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U.S. MEDIA POLICY:
THE EMBEDDED PROGRAM DURING THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

presented by

Myungjin Song

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U.S. MEDIA POLICY:
THE EMBEDDED PROGRAM
DURING THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

By

Myungjin Song

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Journalism

2009

ABSTRACT

U.S. MEDIA POLICY:
THE EMBEDDED PROGRAM DURING THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

By

Myungjin Song

Preparing for the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. military establishment (the
Pentagon) introduced a new media policy called “the embedded program” to provide
reporters with the truth about the war before the enemy spread disinformation and
~ distortions through the media. The embedded program was also intended to create an
amicable military-media relationship.

This study examines the nature of newspaper reporting during the early phase
of the 2003 Iraq War and qualitative similarities and differences in the reporting of
embedded journalists, non-embedded journalists, and other reporters who covered the
conﬂict. The results suggest that embedded, non-embedded, and others’ newspaper
accounts differed in their reporting of the 2003 Iraq War. It is important to recognize
that the application of the embedded program played a signiﬁcant role in accounting
for the differences and the U.S. military assessment of how the program worked out.
However, differences in how they portrayed the war to readers do not indicate that

either type of newspaper stories is better, just that they differ.

Copyright by
Myungjin Song

2009

I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my father.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank the South Korea Army for providing
me with this opportunity to complete this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Folu
Ogundimu who has been the thesis committee chair and an immense help throughout
my thesis research. His vision was certamly inspiring and I am very grateful for his
patience in guiding me throughout my thesis research.

I would also like to thank the members of my thesis committee, Professor
Darcy Greene and Professor Eric Freedman, for their input during the preparation of
this thesis. I am very grateful to them for their very invaluable suggestions and advice.
Especially, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Greene for her
much needed support throughout my time at Michigan State University. I will miss her
and her family members for their kindness and warmth.

Finally, I would like to thank my whole family for their support throughout
my graduate studies. I am especially indebted to my mother, sisters and brother whose

love and their constant encouragement throughout my studies kept me going.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................... vii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 1
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................... 3

The Evolution of the U.S. Media Policy ............................................ 3

The Embedded Program ............................................................... 5
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH QUESTIONS & METHODS ............................... 10
CHAPTER IV: RESULTS ...................................................................... 70
CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION ................................................................. 74
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION .............................................................. 77
APPENDICES ................................................................................... 79
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................. 86

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. News Accounts by Reporter Status and Newspaper Organizations ...15
Table 2. News Accounts by Reporter Status ......................................... 16

Table 3. News Accounts by Newspaper Organizations 17

vii

I. INTRODUCTION

The problem to be examined involves qualitative similarities and differences
among war-related newspaper articles written by journalists during the 2003 Iraq War.
The study’s historical framework follows the evolution of the U.S. military-media
relationship from World War H (WWII) to the 2003 Iraq War, as well as background,
development and consequences of the embedded program, which has functioned as a
media management program by the Department of Defense (DOD) since the 2003 Iraq
War.

Historically, the media were subject to different policies that impacted their
coverage of war during different phases. Consequently, the relationship between the
military and the media was not always amicable. Kennedy (1993) says that cultural
and ideological differences cause this conﬂict between the military and the media. He
also argues that reporters who do not have enough knowledge about the military can
contribute to uninformed or negative coverage. Ricks (1993) says that the persistent
tension between the military and the news media exists because they pursue very
different objectives and often hold very different values. Brogan (2006) shows that the
national security goals of the government and the freedom of information rights of the
media cause tension between the military and the media, and this tension has become
more visible since WWII.

To understand the military-media relationship, this study will focus on three
sub-topics. First, the study will discuss how the different war coverage policies and
programs were formed to manage media involvement during war, in particular since
WWII. It will examine efforts of the U.S. military to keep a cooperative relationship
with the media. Second, this study will provide comparison of news accounts written

by embedded journalists, who “live, work and travel as part of the units with which

they are embedded,” with those written by non-embedded journalists, who travel
alone without the beneﬁts of a military unit. The non-embedded journalists are also
known as “unilaterals.” By comparing the work of the two types of reporters, this
study hopes to show how successfully or unsuccessfully the embedded program
functioned as a media policy during the 2003 Iraq War. Third, by analyzing the media
strategies of the U.S. military, this study will suggest whether the U.S. media policy
may be applicable to other countries’ armed forces, such as the South Korean military.

There were constant efforts to develop eﬂecﬁve press guidelines in the U.S.
because military leaders believed the conduct of the Vietnam War was impaired by
negative media coverage (Barber & Wier, 2002). As a country under continuous
threats of war since the armistice agreement of 1953, South Korea learned a lesson
from the failure of the U.S. in Vietnam. One of the most important missions for the
South Korean military is to ensure that in the event of war, there will be an effective
media policy to guarantee that the government enjoys public support. Therefore this
study will help to show whether the policy of embedding reporters is applicable to the
South Korean military. In doing so, it reviews the evolution of U.S. media policy since

WWII and focuses speciﬁcally on the embedded program during the Iraq War.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. The Evolution of the U.S. Media Policy

From a governmental point of view, the objective of war is victory. To achieve
victory, the media play a signiﬁcant role. As evident by the U.S. experience in its ﬁght
against Iraqi insurgents in the post-Iraq invasion of 2003, it is not too much to say that
the history of war is partly the history of military-media relations. The media’s
importance on the battleﬁeld is noted by Rid who writes that network-centric wars of
the twenty-ﬁrst century would be fought on the physical battleﬁeld as well as in the
virtual battle space (Rid, 2007).

The U.S. has implemented different war coverage programs during eight
periods of conﬂict after WWI. This covers WWII, Korean War, Vietnam War, Grenada
Action, Panama Operation, Gulf War, Haiti War, and Iraq War. With this trail, the U.S.
became an object of considerable study by scholars and military experts who are
interested in writing about managing the programs during war time.

According to Cooper (2003), the press pool system was prevalent during
WWII, and reporters wandered freely on the battleﬁeld with relatively loose restraints.
In Korea, some experts such as Boydston (1992), Olson (1993), and Cassel (1985) say
that journalists most likely practiced voluntary self-censorship, but there was also a
formal censorship system. Boydston (1992) says that self-censorship guidelines were
unclear at the beginning, but war correspondents soon had to submit all news material,
including ﬁlm, to the military for approval. The Vietnam War exempliﬁed a victory
for the media in terms of freedom of access to the battleﬁeld. More than freedom of
access, they also had even logistical support in getting reporters to the battleﬁeld
(Cooper, 2003). In the 1983 action in Grenada, however, reporters were not able to

join ground troops. On the third day of the operation, a group of reporters was

escorted around the island for only a few hours. On the whole, they were not free of
restrictions until the sixth day, when the war was over (Cooper, 2003).

During the 1989 Panama Operation, the press pool was thoroughly controlled
by the military. Reporters were not free from military escorts and transportation.
Instead of being taken to the ﬁghting, pool members received a series of brieﬁngs
from U.S. Embassy personnel who did not provide any up-to-date military
information (Boydston, 1992).

By the Persian Gulf War, reporters were not able to join the troop deployment
and combat Escorts, pooled coverage, and pre-censorship of security-related
information prevailed. The DoD activated the national pool to cover the opening phase
of “Operation Desert Shield.” The system for granting access to those operations
caused a number of press complaints because only about .10 percent of the reporters on
the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) rosters in Dhahran received accreditation.
Moreover, those few ‘elected’ members of the press did not choose what they wanted
to cover, but the military assigned them to units unilaterally (Boydston, 1992).

During the War in Haiti in 1994, press restraints were similar to those in the
Gulf War; military escorts and pre-censorship of material that violated the security
ground rules were included in the program (U .S. Department of Defense, 1994).
According to the guidelines for news media, “Media representatives are asked to assist
the operation by blacking out network broadcasts from launch points prior to the
landing of forces in the area of operation. . .. Do not approach military personnel,
especially during hours of darkness, without express military approval. . .. Security at
the source will be the primary and desired means of protecting the operations security

of the mission and enforcing the media ground rules.”

2. The Embedded Program
Background of Embedded Journalism. The Vietnam War is often blamed for
damaging public support for the U.S. military. After that, military censorship
dramatically changed into restraints. Severe control caused conﬂicts between the
military and the media, and most recently, the military developed media management
policies that were designed to satisfy both sides.

Even before the 2003 Iraq War began, the Bush administration faced world
criticism because there was neither an evident cause for a war nor consensus within
the United Nations Security Council. It made the U.S. administration more focused on
the media to favorably lead public opinion. This was the context in which the DoD
adopted “the embedded program.”

The history of the embedded program goes back to military operations in the
Falldands War of 1982 and Haiti in 1994. The program allowed the military to get its
side of the story out by embedding reporters and the media to portray operations from
the military side in its attempt to inform the public (Brogan, 2006). However, the 2003
version of the embedded program was more elaborate in terms of satisfying press
requests for extensive and thorough access to war operations, as well as accurate and
prompt news reports.

The Pentagon’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Victoria
Clarke, said the purpose of the program was to provide the public with accurate
information about the war before the enemy spread disinformation and distortions
through the media and to create an amicable military-media relationship (Brogan,
2006). According to the DoD’s ground rules to which the ‘embeds’ had to agree to get
assigned to a unit, embeds cannot release information about the speciﬁc number of

troops, equipment, or vehicles, future operations, security levels, intelligence

collection, or the effectiveness of enemy action (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003).

Development through the War in Iraq. At the beginning of the 2003 war with Iraq,
625 journalists including 449 Americans and 175 internationals were assigned in the
embedding plan. This was extraordinary for the opening stages of a conﬂict involving
the U.S. (Getlin, 2003). Foreign journalists were sent from 40 foreign media outlets,
such as BBC, NHK, and Al-Jazeera. U.S. reporters were selected from local media
that were from the towns where combat troops were deployed from (Zeide, 2005).

Commanders had to provide the media with every opportunity to observe
actual combat operations. Embeds and their media organizations took all
responsibilities for the inherently dangerous risks involved and agreed to abide by
military ground rules. In return, supplies, medical attention, transportation,
communications assistance, and temporary loans of biological and chemical protective
gear were given to embeds (Zeide, 2005).

For the purpose of getting the reporters used to the military and the possible
conditions in which they would work, the Pentagon’s ‘Embed boot camps’ were
offered at several military bases (Rodriguez, 2004). They included nuclear, biological,
and chemical training and ﬁrst aid.

Also, reporters had the other opportunities to spend time with military units
training in the U.S. That was designed to build trust between the reporters and military
and to become familiar with each other’s terminology and routines. The news
organizations and reporters were able to test their new equipment, techniques, and
procedures for reporting in probable battle situation (Rodriguez, 2004).

Aside from embeds, some reporters covered the conﬂict outside the

embedded program. News organizations assigned these non-embedded reporters on

the understanding that their safety, including logistic support, and physical protection,
could not be guaranteed by the U.S. military.

An estimated 2,100 non—embedded journalists covered the invasion (Katovsky
& Carlson, 2003). Unlike embeds, the writing of non-embeds’ was not subject to
military restriction. They were able to go anywhere in the war theater and cover
anyone they encountered. Fourteen non-embedded journalists, however, were killed in
the period of the 2003 Iraq War, and this number made up the majority of media
causalities during the war (Rodriguez, 2004).

Restrictive access to sites and soldier interviews was another problem for
non-embeds. Many non-embeds faced indifference or hostility from the military,

partly because of their non-embedded status (Zeide, 2005).

Consequence of Embedding. The program provided embedded reporters open and
direct access to military operations. The program allowed the reporter to live, work,
and travel as part of the units with which they were embedded. They were able to
cover battleﬁeld situation up-close. In return, they had to follow the military system,
rules, and regulations the same as unit members or they lost access to the program or
the battleﬁeld. The military did not accept those who went against or attempted to
cross the rules (Rodriguez, 2004).

Among media critics, there is a rich diversity of opinion on how well the
program functioned during the conﬂict. Supporters claim the program allowed greater
access to the press than in any war since Vietnam. Rid (2007) considers the innovative
decision of the Pentagon as “a fascinating case of organizational change in an
exceptionally large, hierarchical, and presumably change-averse bureaucracy

operating in a fast-paced and unstable environment.” Brogan (2006) notes that “the

discussion over the military-media relationship is over and that the embedded program
is the solution.” Kerr (2004) says that the program is advisable for future conﬂicts as
well. Oehl (2003) opines that the program met journalists’ need as well as provided
the truth about the war. He also calls the program “a sample of how the military’s
experience speaks to the successful open policy of military-media relationship.”

For both the military and the media, the war was covered not just from the
perspective of U.S. and British military spokespersons, but from reporters’ ﬁrst-hand
and eyewitness reporting of frontline action, providing many angles on the war.

Opponents of the program say that it “can never be a source of legitimate news
since the reporter cannot verify the information provided by the military
independently” (Brogan, 2006). Critics say the quality of the stories and the accuracy
of the reports are suspect, and they argue that the program did not improve the
military-media relationship. According to Fisher (2003), embedding journalists tainted
the objectivity of journalism, and Grossman (2003) likens “the effect of embedding to
the Stockholm Syndrome, where hostages take sympathy with their captors and their
captors’ cause.” It would be impossible for reporters to write objectively because they
depended for their transport, food and for their very lives on the military.

Moreover, the media were not permitted to report freely on certain topics as
they wanted, in cases of disturbing or unﬂattering news to the military (Berenger,
2004). Exercising embedding ground rules, the military might have blocked access to
other sides of a story, intentionally or not. Limited access and substantive coverage
controlled by the military implicate signiﬁcant First Amendment concerns about
biased news (Zeide, 2005). Johnson (2003) argues that the public might get the truth,
but not the whole truth.

In a study of the embedded program, Sylvester & Huffaman (2005) say that

embedded journalists were not pleased when unilateral journalists wanted the same
access rights as they did. However, they agree that both types of journalists made a
contribution to the war achievement for the military and the best coverage for the
media. Kerr (2004) says that embedded journalists did not write direct reports about
Iraqi war crime claims, but unilaterals did. Pfau et al. (2004) show that embedded
reports were more favorable toward the military and its personnel, and featured more
episodic ﬂaming by a content analysis of print coverage in the ﬁrst ﬁve days of
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Similarly, the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC)’s OIF coverage is content-analyzed by Lewis et al. (2004) The study ﬁnds a
favorable atmosphere of the coverage toward the govemment’s position on the war

and the Iraqi people’s positive attitudes toward the invasion.

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD OF STUDY

1. Research Questions

The study poses two key research questions:

RQ 1: What was the nature of newspaper reporting during the early phase of
the 2003 Iraq War?

RQ 2: Are there qualitative differences in the reporting of embedded

journalists and non-embedded journalists who covered the 2003 Iraq War?

2. Method of Study

To answer these questions, a qualitative content analysis method is adopted.
This study focuses on the embedded program during the 2003 Iraq War. By comparing
news accounts written by embedded journalists with those written by non-embedded
reporters and other reporters, the study shows how the program affected war coverage.
The term “unilateral” is also used to refer to non-embedded reporters.

To proceed with this comparison, a list of the active journalists under the
program during the 2003 Iraq War was requested from the Public Affairs Office of the
DOD via e-mail. The e-mail was sent on June 27, 2008, and the response was received
on June 30.1 According to the list, there were 775 embedded journalists during the
early Iraq War. This list was sorted by type (ground / air / maritime), assigned unit,
media organization, media type, and name. Names not on the list but found in the
coverage are presumed as unilaterals. I e-mailed the presumed unilaterals one by one

to conﬁrm that they were not embedded during that period. Based on the list from the

 

I Lt. Col Vician, Todd M., Defense Press Ofﬁcer of DoD, responded to the e-mail and sent a copy of
the active journalist list for the 2003 Iraq War.

10

DoD, all U.S. newspaper journalists’ names are sorted by their embedded units and
news organizations. [See Appendix 1]

The data are limited to newspaper coverage that was published during the ﬁrst
one-month period of the 2003 Iraq War, from March 12, 2003 to April 12, 2003. This
was to capture the nature of reporting just before the beginning of the war and in the
immediate period aﬁer the war started. Reasons for choosing only newspaper stories
are that they are easier to access and to look at in their full context of usage and
meaning than TV or radio reportage.

To download and print news accounts for the period, the Web search engine
Lexis-Nexis was used. The key phrase used for the search. was “Iraq War Weapons”
and only U.S. newspapers were selected.

Analysis of content involves stories ﬁled by three categories of reporters;
Embeds, Non-embeds, and ‘Other.’ Embedded journalists are deﬁned as journalists
who were embedded with ground units to cover the 2003 Iraq War. Their names are on
the media list of embedded journalists provided by the DoD. Names of non-embedded
journalists are not on the DoD list but they reported from the Iraq war theater,
including from neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan,
and Afghanistan. Another category of reporters is called ‘Others’ in the study because
they are correspondents who reported from Washington or the United Nations, away
from the war front.

The unit of analysis for this investigation is the individual newspaper article
(n=63). Among 296 news articles found by Lexis-Nexis, there are nine news articles
written by embedded journalists, 14 by non-embedded journalists, and 40 by ‘Other’
reporters. The sample consists of seven newspapers: the New York limes, USA Today,

the Boston Globe, the Philadelphia Inquirer; Christian Science Monitor; Daily News,

11

and St. Petersburg Times.

The study excludes 233 articles such as editorial, classiﬁeds, correction
notices, letters to the editor, “Q & A” articles, casualty reports, and news summary
because these are not qualiﬁed story types for meeting the study’s goal.

To be speciﬁc, the excluded items are removed because 1) they tend to be
written by editorial desks of each news organizations, not by one of three journalist
types; Embeds, Non-embeds, and ‘Other’; 2) they reﬂect each newspaper companies’
judgment of events concerning the war; and 3) they are casualty reports, correction of
errors and news summaries, or informational items.

For example, editorials are about opinions or claims that newspaper
companies or their writers express on national or international issues. They are more
likely to present the points of view of newspaper companies and they are signed
opinions of individual commentators or unsigned opinions of the newspapers.

Sample excerpts of excluded items are as follows:

1) Editorial

 

The International Herald Tribune, April 7, 2003 Monday
BYLIN E: Jon B. Wolfsthal

SECTION: OPINION; Pg. 10

LENGTH: 754 words

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

The mystery of Saddam's banned arms; Chemical and biological weapons

***

So far no weapons of mass destruction have been used against allied troops.
Unfortunately for the Bush administration's case against Iraq, however; no such
weapons have been discovered in any form. While the search is only a few
weeks old, this suggests three possibilities: that U.S. intelligence may not know
the exact location of such weapons; that such weapons are only in areas

controlled by troops loyal to Saddam; or that none are in Iraq, as the regime

 

 

12

 

 

asserts.

If and when any weapons of mass destruction are discovered, those who
supported the war in Iraq can be expected to use the ﬁnd to justiﬁ) the U.S.-led
intervention. But if such weapons are located based on solid U.S. intelligence
information, it raises other questions. If the U.S. knew where such weapons
were, why was the information not given to UN inspectors? If inspectors could

have been used to ﬁnd such weapons, why was war necessary?

 

***

 

 

2) Letters to the Editor

 

The New York Times, April 8, 2003 Tuesday
SECTION: Section A; Column 4; Editorial Desk; Pg. 22
LENGTH: 80 words

A Generation Gap Over the War?

To the Editor:

You report that college professors seem to be more vehemently opposed to
the Iraq war than their students are(front page, April 5).

The contrast with the Vietnam War doesn't mention that student protests did
not reach great numbers and intensity until four years into the war:

The Iraq war; on the other hand, is less than three weeks old, yet according

to the article 50 percent of Yale students already oppose the war.

 

 

 

3) “Q & A” Article

 

USA T ODAX March 27, 2003 Thursday
BYLINE: Glen Nishimura

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 15A
LENGTH: 653 words

Will Saddam use all his weapons?

The Bush administration premised its case for pre-emptively attacking Iraq
on its claim that dictator Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass
destruction. Will Saddam deploy them as U.S. troops close in on Baghdad?
Probably not, says Khidhir Hamza, who was the head of Saddam's nuclear-
weapons program before defecting to the USA in 1994. He was interviewed this

 

 

 

13

 

week by USA TODAY Forum Page Editor Glen Nishimura. His comments were
edited for length and clarity:
Qgestion: Why haven 't U.S. troops found any chemical or biological

weapons yet?

My They have not yet reached near Baghdad. The depots are hidden
where Saddam's most trusted troops - the SSO and the Republican Guard - can
control them. Saddam has probably moved everything north, in the Baghdad
vicinity and Tikrit. But we won’t know until U.S. troops get to Baghdad.

 

***

 

 

4) Correction Notice

 

The New York Times, March 20, 2003 Thursday
SECTION: Section A; Column 3; Metropolitan Desk; Pg. 2
LENGTH: 5 2 words

Corrections

The TV Watch article in some copies on Tuesday, about the tone of President
Bush's address to the nation on war with Iraq, paraphrased his warning about
war criminals incorrectly. He said: "War crimes will be prosecuted.

War criminals will be punished." He did not say the United States would

prosecute them.

 

 

 

5) Casualty Report

 

The New York Times, April 3, 2003 Thursday
SECTION: Section B; Column 6; Foreign Desk; Pg. 2
LENGTH: 57 words

A NATION AT WAR; Casualties

Announced military casualties in the Iraq war zone as of 5 pm. eastern time
Wednesday: U.S.
KILLED: 5 6 * CAPTURED 0R MISSING: 22 *
BRITAHV
KILLED: 27+ CAPTURED 0R MISSING: 0+
IRAQ
KILLED: N.A. CAPTURED OR MISSING: 8,000+

 

 

 

l4

 

Iraq reports only civilian dead, and said on Monday they total 425.

 

(Sources: *U. S. Department of Defense; +British Defense Ministry)

 

 

Quantitative Data Analysis. Among the seven newspapers examined, the majority
of reports are by the New York Times (24 of 62 reports), followed by the Philadelphia
Inquirer (11 reports), the Boston Globe (10), Daily News (8), USA Today (6),
Christian Science Monitor (2), and St. Petersburg Times (2). [See Table 1]

Most of the reports examined are from outside the theater of war operation
(40 out of 63). Of those within the theater, I examined more reports by Non-embeds
(14) than reports by Embeds (9). [Table 1]

When we look at the total number of stories written by Embeds and Non-

embeds, the New York Times accounts for more than one-half of the stories (12 out of
23); while the Boston Globe and USA Today combined account for about one-third of

the stories (7 out of 23). [Table l]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 1 News Accounts by Reporter Status and Newspgwr Organizations

Newspaper News News News Total
by Embeds by Non-embeds by ‘Others’

New York Times 7 5 12 24

Boston Globe l 3 6 10

USA Today 1 2 3 6

Philadelphia Inquirer 0 2 9 11

Daily News (New York) 0 l 7 8

Christian Science Monitor 0 l 1 2

St. Petersburg Times 0 0 2
Total 9 14 4O 63

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Of the 63 news accounts in the seven newspapers—nine by Embeds, 14 by
Non-embeds, 40 by ‘Others’—the average story length slightly varies among the three

categories of reporters. Stories by Embeds average 15.2 paragraphs, Non-embeds

15

average 15.9 paragraphs, and ‘Others’ average 18.2 paragraphs. [See Table 2]

When the pattern of sourcing is examined, there are slight variations in
observed number of sources between Embeds, Non-embeds, and ‘Others.’ The data is
not analyzed for signiﬁcance in the differences observed because there are too few
cases in the cells and also the diﬁerences are absolute because they refer to the
population of content examined for the one-month of study as opposed to a sample.
However, Non-embeds tend to incorporate slightly more sources than Embeds. The

difference in the number of sources is less than 2 sources per story. [Table 2]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 2 News Accoupt_s thReporter Status
Total Mean of Sources
Reporter Status Newspaper Newspaper Mean of
Stories Paragraphs Mean 0‘ [jammed
Total Sources Sources

Embed 9 15.2 4.8 2.2
Non-embed 14 15.9 6.2 2.5
‘Other’ 40 18.2 6.4 2.2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Of the seven newspapers, the News York Times, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and
the Boston Globe ﬁled at least a double-digit numbers of stories for the one-month
period of the war. Although these are still too few cases to speak of true differences
with conﬁdence, the New York Times tends to slightly favor longer paragraphs than the
other two newspapers. [See Table 3]

When the pattern of sourcing is examined, there are slight variations in
observed number of sources among three newspaper organizations. The New York
Times tends to include slightly fewer sources than the other two organizations. The

difference in the number of sources is about one source per story on average. [Table 3]

l6

TABLE 3

News Accouls bv Newspagr Organizations

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sources
Total Mean of
Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper Mean of
Stories Paragraphs Mean 0‘ Unnamed
Total Sources
Sources

New York Times 24 21.3 4.4 2.5

Philadelphia Inquirer 11 19.5 5.4 2.0

Boston Globe 10 15.6 5.5 2.5

 

 

 

 

 

 

Qualitative Data Analysis. From the beginning, the 2003 Iraq War profoundly
divided American public opinion about the country’s ﬁrst preemptive war in a century.
It came with the ﬁnal ultimatum issued to Iraq by President Bush. On March 20, Bush
said that selected targets would be hit by air raids in a bid to “decapitate” the Iraqi
leadership, marking the beginning of the war. (Jukes & Millership, 2004). Defying the
ultimatum, the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, appeared on TV and urged Iraqis to
defend their country, three hours after raids began. Invasion forces swept into southern
Iraq on March 21, 2003. As of May 1, 2003, Bush said major combat operations in
Iraq were over.

Near the beginning of the war, there were controversial issues that the UN.
Security Council did not pass a resolution approving the war in Iraq, and the majority
of the Council members such as France, Russia, China, Germany, Syria, and so on,
strongly opposed the war. The U.S. had to face a great deal of world criticism, and
anti-war protests prompted the U.S. government to ﬁnd its purported cause of war as
soon as possible.

There were three explicit causes asserted by the Bush administration about
why a war in Iraq was inevitable: 1) Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) on its soil and Saddam Hussein could have sent them out of the country and

17

perhaps sell them to other rogue nations or terrorist groups; 2) Saddam Hussein was a
threat to neighboring countries because Iraq could exercise its armed forces against
other countries similar to what happened in 1991 when Iraq invaded Kuwait; and 3)
innocent Iraqi citizens should be ﬂee from the infamous and corrupt autocracy of
Saddam Hussein Based on these reasons for going to war in Iraq, how do journalists

describe the controversial issues of the war?

Embedded Coverage

This study examines nine newspaper stories written by embedded journalists
who were attached to military units in the theater of war. Seven stories are published
by the New York Times, one story by USA Today, and one by the Boston Times. On the
basis of story themes observed in the coverage of the 2003 Iraq War, there are two
stories emphasizing readiness of the U.S. forces, three stories dealing with the Bush
government’s justiﬁcation of the war in Iraq, and four stories focusing on the war
situation at the front.

The articles are divided by three topic categories: 1) the U.S. war effort, 2)

continuing efforts to justify war, and 3) battleﬁeld situation.

1) The U.S. War Effort

Without a cause of war against Iraq or a consensus with the UN, the U.S.
had to be ready for an imminent war. During the pre-war phase, there were two
articles published by the New York Times dealing with the U.S. efforts in the pre-war

stage.

On March 18, 2003, Judith Miller, an embedded jorunalist with the New York

18

Times, wrote an article on the government’s new plan for searching for WMD in Iraq
titled “Threats and Responses: Disarming Saddam Hussein; Teams of Experts to Hunt
Iraq Arms.”

The reporter explained that the Bush administration would deploy mobile labs
and new specialized teams of intelligence officials and disarmament experts to Kuwait
to help the military search for WMD as soon as war began. Developing the story,
Miller presented two points: 1) the missions of the mobile labs and new specialized
teams and 2) the top priority of the war in Iraq.

Firstly, the reporter explained the government’s new plans as follows:

The Pentagon has deployed several new tactical units called mobile
exploitation teams, or ME T Is, with state-of-the-art equipment and
novel tactics to locate and survey at least 130 as many as 1,400
possible weapons sites.

In addition, oﬁ‘icials said the military was planning to ﬁnd and
interview hundreds of Iraqi scientists who worked on germs, chemical
or nuclear-related projects, and to seek their cooperation in
disarming Iraq of the weapons that the United Nations required Mr:
Hussein to destroy after the Persian Gulf War in 1991. [Excerpt #01]

In these paragraphs, Miller showed the government’s efforts to rapidly search
for the weapons by using an ambitious plan. The fact that the government was trying
to contact international weapons inspectors and Iraqi scientists and was trying to
ﬁgure out locations of possible weapons by MET suggests that there was no clear
evidence to support the government’s assertion that it had ﬁrm evidence of the
existence of WMD. The story suggests that the plan was still unsettled even while the
war was around the comer.

Secondly, the reporter explained the hunt for WMD as the top priority as

19

follows:

“The administration has assigned top priority to the hunt for
weapons of mass destruction, oﬂicial said. After months of relatively
ﬁuitless international inspections, the discovery of such arms,
oﬂicials said, would vindicate the administration 3' decision to go to
war to disarm Iraq. Conversely, failure to ﬁnd them would leave the
administration vulnerable to charge that it had started a war

needlessly. [Excerpt #02]

This paragraph shows that searching for hidden WMD in Iraq was highly
prioritized by the government in this war because they could be sent out of Iraq and
sold to other rogue nations or terrorist groups. However, it also shows that the U.S.
was starting the war without any assurance that Iraq was a threat to the world because
there was no trace of WMD so far. Facing a great deal of war opposition, Miller
implied that the U.S. could not avoid worldwide criticism until evidence of WMD was
found.

Overall, Miller raised expectations for aggressive search plans to disarm Iraq
and stressed the government’s efforts toward the weapons search; however, she
suggested the desperate situation in which the U.S. had to show physical evidence to

the world, and the reality that the U.S. faced as the war began.

A March 19, 2003, article by Bernard Weinraub titled “Threats and
Responses: Articles of Capitulation; Iraqis Told, ‘Sign Here’ to Surrender—As Lee
Did” focuses on how the government planned to make Iraqi ofﬁcers surrender
peaceably even before the war began. The writer’s main points are: l) the U.S.
prepares for the war by means of psychological strategy and 2) the U.S. efforts to ﬁnd

a lead on hidden weapons.

20

Here is a portion of Weinraub’s story that includes the ﬁrst point:

Even before the war starts, the United States Army is telling oﬂicers
in Iraq to surrender their units by signing “articles of capitulation. "

In a legal move not used since World War II, the United States has
dropped leaflets, sent e-mail messages and even spoken privately to
Iraqi oﬂicers, urging them to surrender their battalions or brigades

or division. [Excerpt #03]

Drawing on various psychological strategies which had been forbidden since
WWII, the reporter highlighted how elaborately the government was trying to prepare
for this war by using every possible resource.

In addition, much of the article was dedicated to the history, meaning and
goals of the “articles of capitulation” as means of leading Iraqi officers to surrender.
The reporter explained that the articles of capitulation were signed before by Italian
commanders supporting Mussolini in WWII and by Robert E. Lee when he had
surrendered to Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox. The reporter stressed its intent to
prevent the turmoil that took place during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 when large
numbers of Iraqis surrendered.

Weinraub also wrote:

Iraqi ofﬁcers must also sign an article in which they are compelled to
provide the United States with information about subordinates as well
as the location of land mines, conventional and unconventional
weapon bunkers and any other armaments under the control of the

capitulating unit. [Excerpt #04]

In this report, the reporter suggested that the U.S. wanted to get information
about military personnel and weapons’ locations hidden in Iraq from Iraqi ofﬁcers,

trying to ﬁnd any link with WMD.

21

Thus, near the beginning of the war, Weinraub showed the U.S. efforts to win
over Iraqi officers without severe disturbance and interpreted the “articles of
capitulation” as intended to peaceably lead the war and to draw information from the

Iraqi oﬂicers.

2) Continuing Efforts to Justify War

Despite discord among UN. Security Council members, the U.S. decided to
go to war. However, the U.S. had to face signiﬁcant criticism for going to Iraq without
a cause or the justiﬁcation of war. Three newspaper stories focus on the Bush
government’s efforts to justify war against Iraq.

Weinraub’s coverage on March 27, 2003, presented a probable location of
chemical weapons in Iraq narrowed down to the Medina Division. Weinraub showed
two points in his story: 1) where did Hussein move chemical weapons? and 2) what
are the implications of discovery of the weapons?

First of all, here is a portion of the story related to the weapons’ location:

Statements from Iraqi prisoners of war and electronic eavesdropping
on Iraqi government communications indicate that Saddam Hussein
has moved chemical weapons to the Medina Division, one of three
Republican Guard divisions guarding the approaches to Baghdad,
Army oﬂicials said...

...Oﬂicials with V Corps said intelligence information pointed to Mr:
Hussein deploying [5.5-millimeter artillery weapons with shells
carrying mustard gas as well as sarin, or nerve agents, an especially
deadly weapon. Mr: Hussein used these chemical agents against the
Iranians and the countrys Kurdish population in the 1980 Is. [Excerpt
#05]

Information from officials indicated that the Medina Division could be a

22

turning point to show the existence of the weapons that the U.S. had been looking, the
reporter suggested. Mentioning a speciﬁc number and kinds of the weapons, the
reporter highlighted the fact that Saddam Hussein used the same chemical agents
against the Iranians and Kurdish populations in the 19803. This shows the reporter’s
concern about a potential chemical warfare against allied forces.

On the other hand, it was also noted that the information from Iraqi prisoners
and an electronic eavesdropping machine might not be correct. To support this idea,
Weinraub quoted army officials saying, “Monitoring the movement of chemical
weapons was sometimes difficult because Mr. Hussein often hid chemical pellets
inside bunkers that carried conventional armaments.” It suggests that there was
uncertainty over the location and that information from Iraqis might not be enough to
prove the existence of the weapons.

Regarding the meaning of the discovery, here is a relevant portion of the

story:

Intelligence oﬁ‘icers said the apparent deployment of chemical
weapons by Mr: Hussein was not merely a sign of rage by the Iraqi
leader toward the Americans. Although deployment of the weapons
could give the lie to Mr: Hussein Is denial that he had them, oﬂicers
said that Mr: Hussein might be calculating that the step would
actually turn to his advantage, and stunt the American assault.

[Excerpt #06]

Quoting intelligence officers, the reporter explained that the apparent
deployment of chemical weapons by the Iraqi leader would mean that the U.S. had
accused Iraq of having lied about its possession of the weapons to the world, as well
as justifying its cause of war. Also, Iraq would be held responsible for war crimes if

it participated in a chemical attack.

23

Meanwhile, the reporter doubted whether the U.S. could justify the war after

all, repeating, “No chemical weapons have been used against allied troops to date.”

Miller reported another news article on April 4, 2003, titled “A Nation at War:
Illicit Arms; U.S. Forces Have Searched Few Iraqi Weapons Sites” datelined Kuwait
City. The story begins with progress of the weapons search. She presented two main
points throughout her story: 1) is there any progress in weapons search by the U.S.
forces? and 2) is the top priority of the government changed?

Firstly, Miller focused on whether there was any evidence of the illicit

weapons and explained the reason why the search had been slowed:

The oﬂicials in Washington said they expected to intensify their
search in the days ahead, as American forces gained control of a
wider swath of Iraqi territory, including the area around Baghdad
where most of the suspect sites are concentrated...

...A defense oﬂicial who spoke on the condition of anonymity said the
search had been slowed by the fact that until now, Iraqi forces had
controlled the areas surrounding some sites, particularly near
Baghdad and in Tikrit, a city north of Baghdad that is President
Saddam Hussein Is hometown. [Excerpt #07]

Describing search efforts by American forces, the reporter said that even
though fewer than a dozen of several hundred sites had been searched two weeks into
the war in Iraq, there was no success in weapon searches, and the U.S. was not sure
how long it would take to ﬁnd it.

Quoting Pentagon ofﬁcials, the reporter explained that the reason for slowed
searches was that Iraqi forces had controlled suspected areas but it would open a lot
more areas to the U.S. as the war developed. Miller pointed out that the next efforts on

WMD would be critical, increasing the public’s hope for search activities and the

24

cause of war.

Secondly, the reporter moved her focus on the top priority of the war:

Senior administration officials insist that the goal of ridding Iraq of
chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction remains
a top priority. They deny that eliminating these weapons has slipped
in importance as American troops encircle Baghdad, or that the
justification for the war has shifted from disarming Iraq to ending
widespread human rights abuses or preventing Iraqi-supported

terrorism within the United States. [Excerpt #08]

Showing skepticism toward continuous failures to ﬁnd the weapons, Miller
raised a question about whether the government’s priority had been changed. To
support her idea, she compared quotes from Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld,
who emphasized ﬁnding, securing, and ultimately destroying Iraq’s hidden WMD as a
top priority on the second day of the war, and those from a Pentagon spokeswoman
who focused more on captruing and evicting “terrorists sheltered in Iraq” a week later.
Quoting a chemical weapons expert, she explained the reason for changing war
priority might be that the government tried to dampen expectations because it was

worried that it would not ﬁnd any WMD.

On April 7, 2003, Weinraub with V Corps Headquarters in northern Kuwait
reported on a discovery of drums possibly storing chemical agents. The story is
headlined “American Soldiers Find Drums Possibly Storing Chemical Agents.” The
story’s main focus is: 1) how did American soldiers ﬁnd those drums? and 2) what is
the meaning of the discovery?

A military ofﬁcer was quoted to explain the circumstance of the discovery:

Colonel Madere said the soldiers came upon an empty training camp

25

that the Army believed may have been a base for Iraqi paramilitaries
or Palestinians and other foreigners seeking to help defend Iraq.

The soldiers discovered an unusually large amount of chemical
protection gear: and instead of weapons, they found several canisters

on the site. At that point, they called in their chemical unit. [Excerpt
#09]

Since the war started 19 days earlier, no evidence of chemical or biological
weapons had been found in Iraq. At this point, the reporter reported on some
expectations that the discovery by the search unit might have a successful result this
time. He also explained situations in which several soldiers became ill, and the
soldiers quickly put on their chemical protection gear, supporting the possibility of
chemical and biological weapons at the spot The test results revealed that a 20-gallon
drum showed positive indications for sarin and tabun, two nerve agents, and a 55-
gallon drum was positive for mustard gas, the reporter added.

What does the discovery mean? While showing excitement on the discovery,

the reporter expressed concerns about it:

But additional tests must be conducted before the possibility of a false
reading can be excluded. Military oﬂicials say that many industrial
chemicals can cause false alarms, and that they do not want to make
public charges unless they are irreﬁttable.

Asked about the discovery in Washington today, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld urged caution. “We have to recognize that almost
all first reports that we get turn out to be wrong, ” he said. “There
tend to be changes in them. And as a result, we have to take our time

and look at it. ” [Excerpt #10]

The discovery could be a deﬁnite clue in justifying the war but the reporter
did not exclude the possibility of false alarms even though the material was positive in

the preliminary test by quoting official sources such as military officials and the

26

defense secretary. He also emphasized that there were only chemical protection gear
and several canisters on the site which were not weaponized. By saying so, he cast a
question about whether the discovery could give any evidence for the pre-war

justiﬁcation.

3) Battleﬁeld Situation

Four newspaper stories focus on delicate situations on the battleﬁeld. These
show how differently embedded journalists who accompanied ground units covered
their embedded troops. In particular, these stories distinguish themselves from those
written by non-embedded journalists who were not allowed access to American

soldiers.

On March 21, 2003, David J. Lynch, embedded journalist ﬁ'om USA Today,
wrote on a missile attack by Iraq and damage in an American camp. The story is
headlined “Iraq Fires at least 5 Missiles into Kuwait,” datelined Northern Kuwait. The
missiles struck back at U.S. and British positions in Kuwait right after the U.S.
attacked targets in and around Baghdad, but there was no one injured, the reporter said.
Throughout the story, Lynch presented two main points: 1) what kinds of missiles
were used in the attack? and 2) what was the meaning of the attack?

Here is a portion of his story to present the ﬁrst point:

No chemical or biological weapons were detected, U.S. oﬂicials said,
though soldiers and residents in this region remained jittery In
Kuwait City, air raid sirens blared four times Thursday, each time
followed quickly by an all-clear signal. One of the missiles was
apparently intended for Camp Doha, an American headquarters near

the harbor outside Kuwait City.

27

Initial reports of the Iraqi missile strikes were sketchy, and it
remained unclear what sort of missiles were used or exactly how

many were launched; estimates ranged from ﬁve to a dozen. [Excerpt

#11]

The reporter showed the atmosphere of Kuwait which was surrounded by
frustration and fears of a chemical and biological weapons attack. Regarding types of
missiles, the reporter quoted Army ofﬁcials who said that soldiers put on gas masks
and bulky protective suits out of fear that the missiles might contain chemical or
biological weapons. The reporter was soon informed that no chemical weapons were
detected.

The second point by the reporter was made as follows:

Army officials here insisted that two of the missiles were Scuds, which,
if true, would represent an important political victory for the Bush
administration. U.S. oﬂicials have justified their invasion largely on
the claim that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, including
dozens of Scud missiles banned by United Nations sanctions that limit
Iraq Is missiles to a 93-mile range. Some Scuds the Iraqis had—and

might still have—could ﬂy more than 500 miles. [Excerpt #12]

Lynch focused on a type of missiles used in the attack because it might be a
critical clue related to the justiﬁcation for war. If missiles were the same as what the
government had been looking for, it could be a turning point; however, interviews
with anonymous Pentagon ofﬁcials revealed that the missiles were Scuds called the
Ababil-IOO, and those were not Scuds but solid-fuel missiles that had an ofﬁcial range
within U.N. limits.

While providing readers with the government’s hope and concerns about the
missile at the same time, the reporter kept raising a question about whether the U.S.

could ﬁnd any evidence to justify war, underlining the fact that even though the war

28

had begun, the U.S. was still looking for a cause of war and there was an unjustiﬁed

war going on in Iraq.

On March 25, 2003, New York Times embedded journalist Steven Lee Myers
reported on an assault toward the Third Infantry Division. The headline of the story is
“GL’s Pause on Push to Baghdad, and One Falls to a Sniper” ﬁled from central Iraq.
Throughout the story, there are two main points presented by Myers: 1) what was
happening in the assault? and 2) is there any trace of chemical or biological agents?

Here is a portion of the story related to the ﬁrst point:

One soldier in this division was killed by a snipers bullet today, as
the division consolidated its positions on a broad plateau north of
Najaf before what is expected to be a strong assault on Baghdad...

The soldier who was killed was part of a tank platoon positioned
around the First Brigade, and died from a single shot. The tank
platoon returned fire, and killed two Iraqis. Several other Iraqis—it

was not clear how many—were captured. [Excerpt #13]

While covering a scene capturing more Iraqi prisoners, the reporter explained
an unexpected circumstance that a soldier died from a single shot by an Iraqi. The
paragraphs also showed that the level of danger got higher as the division got deeper
into Baghdad.

Myers stressed the loss of war potential among Iraqi militants, saying that the
depot seemed to have been once heavily guarded, but the small forces defending the
area surrendered quickly when American soldiers arrived in armored Bradley ﬁghting
vehicles. The reporter suggested that allied forces seemed the depot with superiority in

strength over Iraqi militants.

29

The reporter precisely described the discovery of a depot which was on a list
of the Bush administration’s suspected chemical weapons sites and was one of the

main objectives of the division’s rapid advance over the escarpment north of Najaf.

Army weapons inspectors began searching on ammunition depot
seized on Sunday for evidence that Saddam Hussein Is government
had stored chemical weapons there. The First Brigade Is Second
Battalion seized the sprawling depot without a ﬁght, capturing 93
prisoners, including one believed to be a general.

The depot—two and a half miles by ﬁve and a half miles in area—is
on a list of the Bush administration Is suspected chemical weapons
sites, and it was one of the main objectives of the division Is rapid

advance over the escarpment north of Najaf [Excerpt #14]

Regarding the controversy on chemical or biological weapons in Iraq, the
reporter said that the discovery of chemical weapons would give a signiﬁcant political
boost to the administration’s rationale for the war. At the same time, he wrote about
oﬁicers’ desire and dedication to ﬁnd weapons in question, noting “a thought that
seems to be less on the mind of officers here than the desire to ensure the quick
capture of any potential sites for storing weapons that might be used against their
troops.”

Describing night near Najaf, the reporter gave the soldiers’ expectations for
ﬁnding WMD, as well as his doubt on whether the U.S. could get the result that it
longed for, saying “across the desert, soldiers continued to ﬁnd and collect weapons,
uniforms and other equipment belonging to Iraqi troops who had either surrendered or
ﬂed. Most unsettling were the gas masks that were found, a possible indication of
Iraq’s intention to use chemical weapons.”

An April 2, 2003, article titled “War in Iraq / Baghdad’s Leader the Karbala

Gap” by Brian MacQuarrie, embedded journalist of the Boston Globe, covered a war

30

front situation. The soldiers of the Third Infantry Division were ﬁghting the battle of
Karbala that could be a deﬁning point in the conﬂict in Iraq, the reporter wrote.
MacQuanie made two main points in his story: 1) the description of before and after
the Karbala battle and 2) the meaning of the battle.

Presenting the ﬁrst point, MacQuanie vividly described soldiers’ actions,

conditions, and facial expressions of those preparing for the battle:

Hours before the beginning of the battle of Karbala, the bravado and
concerns of those who would ﬁght it showed on their faces. Some sat
alone on cots, cleaning their weapons of the grit that swirls
incessantly here. Others shaved with cold water; ensuring that no
stubble remained on skin where gas masks need to mold for an
airtight ﬁt.

Some were irritable, others were adrenaline-pumped, but all were

mindful of the test that would come with the night. [Excerpt #15]

As seen from above, the reporter illustrated how soldiers prepared for the
approaching war situation. Conveying soldiers’ concerns about the potential of
chemical weapons that could turn what was expected to be a nasty battle into
something much worse, MacQuanie added how the U.S. forces ﬁnally controlled the
battle without any U.S. casualties.

Making the second point, the reporter explained a possible implication of the

battle for the whole war.

The Karbala battle loomed as the ﬁrst significant, head-to-head
contest between US troops and Republican Guard soldiers who have
been waiting north and east of Karbala for the American advance.
Although the ranks of the elite Republican Guard reportedly have
been weakened by desertion, they still are reckoned a formidable

force. [Excerpt #16]

31

The reporter underlined the importance of the battle as a turning point in the
war and a critical entry point to the highways and approaches to the ultimate objective,
Baghdad. Throughout this article, the reporter tried to implant hope in the readers. He
described grave consequences to the ﬁrst signiﬁcant, head-to-head contest between
U.S. troops and Republican Guard soldiers, and reported on some expectations of
future battles near Baghdad as well as concerns about more resistance by Iraqi

militants.

On April 9, 2003, Jim Dwyer, another embedded journalists with the New
York Times, covered a vivid battle in a town which is about 50 miles south of Baghdad.
The article is titled “In the Field 101St Airborne Division; A Grenade on the Road, the
Death of the Enemy: the Human Side of War.”

The Iraqi attack came as American forces moved to seize the last of three
cities in a religious triangle—including Najaf and Karbala. At that time, infantry
trucks were carrying 120 soldiers from the Third Brigade of the 101’t Airborne
Division. The reporter took a close look at l) a sudden attack by Iraqis, as well as 2)
American soldiers’ humanitarian actions.

Firstly, presenting war situations that caused casualties, the reporter gave a
vivid description about it based on Sergeant Chuck Shy and Sergeant Major Savusa’s

interviews.

He remembers diving to the ground, returning ﬁre, a loud explosion,
a bright ﬂash. A grenade had been hurled from those bushes. It
landed I 0 feet from Sergeant Shy, then burst into uncountable bits of
shrapnel. A few pieces tore into his face. Stunned, he hustled to the
other side of the truck...

The sergeant major reached onto the front seat of a truck to get a

32

grenade from another soldier: Sergeant Major Savusa worked
methodically. As shots rang from the foliage a few yards away, he
unpeeled the top of the protective canister; pullet the safety pin, and

lobbed the grenade into the bushes. [Excerpt #17]

As viewed from above, the reporter displayed how the combat began and how
acutely the situation proceeded. Mentioning the U.S. soldiers’ responses to the attack,
the reporter pointed out their promptrress and agility in the battle.

Secondly, as the title suggests, the following is a description of dead Iraqi

soldiers showing a human side among war tragedies:

About 10 or 15 feet away, the body of one of the two slain Iraqi
soldiers lay face down in the dust, fingers partially clenched. His
uniform was dark olive, almost black; the boots were new; his hair
looked to have been freshly trimmed in a military cut; he seemed to

have a sturdy, muscular build.

On the other side of the road, the campsite for the Iraqi team was still
fresh. Blankets were placed neatly on the ground, a tea set was
stacked up and half-eaten pita bread was left on a plate. A T—shirt,
apparently ﬁeld-laundered, swung from a tree limb for drying... the
general called to Staﬂ Sgt. James Massey and Pvt. Rob Maher to

retrieve blankets from the Iraqi camp, to wrap the bodies. [Excerpt
#18]

Dwyer made an unusual attempt to reveal humanitarian sides of the war. The
brigade general’s humanitarian gesture toward dead Iraqi soldiers was put into words
as “the general called to Staff Sgt. James Massey and Pvt. Rob Maher to retrieve
blankets from the Iraqi camp, to wrap the bodies.” He concluded the story with his
own humanitarian side and ended it with vivid imagery for readers to think about: “A

breeze passed, and set swaying the ferns on the side of the road where the Iraqis had

hidden, and where they now lay still.”

33

Non-embedded Coverage

Fourteen newspaper articles written by non-embedded journalists are
examined in this study. Five articles are from the New York Times, three from the
Boston Globe, two from USA Today, two from the Philadelphia Inquirer, and one
from Daily News.

These articles are divided into the same topic categories used in the analysis
of embedded journalists’ articles and one more topic category of world reactions to the
war is added as well. Two stories focused on the U.S. decision to go to Iraq, two raised
a question about how the U.S. could justify the war, four dealt with world opinions on

the war, and six focused on battleﬁeld situations.

1) The U.S. War Effort

Unlike embeds’ reportage, non-embedded journalists put more focus on how
Iraq and Kuwait prepared for war and the U.S. efforts in the pre-war stages. Stories
tended to include non-govemmental sources to reﬂect views other than the

government’s and to show the war readiness of the U.S. forces.

On March 14, 2003, David F ilipov, the Boston Globe correspondent, reported
on Iraq’s rejection of a British proposal to disarm Iraq titled “Iraq Rejects British
Proposal.” He presented two main points in his story: 1) the meaning of the British
proposal and 2) Iraq’s response to the proposal.

Firstly, Filipov explained the meaning of the proposal as follows:

The Compromise, proposed by Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain
on Wednesday, would have abandoned a proposed Monday deadline
for Iraq to fully disarm or face war: Instead, Hussein would have to

9

complete six disarmament tasks to avoid “serious consequences,’

34

diplomatic code for military action.
Among the six tasks, Hussein would have to declare on television that

he would give up any hidden weapons of mass destruction. [Excerpt
#19]

Presenting the British government’s point of view, the reporter explained that
the proposal was fundamentally intended to avoid a war situation, unlike the U.S.
decision to go to war. The report pointed out that Iraq had been hiding weapons that
were supposed to have been destroyed since the Persian Gulf War and assured the
existence of weapons. The reporter, however, did not provide any speciﬁc information
about the existence or locations of the hidden weapons.

The other point is about Iraq’s reaction to the proposal by British prime

minister:

As diplomats at the UN considered the measure as an addition to a
proposed US resolution, Foreign Minister Naji Sabri of Iraq
dismissed the new British benchmarks as “an aggressive plan for
war: ”

Sabri said the proposal sought to “personalize ” the conﬂict between
Iraq and a US-and—British-led campaign by demanding that Hussein
make moves to disarm.

“It is a dressing-up a rejected proposal, on aggressive plan for war; ”

Sabri said in Baghdad. “It polishes up a resolution rejected by the
vast majority of the Security Council. ” [Excerpt #20]

In the above paragraphs, the reporter conveyed Iraq’s ﬁrm determination
against the proposal and its deﬁance against the U.S. and British threat of force. The
reporter also suggested that there were other kinds of deﬁance by the UN. Security
Council members who strongly opposed the war, such as France and Russia. This
means that the U.S. took a great deal of risks even in the pre-war stage and faced the

disagreements and world opposition.

35

A March 18, 2003, article headlined “Americans, Britons Evacuate as Troops
Brace for Attack” was written by Thanassis Cambanis, non-embedded reporter with
the Boston Globe. The reporter described the atmosphere in Kuwait City in which
there was going to be a theater of an imminent war and Kuwaiti people who were
aﬁaid of terrorism by Iraqis, remembering the Persian Gulf War. The article’s main
points are: 1) preparation for the war in Kuwait and 2) warning of a chemical or
biological attack and its possibility.

The ﬁrst point is presented as follows:

The more than 130,000 American and British ground troops in

Kuwait, part of a total force of more than 250,000 in the region,

moved onto what appeared to be ﬁnal war footing, receiving a visit

from US General Tommy Franks, who would direct a war against

Iraq from the US Central Command Is regional headquarters in Qatar:

Through Kuwait, 0 third of which has been closed for military

operations, both coalition and Kuwaiti forces were on high alert.

Snipers guarded military fuel convoys, and Kuwaiti troops blanketed

the capital city with checkpoints. [Excerpt #21]

Referring to the ultimatum that was announced by the Bush administration,
the reporter showed how Kuwait prepared for the war as an outpost line. The reporter
stressed the importance of Kuwait City in the war and how both U.S. and Kuwaiti
forces were completely ready for the war against Iraq.

Presenting the other point, the reporter wrote about the danger of a probable

chemical and biological attack against Kuwaitis or American civilians and

counteractions of it:

Warning that terrorists and undercover Iraqi agents in Kuwait could

mount a devastating chemical or biological attack against civilians

36

here, US and British oﬂicials told their citizens to leave and reduced
their embassy staff to essential employees.

According to intelligence cited by senior Western oﬁicials, agents
acting for the Iraqi government or for a terrorist organization
opposed to a US-led War could strike at American and British troops,
or sow panic among civilians by unleashing a chemical or biological

weapon. [Excerpt #22]

While there was no speciﬁc evidence to prove the existence of chemical or
biological weapons in Iraq, the reporter showed that government oﬂicials kept
stressing a probable attack by those weapons, saying, “If there is military action, there
is the risk of an attack from Iraq, which may involve chemical and biological
weapons.” Meanwhile, the reporter suggested that the war did not have any vindicated
reasons yet because the existence or locations of those weapons in Iraq was still not

certain.

2) Continuous Efforts to Justify War
Two news articles reﬂected the U.S. efforts to justify war. Reporters kept
raising questions about whether the U.S. could ﬁnd WMD in Iraq and whether the war

could be justiﬁed at the end.

On March 20, 2003, Daily News correspondent Richard Sisk reported on
Iraq’s missiles attack on Kuwait, from Camp Coyote, Kuwait. He presented two main
themes throughout the story: 1) the kinds of missiles used in the attack and 2) the
possibility of a chemical, biological or nuclear weapons discovery in Iraq.

The missile attack targeted the border with Kuwait several hours after the U.S.

bombed Baghdad, and the reporter focused on what kind of missiles they were:

37

The U.S. military said one Iraqi Scud missile targeted at Kuwait City
was brought down in midair by 0 Patriot missile.

Marines said one missile sailed over their desert camp right up
against the border but dropped harmlessly into the empty desert.

An investigation by U.S. personnel showed it was not carrying

chemical or biological weapons. [Excerpt #23]

The kinds of missiles could be a signiﬁcant clue to prove that Iraq had
violated the Persian Gulf War agreement on Scuds and also gave a cause for war to the
U.S. With these reasons, the reporter emphasized a signiﬁcant meaning of the event as
the war began. However, by mentioning that the missiles did not carry chemical and
biological agents, the reporter dampened expectations about justifying the war by
fmding WMD.

The reporter also presented the other point as follows:

In Baghdad, Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Al Sahaf denied
that his country had any Scuds, which are banned under the 1991
Gulf War ceaseﬁre that also ordered Baghdad to scrap its chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons programs.

Britain said last year that Iraq had kept as many as 20 of the Soviet-
designed Scuds, which can fly up to 400 miles. [Excerpt #24]

In these paragraphs, the reporter reported a claim by Britain that Iraq still
possessed Scuds that were supposed to have been abandoned after the Persian Gulf
War in 1991. Sisk highlighted that Iraq had been deceiving the world about the
weapons if the missiles turned out to be Scuds. In that case, this event could support
the U.S.-British military action in Iraq and reverse world opposition toward them, the
reporter suggested.

At the same time, the reporter explained about strong criticism on the U.S. in

case there was no Scud missile in Iraq. The reporter speculated that the U.S. could

38

recover its position, harshly blamed for going to war without any reasons, saying,
“Any conﬁrmation that Iraq had used banned weapons might temper criticism of the

U.S.-British military action.”

A March 21, 2003, article written by Peter Ford with the Christian Science
Monitor focused on the legality of the war. The story was headlined “As attack on Iraq
begins, question remains: Is it legal?” The reporter’s main points are divided into two:
1) other countries’ positions on the war in Iraq and 2) how to justify the war.

Regarding the ﬁrst point, Peter wrote as follows:

Intemational-law experts are divided on whether Washington has the
right to invade Iraq in the absence of a UN Security Council
resolution specifically authorizing such an assault.

French President Jacques Chirac said Tuesday he had opposed the
war “in the name of the primacy of the law, ” and slammed the US
administration for preferring “the use of force over compliance with
the law. ” UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan also warned last week
that war on Iraq without a new resolution endorsing it “will not be in
conformity with the (UN) Charter; ” a cornerstone of international

law. [Excerpt #25]

The reporter showed conﬂicting opinions about whether Washington had the
right to invade Iraq without a resolution of the UN. Presenting the positions of France,
Russia, and the UN. Security Council against the war, Ford reported on their claims
that the U.S.-led war could not be justiﬁed. On the other hand, the reporter said
legitimacy of the war was claimed by the White House and Britain, saying that UN.
Security Council Resolution 1441, which threatened President Hussein with “serious
consequences” if he did not take a last chance to give up his weapons of mass

destruction,” authorized the use of force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait and to

39

restore international peace and security in the area.

The reporter’s second focus is how the war could be justiﬁed:

The war could be legitimized — even though it is illegal — “if we ﬁnd
all the things that we say we are going to ﬁnd ” such as chemical and
biological weapons, argues Anne Marie Slaughter; dean of the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International aﬂairs at
Prinston University. “But it is going to require that the US and
Britain truly prove their case, ” she adds. ” [Excerpt #26]

As seen above, the reporter strongly believed that the only way to justify the
war was to ﬁnd chemical and biological weapons that the U.S. had been blaming Iraq
for. The source also suggested that the U.S. and Britain would not avoid world
criticism without ﬁnding any weapons because the war was already illegal because of

the lack of a resolution from the UN.

3) World Reactions on the War

Four news articles dealt with world reactions on the war. Non-embedded
reporters who ﬁled stories from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Syria
presented these countries’ positions on the war and focused on anti-war movements

around the world.

Ian Fisher, the New York Times correspondent, wrote on protests in Jordan on
March 24, 2003. The title of the story is “Protests Continue as Jordan Defends U.S.
Presence in Border Region.” There are two points presented in the story: 1) antiwar
protests in Jordan 2) Jordan’s position and role in a war on Iraq.

Firstly, the reporter presented how strong an internal opposition against the

war was in Jordan:

40

There have been about 60 protests in Jordan since the war in Iraq
began last week... and today the police used water cannons and
smoke bombs to quell a large demonstration at the campus of the
University of Jordan here in Amman. Students threw stones at the

police and burned a sheet painted like an American ﬂag as well as an

eﬂigy of President Bush. [Excerpt #27]

To show strong anti-war movements in Jordan, the reporter noted that a large
number of protests broke out and they were getting serious since the war in Iraq began
a week earlier. Stressing strong internal opposition to the war in Saudi Arabia and
Turkey, the reporter expressed concerns about a ripple effect of the war and how
sensitive the issue of protest and opposition to the war was in Jordan.

The other point was Jordan’s position on the war:

While Jordan maintains largely friendly relations with Iraq, its
largest trading partner; it has allowed thousands of American Special
Forces soldiers in the desert on its eastern border with Iraq, in a role
that has grown more contentious in recent days.

Jordan maintains that their role is to operate Patriot antimissile
batteries and other roles ofﬁcials here say are purely defensive.

[Excerpt #28]

The writer suggested a diplomatic dilemma for Jordan-on the one hand,
wanting an amicable relationship with the U.S. and on the other, seeking to maintain
its strategic position in the Arab world. The reporter emphasized that Jordan’s role was
more important to the U.S. in performing successful military operations. With louder
antiwar protests, the reporter said that Jordan was hoping for a quick end of the war in

order to minimize its diplomatic damage.

On March 25, 2003, Craig S. Smith of the New York Times reported on Saudi

41

 

Arabia’s proposals to request the U.S. and Iraq to end the war with the headline
“Saudis Send Proposals to End War to Both Sides.” Throughout the story, the reporter
presented two main points: 1) the purpose of the proposals and 2) Saudi Arabia’s
standing with both nations.

Regarding the proposals, the reporter wrote as follows:

The prince again called on both the United States and Iraq to stop the
war; saying that the conﬂict should be sent back to the United Nations.
He also asked that diplomacy be given a second chance so that we
don ’t reach the point of the First World War; where people are digging
trenches and dying in a war that will bring nothing but hatred
between our two peoples.

Saudi Arabia is negotiating a narrow and diﬂicult path between its
stated opposition to the war; which is deeply unpopular among the
Saudi population, and its quiet support of the American war effort.

[Excerpt #29]

To point out Saudi Arabia’s efforts to avoid the war, the reporter said that the
proposals were intended to stop the ﬁghting between the U.S. and Iraq, and the
kingdom’s foreign minister wanted the conﬂict to be handled by the UN. In later
paragraphs, he also stressed that Saudi Arabia tried to provide political asylum for
Saddam Hussein in order to solve the conﬂict peaceably before the war started.

The other point of the story focused on Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the

U.S.:

Long one of Americas most loyal allies in the Middle East, Saudi
Arabia hopes to protect its relationship with the United States while
not losing its stature in the Arab world. Kuwait and Qatar; which
have more openly supported the United States-led war in Iraq by
allowing both land and air combat missions to be launched from their

soil, have become increasingly isolated in Middle Eastern diplomacy.

42

[Excerpt #30]

While Saudi Arabia seemed to have objected to the war, the reporter
underscored the long friendship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, saying that Saudi
Arabia kept supporting the U.S. in the war. At the same time, pointing to the case of
Kuwait which ended up being isolated in the Arab world due to overt support for the
U.S., the reporter underlined the position of Saudi Arabia as it struggled between the

U.S. and the Arab world.

On March 27, 2003, Carlotta Gall of the New York Times reported on a rocket
attack from Afghanistan on American bases titled “Militants in Afghanistan Fire
Rockets at 2 American Bases.” According to the reporter, Afghanistan militants ﬁred
more than a dozen rockets at two American bases in Shkin in eastern Afghanistan and
Gardez further north overnight but did not cause any damage or injuries. The story’s
main focuses are l) the correlation between the rocket attack and the Iraq war and 2) a
counterattack conducted by the U.S.

Firstly, the rocket attack by Afghanistan was presented as follows:

The attacks, which did not cause any damage or injuries, followed a

number of assaults on American and Afghan forces in recent days,

apparently stepped up with the outbreak of the war: Taliban
supporters and other opponents of the American presence in

Afghanistan have been threatening for weeks to increase their activity

if war broke out in Iraq. [Excerpt #31]

In this report, the reporter linked the Iraq war with increasing levels of attacks
by Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Gall emphasized how successfully American forces

deterred such attacks:

To deter such attacks, American forces launched a large-scale

43

operation in southern Afghanistan on the day the war in Iraq began,
last Thursday. More than 600 troops have been deployed to scour a
mountainous area for rebel groups.

The troops have not encountered any significant enemy presence, but
they arrested four more men after ﬁnding a weapons cache in a
village, Captain Cramer said. A total of eight people have been
detained and several arms caches seized in the last week. [Excerpt

#32]

The reporter stressed that the U.S. performed large-scale operations and
deployed a large number of units to insurgent areas, highlighting efforts to respond to
the attacks rapidly. As seen from Excerpt #32, Gall reported the troops’

accomplishments of arresting insrngents and securing a weapons cache.

New York Times correspondent Neil MacFarquhar wrote on March 31, 2003,
about Syria’s unhappiness with the U.S. war in Iraq. Titled “Syria Wants U.S. to Lose
War, Its foreign Minister Declares,” the story is mainly about Syria’s strong opposition
to the war. The reporter focused on the Syrian foreign minister’s harsh comments,
which accused Syria of allowing military supplies to be transported across its border
to Iraq. The main argument presented in the story is the U.S. response to Syria’s
criticism.

MacFarquhar wrote:

“Syria has a national interest in the expulsion of the invaders ﬁ'om
Iraq because the truth is that the U.S. administration has led its
people to a catastrophic stage and put them in confrontation with the
entire international community, ” Mr: Sharaa said while speaking to

7“

Parliament, praising the Iraqis Courageous resistance. "
He said that the war against Iraq was yet another example of the

United States 'acting to serve Israel Is interest in the region. He also

44

said that oﬂicials in Washington relied on Israel for much of their
information about the Arab world, information that often proved

untrue. [Excerpt #33]

In this report, MacFarquhar suggested that Syria was strongly opposing the
U.S.-led war and it supported Iraq’s resistance against the U.S. He also stressed
Israel’s role and inﬂuence on American policy towards Arabs.

In later paragraphs, the reporter said that Syria had objected to the war as a
member of the UN. Security Council and it criticized the U.S. for violating
international law and the principle of self determination, as ﬁrst championed by
President Woodrow Wilson in 1918. The reporter, however, pointed out that Syria
neglected to address the Bush administration’s fundamental goal to free the Iraqi

people from the corrupt government of Saddam Hussein.

4) Battleﬁeld Situation

Six news articles on battleﬁeld situation are examined to ﬁnd similarities
and/or differences with embeds’ reportage. Similar to embeds, non-embeds focused on
frontline battles and weapon search activities by allied forces. Different from embeds,
some reporters used Iraqi civilian sources for their stories to draw other points of view

on the war.

On March 29, 2003, Ian Fisher of the New York Times reported on 1) whether
Iraq has any Scud missiles that are capable of attacking Israel and 2) efforts to ﬁnd
weapons. His report was titled “Western Desert; War That Is Out of Sight But Not Out
of Mind, Especially for the Israelis.”

On the ﬁrst point, Fisher wrote:

45

In fact, military oﬂicials from several nations said this week that
troops had not found any Scud missiles or launchers capable of
hitting Israel. Iraq denies that it has any long-range missiles or
chemical or biological weapons.

But the western desert is huge, some two and a half times the size of
Israel. And military oﬂicials concede that the relatively small number
of forces there, using jeeps, aircraft, even all—terrain vehicles, have

yet to scour the entire area. [Excerpt #34]

Focusing on the goal of the war as blocking any missile attacks from Iraq on
Israel, the reporter suggested that the goal had not been accomplished yet because
there had been no missile launched from Iraq. Fisher both gave the Iraqi side of the
story on its denial of having WMD, and cast doubt on the truth of the Iraqi claims. He
noted that U.S. troops were yet to search the western desert for the banned weapons
because the desert area was two and a half times the size of Israel, giving a reason for
no weapons discovery.

As for the inaccessibility of the western desert to reporters, Fisher wrote:

The western desert, some 300 miles ﬁ'om Baghdad to the borders of
Syria and Jordan, has been inaccessible to reporters. There are no
news media representatives traveling with Special Operations forces
there, and the danger along the road ﬁ'om Jordan from Iraqi troops
and irregular forces has dissuaded reporters ﬁom venturing in on
their own. Recent travelers have reported seeing burned-out cars and
buses hit from above, suggesting strikes from American and British

airplanes. [Excerpt #35]

Fisher’s report told about the western desert where the U.S. did not allow the
press to visit but Special Operations forces were acting and allied forces’ air attacks
were carried out. While the war began a week earlier and it said there was no speciﬁc

information about the location of the banned weapons or their existence, the reporter

46

raised a question about secret operations in the area which might be a critical place for

the U.S.

On April 2, 2003, Charles M. Sennott of the Boston Globe reported on the
discovery of preliminary evidence of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. The
story is headlined “Signs of Plan for Chemical Arms Reported.” The main points
presented in the story are: 1) the meaning of a weapons discovery and 2) details about
how the weapons were found.

Presenting the ﬁrst point, the reporter quoted a battalion commander:

A battalion commander for the traditionally secretive special forces,
who spoke to reporters on the condition of anonymity, said the air
and ground oﬁ’ensive coordinated with Kurdish troops in recent days
against Ansar al-Islam in northeastern Iraq was a “model ” operation
in the war on terrorism that revealed signs the group was trying to
develop weapons of mass destruction

...He said the materials would be analyzed and that the results would
be made public. Those results would be a key test of the US State
Departments allegation that Ansar al-Islam was experimenting with
the use of chemical and biological weapons at its headquarters in the

village of Sargat, which was reduced to rubble by intensive airstrikes.

[Excerpt #36]

The reporter focused on the preliminary evidence that might be a critical
justiﬁcation for war because it could prove that Islamic militants were developing
chemical and biological weapons. Sennott described a somewhat excited atmosphere
in the U.S. government with the hope of ﬁnally being able to justify war and being
protected from the world criticism, saying that the test results would be a core of
allegation about Iraq’s chemical and biological weapon production. On the other hand,

if the results turned out to be disappointing, the U.S. would take heavy criticism, the

47

reporter suggested.

Presenting the second point, the reporter wrote as follows:

Yesterday in the village of Sargat, three small buildings which were
not damaged by the US airstrikes contained approximately 300 small
bottles of acetone and several plastic, 25-liter containers of
potassium cyanide as well as C-4 explosives.

A foul odor around the buildings discouraged most reporters from
entering, but a German television crew videotaped the labels of the

chemicals. [Excerpt #37]

Describing the discovery of the buildings, the reporter raised the possibility
that the U.S. ﬁnally might have found legitimate evidence and informed readers
about successful military operation on Iraq with the Kuwaiti force. But still, there
was a chance that the preliminary evidence might be a false alarm and did not prove
the existence of any chemical or biological weapons in Iraq, the story suggested.

In later paragraphs, the reporter added that searches of ﬁghters hidden in the
mountains progressed steadily, and the U.S. held a dominant position. Sennott
concluded the story with an interview of an Iraqi civilian to present a different

perspective dealing with the war.

“It is a mixed emotion for us... We are happy that Ansar has been
forced out but we are saddened that our mosque was so damaged in

the process. ” [Excerpt #38]

On the same day, Jonathan S. Landay of the Philadelphia Inquirer reported on
the discovery of a chemical weapons’ clue. The headline of the article is “Militants
Leave Signs of Chemical Arms; The Kurdish Islamic Militant Group Attacked in
Northern Iraq Last Weekend also is accused of Links to Al-Qaeda and Hussein.” The

main points in the story are 1) details of the discovery of evidence and 2) the

48

accomplishments of the joint U.S. and Kuwait operation.
Regarding the ﬁrst point, his story revealed more speciﬁc information about

the discovery of the chemicals than Sennott’s:

The special-forces soldiers also found recipes for three forms of
chlorine gas and for ricin, a deadly toxin derived from castor beans,
American intelligence ofﬁcials said, speaking on condition of
anonymity...

...The commander of the U.S. special-forces battalion that
participated in the attack said evidence the group had been making
chemical—and possibly biological-weapons was uncovered in the

ruins of a base devastated by American bombs. [Excerpt #39]

The reporter wrote that American experts in the U.S. seized evidence that
Iraqi forces and Al-Qaeda were making chemical agents in the northeastern mountain
range of Iraq, speciﬁcally naming their ﬁnding as recipes for chlorine and risin. The
reporter raised the expectation that the discovery might be possibly the ﬁrst major
ﬁnding of chemical agents since the war began two weeks earlier. However, the
reporter described the ﬁnding as ‘possibly biological-weapons,’ leaving room for
uncertainty.

Presenting the second point, the reporter wrote:

“This was not a significant U.S. effort, ” the battalion commander
said. “The real folks who carried the day were the peshmergas. ”
The American troops helped direct the attack, provided mortar and
sniper ﬁre for the peshmerga, and coordinated strikes by U.S. aircraft,
including attack jets, B-52 bombers and AC-I30 “Spooky ” gunships.

U.S. robot spy planes kept tabs on the ﬂeeing militants. [Excerpt #40]

Landay recounted cooperative eﬁorts between the U.S. and the Kurdish

guerrillas, known as peshmerga, who carried the brunt of the offensive against Iraqi

49

insurgents. The reporter also highlighted the U.S.’ state-of—the-art weapon system used

for the joint operation.

Vivienne Walt of USA Today reported on April 2, 2003, about capturing two
key air bases in Iraq’s western desert by coalition forces. The headline of the story is
“Allied forces said to control air, land in western desert.” The story’s main themes are:
l) the strategic importance of the two airﬁelds and 2) evidence of chemical or
biological weapons.

Regarding the ﬁrst theme, the reporter said:

Coalition forces now control the H2 and H3 airﬁelds and are
maintaining surveillance on the highway that connects JordanIs
capital, Amman, with Baghdad, Lt. Col. Mark Elliot, spokesman for
the Australian military forces ﬁghting in Iraq, said by phone from
Qatar on Tuesday.

“Anything moving on that road comes under our observation, and we
can deal with it, ” Elliot said. “We ’ve had a very active campaign on

that road. ” [Excerpt #41]

The reporter said that the two airfields would play a signiﬁcant role in the war,
and securing them was a big accomplishment in moving throughout the western desert.
Expecting high probability of ﬁnding hidden weapons in the western desert, the
reporter was optimistic about ﬁnding chemical and biological weapons in a widened

control zone. This was reinforced with the paragraph:

U.S. oﬂicials believe that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein hides mobile
chemical or biological laboratories in the west. Its an ideal place to
conceal banned weapons. There are no major towns and few people.

Coalition forces are searching the desert for the banned weapons.
They have not found a hidden arsenal. But the operation also is

crucial for preventing Iraq from launching Scud attacks against

50

Israel, which was hit with 39 missiles during the Persian Gulf War in

1991. Israel has said it would retaliate against Iraq this time, and the

United States fears that would provoke Arab countries to join the

conﬂict. [Excerpt #42]

Walt emphasized that there had been no evidence of hidden weapons so far
but the U.S. could have a high possibility to ﬁnd them by securing the western desert.
The reporter also underscored the U.S. efforts to protect Israel ﬁom Iraqi weapons
attacks and not to escalate the war into a wider Arab conﬂict.

The reporter concluded the story with interviews with taxi drivers who had
taken the desert road between Amman and Baghdad to present another point of view

on the war from Iraqi citizens who were struggling for a living even though their lives

were at stake.

“ItIs terrifying driving that road now. All I could think of is that a
missile was going to strike, ” said a taxi driver who arrived here
Monday from the Iraqi capital. With no work in Baghdad, the driver
said, he risked the journey for a $300 fare—three times the normal
rate. The driver; fearing reprisals from Iraqi oﬁ‘icials, wouldn 't allow

his name to appear in print. " [Excerpt #43]

Tom Lasseter, the Philadelphia Inquirer’s correspondent, wrote on April 7,
2003, about the discovery of the nerve gas sarin in Iraq. The title of the story is
“Soldiers evacuated after nerve-gas test.” The story is mainly about 1) the details of
the discovery and 2) the meaning of the discovery to the U.S.

The reporter wrote about the discovery as follows:

U.S. soldiers evacuated an Iraqi military compound early today after
tests by a mobile laboratory detected the presence of the nerve gas

sarin.

51

The testing came after more than a dozen soldiers from the Armys
101‘“ Airborne Division who guarded the military compound on
Saturday night came down with symptoms consistent with exposure to
very low levels of a nerve agent, including vomiting, dizziness and

skin blotches. [Excerpt #44]

Based on his observation of soldiers’ evacuation from the captured military
compound triggered by the existence of sarin, the reporter wrote about the existence of
the nerve gas. Supporting his idea, Lasseter also said the discovery caused 12 soldiers
to contract low levels of nerve gas exposure.

He, however, raised questions about the existence of chemical and biological
weapons because sarin was not the same as the chemical or biological weapons in

question:

Even as the tests were being done, high-ranking commanders
hastened to the scene yesterday to examine the sites, including Col,
Joseph Anderson, Second Brigade commander; Brig. Gen. Benjamin
C. Freakley, assistant commander of the 101'" Airborne for
operations; and Maj. Gen. David H. .Petraeus, division commander:
They made no comment afterward on what was contained in the sites
near the village of Albu Muhawish, on the Euphrates River about 60
miles south of Baghdad. [Excerpt #45]

The reporter said that high ranking ofﬁcers paid sharp attention to the
discovery, drawing tremendous attention from the world because this might be the
ﬁrst evidence of WMD in Iraq. While the result of the discovery examination was not
released, he wrote about inconsistencies of early tests for chemical agents and the
necessity of more precise tests in later paragraphs, suggesting that the negative result

could undermine vindicating efforts of the U.S.

On April 8, 2003 James Cox of USA Today reported on search efforts for

52

illegal arms in Iraq. The article is titled “U.S. gears up to unmask illegal arms.” The
main themes in the article are l) the possibility of weapon discovery in Iraq and 2)
war justiﬁcation of the Bush administration.

Regarding the ﬁrst point, the reporter wrote:

Fears that U.S. troops would face chemical and biological weapons
in battle are subsiding because coalition forces are ﬁghting so closely
with Saddam Hussein .’s army that it would be diﬂicult for the Iraqis to
use those weapons without killing their own troops...

“Everybody wants to ﬁnd the smoking gun, " says Army Col.
Thomas Woloszyn, the U.S. Central Command chemical oﬁicer in
Doha, Qatar: “He Is had more than 10 years to hide everything:
(chemical and biological) agents, weapons and research facilities.
The people who are going to help us ﬁnd it and show it to us are the
ones that worked on it. ” [Excerpt #46]

Even though 20 days had passed since the war began, there was no explicit
evidence of the weapons that could justify the war in Iraq. The reporter said that allied
forces had even a lower chance to ﬁnd banned weapons as they were approaching
Baghdad. While there was no certainty of the existence of the weapons, the story
included an Army oﬁicer’s expectation about a weapon discovery.

The reporter underlined the meaning of a weapon discovery to the U.S.:

President Bush cited Iraqis failure to disclose and destroy its
biological and chemical weapons as justiﬁcation for removing
Saddam and disarming his regime by force. The Bush
administration Is international credibility could rest on whether it can
show that Iraq possessed banned poisons, weapons and labs.

The hunt has focused ﬁrst on chemical and biological weapons. Few

believe that Iraq has a viable nuclear weapons program. [Excerpt

#47]

53

In the report, Cox suggested that the U.S. might lose its international
credibility because there had been no weapons discovery to justify the war. In later
paragraphs, the reporter added that world leaders were also skeptical about the U.S.’
assurances about its accusation against Iraq, saying “Many foreign leaders are
increasingly skeptical of U.S. assurances that chemical or biological weapons will be
found.” Meanwhile, he concluded his story with survey results that showed more than
half of Americans surveyed believed the war with Iraq was justiﬁed whether or not

those weapons were found.

Other Coverage

News articles written by “Others” include 13 from the News York Times, nine
from the Philadelphia Inquirer, seven from the Boston Globe, seven from Daily News,
and one from Christian Science Monitor. Among these 40 articles, only 10 stories are
selected to compare embedded and non-embedded coverage. These articles are
divided into three topic categories: the U.S. war effort, continuing efforts to justify

war, and world reaction on the war.

1) The U.S. War Effort

In the beginning of the war in Iraq, correspondents in Washington and at the
UN. presented controversial opinions on the war and tense atmospheres around the
world. They reﬂected government oﬁicials’ views on controversial issues in the pre-
war stages. Following is the analysis of two news articles which dealt with the U.S.

decision to go to war and its war objectives.

A March 12, 2003, article by Kenneth R. Bazinet and Thomas M. DeFrank of

54

the Daily News reported on prospects and readiness for the upcoming war. The story is
titled “Plan 7-day War in Iraq but U.S. May Have to Attack Saddam without Brits.”
The main themes in the article are: l) prospects for the war and 2) the U.S. decision to
go to war without Britain.

Firstly, the outlook of the war by government ofﬁcials is as follows:

A senior military planner said conﬁdently yesterday that an attack on

Iraq could last as few as seven days.

The oﬂicial, who requested his name and rank not be printed,

predicted with obvious pride that it would be the most spectacular
military operation in history and involve very few American - or
Iraqi - casualties.

The Pentagon has repeatedly said the attack on Iraq would be one of
“shock and awe ” - using monster bombs to keep troops ﬁ'om being
dragged into bloody street ﬁghting — but this was the highest-ranking
oﬂicial to say the war could be extremely brief [Excerpt #48]

Leaving seven days before the U.S. went to Iraq, the reporters used the
government’s sources to increase public optimism and to shape favorable opinions
regarding the war. Through a senior defense oﬂ'rcial’s prediction about the length and
casualties of the war, the reporters wrote about how the U.S. tried to get more support
from the people.

Meanwhile, the U.S. decided to invade Iraq even without help from Britain,

and the reporters explained the position of Britain and the U.S.

With the looming war jeopardizing the career of British Prime
Minister Tony Blair — whose staunch support of President Bush is
backed by only I 9% of Britons in a new poll — Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld said his war planners are leaving open the
possibility of going in without the UK.

“To the extent they are able to participate... that would obviously be

55

welcomed. To the extent they ’re not, there are work-arounds and they

would not be involved, at least in that phase, " Rumsfeld said.

[Excerpt #49]

Preparing for the war in Iraq, the U.S. had neither U.N. backing nor British
support. In adverse conditions for going to war, the reporters told of Britain’s
hesitation. Through the Rumsfeld’s statement, the reporters stressed that the U.S. still

frrrnly decided to go to war even though it took more risks and had less support.

On March 21, 2003, Thorn Shanker and Eric Schmitt, the New York Times
correspondents, reported on the Bush administration’s eight broad objectives, for the
war in Iraq. The title of the story is “Rumsfeld says Iraq Is Collapsing, Lists 8
Objectives of War.”

The reporters mainly focused on the introduction to the objectives including

quotes from the Defense secretary as follows:

The ﬁrst of the eight specific aims, Mr: Rumsfeld said, is to “end the
regime of Saddam Hussein by striking with force on a scope and scale
that makes clear to Iraqis that he and his regime are ﬁnished. ”
Second, Iraq Is arsenal of biological and chemical weapons, and any
program to develop nuclear weapons, are also targets, as the
American military has been ordered “to identz'jy, isolate and
eventually Iraq .’s weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems,
production capabilities, and distribution networks, ” Mr: Rumsfeld
said. [Excerpt #50]

Starting an unjustiﬁed war in Iraq, the Bush administration tried to establish
goals that were to be accomplished throughout the war. However, as shown in the
statements by Rumsfeld, hidden weapons were not identiﬁed or speciﬁed even when

the war started. In later paragraphs, the reporters skeptically drew a parallel to the ﬁrst

56

Persian Gulf War in 1991, raising a question about the effectiveness of the broad goals.
They said the ﬁrst President Bush was criticized for achieving battleﬁeld success, but
not a decisive political victory over Hussein.

The reporters then moved on to the George W. Bush administration’s
determination:

“We will stay on task until we ’ve achieved our objective, which is to

,

rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. '
“Not only do we support those brave souls who are sacrificing on our
behalf; but we want to thank their parents and their families for their
dedication as well, ” Mr: Bush said. [Excerpt #51]

Through these paragraphs, the reporters showed Bush’s will to accomplish
goals of the war and his main claim for going to war. To report on Bush’s decision, the
reporters added the Senate’s unanimous adoption of its resolution to show united
support from the U.S. Congress, as opposed to the discord prevalent among UN.

Security Council members.

2) Continuing Efforts to Justify War

The following six news articles attempted to justify the U.S. war efforts.
Similar to the other two types of journalists, articles written by correspondents in
Washington and at the UN. dealt with the issue of whether the U.S. could ﬁnd hidden

weapons in Iraq and by doing so, the U.S. could be vindicated.

On March 24, 2003, David E. Sanger of the New York Times reported on the
possession of chemical weapons by the Iraqi leadership and carrying them to Shiite
Muslims in the south of the country. The headline of the story is “U.S. Ofﬁcials Fear

Iraqis Plan to Use Gas on G.I.’s.” Sanger focused on two points: 1) the possibility of

57

hidden chemical weapons in Iraq and 2) a sign of any chemical attack.
First, the reporter informed readers that the American forces found no

weapons so far and its explanation:

Senior administration oﬂicials said today that they believe that the
Iraqi leadership may be holding its chemical weapons in reserve until
American forces approach Baghdad, while other oﬂicials said
intelligence suggests that Saddam Hussein may have authorized one
of his key commanders to use those weapons against Shiite Muslims
in the south of the country.

But so far; Iraq has used no chemical weapons, and American forces
have found none. Suggestions on Sunday that a chemical plant in
Najaf might be a weapons site have turned out to be false. [Excerpt
#52]

Mentioning that there had been no chemical weapons found so far, the
reporter suggested that anonymous administration ofﬁcials had neither information
about locations of chemical weapons nor certainty of their existence. Government
ofﬁcials expressed a possibility that there might be an attack when the U.S.
approached to Baghdad, while the reporter mentioned assumptions and rumors about
the possibility of Iraq’s weapons possession were prevalent among people in later
paragraphs.

To support the possibility of an imminent attack by Iraq, the reporter quoted

Pentagon ofﬁcials:

Nonetheless, Pentagon oﬂicials, noting that Iraqi prisoners of war
captured in recent days carried gas masks with them, say they believe
that the weapons may be intended for use when American forces are
in close quarters — and at that time, they may blame the United States
for unleashing them.

Earlier in the day, administration oﬁicials said they believe, based on

58

intelligence reports received during the past month, that such an
attack could be authorized in the south, though they have no evidence

it is imminent. [Excerpt #53]

The reporter said that the government depended on information from the Iraqi
prisoners about any sign of an imminent attack. The above paragraphs also suggested
that even the statements by the Secretary of State did not guarantee any hidden
weapons’ existence in Iraq. Adding skepticism, the reporter said that if Iraq executed
an attack as Hussein did 15 years ago on Kurds, it would prove that he had the
weapons that the U.S. had accused him of holding, and thus help justify the war.
However, Sanger repeated the fact that no chemical weapons had been used so far,

casting doubt on a claim of the U.S.

On March 25, 2003, St. Petersburg Times correspondent Bill Adair raised the
question of Iraqi weapons through his article. The story’s main points are 1) the
possibility of ﬁnding chemical and biological weapons in Iraq and 2) its meaning in
justifying the war.

Firstly, Adair informed the public of no evidence found in Iraq so far:

So where are the weapons of mass destruction?

Five days into the war to disarm Iraq of chemical and biological
weapons, U.S. troops have yet to ﬁnd any.

They have seized a plant that might contain the weapons, but by
Monday afternoon, they had not confirmed the contents. [Excerpt
#54]

The reporter focused on the lack of evidence that could justify a war on Iraq
but he also provided reasons for it, saying that it was still early in the war and there

was still a chance to ﬁnd evidence. Quoting defense analysts and U.S. ofﬁcials who

59

said they were conﬁdent that WMD would be found, Adair emphasized their
statements that the existence of the weapons was certain but it would take time to ﬁnd
them.

He quoted political analysts to explain the meaning of a weapons discovery:

“If the military forces uncover WMD, then Bush is vindicated, ” said
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, a professor of communication at the
University of Pennsylvania. “This is an incredible gamble. We could
go through this entire war and ﬁnd no WJWD, in which case the
(opponents) are vindicated. ” [Excerpt #55]

As the quote shows, the source expressed skepticism about the existence of
WMD in Iraq, and described the military search efforts as a “gamble.” Mentioning
that the controversial war could be justiﬁed by the discovery of the weapons and the
discovery would prove that the administration had been right about Hussein’s lying on

the weapons, the reporter emphasized the discovery’s crucial meaning in the war.

On March 28, 2003 Bryan Bender of the Boston Globe reported on U.S.
efforts to increase the chances of ﬁnding chemical and biological or nuclear weapons
in Iraq. The title of the story is “US Officials Consider Return of Inspectors.” The
story’s two main themes are: 1) the Bush administration’s efforts to ﬁnd banned
weapons and 2) progress in weapons search operations by the U.S.

Presenting the ﬁrst point, the reporter focused on the U.S. efforts to increase

the possibility of ﬁnding weapons in Iraq:

The Bush administration, eager to prove that Iraq is hiding weapons
of mass destruction, is engaged in a heated internal debate over
whether to seek a return of the United Nations weapons inspection

team to help expose the regimes suspected arsenal of chemical,

60

biological, or nuclear weapons, according to government and UN
oﬂicials.

In addition to providing expertise, a UN delegation would help
validate any ﬁndings before a highly suspicious international
community, the oﬂicials said. But opponents in the administration
distrust UN oversight after sparring repeatedly with chief inspector
Hans Blix, the oﬂicials said. [Excerpt #56]

Beginning the war in Iraq, there was no agreement between the U.S. and the
UN. As the war without any weapons discovery went on, both ﬁnally agreed with the
joint weapon search and inspection. The reporter suggested that the U.S. was in a
desperate position to prove the existence of weapons in any possible way, quoting a
State Department spokeswoman who said, “Right now we are focused on the current
operations in Iraq and continue to assess a variety of options for a role for UN
weapons inspectors in postwar Iraq.” Raising the question of whether the U.S. would
frnd enough evidence of illegal weapons to overcome doubts by the world community,
the reporter showed expectation of united efforts between the U.S. and the UN. to
ﬁnd weapons.

Describing search efforts by allied forces so far, the reporter said:

The search of several suspected sites that Iraqi informants have
highlighted, including in Najaf in central Iraq and Umm Qasr to the
south, have not uncovered anything. US Marines seized a stockpile of
chemical protective gear in southern Iraq on Tuesday, but it remains
unclear whether the equipment dated to the Iran-Iraq war when Iraqi
forces used nerve gas against the Iranians, or indicated more recent

intentions, oﬁicials said. [Excerpt #57]

Even though the administration hoped that evidence of a chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons program might be uncovered by allied forces, the reporter stressed

that no evidence had been found so far. The report suggests that ﬁndings at the sites

61

did not guarantee the fact that Iraq was preparing for a chemical attack against the U.S.

forces.

On March 31, 2003, James Gordon, Daily News correspondent, reported on
progress in the biological and chemical weapons search by the U.S.—led coalition. It is
headlined “Rummy Zeros in on Banned Weapons Stashes.” The reporter focused on 1)
fruitless weapon search efforts by the U.S. and 2) presumption of possible weapon
caches in Iraq.

Firstly, the reporter led his article, saying there was no success in the weapon

search so far:

Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in hiding deadly biological and
chemical weapons in sites around Baghdad that coalition forces have
not captured, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday.

Despite controlling a third of Iraq, the coalition has found no terror

weapons, top oﬂicials said. [Excerpt #5 8]

The reporter wrote about repeated failures in weapon search missions. The
story suggested that the U.S. exercised its military forces in Iraq without any reasons
due to the failure of any discovery that could be a critical justiﬁcation of war. The
reporter cast doubt about whether the U.S. would ever ﬁnd these controversial
weapons in Iraq.

To support that point, Iraq’s UN. ambassador who denied his regime has

banned weapons, was quoted:

“We don ’t have chemical weapons to be used at all. Iraq is clean from
that, ” Al—Douri said on NBC .’s “Meet the Press ” yesterday. “This
[accusation] is a justification to... wage war against my country.”

[Excerpt #59]

62

Regarding the second point, the most possible weapon stashes were pointed

out:

Rumsfeld Is citing of Tikrit and Karbala represents the ﬁrst time a U.S.
oﬂicial has publicly identified places where stockpiles of dreaded
ordnance are believed hidden, said Daniel Goure, a defense expert at
the Lexington Institute, a military think tank

Saddam also is said to have concealed mobile biological weapons
labs near Tikrit and artillery munitions with poison gas in Karbala,

possibly in his places, Goure said. [Excerpt #60]

Quoting a defense expert, the reporter said that the U.S. ofﬁcially named
speciﬁc places as probable weapon caches for the ﬁrst time. It suggests that there had
been no clear information to indicate speciﬁed weapons since the war began. Gordon
concluded his story with expectation of ﬁnding any evidence in the areas that could

justify the war in Iraq.

On April 6, 2003, Thomas M. DeFrank of the Daily News wrote of the
possibility of the end of the war and accomplishments from combat operations,
quoting Bush ofﬁcials. The story is headlined “Light at end of Tunnel Prez Boosted by
Signs War’s Wrapping up.” The story’s main themes presented by the reporter are 1)
assessment of the war accomplishments and 2) public opinions on the war and the
Bush government’s position.

Firstly, the reporter focused on the government’s self-assessment of the war:

Nobody in the Bush camp is that bullish, but last weekIs combat
successes, including the capture of Baghdad Is international airport
and an incursion into the city by U.S. armor; have persuaded
presidential subordinates that the war is on track.

“There Is still a long way to go, but we think we ’re starting to see the

63

-d'

light at the end of the tunnel, ” one Bush aide said, echoing a famous

phrase from the Vietnam War: [Excerpt #61]

The reporter described the excited atmosphere around the White House and
Pentagon by the successful combat results of securing signiﬁcant and widened areas in
Iraq. DeFrank also wrote about optimism among Bush officials who mentioned the
end of the war.

In addition, the reporter moved his focus to divided public opinion on the war:

Overnight, almost giddy private predictions that Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein and his regime would collapse in a matter of days
gave way to pessimism as the U.S. death toll mounted and criticism of
the war plan escalated in the press and among retired oﬂicers.

The poll also found that 77% of Americans back the war and would
continue to support it even if chemical, biological and nuclear

weapons aren t found in Iraq. [Excerpt #62]

Presenting opposite responses to the war, the reporter showed there were
divided opinions among American people. As the poll showed, the war would be
supported by majority of American people even though there was no evidence of
chemical and biological weapons in Iraq.

Mentioning Bush’s accusation against the Iraqi regime of repeated war crimes,
DeFrank ended his story quoting Bush, saying, “We will not stop until Iraq is free.”
The reporter suggested that President Bush and his administration slightly changed

their war priority from ﬁnding WMD to freeing Iraqi citizens from the Iraqi regime.

On April 6, 2003, Howard Witt of the Philadelphia Inquirer wrote on whether
and where Saddam Hussein possessed a cache of chemical, biological and nuclear
materials. The article is titled “Pressure Builds for U.S. to Find Banned Weapons.”

Throughout the article, the reporter raised questions about 1) the existence of the

64

weapons and 2) meaning of the ﬁnding.
Firstly, the reporter began the story questioning the U.S. claim about the

weapons:

A war that President Bush launched expressly to rid Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction has yet to uncover any, and with each
passing day the question grows more acute: Where are the huge
caches of chemical, biological and nuclear materials Saddam

Hussein is supposed to possess? [Excerpt #63]

As seen from above, the reporter expressed a somewhat skeptical point of
view of U.S. weapon search efforts. Explaining search progress by allied forces, the
reporter underlined that nothing deﬁnitive had been found, although American and
British forces were operating in vast sections of Iraq. At the same time, he described
the conﬁdence of Pentagon officials and Army Brigade General Brooks who said

they would eventually frnd weapons in question:

“LetIs remember that this regime has been involved in a campaign of
denial and deception for decades and has been very effective at it, ”
Army Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks said in Doha, Qatar; on Friday.

[Excerpt #64]

Regarding the meaning of the weapons, the reporter explained as follows:

Much of the political, diplomatic and legal justiﬁcation for the U.S.-
led war rests on the assertion that Hussein is hiding weapons of mass
destruction and has deﬁed repeated UN. Security Council demands
to surrender them.

If that proves not to be true, the Bush administrations diplomatic
credibility would be shaken, the Muslim world would be reinforced in
its belief that Washington is waging war against Islam, and U.S.
leaders might even be vulnerable to legal challenges in international

courts. [Excerpt #65]

65

The reporter suggested that the discovery of weapons would play a critical
role for the U.S. position in the world. Stressing Saddam Hussein’s claim that he
disposed of many of his deadliest weapons, Witt added skepticism on whether the U.S.
forces could ﬁnd the weapons. In addition, he showed there were concerns about the
U.S. position in the world if the war ended without any WMD ﬁndings. This suggests
that the U.S. should prepare for another criticism different from that in the beginning

of the war.

3) World Reactions on the War
Two news articles focused on world opinion on the war in Iraq. One dealt
with world opinion against the war and the other dealt with the UN. Security

Council’s desperate efforts to end the war.

On March 20, 2003, the Philadelphia Inquirer’s correspondent, Diego
Ibarguen, reported that some diplomats believed that Iraq could be disarmed by
peaceful methods, not by force, because it did not show an imminent threat. The
article’s title is “At U.N., diplomats press futile debate on Iraq: Some Security Council
members, now spectators, insisted Hussein could be disarmed peacefully.” The story’s
main themes are: 1) claims by UN. members to avoid an armed conﬂict between two
nations and 2) reasons for going to Iraq of the U.S. and Britain.

Presenting the ﬁrst point, the reporter quoted opposing opinions of the

Russian and German foreign ministers:

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov complained that if there were
“indisputable facts ” that Iraq directly threatened U.S. security, “then

Russia without any hesitation would be prepared to use all the means

66

available... to eliminate such a threat. However; the Secutiry Council

H

today is not in possession of such facts.
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer insisted again that his
country “emphatically rejects the impending war” and questioned
whether Iraq Is sluggish cooperation with UN. arms inspectors could

”seriously be regarded as grounds for war: ” [Excerpt #66]

The reporter included Russia’s and Germany’s strong objections and
suggested that the U.S. tried to begin an unpopular war without any concrete reasons.
Stressing that other nations did not see Iraq as a threat to the U.S. and did not want
armed intervention to solve conﬂicts between two nations, the reporter suggested that
there might be a possible method to avoid a war.

The reporter suggested the inevitability of a war and post-war eﬁ'orts,

presenting the positions of the U.S. and Britain.

U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte and British Jeremy Greenstock
said their governments had set aside millions of dollars for
immediate food and medical relief and would soon present ideas on
how to use money from the U.N.-run oil-for-food program to meet

humanitarian needs. [Excerpt #67]

The reporter stressed a ﬁrm resolution to go to Iraq by both nations that had
agreed on Iraq issues including Scud missiles, biological and chemical warheads,
unmanned aircraft and spray devices, and a variety of biological and chemical agents,
as well as on military actions in Iraq. The reporter suggested that there would be no

consensus with the UN. in the matter of a war.

On April 9, 2003, Liz Marlantes and Howard LaFranchi of the Christian
Science Monitor reported on the desperate situation that coalition troops might end the

war without any weapons discovery. The article is titled “‘Smoking gun’ May not

67

Affect World’s Opinion.” The story’s main themes are 1) no discovery of WMD and
2) world opinion on a weapons discovery.
The reporters repeated that there was no evidence of weapons even three

weeks after the war began:

Three weeks into the invasion, the few discoveries the coalition has
made may turn out to be nothing more than simple pesticides. US
oﬂicials say the bulk of the search may be put 01?" until the country is
secured. Even then it may take months.

Despite the ﬁxation on ﬁnding a “smoking gun, ” experts say in the
end it may not make that much drﬂizrence in the way the world
perceives the justiﬁcation for the war: At home, polls show that a vast
majority of Americans not only approve of the invasion, but that most
no longer regard ﬁnding weapons of mass destruction as essential to

the war Is success. [Excerpt #68]

Stressing the importance of a weapons discovery, the reporters said that the
U.S. had found no hidden weapons so far and nobody was sure how long it would take.
Even though the claimed top priority of the war was to get rid of hidden weapons in
the beginning of the war, the reporters said that a majority of Americans did not care
about a weapons discovery, citing poll results. At the same time, the reporters quoted
an expert on public opinion and war who said that a failure to uncover them could
intensify international opposition to the war, casting a question about the top priority
of the war.

The reporters presented the other point on a weapon discovery:

Likewise, in the international arena, analysts say perceptions about
the war have hardened to the point where discoveries of weapons
may have little impact on public opinion. Ultimately, American and
international opinion may turn out to be similar in that it is strong-

though divergent-core values that underpin support or opposition to

68

the war; and not what is now increasingly perceived as the
“secondary" issue of chemical and biological weapons. [Excerpt
#69]

Similarly, the reporters stressed that the public were inclined to support the
president and the troops, rather than to question the purpose of the conﬂict. They also
pointed out the government’s priority shift. On the other hand, Marlantes and
LaFranchi concluded the story with world criticism of America’s aggression over
Iraq’s possession of banned weapons, citing another poll that found the public still

largely expected chemical and biological weapons would be found.

69

IV. RESULTS

Qualitative textual analysis of news accounts written by embeds, non-embeds,
and other journalists during the 2003 Iraq conﬂict explore the nature of wartime
newspaper reporting and qualitative differences among news articles.

After examining nine embedded, 14 non-embedded, and 10 others’ news
accounts in the seven newspapers, the average story length for the embedded
newspaper articles was 15.2 paragraphs and the non-embedded newspapers was 15.9
paragraphs, while others’ newspapers averaged 18.2 paragraphs. The New York Times
produced the largest number of stories (24 stories - 38% of the total stories studied);
the Christian Science Monitor and St. Petersburg Times produced the lowest number
(two stories each — 3.2% of total stories studied). The average number of sources for
embedded newspaper stories was 4.8 per article. The average for non-embedded
newspapers stories was 6.2 sources, and 6.4 sources for others’ articles.

At the start of the study, the thesis posed two research questions:

RQ 1: What was the nature of newspaper reporting during the early phase of
the 2003 Iraq War?

KO 2: Are there qualitative differences in the reporting of embedded
journalists and non-embedded journalists who covered the 2003 Iraq War?

KO I sought to understand the nature of newspaper reporting during the early
phase of the 2003 Iraq War. The results indicate that war coverage during one week
before the war tends to quote more official sources that favor and support the Bush
administration. In Excerpt #1 and #3, Miller and Weinraub focused on the U.S.
government’s effort in the pre-war stages by introducing plans for searching for
banned weapons and for making Iraqi ofﬁcers surrender peaceably. They heavily

depended on information from the governmental sources such as the administration,

70

the Pentagon officials, and Army ofﬁcers. This means that the government war
campaign that tried to shape positive public opinion might affect them for starting a
controversial war without a formal resolution from the UN. or an explicit cause of
war.

As the war begins, the media kept raising a question about whether it was
unjustiﬁed and showed hope and skepticism at the same time about whether the U.S.
could prove its decision to go to Iraq war right. Sisk included the Iraqi information
minister’s denial of banned weapons possession (Excerpt #24), and Ford reﬂected
American intemational-law experts’ claims about the illegality of the U.S.-led war
(Excerpt #25). Adair’s story also showed a skeptical view on the rationale for war,
quoting a college professor (Excerpt #55).

As the war was close to the middle stage, reporters focused on world opinions,
progress of the weapons search, and concerns about the end of the war without proof
of the accusations against Iraq. Gall showed how the Iraq War affected increasing
levels of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan (Excerpt #31). MacFarquhar focused on
Syria’s harsh criticism of the U.S. as acting only to serve Israel’s interest (Excerpt
#33). Miller questioned whether the government’s initial war priority had been
changed because of no accomplishments of weapons searches (Excerpt # 8).

RQ 2 asked whether embedded and non-embedded journalists qualitatively
differed in their Iraq War stories. The results indicate that embedded coverage
examined in the study shows mostly positive representation of the U.S. war decision,
hope for the weapons discovery in Iraq, and progress of weapons search efforts.

In this process, reporters heavily quoted the administration and the Pentagon
officials, army spokespersons in press brieﬁngs, and military ofﬁcers and soldiers with

whom the reporters were embedded to quoting governmental sources.

71

 

The contrast between stories by non-embeds and those by embeds is, perhaps,
even more striking as serious ﬁghting for control of Baghdad began. When describing
battle scenes to readers, embedded reporters such as Lynch, Myers and Dwyer, and
Mac Quarrie vividly illustrated ﬁerce battles and closely covered their embedded units.
For example, Dwyer visualized an intensive battle scene based on soldiers’ interviews
to add tension and acute atmosphere (Excerpt #17). To show a humanitarian aspect of
the war, he also described a scene where the U.S. officers covered dead Iraqi soldiers
with their own blankets (Excerpt #18).

On the other hand, non-embedded reports were more sensitive to the response
of other nations. For instance, Filipov stressed the accusation against Iraq by the U.S.
and Britain by quoting the Iraqi foreign minister who strongly objected to the U.S.-led
war (Excerpt #20). Sisk also quoted the Iraqi information minister to support the fact
that Iraq did not have Scuds (Excerpt #24). Ford’s story cast strong doubt on the
legality of the war, quoting American intemational-law experts and the French
president (Excerpt #25).

In addition, non-embedded coverage conveyed the positions of nearby
countries such as Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, paying
attention to world opinions on the war. Growth of anti-war protests and terrorists’
activities around those nations were stressed by the reporters to select international
skepticism about the war (Excerpt #27, 29, 31, and 33).

Stories written by non-embeds were strikingly different in their presentation
of the civilian response to the Allied incursion. Sennott provided an opportunity to
witness the war with a different perspective, including an interview with Iraqi
civilians in the story (Excerpt #38). Including an interview with taxi drivers who ran

between Amman and Baghdad, Walt also illustrated the inﬂuence of the war on Iraqi

72

people (Excerpt #43).

Correspondents in Washington and the UN. tend to heavily quote oﬂicial
sources to raise questions about starting the war and its illegality. News from
Washington presented the U.S. ’ war determination and the progress of the war
(Excerpt #49) and the objectives of war that were established by the U.S. (Excerpt
#50); whereas those from the UN. suggested questions about the existence of WMD
(Excerpt #53, 54, 57, 58, 63, and 68) war justiﬁcation (Excerpt #55 and 65), and the
U.N.’s efforts to solve the conﬂict peaceably (Excerpt #56). Ibarguen quoted the
Russian and German foreign ministers who strongly opposed the use of military force

in Iraq (Excerpt #66).

73

V. DISCUSSION

As shown in other conﬂict coverage, news accounts by three different types of
journalists, embeds, non-embeds, and others, tended to buttress the government’s
viewpoint at the beginning of the war. Pfau et al. point out that news coverage in the
earlier stages of the conﬂict produced more positive coverage (Pfau et al., 2004).
Reasons for this tendency could be explained by existing literature that examines the
U.S. media policy. To demonize the enemy and justify the war, the U.S. media served
as “public relations agents of the U.S. government” (Schwalbe, Silcock & Keith,
2008). Adoption of the government perspective in early U.S. media coverage was the
result of media reliance on framing that emphasized conﬂict rather than the individual
costs of war (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997).

This study uniquely revealed changes in theme choices during a limited period
of the war. Before the war began, the main interests were: questions about legality of
war without the UN. resolution, anti-war public opinion, and the U.S.’ ﬁrm decision
to go to Iraq. In the early days of the war, the media shifted their focus to the
possibility of WMD discovery and the justiﬁcation for war. As the war front moved
into Baghdad over the next few days and Iraqi military resistance collapsed in the next
two days, stories reﬂected skeptical views on Iraq’s weapon possession and concerns
about ending the war without proving the initial cause for war.

Characteristics of embeds’ coverage are in line with ﬁndings of previous
research by Pfau et al. that report embedded coverage was more personalized, based
on the experiences of the troops and the units covered, and more favorable in tone,
both toward the military and its personnel (Pfau et al., 2004). Content analysis of
television news reports by Pfau et al. also consistently supports the fact that embedded

news stories were more favorable in overall tone toward the military and more

74

 

favorable in depictions of military personnel (Pfau et al., 2005).

Under the embedded program, reporters had relatively unfettered access to
government and military sources and were more likely to write positive stories than
negative ones about controversial issues, such as the existence of chemical, biological
and other kinds of WMD in Iraq or the justiﬁcation of war. They took a close look at
the U.S. forces’ eﬁorts to ﬁnd evidence of a cause of war and provided ﬁrst-hand and
real time coverage from the front. Stories by embeds were detailed in describing the
conﬂict and individual battles as well.

Describing battle situations, embeds tended to zoom in on individual troops
and to show intimate views, contrasted with other types of journalists’ conﬂict
coverage. Their coverage included human elements that might have been affected by
their embedded units. They presented the war with the perspective of a member of
their units but might not reﬂect the bigger picture of what was happening in the war.
This is consistent with an argument by Fahmay and Johnson who indicate that
embedded reporters often had short snippets of the war, whereas unilaterals provided
stories with larger perspective (F ahmy & Johnson, 2007).

Non-embedded journalists were comparatively free from military control or
the government’s embed guidelines. Even though they had to take more risks in
security matters, they had more access to Iraqi citizens to obtain their reaction to the
war and contribute to varying angles of war coverage. Their stories paid more
attention to different aspects of the conﬂict from a distance. They wrote about the
potential for chemical, biological, and/or nuclear attacks by the Iraqi military, the
ferocity of paramilitary or irregular Iraqi forces, the possibility of combat situations in
cities such as Baghdad, and severe criticism of the Bush administration by Iraqi and

other nations’ officials. Interviews with Iraqi civilians presented a more negative View

75

on the war than did sources used by embeds. They included few American forces’
sources in their stories because of limited access to the battles with individual units.
Differences in themes and overall tone of coverage between embeds’ and non-
embeds’ coverage were analyzed, supporting earlier content analysis by Cooper and
Kuypers who argue differences them were caused by the activities and conditions the

two groups observed (Berenger, 2004).

76

VII. CONCLUSIONS

There are various opinions about embedded coverage during the 2003 Iraq
War. Critics view embedded reporting as biased, sensational, and narrow. Supporters
claim their reporting was accurate, trustworthy, and fair, and did not endanger the
safety of the troops. They would all agree that embedding provided great access to the
battleﬁeld and understanding of what was happening on the ground. They were
allowed to report speciﬁc information about the broader military objectives of a
speciﬁc operation.

The activities and conditions they could directly witness during combat
operations might account for some differences. Embeds directly experienced the
intensity, danger, and uncertainty of those situations; they covered the Army ﬁom the
inside and presented positive views on military operations, focusing on the troops
rather than Iraqi populace. However unilaterals were physically distant from the actual
ﬁghting and focused more on events outside the war theater, such as the responses of
neighbor countries, Iraqi civilians being wounded and killed, and Iraqi reception and
perceptions of the war.

This research shows that embedded, non-embedded, and others’ newspaper
accounts differed in their reporting of the 2003 Iraq War. It is important to recognize
that the application of the embedded program played a signiﬁcant role in making such
differences and how the U.S. military could estimate how the program worked out.

However, differences in how they portray the war to readers do not indicate
that either type of newspaper stories is better, just that they differ. To be more
informed about the war, news consumers should read both embedded and non-
embedded newspaper stories.

This study has implications related to whether the embedded program might

77

be applicable for the South Korean military in terms of pursuing an amicable military-
media relationship. By offering embedded reporters Opportunities of ﬁrst-hand and
eyewitness reporting of war operations, the U.S. government took advantage of
positive reports toward the military and its personnel as well as provided readers with
many angles on the war. The fact that cannot be neglected is that embedded coverage
was possible because the U.S. permitted non-embedded reporters, too. Both types of
journalists played an important role in providing credible news to readers because they
viewed the war differently. Therefore, the embedded program would be
recommendable with the existence of non-embedded reporting.

The study possesses several limitations. First, by choosing the qualitative
content analysis of news articles published for a limited time period, the study does
not examine a larger amount of data. An analysis of diﬁemnt time periods could
produce different results. Second, this does not have a sample of the universe of
newspaper articles written by the entire population of embedded/non—embedded/ other
journalists, which limits its usefulness in generalizing beyond these papers.

Future research could analyze whether there are differences in war coverage
between the 2003 Iraq War and today because the war is still going on, so it would be
worth doing a comparison and assessing long-term impacts of the embedded program.
Studies could also focus on quantitative analysis of war coverage by the three different
reporter types. Additional areas for further study might include comparison of print

news with other types of media, such as television, magazines, and radio.

78

Appendices

79

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix 1 Embedded Media List (U.S. Newsgamr)

it Type ”3'33“ Media Organization Last Name First Name MI

8 Ground 101 st Baltimore Sun Calvert Scott

12 Ground 10151 Chicago Tribune Schamberg Kirsten

24 Ground 101 st LA Times Zucchino David A.
25 Ground 101st Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Skiba Katherine M
29 Ground 101st New York Times Dwyer James G.
36 Ground 101 st St. Petersburg Times Allison Wes

40 Ground 101st Times News Service Cox Matt J
43 Ground 101 st USA Today Zoroya Gregory M
44 Ground 101 st Wall Street Journal Morse Dan W.
45 Ground 101st Washington Post Atkinson Lﬁ‘aﬁ‘fe R.
48 Ground 101 st (L) Historian Taylor Tom

50 Ground 101 st (L) Leaf-Chronicle Escoto Chantal

51 Ground 101st (L) Lexington Herald Lasseter Tom

52 Ground 101 st (L) Patriot-News Fernandez Michael

53 Ground 101 st (L) Tennessean Parlipilo John ”Leon”

67 Ground 1AD Inside Washington LARDNER RICHARD P
79 Ground 1AD Stars 8 Stripes Anderson Jon

82 Ground 1AD(L) Wichita Eagle Potter Timothy

85 Ground 1CAV Baltimore Sun marbella Jean

96 Ground 1CAV New York Times Leduff Charlie

97 Ground 1CAV New Yorker Magazine Goldbgg Jeffrey

98 Ground 1 CAV News-Press Kovac Adam K.
103 Ground 1CAV St. Louis Post Dispatch Sawyer Jon M.
127 Ground 1MEF Atlanta Journal Constitution Harris Ill Art
128 Ground 1MEF Augusta Chronicle Edwards Johnny R.
131 Ground 1MEF Aviation Week Wall Robert M
140 Ground 1MEF Chicago Tribune Osnos Evan
143 Ground 1MEF Contra Costa Times Ledesma Eddie

Dallas Morni News/ .

147 Ground 1MEF The press_E:$erpﬂse Coronado Michael A
148 Ground 1MEF Detroit Free Press Seidel Jeffrey M
149 Ground 1MEF Detroit News Bebow John C
150 Ground 1MEF Engineering New-Record Wright Andrew G.
151 Ground 1MEF Florida Times Union Burk Donald W
164 Ground 1MEF Indianapolis Star Strauss John C
168 Ground 1MEF Kansas CitLStar Johnson Rich
173 Ground 1MEF LA Times Perry Anthony L
179 Ground 1MEF Miami Herald Tamayo Juan 0.
180 Ground 1MEF Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Toosi Nahal
181 Ground 1MEF Minneapolis Star Tribune Schmickle Sharon A.
185 Ground 1MEF New York 1 News BITZ JEREMY S.
186 Ground 1MEF New York 1 News RAMSAY GARY A.
187 Ground 1MEF New York Daily News Maisel Todd M
188 Ground 1MEF New York Daily News Sisk Richard P
189 Ground 1MEF New York Post Morris Vincent S.
190 Ground 1MEF Newark Star Ledger Woolley Wayne R.
192 Ground 1MEF Newsday RaLman Graham A.
193 Ground 1MEF Omaha World-Herald Bundy Jeffrey P.
194 Ground 1MEF Orange County Register Dillow Gordon L
195 Ground 1MEF Orlando Sentinel Roy Roger E
196 Ground 1MEF Philadelphia Daily News Schoﬁeld Matthew S.
203 Ground 1MEF Salt Lake Tribune lsraelsen Brent
205 Ground 1MEF South Bend Tribune Dodd Jr. Frederick C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

80

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

206 Ground 1MEF St. Petersburg Times Pendygraft John

207 Ground 1MEF Stars & Stripes Oliva Mark

213 Ground 1MEF USA Today Lubold Gordon C
214 Ground 1MEF Virginian Pilot Zerby David M.
215 Ground 1MEF Wall Street Journal Kulish Nicholas M.
216 Ground 1MEF Washington Post Baker Peter E.
217 Ground 1MEF Washington Times Eddins Joseph M.
231 Ground 1MEF (L) North County Times Mortenson Darrin

232 Ground 1MEF (L) North County Times Palmour Hayne

233 Ground 1MEF (L) Sun Herald Peterson Patrick F.
234 Ground 1MEF (L) Ventura County star Medlin Dani

238 Ground ZACR Chicago Tribune Dorning Michael F'P
239 Ground 2ACR Christian Science Monitor Ritchey Warren

241 Ground 2ACR Hartford Courant Rich Eric

247 Ground 3ACR Colorado SrLings Gazette Diedrich John M
250 Ground 3ACR Rocky Mountain News Brennan Charles Ill H.
251 Ground 3ACR(L) Colorado Springs Gazette Rogers Andrew A.
261 Ground 3ID Atlanta Journal Constitution Martz Ronald

265 Ground 3lD Boston Globe MacQuarrie Brian

266 Ground 3ID Boston Herald Crittendon Jules

267 Ground 3ID Business Week Balfour Frederik S
273 Ground 3lD Chicago Tribune DiNuzzo Nuccio

274 Ground 3ID Christian Science Monitor Tyson Ann 3‘:
277 Ground 3ID Columbus Ledger-Enquirer Harper Samuel T.
279 Ground 3|D Dallas Morning News Leeson David J
281 Ground 3|D Florida Times Union Davis Rachel L
285 Ground 3ID Houston Chronicle Sobhani Bahram M.
288 Ground 3ID Kyodo News (Jppan) Gima Tomohiro

290 Ground 3ID LA Times Mohan Geoffrey A
296 Ground 3ID New York Times Myers Stephen L.
297 Ground 3ID Newsday Frank Thomas L.
302 Ground 3|D Orlando Sentinel Perez Hilda M
303 Ground 3|D Philadelphia Daily News Gilkey David

304 Ground 3|D Providence Journal Corkery Michael W.
310 Ground 3ID Salt Lake Tribune Grant Greg M
311 Ground 3|D San Antonio Express-News Christenson Sigurd J
312 Ground 3lD SF Chronicle Nolte Carl W
315 Ground 3ID Stars 8: Stripes Giordono Joseph

318 Ground 3|D Times News Service Naylor Sean D
320 Ground 3ID USA Today Komarow Steven :3
322 Ground 3ID Wall Street Journal Cooper Helene

323 Ground 3ID Washington Post Branigin William J.
324 Ground 3lD (L) Coastal Courier Donahue Patrick

325 Ground 3ID (L) ' Savannah MorningNews Carrington III John R.
326 Ground 3lD (L) Savannah Morning News Phillips Noelle A.
344 Ground 4ID Contra Costa Times Campos Eric

345 Ground 4ID Dallas Morning News Timms Edward G
346 Ground 4ID Denver Post Hughes James M
347 Ground 4lD Detroit Free Press Lubens Pauline

350 Ground 4ID Ft.Worth Star Telegram Sullivan John

351 Ground 4ID Houston Chronicle Hedges Michael B.
352 Ground 4ID Indianapolis Star Richards Philip D
353 Ground 4|D LA Times Slater Eric R
354 Ground 4ID Miami Herald Bouaphanh Kampha

356 Ground 4|D Minneapolis Star Tribune Haley Peter C.
359 Ground 4ID New York Daily News Ingrassia Robert F
360 Ground 4ID New York Post Greene Leonard J.
361 Ground 4lD New York Times Gettleman Jeffrey A.
362 Ground 4ID Newsday Searcey Dionne L.
366 Ground 4|D Omaha World-Herald Kelley Matthew D.
367 Ground 4lD Oregonian Meehan Brian

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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369 Ground 4ID Philadelphia Inquirer Dilanian Ken

373 Ground 4ID Rocky Mountain News Terry Ahmad C.

374 Ground 4ID San Antonio Express-News lnnerarity Andrew B

375 Ground 4ID St. Louis Post—Dispatch Ganey Terrence J.

376 Ground 4ID St. Louis Post-Dispatch Tait Gabriel B.

377 Ground 4|D Tampa Tribune Epstein Keith C.

378 Ground 4ID Times News Service Curtis Rob M

379 Ground 4ID Times News Service Cavallaro Gina

380 Ground 4ID USA Today Leinwand Donna C

381 Ground 4ID Wall Street Journal Dreazen Yochi

382 Ground 4ID Washington Post Vogel SteLhen F.

383 Ground 4|D Washington Times Taylor Guy J.

384 Ground 4ID (L) COX/Austin Am. Statesman Dart Robert E.

394 Ground 4ID (L) The News Tribune Gilbert Mike

398 Ground 82nd Charlotte Observer Johnson Mark D.

399 Ground 82nd Chicago Tribune Madhani Aamer S.

400 Ground 82nd Fayetteville (NC) Observer Maurer Henry K.

401 Ground 82nd Fayetteville (NC) Observer Hebert Stephen G.

405 Ground 82nd Oregonian Sleeth Peter

409 Ground 82nd Washington Post Reel Monte K.

412 Air AAS San Antonio Express-News Pinkerton James E

417 Air AJ Christian Science Monitor Amoldy Benjamin

424 Air AJ Times News Service Trowbridge Gordon

426 Air AU Aerospace Daily Trimble Stemen D

431 Air AU Boston Globe Barnard Anne

436 Air AU Kansas City Star Heying Travis

437 Air AU Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Sieu Benny L

442 Air AU New York Times 030 James C.

443 Air AU St. Louis Post-Dispatch Leiser Kenneth J.

445 Air AU Times News Service Trowbridge Gordon L

449 Ground CFLCC Albuquerque Tribune Ehn. Jr. Jack M

455 Ground CFLCC Daily Titan Larson Ronald P.

458 Ground CFLCC Knoxville News Sentinel Mitchell Bryan E

459 Ground CFLCC LATimes Vertiovek Samuel “A

461 Ground CFLCC New ﬁfaaygsnl'm” Vamey James J

462 Ground CFLCC New York Times Gordon Michael R.

470 Ground CFLCC Wall Street Journal Troﬁmov Yaroslav

471 Ground Rgﬁie Gainesville Sun Bruno Gregory C.

472 Ground Rggﬁfge Gainesville Sun Weimar Mike

473 Ground RESLI-chcrzse St. Augustine Record Guinta Peter

484 Air Inc Houston Chronicle Sandberg Lisa A.

487 Air Inc Omaha World-Herald Dejka Joseph R.

489 Air Inc Rocky Mountain News Schneider Chris M.

490 Air Inc Stars & Stripes Dougherty Kevin T.

493 Air Inc Wall Street Journal Chazan Guy

504 Ground MARDIV Baltimore Sun Murphy John

508 Ground MARDIV Boston Globe Nelson Scott

509 Ground MARDIV Boston Herald Takahashi Kuni

516 Ground MARDIV Denver Post Cross James A.

523 Ground MARDIV LA Times Loomis William R

532 Ground MARDIV New York Times Kifner John

533 Ground MARDIV Newsday Tayler Letta M.

536 Ground MARDIV Orange County Register Avery Mark D

537 Ground MARDIV Philadelphia Inquirer Gerlin Andrea
Providence Journal/

538 Ground MARDIV The Dallas Morning News Lenders James M.

542 Ground MARDIV Seattle Times Hurst Thomas J

543 Ground MARDIV SF Chronicle Koopman John D

544 Ground MARDIV St. Louis Post-Dispatch Harris Ronald J.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

82

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

547 Ground MARDIV Tampa Tribune Bowman Rex L.

548 Ground MARDIV The Ledger, Lakeland, FL Allen Diane L

554 Ground MARDIV USA Today Smith Elliott B

555 Ground MARDIV Virginian Pilot O'Brien Dennis S.

557 Ground MARDIV Wall Street Journal Phillips Michael M.

558 Ground MARDIV Washington Post Finer Jonathan J.

562 Ground MEF CE USA Today Lynch David J

568 Ground MEU New York Times Wilson Michael J.

576 Ground MEU (24th) New York Times LeDuff Charles

647 Maritime Navy LA Times Williams Carol J
. . . . Not accepting

651 Manttme Navy Milwaukee Journal Sentinel at this time

652 Maritime Navy Minneapolis Star Tribune Tyree Christopher D.

660 Maritime Navy New York Times Clemetson Lynette

661 Maritime Nayy New York Times Laforet Vincent B.

662 Maritime Navy Newsday McCrummen Stephanie L.

667 Maritime Navy PhiladeILhia Inquirer Bauers Sandy

679 Maritime Navy Seattle Post Intelligencer Lyke Mary Lynn

680 Maritime Navy Seattle Times Bemton Henry (Hal) P

681 Maritime Navy SF Chronicle Podger Pamela J

684 Maritime Navy Stars & Stripes Helmer Kendra A.

688 Maritime Navy Times News Service McMichaeI William H

696 Maritime NavL USA Today Soriano Cesar G

697 Maritime Navy Virginian Pilot Dolan Matthew S.

700 Maritime Navy Washington Post Layton Lindsey J.

707 Air PSAB Aviation Week Fulghum David A

711 Air PSAB Inside Washington Grossman Elaine

713 Air PSAB New York Times Kershaw Sarah S.

714 Air PSAB Newsday Dowdy Zachary R

715 Air PSAB Washington Post Graham Bradley

718 Air SI Chicago Tribune Quintanilla RaL

728 Ground Special New York Times Dao Jim

729 Ground Special New York Times Miller Judith

730 Ground Special Newhouse News Wood Dave

732 Ground Special Washington Post Finn Peter

733 Ground Special Washington Post Gellman Bart

737 Ground V Corps Atlanta Journal Constitution Penhaul Karl

739 Ground V Corps Boston Globe Kamerman David F

740 Ground V Corps Buffalo News Zremski Gerald W.

745 Ground V Corps Detroit Free Press Canon Scott

746 Ground V Corps Engineering New-Record Sawyer Thomas (Tom) W

752 Ground V Corps Knoxville News Sentinel Clarke Cathy C

753 Ground V Corps LA Times Casey Kevin P

756 Ground V Corps Miami Herald Laughlin Meg

758 Ground V Corps New York Post Jonathan Foreman E.

759 Ground V Corps New York Times Weinraub Bernard

773 Ground V Corps SF Chronicle Ostler Scott L

775 Ground V Corps Washington Post Sheridan Mary Elizabeth

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

83

 

Appendix 2

Table of Excerpts

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reporter Reporter
II T
if Publicatlon Date ne Itle of article name Status
Disarming Saddam Hussein;
1, 2 New York Times 3-18-2003 Teams of Experts to Hunt Iraq Judith Miller
Arms
Articles of Capitulation; Iraqis Told, Be ma rd
3, 4 New York Times 3-19-2003 ‘Sign Here' to Surrender-As Lee W . b
Did einrau
In the Field Intelligence; Army Bernard
5, 6 New York Times 3-27-2003 Reports Iraq Is Moving Toxic Arms Wei n raub
to Its Troops
Illicit Arms; U.S. Forces Have . .
7, 8 New York Times 4-4-2003 Searched Few Iraqi Weapons Sites Judith Miller
American Soldiers Find Dmms Bernard
9' 10 New York Times $74003 Possibly Storing Chemical Agents Weinraub Embedded
Iraq Fires at least 5 Missiles into David Lynch &
11, 12 USA Today 3-21-2003 Kuwait Steven
Komarow
G.I.‘s Pause on Push to Baghdad, Steven Lee
13,14 NewYork Times 3-25-2003 and One Falls toaSniper Myers
Baghdad's Leader the Karbala Gap Brian
15. 16 Boston Globe 4-2-2003 MacQuanie, &
Scott Nelson
In the Field 1011r Airborne Division;
A Grenade on the Road, the Death .
17, 18 New York Times 4-9-2003 of the Enemy. the Human Side of Jim Dwyer
War
19, 20 Boston Globe 3-14-2003 Iraq Rejects British Proposal David Filipov
Americans, Britons Evacuate as Thanassis
21' 22 Boston Globe 348.2003 Troops Brace for Attack Cambanis
23, 24 Daily News 3-20-2003 IraLLaunches Missiles at Kuwait Richard Sisk
Christian Science As Attack on Iraq Begins. Question
25’ 26 Monitor 341-2003 Remains: Is It Legal? Peter Ford
Protests Continue as Jordan
27,28 New York Times 3-24-2003 Defends U.S. Presence in Border Ian Fisher
Region
Saudis Send Proposals to End War . .
29, 30 New York Times 3—25—2003 to Both Sides Craig Smith
. Militants in Afghanistan ﬁre
31, 32 New York times 3-27-2003 Rockets at 2 American Bases Carlota Gall
Syria Wants U.S. to Lose War, Its Neil
33 New York Times 3'31'2003 Foreign Minister Declares MacFarquhar Non-
Western Deserl; War That Is Out of embedded
34, 35 New York Times 3-29-2003 Sight But Not Out of Mind, Ian Fisher
Especially for the Israelis
~ Signs of Plan for Chemical Arms Charles
36 38 Boston Globe 4-2-2003 Reported Sen nott
Militants Leave Signs of Chemical
. . Arms; The Kurdish Islamic militant
39. 4o Pﬁ'r"a‘3f:::"a 4—2-2003 Group attacked in Northern Iraq “£22323"
q Last Weekend also Is Accused of y
Links to AI-Qaeda and Hussein
Allied Forces Said to Control Air, .
41~43 USA Today 4-2-2003 Land in Western Desert Vivrenne Walt
44' 45 Philadelphia 444003 Soldiers Evacuated After Nerve- T om La sset er
lnqurrer gas Test
46, 47 USA Today 4-8-2003 2:8 Gears ”9 t° ”mas" ”393' James Cox
Plan 7-day War in Iraq but U.S. Kenneth
. May Have to Attack Saddam Bazinet &
48, 49 Daily News 3-12-2003 without Brits Thomas Other
DeFrank
. _ Rumsfeld Says Iraq Is Collapsing, Thom Shanker
50' 51 New York Times 3'21 2003 Lists 8 Objectives of War & Eric Schmitt
. U.S. Ofﬁcials Fear Iraqis Plan to .
52, 53 New York Times 3-24—2003 Use Gas on G.I.‘s Davrd Sanger
St. Petersburg Questions Remain over Iraqi . .
54, 55 Times 3-25-2003 Weapons Bill Adair
56, 57 Boston Globe 3-28-2003 ”3 Ofﬁc'a's C°"s'de’ Return °' Bryan Bender

 

 

 

 

Inspectors

 

 

 

84

 

 

58~60

Daily News

3—31-2003

Rummy Zeros in on Banned

James Gordon

 

 

 

 

 

Weapons Stashes
. Light at End of tunnel Prez Boosted Thomas
61’ 62 Daily News #64003 by Signs War’s Wrapping up DeFrank
Philadelphia Pressure Builds for U.S. to Find
63~65 Inquirer 4'6'2003 Banned Weapons Howard W“
At U.N., Diplomats Press Futile
Phil a d el hi a Debate on Iraq: Some Security
66, 67 In ”if; 3-20-2003 Council Members, Now Spectators, Diego Ibarguen
q lnsisted Hussein Could Be
Disarmed Peacefully
68, 69 Christian Scrence 4.92003 Smoking gun May Not Affect World s Liz Ma rlantes

 

Monitor

 

 

Opinion

 

 

85

 

 

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