 

 

[IDDA DV

Michigan. State
University

2-9/9

 

 

 

This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled

THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL AND RELATIONAL
FACTORS ON SUPERVISOR EMPLOYEE NEGOTIATIONS

presented by

Eric B.Meiners

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for the

Doctoral degree in -' Communication

 

 

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Maj/C15,]? I/ I - 1 L

 

/ Major Professor’s Signature

May 12, 2010

 

Date

MSU is an Afﬁrmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer

 

THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL AND RELATIONAL FACTORS ON
SUPERVISOR EMPLOYEE NEGOTIATIONS

By

Eric B. Meiners

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Communication

2010

ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL AND RELATIONAL FACTORS ON
SUPERVISOR EMPLOYEE NEGOTIATIONS

By
Eric B. Meiners

Through the process of negotiation, organizational members and supervisors often
seek to alter or establish role boundaries and modify work tasks and processes. Although
such negotiation activity plays a vital part in the ongoing coordination of behavior in
organizations, little research has addressed its inherent communicative dimensions. In
attempt to shed light on these issues, the current study addresses supervisor/subordinate
role negotiation through the framework of integrative negotiation. Integrative negotiation,
featuring directness, elaboration, and mutual concessions is essential in affording
supervisors and subordinates the opportunity to achieve greater clarity, exchange
information, and modify positions to maximize their joint outcomes, all aspects critical in
optimizing available knowledge to make informed decisions.

This study’s sample consisted of 105 workers (80 employees and 25 supervisors)
employed with the Urban County Government of a mid-sized southeastem US. city.
Using a variation on the Critical Incident Technique, employees were asked to recall a
speciﬁc interaction with their supervisor in which changes in job expectations were
discussed. Employees responded to items measuring the integrative dimensions of this
conversation, in addition to items assessing leader-member exchange (LMX). Divisional
supervisors were asked to complete items measuring formal structure: dimensions of
centralization (PDM and Hierarchy of authority) and formalization (Job Codiﬁcation, Job

Speciﬁcation and Rule Observation).

Both structural and relational factors were found signiﬁcantly associated with the
dimensions of integrative negotiation. Supervisors’ ratings of rule observation were
negatively associated with employees’ reported levels of elaboration and mutual
concessions during their negotiation. Employees’ ratings of LMX were positively
associated with mutual concessions. A supplemental analysis of the data revealed that
mutual concessions was positively related with employee reports of increases in job
satisfaction, increases in supervisor satisfaction, and increases in job effectiveness. The
implications of these ﬁndings are discussed in addition to the strengths and weaknesses.

Future directions for research are presented as well.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project would not have been possible were it not for the efforts of several
key individuals. First, I would like to thank Claudette Meiners for her assistance and
support throughout this project. I would also like to thank Charlie Boland for his
invaluable cooperation during the data collection process. Each of the members of my
doctoral committee: Hee Sun Park, Sandi Smith, and Linn Van Dyne, contributed
valuable guidance in the development and revision of this paper, and their efforts are
certainly appreciated.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of my doctoral chair, Frank
Boster, without whom, this project would have never come to fruition. He truly embodies
the roles of scholar, mentor, and advisor. With his patience, good humor, and sense of
resolve, he has been a calming and steadying presence during the seemingly endless

climb of this dissertation. He is a credit to his ﬁeld and to his craft.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. vi

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
Assumptions and Boundary Conditions ................................................................... 4

CHAPTER 1

COMMUNICATION AND ROLE DEVELOPMENT ....................................................... 6
Communication and Negotiation ........................................................................... 10
Integrative Potential and Role Negotiation ............................................................ 14
Formal Organization Structure and Integrative Negotiation ................................. l7
Informal Organization Structure and Integrative Negotiation ............................... 22
The Interaction of Formal and Informal Structural Factors ................................... 26

CHAPTER 2

METHOD .......................................................................................................................... 30
Research Site .......................................................................................................... 30
Participants ............................................................................................................. 30
Survey Instrument .................................................................................................. 32

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS .......................................................................................................................... 37
Critical Incident Categories ................................................................................... 37
Quantitative Descriptions of Critical Incidents ...................................................... 39
Tests of Hypotheses ............................................................................................... 42
Supplemental Analysis ........................................................................................... 46

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................... 49
Supplemental Analysis ........................................................................................... 52
Strengths and Limitations ...................................................................................... 53
Future Directions ................................................................................................... 5 7

ENDNOTES ...................................................................................................................... 62

APPENDD( 1: Employee and Supervisor N-sizes by Division ......................................... 64

APPENDIX 2: Retained Scale Items, Reliabilities, and Factor Loadings ......................... 65

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 67

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Frequencies and Sample Excerpts of Critical Incident Categories ................... 39
Table 3.2: Zero-Order Correlations for Control Variables and Scales .............................. 43
Table 3.3: Main and Interaction Effects for Directness ..................................................... 45
Table 3.4: Main and Interaction Effects for Elaboration ................................................... 45
Table 3.5: Main and Interaction Effects for Mutual Concessions ..................................... 46

vi

INTRODUCTION

Although the term “role” has been used in a number of ways across (and within)
literatures, a role can generally be deﬁned as “The recurring actions of an individual,
appropriately interrelated with the repetitive activities of others so as to yield a
predictable outcome” (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 189). In performing their roles, individuals
offer up semi-scripted performances guided by social norms, rules, and demands of their
respective audiences (Goffman, 1959; Biddle & Thomas, 1966). The set of persons
prescribing standards for how roles are to be performed and evaluated is often referred to
as the role set, and the sum collection of behaviors comprising a role is typically ascribed
on the basis of status or position (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Merton, 1957; Roos & Starke,
1981; Sarbin & Allen, 1968; Turner, 1956).

Although it has been applied in a number of settings (Biddle & Thomas, 1966),
role theory is prominent in organizational research. Traditional models of bureaucratic
organization typically posit that stable predictable role enactment is the key to the
ongoing coordination of work activity (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Roos & Starke, 1981). The
very nature of role activity in the modern organization has come into question, however,
as scholars have recently suggested that trends such as globalization, advancing
technology, and the decline of unionization necessitate more dynamic organizational
forms, based more on ﬂexible, innovative role behavior than static work routines
(Bridges, 1994; Kahn & Kram, 1994; Miller, Joseph, & Apker, 2000; Parker, 1998;
Parker, Wall, & Jackson, 1997; Rousseau, 2001). It has further been argued that, as

proactive role orientations become increasingly important in organizational life and role

boundaries become more malleable and ambiguous, workers must often take a more
active part in constructing day-to-day arrangements to coordinate their ongoing role
behavior (Barley, 1990; Fine, 1984; Strauss, 1978).

The communication activity undertaken by organizational members as they
articulate the boundaries and expectations for each member’s role has most frequently
been described as a process of negotiation (Ashford & Taylor, 1990; Brett, 1984; Jablin,
2001). In negotiating their roles, members might seek to alter the expectations
accompanying their work routines in a number of ways, including co-opting additional
tasks, phasing out less desirable task elements, or modifying existing procedures and
routines (Brett, 1984; Bunce & West, 1996; Farr & Ford, 1990; Munton & West, 1995;
West & Farr, 1990).

Extended insights into the ways organizational members negotiate their role
boundaries are important for a number of reasons. First, effective negotiation often allows
workers to revise misspeciﬁed or inefﬁciently designed tasks and procedures, improving
overall work effectiveness and helping the organization better adapt to its external
environment (Staw & Boettger, 1990). Role negotiation might also provide members a
better ﬁt between their work activity and their own abilities, aptitudes, and preferences
(Jablin, 2001; Jablin & Krone, 1987; Roos & Starke, 1981; Wrzesniewski & Dutton,
2001). The successful resolution of such issues may help workers assimilate to
organizational demands (Jablin, 2001; Rousseau, 2001; Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001 ),
cope with work related stress (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthal, 1964), and
assert personal control over the working environment (Brett, 1984; Bunce & West, 1996;

Farr & Ford, 1990).

Although role theory enjoys a rich and diverse history (Biddle & Thomas, 1966),
the breadth of communicative activity involved in organizational role negotiation remains
largely unexplored (Jablin, 2001). Nevertheless, this paper argues that the consideration
of communication issues is vital to understanding how organization members develop
their work roles. Role development and maintenance is, by deﬁnition, a communicative
process enmeshed within interconnected subsystems of the organization and shaped by a
number of contingencies within the work environment (Jablin, 2001; Katz & Kahn,
1978). This research seeks to shed insight into the process of work-unit negotiation, both
by addressing the key communicative dimensions comprising this process, and by
proposing conceptual linkages between the organizational context and the communicative
activity undertaken by members as they negotiate their roles.

I will ﬁrst present the assumptions and boundary conditions for the proposed
study. In the following sections, I will review literature discussing the importance of
communication and negotiation to individual work role development. I will also review
research in the traditional negotiation paradigm, and, drawing from work in integrative
negotiation (Pruitt, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965), I propose three communicative
dimensions of role negotiation: directness, elaboration, and mutual concessions. In the
remainder of this paper, I will discuss both the formal (conﬁgurational) and informal
(coactivational) views of organizational structure and derive hypotheses predicting
relationships between these aspects of structure and the communicative dimensions of

organizational role negotiation.

Assumptions and Boundary Conditions

This research is guided by several assumptions and boundary conditions. First, it
is assumed that members can negotiate elements of their work role. Although success in
negotiating role elements may vary as a function of skill, motivation level, or experience,
it is assumed that people within a wide variety of organizational forms and job
assignments can (and will) seek to negotiate role elements. Although personality factors
such as extraversion, verbosity, need for achievement, or desire for control are all
assumed to affect the likelihood of role negotiation (Ashford & Black, 1996; Black &
Ashford, 1995), these factors are beyond the scope of this paper.

Second, this study is limited to verbal interactions involving alterations to
recurrent work behaviors. The discussions of interest might involve the addition or
modiﬁcation of tasks, responsibilities, processes, or technologies. Also of interest are
discussions involving role reduction, or the elimination of tasks deemed superﬂuous or
unnecessary. Changes to a work role initiated without any related verbal interaction are
outside the domain of this study, as are trivial or dysfunctional role modiﬁcations such as
deviance, tardiness, absenteeism, or a general reduction in effort. Also beyond the scope
of this paper are negotiations involving outright role transitions such as leaving the
organization or transferring to another department.

Third, this study is limited to negotiations initiated by subordinates with
immediate supervisors. Although it is recognized that members may negotiate role
expectations with peers or subordinates, research on role development places particular
emphasis on interaction between members and supervisors (i.e., Dansereau, Graen &

Haga, 1975; Dienesch & Liden, 1986; Graen, 1976; Graen & Scandura, 1987; Jablin &

Krone, 1987). The managerial dyad has long been recognized as the basic unit of
instruction and report in the organization (F arace, Monge, & Russell, 1977; Jablin, 1979),
as supervisors not only supply information, but can provide legitimacy for role
modiﬁcations and assist coordinating changes with others in the role set.

Finally, while the impact of culture on negotiation process has spurred a
formidable stream of research (Adair, 2003; Brett, 2000; Drake, 2001), the hypotheses
regarding communication processes tested in this study apply to negotiations between

parties in low-context, western organizations.

CHAPTER 1
COMMUNICATION AND ROLE DEVELOPMENT

The importance of communication processes to the development of work roles is
a prominent theme in organizational research (Apker, 2001; J ablin, 2001; Katz & Kahn,
1978). Investigations in role development suggest that upon newcomers’ entry into the
organization, members of the role-set communicate, through both formal and informal
channels, expectations about the privileges, duties, and obligations accompanying the
newcomers’ position (Kahn et al., 1964; Sarbin & Allen, 1968; Van Maanen & Schein,
1979). Interpreting this set of messages as a “received role,” focal members engage in
role-taking as they anticipate the expectations of others and enact their roles accordingly
(Katz & Kahn, 1978; Turner, 1956). Role senders monitor incumbents’ role activity and
provide revised cues expressing acceptance or rejection of their role performance (Katz &
Kahn, 1978).

In addition to prescribed task elements, organizational roles are said to include an
“area of option in which the occupant can exercise choice with respect to activities,
methods, and styles” (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 219), and members often work to craft work
role elements (J ablin & Krone, 1987; Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001). During this period
of adjustment to the new position, organizational newcomers often work to establish a
range of latitude within which they will modify aspects of their role (Graen & Scandura,
1987; Jablin & Krone, 1987; Nicholson, 1984; Schein, 1971). This two-way process
whereby role incumbents and role senders attempt to clarify the boundaries for the

incumbents’ roles is referred to as “role-making” (Graen, 1976; Katz & Kahn, 1978).

The supervisor/subordinate dyad is a key arena in which work expectations are
coordinated (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975 ; Graen, 1976; Jablin, 2001). The very
nature of the supervisor-employee dyad necessitates the periodic negotiation and
resolution of workplace issues (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Employees oﬁen rely upon
supervisors’ support and facilitation of work to help reduce role ambiguity or conﬂict
(Bedeian, Arrnenakis, & Curran, 1981), and those perceiving their supervisors as open
and receptive to feedback are more likely to voice ideas and suggest role innovations
(Axtell, Holman, Unsworth, Wall, & Waterson, 2000; Janssen, de Vries, and Cozijnsen,
1998; Saunders, Sheppard, Knight, & Roth, 1992). Likewise, supervisors depend on
subordinates for resources, information, unique skills, and leverage in dealing with third
parties as well (Farace, Monge, & Russell, 1977; Kotter, 1985). As the mutual
dependence between managers and employees increases, so does the potential for
conﬂicting values, preferences, and priorities, which must often be resolved through
negotiation.

Researchers suggests that, although they are often limited in formal authority,
employees in organizations have a number of tactics at their disposal as they attempt to
inﬂuence those higher in the organization’s hierarchy (e. g., Deluga & Perry, 1991,
Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Schriesheim & Hinkin, 1990; Yukl & Falbe, 1990).
Among the tactics presented in these studies most similar to negotiation are exchange, the
promise of beneﬁts in return for compliance with the subordinate’s goal, and rational
persuasion, obtaining support through logical arguments and factual evidence (Kipnis,
Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Yuk] & Falbe, 1990). Such research is notable in its

recognition of subordinates’ ability to inﬂuence and negotiate with supervisors. This

research, however, paints a fairly simplistic picture of the process, addressing negotiation
as a singular type of inﬂuence tactic, and failing to consider that numerous types of
negotiations between organization members are not only possible, but likely as well
(Strauss, 1978).

Other research, focusing more directly on role-making activity, also addresses
supervisor/employee negotiation. Extending earlier models of role-making (i.e., Katz et
al., 1964; Katz & Kahn, 1978), Graen and Scandura (1987) present a model of dyadic
organizing, describing how supervisors and subordinates negotiate the boundaries of the
subordinate’s role through a series of interactions, or role episodes. In this model,
supervisors initiate the role-making cycle, offering select subordinates the chance to
engage in non-routine tasks in exchange for resources such as attention, information,
inﬂuence, higher status tasks, latitude, and support. The cycle continues as “the member
receives this proposal. . .decides on an appropriate counter offer, and sends this offer to
the superior” (Graen & Scandura, 1987; p. 181). Although Graen and Scandura frame
dyadic organizing as negotiating, this model pays little attention to the actual
communication activity between supervisors and subordinates as they coordinate role
activity. The authors instead suggest that role-making is “seldom explicitly discussed by
the superior and member” and that “over time, a set of understandings governing
appropriate transactions is developed” (p. 181-182). Hence, in this model the term
negotiation is used rather loosely to describe the incremental working out of agreements
between supervisor and subordinate as they enact their work duties.

In sum, although the term “negotiation” is frequently used in describing

interaction (both role-related and otherwise) between managers and employees, little

insight to date has been revealed as to the communicative dimensions comprising these
negotiations. Researchers have typically addressed supervisory negotiation either as a
tactic of upward inﬂuence (e. g., Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980) or have de-
emphasized its communicative nature altogether (e. g., Graen & Scandura, 1987). The
current research differs from these approaches by assuming a communication-centered
perspective to supervisory negotiation. This approach considers work-unit negotiation
more than merely the use of upward inﬂuence tactics or incremental development of
understandings, but rather a complex communicative interaction through which both
manager and subordinate seek to reconcile conﬂicting work related goals (Jablin, 2001).
As will be illustrated in this paper, this perspective on role negotiation focuses attention
to the manner in which supervisors and subordinates exchange messages, the depth of
information they reveal, and the degree of mutual inﬂuence exhibited as they coordinate
task behavior.

To begin explicating the key communicative dimensions of role negotiation, it is
useful to consider some of the ways negotiation has been conceptualized in its traditional
research paradigm. The following section ﬁrst presents a brief review of negotiation
research and introduces a model of integrative negotiation (Pruitt, 1981; Walton &
McKersie, 1965). This model is particularly relevant to organizational role negotiation, as
integrative negotiation processes are said to help negotiators maximize joint outcomes,
bring about mutually agreeable resolutions, and foster trust and attraction between parties
(Pruitt, 1981). The outcomes and agreements derived from integrative processes are also
valuable in that they are less prone to be refuted at a later time, and are expected to

facilitate collaborative problem-solving in subsequent negotiations (Pruitt, 1981).

Drawing from research in integrative negotiation, the following section presents three key
communicative dimensions of role negotiation: direct language between parties, the
elaboration of plans and ideas, and the exchange of mutual concessions.

Communication and Negotiation

Negotiation can be deﬁned broadly as a “form of decision-making in which two
or more parties talk with one another in an effort to resolve their opposing interests”
(Pruitt, 1981, p. xi.). Parties engaged in negotiation typically share some degree of
interdependence, and voluntarily interact to settle an issue, coordinate behavior, or
distribute a speciﬁc resource (Camevale & Pruitt, 1992; Neale & Northcraft, 1991;
Putnam & Jones, 1982; Rubin and Brown, 1975). Early research in negotiation was
grounded in game theory, and assumed bargainers behaved rationally, adhered to a set of
rules, and had perfect knowledge of alternatives and the values associated with them
(Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Putnam, 1985). Often conﬁned to
laboratory settings, researchers in this genre typically manipulated incentives or
communication restrictions, and assessed the timeliness with which negotiators could
resolve such well-deﬁned scenarios as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, or the Acme-Bolt
Trucking game (Putnam, 1985; Rubin & Brown, 1975).

Although game theory and laboratory settings have been valuable in advancing
negotiation and bargaining theory (Rubin & Brown, 1975), a number of limitations exist
in applying this research to organizational negotiations. For one, the economic game
theory underlying this research tradition limits the alternatives and choices that would
typically be available to negotiators in naturalistic settings (Putnam, 1985). The highly

controlled laboratory setting employed in traditional negotiation research offers little

10

information as to how structural contingencies within organizations can actually shift the
number and nature of issues subject to negotiation (Putnam, 1985). Moreover, in relying
on subjects with little or no history of interaction, traditional negotiation research often
fails to recreate how the underlying relationship between negotiators can shift patterns of
communication as they seek to resolve issues (Bazerman et al., 2000).

Subsequent research in negotiation eased its reliance on rational models of human
behavior and focused more on the process of negotiation conducted under natural
circumstances (Bazerman et al., 2000; Putnam, 1985; Putnam & Poole, 1987). One such
prominent ﬁamework of negotiation distinguishes distributive and integrative forms of
bargaining and decision making (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Pruitt, 1981; Rubin &
Brown, 1975). Distributive negotiation is “the process by which each party attempts to
maximize its own share in the context of ﬁxed-sum payoffs” (Walton & McKersie, 1965,
p. 13). In a more distributive type of negotiation, power exists as a ﬁxed quantity, and the
limited availability of power fosters a competitive, win-lose orientation in which
participants pursue their goals at the expense of the other (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982;
Walton & McKersie, 1965).

Although power imbalances between negotiators can foster distributive forms of
decision making, parties with a more balanced power relationship are less apt to
anticipate that competitive tactics will prove effective, and more likely to pursue
collaborative problem-solving (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981). Integrative negotiation can
be deﬁned as “the process by which the parties attempt to increase the size of the joint
gain without respect to the division of the payoffs” (Walton & McKersie, 1965, p. 13).

The integrative model assumes a variable-sum approach to power, and recognizes that

11

negotiators can often exercise mutual inﬂuence as they seek to resolve issues and allocate
resources (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Pruitt, 1981). Those in more integrative

negotiations generally approach conﬂict less as a win-lose situation, and more an
opportunity to search for mutually beneﬁcial alternatives1 (Bartos, 1995).

Research in distributive and integrative negotiation consistently points to three
communicative dimensions differentiating these forms of negotiation: directness,
elaboration, and mutual concessions (Folger & Poole, 1984; Pruitt, 1981; Walton &
McKersie, 1965). More distributive negotiations are likely to be lower on each of these
dimensions, as parties seek to maximize their own gains, often through the use of
indirectness, strategy, equivocation, or pressure tactics (Pruitt, 1981). Conversely, as
negotiations become more integrative, they are likely higher on each of these dimensions,
as negotiators spend greater effort to maximize their joint outcomes. Negotiations high on
these dimensions provide parties the opportunity to achieve greater clarity, exchange
greater amounts of information, and modify their positions in response to information
provided by the other. These dimensions can be elaborated as follows.

Directness. A direct speech act is deﬁned as an utterance whose intended function
is overtly reﬂected in its content (Riley, 1993). On the other hand, the intent of an
indirect speech act is not reﬂected in its content, and requires the receiver to draw
inferences to discern the sender’s intended meaning (Riley, 1993). Kellermann and Park
(2001) suggest that directness reﬂects efﬁciency, or “a concern for behavioral
expediency” in achieving one’s goals in an interaction (p. 4). Efﬁcient conversational
tactics are “immediate, and to the point,” whereas inefﬁcient tactics are “roundabout,

indirect, and. . .consuming time, energy and effort” (Kellermann & Park, 2001, p. 4).

12

Employees with high levels of trust in their supervisors should be more
comfortable using direct language, both in situations involving relational maintenance,
(Tepper, Moss, Lockhart, & Carr, 2007; Waldron, 1991) and in situations involving
dissent (Kassing, 2000). In negotiation contexts, direct language is likely to foster
integrative outcomes by allowing a more precise deﬁnition of both the salient issues
comprising the negotiation and the relative weight each party assigns to these issues
(Walton & McKersie, 1965). In a more distributive type of negotiation, parties more
likely use hints, hedges, and disclaimers to extract information ﬁom their opponent while
obfuscating their own preferences (Olekalns, & Smith, 2003; Pruitt, 1981).

Elaboration. Elaboration refers to the degree to which participants offer speciﬁc
plans, ideas, rationales, and suggestions for how an issue should be resolved. Negotiation
researchers have often emphasized the exchange of information as a key component of
integrative negotiation (Butler, 1999; Chandler & Judge, 1998; Fisher & Ury, 1981;

F ulmer & Barry, 2004; Kemp & Smith, 1994; Mumighan, Babcock, Thompson, &
Pillutla, 1999; Olekalns, & Smith, 2003; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994). By
exchanging key information, parties become better able to deﬁne the problem, explore
various options, and weigh the consequences, as well as locate areas for potential trade-
offs and compromise. In more distributive negotiations, participants might withhold
information in attempts to gain a strategic advantage over an opponent (Murnighan et al.,
1999; Putnam & Jones, 1982).

Mutual concessions. One of the deﬁning characteristics of negotiation is that it
usually involves the exchange of concessions and counter-offers between parties (Putnam

& Jones, 1982). Pruitt deﬁnes a concession simply as a “change of offer in the supposed

l3

direction of the other party’s interests that reduces the level of beneﬁt sought” (1981, p.
19). Accordingly, mutual concessions are present in a negotiation to the extent that both
parties to some extent concede, yield, adjust, or modify their respective positions in
response to information provided by the other.

Negotiation researchers frequently point to the exchange of mutual concessions as
a cornerstone to integrative negotiation (Langner & Winter, 2001; Moran & Ritov, 2002;
Roloff & Jordan, 1991; Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996). Mutual concessions are most
likely to foster an integrative agreement when applied to a number of alternate issues,
rather than a single issue over which compromise would yield a suboptimal outcome
(Walton & McKersie, 1965). By exchanging mutual concessions parties demonstrate a
cooperative orientation and that they are willing to work toward an equitable resolution,
which is expected to foster a supportive climate for interaction (Folger & Poole, 1984;
Rubin & Brown, 1975). In more distributive negotiations, parties are prone to attempt to
elicit unilateral concessions from their opponent, often through the use of threats,
ultimatums, or time pressure (Pruitt, 1981).
Integrative Potential and Role Negotiation

Although the beneﬁts of integrative processes are apparent, negotiation theorists
suggest that not all situations are equally conducive to negotiating an integrative
agreement. In other words, negotiations differ in terms of integrative potential. One
critical determinant of integrative potential is the number of issues subject to concurrent
consideration by the parties involved (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Pruitt, 1981; Rubin &
Brown, 1975). With multiple issues on the table, negotiators become able to assign

relative weight to each issue, and make trade-offs based on their respective value. Doing

14

so allows parties to seek high payoffs on issues they view as most important and grant
concessions on issues their opponent considers more important (Pruitt, 1981; Rubin &
Brown, 1975). In situations with higher integrative potential, negotiators have the
opportunity to choose cooperative avenues of problem solving, and work toward
mutually satisfactory resolutions (Pruitt, 1981). When few issues are available for
consideration, cooperation becomes less likely and parties are more prone to compete
over limited resources (Pruitt, 1981).

The principles of integrative potential in negotiation hold interesting implications
when applied to supervisor/subordinate negotiations. Members negotiating role

boundaries with managers essentially bargain over the set of tasks and activities
comprising their work routines2 (Ilgen & Hollenbeck, 1991). Therefore, the breadth of

activities within a given work role subject to negotiation should affect the likelihood of
integrative role negotiation. Lower integrative potential results when few role elements
are subject to negotiation. In these situations managers and subordinates can be imagined
to assume more traditional sender-receiver role relationships, with managers acting as
directive role senders and subordinates acting as passive role receivers (Roos & Starke,
1981). Subordinates lacking the opportunity to engage in open negotiation of the
expectations regarding their routines may choose to enact role modiﬁcation through more
furtive means and avoid negotiations of role preferences with supervisors altogether. A
wider array of task elements available for negotiation, however, results in higher
integrative potential. Members and supervisors have greater opportunity to go beyond the
conventional sender-receiver role relationship and engage in more bilateral discussions of

role preferences. With high integrative potential, supervisors and members will be better

15

able to align their positions in a cooperative manner, directly expressing suggestions,
elaborating ideas, and offering mutual concessions regarding role performance.

The negotiated order perspective holds that the social fabric of the organization
itself is not static and unchanging, but rather is constantly revised through the ongoing
negotiation and construction of arrangements among members (Day & Day, 1977; Fine,
1984; Maines, 1977; Strauss, 1978). A critical point in this perspective is that formal
rules and structures in the organization do not determine individual behavior as much as
they provide constraint and context as members reconﬁgure patterns of behavior with
others in the work environment (Barley, 1990; Conway, 1988; Corbin & Strauss, 1993;
Fine, 1984). As Strauss (1978) suggests, the structural properties of the social system not
only serve as backdrop to negotiation activity, but are also likely to enter ‘wery directly as
conditions into the course of the negotiation itself” (p. 99, original emphasis).

The tasks performed as part of a members’ work role do not take place in
isolation, but are instead situated within an array of structural constraints within the
organization (Katz & Kahn, 1978). It follows that the role-making process, and its
inherent negotiation activity is also embedded within a host of structural factors within
the organization (Roos & Starke, 1981), and that these factors should affect the
integrative potential of any given negotiation. The following sections describe two
perspectives on organizational structure: the conﬁgurational view and the coactivational
view (Dow, 1988). Although these perspectives are based on contrasting metaphors of
organizations (Morgan, 1986), both have implications for the integrative potential of

supervisor-subordinate negotiations. The following section addresses the conﬁgurational

l6

view of structure and describes two of its essential indices: centralization and
formalization.
Formal Organizational Structure and Integrative Negotiation

The conﬁgurational view of organizational structure emphasizes formal structural
mechanisms, prescribed by organizational authorities to allow for the coordination and
control of work activity (Dow, 1988; McPhee, 1985; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner,
1968). In the classic bureaucratic model organizational authorities formally specify and
differentiate work roles so that members follow predictable patterns of performance,
consistent with organizational goals and objectives (Miner, 1982). This approach views
structure as a relatively enduring pattern of role relations sustained by formalized
communication between members, ﬂowing through ofﬁcial channels as depicted in the
organization’s hierarchical chart (Monge & Eisenberg, 1987). Such formal structures
mandate the set of people with whom the role incumbent should interact, suitable topics
for interaction, and the procedural requirements for their communicative interactions
(Monge & Eisenberg, 1987). Two indices of formal structure, centralization and
formalization, are likely to help determine the integrative potential involved in
supervisor/subordinate role negotiation and in doing so, affect levels of directness,
elaboration, and mutual concessions.

Centralization. Centralization refers to “how power is distributed among social
positions” (Hage & Aiken, 1967, p. 77). Hage and Aiken describe two speciﬁc
dimensions of centralization: participation in decision making (PDM) and hierarchy of
authority. Participation in decision making is the degree to which “occupants of various

positions participate in decisions about the allocation of resources and the determination

17

of organization policies” (p. 77). Hierarchy of authority refers to the degree to which
subordinates must defer to supervisors for decisions involving their own work. Role
activity in highly centralized organizations is likely maintained through routines,
programs, and schedules (Hage et al., 1971; March & Simon, 1958), with less reliance
upon the open communication of information to achieve coordination (March & Simon,
1958). In less centralized organizations, power is more evenly distributed throughout
hierarchical levels, and the more frequent communication of new information is required
to coordinate role activity (Hage et al., 1971).

Harrison (1985) suggests communication between managers and workers
becomes more important in decentralized work units as the dyad works to achieve
“shared understandings regarding the appropriateness of subordinate inﬂuence and the
channels by which that inﬂuence will be exercised” (1985, p. 97). In her study, members
perceiving their work units as more participative reported more frequent interaction and
greater exchange of information with supervisors. Members in participative work units
also reported engaging in less distortion and withholding of information when dealing
with managers. Similarly, Krone (1992, 1994) found that employees perceiving higher
levels of participation in decision making and greater autonomy reported they were more
likely to attempt to inﬂuence their supervisor and to anticipate that these inﬂuence
attempts would be successful.

Given these ﬁndings, the centralization of a work unit can be imagined to have an
impact upon the communicative dimensions of supervisory negotiation. As members in
highly centralized organizations are likely to experience more programmed roles, they

should have fewer task elements subject to negotiation and lower integrative potential.

18

Those anticipating less opportunity to inﬂuence their supervisor through negotiation are
apt to choose more indirect routes to affect role change (Krone, 1992). Employees in
centralized work units should thus be less direct in the negotiation of role elements.
Those in more participative units should anticipate greater opportunity to negotiate
speciﬁc task elements and should be more forthcoming when doing so.

Hla: Holding other factors constant, work-unit PDM will be positively
associated with members’ reported directness during supervisory
negotiation.

Hlb: Holding other factors constant, work-unit hierarchy of authority will be
negatively associated with members’ reported directness during
supervisory role negotiation.

Workers in centralized units are likely to have fewer elements over which they
can elaborate during negotiation with their supervisor. Those in more participative work
units, requiring more intensive feedback to coordinate role activities, should be more apt
to elaborate role preferences during negotiation.

H2a: Holding other factors constant, work-unit PDM will be positively
associated with members’ reported elaboration during supervisory
negotiation.

H2b: Holding other factors constant, work-unit hierarchy of authority will be
negatively associated with members’ reported elaboration during
supervisory role negotiation.

With fewer issues available to negotiate, members in centralized units should also

have fewer opportunities to elicit concessions from supervisors. In decentralized units

supervisors and members are likely to ﬁnd more areas for mutual concessions and trade-

offs.

19

H3a: Holding other factors constant, work-unit PDM will be positively
associated with members’ reported mutual concessions during supervisory
negotiation.

H3b: Holding other factors constant, work-unit hierarchy of authority will be
negatively associated with members’ reported mutual concessions during
supervisory negotiation.

F ormalization. A second index of organizational structure likely to have an
impact upon role negotiation is formalization. J ablin deﬁnes formalization as “the degree
to which the behaviors and requirements of jobs are explicit. . .codiﬁed into policies,
rules, regulations, customs, and so forth” (1987, p. 404). The degree of formalization in
an organization reﬂects the extent to which detailed rules and regulations deﬁne role
expectations, authority relations, and expected ﬂows of communication (Hage & Aiken,
1969; Pugh et al., 1968). Aiken and Hage (1966, 1968) conceptualize formalization along
three separate dimensions: job codiﬁcation (the presence of written rules for job
descriptions), job speciﬁcity (the extent to which procedures are detailed for employees),
and rule observation (the extent to which employees are monitored for rule violations).

Like centralization, formalization is a critical aspect of the organization structure,
and a likely inﬂuence on members’ communication activity (Hage & Aiken, 1967; Jablin,
1987). In a study involving 16 social welfare organizations Hage, Aiken, and Marrett
(1971) report that job codiﬁcation was negatively associated with the frequency of
unscheduled interactions as well as the frequency of participation on organizational
committees. Job speciﬁcity was also negatively associated with attendance at
departmental meetings.

F ormalization practices also have implications for communication patterns

between supervisors and subordinates. Supervisors in more formalized work groups

20

possess greater legitimate authority to see that rules and procedures are followed
(Atwater, 1995). Supervisors’ increased legitimate authority should foster the use of more
directive role sending messages, and make for fewer negotiable elements in subordinates’
work roles. Workers in these settings are likely to choose more indirect tactics to alter
their work routines and avoid supervisory sanction or disapproval. Those less bound by
rules and procedures, however, are expected to have less fear of posing a challenge to
well-established and explicit standards of work and be more direct in negotiating their
roles.

H4a: Holding other factors constant, job codiﬁcation will be negatively
associated with members’ reported directness during supervisory
negotiation.

H4b: Holding other factors constant, job speciﬁcity will be negatively
associated with members’ reported directness during supervisory
negotiation.

H4c: Holding other factors constant, rule observation will be negatively

associated with members’ reported directness during supervisory
negotiation.

Because supervisors in formal units have greater opportunity to defer to formal
rules to justify decisions regarding role enactment, they should be less likely to engage in
elaboration during role negotiation. Members in formalized work units should also resist
divulging a great deal of explicit information to supervisors. In less formalized settings,
with fewer explicit rules, managers are more prone to engage in elaborated discussions
with members during role negotiation. Likewise, subordinates are expected to anticipate
less resistance to role change based on explicit rules and be more comfortable elaborating

their preferences.

21

HSa: Holding other factors constant, job codiﬁcation will be negatively
associated with members’ reported elaboration during supervisory
negotiation.

H5b: Holding other factors constant, job speciﬁcity will be negatively
associated with members’ reported elaboration during supervisory
negotiation.

H5c: Holding other factors constant, rule observation will be negatively
associated with members’ reported elaboration during supervisory
negotiation.

With the greater power distance between supervisors and subordinates in
formalized settings (Atwater, 1995), there should be less opportunity for the exchange of
mutual concessions. In less formal organizations the power distance in the managerial
dyad should not be as pronounced, and members and supervisors are prone to be more
comfortable exchanging concessions.

H6a: Holding other factors constant, job codiﬁcation will be negatively
associated with members’ reported mutual concessions during supervisory
negotiation.

H6b: Holding other factors constant, job speciﬁcity will be negatively
associated with members’ reported mutual concessions during supervisory
negotiation. -

H6c: Holding other factors constant, rule observation will be negatively
associated with members’ reported mutual concessions during supervisory
negotiation.

Informal Organizational Structure and Integrative Negotiation

Although formal structures within the organization can facilitate or inhibit

integrative forms of decision making, they are not the sole determinants of

communicative behavior. The coactivational view of structure recognizes that linkages in

organizations are not based solely on formal positions, but the personal goals, needs, and

22

relationships between members as well (Dow, 1988; McPhee, 1985; Monge & Eisenberg,
1987). Negotiation researchers have also recognized that the interpersonal orientation
between parties can have a large impact on how they go about settling issues and
distributing resources (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006; Greenhalgh &
Chapman, 1995; Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993). Negotiators with more pro-
social motives and cohesive relationships generally tend toward more relationship-
enhancing integrative processes emphasizing shared goals over distributive process
emphasizing competing goals (Olekalns & Smith, 2003; Pavitt & Kemp, 1999).

Accordingly, the emergent interpersonal relationships between members and
supervisors should be another important factor in the integrative potential of their
negotiations. The most prominent theory describing the effect of interpersonal dynamics
on role coordination is that of leader-member exchange (LMX).

Leader-member exchange. Leader-Member Exchange theory (LMX) suggests that
supervisors do not initiate identical relationships with all members within their sub-unit,
but rather form different types of ties based on various levels of exchange (Dansereau,
Graen, & Haga, 1975 ; Graen, 1976). Higher LMX subordinates (the supervisor’s in-
group) engage supervisors in more social exchanges, based on mutual trust and
anticipation of fair treatment over the long term. Low LMX members (the supervisor’s
out-group) maintain more transactional exchanges with supervisors, in which
participation in structured tasks is traded for minimal levels of support (Graen &
Scandura, 1987). In-group members are said to experience greater latitude in negotiating

and personalizing their work roles, whereas out-group members have less negotiation

23

latitude and are more likely to be given routine work assignments (Dansereau et al., 1975;
Graen, 1976; Liden & Graen, 1980).

Research in leader—member exchange demonstrates different communication
patterns between supervisors and their in-group and out-group members. In situations
involving upward inﬂuence, dissent, or relational maintenance, in-group members have
been shown to engage in more open and direct communication, and provide supervisors
more information, whereas out-group members have been shown to favor strategic self-
presentation, self-censoring, and distortion (Kassing, 2000; Krone, 1992; Lee & Jablin,
1995; Waldron 1991; Waldron, Hunt & Dsilva, 1993). In addition, in-group members
have been demonstrated to be less likely to engage in such abrasive tactics as
assertiveness, coalition, and appeal to higher authorities when dealing with supervisors,
and less likely to employ formal bargaining as an upward inﬂuence tactic (Deluga &
Perry, 1991).

In a conversational analysis involving supervisors with high, middle, and low
LMX followers, Fairhurst and colleagues (Fairhurst & Chandler, 1989; F airhurst, Rogers,
& Sarr, 1987) reported that the interactions of high LMX dyads involved more mutual
persuasion and reciprocal inﬂuence than the middle or lower LMX dyads. The supervisor
in this study was also shown to impose direct authority over middle and lower LMX
members more often than with high LMX members. Fairhurst (1993) reported that high
LMX dyads engaged in more aligning behaviors, in which power differences were
minimized, as well as non-routine problem solving, support, and coaching. Low LMX
dyads were found more likely to engage in polarizing types of communication as well as

performance monitoring and competitive conﬂict.

24

As an emergent form of organizational structure, LMX holds implications for the
manner in which supervisors and subordinates negotiate role expectations. A high LMX
dyad, by deﬁnition, is likely to have a wider range of role activities subject to
modiﬁcation and development (Graen & Scandura, 1987). With greater integrative
potential, coupled with the greater interpersonal familiarity inherent in a high LMX
relationship, in-group members and supervisors should be more candid and direct in their
discussion of role elements.

H7: Holding other factors constant, LMX will be positively associated with

members’ reported directness during supervisory negotiation.

High LMX dyads are more likely to invoke a wider range of topics in their daily
interactions and should be more comfortable elaborating role preferences and exchanging

alternates, plans, and rationales. The narrower range of communication topics in lower

LMX dyads likely lowers the probability of the full elaboration of role preferences.

H8: Holding other factors constant, LMX will be positively associated with

members’ reported elaboration during supervisory negotiation.

Given the pattern of mutual inﬂuence and reciprocity within high LMX dyads, in-
group members should also be more likely to offer concessions to, and elicit concessions
from, supervisors in negotiating their roles. Less effectual out-group members are
unlikely to elicit as many concessions or compromises from a supervisor when

negotiating role elements.

25

H9: Holding other factors constant, LMX will be positively associated with
members’ reported mutual concessions during supervisory negotiation.
The Interaction of Formal and Informal Structural Factors

The previous sections have proposed two types of structural inﬂuences on the
communicative dimensions of role negotiation: formal and informal. Although these
perspectives on organizational structure emerge from separate traditions, communication
scholars have called for their integration (Monge & Eisenberg, 1987; Rapert & Wren,
1998). Rapert and Wren suggest both that “prescribed frameworks stand in a superﬁcial
relationship to the daily interactions in an organization,” while, at the same time,
“understanding emergent structural processes would be incomplete without examination
of the structural frameworks that evoke or constrain the communication” (1998, p. 288).
Scholars of structuration theory also suggest that formal rules and structures are
reproduced and granted legitimacy through their impact on informal routines, and
emergent patterns of interaction can become institutionalized and, over time, affect
formal organizational structures (McPhee, 1985).

Accordingly, the relational exchanges and interpersonal sentiments between
managers and subordinates do not exist independently of the organization’s formal
frameworks. Rather, communication linkages between supervisors and subordinates are
situated within the workﬂow of the organizational system (Lee, 1997; Sias & Jablin,
1995). Formal and informal structures should thus exert a non-additive effect on the
communicative dimensions of role negotiation, and the impact of each type of structure

may be contingent upon the other.

26

Centralization and LMX. Earlier it was proposed that members in highly
centralized work units experience lower integrative potential in their work roles, and are
less apt to engage in integrative role negotiation. Supervisors, however, often have
discretion over how closely they adhere to such prescribed patterns of behavior. For this
reason the relational dynamics between supervisors and members of their work units
could act to override structural constraints. High LMX relationships often afford
subordinates autonomy over their work routine that would otherwise not occur. Even in
centralized work units, supervisors and in-group members may be more likely to voice
their ideas directly, elaborate preferences, and engage in mutual concessions. Out-group
members in centralized work units might have a doubly difﬁcult time initiating
integrative role negotiation, having little ofﬁcial autonomy, coupled with little
interpersonal leverage to enact role change and modify task elements.

In less centralized settings, however, in-group and out-group members alike
should experience greater integrative potential in their role negotiations, independent of
their personal relationships with supervisors. As members rely less upon their supervisory
relationship to gain negotiating leverage, the effect of LMX on the communicative
dimensions of role negotiation will be diminished. Thus, the effect of leader-member
exchange on directness, elaboration, and mutual concessions during role negotiation
should be strongest under conditions of high centralization.

HIOa-b: LMX and the dimensions of centralization will interact, such that the

regression slopes of LMX on directness under high and low conditions of
centralization will both be positive, but the slope of LMX under high

centralization will be greater than the slope of LMX under low
centralization.

27

H1 la-b: LMX and the dimensions of centralization will interact, such that the
regression slopes of LMX on elaboration under high and low conditions of
centralization will both be positive, but the slope of LMX under high
centralization will be greater than the slope of LMX under low
centralization.

H12a-b: LMX and the dimensions of centralization will interact, such that the
regression slopes of LMX on mutual concessions under high and low
conditions of centralization will both be positive, but the slope of LMX

under high centralization will be greater than the slope of LMX under low
centralization.

F ormalization and LMX. As with centralization the relational dynamics between
the member and supervisor are expected to allow members to bypass formalized rules
and procedures in conﬁguring their roles. Under high formalization in-group members
should experience latitude negotiating and modifying work activities that would typically
not occur. In formal work units high LMX relationships are particularly likely to give in-
group members an advantage over their out-group counterparts, who lack both the
structural and interpersonal conditions conducive to integrative role negotiation.

In less formal settings, however, fewer prescribed rules, routines, and procedures
constrain employees’ role negotiation activities. In these contexts members should
experience greater integrative potential, regardless of their supervisory relationship.
Therefore, in informal settings, members may not rely as heavily upon their supervisory
relationship for leverage, and the impact of leader-member exchange on the
communicative dimensions of role negotiation might be diminished.

Hl3a-c: LMX and the dimensions of formalization will interact, such that the
regression slopes of LMX on directness under high and low conditions of
formalization will both be positive, but the slope of LMX under high

formalization will be greater than the slope of LMX under low
formalization.

28

H l4a-c: LMX and the dimensions of formalization will interact, such that the
regression slopes of LMX on elaboration under high and low conditions of
formalization will both be positive, but the slope of LMX under high
formalization will be greater than the slope of LMX under low
formalization.

H l 5a-c: LMX and the dimensions of formalization will interact, such that the
regression slopes of LMX on mutual concessions under high and low
conditions of formalization will both be positive, but the slope of LMX
under high formalization will be greater than the slope of LMX under low
formalization.

29

CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Research Site

Data for the current study were collected from individuals employed with a city
government located in the southeastern United States. The city has a population of
approximately 270,000 and is the second largest city in its state. In 1959, the
governmental and corporate functions of the city merged with those of its surrounding
county, creating a single Urban County Government replacing the respective
governments of both city and county. The Urban County Government employs over 3000
authorized positions, and has an annual expenditure of approximately 529 million dollars
(Personal contact, City Director of Budgeting, Sept 30, 2008).

This study was coordinated through the Urban County Government Chief
Administrative Ofﬁcer, who serves as the senior advisor to the Mayor. Among the
powers and duties of the CAD. are the supervision of each of the city’s executive
departments, including the departments of: Environmental Quality, Finance, General
Services, Law, Public Safety, Public Works, and Social Services. These departments are
further divided into a total of over 30 divisions, each presided over by a Division
Director.

Participants

Five hundred full time employees in non-supervisory positions were randomly
selected from a roster of city wide employees. A packet containing a cover letter, consent
form, survey instrument, and return envelope was mailed to each employee at her or his

work address. Eighty-nine surveys were returned for an initial response rate of 18%. Nine

30

of the initial respondents either did not ﬁll out the survey completely or reported that they
had no relevant supervisory conversations to report. These respondents were
subsequently removed from the analysis. Respondents from a total of 25 city divisions (n
= 80) returned usable surveys (see Appendix 1). The divisions most often represented in
the sample are Parks and Recreation (11 = 11), Building Maintenance (11 = 7) and Air &
Water Quality (11 = 7).

This sample can be described as 55% male (11 = 44) with an average age of 46.84
years (SD = 10.53 years). Participants reported an average organizational tenure of 7.55
years (SD = 6.60 years), an average job title tenure of 4.88 years (SD = 4.52 years), and
an average dyadic tenure with their target supervisor of 3.59 years (SD = 3.98 years).

To more precisely summarize the current sample, respondents’ work positions
were categorized as either predominantly blue-collar (i.e., non-ofﬁce work, hourly wage,
involving physical labor) or white-collar (i.e., ofﬁce work, salaried, involving
information management). In the event that a respondent’s title could not be categorized
as obviously blue-collar (e.g., mechanic) or white—collar (e. g., paralegal), an
organizational informant was solicited for clariﬁcation regarding the content of the
individual’s work role. A total of 44% of the sample (n = 35) was classiﬁed as blue-
collar, while 56% (n = 45) was classiﬁed as white-collar. A series of independent sample
t-tests were performed to see whether the blue- and white-collar workers differed along
any signiﬁcant variables that would qualify this study’s ﬁndings. Although workers in
blue-collar positions reported signiﬁcantly lower levels of LMX than their white-collar
counterparts (t(76) = -2.61, p > .05), the negotiations reported by blue- and white-collar

workers did not differ on any of the communication dimensions or outcomes.

31

Survey Instrument

Instructions. This study employed a variation on the critical incident technique
(CIT; Flanagan, 1954). The CI technique is a very ﬂexible process used to collect,
analyze, and classify participants’ accounts of personally signiﬁcant experiences likely to
have an effect upon their experiences of a phenomenon. This technique has been
incorporated into instruments such as the ICA Communication Audit (Goldhaber &
Rogers, 1979) as a means of analyzing instances of effective and ineffective
. communication in the organization and has been used similarly in studies in which
participants have recalled critical conversations within organizations (e.g., Korsgaard,
Brodt, Whitener, 2002; Tjosvold, Johnson, Johnson, & Sun, 2003; Yukl, Kim, & Falbe,
1996). l '

Employees were asked to recall a recent conversation they initiated with their
immediate supervisor in which they discussed potential changes in expectations for their
own work routine. Participants were instructed that the discussions could involve major
or minor changes, as long as they involved recurring, everyday patterns of work behavior.
Among the possible types of changes listed were: new tasks, increased or reduced
responsibilities, or different methods of performing work. The term “negotiation” was not
used in the instructions to avoid cueing participants to an overly narrow sense of the word
and limiting their responses. Respondents were asked to write a few sentences describing
the type of change and the speciﬁc area of work discussed with their supervisors.

To allow for a thorough description of the negotiation episodes, participants were
asked a series of closed-ended items assessing the following contextual factors: perceived

importance of the issue, the length of the focal discussion, the number of times the issue

32

had been discussed prior to the focal discussion, and the amount of time elapsed since the
focal discussion. Respondents were then asked a series of closed—ended items measuring
their subjective outcome of the negotiation. Anchored with the options “Big Decrease”
and “Big Increase” with “No Change” as the midpoint, these items assessed the degree of
change in: job satisfaction, satisfaction with supervisor, and job effectiveness.

Criterion variables. To assess the communicative dimensions of the
conversations, participants were asked to respond to three scales designed by Meiners
and Miller (2004), measuring perceived levels of directness, elaboration, and mutual
concessions present in the reported negotiation. In their study, Meiners and Miller
provide details as to the construction of these scales as well as evidence of their
unidimensionality and reliability.

Predictor variables. To assess the affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional
respect dimensions of leader-member exchange identiﬁed by Dienesch and Liden (1986),
employees were asked to respond to survey items measuring the relational quality
between them and the supervisors with whom they had the discussions. These items were
developed by Liden and Maslyn (1998).

To help reduce common-method bias typically occurring when predictor and
criterion variables are measured using the same respondents (Podsakoff, MacKenzie,

Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), supervisors from each of the organizational divisions were
sought as “key informants” to assess structural predictors at the division level3 (Rousseau,

1985). Supervisors in each city division were mailed surveys asking them to assess the
dimensions of centralization and formalization for the division in which they were

employed. A total of 25 supervisors from 16 different divisions returned usable surveys.

33

This supervisor sample can be described as 66% male (11 = 18) with an average
age of 48.73 years (SD = 8.82 years). Supervisors reported an average tenure with the
Urban County Government of 14.58 years (SD = 10.26 years), and an average tenure in
their current job title of 7.42 years (SD = 6.77).

Two dimensions of centralization, participation in decision making, (PDM) and
hierarchy of authority, were measured. PDM was measured using items adapted from
Alutto and Acito (1974). This scale was deemed particularly useﬁrl for this study in its
focus on decision making situations involving day-to-day workplace activities. Hierarchy
of authority was assessed with items designed by Hage and Aiken (1967). Three

dimensions of formalization: job codiﬁcation, rule observation, and job speciﬁcity, were
measured using scales designed by Aiken and Hage (1967).4

Each employee respondent’s individual data was matched with the appropriate
supervisory divisional rating for centralization and formalization. In the event that
multiple supervisors from the same division returned surveys, their ratings were averaged
to derive one unit-wide measure. The responses from a total of 52 employees could be
matched with a supervisory division rating. The divisions for which structural predictors
were available are summarized in Appendix 1.

Conﬁrmatory factor analysis. All scale items were analyzed using conﬁrmatory
factor analysis techniques (CF A; Hunter, 1980; Hunter & Gerbing, 1982). This technique
is useful in determining the dimensionality of multiple-item scales and producing
unbiased estimates of scale reliability (Hunter, 1980; Hunter & Gerbing, 1982). Related
techniques such as Exploratory Factor Analysis (EF A) can be problematic when testing

causal models with highly correlated constructs. In these instances, EPA is prone to

34

 

underreport the number of factors or cluster dissimilar items together based solely on
their correlations (Hunter & Gerbing, 1982). Furthermore, in studies with small sample
sizes, EFA becomes susceptible to pernicious sampling error and the factor structures
derived through this technique are highly unstable. Conﬁrmatory factor analysis, in
contrast to EFA, tests whether the dimensionality in the data accurately ﬁts the
hypothesized model speciﬁed by the researcher in advance (Hunter, 1980; Hunter &
Gerbing, 1982).

Following Hunter’s suggestions, items retained met the following criteria: face
validity, internal consistency, and external consistency (parallelism). The product rule for
internal consistency was used to estimate correlations for items within factors (Hunter &
Gerbing, 1982). Observed inter-item correlations were compared to the estimates, and
items producing errors outside of a 95% conﬁdence interval were dropped from their
scales until fewer than ﬁve percent of the inter-item correlations exceeded the conﬁdence
interval. The product rule for external consistency (parallelism) was employed in a
similar manner to evaluate correlations between items in different factors. Only those
items demonstrating internal consistency with items within their scale and external
consistency with the items in the other scales were retained.

Following the initial factor analysis, an inspection of the four subscales of LMX
revealed an average inter-scale correlation of .64, upon correction for attenuation due to
measurement error. A follow-up conﬁrmatory factor analysis was conducted to test for
second-order unidimensionality. The procedure for a second-order factor analysis is
identical to that of ﬁrst-order factor analysis, except the primary factors in the ﬁrst-order

analysis are treated as individual indicators and the second-order factor is treated as the

35

underlying construct (Hunter & Gerbing, 1982). When two or more ﬁrst-order factors
measure the same underlying factor, their correlations should be internally consistent and
parallel to other variables. The four subscales of LMX were examined for internal
consistency and parallelism using the same procedure as described earlier. The data
revealed that the four subscales were internally consistent within their second-order
factor and parallel to the other scale items, and hence consistent with a second-order uni-
dimensional factor model. Accordingly, these items were combined into one scale
producing a overall measure of LMX. The factors were then re-analyzed using the CF A
technique, and following the removal of one LMX item, the uni-dimensional LMX scale
was found internally consistent and parallel to the other factors.

The average primary factor loading was .81, and the bivariate correlation between
the predicted and observed inter-item correlations for the ﬁnal measurement model was
.95 (RMSE = .09). The items retained for analysis, their reliabilities, and primary factor
loadings are presented in Appendix 2.

Demographic information. Following their completion of the scale items,
participants were asked to report their sex, age, length of time working for this
organization, length of time under their current job title, and when applicable, length of
time working with their current supervisor. Participants were also asked to report their

job title, department, and division.

36

CHAPTER 3
RESULTS

A total of 80 critical communication incidents were reported. Although some
studies employing the Cl Technique allow individual respondents to report multiple
incidents, the instrument used in the current study only solicited one incident per
respondent. This decision was made largely because of the prohibitive length of the
closed-ended portion of the survey instrument necessary to measure the constructs of
interest.
Critical Incident Categories

To better understand the types of incidents reported by the respondents, a set of
categories was developed in which each incident could be classiﬁed. First, the principal
investigator and an associate independently examined and reﬂected upon the participants’
narrative accounts. While the reviewers began this process with key concepts from the
research literature in mind (e. g., task revision, role innovation), they were also open to
recognizing emergent themes, other than those speciﬁed in the extant literature, that
might reveal insight into the supervisory negotiation process. Through repeated
examination of the narratives, two judges sorted the descriptions according to similarity
until distinct categories emerged. Through discussion, consensus was developed for the
content of each category. The ﬁnal coding scheme consisted of ﬁve categories:

Communication/coordination. This category included changes to either the
quantity or quality of communication and coordination within the work unit. These

changes might include increasing communication between the focal member and his or

37

 

her supervisor personally, increasing time in meetings and training sessions, or greater
coordination of activity among the entire work-unit.

Task revision. This category includes changes involving the processes,
procedures, techniques, equipment, or scheduling of tasks involved in the focal member’s
work. These include the introduction or adoption of new tools or suggestions to modify
the core processes involved in one’s existing work duties.

Role innovation. This category includes changes involving the introduction of
new tasks or the reduction in tasks for focal member. These changes include
incorporating new tasks, activities, duties, or responsibilities into the existing job, or
altering one’s position, title, or job description.

Third parties. This category includes changes involving expectations for the
activities and routines of speciﬁc third-party individuals, outside the
supervisor/subordinate dyad. These can include other members of the work-unit itself, or
those employed in other organizational units. These are not necessarily changes involving
the members of the work unit as a whole but rather speciﬁc other members.

Miscellaneous. These changes included those for which the respondent did not
provide adequate information to reasonably classify the incident in one of the
aforementioned categories.

Following detailed instruction as to the content of the categories, a third judge,
not involved with the initial category generation, sorted each incident into one of the
categories. Initial inter-rater agreement on incident classiﬁcation was 80% (Cohen’s

Kappa = .72). The cases on which judges did not agree were resolved through discussion.

38

 

The frequencies for each of these categories and representative examples are provided in

Table 3.1.

Table 3.1

Frequencies and Sample Excerpts of Critical Incident Categories

 

Category

Communication/Coon

Role Innovation

Task Revision

Third Parties

Miscellaneous

Sample Excerpt

We need to get back to having manager
owner meetings... We used to have the

meetings and it helped. Now its just a shot in
dark [sic]. ”

“I requested additional work as my daily
workload was too light. Mine is a new
function...there was no way to tell what the

average workload would be or how long it
would take. ”

“I suggested using a downtown map, to lay
out pots and create a legend to aid in
documentation, and organization. He agreed
this could be a possible upgrade in procedure
and agreed to look into. We had a good
dialogue back and forth about how to possibly
arrange and lay out this new method. ”

“We discussed the performance of... outside
contractors...and the results we are seeing
from his poor performance. ”

“I spoke with him about implementing several
changes within my section, shortly after I took
over. ”

10

23

33

%

12.5

28.8

41.3

11.3

6.3

 

Total:

Quantitative Descriptions of Critical Incidents

80

100

Almost 63% (n = 50) of the sample listed the focal discussion issue as “Very

39

Important” while 31% (n = 25) listed the issue as “Pretty Important.” Sixty-four percent
(n = 51) reported the conversation taking between 0 and 20 minutes, and 20% (n = 16)
reported one 21 and 40 minutes in length. Just over 46% (n = 37) reported having
discussed the issue “a few times” prior to the focal discussion, while 29% (n = 23)
reported it was the ﬁrst time the issue had been discussed. Just under 47% (n = 37)
recalled a conversation that had taken place three months or fewer prior and 25% (n = 20)
recalled a conversation from between four to six months prior to the data collection.

In terms of changes in job satisfaction levels, 51% (n = 41) of the sample reported
either “Slight Increase” or “Big Increase,” 21% (n = 17) indicated either “Slight
Decrease” or “Big Decrease” in satisfaction, and the remaining 28% (n = 22) indicated
“No Change.” Similarly, when asked about satisfaction with their supervisors following
the discussion, 47% (n = 37) reported either “Slight Increase” or “Big Increase,” 27% (n
= 21) indicated either “Slight Decrease” or “Big Decrease,” and 26% (n = 21) indicated
“No Change.” When asked about changes in ability to do their job effectively, 53% (n =
42) reported either “Slight Increase” or “Big Increase,” 13% (n = 10) indicated either
“Slight Decrease” or “Big Decrease,” and 35% (n = 28) indicated “No Change.”

To illustrate the types of discussions reported for this study, it is instructive to
view some excerpts of the respondents’ own descriptions. Some employees recalled
highly satisfying interactions in which they successfully brought innovation to their work
roles. For example, a female, 36, from the Social Services Department described a
supervisory interaction in which she attempted to expand her tasks and responsibilities:

[My supervisor] was very receptive to the idea and gladly accepted the

help. She in turn, took the time and eﬂort to show me additional tasks and
how to complete them.

40

Another female from the Law Department, 47, reported successfully introducing a

new process for scanning documents:

[My supervisor] was very receptive and excited about the eﬂiciency of the
new process and cost savings in file storage, ﬁle folder supplies and
document imaging....[My supervisor] thanked me and asked me to present
the process at the next weekly manager meeting so that the division staﬂ
will be on board with the new process.

A male public service worker with General Services, 26, reported discussing with
his supervisor a revision in the technique by which ﬂowers got planted:

I suggested using a downtown map, to lay out pots and create a legend to
aid in documentation, and organization. He agreed this could be a
possible upgrade in procedure and agreed to look into. We had a good
dialogue back and forth about how to possibly arrange and lay out this
new method.

Not all of the respondents however, reported positive interactions. Some
responses reﬂected either frustration with the organizational system as a whole, or
individuals within it. For example, a female, 48, in the Finance and Administration
Department reported a failed attempt to resist the implementation of a change by her

supervisor:

Her method was actually going to make more work for the department. I
asked that she re-think her change and to allow me and the team to
research other ways to make the process more efficient. She declined.

 

A male, 55, in the Department of General Services, described a downright
antagonistic relationship with his supervisor when he suggests technological innovations:
He makes fun of me to other employees. Describing me as a geek +

gearhead. I ’m tired of being mocked. I won 't innovate 0r pioneer any
more—this gov ’t shoots pioneers [sic].

41

Tests of Hypotheses
Means, standard deviations, and zero—order correlations for all scale items are
presented in Table 3.2. To test the hypotheses, OLS multiple regression analysis was

employed. First, a regression was performed for each criterion in which all lower-order
predictors were entered simultaneously.5 The summaries of the regression models for

each of the criterion variables are presented in Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. The omnibus

model of lower order predictors accounted for signiﬁcant variance in elaboration (F (6,45)
= 2.75, p < .05, adjusted R2 = .17) and in mutual concessions (F(6,45) = 5.96, p < .001,
adjusted R2 = .37).

Hypotheses 1 through 3 predicted PDM would be positively associated, and
hierarchy of authority will be negatively associated, with members’ reported directness,
elaboration, and mutual concessions, holding the other factors constant. As shown in
Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, neither PDM nor hierarchy of authority was a signiﬁcant
predictor for any of the outcome variables.

Hypotheses 4 through 6 posited that job codiﬁcation, job speciﬁcity, and rule
observation will each be negatively associated with directness, elaboration, and mutual
concessions. Consistent with hypotheses 5c and 6c, supervisors’ rating of rule
observation in their respective division was negatively associated with member’s
elaboration (,6 = -.34, t = -2.5 1., p < .05) and mutual concessions (,6 = -.37, t = -3.l3, p <
.01). The regression coefﬁcient for rule observation and directness approached

signiﬁcance in the predicted direction (,8 = -.25, t = -l .74, p < .10).

42

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43

Hypotheses seven through nine predicted that leader-member exchange will be
positively associated with members’ reported directness, elaboration, and mutual
concessions. Consistent with hypotheses 8 and 9, LMX had a signiﬁcant positive
association with elaboration (,6 = .30, t = 2.23, p < .05) and mutual concessions (ﬂ = .56, t
= 4.67, p < .001).

To test the proposed interaction effects among the predictor variables, a set of
product vectors was computed by multiplying each employee’s score for LMX with the
respective dimensions of either centralization or formalization. Since these product
vectors only carry the interaction terms once their constituent variables are partialled out,
they were each entered individually intothe regression models containing the lower order
predictors for each criterion. Because the constituent predictors were all continuous
variables without a meaningful zero point, each was centered prior to computation of the
interaction vector (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).

Hypotheses 10 through 12 predicted an interaction between LMX and the
subscales of centralization, such that as centralization increases, the effect of LMX on
members’ reported directness, elaboration, and mutual concessions will increase. As
shown in Table 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, none of the predicted interaction terms achieved
signiﬁcance.

Hypotheses 13 through 15 predicted a similar set of interactions between LMX
and the subscales of formalization. As shown in Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, none of these

proposed interaction terms achieved signiﬁcance.

44

Table 3.3

Main and Interaction Effects for Directness

 

 

 

 

Variable B SE3 ,6 t AR2 Adj-R2
SupPDM 0.36 0.24 0.27 1.51
SupHier 0.33 0.19 0.31 1.76
Supcod -0. 12 0.16 -0. 14 -0.71
SupSpec 0.08 0.26 0.06 0.31
SupRule -0.49 0.28 -0.25 -l .74
LMX 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 .13 .02
LMX x PDM 0.05 0.23 0.30 0.20 .00 .00
LMX x Hier -0.24 0.18 -0.20 -1.31 .03 .03
LMX x Cod 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.49 .01 .00
LMX x Spec 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.01 .00 .00
LMX x Rule -0.49 0.47 -0.18 -l.06 .02 .02
Table 3.4
Main and Interaction Effects for Elaboration
. 2 , 2
Variable B SE B ,8 t AR Adr-R
SupPDM -.19 .34 -.09 -1.56
SupHier .19 .27 .12 1.71
Supcod .45 .24 .33 1.88
SupSpec .58 .38 .28 1.53
SupRule -1.02 .41 -.34 -2.51*
LMX .33 .15 .30 2.23* .27* .17
LMX x PDM -0.39 0.32 -0.17 -1.21 .02 .18
LMX x Hier 0.18 0.27 0.10 0.69 .01 .16
LMX x Cod -0.24 0.17 -0.19 -1.42 .03 .19
LMX x Spec 0.19 0.29 0.09 0.65 .01 .16
LMX x Rule 0.34 0.68 0.08 0.51 .00 .16
*p < .05.

45

Table 3.5

Main and Interaction Effects for Mutual Concessions

 

Variable B SE B p t ARZ Any-R2

SupPDM -. 15 .29 -.08 —0.51
SupHier . 12 .23 .08 0.54
Supcod -.07 .20 -.06 -0.37
SupSpec . 13 .32 .07 0.41
SupRule -1.07 .34 -.37 -3.l3**

LMX .58 .12 .56 4.67*** .44*** .37

LMX x PDM -0.29 .27 -0.13 -1.07 .01 .37

LMX x Hier -0.13 .22 -0.07 -0.58 .00 .36

LMX x Cod 0.06 .15 0.05 0.41 .00 .36

LMX x Spec -0. 14 .24 -0.07 -0.60 .00 .36

LMX x Rule -0.83 .56 -0.20 -l .49 .03 .39

 

**p < .01,***p < .001

Supplemental Analysis

Supplemental analyses were conducted to explore potential relationships between
the measures of the negotiation categories, contextual factors, communication
dimensions, and negotiation outcomes. Although no formal hypotheses have been offered
regarding these relationships, their examination should be useful for generating additional
knowledge of the supervisory negotiation process.

Negotiation categories. First, regressions were performed to test for any
differences among the negotiation categories as to context, communication, and outcome
variables. To use this qualitative predictor in the multiple regressions, dummy coding was
employed. With dummy coding, a qualitative variable of k groups is represented by k-l
dichotomous predictor variables.

The four substantive categories of negotiation topics: communication/

46

 

coordination, role innovation, task revision, and third parties were rendered in three
predictor variables. Because it was the most theoretically ﬁtting with the spirit of the
current study, the role innovation group was not represented as a predictor variable but
was employed as the reference group in the regression equation. The sample mean for
this reference group is the Y-intercept (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) and the unstandardized
regression coefﬁcients represent the difference between the sample mean for each of the
other categories and the reference group.

The three dummy variables were ﬁrst entered as predictors into regression
equations with each of the contextual variables as a criterion. The different negotiation
topics did not differ signiﬁcantly in terms of importance. Similar regressions were
performed with each of the communication variables entered as the criterion. No
signiﬁcant differences among the negotiation topics were revealed for directness,
elaboration, or mutual concessions. The ﬁnal set of regressions involved the subjective
outcome variables. Role innovative negotiations were found to result in higher levels of
satisfaction than those involving communication/coordination (B = -.97, t = -1.96 p >
.05). Notably, those reporting role innovative negotiation episodes reported signiﬁcantly
higher levels of LMX than those who recalled a negotiation over communication/
coordination issues (B = -.80, t = -2.26, p > .05). No differences among the
communication topics were revealed for supervisor satisfaction or job effectiveness.

Contextual factors. To examine the effect of context, a series of multiple
regressions was performed in which each of the contextual factors (i.e., perceived issue
importance, discussion length, number of prior discussions, and time elapsed since the

discussion) was entered as a predictor for the criterion variables: directness, elaboration,

47

and mutual concessions. This block of variables accounted for a signiﬁcant portion of

variance in directness (F (4, 73) = 6.48, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .22). The importance of

the issue was positively associated (,6 = .33, t = 3.22, p < .01) and the time elapsed since
the discussion was negatively associated (B = -.3 l , t = -3.06, p < .01) with directness.
Contextual factors also accounted for signiﬁcant variance in elaboration (F (4, 73) = 4.39,

p < .01, adjusted R2 = .21). Discussion length was positively associated with elaboration

(ﬂ = .40, t = 3.80, p < .001). None of the contextual factors was signiﬁcantly associated
with levels of mutual concessions.

To examine the relationships between the contextual factors and negotiation
outcomes, a similar series of regressions was performed with the following criterion
variables: changes in job satisfaction, changes in satisfaction with supervisor, and
changes in job effectiveness. The number of times the issue had been discussed prior to
the focal conversation was negatively associated with supervisor satisfaction (,6 = -.29, t
= -2.43, p < .05). None of the contextual factors was associated with changes in job
satisfaction or job effectiveness.

Communication factors. To explore the relationships between the integrative
communication variables and outcomes, a series of regressions was performed in which
directness, elaboration, and mutual concessions were entered as predictors for each of the
outcomes. Mutual concessions was signiﬁcantly associated with increases in job
satisfaction (,6 = 0.30, t = 2.15, p < .05), supervisor satisfaction (,6 = 0.49, t = 3.72, p <
.001), and job effectiveness (,6 = 0.31, t = 2.19, p < .05). Neither directness nor

elaboration was signiﬁcantly associated with any of the outcome measures.

48

CHAPTER 4

 

DISCUSSION

The concept of negotiation is one of the most profound and enduring topics in all
of organizational theory (Lax, & Sebenius, 1986; Neale & Northcraft, 1991; Putnam &
Poole, 1987). Negotiation has been an extremely versatile concept, informing
organizational analysis at the systemic (e.g., Strauss, 1978) and the interpersonal and
psychological levels as well (e. g., Graen & Scandura, 1987). Despite the ubiquity of the
topic, there have been few efforts to link micro-level negotiation processes with
organizational contextual variables (House, Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995). Drawing
from such areas as role theory, negotiated order, and traditional negotiation theory, the
current study has investigated the impact of structural and interpersonal factors on
supervisor-employee negotiation. Using the critical incident technique, this study has
examined the effects of centralization, formalization, and leader-member exchange on
directness, elaboration, and mutual concessions.

Consistent with research in organizational role-making and negotiated order, both
structural and relational factors were found to have an impact upon the supervisor-
employee negotiations within the work unit. Supervisors’ ratingsof rule observation was
found negatively associated with employees’ accounts of elaboration and mutual
concessions. Apparently, it is not merely the presence of rules in the work—unit that
constrains the breadth of topics subject to negotiation and revision, but rather the extent
that employees are observed for violations of formal rules. The heightened power
distance between workers and management reinforced through formal rule surveillance

seems to inhibit integrative potential during workplace negotiations, and make

49

elaboration and mutual concessions less likely. These ﬁndings suggest that work units
relying heavily on formal rules to provide stability and order may be less likely to
respond and adapt to changes in its external environment, due to the lack of integrative
negotiation at the dyadic level. In addition, employees in formal work units might also
have an especially difﬁcult time modifying and streamlining their work roles to improve
their overall work process.

The failure of the centralization variables (PDM and hierarchy of authority) to
account for signiﬁcant variance in the outcome measures comes as a surprise. Conceptual
issues surrounding these measures can perhaps help explain these ﬁndings. PDM, for
example, is a complex phenomenon that existing at different levels of analysis. Not only
can participation be formal or informal, participation may also exist at the unit level or at
the individual level (House, Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995; Klein, Dansereau, & Hall,
1994). Unit-wide rates of participation are most likely affected by formal factors such as
reward structures, or worker representation on standing committees, while rates of
individual participation are likely linked with more personal factors such as locus of
control or skill level (House, Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995). The items in Alutto and
Acito’s (1974) PDM scale (e. g., “I participate in decisions regarding time limits and
schedules”) are clearly posed at the individual level. As a result, this measure (even
though assessed using supervisors) might be tapping into more unofﬁcial, individual-
level types of participation in the work unit. A different measure of PDM, one reﬂecting
more ofﬁcially sanctioned, group-level forms of PDM, might have made a more unique

contribution to the predictor models. Such causal models certainly await future testing.

50

 

 

Another key ﬁnding is the positive association between leader-member exchange l
and mutual concessions. This ﬁnding is consistent with prior research showing that
higher exchange dyads engage in more mutual persuasion and reciprocal inﬂuence than
their low exchange counterparts (F airhurst & Chandler, 1989; F airhurst Rogers, & Sarr,
1987). While it would surely be a banal platitude to suggest that a high LMX relationship
is a cure-all for all organizational ills, this study suggests that it will be particularly
unlikely for employees to engage in truly integrative negotiation with supervisors with
whom they share a low exchange relationship. Furthermore, this lack of integration may
not only serve to reduce job satisfaction but may further exacerbate tension between
managers and members as they seek to improve their work respective processes. Hence,
not only might a low LMX relationship make the work environment less pleasant for the
focal member, it may also inhibit workplace innovation, the improvement of faulty tasks,
and ultimately, long term member assimilation and well-being.

Somewhat surprisingly, none of the predictors was found signiﬁcantly associated
with the measure of directness. At the statistical level, this could largely be due to the
lack of variance in the directness variable. The high mean and small standard deviation of
the directness scale (m = 414/500, SD = .67) indicates that respondents simply did not
report many indirect interactions. A couple of potential explanations exist for the sparse
variance. First, it is possible that direct conversations are more easily recalled and
described upon request than highly indirect interactions. Indirect conversations with a
great deal of subtext, which may provide more subtle, ambient cues about the

organizational order, may not be as easy to articulate in a single paragraph.

51

 

The lack of variance in the directness measure might also lie in the nature of the
survey instrument itself. In the instructions, participants were asked to report a discussion
involving fairly concrete issues such as new tasks or different methods of performing
work. These types of discussions might inherently lend themselves to more direct types
of interaction. Negotiation involving more ambiguous issues such as interpersonal
inﬂuence and power between supervisors and employees may involve a wider range of
direct and indirect messages, which may not be as easily revealed using the critical
incident technique.

Despite the current ﬁndings, it seems premature to dismiss directness outright as
an important dimension of manager-employee interaction. For this sample, directness was
signiﬁcantly associated with the perceived importance of the issue at hand. It seems,
however, that direct language may be just as likely to reﬂect time pressure or even
frustration as it is to reﬂect warmth or afﬁliation between managers and employees.
Further research is merited to examine the functions of direct and indirect messages in the
role-making and negotiation process.

Supplemental Analysis

In addition to the hypothesis tests, a supplemental analysis of the data has
revealed some interesting results. Most notably, mutual concessions between supervisors
and employees has been shown linked with increases in job satisfaction, supervisor
satisfaction, and perceived job effectiveness. While the value of integrative process in
fostering positive negotiation outcomes has been almost axiomatic in negotiation
research, the current data is points up mutual concessions as a particularly strong

predictor of positive negotiation outcomes for members. It may not be sufﬁcient for

52

managers to merely foster direct and elaborated workplace communication (e.g.,
suggestion boxes, “open door” policies). Empowering leadership might also involve
supervisors not only being receptive to upward inﬂuence, but fostering more ﬂexible,
concessionary forms of problem solving, eliciting concessions from employees as they
themselves offer the same.

In an unexpected ﬁnding, the number of times an issue had been discussed prior
to the focal conversation was related to a decrease in supervisor satisfaction. It appears
respondents made a clear distinction between the elaboration of a topic and the
belaboring of the topic. Repeated negotiations of the same issue can be a tiresome
process, perhaps reﬂecting frustrating or unresolved inﬂuence attempts. Although
scholars of negotiated order typically discuss negotiation as though it is a perpetual
process within the organizational system, the current data suggest detailed, one-shot
conversations in which some mutual concessions are exchanged might be more effective
in maintaining effective labor management relations than the continual revisiting of the
same tired issue. These critical discussions need not be repeated ad infmitum to be
effective turning points in the development of the employees’ work role.

Strengths and Limitations

As with any research endeavor, circumstances beyond the control of the author
introduced limitations to his ﬁndings. The most obvious of these involves the study’s
response rate. The restrictions placed on the study by the mayor’s ofﬁce combined with
the principle researcher’s ﬁnancial limitation resulted in a low response rate of 18
percent. An informant with the Urban County Government informed me that a culture of

distrust and suspicion among city employees might have made potential respondents

53

 

hesitant to cooperate with a research project afﬁliated with the ofﬁce of the Mayor. L
Despite reassurances that their responses would be conﬁdential, employees might have
possibly feared that their responses may have been made available to their supervisors
and could have created problems in their work units.

Dillman (1978) points out that mail survey response rates computed as the
number of completed surveys divided by the total number of surveys sent in this way
tend to be underestimated, because any lack of a response is typically classiﬁed as a
refusal to participate. The researcher cannot be sure whether the participant chose not to
complete the survey after reading it (resulting in a decrease in the response rate
numerator), or if the respondents either never received or read the survey (resulting in a
decrease in the denominator). Mail surveys also involve the least amount of control for

the researcher because employee mail often goes unread and, in bureaucratic

 

organizations, must often go through many gatekeepers before arriving at its intended
destination. Furthermore, in the case of the Urban County Government, many of the
employees in the initial sampling frame work in ﬁeld positions and may lack the
appropriate physical settings (e. g., a quiet place to sit) to read and complete a multi-page
survey.

On an optimistic note however, Dillman notes that “the prevailing obsession with
response rate leads to overlooking other barriers to representativeness.” Response rates
by themselves are poor predictors of non-response bias (Dillman, 1978; Groves &
Peytcheva, 2008). In their recent meta-analysis of studies in which participant and non-
participant data were both available, Groves & Peytcheva (2008) report a virtually non-

existent association between the studies’ response rates and the mean differences between

54

respondent and non-respondent standardized means. Non-response bias can occur
however, if the content of the survey inﬂuences the decision to participate (Groves &
Peytcheva, 2008). Although the presence of non-response bias is difﬁcult to determine
for the current study, the fact that workers from 25 different divisions returned surveys
suggests that response bias did not occur at the divisional level. While a perfect study
would involve data from multiple organizations, the present study presents data from
employees representing a wide array of divisions and work roles.

Another obvious limitation brought about by the low response rate is the small
sample size and lack of statistical power. Clearly the study was not adequately powered
to test the set of interaction terms proffered in the hypotheses. Given the small effect
sizes for the interaction terms, their observed power estimates (1 - B) ranged from .26 to
.38. Hoenig and Heisey (2001), however, argue that power analyses are most appropriate
in the planning stages of a research project and that post-hoe power analyses contribute
little to the interpretation of a test statistic. They point out that non-signiﬁcant p-values
always correspond with low observed power, since observed power is directly a function
of observed p-value.

Other limitations to this study are present as well. At the request of the Mayor’s
ofﬁce, however, this sample was recruited randomly at the organizational level and not at
the divisional or group level. There were not sufﬁcient respondents from within intact
work groups to allow for the clear partialling of group level effects. Even when located
within the same division, different work units are apt to have disparate job objectives,
work ﬂows, task interdependencies, and communication structures that would have a

large impact upon day-to-day interactions (Rousseau, 1995). Therefore, the current data

55

'- 4-'

offer little insight into group level effects on the negotiation process. Future research

 

efforts would beneﬁt from recruitment within existing work groups to allow for a more
systematic study of group level effects on micro-negotiation processes.

A limitation exists in that, nowhere in instructions, were respondents asked to
report the most signiﬁcant role-episode during their tenure with their managers. The
negotiations included in this study may have merely been recent enough or important
enough to merit recall and discussion. The relative magnitude and contribution of each of
these episodes to overall role adjustment or quality of the supervisor-employee
relationship may vary across participants, introducing additional error variance in the
analyses.

This study’s unit of analysis provides a limitation in that each of these episodes
essentially serves as a snapshot of a complex, ever-evolving process of role development.
The present data reveal little as to how multiple episodes are embedded within the
managerial relationship. Role theory typically maintains that work expectations should
become routinized between managers and employees during the early phases of their
dyadic tenure. Successful early negotiations should help clarify which issues are subject
to negotiation and which are not. Norms regarding ﬂexibility, discretion, and acceptable
tactics of inﬂuence might also emerge and later assist managers and employees resolve
future issues more efﬁciently (Lax & Sebenius, 1986).

The negotiated order perspective, however, does recognize that as contingencies
in the organization shift, so does the negotiation context in which actors interact. No
single negotiation should ever resolve a issue permanently (Strauss, 1978). Although

some degree of predictability between managers and workers is likely to arise during

56

their tenure, it seems unlikely that any work role is ever truly “routinized” with any sense
of ﬁnality. It would be a boon to future negotiation research to explicate the types of
critical events and negotiations that effect more permanent types of changes in employees
work roles and those which set the stage for subsequent negotiation and problem-solving.
Future Directions

Clearly, the current study has only scratched the surface in its examination of
integrative negotiation process. Negotiation research has a rich and diverse history, with
many potential areas that can be applied to manager-employee relations. The behavioral
decision perspective on negotiation holds that individuals employ a host of cognitive
heuristics, frames, shortcuts and other devices as they seek to resolve conﬂict and make
decisions (Camevale & Pruitt, 1992; Neale & Bazerman, 1992). The mental models held
by negotiating parties serve as critical structures for their interaction process and will
affect individuals goals, tactics, and expectations for their opponent’s tactics. For
instance, negotiators often fail to reach integrative agreement due to a “ﬁxed-pie”
assumption, a belief that their interests are diametrically opposed to those of their
counterpart or that no opportunities exist to trade off on issues to maximize joint gains
(De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000). These assumptions can cause managers and employee
to lock into patterns of distributive negotiation, when in fact integrative potential exists.

Harinck, de Dreu, & van Vianen (2000) suggest that the “ﬁxed-pie” assumption is
more likely to occur in negotiations concerning personal, vested interests than those
involving more intellective or evaluative issues. As issues become more personal,
negotiators become more likely to perceive a ﬁxed-pie, and less likely to hold a

cooperative orientation. Negotiators in these instances however, may be more likely to

57

 

 

explore trade-offs and mutual concessions, leading to higher join gains, than they are in

 

instances involving intellect or values, issues not as easily subject to logrolling or
compromise (Harinck, de Dreu, & van Vianen, 2000). Future research should consider
the effect of the type of issue on managers and employees’ distributive assumptions and
negotiation tactics.

Other types of negotiation frames have implication for manager employee
negotiations as well. For example, Pinkley (1990) suggests that situations of conﬂict
elicit in individuals a “dimension of conﬂict frame,” based on prior conﬂict experience
and current goals. These frames serve to guide “disputant behavior, strategy selection,
outcome concerns, and evaluations of the other party” (Pinkley, 1990, p.117). The
dimensions of conﬂict described by Pinkley are: relationship versus task, emotional
versus intellectual, and compromise versus win. Clearly the last of these dimensions
would seem to be the most natural analog of integrative versus distributive
communication process. Future research, however, should examine how each of these
conﬂict frames affects supervisors and employees’ strategy selection and outcome
evaluations of workplace negotiations. Issues involving a greater emotional or relational
dimension may involve different processes and outcomes than those solely intellective
and task related. Furthermore, examination of the effects of interpersonal and structural
factors such as the ones featured in the present study on participants’ assumptions and
conﬂict frames’ seems a fertile area for future inquiry.

While the current study has placed primary emphasis on the predictors of
integrative process, the link between such process and the economic outcomes of

negotiation remains ambiguous. The question inevitably arises, “how does one know

58

when a negotiation is successful?” Rife with bounded rationality, pressing deadlines, and
ambiguous cause-and-effect relationships, real-life negotiations between managers and
employees are messier than those conducted in research laboratories between actors with
little interpersonal history and no anticipation of future interaction. As noted by Curhan,
Elfenbein, & Xu (2006), “It would be implausible, not to mention uncomfortable, for a
real-world negotiation to conclude with a debrieﬁng of parties’ aspirations, targets, and
breaking points” (p. 495).

Because workplace negotiations are inevitably embedded within ongoing
relationships, social psychological outcomes may be as important and often more
important than the actual economic gains. The subjective value of a single negotiation
can help shore up interpersonal rapport between two parties and motivate them to pursue
high quality negotiations at a later time (Curhan et al., 2006). When negotiators share a
strong personal bond or social identity, the need to maintain the face needs of one’s
partner and equity or fairness may weigh heavier than the need for an optimal solution
(Curhan et al., 2006; Kramer et al., 1993).

Work unit negotiation involves face concerns for managers and employees as
well. The data for the current study is consistent with the notion that managers constantly
re-negotiating workplace issues with subordinates may be viewed as less credible or
competent than those who choose areas for negotiation more prudently. A skillful
manager might acquiesce in areas too mundane to negotiate, exert formal authority in
non-negotiable domains, and negotiate in areas important to the work-unit yet too
ambiguous to resolve by formal rules (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Future research will

beneﬁt from examining the linkages between integrative (and non-integrative) process

59

and the constituent parties’ instrumental outcomes, face needs, feelings about the
relationship, and feelings about the negotiation process as a whole (Curhan et al., 2006).
Such efforts would surely add richness to our understanding of workplace negotiation.
One ﬁnal observation is warranted. The tacit assumption underlying the current
research is that integrative process is preferable to other forms of decision making in that
it provides parties the chance to explore options, rank preferences, and produce high
quality outcomes. Although integration is considered by many the “normative
benchmark” for evaluating negotiation outcomes (Kramer et al., 1993), it would be rash
to suggest that supervisors and subordinates must engage in perpetual integrative
negotiation to build a successful working relationship. First, integrative negotiation
requires time, energy, and resources that managers and employees could spend enacting
other aspects of their work roles. Addressing too many simultaneous issues within a
negotiation could cause parties to doubt the effectiveness of their respective outcomes,
and have a deleterious effect upon satisfaction with the negotiation (N aquin, 2003).
Many decisions in organizations are made through shortcuts, rules of thumb, and
other cognitive heuristics. Sometimes time pressure can cause parties to seek a
“satisﬁcing” solution, one that meets a minimal set of acceptable criteria, but is easier
reached than a fully integrative arrangement (Simon, 1957). Although such sub-optimal
arrangements may be viewed in the traditional paradigm as representing failed
negotiation, these arrangements need not receive short shrift from researchers. An
expedient agreement allowing managers and employees to complete their work duties in
a timely manner might indeed prove more desirable than a laborious negotiation in which

every possible alternative is addressed and debated. Further research is needed to

60

explicate the types of problem solving issues for which integrative communication
process will be linked with positive outcomes and those for which it will prove

unnecessary.

61

ENDNOTES
lAlthough integrative and distributive negotiation processes are conceptually

distinct, it is unlikely that any given negotiation will be entirely integrative or
distributive. These two processes are instead imagined to exist as polar ends of a

continuum, with most real-life interactions falling somewhere in between.

2Ilgen and Hollenbeck (1991) suggest that all jobs and roles, regardless of the

nature of the work involved, consist of a “relatively ﬁnite set of generic job components
beyond which further reduction is unnecessary” (p. 172). In their framework, the term
“job” refers solely to the formally documented set of task elements speciﬁed by the prime
beneﬁciaries of the work (i.e., the organization), and roles consist of the set of established
and emergent elements. Emergent elements represent the more subjective aspects of the

person’s role, and are more likely subject to negotiation among those in the role-set.

3The Mayor’s Ofﬁce requested that we not measure supervisor ratings of LMX

for the focal employee (SLMX).

4 . . . . . . .
Reverse-coded items were included in the original scales measuring job

codiﬁcation and hierarchy of authority. Neither item was retained after the conﬁrmatory

factor analysis.

62

 

5To test is any control variables warranted inclusion in the analysis, three l ,

regressions were ﬁrst performed in which sex, age, organizational tenure, and dyadic
tenure were entered as predictors for each of the communication process variables. None
of these variables was found to be a signiﬁcant predictor for directness, elaboration, or

mutual concessions and they were therefore excluded ﬁ'om the hypothesis tests.

63

 

Appendix 1

Employee and Supervisor N-sizes by Division

 

Division

Employee N

Supervisor N

 

Parks & Recreation
Building Maintenance
Air and Water Quality

Building Inspection

Family Services
Waste Management
Community Corrections
Government Communications
Police

Planning

911

Adult Services
Computer Services
Human Resources
Revenue

Risk Management
Streets, Roads, Forests
Trafﬁc

Youth Services
Council Clerk

DEEM

Engineering

Fire

Fleet Services

Law

Unknown

uuwu—wHHNNNNNNNNNWA-hbthmm“\l:

 

Total:

00
O

64

Appendix 2
Retained Scale Items, Reliabilities, and Factor Loadings

DIRECTNESS ($10. = .84)

I pretty much said what was on my mind.

I was straightforward with what I wanted.

I was frank in my discussion of the change.

I was outspoken about what I wanted during this discussion.

ELABORATION (Sla = .90)

Our discussion covered a lot of the ﬁne points of the role issue.
We discussed many of the technicalities involved in this change.
We went into great detail during this discussion.

We discussed this change in great depth.

MUTUAL CONCESSIONS (Sla = .90)

We compromised over the nature of the role change.

Both my supervisor and I made proposals for how the role should be changed.
Concessions were made by both parties.

There were tradeoffs made during this discussion.

We exchanged a number of counter-offers.

PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING (Sla = .89)

I participate in decisions regarding work to be performed next when a
given piece is completed.

I participate in decisions regarding time limits and schedules.

I participate in decisions regarding the order of performing work when
several tasks are to be done.

I participate in decisions regarding checking and redoing work.

HIERARCHY OF AUTHORITY (SIa = .89)
I have to ask my boss before I do almost anything.
Any decision I make has to have my boss’s approval.

Even small matters have to be referred to someone higher up for a ﬁnal answer.

JOB CODIFICATION (SI 0. = .86)
People here are allowed to do almost as they please.
Most people here make their own rules on the job.

JOB SPECIFICITY (SI (1 = .80)

Everyone has a speciﬁc job to do.

Whatever situation arises we have procedures to follow in dealing with it.
This organization keeps written records of everyone’s job performance.

65

.95
.82
.69
.60

.86
.85
.83
.79

.85
.83
.78
.76
.76

.87
.86

.84
.73

.97
.84
.75

.87
.87

.95
.72
.62

Appendix 2 (cont’d).

RULE OBSERVATION (SIG. = .82)

The employees here are constantly being checked for rule violations. .83
People here feel they are constantly being watched to see that they

obey all the rules. .83
LEADER-MEMBER EXCHANGE (SIa = .94)
I am impressed with my supervisor’s knowledge of his/her job.1 .93
I admire my supervisor’s professional skills. 1 .88
I respect my supervisor’s knowledge of and competence on the job.1 .84
My supervisor is the kind of person one would like to have

as a friend.2 .80
My supervisor is a lot of fun to work with.2 .79
My supervisor would come to my defense if I were "attacked" by others.3 .78
I like my supervisor very much as a person.2 .75
My supervisor would defend me to others in the organization if I made

an honest mistake.3 .7 3
I am willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally required, to meet

my supervisor’s work goals.4 .57

 

Note. lOriginally included in the “Professional Respect” sub-scale for LMX .
2Originally included in the “Affect” sub-scale for LMX. 3Originally included in the

“Loyalty” sub-scale for LMX. 4Originally included in the “Contribution” sub-scale for
LMX.

66

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