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A RHETORIC OF APPEASEMENT:
TROPOLOGY IN THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC WAR ON TERROR

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Alma Villanueva

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A RHETORIC OF APPEASEMENT:
TROPOLOGY IN THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC WAR ON TERROR

By

Alma Villanueva

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ABSTRACT

A RHETORIC OF APPEASEMENT:
TROPOLOGY IN THE POLITICO-ECONOMIC WAR ON TERROR

By

Alma Villanueva

In the War on Terror that was initiated by the Bush administration after 11

September 2001 and continues in the policies, if not the rhetoric, of the Obama

presidency, there have been rhetorics that act to appease publics thereby persuading

people into accepting the war. The war is justified through a "color-blind" racism in

which all Muslims become terrorists, potential terrorist, or helpless people in need of

saving. This form of color-blind racism can be seen in political scientist Samuel P.

Huntington's "clash of civilizations" trope, in which the warfare is blamed on Muslims'

culture (as if there were but one). This paper looks at the clash of civilizations theory as

an overarching, dominant trope existing in the discourse of the politico-economic War on

Terror. The trope reveals a colony-blind imperialism, that is, an imperialism in which

contemporary colonialism is denied yet practiced. Such tropes provide a story that hides

the politico-economic incentives behind U.S. foreign policy, thereby allowing the

continuation of warfare in the Middle East. If the field of rhetoric is to follow its

tradition of working towards civic participation, or social activism, then it must continue

in its development of incorporating the study of the macro, the powerful, and the

economic, as these are interlocked with the smaller communities in which we interact.

To the men of my life. My new husband—my study partner—whose
love, support, and conversations made the writing an enjoyment.
My dad, who affectionately withstood my many, longwinded phone calls
in my moments of confusion, anxiety, and excitement,
helping me to carry on the family business.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

Introduction:
Appeasement, Racialization, and the Field of Rhetoric

there have been no words.
no poetry in the ashes south of canal street.
no prose in trucks driving debris and dna.

evident out my window is abstract reality.
sky where once was steel.
smoke where once was flesh.

first, please god, let it be a mistake, the pilot's heart, the
plane's engine.
god, please, don't let it be anyone
who looks like my brothers.

i do not know how bad a life has to break in order to kill.
I've never been so hungry that i willed hunger
never so angry as to want a gun over a pen.
not really.
even as a woman, a palestinian.
never this broken....

both my brothers - my heart stops - not a beat disturbs my fear.
muslim, gentle men. born in brooklyn
and their faces are of the arab man, all eyelashes and
nose and beautiful color and stubborn hair.
what will their lives be like now?

over there is over here.

across the river, burning rubber and limbs. rescuers
traumatized. skyline brought back to human size. no longer
taunting gods.

~From "First Writing Since: Poem on Crisis of Terror"
by Suheir Hammad

Palestinian-American poet Suheir Hammad is not appeased. Surely, this is more

personal for her; for New York is her home, Arabians and Muslims her people, and she is

Brown in America. But people are empathetic and caring. It is in our nature; for without human compassion and the ability to imagine another's life as your own, we as a species would not survive. We thrive off of community, and now we are, as they say, a "global village," or as Suheir Hammad puts it, "over there is over here." So why are we not more upset about what is happening to our neighbors, both far and near?

In the War on Terror initiated by the Bush administration after 11 September 2001 and continues in the policies if not the rhetoric of the Obama presidency, there have been rhetorics that act to appease publics into accepting the warfare. Through a "color-blind" racism in which all Muslims become terrorists, potential terrorists, or helpless people in need of saving, the warfare is justified. In the public discourse on the War on Terror, a religion and the presumed singular culture of members of that religion get characterized racially. Thus as Poet Suheir Hammad waited to find out why the planes crashed into the New York buildings, she prayed, "don't let it be anyone / who looks like my brothers." How else could the U.S. get away with going after Afghanistan and Iraq when most of the hijackers were Saudi? By portraying "those people" as all the same.

While rhetoric has glorified warfare and empire-building by way of reducing large-scale systematic racism, sexism, and poverty to individual cases of biological incapability, the new rhetorics of justification at play in the post-Cold War era use culture as the impetus for its racialization. In the War on Terror, "color-blind" racialization occurs through the overarching trope of a "clash of civilizations." Made known by Samuel P. Huntington, late Harvard political scientist who was involved in U.S. foreign policy, the phrase signifies a gloomy future in which the "Islamic Civilization" is inherently in conflict with the "Western Civilization" due to culturally-specific traits.

Huntington uses a religion to refer to different peoples: Arabs, Afghanis, Pakistanis, Iranians, all northern Africans, Indonesians, and so forth. In this way, they all get grouped together—"Islamacists" (a newly created term), "foreign" brown people. Here, as it is for Huntington, religion is a significant marker of cultural identity.

Such rhetorical devices provide a story that hides the economic incentives behind U.S. foreign policy, thereby appeasing the public and allowing the continuation of warfare in the Middle East. I conclude that the cultural lens that is employed in the dominant narrative of the War on Terror ought to be replaced with one that accounts for political economy. In so doing, a story about imperialism emerges. In our stage of late capitalism, the globe is engulfed within a system of domination and oppression that harms far too many. Big business and government work hand-in-hand, exerting power and acquiring wealth and status, providing for a system in which a few profit at the expense of all others. The continuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq need to be understood within this context. In essence, I explore the rhetorical ways that members of the U.S. policy establishment justify the suffering and injustices of U.S. foreign policy in the greater Mideast region.

Contributing to the Field of Rhetoric:
Bridging the Micro with the Macro, the Cultural with the Politico-Economic

The tradition of rhetoric as emphasized within mainstream academia started as a way to enlist participatory democracy among those deemed citizens (of course, Athens was hardly void of sexism or racism, as women and those not of Athenian decent were denied a political voice). It is, nonetheless, within the spirit of social action that I call upon the tradition of rhetoric. Through the study of the macro—the powerful, and the

economic—I aim to bridge the work being done within rhetoric with that which ought to

be done. Because rhetorics of domination—such as racist rhetoric—are carried out

through a political economy that is now global, as our world exists within a (neo)colonial

S/state, it is important for our field to understand both the macro context and political

economy.

The field of rhetoric addresses social justice and analysis of systems of oppression

such as classism, racism, and sexism on the local level, especially as pertaining to

communities and classroom pedagogy. It addresses the individual with matters

pertaining to identity politics (Cushman) and internal colonialism (Villanueva). And

there are moments of looking at rhetorics of sovereignty (Powell, Lyons), precolonial

rhetorics (Baca), and neocolonial rhetorics (Villanueva). There is some work on the

political economies of academe and labor (Carter) and first-year composition (Miller and

Crowley), but again these are on the micro scale. While there is some work on

transnational and postcolonial rhetorics (Pandey), more is needed on the global level.

In "Toward a Political Economy of Rhetoric (or a Rhetoric of Political

Economy)," Victor Villanueva suggests that the field not only focus on the cultural, but

also on the political economic. He calls for those in the field to apply rhetorical theory to

political science. He writes:

> The role of rhetoric . . . is the demystification of the ideological. The role
> of political economy is the demystification of relations tied to the
> economic. If we're to understand where we are and what is happening to
> us—and maybe even to affect it—we need the tools provided by both.
> ("Toward" 58)

Moreover, as sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein argues, "politics, economics, and the

socio-culture" ought not be treated as separate arenas because these are inseparable

components in social reality (Schouten 5). Any analysis on the human condition will be faulty if any one of these components is left out of the picture.

Just as it is important for rhetoric to adopt multifaceted perspectives that traditionally belong to other disciplines, it is also imperative to incorporate a systems perspective such that any individual or community under study is also seen as part of an entire system. While I make no attempt to do such an analysis here, there is something to the idea of a world-systems approach as described by Wallerstein. It is a worldview and method that analyzes the human condition holistically, including looking at both the macro in terms of grand space and time, *and* looking at the individual and smaller units within that system; for both the macro and micro cannot and therefore should not be pried from one another ("It's the End," 195-96). In studying the rhetoric of the War on Terror, I work from the scholarship in the field to show a different side of the same coin.

Combining the macro and micro is really a natural thing in a world in which the same system reigning over me reigns over most others. While reading a recent *College English* issue, I ran across an article by Aja Y. Martinez, who writes of her students of color and how they, like herself, internalize cultural racism, a concept borrowed from Bonilla-Silva, who writes of the new racism in the U.S. What I found interesting while reading this piece was that Martinez's breakdown of cultural or color-blind racism, which is racism based on cultural rather than biological premises, is that it is just as applicable to Muslims abroad as it is to her study of it in relation to Americans of color. While discussing pedagogy and internal colonialism, the frame or trope (depending on if you are in sociology or rhetoric) also applies at the macro level. This is such because the rhetoric is manufactured by the same political economy.

The tropes Martinez utilizes were referred to her by Villanueva, which he uses to identify color-blind rhetoric being imposed internally in the U.S. and outwardly to Muslims in the Middle East and its surrounding geography. In "The Rhetorics of the New Racism or the Master's Four Tropes," Villanueva discusses two of Huntington's texts: *The Clash of Civilizations* and *Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity*, a book about the "danger" of Latinos in the U.S. In bridging these texts, Villanueva finds the new trope for racism to be culture, which is being implemented to justify systemic injustices inflicted on people of color both domestically and internationally. Thus, Villanueva bridges the macro and micro and provides the analytic of color-blind racism that I, in his footsteps, utilize in the clash of civilizations trope. However, his discussion of my topic is preliminary because his main emphasis is not on Huntington's civilization-clash rhetoric nor on the War on Terror.

It is Dana L. Cloud from the Communications camp of rhetoric who really delves into the clash of civilizations trope in the War on Terror. In "Flying While Arab: The Clash of Civilizations and the Rhetoric of Racial Profiling in the American Empire," Cloud analyses the rhetorical justifications of imperially motivated racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims in U.S. airports. Her assessment is that the rhetoric is "masked as discourse about cultural difference, [but in actuality it] rests on a logic of racialization coded in terms of the 'clash of civilization' and the 'white man's burden'" (220). Cloud traces this rhetoric's longstanding imperial legacy, dating it back to European expansion in the nineteenth century. Cloud's thesis is informative and compelling, offering much for a productive dialogue.

Cloud, as does Villanueva, posits the dangers of using a cultural lens without an economic one, stating that such an approach is "insufficient for understanding the logics of contemporary racism." She continues to vie for the study of the "histories and motivations of ruling classes" so that we do not "misunderstand racism as a simple clash of values and cultures, or as an inevitable product of difference" (223-24). I follow suit by looking at those in power and attempting to understand something of their worldview. With such resolutions calling for scholarship addressing the intersection of the rhetorical tropes and political economy as a necessity of understanding the rhetorics of the War on Terror, I follow Villanueva and Cloud's lead, working towards a holistic understanding of the rhetorics of imperial justification, appeasement, and racialization.

My work extends the scholarship of my predecessors by providing both a depth of detail and a focus on the rhetorical language of those who have had a decisive position of power in the policy establishment—namely Bush and Huntington—and an in-depth analysis of the politico-economic situation of the War on Terror. Villanueva's speech studies tropes and how they are used in the official, dominant narrative, yet Cloud's does little to unpack the tropes and their inner-workings. Further, while both rhetoricians stress the importance of incorporating the economic, neither rhetorician employs a solid framework on the political economy of the War on Terror. In essence, I employ Villanueva's analysis of rhetorical tropes to Cloud's magnified attention on racialization in the rhetorical and politico-economic War on Terror. The product is a tropology of the clash of civilizations rhetoric, whereby tropology means a study of tropes much in the same way that Ralph Cintrón employs the word "tropologic" in *Angels' Town* (I do not

7

mean to indicate "tropology" as it is used for religious interpretations of texts, however such an angle is worth pursuing in this context).

Methods in the Field of Rhetoric:
An Approach to Studying Rhetorics of Appeasement

I began this research project long before I entered graduate school. In the years following the 11 September 2001 events, my mom kept pointing out the recurrent phrase, "clash of civilizations" in the media when Muslims were the topic. Discussions at home introduced me to Huntington (I even secretly "borrowed" my parents' copy of the book and have yet to return it). With the intent of looking into what this popular phrase entailed, I initiated the project. My primary tasks have been to understand (1) what the catchphrase signifies when it is dropped as a simple and quick explanation for the events of the years-long War on Terror, and (2) how it is those meanings are constructed.

Such goals require viewing the catchphrase as a symbol, or a trope. Treating the phrase as such enables two outcomes. One, the phrase transcends its original text(s) and finds life elsewhere. For example, the "clash of civilizations" exists not only in Huntington's text, but significantly in language adopted by others in many other outlets. Those outlets do not share with the original source(s) the explicit theme of being about political affairs on the global level. Newspaper articles employing the trope range in topics from the war in Iraq to hate crimes against Muslims in Brooklyn. Such articles do not question or explain the premise of inherent cultural conflict, but the message nonetheless exists in the very words used.

Secondly, as a symbol, the phrase's meaning may imply more than what the words themselves mean on the surface level. Kenneth Burke writes of symbols as

transforming entities in which "what goes forth as A returns as non-A" (438). Burke's purpose with studying tropes is in determining "their role in the discovery and description of 'the truth'" (421). For instance, the "clash of civilizations" argument reads warfare as a result of cultural difference, but a symbolic reading of the phrase reveals that warfare is fought for empire. Symbols as an analytic do more than answer the "what," they also show the "how."

In order to understand how it is that the "clash of civilizations" trope functions, I proceeded with particular methods in research. My research required textual analysis in the form of rhetorical critique as guided by Sonja K. Foss's *Rhetorical Criticism*. In part because the methodology in Foss's book largely comes out of Communications, it was useful as a heuristic, but it was not to be followed formulaically. Significantly, it has as its precedent a book by Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*, which was first published in 1965. While largely outdated, unlike with Foss, Black foregrounds rhetorical criticism and distinguishes it from methods used in fields like linguistics.

Black states that rhetorical criticism aims to "account for how that subject [the researcher's object of inquiry] works" (18). My object of inquiry is the clash of civilizations trope. This conception of rhetorical critique is important because I do not attempt to establish the impact of the notion of "clash of civilizations." Rather, my aims have been to explore and explain how it operates to potentially appease its audiences. Toward this end, Black writes, a "system of rhetorical criticism… postulates that there will be a correspondence among the intentions of a communicator, the characteristics of his discourse, and the reactions of his auditors to that discourse" (16). The premise guiding my paper is that the discourse of the communicator conveys racialized meanings

through a unique environment of tropes that have the effect of appeasement on many of the audience members.

The set of procedures I undertook in order to understand the "clash of civilizations" trope lead to my doing a tropology, which is the study of the functionality of the trope(s) of inquiry. Within this context, tropology also indicates the existence of more than one trope at play in the rhetoric of clashing civilizations. My findings revealed that the "clash of civilizations" trope operates within an environment of particular other tropes, making for a cluster of tropes. What follows is a brief description of the process of my research and the general structure of the thesis.

The Research Process:
What I did and Why

The research process in general has been recursive, a bouncing between texts, between reading and writing, rereading materials and ongoing with finding new materials. Also, the research and its write-up are theory-oriented, largely based on what I already saw happening in the world; none of it is empirical in the least. I did, however, make some general moves, all of which were guided by the following research questions that now make up the bulk of my paper.

1. *What is the logic of "clash of civilization" rhetoric?*

2. *How is a process of racialization ascribed through culture clash rhetoric?*

3. *What material realities does culture clash ideology hide?*

I began by looking at the phrase "clash of civilizations" as used by those who coined the term, that is Huntington and his primary source, Bernard Lewis (more on this later). I performed a rhetorical analysis of Huntington's 1993 article, "Clash of

Civilizations," with a focus on the text's logos. I took the article as the object of analysis as opposed to the book for matters of practicality since it is sufficient enough for getting at the ideology inherent in the words of the book.

While I am using Huntington's text as the foundation for analysis, the notion of civilization clashing and culture clashing ideology is not particular to nor originates from Huntington. As will be elaborated on in the body of the text, Huntington's conceptualization of civilizations comes from a mid-twentieth century British historian, Arnold Toynbee, and the very phrase "clash of civilizations" comes from a prominent historian of Islam and the Middle East, Bernard Lewis. I have chosen Huntington's version because it is his name that gets taken up in the media and by government figures since 2001, and because he had and his work continues to have direct influence in foreign policy.

One might be quick to dismiss scholarship with such outlandish and skewed worldviews. However, this would be a dangerous mistake because these scholars do receive attention from publics and their ideologies are even adopted by those in the highest seats of power. Toynbee, for example, was widely popular within his time, even making the cover of *Time* magazine in 1947. Moreover, he affected "Western" policy by working within the British government and circles. For example, he worked in the British Foreign Office during WWI and WWII. During WWI this meant working for the Political Intelligence Office, a department responsible for gathering political, economic, and military intelligence on countries involved in the war for the Prime Minister's senior cabinet members. While Toynbee is a root source of civilizational ideology, Lewis and

Huntington, on the other hand, have had direct influence in the contemporary U.S. policy establishment.

Both Lewis and Huntington's ideas made their ways into the circles of the George W. Bush administration. Lewis had an influence on policy in that his ideological leaning regarding Muslims has been adopted by those in power. He has been a direct informant on the state of affairs in the Middle East and as a knowledgeable scholar of Islam, providing lectures at conventions in which government officials were present, such as at functions held by the American Enterprise Institute, a neoconservative think tank group. He also has a close relationship with Dick Cheney (Weisberg). Like Lewis, Huntington too was an academic. Unlike Lewis, however, it is Huntington who had more of a direct and longstanding relationship with the State and on foreign policy and with matters more varied than simply the Middle East and Muslims.

During the Johnson and Carter presidencies, Huntington served as a consultant for the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency. His crowd continued to include Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. More still, according to an article in *The Guardian*, "by the 1980s [he was] the most cited political scientist in America on international relations, and several universities made his works required reading" (Hodgson). Also, significantly, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 acts of warfare within U.S. borders, it was Huntington's name that echoed in the media, not Lewis's.

Furthermore, Huntington does political science (although he does not do political economy). As is elaborated in Part III, journalist Naomi Klein brings in her assessment of capitalism on a global scale, and by bringing in Milton Friedman, who is the icon of

economics that Huntington is of politics. And Lewis comes in as the foundation of Huntington's analysis of foreign policy. In order to study a trope, it is important to locate it in other texts (either oral or written). As such, I look at how Huntington's clash of civilizations theory operates as a trope in political discourse.

Because I am making a case about the ideology of those in power, and since former President Bush initiated and carried out the bulk of the War on Terror to date, analysis of his rhetoric is more compelling than general media sources such as newspaper or journal articles written by individuals who have relatively little political or military power. There were two approaches I took to locate fitting pieces of rhetoric. In one approach I conducted internet searches for "Bush" and "clash of civilizations" or "civilization." These provided a plethora of primary and secondary sources from which to choose and analyze.

The other approach I pursued was locating the speeches Bush made in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 plane hijackings and the 9/11 anniversary speeches made every year of his presidency thereafter (although not all were on the 11th of September). From these texts, I focus on two of them: one from 20 September 2001 to Congress and the other from 2006 which was addressed to the nation. In the final product herein, the speech that gets most of the attention is the 2006 one because (1) it is here that he uses not only the trope "civilization," he uses the entire phrase, "clash of civilizations" (which he does in another of the speeches I reviewed); and because (2) all the rhetorical elements I observed exist within this single piece (whereas in others there is only some of the criteria).

While analyzing Bush's texts, I primarily sought those rhetorical elements identified in Huntington's article in order to determine the extent to which a common trope existed. The correlation, as I suspected, was strong. Then I proceeded to analyze the conditions of the trope that existed in all the texts, coming to the conclusions that (1) there was a certain rhetorical environment and other tropes coming together to make up the dominant trope, "clash of civilizations," and (2) racialization did indeed figure into the way civilization-clash rhetoric functions.

Aside from explicating Huntington and Bush's texts, I searched behind the rhetoric of civilization clash for the material conditions of the War on Terror in order to see what other stories might exist. This required asking the questions, *What else could be going on here?* and *If we assume that there are not inherent cultural differences creating international intercultural violence, what would other lenses reveal?* In order to move away from culture as an analytic, then, I looked at a variety of scholarly sources from history and political economy that look at U.S.-Middle East relations, with a special focus on the 11 September 2001 acts of warfare and the subsequent War on Terror through an analysis of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Of course all of this required an extensive literature review. From the library book database, the online journal databases, internet search engines, and by way of friends and family, I located material that discussed rhetoric, civilizations, terrorism, racism and racialization, Middle Eastern and Islamic history, U.S. foreign policy, capitalism and more. The works I chose span many disciplines, including not only rhetoric, but communications, English studies, sociology, political science, business

14

economics, and history, not to mention the independent scholars and journalists whose work fit into one of these categories.

Sections of the Thesis

Toward these ends, the remainder of the paper has two parts. The next section, Part II, looks at the rhetorical War on Terror, meaning the political discourse addressing 11 September 2001 and the successive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Herein Bush's speech is used as a way into looking at the dominant trope of the clash of civilizations that is traced to Huntington and his intellectual influences. Within this tropology the dominant trope is broken down into the rhetorical elements and tropes that comprise it.

There are five rhetorical elements that indicate the presence of the clash of civilizations dominant trope: (1) subject, (2) common topics, (3) color-blind racism, (4) disclaimer, and (5) type of discourse. The subject is the overall topic: the War on Terror, or more generally, some interaction of non-Western Muslims and members of the West. The idea of the common topics is borrowed from Aristotle but pertains to those words that signify the clash of civilizations trope: "clash," "civilization," and "culture." Color-blind racism is a trope in this context and refers to the mention of culture or religion as a cultural marker in place of race. The disclaimer is the necessary element of denouncing any kind of discrimination or negative generalizations about Muslims or Arabs. And the type of discourse borrows again from Aristotle, meaning generally the three types of oratory: epideictic, deliberative, and judicial. Here the discourse is supposed to be political, but acts more celebratory with praise and blame. These five rhetorical elements mesh together in the trope of "civilization," thereby forming the dominant trope that

reveals a colony-blind imperialism, that is, an imperialism in which contemporary colonialism is denied yet practiced.

The final part of the paper, Part III, looks to the imperialism that is denied by the rhetoric of the War on Terror. The section begins with non-cultural incentives for warfare directed at the U.S., including the actions of 11 September 2001, pointing largely to U.S. foreign policy towards the Mideast region of the world. After complicating U.S. claims that Muslim terrorism and tyranny is a product of cultural difference, what follows is a look into advanced neocolonialism, a global economic system. The political economic approach provides a view into alternative motives for the U.S.'s desire to promote democracy throughout the greater region of the Middle East. But before entering into politico-economic War on Terror, we begin with the rhetorical war.

PART II

Colony-Blind Imperialism:
The Dominant Trope of a Clash of Civilizations

one more person ask me if i knew the hijackers.
one more... [person] ask me what navy my brother is in.
one more person assume no arabs or muslims were killed.
assume they know me, or that i represent a people.
or that a people represent an evil. or that evil is as simple as a
flag and words on a page.

we did not vilify white men when mcveigh bombed oklahoma...
or blame the bible or pat... robertson....
and when we talk about holy books and hooded men and death, why
never mention the kkk?

◈

"either you are with us, or with the terrorists"
- meaning keep your people
under control and resistance censored. meaning we got the loot
and the nukes.

~From "First Writing Since: Poem on Crisis of Terror"
by Suheir Hammad

Appeasement and Democracy

The clash of civilizations theory is that continual warfare is inevitable in

international politics because some "civilizations" are incompatible with others due to

differences in cultural values. Before getting into the logos of the argument as articulated

by its spokesperson, the late political scientist Huntington, its importance must first be

stressed. That the theory has been adopted by others in the U.S. policy establishment

demonstrates the existence of an ideology among the ruling classes that promotes—if not

favors—warfare. Warfare is not a result of cultural difference, but it is necessary in

imperial expansion.

However, unlike other colonial-type enterprises that have fought wars and taken over others' lands and bodies outright, without the need to get people on board, the U.S. claims *not* to be an imperial power. Rather, we are in a *post*-colonial age. America is a democracy, based on principles of freedom and "free" markets. And within a democracy, people are supposed to have influence and be involved in political affairs. So an imperial power cannot simply invade Iraq and privatize business over there. It needs to justify its actions, and keep people appeased. People are held at bay through military force, economic deprivation, or ideological penetration. In a system of supposed democracy, like that of the U.S., all three are at play, but it is largely in the ideological that the State maintains and exerts its control.

Noam Chomsky discusses how within the American democratic system the media promotes ideology that favors the ruling class, which is big business and the government. Chomsky traces an ideology among those in power in Western democracies that extends centuries back. The worldview is one in which the ruling class does not trust American publics to know what is in their best interests. Thus this elite yet minority class attempts to reduce the power of the other classes and proceeds in policies that work within *its* best interests, all the while portraying its minority interests as the interests of the majority ("Manufacture").

This mentality among the powerful is evident in Huntington's scholarship, especially in a report discussing the "crisis in democracy" that occurred during the 1960s in the U.S. The report was published in 1975 and provided to the Trilateral Commission, an organization existing to promote international democracy. The organization was founded in 1973 and was comprised of "about 400 distinguished leaders in business,

media, academia, public service, labor unions, and other non-governmental organizations from" Japan, Western Europe, and North America. As stated by the organization, the goals of the Trilateral Commission are "to foster closer cooperation among these core democratic industrialized areas of the world with shared leadership responsibilities in the wider international system."

According to the report, the crisis of democracy was that there was, in Huntington's very words, an "excess of democracy" which "involved the challenging of the authority of established political, social, and economic institutions, increased popular participation in and control over those institutions," increased "marches, demonstrations, protest movements," and "markedly higher levels of self-consciousness on the part of blacks, Indians, Chicanos, white ethnic groups, students, and women" (113, 61, and 59-60). Thus, he concluded that there needed to be a move to cultivate "political passivity," because "the effective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of *apathy and noninvolvement* on the part of some individuals and groups" (84-85 and 114). Being passive, apathetic, and noninvolved means that people are soothed, quieted, and anything but angry and stirred up. The democracy envisioned by the ruling class, thus, is one in which *appeasement* is key.

While Huntington makes no direct correlation between this report and his clash of civilizations theory, we can see an ideology at play that is not only among those in power, but within Huntington himself. Appeasement is a goal, and the rhetoric and ideology the clash of civilizations trope promotes surely has that effect on far too many. For instance, as for the U.S., American soldiers and mercenaries remain plentiful in Afghanistan and Iraq, even without a draft. Without massive protests or riots, the continuing policies of

the War on Terror are minimally challenged. Again, material power, like the military and economic hardship also deflected the masses from mobilizing, but it is the ideological that I study here.

Seeing as how appeasement goes hand-in-hand with the U.S.-style of democracy, perhaps the quest to spread democracy across the Middle East is an attempt to spread the hegemonic control that functions so well within the U.S. Edward Said does not believe in a description of an Islamic culture as one in which Muslims spend the majority of their time plotting against the "West," which Said sees as being implied in Huntington's clash of civilizations theory. In stark contrast to the mainstream portrait of the "threat of Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism that one encounters so often in the media," it is Said's belief that there are a variety of "currents and counter currents" among Muslims, and that there is an "extremely wide-spread attitude of questioning and skepticism towards age-old authority that characterizes the post Cold War in both East and West." If this cultural reading is indeed a pattern emerging from Muslim cultures and peoples, then in order to protect U.S. interests abroad, the implementation of a system of appeasement in the Middle East would be desired.

In short, those in power benefit from certain ideological explanations of U.S. foreign policy that work in the interests of the few. Thus, with the premise that the rhetoric of the clash of civilizations argument has either the intent or consequence of appeasing some of its audiences, it is important to look at how that appeasement may occur. The remainder of this paper aims to address just this question, finding that it relies heavily on racism. In order to get into the specifics of how a process of racialization is

20

ascribed through the rhetoric of the clash of civilizations, we turn first to Huntington's thoughts on the subject.

Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Theory

Huntington's thesis first came out in the article, "The Clash of Civilizations?," which was published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993. Three years later it became a book by the same title (but without the question mark). The article was one of the most read in the journal's history and the book made the national bestseller list. Within both a roadmap for war is outlined, including the U.S.'s targeted group of so-labeled "Islamic Civilization." According to Huntington, during the Cold War era ideology was the determining factor of global politics and warfare, and with the demise of that era our world has entered into the next: one in which the "great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural" (sec. I).

Huntington divides the world into what he calls "civilizations." The primary civilizations, which account for the entire globe, include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African (sec. III). The varied countries and ethnic groups are grouped together by what Huntington considers to be their "cultural" commonalities, meaning that, in his own words, the "civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion" (sec. III). There is no in-depth explanation for why the globe is divided and grouped as such, and yet these cultural borders are fixed and non-fluid.

The argument is that a cultural identity, or a civilizational identity, is the most fundamental aspect of any person's being. In demonstrating this point, Huntington

claims that it is possible for a person to be of a mix of nationalities and/or ethnicities, like Arab and American, for example. However, one cannot so easily be of two different religions: Muslim *and* Christian (sec. III). Thus, due to an innate identity and way of being that characterizes a civilization, some are more likely to be allies, while others are more likely to have conflict or *clash* with others.

The civilizational conflict that most of the article is concerned with is the one between the West and Islam. The Western Civilization includes the North American continent north of Mexico, Western Europe, and Australia. The Islamic civilization, the West's nemesis, includes northern Africa, Turkey and the Middle East, eastern Central Asian countries such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the southeast Asian island chains of Malaysia and Indonesia (see map in Appendix B).

While Huntington does not get into the specifics of Islam's values, he does lay out those values that are apart of the West that Islamic cultures lack. These include the following (sec. V):

- individualism
- liberalism
- constitutionalism
- human rights
- equality
- liberty
- the rule of law
- democracy
- free markets
- the separation of church and state

The Western cultural values are not religion-centered. Yet the Islamic civilization is titled by a religion. In the upcoming sections it will become apparent how the underpinning ideology comes to life in the War on Terror.

Once the actions of 11 September 2001 occurred, Huntington's clash of civilizations idea became a prominent framework in which to comprehend and interpret the violence that America was not used to experiencing. It was a national experience because it was sold as such through the media and such outlets of public discourse. The official story read as an inevitable clash between Islam and the West, which included *all* Americans. Basically, there was an enemy—terrorists—and their violence was a product of their culture. Because the terrorists were apart of the "Islamic" culture, and *they* are the most fundamentalist and thus the furthest removed from *our* values and ways, *they* simply seek violence and destruction. However, because *we* are an "enlightened" society and do not discriminate on the basis of "color or creed," then *we* could not generalize so openly about an entire culture or religion. Thus, a "subtle" racism emerged: a rhetoric that denies and yet perpetuates racism, and imperialism.

Racialization

Adopted from two sociologists, Karim Murji and John Solomos, a basic definition of racialization is "the process by which ideas about race are constructed, come to be regarded as meaningful, and are acted upon" (1). In the context of the War on Terror, however, race is an unspoken idea, disguised as culture, and it is applied to a religion that is comprised of varying ethnic groups. Thus the idea is not so much about "race" *per se*, but rather it is an idea about a people or peoples who are conceptually grouped together on the basis of religion and are depicted in ways that mark them racially.

Persons of a race share a lineage, ancestry, and common physical characteristics. As such, racism has commonly been a prejudice or discrimination against a people of a

certain "race," or people who "look" a certain way, and it has been justified on the basis of biological difference. Targets of the War on Terror, however, have been multifarious yet conceptually contained by affiliation to a geography in which Muslims are the majority: the Middle East, northern Africa, southwest Asia. The people are not one race (they are Afghanis, Pakistanis, Arabs, Persians, etc.), but have the commonality of religion, which dictates presumed commonality in culture. If the idea is not centered on race, then, one might wonder, why "*racialization*"?

The answer resides in the conceptualization of racialization as described by the sociologist Robin Cohen in which a religion gets racialized. Writing in the mid-nineties, Cohen considers Muslims to be targets of racism, even though "race" is not the determining factor of the discrimination. Although his analysis is on anti-Irish sentiment in post-World War II Britain, Cohen concludes that a group is racialized if the people pertaining to that group are "treated like a different race and alluded to in race-like ways" (194). Through culture, Muslims are treated racially.

Scholar and historian on Muslim and East-West affairs, Mahmood Mamdani, describes the way that culture has become the central explanation for the War on Terror. He calls this element in public discourse, "Culture Talk," and he writes of it as follows:

> [This discourse] assumes that every culture has a tangible essence that defines it, and it then explains politics as a consequence of that essence. Culture Talk after 9/11, for example, qualified and explained the practice of 'terrorism' as 'Islamic.' 'Islamic terrorism' is thus offered as both description and explanation of the events of 9/11. (17-18)

Cultural explanations replace the biological explanations that racism used to rely on. Therefore, even though a notion of culture (by way of religious affiliation) stands in for race, it is still appropriate to discuss civilization-clash rhetoric in terms of racialization.

Returning to the broad definition of racialization as set out by Murji and Solomos, the following addresses how the idea of race/culture in the War on Terror is constructed, gains currency, and is put into action. In the War on Terror, it is through symbols, especially tropes, and they gain currency in the context of imperialism. Writing of metaphors, which are a particular type of trope, Steuter and Wills from sociology and English, respectively, state that the words of symbol discourse are powerful because they do not only describe reality, but they shape how it is one conceives of reality (10). Much of how Americans understand the War on Terror is through the propaganda of the media, which provides the tropes, or as the authors purport, the "frames through which we see the world" (17).

In war there is what Steuter and Wills call a "fabricated enemy." This enemy implicitly and dangerously indirectly becomes symbolic of the whole group from which it is believed to belong. In regards to the War on Terror, the authors write: "When the terrorist comes to stand for all Arabs, for example, or religious extremists for all Muslims, then we generalize globally, broadening our target from immediate actors like the 9/11 suicide bombers to encompass all Middle-Easterners" (26). Furthermore, they assert, "Racism at large works on this same principle, [the] lumping together into a single mass all the variety of individual humanity" (27). Thus, hasty generalizations work to color (pun intended) all Muslims.

However, because symbols make the racism less direct than the racism of the past, racism gets denied. Villanueva points to Eduardo Bonilla-Silva who writes of racism without racists: a "color-blind racism" in which racism is denied yet continues disguised through "frames or *set paths for interpreting information*" (italics in original;

25

Bonilla-Silva 26). Bonilla-Silva provides four frames, from which Villanueva finds

"cultural racism" to be the rhetorical trope of the new racism that the current power nexus

employs, as provided by civilization-clash rhetoric ("Rhetorics"). Thus, the clash of

civilizations concept itself becomes a trope that when invoked in discourses surrounding

the War on Terror forwards a racist argument. The following sections work to unpack

this trope, identifying it as a dominant trope that works within a particular rhetorical

environment.

The Overarching Clash of Civilizations Trope

The clash of civilizations theory becomes a trope when it comes to life in public

discourses within a certain rhetorical context comprised of other tropes and symbols. The

phrase signifies the meanings conveyed in Huntington's text, and those meanings

themselves have a tropologic history. A trope is such when the ideas conjured reveal

hidden messages and thus signify something else. The clash of civilizations trope

indicates a colony-blind imperialism because it operates to justify and thereby promote

empire building all the while denying the continued existence of imperialism.

As a dominant trope, the clash of civilizations includes some combination of the

following rhetorical criteria. First, the subject concerns Muslims and members of "the

West," and is often within the context of the War on Terror. Secondly, one of the phrases

or words "clash of civilizations," "civilization," "culture clash," or "clash" with

"culture," must be employed. Third, when discussing the causes of the 11 September

2001 plane hijackings and subsequent wars, blame is based on cultural difference.

Fourth, there is usually a rhetorical caveat indicating that while some Muslims are

terrorists, most are not. And lastly, in the case of political discourse, it seems to be political, but a closer analysis of it demonstrates that its central function is to justify and promote a predetermined course of action, without leaving open alternative options. That is, whereas deliberative rhetoric is a call to action or at least proposes the possibility of deliberation, the epideictic is a praise of action taken.

The clash of civilizations dominant trope comes to life in the public speeches former President George W. Bush gave on the War on Terror. Before getting into the internal workings of the trope, first a snippet of Bush's September 11th fifth anniversary speech to the nation in which each rhetorical element comprising the clash of civilizations dominant trope are collectively manifest. Bush goes so far as to invoke and yet seemingly reject the culture clashing theory in his proclamation: "This struggle has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization." However, what this struggle entails is evident in the following passage taken from the speech.

> Since the horror of 9/11, we've learned a great deal about the enemy. We have learned that they are evil and kill without mercy, but not without purpose. We have learned that they form a global network of extremists who are driven by a perverted vision of Islam - a totalitarian ideology that hates freedom, rejects tolerance and despises all dissent. And we have learned that their goal is to build a radical Islamic empire where women are prisoners in their homes, men are beaten for missing prayer meetings, and terrorists have a safe haven to plan and launch attacks on America and other civilized nations. The war against this enemy is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century, and the calling of our generation.

While denouncing that there is a clash of differing civilizations, Bush nevertheless provides the phrase and thus the associated meanings that the trope invites.

Bush invoked the clash of civilizations trope numerous times, usually with the common topic, "civilization." Richard Jackson, whose work on critical terrorism studies,

international conflict resolution, and security studies gets published in international political science journals, finds that the "'war against terrorism' [was constructed] as a fight for civilisation itself." He provides a plethora of examples in which Bush, his cabinet members, and even Senator Kerry as a presidential candidate, made such declarations (50).

Just within the six speeches that formed the primary sources for this paper—Bush's annual 11 September, pro-War on Terror speeches from 2001 to 2006—there is at least one such declaration per speech. These statements include: "civilization's fight" (2001), "threaten civilization" (2002), "threat to civilization" (2003), "civilized nations are in this struggle" (2004), "enemy of civilization" (2005), and as already cited above, "struggle for civilization" (2006). Moreover, within these speeches alone, there are seventeen references to "civilization" or "civilized," and in one other speech (2004), Bush again used the very phrase, "clash of civilizations" (also to deny such a worldview). Thus, the first two criteria of the dominant trope are met: the theme is about the War on Terror and the common topics are plentifully present.

The next two indicators of the dominant trope are the cultural explanations and the disclaimer not to generalize about a whole population. Within the passage above, Bush describes the enemy as "evil," and driven by an ideology that is "totalitarian" and "hates freedom." Their ideology stems from a "perverted vision of Islam." There is little else to explain why the terrorists want a repressive empire in the Middle East and to harm America. All rests on the idea that the terrorists are such because they are (*bad*) Muslims and come from a totalitarian society. Such expressions are imbued with culture as conceptualized by Huntington. Culture is explained in terms of matters associated with

America's political system: democracy, liberalism, liberty, "free" markets, the separation of church and state, and so forth.

In another part of the speech, Bush states that the U.S. is "now in the early hours of this struggle between tyranny and freedom." Freedom is associated with and even equated with democracy. Bush claims that terrorism is born of non-democratic or tyrannical states. Bush tells a (his)story of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East prior to 2001. According to Bush, the U.S. spent sixty "[y]ears of pursuing stability to promote peace" in the Middle East. But this was ineffective, as is evident by one "September morning," presumably the eleventh, in 2001. He concludes: "So we changed our policies, and committed America's influence in the world to advancing freedom and democracy as the great alternatives to repression and radicalism." Therefore, Bush implies that if countries in the Middle East were democratic there would not be any foreign terrorism. Since democracy is associated with the very cultural values that make up a civilization, then the problem is a matter of culture.

Also, in returning to Huntington, religion is the fundamental determinant of one's culture and a functioning democracy. The cultural explanation is also a part of the discourse's requirement of a quick acknowledgement that not all Muslims are terrorists. The clash of civilizations trope works only in the discourse environment of what Mamdani refers to as the "good Muslim, bad Muslim" binary. Mamdani explains that in public discourse Muslims fall into one of these two camps; they get described as either "good" Muslims who desire democracy and the like, or they are "bad" Muslims, who are fundamentalists (24). As a rhetorical tactic, the disclaimer functions along the same lines

as the introductory clause, "No offense, but...," at which point the person proceeds with an offense.

It is clear that Bush makes a distinction between "good" and "bad" Muslims. The terrorists seek to repress other Muslims. These other Muslims seek democracy, as indicated in one part of the speech in which Bush states: "And now the challenge is to help the Iraqi people build a democracy that fulfills the dreams of the nearly 12 million Iraqis who came out to vote in free elections last December." Even though everything else within the passage at hand provides images and views of "bad" Muslims, negative stereotyping is denied within the passage itself by way of the inclusion of the clear claim that not *all* Muslims are bad.

Mamdani attributes the "good Muslim, bad Muslim" phenomenon to Bernard Lewis, not Huntington (20-24). However, while it is a part of Lewis's arguments about Muslims, this does not mean that it does not also come from Huntington. One, Huntington's work directly draws from Lewis, and two, it is evident in Huntington's article itself. As with the assimilation narrative with people of color in the U.S., the logic of Huntington's civilization clashing theory too has its version of how a member of a civilization can, in a sense, transcend her/his "color or creed." It would seem that if those of the Islamic civilization adopt Western values, like democracy and its counterparts of freedom and free markets, then there would not be any reason for conflict. Furthermore, as Huntington wraps up his thesis, he concludes with suggestions for foreign policy in general, most of which support warfare. Yet he encourages policy makers to learn more about the religious and philosophical underpinning of other civilizations and to aim for

"coexistence" and a shared future of a single "global civilization" (17). Such remarks have as their premise the belief that there are or can be "good" Muslims.

Yet, as is the nature of the disclaimer, the idea that there are good Muslims and a future of peace is plausible is not the dominant message throughout the text. Huntington is skeptical of "coexistence" as a long-term solution because he finds the culture of Islam to be so drastically different from that of the West, and he predicts other civilizations may modernize yet refuse to "Westernize," meaning not politically and thereby not culturally assimilate (14 and 16). Thus, even with the disclaimer, Huntington still forwards an image of a dark future, and negative images of Muslims. The "good Muslim, bad Mulsim" disclaimer leads to a generalization of a people through disguised meanings. Color-blind racism and the "good Muslim, bad Muslim" disclaimer are foundational for the proliferation of civilization-clash rhetoric in a proclaimed post-colonial era in which racism too is a thing of the past.

Thus far we have looked at four of the rhetorical criteria that indicates the presence of the clash of civilization trope: subject, common topics, cultural racism, and the disclaimer. The fifth element, the genre of the discourse, will be discussed after a look into what the entire trope of the clash of civilization means. The very term civilization signifies both culture and empire. On the one hand, it signifies who is "civilized," which is explained in cultural terms (as opposed to biological). On the other hand, it stands in for "empire" such that one can use the terms interchangeably. The dominant trope becomes not just a color-blind racism, but a colony-blind imperialism.

Civilization Trope:
A Colony-Blind Imperialism

The very word "civilization" itself functions as a trope, a trope that, when combined with the other rhetorical elements, is indicative of the clash of civilization trope. Civilization in public discourse pertains to the "civilized" world, meaning those who have "progressed" and "modernized." Civilization is about "advanced" members of the "first" or "developed" world. Jackson believes that the word as invoked in the public discourse of the War on Terror is apart of the centuries old "civilization-barbarism" narrative (50), which Cloud sees as leading to a scenario of white man's burden (228). From both scholars the idea is that there is a construction of "us vs. them," with an assumed superiority of "us." The "us" are those who belong to some notion of "the West." The "them" are not the terrorists *per se*, but all who are uncivilized, all who are not us, not the West.

The "uncivilized" get portrayed as either savages in need of help, being freed through a system of democracy, or as the enemy, who are barbarous and ought be "exterminated." While the "good Muslim, bad Muslim" element is employed, the images we are left with are not of a docile, kind people in need of help. Rather, the images are of a violent, explosive (pun intended) people who are irrational and full of hatred. The barbarian narrative is dominant. Steuter and Wills look into this stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims in animalistic metaphors, stating that they "extend the violence of individuals to encompass an entire culture, a culture portrayed as inherently violent, uncivilized, empty of our values and our shared concern for the work of human life" (4). The authors claim that the othering of enemies of the State functions to create insoluble divisions (xi and 9).

Such divisions are necessary when the motives of the U.S. are not really to help people, be it Iraqis seeking free elections or Americans who could be attacked again. Wallerstein finds that imperial power is always accompanied by a "moral defense." He writes of the "civilizing mission," a "presumed moral necessity to force others to conform to the norms prescribed by universal values," and what constitutes "universal" values are always the proclaimed values of the imperial power (510). Mamdani stresses the need to "distinguish between civilization and power" (33). Within Bush's speeches there is never the mention of U.S. power nor any political or economic gains the U.S. may realize in spreading democracy. Yet they are present (as will become evident in Part III). This is how a well-functioning trope operates. When Bush invokes the idea of civilization or the phrase "clash of civilization," he invokes a story of power.

In tracing Bush's rhetoric on the War on Terror to Huntington and his influences, it becomes apparent that the trope of "civilization" really means empire, and the "West" primarily refers to the U.S., since it is the current center of imperial power. Huntington draws on a selective history of East-West relations to demonstrate the inherently differing and thereby conflicting Western and Islamic civilizations. In so doing, it becomes apparent that the civilization history is a history of empire. The history of conflict is centuries old, which Huntington dates to 732 CE (a century after the inception of the religion of Islam) when Islam with the Moors expanded into and up through Spain and fought in Tours, with France as a symbol of the West. After, there are the Crusades, the expansion efforts of the Ottoman Empire, Arab and Israeli warfare starting in the mid-twentieth century, the Egyptian and the French problems in the mid fifties, late twentieth-century Muslim terrorist actions, and then the Gulf War.

The latter Huntington alludes to by stating, "This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another" (sec. IV). The earlier history Huntington invokes includes imperial rule: the early spread of Islam as an empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the French colonization of Egypt. The recent and current affairs are connected to that history as if they were but a continuation of imperial interactions, thereby contextualizing terrorism and Mideast warfare in an imperial setting.

Huntington's civilizational lens in which the history of humanity is viewed in a breadth spanning centuries on a scale encompassing the globe follows the scholarship of Toynbee. From 1934 to 1961, Toynbee produced twelve books in a series entitled, *A Study of History*. It is a history of "civilizations" throughout time that, like Huntington's, recounts, examines, and predicts their emergences and demises. Toynbee begins with twenty-three civilizations, most of which have failed and many of which have been consumed by others, resulting in just five now. These he labels as Western Christian, Orthodox Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and Far Eastern. Toynbee's civilizations are also classified as cultural entities in which religion plays a major part. While Toynbee shapes Huntington's view of civilizational history as imperial history, Huntington draws from Lewis for a conceptualization of the "Islamic Civilization" in particular.

Huntington's article even cites an article written by Lewis in 1990, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," which has a section entitled, "A Clash of Civilizations." What Huntington directly borrows is Lewis's belief in a clash of civilizations as an ancient and inherent description of relations between the West and Islam. This is evident in Lewis's history which mirrors Huntington's.

Like Huntington, Lewis provides a long, distorted history of warring interactions between presumed members of the Islamic and Western cultures, which is also about imperial power. In Lewis's 2001 article, "The Revolt of Islam," which in 2004 turned into the book, *Crisis of Islam*, the historian tells a history of Islam in order to explain the causes of the War on Terror. The history he invokes is one of imperial pursuit from Muslim peoples, beginning with the Prophet Mohammad and the foundation of Islam in 632 CE. Huntington and Lewis tell histories or stories not of people but of empires.

Huntington lists a handful of reasons for the inevitable clashes between differing civilizations, all having to do with differences in cultural identities and values, and, significantly, the institutions that advance both. The two greatest reasons, states Huntington, concern power and culture: "Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Differences in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict" (sec. VI). Power and culture are not just intertwined; power is realized through cultural domination.

Huntington claims that the main concern is with the cultural, yet he reveals a great concern with military, economic, and political power. Huntington states: "The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values" (sec. VI). The values that the West exerts its power to protect and promote are political and economic, thus populations with such values would add to Western power. In fact, it is through culture that power can be achieved. Huntington finds that "Differences in culture and religion create differences

over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment" (sec. III). Such concerns with the exportation of Western values abroad suggest imperial expansion via culture.

Cultural expansion is justified through cultural racism. The justification largely comes from the simultaneous acknowledgement of Western imperial penetration in the Middle East and dismissal of the significance and consequences of empire by putting blame on the alleged violent culture of Muslims. As does Huntington, Lewis acknowledges that there is legitimacy in the argument that the Muslim world has been altered by "Western domination, Western influence, or Western precept and example." He explains: "For vast numbers of Middle Easterners, Western-style economic methods brought poverty, Western-style political institutions brought tyranny, even Western-style warfare brought defeat."

Just as Lewis affirms Western imperialism and some of its aftermath in the Middle East, he nevertheless continues with: "And since the United States is the legitimate heir of European civilization and the recognized and unchallenged leader of the West, the United States has [as if innocently] inherited the resulting grievances and become the focus for the *pent-up hate and anger* [of Muslims]" (italics mine; "Roots").

This "pent-up hate and anger" is a cultural attribute that is inherited as if it were a genetic predisposition:

> There is something in the religious culture of Islam which is inspired, in even the humblest peasant or peddler, a dignity and a courtesy toward others never exceeded and rarely equaled in other civilizations. And yet, in moments of upheaval and disruption, when the deeper passions are stirred, this dignity and courtesy toward others can give way to an explosive mixture of rage and hatred which impels even the government of an ancient and civilized country. ("Roots")

The above passage displays the same rhetorical ploy of acknowledging and yet dismissing something that ought to be highlighted and given great attention. Lewis puts forth the argument that it does not matter how many kind, hospitable, or gentle Muslims one has known, because while it is in their "nature" to be as such, the core of a Muslim is actually filled with hatred and anger waiting to *explode* out of "its" façade.

Through cultural racism, blame falls on Muslims and persons of the Mideast, and the U.S. is glorified. Thus there is no reason for the U.S. to change its policies and actions abroad. Culture thus serves as both the reason for Muslim terrorism and the reason for U.S. foreign policy in the Mideast. Through the first four criteria of the dominant trope of the clash of civilizations—subject, common topics, cultural racism, and the disclaimer—we see how these rhetorical elements interact in order to mask colonial discourses. Yet the discourse genre that is under study herein is categorized into political discourse. And political discourse in the tradition of ancient rhetoric, going back to Aristotle, was for deliberation in order to come up with varying solutions for the ailments of society.

The next section looks to the fifth rhetorical component: the type of discourse, which functions as epideictic, not deliberative. Because it does praise and blame without looking into the varied narratives that work through such profound social concerns, it creates one grand narrative that operates to forward but one agenda. Part III, which follows the next section that details how the discourse genre functions, utilizes a lens of political economy in order move in the direction of creating more deliberative rhetorics that take into account multiple perspectives.

Epideictic Oratory in Disguise

The very discourse genre employed by Bush and Huntington is not really political in the sense of drawing on history, weighing facts, and coming to different ways of proceeding and solving the problem. Rather, it is epideictic, celebratory of the West. It does praise and blame, and leads to only one solution. The discourse itself functions to justify and promote but one story and one type of foreign policy, to promote and advance U.S. imperialism.

A premise of the clash of civilization trope is that there must be a "civilization" hierarchy, and it is unquestionably presumed that the "West" will vie for the position in this global competition. There is no suggestion of or hint towards the U.S. taking a different direction; not a thought of deliberation. Rather, Huntington simply states, "In the politics of civilizations, the people and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history" (sec. I). Subtly, the existence of colonialism is denied, and a postcolonial universal culture is alluded to. In utilizing the tropologic reading unpacked in the previous section, such a universal civilization means an even stronger U.S.-dominated monopoly over the world.

Huntington believes that as the West attempts "to promote its values of democracy and liberalism to universal values, to maintain its military predominance[,] and to advance its economic interests" around the globe, it will "engender countering responses from other civilizations" (sec. III). From this Huntington concludes that there are but three routes for these civilizations to take, of course excluding any alternative action on the part of the West.

The non-Western civilizations can attempt to (1) isolate themselves from Western penetration, (2) assimilate into Western culture, or (3) confront the West through warfare (sec. VI). Thus, what in effect happens is that the agency and the blame of the future events of any civilizational clash are afforded to all civilizations; the U.S. is not to blame for a future of global warfare. However, a lens of political economy indicates that what Huntington really advocates is a post-Cold War era of U.S.-led neocolonialism, such that the U.S. expands its power globally not only through militaristic means (a colonial strategy), but also through political and economic institutions via culture (or democracy spreading). More on political economies and the War on Terror in Part III, for now we focus on how the clash of civilization trope in political discourse works to support the U.S. agenda of advancing such economic, military, and political systems of domination.

Huntington, for example, espouses some possible paths for the U.S. in his history and prediction of civilization interactions. He asserts, "Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces" like in the Gulf War when many in the Middle East were proud of Saddam Hussein for challenging the West. Thus, in the long run, Huntington maintains, democracy on non-Western civilizations will be counter productive (sec. IV). Basically, all routes point toward one end: warfare. Even in the one paragraph of Huntington's article that has any explicit call to action, below, there remains one course of action.

Given that warfare is inevitable in the long run, there are nonetheless short term implications for U.S. foreign policy, which thereby provides some element of deliberative discourse. For the time being, Huntington advises the policy shapers of the U.S. to (1) "exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states;" (2) "to support in

other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests;" and (3) "to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvements of non-Western states in those institutions" (sec. IX). Yet such deliberation is minimal, as the calls to action ultimately have a single goal: the promotion of U.S. imperialism.

In the wake of the War of Terror, the clash of civilization trope in political discourse, demonstrates the non-deliberative "political" discourse. As mentioned earlier, Bush's solution for the "struggle of civilization" is simply the advancement of "freedom and democracy." Without deliberation, all his rhetoric does is glorify "the West," and all the values associated with the U.S. political system, such as democracy and individual freedom. There is no real political debate. If there were any actual critique we might get another side of what civilization stands for.

As historian Roger Osborne points out, the images conjured in the mention of civilization tend to be of "tolerance, freedom of expression and democracy; *not* poverty, family breakdown, inequality, crime and drug dependency, . . . war and torture, slavery and genocide" (italics mine; 3). Jackson purports that the dichotomy of the civilized versus the uncivilized world conjured in the civilization argument "obliterates any reference to western civilisation's savagery and brutality in two World Wars, the Holocaust, the atomic attacks against Japan, numerous colonial wars and recent wars, … or the barbarous and savage treatment of prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay" (50). Not to mention all the harm inflicted on the masses comprising Western civilization, such as the U.S.'s large growth of poverty, homelessness, prisons, and increasingly negligent systems of health care and education.

In short, seeing things through a cultural lens provides limiting and destructive solutions to a war that has ensued. Without looking elsewhere, like the material causes of terrorist attacks against the U.S., we might never find a more peaceful path. In order to find productive solutions, all the root causes need to first be ascertained. While the clash of civilizations narrative offers one solution, other viewpoints offer more solutions. Part III is a step towards the activist rhetoric that is deeply needed yet nearly absent in mainstream political discussions. I attempt to bring into dialogue other stories viewed from other angles, through other lenses. The next section looks at some stories that might arise when the lens viewing the War on Terror is one of political economy.

PART III

A Politico-Economic Lens for the War on Terror:
A Story of Imperialism

i cried when i saw those buildings collapse on themselves
like a broken heart. i have never owned pain that needs to spread
like that.

there is no poetry in this. causes and effects.
symbols and ideologies. mad conspiracy here,
information we'll never know. there is death here, and promises
of more.

there is life here. anyone reading this is breathing, maybe hurting,
but breathing for sure. if there is any light to come, it will
shine from the eyes of those who look for peace and justice after the
rubble and rhetoric are cleared and the phoenix has risen.

~From "First Writing Since: Poem on Crisis of Terror"
by Suheir Hammad

The colony-blind imperialism that is cultivated in the clash of civilizations trope

comes to light with a neocolonial perspective. Without such a perspective, one is less

likely to be dissuaded from the clash of civilizations narrative, and one might not

conclude that discussions of civilizations reveal masked colonial discourses. Taking the

flip side, when one is dissuaded from such rhetorics, it begs the question of what

alternative narratives exist. Because my theory of colony-blind imperialism depends on a

story of neocolonialism, such are the narratives I advance herein.

The clash of civilizations trope offers a story based on cultural premises: terrorism

is due to the extremist culture of Islam thus the exportation of democracy and the cultural

values inherent in such a political system would make for a peaceful world. Yet behind

rhetorics are material conditions. Thus if we assume that there are not inherent cultural

differences creating international violence, what would other lenses reveal? In order to move away from culture as an analytic, then, I look to a variety of scholarly sources primarily from history and political economy that look at U.S.-Middle East relations, with a special focus on the 11 September 2001 acts of warfare and the War on Terror as embodied in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In my attempt to apply a politico-economic lens to understand the War on Terror and its rhetoric, I do not mean to create another totalizing narrative to replace the clash of civilizations narrative. Quite to the contrary, I attempt to disrupt totalizing narratives by offering other worldviews. Stories of all walks of life need to collide and intermingle, and most importantly, allow space for other rhetorics and their stories. By offering other ways of making sense of the wars between the U.S. State and Muslim countries and groups, I move in the direction of enacting the very types of discourse and rhetorics that need to be fostered.

I begin with identifying the targets of the 2001 acts of warfare: the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and likely the White House. Given that the plotters were intelligent enough to take control of commercial flights and coordinate multi-destination attacks, it is unlikely that they had any intention of actually destroying American infrastructure. Of course, as the definition of the term "terrorist" designates, the hijackers inflicted fear. But if it was just about conveying fear they could have attacked a large church, commercial mall, or a park, for example.

Rather, the actual targets have symbolic meanings. They convey a history that is not just about inflicting terror because of cultural tendencies and differences. It was about conveying a message about the U.S. military (Pentagon), executive government

(White House), and the economy (World Trade Center). In a word: imperialism. As such, it is imperative to a look into U.S.-Middle Eastern history and to do it within a holistic manner through the scope of political economy.

In pointing to political and economic incentives for the War on Terror, Huntington's claim to purely socio-cultural reasons behind "civilizational" strife between the "West" and Islam becomes undermined. Yet it is not enough to just demonstrate the political *or* economic, for the two are as connected as are the people and their cultures within and surrounding these spheres. It is in the political and economic where power is realized, which is done through rhetoric and ideology. Therefore, since Part II studies the rhetorical and ideological aspects of the War on Terror, what follows is a politico-economic outlook. In the sections that follow, what emerge are alternative reasons behind Muslim terrorism towards representatives of the West, and U.S. foreign policy in the Mideast region. These stories purposefully contradict and conflict assumptions and premises of the clash of civilizations narrative, in an effort to promote rhetorics with the potential for deliberation of social concerns.

Another Historical Perspective:
A Non-Cultural Lens for U.S.-Middle East Conflicts

In contrast to the history that the clash of civilizations trope affords, scholars argue that there are many causes for warfare between the U.S. and groups and countries within the greater Middle East region. After the 2001 acts of war within U.S. borders, the U.S. launched into the post-Cold War ideological phase of justifying and thereby projecting the future path of U.S. foreign policy. Before getting into economic incentives, simply establishing non-culturally based explanations for any Muslim and

Mideast "animosities" towards the West is the next rhetorical move I apply to pry open spaces for varied narratives and thereby varied solutions.

Middle Eastern territory has a history of European and American imperial penetration that has sown resentment against the U.S. Historian of Islam and the Middle East, John Esposito, makes reference to a build up of Middle Eastern tension due to a loss of control over its own territory. As Esposito recounts, "the twentieth-century map of the Muslim world reveals" that the "boundaries and rulers of countries were created by European colonial powers" (75). Furthermore, "deeply felt Muslim grievances against the West," claims Esposito, is a result of "European colonialism, the creation of Israel,…[and] the presence of American troops in the Gulf," among other factors (73).

Of prominence among these factors, Esposito points to the establishment of Israel's official statehood in 1948. According to Esposito, "the most volatile example of European nation building in the Middle East remains the creation of Israel amidst competing and still-unresolved religious, nationalist, and territorial claims" (81). James Bamford, a journalist, takes Esposito's claims further by arguing that the September 2001 attacks in America were a backlash from a long-term U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, especially the U.S.-backed Israeli state that systematically harms Palestinian people. One example after another provided by Bamford shows that Middle Eastern terrorists' demands were that the U.S. should no longer occupy or control Middle Eastern territories and affairs, especially in regards to Israel and Palestine (96, 138-139, 144, 168, 210-211, 237, 239, and 248). However, the presence and actions of Israel is not all there is.

According to Karen Armstrong, scholar on Islam, the coordinators of the September 2001 assaults on the U.S. attribute their reasons for the violence not only to

the U.S. support of Israeli occupation, but also to the U.S. army in the Middle East and on

Muslim "sacred soil" and the deaths attributable to Iraq's sanctions (190). To go directly

to the source, a quote from bin Laden in a 2004 speech points to the U.S.'s involvement

in the Middle East with regards to Iraq:

> [T]he oppressing and embargoing to death of millions as Bush Sr did in Iraq in
> the greatest mass slaughter of children mankind has ever known, and it means the
> throwing of millions of pounds of bombs and explosives at millions of children -
> also in Iraq - as Bush Jr did, in order to remove an old agent and replace him with
> a new puppet to assist in the pilfering of Iraq's oil.

According to this interview, a major influence in bin Laden's violent campaign against

the U.S. has to do with the violence inflicted upon innocent people, and what is construed

as the U.S.'s motives regarding oil.

Of course there is no justification for violence, especially when otherwise

uninvolved people become the victims. Also, the speech may simply be a way of

exciting support from those populations directly affected by the U.S.'s harmful military

and economic policies. Still, even if bin Laden's motivations are separate from his army,

there remains non-cultural factors to consider. Finnegan, a journalist of international

affairs who writes of the 2003 initiated war in Iraq, points out that while the "U.S.

currently enjoys a truly rare global preeminence—military, economic, pop-cultural,"

"power is not, obviously, the same as legitimacy." And the more imperialist actions the

U.S. takes, argues the journalist, the less legitimacy that the U.S. will have abroad.

Finnegan takes it further by asserting that the the actions of al Qaeda have support in the

Muslim world because of the group's claims against American imperial power (Finnegan

53). Since in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 the wars get played out in Iraq and

Afghanistan, it is important to understand these countries' histories in relation to recent

U.S. foreign policy. A synopsis of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan supports Finnegan's argument.

A former U.S. attorney general and scholar of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, Ramsey Clark, addresses the U.S.'s involvement in the Middle East throughout the twentieth century. He states, "The Gulf War was fought…to establish U.S. power over the region and its oil" (3). Such a claim has backing in the history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East, especially in regards to the history of Iraq.

As is the case with many Middle Eastern countries, Iraq and its resources were colonized and controlled by the British until 1958 when there was a national revolution that put Iraqis in charge of their own land. With the help of the new Iraqi government the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960. OPEC allowed for greater Middle Eastern control of their oil, instead of the U.S. This organization exerted Middle Eastern power, as demonstrated with the 1973 oil embargo that temporarily crippled the U.S. (Clark 4, 8). The U.S. was not able to penetrate Middle Eastern lands and their resources as successfully thereafter.

The nationalization of the oil industry did not allow outside control over the industry, resulting in a significant reduction of U.S. profit (Clark 5, 8). Thus, the Central Intelligence Agency began to target the Iraqi government (Clark 5). Tensions between the U.S. and the Middle East escalated with such events. In Iraq, escalation came to its high point in 1990 when Hussein invaded Kuwait, providing the U.S. with a *"justification for intervention in the region to control its resources,"* a justification that had been needed since the 1970s when Iraq nationalized its oil (italics mine; Clark 22, 24).

Thus war ensued in 1991, resulting in mass destruction from hundreds of missiles and bombs that targeted crucial infrastructure that the Iraqi people needed for survival. Also what resulted was an economic embargo, a significant increase of U.S. military units in the region, and continuing acts of warfare for years (Clark 37). Within one year, more than one-hundred-fifty-thousand Iraqi civilians died as a direct result of the war (Clark 1). Such violence and suffering may have had an affect on the 2001 hijackers.

Like with Iraq, Afghanistan too has a history of violence that has spurred anti-U.S. sentiment. During the administrations of Reagan and George Bush in the 1980s, the U.S. became involved in the Afghan War with the Soviets. The U.S. supported the Afghans in an attempt to defeat the Soviets because of the competition between the superpowers since the beginning of the Cold War. Also, through covert actions using the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. attempted to replace the country's leader with someone who would easily work in favor of the U.S.'s demands. In fighting this war, the U.S. employed terrorist tactics, solicited Islamic fundamentalists, and killed thousands (many likely of whom had nothing to do with the military aspects of the war). As soon as the U.S. succeeded in removing the leader, the U.S. withdrew from the country (Bamford 178-79).

Afghanistan was left in "violent chaos," well armed with missiles that ended up "missing," and with more weapons "smuggled, dropped, and tucked into Afghanistan during the 1980s than to any other country in the world" (Bamford 179). The U.S. helped to dissemble the political power structure and practically invited terrorism, providing them with strength and an enemy.

Moreover, the U.S. interference in Afghanistan is the foundation for transforming Osama bin Laden into a violent enemy of the U.S. Bamford states that the U.S. left Afghanistan vulnerable to terrorism, including bin Laden and the Taliban. As a youth, bin Laden had a teacher named Sheik Abdullah Azzam from Palestine. Azzam was a product of the 1967 Israeli occupation that displaced tens of thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank. Always intent on saving his homeland and the people of Palestine from the Israelis, Azzam saw opportunity with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. With this knowledge of Azzam, bin Laden joined his mentor (Bamford 97-98). Thus, one might argue, the seeds of the September 2001 attacks may have been planted by U.S. actions.

A decade later the Pentagon and World Trade Center are hit and, what Noam Chomsky calls, the "new phase" or continuation of the War on Terror is instigated ("New"). Bamford argues that the 11 September 2001 events occurred largely because of the inadequacy of U.S. intelligence agencies and the U.S. support of Israel, and then the terrorist actions were used by the Bush administration as a pretext for a war in Iraq that the Presidential cabinet coveted for years.

Of the violence inflicted on the Iraqi people, Bamford writes, "as more and more civilians, broken and bloody, were pulled from the ruble of their houses following U.S. bombing runs, the anger, fear, and resentment toward the United States spreads" (Bamford 396-397). If there is any merit to Bamford's argument, then there is concern in the casualty rates. According to a 2004 BBC news source, conservative figures placed the Iraqi death toll since the war began in 2003 at about ten thousand. Other 2004 figures ranged up to thirty-seven thousand Iraqi deaths ("Iraq"). A study found that as of 2005,

possibly one-hundred thousand innocent Iraqis had been killed as a direct result of the U.S. invasion, and more than half of these civilian casualties were children and women (Bamford 394). Whether its ten or one-hundred thousand deaths, there are far too many, and since 2004 only more people have suffered through the pain of living within a warzone.

So if the U.S. is creating terrorism through its foreign policy, why does it continue to conduct such policy? The aforementioned scholars of Middle Eastern history, Islamic history, and U.S. foreign policy with regards to the Middle East provide productive insight into this question. There is the protection of Israel, apparently for control over other countries within the region. There is the motive of acquiring wealth through the natural and valuable resource of oil. With Afghanistan there was the motive of defeating Russia, the other dominant world power at that time. And more recently, with the War on Terror, the official or mainstream explanations justifying U.S. foreign policy, such as the clash of civilizations narrative, are incomplete and insufficient.

Juxtapose the history told thus far herein with the history inherent in the clash of civilizations trope. Huntington and Lewis, for example, point to a history in which Muslims and persons of the Mideast penetrate and assault the U.S. as the sole perpetrators, not the other way around. By entertaining the idea that the U.S. may be partially responsible for Muslim warfare, and by presenting a history that does not take as its premise culture as a driving force of conflict, the emerging story might not glorify the U.S.'s quest to democratize the Mideast. Rather, U.S. foreign policy may be driven by a global political economy that is a system of imperialism.

Of U.S. foreign policy, journalist Finnegan writes that it is not about "freedom or democracy. It is a system of control. It is an *economics of empire*" (italics mine; 42). After September 2001, with the advent of the war in Afghanistan, Esposito had the impression that there was a growing concern among the peoples of the Middle East that "America [would] repeat European colonialism and attempt to infiltrate, dominate, and ultimately redraw the map of the Middle East once again" (75). Such assumptions are worth pursuing. With the War on Terror, however, there is a significant difference from previous European colonization and even U.S. twentieth-century military interference into the Middle East.

While the Middle East has been subjected to European colonialism and American imperialism, the region now faces the violence of American advanced neocolonialism. Neocolonialism is, in a nutshell, the way that big business has replaced or carries on domination through economic means. Advanced neocolonialism, I argue, is global corporatism. The concepts are elaborated upon in the context of U.S.-Middle East relations, starting with a look into corporate economics and its ties to military expansion, which is key to neocolonialism.

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Advanced Neocolonialism:
Global Corporatism

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In a critique of mainstream economics, that being the dominant version of economics in business schools and among American society in general, political economy is defined as pertaining to the "relationships of the economic system and its institutions to the rest of society and social development. It is sensitive to the influence of non-economic factors such as political and social institutions, morality, and ideology

in determining economic events" (qut. in Sackey, pg. vi and 96). In other words, an economic policy or lens needs to take into consideration the political and social situation, as they are necessarily intertwined.

In studying the U.S. War on Terror, or the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, the politics and the history are entrenched in the economy. Interestingly, in Strategic Management, a core part of any business school's curriculum, it is explained that Business Strategy has military origins and antecedents. In a common, mainstream book utilized in Business programs, *Contemporary Strategy Analysis*, it is written:

> Enterprises need business strategies for much the same reasons that armies need military strategies – to give direction and purpose, to deploy resources in the most effective manners, and to coordinate the decisions made by different individuals. Indeed, *the concepts and theories of business strategy have their antecedents in military strategy.* (italics mine; 3-14)

Moreover, in an article published in *Harvard Business Review*, "Blue Ocean Strategy," by W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgen (which in 2005 became a book that made the international bestseller list), the authors advocate for a corporate strategy in which the main focus is not competing against other corporations, but rather to "discover" and maintain hold over new uncontested market spaces, which are not necessarily physical space like land, but rather any new profit-making opportunity.

In a move away from company-against-company competition, the authors discourage the leading worldview of "corporate strategy [which] is heavily influenced by its roots in military strategy." They continue, claiming that even the "language of strategy is deeply imbued with military references—chief executive 'officers' in 'headquarters,' 'troops' on the 'front lines.'... It is about confronting an opponent and driving him off a battlefield of limited territory" (3). The authors at once confirm the

indoctrination of the corporate world in military mentality and demonstrate a desire of corporations to seek new market space in which a business venture can in essence monopolize the industry.

Business schools are the training centers for the upcoming generations of the capitalist elites. They are ideology camps for the corporate world, which is our contemporary world where economic imperialism has become the primary avenue of imperial expansion. Big business follows suite from the military because its aims are the same as wars fought by imperial powers. In the latter half of the twentieth century, after World War II, the U.S. has denied its status as a colonial power by granting its colonies either independence, statehood, or the title of "commonwealth," which falls in neither of the former two categories.

Aside from what is the obvious ownership of other territories—after all, what is a commonwealth but a colony with another label—the U.S. has expanded as an imperial power through economic means. In a *Harper*'s article that came out shortly after the beginning of the 2003 war in Iraq, "The Economics of Empire," Finnegan predicts that the war in Iraq was to be one of imperial pursuit, much like the U.S. economic penetration in Latin America over the past few decades. Much of the article discusses the tools of neocolonialism (although he himself does not use this terminology).

The system Finnegan describes is one in which free trade is exported globally, which is done "directly through U.S. foreign policy and indirectly through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization." This system's "core tenets are deregulation, privatization, 'openness' (to foreign investment, to imports), unrestricted movement of capital, and

lower taxes" (41-42). This free trade, as capitalism is referred to, is pushed on the countries of the world in order "to open new markets for U.S. firms and products" (Finnegan 49).

Finnegan is surely onto something here, but his analysis does little in the way of actual examination of Iraq and Afghanistan. What he does is explicate what the U.S. did to Bolivia in the 1980s when that economy was restructured according to free market values. From this detailed account, he argues that the U.S. is likely operating in the same fashion with Iraq. Finnegan sees merit in such a comparison as he cites a *Wall Street Journal* article that "reported that the Bush Administration's plan to rebuild and administer a conquered Iraq relies not on the U.N. or other international-development agencies but on American private companies with deep Pentagon connections, such as Bechtel and Kellog Brown & Root, which have been secretly bidding on contracts" (Finnegan 53). Here Finnegan touches on the inner workings of advanced neocolonialism. Following is a more detailed look into the economic system of neocolonialism as it is manifest in Iraq and Afghanistan, beginning with journalist Naomi Klein.

An Imperial Enterprise:
The War on Terror

Klein's *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, is a powerful compilation of research that analyzes the ways in which the government and big business interact on the global scale, in their many local manifestations around the world. In a methodology that is admirable, the journalist's work begins with her experiences in Iraq immediately following the initiation of the war in 2003. Klein noticed that in each

country where there had been a major socially destabilizing event, immediately following was a major shift in business structures in that location. Looking to Milton Friedman, a pioneer of both capitalism and "democracy"—according to his conception of the political term—Klein "discovered that the idea of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus operandi" of global capitalist advance since the early 1970s (9).

Klein's theory of disaster capitalism relies on what she calls the shock doctrine, which consists of stages of shock that explain how it is that whole societies are weakened and vulnerable to being taken advantage of. This sequence of events is as follows. First, "[C]ountries are shocked—by wars, terror attacks, coup d'etat and natural disasters" (25). Then "they are shocked again—by corporations and politicians who exploit the fear disorientation of this first shock to push through economic shock therapy" (25-26). And then if people resist in the midst of this shock, they are shocked for a third time with "police, soldiers and prison interrogators" (26). Klein documents the growth of advanced capitalism by way of shock doctrine in many countries throughout the world during the past three decades, but she finds a significant difference after 11 September 2001.

In Iraq, for example, Paul Bremer, chief envoy to set-up Iraq's new government, spent the first four months of his term drafting the country's new laws regarding the economy. The changes included the following. Corporate taxes dropped from forty-five percent to fifteen. Foreign companies were given the right to own one-hundred percent of Iraqi assets. All of the profits made by foreign investors could be withdrawn from the country without any reinvestment. Investors could have forty-year leases and contracts, which could then be renewed, meaning that "future elected governments would be saddled with deals signed by their occupiers," as Klein puts it. The only thing that has

yet to occur is the obvious privatization of Iraq's oil (345). But simply extracting the resources, as Clark identifies as the primary motivation behind the Gulf War, would be too simple for the workings of advanced neocolonialism.

The evolution of this capitalist world-system relies on market space as described in blue ocean strategy, which is not necessarily physical land. Colonialism relies on the taking of the land; neocolonialism is once removed such that it colonizes economic industry. Advanced neocolonialism, however, takes it to a new level. Klein writes, "the architects of the War on Terror are part of a different breed of corporate-politicians from their predecessors, one for whom war and other disasters are indeed ends in themselves" (311).

Traditionally, when the U.S. has initiated wars or supported coups through the Central Intelligence Agency, offered loans through the World Bank (WB) or International Monetary Fund (IMF), or determined trade through the World Trade Organization (WTO), it had been paving the way for transnational trade conditions that would benefit U.S.-dominated companies. Not only has the U.S. been working to accomplish favorable free-market conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the Department of Homeland Security and all the contractors enlisted to "restructure" these war-torn countries are profiting tremendously.

High ranking members of the government use their credentials to enter the "homeland security industry" where they then sell their services. Klein provides a few examples, crediting her findings to research conducted by *New York Times* journalist Eric Lipton who details ninety-seven such cases. The government figures move into the private sector to create and head crisis and counterterrorism consulting companies, or

companies that assist homeland security firms in the acquisition of federal contracts, for example (314-15). The War on Terror made the Department of Homeland Security a two-hundred-billion-dollar industry (13).

Moreover, the homeland security market's outsourcing of Iraq's and Afghanistan's "restructure" projects has been phenomenally beneficial to U.S. corporations, many of which high ranking government officials had shares in. To name a few, there is Bechel, ExxonMobil (309), Lockheed, Carlyle, Gilead (Rumsfeld had shares here), and Halliburton (where Cheney owned shares) (311). Halliburton, for instance, had fifty-thousand employees (while the new Iraqi government at that time had only fifteen-*hundred*) (347), and its profits were greater than they had ever been in its entire history up to the Iraq war (313). War is this century's first grand blue ocean strategy. Or, as Klein puts it, the "invasion, occupation and reconstruction" of Iraq created a "fully privatized new market" (346).

And now Afghanistan is on a similar path with reconstruction contractors such as Halliburton, and the involvement of the World Bank that is privatizing its health care system (Klein, "Rise"). Since Afghanistan is the new warfront of the War on Terror (even though the campaign is not called such anymore), it is important to look at who will profit during the process of war and its aftermath. Given the sweeping geography of "the enemy," being "terrorists," we may have only seen the beginning of the warfare into the Middle East. Of this, Klein writes: "After the [U.S.-led free market] crusade had conquered Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia, the Arab world called out as its final frontier" (326). As such, she continues: "The Middle East would be 'cleaned

out' of terrorists and a giant free-trade zone would be created; then it would be locked in with after-the-fact elections" (328).

Klein calls it a "contemporary crusade to liberate world markets:"

> The coups, wars and slaughters to install and maintain pro-corporate regimes have never been treated as capitalist crimes but have instead been written off as the excesses of overzealous dictators, as hot fronts of the Cold War, and now of the War on Terror. If the most committed opponents of the corporatist economic model are systematically eliminated, whether in Argentina in the seventies or in Iraq today, that suppression is explained as part of the dirty fight against Communism or terrorism—almost never as the fight *for* the advancement of pure capitalism." (20)

In short, a global pattern emerges that demonstrates U.S. imperialism. As Klein makes evident, this is hardly isolated to the Middle East. The story that is retold over and over supports capitalism or imperialism in whatever political economic form existing at the time. The advancement of this global system has been sold to publics to appease people, to convince us to follow the State's foreign policy and economic incentives.

However, by combining rhetorical and politico-economic lenses, the "struggle for civilization" shows through as a *struggle for empire*. The two narratives run together, and conflict. They can enter dialogue. They can fight. But they cannot remain in separate spheres. The clash of civilizations trope leads to a grand narrative and that defeats the purpose of political discourse because it offers but one viable solution. Likewise, a neocolonial perspective like Klein forwards too risks becoming a grand narrative. The trick is to engage rhetorics for the political, the deliberative, for its activist roots such that there are varied stories, alternatives, and solutions to the problems humanity faces.

Concluding Thoughts:
New Rhetorics of Appeasement

As Bush, Huntington, and Klein have informed us, the current ideological phase is the War on Terror; the last, the Cold War. While the clash of civilizations trope was the rhetorical trope of the Bush administration's War on Terror, it will be curious to see the new tropes that carry on the campaign for global corporatism.

Using a politico-economic lens is especially important now that the U.S. has an African American president who uses his distant Muslim ties to relate to others of the world. Interestingly enough, Huntington predicted that "Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity" (sec. III). Perhaps in this very spirit Obama will have greater success than Bush in carrying on the same goals: the spread of U.S.-style democracy through warfare or other means.

It is important to use a politico-economic lens now more than ever because the policies of the War on Terror continue. Obama may not use the phrase, "War on Terror," and he does not employ the same clash of civilizations trope, but he is not backing out of Iraq quickly enough, and he is pursuing war in Afghanistan, calling it a "war of necessity." And yet the President has won the Nobel Peace Prize. What might be happening is a far too successful colony-blind imperialism, just with different rhetorics of appeasement at play. With a politico-economic lens and an analysis of the types of symbols and tropes at play in the campaign for continued U.S. imperialism, we can not only decipher rhetorics of appeasement, but we ought to create rhetorics that open spaces for deliberation and offer stories that shape our understanding of our world.

The Stories Our Rhetorics Create

We cannot view the events of our times through a single lens. Looking into wars and other social problems requires multiple lenses, such as bringing together foreign policy, political economy, and rhetoric, among others. Likewise, we need to foster and promote interdisciplinarity in academia. Rhetoric, as does other fields within the Humanities and Social Sciences, needs to continue to break from its borders. The human condition cannot be categorized into isolated categories; we are multifarious and the interconnections of life are our reality.

By looking through alternative lenses, multiple lenses, and entering into dialogue with one another, many ways of seeing the world and many ways of dealing with the problems humanity faces will emerge. Through different lenses we can create different stories, different worldviews and ways of surviving. Of course not everyone is appeased. Obviously there is much resistance to wars and other violent actions of the State. However, if the ideological has anything to do with the maintenance of imperialism, then there is far too much ideological indoctrination.

As a rhetorician, I would like to take my scholarship forward and not only study the rhetoric of the powerful, but also rhetorics of resistance. It is not enough to only analyze and critique dominant narratives of domination. There are rhetorical ways other than exposing imperial tropes that can lead to more peaceful paths. These are the stories that we need to create and foster. Many in the field do look to rhetorics of survival and resistance, and I would like in the future to do this yet while directly tying it to the study of the powerful.

Because I am invested in the human condition and how we, each of us, can have the power to survive and flourish within the time afforded to us here on earth, it is important to study the ways that people grapple with structures of domination so that they may at some point live without such forces. But I work off the premise that in order to fight your enemy, you've got to know your enemy. But this is only the first step in the larger project. I find that I need a methodology that does the *glocal* (a combining of the local and the global, a term coined by Michal Featherstone) and theorizes by way of symbol meaning-making. There is power in our rhetorics, and in the stories they create.

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