeley 2006) for decision making, there were religious rules

that could have prescribed the potential behavior of the believer in almost every situation of his or her everyday life. It is unrealistic to follow so much regulation Gilkey (1974) maintains. This cognition is the grounds for more tolerance and acceptance of the estranged and fallible characteristics of our lives.

Michael Welch and David Leege (1988: 588) followed up with the assessment of Catholics' ideology, measuring closeness to God either through social connections (love, care for another person or groups of people) or through spiritual connections (performance of rituals, reception of sacraments). The researchers explain variation in political ideology regarding issues of sexuality and gender roles. The higher the level of closeness to God through social connections (love, care for another person or groups of persons), the less Catholics were conservative on positions like abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), premarital cohabitation, the husband as the exclusive breadwinner, or secular humanism as threat to society (Leege and Welch 1989: 152, 154). In general, comparative studies of Catholics and Protestant ideology find that conservative Catholics are comparable to Protestant evangelicals or fundamentalists on issues of morals and sexuality (Bendyna et al. 2001; Bendyna et al. 2000; Jelen 1991b).

With respect to economic ideology, the following studies showed inconsistency. Welch & Leege (1988) and Ted Jelen (1991a; 1991b) found scarcely any effect of religious orthodoxy on Catholics for their economic world views. They were progressive as measured as favoring a nuclear freeze and decrease of defense spending. Joseph Tamney and coworkers (1988) distinguished between progressive and conservative Catholics and Protestants on the grounds of social traditionalism. Those with high scores on a scale measuring social traditionalism believed individuals should be responsible for

their own economic well being and relief from poverty should be privately organized through the Church. Catholics who were not so rigid on morals and sexual relations agreed more to the necessity to restructure the economy to relieve poverty. Mary Bendyna (2000) and colleagues found years later that the orthodoxy of Catholics had a conservative effect on their outlook on economic issues, but in 2001 (Bendyna et al. 2001) they found opposite results. Morally conservative Catholics who supported the Christian Coalition were less economically conservative than their evangelical Protestant counterparts when measuring social welfare, aid for poor children, income inequality, or nuclear weapons. Also, conservative Catholics revealed that the evangelically colored economic agenda of the Christian Right posed a barrier for them because their communitarian ethic does not justify calls to eliminate welfare and scale back other poverty programs which the American Catholic bishops conference introduced in the 1980s and 90s (Wilcox 2000 p.129).

Catholicism emphasizes the parish community with the individual as member and his or her relationship to God, not the more abstract direct link between the faithful and God, based on religious belief only that the Protestant inerrancy believers emphasize (Brackley 1996; Greeley 2000). Where Protestants focus on the individual and his or her relationship to God through the divine word in the Bible Catholicism emphasizes the mediation of God's grace through the sacraments administered to the believer through the Church hierarchy (Gilkey 1974; Jelen 1991b; Lent 1998). The Catholic faithful is not directly linked to God like the Protestant, but through the mystic of the Catholic Church. It is the membership in the Catholic community through which the faithful is responsible to God.

Rudy (1996) describes with her investigation about the meaning of moral for pro-choice and pro-life activists, why abortion was “not necessary” (Rudy 1996: 37) in the Catholic community whose members’ shared Catholic rules and traditions. Unwed mothers could turn over their baby to a circle of care centered in the parish. They would know first hand that someone else would care for their child better than they could. The Church had “oppressive tendencies” (Rudy 1996: 38) with the countless rules that should be followed but mothers with unwanted pregnancies found the community which enabled the decision of giving birth and handing over the child. Catholic parents would be found for unwanted pregnancies because the world was a place where family was more about sharing faith than sharing a household. There was a way to deal with unwanted pregnancies that allowed a mother who could not care for her child herself to be responsible to her baby and her Church within the fabric of traditional Catholicism. The sinful member could still be responsible to God by knowing that others in the community would take care of what she or he had not been able to do.

This is an example that illustrates the reason why Catholics in general have been found to be more inclined to take the social structure and political reasons into account for the explanation of poverty than religious conservatives do (Wald 1997). Empirical work shows that the conservatives among the Catholics are restrictive on issues of morality and sexuality similar to Protestants, but moral conservatism has not transferred straight forwardly into economic conservatism (Greeley 1990). Some research shows a link between moral and economic conservatism for Catholics (Green et al. 1996). Others found Catholic conservatives had a stronger communitarian ethic than economic policy endorsed by the Christian Right (Dionne 2008: 156; Walsh 2000).

Catholic Bishops' Socio-Politics

Several of the authors that found the Catholic conservatives have more progressive economic attitudes than their Protestant counterparts interpret these results as the Catholic hierarchy's teaching authority upon the Catholic community. The American bishops who have been quite progressive after the Second Vatican Council (Burns 1996; Kelly 1999; Perl and McClintock 2001) issued pastoral letters in the 1980s and 90s containing the demands for nuclear freeze and reduction of defense spending. They took on capitalism, with their critique of income inequality as the inevitable result of unregulated capitalism (Wald 1997). However, Michael Budde argues (1992: 251) that the American bishops did not question the economic power elite with their pastoral letters on peace and the economy. The Canadian bishops, he continues, risked the wrath of the business community with their critique, while the US bishops portrayed economic life with as little conflict as possible. The major counterparts of the US bishop communication were the power holders, Budde maintains (1992: 251), and not the community members.

However, to rely on the official Catholic teaching to explain the believer's political view is problematic. There has been an ever growing discrepancy between Rome's teaching and Catholics' follow up (McCormick 2003). First, consider sexual moral teaching. Since Vatican II, Catholics have rejected matters of faith and morality by questioning the Vatican's doctrine of sexual morality and rejecting the legitimacy of Papal supremacy (Greeley 1985: 83, 84). Bishops and priests have proposed alternatives of their own, nurtured from the laity's conscience and experience. However, the bishop's pastorals in sociopolitical matters were of strong concern at the American Bishop

Conference in the 1980s. These were not easily assimilated by the laity. William D'Antonio, and his colleagues (1989) found in a 1987 survey that 67 % of American Catholics had not heard of the 1983 peace pastoral and 71 % had not heard of the 1986 economy pastoral despite extensive religious and secular media attention given to the letters.

With Catholic conservatives, though, the relationship to the middle Church hierarchy is problematic. The bishops' liberal views on the economy are not the appropriate explanation to understand the Catholic conservatives' view on the causes of poverty. Catholic conservatives, as a matter of reaching God's grace, want to be obedient to the Church's teaching. However, the American bishops are those whom the Rome-obedient despise as too liberal and not understanding the Vatican's true intentions, whether in moral or other matters (Cuneo 1997). It is doubtful that Catholic conservatives will accept those same bishops' leadership regarding sociopolitical concerns. Catholic conservatives are one subgroup of faith within the Catholic Church, where different beliefs and different social groups continue to exist under a common identity of Catholicism (Dillon 1999a; Dillon 1999b; Manning 1997). Obedience to the Church hierarchy is a means of identification for Catholic conservatives. Since they dismiss the authority of the American bishops, it might be appropriate to look at the origin of the Church teaching, the Pope in the Vatican, as the source of ideological influence for the American Catholic conservatives.

Pope John Paul II's Socio-Politics

The leader of the world's Roman Catholics from 1978 to 2005, John Paul II, was a highly regarded spokesperson for the fight against poverty. He differed from classical

economic liberalism regarding how much the government should be involved to produce a just society with less inequality between the rich and the poor (Cima and Schubeck 2001: 214). In fact he criticized the welfare state in a manner comparable to fiscal conservatives because its “bureaucratic thinking saps human energy and increases economic costs” (p.217). He expressed opinions against big government and agreed with the free market on reasons of individual self development (Burns 1992: 59, 71, 191; Hebblethwaite 1986). Other Popes left more evidence of thinking about how to fight against economic inequality in a context that looks at social structures and political policy. Leo XIII wrote ‘Rerum Novarum,’ a condemnation of unrestricted capitalism and a basis on which the modern labor movement and welfare state developed. Also, it was a source for public program demands, like a US living wage (Dionne 2008: 156).

While John Paul II saw that the free market leaves many behind who have no marketable resources, he was for the principle of subsidiary monies that go back to charity, as compared to his two Vatican II predecessors who emphasized the principle of solidarity on the ground of distribution (Cima and Schubeck 2001). Subsidiary as a function to organize society was introduced by Pope Pius XI at the end of the 19th century. His epistle was broadly concerned with the harmonious relationship among persons and institutions in a hierarchically ordered society. It emphasized the duty of the higher societal entity towards the people in the lower entities, including the recognition of the integrity of every person. Those in the lower social entity have the duty to follow the leadership of those higher up (Skillen and McCarthy 1991: 140).

This consensual thinking rather than a critique of the socio-economic elite seems

to have been influential for the Church hierarchy led by John Paul II. The neo-conservative literature on the Catholic ethic of the economy saw in John Paul's social ethic the appreciation of capitalism. Michael Novak (2003) says the Pope grounded his economic ideas in the tradition of free market liberalism and maintains he developed a Natural Law theology of the market. Richard Neuhaus (2003) saw predecessors such as Paul VI as left leaning and influenced by European socialism. These predilections, finds Neuhaus, were corrected in John Paul's newfound appreciation of capitalism. Charles McDaniels (2007) rejected these two neo-conservative authors' interpretation of John Paul's thinking for market capitalism. On the grounds of John Paul's reference to subsidiarity McDaniels located the Pope's economic philosophy as the middle ground between two extremes, socialism and free market capitalism, with his frequent cautions against individualism and consumerism.

Whether the American bishops are considered left wing or not as authors of the pastoral letters on peace and the economy, but not challenging the structure of inequality with their sparing the capitalist elite from their critique, the Catholic conservatives have questioned the bishops' leadership as too focused on the poor and not enough on morals and unborn life (Cuneo 1997). The Pope, while engaged in fighting poverty, seems to have been reluctant to identify the social structure as the location to which the inequality in wealth could be traced. He warned against consumerism and the dangers of individualism in an uncontrolled market economy. However, he grounded his economic ethics in a free market philosophy and was against welfare that is regulated by the government as means to relieve poverty.

From an ahistorical perspective, the connection between sexuality and public welfare can be explained by the Church's relationship to legal abortion. Compared to Protestant conservative dogma, where the ahistorical lies in the belief of the faithful in the Biblical word, in Catholicism, the ahistorical is located in the believer's obedience to the Church bureaucracy. For the Catholic Church, abortion is the ultimate phenomenon contradicting intentional procreativity. The Church cannot accept legal abortion because abortion means a challenge to the power base of the Catholic Church. Power is the major reason why sexuality has to be procreative (Burns 1992). Any public institution that allows sex to be non-procreative and to happen outside of sacramental marriage is suspicious to the Catholic Church for the same reason that abortion is. Thus, welfare, institutionalized as a public right, is not dependent on religious supervision by the parochial community.

The right of financial help implies an option of family construction that is independent of the sacrament of marriage. Catholics, at least the conservatives who gain identity through their obedience to the Church teaching (Luebbers 2001, Salzmann 2008) view that welfare should be at least influenced by the Pope's perspective about the responsibility of poverty. John Paul II was opposing poverty in the context of free market structures or left enough discretion for interpretation regarding his economic philosophy so that secondary sources like (Republican) party politics who endorse anti-abortion could be influential on the believers opinion about the responsibility for poverty (Papanek 1994; Rose 1999; Saunders and Abramowitz 2007). Hypothesis 3b2) (section: Hypotheses, Responsibility for Poverty) puts this argument more into perspective in relation to the political environment in which the faithful live.

Religious Conservatives and Social Class

In 1973 Robert Wuthnow (1973) associated religious commitment in the US with attitudes about social and economic policies. However, he thought that religion distinguishes between liberal and conservative politics more on the social than on the economic dimension. E. J. Dionne (2008: 80) linked social and economic values in the context of religion furthermore, and he claimed the moral crisis spoken of by the conservatives does not only grow from the permissive ideas of the counter culture of the 1960s but from roots that threaten to allow market values to crowd out all other values. If we accept that anti-abortion is always linked to conservative religious dogma and sexual morals (Ebaugh 1978; Ferree et al. 2002; Granberg 1978; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007: 190), Kristin Lukers' classic study of anti-abortion activists can be seen as a critique of the religious conservatives against unregulated market values. Luker (1984) found 25 years ago from the anti-abortion activists in her study that their engagement against abortion was an expression of their skepticism towards the domination of market values that would destroy the time and social prestige they were accustomed to investing into their patriarchal families.

However, the empirical findings regarding the influence of social class on conservative morals and the attraction to religion with strict dogma do not allow for a clear cut picture. Luker (1984) found that pro-life activists are more likely to be of lower socioeconomic status, have fewer years of education, hold less well paying jobs, and are married more frequently to blue collar workers when compared to pro-choice activists. Also Guth and coworkers (1995) found that the conservative activists for traditional morals and religion are not as highly educated as their

leftwing counterparts. Carol Maxwell (2002), on the other hand, found many middle or higher socio-economic status members among the pro-life activists. An important factor in participants' activism was their opportunity to have the time to participate in a picket line or other protest activities.

The question taken from these findings is whether conservative religious groups are demographically distinct from the rest of the population. If pro life activists are Protestant, they are mostly from the pool of religious conservatives that are evangelical. They are barely distinct demographically from the larger population (Park and Reimer 2002). Evangelicals are not much different from immigrant Catholics. Both groups typically come from the lower classes and both have moved up the social ladder within the last few decades (Smith 2001; Wald 1997). Thaddeus Coreno (2002) maintains that the middle class is comprised of more fundamentalists today than some decades ago. However, this is only a fraction within the middle class. The old middle class was working class. The old middle class continues to struggle within a society governed by the new professional middle class. The middle class today is marked by widening class polarization and scarred, in the eyes of the evangelical religious groups, by progressive cultural secularization. The class polarization occurred, Ralph Pyle (2006) shows, since the old middle class has never been able to claim the wealth, power and prestige of the new middle class and has become a strong advocate of traditionalism and fundamentalism. Especially conservative Protestants have remained behind the mainstream of Catholic and liberal Protestants on the socioeconomic ladder.

Lifestyle, values, and other cultural preferences further distinguish the groups. Alan Wolfe (2006) sees conservative religion and the endorsement of traditional morals in

connection with lower economic classes. He finds for the US South that lower socio-economic status is related to higher divorce rates and argues that this produces social strain, which is countered by joining doctrinally conservative churches. Contrary to this, the experience of social strain, according to Riesebrodt (1993), is not class specific but dependent on whether the conservative believers have conformed their values within the structural conditions of modern society. If they refuse to do so and at the same time protest the structurally enforced conformity, they are likely to be attracted to dogmatically strict religion.

Moral activists who refuse value adaptation and consequently join a dogmatically strict religious group can be found in specific sections of all social classes. Riesebrodt (1993) says those whose power and identity was transplanted to spaces of diminished prestige and groups of less social power seem to be most likely to join the movement. Even though conflict over material interests (as a consequence of the decline of social position) is involved with the believers' attraction to strict dogmatic religion, the major part of their attraction consists of conflict over the values of larger society. The structure of the conflict has changed the cultural position of the carriers from hegemonic importance to marginality (Riesebrodt 1993: 89). This produces the consequence that their former status of conduct of life and conflict management has been deprived by social and religious pluralism of majority cultural recognition and has transplanted them into different (less prestigious) social structures (Marsden 1983; Vinz 1997).

With their fight for maintaining traditional values on sexuality and gender relations, religious conservatives are also fighting against the atomization of society with its domination of market values and the danger of destroying families and the

individual in a careless society. One part of the literature sees the religious conservatives, especially those of conservative Protestant faiths, as less affluent than those belonging to other faiths (Coreno 2002; Luker 1984). Another part sees the attraction to conservative religious dogma not as a class specific phenomenon, but sees dogma identifying with the battle against the dissolving moral values in the secular society (Blanchard 1996).

In summary, this dissertation examines the finding that Christian conservatives give policy preference to moral over economic issues. It follows Risebrodt's (1993) argument that the attraction to conservative religious dogma is an expression of protest against the devaluation of the values and skills for conflict resolution for the social group to which a protesting person belongs. For both Protestant and Catholic conservatives, their values regulating gender relations have been questioned by the secular society. This thesis argues that it is their specific views about gender relations and sexuality that influences their economic ideology. Protestant conservatives reject government regulation, because it deprives the religious community of the control over the members' conversion spirit. Moral implications are in return for the economic and social help that someone is supposed to receive. From this point of view, this thesis argues that Protestant conservatives allocate individualist responsibility to poverty.

Catholic conservatives reject the US bishops' leadership, and Pope John Paul II released mixed signals about the solution to economic problems. His economic policy was ambiguous as to whether he advocated individualist or structural responsibility to explain poverty. In addition, socioeconomic issues like solutions to

questions of poverty, have low priority for the Church since they have no means for power maintenance. Policies are recommendations, but are not binding for what it means to be a Catholic. Sexual morals, however, are binding (Burns 1996). This thesis focuses on moral values about which the Pope provides clear guidance and that have binding character for the Catholic conservatives. Therein is sought an explanation for their economic views.

The literature about Protestant and Catholic conservatives has not, however, addressed the question about whether these two religious groups' moral values about sex and gender relations are based on the same or different ideological and dogmatic grounds. This dissertation investigates whether these morals of the Catholic and Protestant conservatives are based on the same or different ideological grounds and how this affects the two religious groups' attitudes about the causes of poverty.

HYPOTHESES

There are three blocs of hypotheses in this thesis. The first deals with ahistorical religiosity and the religious and ideological components of ahistorical religiosity. The second is about neo-patriarchy as an adaptation of gender relations to current cultural settings. The third examines how economic attitudes about the responsibility of poverty are related to religious dogma, sexual morals, and gender ideology.

Ahistorical Religiosity

This study follows the question about whether religious conservatives have more of an individualist or structural view about the responsibility of poverty and why. It is proposed in this dissertation that the dogmatic background of religious conservatives is ahistorical and that the cultural vehicles that make their religiosity salient to them are

sexual morality and gender ideology. This represents Protestant conservatives' salvation experience and Catholic conservatives' grace experience. Both have their roots in the believers' militancy for sexual morals. This moral militancy is accomplished through the control of women's sexuality (Bendroth 1993; Burns 1992; Burns 1999; DeBerg 2000; Dinges 1993; Hawley 1994; Riesebrodt 1993; Weaver 1999). As outlined in the first chapter of this thesis, the urge to control women's sexual morals is the cultural phenomenon from which the religious conservatives produce their view about gender relations. The second chapter outlines how the religious conservatives express the control of female sexuality in the attitude that sexuality has to be domesticated within marriage and parenthood (Crompton 1999; Epstein 1981; Hawley 1999; Stacey 1996).

This thesis hypothesizes that **1a)** Catholics' and Protestants' ahistorical religiosity is explained by their view about sexuality and gender relations. Morals about sex and gender relations are the major ideological components that are associated in this dissertation making the importance of their religion aware to the believers.

In addition, as outlined in this chapter about the link between social class and conservative dogma, conflict over moral values in the larger society is the major attraction for people to strict religious dogma (Riesebrodt 1993). This thesis further proposed that **1b)** the value conflict is not class dependent but within each socio-economic class are sections of people who experience the value conflict over morals. This is the reason why I expect the influence of sexual morals and views about gender relations on the conservatives' ahistorical religiosity to be independent of class issues like income and education. Also, Weaver (1993) maintains that the conservative religious movement, since its occurrence in the 1980s, has always attracted groups of young

people to its membership. Therefore, I expect that 1c) the influence of sexual morals and views about gender relations on ahistorical religiosity will be independent of the generation variable.

Neo-Patriarchy

Ahistorical religiosity has produced the culture of gender divided care in the gender system of domesticity with a gender division of labor between women caring for the persons they love and men's absorption in their market job (DeBerg 2000; Epstein 1981; Lienesch 1990; Manning 1999; Sheerin 2001). This duality between women's care for the family and men's struggle in the market place comes from the essence of the Protestant and Catholic conservative dogmas. The dogmas say that Protestants' reaching salvation and Catholics' gaining grace are dependent on the condition that women's sexuality be regulated into motherhood as the defining female role (Bendroth 2001; Hawley 1999; Weaver 1994). From this perspective, one would expect to find a strong association between sexual morality and gender ideology on the one hand and the domestic work situation of religious conservative people on the other.

This line of reasoning has to be revised, however. As outlined in the section about neo-patriarchal adaptation (Ellison and Bartkowski 2002; Riesebrodt 1993) in chapter 2, social groups have to adapt their lives to a certain degree to the societal forces that have restructured gender relations and family life. This has occurred with the entry of conservative women into the labor force and their contribution to the family income. From this context I hypothesize that 2a) domestic work distribution between religious conservative men and women is less related to sexual morality and gender ideology than to demographic variables such as generation, education and income. Nevertheless,

research has found attitude stability over the last three decades concerning the religious conservatives' ideology about gender relations. The attitudes about the gender relations has been unchanged since studies about the religious conservatives' ideology of gender relations have been conducted (Petersen and Donnerwerth 1997). While the concept of gender divided care is expected not to apply for the factual domestic work situation, the *ideology* of the religious conservatives about gender relations is expected to be gender divided. This is the reason why I expect to find a difference between *factual* domestic work and the *ideology* of gender relations. Thus I hypothesize that 2b) the factual distribution of household labor between husband and wife is not predicted by their ideology about domestic gender relations. This difference about factual household labor done by men and women and their ideology about gender relations has been investigated with Protestants only. The present dissertation also involves Catholics with whom these differences are followed.

The literature has not distinguished between Protestant and Catholic sexual and motherhood ideologies. This dissertation does investigate the issue of whether there is a structural difference between Catholics' and Protestants' ideology about gender relations and sexual ideology. I examine how the two religious groups conceptualize motherhood and marriage (see chapter 2 of this dissertation, section Catholic and Protestant Cultural Context of the Domestication of Sexuality). It can be seen that Protestants' perceptions on motherhood and marriage are based on textual grounds and for Catholics on bureaucratic grounds. The Catholic Church declared marriage holy, thus sex without procreation intentions in marriage is sinful. On the Protestant side, rules about sex and gender relations do not come from institutional orders but are extracted from the text of

the inerrant Bible. Women are described there as having committed the original sin, and consequently are considered naturally subordinate to men (Bendroth 1993). Thus the message of the Catholic Church in gender relations is about sexuality that is sinful without the procreation in marriage. The message of the inerrant Bible is about the gender division of labor. In the context of bureaucratic and textual grounds for gender and moral ideologies, I predict 2c) a different ideological structure for Protestant and Catholic morality and ideology about gender relations. For Catholics, attitudes describing sexual morality will be the major variables predicting their views about gender relations; for Protestants, issues describing gender hierarchy will be most important.

There are two grounds upon which I hypothesize that 2d) Catholic and Protestant conservatives' *ideology* about gender relations is independent of their demographic origin. Catholic ideology has to do with the conservatives' attitude stability about sexual morals and gender relations. Contrary to the factual domestic work situation, where more egalitarian gender relations have developed, religious conservatives have shown for decades the same hierarchical gender and sexual ideologies (Petersen and Donnenwerth 1997). Also, research has shown a clear policy preference of religious conservatives' political priorities for traditional moral and gender related family issues. Economic issues have come second in importance as to what politicians should solve most urgently (Green et al. 2006; Petrocik 2007). In both of these cases it is doubtful that demographic variables now have an influence.

Responsibility for Poverty

In the first chapter I argued that the dogmatic feature of the religious conservatives is ahistorical and that one ideological issue that has been dealt with in ahistorical terms by

the religious conservatives is sexual morality and the gender relations linked to morals. Protestant conservatives' salvation experience and Catholics' perception of God's grace are rooted in this frame of hierarchical gender ideology and sexual morals.

As outlined in chapter one, a feature of ahistorical religiosity is the focus on the dogma's formal requirements, such as Protestants' frequency of Bible reading or Catholics' correct rituals for the sacraments. The focus on the religious formalism allows for belief in a clearly defined truth. This makes the importance of the religion more salient to the believer (Salzman 2008; Schoenherr 1987). The means that make ahistorical religiosity salient to the believer are sexual morals and the gender relations. In both religions, the focus on the religious formalism is linked to the spiritual connection to God as compared to the social connection with emphasis of the care for others (Welch and Leege 1988: 588). Emphasis of the spiritual, in turn, is linked to an individualist perspective of the world and the focus on individual morals politically expressed in social policies supporting traditional families, gender roles and sexual morals (Papanek 1994; Rose 1999). In this line of reasoning, individual morals and social problems are closely linked to sexual morals. On these grounds I hypothesize **3a)** that Protestant and Catholic conservatives' ahistorical religiosity is the religious component that is associated with their view on an individualist responsibility of poverty.

As argued previously in this chapter Protestant conservatives reject government regulation. It has been associated with immorality and prevents conversion towards salvation. Many public institutions are associated with the promotion of promiscuity, like sex education in the public schools, or welfare with unwed parenthood. The literature shows (Himmelstein 1990; Klatch 1987) that public institutions, which have to do with

the regulation of wealth, prevent the religious community from having control as to whether the needy person deserves support as someone who is morally supervised and lives within the rules of the religious community. According to this view if someone is poor, it is because they did not submit to the religious community's rules (Riesebrodt 1993). From this point of view I hypothesize that **3b1**) Protestant conservatives' ideology about sexuality and gender relations influences their fiscal attitudes towards the individual's responsibility for poverty.

For Catholic conservatives, the question of acceptance or rejection of government regulation has not been so clearly traced from their religious dogma as for their Protestant counterparts. This dissertation intends to develop this theme.

The Pope's policies on the economy have no binding character and are not necessarily to be followed for the individual to be a good Catholic. This contrasts with his moral policy on sexuality (Burns 1999). Welch & Legee (1991), for example, found that conservative Catholics follow their Church's position as long as she is clear about an issue, such as about the death penalty; or if the Catholic Church diverges from other policy organizations, such as those among the Christian Right to which conservatives adhere. If the position of the Catholic Church is ambiguous or missing, the research found that Catholics follow others' direction. Here, the Republican Party with its market individualism might be the preference, since the party endorses pro-life policies. This is a strong incentive since the ban on abortion is a cornerstone of the Catholic belief system (Burns 2005; Kissling 1999).

The opposition against abortion is representative of the conservative believers' struggle against sexual permissiveness (Hawley 1994; Manning 1999; Press and Cole

1999). For Catholic conservatives, permissiveness is the symptom of disobedience to the Pope's teaching about sexuality. The Pope's policy on sexual morals is binding for the conservative Catholics' identity. Believers' faith is bound to obedience to the Church leader for earning God's grace. In addition, John Paul II promulgated a non-binding economic policy, leaning more towards free market economy than towards fiscal government regulation (Cima and Schubeck 2001: 214). From this policy of the Pope on the one hand and the Republican free market ideology on the other, who with its anti-abortion endorsement is supporting the Pope's moral philosophy, I hypothesize **3b2)** that Catholic conservatives' ideology about sexuality and gender relations influences their fiscal attitudes towards individualist responsibility for poverty.

With respect to the association between moral and economic attitudes, there is no work available that distinguishes between the Catholic and Protestant conservative faiths by examining the structure of the ideology about sexual morality and gender relations. As outlined in the second chapter and applied with hypothesis 2c), the Biblical textual grounding produces gender hierarchy as the major ideological component of Protestant moral ideology and women's subsequent submission under men because of Eve's fall. The Catholic bureaucratic structure is dependent on sexual morals for power maintenance, and therefore, moral ideology has sexual morality as its major component. In this context of bureaucratic and textual grounds for ideologies about gender relations and moral ideologies I hypothesize for Catholic conservatives that **3c)** sexual morality will be the major component explaining moral ideology. For Protestant conservatives, this is predicted to be gender hierarchy.

Finally, it is hypothesized that **3d)** the ideological components will withstand the demographic controls of income, education and generation. This argument is based on the importance of moral values over economic issues the religious conservatives have reported with respect to policy preference (Green et al. 2006; Petrocik 2007). For Catholic conservatives, sexual morality is the value taught from the Church hierarchy, binding what it means to be a Catholic. Protestant conservatives read from the Bible that the individual's moral condition is linked to the wellbeing of the society as a whole. Both Catholics' identity and Protestants' moral responsibility are personalistic phenomena required from the respective dogma for everyone and should be independent of class issues.

Summary of Hypotheses

Proposition in relation to ahistorical religiosity: Morals about sex and gender relations are the major ideological components that are associated in this dissertation with making religious conservatives aware of the importance of their religion (see chapter one of this thesis).

Hypothesis 1a): Catholics' and Protestants' view about sexuality and gender relations are the strongest predictors of their ahistorical religiosity.

Proposition in relation to demographic control of ahistorical religiosity – Social Class Issues: Conflicts over moral values in the larger society are the major attraction for people to strict religious dogma. In each socio-economic class there are sections of people who experience the value conflict over morals (Riesebrodt 1993). I expect that the value conflict is independent of variables featuring class membership like income and education.

Hypothesis 1b): The influence of sexual morals and ideology about gender relations on ahistorical religiosity is independent of income and education.

Proposition in relation to demographic control of ahistorical religiosity –Generation: The oldest age cohort born before World War II is the most doctrinally orthodox and the most committed to their church. This age cohort is dying out. The age cohorts born in the 1960s and after are the least likely to participate in doctrinally orthodox worship but the conservative religious movement, since its birth in the 1980s, has always attracted groups of young people to its membership. They have become smaller in numbers but more orthodox and conforming than previous generations (D'Antonio et al. 2001; Weaver 1993).

Hypothesis 1c): The influence of sexual morals and ideology about gender relations on ahistorical religiosity is independent of the generation variable.

Proposition in relation to neo-patriarchy: With the entry of conservative women into the labor force and their contribution to the family income (Ellison and Bartkowski 2002) the religious conservatives had to adapt their lives to a certain degree to the societal forces that have restructured gender relations and family life during the last few decades in the larger society (Riesebrodt 1993). While the concept of gender divided care for the family versus market work for pay is expected not to apply for the factual domestic work situation, the *ideology* of the religious conservatives about gender relations is expected to be gender divided.

Hypothesis 2a): The domestic work distribution between religious conservative men and women is not affected by their ideology about gender relations.

Hypothesis 2b): The domestic work distribution between religious conservative men and women is more dependent on demographic variables like income, education and generation than on the ideology about gender relations.

Proposition in relation to neo-patriarchy – egalitarian versus hierarchical ideology:
Catholic conservatives' ideology about gender relations and sexual morality is built on bureaucratic grounds. They reach God's grace through their obedience to the Pope and his Church teaching about gender divided sexual morals (Burns 2005; Gilkey 1974). Protestant conservatives' ideology about gender relations and sexual morality is built on textual grounds. They reach salvation through belief in the Biblical word of the divinely approved gender hierarchy between men and women (Bendroth 2001; DeBerg 2000).

Hypothesis 2c): Catholic and Protestant conservatives' ideology about gender relations and sexual morality is hierarchical.

Proposition in relation to neo-patriarchy – different structural grounds of ideology:
The structure of the hierarchical ideology about gender relations is different for Catholics than for Protestants (see chapter 2 of this dissertation).

Hypothesis 2c1): For Catholics, attitudes describing sexual morality will be the major variables predicting their ideology about gender relations.

Hypothesis 2c2): For Protestants, attitudes describing gender hierarchy will be the major variables predicting their ideology about gender relations.

Proposition in relation to demographic control of neo-patriarchy: Religious conservatives have revealed for decades the same gender and sexual ideologies (Petersen and Donnerwerth 1997). Also, they have more recently shown preference for politics that give priority to topics about traditional moral and gender related family issues and

economic issues have come second in line in importance in relation to what politicians should take care of most urgently (Green et al. 2006; Petrocik 2007).

Hypothesis 2d): Catholic and Protestant conservatives' *ideology* about gender relations is independent of the demographic variables income, education and generation.

Proposition in relation to the responsibility for poverty: The means that make ahistorical religiosity salient to the believer are sexual morals and the gender relations that are the grounds of the sexual morals (see chapter one of this thesis).

Hypothesis 3a): Protestant and Catholic conservatives' ahistorical religiosity is the religious component that is associated with their views about the responsibility for poverty.

Proposition in relation to the responsibility for poverty – individualist versus structural responsibility for Protestants: The local Protestant conservative community wants to have control over their believers' adherence to Biblical rule in order to decide with religious criteria who deserves help against poverty. Because of prospective loss of control over the faithful, the community rejects a general right to welfare from government intervention (Himmelstein 1990; Klatch 1987).

Hypothesis 3b1): Protestant conservatives' ideology about sexuality and gender relations influences their fiscal attitudes towards individualist responsibility for poverty.

Proposition in relation to the responsibility for poverty - individualist versus structural responsibility for Catholics: The Catholic bureaucratic structure is dependent on sexual morals for power maintenance, and Catholic conservatives' grace experience is dependent on their obedience to the Pope. The economic policy of John Paul II leaned more towards free market economy than towards fiscal government regulation (Cima and

Schubeck 2001: 214). In addition Republican free market ideology and the Republican anti-abortion endorsement support the Pope's philosophy on sexual morals (Papanek 1994; Rose 1999; Saunders and Abramowitz 2007).

Hypothesis 3b2): Catholic conservatives' ideology about sexuality and gender relations influences their fiscal attitudes towards individualist responsibility for poverty.

Proposition in relation to the responsibility for poverty - different structural grounds for Catholics' and Protestants' ideology: Catholic conservatives reach God's grace through their obedience to the Popes and his Vatican theologians' teaching about sexual morals (Burns 2005; Gilkey 1974). Protestant conservatives' reach salvation through the belief in the Biblical word of the divinely approved gender hierarchy between man and woman (Bendroth 2001; DeBerg 2000).

Hypothesis 3c): In this context of a bureaucratic ground for Catholics' and a textual ground for Protestants' ideologies about gender relations and moral ideologies the hypothesis is: Sexual morality is the major component explaining Catholic conservatives' views about the causes of poverty. Hierarchical gender ideology is the major component explaining Protestant conservatives' views about the responsibility for poverty.

Proposition in relation to demographic control of the views about the responsibility for poverty: Moral values have priority over economic issues for the religious conservatives with respect to policy preference (Green et al. 2006; Petrocik 2007). I expect the ideological components about morals and gender relations will explain Catholics' and Protestants' views about their individualist responsibility of poverty. I expect that demographic controls will not affect this explanation.

Hypothesis 3d): Sexual morality is the major component explaining Catholic

conservatives' views about the causes of poverty. Hierarchical gender ideology is the major component explaining Protestant conservatives' views about the responsibility for poverty. The demographic variables income, education and generation have no influence on these explanations.

Chapter 4

METHODS

Description of Data

A questionnaire (see Appendix A) was constructed for data collection of this project.

Data was collected through survey methods. From June 2001 to February 2002 I distributed 800 questionnaires in selected Catholic and Protestant churches and to the Pregnancy Services (Crisis Pregnancy Centers) and the Catholic Social Services (with Respect Life groups) of the Greater Lansing Area. Furthermore, questionnaires were mailed out to Right to Life of Michigan Pregnancy Counseling Services located in the areas from Ann Arbor to Saginaw and Grand Rapids to Detroit. Four hundred eight (408) of the questionnaires were returned.

Roughly 40 questionnaires were distributed to Christian Right, anti-abortion, and conservative religious activist groups in the Lansing areas. They were the Michigan Family Forum, Focus on the Family and the Family Research Council, and the American Family Association of Michigan. Included in the data collection of Christian Right organizations were also the Lansing based Citizens for Traditional Values and the associated Foundation for Traditional Values. These Christian Right organizations are anti-abortion, free enterprise political action groups campaigning in addition for conservative religious and family (hierarchical gender) values. In relation to Catholic conservative activist groups I collected data among the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights with questionnaires mailed to them in the Detroit region. This is a Catholic conservative organization independent of the Catholic Church but fighting for keeping

her conservative values and according to their self description from their web site (Catholic League 2009) fighting the secular danger against civil society and modernizing Catholic religious values. Cuneo (1997) describes this kind of conservative socio-religious vision in his assessment of the Catholic conservatives' aim to keep the American Catholic Church pious and male hierarchical.

Among the specifically anti-abortion and religious activist source of local data collection were the Right to Life of Michigan (RLM) Organization of the Greater Lansing areas, Michigan Christians for Life and Michigan State University (MSU) Students for Life. RLM of Lansing had in addition to pregnancy centers and Christian adoption agencies (Bethany Christian Services 2009) a non-religious adoption agency and two non-religious children's aid non-profit agencies and one government organization (Appendix B, Table 20) listed in their directory of pregnancy support services (Right to Life of Michigan 2000). A check of conservatism through those respondents' abortion ideology (see section Data Collection below) revealed the respondents had mainline or liberal views on religious and abortion issues. I checked any further group listed in a hard copy or online directory on adoption and the prevention of abortion that I considered for data collection for their association with religious values in order to keep control of the income of data in relation to religious conservatism and mainline views. In addition I did contact a few mainline Protestant churches (Appendix B, Table 19) in order to keep a balance between conservative and mainline votes among Protestant and Catholic data in the later part of my data collection.

Three Lansing based religious groups were recommended by the Pastor of the fundamentalist New Covenant Christian Church and the missions director of the

evangelical Trinity Church, Lansing for data collection among religious activist groups. They are the prayer group Pray America, Manos de Jesus in Lansing, a missionary group building houses for widows and orphans based on a literalist Bible life in Guatemala and praying sessions in Lansing. The two others are City Rescue Mission and Lansing Teen Challenge. Each is a Bible mission group working to rehabilitate alcohol and drug addicted youths and adults on the basis of a literalist Bible life. From these religious groups and the anti-abortion and Christian Right organizations a few staff members per group filled out the questionnaire. Another approximately 15 questionnaires were returned from the Catholic homeschooling community of the Greater Lansing area.

Ten percent (9.5%) of the respondents to the entire survey were minorities. Four percent were African American, three percent were Hispanic and an additional three percent were of another non-white ethnic group. With the exception of one male member of the Michigan Family Forum who was Hispanic and one female member of one of the Pregnancy Counseling Services (Appendix B) who was of a not identifiable minority, the participants of the survey of the pregnancy and anti-abortion organizations, Christian Right and Catholic conservative political action and religious missionary groups were white. All Hispanic and African American responses came from one of the Churches where questionnaires were distributed.

Studies on black and white Christians clearly validated the conclusion that African American evangelical Protestants are conservative on moral values (Emerson and Smith 2000; Green et al. 2006; Stacey 1996) but demographically distinct from their white counterparts. Both black and white evangelicals have the same orthodox social values regarding the protection of the family in opposition to sexual permissiveness, divorce,

gay marriage, and especially abortion. African American evangelical Protestants are concerned about the breakdown of the family, as white evangelicals are, but they do not search for the causes of the phenomenon entirely in feminism, secular humanism or the liberal elites. African Americans search for the causes first and foremost, in economic and social problems (Green et al. 1996: 186). As a consequence, they are more progressive on economic issues such as the affirmation of the welfare state, affirmative action and other public programs aimed at reducing poverty and the number of uprooted families.

With all the social traditionalism and religious rigor that African American evangelical Protestants share with their white counterparts, they directly feel the socio-economic implications of Christian Right policies align with the Republican Party. Most of the African Americans vote Democratic, and this is maintained for African American evangelicals (Wilcox and Rozell 2000). Since African American and white conservative Christians are politically distinct and have different socio-economic interests, none of the minority members were included in the study. Also they were too few (all minority ethnic groups totaled 38 cases) to be included as a control group in the regression analysis.

Data Collection

The initial plan was to choose two conservative churches of approximately the same size for data collection from the Lansing area, one Catholic and one Protestant. The criterion for selecting these two churches was their activism against abortion. The protest against abortion is central and stands as representative of all the struggles for socio-moral values for which the Christian conservative movement has been known the last three decades (Ferree et al. 2002). In 2001 the spokesperson of the Michigan Catholic

Conference connected me to the St. Gerard Catholic Church and the Lansing chapter of Michigan Family Forum linked me to a few fundamentalist churches, among them the Trinity Baptist Church, a non denominational Bible church located in East Lansing. Both churches had approximately two thousand members. A pilot study showed two things: That random sampling from the membership lists of the selected churches, as was planned, struck from consideration any participation on the Protestant side. Evangelical church elders made clear that they would not work with membership lists. They would only distribute questionnaires in their churches to volunteers who wanted to fill them out. The Catholic side was more responsive with respect to the sampling request. Fr. Sylvester Fedewa at the St. Gerard Catholic Church would have participated in the distribution of questionnaires randomly sampled from a membership list. However, since there was no Protestant sampling counterpart, membership lists for the project were disregarded.

The second insight from the pilot study was that not enough cases would be collected from distributing questionnaires in one or even a few selected churches from the Protestant and the Catholic religions. Data collection from selected churches would not provide enough cases for data analysis. Not more than approximately 20 people would fill out a questionnaire in one single church, even if it was a mega Church with several thousand members like the Mount Hope Church of Lansing. (During final data collection, there were two cases of Catholic churches from where I collected 25 and 38 Questionnaires and 30 from a Protestant mainline church (Appendix B, List of Churches). If it was a smaller church of a few hundred members, the return rate would drop to under ten returned questionnaires or none at all.

Also it was clear that distributing questionnaires in conservative churches for

volunteers who would be willing to fill them out would still result in gaining a large number of mainline votes about religion and gender issues. Collecting among self selected volunteers to participate in the study would not render enough answers from religious conservatives. Since anti-abortion ideology and conservative religious dogma are strongly associated (Beyerlein and Chaves 2003; Granberg 1978; Kohut et al. 2000) I controlled whether the respondents were conservative by checking their answers to the questions about their opinions about abortion. (See Appendix A question 4.6 (1 to 7). The question 4.6 (1 to 7) is from the General Social Survey (1999). If the answers to four of the seven scales which asked whether they agreed with abortion were filled in with “probably no”, the respondents were considered conservative. The respondents could choose from “definitely”, they would agree with abortion, to “probably”, they would agree to “not sure”, “probably not”, and they would “definitely not” agree with abortion.

The next step in the process of data collection included the systematic coverage of all conservative Protestant denominations listed in the yellow pages for the Lansing area, including the non-denominational churches and Bible groups (see evangelical denominations of the list of Protestant denominations in Table 1) from which at least one medium size church (300 up to 1000 members) was selected to be called and asked whether questionnaires could be dropped off. A definition of conservative religious denominations (Leege and Kellstedt 1993b; Mead and Hill 2001) was used as reference to select the denominations from the Yellow Pages and from the internet. The process of calling for participating in the survey was repeated until one of the evangelical Protestant churches listed under a certain denomination agreed to have questionnaires dropped off.

On the Catholic side, I talked to the director of peace and justice ministry at the St.

Table 1**Protestant Denominations**

Evangelical Denominations	Mainline Denominations
Southern Baptist	American Baptist
Presbyterian in America	Presbyterian in the USA
Missouri Lutheran Synod	Evangelical Lutheran of America
Wisconsin Lutheran Synod	United Methodist
Church of God	Congregational
Assemblies of God	Reformed
Church of the Nazarene	Episcopal
Non-Denominational	United Church of Christ
Bible Fellowship	Disciples of God

Sources: Mead and Hill (2001), Leege and Lyman (1993b)

Mary Cathedral, Lansing and deacon of the Diocese of Lansing from whom I got a directory of the parish social ministries of the Lansing region. They include 23 parishes of the 92 of the Lansing Diocese (Diocese of Lansing 2000). Each parish church's social activities of the Lansing region was listed, from Peace and Justice issues on the left side of the political spectrum to those with focus on Respect Life, the Catholic pro-life pregnancy social services to the middle of the right of the spectrum. The Respect Life groups are the Catholic counterpart of the Right to Life of Michigan (RLM) pregnancy counseling services, to which I mailed questionnaires in the entire mid – Michigan area, after the local Lansing area data collection had not provided enough conservative data for empirical analysis. The pregnancy counseling services are organized and put on the internet by Christian Right organizations like Care net and Heart Beat International (United States 2006).

The Catholic Church organizes the Respect Life services herself, while RLM says

they are not affiliated with any religion (Blanchard 1996). There is a specific Catholic counseling center in Lansing, Project Rachel, to heal trauma after abortion. The director of Peace and Justice Ministries of the Diocese of Lansing told me, however, that this Catholic pregnancy center was staffed, but there was hardly anybody from the community who would seek counseling before or as a psychological support after an abortion.

In any case the deacon made clear that the struggle against abortion of the Respect Life social services and the Catholic Church were not in any way linked to the political action group Right to Life. The parish priest of the St. Therese of Lisieux Church in Lansing to whom the deacon connected me also ideologically distanced Catholic pro life from Right to Life. There were two such Catholic pro-life groups at St. Therese, Problem Pregnancy and Respect Life. The parish priest emphasized the entire human life span which Catholic Respect Life defends including the Church's fight against poverty. He meant poverty is not respectful of a graceful life. Furthermore he was strongly opposed to the death penalty.

The discussion of these two Church officials was support to some of the discussion in the literature claiming that Catholic anti-abortion stances are not right wing, but have progressive features, with their struggle against poverty, death penalty and nuclear weapons (Kelly 1999). At the same time the Catholic Church hosts social groups with opposing social and political aims under her organizational umbrella while Protestant churches are rather organizationally distinct with their social and political views between the more liberal mainlines and the conservative evangelicals (Gilkey 1974), (also see Appendix B of this dissertation). The history of the development of Protestant religious

fundamentalism shows the trend of organizational separation when basic ideological differences cannot be resolved within a Protestant denomination. Disagreeing members are free to leave and build a new Church without losing their religious identity, since Protestant belief is based on the Word, not the institution of the church as with the Catholic faith (Marsden 2006; Walsh 2000).

The Pregnancy Centers Online – Michigan Listings had 133 Centers listed throughout Michigan in 2001 of which 27 were Catholic Social Services. Some Catholics against abortion in the parishes throughout Michigan must have felt close enough to the political action groups of the Christian Right organizations that organize these pregnancy centers (United States 2006) in order to list their parish pro life groups with them, but at the same time, those Catholic centers listed with the Christian Right pregnancy organizations are only a fraction of the many parishes in the State of Michigan. The Lansing Region with its 11 Respect Life social services in the 23 Parishes had none of them listed under Pregnancy Centers - Michigan Listings in 2001 [also see Diocese of Lansing (2000)].

These diverging interests within the Catholic Church were reflected in relations to my data collection in the diocese of Lansing. For data collection I called each parish church listed in the Greater Lansing area of the diocese which had a Respect Life social action committee included in their social ministries, and asked whether I could distribute questionnaires. Also, I asked the staff of these parishes with Respect Life action groups to give me information about which of the Catholic Churches in the Lansing areas had conservative social programs. An indicator for adherence to conservative rule is the rejection of artificial contraception as taught by *Humanae Vitae*, because artificial

contraception is considered the beginning of the abortion process of life and subsequent sexual permissiveness (Miller 1993). Parish churches that advocated “natural family planning” were organized in programs called “Couple to Couple League” promoting information on the monthly cycle of the woman for contraception. Churches like Resurrection of Lansing and St. Thomas Aquinas of East Lansing that emphasized such programs strongly in their social ministries services were asked to fill out questionnaires.

An additional Catholic group that I approached to have questionnaires filled out was the Catholic home schooling community of Lansing. They teach their children at home through 8th grade, because they feel, the Catholic Church bureaucracy and the schools administered by the Church are too liberal. While most of the homeschooling proponents to which I was directed filled out the questionnaire (12 questionnaires), contact to the Protestant counterpart was fruitless. Protestant evangelical and fundamentalist homeschoolers were not responsive. However, one Protestant fundamentalist pastor asked the teaching staff of his elementary school to fill out questionnaires for the project of this dissertation. They all did fill out the questionnaires. The pastor had been approached by the Catholic wife of one of his fundamentalist church members on behalf of my dissertation project.

Catholics in general were more responsive in filling out the questionnaire (n=200) than the Protestant evangelicals (n=133) in relations to my entire data collection (Appendix B, Table 19). To match the larger response rate of the Catholics in general and the Catholic non- conservative responses in particular on the Protestant side, a few mainline Protestant churches (Appendix B, Mainline Churches) were chosen for the final data collection (n=44) in addition to the evangelical churches (n=133) that have more

conservative tradition of dogma than the mainline churches (Wuthnow 1989).

In order to enlarge my data set in addition to the set collected from the Lansing areas I checked from the Internet all pregnancy counseling organizations listed in 2001 under Pregnancy Centers Online – Michigan Listings. They are political action groups that hand out information about abortion and how to avoid it. They offer pregnancy tests to pregnant women that search pregnancy and abortion information and try to convince them not to have an abortion. I called every group between Detroit and Grand Rapids, Ann Arbor and Flint and asked whether I could mail questionnaires. Many of these organizations, especially in the non-metropolitan areas are staffed with one person. They begin operation but then disappear after a few months. So some of the centers listed had no valid phone number any longer. I mailed from one to ten questionnaires to the agreeing service centers, depending on the number of staff members who would volunteer to fill them out.

Construction of Variables

The concepts of interest in this study are ahistorical religiosity, neo-patriarchy, and economic ideology. The following sections describe the variables that were used to analyze the association between strict dogma and moral values of Catholic and Protestant conservatives and how this association is transformed into gender ideology and opinions about poverty. The description of variables is grouped in dependent, independent and control variables. Table 2 gives an overview over these groups of variables.

Dependent Variables

Ahistorical Religiosity: The question “How much guidance does your religion give you for your daily living?” was chosen from the General Social Survey (1999) to

operationalize ahistorical religiosity (see Appendix A, question 1.24). The coding used in the analysis is from (1) to (6): “None” (1) to “the only guide I have” (6). The question about how much one’s religion is one’s guide through daily life measures awareness of the importance of one’s religion and interacts with the awareness of a conservative identity. Gut and Green (1993) found in this context that it is not the content of a religion that is vital to understanding the ideological underpinning of a person’s world view on a progressive conservative dimension but the strength of the attachment to the beliefs and traditions of that religion. The basic concept of religious strength, they found, is salience, the importance that religion has in a person’s life. The link of salience to religious conservatism is that the more doctrinally conservative a religious tradition is the more members say their religion is important to them (Guth and Green 1993).

With respect to the Catholic and Protestant ahistorical dogmas we saw (in the first chapter) that faith depends on capturing the spirit of the religion through its formalism (Schoenherr 1987). The connection of ahistorical religious formalism to salience is that the religious boundaries of the dogma the truth of which can be found in formalism are clear to the believer. A religious belief that has clear boundaries is more salient to the faithful than a dogma that allows dispute over the individual’s consciousness about God’s will (Elliott 2006; Salzman 2008).

The final reason why ahistorical religiosity is operationalized in this dissertation through religious salience is that this concept was in Guth and Green’s (1993: 160) study directly linked to questions of sexuality, morality and abortion, or in general, to “family values”. These are all issues which are components of both Protestant and Catholic current conservative dogma and have sexuality as their underpinnings. The awareness of

the conservative identity is according associated with the believers' awareness of his/her sexual morality.

Domestic Work Distribution: The literature about the gender division of labor in conservative Christian households has mostly been conducted in Protestant evangelical and fundamentalist settings. This research shows a neo-patriarchal situation in which the domestic work situation of the Christian conservatives has changed towards the larger society with the work in the home being adapted to the double earner society.

On the grounds of Arie Hochschild's (1989) findings about the disproportionate load of work for women compared to men in the double earner situation published in her book "The Second Shift" (Hochschild 1989) I wrote a series of questions asking about the distribution of domestic work between the man and the woman in the household (Appendix A, questions 3.2 (1 to 4). "In your family or partnership who does the following activities, the male or the female, or do you share equally?" On a scale from (1) (the man only is taking care of the task in the household) and (7) (the woman deals with the task alone) I asked about who does the shopping for groceries, prepares meals, does the cleaning, takes care of the children. A high score means a high degree of gender division of labor within the household. I added the four questions up into a scale of (0) to (28), which resulted in a reliability factor of $\text{Alpha}=0.76$. (The mean for Catholics is 19.8, the mean for Protestants is 18.7).

The comparison of the means for Catholics and Protestants shows, that both, Catholics and Protestants live in households with relative gender equalitarian relations between husband and wife. We consider that the code (14) means most equalitarian and (28) the most gender divided relations. However, Catholics' gender relations regarding

the distribution of household labor is slightly more gender divided than for Protestants. This possibly indicates that marriage and the relationships within it are sacramental in Catholicism (Strasser 2004).

Ideology about Gender Relations (Table 2, Conservative Gender Ideology): I explained in chapter 3, Hypotheses, that the concept of neo-patriarchy contains the factual gender relations that I measure from the distribution of household work between men and women, and the ideology about gender relations. The questions to measure the believers' ideology about gender relations, (equalitarian or hierarchical), were adapted from the General Social Survey (General Social Survey 1999). The sequence of questions asks about working mothers and family life [Appendix A, questions 3.1 (1 to 9)] and was introduced as follows in the questionnaire: "Here are some questions about women. Do you agree or disagree?" The nine questions were coded from (0) strongly agree to (4) strongly disagree. The questions were added into a scale of (0) to (35) with a reliability factor of $\text{Alpha} = .82$. They were coded in such a way that the higher the score, the more the person has a gender divided ideology about gender relations. Table 2 shows that Catholics with a mean = 20.1 have a slightly more conservative gender ideology than Protestants with a mean = 18.9 on the scale that measures the ideology about gender relations between 0 and 35.

Economic Attitudes: Responsibility for poverty has been allocated to the individual in the conservative Protestant tradition. There is a strong emphasis there on the individual's necessity to convert as a precondition for the betterment of society including the fight against poverty. The reason for poverty is seen in people's sin from not following God's word in the Bible (Wilcox 2000). Structural, social or political

conditions are hardly taken into consideration in the Protestant conservative dogma as possible sources of poverty (Emerson and Smith 2000). Catholic dogma is not as clearly associated with individualist responsibility of poverty. The Catholic conservatives have as one feature to their salvation: To be obedient to the teachings of the Vatican, from which sexual morality is binding for the Catholic membership in the faith. Economic ideology is given more discretion in the Catholic faith, since the socio-economic teaching is not compelling for the Catholic identity (Burns 1996). Economic ideology that allocates individualist vs. structural responsibility for poverty is measured with the question from the General Social Survey (1999) “Which of the following is closer to your view? Individuals are poor because of individual failure or individuals are poor because of social, economic, or political factors.” (Appendix A, question 2.31.3) A scale between (1) strongly structural and (8) strongly individualist measures the degree of individualist responsibility.

The mean for Catholics is 3.6, whereas the mean for Protestants is 4.5. This indicates a slightly stronger tendency for Protestants to search the causes for poverty in individualist responsibility as compared to Catholics and is support for the conclusion in the literature (Hoover et al. 2002; Walsh 2000) about the focus on individualism in the Protestant conservative dogma. In addition, the Catholic mean of 3.6 on the (0) to (8) scale indicates Catholics in general have a more structural approach to explaining poverty as compared to Protestants. This is support to the literature about this theme as I presented it in chapter three, section on Catholic Conservatives. There I described Catholic conservatives’ relationship to God that goes through their parish community with the individual as member. Communitarian views are explained as some of the

reasons why Catholics are more inclined to explain poverty with social causes or deregulated market policy that is harmful for the economic disadvantaged than the Protestant explanation (Gilkey 1974; Jelen 1991b; Lent 1998).

Independent Variables

The independent variables are grouped into three categories for presentation purposes. They are based on gender ideological grounds, religious grounds, or whether they have both gender ideological and religious connotations. Gender ideology and sexual morality are the two major gender ideological variables. The importance of these two variables is that they are used to test the structural difference of the concept of morality for Protestant and Catholic conservative dogmas (chapter 3, hypothesis 2c). How are these dogmas associated with gender ideology and then transformed into opinions and interpretations about the causes of poverty? The variable gender ideology is constructed from questions asking about the opinion on gender relations. The questions ask the opinion about the role of women as mothers and part of the labor market [Appendix A, questions 3.1 (1 to 9)]. The variable gender ideology is used both as an independent and a dependent variable in this study (see chapter 5). The construction of the variable is described above (section Dependent Variables, Ideology about Gender Relations).

The description of the next variable is sexual morality. It is the structural counterpart of gender ideology to test whether there is a structural difference of the concept of morality for Protestant and Catholic conservative dogmas (chapter 3, hypothesis 2c).

Sexual Morality (Table 2, Conservative Sexual Morality): Morals in the conservative religious context of the Protestant and Catholic faith are framed by the domestication of

sexuality. In this view sex outside marriage does not exist. Divorce is one of the first measures of breakup of the grounds of domesticated control over women through sexuality (DeBerg 2000). Three questions from the General Social Survey (1999) were chosen to approach this situation (Appendix A, questions 4.2, 4.3, 4.4). The coding with the first two questions is from 0 (not wrong at all) to 4 (always wrong) and asks if they think it is always wrong or not at all if a man and woman have sexual relations before marriage, or if a person has extramarital sexual relations, or whether they think getting a divorce should be easier or more difficult.

In both the Protestant and Catholic conservatism, the public school is considered a pool of liberal thought. The public school threatens with sex and evolution the values of the creationist view of the world and the reproduction of the religious identity of conservative Protestants and Catholics (Riesebrodt 1993). Sex education has been considered one ground of sexual promiscuity and therefore one of the primary features to be battled (Irvine 2002). On the grounds of this information, I constructed the four questions on teaching sex education and abstinence in the public schools (Appendix A, questions 4.51 to 4.54) with the coding for the first three being 0 (definitely yes) to 4 (definitely no). The fourth question is: At what age should abstinence be taught, if at all. All seven variables about pre- and extra marital sex, divorce and sex education were computed into a scale from 0 to 28 with the reliability Alpha= 0.71. The coding means the higher the score, the more a person holds conservative moral values on sexual morality.

The next two variables, abortion and male church leader have both gender ideological and religious connotations. Abortion indicates permissiveness (Becker and Eiesland 1997: 158) as it implies female sexuality without the frame of domesticated

control in the male dominated family. Permissiveness is for Catholic conservatives the issue about the mortal sinfulness of sexuality without the intent of procreation (Burns 1999; Kissling 1999; Weaver 1999). For Protestants abortion is the objection to God's will (Bendroth 1999).

Abortion (Table 2, Conservative Abortion Ideology): In order to measure abortion attitudes, I constructed a scale measuring opinion about abortion and activism about abortion. The part about abortion attitudes is composed of a scale with seven questions from the General Social Survey (1999) asking under which conditions the respondent would agree with abortion, coded from (0) affirmative to (5) negative (Appendix A, questions 4.6 (1 to 7). The questions were: Do you agree with abortion if 1) there is a strong chance of serious birth defect in the baby, 2) a woman is married and does not want to have any more children, 3) the woman's health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy, 4) the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children, 5) the woman became pregnant as a result of rape. Finally, the last questions asked under what conditions they would agree with an abortion if 6) she is not married and does not want to marry the man, and if 7) the woman wants abortion for any reason. Also included is an additional question about abortion formulated as whether the abortion issue is of concern to the respondents among other social issues (Appendix A, question 4.1.3). The coding is from 1) not important at all to 7) very important.

In addition to these questions about the respondents' attitudes about abortion the questionnaire asks also about activism on behalf of pro-life [Appendix A, questions 5.1(1) to 5.2]. The questions ask whether the respondent works in an organization that promotes alternatives to abortion, whether money is donated, letters are written to

officials, or whether the respondent goes on a picket line. All questions, those about the attitudes and those about activism were added up into a scale from 1, indicating they were not opposed at all to abortion, to 46, indicating they were strongly opposed to abortion.

The mean for Catholics is 28.9 (Table 2), six units more conservative than the middle score (23) of the scale between (0) and (46). The mean for Protestants is 27.3. It indicates that Catholics in general (including all Catholics in the data set, not only the Catholic conservatives) are only slightly more conservative on abortion than Protestants in general, and both are closer to the middle score than to any of the extremes. Even though the Catholic Church portrays anti-abortion as a matter of Catholic identity (Weaver 1999: 92) these results confirm that Catholics in general do not take Vatican teaching on morals as a matter of their Catholic identity (Christiano et al. 2002; D'Antonio et al. 2001).

Male Church Leader: This variable also has a religious and a gender component. The variable “male church leader” signifies the believer’s resistance to women as pastors of their local church or women as ordained priests. Catholic conservatives want a newly masculinized Church – cleared of functions that Vatican II has allowed women to perform in parochial Church ceremonies (Cuneo 1989; Schoenherr 2002). Also for Protestant conservatives, women as pastors contradicts the Biblically requested male “headship” and is fiercely contested (Lazarus-Yafeh 1988: 37). In order to measure the view about the importance of male church leadership as compared to include women into church leadership, the General Social Survey (1999) question “If your church nominated a women for priest or pastor would you approve or disapprove?” was used with the coding approve a lot (0) to disapprove a lot (4) (Appendix A, question 3.1.10).

The rest of the major variables that are described in Table 2 are mostly based on religious connotations. Job performance of the Pope, Importance of church for one's decisions and making the sign of the cross are variables with Catholic religious connotations, Conversion (Getting people to Christ solves social problems), frequency of Bible reading and importance of Bible for one's decisions are variables with Protestant religious connotations.

Job Performance of the Pope: In order to measure the degree of conservatism within the Catholic faith, Catholics relationship to the Church hierarchy was investigated. Do they practice "loyal disobedience" (Christiano et al. 2002) as found characteristic of mainstream Catholicism? The loyally disobedient Catholics are participating in their Church but just do not care about the specifically sexual rules of the Vatican. Compared to the liberal branch of Catholicism, the characteristic of Catholic conservatives is the absolute obedience to the Church hierarchy (Cuneo 1995; Dinges 1987). Job performance of the Pope, as measured in the question used in this study does not measure absolute obedience but indicates through the believers' agreement of the church hierarchy readiness to approve the Pope's actions. The question to measure this are from Greeley (1990) asking "Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Pope is handling his job?". The coding was set at (1) disapprove a lot to (5) approve a lot (Appendix A, question 2.4).

To Get People to Christ Solves Social Problems: To bring people to Christ is the Protestant evangelical requirement for conversion. It is the precondition to earn salvation. Without accepting Christ through a Bible conforming life including proper sexual behavior, salvation is not possible according to conservative Protestant ideals (Riesebrodt

1993). “If enough people were brought to Christ, would social ills take care of themselves”? (General Social Survey 1999) is the question to measure Protestant salvation with the coding from strongly disagree (1), to strongly agree (5) (Appendix A, question 2.31.4). The second part of the question (that social ills will take care of themselves) points to the feature of allocating individualist responsibility to social problems, as found inherent in conservative Protestantism (Emerson and Smith 2000).

The comparison of the means (Catholic mean = 3.58, Protestant mean = 3.47) that shows hardly any difference for Catholics and Protestants does not suggest however that this variable describes a strictly Protestant feature. It indicates, that conversion, as directed from the Protestant Bible, is as important for Catholics as for Protestants, suggesting, that a certain degree of “Protestantization” (Gilkey 1974) of the Catholic faith might have become reality. After Vatican II, some of the mystic that was inherent in the sacraments of the Catholic faith had been replaced with more reference to the Bible than was used before Vatican II. Some literature says, the sacraments have lost importance since Catholicism’s newer reference to the Bible is competing with the importance of the sacraments (Gilkey 1974; Schoenherr 2002).

Frequency of Bible Reading and Importance of Bible for One’s Decisions: The Bible is the root of the Protestant’s belief to God (Harris 1998). With these variables emphasis of the Bible, both variables have Protestant connotation. However, frequency of Bible reading is focusing on the formalism of the Protestant belief. The believer’s emphasis on the formalism like frequency of reading the Bible I described in chapter one as a ahistorical feature of Protestant conservative dogma. The questions to measure formalism in relation to the Bible in my study and the importance of the Bible were (General Social

Survey 1999): How often do you read the Bible on your own? The coding is (1) never to (6) several times a day and: How important is the Bible in helping you make decisions? with the coding (1) not very important to (7) very important (Appendix A, questions 1.222 and 2.32.1).

The comparison of the means in Table 2 between Catholics (mean = 3.50) and Protestants (mean = 4.24) in relation to the frequency of Bible reading indicates, that the formalism is somewhat more important for Protestants than for Catholics. Also, the comparison of the means in relation to the importance of the Bible for decision making (Catholics mean = 5.18, Protestants mean = 6.27) indicates the Bible is more important for Protestants than for Catholics, indicating that the Bible is indeed a more relevant religious reference for Protestants than for Catholics.

Importance of Church for One's Decisions and Making the Sign of the Cross: The religious counterpart of the Protestant Bible for Catholicism is the Church and her rituals (Dinges 1987; Weaver and Appleby 1995b). Making the sign of the cross as a feature representing Catholic rituals is clearly not a religious feature shared with the Protestants in my data set, as the comparisons of the means show (Catholic mean = 5.09, Protestant mean = 1.37). The question "how often do you make the sign of the cross" (General Social Survey 1999), Appendix A, question 1.232) was coded from (1) never to (6) several times a day, the question about the Church was "how important is your church in helping you make decisions" coded from (1) not very important to (7) very important (General Social Survey 1999), Appendix A, question 2.32.2). Also here the comparison of the means between Catholics (5.60) and Protestants (5.29) indicates the Church is more a feature of Catholicism than of Protestantism even though the indication from the

means is not strong and the Bible is more a feature of Protestantism (Catholic: Church mean = 5.60, Bible mean = 5.18; Protestant: Church mean = 5.29, Bible mean = 6.27).

Praying: The reminder of the independent variables which are included in the study are three questions about praying - on one's own, for grace at mealtime, and supporting prayer in the public schools. The questions are from General Social Survey (1999) and read "How often do you pray on your own?" And "How often do you say grace at mealtime?" They were coded from (1), never to (6) several times a day (Appendix A, questions 1.221 and 1.231). The means for Catholics (Table 2, praying on one's own, mean = 5.61; saying grace, mean = 4.98) and Protestants (praying on one's own, mean = 5.68; saying grace, mean = 5.14) do not indicate a faith specific feature for any of them. The question whether support of prayer in the public schools (General Social Survey 1999), Appendix A, question 4.1.1) is important to the respondents was coded from (1) not important at all to (7) very important. Here, the Protestant mean = 4.68 is somewhat higher than the Catholic (mean = 4.41), supporting the suggestion of some of the literature, that sustenance of prayer in the public schools is rather a Protestant public policy issue than a Catholic issue that is also promoted by the Christian Right but less by the official Catholic Church (Guth and Green 1996: 32-39).

Control Variables

Four demographic control variables were used in this study to test the predictor variables of ahistorical religiosity, neo-patriarchy and the economic attitudes about the causes of poverty. The control variables are gender, income, education, and generation. The questions on which the variables are based are from General Social Survey (1999) (Appendix A, questions 6.2, 6.4, 6.51, and 6.6).

Table 2
Description of Variables Used in the Analysis

Variable Name	Definition	Catholic		Protestant	
		Proportion/ Mean	Std. Dev.	Proportion/ Mean	Std. Dev.
Major Variables					
Ahistorical Religiosity	R's level of ahistorical religiosity; 1=low, 6=high	5.12	0.611	5.29	0.709
Domestic Work	0=Husband does all the work, 26=wife does all the work	19.76	4.465	18.65	4.722
Individualist Economic Attitudes	1=Strongly structural, 8=strongly individualist	3.60	1.993	4.48	1.866
*Conservative Gender Ideology	0=Egalitarian, 35=hierarchical	20.08	6.298	18.85	5.461
Conservative Sexual Morality	0=Not conservative at all, 28=very conservative	15.39	5.841	15.31	4.21
*Conservative Abortion Ideology	1=Not opposed at all, 46=very much opposed	28.90	11.321	27.32	11.695
Male Church Leader	0=Approve a lot of female priest/pastor, 4=disapprove a lot	2.12	1.676	1.94	1.594
Job Performance of Pope	1=Disapprove a lot, 5=approve a lot	4.40	1.116		
People to Christ Solves Social Problems	1=Strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree	3.58	1.104	3.47	1.165
*Frequency of Bible Reading	1=Never, 6=several times a day	3.50	1.316	4.24	1.05
Importance of Bible for One's Decisions	1=Not very important, 7=very important	5.18	1.711	6.27	1.177
Importance of Church for One's Decisions	1=Not very important, 7=very important	5.60	1.493	5.29	1.413
Making Sign of Cross	1=Never, 6=several times a day	5.09	1.178	1.37	0.886
Praying on One's Own	1=Never, 6=several times a day	5.61	0.758	5.68	0.649
Saying Grace at Mealtime	1=Never, 6=several times a day	4.98	1.332	5.14	1.253
Supporting Prayer in Public Schools	1=Not important at all, 7=very important	4.41	2.159	4.68	2.004
Control Variables					
Gender					
Male (R)	Self-identified gender is male	0.25	0.433	0.28	0.453
Female	Self-identified gender is female	0.75	0.433	0.72	0.453

Table 2 (cont. d)
Control Variables

	Definition	Catholic		Protestant	
		Proportion	Std. Dev.	Proportion	Std. Dev.
Education					
Higher Education (R)	Master's & Ph.D.	0.28	0.449	0.22	0.413
Middle Education	Bachelor's	0.31	0.465	0.44	0.498
Lower Education	Up to some college	0.41	0.493	0.34	0.477
Income					
Higher Income (R)	Total yearly family income is above \$75,000	0.36	0.48	0.25	0.437
Middle Income	Total yearly family income is between \$50,000 and \$74,999	0.27	0.444	0.3	0.462
Lower Income	Total yearly family income is below \$50,000	0.38	0.486	0.44	0.498
Generation					
60 through 90	Respondent's age is between 60 and 90 years	0.29	0.455	0.18	0.383
40 through 59	Respondent's age is between 40 and 59 years	0.49	0.501	0.53	0.501
19 through 39 (R)	Respondent's age is between 19 and 39 years	0.22	0.414	0.3	0.458

Notes: N: Catholics=163, Protestants=128

Definition: R=Respondent

(R)=Reference Category. All of the control variables are dichotomous.

*Used as dependent and independent variables in subsequent models. See chapter 5, sections Ahistorical Religiosity and Neo-Patriarchy.

Dummy variables were constructed with two categories for gender, and three categories each for lower, middle, higher income, and education and young middle and older generation. All categories of the dummy variables are dichotomous. Table 2 displays the proportions of the sample in each demographic group of the dummy variables and explains the coding.

One category of each dummy variable is the reference category [Table 2, (R)]. For gender it is the male category, for education and income it is the category higher education or income, and for generation it is the younger, the 19 to 39 years old. Historically men were considered less religious than women among Protestants and Catholics, even though in both religions' conservative dogma, masculine leadership is essential for conservative identity and rejects the idea of women clergy (Lazarus-Yafeh 1988). The rejection occurs on the grounds of the central role of gender division of labor for the existence of the conservative Bible dogma (DeBerg 2000), and the power structure of the Catholic Church (Burns 1996; Weaver 1994). Among the common believer, women are thought to be more religious, to be sure. Women have been considered the grounds for care and nurture within which the transfer of Christian values to the next generation is embedded including to make husbands more committed to families and church (Balmer 1994; Bendroth 2001). And Catholic women's volunteer work has been the back bone of several generations of Catholic Church life (D'Antonio et al. 2001). Women have been more involved historically in conservative religion than men so that the category of women is the main category that is compared to the male category (reference category) of the gender variable in this study.

The maximum of the three units of each higher education and higher income are the

reference category for the two dummy variables. The rationale for this choice is the association that wealth and education have with secularism. The United States has been called the religious exception because Americans are reported to be more religious than the inhabitants of other industrialized nations (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007). However the acceptance of secular values has progressed in the United States, in that more people consider themselves not related to organized religion than two decades ago (Hout and Fischer 2002). Inglehard (1990) contends that the need for spiritual answers does not die out with economic development in postindustrial societies as the secularization hypothesis (Berger and Luckmann 1966) claimed. Inglehart and Baker (2000) modify this claim in that they propose that educational level and economic development of a nation do have an impact on the traditional secular dimension of the world view of people in post industrial society. This involves the authors maintain the people's reduction of following absolute authorities in their lives such as the authority of parents, religious formalism, or political leaders and superiors in the workplace. Since religious formalism is an important factor of conservative religion and higher education and economic wealth are associated with decrease of the importance of the religious formalism on the macro level, I choose higher education and higher income as reference categories for the two dummy variables in my study.

For the dummy variable generation the unit indicating the youngest age group (19 to 39 years old) is taken as reference group. Some of the literature argues that the conservative Christian movement will not fade with the passage of the older generations, but is meant to stay since it does attract young people (Greeley 2001; Weaver and Appleby 1995a). However there is evidence on the macro level that obedience to religion

has been more integrated in the generation that was born before the onset of the post modern society after the Second World War. D'Antonio and his research associates (2001) showed that fewer will be committed to the values of the Catholic Church in the coming decades. A decreasing proportion of Catholics is in the category pre-Vatican II, Catholics born prior to World War II. It is this latter, shrinking generation D'Antonio and authors manifest that has been the most doctrinally orthodox and the most committed to the church as an institution. The authors observe that, as the oldest cohort dies the youngest increases. Those are the post Vatican II Catholics. They are the least likely to participate in the church's formal worship (p. 62), and the least likely to give weight to official church teachings on moral issues (p. 78). The younger Catholic age cohort is associated with less conservative religiosity and chosen as reference category.

In the context of the Protestant religion, the secularization trend has taken believers away from the Protestant religion, too, but it is more the mainline denominations who suffered diminished numbers, while the more conservative evangelical Protestant churches have been thriving (Finke and Stark 1992; Wuthnow 1998). I apply the same units of pre- (60 to 90 years old), post- (19 to 39) and Vatican generation (40 to 59 years) for the Protestants as I have for the Catholics, since the middle group is the largest for the Protestants in my sample (40 through 59 years old=53%, N=80), as is for the Catholics (49%, N=97). Even though Protestants have a stronger youth category (19 through 39 years old=30%, N=45) than the Catholics (22%, N=43) the older cohort of the Protestant 60 to 90 years old (18%, N=27) does not provide sufficient cases in order to separate them in more age cohorts (Catholic pre-Vatican II cohort=29%, N=57).

Analytical Strategy: Linear multiple regression also known as OLS (ordinary least

squares) was used in order to analyze the association between strict dogma and moral values of Catholic and Protestant conservatives and how this association is transformed into gender ideology and opinions about poverty. There are six dependent variables in this study: ahistorical religiosity, Protestant frequency of Bible reading, Catholic abortion ideology, neo-patriarchal domestic work distribution between men and women and their ideology about the gender relations, and the economic attitudes about the causes of poverty. For these six dependent variables gender ideological and religious variables (Table 2) were used in linear regression analyses to test whether they are predicting the dependent variables. Those independent variables that were significant predictors of the dependent variables were further tested in a linear regression analysis that includes the demographic dummy variables.

This further analysis of controlling the usefulness of the ideological and religious independent variables with the four demographic characteristics was possible in relation to five of the six dependent variables. None of the hypothesized ideological and religious variables predicted ahistorical religiosity. Therefore ahistorical religiosity was excluded from control analysis through the demographic variables (chapter 5). The demographic variables should control (as stated in the hypotheses in chapter 3) whether gender, education, income and generation had any influence on the strength of the ideological and religious variables predicting frequency of Bible reading, abortion ideology, neo-patriarchal domestic work distribution and the ideology about the gender relations, and finally the opinion about the responsibility of poverty.

The comparison of the proportions in each demographic group for income, education and generation between Catholics and Protestants shows that Catholics have higher

income than Protestants (Table 2, Catholic higher income proportion = 0.36, Protestant proportion = 0.25; Catholic lower income proportion = 0.38, Protestant proportion = 0.44). Among the Catholics, there are also more of those who are higher educated with at least a master's degree (proportion = 0.28), than among the Protestants (proportion = 0.22), however, the Catholics (proportion = 0.41) have also the larger group that is lower educated than the Protestants (proportion = 0.34). The middle education with bachelor's degrees is the Protestants' largest educational group (proportion = 0.44). This confirms the notion in the literature that Catholics are not poorer with less education than Protestants any longer, but have been upwardly socially mobile, especially regarding income (Green et al. 1996; Walsh 2000; Wilcox 2000).

Chapter 5

DATA ANALYSIS

Ahistorical Religiosity

The study examines the question: Do religious conservatives adhere to a more individualist or structural explanation of poverty?

I have argued in the first chapter of this dissertation that ahistorical religiosity is a characteristic belief structure of the religious conservatives. Truth in this context is dogmatic. In Protestantism the ahistorical character has its origin in the inerrant Bible where the inerrancy lies in the rejection of any hidden meaning of Biblical words. Faith on this background depends, according to James Barr (1978), on the formal structure of the text. The ahistorical maintains the inerrancy of the Biblical truth, which not only sees the lack of gender relations as sinful on the individual level, but excluding any empirical and historical facts from social analysis, also socially detrimental. This exclusion allows for a direct link between personal sexual moral as precondition of salvation and the restructuring of society (Sennet 1994, also see chapter 3 of this thesis).

In Catholicism the believer is acted upon through the Church bureaucracy (Burns 1999). It is in the Church bureaucracy where the Catholic ahistorical is embedded since the Church hierarchy teaches its truth in general and particularly about intentional procreativity of sexuality. For the conservative believer the spirit of faith is captured through the obedience to the hierarchy's teaching in applying correct rites and sacraments that are believed to guide to the truth (Schoenherr 1987). The truth about the intentional procreativity of sexuality is absolute because it is the power base of the Church (Burns

1992). A tradition about it cannot develop with which the faithful would be able to apply their experience and evaluate it on the background of the learned Church tradition in the process of decision making. The inclusion of the believers' consciousness - permitted in dealing with Catholic rules since Vatican II (Greeley 1985) - is not allowed with respect to sexuality.

On the grounds of the importance of sexuality for ahistorical religiosity I said the content of the belief structure which makes ahistorical religiosity salient to the religious conservatives is sexual morality based on a hierarchical gender ideology. I outlined that sexual morality framed on hierarchical gender ideology has been directly linked to the Protestant conservatives' salvation history or in relations to Catholicism to their conservatives' experience of sacramental grace. Gender division of labor is linked to the Protestant conservative salvation history because of the central role of gender division for the self-conception of the conservative Bible dogma (DeBerg 2000). For Catholic conservatives, sexual morality is central for their beliefs because their obedience to Vatican teaching is essential to deserve sacramental grace and Vatican power structure is based on the gender hierarchical morals they teach (Burns 1996; Weaver 1994).

In order to know whether the belief structure of ahistorical religiosity is linked to economic attitudes as I will examine in section three of this chapter, I investigate now the major components that contribute to the explanation of the concept. I select two sets of variables: Those based on gender ideology and sexual morality and those based on specific Catholic and Protestant components of religiosity. With these two sets, I intend to evaluate the relative importance of the religious components on the one hand and the ideological components about sexuality and gender relations on the other in explaining

ahistorical religiosity. I measure ahistorical religiosity with the question of how much guidance one's religion gives for one's daily decisions. This question represents the believer's awareness of his or her religious identity (Elliott 2006), and high values have been associated to conservative religious dogma that focuses on gender division of labor and morals about sex (Guth and Green 1993). As I explained in chapter one and three, it is the values about sexuality and gender relations that have been static and are requested by the religious conservative to stay non- influenced by changes of human experience and non influenced by any changes of history. This lack of development gives the values an ahistorical feature.

Besides the ideological variables about sex morals and gender relations I include the variables "abortion" and "male church leader" in the analysis. The latter two variables have both a religious connotation and a connotation about sexuality and gender ideology. I want to see whether these variables have a distinct meaning for Catholic and Protestant conservatives, that is whether the one or the other of the variables has a more Catholic than Protestant meaning and vice versa.

The abortion issue is for both Catholic and Protestant conservatives essential and more than the litmus test for family values in the context of hierarchical gender relations (Ferree and Gamson 1999). Abortion indicates permissiveness (Becker and Eiesland 1997: 158) as it implies female sexuality without the frame of domesticated control in the male dominated family. Permissiveness is for Catholic conservatives the issue about the mortal sinfulness of sexuality without the intent of procreation (Burns 1999; Kissling 1999; Weaver 1999). For Protestants abortion is the objection to God's will that a women has to submit herself to the husband (Bendroth 1999) in which the interruption of

pregnancy inside or outside of marriage has no place. Abortion is linked to conservative religious dogma through the sexual permissiveness (of women) because hierarchical gender relations (the principle of which is violated through the interruption of pregnancy) belong to the conservative dogma of both religions.

The variable “male church leader” signifies the believer’s resistance to women as pastors of their local church or women as ordained priests. Catholic conservatives want a newly masculinized Church – cleared of functions that Vatican II has allowed women to perform in parochial Church ceremonies (Cuneo 1989; Schoenherr 2002). Also for Protestant conservatives, women as pastors contradicts the Biblically requested male “headship” and is fiercely contested (Lazarus-Yafeh 1988: 37). The local church is the last stronghold where the relative gender amelioration in the institutions of the larger society has been kept away. For the time being we can keep in mind that “male church leader” is for Catholic and Protestant conservatives a religious connotation in that it signifies the objection against women’s leadership in the church context. It has a connotation of gender relations in that it signifies the belief in women’s submissiveness.

The following religious variables have a specific Catholic rather than Protestant connotation. “Making the sign of the cross” is specific to the Catholics and not performed in most Protestant faiths except for some Lutherans. The “importance of the Church for one’s decision making” has insofar a Catholic notion, as the Church has the meaning of being the grounds from which the Catholic faith is taught and from which God’s grace will be mediated to the faithful (Gilkey 1974; Greeley 2000).

The importance of the Church in Catholic doctrine is comparable on the Protestant side with the “importance of the Bible”, and the “frequency of Bible reading”. The

Table 3
Linear Regression Predicting Catholic and Protestant Ahistorical Religiosity

Variables	Catholics		Protestant	
	β	SE	β	SE
Conservative Gender Ideology	0.15	0.009	-0.054	0.013
Conservative Sexual Morality	-0.077	0.011	0.177	0.017
Conservative Abortion Ideology	0.214 *	0.006	-0.088	0.007
Male Church Leader	-----	-----	-0.049	0.046
Job Performance of Pope	-0.051	0.049	-----	-----
People to Christ Solves Soc. Problems	0.102	0.041	0.072	0.053
Frequency of Bible Reading	0.048	0.034	0.227 *	0.065
Importance of Bible for Decisions	0.145	0.032	0.165	0.062
Importance of Church for Decisions	0.18 *	0.032	0.096	0.041
Making the Sign of the Cross	0.071	0.046	-0.017	0.062
Praying on One's Own	0.184 *	0.057	0.021	0.101
Saying Grace at Mealtime	-0.096	0.038	0.023	0.05
Supporting Prayer in Public School	-0.054	0.023	0.168	0.031
R²	0.326	0.519	0.255	0.64
Intercept	3.052	0.348	3.02	0.544

Notes: N: Catholics = 184, Protestants = 151

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

Male Church Leader is excluded for Catholics because of high collinearity.

Job Performance of Pope is excluded for Protestants since it does not apply to Protestant religion.

Biblical word is the tool that links the believer directly to God. Also, support of prayers in the public schools has been portrayed in the literature as a Protestant issue, requested as policy mostly by Protestant fundamentalists and evangelicals, but to lesser extent it has been a Catholic issue (Leege and Kellstedt 1993b; Welch and Leege 1991). The variables “praying on one’s own” and “saying grace at mealtime” are included as a general religious trait for both, Protestants and Catholics. All variables except for “job performance of the Pope” are included in both, the Catholic and the Protestant regression models. This allows examining whether the assumption that the religious variables are specifically faith related and whether this holds for my data set.

Table 3 shows the predictors of Catholic and Protestant ahistorical religiosity. The

variable “male Church leader” was excluded from the Catholic model because it correlates strongly ($r=0.712$, $p<0.000$) with ‘sexual morality’. According to Julie Pallant (2005: 155), of two variables with correlations at $r=0.7$ or stronger one should be removed from the regression model on reasons of multicollinearity. I remove ‘male Church leader’ from the Catholic analysis since sexual morality is one of the major variables in the analysis⁹.

The results in Table 3 show that hypothesis 1a) is not confirmed. Hypothesis 1a) said that Catholics’ and Protestants’ view about sexuality and gender relations are the strongest predictors of their ahistorical religiosity. In the present analysis conservative sexual morality and gender ideology are weak and not significant predictors of Protestant or Catholic ahistorical religiosity. The faith related are the predicting religious variables. The variable contributing most to the explanation of ahistorical religiosity for Catholics is their view on abortion with $\beta = 0.214$ in a model in which R^2 says all the variables explain 33% of the variability in Catholic ahistorical religiosity. The frequency of Bible reading is with $\beta = 0.227$ the only significant Protestant predictor contributing to the explanation of the 26 percent ($R^2 = 0.255$) of the variance of Protestant ahistorical religiosity.

Since the Bible and prayer in the public school have specific Protestant features (Welch and Leege 1991) I tested whether ‘frequency of Bible reading’, the ‘importance of the Bible for one’s decisions’ and ‘supporting prayers in public schools’ are significant predictors of Protestant ahistorical religiosity (Table 4). As Table 4 shows, they are. The variable most contributing to the explanation of Protestant ahistorical religiosity is still

⁹ All the analyses about Catholics that include “sexual morality” and “male church leader” as independent variables will have the latter one removed from the analysis and replaced by “Job performance of Pope”.

their frequency of Bible reading.

Table 4
Linear Regression Predicting Protestant Ahistorical Religiosity

Variables	Protestant	
	β	SE
Frequency of Bible Reading	0.248 **	0.057
Importance of Bible for Decisions	0.184 *	0.053
Support Prayer in Public School	0.197 *	0.027
R²	0.226	0.631
Intercept	3.567	0.291

Notes: N: Protestants = 153

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

The Bible and the support of prayer in the public schools indicate a faith-specific structure of religiosity. The fact that the frequency of Bible reading contributes more to the model than the importance of the Bible for decision making is an indication towards the ahistorical feature of the belief structure of Protestant conservatives. It is the formal factor of the frequency of reading the Bible that explains more of the believer's religiosity than the meaning of the Book. As I explained in chapter one, adhering to the formalism of one's religion belongs to the feature of ahistorical religiosity. This is equivalent to the meaning of abortion and the importance of the Church for Catholics' decision making. Abortion is the symbol that rejects the intentional procreativity of sexuality. I outlined in chapter one, that intentional procreativity is the major feature of Catholic ahistorical religiosity.

Protestant Frequency of Bible Reading

Since my original prediction was that the gender and sexual ideological factors would contribute strongest to the explanation of ahistorical religiosity (hypothesis 1a) I

would like to know, whether these ideological variables have any predictive influence on the frequency of Bible reading and abortion ideology.

According to my definition of ahistorical religiosity, gender hierarchy, based on the inerrancy assumption of the Bible is a defining feature of the ahistorical aspect of the Protestant conservatives' religion. In order to see whether gender hierarchy is associated with explaining the frequency of Bible reading, the variables with gender connotations were put in the regression model: Besides gender ideology and sexual morality this is the opinion that the church should be guided by a male leader (Lazarus-Yafeh 1988). Abortion, with its symbolism of sexual promiscuity (Luker 1984; Manning 1999; Strickler 2002) is the other variable that is included in the model to explain Protestant frequency of Bible reading.

The regression analysis (Table 5) reveals that only gender ideology and abortion attitudes are significant predictors of the Protestants' frequency of Bible reading. The interesting finding is that sexual morality does not explain results but gender ideology does have a moderate influence. Even though it is second behind abortion attitudes in predicting the frequency of Bible reading, the fact that gender ideology is a predictor but not sexual morality supports the difference between Protestant and Catholic conservatives' ahistorical religiosity. With the frequency of Bible reading, a religious variable is contributing most importantly to the prediction of Protestant conservatives' ahistorical religiosity before any ideological variable with sexual and gender connotation. Gender ideology is a predictor of Protestants' frequency of Bible reading, however. The ideological variable about gender hierarchy has through the frequency of Bible reading an indirect influence on Protestant ahistorical religiosity.

Table 5

Linear Regression Predicting Protestant Frequency
of Bible Reading

Variables	Protestant	
	β	SE
Conservative Gender Ideology	0.177 *	0.018
Conservative Sexual Morality	0.021	0.024
Conservative Abortion Ideology	0.235 *	0.009
Male Church Leader	0.112	0.064
R^2	0.191	0.958
Intercept	2.804	0.359

Notes: N: Protestants = 150

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

Table 6

Linear Regression Predicting Protestant Frequency
of Bible Reading
Controlling for Demographic Characteristics

Control Variables	Protestant	
	β	SE
Gender		
Male	-----	-----
Female	0.01	0.188
Education		
Higher Education	-----	-----
Middle Education	-0.136	0.218
Lower Education	-0.023	0.23
Income		
High Income	-----	-----
Middle Income	0.063	0.224
Lower Income	0.217 *	0.218
Generation		
60 through 90	0.167	0.253
40 through 59	0.176	0.205
19 through 39	-----	-----
Major Variables		
Conservative Gender Ideology	0.21 *	0.017
Conservative Abortion Ideology	0.304 **	0.008
R^2	0.251	0.94
$R^2(\text{Change})$	0.167	
Intercept	2.344	0.41

Notes: N: Protestants = 152

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

Demographic Influences

In the next step I examine whether gender ideology and abortion attitudes are significant predictors of Protestants' frequency of Bible reading and withstand demographic control. For hypothesis 1b I argued that the influence of sexual morals on the conservatives' ahistorical religiosity is independent of class issues like income and education. Applied to the current examination I want to know whether Protestants' frequency of Bible reading is independent of class issues.

The full model shows that none of the educational and generation levels reveal any significant influence on the predictors of Protestants' frequency of Bible reading (Table 6). However, lower income does comprise a significant contribution to the explanation of the dependent variable. Historian Lassiter (2008) argues that the working class followed the Christian Right in the decades since the Reagan election because the religious conservative movement promised to protect their families. On the background of the feminist and anti-war movements authority structures were questioned and divorce started to break up families. The conservative religious movement proposed a combination of strict (gender hierarchical) family and religious values as grounds for enduring social relationships. They maintained that this could be a solution to the perception of social deterioration from divorce and single parenthood. That hit low income families harder than those with more wealth since the split off of each earning member is loss of one resource more (Stacey 1996). Inglehart and Baker (2000) argue that specifically those for whom economic security is far off have a different perspective on authority than those who take economic prosperity for granted. Included in the frame of authority structure is the person's relationship to religion. The authors argue that lack

of the experience of wealth is more related to the formalism of religion than to a pluralist view about religious and social values.

The significant result of the low income cohort in Table 6 suggests that an influence additional to the ones of conservative gender and abortion ideologies is contributing to those lower income Protestants' explanation of frequency of Bible reading. Lower income is defined as less than 50,000 dollars total yearly family income, middle income is between 50,000 and 74,999 dollars and higher income is 75,000 dollars and more (chapter 4, Table 2). However, as we see from the β -values of the abortion and gender ideologies, the significance of neither of the ideological predictors is affected by controlling them through the lower income variable.

Also Table 6 shows that the contribution of the demographic variables to the overall explanation of Protestant frequency of Bible reading is smaller than the contribution of the ideological variables. The whole model including all demographic and ideological variables explains 25 percent of the variance ($R^2=0.251$). After removing the effect that the significant low income and the other non-significant demographic variables have on the ideological variables, conservative gender and abortion ideologies explain still an additional 17 percent ($R^2(\text{Change})=0.167$) of the variance of the model. This suggests that the predictor that influences the low income Protestants' frequency of Bible reading as compared to high income Protestants' frequency of Bible reading in addition to conservative gender and abortion ideology is rather small.

Catholic Abortion Attitudes

For Catholics, "conservative abortion ideology" is the slightly stronger predictor of ahistorical religiosity (Table 3) besides the two religious variables "importance of Church

for decision making”, and “praying”. Analog to the Protestant “frequency of Bible reading” I want to see whether ideological components about gender and views about sexual morality that I hypothesized for ahistorical religiosity are a predictor for Catholic’s abortion attitudes. In addition, the “Pope’s job performance” is included in the analysis as a replacement of “male church leader” (see footnote 9 for an explanation).

Table 7 shows that all three variables are significant components that predict abortion ideology for the Catholic conservatives. The comparison of the results about the abortion ideology (Table 7) and the frequency of Bible reading (Table 5) reveal that for Catholics, abortion ideology is most strongly predicted by their view about the Pope, lending support to the notion that to follow the Vatican’s moral teaching has the feature of identity for Catholic conservatives (Burns 1992; Greeley and Hout 2006). The Pope as strongest predictor of abortion ideology is directly followed by sexual morality, while gender ideology is a much weaker predictor. I described sexual morality in the previous chapters as defining Catholics’ ahistorical religiosity, more so than Protestants. For Protestants’ frequency of Bible reading, sexual morality is no predictor at all, but conservative gender ideology is, even so a weaker one than abortion ideology. I outlined in chapter one that the ideology of gender division of labor is considered the grounds on which the inerrant Bible is built (DeBerg 2000).

Demographic Influences

In the next step I want to see whether demographic controls can influence the ideological strength predicting Catholics’ abortion attitudes. D’Antonio and colleagues (2001) find the most orthodox Catholics in the United States are in the pre-Vatican II Generation. They were born before the Second World War (age 60 through 90). The

Table 7

Linear Regression Predicting Catholic Abortion Ideology Controlling for Demographic Characteristics			
Variables	β	Catholic	SE
Conservative Gender Ideology	0.178	**	0.116
Conservative Sexual Morality	0.360	***	0.13
Job Performance of Pope	0.367	***	0.606
R^2	0.600		7.217
Intercept	-4.624		2.299

Notes: N: Catholics = 184

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

Table 8

Linear Regression Predicting Catholic Abortion Ideology Controlling for Demographic Characteristics			
Control Variables	β	Catholic	SE
Gender			
Male	-----		-----
Female	0.04		1.318
Education			
Higher Education	-----		-----
Middle Education	0.103		1.538
Lower Education	0.173	**	1.481
Income			
High Income	-----		-----
Middle Income	0.026		1.431
Lower Income	-0.030		1.336
Generation			
60 through 90	-0.03		1.735
40 through 59	0.022		1.48
19 through 39	-----		-----
Major Variables			
Conservative Gender Ideology	0.176	**	0.12
Conservative Sexual Morality	0.342	***	0.136
Job Performance of Pope	0.317	***	0.667
R^2	0.625		7.143
$R^2(\text{Change})$	0.410		
Intercept	-4.925		3.266

Notes: N: Catholic = 184

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

largest proportion of U.S. Catholics, comprising 46 percent of all adult members, is in the post-Vatican II generation, born after 1961 (ages 19 through 39). The authors point out that the shrinking generation of the pre-Vatican II Catholics is the most committed and doctrinally conservative one. The post Vatican II Catholics are the least likely to participate in the Church's formal worship (p. 62) and the least likely to give weight to official Church teachings on moral issues (p. 78). Also D'Antonio and researchers note a detachment of Post Vatican II women to the expectation of voluntary involvement into the Catholic Church that was a characteristic of pre-Vatican II women.

My data in Table 8 suggests there is no additional generational influence for Catholic conservatives' opinion about abortion. In neither, the generation of the 60 through 90 year olds nor the one of those between 40 and 59 is there a factor additionally to sexual morality and the opinion about the Pope's job performance that would predict Catholic conservatives' abortion ideology if we compare the two generations to the youngest, the 19 to 39 year olds. Also, the data supports the idea that there is no gender difference between men and women regarding the prediction of their abortion attitude.

However, education comprises a significant control over the Catholic's abortion ideology ($\beta = 0.173$, $p < 0.008$ for lower education). Lower education is defined as any schooling up to some college; middle education means up to a bachelor's degree. The reference category is higher education with a master's degree or a doctorate.

All demographic characteristics together explain 22 percent [$R^2 - R^2$ (Change)] of the variance in the complete model predicting Catholic's abortion ideology (Table 8). After entry of the variables Pope, sexual morality and gender ideology to the demographic control variables, the total variance explained by the model as a whole is 63 percent

($R^2=0.625$), from which the three ideological variables explain an additional 41 percent ($R^2(\text{Change})=0.410$), after the effect of the demographic characteristics on the model has been removed. This finding points in the direction that Catholics with lower education as compared with those of higher education have an additional predictor for their conservative abortion ideology than just their conservative ideology. The demographic characteristics do not much affect the strength of the β -values of the Pope, sexual morality and gender ideology though, each of them predicting a stronger degree of abortion attitudes than lower education (Table 8).

If lower education is associated with lower class structure (Luker 1984) the result for education in the full abortion model (Table 8) reveals that Catholics with lower education as compared to those with higher education have an additional factor, in addition to their conservative ideological characteristics (sexual morality, positive job evaluation of the Pope and conservative gender ideology) that contributes to the prediction of their abortion ideology. The additional factor contributes to a more conservative view about abortion than the Catholics of higher education have.

This is support to the notion that the lack of the experience of education and wealth is more related to the formalism of religion than to a pluralist view about religious and social values (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Anti-abortion belongs to the formalism of Catholic religion because of the request of the Church that sexuality be intentionally procreative (Perreault 2004; Weaver 1999) to which abortion is contradictory. However, the additional demographic factor that the lower education characteristic contributes to the explanation of Catholic anti-abortion ideology does with $\beta = 0.173$, $p < 0.008$ not overturn the importance of sexual morality and the authority of the Pope's moral

teachings in predicting Catholic conservatives' view about abortion.

To sum up the findings in the context of ahistorical religiosity, the reader can see that sexual morality and gender ideology are not direct predictors. Ahistorical religiosity is foremost explained by religious variables. In addition, the major predictors are abortion for Catholics and the frequency of Bible reading for Protestants, distinctly faith specific. Abortion cannot be tolerated by the Church because it undermines her moral power based on procreative sexuality, and the believers' opposition against abortion shows their ultimate loyalty to the Pope's teaching. This is supported by the finding that the believers' abortion view is most strongly predicted by their sexual morality and view about the Pope.

With the frequency of Bible reading as the major predictor of Protestant ahistorical religiosity the emphasis is with frequency on the formalism, which is defined as an ahistorical feature (see chapter one). The Bible is the source from which the gender ideology is learned, supported by the finding that gender ideology is, even though second behind abortion, a predictor of the frequency of Bible reading.

Finally the results show that sexual morality is the stronger predictor for the Catholics than for the Protestants, gender ideology is more important for the Protestants than for the Catholics and demographic variables have only minor influence in decreasing the influence of the ideological and religious variables. Even though ahistorical religiosity is not explained by sex or gender ideology, these ideological variables have an indirect influence on the ahistorical belief structure through Catholics' abortion attitudes and Protestants' frequency of Bible reading.

Neo-Patriarchy

Distribution of Household Labor between Men and Women

The hypothesis about the domestic work distribution of the religious conservatives is only partially confirmed. Domestic work of Protestant and Catholic religious couples is contrary as predicted linked to their ideology about gender relations. In hypothesis 2a) I argue that because of the neo-patriarchal adaptation on the grounds of the necessary entry of women into the labor force the domestic work situation between religious men and women is not dependent on their ideology about gender relations. I argued that view is based on their sexual morality and gender ideology. Because of the neo-patriarchal adaptation however I argue Catholics' and Protestants' view on gender relations is an ideology, only, not reflected in their actual everyday household situation. Their gender ideology is more conservative with respect to division of labor than the factual gender relations they live in their homes. (Civettini and Glass 2008; Ellison and Bartkowski 2002).

Also, contrary to expectation, demographic variables have barely any influence on Protestants, but there is an influence on Catholics. In hypothesis 2b I argue that the domestic work distribution between religious conservative men and women is more dependent on demographic variables like income, education and generation than on the ideology about gender relations. The demographic variables income and generation do have some predictive value besides gender ideology for Catholics' distribution of household labor, but in the opposite direction than expected: The wealthier and the younger are more gender divided in their household labor than the older and less wealthy.

In order to test hypothesis 2a) and to see direct and possible indirect ideological

Table 9
Linear Regression Predicting Catholic and Protestant Domestic Work Distribution

Variables	Catholic		Protestant	
	β	SE	β	SE
Conservative Gender Ideology	0.302 **	0.081	0.267 *	0.098
Conservative Sexual Morality	0.088	0.095	-0.098	0.131
Conservative Abortion Ideology	0.085	0.053	0.218	0.052
Male Church Leader	-----	-----	0.027	0.357
Job Performance of Pope	0.073	0.441	-----	-----
People to Christ Solves Soc. Problems	-0.026	0.367	-0.084	0.413
Frequency of Bible Reading	0.029	0.305	-0.098	0.509
Importance of Bible for Decisions	-0.040	0.287	-0.007	0.485
Importance of Church for Decisions	0.110	0.291	-0.109	0.325
Making the Sign of the Cross	-0.060	0.409	0.091	0.488
Praying on One's Own	0.094	0.51	0.092	0.791
Saying Grace at Mealtime	-0.080	0.339	-0.011	0.392
Supporting Prayer in Public Schools	-0.173	0.208	0.086	0.242
R²	0.165	4.25	0.142	4.609
Intercept	11.860	3.108	13.413	4.265

Notes: N: Catholics=163, Protestants=128

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

predictors (those via religious variables) of household work distribution I entered variables related to gender ideology and sexual morality into the regression analysis and religious variables (Table 9) and found that gender ideology is indeed a predictor of domestic work situation of Protestants and Catholics. The more gender hierarchical their ideology, the more gender divided their households, with women doing more of the household work and child care than men.

Demographic Influences

After controlling for education, income and generation, for only Catholics, not the Protestants, demographic variables contribute to the explanation of their household participation. I expected the effect of generation to be negative for younger generations and positive for older ones. However, the results of the full model about domestic labor

Table 10
Linear Regression Predicting Catholic and Protestant
Domestic Work Distribution
Controlling for Demographic Characteristics

Control Variables	Catholic		Protestant	
	β	SE	β	SE
Gender				
Male	-----	-----	-----	-----
Female	0.084	0.768	0.112	1.005
Education				
Higher Education	-----	-----	-----	-----
Middle Education	-0.044	0.884	0.127	1.171
Lower Education	0.09	0.841	0.160	1.238
Income				
High Income	-----	-----	-----	-----
Middle Income	-0.284 **	0.834	0.102	1.202
Lower Income	-0.169 *	0.772	0.008	1.166
Generation				
60 through 90	-0.257 *	0.978	0.008	1.341
40 through 59	0.19	0.859	0.065	1.102
19 through 39	-----	-----	-----	-----
Main Variable				
Conservative Gender Ideology	0.287 ***	0.053	0.263 **	0.083
R²	0.267	3.928	0.114	4.612
R²(Change)	0.075		0.064	
Intercept	16.82	1.586	11.763	2.188

Notes: N: Catholics 163, Protestants = 128

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

distribution among Catholic and Protestant men and women (Table 10) suggests, that older couples have less gender division of labor than younger ones. This is in addition to the gender ideology there is an additional predictor of household labor distribution for older couples. In comparison with younger couples it predicts, contrary to expectation, less gender division of labor for older couples ($\beta = -0.257$) compared to younger ones. The negative β -values of Catholics with middle and low income reveal that also these income characteristics make a unique contribution to the explanation of domestic labor distribution in addition to gender ideology. The prediction goes towards less gender division for the low income Catholics as compared with those of higher income (Table

10).

Perhaps this reflects the long term adaptation process of Catholics to the changing economic situation. For low but also middle income families, women's participation in the labor market is not a choice, but a necessity to compensate for reduced wages or unemployment of husbands. With the changing economy the male bread winner model was hardly applicable any longer for middle class families, if they wanted to keep standards of living constant. With lower class families, the male bread winner model had never been a reality in the first place (Crompton 1998). As a means of necessity, husbands in such situations should adapt with more participation in the household than seems to be the case when higher income makes gender equality from the financial point of view more an option. Also older generations (specifically the 60 year olds and more) might have to adapt to more equally managing the house due to health reasons or both partners might be retired or have part time jobs. (Acker 1999; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999)

The importance of these demographic variables can be seen in the increase of the predicting strength they have on the household labor model. Gender ideology explains only an additional eight percent (Table 10, $R^2(\text{Change}) = 0.075$) of the variance of the model, after the effect of the demographic characteristics have been removed. All predictors together explain 27 percent ($R^2 = 0.267$). When gender ideology is controlled for by the demographic variables, gender ideology explains not more than 8 percent of Catholics' distribution of domestic work between men and women. The strength of the contribution of gender ideology ($\beta = 0.287$), middle income ($\beta = -0.284$), and older generation ($\beta = -0.257$) are not much different from one another.

The total absence of demographic predictors of household labor distribution for Protestants is unexpected and contrary to hypothesis 2b. The hypothesis says that the domestic work distribution between religious conservative men and women is dependent on demographic characteristics like income, education and generation more so than on the ideology about gender relations. One reason for the absence of the predictive influence of demographic characteristics might be that gender ideology is an integral part of the Protestant conservative ahistorical religion, more so than for Catholics, where the ideological issue comparative in importance is sexual morality. N. H. Civettini and J. Glass (2008) show that specifically conservative religion has no effect on the prediction of how many hours of household work and child care religious conservative men participated in. Also Voicu and colleagues (2009: 372) found in their comparative analysis of various Christian religions and how religion affects their members' household work that the individual's religiosity does not influence gender division of household work. However, they found religion does have its influence, but it occurs only via values and attitudes in specific religious contexts. The following section addresses this notion.

Views about Gender Relations

In Hypothesis 2c) I argue that the *ideology* of the religious conservatives' gender relations and sexual morality is hierarchical. The important point to see from the regression analysis is whether gender ideology is predicted by gender division of labor and whether there is, according to the feature of ahistorical religiosity, a structural difference between Catholic and Protestant sexual and gender ideologies. Hypothesis 2c1) predicts that for Catholics, attitudes describing sexual morality will be the major variables explaining their ideology about gender relations. Hypothesis 2c2) says for

Protestants, attitudes describing gender hierarchy will be the major variables predicting their ideology about gender relations. In order to see the possible structural difference in ideology about Catholic and Protestant gender relations I tested gender ideology of Catholics and Protestants with the same two groups of independent ideological and religious variables that I utilized to test the domestic work distribution before.

The results in Table 11 show that hypothesis 2c) about the gender attitudes of religious conservatives is confirmed. These data portray the picture that the gender attitudes are based on hierarchical views of gender relations. The more conservative the believer's view on sexual morality and abortion (for Catholics) and sexual morality and the view on the importance that the pastor be male (for Protestants), the more they reveal gender hierarchical ideology.

With respect to hypotheses 2c1) and 2c2) the results illustrate that for both, Catholics and Protestants, sexual morality is a predictor of gender ideology. This it is the strongest for the Catholic model. For the Protestant model, sexual morality comes after "male church leader". The latter has a more gender hierarchical evaluation for Protestants than for Catholics (Hawley 1994; Lazarus-Yafeh 1988). For the Catholics the Pope is the male leader that is, in relation to religious dogma, most closely associated with sexual morality. This is because the Vatican's teaching about sexual morality is binding for the Catholic conservatives religious identity (Burns 1996).

The link between Catholic conservatives' gender ideology and sexual morals also comes through their Church's teaching about abortion. Conservative abortion ideology is a factor predicting gender ideology, even though not strong (Table 11). The Catholic resistance to abortion identifies with the Vatican's teaching about sex (without intentional

Table 11
Linear Regression Predicting Catholic and Protestant Gender Ideology

Variables	Catholic		Protestant	
	β	SE	β	SE
Conservative Sexual Morality	0.305 ***	0.087	0.274 **	0.113
Conservative Abortion Ideology	0.188 *	0.049	-0.097	0.046
Male Church Leader	-----	-----	0.348 ***	0.299
Job Performance of Pope	0.071	0.417	-----	-----
People to Christ Solves Soc. Problems	0.083	0.347	0.168 *	0.361
Frequency of Bible Reading	0.071	0.289	0.069	0.452
Importance of Bible for Decisions	0.093	0.271	0.036	0.43
Importance of Church for Decisions	-0.048	0.276	0.079	0.287
Making Sign of Cross	0.074	0.387	-0.002	0.433
Praying on One's Own	-0.08	0.482	-0.023	0.703
Saying Grace at Mealtime	0.15 *	0.318	0.067	0.348
Supporting Prayer in Public Schools	0.071	0.197	0.06	0.214
R²	0.54	4.406	0.386	4.456
Intercept	4.032	2.936	4.301	3.771

Notes: N: Catholics=184, Protestants=150

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

procreation sex is sinful (Weaver 1999). Abortion as a predictor of gender ideology is specifically Catholic in that abortion in the data of this dissertation is also the strongest predictor of Catholics' ahistorical religiosity (Table 3). For the Protestants the religious influence on their gender ideology comes through their salvation history. The connotation that bringing people to Christ solves social problems is the conversion requirement that is precondition for Protestant conservatives' salvation.

This dissertation gives evidence with the analysis of hypotheses 2c1) and 2c2) to the argument that the gender ideologies of Catholics and Protestants are based on different ideological grounds. For the Catholics it is with the sexual and the abortion variables based on sexual morality as ideological and religious structures (Table 11). For Protestants the different ideological ground is indirectly shown through the variable

“male church leader.” As mentioned before, the view of the Protestant conservative faith that the pastor must be a man, not a woman, is based on the hierarchical gender view, endorsed by the inerrant Bible (Lazarus-Yafeh 1988). The gender hierarchical “male church leader” is the stronger predictor of Protestants’ gender ideology than sexual morality, indicating that there is indeed an ideological difference between Protestants and Catholics in the explanation of their gender ideology. In the next step, I examine whether these findings are still valid after the introduction of demographic controls.

Demographic Influences

As the full models for Protestant and Catholic gender ideology show (Tables 12, 13) with the exception of the Protestant middle generation, the demographic controls exert no additional contribution to the ideological variables for the prediction of gender ideology. Hypothesis 2d) is insofar partially confirmed because for Catholics, none of the demographic variables has an influence on sexual morality, abortion, and saying grace as predictors of their ideology about gender relations. Sexual morality and abortion attitudes remain the strongest predictors. This is particularly interesting because sexual morality is a predictor of Catholic abortion attitudes (Table 8) which in turn is the major predictor of Catholic ahistorical religiosity (Table 3).

Table 12

Linear Regression Predicting Catholic Gender Ideology
Controlling for Demographic Characteristics

Control Variables	β	SE
Gender		
Male	-----	-----
Female	-0.047	0.824
Education		
Higher Education	-----	-----
Middle Education	0.004	0.965
Lower Education	0.064	0.942
Income		
Higher Income	-----	-----
Middle Income	-0.063	0.893
Lower Income	-0.125	0.829
Generation		
60 through 90	0.041	1.059
40 through 59	-0.053	0.925
19 through 39	-----	-----
Major Variables		
Conservative Sexual Morality	0.370 ***	0.087
Conservative Abortion Ideology	0.290 ***	0.044
Saying Grace at Meal Time	0.209 **	0.292
R²	0.527	4.464
R²(Change)	0.434	
Intercept	5.528	1.888

Notes: N: Catholics=183

***denotes p<.001, **denotes p<.01, *denotes p<.05

Table 13

Linear Regression Predicting Protestant Gender Ideology
Controlling for Demographic Characteristics

Control Variables	β	SE
Gender		
Male	-----	-----
Female	0.045	0.9
Education		
Higher Education	-----	-----
Middle Education	0.101	1.069
Lower Education	0.058	1.152
Income		
High Income	-----	-----
Middle Income	0.037	1.119
Low Income	0.061	1.06
Generation		
60 through 90	0.091	1.246
40 through 59	0.238 *	1.018
19 through 39	-----	-----
Major Variables		
Conservative Sexual Morality	0.18 *	0.116
Male Church Leader	0.41 ***	0.293
People to Christ Solves Soc. Problems	0.212 **	0.355
R²	0.401	4.398
R²(Change)	0.326	
Intercept	6.742	2.086

Notes: N: Protestants=151

***denotes p<.001, **denotes p<.01, *denotes p<.05

Protestants' gender ideology predictors are somewhat influenced by the generation variable, but the ideological prediction remains most influential. This is shown after the demographic variables have been entered into the Protestant model. With the demographic characteristics, the model explains only about 8 percent ($R^2 - R^2(\text{Change}) = 0.075$) of the variance. After "male church leader" "sexual morality" and "people to Christ" are included, the model as a whole explains 40 percent ($R^2=0.401$) of the variance. After the effect of the demographic influence is removed, the three variables issuing ideology and religion explain an additional thirty three percent ($R^2(\text{Change})=0.326$), allowing the assumption that the generational prediction on Protestant gender ideology is very minor indeed. This lends support to the argument that the variables of religion and gender ideology first place and sexuality next are still the strongest predictors of Protestant ideology of gender relations.

In sum, these findings show, that Protestant conservatives' domestic work distribution is contrary to hypothesis 2b) and not mainly predicted by demographic phenomena like income, education, and generation. It is rather explained by gender ideology as the only significant predictor. This is in a model, however, that does itself not very strongly contribute to the explanation of the dependent variable, since the whole model explains only 14 percent of the variance of domestic work distribution (Table 9, $R^2=0.142$).

The subsequent analysis of the predictors of Protestant *ideology* about gender relations reveals the believers' view that only a man should be the leader of their church as the most important one (Table 11). The male church leader has for Protestants a stronger connotation from gender hierarchy ($r=0.503$, $p<0.001$) than from sexual morality

($r=0.468$, $p<0.001$). Also, the male church leader variable contributes 11 percent of the total variance from the ideological and demographic control variables (Table 13) uniquely to the explanation of Protestant gender ideology¹⁰. It suggests that the male church leader is the much more important predicting factor as compared to the age characteristic of the 40 to 59 year olds that is also a contribution for explaining Protestants' gender ideology. The importance of the male church leader for the Protestant believers is together with salvation through saving souls (variable: people to Christ solves social problems) an indication to the support of hypothesis 2c2) that the basic feature of Protestants' view about gender relations is gender hierarchical and therefore distinct from Catholics'.

Catholics' domestic work distribution among couples is also predicted by their gender ideology with 16 percent of the variance explained (Table 9, $R^2=0.165$). The full model of domestic labor distribution (Table 10) reveals, however that the demographic characteristics with income and generation significantly contributing, are the major part of the prediction of domestic labor distribution between Catholic men and women. Of the 27 percent of the variance (Table 10, $R^2=0.267$) for both the gender ideological and demographic factors, the demographic characteristics explain 19 percent (R^2 - ($R^2(\text{Change})=0.192$) of the variance in domestic labor distribution. The variance for conservative gender ideology, after the control effect of the demographic characteristics have been removed, is only eight percent (Table 10, $R^2(\text{Change})=0.075$). The demographic variables predict Catholic domestic work distribution better than gender

¹⁰ The semipartial correlation coefficient of "male church leader" in this model (Table 13) is $sr^2=0.339$. This value has to be squared in order to provide the unique contribution value (Pallant 2005: 159). The total variance of the model explaining Protestants' gender ideology (Table 13, $R^2=0.401$) would drop 11 percent, from 40 to 29 percent if "male church leader" were not included. As a comparison, for the generation of the 40 to 59 year olds in Table 13 this value would be only 3 percent ($sr^2=0.180$).

ideology.

However, this is not towards a confirmation of hypothesis 2b). Both demographic variables predict domestic labor distribution in the opposite direction than hypothesized. The younger and middle generations' domestic work distribution is more gender divided as compared with the older one. And the middle and lower income Catholics' distribution of domestic work between the man and the woman is least gender divided. The younger and the more wealthy Catholic women do more household work than the older ones and those with little income. For Catholics, their gender ideology (Table 10, $\beta = 0.287$) is just one predictor together with the middle income ($\beta = -0.284$) and older Catholics ($\beta = -0.257$) that contribute with approximately equal strength to the explanation of the work distribution in their homes. It suggests that gender ideology and demographic issues both contribute importantly to the prediction of Catholic couples' gender relations regarding household labor.

The analysis about Catholics' *ideology* of gender relations is as hypothesized (hypothesis 2d), not influenced by their demographic variables and their gender ideology reveals predictors that are distinct from those found for the Protestants (hypothesis 2c1, 2c2). For Catholics, it is the factor sexual morality that exerts the best prediction of their gender ideology (Table 12, $\beta=0.370$) with conservative abortion ideology ($\beta=0.290$) second in line as a religiously distinct Catholic contributor. Abortion ideology is the major variable contributing to the Catholics' ahistorical religiosity (Table 3).

From the two issues, domestic work distribution between men and women on the one hand, and the religious conservatives' beliefs about gender relations on the other, the latter indicates clearly that the structure on which the beliefs about gender relations is

built, is different for Catholics and Protestants. The distinct meaning of sexuality and gender hierarchy that is indicated from the Catholic and Protestant prediction models for their gender ideology is reflected in their ahistorical religiosity. There, Catholics' view about sex and Protestants' about gender relations are predicted through channels that are religious. They are Catholics' religious-sexual abortion views and Protestants' Bible reading. The importance of the religious variables, besides those of sex and gender, can be found, too, in the gender ideology of the Catholics and Protestants.

Responsibility for Poverty

The study analyzes the question of whether religious conservatives have more an individualist or structural view about the responsibility of poverty and why. In the first chapter I argue that the dogmatic feature of the religious conservatives is ahistorical and that some of the ideological issues that are dealt with in ahistorical way are sexual morality and the gender relations that follow from the morals. I outlined that sexual morality framed on hierarchical gender ideology has been directly linked to the Protestant conservatives' salvation history or in relations to Catholicism to their conservatives' experience of sacramental grace. In the third chapter I outline the view that religious conservatives link the individual's personal immorality to a deteriorated economic outcome in society. These are the reasons why I expected that ahistorical religiosity is contributing significantly to the explanation of the religious conservatives' attitudes about the responsibility of poverty as predicted in hypothesis 3a). It is not a predictor, however, as the Table 14 below shows. Ahistorical religiosity is not a significantly contributing explanation to the economic view of either Catholic or Protestant conservatives.

Maybe one should not be surprised about this after the analysis of ahistorical

religiosity revealed that hierarchical gender ideology and conservative sexual morality are not significant predictors (Table 3) even though the findings about the predictors of ahistorical religiosity themselves reveal an indirect link of the gender and moral components to ahistorical religiosity. Hierarchical gender ideology together with conservative abortion ideology predicts the Protestants' frequency of Bible reading and that one is the best predictor of their ahistorical religiosity. And conservative sexual morality predicts together with the affirmation of the Pope Catholics' abortion ideology which is included as the major component in explaining ahistorical religiosity.

The importance of the conservative views about sexuality and gender relations for the prediction of the attitudes about poverty is seen from the confirmation of hypothesis 3b). Sexual morals and gender ideology are predictors of religious conservatives economic attitudes. Hypothesis 3c) is confirmed, too. The ideological predictors are distinct for Catholics (sexual morals) and Protestants (gender ideology). The demographic issues (hypothesis 3d) that have no influence on the Protestant predictors of economic attitudes do however modify the economic model for the Catholics.

In order to test the first two hypotheses (3a and 3b) about the economic attitudes of religious conservatives, I included the six variables that contain gender and moral ideology on the one hand and religiosity on the other to see which ones are significant predictors of economic attitudes, as shown in Table 14. We see that ahistorical religiosity is not an important contributor besides the moral and gender ideological characteristics. However, the assumption of hypothesis 3b1) and 3b2) are confirmed. Factors describing gender relations like conservative sexual morality and gender ideology contribute to the explanation of religious conservatives' economic attitudes about the individualist

Table 14
Linear Regression Predicting Catholic and Protestant Economic Attitudes

Variables	Catholic		Protestant	
	β	SE	β	SE
Ahistorical Religiosity	-0.121	0.237	0.044	0.213
Conservative Gender Ideology	0.046	0.029	0.210 *	0.032
Conservative Sexual Morality	0.368 ***	0.034	0.044	0.045
Conservative Abortion Ideology	-0.022	0.019	0.070	0.016
Male Church Leader	-----	-----	0.190	0.117
Pope's Job Performance	0.218 *	0.162	-----	-----
R²	0.26	1.739	0.183	1.718
Intercept	1.795	1.170	1.481	1.165

Notes: N: Catholics 184, Protestants=149

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

Economic Attitudes: Positive values indicate individualist responsibility, negative values indicate structural responsibility.

responsibility of poverty. More conservative sexual morality and affirmative opinion about the Pope contribute to the Catholics' individualist explanation of poverty. And the more hierarchical gender ideology is the more it predicts Protestants' explanation that individuals cause their own poverty.

Also it is clear the ideological grounds are different for Protestants and Catholics. For Protestants, gender ideology is the stronger predictor for the view that the individual is responsible for poverty rather than social structures or policies (hypotheses 3b1), 3c). Besides the ideological gender variable again the view arises that a church needs to be led by a male pastor who is the religious link to the economic view of the Protestant conservatives.

The data in Table 14 show that the variable "male church leader" is not significant ($\beta=0.190$, $p < 0.061$). But this predictor is clearly stronger than the "abortion attitudes" and stronger than "sexual morality" that has been characteristically Catholic in my analysis. Also the emphasis of the "male church leader" is a characteristic which implies views

Table 15
Linear Regression Predicting Protestant Economic Attitudes

Variables	Protestant		
	β		SE
Conservative Gender Ideology	0.241	**	0.300
Male Church Leader	0.239	**	0.103
R²	0.173		1.709
Intercept	2.394		0.517

Notes: N: Protestants=149

***denotes $p < .001$, **denotes $p < .01$, *denotes $p < .05$

Economic Attitudes: Positive values indicate individualist responsibility, negative values indicate structural responsibility.

about gender hierarchy (DeBerg 2000). On these grounds I included the variable male church leader as a predictor in a new regression that also includes gender ideology, the significant predictor from the previous regression. In the new analysis (Table 15) “male church leader” contributes significantly to the explanation of Protestants’ economic attitudes together with gender ideology.

For Catholics, the corresponding findings are opposite (Table 14). Gender ideology is no predictor for their economic attitudes, but sexual morality is. The religious variable “job performance of Pope” has a strong association with sexual morals. They are the base of the Pope’s power (Burns 1992). The analog to the Protestants’ religious predictor “male church leader,” is the Catholic Pope. The Pope is more strongly linked to sexual morals ($r=0.578$, $p<0.001$) than to gender ideology ($r=0.521$, $p<0.001$). Comparatively, the Protestants view about the importance of the male pastor is associated with gender hierarchy ($r=0.503$, $p<0.001$) more strongly than with the view about sex and morals ($r=0.468$, $p<0.001$). The differences for these correlations are small. However they do go in the direction as hypothesized (3c) and are an indication for ahistorical religiosity as defined in the previous chapters. In the context of a bureaucratic ground for Catholics’

Table 16
Linear Regression Predicting Catholic Economic Attitudes
Controlling for Demographic Characteristics

<u>Control Variables</u>	<u>β</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>SE</u>
Gender			
Male	-----		-----
Female	-0.159 *	0.307	
Education			
Higher Education	-----	-----	-----
Middle Education	0.029	0.359	
Lower Education	0.199 *	0.345	
Income			
High Income	-----	-----	-----
Middle Income	-0.108	0.334	
Low Income	-0.247 **	0.309	
Generation			
60 through 90	-0.141	0.404	
40 through 59	-0.126	0.345	
19 through 39	-----	-----	-----
Major Variables			
Conservative Sexual Morality	0.357 ***	0.027	
Job Performance of Pope	0.113	0.152	
R²	0.336	1.668	
R²(Change)	0.154		
Intercept	1.342	0.617	

Notes: N: Catholics=183

***denotes p<.001, **denotes p<.01, *denotes p<.05

Economic Attitudes: Positive values indicate individualist responsibility, negative values indicate structural responsibility.

Table 17
Linear Regression Predicting Protestant Economic Attitudes
Controlling for Demographic Characteristics

<u>Control Variables</u>	<u>β</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>SE</u>
Gender			
Male	-----	-----	-----
Female	-0.038	0.353	
Education			
Higher Education	-----	-----	-----
Middle Education	0.087	0.417	
Lower Education	0.107	0.444	
Income			
High Income	-----	-----	-----
Middle Income	-0.061	0.423	
Low Income	0.011	0.411	
Generation			
60 through 90	0.032	0.484	
40 through 59	0.107	0.4	
19 through 39	-----	-----	-----
Major Variables			
Conservative Gender Ideology	0.203 *	0.034	
Male Church Leader	0.285 **	0.118	
R²	0.191	1.74	
R²(Change)	0.17		
Intercept	2.057	0.77	

Notes: N: Protestants=149

***denotes p<.001, **denotes p<.01, *denotes p<.05

Economic Attitudes: Positive values indicate individualist responsibility, negative values indicate structural responsibility.

and a textual ground for Protestants' views about moral ideologies and gender relations, sexual morality is the major component explaining Catholic conservatives' views about the causes of poverty. Hierarchical gender ideology is the major component of explaining Protestant conservatives' views about the responsibility for poverty.

Demographic Influences

In order to know whether the dogma-specific ideology about moral and gender relations remain predictors when controlled by demographic variables, I included gender, income, education and generation in the regression model. Table 17 shows that for Protestants none of the demographic variables presents a unique contribution towards explaining Protestants' economic attitudes about poverty besides their gender ideology and their gender hierarchical view about church leaders. Hypothesis 3d) states that the demographic characteristics besides conservative sexual morality and hierarchical gender ideology as major components have no influence on the prediction of the economic attitudes of Catholic and Protestant conservatives. With Protestants' demographic characteristics not contributing to the explanation of their economic ideology, Hypothesis 3d) is partially supported.

Catholic economic attitudes however are, besides sexual morality and the view about the Pope, also influenced by various demographic variables (Table 16). Catholic men are more likely to allocate responsibility for poverty to the individual, compared to Catholic women. It has been the perspective of Catholic women to see the Church and the society more from a communal angle. It was common for former generations of Catholic women to be voluntarily involved in Church life. This Church resource of volunteerism is decreasing, as D'Antonio and colleagues (2001) report for the younger generations. The

finding from my data that Catholic women include structural and political factors more than men in explaining poverty, might be a left over from that tradition of specific Catholic women's community life.

Also low income and low education contribute to predict Catholic economic attitudes. The latter group predicts more a view of individualist responsibility of poverty than those with higher education. However, those that belong to the lower income section are more ready to include structural and political factors in their explanation of poverty than those of higher income. It indicates that people with higher income are more likely to allocate their economic success to themselves than to social structures (Emerson and Hartman 2006). Lower education leaves people more likely excluded from the culture shift (Inglehart 1990) that implies a transformation of values towards a pluralist society.

Table 16) suggests that demographic variables are indeed more responsible for Catholics' economic attitudes about poverty than their ideological views about sexuality and the Pope. When all the variables, ideological and demographic, are included in the model, the variables together explain 34 percent ($R^2=0.336$) of the variance of Catholics' economic attitudes. After the ideological predictors have been controlled for demographic effects, they explain only an additional fifteen percent ($R^2 \text{ (Change)}=0.154$) of the variance of the model. There is no significant influence of the Pope as a predictor for fiscal opinions any longer when the variable Pope is controlled for by the demographic variables. Furthermore sexual morality is barely influenced by the demographic control variables. Sexual morality is still stronger in explaining fiscal attitudes than any of the demographic predictors.

In order to finally see whether demographic or ideological predictors are stronger in

explaining the Catholics' view about responsibility of poverty, I remove the insignificant demographic predictors from the model but leave the Pope included, since the Pope has the connotations of Catholic religion and sexual morals. As can be seen from Table 18 there is a significant effect ($\beta=0.154$) of the Catholics' view about their Church leader on the prediction of their economic attitudes. The influence of the Pope goes in the direction of the individualist responsibility of poverty.

Table 18
Linear Regression Predicting Catholic Economic Attitudes
Controlling for Gender, Lower Education, and Lower Income

Demographic Variables	Catholic β	SE
Female	-0.151 *	0.307
Lower Education	0.149 *	0.298
Lower Income	-0.203 **	0.269
Ideological Variables		
Conservative Sexual Morality	0.353 ***	0.027
Pope's Job Performance	0.154 *	0.142
R²	0.317	1.671
R²(Change)	0.198	
Intercept	1.129	0.592

Notes: N: Catholics=183

Economic Attitudes: Positive values indicate individualist responsibility, negative values indicate structural responsibility

***denotes $p<.001$, **denotes $p<.01$, *denotes $p<.05$

It is clear that sexual morality is the strongest of all predictors (Table 18 $\beta=0.353$). After sexual morality and the view about the Pope's performance are controlled for by female gender, lower income and lower education, the ideological predictors still explain an additional 20 percent ($R^2(\text{Change})=0.198$) of the overall model ($R^2=0.317$), making them stronger predictors than the demographic variables. Sexual morality remains the strongest predictor even if the believer's affirmative attitude about the Pope is removed as predictor from the final model. In a model including the demographics gender, lower

education and lower income, and sexual morality as the only ideological variable, sexual morality stays strongest ($\beta=0.430$, $p<0.000$) among the predictors of Catholic economic attitudes. After the effect of the three demographic variables on sexual morality has been controlled, now sexual morality as the only ideological variable explains an additional 18 percent ($R^2(\text{Change})=0.175$) of the overall model ($R^2=0.291$). That explains 29 percent of the variance.

Summary of Findings

In summary ahistorical religiosity is not as expected in hypothesis 3a) directly a predictor of economic attitudes of Catholic or Protestant conservatives. However, hierarchical gender ideology in general and specifically with respect to church leaders (hypothesis 3b1, 3c) is a predictor of Protestants' view of individualist responsibility of poverty. Income, education, generation and the gender of the faithful have as hypothesized (hypothesis 3c) no influence on the gender ideological predictors of Protestant economic attitudes.

The importance of gender hierarchy in explaining individualist responsibility of poverty is in line with the inerrant Bible's word. Public institutions put the gender hierarchy in question, but those who believe in the inerrant Bible find it necessary to structure women's sexuality into motherhood and domesticity. Also the religious meaning of gender hierarchy for Protestants is revealed from Table 5 where gender hierarchy is one of the predictors of Protestant frequency of Bible reading. This is pointing in the direction that the association of gender ideology with ahistorical religiosity is mediated through the Bible.

With respect to Catholics' economic attitudes, sexual morality is as assumed

(hypotheses 3b2, 3c) to be the outstanding predictor for their view about the individualist responsibility of poverty. Sexual morality's contribution is little affected when controlled by demographic variables in explaining Catholic's economic attitudes (Tables 16, 18). However, the variable "Pope's job performance" loses explanatory power through the inclusion of demographic variables, indicating that gender and lower education are more important in predicting an individualist view about the responsibility of poverty than what the Pope teaches about the reasons for poverty. And Catholic lower income contributes towards an opposite influence, towards the perception that policies and social structures are responsible for poverty. As portrayed in chapter three of this thesis, John Paul II's economic philosophy was not endorsing the welfare state and rejected structural explanations of poverty. That the variable Pope is a predictor of Catholics' view about individualist responsibility of poverty (Table 18) supports this suggestion.

The ahistorical nature of the Catholics religiosity as described in the first chapter of this thesis is located in the Catholic believer's obedience to the Church bureaucracy, from where the Pope teaches that sexuality has to be procreative. Any institution that allows sex without the intention for procreation has to be opposed. Abortion is the symbol for disobeying the Church's teaching through sexual promiscuity. Sexual morality and the Pope are both predictors of abortion and they are predictors of the economic attitudes about the individualist responsibility of poverty (Table 7, Table 18). Specifically sexual morality is a predictor of Catholics' individualist economic attitudes. This suggests that abortion, which is also a predictor of Catholic ahistorical religiosity, is more strongly framed by religion than economic attitudes. It is the sexual moral aspect, and less the religious aspect, that determines Catholics' view about the individualist responsibility

of poverty and the welfare state.

Chapter 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study has examined the economic attitudes of Catholic and Protestant conservatives, focusing on the association between strict dogma and moral values and how this association is transformed into gender ideology and opinions about poverty. The important contribution of the study is that it accounts for the comparison of Catholic and Protestant religious dogma and moral ideologies on the one hand and views about the reasons for poverty on the other, in a new perspective. The association between dogma, moral ideology and economic attitudes is framed in the concept of ahistorical religiosity.

The hypotheses were derived from the literature on religious conservatives and their social and political behavior, their gender relations and their social and economic opinions. The main finding of the study is that there is a different structure of the gender ideology and sexual morality that are associated with attitudes about poverty, comparing Protestants with Catholics. The results indicate that, for Protestants, the structure is gender hierarchical, with the Bible as the religious grounding of the ideological structure; for Catholics, the structure is based on conservative sexual morals with the opposition to abortion based on the dogma that sexuality has to be intentionally procreative as the religious grounding for the ideological structure.

In this chapter, the results are first summarized with respect to the corresponding topics of ahistorical religiosity, neo-patriarchy, and the opinion about the responsibility of poverty. Finally, limitations and further research are discussed.

Summary and Discussion of Results in Relation to Ahistorical Religiosity

In relation to the concept of ahistorical religiosity, it was expected to find that this religious feature of Catholic and Protestant conservatives can be explained by the believers' views about sexuality and gender relations. The reason for this expectation was that the unambiguousness of the religion, which teaches Protestant conservatives hierarchical gender ideology, is the means through which religion becomes salient to them. The inerrant Bible emphasizes the importance of the hierarchical gender relations because they are essential for reaching salvation (Denton 2004; Gallagher 2004; Gallagher and Smith 1999; Grasmick et al. 1990). For Catholic conservatives, it was expected that conservative sexual morality makes their religion salient to them because the demands of the Natural Law requirement that sexuality has to serve procreation is violated through abortion. The act of abortion represents the violation of the necessary intention of procreation that has to be the reason for sexual intercourse in Catholicism because the Church's power is based on sexual morals (Burns 1992; Cuneo 1997; Rudy 1996).

The hypothesis about ahistorical religiosity was not confirmed. Instead, for Catholics, attitudes against abortion and the importance of the Catholic Church for decision making and praying were the major predictors of their ahistorical religiosity. However, both the views against abortion and the Catholic Church are strong indicators of conservative sexual morality. Abortion represents, in violation of intentional procreativity, sexual permissiveness. The sexual connotation of the Church is indicated by the fact that her power is in question without the requirement that sex has to be procreative (Burns 1999; Weaver 1994). A follow up analysis of abortion as the strongest

predictor showed that conservative sexual morality indeed explains attitudes against abortion strongly, together with the believers' affirmative opinions about the Pope.

This suggests that Catholic opinions about abortion are based on at least two components: one is a religious factor represented by the believers' opinions about the Pope, and the other is with sexual morality an ideological factor. These results further suggest that abortion attitudes are the channel through which sexual morality is influencing Catholics' ahistorical religiosity. In addition to the ideological influence about sexuality, the Pope as a religious predictor of abortion attitudes indicates that there are religious components besides the ideology about sexuality that make their ahistorical religiosity salient to the believer. Demographic controls showed hardly any influence on these findings.

For Protestants, it was the believers' frequency of Bible reading, the importance of the Bible for their decision making, and their support of prayer in the public schools that was found to predict their ahistorical religiosity. The Bible in Protestantism is the analog feature to the Church in Catholicism and praying is for both Protestants and Catholics a minor component explaining their ahistorical religiosity. Since the literature suggests that the inerrant Bible has a strong gender hierarchical connotation (Bendroth 1993; DeBerg 2000; Hawley 1994), a follow up analysis was conducted to investigate the ideological components of the frequency of Bible reading, the strongest predictor of Protestant ahistorical religiosity. The analysis found that hierarchical gender ideology is indeed a predictor of Protestants' frequency of Bible reading, even though attitudes against abortion is the stronger one. Also, for Protestant conservatives, the literature suggests that abortion has both a religious (Cuneo 1987; Leege and Kellstedt 1993b) and a sexual

feature, in that it is linked to promiscuity (Press and Cole 1999) and disobeying God because of the rejection of the gender hierarchy that is implied with the act of abortion. Gender hierarchy is portrayed in the literature as a condition for salvation, however (Kepel 1994). Compared to the Catholic Church, whose power is based on procreative sexuality, the opposition to abortion in Protestant conservatism is not of bureaucratic importance to the local Protestant church. Protestant anti-abortion linked in chapter 5 of this dissertation the Bible to ahistorical religiosity, as did hierarchical gender ideology. The results suggest that the frequency of Bible reading is the means through which the gender hierarchical ideology makes ahistorical religiosity salient to Protestant conservatives. The indication that conservative gender ideology is contributing to the religious salience of Protestant conservatives suggests that the ideological structure of Bible reading is different than the ideological structure of Catholics' attitudes against abortion. The abortion component of the Protestant Bible reading suggests, however, that in addition to the conservative gender ideology there are other components included in making their religion salient to Protestant conservatives.

Summary and Discussion of Results in Relation to Neo-Patriarchy

With respect to household labor distribution, it was predicted that household work and child care are not affected by conservative religious faiths. The reason for this prediction was that hierarchical gender relations in the household according to the male breadwinner model (Crompton 1999) cannot be maintained in a society where women are in the labor force and support families economically (Ellison and Bartkowski 2002; Riesebrodt 1993). This is contrary to the *ideology* about gender relations, where the literature (Petersen and Donnenwerth 1997) has reported that the religious conservatives

have revealed hierarchical attitude stability for over three decades of research. The related prediction in this dissertation was that factual gender relations are less dependent on the ideology about gender relations than on demographic variables; however, the gender ideologies are hierarchical.

Only the second part of the hypothesis was confirmed—gender ideologies of the religious conservatives are hierarchical—but the hypothesis about the factual gender relations in the household was not confirmed. Both Catholics' and Protestants' household labor distribution is predicted by an ideological factor; this is their hierarchical gender ideology, even though it is not a strong component. No demographic variables influence Protestants' distribution of domestic work and child care. For Catholics, demographic variables do predict their factual gender relations better than gender ideology, but in the opposite direction than expected. Low and middle incomes predict more a gender egalitarian Catholic household than high income, and older generations have a less gender divided household than younger and middle generations.

The second part of the hypothesis confirms that religious conservatives' gender ideology is hierarchical and that there is a structural difference between Catholic and Protestant gender ideology. Testing the predictors of gender ideology for Protestants revealed the male church leader as the strongest predictor; for Catholics this was conservative sexual morality. For Protestants, conservative sexual morality came second in line and the primary predictor was the male church leader who has a gender hierarchical connotation (Lazarus-Yafeh 1988). These findings suggest that the structure of gender ideology is different for Catholic than it is for Protestant conservatives.

A further look at the predictors of Protestant and Catholic gender ideology and a

comparison with the predictors of the responsibility of poverty reveals some parallels. The male church leader is a predictor with both Protestants' hierarchical gender ideology and their economic attitudes. For the Catholics, sexual morality plays this role. Catholic conservative sexual morality is the factor explaining hierarchical gender ideology and the economic attitudes about the individualist responsibility for poverty. Taking the gender hierarchical connotation of the Protestant male church leader into account, the findings about the same predictors of gender ideology and economic attitudes gives further support to the suggestion of the different ideological structures between Catholic and Protestant conservative religious groups.

There are no demographic influences that overturn these findings for the Catholics. The Protestants' middle generation is, aside from the religious and ideological variables, a factor however that contributes to explain hierarchical gender ideology. The contribution of the male church leader to explain Protestant conservative gender ideology remains uniquely strong and more important than the middle generation in explaining Protestant conservative gender ideology.

Finally, the results on domestic work distribution on the one hand and the ideology about gender relations on the other suggest that there is, in fact, a difference between factual gender relations and the ideology about it. Catholics' factual gender relations of the household situation seem not to have any influence on their view about the responsibility of poverty. None of the predictors are common. However, Catholics' hierarchical gender ideology and their opinion about the individualist cause of poverty have conservative sexual morality as common predictor.

On the Protestant side, the actual gender relations and the responsibility of poverty

on the one hand and the ideology about gender relations and the responsibility of poverty on the other have each a predictor in common. For the actual gender relations and the issue of poverty it is gender ideology; for the ideology about gender relations and the issues of poverty it is the male church leader.

Some important conclusions about abortion: For both Catholic and Protestant conservatives, abortion is a predictor for religion. With Catholics, their ahistorical religiosity is predicted by abortion and for Protestants abortion contributes to predict their frequency of Bible reading. However, for Catholics, their anti-abortion ideology is also a factor that contributes to predict their conservative gender ideology. This is not the case with Protestants.

Summary and Discussion of Results in Relation to Responsibility for Poverty

The hypothesis about the association between ahistorical religiosity and economic ideology was not confirmed. Ahistorical religiosity is not, as assumed, associated with either Catholics' or Protestants' opinions about the causes of poverty. The reason for the assumption was that I associated ahistorical religiosity with gender hierarchical ideology for Protestants. The literature (Bendroth 1999) on conservative Protestants and gender relations retrieves the importance of gender hierarchy from the inerrant Bible in which women's sexuality is portrayed as detrimental if not structured in hierarchical marriage and motherhood. Public institutions that allow undomesticated sexuality (Balmer 1994) or motherhood without marriage put the gender hierarchy of the inerrant Bible, needed for earning salvation, in question.

The reason why I associated ahistorical religiosity and Catholic economic attitudes is that I linked ahistorical religiosity for Catholics with the request of the Church that

sexuality has to be intentionally procreative whereas public institutions in the realm of welfare and education allow non-procreative sex. Public institutions violate the identity of Catholic conservatives who believe that obedience to the Church teaching is necessary to receive the sacraments and then God's grace (Dinges 1987).

The discussion about the components of ahistorical religiosity shows that the concept is not directly predicted by sexual morality and gender ideology as assumed, but by Bible reading and abortion. It is suggested that they are the means through which gender ideology and sexual morality are linked to ahistorical religiosity. However, the lack of a direct link between these ideological variables and ahistorical religiosity seems to be the reason why ahistorical religiosity does not have any direct influence on the religious conservatives' view about the causes of poverty.

The second part of the hypothesis about the view of the causes of poverty is confirmed for both Protestants and Catholics. Both, Catholic and Protestant conservatives' ideology about sexuality and gender relations influences their fiscal attitudes towards individualist responsibility for poverty. Also, in both cases, as hypothesized, their economic beliefs are based on different ideological structures. Catholics' beliefs are most importantly structured on conservative sexual morality, while hierarchical gender ideology is not of importance in explaining their view about the individualist responsibility for poverty. The analogy holds for Protestants. Protestants' beliefs are mainly structured on hierarchical gender ideology, and conservative sexual morality plays no part in explaining their fiscal views about the individualist responsibility for poverty.

Also, in both the Protestant and Catholic cases, the economic view about poverty is

predicted by the religious leadership. Even though the contribution of the Pope towards fiscal attitudes of the Catholics is not very strong, the Pope is, contrary to the notion of Catholic communalism (Dionne 2008; Gilkey 1974), a predictor of individualist responsibility for poverty. This suggests that John Paul II's policy proposals on the economy were more readily received by the Catholic conservatives than the larger Catholic community (D'Antonio et al. 1989). The larger Catholic community is not very obedient to the Vatican's policy endorsements, especially since Vatican II (Greeley 1985). My data about the demographic influences in addition to the ideological predictors of Catholic economic attitudes suggest, however, that these perceptions about the Pope's endorsement of individualist economic responsibility are less accurate in formulating Catholic's attitudes about the causes of poverty for some of the demographic groups. This is for those in the lower income groups and those in the lower education groups as compared to those in the higher classes and for women as compared to men.

Protestant pastors also influence the explanation of Protestant conservatives' view in direction of the individualist responsibility of poverty. There is substantial literature (Guth et al. 1997: 86; Smith 1997; Weissman 2000; Wilcox 2000) that reports on the Protestant conservative leadership, pastors, Protestant conservative political leaders and church administrators. The free market principle is supported and is negatively inclined towards government regulation. The results of this dissertation indicate that the members of the Protestant religious community follow their leadership into the free market principle.

Limitations and Further Research

This study describes Protestant and Catholic views on the placement of responsibility for poverty in relation to their gender ideology and sexual morals, based on their religious

dogma. One limitation of this research is the scope of the data set. It is limited to the data collection from Ann Arbor to Flint and Grand Rapids to Detroit, mid-Michigan, a mid-western state. Other research (Roh and Haider-Markel 2003) has pointed to the different political and cultural contexts in different geographical areas for the study of political opinions of religious conservatives. Bendyna and colleagues (2000: 329) compared Catholics ideologically close to Christian Right politics in four different states, Florida, Texas, Washington and Minnesota. They found that the conservative opinions about moral and economic issues were also a reflection of the organizational background of right wing politics in each state. In each state, there is a different mix of uniquely Catholic conservative organizations that might enlist morally conservative Catholics into political action groups that are not organized within the Catholic Church. Also, these states differ in the political context with respect to the views of the non-Catholic religious conservatives and their organizational relations. More Protestant fundamentalists are members of the GOP state parties in Florida and Texas, as compared to Washington and Minnesota (Bendyna et al. 2000: 330). Research in the context of different right wing political concentration in different geographic areas would allow for testing whether the influence of the Pope's economic policy endorsements or the political environment of the Catholic conservatives is more important to determine their views on moral and fiscal politics. If the Pope is more influential in building Catholic conservatives' views about the causes for poverty and the role the welfare state should play, Catholic Conservatives fiscal views would stay stable through various regions.

Since obedience to the Church teaching is of identifying importance to Catholic conservatives (Cuneo 1997), any Vatican policy, not only about moral issues, might be

more salient to them than to the remaining Catholic community, which is less informed about Church policies (D'Antonio et al. 1989) or ignores them (Christiano et al. 2002). A reflection of the Catholic conservatives' fiscal views on the Vatican's policy endorsements on the one hand and on the political context, in which the conservatives live on the other, would allow for learning about the sources of their information.

More research is also needed on the individual level to evaluate the meaning of abortion for Catholic and Protestant conservatives. The literature about abortion in the Catholic context has shown that the opposition against it is unequivocally linked to the definition of the Catholic Church's influence over its communities. Church power is based on the intentional procreativity of sexuality (Burns 2005; Weaver and Appleby 1995a). There are two components that describe Catholic abortion ideology, an ideological and a religious one. The results of the analysis of Catholic abortion attitudes in this dissertation support this notion. Conservative sexual morality and the affirmative view about the Pope explain the attitudes against abortion of the Catholic conservatives.

This distinction between religious influence represented by the Pope and ideological influence represented by sexual morality that both explain the Catholic conservatives' abortion ideology is in line with newer findings that reject the idea of the secularization theorists (Berger and Luckmann 1966) who evaluate religion as one among other ideologies. The study of the religious movements in the last three decades found that religiosity contains a spiritual factor distinct from political ideology (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Leeg and Kellstedt 1993b). Research about abortion and political ideology found that for Protestants there is a link between their pro-life stance and opposition to the welfare state (Tamney et al. 1992; Wilcox 2000).

In the Catholic context, the relationship between moral conservatism and fiscal-political conservatism is contested (Bendyna et al. 2001; Kelly 1999). An analysis of ideological and religious variables of abortion could reveal whether their influence on the political ideology of religious conservatives is the same and whether there is a difference regarding that influence of ideology and religion on politics with respect to Protestant versus Catholic conservatives.

Writings about the abortion attitudes of Protestants suggest that the opposition to abortion is based on the opposition to sexual promiscuity (Press and Cole 1999), which is evidence of disregarding the gender hierarchy requested in the Bible. The religious component involved is directly linked to the believer's salvation, meaning disregarding gender hierarchy is a sign of disobeying God. The structure of the religious institution is not affected by religious belief in the Protestant conservative case compared to the structure of the Catholic Church. But the direct relationship to God is affected for Protestants. Future research could reveal, however, the degree to which sex and gender ideological and religious components of the Catholic and Protestant conservatives' beliefs influence their view about the causes of poverty and their opinions about free market principles and government regulation.

A final topic for further research is in the area of religious salience. Religious salience seems to have special bearing in the context of the American party system. The political relevance seems to be that those for whom religion is important have a clearer impression about the parties than those for whom religion is less important. Those with strong religious salience have more Democratic dislikes and Republican likes than those for whom religion is not so important. The newer writings maintain cautiously that these

likes for the Republicans, or dislikes for the Democrats is related to cultural, non-economic issues. They further state the trend started in the 1980s, and has increased in strength since (Brewer 2009: 69).

The link between religious salience and the Republican Party is an additional indication, that those for whom being aware that their religion is important for them for their daily decisions are dogmatically conservative. The association has ideologically been found already years ago (Guth and Green 1993) but also politically if we consider the argument, that the Republican Party has been the voting ground for the religious conservatives more so than the Democratic Party (Saunders and Abramowitz 2007; Stonecash 2007).

I defined one of the common grounds of the Protestant and Catholic conservative dogmas over the last 30 years as their ahistorical character. A distinction between ahistorical religiosity and religious salience would allow better seeing the relevance of religion for political ideology, to which the questions about the causes of poverty and who has to bear the responsibility for it are at the bottom for many social policies.

I lined out the crucial elements of ahistorical religiosity in relations to Protestant conservative dogma as originated in the inerrant Bible and the formalism of the specific Biblical words (Barr 2002). I argued that the major component that links Protestant ahistorical religiosity to the religious salience of the faithful is the hierarchical gender ideology. The inerrant truth in the Biblical words makes the hierarchical gender relations portrayed there divine and the subsequent control of female sexuality sanctioned by God (DeBerg 2000). The feature that is ahistorical in relation to Catholic conservative dogma is located on the institutional level and there the Church hierarchy teaches its truth about

intentional procreativity of sexuality. This truth is the power base of the Catholic Church (Burns 1999). The Church teaches that the morals about the procreative sexuality are binding for the Catholic identity. The major point that links Catholic ahistorical religiosity to their religious salience is accordingly the conservative sexual morality. The conservative faithful believes the Church has the right to act upon the believer (Chang 1998) and draw the boundaries of Catholic identity.

However in both cases, the results of this project showed, that hierarchical gender ideology is not a predictor of Protestant ahistorical religiosity and conservative sexual morality is not a predictor of Catholic ahistorical religiosity. Protestant hierarchical gender ideology and Catholic conservative morals about sex seem to be indirectly linked to ahistorical religiosity through the Protestant frequency of Bible reading and the Catholic opposition to abortion.

A more systematic distinction between the religious, sexual moral and gender ideological components of ahistorical religiosity would allow seeing more clearly how religious and ideological factors overlap and which ones, religious or ideological are more strongly eliciting the believers' awareness of their religiosity. In that, the components would allow distinguishing more clearly between ahistorical religiosity and religious salience. Knowing the distinction better one could more readily recognize some grounds of the believers' political ideology and its relevance for the explanation of phenomena like poverty and the subsequent party preference of the faithful.

APPENDIX A

Questionnaire

Selected Questions

1.11 Are you a religious person? Yes____ No____

1.12 How do you define yourself religiously? Check all that apply to you.

____ I am a Christian

____ I am a Catholic

____ I am a Protestant

____ I am agnostic

____ Other: I am _____

1.13 How would you describe your Christianity? Again, check all that apply to you.

____ I am an evangelical

____ I am a fundamentalist

____ I am a charismatic or spirit-filled

____ I am a Pentecostal

____ I am a traditionalist

____ I am a conservative Christian

____ I am a liberal Christian

____ Other: I am _____

1.21 These days, apart from occasional weddings, baptisms, or funerals, how often do you attend religious services?

Every Day____ A few times a week____ Every week____ Almost every
week____ Once or twice a month____ A few times a year____ Almost
never____ Never____

1.22 In which church are you a member or do you participate?

Please write the name and location of the church.

_____ None____

People follow their faith in different ways. How often do you do each of the following?

1.221 How often do you pray on your own?

Several times a day____ Once a day____ A few times a week____

Once a week or less____ Almost never____ Never____

1.222 How often do you read the Bible on your own?

Several times a day____ Once a day____ A few times a week____

Once a week or less____ Almost never____ Never____

1.231 How often do you say grace at mealtime?

Several times a day____ Once a day____ A few times a week____

Once a week or less____ Almost never____ Never____

1.232 How often do you make the sign of the Cross?

Several times a day____ Once a day____ A few times a week____
Once a week or less____ Almost never____ Never____

1.24 How much guidance does your religion give you for your daily living?

None____ Not very much____ I don't know____ Some____
Quite a bit____ The only guide I have____

2.31 1. Which of the following two statements is closer to your own view: "*The church should attempt to encourage individual morality*" or "*The church should attempt to encourage social justice*"

Individual Morality

Social Justice

Don't know 9

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

2.31 2. Again, which is closer to your view: *The best way to address social problems is to.....*

*Change the
Hearts of
Individuals*

Change Society

Don't know 9

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

2.31 3. And which of the following is closer to your view? *Individuals are poor because of.....*

*Individual
failure*

*Social, Economic,
or Political Factors*

Don't know 9

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

2.31 4. If enough people were brought to Christ, social ills would take care of themselves.

Strongly disagree____ Disagree____ Don't know____ Agree____
Strongly agree____

2.32 Can you tell me how important is each of the following in helping you to make decisions about your life? Place your feelings on a scale from 1 to as shown below.

2.32 1. How important is the Bible in helping you make decisions?

Not Very
Important

Very
Important

Don't Know 9

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

2.32 2. Your church?

Not Very
Important

Very
Important

Don't Know 9

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

Question 2.4 CATHOLICS ONLY

Now, please think about how much you approve or disapprove with the job performance of the Pope.

2.4 Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Pope is handling his job?

Approve a lot____ Approve some____ Don't know____ Disapprove some____
Disapprove a lot____

3.1 Now, here are some questions about women.

Do you agree or disagree ...

1. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.

Strongly agree____ Agree____ Neither agree nor disagree____
Disagree____ Strongly disagree____ Don't know____

2. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.

Strongly agree____ Agree____ Neither agree nor disagree____
Disagree____ Strongly disagree____ Don't know____

3. A woman and her family will all be happier if she goes out to work.

Strongly agree____ Agree____ Neither agree nor disagree____
Disagree____ Strongly disagree____ Don't know____

4. A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children.

Strongly agree____ Agree____ Neither agree nor disagree____
Disagree____ Strongly disagree____ Don't know____

5. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.

Strongly agree____ Agree____ Neither agree nor disagree____
Disagree____ Strongly disagree____ Don't know____

6. Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person.

Strongly agree____ Agree____ Neither agree nor disagree____
Disagree____ Strongly disagree____ Don't know____

7. Both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income.

Strongly agree____ Agree____ Neither agree nor disagree____
Disagree____ Strongly disagree____ Don't know____

8. A husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family.

Strongly agree____ Agree____ Neither agree nor disagree____
Disagree____ Strongly disagree____ Don't know____

9. Do you approve or disapprove of a married women earning money in Business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?

Approve a lot____ Approve some____ Don't know____ Disapprove some____
Disapprove a lot____

10. If your church nominated a women for priest or pastor would you approve or disapprove?

Approve a lot____ Approve some____ Don't know____ Disapprove
some____ Disapprove a lot____ Not applicable____

11. If your party nominated a women for US President, would you vote for her?

No____ Yes____ Don't know____

3.2 In your family or partnership who does the following activities, the male or the female, or do you share equally? *If you don't live in a family or partnership, please go to 3.21, #8.*

For each of the following activities, please "**c i r c l e**" the number that is nearest your answer.

1. Shopping for groceries

Male		Share equally		Female		Not applicable
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7						9

2. Preparing meals

Male		Share equally		Female		Not applicable
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7						9

3. House cleaning

Male		Share equally		Female		Not applicable
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7						9

4. Taking care of the children

Male		Share equally		Female		Not applicable
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7						9

4.1 People are concerned about a lot of different social issues these days. Which of the following issues is important for you?

1. Supporting prayer in public schools

Not important at all		Very important	Don't know
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7			9

2. Everybody being able to have a minimum standard of living from their salary

Not important at all		Very important	Don't know
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7			9

3. Preventing Abortion

Not important at all		Very important	Don't know
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7			9

4. Providing affordable housing for the poor and homeless

Not important at all		Very important	Don't know
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7			9

5. Nuclear disarmament

Not important at all		Very important	Don't know
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7			9

6. The private moral conduct of politicians

Not important at all		Very important	Don't know
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7			9

7. Taking care of the environment and preventing pollution

Not important at all		Very important	Don't know
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7			9

8. US troops participating in foreign peace keeping efforts

Not important at all		Very important	Don't know
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7			9

9. US troops participating in foreign wars

Not important at all		Very important	Don't know
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7			9

10. Giving American economic aid to developing countries
- | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------|---------------|---|
| Not important
at all | | Very
important | Don't
know | |
| 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 | | | | 9 |
11. Providing equal opportunities for minorities
- | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------|---------------|---|
| Not important
at all | | Very
important | Don't
know | |
| 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 | | | | 9 |
12. Opposing the death penalty for criminals
- | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------|---------------|---|
| Not important
at all | | Very
important | Don't
know | |
| 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 | | | | 9 |
13. Helping the economic needs of poor single women and children
- | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------|---------------|---|
| Not important
at all | | Very
important | Don't
know | |
| 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 | | | | 9 |

4.2 These days there is a lot of discussion about morals and attitudes about sex in this country.

If a man and woman have sexual relations before marriage, do you think it is

Always wrong____ Almost always wrong____ Not sure____
Wrong only sometimes____ Not wrong at all____

4.3 What is your opinion about a married person having sexual relations with someone other than their marriage partner. Is it

Always wrong____ Almost always wrong____ Not sure____
Wrong only sometimes____ Not wrong at all____

4.4 Should getting a divorce in this country be easier or more difficult than it is now?

Much easier____ Easier____ Not sure____ Somewhat more difficult____
Much more difficult____

4.51 Do you think the public schools should give information to teenagers on how to avoid becoming pregnant.

Definitely yes____ Probably yes____ Not sure____ Probably no____
Definitely no____

4.52 Do you support the public schools offering general sex education if there is community and parental involvement?

Definitely yes____ Probably yes____ Not sure____ Probably no____
Definitely no____

4.53 Do you support the public schools offering sex education based on abstinence.

Definitely yes____ Probably yes____ Not sure____ Probably no____
Definitely no____

4.54 At what ages should sexual abstinence be taught in the public schools?

From____to____ At all ages____ Not at all____

4.6 We hear a lot of talk these days about the abortion issue.

Please tell me: Should a pregnant woman be able to obtain a legal abortion:

4.6 1. If there is a strong chance of serious birth defect in the baby?

Definitely____ Probably____ Not sure____ Probably no____
Definitely no____

4.6 2. If a woman is married and does not want to have any more children?

Definitely____ Probably____ Not sure____ Probably no____
Definitely no____

4.6 3. If the woman's health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy?

Definitely____ Probably____ Not sure____ Probably no____
Definitely no____

4.6 4. If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children?

Definitely____ Probably____ Not sure____ Probably no____
Definitely no____

4.6 5. If the woman became pregnant as a result of rape?

Definitely____ Probably____ Not sure____ Probably no____
Definitely no____

4.6 6. If she is not married and does not want to marry the man?

Definitely____ Probably____ Not sure____ Probably no____
Definitely no____

4.6 7. If the woman wants abortion for any reason?

Definitely____ Probably____ Not sure____ Probably no____
Definitely no____

QUESTIONS 5.1 TO 5.2 TO BE ANSWERED BY PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS ONLY

5.1 Do you agree or disagree:

5.11 I work towards the reform of society.

Definitely yes____ Probably yes____ Don't know____ Probably not____
Definitely not____

5.12 I am helping to improve the position of women in society.

Definitely yes___ Probably yes___ Don't know___ Probably not___
Definitely not___

5.13 I am helping to strengthen families in our society.

Definitely yes___ Probably yes___ Don't know___ Probably not___
Definitely not___

5.14 I am helping to improve the moral values of our society.

Definitely yes___ Probably yes___ Don't know___ Probably not___
Definitely not___

5.15 I am working - either as a volunteer or for pay - in an organization that promotes alternatives to abortion.

Yes___ No___ If yes, which
organization? _____

Approximately how many hours each week on average do you work for this organization?

0 - 1 hour___ 2-3 hours___ 4-5 hours___ 6-9 hours___ 10-20
hours___ 21-30 hours___ 31-40 hours___ More than 40 hours___

5.16 Could you tell me how often you have done any of these things as a member of your organization?

1. Work in the office A lot___ Some___ Not very much___
Not at all___
2. Counseling women A lot___ Some___ Not very much___
Not at all___
3. Sort out cloths and toys for children A lot___ Some___
Not very much___ Not at all___
4. Attend committee meetings A lot___ Some___
Not very much___ Not at all___
5. Attend conferences or workshops A lot___ Some___
Not very much___ Not at all___
6. Participate in demonstrations: Yes___ No___
If yes, how many times? _____

5.16 7. Do you donate money? Yes___ No___ If yes, to which
organization? _____

5.16 8. Do you write letters to elected officials? Yes____ No____
If yes, approximately how many a year? _____

5.2 Check each one of the following that you feel describes you.

I am a pro-life activist____

I am a moral crusader____

I am a social reformer____

I am a pro-choice activist____

6.1 Please describe your marital status

Married____ Live with a partner____ Widowed____ Divorced____

Separated____ Never been married____

6.2 Are you male or female? Male____ Female____

6.3 If you were asked what is your social class, which one would you choose?

Lower class____ Working class____ Middle class____ Upper middle
class____

Upper class____ No class____ Don't know____

6.4 In what month and year were you born? Month:____ Year: 19____

6.51 Now, I have some questions about your education and work.

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

____ Did not go to school

____ Grade School

____ High school or GED

____ Some college

____ Technical school or Junior College

____ Bachelor's degree (B.A., A.B., B.S., etc.)

____ Master's degree (M.A., M.S., M.B.A., M.Ed., etc.)

____ Doctorate degree or first professional degree (Ph.D., Ed.D. dental, medical,
law, theology, etc.)

____ Don't know

6.52 In what year did you complete your schooling? _____ Currently
enrolled____

6.6 Just approximately as a rough estimate, in which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year before taxes.

Under \$10,000_____	\$10,000 to 12,499_____	\$12,500 to 14,999_____
\$15,000 to 17,499_____	\$17,500 to 19,999_____	\$20,000 to 22,499_____
\$22,500 to 24,999_____	\$25,000 to 29,999_____	\$30,000 to 34,999_____
\$35,000 to 39,999_____	\$40,000 to 49,999_____	\$50,000 to 59,999_____
\$60,000 to 74,999_____	\$75,000 or over_____	Don't know_____

What is your race or ethnic group?

6.71 Are you of Spanish/Hispanic/Latino origin? Yes_____ No_____ *If no go to question 7.83*

6.72 If yes, mark one or several of the following options. Are you

Mexican, Mexican American or Chicano_____

Puerto Rican_____

Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino group_____ Which

one:_____

6.73 Mark one or several of the following options. Are you

White_____ Black or African American_____

American Indian or Alaska Native_____

Asian Indian_____ Chinese_____ Filipino_____ Japanese_____

Korean_____ Vietnamese_____ Native Hawaiian_____

Other Pacific Islander_____ Other Asian_____

Any other race_____ Which one:_____

APPENDIX B

Churches, Activist Groups, and Pregnancy Centers for Data Collection

Churches

The following Table (19) shows the churches, in which the respondents who filled out a questionnaire were either members or where they participated regularly. The information of their church membership was taken from their answers to the questionnaire (Appendix A, question 1.22). In the greater Lansing areas I approached the churches indicated with # in Table 19 directly for questionnaire collection. Regarding charities and social services I selected the Protestant churches according to information as listed in Table 1 (chapter 4) from the Lansing areas phone book, the Catholic churches according to the information from the Diocese of Lansing for the Lansing Region. I chose those Catholic churches that focused on the anti-abortion Respect Life activities as a priority of their social services (Appendix B) and as an additional indicator of sexual conservatism promoted natural family planning (chapter 4, Data Collection). The remaining churches in the Lansing areas (listed *without* # in Table 19) were taken from the question 1.22 (Appendix A) of the questionnaires that I had collected from the Christian Right, religious missionary and pregnancy groups located in the Lansing areas (Table 20)

The names and locations of those churches outside greater Lansing I retrieved from the questionnaires that I had mailed to the pregnancy service centers located in mid Michigan between Grand Rapids and Detroit, and Ann Arbor and Flint (Table 20 and chapter 4, Data Collection). With the exception of the churches indicated with # in

Table 19 the list below shows the information as provided from question 1.22 of the questionnaires as they were sent back from pregnancy centers and religious activist groups. The label (*) indicates that the respondent provided incomplete information about name and location of their church.

Eleven of the 408 respondents of my data set did not answer the question about name and location of their church. Another 11 of the respondents said they are not participating in any church and 9 of the respondents were not either affiliated with Catholic or Protestant religion. This latter group of the non Catholics and non Protestants were excluded from further analysis.

Table 19

Churches

Religious Group	Place of Worship	N
Catholic	St. Robert Church, Ada	1
	St. Frances Cabrini Parish, Allen Park	2
	St. Francis of Assisi Church, Ann Arbor	2
	St. Mary Student Parish, Ann Arbor	1
	Women Eucharist, Ann Arbor	1
	St. Anthony Parish, Belleville	1
	St. Hugo of the Hills Catholic Church, Bloomfield Hills	2
	Holy Spirit Catholic Church Hamburg, Brighton	2
	# St. Mary's Rectory, Charlotte	1
	St. Daniel Church, Clarkston	2
	Divine Child Parish, Dearborn	1
	Sacred Heart Parish, Dearborn	1
	St. Linus Parish, Dearborn Heights	2
	Christ the King Parish, Detroit	2
	Day House Detroit Catholic Worker, Detroit	1
	Detroit Province of the Society of Jesus, Detroit	1
	St. Leo Church, Detroit	2
	Sacred Heart Church, Detroit	1
	St. Ignatius Parish, Detroit	2
	# St. Jude Catholic Church, Dewitt	8
	# St. John's Student Parish, East Lansing	19

Table 19 (cont.d)

Religious Group	Place of Worship	N
Catholic	Our Lady of Sorrows Catholic Church, Farmington	3
	St. Fabian Church, Farmington Hills	1
	St. Raphael's, Garden City	1
	St. Michael Parish, Grand Ledge	1
	Catholic Information Center, Grand Rapids	2
	St. Paul the Appostle Catholic School, Grand Rapids	1
	St. Robert, Grand Rapid	1
	St. Paul Catholic Church and Rectory, Grosse Point	1
	St. Joseph Catholic Church, Howell	1
	St. John the Baptist Catholic Church, Hubbardston	2
	# Church of the Resurrection, Holy Cross, Lansing	5
	Holy Cross Parish, Lansing	1
	Immaculate Heart of Mary, Lansing	4
	# St. Gerard Parish, Lansing	9
	# St. Mary Cathedral, Lansing	11
	# St. Therese of Lisieux Catholic Parish, Lansing	25
	# St. Thomas Aquinas Church, Lansing	38
	# St. James Catholic Church, Mason	1
	St. Mary's Parish, Morrice	4
	The Church of the Holy Family, Novi	1
	St. Martha's Catholic Church, Okemos	2
	Our Lady of the Lakes, Pentwater	1
	St. Joseph Catholic Church, Pewamo	2
	St. Vincent de Paul Parish, Pontiac	1
	St. Patrick Catholic Church, Portland	1
	Shrine of the Little Flower, Royal Oak	3
	St. Rene Goupil Parish, Sterling Heights	6
	St. Joseph Parish, St. Johns	2
	St. Mary of the Woods, Twin City	1
	St. Mark Catholic Church, Warren	3
	St. Martin De Porres Parish, Warren	1
	St. Sylvester Parish, Warren	1
	# St. Mary Catholic Church, Williamston	1
	St. Stanislaus Kostka Parish, Wyandotte	1
	Our Lady of Mount Carmel, Wyandotte	1
	Our Lady of the Rosary (*)	1
	South Eastern Michigan Women Eucharist (*)	1
	St. Germaine Parish, St. Clair Shores (Lawrence) (*)	1

Table 19 (cont.d)

Religious Group	Place of Worship	N
Catholic	St. Patrick (*)	1
	St. Sebastian, South East Michigan (*)	1
	Total	200
Evangelical Protestant	Lakeside Chapel of Park Lake, Bath	1
	Faith Baptist Church, Davison	1
	# Community Church, Dewitt	1
	# Capital City Vineyard Church, East Lansing	1
	# Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod (WELS) Campus Ministry, East Lansing	2
	Eaton Rapids Assemblies of God, Eaton Rapids	1
	Farmington Hills Church of God, Farmington Hills	1
	South Baptist Church, Flint	1
	Trinity Baptist Church, Flushing	1
	Most Holy Trinity Church, Fowler	2
	Bethany Baptist Church, Grand Blanc	3
	Oneida Gospel Church, Grand Ledge	1
	Fountain Street Church, Grand Rapids	1
	Mars Hill Bible Church, Grandville	1
	# Spirit of Christ, Haslet	8
	# Holy Epiphany Evangelical Orthodox Church, Holt	1
	# Holt Nazarene Church, Holt	1
	# Riverview Community Church, Holt	3
	Graham Church, Laingsburg	2
	# First United Brethern Church, Lansing	7
	# Liberty Christian Church, Lansing	15
	# Living Hope Church, Lansing	1
	Our Savior Lutheran Church, Lansing	1
	# Reachout Christian Center, Lansing	11
	# Trinity Church, Lansing	4
	# Mount Hope, Lansing	6
	# Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church, Lansing	5
	# New Covenant Christian Church, Lansing	15
	# South Baptist Church, Lansing	3
	# South Nazarene, Lansing	1
	# Spirit of Christ Church, Lansing	1
	# Mason Assembly of God, Mason	2
	# Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Lansing, Okemos	1

Table 19 (cont.d)

Religious Group	Place of Worship	N
Evangelical Protestant	Northridge Church, Plymouth	1
	Highland Park Baptist Church, Southfield	1
	Gilead Baptist Church, Taylor	1
	First Baptist Church of Troy, Troy	1
	Williamston Free Methodist Church, Williamston	1
	Bible Church, Woodhaven	2
	Shalom Ministry, Dearborn Heights (*)	2
	Baptist Church, Lapeer (*)	2
	Calvary Baptist Church (*)	1
	Christ Memorial Church (*)	1
	Faith Bible Church (*)	1
	First Love Christian Fellows (*)	2
	Free Methodist (*)	1
	Grace Bible Baptist (*)	1
	Missouri Lutheran (*)	2
	Missouri Trinity Lutheran (*)	3
	Non-Denominational Church (*)	2
	Presbyterian Living Water, SG (*)	1
	Small Mixed Race Christian Church (*)	1
	Total	133
Mainstream Protestant	# Edgewood United Church of Christ, East Lansing	2
	# River Terrace Reformed Church, East Lansing	1
	# Haslet Community Church: United Church of Christ (UCC), Haslett	1
	# Bethlehem Lutheran Church, Lansing	1
	# Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Lansing	30
	# Grace Lutheran Church, Lansing	1
	# Plymouth Congregational Church, Lansing	1
	Trinity United Methodist Church, Lansing	1
	Kenwood Church of Christ, Livonia	1
	Memorial Church of Christ, Livonia	1
	# The Presbyterian Church of Okemos, Okemos	1
	Hilltop Christian Church, Ohio (*)	1
	Laingsburg Church, Laingsburg (*)	1
	Methodist (*)	1
	Total	44

Table 19 (cont.d)

Religious Group	Place of Worship	N
Other	First Unitarian Universalist Congregation of Ann Arbor, Ann Arbor	3
	First Unitarian Universalist Church of Detroit, Detroit	1
	Unitarian Universalist Church of Greater Lansing, Lansing	1
	Shema Yisrael, Southfield	1
	Fellowship for Toda Buddha (*)	1
	Kehillat Israel (*)	1
	Searching proper church (*)	1
	Total	9
None	None	11
	Total	11

Notes: N=Number of questionnaires returned per church

(*) The respondent provided incomplete information about name or location of his or her church.

Churches located in the greater Lansing areas directly approached for data collection. The information about the other churches came from the questionnaires that were mailed back from the pregnancy, adoption and activist organizations.

Religious Activist Groups and Pregnancy Centers

Table 20 shows the religious activist groups (chapter 4, Description of Data) and pregnancy centers from which data was collected. Except for Call to Action and Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice (Table 20, Progressive Catholic and Interreligious) all the activist groups were contacted on the grounds of their conservative views on religion and abortion.

The pregnancy centers provide pregnancy tests and counsel women towards not having an abortion (United States 2006). The centers I contacted for data collection were either located in the greater Lansing areas listed in the Directory of Pregnancy Support Services published by the Lansing chapter of the Right to Life of Michigan (RLM)

(2000) or from pregnancy centers listed online. Right to Life of Michigan (2000) had also a non-religious adoption and two non-religious children's aid non-profit agencies and one government organization [Ingham County Family Independence Agency (FIA)] listed from which I collected questionnaires (Table 20). (Most of those respondents had liberal views on abortion (Appendix B, question 4.6.1 through 4.6.7) and I stopped taking pregnancy or children's support groups into consideration if they were not affiliated with any religion.)

The Catholic Respect Life pregnancy centers listed in Table 20 were contacted together with their parish church listed in the church directory (Diocese of Lansing 2000). The online source was Pregnancy Centers Online –Michigan Listings. This list was not all inclusive. The Catholic Respect Life centers and the pregnancy centers that are listed under Right to Life of Michigan, Greater Lansing in Table 20 were not listed in “Pregnancy Centers Online” in 2001.

I got the internet address about the pregnancy centers through the Right to Life of Michigan home page, where “Pregnancy Centers Online” was indicated under “Website Links” in 2001. The listings of pregnancy services centers have different names today and are continued by different websites such as Lifecall or Ramah International. They are organized by Christian based religious groups like Heart Beat International or Care Net (United States 2006) The internet listings then and now do not represent a specific religious group and most of the centers identify themselves as interdenominational and do not indentify a church or religious group as their affiliate. But with the exception of two participants of Jewish religion, the respondents of the pregnancy centers to my questionnaire in 2001 were either Catholic or Protestant. Those centers that do identify a

religion are Catholic or Lutheran social services or Bethany Christian services. The latter one is, according to information from their homepage “bethany.org” (Bethany Christian Services 2009) associated with an evangelical Christianity and active in anti-abortion and promoting adoption matters.

Table 20
Pregnancy Centers and Activist Groups

Pregnancy Support Services for the Lansing Area, Right to Life of Michigan, Lansing	Catholic Social Services Local Parishes, Lansing Region of Diocese of Lansing
Beacon of Hope Pregnancy Care Center, St. Johns, MI	Respect Life Church of the Resurrection Lansing, MI
Bethany Christian Services East Lansing, MI	Respect Life St. Gerard Parish Lansing, MI
Christian Cradle East Lansing, MI	Respect Life St. James Catholic Church Mason, MI
Catholic Social Services (Diocese of Lansing), Lansing, MI	Respect Life St. Mary's Rectory Charlotte, MI
Project Rachel (Catholic Diocese of Lansing), Lansing, MI	Respect Life St. Mary Cathedral Lansing, MI
Lutheran Social Services Lansing, MI	Respect Life St. Mary Catholic Church Williamston, MI
Adoption Associates Inc. Lansing, MI	Respect Life St. Michael Parish Grand Ledge, MI
Child and Family Services Holt, MI	
Michigan Indian Child Welfare Lansing, MI	
Ingham County Family Independent Agency (FIA), Lansing, MI	

Table 20 (cont.d)

Pregnancy Centers Online

Bethany Christian Services
Allegan, MI

Bethany Christian Services
Fremont, MI

Bethany Christian Services
Grand Rapids, MI

Bethany Christian Services
Holland, MI

Bethany Christian Services
Madison Heights, MI

Bethany Christian Services
Paw Paw, MI

Crisis Pregnancy Center Inc.
Allen Park, MI

AAA Crisis Pregnancy Center
Cheboygan, MI

Metro Crisis Pregnancy Center
Dearborn, MI

Crisis Pregnancy Center of Detroit
Detroit, MI

Flint Crisis Pregnancy Center
Flint, MI

Crisis Pregnancy Services of
Midland, Midland, MI

Crisis Pregnancy Aid Center
Taylor, MI

Care Net Pregnancy Information
Center, Berkley, MI

Catholic Social Services

Problem Pregnancy/Operation
Stork

Respect Life
St. Therese of Lisieux Catholic
Parish, Lansing, MI

Respect Life
St. Thomas Aquinas Church
Lansing, MI

Activist Groups

Political

Citizens for Traditional Values
Lansing, MI

Foundation for Traditional
Values
Lansing, MI

Michigan Family Forum
Lansing, MI

Right to Life of Michigan
Lansing, MI

Catholic

Catholic Homeschoolers
Lansing Areas

Catholic League for Religious
and
Civil Rights, Detroit Region, MI

Evangelical Protestant

City Rescue Mission
Lansing, MI

Lansing Teen Challenge
Lansing, MI

Pray America - Manos de Jesus
Lansing, MI

**Progressive Catholic
and Interreligious**

Call to Action of Michigan
Ada, Dearborn, Warren, MI

Table 20 (cont.d)

Pregnancy Centers Online

Pregnancy Aid

Detroit, MI

Problem Pregnancy Center

Detroit, MI

Pregnancy Services of Greater

Lansing, East Lansing, MI

Another Way Pregnancy Center

Farmington, MI

Pregnancy Helpline

Howell, MI

Shared Pregnancy Women's

Center, Lansing, MI

Activist Groups

Interreligious

Reproductive Choice

East Lansing, MI

Pregnancy Centers Online

Hannah's House

Lansing, MI

Right to Life, Lifespan

Livonia, MI

Mother and Unborn Baby Care

Southfield, MI

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