




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**PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AMONG TURKISH POLICE  
CADETS**

**By**

**Nebi ÇETINKAYA**

**A DISSERTATION**

**Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
In Partial fulfillment of the requirements  
For the degree of**

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**Criminal Justice**

**2010**



## **ABSTRACT**

### **PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AMONG TURKISH POLICE CADETS**

**By**

**Nebi CETINKAYA**

Literature in police corruption in Turkey mostly involves police officers in active duty. Empirical research that aims to discover police cadets' attitudes toward the phenomenon is rare. A comparison between future supervisors' and line officers' perceptions on specific aspects of corruption is lacking. This dissertation attempts to explore and delineate a variety of factors that may influence police cadets' perception about some basic types of police corruption, namely, gift giving to obtain favored status, bribes to fix a desired outcome in a legal issue, and "speed money" to hasten or secure one's rightful and legal administrative process. In addition, this study aims to explore any differences among police academy and police vocational school cadets' perceptions of petty corruption and their attitude toward reporting corruption. It is expected that this study will provide important and useful information to policy makers and leadership cadres responsible for police training in the Turkish National Police (TNP).

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**I dedicate this work to the Turkish National Police**

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

A project at this magnitude requires a lot of supporting elements of vital value. I would therefore thank those who were always there to support and encourage when it is desperately needed.

First of all I would like to thank my dear wife Hatice for her patience and encouragements during all stages of this stressful process; Holding things together in a foreign country with the responsibility of our children Alikasım and my daughters Aysenur and Rukiye was a herculean task alone.

I especially thank to my committee chair Doctor Mahesh Nalla who never ceased his continuous and precious support. His vision and guidance helped me a lot for reaching to my goals.

Special thanks to my committee members Doctor Sheila Maxwell, Doctor Charles Corley and Doctor Steve Kozlowski for providing guidance that fostered my development, stimulated creative thinking, and tapped independent initiative taking.

I also thank to the Turkish community of the MSU that created a warm and supportive environment during our stay in the US.

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION and STATEMENT of PROBLEM**

Since the beginning of known history, corruption has been a part of society. It has been a subject of inquiry for a wide range of disciplines. Despite a tremendous amount of accumulated scholarship, corruption as a phenomenon still generates heated debates. Police corruption remains a contested topic in criminal justice literature.

Successful corruption control measures require solid academic research backed with sound theoretical foundations (Klockars, et al., 2000). Systematic studies of police corruption are initiated primarily when societies become aware of scandals and reach a certain democratic maturity necessary to discuss or criticize its causes and consequences (Sherman, 1978). More specifically, police corruption in general began to receive consideration from social scientists following the eruption of major corruption scandals in the U.S. in the 1970s. However, in democracies where organizational accountability is not yet established, scandals rarely give rise to constructive debates and efficient reforms.

The primary aim of this study is to delineate the antecedents of the perceptions of police cadets from different police training organizations, namely, police academy and police vocational school of higher education, regarding petty corruption, both in terms of seriousness and their reporting behavior involving hypothetical corruption scenarios. As an explanatory study examining Turkish police cadets' perceptions, this study promises a wealth of information for researchers aiming to address the question in their respective police training institutions.

## **Rationale of the Study**

The extant literature about police corruption draws attention to a variety of factors that affect the perceptions of police officers concerning the phenomenon. These factors can be named as processes of recruitment and selection, formal training, and probation – in other words, the phases through which rookies become part of the organization (e.g. Haberfeld, 2003; Kleinig, 1990; Carter, Sapp, and Stephens, 1989; Lynch, 1976). The recruitment and selection practices of police organizations are important indicators of the diligence with which the organization aligns itself with societal demands in general. The education and training programs and processes' success in shaping the cadets according to the desired organizational and societal values merits an empirical assessment. Such an assessment necessitates deciphering the attitudes of police cadets about corruption, which taints the image of their institution.

It is necessary to mention that this study does not attempt to develop an index for predicting potential corrupt behavior of Turkish police personnel. Instead, it aims to expose current attitudes of cadets toward limited but prevalent types of corruption scenarios involving police and some public institutions.

The data that is used in this dissertation has been collected from the Police Faculty of Security Sciences (police academy) located in Ankara and from two Police Vocational Schools of Higher Education (PVSHE or vocational schools) located in Istanbul and Izmir, which were selected from among the existing 26 similar institutions.

## **The Significance of the Study in the Turkish Context**

Since the contemporary emergence of attempts to address police corruption, concerned authorities and scholars, as well as police professionals, have offered a variety

of remedies that focus on different aspects of the problem. These propositions range from implementing structural or cultural changes, such as applying stringent control mechanisms into work processes, to ameliorating recruitment criteria and training standards of police candidates. Any of these solutions must take into account the crucial importance of the quality of police training programs; accordingly, it is important to collect data about police cadets' attitudes toward corruption's prevalence within society.

This study is exploratory in nature and is based on the theoretical framework of police integrity developed by Klockars and colleagues (1997, 2000, 2004). The study aims to capture the perceptions of police cadets who are not formally exposed to active police duties. Given the secrecy of police work and police cadets' limited opportunities to be involved in or witness such transactions, the current study focuses on instances of petty corruption that are reported to be the most prevalent forms of such within Turkish social life and bureaucracy. Petty corruption was chosen as the survey topic in order to compensate for the cadets' lack of experience in encountering issues of corruption through actual police work; comparatively, petty corruption is a topic about which cadets may be reasonably expected to have formed perceptions. This study also will attempt to uncover how cadets perceive their fellow officers' attitudes toward the same phenomenon, including their own and their colleagues' reporting behavior when they come across such instances.

In summary, this study is expected to contribute to the literature by delineating the attitudes of future police officers who are going to occupy leadership positions as well as rank and file positions in the Turkish National Police (TNP). Consequently, given the

scope of this study, presented findings are expected to guide responsible authorities in taking appropriate measures.

### **Organization of the Study**

This study involves six chapters. The first chapter, following the introduction that summarizes the purpose of the study, includes the statement of the problem, the significance of the study in the Turkish context, and a summary pertaining to the adopted theoretical standpoint.

Chapter 2 focuses on the definition of police corruption, theories relevant to police corruption with respect to their taxonomies, and the espoused conceptual and theoretical framework pertaining to the adopted corruption framework. Additionally, it discusses differences between major streams of corruption approaches, the state of the current literature and the rationale of selecting the adopted conceptual framework.

Chapter 3 describes the contextual factors pertaining to the Turkish National Police and the social, cultural, and demographic characteristics of the surveyed police cadets. Additionally, it provides a brief summary of the engrained traditions of Turkish public service in general, as well as a short history of the Turkish National Police, its administrative structure, and its role in the Turkish criminal justice system. This chapter includes detailed information about the Faculty of Security Sciences and its branches, the Police Vocational Schools and the Police Academy, in addition to their roles in providing the Turkish National Police with line officers and entry level supervisors.

Chapter 4 describes the research design and the adopted methodology.

Chapter 5 offers a comprehensive analysis of the project's research questions, including basic statistics and the dimensions of the research questions. Descriptive

statistics, mean comparison tests, and OLS regression analysis will also be provided in this chapter.

Finally, Chapter 6 is devoted to a discussion of the potential utility of the study findings. The discussion also includes recommendations for police administrators and policy makers.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **CONCEPTUAL and THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

#### **Introduction**

The function of corruption is a highly contested topic. Due to the dynamic and mostly elusive nature of the term it is a challenge to group some acts or processes under clear cut corruption categories. The adopted point of reference and level of analysis (individual, group or institutional) play an important role in identifying the characteristics of the act or the processes in question. For example, according to Lipset and Lenz (2000), corruption can serve as a mechanism to redistribute wealth, serve as a source of efficiency in over-bureaucratized States/societies, and enable less powerful political groups to access the political arena, and benefit those having little access to the opportunity structure in a society due to the unfavorable effects of race, ethnicity or lack of skills (Euben, 2004). On the other hand, some view corruption as one factor among others that hamper the spirit of democracy within a democratic society.

This chapter comprises a review of major theories and the adopted theoretical framework of corruption. Due to the scope of the current study, the reviewed literature will not include studies that focus on morality or ethics and the dilemmas that arise from a given adopted philosophical standpoint.

The current chapter contains two sections. The first delineates major differences that distinguish police corruption from other corrupt activities occurring in public domains. The second section provides an overview and theoretical background of existing definitions and major conceptions of police corruption. Acknowledging that the

concept of police corruption overlaps in some circumstances with distinct concepts of corruption specific to political, economic, and administrative spheres, I will limit my discussion to the type known as petty corruption in police corruption literature.

### **Police Corruption as a Distinct Form of Corruption**

The police occupy a distinct position among other public institutions because they operate at a crossroads where they have the opportunity to serve as a hub between and across layers of public and private institutions. Such multidimensional linkages create a plethora of opportunities for the police to engage in legitimate as well as corrupt transactions.

Analogous to other organizations, private or public, the police are not corruption free. However, given their role within the society, behaviors that contradict the established and espoused norms (by law, morality or ethics) are less tolerated when perpetrated by the police (Huon, et al., 1995). The impact of police corruption on public life is more intimidating and less tolerable compared to other types of corrupt activities perpetrated by other institutions. As Barker and Carter (1991) noted, “what the police do and how they do it affects the perceptions of how the public views the fairness and honesty of the entire criminal justice system” (p. 3).

Police work is bound to enforce a vast area of law and regulations, and consequently, it is an occupation rife with opportunities for misconduct. Police exercise a discretion in enforcing laws that regulate individual or societal liberties that is far greater than in any other profession (Sherman, 1982). This augments the chances of police abusing the power entrusted to them in a variety of circumstances, especially those in which they have legal control.



Police corruption is a form of organizational deviance in the public sector (Moran, 2005). However, despite the existence of some conceptual similarities to other forms of deviance, police corruption has its own distinctions. Police practices and organizational functioning cannot be understood either simply in terms of production economies or solely from the perspective of technical efficiency and effectiveness. A police organization does not create a product which is exchanged in a market such that organizations are rewarded for effective and efficient control of the work process (Crank & Langworthy, 1992).

Police corruption is not specific to a distinct police branch or limited to the personnel occupying lower levels of the organizational hierarchy. To the contrary, it is pervasive, continuing, and not bounded by rank (Newburn, 1999). Its characteristics may vary in terms of seriousness, according to the personnel involved at different hierarchical and seniority levels or within performance domains such as specialized units or departments within the organization (e.g., Klockars, et al., 1997).

### **Definition of Police Corruption**

Police corruption involves any proscribed act perpetrated by the misuse of the officer's official position for actual or expected material reward or gain (Barker & Roebuck, 1973; Barker, 1977). Based on their standpoint (e.g., ethical, moral, or legal) social scientists and practitioners alike use that concept to refer to a variety of activities, including bribery; violence and brutality; fabrication and destruction of evidence; racism; and, favoritism or nepotism (Newburn, 1999). As noted by Punch (2000), corruption has been referred to as a 'container' concept that is used for a much wider range of police deviant behavior than traditional bribe-taking. McMullan (1961, p. 183-184) defines a

public official's actions as corrupt "if he accepts money or money's worth for doing something that he is under a duty to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do, or to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper reasons." Goldstein (1977, p. 188) identifies corruption as "the misuse of authority by a police officer in a manner designed to produce personal gain for the officer or others." Cohen (1986) defines corruption as "acting on opportunities created by virtue of one's authority for personal gain at the expense of the public one is authorized to serve" (p. 23). Looking at it from an organizational perspective, Klockars and colleagues (2000, 1997) conceptualize the notion of police integrity as "the normative inclination of police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation." Kleinig (1996), on the other hand, proposes that "Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private or departmental/divisional advantage" (p. 599). Each of these definitions covers the phenomena to some extent, but a universal definition is still to be found.

### **Types and Taxonomies of Police Corruption**

The categorization of police corruption is also a contended issue. In particular, most of the disagreements arise from the challenge of classifying misconduct of all sorts perpetrated by the police in general. Depending on the scholar's conceptualization of corruption, specific actions may shift categories from unethical behavior to misconduct or from pure criminal activity to police corruption.

For example, one of the earlier and widely used typologies of police corruption developed by Roebuck and Barker (1974) and lately expanded by Punch (1985), shown Table 1 (Punch, 2000, p.303), involves nine types of police corruption.

Table 1. Types and dimensions of police corruption.

| <b>Type</b>                               | <b>Dimensions</b>                                                                                                                                                          |
|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>'Corruption of authority'</i>          | When an officer receives some form of material gain by virtue of their position as a police officer without violating the law per se (e.g., free drinks, meals, services). |
| <i>'Kickbacks'</i>                        | Receipt of goods, services or money for referring business to particular individuals or companies.                                                                         |
| <i>'Opportunistic theft'</i>              | Stealing from arrestees (sometimes referred to as 'rolling'), from traffic accident victims, crime victims and the bodies or property of dead citizens                     |
| <i>'Shakedowns'</i>                       | Acceptance of a bribe for not following through on a criminal violation, i.e., not making an arrest, filing a complaint or impounding property.                            |
| <i>'Protection of illegal activities'</i> | Police protection of those engaged in illegal activities (prostitution, drugs, pornography) enabling the business to continue operating.                                   |
| <i>'The fix'</i>                          | Undermining of criminal investigations or proceedings, or the 'loss' of traffic tickets.                                                                                   |
| <i>'Direct criminal activities'</i>       | A police officer commits a crime against person or property for personal gain 'in clear violation of both departmental and criminal norms'.                                |
| <i>'Internal payoffs'</i>                 | Prerogatives available to police officers (holidays, shift allocations, promotion) are bought, bartered and sold.                                                          |
| <i>'Flaking' or 'paddling'</i>            | Planting of or adding to evidence (argued by Punch to be particularly evident in drugs cases).                                                                             |

The authors (Roebuck & Barker, 1974) embraced a broad concept of police corruption that can be described as “deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical or criminal behavior perpetrated by a police officer” (Newburn, 1999). In this framework, Punch (2000, p.304-305) categorizes previous types of behavior into three broad categories, namely, *corruption*, *misconduct*, and *police crime*. According to Punch’s (2000) perspective, corruption refers to the conventional understanding of taking something against the duty

to do or not to do something as an exchange for money or gifts from an external corrupter. Misconduct refers to breaking internal rules and procedures; such instances are analogous to inappropriate behaviors perpetrated in other organizations, such as sleeping on duty or leaving early without valid excuse. These actions or omissions generally involve infringements of disciplinary regulations; they are investigated and sanctioned internally. Police crime, on the other hand, is not limited to accepting bribes but also involves breaking the law in a serious manner. Police crime may also involve the use of excessive force, criminal activities such as grand auto theft, cover-ups of burglaries or drug sales, and the abuse of individual rights guaranteed by law. This category of crime does not have a noble motive or involve a distinct criminal group and can be described as crimes perpetrated by criminals in uniform (Punch, 2000).

According to Punch's (2000, p. 304) classification of police misconduct, indicated in above, can be grouped as follows: kickbacks, shakedowns, protection of illegal activities, and the fix are forms of 'conventional' corruption - and the rest are forms of misconduct (corruption of authority) or of crime (opportunistic theft, direct criminal activities, and flaking or paddling).

This new taxonomy is useful for considering new types of police misconduct that fall outside the definition of an individual engaging in a behavior for the purpose of seeking material gain, because it expands the definition to contextualize behaviors within the social dynamics of the group or organization and the occupation. Following the proposed definition by Punch (1984), it is possible to extend the three grouped taxonomies in a way that distinguishes among diverse motives and a broad array of patterned behaviors, the parties involved (e.g., such as internal or external), and the type

of action—i.e., doing or not doing something with legitimate or illegitimate goals (Punch, 2000). In this vein, the new categorization yields seven types of police deviance as follows: (1) police misconduct; (2) straightforward corruption; (3) strategic corruption; (4) predatory corruption; (5) noble cause corruption; (6) police crime; and, (7) state related police crime.

*Strategic corruption* occurs in cases when the police and organized crime group(s) engage in a stable arrangement serving both groups' interests via the non-enforcement of the legal obligations of the police. In *predatory corruption*, the police are the real culprits. They initiate the criminal activity, organizing and tapping into sources of money by exploiting their advantages as members of a police organization. *Noble cause corruption* involves using illicit means to attain approved social or organizational ends. This category, from the organizational or agent's perspective, does not necessarily involve a financial benefit per se but oils the criminal justice machinery. Klockars (1985) refers to this type of misconduct as the "Dirty Harry problem," where the legal process is adulterated in order to attain desirable (social or organizational) ends. *State related crime* primarily involves attaining political goals. In this type of crime, police officers are put under political or administrative pressure to perpetrate criminal executions or torture prisoners for forced confessions in order to secure convictions for the benefit of the state.

### **Adopted Theoretical Framework**

The adopted general framework of this study relies on the theoretical principles of police integrity set by Klockars and Kutnjak Ivkovich (2004); Klockars, Kutnjak Ivkovich, and Haberfeld (2004); Klockars, Kutnjak Ivkovich, Harver, and Haberfeld (1997); and Klockars, Kutnjak Ivkovich, Haberfeld and Uydess (2001). The scholars

define the concept of police integrity as “the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse rights and privileges of their occupation” (Klockars, et al., 1997, 2001, 2004, 2007). The theory of police integrity also makes reference to some basic tenets of organizational studies. More specifically, police integrity is associated with: (1) the quality of official rules and the manner in which they are made, communicated, and understood; (2) the quality of detection, investigation, and disciplinary actions undertaken by an agency; and, (3) the ability to curtail the code of silence.

In addition to purely organizational considerations, the problem of corruption must also be considered within the social context in which the organization is embedded. This study contributes to the literature by studying both the political and cultural context of the research area and police cadets’ individual characteristics, such as their social and cultural orientation, in order to discover how both influence the cadets’ perceptions of corruption.

### **Adopted Concept Pertaining to Corruption**

As explained above, all definitions of corruption cover some aspects of the phenomena. Narrower definitions, although more specific, are mostly concerned with the material gain that police acquire in an illegitimate way or through the misuse of their professional status; these definitions fail to embrace other instances that might involve benefits having more subtle characteristics. On the other hand, broader definitions fail to draw a workable framework that clearly differentiates what constitutes corruption in specific instances. Thus, an ideal definition of police corruption should not be limited to the perpetration of specific acts but should also include the process that results in

achieving such ends and acknowledge the varying means, ends, and motives of corrupt activities (Newburn, 1999).

Barker (1977) indicates three elements that must be present for an act to be considered as corruption: the act must (1) be forbidden by some norm, regulation or law, (2) involve the misuse of the officer's official position, and (3) involve the acquisition of material gain. Accordingly, this concept does not include police occupational deviance or police crime (Barker, 1977, 1978; Punch, 1984, 2000) that does not aim for any material gain but still involves deviant acts, relevant to violations of the criminal law, rules and regulations regulating police work and behavior, and ethical and professional police standards. Due to the scope of this study, the adopted definition of police corruption involves any proscribed act perpetrated by the misuse of the officer's official position for actual or expected material reward or gain (Barker & Roebuck, 1973; Barker, 1977).

Police work involves a very diverse environment ripe to extract financial gain. Since different types of exchanges occur in different contexts, from fixing a ticket, to being paid off by organized crime rings, a meticulous differentiation of the illicit financial gain is crucial for analyzing the root causes of a specific type of problem. Given the variety of acts and processes named as police corruption, corrective and preventive measures may change depending on a plethora of variables. Accordingly, in this study our concept is limited to instances that are described as petty corruption, which includes gratuities, free services, etc.

## **Petty Corruption as a Slippery Slope**

The intentions behind the offering of free services and goods to police officers are not always benevolent. Although from the outside these transactions appear innocent, they prepare appropriate grounds for corruption by working as slippery slopes (Kania, 1988).

One of the explanations for an individual's descent into corruption is the famous "slippery slope" analogy. The function of gratuities is interpreted by scholars in a variety of ways; some see gratuities as a slippery slope leading to major corrupt acts in a steady fashion (e.g., Malloy, 1982; Sherman, 1982) or as a pretext for the disproportionate distribution of police services to the taxpayers.

Accordingly a police officer that tolerates even small gratuities finds himself or herself in a position where he or she cannot refuse to engage in transactions that lead to greater instances of corruption. Sherman (1982) proposes that such minor transactions in fact constitute preliminary steps that morally desensitize the perpetrator and encourage further enterprises on a large scale. In cases where such acts are perpetrated or tolerated in concert they bind the group together through the act of keeping their activities secret. Those who do not engage in such groups face different treatment and are alienated from the group. Peer pressure or pressure from senior officers involved in such activities prepares adequate ground for officers' initiation into corruption and the rationalization of small gratuities that can facilitate the acceptance of more corrupt activities. Another slippery slope typology, developed by Crank and Calendero (2000), is based on the notion of the noble cause corruption. This kind involves a testing procedure in order to assess whether or not a newcomer can be trusted in all circumstances. Briefly, this type of



initiation aims to submerge the newcomer in such circumstances where stepping back risks his or her interests in a severe manner. In organizations where such practices are prevalent, new recruits face a challenging dilemma in terms of defining their position in the job.

### **Theoretical Explanations of Police Corruption**

Scholars and practitioners alike propose several explanations in order to delineate the underpinnings of corruption. These propositions can be grouped under three broad categories: individual, institutional, and systemic explanations (e.g., Johnston, 1995).

#### **Individual level explanations.**

Literature dealing with an individual level of analysis, focuses particularly on the police candidates', cadets', probationary officers', and active officers' background characteristics, including their personality characteristics, SES background, and moral stances toward ethical or unethical instances relevant to police corruption (e.g., Beck & Lee, 2002; Chan, et al., 2003). The individual approach attributes the causes of corruption to the individual and can be summarized under three major categories, namely, the rotten apple, recruitment, and police personality approaches (Banks, 2004).

The rotten apple approach can be described as a classical defense mechanism utilized by higher level stakeholders that may get harmed when their systemic linkages to corruption are uncovered. In order to save the interest at stake, the act of corruption is localized into one or a few corrupt officers (Barker, 1996).

The recruitment perspective emphasizes that selection procedures that are designed to recruit individuals with similar backgrounds increase the potential for involving them in corruption. This approach is mostly used in explaining police abuse of

authority of various kinds directed toward minorities and people belonging to the lower social strata.

The psychological or personality approach is mostly concerned with the personality attributes of the police personnel. This particular approach assumes that personality attributes governing subsequent behavior are less likely to change and will govern the occupational behavior of the individual. This perspective draws attention to the relatively stable aspects of the individual such as personality traits and value orientations. For example, Caldero (1997) reports that police values over the past two and one-half decades remained constant, emphasizing that people joining the police issued from milieus holding similar values (cited in, Klockars et al, 2004). Considering the relatively stable nature of values, education is assumed to have little or no effect on them, emphasizing the futility of higher education (Hunter, 1999). On the other hand, the socio-psychological paradigm emphasizes the potential of change in the personality of police officers during the course of their lives. This approach sees personality characteristics as developmental, dynamic and changing with an individual's life experience (Kappeler, et al., 1998). Study results demonstrated a widening gap between officers' initial idealistic ethical values and the values they later espoused. In this vein, in researching the Australian police, Chan and colleagues (2003) report that the real indoctrination phase starts at the academy when students encounter police officers that attend the academy for advanced courses or other activities such as in-training programs.

### **Organizational level explanations.**

In the last decade, corruption studies have drawn more interest, especially from the organizational perspective. Recent approaches relevant to studying police corruption

opened new avenues for the exploration of police attitudes toward corruption. The measurement of ethical boundaries, tolerance for corruption, types of corrupt behavior, and integrity level became some of the routine procedures for practitioners in their attempts to reform a corrupt organization (e.g., Ivkovich, 2003). Most of the perception studies involve police officers' perception toward corruption and focus on the organizational aspects of police work, such as length of service, size of the organization, rank, type of police work, and policing context (e.g., Klockars, et al., 1996), with respect to the socio-demographical aspects of the study participants, such as race, gender, educational level (including attending ethics classes) (e.g., Chan, et al., 2003). Additionally, research in this domain also includes perception studies at the departmental as well as the interdepartmental, national and international levels. Additionally, there are also studies that combine different methodologies such as field research and attitude research together (e.g., Klockars, et al., 2006; Chan, et al., 2003).

Another approach pertaining to organizational aspects draws attention to the police subculture, management and administration, or both (Pollock, 2005). Literature about police corruption in this domain emphasizes the role of the existing occupational culture in the ways police internalize norms and values that are developed through police work (Kappeler, et al., 1998). According to this perspective, the police culture reverberates with negative connotations (e.g., Reiner, 1992). It is associated with a capacity for harboring tacit codes that foster and regenerate corruption. In organizational culture literature, scholars discuss specific organizational and environmental factors affecting the formation of the police culture (e.g., Manning, 1997; Crank, 2004) and elements that shape police officers' value orientations starting from their recruitment to

the police academy and continuing through subsequent phases of their career (e.g., Van Maanen, 1974; Sherman, 1982).

Research involving the organizational approach offers supportive findings that recruits' and probationary officers' attitudes and values are deeply affected by the formal training and socialization they undertake (Kappeler, et al., 1998), as well as the following field training and occupational socialization processes (Skolnick, 1966; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). The socialization processes within uniformed organizations such as the police and military have their distinctions compared to other civilian public or private organizations. Cultural influences prevalent at the training and educational institution are found (e.g., Chan, et al., 2003) to influence the development of the cadets or their future cultural profile as police officers (Caglar, 2001).

### **Societal level explanations.**

Societal level explanations focus on forces beyond the control of the police. Some scholars attribute the emergence of the problem of corruption to the moral pluralism that characterizes a diverse society with inherently conflicting interests (e.g., Johnston, 1995). In this vein, but more so in homogeneous societies, police departments are likely to reflect the general characteristics of the communities where they police (Pollock, 2005). A cultural reluctance to react to corrupt transactions within a given community may encourage police officers not to enforce specific regulations and to take advantage of the state of affairs. When society tolerates the perpetration of wrongdoings, it becomes a real challenge for police officers to ensure equal implementation of the law and regulations. More specifically, police units dealing with sensitive issues such as vice, drugs, and gambling may encounter a variety of situations that have the propensity of procuring

benefits for individual or group level stakeholders. This may not be attributable solely to the inherently tempting nature of these types of situations or actions but also to the lack of enforcement of related laws and regulations by the entire criminal justice system or to the tolerance by society of those who transgress these rules. As a result, the police tend to rationalize their involvement in corrupt interactions by claiming such cases as victimless crimes.

In parallel research, cross-national as well as national studies involving different countries demonstrate that their respective cultural, legal, societal, and political background characteristics play a significant role in the perception of seriousness or reporting behavior of corruption. Comparative study results (e.g., Ekenvall, 2003; Ivkovich and Shelley, 2008) also report differences between police organizations' (as well as their respective societies') perception of petty corruption. Ekenvall's (2003) study points out that in countries that are sensitive about alcohol-related misconduct, police officers were also stricter in their ratings of the seriousness of such case scenarios compared to officers in other countries. Additionally, Beck and Lee (2002), in their study involving Russian police cadets' and graduates' attitudes toward corrupt behavior, focused on specific aspects such as the moral acceptability of the act or process, underlying motivational aspects, and justifications for engaging in corruption. Their findings (Beck and Lee, 2002) demonstrate how police trainees perceive linkages between economic, cultural and organizational factors that facilitate the perpetration of corrupt behavior. Research findings yield evidence that a considerable number of cadets perceived corruption as justifiable or morally acceptable in specific circumstances or in order to attain specific goals. The research was particularly important in terms of

deciphering the factors, such as economic, organizational, and external pressures and close family friendship ties, that facilitate turning a blind eye on corrupt activities despite the existence of institutional or individual level norms proscribing such behavior.

### **A Multidimensional Approach**

Corruption in police organizations have multiple causes and merit a multidimensional approach. Punch (2000) draws attention to the mostly intertwined nature of the problem and proposes that behavior is learned in small groups within the context of police culture, work, and structural organization, and shaped by the perceptions of society. Accordingly, police officers have to be initiated into these practices, rationalizations have to be produced to accept them, supervisors have to collude or turn a blind eye, justifications have to be sought to continue them, and organizations have either in some way to condone or encourage these activities—or else fail to tackle them (Punch, 2000). Considering the scope of our research, which involves the initial phase of the formal socialization of the police cadets, it is important to look at the existence of potential familial or societal influences that affect the cadets' perceptions toward petty corruption (Cerrah, 2008).

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **The Scope of the Study**

The initial formal training phase is a crucial facet in the formation of a relatively corruption-free police agency. The influence of education and training in instilling the cadets with ethical police behavior depends heavily on the quality of the recruitment and subsequent formal and informal training phases. Thus, this study involves one of the important socialization mechanisms of the police organization where future police line officers and administrators are formally prepared to become a part of the criminal justice system.

The current study will focus on two educational institutions that provide the Turkish National Police (TNP) with middle managers and no rank police officers, namely, the police academy and the police vocational school of higher education. It attempts to discover police academy and police vocational school cadets' perceptions of petty corruption with respect to their socio-demographic background characteristics.

Studying police cadets' perceptions in centralized structures offers an opportunity to make generalizations across similar institutions. In Turkey, the centralized nature of the police academy and police vocational schools enables the State to provide police cadets with relatively homogeneous training and education across classes (promotions). The following describes the general contextual and administrative characteristics of the Turkish National Police. It is followed by a detailed description of the TNP's police training system.

## **Administrative Aspects and Organizational Structure of the TNP**

Besides the duties relevant to administrative aspects of the citizenry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for assuring national security within the inhabited regions of Turkey. The TNP, as a general directorship, is under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, along with the General Commandership of Gendarme and the Commandership of Coast Guard.

Turkey is divided into 81 provinces, similar to the French prefectural concept. Depending on its population, each prefecture or province is categorized as an urban or rural area. Accordingly, the National Police exercises its duties in the urban areas, the gendarme in the rural areas, and the coast guard along the Turkish coasts. The Gendarme and the Coast Guard report also to the Ministry of Defense.

The founding of the Turkish National Police (TNP) dates back to 1845, before the establishment of the Turkish Republic in which it perpetuates its existence. The TNP is one of the largest public organizations in Turkey. It is highly centralized and has more than 200,000 sworn officers. Using Bayley's (1992) police organization taxonomy, the TNP resembles the multiple coordinated type, where each institution operates in its own jurisdiction.

The TNP is under the supervision of the Director General, who is appointed from among high-ranking civil servants entitled to hold the rank of governorship. The Director General coordinates and supervises the central administrative structure of the police organization, which in turn coordinates the day to day policing operations and policies throughout the central operational departments and prefecture level branches.



As a national police force, the TNP is responsible for enforcing a wide variety of law and regulations ranging from crime fighting to public order (e.g., Cerrah, 1996; Caglar, 2004), whereas in the U.S., such domains are the responsibilities of distinct federal law enforcement agencies. The administrative structure of the police and its highly specialized departments has considerable power in terms of solidifying its monopoly in assuring the security services within the urban areas of the Turkish territory.

### **Organizational and Administrative Aspects of the Police Academy and Dependent Police Training Institutions**

#### **Police Academy.**

The Police Academy figures among the main institutions affiliated directly with the central structure of the TNP. The academy is governed by the president, a high-ranking police director, for a (renewable) four-year term. The president reports directly to the Director General of the National Police and is responsible for the overall functioning of the Faculty of Security Sciences, Institute of Security Sciences, and 26 Police Vocational Schools of Higher Education. The president of the academy reports also to the Higher Education Board that supervises public and private universities in Turkey.

The Police Academy was founded in 1937 as an in-training high school in order to provide the TNP with middle and high level managers. Initially the school was called Police Institute and provided a one-year-long program of lectures and applied police training courses. In The program length has been extended three times—in 1940, 1962, and 1980—by one year each time. In 1984, the Police Academy became an institution of higher education granting bachelors degrees. Now, the Police Academy delivers five distinct police formation trainings, namely, a pre-license training equivalent to a two-year

associate college degree, the bachelors degree, masters degree, faculty and high school training, and leadership training. The centralized nature of the training institutions enables the TNP to provide police cadets with relatively homogeneous training and education across classes (promotions).

The curriculum of the academy as well as the vocational schools is simultaneously adapted according to the changes in the law and procedures. in particular, new techniques for avoiding the illegal use of police powers are meticulously developed. Besides the requirements of the EU standards in terms of policing, harsh criticism from the media and public intolerance of police misconduct compared to other public organizations have a considerable share in these timely updates. The training of academy students occurs in virtual seclusion from civilian social life. From a socialization perspective, as a full-time boarding school, the academy generates a unique environment for influencing the cadets in the desired way. The campus is located on the hills of the town of Gölbaşı, 20 minutes from Ankara.

Although the police academy has been highly criticized for lax and populist recruitment policies (e.g., Caglar, 2004; Mutlu, 2000), discretionary recruitment has been significantly reduced thanks to the centralized testing system administered by the Higher Education Board. Each year, in addition to those recruited from police high schools (similar to military high schools), approximately 100 students from civilian high schools that pass the selection procedures are accepted to the Police Academy. Ten percent of the cadets are female.

### **Police Vocational Schools of Higher Education.**

Police vocational schools are responsible for training future line officers of the TNP. The timeframe dedicated for training in police vocational schools is significantly longer than that in most Western countries. In 2001, following the restructuring phase of the Police Academy, the TNP changed the nine-month-long education phase to two years. Accordingly, former police schools have been transformed into Police Vocational Schools of Higher Education (PVSHE), which grant associate degrees. Strict discipline and rigorous formal education give administrators ample opportunities to indoctrinate cadets into the expectations of the occupation. Each year, 26 police vocational schools throughout the country graduate 10,000 line officers in total.

### **Extracurricular training activities.**

#### *Orientation course.*

Before their formal education starts, police college graduates and high school graduates that successfully pass the qualifying exams go through an orientation program. The orientation course for each group occurs in detached environments. The content of the orientation program includes the formal and informal requisites of daily life within the school. Cadets, especially those who come from the civilian high schools, are exposed to drastic disciplinary applications of the police training system.

#### *Summer camp.*

Students that pass to the second and third grade or who must redo these classes participate in a one-month-long hands-on training camp program in the academy's facilities at Didim, Aydin, a small, touristic sub-province on the coast of the Aegean Sea. The camp curriculum is designed in a way that aims to develop, strengthen and enhance

students' endurance under the most challenging physical and psychological circumstances.

Apart from enhancing the technical side of policing, the camp program serves to inculcate police discipline, solidify friendship bonds, generate sympathy for police work, and generate the respect and pride required for wearing the police uniform.

#### *Field training.*

Cadets spend only three months in the field during the summer just after the third grade for the police academy students and following the first year for the police vocational school students. The field training is mostly carried out in large cities where the cadets may have the opportunity to come across a variety of policing instances that may not be experienced in small cities. The field training lasts one month in total. It is rotational. Cadets spend equal amounts of time in different police work domains such as police stations and a variety of specialized police units, including the vice department, intelligence department, anti-terror department, and anti-smuggling department, as well as other administrative and support units. Since cadets do not have sworn officer status, they do not engage in active police operations that may have legal consequences.

### **Corruption in the Turkish Context**

In Turkey, the criminal justice discipline is still in its infancy. Although interest in this domain increases rapidly, it is very challenging for researchers to get access to criminal justice institutions in order to conduct studies involving sensitive topics that may harm the image of the organization. Especially because of the quasi-militaristic organizational structure of the police organization and its resulting secretive nature, empirical research dealing with sensitive topics such as corruption is nearly nonexistent.

Existing studies (e.g., Cerrah, 1996; Caglar, 1996) conducted in the Turkish context covered the police vocational schools and revealed some distinct socio-demographical characteristics of the police cadets. On the other hand, police academy students and their background attributes are under-researched.

The following sections will describe some significant events that affected Turkish society and, consequently, its perceptions about corruption among the general public.

### **Macro-level Changes That Affected the Rise of Corruption in Turkey**

After the military coup in 1980, Turkey experienced significant changes affecting the country's social, economic, and political life. Major restructuring policies enacted by the government in power during the 1980s involving the Turkish economic system affected the social sphere, including the bureaucratic mechanisms of the State. In this context, new economic arrangements without a solid foundation in community life prepared an adequate environment for corruption.

According to Ozyurek (2005), the value system pertaining to the new economic policies has been perceived as limitless or ethics/morals free instances for acquiring state funds. Accordingly, during the 1990s, the pace of corrupt activities, especially grand corruption, expanded in volume. Findings of the field research conducted during the 1990s and early 2000 indicate that participants perceived corruption in the public bureaucracy as one of the major problems of Turkey (Ozyurek, 2005).

Ozyurek (2005) mentions the lack of consciousness of rule of law as one of the elements fostering corruption in public service. According to this mentality, the lack of accountability in bureaucracy facilitates the incumbents to engage in corrupt activities with confidence that their actions will not result in any negative administrative or judicial

consequences. Such a permissive environment is a major impediment to the establishment of ethical norms in the public sector (Ozyurek, 2005). Although international norms have been transplanted into the Turkish public administration without establishing a culture of the rule of law, improvements in the formal system do not promise a viable solution for the overall problem.

In summary, despite radical changes in the type of regime, the newly established modern Turkish State was strongly influenced by the heavily centralized and bureaucratized Ottoman administrative traditions (Ozbudun, 1996). The current formation of the public institutions reflects to some degree the strength of the State and their status with respect to the civil society. Accordingly, in the Turkish context, in addition to other state branches such as the military, court system, and national security council, the centralized nature of police services also reflects the stance of the State polity with respect to its relations involving the civil society (Sozen & Shaw, 2002 ).

### **Societal Factors in the Turkish Context**

The Social Research Center's (SAM) study findings emphasize that corruption in the Turkish context is a problem that has its roots primarily in the society rather than the public sector alone (Akozer, 2003). Additionally, researchers draw attention to the potential influences of the social environment, such as family socio-economic and cultural characteristics (Mutlu, 2000; Caglar, 2004; Cerrah, 2008), on cadets' perceptions of corruption within the police environment.

SAM (Akozer, 2003) results suggest that the perception that petty corruption is prevalent in the public sector is supported by the public's conformity to such traditions. In particular, petty corruption, such as regular bribes or speedy money, is perceived by

24.2% of the study participants as at least partly acceptable. The ratio between those who did not have any public sector job experience is 24.9%, significantly different from those who work or worked in the public sector, 18.3%. Similarly, the type of corruption is also a factor that influences the perception of seriousness among the public. Study participants classified the first and second degree of importance depending on the type of corruption and its perceived harm. Accordingly, corruption that is perpetrated with the involvement of high-level public officials, such as appropriating public money, was considered the gravest offense, 27.4%, followed by extracting money by abusing State power for personal benefit. Petty corruption/bribery that may involve considerable amounts of financial gain is ranked as number three at 19%. According to the terms used by Transparency International, petty corruption in this study was grouped into two categories: according to the rules (bribery for speed money and bribery for doing something not against the law or regulations) or against the rule (when the public official accepts bribes in exchange for taking or not taking action in contradiction to what is required of him or her by law).

SAM results also indicate the existence of generational differences in the perception of corruption (Akozer, 2003). The young generation (18-24), with a ratio of 28.2%, seems particularly more lenient in terms of tolerating petty corruption. According to SAM findings, economic causes, such as lower salaries, is one of the factors that facilitates tolerating petty corruption (Akozer, 2003). Despite the fact that study participants were reminded that such an action is a breach of legal and moral norms, 24.6% of them at least seemed sympathetic to taking baksheesh. Those who had a public service background responded to that question with modest support. The striking finding,

however, is that one third (33.2%) of those in the lowest SES group supported the proposition of speedy money in exchange for public services due to low salaries.

The code of silence fostering the practice of corruption is not a specific attribute of the police organization itself; it has roots in the greater society. The SAM findings discovered that only 62% of the study participants claimed that they would absolutely disclose to the authorities the names of those who asked for bribes, whereas the remainder agreed with disclosing names under certain conditions (Akozer, 2003). The findings suggest that most of those who are not willing to disclose the bribers (14.7%) are not confident that their disclosures will result in sincere interventions by responsible authorities. Moreover, they are suspicious of being retaliated against by those who are harmed by that act, and 6.1% of these respondents think they would abstain from disclosing due to their fear of getting into more trouble. Those who reported that they would not disclose the bribers, under the pretext that public officers would not ask for bribes if they were not in serious need, are in a negligible minority (Akozer, 2003).

### **Societal and Organizational Factors Affecting Police Cadets' Perceptions of Petty Corruption**

Prevalent values within a society are some of the major elements shaping individuals' attitudes toward everyday life. Members of the police service coming from the same population to which they offer their services are not exempt from these influences. Research findings reveal salient differences in socio-economic background characteristics and cultural attributes of people relevant to their perception of corruption. Such differences create distinct categories within the society in which members of



specific classes or groups are distinguishable from other groups in terms of their perception of everyday corruption.

### **Parents' income.**

Most of the police cadets interested in police work originate from middle-class or economically disadvantaged families (Caglar, 2004). In general, most of the parents consist of blue-collar workers, farmers, and low-level civil servants. In a survey conducted in 1997, 20% of the police vocational school cadets did not respond to the question regarding the education level of their mothers, while 75% indicated that their mother had a primary school diploma. Only 4% of the cadets' mothers had graduated from middle or high school and only 0.4% from college (Cerrah, 2008). A low level of education is also mentioned as an indicator of low income. The same survey revealed that approximately 85% of the participants had grown up in households with a modest income due to their parents' occupations. Accordingly, police cadets coming from low-income families are expected to be influenced by this financial disadvantage in a way that reflects on their perceptions of corruption.

### **Family occupation: Socialization within the police environment.**

Police organizations, due to their quasi-militaristic nature, more or less share specific characteristics with military organizations (Soeters, 2004). These organizations are more parochial in nature compared to other public or business organizations. In studies involving international settings, researchers (e.g., Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders, 1990) indicated that in such organizations, members of these institutions reflect the adopted professional norms in their daily lives to a significant degree (Soeters, 2004). More specifically, parents' occupations, especially uniformed vocations, tend to influence

family members. In this vein, police cadets from such families tend to be more influenced by the reigning police culture and its values, including its attitudes toward specific perks of the occupation.

Another factor that fosters a distinct police culture compared to civilian society rests on the vocational necessities that virtually seclude police families from civilian social life (Cerrah, 2008). Secluded social interactions facilitate the formation of a subculture specific to distinct public officials including their family members. Such social environments enable interacting with other police families at different hierarchical levels and with different levels of experiences and cultural traditions. In this way, cadets raised in these environments are more likely to internalize police values compared to those who do not have access to these milieus.

#### **City of origin.**

Corruption thrives in environments where anonymity is more assured. Although corruption is not exclusive to populated cities, the potential for engaging in such activities is higher in large urban settings compared to small cities. The anonymity of well-populated cities enables the appropriate environments for public officials and their civilian counterparts to become involved in corrupt exchanges. Accordingly, police cadets from larger cities are expected to be more familiar with the way the work is done in large cities and to be more tolerant of such cases (e.g., involving speeding bureaucratic procedures) compared to police cadets from small cities. From this perspective, cadets from larger cities are expected to consider transactions like speeding administrative procedures or fixing a ticket to be less serious infractions than would cadets from less populated cities. The data on their perceptions of the seriousness of corrupt actions may

be similar among the police cadets. However, given the idealistic nature of the academy cadets, they are expected to grade the corruption transactions more seriously than vocational school cadets.

### **Organizational factors: Police academy vs. police vocational school**

Several studies (e.g., Reuss-Ianni, 1983) draw attention to the discrepancies between line officers and ranking officers in terms of their perceptions of policing processes. Country specific comparisons (e.g., McConkey, et al., 1996; Huon, Hesketh, Frank, McConkey, and McGrath, 1995) as well as comparative (Ivkovich, 2005) “intercultural/state level studies” indicate police officers’ rank is relevant to differences in their perceptions of corruption. The differences in the entry requirements of the academy and vocational schools, their respective training quality and experiences, as well as the potential career options offered by each contribute to differences in their perceptions of corruption. Thus, in this study, cadets are grouped as academy or vocational school cadets depending on their training affiliation.

Accordingly, the quality and coverage of the ethical training and activities as well as discourses are expected to play an important role in shaping the participants’ perceptions. This might be also due to the rigorous selection and training process of the academy cadets. More specifically, due to their future responsibilities as ranking officers, academy cadets’ education in terms of length, quality and training content is more demanding than that of the police vocational school cadets. Thus, we may expect that academy cadets tend to be more idealistic in terms of judging police corruption compared to the vocational school students.

## **Hypotheses**

### **Main Hypothesis**

HO: There is no difference between police cadets in terms of perception of seriousness and reporting behavior pertaining to corruption scenarios.

Police cadets hold similar values including corruption. There is no difference between police academy and vocational school cadets. Thus all police cadets, no matter their future career paths, perceive corruption scenarios in the same manner and have similar attitudes toward reporting such instances to the authorities.

H1: Police cadets' perceptions of seriousness and their reporting behavior toward corruption scenarios are different from each other.

Police academy and police vocational school cadets have different career paths beginning with their entrance to their respective training academy. Thus their value orientations and expectations as line versus career officers are different from each other.

H1a: Police cadets' perceptions of their fellow officers' perceptions of seriousness pertaining to corruption scenarios are different from each other.

H1b: Police cadets' perceptions of their fellow officers' attitudes pertaining to reporting behavior are different from each other.

### **Sub-Hypotheses**

Socio-demographic factors:

Socio-demographic factors do not affect cadets' perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior pertaining to corruption scenarios.

Socio-demographic factors do affect cadets' perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior pertaining to corruption scenarios.

Family income.

H2a: Perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior relevant to corruption scenarios are different among police cadets from different income categories. Police cadets from a higher income category perceive corruption with more seriousness and this is reflected in their attitudes toward reporting behavior.

H2b: Police academy cadets from a higher income category perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to academy cadets from lower income category.

H2c: Police academy cadets from a higher income category perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to police vocational school cadets from the same income category.

H2d: Police academy cadets from a higher income category perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to police vocational school cadets from a lower income category.

H2e: Police academy cadets from a lower income category perceive corruption and reporting behavior compared to police vocational school cadets from a higher income category.

H2f: Police academy cadets from a lower income category perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to police vocational school cadets from the same income category.

### Parents' occupation.

Among police cadets from families working in the public sector, perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior relevant to corruption scenarios are different compared to those in the private sector.

H3a: Police cadets from families working in the public sector perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness.

Perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior relevant to corruption scenarios are different among police academy and vocational school cadets from families working in the public sector compared to those working in the private sector.

H3b: Police academy cadets from families working in the public sector perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to academy cadets from families working in the private sector.

H3c: Police academy cadets from families working in the private sector perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to police vocational school cadets from families working in the public or private sectors.

H3d: Police vocational school cadets from families working in the public sector perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to police vocational school cadets from families working in the private sector.

### Parents' educational level.

Among police cadets from families with different educational levels, perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior relevant to corruption scenarios are dissimilar.

H4a: Police cadets from families with high educational levels perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness.

Among police academy and vocational school cadets from families with different educational levels, perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior relevant to corruption scenarios are dissimilar.

H4b: Police academy cadets from families with high educational attainment perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to academy cadets from families with low educational attainment.

H4c: Police academy cadets from families with high or low educational attainment perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to police vocational school cadets from families with high or low educational attainment.

H4d: Police vocational school cadets from families with high educational attainment perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to police vocational school cadets from families with low educational attainment.

#### City population.

Among police cadets coming from cities with different population levels, perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior relevant to corruption scenarios are dissimilar.

H5a: Police cadets from small cities perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness.

Among police academy and vocational school cadets from cities with different population levels, perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior relevant to corruption scenarios are dissimilar.

H5b: Police academy cadets from small cities perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to academy cadets from large cities.

H5c: Police academy cadets from large or small cities perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to police vocational school cadets from large or small cities.

H5d: Police vocational school cadets from small cities perceive corruption and reporting behavior with more seriousness compared to police vocational school cadets from large cities.

## **Summary**

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and delineate a variety of factors that may influence police cadets' perceptions about some basic types of police corruption, namely, gift giving to obtain favored status, bribes to fix a desired outcome in a legal issue, and "speed money" to hasten or secure one's rightful and legal administrative process. In addition, this study aims to explore any differences among police academy and police vocational school cadets' perceptions of petty corruption and their attitude toward reporting corruption. The adopted theoretical framework is based on Klockars and colleagues' (1996, 2000, 2004) police integrity approach. However, due to the contextual differences at the national level and the distinct characteristics of the organization in which the study is conducted, emphasis is given to both organizational and individual (i.e., demographic, socio-economic, and cultural) characteristics in order to decipher the cadets' perceptions of corruption.



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **PRESENT STUDY**

#### **Police Cadets' Perceptions**

Police corruption literature, especially in Turkey, rarely focuses on the educational aspect of the organizational socialization processes and their consequences in terms of affecting police cadets' perceptions about police corruption before joining the ranks (e.g., Cerrah, 1996; Mutlu, 2000). Thus, exploring police cadets' perceptions at the beginning of their career toward the most prevalent corrupt police behavior is an appropriate starting point.

It is possible to argue that police cadets are less knowledgeable about police work for a variety of reasons and, consequently, that it does not make sense to study their perceptions concerning corruption. However, although the cadets are less experienced and less knowledgeable compared to police officers on active duty about the dilemmas of their future vocation and its extant corrupt activities, there is still valuable information to extract from this group. Police socialization is a continuous process, starting from pre-entrance to the police academy or vocational school to post-retirement. Thus, the study of cadets' perceptions may provide an important starting point for comparing and evaluating those on active duty in different departments, at varying levels of the police hierarchy, and according to categories such as seniority, experience, and specialization levels. To rectify the lack of empirical studies in this specific domain, this dissertation aims to lay a foundation that will contribute to extending the knowledge about perceptions of petty corruption among Turkish police cadets.

## **Research Questions**


The current study compares the perceptions of petty corruption, as influenced by a variety of factors, by TNP police cadets pursuing two different career paths. More specifically, the study attempts to decipher any potential differences among police cadets' attitudes in terms of perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior, due to their background characteristics, including participants' (a) social, (b) cultural, (c) economic, and (d) demographic aspects, as well as (e) their organizational affiliations such as their training institutions.

Basically, this research tries to answer the following questions: How do the police cadets perceive petty corruption (e.g., speed money, gift giving, and abuse of authority)? Do police academy cadets differ from vocational school cadets, depending on their family background, in terms of their attitude toward the seriousness of corrupt behavior (speed money, gift giving, and abuse of authority)? Do police academy cadets differ from vocational school cadets, depending on their family background, in terms of their attitude toward reporting the corrupt behavior in question (speed money, gift giving, and abuse of authority)? Does the demographic background of police cadets affect their perceptions of the seriousness of corruption? Does the demographic background of police cadets affect their willingness to report the behavior in question? Does police cadets' familiarity with police culture affect their perceptions of the seriousness of corruption? Does police cadets' familiarity with police culture affect their willingness to report the behavior in question? Do the demographic backgrounds of the police cadets affect their willingness to report the behavior in question? Do police academy cadets' perceptions differ from vocational school cadets' depending on their family background, in terms of their attitude

toward reporting the corrupt behavior in question (speed money, gift giving, and abuse of authority)? This study does not attempt a causal explanation for this complex problem but tries instead to shed light on some scientifically underexplored aspects of the phenomenon.

In summary, the current study explores how several factors influence cadets' perceptions of corruption, including demographic characteristics such as familiarity with police work, family income and social standing as well as organizational factors, such as general and specific courses intended to raise awareness about corruption and police work training.

**Figure 1:** Cadets' attitudes pertaining to corruption scenarios with respect to their socio-demographical and organizational background characteristics.



## Methodology

The paucity of empirical research relevant to the educational and ethical facets of the Turkish National Police as mentioned by policing scholars is a major drawback in

terms of building upon previous findings. This makes such research endeavors even more challenging when they involve highly sensitive and multidimensional topics such as the perception of police corruption among police (Caglar, 2003). Another challenge for tackling the problem is the scarcity of academic literature based in theory and empirical research. Much of the scholarship is built upon case by case scenarios and tainted with political or ideological fanaticism.

Studying corruption empirically is one of the challenging endeavors in social research. Despite their inherent limitations for gauging the actual extent of corruption within a particular environment, surveys are a useful research method (Ivkovich, 2003). The current study involves case scenarios and questionnaires parallel to relevant literature and bears similarities to other studies that assess police integrity and misconduct in active police officers (Klockars, et al., 2000). Many researchers have employed, adapted and modified these scenarios and questionnaires both nationally and internationally in a variety of countries having distinct cultural background characteristics (Klockars, et al., 2004).

The current survey instrument was prepared by the author as part of the requirements of an independent study guided by Professor Mahesh Nalla. The author's professional background in the police force for more than 19 years, inclusive of the educational phase, also contributed in designing the research framework by providing essential information about the cultural context of Turkish society and its police organization.

The chosen theoretical framework is based on the foundations of Klockars and colleagues' (1996, 2000, 2004) theory pertaining to the contours of police integrity.

However, taking into account the contextual differences in terms of the attributes of the organization in which the study will be conducted, the theory has been adapted accordingly. Because the police academy and police vocational school constitute the formal transitional stations between the civilian world and the formal police world, it is important to take into account their organizational characteristics.

First, research findings emphasize the salient effects of the training process in shaping recruits' attitudes and values, but find little support, however, for the idea that a police officer's personality is shaped by peers in the early years of his or her career (Kappeler, et al., 1998). The group approach of assessing friendship groups has been omitted from this study.

Second, despite the length of their formal training in the schools, Turkish police cadets, ironically, are less exposed to the real police world compared to cadets in different countries. More specifically, the field training phases designed for such exposure, for both types of cadets, are shorter compared to most police training schools in Western democracies (e.g., the US, UK, Australia, France, and Netherlands). Police academy and vocational school cadets spend one month in the field. The time spent within special police units may not be enough for cadets to witness corrupt transactions, and consequently, cadets may not have firm ideas about the conditions fostering corruption. Additionally, because cadets have very limited access to real police work in the field, an appropriate assessment relevant to organizational characteristics such as peer pressure, leadership, and other potential variables cited in police literature (e.g., Crank, 2004; Skolnick, 1966) that affect involvement in corruption is omitted.

Moreover, close family ties in Turkish culture and their salient influences (Mutlu, 2000) over the cadets require examining their potential influence over the ways cadets perceive instances of petty corruption. In this way, the present study expands Klockars and colleagues' (1996, 2000) framework by including the socio-economic characteristics and cultural dispositions of the cadets' families. On the other hand, it excludes specific components of the above mentioned framework that are more suitable to police officers having greater field experience, such as specific instances of police misconduct as well as their opinions about the seriousness and reporting behavior of their colleagues. The scope of the research is limited to assessing cadets' attitudes toward petty corruption, and therefore only relevant scenarios pertaining to corruption are selected.

One of the challenges pertaining to studies of corruption is the risk of intimidating the participants by disclosing their attitudes toward acts that bear the risk of positioning the person as morally inferior. Thus, the other rationale for this modification is to reduce biases that may emerge due to social desirability concerns. For this reason, case scenarios are modified to reflect situations that a regular citizen might encounter during her or his day to day activities with the state or municipal bureaucracy.

Succinctly, the survey instrument asks questions relevant to the cadets' social background; the quality and adequacy of their police training in general and corruption related programs in particular; their opinions about the seriousness of case scenarios involving a range of instances from gift giving to bribery; their opinions about rationalizing such acts; their perception of the seriousness of such acts; and, their perceptions concerning the prevalence of such instances.

Since the original survey questionnaire was prepared in English, in order to reduce reliability and validity problems because of its application in another cultural setting, back translation and pretest methods have been applied. Specifically, the survey instrument was translated by graduate students in the US and back translated into Turkish by another group of graduate students familiar with police terminology. The instrument was pretested on police cadets and was used as it had been translated into Turkish. Study participants were informed about the confidentiality of their identity. The questionnaires distributed to cadets in the police academy and police vocational schools were identical.

### **Measurement of the Variables**

The survey (Appendix A) instrument used to collect the data comprised four sections. The first section included questions pertaining to the socio-demographic background information of the police cadets, such as family income, the occupations of their families (e.g., public or private service), city population where they lived, and parents' education level. These questions enabled the authors to conduct comparative analyses between different groups of police cadets. Other sections of the questionnaire included instruments measuring how seriously the cadets perceived corrupt acts as well as their perceptions about reporting behavior.

The questionnaire aimed to evaluate: (1) cadets' perception of the seriousness of corruption, (2) cadets' attitude toward reporting corruption, (3) cadets' perceptions of their fellows' attitudes about the seriousness of corruption, and (4) their reporting behavior pertaining to the case scenarios.

Case scenarios utilized in our study are in line with our adopted definition (Barker & Roebuck, 1973; Barker, 1977) of police corruption, in which the phenomenon is

considered to be any proscribed act that involves the misuse of the officer's official position for current or potential material reward or gain. Accordingly, our case scenarios were developed in ways that did not require a total submersion of the cadets into very specific and complex police work. Hypothetical scenarios contained three main elements of the adopted concept: each scenario (1) was forbidden by some norm, regulation or law; (2) involved the misuse of the officer's official position; and (3) involved material gain regardless of its value (Barker, 1977). The scope of the study limited the survey to instances relevant to petty corruption, namely, gift giving, speed money, and bribery.

The first four dimensions are adapted from Klockars and colleagues' (1996, 2000) concept of the integrity measurement instrument.

### **Measurement of Dependent Variables**

The previously mentioned four dimensions are used as dependent variables. Each of the dimensions is measured by two to three items. Answers for the questions were on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly agree"=1 to "strongly disagree"=5, or "very serious"=1 to "not serious at all"=5, depending on their relevance. Additionally, the following outlooks will be aggregated for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis to the extent the statistical requirements for aggregation permit. Outlooks that are not suitable for aggregation or do not measure the intended aspect of the phenomenon will not be included in the OLS.

1. Own perception of seriousness: Three items were utilized in order to measure cadets' perceptions of seriousness involving petty corruption scenarios. Lower scores indicate more seriousness about the relevant behavior. A sample item for this group is, "I consider this behavior to be very serious."



2. Own reporting behavior: Two items were utilized in order to measure cadets' attitudes on reporting the case to the authorities. Lower scores indicate more seriousness about the relevant behavior. A sample item for this group is, "As a future police officer, if I see a fellow officer engage in this type of behavior I would report the matter to the officials."

3. Others' perception of seriousness: Two items were utilized in order to measure cadets' attitudes on their fellows' perceptions of seriousness involving petty corruption scenarios. Lower scores indicate more agreement about the relevant behavior. A sample item for this group is, "Most police officers I know would consider this behavior to be most serious."

4. Others' reporting behavior: Two items were utilized in order to measure cadets' perceptions involving their fellows' attitude on reporting case to the authorities. Lower scores indicate more agreement about the relevant behavior. A sample item for this group is, "I think most fellow police officers would report this matter to the officials."

### **Measurement of Independent Variables**

Independent variables are grouped into two categories, namely socio-demographic factors and organizational factors. The literature pertaining to perceptions of police corruption in Turkey draws attention to the potential effects of the socio-demographical background characteristics of the participants. However, rigorous research that analyzes these aspects is rare in this domain. Accordingly, categories involving socio-demographical characteristics, financial situation of the cadets' families were expended in a way that involves most plausible categories. However, Chi-Square analysis, not reported here, did not reveal significant differences between the sub-

branches of the main categories and then these categories are collapsed as mentioned below.

Socio-demographic characteristics of the cadets were measured by the following survey items.

**City Population of Hometown:** The cadet's city (where he or she lived with family) population was measured as: (1) Less than 10,000, (2) 10,001 and 50,000, (3) 50,001 and 250,000, and (4) 250,001 or more. Based on the survey responses, the four categories were reduced into two categories as follows: (1) 250,000 or less and (2) 250,001 or more.

**Parents' Occupation:** Cadets' parents' occupations were measured with the following instrument: Have either of your parents ever worked in the following profession (please select only one): (1) Police/Customs or other similar agencies, (2) Medical/Health, (3) Municipal/Government, (3) School/College, or (4) Private sector. Based on the survey responses, the categories were reduced to two general groups, namely, (1) private organization and (2) public organization.

**Parents' Education Level:** Cadets' parents' education level was measured as their highest achieved education level: (1) Less than high school, (2) High school, (3) Bachelor's degree, or (4) Master's degree and higher. Based on the survey responses, the four categories were reduced to two categories as follows: (1) High school or less and (2) Bachelors degree and above.

***Parents' income:*** Cadets' family income on a monthly basis were surveyed using the following measure: What is the best estimate of your monthly family income before taxes last year?: (1) 400 Lira or less, (2), 401 – 600 Lira, (3), 601 – 1,000 Lira, (4)

1,001 – 1,501 Lira, or (5) Above 1,501 Lira. Based on the survey responses, the four categories were reduced to the following two categories: (1) less than 1,000 Lira and (2) 1,001 Lira or above.

Organizational factors were measured by one item, namely, cadets' affiliated training school.

***School:*** Each cadet's school was measured as (1) Police Academy or (2) Police Vocational School.

### **Study Population, Research Sites, and Administration of the Questionnaires**

Following the permission acquired from the IRB, data for this study were collected from Faculty of Security Sciences and two police vocational schools of higher education during the first week of September, 2004. Three hundred questionnaires were distributed to the Police Academy, and 200 questionnaires for each, or 400 in total, were distributed to Rustu Unsal Police Vocational School in Izmir and Etiler Police Vocational School in Istanbul, respectively. The survey was conducted while cadets were attending the study hour in their classrooms. In the police academy as well as in both vocational schools, police supervisors distributed the questionnaires in randomly selected classrooms and instructed police cadets about the survey process. These instructions were also clearly written in the consent form which appeared on the first page of the questionnaire. According to the design of our research, although the distribution process was similar, the selection of the participants was different. In the police academy, the survey instruments were distributed to three promotions. The survey instruments were distributed to the fourth, third and second class students. Since the timing coincided with the opening of all the police training schools, we did not include the first grade academy

cadets or the first grade of the police vocational school students in our study because of their lack of experience.

After administering the surveys, supervisors left the room in order to avoid potential pressure on the cadets and ensure their anonymity. Cadets who were willing to participate in the study filled out the questionnaire. After completing questionnaire, cadets returned their scantron sheets to the designated box. Cadets were allowed to keep the questionnaire. The boxes containing the scantron sheets were collected by the supervisors. Although there was not any information on the scantron sheets that could identify the participants, the answer sheets were shuffled in order to assure the confidentiality of the classes before being mailed to the Education Department of the Turkish National Police. All these processes were similar for the police vocational schools and the police academy. The scantron sheets received from different schools were scanned separately by the Data Processing Unit within the Education Department. Data from different schools were sent separately to our e-mail address. Data were received in a text file and transformed to a SPSS file in order to conduct our analyses.

## **Summary**

This study attempts to discover in its capacity the perceptions of police corruption (Klockars, et al., 2004) with respect to societal and cultural factors of future police supervisors and line officers of the TNP. The majority of attitude research involving police corruption, ethical climate, and lately, contours of integrity studies focus on active officers' perceptions about corruption phenomena. Ironically, very few studies (e.g., Beck and Lee, 2002; Caglar, 2004; Cerrah, 2008; Ivkovich, 2006; Mutlu, 2000; Neiderhoffer, 1967), with their respective research approaches, looked at the formal

training stages of the cadets. Similarly, the nonexistence of any systematic attempt to do so in the Turkish context requires urgent attention in order to fill that gap. The current study aims to shed light on these under researched subjects, namely, Turkish police cadets.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **ANALYSIS**

This chapter involves the statistical analysis and methods that are used to evaluate the research questions of the current study. The initial part of the chapter reports the demographic characteristics of the study population. It follows with factor analysis, principal components analysis, correlation analysis involving the dependent variables and a T-test pertaining to specific corruption cases and related factors. Findings pertaining to the mentioned tests are also reported.

Data for the dissertation is secondary in nature. Originally it was collected in order to accomplish the requirements of an independent study conducted under the guidance of Professor Nalla. Data was collected in September, 2004, from two police vocational schools and from the police academy, located in three different cities of Turkey, namely, Izmir, Istanbul, and Ankara.

A total of 700 questionnaires were distributed to the research sites; 200 to each police vocational school and 300 to the police academy. At the police vocational schools, subjects were second grade cadets with one full year of schooling experience including two months of field training. Vocational school cadets have no previous police experience and are recruited among candidates with a high school diploma or better. On the other hand, the police academy cadets surveyed were second, third and fourth graders, of which 80% were graduates of four-year police high schools. Two hundred and eighty police academy students (93.3%) and 376 vocational school students (94%) responded to the survey. In all, 596 of the questionnaires were returned. In order to analyze whether

the data conform with the basic requirements of further analyses such as accuracy of the data entry, issues related to missing data, extreme values, and normality aspects, the data's variables were assessed via statistical analysis software SPSS.16. Following the data screening procedure, 565 questionnaires satisfied the requirements for further analysis. The response rate was more than 70%, enabling us to carry out our analyses under the assumption that the data was representative of our cadet population and diminishing the chances of response bias.

### Descriptive Statistics of the Participants

The first section of our survey instrument involved organizational and socio-demographical characteristics of the police cadets, such as their school of origin, family's monthly income, hometown city population, parents' occupation, and the highest level of education of either parent (see Table 2).

Table 2. Demographics of the Turkish police cadets (N=656).

|                       | N   | %  | $\chi^2$ | df |
|-----------------------|-----|----|----------|----|
| Organizational origin | 656 |    | 14.05**  | 1  |
| Police Academy        | 280 | 43 |          |    |
| Vocational School     | 376 | 57 |          |    |
| Parents' Income       | 645 |    | 274.79** | 1  |
| Less than 1000 TL     | 533 | 83 |          |    |
| More than 1.001 TL    | 112 | 17 |          |    |
| City population       | 651 |    | 14.45**  | 1  |
| Less than 250,000     | 277 | 43 |          |    |
| 250,000 and above     | 374 | 57 |          |    |
| Parents' occupation   | 474 |    | 19.44**  | 1  |
| Public Sector         | 285 | 60 |          |    |
| Private sector        | 189 | 40 |          |    |
| Parent's Education    | 648 |    | 170.10** | 1  |
| High school and less  | 490 | 76 |          |    |
| Bachelor's and above  | 158 | 24 |          |    |

\*\*p<.01

A Chi-square goodness of fit test showed an uneven distribution among categories. The majority of our study participants consists of vocational school cadets (n=376, 57% vs. n=280, 43%). Most of the police cadets are coming from families that have an income level lower than 1000 TL (n=533, 83% vs. n=112, 17%) and most of the cadets are from large cities (n=374, 57% vs. n=277, 43%). Police cadets' families have a predominant public sector (n=285, 60% vs. n=189, 40%) occupational background with an educational background equivalent to high school or less (n=490, 76% vs. n=158, 24%).

A two sample Chi-Square test revealed similar differences between organizational affiliations of the cadets and their frequency distribution across socio-demographic factors except their city of origin (Table 3).

Table 3. Demographics of police cadets pertaining to police academy and vocational schools (n=656).

|                             | Police Academy<br>(n=280) |    | Vocational Schools<br>(n=376) |    | $\chi^2$ | df |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----|-------------------------------|----|----------|----|
|                             | N                         | %  | N                             | %  |          |    |
| <b>Parents' Income</b>      | 272                       |    | 373                           |    | 20.99**  | 1  |
| <i>Less than 1000 TL</i>    | 203                       | 75 | 330                           | 88 |          |    |
| <i>More than 1.001 TL</i>   | 69                        | 25 | 43                            | 12 |          |    |
| <b>City population</b>      | 279                       |    | 372                           |    | 1.95     | 1  |
| <i>Less than 250,000</i>    | 110                       | 39 | 167                           | 45 |          |    |
| <i>250,000 and above</i>    | 169                       | 61 | 205                           | 55 |          |    |
| <b>Parents' occupation</b>  | 213                       |    | 261                           |    | 17.10**  | 1  |
| <i>Public Sector</i>        | 150                       | 70 | 135                           | 52 |          |    |
| <i>Private sector</i>       | 63                        | 30 | 126                           | 48 |          |    |
| <b>Parent's Education</b>   | 276                       |    | 372                           |    | 53.54**  | 1  |
| <i>High school and less</i> | 167                       | 61 | 323                           | 87 |          |    |
| <i>Bachelor's and above</i> | 109                       | 39 | 49                            | 13 |          |    |

\*\*p<.01



The education level of the parents of police academy cadets was predominantly (n=149, 49%) bachelors degree or more, whereas, the majority of vocational school cadets' parents had less than a high school diploma (n=213, 57.3%). Most of the cadets from both police training schools came from large cities having a population more than 250,000 (n=160, 60.6%, and n=205, 55.1%, respectively). Concerning the parents' income, most of the cadets from the police academy are coming from families with an income level with less than 1000 TL (75%, n= 203), whereas vocational students were coming from families with more modest income levels such as less than 1,000 TL (89%, n=330). More than one-third of the parents (n= 78, 36.6 % vs. n=71, 27.2%) as well as relatives (n= 99, 40.4 % vs. n= 140, 40.6%) from both groups were working in vocations having characteristics similar to police work.

Table 4. Demographics of police cadets pertaining to police academy and vocational schools (n=656).

|                      | Police Academy<br>(N=280) |    |          |    | Vocational Schools<br>(N=376) |    |          |    |
|----------------------|---------------------------|----|----------|----|-------------------------------|----|----------|----|
|                      | N                         | %  | $\chi^2$ | df | N                             | %  | $\chi^2$ | df |
| Parents' Income      | 272                       |    | 66.02**  | 1  | 373                           |    | 220.83** | 1  |
| Less than 1000 TL    | 203                       | 75 |          |    | 330                           | 88 |          |    |
| More than 1.001 TL   | 69                        | 25 |          |    | 43                            | 12 |          |    |
| City population      | 279                       |    | 12.48**  | 1  | 372                           |    | 3.88**   | 1  |
| Less than 250.000    | 110                       | 39 |          |    | 167                           | 45 |          |    |
| 250.000 and above    | 169                       | 61 |          |    | 205                           | 55 |          |    |
| Parents' occupation  | 213                       |    | 35.54**  | 1  | 261                           |    | 0.31     | 1  |
| Public Sector        | 150                       | 70 |          |    | 135                           | 52 |          |    |
| Private sector       | 63                        | 30 |          |    | 126                           | 48 |          |    |
| Parent's Education   | 276                       |    | 12.19**  | 1  | 372                           |    | 201.87** | 1  |
| High school and less | 167                       | 61 |          |    | 323                           | 87 |          |    |
| Bachelor's and above | 109                       | 39 |          |    | 49                            | 13 |          |    |

\*\*p<.01

When we take a closer look at the frequency distributions of the socio-demographic characteristics of the cadets with respect to their schools of origin, an uneven distribution among these categories arises. The Chi-Square goodness of fit test (Table 4) reveals an uneven distribution among socio-demographic categories pertaining to the police academy cadets. For the police vocational school cadets, the dissimilarity was also persistent except for the category pertaining to the cadets' families' occupational background.

### **Descriptive Statistics**

Police cadets' perceptions of corruption were measured using four outlooks as follows: (1) perception of seriousness, (2) reporting behavior, (3) others' perception of seriousness, and (4) others' reporting behavior. Perception of seriousness refers to the level of seriousness of the given case scenario from a cadet's own point of view. Reporting behavior refers to the cadet's attitude toward reporting the case when s/he witnesses the occurrence of such a transaction. Others' perception of seriousness refers to the cadet's evaluation of fellow officers' perceptions of seriousness when they encounter the relevant case scenario. Others' reporting behavior refers to the cadet's perception of fellow officers' reporting behavior of the case scenarios. Three different hypothetical scenarios representing corruption were used to measure perceptions of the seriousness of corruption and reporting behavior. However, the distribution of the outlooks is not similar for all the hypothetical scenarios. For the first hypothetical scenario, all four dimensions were used, namely, a cadet's own perception of seriousness and reporting behavior and others' perception of seriousness and reporting behavior. The second case scenario used three outlook questions: one question pertaining to cadets' own attitudes of seriousness,

one pertaining to others' perceptions of seriousness, and the third regarding others' reporting behavior. The third case scenario measuring attitudes toward bribery included one question regarding cadets' own perceptions regarding the case and one question about cadets' reporting behavior. Answers to each question were coded on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly agree"=1 to "strongly disagree"=5. The properties of the items are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Scale Characteristics of the dependent variables pertaining to the total sample (N=656).

| Description of item               | n   | Mean | SD   | # of items | Min. | Max. |
|-----------------------------------|-----|------|------|------------|------|------|
| <b>Petty Corruption</b>           |     |      |      |            |      |      |
| Own perception of seriousness     | 624 | 2.55 | 1.76 | 1          | 1    | 5    |
| Own reporting behavior            | 626 | 2.76 | 1.33 | 1          | 1    | 5    |
| Others' perception of seriousness | 624 | 2.00 | 1.12 | 1          | 1    | 5    |
| Others reporting behavior         | 625 | 2.91 | 1.12 | 1          | 1    | 5    |
| <b>Gift Giving</b>                |     |      |      |            |      |      |
| Own perception of seriousness     | 607 | 2.66 | 1.43 | 1          | 1    | 5    |
| Others' perception of seriousness | 601 | 2.96 | 1.17 | 1          | 1    | 5    |
| Others reporting behavior         | 601 | 2.25 | 1.60 | 1          | 1    | 5    |
| <b>Bribing</b>                    |     |      |      |            |      |      |
| Own perception of seriousness     | 601 | 2.25 | 1.60 | 1          | 1    | 5    |
| Own reporting behavior            | 598 | 1.80 | 1.11 | 1          | 1    | 5    |

*Note.* Scales are derived from five-point Likert items ranging from (1) strongly agree to (3) undecided to (5) strongly disagree. SD: Standard deviation

## Mean Differences

T-Test and analysis of variance were used in order to test mean differences in police cadets' perceptions of the phenomena. Items represent perceptions pertaining to each different scenario. Mean comparisons for police cadets yielded statistically significant differences.

## Organizational Differences

The first hypothesis purporting the existence of differences between police academy and police vocational school cadets' perceptions of case scenarios was tested using mean differences tests. As hypothesized, police academy cadets' attitudes pertaining to the seriousness of corruption were greater than police vocational school cadets' for the first and second case scenarios (Table 6). A greater proportion of police academy cadets defined the hypothetical cases as more serious than police vocational school cadets did.

Table 6. Comparison of mean differences among police cadets' school of origin (organizational differences) for perception of corruption aspects.

| Police Academy |     |       |            | Police Vocational School |       |            |        |
|----------------|-----|-------|------------|--------------------------|-------|------------|--------|
| VARIABLES      | N   | A/DA  | M/SD       | N                        | A/DA  | M/SD       | t      |
| Case 1 a       | 253 | 66/27 | 2.30/ 1.63 | 371                      | 55/40 | 2.72/ 1.82 | -2.80* |
| Case 1 b       | 258 | 43/31 | 2.78/ 1.26 | 368                      | 44/31 | 2.74/ 1.38 | 0.43   |
| Case 1 c       | 256 | 71/10 | 2.01/ 1.07 | 368                      | 67/10 | 2.00/ 1.15 | 0.16   |
| Case 1 d       | 257 | 33/33 | 3.00/ 1.10 | 368                      | 35/24 | 2.85/ 1.13 | 1.57   |
| Case 2 a       | 245 | 54/24 | 2.50/ 1.35 | 362                      | 47/33 | 2.77/ 1.47 | -2.31* |
| Case 2 b       | 237 | 54/18 | 2.54/ 1.05 | 362                      | 54/22 | 2.55/ 1.20 | -0.10  |
| Case 2 c       | 238 | 16/46 | 3.45/ 1.07 | 360                      | 14/51 | 3.58/ 1.13 | -1.14  |
| Case 3 a       | 240 | 70/21 | 2.10/ 1.49 | 361                      | 63/30 | 2.35/ 1.67 | -1.88  |
| Case 3 b       | 236 | 78/07 | 1.81/ 1.04 | 362                      | 79/09 | 1.80/ 1.15 | 0.12   |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.001.

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case).

A/DA: % Agree/% Disagree, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation, t: Mean differences t test value.

However, in contrast to the hypothesis expecting differences in cadets' school of origin with respect to their attitudes of reporting of the case scenarios by their fellow officers, there were no statistically significant differences between police cadets in these

aspects. More specifically, t-tests regarding the seriousness of the behavior pertaining to fellow officers' own reporting behavior as well as others' reporting behavior did not yield statistically significant results. Police cadets from both training institutions were less optimistic in their perceptions pertaining to their fellow officers' willingness to report the case to the officials.

## **Socio-demographic Factors**

### **Family Income.**

Findings pertaining to family income among police cadets in general indicated no significant differences (Table 7). Findings did support our hypothesis that cadets from lower income families would be less strict in terms of evaluating and reporting the seriousness of the case scenarios.

Table 7. Comparison of mean differences regarding to perception of corruption aspects of families' income groups.

| <b>Income less than 1000 TL</b> |          |             |             | <b>Income more than 1000TL</b> |             |             |          |
|---------------------------------|----------|-------------|-------------|--------------------------------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| <b>VARIABLES</b>                | <b>N</b> | <b>A/DA</b> | <b>M/SD</b> | <b>N</b>                       | <b>A/DA</b> | <b>M/SD</b> | <b>t</b> |
| Case 1 a                        | 512      | 60/35       | 2.53/ 1.76  | 104                            | 56/34       | 2.61/ 1.72  | -0.42    |
| Case 1 b                        | 513      | 44/31       | 2.75/ 1.33  | 104                            | 45/29       | 2.71/ 1.32  | 0.27     |
| Case 1 c                        | 510      | 69/90       | 1.98/ 1.12  | 106                            | 67/12       | 2.07/ 1.07  | -0.71    |
| Case 1 d                        | 512      | 33/26       | 2.89/ 1.12  | 105                            | 35/35       | 2.98/ 1.11  | -0.75    |
| Case 2 a                        | 494      | 49/30       | 2.65/ 1.43  | 104                            | 50/30       | 2.68/ 1.45  | -0.19    |
| Case 2 b                        | 490      | 53/21       | 2.56/ 1.15  | 100                            | 57/17       | 2.48/ 1.10  | 0.67     |
| Case 2 c                        | 487      | 14/50       | 3.55/ 1.10  | 103                            | 18/45       | 3.39/ 1.14  | 1.38     |
| Case 3 a                        | 489      | 66/26       | 2.25/ 1.61  | 103                            | 65/29       | 2.31/ 1.63  | -0.34    |
| Case 3 b                        | 489      | 80/08       | 1.77/ 1.11  | 100                            | 73/08       | 1.92/ 1.03  | -1.22    |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.001,

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case),

A/DA: % Agree/% Disagree, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation, t: Mean differences t test value.

Findings regarding police academy cadets' from different income categories indicate differences in perception between categories. Academy cadets' attitudes regarding reporting behavior and perception of seriousness were significantly different in the first and third scenarios; cadets from lower income groups were stricter in terms of evaluating such transactions as serious (Table 8).

Attitudes of the PVSHE cadet groups from different income groups were not statistically significant for all the cases. Keeping with our hypothesis, although not statistically significant, PVSHE cadets from the lower income category were more lenient in grading the seriousness of corrupt transactions. For all three cases, the proportion of students agreeing about each one's seriousness was lower for the police vocational school cadets from lower income families.

On the other hand, data comparing police academy and vocational school cadets from similar income categories (Table 9) demonstrate significant differences. Findings of the mean comparison test between cadets from the lower income category demonstrate significant differences in perceptions of cadets' own seriousness relevant to all three case scenarios. As hypothesized, in all three categories, police academy cadets were stricter in grading the seriousness of the case scenarios compared to vocational school students from lower income families. When we look at the cadets from higher income families, statistically significant findings pertaining to the cadets' own and others' reporting behavior were only relevant to the first scenario. Contrary to our hypothesis, police vocational school cadets were more willing than academy cadets from high income families to report witnessed corrupt transactions. Additionally, although cadets from both

**Table 8. Comparison of mean differences between income groups of Academy and PVSHE cadets' families with respect to corruption perception aspects.**

| Academy                  |     |       |           |    |       |           |        |                         |       |           |    |       |           |       | PVSHE |                          |       |   |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--------------------------|-----|-------|-----------|----|-------|-----------|--------|-------------------------|-------|-----------|----|-------|-----------|-------|-------|--------------------------|-------|---|--|--|--|--|--|-------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Income less than 1000 TL |     |       |           |    |       |           |        | Income more than 1001TL |       |           |    |       |           |       |       | Income less than 1000 TL |       |   |  |  |  |  |  | Income more than 1001TL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| VARIABLES                | N   | A/DA  | M/S/D     | N  | A/DA  | M/S/D     | t      | N                       | A/DA  | M/S/D     | t  | N     | A/DA      | M/S/D | N     | A/DA                     | M/S/D | t |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 a                 | 185 | 70/25 | 2.19/1.6  | 63 | 56/31 | 2.57/1.68 | -1.60  | 327                     | 55/40 | 2.72/1.83 | 41 | 56/37 | 2.66/1.8  | 0.19  |       |                          |       |   |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 b                 | 187 | 46/28 | 2.72/1.24 | 65 | 40/34 | 2.89/1.31 | -0.97  | 326                     | 43/33 | 2.77/1.38 | 39 | 54/21 | 2.41/1.29 | 1.55  |       |                          |       |   |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 c                 | 185 | 74/7  | 1.92/1.05 | 66 | 62/14 | 2.23/1.06 | -2.05* | 325                     | 66/10 | 2.02/1.16 | 40 | 75/10 | 1.8/1.04  | 1.14  |       |                          |       |   |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 d                 | 187 | 34/28 | 2.93/1.09 | 65 | 31/43 | 3.15/1.09 | -1.42  | 325                     | 33/24 | 2.87/1.14 | 40 | 43/23 | 2.7/1.09  | 0.88  |       |                          |       |   |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 2 a                 | 174 | 55/21 | 2.41/1.28 | 65 | 52/31 | 2.72/1.54 | -1.60  | 320                     | 47/34 | 2.79/1.49 | 39 | 46/28 | 2.62/1.31 | 0.69  |       |                          |       |   |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 2 b                 | 170 | 54/17 | 2.54/1.02 | 61 | 53/21 | 2.61/1.12 | -0.46  | 320                     | 53/23 | 2.58/1.21 | 39 | 64/10 | 2.28/1.05 | 1.46  |       |                          |       |   |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 2 c                 | 169 | 15/48 | 3.48/1.06 | 64 | 16/41 | 3.38/1.09 | 0.66   | 318                     | 13/51 | 3.59/1.12 | 39 | 21/51 | 3.41/1.23 | 0.96  |       |                          |       |   |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 3 a                 | 170 | 74/18 | 1.98/1.43 | 64 | 59/33 | 2.47/1.64 | -2.23* | 319                     | 61/31 | 2.39/1.68 | 39 | 74/23 | 2.05/1.59 | 1.21  |       |                          |       |   |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 3 b                 | 169 | 81/8  | 1.77/1.06 | 61 | 74/5  | 1.92/0.95 | -0.96  | 320                     | 80/9  | 1.78/1.14 | 39 | 72/13 | 1.92/1.16 | -0.77 |       |                          |       |   |  |  |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.001,

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the third hypothetical case).

A/D/A: % Agree/% Disagree, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation, t: Mean differences t test value.





institutions held significantly different opinions about others' attitudes toward reporting behavior, they also shared high levels of cynicism about their fellows' reporting behavior.

### **City population.**

Findings pertaining to the mean comparison statistics did not yield significant differences for the police cadets from highly populated cities with more than 250,000 people versus less populated cities (Table 10). Additionally, findings did not yield

Table 10. Comparison of mean differences among cadets' cities of origin with respect to corruption perception aspects.

| <b>City Population</b>    |          |             |             |                          |             |             |          |
|---------------------------|----------|-------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| <b>Lower than 250.000</b> |          |             |             | <b>More than 250.001</b> |             |             |          |
| <b>VARIABLES</b>          | <b>N</b> | <b>A/DA</b> | <b>M/SD</b> | <b>N</b>                 | <b>A/DA</b> | <b>M/SD</b> | <b>T</b> |
| Case 1 a                  | 259      | 59/35       | 2.54/ 1.75  | 360                      | 60/34       | 2.54/ 1.76  | -0.03    |
| Case 1 b                  | 260      | 45/31       | 2.72/ 1.35  | 361                      | 43/31       | 2.79/ 1.31  | -0.64    |
| Case 1 c                  | 258      | 70/11       | 1.98/ 1.18  | 361                      | 68/9        | 2.02/ 1.08  | -0.50    |
| Case 1 d                  | 261      | 35/27       | 2.87/ 1.16  | 359                      | 32/28       | 2.94/ 1.09  | -0.82    |
| Case 2 a                  | 251      | 40/30       | 2.68/ 1.43  | 351                      | 50/29       | 2.64/ 1.43  | 0.31     |
| Case 2 b                  | 247      | 55/20       | 2.54/ 1.14  | 347                      | 53/21       | 2.54/ 1.14  | 0.01     |
| Case 2 c                  | 247      | 13/52       | 3.59/ 1.12  | 346                      | 15/47       | 3.49/ 1.1   | 1.08     |
| Case 3 a                  | 248      | 65/27       | 2.29/ 1.61  | 348                      | 67/26       | 2.23/ 1.6   | 0.43     |
| Case 3 b                  | 245      | 80/9        | 1.78/ 1.13  | 348                      | 78/9        | 1.82/ 1.09  | -0.43    |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.001.

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case).

A/DA: % Agree/% Disagree, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation, t: Mean differences t test value.

statistical differences in terms of cadets' school of origin with respect to their city of origin (Table 11).

Table 11. Comparison of mean differences between cities of origin of Academy and PVSHE cadets with respect to corruption perception aspects.

| PVSHE              |    |       |                   |     |       |                    |       |     |                   |            |     |       |            |       |
|--------------------|----|-------|-------------------|-----|-------|--------------------|-------|-----|-------------------|------------|-----|-------|------------|-------|
| Academy            |    |       |                   |     |       |                    |       |     |                   |            |     |       |            |       |
| Lower than 250.000 |    |       | More than 250.001 |     |       | Lower than 250.000 |       |     | More than 250.001 |            |     |       |            |       |
| VARIABLES          | N  | A/DA  | M/SD              | N   | A/DA  | M/SD               | t     | N   | A/DA              | M/SD       | t   |       |            |       |
| Case 1 a           | 96 | 63/30 | 2.4/ 1.68         | 156 | 67/25 | 2.26/ 1.61         | 0.66  | 163 | 57/38             | 2.63/ 1.80 | 204 | 54/41 | 2.76/ 1.84 | -0.73 |
| Case 1 b           | 99 | 49/29 | 2.73/ 1.32        | 158 | 40/32 | 2.83/ 1.22         | -0.63 | 161 | 42/32             | 2.72/ 1.37 | 203 | 4531  | 2.76/ 1.38 | -0.30 |
| Case 1 c           | 97 | 73/12 | 2.02/ 1.15        | 158 | 70/8  | 2.00/ 1.03         | 0.15  | 161 | 68/11             | 1.95/ 1.19 | 203 | 66/10 | 2.04/ 1.12 | -0.73 |
| Case 1 d           | 99 | 37/28 | 2.95/ 1.10        | 157 | 30/35 | 3.01/ 1.09         | -0.45 | 162 | 34/26             | 2.82/ 1.19 | 202 | 33/23 | 2.89/ 1.09 | -0.58 |
| Case 2 a           | 92 | 50/29 | 2.65/ 1.45        | 152 | 56/21 | 2.41/ 1.29         | 1.33  | 159 | 48/31             | 2.69/ 1.42 | 199 | 46/35 | 2.81/ 1.51 | -0.78 |
| Case 2 b           | 88 | 57/13 | 2.47/ 1.02        | 148 | 52/22 | 2.59/ 1.07         | -0.86 | 159 | 54/24             | 2.58/ 1.20 | 199 | 54/20 | 2.51/ 1.20 | 0.61  |
| Case 2 c           | 88 | 13/50 | 3.53/ 1.08        | 149 | 18/44 | 3.40/ 1.07         | 0.91  | 159 | 14/54             | 3.62/ 1.15 | 197 | 14/49 | 3.56/ 1.12 | 0.53  |
| Case 3 a           | 89 | 67/24 | 2.24/ 1.57        | 150 | 72/20 | 2.02/ 1.44         | 1.08  | 159 | 63/30             | 2.32/ 1.64 | 198 | 63/31 | 2.39/ 1.70 | -0.41 |
| Case 3 b           | 86 | 85/06 | 1.70/ 1.02        | 149 | 75/08 | 1.87/ 1.05         | -1.19 | 159 | 78/10             | 1.82/ 1.19 | 199 | 79/09 | 1.78/ 1.12 | 0.33  |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.001,

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the third hypothetical case), A/DA: % Agree/% Disagree, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation, t: Mean differences t test value.

Table 12. Comparison of mean differences of perception of corruption aspects between Academy and PVSHE pertaining to same city population group.

| Population with lower than 250.000 |    |       |            |     |       |            |       |     |       | Population with more than 250.000 |     |       |            |        |       |  |  |  |  |
|------------------------------------|----|-------|------------|-----|-------|------------|-------|-----|-------|-----------------------------------|-----|-------|------------|--------|-------|--|--|--|--|
| Academy                            |    |       |            |     | PVSHE |            |       |     |       | Academy                           |     |       |            |        | PVSHE |  |  |  |  |
| VARIABLES                          | N  | A/DA  | M/SD       | N   | A/DA  | M/SD       | t     | N   | A/DA  | M/SD                              | N   | A/DA  | M/SD       | t      |       |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 a                           | 96 | 63/30 | 2.40/ 1.68 | 163 | 57/38 | 2.63/ 1.80 | -1.02 | 156 | 67/25 | 2.26/ 1.61                        | 204 | 54/41 | 2.76/ 1.84 | -2.74* |       |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 b                           | 99 | 49/29 | 2.73/ 1.32 | 161 | 42/32 | 2.72/ 1.37 | 0.04  | 158 | 40/32 | 2.83/ 1.22                        | 203 | 45/31 | 2.76/ 1.38 | 0.47   |       |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 c                           | 97 | 73/12 | 2.02/ 1.15 | 161 | 68/11 | 1.95/ 1.19 | 0.46  | 158 | 70/08 | 2.00/ 1.03                        | 203 | 66/10 | 2.04/ 1.12 | -0.34  |       |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 d                           | 99 | 37/28 | 2.95/ 1.10 | 162 | 34/26 | 2.82/ 1.19 | 0.87  | 157 | 30/35 | 3.01/ 1.09                        | 202 | 32/23 | 2.89/ 1.09 | 1.05   |       |  |  |  |  |
| Case 2 a                           | 92 | 50/29 | 2.65/ 1.45 | 159 | 48/39 | 2.69/ 1.42 | -0.21 | 152 | 56/21 | 2.41/ 1.29                        | 199 | 46/35 | 2.81/ 1.51 | -2.62* |       |  |  |  |  |
| Case 2 b                           | 88 | 57/13 | 2.47/ 1.02 | 159 | 54/24 | 2.58/ 1.20 | -0.79 | 148 | 52/22 | 2.59/ 1.07                        | 199 | 54/20 | 2.51/ 1.20 | 0.65   |       |  |  |  |  |
| Case 2 c                           | 88 | 13/50 | 3.53/ 1.08 | 159 | 14/54 | 3.62/ 1.15 | -0.59 | 149 | 17/44 | 3.40/ 1.07                        | 197 | 14/49 | 3.56/ 1.12 | -1.31  |       |  |  |  |  |
| Case 3 a                           | 89 | 67/24 | 2.24/ 1.57 | 159 | 63/30 | 2.32/ 1.64 | -0.40 | 150 | 72/20 | 2.02/ 1.44                        | 198 | 63/31 | 2.39/ 1.70 | -2.17* |       |  |  |  |  |
| Case 3 b                           | 86 | 85/06 | 1.70/ 1.02 | 159 | 78/10 | 1.82/ 1.19 | -0.83 | 149 | 75/08 | 1.87/ 1.05                        | 199 | 80/09 | 1.78/ 1.12 | 0.69   |       |  |  |  |  |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.001,

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case),  
A/DA: % Agree/% Disagree, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation, t: Mean differences t test value.

From another perspective, when we look at the findings on police academy and vocational school cadets from less populated vs. highly populated cities, differences are more salient for the latter group (Table 12). More specifically, mean differences in the perceptions of academy and vocational school cadets from populated cities about the seriousness of the behavior yielded more significant differences. In the first group, which included police academy and vocational school cadets from less populated cities, there were no statistically significant differences. On the other hand, in the group of cadets (both police academy and PVSHE) from highly populated cities, mean differences in perceptions of seriousness were significant for all three scenarios. However, cadets' own attitudes as well as their perceptions involving others' reporting behaviors did not yield statistically significant differences. More specifically, as hypothesized, most of the academy cadets graded the cases more seriously than did the vocational school cadets.

#### **Parents' vocation.**

In general, findings on cadets' family occupations did not yield significant differences in terms of cadets' perceptions of their own and others' seriousness and reporting behavior (Table 13). Similarly, statistics pertaining to academy or vocational school cadets from families working in public or private sector occupations did not yield significant differences in cadets' attitudes (Table 14). On the other hand, findings pertaining to the mean comparison between both academy and vocational school cadets from family groups working in the public or private sectors yielded significant differences in both groups (Table 15). The mean comparison of perceptions of both police academy and vocational school cadets from families working in the public sector yielded significant differences in their perception of

Table 13. Comparison of mean differences among cadets' families vocation groups with respect to corruption perception aspects.

| Parents' Vocation |     |       |            |                 |       |            |       |
|-------------------|-----|-------|------------|-----------------|-------|------------|-------|
| Public Service    |     |       |            | Private Service |       |            |       |
| VARIABLES         | N   | A/DA  | M/SD       | N               | A/DA  | M/SD       | t     |
| Case 1 a          | 267 | 60/32 | 2.48/ 1.75 | 181             | 55/38 | 2.7/ 1.78  | -1.31 |
| Case 1 b          | 269 | 45/27 | 2.66/ 1.29 | 183             | 45/31 | 2.77/ 1.38 | -0.84 |
| Case 1 c          | 268 | 66/13 | 2.08/ 1.2  | 182             | 65/8  | 1.99/ 1.06 | 0.82  |
| Case 1 d          | 268 | 30/30 | 3/ 1.09    | 182             | 36/25 | 2.84/ 1.16 | 1.50  |
| Case 2 a          | 261 | 51/28 | 2.58/ 1.45 | 178             | 45/32 | 2.83/ 1.4  | -1.78 |
| Case 2 b          | 255 | 57/20 | 2.47/ 1.12 | 177             | 50/22 | 2.58/ 1.12 | -0.96 |
| Case 2 c          | 256 | 18/48 | 3.5/ 1.15  | 177             | 14/46 | 3.5/ 1.12  | -0.06 |
| Case 3 a          | 260 | 68/24 | 2.14/ 1.56 | 176             | 63/30 | 2.41/ 1.67 | -1.77 |
| Case 3 b          | 256 | 80/7  | 1.71/ 1.03 | 176             | 76/10 | 1.9/ 1.14  | -1.81 |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.001,

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case),

A/DA: % Agree/% Disagree, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation, t: Mean differences t test value.

others' seriousness for the first scenario and their own reporting behavior pertaining to the third scenario involving speed money.

In the first case, academy cadets from families working in the public sector were more pessimistic in terms of others' reporting behavior of the case compared to police vocational school cadets from the same category. Another significant finding consists of cadets' reporting behavior involving the third case scenario. In this case, police academy cadets demonstrated a statistically significant greater tolerance compared to the vocational school cadets.



Table 15. Comparison of mean differences of perception of corruption aspects between academy and PVSHE pertaining to same parent vocation group.

| Parents in Public Sector |     |       |            |       |       |            | Parents in Private Sector |    |       |            |       |       |            |        |
|--------------------------|-----|-------|------------|-------|-------|------------|---------------------------|----|-------|------------|-------|-------|------------|--------|
| Academy                  |     |       |            | PVSHE |       |            | Academy                   |    |       |            | PVSHE |       |            |        |
| VARIABLES                | N   | A/DA  | M/SD       | N     | A/DA  | M/SD       | t                         | N  | A/DA  | M/SD       | N     | A/DA  | M/SD       | t      |
| Case 1 a                 | 137 | 62/29 | 2.36/ 1.66 | 130   | 59/36 | 2.61/ 1.83 | -1.17                     | 55 | 62/29 | 2.42/ 1.64 | 126   | 52/42 | 2.83/ 1.83 | -1.42  |
| Case 1 b                 | 140 | 41/31 | 2.81/ 1.27 | 129   | 50/23 | 2.49/ 1.28 | 2.09*                     | 57 | 56/32 | 2.60/ 1.40 | 126   | 40/31 | 2.84/ 1.36 | -1.11  |
| Case 1 c                 | 139 | 66/17 | 2.15/ 1.22 | 129   | 67/10 | 2.00/ 1.17 | 1.03                      | 56 | 70/00 | 1.80/ 0.88 | 126   | 63/11 | 2.07/ 1.12 | -1.59  |
| Case 1 d                 | 139 | 30/38 | 3.13/ 1.09 | 129   | 30/20 | 2.85/ 1.07 | 2.10*                     | 57 | 42/28 | 2.77/ 1.21 | 125   | 34/24 | 2.86/ 1.15 | -0.49  |
| Case 2 a                 | 135 | 55/23 | 2.42/ 1.36 | 126   | 47/33 | 2.75/ 1.52 | -1.82                     | 55 | 55/22 | 2.51/ 1.30 | 123   | 41/37 | 2.97/ 1.43 | -2.03* |
| Case 2 b                 | 129 | 57/16 | 2.49/ 1.03 | 126   | 56/18 | 2.45/ 1.21 | 0.26                      | 54 | 41/22 | 2.72/ 1.09 | 123   | 55/21 | 2.51/ 1.13 | 1.15   |
| Case 2 c                 | 131 | 21/47 | 3.44/ 1.16 | 125   | 14/50 | 3.56/ 1.14 | -0.87                     | 54 | 17/41 | 3.31/ 1.08 | 123   | 12/49 | 3.59/ 1.13 | -1.49  |
| Case 3 a                 | 133 | 70/23 | 2.09/ 1.49 | 127   | 66/25 | 2.19/ 1.63 | -0.51                     | 54 | 61/26 | 2.41/ 1.62 | 122   | 63/32 | 2.42/ 1.70 | -0.04  |
| Case 3 b                 | 130 | 77/08 | 1.84/ 1.07 | 126   | 83/06 | 1.57/ 0.98 | 2.09*                     | 53 | 81/08 | 1.72/ 1.06 | 123   | 74/11 | 1.98/ 1.16 | -1.39  |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01 (Two tailed)

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case),

N: Sample size; A/DA: Agree/Disagree; M/SD: Mean Standard Deviation; t: Mean differences t test value.

Looking at the police cadets from families working in the private sector, cadets' perceptions differed on their own seriousness with regard to the second case scenario. As expected, police academy cadets perceived the case as more serious compared to the vocational school students in the same category.

### **Parents' education level.**

In general, family education level did not yield significant mean differences in perceptions of cadets' own seriousness or their perceptions of others' seriousness and reporting behavior (Table 16).

Table 16. Comparison of mean differences among educational level of the cadets' parents with respect to perception of corruption aspects.

| <b>Parents' Education Level</b> |          |             |             |                             |             |             |          |
|---------------------------------|----------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| <b>High School and Lower</b>    |          |             |             | <b>Bachelors and Higher</b> |             |             |          |
| <b>VARIABLES</b>                | <b>N</b> | <b>A/DA</b> | <b>M/SD</b> | <b>N</b>                    | <b>A/DA</b> | <b>M/SD</b> | <b>t</b> |
| Case 1 a                        | 472      | 61/34       | 2.50/ 1.78  | 147                         | 54/35       | 2.69/ 1.69  | -1.15    |
| Case 1 b                        | 470      | 43/30       | 2.74/ 1.35  | 150                         | 46/32       | 2.79/ 1.28  | -0.46    |
| Case 1 c                        | 468      | 69/09       | 1.96/ 1.12  | 150                         | 67/11       | 2.10/ 1.07  | -1.33    |
| Case 1 d                        | 468      | 35/25       | 2.86/ 1.14  | 151                         | 30/34       | 3.05/ 1.02  | -1.75    |
| Case 2 a                        | 459      | 49/30       | 2.67/ 1.44  | 143                         | 53/28       | 2.59/ 1.42  | 0.57     |
| Case 2 b                        | 455      | 55/22       | 2.55/ 1.18  | 140                         | 50/16       | 2.55/ 1.00  | 0.01     |
| Case 2 c                        | 453      | 13/50       | 3.56/ 1.12  | 141                         | 18/49       | 3.47/ 1.06  | 0.85     |
| Case 3 a                        | 452      | 68/25       | 2.18/ 1.60  | 144                         | 60/31       | 2.47/ 1.63  | -1.91    |
| Case 3 b                        | 452      | 80/09       | 1.77/ 1.13  | 142                         | 75/05       | 1.89/ 0.99  | -1.17    |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01 (Two tailed)

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case).

N: Sample size; A/DA: Agree/Disagree; M/SD: Mean Standard Deviation; t: Mean differences t test value



However, police academy cadets demonstrated significant differences when their family's education level was involved (Table 17). Disagreement was mostly relevant to the cadets' own attitude of seriousness in the first and third case scenarios, their own reporting behavior and others' perception of the first case, and their own attitude and reporting behavior pertaining to the third case scenario. In summary, police academy cadets from less educated families were stricter in their grading of seriousness and reporting behavior compared to academy cadets from more educated families. On the other hand, the case is not the same for police vocational school students from families with different educational backgrounds. There is no statistical difference in vocational school cadets' perceptions with respect to their parents' education level.

From another perspective, a comparison between police academy cadets and vocational school cadets with respect to similar family educational backgrounds yielded more diverse findings (Table 18). Statistics pertaining to academy and vocational school cadets from less educated families yielded significant differences in their attitudes pertaining to their own seriousness involving the first and third case scenarios. In keeping with our hypothesis, academy cadets from less educated families were stricter in terms of their attitudes of seriousness for both instances compared to vocational school cadets in the same group.

Similarly, academy and vocational school students from families with higher education yielded significantly different mean differences in their perceptions of the three hypothetical scenarios. For the first scenario, academy and vocational school cadets diverged in their perception of reporting behavior of their fellow officers; for the second

Table 17. Comparison of mean differences between parents' education levels of academy and PVSHE cadets with respect to corruption perception aspects.

| Academy               |     |       |           |     |       |           |         |                      |       |           |    |       |           | PVSHE |   |                       |      |   |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|-----------------------|-----|-------|-----------|-----|-------|-----------|---------|----------------------|-------|-----------|----|-------|-----------|-------|---|-----------------------|------|---|--|--|--|--|--|----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| High School and Lower |     |       |           |     |       |           |         | Bachelors and Higher |       |           |    |       |           |       |   | High School and Lower |      |   |  |  |  |  |  | Bachelors and Higher |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| VARIABLES             | N   | A/DA  | M/SD      | N   | A/DA  | M/SD      | t       | N                    | A/DA  | M/SD      | N  | A/DA  | M/SD      | t     | N | A/DA                  | M/SD | t |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 a              | 154 | 72/23 | 2.12/1.61 | 98  | 56/32 | 2.56/1.62 | -2.10*  | 318                  | 56/40 | 2.68/1.83 | 49 | 51/42 | 2.94/1.81 | -0.94 |   |                       |      |   |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 b              | 154 | 46/27 | 2.67/1.27 | 102 | 41/34 | 2.92/1.22 | -1.58   | 316                  | 42/32 | 2.77/1.38 | 48 | 56/27 | 2.52/1.35 | 1.16  |   |                       |      |   |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 c              | 151 | 76/07 | 1.87/1.05 | 103 | 64/13 | 2.17/1.05 | -2.17*  | 317                  | 66/10 | 2.00/1.15 | 47 | 72/09 | 1.96/1.10 | 0.25  |   |                       |      |   |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 1 d              | 152 | 36/28 | 2.88/1.15 | 103 | 27/40 | 3.17/0.97 | -2.05*  | 316                  | 34/24 | 2.85/1.14 | 48 | 35/23 | 2.79/1.09 | 0.36  |   |                       |      |   |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 2 a              | 146 | 51/26 | 2.57/1.39 | 97  | 60/21 | 2.37/1.30 | 1.11    | 313                  | 48/32 | 2.72/1.46 | 46 | 40/44 | 3.07/1.54 | -1.48 |   |                       |      |   |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 2 b              | 142 | 58/19 | 2.49/1.10 | 94  | 48/17 | 2.63/0.95 | -0.97   | 313                  | 53/23 | 2.58/1.22 | 46 | 54/13 | 2.39/1.08 | 0.99  |   |                       |      |   |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 2 c              | 142 | 13/47 | 3.48/1.10 | 95  | 19/46 | 3.41/1.05 | 0.48    | 311                  | 13/51 | 3.59/1.13 | 46 | 17/54 | 3.59/1.09 | 0.04  |   |                       |      |   |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 3 a              | 141 | 78/16 | 1.84/1.42 | 97  | 60/29 | 2.45/1.52 | -3.16** | 311                  | 63/30 | 2.33/1.65 | 47 | 60/34 | 2.51/1.84 | -0.68 |   |                       |      |   |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Case 3 b              | 139 | 82/07 | 1.65/1.05 | 96  | 74/06 | 2.01/0.98 | -2.63*  | 313                  | 79/10 | 1.82/1.17 | 46 | 78/04 | 1.65/0.99 | 0.93  |   |                       |      |   |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01 (Two tailed)

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 c (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 d (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case).

N: Sample size; A/DA: Agree/Disagree; M/SD: Mean Standard Deviation; t: Mean differences t test value.

Table 18. Comparison of mean differences of perception of corruption aspects between Academy and PVSHE pertaining to same educational levels of parent groups.

| High School and Lower |     |       |           |     | Bachelors and Higher |           |         |       |       |           |    |       |           |        |
|-----------------------|-----|-------|-----------|-----|----------------------|-----------|---------|-------|-------|-----------|----|-------|-----------|--------|
| Academy               |     |       | PVSHE     |     | Academy              |           |         | PVSHE |       |           |    |       |           |        |
| VARIABLES             | N   | A/DA  | M/SD      | N   | A/DA                 | M/SD      | t       | N     | A/DA  | M/SD      | t  |       |           |        |
| Case 1 a              | 154 | 72/23 | 2.12/1.61 | 318 | 56/40                | 2.68/1.83 | -3.20** | 98    | 56/32 | 2.56/1.62 | 49 | 51/43 | 2.94/1.81 | -1.28  |
| Case 1 b              | 154 | 46/27 | 2.67/1.27 | 316 | 42/32                | 2.77/1.38 | -0.76   | 102   | 41/34 | 2.92/1.22 | 48 | 56/27 | 2.52/1.35 | 1.81   |
| Case 1 c              | 151 | 76/7  | 1.87/1.05 | 317 | 66/10                | 2/1.15    | -1.16   | 103   | 64/13 | 2.17/1.05 | 47 | 72/9  | 1.96/1.1  | 1.11   |
| Case 1 d              | 152 | 36/28 | 2.88/1.15 | 316 | 34/24                | 2.85/1.14 | 0.24    | 103   | 27/40 | 3.17/0.97 | 48 | 35/23 | 2.79/1.09 | 2.11*  |
| Case 2 a              | 146 | 51/26 | 2.57/1.39 | 313 | 48/32                | 2.72/1.46 | -1.06   | 97    | 60/21 | 2.37/1.3  | 46 | 40/44 | 3.07/1.54 | -2.80* |
| Case 2 b              | 142 | 58/19 | 2.49/1.1  | 313 | 53/23                | 2.58/1.22 | -0.71   | 94    | 48/17 | 2.63/0.95 | 46 | 54/13 | 2.39/1.08 | 1.32   |
| Case 2 c              | 142 | 13/47 | 3.48/1.1  | 311 | 13/51                | 3.59/1.13 | -1.02   | 95    | 19/46 | 3.41/1.05 | 46 | 17/54 | 3.59/1.09 | -0.93  |
| Case 3 a              | 141 | 78/16 | 1.84/1.42 | 311 | 63/30                | 2.33/1.65 | -3.03** | 97    | 60/29 | 2.45/1.52 | 47 | 60/34 | 2.51/1.84 | -0.20  |
| Case 3 b              | 139 | 82/7  | 1.65/1.05 | 313 | 79/10                | 1.82/1.17 | -1.44   | 96    | 74/6  | 2.01/0.98 | 46 | 78/4  | 1.65/0.99 | 2.03*  |

**\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01 (Two tailed)**

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the third hypothetical case), Case 3 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the third hypothetical case).

N: Sample size; A/DA: Agree/Disagree; M/SD: Mean Standard Deviation; t: Mean differences t test value.

scenario, in their own perception of seriousness; and in the third scenario, in reporting behavior.

### **Regression Analyses**

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis was performed in order to decipher to what extent the relationship between the mean score differences still persists while controlling for the effects of the other factors. Independent variables were divided under two distinct categories namely socio- demographical factors and organizational factors. The school of origin was considered as organizational level variable. Socio- demographical factors include the following variables; family income, education level of cadet's family, occupation of cadet's parents, and the population of the cadet's city of origin. In order to increase the variance, items pertaining to dependent variables will be aggregated. In order to assess the feasibility of the aggregation, factor analysis, PCA and correlation analyses were used. Reported OLS models include un-standardized regression coefficients and standard errors.

### **Factor Analysis**

Before aggregating the survey items pertaining to cadets' perceptions about the seriousness and attitudes toward reporting exploratory factor analysis was used. Barlett's test of sphericity (1.075,  $p < .0001$ ) and Kaiser -Meyer Olkin measure of sampling adequacy of .68 indicated the appropriateness of conducting factor analyses test. Based on Kaiser Guttman criterion, factors with Eigenvalues less than 1.00 were ignored. Survey items intended to measure four underlying variables loaded on three factors having eigenvalues greater than 1.00. Results suggest that the items involve three dimensions rather than four. The items pertaining to one outlook collapsed into two of the

others. All the items relevant to cadets' own perception loaded on the first factor and two items measuring cadets' own attitude of reporting loaded on its intended factor. The others' perception of seriousness and others' attitudes of reporting items split. One of the items pertaining to these variables had moderate loadings to more than one factors. Such distribution creates complexity their interpretation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2004).

The factor loadings pertaining to individual items did change following the Varimax- ortagonal rotation. The table involving loading matrix for these factors is shown in Table 19 (Appendix B).

### **Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Alpha Results**

Four of the outlook variables were subjected to exploratory factor analysis. Following the analysis two of them namely, cadets' own perception of seriousness and reporting behavior passed the statistical criteria, loading to their appropriate factors.

#### **Cadets own perception of seriousness.**

All the three items conceived to measure cadets' own perception of seriousness were subjected to PCA loaded in their intended factor. The PCA revealed the existence of a single component with an eigenvalue (2.61) exceeding the required criterion 1, explaining 69% of the variance among the variables. Results reported in Table 18 shows all items loading (with scores above 0.40) on the single factor. Cronbach's Alpha scores were calculated in order to assess the reliability of the dimension. Perception of seriousness variable with a Cronbach reliability score of 0.77, exceeded the 0.70 Cronbach's reliability threshold.

### **Cadets' attitude of reporting.**

All the two items conceived to measure cadets' attitude of reporting were subjected to PCA loaded in their intended factor. The analyses revealed the existence of a single component with an eigenvalue (1.22) that exceeds the required criterion 1, explaining 60% of the variance among the variables. Results reported in Table 20 shows all items loading (with scores above 0.40) on the single factor. Cronbach's Alpha scores were calculated in order to assess the reliability of the dimension. Cadets' attitude of reporting variable with a Cronbach reliability score of 0.36, failed to pass the 0.70 Cronbach's reliability threshold and could not produce adequate reliability score.

Due to their complex natures items relevant to perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior is not summated and utilized in the OLS regression analyses. Only the outlook pertaining to cadets own perception of seriousness is assessed.

Table 20. PCA factor loadings scales pertaining to two outlook variables.

| <b>Scale / Scale Items</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | <b>Factor Loading</b>   | <b>Eigenvalue</b> | <b>Scale</b> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| <b>Perception of Own Seriousness</b> (range 3-15)<br>A. 1 I consider this behavior to be very serious (Pety corruption).<br>A.2 I consider this behavior to be very serious (Gift giving).<br>A.3 I consider this behavior to be very serious (Bribery).                               | 0.853<br>0.765<br>0.865 | 2.06              | 0.77         |
| <b>Own Attitude of Reporting</b> (range 2-10)<br>C. 1 As a future police officer, if I see a fellow officer engage in this type of behavior I would report the matter to the officials (Petty Corruption).<br>C.2 As a civilian I would report this matter to the officials (Bribery). | 0.780<br>0.780          | 1.22              | 0.36         |

## Correlation Analysis

The correlation matrix gives important information about the convergent and discriminant validities of the constructs (Spector, 1992). Although eliminated, after the factor analysis results correlation values pertaining to other cadets' perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior are mentioned in the correlation table (Table 21).

Table 21. Correlation Table pertaining to the Dependent variables involving perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior of the cadets (N= 570).

| VARIABLES | 1     | 2     | 3     | 4     | 5     | 6     | 7    | 8     | 9    |
|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|
| Case 1 a  | 1.00  |       |       |       |       |       |      |       |      |
| Case 1 b  | .41** | 1.00  |       |       |       |       |      |       |      |
| Case 1 c  | .05   | .12** | 1.00  |       |       |       |      |       |      |
| Case 1 d  | .06   | .19** | .44** | 1.00  |       |       |      |       |      |
| Case 2 a  | .46** | .26** | .05   | .06   | 1.00  |       |      |       |      |
| Case 2 b  | .21** | .44** | .14   | .21** | .42** | 1.00  |      |       |      |
| Case 2 c  | -.00  | .06   | .10   | .29** | .08*  | .21** | 1.00 |       |      |
| Case 3 a  | .64** | .39** | .08   | .06   | .49** | .22** | -.01 | 1.00  |      |
| Case 3 b  | .06   | .05   | .22   | .13** | .21   | .03   | -.04 | .14** | 1.00 |
| M         | 2.55  | 2.76  | 2.00  | 2.91  | 2.66  | 2.96  | 3.53 | 2.25  | 1.80 |
| SD        | 1.76  | 1.33  | 1.12  | 1.12  | 1.43  | 1.17  | 1.11 | 1.60  | 1.11 |

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.001,

Case 1 a (own attitude for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the first case), Case 1 c (own reporting behavior for the first hypothetical case), Case 1 d (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the first hypothetical case), Case 2 a (own attitude for the second hypothetical case), Case 2 b (own perception pertaining to others' perception of seriousness for the second case), Case 2 c (own perception of others' reporting behavior pertaining to the second hypothetical case), Case 3 a (own attitude for the third hypothetical case), Case 3 b (own reporting behavior for the third hypothetical case).

A/DA: % Agree/% Disagree, M: Mean, SD: Standard Deviation.

Convergent validity requires that different measures of the same construct will relate strongly with one another, whereas, discriminant validity requires a modest relationship among different constructs (Spector, 1992). Findings (Table 21) indicate moderate correlations among cadets' own perceptions of seriousness pertaining to three

hypothetical corruption scenarios ranging between 0.46 to 0.64. Despite lower correlation values, cadets' attitudes toward the seriousness of the phenomena suggest consistency in their perceptions. Correlations between items representing cadets' own perceptions of seriousness and attitudes of reporting are not significant. These findings, despite supporting the discriminant validity of the previous construct raise serious concerns about the validity of the scale items representing cadets' own reporting attitude. Accordingly despite the items pertaining to the cadets' own reporting attitude loaded on its' intended factor, due to the lack of correlations among the items and a very low alpha reliability score the mentioned construct will not be aggregated and assessed in the regression analysis.

### **Results of the OLS Analysis**

Table 22. shows the results of OLS regression analyses. OLS analysis pertaining to cadets' own perceptions of seriousness resulted in statistically significant findings. Three of the five predictors are statistically significant.

Although statistically significant, only three percent (3.3 %) of the variability in cadets own perceptions of seriousness can be explained with reference to the organizational factor namely cadets' school of origin, and demographical factors that include parent's education and parents' occupation:  $R^2 = 0.033$ ,  $F(5, 411) = 2.81$ ,  $p < .05$ . Adjusted  $R^2 = 0.021$ . Results of the analysis indicate that cadets' organizational affiliation, parents' occupation as well as their level of education showed (Beta .110, .126, and .122 respectively) virtually similar effects in terms of predicting the perception of cadets' own seriousness in the model. More specifically, consistent with the mean difference results, cadets coming from families working in the public sector,



educated parents, and students of the police academy were more likely to report serious attitudes toward corruption scenarios.

Table 22. OLS Regression of the aspects pertaining to corruption perception and attitude toward reporting for petty corruptions.

|                                        | Own perception of seriousness |
|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <b>Demographical Factors</b>           |                               |
| Income (1= Lower than 1000 TL)         | -.017 (.51)                   |
| Education (High School and lower= 1)   | 1.13* (.48)                   |
| Parents' occupation (Public service=1) | .99* (.42)                    |
| City Population (250.001 and less=1)   | -.34 (.40)                    |
| <b>Organizational Factors</b>          |                               |
| Cadets' School (1=Academy)             | .897* (.42)                   |
|                                        |                               |
| Intercept                              | 4.76                          |
| R <sup>2</sup>                         | .03                           |
| F                                      | 2.81*                         |

Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses; \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01. Income:0= Higher than 1000TL (Turkish Lira), Education; 0= Bachelors degree and higher, Family occupation; 0= Private service, Population of the city; 0= More than 250.000.

### Summary of the Findings

Mean differences tests demonstrated that police cadets' perceptions were affected by socio-demographical factors and their respective training institution. The summary of the findings pertaining the T test and OLS regression analysis are as follows.

\*Based on organizational category, cadets' attitudes varied on the perception of seriousness pertaining to all three hypothetical case scenarios. Police academy cadets had a more serious attitude in evaluating the seriousness of the cases compared to police vocational school cadets.

\*Findings indicate that, based on the family income categories, academy cadets' perceptions of the three hypothetical case scenarios differed significantly in level of seriousness. On the other hand, income level did not affect vocational school cadets' attitudes with the exception of their own perception of the seriousness of the case scenario involving speeding money.

\*Results indicated that police academy and police vocational school cadets differed significantly according to their respective income categories.

\*Statistical findings indicated that the size of the cadets' city of origin affects their perceptions of corruption among police cadets, both among police academy and vocational school cadets.

\*With the exception of one dimension, academy and police vocational school cadets' attitudes were not statistically different among their own group according to their parents' vocation categories. On the other hand, academy and vocational school cadets were significantly different from each other in two different categories according to their parents' vocation groups.

\*Parents' education level had significant influence on academy cadets' perception of corruption, whereas, based on parents' educational level, vocational school cadets' perceptions were not statistically different from each other. On the other hand, police academy cadets and vocational school cadets with parents having similar educational backgrounds were significantly different with respect to their attitudes pertaining to the seriousness of corruption.

\*In parallel with findings pertaining to means scores tests, OLS regression results showed that cadets' socio-demographical background characteristics such as parents' education level and type of occupation as well as their organizational affiliations had significant effects on their perceptions of seriousness involving corruption scenarios.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **DISCUSSION**

The main purpose of this study is to evaluate the perceptions of corruption held by police cadets in the police academy and police vocational schools of higher education who are the future rank and line officers of the TNP. The current study examines police cadets' perceptions of the seriousness of corruption and their reporting behavior, as well as their fellow officers' perceptions of the seriousness of corruption and reporting behavior with regard to three different corruption types that are considered prevalent in public bureaucracy in Turkey. This study also aims to extend our understanding of whether socio-demographic background characteristics of the police cadets and the organizational characteristics of their training institutions are influencing their perceptions of petty corruption. The current study is based on police corruption literature and makes reference to previous perception of corruption studies.

#### **Key Findings**

The current study tried to answer the following questions: How do police cadets perceive police corruption? Do they differ in their perceptions about the phenomena? Do socio-demographic characteristics have any effect on their perception of seriousness and reporting behavior? How do police cadets perceive their fellow cadets' perceptions of seriousness and reporting behaviors?

Three different case scenarios were used in order to delineate the attitudes of the cadets. Findings reveal that organizational and socio-demographic characteristics affect cadets' perceptions of seriousness of the phenomena.

The following section contains a summary of findings pertaining to the perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior of cadets related to their organizational or school affiliation and socio-demographic characteristics.

### **Organizational affiliation as training school of the cadets.**

The organizational affiliation—whether the cadet was from the police academy or the vocational school—affected cadets’ perceptions of the seriousness of corruption. Based on their respective training school, cadets’ attitudes varied in all three hypothetical case scenarios. Police academy cadets had a stricter attitude in evaluating the seriousness of the three cases compared to police vocational school cadets. However, reporting behavior was not statistically significant between these groups for any of the cases.

Police vocational school cadets generally apply to the police vocation as a last resort for getting a job. Especially during the last decade and due to the economic recession, stable and secure jobs have become more popular. Rising unemployment rates have made police work quite attractive. At the same time, populist recruitment policies in the public sector during the period of time when the survey was conducted might also have influenced the opinions of police vocational school candidates about the state of affairs during their job securing initiatives. For example, cadets who successfully secured jobs might see using speed money as a viable practice and may not oppose engaging in corruption practices of that nature even though their income level is low. In contrast, those who did not need to get any support from powerful circles may not approve of engaging in corruption.

On the other hand, recruitment mechanisms do not allow for any types of financial interventions to be used to secure a position in the police academy, the previous

explanation may not be valid for the academy cadets. Thus, academy cadets, most of whom enter into their career path at a very young age, may not have experienced the functional role of corruption, and consequently, may hold more idealistic ideas about the negative effects of corruption. Cadets from families that have scarce income may be particularly against corruption (here, gifts and speeding money) compared to their fellows who have the means for allocating some resources for speeding up procedures when necessary. From another perspective, those from higher income families may have more resources to get appropriate advantages that may put them ahead of their peers without similar financial means (i.e., access to training and preparation for the entry exams).

The quality of the training the cadets get from their respective schools may also be a significant factor affecting the survey results.

#### **Income level of the cadets' parents.**

In general, police cadets from families with different income categories were not significantly different in their perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior pertaining to corruption cases in all aspects. However, when we compared the perceptions of seriousness or reporting behavior between police cadets of the same and different training schools relevant to their income level, the differences were more salient. Accordingly, based on family income categories, academy cadets' perceptions pertaining to the first and third hypothetical case scenarios differed significantly. However, vocational school cadets from different income categories did not demonstrate salient differences in their perceptions (Table 8).

For the first scenario, 74% of the academy students (with a mean score of 1.92) from lower income households indicated that they would report such behavior, whereas

62% of the members (with a mean score of 2.23) of the higher income category indicated that they would report such cases to the authorities. With respect to the case scenario pertaining to speeding money, academy cadets from the lower income group were stricter in their evaluations of seriousness compared to their fellow cadets from the higher income group: 74% of the cadets from the lower income group (with a mean score of 2) considered this act as serious, and only 17% of the cadets from the same group graded the case as not serious at all.

In comparison, the group from higher income families was more lenient with a mean score of 2.45, in which 59% found the situation serious and 30% not serious at all. Police academy cadets from the lower income group were stricter in terms of grading the seriousness of the cases and their attitudes toward reporting behavior compared to their fellows from the higher income category. Additionally, the previous group was less cynical in terms of fellow officers' reporting behavior and their attitudes of seriousness toward the hypothetical scenarios.

On the other hand, although statistically not significant, the pattern of reporting behavior among cadets from higher and lower income families was different for the PVSHE cadets. Cadets from lower income families were more lenient in evaluating the seriousness of the cases as well as reporting behavior, and were more cynical about their fellow officers' reporting behavior compared to their fellow cadets from higher income families.

When we compare police academy and vocational school cadets from similar income categories (Table 9), cadets from the higher income group differed in their perceptions pertaining to the first case scenario, whereas cadets from low income families

differed in all three case scenarios. More specifically, when we look at the case scenarios separately, in all three categories, police academy cadets from lower income families were stricter in terms of grading the seriousness of the case scenarios compared to vocational school students from families with the same income level.

Accordingly, for the first scenario, 70% of the academy cadets vs. 55% of the vocational school cadets described the scenario as serious. For the second scenario, findings indicated statistically significant differences. In this case, 55% of the academy cadets rated the scenario as serious, and 21% percent of them rated it as not serious at all. On the other hand, the percentages among the vocational school students emphasize significant differences with 47% finding the issue serious vs. 34% finding it not serious at all. Similarly, for the third scenario involving speed money, 74% vs. 18% of the police academy students found the scenario as serious, whereas the ratio for vocational school students was 61% vs. 31%.

Although not statistically significant, both, academy and PVSHE cadets from lower income groups differed in their attitudes toward their fellow officers' perceptions of seriousness as well as their reporting behavior. Academy cadets from the lower income category were less cynical about their fellow officers' reporting behavior. Looking at the cadets from higher income families, statistically significant findings pertained only to the cadets' own and others' reporting behavior relevant to the first scenario. In contrast to our hypothesis, vocational school cadets were more willing to report witnessing corrupt transactions. More specifically, 62% vs. 14% of the academy cadets from the higher income category were willing to report such transactions compared to vocational school cadets' 75% vs. 10%.



When we compare the cadets from different institutions but from families with similar income levels, we notice salient differences in seriousness perception for the lower income group (here between academy and vocational school cadets). These differences might be due to the inexperience of academy cadets who did not have to spend anything to secure a job in the outside world. The difference between cadets from the higher income group pertains only to the reporting behavior, emphasizing the potential existence of loyalty among vocational school cadets and academy cadets. Police academy cadets seem more loyal to their peers compared to vocational school cadets. In this sense, the long training periods may be the cause of low reporting behavior for the cadets.

### **Parents' vocation**

Generally, parents' vocations do not significantly affect police cadets' perceptions of corruption and subsequent reporting behavior (Table 13). Likewise, police academy and police vocational school cadets also reported similar perceptions of the seriousness of the case scenarios for themselves as well as their fellow officers (Table 14).

However, significant differences emerged when we compared police academy and police vocational school cadets' attitudes with respect to their parents' vocational background (Table 15). Accordingly, police academy cadets and police vocational cadets the same family vocational background characteristics were statistically different from each other.

When we look at the case scenarios individually, for the first case, academy cadets from families working in the public sector were more cynical compared to vocational school cadets in terms of their attitudes pertaining to others' reporting

behavior of the case scenario. More specifically, although the same proportion of cadets (30% for both groups) thought that fellow officers may consider that case as serious, 38% of the academy cadets indicated that their fellow officers would not report the case, compared to 20 % of the vocational school cadets.

The second difference in perception of reporting behavior pertains to the third case scenario. Here, 77% of the academy cadets vs. 83% of the vocational school cadets indicated that they would report the behavior when they witness its occurrence. These finding were against our hypothesis expecting that academy cadets' perceptions of seriousness (for the first scenario) and reporting behavior would be superior compared to vocational school cadets.

When we compare perceptions of police cadets' from families working in the private sector, one case scenario yielded a statistically significant difference. The difference involving the second scenario is as follows: 55% (vs. 22%) of the academy cadets compared to 41% (vs. 37%) of the vocational school cadets reported that they would grade this situation seriously.

Homogeneity in the perceptions of cadets from different family vocational background categories emphasizes interesting interpretations. Based on the extant literature, significant differences were expected between cadets from families with public or private sector backgrounds. However, police cadets demonstrated homogeneous perceptions with respect to their parents' vocation categories. In the light of these findings, it is possible to think that cadets are not under their families' cultural influences with respect to their attitudes toward corruption. The new generation, especially, has more opportunities to experience close interactions with individuals from different social

and economic backgrounds. Changing societal characteristics close the gap between the vocational categories (i.e., private and public sectors) that was more salient a couple of decades ago. Additionally, heterogeneity in school populations with respect to family background characteristics may also have contributed to changing police cadets' attitudes compared to the attitudes of their parents.

### **Parents' education level.**

Family education level is purported to be one of the salient factors influencing individuals' attitudes. Accordingly, in this study, it was assumed that police cadets from more educated families were expected to consider all case scenarios more seriously compared to their fellow cadets with less educated parents. When we looked at the grand picture, family education level did not yield significant mean differences in terms of perceptions of the cadets' own seriousness as well as others' perceptions of seriousness and reporting behavior (Table 16).

However, when we looked at the differences pertaining to both police academy and vocational cadets' families' educational backgrounds (Table 17), differences in perception arose. Findings indicate that parents' education level has significant effects on academy cadets' perceptions of corruption, but the same did not hold true for vocational school cadets from highly educated families or the contrary. Disagreements were mostly relevant to the first and third case scenarios, namely to cadets' own attitudes of seriousness, own reporting behavior and others' perceptions in the first case as well as to their own attitudes and reporting behavior in the third case scenario.

Accordingly, academy cadets from families with lower educational attainment were more strict in their grading of seriousness with a score of 72% (vs. 23%) compared

to cadets from highly educated families with a score of 54% (vs. 32%), respectively. Likewise, cadets from less educated families were more motivated in reporting such cases compared to cadets in the opposite group with 76% (vs. 7%) versus 64% (vs. 13%) ratios of agreement and disagreement, respectively. Attitudes toward the third scenario also emphasized the same tendencies in degrees of seriousness and reporting behavior with regard to families' educational backgrounds. Specifically, 78% (vs. 16%) of the cadets compared to 68% (vs. 29%) of the cadets in lower and higher educated families, respectively, reported that they agreed on the seriousness of the first scenario. Similarly, cadets from less educated families demonstrated more willingness to report corrupt acts with a score of 87% (vs. 7%) comparing to cadets coming from highly educated families (74% vs. 18%), respectively. In summary, police academy cadets from less educated families were stricter in their grading of seriousness and reporting behavior compared to academy cadets from highly educated families.

On the other hand, when we compared police academy cadets and vocational school cadets from families with the same level of educational attainment, differences in perceptions of seriousness appeared (Table 18). In the less educational background category, police academy cadets were found to be stricter in their perceptions of seriousness compared to police vocational school cadets in the same category. For the first case scenario, 72% (vs. 23%) of the academy cadets compared to 56% (vs. 40%) vocational school cadets reported finding the case to be serious. The pattern was similar for the third scenario, in which 78% (vs. 17%) of the academy cadets reported finding the case to be serious compared to 63% (vs. 30 %) of the vocational school cadets.

Although not statistically significant, in comparing their perceptions of their own reporting behavior (64% vs. 13% for the academy cadets and 72% vs. 9% for the vocational school cadets), both categories were more cynical about their fellow cadets' reporting behavior for the same case. Differences also appeared with the second case scenario: 60% (vs. 21%) of the academy cadets were stricter in terms of their evaluation of the seriousness of the case compared to vocational school cadets (40% vs. 44%). Interestingly, when looking at cadets' perceptions of others' seriousness in terms of evaluating the scenario, 28% (vs. 42%) of academy cadets reported that others may perceive the case as serious compared to 40% (vs. 44%) of vocational school cadets.

Although their perceptions of seriousness were less than those of academy cadets, vocational school cadets were less cynical compared to their academy counterparts. Police academy and vocational school cadets also diverged in their reporting behaviors pertaining to the third case scenario. For this particular case, police vocational school cadets were more willing to report compared to academy cadets, scoring 74% (vs. 6%) and 78% (vs. 4%), respectively.

There are some potential explanations for these differences. For example, the seriousness of the academy cadets from less educated families may be due to their lack of knowledge about the existing conditions involving corrupt transactions. Their lack of access to influential spheres due to their parents' education level may have contributed to that perception. In other words, cadets from highly educated families might be more aware about the existing state of affairs in terms of corruption's place in public life and thus have a more mitigated perception about the function of corruption. Since vocational school cadets have similar attitudes, the effects of the education level of their parents

might be mitigated due to the cadets' own higher involvement in social life. Instead of adopting their parents' perceptions, cadets may have developed their own sense about the way the work is done and, consequently, their own perceptions about the seriousness of corruption.

#### **The city of origin: Size of the city.**

The size of the city did not affect cadets' perceptions in a statistically significant manner (Table 10.). Similarly, academy cadets from less populated or more populated cities perceived the corruption phenomena with virtually the same level of seriousness. Police vocational school cadets' perception scores also did not yield significant differences (Table 11).

When police academy cadets and vocational school cadets were compared to each other with regard to their city of origin (Table 12), findings did not yield statistically different outcomes in the perception scores of cadets from small cities. However, for those from large cities, the comparison of mean differences between academy and vocational school cadets' perceptions of seriousness were significant for all three scenarios. As hypothesized, most of the academy cadets graded the cases as more serious than did the vocational school cadets. For the first scenario, 67% vs. 25% of the cadets graded the scenario as serious, whereas 54% vs. 41% of the PVSHE cadets reported strong perceptions of the seriousness of the instance. For the second scenario, 56% (vs. 21%) of the academy cadets compared to 46% (vs. 35%) of the vocational cadets reported such instances as serious. For the third scenario, too, academy cadets reported greater concern with a mean score of 2.02 vs. 2.39, respectively. Specifically, 72% vs. 17% of the cadets indicated that they considered bribery to be a serious infraction

compared to vocational school cadets, who reported, 63% vs. 31%, such transactions as serious and not serious at all, respectively.

The lack of significant differences correlated to the city of origin among cadets at the same training institution might be due to the extended travel and communication opportunities that we are experiencing in this era. Increasing mobility and access to urban areas give people living in small cities more opportunity to travel and experience life in larger cities.

Broader access to communications technology and media also enables individuals to follow trends in public life and society with respect to the prevalence of corruption in general. However, differences among vocational school and academy cadets were more salient for those from larger cities. As expected for all the case scenarios, academy cadets from large cities perceive corruption more seriously compared to vocational school cadets. The relative gap between cadets from different cities of origin might be due to the fact that vocational school cadets are more exposed to society compared to the academy cadets. Accordingly, their more frequent exposure to the existence of corruption might have mitigated their perceptions of its seriousness compared to those of academy cadets living in a more isolated social environment.

## **Summary**

In summary, rather than an isolated incident, corruption should be perceived as a symptom of a deeper “malaise” (Chan, Dixon, et al., 2007). In general terms, the study found that organizational and socio-demographic characteristics affect police cadets’ perceptions of corruption.

## **Implications**

Eradicating corruption is a giant task that requires a multidimensional approach. Based on the study findings, it is possible to propose specific policy implications involving not only the police organization but also society in general. Because police organizations are a part of the society in which they are embedded, it is necessary to take multiple levels of analysis into account, including individuals, organizations, and cultures (Kleinig and Heffernan, 2004).

### **Societal Level Implications**

Corruption as a phenomenon should be considered from a larger perspective, not only within the limits of the public sector in general and the criminal justice system in particular, but also in the context of the greater society (Akozer, 2003). The responsibility for raising awareness about the negative consequences of corruption belongs to a wide spectrum of agencies and institutions, ranging from the family environment to local or national level institutions.

In order to reduce corruption, it is important to understand the nature of the existing value system in a society and the direction in which it is evolving. Public agencies that fail to synchronize their operations with changing societal values become obsolete and irrelevant to their environment. This proposition is especially important for leadership cadres responsible for developing policies relevant to the fight against corruption. It might be useful to design educational programs aimed at raising awareness about the secondary effects of corruption for audiences ranging from primary schools to public organizations.



## **Organizational Level Implications Regarding the Police Training Schools**

Police organizations reflect the cultural attributes of their national culture (Hofstede, et al., 1990). In this vein, interventions should be designed primarily according to the characteristics of the society in which the organization is embedded. Additionally, due to the effects of globalism over such agencies, international norms pertaining to corruption should also be taught to police cadets as well as officers occupying all levels of the hierarchy.

The police culture has been described as a corrupting influence adulterating all good intended initiatives and rehabilitative elements in an efficient organization. However, it also contains some attributes that may be utilized as solid bases against corruption if used in a timely and efficient manner. Experiences from international settings suggest the possibility of changing at least some parts of the culture that foster corruption (e.g., Chan and Dixon, 2007). The unusually long education and training process for the grand majority of future police administrators of the TNP permits such an initiative. The early recruitment age (14- to 15-year-olds) of police college students and the cultural context of their educational environment may aid in this goal if intervention programs are designed efficiently.

Perceptions of corruption are also relevant to developing awareness of the phenomenon. A good understanding of cadets' perceptions about corruption may enable authorities to take appropriate measures to rearrange their training programs. Scholars emphasize the importance of developing cognitive capacity and awareness within police cadets in order to help them differentiate right from wrong and to see the potential harm that corruption can cause at different levels of analysis. The positive role of training is

one crucial element that promises significant contributions to decreasing the rate of corruption detailed in major reports issued by international organizations (Ozyurek, 2005).

Police cadets in the academy and the vocational schools have differing perceptions about corruption. In order to mitigate the differences, stemming from their different social background characteristics, among police academy cadets' perceptions of corruption, it is important to place more emphasis on training interventions that may raise more awareness and uniformity about the corruption phenomena. In order to develop more precise policies, it is important to discover the dynamics that give rise to such differences. Additionally, given the existence of cognitive differences and age-related gaps between academy and vocational school cadets, training processes should be adapted according to the developmental stages of the cadets. However, one of the greatest challenges is to find appropriate and proven training strategies. Unfortunately, in most circumstances, the purpose of education in police ethics within institutions preparing the future cadres of the law enforcement agencies is not clear (Heffernan, 1982). Additionally, it is very difficult to predict how police work requirements will evolve one decade later and thereby forecast the traits of an ideal future police officer ahead of time. The length of the education program at the police university is one of the obstacles for keeping pace with the dynamic nature of society. Given the eight-year-long police high school and college recruitment and education process, future officers may risk growing up detached from the exigencies of the society they are going to police.

Despite the shared experience of cadet life in a boarding school, police vocational school cadets undergo a different training process from their academy peers. Initially,

police vocational school cadets join the police vocational school after graduating from high school. Most of them have previous job experience and a more accurate understanding of the nature of the outside world (Cerrah, 1996). In contrast, academy cadets, who are mostly isolated from a broader social life, may experience frustration in trying to embrace and enforce their conservative values relevant to corruption. In other words, cadets who experience “real” life more easily shift from their idealistic approaches to more practical ones that enable them to survive the troubles within their occupational lives (e.g., Crank, 2004). In order to reduce potential discrepancies between the real and anticipated world, police organizations should prepare their personnel before letting them join active duty.

### **Leadership Implications**

The role of leadership in organizations has been indicated as an important factor influencing the values and, consequently, the environments that foster specific attitudes toward certain phenomena. The leadership process plays an important role in fostering or preventing the occurrence of corrupt transactions. In this vein, concrete, living examples of integrity in police work can generate more powerful influences on students than the analysis of moral values and ethical rhetoric alone (Heffernan, 1982). More specifically, when training schools are in question, the incumbent leadership of training schools should demonstrate a substantive commitment to fostering an anti-corruption climate in their respective training school. Such a climate can be established via appropriate recruitment and selection criteria and police cadet training processes, establishing and strongly enforcing fair discipline measures, and encouraging appropriate behavior. Additionally, the top leadership and middle level managers appointed to training schools

should not have records tainted with corruption charges. Police training schools should be staffed with role models who stand out for their integrity as well as for their success.

### **Limitations**

As in other disciplines, empirical research in criminal justice studies involves limitations. Some of the limitations are inherent to the adopted research design. As in this study, although abundantly used in attitude research, cross sectional research design has its specific shortcomings. Since the data represent the perceptions of police cadets in one single picture, it limits our ability to issue solid causal explanations. The lack of robust scales measuring the cadets' or police officers' perceptions of phenomena like corruption, coupled with the lack of empirical research in the Turkish context, is another significant limitation. Additionally, one of the challenges of attitude research to date is demonstrating solid linkages between measured attitudes and subsequent behavior (e.g., Crank, 2004). Police corruption involves a wide variety of instances depending on a variety of factors. Thus perceptions of the phenomena may represent diverse opinions depending on unofficial or official affiliations of the involving subjects. In this study, the selection of the cases was based on widespread corruption practices familiar to the cadets through hearsay or the occurrence of daily life, even if they had no direct, personal experience with these practices. Social desirability concerns are part of the very nature of our topic of study. Although anonymity was assured at the beginning of the data collection procedure, cadets may have answered the question in a way that is more likely to please the administration, rather than reflecting their genuine perceptions.

## **Future Research**

The current study is one of the pioneering empirical studies that compare police cadets' perceptions in the context of organizational and socio-demographic factors in the TNP. However, despite its contribution to laying the groundwork for future endeavors, there are several aspects that still need to be considered. The initial issue pertains to the revision of the sample. TNP has extended its recruitment and selection pool in recent years. In addition to the regular recruits for the police vocational school of higher education, TNP has started recruiting cadets with bachelor's degrees. Given such changes in recruitment practices, it is important to expand the sampling in a way that includes all categories of police cadets. It is important to decipher the moderating and mediating factors that influence basic SES characteristics in cadets' perceptions of the phenomena. Additionally, the potential effects of significant turning points during cadets' training programs, such as social, economic, and political factors, should be considered. Although the perceptions of study participants suffice for conducting attitude research, the perceptions of leadership cadres toward corruption should also be included in future research designs. In-depth qualitative studies should be conducted to understand the underlying motivations that guide cadets in selecting their respective career paths. A longitudinal study should complement further understanding by delineating underlying factors and causal relationships.

Corruption has also been approached from a moral perspective. Morality is a relative phenomenon; it is experienced by individuals and groups at different levels of intensities depending on the governing ideological, philosophical or religious principles. Accordingly, a relationship between the adopted moral principles and perceptions

concerning corruption merits an empirical investigation. Islam, as the predominant religion in Turkey, has specific regulations relevant to corrupt transactions. Turkey is a secular country where the grand majority of its population is Muslim. In the Turkish context geographical differences are salient factors that differentiate such experiences. It may be possible to argue that the majority of the Eastern part of Turkey can be described as more conservative in terms of espousing more traditional values. Accordingly future researches may take into account geographical origins of the study participants.

## **Conclusion**

In general terms, the conclusion of the current study is that socio-cultural factors and organizational characteristics significantly affect cadets' perceptions of corruption. The purpose of the study is to evaluate socio-cultural and organizational characteristics of police cadets with respect to their influence on perceptions of corruption. The findings, based on empirical data analysis, provide quantitative outcomes that offer important information about factors that affect the perceptions of police cadets and their differences among each other with respect to these factors. This study offers substantial information with which to initiate an evaluation of current policy applications pertaining to police cadets' value orientations in order to predict future intervention plans. This study has reached the conclusion that uniform training strategies are not fit for all types of police training institutions and should be adapted depending on the characteristics of the cadets and their respective training schools.

## **APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX A

### **SURVEY PERTAINING TO POLICE CADETS/TRAINEES PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION IN TURKEY**

The aim of this study is to broaden the scope of existing knowledge regarding a range of attitudes and beliefs police cadets toward issues relating to corruption in your country. Efforts will be made to share the preliminary findings with the students before the end of the semester.

In this study we refer to corruption as “political and bureaucratic misuse of power through bribery and destruction of integrity.” It refers to public officials taking bribes to engage in public affairs for which they are paid salaries. Examples of public officials include politicians, police officers, customs officers, public hospitals, public schools and colleges, etc. Taking bribes in cash or kind to grant licenses, speed up work, give admission in schools or release you if you are caught speeding on the highway are all examples of corruption. In this survey, we would like you to answer the questions relating to this topic to the best of your ability.

**Please fill the questionnaire as completely as possible. Mark your answers on the bubble sheet (Scantron). The survey administrators do not know the names of the respondents who choose to participate in the study nor do the surveys have any identification marks. All responses are completely confidential and will not be used in anyway that may identify the participant. Your privacy will be protected to the maximum extent allowable by law. Please return the filled-in Scantron sheets to the survey administrator. You do not have to return the survey form.**

Participation is voluntary; you may choose not to participate at all, or you may refuse to participate in certain procedures or answer certain questions or discontinue your participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits. You indicate your voluntary agreement to participate by completing and returning this questionnaire. This survey will take about 25 minutes to complete.

If you have questions about the study please feel free to call Professor Mahesh Nalla, School of Criminal Justice at MSU (Tel.001-517-355-2197; e-mail: [Nalla@msu.edu](mailto:Nalla@msu.edu)) who is the responsible project investigator or 1st Class Police Director Tuncay Yilmaz, President of the Police Academy, Professor Tulin Icli, Dean of Faculty of Security Sciences at Ankara (Tel: 011 90 312.499 70 02). If you have questions or concerns regarding your rights as a study participant, or are dissatisfied at any time with any aspect of this study, you may contact – anonymously, if you wish –Peter Vasilenko, Ph.D., Chair of the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (UCRIHS) by phone: (517) 355-2180, fax: (517) 432-4503, e-mail: [ucrihs@msu.edu](mailto:ucrihs@msu.edu), or regular mail: 202 Olds Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824. ”



**Part 1. Background information: Please use the enclosed bubble sheet the fill your answers.**

1. You are a student of:    A. Police Academy (Academy)    B. Police Vocational School (Vocational)
2. Before joining the academy/vocational school you came from a city with a population of :
  - A. Less than 10,000
  - B. 10,000 and 50,000
  - C. 50,000 and 250,000
  - D. 250,000 and above
3. What is the best estimate of your MONTHLY family income before taxes last year?
  - A. 400,000,000 Lira OR LESS
  - B. 400,100,000 to 600,000,000
  - C. 600,100,000 – 1,000,000,000
  - D. 1,000,100,000 – 1,500,000,000
  - E. Above 1,500,000,000 Lira
4. What is the highest educational level achieved by either of your parents?
  - A. Less than high school
  - B. High school
  - C. Bachelor's degree
  - D. Master's degree and higher
5. Have any of your parents ever worked in the following profession (please select only one):
  - A. Police/Customs or other similar agencies
  - B. Medical
  - C. Municipal Government
  - D. School/College
  - E. Private sector

**II. In this section we would like your views on why people engage in corruption. For example, an officer who takes a bribe for not giving a speeding ticket or a principal of a school taking bribe to admit your child. Given below are case scenarios. Please answer the following questions by filling the bubble that best expresses your personal view: A (Strongly Agree), B (Agree), C (Not sure or unclear) D (Disagree), and E (Strongly Disagree). If your answer is strongly agree mark the space with A etc.**

**Case 1 Petty Corruption. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half the amount of the fine in exchange for not booking the case/issuing a citation.**

6. I consider this behavior to be very serious. \_\_\_\_\_
7. Most police officers I know would consider this behavior to be most serious. \_\_\_\_\_
8. As a future police officer, if I see a fellow officer engage in this type of behavior  
I would report the matter to the officials. \_\_\_\_\_
9. I think most fellow police officers would report this matter to the officials. \_\_\_\_\_

**Case 2 Gift Giving. An official in the municipal government is well liked by the local community. During holiday season, local merchants, restaurant owners and other business people show their appreciation by giving gifts of food and liquor, etc.**

10. I consider this behavior to be very serious. \_\_\_\_\_
11. Most police officers I know would consider this behavior to be most serious. \_\_\_\_\_
12. I think most fellow municipal officers would report this matter to the officials. \_\_\_\_\_

**Case 3. A government employee in charge of processing applications for a seat in a government school asks for a bribe for speeding up your application process.**

13. I consider this behavior to be very serious.

\_\_\_\_\_

14. As a civilian I would report this matter to the officials.

\_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX B

Table 19. Rotated component matrix involving factor loadings for outlook variables (n=656).

| Scale Items                                                                                                                                          | Outlook                                        | Factor 1 | Factor 2 | Factor 3 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| I consider this behavior to be very serious (Pety corruption).                                                                                       | Perception of Own Seriousness (range 3-15)     | .83      | .01      | -.12     |
| I consider this behavior to be very serious (Gift giving).                                                                                           |                                                | .73      | -.06     | -.16     |
| I consider this behavior to be very serious (Bribery).                                                                                               |                                                | .83      | .13      | -.12     |
| Most police officers I know would consider this behavior to be most serious (Petty corruption).                                                      | Perception of Others' Seriousness (range 2-10) | .61      | .11      | -.29     |
| Most police officers I know would consider this behavior to be most serious (Gift giving).                                                           |                                                | .48      | .03      | .57      |
| As a future police officer, if I see a fellow officer engage in this type of behavior I would report the matter to the officials (Petty Corruption). | Own Attitude of Reporting (range 2-10)         | .02      | .76      | .23      |
| As a civilian I would report this matter to the officials (Bribery).                                                                                 |                                                | .01      | .71      | -.33     |
| I think most fellow police officers would report this matter to the officials (Bribery).                                                             | Others' Attitude of Reporting (range 2-10)     | .01      | .61      | .53      |
| I think most fellow municipal officers would report this matter to the officials (Gift giving).                                                      |                                                | -.04     | .03      | .73      |

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Rotation converged in 4 iterations.

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