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thesis entitled

IMMIGRANT PLACE ENTREPRENEURS AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT IN HOUSTON’S CHINATOWN DISTRICTS

presented by

ANTHONY ARTHUR KNAPP

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IMMIGRANT PLACE ENTREPRENEURS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN
HOUSTON’S CHINATOWN DISTRICTS

By

Anthony Arthur Knapp

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
Geography

2009

ABSTRACT

IMMIGRANT PLACE ENTREPRENEURS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN
HOUSTON’S CHINATOWN DISTRICTS

By
Anthony Arthur Knapp
Faced with an increasingly competitive global economy, Houston’s local
government and private interests, which constitute a powerful growth machine,
aggressively pursued inner city redevelopment initiatives as a strategy to bolster tourism,
attract new residents, and increase revenue. Past scholarship has focused on examples of
celebrated ethnic neighborhood redevelopment projects in various cities resulting from
the interplay of both private and public actors. In the Houston, Texas context, Chinese
immigrant neighborhoods lack support from local government even though Houston uses
these neighborhoods to promote its image as a multicultural city. Instead, high-profile
individuals serving as local place entrepreneurs from the Chinese community play a
major role in shaping these immigrant districts. This lack of public support indicates that
such a development was not part of Houston’s plan to revitalize the inner city. This study
considers the typology of Houston’s neighborhoods by analyzing 1980 and 2000 census
data and comparing the changing characteristics of neighborhoods targeted for
redevelopment by the city’s growth machine. Results show that Houston’s recent push to
revive the inner city and its emphasis on fostering multiculturalism has not translated into
economic improvements for its Asian residents. These findings provide insight into the
priorities of the local growth machine and identify trends that are relevant to issues of

equity within neighborhood-level redevelopment initiatives.

Copyright by
ANTHONY ARTHUR KNAPP
2009

For Bill and LaVere

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Brian Swanland for guiding me through the daunting task of
conducting a comprehensive study on Houston’s Chinese-American community. His
local knowledge of the city was an invaluable resource. I am indebted to Jonathan
Archer and Eric Sandberg, two fellow students in geography who instilled in me their
618 and cartographic expertise. The maps found throughout this thesis could not have
been completed without their influence. Also, I am grateful for Jieun Lee and Ivan
Ramirez for their tremendous impact on me when I first entered the discipline of
geography.

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Igor Vojnovic for his unceasing
dedication and enthusiasm for this project. I also would like to thank my committee
members, Professors Bruce Pigozzi and Patricia Machemer for their insightful comments
and advice. Many thanks to Professor Antoinette WinklerPrins who initially recruited me
to Michigan State and opened the door to so many wonderful opportunities.

Finally, I wish to thank my parents, Greg and Sookie, and also my fiancee
Stephanie, for their support and patience as I completed the program here at Michigan

State University.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ x
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Background to the Problem Statement ..................................................................... 7
1.2 The Problem Statement ............................................................................................. 9
1.3 The General Hypothesis .......................................................................................... 10
1.4 Justification ............................................................................................................. 10
1.5 Conceptual Framework ........................................................................................... 16
1.6 Thesis Outline ......................................................................................................... 18

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY .................................................................. 20
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 20
2.2 The Growth Machine and the Land-Based Urban Elite .......................................... 21
2.3 Immigration and Ethnic Neighborhoods ................................................................. 28
2.4 Immigrant Place Entrepreneurs ............................................................................... 31
2.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 38

3. METHODS ................................................................................................................... 41
3.1 Research Questions ................................................................................................. 41
3.2 Hypothesis ............................................................................................................... 41
3.3 Research Objectives ................................................................................................ 43
3.4 Data & Methods ...................................................................................................... 44
3.5 Study Region and Unit of Analysis ........................................................................ 48

4. CITY OF HOUSTON AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT ............................................. 54
4.1 The Houston Growth Machine ................................................................................ 54
4.2 Entrepreneurial Spirit Behind Houston’s Growth since 1836 ................................ 55
4.3 The SF Suite Group 1920 — 1970 ............................................................................ 58
4.4 Houston Chamber of Commerce 19703 — present .................................................. 61
4.5 A New Growth Agenda .......................................................................................... 62
4.6 Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 78

5. CHINESE-AMERICANS IN HOUSTON ................................................................... 81
5.1 Chinese Immigration ............................................................................................... 81
5.2 Chinese Place Entrepreneurs ................................................................................... 86
Response to the New Convention Center ................................................................. 93
Funding the Development of Chinatown .................................................................. 94
Obstacles Against Chinatown Development ............................................................ 97
Downtown Chinatown During the Post-Bobo Woo Era (1990 — present) .............. 102

5.3 New Chinatown .................................................................................................... 11]

vi

Investment from Private Sources ............................................................................ l 14

Support from the City of Houston .......................................................................... 121

5.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 125

6. DATA AND ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 128
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 128
6.2 Data Selection ....................................................................................................... 130
6.3 Limitations in the Data .......................................................................................... 134
Time period ............................................................................................................. 134
Variables ................................................................................................................. 134
Variation in census tract boundaries over time ....................................................... 135

6.4 Principal Components Analysis ............................................................................ 138
Component Descriptions ......................................................................................... 141
Commonalities ........................................................................................................ 143
Mapping the Factor Scores ..................................................................................... 144

6.5 Cluster Analysis .................................................................................................... 151
Cross-Neighborhood Comparisons ......................................................................... 153

6.6 Two-Sample Difference of Means T—Test ............................................................ 161
6.7 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 166

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................... 169
7.1 Summary of Results .............................................................................................. 169
7.2 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 174
7.3 Research Contributions ......................................................................................... 178
7.4 Directions for Future Research ............................................................................. 182
7.5 Final Remarks ....................................................................................................... 185
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 189

vii

Table 4.1.1:

Table 4.5.1:

Table 5.1.1:

Table 5.1.2:

Table 6.2.1:

Table 6.3.1:

Table 6.3.2:

Table 6.3.3:

Table 6.3.4:

Table 6.4.1:

Table 6.4.2:

Table 6.4.3:

Table 6.5.1:

Table 6.5.2:

Table 6.5.3:

Table 6.5.4:

Table 6.6.1:

Table 6.6.2:

Table 4.1.1:

Table 4.5.1:

Table 5.1.1:

Table 5.1.2:

LIST OF TABLES

Succession of Houston’s Business Elites ..................................................... 55
Selected Inner City Redevelopment Projects Receiving Public Funding ..... 71
Chinese Population in Texas Cities (1880 — 2000) ...................................... 82
Chinese Population in Major US Gateway Cities (1870 —- 2000) ................. 83
Variable Names and Definitions ................................................................. 133
Census Tract Relationship File ................................................................... 137
Year 1 Population Dataset .......................................................................... 138
Year 2 Population Dataset .......................................................................... 138
Normalized Year 1 and 2 Tract Population Data ........................................ 138
Five —— Dimensional Rotated PCA Loadings Matn'x ................................... 140
Component Definitions and High Loading Variables ................................ 142
PCA Variable Commonality Values ........................................................... 144
K-Means Group Incremental F-statistics .................................................... 152
Property Values and Change in Houston’s 12 Urban Districts .................. 156
Property Values and Change — New Chinatown and Urban Districts ........ 158
Real Income Levels and Change — New Chinatown and Urban Districts .. 160

White and Asian Neighborhood Clusters ................................................... 162
T-test Results .............................................................................................. 164
Succession of Houston’s Business Elites ..................................................... 55
Selected Inner City Redevelopment Projects Receiving Public Funding ..... 71
Chinese Population in Texas Cities (1880 —— 2000) ...................................... 82
Chinese Population in Major US Gateway Cities (1870 — 2000) ................. 83

viii

 

 

Table 6.2.1:

Table 6.3.1:

Table 6.3.2:

Table 6.3.3:

Table 6.3.4:

Table 6.4.1:

Table 6.4.2:

Table 6.4.3:

Table 6.5.1:

Table 6.5.2:

Table 6.5.3:

Table 6.5.4:

Table 6.6.1:

Table 6.6.2:

Variable Names and Definitions ................................................................. 133

Census Tract Relationship File ................................................................... 137
Year 1 Population Dataset .......................................................................... 138
Year 2 Population Dataset .......................................................................... 138
Normalized Year 1 and 2 Tract Population Data ........................................ 138
Five — Dimensional Rotated PCA Loadings Matn'x ................................... 140
Component Definitions and High Loading Variables ................................ 142
PCA Variable Commonality Values ........................................................... 144
K-Means Group Incremental F-statistics .................................................... 152
Property Values and Change in Houston’s 12 Urban Districts .................. 156
Property Values and Change — New Chinatown and Urban Districts ........ 158
Real Income Levels and Change — New Chinatown and Urban Districts.. 160

White and Asian Neighborhood Clusters ................................................... 162

T-test Results .............................................................................................. 164

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

NOTE: Images in this thesis are presented in color

Figure 3.5.1: Map of Houston and Chinatown Districts ................................................... 49
Figure 3.5.2: City of Houston and District Areas ............................................................. 50
Figure 3.5.3: Detailed Map of Houston’s Urban Districts ................................................ 51

Figure 4.5.1: Downtown View From George R. Brown Convention Center — Discovery
Green in Foreground (source: Author) ............................................................................. 69

Figure 4.5.2: Discovery Green - George R. Brown Convention Center in Background

(source: Author) ................................................................................................................ 69
Figure 4.5.3: George R. Brown Convention Center (source: Author) .............................. 70
Figure 4.5.4: Hilton-Americas Convention Center Hotel (source: Author) ..................... 70
Figure 4.5.5 Major Publically Funded Redevelopment Projects in Downtown ............... 72
Figure 4.5.6: Houston’s Public Art Installations and Urban Districts .............................. 75

Figure 5.1.1: Harris County and the City of Houston with Downtown and Chinatowns. 86
Figure 5.2.1: Original Downtown Chinese Businesses and Old Chinatown District ....... 88
Figure 5.2.2: On Leong Merchants Association Building (abandoned) (source: Author) 91
Figure 5.2.3: Former Chinese Cultural Center in Old Chinatown. Original Movie Theater
converted into an Asian Grocery Store. Convention Center and Elevated Freeway at left
(source: Author) ................................................................................................................ 91
Figure 5.2.4: Asian Wholesaler Warehouse - Old Chinatown. Convention Center and

Downtown in Background (source: Author) ..................................................................... 92

Figure 5.2.5: Asian Food and Restaurant Supply Wholesaler — Old Chinatown (source:
Author) .............................................................................................................................. 92
Figure 5.2.6: Artist rendering of the Proposed Streetscape for Old Chinatown (source:
Central Houston Civic Improvement 1987, p. 22) ............................................................ 97
Figure 5.2.7: Eastex Freeway (US. 59) Causeway and George R. Brown Convention
Center as seen from Old Chinatown (source: Author) .................................................... 101
Figure 5.2.8: St. Emanuel & McKinney Intersection. Former Site of the Proposed
Chinese Gateway Arch and Mandarin International Hotel. Minute Maid Park and
Convention Center in Background (source: Author) ...................................................... 104
Figure 5.2.9: View of Convention Center from Abandoned Old Chinatown Building
along Eastex (US 59) Frontage Road. (source: Author) ................................................ 104
Figure 5.2.10: Import Export Firm and Warehouse — Old Chinatown (Notice traditional
Chinese entryways) New row houses at right (source: Author) ..................................... 107
Figure 5.2.11: Advertising for New Townhomes in Old Chinatown. Convention Center
and Lang Yee Woo’s Original Shopping Center in Background (source: Author) ........ 107
Figure 5.2.12: Empty Building with Chinese-style rooftop along St. Emanuel Street.

Lion statue at right in front of an abandoned Asian restaurant (source: Author) ........... 108
Figure 5.2.13: Abandoned Vietnamese Restaurant - Old Chinatown (source: Author) 108
Figure 5.2.14: Chinatown Plaza Mall —— Old Chinatown. Notice traditional Chinese-style
green tile roofing and red columns. New townhouses at right (source: Author) ............ 109
Figure 5.2.15: Kim Son Vietnamese Restaurant, one of the remaining Asian restaurants in

Old Chinatown (source: Author) .................................................................................... 109

xi

Figure 5.2.16: Tien Hou Temple and new housing developments across the street.

(source: Author) .............................................................................................................. 1 10

Figure 5.2.17: Encroaching townhouse developments surrounding Tien Hou Temple

(source: Author) .............................................................................................................. 1 10
Figure 5.3.1: Diho Plaza Supermarket, the first successful Asian business in New
Chinatown (source: Author) .......................................................................................... 113
Figure 5.3.2: Ocean Palace Restaurant — Hong Kong Mall (source: Author) ............... 116
Figure 5.3.3: New Chinatown Gate — Hong Kong Mall (source: Author) ..................... 1 16
Figure 5.3.4: Asian American Banks along Bellaire Blvd, New Chinatown (source:
Author) ............................................................................................................................ 117
Figure 5.3.5: American First National Bank — Office Tower in New Chinatown (source:
Author) ............................................................................................................................ 117
Figure 5.3.6: Dun Huang Shopping Center (source: Author) ........................................ 1 19
Figure 5.3.7: Lee Ho Townhouses — built to suit Asian residents (source: Author) ...... 1 19
Figure 5.3.8: Asian-style Commercial Park (source: Author) ....................................... 120
Figure 5.3.9: Bellaire Blvd Shopping Center with Asian-style Accents (source: Author)
......................................................................................................................................... 120
Figure 6.3.1: An Example of Census Tract Subdivision Over Time .............................. 136
Figure 6.3.2: Year 1 Census Tract Data Normalized to Year 2 Boundaries ................... 137
Figure 6.4.1: Component 1 — Economically Depressed Black Neighborhoods ............. 146
Figure 6.4.2: Component 2 — High Growth Historically White ..................................... 147
Figure 6.4.3: Component 3 — Asian Growth ................................................................... 148
Figure 6.4.4: Component 4 — Hispanic Growth .............................................................. 149

xii

Figure 6.4.5: Component 5 — Asian Neighborhoods (1980) ........................................... 150
Figure 6.5.1: Neighborhood Clusters within Houston’s Districts ....... . ............................ 153

Figure 6.6.1: White and Asian Neighborhoods .............................................................. 163

xiii

I. Introduction

There is a Chinese saying, “‘If there’s water, there’s money’ water is seen as a
symbol of fortune and wealth” (Yip 1993a, p. D18). Houston, Texas, which has
benefited from its location next to the Gulf of Mexico and its natural resources, has had a
long history of aggressively promoting economic growth centered on petroleum and
shipping. An outcome of the city’s strong linkages to overseas trade has been its
familiarity to global markets and immigration. Although Houston is most noted for its
large Latino presence, the city is also home to a thriving entrepreneurial Asian
population, which makes up only 5% of the city’s total population, yet accounts for 25%
of local Small Business Administration loans (Kaplan 2002). Since the 19703, there has
been an organized effort among immigrant business interests, most notably the Chinese,
in establishing an ethnic business district in the city.

During the creation of Houston’s suburban Chinatown in the mid-19803, Asian
developers had promoted that district both domestically and abroad. “Word is said to be
spreading, especially in Taiwan and Hong Kong, that if you're moving to the US,
Houston is the place to settle,” exhorts an article from the Wall Street Journal that
exemplifies the advantages for Asian immigrants living in Houston (Kaplan 2002, p. A1).
That same promotion also highlights Houston’s appeal among foreigners for doing
business with its low unemployment, unionization, rent, and real estate costs. These
accolades parallel those very values espoused by both the city’s municipal government
and entrenched business elite, reflecting a general support of a pro—business environment

among both immigrant and non-immigrants groups.

Houston’s business friendly atmosphere is underpinned by an approach to urban
governance influenced by a long succession of elite business interests and political
associates who shared a common goal of promoting economic growth. The economic
growth of some U.S. cities has been strongly influenced by an alliance of influential
private and public sector coalitions that promoted their respective land holdings for
development, thus forming an urban growth machine. The outcome of such coalitions
has altered local policies to promote pro- growth initiatives, where local government is
tailored to the needs of high-profile businesses and individuals allied with the growth
machine. As recognized in the seminal work by Joe Feagin’s (1988) Free Enterprise
City, Houston provides a fitting example of growth machine governance.

While local officials historically supported private projects—through public
subsidies and public-private partnerships—Houston’s local government has refrained
from participating in several aspects of urban management, which are then delegated to
private enterprise. For example, neighborhood restrictive covenants, legal associations,
and master planned private developments substitute for citywide public zoning laws.
Houstonians for Responsible Growth, an organization representing members from the
real estate industry and supported by former mayor Bob Lanier, had become a powerful
political force in rebuffing popular attempts to regulate development, especially plans to
implement zoning (Snyder 2008b). Referring to Houston’s future growth plan, one
commentator observed that “[i]n a manner typical throughout modern Texas, private
interests began to develop the comprehensive vision that public entities had failed to

achieve” (Barna 2003b, p. 47).

The city’s claim of a minimal government philosophy also influenced immigrant
developments. In one example of local immigrant real estate projects, one observer
identified the suburban Chinatown as the epitome of Houston-style private development,
comprised of “a string of strip centers with air-conditioned stores, built on the most basic
of Houston formulas: Develop affordable land in driving range of your target suburban
customer and keep expanding” (Kaplan 2002, p. A1). This outcome adds to the
perception that in Houston the lack of government structure means the future success of
the city rests on the entrepreneurial prowess of private developers, both local and foreign.
Nevertheless, the expanse of privately driven development across the urban landscape
conceals the fact that local government, as an integral component of the growth machine,
maintains an active role in facilitating and hindering urban development in targeted
neighborhoods, as well as influencing both the type and scale of development.

During the mid-19803, Houston was forced to reevaluate its growth strategy as
falling worldwide oil prices inflicted heavy losses on the local petroleum industry. The
collapse of the city’s basic economic sector led to a devastating regional recession at a
time when the rest of the country was experiencing positive economic growth.
Throughout the 19903, the city attempted to diversify the local economy and shifted focus
towards developing other emerging economic sectors such as health & medical research,
education, high-tech industries, specialized services, transportation, tourism, and finance
(Vojnovic 2003a, 2003b). One phenomenon of note has been the growth machine’s
focus on infusing public investment into Houston’s downtown and inner city
neighborhoods as a means to bring residents and tourists to the city center, shoring up

flagging revenues and creating new investment opportunities for private development.

By 2008, this program had led to the creation of twelve distinct urban “districts,” which
comprise of neighborhoods that have been recognized by the city and promoted to
tourism. Ten of these districts are located in the inner city and several neighborhoods
have been targeted by the city for intensive public investment.

Since the 19703, municipal governments throughout the country and their allies
have been hard pressed to redraw urban economic development strategies in the wake of
deindustrialization and federal deregulation. Compounding this economic restructuring
and reduction in federal support is the erosion of national and international barriers to
economic activity, which not only allowed for greater mobility of capital across
international borders but also signaled the rise of international competition between
geographic regions for this mobile capital. Many regions in Europe and North America
diverted their efforts from manufacturing towards ventures that will draw in tourists and a
new wave of residents; cities now are engaged in the production of urban “visitability”
(Dicks 2003) and “livability” (Ley 1996). More specifically, cities pursue these
strategies in order to attract consumer spending that can be confined within the locality
(Harvey 1989b); this leads to the creation of initiatives that produce concentrations of
upper to middle-class spending in the city.

The emphasis on Houston’s inner city, however, has been a relatively recent
phenomenon compared to other North American cities. Though plans to redevelop
Houston’s downtown and surrounding inner city neighborhoods existed during the 19803,
tangible results were not realized until the mid-19903. According to one measure in
1995, Houston’s downtown contained approximately 900 apartment and condominium

units but that number would grow to an estimated 2000 units by the end of 1999, and the

area within a two mile radius from downtown recorded growth in new residential units
averaging 33 percent per year (Bama 2003 a).

In addition to these changing economic conditions, differentiations associated
with place became more important for cities to remain competitive for mobile
investment, tourism, real estate development, and new residents. Urban development
projects, which promote unique local cultures, are often invoked by public and private
entities in order to augment a particular locale’s advantage when competing in the global
market for capital and labor (Harvey 1989a, Zukin 1995). Urban cultural diversity is a
vital resource for economic development since potential investors do consider this
diversity as one of many determining factors for locating new businesses (Pang and Rath
2007).

In the case of Houston, the celebration of ethnic diversity has become an
important component of its new growth agenda, and particularly as it relates to urban
reinvestment and redevelopment. Ethnic diversity, historically downplayed in this
southern city, had become a new focus of attention by the 19803. One study asserts,
“Houston’s public and private leadership has been virtually unanimous in calling for the
city to capitalize on its diversity in the new economy” (Klineberg 2005, p. 31). This
awareness is also evident among the general populace, where a citywide survey revealed
that 61% of white residents polled believed ethnic diversity was good for the city
(Klineberg 2007).

Immigration is largely responsible for Houston’s rich ethnic diversity. During the
latter part of the 20th century, Houston became a major gateway city for immigrants. In

1970, Harris County, which includes the City of Houston, recorded 44,515 foreign-born

residents (2.7% of the total county population), which ballooned to 202,011 (8.4%) by
1980, 403,974 (16.7%) by 1990, and 756,548 (22.2%) by 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000). The greater appreciation for diversity has created an
opportunity to attract investment into immigrant neighborhoods, many of which are
located in the inner city during the 19803 and 19903. The 2004 Houston Survey
identified access to ethnic diversity, in addition to cultural amenities, as an important
reason why the inner city is increasingly becoming attractive to Houston’s White
suburban residents (Klineberg and Fitzmorris 2004).

It has been generally argued that this greater acceptance of ethnic diversity by the
local population, combined with the promotion of diversity by the local media and
government, has been a boon for Houston’s minorities. In his study of Houston’s ethnic
business interests, Jan Lin (1995) argued that the recent attention placed on inner city
redevelopment had given immigrant communities an opportunity to attract attention from
the mainstream growth machine. In some cases, certain communities produce a
collection of ethnic business elites who have the entrepreneurial skill and market savvy to
drive urban developments in these communities at a large scale. Lin’s (1995)
documentation of Houston’s downtown area ethnic communities—such as the African
American Freedmen’s Town, the Mexican American barrios in the Second Ward, and
Houston’s downtown Chinatown—provided early Houston examples of how ethnic
interests have been shaping the city’s landscape. By far, Houston’s Chinese have had the
most success of all minority groups in creating a vibrant ethnic commercial district in the

city.

Given the new celebration of ethnic diversity, one could assume at first glance
that the growth machine might welcome the Asian entrepreneurial spirit and aspirations
to reshape the city, at least selectively, as had been argued by Lin (1995). In addition,
given the experience of ethnic place entrepreneurs in Los Angeles (Light 2002) and
Miami (Nijman 1997), and their influence on the growth coalitions in these major urban
centers, along with the growing celebration of diversity across large American cities in
general, it could be reasonably assumed that Houston’s new appreciation of ethnic
diversity would benefit ethnic minorities as well as the city at large. Although Houston
encourages the creation of distinct neighborhood districts as part of the larger scheme to
revive its urban core, the extent to which ethnic neighborhoods are incorporated into the
growth agenda is not clear. The role of ethnic groups participating in Houston’s urban
revival efforts have been especially questionable given the new reinvestment that are
taking place in the city since the mid-19903—after Jan Lin’s article was published in
1995. The purpose of this study is to investigate Houston’s Chinese immigrant place
entrepreneurs, to document the role they played in reshaping Houston’s urban
environment, and to explore the link between the city’s new growth agenda of promoting
diversity and any measurable economic benefits that this had on Houston’s Chinese

population.

1.1 Background to the Problem Statement

In the latter 20‘h century, with municipalities facing increasing pressures to
become more entrepreneurial and competitive in the global economy, local governments

and private interests have directed extensive investment to bolster certain culturally rich

neighborhoods as an economic development strategy to attract both domestic and
international tourism and investment. Elite interest groups and place entrepreneurs play a
critical role in promoting and directing these urban development programs in their
respective locales. The marketing of neighborhoods to investment by promoting the
intrinsic uniqueness of place, displaying cultural resources, and developing tourism in the
city, has become a common economic development strategy in the postindustrial urban
economies of North America and Western Europe (Harvey 1989a; Sorkin 1992; Philo
and Kearns 1993; Dicks 2003). Not only do these places draw tourists and investment,
they also attract new, typically affluent, residents to bolster the fiscal reserves in cities.
Urban places, tourism, and immigration are closely intertwined as well. Several
immigrant communities played a greater role in rejuvenating certain cultural and
economic functions in the urban core of large metropolitan regions (Lin 1995, 1998;
Dymski and Li 2004; Li et a1 2006). For example, immigrant neighborhoods often serve
as sites of major festivals and special events, and are the home to a variety of ethnic
businesses, which run the gamut from small corner grocery stores to multinational banks.
In some cases, the “Chinatowns, Koreatowns, and Little Havanas of the postindustrial
city have rejuvenated warehouse districts, retail corridors, and residential quarters of the
zone-in—transition, reversing the obsolescence threatened with the decentralization of jobs
and people to the urban periphery” (Lin 1998, p. 314). Consequently, high-profile
representatives and business leaders from these immigrant communities have become
active in directing the local urban economic development initiatives in these
neighborhoods (Wood 1997; Light 2002; Hackworth and Rekers 2005; Li 2006a, 2006b;

Lo 2006; Wood 2006; Pang and Rath 2007). These recent events reflect the dynamic

nature of immigrant populations and businesses as well as the host society’s changing
attitudes toward the presence of immigrant communities and their impacts on the urban

landscape.

1.2 The Problem Statement

Although studies have documented immigrants and their connection to urban
revitalization in the North American gateway cities, the extent to which immigrant place
entrepreneurs, as well as their land holdings in ethnic neighborhoods, are incorporated
into the urban growth agenda is not clear. Little has been done to directly measure the
subsequent socioeconomic changes occurring in these neighborhoods in the face of urban
redevelopment. Also, previous studies have focused primarily on the major immigrant
gateway cities along the east and west coasts of North America. However, the level of
public involvement and the consequent impacts of immigrant groups on these cities are
not necessarily replicated in the newly rising gateway cities in the southern United States.
In this research, I examine the marketing of ethnic places by Chinese immigrant place
entrepreneurs in Houston, Texas—a city that has experienced an influx of immigrants
during the latter half of the 20th century, and as of 2000 had the fourth largest foreign-

bom population in the United States (Bergman 2003).1 2

 

' According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the largest foreign-born populations among U.S.
cities in 2000 were in New York City with 2.9 million people, Los Angeles at 1.5 million,
Chicago with 629,000, and Houston with 516,000 (Bergman 2003).

2 A study from the 2002 American Community Survey (ACS) ranks Houston ninth
among large U.S. cities (population > 250,000) in terms of the proportion of the
population that are foreign-bom (Buckner and Gonzalez 2003).

1.3 The General Hypothesis

The general hypothesis is that: immigrant place entrepreneurs have driven the
urban development initiatives in Houston ’3 Chinatown districts, with the public sector
providing verbal support, but little in terms of fiscal support to back these initiatives. This
lack of financial support effectively reveals the priorities that the city of Houston places
in its economic deveIOpment policies, and that ethnic communities are in fact not a
priority in its urban revitalization strategy despite the local public rhetoric of celebrating
ethnic diversity. The lack of public fiscal aid in developing the suburban “New”
Chinatown also reveals that the ethnic place entrepreneurs, though important in
attracting immigrant development projects, continue to fall outside the mainstream

growth coalition in Houston.

1.4 Justification

Reacting to the erosion of the traditional economic base, and the changing
preferences of residents and tourists toward urban amenities, many cities and their
respective elites have realigned their economic development strategies to include
diversity. This trend reflects the influence of the critical urban studies pioneered by Jane
Jacobs (1961), who staunchly advocated for the preservation and creation of diverse and
mixed-use neighborhoods. Since 2000, several commentators have argued that such
diverse and amenity-rich environments are essential in attracting the talented and highly
skilled labor force necessary to run the postindustrial urban economy, which has
increasingly become service-based (Landry 2000; Florida 2002; Clark 2004). Ethnic

places, with their culturally rich offerings, can provide a significant contribution to

10

building an urban atmosphere based on entertainment that visitors and residents find
appealing (Mele 1996). As a result, cities are becoming increasingly aware of the
potential benefits of its cultural capital embodied within the various racial and ethnic
communities. Business improvement districts and economic/community development
organizations, along with a coalition of other stakeholders, are encouraging the assertion
of ethnic identity on the urban landscape as a means to enhance neighborhood vitality and
ultimately spur investment back into the city. In this light, immigrant businesses in
several major cities are finding new avenues of support among co-ethnic financiers as
well as local governments (Hohn 2005).

These concepts, especially evident in Richard Florida’s writings on the creative-
class and creative-city models, have gained greater saliency among public media, policy
makers, public administrators, and urban elites. One reason for the attractiveness of these
models is that they seek to link the popular notion of “celebrating diversity” (tolerance of
different races, ethnicities, genders, and sexual orientations) to enhancing economic
growth. Places that have a greater appreciation for residents of differing backgrounds
tend to do well in terms of economic growth according to Florida (2002). One glaring
omission from that study, however, is the analysis of diversity in terms of economic
status. The first edition of Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class makes little mention
of economic inequality or poverty in cities that attract the creative class. This omission is
addressed in his second edition (Florida 2004), which provides a correlation between
income inequality and economic growth. Florida’s analysis shows a strong positive
association between these two measures; cities with high levels of economic growth are

also places with high levels of economic inequality. This finding is unsettling since it

11

suggests that the attractive and economically vibrant cities, which Florida and a growing
multitude of policy-makers, public officials, and private interests are aspiring to imitate in
their own localities, are places that are tolerant of diverse peoples but show little regard
for improving the conditions of its economically disenfranchised citizens.

This situation is elicited in greater detail in Walter Benn Michaels’ (2006) book
The Trouble With Diversity.“ How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality.
Michaels explains that during the closing decades of the 20’h century this growing
fascination with appreciating racial/ethnic diversity has preoccupied the public and
political discourse while diminishing the urgency to abate income inequality in the
United States. The right-wing left-wing sociopolitical divide in which racial diversity
was a polarizing topic during the Civil Rights era has become less defined by the close of
the 20th century. Michaels asserts that both liberals and conservatives are incorporating
this idea of celebrating racial diversity into their respective social agendas. The most
recent Bush administration had trumpeted its recruitment of racial minorities to its fold.
In 2009, the first African American was selected to serve as chairman of the Republican
National Committee. In the Texas Supreme Court, which is entirely Republican, three
out of the eight total justices consist of racial minorities. Republican Governor Rick
Perry appointed Justice David Medina, a Hispanic American, to the Texas Supreme
Court. According to one Houston study, “[wlhen being racist and segregationist began to
interfere with economic success, many white leaders lost interest in preserving the old
system” (Houston Metropolitan Study 1998, p. 34).

In terms of diversity within the city, both liberal and conservative urban

governments are appropriating racial and ethnic cultures to promote the locality.

12

“Indeed, diversity has become virtually a sacred concept in American life today. No
one’s really against it; people tend instead to differ only in their degrees of enthusiasm
for it and their ingenuity in pursuing it” (Michaels 2006, p. 12). However, there is an
important difference between merely appreciating diversity and using diversity to address
the rich-poor divide—a divide that is associated closely with race. The “problem with
diversity,” as Michaels (2006, p. 172) states, “is not just that it won’t solve the problem
of economic inequality; it’s that it makes it hard for us even to see the problem.” The
creative-city model encourages policy makers to pursue strategies that take advantage of
its local wealth of cultural amenities, especially those that promote diversity, which is a
notion that attracts “targeted” tourists and residents into the city but at the same time
obfuscates the pressing problems of economic inequality. These initiatives serve to
promote the city favorably and show that despite the social ills brought about by the
current economic system, the city is doing just fine.

The celebration of ethnic places, therefore, may not necessarily be the solution for
sustained urban revitalization. The presence of growth coalitions that have adopted these
economic development strategies may yield outcomes that neglect certain residents and
businesses in the community, especially those who are most economically vulnerable.
Certain ethnic and immigrant groups may be left out of the planning process, and
activities from these coalitions may exacerbate already precarious levels of
socioeconomic polarization. Urban redevelopment projects initiated by place
entrepreneurs may cause property values to skyrocket, which leads to the expulsion of the

most economically disenfranchised from the neighborhood.

13

These outcomes have led some to view the city in a negative light. David Ley
(2003) notes that these types of development projects create a somewhat fabricated
environment since it is not an accurate recreation of an authentic community and shields
high-income earners from those urban lifestyles that burden many citizens living in
poverty. As cities attempt to redevelop themselves as viable destinations for
consumption and leisure, Ley (2003) argues that in the process of this transformation,
today’s cities have become “privatized” places of surveillance that maintain certain zones
of consumption for those with disposable income, while ensuring that visitors and
wealthier residents are not detracted by the homeless and poor, who are excluded from
this zone. Other examples markedly show the implications of these types of
developments that use theme and imagery to manage the urban environment. In the case
of New York City, business improvement districts have spawned a growing collection of
carefully constructed and manicured zones in the city, which promote an image of social
order and visual consistency to the visitor (Zukin 1995, 1998). Dear and Flusty (1998)
observe the extreme disparities in the wealthy and poor zones in Los Angeles, and the
markedly different lifestyles between these zones, which are maintained by heavy
surveillance and policing.

In addition to the appropriation of images to maintain a certain theme in the
landscape, these developments also open neighborhoods up to the uncertainties of an
increasingly global market. Urban development is much more piecemeal and speculative
than before, with greater attention placed on particular projects and places that pose the
greatest chance to attract investment rather than city-wide services and investments in

health care, education, and housing (Knox 1993). This has led to a proliferation of

14

spectacular set-piece projects such as upscale shopping centers, festival market places,
redeveloped waterfronts and warehouse districts, stadiums, and convention centers.
Cities view major convention centers and other similar infrastructure projects as “loss
leaders” (Fainstein and Stokes 1998, p. 155), but this notion can be used to justify public
expenditures on a variety of megaprojects (Levine 2003). Therefore, cities often
spearhead these projects with aplomb with the hopes of improving the image of the city
and attract additional forms of development even if these projects themselves are poor
economic performers.

More recently, in the summer of 2007, the economic fallout from the poorly
regulated subprime lending market negatively impacted every city in the United States,
exacerbating the precarious social and economic inequalities in the more vulnerable
locales. Thus, the current system effectively makes the city a place on edge, with its
leaders constantly engaged in the fight to keep capital from fleeing to other locales while
also trying to attract new investment. As an effect of this fight for capital, places of
leisure and consumption are relegated to the highly manicured zones of culture and
display. The rise in the display of cultural pluralism and diversity in neighborhoods are a
common public gesture to promote the image of the city, but marginalization and
inequality yet remain a reality (Kahn 1995).

In addition to measuring the corresponding effects of urban redevelopment,
especially within ethnic neighborhoods, this thesis considers the regional aspect of this
problem. Further research on southern cities is important since the phenomenon of place
entrepreneurialism and place marketing may differ from New York City, Los Angeles,

and Chicago, which have been discussed by scholars in great detail for decades.

15

Politically and economically, the southern states have been gaining greater power as they
continue to grow in population and increase their economic performance. Public policy
at the regional and national levels will be impacted by the growing importance of the
southern states. A particularly regional brand of politics that has been unique to Texas
for decades finally pervaded the national stage during the dawn of the 21st century—
which strikingly differs from the relatively progressive administration headed by
President Lyndon B. Johnson, who is a native Texan. The LBJ presidency was notably
one of the last administrations that promoted a comprehensive urban program to improve
the conditions of America’s cities. A greater understanding of this phenomenon of place
entrepreneurialism and place marketing, which occurs in increasingly diverse cities, is
essential when considering future policies that may yield applicable economic and
community development initiatives in other city-regions while also considering the

inevitable implications relating to equity, diversity, and growth.

1.5 Conceptual Framework

This thesis adopts growth machine theory as the conceptual model for explaining
the shaping of urban places in Houston, Texas. The crux of the growth machine
framework is the presence of a well-organized and highly influential coalition of land-
based interests (place entrepreneurs), as well as other private and public agents, all
striving for a common goal of securing economic growth in their respective localities.
The introduction briefly highlighted the structural transformation of urban economies
faced by many North American cities, the movement towards deregulation, and the

changing tastes and preferences of the new urban class of residents and tourists. This

16

thesis argues that growth machine—though describing a phenomenon in urban
development dating back to the 18003 in the United States—remains relevant within the
context of contemporary Houston (Vojnovic 2003a, 2003b). Although the economic
transitions from an industrial to a specialized services and high-tech economy affected
Houston’s traditional economic and political structure, the city’s local growth coalitions
have adapted accordingly with a new growth agenda, which includes direct reinvestment
into neighborhoods that cater to the new urban class of residents and tourists. During the
closing decades of the 20th century, Houston’s growth coalitions have engaged in a
variety of new economic pursuits, including the revitalization of its declining urban core.

The central focus in this thesis is the use of culturally distinct neighborhoods, and
particularly immigrant business districts, by Houston’s growth coalitions as a strategy to
attract investment into the city. Important investments include new real estate
developments for middle to upper income residents as well as building vibrant urban
neighborhoods to attract tourists, which encourages additional new residential
developments in the urban core. lBy promoting neighborhoods that satisfy the needs of
this target group, the city may accomplish its growth-oriented objectives—to keep
investment and middle to upper income residents within the city. Within the context of
Houston, given its history of post-war suburbanization and urban decline, an important
strategy was to bring people back into the city and to repopulate the urban core.

Finally, this thesis considers the recent attention of scholars on the role of
immigrant communities in supporting, and at least selectively influencing, the objectives
of a city’s growth machine. This thesis argues that regardless of Houston’s recent focus

on inner city revival and the potential use of diversity to promote development, the city’s

17

ethnic and racial minorities have not been an important influence on local development,
and have not economically benefited from this new appreciation of diversity. This
research illustrates that the development and eventual destruction of Houston’s
downtown Chinatown is partially attributed to competing development projects, both
public and private, that have been extensively funded by government, revealing the
traditional public support structures of the growth machine, even in a city considered the
model of laissez-faire. The collapse of this Chinese business district indicates that this
ethnic neighborhoods is not a part of the city’s plan for downtown revival and that the
Chinese place entrepreneurs, while the most economically influential ethnic group in

Houston, are not an influence on the mainstream growth coalitions.

1.6 Thesis Outline

In chapter 2, I present the literature review and theoretical discussion on the urban
growth machine. The literature then elicits the notion that the growth machine over time
had appropriated culture as a strategy for growth, which replaces the traditional strategy
of attracting major employers into the area with neighborhood redevelopment and tourist-
based initiatives. Immigrants are considered one of the predominant agents in
introducing diverse cultures into the region, which then may be used by a well developed
immigrant growth machine or appropriated by the city’s mainstream growth machine.
Narrowing the geographic scale even further, the literature review focuses on examples
that reflect both the historical and current growth coalition strategies in Houston, Texas

and how they relate to the Chinese immigrant community in particular.

18

Chapter 3 presents the research questions, hypothesis, research objectives, and
methods for collecting data and analysis. The methods used in this thesis are derived
from previous studies examined in the literature review. This thesis will use both
primary (interviews) and secondary data (newspaper articles, governmental literature, and
census data). This study proposes the use of principal components analysis (PCA),
cluster analysis, and t testing, as methods to quantify the changing socioeconomic
conditions occurring in Houston’s neighborhoods. This analysis also provides a setting
in which to compare the economic conditions experienced by the Asian subpopulations
with Houston’s mainstream white residents as a way to test Houston’s celebration of
diversity.

In chapter 4, I describe the development of Houston from a growth machine
perspective, describing the type of political atmosphere that pervades the governance of
this city to this day. Chapter 5 provides a historical narrative based on primary and
secondary sources to reveal the relationship the Chinese place entrepreneurs had with the
city, and Houston’s growth coalitions.

Chapter 6 presents the quantitative dimension to this analysis, which employs
census data to measure neighborhood change in Houston. In the final analysis, this study
applies PCA, cluster analysis, and t testing on modified census data to compare the
economic prosperity of the Asian neighborhoods with those of the White neighborhoods.

Chapter 7 serves as the conclusion for this study and discusses the contribution of
the results to the growth machine discourse and implications for public policy. The
second section provides additional recommendations for further research in this topic,

particularly within Houston, Texas. The final section offers concluding remarks.

19

2. Literature Review and Theory

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the core components behind growth machine theory and
augments it by incorporating immigrant urban elites in neighborhood-level development
and redevelopment projects. Challenges to Logan and Molotch’s (1987) initial
proposition on the limited influence of ethnic place entrepreneurs on the growth machine
by Ivan Light (2002) in Los Angeles, Jan Nijman (1997) in Miami, and Jan Lin (1995) in
Houston will be examined. In the Houston context, urban governance was, and continues
to be, influenced by a strong organization of business and public interests, underpinned
by property development initiatives that are facilitated by a strong consensus on
maintaining pro-business and pro- growth policies.

This research argues that in recent decades, shifts in municipal management and
urban planning practices, forced by widespread economic changes and cultural
transitions, have led to a greater tolerance of certain nonconforrnist neighborhoods. Such
neighborhoods include artist quarters, theater districts, gay neighborhoods, historic
districts, waterfronts, warehouse districts, and ethnic enclaves. These neighborhoods are
recognized by cities due to their innate physical and cultural qualities, which fit into
overarching ideal of the “celebration of diversity.” Jan Lin (1995) argued that the
growing interest in reviving such neighborhoods, many of which are home to inner city
minorities, has created an opportunity for enterprising minorities, who were traditionally
marginalized, to benefit from the new growth agenda. The urban elite has accepted this
cultural turn as a means to increase revenue and revive targeted neighborhoods by

attracting tourists, businesses, and new residents back into the city. Both private and

20

public agents are active in transforming these targeted neighborhoods into attractive
districts by packaging certain neighborhood qualities to conform to a distinct theme.
Neighborhoods under this condition can be marketed to certain segments of the
population, with the aid of an active municipal coalition of growth-oriented interests. In
many cases, neighborhoods are specifically packaged and marketed to attract
predominately middle to upper income class of tourists and residents. In Houston,
government and elite land-based interests, who continue to constitute cohesive growth
coalitions—although more diffused in power from the city’s classical growth machine—
have adopted the celebration of ethnic diversity as a means to increase the attractiveness
and economic competitiveness of the city. However, despite the new marketing and
visibility of ethnicity, the city’s new celebration of diversity may not translate into

tangible economic improvements among ethnic minorities.

2.2 The Growth Machine and the Land-Based Urban Elite

Harvey Molotch (1976) conceptualized the city’s urban elite as a “growth
machine,” where a locality may house a collection of land-based interest groups and
individuals whose primary goal is to promote urban economic growth. Their activities
would ultimately increase land values and yield higher revenues for these groups and
local governments. The growth machine thesis challenged the traditional concept of the
city where its urban spatial outcomes were dictated entirely by the constraints of supply
and demand, within a leaderless market, and sought to emphasize the role of agency,
especially as it relates to a handful of powerful local interest groups and individuals, in

the shaping of urban places. The growth machine competed against other cities for

21

mobile capital by raising funds to build the necessary infrastructure, winning subsidies
and tax abatements to attract businesses, and promoting local policies designed to foster a
favorable business climate. Members of the growth coalition were also able to take
advantage of the pro- growth approach to urban governance and ensure the public
subsidization of their own local economic projects, ensuring lower levels of financial
risk. For these reasons, Molotch argues that the economic health of cities and spatial
distribution of populations should not be attributed solely to chance or to the “invisible
hand” of free markets, as underlined by the notion of an unorganized free market that
responds to a leaderless and highly-mobile population of “rational” decision-makers.
Although the role of the market is important, Molotch stresses the tremendous clout of
local growth coalitions in driving development and local economic expansion. Growth
coalitions may have a substantial impact on local land markets once government actors
become involved, skewing the competitiveness for investment towards certain
neighborhoods and economic agents.

The growth machine thesis was modified further in John Logan and Harvey
Molotch’s 1987 book Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place. In this work, the
authors placed additional emphasis on the importance of urban real estate development in
shaping urban systems. Borrowing from classical Marxist principles, Logan and Molotch
make a distinction between the “use-value” and the “exchange-value” of land. Use-value
represents value that people attach to a particular place due to its inherent qualities that
facilitate everyday living and uses. In the case of residential properties, a house or
apartment unit has use-value to its inhabitants because it serves a particular use, such as

providing a home. However, over time, these properties generate rent (exchange-value)

22

for its owners. Property owners differ with respect to which of these aspects is most
important to their own lives. For some owners, properties are merely places for living in,
whereas others would view properties as places to invest in through purchasing,
accumulating, upgrading, packaging, leasing, and selling.

This use-value/exchange-value duality coincides with a divide between owner
preferences. On one extreme, there exist the residents, who utilize place to satisfy an
essential need, in most cases providing adequate living arrangements. On the other
extreme, “place entrepreneurs” view places as opportunities for investment and financial
return. Most people value their land or buildings for the day-to-day uses they generate
for the owner but a small group of owners, which have the capability to do so, are
organized to tap into the potential financial gains that the land and buildings may
generate. The latter type achieves their goal of maximizing the value of their holdings by
intensifying land uses on their properties. Logan and Molotch (1987) identify these place
entrepreneurs as the primary agents behind the urban development process. Yet, these
agents constitute one dimension of the growth machine.

Place entrepreneurs are part of a privileged class of urban landowners who are
directly responsible for buying places and collecting rents at a large-scale. They have the
task of attracting and trapping certain types of human activity within their accumulation
of holdings by altering the conditions that structure the local land markets. This process
is accomplished through their active influence on various levels of decision making in the
public and private sectors that affect the locational advantages of place. Place
entrepreneurs encourage public investment in infrastructure, lobby against development

restrictions, advocate for government subsidies towards private businesses and

23

development projects, as well as promote other programs that will rearrange the
relationships between places to their advantage.

However, these agents cannot achieve their goals alone. Place entrepreneurs
often lack the expertise and the capacity to establish residential, commercial, and
industrial projects without the aid from additional individuals and organizations.
Corporations and real estate developers are those organizations that actually modify
places for these uses but are increasingly footloose and have several opportunities to
locate across space; they are not necessarily bound to a particular place and have the
freedom to locate their activities wherever the potential for profit exists. Such
organizations are recruited to build these places whereas the property owners take a cut of
the financial gain.

The success of the entrepreneurs’ investments, however, rides on their ability to
attract these necessary agents into their holdings. This is the weakness of place
entrepreneurs as a class; they are “place-bound” since their holdings are not mobile and
cannot readily be uprooted to follow capital from one place to another. Logan and
Molotch (1987) refer to this condition as “parochial capital” in which initial capital has
already been fixed into land holdings, motivating the place entrepreneur to remain in
place while doing everything in their power to attract additional investment. Another
reason why place entrepreneurs are place-based and not readily mobile is their tacit
knowledge of the region’s political and economic climate as well as familiarity with local
business interests, institutions, political officials, and allies. Such intimate networks,
which take years to build, would be difficult to reconstruct if the place entrepreneur were

to leave for another locality.

24

The investment offered by corporations, real estate developers, non-local
government, and other entities with access to credit, on the other hand, is more mobile
and can shift readily from one place to another. Logan and Molotch refer to this mobile
capital as “metropolitan capital.” The land-based entrepreneurs strive to attract
metropolitan capital into their holdings by either bargaining with local and non-local
investors or by pushing local government to create a “business-friendly” environment
that will attract investment (metropolitan capital) into their region. Many strategies rely
on the use of government subsidies to modify local land markets that encourage high-
retum developments in certain places. Within the growth machine perspective, place
entrepreneurs with the greatest political influence control the places that are receiving
government assistance.

Growth machines form through an alliance of place entrepreneurs, government
officials, businesses, media organizations, developers, real estate agents, bankers,
schools, and others. The methods used to achieve the objectives of the landowners,
which is to maximize rents generated from their holdings, are seen by members of the
growth machine to benefit their own individual interests. All members of the growth
machine share a common commitment to promote economic growth in the face of intense
competition for capital across space. Within this competitive spirit, the growth machine
is charged with generating and sustaining, in Logan and Molotch’s (1987) words, the
“place patriotism of the masses” (p. 60), where growth machine aspirations are tied to
local civic pride. In the political realm, public benefits from growth machine projects are
accentuated, whereas benefits to private interests are downplayed, and the celebration of

local growth compliments the notion ingrained in the American consciousness that

25

growth signifies success. Such a marketing tactic emboldens the general populace to take
ownership of the growth agenda and thus disarms popular resistance against the growth
machine.

However, the decision-making system under the growth machine serves to benefit
the most powerful while the least powerful are at a disadvantage. The growth machine
members’ common focus on exchange-value over use-value in urban real estate creates a
condition where “in many cases, probably in most, additional local growth under current
arrangements is a transfer of wealth and life chances from the general public to the [place
entrepreneurs] and their associates,” (Logan and Molotch 1987, p. 53). Thus growth
achieved by the growth machine is not equal. The costs of such as system “fall
disproportionately on low income communities and marginal local businesses, which are
often physically displaced by redevelopment strategies,” (Harding 1995, p. 43). The
growth machine may relocate, rather than generate, economic activity. In fact, in the
extreme scenario, aggregate growth in the locality may be negative while certain groups
of interest stand to benefit (Vojnovic 2000a, 2000b, 2003a).

Logan and Molotch focused on the activities of the growth machine as implicitly
controlled by members of the host society; the growth machine was directed by political
officials, business leaders, developers, real estate agents, newspapers, and other high
profile individuals and organizations, which the authors considered to be dominated by
the White majority in the North American context. Racial minorities, including
immigrants, traditionally fell outside the decision-making process of the growth machine
and thus were not entitled to the benefits that were enjoyed by the urban elite. Blacks,

and Black businesses, especially were curtailed due to institutional racism (Zunz 1982),

26

 

 

as well as the vested economic interests of the majority White society. For instance,
there have been several cases where racial minority and ethnic enclave neighborhoods
were demolished to make way for urban redevelopment projects (Weaver 1955;
Anderson 1964; Wolf and LeBeaux 1967; Allen 1980; Boyd 2000; Podagosi and
Vojnovic 2008; Che 2008), which may be attributed to the lack of representation of these
community members in the local growth machine.

However, changing preferences among the middle and upper class—segments of
the population that the city relies on for economic success—have forced influential
members of the growth machine to reassess their development strategies. Subsequent
generations of culture-conscious residents and tourists had created a market for urban
development initiatives that cater to these sensitivities.3 Previous growth machine tactics,
which emphasized growth at the expense of quality of life, had become obsolete due to
the greater emphasis on the urban cultural milieu demanded by this new class of urban
residents and tourists. The following sections discuss the growing importance of
culturally infused spaces in cities that appear exotic, and thus attractive, to the leisurely
class of residents and tourists. Specifically, ethnic and racial minorities, that exude this
culture of difference, now have a presence, that some have argued, is increasingly

recognized by the growth machine (Light 2002; Nijman 1997; Lin 1995).

 

3 David Ley (1996) describes this change in middle-class sensitivities as a consequence
of the widespread counter-culture movements of the 19603.

27

2.3 Immigration and Ethnic Neighborhoods

The arrival and departure of immigrants has a definite impact on the urban places
they occupy. Immigrants often refill the pool of cheap labor, which is geared towards
filling the demands for the lower-order service industries, such as restaurants, maid
services, and small shops—many of which serve as an integral component of the tourist
industry (Philo and Keams 1993). Immigrants also have an inherent quality that bolsters
the urban tourist industry. As the host society’s apprehension towards foreign cultures
waned in the latter-20th century, and as the tourist industry became the largest sector in
many urban economies, the real and imagined cultural expressions of these diverse
immigrant groups became a valuable commodity for many cities. In the urban landscape,
the cultural expressions of the diverse ethnic groups are evident in local architecture,
streetscapes, language, cuisines, and daily rituals.

Growing numbers of tourists gravitate to these culturally rich urban places,
bringing with them additional revenue to bolster dwindling city coffers. Not only leisure
seekers, but also business travelers and big-time investors increasingly are drawn to this
ethno-cultural urban spectacle, where they attend festivals, patronize retailers, and dine in
the choice selections of ethnic cafes and restaurants. As these ethnic neighborhoods
continue to develop over time they enjoy a greater international reputation; immigrant
commercial districts draw a significant amount of investment from overseas. Such places
attract the increasingly multinational, footloose, and affluent: the MBAs, the purveyors of
international culture, the students, the scientists, the techies, the diplomats, and the artists,

which consequently create an energized place of convergence within the global network

28

of cities. Immigrants, therefore, have the potential to be the catalyzing agents of
neighborhood vitality.

In their growth machine thesis, Logan and Molotch (1987) implied that racial and
ethnic minorities fell outside of the urban growth machine. However, others have argued
that the presence of a large immigrant community has the potential to attract the attention
of the mainstream growth machine (Lin 1995; Nijman 1997; Light 2002). The influx of
immigrants in these cities can impact neighborhood vitality in two ways. First, the
presence of vibrant immigrant communities can draw from their own social capital and
also infuse new investment from alternative sources into economically depressed
neighborhoods in the city. Second, immigrants create unique communities that
contribute to the cultural diversity of the city, which can attract investment from outside
tourism and spur economic development.

In addition, Lin (1998) suggests that immigration might improve housing values
in the traditionally depressed neighborhoods of the inner city. Saiz (2003) asserts that
potentially the biggest impact of immigration on cities is their effect on housing markets
as an influx in newly arriving immigrants can contribute to higher prices and rents. Also,
immigrants may be more willing to invest in refurbishing residential properties that can
result in the revalorization of ethnic neighborhoods (Saiz 2007). These observations
contradict the traditional notion of immigrant communities located in perpetually poor
neighborhoods (ethnic ghettos) within the zone-in-transition, as espoused by the Chicago
School’s ecological urban framework (Park and Miller 1921; Burgess 1925). Pamuk
(2004) presents evidence that during the past three decades immigrant households

became the main demographic driver of housing demand in the major American cities.

29

From an urban policy standpoint, newly arriving immigrant groups can revitalize the
economically depressed neighborhoods in inner cities, thus providing additional tax
revenues that have dwindled due to the decline in the traditional base economies and loss
of the affluent population to the suburban localities.

A small but growing literature focuses on the impact of ethnically owned formal
financial institutions in these immigrant neighborhoods. Increasing investments into
these neighborhoods is possible since certain immigrant groups enjoy the benefits of
access to foreign capital, unlike other minority groups in the city. Immigrant groups,
especially Asians, that maintain close ties to their home countries have access to
alternative sources of credit, thus circumventing traditional credit that historically were
difficult to access among minorities in the United States. Decades of discriminatory
lending practices, especially in the form of redlining, had effectively severed channels of
credit to neighborhoods with a large minority and low-income presence, and exacerbated
the physical decline of these neighborhoods. However, the Chinese-Americans in Los
Angeles not only established ethnically owned banks, which offered alternative streams
of credit within these communities, but also had access to Chinese based financial
institutions that maintain branch offices in the metropolitan area (Li et a1. 2001; Dymski
and Li 2004). Li and her colleagues argue that this process was attributed to the
mainstream financial institutions’ neglect and discrimination against racial minority
neighborhoods (Li et al. 2002). Such actions from the host society created an opportunity
for ethnic banks to satisfy the growing demand for credit among minority groups in the
city. In some cases, ethnic owned banks have given certain immigrant groups the

opportunity to sidestep the structural constraints that traditionally inhibited investment

30

 

into certain neighborhoods, which had exacerbated the intrametropolitan inequalities and
decline of these neighborhoods in previous decades (Smith 1995; Dymski and Mohanty
1999; Li et al 2002; Dymski et a1 2006).

These financial organizations offer a means for minorities to overcome the
structural constraints of the market for credit and also for land. However, minority
owned banks and financial institutions are part of a larger and more complex level of
organization within immigrant groups that can bring investment into inner city
neighborhoods. In the larger immigrant gateway cities, the urban landscape is being
shaped by a large and influential immigrant presence. Consequently, there exists a
situation whereby “immigrant” place entrepreneurs, who may operate outside of the local
growth machine coalitions, are engaged in speculative activities in the immigrant
neighborhoods. Similar to their counterparts who are part of the mainstream growth
machine, immigrant place entrepreneurs’ holdings are restricted by geography and must
recruit the help of financial institutions as well as other organizations and individuals that
will benefit from the development of immigrant neighborhoods. The following section

discusses the immigrant place entrepreneurs.

2.4 Immigrant Place Entrepreneurs

In the gateway cities, immigrant communities have had a significant role in
shaping the urban landscape. However, much of the literature does not elaborate on the
creation of immigrant districts. In one early example, Robert Park (1915) left the
responsibility for immigrant housing, in addition to other residential and industrial

districts, to the realm of “private enterprise without paying attention to how private

31

enterprise actually produced it” (Light 2002, p. 215). This section provides a review on
the role of both elite political and business groups originating from the host society and
the various immigrant communities in the supply of immigrant housing and creation of
immigrant districts. In addition, I integrate the literature on immigrant ethnic place-
marketing and place—branding. This transition not only incorporates the role of the elites
on selling housing to newly arriving immigrants, it also addresses the additional step of
designing specific themed-neighborhoods that are marketed towards immigrant and non
immigrant groups. The Little Italys, Greektowns, Chinatowns, and Little Saigons, which
are common tourist destinations in many North American cities, are some examples of
ethnic “themed” neighborhoods.

Ivan Light (2002) argues that certain immigrant groups during the closing decades
of the 20th century became more active in the urban growth machine. In the case of Los
Angeles, he asserts that leaders within the Asian immigrant communities and co-ethnics
abroad not only became more active but also replaced the previous leadership of the
city’s mainstream growth machine. Drawing primarily from newspaper articles, various
print media, and archival documents from the LA. region’s plethora of local planning
agencies, Light traces the historical development of two neighborhood projects in Los
Angeles that were directed by Asian immigrant place entrepreneurs: Koreatown and
Monterrey Park. Light argues that these two developments did not occur spontaneously,
contrary to the traditional histories of these neighborhoods, but follows an intentionally
planned development initiative orchestrated by a highly organized coalition of immigrant
business leaders and politicians that had “acquired a financial interest in promoting

growth in the locality” (Light 2002, p. 223). These articles and documents also

32

identified the major stakeholders in the local growth machine, which Light labeled as
“immigrant place entrepreneurs,” who are actively involved in the. creation and selling of
urban places to co-ethnic immigrants.

In the case of Koreatown, Korean real estate speculators with access to overseas
capital were able to purchase parcels of land in the inner city and sell these properties to
recently arriving Korean immigrants. These activities are analogous to the intense
boosterism and land speculation that ran rampant in the American frontier during the 19m
century, where pioneering entrepreneurs, driven by the potential “exchange-value” of
their holdings, marketed open land to their cohorts back in the eastern United States and
Europe. The outcome of this activity led to the creation of a distinctly Korean district,
which served as an alternative downtown to Los Angeles’ downtown. This district
included major Korean banks, strip malls, condominiums, and large-scale indoor malls.

In the City of Monterrey Park, a coalition of Chinese business interests
established an all Chinese Chamber of Commerce whose goals often conflicted with
those of the previously established Chamber of Commerce, which served the non-
Chinese businesses. Monterrey Park would eventually be redeveloped with an Asian
theme and aggressively marketed to overseas Chinese as the “Chinese Beverly Hills”
(Fong 1994, p. 29). These examples help explain why certain immigrant neighborhoods
persistently maintain their ethnic image, such as the ethnic enclaves and “ethnoburbs”
described by Li (1998, 2005, 2006a, 2006b). However, Light concedes that these case
studies do not necessarily support the assumption that immigrant entrepreneurs will

always integrate into the local growth machine. Of all the recent immigrants in the LA.

33

region, the East Asian populations have been the most successful whereas the Latino
populations have noticeably lagged behind.

The two case studies highlighted by Light primarily focus on the creation of
affluent places of residence by immigrants primarily for coethnics. Another example of
the immigrant growth machine illustrates the recent transformation of Miami, Florida into
a global city. Jan Nijman (1997) argues that the presence of a large, entrepreneurial, and
highly motivated Latino population effectively meshed with the city’s growth agenda,
centered on developing Miami into international business center. The local growth
machine enrolled Latino, particularly exiled Cuban, interests as part of its plan to
transform Miami into a center for international trade. Miami’s urban elite crafted the
local growth rhetoric in such a way that accentuated the city’s multicultural and
multilingual tradition as a means to improve the attractiveness of the region to foreign
finance.

Initially, the city’s reaction towards an increasing wave of immigration, beginning
in the 19603, was tepid. However, over time, this sentiment changed as the city
transformed into a major international trading center, and as a new growth machine was
being assembled by various high-profile individuals and organizations. Nijman viewed
the local newspaper, Miami Herald, as effectively fulfilling the media role of the urban
growth machine. This newspaper originally took a critical stance towards the influx of
Hispanics in Miami, but by the mid-19803 it became a “a strong advocate of
multiculturalism and visibly the most important force in forging a stable community in
this city, emphasizing the link between growth goals and better lives for Miami residents”

Nijman (1997, p. 169).

34

Though the city of Miami had experienced white flight during the latter part of the
20lh century, non-Hispanic whites still dominate local decision-making. Nijman not only
based this assertion on the proportionally greater representation by non-Hispanic whites
serving in local public office, but also on economic dominance, which questions the
popular notion of Miami as a strictly Latino city. N ijman also attributes the underrated
white dominance in the Miami establishment to the existence of behind-the-scenes
politicking by influential non-Hispanic business interests forming, in N ijman’s words, the
“Non Group” (1997, p. 171), a classic entity found in urban growth machines. What
makes this organization particularly elusive is that “[d]espite the fact that this group
consists of the most influential businesspeople in Miami, not many locals have ever heard
of it” (Nijman 1997, p. 171).

Although the core of the growth machine is dominated by non-Hispanic
interests—which is remarkable given the minority status of non-Hispanics in the city—its
growth goals of developing Miami into an international metrOpolis is promoted by
various ethnic interest groups. Hispanics, particularly the Cuban elites, take advantage of
the constructed image of the Latino City in order to cement their own claims to the future
growth of the city as well as market Miami to Latin America to bolster their own
interests. According to 1990 labor data, Hispanics were well represented in the producer
services sector—a rapidly expanding economic sector heavily tied to international
networks and closely attuned to Miami’s growth machine interests.

Nijman cautions that the Latino success story still overshadows the less fortunate
Hispanic groups as well as Miami’s black populations, both native and foreign. He

considers that globalization and growing transnationalism has created a situation, in

35

which ethnic communities are self-reliant and less likely to rely on mainstream support
structures as they pursue their own growth agendas. In Miami, this situation has led to
the creation of several cohesive ethnic communities that rarely interact with each other,
and in fact are quite suspicious of others who don’t belong in their group. Thus,
according to Nijman, although the growth machine has promoted a growth agenda that
benefited certain Latino interests, Miami failed to maintain a unified civic community,
which betrays any notion of a social celebration of multiculturalism.

Another line of research focuses on the creation of ethnic places to bolster tourism
in certain areas of the city. During the final two decades of the 20'h century, many cities
struggled with the erosion of their tax base due to the collapse of the traditional economic
sectors, especially heavy industry (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). A growing number of
cities considered tourism and culture-based enterprises as viable options to ameliorate
declining revenues. Economic development initiatives often make use of local immigrant
communities, which are laden with unique cultural assets, to fulfill this role. Jan Lin
( 1995) observes the “revalorization” of ethnic places by those “place entrepreneurs”
whose projects are complementing the initiatives of the local growth machine. Lin relies
on the interpretation of place-based symbols such as signage, literary texts, landmarks,
and artifacts (such as statues, parks, buildings) to trace the historical development of the
Chinese, and other ethnic neighborhoods in Houston, during the 19803 and early 19903,
and to identify the growing influence of ethnic place entrepreneurs in the growth
machine.

Areas that have experienced an increase in the Chinese population have also

experienced a physical upgrading of the existing buildings. Clearly in the Houston

36

example, Asian themed neighborhoods dominate many of these new immigrant housing
projects. Lin concluded that reinvestment projects initiated by the Chinese community
had caught the attention of the local growth machine, whose members began selectively
incorporating the efforts of ethnic place entrepreneurs in downtown redevelopment.
Based on interviews of local community leaders, he concludes that such projects that
infused ethnic culture onto place was motivated by a unifying goal to stimulate
neighborhood revitalization, which translates into economic growth for the locality. As
Lin (1995) maintains “[i]n the wake of a postmodern architectural building episode,
which crowned the severe regional recession of the mid-19803, ethnic ‘place
entrepreneurs’ have emerged to gain the attention of a municipal ‘growth machine’ that
selectively incorporates their efforts into central city redevelopment projects and urban
tourism” (p. 629).

Although devoted primarily to gentrification research, Ley et a1 (2002) is one of
the few articles that attempt to quantify the impacts of immigrants on demographic
change and property values in neighborhoods across space. However, Ley’s article
operates outside of the growth machine paradigm as established by Molotch (1976).
Instead, he relies on the urban factorial ecology framework, which focuses primarily on
the demand-side aspect of the housing dynamics while excluding how such places of
residence are supplied. It should be noted that within this discourse, Light (2002) argues
that immigrants largely are responsible for supplying housing to their newly arriving co-
ethnics. Ley identifies census tracts where immigrants, professionals, and affluent
citizens are located and measures these groups’ impact on the percent change in the

average housing and dwelling prices for Vancouver between 1971-1986 and 1986-1996.

37

 

Using principal components analysis (PCA) on a dataset compiled from the Canadian
census, which includes migrant status, ethnic status, housing age, socioeconomic status,
and family status variables, Ley identified four dimensions (socioeconomic status, family
status, immigrant status, and gentrification) that accounted for most of the variation in the
data. Ley found a significantly positive correlation between the immigrant status
dimension, which includes the Chinese population, and the percentage change in housing
and dwelling values in Vancouver. This finding suggests that the presence of Chinese in
several Vancouver tracts is associated with increasing housing and dwelling values.

Ley’s article presents one of the few works that have attempted to use spatial data
to measure and assess the impacts of immigrants in the city. His study serves as an
exercise in assessing the applicability of principal components analysis (PCA) for this
type of research. Ley’s method can potentially be used to corroborate the findings from
Light (2002), Nijman (1997), and Lin (1995), who exclusively relied on qualitative
research methods to gauge the demographic, socioeconomic, and physical changes in the
immigrant neighborhoods. While Molotch’s concept of the growth machine and Light,
Nijman, and Lin’s research on the immigrant/ethnic place entrepreneurs can be used to
highlight some of the reasons why immigrants are located in particular areas of the city,
Ley’s method may be used to measure socioeconomic changes within immigrant

neighborhoods.

2.5 Conclusion

Recent trends identified by the literature show a greater integration between the

elites from immigrant communities and the major players from the mainstream public

38

and private realms within certain gateway cities. This notion complements that of greater
private—public cooperation in the reshaping of neighborhoods. However, this close
relationship between elites from the immigrant communities and elites from the host
society may not be universal. For example, in Houston, Texas, the concentration of
power is held by a cohesive organization of local business interests and politicians who
devote considerable resources toward specific projects to promote economic development
within the locality—a fundamental dimension to growth machine tactics (Vojnovic
2003a). Much of the public support has been geared towards reducing taxes and
subsidizing business concerns, such as the shipping, space, oil industries, transportation
infrastructure, and places of entertainment and leisure. Lin (1995) asserts that the
proposed ethnic enclave development projects spearheaded by immigrant place
entrepreneurs gained the attention of the city’s local growth machine due to the severe
local economic recession that occurred during the mid—19803 as a result of the bust in the
petroleum industry. However, given that the city has traditionally neglected the lower-
income class and racial/ethnic minorities, as evident in the recent physical and social
transformations in Houston (Vojnovic 2003a; Vojnovic 2003b, Podagrosi and Vojnovic
2008), government support for ethnic neighborhoods may be deficient compared to other
cities.

Houston has a suburban ‘New’ Chinatown, as well as areas of Korean business
development, and a Vietnamese ‘Little Saigon.’ Although in 1995 Lin described the
original downtown Chinatown (‘Old’ Chinatown) development project as being
“augmented rather than diminished by this other activity since the warehouses in this

district are of great use to Asian food and restaurant product wholesalers” (1995, p. 639),

39

the overall development project never came to fruition. The early and advantageous land
holdings that the Chinese community had in downtown Houston had been lost, and
downtown Chinatown is in the process of being erased from Houston’s urban landscape.
Most of the remaining Chinese businesses moved to ‘New’ Chinatown in suburban
Houston. The failure to realize a Chinese ethnic district in Houston’s downtown suggests
the local Chinese immigrant place entrepreneurs’ lack of influence over the city’s
mainstream growth coalitions. This lack of influence can also be found among Houston’s
other minorities. Some examples include: the displacement of the Vietnamese ‘Little
Saigon’ district from its original location in Houston’s Midtown to the edge of the city,
the failure of the Hispanic-themed El Mercado del Sol commercial center and lack of
spillover into the surrounding mainly Hispanic neighborhoods, and the destruction

Freedmen’s Town, Houston’s historical Black neighborhood.

40

3. Methods

3.1 Research Questions

The problem statement indicates that a gap exists in the research on the link
between city government and the ethnic community in Houston. Also, little has been
done to measure population and housing changes. In order to fill these gaps, this thesis

considers the following research questions:

1. Has Houston’s municipal government financially supported urban development
initiatives in Houston’s ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Chinatowns?

2. Given, the city’s active promotion of multiculturalism and ethnic/racial diversity,
has such rhetoric translated into improving economic conditions within the
Chinatown districts and the city’s Chinese community at large? More
specifically, how do these neighborhoods, which were redeveloped by immigrant
place entrepreneurs, differ economically from those themed neighborhoods where
the city has devoted considerable resources to promote development? How has
the overall economic status of Houston’s Asian groups changed over time? Are

changes in incomes among Asian groups comparable to the White population?

3.2 Hypothesis

In the latter 20‘h century, with municipalities facing increasing pressures to
become more entrepreneurial and competitive in the global economy, local governments
have guided extensive resources towards ethnic communities as a viable economic

development strategy to attract tourism and investment. Research has shown that

41

Houston, Texas—despite its claim as the paradigm laissez-faire city in the United
States—has historically devoted considerable public resources toward supporting local
business interests and extensively promoting select neighborhood developments (Feagin
1988; Vojnovic 2003a; 2003b; Podagrosi and Vojnovic 2008). This study considers the

following two hypotheses:

1. Despite the rhetoric of celebrating diversity exhibited by the city of Houston, the
Chinese business community has not received financial support from Houston ’s
municipal government. As a result, much of the development projects
contributing to the Asian-theme of the Chinatown districts are attributed to a
local class of immigrant entrepreneurs operating outside of the local growth

coalitions.

2. Since the city of Houston began encouraging the redevelopment and promotion of
inner city neighborhoods in late-I 9803—including ethnic districts—these
initiatives have benefited the afiluent and the highly educated professionals who
are increasingly concentrating in the urban core, whereas members of the local
Chinese community have not enjoyed similar levels of improvement in economic

well—being.

The existence of multiple Chinatown districts during the course of Houston’s

history indicates the presence of an active association of Chinese immigrant place

entrepreneurs who have had a role in shaping Houston’s urban landscape. However, a

42

question that remains is whether public fiscal support, which the city has a history of
granting for local development initiatives, is also evident with the urban development
projects driven by local Chinese place entrepreneurs. The presence or absence of the
public financial support will give some insight into the degree of clout that Houston’s
immigrant place entrepreneurs have in city hall and among the city’s coalition allies in
the private sector. Also, to test the first hypothesis, a comparison will be made between
the public financial support that ethnic immigrant neighborhoods (specifically the ‘Old’
and ‘New’ Chinatowns) receive and other urban development initiatives in the downtown 1

and surrounding neighborhoods. In addition, although the city has actively marketed

 

itself as a place that acknowledges, as well as embraces and supports, its multicultural
diversity, this research will explore whether improvements in economic prosperity are
evident among ethnic and racial minorities residing within the city, or whether this new

celebration of ethnic diversity is merely political rhetoric.

3.3 Research Objectives

This study proposes two primary research objectives. This first objective is to
determine the city govemment’s involvement with the historical development of
Houston’s two Chinatown districts. More specifically, this study will provide insight into
the city’s financial support of the development projects in Old and New Chinatowns
compared to its financial support of development projects in the other districts.

The second objective is to analyze socioeconomic changes as well as changes in
housing values in the districts marketed by Houston’s municipal government. This study

will compare neighborhood change that occurred in the two Chinatown districts with the

43

other various districts in Houston between 1980 and 2000. This analysis will show the
specific districts that attracted certain subgroups of the population and changing housing
values and income levels in these districts. The latter part of this analysis will determine
whether or not the Chinese community has experienced an increase in income levels in

comparison to the majority White population in Houston during this twenty year period.

3.4 Data & Methods

This research proposes using both qualitative and quantitative methods to address
the two hypotheses. To complete the first objective, this study will use a qualitative
approach—similar to the methods utilized by comparable studies described in the
literature review—that provides insight to the historical development of the Chinese
district from both the perspective of the local Chinese community of place entrepreneurs
and the local (municipal and county) government. Data derived from development plans
and building cost reports will also be collected for a quantitative analysis, in order to
explore the scale of government financial investment in Houston’s urban revitalization

initiatives. This portion of the research consists of the following data collection methods:

1. Conduct informal open-ended interviews of local Chinese entrepreneurs and city

officials.

2. Collect official print media published by the Houston Chinese Chamber of
Commerce and official print media published by the Houston city government.

Examples will include city-planning reports, materials produced by the Greater

44

Houston Convention and Tourists Bureau, and the local Chinese business and
tourist magazines retrieved from business organizations and city archives.
3. Collect information from interviews conducted by local newspapers and collect

anecdotal stories and news concerning Chinatown.

4. Build an inventory of public investment and public subsidies (including in private
development projects) that have been part of Houston’s downtown urban revival
initiative since the mid-19803. This will also include an inventory of public art,
which is one proxy indicator of where government has invested in public spaces
in the city. This inventory will be derived from city of Houston and Harris

County’s public documents and listings of civic art.

The data collected and analyzed for this first objective serves to substantiate the first
hypothesis. The results will also help inform the interpretation of results for the second
objective.

For the second objective, a quantitative approach will be adopted. The second
objective will primarily focus on socioeconomic change occurring within Houston’s
neighborhoods. This study will use decennial census data reported by the U.S. Census
Bureau at the census tract level of aggregation for 1980 and 2000, which will allow for
the analysis of neighborhood-level characteristics and change.

The wave of Asian immigrants moving into the Houston region did not
commence until the mid—19703 and early 19803. Also, the immigrant place
entrepreneurial activities in Houston began to occur during the mid-19803. Therefore, I

feel that 1980 is a suitable starting year for analyzing immigrant populations in Houston.

45

The study eschews from using data from the 1990 census. There are two reasons for this
omission. The first reason relates to the unique economic environment Houston and the
surrounding region were experiencing during the 19803. The regional recession, induced
by the decline of Houston’s petroleum-based economy during the mid-19803, affected the
entire population and had a detrimental impact on local housing markets. Second,
majority of the Houston growth machine’s projects were being completed during the
19903. Thus, any measurable impacts from these redevelopment projects would not be
noticed until the end of that decade. In addition, the economy would have had ample
time to recover from the recession by 2000.

Census data collected at the census tract level of aggregation will serve as a proxy
for neighborhoods. Ideally, neighborhood—level characteristics can be compared across
the racial and ethnic makeup of the residential population. However, a major limitation
of using this data is that several variables are not stratified by race/ethnicity at the
neighborhood level. For example, housing values are not reported by the race or
ethnicity of the property owner at the neighborhood level. One method to rectify this
problem is to create a typology of neighborhoods based on racial and ethnic make-up.
Thus, one census tract can be categorized as an Asian neighborhood whereas a
neighboring tract can be categorized as a Black neighborhood. The characteristics of
these neighborhoods can then be assumed to represent the characteristics of the
predominant population group.

There exist a handful of options to create this neighborhood typology. This study

proposes the following three-part method:

1. Data Reduction: Principal Components Analysis (PCA)

46

2. Categorization: K—Means Cluster Analysis

3. Inferential Statistical Analysis: Two-Sample Difference of Means T-Test

First, the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) will be conducted on a list of
neighborhood variables derived from census data. The PCA is a data reduction method
that utilizes a correlation matrix to determine which variables in the data set have a strong
relationship with each other. Highly related variables are combined to create a set of new
variables called factors or components. This technique reduces the number of redundant
variables in the data set, creating a list of new combined variables that reflect the
conditions occurring in the census tracts. Given that these components are essentially
variables, standardized factor scores can be extracted from them and assigned to each
census tract based on how well the census tract is described by a particular component.
Ideally, the individual race/ethnicity variables should be loaded separately from each
other across the various components. For example, Asian subpopulations, Hispanics,
Blacks, and Whites would be highly loaded in their own separate components.

Assuming that m > n, a dataset with ‘m’ number of variables can be reduced to
‘n’ number of components using the PCA. This analysis can be used to extract ‘n’ sets of
factor scores (one set for each component). A cluster analysis will be invoked to group
similar census tracts based on their respective factor scores. Assuming that the race and
ethnicity variables are highly loaded on separate components, the cluster analysis can
create census tract groups associated with race and ethnicity. For example, census tracts
that receive high factor scores for a Hispanic component may be grouped together by the
cluster analysis. The PCA and cluster analysis provides an objective way to categorize

Census tracts .

47

A comparative analysis can be achieved once the cluster analysis generates
categorical groupings of census tracts by race. The third step begins with the first use of
an inferential statistical analysis. For the second objective, this study singularly focuses
on differences in economic prosperity between Houston’s Asian and White
neighborhoods. Thus, Asian and White neighborhoods will be extracted from the cluster
analysis. This binary arrangement will facilitate the use of a two-sample difference of
means t—test. The two-sample difference of means test compares two samples of census
tracts to determine whether the two groups are statistically different from one another
based on a particular variable. Economic prosperity is defined as increasing income,
increasing residential property values, and declining poverty. This study will observe
both the dynamic and static nature of these measures—that is, changes in these variables

over time in addition to the level of these variables for the most recent year.

3.5 Study Region and Unit of Analysis

This study will focus on Harris County, which contains the City of Houston. The
study region includes 649 census tracts and encompasses a diverse collection of
neighborhoods experiencing extreme changes in population and housing characteristics.
Currently, Houston’s suburban Sharpstown neighborhood is the home to a large Chinese
business district, which has neither a definite boundary nor an official name but is often
referred to as Chinatown in many official city materials and tourist brochures.

The Alief neighborhood is adjacent to Sharpstown and is home to a sizeable
Vietnamese district in addition to Chinese businesses that spillover from the neighboring

suburban Chinatown district. In this study, I refer to the Chinese portion of these two

48

business districts as ‘suburban’ or ’New‘ Chinatown, in order to distinguish it from the
original Chinatown district, which I will refer to as ‘downtown’ or ‘Old’ Chinatown (see
figure 3.5.1). ‘Old’ Chinatown is an older Chinese-Vietnamese district located just to the
east of downtown Houston. The previous Asian and Afi'ican-American populations are
abandoning Old Chinatown as a result of increasing property values and extensive

physical upgrading. NOTE: Images in this thesis are presented in color.

Figure 3.5.1: Map of Houston and Chinatown Districts

     
 

:1 Harris County 1

L City of Houston 4‘
This thesis also focuses on the emergence of Houston’s urban “districts.” I define
these districts as urban places that may contain a single or multiple neighborhoods whose
physical appearances and development conform to a unifying theme and are promoted by
the city of Houston. Figure 3.5.2 shows the spatial footprint of the combined districts.

Most of the affected neighborhoods are in the inner city. For this study, neighborhoods

49

are represented as census tracts. Thus a district is a spatial entity that encompasses an
area larger than a neighborhood (census tract). The districts are derived from what the
official city of Houston literature defines as “City Explorer” destinations. I use the maps
provided in the 2008 edition of the official Houston visitor’s guide, Oflicial Visitors
Guide: Houston, issued by the Greater Houston Convention and Visitor’s Bureau
(GHCVB).4 I merged the census tracts that overlapped the individual city explorer
destinations demarcated by the GHCVB to create the district boundaries to be used for

this study.

Figure 3. 5.2: City of Houston and District Areas

[:1 Harris County
City of Houston

 

 

4 The GHCVB serves as the sales and marketing arm of the city of Houston and Harris
County. The mission of the GHCVB is to improve the economy of Greater Houston by
attracting conventions, tourists and international government officials. (Greater Houston
Convention and Visitor’s Bureau 2009). The City of Houston provides $10 million
towards the bureau’s $12 million operating budget (Mack 2006).

50

 

 

 

 

I identified twelve prominent urban districts that are defined and promoted by the

GHCVB (see figure 3.5.3). These districts include: (A) Southwest (Chinatown &
Harwin), which includes the suburban New Chinatown; (B) Uptown Galleria; (C) Upper
Kirby, River Oaks, Greenway; (D) Montrose; (E) Midtown; (F) Third Ward; (G)
Museum District; (H) Rice Village; (1) Medical Center; (J) Downtown Theater District;
(K) Sixth Ward; (L) Houston Heightsé Although these districts are demarcated and
named based on the descriptions found in the GHCVB literature, local residents and
businesses often use these designations and place names as well. Old Chinatown was

noticeably absent from the GHCVB literature. I included the approximate center of this

 

5 Derived fi'om maps in Greater Houston Convention and Visitor’s Bureau (2008)
6 I assigned the alphabetic ID code as a way to match the district names to their
respective boundaries in the maps and figures.

51

immigrant business district to show its relative proximity to downtown and the other
urban districts.

In addition to the list above, the visitors guide included another district called
Greenspoint Northwest Houston, “a major business center, where offices for more than
80 energy-related companies are found” (Greater Houston Convention and Tourists
Bureau 2008, p. 18). I opted to exclude this district from the study for two reasons. First,
this district encompasses an expansive area in the northern fringes of Harris County
outside the city limits and includes the city airport; this district covers an area nearly the
size of that portion of the city inside the inner loop 610. Second, the district offered a
limited number of attractions—mostly major hotels, shopping malls, golf courses, and the
city airport—spread across a large area, which does not particularly reflect a cohesive
urban district in the traditional sense.

Most of the districts were separated precisely into their own census tracts but
there were a few discrepancies. In some cases, multiple districts fell within a single
census tract. I retained all district names when identifying these tracts. Examples include
the Upper Kirby, River Oaks, Greenway districts and the Downtown and Theater District.
These five entities are already grouped into the two respective districts by the GHCVB.
Some districts were split into different census tracts that happen to be dominated by other
districts. For example, the Medical Center is split between districts ‘G’ and ‘I.’ I
designated district ‘G’ as the Museum district because museums and parks dominated
much of its area. The Medical Center is then grouped with the Reliant Stadium complex
in district ‘I.’ Unfortunately the 2000 census tract boundaries, in this case, preclude a

precise demarcation between these two districts.

52

Finally, the GHCVB defines district ‘A’ as Southwest (Chinatown I Harwin).
There has been controversy over the naming of this district, which houses various ethnic
communities in addition to the Chinese. The GHCVB, and by extension the city, views
much of the area as constituting Houston’s Chinatown district. However, this area is also
home to a sizeable Vietnamese district as well as a small South Asian business enclave,
making the term Chinatown somewhat of a misnomer. Some argue that “Asia Town” is a
more appropriate designation for the district encompassing these diverse neighborhoods
(Rodriguez 2007). I adopt the term ‘New’ Chinatown as this has become a popular
nomenclature in Houston and appropriately distinguishes this area from ‘Old’ Chinatown
near downtown.

The boundaries of the Chinese and Vietnamese sections are quite fluid with much
overlap. Also, Asian ethnic activities are dispersed throughout district ‘A.’ I include the
approximate center of New Chinatown just east of Hwy 8 as a reference for the reader in
figure 3.5.3. This reference point represents the census tract that has the highest
concentration of ethnic Chinese business developments and also registers the largest
number of Chinese residents in Harris County based on 2000 census data. Hong Kong
Mall, which was developed by a Chinese-Vietnamese entrepreneur, houses the iconic
Asian gateway arch, which serves as the symbol of New Chinatown. However this
development is located on the west side of Hwy 8 in the predominately Vietnamese
section of the district. This circumstance reveals the general lack of borders between the

two Asian sections as well as the expansive nature of the district.

53

4. City of Houston and Historical Context

4.1 The Houston Growth Machine

The growth machine in Houston is founded upon principles that sustain a
“business friendly” climate in the city. While considerable effort in Houston is directed
at promoting and celebrating its minimal government approach, past studies have, in fact,
challenged the city’s claims of laissez-faire governance. Joe Feagin’s study of Houston,
Free Enterprise City: Houston in Political-Economic Perspective (1988), details the
extensive role of government intervention in the private sector as a form of corporate
welfare. State and city governments traditionally maintained strong links with Houston’s
business community and actively responded to the needs of business interests. Every
major economic transition in Houston was facilitated with an extensive infusion of public
money into the local economy to support the new changes in the private sector
investment focus.

Research has shown that the growth machine framework is effective in reflecting
the Houston governance strategy due to the strong cooperation between the city’s urban
elite, both political and economic, and continued consensus of the pro- growth
philosophy, which advocates a government that caters to business interests (Feagin 1988;
Lin 1995; Vojnovic 2003a; 2003b). Whereas many cities have experienced
fragmentation and competition between its urban elite, Houston has been relatively
unified in this regard throughout much of its history. Feagin (1988) traces a succession
of urban elites that carried the growth machine during particular periods of Houston’s
development (see table 4.1.1), and while their business interests might have been very

different, they all shared similar growth philosophies. In addition, Houston’s pro-growth

54

rhetoric has met little resistance. Factors such as anti-growth coalitions, advocates from
environmental and labor interests, as well as violent racial conflict and civil strife, which
derailed pro- growth initiatives in other major cities, have not seriously challenged

Houston’s growth machine during the 20th century.

Table 4.1.1 : Succession of Houston ’s Business Elites7

 

 

Emerging Decades of Members of
Economic Sector Prominence the Urban Elite

Agricultural production, 18403 — 18803 Allen brothers, W. M. Rice,

marketing T.W. House

Transportation; railroad; 18803 — 19103 J .A. Baker, W. Baker, H.

shipping Rice, J .H. Kirby, J. Jones, 0.
Holcombe

Primary commodity 19203 — 19603 Suite 8F crowd, J. Jones, W.S.

production; oil tools; banking Farish

Medical services; space- 19703 — Chamber of Commerce

related industry (Greater Houston
Partnership),

other business groups, public-
private organizations

 

4.2 Entrepreneurial Spirit Behind Houston’s Growth since 1836

Following its newly won independence from Mexico in 1836, the Republic of
Texas8 became the owner of a vast expanse of land ready for settlement and

development. The transition from a Mexican state to an independent nation provided the

 

7 Table derived from Feagin (1988, p. 108), modified by Author.

8 Prior to the Texas War of Independence, Texas was a political department within the
Mexican state of Coahuila y Tejas. After seceding from Mexico, Texas existed as an
independent republic from 1836 until its annexation by the U.S. in 1845.

55

impetus for intense speculative activities among residents and enterprising people.
Attracted by the opportunity to found a new capital city of Texas, John and Augustus
Allen, two land developers based in New York City, established Houston in the spring of
1836 by the head on navigation of Buffalo Bayou. The Allen brothers were not the only
developers in the area. Enterprising speculators were platting competing settlements such
as Lynchburg, Harrisburg, New Washington, Powhattan, Scottsburg, Louisville, San

J acinto, Buffalo, Hamilton, and a collection of other speculated cities with great
expectations of grandeur but few inhabitants to show for it (Sibley 1968).

The Allen brothers, however, excelled in marketing tactics and effectively
promoted their land assets to their audience (newly arriving immigrants to Texas and
government officials). John Allen won a seat in Congress and argued his cause for his
proposed city before that body. The Allen brothers advertised the planned city in several
newspapers. Though advertising the founding of new cities were common in newspapers
back in the eastern United States, this advertisement submitted by the Allen brothers was
the only one of its kind in Texas at the time (Sibley 1968). In addition, the Allen brothers
strategically named their planned city after General Sam Houston, the future president of
the Republic of Texas, then at the height of his popularity for his role in the Texas War of
Independence.

The Allen brothers convinced Congress to establish Houston as the national
capital with the condition that construction be financed at the developers’ expense (Sibley
1968). This promise effectively made the deal more attractive to legislators by offering
the government free lots and buildings to be rented on credit. However, this act of

Congress was not without controversy. Rival entrepreneurs, who had vested interests in

56

other speculated cities in the region, complained that the Allens won favor from Congress
because of their tenacity for behind the scenes dealings with legislators and the use of
questionable methods to influence the president’s office (Sibley 1968). Anson Jones, a
congressman and a former president of Texas who oversaw the republic’s annexation to
the United States in 1845, lambasted the choice of Houston for the new capital as one of
the most corrupt acts of Congress. In his memoirs, Jones recalled that “Houston and
Galveston were pretty respectable speculations by members of legislature,” but these
actions constituted “a perfect selling out of Texas to a few individuals” (Jones 1859, p.
18-19).

Despite the location’s inherent shortfalls and the bitter outcry from rival interests,
the decision to locate the capital to Houston provided the additional stability required to
support the nascent city. This act by the Texas Congress, and the faith that the newly
elected President Sam Houston would use all means in his authority to protect his
eponymous city from other competing place entrepreneurs, provided a stimulus that
attracted politicians and businesses to the area. It also assured newly arriving residents
and future enterprising individuals that the city would be a sure win for investments.
Although the seat of government eventually would abandon Houston in favor of the
newly founded city of Austin in the interior of Texas, the city’s base trade and
manufacturing economies was firmly established. One historian would conclude that
“the selection of the site, the naming of the place, the presentation of the advantages of
the place, the success in securing the temporary location of the seat of government,
constitute a high testimonial to the shrewdness, sagacity and enterprise of the promoters

of the City of Houston... it marks the beginning of one of the few successful speculations

57

of the kind, so numerous in that day” (Winkler 1906, p. 168-169). Johnston (1991) adds
that “[n]o twentieth-century marketing expert could have promoted a city more
shrewdly” (p. 9).

Beginning in the late-19th century, Houston business delegations lobbied U.S.
Congress and won extensive public funds to develop its transportation infrastructure, the
port, and rail network (Rose 1965). In 1909, after decades of securing federal funding, a
delegation of boosters went to Washington DC. to secure new funds through a cost-
sharing arrangement. In 1911, Congress approved the plan, setting two precedents: (l)
the $1.25 million (about $27.5 million in 2007 dollars) grant was the largest sum that
Congress had approved for a local project; (2) this marked Congress’ first foray in cost-
sharing with a municipality. This seminal arrangement became known as the Houston
Plan (Sibley 1968). Hundreds of millions of dollars from the federal government would
continue to be directed at deveIOping Houston’s port over the next century. These strong
ties between local government actors and economic elites would continue throughout the
20‘h century. Although Houston’s growth machine is composed of a diverse set of private
and public interests, they were united by the mutual need to promote economic growth as

the focus of local public policy.

4.3 The SE Suite Group 1920 - 1970

During the following decades, Houston saw a highly centralized and powerful
elite who shaped the course of local public policy. The power elite consisted of
“wildcatter industrialists” and “society tycoons” who ran a variety of ventures in 011, real

estate, construction, and banking (Feagin 1988). They were referred to as the “SF suite

58

group,” named after the downtown Lamar Hotel suite where they often held meetings.
Prominent members of the 8F group included George and Herman Brown, both involved
in construction and shipbuilding, Jesse H. Jones, a lumber magnate and politician;
Samuel Rayburn, chairman of the Federal Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee;
Gus Wortham and William Vinson, both insurance entrepreneurs and founders of major
insurance companies; William Hobby, governor of Texas and owner of the Houston Post;
and James Abercrombie, Hugh R. Cullen, and Morgan J. Davis, who were all oil
magnates. Other prominent individuals at the local, state, and national levels, who were
not necessarily active members, were still influenced by the 8F group. This group
represented the most cohesive power structure in Houston for much of the 20th century.

Several building projects in Houston, in response to the oil boom, were directed
by members of this power elite. The Houston Cotton Exchange and Board of Trade
Building (1924), the Petroleum Building (1927), and the Niels Esperson Building (1927)
are some examples of buildings constructed under the direction of the 8F group. Jesse H.
Jones, the lumber magnate and eventual banker and financier, constructed the Houston
Chronicle Building and the 36-story Gulf Building — the tallest in Houston at the time.
Jones was also chair of the New Deal-era Reconstruction Finance Corporation, who
successfully funneled federal funding into local Works Progress Administration (WPA)
civic projects (Feagin 1988).

Public policy under the 8F group era centered on enhancing transportation
infrastructure and developing the Houston oil industry. The SF group successfully
lobbied the federal government to protect these local initiatives. Sam Rayburn and

President Lyndon Johnson, a Texas native, played an important role in allocating

59

investments into local infrastructure projects. With respect to the oil industry, these
individuals were instrumental in securing the oil depletion allowance, which allowed oil
companies to exempt 27.5% of their income from taxes (Vojnovic 2003b). These
initiatives worked well for a “pro-growth” regime in city hall whose public servants were
either former-businessmen or were closely tied to Houston’s business community. Thus,
this system perpetuated the notion of whatever is good for business is good for the city,
but the uncontrolled boosterism contributed to Houston’s poor urban quality of life
standards.

The marriage of public policy and private development led to the creation of the
Houston Ship channel, which not only became one of the busiest waterways in the world
but also one of the most polluted. In addition, the unregulated growth of the city’s major
industries (primarily petrochemical) endangered public health—especially among the
low-income and predominantly minority residents who lived near these facilities along
Buffalo Bayou (Melosi and Pratt 2007).

The monopoly of power wielded by the SF group, which represented Houston’s
traditional elite, began to wane during the 19703. Vojnovic (2003b) indicated that the
Houston business community had extensively evolved from the days of the 8F group by
the closing decades of the 20th century—in part due to international immigration, an
increase in transnational service providers, the expansion of the Houston economy, and a
diversifying economic base. New economic elites emerged in the city, diluting the
traditional power structures of the 8F group. The new local business leaders, however,
still maintained close ties to the city’s political leadership, and local government

continued to preserve a strong pro-business agenda, as evident with ongoing financial

60

support—in terms of subsidies and public-private partnerships—of selected private

development projects.

4.4 Houston Chamber of Commerce 19703 — present

The Houston Chamber of Commerce9 continued the pro- growth tradition of its
predecessor, the 8P group. The chamber of commerce provided an opportunity for high-
level business leaders to enter the public sector (Thomas and Murray 1991). In addition
to advocating policies that would benefit its closest business interests, the chamber of
commerce also challenged programs that conflicted with its pro-business philosophy and
power. For instance, in the late 19703, the chamber of commerce impeded the
incorporation of Houston United, an “enterprise designed to bring business leaders
together with ethnic, religious, labor, and civic leaders” (Thomas & Murray 1991, p. 95).
The Greater Houston Partnership is the current incarnation of the chamber of commerce,
which merged with the Houston Economic Development Council. This association is
less united in its organization compared to its predecessors. The continuous entry of
national and international corporate elites, as well as the increasing diversity in the local

ethnic place entrepreneurs, has led to a new growth coalition very much different from

 

9 The Chamber of Commerce was renamed the Greater Houston Partnership after its
merger with the Houston Economic Development Council and Houston Foreign Trade.
The partnership serves as an advocate for business-focused public policy towards
economic development. It also facilitates corporate relocations and expansions in the
region, promotes international outreach, and participates in strategic planning for the city.
The Partnership’s membership includes the city of Houston, Harris County, the Houston
Port Authority, and several high profile businesses.

61

the traditional Anglo-based elite, but still carrying the pro-growth initiatives of its
predecessor.

Chapters 4 and 5 will show that despite the growing immigrant population, the
emergence of ethnic place entrepreneurs, and the city of Houston’s active celebration of
ethnicity and diversity, which emerged during the 19803 and 19903, ethnic communities
and immigrant place entrepreneurs investing in Houston did not receive the public
financial aid that was granted to members of the mainstream growth coalitions. This is
clearly apparent with Houston’s Chinese entrepreneurs and their development projects in
the city’s two Chinatowns. Without the public fiscal aid, ethnic place entrepreneurs were
simply not as competitive as their publicly funded rivals, and ethnic communities and

neighborhoods were slowly squeezed out of the Houston urban core.

4.5 A New Growth Agenda

Since the 19703, Houston has become one of the most ethnically and racially
diverse cities in the U.S. This transition in demographics impacted the city’s changing
political leadership. In 1971, citizens elected the first non-Anglo candidates into city
hall. Fred Hofheinz, who won the 1973 mayoral election, served as a city official who
relatively was sensitive towards the needs of the traditionally marginalized populations
(Vojnovic 2003a). More recently, in 1997 the city elected Lee Brown as its first African
American mayor. The current city council of 13 occupied seats includes four Blacks, one
Asian, and one Hispanic representative.

Houston is a major gateway city receiving a sizeable immigrant population.

Asians and Hispanics notably increased during the latter 20th century. From the 19703 to

62

the present, Asians—particularly the Chinese—developed a growing business elite,
forming the foundation of Houston’s new class of ethnic place entrepreneurslo (Lin

1995, 1998). The recent entry of a market savvy immigrant entrepreneurial class along
with increasing tolerance towards racial and ethnic diversity contributed to changes in
Houston’s pro-growth economic and political environment. Whereas before, racial and
ethnic diversity had no place in the growth machine’s plans to develop Houston, since the
19803 there has been some evidence that city officials and local economic leaders view
immigrant communities, and the diversity that they bring to the city, as important
amenities that contribute to attracting tourism and investment.

These ethnic enclaves tie into the city’s cultural amenities. During the mid-19903,
Imagine HoustonI ', a steering committee established by the city, submitted a report
proposing a plan “to celebrate and promote Houston as a vibrant, multi-cultural and
international center for the arts, urban design and historic resources” (Imagine Houston
1995a, p. 1). One of the proposed methods to accomplish this is to create a cultural

guidebook of the city. Specifically, the committee sought to:

Promote the City through the arts and the Greater Houston Convention
and Visitors’ Bureau (GHCVB), especially outside of Houston (including
internationally) in order to promote a cosmopolitan, positive image for the
City. [And] create a cultural guide which includes a map, and information
about services and historic resources (Imagine Houston 1995a, p. 6).

 

'0 The terms ethnic and immigrant place entrepreneur are used interchangeably in this
thesis.

H In 1994, Mayor Bob Lanier appointed lawyer David Berg to head Imagine Houston, a
steering committee organized by the Mayor’s Office and City Council to create a
community vision plan for the future. The steering committee formulated initiatives
relating to education, economy, diversity, neighborhoods, safety and beautification
(Mason 1995a). The cost of the committee amounted to $300,000 in public money to be
used to finance a proposal to transform Houston into a “city of urban villages,” which
would be implemented by the city’s Department of Planning and Development (Mason
1995b, p. A13).

63

Funding for this guidebook would Come from the GHCVB '2, the Greater Houston
Partnership, and the hotel occupancy taxes. Houston’s Department of Plarming and
Development13 also realized the importance of cultural amenities in promoting the city.

A report by the city’s planning and development department stated:

Cultural attractions can stimulate tourism and add to the City’s tax and
business revenues Cultural tourism can bring visitors to a city and can
keep visitors coming to the city for other reasons such as business,
conventions, shopping, medical treatment, or mild winter climate.
Cultural resources can attract corporate relocations and stimulate initiation
and growth of community-friendly industries and service professional
firms (City of Houston 1992, p. 25).

Another report from Imagine Houston listed the following “pathways to
progress,” which specifically incorporates ethnic communities into Houston’s

development plan:

Ensure that Houstonians have access to a multilingual network of
information, education, and other services to encourage participation in
community life, promote greater involvement by Houston’s ethnic
communities in economic development initiatives, particularly
international trade, [and] hold inter-ethnic forums to identify and explore
issues affecting our success as a multicultural community (Imagine
Houston 1995b, p. 11).

 

'2 The GHCVB serves as the sales and marketing arm of the city of Houston and Harris
County. The mission of the GHCVB is to improve the economy of Greater Houston by
attracting conventions, tourists and international government officials. (Greater Houston
Convention and Visitor’s Bureau 2009). The City of Houston provides $10 million
towards the Bureau’s $12 million operating budget (Mack 2006).

13 This department is responsible for the implementation of city ordinances, policies,
contracts, programs, and studies. The department oversees the historic preservation
division, as well as the neighborhood planning division, which promotes “programs and
initiatives designed to encourage the stabilization or revitalization of neighborhoods”
(City of Houston 2009c, up).

64

As argued by Vojnovic, “[t]he ability to capitalize on the Hispanic culture, already
proven successful in San Antonio and developing Chinatowns around the growing Asian
community, became new elements of the pro-growth agenda as Houston began
celebrating ethnic diversity” (Vojnovic 2003a, p. 615). The culmination of these reports
led to the recognition of the twelve distinct urban districts in the city (recall figure 3.5.3
on page 51).

During the mid—19803 and 19903, Houston’s new growth agenda also shifted
towards an interest in inner-city revitalization. Houston’s downtown, though a
commercial success given its collection of major corporate offices and headquarters,
lacked a strong residential presence. Houston’s downtown had a population of about
7,000 residents in 1990 (U.S. Census 1990) but market studies conducted during the mid-
19903 showed that nearly 100,000 residents would consider living in the downtown area
(Williams 1997b). Most of Houston’s population resided in the suburbs but recent
changes in consumer preferences for inner city living, as exemplified in increasing
gentrification and New Urbanist inspired developments, along with the availability of
vacant and relatively inexpensive properties created an opportunity to redevelop
Houston’s urban core. In addition, this recent attention towards Houston’s downtown
and surrounding areas was partially attributed to an activist mayoral administration
during the 19903, a rebounding national economy, and the end of the sewer moratorium,
which restricted new developments in the city center (Barna 2003a). Such change in
interests created a potential for large—scale residential development projects in the

neighborhoods in and around downtown.

65

The city used its influence through public organizations, extensive tax credits and
public subsidies to selectively entice development projects in the area. Bob Lanier, who
served as Houston’s mayor from 1992 to 1998, was a former suburban developer whose
opposition towards mass transit rail was one of the rallying points during his election
campaign. However, after being elected he played a significant role in the redevelopment
of the city center. According to the then acting director for the Houston Downtown
Management District”, Mayor Lanier was the first mayor to use city resources for inner-
city redevelopment (B ama 2003a). Mayor Lanier selected Michael Stevens to head the
Houston Housing Finance Corporation (HHFC)15 , which is a city agency established to
manage federal funds to be used for constructing affordable housing. Federal funding
was used by the HHFC to buy and rehabilitate abandoned apartment units around the city
and sell them to private developers for a profit; restrictions kept 30% of the sold
apartment units affordable but these were not stringently enforced, and some questioned
if the city had become too committed as a public real estate developer (Barna 2003a).
The city had focused on generating profits for itself and for developers who benefited

from these land sales at the expense of providing affordable housing.

 

'4 Formed by an act of the Texas Legislature in 1995 with the authority to assess taxes on
downtown businesses, the management district promotes new downtown revitalization
projects by leveraging public funding with private resources. Since 1996, the
management district has been involved in over 110 public and private construction
projects amounting to over $4 billion, in addition to receiving $500 million in
infrastructure improvements from the city of Houston, and from state and local
transportation authorities (Houston Downtown Management District 2006).

'5 The HHFC is a public non-profit corporation established by the city of Houston in
1979. The HHFC was formed to provide affordable housing in the city by issuing over
$600 million in mortgage bonds, providing assistance towards home ownership, and
directing loans to redevelop residential properties (Houston Housing Finance Corporation
2007). The HHFC is most known for its participation in renovating the Rice Hotel and
its activities in redeveloping Houston’s Fourth Ward.

66

Local development initiatives in Houston also involved public-private
partnerships. One such partnership is evident in the $800 million proposed development
of Buffalo Bayou, a currently ongoing project. Buffalo Bayou is Houston’s historic
waterway that runs through the city’s downtown. The focus of public resources on this
project reflects the spirit and goals of Houston’s broader economic development
initiatives. As noted in the Buffalo Bayou Master Plan”:

Successful 213t century cities will be those that attract and retain creative
entrepreneurial people who drive knowledge-based industries—the new
global economy. As this global economy shifts from moving goods to
generating ideas, great cities are renewing themselves along their
waterfronts—New York’s Harbor, Chicago’s Lakefront, Baltimore’s Inner
Harbor, Barcelona’s seafront. Because of these global shifts in the
competitive value system, it is the moment to reevaluate ecological and
urban goals, to rejoin land and water, and to establish an identity for
Houston extolling the harmony of its built and natural environment. This
2lst century outlook establishes the Buffalo Bayou Master Plan’s theme—
Balancing Conservation and Development. (Thompson Design Group Inc.
2002, p. 3)

Another example of a public—private initiative promoting redevelopment in
Houston is Discovery Green”, a 1.2 acre, $122 million park in downtown Houston, which

opened in 2008. Discovery Green is located close to the George R. Brown’s Convention

Center, Minute Maid Park, and Toyota Center. In addition to natural green areas and a

 

'6 In 1984, Mayor Kathy Whitmore appointed a task force to study the feasibility of
redeveloping the Buffalo Bayou waterfront. The outcome has been the creation of the
Buffalo Bayou Partnership, a non-profit authority composed of government and business
representatives and a director who is confirmed by the Houston mayor and Harris County
judge. The partnership has raised $45 million for the development (Buffalo Bayou
Partnership n.d.).

’7 Discovery Green Conservancy is the primary developer of the Discovery Green
project. The city of Houston with support from Mayor Bill White, initiated the
conservancy as a public-private partnership to develop and operate Discovery Green.
Downtown Park Corporation, a public local government corporation that owns the park,
was responsible for acquiring private land for the project.

67

lake, the park has children’s playgrounds, art displays, an amphitheatre, a restaurant, and
an ice rink (Discovery Green 2008). The city of Houston has provided $41 million for
the development costs of the park (Snyder 2008), and is also promoting similar
development and redevelopment projects of other parks throughout the city.

Urban revitalization in Houston is also facilitated though direct public investment
focused on manicuring the urban environment and improving access to amenities in the
urban core. This public investment was meant to complement the private and the private-
public redevelopment initiatives in the downtown. The string of large-scale projects
commenced in 1987 with the opening of the George R. Brown’s Convention Center”, a
$104.9 million project built and operated by the City of Houston. In 2001, a $165 million
addition was added to the Convention Center, which included the 1,200-room Hilton-
Americas Hotel, increasing the overall size of the Center to 1.8 million square feet
(George R. Brown Convention Center 2009). In the context of its minimal government

ethic, one might question the city of Houston running a 1,200-room hotel. '9

 

'8 The convention center is managed by the Houston Convention and Entertainment
Facilities (CEF) Department, which also operates several theaters and cultural centers in
the Houston Theater District. The CEF has an operating budget of $80 million which is
mostly paid for through local hotel tax and parking fees. The CEF also administers
contracts for the Greater Houston Convention and Visitor’s Bureau (City of Houston
2009b)

'9 Houston Convention Center Hotel Corporation (HCCHC) is a non-profit corporation
created February 2, 2000, by the Houston City Council. HCCHC funded, developed,
constructed, and now operates and maintains the Hilton-Americas Hotel. In 2007, the
Hotel recorded $77.5 million in revenues and $23.5 million in operating profits, of which
HCCHC allotted $92 million to the city to pay off public bonds issued for the
construction of the hotel (Houston Convention Center Hotel Corporation 2007).

68

Figure 4. 5. 1. ' Downtown View From George R. Brown Convention Center — Discovery

Green in Foreground (source: Author)
“I?“ g‘ . '

 

Figure 4. 5.2: Discovery Green — George R. Brown Convention Center in Background
(source: Author)

’ 1.1 ’

.m,«
f“,
.{_

. .:;+L

an up?

\“‘k\ l n-' [’77

 

69

 

70

Table 4.5.1 : Selected Inner City Redevelopment Projects Receiving Public Funding

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Public
Project Name Year Primary Developer(s) Funding
(millions)
Buffalo Bayou 1986 — City of Houston, $ 331.1 -
Waterfront present Buffalo Bayou Partnership 580.620
Main Street 2004 Metropolitan Transit 326.9
Redevelopment Authority
Convention Center Hotel 2003 City of Houston 285
Reliant Stadium 2002 Harris County Sports & 284
Convention Corp
Toyota Center 2003 Harris County Sports & 182
Convention Corp
Minute Maid Park 2000 Harris County Sports & 180
Convention Cg)
Convention Center 2001 City of Houston 165
Expansion
George R. Brown 1987 City of Houston 104.9
Convention Center
Cotswold Project 2006 City of Houston, 68
Downtown Management
District
Discovery Green 2008 City of Houston, 41
Downtown Park Corp,
Discovery Green Conservancy
Bayou Place Phase 1A 1997 City of Houston, 23
The Cordish Company
Rice Lofts 1998 The Randall Davis Company 12
Club Quarters Hotel 2004 City of Houston, 10
Downtown Management
District
Fourth Ward 1994 — City of Houston, Renaissance 10
Redevelopment present Inc, HHFC
Southeast Quadrant 2004 City of Houston, Downtown 8
Streetscape Management District
Jones Plaza 2001 City of Houston 6
2036.9 -
Tm" 2286.4

 

Sources: Williams (1997a); Brewer (2001); and Dawson (2002); CD8 Market
Research (2005); Houston Downtown Management District (2009)

 

20 Projected Costs

71

 

   
 
   
    

 

 

 

      
 
 
   
 

. Public Art
Main Street Light RailI ff Ba)“
10 ’
B“ a __..//
THEATER /
DIsrRi-fii 1

FOURTH
WARD
5
LlTleE ,
SAIéON ”IF 0.25 0.5
MIDTOWN E: Miles
Projects Receiving Public Aid
1) Bayou Place 7) Minute Maid Park (Baseball Stadium)
2) Jones Plaza 8) George R. Brown Convention Center
3) Rice Lofts 9) Discovery Green
4) Main Street Revitalization 10) Hilton-Americas Convention Center Hotel
5) Freedmen’s Town Redevelopment 11) Toyota Center (Arena)
6) Buffalo Bayou Redevelopment 12) Mercado Del Sol

Old Chinatown Projects (privately funded):
a) On Leong Building b) Chinese Cultural Center 0) Former Site of Proposed Chinatown Gate

The renovation of the Rice Hotel and its conversion into loft apartments had a $32
million price tag, which was partially paid for through historical preservation tax credits
and incremental tax revenues (Williams 1997b). In addition, extensive public subsidies
were used to build the two sports projects in downtown and the new football stadium
(Reliant Stadium) in south Houston. Minute Maid Park (formerly known as Enron
Field), which serves as home for the Houston Astros—the city’s major league baseball

franchise, and the Toyota Center, which houses the NBA’s Houston Rockets fianchise,

72

are the two major stadium projects located downtown. According to one source, “nearly
$1 billion will be spent on local stadiums between 1997 and 2002, the fastest buildup in
modern times of three major-league sports facilities in any U.S. city... At least two—thirds
of the money spent or earmarked for Enron Field, Reliant Stadium and the arena (Toyota
Center) is public money” (Berger 2000, p. A1).

The downtown Main Street redevelopment program is one of the more ambitious
initiatives to take place in Houston’s city center. Public and private interests have formed
the Houston Main Street Commission, a partnership created to advance and implement
proposals to redevelop Houston’s inner city districts along the Main Street corridor.
Some goals of the Main Street Commission include: to “revitalize and transform the
Main Street Corridor through the strategic integration of land use and
transportation/transit;” and to “[s]timulate and intensify development, including inner-
city residential housing, new businesses, and urban beautification,” (Federal Highway
Administration 2009, n.p.).2| The city received $3.4 million in federal funds between
1999 and 2001 to fund the pilot study coordinated by the Main Street Commission. The
Main Street Coalition includes the city of Houston, Harris County, the Metropolitan
Transit Authority, the Houston-Galveston Area Council——the metropolitan planning
organization serving the region, the Texas Department of Transportation, institutions
such as the Texas Medical Center and the Museum of Fine Arts, and various civic groups

and nonprofit and businesses, including Central Houston, Inc.22

 

2' N.P. - No page number provided

22 Central Houston, Inc. is a private non-profit civic improvement organization funded by
downtown businesses. Bob Eury, its current president, also serves as executive director of
Houston Downtown Management District. Central Houston is involved with marketing
downtown to businesses, streetscape beautification projects, and business advocacy.

73

This program prescribes connecting several urban districts (Downtown, Theater
District, Midtown, Museum District, Rice University, and Medical Center) by
constructing a $300 million light-rail system23 along the Main Street right-of-way. This
plan also encourages the redesign of certain districts through improved streetscapes and
new construction projects. The railway traverses through downtown, midtown, the
museum district, medical center, and terminates at the sports complex in south Houston.
The plan focuses on certain zones within these districts that attract high levels of activity
such as historical buildings, the convention center, museums, and public spaces. It also
proposes creating new attractions such as the construction of a new cathedral and
adjacent square as well as the creation of a new public school for performing arts next to
Main Street. The plan also recommends augmenting preexisting attractions such as the
flower market and museums in and around Midtown. The plan maintains that “the
concepts for each district are market-driven—with uses and scale to be determined by
market forces” (Ehrenkrantz Eckstut & Kuhn Architects 2000, p. 6).24 However, the city
plays a significant role in guiding these developments, the most notable being the public
subsidization of the sports arenas and the building of the convention center—which will

serve as major anchors incorporated within this plan.

 

Central Houston was also active in relocating professional sports franchises downtown
through initiating market research; site selection of stadium projects and voter advocacy
drives to approve stadium construction.
The initial 7.5 mile light-rail track was completed in December 2003. Voters have
authorized a $640 million bond to fund an additional 22 miles of track, which is

234cheduled to be completed in 2012 (Wall 2003).

' Ehrenkrantz Eckstut & Kuhn Architects prepared the Main Street Corridor Master Plan
111 August 2000 for the Houston Department of Planning & Development and the Main
Street Coalition - an organization created by the mayor’s office to direct the revitalization

0f the Main Street Corridor.

74

Figure 4. 5. 6: Houston’s Public Art Installations and Urban Districts25

- Public Art '
O

 

 

 

L 0
no ' ..
o I 9
. K
Old
— d
8 B . Downtown .4 I Chinatown
D O
3 New Chinatown C .
G
59 o H k F
I o .
A
I 288 I
' N
' A
0:1-:2_ Miles

District:
A- Southwest, Chinatown, Harwin E — Midtown l - Medical Center
B - Uptown, Galleria F - Third Ward J - Downtown, Theater District
C - Upper Kirby. River Oaks, Greenway G - Museum District K - Sixth Ward
D - Montrose H - Rice Village L - Houston Heights

The city’s planning and development department received federal grants of over
$5 million to help fund Main Street and related projects between 1999 and 2002 (City of
Houston n.d.). In addition, the master plan asserts that there exist “many opportunities
for art to enhance the Main Street Corridor and to contribute to the creation of unique
civic spaces, as well as ‘wayfinding’ and cultural identity” (Ehrenkrantz Eckstut & Kuhn
Architects 2000, p. 48) such as plazas and squares, street furniture, bayou crossings”,

gateways, developing green spaces and incorporated artwork along overhead freeways,

 

25 Locations derived from the City of Houston’s (2009a) municipal art inventory.

26 Art can be an important tool for reconnecting Houston to its bayous. Vertical elements
can be designed to denote a bayou crossing for automobiles and pedestrians, and can be
given a night-time character through special lighting (Ehrenkrantz Eckstut & Kuhn
Architects 2000, p. 48)

75

using artists to design light-rail transit stops, and providing public spaces to showcase art.
Recently, the city actively placed civic art along the Main Street Corridor in order to
provide attractive public spaces and to promote increasing pedestrian traffic downtown.
Figure 4.5.2 shows that the majority of the city’s public art are located in downtown and
in the Museum District, two important anchors along the newly built light-rail line.

These projects that bolstered Houston’s downtown amenities, facilitated a new
demand for downtown living and created new opportunities for developers to build
additional residential development projects. However, such projects placed additional
burdens on minorities and lower income residents. The announcement of the major
construction projects, such as the new stadiums, led speculators and landowners to
demand excessively higher prices for their holdings (Bivens 1996), effectively restricting
development to high-retum projects that cater to the affluent.

During this time, the city of Houston also became involved in directly subsidizing
the redevelopment of riskier urban projects. In addition to the subsidization of private
redevelopment projects, the city began supporting land clearing and land assembly, and
this was all evident in the redevelopment of the city’s traditional African American
neighborhood, Freedmen’s Town (Podagrosi and Vojnovic, 2008). The city of Houston
assisted in developing innovative institutional structures to facilitate land acquisition and
assembly in the Fourth Ward, a historic African-American neighborhood adjacent to
Houston’s downtown. There was a long history of land struggle and attempted
displacement of the traditional Black population dating back to the 19203. In recent

history, this struggle was effectively illustrated in 1995 when the Houston Housing

76

Authority27 submitted a request to the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
demolish the Allen Parkway Village (APV), a predominantly African-American housing
project. In June of 1996, 250 armed officers forcibly evicted APV residents from their
units. By September 1996, demolition had been approved and a redevelopment project
was put in place that reduced the original number of units in half and pursued a mixed-
income housing initiative (Podagrosi and Vojnovic, 2008).

In 1994, the land struggle in the Fourth Ward was further exacerbated by the entry
of a nonprofit agency, the Houston Renaissance Inc.28 The Renaissance was created by
local developers and city of Houston officials with the task of purchasing and assembling
property in the Fourth Ward for redevelopment. The original plan involved building 80
blocks of moderately priced single family housing units. Approximately $10 million was
granted to the Houston Renaissance by the city of Houston and the Houston Housing
Finance Corporation to purchase properties in the Fourth Ward (Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas 2002). The city originally planned to subsidize the construction of 350 affordable
housing units through Renaissance, but Mayor Bob Lanier’s housing officials made
allowances scaling the project back to 150 units (Verhovek 1998). Consequently,
Houston Renaissance adopted block-busting tactics, extensively recorded by the Houston

Chronicle and other local journalists (Podagrosi and Vojnovic 2008).

 

27 The city established the Houston Housing Authority in response to the US Housing
Act of 1937, which subsidized improving low-income housing. This agency is funded
and overseen by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and does not
have connections to city hall (Mason 1997)

8 Renaissance is a private non-profit organization established by Julio Laguarta, a
prominent real estate developer who also served in Houston’s planning department. The
purpose of the organization was to raise money and redevelop Houston’s Fourth Ward.

77

In 1999, however, after exhausting public funds to purchase and assemble
extensive tracts of land for redevelopment in the Fourth Ward, and after not being able to
raise funds to build moderate priced housing, the Renaissance filed for bankruptcy. The
Houston Housing Finance Corporation then took over ownership of the properties.
Approximately 20 parcels were transferred to the Housing Authority of the City of
Houston to be used for affordable housing, and the remaining properties were sold to
private developers at $16 per square foot (Sarnoff 2000). The low prices at which the
properties were sold (particularly when compared to adjacent parcels in the downtown
averaging $100 to $125 per square foot) in combination with the fact that the community
was cleansed from the original resident and the properties already assembled, made

private redevelopment in this once-risky community much more attractive.

4.6 Conclusions

While local residents and public officials are proud to market and celebrate
Houston’s minimal government philosophy, Houston’s existence and historical
development into a major city is a testament to the effective lobbying by the city’s
business elite to get public funding for private local development projects and
complementary public amenity investments. Houston’s recent downtown revival efforts
are a reflection, once again, of the role of government in facilitating local economic
development. By attracting public investment and subsidies, the local business elite
manipulates the attractiveness of certain places and industries within the city, minimizing
the risk of new investment. For instance, in the city’s recent urban revival efforts, by

removing obstacles to development, from unwanted populations to urban blight, the city

78

made new investments considerably more attractive. This process has facilitated
investment synergies, as the billion-plus dollars in government investment in the
downtown has facilitated new scales of redevelopment. Public monetary intervention,
such as the initiatives above, alter local prices for investors and change the relative
attractiveness of place, encouraging private development in locations targeted by the
public investment or public subsidies. It is not just the money, though, but the
government involvement in politically sensitive redevelopment efforts—for instance,
‘domesticating’ neighborhoods such as the Fourth Ward—that plays a critical role in
ensuring increased security and stability for private investors. Given the city’s new
celebration of historic and ethnic neighborhoods, tearing down the historically and
culturally significant Freedmen’s Town would have been difficult for private developers
without the extraordinary political, administrative, and fiscal impacts of government.

Recent developments have become more piece-meal, but the pro- growth
philosophy, which has pervaded throughout Houston’s history, remains entrenched in the
local culture. Recent development projects in and around the downtown area—with
extensive support from government in the form of compatible public investment or the
direct subsidization of private projects—ultimately have benefited corporations,
developers, sports team owners, tourists, conventioneers, and residents who are able to
reside in these redeveloped neighborhoods and districts (Vojnovic 2003a, 2003b;
Podagrosi and Vojnovic 2008).

The next chapter provides evidence that individuals and organizations from
Houston’s lower income groups, and ethnic and racial minorities, have not been as

successful in getting financial support from the local government for their development

79

projects. While Houston’s local government and the media extensively celebrate the
city’s diversity, this verbal support has not been translated into public aid that has been
granted by the city to many ethnic business elites involved in local urban redevelopment,
including upscale projects. By not receiving public assistance, it not only reveals that
ethnic place entrepreneurs are not part of the mainstream growth coalition, but without
this public funding, ethnic place entrepreneurs simply could not compete against other
developers that were receiving public financial support. In the Chinatown case study, the
Chinese entrepreneurs were displaced from their downtown holdings at various times
over the last two decades as a result of inner—city redevelopment initiatives orchestrated

by the mainstream growth coalition and financed by government.

80

5. Chinese-Americans in Houston

5.1 Chinese Immigration

Houston’s Chinese immigration can be divided into two waves: the first wave
spanning a century from 1870 - 1970 was of primarily Cantonese origin. The second
wave occurred from the 19703 onwards. However, for much of the 20Lh century, the
Chinese comprised a small portion of the city’s population. Houston did not contain a
sizeable and visible Chinese enclave, unlike the major American cities on the Pacific
Coast and in the Northeast. In addition, several mining and frontier communities in the
American West had Chinese communities more developed than Houston’s. In the case of
Texas, during the turn of the 20‘h century, places such as El Paso and San Antonio
registered larger Chinese populations than Houston (see table 5.1.1).

These Chinese laborers were highly transitory given the nature of the work in
which they were employed. However, a few enterprising individuals were able to escape
from a life of menial labor and earn enough savings to support their own businesses. The
Houston Chronicle describes that not too long after the arrival of the first group of
Chinese, an unidentified laundry whose owner “was probably Houston’s first Chinese
businessman and his was probably Houston’s first laundry” because for many residents in
and around Houston, the “family washing and ironing problems had until then been taken
care of by the family slaves; but those days were past and the time was ripe for an
energetic ‘Yankee of the Orient’ to set himself up in the business” (Hendricks 1942, up).
The first Chinese residents in the City of Houston were enumerated in the 1880 citywide
census. They included a family of three comprised of a Mr. and Mrs. Wah Yeun and

their six-month-old son, Lincoln Yeun (Swanland 1995). The family operated a laundry

81

in Downtown Houston. Four other Chinese residents enumerated in the 1880 census
comprised of isolated males who were employed in the laundry business (Swanland

1995). The Chinese residential population remained small for the rest of the 19th

century.

Table 5.1.1: Chinese Population in Texas Cities (1880 - 2000)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sa El
Year Houston Galveston Dallas Antonio peso
1880 Chinese 7 15 6 0 0
% Pop 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00
1890 Chinese 8 42 63 46 210
% Pop 0.03 0.14 0.17 0.12 2.03
1900 Chinese 43 68 24 62 299
% Pop 0.10 0.18 0.06 0.12 1.88
1910 Chinese 10 46 16 62 228
"/0 Pop 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.58
1920 Chinese 13 11 193 426
°/o Pop 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.55
1930 Chinese 179 112 454 310
% Pop 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.30
1940 Chinese 119 21 471
°/o Pop 0.03 0.01 0.19
1950 Chinese
% Pop
1960 Chinese 765 72 399
% Pop 0.08 0.01 0.07
1970 Chinese 3.046 525 903
% Pop 0.25 0.12 0.14
1980 Chinese 8,703 1,557 1,169
% Pop 0.55 0.17 0.15
1990 Chinese 17,317 4,105 2,094
°/o Pop 1.06 0.41 0.22
2000 Chinese 24,001 5,762 3,271
°/o Pop 1.23 0.48 0.29

 

Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau

82

Table 5.1.2: Chinese Population in Major US Gateway Cities (1870 - 2000)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

New York San Loa
Y9“ ”WSW" City Chicago Francisco Angeles
1870 Chinese 0 12 0 12,030 172
°/o Pop 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.05 3.00
1880 Chinese 7 747 173 21 .790 605
% Pop 0.04 0.06 0.03 9.31 5.41
1890 Chinese 8 1 ,970 567 25,833 1,871
°/o Pop 0.03 0.13 0.05 8.64 3.71
1900 Chinese 43 6,321 1,209 13,954 2,111
% Pop 0.10 0.18 0.07 4.07 2.06
1910 Chinese 10 4,614 1,778 10,582 1,954
% Pop 0.01 0.10 0.08 2.54 0.61
1920 Chinese 13 5,042 2,353 7,744 2,062
% Pop 0.01 0.09 0.09 1.53 0.36
1930 Chinese 179 13,363 5,442 27,700 28,454
% Pop 0.06 0.19 0.16 4.37 2.30
1940 Chinese 119 12,753 2,013 17,782 4,736
% Pop 0.03 0.17 0.06 2.80 0.31
1950 Chinese
% Pop
1960 Chinese 765 12,173 1,915 15,821 6,734
°/o Pop 0.08 0.16 0.05 2.14 0.27
1 970 Chinese 3,046 69,324 9,357 58,696 27,345
°/o Pop 0.25 0.88 0.28 8.20 0.10
1980 Chinese 8,703 24,764 13,638 82,480 44.353
% Pop 0.55 0.35 0.45 12.15 1.49
1990 Chinese 17,317 238,919 22,295 127,140 67,196
% Pop 1.06 3.26 0.80 17.56 1.93
2000 Chinese 24,001 361,531 31,813 152,620 63,075
% Pop 1.23 4.51 1.10 19.65 1.71

 

Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau

83

The repeal of the Chinese Exclusionary Acts in 194329, the loss of Mainland
China to communism in 1949, and the increasing legal quotas for newly arriving Chinese
professionals, culminating in the passage of the Hart-Cellar Immigration Act of 196530,
which abolished racial discrimination in American immigration laws, would have a
dramatic impact on the size of the Chinese community in Houston as well as the United
States. Prior to the Hart-Cellar Act, the United States had 236,084 ethnic Chinese
according the 1960 U.S. Census. The Chinese accounted for about a tenth of 1 percent of
the national population. Since then, the Chinese population would nearly double in size
for each decade (Chang 2003). In 1960, the city of Houston had 765 Chinese residents—
roughly 0.08 percent of the city population. In 1980, this grew to 8,703 Chinese,
accounting for half of 1 percent of the city’s population. By 2000, Houston registered
24,001 Chinese residents, which is about 1.2 percent of the city’s population. For the
greater Houston area (the Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area or PMSA), the census
recorded 46,841 Chinese residents, which comprises 1.1 percent of the PMSA
population.

During the second half of the 20’h century, many of these Chinese immigrants
came to Houston to secure jobs different from those of their predecessors. Whereas the
earlier immigrants were generally uneducated and took low-paying jobs in construction
and farm labor in addition to menial work in laundries, restaurants, and grocery stores,

many of the newer generation of immigrants had higher levels of education and worked

 

29 The Magnuson Act (aka the Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943) allowed Chinese
immigration into the U.S. and permitted citizenship to Chinese already residing in the
country. This occurred during World War II when China was an ally to the U.S..

30 Also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. This act effectively
ended immigration quotas mandated by the Immigration Act of 1924, which had
prohibited immigration of East Asians and Asian Indians.

84

as scientists and engineers for Houston’s growing petroleum and energy industry
(Interview with Don Wang April 2009). Others were hired as medical specialists for
Houston’s newly constructed Medical Center. In addition, most of the Chinese up to the
mid-20th century were of Cantonese origin, but during the later decades this composition
became more diversified as Houston experienced the arrival of Chinese immigrants
originating from Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, other provinces of Mainland China, as
well as overseas Chinese living in a variety of states and foreign countries prior to their
arrival in Houston.

These changing characteristics in addition to the disintegrating barriers to
property ownership contributed to changes in Houston’s Chinese residential patterns.
During the 19603 and 19703, many of the Chinese residents who originally lived on the
eastside of downtown Houston moved towards the southwest periphery of the city and in
neighboring affluent Fort Bend County. In addition, a few professionals moved to the
southeast, which houses a high concentration of oil refineries and is also the location of
NASA’s Johnson Space Center. However, the Alief and Sharpstown neighborhoods in
southwest suburban Houston experienced the greatest level of growth in Chinese
residents. Between 1980 and 2000, the census tract comprising the center of the New
Chinatown, which has Houston’s highest concentration of Chinese, experienced an
increase in the number of Chinese residents from 64 in 1980 to 2,331 in 2000 (US Census
1980; US Census 2000). Chinese residents comprised of 4.2 percent of the total
population in this tract in 1980 and by 2000 this value increased to 16.1 percent (US
Census 1980; US Census 2000). In addition, this single tract is the home to 10 percent of

the city’s total Chinese population (US Census 2000). The growing Chinese, as well as

85

growing pan-Asian populations, has contributed to a distinctly Asian presence in these
neighborhoods. Likewise, the growing Asian populations have attracted a developing
ethnic business district in the Alief and Sharpstown neighborhoods. This district has
become Houston’s New Chinatown replacing the downtown location as the cultural,

social, and economic center of an increasingly diverse Chinese community.

Figure 5.1.1: Harris County and the City of Houston with Downtown and Chinatowns

 

:1 Harris County
City of Houston 0

 

E 8 if
8
> z

5.2 Chinese Place Entrepreneurs

Irnmi grant Chinese place entrepreneurs played a significant role in the promotion
of Houston neighborhoods to coethnics. Houston’s first Chinese neighborhood was
located in the northern section of downtown. It comprised a loose collection of Chinese-
owned business, primarily laundries and restaurants, with locations scattered across

several city blocks (see figure 5.2.1). An early example of an organized and deliberate

86

creation of a Chinese-themed district by the Chinese business community occurred
during World War II. The New York Chinese Merchant’s Association, in collaboration
with Houston’s Chinese leaders, announced plans to create a Chinese business and
community center on the 400 block of Smith Street (near the intersection with Texas
Street) in downtown Houston; the center would include spaces for restaurants, novelty
shops, and other business houses (Houston Chronicle 1944). The purpose of this building
project was not only to provide a central place to house Houston’s Chinese businesses,
but to also build up the businesses’ visibility to attract non-Chinese and visitors into the
area. Jimmie Lin, a local restaurant operator and chairman of the Chinese Merchants
Association affirmed that the entrepreneurs “will give the people of Houston and visitors
to the city a real and colorful Chinese center” (Houston Chronicle 1944).

However, this attempt was short lived as the booming Houston economy sparked
a skyscraper binge in the downtown, forcing the Chinese business community to relocate
outside of the downtown. The second Chinese business district was centered within a
predominately African American neighborhood just to the east of downtown in the
Second Ward. Several businesses were established along St. Emanuel Street, which
served as the de facto main strip of the Chinatown district. During the 19503, the On
Leong Merchants Association3 I erected their meetinghouse on the boundary between
downtown Houston and Chinatown (see figure 5.2.2 on pg. 91). However, during later

decades, the Chinese population continued to expand outward towards the suburbs. The

 

3 ' The On Leong Merchant’s Association began as a tong society established in New
York City’s Chinatown in 1893 by immigrant Cantonese-Chinese. The purpose of the On
Leong Merchant’s Associations was to offer services to newly arriving immigrants,
provide a financial support network for local Chinese businesses. The Houston chapter
was active in hosting a variety of Chinese social and cultural events in the city.

87

Chinatown district would be relegated to catering to weekend visitors as well as weekday

lunch crowds that strolled in from company offices located in the neighboring CBD.

Figure 5.2.1: Original Downtown Chinese Businesses and Old Chinatown District’ 2

Chinese Businesses (1905-30)
s Laundry
A Restaurant

.. Old Chinatown (1978-2000)

 

During the 19703, Lang Yee “Bo Bo” Woo, who was born in Guangdong, China
was one of the primary leaders responsible for marketing Old Chinatown to a broader
audience. Woo was president of the Chinese Economic Development firm who
aggressively built up the necessary infrastructure to develop the Old Chinatown district.

Woo envisioned a location for people to come together, “not only for the tourists, but for

 

32 Source: U.S. Asian News (April 25, 1986), derived from Swanland (1995)

88

the Chinese American community” (Lee 1978, n.p.).33 The neighborhood was also
located in a strategic area that had the potential to draw large numbers of visitors as
Houston’s oil-economy continued to boom. The completion of the first phase of the
Houston Center—a master planned high-rise shopping and office complex in
downtown—and the development of nearby hotels placed Old Chinatown within close
proximity to a pool of potential tourists. Woo explained the additional necessity for a
city such as Houston to have a real Chinatown: “Houston has a million and a half people
now and there is a need for them. There are a lot of tourists in the downtown area and I
always thought, ‘Where gonna [sic] be Chinatown’?” (Budd 1978, n.p.). The initial
development consisted of a collection of low-density buildings with green-tiled Chinese
roofs and a plethora of Chinese character signage in a designated area of two city blocks.
Proposed projects included a low-rise strip mall, grocery stores, a building to house a
Chinese savings and loan, federally funded housing, apartments, a nursing home, and a
cultural center.

The development project received interest from the non-Chinese community as
well. The then-active governor of Texas, Dolph Briscoe, presided over the red ribbon-
cutting ceremony for the newly constructed Chinese Cultural Center (Ewing 1978) and
Houston’s mainstream newspapers, the Houston Post and Houston Chronicle often
published stories promoting the district. The Chinese Cultural Center was a 308-seat
movie theater that had a green-tiled Chinese style pagoda roof and matching accents (see

figure 5.2.3). It’s main facade, with its red columns and distinctly Chinese architecture,

 

33 Note: newspaper articles prior to 1985 were stored in the Houston archives as
clippings. Unfortunately, the page numbers were not preserved. The term ‘n.p.’ stands
for no page number.

89

was to serve as the central focal point for Chinatown. During its completion, ground was
already broken to make way for a Chinese strip mall on the adjacent block. The cultural
center was built on land that Woo purchased from the On Leong Merchants Association
out of pocket; Woo had personally purchased about 40,000 square feet from the On
Leong Merchant’s Association, the Houston Independent School District and individual
homeowners in the area (Budd 1978). By the early 19803, Woo invested about $2.5
million in Chinatown, “a good reason for his opposition to Chinatown’s move to another
area such as southwest Houston, as has been suggested by some” (Karkabi 1982, n.p.).

However, one drawback of the neighborhood was that the image the promoters
were trying to convey was not completely apparent to the outside audience. Unlike
established Chinatown districts in other North American cities, this neighborhood overall
had few visual elements that would suggest that this was in fact an Asian-themed
neighborhood. One newspaper article accounts the status of the neighborhood during the
late 19705:

There’s an uneasy sense of shifting identity to the several blocks just east

of downtown Houston, where the skyscrapers cast shadows on an elevated

freeway and ragtag wooden houses vie for space with drab industrial

buildings. The area can’t seem to decide if it’s an inner-city ghetto, an

open-air home for transients, an industrial park or perhaps the first
Chinatown in Texas (Bryant 1979, n.p.).

Another problem was that most of the Chinese living in the greater Houston area and
“many maintain their Oriental identities in homes scattered in the best and worst parts of

town” (Bryant 1979, n.p.).

9O

Figure 5. 2.2: On Leong Merchants Association Building (abandoned) (source:
Author)

 

Figure 5.2.3: Former Chinese Cultural Center in Old Chinatown. Original Movie
Theater converted into an Asian Grocery Store. Convention Center and Elevated
Freeway at left (source: Author)

 

91

Figure 5.2.4: Asian Wholesaler Warehouse — Old Chinatown. Convention Center and
Downtown in Background (source: Author)

 

Figure 5.2.5: Asian Food and Restaurant Supply Wholesaler — Old Chinatown
(source: Author)

 

92

Response to the New Convention Center

In 1981, the Houston Center Improvement Committee submitted a report
promoting the benefits of constructing a world-class convention center on the eastside of
downtown. In addition to boasting easy accessibility, unlimited parking, opportunity to
acquire free land, room for future expansion, and overall cost effectiveness of the
proposed site, the committee also indicated “the development would enhance the
development of Chinatown, the planned Mexican-American Mercado (Mercado del Sol)
and business in general” (Convention Center Improvement Committee 1981, n.p.). This
is evidence that the city was aware of the Chinese business presence on the eastside.

In 1981, Woo secured $1.5 million in private funding from the DMA World
Corporation to expand the Chinatown development project; this project included a 900-
seat movie theater and added a two-story retail complex, which would house a variety of
retail shops, a bank, a beauty salon, and a meat market (Houston Post 1981). This
expansion was pursued with the hopes of revitalizing the area and, according to Woo,
provide a “variety of shops and services [that] will represent another retail and
entertainment asset for the attraction of convention groups to the proposed downtown
Convention Center” (Houston Post 1981, n.p.). Jan Lin surmised, “the construction of
the Brown Convention Center on the downtown’s southeastern periphery near Chinatown
[had] given the Asian community interests an opening” (Lin 1995, p. 636). This
sentiment was also shared by Woo more than a decade earlier who considered that “the
growing [Chinatown] development will also act as a catalyst in the revitalization of the

eastside area and the variety of shops and services will represent another retail and

93

entertainment asset for the attraction of convention groups to the proposed downtown

Convention Center” (Houston Post 1981, n.p.).

Funding the Development of Chinatown

Over time, the proposed Chinatown development projects became larger in scale.
Whereas Woo developed low-density strip malls during the initial stages of the
Chinatown project, later plans would call for high—rise projects that would complement
the developments occurring in Houston’s downtown. The Continental King Lung Group,
which is a Hong Kong-based conglomerate dealing with a variety of ventures ranging
from real estate to precious metals, acquired land in the Chinatown district in order to
construct a condominium tower, bank, restaurant, and nightclub. Woo noted that this
operation was “funded mainly by Chinese money from Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila,
and elsewhere (Hooper 1981, n.p.). One of the more ambitious proposals was to
construct a seven-story 200-room luxury hotel near the convention center, directed by
Woo’s Chinatown Development firm and Hong Kong-based Y.S.Y Credit Investment
(Hooper 1981). This hotel would be called the Mandarin Plaza International and its
architectural features were to be modeled after the Forbidden City in Beijing.

In addition to relying on contributions from private enterprises, downtown
Chinatown’s major entrepreneurs also attempted to attract investment from both local and
foreign government entities. For the Mandarin Plaza International project, which would
have broken ground by mid-1986, developers planned to use the city of Houston’s
industrial bonds to finance the project (Longeway 1985). In addition, Chinatown

received a 30-foot high traditional Chinese-style gate as a gift from the city of Taipei,

94

Taiwan (Kennedy 1989). The gate would have been located at the intersection of
McKinney and St. Emanuel Streets, the center of Chinatown.

Woo’s Chinatown Development firm established a branch office in Mainland
China to spur investment into Chinatown in response (to the real estate recession affecting
Houston at the time. Sonny Woo, vice president of Chinatown Development stated that
historically “Chinese-Americans haven’t been real receptive to courting the PRC
(People’s Republic of China) because they’re communists but now they’re seeing it as
a way to bring investment to the Chinese community” (Longeway 1985, p. D1). In
addition, his firrn’s Hong Kong office was trying to convince the China Shop, the official
state-run department store for the PRC, to open a location in Houston’s Chinatown.

In the meantime, the City of Houston was realizing the potential of this ethnic
neighborhood adjacent to downtown. The 1981 Convention Center Improvement
Committee proposal implied that steps were taken to get feedback from the businesses
adjacent to the building site and that the majority favored the construction of the
convention center; these included the Chinese entrepreneurs. In addition, the Chinese
development would have contributed to the “support amenities” necessary for the
viability of the convention center (Convention Center Improvement Committee 1981).

Chinatown was also incorporated in the 1987 Civic Improvement Plan, which had
specified these three goals of downtown redevelopment: “maintain and improve the

H ‘6

downtown as the transportation hub of the region, ensure the success of Houston’s
expanding convention and tourist business,” and “provide an exciting ‘core’ to

downtown” (Central Houston Civic Improvement 1987, p. 8). In addition, the plan

specifically stated that:

95

[N]ew visitors, including children, in the downtown must be offered
activities, entertainment, and fun in a secure and attractive environment
Visitors, shoppers, workers, and residents need a place which is appealing,
innovative, understandable, and economically productive. Retail facilities,
offices, and hotels in a revitalized street environment should also provide a
dynamic new image for the downtown (Central Houston Civic
Improvement 1987, p. 8)
In order to achieve this type of environment, the plan proposed the development of an
east side civic complex anchored by the George R. Brown Convention Center. The plan
also states that in addition to the convention center, “Chinatown has the potential for an
excellent visitor attraction” (Central Houston Civic Improvement 1987, p. 20). Also,
“street improvements within the area, such as ornamental gates or special street lights,
could easily reinforce the oriental character” (Central Houston Civic Improvement 1987,
p. 22) (see figure 5.2.6). Chinatown is seen as a “support facility,” along with the
Theater District, Warehouse District, Houston Center, and Main Street, which can be
used to attract visitors, especially businessmen and conventioneers into the area.

The Chinese entrepreneurs worked with the city’s planning department to
collaborate on a future 20-acre expansion to the east of the Chinatown district (Longeway
1985). However, the Department of Flaming and Development, in its 1986 report of the
Second Ward, devoted only two brief paragraphs on Chinatown and it did not mention
any details about the city’s involvement with the project:

Houston’s small, yet expanding Chinatown is located immediately

southwest of the Second Ward. Chinatown has developed along Chartres

and St. Emanuel streets, from Rusk Street on the north to McKinney Street

on the south.

The development of Chinatown is being led by the Chinatown

Development Company, which has constructed the existing shopping

center, bank, and theater. Chinatown Development Company has

announced plans to develop a seven-story, ZOO-room luxury hotel. The
site of the proposed hotel is at the intersection of St. Emanuel and

96

McKinney streets. The ultimate goal of the company is for Chinatown to
contain commercial development, and entertainment center, and
residential development (City of Houston 1986, p. 28)

During the late 19803, little progress had occurred. By 1989, the Mandarin Plaza

project was still on hold, and the Asian-themed developments were still restricted within

the few blocks along St. Emanuel and McKinney Streets.

Figure 5.2. 6: Artist rendering of the Proposed Streetscape for Old Chinatown (source:
Central Houston Civic Improvement 1987, p. 22)

 

 

   

 

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Sketch of oriental ornament for Chinatown '8 power poles, roads and
Sldewa/ks.

Obstacles Against Chinatown Development
Several problems had plagued the location of downtown Chinatown, such

as parking, highly inflated land values, and limited infrastructural capacity. By

97

the early 19803, real estate prices already hindered further expansion of the
district. George W. Jones, a local realtor who operates a brokerage firm in the
area offered cautious criticism of the Chinatown project: “Bobo [Woo] wants to
build one- and two- story shops and cafes but can’t do it if the land is too
expensive for anything but high-rises” (Hooper 1981, n.p.). This concern relates
to another factor, which is that the majority of these developments were privately
financed, many of which were funded out of pocket by Woo. This condition
severely limited the ability to purchase additional land if prices inflate. Such is
the case in the eastside of downtown where the city’s announcement to build the
new convention center adjacent to Chinatown caused many owners in that
neighborhood to demand a higher selling price for their properties (Hooper 1981),
thus hindering future growth of the Chinatown project. Compounding this
problem was the lack of city services. Joh Liu, 3 local business operator lamented
that “if [the entrepreneurs] don’t get some kind of communication going with City
Hall, the property taxes will go up, city services will go down and prohibit
expansion. Then we might be in danger of losing Chinatown” (Karkabi 1982,
n.p.).

The 1986 Houston Department of Flaming and Development report devotes
several pages to discussing the predicted success of the nearby Mercado del Sol site and
surrounding Hispanic neighborhoods, whereas only a couple brief paragraphs referring to
the Chinatown site. The report described the conditions of Chinatown but did not
incorporate it, or promote it, into the local economic deveIOpment strategy. The report

also contains a brief outline of a Historical Preservation plan for the Second Ward. The

98

passage of Ordinance 81-625 allowed the City of Houston to partially exempt historically
significh properties from ad-valorem taxes. The report recommended neighborhood
churches, industrial buildings, and the Mercado del Sol site as potential recipients of aid.
Properties within Chinatown were notably excluded from this report even though it
contains the historically and culturally significant On Leong Merchant’s Association
Building.

The 1986 report also discusses the possibility for public expenditures for capital
improvement campaigns in the Second Ward. Again, the Mercado del Sol project is
listed as the primary beneficiary of public investment. The 1985-1989 Capital
Improvements Plan allocated funds for street improvements for the site. The report
states: “the scheduled construction of El Mercado del Sol Park on the site is an additional
public expenditure benefit to Second Ward residents and the leveraging of public
funds, as in the development of El Mercado del Sol will provide incentive for additional
reinvestment” (City of Houston 1986, p. 39).

The aging sewer lines especially prohibited Chinatown to be developed in places
owned by the Chinese entrepreneurs. The 1986 Planning and Development Report
admitted that the “lack of sewer capacity has been a deterrent to development” (City of
Houston 1986, p. 35). This lack of sewer capacity was attributed to a moratorium placed
on the construction of new sewer lines in certain areas east of downtown, which
precluded any new development of wastewater—intensive projects. In the case of
Chinatown, these restrictions confounded any major development projects. Although the
moratorium was lifted with the opening of a new wastewater treatment facility, sewage

limits were still in place. Developers who planned to develop major projects in the

99

vicinity needed to petition for additional sewer capacity through procedures established
by the Capital Recovery Ordinance, which assessed charges on developments in order to
contribute to the cost of the new wastewater treatment facility. According to one local
entrepreneur, “growth screeched to a halt in the mid—1980s, partly because of a lack of
sewerage capacity if someone wants to open a restaurant in Chinatown, he or she
would have to buy existing sewerage rights at $8 to $10 a gallon” (Yip 1993c, p. D1).
The convention center, which the Chinese place entrepreneurs saw as a boon to
their goals of establishing a downtown Chinatown, turned out to have lasting effects,
limiting the success of the development. The announcement to build the convention
center along the downtown’s eastside caused land prices to skyrocket, limiting the ability
of the Chinese place entrepreneurs to expand their current holdings. In addition, the
convention center’s design contributed to the failure of Chinatown to attract visitors.
During its completion, the convention center covered three city blocks along the Eastex
Freeway (U.S. 59). Following its most recent expansion, the convention center now
occupies five blocks with its main entrances facing towards Discovery Green and
downtown. Its service entrances and fenced-in parking lot faces the elevated freeway
pillars and Chinatown beyond. The design along with the elevated freeway effectively
created a physical barricade between Chinatown and downtown (see figure 5.2.7). The
convention center itself cut off traffic from cross streets that had once connected the
eastside to downtown. The anticipated results from the construction of the convention
center, which was “expected to increase business, as conventioneers could walk under
U.S. 59 in search of a Chinese meal or Oriental gift,” according to one observer, “have

been disappointing. . .as few conventioneers remain downtown after hours” (Baird 1990,

100

p. D1). Also, the journey from the main entrance of the convention center underneath the
freeway was not pedestrian friendly and the appearance of the backside of the convention
center and the poor appearance of the neighborhood would hardly inspire many visitors

to hazard the trek to Chinatown.

Figure 5.2. 7: Eastex Freeway (U.S. 59) Causeway and George R. Brown Convention
Center as seen from Old Chinatown (source: Author)

 

Finally, during the mid-19805, rival Chinese entrepreneurs were developing two
competing “suburban—style” Chinatowns in the outskirts of Houston. Calvin M. Leung, a
Hong Kong-bom California businessman acquired ZOO-acres of open land in neighboring
Fort Bend County to develop a suburban self-contained Chinatown, which was named
Tang City”. The $300 million master-planned community would be the largest Chinese

development in North America and would boast a 10-acre shopping complex with a

 

3" Named afier the Tang Dynasty (618 — 907 CE), an imperial reign that is regarded by
Chinese to be a golden age in their civilization’s history

101

28,000 square foot Chinese department store, a 12,000 square foot upscale restaurant, and
a 65-foot high Chinese-style arch—the largest of its kind in the U.S. (Houston Business
Journal 1986). This Chinatown project would resemble typical American-style suburban
developments, which was purposefully designed to improve the poor images of other
typical Chinatowns. According to Leung, “[Tang City] identifies the needs of the people
living in the neighborhood and incorporates them in coordinated, realistic planning to
avoid a ‘helter-skelter’ appearance as with most Chinese communities” (Houston
Business Journal 1986, p. 19).

The other Chinatown was developing around a Chinese grocery store and strip
mall, established by a Taiwan-born developer who recently arrived in Houston from Los
Angeles. This development was growing along Bellaire Blvd, the main thoroughfare
through the Sharpstown neighborhood in southwest Houston. These two developments
offered a low-density suburban-style alternative that was not limited by high land values
and restricted sewer allowances faced by the downtown Chinatown. More importantly
these sites, due to their location away from the rapidly redeveloping downtown, were not
threatened by the imminent danger of being displaced by other development projects
more suitable to the objectives of the city’s entrenched political and economic elite, the

mainstream growth machine.

Downtown Chinatown During the Post-Bobo Woo Era (1990 — present)

Dan Nip acquired Lang Yee “Bo Bo” Woo’s role as the primary booster for the
district following his death. Woo’s Chinatown Development firm was replaced by the
Houston Chinatown Council, of which Dan Nip was the executive director. Whereas

Woo envisioned a primarily Chinese-themed district that would attract Chinese and non-

102

Chinese visitors in addition to conventioneers, Nip would propose a Chinatown that
mainly catered to downtown office workers for lunch hour businesses, which was already
the district’s principal market. The repackaged Chinatown would house a collection of
Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, Thai, Mexican, Italian, and Texan barbeque restaurants
while the architecture and streetscape would remain distinctly Chinese. Private
investment, which the entrepreneurs heavily relied on to develop Chinatown was leaving
the district, leading Nip to assert “if private investors cannot do it, the only way is to get
the public involved” (Baird 1990, p. D1).

However, as the new place entrepreneurs tried to reestablish Chinatown as a
viable destination in Houston, public investment was channeled to urban redevelopment
programs in downtown and other surrounding neighborhoods. One of the more notable
developments was the expansion of the convention center in 2001, which permanently
blocked off McKinney Street. This was a primary road that connected central
Chinatown’s St. Emanuel Street with downtown. Chinatown’s boosters planned to erect
the main Chinese gate at the intersection of McKinney and St. Emanuel. “We wanted to
break ground [on the gate] three years ago,” Dan Nip recalls. “But then the convention
center said, ‘We’re going to have an expansion, blocking off two more streets between
Old Chinatown and downtown.’ One of those streets was McKinney, which is what we’d
picked as the center of Old Chinatown they knew that we were supposed to build the
gate there. But the convention center had more money and was seen as more important

than Chinatown” (Chow 2002).

103

Figure 5. 2. 8: St. Emanuel & McKinney Intersection. Former Site of the Proposed
Chinese Gateway Arch and Mandarin International Hotel. Minute Maid Park and
Convention Center in Background (source: Author)

 

Figure 5.2. 9: View of Convention Center from Abandoned Old Chinatown Building
along Eastex (US 59) Frontage Road. (source: Author)

 

 

104

In 1996, the city of Houston announced plans to build a retractable roof baseball
stadium on the site. of Union Station next to Chinatown. The Harris County-Houston
Sports Authority, a governmental agency authorized by the city council and Harris
County Commissioners Court to oversee the stadium project, proposed that up to $180
million of the $250 million project to be publically financed (Williams 1997a). The
failure of the convention center project to attract tourists into Chinatown as well as a
decade of setbacks hardened feelings toward the new stadium project. "The only thing it
would bring to Chinatown is traffic," Nip said, “No one knows there is a Chinatown
behind the convention center No one knows there is good food behind the convention
center. The same will be true for the ballpar ” (Bivens 1996, p. Al). At this time, many
of the Chinese and Vietnamese businesses that were in downtown Chinatown relocated to
New Chinatown in southwest Houston. The On Leong Merchant’s Association, one of
the earliest Chinese entities to move into downtown Chinatown relocated to the New
Chinatown.

Currently, the neighborhood that once housed the downtown Chinatown district is
in the process of being rebranded as East Downtown (EaDo). The East Downtown
Management District” was established in 1999 in order to enhance security in the
neighborhood, coordinate with city offices to attract investment, and promote a positive
image of the neighborhood. According to Tina Araujo, Consulting General Manager of
the management district, efforts are being made to convert the area into a mixed-use
district that does not follow any particular theme. Dan Nip’s projects were cancelled

since there simply is no market for a downtown Chinatown in Houston (interview Tina

 

35 A management district is a neighborhood-level authority that allows private businesses
to self-assess taxes to help fund street and landscape improvements.

105

Araujo July 31, 2008). The East Downtown Management District and the tax increment
refinance zone had usurped the role once carried by the Chinatown Council. Whereas the
council sought out investment and allied itself with developers who shared the common
goal of creating a Chinese-themed district, the current management district has targeted
any development that seeks to redevelop the eastside neighborhoods. Focus has shifted
towards attracting professionals who desire an urban living environment next to
downtown.

The district currently is in the process of redevelopment with new projects
primarily consisting of high—density condominiums, postmodern style lofts, and
townhouses similar to those found in other redeveloping neighborhoods surrounding
downtown. St. Emanuel Street, once the main boulevard through downtown Chinatown,
houses a small collection of newly established nightclubs and bars adjacent to rows of
abandoned Asian businesses. The construction of Minute Maid Park (formerly known as
Enron Field), home of Houston’s major league baseball team, sits across the freeway
from the original boundaries of downtown Chinatown. These nightclubs and bars have
benefited from the presence of crowds during game days. The few remaining Asian
businesses primarily consist of various food and restaurant supply warehouses, a large
Vietnamese restaurant, which caters to the lunch-crowd, a Vietnamese grocery store,
which is located within the original Chinese Cultural Center’s theater, and a collection of
Chinese and Vietnamese retail stores. One entrepreneur stated the success of downtown
Chinatown rested on the tact of the original Chinese business community controlled by
the original “Old Cantonese” but this district fell apart as the Old Cantonese passed away

(interview with Kenneth Li, April 2009).

106

Figure 5. 2.10: Import Export Firm and Warehouse — Old Chinatown (Notice
traditional Chinese entryways) New row houses at right (source: Author)

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Figure 5.2.11: Advertising for New T ownhomes in Old Chinatown. Convention Center
and Lang Yee W00 ’5 Original Shopping Center in Background (source: Author)
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107

Figure 5. 2.12: Empty Building with Chinese-style rooftop along St. Emanuel Street.
Lion statue at right in front of an abandoned Asian restaurant (source: Author)

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vs. .11

 

  

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Figure 5.2.13: Abandoned Vietnamese Restaurant — Old Chinatown (source: Author)

 

108

Figure 5.2.14: Chinatown Plaza Mall - OId Chinatown. Notice traditional Chinese-
style green tile roofing and red columns. New townhouses at right (source: Author)

‘1‘ -.' v

 

Figure 5.2.15: Kim Son Vietnamese Restaurant, one of the remaining Asian
restaurants in Old Chinatown (source: Author)

 

109

 

Figure 5. 2. 16: Tien Hou Temple and new housing developments across the street.
(source: Author)

 

Figure 5. 2.1 7: Encroaching townhouse developments surrounding Tien Hou Temple
(source: Author)

 

110

5.3 New Chinatown

. Houston’s New Chinatown is located along Bellaire Blvd in the southwest
neighborhood of Sharpstown. This development began during the early 19808 as Chinese
investors recognized that Houston’s high-tech and energy economy had attracted a large
Asian immigrant population. The sizeable Asian presence in the region created a
potential market for large-scale ethnic businesses. Chinese entrepreneurs assessed the
retail potential of the region and responded accordingly by purchasing real estate along
Bellaire Blvd, a strategic location for Asian ethnic businesses.

Decades before, Sharpstown was created from a project directed by major place
entrepreneurs and the city’s growth machine. Sharpstown was established in the mid-
19503 as the first and one of the largest master—planned communities in Houston. Jack
Sharp}6 was the primary developer of the project. He donated a 300-ft wide strip of land
running through his property to the State of Texas to construct the Southwest Freeway
(U.S. 59). This ensured a direct link between his planned community and downtown. It
also provided a major route linking the greater Houston region to the proposed

Sharpstown Center — Houston’s first indoor air-conditioned shopping mall. Unusual for

 

36 Sharp is most notably known for his role in the Sharpstown Scandal. This scandal
involved stock fraud instigated among Sharpstown developers and bribery of leading
political figures during the early 19703. Jack Sharp loaned money to state-level
politicians to encourage them to buy stock issued from his Sharpstown State Bank and
National Bankers Life Insurance Corporation. The lending also provided leverage to
sponsor bills in the state legislature that would indirectly inflate the value of these stocks.
The scandal implicated over two-dozen state officials including the attorney general and
the govemor of Texas.

111

its time, Sharpstown also boasted a high-rise residential building and several apartment
complexes.

By the early 19703, Sharpstown was completely built up and was considered one
of Houston’s premier neighborhoods. However, during the 19803 Sharpstown began its
steady decline. White flight occurred in these neighborhoods as newer subdivisions were
built farther from the urban core and the White population followed the newer
developments into the outer suburbs. During this time, immigrants arriving from Asia
and Latin America moved into these neighborhoods. Also, Houston’s Black residents
who were either displaced from the traditionally Black neighborhoods around downtown
or relocated out from other areas moved into Sharpstown during this White flight. Thus,
these neighborhoods have a diverse racial and ethnic composition.

In 1983, Di Ho Supermarket, a Chinese grocery store chain headquartered in
Monterrey Park, California, expanded into the Houston market. At the time Sharpstown
was in decline as its original residents were moving out. Bellaire Boulevard was lined
with dilapidated buildings and vacant lots (CIRE 2003). Kenneth Li, a Taiwanese-bom
commercial real estate entrepreneur, and a family relative entered a joint venture with a
Houston landowner to develop Di Ho Plaza—a Chinese shopping center—near the
intersection of Bellaire Blvd and Beltway 8. This would be the first major investment in
the new Chinatown by a Chinese ethnic enterprise. Di Ho Supermarket, its primary
anchor, leased 12,000 square feet of the 40,000 square foot shopping center while its
developers attracted other Chinese businesses into the shopping center, which has had a
100 percent occupancy rate ever since (CIRE 2003). This location was selected due to its

accessibility to the freeway and also proximity to Houston’s middle class Asians

112

(interview with Kenneth Li, April 2009). In addition, the Sharpstown offered apartments
and a “well-established subdivision at median rent and sales price ranges” (CIRE 2003,
n.p.). Unlike downtown Chinatown, the new Chinatown served primarily middle-class
immigrants that recently arrived into the city. Many Chinese immigrants that lived in
Sharpstown and Houston’s suburbs spoke Mandarin Chinese and came from regions

outside of Guangdong, especially Taiwan (Swanland 1995).

Figure 5.3.1: Diho Plaza Supermarket, the first successful Asian business in New
Chinatown (source: Author)

 

Soon afier the completion of Di Ho Plaza, Li and his associates entered a second
joint venture to acquire a preexisting 90,000 square foot shopping center along Bellaire
Blvd, which was redeveloped into Di Ho Square. This shopping center was 80 percent
occupied when purchased in 1985, but occupancy rates soon declined to 10 percent as

Houston’s oil-economy crashed (CIRE 2003). Yet, due to the success of Di Ho Square, a

113

consortium of investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore purchased commercial
properties along Bellaire Blvd (Swanland 1995). Determined to hold Di Ho Square as a
long-term investment, Li rode out the recession by directing investors from New York,
California, and overseas into the area and injected more capital into Di Ho Square (CIRE
2003). The entrepreneurs renovated the shopping center’s preexisting 32,000-square foot
grocery store into an Asian-themed supermarket to attract other tenants into the complex
and to serve Houston’s growing Asian-American population (CIRE 2003). In addition,
the local entrepreneurs attracted more attention to these developments by sponsoring

several community events and festivals such as Chinese New Years.

Investment from Private Sources

During this time, both domestic and foreign Asian enterprises became important
sources of investment into the district. Chinese business interests, especially those with
ties to Hong Kong and Taiwan, grew concerned about the future political and economic
relationship with Mainland China (Swanland 1995). Anticipating Britain’s expiring lease
over Hong Kong back and plans to cede that land back to China—as well as the potential
effects on Taiwan’s political status and economic dominance in the Pacific Rim—many
overseas Chinese investors looked to the United States for new investment opportunities.
The 19803 was a time of exponential economic growth for many Pacific Rim economies.
In order to take advantage of these investment channels, the New Chinatown’s place
entrepreneurs established offices in Hong Kong and Taipei, Taiwan to market Houston’s
commercial real estate opportunities to investors (Swanland 1995). Tsang Dat Wong,
who ran the Di Ho supermarket chain, invited an associate from Singapore to develop the

120,000 square foot Dynasty Mall at the comer of Bellaire Boulevard and Corporate

114

Drive. "When Dynasty Mall was being developed in 1986, 1987, it was the worst time,
but Mr. Wong saw it was a good time for outsiders to come in because of cheap land and
foreclosures," Li said (Yip 1993a, p. D18). With the market for ethnic businesses
established, this consortium of investors sought to create a larger Chinese business
district. Whereas the Cantonese Lang Yee Woo envisioned an inner city Chinatown in the
mold of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York, the new class of entrepreneurs
sought to create a suburban Chinatown similar to Monterrey Park, California.

In addition to international investment, funding also came from various ethnic
banks located in the neighborhood. MetroCorp Bank, which is an Asian-American
owned bank that caters mainly to Asian immigrants, financed the construction of Hong
Kong Market (see figure 5.3.2)—managed by a Chinese-Vietnamese developer—as well
as the iconic Chinese-style gateway arch (see figure 5.3.3), which is the symbolic center

of Houston’s New Chinatown (interView with Don Wang April 2009).

115

Figure 5.3. 2: Ocean Palace Restaurant — Hong Kong Mall (source: Author)

 

Figure 5.3.3: New Chinatown Gate — Hong Kong illall (source: Author)

 

116

Figure 5.3. 4: Asian American Banks along Bellaire Blvd, New Chinatown (source:

Author)
8?}? ‘

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15'

13."?

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Figure 5.3. 5: American First National Bank — Office Tower in New Chinatown
(source: Author)

 

117

Chinese commercial development continued throughout the late 19805 despite
Houston’s economic downturn. Several industrial buildings, business parks, and
apartments north of Bellaire Boulevard were bought by Chinese investors (Houston
Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce 1993). The corner of Bellaire Boulevard and
Corporate Drive, near the heart of New Chinatown, contains several banks, many of
which are Asian American owned (see figures 5.3.4 and 5.3.5). Businesses also began to
diversify. New Chinatown contains a large collection of the typical Asian grocery stores
and restaurants, but also boasts realtors, newspapers, legal firms, accountants,
wholesalers, and medical practitioners. Figures 5.3.6 through 5.3.9 provide some
architectural examples of various Chinese and Chinese-Vietnamese developments
housing many of New Chinatown’s retailers and professional services firms. Following
the past successes of the two Di Ho market projects, Li developed two residential
subdivisions consisting of 440 homes, an office condominium building, and a medical
office property in the district (CIRE 2003). David Wu, 3 Taiwanese developer,
announced plans to build a $300 million high-rise luxury condominium project consisting
of three 23-story towers, with units selling between $185,000 - $500,000 (Patel 2007, p.

D1).

118

Figure 5.3. 6: Dun Huang Shopping Center (source: Author)

 

Figure 5.3. 7: Lee Ho Townhouses — built to suit Asian residents (source: Author)

 

119

Figure 5.3. 8: Asian-style Commercial Park (source: Author)

 

Figure 5. 3. 9: Bellaire Blvd Shopping Center with Asian-style Accents (source:
Author)

 

120

Support from the City of Houston

Development in New Chinatown, similar to Old Chinatown, is primarily funded
through private sources. Kenneth Li stated that all the developments were due to market
research and the presence of various private ethnic developers interested in turning a
profit (interview with Kenneth Li, April 2008). The City of Houston has not financially
contributed to these developments, and traditionally the Chinese business community had
been distant from the city in this regard (interview with Kenneth Li, April 2008). He
attributes this to the local govemment’s culture that condones the idea that these
enterprises must go at it alone, but if the Chinatown project continues to be successful, it
may attract additional attention from city hall.

Map 4.5.1 from chapter 4 shows the locations of the major development projects
subsidized by the government or fully funded by the government. In addition, map 4.5.2,
also from the previous chapter, shows the distribution of public art in Houston.
Complementing the direct public funding of development projects, the location of public
art may be used as an indicator of government assistance in developing public spaces and
improving the overall image of the neighborhood districts. The majority of art are
located in and around downtown, particularly along the CBD and Museum District nodes
of the light-rail system. This is indicative of the city’s urban revival efforts and its Main
Street Corridor project, which has received considerable guidance and investment from
the city. The extensive scale of local and state government subsidies provided to new
development, along with public investment in infrastructure, within this downtown area
has been evident in a number of recent publications (Vojnovic 2003a; Vojnovic 2003b,

Podagrosi and Vojnovic 2008). However, the New Chinatown lacks such public spaces

121

 

and public artwork from the city. This is also true with Old Chinatown, which
exclusively relied on private developers and local entrepreneurs to supply the necessary
cultural amenities for the district. As with many Chinatowns throughout the world,
Houston’s New Chinatown boasts an Asian-style gateway arch. However, unlike other
Chinatowns where the gateway is prominently positioned across a major thoroughfare or
in a public space, this arch is relegated within a private parking lot serving Hong Kong
Mall. This gateway arch is essentially an extension of this retail complex, and serves as a
marquee to attract motorists to its shops and restaurants. In the case of New Chinatown, l

Hong Kong Mall generally is viewed by tourists and businesses as the visual center of the

 

district. Street signs throughout the district use both English and traditional Chinese.
However, most of the Asian-themes are exhibited by architectural elements incorporated
into private shopping centers and restaurants.

The reality that New Chinatown is predominantly private and has little to offer in
terms of public spaces is a pressing concern for entrepreneurs. A public meeting hosted
by the Sharpstown Management District in the summer of 2008 discussed the problem
associated with the lack of public spaces in New Chinatown. Proposed solutions to
enhance the district included the following: managing high-speed traffic along Bellaire
Blvd (the main thoroughfare through New Chinatown), improving safety, addressing the
poor condition of sidewalks and lack of pedestrian friendly spaces, and developing multi-
use public spaces. In order to improve pedestrian foot traffic, the management district
encouraged private commercial landowners to allocate property to be used to expand
walkable spaces along the major right of ways. These spaces would receive improved

landscaping, signage, walkways, and crosswalks. Various members of the Chinese

122

business community were receptive to the idea of creating more public and walkable
spaces around their developments since it would be a good investment, increase property
values, attract more tourists, and increase sales (Sharpstown Management District
Meeting 2008). The management district also sought additional assistance from the city
of Houston in order to allow such developments to occur along the public right of way
easements and to create additional public spaces. The district also wanted to work with
the city to improve the roadways, which were in various states of disrepair. The
management district used examples of city-funded projects such as Jones Plaza and
Discovery Green in downtown Houston as models to bolster the development of New
Chinatown.

A board member of the Houston Greater Partnership since 1991 stated that the
City of Houston actively places minorities in high-level government positions. However
those who chose to accept must have money to support oneself during the course of their
appointment and must be willing to donate money to and raise money for the city. With
respect to ethnic business communities, the city does not have a good reputation. This is
partially due to various business organizations representing Houston’s diverse ethnic
communities fighting with the city’s chamber of commerce and with one another
(interview with Don Wang, April 2009).

According to John Kim, a business leader from the Korean community and
former president of the Houston Asian Chamber of Commerce, “one of the biggest
complaints I hear from other Asians is that we have too many small groups and not
enough cohesiveness under one umbrella” (Yip 1993b, p. D1). The disunity not only is

evident between Asians but also within single ethnic groups. The Chinese in particular,

123

 

with their diverse backgrounds, have had difficulty in establishing a cohesive growth
agenda. "The diversity is just mind-boggling," notes Michael Chou, co-founder of the
Council of Asian American Organizations. "We have Chinese from Hong Kong. We have
Chinese from Taiwan, and Chinese who are American—bom In Asian communities
everyone has their own agenda, their own way of doing things. The only thing that
sometimes brings people together is politics" (Yip 1993b, p. D1).

When it comes to economic development, Houston has historically targeted major
employers into the region while circumventing the ethnic business organizations, which
is a cause for much distress (interview with Don Wang, April 2009). Houston’s
mainstream business councils have engaged in such tactics before. As mentioned earlier,
in the late 19705, the Houston Chamber of Commerce, which was the predecessor of the
Greater Houston Partnership, was considered responsible for obstructing the
incorporation of Houston United, an organization that would have brought together
various business leaders with religious, labor, civic, and ethnic leaders (Thomas and
Murray 1991).

Immigrant entrepreneurs in various cities face obstacles ranging from language
barriers to restrictions in lending. Yet, according to one report that analyzes the public
support of immigrant groups within various cities, “one drawback more unique to
Houston is that it doesn’t have nearly as extensive a network of business assistance
services available to entrepreneurs—offered by either nonprofits or the local
govemment—as cities like New York and Los Angeles” (Center for an Urban Future

2007, p. 54).

124

 

However, the city uses the Chinatown presence to promote its image to visitors
and new residents. The 2008 official visitors guide prominently lists “Southwest
Chinatown” along with the Theater District, Galleria, and the upscale Montrose, Kirby,
and Rice Village neighborhoods as one of its “city explorer” destinations (Greater
Houston Convention and Visitors Bureau 2008). These are the destinations, from

Chapter 4, that this study identifies as urban districts. In addition, the Chinese business

To"!

community, with help from the city and local economic development authorities,
published a bilingual map of the New Chinatown district (CIRE 2003). That is the

greatest extent to which the Chinese entrepreneurs worked with the city (interviewed

 

Kenneth Li, April 2009). What is more relevant to the local Chinese entrepreneurs,
however, is that Sharpstown still remains underserved in infrastructure while services are
higher standard and provision in the Galleria and other upper-income areas (interviewed

Kenneth Li, April 2009).

5.4 Conclusion

In reviewing the Chinatowns’ historical development, the dissonance between the
local growth coalition and Houston’s immigrant place entrepreneurs emerged as one of
the primary reasons behind the current spatial outcomes of the Chinese business districts.
Houston’s Chinese economic and cultural centers continued to move around downtown
as a response to the encroaching inner-city redevelopment projects before finally
relocating to the suburbs. The convention center project and the sports center projects
pushed property values beyond what the local Chinese entrepreneurs could afford,

effectively precluding any future expansion of the district. Yet, the emergence of the

125

downtown Chinese business district during the 19805, and its potential to open new
channels of foreign investment into Houston, had attracted the interest of city hall (Lin
1995), at least at a time that the city was facing an economic downturn. In addition,
Chinatown’s main boosters “ha[d] garnered considerable investment capital” (Lin 1995
p. 639) but the project remained in hiatus during the wait for badly needed infrastructure
improvements in the neighborhood. However, as the oil economy recovered and the
economic fortunes improved during the 1990s, Chinatown failed to attract sustained
attention from the city.

Kenneth Li, however, remarked that Lang Yee Woo, one of the primary boosters
for the downtown Chinatown, was able to break into Houston’s city council during the
19705, something that his predecessors were never able to do. One reason for this is that
before the current term restrictions, the city council amounted to an old boys group,
whose members were well entrenched in city hall and had accepted Woo as an important
business leader. Now the current term limits for the city council created a high turnover
with little time to establish rapport with its members (interview with Kenneth Li, April
2009). After Woo had died, his predecessors were never able to build a consensus with
the main power brokers in Houston. In addition, the nascent Chinese business district fell
apart when the remaining high-profile “Old Cantonese” boosters passed away and
supporting organizations and businesses moved out, in the face of the new government
financed developments in the downtown area.

This transition in the city council also parallels the emergence of a reorganized
growth coalition structure in Houston during the 19705 and 19805, where power is no

longer concentrated within a single well known organization of influential urban elites

126

 

 

(such as the SF Suite Group), but has become more complex and fluid due to increasing
international immigration, growing number of transnational service firms, the expansion
of the Houston economy, and a diversifying economic base. As new industries and
economic elites emerged in the city, the Houston business community extensively
evolved from the days of the SF group. However, the new local business leaders still
maintain close ties to the city’s political leadership, and local government continues to
preserve a strong and unchallenged pro-business agenda, as evident with ongoing
financial support of select private development projects in Houston’s urban revival
efforts.

The Chinese ethnic place entrepreneurs had lost their initial influence and
advantages land holdings, and Old Chinatown has been almost completely erased from
Houston’s urban core. Despite the city’s celebration of ethnicity and diversity, ethnic
communities and immigrant place entrepreneurs investing in Houston’s downtown and
surrounding areas did not receive the public financial aid enjoyed by other developers
and competing private development projects. Without the public aid, ethnic place
entrepreneurs were simply not as competitive as their publicly funded rivals, and ethnic

communities and neighborhoods were slowly squeezed out of Houston urban core.

127

 

6. Data and Analysis

6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of neighborhood change occurring within
Houston and its suburbs in Harris County. According to the discussion from the previous
chapters, the new Chinese community was able to attract some degree of recognition
from the city, culminating in the inclusion of the New Chinatown district in the city’s W
official tourist guide. However, this Chinese district received little in terms of financial

support from the city council or other local public agencies. The Old Chinatown district,

 

though located adjacent to the several important development projects in the city center— .2»l
including the George R. Brown Convention Center, Minute Maid Park, and Toyota
Center—failed to be incorporated into the city’s urban revitalization plans. The majority
of these developments in the past and present Chinatowns were privately financed and
directed by a collection of immigrant place entrepreneurs who operated outside of the
mainstream growth machine. The exclusion of the downtown Chinese district from the
city’s set piece Main Street Corridor project, the expansion of the convention center, and
the lack of investment from the city into local public spaces within Old and New
Chinatown indicates that the Chinese immigrant neighborhoods were not part of
Houston’s overarching plan for its urban revival strategy. However, the importance of
Chinatown and the Chinese presence in Houston’s diversity-related materials and tourist
guide published over the last decade indicates that the city bolsters the acceptance of this
community and. uses it to promote the overall image of the city to visitors and residents.
This chapter provides an additional layer of analysis using quantitative data. This

section of the analysis utilizes census data to trace neighborhood Changes occurring in the

128

 

redeveloped inner city neighborhoods. This analysis also reveals the changes occurring
within New Chinatown as well as those neighborhoods that once housed Old Chinatown.
In addition, given that the local government has used Chinatown as a strategy to attract
favorable attention to the city, a statistical test should be run to determine if a growing
acceptance of ethnic and cultural diversity by the city has translated into improving
economic conditions for this immigrant community. Based on historical and anecdotal I
evidence, the previous chapter infers that the city has done little to facilitate the
development of the two Chinese districts. Whereas the previous chapter highlights the

little support that the Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs’ received from the city,

 

‘W Lu.

particularly in light of the extensive public subsidies that competing downtown
development projects received, this chapter focuses on the lack of economic
improvement of the overall immigrant community compared to Houston’s mainstream
community.

The rationale behind this analysis is to reveal the fundamentally flawed
disconnect between the City of Houston’s claims to fostering a multicultural
community—through its celebration of diversity—and the measurable economic
improvements of its ethnic groups. Analyzing the Chinese communities as well other
Asian subgroups may reveal the extent of this dilemma; Asians immigrants are expected
to be successful; politicians and the media for decades touted these groups as America’s
“model minority.”37 However, the lack of economic improvement among these groups in

Houston will indicate that regardless of the rhetoric espoused by the city, the economic

—_

37 The model minority is a term popularly applied to Asian groups such as the Japanese,
Koreans, and Chinese, whose status is earned due to high educational achievement levels,
large numbers employed in the professional sectors, low incidents of crime, and low
Poverty levels.

129

fortunes of even the most admired immigrant communities are not at levels akin to the

mainstream population.38

6.2 Data Selection

The first part of this chapter will focus on the principal components analysis
(PCA). The PCA will be conducted on a list of neighborhood (census tract) variables
derived from U.S. census data. The PCA is a data reduction method that utilizes a
correlation matrix to determine which variables in the data set have a strong relationship
with each other. Highly related variables are combined to create a set of new variables
called factors or components. This technique reduces the number of redundant variables
in the data set, creating a list of new combined variables that reflect the conditions
occurring in the census tracts. I adopt the PCA as a method to track population and
socioeconomic changes occurring in Houston’s neighborhoods over time.

Discussions of methods and results from the previous literature and studies,
which utilized PCA analysis, were used to inform the census variable selection process
for this study. Podagrosi’s (2006) study on social and physical upgrading in Houston, TX
used U.S. census data from the following categories: population, socioeconomic status,
and housing. Podagrosi segmented the population data into different racial categories.
David Ley’s study on the association of immigrant neighborhoods on inner—city housing
prices conducted a correlation analysis and PCA analysis using Canadian census data

from 1971-1986 and 1986-1996 (Ley et al 2002). He categorized the census data

 

38 Evidence of such a disparity in economic fortunes between the majority White and
these immigrant subpopulations would also challenge the myth of the “model minority.”

130

according to the following five categories: migrant status, ethnic status, housing age,
socioeconomic status, and family status. Socioeconomic status consists of census data
measuring household incomes, employment in the professional-managerial occupations,
attainment of a college degree, and housing values.

This study will organize U.S. census data according to the following seven
categories: (1) population, (2) race/ethnicity status, (3) race/ethnicity change, (4) family
structure, (5) immigrant, (6) socioeconomic change, and (7) housing. The population
variable will measure percent change in the census tract population between 1980 and
2000. This measure will indicate which neighborhoods in the city have attracted high
levels of growth of new residents.

Next, the race/ethnicity category is divided into two parts: status in 1980 and
change from 1980-2000. The first part indicates the majority racial/ethnic group for a
census tract in the year 1980. The second part reveals the changes in the racial/ethnic
share for a census tract over time. This framework allows the researcher to track the
changing population characteristics for a census tract over time and reveals which
population groups are being replaced by other population groups since 1980. The
race/ethnicity category includes variables that measure the status and change of non-
Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and Asian residents.

Keeping in line with the focus of this thesis, this analysis further segments Asians
into Chinese and Vietnamese. The Vietnamese, though not discussed in detail in
previous sections, is included as a separate population group since Houston’s Vietnamese
populations historically overlaps Chinese residential and business patterns across space.

In addition, many Chinese and Vietnamese residents share similar historical experiences

131

and cultural heritages. In the case of Houston, Chinese and Vietnamese businesses often
locate within close proximity to each other. Old and New Chinatowns, though initiated
by ethnic Chinese private interests, also attracted Vietnamese businesses. New
Chinatown is located adjacent to a growing Vietnamese business district and is in a
neighborhood with growing Chinese and Vietnamese populations.

The family structure category measures the share of the census tract population of
families that are defined according to a particular type. This category includes female-
headed families with children, which are family types that especially are vulnerable to
economic uncertainty. Socioeconomic Change contains a variety of measures accounting
for income levels, share of college graduates, and occupation.

The immigrant category lists variables that account for certain characteristics of
Houston’s immigrant population that were not accommodated in the previous data
categories. These variables measure the following: the change in the number of people
over 17 years old who are not fluent in English; and change in the share of the census
tract population who were born outside the United States and U.S. territories.

The next category accounts for socioeconomic change in census tracts between
1980 and 2000. This category includes variables that measure changes in college
graduates, professionals, poverty, and incomes. The income subcategory is subdivided
into two measures: income per household and income per family. These variables will
reveal which neighborhoods house a class of middle and upper class residents.

The housing category accounts for changing characteristics of housing within the
census tract. This category includes the percent change in owner-occupied housing

values. This variable should reveal particular tracts that experienced increasing and

132

decreasing residential property values. For this analysis, I assume that rising property
values indicate highly desirable and increasingly affluent neighborhoods. The opposite
of which indicate deteriorating neighborhoods in economically depressed regions of the

city. All income and property values are adjusted for inflation.

Table 6.2.1 : Variable Names and Definitions

1. Population
PC_POP - percent change in total tract population (1980 - 2000)

2. Race/Ethnicity (status 1980)
WHIT E80 — % of the 1980 population that is non-Hispanic White
BLACK80 — % of the 1980 population that is non-Hispanic Black
HISP80 — % of the 1980 population that is Hispanic
ASIAN80 — % of the 1980 population that is Asian
CHIN80 — % of the 1980 population that is Chinese
VIET80 — % of the 1980 population that is Vietnamese

3. Race/Ethnicity (change 1980 -- 2000)
V3C NHWHITE — change in the % of population that is non-Hispanic White
V3C NHBLACK — change in the % of population than is non-Hispanic Black
V3C_HISPANIC — change in the % of population that is Hispanic
V3C_ASIAN — change in the % of population that is Asian
CHINESE — change in the % of population that is Chinese
VIETNAMESE — change in the % of population that is Vietnamese

4. Family Structure
V3C FHF_WK -— change in the % of families that are female-headed and with children

5. Immigrant
V3C_SPKLANF — change in the % of people over 17 years old not fluent in English
V3C_FOREIGN — change in the % of population who are foreign born

6. Socioeconomic Change
V3PC_CGRAD — % change in the number of college graduates
PROF — change in % of population over 15 years old employed in professional sector
V3C POV — change in the % of population over 15 years old that are in poverty
V3PC_HH_INC — % change in average income per household
V3PC_INC_FAM — % change in average income per family

133

 

Table 6.2.1 - cont’d

7. Housing
V3PC_OVAL — % change in owner-occupied property values

Unit of observation: census tract
Total number of variables: 22

6.3 Limitations in the Data

Time period

In order to observe the changes in these neighborhood population and housing
characteristics over time, I will use 1980 and 2000 decennial census tract data reported by
the US Census Bureau.39 The wave of Asian immigrants moving into the Houston region
did not commence until the mid-19705 and early 19805. Also, the immigrant place
entrepreneurial activities in Houston began to occur during the late 19705 and early
19805. Therefore, I feel that 1980 is a suitable starting year for analyzing immigrant
populations in the PMSA. Unfortunately the data reported from the most recent census
decennial has become outdated by this time. The changes occurring in Houston’s

neighborhoods during this 20-year time period most likely accelerated since 2000.

Variables

The variables within the census dataset have changed in previous censuses. For
example, the census did not consistently collect population counts for Latin American

groups other than for Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. Since Puerto Ricans and

 

39 Several variables from the 1980 census were downloaded from the National Historical
Geographic Information System (2008), which is maintained by the Minnesota
Population Center and the University of Minnesota.

134

Cubans have a small presence in the PMSA, I will rely on the Mexican population
variable“). Also, older censuses did not distinguish between ethnic Chinese emigrating to
the U.S. from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mainland China, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. I will
create a variable that includes all ethnic-Chinese peoples regardless of the country or
region of origin. Restricting this study within the 1980 — 2000 time period will help
minimize this problem of changing variable definitions. Censuses prior to 1980 do not
differentiate between Hispanic and non-Hispanic racial and ethnic groups, and thus

precludes a comparative analysis of subpopulation groups between census years.

Variation in census tract boundaries over time

Prior to 1980, census tracts containing neighborhoods that currently have a
substantial immigrant population were either non-existent or contained a substantial area
of the PMSA, which precludes a detailed analysis of those neighborhoods due to the high
level of aggregation of the data. In addition, the U.S. Census Bureau is constantly
redrawing census tract boundaries, thus adding to the difficulty in the analysis (see figure

6.3.1 for an illustration of a hypothetical tract subdivided between two time periods).

 

40 The U.S. Census Bureau did not report detailed countries of origin for Hispanics until
the 1990 census. The 1980 census categorizes Hispanics as Mexican, Cuban, Puerto
Rican, or Other. Thus, the rich diversity of Houston’s Hispanic population cannot be
compared across time. Given that the majority of Hispanics in Harris County claim a
Mexican heritage (Mexican 72.8%, Cuban 0.7%, Puerto Rican 1.1%), I opted not to
stratify the Hispanic variable. Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2000

135

Figure 6.3.1: An Example of Census Tract Subdivision Over Time

 

 

 

Time period 1 Time period 2
1000.01 1000.02
1000.00 \
1000.03 1000.04

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In order to compare the data across different time periods, the census tract
boundaries will need to be standardized. For this study, I adjust 1980 census tracts4| and
data to the most recent 2000 tract boundaries42 using a 1980-1990 census tract
relationship file acquired from MABLE/Geocorr2K hosted by the Missouri Census
Center43 and the 1990-2000 census tract relationship file acquired from the U.S. Census
Bureau“. This study adopts the method recommended by the U.S. Census Bureau and
Peters and MacDonald (2004), which adjust census tract data based on population

weights.

 

4' 1980 census tract shapefiles were downloaded from the Geolytics (1999) Census CD
for the 1980 census.

42 2000 census tract shapefiles are available at ESRI’s (2000) TIGER/Line webpage.
43Blodgett, J. and Consortium for lntemational Earth Science Information Network
(CIESIN) at Columbia University. (1996) 1980-1990 Geocodes, MABLE/Geocorr2K

Geographic Correspondence Engine, hosted by the Missouri Census Center and CIESIN.

Available online at: http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr90.shtml Accessed: 20
January 2008

44 U.S. Census Bureau. (2001) Census Tract Relationship Files, Available online at:
http://wwwcensus.gov/geo/www/relate/rel tracthtml Accessed: 16 January 2008

 

136;

 

 

 

The census tract relationship files include the census tract ID numbers and
populations for the two time periods. The allocation factor indicates the proportion of the
original tract’s population in year 1 that falls within another tract for year 2. An
allocation factor of 0.5 indicates that 50 percent of the original tract population for year 1
was moved into another census tract for year 2. An allocation factor of 0 indicates that 0
percent of the population fell into another tract for year 2 even if the original census tract
was split. On the other extreme, an allocation factor of 1.0 indicates that the entire
population of the original census tract for year 1 falls within another census tract for year

2. The following figures illustrate the nature of census tract subdivisions across time.

 

Figure 6.3.2 and tables 6.3.1 through 6.3.4 show in detail the calculation of census data

for census tracts that have changed their boundaries over time.

Figure 6.3.2: Year 1 Census Tract Data Normalized to Year 2 Boundaries

Year = 1 Tracts Year = 2 Tracts

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 6.3.1: Census Tract Relationship File

Year 1 Population Year 2
Tract Allocation Tract

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A 0.75 A
A 0.25 C
B 0.5 C
B 0.5 B

 

137

Table 6.3.2: Year 1 Population Dataset

 

 

 

 

Tract Tract
Population
A 500
B 1000

 

 

 

Table 6.3.3: Year 2 Population Dataset

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tract Tract
Population
A 350
B 725
C 700
Calculations:

Normalized tract population = [Y1 Tract Population] x [Population Allocation]

Tract ’A’ = 500 x 0.75 = 375 people
Tract ’B’ = 1000 x 0.5 = 500
Tract ’C’ = (500 x 0.25) + (1000 x 0.5) = 625

Table 6.3.4: Normalized Year 1 and 2 Tract Population Data45

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tract Year 1 Tract Year 2 Tract (Pop, — Pop.) 96 Change in
0 . b X 100
Population Population Pop, Population
A 375 350 [(350-37S)/350] x 100 -6.67%
B 500 725 [(725-500)/500] x 100 45%
C 625 700 [(700-625)]625] x 100 12%

 

* adjusted to year = 2 tract boundaries

6.4 Principal Components Analysis

I conduct a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to identify similarly related

variables from the census data and combine them into orthogonal sets, here referred to as

components (also known as factors and dimensions), which share no similarities with

‘

45 . . . .
This method for nonnalizrng census tracts was derived from:
Peters, A. and MacDonald, H. (2004) Unlocking the Census with GIS, Redlands, CA:

ESRI Press.

138

 

 

each other. I begin with the 22 variables from the original dataset as specified in the
section 6.2, which measure demographic and housing trends within the Houston
metropolitan area between 1980 and 2000. I use the PCA first to reduce these 22
variables into a handful of generalized components, which will provide additional insight
into those fundamental variables underlying the demographic and housing dynamics for
the city of Houston and surrounding Harris County.

For the PCA, the varimax factor rotation technique is used to make sharper
distinctions between the higher and lower factor loadings that will enhance the
interpretability of the components. In order to find a satisfactory balance between
parsimony and comprehensiveness of the data reductions, I forced the statistical package
(SYSTAT) to return a different number of components using the PCA module. Several46

components were extracted in the various PCA runs.

 

46 For the first PCA run, I set the parameters such that the statistical package will extract
those dimensions where the eigenvalue of each dimension is greater than 1.0. I also
included a variable created from a random number generator in the dataset. A component
where this variable is highly loaded indicates that it is not revealing any meaningful
information. The first PCA run returned 7 components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0.

139

 

Table 6. 4.1.- Five — Dimensional Rotated PCA Loadings Matrix“

1 2 3
PC_POP 0.017 0.673 0.064 -0.
V3C_NHWHITE -0.541 -0.243 -0.151 -0.
V3C_NHBLACK 0.630 0.382 0.114 -O.
V3C_HISPANIC 0.172 -0.050 -0.l77 0.
V3C_ASIAN 0.025 0.141 0.939 0.
WHITEBO 0.063 0.742 0.181 0.
BLACKBO 0.007 -0.737 -0.029 -0.
HISP80 -0.148 -0.100 -0.320 0.
ASIAN80 0.113 0.074 0.200 0.
CHIN80 0.200 0.097 0.329 -0.
VIET80 -0.119 —0.064 -0.178 0.
CHINESE -0.299 0.031 0.691 0.
VIETNAMESE 0.210 0.059 0.787 0.
V3C_FHF;WK 0.727 0.280 -0.045 -0.
V3C_SPKLANF 0.204 -0.062 0.064 0.
V3C_FOREIGN 0.131 -0.017 0.179 0.
V3PC_CG -0.104 0.638 0.038 -0.
PRO! 0.027 0.739 0.027 -0.
V3C_POV 0.513 -0.260 -0.007 0.
V3PC_HH_INC -0.847 0.142 0.000 -0.
V3PC_INC_PAM -0.751 0.127 -0.025 -0.
V3CP_OV1L -0.694 0.088 -0.043 -O.

"Variance" Explained by Rotated Components

1 2 3

3.575 2.954 2.408 3.

Percent of Total Variance Explained

1 2 3

16.248 13.427 10.947 16.

077
646
129
928
025
039
206
272
067
039
141
002
148
011
901
931
108
143
522
253
303
173

636

4
525

—0.148
-0.291
0.366
0.039
0.121
0.233
-0.280
-0.089
0.896
0.753
0.773
0.016
0.052
0.098
0.047
0.119
-0.229
0.086
-0.085
0.077
0.147
-0.170

2.516

11.435

Finally, I restricted the PCA module in SYSTAT to extract 5 components. In the

following output (see table 6.4.1), all components have eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and

recorded variances greater than 10%. The percent of the total variance in the data set

explained by these extracted dimensions is (16.248 + 13.427 + 10.947 + 16.525 +

11.435) = 68.582%. Variables that are highly loaded within these components are

highlighted. Table 6.3.2 presents a list of definitions assigned to each component as well

as the highly loaded variables.

 

7 . .
4 varimax rotation used

140

 

Component Descriptions

For the first component, non-Hispanic Black and Female-Headed Families with
children are highly loaded (a.. > 0.6) and positively associated with each other. This
component represents census tracts in the county that have experienced growth in the
Black share of the population as well as growth in share of female-headed families with
children. Variables accounting for changes in income and housing values are located on
the opposite end of the component. The negative association between the growing
percentage of Blacks and incomes and housing values indicates that this component
describes poor neighborhoods dominated by Black residents. I define this component as
Economically Depressed Black Neighborhoods.

The second component contains growth measures relating to population,
education, and profession. In this case, high population growth, increasing college
graduates, and professionals are positively related. In addition, these growth measures
are positively associated with neighborhoods that had a preexisting white majority in
1980. The BLACK80 variable, which accounts for traditionally Black neighborhoods, is
negatively associated with this growth. This component indicates that college educated
professionals are attracted to neighborhoods that historically have been dominated by

White residents. This dimension is defined as High Growth Historically White.

141

Table 6.4.2: Component Definitions and High Loading Variables

 

 

 

 

Component Definitions and Variables Loadings
Component 1: Economically Depressed Black
Neighborhoods
Change in Female-Headed Families with Children Share +0.727
Change in non-Hispanic Black Share +0630
1
Percent Change in Owner-Occupied Housing Values -0.694
Percent Change in Family incomes -0.751
Percent Change in Household Incomes -0.847
Component ll: High Growth Historically White
White Population Share 1980 40.742
Change in % Professionals +0.739
Percent Change in Population +0.673
Percent Change in College Graduates +0638
1
Black Population Share 1980 -0.737
Component III: Asian Growth
Change in Asian Share +0.939
Change in Vietnamese Share +0.787
Change in Chinese Share +0.691
Component IV: Hispanic Growth
Change in Foreign Born Share +0.931
Change in Hispanic Share +0.928
Change in % Population not Fluent in English +0.901
I
Change in Non-Hispanic White Share -0.646
Component V: Asian Share in 1980
Asian Share 1980 +0896
Vietnamese Share 1980 +0773
Chinese Share 1980 +0753

 

 

The next component addresses changes in Asian populations. Growth in the share

of Chinese, Vietnamese, and overall Asian populations is positively loaded in this

142

component. This relationship reveals neighborhoods that experienced an overlap in
Asian populations between 1980 and 2000. I define this dimension as Asian Growth.

The non-Hispanic White variable is negatively loaded on the fourth component.
On the positive side of this component are the Hispanic and Immigrant variables. Thus,
the foreign born population, speakers of foreign languages, and Hispanics are negatively
associated with growth in the non-Hispanic White population. This implies that these
two groups are segregated into different areas in the county; Non-Hispanic Whites are not
locating in areas that are receiving Hispanic residents. I define this dimension as
Hispanic Growth.

The fifth component includes the 1980 population status for all Asian variables.
Variables measuring the percent of the census tract population that are Asian, Chinese,
and Vietnamese are highly loaded in this component and are positively associated with

each other. I define this component as Asian Share in 1980.

Commonalities

This section provides a description of the level of participation of the variables in
the PCA. The values are defined as commonalities. The majority of the variables (18 out
of 22) from the PCA have commonality values greater than 0.5 (see table 6.4.3)——that is,

more than half of their variance was accounted for in this five dimensional matrix.

143

Table 6.4.3: PCA Variable Commonality Values

 

Variable

Commonality48

 

PC_POP
V3C_NHWHITE
V3C_NHBLACK
V3C_HISPANIC
V3C_ASIAN
WHITE80
BLACK80
HISP80
ASIAN80
CHIN80
VIET80
CHINESE
VIETNAMESE
vsc_rm=_wx
V3C_SPKLANF
V3C_FOREIGN
V3PC_CG
PROF
V3C_POV
V3PC_HH_INC
V3PC_INC_FAM
V3CP_OVAL

 

 

0.485
0.877
0.706
0.926
0.917
0.643
0.665
0.216
0.866
0.726
0.667
0.568
0.692
0.619
0.864
0.930
0.483
0.575
0.611
0.808
0.694
0.550

 

HISP80 was the only variable in the dataset that was not highly participatory in
the PCA and was not highly loaded in any of the 5 extracted components. The results
from the commonality table show that less than half of the variances for the PC__POP and

V3PC_CG variables were accounted in the PCA. However, these two variables were

highly loaded in the second component.

Mapping the Factor Scores

¥

48 . . . . . . . .
Variables With at least half their variances accounted 1n the S-dimensmnal PCA are in

bold.

 

 

Next, I extract standardized scores for each of the five components from the PCA
described in table 6.4.2.49 These scores were then assigned to each of the 649 census
tracts comprising Harris County and the City of Houston. I have created five maps that
present the spatial distribution of scores for the nine components extracted from the
PCA.50 I will refer to these scores as “factor scores” since the output from SYSTAT
defines these variables as factors. Thus the scores for components I, II, III, IV, and V.
will be referred to as factor 1 score, factor 2 score, factor 3 score, factor 4 score and
factor 5 score. The distributions of scores were divided into fourths, with the center of
the distribution set at 0. These scores were assumed to be normally distributed, which
allowed the use a score value of -O.67, 0.00, and +0.67 as the cutoffs. After looking at
the histograms for these scores, I felt these cutoffs reasonably divided the distributions
into equal fourths centered on a value of 0.00. Note: images and figures in this thesis are
presented in color.

Figure 6.4.1 represents factor 1 scores representing the Economically Depressed
Black Neighborhoods component. This component reveals census tracts that have
experienced a growth in the share of non-Hispanic Blacks and a growth in the share of
female-headed families with children and declining incomes and housing values. Census
tracts experiencing a growth in these variables are scattered throughout the county, with
several located out in the suburbs. There is also a marked increase in areas within the

New Chinatown district.

 

49 A component essentially can be treated as a new variable, created from the union of
other variables, and defined according to the relationship between these variables — as
indicated in table 6.3.2. Thus, we can extract standardized score values for each census
tract, given how well these tracts represent the characteristics described for each
component.

50 Factor scores were mapped using ArcMap

145

 

in.
“on.

 

Figure 6.4.1: Component 1 — Economically Depressed Black Neighborhoods

    

I: Harris County
FACTOR 1
scores

-l.ow
-
-

-Hich o 5 10 N
_ma..a..¢um Em"... A

However, the non-Hispanic White neighborhoods to the west of downtown as
well as downtown itself experienced a decline in the share of Black residents. These areas
in particular have been redeveloped substantially during the last two decades of the 20th
century. Neighborhoods southwest of downtown have experienced substantial
redevelopment initiatives due to the Main Street light rail corridor project. The areas to
the east and southeast of downtown, on the other hand, show a high level of variation in
factor scores in which certain census tracts are experiencing declines in the Black share,
but are adjacent to tracts that have experienced high growth in the Black share. This may
be attributed to the plethora of urban redevelopment projects occurring in the urban core

and the displacement of minority populations.

146

Figure 6.4.2: Component 2 — High Growth Historically White

    

[3 Harris County
FACTOR 2
scores
:1 Low

- .
- '

- High 0 5 10 N
E: Miles A

 

 

Figure 6.4.2 presents the distribution of factor 2 scores. High factor scores
represent areas that have experienced an influx of new residents as well as new increasing
college educated residents and professionals. These increases are occurring in
neighborhoods that have had a White majority in 1980. Low factor scores represent the
opposite outcome. The darker regions represent tracts that have scores on the positive
end of the distribution whereas the lighter regions represent tracts with scores on the
negative end of the distribution. The majority of these darker tracts are located in the
west side of the city and around its periphery. These areas have had several residential
development projects during the past few decades. Given the description of component

two, the majority of these darker colored census tracts experienced traditional suburban

147

subdivision development, with the emphasis on single-family owner-occupied housing.
Downtown Houston has also experienced high population growth. This outcome may be
attributed to the growth in housing stock and extensive redevelopment projects described

in the previous chapters.

Figure 6.4. 3: Component 3 — Asian Growth

    

1: Harris County
FACTOR 3
scores

-low
-
-

- ”i‘" o 5 10 N
:3 missins data EZMiles A
Figure 6.4.3 illustrates factor 3 scores representing the Asian Growth component.
This component describes census tracts that have experienced a growth in the share of the
Chinese, Vietnamese, and total Asian populations. These tracts are represented as the

darker areas. The majority of these concentrations are located to the southwest, which is

the site of the New Chinatown district. High Asian grth also occurred in tracts

148

 

surrounding the medical center and university campuses directly south of downtown.
This outcome indicates potentially a large class of students and staff employed in these
institutions. The site of the original Chinatown, to the east of downtown, continues to

lose Asian residents, and is no longer indicative of a vibrant Asian enclave.

Figure 6.4. 4: Component 4 - Hispanic Growth

    

[:1 Harris County
FACTOR 4

scores

- Low

-

-

- High

0 5 10 N
mmissinsdata EZMiles A

Figure 6.4.4 presents factor 4 scores, which accounts for the division between
non-Hispanic White and Hispanic census tracts. The darker regions represent high levels
of grth in the Hispanic and Foreign share of the population, whereas low scores,
indicated by the lighter regions, represent relatively high levels of growth in the non-

Hispanic White share of the population. The Hispanic populations are predominant in the

149

inner ring suburbs inside Highway 8. Concentrations are located in areas southeast of the
downtown along the Houston-Galveston corridor, the southwest, north, and northwest.
The non-Hispanic White populations exist in inner city neighborhoods surrounding the
downtown and in neighborhoods to the west along Buffalo Bayou. In addition, outer ring
suburbs, located outside of Highway 8, experienced increases in the overall share of non-

Hispanic whites.

Figure 6. 4. 5: Component 5 — Asian Neighborhoods (1980)

    

I: Harris County
FACTOR 5

scores

{:1 Low

-

-

- "‘5“ o 5 10 N

{:3 no data EZMilee A

Figure 6.4.5 represents factor 5 scores, which describe census tracts that had a

sizeable Asian share in 1980. These tracts are represented as the darker areas. The

150

 

majority of these concentrations are located to the southwest, which is the site of the New
Chinatown district. The site of the original Chinatown had a large Asian population in
addition to areas in and around downtown. Other pockets of Asian populations are
located to the northwest and along the Houston-Galveston corridor to the southeast.
Houston’s Asian populations were concentrated in and around downtown during

1980 — around the time the place entrepreneur Lang Yee Wu began to redevelop Old “l
Chinatown into a distinct ethnic district. However by 2000, much of this concentration ‘1‘
had been lost. The neighborhoods in the southwestern suburbs of Houston had a sizeable

concentration of Asians in 1980 and continued to experience growth in Asian residents

1. , 1 - r.
wu*'. _

 

for the next two decades. The spatial pattern indicates higher concentrations of Asian
residents in the southwest and northwest suburbs, as well as infilling in the adjacent
neighborhoods. This change in residential pattems among Asian groups helps to support
the notion that the suburban New Chinatown became economically vibrant due to its
close proximity to a preexisting and expanding Asian clientele. The collapse of Old
Chinatown near downtown Houston, on the other hand, parallels the subsequent decline
in Asian residents located in this section of the city.

The following section conducts a cluster analysis based on the five factor scores
extracted from the PCA. This analysis allows for the cross-comparison of Houston’s 12
urban districts based on the changing neighborhood characteristics measured by the

factor scores.

6.5 Cluster Analysis

151

 

This study conducts a Euclidean distance k-means cluster analysis on the five

factor scores extracted from the PCA for all 649 census tracts with data in Harris County.

F statistics were calculated in order to assess the additional explanatory power provided

to the analysis by adding another cluster. Based on the calculated incremental F -

statistics, I extracted 15 cluster groups (see table 6.5.1). Of these 15 cluster groups, 11

are represented by neighborhoods in Houston’s 12 urban districts.

Table 6.5.1 : K-Means Group Incremental F -statistics

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

# Between Deg. of Within Deg. of Total Sum R2 lncr.
Groups 88 Freedom 88 Freedom of Squares F

2 197.529 5 2842.74 604 3040 0.064

3 640.836 10 2399.163 599 3040 0.210 39.789“
4 983.499 1 5 2056.501 594 3040 0.323 26.868”

5 1208.836 20 1831.164 589 3040 0.397 15.849”

6 1389.996 25 1650.004 584 3040 0.457 11.766“

7 1577.416 30 1462.584 579 3040 0.518 9.812"

8 1952.804 35 1087.197 574 3040 0.642 23.090“

9 2020.8 40 1019.201 569 3040 0.664 3.958“
1 0 2053.93 45 986.07 564 3040 0.675 1 .790“
1 1 2099.901 50 940.099 559 3040 0.690 2.364"
1 2 2200.47 55 839.53 554 3040 0.723 5.300"
13 2229.215 60 810.785 549 3040 0.733 1.445*
14 2258.483 65 781.517 544 3040 0.742 1.415*
1 5 2286.799 70 753.201 539 3040 0.752 1 .323*
16 2299.5 75 740.5 534 3040 0.756 0.564
1 7 2341 .322 80 698.678 529 3040 0.770 1 .852*
18 2375.223 85 664.777 524 3040 0.781 1 .487*
19 2394.229 90 645.771 519 3040 0.787 0.811
20 2420.514 95 619.486 514 3040 0.796 1.1092

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

** - Significant at the 1% level
* - Significant at the 5% level

152

 

 

 

Cross-Nei borhood Com arisons

I will use groupings derived from the cluster analysis to compare the various
themed-neighborhoods that are marketed by the city of Houston. Of the twelve
neighborhoods/districts promoted by the official city guide, including New Chinatown,
nine contain census tracts that are categorized as having increasing real incomes. These
districts include: Uptown/Galleria, Upper Kirby, Montrose, Rice Village, the Museum
District, Midtown, Downtown/Theater District, Sixth Ward, and Houston Heights (see
figure 6.5.1). In the discussion below, I will first introduce the clusters within the

relevant city-defined districts, and then I will proceed to review the analysis results.

Figure 6. 5.1: Neighborhood Clusters within Houston ’s Districts

 

- Rising Econ. Declining Minority Asian Growth - Hispanic Growth

- Rising Econ, Declining Black Asian Growth. Declining Prof, CG - Black Growth, Declining Econ
f1 Decline Asian - Asian and Hispanic Growth - Black Growth. Declining Prof. CG
T" Asian 1980 - Hispanic Growth. Asian 1980 L; College Campus. Sports Complex

 

w L 5

 

 

 

 

K
Downtown —> "a
8 Chinatown
S New Chinatown G
59 , 2 ' G i ‘
A
, . y j 288 . r
o I L N

o 1 2 4 . A

—:_— Mlles
Districts
A- Southwest, Chinatown, Harwin E - Midtown | - Medical Center
B - Uptown, Galleria F - Third Ward J — Downtown, Theater District
C - Upper Kirby, River Oaks, Greenway G - Museum District K - Sixth Ward

. D - Montrose H - Rioe Village L - Houston Heights

* Econ — income per household, income per family, owner-occupied property values
* Prof — professionals

153

The Medical Center district, which also contains the sports complex (Reliant
Stadium, Astrodome), as well as the southern portion of the Museum District, is
characterized as an area that experienced a growth in the Asian share of the population.
The increasingly affluent districts include: Rice Village, Upper Kirby, River Oaks, and
Greenway. These neighborhoods are also clustered with the revitalized downtown,
Houston Heights, as well as the Galleria district. These neighborhoods are characterized
as places that have experienced an increase in real incomes and property values, while
also experiencing a decline in ethnic and racial minorities between 1980 and 2000. This
finding particularly is critical since it indicates that displacement of the neighborhoods
original populations, particularly minorities, has occurred as the city has pursued inner
city redevelopment. In addition, this finding reveals that the ultimate goal of growth
machine — increasing land prices — is being achieved through this program of inner city
redevelopment.

The Third Ward is one of the traditionally African—American neighborhoods in
Houston. It is also the home of the University of Houston and Texas Southern

University, the latter being a historically Black college. This neighborhood, according to

the cluster analysis, is associated with increasing Black, Asian, and Hispanic populations.

The Third Ward is one of the traditionally economically distressed neighborhoods being
promoted by the city to tourism. Although this district has seen an increase in the
minority share of the population, it is not categorized as a place of increasing economic
prosperity, unlike those neighborhoods in and around downtown.

The New Chinatown district, similar to the Third Ward, is categorized

predominately by racial/ethnic status and change. The majority of the district contains

154

 

 

 

census tracts that are attracting medium to high levels of Asians. The census tracts at the
eastern boundary of the New Chinatown district are defined as places having a high
Asian share in 1980, and since then experienced increases in the Hispanic share of the
population. The census tracts neighboring to the west, which constitute the center of
New Chinatown and the Vietnamese business district registered increases in both Asian
and Hispanic shares. The census tract directly to the south of central New Chinatown is
defined as a neighborhood experiencing an increase in the Black share of the population
as well as declining incomes and housing values. Overall, income and property values
are not the primary descriptors for New Chinatown, unlike those districts in and around
downtown.

Finally, I include two additional census tracts that contain the Old Chinatown
district, which was not included in the city’s promotional literature as of 2008. The
southern portion of the former district is defined as experiencing an increase in the
Hispanic share of the population. The census tract, which includes the northern portion
of Old Chinatown, is defined as an neighborhood that has experienced increases in
incomes and housing values, while the racial/ethnic minority share of the population has

declined. This decline in minority share also includes Asian residents. Although the

increases in housing values occurred in an area that includes Old Chinatown, this increase

cannot be credited to the work of the original Chinese place entrepreneurs since the
control of the land has passed to other entities—most notably the East Downtown
Management District (EaDo). The rise in housing values, according to the historical
analysis, may be attributed to spillover effects due to the massive redevelopment projects

occurring in the adjacent downtown as directed by members of the mainstream growth

155

 

 

coalition, with such projects creating intensive land speculation in the area. In addition,
several large-scale projects in Old Chinatown complement the redevelopment projects in

downtown, such as the George R. Brown Convention Center and the new baseball

stadium.

Table 6.5. 2: Property Values and Change in Houston ’s 12 Urban Districts

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

% Change
Housing 1980 2000
District Name 8 Census Tract lD Values Value* Value
A. Southwest, Chinatown, Harwin
4228 -40.5 1 33,443 79,338
4329 -47.1 204,653 108,314
New Chinatown - 4330 -23.1 65,688 50,517
4331 -60.9 161,211 62,955
4332 -47.9 161,211 84,011
4333 -37.8 1 53,294 95,408
4523 -43.7 127,879 72,053
4524 -45.5 127,879 69, 708
4525 -58.3 127,885 53,281
4526 -34.3 1 34,934 88,704
4527 -36.6 1 34,934 85,496
4528 -52.6 1 34,906 63,868
4529 -46.8 1 14,197 60,753
4530 -40.9 47,860 67,435
4531 -47.2 100,534 53,082
3. Uptown, Galleria
4317 35.4 430,128 582,580
4318 -4.95 282,829 268,815
4319 138.2 97.169 231.467
C. Upper Kirby, River Oaks, Greenway
4110 24.4 194.101 241,435
4115 17.4 176,760 207,521
D. Montrose
‘" 4107 55.2 166,602 258,576
4108 74.3 122,469 213,482
- 4109 26.7 170,448 215,957
E. Midtown
3125 117.9 67,461 147,020
4106 -2.4 152,798 149,185

 

 

 

 

 

156

 

Table 6.5.2 — cont’d

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I
‘- II'. ”I,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

F. Third Ward
, 3119 -42.4 95,121 54,821
3120 15.4 95,312 110,017
3124 142.8 47,975 116,476
3127 35.2 78,860 106,649
3128 9.8 72,985 80,120
G. Museum District
3126 147.7 106,480 263,753
3131 -7.9 209,057 192,520
4 41 19 75.1 255,902 448,124
H. Rice Village
4120 52.9 305,522 467,253
4122 28.2 264,277 338,779
I. Medical Center
3140 -32.8 96,897 65,115
3141 -56.3 98,696 43,130
3143 -33.2 98.696 65,929
J. Downtown, Theater District
10007 40.2 I 63,352 I 88,788
K. Sixth Ward
5101 58.3 45,345 70,188
5102 89.4 59,892 113,441
L. Houston Heights
5104 104.7 __ 85,740 175,517
5105 34.8 69,564 93,791
5113 109.4 82,356 172,435
Old Chinatown, Second Ward
3101 5.7 44,306 46,815
3102 28 50,745 64,938
Harris County
Harris County I -2.7 I 122,756I 1 19,469

 

 

* adjusted to 1999 ($)

lmmi grant place entrepreneurs have been active in redeveloping the

am. .n-n'm
rl
'I"
‘I a ‘ ' _

neighborhoods in the New Chinatown district. However, the goal of increasing the value

of these land holdings has not been realized. This outcome is in contrast to what has been

157

experienced by land holdings in the other eleven districts, and particularly in the
developments in the downtown and west of downtown areas, which have seen substantial
housing value increases. Table 6.5.2 presents the 1980 and 2000 average values of
owner-occupied properties (adjusted for inflation) in census tracts that comprise
Houston’s twelve urban districts, as defined in the official city tourist documents for
2008. Census tracts in the Southwest Chinatown Harwin district all experienced declines . .
in real property values since 1980. Census tract 4330, which contains many of New HI
Chinatown’s developments, also experienced declining property values. During this

time, however, several inner city neighborhoods experienced substantial increases in

11";

 

property values. The Galleria, Midtown, the Museum District, and Houston Heights *
contained tracts that had experienced increases in real property values by over 100

percent. Even the two census tracts that once housed Old Chinatown experienced

positive increases, which reflect rising property values resulting from the various

redevelopment projects occurring in downtown’s eastside.

Table 6.5. 3: Property Values and Change — New Chinatown and Urban Districts

 

%
Change 1980 2000
Housing Average Average
District Name Values Value* Value

 

 

 

 

Southwest, Chinatown, Harwin
n=151ractsI -43.3I 128,701I 72,995

 

 

Other 11 Districts

 

n = 29 I 36.4 I 1414096 I 192,513

 

Harris County

 

n = 649i 2] F122,?56 I 119,469

 

 

 

* adjusted to 1999 ($)

158

 

Table 6.5.3 provides a comparison between the New Chinatown (Southwest,
Chinatown, Harwin) district and the other eleven urban districts—excluding the two
census tracts containing Old Chinatown. In 1980, the difference in the average owner-
occupied property values between New Chinatown and the other urban districts was
$12,305. But, this difference increased to nearly $120,000 by 2000, where average
property values in New Chinatown declined by 43.3% and property values in the other 5}
urban districts increased by 36.4%. Between 1980 and 2000, Harris County’s average h? «
housing values declined slightly by 2.7%. This cross comparison of districts in the city

of Houston reveals two important outcomes. First, Houston’s growth coalition, supported

1':
m,

 

by extensive government funds focused on city center redevelopment, has successfully
increased the real value of its land holdings since the initiation of its inner city revival
strategy of the 19803. Second, Houston’s Asian immigrant place entrepreneurs have not
realized similar gains in property values during this time, and in fact, the real property
values in their district have been decreasing despite the extensive private investments into
New Chinatown.

A component to Houston’s new growth agenda is to attract wealthy middle and
upper income class residents into the inner city. Such a program was carried out by the
urban redevelopment and reinvestment efforts, supported by extensive public fiscal aid,
in Houston’s downtown and west of downtown neighborhoods. Table 6.5.4 presents two
indicators measuring changes in real incomes in the urban districts between 1980 and
2000. The table shows that New Chinatown saw substantial declines in income levels
between the years 1980 and 2000. These neighborhoods had average income per family

levels that were on par with the Hanis county level in 1980. The average income per

159

household in New Chinatown was actually greater than the Harris county average in
1980. The average income levels in these neighborhoods were also greater than those
neighborhoods that would eventually be grouped into Houston’s other eleven urban
districts. However, by 2000 this relationship had reversed. New Chinatown and
surrounding neighborhoods experienced sharp decreases in average real incomes. This
outcome reflects the loss of Sharpstown’s original middle class residents and its
replacement by lower income minorities. However, this finding also reveals that
regardless of nearly twenty years of intensive redevelopment lead by immigrant place
entrepreneurs in these neighborhoods, these investments were not able to attract affluent

residents onto their holdings.

Table 6.5. 4: Real Income Levels and Change - New Chinatown and Urban Districts

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

% %
Change Change
Income 1980 2000 Income 1980 2000
per Average Average per Average Average
District Name Family Value" Value Household Value‘ Value
Southwest, Chinatown, Harwin
I -27.2 I 66,069 I 48,097 I -27.2I 62,248 I 45,315

 

Other 11 Districts
5 C 7 I 47.8 I 59,2931 67,617T 34.1 I 47,5701 63,769
Harris County

 

 

 

 

 

L 2.2 I 66,189 I 67L618I 2.5 I 58,696L 60,178
* adjusted to 1999 ($)

 

Downtown and the other inner city districts, on the other hand, have experienced
increases in average income levels. Whereas in 1980, these neighborhoods had registered
average income levels well below New Chinatown and Harris County, by 2000 these
neighborhoods—now considered as premier districts by the residents, businesses, and the

city—have surpassed average income levels in Harris County and New Chinatown. Thus

160

 

- -. 4.11“}
. .‘u

 

 

in addition to boosting property values in the select neighborhoods in the inner city, the
urban redevelopment and reinvestment efforts were also successfully in attracting middle

and upper income residents.

6.6 Two-Sample Difference of Means T-Test

The final step in the analysis will offer a comparison between the Asian and

White majority communities. Whereas the PCA and cluster analysis created a typology
of neighborhoods and provided a visual comparison between Houston’s urban districts,
this final analysis will use inferential statistical analysis to test whether disparities in
economic prosperity are evident between neighborhoods, and specifically, Asian and
White majority communities. I expand the analysis to include various Harris county
neighborhoods. This way, the analysis will consider White and Asian neighborhoods not
necessarily within the boundaries of Houston’s 12 urban districts. This study will use the

following variables as indicators of economic prosperity:

T-test Analysis Variables (unit of observation: census tract) 9 variables
Status (year = 2000)

MEDINC_HH — Median Income per Household

MEDINC_FAM — Median Income per Family

INC_PERCAP — Average Income per Capita

POVERTY - Percent of Residents between 16 and 64 Years Old in Poverty
MED_OVAL — Median Owner-Occupied Housing Values

5099!"?

161

‘C.

 

Change (between years 1980 and 2000)

6. PC_INCHH — Percent Change in Average Income per Household

7. PC_INCF AM — Percent Change in Average Income per Family

8. C_POV — Change in % of Census Tract Living in Poverty

9. PC_OVAL — Percent Change in Average Owner-Occupied Housing Values

In order to conduct the difference of means t-test, two independent samples must
be drawn from the population of census tracts. For the second hypothesis, this research
will test the differences between the non-Hispanic White and Asian neighborhoods. The
combined PCA and cluster analysis categorized the census tracts according to changes in
its characteristics according to population, age, race/ethnicity, family structure,
socioeconomic status, housing status, and immigration. The cluster analysis returned 15
neighborhood clusters, which can be categorized according to race and ethnicity. Of
these 15, I identify three clusters that may be defined as White neighborhoods and three

cluster groups that may be identified as Asian neighborhoods (see table 6.6. 1 ).51

Table 6. 6.1: White and Asian Neighborhood Clusters

 

 

 

Definition White (1) Asian (2)
Neighborhood 6, 9, 14 7, 11, 15
Clusters:

Total Tracts: 90 tracts 57 tracts

 

 

 

 

 

Through the use of PCA and cluster analysis, this study has extracted two

independent samples from the census tract data, which can be analyzed using the

‘

5' See appendix for k-means cluster analysis output and descriptions

162

 

 

difference of means t-test. For this analysis, the White neighborhoods will be labeled as

sample I and Asian neighborhoods will be labeled as sample 2.

Figure 6. 6.1: White and Asian Neighborhoods

  
   

- Cly or Houston
Neighborhoods
- MIG (1)
- Adan (2) E: Miles

>2

163

 

 

Table 41 6.2: T-test Results52

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

White Asian White Asian
t - value p - value
Variables mean mean stdev stdev
Status (2000)
MEDINC_HH 74,857 44,369 32,572.01 12,405.40 7.86 0.00*
MEDINC_FAM 90,628 50,228 35,999.29 14,642.70 9.28 0.00*
INC_PERCAP 41,690 21,080 19,436.81 8,275.95 8.67 0.00*
POVERTY 8.29 6.96 6.87 5.13 1.28 0.20
MED_OVAL 194,760 87,834 125,056.55 39,994.63 7.42 0.00*
Change (1980-2000)
PC_INCHH 3.232 2.22 0.84 1.29 3.62 0.00*
PC_INCFAM 41.13 -12.18 74.11 23.37 6.26 0.00*
CEPOV 0.012 6.92 4.07 5.89 -8.04 0.00"
PC_OVAL 25.113 -31.91 39.00 22.20 10.76 0.00"“

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

* - Significant at the 1% level

Table 6.6.2 provides a summary of the results for the difference of means t—tests.
The null hypothesis is rejected for 8 out the 9 tests. The average income per household
levels, average income per families, and average income per capita in White
neighborhoods was significantly greater than the Asian neighborhoods for the year 2000.
The next hypothesis tests the incidence of poverty between White and Asian
neighborhoods. The Host shows that the percent of residents living in poverty in Asian
neighborhoods in 2000 was not significantly different from White neighborhoods in
2000. The final test using 2000 census data measures the difference in the average

owner-occupied housing values between White and Asian neighborhoods. This test

 

52 A Lilliefors variant of the Kolmogorov—Smirnov test for normality was conducted on
the dataset. The eight of the nine variables for the two samples were found to be
normally distributed — satisfying an assumption behind the t-test. A log transformation
was used for PC_INCHH in order to normalize its distribution.

164

 

 

shows that White neighborhoods had higher average values in owner-occupied housing
compared to Asian neighborhoods at the 1% significance level.

The remaining t-tests focus on the change in economic conditions between these
two types of neighborhoods. White neighborhoods on average experienced positive
growth in both average income per households and average income per families between
1980 and 2000, whereas Asian neighborhoods experienced negative growth in these two
measures. This trend does not necessarily suggest that Asian residents as a whole
suffered from losses in income. Instead, these particular neighborhoods that have
experienced a booming Asian population had recorded higher income levels in 1980 due
to the fact that many served as places for a more affluent population that would be
eventually replaced by lower-income minorities during the course of this twenty-year
period. However, these measures of change do indicate that there exists a disparity in the
economic prosperities of these two neighborhoods. The change in poverty levels are also
significantly different between White and Asian neighborhoods. Although both
neighborhood types experienced positive growth in the number of residents living in
poverty, the Asian neighborhoods registered a significantly greater increase at the 1%
level.

The final analysis tests the difference in means between the average percent
changes in owner-occupied housing. The results show that White neighborhoods
experienced an increase in owner—occupied housing values whereas Asian neighborhoods
experienced a steep decline. The t-test reveals that the positive growth in housing values
in White neighborhoods is significantly greater than Asian neighborhoods at the 1% level

of significance. By using this analysis, this study shows that, unlike in other parts of

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““732 ,

 

North America described in the literature review, Houston’s Asian neighborhoods have

not experienced the levels of prosperity enjoyed by residents in White neighborhoods.

6.7 Conclusions

The results reveal two important trends that define the redevelopment of
Houston’s inner city. First, Houston has been relatively successful in reevaluating its
growth agenda and shifting focus towards inner city redevelopment during the 19808 and
19903. The analysis of Houston’s new growth agenda in the previous chapters reveals
that much of the efforts have been directed towards neighborhoods in and around
downtown. This new reinvestment focus is evident in the extensive public subsidies
granted to redevelopment projects and the direct public investment into improving urban
amenities and public spaces in several of the inner city districts. The public and private
growth coalitions, driven by the billion plus dollars in public investment over a period of
a decade, have so far been successful in reversing the decline of Houston’s urban core, as
evident in the rapidly rising real income levels in these neighborhoods and the real
property value increases. As Logan and Molotch (1987) argue, ultimately these changes
represent the raison d’etre of growth machine’s place-based entrepreneurs.

Second, the racial/ethnic minority share had declined in those inner city district
neighborhoods that have been receiving subsidized redevelopment initiatives since the
19803. The majority of the inner city districts registered an increase in residential
property values but a decline in the minority share of the population. The northern

portion of the Old Chinatown district currently is transforming into a White

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neighborhood. Observations from field work in that neighborhood show that the current
housing boom, as well as the entry of new businesses, is facilitating this transformation.

One particular item of note is the eastern portion of the Sixth Ward. Regardless
of the redevelopment projects in the adjacent downtown, this neighborhood was
categorized as a Black neighborhood by the cluster analysis. An investigation of the data
set reveals that White residents increased during this time, but not to the extent
experienced in the other redeveloping neighborhoods. However, this holdout appears to
be on its way to assimilating with the surrounding neighborhoods. Data from the 2010
Census, once it becomes available, may reveal that this neighborhood has lost most of its
minority population. In addition, much of the southern portion of the Museum District
currently is used as parkland, while most of the Medical Center is devoted to hospitals
and the Reliant Stadium complex, making residential redevelopment in these
neighborhoods highly unlikely.

Unlike several districts in the inner city, all of New Chinatown’s neighborhoods
experienced decreases in real property and income values. This outcome indicates that
the immigrant place entrepreneurs were unable to achieve their goals of increasing
neighborhood property values and attracting upper income residents. The neighborhood
containing the core of New Chinatown and much of the entrepreneurial activity
experienced a 23 percent drop in property values between 1980 and 2000. During the
same period, Houston’s other urban districts experienced a 36 percent increase in
property values.

Furthermore, the results from the t-test analysis reveal that neighborhoods

experiencing a growing share of White residents had positive increases in average

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1
L-‘N .4.

 

incomes per family and average property values while neighborhoods experiencing a
growing share of Asian residents experienced declining average incomes per family and
average property values. In addition, the increase in the poverty share for Asian
neighborhoods was significantly greater than in White neighborhoods. Thus, the
economic prosperity divide between these two groups has become greater between 1980
and 2000—a period when public perception of ethnic diversity was becoming
increasingly positive and government was engaged in promoting and celebrating the
city’s multicultural characteristics. Thus, the city’s program of promoting and
celebrating ethnic diversity did not translate into improving economic prospects for

Chinese and Asian residents.

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7. Summary and Conclusions

7.1 Summary of Results

Several dynamics have contributed to the spatial relocation of the Chinese
business district. Perhaps most importantly, restrictions to development arising from
competition with private developments extensively subsidized by government, or fully
funded by government, which facilitated rising land prices in neighborhoods surrounding
Houston’s downtown and Old Chinatown. Other restrictions to the expansion of the
downtown Chinatown included limited public utilities, a lack of customer-base, with
many Asian residents scattered across the metropolitan area in neighborhoods ranging
from very rich to very poor, and finally competition between various factions of the
Chinese and Asian immigrant place entrepreneurs. This study provides an in-depth
analysis behind the first factor, which is directly related to the city of Houston’s recent
initiatives to curtail the city’s urban decline, which has been on-going for decades, and to
redevelop the urban core and provide the necessary support amenities to attract future
residents, businesses, and tourists back into the city.

In reviewing Houston’s historical growth, the spatial outcomes of local
development were extensively shaped by the activities of a highly organized and
politically influential urban land—based elite. They engaged in local investment and
development, through coalitions with government, whose officials actively subsidized
their projects with public funds. These public subsidies manipulated the attractiveness of
place by reducing the risks, and increasing the returns on investment. Since the 19803,
with the city’s new urban revival efforts, similar processes of development have been,

and still are evident. City officials and developers have targeted certain inner city

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neighborhoods—and especially those in the downtown and west of downtown areas—
and these developments are selectively subsidized, encouraging reinvestment and
redeveloped into themed districts. What becomes evident in Houston’s history is that
ethnic communities, and ethnic based development projects, have been excluded from
these public subsidies, and as a result were simply not competitive against other publicly
funded private development projects that were encroaching onto the downtown and
surrounding ethnic communities.

Based on the historical and anecdotal evidence of the Chinese-American
experience in Houston, the preexisting Old Chinatown, though adjacent to several of
these recent developments, received little attention from the City of Houston even though
inner city ethnic districts are utilized by many other large North American cities to
promote local economic development, such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco. The construction of the necessary infrastructure, government investment in
major downtown developments (including a convention center and hotel), and
government subsidized private development around Houston’s urban core created a
torrent of speculative activity among place entrepreneurs that effectively squeezed out
ethnic developments from Old Chinatown. Old Chinatown existed due to the organized
efforts of highly motivated Chinese immigrant place entrepreneurs who had gained a
financial stake in developing land near downtown. However, these immigrant elites were
unable to infiltrate Houston’s mainstream growth coalition. Thus, without allies within
the mainstream growth machine, Old Chinatown failed to become incorporated into
Houston’s growth-oriented policies in any substantial way and was eventually displaced

from the urban core.

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‘w‘% L". . '.

 

 

Very similar to the displacement of the downtown African American community
Freedmen’s Town, while competing developments and developers were receiving
extensive public aid—evident in the form of public subsidies for the developments
themselves, government assistance in land assembly, and complementary public
infrastructure investment—the local Chinese community received no comparable public
support. In this struggle over space and place, as such initiatives reduced the cost of
development for its competitors, the innnigrant place entrepreneurs were at a
disadvantage, eventually pushing Old Chinatown and its investors out of the downtown
area. Not only did the Chinese community not receive funding for private development
projects, Old Chinatown was not even provided with adequate basic infrastructure (such
as sewerage lines). This severely limited the development of Old Chinatown, even when
private funding was available for large-scale investment (such as stadiums, high-rises,
and hotels) in the neighboring areas. One might even reasonably argue that this
moratorium on infrastructure provision was purposefully orchestrated, in order to limit
the scale of new development that the city might not want in its urban revitalization
efforts.

Government structures and development mechanisms were firmly in place that
restricted developments to hi gh-end projects that catered to a more affluent clientele than
those who previously took advantage of the amenities Old Chinatown had to offer.
Examples include the prohibitively high cost to obtain sewer permits once the sewer
moratorium was lifted in the inner city, deteriorating public infrastructures in
marginalized neighborhoods, inflating land prices due to real estate speculation, and a

municipal government that increasingly became active as a land developer during the

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19903, targeting certain neighborhoods in the city for extensive redevelopment. By
targeting these neighborhoods, the city was also targeting developers and developments
that it planned to financially support. Recent developments include the construction and
expansion of the convention center, construction of loft-style condominiums and
townhouses throughout the inner city, and redevelopment of those city blocks along the
recently completed light-rail line. The lack of public financial support in expanding Old
Chinatown, and its eventual collapse as a vibrant ethnic business district during the recent
construction binge reveals that this development was not an integral part of the city’s plan
to revitalize the city center.

The creation and expansion of the suburban New Chinatown not only is attributed
to better proximity to the region’s Asian population but also the greater distance between
New Chinatown and the more attractive neighborhoods in the inner city slated for
redevelopment or that have been already redeveloped. This distance gives New
Chinatown some protection from the effects of urban revitalization programs that
inhibited the future development of Old Chinatown, but it also means that the Chinese
business interests have been displaced, and have lost its initial investment advantage in
the more lucrative downtown area location. One may argue that Old Chinatown would
have been successful in attracting the Asian clientele if not for restrictions to its
development caused by the publically financed developments in the inner city; in many
cases immigrant residents live far away from the ethnic commercial districts.

The second part of the research addressed the notion of Houston as a multicultural
city, which became increasingly tolerant of its ethnic and racial diversity during the

19708 and 1980s and promoted these differences in order to create a favorable image of

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rm 3. t- .J'H

 

 

the city. Though evidence produced in the research shows that the Chinese interests had
little financial or political support from the city’s mainstream public and private elite, and
development projects in the Old and New Chinatown districts were exclusively funded
through private entities within the irrrrnigrant community, Houston had promoted New
Chinatown in its tourist brochures and official materials, seeking to attract tourists and
new residents into the city. Despite not financially supporting the Chinese community, as
it did other developments, the city was using the Chinese and Asian presence in Houston
to market the image of the city to residents, businesses, and potential visitors.

This component of the study utilizes a variable reduction method (PCA), cluster
analysis, and a difference of means t-test in order to test whether this rhetoric of
celebrating diversity had translated into improving economic conditions for Houston’s
minorities, using Asians, particularly Chinese residents, as a case study. Results show
that Houston Chinese, as well as other Asian populations (including the Vietnamese, the
Filipinos, and the Asian Indians), consistently experienced levels of economic health
significantly lower than the White population in 2000—the most recent year when data
was collected. In addition, during a period of history when Houston city officials actively
began celebrating diversity and ethnic neighborhoods, the economic opportunities and
overall economic condition of these population sub-groups actually declined. When
considering changes in economic health between 1980 and 2000, these Asian groups
experienced negative growth in incomes and property values. Poverty also increased at a
higher rate in Asian neighborhoods compared to White neighborhoods. Thus, increasing
acceptance of ethnic and racial diversity by the city has not translated into improving

conditions for these minority groups.

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7.2 Discussion

Growth machine, the coupling of public and private sector coalitions in driving
local growth, is an important lens through which to view the historical development of
Houston. The immense influence of local economic elites on public policy and urban
development—and the impacts of government on selected business interests—reveals the
significance of growth coalitions and government financing in shaping Houston, despite
the city’s claim of adhering to laissez-faire principles (Feagin 1988; Lin 1995; Vojnovic
2003a, 2003b). The 21St century represents a very different coalition structure from the
early- and mid-20‘h century. This coalition is much more diffused and focused on a very
different economic development agenda, but the ongoing and selective financial support
of private development by government is still ongoing. In addition, this selective public
financial support of private sector projects, in the tradition of Houston’s past, continues to
dismiss the interests of lower-income groups and ethnic communities.

The influence wielded by the SF group since the 19303, which embodied the most
cohesive and influential power structure of the growth machine in Houston’s history,
disappeared during the 19703. The Houston urban elite substantially evolved by the late
20th century, due in part to international immigration, an increase in transnational service
providers, the expansion of the Houston economy, and a diversifying economic base.
While new economic elites emerged in the city, the new business leaders still maintained
close ties to the city’s political leadership. Local government continued to preserve a
strong pro-business agenda, supported with ongoing financial aid—as evident with public
subsidies and public-private partnerships—of selected private sector initiatives.

Government intervention in private markets is particularly evident with the city’s new

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urban revitalization efforts in the downtown and surrounding neighborhoods, where at
least $2 billion in public funds is planned to be spent, or has been spent since the 19808
(see table 4.5.1 on page 72).

Despite Houston’s celebration of ethnicity and diversity, which emerged during
the 19808 and 19908 in an attempt to improve the city’s image, ethnic communities and

immigrant place entrepreneurs investing in Houston’s downtown and surrounding areas

did not receive the public financial aid that other developers and competing private .1 .

development projects received in Houston’s urban revival initiatives. Ethnic place

 

“hull..- --

entrepreneurs simply were not as competitive as their publicly funded rivals, and ethnic

communities and neighborhoods were, and continue to be, slowly squeezed out of the

l

Houston core, as evident with Freedmen’s Town and Old Chinatown.

In the analysis of Houston by Jan Lin (1995), which focused on changes that
Houston was experiencing during the 19808 and early 19908, Lin had argued that Old
Chinatown’s proximity to a revitalizing downtown, as well as the initial interest
expressed by local government to this enclave’s development, indicated that local
Chinese entrepreneurs had gained an opportunity to influence the future trajectory of the
Houston’s new growth agenda and Houston’s growth machine. However, the
disintegration of the district suggests that whatever interest that the Houston’s economic
and political leadership had during the 19808 and early-1990s‘with downtown Chinatown
had been lost by the end of the 19908, revealing that the Chinese American place
entrepreneurs, though sharing similar pro-growth aspirations, were not on equal footing
with Houston’s mainstream elite. It is clear that in Houston, ethnic place entrepreneurs

simply do not have an influential voice in shaping the mainstream growth coalitions that

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_._' _. .

 

underlie the vast public-private partnerships driving Houston’s urban revival. In
addition, the various factions between immigrant entrepreneurs and competition in the
Asian business community, compounded by little assistance from local government,
precluded the creation of an effective immigrant growth coalition, as observed by Light
(2002) and N ijman (1997) in the Los Angeles and Miami contexts.

With growing difficulties to intensify and expand Old Chinatown—in part due to
the direct competition with private development projects heavily subsidized by *1
government and direct government investments into projects such as a downtown

convention center and hotel—Chinese immigrant place entrepreneurs shifted focus on the

 

rapidly expanding New Chinatown in southwest suburban Houston. However, these a
investment and reinvestment efforts have not translated into increasing property values in
this district. This outcome is in contrast to what is realized in Houston’s downtown and
surrounding neighborhoods to the west, which have been the focus of the billion plus
dollars of public investment over a period of a decade that has facilitated Houston’s urban
redevelopment and revival efforts. The downtown development and redevelopment
initiatives, the focus of the public investment and government subsidies, were also
development projects that over time erased Old Chinatown and a large Houston minority
sub—population from their early land holdings in the urban core. The ethnic
neighborhoods were simply not able to compete with other private developments
receiving public subsidies or redevelopments that were politically supported by the
authority of local government. This was evident, for instance, with the 2001 expansion

of the George R. Brown Convention Center, which permanently blocked off key

176

 

 

thoroughfares into Old Chinatown—most notably McKinney Street—from the Houston
downtown, marginalizing this ethnic business district.

As various immigrant-directed projects foundered in Houston’s urban core, other
projects—and particularly private projects that were receiving extensive public financial
support, such as the Rice Lofts, the Fourth Ward Redevelopment, and the sport
stadiums—established a new imprint on Houston’s downtown and surrounding
neighborhoods. While local government and media were promoting and celebrating n
Houston’s racial and ethnic diversity, the initial and advantageous land holdings that

ethnic groups had in the urban core were being slowly torn down and immigrants were f , I

 

.t
disappearing from the city center. New developments emerged that were being p.41
extensively supported by the extraordinary impacts of government, whether financial or
authoritative, dramatically changing the relative attractiveness of place for investment,
particularly for the developers being supported by public funding.
In a traditional style characteristic of intra-municipal politicking driven by a
cohesive set of growth coalitions, Houston’s urban reinvestment and revival has been
shaped by two different sets of rules. One set applies to Whites and developments
(whether upscale lofts, ballparks, or entertainment venues) marketed to middle and
upper-income groups. In many cases, government extensively subsidizes these

developments. The second set of rules applies to ethnic groups and the poor, who have

 

not received government support, even for the mere preservation of their neighborhoods.
In fact these groups have been actively inhibited by government in safeguarding their
traditional communities, with the eventual outcome being the erasure of the ethnic

enclaves from their traditional downtown and surrounding neighborhood locations.

177

In addition, from the 19708 onwards, while members from diverse racial and
ethnic backgrounds were selected to serve in various capacities in local government and
non-profit agencies, this review shows that the recent shifts in attitudes towards
minorities and symbolic gestures by the city to incorporate members of the ethnic
community into the fold have not been translated into improving economic prosperity.
A8 evident from exploring the city’s Chinese neighborhoods between 1980 and 2000, real
family incomes and real property values within these neighborhoods have declined while
poverty is increasing. As Vojnovic (2003a) argued, a “successful translation of increased
political power among the minorities into economic opportunities will unlikely occur
unless dramatic changes are made in the city’s education, training, and hence, social
service programs,” (p. 620). Such reforms will be difficult to achieve in Houston, given
the historical treatment of lower-income groups and ethnic minorities, and government
involvement being limited to a narrowly defined corporate welfare culture that has been

instilled in the city for over a century by the local growth machine.

7.3 Research Contributions

This research offers several contributions to the existing literature regarding to
urban political economy. Whereas the literature on urban redevelopment carried out by
public and private agents generally focus on the inequalities between the White and
traditional minority (Black and Hispanic) populations, this study considers the presence
of immigrants, which adds an extra layer of complexity to urban research. Given the
diversity of immigrant subpopulations, the effects of urban redevelopment initiatives on

certain immigrant groups are not necessarily universal. This is especially true for certain

178

 

 

 

Asian and Hispanic immigrant groups that have had varied success in driving and
sustaining their own development initiatives in cities. Following in the footsteps of Ivan
Light (2001, 2002), Jan Nijman (1997), and Jan Lin (1995) who appropriated elements
from Harvey Molotch and John Logan’s (1987) growth machine theory to craft their
immigrant place entrepreneur hypotheses, this research traces the development of the city
through a traditional mainstream growth machine coalition and the recent entry of an elite
class of immigrant place entrepreneurs, which in the Los Angeles context operated
against the traditional growth machine and in some instances replaced it as the major
driver for growth in certain locales. Thus certain minorities have gained enough power to
direct the future development of urban places.

Other studies reveal the success of establishing ethnic immigrant districts in major
cities (Fong 1994; Smith and Logan 2006; Pang and Rath 2007; Lin 2008; Park and Kim
2008). This study, on the other hand, provides a sobering example of a Chinese
immigrant business district, which had the potential to be recruited as allies in the
preexisting growth machine, yet disintegrated over time due to the influence of the
mainstream urban elite. This research shows that the success of the Chinese urban elites
in driving development in places such as Los Angeles and Vancouver have not been
evident—at least for now—in the Houston context.

This research also contributes to the methodological dimension behind conducting
such urban studies. Previous literatures that address the topics described in this thesis
rely on qualitative analysis to support their arguments. This study adopts some of these
methods but provides an extra layer of analysis that relies on quantitative data collected

over a prolonged time period. Jan Lin’s early to mid— 19908 interpretation was an

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11"..‘5V... _

 

important recognition of the emergence and growth of new economic agents in the
Houston economy, the ethnic place entrepreneurs. However, the establishment of the
early roots of Old Chinatown, coupled with the new local government celebration of
ethnicity and diversity—and particularly in a national context where ethnic communities
were becoming an important element of local tourism—led to a much more optimistic
interpretation by Lin of the role of ethnic groups and their ability to shape the Houston
landscape. Observing changes in architecture, urban iconography, immigrant sub-
populations, and ethnic neighborhoods, Lin’s recognition of the city of Houston’s
evolution from a modernist to postmodern city, and what this meant to ethnic
communities, was a reasonable assessment for the early—19908. Nevertheless, some two
decades later, it has become apparent that many of Houston’s ethnically significant
landmarks, which Lin had observed in his review of ethnic preservation in the
postmodernist city, had been either erased from the Houston’s landscape (including Old
Chinatown and Freedmen’s Town) or are in a state of decline (such as the Mexican
American barrios in the Second Ward, east of downtown).

A quantitative-based assessment, using census data during this period from 1980-
2000, reveals that Asian populations have experienced declining economic prospects
despite the greater appreciation for ethnic spaces exhibited by the city and associated
growth coalitions. This study substantiates that the program of promoting diversity in
Houston has been meager, and that despite the ethnic and cultural celebration that is part
of Houston’s new growth agenda, the city’s minority groups, and particularly the

Houston Chinese, have not economically benefited from this new growth direction. This

180

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35:214.,

 

validates Logan and Molotch’s (1987) position that ethnic groups are excluded from the
growth machine, at least within the Houston context.

This study also provides a method to be used for measuring neighborhood change.
A recurring problem with measuring changes in the population is the availability of data
collected at an appropriate level of observation. For this study, demographic data
collected at the individual level would be most appropriate since racial and ethnic
backgrounds can be easily grouped and compared. However, the most readily available
datasets that provide such data are at the neighborhood (census tract) level of
aggregation. Thus focus is shifted from members belonging to a particular community,
to neighborhoods dominated by a particular community. As a researcher uses
neighborhood level data, the distinction between racial and ethnic groups becomes less

clear; unlike for an individual, defining a neighborhood based on race and ethnicity

becomes a problem since few neighborhoods are 100% homogenous and thus are difficult .

to label. This study provides one solution to this definition problem through the use of
PCA and cluster analysis. The outcome of this approach is a data-driven method that
examines several variables to create a typology of neighborhoods based on race and
ethnicity. Although not a perfect solution, this method is relatively objective and less
arbitrary compared to other methods, such as using thresholds to determine the majority
population group in the neighborhood.

Although not discussed in detail in this study, displacement of lower—income and
minority residents is a major problem with urban revitalization initiatives. Whereas this
study specifically focuses on the displacement of private ethnic immigrant enterprises

from the inner city, the evidence from this study provides another layer of analysis to the

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residential displacement literature. What is learned from Houston’s current plans to
revive the city center is that this program has achieved remarkable results. Downtown is
benefiting from an influx of new and highly affluent residents; several new urban
attractions have been completed; and downtown and west of downtown districts have
become more inviting to private development, facilitated by the public sector’s initial

financial infusion in inner city redevelopment. However, the poverty and social strife

7

ft
,m

that had once dominated this area had been displaced to other parts of the city. This
program does not solve the local social pressures associated with substandard housing,

poverty, education, and health; it just moves these issues to locations in the metro area.

 

7 .4 Directions for Future Research

An important finding immediately emerges from the historical and quantitative
analysis of the rise and fall of old, downtown Chinatown, and the rise of new suburban
Chinatown. Given the lack of public financial support, and the fact that ethnic
neighborhoods are being driven out of districts experiencing intensive redevelopment, it
becomes evident that unlike in the case of Los Angeles and Miami, ethnic place
entrepreneurs are not influencing members of Houston’s growth coalition. It may be
revealing to examine the extent to which the economic condition of the Koreans,
Chinese, and Cubans in Los Angeles and Miami actually increased between 1980 and

2000. Light and Nijman’s work might be reinterpreted once changes in real income

 

levels and real values of properties within the ethnic communities are examined and

compared to the local White population and their neighborhoods.

182

Although mentioned in some detail in the previous chapters, future research
should also consider the role of ethnic place entrepreneurs from other minority groups.
In the Houston context, additional research needs to be done on the region’s sizeable
Hispanic population, particularly the Mexican-American community—this is another
major group of ethnic place entrepreneurs described in Jan Lin’s (1995) study of
Houston. City reports discussed in this study had mentioned the importance of the
Mercado del Sol site and surrounding neighborhoods, although this too is an area
experiencing rapid decline. Hispanic entrepreneurs have traditionally lagged behind their
Asian counterparts in driving economic development. However, this situation is not
universal. J an N ijman’s (1997) study of Miami’s growth machine reveals a full-fledged
integration of high-level individuals from the Latino immigrant communities. Future
research should study the relationship between the city of Houston and Hispanic
entrepreneurs to gauge whether the Hispanic communities experienced similar economic
fortunes described in the Chinese case study. Such an analysis will provide additional
information about the city’s overall view towards immigrant communities.

At the time of writing, the suburban New Chinatown and adjacent Vietnamese
and Asian Indian districts have been expanding and increasing in density. Although the
prospects for a downtown ethnic district seem bleak, the suburbs are experiencing an
abundance of ethnic developments. In addition, Houston’s Black residents, many of
which were displaced from their traditional neighborhoods around the urban core,
relocated into other parts of the metro region, especially in the inner ring suburbs. These
neighborhoods experienced a high growth in the share of the Hispanic population as well.

However, New Chinatown is the dominant ethnic business district in the area. As New

183

 

 

 

Chinatown continues to expand, future research should consider the impacts of the Asian
developments on non-Asian residents. One question to consider, once the 2010 U.S.
census data becomes available, is what is the impact of New Chinatown’s growth on the
socioeconomic status of surrounding neighborhoods? Has this led to social and physical
upgrading in the area? What impacts has the Chinese or Asian developments had on
other ethnic and racial minorities living in the suburbs? What are the effects of

immigrant place entrepreneurs on neighborhood property values? The previous question

.‘a. ‘3". 1.2"!

may entail the collection of time-series real estate data for all neighborhoods in the
county. This direction in research also creates an opportunity for using neighborhood-

level ethnographic methods, such as surveys and interviews with local residents.

 

Researchers should also consider the complex nuances of race relations not only
between Whites and racial/ethnic minorities but also between minorities. ‘Has the
emergence of Asian development projects produced conflicts with other minority groups
living in the surrounding neighborhoods?’ Houston has had interracial conflicts,
especially between Asian and Black communities. Acres Homes, a distinctly Black
suburban subdivision, lies near the Chinese and Asian developments. This may provide a
unique situation where a particular minority group has acquired increasing power over
determining the future trajectory of these neighborhoods, and affecting other minorities.

Finally, a recent phenomenon that future research should consider is tax
increment financing (TIF). A TIP is a common public financing strategy used to
encourage development in brownfields and other economically depressed neighborhoods,
but uses have expanded to also include encouraging development in greenfield areas.

TlFs were existent during the course of this study. In 2003, the Greater Sharpstown

184

Management District53 was established. New Chinatown falls within the jurisdiction of
the management district and has had their business members serve on the board. Also, in
2003 the Texas State Legislature authorized the creation of a tax—increment refinance
zone (TIRZ) —- also known as a TIF serving the greater Sharpstown area. TIFs have been
used in Houston, especially in those districts in the city center. The Sharpstown TIF,
however, has been a relatively recent addition and it is too short of a timeframe to assess
its impacts in this study. In addition, the neighborhood-level data required to conduct
such an assessment will not be available until after the 2010 U.S. Census is conducted
and disseminated. Future studies should consider the role of TIFs on urban development,
especially within Houston as data becomes available. These entities are important,
especially within the Houston context, since they may provide alternative sources of
funding for development projects. Ethnic communities, and particularly place
entrepreneurs, may circumvent the city’s lack of support by invoking these state-
authorized entities. Future questions may include: ‘What are the outcomes of ethnic
neighborhoods that fall under the jurisdiction of TIFs?’, ‘Have members of immigrant
communities been participating in TIFs?’, ‘Have TIFs translated into improving

economic conditions for minorities in these neighborhoods?’

7.5 Final Remarks

This thesis has explored the importance of well-organized urban elites from both

public and private circles in manipulating place to facilitate certain forms of urban

 

53 The management district is a neighborhood-level authority that allows private
businesses to self—assess taxes to help fund street and landscape improvements.

185

 

 

 

 

redevelopment. In the Houston example, much of the recent initiatives have been
focused on inner city revival, especially in downtown. The monopoly of power wielded
by the SF group, which represented Houston’s traditional elite, began to wane during the
19708. Vojnovic (2003b) shows that by the 218t century, in part due to international
immigration, an increase in transnational service providers, the expansion of the Houston
economy, and a diversifying economic base, the Houston business community had
extensively evolved from the days of the SF group. New economic elites emerged in the
city, diluting the traditional power structures of the 8F group. The new local business
leaders, however, still maintain close ties to the city’s political leadership, and local
government continued to preserve a strong pro-business agenda, as evident with ongoing
financial support (in terms of subsidies and public-private partnerships) of selected
private development projects.

The Chinese community had a highly motivated collection of ethnic elites, who
had gained a financial stake in developing land adjacent to downtown for their own
business district project in the 19708, but were unable to attract the attention of the
mainstream urban elite, and eventually succumbed to the effects of the area’s revival by
the mainstream growth coalition. Ethnic communities and immigrant place entrepreneurs
investing in Houston’s downtown and surrounding areas did not receive the public
financial aid that other developers, and competing private development projects, received
in Houston’s urban redevelopment efforts. Without the public aid, ethnic place
entrepreneurs were simply not as competitive as their publicly funded rivals, and ethnic
communities and neighborhoods were slowly squeezed out of the Houston core. This

outcome shows that the City of Houston—despite its rhetoric of promoting diversity—

186

 

 

and its major allies were indifferent to hosting a downtown Chinese ethnic district, unlike
the outcomes experienced in other major cities. In addition, despite the city’s stance
towards embracing multiculturalism and positive claims among its allies that its inner-
city development initiatives have benefited residents, the economic fortunes of Asian
residents have declined since Houston’s new openness to ethnicity.

This research highlights the narrowness of Houston’s recent interest in cultural
pluralism and diversity. The issues are not simply the greater visibility of minority
groups in the urban landscape, the participation of ethnic members in government, or the
marketing of their communities in local media or government documents. Many of those
recent changes no doubt benefit minority communities whose presence had for too long
been ignored by the city. However, Houston’s popular program of celebrating diversity
masks the pressing need to improve economic prospects for its minorities. In addition,
local government, in their selective process of funding private development projects,
ensures that ethnic place entrepreneurs are not given an opportunity to fairly compete in a
free market.

Philo and Keams (1993) observed that cities mobilize diverse cultural resources
in an attempt to sway local opinion, and show that despite the ills of urban change, the
city itself is “basically ‘doing alright’ by its citizens” (p. ix). In the Houston context,
public gestures promoting diversity serve as a diversion. Yet, this promotion effectively
divests the city of any responsibility to actively improve the conditions and opportunities
of its diverse residents, allowing government to focus on a narrow set of growth

objectives and dismissing the needs of large segments of its residents.

187

 

 

 

Today, the city of Houston prominently advertises New Chinatown to visitors—in
place of Old Chinatown—fulfilling the desire among middle and upper income tourists
and residents for culturally unique commodified places as discussed by Harvey (1989b),
Knox (1991, 1993), Zukin (1995, 1998, 2005), Dicks (2003), and ethnic neighborhoods
described by Hackworth and Rekers (2005). Despite the fact that the city and major
place promoters have openly voiced support for multiculturalism, the lack of local
government support for the Chinese and other Asian businesses, and the lack of ; 1:
improving economic conditions in Chinese and Asian neighborhoods, indicates that the
current strategy of celebrating diversity, as well as Houston’s gestures toward minority

communities, have been more symbolic than substantive.

 

There is an important message here for other ethnic communities across American
cities. The rising government and popular media celebration of ethnicity and diversity
that has been evident since the 19608, and especially in large American cities, coupled
with the growing political representation by minorities, has generally been interpreted as
a positive outcome for ethnic communities, particularly in the larger and the more
culturally diverse cities. However, these new approaches by local govemment—fostering
pluralism, diversity, and ethnicity—might well be masking the declining economic state
of minority sub-populations and their deteriorating economic opportunities, as in the case
of Houston. The story of Houston closely aligns with the national sentiment, which was
critically observed by social commentator Walter Benn Michaels. He decries the current
fascination with diversity quite succinctly: “We would much rather get rid of racism than
get rid of poverty. And we would much rather celebrate cultural diversity than seek to

establish economic equality” (2006, p. 12).

188

 

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