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FROM THE TIGRIS TO THE ROUGE: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CHALDEAN GENDERED ETHNICITY AND GENDER TRANSITION

presented by

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has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for the

Ph.D. degree in Sociology

Major Professor's Signature

May, 14, 2010

Date

FROM THE TIGRIS TO THE ROUGE: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CHALDEAN GENDERED ETHNICITY AND GENDER TRANSITION

By

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPY

SOCIOLOGY

2010

ABSTRACT

FROM THE TIGRIS TO THE ROUGE: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CHALDEAN GENDERED ETHNICITY AND GENDER TRANSITION

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The literature on gender adaptation and migration has illuminated a general pattern of changing gender relations within immigrant families and communities. Immigrant women are accomplishing this task with the aid of economic and power resources they obtain in the host society. Still little theoretical or empirical attention has been directed at immigrant groups that maintain patriarchal gender relations.

To fill this void, this study examines Iraqi Chaldean immigrants who are a group from an understudied region of the world and who retain patriarchy authority in their families and community organizations. Patriarchal dominance is a cultural feature particular to Near East and Central Asia given that the extended family is the dominant household arrangement. Beyond households, kinship networks provide access to most social, political and economic opportunities, making kinship ties persistent and the gender order patriarchal. Evaluating the social processes immigrants from this geographic region experience is crucial given the current political involvement of the United States and with the increasing number of immigrants and refugees arriving for settlement.

To address our needs for more primary research on Near East immigrants, life history data is collected from fifty-one respondents to address the issue of patriarchal persistence. Respondents explain their migration motivations, community building and

family history in a dialogical interview. The interviews are low intervention and seen as polyphonic dialogues understandable to in-group members.

The theoretical approach builds on a structuration model identifying that emotional and symbolic structures in gender relations create normative constraints against immigrant and second-generation men and women. Within this framework, social reproduction occurs. Men accept these constraints acting as responsible patriarchs for their extended families, while women negotiate within woman-to-woman networks for desired concessions without a wholesale challenge to existing patriarchal gender relations.

This research provides an additional case study and expands our theoretical horizons beyond power and economic factors. Further, pre-migration factors indicate that men dominate most social and economic resources leaving women in a dependent state. After migration, ethnic traditions within the community and family build formidable emotional and symbolic structures that extend patriarchal customs into the second generation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I extend special thanks to Steven Gold whose tireless efforts brought this work to completion. He acted as a patient adviser while reviewing multiple versions of this dissertation. I marvel at his near encyclopedic knowledge of books, regional studies, special reports and journal articles on cultural adaptations of multiple immigrant and ethnic groups of which he has apprised me to contextualize this study within several rich intellectual traditions. He certainly made more content available than I utilized for this study. I appreciate Maxine Baca Zinn for her guidance on gender research and directing this study towards greater methodological clarity. Toby Ten Eyck offered encouragement along the way and schooled me to understand my status as a young sociologist. Leslie Moch provided a steady hand during the completion phase of the research making multiple suggestions for clarification and presentational style. My colleague Raymond Liedka provided feedback and comments which have been instrumental in the completion of my project as well.

I save my last comments for the sacrifices my family made while I finished this endevour. To my son Danni Zhu, who wrote a poem at ten years of age describing his daddy as a vampire for staying up all night writing this dissertation, I find you a constant source of inspiration. Without a doubt my greatest appreciation extends to my *Lao Po*, Zhu Suyun. Without her constant and intense support, this project may have never come to fruition.

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CHAPTER 1

GENDER ADAPTATION AND MIGRATION: THE CHALDEAN CASE STUDY

This study investigates gender relations among Chaldean immigrants and the second generation. While most research indicates that women gain domestic authority and reorder community structures towards egalitarian standards, Chaldeans show notable patriarchal persistence. This remarkable outcome relates to the world region that Chaldeans migrate from, and the ethnic resources they have used for building an institutionally complete community. To untangle pre-migration influences, I review the relationship between Iraqi society and Chaldean community. To understand the post-migration period, I look at inter-community exchanges which reestablish both normative and economic patriarchy. My variation on this subject is to examine the role that symbolic and emotional structures play in maintaining conservative gender relations. I further analyze women's agency from a social reproduction perspective. This investigation adds a case study of patriarchal persistence that expands our theoretical approach in the gender adaptation and migration field.

The gender adaption and migration literature focuses on realignments that transpire in the patriarchal order of immigrant families and communities. While root causes vary for why immigrant men lose control over the social institutions and group norms they use to dominate co-ethnic women, the field holds that immigrant women play the leading role in challenging patriarchy within their families and community organizations. In order to advance our theoretical understanding of this social process, I utilize the works of Robert Connell (1987) and Pierre Bourdieu (2001). Both theorists

have developed positions consistent with the gender adaptation and migration field that "... gender organizes a number of immigrant practices, beliefs, and institutions" (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003: 9). In accounting for practices and beliefs, Connell analyzes structures of gender relations within family, schools, and workplaces by identifying gender relations in terms of power, economy, emotions and symbols. Bourdieu incorporates practices and beliefs into his habitus construct (dispositions guiding social practice) that contributes to social reproduction. I seek to identify Chaldean gender structures and habitus.

CHALDEANS: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The single most important factor for understanding this group's gender adaptation is the strength of their ethnic identity as supported by the many community institutions in the pre- and post-migration periods. An important factor for understanding the strength of ethnic attachment is historicity (Bellah et al. 1996). While Chaldean Catholicism was recognized by the Roman Catholic Church in 1551 CE, Detroit Chaldeans date their identity to antiquity with advances in civilization, as with Hammurabi's legal code, and early developments in mathematics, science and agriculture. In essence, the community sees themselves as descendants of the native peoples of Iraq predating Arab influence. Rt. Reverend Sarhad Jammo's (1993) writing embodies much of the intra-community dialogue about who the Chaldeans are.

> Around 634 A. D., Moslem Arabs conquered the region, and Islam was imposed as the religion of the state, and became gradually thereafter the religion of the majority; the Arabic language and culture became as well the language and

> culture of the majority. Christians remained what they were, i.e. the descendants of those ancient inhabitants of Mesopotamia and the heirs of their cultural heritage. Therefore, present day Chaldeans and Assyrians are precisely that: ethnically, they are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of Mesopotamia; culturally, they are the heirs of the Aramaic language and heritage.

Recognizing these origins remains a part of the everyday discussion that affirms traditions and customs which in turn form a basis for maintaining community institutions and cultural heritage. Beyond ancient history, social processes shape ethnic identity through differences in natal origin, occupation, and cultural organizations.

In Iraq, Chaldeans lived separately from Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish ethnicities in villages located in the mountainous region north of Mosul, known as the Nineveh Plains. While villagers had relocated to the cities of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul from the 1920s forward, migrants still trace their origins to their ancestral village that they frequently visited during Iraq's hot summer months. There is also a link between village origin and migration. Mary Sengstock (1999) reports that nearly ninety-five percent of all Chaldeans in the Detroit area come from the Village of Telkeppe (meaning hill of stones in Neo-Soureth); in the Arabic, it is called Telkaif. This fact underscores that dense and supportive social networks had operated during migration. It also signals the important role that ancestral village has in adding to the rich texture of identity. Presently, Chaldeans with ancestral ties to al-Qosh, Araden, Dohuk, among several other villages migrate to the United States. In Detroit, village of origin plays a limited role in where Chaldeans live. But as a community, they reside in proximity to their churches in Oakland and Macomb Counties. In 1999, the City of Detroit had recognized the area

around Sacred Heart Church, at the intersection of 7 Mile and John R, as Chaldean Town. This belated designation honors the once vibrant community where many families had settled in the 1960s.

Throughout the twentieth century, Chaldeans have remained an entrepreneurial business class. In Iraq, their principle economic adaptation had been service related businesses: hotels, restaurants, and shops catering to Europeans and Iraq's business classes (Harris 1958). They carried this pattern of economic activity to Detroit, and currently own ninety-nine percent of Detroit's convenience stores, with a majority of Chaldean families owning at least one business (Chaldean American Chamber of Commerce 2008).

Obviously, Chaldean identity develops from cumulative interactions between religion, language, ancestral village and business orientation. Beyond these factors are multiple social institutions of which there are many; the premier is the Chaldean Rite Catholic Church. The community maintains its churches in Detroit's suburbs: Mar Addai, St. Thomas, St. George, St. Joseph, and Our Lady of Chaldeans Cathedral. Congregants observe religious instruction in Neo-Soureth, Arabic and English. Older worshipers receive mass in Neo-Soureth; the church has also established language classes for youth to learn their parent's mother tongue. The church's importance remains significant throughout the life cycle given that Chaldeans receive the sacraments of faith from their own priest leading to family celebrations of marriage, confirmation and baptism.

Beyond the church other social groups ply for participation and recognition within the community. Examples include: the Chaldean Federation of America, the Chaldean American Ladies of Charity, the Chaldean American Chamber of Commerce, the

Chaldean American Community Center and other groups relating to alumni status in both the United States and Iraq. These groups serve to bring Chaldeans together in informal and formal interaction. For instance, the Chaldean Federation of America holds the Annual Chaldean Commencement for graduates of secondary and post-secondary education. Speakers address perils the world Chaldean population faces, and the need for youth to remain connected to this formal organization.

Beyond the church and social organizations, the family plays an important role in identity formation. While all families inculcate values, norms and beliefs into the next generation, Chaldean families do so from an alternative set of expectations relative to American families, especially when it comes to gender relations. Stephanie Coontz (2006) has traced this distinction to *longue durée* processes that make Asian families, of which the Chaldean family is closely aligned, different from the European family. In terms of sources of women's power, European women have held the ability to consent to marriage proposals and worked prior to marriage for independent incomes since the end of the eighteenth century. By contrast, these are relative new developments for many Asian women that have remained locked within a family structure that Deniz Kandiyoti (1988) calls *classical patriarchy*. Under this family structure, men monopolize and expropriate women's resources. And unlike Europeans, Asian households include the patriarch, married adult males and their children, and unmarried children. This family structure remains important for many ethnic groups in Asia, as evidenced by multiple ethnographic studies (Halberstadt and Nikolsky 1996; Joseph 1999b; Kandiyoti 1988; Oishi 2005). This structure also contributes to conservative gender relations.

In the Chaldean community, this family pattern is less prevalent in terms of extended family residence. But given that Chaldean families often live within close proximity to each other, they maintain weekly visitations and engage in business partnership; Mary Sengstock (1999) concludes that Chaldeans follow a functionally extended family pattern. She reached this conclusion given the often crisscrossing social ties between laterally and vertically extended kin.

Sociability among family members follows patterned rules similar to what Suad Joseph (1999) calls *connective patriarchy*. Connectivity relates to the myriad social relations between kin, and patriarchy relates to the hierarchal organization of authority. Chaldean youth learn early on that there is a social legitimacy for male authority, and that there are incumbent obligations for family members to each other. As a matter of their identity, the Lebanese men, studied by Suad (1999) learn to speak for their families, including their "... wives, sisters, junior siblings, and children, and to 'make decision for them.'" Men also carry obligations. As a practical example, divorced or widowed Arab women draw on their eldest brother for social support. These men accept this obligation because of their connective ties to the family. Further, the eldest male draws upon the cooperation of household members.

In summary, Chaldeans have built an institutionally complete community in the Detroit metropolitan region (Breton 1964). The immigrants built this community to complement their Chaldean social identity. An essential institution remains the Chaldean Rite Catholic Church where congregants accept the sacraments of faith, and deepen their mutual commitment towards maintaining ethnic attachment. In part, community building depends on the entrepreneurial adaption by men in the community. Their business

success provides the material basis for these institutions, but the businesses rely on the social ties between family members that maintain hierarchal gender relations.

GENDER APPROACHES TO SOCIETY

Chaldeans offer a unique community for following gender adaptation, as they differ from the undocumented and working class immigrants typically studied. These groups tend to have transnational orientations in response to the hostile and reactive forces within the host society (Goldring 2003), and build community institutions towards the home society (Levitt 2001; Schiller and Fouron 1999; Schiller and Fouron 2001). Chaldeans differ; they can not return to Iraq. As a result, Chaldeans have to succeed in the United States, and do so through the community's high degree of institutional completeness aided by their entrepreneurial zeal. And a central quality of the group's gender norms is the distinctive feature of connective patriarchy.

This quality makes non-economic sources of gender power, such as emotional and symbolic structures of gender relations, key for maintaining the legitimacy of their hierarchical gender relations. Robert Connell's (1987) and Pierre Bourdieu's (1990; 2001) works offer frameworks for discussing non-material factors, such as culture, identity, norms, values and beliefs, in upholding and changing gender relations.

Structuration

Robert Connell (1987: 94) recognizes that institutional reflexivity comes "... closest to the requirements of *gender theory*," which holds commonality with structuration theory (emphasis added, Giddens 1984). This perspective formulates that

humans hold a reflexive capacity to change the structures that restrain them. In this study, these are structures of gender relations. Gender structures operate in various social institutions: the family, factory or office floor, and social policies. The factory has a power structure controlled by men, a gender division of labor, and symbolic and emotional processes operating in concert to differentially reward women and men for their labor. Connell calls these gendered institutions *gender regimes*. Whether the sum total of society's regimes complement or conflict constitutes what Connell calls the *gender order* of the society.

There are three basic gender orders: complementary, parallel, and conflictive. In explaining these orders, Connell operates from a critical perspective that the gender order of society must change. The ultimate aim for feminists is the parallel position. This is a transgressive movement wherein different social institutions work in parallel fashion to support greater gender equality. When employers, courts and the legislature promote equal pay or comparable worth, these social institutions are jointing promoting gender equality. The conflictive order is the backlash position. Here social institutions operate at cross ends undermining woman centric policies and initiatives. When a political party removes enforcement of gender pay equity, a conflictive context exists. The complementary position is the historic arrangement of patriarchy, where undue emphasis is given to gender differences leading to gender stratification.

The institutional reflexivity position has done an admirable job in outlining the linkages between socialization, identity and social institutions in the complementary stage of gender order. One such theorist, Erving Goffman (1977) explores how ideological sexism patterns social interaction in social institutions. His position is that

society routinely accepts biological dimorphism as sufficient for gendering identity, and then uses social space to reify this belief over the life course. For example, girls readily see that boys receive differential treatment on the basis of being male; and visa versa (1977: 314). When children carry these gendered identities into adulthood, girls accept that they depend on men, and men expect to provide for their wives and children. This position shares commonality with West and Zimmerman's (1987) doing gender perspective, where men and women model their social interactions to demonstrate their sex category. In essence, gender is enacted through categories (Glenn 2000); the most notable being male and female.

The reflexive institutional position emphasizes the coupling between identity and society. For instance, Barbara Risman (1998) recognizes that gendered institutions act as formidable obstacles to feminists families. Men and women committed to peer-marriage (or no less than a 60/40 split in household and childrearing obligations) find that family expectations and gendered labor markets put their egalitarian principles at risk. Rather than being partners, society pressures the couple to adopt a more conventional arrangement, as in caregiving women and breadwinning males. The pressures stem from a host of sources. For example, gendered inequality leads to less pay for women's work, and public policies offer few public solutions for the cost women incur while in the workforce, as with childcare. Similarly, children burden household finances making shared parental obligations difficult for men who commit to the good provider model. Barbara Risman's point is that even when men and women want egalitarian domestic politics, the broader society – in terms of pay rates, job related expectations, and normative gender standards – conspires against them.

Similarly, Robert Connell (2002) argues that social institutions treat men and women differently. For example, education organizes education around dimorphic sex categories that in later life leads to lower wages in part-time work and dead end jobs for women (Connell 1987: 135). His observations are supported by survey and census data which routinely documents gender segregation in the labor force, wage differentials, and gender harassment (Andersen 2006). The same applies to the organization of major universal entitlements, such as Social Security Income, minimum wage, retirement income, and unemployment insurance that are all male centered policies (Lorber 1994). Even today, women's work remains undervalued and not recognized for purposes of earning work credits towards Social Security Income. And with nearly seventy-one percent of women with dependent children now working, women centered policies, such comprehensive national maternity leave (Baca Zinn, Eitzen and Wells 2008) and subsidized daycare and universal preschool (Clawson and Gerstel 2002), go unmet. Expanding these human services would push the United States gender order towards a complementary stage.

These institutional reflexivity accounts differ from sex roles. A proponent of sex roles, Talcott Parsons (1942) relays his functional view that men hold an instrumental disposition that are played out in public, while women assume expressive roles hidden in the private sphere of the home. Rather than recognizing that gender is embedded in social institutions, Parsons' model explains gender as internalized in persons. While most textbooks (Andersen 2006; Eitzen, Zinn and Smith 2009) identify socialization as a culprit in exaggerating gender differences, Parsons' shortcoming is not perceiving gender as a constraint, as a system of power, and as a property embedded in social institutions

(Krais and William 2000). Parsons also overlooks that gender operates publicly, as in the labor market. As every serious study of work shows, firms selectively include women workers to perform emotion labor under conditions of gender segregation (Hochschild 1983). Similar points can be made about all major social institutions of society, as with religion, education, military, police, and political parties; and the social organizations that carry out the work of these institutions. In terms of power and force, the sex role concept ignores the horrific degree of violence required to make people live within the stricture of their role identity (see Connell 1987: 52-54).

Institutional reflexivity posits that gender is a structure modified through personal strategies, but not to the point of structure being a voluntary imposition. Rather, gender (like race and class) is relational, as men hold more power than women. The definition of power follows a hegemonic construction. Given social institutions reflecting complementarity in gender relations, men tend to be advantaged as a group over women. Entitlements, lower taxes by not enacting women-centered legislative changes, and organizational advantages represent male privilege. Even the very definition of womanhood undermines practical strategies to rearrange gender identities. In summarizing his definition of power, Connell (1987: 107) states "The ability to impose a definition of the situation, to set the terms in which events are understood and issues discussed, to formulate ideals and define morality, in short to assert hegemony, is also an essential part of social power."

In considering the Chaldean case study, several questions present themselves. Are the community's institutions sufficient to maintain a *sui generis* gender order that follows the Asian kinship model outlined above? Does the American context challenge the

institutional gender arrangements within the community? Responses to these questions require identifying the arrangement of gender relations within the gender regimes of the family and community organizations, and how these influence the gender order of the community.

Social Reproduction

Social reproduction refers to social processes that reproduce relations of power. Social processes include both social structures and human agency. While class, race and gender structures operate to undermine social opportunities for women and minorities, social reproduction adds that actor orientations matter. How people respond to their structural conditions varies and to some degree may actually shape their agency. William Julius Wilson (2009) reviews this point noting that "decision making" and "meaning making" powers of culture along with cultural tools have a role in understanding minority responses to racial inequality in the United States. In employing social reproduction analysis here, I explore habitus, social field, capital and symbolic violence. These Bourdieusian concepts have import for our study.

Habitus. Pierre Bourdieu (1990: 53) argues that habitus is a system " ... of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures." As a step toward understanding this definition, habitus defines a set of dispositions that are learned through social experience and are reproduced in conjunction with others (Wainwright, Williams and Turner 2006: 537). As Jay MacLeod (1995: 15)

explains, "... habitus disposes individuals to think and act in certain ways." In short, habitus provides "... different ways of apprehending the world" (Swartz 1997: 83).

Beate Krais and Jennifer Williams (2000: 56) apply this concept to gender and argue that habitus actually shapes the body "... through the habitus, the social construction of gender relationships determines body image, body experience, even the form of the body, sensory perception, the possibility of feeling and expressing joy and pain." This is similar to Judith Lorber and Patricia Martin's essay on gender bodies (2005). Social demands upon gendered bodies are thought to generate gender differences in morbidity and mortality. For example, society encourages young men to demonstrate bravado, and expects women to have effeminate/petite bodies.

Bourdieu (2001: 23) notes that beyond framing uses and expression of body, gender is so deeply rooted in culture and common sense as to be understood as a biological fact. "The particular strength of the masculine sociodicy comes from the fact that it combines and condenses two operations: it legitimates a relationship of domination by embedding it in a biological nature that is itself a naturalized social construction" (Bourdieu 2001).

Social Field, Capital, and Symbolic Violence. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 97) define a field "as a network, configuration, of objective relations between positions." Stakeholders take positions in the field for the "production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge, or status" (Swartz 1997: 117). Once within the field, stakeholders accept tacitly the rules of the game. In this way, the field establishes the way

of doing things, and persists as long as the social resources attainable remain desired by social participants.

Social fields for immigrants are subject to the condition of hysteresis. Hysteresis exists when the social field no longer offers participants valuable goods. For immigrants and the second-generation, patriarchal gender relations may be out of place. Perhaps society offers rewards the immigrant culture can no longer provide. But as long as both generations accept the logic of the game, Chaldean women and their second-generation children will continue to take a position in social fields. The dominant stakeholders follow conservative strategies to hold onto their advantages, while subordinate players attempt goals of succession or subversion (Swartz 1997: 125).

In the field, stakeholders exercise power according to their capital. Economic, social, cultural and symbolic are obvious examples of capital, along with organizational, political, family, state and moral (Swartz 1997: 78). Each form of capital belongs to a particular field; economic capital is the purview of the business realm. In intellectual circles, cultural capital dominates. Wainwright et al. (2006) find that ballet troupes create a social field rewarding a specific body shape, posture, and etiquette of dancers. As such, the bodies of all ballet dancers are not equal for all performance styles showing how closely field and habitus are bound.

All stakeholders seek to maximize power within their field (Moi 1991). To exercise or gain power requires acceptance of the field (and its inequalities), and power is only gained by amassing "symbolic capital" (Moi 1991: 1021). Symbolic capital emerges from the relational system of doxa and heterodox; doxa means the established order of doing things, as if no other way existed.

In terms of gender relations, Bourdieu (2001: 93) argues that femininity operates as a "negative symbolic coefficient." Being devalued operates between the interaction of social production and social reproduction. In this instance, Bourdieu (2001) points to men controlling the power field, what Connell calls a part of the structure of gender relations. Therefore, men manage the economy and state, and hold prestigious professional positions, while women are delegated to the order-taking position of society. The extent of the 'symbolic tax' is measured when "women who attain very high positions (senior executive, head of the ministry, etc.) have to 'pay' in a sense for this professional success with less success in the domestic realm (divorce, late marriage or no marriage, difficulties or failures with children, etc.) and in the economy of symbolic goods, or, conversely, that success of domestic undertaking is often achieved at the price of partial or total renunciation of major professional success ..." (Bourdieu 2001: 107).

This discussion provides a clear analytic picture that habitus and field are homologous concepts. So that Chaldean men and women carry a habitus into their families, community organizations, and family-run businesses. Given the strength of community attachment, many Chaldeans still uphold customs and practices which make them stakeholders in social fields and players who abide by the rules which operate to define social interaction

GENDERED ADAPTATION AND MIGRATION: THE LITERATURE

The field has developed steadily from the influences of feminist theorizing to gradually incorporate gender into the study of migration. Before shifting the focus, migration research had examined migration as a class phenomenon. Exemplary of this

kind of research, Michael Piore's (1979) classic study details the conditions of sojourning males searching for work while minimizing the cost associated with settlement. In contrast, Donna Gabaccia (1994) documents research on women's migration motives that overcomes the limitation of seeing women as locked within sex roles and spatially immobilized except through their husband's initiative.

Incorporating a gender framework has proceed according to Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo (2000; 2003) in three phases. Initial research simply had added women as a variable for the sake of comparing them to men in terms of education and occupational patterns instead of seeing gender as a relational system of power. Second phase writers, of which Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994), Nazli Kibria (1993) and Sherri Grasmuck and Patricia Pessar (1991) are examples, analyzed gender within meso structures, such as the immigrant family and community. The second phase studies generated useful findings, and pushed the field into the study of gender relations within these institutions. The third phase of present research examines gender within the institutions of society. This dissertation utilizes an approach comparable with both the second and third phase. While I conduct research on gender relations within family and community organizations, I remain cognizant of gender relations as these interact between community and society.

Research approaches themselves have utilized a variety of approaches. A general position is work and income provided women with resources that they use to change gender relations in the household (Pessar 1986). This explanatory model has grown to include expanded housework (Kibria 1993), and normative shifts brought about by contact with mainstream gender relations (Menjívar 2003). Another approach has viewed migration as undermining patriarchal structures. Fragmented structures include losing the

normative order associated with masculine privilege (Levitt 2001), along with extended family members who liberate men from domestic labor (George 2005). By categorizing the literature in this way, I am examining research findings for their utility in identifying structure and agency.

Transgressive Practices

As a master statement, the field holds that migration leads to the renegotiation of domestic and community power. Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994: 101) states that: "Research conducted in Vietnamese, Dominican, Mexican, and Portuguese immigrant communities in the U.S. suggests that the increase in immigrant women's economic contributions to the family economy, concomitant with immigrant men's declining economic resources, accounts for the diminution of male dominance in immigrant families." Scholarship differs on the source of change and the starting points from which gender change occurs. Still, the overall position is that migration creates conditions leading to women's empowerment.

The resource approach to marital power states that domestic decision making belongs to the partner with the greatest resource shares (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Kamo 1988; Pessar 1986). Historically, resource theory has looked exclusively at a male subject, and states that male education attainment, occupational prestige and earned income leads to patriarchal domestic power (Blood and Wolfe 1960).

The gender migration field currently uses a variation of resource theory which recognizes women gain these fungible assets in both the pre-migration and post-migration period. As examples, Asian Indian women lead their household's migration by

virtue of holding professional degrees, and by being the family's breadwinner (George 2005). Korean and Filipino men experience declining occupational status in the United States when sponsored by their professional wives (Espiritu 2003a). Among all three immigrant groups, research holds that domestic power changes towards a more egalitarian arrangement. Dominican women have accomplished a similar achievement as measured by their control over household budgets (Pessar 1986).

Transgressive processes operate within community organizations. Prema Kurien (2003) observes that Asian Indian religious organizations provide women a site for renegotiating the community's gender ideologies, by reordering the meanings of culture stories and by teasing intractable men to revise their gendered outlooks.

Where transgressive practices fail, the general conclusion holds that either strong gender ideologies operate within the group, or the racist and class structures of society do not allow for gender role reversal. As an example of social location research (or social structures), Patricia Zavella (1987) finds that Santa Clara County's blue collar job market stratifies workers by race and gender. As a result, Chicanos earn lower pay than white workers, and Chicanas gain access to part-time seasonal work. In this case, household solidarity with traditional gender norms emerges within Chicano households as both men and women contribute towards maintaining family finances under the distressed earnings opportunities of a racialized and gendered labor market.

As an example of gender ideology, Maria Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Ana García (1990: 134) hold that "... patriarchy should be seen as a series of flexible ideologies involving norms of reciprocity for both men and women." For immigrants who identify with sex roles differentiation, researchers find that women's attitudes

towards work are viewed as a short term adaptation not a long-term change. For example, Cuban and Ladina (Guatemalan) women seek to reinstate their middle class status when their husbands become financially secure (see Fernández-Kelly and García 1990 for Mexicans and Cubans; and Menjívar 2003 for Salvadorans and Ladina Guatemalans). Ladina women also protect their homemaking status by using some of their earned income for purchasing home decorations.

Fragmented Structures

While transgressive practices originate from women's gained assets, another source of changing gender relations emanates from fragmented structures. In following nuclear family migration, Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) recognized that family unit migration leads to changing domestic relations. Similarly, immigrants and refugees leave family members behind for reasons related to their contexts of exit. For Indian migrants, Sheba George (2005) notes that Keralite nurses undermine gendered norms simply by assuming a professional life obtained by working and traveling. Further, the women attack marital customs that devalue women and burden their families, as with the dowry system. Further, the Indian social context – with servants and extended family members – aids patriarchy by allowing men to avoid household duties. These benefits are lost in female-led migration. Among refugees, Nazli Kibria (1993) identifies fragmented extended families as a factor in accounting for declining domestic patriarchy.

Beyond simply leaving patriarchal meso structures behind, research shows how migrant women also work to transform structures. Prema Kurien (2003) observes that Asian Indian religious organizations provide women a site for renegotiating the

community's gender ideologies, by reordering the meanings of culture stories and by teasing intractable men to revise their gendered impositions on their spouses. Sharon Suh (2004) finds that women have used the Buddhist temple to provide them with a respite from patriarchal control.

In moving beyond the meso structures of family and community, Steve Gold (2003) argues that social policies matter as well. Israeli women leave a society that provides subsidies for their carework activities, and enter the United States that offers little caregiving resources through federal or state programs. The two states different approaches to supporting caregiving lead Israeli women to be less agreeable to the notion that migration is beneficial. Men, however, are liberated from taxes and competitive business pressures, and hold a positive assessment of migration benefits.

To recap, the gender adaptation and migration literature focuses on the sources of change in gender relations through transgressive practices and fragmented structures. As the Chaldean case study differs significantly from other immigrant groups, I review key social processes as these relate to transgressive opportunities and retention of gender structures.

CHALDEAN STUDIES SO FAR

The Chaldean community has received some recognition from academic circles making a review of secondary sources a point of departure. Qais Al-Nouri (1964), Mary Sengstock (1999) and Barbara Gallagher (1999) develop statements about gender norms in their work. A second body of research examined educational issues for Chaldean youth. These studies are reviewed last.

Al-Nouri finds weak labor force attachment, substandard educational attainment, and young marital age for women play a determining role in women's gender status, and it is low. According to Al-Nouri, the typical Chaldean woman is a submissive supplicant to her husband's will. Even when Chaldean women work, they do not gain power through contributing resources to the household. Rather a husband invites his wife to work in the family business, and dismisses her to care for his children (Al-Nouri 1964: 27). Archetypical femininity for the Chaldean womanhood is to be deferent. And if a man can not find that quality, he marries transnationally.

Mary Sengstock (1999: 135-136) focuses on women's incremental gains which change her gender status relationally to men. She finds several areas where women have made inroads to greater levels of equality with her male counterpart. She observes that age differences have converged among marital partners, and women's education attainment and employment opportunities have expanded. Changes extend to public occasions with mixed-sex groups sitting together in banquet halls, along with women holding active positions in the church. Her approach is very similar to the gendered adaptation and migration literature that uses resource theory, but is missing an explanation as to why conservative gender relations endure.

Barbara Gallagher (1999) offers the first study of family and gender on the Chaldean community. Drawing on interviews with twenty-one women, her work focuses on gender power within the family. Her advance over previous research is to focus on the ways women resist men, rather than comply. In opposition to masculine power, women pout and publicly cry, or they subvert social control by voiding community surveillance (Gallagher 1999: 153). Chaldean masculinity, however, is presented in rather startling

and dark terms. Not only do men exploit women by controlling them, but they resort to violence sanctioned by the family and church. Gallagher's approach is based on Foucault's notion of power over bodies; men control women's bodies. As understood by this study, power does not exist as a diffuse, ubiquitous or hegemonic structure recreating its own set of rules, but rather as male supremacy.

These works represent the most exhaustive community studies in the literature that comment on gender. There are other dissertations that attend to issues of education. Sister Therese Shikwana (1997) and Robyne Thompson (2004) study Chaldean socio-economic status, and parental involvement in children's educational orientations. The authors of these studies neglect gender. In essence, the studies assume that parents value boys and girls education equally (Shikwana 1997; Thompson 2004). A more dated study by Allene Doctoroff (1978) engages in a detailed statistical analysis of Chaldean children in the Birmingham School District, which included gender data. Even though significant differences exist in methodology, these education studies provide comparative data to contrast parental occupation, hours worked by students, and parents' attitudes about their children working.

In another work, Natalie Smith (2001) writes about the degree of genetic relatedness and pro-social behavior. Basically social cooperation emerges from "inclusive fitness." Chaldeans tend to cooperate at rates higher than other groups given their first cousin marriages. But Smith (2001: 92-95) also attributes this outcome to norms cultivated among Chaldeans given their agrarian past, when help and aid were common among family groups. This finding supports the connective patriarchy concept of Suad Joseph.

GENERATIONS

Immigrant cohorts and generations play an important part in the investigation. The immigrant generation has built a strong community that integrates the second-generation into community norms around work, religion, dating, marriage, and other community events. As such, this section defines the concept of immigrant and second-generation.

Rubén Rumbaut defines generation as first, one-and-a-half (or 1.5), and second. Parents represent the first generation, as they are the migrants. The first generation includes children born abroad and over the age of twelve at time of migration. At this point, research supports difficulty in adapting fluently to a new language, and makes a useful distinction in terms of immigrant destinies. The second-generation signifies those born in the United States of immigrant parents. And the one-and-a-half generation (1.5) had migrated, but before the age of twelve.

These distinctions play an important role in migrant adaptation. Many comparative studies point to alternative patterns of assimilation for the second-generation, such as straight-line, bumpy-line and segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993). Where parental and second-generation assimilation occurs simultaneously there is consonant acculturation between the generations. Under these conditions, role reversal, or children assuming parental responsibilities, seldom if ever takes place. However, when children's assimilation outstrips parent's then dissonant acculturation takes place. The final pathway is selective acculturation which occurs when community institutions permit the continued value of parental home culture as in language and norms (Portes and Rumbaut 2001: 49-54).

Chaldeans represent a mixture of these processes which can be discerned from the life histories. On the one hand, the Chaldean church and intense sociability operates to reaffirm Chaldean values and norms and is socialized into the second generation. This has a significant impact on maintaining gender relations across generations, as the parental habitus maintains its relevance for the second-generation. But there is clear evidence that in the complex maze of time of arrival, age at arrival, context of arrival and time in the United States, that consonant and dissonant acculturation occur as well. Some parents push their children towards adapting to key educational institutions with the unintended consequence of the children seeking more liberal gender relations. Similarly, some parents fall behind their children's savvy leading to a loss of connection and ambiguous generational antipathies.

PLAN OF DISSERTATION

The dissertation investigates Arab Christian immigrants whose social practices are not entirely understood or documented within the gender and migration literature. The chapters are organized to examine the exceptional qualities of the Chaldean community, as institutionally complete, and the family. I will follow how structure and social reproduction operate within this group.

Chapter two outlines the methodology used in the dissertation. Both theoretical approaches specify different methodological tactics in discovering the key structures and sources of agency. For structuration, I will introduce the concept of structural inventory, and document this approach. I also explain conditions in the field relating to the volatile period following September 11 and the Gulf War, and detail how I made contact and

gained the confidence of my informants. Further, the life history approach is explained and the significance of life stories in understanding culture. The survey guide and the population census is provided in the appendix.

In the third chapter, I explain Chaldean migration through network theory. This theory provides a means to make crucial observations about Chaldean social ties. Namely, the thick bonds of social trust that generate reciprocity needed for developing an entrepreneurial adaption in Iraq, and for transporting those skills to the United States. Beyond identifying social capital, this chapter focuses on the gender regimes and gender order in Iraqi society. The gender order helps us identify trends between the various cohorts that left Iraq which pattern their views about gender relations in the United States.

In chapter four, I present data documenting the regional pattern of classical patriarchy and how Chaldeans organize connective patriarchy through emotional and symbolic structures of gender relations. This information provides details on the structure of the Chaldean family and how this shapes gender relations within the community. Particular attention is paid to rites, traditions, and gifting. As a structure, this provides legitimacy to connective patriarchal ties.

Chapter five explores Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and social field. Evidence is presented as to my interviewees' definitions of gender values, norms, and statuses (their habitus). Gender relations within community organizations and families are explored as social fields where women actively build symbolic capital. I propose that the social field still offers a meaningful reason for women to comply with connective patriarchy, while they continue to be subject to surveillance and gender control.

Chapter six concludes my dissertation with suggestions for future research. Among information collected by but not present include norms of cooperation within families for businesses formation.

CHAPTER 2

LIFE HISTORIES

The methods chosen for this study address the major theoretical concern of the gender adaptation research agenda; how do migrant women change gender relations? As discussed in the previous section, gender relations operate as a structure that constrains the activities of men and women. Migrant men may actually lose supporting societal patriarchal structures and norms, what I call structural fragmentation. As a result, women gain the opportunity to transform their domestic and community power relations because the constraints are no longer in place to restrain their agency. To follow this process, Robert Connell (1987) recommends a structural inventory. This means accounting for structures of gender relations as they occur within community institutions, what Connell calls gender regimes. He also suggests looking across gender regimes to follow how these institutions conflict or support each other, what he calls the gender order. Structures include: power, economy, symbols and emotions. Power and economic structures are common in social science analysis. Power is often denoted as decision making capacity, and economic structure is generally linked to class power and the division of labor. Emotion and symbol structures are less frequently analyzed yet have explanatory value. Under Connell (2002), emotions relate to positive or negative feelings people hold towards objects. For example, the object woman is tied to the negative feelings of misogyny within the context of a patriarchal society; similarly the object homosexual is tied to the emotion of homophobia in a compulsory heterosexist society. Feelings can be positive as is the case for caregiving motherhood in the context of the traditional middle

class family. Symbols denote ideal images related to masculinity and femininity, and are often embedded in cultural as ideals, values and norms.

In applying this method, I assume that Chaldeans effectively organize robust ethnic institutions capable of meeting criterion laid out by Philip Selznick's (1992) definition of community. As a metric for understanding institutional completeness (Breton 1964), I propose that Chaldeans are accomplished in socializing *identity*, engaging in *mutuality* (exchange), fomenting *participation* within social and cultural organizations, and initiating *integration* of members into community life. In the brief introduction to Chaldeans in the preceding chapter, I described several community organizations and institutions that accomplish these missions. The Chaldean Rite Catholic Church accomplishes all of these tasks, as does the extended family, family business, and the multiple social organizations. Another measure for validating this assumption appears in the research findings that provide ample data to support this assessment making the structural inventory a legitimate method.

My actual means for gaining information are the qualitative methods of life history data and participant observation. Chaldeans life or oral histories are memories drawn from socially and culturally specific narratives. In other words, life history data documents the context under which this community arranges gender relations within family and ethnic institutions in relation to the order of Iraqi and United States society.

EXPERIENCES IN THE FIELD

My research began ten months after September 11, 2001 on June 18, 2002. By the time I had completed my last interview in July 2005; the United States had launched and

concluded the Second Gulf War, begun the occupation of Iraq, and reorganized Immigration and Naturalization Service into the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Immigration law enforcement functions were coordinated by a new branch of the Federal Government, the Department of Homeland Security.

The events in September generated a firestorm of suspicion and law enforcement furor. Over the course of these several months, the Department of Justice detained 5,000 Middle Eastern men shortly after September 11 of which none was ever charged with terrorism. Under the authority of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), the Federal Bureau of Investigations interviewed another 80,000 men, detained 2,783, and identified eleven terrorist suspects, none of which has been charged with terrorism (The Constitution Project 2008). These national events shook Arab Detroit and created difficult conditions for launching a study on Middle Easterner immigrants.

With Detroit being home to major settlements of Arab national origin immigrants, these events had repercussion within the different Middle Eastern communities around the metropolitan area. For example, I attended the second meeting of the Congress of Arab American Organizations (CAAO) at Beit Hanina, a social club for Arab Americans in Dearborn's South End, where members were fuming over different discriminatory acts they endured. An example included the City of Dearborn invoicing two imams $6,600 and $1,500 for failure to attain permits before leading public protests against the buildup to the Gulf War (Abbas 2002; American Civil Liberties Union 2003).

Demonstrations were a mainstay during these days. And the Federal Government frequently held town hall meetings to address citizens of Arab ancestry in Dearborn. Typical of these efforts, the Justice and State Departments, as well as law enforcement

agencies from federal, state and local levels received complaints and issued directives about aiding terrorist organizations abroad. On one occasion, the State Department held a foreign policy town hall to showcase their Secure Borders initiative. During the luncheon, I sat with two young adults from the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) and four Euro-American elderly gentlemen. Given the topic, the non-Arab men voiced their opinions that occupation of Iraq would lead to autonomous political governance and a self-sustaining economy as occurred in Europe following World War II. The Arab ancestry youth and I voiced our dissent. Instead of discussing our differences, one of the gentlemen dismissed himself from the table, and within fifteen minutes a Dearborn police officer arrived on the premises. The younger ADC associates promptly left. I viewed the reaction of the youth as a response to perceived intimidation.

During this period, the war overtook the normal flow of life. Community organizations were responding to government policies that were profiling them. And events abroad stirred emotions and public reaction in Dearborn. For example, I had an appointment with a Dearborn police officer for a ride along. Arriving shortly before meeting the officer, I encountered Iraqis celebrating the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime, when an American tank had demolished a statue of the deposed dictator. At first, a few cars raced up and down Warren Avenue with the Iraqi flag trailing from the passenger windows. But as the day wore on, the celebration expanded and Iraqis took to the street. Their goal was to march on Dearborn City Hall. The following are field notes from that day.

> When we left the City of Dearborn Television Studio we heard over the radio that shots had been fired in Detroit. The officer said, "It could be anything, even

> firecrackers." It soon became clear that a march was starting at the Karbala Islamic Educational Center, and marchers were taking over Warren Avenue. Dispatch radioed that demonstrators were marching against traffic, and the response from city hall was to get them off the street. The officer was upset and caustically remarked, "Stupid." We raced down Warren Avenue siren blaring as we arrived at the scene of a mass demonstration. The police had already started routing traffic and blocking off side streets. The police goal became to stop the demonstration from going to city hall.

Everyday that I went to Dearborn in late 2002 and early to mid 2003, there was a crisis in Arab Detroit. In March 2003, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents coordinated interviews and arrests of Iraqi origin immigrants, and by April had conducted 11,000 interviews (Ardalan 2003; Schaefer and Warikoo 2003; Warikoo 2003). It became apparent that suspicion reigned making my entry into Dearborn unrealistic.

OVERCOMING OUTSIDER STATUS

As outlined above, my entry into the field came at a rather difficult period. The general means for gaining access to the Chaldean community came by searching the printed media, making phone calls, doing web-based research, and finding respondent referrals at public events. My first contact with Chaldeans occurred at a food drive organizational meeting held by Chaldean Americans Reaching and Encouraging (CARE) on February 13, 2003. I found that meeting by searching the Internet and locating CARE's webpage. The website announced the location and time, calling for those interested to attend. I sent an email to the committee organizer who graciously invited

me; there I met three highly involved women and a man who extended later opportunities for volunteering at food, clothing and furniture drives. My first opportunity came that Easter.

My first food delivery experience gave me a chance to meet new immigrant families in Detroit. I traveled with other volunteers and visited families just north of Chaldean Town. These families were linguistically isolated newcomers with significant income and medical service needs. The condition of their housing was poor and the neighborhood in decline.

> In front of a family house we were visiting, a late model car sped through a neighborhood of vacant lots and concrete slabs where houses once stood. Gun shot holes figured prominently in the front windshield and, as the car raced sped away, plastic and duct tape waved good-bye from the space glass usually sits. The house we entered was neighbored by a burned, gutted and ruined structure that served as a dump for unwanted garbage. Inside we found two Chaldean brothers whose families occupied a subdivided house with unified living quarters.

This residence pattern resembles the extended family household that is somewhat common in the Middle East. Visiting other Chaldean homes gave me insight into physical organization of living space which is linked to family visitation, as most of these homes had multiple large sofas in the sitting rooms. Experiences, such as these, helped me identify more subtle forms of family social ties and networks.

While information like this was invaluable, my participation in community organizations generated the trust needed to gain access to potential interviewees. With the tight knit relationships within the community, networks buzzed each other about a

researcher interested in meeting and attending Chaldean social clubs. As a result, groups quickly understood that my research goals included attending organizational meetings and interviewing group members.

For example, the operating budget for CARE in 2003-2004 came from a fundraiser dinner. At the August 2003 event, I contributed pictures that were projected onto two large screens in the banquet hall of Southfield Manor, a social club built by the Chaldean-Iraqi American Association of Michigan (CIAAM). I took these pictures during the week of the Jewish and Chaldean Opportunity Builders program (JACOB); when Chaldean and Jewish youth tore down abandoned houses in Redford while breaking down stereotypes they held towards each other. It was a great week to ride a bus and listen to youth and their mentors speak at length about themselves, the schools they attended, their goals in life and the dilemmas of daily life. And I was there with them, swinging an axe, carrying trash, and generally wilting under the heat and humidity. By tearing down houses, I was invited to the fundraiser, where I met other Chaldean community members who invited me to their social organizations and agreed to participate in my study.

In another instance, parish council members invited me to direct traffic in the parking lot of a church. As congregants entered the church, parish council members introduced me to men and women who would later participate in the study. When mass ended, I held a stop sign to direct traffic on an adjoining street. Beyond making contacts for interviews, traffic duty led to further opportunities to participate. For example, I was invited to a fundraiser to aid Chaldean orphans in the Village of Al-Qosh. I was also invited to a town hall meeting at the church that discussed changing the Chaldean (Neo-

Soureth) mass from noon to nine o'clock in the morning. And so it went at every social activity or function; I introduced myself and discussed my research. Through these efforts, I learned about Chaldean social life from interview and interaction.

By participating, I learned almost serendipitously. For example, while directing cars in the church parking lot, I recognized a young unmarried woman whom I had worked with at volunteer functions. As is typical of my jovial self, I shouted out a hello and was ignored. I felt somewhat rebuffed and later spoke to her about it. She was very pleasant, but could not recall the incident. I assigned meaning to this interaction as a violation of community background norms, an unaccompanied and unmarried young woman does not speak to unrelated men in parking lots.

Even if I did not participate in a social organization, I attended meetings. Doing this provided me access to more informants and contacts. This process spiraled outward from these many contacts into different social networks that took me to Chaldean youth, Chaldean congregants, Chaldean political activists, Chaldean social activists, Chaldean organizational leaders, and Chaldean businessmen and women. Eventually I made contact with informants linked to the Chaldean American Ladies of Charity, Chaldean American Chamber of Commerce, Chaldean American Student Association, Chaldean Cultural Center on 7 Mile Rd., Chaldean Cultural and Community Center in West Bloomfield and the Chaldean Rite Catholic Church. Additionally, I attended a informational discussion of the Iraqi national elections by the Iraqi Democratic Union. I was subsequently invited to a celebration of the July 14 Revolution, the date of the First Republic, which brought political sensitive Chaldeans together for dinner, entertainment and sociability. The food was simple Arab in origin and delicious.

CHALDEAN MOTIVATION TO PARTICIPATE

With all the problems associated with the politics of the Middle East, and with Chaldeans being Iraqi during a time of war, it seemed somewhat dubious that I could overcome the problem of outsider status (Merton 1972). And indeed, initial contacts in Dearborn proved to be very unsupportive of my research agenda. For Arab Detroiters, instantaneous resistance developed from the Orientalism perspective, what Edward Said (1979) defines as the academic and literary misrepresentation of Eastern culture. In essence, I was an outsider with a research agenda seeking to profit on the despair of an embattled community.

In actuality, I thought of my research as being sympathetic to Arab origin immigrants and wanted to explore their identity from their perspective. When I broached my research agenda with a social service agency, its leaders requested a place on my dissertation committee, monetary compensation for both informants and the organization, and control over the research agenda. This may seem somewhat controlling from an academic perspective; from my experience however, it is quite common for knowledge gatekeepers to specifically inquire about the benefits their community can expect from their participation in a study. In many cases, these communities wanted directed research with tangible benefits. How does this research help my group? My answer to this question was that social science research clarifies misunderstandings and stereotypes common within the academy and the general public which aids in fashioning better social services and reframes racialized discourse. These are worthy goals for both the researcher and the researched.

For Chaldeans, my outsider status was less of a problem; they were much less guarded about my research project. Instead of rejecting my entreaties, Chaldeans eagerly involved me in their community organizations. I believe this response relates to the trying times in Iraq and the United States. After all, my objectivity and independence of opinion would advance their own claims of being a minority community from Iraq, Christians from the Middle East, and hard working Americans. This was a message they often communicated to a sometimes hostile public. I reached this conclusion during an interview, when a respondent explained that September 11 galvanized the community to change public perception of Chaldeans. My presence in the field coincided with this initiative, and many Chaldean social groups welcomed my presence.

The community's major concerns relate to both overseas issues and local concerns. War consumed a significant degree of their attention. Sectarian violence had emptied many Chaldean villages in the Kurdish region, and priests, nuns, and congregants remain targeted for personal assault and murder. As a response, Detroit's Chaldean community leaders emphatically stated that they have a stake in their homeland and wished to secure rights for a Chaldo-Assyrian enclave, given the long roots of Christianity in Mesopotamia. This larger political goal was sidelined by the violence abroad that created a growing number of Chaldean refugees stranded in countries of first asylum. While waiting for permanent settlement, law makers in the United States had made "passion fatigue" complaints for not wanting more immigrants in their state. The Chaldean Federation of America took it upon itself to advocate for refugees and for political rights in Iraq. Further, backlash developed against American born Chaldeans. In

one instance, a boy at a local high school was followed relentlessly by a principal. These are problems which the community continues to manage.

A second set of initiatives for participating in the study deals with youth concerns. Given the high rates of business ownership, families often work long hours. Youth advocates point out that children need more time with their fathers. Women leaders recognize that mothers are not geared towards interacting with public officials, even primary school teachers. And community members schooled in social work discuss the problems associated with Iraqi discipline in the schools and home as being different from that in the United States. These are areas of discourse and motives for participating in the study which made outsider status less problematic.

LIFE HISTORY DATA AND LIFE STORY INTERVIEWS

With Chaldeans inviting me into their community, I could focus my attention on understanding their history, migration patterns, and settlement experiences. After initial observations, I had believed that the community was highly assimilated. Women in community organizations hold university degrees. St. Thomas follows the dictates of Vatican II with young women serving the Eucharist. Many informants live upper middle class lifestyles evidenced by their cars, homes, clothing and mannerisms. These observations suggest that Chaldeans are following social processes common among other immigrant groups. Had I chosen a positivist approach for data gathering as with a questionnaire, I could have easily arrived at the wrong conclusion, and missed the customs that have determinative impact on gender relations.

The choice of life history data, therefore, proves advantageous, as the information collected reflects the informant's understanding of their social contexts and culture. Further, the narration of events provides descriptively thick accounts of migration motives, social networks and family history. These accounts operate as recollections and memories, what Michal McCall and Judith Wittner (1990) refer to as experience. Experience or memories are, as Mary Chamberlain and Selma Leydesdorff (2004) recognize, a social and cultural activity that represent mediated knowledge between the story teller and the listener. "While the personal narrative may be seen as a the property of the individual – intrinsic to and defining of the individual – the plot that it follows and the themes that are woven through it may reflect and conform to the cultural narratives to which any one individual is exposed at any one time" (Chamberlain and Leydesdorff 2004: 230). During the discursive activity of giving a life story, the informant draws on meaning frames shaped in partnership with those of their social group. This quality of referencing takes on a polyphonic quality (Tanggaard 2009). In other words, the informant provides explanations towards those within the conversation, even when these others are not present. The interviewer has the obligation to identify the narrative truth of the life history with regards to its believability from the perspective of an insider.

This approach is ideally suited for learning about understudied or emergent social groups, whose culture is not totally known or carefully understood. As life histories are dialogical, that is discursive with regards to making a narrative truth comprehensible for others in their social group; it works well for making case comparisons. Case comparisons allow for conjectural conclusions by contrasting findings with other groups in similar social contexts. For example, in following gender adaptation, researchers

continuously use their data to contrast the potential sources of change and persistence in gender relations after migration. These case studies, therefore, add to our understanding of diverse populations and the social processes unleashed during migration.

In terms of interviews and the meaning of dialogical interviewing, some explanation is required. First, knowledge gathering through the interview is itself relatively new, but is an accepted medium for collecting market research, social science and political polling data, along with other uses (Lee 2008). For the dialogical concept, it has at least two definitions. In its simpler meaning, dialogic equals dialogue, a conversation between two parties. Steinar Kvale (2006) holds that dialogues vary by intent and approach by the interviewer. I provide two examples of his typology of interview types. In "agnostic interviews," the researcher challenges the informant. In "actively confronting interviews," researchers push informants to explain assumptions behind their comments. An alternative use of dialogical owes its development to the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Buhktin (see Tanggaard 2009). This second usage is in line with my comments above regarding the social and cultural rules embedded in the subject's life story/history. In my case, dialogic means the interviewee holds all the inside information and explains the cultural meaning and social structures that Chaldeans understand. This use is certainly more egalitarian than positivist approaches, but it also depends on my ability to understand the life world of Chaldeans.

Despite my effort to create equality during the interview process, potential problems arise from life story data. Notably, power relations operate between researchers and the researched. Steinar Kvale (2006) holds that dialogic interviews, as a two party partnership, offers enormous potentials for abuse. In essence, the qualitative research

interview "... entails a hierarchical relationship with an asymmetrical power distribution (of) interviewer and interviewee. It is a one-way dialogue, an instrumental and indirect conversation, where the interviewer upholds a monopoly of interpretation" (Kvale 2006: 484).

Beyond the interview format is the knowledge attained. Exactly whose information is this? Michelle Fine et al. (2000: 124) advocate moving beyond the dispassionate researcher model for one taking responsibility on behalf of the researched. In return for access, the sociologist transforms herself into an advocate. "We must probe to find the sites of intellectual leverage, responsibility, and obligation through which our work can begin to fissure public and political discourse, shifting the ideological and material grounds on which poor and working-class men and women are now being tortured."

Further related to the power imbalance is a methodological problematic: who is best able to study disadvantaged groups? This is known as insider-outsider debate. Insider researchers have advantages in following a research agenda given their innate ability to overcome the suspicion of the researched, called the *insider doctrine* by Robert Merton (1972). Without neglecting the implications of insider status, the shared social location of the researcher and researched does offer potential for considering alternative approaches in studying minority groups (Baca Zinn 1979).

While this critique still holds validity, today's immigrants have high rates of entrepreneurship, college graduation, and high family median incomes. For example, Asian Indians have higher labor force participation rates and percent employed as professionals or specialty occupations than the native born population of the United

States. Further, Asian Indians, Filipinos, Hong Kongese, and Taiwanese have median family incomes 30 percent higher than the native born population (Portes and Rumbaut 1996: 68, 78). Not all immigrants represent minority populations disadvantaged by class, education, and income. A different issue may be operating, namely the immigrants may have their own agendas.

RESEARCH PROCESS

My dialogical life story interviews follow a low intervention strategy permitting informants a high degree of freedom to explain details regarding their participation in community organizations, interaction within family life, and businesses cooperation. I chose these themes and constructed a survey guide around these social processes for the close alignment to research agendas on gender adaptation, ethnic economics, social networks, and social capital. This strategy follows the advice of William Foote Whyte (1984) who recommends a scale of intervention ranging from simple encouragement that you are listening and want the informant to continue, to probing with follow-up questions for themes introduced during the interview. Probing questions became the dialogic portion of my interview. As I became more fluent in Chaldean culture, I added cultural constructs to the interview schedule (see Appendix 2).

In collecting interviews, I made telephone calls to establish appointments and met each informant at locations they chose. Before they began their actual life story, I reviewed the consent form (see Appendix 1), and in most cases began the interview. All interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed. I also took notes in notebook as the interview progressed. To begin, I asked the respondent to explain their migration and

settlement history which they did so chronologically, from the time they or their parents migrated, migration motivations, social networks used in accomplishing, settlement, and education and work history. As they progressed through their life history, I referred to the survey guide to see if there were any unaddressed issues. When I left the field, I reviewed taken notes and began memo writing. Memo writing served for what Anselm Strauss (1987: 110) considers an internal dialogue. In this context, I took stock of emergent concepts and added these to the interview schedule. When appropriate, I asked probing questions in subsequent interviews to fill in details about new concepts. As new terms become better understood, I closed the topic. I also verified my understandings through social interaction in the community's social spaces.

SAMPLING

To create my interviewee sample, I used a snowball method. To garner a representative sample, I made contacts through multiple community organizations. I had attended Chaldean student organizations and social organizations that led me to networks of young adults at college and work. I met business women and men through the Chaldean-American Chamber of Commerce. I found immigrants through their political groups and churches. My informants, therefore, are pulled from many different organizations. To further enlarge this sample, I received referrals to key informants, and these respondents recommended informants not linked to community organizations.

The sample of fifty-one participants presented in Appendix 3.0 and Appendix 3.1. By gender, there are twenty-eight males and twenty-three females. By generation, there are thirty second-generation, fifteen first-generation, and six of different generational

status. While the class composition of the same seems skewed towards a professional middle class and middle class, in actually all of the immigrants began humbly. Only the second-generation of the second cohort actually started with middle class privilege.

CAUTION ON PSEUDONYMS

Social science research is conducted under the direction of a human subject review board. This body requires complete confidentiality of respondent information. As such, I use pseudonyms to protect the respondent. That is, I attribute quotes to people whose name I made-up. I did this to protect the confidentiality of the persons who actually participated in the study, even though many of these informants would prefer to stand behind their comments by being named. For surnames, I borrowed from the Chaldean Directory, a phone book published by the community for Chaldeans. The given name however is invented. For English first names, I drew on my own knowledge about male and female names. For Chaldean names, I borrowed these from Chaldeans I know. It is important to note that the surnames are not chosen for the village ancestry of the respondent.

DATA ANALYSIS

Life history/story data provides excellent details, but requires an analytic frame to render order to the information. In this study, the data pointed towards strong cooperation within families that facilitated migration and established small businesses. Several frameworks exist that provided a basis for organizing the data. One such approach includes the New Economics of Migration model of family solidarity (for a discussion

see Massey 1994). But the life history data did not support the findings of this perspective, as families engaged in family unit migration and there were significant age and gender hierarchies in all the forms of social cooperation.

Under these conditions, I opted for what Robert Connell (1987: 98) calls a structural inventory. A structural inventory of gender relations means that the researcher explores the arenas of power, economy, emotions and symbols in gender relations. Connell (1987) calls this the "gender regime" of the institution.

> "Any attempt to grasp the current moment in sexual politics, to define where we have got to, any attempt to characterize the gender relations of another culture or another time, likewise involves a structural inventory."

In coding the data along the lines suggested by Connell, I created an inventory of gender regimes for Chaldean institutions, and an inventory of the gender order of Iraqi society. For gender regimes, I looked at all four dimensions of gender relations of power, economy, symbols and emotions. For power, I looked at who held it within the family, community organizations and businesses. In terms of economy, informants discussed their normative expectation of breadwinner and caregiving roles. Symbolic and emotional structures generate insight into the meanings the community assigns to women's work, income and education. I also used secondary data sources with my life story data to evaluate the overall pattern of Iraqi social institutions. Was there evidence that Iraqi society had taken steps towards egalitarian gender standards in education, political representation, and access to work? How did Chaldeans live within their community institutions given the Iraqi gender order? And did Chaldean transport conservative gender relations to the United States? This data is presented in chapter 3 and chapter 4.

While I had expected Chaldeans to follow other immigrant groups and establish more egalitarian domestic politics, the data did not support this conclusion. The structuration model is good for understanding political transgression, but I find that social reproduction works better for following "meaning making" that supports the existing social order. Consequently, I used social fields and habitus to define the stakeholders involved and capital accumulated. The key symbolic capital is family honor that is presented in chapter 5.

CONCLUSION

The life story data provide details difficult to attain through positivist methods. In the case of Chaldeans, understanding how connective patriarchy shapes social interaction between men and women migrants and their children can only be understood by getting detailed knowledge about ideal marital partners, the dilemmas dating poses for girls, and the immense social connectivity within extended families. In fact, knowing that connective patriarchy is in play requires learning a great deal about the social group under study, this can not be imputed by geographic region alone. To follow the processes shaping gender relations also requires robust knowledge about the number of family members, surveillance in everyday life, and the meaning of family honor. Such knowledge is socially and culturally specific, and may vary by national origin and ethnicity depending on contextualizing factors, such as war, economic development of the country of origin, and migrant status. Chaldeans, therefore, may vary from other Iraqi ethnicities. They may be similar to different ethnicities from other countries. Only by

conducting a case study based on understanding the whole of Chaldean culture can such comparative analysis be made.

CHAPTER 3

MIGRATION: A CENTURY IN THE MAKING

This chapter presents a structural inventory of the Chaldean gender regime in the family and gender order of Iraqi society. In Arab society, kinship serves to organize familial social ties into hierarchal relations based on age and gender, what we call connective patriarchy. As family social ties are resource laden networks, some inertia exists in changing these structures towards egalitarian gender relations in the post-migration experience. But to analyze this proposition, it is paramount to first determine if normative and behavioral connective patriarchy had operated before migration. This question is addressed by looking at Chaldean migration through the prism of cohorts. Between the migration pulse of the first and second cohort, Iraqi society had changed sufficiently to challenge the notion of invariant social contexts. It is possible therefore for gender relations in society to have changed sufficiently to reorder gender regimes. Thus, it is an empirical matter and an issue resolved by using the structural inventory of gender relations. The second issue deals with the context of settlement. If gender relations had remained conservative, perhaps supporting persistent gender structures after migration which reconstituted connective patriarchy in Detroit. This too is an empirical issue taken up by examining social interaction between generations.

MIGRATION NETWORK THEORY AND THE GENDER ORDER

Increasingly, research demonstrates international movements occur between individuals linked in social networks, followed in the literature as transnationalism

because persons so connected remain socially sensitive to each other (Levitt 2001; Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992; Schiller and Fouron 1999; Schiller and Fouron 2001). Transnational migration arises for any number of reasons. And in understanding any particular group requires examining the specific social context that gives rise to their migration and the resources they utilize in their trek. As Steve Gold (2005: 259) writes, " ... migration is embedded in a series of political, ethnic, familial, and communal relationships and environments ... ." Viewing migration under these terms means paying attention to the varying conditions that pattern human agency. In cases of labor migration, receiving countries draft legislation aimed at controlling skill sets, gender, and family status of the desired migrant (Tyner 2003), and sending societies use migration as a tool for relieving political turmoil (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991). Whatever the unique sending and receiving factors in play, once in place, migration flows take on a life of their own from the actions of those linked in social networks, as they create a cultural of migration (Massey et al. 1993).

The network perspective accounts for migration capacity with the concept of social capital (Portes 1998). Social capital offers a means for accomplishing those things not possible in its absence (Coleman 1988). The beneficial quality of social capital tends to increase with use, actually increasing in value for those who remain attached. In part, this quality relates to the durable qualities of social capital bearing networks that are "... more or less institutionalized relations of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 119). Simply put, social ties operate to reinforce social sensitivities that lead group members to provide support to the construction of community institutions and practices (Light 1984; Portes 1987), to lend money for

starting businesses (Light and Gold 2000; Yoo 1998), to finance others' migration and to help them locate a place to live when settling in a new country (Faist 2000a; Faist 2000b). These ties know little of international boundaries, as measured by remittances, return vacations, and involvement in ongoing political affairs of the homeland (Castles and Miller 1998; Foner 1997; Maira 2002; Massey et al. 1998; Massey 1994).

In Arab societies, social ties and social networks are coterminous with family lineage. Andrew Shryock (2000: 577) writes that "... the entire political economy of the Arab world is shot through with family ties, and those ties extended beyond the region to influence the way global business networks, military alliances, and diplomatic elites operate." Philip Kayal (1973: 411) supports this contention and writes that "... Middle Easterners have effectively limited the boundaries of psycho-social identification and responsibility to those of the same family." This occurs to such an extent that family lineage operates as a status marker, and the family name remains an important source of ancestral knowledge that Middle Easterners used in gleaning details about a person's nativity, religious sect, political sensitivities, and personal background information regarding his education (Shryock 2000: 580). Among Chaldeans that information includes statements regarding family honor (Sengstock 1999).

Arab familism operates under the social organization of connective patriarchy that is age and gender stratified. The family household remains normatively and behaviorally patriarchal and extended. Thomas Stevenson (1997) documents families in the Yemen Central Highlands living in extended relationships in forty-five percent of the households. The nuclear family structure exists as a smaller proportion of all households. For Iraq, surveys show that nearly fifty percent of marriages are between first and second cousins

(Tierney 2003). These practices uphold the concept of narrow kin-based social networks with pro-social behavior limited to those in the lineage (Smith 2001).

Thomas Faist (2000b) provides an example of how migration networks operate in this geographic and cultural region. His review is based on a case study of a Turkish village done by Ulla-Britt Engelbrektsson (1978). Her study on Alihan villagers fits the Chaldean case in the way social ties are cultivated and extended to others. She finds that social ties begin specifically among a single ethnicity within the village, but over time had extended to others regardless of ethnicity or family lineage.

In short, Thomas Faist argues that these villagers began their migration careers from the resources gained by using *specific reciprocity* between kinsmen; over time this social capital had become *generalized* across ethnic lines drawing the entire village into migration. Simply put, social ties had become available to everyone in the town, while in other villages, immigration had remained limited to only a single lineage and thereby one ethnicity.

Why were social ties initially limited? Alihanean social networks had supported the notion of collective consciousness and supported solidarity among the ethnically homogenous because of extensive intermarriage between different lineages. Effectively, Alihaneans were of common ancestry. As a consequence, Alihan villagers operate as a community given their "moral obligation to extend practical assistance to those that emigrated" (Faist 2000b: 140 quoting Engelbrektsson 1978: 287).

The Chaldean case demonstrates multiple similarities with the Alihan villagers. Mary Sengstock (1999) estimates that the original Chaldean immigrants mostly came from the Village of Telkeppe. These pioneer immigrants and their children tend to view

kinship ties as thickly linked and express this normatively by offering aid to their fellow villagers. As an external motivation for restricting solidarity to their own ethnicity, Chaldeans have lived as a minority in Iraq. Religion, language and cultural distinctions set Chaldeans apart from the Muslim majority from which they received differential and unequal treatment (see Wirth 1945 for definition of minority group). Given specific reciprocity among kin and minority status, my informants spoke of few solidaristic ties with other Iraqi minorities, as with Kurds or even other Christian groups. As a result, immigration from Iraq springs from narrow social networks among kinship members tending to be of the same origin village, at least among the first and second cohorts.

Another development in migration research with relevance to the Chaldean case deals with globalization. While women have always been in migration flows and a majority in many cases (Gabaccia 1994), researchers tend to forget that manufacturing pulls women into the labor market and operates as an explanation for women's migration (Sassen 2003). But for the Arab region, this position needs further consideration. Nana Oishi's (2005: 14) study of foreign direct investment and migration in South Asia leads her to conclude that gender norms play a determining role in the gender composition of migration. Her work differs from sex role theory that predicts women migrate less given that they are tied to domestic work in their own homes (see Hondagneu-Sotelo and Cranford 1999). She finds a paradox between economic need and unemployment, both prime motivators of immigration, and the scant levels of women's labor migration from Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The key issue remains legitimacy. From society's perspective, women's employment challenges family honor. While export processing zones have led to the

expansion of women's employment and acceptance of women's work, the kinds of international employment open to low-income workers (domestic maids and entertainers) are not seen as *shal kaaj* or pure work (Oishi 2005: 166). As such, women do not have networks or legitimacy for migrating abroad. Such developments take place only after sustained contact between women and work as in the Philippines. And even then, domestic relations remain extremely conservative (Parreñas 2005).

The social context of South Asia and the Arab region suggests that social ties are somewhat circumspect. As this review shows, the Arab region maintains distinctive cultural practices regarding family life and family structure. As explained in the theory chapter, family life is imbued with gender and age relationality that Suad Joseph (1999b) calls connective patriarchy. In practice, Telkeppes had extended social ties extensively among themselves and had become the dominant village origin in Detroit. As other notable villages exist, the data demonstrates that narrow and exclusive social ties were in operation. A further deduction can be made in asserting that men dominated immigration initiatives for their families given the gender order of Arab and South Asian societies. Additionally, Chaldeans share in common with other immigrant and refugee groups sequential cohort arrivals.

IMMIGRANT COHORTS

Successive migration cohorts have supplied resources in helping subsequent migrants settle. In following this among Cubans, Alejandro Portes (1987) identifies successive Cuban migration waves had provided the conditions for the development of an ethnic enclave economy, dense residential settlement in proximity to business networks

tied together horizontally and vertically to generate positive economic effects (see Light and Gold 2000: 11-15). Similarly, Eastern Jewish immigrants had relied on the aid of German Jews (Kasinitz 2008). In working together, the New York City's Jewish community had consolidated an ethnic economy in the textile industry. From 1899 to 1914 nearly 400,000 workers were employed in this sector of the economy (Gold and Phillips 1996).

Chaldeans, too, benefit from the process of proximal host. To some extent, Lebanese business owners and the Maron Church had provided some assistance. But this was short lived because the pioneers built their own community institutions. The founding of the Chaldean Rite Catholic Church under the direction of Reverend Thomas Bidawid at Second and Euclid provided the community a site for focusing their spiritual and social life (Sengstock 1999: 29). And grocery store ownership had been established to economically support the extended family.

The actions taken by the first cohort had proven to be significant for those to follow. These choices set the stage when Congress reformed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1924 (or Johnson Reed Act) that had limited Iraqi migration to only 100 entrants. The community's population growth had accelerated when quotas were removed and political turmoil began abroad in Iraq, and had grown by more than five fold between 1952 and 1967, and four fold again by 1978 (Sengstock 1999). Thus, a forty year hiatus broke with a second cohort flood under which the social and economic patterns of settlement were set by the pioneer cohort making it possible to retain normative and behavioral connective patriarchy. Businesses had existed to support men in employment, and social institutions reinforced a traditional normative framework.

CHALDEAN COHORTS

The gender adaption and migration literature makes a theoretical distinction that pre-migration contexts have import for men and women's experiences during settlement. I have linked this position with the concept of gender order. Gender order provides a general direction that gender regimes tend to follow. Given that women have high employment rates in the United States, there have been some parallel changes in the gender order. For example, Congress provides tax deductions for daycare, and has passed the Family Medical Leave Act. While infinitesimal steps, these are parallel and supportive of egalitarian gender relations in the family.

For the Arab region, the gender order supports social familism and the patriarchal extended family, a complementary condition between order and regime. Thus two questions present themselves. Did Chaldeans experience gender relations changes due to economic and political policies prior to migration? And does the new gender order of the United States unravel connective patriarchy, if it was ever established?

The Chaldean immigrants represent three distinct cohorts, which relate to multiple differences in aspects of their migration motives, settlement experiences and changes in Iraq's gender order. Among those immigrants coming before and during the 1950s, they left an undeveloped country. The principle reason for leaving relates to the demographic pressures on the village of Telkeppe and dire economic conditions. The dominant gender order of Iraq for the initial cohort provided few outlets for women. Among Chaldeans, the structural inventory reveals that women married at an early marriage and lived a domestic life. The gender regimes of business and education operated as sex segregated institutions structuring male and female opportunities differently.

The group coming in the 1960s until the 1980s left a country in political crisis and undergoing national development under increasingly Arab auspices. Basically, the Baath Party had sought to change minority identities, as with Kurds and Chaldeans, into Arab and Iraqi national identities. Further, areas without Arab majorities had been transformed by forced population movements.

Political crisis and identity assaults mark the basic reasons this cohort left Iraq. The gender order of Iraqi society changes during this period. The state had taken measures to modernize society by changing women's status. Positive gains included women marrying later, attending primary and secondary school, graduating from university, and a growing number working outside the home. These changes are uneven. Among Chaldeans, multiple trends exist. Middle class women expected an education and potential employment during their lifetimes. For other women, feminine identities revolve around patriarchal family.

The third cohort is composed of Chaldeans leaving since the end of the first Gulf War. This group departs Iraq under conditions of extreme deprivation following years of war with Iran, United Nations' sanctions, and ongoing security and economic crises. Further, under these trying times, the gender order of Iraqi society has regressed. Honor killings have reemerged, occupying headline news among the Muslim majority. Chaldeans do not report honor killings, still women's overall condition has suffered.

Each of these cohorts had faced different social, political and economic contexts that had shaped their Iraqi gender order. The social forces of disparagement and economic and existential insecurity frame the motivations for their exit. In the proceeding sections, the social context for exit is presented for the first two cohorts. For each group,

the term immigrant means a person who migrated at an adult age. For those over the age of twelve years, I denote them as one-and-a-half as they have had more contact with United States society than adult immigrants. Some of these children have been educated in primary and secondary Detroit schools. Iraqi born children who had migrated as toddlers or younger are referred to as one-and-three-quarter. These children are close to being reared entirely in the United States, but may have different developmental experiences. The second-generation refers to any individual born in the United States of either cohort. In the section dealing specifically with the first cohort, the second-generation refers to the children born of the first cohort. Typically these are older men and women, and are either working or retired. Similarly, the second-generation of the second cohort means the children of immigrants. Their parents had migrated during the 1960s and 1970s leaving Iraq given the political turmoil. These are younger men and women who are just beginning their adult status.

POLTICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT: THE FIRST COHORT

"My uncle just knew he had to go somewhere, because they were dirt poor. I mean it was absolutely terrible." This is a common explanation for the migration motive among the first cohort. Iraqi policies and the failure of the Ottoman Empire to bring economic development to this area made it a necessity to leave.

Micaeli di Leonardo's (1984) discussion of Southern Italians applies to the Chaldean case. Much the same as Italian peasants, state policy had disadvantaged Chaldeans. By withdrawing resources from rural areas, the Iraqi state had sought to maximize urban development in Baghdad (Tripp 2000: 69). Chaldeans had been further

victimized by differential tax treatment, paying five to six times that charged to Muslim cultivators (Lukitz 1995: 31-32). And as the global depression of the 1930s arrived, state policy and global economic processes had pauperized the Christian population (Lukitz 1995: 31). Migration theories often posit economic need as a prime motivator for international movement.

For this cohort, migration was a perilous journey. Bill Hermiz, a one-and-a-half immigrant himself, talks about his uncle who had migrated during the timeframe of the first cohort. Bill's uncle started in Mexico where he supported himself by reselling clothing before coming to Detroit. Other migrants followed similar pathways. In one case, a man had spent twenty years separated from his extended family, as he peddled wares across the Canadian frontier. He had played an important role in settling the Chaldean community in Detroit, by soliciting sojourner migration among several men from Telkeppe families.

As another motive, Chaldeans had left Iraq because nationalist education policies had closed minority schools (see Article 28 of the 1930 Public Education Law). This law "... (had) deprive(d) 125,000 Christian children (of) their communal schools" (Lukitz 1995: 28). By 1939, the state had direct control over all private schools, with the power to shutter any school that undermines national unity (see Lukitz 1995: 120; Simon 1986, for further discussion of public education reform).

Both economic and educational policies had placed Christians at a disadvantage during this time period. Beyond these issues, nation building had figured notably in the fates of Iraq's national minority populations. As the British Colonial Office and Iraq's monarchy sought to strengthen national identification, the multiple minority peoples of

the nation had lost recognition for political autonomy (Lukitz 1995: 30-32). As a result of their minority status, Chaldeans had to undertake migration. Personal security plays a role here in their motives. As Bill explains, "You know, just being Christian at that time was difficult. My uncle, my *mother's brother*, was physically thrown off a train and killed by another soldier strictly because we worshiped a Jew by the name of Jesus Christ."

This history documents three major forces driving Chaldean migration for the first cohort: economic, security, and identity. In studying ethnicity, sociology places these as notable conditions for fostering reactive solidarity, a form of social capital. Like the Alihaneans, Chaldeans use social ties, as regulated by connective patriarchy, in effecting migration. And kinship sensitivities remain a part of even the Americanized immigrant's sensitivities that are quoted above.

SOCIAL TIES, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND PATRIARCHY

Social ties had meant everything for the first cohort in getting to the Americas. Migration sponsorship, first job, and business loans had flown from their kin to make their migration journey possible. These ties had generated social capital while simultaneously accruing in the context of relational kinship statuses. In the above quote, Bill Hermiz refers to his uncle as his *mother's brother*. This is a particularly noteworthy comment coming from a highly Americanized immigrant with fifty years experience living in the United States. Mother's brother (or khal) are men extending kindness and support in their relations to their sisters' children (Joseph 1999a).

Within connective patriarchy, Chaldeans expect social and economic support from heads-of-household. Thus, older men hold legitimacy to call the shots in business or

expect privileges at home. Both Mary Sengstock (1999) and Qais Al-Nouri (1964) provide quotes that women had upheld their status in the patriarchal bargain as caregivers and homemakers. Children contribute to the bargain by working in family stores. Like previous research on the community, my informants basically called family relationships "... very *patriarchal*, and whatever the father said was normally done."

In operation, connective patriarchy had meant that most Chaldeans depended on relationships between men. Bill Hermiz recalls that his father's brother had sponsored his father. In return, his father had worked for my informant's uncle to learn the retail trade until he had opened his own business. That business had supported my informant's family, and had drawn on his and his siblings' labor. Further, migrant men had made it their moral obligation to support their patriarchs (that is their fathers) isolated by language or left unproductive by age.

For women, the same kinship networks existed. What differs is their gender status. In the first cohort, women had married young, many in their middle teen or younger years. Parents had provided dowries when the marriage had not been between cousins. Further, girls' schooling remained nominal relative to boys.

Following migration, it is understandable that women were somewhat isolated from the public realm. Not knowing English had deepened their dependence on their husbands. In explaining her mother's situation, Terry Kashat, a second-generation informant with first cohort parents, spoke of the "... *few women* (who had) started taking English classes at night." The majority, she concluded, had found Neo-Soureth suitable for caregiving, and did not learn to drive a car.

For the second-generation, connective patriarchy had worked as a constraint in every detail of their lives. Even the pull of American youth culture (Whyte 1992) did not unmoor Chaldean prohibitions regarding dating and dances. For Terry, she relied on patriarchal protection to attend a school dance. "I really had to beg my father, in order to attend my high school prom. And he only let me go because my cousin was going to double with me."

Further connective patriarchy interacts with additional male migration. As Terry's *father's brothers* migrated to the United States, they had made demands that she and her sisters should live more conventionally. For Julia (Terry's sister), "My father's brothers (had migrated) from Telkaif, and as my father was the youngest, all the strict village traditions (had been) thrown right back on me." Attempts to arrange marriage and terminate education goals had been their demands. As this demonstrates, connective kinship obligations continuously renewed migration networks, which in turn revitalized connective patriarchy.

While the dimension of power and economics are easily documented here, evidence emerges showing the gender structures of symbols and emotions. For example, women's role as caregivers are recognized and supported within community institutions as a basic value. The Chaldeans American Ladies of Charity acknowledges outstanding women who are nominated for the Guardian Angel award. Bestowing the award is based on community service. Kayla Facho, a second-generation woman (in her mid-thirties) explains that her grandmother earned this award from her charity work.

> My grandma did numerous things for the community. She would visit senior citizens at nursing homes and pray with them. She would sew for them. She was

one of the few women in her age group that drove; so she gave several women transportation to church. And she started her own prayer group.

While men give to the community as well, their contributions follow masculine expectations. Chaldean men raised money to build or to rent infrastructure for the community's many social organizations, such as the churches, community center, and social clubs. Thus, men and women are symbolically coded and rewarded differently. In this case, women's symbolic rewards support complementary gender relations.

For the first cohort, the structural inventory includes male breadwinning, social capital controlled by men, and intact connective patriarchy after settlement. Using the structure of gender relations model, Chaldean men predominate in the areas of power, economy, and symbols. From the late 1930s, until the middle of the 1950s their second-generation is embedded in the gender regimes of the Chaldean community organized around gender relations marked by patriarchal dominance in all areas of gender structures. For the first cohort women, interactions between the gender order of the United States and the gender regimes of the community are present, but limited and not ubiquitous. For the second generation, the community shelters its girls from the dominant society. In summary, the data does not support a parallel trend in gender relations between the gender order of the United States and the gender regimes of the community or Chaldean family.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT: THE SECOND COHORT

The reason the second wave got out of Iraq, was not because of the magnet power of American wealth. The majority of the second wave was *better off monetarily* in

> Iraq. So, they had to leave because their children were of military age or because of background discrimination. Which was not very public, but it is there all the time. The Nationalist Arab movement, the Baath, had encouraged [these negative feelings between ethnic groups]. ... And after 1963, Abd al-Salam Arif, who ruled Iraq for about seven or eight years, declared in one of his speeches, "There will be no John and Johnny in Iraq any more. There will only be Mohammad and Ali." The names John and Johnny are pretend Christians, because they are Christian names, like western names. Mohammad and Ali are other people, Muslim people. So in a public speech, he is saying that. So there is a lot of pressure on Christians to get out. (Nemir Romayah, second cohort male, age 50s).

This quote catches the horns of a dilemma. While most second cohort informants discuss political and security concerns as the prime motive for their migration, more than a few immigrants recall that they or their parents choose to stay in Iraq during the critical years leading up to the war with Iran. In staying put, these Chaldeans had offered explanations ranging from status inconsistency, lost wealth and income, lost language proficiency, and most importantly the inability to function as patriarchs.

Those who stayed had taken advantage of Iraq's economic development as it unfolded during the 1960s and after nationalization of the nation's oil fields in the 1970s. Chaldeans had been uniquely positioned to capture oil dollars in service businesses. For example, Islamic rules forbid Muslims to sell liquor. As Christians, Chaldeans faced no legal or religious restrictions in service businesses open to them. Secondly, many Chaldean families had encouraged their sons to attend university. As a result, several

Chaldeans had become qualified professionals in banking, accounting, and engineering. As Jim Esso, second cohort immigrant explains:

> From 1968 to 1979, the country was fairly prosperous. There was a lot of work, contracts, the oil had been nationalized, and profit from oil production was coming back to rebuild the country. So there was a lot of promise and hope.

As a result of these conditions, Chaldeans speak of these times as financially viable. A second cohort male had explained it in terms of the currency exchange. During this time, the dinar (Iraqi currency) had been three times the value of the United States Dollar. Nedhal Habboo, a third cohort immigrant women, recalls that her father visited Detroit in the 1970s "... to check out the scene; he had decided that life in Iraq was much better financially."

That promise had ended in 1980 when Saddam Hussein crashed Iraq's future by waging war on Iran. As my informants explain, no family escaped the war, and nearly everyone lost kin. For those fortunate enough to survive, the war still had brought economic problems and had made physical security a major concern. A third cohort immigrant woman recalls that intense attacks on Basra had sent her family to the desert in search of safety. They eventually returned north to the Mosel area where Chaldeans have many villages and enclaves in northern cities like Mosul.

While economic inertia provides one explanation for not migrating, another factor had operated as well. From the interviews, two themes emerge. The first is inter-family status. Most immigrants did not speak of simple status inconstancy, as in having to drive a taxi in Detroit when they had been a professional in Iraq. Rather, Chaldeans had felt significant community pressure. Most migrants had anticipated that their lack of English

proficiency and circumscribed social networks would erode their status within their community of peers. Thus, Iraqi Chaldeans and American Chaldeans had harbored ambiguous feelings towards each other. In one case, a university trained second-cohort immigrant had been chastised for not mopping a store floor correctly, and he had conveyed his feelings regarding such as an insult. Qais al-Nouri (1964) writes about inter-community strife between the older and newer immigrants from his field work as well.

The second factor relates to being able to support a family solely by male earnings. Chaldeans did not see this as possible. Nadhal Habboo summarizes the confluence of mixed motives shaping ambiguous migration motives during this period.

> Although being in Detroit might have promised them greater economic prosperity, they (had) noticed that they would not be able to practice the same professions. So they would have to go into the store business. In my father's case, he would have joined his brothers in their store business and would have stayed away from (his profession) which was his career. And he (had) considered this as a kind of *degradation*, or going down a step in profession; even though it might have promised his family a better future. So he decided to go back to Iraq, and we are talking the 1970s which was for the Arab world a period of oil boom ... Things were going very well economically for Iraq. Although he was *not making* a great salary he was easily able to *support* his family. And he was just comfortable in Iraq; he could speak his first language. English would have been a great barrier for him. So he would have had to abandon his profession, his fame, and his good (professional) reputation there. They didn't speak enough Chaldean.

So they were estranged from both communities in the United States, both the American and Chaldean.

As this narrative makes clear, potential migrants had debated risk associated with staying versus conditions in Detroit. Inter-community status and status inconsistency had been a factor in the decision making. In part, this point shows clearly that Chaldeans had considered their economic and social fates in the United States as tied to opportunities established by their extended family. This suggests that Chaldeans depended on social capital from their social ties within the community. Secondly, as the above informant makes clear, maintaining head-of-household status had been an important consideration. This finding is similar to men in the Dominican and Hmong communities, who prefer return migration (or at least mention it) over permanent settlement with lost gender status (Espiritu 2003a; Pessar 1986).

Although some of the informants had explained why they or other family members choose to remain in Iraq, the overwhelming majority had chosen to leave. For these informants, the society had become intolerable given the emerging totalitarianism, internal warfare, and identity threats from Arabization campaigns. They simply had known that remaining in Iraq was not an option.

From Abd al-Karim Qasim, the leader of the 1958 Revolution that ended Iraq's monarchy period, through 1973 and the Algiers Agreement, Iraq's political regimes had sought to undermine Kurdish autonomy. The entire period can be read as attempts to pacify separatist aspirations through force, phony negotiations, and forced population movements. The principle aim had been to gain control over the Kirkuk region, which is

located in Northern Iraq and is an oil rich region (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001; Human Rights Watch 2003b: 8; Jawad 1981). Chaldean villages are located in northern Iraq and are in proximity to these contested areas. As a result, whatever happened militarily to the Kurds, had repercussions on the Chaldeans living in the villages or the major cities where Arabization campaigns took place.

Bassam Gumma, a second-cohort migrant male, relates the following account. He describes security concerns as one of the prime motives for Chaldean migration during this period. At this time Detroit offered a supportive community and safety.

> Back in the beginning of 1970, I became a teacher. For my first four years of teaching, I was in the middle of a civil war. The Kurdish uprising had a huge impact because geographically the Chaldean towns and villages were in the middle of the conflict. And many of those towns were bombed. So I can tell you the biggest factor in Chaldean lives in Iraq was what happened between 1961 until now.

Establishing Arab hegemony over the oil rich areas had marked a long period of military action and political machination. Through the 1980s, military actions had included the gas attack on Halabja and the ethnic purges during the Anfal campaign. Chaldean villagers were affected in terms of security concerns, and sought refuge in cities and migration.

Beyond insecurity in the north, informants speak of their experiences in terms of surveillance. Chaldeans had seen the Baathist party establish a link between the security apparatus of the state and political recruitment. As Fawzi Younan, second cohort male, explains, the Baathist had attached itself to collage campuses.

> And the same things happen in the colleges. I had so many friends that the Baathist used to call and ask them to join the party. And for any reason, if you say no, then they either beat you up, or they would call the secret police to take you away in handcuffs. From there, they take you to a processing center. Now who knows about you? Not even God. Not even God knows where you're at. And if your family were to go to the secret police or to the other government offices and ask about you; then they would say 'We don't know. Sorry, we have not heard of this person.'

As Fawzi explains, denying the Baath political allegiance carried great risk. This narrative is not a lonely account. Many Chaldeans left Iraq for the well-founded fear of political persecution. While the stories vary, escape from violence serves as the cause for Chaldean exit (see Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989 for discussion of political refugees). Some of those leaving were newspaper writers and editors. Others were simply politically active.

A similar account about the fear of Baathist incursion on social life is expressed in the following account. In his life history, Nemir Romayah's family protects their son from possible military conscription by sending him out of the country. His own precocious appetite for political discussion perhaps aided his parents' decision to send him abroad.

> So, I left in the late 60s. Basically my family was afraid because I was kind of active. And so they arranged for me to leave the country, and go for study. It wasn't life threatening or things like that. But they were afraid of what was going to happen. I was getting into the age of the army, which is 18. And the army in

> that era was a very bad place to be. You know, because there were a lot of wars and stuff like that. So I left. And when I left Iraq, I got very much involved in Iraqi politics, human rights issues, and defending Iraqi rights. (I was) working for democracy, and trying to build democracy in Iraq. Basically, after that I could not go back. I could not go home. I was opposing the regime at that time. And the Iraqi state, through the Mohabrat, secret police, and the embassies all over the world were against me and people that dissented. I was in England and they took my passport away to force me to go back to Iraq. So they could erase me.

These exit narratives share in common the palpable fear emerging from 1963 through to the beginning of the war with Iran. The civic life of Iraq was strangled by the Baathists. In order to political power, the party increasingly used surveillance over Iraqis (see Makiya 1989).

Beyond major conflicts and the police state, Chaldeans also cite ethnic disparagement as a reason for leaving. For some, the society developed under a totalitarian model without tolerance for ethnic diversity. Jim Esso explains how he felt Christianity was threatened.

> In 1968 when I finished at the university, the Baath Party came to power. Saddam Hussein's regime had come to power. They basically had closed the Jesuit Schools, Baghdad College, al-Eckma that was the name of the university, and basically all Christian schools. There were many Christian schools in Iraq run by the Chaldean sisters. And, the rationale and reasoning you know, it wasn't always spoken, was that this was not compatible with the philosophy of the Baath party. Private education was not compatible with the philosophy of the Baath Party.

> They wanted to educated people a certain way. With that, any hope of mine going back at one time, idealistic notions going back and serving, became very difficult. And the family started making plans to come over. So my family came over in 1973 that was my father, mother, and siblings. I had one that remained behind and got married. But eventually he came and he immigrated in 1978.

For Jim Esso's family, the problem had not been a stated concern for security, or having a well-founded fear. Rather, his family considered the possibly of remaining Chaldean in a society intolerant to ethnic diversity problematic.

During the 1960s, Human Rights Watch (1995) documents that Iraq engaged in identity cleansing. As an example, a Chaldean solider had ceased to be ethnic when the state relabeled him as Arab. Nemir Romayah explains the same process.

> I was in England when the census started in 67 or 68, I can't remember. Being Iraqi, I got excited. So I went to the center and I filled twenty forms. And under race, I put Chaldean. I went to the stupid officer sitting there, somebody with a high school degree; and he said, "What is this? What is Chaldean?" He throws the thing in my face; and he says, "Go put Arabic." There is no Chaldean in Iraq. That is a personal thing, and that is what happened to the community. Eventually, a lot of Christian and Chaldeans left Iraq because of this discrimination.

As these accounts make clear, Baathist policies encroached upon education, politics, and social life. Living in Iraq meant staying in a society that was intolerant of diversity.

Given these exit narratives, it is clear that Chaldeans saw migration as a one-way street. In migrating, the second cohort had understood return migration had little possibility. To the extent that transnational social ties operated, Chaldeans had focused on

relatives stranded by immigration delays in countries of first asylum, as with: Jordan, Italy, Greece and Spain. Thus, permanent settlement for the second cohort and those making up the initial third cohort had become the only option. There is little reason to believe that this trend will reverse. At the time of this writing, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates approximately two million Iraqi refugees. As a result, Chaldean migration is defined as family unit migration (that is the whole families migrated), permanent, and dependent on social ties and networks between family members.

SOCIAL TIES, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND PATRIARCHY

> The hospitality business, and the restaurant business in Iraq, was run by the Christians for a reason. The Muslims were not granted by law, a liquor license. It is against their religion. So, that actually opened a window to the Christians, and mainly the Chaldeans got into that. And the country's economy was improving a lot. So that business flourished (Nemir Romayah, second cohort immigrant male).

This respondent explains what Ivan Light and Carolyn Rosenstein (1995) call supply side effects in entrepreneurship. Supply effects occur when a group is more able to provide a good or service relative to some other ethnic group in society. Because Iraqi society had placed restrictions on Muslims, Christians had become the nation's hospitality business owners. This adaptation dates back several decades.

Desmond Stewart and John Haylock (1956: 58) had identified Chaldeans as restaurant and hotel owners in Baghdad in the late 1940s. George Harris (1958: 4)

identifies class heterogeneity within the community ranging from lower to higher occupational prestige. Harris (1958) recognizes that Chaldeans were disproportionate to their numbers when examining occupations associated with Europeans. They were domestics, servers at restaurants, assistants on archeological sites, and dealers of antiquities (Harris 1958: 4). As these authors confirm, Chaldeans had established their own businesses at a rate disproportional to their numbers. This condition meets what sociologists call ethnic economics and ethnic niches (Waldinger 1996; Zhou 1992).

As a social institution, the Chaldean ethnic economy relies extensively on kinship ties. As with the first cohort, these networks had been embedded in gendered practices. For example, Ayman Jiddou, a second cohort immigrant, had explained that his father, born in Telkeppe, had migrated successively from Telkeppe to Mosul in 1945, then to Baghdad in 1952. When his father had left Baghdad, he had relied on a brother to assume the Mosul business. In this case, specific reciprocity operates within the lineage; help is extended within the psycho-social limits of the family. In a similar case, an inter-generational lineage tie had led an informant to stay and maintain a family business holding during the Iraq-Iran War. When things proved untenable, he had migrated to Detroit, and his father had established him in another business. As his experience demonstrates, men follow this pattern of social cooperation in both Iraq and Detroit in building business assets.

The reliance on male networks had carried a burden for Chaldean men, especially among the second cohort. These men had taken advantage of educational opportunities in Iraq and the West. Some had travelled to England and others to the United States for graduate study in engineering and other fields. Their major burden had not been simple

status inconsistency, where occupational prestige is jeopardized by linguistic isolation or credentials mismatch. Rather, Chaldean men had remained important, as breadwinners for their families. Consequently, immigration had depended on them accepting an economic adaption which could support the extended family.

Jim Esso, a second cohort immigrant with graduate training as an engineer, had left his chosen field, and delayed marriage to carry out his obligation to his family of origin. Similarly, Yasmeen Hakim, a second generation female, explains that her father left his career to support his extended family

> [My father] is a civil engineer by trade. And he worked [for a manufacturing firm] for about maybe three to four years before he realized that working for a company wasn't going to suit him financially. [When his several] brothers and sisters came from Iraq, he had opened a party store. My father is very educated and an interesting man, and should never have been behind the "cage."

Stores had offered a means to sponsor siblings and parents to the United States because the businesses had provided jobs and income to immigrants. These cases point towards connective patriarchy through the sacrifices men made in helping their families migrate to the United States.

Similar to the first cohort, women had relied extensively on male networks. While women had played roles in facilitating migration, most women had their migration sponsored by relatives or came in family unit migration. Beatrice Denja, a second generation female, had explained that her mother had migrated to the United States by herself. Upon arriving, she had lived with her aunt. She had understood, being the eldest, that her earned income was to support her family of origin when they arrived in the

United States. Thus, very much like the men, women had supported their fathers and their siblings.

But noticeable changes exist in terms of gender status for Chaldean women in this cohort. While it remained that some Chaldean women married as teen brides and had little educational experience, others had gained some education and professional experience. This trend had reflected a change in the Iraqi gender order.

Gender relations had begun to change with personal status reforms. Personal status laws pertain to rights to divorce, age of marriage, inheritance, and child custody. Amal al-Sharqi (1982) writes that Iraq had changed these laws in 1978. Further, al-Sharqi states that the Baathist had sought to expanded women's participation in education. To do so, public education had been made free at all grade levels in 1974. This new policy had sought to eliminate parental social practices of favoring boys over girls when it came to education. This policy initiative had expanded by the 1979 school year when the government had mandated compulsorily education for all Iraqi children. As a result, the number of girls in primary education improved from 29 percent of the student body in 1970 to 45 percent in 1979. In the same period, women represented 31 percent of the university students. Educational gains had worked to increase women's representation in employment, and 19 percent of the non-agricultural workforce had been female (Al-Sharqi 1982). On the face of it, the gender order of Iraq seems radically changed.

An important research study provides us a test of resource theory. Qais al-Nouri (1993) had studied domestic decision making among rural women. Al-Nouri finds that urbanization had made a significant impact on eroding traditional family structure. In principle, removing kinship obligations offers one means for women to balance domestic

power. However, al-Nouri finds this to be a mixed blessing. Instead of a feminist realization, young wives had lost contact with their extended family resulting in less emotional and material support. These women had been handed the double burden of access to work, while losing care resources. Secondly, women's status within families had changed very little. As al-Nouri (1993) states, "Conjugal life ... has not been seriously disrupted despite a growing imbalance between old and new norms governing spouses relationships." Similarly, al-Nouri notes that career women, generally older and unmarried, are subject to "gossip and criticism." While expanded rights to education and work, women's relations with men in the household had remained conventional.

Among Chaldean women that migrated in the 1960s, their second-generation daughters had not recounted educational or occupational gains by their mothers. They simply had stated that their mothers were housekeepers. In part, these accounts reflect the marital practices of Chaldean men who returned to Iraq and arranged marriages to younger women, teens in some cases during the 1960s. In other instances, young immigrant women chose to work at a family store and had followed a marital path without thought of further career or educational goals. Either through arranged marriage or opting for marriage, these women chose to be caregiving wives and mothers.

But there were changes. A few of the immigrant women had earned high school and university degrees either in Iraq or in the Detroit metro area. Even among this group, fathers and husbands had dictated where some of these women could work. A few actually had combined career and family in ways consistent with the similar unequal domestic responsibilities borne by women, but with acceptance of American standards of personal freedoms and choice in working and career.

In any event, the structural inventory remains consistent with men organizing migration and economic adaptation. By taking the role of patriarch, the men had gained important symbolic and emotional recognition that legitimates their privileged position with the family. Most Chaldeans speak lovingly of their fathers and all the things these men have sacrificed on their behalf. Given the loss in professional status and the cost to their patriarchal privilege by coming to the United States, it is understandable that men had been fully vested in the symbolic and emotional structures of gender relations.

THIRD COHORT

The end of the 1970s seemed pivotal in terms of greater status and freedoms for Iraqi women. However, fortunes turned for the worse. What followed end progressive social reforms. And women's gains have faltered in terms of education and occupation.

These changes related to maintaining control over the country following the first Gulf War. Saddam Hussein had relied on conservative religious and tribal groups to consolidate his power. Under this new regime, previous legal gains granted to protect women's rights had been lost, leading to an increase in honor killings throughout the nation. Under presidential decree, "a male defendant accused of murder or assault of a female relative may plead as a defense that he was motivated by a real or perceived breach of family honor" (Human Rights Watch 2003a). Additionally, the paralyzed economy has left universal education derelict due to the lack of funds. In response, Iraqis have chosen to educate their boys over girls. Once again the gender gap has increased in terms of education.

For Chaldean women, the life histories support some of these larger generalizations, but not honor killings. Nadhal Habboo, a third cohort immigrant, recalls with regards to her own motivations in leaving is that things got worse after the Iran-Iraq War.

> I guess it depends on the social class. Both my father and mom's families had working women in them. In fact, all my aunts are working women, and my mom. In terms of social mobility and freedom for the women in the 60s and 70s it was a lot better than during my generation or my sister's generation during the 80s. In terms of the way they could dress outside of the house, the kind of options they had for working, or interaction with other people, they had freedom. It is not that every generation had those freedoms. Rather the particular social class they belonged, with them being Christian, and often times being within the community being equated as being more westernized helped Chaldean women a great deal.

In summary, war and sanctions undermined potential gains for women in Iraq related to development. Taken together, gender developments have not borne out significant gains for women making the gender order of Iraq in the complementary or conflict state by 2005.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed many of the details for why Chaldeans left Iraq. Economic, political and cultural discrimination had force the migrants abroad. Further, these reactive conditions had cemented specific reciprocity. The gendered obligations of connective patriarchy had placed men in charge of migration. In terms of settlement, men

had maintained their breadwinning role. While women had contributed, their primary role had remained as homemakers. This gender division of labor results in Chaldean men receiving symbolical and emotional validation for their work. Women's work and sacrifices receive recognition more for their homemaking activities.

For the first cohort, the data points towards women being subsumed by family and community. Even as the first second-generation had struggled with the traditional gender relations of their parents, additional family members (from the second cohort) had added to the overall lineage, making for age demands upon younger brothers to uphold conservative norms, showing that connective patriarchy still operated within the second-cohort and could be extended to the first cohort by the authority of older men.

The incoming second cohort had left Iraq prior to significant changes in the gender order. Any advances for women had been uneven, with middle class women receiving the lion's share of expanded opportunities into the late 1970s. And once in the United States, the small producer economy had set a pattern of male breadwinning and social institutions had provided ample opportunity to recreate gender within community space.

As the data shows, Chaldeans had been their own proximal host with the unintended consequence of upholding connective patriarchy from the beginning to the end of the twentieth century. This case differs from German and Eastern Jews, as Chaldeans became influenced socially by the new wave of migration. Still the economic success of the group made all of this possible, otherwise the economic and social resources might have led to a different gender trajectory.

CHAPTER 4

EMOTIONAL AND SYMBOLIC STRUCTURES OF GENDER RELATIONS

> I have found that a lot of the girls were still having that double standard with school, work, and going out. A lot of girls can't tell their parents that they are going out. If they go anywhere, then their brothers have to be with them. Actually one of my friends right now, her sister-in-law has never worked a day in her life and has never gone anywhere without somebody in her family. Now that she is married, she actually has more freedom, than she did when she was living at home. She didn't go to [college]. She did high school and that was it (Kayla Facho, second-generation informant).

This study did not expect to find strong prohibitions against young women's education, dating, and work into the second-generation of the second cohort. These double standards, while shifting in their nature, have remained in place for nearly a half-century. This is an odd finding which requires an explanation. A dominant perspective on migrant adaptation, assimilation theory, holds that all immigrant groups undergo structural and cultural integration with the dominant society and lose their distinctive ethnic practices in family life and interaction styles (Alba and Nee 2003). In the Chaldean community, the prolonged double standard suggests that the family gender regime is embedded in gender norms resistant to assimilative pressure. In part, this stems from their economic success as merchants. As reported by the Chaldean American Chamber of Commerce, nearly seventy percent of Chaldeans own a business and the community's

median family income is $96,100 (2008). So while assimilation obviously occurs, the tried-and-true method of being Chaldean has tremendous value. To ferret out what assimilation theory misses, I examine the family from the perspective of gender structures. I will examine in particular emotional and symbolic features.

ISSUE OF FAMILY STRUCTURE

To understand the Chaldean family requires examining its social organization and cultural meanings. As a minority group, Chaldeans follow the dominant kinship pattern of Iraq, which is also endemic to Asia. Thus, many different Asian national and minority peoples live under a similar kinship structure. For example, the kinship patterns of Chaldeans are similar to historic patterns among the Japanese and Chinese (Chow 1996; Glenn 1986). Nana Oishi's (2005) discussion of contemporary Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Asian Indian women follow similar kinship and gender norms of Chaldeans. And another minority group from the region, Bukharan Jews from Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan hold similar family practices and structures (Halberstadt and Nikolsky 1996).

In terms of practice and norms, the Bukharans provide a good example. Men hold authority within their families, and women abide by the power of their "... father, brothers, and then husband" (Halberstadt and Nikolsky 1996: 245). A Bukharan woman gains status in the patrilineage through her children. With age, she becomes "... a decision maker for her adult children and may control the family wealth" (Halberstadt and Nikolsky 1996: 246). Still a woman's status remains low. "Neither education, nor the professional status of women can necessarily provide her with the respect of her family" (Halberstadt and Nikolsky 1996: 245). For single women, double standards exist and girls

are not allowed to date. Rumors of loose behavior lead to girls being undesirable marital partners within their community, which is very similar to the Chaldean community.

This kinship pattern, known as *classical patriarchy*, diverges from the patriarchal family of Europe and North American (Coontz 2006; Kandiyoti 1987; Kandiyoti 1988). These differences are significant enough to warrant review. Stephanie Coontz (2006: 124-25) argues that European family structure and practice was modified over several centuries to become radically dissimilar to classical patriarchy. As practiced, European women have held distinct advantages. They benefited from neo-locality after marriage, delayed marital age, and earned their dowry (Coontz 2006: 124-132). As a result, European women have enjoyed greater independence and gained more power after marriage relative to Asian women living under classical patriarchy. This dates historically to the fourteenth century (Coontz 2006: 124). Additionally, European society had prohibited polygamy by the twelfth century and the doctrine of consent had allowed for consensual unions.

In the United States, the Standard North American Family developed by the nineteenth century. Limited to a white middle class, women organized their domestic life under the cult of true womanhood (Welter 1973). This family relied on a division of labor between a breadwinner father and stay-at-home mom. By the mid-twentieth century, institutional arrangements between government, industry and labor extended this arrangement to the working class (Coontz 1997). But change was inevitable. Economic globalization undermined male breadwinning ability by the 1970s, and women's labor force participation increased dramatically. With women's entry into labor, men have begun to take up the slack in childcare and domestic work to the extent of being

recognized by some researchers as holding their own second shift (Bianchi, Robinson and Milkie 2006).

Asian patriarchy is built on different traditions that uphold patriarchal privilege in contrast to the Standard North American Family. As practiced historically, the household patriarch retains power over the multigenerational family that includes his wife, unmarried sons and daughters, married sons and their wives, and grandchildren. Women enter this family at a young age often without much say over her betrothed. Her future status depends on bearing sons and cultivating lifelong and enduring social ties with them. If she accomplishes this feat, she gains status in the household through control over daughters-in-law (Coontz 2006; Kandiyoti 1988).

My interviews identify many of these broad facets of classical patriarchy, as with young age at marriage, patrilineal residence, arranged marriage, and in a few instances a cruel mother-in-law. In terms of female dominance, young women spoke to their desires to be accepted by the groom's family as a sister. As explained, some families might not be nice to the daughter-in-law. This stems historically from the cyclical status of women under classical patriarchy. In an unfortunate description, Saleen Koury discusses how her grandmother victimized her mother.

> My grandmother trained her sons, which are my *dad's brothers*, to beat my mom. So she had a very rough life. Between all the children she bore and the cruelty of my uncles, it was a lot on her body.

The interviews support the basic proposition that Chaldean women of both the first and second cohort had contemporaries living within the structure and normative system of classical patriarchy. While not all households exercised male hegemony over every

aspect of family life, evidence documents that classical patriarchy worked in the Chaldean community in terms of arranged marriage and male privilege.

These differences between European and Asian family structure and practice play an important role in post-migration experiences. To understand this for Chaldeans, we need to review the details of their kinship and family practices.

CHALDEAN FAMILY STRUCTURE

Al-Nouri's (1964) work documents the pattern of classical patriarchy among the Chaldean community of Telkeppe in the early twentieth century. The typical family structure continued in the extended form. "At least three generations continued to live and functioned as an economic unit" (Al-Nouri 1964: 4). Family leadership fell to the senior male. When the father died, the rule of primogeniture passed the family wealth to the oldest male heir, and he assumed authority over the household. Family members included the patriarch, his wife, unmarried sons, married sons and their wives, along with children and grandparents. Patrilineal descent had meant that only men carried the family name, and "... girls were entirely submerged in their spouses' kin groups" (Al-Nouri 1964: 5). Gender roles had segregated male and female experiences from childhood till death.

The Chaldean family structure is not unique to the Village of Telkeppe or the early twentieth century. In the contemporary period, informants mentioned that had they remained in Iraq then they naturally would have lived in their fathers' household and given him their earnings. The continuance of classical patriarchy among Chaldeans is not

exceptional for the region. Thomas Stevenson (1997: 22) used Yemen's census data and found that forty-five percent of the households were extended or multifamily.

After migration, Mary Sengstock (1999: 47) observed that the Chaldean family remained close because of their business dealings and frequent visitation. In her analysis, she prefers the concept of functionally extended family and expanded family pattern. My research confirms her findings that sponsoring families had grown and contracted as relatives arrived and eventually moved on to their own residence. In terms of visitation frequency, Sengstock (1999: 40) reported that 25 percent of the families of the 1962-1963 survey had relatives other than their own children living within their households. The household also expanded when elderly parents or grandparents fell back on the children for care when ill. In her 1990-1991 survey, Sengstock found that over fifty percent of the elderly Chaldeans report living with their children (1999: 41).

Like Sengstock, I had encountered brothers working together and living in close proximity, or even the same subdivided rental property. I visited a household in Detroit with a newcomer extended family. Two brothers settled their family on the separate floors of a rental property but joined the common living spaces into a single cooking and eating arrangement. For sleeping, one family occupied the upstairs and the other the downstairs rooms. And it goes without saying that many brothers and cousins work together in business and spend their leisure jointly.

These family practices reflect an alternative arrangement which is very dissimilar to that of North America, Europe, many parts of Africa, and the Caribbean. While other groups demonstrate similar historical familial arrangements, economic development, urbanization, and migration have undermined the traditional patterns of classical

patriarchy. In particular, Dominicans had family patterns marked by male dominance over land assets. But national economic development undermined male power given as women could migrate and seek work outside the patriarchal family (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Pessar 1995). Chaldeans are unique in terms of being able to reestablish male control over financial assets and their geographic region, where classical patriarchy remains a hegemonic force in shaping family life. This second assertion is reasonable given the patriarchal norms discussed by Oishi (2005) and Halberstadt and Nikolsky (1996), which show that normative and structural classical patriarchy shape migration and settlement.

WELLSPRINGS OF CHALDEAN CLASSICAL PATRIARCHY

There is little evidence that either the pre-migration or post-migration context had generated significant changes in family practices. Still, the United States gender order differs sufficiently so that attitudes about family and gender relations ought to bear evidence of a broad shift in community and domestic politics. My interviews should have borne conversations about these changes, but did not.

The answer resides in family practices in a broad community sense. It is not simply male privilege embedded in the gender structures of power and economic. Rather, the rich and thick social ties which are celebrated jointly at church and family gatherings forge emotional and symbolic structures that provide significant amount of social reward to either gender. This section explores the intense commitment to kinship obligations which are part of everyday life in among Chaldeans. The evidence is presented on

migration networks, family visitation, family traditions, gifting rules, family size, and generational authority.

Migration Networks

The Chaldean extended family exists in large part due to familial obligations. For both Chaldean cohorts, men undertake the task of reestablishing their patrilineage in the United States. To do so, Chaldean men rely on family-based social capital. Chaldean social ties operate under strict gender and generational norms emanating from the cultural practice of connective patriarchy. Under these norms, men accept responsibility for their unmarried siblings, retired parents, nieces, nephews and cousins. They place family above their own interest, and without regard to personal sacrifice fulfill their masculine obligation. Accepting this position within the family provides men with cooperation from their household. Older parents migrate despite their preference to remain in Iraq, and younger family members comply with request for working in family-based economic activities.

Representative of this process, Susan Kasshamoun, daughter of the second cohort, explains the migration network of her family. Like many of the informants, brothers cooperated in effecting migration from Iraq and had jointly opened a business. What happened was her father's older brother came to the United States in 1963.

> My uncle started a business here, but I don't remember what it was. To get the family here, he sponsored my grandmother, my dad's mom. And she sponsored the rest of the kids. So my father came with the rest of the family in 1966. So at that time, my uncle had a business; and his brothers came and started working

with him for about a year. Eventually they became partners with that business which was a liquor store in Detroit.

Nearly all of my informants point to an older male who assumed responsibility for the family's migration. This stems from earlier cultural preferences to retain sufficient family property to support the eldest male head-of-household, or primogenitor (Al-Nouri 1964). Therefore, the eldest male works in cooperation with his parents and siblings, which to some extent means some degree of primogenitor has been transplanted to Detroit.

This migration pattern differs between Chaldean men and men of other national origins discussed in the gender adaption and migration literature. First, Chaldean men do not face status inconsistency in terms of their family, and never incur role reversal as heads-of-household. This is more common among the Mexican men studied by Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Ana García (1990) or the Ladino Guatemalan men studied by Cecilia Menjívar (2003). This difference springs from classical patriarchy that provides ample social capital to reinstate breadwinning roles once in the United States. This social practice reifies male authority, making Chaldean fathers revered within their families.

Among my sample, nearly every informant links the migration task to the provided resources and sacrifices of their fathers. It is important to note that Barbara Gallagher (1999) finds women did negotiate with Kurds to effect escape for themselves and their marital partners in military service. In my sample, when women had initiated migration, they had done so within the framework of meeting community normative expectations. For example, one mother had wanted a perfect Chaldean daughter-in-law.

So she had travelled to Iraq to find a girl with socially desirable traits. In this case, she looked for a girl that was young, of a good family name, not overly educated, and excellent potential for cooking traditional Chaldean foods.

For Chaldeans, their post-migration experience is perhaps more similar to the Bukharan case in that both rely on small businesses to support the family. Further, small business assures the patriarch a securer financial role over those in the secondary labor market or day laborers (Dohan 2003; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Menjívar 2000). In all cases, life history points towards lineage cooperation in the migration experience, and intact family-unit migration.

Chaldean sociability

In the post-migration context, family social ties retain their importance. Visitations develop around weekly meetings, holidays, and key life cycle events, such as first communion and wedding parties. Obvious benefits develop from being close to family which includes emotional, social and economic support. Nemir Romayah, a second cohort male explains visitation as a common weekly practice.

> Most of the time, we get together at my mother's house on Sundays for dinner. It is a good occasion for the brothers and sisters to get together and chat about the events of the week, about politics, about events in Iraq. Also these occasions are good for kids to get to know their cousins by mingling and bonding with them.

Social ties born of weekly visitation provide enduring relationships replete with social trust translated in later life into economic partnership. I find many cases of second-generation Chaldean men forming business relations with siblings and cousins. They

engage in all types of business ventures, from the traditional ethnic niche of grocery stores to professional services. In one instance, an informant had founded an IT firm with a cousin. In another instance, brothers manage multiple grocery stores, and spend their leisure time together.

Sociability training also comes with a price when family visitation conflicts with mainstream institutions. Life stories document this factor. Karen Yono, second cohort and a one-and-three-quarter generation, describes the problem.

> When we came home, we were totally Chaldean. If we had a report, homework, or anything that we had to do with school, then it was dropped when there was a family event to go to. If relatives came over, then you'd drop everything. Anything related to family was first priority. They [my parents] would never say [when out late visiting family members]: 'Oh, we got to leave as it is 10 o'clock and my kids have school tomorrow morning.' Instead, we would stay out till one o'clock in the morning. From our cousins' houses, we would come home and go to school the next day.

Family might interfere with going to school, as discussed above. Among today's high school students, this problem still exists. My informants mention related problems associated with working long hours in family businesses, being fatigued and inability to pay attention at school. This finding supports Sister Shikwana's (1997) work that documents parental preference for their children working after school, and Allene Doctoroff's (1978) research that showed boys had been typically employed and worked many hours for their parents.

Another form of family sociability relates to kinship obligations and involvement in the lineage. Chaldeans demonstrate similar practices studied by Suad Joseph (1999a: 134). In Lebanon, culture formalizes brother and sister ties around the relationship of maternal uncle and aunt, or *khal* and *khalta*. The maternal uncle and paternal aunt hold authority to intervene with their siblings' children as a matter of kinship obligation. Chaldeans recognize that brothers and sisters (or uncles and aunts) have both the right and the obligation to step into family matters and make points about their nieces' and nephews' social conduct. Nemir Romayah, second cohort male informant, explains.

> My cousins, my brothers-in-law, my sisters-in-law, my wife's family, we are open. Anybody can walk in without even calling, and they are welcome. We are a very extended family! And we keep it that way. It is good for the kids. They grow up with their grandfather, grandmother, and cousins. And everybody around them keeps them from trouble. That is because they are a big family. If I talk to my kid and he doesn't listen to me, then I pick up the phone and my sister will get involved. I say, "Hey talk to this guy." And she will call him and put him in her house. My sister has all the *right to talk* to my kids, as much as I do.

Being responsible to each others children only intensifies the connectivity between family members. The scope of these ties operates to link family networks together and provide substantial resources to family members in later life.

Despite any interferences that family obligations might have when it comes to mainstream institutions, the families themselves give them high priority. Karen Yono – second cohort and a one-and-three-quarter generation – recalls that: "Whatever we had to do [it] was dropped [if] we had a family event to go to. Or relatives came over, you drop

everything. … Anything at home was first priority." Family ties are highly prized and desired and create formidable emotional structures of gender relations.

Family Traditions

There are multiple formalized customs in the Chaldean culture: the tenetha, wedding gifting, social visitation and social capital being highly prized. Perhaps the most pleasurable is the betrothal ritual. While directing traffic at a local church, a congregant talked with obvious joy of an upcoming *tenetha* for his daughter. Chaldeans uphold this tradition which has long historical standing in the group. The terminal end of tenetha is a wedding. Gifting to brides and grooms follows the normative guidelines of connective patriarchy with closer relations to the bride and groom expected to provide more valuable gifts.

Tenetha. Leading up to *tenetha*, a man has basically expressed his interest toward a woman. In more traditional families, the man's family will call on the woman's family for tea. If the woman accepts his interest, the families proceed towards the more formal event. At the *tenetha*, the boy's father asks the girl's father for her hand in marriage. As explained by Kayla Facho, one of several second-generation women who recount this ritual.

> But what they do in the traditional *tenetha* is they ask for the hand of your daughter. And they basically form it in the phrase where it sounds like; translated, it sounds like this, "May we have a flower from your garden and plant her in ours." That is what it translates to.

The engagement ritual symbolically places the girl within the patrilineage of her husband's family. This is a vestige of the old marriage system, when girls actually joined the patriarch's household with her husband. Today, this is more ritualistic than practiced, as the couple establishes their independent household. But cases obviously operate where young couples return for periods to live with the husband's family. This is the preferred case, as Chaldean culture patterns cooperation between fathers and sons, or between brothers.

The *tenetha* is not a one time meeting. Rather, tradition dictates that the families continue to meet at recurring social occasions that terminate with a wedding reception. A typical festive event is the engagement party. One informant recalled that her brother's engagement party had over 200 guests. Traditionally, couples asked a priest to bless the wedding bands, making the engagement official and binding, and adding further symbolic importance. Some families have henna parties (less formal or stylized than the Arab practice), and most hold wedding showers prior to the weddings.

The most celebrated occasion among the extended family is the wedding ceremony and reception. These events are first and foremost family events. The wedding reception itself is a huge occasion. As explained by my informants, the groom and bride typically invite their first and second cousins. As Chaldean families are large, this can mean up to hundreds of people.

This practice is so pervasive in the community. There was not a single second-generation woman who missed the opportunity to speak at length about tenetha, weddings, and receptions. Young men had tended to be somewhat standoffish about such

information, but they were well aware of marriage customs in the community. Beatrice Denja explains the problems of inviting guest. Her account is nearly representative of every young woman in this sample.

> Beatrice: Personally, if it were my wedding, then I would invite my closest friends and my closest relatives. I wouldn't go very far. Maybe I would invite one from each family. It is really hard when you have to cut down to that many people, because I have 150 first and second cousins on my dad's side and a 150 from my mom's side. So I have 300 first and second cousins alone that would be at my wedding right there, if I invited every single one.
>
> Charles Spurlock: Are you close to all these first cousins?
>
> We are all close. We don't see them all the time. I see them, but I don't see them everyday. I see them, if I am lucky may be once every couple of months, and then for sure during family function and the holidays.

The narrative describes ongoing closeness in social ties to her kinship group. Like many other Chaldeans, she has had constant contact with her cousins through multiple family occasions. As such, these social ties require confirmation within important lifecycle events. One such measure of fact is the reception.

Wedding Gifts. In my experience in attending Chaldean events, I had learned quickly that it is typical to provide a gift appropriate to my relationship with my host and for the degree of respect I held him or her. In one case, I had been invited to a wedding. Not knowing how to calculate an appropriate gift, I had asked an informant what I should do. I explained the situation, and he asked me two questions. "Are you close to this person

and do you want to show some respect?" Obviously, I wanted to keep good faith, and my informant told me the safe gift range.

The same rules apply within the community and gifting provides another opportunity to examine connectivity in Chaldean social networks. Theodore Bestor (1989) discovers a similar practice in an urban community of Tokyo, referred to by the Japanese as *koden*. Similar to this community, Chaldeans track the value of gifts given at their wedding receptions. Failure to meet expected monetary obligations are interpreted very harshly. An informant explained that failure to give appropriately is interpreted as a lack of love between you and the extended family. Other outline the need for gifting according to the closeness between you and the family member. Kayla Facho verified this point.

> My cousin, she was saying how her husband's family was cheating her. She thought they were cheap because they only gave the minimal amount of money. At my brother's wedding, my younger brother and I went through the cards, because my brother (the groom) went on a honeymoon. We got a couple of blank cards (no gift or money). So yes, you keep track. We actually had a wedding list, and we went through and put down next to each name how much they gave. And whenever a wedding comes up, we will pull up the list and see how much they gave. Because you don't want to under give.

Again, gifting is a gendered and age event. Chaldeans look at birth order and closeness in determining the range of their gifting. Obviously, the greater the distance between you and the wedding couple, the smaller the gift. Similarly, the gifts become larger depending on the closeness and the age and gender of the receiving party.

Family Size. This is a factor somewhat unique to Chaldeans. Among Arab national origin migrants, total fertility rates for women had been 7 children from 1975-1980 and has decreased to around 4 in the present period (Central Intelligence Agency 2009; United Nations 2001). Most of my informants had large families with many siblings, but a few had small family sizes. Many migrant groups do not have this benefit. For instance, Russian Émigrés, Cubans and Koreans tend to have lower fertility rates in the pre-migration period, making their families smaller (Gold 1992; Kim 1981; Light and Gold 2000). These other national origin immigrants still utilize family resources, but they draw them from a smaller pool of relatives.

For Chaldeans, family size acts to extend family relations along horizontal or lateral lines, instead of simply vertical lines. As noted above, my informants note extensive social connection between cousins. But at times, they also refer to aunts and uncles, as cousins and as brothers and sisters. The reason for this is the wide age range among siblings. The eldest sibling's son or daughter may be of the same age as the sibling's youngest brother or sister. In other words, an aunt could be younger than her niece. As such, the kinship network expands for any age group according the family size and ages of siblings' children. For example, Susan Kasshamoun provides her own experience in terms of family size and the high degree of connectivity.

> In fact, I have an uncle that is my age. And my mom and grandmother were pregnant at the same time. I have an aunt who is younger than me as well. These 12 aunts and uncles range from the upper 60s to the youngest as 36. So we all grew up

as friends, more like cousins than aunt and uncle. I didn't even call them aunt and uncle cause we were so close in age.

Social Capital. By maintaining close familial ties, Chaldeans generate effective and enduring social ties which create social conditions supportive of social trust. This routine quality of network operation delivers a form of social capital that Alejandro Portes (1993) referred to as value introjection. Visitation works to reinforce the collectively held value of working with family members throughout the community. The result is that Chaldean networks offer family members resources that come from being a member of the kinship group. Chaldeans draw on social capital for all kinds of activities. Examples include, businesses mentoring, family loans, and information for jobs and schooling opportunities.

Gaining knowledge about business opportunities, securing networks to jobs outside the ethnic economy, and learning about educational opportunities represent gains from being linked to family networks. The knowledge about these opportunities emerges from immediate family members and extended family members. Mariam Qashat, a twenty year old second generation informant, explained how she found a job. She explains her relationship to family social ties from two vocabularies. In the more common American system, she says aunt's dad. But her training in connective patriarchy has her saying mother's brother.

Mariam Qashat, second generation female: (somewhat fast) my aunt's dad's company, my uncle's, my mom's brother's wife's dad's company.

Charles Spurlock: is this an uncle, or an aunt that owns the business?

Mariam Qashat: [a little slower] it is my uncle's wife's family's, so it isn't even hers.

Charles Spurlock: uncle's wife's family's?

Mariam Qashat: [normal speech rate] Here, I can tell you. It is my uncle that is an attorney; his wife's family; like her dad's company. And I had needed a summer job. I was having trouble finding one, and she said why don't you come help us out over here? And it is about 3 years later, and I am still there.

It is interesting that the informant indexes her relatives in a way similar to the first cohort's second generation. While she is not conveying social obligation, she is tracing familial relations as if living under the conditions of connective patriarchy (Joseph 1999b). To extend these relations unto her mom's brother wife, who is not Chaldean, is not really surprising. I read this informant as being skilled in her culture and seeking help from her familial network.

CONCLUSION

As explained throughout this chapter, Chaldean social ties within and between families remain ongoing and intense. This sociability consummates the legitimacy of men's authority, as patriarchs, by forging a powerful cathexis towards family. While family itself is gendered and treatment towards women disagreeable (at a level and extent not measured by the study), both men and women draw pleasure from this social life. This emotional structure is overlaid by the symbol structure of gender relations encoded in the *tenetha*. This is a finding not typically studied or reported within the gender and adaption literature.

The family practices themselves hold significant value. Connective patriarchy provides durable networks rich with ready family members who share information, savings, and cooperation as part of their value system. This differs from North American families where reciprocal exchanges between siblings are rare and limited to emotional support (Widmer 2004). Chaldeans demonstrate time and time again that there is extensive financial and emotional obligation throughout their family ties.

Another point which makes Chaldeans unique from working class and day labor migrants is that the men did not experienced status inconsistency or role reversal. Men fulfill their obligation to their family, and take their status as family patriarch.

As part of the extended case method, the combination of emotional and symbolic structures with male status consistency maintains the status quo in gender relations. I believe that family ties socialize Chaldean values which produce orientations towards cooperation that make the ethnic economy as viable as it is. A big issue is the extent that gender relations are unresponsive to women's needs which is discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL REPRODUCTION OF CONNECTIVE PATRIARCHY

> We don't say you have to marry a Chaldean, any Chaldean. It has to be somebody from a *good family*. There were a couple of boys I wanted to date, but my father wouldn't let me do it. They were Chaldean, but they didn't have good reputations. Or their families didn't have good reputations. So, family reputation meant everything. So we are selective even within our community (Terry Kashat, second generation of the first cohort).

A good family meets certain criteria regarding honor. In Iraq, Sana al-Khayyat (1990) defines honor as gendered where men and women's conduct reflects on their lineage. Men bring respect to their family by being a good earner, hard worker, or educated. In other words, men give honor (in the Arabic *sharaf*) to their families through their achievements. Women hold a limited number of statuses, the dominant being homemaker. Consequently, her actions place her at risk for shame. For women, they maintain their *ird*, by remaining sexually innocent and *aib*, by being modest.

In the Chaldean community, I have observed many instances of women being evaluated on the basis of their *ird* and *aib*, but not to the extent that her shame disfigures family honor requiring some drastic solution. My examples are more mundane. I had attended a network meeting among Chaldean professionals sponsored by the Chaldean American Chamber of Commerce. During the course of a mostly male event, an intelligent female financial services professional had remarked that Chaldean businesses

needed better accounting statements. While a helpful suggestion and legitimate point, she had brought the meeting to an abrupt halt. The facilitator had to contain himself in order to maintain his decorum, but the breach had been made. The problem was not the soundness of the idea, but the violation of *aib*. In another instance, Terry and Julia Kashat recount the rules of their first cohort parents. Their family asked them not to dance at weddings. Instead they were expected to "sit down, and be discrete, be humble, be low key." The community expects men and women to uphold the standards of *sharaf*, *aib* and *ird*, as indicators of family worth. This chapter seeks to explore women's agency in upholding family prestige by redefining aib.

This position differs from Pierre Bourdieu's (2001) case study of Kabyle society where men convert women's purity into social capital, or create networks with other lineages by tying them more tightly on the basis of marriage. Perhaps Chaldeans make marital arrangements to conserve family financial capital, but this wasn't a research finding. The most consistent find was that women use multiple strategies to refashion the rules of connective patriarchy into a slightly more egalitarian arrangement. This deserves our attention, which is executed by looking at the interplay between habitus (durable disposition) and social field (stable set of social relations between actors).

CHALDEAN HABITUS

The habitus concept relates to dispositions (Krais and William 2000; MacLeod 1995; Wainwright, Williams and Turner 2006). Under this construction, social interaction occurs as durable ways of doing things. Years of socialization, practice, rewards, and punishments lead men and women to assert gender identities consistent with the gender

regime of family and the community. Under Pierre Bourdieu's (1990: 54) construction this creates mental dispositions for action.

> [The habitus] ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the 'correctness' of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms.

Social practice creates a collective representation of reality that is a schema and manner of doing things; it becomes the normative rule for the social group. This position has been criticized for being determinist and unresponsive to political action (Connell 1987). However, Ricardo Costa (2006) holds that reframing the habitus permits changing the social field. In other words, people remake the structural relations of their lives by what they do. Against the weight of tradition, the second-generation constantly challenges parental rules framed by the habitus. The habitus carries with it the way previous generations handled issues of honor, namely protecting female purity. The second-generation works against these traditions to win liberties that ever so slowly filter back to the habitus of the community and ameliorate gender relations for today's second-generation.

Gender Socialization

Gender socialization lays the initial ground work for the habitus. In regards to socialization, Chaldean households are like other immigrant groups in that double standards operate around carework, domestic tasks, dating, extracurricular activities, and education (Espiritu 2003b; Song 1999). Mexican girls tend to domestic tasks more readily than boys. "... moreover, they seem to operate with the "running wheel" of a caregiver's

mind, attending to what needs to be done and simply doing it without being asked" (Orellana 2001: 382).

My informants tend to support the notion that boys and girls receive differential treatment as children. Historically, parents expected girls to leave the father's home and marry at a relatively young age. Further, the social institutions for education did not progress past the second grade level for girls, and parents did not pay attention to their education. As Susan Kasshamoun (second generation in her thirties) explains,

> My mother was pulled out of school in the second grade to take care of the other siblings. That wasn't uncommon for over there, where you were raised as a women to immediately be a wife and a mother.

Even though this happened in the past, and by the 1970s Iraq had passed universal education, the community still sees a good homemaker as an ideal marital partner. And if required, men and mothers will seek suitable women in the homeland.

Since these qualities still have prime importance, it is not surprising women train their daughters to do domestic work. Rhonda Mansoor, a second generation homemaker in her thirties, explains that she teaches her daughter to be an all around woman; able to do school work, but also to carry out her duties as a homemaker.

> With my daughter, I have never really pressured her. She has been on honor role her whole life. If I see a B or B-, I never ask her why. I don't want her to be all academic. Because to be Chaldean, you need to be an all around type not just child, but a *woman*. Meaning that, I want her to be good at school and be able to go to school, to graduate and to have good grades. But I also want her to be able to come home and fix dinner for her husband. To know how to cook, how to

clean, that is a very important thing, to know it without me even telling her. If she comes home at 3:15 and she realizes there is food on the table, she doesn't have to wait for me to say, "Serve yourself!"

In essence a girl's social identity is the capacity to internalize the rules related to making a home. Schooling remains important, but it is secondary to her identity as a future mother. The community considers domestic and traditional gender role socialization consistent with appropriate gender knowledge. Under this model, women play an important role in recreating culture through social reproduction that is the work needed to reproduce Chaldean ethnicity. Food such as dolma (meat and rice dish served in grape leaves) or kuba (breaded meat in a tomato base served with rice) reinforce ethnic identity. The flavor, scent and enjoyment of food is enacted over and over again as a family ritual weekly and then again on the weekends with the hustle and bustle of the extended family.

While girls are trained towards domestic life, boys receive special attention within the community and their family. Still practiced within the community, perhaps more commonly among the older immigrants, relatives observe a girl's birth with sadness and delight in a boy's arrival. Chaldean parents hold special sensitivity towards boys. While not neglecting girls, parents stop whatever they are doing to sooth boys who need physical or emotional comfort. Further, boys are granted greater liberty for their actions, as parents impose few restrictions. Rhonda Mansoor discusses her experience.

> And when you say boys were spoiled or boys got to do more than girls; this was certainly so in our case. My brother got to do anything he wanted. My older sister still tells us about the story when he couldn't go with my parents one day; so he pulled the entire Christmas tree down. And he didn't get in trouble for it, because

he was a boy, and that is a funny thing. Or even when he used to hit or chase us; he never got in trouble. We got in trouble for screaming.

Upholding favoritism for boys is a holdover from the old country. Historically, Chaldeans had transferred wealth from children to parents. Under those conditions, boys were seen as social support for the parents in old age. Informants had indicated that Chaldeans viewed girls from the perspective that they were subsumed by their husband's lineage and lost as "spilled water" later on. In some ways, there is a bit of cultural lag in play, but it still speaks to the emotional qualities of Chaldean gender structures.

Honoring parents holds a significant place in adolescent socialization that carries over into youth and eventually adulthood. When asked to explain what a Chaldean believes, among the top three or four responses is honoring and caring for the elderly. Sengstock (1999: 41) presents data from a survey that collected data on 91 Chaldean elderly; she found that "over half of them (of 60 years of age and over) report living in households in which one or more children were present." Often Chaldeans explain that they support their fathers to honor his sacrifices for taking the arduous task of migrating and settling in a new country. Given that respect for elders is an obligation under connective patriarchy, it is not surprising that both genders abide by this norm.

Dating

Ethnic survival and feminine purity tend to be conflated within immigrant communities. In response to this pressure, immigrant parents protect their daughters from harm. As a consequence, girls face double standards during teen years. Yen Le Espiritu (2003b) finds that Filipino parents justify these restrictions by linking sexual activity to

Americanization and the immorality of the dominant culture. Thinking in terms of regional patriarchy, Gloria González-López (2003) notes that mothers protect their daughters' sexual purity as a means to facilitate greater marital satisfaction. Diane Wolf (1997) writes that parents exert control over girls who they considered to be sexually vulnerable and place restrictions over where to attend college.

The Chaldean community is no different than these other immigrant groups. Families think in terms of marriage for their daughter. Ideal marriages fall to girls with an excellent reputation, which includes her and her family's conduct. Dating threatens this goal, and parents often remark that while they trust their daughters, they consider them vulnerable. Consequently, girls find dating, going out, or inviting friends of the opposite sex home impossible.

The second-generation recognizes there are double standards in operation. And despite the inherent inequality regarding spatial mobility, as girls are more restricted in who they visit and the time they are allowed to be out, boys see this as reasonable. They basically agree with their parents that ethnic survival is at stake. Frank Yalda, second generation 20s year old student, discusses his views.

> But when I think about it (double standards), I don't see there is really a problem with the parent's position. When we came here, we didn't really have problems with premarital intercourse or things like that. We had such strong moral ethics, like all of our people, most of them. And then people started to get integrated into society, and that is how we took a stand against that. How we kept our own identity; was to make *strong enforcements* on our women, to keep them from doing these things. So we can keep ourselves, I guess you could say, pure. I don't

know how to exactly describe it. Most people don't understand where we come from. They don't understand how we think. We look at it as a threat to our existence. I would say to our way of life.

This statement mirrors Espiritu's (2003b: 274) findings that "... it is the daughters who have the primary burden of protecting and preserving the family." Thus, a central community norm has been to protect girls and young women, leading to the practices that young women remain with their family until married, of limiting dating, travel and mobility.

For boys, parents allow them to date, but it is impossible for them to find a Chaldean girl. "I am 16 (and) my parents don't mind if I have a girl friend, but it is pretty hard trying to find a Chaldean girl that is about my age, that is allowed to go out." This is quite common. As this young man explains, "Chaldean-wise it is kind of different. The girl is kind of put on lockdown." So when it comes to being around girls, they describe them as "white girls; American I guess you would call them." And it wasn't dating, "it was you went out with them, I wouldn't consider it a girl friend kind of thing. We are together; and you just do this and that." While boys hang around and gain socializing experiences with the opposite sex, parents consider this very risky for Chaldean girls.

Education

The community holds mixed views on education (Shikwana 1997). In part, this relates to being merchants, where children's labor has been helpful in running small businesses. Allene Doctoroff (1978: 191) documented this finding first, noting that boys tended to work long hours, and were less likely to see education highly important. For

instance, girls are twice as likely to agree with the statement "It is very important to please teachers." Doctoroff attributes this to boys working longer hours.

Among my informants, there is a growing recognition that second-generation women of the second cohort hold higher levels of education than men. Other informants indicate that while their parents encouraged them to attend school, it was "unusual, especially for girls" to be supported in these pursuits. Still others had finished high school, but became disillusioned when their parents suspended approval for college and university attendance.

Boys find education problematic as well. Doctoroff finds clear data that boys had worked many hours and more so than girls. To this day, youth continue to work for their parent's business concerns. This second-generation school teacher has observed that boys "come in really late and many times." The reasons relate to them having "... to work at the family business; either it is a gas station or a party store. And (they) don't get home till (midnight)." While boys might be encouraged to work, they may find that education is not necessary to finding fulltime employment or to make the transition to adulthood.

Summary of the Chaldean Habitus

Gender socialization remains sensitive from childhood through the life cycle. Parents place expectations upon children to retain their honor. While boys hold freedoms denied girls, they also hold responsibilities which demand longer work hours. Girls tend to be protected more, but tradition requires them to understand the needs of homemaking and being a Chaldean woman. The gender habitus disposes boys and girls towards different honor systems which lead to how they act in social fields. The most obvious

social field is that of the family, but also includes church and everyday life. In the next section, I focus on the social field of dating and marriage.

SOCIAL FIELD

The Chaldean gender habitus is a "system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions" (Bourdieu 1977: 83). As such, it operates as a generative process by reproducing Chaldeans both as individuals and as a collectivity (Adkins 2003). Within a social field, of which there are several in any given society, actors stand in durable relation to each other and compete in what Bourdieu calls a game.

The game's players seek to gain power over the field and dominate it by acquiring symbolic capital. Women enter any field with a distinctively "negative symbolic coefficient" (Bourdieu 2001: 93). Under these conditions, it is hard for women to come out ahead, as "The aim is to rule the field, (and) ... confer or withdraw legitimacy from other participants in the game" (Moi 1991: 1021). If monopolization takes place, then the doxic position acts as a censor over the entire field. Under these conditions, Moi argues that symbolic violence exists. In this case, violence means control over legitimate expressions, not physical or emotional abuse. The issue is to what extent has classical patriarchy been frozen in time, or can youth act in the social field as actors.

Dating

While gender socialization suggests girls become dominated by gender status at an early age, the data reveals an interesting give and take in parental and child relations.

For example, families retain the right to intervene in the social life of girls. In some cases this is subtle. Many attend Catholic schools which are gender segregated. For these girls, a school dance creates a temporary conundrum, as in who to bring to the dance. Later, the problem becomes where to attend college. Parents request and encourage their daughters to attend schools close by so they may continue to live at home. In fact, many girls live at home until they marry. In all of these scenarios honor is being preserved. Parents act to protect their daughter's reputation which they deem important for marriage to Chaldean boys.

But the situation remains a little more complex than simply following the doxic wishes of parents. As used by Bourdieu, doxic means the dominant and the only way of doing things. Chaldean youth have been ever engaged in careful negotiation with parents about freedom to date. While boys win liberties without much effort, girls and young women work strenuously to fabricate social space which honors their parents but provides some openness to youth needs.

Across the two second-generations (referring to the children of the first and second cohort, women in their fifties and higher, and young adults), a pattern frequently reoccurs in response to gender control, what Judith Lorber (1994: 30) defines as approval or disapproval direct at non-conforming gendered behavior. Some girls choose to keep things hidden from their parents. They do so in a variety of ways. One informant discusses how she and her boyfriend had arranged clandestine meetings in another city in the metropolitan area to be alone. Typically, this meant simply hanging out. But as this is unheard of, young women have to keep secrets from their parents and avoid community surveillance to do these things.

Another position taken by girls includes negotiation. A woman recounts how the first second-generation girls had formed a youth club to "stay within the bounds" of their parental expectations. To do so, they organized a youth club. Instead of American styled dating, they had met as a group, and were able to do a variety of activities: picnics, boating, hay rides and dances. Not all parents accepted this accommodation and the newest second-generation often appeal to notable women in the community to petition on their behalf. Interestingly, these are woman-to-woman interactions. Rosie Yaldoo recounts a time when young Chaldean women needed her help.

> I had a friend of mine come to me pleading. She was just in tears; she wanted to go to her prom. And her parents said, "High school prom: absolutely not." You have to consider, in the old country, we had no such thing as proms. But for [my friend] it was very important. I literally took her mother out to lunch, and said, "It is no big deal. Let her go with one of her cousins, just let her go."

For boys the issues differ. Boys have their freedom and liberty to date, go out, stay out, and attend parties. Neither the men nor the boys had recounted ordeals in finding ways to respect the parental wishes while negotiating for freedom in mobility. Boys, however, take a privileged position in the field, and hold power over their sisters and other girls. They have a legitimate right (or symbolic capital) to make demands of their sisters or other women in their lineage that stems from connective patriarchy.

This stands across the two generations. A first generation woman recounts the time she was going on a date, and a cousin made her cancel. As she explains, "first cousins are like your brothers. And my first cousin Jimmy made me call this boy and say no." Fifty years later and boys are still telling girls what to do. Beatrice Denja reminisces

about her non-chaperoned sister who was schooled by a young man for being in a bar without permission.

> This guy [says to my sister], "No one better talk to you; I'm going to tell your brothers. Wait till I tell your brothers; I'm going to call them." And she said, "They are going to here in half-an-hour." He was freakin' out cause my sister was at the bar.

These instances carry with them tremendous burdens and resentment among young women. Often times, girls find themselves the subject of gossip which is notorious within the community. In fact, a priest had remarked that "talk" was a problem, and had beseeched his congregation to forget past transgressions and evaluate how young people live here in the United States. That assessment resonates with many of the women participating in the study. In one case, a woman had been studying with a brother and was reported by another Chaldean male as being out with an unknown man. In another instance, a young woman had met an old friend waitressing at a restaurant, the two exchanging joyful hellos. Two days later, my informant had to address questions on whether she had been drunk.

Contrasting girl agency to male gender enforcement (or female guarding by boys, gossip, and talk) illustrates the conundrum of the social field. When girls act, they negotiate as partners in seeking a means to gain legitimacy for their interest while at the same time respecting parental norms. As a result, they create the conditions for their own symbolic capital by seeking alliances with notable women, or through their own social ties and networks. When successful, the girls have wrought changes in Chaldean habitus

leading to a more generalized acceptance of female liberties. Of course, these are freedoms within boundaries. Still, the tireless pressure brought by girls and women have won expanded freedoms which are becoming increasingly embedded in the habitus of the community. The changes are uneven, but are progressing, as explained by Sommer Shaouni a second-generation school teacher in her 20s.

> There are some parents that still don't allow their kids to attend school dances. The kids can't go to homecoming and can't go to prom, especially the daughters. They are more restricted. ... Things are changing with this generation. They are a little bit more allowed to go than they were even 15 years ago. And even at this very school, teachers say, '[We] remember when none of the Chaldean kids, especially the girls, would show up at the school dances cause their parents wouldn't let them.' Now they are showing up. And now it is a little different. But if they show up with a date, sometimes their parents know and sometimes they don't. You know it might be a secret.

Why have Chaldean women struggled so long to gain recognition for dating and freedom of movement? In part, the transnational linkages between the community and Iraq and the entrepreneurial adaption work to reinforce each other. During the relevant time period, Iraq's gender order had remained supportive of connective patriarchy. Universal education had arrived late and war had ushered a return to conservative gender relations within a few years, hardly long enough time for a new gender order to advance society towards egalitarian gender relations. Besides, the reactive condition fostered by personal security had led to further Chaldean emigration. As a result, extended families

had reunified bringing older and more traditional kin to American. Among the first second-generation, informants had brought this up more often than the second second-generation. Rosie Yaldoo provides an example of male authority.

> In fact I did cancel a date. I was going to go out to a dance at the university, just one dance that a boy had asked me to. And just two weeks before, my uncle came to America. Both my mom and dad said, "You have to cancel. I said, '[Jeez] it is just one date."

The habitus, or dispositions toward action, undergoes a tug-of-war. On the one hand, second-generation girls of the first cohort pushed parents toward accepting elements of American youth culture. They got their parents onboard with dating, dances, and going to college. Then transnational reinforcements arrived to reassert older gender conventions. What was won became endangered, and the community retrenched its position on appropriate gender behavior. The current second-generation is taking up a similar struggle trying to overcome community gender norms regarding many of the same issues regarding dating, independence, and travel.

Symbolic Violence

Different case studies show that not all immigrant groups have openness toward changing gender relations. In part, time of arrival has an impact. For others, like the Bukharan Jews, culture and time of arrival interact. This Central Asian immigrant group upholds traditions of classical patriarchy; as a consequence, gender relations remain highly conservative.

Chaldeans were very similar to this group when living in Iraq through the 1970s, and the second cohort transported many of these norms with them to Detroit in the1960s. For instance, Qais al-Nouri (1964) notes Chaldean women's overall domestic power remained insignificant. These women had never held means to improve their situation given low education attainment, linguistic isolation and spatial immobility. Consequently, major domestic decision fell to men, including children's marriage.

> Another situation reflecting the dominant place of the husband is the greater importance attached to his views on the marriage of his children. This point is explicit in the exclusive concern of a man wanting to marry a girl with her father's response to his request. When he feels that her father is favorable about giving her in marriage to him, he scarcely worries about her mother's role. It is true that in few cases the husband consults with this wife about whether or not his daughter should marry a particular man. But the ultimate opinion on the matter is his sole right (Al-Nouri 1964: 30).

Young women support this interpretation. Most had remarked that their mothers were housewives. Some of the first second-generation comment about the dependence many women still display in simple things like ordering dinner when at restaurants.

The life history data had noted occasions where men did in fact arrange marriages between cousins. For a family that lost their father, his father's brother had stepped in providing mentoring, support and guidance. In time, the uncle had asked his nephews to give their sister's hand in marriage to his son.

In recounting the history of marriage and choice, one informant dated the arrival of romantic love in the community around the 1980s. Before then, many of the women in

the fifties "were more fixed up." Inaya Kinaya, second-generation female in her forties, explains.

> It was more arranged, and they didn't really date. So those women, their choices were based on who their parents wanted. And not who they wanted; [even then] they didn't have the [chance] to figure it out. It was a matter of a good family, a good provider, a good husband; and those were the basics. For women in their forties, they had a little more freedom. They did date, but only for the purpose of marriage. Still even when they dated, it was a very short time. It was based on who your parents wanted, more so than your own choice. If the relations had failed to end in marriage, then the girl's reputation was marred. Today's women, those in their twenties are more open; they date. So the community is more encouraging to them.

This progression points towards time in the United States and the addition of girl's and women's struggles to pressure the culture to accept women's choices. This reading neglects to account for an important stakeholder in this social field, the mother. As discussed above, women gain power over time under the arrangement of classical patriarchy. As a consequence, older women hold onto their moral capital and influence their children's choices. Often times, women in their 30s and 40s remarked about young men being mamma's boy. By this they meant that even if a girl and a boy held strong romantic intensions, these "men" defer to their mother's wishes even though it might not be his desire.

Mother's influence also had extended to taking the matter into their own hands. On one occasion a mother was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with a series of

unacceptable marital partners for her children. Unwilling to risk further disappointment, she had taken her son to find a bride in Iraq. In another instance, a mother returned with her son's bride. The mother had found what she was looking for, a daughter-in-law with skill in cooking, cleaning and making a nice home. These examples impeach al-Nouri's assertion that women did not hold domestic power. But the kind of power exercised here operates as a form of symbolic violence because the outcome favors only one gender identity for women.

Consequently, Chaldean women often report finding it difficult to hold education, employment or income, and be acceptable to Chaldean men their age. A second-generation woman had caustically ridiculed men for labeling her as unapproachable. Other women understand that age and independence are not qualities sought for by "old fashion" families and their son. And the general method for finding a match closes after a certain point.

But rejection happens within the daughter's family as well. Not only does a Chaldean woman suffer at the hands of men, they find little consolation from their female kin. One woman had expressed dismay over how the women in her kinship group fawned over a cousin. The issues are typical; having waited too long she was no longer considered prime marital material, while her cousin was much younger. The same conditions apply to the cases of transnational marriage, explained above. In this way, women are subject to symbolic violence. The only legitimate capital within the marital field for traditional families is the physical capital of youth and beauty (Wainwright, Williams and Turner 2006).

For these families, a daughter's capacity to capitalize on education or income is seriously jeopardized. In one case, a mother favors a young, Arab speaking and non-educated daughter-in-law over her own daughter. In many ways, the mother's habitus acts as a schema reciting a mantra: young, homemaker, pure, and innocent. Such women do not really neglect the value of education *per se*, or not love their daughters, but their habitus has not changed and is upheld by others.

Even though it may seem as if women always lose in the marital field, given the impossibility of remaining naïve and forever young, my data disputes hegemonic domination by the doxic habitus. While Chaldean culture holds some very old traditions in marital rituals, one in particular allows girls and women leeway. Working in tandem, what Erving Goffman (1967) calls an interaction team, mothers and daughters give subtle clues on how they feel when a family calls over for an appointment. Daughters are schooled on serving tea to visitors as practice for when this day might arrive. Typically the visitors sit in the living room and engage the parents in conversation, the girl presents herself at the same time as the tea, and the family makes an appraisal. If the daughter leaves quickly or fumbles pouring the tea, then the mother generally intervenes ending the interest then and there. Clearly, woman to woman networks operate to shape the outcome of these visits.

Another common means for shaping marital choice occurs in the social spaces of the community. Beside boys making decision or the mother of a boy, women do take the matter into their own hands for their daughters. In one instance, an influential woman in the community had been approached by a mother and daughter wanting an arranged meeting with her son. My informant had visited the family and had conveyed her son's

feelings that he was not interested. The interested women then pursued my informant's mother. While their insistence did not change the nature of the interaction, it demonstrates that woman to woman networks operate in the marital field. Women's social capital does have legitimacy in shaping the outcome.

CONCLUSION

Chaldean gender relations have changed, but not at the speed predicted by the gender and migration literature. Rather than reading this as a form of cooptation, the data points towards a complicated pattern of negotiation and entrenchment. Changes come slowly with girls and women using a host of social resources at their disposal to create transgressive practices. The most powerful source for change is woman to woman networks. Girls suffering from a common disadvantage had banded together to form a social club, and girls appeal to recognized and well respected women for their help. These woman-to-woman networks enter the dating and marital field and shift the conversation towards a different conclusion. Such interventions have an incremental impact that is slowly changing the Chaldean habitus and transforming dating into a non-honor threatening activity. Similarly, girls do shape the marital field. This is an important finding for it has been suggested that Chaldean women have no say in their marital choices. Obviously women do play a role in these affairs as do men.

The other side of the issue is symbolic violence. Again symbolic violence means the censorship power of the doxic habitus. In this case, women's age and beauty operate as powerful coefficients in her choices. In some ways, an older unmarried woman may actually have a master status attached to her by virtue of being educated and outspoken,

older and mature, and working and independent. These are not the qualities of the ideal spouse for an "old-fashion" Chaldean family. But for Americans, these traits have afforded a more comfortable living standard from the wages women contribute to the household. For Chaldeans, this may not be an overriding concern especially for the more traditionally minded and the more affluent.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Chaldeans represent a unique case study for reassessing our theory of gender relations after migration. As stated at the outset, my research project began under the assumption that politics in the domestic sphere and community organizations move towards an egalitarian/participatory model rapidly, with migrant women benefiting in terms of household decision making and greater freedom of movement. While limited support exists for this position, a more conservative finding asserted itself. Across cohort and generation, powerful centripetal forces reinforce traditional gender relations. While it is somewhat surprising, this was not a totally unexpected outcome. It turns out that Chaldeans are like other immigrant groups that have high rates of self-employment (see Light and Gold 2000: 156).

GENDER ADAPTATION

Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) states that multiple immigrant groups experience a shift in gender relations after migration. Her position rejects the New Economics of Migration perspective that posits a harmonious family myth. Instead, women fight family dominance, and draw on resources in the post-migration context to assert themselves in their homes and communities. This position defines a broad research outcome in the study of many immigrant households. One criticism has been that many of these case studies follow gender relations among undocumented or class disadvantaged migrants. And in looking at Middle Easterners, and now Chaldeans, we

find a growing list of immigrants where gender relations remain more traditional (Light and Gold 2000).

In understanding high rates of self-employment, researchers identify multiple ethnic resources which create conditions for self-employment. Ivan Light and Carolyn Rosenstein (1995) note that ethnicity plays a role in shaping the supply of entrepreneurs. Basically, culture supplies skills differently to ethnic groups in society, providing some groups with skills needed but in short supply. Ann Swidler (1986) calls this the tool-kit approach, meaning that culture teaches people a language, style of cooking, orientation towards interaction which provides skills for making a living. Chaldeans demonstrate that beside human capital, social capital is acquired through sociability. And somewhat like the "other side of embeddedness concept," male entrenchment in income generating activities secures the cultural preference for a gender division of labor. Rodger Waldinger's other side of embeddedness concept simply means that ethnic entrenchment in a business closes recruitment to other ethnic groups into that sector of the work force (1987; 1996). Self-employment may actually operate to retain conservative patriarchal relations, as an interaction between ethnic economy and cultural retension.

CHALDEAN PATRIARCHY

The definition of patriarchy requires careful consideration. Deniz Kandiyoti (1988) notes that there are differences in Asian and Afro-Caribbean kinship practices. Similarly, Stephanie Coontz (2006) argues that European and Asians families differ. This dissertation argues that Chaldeans follow an Asian kinship model, referred to as classical patriarchy (Kandiyoti 1988). As presented by Deniz Kandiyoti, particular attention is

paid to the structure of power in the domestic realm. Suad Joseph (1999b) provides a valuable addition to this model by focusing on connective patriarchy for its age and gender relationality. As she explains, the Arab model follows multiple rules that define relationship obligations and power. Both connective and classical patriarchy operate in Chaldean kinship.

STRUCTURE OF GENDER RELATIONS: STRUCTURATION THEORY

Robert Connell (1987; 2002) appropriates structuration for the purpose of exploring structures of gender relations. These are power, economics, emotions and symbols. These structures channel the ebb and flow of men and women's lives as they navigate gender regimes in work, education, and organizations.

To date, most studies on immigrant gender relations focus almost exclusively on power and economic factors. As an exception to this tendency, Prema Kurien (2003) adds storytelling to her understanding of gendered ethnicity. And women's control over cultural narratives stems from women's employment and the domestic power that they gain in the post-migration period. Sheba George (2005) offers a book length treatment of gender using a structuration model. Yet, she limits her analysis to the structures of power and economy. My work expands on this by focusing on how emotional and symbolic relations operate in the Chaldean community. Thus, *tenetha* offers emotional and symbolic importance to social life. The ritual involves significant amounts of time, money and energy to celebrate, making them a formidable structure.

Using this model towards understanding the post-migration period also requires looking at gender regimes relative to the overall gender order between regimes. Again,

regimes operate within any social institution or organization around the four key structures of gender relations.

In terms of gender order, regimes operate either in complementary, conflictive or parallel relationships. Many studies have focused on private patriarchy, or interpersonal domination, forgetting that immigrants are robust community builders. In following gender relations among Chaldeans, it is important to evaluate religious rites, business ownership, social organizations, and family as these either buttress or change gender relations. In other words, Chaldeans have a community life where their own institutions operate as connected regimes, which allow them to create their own particular gender order somewhat independently of the larger society.

The gender adaptation literature offers some examples of this. Michael Jones-Correa (1998) documents gendered participation in hometown association. In this case, Mexican men set the agenda with only tangential participation by women. Prema Kurien's group does the opposite, where women assume power over storytelling with the intensions of reshaping gender relations in the domestic and community realms. Given these possibilities, my goal was to disentangle symbolic and emotional effects from work and power dimensions.

For Chaldeans, it turns out that social institutions operate at the complementary stage for the first cohort. Even the second generation of the second cohort struggles with their gender status in terms of attending parties and dances and in choosing their own occupations. Rapid assimilation does not occur, and women remain attached within the community. But given the larger social context of the United States, it is necessary to see how connective patriarchy is reproduced.

SOCIAL REPRODUCTION: THEORY

The social reproduction model in this study operates on the basis of exchanges within social fields. Pierre Bourdieu (1990; 2001; 1992) provides the basic model for this perspective. Within a social field, stakeholders seek to modify interactions towards their favor by using resources at their disposal to gain dominance. If that outcome is reached, then symbolic violence is said to delegitimize the symbolic capital of all others within a field.

My approach represents an accommodation with the model. In the *Logic of Practice*, Bourdieu discusses strategies by Kabyle families in the marital field related to wealth, number of children, and status of potential matches. Parents hold greater power over marriage than children given that they control the sole source of wealth, land. In deciding acceptable marital partners, boys are expected to marry women that fetch a high dowry. Of course, this depends on multiple factors such as the number of siblings, their sex, and the potential for hypergamy. In other words, logic depends on what capital a family holds.

This modeling does not fit my needs. But the notion that social actors vie for legitimacy within a social field does. Therefore, I look at data that supports the dominant habitus of honor, but seeking to redefine what was acceptable. To that end, second-generation women keep challenging the doxic position on dating, marriage, employment and education. They challenge the community to reconsider the cultural assumptions of honor and shame.

I prefer understanding Chaldean women's agency under this model for it demonstrates that compliance and contest operate simultaneously. Thus, the women may

seem controlled, because they concede to a conservative patriarchal bargain. But that reading is only partial. The data shows a tremendous amount of symbolic capital in women's hands that makes it viable for them to forge social capital as a resource to negotiate change over the definitions of *aib*.

CENTURY IN THE MAKING

Chaldeans migrate for multiple reasons and across nearly eleven decades. Given this long period, economic and political changes provide potential structural conditions for reordering gender relations. Economically, nationalizing oil had fed the economy in the 1970s, but this had a paradoxical impact. While the state had used these proceeds to extend universal education to boy and girls, many Chaldeans had found the strong economy supported male breadwinning. If any thing, the oil driven economic boom had deepened the competitive advantage to Chaldeans who were already established business owners. Besides, universal education came late to Iraq, and most of the first and second cohorts had already immigrated to the United States (Marr 1985).

Sana al-Khayyat (1990), Qais al-Nouri (1993), and Lahai Mokhif (1991) revisit the issue of gender relations in the 1990s. They argue independently that neither urbanization nor war had reconfigured women's gender status entirely. And today, the conditions for women have simply worsened.

In Iraq, gender regimes and the overall order between regimes had supported patriarchal privilege while the majority of the first and second cohort lived there. In the United States, social changes in work, family size and age at time of first marriage have been cumulative causes in changing domestic and public gender relations. Despite these

gains, Veronica Tichenor (1999) and Barbara Risman (1998) find gender constraints operate against women, while Pepper Swartz (1994) presents data showing the possibility of egalitarian domestic relations in peer marriage. As such, America's gender regimes might well reshape Chaldean gender relations with more time in the United States.

However, Chaldean gender relations have stood the test of time, although there have been changes with regards to dating and other issues relating to more mobility and freedom for young women. The reasons for conserving traditional measures of masculinity and femininity are somewhat complex, but deal with status consistency, male bread winning, connective patriarchy, family unit migration, continued migration and social solidarity.

The pioneers had founded the key social institutions to reestablish male breadwinning and patrilineage in the United States. The ethnically owned economy in grocery stores and party stores provide the first step in what Jennifer Lee (2002) refers to as evolutionary retail chain. As the more experienced Chaldeans moved into different businesses services (or up the line of business specialization) newer immigrants had replaced them in the store business. Today, Chaldeans sell Information Technology, professional services, and development expertise in construction and architecture. Male breadwinning remains in place across a broad spectrum of self-employment activities.

In large part, the initial business model relied on men's positions within connective patriarchy. Men had drawn on their authority, as patriarchs, to gain the support of their immediate family to work in their stores. Siblings had pooled resources to buy collectively owned businesses. And fathers had relied on sons to support them when age or linguistic isolation rendered them superannuated. Further, the store business

had the potential to draw the lineage together in the United States which sustained both the family composition of extended family, and the myriad of in connective relations.

As security concerns had worsened abroad, extended family members choose to migrate and join family already in the United States. As a result, the migrants' older brothers revived traditional gender expectations in the community.

Finally, the stark pre-migration contexts had operated to create reactive solidarity. As a minority, Chaldeans had become accustomed to relying on their families. This fits the broader pattern of family-based social networks in the Arab region (see Shryock 2000). And in migrating, they had depended on family based-social networks to provide resources in terms of jobs, housing, and loans.

EMOTIONAL AND SYMBOLIC STRCUTURES OF GENDER RELATIONS

Initial indication suggests that neither immigration nor settlement processes had led to male status inconsistency or role reversal that is accompanied by women's resources. Rather, the data had shown that men remained in charge of multiple facets of social, economic and family life. Such persistence comes about only when the legitimacy of this social arrangement is supported by sources other than brute force.

Using the method of structural inventory, information is presented on the emotional and symbolic structures of gender relations. The Chaldean family provides a rich cultural life for the people living in their community. Many rituals reaffirm the community's ethnic identity. These include family sociability, tenetha, and gifting.

Family sociability includes the ongoing integration of the extended family. Weekends, holidays, and special occasions bring the extended family together, so that it

is possible to know and have close family relations with hundreds of cousins. Further, brothers and sisters expect strong and positive relations between each other and their children. Maternal and paternal uncles and aunts understand their roles in interacting with the second generation. Together, sociability and extended family relations create strong social networks which have constructive implications for business relations.

Another source of emotional attachment are community rituals. Historically, the tenetha had tied families together. Today, this rite carries less financial or economic consideration, but still generates a significant emotional investment and holds some symbolic meaning as well. Further, brides and grooms have other occasions that draw their families together deepening the symbolic quality of marriage. The wedding reception itself is organized around patriarchal connectivity. Birth order and sex drives the guest list. And valuation of gifting depends on the closeness and respect paid to the groom and bride's family of origin.

SOCIAL REPRODUCION

The Chaldeans hold that masculine and feminine behavior should follow percepts of honor and shame. These two concepts frame the Chaldean habitus which shapes social action within social fields. This is only possible given the ongoing quality of community life. Consequently, when Chaldeans interact over important issues, like an interest in marriage, each knows the quality of the others resources, their various capitals. As such, the history of particular families and individuals shape perceptions regarding business trustworthiness and matrimonial worth.

In following the second-generation, my findings indicated that women hold a stake in family honor. The data clearly documents that women face constraints in multiple social fields (dating, education, and marriage), but they work in woman-to-woman networks to win concessions from parents. As a result, they reshape the definitions of shame, and gain liberty to attend extracurricular school activities, group data, and set their own educational goals and work expectations.

But it is also clear that the habitus has deep seated gender norms and statuses that are hard to invalidate. If these dispositions come to censor the entire field, be that dating, marriage, education or work, then a state of symbolic violence has been achieved. Using this as an objective measure, I believe that youth are participating in reproducing an ethnic culture in the United States. However, the culture is responsive to the new social context and demands of the second-generation.

LIMITATIONS

The research does hold several limitations. While the community concept operates within this group, there is evidence that ethnic identity has an optional quality among some of the latest second-generation and youth of the third cohort (Waters 1990). One informant actually had commented that women with premarital sexual experience are being seen as acceptable marital partners within the community. Obviously, this would only apply if the groom is not from an "old fashion" family. Another group of Chaldeans, not interviewed for this study, are converted Protestants.

Still, the data has not been contrived. Among those participating in the study, one-hundred percent can define organizing cultural tenants. Nearly, one-hundred percent

document close social ties with family members, centrality of business cooperation, and common experiences in migration and family life.

Of the third cohort, there is little evidence gathered here. This group presents a unique cohort. Their experiences under Saddam Hussein's surveillance society, decades of war, sanctions and occupation, and experiences in country of first asylum may well have sparked significant changes in gender attitudes. The only third cohort informant had clearly rejected the Chaldean habitus, and had ceased to participate in the social fields of the community, making this a possibility.

While transnationalism was touched upon, the relationship between the Chaldean diaspora and the Detroit community are not fully understood. Clearly the community maintains an interest in Iraq and the diaspora. Fundraisers support orphans abroad and Neo-Soureth instruction schools. Also the community's major organizations have petitioned the United States Congress to provide refugee status for those without a country of permanent settlement, and families support kin stuck in their country of first asylum.

FUTURE RESEARCH

The relationship between ethnically owned economies and gender relations in the immigrant family is beginning to take shape. While class location has been the leading analytic tool, it is clear that certain immigrants hold cultural attitudes and identities which maintain conservative patriarchal bargains. In these cases, gender arrangements may be a driving factor in creating ethnically owned economies. And in the Chaldean cases, I have collected data that documents this trend.

The initial data shows that men benefit from connective patriarchy and receive a host of resources related to their status as patriarchs. The resources vary but include: dedicated family labor, extended family cooperation, and family derived loans. Resources extend beyond the family to Chaldean embeddedness in higher order organizations. For example, Chaldean ownership in food stores leads to their involvement in Associated Food Dealers of Michigan. Similarly, Chaldean business leaders network at the Chaldean American Chamber of Commerce providing insight into key problems businesses might face in uncertain regulatory conditions, as was the case when oil companies sold their gas stations.

These findings need to be presented as the ethnic economy field holds some ambivalence towards the necessity of family labor in business formation. Further, little information is presented on the attitudes of children in ethnic economies (Song 1999).

CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States war on terrorism is leading to a new set of institutional and personal connections that may increase the number of immigrants and refugees from regions of the world were classical patriarchy is dominant. In these areas, we know that foreign direct investment is slowly changing the gender orders of these societies granting women some legitimacy to work and travel (Oishi 2005). As migrants consolidate their settlement, some cities should become host to an understudied set of social relations. This dissertation has reviewed one such group to note their distinctiveness.

Minority status among immigrants in the pre-migration period has not been assessed completely either. Cecilia Menjívar (2003) recognizes gender differences among

Ladino and Mayan immigrants from Guatemala. But most cases studies focus on ethnically dominant migrants or treat migrants according to their United States minority status. It is clear that Chaldean minority status had created an outsider orientation. As a result the community has become practiced at being community builders in two countries. This is similar to Parminder Bhachu's (1985) East Asian immigrants that twice migrated from India to Africa, and then from Africa to England.

While multiple studies exist on gender adaptation by migrants, few document gender relations as an outcome of community processes. In this study, community has significant importance which can not be easily invalidated. The multiple community organizations offer social settings to act out gender identity: to do gender. Further, community processes make it possible to sustain high degrees of connectivity between family members both horizontally and vertically. Also, the community reifies the connective features of patriarchy, which is a finding often overlooked in Nabila Kibria's (1993) work on the Vietnamese in Philadelphia. For example, a battered woman sought help from her abuser's older brother. In other words, she turned to the community's traditional means, connective patriarchy, to resolve the problem.

The focus on emotional and symbolic structures of gender relations offers a means to critically examine what is often called gender ideology, noted as the deep seated belief in gender differences in behavior (Fernández-Kelly and García 1990). In many ways, the degree that migrant women seek changes in their patriarchal bargains relates directly to the degree that social life reproduces legitimacy in these symbolic and emotional structures. The rites, customs and rituals offer a means for substantiating a collective value system which operates within the Chaldean patriarchal bargain. It is

apparent that women are busily reworking these traditions, but their focus for changes relates to maintaining their legitimacy in the habitus of the community. Of course, Chaldeans are slipping away to the mainstream society, but it is clear that there is a large community busy and active in reproducing their social values.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Title of Dissertation Project: From the Tigris to the Rogue: an exploratory study of Chaldean gendered ethnicity and gender transition.

Dear Sir or Madam:

This is a consent form, asking for your participation in a study about immigrants and their settlement experiences in the Detroit region. The goal of this interview is to collect your ideas, sentiments, and feelings to better understand how your life is influenced by international migration. The interview will last from 1 to 3 hours, and will be recorded. If you participate in this study, you will not benefit from your participation. There are no foreseeable risks associated with participation in this study.

What is the value of this study? Your participation in this study may contribute to the understanding of America's multiple ethnic, racial, and immigrant groups. Such information may help us to better understand each other. Such information has helped us to better understand how immigrant groups are settling and adjusting to life in America, and how non-immigrant groups understand and interact with them. I hope you will take this opportunity to help me better understand the interactions between yourself and others in the Detroit region.

How will this information be used? The details you provide may be included in a dissertation, book, or social science journals. As such, you may want to know more about your rights as a participant. It is my responsibility to protect your confidentiality by every measure allowed for by law. I can only do this by reporting and attributing any information you provide under a pseudonym. If you allow me to take your photo, you must realize that your image may be reproduced in a publication. If you chose, I can collect your information and offer to one of several museums and institutes that are interested in the collection and archiving of the life stories of immigrants.

I hope you choose to participate in this study today. And should you have any questions or wish to provide additional information after the interview, please contact me at the following address.

Chuck Spurlock
Sociology Department
316 Berkey Hall
Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824-1111
Telephone: (517) 355-6640
Fax: (517) 432-2856

and by email spurloc1@msu.edu

or if an emergency (only during reasonable hours) my home phone is 517-337-3989 (please no collect calls).
Title of Dissertation Project: An exploratory study of international migration and social factors affecting the settlement and adaptation of immigrants in the Detroit region.

Please sign:

Yes, I want to participate but I do not wish to contribute this interview to an archive:
Signed by _____, and date _____.

Yes, I release you to use my image or that of my business or property for your own work:
Signed by _____, date _____.

Yes, I wish for my life history and my image to be stored as part of an archive. But understand that such material may not be released immediately to the public.
Signed by _____, date _____.

Additionally, Michigan State University wants you to know that if you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to contact Peter Vasilenko, Ph.D., Director of the Human Subject Protection Programs at Michigan State University: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, email: irb@msu.edu, or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824.

APPENDIX 2

Survey Guide

FROM THE TIGRIS TO THE ROUGE: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CHALDEAN GENDERED ETHNICITY AND GENDER TRANSITION

Demographic Information

Baseline demographic data is collected on every informant. This includes: social identity, age, sex, and years in the United States, religious background, citizenship status and involvement in community organizations.

Immigration History:

What was the migration motive?

Who was in the migration network?

What were the work and homemaking responsibilities prior to coming to the United States?

Does this family maintain social ties to support family members abroad?

What was the highest level of education attained abroad?

Do you belong to any social clubs or academic groups that have their origin abroad?

What was the work performed abroad?

What was the marital status abroad?

What were family living and support arrangements abroad?

Did the informant come with his or her family?

Whose idea was it to migrate?

Did the family come together?

Did the family stop in a transitional country? How long was the family there and who supported the family while in this country?

Who sponsored the migration?

Family History:

At what age did you marry?

What was the age of your spouse?

Did you have children right away?

Did you live with your in-laws?

Who supported the family?

After migration did you live with relatives?

Do you live near relatives now?

Is it important to visit family?

How often do you visit family?

What are the family traditions you uphold?

Are weddings important within your community?

Do families sit together during community events? Are there exceptions?

Does your community maintain a gender division with women and children separate from men?

Do you feel that you have the right to speak for your younger brothers, sisters and cousins?

Do older relatives tell you what to do? And do you listen?

Is it important to maintain maternal and paternal relations between siblings?

Does this involve simply visitation?

Or do you expect relatives to help with the moral upbringing of your children?

As a second-generation adult, do you plan to marry within your mother and father's social group?

Do you plan to marry anyone from your geographic region?

Do you plan to marry within the general American public?

What is your expectations regarding jobs and education?

Do you want to leave the area?

Is your family so important that you might wish to stay in the area?

Did family life interfere with your education? If so how?

Could you participate in extracurricular actives?

What are the types of things you did as a kid that make you who you are today?

Education History:

What is the highest level of schooling abroad?

Do you speak the mother tongue fluently? Do you write it fluently? Is it important to maintain? Why?

Did you continue your education in the United States?

Is education the reason you came to the United States?

Do you know others educated at a college program abroad that you maintain regular contact? Has this group formed a social club?

What subject did you study?

Was it important to find a job in your field of study? If not, why not?

Did you require your kids to learn the mother tongue?

Are your kids able to converse with their grandparents, or is there a language gap?

For the second generation:

Did you learn your parents' mother tongue? If no, then why not? If yes, did you like it?

Did your parents allow you to attend school activities?

Did you negotiate with your parents on issues like dating, attending dances or proms, or other issues? How did you negotiate and bargain? Did you have an easier or harder time than the younger or older siblings?

Work History:

How did you find your first job when you arrived in the United States?

How did you find subsequent jobs?

Did you take a job that the community finds acceptable work?

Do you own a business?

Did family help raise the initial capital?

Did you run the business with family? Were your children helpful and needed in your business? Do you want them to follow in your footsteps?

How many business have you owned? Is there any kind of progression in it?

Do you rely as much on family now as you did when you started?

Do you have a retail business in Detroit?

Does your business deal more with b2b or is it towards the public?

Do you find it hard to work with the public? If so, why?

Do you participate in the communities that support your business? If so how?

Do you have good working relations with the public? Or are there problems?

Is there an expectation for your social group to get involved with the community, or is it your own idea?

Organizational Involvement History:

Do you attend social or cultural clubs?

If so, are these professional or community based?

Do you contribute funds to support these social institutions?

Which are the most important social clubs within your community? Do you belong or don't want to belong to these? If yes why? If no why?

Do you have leaders within your community that are not elected to public office?

Is it important to uphold your status within these community organizations?

How important to your identity are these organizations?

Spatial History

Where did you initially settle?

Do you still live there?

Where did you move?

Do you live near family members?

What is it about your current residence that you like besides the commute? Is it close to family, and social and community organizations?

APPENDIX 3.0

CHALDEAN SAMPLE
MEN

	Generation	Career	Age
1.	2nd	college student	20s
2.	2nd	college student/store employee	20s
3.	2nd	college student/disc jokey	20s
4.	2nd	professional	30s
5.	2nd	professional	30s
6.	2nd	college student/store employee	20s
7.	2nd	business owner	20s
8.	1 and ½	business owner	40s
9.	1 and ½	Executive	60s
10.	1st	retired business owner	70s
11.	1st	business owner	50s
12.	1st	Engineer	60s
13.	2nd	business owner	50s
14.	1st	Engineer	50s
15.	1st	real-estate	60s
16.	1 and ½	Clergy	30s
17.	2nd	college student/store employee	20s
18.	1st	real-estate	50s
19.	1st	Engineer	60s
20.	1st	Artist	60s
21.	1st	computer programming	50s
22.	2nd	Lawyer	30s
23.	1st	business owner	60s
24.	1st	computer programming	50s
25.	1st	business owner	60s
26.	2nd	Lawyer	30s
27.	1st	scientist	60s
28.	2nd	business owner	30s

APPENDIX 3.1

CHALDEAN SAMPLE
WOMEN

	Generation	Career	Age
1.	2nd	student/intern	20s
2.	2nd	financial services	30s
3.	2nd	Lawyer	40s
4.	2nd	social worker	40s
5.	2nd	financial services	30s
6.	2nd	financial services	30s
7.	2nd	Teacher	20s
8.	2nd	student/employed	20s
9.	2nd	Teacher	20s
10.	1 and ½	financial services	30s
11.	1st	social worker	30s
12.	2nd	Doctor	40s
13.	2nd	student/employed	20s
14.	3rd	social worker	30s
15.	2nd	Teacher	20s
16.	2nd	retired/charity	70s
17.	2nd	business administration	40s
18.	1st	student/employed	20s
19.	2nd	Professional	30s
20.	1 and ¾	Homemaker	40s
21.	2nd	Teacher	20s
22.	2nd	retired/store	60s
23.	2nd	artist	30s

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