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U.S. MEDIA POLICY:
THE EMBEDDED PROGRAM DURING THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

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Myungjin Song

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M.A. degree in Journalism

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**U.S. MEDIA POLICY:
THE EMBEDDED PROGRAM
DURING THE 2003 IRAQ WAR**

By

Myungjin Song

A THESIS

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
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ABSTRACT

U.S. MEDIA POLICY: THE EMBEDDED PROGRAM DURING THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

By

Myungjin Song

Preparing for the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. military establishment (the Pentagon) introduced a new media policy called “the embedded program” to provide reporters with the truth about the war before the enemy spread disinformation and distortions through the media. The embedded program was also intended to create an amicable military-media relationship.

This study examines the nature of newspaper reporting during the early phase of the 2003 Iraq War and qualitative similarities and differences in the reporting of embedded journalists, non-embedded journalists, and other reporters who covered the conflict. The results suggest that embedded, non-embedded, and others’ newspaper accounts differed in their reporting of the 2003 Iraq War. It is important to recognize that the application of the embedded program played a significant role in accounting for the differences and the U.S. military assessment of how the program worked out. However, differences in how they portrayed the war to readers do not indicate that either type of newspaper stories is better, just that they differ.

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I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my father.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The problem to be examined involves qualitative similarities and differences among war-related newspaper articles written by journalists during the 2003 Iraq War. The study's historical framework follows the evolution of the U.S. military-media relationship from World War II (WWII) to the 2003 Iraq War, as well as background, development and consequences of the embedded program, which has functioned as a media management program by the Department of Defense (DoD) since the 2003 Iraq War.

Historically, the media were subject to different policies that impacted their coverage of war during different phases. Consequently, the relationship between the military and the media was not always amicable. Kennedy (1993) says that cultural and ideological differences cause this conflict between the military and the media. He also argues that reporters who do not have enough knowledge about the military can contribute to uninformed or negative coverage. Ricks (1993) says that the persistent tension between the military and the news media exists because they pursue very different objectives and often hold very different values. Brogan (2006) shows that the national security goals of the government and the freedom of information rights of the media cause tension between the military and the media, and this tension has become more visible since WWII.

To understand the military-media relationship, this study will focus on three sub-topics. First, the study will discuss how the different war coverage policies and programs were formed to manage media involvement during war, in particular since WWII. It will examine efforts of the U.S. military to keep a cooperative relationship with the media. Second, this study will provide comparison of news accounts written by embedded journalists, who "live, work and travel as part of the units with which

they are embedded,” with those written by non-embedded journalists, who travel alone without the benefits of a military unit. The non-embedded journalists are also known as “unilaterals.” By comparing the work of the two types of reporters, this study hopes to show how successfully or unsuccessfully the embedded program functioned as a media policy during the 2003 Iraq War. Third, by analyzing the media strategies of the U.S. military, this study will suggest whether the U.S. media policy may be applicable to other countries’ armed forces, such as the South Korean military.

There were constant efforts to develop effective press guidelines in the U.S. because military leaders believed the conduct of the Vietnam War was impaired by negative media coverage (Barber & Wier, 2002). As a country under continuous threats of war since the armistice agreement of 1953, South Korea learned a lesson from the failure of the U.S. in Vietnam. One of the most important missions for the South Korean military is to ensure that in the event of war, there will be an effective media policy to guarantee that the government enjoys public support. Therefore this study will help to show whether the policy of embedding reporters is applicable to the South Korean military. In doing so, it reviews the evolution of U.S. media policy since WWII and focuses specifically on the embedded program during the Iraq War.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. The Evolution of the U.S. Media Policy

From a governmental point of view, the objective of war is victory. To achieve victory, the media play a significant role. As evident by the U.S. experience in its fight against Iraqi insurgents in the post-Iraq invasion of 2003, it is not too much to say that the history of war is partly the history of military-media relations. The media's importance on the battlefield is noted by Rid who writes that network-centric wars of the twenty-first century would be fought on the physical battlefield as well as in the virtual battle space (Rid, 2007).

The U.S. has implemented different war coverage programs during eight periods of conflict after WWI. This covers WWII, Korean War, Vietnam War, Grenada Action, Panama Operation, Gulf War, Haiti War, and Iraq War. With this trail, the U.S. became an object of considerable study by scholars and military experts who are interested in writing about managing the programs during war time.

According to Cooper (2003), the press pool system was prevalent during WWII, and reporters wandered freely on the battlefield with relatively loose restraints. In Korea, some experts such as Boydston (1992), Olson (1993), and Cassel (1985) say that journalists most likely practiced voluntary self-censorship, but there was also a formal censorship system. Boydston (1992) says that self-censorship guidelines were unclear at the beginning, but war correspondents soon had to submit all news material, including film, to the military for approval. The Vietnam War exemplified a victory for the media in terms of freedom of access to the battlefield. More than freedom of access, they also had even logistical support in getting reporters to the battlefield (Cooper, 2003). In the 1983 action in Grenada, however, reporters were not able to join ground troops. On the third day of the operation, a group of reporters was

escorted around the island for only a few hours. On the whole, they were not free of restrictions until the sixth day, when the war was over (Cooper, 2003).

During the 1989 Panama Operation, the press pool was thoroughly controlled by the military. Reporters were not free from military escorts and transportation. Instead of being taken to the fighting, pool members received a series of briefings from U.S. Embassy personnel who did not provide any up-to-date military information (Boydston, 1992).

By the Persian Gulf War, reporters were not able to join the troop deployment and combat. Escorts, pooled coverage, and pre-censorship of security-related information prevailed. The DoD activated the national pool to cover the opening phase of "Operation Desert Shield." The system for granting access to those operations caused a number of press complaints because only about 10 percent of the reporters on the Joint Information Bureau (JIB) rosters in Dhahran received accreditation. Moreover, those few 'elected' members of the press did not choose what they wanted to cover, but the military assigned them to units unilaterally (Boydston, 1992).

During the War in Haiti in 1994, press restraints were similar to those in the Gulf War; military escorts and pre-censorship of material that violated the security ground rules were included in the program (U.S. Department of Defense, 1994). According to the guidelines for news media, "Media representatives are asked to assist the operation by blacking out network broadcasts from launch points prior to the landing of forces in the area of operation.... Do not approach military personnel, especially during hours of darkness, without express military approval.... Security at the source will be the primary and desired means of protecting the operations security of the mission and enforcing the media ground rules."

2. The Embedded Program

Background of Embedded Journalism. The Vietnam War is often blamed for damaging public support for the U.S. military. After that, military censorship dramatically changed into restraints. Severe control caused conflicts between the military and the media, and most recently, the military developed media management policies that were designed to satisfy both sides.

Even before the 2003 Iraq War began, the Bush administration faced world criticism because there was neither an evident cause for a war nor consensus within the United Nations Security Council. It made the U.S. administration more focused on the media to favorably lead public opinion. This was the context in which the DoD adopted “the embedded program.”

The history of the embedded program goes back to military operations in the Falklands War of 1982 and Haiti in 1994. The program allowed the military to get its side of the story out by embedding reporters and the media to portray operations from the military side in its attempt to inform the public (Brogan, 2006). However, the 2003 version of the embedded program was more elaborate in terms of satisfying press requests for extensive and thorough access to war operations, as well as accurate and prompt news reports.

The Pentagon’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Victoria Clarke, said the purpose of the program was to provide the public with accurate information about the war before the enemy spread disinformation and distortions through the media and to create an amicable military-media relationship (Brogan, 2006). According to the DoD’s ground rules to which the ‘embeds’ had to agree to get assigned to a unit, embeds cannot release information about the specific number of troops, equipment, or vehicles, future operations, security levels, intelligence

collection, or the effectiveness of enemy action (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003).

Development through the War in Iraq. At the beginning of the 2003 war with Iraq, 625 journalists including 449 Americans and 175 internationals were assigned in the embedding plan. This was extraordinary for the opening stages of a conflict involving the U.S. (Getlin, 2003). Foreign journalists were sent from 40 foreign media outlets, such as BBC, NHK, and Al-Jazeera. U.S. reporters were selected from local media that were from the towns where combat troops were deployed from (Zeide, 2005).

Commanders had to provide the media with every opportunity to observe actual combat operations. Embeds and their media organizations took all responsibilities for the inherently dangerous risks involved and agreed to abide by military ground rules. In return, supplies, medical attention, transportation, communications assistance, and temporary loans of biological and chemical protective gear were given to embeds (Zeide, 2005).

For the purpose of getting the reporters used to the military and the possible conditions in which they would work, the Pentagon's 'Embed boot camps' were offered at several military bases (Rodriguez, 2004). They included nuclear, biological, and chemical training and first aid.

Also, reporters had the other opportunities to spend time with military units training in the U.S. That was designed to build trust between the reporters and military and to become familiar with each other's terminology and routines. The news organizations and reporters were able to test their new equipment, techniques, and procedures for reporting in probable battle situation (Rodriguez, 2004).

Aside from embeds, some reporters covered the conflict outside the embedded program. News organizations assigned these non-embedded reporters on

the understanding that their safety, including logistic support, and physical protection, could not be guaranteed by the U.S. military.

An estimated 2,100 non-embedded journalists covered the invasion (Katovsky & Carlson, 2003). Unlike embeds, the writing of non-embeds' was not subject to military restriction. They were able to go anywhere in the war theater and cover anyone they encountered. Fourteen non-embedded journalists, however, were killed in the period of the 2003 Iraq War, and this number made up the majority of media casualties during the war (Rodriguez, 2004).

Restrictive access to sites and soldier interviews was another problem for non-embeds. Many non-embeds faced indifference or hostility from the military, partly because of their non-embedded status (Zeide, 2005).

Consequence of Embedding. The program provided embedded reporters open and direct access to military operations. The program allowed the reporter to live, work, and travel as part of the units with which they were embedded. They were able to cover battlefield situation up-close. In return, they had to follow the military system, rules, and regulations the same as unit members or they lost access to the program or the battlefield. The military did not accept those who went against or attempted to cross the rules (Rodriguez, 2004).

Among media critics, there is a rich diversity of opinion on how well the program functioned during the conflict. Supporters claim the program allowed greater access to the press than in any war since Vietnam. Rid (2007) considers the innovative decision of the Pentagon as "a fascinating case of organizational change in an exceptionally large, hierarchical, and presumably change-averse bureaucracy operating in a fast-paced and unstable environment." Brogan (2006) notes that "the

discussion over the military-media relationship is over and that the embedded program is the solution.” Kerr (2004) says that the program is advisable for future conflicts as well. Oehl (2003) opines that the program met journalists’ need as well as provided the truth about the war. He also calls the program “a sample of how the military’s experience speaks to the successful open policy of military-media relationship.”

For both the military and the media, the war was covered not just from the perspective of U.S. and British military spokespersons, but from reporters’ first-hand and eyewitness reporting of frontline action, providing many angles on the war.

Opponents of the program say that it “can never be a source of legitimate news since the reporter cannot verify the information provided by the military independently” (Brogan, 2006). Critics say the quality of the stories and the accuracy of the reports are suspect, and they argue that the program did not improve the military-media relationship. According to Fisher (2003), embedding journalists tainted the objectivity of journalism, and Grossman (2003) likens “the effect of embedding to the Stockholm Syndrome, where hostages take sympathy with their captors and their captors’ cause.” It would be impossible for reporters to write objectively because they depended for their transport, food and for their very lives on the military.

Moreover, the media were not permitted to report freely on certain topics as they wanted, in cases of disturbing or unflattering news to the military (Berenger, 2004). Exercising embedding ground rules, the military might have blocked access to other sides of a story, intentionally or not. Limited access and substantive coverage controlled by the military implicate significant First Amendment concerns about biased news (Zeide, 2005). Johnson (2003) argues that the public might get the truth, but not the whole truth.

In a study of the embedded program, Sylvester & Huffaman (2005) say that

embedded journalists were not pleased when unilateral journalists wanted the same access rights as they did. However, they agree that both types of journalists made a contribution to the war achievement for the military and the best coverage for the media. Kerr (2004) says that embedded journalists did not write direct reports about Iraqi war crime claims, but unilaterals did. Pfau et al. (2004) show that embedded reports were more favorable toward the military and its personnel, and featured more episodic framing by a content analysis of print coverage in the first five days of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Similarly, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)'s OIF coverage is content-analyzed by Lewis et al. (2004) The study finds a favorable atmosphere of the coverage toward the government's position on the war and the Iraqi people's positive attitudes toward the invasion.

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD OF STUDY

1. Research Questions

The study poses two key research questions:

RQ 1: What was the nature of newspaper reporting during the early phase of the 2003 Iraq War?

RQ 2: Are there qualitative differences in the reporting of embedded journalists and non-embedded journalists who covered the 2003 Iraq War?

2. Method of Study

To answer these questions, a qualitative content analysis method is adopted. This study focuses on the embedded program during the 2003 Iraq War. By comparing news accounts written by embedded journalists with those written by non-embedded reporters and other reporters, the study shows how the program affected war coverage. The term “unilateral” is also used to refer to non-embedded reporters.

To proceed with this comparison, a list of the active journalists under the program during the 2003 Iraq War was requested from the Public Affairs Office of the DoD via e-mail. The e-mail was sent on June 27, 2008, and the response was received on June 30.¹ According to the list, there were 775 embedded journalists during the early Iraq War. This list was sorted by type (ground / air / maritime), assigned unit, media organization, media type, and name. Names not on the list but found in the coverage are presumed as unilaterals. I e-mailed the presumed unilaterals one by one to confirm that they were not embedded during that period. Based on the list from the

¹ Lt. Col Vician, Todd M., Defense Press Officer of DoD, responded to the e-mail and sent a copy of the active journalist list for the 2003 Iraq War.

DoD, all U.S. newspaper journalists' names are sorted by their embedded units and news organizations. [See Appendix 1]

The data are limited to newspaper coverage that was published during the first one-month period of the 2003 Iraq War, from March 12, 2003 to April 12, 2003. This was to capture the nature of reporting just before the beginning of the war and in the immediate period after the war started. Reasons for choosing only newspaper stories are that they are easier to access and to look at in their full context of usage and meaning than TV or radio reportage.

To download and print news accounts for the period, the Web search engine Lexis-Nexis was used. The key phrase used for the search was "Iraq War Weapons" and only U.S. newspapers were selected.

Analysis of content involves stories filed by three categories of reporters; Embeds, Non-embeds, and 'Other.' Embedded journalists are defined as journalists who were embedded with ground units to cover the 2003 Iraq War. Their names are on the media list of embedded journalists provided by the DoD. Names of non-embedded journalists are not on the DoD list but they reported from the Iraq war theater, including from neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, and Afghanistan. Another category of reporters is called 'Others' in the study because they are correspondents who reported from Washington or the United Nations, away from the war front.

The unit of analysis for this investigation is the individual newspaper article (n=63). Among 296 news articles found by Lexis-Nexis, there are nine news articles written by embedded journalists, 14 by non-embedded journalists, and 40 by 'Other' reporters. The sample consists of seven newspapers: the *New York Times*, *USA Today*, the *Boston Globe*, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Daily News*,

and *St. Petersburg Times*.

The study excludes 233 articles such as editorial, classifieds, correction notices, letters to the editor, "Q & A" articles, casualty reports, and news summary because these are not qualified story types for meeting the study's goal.

To be specific, the excluded items are removed because 1) they tend to be written by editorial desks of each news organizations, not by one of three journalist types; Embeds, Non-embeds, and 'Other'; 2) they reflect each newspaper companies' judgment of events concerning the war; and 3) they are casualty reports, correction of errors and news summaries, or informational items.

For example, editorials are about opinions or claims that newspaper companies or their writers express on national or international issues. They are more likely to present the points of view of newspaper companies and they are signed opinions of individual commentators or unsigned opinions of the newspapers.

Sample excerpts of excluded items are as follows:

1) Editorial

The International Herald Tribune, April 7, 2003 Monday

BYLINE: Jon B. Wolfsthal

SECTION: OPINION; Pg. 10

LENGTH: 754 words

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

The mystery of Saddam's banned arms; Chemical and biological weapons

So far no weapons of mass destruction have been used against allied troops. Unfortunately for the Bush administration's case against Iraq, however, no such weapons have been discovered in any form. While the search is only a few weeks old, this suggests three possibilities: that U.S. intelligence may not know the exact location of such weapons; that such weapons are only in areas controlled by troops loyal to Saddam; or that none are in Iraq, as the regime

asserts.

If and when any weapons of mass destruction are discovered, those who supported the war in Iraq can be expected to use the find to justify the U.S.-led intervention. But if such weapons are located based on solid U.S. intelligence information, it raises other questions. If the U.S. knew where such weapons were, why was the information not given to UN inspectors? If inspectors could have been used to find such weapons, why was war necessary?

2) Letters to the Editor

The New York Times, April 8, 2003 Tuesday

SECTION: Section A; Column 4; Editorial Desk; Pg. 22

LENGTH: 80 words

A Generation Gap Over the War?

To the Editor:

You report that college professors seem to be more vehemently opposed to the Iraq war than their students are (front page, April 5).

The contrast with the Vietnam War doesn't mention that student protests did not reach great numbers and intensity until four years into the war.

The Iraq war, on the other hand, is less than three weeks old, yet according to the article 50 percent of Yale students already oppose the war.

3) "Q & A" Article

USA TODAY, March 27, 2003 Thursday

BYLINE: Glen Nishimura

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 15A

LENGTH: 653 words

Will Saddam use all his weapons?

The Bush administration premised its case for pre-emptively attacking Iraq on its claim that dictator Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. Will Saddam deploy them as U.S. troops close in on Baghdad? Probably not, says Khidhir Hamza, who was the head of Saddam's nuclear-weapons program before defecting to the USA in 1994. He was interviewed this

week by USA TODAY Forum Page Editor Glen Nishimura. His comments were edited for length and clarity:

Question: Why haven't U.S. troops found any chemical or biological weapons yet?

Answer: They have not yet reached near Baghdad. The depots are hidden where Saddam's most trusted troops – the SSO and the Republican Guard – can control them. Saddam has probably moved everything north, in the Baghdad vicinity and Tikrit. But we won't know until U.S. troops get to Baghdad.

4) Correction Notice

The New York Times, March 20, 2003 Thursday

SECTION: Section A; Column 3; Metropolitan Desk; Pg. 2

LENGTH: 52 words

Corrections

The TV Watch article in some copies on Tuesday, about the tone of President Bush's address to the nation on war with Iraq, paraphrased his warning about war criminals incorrectly. He said: "War crimes will be prosecuted.

War criminals will be punished." He did not say the United States would prosecute them.

5) Casualty Report

The New York Times, April 3, 2003 Thursday

SECTION: Section B; Column 6; Foreign Desk; Pg. 2

LENGTH: 57 words

A NATION AT WAR; Casualties

Announced military casualties in the Iraq war zone as of 5 p.m. eastern time Wednesday: U.S.

KILLED: 56* CAPTURED OR MISSING: 22*

BRITAIN

KILLED: 27+ CAPTURED OR MISSING: 0+

IRAQ

KILLED: N.A. CAPTURED OR MISSING: 8,000+

Iraq reports only civilian dead, and said on Monday they total 425.
*(Sources: *U.S. Department of Defense; +British Defense Ministry)*

Quantitative Data Analysis. Among the seven newspapers examined, the majority of reports are by the *New York Times* (24 of 62 reports), followed by the *Philadelphia Inquirer* (11 reports), the *Boston Globe* (10), *Daily News* (8), *USA Today* (6), *Christian Science Monitor* (2), and *St. Petersburg Times* (2). [See Table 1]

Most of the reports examined are from outside the theater of war operation (40 out of 63). Of those within the theater, I examined more reports by Non-embeds (14) than reports by Embeds (9). [Table 1]

When we look at the total number of stories written by Embeds and Non-embeds, the *New York Times* accounts for more than one-half of the stories (12 out of 23); while the *Boston Globe* and *USA Today* combined account for about one-third of the stories (7 out of 23). [Table 1]

TABLE 1 News Accounts by Reporter Status and Newspaper Organizations

Newspaper	News by Embeds	News by Non-embeds	News by 'Others'	Total
<i>New York Times</i>	7	5	12	24
<i>Boston Globe</i>	1	3	6	10
<i>USA Today</i>	1	2	3	6
<i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>	0	2	9	11
<i>Daily News (New York)</i>	0	1	7	8
<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	0	1	1	2
<i>St. Petersburg Times</i>	0	0	2	2
Total	9	14	40	63

Of the 63 news accounts in the seven newspapers—nine by Embeds, 14 by Non-embeds, 40 by 'Others'—the average story length slightly varies among the three categories of reporters. Stories by Embeds average 15.2 paragraphs, Non-embeds

average 15.9 paragraphs, and 'Others' average 18.2 paragraphs. [See Table 2]

When the pattern of sourcing is examined, there are slight variations in observed number of sources between Embeds, Non-embeds, and 'Others.' The data is not analyzed for significance in the differences observed because there are too few cases in the cells and also the differences are absolute because they refer to the population of content examined for the one-month of study as opposed to a sample. However, Non-embeds tend to incorporate slightly more sources than Embeds. The difference in the number of sources is less than 2 sources per story. [Table 2]

TABLE 2 News Accounts by Reporter Status

Reporter Status	Total Newspaper Stories	Mean of Newspaper Paragraphs	Sources	
			Mean of Total Sources	Mean of Unnamed Sources
Embed	9	15.2	4.8	2.2
Non-embed	14	15.9	6.2	2.5
'Other'	40	18.2	6.4	2.2

Of the seven newspapers, the *News York Times*, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and the *Boston Globe* filed at least a double-digit numbers of stories for the one-month period of the war. Although these are still too few cases to speak of true differences with confidence, the *New York Times* tends to slightly favor longer paragraphs than the other two newspapers. [See Table 3]

When the pattern of sourcing is examined, there are slight variations in observed number of sources among three newspaper organizations. The *New York Times* tends to include slightly fewer sources than the other two organizations. The difference in the number of sources is about one source per story on average. [Table 3]

TABLE 3

News Accounts by Newspaper Organizations

Newspaper	Total Newspaper Stories	Mean of Newspaper Paragraphs	Sources	
			Mean of Total Sources	Mean of Unnamed Sources
<i>New York Times</i>	24	21.3	4.4	2.5
<i>Philadelphia Inquirer</i>	11	19.5	5.4	2.0
<i>Boston Globe</i>	10	15.6	5.5	2.5

Qualitative Data Analysis. From the beginning, the 2003 Iraq War profoundly divided American public opinion about the country's first preemptive war in a century. It came with the final ultimatum issued to Iraq by President Bush. On March 20, Bush said that selected targets would be hit by air raids in a bid to "decapitate" the Iraqi leadership, marking the beginning of the war. (Jukes & Millership, 2004). Defying the ultimatum, the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, appeared on TV and urged Iraqis to defend their country, three hours after raids began. Invasion forces swept into southern Iraq on March 21, 2003. As of May 1, 2003, Bush said major combat operations in Iraq were over.

Near the beginning of the war, there were controversial issues that the U.N. Security Council did not pass a resolution approving the war in Iraq, and the majority of the Council members such as France, Russia, China, Germany, Syria, and so on, strongly opposed the war. The U.S. had to face a great deal of world criticism, and anti-war protests prompted the U.S. government to find its purported cause of war as soon as possible.

There were three explicit causes asserted by the Bush administration about why a war in Iraq was inevitable: 1) Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on its soil and Saddam Hussein could have sent them out of the country and

perhaps sell them to other rogue nations or terrorist groups; 2) Saddam Hussein was a threat to neighboring countries because Iraq could exercise its armed forces against other countries similar to what happened in 1991 when Iraq invaded Kuwait; and 3) innocent Iraqi citizens should be free from the infamous and corrupt autocracy of Saddam Hussein. Based on these reasons for going to war in Iraq, how do journalists describe the controversial issues of the war?

Embedded Coverage

This study examines nine newspaper stories written by embedded journalists who were attached to military units in the theater of war. Seven stories are published by the *New York Times*, one story by *USA Today*, and one by the *Boston Times*. On the basis of story themes observed in the coverage of the 2003 Iraq War, there are two stories emphasizing readiness of the U.S. forces, three stories dealing with the Bush government's justification of the war in Iraq, and four stories focusing on the war situation at the front.

The articles are divided by three topic categories: 1) the U.S. war effort, 2) continuing efforts to justify war, and 3) battlefield situation.

1) The U.S. War Effort

Without a cause of war against Iraq or a consensus with the U.N., the U.S. had to be ready for an imminent war. During the pre-war phase, there were two articles published by the *New York Times* dealing with the U.S. efforts in the pre-war stage.

On March 18, 2003, Judith Miller, an embedded journalist with the *New York*

Times, wrote an article on the government's new plan for searching for WMD in Iraq titled "Threats and Responses: Disarming Saddam Hussein; Teams of Experts to Hunt Iraq Arms."

The reporter explained that the Bush administration would deploy mobile labs and new specialized teams of intelligence officials and disarmament experts to Kuwait to help the military search for WMD as soon as war began. Developing the story, Miller presented two points: 1) the missions of the mobile labs and new specialized teams and 2) the top priority of the war in Iraq.

Firstly, the reporter explained the government's new plans as follows:

The Pentagon has deployed several new tactical units called mobile exploitation teams, or MET's, with state-of-the-art equipment and novel tactics to locate and survey at least 130 as many as 1,400 possible weapons sites.

In addition, officials said the military was planning to find and interview hundreds of Iraqi scientists who worked on germs, chemical or nuclear-related projects, and to seek their cooperation in disarming Iraq of the weapons that the United Nations required Mr. Hussein to destroy after the Persian Gulf War in 1991. [Excerpt #01]

In these paragraphs, Miller showed the government's efforts to rapidly search for the weapons by using an ambitious plan. The fact that the government was trying to contact international weapons inspectors and Iraqi scientists and was trying to figure out locations of possible weapons by MET suggests that there was no clear evidence to support the government's assertion that it had firm evidence of the existence of WMD. The story suggests that the plan was still unsettled even while the war was around the corner.

Secondly, the reporter explained the hunt for WMD as the top priority as

follows:

“The administration has assigned top priority to the hunt for weapons of mass destruction, official said. After months of relatively fruitless international inspections, the discovery of such arms, officials said, would vindicate the administration’s decision to go to war to disarm Iraq. Conversely, failure to find them would leave the administration vulnerable to charge that it had started a war needlessly. [Excerpt #02]

This paragraph shows that searching for hidden WMD in Iraq was highly prioritized by the government in this war because they could be sent out of Iraq and sold to other rogue nations or terrorist groups. However, it also shows that the U.S. was starting the war without any assurance that Iraq was a threat to the world because there was no trace of WMD so far. Facing a great deal of war opposition, Miller implied that the U.S. could not avoid worldwide criticism until evidence of WMD was found.

Overall, Miller raised expectations for aggressive search plans to disarm Iraq and stressed the government’s efforts toward the weapons search; however, she suggested the desperate situation in which the U.S. had to show physical evidence to the world, and the reality that the U.S. faced as the war began.

A March 19, 2003, article by Bernard Weinraub titled “Threats and Responses: Articles of Capitulation; Iraqis Told, ‘Sign Here’ to Surrender—As Lee Did” focuses on how the government planned to make Iraqi officers surrender peaceably even before the war began. The writer’s main points are: 1) the U.S. prepares for the war by means of psychological strategy and 2) the U.S. efforts to find a lead on hidden weapons.

Here is a portion of Weinraub's story that includes the first point:

Even before the war starts, the United States Army is telling officers in Iraq to surrender their units by signing "articles of capitulation." In a legal move not used since World War II, the United States has dropped leaflets, sent e-mail messages and even spoken privately to Iraqi officers, urging them to surrender their battalions or brigades or division. [Excerpt #03]

Drawing on various psychological strategies which had been forbidden since WWII, the reporter highlighted how elaborately the government was trying to prepare for this war by using every possible resource.

In addition, much of the article was dedicated to the history, meaning and goals of the "articles of capitulation" as means of leading Iraqi officers to surrender. The reporter explained that the articles of capitulation were signed before by Italian commanders supporting Mussolini in WWII and by Robert E. Lee when he had surrendered to Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox. The reporter stressed its intent to prevent the turmoil that took place during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 when large numbers of Iraqis surrendered.

Weinraub also wrote:

Iraqi officers must also sign an article in which they are compelled to provide the United States with information about subordinates as well as the location of land mines, conventional and unconventional weapon bunkers and any other armaments under the control of the capitulating unit. [Excerpt #04]

In this report, the reporter suggested that the U.S. wanted to get information about military personnel and weapons' locations hidden in Iraq from Iraqi officers, trying to find any link with WMD.

Thus, near the beginning of the war, Weinraub showed the U.S. efforts to win over Iraqi officers without severe disturbance and interpreted the “articles of capitulation” as intended to peaceably lead the war and to draw information from the Iraqi officers.

2) Continuing Efforts to Justify War

Despite discord among U.N. Security Council members, the U.S. decided to go to war. However, the U.S. had to face significant criticism for going to Iraq without a cause or the justification of war. Three newspaper stories focus on the Bush government’s efforts to justify war against Iraq.

Weinraub’s coverage on March 27, 2003, presented a probable location of chemical weapons in Iraq narrowed down to the Medina Division. Weinraub showed two points in his story: 1) where did Hussein move chemical weapons? and 2) what are the implications of discovery of the weapons?

First of all, here is a portion of the story related to the weapons’ location:

Statements from Iraqi prisoners of war and electronic eavesdropping on Iraqi government communications indicate that Saddam Hussein has moved chemical weapons to the Medina Division, one of three Republican Guard divisions guarding the approaches to Baghdad, Army officials said...

...Officials with V Corps said intelligence information pointed to Mr. Hussein deploying 155-millimeter artillery weapons with shells carrying mustard gas as well as sarin, or nerve agents, an especially deadly weapon. Mr. Hussein used these chemical agents against the Iranians and the country’s Kurdish population in the 1980’s. [Excerpt #05]

Information from officials indicated that the Medina Division could be a

turning point to show the existence of the weapons that the U.S. had been looking, the reporter suggested. Mentioning a specific number and kinds of the weapons, the reporter highlighted the fact that Saddam Hussein used the same chemical agents against the Iranians and Kurdish populations in the 1980s. This shows the reporter's concern about a potential chemical warfare against allied forces.

On the other hand, it was also noted that the information from Iraqi prisoners and an electronic eavesdropping machine might not be correct. To support this idea, Weinraub quoted army officials saying, "Monitoring the movement of chemical weapons was sometimes difficult because Mr. Hussein often hid chemical pellets inside bunkers that carried conventional armaments." It suggests that there was uncertainty over the location and that information from Iraqis might not be enough to prove the existence of the weapons.

Regarding the meaning of the discovery, here is a relevant portion of the story:

Intelligence officers said the apparent deployment of chemical weapons by Mr. Hussein was not merely a sign of rage by the Iraqi leader toward the Americans. Although deployment of the weapons could give the lie to Mr. Hussein's denial that he had them, officers said that Mr. Hussein might be calculating that the step would actually turn to his advantage, and stunt the American assault.

[Excerpt #06]

Quoting intelligence officers, the reporter explained that the apparent deployment of chemical weapons by the Iraqi leader would mean that the U.S. had accused Iraq of having lied about its possession of the weapons to the world, as well as justifying its cause of war. Also, Iraq would be held responsible for war crimes if it participated in a chemical attack.

Meanwhile, the reporter doubted whether the U.S. could justify the war after all, repeating, “No chemical weapons have been used against allied troops to date.”

Miller reported another news article on April 4, 2003, titled “A Nation at War: Illicit Arms; U.S. Forces Have Searched Few Iraqi Weapons Sites” datelined Kuwait City. The story begins with progress of the weapons search. She presented two main points throughout her story: 1) is there any progress in weapons search by the U.S. forces? and 2) is the top priority of the government changed?

Firstly, Miller focused on whether there was any evidence of the illicit weapons and explained the reason why the search had been slowed:

The officials in Washington said they expected to intensify their search in the days ahead, as American forces gained control of a wider swath of Iraqi territory, including the area around Baghdad where most of the suspect sites are concentrated...

...A defense official who spoke on the condition of anonymity said the search had been slowed by the fact that until now, Iraqi forces had controlled the areas surrounding some sites, particularly near Baghdad and in Tikrit, a city north of Baghdad that is President Saddam Hussein's hometown. [Excerpt #07]

Describing search efforts by American forces, the reporter said that even though fewer than a dozen of several hundred sites had been searched two weeks into the war in Iraq, there was no success in weapon searches, and the U.S. was not sure how long it would take to find it.

Quoting Pentagon officials, the reporter explained that the reason for slowed searches was that Iraqi forces had controlled suspected areas but it would open a lot more areas to the U.S. as the war developed. Miller pointed out that the next efforts on WMD would be critical, increasing the public's hope for search activities and the

cause of war.

Secondly, the reporter moved her focus on the top priority of the war:

Senior administration officials insist that the goal of ridding Iraq of chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction remains a top priority. They deny that eliminating these weapons has slipped in importance as American troops encircle Baghdad, or that the justification for the war has shifted from disarming Iraq to ending widespread human rights abuses or preventing Iraqi-supported terrorism within the United States. [Excerpt #08]

Showing skepticism toward continuous failures to find the weapons, Miller raised a question about whether the government's priority had been changed. To support her idea, she compared quotes from Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who emphasized finding, securing, and ultimately destroying Iraq's hidden WMD as a top priority on the second day of the war, and those from a Pentagon spokeswoman who focused more on capturing and evicting "terrorists sheltered in Iraq" a week later. Quoting a chemical weapons expert, she explained the reason for changing war priority might be that the government tried to dampen expectations because it was worried that it would not find any WMD.

On April 7, 2003, Weinraub with V Corps Headquarters in northern Kuwait reported on a discovery of drums possibly storing chemical agents. The story is headlined "American Soldiers Find Drums Possibly Storing Chemical Agents." The story's main focus is: 1) how did American soldiers find those drums? and 2) what is the meaning of the discovery?

A military officer was quoted to explain the circumstance of the discovery:

Colonel Madere said the soldiers came upon an empty training camp

that the Army believed may have been a base for Iraqi paramilitaries or Palestinians and other foreigners seeking to help defend Iraq. The soldiers discovered an unusually large amount of chemical protection gear, and instead of weapons, they found several canisters on the site. At that point, they called in their chemical unit. [Excerpt #09]

Since the war started 19 days earlier, no evidence of chemical or biological weapons had been found in Iraq. At this point, the reporter reported on some expectations that the discovery by the search unit might have a successful result this time. He also explained situations in which several soldiers became ill, and the soldiers quickly put on their chemical protection gear, supporting the possibility of chemical and biological weapons at the spot. The test results revealed that a 20-gallon drum showed positive indications for sarin and tabun, two nerve agents, and a 55-gallon drum was positive for mustard gas, the reporter added.

What does the discovery mean? While showing excitement on the discovery, the reporter expressed concerns about it:

But additional tests must be conducted before the possibility of a false reading can be excluded. Military officials say that many industrial chemicals can cause false alarms, and that they do not want to make public charges unless they are irrefutable. Asked about the discovery in Washington today, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld urged caution. "We have to recognize that almost all first reports that we get turn out to be wrong," he said. "There tend to be changes in them. And as a result, we have to take our time and look at it." [Excerpt #10]

The discovery could be a definite clue in justifying the war but the reporter did not exclude the possibility of false alarms even though the material was positive in the preliminary test by quoting official sources such as military officials and the

defense secretary. He also emphasized that there were only chemical protection gear and several canisters on the site which were not weaponized. By saying so, he cast a question about whether the discovery could give any evidence for the pre-war justification.

3) Battlefield Situation

Four newspaper stories focus on delicate situations on the battlefield. These show how differently embedded journalists who accompanied ground units covered their embedded troops. In particular, these stories distinguish themselves from those written by non-embedded journalists who were not allowed access to American soldiers.

On March 21, 2003, David J. Lynch, embedded journalist from *USA Today*, wrote on a missile attack by Iraq and damage in an American camp. The story is headlined “Iraq Fires at least 5 Missiles into Kuwait,” datelined Northern Kuwait. The missiles struck back at U.S. and British positions in Kuwait right after the U.S. attacked targets in and around Baghdad, but there was no one injured, the reporter said. Throughout the story, Lynch presented two main points: 1) what kinds of missiles were used in the attack? and 2) what was the meaning of the attack?

Here is a portion of his story to present the first point:

No chemical or biological weapons were detected, U.S. officials said, though soldiers and residents in this region remained jittery. In Kuwait City, air raid sirens blared four times Thursday, each time followed quickly by an all-clear signal. One of the missiles was apparently intended for Camp Doha, an American headquarters near the harbor outside Kuwait City.

Initial reports of the Iraqi missile strikes were sketchy, and it remained unclear what sort of missiles were used or exactly how many were launched; estimates ranged from five to a dozen. [Excerpt #11]

The reporter showed the atmosphere of Kuwait which was surrounded by frustration and fears of a chemical and biological weapons attack. Regarding types of missiles, the reporter quoted Army officials who said that soldiers put on gas masks and bulky protective suits out of fear that the missiles might contain chemical or biological weapons. The reporter was soon informed that no chemical weapons were detected.

The second point by the reporter was made as follows:

Army officials here insisted that two of the missiles were Scuds, which, if true, would represent an important political victory for the Bush administration. U.S. officials have justified their invasion largely on the claim that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, including dozens of Scud missiles banned by United Nations sanctions that limit Iraq's missiles to a 93-mile range. Some Scuds the Iraqis had—and might still have—could fly more than 500 miles. [Excerpt #12]

Lynch focused on a type of missiles used in the attack because it might be a critical clue related to the justification for war. If missiles were the same as what the government had been looking for, it could be a turning point; however, interviews with anonymous Pentagon officials revealed that the missiles were Scuds called the Ababil-100, and those were not Scuds but solid-fuel missiles that had an official range within U.N. limits.

While providing readers with the government's hope and concerns about the missile at the same time, the reporter kept raising a question about whether the U.S. could find any evidence to justify war, underlining the fact that even though the war

had begun, the U.S. was still looking for a cause of war and there was an unjustified war going on in Iraq.

On March 25, 2003, *New York Times* embedded journalist Steven Lee Myers reported on an assault toward the Third Infantry Division. The headline of the story is “G.I.’s Pause on Push to Baghdad, and One Falls to a Sniper” filed from central Iraq. Throughout the story, there are two main points presented by Myers: 1) what was happening in the assault? and 2) is there any trace of chemical or biological agents?

Here is a portion of the story related to the first point:

*One soldier in this division was killed by a sniper’s bullet today, as the division consolidated its positions on a broad plateau north of Najaf before what is expected to be a strong assault on Baghdad...
...The soldier who was killed was part of a tank platoon positioned around the First Brigade, and died from a single shot. The tank platoon returned fire, and killed two Iraqis. Several other Iraqis—it was not clear how many—were captured.* [Excerpt #13]

While covering a scene capturing more Iraqi prisoners, the reporter explained an unexpected circumstance that a soldier died from a single shot by an Iraqi. The paragraphs also showed that the level of danger got higher as the division got deeper into Baghdad.

Myers stressed the loss of war potential among Iraqi militants, saying that the depot seemed to have been once heavily guarded, but the small forces defending the area surrendered quickly when American soldiers arrived in armored Bradley fighting vehicles. The reporter suggested that allied forces secured the depot with superiority in strength over Iraqi militants.

The reporter precisely described the discovery of a depot which was on a list of the Bush administration's suspected chemical weapons sites and was one of the main objectives of the division's rapid advance over the escarpment north of Najaf.

Army weapons inspectors began searching an ammunition depot seized on Sunday for evidence that Saddam Hussein's government had stored chemical weapons there. The First Brigade's Second Battalion seized the sprawling depot without a fight, capturing 93 prisoners, including one believed to be a general.

The depot—two and a half miles by five and a half miles in area—is on a list of the Bush administration's suspected chemical weapons sites, and it was one of the main objectives of the division's rapid advance over the escarpment north of Najaf. [Excerpt #14]

Regarding the controversy on chemical or biological weapons in Iraq, the reporter said that the discovery of chemical weapons would give a significant political boost to the administration's rationale for the war. At the same time, he wrote about officers' desire and dedication to find weapons in question, noting "a thought that seems to be less on the mind of officers here than the desire to ensure the quick capture of any potential sites for storing weapons that might be used against their troops."

Describing night near Najaf, the reporter gave the soldiers' expectations for finding WMD, as well as his doubt on whether the U.S. could get the result that it longed for, saying "across the desert, soldiers continued to find and collect weapons, uniforms and other equipment belonging to Iraqi troops who had either surrendered or fled. Most unsettling were the gas masks that were found, a possible indication of Iraq's intention to use chemical weapons."

An April 2, 2003, article titled "War in Iraq / Baghdad's Leader the Karbala Gap" by Brian MacQuarrie, embedded journalist of the *Boston Globe*, covered a war

front situation. The soldiers of the Third Infantry Division were fighting the battle of Karbala that could be a defining point in the conflict in Iraq, the reporter wrote. MacQuarrie made two main points in his story: 1) the description of before and after the Karbala battle and 2) the meaning of the battle.

Presenting the first point, MacQuarrie vividly described soldiers' actions, conditions, and facial expressions of those preparing for the battle:

Hours before the beginning of the battle of Karbala, the bravado and concerns of those who would fight it showed on their faces. Some sat alone on cots, cleaning their weapons of the grit that swirls incessantly here. Others shaved with cold water, ensuring that no stubble remained on skin where gas masks need to mold for an airtight fit.

Some were irritable, others were adrenaline-pumped, but all were mindful of the test that would come with the night. [Excerpt #15]

As seen from above, the reporter illustrated how soldiers prepared for the approaching war situation. Conveying soldiers' concerns about the potential of chemical weapons that could turn what was expected to be a nasty battle into something much worse, MacQuarrie added how the U.S. forces finally controlled the battle without any U.S. casualties.

Making the second point, the reporter explained a possible implication of the battle for the whole war.

The Karbala battle loomed as the first significant, head-to-head contest between US troops and Republican Guard soldiers who have been waiting north and east of Karbala for the American advance. Although the ranks of the elite Republican Guard reportedly have been weakened by desertion, they still are reckoned a formidable force. [Excerpt #16]

The reporter underlined the importance of the battle as a turning point in the war and a critical entry point to the highways and approaches to the ultimate objective, Baghdad. Throughout this article, the reporter tried to implant hope in the readers. He described grave consequences to the first significant, head-to-head contest between U.S. troops and Republican Guard soldiers, and reported on some expectations of future battles near Baghdad as well as concerns about more resistance by Iraqi militants.

On April 9, 2003, Jim Dwyer, another embedded journalists with the *New York Times*, covered a vivid battle in a town which is about 50 miles south of Baghdad. The article is titled “In the Field 101st Airborne Division; A Grenade on the Road, the Death of the Enemy: the Human Side of War.”

The Iraqi attack came as American forces moved to seize the last of three cities in a religious triangle—including Najaf and Karbala. At that time, infantry trucks were carrying 120 soldiers from the Third Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. The reporter took a close look at 1) a sudden attack by Iraqis, as well as 2) American soldiers’ humanitarian actions.

Firstly, presenting war situations that caused casualties, the reporter gave a vivid description about it based on Sergeant Chuck Shy and Sergeant Major Savusa’s interviews.

He remembers diving to the ground, returning fire, a loud explosion, a bright flash. A grenade had been hurled from those bushes. It landed 10 feet from Sergeant Shy, then burst into uncountable bits of shrapnel. A few pieces tore into his face. Stunned, he hustled to the other side of the truck...

...The sergeant major reached onto the front seat of a truck to get a

grenade from another soldier. Sergeant Major Savusa worked methodically. As shots rang from the foliage a few yards away, he unpeeled the top of the protective canister, pullet the safety pin, and lobbed the grenade into the bushes. [Excerpt #17]

As viewed from above, the reporter displayed how the combat began and how acutely the situation proceeded. Mentioning the U.S. soldiers' responses to the attack, the reporter pointed out their promptness and agility in the battle.

Secondly, as the title suggests, the following is a description of dead Iraqi soldiers showing a human side among war tragedies:

About 10 or 15 feet away, the body of one of the two slain Iraqi soldiers lay face down in the dust, fingers partially clenched. His uniform was dark olive, almost black; the boots were new; his hair looked to have been freshly trimmed in a military cut; he seemed to have a sturdy, muscular build.

On the other side of the road, the campsite for the Iraqi team was still fresh. Blankets were placed neatly on the ground, a tea set was stacked up and half-eaten pita bread was left on a plate. A T-shirt, apparently field-laundered, swung from a tree limb for drying... the general called to Staff Sgt. James Massey and Pvt. Rob Maher to retrieve blankets from the Iraqi camp, to wrap the bodies. [Excerpt #18]

Dwyer made an unusual attempt to reveal humanitarian sides of the war. The brigade general's humanitarian gesture toward dead Iraqi soldiers was put into words as "the general called to Staff Sgt. James Massey and Pvt. Rob Maher to retrieve blankets from the Iraqi camp, to wrap the bodies." He concluded the story with his own humanitarian side and ended it with vivid imagery for readers to think about: "A breeze passed, and set swaying the ferns on the side of the road where the Iraqis had hidden, and where they now lay still."

Non-embedded Coverage

Fourteen newspaper articles written by non-embedded journalists are examined in this study. Five articles are from the *New York Times*, three from the *Boston Globe*, two from *USA Today*, two from the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and one from *Daily News*.

These articles are divided into the same topic categories used in the analysis of embedded journalists' articles and one more topic category of world reactions to the war is added as well. Two stories focused on the U.S. decision to go to Iraq, two raised a question about how the U.S. could justify the war, four dealt with world opinions on the war, and six focused on battlefield situations.

1) The U.S. War Effort

Unlike embeds' reportage, non-embedded journalists put more focus on how Iraq and Kuwait prepared for war and the U.S. efforts in the pre-war stages. Stories tended to include non-governmental sources to reflect views other than the government's and to show the war readiness of the U.S. forces.

On March 14, 2003, David Filipov, the *Boston Globe* correspondent, reported on Iraq's rejection of a British proposal to disarm Iraq titled "Iraq Rejects British Proposal." He presented two main points in his story: 1) the meaning of the British proposal and 2) Iraq's response to the proposal.

Firstly, Filipov explained the meaning of the proposal as follows:

The Compromise, proposed by Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain on Wednesday, would have abandoned a proposed Monday deadline for Iraq to fully disarm or face war. Instead, Hussein would have to complete six disarmament tasks to avoid "serious consequences,"

diplomatic code for military action.

Among the six tasks, Hussein would have to declare on television that he would give up any hidden weapons of mass destruction. [Excerpt #19]

Presenting the British government's point of view, the reporter explained that the proposal was fundamentally intended to avoid a war situation, unlike the U.S. decision to go to war. The report pointed out that Iraq had been hiding weapons that were supposed to have been destroyed since the Persian Gulf War and assured the existence of weapons. The reporter, however, did not provide any specific information about the existence or locations of the hidden weapons.

The other point is about Iraq's reaction to the proposal by British prime minister:

As diplomats at the UN considered the measure as an addition to a proposed US resolution, Foreign Minister Naji Sabri of Iraq dismissed the new British benchmarks as "an aggressive plan for war."

Sabri said the proposal sought to "personalize" the conflict between Iraq and a US-and-British-led campaign by demanding that Hussein make moves to disarm.

"It is a dressing-up a rejected proposal, an aggressive plan for war," Sabri said in Baghdad. "It polishes up a resolution rejected by the vast majority of the Security Council." [Excerpt #20]

In the above paragraphs, the reporter conveyed Iraq's firm determination against the proposal and its defiance against the U.S. and British threat of force. The reporter also suggested that there were other kinds of defiance by the U.N. Security Council members who strongly opposed the war, such as France and Russia. This means that the U.S. took a great deal of risks even in the pre-war stage and faced the disagreements and world opposition.

A March 18, 2003, article headlined “Americans, Britons Evacuate as Troops Brace for Attack” was written by Thanassis Cambanis, non-embedded reporter with the *Boston Globe*. The reporter described the atmosphere in Kuwait City in which there was going to be a theater of an imminent war and Kuwaiti people who were afraid of terrorism by Iraqis, remembering the Persian Gulf War. The article’s main points are: 1) preparation for the war in Kuwait and 2) warning of a chemical or biological attack and its possibility.

The first point is presented as follows:

The more than 130,000 American and British ground troops in Kuwait, part of a total force of more than 250,000 in the region, moved onto what appeared to be final war footing, receiving a visit from US General Tommy Franks, who would direct a war against Iraq from the US Central Command’s regional headquarters in Qatar. Through Kuwait, a third of which has been closed for military operations, both coalition and Kuwaiti forces were on high alert. Snipers guarded military fuel convoys, and Kuwaiti troops blanketed the capital city with checkpoints. [Excerpt #21]

Referring to the ultimatum that was announced by the Bush administration, the reporter showed how Kuwait prepared for the war as an outpost line. The reporter stressed the importance of Kuwait City in the war and how both U.S. and Kuwaiti forces were completely ready for the war against Iraq.

Presenting the other point, the reporter wrote about the danger of a probable chemical and biological attack against Kuwaitis or American civilians and counteractions of it:

Warning that terrorists and undercover Iraqi agents in Kuwait could mount a devastating chemical or biological attack against civilians

here, US and British officials told their citizens to leave and reduced their embassy staff to essential employees.

According to intelligence cited by senior Western officials, agents acting for the Iraqi government or for a terrorist organization opposed to a US-led War could strike at American and British troops, or sow panic among civilians by unleashing a chemical or biological weapon. [Excerpt #22]

While there was no specific evidence to prove the existence of chemical or biological weapons in Iraq, the reporter showed that government officials kept stressing a probable attack by those weapons, saying, "If there is military action, there is the risk of an attack from Iraq, which may involve chemical and biological weapons." Meanwhile, the reporter suggested that the war did not have any vindicated reasons yet because the existence or locations of those weapons in Iraq was still not certain.

2) Continuous Efforts to Justify War

Two news articles reflected the U.S. efforts to justify war. Reporters kept raising questions about whether the U.S. could find WMD in Iraq and whether the war could be justified at the end.

On March 20, 2003, *Daily News* correspondent Richard Sisk reported on Iraq's missiles attack on Kuwait, from Camp Coyote, Kuwait. He presented two main themes throughout the story: 1) the kinds of missiles used in the attack and 2) the possibility of a chemical, biological or nuclear weapons discovery in Iraq.

The missile attack targeted the border with Kuwait several hours after the U.S. bombed Baghdad, and the reporter focused on what kind of missiles they were:

The U.S. military said one Iraqi Scud missile targeted at Kuwait City was brought down in midair by a Patriot missile.

Marines said one missile sailed over their desert camp right up against the border but dropped harmlessly into the empty desert.

An investigation by U.S. personnel showed it was not carrying chemical or biological weapons. [Excerpt #23]

The kinds of missiles could be a significant clue to prove that Iraq had violated the Persian Gulf War agreement on Scuds and also gave a cause for war to the U.S. With these reasons, the reporter emphasized a significant meaning of the event as the war began. However, by mentioning that the missiles did not carry chemical and biological agents, the reporter dampened expectations about justifying the war by finding WMD.

The reporter also presented the other point as follows:

In Baghdad, Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Al Sahaf denied that his country had any Scuds, which are banned under the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire that also ordered Baghdad to scrap its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.

Britain said last year that Iraq had kept as many as 20 of the Soviet-designed Scuds, which can fly up to 400 miles. [Excerpt #24]

In these paragraphs, the reporter reported a claim by Britain that Iraq still possessed Scuds that were supposed to have been abandoned after the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Sisk highlighted that Iraq had been deceiving the world about the weapons if the missiles turned out to be Scuds. In that case, this event could support the U.S.-British military action in Iraq and reverse world opposition toward them, the reporter suggested.

At the same time, the reporter explained about strong criticism on the U.S. in case there was no Scud missile in Iraq. The reporter speculated that the U.S. could

recover its position, harshly blamed for going to war without any reasons, saying, “Any confirmation that Iraq had used banned weapons might temper criticism of the U.S.-British military action.”

A March 21, 2003, article written by Peter Ford with the *Christian Science Monitor* focused on the legality of the war. The story was headlined “As attack on Iraq begins, question remains: Is it legal?” The reporter’s main points are divided into two: 1) other countries’ positions on the war in Iraq and 2) how to justify the war.

Regarding the first point, Peter wrote as follows:

International-law experts are divided on whether Washington has the right to invade Iraq in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution specifically authorizing such an assault.

French President Jacques Chirac said Tuesday he had opposed the war “in the name of the primacy of the law,” and slammed the US administration for preferring “the use of force over compliance with the law.” UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also warned last week that war on Iraq without a new resolution endorsing it “will not be in conformity with the (UN) Charter,” a cornerstone of international law. [Excerpt #25]

The reporter showed conflicting opinions about whether Washington had the right to invade Iraq without a resolution of the U.N. Presenting the positions of France, Russia, and the U.N. Security Council against the war, Ford reported on their claims that the U.S.-led war could not be justified. On the other hand, the reporter said legitimacy of the war was claimed by the White House and Britain, saying that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, which threatened President Hussein with “serious consequences” if he did not take a last chance to give up his weapons of mass destruction,” authorized the use of force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait and to

restore international peace and security in the area.

The reporter's second focus is how the war could be justified:

The war could be legitimized – even though it is illegal – “if we find all the things that we say we are going to find” such as chemical and biological weapons, argues Anne Marie Slaughter, dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International affairs at Princeton University. “But it is going to require that the US and Britain truly prove their case,” she adds.” [Excerpt #26]

As seen above, the reporter strongly believed that the only way to justify the war was to find chemical and biological weapons that the U.S. had been blaming Iraq for. The source also suggested that the U.S. and Britain would not avoid world criticism without finding any weapons because the war was already illegal because of the lack of a resolution from the U.N.

3) World Reactions on the War

Four news articles dealt with world reactions on the war. Non-embedded reporters who filed stories from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Syria presented these countries' positions on the war and focused on anti-war movements around the world.

Ian Fisher, the *New York Times* correspondent, wrote on protests in Jordan on March 24, 2003. The title of the story is “Protests Continue as Jordan Defends U.S. Presence in Border Region.” There are two points presented in the story: 1) antiwar protests in Jordan 2) Jordan's position and role in a war on Iraq.

Firstly, the reporter presented how strong an internal opposition against the war was in Jordan:

There have been about 60 protests in Jordan since the war in Iraq began last week... and today the police used water cannons and smoke bombs to quell a large demonstration at the campus of the University of Jordan here in Amman. Students threw stones at the police and burned a sheet painted like an American flag as well as an effigy of President Bush. [Excerpt #27]

To show strong anti-war movements in Jordan, the reporter noted that a large number of protests broke out and they were getting serious since the war in Iraq began a week earlier. Stressing strong internal opposition to the war in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the reporter expressed concerns about a ripple effect of the war and how sensitive the issue of protest and opposition to the war was in Jordan.

The other point was Jordan's position on the war:

While Jordan maintains largely friendly relations with Iraq, its largest trading partner, it has allowed thousands of American Special Forces soldiers in the desert on its eastern border with Iraq, in a role that has grown more contentious in recent days.

Jordan maintains that their role is to operate Patriot antimissile batteries and other roles officials here say are purely defensive.
[Excerpt #28]

The writer suggested a diplomatic dilemma for Jordan-on the one hand, wanting an amicable relationship with the U.S. and on the other, seeking to maintain its strategic position in the Arab world. The reporter emphasized that Jordan's role was more important to the U.S. in performing successful military operations. With louder antiwar protests, the reporter said that Jordan was hoping for a quick end of the war in order to minimize its diplomatic damage.

On March 25, 2003, Craig S. Smith of the *New York Times* reported on Saudi

Arabia's proposals to request the U.S. and Iraq to end the war with the headline "Saudis Send Proposals to End War to Both Sides." Throughout the story, the reporter presented two main points: 1) the purpose of the proposals and 2) Saudi Arabia's standing with both nations.

Regarding the proposals, the reporter wrote as follows:

The prince again called on both the United States and Iraq to stop the war, saying that the conflict should be sent back to the United Nations. He also asked that diplomacy be given a second chance so that we don't reach the point of the First World War, where people are digging trenches and dying in a war that will bring nothing but hatred between our two peoples.

Saudi Arabia is negotiating a narrow and difficult path between its stated opposition to the war, which is deeply unpopular among the Saudi population, and its quiet support of the American war effort.

[Excerpt #29]

To point out Saudi Arabia's efforts to avoid the war, the reporter said that the proposals were intended to stop the fighting between the U.S. and Iraq, and the kingdom's foreign minister wanted the conflict to be handled by the U.N. In later paragraphs, he also stressed that Saudi Arabia tried to provide political asylum for Saddam Hussein in order to solve the conflict peaceably before the war started.

The other point of the story focused on Saudi Arabia's relationship with the U.S.:

Long one of America's most loyal allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia hopes to protect its relationship with the United States while not losing its stature in the Arab world. Kuwait and Qatar, which have more openly supported the United States-led war in Iraq by allowing both land and air combat missions to be launched from their soil, have become increasingly isolated in Middle Eastern diplomacy.

[Excerpt #30]

While Saudi Arabia seemed to have objected to the war, the reporter underscored the long friendship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, saying that Saudi Arabia kept supporting the U.S. in the war. At the same time, pointing to the case of Kuwait which ended up being isolated in the Arab world due to overt support for the U.S., the reporter underlined the position of Saudi Arabia as it struggled between the U.S. and the Arab world.

On March 27, 2003, Carlotta Gall of the *New York Times* reported on a rocket attack from Afghanistan on American bases titled “Militants in Afghanistan Fire Rockets at 2 American Bases.” According to the reporter, Afghanistan militants fired more than a dozen rockets at two American bases in Shkin in eastern Afghanistan and Gardez further north overnight but did not cause any damage or injuries. The story’s main focuses are 1) the correlation between the rocket attack and the Iraq war and 2) a counterattack conducted by the U.S.

Firstly, the rocket attack by Afghanistan was presented as follows:

The attacks, which did not cause any damage or injuries, followed a number of assaults on American and Afghan forces in recent days, apparently stepped up with the outbreak of the war. Taliban supporters and other opponents of the American presence in Afghanistan have been threatening for weeks to increase their activity if war broke out in Iraq. [Excerpt #31]

In this report, the reporter linked the Iraq war with increasing levels of attacks by Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Gall emphasized how successfully American forces deterred such attacks:

To deter such attacks, American forces launched a large-scale

operation in southern Afghanistan on the day the war in Iraq began, last Thursday. More than 600 troops have been deployed to scour a mountainous area for rebel groups.

The troops have not encountered any significant enemy presence, but they arrested four more men after finding a weapons cache in a village, Captain Cramer said. A total of eight people have been detained and several arms caches seized in the last week. [Excerpt #32]

The reporter stressed that the U.S. performed large-scale operations and deployed a large number of units to insurgent areas, highlighting efforts to respond to the attacks rapidly. As seen from Excerpt #32, Gall reported the troops' accomplishments of arresting insurgents and securing a weapons cache.

New York Times correspondent Neil MacFarquhar wrote on March 31, 2003, about Syria's unhappiness with the U.S. war in Iraq. Titled "Syria Wants U.S. to Lose War, Its foreign Minister Declares," the story is mainly about Syria's strong opposition to the war. The reporter focused on the Syrian foreign minister's harsh comments, which accused Syria of allowing military supplies to be transported across its border to Iraq. The main argument presented in the story is the U.S. response to Syria's criticism.

MacFarquhar wrote:

"Syria has a national interest in the expulsion of the invaders from Iraq because the truth is that the U.S. administration has led its people to a catastrophic stage and put them in confrontation with the entire international community," Mr. Sharaa said while speaking to Parliament, praising the Iraqis' "Courageous resistance."

He said that the war against Iraq was yet another example of the United States' acting to serve Israel's interest in the region. He also

said that officials in Washington relied on Israel for much of their information about the Arab world, information that often proved untrue. [Excerpt #33]

In this report, MacFarquhar suggested that Syria was strongly opposing the U.S.-led war and it supported Iraq's resistance against the U.S. He also stressed Israel's role and influence on American policy towards Arabs.

In later paragraphs, the reporter said that Syria had objected to the war as a member of the U.N. Security Council and it criticized the U.S. for violating international law and the principle of self determination, as first championed by President Woodrow Wilson in 1918. The reporter, however, pointed out that Syria neglected to address the Bush administration's fundamental goal to free the Iraqi people from the corrupt government of Saddam Hussein.

4) Battlefield Situation

Six news articles on battlefield situation are examined to find similarities and/or differences with embeds' reportage. Similar to embeds, non-embeds focused on frontline battles and weapon search activities by allied forces. Different from embeds, some reporters used Iraqi civilian sources for their stories to draw other points of view on the war.

On March 29, 2003, Ian Fisher of the *New York Times* reported on 1) whether Iraq has any Scud missiles that are capable of attacking Israel and 2) efforts to find weapons. His report was titled "Western Desert; War That Is Out of Sight But Not Out of Mind, Especially for the Israelis."

On the first point, Fisher wrote:

In fact, military officials from several nations said this week that troops had not found any Scud missiles or launchers capable of hitting Israel. Iraq denies that it has any long-range missiles or chemical or biological weapons.

But the western desert is huge, some two and a half times the size of Israel. And military officials concede that the relatively small number of forces there, using jeeps, aircraft, even all-terrain vehicles, have yet to scour the entire area. [Excerpt #34]

Focusing on the goal of the war as blocking any missile attacks from Iraq on Israel, the reporter suggested that the goal had not been accomplished yet because there had been no missile launched from Iraq. Fisher both gave the Iraqi side of the story on its denial of having WMD, and cast doubt on the truth of the Iraqi claims. He noted that U.S. troops were yet to search the western desert for the banned weapons because the desert area was two and a half times the size of Israel, giving a reason for no weapons discovery.

As for the inaccessibility of the western desert to reporters, Fisher wrote:

The western desert, some 300 miles from Baghdad to the borders of Syria and Jordan, has been inaccessible to reporters. There are no news media representatives traveling with Special Operations forces there, and the danger along the road from Jordan from Iraqi troops and irregular forces has dissuaded reporters from venturing in on their own. Recent travelers have reported seeing burned-out cars and buses hit from above, suggesting strikes from American and British airplanes. [Excerpt #35]

Fisher's report told about the western desert where the U.S. did not allow the press to visit but Special Operations forces were acting and allied forces' air attacks were carried out. While the war began a week earlier and it said there was no specific information about the location of the banned weapons or their existence, the reporter

raised a question about secret operations in the area which might be a critical place for the U.S.

On April 2, 2003, Charles M. Sennott of the *Boston Globe* reported on the discovery of preliminary evidence of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. The story is headlined "Signs of Plan for Chemical Arms Reported." The main points presented in the story are: 1) the meaning of a weapons discovery and 2) details about how the weapons were found.

Presenting the first point, the reporter quoted a battalion commander:

A battalion commander for the traditionally secretive special forces, who spoke to reporters on the condition of anonymity, said the air and ground offensive coordinated with Kurdish troops in recent days against Ansar al-Islam in northeastern Iraq was a "model" operation in the war on terrorism that revealed signs the group was trying to develop weapons of mass destruction...

...He said the materials would be analyzed and that the results would be made public. Those results would be a key test of the US State Department's allegation that Ansar al-Islam was experimenting with the use of chemical and biological weapons at its headquarters in the village of Sargat, which was reduced to rubble by intensive airstrikes.

[Excerpt #36]

The reporter focused on the preliminary evidence that might be a critical justification for war because it could prove that Islamic militants were developing chemical and biological weapons. Sennott described a somewhat excited atmosphere in the U.S. government with the hope of finally being able to justify war and being protected from the world criticism, saying that the test results would be a core of allegation about Iraq's chemical and biological weapon production. On the other hand, if the results turned out to be disappointing, the U.S. would take heavy criticism, the

reporter suggested.

Presenting the second point, the reporter wrote as follows:

Yesterday in the village of Sargat, three small buildings which were not damaged by the US airstrikes contained approximately 300 small bottles of acetone and several plastic, 25-liter containers of potassium cyanide as well as C-4 explosives.

A foul odor around the buildings discouraged most reporters from entering, but a German television crew videotaped the labels of the chemicals. [Excerpt #37]

Describing the discovery of the buildings, the reporter raised the possibility that the U.S. finally might have found legitimate evidence and informed readers about successful military operation on Iraq with the Kuwaiti force. But still, there was a chance that the preliminary evidence might be a false alarm and did not prove the existence of any chemical or biological weapons in Iraq, the story suggested.

In later paragraphs, the reporter added that searches of fighters hidden in the mountains progressed steadily, and the U.S. held a dominant position. Sennott concluded the story with an interview of an Iraqi civilian to present a different perspective dealing with the war.

"It is a mixed emotion for us... We are happy that Ansar has been forced out but we are saddened that our mosque was so damaged in the process." [Excerpt #38]

On the same day, Jonathan S. Landay of the *Philadelphia Inquirer* reported on the discovery of a chemical weapons' clue. The headline of the article is "Militants Leave Signs of Chemical Arms; The Kurdish Islamic Militant Group Attacked in Northern Iraq Last Weekend also is accused of Links to Al-Qaeda and Hussein." The main points in the story are 1) details of the discovery of evidence and 2) the

accomplishments of the joint U.S. and Kuwait operation.

Regarding the first point, his story revealed more specific information about the discovery of the chemicals than Sennott's:

The special-forces soldiers also found recipes for three forms of chlorine gas and for ricin, a deadly toxin derived from castor beans, American intelligence officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity...

...The commander of the U.S. special-forces battalion that participated in the attack said evidence the group had been making chemical-and possibly biological-weapons was uncovered in the ruins of a base devastated by American bombs. [Excerpt #39]

The reporter wrote that American experts in the U.S. seized evidence that Iraqi forces and Al-Qaeda were making chemical agents in the northeastern mountain range of Iraq, specifically naming their finding as recipes for chlorine and risin. The reporter raised the expectation that the discovery might be possibly the first major finding of chemical agents since the war began two weeks earlier. However, the reporter described the finding as 'possibly biological-weapons,' leaving room for uncertainty.

Presenting the second point, the reporter wrote:

"This was not a significant U.S. effort," the battalion commander said. "The real folks who carried the day were the peshmergas."

The American troops helped direct the attack, provided mortar and sniper fire for the peshmerga, and coordinated strikes by U.S. aircraft, including attack jets, B-52 bombers and AC-130 "Spooky" gunships. U.S. robot spy planes kept tabs on the fleeing militants. [Excerpt #40]

Landay recounted cooperative efforts between the U.S. and the Kurdish guerrillas, known as peshmerga, who carried the brunt of the offensive against Iraqi

insurgents. The reporter also highlighted the U.S.' state-of-the-art weapon system used for the joint operation.

Vivienne Walt of *USA Today* reported on April 2, 2003, about capturing two key air bases in Iraq's western desert by coalition forces. The headline of the story is "Allied forces said to control air, land in western desert." The story's main themes are: 1) the strategic importance of the two airfields and 2) evidence of chemical or biological weapons.

Regarding the first theme, the reporter said:

Coalition forces now control the H2 and H3 airfields and are maintaining surveillance on the highway that connects Jordan's capital, Amman, with Baghdad, Lt. Col. Mark Elliot, spokesman for the Australian military forces fighting in Iraq, said by phone from Qatar on Tuesday.

"Anything moving on that road comes under our observation, and we can deal with it," Elliot said. "We've had a very active campaign on that road." [Excerpt #41]

The reporter said that the two airfields would play a significant role in the war, and securing them was a big accomplishment in moving throughout the western desert. Expecting high probability of finding hidden weapons in the western desert, the reporter was optimistic about finding chemical and biological weapons in a widened control zone. This was reinforced with the paragraph:

U.S. officials believe that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein hides mobile chemical or biological laboratories in the west. It's an ideal place to conceal banned weapons. There are no major towns and few people. Coalition forces are searching the desert for the banned weapons. They have not found a hidden arsenal. But the operation also is crucial for preventing Iraq from launching Scud attacks against

Israel, which was hit with 39 missiles during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Israel has said it would retaliate against Iraq this time, and the United States fears that would provoke Arab countries to join the conflict. [Excerpt #42]

Walt emphasized that there had been no evidence of hidden weapons so far but the U.S. could have a high possibility to find them by securing the western desert. The reporter also underscored the U.S. efforts to protect Israel from Iraqi weapons attacks and not to escalate the war into a wider Arab conflict.

The reporter concluded the story with interviews with taxi drivers who had taken the desert road between Amman and Baghdad to present another point of view on the war from Iraqi citizens who were struggling for a living even though their lives were at stake.

“It’s terrifying driving that road now. All I could think of is that a missile was going to strike,” said a taxi driver who arrived here Monday from the Iraqi capital. With no work in Baghdad, the driver said, he risked the journey for a \$300 fare—three times the normal rate. The driver, fearing reprisals from Iraqi officials, wouldn’t allow his name to appear in print.” [Excerpt #43]

Tom Lasseter, the *Philadelphia Inquirer’s* correspondent, wrote on April 7, 2003, about the discovery of the nerve gas sarin in Iraq. The title of the story is “Soldiers evacuated after nerve-gas test.” The story is mainly about 1) the details of the discovery and 2) the meaning of the discovery to the U.S.

The reporter wrote about the discovery as follows:

U.S. soldiers evacuated an Iraqi military compound early today after tests by a mobile laboratory detected the presence of the nerve gas sarin.

The testing came after more than a dozen soldiers from the Army's 101st Airborne Division who guarded the military compound on Saturday night came down with symptoms consistent with exposure to very low levels of a nerve agent, including vomiting, dizziness and skin blotches. [Excerpt #44]

Based on his observation of soldiers' evacuation from the captured military compound triggered by the existence of sarin, the reporter wrote about the existence of the nerve gas. Supporting his idea, Lasseter also said the discovery caused 12 soldiers to contract low levels of nerve gas exposure.

He, however, raised questions about the existence of chemical and biological weapons because sarin was not the same as the chemical or biological weapons in question:

Even as the tests were being done, high-ranking commanders hastened to the scene yesterday to examine the sites, including Col. Joseph Anderson, Second Brigade commander; Brig. Gen. Benjamin C. Freakley, assistant commander of the 101st Airborne for operations; and Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus, division commander. They made no comment afterward on what was contained in the sites near the village of Albu Muhawish, on the Euphrates River about 60 miles south of Baghdad. [Excerpt #45]

The reporter said that high ranking officers paid sharp attention to the discovery, drawing tremendous attention from the world because this might be the first evidence of WMD in Iraq. While the result of the discovery examination was not released, he wrote about inconsistencies of early tests for chemical agents and the necessity of more precise tests in later paragraphs, suggesting that the negative result could undermine vindicating efforts of the U.S.

On April 8, 2003 James Cox of *USA Today* reported on search efforts for

illegal arms in Iraq. The article is titled "U.S. gears up to unmask illegal arms." The main themes in the article are 1) the possibility of weapon discovery in Iraq and 2) war justification of the Bush administration.

Regarding the first point, the reporter wrote:

Fears that U.S. troops would face chemical and biological weapons in battle are subsiding because coalition forces are fighting so closely with Saddam Hussein's army that it would be difficult for the Iraqis to use those weapons without killing their own troops...

... "Everybody wants to find the smoking gun," says Army Col. Thomas Woloszyn, the U.S. Central Command chemical officer in Doha, Qatar. "He's had more than 10 years to hide everything: (chemical and biological) agents, weapons and research facilities. The people who are going to help us find it and show it to us are the ones that worked on it." [Excerpt #46]

Even though 20 days had passed since the war began, there was no explicit evidence of the weapons that could justify the war in Iraq. The reporter said that allied forces had even a lower chance to find banned weapons as they were approaching Baghdad. While there was no certainty of the existence of the weapons, the story included an Army officer's expectation about a weapon discovery.

The reporter underlined the meaning of a weapon discovery to the U.S.:

President Bush cited Iraq's failure to disclose and destroy its biological and chemical weapons as justification for removing Saddam and disarming his regime by force. The Bush administration's international credibility could rest on whether it can show that Iraq possessed banned poisons, weapons and labs.

The hunt has focused first on chemical and biological weapons. Few believe that Iraq has a viable nuclear weapons program. [Excerpt #47]

In the report, Cox suggested that the U.S. might lose its international credibility because there had been no weapons discovery to justify the war. In later paragraphs, the reporter added that world leaders were also skeptical about the U.S.' assurances about its accusation against Iraq, saying "Many foreign leaders are increasingly skeptical of U.S. assurances that chemical or biological weapons will be found." Meanwhile, he concluded his story with survey results that showed more than half of Americans surveyed believed the war with Iraq was justified whether or not those weapons were found.

Other Coverage

News articles written by "Others" include 13 from the *News York Times*, nine from the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, seven from the *Boston Globe*, seven from *Daily News*, and one from *Christian Science Monitor*. Among these 40 articles, only 10 stories are selected to compare embedded and non-embedded coverage. These articles are divided into three topic categories: the U.S. war effort, continuing efforts to justify war, and world reaction on the war.

1) The U.S. War Effort

In the beginning of the war in Iraq, correspondents in Washington and at the U.N. presented controversial opinions on the war and tense atmospheres around the world. They reflected government officials' views on controversial issues in the pre-war stages. Following is the analysis of two news articles which dealt with the U.S. decision to go to war and its war objectives.

A March 12, 2003, article by Kenneth R. Bazinet and Thomas M. DeFrank of

the *Daily News* reported on prospects and readiness for the upcoming war. The story is titled “Plan 7-day War in Iraq but U.S. May Have to Attack Saddam without Brits.” The main themes in the article are: 1) prospects for the war and 2) the U.S. decision to go to war without Britain.

Firstly, the outlook of the war by government officials is as follows:

A senior military planner said confidently yesterday that an attack on Iraq could last as few as seven days.

The official, who requested his name and rank not be printed, predicted with obvious pride that it would be the most spectacular military operation in history and involve very few American – or Iraqi – casualties.

The Pentagon has repeatedly said the attack on Iraq would be one of “shock and awe” – using monster bombs to keep troops from being dragged into bloody street fighting – but this was the highest-ranking official to say the war could be extremely brief. [Excerpt #48]

Leaving seven days before the U.S. went to Iraq, the reporters used the government’s sources to increase public optimism and to shape favorable opinions regarding the war. Through a senior defense official’s prediction about the length and casualties of the war, the reporters wrote about how the U.S. tried to get more support from the people.

Meanwhile, the U.S. decided to invade Iraq even without help from Britain, and the reporters explained the position of Britain and the U.S.

With the looming war jeopardizing the career of British Prime Minister Tony Blair – whose staunch support of President Bush is backed by only 19% of Britons in a new poll – Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said his war planners are leaving open the possibility of going in without the U.K.

“To the extent they are able to participate... that would obviously be

welcomed. To the extent they're not, there are work-arounds and they would not be involved, at least in that phase," Rumsfeld said.
[Excerpt #49]

Preparing for the war in Iraq, the U.S. had neither U.N. backing nor British support. In adverse conditions for going to war, the reporters told of Britain's hesitation. Through the Rumsfeld's statement, the reporters stressed that the U.S. still firmly decided to go to war even though it took more risks and had less support.

On March 21, 2003, Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, the *New York Times* correspondents, reported on the Bush administration's eight broad objectives, for the war in Iraq. The title of the story is "Rumsfeld says Iraq Is Collapsing, Lists 8 Objectives of War."

The reporters mainly focused on the introduction to the objectives including quotes from the Defense secretary as follows:

The first of the eight specific aims, Mr. Rumsfeld said, is to "end the regime of Saddam Hussein by striking with force on a scope and scale that makes clear to Iraqis that he and his regime are finished."

Second, Iraq's arsenal of biological and chemical weapons, and any program to develop nuclear weapons, are also targets, as the American military has been ordered "to identify, isolate and eventually Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, production capabilities, and distribution networks," Mr. Rumsfeld said. [Excerpt #50]

Starting an unjustified war in Iraq, the Bush administration tried to establish goals that were to be accomplished throughout the war. However, as shown in the statements by Rumsfeld, hidden weapons were not identified or specified even when the war started. In later paragraphs, the reporters skeptically drew a parallel to the first

Persian Gulf War in 1991, raising a question about the effectiveness of the broad goals. They said the first President Bush was criticized for achieving battlefield success, but not a decisive political victory over Hussein.

The reporters then moved on to the George W. Bush administration's determination:

"We will stay on task until we've achieved our objective, which is to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction."

"Not only do we support those brave souls who are sacrificing on our behalf, but we want to thank their parents and their families for their dedication as well," Mr. Bush said. [Excerpt #51]

Through these paragraphs, the reporters showed Bush's will to accomplish goals of the war and his main claim for going to war. To report on Bush's decision, the reporters added the Senate's unanimous adoption of its resolution to show united support from the U.S. Congress, as opposed to the discord prevalent among U.N. Security Council members.

2) Continuing Efforts to Justify War

The following six news articles attempted to justify the U.S. war efforts. Similar to the other two types of journalists, articles written by correspondents in Washington and at the U.N. dealt with the issue of whether the U.S. could find hidden weapons in Iraq and by doing so, the U.S. could be vindicated.

On March 24, 2003, David E. Sanger of the *New York Times* reported on the possession of chemical weapons by the Iraqi leadership and carrying them to Shiite Muslims in the south of the country. The headline of the story is "U.S. Officials Fear Iraqis Plan to Use Gas on G.I.'s." Sanger focused on two points: 1) the possibility of

hidden chemical weapons in Iraq and 2) a sign of any chemical attack.

First, the reporter informed readers that the American forces found no weapons so far and its explanation:

Senior administration officials said today that they believe that the Iraqi leadership may be holding its chemical weapons in reserve until American forces approach Baghdad, while other officials said intelligence suggests that Saddam Hussein may have authorized one of his key commanders to use those weapons against Shiite Muslims in the south of the country.

But so far, Iraq has used no chemical weapons, and American forces have found none. Suggestions on Sunday that a chemical plant in Najaf might be a weapons site have turned out to be false. [Excerpt #52]

Mentioning that there had been no chemical weapons found so far, the reporter suggested that anonymous administration officials had neither information about locations of chemical weapons nor certainty of their existence. Government officials expressed a possibility that there might be an attack when the U.S. approached to Baghdad, while the reporter mentioned assumptions and rumors about the possibility of Iraq's weapons possession were prevalent among people in later paragraphs.

To support the possibility of an imminent attack by Iraq, the reporter quoted Pentagon officials:

Nonetheless, Pentagon officials, noting that Iraqi prisoners of war captured in recent days carried gas masks with them, say they believe that the weapons may be intended for use when American forces are in close quarters – and at that time, they may blame the United States for unleashing them.

Earlier in the day, administration officials said they believe, based on

intelligence reports received during the past month, that such an attack could be authorized in the south, though they have no evidence it is imminent. [Excerpt #53]

The reporter said that the government depended on information from the Iraqi prisoners about any sign of an imminent attack. The above paragraphs also suggested that even the statements by the Secretary of State did not guarantee any hidden weapons' existence in Iraq. Adding skepticism, the reporter said that if Iraq executed an attack as Hussein did 15 years ago on Kurds, it would prove that he had the weapons that the U.S. had accused him of holding, and thus help justify the war. However, Sanger repeated the fact that no chemical weapons had been used so far, casting doubt on a claim of the U.S.

On March 25, 2003, *St. Petersburg Times* correspondent Bill Adair raised the question of Iraqi weapons through his article. The story's main points are 1) the possibility of finding chemical and biological weapons in Iraq and 2) its meaning in justifying the war.

Firstly, Adair informed the public of no evidence found in Iraq so far:

So where are the weapons of mass destruction?

Five days into the war to disarm Iraq of chemical and biological weapons, U.S. troops have yet to find any.

They have seized a plant that might contain the weapons, but by Monday afternoon, they had not confirmed the contents. [Excerpt #54]

The reporter focused on the lack of evidence that could justify a war on Iraq but he also provided reasons for it, saying that it was still early in the war and there was still a chance to find evidence. Quoting defense analysts and U.S. officials who

said they were confident that WMD would be found, Adair emphasized their statements that the existence of the weapons was certain but it would take time to find them.

He quoted political analysts to explain the meaning of a weapons discovery:

"If the military forces uncover WMD, then Bush is vindicated," said Kathleen Hall Jamieson, a professor of communication at the University of Pennsylvania. "This is an incredible gamble. We could go through this entire war and find no WMD, in which case the (opponents) are vindicated." [Excerpt #55]

As the quote shows, the source expressed skepticism about the existence of WMD in Iraq, and described the military search efforts as a "gamble." Mentioning that the controversial war could be justified by the discovery of the weapons and the discovery would prove that the administration had been right about Hussein's lying on the weapons, the reporter emphasized the discovery's crucial meaning in the war.

On March 28, 2003 Bryan Bender of the *Boston Globe* reported on U.S. efforts to increase the chances of finding chemical and biological or nuclear weapons in Iraq. The title of the story is "US Officials Consider Return of Inspectors." The story's two main themes are: 1) the Bush administration's efforts to find banned weapons and 2) progress in weapons search operations by the U.S.

Presenting the first point, the reporter focused on the U.S. efforts to increase the possibility of finding weapons in Iraq:

The Bush administration, eager to prove that Iraq is hiding weapons of mass destruction, is engaged in a heated internal debate over whether to seek a return of the United Nations weapons inspection team to help expose the regime's suspected arsenal of chemical,

biological, or nuclear weapons, according to government and UN officials.

In addition to providing expertise, a UN delegation would help validate any findings before a highly suspicious international community, the officials said. But opponents in the administration distrust UN oversight after sparring repeatedly with chief inspector Hans Blix, the officials said. [Excerpt #56]

Beginning the war in Iraq, there was no agreement between the U.S. and the U.N. As the war without any weapons discovery went on, both finally agreed with the joint weapon search and inspection. The reporter suggested that the U.S. was in a desperate position to prove the existence of weapons in any possible way, quoting a State Department spokeswoman who said, "Right now we are focused on the current operations in Iraq and continue to assess a variety of options for a role for UN weapons inspectors in postwar Iraq." Raising the question of whether the U.S. would find enough evidence of illegal weapons to overcome doubts by the world community, the reporter showed expectation of united efforts between the U.S. and the U.N. to find weapons.

Describing search efforts by allied forces so far, the reporter said:

The search of several suspected sites that Iraqi informants have highlighted, including in Najaf in central Iraq and Umm Qasr to the south, have not uncovered anything. US Marines seized a stockpile of chemical protective gear in southern Iraq on Tuesday, but it remains unclear whether the equipment dated to the Iran-Iraq war when Iraqi forces used nerve gas against the Iranians, or indicated more recent intentions, officials said. [Excerpt #57]

Even though the administration hoped that evidence of a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons program might be uncovered by allied forces, the reporter stressed that no evidence had been found so far. The report suggests that findings at the sites

did not guarantee the fact that Iraq was preparing for a chemical attack against the U.S. forces.

On March 31, 2003, James Gordon, *Daily News* correspondent, reported on progress in the biological and chemical weapons search by the U.S.-led coalition. It is headlined “Rummy Zeros in on Banned Weapons Stashes.” The reporter focused on 1) fruitless weapon search efforts by the U.S. and 2) presumption of possible weapon caches in Iraq.

Firstly, the reporter led his article, saying there was no success in the weapon search so far:

Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in hiding deadly biological and chemical weapons in sites around Baghdad that coalition forces have not captured, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday. Despite controlling a third of Iraq, the coalition has found no terror weapons, top officials said. [Excerpt #58]

The reporter wrote about repeated failures in weapon search missions. The story suggested that the U.S. exercised its military forces in Iraq without any reasons due to the failure of any discovery that could be a critical justification of war. The reporter cast doubt about whether the U.S. would ever find these controversial weapons in Iraq.

To support that point, Iraq’s U.N. ambassador who denied his regime has banned weapons, was quoted:

“We don’t have chemical weapons to be used at all. Iraq is clean from that,” Al-Douri said on NBC’s “Meet the Press” yesterday. “This [accusation] is a justification to... wage war against my country.” [Excerpt #59]

Regarding the second point, the most possible weapon stashes were pointed out:

Rumsfeld's citing of Tikrit and Karbala represents the first time a U.S. official has publicly identified places where stockpiles of dreaded ordnance are believed hidden, said Daniel Goure, a defense expert at the Lexington Institute, a military think tank.

Saddam also is said to have concealed mobile biological weapons labs near Tikrit and artillery munitions with poison gas in Karbala, possibly in his places, Goure said. [Excerpt #60]

Quoting a defense expert, the reporter said that the U.S. officially named specific places as probable weapon caches for the first time. It suggests that there had been no clear information to indicate specified weapons since the war began. Gordon concluded his story with expectation of finding any evidence in the areas that could justify the war in Iraq.

On April 6, 2003, Thomas M. DeFrank of the *Daily News* wrote of the possibility of the end of the war and accomplishments from combat operations, quoting Bush officials. The story is headlined "Light at end of Tunnel Prez Boosted by Signs War's Wrapping up." The story's main themes presented by the reporter are 1) assessment of the war accomplishments and 2) public opinions on the war and the Bush government's position.

Firstly, the reporter focused on the government's self-assessment of the war:

Nobody in the Bush camp is that bullish, but last week's combat successes, including the capture of Baghdad's international airport and an incursion into the city by U.S. armor, have persuaded presidential subordinates that the war is on track.

"There's still a long way to go, but we think we're starting to see the

light at the end of the tunnel,” one Bush aide said, echoing a famous phrase from the Vietnam War. [Excerpt #61]

The reporter described the excited atmosphere around the White House and Pentagon by the successful combat results of securing significant and widened areas in Iraq. DeFrank also wrote about optimism among Bush officials who mentioned the end of the war.

In addition, the reporter moved his focus to divided public opinion on the war:

Overnight, almost giddy private predictions that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and his regime would collapse in a matter of days gave way to pessimism as the U.S. death toll mounted and criticism of the war plan escalated in the press and among retired officers.

The poll also found that 77% of Americans back the war and would continue to support it even if chemical, biological and nuclear weapons aren't found in Iraq. [Excerpt #62]

Presenting opposite responses to the war, the reporter showed there were divided opinions among American people. As the poll showed, the war would be supported by majority of American people even though there was no evidence of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq.

Mentioning Bush's accusation against the Iraqi regime of repeated war crimes, DeFrank ended his story quoting Bush, saying, “We will not stop until Iraq is free.” The reporter suggested that President Bush and his administration slightly changed their war priority from finding WMD to freeing Iraqi citizens from the Iraqi regime.

On April 6, 2003, Howard Witt of the *Philadelphia Inquirer* wrote on whether and where Saddam Hussein possessed a cache of chemical, biological and nuclear materials. The article is titled “Pressure Builds for U.S. to Find Banned Weapons.” Throughout the article, the reporter raised questions about 1) the existence of the

weapons and 2) meaning of the finding.

Firstly, the reporter began the story questioning the U.S. claim about the weapons:

A war that President Bush launched expressly to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction has yet to uncover any, and with each passing day the question grows more acute: Where are the huge caches of chemical, biological and nuclear materials Saddam Hussein is supposed to possess? [Excerpt #63]

As seen from above, the reporter expressed a somewhat skeptical point of view of U.S. weapon search efforts. Explaining search progress by allied forces, the reporter underlined that nothing definitive had been found, although American and British forces were operating in vast sections of Iraq. At the same time, he described the confidence of Pentagon officials and Army Brigade General Brooks who said they would eventually find weapons in question:

"Let's remember that this regime has been involved in a campaign of denial and deception for decades and has been very effective at it," Army Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks said in Doha, Qatar, on Friday. [Excerpt #64]

Regarding the meaning of the weapons, the reporter explained as follows:

Much of the political, diplomatic and legal justification for the U.S.-led war rests on the assertion that Hussein is hiding weapons of mass destruction and has defied repeated U.N. Security Council demands to surrender them.

If that proves not to be true, the Bush administration's diplomatic credibility would be shaken, the Muslim world would be reinforced in its belief that Washington is waging war against Islam, and U.S. leaders might even be vulnerable to legal challenges in international courts. [Excerpt #65]

The reporter suggested that the discovery of weapons would play a critical role for the U.S. position in the world. Stressing Saddam Hussein's claim that he disposed of many of his deadliest weapons, Witt added skepticism on whether the U.S. forces could find the weapons. In addition, he showed there were concerns about the U.S. position in the world if the war ended without any WMD findings. This suggests that the U.S. should prepare for another criticism different from that in the beginning of the war.

3) World Reactions on the War

Two news articles focused on world opinion on the war in Iraq. One dealt with world opinion against the war and the other dealt with the U.N. Security Council's desperate efforts to end the war.

On March 20, 2003, the *Philadelphia Inquirer's* correspondent, Diego Ibarguen, reported that some diplomats believed that Iraq could be disarmed by peaceful methods, not by force, because it did not show an imminent threat. The article's title is "At U.N., diplomats press futile debate on Iraq: Some Security Council members, now spectators, insisted Hussein could be disarmed peacefully." The story's main themes are: 1) claims by U.N. members to avoid an armed conflict between two nations and 2) reasons for going to Iraq of the U.S. and Britain.

Presenting the first point, the reporter quoted opposing opinions of the Russian and German foreign ministers:

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov complained that if there were "indisputable facts" that Iraq directly threatened U.S. security, "then Russia without any hesitation would be prepared to use all the means

available... to eliminate such a threat. However, the Security Council today is not in possession of such facts."

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer insisted again that his country "emphatically rejects the impending war" and questioned whether Iraq's sluggish cooperation with U.N. arms inspectors could "seriously be regarded as grounds for war." [Excerpt #66]

The reporter included Russia's and Germany's strong objections and suggested that the U.S. tried to begin an unpopular war without any concrete reasons. Stressing that other nations did not see Iraq as a threat to the U.S. and did not want armed intervention to solve conflicts between two nations, the reporter suggested that there might be a possible method to avoid a war.

The reporter suggested the inevitability of a war and post-war efforts, presenting the positions of the U.S. and Britain.

U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte and British Jeremy Greenstock said their governments had set aside millions of dollars for immediate food and medical relief and would soon present ideas on how to use money from the U.N.-run oil-for-food program to meet humanitarian needs. [Excerpt #67]

The reporter stressed a firm resolution to go to Iraq by both nations that had agreed on Iraq issues including Scud missiles, biological and chemical warheads, unmanned aircraft and spray devices, and a variety of biological and chemical agents, as well as on military actions in Iraq. The reporter suggested that there would be no consensus with the U.N. in the matter of a war.

On April 9, 2003, Liz Marlantes and Howard LaFranchi of the *Christian Science Monitor* reported on the desperate situation that coalition troops might end the war without any weapons discovery. The article is titled "'Smoking gun' May not

Affect World's Opinion." The story's main themes are 1) no discovery of WMD and 2) world opinion on a weapons discovery.

The reporters repeated that there was no evidence of weapons even three weeks after the war began:

Three weeks into the invasion, the few discoveries the coalition has made may turn out to be nothing more than simple pesticides. US officials say the bulk of the search may be put off until the country is secured. Even then it may take months.

Despite the fixation on finding a "smoking gun," experts say in the end it may not make that much difference in the way the world perceives the justification for the war. At home, polls show that a vast majority of Americans not only approve of the invasion, but that most no longer regard finding weapons of mass destruction as essential to the war's success. [Excerpt #68]

Stressing the importance of a weapons discovery, the reporters said that the U.S. had found no hidden weapons so far and nobody was sure how long it would take. Even though the claimed top priority of the war was to get rid of hidden weapons in the beginning of the war, the reporters said that a majority of Americans did not care about a weapons discovery, citing poll results. At the same time, the reporters quoted an expert on public opinion and war who said that a failure to uncover them could intensify international opposition to the war, casting a question about the top priority of the war.

The reporters presented the other point on a weapon discovery:

Likewise, in the international arena, analysts say perceptions about the war have hardened to the point where discoveries of weapons may have little impact on public opinion. Ultimately, American and international opinion may turn out to be similar in that it is strong-though divergent-core values that underpin support or opposition to

the war, and not what is now increasingly perceived as the "secondary" issue of chemical and biological weapons. [Excerpt #69]

Similarly, the reporters stressed that the public were inclined to support the president and the troops, rather than to question the purpose of the conflict. They also pointed out the government's priority shift. On the other hand, Marlantes and LaFranchi concluded the story with world criticism of America's aggression over Iraq's possession of banned weapons, citing another poll that found the public still largely expected chemical and biological weapons would be found.

IV. RESULTS

Qualitative textual analysis of news accounts written by embeds, non-embeds, and other journalists during the 2003 Iraq conflict explore the nature of wartime newspaper reporting and qualitative differences among news articles.

After examining nine embedded, 14 non-embedded, and 10 others' news accounts in the seven newspapers, the average story length for the embedded newspaper articles was 15.2 paragraphs and the non-embedded newspapers was 15.9 paragraphs, while others' newspapers averaged 18.2 paragraphs. The *New York Times* produced the largest number of stories (24 stories - 38% of the total stories studied); the *Christian Science Monitor* and *St. Petersburg Times* produced the lowest number (two stories each – 3.2% of total stories studied). The average number of sources for embedded newspaper stories was 4.8 per article. The average for non-embedded newspapers stories was 6.2 sources, and 6.4 sources for others' articles.

At the start of the study, the thesis posed two research questions:

RQ 1: What was the nature of newspaper reporting during the early phase of the 2003 Iraq War?

RQ 2: Are there qualitative differences in the reporting of embedded journalists and non-embedded journalists who covered the 2003 Iraq War?

RQ 1 sought to understand the nature of newspaper reporting during the early phase of the 2003 Iraq War. The results indicate that war coverage during one week before the war tends to quote more official sources that favor and support the Bush administration. In Excerpt #1 and #3, Miller and Weinraub focused on the U.S. government's effort in the pre-war stages by introducing plans for searching for banned weapons and for making Iraqi officers surrender peaceably. They heavily depended on information from the governmental sources such as the administration,

the Pentagon officials, and Army officers. This means that the government war campaign that tried to shape positive public opinion might affect them for starting a controversial war without a formal resolution from the U.N. or an explicit cause of war.

As the war begins, the media kept raising a question about whether it was unjustified and showed hope and skepticism at the same time about whether the U.S. could prove its decision to go to Iraq war right. Sisk included the Iraqi information minister's denial of banned weapons possession (Excerpt #24), and Ford reflected American international-law experts' claims about the illegality of the U.S.-led war (Excerpt #25). Adair's story also showed a skeptical view on the rationale for war, quoting a college professor (Excerpt #55).

As the war was close to the middle stage, reporters focused on world opinions, progress of the weapons search, and concerns about the end of the war without proof of the accusations against Iraq. Gall showed how the Iraq War affected increasing levels of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan (Excerpt #31). MacFarquhar focused on Syria's harsh criticism of the U.S. as acting only to serve Israel's interest (Excerpt #33). Miller questioned whether the government's initial war priority had been changed because of no accomplishments of weapons searches (Excerpt # 8).

RQ 2 asked whether embedded and non-embedded journalists qualitatively differed in their Iraq War stories. The results indicate that embedded coverage examined in the study shows mostly positive representation of the U.S. war decision, hope for the weapons discovery in Iraq, and progress of weapons search efforts.

In this process, reporters heavily quoted the administration and the Pentagon officials, army spokespersons in press briefings, and military officers and soldiers with whom the reporters were embedded to quoting governmental sources.

The contrast between stories by non-embeds and those by embeds is, perhaps, even more striking as serious fighting for control of Baghdad began. When describing battle scenes to readers, embedded reporters such as Lynch, Myers and Dwyer, and Mac Quarrie vividly illustrated fierce battles and closely covered their embedded units. For example, Dwyer visualized an intensive battle scene based on soldiers' interviews to add tension and acute atmosphere (Excerpt #17). To show a humanitarian aspect of the war, he also described a scene where the U.S. officers covered dead Iraqi soldiers with their own blankets (Excerpt #18).

On the other hand, non-embedded reports were more sensitive to the response of other nations. For instance, Filipov stressed the accusation against Iraq by the U.S. and Britain by quoting the Iraqi foreign minister who strongly objected to the U.S.-led war (Excerpt #20). Sisk also quoted the Iraqi information minister to support the fact that Iraq did not have Scuds (Excerpt #24). Ford's story cast strong doubt on the legality of the war, quoting American international-law experts and the French president (Excerpt #25).

In addition, non-embedded coverage conveyed the positions of nearby countries such as Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, paying attention to world opinions on the war. Growth of anti-war protests and terrorists' activities around those nations were stressed by the reporters to select international skepticism about the war (Excerpt #27, 29, 31, and 33).

Stories written by non-embeds were strikingly different in their presentation of the civilian response to the Allied incursion. Sennott provided an opportunity to witness the war with a different perspective, including an interview with Iraqi civilians in the story (Excerpt #38). Including an interview with taxi drivers who ran between Amman and Baghdad, Walt also illustrated the influence of the war on Iraqi

people (Excerpt #43).

Correspondents in Washington and the U.N. tend to heavily quote official sources to raise questions about starting the war and its illegality. News from Washington presented the U.S.' war determination and the progress of the war (Excerpt #49) and the objectives of war that were established by the U.S. (Excerpt #50); whereas those from the U.N. suggested questions about the existence of WMD (Excerpt #53, 54, 57, 58, 63, and 68) war justification (Excerpt #55 and 65), and the U.N.'s efforts to solve the conflict peaceably (Excerpt #56). Ibarguen quoted the Russian and German foreign ministers who strongly opposed the use of military force in Iraq (Excerpt #66).

V. DISCUSSION

As shown in other conflict coverage, news accounts by three different types of journalists, embeds, non-embeds, and others, tended to buttress the government's viewpoint at the beginning of the war. Pfau et al. point out that news coverage in the earlier stages of the conflict produced more positive coverage (Pfau et al., 2004). Reasons for this tendency could be explained by existing literature that examines the U.S. media policy. To demonize the enemy and justify the war, the U.S. media served as "public relations agents of the U.S. government" (Schwalbe, Silcock & Keith, 2008). Adoption of the government perspective in early U.S. media coverage was the result of media reliance on framing that emphasized conflict rather than the individual costs of war (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997).

This study uniquely revealed changes in theme choices during a limited period of the war. Before the war began, the main interests were: questions about legality of war without the U.N. resolution, anti-war public opinion, and the U.S.' firm decision to go to Iraq. In the early days of the war, the media shifted their focus to the possibility of WMD discovery and the justification for war. As the war front moved into Baghdad over the next few days and Iraqi military resistance collapsed in the next two days, stories reflected skeptical views on Iraq's weapon possession and concerns about ending the war without proving the initial cause for war.

Characteristics of embeds' coverage are in line with findings of previous research by Pfau et al. that report embedded coverage was more personalized, based on the experiences of the troops and the units covered, and more favorable in tone, both toward the military and its personnel (Pfau et al., 2004). Content analysis of television news reports by Pfau et al. also consistently supports the fact that embedded news stories were more favorable in overall tone toward the military and more

favorable in depictions of military personnel (Pfau et al., 2005).

Under the embedded program, reporters had relatively unfettered access to government and military sources and were more likely to write positive stories than negative ones about controversial issues, such as the existence of chemical, biological and other kinds of WMD in Iraq or the justification of war. They took a close look at the U.S. forces' efforts to find evidence of a cause of war and provided first-hand and real time coverage from the front. Stories by embeds were detailed in describing the conflict and individual battles as well.

Describing battle situations, embeds tended to zoom in on individual troops and to show intimate views, contrasted with other types of journalists' conflict coverage. Their coverage included human elements that might have been affected by their embedded units. They presented the war with the perspective of a member of their units but might not reflect the bigger picture of what was happening in the war. This is consistent with an argument by Fahmy and Johnson who indicate that embedded reporters often had short snippets of the war, whereas unilaterals provided stories with larger perspective (Fahmy & Johnson, 2007).

Non-embedded journalists were comparatively free from military control or the government's embed guidelines. Even though they had to take more risks in security matters, they had more access to Iraqi citizens to obtain their reaction to the war and contribute to varying angles of war coverage. Their stories paid more attention to different aspects of the conflict from a distance. They wrote about the potential for chemical, biological, and/or nuclear attacks by the Iraqi military, the ferocity of paramilitary or irregular Iraqi forces, the possibility of combat situations in cities such as Baghdad, and severe criticism of the Bush administration by Iraqi and other nations' officials. Interviews with Iraqi civilians presented a more negative view

on the war than did sources used by embeds. They included few American forces' sources in their stories because of limited access to the battles with individual units.

Differences in themes and overall tone of coverage between embeds' and non-embeds' coverage were analyzed, supporting earlier content analysis by Cooper and Kuypers who argue differences them were caused by the activities and conditions the two groups observed (Berenger, 2004).

VII. CONCLUSIONS

There are various opinions about embedded coverage during the 2003 Iraq War. Critics view embedded reporting as biased, sensational, and narrow. Supporters claim their reporting was accurate, trustworthy, and fair, and did not endanger the safety of the troops. They would all agree that embedding provided great access to the battlefield and understanding of what was happening on the ground. They were allowed to report specific information about the broader military objectives of a specific operation.

The activities and conditions they could directly witness during combat operations might account for some differences. Embeds directly experienced the intensity, danger, and uncertainty of those situations; they covered the Army from the inside and presented positive views on military operations, focusing on the troops rather than Iraqi populace. However unilaterals were physically distant from the actual fighting and focused more on events outside the war theater, such as the responses of neighbor countries, Iraqi civilians being wounded and killed, and Iraqi reception and perceptions of the war.

This research shows that embedded, non-embedded, and others' newspaper accounts differed in their reporting of the 2003 Iraq War. It is important to recognize that the application of the embedded program played a significant role in making such differences and how the U.S. military could estimate how the program worked out.

However, differences in how they portray the war to readers do not indicate that either type of newspaper stories is better, just that they differ. To be more informed about the war, news consumers should read both embedded and non-embedded newspaper stories.

This study has implications related to whether the embedded program might

be applicable for the South Korean military in terms of pursuing an amicable military-media relationship. By offering embedded reporters opportunities of first-hand and eyewitness reporting of war operations, the U.S. government took advantage of positive reports toward the military and its personnel as well as provided readers with many angles on the war. The fact that cannot be neglected is that embedded coverage was possible because the U.S. permitted non-embedded reporters, too. Both types of journalists played an important role in providing credible news to readers because they viewed the war differently. Therefore, the embedded program would be recommendable with the existence of non-embedded reporting.

The study possesses several limitations. First, by choosing the qualitative content analysis of news articles published for a limited time period, the study does not examine a larger amount of data. An analysis of different time periods could produce different results. Second, this does not have a sample of the universe of newspaper articles written by the entire population of embedded/non-embedded/other journalists, which limits its usefulness in generalizing beyond these papers.

Future research could analyze whether there are differences in war coverage between the 2003 Iraq War and today because the war is still going on, so it would be worth doing a comparison and assessing long-term impacts of the embedded program. Studies could also focus on quantitative analysis of war coverage by the three different reporter types. Additional areas for further study might include comparison of print news with other types of media, such as television, magazines, and radio.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Embedded Media List (U.S. Newspaper)

#	Type	Assigned Unit	Media Organization	Last Name	First Name	MI
8	Ground	101st	Baltimore Sun	Calvert	Scott	
12	Ground	101st	Chicago Tribune	Schamberg	Kirsten	
24	Ground	101st	LA Times	Zucchini	David	A.
25	Ground	101st	Milwaukee Journal Sentinel	Skiba	Katherine	M
29	Ground	101st	New York Times	Dwyer	James	G.
36	Ground	101st	St. Petersburg Times	Allison	Wes	
40	Ground	101st	Times News Service	Cox	Matt	J
43	Ground	101st	USA Today	Zoroya	Gregory	M
44	Ground	101st	Wall Street Journal	Morse	Dan	W.
45	Ground	101st	Washington Post	Atkinson	Lawrence "Rick"	R.
48	Ground	101st (L)	Historian	Taylor	Tom	
50	Ground	101st (L)	Leaf-Chronicle	Escoto	Chantal	
51	Ground	101st (L)	Lexington Herald	Lasseter	Tom	
52	Ground	101st (L)	Patriot-News	Fernandez	Michael	
53	Ground	101st (L)	Tennessean	Partipilo	John "Leon"	
67	Ground	1AD	Inside Washington	LARDNER	RICHARD	P
79	Ground	1AD	Stars & Stripes	Anderson	Jon	
82	Ground	1AD(L)	Wichita Eagle	Potter	Timothy	
85	Ground	1CAV	Baltimore Sun	marbella	Jean	
96	Ground	1CAV	New York Times	Leduff	Charlie	
97	Ground	1CAV	New Yorker Magazine	Goldberg	Jeffrey	
98	Ground	1CAV	News-Press	Kovac	Adam	K.
103	Ground	1CAV	St. Louis Post Dispatch	Sawyer	Jon	M.
127	Ground	1MEF	Atlanta Journal Constitution	Harris III	Art	
128	Ground	1MEF	Augusta Chronicle	Edwards	Johnny	R.
131	Ground	1MEF	Aviation Week	Wall	Robert	M
140	Ground	1MEF	Chicago Tribune	Osnos	Evan	
143	Ground	1MEF	Contra Costa Times	Ledesma	Eddie	
147	Ground	1MEF	Dallas Morning News/ The Press-Enterprise	Coronado	Michael	A
148	Ground	1MEF	Detroit Free Press	Seidel	Jeffrey	M
149	Ground	1MEF	Detroit News	Bebow	John	C
150	Ground	1MEF	Engineering New-Record	Wright	Andrew	G.
151	Ground	1MEF	Florida Times Union	Burk	Donald	W
164	Ground	1MEF	Indianapolis Star	Strauss	John	C
168	Ground	1MEF	Kansas City Star	Johnson	Rich	
173	Ground	1MEF	LA Times	Perry	Anthony	L
179	Ground	1MEF	Miami Herald	Tamayo	Juan	O.
180	Ground	1MEF	Milwaukee Journal Sentinel	Toosi	Nahal	
181	Ground	1MEF	Minneapolis Star Tribune	Schmickle	Sharon	A.
185	Ground	1MEF	New York 1 News	BITZ	JEREMY	S.
186	Ground	1MEF	New York 1 News	RAMSAY	GARY	A.
187	Ground	1MEF	New York Daily News	Maisel	Todd	M
188	Ground	1MEF	New York Daily News	Sisk	Richard	P
189	Ground	1MEF	New York Post	Morris	Vincent	S.
190	Ground	1MEF	Newark Star Ledger	Woolley	Wayne	R.
192	Ground	1MEF	Newsday	Rayman	Graham	A.
193	Ground	1MEF	Omaha World-Herald	Bundy	Jeffrey	P.
194	Ground	1MEF	Orange County Register	Dillow	Gordon	L
195	Ground	1MEF	Orlando Sentinel	Roy	Roger	E
196	Ground	1MEF	Philadelphia Daily News	Schofield	Matthew	S.
203	Ground	1MEF	Salt Lake Tribune	Israelsen	Brent	
205	Ground	1MEF	South Bend Tribune	Dodd Jr.	Frederick	C

206	Ground	1MEF	St. Petersburg Times	Pendygraft	John	
207	Ground	1MEF	Stars & Stripes	Oliva	Mark	
213	Ground	1MEF	USA Today	Lubold	Gordon	C
214	Ground	1MEF	Virginian Pilot	Zerby	David	M.
215	Ground	1MEF	Wall Street Journal	Kulish	Nicholas	M.
216	Ground	1MEF	Washington Post	Baker	Peter	E.
217	Ground	1MEF	Washington Times	Eddins	Joseph	M.
231	Ground	1MEF (L)	North County Times	Mortenson	Darrin	
232	Ground	1MEF (L)	North County Times	Palmour	Hayne	
233	Ground	1MEF (L)	Sun Herald	Peterson	Patrick	F.
234	Ground	1MEF (L)	Ventura County star	Medlin	Dani	
238	Ground	2ACR	Chicago Tribune	Dorning	Michael	F.P
239	Ground	2ACR	Christian Science Monitor	Ritchey	Warren	
241	Ground	2ACR	Hartford Courant	Rich	Eric	
247	Ground	3ACR	Colorado Springs Gazette	Diedrich	John	M
250	Ground	3ACR	Rocky Mountain News	Brennan	Charles III	H.
251	Ground	3ACR(L)	Colorado Springs Gazette	Rogers	Andrew	A.
261	Ground	3ID	Atlanta Journal Constitution	Martz	Ronald	
265	Ground	3ID	Boston Globe	MacQuarrie	Brian	
266	Ground	3ID	Boston Herald	Crittendon	Jules	
267	Ground	3ID	Business Week	Balfour	Frederik	S
273	Ground	3ID	Chicago Tribune	DiNuzzo	Nuccio	
274	Ground	3ID	Christian Science Monitor	Tyson	Ann	Sc ott
277	Ground	3ID	Columbus Ledger-Enquirer	Harper	Samuel	T.
279	Ground	3ID	Dallas Morning News	Leeson	David	J
281	Ground	3ID	Florida Times Union	Davis	Rachel	L
285	Ground	3ID	Houston Chronicle	Sobhani	Bahram	M.
288	Ground	3ID	Kyodo News (Japan)	Gima	Tomohiro	
290	Ground	3ID	LA Times	Mohan	Geoffrey	A
296	Ground	3ID	New York Times	Myers	Stephen	L.
297	Ground	3ID	Newsday	Frank	Thomas	L.
302	Ground	3ID	Orlando Sentinel	Perez	Hilda	M
303	Ground	3ID	Philadelphia Daily News	Gilkey	David	
304	Ground	3ID	Providence Journal	Corkery	Michael	W.
310	Ground	3ID	Salt Lake Tribune	Grant	Greg	M
311	Ground	3ID	San Antonio Express-News	Christenson	Sigurd	J
312	Ground	3ID	SF Chronicle	Nolte	Carl	W
315	Ground	3ID	Stars & Stripes	Giordono	Joseph	
318	Ground	3ID	Times News Service	Naylor	Sean	D
320	Ground	3ID	USA Today	Komarow	Steven	No ne
322	Ground	3ID	Wall Street Journal	Cooper	Helene	
323	Ground	3ID	Washington Post	Branigin	William	J.
324	Ground	3ID (L)	Coastal Courier	Donahue	Patrick	
325	Ground	3ID (L)	Savannah Morning News	Carrington III	John	R.
326	Ground	3ID (L)	Savannah Morning News	Phillips	Noelle	A.
344	Ground	4ID	Contra Costa Times	Campos	Eric	
345	Ground	4ID	Dallas Morning News	Timms	Edward	G
346	Ground	4ID	Denver Post	Hughes	James	M
347	Ground	4ID	Detroit Free Press	Lubens	Pauline	
350	Ground	4ID	Ft.Worth Star Telegram	Sullivan	John	
351	Ground	4ID	Houston Chronicle	Hedges	Michael	B.
352	Ground	4ID	Indianapolis Star	Richards	Philip	D
353	Ground	4ID	LA Times	Slater	Eric	R
354	Ground	4ID	Miami Herald	Bouaphanh	Kampha	
356	Ground	4ID	Minneapolis Star Tribune	Haley	Peter	C.
359	Ground	4ID	New York Daily News	Ingrassia	Robert	F
360	Ground	4ID	New York Post	Greene	Leonard	J.
361	Ground	4ID	New York Times	Gettleman	Jeffrey	A.
362	Ground	4ID	Newsday	Searcey	Dionne	L.
366	Ground	4ID	Omaha World-Herald	Kelley	Matthew	D.
367	Ground	4ID	Oregonian	Meehan	Brian	

369	Ground	4ID	Philadelphia Inquirer	Dilanian	Ken	
373	Ground	4ID	Rocky Mountain News	Terry	Ahmad	C.
374	Ground	4ID	San Antonio Express-News	Innerarity	Andrew	B
375	Ground	4ID	St. Louis Post-Dispatch	Ganey	Terrence	J.
376	Ground	4ID	St. Louis Post-Dispatch	Tait	Gabriel	B.
377	Ground	4ID	Tampa Tribune	Epstein	Keith	C.
378	Ground	4ID	Times News Service	Curtis	Rob	M
379	Ground	4ID	Times News Service	Cavallaro	Gina	
380	Ground	4ID	USA Today	Leinwand	Donna	C
381	Ground	4ID	Wall Street Journal	Dreazen	Yochi	
382	Ground	4ID	Washington Post	Vogel	Stephen	F.
383	Ground	4ID	Washington Times	Taylor	Guy	J.
384	Ground	4ID (L)	COX/Austin Am. Statesman	Dart	Robert	E.
394	Ground	4ID (L)	The News Tribune	Gilbert	Mike	
398	Ground	82nd	Charlotte Observer	Johnson	Mark	D.
399	Ground	82nd	Chicago Tribune	Madhani	Aamer	S.
400	Ground	82nd	Fayetteville (NC) Observer	Maurer	Henry	K.
401	Ground	82nd	Fayetteville (NC) Observer	Hebert	Stephen	G.
405	Ground	82nd	Oregonian	Sleeth	Peter	
409	Ground	82nd	Washington Post	Reel	Monte	K.
412	Air	AAS	San Antonio Express-News	Pinkerton	James	E
417	Air	AJ	Christian Science Monitor	Arnoldy	Benjamin	
424	Air	AJ	Times News Service	Trowbridge	Gordon	
426	Air	AU	Aerospace Daily	Trimble	Stephen	D
431	Air	AU	Boston Globe	Barnard	Anne	
436	Air	AU	Kansas City Star	Heying	Travis	
437	Air	AU	Milwaukee Journal Sentinel	Sieu	Benny	L
442	Air	AU	New York Times	Dao	James	C.
443	Air	AU	St. Louis Post-Dispatch	Leiser	Kenneth	J.
445	Air	AU	Times News Service	Trowbridge	Gordon	L
449	Ground	CFLCC	Albuquerque Tribune	Ehn, Jr.	Jack	M
455	Ground	CFLCC	Daily Titan	Larson	Ronald	P.
458	Ground	CFLCC	Knoxville News Sentinel	Mitchell	Bryan	E
459	Ground	CFLCC	LA Times	Verhovek	Samuel	M. H.
461	Ground	CFLCC	New Orleans Times-Picayune	Varney	James	J
462	Ground	CFLCC	New York Times	Gordon	Michael	R.
470	Ground	CFLCC	Wall Street Journal	Trofimov	Yaroslav	
471	Ground	CFLCC-Red Horse	Gainesville Sun	Bruno	Gregory	C.
472	Ground	CFLCC-Red Horse	Gainesville Sun	Weimar	Mike	
473	Ground	CFLCC-Red Horse	St. Augustine Record	Guinta	Peter	
484	Air	Inc	Houston Chronicle	Sandberg	Lisa	A.
487	Air	Inc	Omaha World-Herald	Dejka	Joseph	R.
489	Air	Inc	Rocky Mountain News	Schneider	Chris	M.
490	Air	Inc	Stars & Stripes	Dougherty	Kevin	T.
493	Air	Inc	Wall Street Journal	Chazan	Guy	
504	Ground	MARDIV	Baltimore Sun	Murphy	John	
508	Ground	MARDIV	Boston Globe	Nelson	Scott	
509	Ground	MARDIV	Boston Herald	Takahashi	Kuni	
516	Ground	MARDIV	Denver Post	Cross	James	A.
523	Ground	MARDIV	LA Times	Loomis	William	R
532	Ground	MARDIV	New York Times	Kifner	John	
533	Ground	MARDIV	Newsday	Taylor	Letta	M.
536	Ground	MARDIV	Orange County Register	Avery	Mark	D
537	Ground	MARDIV	Philadelphia Inquirer	Gerlin	Andrea	
538	Ground	MARDIV	Providence Journal/ The Dallas Morning News	Landers	James	M.
542	Ground	MARDIV	Seattle Times	Hurst	Thomas	J
543	Ground	MARDIV	SF Chronicle	Koopman	John	D
544	Ground	MARDIV	St. Louis Post-Dispatch	Harris	Ronald	J.

547	Ground	MARDIV	Tampa Tribune	Bowman	Rex	L.
548	Ground	MARDIV	The Ledger, Lakeland, FL	Allen	Diane	L
554	Ground	MARDIV	USA Today	Smith	Elliott	B
555	Ground	MARDIV	Virginian Pilot	O'Brien	Dennis	S.
557	Ground	MARDIV	Wall Street Journal	Phillips	Michael	M.
558	Ground	MARDIV	Washington Post	Finer	Jonathan	J.
562	Ground	MEF CE	USA Today	Lynch	David	J
568	Ground	MEU	New York Times	Wilson	Michael	J.
576	Ground	MEU (24th)	New York Times	LeDuff	Charles	
647	Maritime	Navy	LA Times	Williams	Carol	J
651	Maritime	Navy	Milwaukee Journal Sentinel	Not accepting at this time		
652	Maritime	Navy	Minneapolis Star Tribune	Tyree	Christopher	D.
660	Maritime	Navy	New York Times	Clemetson	Lynette	
661	Maritime	Navy	New York Times	Laforet	Vincent	B.
662	Maritime	Navy	Newsday	McCrummen	Stephanie	L.
667	Maritime	Navy	Philadelphia Inquirer	Bauers	Sandy	
679	Maritime	Navy	Seattle Post Intelligencer	Lyke	Mary Lynn	
680	Maritime	Navy	Seattle Times	Bernton	Henry (Hal)	P
681	Maritime	Navy	SF Chronicle	Podger	Pamela	J
684	Maritime	Navy	Stars & Stripes	Helmer	Kendra	A.
688	Maritime	Navy	Times News Service	McMichael	William	H
696	Maritime	Navy	USA Today	Soriano	Cesar	G
697	Maritime	Navy	Virginian Pilot	Dolan	Matthew	S.
700	Maritime	Navy	Washington Post	Layton	Lindsey	J.
707	Air	PSAB	Aviation Week	Fulghum	David	A
711	Air	PSAB	Inside Washington	Grossman	Elaine	
713	Air	PSAB	New York Times	Kershaw	Sarah	S.
714	Air	PSAB	Newsday	Dowdy	Zachary	R.
715	Air	PSAB	Washington Post	Graham	Bradley	
718	Air	SI	Chicago Tribune	Quintanilla	Ray	
728	Ground	Special	New York Times	Dao	Jim	
729	Ground	Special	New York Times	Miller	Judith	
730	Ground	Special	Newhouse News	Wood	Dave	
732	Ground	Special	Washington Post	Finn	Peter	
733	Ground	Special	Washington Post	Gellman	Bart	
737	Ground	V Corps	Atlanta Journal Constitution	Penhaul	Karl	
739	Ground	V Corps	Boston Globe	Kammerman	David	F
740	Ground	V Corps	Buffalo News	Zremski	Gerald	W.
745	Ground	V Corps	Detroit Free Press	Canon	Scott	
746	Ground	V Corps	Engineering New-Record	Sawyer	Thomas (Tom)	W
752	Ground	V Corps	Knoxville News Sentinel	Clarke	Cathy	C
753	Ground	V Corps	LA Times	Casey	Kevin	P
756	Ground	V Corps	Miami Herald	Laughlin	Meg	
758	Ground	V Corps	New York Post	Jonathan	Foreman	E.
759	Ground	V Corps	New York Times	Weinraub	Bernard	
773	Ground	V Corps	SF Chronicle	Ostler	Scott	L
775	Ground	V Corps	Washington Post	Sheridan	Mary Elizabeth	

Appendix 2

Table of Excerpts

#	Publication	Dateline	Title of article	Reporter name	Reporter Status
1, 2	New York Times	3-18-2003	Disarming Saddam Hussein; Teams of Experts to Hunt Iraq Arms	Judith Miller	Embedded
3, 4	New York Times	3-19-2003	Articles of Capitulation; Iraqis Told, 'Sign Here' to Surrender-As Lee Did	Bernard Weinraub	
5, 6	New York Times	3-27-2003	In the Field Intelligence; Army Reports Iraq Is Moving Toxic Arms to Its Troops	Bernard Weinraub	
7, 8	New York Times	4-4-2003	Illicit Arms; U.S. Forces Have Searched Few Iraqi Weapons Sites	Judith Miller	
9, 10	New York Times	4-7-2003	American Soldiers Find Drums Possibly Storing Chemical Agents	Bernard Weinraub	
11, 12	USA Today	3-21-2003	Iraq Fires at least 5 Missiles into Kuwait	David Lynch & Steven Komarow	
13, 14	New York Times	3-25-2003	G.I.'s Pause on Push to Baghdad, and One Falls to a Sniper	Steven Lee Myers	
15, 16	Boston Globe	4-2-2003	Baghdad's Leader the Karbala Gap	Brian MacQuarrie, & Scott Nelson	
17, 18	New York Times	4-9-2003	In the Field 101 st Airborne Division; A Grenade on the Road, the Death of the Enemy: the Human Side of War	Jim Dwyer	Non-embedded
19, 20	Boston Globe	3-14-2003	Iraq Rejects British Proposal	David Filipov	
21, 22	Boston Globe	3-18-2003	Americans, Britons Evacuate as Troops Brace for Attack	Thanassis Cambanis	
23, 24	Daily News	3-20-2003	Iraq Launches Missiles at Kuwait	Richard Sisk	
25, 26	Christian Science Monitor	3-21-2003	As Attack on Iraq Begins, Question Remains: Is It Legal?	Peter Ford	
27, 28	New York Times	3-24-2003	Protests Continue as Jordan Defends U.S. Presence in Border Region	Ian Fisher	
29, 30	New York Times	3-25-2003	Saudis Send Proposals to End War to Both Sides	Craig Smith	
31, 32	New York times	3-27-2003	Militants in Afghanistan fire Rockets at 2 American Bases	Carlota Gall	
33	New York Times	3-31-2003	Syria Wants U.S. to Lose War, Its Foreign Minister Declares	Neil MacFarquhar	
34, 35	New York Times	3-29-2003	Western Desert; War That Is Out of Sight But Not Out of Mind, Especially for the Israelis	Ian Fisher	
36-38	Boston Globe	4-2-2003	Signs of Plan for Chemical Arms Reported	Charles Sennott	
39, 40	Philadelphia Inquirer	4-2-2003	Militants Leave Signs of Chemical Arms; The Kurdish Islamic militant Group attacked in Northern Iraq Last Weekend also Is Accused of Links to Al-Qaeda and Hussein	Jonathan Landay	
41-43	USA Today	4-2-2003	Allied Forces Said to Control Air, Land in Western Desert	Vivienne Walt	
44, 45	Philadelphia Inquirer	4-7-2003	Soldiers Evacuated After Nerve-gas Test	Tom Lasseter	
46, 47	USA Today	4-8-2003	U.S. Gears up to Unmask Illegal Arms	James Cox	
48, 49	Daily News	3-12-2003	Plan 7-day War in Iraq but U.S. May Have to Attack Saddam without Brits	Kenneth Bazinet & Thomas DeFrank	Other
50, 51	New York Times	3-21-2003	Rumsfeld Says Iraq Is Collapsing, Lists 8 Objectives of War	Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt	
52, 53	New York Times	3-24-2003	U.S. Officials Fear Iraqis Plan to Use Gas on G.I.'s	David Sanger	
54, 55	St. Petersburg Times	3-25-2003	Questions Remain over Iraqi Weapons	Bill Adair	
56, 57	Boston Globe	3-28-2003	US Officials Consider Return of Inspectors	Bryan Bender	

58-60	Daily News	3-31-2003	Rummy Zeros in on Banned Weapons Stashes	James Gordon	
61, 62	Daily News	4-6-2003	Light at End of tunnel Prez Boosted by Signs War's Wrapping up	Thomas DeFrank	
63-65	Philadelphia Inquirer	4-6-2003	Pressure Builds for U.S. to Find Banned Weapons	Howard Witt	
66, 67	Philadelphia Inquirer	3-20-2003	At U.N., Diplomats Press Futile Debate on Iraq: Some Security Council Members, Now Spectators, Insisted Hussein Could Be Disarmed Peacefully	Diego Ibarguen	
68, 69	Christian Science Monitor	4-9-2003	'Smoking gun' May Not Affect World's Opinion	Liz Marantes	

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