HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN AFRICAN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: THE INTELLECTUAL CAREER OF GILBERT HAVEN JONES

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines the intellectual career of the early African American philosopher, Gilbert Haven Jones. Jones was the first African American scholar to receive a PhD in philosophy in Germany (University of Jena in 1909). In order to thoroughly analyze the life and work of Jones, this dissertation advocates a framework that combines a historical and philosophical methodology. My use of this framework is a response to the lack of historical considerations undertaken by contemporary African American philosophers. The dissertation examines Jones’ works including an undergraduate essay written at Wilberforce University, his dissertation, and his published book, *Education in Theory and Practice*. Philosophically, I analyze Jones’ work through the lens of personalism, as he was one of the first contributors to the field from both a mainstream and African American context. This project also, for the first time, contributes and analyzes the first English translation of Jones’ doctoral dissertation.
Dedicated to my father.
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The Method and Purpose of African American Philosophy

The history of African American philosophy—in similar ways to the history of mainstream philosophy—requires an inclusive look at both philosophy and history. Of great importance in this analysis is the focus on methodology. It’s understood how the two disciplinary methods function by themselves: history is saliently empirical and descriptive and philosophy conceptual and interpretive. What happens, however, and what priorities are assigned when these two fields are combined to form a sub-genre: the history—or historiography to use Richard Rorty’s term—of philosophy? Do we understand this genre to be primarily historical (empirical) in nature (Rorty, 1984)? Or is it the case that the historian of philosophy ought to advance more of a philosophical (conceptual) orientation? If we are to understand that scholars, specifically historians of philosophy, are attempting to find a relationship between the two, in what ways do they correlate?

I understand these questions to be metaphilosophical in nature, and my aim in addressing this problem (that of the history of philosophy) has ultimately led me to conclude that as a sub-field of the African American philosophical tradition, the history of African American philosophy is both, one, severely underrepresented within African American philosophical discourse and, two, a necessary component of this philosophical tradition and thus deserved of more attention. The above rhetorical questions and arguments are highlighted in this dissertation. Although this dissertation, “Historical Considerations in African American Philosophy: The Intellectual Career of Gilbert Haven Jones,” is an analysis of the intellectual life and work of one scholar, underlying my project is the metaphilosophical question: what constitutes African American
philosophy? This question can only be satisfactorily answered in light of my above argument; namely, that continued work in the history of African American philosophy will, in time, enlighten contemporary scholars as to the inherent concerns presented by the history of African American philosophy.

African American philosophy must seek to expand its methodological norm from one that is merely “governed by the conceptual imperative to grapple with the ontological task of outlining what it means to exist in the world” (McClendon, 2004, p. 2) to one that is more inclusive of empirical and descriptive information. The latter method must also include the practice of translation. Translation is a necessary aspect of African American philosophy as a number of African American intellectuals, specifically philosophers, researched and wrote in languages other than English. Along with Gilbert Haven Jones, African American intellectuals, including Charles Leander Hill, Clarence Mills, Georgiana R. Simpson, and Edward Davis, are among a few scholars whose work in the German language would require contemporary historians of African American philosophical and intellectual history to be competent in the comprehension and translation of German (Walker, 2002).

Charles Taylor envisions philosophy to be an exercise that ought to be inherently historical (Taylor, 1984). Without this relationship, contemporary philosophers fall into the trap of “forgetting” and philosophizing under the pretense that their past is assumed. He notes simply, “in order to undo the forgetting, we have to articulate for ourselves how it happened, to become aware of the way a picture slid from the status of discovery to that

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1 Two African American philosophers who studied and wrote dissertations in other countries are Patrick Francis Healy, who taught philosophy at Georgetown University (University of Leuven in Belgium, 1865) and Francis Monroe Hammond (University of Laval Quebec, Canada, 1943).
of a inarticulate assumption, a fact too obvious to mention” (Taylor, 1984, p. 21). He continues and concludes "freeing ourselves from the presumption of uniqueness requires uncovering the origins. That is why philosophy is inescapably historical” (1984, p. 21). I find these reasons at the epicenter for a detailed analysis in the history of African American philosophy.

Perhaps exclusive to the African American philosophical context, the identification and interpretation of early professional philosophers and their works should occupy the largest amount of energy for the historian of African American philosophy. John McClendon sums it up sufficiently in the following passage:

The historical interpretation of African-American philosophy must be grounded in a factual framework and its affixed descriptive accounts. I contend that the empirical side adjoined to philosophy’s history has monumental significant implications for conceptualizing African American philosophy…Moreover, all talk about what constitutes an African American philosophy is decidedly intertwined with how we understand what makes up the history (formation) of African American philosophy. (2004, p. 2)

Not only does the empirical historical research lend validity to the legacy of African American philosophers (both non-professional and professional), but it also, and perhaps more importantly for any African American historical analysis, affords the historian of philosophy the opportunity to properly contextualize this history in the lived material conditions of the time. As both Taylor and McClendon allude to above, contemporary philosophers tend to presuppose a philosophical legacy as opposed to actually conducting the hard historical work of reconstructing a legacy. Once historians of philosophy become aware of the foundations of their philosophical tradition, they are able to do two things. First, they will be in the ideal position to thoroughly explicate the earlier metaphilosophical concerns; namely, and in my context, what is the nature of the African
American philosophical position? Second, they will be more appropriately suited to interpret contemporary philosophical concerns given their knowledge of whom and where these contemporary arguments have their geneses. My dissertation project seeks to promote this methodology—the shared primacy of historical and philosophical analysis—which is inherent to the history of philosophy, as a critical framework that deserves more attention from contemporary scholars of African American philosophy.

Once this framework is adopted, scholars will be able to comprehend and appreciate the complex professional philosophical and non-professional philosophical nature of the legacy of African American philosophy as well as its reliance upon disciplines and areas of knowledge independent of academic philosophy. The non-professional nature of African American philosophy seeks to analyze the lives and works of non-philosophers using philosophical methods and tools. I believe that the non-professional philosophical nature of the history of African American philosophy ascribed to by the majority of African American philosophers is both incomplete and therefore detrimental. I do not want to say that this position is mutually exclusive to the one I prescribe, but instead I believe little room has yet been given to those professional African American philosophers whose life and work clearly deserve a place alongside their non-professional philosophy brethren.

Once this gap has been filled, contemporary African American scholars will have at their disposal the intellectual work of both lay and academy trained African American philosophers from whom they can, one, strengthen their philosophical literature canon and, two, become more disciplinarily inclusive, as many African American philosophers either had their training in another academic discipline or taught and researched beyond
just philosophy. This framework will guide my project and in what follows I illustrate how I will implement this methodology in analyzing the life and work of the African American philosopher, Dr. Gilbert Haven Jones.

An analysis of the history of African American philosophical practice oftentimes requires a very multidisciplinary approach. Although the scholars engaged within this field were trained as academic philosophers, their scholarship, social missions, and administrative obligations were far more inclusive than the formal teaching and research expectations of mainstream American philosophers. When combined with the metaphilosophical concern expressed in the following, we find that Black philosophers at the beginning of the twentieth century were indeed potent intellectual beings who worked from a variety of disciplinary perspectives under less-than-ideal professional and social circumstances.

Graham Priest describes philosophy as that “intellectual inquiry in which anything is open to critical challenge and scrutiny” (2006, p. 202). He goes on to note the universal importance of this discipline. “One should expect philosophers to challenge, question, object. This is why philosophy is so absolutely essential to any university worth the name, and any society worth having” (2006, p. 207). With this in mind, early African American philosophers were in ideal positions, given their training, to offer salient critiques of the Academy, society, and social ideologies. They were also seen as pioneers for philosophical construction—another aspect of Priest’s philosophy equation—which solidified their place as key Black intellectuals. Although motivated by their philosophical training, their scholarship oftentimes took the form of different disciplinary perspectives.
The combination of a classic philosophical methodology—criticism and construction—with the diversity of the needs of the Black educational, social, and intellectual community created engaged Black philosophers who had to find ways of maximizing the utility of the former in order to fulfill their obligations to the latter. Although no easy task, many Black philosophical pioneers were able to bridge this divide in effective ways. Indeed, current scholars and students of Black Studies can recognize that their foundational motivation—intellectual excellence with practical social implications—came to light in order to carry on the legacy of these Black pioneers.

One cannot discuss the life and work of first generation African American philosophers in any one-dimensional fashion. To talk of the scholarship of Dr. Alain Leroy Locke as simply an American philosopher omits both the context of his philosophizing as well as his other non-philosophical work—notably his work during the Harlem Renaissance—which both had an influence on his philosophical orientation and were also simultaneously directly influenced by it (Harris & Molesworth, 2008). A discussion only of Dr. Charles Leander Hill’s philosophical publication *A Short History of Modern Philosophy* (1951) fails to recognize his genius as an educator and president of a University and scholar of the early protestant reformation. As a last example, if we fail to recognize the non-philosophical and instead focus only on philosophical output, then as scholars we would fail to give due significance to those who ultimately chose a path outside of philosophy; namely Joyce Mitchell Cook, who, in 1965, was the first Black woman to receive a PhD in philosophy. She earned her degree from Yale University, the same institution where Thomas Nelson Baker was the first African American male to receive a PhD in philosophy in 1903 (Yancy, 1998, p. 6). Although she taught philosophy
at Yale, Howard, and Connecticut College, she also worked in the State Department and government, working for the Office of Economic Opportunity (Yancy, 1998, p. 272).

The historian of early African American philosophy has a two-fold mission. In order to fully appreciate and analyze the scholarship of these African American philosophers, the historian must first properly contextualize the non-philosophical features of the philosopher. These features include the diverse historical and social context in which early African American philosophers lived. When thoroughly examined, these non-philosophical features provide a relevant framework from which the scholar can begin his/her second task, which is philosophical in nature and also interdisciplinary. Philosophy has shown that its methods and theories have been continuously shaped by other academic disciplines. Indeed, any philosophical analysis of early African American scholars requires a certain competency in the different fields that their philosophical work influenced. It is with this two-fold mission in mind that I develop my dissertation project.

“Historical Interpretation in African American Philosophy: The Intellectual Career of Gilbert Haven Jones” focuses on the philosopher Dr. Gilbert Haven Jones and his scholarly contributions, which include an unpublished philosophy essay, his dissertation, and his one published book.

Dr. Gilbert Haven Jones was born on August 23, 1883 in Fort Mott, South Carolina. He was the son of one-time Wilberforce president and AME church bishop, Joshua H. Jones. Much of the scarce information we have about Gilbert Haven Jones comes from the relationship he had with his father. During the time the young Jones was an undergraduate at Wilberforce, his father was an influential administrator and during Gilbert Jones’ tenure as president of Wilberforce, his father was director of the board of
trustees. After receiving an A.B. in 1902 and Bachelor of Science in 1903 (both from Wilberforce), Jones taught classic languages at Langston University. Following graduate work at Dickinson College and a brief stint as principal of a local school for colored children in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Jones traveled abroad and studied at the Universities of Göttingen, Berlin, Leipzig, Halle and Jena in Germany and the University of Toulouse and the Sorbonne in France. In 1909, he received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Jena in Germany with a dissertation entitled Lotze und Bowne: Eine Vergleichung ihrer philosophischen Arbeit.

Upon returning to the United States, Jones accepted positions as professor of philosophy and education at St. Augustine Collegiate Institute in Raleigh, North Carolina, professor of ancient languages at the Agricultural and Normal University in Oklahoma, professor of politics and government at Wilberforce University in Wilberforce, Ohio, dean of the college of Liberal Arts at Wilberforce, and president of Wilberforce between 1924-1932. Later in his career Jones served as dean of the College of Education and Industrial Arts at Central State University and received honorary doctorates from Howard and Dickinson Universities. He died in Chicago on June 24th, 1966.

Although the majority of Jones’ scholastic efforts were not directed exclusively to philosophical teaching and publishing, he was, nonetheless, a professionally trained philosopher and is therefore worthy of the title of philosopher, as opposed to a scholar who did philosophy and other things. The purpose of my project is to give the appropriate light to the work of a philosopher who deserves more scholarly attention than he has hitherto received. This purpose has its motivation in a charge given by George Yancy. He notes: “when it comes to our knowledge of African American philosophers, there is often
a stark paucity of information” (Yancy, 2003, p. 253). A simple phrase, yet it speaks to the fact that a lot of these scholars and their work go unexamined. If these works and scholars continue to remain unanalyzed, contemporary scholars will remain ignorant to the progenitors of their own tradition. This project desires to bridge this historical gap so as to help contemporary scholars understand the dynamic nature of the early African American philosopher. In so doing, this dissertation should open up the question of what it meant to be an African American philosopher during the Jim Crow era.

One reason for the ignorance among contemporary scholars in regard to early African American philosophers is the dual nature of contemporary African American philosophy. The first branch of African American philosophy, which is partly historical in nature, would begin with the study of those Black men and women of letters who received advanced degrees in philosophy. This history would thereby have as its genesis Dr. Francis Patrick Healy (PhD, philosophy, University of Louvain, 1865) and Dr. Thomas Nelson Baker (PhD, philosophy, Yale University, 1903). The second branch of African American philosophers, as mentioned earlier—one which is clearly more popular given its number of publications—within the field of African American philosophy pays little attention to the legacy developed by those first generation Black philosophers and instead conducts its philosophical exercises with little knowledge of the pioneers of their field; this is the contemporary branch of African American (Africana) philosophy.² Although these two areas are not mutually exclusive, I believe that they occupy two different, yet equally important positions.

Many books, articles, lectures, and courses are based on the latter area of focus, namely presenting non-traditional philosophical concepts (race, social relationships, inter(tra)-group phenomena), and persons whose ideas can be analyzed philosophically (Jupiter Hammon, David Walker, Frederick Douglass, W.E.B. Du Bois, Booker T. Washington). This, then, has led to the negligence of contemporary Black philosophers to those men and women who held doctorates in philosophy and the work that they accomplished. One of the weaknesses behind this phenomenon is the lack of primacy by contemporary scholars to historical research.

A very large aspect of African American philosophy is its historical practice. Without the exercise of locating African American philosophy doctorates and their work, contemporary African American philosophers would be without a canon of original scholarship to analyze. My work on Jones, then, satisfies this discrepancy. Through a thorough historical and philosophical analysis of Jones’ life and legacy, I am contributing to the under-appreciated work done on first generation Black philosophers by illustrating how Jones is a critical figure in the African American philosophical tradition. Understanding Jones’ lifelong journey through philosophy is significant. Even if Jones’ scholarship is lacking in quantity, his status as a philosopher and the work he did in this

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capacity is important because it questions the very nature of our understanding of philosophy, specifically as it relates to a philosophical understanding of the Black experience. In Jones, we have a credentialed and published philosopher whose work is misunderstood because he neither comes up in philosophical literature nor literature surrounding African American history or the African American intellectual tradition. Jones is not the first Black philosopher to fall into this mold, but in locating his work and understanding his philosophical career, my work on Jones can help scholars contextualize and better understand the life and work of other Black philosophers who’ve fallen through the cracks. It is important to recognize that in understanding Jones philosophical journey we are able to re-question what we know about philosophers during this specific time period. In Jones we have the first example of an African American philosopher who had to utilize his degree in philosophy in a unique way; both because of institutional racism, and because of his own philosophical desires. Jones provides those of us who study early African American philosophers with a framework around which we can analyze Black philosophers of Jones’ era. His life and philosophical work is similar to those of Alain Locke, Charles Leander Hill, and others who found success in using philosophy to question and try to improve themselves and others in their communities.

I also want to show that Jones’ contributions had larger implications both within and outside the Black community. Contemporary scholars who study psychology, philosophy, religion, and, of course, African American history will now have the contributions of a scholar whose work signified the diversity of his training and academic career.
Like other Black scholars of his day who were very much entrenched within the halls of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (hereafter HBCUs), Jones and other “African Americans had studied widely in Europe and not a few held theoretical positions associated with European and Anglo-American authors” (Harris, 2000, p. xxvi). Both Jones’ life and work, when critically analyzed, will be able to appeal to a diverse academic audience. As mentioned above, Jones’ scholarship can be used as an example for a variety of disciplines. Similarly, his life can offer scholars a lucid entrée into the reality of the Black scholar during the early and middle parts of the twentieth century. This intellectual biography will not only provide the life and work of a needed Jim Crow era scholar, but it will do so critically. Although Jones’ work is very important for the above-mentioned reasons, his work is not above criticism and with this in mind, the dissertation is also intended to thoroughly and critically interrogate Jones’ contributions.

My dissertation is separated into two parts. Part one develops a framework and includes the first three chapters to properly contextualize Jones historically as a scholar within various African American academic discourses. Part two is a critical analysis of Jones’ philosophical and non-philosophical work and comprises chapters four through six and is dedicated to analyzing Jones’ scholarly contributions. Including an introduction, which details the method and purpose of my project and conclusion, which discusses Jones’ relevance to African American Studies, the dissertation is eight chapters. Below are a few overarching questions that guide my project: Why is the history of philosophy a critical aspect of philosophical analysis? What implications does the above question have on the metaphilosophical concerns of African American philosophy? Why is it important to study first generation African American philosophers? What did it mean to be a Black
philosopher at the beginning of the twentieth century? What motivated Black scholars to travel and study in Germany? And finally, how can we appropriately appraise the life and legacy of early twentieth century African American scholars given the Jim Crow Era?

The first chapter, “African American Intellectuals and German Higher Education,” notes the importance given to the influence the German intellectual tradition had, in general, on early twentieth century mainstream American and African American philosophy. Using Du Bois and other Black scholars, I aim to prove that although Jones and other intellectuals exhibited social and academic responsibilities to their race, they did so, in part, with theories, methods, and experiences derived from the German tradition. Without a thorough examination of late nineteenth and early twentieth century German influence in the life of Black scholarship, any analysis of the work of these scholars, specifically Jones, would be incomplete. I also incorporate in this section the information I have gathered on Jones’ life while he was in Germany, specifically his time at the University of Jena from 1907 to 1909.

As is evident in the second chapter of my project, Dr. Jones’ philosophical work most closely resembles the philosophical tradition of personalism. This second chapter of my dissertation, “Personalism as a Distinct (African) American Philosophical Tradition,” emphasizes this American philosophy, which has its roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth century German idealist tradition.

The most apparent argument that is made in this chapter is that Jones’ work in personalism predates all work done in Black personalism and also follows alongside first generation American mainstream personalism. Jones, I conclude, is truly one of the pioneers of the American personalist tradition. By placing Jones within this tradition, I
recognize that he should not only be studied as a member of the Black personalist tradition, but also—and primarily—as a progenitor of the tradition in both its Black and mainstream forms.

Jones was not alone in the flexibility of his disciplinary and academic specializations. Jones was one of many Black scholars who contributed to a variety of academic endeavors, in a variety of fields, including teaching (in both philosophy and psychology)\textsuperscript{4}, mentoring, researching, and administrative work. The third chapter, “Early African American Scholars as Men Who Wear Many Hats,” contextualizes Jones within the state of Black scholars at the beginning and middle of the twentieth century.

This chapter also consists of an examination of the roles of presidents and administrators at HBCUs at the beginning and middle of the twentieth century. Jones was president of Wilberforce University for eight years between 1924 and 1932. Little is known of his tenure as president, but through looking at the nature of other HBCU presidents, their missions and resources, I show how Jones’ career as both scholar and administrator were directly correlated, and conclude that similar to Francis A. Thomas, Jones’ contributions to academia in general needs to be seen through the perspective of the “long legacy of critical pedagogical engagement and administrative duties at the highest level of excellence” (McClendon, 2003c, p. 36) which embodied the HBCU educator during the Jim Crow Era.

The second part of my project is dedicated to a critical look at Jones’ publications. The fourth chapter, “Conceptual and Critical Considerations of Gilbert Haven Jones’ Philosophical Work,” begin to analyze Jones’ philosophical writings. Beginning in this

\textsuperscript{4} Robert Guthrie notes, in his \textit{Even the Rat was White} (1998) that Jones “was the first Black person with an earned doctorate to teach psychology in the United States” (163).
chapter with his unpublished essay, “The Existence of a God: an Intelligent First Cause,” I illustrate that Jones’ philosophical development began as a non-academic endeavor. Instead, this essay was a personal attempt to see what he understood in terms of general philosophy and the philosophy of religion specifically. Additionally, this chapter addresses conceptual concerns regarding Jones’ membership within the African American personalist tradition. As his essay is not only the beginning of his philosophical years, but also his personalist development, outlining his place in this tradition is important. I take Rufus Burrow’s framework of what constitutes Black personalism to task as he is the foremost scholar of Black personalism, but also a scholar who has neglected to include Jones at any point in his writings. This chapter leads into Jones’ dissertation.

Chapter five, “A Critical Assessment of Jones’ Dissertation: Eine Vergleichung ihrer philosophischen Arbeit,” is dedicated exclusively to Jones’ dissertation. Jones’ dissertation has yet to be fully analyzed and critiqued because, until very recently, it had not been translated to English. This chapter is based on my own translation and aims to give a comprehensive and critical analysis of this project. It draws on the subject matter of chapter two, insofar as the dissertation can be seen as a significant text in the personalist tradition. It is appraised on its many insights into the philosophical systems of both Herman Lotze and Borden Parker Bowne.

Although it is not mentioned explicitly in his dissertation, I would say that, especially given Jones’ role as an early Black personalist, philosophy’s ultimate function was to provide a theoretical foundation for the social, educational, and political motivations Jones carried throughout his life. As I mention in chapter two, Black
intellectuals’ utilization of personalism as a philosophy allowed them to legitimate their extra-scholastic activities, which, as I prove, were inseparable aspects to their academic work.

Chapter six, “The Culmination of Jones as Philosopher and Educator: Education in Theory and Practice,” focuses on Jones’ only published book. Like chapter five, this chapter aims to give a clear analysis of the work in its entirety. As it is a work in education (and a bit in psychology) and not philosophy, this chapter also discusses the role Jones played as an interdisciplinary scholar, and not simply a philosopher proper. I believe this work to have latent personalist themes, and so I work my way through the chapter with this in mind. Education in Theory and Practice (G. H. Jones, 1919) is a systematic and comprehensive account of the American educational process. According to his foreword, Jones’ work did “not attempt to be argumentative or analytical but particularly descriptive and explanatory” (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 5). With this in mind, the reader is introduced to almost every aspect of education in all its forms starting at the theoretical and philosophical justifications to more practical exercises like school location, proper sanitation, recitation orders and playground advice.

My conclusion considers Jones’ legacy in regard to African American Studies. Although Jones died just shortly before African American Studies became an academic field of study, it is my belief that his work and life-mission typified the philosophy embodied by past and present African American Studies scholars. The interdisciplinarity of his work, I conclude, should serve as part of the motivation for future research by scholars and educators within African American Studies.
As mentioned before, unearthing Jones and his work is a very important task to undertake, as it gives contemporary African American philosophers another instance of critically analyzed first generation African American philosopher for review and edification. It also gives scholars of various other disciplines (education, religion, psychology, African American Studies) a figure that featured as a pioneer in each field and contributed possible models, theories and methodologies relevant for today. Jones not only contributed to these disciplines, but I argue that he was a pioneering force behind a multitude of traditions that advanced these respective disciplines. With his work and legacy carefully and properly analyzed, contemporary scholars are able to see in Jones’ legacy, what constitutes a shining model of dedication to academic excellence by another early yet neglected Black intellectual /educator. Moreover, we have a pioneering American philosopher that enriched African American intellectual history and philosophical inquiry.
Chapter I: African American Intellectuals and German Higher Education

Afro-German Studies has in recent years become an expanding and popular field in the humanities and social sciences. Similar to many interdisciplinary area studies, this field of inquiry developed out of social concern, primarily from Afro-German women. Initiated with the seminal *Farbe Bekennen: Afro-Deutsche Frauen auf den Spuren ihrer Geschichte* (Oguntoye, Opitz, & Schultz, 1992) Afro-German Studies has, in part, reconceptualized studies within the Black Diaspora by shifting scholarly attention from the Black Atlantic to Black-European considerations. The year 2011 saw the publication of yet another Afro-German anthology, this one published exclusively with the relationship of African Americans and Germans in mind. *Germans and African Americans: Two Centuries of Exchange* (Greene & Ortlepp, 2011), chronicles the mutual relationships between Black Americans and Germans on both American and German soil, from a variety of disciplines. The editors of the piece maintain that their project documented how the connection between these two groups of people “shaped the African American freedom quest and both their attempts at ethnic self-definition” (Greene & Ortlepp, 2011, p. vii ). In their attempt to offer a comprehensive account of the many variables utilized in the identificatory and emancipatory struggles of African Americans during the nineteenth and twentieth century, the editors failed to include in their analysis a discussion on those African American scholars who studied in Germany. This chapter is an attempt to rectify the paucity in this literature.

This chapter includes an account of those late nineteenth and early twentieth century African American intellectuals who traveled to Germany for the purposes of higher education. I aim to explicate the atmosphere, motivations, and contributions that
influenced Dr. Gilbert Haven Jones, the first African American to earn a PhD from Germany. Jones was among a handful of African American scholars who traveled to Germany to further their education. Corey Walker illustrates the direct correlation African American scholars recognized between the racist social and intellectual state in late nineteenth century America and the esteemed German academic system. He writes,

Although educational travel to Europe was undertaken for a diversity of reasons, they are somewhat related to two overarching issues: a racist and sexist American higher education apparatus and social milieu which conferred a pariah status on African Americans and the social, symbolic, and the intellectual and social capital offered by a European educational experience. (Walker, 2002, p. 13)

My argument, in other words, is as follows: Jones studied in Germany for two reasons. First, academic racism in America pushed Jones to receive an equal education in Europe. Second, the pull of the prestige of the German higher education system motivated Jones and others to travel there and study with the world’s most respected scholars.

In what follows, I discuss briefly the nature of academic racism in higher education in America, which forced many—non-intellectuals included—to Germany. I then discuss the allure of the higher education system in Germany, which was during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the most revered Western country for Academia. Lastly, I give an account of a few African American scholars who traveled to Germany for education. I end my discussion with my contributions on Jones’ time in Germany.
The Push: Academic Racism in America

The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was a time of educational unrest for African Americans. The industrial education model, pioneered by Booker T. Washington, was very influential throughout many HBCUs. This caused a stranglehold on other Black schools, which did not want to assume such an ideology:

Small wonder then, that the few institutions like Atlanta, Fisk, and Howard which tried valiantly to provide a genuine collegiate education to Negroes languished in poverty and neglect while the propaganda centers for industrial education, Hampton and Tuskegee, prospered and received the lion’s share of philanthropic support until the 1930’s when it became clear to virtually all observers that industrial education had been a cynical political strategy, not a sound educational policy. (Winston, 1971, p. 683)

Coupled with this was the devastating impact academic racism played in hindering African American scholars from matriculating at and graduating from integrated northern schools. The example of Edmonia Lewis offers a general illustration of the frustrations Black scholars faced at these institutions:

Yet integrated school experiences in the United States revealed an undercurrent of race antagonism as well as cases of overt hostility, like that of Edmonia Lewis, who entered Oberlin in 1859. Lewis, of African American and Chippewa heritage, suffered a series of physical attacks by fellow students who accused her of poisoning two White female classmates and of stealing art supplies…Though not all incidences at Predominantly White Institutions in the 19th century were this severe, Black students were subject to racism by students, staff, and faculty, or by institutional policies that regulated curriculum, housing, meals, and social interaction. Lewis, like many students after her, chose to move overseas where she would have a better chance to learn in a supportive environment. (Evans, 2009, pp. 79-80)

Examples such as this help to contextualize the climate Black scholars faced within higher education. Regardless of whether or not they were intellectually qualified to study at the higher education level, pseudo-philosophical and scientific racist notions of the
inferiority of the African American at every level created a tenuous atmosphere within
the Academy.

Martin R. Delany, the abolitionist, civil war officer, and back-to-Africa advocate,
also had dreams of obtaining a medical degree from Harvard. This never came to fruition
as he and his two other Black colleagues, were removed from the University after only
three weeks. Frank Rollin comments that Delany’s fight for education was shared
throughout the members of his race, regardless of one’s perceived, or documented
intellectual capacity. This is true specifically of J.W.C Pennington.

Then, no college or academy of note in the United States received within its walls
a black student, no matter how deserving…”At this time,” said Martin Delany, “or
shortly after, the now learned J.W. C. Pennington, D.D., who received the degree
of Doctor of Divinity at the University of Heidelberg, under Prince Leopold,
president, was standing either behind the door of Yale College, or perhaps on its
threshold, listening to instructions given in the various branches by the professors,
and considering it a privilege, as it was the closest proximity allowed him toward
entering its sacred precincts as a student. (Rollin, 1883, p. 41)

Alexander Crummell, like Pennington and Delaney was refused the right to receive his
desired degree, specifically theology. In 1853 Crummell traveled to England to study
philosophy with the Cambridge Platonist, William Whewell (Scruggs, 1982, p. 146).
Crummell would later become the first professor of Moral Philosophy at the Liberia
College in Monrovia, Liberia, thereby making him the first African American to formally
hold the position of professor of philosophy at any institution.

Guided, in part, by Pennington’s example, a handful of African American
scholars took an opportunity to travel to Germany to take part in German educational and
social life. Spurred by American academic racism and the reputation of German higher
education excellence, these African Americans sojourned to a Germany at the height of
its global academic influence.
The Pull: German Higher Education

Germany represented the finest educational systems in the world and both White and African American students recognized this fact:

Nineteenth-century America marveled at Germany by modifying their educational institutions and sending promising young as scholars to Germany to refine their academic skills. African Americans were cognizant of the same ideas and issues that affected the majority culture and adapted them to their specific needs and aspirations. (Hopkins, 1996, p. 44)

Studying in Germany at this time was one of the few opportunities wherein African and White American students could take advantages of the finest academic resources, perhaps in the world at that time, simultaneously and, for the African American students, without fear of racist backlash. Indeed, I argue that, perhaps for the first time, African American students/scholars were judged first and foremost on their intellectual capacities instead of their status as African Americans.° Germany allowed these African Americans an opportunity to accomplish much by way of intellectual growth. Such an occasion had not been widely available to African Americans before, and as I will note below, those who took advantage of German higher education, left that country with a diverse accumulation of social, political, aesthetic, and academic knowledge, which was then, as teachers and professors, immediately manipulated and transferred directly to the mass of Black students who would not have the same opportunity.

°This was very rare for African American thinkers of the antebellum period. A clear example can be found in Charles Lewis Reason who was the first African American to teach at a predominantly white college. He would later become an administrator of schools in New York City and in 1873 he would be among many who led the fight to end segregation in New York City’s public schools.
Academic relations between African Americans and Germans had their roots in the social significance the latter had for the former. Leroy Hopkins notes that during the antebellum period:

One can characterize the African-American perception of Germans…as that of an important ally in the struggle for freedom and self-determination. The recent immigrant, especially the intellectual fleeing political oppression in Europe, was directly courted by African-American leaders such as [Frederick] Douglass who perceived an intrinsic love of personal freedom in the German character. This idealized image of the German united two seemingly diametrically opposed forces: the liberalism of the revolutionary and the conservatism of German family values. To the African-American, however, both impulses were extremely valuable in the struggle against a system that threatened him on an individual and group level. (Hopkins, 1996, p. 30)

For African Americans of this period, German immigrants to America represented a symbolic push for social and political freedom. Although African Americans could not go about attaining their freedom using the same methods as the Germans, they did understand that within these people, there was enough of a drive to escape oppression, and because of that push, they found the pull of a democratic America too alluring an opportunity for freedom and growth to pass up. Ironically, it was this very spirit of German personal freedom, which led African American intellectuals to partake in a similar journey, only theirs took them to the country many German immigrants left. Although this push-pull motivation led to reverse migrations, it, nonetheless, had at the heart of its relationship the inspiration of self-cultivation, personal freedom, and group identity. Germans sought this, in large numbers, in America, while African American intellectuals sought it in Germany and its system of higher education (Greene & Ortlepp, 2011).

Of Germany’s prestige and influence within American higher education, C. Wright Mills writes
[T]here is one other feature of American intellectual life which furthered the growth of graduate schools and the consequent professionalization of disciplines. These processes occurred in America under the heavy influence of German models of research. The full influence of the German university system with its animus of specialization and research was mediated by American scholars who studied in German universities and by German professors who came to teach in American universities. (Mills, 1964, p. 71)

American students studying in Germany was not just a trend, but it was also an accepted mode of academic training for aspiring scholars. The number of Americans matriculating at German universities was relatively small until the 1850s when, “the number came to exceed one hundred, and in the sixth [decade], it increased at least three fold. In the seventies there were more than 1,000 students” (Thwing, 1928, p. 16). Daniel Fallon sums it up succinctly when he writes

the ‘doctor of philosophy’ had been assumed directly from the German Dr. phil. which was the principal academic degree awarded by the German ‘philosophische Fakultät,’ or faculty of arts and sciences…Throughout this period of birth and development of the American university the dominant influence, the overriding ideal, was the model of Humboldt’s enlightenment university. (Fallon, 1980, p. 52)

Paul Grimly Kuntz calls the period between 1880-1920—an instrumental time in the development of American higher education and overall intellectual growth—“the Lotzean period” (Santayana, 1971, p. 48). Named after the German philosopher, Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), Kuntz claims that because of his progressive philosophical system— in which one could “see through the difficulties of adjusting the old biblical authority to the new authority of science”— Lotze “was the German academic philosopher who was best known to the outside world and who proved peculiarly attractive to young Anglo-Americans” (Santayana, 1971, p. 48). Lotze’s scholarship is an example of the pioneering work that was done during the nineteenth century in German institutions. I believe that Lotze personifies the popularity of the German scholar and
German academia at the time. This influence was adopted by many in the United States and persuaded many students to travel abroad to study with Lotze and his contemporaries. Although Mills’ and Thwings’ work is concerned only with the professionalization of academic disciplines, and therefore presumes only white scholars and scholarship, we know that African American scholars were also partakers in this trend. A small number of African Americans studied in Germany and had their work directly influenced by the German educational system.

Not only did Germany typify the zenith of intellectual excellence up to the end of the nineteenth century, Germany’s universities afforded American visiting students opportunities far greater than even German students at the time. Given the complex postgraduate work at German universities, it was common practice there to be only a few full professors at a university at a given time. Students wishing to enroll as a Doctoral student would do so by applying to study with a *Doktorvater* and work toward the degree under the auspices of this mentor. This degree took, on average, around six years to complete (Paulsen, 1902). A difficulty in this practice came, however, in the students’ access to their mentor. Given the amount of prestige afforded these full professors and their busy research agendas, it was very difficult for doctoral students, assistant, and associate professors alike to gain access to them. The latter two were still under the tutelage of the full professor and were required to remain in good standing with him in order to be “called” to promotion to full professor.

Fallon notes that it was extremely advantageous for American visiting students to study in Germany because they were given almost exclusive access to these full professors. He writes,
It is worth noting that what U.S. scholars perceived as the German ideal was probably seriously distorted by the status of Americans as foreign visitors in Germany. Thus, for example, because their own careers were not dependent on the resident full professor, U.S. scholars tended not to be sensitive to the barrier a German full professor often posed to the careers of German scholars. Similarly, since visiting U.S. scholars usually knew exactly what they wanted to study and with whom, the problems of the young German scholar struggling with these fundamental questions went unrealized. As foreign visitors, U.S. scholars also had a direct access to full professors, which very few native Germans enjoyed. (Fallon, 1980, p. 51)

As I will mention in my section on Jones, this advantage, I believe, aided Jones in expediting his degree requirements and graduating in just over two years.

The above quote is indicative of White American and African American scholars who traveled to Germany. As I will note in my fourth chapter, Borden Parker Bowne—an American philosopher who studied in Germany—traveled to Germany to study exclusively with the renowned philosopher Herman Lotze. W.E.B Du Bois did similar and came in contact with influential German social scientists including Heinrich von Treitschke, Rudolph von Gneist, Adolf Wagner, and Gustav von Schommler (Barkin, 2011). Gilbert Haven Jones, while at Jena, had the opportunity to study with the classicist, Rudolph Hirzel and the philosopher Rudolph Eucken (Archives, 1908). The opportunity to study under these well-known German scholars gave these African American and American students a first-hand look at the progressiveness of the Universal academy at the time—one heavily influenced by the industrial revolution and the need for scientific inquiry—as well as the distinction of being the first American scholars to apply these theories and methods to the American intellectual scene.

**Germany and Its History with Blackness**

Germany became for many Americans and African Americans alike an intellectual haven, which afforded the very best in progressive educational practices. This
part of the chapter illustrates the importance Germany had for both the American system of higher education, and African American intellectual culture. Gilbert Haven Jones turned out to be just one of a few African American scholars who traveled to Germany to further his education. Through a careful examination of the German educational system’s influence on the American academy as well as an analysis of African American and German relations, I better explicate the role Germany played in the social and intellectual lives of those African Americans who traveled there. In order to do this I rely on the experiences of those early African American intellectuals who traveled to Germany. Included in this group are Richard R. Wright, Mary Church Terrell, George Washington Henderson, W.E.B. Du Bois, Alain Locke, as well as Gilbert Haven Jones. Given the paucity of historical information on Henderson Wright and Terrell, I resign myself, specifically, to an analysis of Du Bois, Locke, and ultimately Jones.

Black presence in German academic discourse has a long history. The first person of African descent to experience the direct influence of German higher education was the West African, Anton Wilhelm Amo. Amo’s exact birth date has been and continues to be a point of contention. However, scholars have agreed that he was born around 1703 in Akonu in present day Ghana (Sephocle, 1992, p. 182). He was presented as a gift to Dukes August Wihelm and Ludwig Rudolf von Wolfenbuttel and baptized on July 29th, 1707. His name is derived from Duke August Wilhelm and his son Anton Ulrich. “Amo” is of Ghanaian lineage. This aspect of his name as well as how he later signed his name—either with the Latin “Afer” or “Gvinea,” or a combination thereof—attests to his knowledge of and pride in his Ghanaian heritage. In 1734 Amo received his PhD from the University of Wittenberg in philosophy and went on to become a relatively well-
known enlightenment thinker while he taught at the Universities of Halle and later, Jena. Leroy Hopkins notes that Amo’s time in Germany was cut short given the racism that Black Africans encountered in eighteenth century Germany. Although well educated in the highest form of academic prestige, Amo could not escape the fact that he was an “object of curiosity” thrust “into a largely unfriendly environment” (Hopkins, 1991, p. 68).

Most of the research on Amo has centered on his academic career, and justly so; he studied, published, and taught during the enlightenment, and became a central figure throughout it. Amo’s fascination with the enlightenment began with the scholar Christian Wolff. Amo never studied with Wolff; due to the scholar being expelled from the university for his beliefs, which proved antithetical to those who believed religious justification (pietism) was superior to rational justification (rationalism). Amo put himself into the debates between rationalists and religious thinkers at the University and his first disputation entitled *The Rights of an African in Eighteenth Century Europe* (1734) attests too many of said rational beliefs. Amo’s writing can be justified through Amo’s rational-driven disputation:

It is fair to assume that this dissertation or *Disputation*, which he wrote under the supervision of von Ludewig, linked to his own condition Thomasius’s concepts of individual happiness as a product of the power of the state and his concept of prejudice as the antithesis of ‘happiness through right practice’. (Sephocle, 1992, p. 185)

Amo continued to write and teach on issues of philology, mathematics, rhetoric, and medicine at both the University of Wittenburg and the University of Jena. Throughout his academic tenure in Germany, which lasted until the early 1740’s with the onset of the Austro-Prussian War, Amo was noted as a very popular lecturer and scholar,
having received awards and praise from colleagues and administrators. As Sephocle points out in the conclusion of her essay, Amo’s fall from academic and financial grace was swift. Sephocle writes,

> The year 1740 indicates a turning point in Amo’s life. The dukes were involved in the Austro-Prussian War and showing less and less interest in the studies of their protégé. They began to distance themselves from the philosophy of the Enlightenment, to which Amo was still committed. Ultimately they distanced themselves from Amo himself. (Sephocle, 1992, p. 187)

The lack of financial and moral support from his long time benefactors as well as increasing racial tensions in Germany led Amo to leave the country in 1751 for the solace of his homeland. He worked as a goldsmith for three years in Ghana before he passed away in 1754.

Amo’s legacy as the first Black philosopher resonated throughout African American intellectual history. John McClendon notes that

> Amo’s accomplishments as an intellectual in eighteenth century German stand as a stark challenge to the hegemonic and racist presumptions about Black intellectual inferiority…In as much as colonialism and segregation were most alive and well in Africa and its diaspora, Amo’s examples, throughout the African world, was a critical resources for the needed moral and intellectual fiber in the ongoing confrontation with imperialist assaults and brutality. (2003b, p. 42)

Amo’s experiences as a Black intellectual, when supplemented with his accomplishments as a Black scholar in Germany give a good context for what these African American intellectuals were capable of, despite the many forms of exploitation which they faced. The African American philosopher, Charles Leander Hill was the first scholar to translate Amo’s work into English. With a strong background in German religious and philosophical history—from his research on Phillip Melanchthon and the Protestant Reformation as well as his mastery of Latin—Hill was in an ideal position to both translate and critically examine Amo’s work (McClendon, 2003b).
Not for another 115 years did an African American begin the trend of embracing the intellectual promise of the German educational system. In 1849, James W.C. Pennington received an honorary doctorate in Theology from the University of Heidelberg. At the time of Pennington’s request for the degree, German academics and their scholarship were enjoying vast popularity in the United States. Heidelberg had also, at that time, emerged as one of the more liberal and leading research institutions in Germany, specifically for philosophy and theology. Although Pennington’s request for the doctorate may seem selfish in nature, when we reflect upon his work for the education of the Black community—namely through his *A Text Book of the Origin and History of the Colored People* (Pennington, 1841)—we see that he had a practical use for his degree. Pennington notes that his motivation in pursuing this degree was to “spread among our youth the higher branches in education” (Hopkins, 1991, p. 68). He continues by noting

As a result of this I am in the process of founding a school as an adjunct of my parsonage. Would not Germany like to be the first one to give a strong push to our endeavors by recognizing the struggle of my people using all its power to educate my brothers and to evangelize them and to lift them up? (Hopkins, 1991, p. 68)

By placing his educational mission in a dependent relationship upon the German education system Pennington “envisioned a liberation strategy he hoped the Germans would endorse symbolically with the doctorate” (Hopkins, 1991, p. 68).

Just three years after Pennington made his proclamation that adopting German higher education missions and foundations were ideally suited for African American education, we find Pennington’s words acknowledged and supported at a state level. The Ohio Black State Convention of 1852 recognized the value of becoming considered on par with what they perceived as German high intellectual capabilities. It was resolved
“that they [the colored people] should aspire to be the equal of the ‘Saxon,’ equal in intelligence, wealth, enterprise, commerce, mechanism, arts and science” (Foner & Walker, 1852, p. 276). Perhaps evoking the revolutionary and freedom-driving Geist of the German people, the convention set to impress upon the Black students of Ohio the language of the Germans. They “recommended the teaching of the German language in our schools, believing that it will prove a great auxiliary to our cause” (Foner & Walker, 1852, p. 276). Bridging this language barrier would have also perhaps strengthened allegiances between these two groups of people, both of who were fighting for equality.

The convention also offered their pleasure to the “German Socialists in their efforts to throw off the yoke of despotism and re-establish their liberty, and that we hail Gottfried Kinkle and Louis Kossuth and their representatives on this continent as the true apostles of European liberty” (Foner & Walker, 1852, p. 277). This trend of combining German intellectual excellence with social, political and education uplift of the Black community continues to be prevalent as my discussion furthers to the experiences of Du Bois, Locke, and ultimately Jones.

One might wonder as to the racist atmosphere in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century. As one of the progenitors of contemporary oppressive racist ideology, which permeated the country beginning during the scramble for Africa and the 1885 Berlin conference and reached its zenith during the interwar period, Germany has been known to those inside and outside the country as a place very insensitive to outsiders. Add to this the allure of the PhD system for African Americans and there is the potential for a truly troubling social situation for these Black scholars. My initial thoughts on this equation were quite pessimistic.
The discussion of race and Germany is centuries old. According to Peter Martin, discussions about Blackness had been prevalent in German consciousness as early as the eleventh century. “Die Begriffe aithiops, mor bzw. das lateinische niger wurden im allgemeinen also Synonyme verwendet und bezeichneten einen dunkelhäutigen Menschen afrikanischer Abstammung“ (P. Martin, 2001, p. 19). Ruth Simms Hamilton articulates similar racial notions of German consciousness in her essay “African Resistance to German Colonialism and its Legacies.” Racial purity was a critical motivating tool for German colonists in Africa as well as the German public (Hamilton, 2007, p. xv). This obsession with race led the Germans to “create new social identities: mixed African and German Mischlingskinder and so-called Rehobothers” (Hamilton, 2007, p. xv). Molefi Kete details how European and German notions of race developed from the Renaissance period to contemporary internalized and unconscious feelings. Racial hierarchies and hegemony, claims Asante, are still prevalent in modern German society, and therefore, those Afro-Germans of mixed race, and Africans in Germany are still at the bottom of the racial ladder (Asante, 1996).

Not only have Afro-Germans been racialized and felt the negative consequences (physical brutality, identity/community isolation) from that, but they also have not been able to create Black communities and common identities and because they grew up in a predominantly white country, they were not aware of the benefits of racial and group solidarity. Asante may be right in placing racial solidarity as the ultimate goal of Afro-Germans; it is true that other diasporic communities have rallied behind the same call. Marilyn Sephoscle, however, is reluctant to make the same claim. She puts it succinctly when she writes that,
[T]he temptation, of course, is to evaluate their identity and their identity with African/black American, black French, or black British criteria and parameters...Black Germans have not yet developed a comprehensive cultural frame of reference that would be a vehicle in their daily lives. The culture they have usually internalized is the German one. (Sephocle, 1996, p. 15)

These historical examples of race in the German ethos help paint a partial picture of the environment Black intellectuals, and indeed all Black peoples, encountered in the country. An effective conversation of the racial atmosphere that early Black scholars encountered in Germany toward the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century can be seen in an article by Leroy Hopkins. His article, “Fred vs. Uncle Tom” (Hopkins, 1991) discusses how Frederick Douglass and his autobiographies were received in Germany. As a highly visible representation of his race, Douglass afforded the German public a glimpse at the trials and tribulations of the nineteenth century African American material culture. Although Douglass was seen as an intellectual and visionary by his Germany readers, his rhetoric did nothing to quell socially validated forms of racial superiority already in place for centuries. Instead of proving that Black Americans possessed the same capacity for intellect and critical thinking as the European, the German audience, instead, believed that he must have had white blood within him, which would have explained his capacity to critical thought. “Zu den glänzenden Beispielen von hervorragender Bildungsfähigkeit, deren die Neger sich rühmen dürfen, gehört Henry Douglaß, freilich der Sohn eines weißen Mannes und wie man glaubt seines eignen Herrn” (Weber, 1845, p. 144). These racial hierarchies were quite prevalent in western intellectual thought and were justified, in part, by many thinkers including Kant (Eze, 1995) and Hegel (Taiwo, 1998). Sara Eigen and Mark Larrimore note that

[W]ithin four decades straddling the close of the eighteenth century, the word ‘race’ was adopted in remarkably similar forms across Europe as a scientific term
denoting a historically evolved, quite possibly permanent, and essentially real subcategory of the more inclusive grouping of living beings constituting a single species. The emergence of a scientific theory of race was the product of often fierce debate among scientists and philosophers, many of whom were clustered at universities in German-speaking lands. (2006, p. 1)

Discussions around race, geography, and anthropology became embedded, as mentioned, within scientific and philosophical discussions. It is clear that the Germany to which African American scholars traveled was a place of strong racial convictions and the heart of an oppressive ideology, maintained by scientific and philosophical analysis. However strong these thoughts were, we find, especially with the examples of Alain Locke and W.E.B. Du Bois, that their status as esteemed visiting academics may have granted them access to social and academic circles—the two were indeed intertwined—that might have been untouchable to many other members of their race back in the United States. The structure of the German academic system was developed in such a way as to maintain social hierarchical imperatives. Fritz Ringer writes “the history of German higher education during the nineteenth century was intimately connected with the evolution of the German bureaucracy” (1969, p. 34). Moreover, it has been suggested that

the academically educated constitute a kind of intellectual and spiritual aristocracy in Germany…they form something like an official nobility…together, they make up a homogeneous segment of society; they simply recognize each other as social equals on the basis of their academic cultivation…As a consequence, the acquisition of a university education has become a sort of social necessity with us, or at least the acquisition of the Abitur, the potential right of academic scholarship. (Paulsen, 1902, p. 141)

What made this membership more exclusive came with the relationship of the professional working middle class (administrative and civil) to the academic system. The two systems developed side by side, with the latter institution—comprised of middle
class males—feeding directly into the former, in the form of those who completed the

Staatsexamen and other qualifications for civil service. Ringer says,

[O]ne is tempted to speak of a social fusion in which the administrative and professional classes drew together. The officials contributed aristocratic and bureaucratic values: but it was the academic ideology of ‘cultivation’ that provided the most important bond between the various elements of the alliance (1969, p. 34).

The two institutions actually upheld each other. The academic system provided the opportunity for state and individual development by way of active research and intellectual cultivation. This cornerstone of the German academic tradition was upheld by their commitments to two basic principles. The first, die Einheit von Forschung und Lehre, established the connection between research and teaching. This mandated top class scholars at universities and did much to add to their prestige. The second principle came by way of protection of freedom. Lernfreiheit und Lehrfreiheit, or the freedom to learn and the freedom to teach respectively, afforded scholars “the right to free inquiry” (Fallon, 1980, p. 28). The American tenure system is still based upon this latter principle.

The above principles helped lend theoretical credence to those in the professional realm whose vocation it was to uphold these conceptual foundations by way of providing proper manifestations of a cultivated and educated citizen educated in the above ideals. These middle class educated state officials reciprocally aided the universities in their endeavors given that the German higher education system was “financed and administered by the various ministries of culture” (Ringer, 1969, p. 35). The academy, therefore, was under the direct influence of the state, and in some ways, the state and its institutions maintained the theoretical findings of the universities; ergo, the genesis of state sanctioned institutionalized racism in Germany—which spread like the plague to the
rest of the western world—had its birth in the philosophical and scientific musings of some of the academies most “enlightened” minds.

It is with this background in mind that I return to my previous conversation on the African American intellectual sojourner in Germany. It has been noted that there are deep-rooted racist themes in German intellectual thought and I conclude, that nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany was a rather hostile place to visit in light of the racist sympathies. However, one must keep in mind the relatively elite nature of those within the German Academy. Not only did they enjoy a certain amount of prestige given their education, but also were they able to become very influential participants in a society whose social stratification was based off, and theoretically maintained by, those cultivated peoples who had access to higher education.

I contend that although these African Americans appeared to have been socially disadvantaged in Germany given their race classification, they actually enjoyed a relatively unseen amount of respect and social notoriety given their positions as scholars. They were able to exercise this freedom given their acquaintances with some of Germany’s most “cultivated” and educated individuals. George Washington Henderson was another African American scholar who preceded Du Bois and Locke in Germany, however given the lack of literature on him, I cannot comment satisfactorily on his time there. After becoming the first African American Phi Beta Kappa inductee, Henderson, beginning in 1883, began studies at Yale for a bachelor of divinity. While there, he received a Hooker fellowship, which allowed him to continue his study of religion for two years with time split between Yale University and the University of Berlin. Henderson arrived in Germany in 1884 and stayed for a year (Titcomb, 2001). As is the
case with Jones, I have to rely mainly on Du Bois and Locke to paint a picture of Jones’
time at the University.

It is not entirely clear how Henderson’s time in Germany influenced his
educational philosophy. Like Pennington, who also saw the influence of religious study
in Germany to be progressive and beneficial, Henderson, who was trained and later
taught in Greek, Latin, German, and Ancient literature, had the times’ best resources
available to him in Berlin. After Germany, Henderson took up administrative positions at
Craftsbury and Newport Academy, and later served on the faculty at Straight (now
Dillard), Fisk, and Wilberforce Universities (Titcomb, 2001). In what follows I elaborate
briefly on the experiences of W.E.B. Du Bois and Alain Locke while they were in the
then imperial city of Berlin in order to explicate that their time there privileged their
status as scholars over and above their status as racialized, and therefore, oppressed
African Americans.

**African American Scholars and Germany**

I begin with a discussion on W.E.B Du Bois. This conversation ultimately leads
me to my original contributions on Gilbert Haven Jones’ time in Germany. It allows me
mostly to speculate, as primary sources on his time in Germany are currently inadequate
for any sufficient analysis.

Much has been said of W.E.B. Du Bois’ sojourns to the continent of Europe. Du
Bois arrived in Düsseldorf, Germany in August of 1892 with the aspirations of earning a
PhD in economics from the Friedrich-Wilhelm III University Berlin. As so many
Americans had perceived of the superiority of the German higher education system, Du
Bois was likeminded in noting, “[A] doctorate in economics from Berlin (‘the most
difficult of German degrees’) would represent the capstone of western academic preparation. Not just for himself, then, but ‘for the sake of my race,’ he must try to obtain this degree” (Lewis, 1993, p. 143). More than one scholar has taken up the influence of Germany on Du Bois’ academic career, specifically in how the burgeoning social sciences began to develop within him a more scientific methodology in his historical work.\(^6\) As much as the rigorous academic nature intrigued and motivated Du Bois, the influence of the country was not merely professional, but it was also social and to a lesser extent, political. As the consummate “race man,” Du Bois was always aware of his status as an African American as well as his imperative to African American educational uplift. The German socio-political environment also influenced the young Du Bois before he even set foot in the country. While at Fisk, Du Bois took a keen interest in the German Alltag of his day. Du Bois “developed a close relationship with the German language professor Henry S. Bennett. He was a frequent visitor at the professor’s home and often borrowed books from his private library” (Barkin, 2011, p. 3). Du Bois also made public his views on Germany; this was accomplished by his short essay “Das Neue Vaterland” and his valedictory speech entitled “Bismark.”

“Das Neue Vaterland” was an essay written by Du Bois, in German, and addressed to “the more than two million Germans who departed from Bismark’s empire for the United States” (Barkin, 2006, p. 446). The essay reads as though Du Bois is

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\(^6\) Works that have looked at the impact of Germany’s academic influence on Du Bois’ later thought are Francis Broderick’s “German influence on the Scholarship of W.E.B Du Bois”; Axel Schafer’s “W.E.B. Du Bois, German Social Thought and the Racial Divide in American Progressivism”; and Shamous Zamir’s “Dark Voices: W.E.B. Du Bois and American thought 1888-1903. Perhaps the largest influence seen in Du Bois’ work is in his “The Philadelphia Negro.” Du Bois’ studies in Germany secured within him a passion for both historical and social scientific methods, both of which are seen in the aforementioned book.
appealing to his audience’s (in their own language) racial and religious presuppositions. “They came to a foreign country to live among a foreign people who are sons of Adam but whose faces, alas, are black, faces they have been taught to despise, and, what is more, that contact with them would stain them” (W.E.B. DuBois & Marcum, 2006, p. 450). He continues by inquiring into their religious history. “Did the German fatherland teach them to set their hearts according to the color of people’s faces; did the God of the Germans direct that the door to the house of Jesus Christ be shut against my people?” (W.E.B. DuBois & Marcum, 2006, p. 450). Du Bois’ provoking rhetoric in this essay does contain within it glimpses of hope. First, Du Bois’ targeted audience gives the reader insight into the author’s motivations:

Du Bois may have been aware that the migrants were from the lowest strata of the Prussian population and, most importantly, that their grandparents and great grandparents had been serfs, tied to the soil until Prussia ended serfdom in the first decade of the 19th century. Similarly to former slaves in the south, the conditions of the former serfs in Prussia did not markedly improve for several generations after they were freed. They were an ideal audience for Du Bois’ plea against the southern landowning class. (Barkin, 2006, p. 446)

Du Bois ends his essay by inviting his audience to find validation for the humanity and cultivation of the African American in their universities. Therein, Du Bois believes he will find a fine example “of a class that has learned to love their mother tongue [German]” (W.E.B. DuBois & Marcum, 2006, p. 450). Du Bois had faith in the rational disposition of these German immigrants, and had, for reasons unclear, decided to appeal to them as opposed to any other migrant group. Du Bois was clearly very interested in many things German during his time at Fisk. His valedictorian speech may be seen as the culmination of this fascination.
Du Bois’ commencement address in June, 1888, “Bismark”, gave his colleagues a glimpse at his intellectual and social fascination with Germany. Commenting on his choice to utilize the rhetoric of heroic vitalism in the form of Bismark, Du Bois in the 1930’s realized his naiveté of America’s and Germany’s imperialistic prowess.

Du Bois understood that his choice of Bismark as hero revealed ‘the abyss between [his] education and the truth in the world.’ In those early years he understood nothing ‘of current European intrigue, of the expansion of European power into Africa, of the Industrial Revolution built on slave trade and now turning into Colonial Imperialism. (Zamir, 1995, pp. 30-31)

At the time, however, Du Bois could be said to have followed the historical philosophy that the hero “is the force that moves history forward and the pattern inside which others can live by imitation” (Zamir, 1995, p. 30). Much like the topic of the next chapter: the philosophy of personalism; the belief that history is reduced to the biographies of great men offers Du Bois and those of his race a sense of free will and agency; concepts that were promised but not fulfilled under the nature of an exceedingly capitalist and individualistic America. This “great men of history” rhetoric was perhaps the theoretical catalyst, which guided the young Du Bois toward his Talented Tenth social theory, but also the American Negro Academy Spearheaded by Alexander Crummell, The American Negro Academy, which was founded in 1897, was a Black “think tank, guided and bound by objectives laid out in its constitution: ‘to promote the publication of scholarly works…to gather its archives…data and the work of Negro authors…to publish…to raise the standard of intellectual endeavor among American Negroes’” (Blaxton, 1997, p. 19).

Du Bois relished his time in Germany. He traveled, wrote extensively and enjoyed the challenge and possibility of obtaining a degree in Germany. While relishing in his
soon-to-be newly minted PhD, Du Bois writes “I have finally proved to my entire satisfaction that my race forms but slight impediment between me and kindred souls...therefore, I have gained for my life work new hope and zeal—the Negro people shall yet stand among the honored of the world” (W.E.B. DuBois, 1894, p. 490).

As much as he was engulfed with the race struggle of his people, Germany afforded Du Bois an opportunity to experience a lifestyle where people made assumptions based upon his academic professionalism rather than his racial demarcation (Lewis, 1993). This allowed the young Du Bois to engage openly with White people in a way he had hitherto not been able to. David Levering Lewis notes “for two years, he had grown more and more accustomed to meeting white ‘men and woman’ as [he] had never met them before,’ and slowly, he found them becoming ‘not white folks, but folks’” (Lewis, 1993, p. 149). This translated uneasily into a more romantic relationship with a young Fräulein.

*Es war so schön gewesen/ Es hat nicht sollen sein.* For Du Bois, this was the most appropriate proverb to summarize his brief courtship with a young German woman named Dora (W.E.B. DuBois, 1968, p. 161). After spending his first summer traveling and improving his German, Du Bois and Dora had become quite fond of each other and talks of marriage and life in the United States surfaced, only to be quelled by the young Du Bois on account of the amount of work he had to do, his reluctance of an interracial relationship, and the prejudices from people like Prof. and Mrs. Far West. These deterrences notwithstanding, Lewis notes “yet, sixty years later, he would confess to his second wife that he had fallen in love with Dora, and leaving her had been painful” (Lewis, 1993, p. 130). We see the influence of Germany and high society in Du Bois
throughout his work and mannerisms. The iconic picture of Du Bois arriving at the 1900 Paris exhibition in top hat, gloves and cane symbolize not only a scholar, but a cultivated man adept to experiencing the joys of high society in imperial Germany.

Du Bois’ time in Germany as a young scholar was similar to another African American’s in a couple of ways. Like Du Bois, Alain Locke traveled to Berlin in 1910 to complete his PhD, only his was in philosophy. Locke too was enamored with the culture of the imperial city of Berlin and took many available instances to use his tenure there to satisfy his social and aesthetic inclinations. Additionally, neither scholar completed his respective degree.

Not nearly as much work has been done on Germany’s academic influence on the young Locke as there had been with Du Bois mostly because Locke’s time there, however jovial, seems to have been spent on more personal, reflective development rather than on academic growth. Harris and Molesworth note

[I]n contrast to the colonial subjects who had come to Oxford to become part of the managerial class in the British Empire, the students whom Locke was likely to meet were involved in explorations of the Romantic sensibility, idealist philosophy, and the emphasis on Innerlichkeit or inwardness. (2008, p. 93)

It’s probable that Locke’s future literary and aesthetic ventures were nurtured in Germany more so than his philosophical ones. In any case, there is no documentation of him ever experiencing overt racism, and, although merely speculative, it is possible that Locke enjoyed a relatively open homosexual lifestyle in Berlin as it had a more liberal atmosphere than did Oxford. While in Berlin, Locke studied with, and was chiefly influenced by two scholars: Georg Simmel and Hugo Münsterberg.

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7 While in Germany, Du Bois, like Locke was an avid diary and short story writer.
Georg Simmel was a dynamic sociologist who taught at Berlin during Locke’s year there. Locke was most likely drawn to Simmel and his work for a number of reasons. For one, Simmel was one of the first scholars to scholarly engage the concept of culture. In Simmel, Locke may have found motivation for his later ideas on cosmopolitanism as Simmel noted that formal structures of social formation can be separated from the content of social interactions. Harris and Molesworth note that Simmel’s work on culture inspired within Locke the sense that in cultural contact a reciprocity can take place, largely because people can critically investigate the role that certain cultural values and activities play in the overall cultural framework. If such a role in one culture has some analogue in another, then a greater—and mutual—cultural ‘translation’ can occur, even if there is a significant difference between values in the two societies. Such cultural reciprocity increases understanding between peoples and aids in the elimination of oppressive stereotypes and destructive feelings of group or racial supremacy. (Harris & Molesworth, 2008, p. 93)

Locke’s belief in the functional value of cultural reciprocity manifested itself in a speech he gave on cultural relativism and ideological peace. In this speech, Locke recognized the urgent need for a cultural relativism both in theory, but more importantly in practice (Harris, 1989). Locke believed that his is an age ready to accommodate a new cultural relativism, which had its root in science and objectivism. In order to attain such objective intercultural understanding, Locke writes that in following three working principles: cultural equivalence, cultural reciprocity and limited cultural convertibility; one can maintain control over these interrelationships. Cultural equivalence would search for the various comparisons and similarities that could be found within various cultures. In looking for “functional similarities in our analyses and comparisons of human cultures” we would be “offsetting our traditional and excessive emphasis upon cultural difference” (Harris, 1989, p. 73) In recognizing that all cultures share specific foundational
similarities, Locke believes that there would not be a need to insist on a hierarchical categorical structure of cultures.

Cultural reciprocity notes that acknowledging the reciprocal nature of the contacts between cultures would “invalidate the lump estimating of cultures in terms of generalized, *en bloc* assumptions of superiority and inferiority, substituting scientific, point-by-point comparisons with their correspondingly limited, specific, and objectively verifiable superiorities and inferiorities” (Harris, 1989, p. 73) This validation of cultural reciprocity notes that there are objective measures by which people of difference cultures can recognize elements in other cultures. This recognition of reciprocity helps to displace hierarchical and oppressive views of culture as subjective and not able to stand up to science.

Lastly, Locke’s limited cultural convertibility places emphasis on the interchangeable and separable cultural characteristics of institutional forms and values. Because cultural elements have these characteristics, Locke writes, “The organic selectivity and assimilative capacity of a borrowing culture becomes a limiting criterion for cultural exchange” (Harris, 1989, p. 73). Cultural exchange between a group which deems itself superior is detrimental to the other culture’s capacity to borrow, assimilate and otherwise share in the cultural experiences of another group. Locke is certain that cultural relativism is the most scientifically relevant and necessary anthropological undertaking of his time. Locke’s time in Germany may have introduced him to find a common link between his ethics and science, which may have led him to conclude that “cultural relativism itself stands on the very firm base of a now rather formidable body of established scientific facts, with the support of an increasing consensus of scientific
opinion among the students of human culture” (Harris, 1989, p. 74). Hugo Münsterberg was instrumental in relaying these sentiments to Locke during his time in Berlin.

Locke was able to take courses form Münsterberg while at Harvard and during Münsterberg’s exchange year at Berlin. Münsterberg, Harris and Molesworth note, was concerned with the “Austrian value theorists” as well as “typical post-Kantian problems of how the mind interacts with the physical stimuli of the external world to form comprehensive cognitive structures” (2008, p. 95). Although a philosopher at home within the German idealist tradition, Münsterberg was also a pioneer in industrial psychology; his philosophical pursuits did not jeopardize, but instead perhaps enhanced his scientific work. He was so dedicated to this latter commitment that he “equipped his own home laboratory with scientific apparatus to pursue his work in experimental psychology” (Harris & Molesworth, 2008, p. 95). This combination between scientific justification and philosophy in general but also between philosophy and psychology specifically is a trend that both Locke and Gilbert Haven Jones found to be important as they pursued their studies in Germany. It is no accident that, at the time, there were scholars, like Münsterberg, who were committed to finding answers to philosophical problems through the new field of psychology. As will be mentioned below, Jones supplemented his philosophical work with work in the natural sciences and psychology.

We have no documentation, be it through personal correspondence, or formal paperwork to suggest that Gilbert Haven Jones’ time in Germany deviated greatly from the above two scholars. One of the major differences between Jones and the aforementioned scholars was that he spent most of his academic time in Germany in Jena, and not the capital, Berlin.
The Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena was founded in 1558 (Walther, 1999). It has enjoyed a relatively illustrious history as far as German universities are concerned. Amongst the school’s most noted students were the philosopher Gottfried Leibniz and Karl Marx, who in 1841 earned a doctorate from the university “in absentia” (Bauer & Pester, 2012). Some of the more well-known faculty members to have taught at the university were the university’s namesake, the writer Friedrich Schiller, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, G.W.F. Hegel and F.W.J. Schelling. These latter two philosophers influenced, in part, the school’s reputation as a leading center of idealist philosophical thought. It will come as no surprise, then, that Jones took up the study of idealist philosophy, in the form of personalism for the subject of his dissertation.

By the time Jones arrived in Jena in 1907, he was one of approximately 1100 students at the university. Of the academic, social, and political climate of the university at the time of Jones’ stay, very little literature exists in either German or English. In 1864, the English journalist Henry Mayhew published his account of German life as seen through his eyes. This report represents a foreigner’s account of the life and customs of the people in the German state of Thüringen. Of particular note to this essay is his chapter on student life at Jena. Never straying far from his comparative analysis of German higher education to that in his native England, Mayhew offers a telling critique of the demographic of the university as he notes, “the German students must not, in any way, be confounded with those of the part, the sons merely of second-rate middle-class families…The German ‘boys’ in expense of the course of study, only the children of the richest in the land can be sent” (Mayhew, 1864, p. 79). This comparison is important to note as his use of “boy” is significant throughout his analysis of student life in Jena.
Mayhew believes that it is custom for these boys to supplement—although the rhetoric he employs implies a replacement—their university education with beer-drinking, as is customary in this region.

This beer culture is solidified with the university’s three Burschenschaften. These fraternities of sorts were a common social and political fixture within the German higher education. It is noted that these groups stand for “college ‘boys’ who have formed themselves into some club or closed society, for the working out of certain principles which they believe to be either for the general benefit of their country, or for the individual welfare and honor of their brother students” (Mayhew, 1864, p. 81). This climate of fraternities, however, according to Mayhew did not extend itself to non-natives of this certain state, and foreigners. Given the nationalist perception of these groups, “no foreigners are ever permitted to enter the select circle; since they are supposed to have nothing in common with the interests of the Fatherland” (Mayhew, 1864, p. 88). There are no documents, which support any relationship Jones did or did not have to any of the Burschenschaften during his time at the university. They are important to mention as they were a very active social and political institution at the University at that time.

The motivations for his sojourn to Germany were probably similar to any Americans in that Germany was, at the time, the pinnacle of academic excellence, and as was present in Du Bois’ and Locke’s testimonies, a PhD from one of their universities would surely put him on the map academically. It was clear to those who knew him that Jones was proud of his education and accomplishments. In a 2001 article in Dickinson Magazine, Jones daughter, Gladys Jones Robinson notes that Jones’ demeanor illustrated he “was an engaging man…He was very proud of his accomplishments but didn’t have a
swelled head…and the Jones name was something to be attached to. It was unusual to be a student of German. It meant prestige” (Kimmel, 2001, p. 24). Unlike the two earlier scholars, Jones did complete his degree from a German university: the University of Jena. Not only that, but he did so in just under two years; a remarkable feat regardless of the race of the student.

Jones’ choice of the study of philosophy at the University of Jena was not his only option. In letters exchanged between him and W.E.B Du Bois in 1907, Jones sought the advice of Du Bois on matters of where in Germany to study and what subject to study. It was Du Bois, who, upon applying to graduate school, sought the advice of William James over whether or not to pursue philosophy at the graduate level. James ultimately replied that philosophy would not offer Du Bois enough by way of job placement and research. Du Bois’ response to Jones seems to be much less invasive but nonetheless very helpful. The following are excerpts from his response dated April 08, 1907.

Let me say first a word as to the things which you intend to study: I should be rather careful as to how I chose general philosophy or mathematics as the major subject. In both subjects the last word has not been spoken and yet so much has already been done that there is very little chance for a new scholar to make a name for himself. On the other hand psychology, especially the newer, physical psychology, experimental psychology there is a vast and growing field….

(W.E.B. DuBois, 1907, p. 1)

Jones would heed Du Bois’ advice and continue his studies in psychology. Although his major subject at Jena would be philosophy, parts of his dissertation and book contained numerous references and discussions on physical and general psychology. Jones would sail for Germany on July 1, 1907. Upon arrival, Jones intended to study either at the University of Göttingen or Leipzig. Come October 24, 1907, Jones had matriculated at the University of Jena to study philosophy.
That same correspondence addressed more mundane matters relating to Jones’ time in Germany, specifically when and how to travel there, where to stay, where to study, and the cost of living.

You will probably find the best work in psychology at Berlin and also in general philosophy...the tuition in German universities is very low. I forget the exact amount but much lower than in American universities...I should advise your going in the early summer, in June for instance if possible...Go to a small town like Eisenach where I could recommend you to an excellent boarding house and stay there for the summer and learn the language, then in the fall go to your university town and hire a room as other students do and board in the restaurant with them...you ought to allow some money for travelling in the many vacations. Travel does not cost much in Germany and is a great source of education. (W.E.B. DuBois, 1907, pp. 2-3)

Although rare, to have another African American scholar in Du Bois who attended a German university was of great help to Jones. The two scholars would stay in touch throughout Jones’ tenure in Germany. Jones wrote to Du Bois after his first year in Jena and relayed to Du Bois the difficulties of the German academic system and the possibility that he might have had an entire year’s worth of work count for nothing. In the end however, Jones was able to complete his requirements at a very efficient pace. In a letter to Du Bois on June 17, 1908, Jones expressed his frustrations with the difficulty of navigating his studies. A discouraged Jones wrote, “I never believed that in so short a time in one man’s life so many things could arise to block a man’s path. But I have now learnt that it is possible” (G. H. Jones, 1908, p. 3). Du Bois’ response is encouraging, as he informs the frustrated Jones to remain confident and patient. Specifically, he writes,

I am very glad to hear that you are so successful in your work, and instead of being in the least surprised or discouraged you out to count yourself unusually lucky in having the first year’s work count for anything. If I were you I would not hurry—take as much time as possible. (W.E.B. DuBois, 1908, p. 1)
Du Bois may have sympathized with Jones as Du Bois experienced similar problems while progressing through his graduate work at the University of Berlin. In writing that Jones ought to consider himself lucky to have his work count, the reader might note a touch of reproach in a similar fashion to how a parent might scold an entitled child. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Du Bois could not complete his degree in Germany as the Slater Fund (the source of Du Bois’ funding) refused to the necessary financing Du Bois needed to complete his doctorate (Lewis, 1993, p. 146). Jones’ trepidation with continuing may have struck a nerve within Du Bois who, given factors outside his control, could not continue his studies. Regardless of Du Bois’ intention in that passage, what is clear is that Jones valued his opinion as a fellow academic sojourner to Germany and without his help, Jones might not have been as well prepared as he was both intellectually and, although I can only speculate given the paucity of information, socially and politically.

Unlike Du Bois and Locke, we know nothing about the social and political nature of Jones’ trip. However, there are records of Jones’ matriculation at the University Jena, completing the necessary coursework and exams and successfully defending his dissertation. My aim in the previous sections was to paint a general picture of the African American scholar in Germany at the beginning of twentieth century. Given the professional and relatively privileged position of the educated elite in Germany at the time, it was very likely that Jones’ tenure in Germany was spent in a more accepting racial environment. The three scholars interacted primarily with other scholars—German and American—during their time in Germany and may have been sheltered, to some extent, from the racist ideologies inherent within the state structure. There is very little in
Du Bois’ and Locke’s accounts to suggest that they encountered a hostile racial atmosphere while in Germany. Second, contrary to the expensiveness of the American higher education system, the German university was, and still is, mostly state run and funded. This means that students—be they German or Ausländer—wishing to pursue a degree could do so at the expense of the state and not their personal fortune. With the exception of paying for his living costs, Jones was able to progress through his degree with few financial strains, which also aided in the efficiency of his studies.

In a correspondence he had with a Mr. Donald A. Laird throughout 1947, Jones notes the distinct and contrary natures of personal finances during his time at Wilberforce and in Jena. Of his time as a student-worker at Wilberforce Jones writes,

> At Wilberforce I did janitor work around the building during the school year. I also fired the furnace and even at times hauled the coal from a Pennsylvania Railroad Spur about three and one-half miles from the University. Working your way through school was a common practice among the students at the University. This being a rural area, I worked at times on farms in the neighborhood…Plowing in the spring was an early morning job of mine at times. (G. H. Jones, 1957)

Jones worked his way through Wilberforce and was a teacher in the Carlisle public school system while he completed his graduate work at Dickinson College, which he completed in 1906. He paints a very different picture during his time in Jena. In his letter to Laird he succinctly states, “At Jena in Germany there is no opportunity for work. Neither the government nor school makes any arrangements for work students. Unlike democratic America the schools of Continental Europe regard advance education as that of high dignity, culture, class, and money and make no arrangement for work” (G. H. Jones, 1957). Jones’ ability to dedicate all of his mental and physical energies toward his PhD work was clearly an advantage as he needed to complete his paperwork, lecture
notes, exams, and oral defenses in a foreign language. I have not yet found the source of Jones’ funding.

As mentioned earlier, a typical PhD student in Germany at the turn of the twentieth century could expect to get through the required lectures, exams, and dissertation work in around six years. I argue that Jones’ ability to focus all his attention to his studies combined with a Spartan-like work ethic, helped Jones finish his degree in just over two years. Jones’ family and friends had always known him to possess a very professional and rigorous work ethic that allowed him to be quite successful in whatever he did.

Thus far we know of Jones’ time in Germany that it was more racially accommodating than in the US at the time. We can also acknowledge of Jones’ time in Germany that the dominant continental ideologies, which developed in Germany and later became popular in the U.S, played a pivotal role in Jones’ scholarship. Du Bois explored and later utilized the relatively new field of the social sciences, and Locke solidified his beliefs on value theory and modernist aesthetics. Jones was similar in this tradition in that he was able to lay a theoretical and historical foundation for his later philosophical and educational views. Although Jones was an influential pioneer of the Personalist movement, which flourished for generations in the United States, I think that the greatest academic influence on Jones during his time in Germany was his introduction to the mechanics of psychology.

Robert Guthrie explains that Jones was the first African American PhD to teach a course in psychology in the United States. Although there is no documentation of Jones’ course work while at Jena, we can still make a few deductions based upon what we do
know of his time there. The field of psychology during the early twentieth century was very much a developing field. Indeed, it was not seen as an autonomous discipline until the 1870’s when Wilhelm Wundt began to introduce his theories on experimental psychology in Leipzig. Another German creation, psychology organically grew out of the field of philosophy and for some time psychology classes were housed in and taught by philosophers. Wundt began his research in Leipzig through a combination of his medical and philosophical training. He and subsequent psychologists were very much focused on maintaining psychology as *Einteilung der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie*. As a scientific philosophy, then, psychology necessitated equal studies of the hard sciences including: statistics, chemistry, biology, physiology and philosophy including: metaphysics, moral philosophy, and axiology.\(^8\)

Jones’ time in Germany put him in touch with the pioneers of modern psychology, their theories and methods. As a training philosopher, Jones had a solid humanities basis to begin his studies as a psychologist. Coupled with his philosophical work in Jena, Jones also took his minors in both Botany and Zoology. Standard practice at the time required PhD students to minor in other disciplines. He therefore had to take lectures and exams in the above fields. His notebook from a few of these lectures still exist and are interesting as they show, simultaneously, Jones’ mastery and unease with certain German scientific phrases and concepts. Jones passed both of his comprehensive exams in these fields; he received the grade of *genügend*, which means he received just enough points to pass.

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\(^8\) First generation African American philosopher, Thomas Nelson Baker wrote his dissertation, entitled *The Ethical Significance of the connection between Mind and Body*, on the emerging field of psychology and its connection to science and philosophy (Baker, 1903).
Although these two fields are not necessarily characteristic of a trained psychologist, I nonetheless believe that Jones came to study these disciplines for the sake of their value as experimental scientific disciplines. As it was not yet a social science, but instead a hard science, psychological methods very much relied heavily on scientific experimentation. Through these scientific fields of study, Jones garnered the tools necessary for doing experimental work that psychology students were expected to become familiar with at the time. It is not clear why he picked these two disciplines as opposed to two that deal directly with the human condition, but to say that they were arbitrary decisions would be incorrect. Although we do not see either field feature in his dissertation or work thereafter, they appear to me to be relevant courses of study. By 1909, when Jones had successfully completed his dissertation, it would seem that he put himself in a unique and favorable position to utilize his philosophical and scientific trainings. Indeed, his time at Wilberforce in the ensuing years saw him teach both philosophy and psychology. He was preparing to do work in psychology a full twenty-one years before the first African American received a PhD in psychology; that honor was reserved for one-time Wilberforce faculty member, Francis Cecil Sumner who received his degree from Clark University in 1930 (Sawyer, 2000, p. 122). Following Sumner, Francis Monroe Hammond was the first African American to chair, at different times, the psychology and philosophy departments at a white institution, Seton Hall University. His dissertation, La Conception Psychologique de la Societe Chez Gabriel

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9 Consult Hammond’s resume, “Professional and Personal Data” in the Francis Monroe Hammond Collection at Seton Hall. Special thanks to Dr. Alan Delozier, Archivist, Seton Hall University.
*Tarde*, in a similar fashion to both Thomas Nelson Baker and Jones investigated both psychological and philosophical themes (Hammond, 1943).

My aim in this chapter was to properly contextualize Jones’ sojourn to Germany. In so doing, I presented information on two more well-known African American academics. Jones’ time in Germany was similar to theirs in that he was able to escape the institutional and academic racism of the US, thrive in an atmosphere that held higher education in a high esteem, dedicate himself fully to his studies and extracurriculars because he did not have to work part-time, and begin his foundations on the collaborations of philosophy and the sciences which ultimately yielded within him a desire to pursue the burgeoning field of psychology.

Although Jones was not the first African American academic to study in Germany, he was the first to leave the country with a PhD in hand. Throughout his life, Jones acknowledged that his German degree was a very proud moment for himself, his family, and his race. It meant something extraordinary to be among the distinguished few American scholars to have received the coveted PhD from Germany, which reserved the right to be aptly titled *Herr Doktor*. Robert Fikes notes that “prior to World War I, African American intellectuals maintained a vision of Germany as a ‘spiritual fatherland’” (Fikes, 2001, p. 108). Jones’ experiences in Germany, as little as we know of them, secured for Jones a sense of notoriety, specifically from the Black community in Wilberforce, Ohio. Jones and the other Black scholars who traveled to Germany were at the forefront of their respective fields of study. This was the case, in part, due to their progressive and intensive training in Germany. As will be discussed in the following chapter, it happens that, like Du Bois, Jones’ acquired knowledge in Germany that led
him to become one of the progenitors of a German-inspired American philosophical movement. If we trace the history of Personalism we find that Jones, and specifically his dissertation, appear at a crucial moment in this philosophy’s development. The relationship between (African) American and Germany in this instance ought not to be overlooked. Indeed, it is this very relationship that proves to be at the foundation of this movement, with Jones’ dissertation leading the way as a piece of definitive literature.
Chapter II: Personalism as a Distinct (African) American Philosophical Tradition

Germany, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was home to some of the best minds, schools, and resources available to students of higher education. This is due, in part, to the privileged position society bequeathed this institution, and also in part to the figures who made up its ranks. Germany boasted, at least in the eyes of American scholars, many of the world’s finest minds. These scholars made breakthroughs in a multitude of disciplines and ushered in progressive and insightful ideologies.

My last chapter illustrated, in general terms, the influence of the German academic system on the development of scholars and schools of thought in the, then, developing American academy. Many scholars have analyzed this relationship in depth from a variety of perspectives; however the one discipline, which is paramount among the rest in this regard, appears to be philosophy. C. Wright Mills claims, “the history of pragmatism is, in part, a history of the academic profession in America” (Mills, 1964, p. 38). Further abstracted, the academic profession in America, specifically its basis in research and distinctive disciplines, grew from the German higher education system. Mills notes,

There is one other feature of American intellectual life which furthered the growth of graduate schools and the consequent professionalization of disciplines. These processes occurred in America under the heavy influence of German models of research. The full influence of the German university system with its animus of specialization and research was mediated by American scholars who studied in German universities and by German professors who came to teach in American universities. (Mills, 1964, p. 71)

Like the development of the American academy, the discipline of philosophy, in its American guise, owes much of its essence to Germany, its scholars, and its institutions. This chapter is dedicated to one philosophical school of thought. As Mills
mentions, pragmatism developed out of a very German context. The philosophy and theology of personalism is similar in that its influences can be traced back to many of Germany’s thinkers from the enlightenment onward. This chapter serves as the contextual foundation for Gilbert Haven Jones’ work, which, I argue, follows within the personalist tradition. By the end of the chapter I hope to arm the reader with the necessary methodological tools, history, rhetoric, and figures needed to properly analyze Jones’ dissertation and subsequent publications, all of which consumes the second part of this dissertation (chapters 4-6).

The task I lay out in this chapter is large, but is also one that has been done before by a number of scholars. Instead of simply reiterating the history of personalism, its antecedents and the modified form I utilize in this project (African American personalism), I organize my chapter in order to ultimately make the following argument. Although not currently considered an influential personalist, in my estimation, Gilbert Haven Jones represents an integral figure in both mainstream and African American personalism. His dissertation can be seen as one of the earliest works of personalism—both by interpretation and by author’s motivation. Nevertheless, the general body of scholarship has yet to give any significant treatment to his contributions. By working through the various contexts from which his dissertation project emerged, I argue that Jones’ work offers the personalist scholar a very lucid picture into one of the first pieces of personalist literature. A summary of personalism, then, is a logical place to start this chapter.

Personalism: A Summary
Personalism as a philosophical system, theology and overall way of life is complex, diverse, and has many proponents and definitions. For the purposes of this dissertation I will concern myself only with what Albert Knudson specifies as typical theistic personalism. As Knudson notes in his extensive work *The Philosophy of Personalism* (1927), the history of personalism, and more generally of idealism, has seen constant debate around the issues of pluralism and absolutism. Instead of picking one, Knudson feels personalism “recognizes a permanent truth in both pluralism and absolutism, and so seeks to keep the scales evenly balanced between them” (1927, p. 86).

Knudson’s history of personalism takes the reader throughout the many idealist thinkers and their systems, all of who contribute elements to the overall personalist equation. A couple of the prominent early thinkers were Emanuel Kant, and Hermann Lotze. Kant and Lotze called for (in different guises) the active mind in knowledge construction. They believed that one could not merely be a passive receptor to sense data, but that a creative active mind would be necessary to develop categories and concepts in order to come to any rational understanding. Kant’s rejection of Locke’s empiricist formulation that the mind is a passive *tabula rasa* on which external stimuli merely congregate is coupled with his theory in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that knowledge is, to quote Burrow “not possible without an active thinking mind that is capable of creativity” (1999b, p. 24). Kant then influences personalism’s belief that the individual person and his/her epistemology must be activistic.

Herman Lotze’s influence is essential as he was the teacher of Borden Parker Bowne. Lotze contributed the concepts of freedom and person to personalism. His
dedicated aforementioned student carried on the legacy and solidified it within the personalist tradition by maintaining that both aspects (person and freedom) were central.

The rich philosophical history of this tradition has meant that personalism has “not received a fixed definition” (Bowne, 1908, p. 20). However, after explicating the sources of personalism’s past, Albert Knudson attempts to offer an appropriate, if not overly general, definition of this field. He writes:

In light of these facts we may define personalism as that form of idealism which gives equal recognition to both the pluralistic and monistic aspects of experience and which finds in the conscious unity, identity, and free activity of personality the key to the nature of reality and the solution of the ultimate problems of philosophy. (Knudson, 1927, p. 87)

More specifically, personalism, then, is a philosophical and religious perspective in which the person is the ontological ultimate and for which personality is the fundamental explanatory principle. Personalism is a form of philosophical idealism, which states that the mind is the source and limit of reality or knowledge. In particular, it is a form of personal idealism, which states that the person is rational and active in knowledge production. Unlike utilitarianism, the individual person becomes the supreme philosophical principle. Religiously, we can see that personalism is theistic (in most cases, but not all) in that it holds that God possesses personal attributes and emotions and therefore cares about humanity. Personalists conceive of God in a very broad sense, allowing one’s conception of God to be shaped through both reason and faith.

Depending on one’s metaphilosophical orientation, personalism can be approached as either philosophy or theology. Philosophy, traditionally, is known for its position of disciplinary exclusivity; by that I mean that philosophers’ desire for their
quest for conceptual clarity seems to set themselves apart from other fields of inquiry.

Sven Hansson reflects,

> In philosophy, there is much less interest in new subject matter. A possible explanation may be that many philosophers prefer to see their discipline as concerned with eternal truths, and therefore in some sense independent of empirical facts. The idea seems to be that whereas the empirical sciences deal with synthetic truths, philosophy is devoted to an analytic realm in which empirical facts have no relevance. (2008, p. 478)

In setting boundaries, philosophers and especially non-philosophers recognize the esteemed position from which philosophers operate. This, then, has perhaps led to the split appearance between philosophy and religion. As I will illustrate, it seems upon first glance and interpretation that when dealing with mainstream (white) philosophy, one could identify it as a philosophy; whereas, when dealing with Black personalists the reader might notice a more theological current in their work. This is not to say that one tradition is more pertinent to personalism than the other; instead, I want to show that from a metaphilosophical point of view, philosophy and religion are very closely intertwined. Black personalists, we will see, found their philosophical study and utility to be intimately linked to their lives as religious persons.

Mainstream personalism developed as a philosophy. This was the intention of Bowne, who aimed to create a metaphysics based on the centrality of the person. Indeed much of the early personalist literature was very philosophical in its orientation. Burrow comments on the difficulty he encountered with the philosophical rhetoric of personalism’s early advocates and points out that the literature was largely unintelligible for many students:

> [Albert] Knudson’s book was written primarily for a more philosophical audience and is therefore replete with technical philosophical language that proves an impediment for numerous persons interested in knowing what personalism is and
how it developed…I would say that it is not an exaggeration to say that it requires the reader to have a good background in the history of philosophy generally and idealistic philosophy more particularly…I did not fare much better when I used Bowne’s books. (1999b, p. 7)

I mention this observation to point out the fact that personalism was intended to be a philosophical endeavor. One cannot read a personalist text without, as Burrow notes, knowledge of the philosophical systems of Kant, Hegel, Spencer, Eucken, Lotze, to name a few. Personalism’s metaphysics, which maintained the centrality of the person and a relationship to God, could not overlook its religious overtones. The personal God, an outgrowth of European Christianity, was a crucial party in the personalist equation.

Many scholars, including the ones mentioned above, also recognize personalism as a distinct theology and utilize it in their quest for religious fulfillment. As a metaphysical theology, personalism maintains a Divine Person(ality). Flewelling writes:

[T]he world of things depends upon the causal activity of a Divine Personality. The mutual relations and interactions of the world spring from the unity of the Supreme Will. The mind of man grasps a true world because both thinker and thing are included in the one creative harmony. (1915, pp. 75-76)

The inclusion of God in this activist relationship of personalities is not questioned and therefore not open to rational analysis. Instead, the Divine Personality is seen as a necessary party in this system and without it, one would find faults in personalism’s ethics, metaphysics and epistemology.

At an ethical level, God is responsible for the development of moral character amongst humans. As a deistic (as opposed to theistic) Supreme Personality, God instills within persons the capacity for moral development. I use development because personalists maintain that it is through the unity of a community of personalities whereby we learn to cultivate our moral fortitude. Flewelling asserts,
But under the order of Personalism evil is no longer the necessary expression of the fundamental reality, nor is it loaded upon the Divine Will. It is, rather, an attendant upon the granting of freedom to responsible human personalities, it being more dear to the Divine to secure moral character than to create an otherwise perfect but morally irresponsible world...if at the end of long disciplines he can bring mankind up to a moral perfection that is true because voluntary, might that not be the perfect world that should satisfy the divine thought. (1915, pp. 76-77)

As metaphysics, Bowne maintained the primacy of the person and God-in-community over and above the more naturalistic teachings of materialism, which were becoming prominent during his career. There is no separation between person and God, and to take one independent of the other would break apart this philosophy. Bowne makes it clear when he notes, “we are in a personal world from the start, and all our objects are connected with this world in one indivisible system” [emphasis added] (1908, p. 25). It is with this basis in personality that we come to know and experience the world; for without personality and the Intelligent Personality, which acts with us, we would have no grasp of the world.

Personalists come to an understanding of the world—which they construct—through the active mind of God. They are able to conceive of natural laws because they are at the mercy of the activist nature of the Intelligent Personality. Without this Personality, there would be no explanation of these laws and this system would quickly implode. Flewelling offers a lucid description of this relationship:

We think truly of the world of matter because the world of matter is founded in an Intelligence related to our own. The mind and the world are by their very nature prepared to correspond and cooperate, and both find synthesis and agreement in the intelligent Personality which is able to grasp all and to act in all...natural laws are not erected into an independent system in which God is a slave, for they are but the uniformities of his activity. (1915, p. 185)
As has just been illustrated, God—the Divine Personality—plays a foremost role in the entire system of personalism. The only exception to this rule could be in the works of John M.E. McTaggart. McTaggart was a metaphysical personalist who believed in the ultimateness of finite selves; where he disagreed with theistic personalism was on the grounds that there need not be God to serve as an absolute, instead he maintained that this unifying cosmic orientation was held together by a spiritual unity consisting of a system of finite selves (Burrow, 1999b). McTaggart is very much the exception to theistic personalism and is one of the only personalists, who takes personalism as a philosophy to task. Contrary to theology, philosophical methods take nothing for granted, specifically the existence of God. Perhaps, then, we have in McTaggart the purest form of personalist philosophy.

For those seeking to characterize normative versions of personalism within a school of thought, most scholars would agree that it is most appropriately a theology. This does not mean that it does not contain and even require philosophical considerations, but its implicit belief in God sets it apart from other philosophical traditions.

The philosophical/theological debate is an important one to bring up as the two disciplines functioned simultaneously throughout the evolution of personalism. As we will see in the next section on Black personalism, the bridge between philosophy and theology in Black intellectualism is indeed a small one. Far from being mutually exclusive entities, philosophy and theology have often functioned side-by-side. As was the case with many Boston Personalists—many, including Bowne, were Methodists—those Black personalists whom I discuss below were either clergy, trained theologians, or served in academic capacities which mandated that they teach either philosophy,
theology, or both. Benjamin Quarles comments “Negro leadership in antebellum America was predominantly ministerial, colored men in the other professions being in short supply. This accounted for the key role of the Negro church” (Quarles, 1969, p. 69). It is from this backdrop that scholars and many Black philosophers functioned. It’s no surprise then, that the following scholars’ literature is very much saturated with religious overtones. What will separate Black personalist scholars from many other Black religious followers is how personalist scholars’ utilize philosophical material and understanding.

**Black Personalists and Their Work**

Black interest in personalism, believes Rufus Burrow, follows from personalism’s primacy of the person at an ethical level. Burrow notes that personalism’s two most appealing factors for African Americans are its “individual-social conception of reality, persons, and God, and 2) that it gives primacy to the person” (Burrow, 1999a, p. 148). Burrow, in his “Personalism and Afrikan Traditional Thought,” makes note of the points of similarity between West African philosophical and cosmological orientation and some of the basic tenets of personalism. He finds “African traditional thought regarding the person, community, and God existed long before the system of thought that Bowne first began calling’ personalism’ around 1905” (Burrow, 1999b, p. 323). While recognizing the inherent similarities between the two, Burrow is critical of personalism in regard to African thought on a couple of grounds. First, Burrow notes the differences between Western personalism’s tendency to maintain the primacy of the individual in all matters. This clashed with African epistemological and ethical beliefs in that African’s, and many throughout the African Diaspora, consider the community just as equally important as the individual. Personhood is a communal process for West African societies, wherein the
emphasis is as much on the individual as it is on those who raise and nurture said person(ality).

Another area of difference comes in the corporeal aspect of personhood. Traditional personalists maintain that the most important aspect of the personality is exactly that: the human personality, spirit, soul, or mind. The incorporation of the physical body is necessary for West Africa.

The whole person—soul and body—is sacred in Afrikan traditional thought. African traditional culture had a clarity about this that eluded early personalists. One gets a sense of the sacredness of soul and body in the Akan concept of the person. For here it is believed that the person receives his personality spirit \((Nitoro)\) from his earthly father. (Burrow, 1999b, p. 333)

The idea of a personal God who understands the plight of Black peoples and who also is capable of expressing compassion is clearly a favorable trait that many African Americans would enjoy. We find that those African American philosophers and theologians who were interested in personalism utilized this theory for more religious and social purposes. In short, the use of personalism in the African American framework is summed up well by Burrow when he says that Black people “want to know what personalism can contribute to solving some of the most serious and deadly problems in Black and other communities of oppression. Therefore, they are more inclined to an anthropocentric ethic, grounded in the theocentric idea, such as we find in ethical personalism” (1999b, p. 333). This can be seen most clearly with Martin Luther King, Black personalism’s most recognizable figure.
Martin Luther King’s connection to this tradition began even before he arrived at Boston University for his PhD work. While a student at Morehouse and then Crozer Theological Seminary, King had already developed a conception of God that included many personalist traits: a personal and ethical God who believes in the sanctity and dignity of all persons. King’s formal study of personalism gave him “a name and a theoretical framework for what he already believed as a result of his family upbringing and his training in the black church in Atlanta, Georgia” (Burrow, 1999b, p. 77). Burrow also writes that King came to Boston University for the purpose of studying personalism under Edgar Brightman, a prominent personalist who himself studied under Bowne. Although not the first African American to apply personalism to “social problems such as racism, militarism, and economic exploitation” (Burrow, 1999b, p. 77), King’s application of personalism was nationally observed throughout the civil rights movement—more so than anyone else’s. Burrow identifies four major personalist principles that stand out in King’s writings and ministry. They are an emphasis on the existence of a personal God, the dignity and sacredness of all persons, the existence of an objective moral order and corresponding moral laws, freedom, and moral agency. Both scholars and admirers of King can recognize each of these features in his social and religious policies specifically with his non-violent outlook on civil rights.

One of the other personalist principles that allows King to stand out is his belief in the development of the human personality which “caused him to realize the possibilities for the actualization of the beloved community” (Ansbro, 2000, p. 71). The development of the human personality for King was tied to Hegel’s dialectics. Jon Ansbro’s “Martin
Luther King’s Debt to Hegel” (Ansbro, 1994) outlines King’s usage of the dialectic as he developed his own non-violent philosophy. In Stride Toward Freedom, King recognizes the need for combining both thesis and antithesis when he writes, “like the synthesis in Hegelian philosophy, the principle of nonviolent resistance seeks to reconcile the truths of two opposites—acquiescence and violence—while avoiding the extremes and immoralities of both” (M. L. King, 1958, p. 213).

Ansbro goes on to note that only in the limited use of both of these concepts could man develop a useful system of nonviolence.

King recognized that the partial truth in each of these two positions can be included in an effective synthesis to achieve more social justice, while each of the positions, if considered in isolation from the other, must be rejected as extreme and immoral…By appealing to the limited truths in both positions, the nonviolent register is able to avoid the extremes and pitfalls of nonresistance and violent resistance. (1994, p. 99)

I think King’s use of the dialectic was appropriate as it took into consideration elements of evil, violence, and oppression; these were variables that could not be ignored in the non-violent struggle. One of my critiques of personalism is that it does not weigh considerably issues of violence and opposition. Ansbro notes that early on King called for his followers to work Agape—the love for all humans—into their mission. Ansbro is very conscious of the developmental promise King saw in this term. Although love was the most appropriate term for King’s general theory of non-violence, Ansbro (2000) problematizes the word and shows how King had to grapple with eros, philia, and agape in order to ultimately discern which term was most helpful. In short, there was no one all-good way to fight for non-violence, just as there was no one appropriate term that encompassed the entirety of King’s dream. Love must sometimes incorporate sacrifice, loss, disappointment and betrayal in order for it to be comprehensive. The same was true
for King’s nonviolent movement. The movement was not simply about appealing to the positive and innate goodness of humans, but it also had to deal with the negatives in such a way that when combined with the positives, the human personality would be able to develop into its ultimate potential. To sum up King’s practical use of Agape with his professed non-violence, Ansbro writes,

King’s frequent appeals to his followers during his crusades that they be prepared to sacrifice all for the sake of human dignity and for the beloved community revealed his capacity not only to absorb the positive elements in Nygren’s conception of agape but also to transcend Nygren’s negative view of the human personality by affirming with Davis, DeWolf, and other Boston Personalists, that the purpose of altruism is to create a brotherhood in which all individuals may preserve their dignity, realize their rational potential, and fulfill their destiny. (2000, p. 17)

King’s personalistic ethic led him to value the dignity and worth of each human individual. This goes hand-in-hand with his non-violent tactics as it would be immoral to violently attack any person. King found motivation for this social tactic from Mahatma Gandhi’s term “Satyagraha.” As a general way of life, Satyagraha means “holding on to Truth.” Gandhi “taught that if one seeks Truth, then he will also begin to achieve Beauty and Goodness” (Ansbro, 2000, p. 3). What is interesting to note in the history of non-violent struggle in the United States is that although it is primarily mentioned in the same breath as Gandhi and King, the term Satyagraha and perhaps its relation to King and personalism would never have come to light had it not been for a couple of other African American scholars, namely William Stuart Nelson and Mordecai Johnson.

I believe a brief discussion on the contributions of the two scholars is important at this point because of their impact on King as a developing personalist. King was one of the pioneering advocates (White or Black) of a non-violent movement with personalist
foundations, however, this connection might not have happened if it had not been for the influence of these two men.

It was a speech by Mordecai Johnson, which initially sparked within King an interest in Gandhi’s non-violent rhetoric. Johnson, along with Benjamin Mays, Howard Thurman, A. Philip Randolph, and William Stuart Nelson, were ardent believers in nonviolence, and of the four, all but Randolph actually traveled to India “hoping to learn about Satyagraha and apply its methodologies to the black freedom struggle” (Dickerson, 2009, p. 17).

Personalism and nonviolence have an interesting history together. It was Johnson and his work that influenced Mays, Thurman, and Nelson to pursue their work in nonviolence. Benjamin Mays was Martin Luther King’s mentor and most certainly had a hand in inspiring King with nonviolence rhetoric. Howard Thurman was dean of the chapel at Boston University when King was there. Thurman was also close with another Black Boston Personalist, James Farmer Sr. who graduated from Boston University in 1917 and taught religion at Howard. These scholars are all responsible for the application and popularity of the non-violent struggle made famous by King. For me, King’s importance as a personalist was his gifted position as a lifelong student. He had the opportunity to learn from the above-mentioned scholars in many ways. He was astute enough to combine his years of personalist thought with a non-violence rhetoric, which had already been developed for 20-30 years within the Black intellectual tradition.

King was not the first African American intellectual activist to combine personalism to the social, religious, or educational plights of Black people. Some other African American personalists who served as predecessors to King were Willis Jefferson
King, Gilbert Haven Jones, and John Wesley Edward Bowen. Both King and Bowen were directly influenced by the Boston personalist school while Jones approached it in a more indirect way.

**Jonathan Wesley Bowen**

Jonathan Wesley Edward Bowen was the first African American to academically contribute to personalism. He was a prominent African American member of the personalist camp. Bowen was the first African American personalist as he studied directly under Borden Parker Bowne. He was also the first African American to receive a PhD from Boston University, which he earned in 1887. After graduating from Boston University, Bowen became an educator and minister and dedicated his career to Black educational and spiritual development. He became president of Gammon theological seminary in 1906. Although Bowen never published specifically on personalism, the Hegelian-inspired personalist notion of development was taken almost exclusively from his teacher and mentor, Bowne. Unlike the majority of educators of his day, Bowen and other Black educators and personalists knew of the inherent equality of Black men and women and therefore did not feel the need to justify Blacks in higher education. Instead Bowen spent his time insisting “that the aim of education was to develop persons into men and women, who would then be able to occupy important places in society” (Bowen, 1897, p. 20). His notion of development is a crucial theme in that it already assumes the centrality of human self-hood which would therefore proffer that all men and women, regardless of race, gender, and other social biases under equal circumstances would be able to develop into socially responsible citizens. Bowen devoted much attention to the principle of development—a principle that was central to Bowne’s ethics and philosophy
of religion. Bowen applied the law of development to religion and modern theology, concluding that “the apprehension of religion is a process of growth depending upon the psychological growth of man” (1999b, p. 78).

Like King, Bowen already possessed personalistic beliefs before formally studying it at Boston University, so that “he resonated with personalism primarily because it provided for him philosophical grounding for his two basic faith claims, that is, belief in a personal and loving God, and the dignity and sacredness of all persons” (Burrow, 1999b, p. 79). Bowen’s sought in personalism an ideological companion to his already radical social and educational agenda. He believed that any sort of social change had to begin with the education of the individual. He wrote that “it is impossible to raise and educate a race in the mass,” and that “all revolutions and improvements must start with individuals” (Bowen, 1892, p. 34). He did so in his 1891 piece “A Psychological principle in Revelation” and “An Apology for the Higher Education of the Negro,” which was written in 1897.

“A Psychological Principle in Revelation” is very much an interdisciplinary work, which shows the breadth of knowledge Bowen had for philosophy, history, psychology, and religion. In studying the history of man, the philosophy of history, and more specifically the history of ideas and concepts, we find that religion (Christianity) has developed—oftentimes unevenly—throughout history. Religion is not a concept external to the ideas, personalities, or essences of man; quite contrary, religion grows as man grows. “Therefore, as human nature is the matter and base of history, history is, so to speak, the judge of human nature, and historical analysis is the counter-proof of psychological analysis. Religion comes within the pale of history, for it is the universal
phenomenon of mankind, and it is, therefore, subject to growth” (Bowen, 1891, pp. 727-728). Religion, then, grows, diminishes, changes interpretation, function, and structure based on the intellectual and cultivated capacities of human personality. “It will be clearly seen in this line of thought that the apprehension of religion is a process of growth depending upon the psychological growth of man” (Bowen, 1891, p. 728).

Although Bowen does not utilize the term of personalism in this text, he is cognizant of one of its basic concepts: development. Similar to Hegel’s philosophical system, methodological personalists maintain that the personality/soul is an entity which is constantly developing, and becoming cultivated. The same is true for religion. As the human personality becomes more cultivated, developed, enlightened etc. so too does its conceptual grasp of religion. The complexity of religion is tied intimately to the process of development of the human personality. This development is also tied to nations and races. As it is not a monolithic entity devoid of external variables and influences, religion will develop and operate differently for different races and nations of people.

Bowen’s studies in personalism stick out in this piece as he shows that religion is but a creation of man, a human derived institution over and against those scholars that believe that the doctrines of religion were prescribed onto humans from on high. This latter argument works in favor of Bowen’s belief in the unlimited potential of Black peoples. Instead of being destined to remain an inferior people, —as was told to them according to the biblical hermeneutics of White Christianity—Black people were now able to use religion as a motivational weapon, using God’s salvation and strength to help guide them toward upward mobility they were capable of.

Bowen’s second work, “An Apology for the Higher Education of the Negro,”
(Bowen, 1897) is concerned with the then popular method of Negro higher learning: Booker T. Washington’s industrial education. Industrial education had worked for so long because those who were “cultivated” through American higher education maintained that the Negro’s intellectual status was not ready to be introduced to the uplifting nature of the liberal arts education, which was at that time only reserved for those whose intellectual potential were high enough for cultivation. This has forced the Negro into a state of leadership-less and inferiority.

Bowen’s argument for liberal higher education for southern Negro’s is as much geared toward men of the cloth as it is toward the masses. The development of the intellect/personality is a key tenet in any personalist theory, and Bowen utilizes it well in this essay. Along with this point is the notion of the activistic mind. For Bowne and Knudson especially, the active mind/cultivated personality made man, and without it there would be no man (humanity). Thus, for Bowen, by keeping African Americans separated from the liberal/cultivated/humanity arts, there is a complete denial of humanity. Bowen writes, “First, the Negro needs the higher education on the basis of humanity. Whatever is good for man is good for man” (Bowen, 1897, p. 729). He goes on to further explicate this point by remarking that as a personality, the Negro is deserved, given basic human dignity, a right for the cultivation of the soul: “The Negro is a human personality, and, as such, every attribute within him should be cultured, and every aspiration given free scope. This will not destroy his identity. He will become a cultured man and a man of power” (Bowen, 1897, p. 731).

As an ethical principle, Bowen sees the powerful nature behind a personalism and education for the Negro. “But for the ante bellum teachers to teach the enslaved Negro
the equality of mind, in its essential, divine, and human endowments, would have
destroyed slavery between one day’s suns. For equality of mind and soul would lead as
conclusively to equality of rights as that two and two lead to four” (Bowen, 1897, p. 732).
Whether or not “enlightened” slaves would have made a structural difference in the
institution of slavery notwithstanding, Bowen here is appealing to an active, cultivated
mind as a Pandora’s Box that White slave sympathizers knew not to open; for once they
did, their system of segregation would have surely not been as widely accepted.

For Bowen, it was high time for society to see the inherent personality/humanity
within Black people. Once that was observed, then the question of an industrial education
would be obsolete. When this model is finally accepted, then one would see Negros as
humans, worthy of a liberal arts education as any other European. Bowen ultimately does
well in following his teacher and mentor (Borden Parker Bowne) as his essay is based on
Personalism as a metaphysic; an overall way of life whose system we use as a method to
guide our (in this case) religious and educational convictions. The basic humanity and
equality of the Negro personality is no longer in question for Bowen, and it is from this
ontological background that we now move forward and if the system in place is
inadequate, new and enlightened minds will find a way to rectify it.

Now, if his process of education, which aims at developing his powers, making
him a better man, a thoughtful man, a respectable citizen, a man of character and
judgment, will spoil him, then let him spoil, and the sooner he spoils the better. If
truth, pure, unmixed, is an enemy to a man, a system, a State, or society, then let
that truth be proclaimed and that man or State go down. (Bowen, 1897, p. 743)

I will move next to another Black Boston personalist. J. Leonard Farmer is most
famously known for being the father of James Farmer Jr., founder of the Congress of
Racial Equality. This fact notwithstanding, the elder Farmer was, given his dedication to
Black educational and religious development, well-known amongst Black scholars of his
day. As I will mention in the next chapter, Farmer, although a very experienced and
competent scholar, never enjoyed financial stability, and as was the case with many
Black scholars, his teaching and administrative roles hindered his ability to grow as a
researcher.

**J. Leonard Farmer**

Between 1909 and 1918, Farmer studied in the Theology department at Boston
University. As he grew up with little money, the young Farmer arrived in Boston after
having walked there from Texas. Farmer went on to study with first and second-
generation personalists and received all of his three degrees (A.B, S.T.B, PhD) from the
University. Farmer’s career after Boston saw him pastor “churches in Texarkana,
Marshall, and Galveston.” He then

[T]aught at Wiley College in Marshall from 1919 to 1920, then returned from
1933 to 1938, Rust College from 1920 until 1925, Samuel Huston College from
1925 to 1931, to which he returned from 1946 to 1956. He also taught at Gammon
Theological Seminary in Atlanta, Georgia, from 1931 to 1933, and at Washington
D.C’s Howard University School of Divinity from 1939 to 1946. (Beil, 1999, p.
6)

Farmer’s connection to personalism post-Boston can be found explicitly in his
teachings over and above his publications. Beil notes that, while at Howard, Farmer’s
students,

[Had] been exposed to the same theology and had the same commitment to the
social gospel as did both Farmer father and son. So if there were despairing letters
to a bishop about Howard’s biblical scholar, they were probably ignored.
Nevertheless, some students were clearly troubled when they found themselves
exposed to the theology of personalism and the social gospel. (1999, p. 82)

It is not clear why these students were opposed to personalist theology; I find this even
more surprising as Howard, at the time, was the bastion for the development of non-
violent philosophical and theological rhetoric. As I will discuss in my section on King, Howard scholars such as Mordecai Johnson, Howard Thurman, and Benjamin Mays all championed a non-violent orientation which when studied, must have looked very similar, at an ethical level, to personalism.

Although stretched to his maximum with the heavy teaching, staff, and religious roles, Farmer did publish. The majority of his publications were written later in his career and appeared in the form of book reviews. His one major manuscript, *John and Jesus in their Day and Ours* was published in 1956. Written as a piece of social science literature, Farmer aimed to approach this study as one situated in the social sciences, whereby any student could, objectively, come “face-to-face with the living Christ as he would lead the way in contemporary societies the world over, for the social uplift of the underprivileged with national and international peace and freedom for the individuals” (Farmer, 1956, p. 13). As a piece in social personalism, Farmer is concerned with how the tenets of personalist philosophy—through the manifestation of the career of Jesus Christ—would fit in a modern society; a modern society which places very little emphasis on the ethical value and dignity of the individual.

Farmer is aware that modern society, which in 1956, he claims, was caught between the grips of capitalism and communism, “there is all over the world a greater demand for the achievement for the social salvation of the masses than, perhaps, there has been in any other day in human history” (Farmer, 1956, pp. 28-29). He continues by saying, “as in the day of Jesus, the poor today the world over are looking for a savior. They are not overmuch concerned about whether theirs be an individual savior” (Farmer, 1956, p. 29). Instead, Farmer notes, the masses today seek an “institutional or
Farmer’s personalist training permeates throughout the text as his goal ultimately seems to be reconciling which leader’s political and social career translates best to today’s socio-political climate. Echoing future non-violent personalist rhetoric, Farmer illustrates that the best path toward any sort of salvation must be guided by the dignity and humanity of all peoples.

No matter what apologies may be made for it, and no matter in whose name it may be performed, the aggressive, indiscriminate and wanton use of physical force and violence to achieve one’s goal except, perhaps, as means to self-defense, is an expression of ethical atheism (Farmer, 1956, p. 283).

Jesus, then, would represent the pinnacle in personalist thinking as he advocated for democratic, ethical, and social spiritual growth. Farmer ends on an open note, claiming that it is unclear what political messages Jesus and John would have professed; indeed the world is much larger and, in many instances, more complicated than it was 1,900 years ago. What is clear, however, is that whatever direction nations, societies, and individuals take, it ought to be one guided in the ethical and humane principles taught by Jesus Christ and his religion. In the end, Farmer recognizes that any social study of Jesus’ career must be inclusive of his religious one, and vice versa. This same fact is true of contemporary Christianity: “for a religion which has no appreciable bearing upon social attitudes and relations—local, national, and international—is not the bona fide Christian religion” (Farmer, 1956, p. 291). This piece illustrates in clear ways the connection between personalism and Christianity, whose ethics are (said to be) the same.

**Willis Jefferson King**

The next Black personalist was one of the first most outspoken Black personalists,
and a colleague of Farmer’s at Boston University. Willis Jefferson King was born in Rose Hill Texas in 1886. Both his S.T.B and PhD work were done at Boston University in 1913 and 1921 respectively. King’s contributions to personalism, and specifically personalism and race make him one of the most outspoken African American scholars of this field. King’s first published personalist work came in his edited Christian Bases of World Order (Wallace, McConnell, & King, 1943), within which he wrote “The Christian Conception of Man.” His other piece “Personalism and Race” was published in Personalism and Theology (W. J. King, 1943b). Unfortunately, with the exception of his above-mentioned works, King did not do much more publishing. As I will note with John Wesley Edward Bowen and Gilbert Haven Jones, Black academics—especially those with the PhD—at the beginning of the twentieth century were often required to assume many roles within the university including both teaching and administration positions concurrently. King was also quite consumed with his work within the Methodist Episcopal Church. As Burrow (1999) notes, King was professor of Old Testament and Christian sociology at Gammon Theological Seminary from 1918-1930 and served as president there from 1932-1948. In between that time he served as president of Samuel Huston College. In 1944, King was elected bishop. Indeed King had a very full academic and pastoral career and although some are weary of him having published only two works on the topic, King’s contributions to personalism grant him prestige among Black and White personalists. As Francis McConnell notes, King and his fellow personalist bishops, were indispensible regardless of their race (McConnell, 1942).

“The Christian Conception of Man” takes the basic principle of personalism (the person), and poses the following: “one of the most pressing and, at the same time, most
baffling problems of our day is a satisfactory view of the world and dignity of man and his place in the scheme of things” (W. J. King, 1943a, p. 45). King approaches this query from a variety of angles with the ultimate goal to prove that the most appropriate response is found in biblical scripture. King is primarily concerned with the onset of scientific (objective) methods of analysis and the fact that they do not take seriously the dignity and value of the person.

In his section on Marxian communism, King criticizes Marxist theory for “the absorption of the individual into the community” and for “lacking the proper appreciation of religion in human life” (W. J. King, 1943a, p. 49). King makes the distinctions between scientific definitions of man and Christian conceptions of man because he wants to proffer that the person possesses unique cultural, spiritual, and moral qualities. Persons are not merely evolved animal members in the grand scheme of evolutionary history, nor are they simply passive objects in a totalitarian government. Instead, King posits that by reflecting on biblical conceptions of the person, we come to associate the person with 1) spiritual and physical attributes, 2) having a unique and dependent relation to God, the Creator, 3) possessing a supreme worth and dignity, 4) being a unified and equal race of human, and lastly, 5) sharing in a curiosity in immortality (1943). When combined, King would say he has proven why it is necessary, in light of contrary evidence, to remember that the human personality is unique and as can be seen with King’s next piece, perhaps the potential of the human personality is capable of fixing certain social oppressions.

In “Personalism and Race,” (1943) King optimistically lays out the ways an ethical system, based on personalist ideals can improve race relations both in the United States and abroad. King recognizes that there is no one personalist ethic, but instead a
series of working definitions based on Christian moral principles. He structures his argument around these four general personalist principles of ethics: 1) “the universe is a society of persons, unified by the will of a Supreme Person; 2) the human personality is sacred; 3) there is an absoluteness of the law of good will; and 4) any social order should be administered impartially” (W. J. King, 1943b, p. 206). King is not oblivious that these four principles share an uncanny resemblance to Christian moral principles, instead he pushes this idea as “Personalists believe that religion, particularly the Christian religion, has genuine significance in the effort to find the solution to the ethical problems of mankind” (W. J. King, 1943b, p. 207).

Before King attempts to give a personalist solution to the race problem, he illustrates briefly the history of race-relations and its negative implications in the United States and selected places abroad. King’s ultimate findings on the solving of race problems (which is very suassionist, and of course, idealist in orientation) does not correlate well with his analysis on the history of race-relations (which is very materialist in orientation). King does well to illustrate the geographical and economic exploitation of “the colored races” as the ultimate source of racial superiority around the globe. He also notes that in the United States, the institution of slavery perpetuated the superior/inferior race-principle. This was done to such an extreme degree because White people wanted to, at all cost, maintain the “economic and political domination of the whites and […] a social color line” (W. J. King, 1943b, p. 213).

As a response to the rejection of Black humanity, King assumes a positive “go get ‘em” attitude targeted specifically at America itself. In an almost salesman-like way, King endorses the personalist ethic, not only because it would create a better model for
human equality, but also because it would be in the best interest of the United States—as a world power—to find a solution to the race-problem. In order to do this, King appeals to the four-principled Christian oriented personalist ethic so as to say that by reflecting on and remembering these principles (which are principle tenets of the faith most White people practice), we can create a society, which recognizes the uniqueness of the individual and their race, while at the same time living as citizens as one human race under God.¹⁰

Unfortunately for King, his conclusion does not seem to give a fair answer to a problem with its origins in the economic and political sphere of the capitalist system. One of the shortcomings with the personalist system in practical situations is whether or not an appeal to a higher power of faith or reason can have actual significance in the lives of those being exploited. Similar to the argument William R. Jones makes in Is God a White Racist? (W. R. Jones, 1998), we need to know on what empirical grounds we can justify our belief in faith and reason to overcome our economic problems. Despite being unable to thoroughly answer this question, King’s work within personalism is nonetheless important.

Gilbert Haven Jones

The next scholar is just recently becoming considered a member of this African American philosophical tradition. Gilbert Haven Jones never studied at the Boston University School of personalism or under any of its scholars. There are no records of him having traveled to Boston and he most likely only came to personalism through his PhD research. One connection to Boston personalism however, came by way of his dissertation. George Yancy notes that throughout the United States “copies of the dissertation had been requested from Jones so that it might be translated by the graduate school of Boston University’s philosophy department. The dissertation was to be used in certain philosophy courses once translated” (Yancy, 2003, p. 53). Although born in South Carolina, with the exception of graduate work in Pennsylvania and Germany, Jones spent the majority of his life in central Ohio at Wilberforce University, first as a student and faculty member and ultimately as dean and later its president. Jones’ beginnings with personalism can be seen to commence during his study in Germany. Jones pursued a PhD in philosophy (with minors in zoology and botany) at the University of Jena and was awarded the degree in 1909. Part of the reason why Jones’ influence on Black personalism has not been fully acknowledged is that he wrote his dissertation in German. Even without knowing German, however, the reader gets the idea that Jones was writing a dissertation addressed directly to personalism. His title Lotze und Bowne: Eine Vergleichung ihrer philosophischen Arbeit\(^\text{11}\) can be interpreted as a comparison of the work of personalism’s two forefathers: Hermann Lotze and Borden Parker Bowne. I have since translated the dissertation, and similar to what the title suggests, Jones’ aim is to

\(^{11}\) Translated: Lotze and Bowne: A Comparison of Their Philosophical Works.
show the philosophical, religious, and psychological contributions of the two scholars and the influence Lotze had on Bowne—the former was the latter’s teacher in Germany.

By way of significant figures, Jones’ dissertation can be said to contain at least three of personalism’s progenitors, two Germans and one American. The chair of Jones’ dissertation committee, Professor Dr. Rudolph Eucken was a very influential nineteenth century German philosopher and philologist. The year preceding Jones’ successful dissertation defense, Eucken won the Nobel Prize in Literature, which further elevated this scholar’s social and academic status. Eucken’s philosophical work, as it pertains to Personalism, is significant when one considers his philosophy of religion. One of the key tenets to his philosophy, which makes Eucken stand out among those thinkers during the scientific revolution, is his belief in the human spirit and human personality in matters of faith and religion. Acknowledging that Eucken believed humans were deeply social creatures, Howard Brown observes,

Eucken’s philosophy stands for a return to personality as a fact of cosmic significance…in professor Eucken we have one able to do full justice to all that modern science has to say; one, moreover, who fully understands and appreciates the whole history of philosophical thought; and who puts man, as a person, in that place of something like equality with God and nature, to which unreflective religion instinctively assigns him. (1909, p. 470)

He goes on to conclude that

[I]n Eucken’s philosophy, then, we have mankind once more occupying that central place on the wide stage of the physical creation which ancient poetry and religion assigned to human beings; and we are thereby delivered from that feeling of the littleness and worthlessness of our life which finds so much sad expression in modern literature. We have this child of Deity, inheritor of the freedom and the creative faculty belonging to the sons of God, set to do battle with oppositions that surround his steps; made to achieve greatness only by stout courage and tireless industry. (Brown, 1909, p. 479)
Eucken’s notions of the centrality of human personality in religion’s cosmic orientation puts man/woman in direct relationship to God, nature and his/her neighbor in a way that, as we saw validated with other personalist thinkers, influences mutual respect, love and development. This also places the impetus on each member in this union as opposed to any one party individually; indeed Eucken’s philosophy opposed the type of individualism brought about by the popularity in capitalism and the free market.

Another area in which Eucken was tied to personalism was his rather amicable relationship with Borden Parker Bowne. It was Eucken, whose remarks in 1915 opened up Ralph Tyler Flewelling’s book *Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy* (1915). Eucken’s introduction to this book—which was dedicated to the life and work of Bowne—illustrates the profound respect the former had for the latter. What is interesting, and somewhat troubling, in his introduction is his omission of any acknowledgement of the work Gilbert Haven Jones did under him. On more than one occasion Eucken provides suggestions for dissertation topics which sound eerily similar to the work Jones did (under his supervision) just six years before. The best example Eucken gives is: “I should like to recommend to your younger men a good subject for a dissertation, and it would be, ‘Bowne’s Philosophy in Relation to that of Kant,’ together with the objections which Bowne would raise against the latter” (Flewelling, 1915, p. 24).

It turns out that Jones did actually take this matter up in his dissertation. In his final section, “Ihre Beziehungen zu Kant und Herbart,” Jones focuses on the similarities and motivations that Bowne and Lotze drew from both Kant and Herbart. In showing the similarities to Kant, however, Jones writes, “The chosen passages were given as an idea of the near relation to Bowne’s and Lotze’s idea in reference to Kant and have shown us
how their original viewpoints and prerequisites indeed led them to the same mindset toward the views of the leading masters” (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 110). It would seem that this eluded Eucken, or maybe Eucken was looking for a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship as Jones dedicated only ten pages to this theme. In any case, Eucken signed Jones’ dissertation and was therefore aware of his student’s comparative analysis with Kant.

As I mentioned earlier, Jones’ dissertation was consumed with the philosophical and psychological work of Herman Lotze and his American student, Borden Parker Bowne. Of Lotze’s importance, Jones exclaims, “He was the one who taught us to hope for a “realm of souls” that he ‘tried to determine to the satisfaction of his own intellect and for the worth of our lives on earth’ in his fights for the struggling mankind” (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 11). Albert Knudson explains that Lotze’s contribution to personalism were primarily in his belief in an active self-consciousness. It was Lotze, “who combined the idea of reality with that of consciousness, or rather, interpreted reality in terms of self-consciousness. For him there was no consciousness without a subject, no thought without a thinker, no activity without an agent” (Knudson, 1927, p. 74). Knudson goes on to claim that with Lotze “the true activistic theory of the self finds the reality of the soul in self-consciousness and self-direction, and says with Lotze that when it is in a state of complete unconsciousness and complete passivity ‘the soul is not’” (1927, p. 74).

It is Lotze who brings to personalism the active agent, one who is intelligent and part of a cosmic system of intertwined personalities. Jones writes of Lotze’s activism:

The absolute mind is intelligent and as a consequence of this characteristic it has ideas. And all of these ideas are good. According to Lotze, He is ‘substance,’ the creating cause and the designing principle of the world of phenomena; the human
mind is a part of this universal ‘substance’ and receives from it its intelligence, which connects it to this universal ‘substance’. (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 15)

Before Lotze became known for his work in metaphysics, ethics, and theology, he trained in medicine and therefore observed a more naturalistic and mechanical approach to his work. Jones explains this fact in reference to how Lotze developed his philosophical system later in his career:

Lotze’s first university studies and extensive work in the natural sciences (physiology and anatomy as a basis for his medical profession) appear to have led him to a natural scientific view of things, which despite the strong idealist, religious and ethical direction of his work, penetrate his thought and rearrange the understanding and the general plan of his system. This is especially apparent in the mechanical element that penetrates his entire system and that is altogether absent in Bowne’s writings. (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 14)

Lotze’s academic upbringing in the natural sciences and psychology also made him a valuable figure in the young Jones’ eyes as he was keen to not only secure a solid training in philosophy, but also in psychology. Lotze’s American student, Borden Parker Bowne arrived in Germany (University of Göttingen) after Lotze had made the switch from one of a mechanistic scientific to philosophy and theology orientation and therefore we find that Bowne’s early writings are primarily reflective of his teacher’s metaphysical, ethical and psychological work, which was done later in his career.

Jones explains early on in his dissertation that Bowne (in 1909) was a relatively unknown academic figure in America; I disagree. By 1908, Bowne had published some very influential works and was becoming more recognizable as a philosopher. By 1909, Bowne had published the majority of his literature. Very little of his was published posthumously after his untimely death in 1910. By the time Jones was writing on Bowne, he had, at his disposal, the bulk of his work.
As a personalist, Bowne is responsible for creating the philosophical system of personalism, one that had its antecedents in Lotze, Kant, Leibniz and countless others. What made Bowne unique amongst these scholars and his contemporaries was his ability to observe personalism, not only as a philosophical and theological guiding principle, but instead as a philosophical method and set of conclusions. As Knudson observes, Bowne’s systematic methodological personalism

[T]ook the personalistic conception of reality, grounded it in the Kantian epistemology, developed its implications in a comprehensive way, and made it the center and constitutive principle of a complete metaphysical system. This principle he formulated in the statement that the categories of thought do not explain intelligence but are explained by it. (Knudson, 1927, p. 86)

Defended in February of 1909, Jones’ dissertation coincides almost perfectly with the publication of Bowne’s *Personalism*. The importance and timeliness of Jones’ dissertation is appreciated only after one becomes familiar with the importance of personalism at the beginning of the twentieth century. Contrary to what Jones said about Bowne being an obscure American philosopher, I believe Bowne and his philosophical system was quite well known in the academic community at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. Bowne is responsible for bringing philosophy to Boston University, developing a program dedicated to training educators, and beginning a major philosophical tradition, “to which the department remained committed also until the 1960’s” (Kohak, 1994, p. 3).

Outside of his work in personalism, Bowne was a champion for open inquiry and educational equality. To the former, Bowne would remain steadfast. Kohak notes,

When the openness to the secular world incurred the wrath of the more traditional dignitaries of the Methodist Church, it was Bowne who as the Dean of the Graduate School defended the autonomy of the University against the Church. He
got himself charged with heresy for his pains and underwent a harrowing trial. At no time, though, did he deny what he was teaching. (1994, p. 4)

On the second note, Bowne recognized that Boston University needed to offer students an all-around education that would prepare them to become influential teachers. As Boston University was not a “finishing school” for the wealthy, like its neighbor Harvard, Bowne was completely dedicated to realizing that “the task of education thus is one of helping young people to grow to full stature of their Personhood. It was virtue ethics with a vengeance, and ideally suited to a school whose primary task remained one of helping its students make the transition from drudgery to culture” (Kohak, 1994, p. 3). By the time Jones’ began his research on Bowne, Bowne was quite an accomplished scholar and educator, both within and outside Boston.

Jones is the first scholar, not including Bowne (either African American or white), to offer a general comprehensive account of personalism and its history. By 1909, personalism and its key tenets were still being developed. We would not find another example of a comprehensive treatment of personalism until five years after Bowne’s death. Ralph Tyler Flewelling’s *Personalism and the Problem of Philosophy* (1915) could be said to be the first mainstream account of Bowne’s philosophical system. Flewelling undertook the project at the behest of Rudolph Eucken, one of Jones’ dissertation advisors. It would seem that Jones’ piece was either inadequate as a comprehensive piece in personalist literature, or simply ignored. In the foreword, Flewelling remarks, “the author does not aim at an exhaustive discussion, but, rather at a brief and suggestive treatment that shall define for the popular mind the relation of Bowne’s thought to other philosophical endeavors” (Flewelling, 1915, p. 12). It would appear that Flewelling is guilty of the latter as Jones’ work is neither acknowledged nor
cited in that piece. The other significant piece in early personalist literature is Albert Knudson’s *The Philosophy of Personalism* (1927). This piece was published 12 years after Jones’ dissertation and is often the most cited personalist text, as it is extremely detailed. This piece does recognize Jones’ contribution to the field (Knudson, 1927, p. 188).

I mention these works to illustrate the obscurity, which befell Jones’ dissertation. This unfortunate state couldn’t have been farther from his intentions. It was his desire to be an active contributor to personalist literature. Jones wished to have his dissertation translated and disseminated with the purposes that his research could make a recognizable impact amongst personalist researchers and graduate students, specifically at Boston University. Jones’ dissertation contains a very comprehensive account of Bowne’s thought in regard to other philosophical systems. What Jones lacks in critical analysis, he makes up for in his detail of the primary and secondary literature. I will return to this point in chapter four.

Jones’ dissertation is, in my opinion, attempting to offer a formal example of the way philosophy has been constructed throughout history. Jones’ introduction, when read with this in mind, then makes sense. Jones begins his dissertation with the following general claim about the history of philosophy:

*Philosophy did not emerge suddenly, but instead it gradually developed with the development of the human mind. Each people contributed their own little part to the solution of world problems. The offspring absorbed thoughts that were handed down to them and, in turn, developed these further. The later thought was in reference to the earlier thoughts.* (1909b, p. 14)

Philosophy has developed throughout history from generation to generation. Successors take the systems of their teachers and manipulate them in ways that are appropriate to their respective contexts, with the ultimate goal of obtaining some form of higher truth.
Jones’ use of a teacher-student model for his dissertation fits this form well. The respective prominence of the two scholars and their influence (Lotze’s influence in psychology and Bowne’s in American philosophy) serve as a lucid metaphor for the ongoing evolution of philosophical systems. In short, Jones aims to show that despite methodological and metaphysical differences, the student (Bowne) was able to absorb the thoughts from his teacher (Lotze) and develop them in a positive, solidified way.

Part of Jones’ dissertation shows his skepticism about assigning Lotze a place in philosophical literature and seeks, to an extent, to grant him such a place by relating his works to philosophical categories. Lotze’s work, initially as a physician, and trained in the natural sciences provoked him given his later idealist sensibilities—to seek some unity between “the world of feeling and science” (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 25). Jones then, attempts to clarify Lotze’s diverse philosophical system, which incorporates much from teleological idealism, the sciences, and psychology and seeks to find threads with Bowne’s budding philosophical system. In attempting to find points of comparison, Jones notes that the two philosophers’ systems are similar insomuch as:

Both Lotze and Bowne are similar in their attempts to give us a vivid view of the nature and laws underlying our thought processes, as well as their worth and content in reference to our formal and practical recognition (logic). This is also seen from the reality as it has to be imagined (metaphysics), from the development and form of activity, which leads us to the postulate of the soul and that activity through which we recognize the good in life, and strive for the perfection of our lives through the correct shaping of our ideals and our lifestyle. (1909b, p. 15)

Jones indicates that their biggest point of contention was over matters of logic. Despite finding agreement on matters of ethics, aesthetics, and religion, Bowne attacks Lotze’s classification of pure and applied logic. Bowne writes of formal logic that “if logic is not to sink into a barren shuffling of artificial notions without any significance for truth or
knowledge, it must take some account of its own metaphysical presuppositions” (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 14). This difference in thinking also led the two scholars to differ slightly in method and philosophical consideration (Jones notes that despite his German education, Bowne recognizes to a greater extent, English philosophers), but as Jones eventually concludes after a thorough examination of the two scholars’ work and influences, Lotze’s oftentimes incomplete philosophies motivated Bowne to take them up and elaborate on them. Jones comes full circle with his dissertation, in that he ends with an assessment of the history of philosophy that opened his essay:

But this is not a new fact. This is how philosophy has progressed all along. Motivated by the struggles of preceding men, the most struggling souls of each generation take up their problems and strive to broaden human cognition through the acquisition of new facts and the application of new methods, and to deepen the philosophical thoughts and, thereby, lead them closer to the finite solution/answer. (1909b, p. 117)

Jones is right to give acknowledgement to Lotze for shaping Bowne’s work. Jones was the first scholar to make such a connection, and although this dissertation is only now becoming appreciated, any personalist scholar should recognize that Jones’ essay was the first to offer any clear analysis on the beginnings of personalism. One scholar in particular did recognize this fact. Alfred Knudson’s *The Philosophy of Personalism* (1927) does make two references to Jones’ dissertation. One reference was in regard to the difference in opinion between Lotze and Bowne in their respective logic systems and the other was in regards to Bowne’s dependence on Lotze. Jones illustrates that although Bowne learned much from Lotze, he does not display a heavy dependence on his teacher, Lotze. This is an interesting find and it indicates that among prominent personalists, Jones’ dissertation was considered an important piece within the history of their field.
One of the interesting things to note about Jones’ dissertation was that he does not mention the word “personalism” (Personalismus in German) once in the entire essay. As I have already mentioned, Jones was aware of the tradition, at least insomuch as he knew Bowne was a figure head at Boston University, which makes the omission of the term more surprising. Bowne’s seminal personalist text *Personalism* was compiled from a series of lectures he gave at Northwestern University in 1907. He published the book in 1908, one year before Jones finished his dissertation. I assume Jones was not aware of the publication of this new text, as there is no mention of it at all in his dissertation. What is important to note is Jones’ acknowledgement of this popular school of thought and its influence in the American intellectual community. It is not known what motivated Jones to write on and engage personalism and its followers, but what can be known for sure is that personalism affected Jones’ philosophical, educational, and psychological thought for the rest of his academic career. Although discussed as some length in this chapter, chapter 5 is dedicated to a more thorough investigation of Jones dissertation, specifically as it pertains to educational personalism.

After obtaining his PhD from Jena in 1909, Jones returned to Wilberforce where he taught in the department of philosophy and psychology, was dean of the college of liberal arts and in 1924 became president of the university. As a scholar, Jones did not publish much after receiving his PhD. He published three articles in the *A.M.E Church Review*, one article in Wilberforce’s *Soldalian* journal, and one book entitled *Education in Theory and Practice*.¹² As we will see with Bowen, Jones’ application of personalism

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¹² His four articles are titled: “Germany” (G. H. Jones, 1909a); “Post War Planning for Education” (1935); “The Negro in Early World History” (1909a); “Hitlerism, A Curse and a Blessing”(1945).
in the educational process is fostered specifically by the notion of development. The person or subject is not static and limited to any specific educational caste, instead Jones and other educational personalists believe that, to quote philosopher George Yancy, education “involves a theory of the self as dynamic and capable of growth, movement, progress, and change” (2003, p. 53). Jones’ only book reads as a theoretical manual for the successful development of a school system. More importantly, Jones is concerned with the students as agents of learning, and indeed he dedicates a lot of space to correlating appropriate material conditions to efficient student development. With this in mind, the reader is introduced to almost every aspect of education in all its forms starting at the theoretical and philosophical justifications to more practical exercises like school location, proper sanitation, recitation orders and playground advice. These more mundane and engineering facilities are acknowledged in order to stress the positive dialectical relationship between personal and educational development with proper physical, environmental, disciplinary, and aesthetical resources. As an educational personalist, Jones’ ultimate concern is the student as person and his/her successful development and socialization into a society marred by racism and other social biases.

One of the more interesting aspects of Jones’ book is the fact that it is not implicitly intended for an African American audience, nor does it appear to be immediately written with African Americans in mind. This would make it seem that Jones was indifferent to the racial and educational climate of the time. On the contrary, I believe that Jones’ omission of blatant Black themes and discourse is on purpose. Though maintaining personalist values of human dignity and equality, specifically within the educational realm, Jones is utilizing the age-old African American rhetorical device of
discounting White hegemonic racial and educational assumptions through veiled and recognizable language. On my reading, Jones is providing a strong critique of the day’s racist beliefs on Black education and showing, through theoretical and practical methods, what the Black self will need in order to develop into a socially conscious being. Like Bowen before him and Martin Luther King after him, Jones’ use of personalism is solely for the solving of the material problems that plagued Black peoples. And in order for this to happen, Jones recognized the need for educated Black people to lead the way. A more comprehensive account of Jones’ book will be found in chapter six.

These above Black personalists were instrumental scholars within not just the Black personalist tradition but also within the more “mainstream” personalist philosophical orientation. Unlike many of their white counterparts, these men of color recognized the necessity of philosophy in any sort of social, educational, or religious activism. Philosophy can be a radical field of study, and throughout history Black intellectuals and activists have recognized philosophy’s importance in shaping their revolutionary missions. In this tradition then, Personalism has played a pivotal role in the training and dissemination of Black activists throughout the twentieth century. The Black civil movements owe much of their ideological foundations to the personalist tradition. As I have noted, Dr’s Martin Luther King, John Wesley Edward Bowen, Willis Jefferson King, and Gilbert Haven Jones were inspired by the inclusive, and therefore, radical nature of personalism and manipulated it to suit their needs. In the next chapter I will focus on the academic careers of Black scholars during the Jim Crowe era in order to elucidate the difficulties, which hindered scholars (some of whom I have already discussed) from becoming popular researchers on a national stage.
Chapter III: Early African American Philosophers as Persons Who Wear Many Hats

Clifton Wharton, the first African American president of Michigan State University, once remarked that there are three traditional sources of individual and collective power: political power, economic power, and intellectual power (Wharton, 1980). In order to rectify the problems that Black peoples face in every sector of power relations, Wharton exclaims, “We need highly educated minds able to grapple with these problems and dedicated to building viable alternatives” (Wharton, 1980, p. 280). Obtaining this end will occur only when “we have a critical mass of Black intellectual power.”

Such talent is vital not just for research but for the full array of developmental needs of the Black economy and the Black society. The need for human capital permeates the entire developmental panorama, ranging from policymakers to researchers, from business managers to urban planners. (Wharton, 1980, p. 293)

Wharton envisions there to be major concerns with achieving a viable critical mass of Black intellectuals; however he does not go far enough in his analysis to present a lucid picture of the latent power struggles, that occur at a racial level at every part of the academic framework. In order to fully understand Wharton’s argument, I believe one needs to expand it by discussing why these Black intellectuals, under discussion, were stunted from accumulating any amount of intellectual and institutional power. I think a lucid explanation of this can be seen by looking at the struggles and limitations of early Black philosophers in the Academy. Although these philosophers, including Gilbert Haven Jones, were part of this “critical mass of Black intellectual power,” they suffered like many Black scholars at the time, from the more dominant and oppressive mainstream (white) academic power machine. This system, in turn, led to numerous professional
consequences for these philosophers. As I will discuss below, these philosophers became
overburdened with additional professional responsibilities, fewer resources, and
exclusion from job opportunities afforded only to their white colleagues. Wharton’s
desire for a community of Black intellectuals came up against an institution, which would
try to maintain its own power by limiting and repressing the power of its African
American members. This struggle occurred not only at the university level, but also at the
conceptual level or intellectual pursuits of academe, forcing Black philosophers to
navigate an oppressive institution in order to maintain any level of power of their own.
Through clarifying Jones’ own position in relation to this institutional power struggle, I
hope to illustrate the hardships and barriers that Black philosophers had to overcome in
order for them to be the leaders Wharton would later envision, as persons who could
transcend these power relations and build viable alternatives as a gateway for the Black
community to enter into these politics.

The oppressive, unequal, and racist values and ideologies which prompted the
drive for African American Studies in the late 1950’s and 60’s developed over time,
through diverse literature and debates, and influenced, for good or bad, numerous
persons, both students and faculty. I understand this notion of power to be at the very
core of the American academic framework. The inclusion of African American Studies
signaled for the first time a shift in power relations within the academy. Gilbert Haven
Jones’ generation, however, suffered under different circumstances and was therefore not
able to challenge at the macro-level the institutional power forces at work during that
time (Winston, 1971).
The Italian Marxist social activist, Antonio Gramsci, developed the concept of an organic intellectual as a reaction against traditional intellectuals who were withdrawn from the complexities of social life (Gramsci, 1971, p. 5). Adapting Gramsci’s notion of the organic intellectual to Black intellectuals like Gilbert Haven Jones might seem an appropriate theoretical move as Jones and the theorized organic intellectual would have utilized their technical and academic expertise for the good of their communities, however given the above discussion of power, I believe Jones was not in a position to entertain the option of choosing whether or not he wanted to be an organic intellectual and as such, he would not fit the part.

This is a tricky extrapolation as there is precedent for a Gramscian analysis of a Black intellectual. Following Gramsci’s notion of the organic intellectual, Ralph Crowder notes in his intellectual biography of John Edward Bruce that Bruce “provides a window onto the lives of the Black thinkers, writers, and activists who worked to cultivate a Black audience, and who had little interest in attracting a white following” (Crowder, 2004, p. 163). Crowder’s analysis, however appropriate for Bruce, is not appropriate for Jones as Jones did not have the choice to decide whether or not he would assume the role of the traditional intellectual or organic intellectual. A Gramscian analysis of Jones and the other Black intellectuals I cover in this chapter would not hold despite their positive contributions to the Black community. Gramsci and Crowder’s accounts of the organic intellectual do not grant primary importance to the results an organic intellectual produces, instead both Gramsci, in the Marxist-Italian context and Crowder, in the African American intellectual iteration, argue that the organic intellectual needs to want to represent their respective social groups in a way that, specifically in Crowder’s view,
at the same time, also shows a certain disdain toward the dominant societal institutions. Neither Jones’ writings nor his professional ambitions illustrate a particular disdain toward his profession’s dominant institution—the academy in general and professional philosophy specifically—thereby concluding that Jones, although he may have produced results for his community akin to an organic intellectual, could not have, in fact, make the decision to be an organic intellectual as his marginalized status in the academy ultimately afforded him no choice over his ability to conclude what type of intellectual he would want to be.

Ever cognizant that Gilbert Haven Jones’ career and written works fell victim to this power struggle, I argue that the academic power struggle felt by Jones and his generation of Black philosophers yielded the following ominous conditions and consequences: these Black philosophers, despite their qualifications and credentials, were deemed inferior candidates to occupy academic positions at traditionally white universities, thereby relegating them to work at HBCUs. Working at an HBCU was not necessarily a slight for these scholars; however, in light of the fact that academics maintained similar professional standards regardless of their institution (a varied mix of teaching, research, and service), these Black philosophers found themselves without the requisite resources and time needed to perform at the same level as their white colleagues. At an institutional level, the lack of power for Black philosophers and Black scholars in general was perpetuated for generations. In what follows I describe some of the conditions these Black philosophers worked under with the hopes of illuminating further the context around professional work.
Jones as a Career HBCU Professional

Gilbert Haven Jones, and his African American philosopher colleagues rarely enjoyed the same amount of respect and notoriety as their White colleagues. Credentialed Black scholars—specifically those with PhD’s—joined, or attempted to fully participate in an academy with high values and a very exclusive charisma. For Jim Crow era—early twentieth century—scholars, obtaining an academic degree was harrowing enough; add to that the promise of working in a segregated higher education system, and it seemed that these philosophers had very few allies within this intellectual community. HBCUs were more than willing to indulge their specialized services; the downside came, however, in the amount of work being asked of these persons.

As a starting point, it would be prudent to make clear that all of the following philosophers worked, almost exclusively, within the halls of America’s HBCUs. In many instances, these Black scholars worked at more than one institution throughout their lifetimes. HBCUs were underfunded, understaffed, and underappreciated institutions in American higher education. Scholars who worked at schools like Atlanta, Fisk, and Howard were able to garner relatively more prestige and resources as opposed to those who took positions at Wilberforce, Rust, and Huston-Tillotson. My concern is primarily with those HBCUs, which required their PhD faculty to serve as educators first, over and above their careers as researchers. Many of the persons I discuss did do research, but their work was scant and difficult to locate as much of this literature was published in minor journals and publications making a proper assessment of their life work more difficult than those scholars who had access to their disciplines’ best publication
resources. This work was also underappreciated by the mainstream academy, which has led to a lack of critical attention to the life and work of these Black philosophers.

Discussions of the “Black scholar” naturally raise questions about the concept of “scholar.” Thomas Martin and K.J. Berry note that the teacher-researcher relationship began in the Academy through the emergence of scientific research and associations. The university professor began to see himself and many of his academic colleagues in a new light, that is, as belonging to a group of professionals which extended beyond the boundaries of the university. Once-traditional and caste-like standards gradually diminished in importance as determinants of academic status and prestige. (T. Martin & Berry, 1969, p. 696)

Instead, scholars’ prominence began to be measured by their national recognition as researchers over and above their utility as teachers. This point is important to note as many within the academy recognized this as the template from which all scholars ought to be judged. Black scholars entering the academy as graduate students and junior faculty were generally under the same impression. The Black scholars’ reality, however, proved that their professional merits would be based on other variables, and very rarely on their scholarship. Two factors here stand out. First, and as mentioned earlier, Black scholars tended to be—to use William Banks’ term—misused, at least at many White institutions. Those at Black institutions (HBCUs) were not so much misused so much as they were overused. The traditional correlative relationship between scholarly output and promotion became veiled behind notions that the merits of the Black scholar ought to be assessed differently. This created a professional tension among Black and White scholars as the pressures to maintain a high level of scholastic output was never diminished for the former; instead, it was implied that the Black intellectual would both cater to extra-
curricular needs of students, other faculty, the university, and the community on top of producing a competitive volume of literature, and lastly maintaining an, oftentimes rigorous, teaching load.

The second factor to be considered is the relationship between Black scholars’ academic productivity, legitimacy, and race within the academy. There was not necessarily a relationship between the three concepts for White scholars at the time. Although it was possible that a White scholars’ research could be seen as insufficient, such an assessment was never made based on race. In contrast, Black scholars had latent concerns over the perception of their work being based not on its intellectual and critical merit, but instead on the fact that they were writing as an African American. Richard Scott affirms my point that Black scholars’ productivity may have been hampered by reasons not necessarily intrinsic to their intellectual capabilities, but instead primarily by their race.

The products of black faculty could be discounted either directly or indirectly. Directly, products of black faculty may be judged inferior merely because they were produced by blacks (who are perceived as inferior by their white colleagues). Indirectly, such products may be judged inferior because they address issues or use methods that are deemed trivial or ‘non-traditional’ by white review committees. And, because black faculty are likely to address issues that are of concern to the black community or to be interested in effecting social change, their products may be subject to this evaluation. (Scott, 1981, p. 225)

In an attempt to curtail such a racialized evaluation of his work, Jones wrote his book to appear seemingly less Black in its rhetoric, even though the intended audience was the African American community. Jones published his first and only book Education in Theory and Practice in 1919 with Gorham Press, a small printing press in Boston. Jones’ manual on education sought to first analyze the aims, definitions, and scope of education and second, plan out the more practical and everyday exercises associated with
constructing, implementing and maintaining a school and its many constituents. The reader eventually notes no rhetoric aimed toward a Black audience. The text is comprehensive, yet, on first glance, culturally neutral. George Yancy notes that despite this point, “Jones’ race and class-consciousness permeates his treatise on education. Central to the text is the motif of Black power” (Yancy, 2003, p. 53). This point notwithstanding, as a Black scholar Jones had very few opportunities to not only publish, but publish his work as a race man, one dedicated to the social and educational uplift of his people. Jones’ work will be covered more in later chapters, but suffice it to say that Jones’ veiled Black rhetoric

[W]as not the adopted strategy of a coward, but the enactment of a skilled thinker and writer. The strategy, by the way, of critiquing those in power to their face without their being the wiser is an old technique used by Blacks under conditions of white dominance. (Yancy, 2003, p. 55)

Utilizing race neutral language may have been the only way Jones could have published. He was not the only Black scholar to take this route and as can be seen later, this path did not deter from his ultimate goal: educational and political uplift for the Black community.

**Ancillary Obligations for Jones and other Black Philosophers**

One of the implicit questions which have guided this chapter thus far has been: what specifically were these Black intellectuals responsible for over and above their teaching and researching agendas? In short, what made them persons “who wore many hats”? One of the reasons for the paucity of critical information on many early (Nadir and
Jim Crow Era)\textsuperscript{13} African American scholars, specifically philosophers, is the lack of primary literature (both scholarly and personal) written by these scholars. This does not mean that they were not productive scholars, but instead it points to the fact that their positions at higher education institutions provided them little time to publish regularly. In what follows I will give examples of a few scholars whose tenures, at predominantly HBCUs, like Jones’ mandated that they assume multiple and simultaneous roles, causing their scholarly output to suffer.

In this conversation one must also recognize that many early Black intellectuals were also persons of faith. As we found in the last chapter, many Black intellectuals who did work within personalism were prominent members within the (African) Methodist church. John Wesley Edward Bowen was one of the earliest Black PhDs (the first from Boston University, in 1887). Bowen remained quite busy throughout his career engaging in speeches, sermons, and some writings on Black uplift. His administrative duties saw him assume the chair of the department of historical theology at Gammon Theological Seminary, an institution where he stayed for 39 years. From 1906 to 1910 he served as the Seminary’s president. His academic publications were sparse as a result.

Another one-time Gammon faculty member, James Farmer Sr., experienced a much more complex academic career. In his autobiography, his son, James Farmer Jr. reflects,

\begin{quote}
Because [Black] colleges were short on money, highly trained faculty, and clerics who could preach to the bookish, daddy had to be versatile. At Rust, for Instance, he was campus minister, dean of the college, and professor of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13} The Nadir period occurred between the end of Reconstruction to the early twentieth century, 1877-1901. The Jim Crow Era began around the same time as the Nadir and ended at the onset of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950’s.
philosophy and religion. At times, he taught sociology and even psychology (they believed anyone with a PhD should be able to teach anything). (1985, p. 35)

This final note resonates with many Black scholars with PhDs. As the first African American in Texas to possess a PhD, and one of only a few in the south to have one at the time, Farmer was “an authentic scholar at a time and place in which scholarship was mysterious and a PhD degree magical” (Farmer, 1985, p. 34). Gilbert Haven Jones, for example, although not formally trained, was the first African American PhD to teach psychology in the United States.

Gail Beil comments on Farmer’s other obligations while in Texas and notes that “catalogues of Wiley, Rust, and Samuel Huston suggest that Farmer had more than a professional role, particularly at Rust, where he was academic dean, and at Samuel Huston, where he was registrar during both periods he was on that faculty” (1999, p. 6). It was the case, however, that both Samuel Huston and Wiley were institutions which, at the time, could not afford to accommodate separate persons for these positions and therefore had to utilize their faculty for a variety of purposes.

In a similar scenario, the activist Mary Terrell Church, shortly after receiving her degree from Oberlin College, taught for some time at Wilberforce University. Although compensated relatively generously ($40 per month), Church was expected to teach a variety of courses and also serve in a non-academic capacity. Of her time there she writes,

I taught everything from French to mineralogy in the college department to reading and writing in the preparatory department….In addition to teaching five classes in subjects totally dissimilar, I was secretary of the faculty and had to write the minutes in longhand, no matter how voluminous they were or how busy with my classes I was….In addition to teaching five classes and being secretary to the faculty, I played the organ for the church services every Sunday morning and evening and gave a night every week to choir rehearsal. (Terrell, 1980, pp. 61-62)
It has never been uncommon for scholars, White or Black, to make the academic to administrative transition. The difference comes however in the ancillary roles expected of these administrators on top of their everyday work. George Yancy writes about Charles Leander Hill, Wilberforce University’s 13\textsuperscript{th} president, that he “not only functioned at the administrative level, but could be seen painting buildings, teaching courses, raising money, and so on” (2003, p. 53). John McClendon offers some further insight into the lack of recognition of these Black scholars. He argues that when looking at Black intellectuals’ success, simply focusing on scholastic outlook is unfair. Speaking of his mentor, Dr. Francis A. Thomas, McClendon writes,

> Rather Dr. Thomas’s contributions are more importantly and relevantly measured by his teaching, mentoring and dialoging with students and colleagues. Moreover, his administrative role both as chair of the philosophy department at Central State University and later Dean of Payne Theological Seminary did not afford him the public exposure adjoined with being employed at more prestigious white institutions. (2003\textsuperscript{c}, p. 36)

McClendon continues by shedding light on the value of Dr. Thomas within the halls of an HBCU; this value is unique among Black colleges and was rarely acknowledged within traditionally white institutions.

> In the period from 1948 to 1978, when Thomas was a faculty member at Central State University, his duties ranged from chair and professor of philosophy and religion to director of the Audio-Visual center, not to mention his numerous committee assignments and extensive teaching loads…Yet having such diverse skills was a boon in and for the academic setting for Central State University. At a small Historically Black University, Thomas’s ability to wear many hats proved to be invaluable to the mission and very survival of the institution. (McClendon, 2003\textsuperscript{c}, p. 36)

Thomas’ example gives us a picture of just how vocationally diverse Black intellectuals had to be. Their teaching and research had to be intertwined with their community and extra-scholastic priorities. McClendon also points out a couple of variables in Black
intellectualism, not often seen at White institutions: sacrifice and survival. It was clear that Thomas invested great time and energy into Central State. These Black intellectuals worked for the betterment of their institutions, as they saw the uplift of the Black community explicitly tied to the success of Historically Black Colleges and Universities. As George Yancy succinctly notes, Black scholars followed a similar precedent to Gilbert Haven Jones. “As an administrator of Black educational institutes, Jones moved with great passion, vision, and fortitude…Jones invested greatly in Wilberforce University” (Yancy, 2003, p. 53).

Along with those HBCU presidents I have already mentioned, McClendon gives us a comprehensive list of African American philosophers who have also served as presidents. The list includes Joseph C. Price (Livingston College), Richard McKinney (Storer College), Marquis Harris (Philander Smith), William Stuart Nelson (Shaw University and Dillard University), and Broadus Butler (Dillard University and Texas Southern). In what follows, I aim to give more examples of Black scholars and administrators whose academic career mirrors the title of scholars “who wore many hats” by way of utilizing an argument posed by an African American educator who was a contemporary of many of the persons I discuss.

**Jones and Black Philosophers as Scholars and not Simply Educators**

In 1933, Algernon B. Jackson—one of the founding members of the first Black fraternity, Sigma Pi Phi—lambasted Black teachers for their lack of professionalism:

> Many trained for their doctorate degree, forced like plants in the garden of Adonis, come to the classroom mentally exhausted and anemic, besplattered with canned knowledge but bereft of ideas. I have seen and heard many of the learned Doctors of Philosophy in their classrooms, whom in spite of a bitter struggle between my natural charitableness and sense of humor I have christened Doctors of Phraseology instead. The trained educator has the finest and best opportunity
among Negro professionals to be and remain truly professional, but in far too many instances they are naught but careless, conscienceless, and contented job holders. (1933, p. 54)

By breaking up my response to Jackson, I believe that I can do a satisfactory job of addressing the different variables essential to my argument. Writing in 1933, Jackson had been privy to the types of Black educator I am interested in for this essay. The Nadir and Jim Crow era scholar was educated at the beginning of the twentieth century and functioned in all capacities throughout the First World War and into, depending on the career, the Second World War, or perhaps beyond. Many of these scholars received their undergraduate education at HBCUs and their graduate training at “Northern Schools,” Ivy League Schools, or, as was discussed in the first chapter, abroad. Once on the job market, these scholars had only HBCUs available to them. With the exception of later scholars such as William T. Fontaine, W. Allison Davis, Forrest Oran Wiggins, Francis Monroe Hammond, Cornelius Golightly and Catherine Golightly—of whom Fontaine, Wiggins, Hammond, and Cornelius Golightly were philosophers, the majority of Black PhDs taught at HBCUs.

First, I would like to take argument with Jackson’s “Garden of Adonis analogy.” This reference aims to point out that, like those flowers planted in the garden, the training these Black scholars received were hastily undertaken, and therefore shallow or bereft of critical “roots.” This would mean, for Jackson, that scholars received the appropriate credentials, yet none of the necessary rigor and learning associated with it. This seems to me to hardly be the case. As an example I will look at two Wilberforce presidents who were also African American philosophers: Charles Leander Hill and again, Gilbert Haven Jones. Although not completely representative of the entire demographic Jackson is
trying to discuss, both Hill and Jones typify the Black PhD of this era in terms of their intellectual comprehensiveness and diversity.

Hill was a committed scholar whose interests spanned from education, the teaching of philosophy, the Protestant Reformation, classics to the history of philosophy. He was another Black scholar who studied in Germany, conducting research at the University of Berlin. While there, and “consumed with his research on Philip Melanchthon, the co-reformer with Martin Luther, Hill not only wrote a dissertation on Melanchthon but also became an internationally renowned scholar of Melanchthon” (McClendon, 2003b, p. 43). Like Gilbert Haven Jones, Hill completed the requirements for his PhD in an efficient two years (McClendon, 2003a, p. 90). Hill’s understanding of Latin, specifically, separated him from his colleagues. His dissertation as well as his 1944 piece _The Loci Communes of Philip Melanchthon_ illustrated that

Hill was more than prepared to carry out the tasks of providing a critical commentary and translation of [Anton Wilhelm] Amo. His work on Melanchthon was precisely that kind of undertaking, where Hill’s knowledge of Latin, Greek and German in combination with his extensive study of the history of philosophy proved to be immeasurable assets. (McClendon, 2003b, p. 43)

Hill’s diverse academic specialties clearly dispel any claim that his training was inadequate. His academic accomplishments and understandings of multiple languages (ancient and modern) and histories attest to Hill as a consummate scholar, and as noted earlier, administrator (Stokes, 2000). In a similar light, Jones’ aptitude for a variety of academic interests makes it clear that he was an ardent student dedicated to scholastic fulfillment in a number of areas.

Jones was a complete intellectual in a time where most Black students received second-rate resources and were not given ample time to cultivate their intellectual
potential. His studies at the Ohio State University, Wilberforce University, Dickinson College and at numerous universities in Western Europe\textsuperscript{14} allow us to get a picture of Jones’ ardent desire for the best of educations. Like other Black scholars trained at HBCUs, Jones’ undergraduate education was very classical in its orientation, introducing Jones to a curriculum similar to traditionally white institutions. William Banks notes that many Black four-year colleges and universities “emphasized Latin and Greek in their requirements” (Banks, 1996, p. 45). Banks also writes that German-inspired industrial training also had a strong foothold at many HBCUs, specifically toward the end of the nineteenth century. Specifically his masters and PhD studies were very scientific in nature. His combination of philosophy and, as Dickinson College notes, his “Latin scientific” curriculum allowed the young Jones to mature as a well-rounded humanities scholar and social scientist. He developed his proficiency in these diverse fields while becoming competent enough in the German language to complete his PhD requirements entirely in German. We see then with the examples of Hill and Jones that the training of these Black scholars during the beginning of the twentieth century was both diverse and comprehensive and thereby lend no credence to Jackson’s Adonis garden analogy.

Jackson’s claim that Black scholars come to the classroom mentally exhausted and anemic could have been one consequence of the aforementioned Black scholar as a person who “wore many hats.” One example to the contrary would be Dr. Richard McKinney of Morgan State, who at age 90 was still teaching philosophy courses; indeed

\textsuperscript{14} Those institutions include: The Universities of Göttingen, Berlin, Leipzig, Halle, as well as Toulouse and the Sorbonne in Paris. Jones would eventually receive his PhD from the University of Jena (Germany).
his energy and zeal for teaching at historically Black colleges throughout the twentieth
century have had the inverse effect of what Jackson proclaims (McClendon, 2006).

I turn now to the final and most heated sentence in Jackson’s quote. It reads,
“The trained educator has the finest and best opportunity among Negro professionals to
be and remain truly professional, but in far too many instances they are naught but
careless, conscienceless, and contented job holders” (Jackson, 1933, p.54). Among Black
professionals it was seldom the case that Black scholars had the best and finest
opportunities for training. Black students had to work with academic racism, unfair
funding and research opportunities, nasty campus environments, which were not
conducive to high retention rates, and a lack of fundamental educational resources. As
was noted in chapter one, W.E.B Du Bois encountered stiff resistance from funding
organizations during his attempt to study abroad in Germany. The only reason Du Bois
failed to earn his doctoral degree from Berlin was because he was not granted a third year
of funding (Barkin, 2000). The example of James Farmer Sr. also gives a lucid picture of
the tribulations and sacrifices of certain Black students. It was the young Farmer who
upon admittance to Boston University could not afford public transportation from Florida
to Boston and therefore completed the trip entirely by foot (Farmer, 1985).

Regardless of the scant academic opportunities and few advocates, Black
scholars turned out to be passionate, rigorous in the trade, and committed professionals.
Jackson’s argumentative rhetoric highlighted by the key terms careless, conscienceless,
and contented, paint a picture antithetical to the one I am proposing in this chapter. It
would be naïve to say that all Black educators were square pegs in my circle-holed
argument, however for the purposes of this chapter it is important to locate those scholars
of note who became successful in their own right despite institutional disfavor, a variety of simultaneous and oftentimes unrelated job requirements, and high scholarly expectations. I noted above that Jones was one of those scholars who prevailed at both his academic as well as administrative professions. I would like to dedicate some space to highlighting Jones’ tenure as president of Wilberforce University.

**Jones’ Presidency at Wilberforce University**

By the time Jones became president of Wilberforce University in 1924, he had 10 years of experience at the university at both the faculty and administrative level. When Jones began teaching at Wilberforce 1914, he was continuing in the footsteps of two other prominent Black scholars, both of whom, like Jones, had studied in Germany: W.E.B. Du Bois, who taught economics, mathematics and Latin (among other courses) there from 1894 to 1896, and, George Washington Henderson, who was a Classics professor there from 1909 to his retirement in 1932. Jones’ and Henderson’s careers overlapped at Wilberforce. As an alumnus of the school, Jones was very much familiar with what the school needed at a structural and curricular level.

The ascension of Jones to the presidency can be said to have begun during the tenure of the president prior to his immediate predecessor, William Scarborough. Scarborough, a Greek scholar, succeeded Gilbert Haven Jones’ father, Joshua Jones, as president in 1908. This was not an entirely amicable transition and the elder Jones remained a critic of Scarborough in Jones’ capacity of the president of the Board of Trustees. Scarborough’s retirement in 1920 opened the door for the elder Jones to impose his will on the future of Wilberforce University. Jones Sr. naturally believed his son, Gilbert Haven, would be the best candidate for president. Although the elder Jones was
powerful and influential as president of the board he did have his opponents and as Frederick McGinnis notes “the president of the board was doomed to disappointment; for after 2 days of wrangling, John Andrew Gregg, then president of Edward Waters College in Jacksonville, Florida, was elected to the position” (1941, p. 71).

After his four-year tenure and a call to the bishopric of the A.M.E. Church, Gregg resigned his position as president and the young Jones, much to the delight of the elder Jones, became president of Wilberforce University. Jones remained president for 8 years. Like any president during this time, Jones’ greatest obstacle was maintaining a growing university in the midst of the Great Depression. As Wilberforce was founded under the auspices of the A.M.E. Church, it was this latter institution to which Wilberforce looked during financial strain. Jones notes pessimistically “Wilberforce University, like all church schools, has been subjected to a falling off income, has in many instances, reached the point of danger and even destruction” (Church, 1932, p. 382). Jones was not naïve enough to assume Wilberforce’s continued reliance on the Church; instead he maintained that there ought to be a healthy balance between a church supported curriculum and training and Wilberforce’s independent economic and educational ethos.

By way of a commitment to general student well-being and institutional growth, Jones’ primary task during his presidency was the standardization of the university. Jones “noted that the two things which seem to stand most in the way of accreditation were the lack of productive endowment and the lack of an adequately trained faculty” (McGinnis, 1941, p. 85). Despite becoming a member of the Association of American Colleges, being approved by the Board of Regents of the State of New York, and
solidifying the equal status of its students from the Department of Education of North Carolina, Virginia, Florida, and Texas, Wilberforce still lacked accreditation by the North Central Association of colleges and secondary schools, a critical accreditation milestone for any growing educational institution (McGinnis, 1941).

Although many of the above accreditation successes can be linked directly to the hard work and persistence of Jones, in order to receive accreditation from the North Central Association, Jones appealed to the fundraising potential of his institution, as a legitimate endowment was heavily prioritized in accreditation decisions. Unfortunately two barriers stood in his way. The first was the Board of Trustees, over which ironically his father presided. Funding drives in 1927 in 1928 were rejected by this Board. In the midst of staging a $1 million drive in 1929 the depression hit and “put an end to all efforts to raise large amounts of money for the university” (McGinnis, 1941, p. 86). The endowment proved ultimately to be the major retarding factor during Jones’ drive for Wilberforce’s successful accreditation.

Jones was effective however in another venture which was maintained even after he left the presidency. Between 1927 and 1932, a number of Wilberforce’s faculty members were given leaves of absences to receive Masters degrees and attend extension courses.

Each year great improvement in the faculty was noted, with the result that forty-eight of a faculty of seventy-two were actually engaged in taking advanced training. Moreover in the same year nine members took Masters degrees… twenty-nine members of the faculty of global forces were continuing their advanced study… and three took Masters degrees. (McGinnis, 1941, pp. 86-87)

As will be seen in the discussion of Jones’ book, Jones was a firm believer in the continual development of his teachers as both scholars and educators. Jones’ mission of
faculty development gives us another example over and against the musings of Jackson’s Black scholars who were “careless, conscienceless, and contented job holders.” (Jackson, 1933). Indeed, at one point in Jones’ tenure almost two-thirds of Wilberforce’s faculty was pursuing advanced degrees. Although Jones was never successful in garnering the North Central Association accreditation for Wilberforce University, scholars ought not to be quick to judge his tenure as a failure; instead, one can proclaim it a moderate success when we recognize Jones’ commitment to Black intellectual continual development for both Black students and teachers alike.

I have contended that Jones, as a Black scholar, in light of academic racism, was forced to simultaneously maintain positions as an intellectual, an administrator, as well as mentor, tutor and perhaps counselor. This became part and parcel of the profession of Black intellectuals. In a similar vein, we find that Jones’ academic affiliation as a philosopher also mandated that he assume a role as a Black Studies pioneer and advocate. Although the institutionalization of Black Studies did not occur for another 20 years after his retirement from the Academy, Jones can be seen as one of the early pioneers of this movement. His dedication to the educational, social, and political uplift of African-American students and educators placed him as one of the predecessors and theoretical forbearers of this field of study.

In what follows I want to give a brief account of the role philosophers, namely Black philosophers played in the development of African-American Studies. Although Jones did not play a part in Black Studies’ beginnings at Wilberforce University in any formal sense, a conversation such as this remains relevant in light of the fact that Jones
paved the way, both intellectually and politically, for those philosophers who found themselves supporting this endeavor.

**Black Philosophers and African American Studies**

African-American philosophers were as present throughout the institutionalization of Black Studies as any other group or scholars. Given the conceptual, and often times critical approach philosophers take to the subject matter, Black philosophers appear, at a formal level, to be worthy contributors to this movement. Not only did African-American philosophers assume administrative positions in Black Studies departments, they also debated topics related to Black Studies with their colleagues, many of whom were not as tolerant to the idea of the inclusion of this new field of study into the Academy.

One Black philosopher in particular attempted to bring the discussion of philosophy and African-American Studies together by way of debate. In 1970, Berkeley Eddins along with his colleagues John Bruce Moore and Paul Olscamp engaged this question at the Western Conference on the teaching of philosophy. Their symposium, entitled “Philosophy and Black Studies” attempted to come to a lucid perspective on the role of philosophy departments and their contributions, or lack thereof, to the burgeoning field of African-American Studies. In short, should philosophers and philosophy departments feel obligated to take part in the development and curriculum building of Black Studies on campus? As I will show below, the three above-mentioned philosophers offer varying accounts as to what philosophy departments should do in regard to Black Studies. As Eddins is the only African-American to have taken part in this debate, I will leave his commentary until last.
Philosopher Paul Olscamp was as much a faculty member as he was an administrator throughout his academic career. By the time he retired he had presided over 4 universities throughout the country. This is important to note as his commentary on philosophy and Black Studies comes from the perspective of an administrator, and is representative to entire universities. This perhaps influenced his discourse on the topic as his opinions on Black Studies would ultimately come from his observations with Black Studies at not simply a departmental level but instead a university level (Olscamp, 1971).

Although his views on the topic are initially skeptical, and it is quite clear that Olscamp is reluctant to afford Black Studies the title of an academic discipline, he nonetheless is an ardent believer that philosophy not only has a role to play within Black Studies, but also must be integral in terms of Black education and retention at the higher education level. As a future administrator, Olscamp recognized the value of philosophy and many of its different approaches as they could possibly relate to a more comprehensive understanding of the issues and experiences of Black peoples. Much of what he is arguing for is meta-philosophical in its orientation. Noting the history of philosophy to be one concerned with specific ethnic, national, or belief orientations (i.e. Christianity, German national socialism, British philosophical system etc.), Olscamp recognized that perhaps the most pertinent racial or ethnic orientation of the time that philosophy can discuss would be that of the African-American experience. He acknowledges that since there are “such felt needs that are unique with the [B]lack world, then we can expect, whether presently existing philosophy departments respond to them or not, that theories embodying those needs will continue to be forthcoming” (Olscamp, 1971, p. 283).
The same meta-philosophical approaches are carried over into the second part of his essay. As philosophy is an exercise in critical analysis not only of foreign and external concepts but also of itself, its methods and functions, philosophy would do well in this changing academic climate to reconceptualized the way it goes about philosophizing. He notes,

The study of how are symptomatic thought has increased deprivation, perpetuated those of our beliefs and practices which affect blacks, and form the educational structures of our society from which they are trying to free themselves, is therefore of material interest to philosophers, especially those whose interest is economic, political and moral philosophy, and the history of all three. If we continue to exfoliate and defend the same philosophical views about these topics, we can expect little in the way of significant change; it might well be said that if there are any moral obligations at all, then we have a moral obligation to re-examine the conceptual structures we have created, changing and eliminating, and creating a new, in light of the consequences for 25 millions of our citizens, not to mention the millions of nonblack peoples whose lives are worse than they might be had we not long ago rested to content too soon. (Olscamp, 1971, pp. 203-204)

He is right to balance this need for reconceptualization within philosophy, and I daresay within higher education in general, as it would organically lead to studies in untouched areas of inquiry. It would also lead to Olscamp’s final point, namely the beginnings of the professionalization of not simply Black philosophy, but of Black philosophers. Olscamp divides his discussion of “what ought to be a black philosopher” into two sections: the Black philosopher in an ideal world, and the Black philosopher in the world in which we live. I want to begin the latter as my contention with the former will lead me back to my initial conversation of this chapter: the role of the underappreciated Black scholar vis a vis the Black philosopher.

The training of Olscamp’s Black philosopher coincides directly with Black scholars’ belief in the development of Black intellectuals in general. In short, Olscamp wants to propose that we engage philosophy within Black Studies on three levels: the
recruiting and training of Black students, the recruiting, retention, and support of the implementation of courses and policies directly related to the subject matter. It is not clear whether or not Olscamp was able to successfully implement these things throughout his tenure as president of either of his four universities, however as a quick response to him—and in concert with the topic of this chapter—it should be recognized that the glue which could hold these demands together would be trained Black faculty, specifically Black philosophers.

At this point I want to carry through to what Olscamp’s believes an ideal Black philosopher should look like. Although well-meaning and optimistic about the current state and future of African-Americans in higher education, the future administrator in Olscamp would have done well to recognize that this idealized Black philosopher, in a similar fashion to his practical Black philosopher, would have to endure many more hardships than the traditional academic philosopher. In order to properly contextualize Olscamp’s vision of the Black philosopher, I will cite his requirements completely:

In the best situation, we would want professionally trained philosophers whose areas of specialty work, of the subdisciplines in philosophy, those most closely concerned with the social and moral issues most affecting blacks. We would also want in this man [and woman] the practical experience of living under the kinds of pressures ordinary black people are subjected to each day of their lives. This perfect scholar-teacher-creator would have to be a virtual Renaissance man. He would have to know the history of his own people and of those who brought him to this country in the hold of slave ships; he would have to understand the history of trade in Africa, the nature of several different African cultures, being experts in how cultures and traditions were preserved and transmitted among the slaves, no many languages, understand the development of capitalism, Democratic, Republican and other forms of government, nor the laws governing the development of bureaucracies, see how the psychology of our culture preserves itself in our institutions, be intimate with familiar with Freud and his successors, a Master of music both European African and American and several ages, though the history and development of Christianity, Judaism, Mohammedism, many African religions and the philosophical system supportive of their principles, study the systems of reasoning, meaning, the truth which we traditionally use,
master our philosophical value systems, and possess a careful and precocious analytic and eclectic intelligence. If he had all of these qualities, and they are but a few of the many he would need, then he might make a beginning at creating a theory within which the new black man could defend his criticisms of our system and profound and justify ways in which his own values and principles could be used to his benefit while trying to change those institutionalized practices which so far prevented this from coming to pass. (Olscamp, 1971, p. 204)

It would appear that Olscamp, with of course few attributes notwithstanding, has characterized the intellectual attributes of more than one Black philosopher. Two that easily come to mind are Charles Leander Hill and Gilbert Haven Jones. In the spirit of the purpose of this chapter, it is not in the least surprising that Olscamp had not heard of either of these two philosophers. Given the institutional and racist constraints, both Hill and Jones were unfortunately not able to be recognized outside of their immediate institution, Wilberforce University. This is an unfair if we consider that both scholars possessed the aforementioned attributes of the ideal Black philosopher, and both utilized and maximized the intellectual efforts for the very purposes for which Olscamp aims to advocate. Had Black philosophers like Jones and Hill been able to make an influence at some of the nation’s larger and well-recognized institutions, perhaps this connection between philosophy and Black Studies, by the time Olscamp was writing, would have been solidified in more concrete ways. The two scholars’ commitment to Black education and intellectual developments, as well as to traditional philosophical values and methods, would have given Olscamp a representation of this idealized Black philosopher and in so doing would have, perhaps, illustrated to philosophy departments that there is a necessary connection between the teaching and research done in philosophy and the development of Black Studies.
John Bruce Moore takes up the same debate albeit in a different manner. His focus is not centered on the Black philosopher and his/her role in expounding a Black philosophy within African-American Studies, instead Moore is concerned with the obligation white philosophers and therefore white-centered philosophy departments have in regards to Black Studies. Moore, like Olscamp, recognizes that the way philosophy has been done is inadequate for a future academic climate wherein fields of inquiry such as African-American Studies have begun to become prevalent. To the question of whether or not philosophy has a place to play in African-American Studies, Moore believes that that is the wrong question. Instead, the intellectual energy ought to be centered on the reconceptualization of philosophy and its values and methods so that it can properly and comprehensively take part in the discourse surrounding African American Studies (Moore, 1971).

Philosophical status quo is no longer appropriate or adequate. Moore writes, “The demand is not that business as usual be suspended for an emergency; the demand is that we close down some of the usual business as dangerous” (Olscamp, 1971, p. 211). In so doing, Moore sees African-American Studies offering philosophy a sort of spiritual recompense wherein the philosophical pursuit of African-American Studies, and therefore the experiences and history of Black peoples would help philosophers and the discipline of philosophy show its true colors and significance. Indeed, writes Moore, “to be asked to help set accounts right, to be invited to make the usual business of philosophy inclusive of contributions to excellence in black studies is a high compliment” (Olscamp, 1971, p. 211).
It would appear to Moore that traditional standards of philosophizing exclude, or at the very least dissuade, thinkers from “self-inquiry…self-discovery and self knowledge” (Olscamp, 1971, p. 212). In this sense, and in a similar vein to Olscamp, Moore is appealing to philosophy departments and philosophers themselves to be more open and inclusive to intellectuals who want to philosophize on the Black experience. As white philosophers tend to philosophize on matters close to their experiences and passions, Black philosophers would do likewise. The question then of “what is a philosopher?” becomes important. Moore suggests:

But who a philosopher is may well influence what he takes to be philosophically important. In the sense, philosophy is not status free and determine by canonical principles alone; philosophy status loaded, for each is the final arbiter, the court of last resort from which can issue decisions binding upon practice. One cannot philosophize by proxy. (Olscamp, 1971, p. 212)

Implicit in his argument is a belief that the very way intellectuals philosophize must be reconceptualized. It is not to say that Black Studies mandates that people philosophize differently. Instead there ought to be room for philosophers of color as well as room for philosophical analysis of Black themes and concepts within philosophy departments. For Moore, philosophy is embarking on a pivotal crossroads in its history. To be given the opportunity to combine philosophical theories and methods with the history, life, and experiences of the Black condition is an opportunity philosopher’s and philosophy departments ought not to pass up.

“Blacks need and want conceptual analysis, also” (Eddins, 1971, p. 207). This demand resonates throughout Berkeley Eddins’ essay. As the only African American philosopher to contribute to this symposium on philosophy and African-American Studies, it is no wonder we find the above statement implied throughout his discussion. If
the above two philosophers’ primary concern in this endeavor was to inform the audience that indeed there is a relationship between philosophy departments and African-American Studies, Eddins takes that belief for granted and supplements it with a call for action. As one of the idealized Black philosophers Olscamp alluded to in his essay, Eddins appears to be in a fortunate situation to offer insight into how philosophy departments can make themselves relevant to the Black experience. One of the main concerns that Black students may have with philosophy is that it does not offer solutions to the problems that they raise. Eddins notes that more often than their white colleagues, Black students and scholars utilize philosophy as a way to better understand issues like oppression, inhumanity, power, inequality etc. and although a more thorough understanding of these concepts can often times be attained, seldom are praxis-oriented solutions garnered. In a similar manner to the mission and foundation of African-American studies, Eddins believes that philosophy departments ought to offer students courses of study that would appear to be interdisciplinary in nature. As cited in Olscamp, Eddins notes,

> I would say that one should try to design into department programs (and this is especially appropriate for philosophy departments), programs in philosophy and psychology, philosophy and political science, philosophy and English, philosophy and art, ad hoc majors which will enable the student to put together parts from one departmental program with another some kind of project which constitutes human investigation could also be instituted. (Olscamp, 1971, p.208)

Although Eddins gives much to the belief that an action-centered philosophy of the Black experience is necessary, he is careful in his appropriation of philosophy to secure that any praxis driven analysis of the Black experience has, as its foundation theoretical knowledge. This is where philosophy can really benefit any intellectual account of the Black experience. By offering a conceptual and critical analysis to
African-American Studies, philosophy will have offered this new area of inquiry its most valuable asset.

As optimistic as these last three essays were on the relationship between philosophy and African-American Studies, it would be naïve to think that those practitioners of such a relationship, namely Black philosophers, would be afforded the same resources, time, space, and intellectual energy in developing this new field as their white counterparts were in their endeavors. One can see that those intellectuals that were charged with re-conceptualizing philosophy, its courses, and its value to African American Studies often did so at the detriment of their own individual scholarship. Matters of real social and material importance became for many philosophers their primary intellectual consideration. Oftentimes these philosophers were not afforded the luxury of establishing research and theories, which could then serve as topics of debate at conferences and national discourse. Instead, as we see with the example of Black philosopher Richard McKinney, immediate issues of racism—a concept numerous Black philosophers have interrogated—and therefore life and death preceded in importance any notions of scholarly advancement. As echoed above, and throughout this chapter, McKinney was an HCBU scholar and administrator whose lack of scholarly output must be properly contextualized within his work as an intellectual within historically Black colleges and universities. John McClendon writes,

[W]hen Richard McKinney assumed the presidency of Storer College in West Virginia, he became the 1st black president of an institution founded on the idea of education for black people… when McKinney arrived to take over as head of Storer, the KKK burned a cross in his yard. The general lesson here is that the HBCU you as an offshoot of the ‘Color- Line’ were not ivory towers removed from the dangers in indignities of racism. Hence the immediacy of the material reality of racism was part of ourselves of the HBCU life. Most African-American
philosophers were committed to the practical application of philosophical principles to the problems confronting the black community. (2006, pp. 18-19)

Because there were real-life problems to confront, both on a personal and communal level, Black philosophers were determined to utilize their scholarship for use in the real world. They weren’t afforded the luxury of theorizing for the sake of theorizing. They believed that in understanding philosophy, they could come to a fundamental comprehension of the dangers that confronted their communities as well as develop solutions to these problems.

This ends the framework section of this project. I have contextualized Gilbert Haven Jones throughout his sojourns in Germany, part of his intellectual participation within the philosophical and theological movement of personalism, and have presented him in light of his professional and administrative duties, which unfortunately deterred from the quantity of his academic publications. All of these contexts were crucial to comprehend before any analysis of his work is to be undertaken. This does not mean that some scholars would misinterpret Jones’ work. Instead, I have tendered that Black scholars deserve a different level of contextual consideration before approaching their scholarship. This is necessary primarily because of the space they occupied in a racist society and academy, which afforded them few opportunities to succeed at a social or professional level. What Jones and other scholars of his caliber were able to accomplish given said setbacks was remarkable and worthy of note.

My final three chapters are dedicated to analyzing Jones’ work. I recognized in this chapter that Jones, Black philosophers and indeed Black scholars were fervent advocates of Black educational uplift. In the 1920s and 30s when Jones was in the middle of his career through the 1960s and 70s when Black Studies was developing as an
academic area of inquiry, Jones and his colleagues, even over and above their own individual scholastic development, pursued the charge of Black educational progress as a personal quest.

Even though Jones was a trained philosopher, one should recognize his interdisciplinary genius. Indeed, his philosophical training supplemented his belief in education by way of adding analysis to content. Jones’ studies in philosophy allowed him to develop his own philosophy of education, which was introduced in his dissertation and followed through in his book, *Education in Theory in Practice* (1919). My next chapters illustrate Jones’ commitment to the educational progress of Black peoples by analyzing an unpublished essay, and then his dissertation, which can be seen to be not only a piece in the history of philosophical personalism, but when combined with Joneses motivation for education and his desire for teaching, one can understand Jones’ dissertation to put forth his philosophy on education, namely, educational personalism. Lastly I analyze his book.
Chapter IV: Conceptual and Critical Considerations of Gilbert Haven Jones’ Philosophical Work

Before I can discuss Jones’ philosophical literature, it would be prudent to address some conceptual concerns regarding Jones’ philosophical cartography. Although my dissertation makes the case that Jones’ work belongs within the field of Black personalism, this has not, to date, shared by Black Personalism most prominent scholar. The most extensive treatment of a conceptual framework for Black personalism and personalists is posited by Rufus Burrow. Although Burrow maintains the most extensive research on Black personalism, his scholarship lacks any mention of Gilbert Haven Jones or his work. My aim in this chapter is twofold. First, I want to examine the reasons behind Jones’ omission from Black personalism. Looking specifically at Burrow’s research I want to discern whether or not Jones’ exclusion within the research is due to a sin of omission or whether or not there is a conceptual problem with Burrow’s framework.

My second objective in this chapter ties in my own research on Jones to the field of Black Personalism. In essence, how does Jones’ inclusion within Black personalism contribute to the tradition? Will Jones’ inclusion mean that Burrow will need to reconceptualize his ideas surrounding what constitutes a Black personalist? Or will it be that Jones’ inclusion falls well within the confines of a Black personalist framework, and that his scholarship can be seen as enriching the tradition? This second objective will lead into the beginning of my discussions on Jones’ philosophical work.
Rufus Burrow has contributed three major works to the philosophical tradition known as Black personalism. His articles, “African American Contributions to Personalism” (Burrow, 1999a), “Personalism and Afrikan Traditional Thought” (Burrow, 2000) and “The Afrikan Legacy in Personalism” (Burrow, 2002) are three comprehensive accounts of how African, and African American thinkers have either directly or indirectly utilized the philosophy of personalism. Burrow’s book *Personalism* (Burrow, 1999b) supplements and contextualizes his work on Black personalism within a critical and historical account of personalism. As mentioned in chapter two, African Americans have had ties to personalism since the early twentieth century. Burrow does well to acknowledge those Black scholars who either studied at Boston University (then the hub of personalist thinking), or did not reference personalism in their writings, but upon investigation, can be seen as having done work related to personalism in some way. Of the first group, Burrow mentions scholars like John Wesley Edward Bowen, Willis Jefferson King, James Farmer Sr., and Martin Luther King. Of the second group, Burrow mentions the work of David Walker, specifically *David Walker’s Appeal* and Anna Julia Cooper, the speeches of Maria Stewart, and the autobiographical accounts of Frederick Douglass, Sojourner Truth, and Harriet Jacobs (Burrow, 1999b).

Although it is never explicated in his scholarship, Burrow’s inclusion of both academically trained Black philosophers (those who studied extensively in philosophy or theology and/or had degrees in the discipline) as well as non-academically trained Black thinkers and activists illustrates that his understanding of who constitutes Black personalism is very inclusive. In short, the two barriers within which Black personalists
need to operate for Burrow include, on the one hand, formal instruction in, or explicit academic attention to the philosophy of personalism. On the other hand, Burrow’s inclusion of non-academically trained thinkers illustrates his belief that one need not have even been privy to the word personalism *so long as* personalist themes and messages can be lifted from that thinker’s communicated ideas (writings, speeches, etc.).

Another aspect of Burrow’s Black personalist framework that needs to be dealt with is his use of the term “Black.” For Burrow, does “Black” signify that the work done within the Black personalist tradition was created by a Black person? Or does “Black” denote an alteration in nature within personalism? Said another way, does Burrow believe that Black personalism is in some way conceptually different from mainstream personalism? Burrow does not take up this question in his research, however given that Burrow attributes classical personalist themes and rhetoric to research on Black personalism, it stands to reason that, for Burrow, Black personalism is simply a sub-tradition of personalism within which Black persons philosophize about personalism and/or whose work can be interpreted through a personalist lens. My second chapter dealt exclusively with this former interpretation, as I spent time elaborating on the scholarship of professionally trained scholars who studied personalism. An example of the latter can be found with his personalist interpretation of Anna Julia Cooper’s *A Voice from the South* (1892). Of the book’s personalist credentials, Burrow writes,

> In numerous passages, Cooper emphasizes the fundamental dignity of persons regardless of race, gender or class…Cooper passionately argued that wrongs or injustices committed against women or any person are also committed against *all* persons. For Cooper, as for many nineteenth century Afrikan Americans, persons are united by the will and love of God, and thus are inextricably connected. (1999a, p. 147)
Burrow’s personalist rhetoric shines through this interpretation. In placing the person above all else, Burrow is informing the reader that, even though Cooper was not familiar with Black personalism, her work falls nicely within the boundaries of the tradition. Cooper’s tone in regards to her belief that all persons are connected, share in a connected struggle, and are ultimately responsible for their fellow persons are themes at the heart of both mainstream and Black personalist scholarship.

Burrow’s interpretation and inclusion of a variety of Black literature—both academic and non-academic—as well as his inclusion of both trained and not trained Black personalists suggests that his framework would be able to accommodate the life and work of Gilbert Haven Jones. At the level of professional studies, Jones studied in Germany with one of personalism’s forefathers, Professor Rudolf Eucken in Jena. At the level of philosophical interpretation, Jones also fits into the framework as someone who did not ever mention personalism in any of his writings, and would therefore require examination from a personalist viewpoint in order to validate that his scholarship, indeed, belongs within the Black personalist tradition.

Burrow’s Black personalist framework would not seem, then, to exclude much, least of whom Gilbert Haven Jones and his work. As I discuss in subsequent chapters, Jones’ work fits well within the Black personalist tradition, not because he was writing from the viewpoint of personalism, but instead because his work can be seen as indirectly addressing personalist themes, specifically within history and education. In light of the fact that Burrow’s framework for Black personalism is relatively open with its boundaries, I believe it a more appropriate judgment of Burrow’s scholarship to suggest that his exclusion of Jones is due to a sin of omission. There seems to be nothing in
Burrow’s conception of what constitutes a Black personalist that implies he is, in some way, attempting to keep a scholar of Jones’ academic credentials and contributions out of the tradition. On the contrary, and in sync with my dissertation’s framework—more historical considerations within African American philosophy—had Burrow done the work to locate Jones’ scholarship he would have recognized that Jones makes a relevant, and even, necessary contribution to the field.

One reason I believe Burrow was unable to thoroughly explore Jones’ work and count him among other Black personalists is because Burrow’s documentation of academically-trained Black personalists is confined exclusively to Boston University. As a graduate of Boston University, Burrow continues the legacy of Black personalists who graduated from that institution, however had he done more digging; he would have realized that there was at least one Black personalist who studied elsewhere. Secondly, until recently very little was known about Jones’ life and academic career and more importantly, nothing was known about his dissertation, the document that explicitly signals Jones’ studies in personalism. My own dissertation research included translating contains Jones’ dissertation to English for the first time. As cited in chapter two, George Yancy’s article on Jones, “Gilbert Haven Jones as an Early Black Philosopher and Educator,” has been the most comprehensive source on Jones and his work within personalism (Yancy, 2003). Yancy did not have the benefit of an English translation of Jones’ dissertation, and therefore Yancy’s assessment of Jones’ work on and commitment to personalism was not as exhaustive. Without knowledge of the content of Jones’ dissertation, it would be very difficult for scholars like Burrow and Yancy to deduce that Jones had both studied with a German personalist, wrote his dissertation on two early
personalists, and published a book which, when interpreted through a personalist eye, offers a comprehensive philosophy of education.

**Jones’ Contribution to Black Personalism**

As mentioned, Jones’ contribution to the field of Black personalism does not in any way sacrifice the conceptual integrity already established by Burrow. It can be said that Jones would not be the most discussed Black personalist; that honor will be reserved for Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. That accolade notwithstanding, Jones’ contribution to Black personalism is a significant one. First, Jones is the first Black personalist to receive his PhD in philosophy. He was also the first Black personalist, and indeed one of the first personalists of any race, to complete a work in the history of personalism. As is discussed in the next chapter, Jones’ dissertation offers a salient account of not only the history of philosophy, but also of personalism.

Historically, Jones’ academic career is also significant. As mentioned above, of the academically-trained Black personalists that Burrow discusses, Jones is the only one who did not study at Boston University, and in fact was the only one who had any formal training in Europe. Instead of taking classes with Borden Parker Bowne (like John Wesley Edward Bowen) or becoming influenced by Edgar Brightman (like Martin Luther King Jr.), Jones wrote his dissertation on Bowne and the influences German philosophical thought had on him and his personalism.

The last significant contribution Jones brings to the Black personalist tradition is his published book. Jones is the first Black personalist to write a book that, when analyzed as a personalist text, sheds light on a number of themes in which Black
personalists would be interested including a personalist conception of education, Black educational uplift, and personalism and political education.

Jones' engagement with personalism began when he was an undergraduate student. Although there is no record of him producing any work or studying personalism during his undergraduate days at Wilberforce University or graduate days at Dickinson College, there is one document which can serve, in part, as motivation for Jones’ foray into philosophy. Jones did not major in philosophy as an undergraduate, nor did he take his master’s degree in philosophy. Instead, Jones approached philosophy independently; this yielded one-known document, which he wrote in the final year of his undergraduate studies. There is no personalist rhetoric or message within his “The Existence of a God: An Intelligent First Cause,” (1903). However, looking at the timing of when this piece was written, we can deduce that Jones was contemplating a future that contained aspects of questioning and critical thinking. Philosophy, he may have found, would offer the best practice for such endeavors.

Jones’ First Philosophical Essay

I believe that Jones contributed three works to the Black personalist tradition. His first was an unpublished essay written during his undergraduate years at Wilberforce. The other two were his dissertation, written in 1909 at the University of Jena (Germany), and his only published book, *Education in Theory and Practice*, which was published in 1919. The remainder of this chapter focuses on his first piece. Jones’ writings on personalism were largely descriptive and objective as opposed to conceptual and apologetic, as we might find with personalist thinkers who were actively trying to conceptualize and further personalist philosophy. The differences
between the two approaches have to do with the writer’s rhetorical strategies. Wherein
the former method of writing seeks elaboration for the sake of comprehension as well as
detail to fact for the sake of precision, the latter method aims to adopt a more
comprehensive argumentative tone for the purpose of theoretical clarity. Where the
former requires less analytical thinking and more superficial reasoning, the latter
demands more thorough and oftentimes dialectical thought. Jones’ first foray into
philosophical writing is neither fully developed nor critical.

Unlike W.E.B Du Bois, who by the time he composed his thesis “The
Renaissance of Ethics” (1889), had graduated with an undergraduate philosophy degree
from Fisk University and was completing another undergraduate philosophy degree from
Harvard, there is no evidence illustrating that Jones took any philosophy courses until he
arrived in Germany for his doctoral work. Although Jones ultimately defended a
philosophical dissertation, the gap between Jones’ first attempt at philosophical inquiry
and his dissertation seems quite large. It is with this gap in mind that makes me believe
that Jones used this early philosophical endeavor as motivation to study philosophy more
rigorously, and to do so using his times’ most prestigious country for such a pursuit. Even
though there is not a direct link between the philosophical content of this unpublished
work and his dissertation, I believe a closer examination of the text is pivotal as it allows
the reader to better understand Jones’ intellectual influences, his philosophical
development, and his overall academic motivation to study in Germany.

Jones’ first attempt at philosophical, and in my opinion personalist, inquiry came
in 1903. This essay, “The Existence of a God: An Intelligent First Cause,” was written as
either a personal essay or exam. If it were an exam, Jones would have written it as either
a sophomore or a junior at Wilberforce University. One can deduce that this was his first major philosophical investigation by the tone of skepticism he assumes in regard to his intellectual capacity in his initial philosophical endeavor. He concludes his essay by addressing his “Papa” with the following postscript, “What do you think of my childish venture into philosophy? Have I failed utterly or is there still hope” (G. H. Jones, 1903, p. 1)? The young Jones’ essay gives the scholar of Jones a lucid foray into his philosophical past and ultimately a glimpse of his future, as the essay alludes to some of the personalist principles he would later re-address in his dissertation. This is also the first place where we can see German influences on Jones’ critical thinking, specifically through Hegel, but also in his conceptions of God. Although slightly scattered in scope and rhetoric, I believe this essay is an appropriate introduction to Jones’ future work; hence, I will begin my discussion of his later work, which features in the subsequent chapters, by looking critically at this piece.

Jones’ essay is motivated by, what he believes to be, an understanding of truth. In a Hegelian fashion, Jones posits that to come to know truth we must understand truth in its entirety; for only in this manner—the comprehension of truth as a dialectical concept—do we come to actually understand it. This charge holds also for truth of God. No understanding, or attempt thereof, of truth in relation to God is, for Jones, “more damaging that no truth at all” (1903, p. 1). We get a further example of Hegel’s influence on Jones through his belief that more enlightened minds might be, in time, able to come to a better and more comprehensive understanding of the essence of God. “Psychic phenomenon proves that the mind of man is steadily evolving toward a higher and more perfected state. As we approach this state of absolute perfection we are more and more
enabled to comprehend God in essence. Hence God when fully known…(page breaks away)” (G. H. Jones, 1903, p. 1). This ultimately proves important for Jones’ essay, as his thesis is an attempt to prove the existence of God.

Jones attempts to prove the existence of God given certain unpredictability with naturalist arguments. Jones’ God is an intelligent, spiritual being who “we therefore must know as the universal lawgiver, the essence of universal and essential order… [God] is an omnipresent, all-pervasive, universally existent, intelligent Cause comprehending all causes and their relations to their consequent effects” (G. H. Jones, 1903, p. 2). Of God’s presence in the world Jones notes, “He, being the supreme intelligent Cause prearranges every effect, predisposes in the cause a tendency toward a predetermined result and by a unique display of absolute prevision controls the operations of the whole toward a pre-established harmony, a pre-intended continuity” (G. H. Jones, 1903, p. 2).

Jones’ motivation for naming God as the uncaused cause falls in line with his religious upbringing (in the African Methodist Episcopal Church), and indeed the exalting rhetoric used to describe the power, intelligence, and determining characteristics of God certainly allow us to recognize that Jones does not believe that God is, in any aspect, finite. One problem with the cosmological argument in general and in Jones’ case specifically, is that there is no accountability for the ontological nature of the “First Cause.” According to the logic of the argument, even if one were to accept that the first cause does not have a cause, there is nothing in the argument to suggest that that First Cause is God. Jones fails to account for this in the many descriptive attributes he assigns to God; indeed the argument doesn’t posit a necessary set of characteristics or attributes for this First Cause and therefore would have little need for those attributes assigned to
God. And although intelligence, omnipresence, and all-pervasiveness, may be necessary conditions for the existence of an all-powerful/knowing/infinite God, these are not the same requisite conditions for an Uncaused Cause. It seems, then, that Jones conflates God’s ontological properties with those of a First Cause’s properties. Jones’ argument does not work precisely because he assumes the existence of God and uses that as a starting point for his reasoning for the existence of the First Cause. This thinking model is uncritical, but it allows for a religious understanding of the creation of the universe, and therefore Jones’ knowledge of God from his upbringing is safe.

Another criticism of the cosmological argument pertains to the uncaused property of the First Cause. What is it about the nature of this specific cause that allows it to be uncaused? Here, Jones points to the fact that God pre-arranges every effect, and determines every outcome as a defense against God’s finitude. These attributes hardly address the fact that there is an ontological imperative that states that the First Cause is exempt from causality.

Furthermore, for Jones the ontological nature of God assumes that God is the greatest being of which we can conceive. And, if we can fully conceivce of God, then God must exist. Above, I pointed to the fact that Jones, in Hegelian fashion, posits that as finite creatures, our minds are nonetheless capable of evolving to the point of fully comprehending the essence of God. This begs the question in general of the finitude of the human mind, but more specifically of the gap between said finitude and God’s infinitude. If humans are finite, and therefore have a limit on conceptions of the infinite, yet accept that the greatest thing of which one can conceive is God, then it is possible that one’s conception of God can not necessarily conceive of infinitude or all-perverseness,
thereby negating the very ontological nature of God. Simply put, God cannot be the expression of the greatest thing we can imagine, as we are, by nature of being finite creatures, are not fully capable of comprehending those properties and concepts necessary for the existence of God. I have contributed this short critical section on Jones’ thoughts on God to illustrate the lack of philosophical development Jones had at this point in his young academic career. In what follows I will elaborate more on Jones’ argument as it relates to personalist themes.

Although there is not one agreed upon conception of God to which personalists hold, I believe Jones’ conception of God ultimately does justice to a personalist conception of God, specifically given the personal attributes and omnipotent characteristics, which are, at the very least, general conceptions of God held by the majority of personalists.

Jones is clear that God is not absolute in the Hegelian sense. Hegel’s God is an impersonal consciousness. Similar to Kierkegaard’s argument against Hegel’s absolute God, Jones’ God would possess more individual, and would therefore more personal qualities, as in intelligence, and emotion. Although intelligent, God cannot do everything, and if natural selection will give credence to evolution—a process, which is thoroughly within the scope of God’s potential, Jones would argue—then there must be guidelines. By natural selection, I mean the gradual evolutionary process through which specific traits, characteristics, or physical attributes become either more or less common. For example, Jones posits, “Suppose a man need to fly from some imminent danger as the only means of preserving his life. Could any effort or combination of efforts and need concur and become conducive of the production of wings or shape out of the anterior
member to form a wing” (G. H. Jones, 1903, p. 2)? Jones’ exaggeration of natural selection is perhaps a bit heavy; however, it does point to the realization that God, as a controlling formal principle in this equation, is not capable of everything, specifically those things and occurrences outside of reason. In this case, then, God is absolutely rational. What is problematic about Jones’ example specifically, and his understanding of natural selection in general is the fact that he ascribes a certain teleological function to natural selection that is not inherent within that process. By this I mean that natural selection, as an on-going and never-ending process does not seek final products in nature. The need Jones expresses above is not one, which would fit into the category of natural selection.

A personalist conception of God also holds that God created the world, has an active and moral obligation toward the world and is absolute insofar as God can do things that are possible and stand within reason. Jones recognizes that not only did God create and oversee the world and the various life forms therein, but God continues to impress God-self in the world through moral, benevolent, and rational ways. Jones writes “in this world everything was here in substance before the advent of man. Everything had been created beforehand. God had created everything. Man has created nothing. He is simply the utilizer and transformer of substance” (1903, p. 16). Jones understands that there is an ontological relationship between creator and creature. God, in being God, is endowed with the capacity of creation. Humans, on the other hand, by stint of them being finite creatures possess no such capacity for creation. Although members of this personal cosmic relationship, humans are, nonetheless, subordinate and dependent upon God.
Jones’ understanding of God can be clarified when compared to Borden Parker Bowne’s views on the topic.

Borden Parker Bowne’s conception of God is broken up into two categories. The first class “is metaphysical: unity, unchangeability, eternity, omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence. The second category includes the more concrete, worship-inspiring ethical attributes: love, holiness, righteousness, mercy, justice” (G. H. Jones, 1903, p. 12). Jones seems to be more concerned with the metaphysical concerns, as he would say that without those metaphysical qualities, one could not talk of God. The latter category is not taken up in Jones’ essay in great length as he is not, at least in this instance, concerned with those attributes, which God might possess and share with the world. He dedicates some space to God’s “more concrete, worship-inspiring ethical attributes,” (G. H. Jones, 1903, p. 12) as he recognizes that God, as an intelligent being, not only created and loves the world, but is also the force behind all of the world’s happenings. Jones grants that God is the

Eternal spirit, a persistent energy in the world, of the world and above the world; the maker and control of the universe. That Intelligence, who by precision sees every possible thing in every possible relationship and by pre-intention and predetermination pre-arranges every possible thing so as to be conducive of absolute harmony. (G. H. Jones, 1903, p. 12)

This statement touches on what might be the clearest critique of personalists’ conception of God specifically when it comes to the question of theodicy. This becomes all the more cogent in light of Jones’ position as a Black personalist.

**Jones, Black Personalism, and the Question of Theodicy**

Although not taken up in Jones’ essay, I think a conversation about a Personalist conception of God’s omnipotence and personal nature would be appropriate as I am
beginning to place Jones within a Black Personalist discussion and his responses to or omission of the following should be helpful. Jones adheres to the more traditional notion of God’s omnipotence, as ascribed to by Bowne. This, I find, is appropriate given the influence Jones’ studies of German philosophy had in his work. His words above signify God’s personal temperament; specifically in terms of God’s power and desire to provide mankind with “absolute harmony.” As mentioned above, God pre-arranges and determines everything, so as to lead to this harmony. What is not taken up in Jones’ essay is whether or not this “absolute” refers to the God’s capacity for good and evil in the world. If Jones grants that God, like Bowne’s God, is loving and cares for the world, yet also maintains God’s absolute nature, then it would we would find problematic the issue of theodicy. How could an absolutely good God create evil? This understanding of God would not be adequate for those asking about God’s nature in light of suffering and oppression. Even though an absolutely good God would not be capable of such evil, the fact that God is responsible for all relationships and actions means that there must be something inherent within God that can answer to the question of evil. For this absolute harmony to work, there must be both good and evil in play. An omission of one of factor would lead to disharmony in the world.

As Jones did not go into detail about what specifically constituted the absolute nature of his God, it is possible that Jones’ God might benefit from a perspective more in line with Brightman instead of Bowne. Edgar Brightman was a student of Bowne and as such adhered closely to his work. One key difference between the two scholars, however, was their work on the question of evil. Brightman spent much more time addressing the question of theodicy than his teacher. Brightman did not believe in the absolute nature of
God. Brightman believed that God possessed a limitation, which he called “surd evil” (Burrow, 1999b). This aspect of God was part of the nature of God, but not of God’s own will. God, for Brightman, is responsible for all the evil of the world, regardless of whether or not it was in God’s interest. This finite-infinite God separated Brightman from his Personalist predecessors and made him one of the only personalists who attempted to settle, in any substantive way, the problem of evil.

I propose that the primary question for Jones in respect to theodicy is not whether or not God is omnipotent, as omnipotence, at least from Brightman’s perspective, might not deal fully with the unwilled capacity for evil inherent within God’s nature. Instead, the question is one of God’s absolute benevolence. If Jones subscribes to Bowne’s conception of an absolute benevolent God, then Jones would have a problem addressing the problem of evil, as it is not clear that a God who is all good would have the capacity to create and/or alleviate suffering and oppression. Although Jones did not question the omnipotent nature of God, the question of God’s power has been brought up by other Black personalists.

Jones’ God can still be the most powerful force in the universe without being all-powerful. Martin Luther King’s conception of God acknowledges this as he writes, that God’s omnipotence is best described as “The matchless Power of God” (Burrow, 2006, p. 111). This is a critical piece of nomenclature as it suggests, and Burrow notes, that it makes “clear that a God who possesses such power is able to accomplish the divine purposes in the world and thus possess power sufficient to God’s purposes and to human needs” (Burrow, 2006, p. 111). At this point in Jones’ philosophical career, I do not believe he had had the training or grasp on the literature to make such an argument as
King had made. As his conception of God was shaped primarily from traditional trends in personalist and Christian beliefs, and not so much influenced (yet) by social concerns, Jones’ views on God are still premature. As I will note later, in his book Jones is much more adept at recognizing the need for social considerations in his work.

Jones and other personalists believe that inherent within God’s nature are the personal traits of intelligence, reason, and moral competence. Can God be both personal and omnipotent? Can God remain rational in the face of evil, which by nature, involve relationships based on inequality? If God pre-determined actions and devised an absolute harmony where evil was present, how would God rationalize who became oppressed and who did the oppressing? A God “matchless in power” but simultaneously exposed to emotion, sentiment, and moral codes, and subjectivity would cause, at times, a conflict of interests.

Martin Luther King attempted to reconcile this conflict. “King believed in a thoroughly personal God, a God who is at once immanent enough to assure created persons they are cared about and yet transcendent enough to warrant their worship” (Burrow, 2006, p. 111). Who would God care for? If God cared for all humanity equally, and God can do all rational things within God-self, how would personalists explain suffering and oppression? I posit that it would then be possible that God, to answer William R. Jones’ rhetorical question: Is God a White Racist? (1998) could indeed be a white racist. It would then be possible that God’s emotional sensibilities moved God to care for a certain group of persons over and above another. In essence then, what would contradict God’s “matchless power” would be the inherent subjectivity we find within personality; namely fundamental differences in regards to morality, intelligence, and
reason. If agreed upon equally, then it would be possible to have a God who could make decisions and utilize power while simultaneously reconciling that with whatever personal sensibilities the context calls for. As the latter cannot be said to conform in any way to everyone in personalisms’ community of persons, I do not see how Jones’ God can claim “matchless power.” As mentioned, this critique problematizes a personalist God’s response to theodicy. The following also appears to question God’s power.

Jones’ assumes a universal harmony, which is pre-established and constantly maintained by God. Man enters into the equation as that being who merely transforms the substances put in place by God. The problem with both of these assertions is that in each instance God is directly responsible for—in the former explicitly, and the latter implicitly—suffering, and in the case of Black peoples, the historical and systematic oppression of African descendent peoples. In the first case, God would have explicitly pre-determined specific historical acts such as the trans-Atlantic slave trade, anti-Black racism, and legalized forms of oppression under the guise of Jim Crow. This then contradicts both Jones’ conception of God as well as Bowne’s. Second, even if God were to have simply pre-established man’s workings with nature, and not with his fellow man, by stint of the fact that man transformed nature to create societies whereby racism and oppression became manifest, God would be neglecting God’s obligation to man by ignoring this plight. In either instance, the God of personalists and Jones fails to live up to the very essence of what constitutes God.

Jones’ argument, in a similar fashion to the argument posed by personalists, is not overly surprising, as both parties address this issue from the perspective of religious persons. Jones was a lifelong member and minister within the African Methodist
Episcopal church, and one finds that many personalists, specifically in Boston, were Methodists themselves. When one's religious orientation influences one’s philosophical perspectives, the former belief usually remains primary over the latter in motivation, as the latter is used oftentimes to justify specific themes in the former. When this is done, rational, historical, and material occurrences tend to be omitted, or at the very least, set aside as unfortunate consequences or unintelligible inconsistencies in one’s religious beliefs.

This presupposition (the existence of God as assumed, not concluded) causes anxiety with the above-mentioned material concerns, specifically in the case of African Americans. As an aspect of the thoroughgoing Personalist methodology, which Bowne championed, the assumption of a God, in discussions on theodicy, leaves the essence of God vulnerable. If Jones were actually interested in establishing a discussion of truth-values, then he already fails himself methodologically if he does not entertain a set of philosophical methods, which, William R. Jones posits, broadens the premise of the argument so as to incorporate more than one position. William R. Jones also notes that any value placed on God ought to be concluded, not presupposed.

What I wish to insist upon is the recognition of the multievidential quality of the materials themselves and the necessity of trying to let the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ labels be conclusions reached about the experiences in question—not presuppositions brought to the analysis of these experiences. (1998, p. 65)

The question of theodicy is not taken up by Gilbert Haven Jones in his essay, and perhaps this is a good thing as the material conditions of Black people during Jones’ time would have certainly begged more presuppositions other than the one Jones offers. As Jones’ essay contains no comments or grades nor is it addressed to a specific course or professor, it appears to me that this work was self-motivated. This was not uncommon in
Jones’ day. Although the attributes of God that he illustrates in this essay are not necessarily exclusive to personalism, they resonate with the various characteristics, obligations, and actions that Borden Parker Bowne and other theistic personalists detailed in their descriptions of a personal God. Within a year and a half of writing this essay Jones moved on to Dickinson College where he received another Bachelor’s degree as well as a Master’s degree. Although his course study was in classics and not necessarily or specifically in philosophy, he did continue with his philosophical curiosity and by the time he began his doctoral work, Jones had around six years of formal and informal philosophical study under his belt. Most of the study, one can assume given his dedication to the African Methodist Episcopal Church, probably dealt with the philosophy of religion, historical idealism, and psychology.

I have attempted just now to illustrate Jones’ history with the discipline of philosophy and indirectly the field of Black personalism. In what follows I show how Jones’ dissertation contributes to the field of the history of philosophy as well as educational personalism. Jones’ dissertation offers readers an illustration of his philosophical development from the essay covered in this chapter.
Chapter V: The Educational Personalism of Gilbert Haven Jones

Gilbert Haven Jones’ dissertation was one of the earliest works in the history and foundation of philosophical and theological personalism. *Lotze und Bowne: Eine Vergleichung ihrer Philosophischen Arbeit* was written with the larger personalist community in mind. After researching Jones’ intellectual career and reading the dissertation, his goal in writing this work can be identified as the creation of a document, which could be, once translated, a seminal piece of philosophical literature widely disseminated to graduate students and scholars of personalist philosophy. George Yancy notes that Jones’ dissertation “did manage to find its way into American universities. Apparently, copies of the dissertation had been requested from Jones so that it might be translated by the graduate school of Boston University’s philosophy department. This dissertation was to be used in certain philosophy courses once translated” (2003, p. 53). Although there are no primary documents that directly express his motivation, as a consummate educator, the above citation not only points to the eager anticipation Jones’ work found with his audience, but it also signifies the belief that Jones was producing a piece of literature that ought to have been widely accessible.

This chapter analyzes Jones’ dissertation and make the two following assertions. Firstly, the dissertation best fits within the genre of the history of philosophy. Writing in this genre was not uncommon in the African American philosophical tradition. Secondly, his work, even if the content doesn’t explicitly suggest it, begins to develop Jones’ philosophy of education. Jones’ study of personalism led him to develop his educational philosophy, which was very much predicated on the ethical considerations espoused by personalism as well as the intellectual development and overall cultivation of the
individual. For Jones, the social and economic equality for Black persons began with an appeal to the fundamentally equal moral, cognitive, and social essence for both the Black and White individual. Jones was attempting, in 1909, to combat racism and oppression by coming to a more thorough understanding of the person, the person’s educational, and therefore social, capacity as well as the society of persons, which, to personalists, make up reality. Before I get into the educational tenets of Jones’ personalism, I offer the reader a summation of his dissertation project. Jones’ dissertation was initially written in Germany. I have translated it and any citation given below is my own.

**Jones’ Dissertation: A Summary**

Jones’ dissertation is relatively straightforward. He believes his project to serve as a microcosm of his overall understanding of the history of philosophy. Jones’ dissertation is, in my opinion, an attempt to offer a formal example of the way philosophy has been constructed throughout history. His dissertation was divided into three parts and in what follows I summarize his points in each of these parts.

In part one, “General Discussion of the Writers: Lotze and Bowne,” Jones outlines in a general and comparative manner the philosophical perspectives which both Lotze and Bowne held. As the latter was the student of the former we find that Lotze—one of the most prominent German idealists of the late nineteenth century—influenced his American student, Bowne, in the ways of subjective or personal idealism. Jones alludes to the personalist facets of both Lotze’s and Bowne’s systems:

Both Lotze and Bowne assume as the basis of their systems a universal mind, God, and a variation thereof, the human mind. The one is absolute, the other relative; the absolute mind infinite and completely in and of Itself, relative only so far completely in and of itself as it is connected with the mind of the rest of mankind, but otherwise a part of the one
eternal, absolute mind, God, to whom he has a close, uniquely dependent relationship. (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 16)

Jones recognizes in both Lotze and Bowne the intelligent, eternal and absolute mind, God. This God established the world order around a community of persons, of which God is the ultimate. By way of commonality between student and teacher, Jones breaks down their ideas of personalism’s basic tenets. These include: the universal mind, the individual mind, and the idea of the finite. The universal mind for both scholars, Jones explains, operate with good as the ultimate end. And although both of their minds have a personality, for Lotze the universal mind is a substance, a pure idea or force from which individual minds can conceive of a world plan and purpose. Jones explicates that Bowne’s universal mind is similar to Lotze’s in that he recognizes the universal to be a force, however instead of noting that this force is a substance, or idea, he believes it to be a principle of causation. As a force, God is said to be the infinite acting cause who influences, through his actions, the values and ideas of the entire cosmic community of personalities.

The individual mind for both men contains characteristics of the absolute mind. For Lotze it is an immortal, self-guiding, creative, and confident soul, which finds completeness only as it remains in relationship with the rest of humanity (spirits). Bowne’s individual mind is similar but is fundamentally different in the same sense as his universal mind. This is so insofar as the individual mind is constantly changing and is intelligent in light of the fact that it is also a principle of causation. Their universal and individual minds are very much tied to their metaphysics. As Lotze posits that all reality is mental, Bowne agrees and supplements that by saying “All reality is known by the
power and fact of action; only the definite and only the active can be viewed as
ontologically real” (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 18).

Finally, Jones explains the finitude of the human mind and its relation to the body. Although the body and mind have reciprocal influence on each other, it is the mind that holds primary significance and it is from which the body—the house of the mind and intermediate of the mind to outside world—owes its dependence. For Lotze, the finite mind is, in similar fashion to Leibniz, a monad; for Bowne this mind occupies the familiar role of the infinite mind, namely an acting force, or subject of activity. Herein Jones completes his initial comparison between the philosophers Lotze and Bowne. As a last point of introduction Jones specifies that although the systems of the two scholars are the same, the methods they undertake are different. Jones writes,

As mentioned before, Bowne’s writings are more “critical” than Lotze’s; but they also lack any natural scientific addition. That is why he gives more room to the discussion of different schools and the rejection of their teachings than Lotze. On the other hand Lotze was a medical doctor, anatomist, and physiologist and in his younger years even professor of physiology in Leipzig; consequently he has more trust in the physiological psychology than one can expect from Bowne. (1909b, p. 22)

Clearly Lotze’s studies and career as a learned man of the hard sciences and medicine influenced his philosophical outlook and methodology. Lotze’s commitment to personal idealism can be seen to manifest itself in his work as an early psychologist and therefore advocate for the study and consideration of the mind.

Part two of Jones’ dissertation, “General Comparisons,” proceeds organically from his first section and the overall purpose of his work, which aims to categorize the perspectives from which the authors conceive their work. As philosophy has, since time immemorial, sought to build for itself separate categories and perspectives which speak
to and simultaneously challenge various aspects of reality, so too must we as philosophy students (Jones’ audience) recognize that both Lotze and Bowne must be seen from one or many philosophical categories. Aptly stated, “The various authors arranged or adapted all classical or ideal views into their schemes as well as into their more or less extensively elaborated systems; or they put special emphasis on a single phase of the general philosophical question in their discussion” (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 23).

Jones first takes Lotze to task on his philosophical perspectives. Of Lotze’s relatively problematic place in philosophy Jones notes,

We find it somewhat difficult, to assign Hermann Lotze a place as a philosopher in a certain and convincing way. In his views he shows affinity with different schools, and as a result of an attempt to gain an accurate understanding of him and his point of view, we can only associate him with some certainty with those schools which he followed in his treatment of the philosophical material. (G. H. Jones, p. 24)

Lotze’s work, initially as a physician, and trained in the natural sciences provoked him—given his later idealist sensibilities—to seek some unity between “The world of feeling and science” (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 14). Jones is the first scholar to attempt to classify Lotze’s various philosophical perspectives. He recognizes that Lotze would fall under five unique philosophical categories: idealist, realist, teolog, spiritualist, mechanist. Jones’ treatment of this section is ideal for students of philosophy, specifically those interested in the various connections between philosophical systems and the philosophy and religion. Lotze’s primary philosophical allegiance fall within the school of personalism, of which Jones posits “Lotze is above all mainly a supporter of the school of idealism and as such he deals with the ‘world of ideas’ and sets out to work especially in that ‘great realm of ideas,’ which was an object of investigation for the world of philosophy since it first captivated the attention of Plato” (1909b, p. 27). Jones’ continued
characterization of Lotze’s philosophical system is not only descriptive and formal in nature, but also largely annotative. Drawing on the extensive and diverse literature of Lotze, Jones presents this section as one dedicated to explicating, in a general and objective manner, the systems of Lotze’s thought. This section, as well as each successive part of the dissertation, is saturated with primary (from both Lotze and Bowne) and secondary (philosophical critics/commentators of the two philosophers) literature in a way perhaps too superfluous for someone merely interested in a philosophical critique of both scholars.

As mentioned earlier, Jones’ dissertation is the first piece of literature to analyze Bowne’s entire philosophical worldview. Not only was he still alive at the time of this dissertation, but Jones tenders that Bowne’s worldview was not entirely spelled out, in light of the fact that, by 1909, Bowne had not developed his system completely. Jones notes these problems and concludes that the most efficient and fairest way to handle an analysis of Bowne is to take excerpts from his publications, which might illuminate for the reader his various philosophical allegiances. Of primary import to Jones in this section were Bowne’s *Introduction to Psychological Theory, Theism, Metaphysics,* and *Theory of Thought and Knowledge.* From these works, Jones asserts that Bowne is a(n): idealist, teolog, spiritualist, and realist.

These designations are not overly surprising in light of the fact that Bowne was the student of Lotze and was obviously influenced by the latter’s philosophical considerations. In summary, Jones gives the following comparison:

With this, we think to have given a certain idea of Bowne’s views. In his goal, he differs only slightly from Lotze: the same illustrious desire, to give life value and sense in this and the other world! Lotze places more emphasis on life here, whereas Bowne turns more to the other world. Lotze proceeds constructively,
Bowne critically and analytically. The biggest difficulties they both found for their works were in the views of value of life, as they are disseminated through the writings and efforts of the mechanical, materialistic, sensationalist and empirical schools of philosophy. These argue that the cosmos, its contents and its processes are linked only through blind, necessary, mechanical laws with the intellect, and they expand this interpretation even to the phenomena of the mind. They interrupted, thus, to great extent, the peaceful balance of the idealistic, spiritualistic and theistic philosophy. Lotze’s and Bowne’s aim was now to do mankind good and to equip it with a stable life view and ideology in which the Spirit is understood as a being ("a mental subject"), a personality. God is the absolute personality, he is intelligent and has goals that he reveals in his activity. (1909b, p. 48)

Jones primary aim in his first two sections is to express the similarities of the two philosophers specifically as they both resemble personalists. Although primarily a metaphysics and religious ethical system, personalism certainly has inroads with the above-mentioned schools to which both men were said to belong. It appears that not only is Jones attempting to give a comprehensive account of both Lotze and Bowne’s systems, but he is doing so under the auspices of one dedicated to advancing the personalist agenda, thereby exhausting his claim to descriptive objectivity. Jones’ final and longest section of the dissertation, “Special Comparison,” is divided into three parts wherein he gives equal treatment to both writers at various philosophical levels. These themes are: logic, metaphysics, and psychology.

The system of logic for Lotze and Bowne, Jones tells us, is primarily a difference between logic in its formal and practical applications. Lotze, in light of his classical German Idealist background, “adheres with great perseverance to the old formal logic as was left to us by Aristotle and has been further developed by medieval scholars” (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 55). Bowne, in a similar fashion to the pragmatists, sought philosophy to be critical and applicable to practical issues and in this light his logic mirrored more of a practical approach. Jones’ discussion on logic emphasizes Lotze’s thoughts and
contributions over and above Bowne’s perhaps because by 1909 Jones did not have available all of Bowne’s writings on the topic whereas Lotze’s materials was much more widely accessible. Regardless of this point, for a section which aimed to discuss, equally and comprehensively, the logical writings of these two men, Jones, whether through fault of his own or otherwise, fails to fully account for the logical systems of Bowne, and does so mainly through what was said by his teacher, Lotze. The fact that the two men differ in their approach to logic—Lotze being formal, and Bowne practical—seems, to Jones, to make a more comprehensive discussion of their work superfluous at that point in his dissertation. If Jones is functioning as a personalist educator aimed at illuminating the history of personalism to philosophy students, I believe this reason ought to have had the inverse effect on Jones. As he posits earlier in the piece, philosophical thought both changes and enhances the previous generation of thinkers; in this light, Jones would have done well to incorporate more analysis and speculation as to the reasons why Bowne deviated from his teacher’s thoughts on logic.

The metaphysical systems of both Lotze and Bowne are similar in that their thoughts on the topic both revolve around relationships—the individual personality to other personalities and ultimately to the ultimate personality—and action. Jones is able to give a much more comprehensive account of the metaphysical systems of both men as he had available to him a lot of primary literature on the topic. Lotze wrote extensively on metaphysics specifically within his “Vom Werden und der Veränderung,” “Von den Qualitäten der Dinge,” “Von dem Realen und der Realität,” Metaphysik, Mikrokosmus, and Grundzüge der Metaphysik. Bowne had written his Metaphysics, “Change and Identity,” and Personalism. For the latter scholar at least, metaphysics was a crucial area
of discussion as his work within personalism was developed primarily as a metaphysics in order to come to terms with the nature of the personality in reality.

Jones’ section on psychology gives the reader, more so than anything else, article and book summations of relevant pieces of Lotze and Bowne. As they both conducted work primarily on the spirit, personality/mind, and the expressions thereof, it is clear that their views on psychology and in particular the function of the mind would have occupied a great deal of their work. Jones separates his treatment on psychology between the two scholars’ work on the soul, a critique of the materialist school in regards to their thoughts on the mind, the interaction between the internal and external forces (perception, thoughts, and feelings), and freedom and necessity. In the end, however, both scholars come to the conclusion that without an intelligent, self-confident mind, an immortal and non-spatial soul, and an ultimate mind, reality, thought, and the physical manifestations lose significance and meaning.

There are two possible ways through which Jones became introduced to personalism. The first is that his philosophical education at Wilberforce and work within the A.M.E church led him to an appreciation of humans at a fundamental metaphysical level. Jones was educated during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century, a time where American intellectualism was dominated by psychological, scientific, and philosophical justifications for the inferiority of Black peoples. At the time of Jones’ undergraduate and master’s work, there do not appear to have been any scholars at his respective institutions who were recognized as personalist thinkers. This suggests that Jones was introduced to and developed his personalist thinking while a student at the University of Jena. It’s there that that Jones began to form his ideas on the primacy of the
human. His studies in botany and zoology—the most available hard sciences—as well as his work in psychology illustrate that he was attempting to formulate his own ideological beliefs against the rhetoric that Black people were inherently sub-human beings capable of very little intellectual capacities.

This indicates that at the time Jones was writing his dissertation on personalism, he was relatively new in studying the field, which may have led him to simply offer a non-critical account of the bourgeoning philosophy. Had Jones, like Martin Luther King, been exposed to personalism, even implicitly, early in his academic career, perhaps his dissertation would have mirrored a scholar more advanced in his philosophical use of concepts. Needless to say, personalism is the conceptual glue that ties his dissertation together. Despite their differences in logic and metaphysics, Jones is astute when he mentions that the commonalities that bind both Lotze and Bowne together are the religious and philosophical principles of the universal mind. He elaborates and says that both scholars:

> [A]ssume as the basis of their systems a universal mind, God, and a variation thereof, the human mind... The one [mind] is absolute, the other relative; the absolute mind infinite and completely in and of itself, relative only so far completely in and of itself as it is connected with the rest of mankind, but otherwise a part of the one eternal, absolute mind, God, to whom it has a close, uniquely dependent relationship...the absolute mind is intelligent and as a consequence of this characteristic it has ideas and all of these ideas are good. (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 15)

On a religious level—both Lotze and Bowne were deeply religious men whose philosophies both informed and were informed by their religious beliefs—we recognize that their personalism falls into the category of theistic personalism, the most normative branch. Jones spends significant time detailing the intricacies of the ethics, metaphysics, and epistemological foundations of both scholars’ personalism.
In and of itself, Jones’ text has very limited influential content. Jones’ comparative analysis of two well-known philosophers either was or has since been duplicated and elaborated on by numerous philosophers and other intellectuals. It is not until one recognizes Jones’ motivation for writing the dissertation that one gets a notion that this is a piece of practical literature. Jones was not simply writing a document in order to partially fulfill graduation requirements; indeed Jones’ life and work ethic appear contrary to such trivial work. Always the educator, Jones wanted this piece to serve as introductory philosophical work for students of not only personalism but also, perhaps, German idealism, philosophy of religion, American philosophy, and even psychology, as he dedicates some space to Lotze and Bowne’s impact on that last field. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Jones believed this dissertation to be of importance in a teaching setting.

Jones comes full circle with his dissertation, in that he ends with an assessment of the history of philosophy that opened his essay. He concludes that this trend

[I]s not a new fact. This is how philosophy has progressed all along. Motivated by the struggles of preceding men, the most struggling souls of each generation take up their problems and strive to broaden human cognition through the acquisition of new facts and the application of new methods, and to deepen the philosophical thoughts and, thereby, lead them closer to the finite solution/answer. (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 107)

Jones is right to give acknowledgement to Lotze for shaping Bowne’s work. Jones was the first scholar to make such a connection, and although this dissertation is only now becoming appreciated in a substantive manner, any personalist scholar should recognize that Jones’ dissertation was the first to offer any clear analysis on the beginnings of personalism.
One scholar in particular did recognize this fact. Alfred Knudson’s *The Philosophy of Personalism* (1927) does make two references to Jones’ dissertation. One reference was in regard to the difference in opinion between Lotze and Bowne in their respective logic systems and the other was dedicated to Bowne’s dependence on Lotze. Jones illustrates that although Bowne learned much from Lotze, he does not display a heavy dependence on his teacher, Lotze. This is an interesting find and it indicates that among prominent personalists, Jones’ dissertation was considered an important piece within the history of their field.

**Jones and the History of Philosophy**

An analysis of Jones’ dissertation fits best within the history of philosophy, specifically within the history of personalism. A text in this genre is largely historical and explanatory, as opposed to conceptual and argumentative. By no means were they mutually exclusive rhetorical strategies in this piece, as the reader can ultimately come to understand what informed Jones philosophical and larger educational missions based on his relatively objective historical and descriptive account.

The African American philosopher Charles Leander Hill offers a good example of the history of philosophy literature found within the Black philosophical tradition. A philosophy colleague and successor of Jones to the presidency at Wilberforce University, Hill offers a valid explanation for motivation in writing within such a genre. In his book, *A Short History of Modern Philosophy From the Renaissance to Hegel*, Hill notes,

> The author has kept in mind that he is performing the role of historian of philosophy. As such, he has attempted to be faithful to the original works of the philosophers. It is not the primary function of the historian of philosophy to give critiques of the philosophers whose systems he delineates. (1951, p. 9)
According to Hill, students’ need for a comprehensive and historical account of major philosophical principles, outweighs the desire for the author to write a deeply conceptual manuscript, which would have only had limited use within philosophy courses. In a similar spirit to Hill, Jones also appears to place philosophy students foremost in his concern for clarity in this dissertation. Instead of writing an essay for the sake of proving his own philosophical merit, Jones chose to construct a historical, and therefore empirical project for the sake of providing philosophy students with a coherent explanation of personalism, its antecedents, and its predecessors. This also suggests that Jones’ understanding of his two subjects—the German Herman Lotze and American Borden Parker Bowne—needed to be both comprehensive but relatively objective.

One can observe, given Jones’ and Hill’s work, a connection between their profession as dedicated Black scholars and their genre of philosophical publication (history of philosophy). For a scholar more interested in one’s own research agenda, it might seem that their scholastic output would take priority over the accessibility of their work to students. This was the case with much of personalist literature as it was very much conceptual and not accessible to beginning philosophy students. Rufus Burrow recalls that personalism’s primary teaching text, *The Philosophy of Personalism* was

> Written primarily for a more philosophical, scholarly audience and is therefore replete with technical philosophical language that proves an impediment for numerous persons interested in knowing what personalism is and how it developed…I believe it is not an exaggeration to say that it requires the reader to have a good background in the history of philosophy generally and idealistic philosophy more particularly. (Burrow, 1999b)

Similar to what my third chapter suggests, as Black philosophers who wore many hats, Jones and Hill remained ever cognizant of their role as teachers. And when researching, they recognized what resources were *not* available to their student
demographic. As both Jones and Hill note, their intention in publishing their philosophical literature was to keep philosophy students in mind and to write for them a coherent, lucid, and comprehensive account of major themes in philosophy. This motivation also found its way into the methods they employed in their endeavors.

Of the method a philosopher must employ in this venture, Hill tells us that a philosopher ought to explain very clearly and precisely the teachings of a philosopher on different philosophical topics (Hill, 1951). This should come as no surprise to those familiar with historical methods. Particularly noteworthy for this essay, however, is the philosophical historian’s acknowledgement and use of philosophical bias by way of his chosen ideological perspective. Hill gives us a cogent example of how this influences a piece of historical literature:

It is impossible, however, for the historian of philosophy to hide his hand completely in any exposition of philosophy. He, like other men, has his own presuppositions and his own inclinations. Often he finds it impossible to resist making asides at certain intervals…Try as we may, we cannot overcome completely our intellectual biases. It is inevitable that the historian of philosophy will have greater sympathies for, and affinities with, certain philosophers than with others. (Hill, 1951, pp. 9-10)

This latter point certainly helps to pose some questions about Jones’ dissertation. Jones’ dissertation is intriguing as it imbeds in the reader a desire to understand two primary themes: motive and influence. To the latter concept, influence, the following questions come to mind: What influence did Jones believe this piece would have for him, his community, or larger philosophical circles? What was the purpose of treating Lotze and Bowne with such an objective eye? Why does there seem to be a paucity of philosophical critique? These questions will guide me as I go through Jones’ dissertation.

Although there is no record of the translation ever being completed, Edgar Brightman, a Boston personalist and future mentor to Martin Luther King, concurred with
Jones and agreed to have the work become primary literature in his philosophy department, which he was chairing at the time. George Yancy writes of the possibility of Jones’ translation, “Permission was given and a graduate student had begun the task of translating it [dissertation] under the tutelage of philosopher Edgar S. Brightman” (2003, p. 53). Jones is not alone in his quest to provide an objective philosophy text for students. As mentioned earlier, one of Jones’ successors to the presidency of Wilberforce University, Charles Leander Hill likewise completed an introductory philosophy text as he believed none existed that were suitable for his undergraduate students. Published in 1951, *A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From the Renaissance to Hegel* according to John McClendon was the first project by an African American to chronicle the history of philosophy. Hill managed to accomplish this feat while serving as president of Wilberforce as well as teaching courses in philosophy.

Jones attempted to do exactly the same thing Hill did, only Jones was writing forty-two years prior. Although not as all-encompassing as Hill’s piece, Jones still managed to use his knowledge of “German in combination with his extensive study of the history of philosophy” (McClendon, 2003b, p. 43) to create an extensive philosophical text for students. I contend that Jones’ essay was the first such text written by an African American on the history of philosophy. Upon reading Jones’ dissertation it becomes clear that Jones removes himself from his content thereby leaving both the philosophical thoughts of Herman Lotze and Borden Parker Bowne to speak for themselves. This poses a bit of a problem for the scholar of Jones as any foray into his scholarship would, traditionally, warrant a critical and sometimes criticizing eye. As Jones gives no indication of original philosophical analysis and instead resigns himself to the position of
objective descriptor-narrator of Lotze and Bowne’s work, my own critique of Jones’ philosophical literature will have to be mostly descriptive.

It is not my intention to critique either the philosophical systems of Lotze and Bowne, and if left to traditional notions of philosophical critique of an author’s content, that would have been exactly my charge. Instead I aim to illustrate the influence Jones’ dissertation had on the trail I believe he pioneered. Concurrently fitting within the genre of the history of philosophy, I see Jones’ work beginning to lean toward educational personalism, a subset of personalism most closely related to its ethical commitments. This can be concluded based on Jones’ career, the desire of many to receive his dissertation, as well as the topic of his one published book.

On the first note, it is clear, specifically given my third chapter, that Jones was a dedicated scholar of education. A lifelong HBCU academic, Jones committed himself to the teaching, mentoring, and administrative side of academic work at two historically Black schools: Wilberforce University and Central State University. As mentioned above, had Jones’ dissertation been translated 100 years ago, it would have surely been widely utilized throughout personalist centers and undoubtedly within his philosophy and psychology courses at Wilberforce. Lastly, Jones’ one book *Education in Theory and Practice* (1919) appears to be an organic sequel to his dissertation. As will be discussed later in this chapter and in the next chapter, Jones’ book on education fulfills much of the philosophical foundation laid out in his dissertation. At this point, I will discuss Jones’ place within educational personalism.
Jones and a Personalist Account of Education

Educational personalism is one of the few areas of personalist philosophy neglected throughout personalist philosophical and religious literature. One can speculate that this occurred due to reasons central to timing in the philosophical world. Not only were Borden Parker Bowne (personalism) and John Dewey (pragmatism) contemporaries, the philosophies they introduced had much in common, specifically within the realm of education. Given their philosophical concern for the individual, both a pragmatic and personalist philosophy of education share enough practical commonalities so that a unique personalist theory of education, although warranted, may not have been an overly pressing concern within personalist circles. Indeed, pragmatic educational theory has resonated, and to some degree still does, as the distinctly American philosophy on education. John Stuhr writes “for both personalism and pragmatism, the subject matter, the method, and the value of a philosophy must be found in the actual lives and social arrangements of individuals” (Stuhr, 1990, p. 145). The basic difference between the two perspectives in regards to the individual is in their definition of the person. For the pragmatists, a person (individual) is not born a person, but instead “individuality is a matter of associated activities, harmonious values, shared meanings, and developed character. It is the social realization of the social self” (Stuhr, 1990, p. 145). Personalism’s individual, although similar, possesses innate human qualities at birth and recognizes these attributes as being inherently equal to the other individuals, which comprise the larger cosmic community of personalities. Also, the personalist individual is not created by its environment, even though it is an important
aspect of its development. Both philosophies recognize that when it comes to the education (moral development) of the individual precedence must be assigned, in equal measures, to the individual as a social, moral, and overall holistic creature.

If for pragmatists, experience is both irreducible and the ultimate epistemological category, personalists maintain, in a similar fashion to Kant, the active mind in knowledge construction. For personalists,

[A] thing exists for the mind only as the result of a highly complex activity. The mind constructs its objects and imposes its own forms upon the data of experiences. These mental forms are immanent mental principles which determine the form of knowing. (Stuhr, 1990, p. 157)

Although a necessary component of knowledge acquisition, experience is by no means the primary variable for personalists. The first comprehensive account of a personalist theory of education came in 1935 with the dissertation of Hubert Langan. Langan makes the case for the religious, moral, and educational development of the individual while utilizing personalist and Catholic literature. His approach to educational personalism comes in a similar light to those theistic personalists, specifically in the role the individual plays as a creature of God, the ultimate personality. In what follows I aim to give the basic tenets of a personalist philosophy of education. As Jones was also ordained clergy, I form this model around the theistic tenets of personalism. I derive the following model from Langan’s account of educational personalism. It serves this and my next chapter well as I utilize and refer to it as the various tenets become manifest in my discussions on Jones’ dissertation and book.

1) The nature of the individual. The individual is born with an inherent dignity and human-ness. Each individual possesses this characteristic. Each personality is seen as a member of the moral and religious community of persons, which has as its ultimate, the
personality of God. God is given personal characteristics in terms of emotion, sentiment, and moral integrity. God recognizes that although God commands God’s cosmic community of personalities, each individual is endowed with free will and the ability for self-development at the level of education and morality. Each individual regardless of race, class, or gender ought to be allowed—given the fact that they were born persons in a cosmic reality of persons—the ability to develop and improve oneself. Of course there are limitations to this process, but in theory and given the metaphysical imperative to the individual, a personalist philosophy of education would mandate that each individual is capable of social, moral, and intellectual development. As I will discuss from his book, Jones, like many Black scholars of his day, recognized that Black students had the same potential for educational and moral uplift as any other person. If one accepts the basic humanity of Black persons, then race becomes a superfluous indicator of educational potentiality.

2) The Active Mind. Personalists derived their epistemological beliefs mainly from Kant. As was described in chapter two, the active mind is primary in the development and manifestation of knowledge. Contrary to the empiricists (pragmatists) where experience became the primary and indisputable method of knowledge, the active, complex, and discerning mind of the personalist thinker is given the ability to analyze experience, observations, reflection, and trained thought in order to synthesize said information to come to a lucid understanding of knowledge. The educational application of this tenet would recognize that the individual is not merely a body onto which information can simply be placed, nor a tabula rasa incognizant of their own experiences, literacies, and thoughts. Instead, students must take an active role in their
education. Personalist thinkers are endowed with the critical thinking and analytical capabilities, which allow them to question, decide, and analyze information as opposed to pragmatic thinkers who find themselves trapped oftentimes by the formal nature of their own experiences.

3) The Individual and the Community (moral order). Although personalism acknowledges the individual as the ontological ultimate, there is recognition that these individuals function within a community of cosmic individuals, all equal and inspired by the ultimate personality, God. In the realm of education, we see this tenet manifest in the individuals’ capacity to acquire knowledge and moral fortitude through the interactions they have with other individuals. Not beings to learn and grow in isolation, persons develop within their communities through traditional, cultural, linguistic, and other social variables. At the level of moral development, individuals begin to recognize themselves as mature persons through their moral obligations to other members of their community. This would resonate clearly with Wilberforce University as an institution embedded within the Black community. Jones’ contribution to Black educational uplift is a tangible example of his moral dedication to other members of his community.

4) The Individual and Society (moral state). The state plays a large role in the development of the individual as the state is comprised of individual persons. With this being the case, society would therefore be dependent upon the intellectual, physical, and moral capacities of its members. In order to have a fully functioning, moral, and democratic society, the state must rely on the proper education of its members. This then makes education the most crucial of institutions! Stuhr puts it succinctly,

This social realization is possible only to the extent that a society has become a community. That is, the self is social, and when the self’s society is a genuine
community then the self is fully an individual. Put in the language of an SAT analogy exam: society: community; self: individual. (Stuhr, 1990, p. 157)

This argument would conclude that Jones and the mass of Black educated individuals would have been cherished members of society. Instead, we see this tenet of personalist education to be a mostly unfulfilled relationship between society and those within Black education. Society did little to embrace the intellectual accomplishments and promises of Black scholars and as a result many scholars, specifically Jones, left and pursued their education in different countries.

5) Individual Education and its corporeal aspect. As an idealist formulation, personalism gives primacy to the mind in all epistemological instances. Although rarely mentioned in personalist literature, the educational personalist would not be opposed to the material variables inherent within individual education. Langan notes, albeit very briefly and without analysis,

that we find in personalism and in personalistic philosophies of education a demand for proper care of the body and hence for health education and for physical education. The body exerts such an influence on the mind that it must be properly looked after in order that the higher faculties may be enabled to function as they should. (Langan, 1935, p. 42)

Although idealists conceive of the corporeal faculties as mundane and supplemental, they do recognize that the physical environment, person, and structures are necessary (but not primary) variables to consider when discussing the education of the person. As I will discuss in the chapter, Jones makes particular note of this point in his analysis of the structural components of a school system.

These five points indicate the fundamentals to any application of a personalist philosophy of education. I will add another tenet, which makes sense when considered in the frame of the African American personalist tradition. The title of this tenet would be...
similar to the fourth (the individual and society) in both name and character: The individual against society. Although harsh-sounding in its tone, I believe that Jones (exclusively in his book) lays out the foundation for the education of individuals who society places in an inferior status. This part of the model would utilize personalist rhetoric in way that allows for intellectual development against a society of persons, which does not deem fit certain persons the ability and resources to acquire such intellectual growth. Martin Luther King’s social personalism could be seen as a relevant model for this process. King’s belief that all personalist growth and development comes through both progress and sacrifice for both Black and White persons, helps in understanding what moves must be made by Black people. Intellectual growth, for personalists would serve as the vehicle for social change; in short, in order to alter the oppressive society, those oppressed by it must come to a more enlightened understanding all facets of said society, their oppressors and themselves.

Rufus Burrow refers to this type of personalist analysis as militant personalism. Although it does not have an immediate relevance to educational personalism, his argument to move attention from the abstract person to the concrete, marginalized person has educational ramifications. He notes,

…For a viable personalism there needs to be an emphasis not simply on the centrality of the person, but on the centrality of the systematically oppressed, brutalized person. For when we get right down to the actual concrete state of affairs of persons in the world, it is these whose dignity is trampled upon. It is these who are treated like nonpersons. Therefore, it is not enough to merely stress the dignity of the abstract person or of persons in general. Since particular persons and groups are the victims of systematic dehumanization, it is necessary to be concrete and particular when talking about the centrality of persons and their inviolable sacredness. The type of oppression and dehumanization persons experience is concrete and specific, not general and abstract. Therefore, militant personalism requires the naming of both the persons and groups, in addition to the types of oppression suffered. (Burrow, 1999b, p. 251)
Burrow will aid in my analysis of Jones’ book as both scholars take personalism to task in its social commitments and ultimately aim to develop a nuanced personalism—for Jones at the educational level and Burrow at the social level—which has a direct influence over the Black community. I will elaborate on this tenet in my next chapter.

I turn now to Jones’ dissertation, which highlights and expresses these tenets. I will use this model to break down my discussion of the dissertation. Although Jones is writing a piece of philosophical history and not one explicitly educational in its rhetoric, Jones’ text lends itself to such an educational analysis as I believe it to be the theoretical forbearer to his larger educational work, *Education in Theory and Practice* (1919).

**Jones’ Dissertation and the Tenets of Educational Personalism**

As mentioned above, there are six (five including one of my own) tenets, which embody a general understanding of educational personalism. Although I believe Jones’ dissertation only lays a foundation for the later educational views espoused in his book, I believe that his commentary of Lotze and Bowne offer some relevant examples pertaining to the development of his educational philosophy. In order to transition into my final chapter, I will discuss only the first two tenets here. The final four are not dealt with in Jones’ dissertation as this work did not lend itself to any comprehensive discussion of the person in relation to society.

**The Nature of the Individual**

The nature of the individual is a key component of a personalist philosophy of education for two reasons. First, as the ontological ultimate, the individual (personality) is the focal point of any analysis. In education, any attention paid to theory building,
practical utilization, as well as pedagogy must be done for the developmental needs of the individual. Second, Jones, as we’ll see in his *Education in Theory and Practice*, recognizes that in order to teach, or organize a curriculum, one must know the subject one is teaching. In this instance, that would presume knowledge of the workings of the mind. He notes,

> It is obvious, therefore, that to be able properly to control and direct the growth and development of the mind we much have an especially capable knowledge of it. That is, the teacher must have a special fitness for his work, which has been acquired by special preparation and training for it! (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 22)

This merging of the psychological with the educational is not surprising in light of Jones’ educational development which saw him study, and eventually teach courses in psychology. As an idealist construct, the mind and the understanding of it, will play a crucial role in any form of educational development. This, then, fits appropriately with the understandings of Lotze and Bowne in regards to the nature of the individual.

Although approached from different angles, Jones believes that Lotze and Bowne’s nature of the individual share many common traits. For Lotze the individual is held together in reality through its circle of relationships throughout which the individual is held in constant movement with the “infinite absolute.” According to Jones, Lotze finds that “whoever speaks of a being without relationships confuses the metaphysics with the logical content and finds something that could perhaps be thought logically but can’t be in reality” (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 59). As it relates to education, we find that Lotze’s being of relationships must be constantly mediated through experience and the relatedness of experiences by those members in the relationship of being. Pure being—Lotze’s ontological antithesis—is synonymous with non-being in so far as it does not participate in and therefore cannot relate to the experiences of those who continually
share the facts of experience. This assessment should work for Jones and an understanding of personalist education insofar as it posits a constant metaphysical dialectic between parties: it supposes a dynamic, altering, and oftentimes-tenuous relationship between all parties involved. This process is held together by constant reinforcement of the Infinite absolute. As mentioned throughout this project, many personalists, specifically those affiliated with Boston personalism were religious persons (Methodists). Those Black personalists were also religious, and oftentimes—as in the case of Jones—ordained clergy. Jones’ familiarity with the connection between higher education and religion began with his Alma Mater, Wilberforce University, which is an affiliated school of the African Methodist Episcopal Church. Jones himself later became an ordained a minister in the church.

Jones found that the nature of the individual was similar in Bowne’s account as both scholars maintain a sense of constant motion in their relationships. If for Lotze, a being can only be such if it stands in relationship to others, then for Bowne a being can only be so if it maintains a sense of action and causality; a being without action is not a being at all. For Bowne’s being, Jones writes “real things are distinguished from things only having conceptual existence by this power and fact of action…the being must be causal and active and must contain the thought of causality” (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 58).

Rufus Burrow reiterates this sentiment when he writes,

For personalism only that which acts has existence. Accordingly, power of action is the most distinctive feature of being. Being is not a thing, object, or lump, that we can picture. Rather, it is ‘self-centered activity.’ All being, therefore, is active or processive. Activity penetrates to the very core of being. The passivity of matter is only appearance. The elements of which it consists are perpetually active. ‘Such rest and inaction as we observe among the objects of experiences are but the resultant of an underlying dynamism.’ (1999b, p. 93)
Personalists are not concerned with static beings, and this is reflected in their education, specifically with their notions of development. We see in the dissertation that Jones was aware that Bowne’s thoroughgoing personalism in general and his theory of being-as-active specifically, was a crucial part of the personalist fabric. I will note later that Jones’ own writing mirrors this theme as his book outlines a holistic educational process built around the tenets of development and constant action, both intellectually and physically.

**The Active Mind**

From an educational point of view, it is clear that the possession of an active mind is critical. In order to develop a person into a fuller, active, and productive member of the society of persons, one must assume that persons are endowed with a mind capable of such development. Jones dedicates the section of his dissertation, entitled “Psychology” to working through the matters of the mind and spirit in the writings of Lotze and Bowne.

Before I lay out what I believe to be Jones’ intentions concerning the mind and education, I would like to make a translators note, which had a large impact on how I worked through this section. In German, there are instances where the English words “mind” and “spirit” translate into the same German word, “Geist.” This made translating this section particularly tricky as there were times where it was not overtly clear which word would be more appropriate.

The concept “Geist” has occupied a rather tenuous spot in German philosophical literature specifically since its inclusion in the writings of Hegel. Simplified, his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, is an attempt to come to understand the concept itself. Yet, how it is conceptualized in the text and also in subsequent writings of the German idealist tradition is rather difficult to grasp. R.C. Solomon (Solomon, 1970) points out that given
the context, “Geist” can be both universal and at the same time, non-universal. Although his stance on “Geist” comes from the Hegalian tradition, I believe that his work is also relevant to personalism. “Geist is universal only in that it is the name of those properties had by every human consciousness: it is not universal in the sense that it is the name of a single entity (mind)” (Solomon, 1970, p. 644). Personalists make a distinction between a cosmic society of minds (personalities) which share values, properties, and common interests (metaphysics), but they also place value on the individual and active mind, which need not share common experiences with other minds, but nonetheless has similarities with other minds. Solomon gives the example of “the mind of middle class Americans” in order to point out that this does not refer to one single mind or spirit, but instead to commonly held beliefs and values.

In many instances, Geist as a non-universal concept (mind) becomes dependent upon its own universal construction (spirit). Jones notes that both Lotze and Bowne conceive of a spirit, which serves as the (space-less) foundation of all mental activity. Both envision the spirit as that which unifies the internal interactions of the mind with the external interactions of the body. Without such an organ, which helps explain the mental, life would be “strange and paradoxical” to personalists. Jones writes, “We attain the only possible unambiguous interpretation through the assumption of a spirit (Voraussetzung eines Geistes), which remains unchanged amidst the changes, which we recognize in the movements of the nerves and brains cells, and which constitutes the uniting entity of this movement” (G. H. Jones, 1909b, p. 79). This, then, necessitated that I maintain a careful and discerning eye, as there were, oftentimes instances where a mistake in translation could lead to a misunderstanding of intention.
The active mind for both Lotze and Bowne, as we saw briefly above, cannot be separated from any notion of the spirit. In terms of psychology, Jones points out that as active as the mind is and can be, it relies heavily on the non-spatial and non-temporal spirit, which fulfills the function of mental life. By way of education one can see that for personalists, the spirit is yet another part of the society of minds; all persons have a spirit—which emanates from God—and as a result their mental life is substantiated and unified with external stimulate i.e. experience, observation etc. Without the spirit, the active mind would have no way to comprehend or make use of the physical, emotional, or psychological stimulate, which occur. In essence, it consolidates and clarifies that which the active mind and the body take in; it allows us to recognize the various intellectual, psychical, and other empirical information we receive as educational.

By way of explaining the educational potential of Jones’ personalism, I must now cease to cite Jones’ dissertation as the content of the project does not allow for a lucid conversation about the social and political implications of personalist education. This chapter has attempted to show the historical, metaphysical, and epistemological importance of Jones’ dissertation to the field of personalism in general, and to personalist education specifically. As the first piece within the history of personalism, Jones’ dissertation occupies an important place not only in that sub-genre of the field, but in the canon of personalism and American philosophy itself.
Chapter VI: The Culmination of Jones as Philosopher and Educator: *Education in Theory and Practice*

In order to come to a thorough comprehension of Jones’ book, *Education in Theory and Practice*, I believe it necessary to reiterate the primary framework of this dissertation. In the preceding chapters I have attempted, in a more formal way, to outline a basic guide to Jones’ intellectual career. First, Jones was a serious and credentialed philosopher. Simultaneously, he was also a passionate and energetic educator. He was motivated both by the production and dissemination of knowledge to the community of students he served. I aim to show that these two endeavors, namely producing and disseminating knowledge, manifested themselves in Jones’ book. Equal parts theory and educational practice, Jones utilized all of his intellectual capacities toward the goal of presenting students and educators with not simply an abstract manual nor a practical step by step guide, but instead an all-encompassing treatise on how to both understand education and attain its highest level.

Undergirding this book is Jones’ belief that through education, individuals can aspire to all things, both for themselves, but also for their communities and the society in which they live. Not only should individuals aim to satisfy and ultimately surpass any and all intellectual expectations, they, specifically African Americans, must do so in order to engage and fight the status quo, which during Jones’ time meant combating racism and other oppressions, which plagued the American ethos. While Jones called each reader to strive for these ideals in his book, a reader might mistake Jones’ writing for simply an objective piece of educational literature, if not understood in a racial context. Indeed, despite the race-less rhetoric in his book, I believe that Jones was writing explicitly for and about the Black community. Furthermore, in this chapter, I aim to
analyze Jones’ book and evaluate it in light of the remaining educational tenets of personalism, which I began introducing in the last chapter. I also analyze the book in light of Rufus Burrow’s call for a contemporary militant personalism (1999).

Burrow’s inclusion in this dissertation has come from both a critical and clarifying perspective. As I have attempted to show, analyzing Jones’ work in isolation does not give the reader a comprehensive understanding of the context or content of his work. By placing Jones’ work in conversation with Burrow—the leading scholar on Black personalism—Jones’ work can be better appreciated as he stands in accord with Burrow’s arguments and moreover we discover Jones provides methodological support for many of Burrow’s theoretical positions. Suffice it to say that Jones’ work is very relevant today as Black philosophers like Burrow are still grappling with the same problems Jones attempted to interpret almost 100 years ago. Before any thorough discussion of his book can take place, I contextualize it in regards to one or two more prominent pieces of educational literature of his time.

**Jones’ Book and Educational Literature**

In terms of educational literature, Jones’ book both draws from some notable education theory, but also seeks to bring forth original material. Jones does not make claims, which would situate his text as a unique addition to the field of philosophy of education, the history of education, or even a new field at his time, the psychology of education. Although he does not utilize any explicit citations or quotes from other scholars, at the end of each chapter Jones outlines a section on reference reading, whereby the reader can locate not only specific texts that Jones drew from but also the specific chapters in said texts. Jones draws on the large canon of educational literature,
which was being published in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century.

Specifically, Jones’ text can be read as a continuation of one of the more comprehensive and popular philosophy of education pieces of his generation. Published in 1895, *The Philosophy of Education*, by Karl Rosenkranz outlined education from almost every theoretical level. Rosenkranz’ objective was to portray education as a science, and in so doing he believed that his book ought to analyze each and every facet of the nature of education. To quote the editor of Rosenkranz’ text,

It is believed that the book as it now appears will meet a want that is widely felt for a thoroughgoing philosophy of education. There are many useful and valuable works on “the theory and practice of teaching,” but no work that entirely satisfy the description of a genuine philosophy of education. During this title, such a work must not only be systematic, but it must bring all its details to the test of the highest principle of philosophy. This principle is the acknowledged principle of Christian civilization, and, as such, Rosenkranz makes it the foundation of his theory of education, and demonstrates its validity by an appeal to psychology on the one hand and to the history of civilization on the other. (Rosenkranz, 1895, p. vi)

Rosenkranz’ appeal to psychology, religion, and the history of civilization are notions that Jones appropriated for his use within his own book. Indeed, the first third of Jones’ book is dedicated to outlining an overall theory of education. Within that section of Jones’ book, there is not much that the reader would find unique, had the reader already been familiar with similar works in education. Jones recognizes this, yet claims that his work is important as there had been at the time “little effort to open the field of education to the beginning in young student…[this book] will be helpful to him and his struggle to solve the simple problems of education” (Rosenkranz, 1895, p. vi). Jones continues,

[I]n particular does he desire that both the principles discussed in the statements made prove to be enlightening in themselves, and which is to him more important that they shall served to inspire him and create with in him a desire for a more
advanced, complete and fundamental study of the subject of education… (1919, pp. 5-6)

It seems that Jones was aiming to simply set a foundation for the beginning student, teacher, and administrator; to give them the basic tools necessary to carry out the various theoretical and practical parts that comprise the entire educational process. In terms of audience, this makes Jones’ piece unique. Rosenkranz’ book was not intended for the beginning student. As a consummate educator at an HBCU, Jones took seriously the task of educating students. This dedication stretched into his research and as this book signifies, Jones was more concerned with publishing an accessible book for his audience than he was with writing for the sake of his own publication record and scholarly reputation. Thus Jones’ scholarly contribution centers on pedagogical objectives in the field of philosophy of education.

As cited by Rosenkranz above, there were many published teaching manuals in circulation when Jones wrote his book; most notably, David Pages’ *Theory and Practice of Teaching; or Motives and Methods of Good School Teaching* (Pages, 1885) and *Theory and Practice of Teaching* by Edward Thring (1928). Both books read as manuals and are, as a result, meant to serve as practical guides for teachers and administrators. What makes Jones’ work so unique is that he creatively combined the philosophical approach of Rosenkranz with the manual-style rhetoric of both Page and Thring.

Jones’ book is comprised of the philosophical foundations of education combined with the pedagogical aspect of education. Although neither section is remarkably unique, as a whole the book reads as a nuanced piece of literature as there had been no comprehensive text on the entire nature of education—both in theory and in practice—
before Jones’ book. We can conclude that Jones’ unique contribution rests in his historic
location as theorist and practical teacher in the philosophy of education.

Jones knows that his book ought to serve as an aggregate of educational ideas,
philosophies, processes, and rhetoric so that the book would be more accessible to
beginning students. In a similar fashion to how I believe Jones approached his
dissertation, the primary motivation of this piece of literature is not in expounding
revolutionary philosophical ideas or even debating some of the theoretical foundations of
education. Instead, and like Charles Leander Hill did in his book, A Short History of
Modern Philosophy (1951)15, Jones prepared a book on education that was all-
encompassing, objective, and could speak for itself. He sums it up succinctly as he notes,
because of the slight acquaintance of these young students and workers with the
nature and scope of the problems of this their basic science, in a treatise of this
kind which is intended to be primary in the sense of introductory, it has been
deemed both unnecessary and unwise to give many citations and quotations.
Especially is this plan desirable since the text does not attempt to be
argumentative or analytical but particularly descriptive and explanatory. (G. H.
Jones, 1919, p. 5)

As mentioned above, in lieu of citations, Jones gives references. This points to
Jones’ belief that his work ought to serve as a text that students can use in order to find
other valuable sources. In a way, his book functions as a detailed and informative search
engine, wherein students can find information on a variety of subjects and from there,
venture forth and conduct more in-depth research using Jones’ references as a guide.

**Jones’ Education in Theory and Practice**

Written in 1919, Jones’ book, Education in Theory and Practice, is his only
scholarly publication in any form. Education in Theory and Practice, then, is the

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15 Hill’s work was the first history of modern western philosophy written by an African
American.
culmination of his scholarly research. As the title suggests, Jones attempts to come to a comprehensive understanding of the education process, both in how its function is conceptualized in American society in reference to a variety of human habits and needs, but also in how we ought to properly develop the most effective form of it.

Jones begins his manual with a comparative look at definitions of education. Although he finds previous definitions of the concept adequate, he offers his own definition, which he refers to throughout his book. He writes,

> From the author’s viewpoint, Education is a process through which individuals go, or are taken (more often the latter) which is intended to fit them for social efficiency, i.e. for an active aggressive life of service among their fellows. It aims to remove from the individual defects with which they are born or through any cause have acquired, and supplant them with the capacity to live harmoniously with their fellows and to share equitably with them the duties and responsibilities as well as the material goods of this life. Its purpose or end is to create for mankind social advantages and opportunities in life by nurture which they could never hope to attain by nature. (1919, p. 5)

The process Jones spells out is not entirely unique, however the rhetoric he employs, specifically around the concept of education, is very strong. By this, I mean that Jones understands the overall function of education to be to prepare one to combat a life filled with difficulties, oppressions, and disadvantages. Education as a weapon then becomes a tool one can wield in order to fight these issues and come out as a productive member of society. This interpretation will become more salient as I discuss Jones in comparison to Burrow.

Jones, like Rosenkranz, utilizes an analysis of the history of civilization to further his claim that education is a process undertaken by generations of individuals and not simply just one person. This adds a community aspect to his work that will be important to consider specifically within the African American context. He notes,
But whatever of this ancestral store of knowledge each individual gains for himself he must gain it by putting forth his own time and energy, the total amount of knowledge possessed by a people at a given time being made up of his ancestral knowledge aided by that small increment which each generation may wring out of the environing world during its own struggles for existence and during the stage of early life, preparatory for that struggle. (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 14)

This citation is very familiar when compared to Jones’ framework in his dissertation.

Where philosophy was an ongoing generational process, so too is education. This is true not simply in the intellectual realm, but also in terms of social and communal living. This idea is also expressed in Rufus Burrow’s discussion on Afrikan traditional thought and personalism. As Afrikan philosophical and theological thought preceded personalism, Burrow believes the former shares many similarities on the latter system. In terms of the development of the individual, Burrow posits that personalism adopted a similar stance to the growth of the individual vis-à-vis their role in both present and ancestral society. He writes,

> In light of this, we should not be surprised to find that much in the traditional African concept of the person focuses less on the spiritual or physical traits of the individual then on the contributions of the community to its full development as person and his full incorporation into society. In defining the person, then, the emphasis is on the role of the community rather than on the psycho-physical traits of an individual person. (Burrow, 2000, p. 336)

Although Jones was not writing with knowledge of African traditional beliefs within personalism, my inclusion of Jones within the African American personalist tradition would open up a conversation whereby his work can now be seen in reference to other African American personalists like Burrow.

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16 This assumption is made based on Jones’ coursework and an examination of his unpublished writings and correspondences with other scholars. There is no indication that Jones either studied or researched topics relating to African tradition philosophy or religion.
The remainder of Jones’ book is much less theoretical and instead dedicated to the implementation of the various practical methods and skills necessary for any successful educational enterprise. Instead of going through the various chapters and detailing the more mundane aspects of education, I instead touch upon many of them as I continue my discussion of Jones as a personalist educator. Below I describe the last four tenets of a personalist philosophy of education as they are seen in Jones’ book. The first four were found in the last chapter.

**Jones’ Educational Philosophy: The Individual and the Community (Moral Order)**

Jones’ educational philosophy is spelled out, from almost every possible angle, in his book. He was very much qualified to develop ideas about and publish on education given his dedication to Wilberforce and Central State Universities. As much as personalism prioritizes all things individual, the literature has always stressed a sense of community within which individuals must function. These persons-in-community not only interact with one another, there is also an imperative for moral equality both in the development and eventually treatment of individuals. Moral order here is a culturally relevant concept wherein individuals come to understand what it means to follow the habits, traditions, and other cultural norms of their respective community/communities. Through the socialization practices of education, one ought to come to an understanding of one’s community’s values and beliefs.

For Jones, individuals are not blank slates into which a complete moral agenda must be developed, rather, for him and other personalists, individuals are born with moral defects; these faculties are limited and must be adjusted over time. Of education’s function in this moral adjustment, Jones writes,
We are born into the world with certain defects, moral, mental and physical. Education as such aims to remove or modify these defects in such a way as to give us increased activity and increased participation in and enjoyment of the affairs of life…From this viewpoint the aim of education would be the adjustment to any and all conditions required for or in any way contributing to life. (1919, p. 30)

One’s moral adjustment to a community requires many considerations; among a few, Jones notes physical, mental, economic, civil, and social. Education imparts to the individual both the physical, intellectual, and social strategies and tools necessary for said adjustment. Jones’ choice of the word “adjustment” is, in my opinion, befitting a personalist conception of education. Whereas “socialization” or “acculturation” would be appropriate for individuals who needed comprehensive and holistic education from the ground up, Jones carefully implies that individuals are born and reared already with both a moral capacity and form, albeit in a defected shape not necessarily appropriate for their immediate community. This is a unique assessment of the moral nature of children and the un-educated. In speaking to teachers, administrators, and parents—his intended audience—Jones recognizes that all individuals share, until they are educated and therefore “adjusted,” basic moral elements. This changes when they are taught that these moral values are inconsistent with their community’s beliefs, habits and traditions.

From a racial standpoint, I believe Jones to be implying that children, regardless of racial or cultural makeup—share with other not-yet educated children, a belief in the moral equality of every individual, therefore perpetuating a basic tenet of personalism. These values, however, become adjusted as one becomes educated in the norms and values of a community. The argument following this reasoning in regards to racism would mean: White Americans (as a community) are born with the same egalitarian and inclusive values as and toward any other community of persons. It is not until their
learned peers (educated and adjusted White Americans) introduce the non-adjusted to the
moral habits and ways; at this point these individuals recognize and adopt these beliefs
and practices. This is one way of looking at a moral community, and the way Jones
intended when he noted the following. “By moral adjustment is meant the adjustment of
an individual to the habits and customs of his fellows as a race or type” (G. H. Jones,
1919, p. 30).

Although not taken up at this level in Jones’ text, the more accepted use of
personalist moral values becomes slightly more problematic in terms of education and
adjustment. Although a race man, Jones also approached this project from a personalist
viewpoint, which at that time had not made considerations for its exclusive nature for
specific communities (all but white males). Personalists recognize a community of
persons at an abstract level, meaning at an abstract and not a concrete level. This would
then imply that personalist theory would have accounted for a moral order fit for all
individuals once they’ve been adjusted to recognize it. This perhaps utopian set of values
and imperatives does not fit well to an analysis made outside a vacuum. Inherent in this
problem is the notion of power. This macro community of persons is comprised of many
diverse and morally tenuous social communities of people. In what follows I explicate the
relationship between the individual and this larger community.

**The Individual and Society (Moral State)**

The relationship between the individual and society is one of mutual dependence.
In terms of education, the individual needs society for moral and intellectual
development. For Jones, this type of education signifies the more consistent and ever-
lasting form of learning. He writes, “the educational opportunity offered by society is the
true one, knowledge learned through it than true knowledge. Besides the opportunity thus offered is with us during all of our normal waking hours. It is the real and true educational opportunity” (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 52). This is an interesting commentary specifically because it implies that knowledge of and from society is something that benefits every individual. At the time this book was written this was hardly the case. If we understand Jones to be offering an implicit critique of racism, then he would have been aware that this form of knowledge is dependent upon opportunity.

Jones notes a divide between the moral and intellectual development between the races. In terms of what each race contributes and learns from one another, there is quite a disparity. Although personalists maintain that society is comprised of individuals, each race, posits Jones, does not contribute the same intellectually, mentally, or socially. “The mental acquisition of the various racial groups of mankind is varied.” Furthermore, of the tension this might cause, Jones notes, “This disparity in mental caliber (quality of mind) and intelligence (quality of mind and content of mind) is the source of much inconvenience and misunderstanding among men” (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 32). This ultimately will have a major impact in the way Jones understands how an individual can learn from others in society. Jones is clear that intellectual development does not necessarily mean moral development. He writes,

Some men are so far in advance of their fellows in their possession of knowledge that they are and can be of little good to them. Consequently though possessing much knowledge their power for good among men practically is nil, because they have not enough in common in their thoughts and manner of action and reaction to effect a mutual regard and general consent for commingling, even if they really desired such. (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 52)

The rhetoric Jones employs in this section is discrete, as he gives no claim to specific races in their relation relative to this spectrum of intellectual capability. He does,
however, assert boldly that there are certain minds which both hinder society as well as the individuals’ development vis-à-vis their intellectual growth from society. In the following quote, I see Jones subtly enforcing the idea that those minds which make up mainstream society and the status quo (white America) have become detrimental, limited, and ultimately too short-sighted to be of any use to those individuals attempting to gain knowledge of and help develop their society.

To suggest that certain individuals are superior in terms of intellect, power, and influence illustrates that Jones is not convinced that society is made up of equal individuals. In this sense, one’s acquisition of knowledge from society is going to be skewed depending on one’s level of intellect and one’s desire to create a society wherein all have access to equal resources and opportunities. In order for this educational tenet to become manifest, Jones knows that it would take a fundamental change in society’s motivation in order for every individual to gain full access to what social education has to offer. For some individuals, and African Americans specifically, gaining access to these resources might entail pushing back against those in the majority of society who actively hinder the intellectual development of those in the minority. Rufus Burrow’s militant personalism confronts this abstractly, and as I illustrate in the section on militant personalism, Jones outlines a method whereby social education might be given equal access to all.

**Individual Education and its Corporeal Aspect**

Although far from recognizing that the body plays the primary role in education, Jones is perhaps unique as a personalist thinker in that he believes the body, and a thorough education of it, is necessary in every form of intellectual development. In
essence, Jones wants to help facilitate an educational system, which will, at the very least, seek to form an equitable relationship between intellectual and physical growth. To fight against “the dictum that each generation grows weaker and wiser…” (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 52) seems to be the impetus for Jones to dedicate space to this topic. Jones attributes this physical discrepancy on both psychological and genetic levels. As a scholar versed well in the new field of psychology but also the natural sciences, Jones was, in 1919, in a unique position to offer an analysis of the physical and physiological components of education. Even though personalists recognize the active mind as the primary epistemological agent, it is through the body, which this mind must interact with other minds.

Jones attempts to come to an understanding of this fact through utilizing the foundation of a newer field of study. Physiological psychology—the study of the “relationship of the bodily processes to the functioning of the brain”—was a discipline, which allowed Jones, specifically in the second, “practice” aspect of his book, to explain the properties of the physical body as they relate to the educational process” (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 59). He believes this field offers answers to problems of the mind and education; it suggests that the material properties one possesses and interacts with are just as important to consider as the mind during education. He writes,

This form of physiological education is very valuable to the study of the processes of mental education and has given much needed explanations of conditions and problems that were sources of inconvenience and obstruction to educational processes in general, but for which no sufficient remedy had thus far been found. (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 57)

He justifies his reliance on the physiological components of education throughout the second part of his book. I believe that this occupied so much of Jones attention mostly
because there was already a significant amount of literature on the topic of education and its philosophical considerations. Jones recognized the need for more literature on the physiological and physical aspects of education as they were up to that point, not considered to be significant variables in an individual’s education. The chapters, which deal with either the physical and physiological aspects of education include: The School (chapter 5), The School Room (chapter 6), Discipline (chapter 7), Punishments in the School (chapter 8), and Play, Playground, and Athletics (chapter 16). Discussions in these chapters deal with the physical and physiological stimulate, which can either help or hinder a student, or educator. In bringing these factors to light, Jones is informing his audience that education is very much a holistic and social process comprised of the mental individual—first and foremost—but also the physical manifestation of that intellect. I invite the reader to peruse the above chapters in Jones’ book. A description of them is not necessary for this dissertation as they lend very little by way of understanding Jones’ educational considerations.

The Individual against Society: Militant Personalism

The individual against society, my own inclusion to educational personalism, may be most closely related to the militant personalism espoused by philosopher Rufus Burrow. Inherent in this category is the notion that individuals’ education ought to prepare them to combat a society that is oppressive and not receptive to a certain individual’s rights, liberties, or access to equal resources. In this case, I believe this would be most relevant to the African American intellectual community. I continue George Yancy’s thoughts on Gilbert Haven Jones’ philosophy and claim that Jones offers
Burrow a lucid and comprehensive guide to a militant personalism. Yancy makes the argument,

Hence Jones’s philosophy of education places a deep social and personal demand upon how we ought to live, and it calls for a radical understanding of democracy and racial exploration of new forms of praxes, and the adoption of radically new educational values, for the sake of a better world. (2003, p. 56)

Of the need for a militant personalism, Burrow writes,

Today there is no sustained emphasis on the prominence of persons and their inherent dignity and worth. Rather than the rule, it is more often the exception that persons are treated like beings imbued with the image and fragrance of God…I think this calls for a personalism that is at once more militant and aggressive than what we have known before now. (1999b, p. 244)

For Burrow, a more thorough examination of personalism is necessary in light of the “present level of poverty, homelessness, unemployment and underemployment, institutional racism, sexism, classism, ageism, and militarism in this country and other parts of the world” (Burrow, 1999b, p. 244).

It seems that the personalism espoused by traditional mainstream personalists is now inadequate in light of the systems and institutions, which work without any consideration of an ethical system based on the person. Burrow’s contemporary ethics would be most relevant to the African American condition as he posits that it is this community of persons who are on the wrong end of society’s behaviors and norms. What I aim to show in this section is that through an examination of Jones’ book in light of “the individual against society,” Burrow has a lucid example of personalism, which resonates with his militant personalism. Jones’ inclusion here is critical as it gives Burrow a method to his ethics; something he lacked in his consideration of his nuanced personalist ethics. Although Jones’ is a theory dedicated to education, the ethics to which Jones subscribes are similar to that which Burrow believes is necessary for a relevant
personalism for the African American community. The following tenets comprise Burrow’s militant personalism: The sanctity of the body, we-centeredness plus I-centeredness, and preference for the poor and oppressed. I elaborate on them by way of including both Burrow’s take on them and the stance under which I believe Jones would have operated.

**The Sanctity of the Body**

As Burrow’s militant personalism is geared specifically for the oppressed, the factors he believes we ought to consider in a nuanced way have a direct connection to the lived and material histories of said oppressed persons. A militant personalism has three primary foci, all of which are, in some way, tied to mainstream personalism; the difference in Burrow’s theory is that these aspects must become primary considerations. First, Burrow’s new personalism must make central the sanctity of the body. This is perhaps a bit unusual for traditional personalists (subjective idealists) as considerations of the body have traditionally taken a back seat to those of the mind and intellect. Burrow makes this claim in light of the “long history of massive, systematic destruction of black bodies through both legal and illegal means” (Burrow, 1999b, p. 244). This new personalism’s dedication to the inherent dignity of the body illustrates personalism’s commitment to recognizing that the material conditions of Black people, specifically in terms of historical and contemporary oppression, deserve a larger analysis than traditional personalism has been able to offer. Indeed, Burrow is asking personalists to cease limiting their analysis of persons to communities/societies of minds, and instead must “necessarily give prominence to an integrated mind and body” (Burrow, 1999b, p. 249).
Jones’ book makes similar claims for a larger appreciation and combination of the mind and body in his thoughts on education. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Jones champions an educational process that considers all aspects of the individual, be it corporeal, spiritual, emotional, or mental. Jones posits that although intellectual education is “education par excellence,” without proper acknowledgement of the more physical and physiological faculties students will continue to be “born weaker, more nervous and emaciated than those of former generations” (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 63). The lack of empirical evidence given by Jones for the above assertion notwithstanding, his argument points at the lack of attention education leaders have paid to the function and development of the body. Not only have educators traditionally neglected the sanctity of the body in education, Jones gives purposefully veiled commentary regarding the lack of dignity given to African American bodies in larger society.

Jones’ book contains little indication that he was either African American or writing a book for an African American audience. The rhetoric of the book is culturally neutral and lacks any sort of explicit veiled political or ideological critique. I argued in my second chapter that this was a strategic move by Jones given who he was (an African American scholar) and where he sought recognition (the American Academy). Unfortunately, Jones’ generation of African American scholars risked their publication if they included any sort of racial or political critique. Compounded with that level of discrimination was the fact that African American scholars were not seen as equals to their white (and male) counterparts. This would have forced Jones to write a book neutral in its racial and political commitments, but it also would have forced Jones to either seek out a publisher dedicated to publishing Black-written material or instead hide the fact that
he was African American. In short, any sort of critique based on racial or political lines would have been thickly veiled.

As mentioned earlier, Jones recognizes that each race of person has a different capacity for intellectual development given its history and the forces/environment, which act upon them. At the same time, however, Jones believes that in education, everybody, regardless of race, has the ability to come to a better understanding of his/her environment and ultimately work to manipulate it. “But it is the aim of education, namely, to equalize the opportunity of all in their access to the accumulated knowledge of the race and to give to one and all alike equal opportunity to acquire skill in the use of its material achievement” (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 39). It is clear that, in theory, education ought to help achieve this, however Jones writes that “The Negro is still the chief cause of the high illiteracy in America” (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 76). Furthermore, and in direct reference to the correlation between intellectual development and control over one’s material environment, Jones notes that “the Negro is so restricted in political power and the use of the elective franchise as to be of little danger” (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 77).

From the above, I understand Jones to be championing a materialist analysis of education. In examining the material conditions of African Americans at both the local (body) and societal level, Jones realizes that education for the oppressed can only remain relevant if it appreciates and ultimately helps to develop the complex material existence of African Americans. Although more educational than ethical in scope, this is the type of personalist examination that Burrow is seeking in his militant personalism. Jones understands that white people are superior in the educational system, and this analysis
points to the fact that at both the race and class level, Black people are disenfranchised.

George Yancy notes correctly that,

One might argue that Jones is not only putting forward a critique of white power, but also a critique of which power as specifically manifested within a capitalist, socio-economic context…Jones delineates a radically democratic conception of education, a theory of education that challenges vast economic disparities, socially imposed, and, racist epistemologically engineered, conceptions of who is inferior vis-à-vis who is superior, and the biological determinist view that we are who were are by nature. (2003, p. 55)

As a personalist writer, Jones was one of the earliest personalist scholars to base a critique of the racial and classist inequalities of society at any philosophical level. In utilizing education as his foundation, Jones is outlining a similar critique of race and class to what can be found in W.E.B. Du Bois’ “The Talented Tenth” (W.E.B DuBois, 1903).

As mentioned in the first chapter, Drs. Du Bois and Jones were friends and communicated on numerous occasions. The former scholar had a teaching assignment at Wilberforce University while Jones was an undergraduate there. It is not outside of reason to suggest that the writings of Du Bois influenced Jones’ educational philosophy. As both writers advocate the positive correlation between intellectual development and material advancement, it would appear Jones is in good company with his critique on race and class. Rufus Burrow’s next category of his militant personalism combines a focus on the body and mind of the individual with the larger Black community.

**We-Centeredness Plus I-Centeredness**

This aspect of Burrow’s personalism derives largely from his work on African traditional religion and philosophy. Burrow believes that

In Afrikan traditional thought the entire community is involved in the process of the individual person’s journey toward full humanity. The individual learns from the very beginning the value of the community and does not fall as easily into the trap of individualism as might be the case of those early Personalists for whom
the emphasis was on the individual development of the person within the social order. (Burrow, 2000, p. 117)

For Burrow, African Americans combine the value of community with the individualism of the American ethos, and what results is a community-centered people who nonetheless understand the importance of each individual. In recognizing that the individual is the basic moral unit of any community, African descendent people, Burrow posits, can “retain we-centeredness plus I-centeredness in both the metaphysical and ethical outlook” (Burrow, 2000, p. 117).

My comments on Jones in the last section point to the closest instance wherein he may have addressed the We/I relationship. Jones’ educational philosophy was both inherently individual (centered on the person), but also communal. I take the following passage from Jones’ book to confirm Burrow’s belief that in the African and African American community specifically, individuals are only as important as the community that both raised and supported them. In this, Jones sees one of the more important aspects on individual intellectual development.

If we were to have regard for the most important factors in education, time, physical and moral control, mental responsiveness and community of interest all well tempered with love and sympathy and a disposition to self-effacement in sacrifice, we would make school education supplementary to the home instead of the reverse as it mostly tendency to organic activity may seem at times overly strong and the energy which is presupposes superfluous, it should not be inhibited, but controlled and directed constantly toward a goal to be found in the type of civilization and government into which the child is born, and sooner or later is to take his place as a self-directing responsible moral agent and who as a factor in it is to exercise force. (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 85)

The home, as an agency of education, is critical for the development of certain moral, cultural, and social skills, many of which cannot be found in school. If the school cultivates the intellectual development of the individual, then the home cultivates the
intellectual development for the individual-in-community, a different type of education, but one that is nonetheless crucial for an individual learning how to survive in a larger community of other individuals.

One of the pitfalls of this We+I-Centeredness framework is the potential for the individual to get swallowed up within the larger group. This problem would be disastrous for personalists as it would challenge their fundamental belief that the person is the ontological ultimate. Jones handles this by asserting that neither form of education (individual-school/communal-home) is more important than the other; both have benefits and deficits. Most importantly, both agencies of education can only thrive when the two work harmoniously and in-sync.

In particular must the home see to it that the school performs its functions and the general and special values of those functions and the general and special values of those functions in the general life and the relation of those functions to the corresponding functions of the home. (G. H. Jones, 1919, p. 84)

The two educational agencies must uphold the values of their counterpart. For the African American community, the home, argues Burrow, would be comprised of the entire community and not simply just the parents. According to Burrow’s militant personalism, the individual would stand in a unique place, both educationally and ethically to both live in and manipulate a society, which is not hospitable to certain communities of persons. I believe Jones’ analysis is necessary for Burrow as it lends credence to his ethical militant personalism. Jones’ book offers Burrow the content in terms of where the individual might learn the ethical considerations that Burrow espouses. He does not go so far as to explain the process of this nuanced personalism, and so Jones’ work is all the more important.
Preference for the Poor and Oppressed

This final requirement for a contemporary personalism necessitates that personalists become more concrete in their analysis of the individual. Traditional personalist notions of the individual are abstract and general. Burrow contends that “since particular persons and groups are the victims of systematic dehumanization, it is necessary to be concrete and particular when talking about the centrality of persons and their inviolable sacredness” (Burrow, 1999b, p. 251). The call for personalists to dedicate more time to specific groups of individuals is not new. Martin Luther King’s personalism addressed this very same problem. Because of the consistent nature of the oppression faced by certain groups of persons, there ought to be a more focused analysis on these specific groups; generalizing about all persons would essentialize the humanity of all people, when in reality no efforts are being made, at a material level, to create this situation.

By continuing to focus on the abstract person, personalists are negating the fact that certain groups of persons do not enjoy the same resources, status, rights, and dignity afforded to other groups. In order to fully understand the abstract notion of the person, Burrow believes a more concentrated analysis on those more oppressed persons will help shed better light on personhood in general.

I believe Jones would agree with Burrow as Jones recognized that in education, not all groups are treated equally. By that I mean that certain groups of persons enjoyed the benefit of having access to their immediate circumstances. They (white, mainstream society) had generally more educational resources and were able to use this higher level of intellectual development to not only take power over their own circumstances, but they
also had the ability to control the material circumstances of those groups of persons not able to gain access to higher levels of intellectual learning. Given Jones’ analysis, there is a hierarchy of persons. As mentioned earlier, Jones believes that a fully educated person is one who can take control over his/her circumstances. Personhood, then, requires power and Jones is very clear that not everybody has this power and even access to this sort of power. The concept of power is one not touched upon by Burrow in his *Personalism: A Critical Introduction*. Jones’ educational philosophy offers Burrow a concrete level of analysis that points to the heart of Burrow’s argument.

In conclusion, I believe that Jones’ educational philosophy not only suggests that he was one of the earliest personalists to advocate a personalist philosophy of education, but also that his version of personalist education was radical, concrete, and espoused a militant component not appreciated until Burrow brought this component of personalism to light. Jones’ educational philosophy offers Burrow lucid analyses of both educational and ethical importance. The content of Jones’ book is much more thorough and accessible to justifications for militant personalist than Burrow’s work. Although Burrow posits that his militant personalism contains considerations not-before made significant, I argue that, in Jones book, we see a prime example of militant personalism; Jones was making similar arguments as Burrow, only Jones’ were made roughly 90 years before.
Conclusion

The purpose of the dissertation was twofold. My first goal was to argue for a framework that advocated for more historical considerations within African American philosophy. Secondly, my aim was to introduce Gilbert Haven Jones and his work to a larger audience.

The first goal, the framework, was impacted by the argument that there has not been sufficient historical work done within the field of African American philosophy. This has led to the omission of many important works and scholars who could be classified within this tradition. Unlike mainstream philosophy’s ability to maintain constant dialogue and debate around a substantive canon of old and contemporary intellectuals and scholarship, African American philosophy is not yet advanced enough to have thoroughly developed a large enough canon of historical works and thinkers. In bringing Jones’ philosophical and overall educational career to light, I believe scholars of African American philosophy will both have at their disposal an early member of the African American philosophical tradition and his work for debate as well as give scholars incentive to continue study of early African American philosophers whose life and work have not yet been fully appreciated. This, I believe, is a critical avenue of research for African American philosophy as it develops a literary canon, expands and diversifies philosophical perspectives, as well as recognizes historical similarities between early African American philosophical thinkers.

Thanks to the work of scholars like Leonard Harris, John McClendon, and George Yancy, more and more early Black philosophers and their work are becoming unearthed, analyzed, and debated. As I have pointed out in this dissertation, such historical
considerations including translation, as well as non-philosophical historical contextualizing are critical aspects to any methodological considerations within the African American philosophical tradition. Without these historical tools and insights, philosophical analysis becomes incomplete and potentially inappropriate. In recognizing this dual historical and philosophical framework, African American philosophy broadens as it begins to encompass early African American philosophers who may not have written exclusively about the Black experience, received their degrees in the United States, published extensively, or even committed their entire academic careers to philosophy. By expanding the expectations and requirements for those figures considered significant enough for study and debate, the future of African American philosophy looks both diverse and rich.

**First Goal of the Dissertation: Historical Considerations to Jones’ Work**

The first three chapters of this dissertation served as the historical backbone and context of Jones’ intellectual career. As mentioned above, the purpose of dedicating half of the dissertation to historical considerations is due to the importance of situating any philosopher and his/her work in the proper context. Given Jones’ complex education and philosophical training and expertise, I offered the reader a thorough examination of the following contexts: African American philosophers and Germany, the Black personalist tradition, and the multifaceted roles of African American intellectuals within the academy.

Chapter one concerned those African American scholars who studied in Germany. This was an important inclusion because it helped situate Jones’ academic development
as a unique African American scholar who was able to study in Germany, which was at that point the pinnacle of the academic world. Jones’ desire to study in Germany was motivated by the racism inherent within the American academic structure, and also by the allure of studying at the world’s premier academic institutions throughout Germany. Scholars like Du Bois, Locke, Terrell, and Pennington embraced their times in Germany and were able to return to their intellectual communities with a diverse array of knowledge and experiences. Although Jones’ tenure in Germany spanned only two years, he was nonetheless able to earn his PhD and bring back to Wilberforce University an expertise in philosophy, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. His time there also influenced his development as a personalist thinker.

Chapter two addressed the Black personalist tradition. As Jones developed as a philosophy, religion, and psychology scholar, the philosophy of personalism had a lasting impact on his work. When contextualized within the work of other Black personalists, one recognizes that Jones was one of the earliest personalists to contribute knowledge to Black personalism. Although Jones did not either explicitly acknowledge any affiliation with or write specifically about either personalism or Black personalism, maintaining that he belonged to the field has been difficult and has led to scholars omitting him from any discussion of Black personalism. The Black personalism tradition has had contributors since Jones and has evolved through the work of Martin Luther King’s philosophy of non-violence and is now receiving more appreciation with the work of Rufus Burrow. Although Jones has not received the same attention as other Black personalists, his work within the field is one of the earliest in both mainstream and Black personalism and as a
result his work deserves to be considered one of the earliest and complex works within personalism.

The last chapter in my historical framework, chapter three, recognized Jones and other Black philosophers as scholars who “wore many hats.” Although credentialed philosophers, Jones and his colleagues faced very little recognition given the academic racism at the time and the fact that they were employed, almost exclusively at Historically Black Colleges and Universities. I argued that although Jones and his other philosophy colleagues did not publish as much within the field of philosophy, they nonetheless ought to be considered valuable contributors to the field given their commitment to the teaching aspect of philosophy. The lack of resources at HBCUs and the paucity of scholars with PhDs, meant that Jones and others were expected to assume multiple and simultaneous roles throughout their institutions. Despite the infrequent nature and varied subject matters of these scholars’ publications, the work of these philosophers ought to be analyzed in philosophical circles and considered part of the literary canon of the African American philosophical tradition.

Combined, these three historical chapters showed Jones in a larger and therefore more complex light than simply the philosopher many people might believe him to be. There may be some who would be quick to discount Jones as a philosopher given that he did not write exclusively within philosophy, nor did he occupy the same positions and memberships as a professional philosopher. It is against the very attack of him not being a legitimate philosopher that historical attention within African American philosophy is of paramount importance. This is not to say that Jones’ philosophical work cannot speak for itself, it simply points to the fact that in the field of African American philosophy,
more considerations have to be made than in other fields. Jones’ philosophical work offers readers a look at a dedicated philosopher and interdisciplinary scholar.

The last three chapters of the dissertation were dedicated to Jones’ philosophical work. Jones was not a traditional philosophy student in that he did not study and/or maintain his philosophical training exclusively throughout his career. Drawing closely from the first three chapters, it appeared that Jones remained close to this religious background and personalist tendencies. It also showed, in a less traditionally philosophical way, that Jones was quite competent in a variety of natural and social sciences. Jones’ development as a philosopher, beginning with his early writing as an undergraduate up to (and past) his book, illustrate that he was not merely interested in philosophy in a static way. His work suggests that he wanted to utilize the dynamic and interdisciplinary qualities inherent in the field of philosophy. Jones’ interest with the philosophy of religion (chapter 4), psychology (chapter 5), and the philosophy of education (chapter 6), confirm the argument that Jones was not an ordinary philosopher. As discussed in chapter three, it is evident that Jones believed philosophy to possess a practical quality, specifically when it came to education. He wanted to make philosophy more accessible to his students. He understood the radical nature of this discipline and attempted to understand it for himself so that he could help others better comprehend it.

**Second Goal of Dissertation: Jones’ Philosophical Work**

My dedication to a historical and philosophical framework was to justify the second goal of my dissertation: introducing Jones and his work to a larger philosophical and overall academic audience. Part of the reason why Jones’ work has not yet been fully
appreciated was because of a historical problem. Without the English translation of his
dissertation, proper analysis and criticism of his work could not be completed. Jones’
work will contribute to a variety of conversations not only within the field of African
American philosophy, but also to psychology, education, history, and, to a lesser extent,
the natural sciences including botany and zoology. Like the work done on Alain Locke,
initially by Leonard Harris, scholarship on Jones, can now begin to flourish in both
appreciative and critical avenues. Given Jones’ interdisciplinary, intergenerational, and
even inter-geographical appeal, there ought to be no shortage of comparative scholarship
dedicated to Jones.

Chapter four dealt with the beginning of Jones’ philosophical development. 
Dedicated to his first attempt at philosophical writing, I discussed and critiqued Jones’
essay on the defense for the existence of God. As his first piece of philosophical writing,
it is clear that Jones was both passionate toward and reluctant about his philosophical
abilities. His short essay also illustrates his beginnings in religious and philosophical
personalism. Jones’ philosophical knowledge expanded greatly by the time he completed
his PhD four years after he wrote this piece. This chapter also included conceptual
concerns regarding Jones’ place within Black personalism. I concluded that Burrow’s
failure to include Jones in Black personalist discussions was not a case of an inadequate
framework, but instead simply a matter of a sin of omission. The continued conversation
with Burrow which began in this chapter and remained throughout the final chapters is
important as it places Jones within current philosophical discussion with one of the
leading Black personalist scholars.
In chapter five I discussed Jones’ PhD dissertation, which was completed in 1909. Once translated, it became clear that Jones was utilizing his training in religion, philosophy, psychology and the natural sciences to create a manuscript that at one level aimed to illustrate, generally, how the history of philosophy functions and specifically how this manifested itself with the works of Herman Lotze and his student, Borden Parker Bowne. His dissertation was somewhat tricky to analyze as it was purely descriptive and contained little argumentative rhetoric. Regardless, it is an important piece of literature as it gives African American philosophical scholars one of the earliest and pieces of historical literature on personalism. Although Jones’ dissertation fell within the genre of metaphilosophy and the history of philosophy, I argued that it could also be analyzed as a piece within the field of educational personalism. Following Hubert Langan’s (1935) model for educational personalism, I appropriated Jones’ dissertation to fit said model. Jones continued the social and political aspects of his educational personalist writing in his book.

Jones’ book, *Education in Theory and Practice* (1919), was the focal point of the final chapter. By continuing and ultimately expanding Langan’s model of educational personalism, I argued that Jones must not only be considered to be one of the foremost educational personalists of the twentieth century, but he also exemplifies what Rufus Burrow terms Militant personalism (1999). My own contribution to Langan’s model, “The Individual against Society” resonated well with Burrow’s militant personalism. As a Black personalist, Jones dedicated himself to the educational, social, and political uplift of the Black community. Jones’ philosophical scholarship and commitment to Black educational uplift manifested themselves in his book; it is this combination with serves as
the more appropriate example of Rufus Burrow’s nuanced and radical personalist metaphysics. Jones’ overall commitment to both academic development and Black social awareness made him a pioneer to the movement to incorporate African American Studies into the academy.

**Jones’ Legacy and African American Studies**

Although discussed with some depth in my third chapter, I have not discussed African American Studies explicitly within the context of Jones. One of the areas important to Jones’ intellectual career is his dedication to interdisciplinary Studies, specifically within the African American educational context. As mentioned earlier Jones was a lifelong HBCU educator, and was therefore passionate about Black education. In this sense, the argument can be made that he belongs to a strong tradition of early and middle twentieth century Black scholars who had a direct impact on the philosophical foundations of African American Studies. Although there is not documentation of his direct work to this movement, Jones’ scholarship and teaching symbolize the very essence African American Studies captures.

African American Studies had many pioneers. Whether worked and fought within or outside the academy, is not so important. What is important is the fact that a large volume of men and women of different disciplines, methodologies, philosophies, professions, and rank enlisted one another in a fight to create a field of study that would unify around the life and culture of Black people. Very few typified this commitment better than Gilbert Haven Jones. Regardless of his philosophical commitments, credentials, and merits, Jones worked for, and believed in a more equitable system of higher education for Black people. In order to conclude this dissertation on Jones’
intellectual career, I would like to briefly discuss the legacy Jones’ work as a scholar and educator had on African American Studies.

Although not the primary task of this dissertation, in examining Jones’ commitments as both a scholar and educator, it becomes apparent that not only did Jones symbolize the very philosophical foundation of African American Studies (intellectual development and praxis) but he did so while operating within an academy which saw very few merits in this approach. Even today, when African American Studies is continuing to fight for its place within the academy, Jones’ commitment to this movement offers much motivation. With few resources during his tenure as teacher, department head, and ultimately president, Jones succeeded in bringing philosophical scholarship to many Black students. Although the content and field of study of his teachings and scholarship varied, Jones was consistent and passionate about delivering a quality education to students who traditionally were not able to receive it. He created knowledge (intellectual development) so that it could be transformed, ingested, and ultimately shared with his Black students and the Black community (praxis). As a close friend to one of African American Studies’ legends, W.E.B. Du Bois had a small, but unwavering impact on Jones as the two both committed themselves to the highest attainable education possible, not simply for themselves, but ultimately for the betterment of those they served.

Gilbert Haven Jones was a complex scholar and philosopher as well as a committed educator. Any analysis of his intellectual career must also be diverse in its breadth and understanding. As mentioned above, Jones’ scholarship has the potential to be critically analyzed throughout a variety of disciplines. It is the hope that this
dissertation can serve as a starting point to a continued discussion on Jones and his work. The pieces discussed in this dissertation as well as his other works will hopefully shed more light on Jones as well as other Black philosophers of his time.
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