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AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF MICHIGAN'S
ELECTRICITY LANDSCAPE

presented by

JORDAN PATTERSON HOWELL

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AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF MICHIGAN'S ELECTRICITY
LANDSCAPE

By

Jordan Patterson Howell

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
Geography

2010

ABSTRACT

AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF MICHIGAN'S ELECTRICITY
LANDSCAPE

By

Jordan Patterson Howell

Michigan’s utility companies and rural cooperatives, along with the
federal government, national, and multi-national corporations have traditionally
been held responsible for the development of the state’s electricity infrastructure.
In contrast, I argue that it has actually been Michigan’s utilities oversight regime
and the specific actions of the state's regulatory body, the Michigan Public
Service Commission, that have played a central role in shaping the state’s
electricity landscape. Underlying this scheme was a particular notion of
“progress,” shared by utilities, cooperatives, and the Commission alike, which
linked the deployment of massive, complex electricity infrastructure to the state’s
social advancement. These factors prompted utility companies to invest in new
facilities of dubious necessity, producing an electricity landscape that is today
characterized by dirty, ageing, fossil-fuelled power plants. Despite reforms, the
artifacts of years past continue to block the implementation of both meaningful
conservation programs and renewable fuels.

Through an examination of regulatory hearings, Commission and utility
publications, and similar materials with a sub-national focus, this thesis employs
narrative analysis to extend, temper, and illustrate the more common, national-
level studies of the US. electricity system. In so doing, it recognizes the
importance of scale in analysis and highlights the unique economic and social

context surrounding Michigan's electricity landscape.

Copyright By
JORDAN PATTERSON HOWELL
2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ................................................................................. 0
List of Figures ................................................................................ vi
List of Abbreviations ...................................................................... viii
Introduction .................................................................................. 1
0.2 Research in Context ...................................................... 4
0.2A Research Outside Geography ................................. 4
0.28 Research In Geography ......................................... 6
0.3 Methodologies ............................................................. 7
0.4 Structure of the Present Work .......................................... 9

Chapter One: The Historical Development of Michigan’s Electricity

Landscape ..................................................................................... 15
1.2 Early Days of Electric Power in Michigan ........................... 15
1.3 Utility Boom Years, 1930-1978 ........................................ 18
1.4 Rural Electrification in Michigan ..................................... 23
1.5 The Era of Market Liberalization .................................... 29
Chapter Two: The Impacts of Michigan’s Regulatory Regime .................. 38
2.2 The Roots of Regulation in Michigan ................................. 39
2.3 Key Components of Michigan’s Regulatory Regime ............. 43
2.4 The ”Midland” Hearings ................................................ 48
Chapter Three: The ”Progress” Paradigm ........................................... 57
3.2 Origins of the ”Progress” Paradigm ................................. 59
3.3 The Development and Impacts of ”Progress” ..................... 63
3.4 Challenges to the ”Progress” Paradigm ............................ 70
Conclusion .................................................................................... 80
Appendices
Appendix A: An Inventory of Michigan’s Generating Units ............ 89
Appendix B: An Electricity Atlas .............................................. 124

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: The electricity landscape in context ....................................... 17
Table 1.2: Non-utility generating capacity, 1978—1991 and 1992—2000 ......... 31
Table 2.1: Rate hearings surrounding Consumers Power's Midland Nuclear
Facility ......................................................................................... 49
Table A1: Michigan’s existing coal-fired generating units ...................... 90
Table A2: Michigan’s existing petroleum-fired generating units .............. 94
Table A3: Michigan’s existing natural gas-fired generating units ............. 100
Table A4: Michigan’s existing hydroelectric generating units .................. 108
Table A5: Michigan’s existing nuclear generating units ......................... 118
Table A6: Michigan’s existing wind generating units ............................ 118

Table A.7: Michigan’s existing wood- and wood-waste-fired
generating units .............................................................................. 118

Table A8: Michigan’s existing landfill gas and municipal solid waste-fired
generating units .............................................................................. 119

Table A9: Michigan’s existing pumped storage units ........................... 123

Figure 1.1:
Figure 1.2:
Figure 1.3:
Figure 1.4:
Figure 1.5:
Figure 1.6:

Figure 1.7:

LIST OF FIGURES

Michigan's power plants, 2000 .......................................... 16
Existing generator units by Year ........................................ 20
Existing capacity by year ................................................................... 20
Detroit Edison's St. Clair power plant ................................. 21
Michigan's electricity system ca. 1950 ................................. 22

International transmission link between the US. and Canada... 23

Michigan's first rural electric power line .............................. 25

 

Figure 1.8: One of Baton Rapids, MI historic dams associated with the town's
commercial dairy farm ..................................................................... 25
Figure 1.9: Service areas of Michigan's RECs, ca. 1940 ........................... 27
Figure 1.10: Michigan's "Fuel Mix" ..................................................... 33
Figure 1.11: Granger Electric's landfill gas collection system ................... 35
Figure 1.12: Granger’s generators ...................................................... 35
Figure 2.1: Michigan’s utility service areas (approximate) ...................... 42
Figure 3.1: The Song of Croton Dam ................................................... 60
Figure 3.2: Cover, A Better Home ...................................................... 63
Figure 3.3: Michigan’s integrated transmission system (approximate) ...... 66
Figure 3.4: The centralization of generating facilities .............................. 69
Figure 4.1: Consumers Power’s own depiction of its service area ............. 82
Figure 4.2: ”Powering Michigan's Progress” ....................................... 83
Figure 4.3: "Rural Electric Park” ....................................................... 84
Figure 8.1: Michigan's Power Plants, 2000 ........................................... 125
Figure 3.2: Michigan’s transmission system ......................................... 126

vi

LIST OF FIGURES, CONTINUED

Figure 8.3: Michigan’s REC service areas ............................................. 127
Figure 8.4: Michigan's ten largest power plants .................................... 128
Figure 8.5: Michigan’s coal-fired power plants .................................... 129
Figure 8.6: Michigan’s hydroelectric plants .......................................... 130
Figure 8.7: Michigan's natural gas-fired power plants ........................... 131
Figure 8.8: Michigan's petroleum (distilled fuel oil) power plants ............ 132
Figure 8.9: Michigan’s nuclear facilities and commercial

wind generators .............................................................................. 133
Figure 8.10: Michigan’s wood- and wood-derived fuel power plants ........ 134

Figure 8.11: Michigan's landfill gas and municipal solid waste-powered
electricity generating facilities ........................................................... 135

NB: Images in this thesis are presented in color. Contact author for more
information.

vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DOE .................................................................. US. Department of Energy
DSM ................................................................. Demand—Side Management
EIA ....................................................... Energy Information Administration
EPAct ................................................................... Energy Policy Act (1992)

FERC ............................................... Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
G+T ............................................. Generation and Transmission Cooperative
IRP ...................................................................... Integrated Resource Plan

MEOS ..................................................... Michigan Electricity Options Study
MRC ........................................................... Michigan Railroad Commission
MPSC .................................................. Michigan Public Service Commission
MPUC ................................................. Michigan Public Utilities Commission
NEA .................................................................. National Energy Act (1978)
PURPA ...................................... Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (1978)
REA ....................................................... Rural Electrification Administration
REC .................................................................... Rural Electric Cooperative
USDA .......................................................... US. Department of Agriculture

viii

Introduction

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Once taken for granted as a stable and secure consortium of publicly regulated and
tyficiently run monopolies the electric utility industry in the United States has over the
past three decades become increasingly unstable, fragmented, unreliable, insecure,
inefficient, expensive, and harmful to our environment and public health.

-- BK. Sovacool, The Dirty Energy Dilemma; 2008 (2)

The infrastructure responsible for the provision of electricity represents
the single largest investment sector of the United States’ economy, worth over
$800bn (Sovacool 2008, 16-17). Sales of electricity topped $360bn in 2007 (ibid).
Surpassing all monetary impacts, however, is electricity’s role as facilitator for
almost every economic, governmental, academic, and social transaction in the
country. Ubiquitous, bountiful electricity is all but expected in 215t century
America, and the processes underlying its production and consumption are
typically considered only periodically, during blackouts or other shortages. In
reality, the contemporary electricity landscape -- collectively referring to all
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure -- is the outcome of
more than a century’s worth of near-continuous processes of investment,
regulation, construction, and planning.

A common perception is that utility companies and electricity
cooperatives are directly responsible for the physical electricity infrastructure
that serves us today. While they are the all-but-exclusive builders and operators

of that infrastructure, in this thesis I argue that state-level utilities oversight

regimes and the actions of public regulators like the Michigan Public Service
Commission have been the most powerful forces shaping the electricity
landscape. The structure of utilities regulation, and in particular the rate-of—
return accounting system, has contributed to an electricity landscape
characterized by large, complex, and centralized projects relying on coal, nuclear
fuel, and, increasingly, natural gas. Decisions affecting the planning and
deployment of this infrastructure were made in the context of a specific

” progress imperative” that dominated regulatory, cooperative, and utility
company thinking through the 19803, and traces of which can still be found
today. This mode of thought, growing out of the type of ”modernization”
paradigm described and critiqued by Marshall Berman (1982), linked the
deployment of new electricity infrastructure, particularly generating facilities,
with social advancement and economic growth. Even with reforms in the past 20
years, the infrastructural and organizational artifacts produced by such policies
continue to dominate the electricity landscape today, and inhibit the deployment
of both conservation programs and renewable fuels.

I have chosen to focus on the state of Michigan for three reasons. With
regards to electricity infrastructure, Michigan hosts a diverse set of facilities:
there are some of the largest coal and nuclear power plants in the United States,
as well as numerous small-scale hydroelectric projects. The state has been
influenced by municipal utilities, large private companies, and federally-funded
rural cooperatives. If we accept that electricity consumption mirrors changes in
economic and industrial activity, then during its economic zenith, Michigan was
a world-beater in terms of the amount of electricity produced and the pace at

which new facilities came online; however now, during a period of deepening

economic malaise, the state must find ways to deal with an ageing glut of
electricity infrastructure while addressing new -- and costly -- environmental
concerns.

This thesis focuses on the Lower Peninsula of Michigan. Most of the
population and economic activity is concentrated in the Lower Peninsula, and
accordingly, so is most of the electricity infrastructure. Additionally, the
electricity landscape in the Upper Peninsula has been shaped by a much different
set of forces than the Lower Peninsula -- in particular, the federal government,
municipally-owned utilities, and utilities from neighboring Wisconsin and
Minnesota. The focus of this project further tightens in its concern primarily
with the activities of the state’s two largest private utilities, Consumers Power
and Detroit Edison. In spite of the fact that one can compile a long list of
companies selling electricity in the state of Michigan, Consumers Power and
Detroit Edison supply most of it, and have done so since the turn of the 20th
century. As such, their historical and contemporary influence in shaping the
electricity infrastructure in the state cannot be overstated

The conclusions I have reached in this thesis could only be arrived at
through a careful consideration of scale: in contrast to most studies of the
electricity landscape, this thesis has an explicitly sub-national focus. This not
only recognizes the fact that the most critical decisions surrounding electricity
infrastructure in the United States have historically been made at the state level,
but also draws attention to the unique circumstances surrounding electricity
system development in each state. In conducting this study, I have relied upon
the records of regulatory hearings and orders produced by the Commission, as

well as publications and archival materials produced by the Commission and the

state’s largest utilities. This has been augmented with analysis of state and
federal utilities laws and field visits to sites important in the development of

Michigan’s electricity landscape.

0.2 Research in Context

Electricity is frequently the subject of academic research and debate.
Studies range from engineering and materials research to economics and policy
studies to the ecological impacts of power generation. Rare, however, are
syntheses of these factors into an holistic explanation of the current spatial
composition of the electricity system, and rarer still are those which place the
development of the electricity landscape into a wider political, economic, and
social context. Geography’s integrative nature, however, means that it might be
the ideal discipline in which to conduct such an analysis. In this study of
Michigan’s electricity landscape, I have drawn on research in economics, public
policy studies, and history, focusing on information directly related to the state

wherever possible. A brief overview of these ”external” contributions follows.

0.2A Research Outside Geography

Economic considerations of the electricity industry are many, and cover
everything from historic price structures and the financial roots of governmental
regulation (Hausman and Neufeld 2002), to the economic efficiency of
transmission network expansion projects (Fang and Hill 2003). Economic
research on the electricity system typically traces the historical development of
the industry and considers the impacts of both governmental regulation and

aspects of ”deregulation.” Much of the best work is drawn directly from the pool

of energy statistics maintained by state and federal agencies like the Energy
Information Administration (EIA). Accordingly, many studies analyze economic
problems and trends both before and after new regulations, market failures, or
major blackouts have occurred (e.g. Ayres, Ayres, and Pokrovsky 2005; or
Kwoka 2008).

Studies of federal electricity policies, as well as those of large states like
California, New York, or Texas are also quite common (eg. Kingsley 1992). The
prevalence of domestic federal-level studies is somewhat perplexing given the
fact that federal oversight of electricity generation and transmission has been
quite limited, historically speaking. Other research comparing national
electricity policies (like Chick 2007) can help put U.S. treatment of the electricity
sector in perspective with other countries, which can be a useful analytical tool.
The relatively less-common studies of electricity policy at the state level tend to
focus on a single aspect of the electricity system, like wind energy in California
(Gipe 1991), a state’s response to an incident like the ”California Energy Crisis”
(Timney 2002) or the massive 2003 northeast blackout (DeBlasio et al. 2004).

Historians of electricity systems and the utilities sector offer important
insights into the chronology of electricity landscape development. Many (e.g.
Doyle 1979; Hyman 1988; Brigham 1998) are broad national or regional outlines,
but there exists a considerable body of historical research on state-level electricity
landscapes as well. In Michigan, some of the first histories were written by the
state's own utilities (Miller 1957; 1971; Bush 1973) and provide details about the
growth of the industry that more general studies would have to omit. Later
scholarship (most importantly, Anderson 1994) draws on these sources to

analyze several theories of regulatory oversight that were thrust into the

spotlight during the telephone and electricity industry crises of the 19703 and
19805. More recently, Kuhl (1998) has examined the history of rural electric
cooperatives in the state, both in their own right and in the context of the larger

federal rural electrification program.

0.28 Research in Geography

Unfortunately, studies of electricity infrastructure that draw on such
sources are not commonly found within geography journals. In fact, only
recently have geographers started to directly address electricity systems at all, let
alone in a critical fashion. Geographers working on energy problems have
traditionally focused on geopolitical and economic issues surrounding the
extraction and trade of fossil fuels in an international context (e.g. Conant and
Gold 1978; Mitchell, Beck, and Grubb 1996; Peters 2004; or Pacheco 2005). More
general geographic studies of energy have tended towards descriptive writing
emphasizing resource reserves and production data (e.g. Manners 1964; Guyol
1971; or Chapman 1989), with little to no attention paid to the processes driving
the development of those resources and systems. Early research in geography
examining specifically the evolution of the electricity landscape has continued
this trend. Two of the earliest works in this vein consider the structure of the
United States’ electric power industry and the importance of coal in electric
power generation, both at the national scale, and both with a strong emphasis on
the hand of the federal government (Elmes 1996; Elmes and Harris 1996
respectively). Both pieces argue that the US. electricity landscape cannot be

understood apart from the geography of the primary fuels used to supply it.

More progressive research has only begun to emerge, considering not only
the importance of scale in the analysis of energy issues but also the interrelated
factors of politics, ecology, economics, and culture in configuring the electricity
landscape. Serralle’s’ (2004) study of popular perceptions of electricity
infrastructure examines conflicts tied to the siting of renewable energy projects
like wind turbines in the United States and European Union. Vogel (2008)
similarly analyzes the interaction between political policy and environmental
conservation efforts at different scales in the Pacific Northwest. These two
studies demonstrate not only the very real power geometries that link utilities,
government, interest groups, and the deployment of energy infrastructure but
also the central role that scale must take in framing environmental research.
Other studies have also emerged from geography in the past 10 years
emphasizing particular aspects of the electricity landscape, like renewables or
rural electrification in Latin America (e.g. Heiman and Solomon 2004; Taylor
2005; Heiman 2006; Taylor 2006). This has followed the trend towards more
critical research into the development of other infrastructural systems like
communications and urban water facilities (Hillis 1998; Kaika and Swyngedouw

2000; Vojnovic 2006; Malecki and Wei 2009).

0.3 Methodologies

It is with the goal of contributing to this growing body of critical
geographic literature that I have undertaken the present thesis. In conducting
this research, I have examined the case records, public statements, position
papers, project studies, policy briefs, and archival materials produced by and for

the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC, Commission) and the state’s

two largest utility companies, Consumers Power and Detroit Edison.
Additionally, I have considered similar material from the federally—funded Rural
Electrification Administration (REA), US. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
US. Department of Energy (DOE), and EIA. To augment these sources I have
analyzed state and federal laws related to the regulation of the electric power
industry and also visited several sites important to the history of Michigan's
electricity landscape.

To structure this tranche of sources in a meaningful way, I have employed
a narrative (or discourse) analytic approach. Narrative analysis recognizes that
phenomena such as the development of the electricity landscape are contingent
upon environmental, political, cultural, and geographic particularities and
motives that tend to go unexamined. It differs from other qualitative analytic
methods because of its emphasis on the impacts of the texts —- not simply their
content. Indeed, ”the methodological strength of discourse analysis lies in its
ability to move beyond the text. . .to uncover issues of power relationships.”
(Waitt 2005, 166) This approach has proven quite valuable in contemporary
political ecology (cf. Dalby 1996; Feet and Watts 2004; Robbins 2004), and is
becoming increasingly popular in other areas of critical geographic and
environmental policy research as well (e.g., Sharp and Richardson 2001).

Such a ”constructionist” approach is a marked departure from earlier
studies of the electricity landscape. While most are concerned primarily with the
impact of a given construction program, fiscal innovation, or regulatory initiative,
I employ narrative analysis to excavate the foundations of those same programs,
innovations, and regulations. The ultimate significance and value of this

technique lies in the explosion of taken-for-granted concepts and arguments,

analysis of their component parts, and ability to offer alternatives that are

environmentally and socially responsible (Roche 2005).

0.4 Structure of the Present Work

Chapter One traces the development of Michigan’s electricity landscape
from the late 19''1 century to the present day, considering the different factors that
have contributed to its current configuration, including the efforts of the state’s
utilities companies and federally-funded rural cooperatives. Chapter Two
focuses on the most important aspects of the regulatory regime -- rate of return
accounting, territorial monopolies, and electricity pricing policies -— and the
devastating structural flaws contained therein as exposed by the 15-year
Midland Nuclear Facility debacle. Chapter Three explores the underlying
motivation of utilities, cooperatives, and the MPSC alike in shaping the
electricity landscape -- namely, a particular ideal of ”progress” -- and how this
ideal has impeded necessary reforms to Michigan’s electricity system. The
concluding chapter considers the future of the state’s electricity landscape, and
pays particular attention to the outlook for both meaningful electricity
conservation programs and renewable fuels in the state. The thesis is completed
with appendices detailing specific information about Michigan’s power plant
inventory and other electricity infrastructure.

This project has been guided by a simple question: why is Michigan’s
electricity landscape configured the way it is, with such heavy emphasis on
massive, centralized facilities and imported fossil fuels? This initial question
prompted several others related to the political, economic, ecological, and social

processes responsible for that configuration. Few people take the time to

interrogate the physical nature of the electricity landscape, and most of those that
do are already inside the electric power industry or the bits of government that
ostensibly oversee it. This makes independent investigation critical for holding
Commissions, companies, and even entire regulatory regimes to account.

While it is undeniable that the spread of electricity infrastructure has
improved the lives of literally billions of people around the world, it is equally
irrefutable that there are serious ecological and social consequences for
electricity’s use that must be addressed right now. Generating electricity from
fossil fuels -- which accounts for more than two—thirds of power generation in
Michigan —- releases toxic emissions and waste materials into the natural
environment, contributing to global climate change, the loss of biodiversity, and
degradation of human health. The extraction of these fossil fuels poses
additional, well-documented environmental, social, and geopolitical problems.
My concern for the protection of both the natural environment and the health of
those members of our society forced to bear the extemalities of electric power
production forms the core of this research.

The ultimate success of this project will be measured by the improvements
made to Michigan’s electricity landscape: both in terms of transparency in its
governance and sensitivity to the unique gifts that are the natural environment

and the people who live here.

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Sonoran Ejidos. Journal of the Southwest 48 (1): 63-90.

Timney, M. M. 2002. Short Circuit: Federal-State Relations in the California
Energy Crisis. Publius 32 (4): 109-122.

13

Vogel, E. 2008. "Regional Power and the Power of the Region: Resisting Dam
Removal in the Pacific Northwest". In Contentious Geographies:
Environmental Knowledge, Meaning, Scale. Eds. M. K. Goodman, M. T.
Boykoff and K. T. Evered. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub.

Vojnovic, I. 2006. "Urban Infrastructures". In Canadian Cities in Transition: Local
through Global Perspectives. Eds. T. Bunting and P. Filion. Oxford
University Press, USA.

Waitt, G. 2005. "Doing Discourse Analysis". In Qualitative Research Methods in
Human Geography. Eds. l. Hay. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

14

Chapter One

The Historical Development of Michigan’s Electricity
Landscape

Coal dominates electricity generation in Michigan..Although Michigan is a major
generator of electricity from wood and wood waste, has many small hydroelectric plants,
and has several plants that generate electricity using methane recovered from landfills
and anaerobic digesters, renewable power generation contributes minimally to the State
electricity grid. Electricity generation in Michigan is high, as is overall per capita
electricity consumption.

-- ElA State Energy Profile, Michigan (2009a)

The above epigraph offers a straightforward assessment of Michigan’s
electricity production and consumption patterns. Though official statements like
these, and related figures designed to demonstrate the configuration of the
electricity system (e.g., Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1) can be useful inventories, they
overlook the complexities that have shaped the system since its inception in the

later part of the 19th century.
1.2 Early Days of Electric Power in Michigan

In Michigan, electricity provision began in the early 18809. Initially,

anyone with adequate financing could sell electricity, but technology limited the

15

Figure 1.1: Michigan’s power plants, 2000

 

Michigan Power Plants, 2000

County, Capacity, and Ownership

‘1.
In
C

 

Consumers Energy
Detroit Edison
Other Private Utility
Municipality

Electric Cooperative

Independent Power
Producer

1:3 4:31:73 r“ :- 0

MW = Megawatt. or 1m watts

<100MW

101 MW- 1000 MW

> 1001 MW

 

:1
b-
on €2 4.-.- '
i-"e . l.
0 so 0
“ “i o o.
,_ .92
‘1: ‘ QM.»
l 5‘
I. r)
3 o o ‘
‘Afi
.’ (I. .5
o u g; o - "’
_, - .- .. , - ~. 0
“:1? ~29 1' ° "
.n _ (cg
‘ 2' _ 3 (0 V. «a; @530
' ‘ u ‘43 ‘P
I o o, .o co ;.

 

 

 

 

 

Table 1.1: The electricity landscape in context (after MPSC 2008; EIA 2009a)

Attribute YALE; U.S. Rank
Net Electricity Generation 8,232 GWh 2.6% of total
Net Summer Capacity 30,305 MW 10th

Per Capita Energy 313 m BTU 35th
Consumption

Population 10.0 m 8‘h
State GDP $382.0 bn 12'h

scope of early generation projects and distribution networks. This constraint
concentrated electric service in densely populated areas and spurred the
proliferation of power companies. The rush to profit from this new technology is
typified by the city of Grand Rapids, Michigan, which by 1905 hosted no fewer
than four electric power companies, each with its own generating capacity and
distribution lines (Anderson 1994). By 1919, Michigan had over 150 utilities,
most with their own generation and distribution infrastructure (MPUC 1919, 12).
The explosion in the numbers of electricity providers was matched by
improvements in generation and transmission technology. Advances in the
understanding of electricity’s physical properties permitted new developments
of the size and complexity required to meet surging demand from the state’s
industries. These advances were seized upon by the emerging giants in
Michigan’s electricity market, Consumers Power and Detroit Edison. Between
1907 and 1930, Consumers Power built 11 new dams and over 300 miles of
transmission line (Bush 1973). Though small by today's standards, these
hydroelectric projects were some of the largest in the world at the time, attracting

a stream of international engineers and industrial tourists alike (ibid). In

17

southeast Michigan, limited hydroelectric potential precluded Detroit Edison
from repeating Consumers Power’s success with large dams. Accordingly,
Detroit Edison turned to fossil fuels, and in particular coal, building four large
power plants and an accompanying transmission network by 1925 (Miller 1971).
Transmission facilities allowed utilities to build power plants outside of the
communities they actually served, taking advantage of comparatively remote
hydroelectric resources and less-expensive land.

These advances in system size led to economies of scale which encouraged
industry consolidation. Consumers Power employed its expansive new network
to control the electricity market in all of Michigan’s major cities except Detroit
and Lansing, which were in turn dominated by Detroit Edison and a municipal
utility, respectively. By 1925, the number of companies providing electric service
in the state had fallen by about 25%, to approximately 115 (MPUC 1925). Such
consolidation was described as ”the logical trend of the development of the

electric industry” by state officials (ibid, 8).

1.3 Utility Boom Years, 1930 - 1978

Corporate giants like Consumers Power and Detroit Edison dominated
the urban areas of the Lower Peninsula by 1930. During the Depression years,
however, all of Michigan's utilities experienced a sharp drop in demand, leaving
them with excess capacity. Nevertheless, in the build-up to World War II,
Michigan’s utility companies continued to grow. The war effort prompted rapid
and significant growth in Michigan’s electricity infrastructure. Additional means
of generating electricity had to be found as the completion of Consumers

Power’s Allegan and Hardy Dams in the mid 19305 tapped the remaining

18

significant hydroelectric resources in the state. Accordingly, new, state-of-the-art
coal facilities were added to the landscape between 1939 and 1943: Consumers
Power constructed four 35-MW units and two 50-MW units, and Detroit Edison
expanded existing facilities by 225 MW (EIA 2000).

The installation of these facilities initiated a utilities construction boom
that continued uninterrupted for nearly thirty years, fuelled by increased
residential, commercial, and industrial consumption and an overall population
influx into the state. This prolonged construction effort was responsible for a
major proportion of the infrastructure still in use today, especially when the
generating capacity itself is considered (Figure 1.2, Figure 1.3). Between 1944
and 1978, Consumers Power added 50 generating units, including the company's
four largest facilities, while Detroit Edison added 109 new generating units to its
system (EIA 2000). Each facility trumped its predecessor in size and complexity.
In 1949, Detroit Edison built its St. Clair plant, which combined with the
company’s River Rouge facility to produce nearly 2.5 percent of all electricity in
the United States. After expansion in 1960, it became the single largest
generating facility in the country (Miller 1971, 88). Geographic distribution of
the fuel, in conjunction with federal subsidies for its production, ensured that
coal and the massive power plants like St. Clair that burned it (Figure 1.4)
became the industry standard (Elmes and Harris 1996). Appendix A offers
greater details of Michigan's power plant inventory.

The explosion in infrastructure during this time cannot be overstated.
Between 1950 and 1959 alone, Consumers Power made over $400m worth of

capital additions to its electricity system, an unprecedented sum at the time.

19

Promotional materials produced by the state celebrated Michigan’s vast quantity

of power plants (number two in the nation), and rapidly growing

Figure 1.2: Existing generator units by year (after EIA 2008)

 

Generating Units Added by Year, 1900-2010

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

200 -——---—~ «~—
159
150 '77
100
61
5° mil tr... ' 1
0 ‘. m1!“ 1‘

1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year

 

 

 

Figure 1.3: Existing capacity by year (after EIA 2008)

 

Capacity Additions by Year (MW), 1900-2010

 

 

 

19005 19105 19205 1930s 1940:. 19505 1960s 19705 19805 19905 2000s
Year

 

 

 

capacity base (sixth in the nation), praising the state’s ”investor-owned and
locally managed power companies," for their ”sound policies, progressive

leadership, strong financing, forecasting and planning, up-to—date engineering,

20

Figure 1.4: Detroit Edison ’5 St. Clair power plant. Photo by author (2009).

.w ‘Irr I .’ - r
h‘ ’ ' i1 . ,. ‘ 7
.

it" ‘

    

 

  

excellent relations with the public, and civic-mindedness.” (MI Dept. of

Economic Development 1949) Michigan’s utilities had created one of the largest,
most technologically advanced electricity systems in the country.

A key component of the state’s electricity system was its long—distance
transmission network (Figure 1.5). As generating facilities grew in both size and
complexity, so too did these linkages between power plants and customers:
initially proprietary systems designed to deliver one company’s generating
capacity to its exclusive customer base, transmission links between Consumers
Power and Detroit Edison were established first for emergency purposes in the
19205, but quickly opened to the wholesale transfer of electricity between utilities

by the 19305. The companies connected Michigan’s power supply to utilities in

21

Figure 1.5: Michigan's electricity system ca. 1950 (M1 Dept. of Economic Development,
1949)

 

 

Ohio, Indiana, and the Canadian province of Ontario (Figure 1.6), which was in
turn connected to upstate New York and the New England states. This
integrated transmission network, coupled with the ”energy crises” and
deregulatory push that characterized the industry during the 19705 and 19805
spurred the move towards ”market liberalization.” But before discussing the

impacts of this era, however, it is worthwhile to pause and consider the role of

22

Figure 1.6: International transmission link between the U.S. and Canada. Photo by
author (2009).

Intematlonal Linkage

St. Clalr River

 

another important actor in the development of Michigan’s electricity landscape:
the federal government. The Rural Electrification Administration (REA) made
significant contributions to the configuration of the state’s electricity system,
particularly its transmission and distribution networks, and it is to this unique

aspect of Michigan’s electricity landscape that we will briefly turn.

1.4 Rural Electrification in Michigan

Corporate giants like Consumers Power and Detroit Edison dominated
Michigan’s electricity landscape through their control of the state's population
and industrial centers. But by 1934, fewer than a quarter of Michigan’s farms

had electricity (Kuhl 1998, 10). The Commission was well aware of the

23

 

transformative power of electricity on the state's farms, however, noting in its
1923 annual report that
...the delivery of electric energy to the farms and homes of the rural
population would supply an excellent means of power for use in
stationary machinery and add greatly to the comfort of the
farmer. . .The problem of distributing electrical energy for use on the
farms of the state is a subject that has attracted the attention of
farmers and utilities alike. When a means is devised for bringing
electricity to the aid of agriculture something similar to the
revolution already effected in factory production may result.
Certainly the contrast between farm and urban life will be greatly
lessened. (MPUC 1923, 8)

Michigan’s utilities had long flirted with rural electrification. In 1927,
Consumers Power in association with the Michigan State College (forerunner of
Michigan State University) strung 7 miles of line between Mason and Danville,
southeast of Lansing (Figure 1.7), but the project attracted only 12 customers. By
1929, the state had approximately 7,000 farms with electrical service (Kuhl 1998,
9), but the majority of farmers interested in electric power were still forced to
choose between self-generation (as in the case of large, commercial dairy farms
[Figure 1.8]) or a steep premium for the construction of power lines, sometimes
in excess of $2,000 per mile. A New Deal—era program, the Rural Electrification
Administration (REA), sought to change this by extending low-interest loans to
farmers who had organized into cooperatives for the purpose of attaining
electricity service.

By 1936, the REA had $6m ready for rural distribution projects in

Michigan. Farmers and rural leaders had started organizing rural electric

cooperatives (RECs) in 1935, but met stiff resistance from the large investor-

24

Figure 1.7: Michigan '5 first rural electric power line. Photo by author (2009)

 

Figure 1.8: One of Eaton Rapids, MI historic dams associated with the town '5
commercial dairy farm. Photo by author (2009)

  

25

owned utilities and their associates. Evidence abounds that Consumers Power
and Detroit Edison teamed up with county agricultural extension agents and the
Michigan Farm Bureau to actively disrupt several pro-REA gatherings, even
resorting to tactics of physical intimidation and violence to break up
organizational meetings (Kuhl 1998).

It might be expected that the utilities would resist any perceived
encroachment on their turf. But rural electrification in Michigan also
encountered political resistance from the regulatory Commission, which in spite
of its earlier position, argued against REA money for the state since the rural
areas were at least nominally served by the big utilities. Both the MPUC and the
governor refused to recognize the cooperatives as utilities, subsequently barring
them from accepting loans and selling electricity. But in 1937 the state Attorney
General rendered an opinion that RECs are not, in fact, ”public utilities” -- they
are cooperatives -- and thus not subject to Commission oversight anyway (Kuhl
1998). That same year, RECs started building both distribution networks and
generating facilities in the state. In only five years, more than 14,400 km (9,000
mi.) of line had been electrified and over 70 percent of Michigan’s farms serviced;
some two times the national average (REA 1941a; REA 1941b). Figure 1.9
illustrates the early service areas and generating facilities of Michigan’s
cooperatives.

By 1950 almost 95% of Michigan's farms were receiving electric service,
compared with 77% nationally (REA 1958), and by 1960 that number had reached
99% in Michigan and 96% nationally (REA 1960, 14). The work of making
electric power available in rural areas had been completed, but tension remained

high between the cooperatives and utilities over two important issues.

26

Figure 1.9: Service areas of Michigan '5 RECs, ca. 1940

 

 

. Alger Delta E.C.

. Cherryland E.C.

. Cloverland E.C.

. Fruit Belt E.C.

. 0&A E.C.

. Oceana E.C.

. Ontonagon Cty Rural
Electrification Assoc.

8. Presque Isle Electric

and Gas Co-op

9. Southeastern MI R.E.C.

10. Thumb E.C.

11. Top 0’ Michigan E.C.

12. Tri-County E.C.

13. Western MI E.C.

\JO‘U‘IAUJNH

 

 

 

 

Michigan REC Service Areas

Approximate Service Areas, ca. 1940

Indicates REC
power plant

11

13

12

 

27

 

The first was the ”right” of each to serve customers in the areas where
service territories met or overlapped. Hearkening back to the early days of
electricity service, there were several instances when utilities and cooperatives
built parallel sets of distribution lines to reach new customers or else poach from
the other company (Kuhl 1998). This situation was eventually resolved in the
early 19605 when Michigan's RECs issued a formal request for state regulation,
premised on the same ”deal” that the utilities had made with the state 30 years
earlier, to exchange oversight of rates for a protected service area (discussed
further in Chapter Two).

The second, contemporaneous issue was that of adequate electricity
supply. As RECs grew in both membership and electricity consumption,
securing enough electricity to meet customer demand became an issue of critical
importance. Initially, the REA was hesitant to make loans for new power plants,
but as the utilities demonstrated their reluctance to sell bulk electricity to
cooperatives, the federal agency pursued two new means of strengthening REC
systems.

The first tactic was to encourage -- and finance -- the formation of
“Generation and Transmission” (G+T) cooperatives, umbrella organizations that
would channel larger pools of money into the construction of power plants and
transmission systems on behalf of member RECs. Two G+Ts formed in Michigan
by the early 19605: the Wolverine Electric Cooperative (O&A E.C., Tri-County
E.C., Western Michigan E.C., and Oceana E.C.) and the Northern Michigan
Electric Cooperative (Presque Isle E.C., Cherryland E.C., and Top 0' Michigan

E.C.). Between the two of them, these organizations added 57 MW of new

28

generating capacity and over 480 km (300 mi.) of high-voltage transmission lines
to Michigan’s electricity landscape (Kuhl 1998).

Despite these new facilities, rural cooperatives still faced power shortages
as electricity usage grew by nearly 14% per year (REA 1959, 1). Michigan's
cooperatives sought to meet the rest of their power demand through "power
pools” and electricity transfer agreements with each other as well as
municipalities within and on the margins of their service areas. In 1968, the
G+Ts made a pooling arrangement with Traverse City and the City of Grand
Haven to take advantage of the urban-rural demographic swings that affected
electricity consumption patterns (Bailey 1979, 420). This also ensured a measure
of reserve capacity in the event of an emergency.

The agreement was extended to other municipal systems, and also the
Consumers Power transmission system, by 1973. All of the Lower Peninsula's
electricity providers were connected to a single transmission network, while the
numerous external connections established earlier by Consumers Power and
Detroit Edison meant that Michigan’s electricity landscape was now fully linked
to a broader, regional network wherein electricity produced in one state could

theoretically meet demand in another.

1.5 The Era of Market Liberalization

The potential of an electricity marketplace where producers could thus
compete on the costs of generation, and consumers could purchase electricity
from a wide geographic area, generated significant excitement. This excitement,
coupled with new concerns about the environmental impacts of electricity

generation, variousenergy crises (most notably, the ”Arab Oil Embargo”), and

29

the experience of regulatory failures like Midland (discussed in Chapter Two),
produced the climate for changes to the configuration of Michigan's electricity
landscape that has characterized the industry from the 19705 to the present day.
(Whether or not these changes have been realized is the subject of the concluding
chapter of this thesis). This era is frequently labeled as a period of
"deregulation” or “liberalization.”

”Deregulation” took its first steps in 1978, with the federal passage of the
National Energy Act (NEA). Aside from being the first significant attempt at
addressing the country's energy policy, it contained several provisions directly
affecting the electricity sector. With regards to infrastructure, the most important
aspect of the legislation was the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA),
which encouraged small power production, renewable, non-fossil fuels and
cogeneration in the interests of environmental protection. Symbolically, it was
also intended to loosen the monopoly grip that utilities had enjoyed on electricity
markets since the 19305 by introducing generating facilities that were explicitly
not owned by utilities like Consumers Power and Detroit Edison.

Michigan’s regulators took great interest in the proposed changes,
particularly with regards to industrial cogeneration (Anderson 1994). The
Commission believed that Michigan's huge industrial base -- with over 60,000
boilers registered with the Department of Labor -- would significantly impact
both the price and security of electricity supply (MPSC 1982, 15). However, the
uptake of both cogeneration and small power production was limited, as was the
adoption of non-fossil fuels. Between the implementation of PURPA in Michigan
and the passage of the next significant piece of energy legislation just 31 new

power plants came online as cogenerators or small power producers,

30

Table 1.2: Non-utility generating capacity, 1978-1991 and 1992-2000 (after EIA 2000)

N on-Utility Capacity
Fuel Type

Biomass

Coal

Hydro

Landfill Gas
Municipal Solid Waste
Natural Gas

Other (Fuel Oil, Hospital
Waste, undefined)

N on-Utility Cm
Fuel Type

Biomass

Fuel Oil

Landfill Gas
Municipal Solid Waste

Natural Gas

1978-1991

Capacity (MW)
15.4
28.9
11.7
12.2
90.1
1,912.2

7.9

1992-2000
Capacity (MW)
117.1
3.9
70.6
22

1157.4

Number of Facilities

5

Number of Facilities
3
1

14

representing some 2,219 MW of capacity, or about 8% of Michigan's total at the

time (Table 1.2; EIA 2009b). If the outlier of the group -- the massive Midland

Cogeneration Venture -- is removed, the amount of new, non-utility capacity

drops to only 364.9 MW, or about 1% of the state's total in 1992.

The passage of the federal Energy Policy Act (EPAct) that same year was

designed to increase uptake in non-utility electricity generation. The law created

31

a new class of electricity companies free from the cogeneration, fuel, and
ownership restrictions imposed by PURPA. Additionally, EPAct gave the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the authority to order uniform,
open access to transmission facilities, a process called ”wheeling.” In theory, the
EPAct should have made significant impacts by spurring both construction of
new, efficient (technologically and economically) power plants and expanded
transmission capacity while also freeing customers to choose their electricity
providers based on competitive costs, environmental sensitivity, or any other
attribute, rather than their mailing address. In practice, the response to EPAct
reforms was as muted as that of PURPA, with just 20 new facilities coming
online before the turn of the millennium.

Despite the intentions of the EPAct and subsequent moment of
transmission access perestroika, the nuts and bolts of implementing the proposed
reforms proved far more contentious than anticipated. The MPSC, utility
companies, new electricity generation and power marketing companies, and the
general public alike all turned their attention towards purchasing and licensing
agreements, transmission access tariffs, and the formation of a regional market
for bulk power sales. Accordingly, the spotlight moved away from the upgrade
and replacement of electricity infrastructure -- despite the fact that some of it was
nearing 50 years of continuous use. The fine points of this organizational,
financial, and regulatory overhaul, however, are outside the scope of this thesis
(cf. Brennan, Palmer, and Martinez 2002; EIA 1993, et al.).

It has been only recently, as the state of Michigan seeks to recover from a
string of economic and demographic calamities by capitalizing on ”green”

development that any interest has returned to electricity generation from

32

alternative and renewable fuels. As of 2002, the governor’s office, state
legislature, and the MPSC have all promoted programs in this arena, including a
statewide renewable portfolio standard of 10 percent for all utilities and a
streamlined net metering program to encourage distributed generation. These
programs have yet to make a meaningful impact on Michigan’s sources of
electricity (Figure 1.10).

As the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter noted and Table 1.2
corroborates, Michigan does have a fair number of wood-, biomass-, and solid-
waste—powered facilities, and is arguably a national leader in landfill gas capture
and conversion technology (Ralph Nuerenberg, Personal Communication 2009;
see also Figure 1.11 and Figure 1.12). Yet, the state continues to lag behind others

in terms of conventional ”clean energy” like wind, solar, and geothermal.

Figure 1.10: Michigan '5 ”Fuel Mix ” (after MSPC 2008)

 

 

Mlchigan’s fuel sources
for electrlc power

 

 

 

Even as commitments to expand Michigan’s renewable infrastructure
mount, it seems likely that the state’s electricity landscape will continue to be

dominated by massive, fossil-fuelled power plants for some years to come. Most

33

studies argue that the eagerness to maintain existing facilities -- despite dubious
environmental and efficiency credentials -- and the rush to install easily
“dispatchable” natural gas-fired turbines are simply a function of expense
relative to other options, particularly renewables (Elmes 1996; Heiman and
Solomon 2004; Sovacool 2008). While I do not reject these arguments, I contend
that many other factors have coalesced to limit the deployment of renewables in
the state, not least of which have been the actions and policies of the state
regulatory Commission.

Indeed, the Commission has played a central role throughout the history
of Michigan’s electricity landscape. The prevalence of massive, centralized
facilities and reliance on dirty, imported fossil fuels are the direct consequence of
the state’s regulatory policies regarding rate of return accounting, electricity
pricing, and capacity planning. In order to better understand the infrastructural
and organizational features that dominate Michigan’s electricity landscape

today, it is to an analysis of the regulatory regime that we now turn.

34

Figure 1.11: Granger Electric '5 landfill gas collection system. Collectors are laid during
landfill construction. Gas is pumped directly to generators. Photo by author (2009).

 

Figure 1.12: Granger’s generators. This facility, along with another near Grand Ledge,
provide fully 10% of Lansing’s electricity needs. Photo by author (2009).

 

35

Works Cited

Anderson, J. R. M. 1994. Michigan Utility Regulation: The Perspective of the
Dissenters. Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, East Lansing.

Bailey, R. 1979. "An Analysis of Northern Michigan and Wolverine Electric
Cooperatives and the Circumstances Behind Their Nuclear Power
Partnerships with Investor-Owned Utilities in Michigan". In Lines Across
the Land: Rural Electric Cooperatives, the Changing Politics of Energy in Rural
America. Eds. J. Doyle, V. Reinemer and A. H. Wright. Washington, DC:
Environmental Policy Institute -- The Rural Land 8: Energy Project.

Brennan, T. J., K. L. Palmer and S. Martinez. 2002. Alternating Currents: Electricity
' Markets and Public Policy. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.

Bush, G. 1973. Future Builders: The Story ofMichigan's Consumers Power Company.
New York: McGraw Hill.

Energy Information Administration. 1993. The Changing Structure of the Electric
Power Industry, 1970-1991. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of Energy

---. 2000. Form 860a -— Existing Generators, 2000. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of
Energy.
<http:/ /www.eia.doe.govj cneaf/ electricity/page/eia860a.html>,
accessed 23 March 2010.

---. 2008. Form 860a -- Existing Generators. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of
Energy. <httpz/ / www.eia.doe.gov / cneaf / electricity / page / eia860.html>,
accessed 23 March 2010.

---. 2009a. State Energy Profile: Michigan. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of
Energy.
<http:/ [ tonto.eia.doe.govLstate/ state energy profiles.cfm?sid=MI>,
accessed 7 February 2010.

---. 2009b. Existing Nameplate and Net Summer Capacity by Energy Source,
Producer Type and State. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of Energy.
<http: / / www.eia.doe.gov / cneaf / electricity / epa/ existing capacity state.
$2, accessed 23 March 2010.

Elmes, G. 1996. The Changing Geography of Electric Energy in the United States
- Retrospect and Prospect. Geography 81 (353): 347-360.

Elmes, G. A. and T. M. Harris. 1996. Industrial Restructuring and the United
States Coal-Energy System, 1972- 1990: Regulatory Change, Technological
Fixes, and Corporate Control. Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 86 (3): 507-529.

36

Heiman, M. K. and B. D. Solomon. 2004. Power to the People: Electric Utility
Restructuring and the Commitment to Renewable Energy. Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 94 (1): 94-116.

Kuhl, R. G. 1998. On Their Own Power: A History of Michigan '5 Electric
Cooperatives. Okemos, MI: Michigan Electric Cooperative Association.

Michigan Department of Economic Development. 1949. Michigan Power
Resources for Industry. Lansing, MI.

Michigan Public Service Commission. 1982. U-6798, 27 August. Lansing, MI.

---. 2008. Michigan Energy Overview. Lansing, MI: Dept. of Labor and Economic
Growth

Michigan Public Utilities Commission. 1919. Annual Report. Lansing, MI:
Michigan Dept. of Commerce

---. 1923. Annual Report. Lansing, MI: Michigan Dept. of Commerce
---. 1925. Annual Report. Lansing, MI: Michigan Dept. of Commerce

Miller, R. C. 1971. The Force of Energy: A Business History of the Detroit Edison
Company. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press.

Rural Electrification Administration. 1939. Annual Report. Washington, DC:
US. Dept. of Agriculture

---. 1941a. Allotment, Construction, Operating, and Financial Statistics of REA-
Financed Systems. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of Agriculture

---. 1941b. Report of the Administrator. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of
Agriculture

---. 1958. Annual Report. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of Agriculture
---. 1959. Annual Report. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of Agriculture
---. 1960. Annual Report. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of Agriculture

Sovacool, B. K. 2008. The Dirty Energy Dilemma: What's Blocking Clean Power in the
United States. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

37

Chapter Two

The Impacts of Michigan ’5 Regulatory Regime

The public service commission is vested with the power and jurisdiction to regulate all
rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of service, and all other matters
pertaining to the formation, Operation, or direction of public utilities. The public service
commission is further granted the power and jurisdiction to hear and pass upon all
matters pertaining to, necessary, or incident to the regulation of public utilities,
including electric light and power companies, whether private, corporate, or cooperative.

-- Michigan Compiled Laws, 1939 (Section 460.6(1))

Selected from Michigan’s compilation of laws covering utility companies,
the above epigraph suggests that the Michigan Public Service Commission’s
(MPSC, Commission) oversight of electricity provision is, at a minimum,
comprehensive. Yet, a number of gaps exist between regulatory oversight and
the operations of utilities. The most critical of these is the Commission’s inability
to approve or deny a utility’s construction plans. In conjunction with serious
flaws in the nature of the state’s oversight -- particularly, a reliance on rate-of-
return accounting, variable pricing structures, and the guarantee of territorial
monopolies for market incumbents -- the Commission regularly found itself in an
awkward role as both protector of electricity consumers and guarantor of utility

company finances.

38

These structural flaws were exposed at key moments in the development
of Michigan’s electricity landscape, most famously during the hearings tied to
Consumers Power's proposed Midland Nuclear Facility in the 19705 and 19805.
However, they had already been worsened by the specific actions and attitudes
of the Commission throughout its history, contributing directly to an electricity
landscape now dominated by massive, ageing, and dirty fossil-fuelled power

plants.

2.2 The Roots ofRegulation in Michigan

Despite loud and passionate cries to the contrary, governmental oversight
of economic activity has a long history in the United States. A US. Supreme
Court case from the 19"1 century, Munn vs. Illinois, established that government
has the right to make rules for, and control prices of, companies that provide
public goods like transportation or telegraph service. Subsequent laws, like the
1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, authorized the establishment of regulatory
commissions to oversee prices and commercial activities in monopolistic
environments. The state of Michigan had been drawing on these laws as the
legal basis for regulating the activities and prices of railroad services through the
Michigan Railroad Commission (MRC), established in 1873. With the passage of
the Transmission of Electricity Act of 1909, the MRC was granted oversight of the
state's burgeoning electric power industry.

While ostensibly to protect the consuming public, utilities regulation was
also intended to stabilize a volatile industry. High construction costs, cutthroat
competition, and low margins made financing electricity projects difficult;

furthermore, rapid advances in technology made systems quickly obsolete or

39

otherwise inadequate. By 1910, industry leaders like Samuel lnsull and Detroit
Edison’s Alex Dow had publicly argued that the industry ought to exchange
control of its prices for a territorial monopoly and guaranteed rate-of—return from
a state regulator (Hausman and Neufeld 2002; Yakubovich, Granovetter, and
McGuire 2005). The new price for electricity would be determined by the costs of
production plus a small profit set by the state -- the so-called "rate—of—return.”

In Michigan, shoddy construction practices and accidents associated with
booming electric train lines, along with the frequent mergers and acquisitions
among utilities were among the initial motives for state oversight. The
Commission was given the authority to enforce safety parameters for new line
construction, and more importantly, to set the rate companies could charge for
electricity in order to prevent monopoly abuses. Documents published by the
MRC make it clear, however, that state supervision of the electric utilities'
finances was, from the very outset, at least as important as public safety. The
MRC published accounting rules which explicitly defined assets, liabilities, and
revenue -- along with 30 more pages of detailed instruction on accounting
practices for everything from plant maintenance to employee wages (MRC 1914).
Not long after, the Commission argued that electricity ”is of sufficient
importance so that the State should enact regulatory laws which would remove
the uncertainty, unfairness, and discrimination that now exists throughout the
State.” (MPUC 1919, 12)

The subsequent consolidation of all utilities oversight into a single body,
along with the assurance that any new capital investments would be made
profitable, removed much of the uncertainty that had limited investment in the

state’s electricity landscape. In terms of infrastructure, Chapter One documented

40

 

how Michigan's largest utilities grew considerably during the 19205; Consumers
Power through a massive dam building program and Detroit Edison on account
of its new coal-fired power plants. Both companies, however, undertook
significant organizational expansion as well. Consumers Power’s corporate
history notes that during the mid and late 19205, the company enjoyed ”a
shopping spree among the many, mostly run-down little municipal and privately
operated plants in Western Michigan.” (Bush 1973, 221) Consumers Power
would acquire no fewer than 12 municipal and private systems between 1923
and 1929, tripled the raw number of customers it served, and closed additional
industrial contracts equivalent to the usage of 100,000 people. (ibid, 222)

For its part, the Commission encouraged such consolidation, citing the
”almost prohibitive rates necessary in communities served by...smaller plants.”
(MPUC 1923, 7) Accordingly, the Commission noted that

...the absorption of distribution areas heretofore served by small,
local utilities by the large utilities of the State. . .has been common.
During 1925 the Consumers Power Company acquired the
properties of. . .smaller utilities and have or will bring such
distribution districts into connection with their transmission
system...By this means only can the benefits of increased efficiency

of production by large units be diffused to all the communities
within the field of its economical transmission...(MPUC 1925, 6-8)

Because these consolidations resulted in lower prices for customers and greater
profits for utilities, the Commission would impede neither company as
Consumers Power and Detroit Edison leveraged their new infrastructural and
organizational dominance to carve out exclusive service areas in the Lower

Peninsula (Figure 2.1). Confident that the Commission’s control over

41

Figure 2.1: Michigan '5 utility service areas (approximate)

 

Utility Service Areas

Approximate Claims by Consumers Power
and Detroit Edison, ca. 1930

Datar M119: 1071, \ \
‘ ' 1’1’ ..nr I'IEH- \

 

l
/‘ .
r’
l, ,/
‘ Consumers " '1 1,
,\ Power Detroit \
, Edison J
1
/
“\,
L .
t W-
_ M

 

 

 

42

utility company prices would defeat any sort of abusive pricing, the state
legislature cemented these exclusive service areas into de jure monopolies with
the passage of the Convenience and Necessity Law of 1929, decreeing that:
no public utility shall hereafter begin the construction or operation
of any public utility plant or system thereof nor shall it render any
service for the purpose of transacting or carrying on a local
business either directly, or indirectly. . .until such public utility shall
first obtain from the commission a certificate that public
convenience and necessity requires or will require such a
construction, operation, service, or extension. (MCL 460.502, 1929)
The passage of this law formalized the regulatory "deal” that lnsull, Dow, and

others had proposed nearly 30 years earlier: an exchange of price controls for a

guaranteed market and guaranteed profit.

2.3 Key Components ofMich-igan’s Regulatory Regime

Territorial monopolies influenced the development of Michigan’s
electricity landscape in an obvious way: in a given service area, all decisions
regarding new construction, operating procedures, and other aspects of
electricity provision were left to the discretion of a single company. Less obvious
-- though even more influential -- are the ways in which ”rate-of—return”
accounting and electricity pricing schemes ultimately shaped the configuration
of Michigan’s electricity landscape.

Underlying all three factors is the logic of the ”natural monopoly.”
Because of its capital-intensive nature, electricity service is frequently offered as
an example of a natural monopoly, which can be understood as a situation
wherein resources in the market for a certain good or service are most efficiently

allocated when only one seller is present. With regard to the provision of

43

electricity, it is argued that customers would be better served if the costs of
duplicating another company’s distribution infrastructure (wires, poles, and
meters) were instead spent on the construction of new, more efficient generating
facilities. With only one seller present, a larger pool of customers could
distribute these costs, and thus benefit from lower per-unit electricity prices
achieved through an economy of scale. The 1929 Convenience and Necessity
Law implementing territorial monopolies served as the state’s endorsement of
the natural monopoly logic.

In exchange for that protected market, utility companies handed over
control of the prices they could charge for electricity. The ratemaking procedure
in most states, including Michigan, was based on a simple formula -- the cost of
generating the electricity and getting it to the end user, plus a small profit. The
profit, or rate-of-return, would be a percentage determined by the state regulator
based on an accounting of utility investments in infrastructure. In Michigan, the
Commission could also approve or deny utility requests to raise money through
equity or debentures. Requests for either rate adjustments or the flotation of new
shares would be followed by the utility company’s presentation of its recent
costs, changes in demand for electricity, and capital expenditures. These figures
would then be compared with the MPSC’s estimates of the same, and a new rate,
block of shares, mortgage, or bond issue would be approved or denied.

The Commission also supervised the collection of revenue, approving rate
structures for different classes of customers (residential, industrial, etc.). In the
first part of the 20"' century, Consumers Power and Detroit Edison sold
electricity at a flat monthly rate to customers regardless of how much they used,

since metering technology had not yet been adopted. Once meters came into

44

wide use, flat rates were replaced with a ”declining block" structure, where
electricity costs less, per unit, after certain thresholds are passed. In order to
achieve the cheapest price per unit, the user must consume increasing amounts
of electricity. In the interest of economic growth, the Commission also regularly
approved special prices for large energy users (typically heavy industries),
wherein the recipient paid far below the retail price for electricity (e.g MPSC
1962).

This regulatory regime functioned exactly as designed during the boom
years of electricity system growth. Between 1920 and 1960, electricity
consumption increased amidst falling prices as utilities achieved economies of
scale through the construction of numerous large generating facilities. As
utilities acted to meet surging demand, Michigan’s regulatory structure
streamlined the planning process. The Commission had no say in individual
utility projects, meaning that with appropriate financing, companies could begin
construction on new facilities confident that all costs would be recovered later
through the ratemaking process. New efficiencies prompted the state Economic
Development Office to boast that ”even the smallest savings. . .are passed on to
customers." (MI Dept. of Economic Development 1949) Such public pressure
from the Commission and other arms of the state government to keep electricity
prices low encouraged utility companies to continue taking risks on increasingly
massive, complex generation and transmission projects.

The physical characteristics of electricity meant that new economies in
electricity production had to be matched by greater consumption -- electricity
cannot be stored for use at a future time. Utilities had no problems matching

supply to demand since overall consumption was rising on account of a growing

45

customer base (due to a general population influx) and proliferating linkages
between utility companies permitting the bulk transfer of power between
transmission systems. Nevertheless, Consumers Power and Detroit Edison
actively encouraged consumption by subsidizing appliances, even offering in-
home demonstrations for using electric ovens, refrigerators, and microwaves
(Bush 1973; Kuhl 1998). Consumer Power’s corporate history cites the
importance of appliance sales "less as a direct profit function than as a means of
stimulating additional power consumption.” (Bush 1973: 213) In many cases,
these appliances were paid for in monthly installments through the regular bill,
and customers were given a price break on the electricity needed to operate them
(c.f. MPSC 1961 for an example of special rates for electric water heaters).

While many companies make promotional offers to generate sales, the
problem with regulated utilities offering such incentives is that it produces an
artificial build-up in demand. By inflating the amount of electricity that
consumers used, either through direct subsidy or by penalizing them for
conservation (as in the ”declining block” price structure), utilities easily justify
the expansion -- and expenses -- of new infrastructure. As the late 19605 saw the
first of many economic problems unfold in the state, suppressing consumption of
electricity, a significant gap between supply and demand appeared that no level
of subsidy or bulk transfer of power could close. By 1974, electricity demand
actually declined for the first time since the Great Depression (Anderson 1994),
yet, curiously, the state's utilities continued plans for new capacity unabated.

This is attributable directly to the structure of Michigan’s regulatory
regime. The rate-of-return accounting system central to utilities oversight

elevated capital expenditures like plant construction and depreciation to the

46

utmost importance, making any challenge or limit to the construction program a
frontal assault on a company’s long-term financial health. In rate hearings, the
Commission made precisely this argument, claiming that any move to withhold
or deny rate increases would seriously endanger Michigan’s supply of electricity
(e.g., MPSC 1978a, 18-19). Accordingly, the only means by which companies
could maintain profitability -- and literally, keep the lights on -- was to invest in
new, progressively larger, and more expensive pieces of infrastructure, even if
they could not be justified to meet actual demand.

Perversely, the MPSC’s repeated commitment to low prices precluded the
state’s utilities from simply charging more per unit of electricity as a means to
maintain revenue amidst falling demand (MPSC 1972). At any rate, there was no
incentive for utilities to either temper demand or make transmission more
efficient anyway, in spite of the obvious savings found in deferring new
construction, since their short-term revenue was based entirely on the sale of
electricity.

The Commission’s awkward position as both protector of electricity users
and guarantor of the utilities’ financial health snapped sharply into focus during
the late 19605. Nowhere is this issue, nor the linkages between rate-of-return
accounting, territorial monopolies, electricity pricing, and the development of the
electricity landscape better illustrated than in the cases surrounding Consumers
Power’s proposed Midland Nuclear Facility, a 15-year episode costing all parties

involved several billion dollars.

47

2.4 The ”Midland” Hearings

By the late 19605, Consumers Power's total revenues for electricity had
increased by 71.5% over the past decade, on account of an increasing customer
base and greater sales to cooperatives, in spite of the fact that per-unit prices for
electricity continued to fall (Anderson 1994, 113). The company looked to
continue this trend as it built its third nuclear facility near Midland, Michigan.
Slated to be one of the largest power plants in the country, it was designed to
supply not only electricity but also industrial steam to nearby Dow Chemical -- a
first for an industry that had described cogeneration as ”dream” that ”died
hard.” (Miller 1971, 149) Consumers Power indicated that it needed more money
to combat the effects of inflation, and so approached the MPSC in 1968 seeking
the first in a series of rate increases (Table 2.1), arguing that the costs of new
generating facilities were no longer matched by increasing sales and an
expanding customer base (MPSC 1969). Additionally, the company’s previous
nuclear project, Palisades, was over-budget and plagued by delays, dragging
down the company’s balance sheet.

This was one of the first instances in which the Commission was forced to
consider a rate increase for the price of electricity, suggesting that economies of
scale for new power plant construction had been tapped out. The MPSC agreed
that the rate increases sought by Consumers Power were in many ways the
product of inflation and higher construction costs, but also a direct result of the
company's emphasis on building large, complex facilities (MPSC 1974a, 27). The
Commission also noted that these problems were magnified by the company’s
rate schedules, which were still dominated by ”declining block” pricing, as well

as its special industrial contracts (ibid; MPSC 1978a). Fearing the worst,

48

Table 2.1: Rate hearings surrounding Consumers Power's Midland Nuclear Facility

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

,1 Case # Year Consumers Power I Outcome
1 Request
U-3179 1969 $16111 rate increase j$16m increase approved
lU-3749 1970 $285111 rate increase $10.6m increase approved
lU-4174 1972 $56111 rate increase— — - “$29111 in—cfease'ap—prgved —_—'
'U-4324 1973 ~15% inc—cease on rate of Request—Regected'
:- g j i return, M j i ._ c _ g 1..-- __ ,, f
lU’4332 ' 1974a $36111 rate increase $3lm increase approved
lU-4576 1974b $722111 rate increase $56m increase approved
1 ‘ ;
U-4840 1976 Interim ”rate relief”: $34m total increase
j ‘ $66.8m approved
' Final rate increase: l
l $106.6m
| U-5353 1977a lIssue 500,000 shares of . Approved
, stock and $125111 1
1 worth of first
i ‘ mortgage bonds
lU-5388 1977b ,' Issue 3.5m shares of stock ' Approved
;U_-5438_- ‘ 1977c Issue: 1) $7511111115Ecured lAll approved 1 i 7‘
I note
2) 2m shares of preferred
stock
i '3) $46m worth of Pollution
1 l Control Revenue
‘ Bonds
:U-5331 1978a §$164.2m rate increase l$55m increase approved
' l
U-5734 1978b TIssue up to $60m worth of Approved
bonds
-U-5979 1979 Step 1: Interim ”rate relief: $70.3m total increase
$52m approved, Steps 1&2
Step 2: $195.3m rate $97.4m increase approved
increase when plant comes online
Step 3: $124.7m rate
j increase (upon

 

 

 

 

 

49

Table 2.1, Continued

completion of
l . Campbell 3 coal plant)

I
l
l
l

 

 

- ,___. _.._.

 

F6923 1982a— Interim ”rate relief”: $120.5m total increase
. $172.5m : approved

l Final rate increase: $339111 1

U-7263 1982b .lssue $30m worth of Approved

1 Pollution Control
Revenue Bonds 1

'U-7830 1983-5 Step1. Interim ”rate relief: $94111 per year, for sixyears,

 

 

 

(et seq.) ‘ $155.8m ' rate increase approved
1 Step 2: $212.4m final .Note: This order intended to
' l I' increase stave off the company's

Step 3: $564.3m rate impending bankruptcy
j . increase (when f
' : Midland 2 comes I
‘ online)
‘ Totals ‘ Rate Increases: $1.9bn fRate Increases: $1.08bn
‘ jBonds and Securities: ‘ Bonds and Securities:
1 j $336m l $336m

 

 

 

however, the MPSC argued that “if there is to be sufficient electric energy
available to the citizens of Michigan, it is essential that all parties soberly address
themselves to...finance the new construction which the public requires.” (MPSC
1972, 26) Accordingly, the Commission assented to the rate increases, claiming
that ”it must continue to pursue responsible regulatory policies which will
ensure an adequate supply of electricity in the future.” (MPSC 1978a, 17)

During these hearings, the Commission allowed for the first time
”projected-data test years” as evidence for the plant’s necessity: Consumers
Power could present estimated future costs and electricity demand as justification
for a rate increase now. In spite of the recent negative trends, the company
(perhaps unsurprisingly) forecast a significant increase in both. The state
Attorney General and others vehemently disagreed, arguing that the company’s

forecasts were outright wrong -- and had been for some time; that the Midland

50

facility was un-necessary to meet demand; and that it should be excluded from
any rate increase considerations (MPSC 1978a).
The Commission admitted that

...the Applicant's [Consumers Power’s] past forecasts have often
been too high. However...it does not necessarily follow that
because previous forecasts were too high that the present forecasts
are likewise too high.

Perhaps even more important, even assuming Applicant's forecasts
are somewhat high, it does not follow that the Midland project is
unneeded and therefore an imprudent investment to be totally
excluded from the rate base...The Midland project is designed to be
a major baseload plant and if it runs properly it should provide
power at a price which is comparable to many other units (MPSC
1978a, 18). '

The MPSC returned to the argument that blocking utility construction plans (in

this case, the Midland facility) would have dire implications for electricity service

into the unforeseeable future,
...not only for the Applicant's retail customers but also for the
whole State of Michigan. Moreover, the forced abandonment of all
of the Midland plant would be a financial disaster for Applicant
[Consumers Power] and would seriously compromise Applicant's
ability to finance any additional construction, including coal-fired
and cogeneration facilities. Finally, to the extent that the financial
community perceived the Commission as acting irresponsibly by
enforcing the abandonment...all other utilities in Michigan would
have increased difficulty in financing their construction projects.
(MPSC 1978a, 18-19)

In spite of the rate increases and approved securitizations, Midland’s costs
had exploded to over $3bn and by 1982 Consumers Power was facing a financial
meltdown. The company’s credit rating had been downgraded and securing
external financing was all but impossible. Couched in the terms of an overall rate

decrease when the plant came online, the MPSC, ”Although. . .not bound by the

actions of Wall Street,” approved a massive $120.5m annual rate increase,

51

essentially co-signing the loan, on the state’s electricity users' behalf, to continue
work on the Midland project (MPSC 1982a, 8).

Outraged, the state Attorney General argued that “the awarding of...relief
can do irreparable harm to the consumers' interests".and asserted that Michigan
courts ”require that this Commission perform a balancing test between the
interests of the investor and the ratepayer.” (MPSC 1982a, 5) Even one of the
MPSC’s own commissioners, Edwyna Anderson, dissented from the majority
opinion, accusing the others of sticking their ”heads in regulatory sands” and
arguing that "the majority [of MPSC Commissioners] have created a void that
will enable any utility company to show it has an immediate revenue deficiency
and thus automatically receive partial rate relief monies.” (Anderson 1982, 19; 2).

Anderson directed the spotlight squarely to the issues that advocacy
groups, the Attorney General, and even private citizens had been decrying for
years, noting that

...over the last several years, up to and including today, the
Commission has failed to undertake a comprehensive review of
that massive construction project. . .Nowhere in 14 years, according
to the record, has an Opinion been issued concerning whether:

1. The Midland plant continues to be needed,

2. The plant is cost efficient,

3. Construction costs overruns are justified,

4. There are viable alternatives for energy generation at

Midland,

5. The Commission should place a cap or ceiling on

construction expenditures for this plant, and

6. There may be extreme rate implications to all Consumers

Power Company customers once Midland comes on line.

...the Michigan Public Service Commission. . .does not examine
these relevant issues before or during construction. Instead, it
allows a utility company's investors to put millions, or in this case,
billions of dollars into facilities that it claims will be evaluated for
viability at the time a company requests inclusion of such facilities
in its rate base.

52

The majority says such issues should be examined in power plant
siting proceedings, not securities proceedings. Yet this state has no
power plant siting legislation and thus no such proceedings.
(Anderson 1982, 8-10)

Anderson described the Midland project as an ”albatross around
Consumers' [Power’s] neck” and demanded a ”comprehensive review of the
construction of this plant and its attendant problems.” (Anderson 1982, 12) As it
would happen, however, the review never took place. 111 1983, Consumers
Power teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, threatening to halt electricity and
natural gas service to most of the state. The MPSC took emergency action to
stabilize the company's finances, ordering a six-year, $99m per year rate increase,
on the condition that the company officially abandon all work on the Midland
facility (MPSC 1985).

After 15 years of construction delays, $4bn of cost overruns, and more than
$1bn of Commission-approved rate increases and securitizations, the remains of what
would have been among the largest nuclear facilities in the US. was sold at 85
percent completion to a consortium of buyers (including a Consumers Power
subsidiary) who would later transform the facility into the massive Midland
Cogeneration Venture. Testimony presented by various advocacy groups as well
as the state Attorney General during this hearing again argued that ”Consumers'
forecasts of electricity sales were seriously flawed,” and that “new capacity
would not be required before the year 2000. . .additional need could be covered
by purchased power, refurbished existing power plants and cogeneration, each
at a much lower cost than new construction.” (MPSC 1985, 15)

Nevertheless, shortly before the bailout orders were in place, the largest

coal-fired unit ever built in the state -- Campbell III, another Consumers Power

53

project -- came online. Not long after, Detroit Edison’s Enrico Fermi II project
started up as the state’s second largest nuclear facility. These massive, complex
generation facilities are just a portion of the infrastructure glut that continues to
impact the state’s electricity landscape today, and are the direct consequence of a
regulatory regime which punished both technological and fiscal efficiency.

The tripartite combination of rate-of—return accounting, wasteful
electricity pricing schemes, and territorial monopolies represent the most potent
forces shaping the historical development of Michigan’s electricity landscape.
Rate-of—return accounting encouraged utilities to continually add new
infrastructure, while electricity pricing policies like the ”declining block” (which
remained in place in Michigan until 1978, cf. MPSC 1974a; MPSC 1978a)
provided the avenues by which to match increasing electricity production with
additional consumption. The territorial monopolies implemented by the state to
ease companies’ financing concerns also eliminated any sort of backstop
electricity system (in the form of a competing service provider) should the
company fail.

The inevitable outcome of this scheme, as witnessed in the Midland
hearings, is that neither customers nor utility companies are adequately
protected from exploding costs, while the landscape is polluted, both literally
and figuratively, by extraneous infrastructure. Concerns were raised about the
sustainability of the rate-of—return model as early as the 19605 (Anderson 1994),
yet it remained in place, virtually unmodified, through the mid 19905. In order
to understand this, we must examine the societal context underlying and

surrounding its continued use: namely, the idea of ”progress.”

54

Works Cited
Anderson, E. 1982. Dissenting Opinion, U-6923, 13 May. Lansing, MI

Anderson, J. R. M. 1994. Michigan Utility Regulation: The Perspective of the
Dissenters. Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, East Lansing

Bush, G. 1973. Future Builders: The Story ofMichigan ’3 Consumers Power Company.
New York: McGraw Hill

Hausman, W. J. and J. L. Neufeld. 2002. The Market for Capital and the Origins
of State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States. Journal of
Economic History 62 (4): 1050-1073.

Kuhl, R. G. 1998. On Their Own Power: A History of Michigan '5 Electric
Cooperatives. Okemos, MI: Michigan Electric Cooperative Association.

Michigan Compiled Laws. 1939. Section 460.6. Lansing, MI.

<http: / /www.legislature.mi.gov / (S(ki0dqraivmvtj1q11ycpkajn)) / milega
s 3x?page=getobject&objectname=mcl-
cnap460&query=on&highlight=utilities>, accessed 23 March 2010.

 

Michigan Department of Economic Development. 1949. Michigan Power
Resources for Industry. Lansing, MI

Michigan Public Service Commission. 1961. U-787, 19 October. Lansing, MI
---. 1962. U-918, 29 March. Lansing, MI

---. 1969. U-3179, 21 October. Lansing, MI

---. 1970. U-3749, 26 October. Lansing, MI

---. 1972. U-4174, 24 November. Lansing, MI
---. 1973. U-4324, 5 April. Lansing, MI

---. 1974a. U-4332, 18 January. Lansing, MI
---. 1974b. U-4576, 16 September. Lansing, MI
---. 1976. U-4840, 12 April. Lansing, MI

---. 1977a. U-5353, 7 March. Lansing, MI

---. 1977b. U-5388, 16 May. Lansing, MI

1977c. U-5438, 24 June. Lansing, MI

55

---. 1978a. U-5331, 31 July. Lansing, MI

---. 1978b. U-5734, 5 June. Lansing, MI

---. 1979. U-5979, 27 November. Lansing, MI
---. 1982a. U-6923, 13 May. Lansing, MI

---. 1982b. U-7263, 23 August. Lansing, MI
---. 1985. U-7830—3A, 24 July. Lansing, MI

Michigan Railroad Commission. 1914. Uniform System of Accounts for Electric
Light and Power Utilities. Lansing, MI: Michigan Dept. of Commerce

Michigan Public Utilities Commission. 1919. Annual Report. Lansing, MI:
Michigan Dept. of Commerce

---. 1923. Annual Report. Lansing, MI: Michigan Dept. of Commerce
-—-. 1925. Annual Report. Lansing, MI: Michigan Dept. of Commerce

Miller, R. C. 1971. The Force of Energy: A Business History of the Detroit Edison
Company. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press.

Yakubovich, V., M. Granovetter and P. McGuire. 2005. Electric Charges: The
Social Construction of Rate Systems. Theory and Society 34 (5/ 6): 579-612.

56

Chapter Three

The ”Progress” Paradigm

Thus, energy output is the basis (and a measure) ofa nation's standard ofliving, not
because of gadgets like electric toothbrushes and can openers, but because of the
prodmtivity it generates.

-— George Bush, Future Builders, 1973 (10)
The exterior of the plant showed clearly its form and purpose, and no eflort was made to
give it artificial beautification. The external walls were metallic, with pre-attached
insulation for speedy and economical construction. It was frankly a machine, designed to

utility and built to stand in a world of work. To many, the angular functional approach
proved to be artistically successful as well.

-- Raymond Miller, The Force of Energy, 1971 (89)

Michigan’s utilities were eager to meet surging demand for electricity, and
thereby revolutionize both industrial activities and private life. Electric
cooperatives, as well as their parent organization, the REA, desired the same for
the U.S.’ rural areas. Many would argue that both parties were justified in their
pursuit of large, high-capacity power plants and interconnected transmission
facilities, and that the MPSC’s policies contributed directly to these goals while
maintaining generally low prices. The implementation of mandatory electricity
conservation, distributed generation, or renewable fuels would only have served

to make power -- and its myriad benefits -- more expensive.

57

At the same time, arguments like these in defense of the current
configuration of the electricity landscape overlook several obvious questions
regarding efficiency, the environment, and the wisdom of centralized services.
For instance, considering that the Commission's legal charge emphasized
protecting customers from abusive pricing, why was the inefficient ”declining
block” pricing structure maintained for as long as it was -- since most users never
attained the cheapest per-unit prices, thus paying above their true costs of
service? Or, for what reason did utilities, c00peratives, and the Commission
alike avoid the adoption of smaller-scale generating technology that relied on
indigenous fuels, such as wood residues and wind, instead preferring to pay
increasing production and transport costs for the imported fossil fuels that
Michigan’s power plants required (and represent nearly 70¢ of every ”energy
dollar” spent in the state [MPSC 2008])?

The answer is that the aforementioned parties shared, as a fundamental
guiding principal for all operations, the pursuit of ”progress.” While themes of
”progress” are by no means uncommon in histories and geographies of
infrastructure in the West (cf. Berman 1982; Mitchell 1988; Brigham 1998; Scott
1998; Wainwright 2008 for just a handful of examples), there is a particular
notion of ”progress" that shaped Michigan’s electricity landscape. This idea,
developed and propagated by the utilities, cooperatives, and regulatory
Commission alike up through the Midland crisis, linked the deployment of
centralized, complex, and massive electricity infrastructure with Michigan’s social

advancement. The impacts of this program continue to affect the state today.

58

3.2 Origins of the ”Progress” Paradigm

This particular idea of ”progress" can be traced all the way back to the
industry’s earliest days in the state. Promotional material from the company that
would later become Consumers Power promised customers ”nights as bright as
day” and that "every street will have its own moon regardless of the weather" by
the turn of the 20'“ century, on account of the company’s plans for tower-
mounted street lighting in Jackson (Bush 1973, 48). Early regulatory
commissioners argued in favor of utility consolidation as well as the construction
of large hydroelectric projects because of the ”advancement of the general
welfare of the State” that would result (MPUC 1925, 8). As the rural
electrification movement gathered steam, the benefits that electric power brought
to US. industries were promised as well to the farmer, who ”still depends in too
large a degree upon manual labor." (USDA 1939) Electrification was made to be
irresistible, and adapting it to farm use inevitable, since a farmer whose ”brawny
back is his power plant. . .cannot compete with electric motors.” (ibid.)

As the electricity landscape grew and consumption increased, the flowery
prose (and even songs -- Figure 3.1) highlighting electricity’s potential to
transform both rural and urban economies gave way to thoroughly Modern
paeans celebrating the vast social change it was bringing about and impatience
towards those who might stand in the way. Detroit Edison’s corporate history
describes the post-War construction boom as emblematic of the fact that the
utilities ”had an interest in recreating a world of order” (Miller 1971, 297), hailing
the ”mystery and an excitement about the power plant. The cathedral like vistas,
the awesome might and majesty of the flaming furnace, and, above all, the

turbine generator room, where almost unbelievable power is marshaled in

59

Figure 3.1: The Song of C roton Dam (National Park Service, no date)

 

The Song of Croton Dam

lyrics: H. Vander Ploeg, Holland, MI
tune: ”Marching Through Georgia”

Sing a song ofCroton Dam
the biggest in the State.
Where the water sizzles through
and things are up to date.
Sing it with a hearty cheer
as long as you can make
While we are riding to Croton.

Chorus: Hurrah! Hurray! We shout for Croton Dam.
Hurrah! Hurrah! The biggest dam what am.
And so we shout the chorus of the dam
that gives as light,
As we are riding to Croton

How the water dashed o’er
the dam that fills the creek.
How it surges through the gates
that sends it on its work
How the wheels are turning
as the water rushes through
While we are riding to Croton

Chorus

Oh, the power, the light, the heat
that dam does furnish us.
Oh, the industries that hum
that feel the electric touch
Oh, the cities that are built
Where’er the power is used
While we are marching to Croton

Chorus

 

 

 

60

dramatic orderliness." (ibid, 105) New power plants represented ”milestones of
progress, not only for the utility company that built the plants, but even more so
for the people, for the consumption of electric power is a measure of the nation's
standard of living: power means prosperity." (Bush 1973, 341)

Cooperatives and their parent agency, the REA, made strikingly similar
arguments:

Electricity takes its place in the natural evolutionary progress made
by man in his efforts to produce sustenance from the soil. It has not
been grafted artificially on to our rural way of life...The farmer has
come to recognize, as a result, that electricity offers one means by
which he may catch up and keep pace with technological advances
in industry. ..[and] a chance for survival on many hundreds of
thousands of family-size farms. (REA 1944, 18)
In more grandiose terms, ”The wheels of progress are turned by power. It is the
thing that sends civilization forward...Always tireless, always on tap, electricity
offers farmers greater opportunities for economical and diversified production
than any other force available.” (REA 1947, 33)

Even the literal brick-and-mortar construction of new generating plants
and distribution systems was shot through with glory. An experimental
pumped-storage facility on Lake Michigan near Ludington, co-financed by
Consumers Power and Detroit Edison, was described as ”almost unequalled as
an earthmoving job since the Panama and Suez Canals were built.” (Bush 1973,
418) Skeptics were quickly dismissed, awash in a ”tepid sea of essential
miscomprehension.” (Bush 1973, 440) Not to be outdone, the REA claimed that

”Rural Electrification is a form of modern pioneering. The men who clear the

rights-of-way for today’s cross country power lines are but extending the work

61

of their forebears who tamed the early wilderness." (REA 1947, 30) The

importance of this work could not be overstated:
The cooperative is part of the important legacy that has come to us
from the old frontiers of American development. It is one we as a
Nation will do well to preserve and strengthen as we move ahead
on the new frontiers. The rural electric cooperatives stand today as
one of the vital institutions of rural democracy. In a Nation of
rapidly changing population patterns they offer a means of

carrying over into the more complex. . .communities of the present
and future the spirit of basic democracy from which they grew.

(Clapp 1963, 12)

It may seem as though the advances wrought by electricity were only
truly realized in those domains of men; in heavy industry, intensive agriculture,
and hard-nosed civil engineering. This, however, is highly inaccurate: ”to the
housewife,” the new wave of appliances made possible by electricity
”constituted the welcome beginnings of domestic emancipation.” (Miller 1971,
120) Such a paternalistic attitude might be expected from a company (Detroit
Edison) that through the late 19505, fired, without exception, any female
employee engaged to be married. But the strongest proponent of the ”electricity
as liberation” argument was the REA, which printed dozens of ”home-
economics” guides for using electricity, such as The Electrified Farm of Tomorrow
(1939), Electricity for the Farm through REA (1940), and A Better Home cookbook
(1941, Figure 3.2). Electrification, and conveniences that came with it was ”an
occasion ranking with the stature of the feasts of Thanksgiving and Christmas.”
(Kuhl 1998, 39)

Much of this gendered, social boosterism was undoubtedly the result of
attempts to build demand, as suggested by the subsidy on new appliances that

many utilities offered to their customers. However, the premium that

62

Figure 3.213: Cover, A Better Home (REA 1941).

 

”progress“ placed on raw growth, economic prosperity, and imposing physical
infrastructure translated through a typically grandiose tone and agreeable

regulatory Commission to make real impacts on Michigan’s electricity landscape.

3.3 The Development and Impacts of ”Progress”

It would be easy to dismiss the self-righteous concern with ”progress” as
nothing more than hubris. However, an uncritical belief in the correlation
between the consumption of electric power, economic prosperity, and social
advancement directly and significantly affected Michigan’s electricity landscape,
and most importantly, was shared by utilities, cooperatives, and the Commission

alike. With specific regards to infrastructure, the pursuit of ”progress” in the

63

context of the state’s regulatory regime led to both a massive surplus in
generating capacity and a highly centralized electricity system, as well as the
associated heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels.

Both outcomes centered on the concept of scale, and in particular, the
economy of scale: in a direct equivalent to manufacturing, it was believed that
the production of greater quantities of electricity would result in lower per-unit
prices, which in turn would spur greater consumption and thus social
advancement. Accordingly, utilities and cooperatives were interested in
expanding the capacity base as quickly as possible. By 1949, the state Economic
Development Office boasted that utility-owned generating capacity already
exceeded ”any load ever experienced or anticipated” by 15 percent, and
promised that ”by 1952, generation capacity will be expanded by another 15
percent” (MI Dept. Economic Development 1949).

The utility companies argued that some slack was necessary to meet
unforeseen spikes in consumption. The surplus was crucial, and even

defined the [Detroit Edison] Company’s obligation, for if the
electricity cannot be stored neither can it be improvised. For 3, 4, or
even 5 years, the planning, financing, and building of the entire
system had been aimed at this one 15-minute period in a late
December afternoon, or in a summer heat wave. (Miller 1971, 172)
This-practice was regularly endorsed by MPSC, and rightfully so: the electric
power industry standard for reserve capacity hovers around 10 percent.
However, the Commission oversaw the creation of extreme surpluses, in spite of

the fact that financing extraneous capacity lie at the heart of the utilities’

problems, as exemplified in the Midland Nuclear Facility hearings.

64

With Midland,
Consumers' own data point to its substantial excess reserve
capacity. It shows that Midland units 1 and 2 will generate
approximately 1350 megawatts of electricity as they come online in
1984. This data indicates a 35.4% excess summer generating
capacity (1842 MW) and a 56.6% winter generating capacity (2323
MW) are anticipated for 1984. In 1985, projected excess capacity
increases to 38.3% (2113 MW) during the summer and 50.1% (2609
MW) in the winter.
Additionally, all demand forecasts are based on increasing electric
usage, which currently is not taking place...If such demand
increases do not materialize then reserve capacity percentages will
be even greater. (Anderson 1982, 9; emphasis added)
Nevertheless, the shared vision of ”progress” in the context of Michigan’s
regulatory regime led the Commission to defend its position on the project’s
financing with the claim that ”a temporary minor overcapacity would not be a
justification for excluding the plant from the rate base.” (MPSC 1978, 18)
The massive glut of excess generating capacity went hand-in-glove with
the centralization of the electricity system, as revealed in two distinct ways.
First, in the formation of a fully-integrated transmission network (Figure 3.3; and
second, with the consolidation of generating capacity in fewer, and larger, power
plants. Organizationally, control of Michigan’s electricity landscape has also
become more centralized over time, despite the illusion of ”market
liberalization,” through various mergers and buy-outs. However this is largely a
function of the aforementioned infrastructural centralization than any other
factor.
Interest in the development of a comprehensive electricity system began

early. As new dams and power plants came online, ”high-voltage power sources

could be utilized to supply distant communities, and by the same token the

65

Figure 3.3: Michigan's integrated transmission system (approximate)

 

Michigan’s Integrated Transmission System
Lines of 11kV or greater

2g”
. 9%?
"1

Approximate

 

z 140 kV lines

 
 

11kV 5 lines 5 140 kV

. Major power
plant

 

 

 

 

 

 

66

electrical services in these communities could be interconnected,” with these
transmission linkages ”forming a network of usefulness for the citizens of
Michigan.” (Bush 1973, 83) The ”network of usefulness” precipitated the buyout
of small utilities by larger ones, according to the Commission, ”invariably with a
View to extend their markets for [electric] current which they are unable to
produce beyond the demands they have for utilization...” (MPUC 1925, 7)

Cooperatives also expressed great interest in wide-ranging transmission
networks. As early as 1939 -- just four years after its inception -- the REA had
plans for "by far the longest cooperative generating system in the world” in
Wisconsin (REA 1939, 91). That same year in Michigan, the Tri-County E.C. was
praised by the REA for its ”interconnected system with at least six generating
plants and in excess of 3,000 miles of distribution lines,” designed to ”ultimately
serve perhaps 10,000 rural families.” (ibid, 92) Administrators claimed that ”the
maximum benefits from the industry can come only from a high degree of
cooperation and coordination among its various segments -- commercial,
cooperative, and public," (Clapp 1963, 14) linked through the transmission
system.

Likewise, Michigan’s major utilities pursued centralization policies
through the interconnection and pooling of resources. The completion of
Consumers Power’s Au Sable dam complex and subsequent connection to the
company’s transmission network ”fulfilled a vision that the two brothers [the
Foote brothers, founders of Consumers Power] had had all along -- that of an
interconnected system, operated on a system-wide basis.” (Bush 1973, 161) By

1928 the company forged a transmission linkage with Detroit Edison, initiating a

67

decades long ”search for economies from pooled reserves, the mass production
of electrical energy, and...jointly planned extensions.” (Miller 1971, 206)

Though they would remain distinct business entities, the merger of
Consumers Power and Detroit Edison’s systems shifted control of Michigan’s
electric power market from a duopoly to essentially a monopoly, for while ”in
administration and financial matters, the integrity of the two companies was
complete. . .in operating matters, involving current supply of bulk power,
transmission, and planning for future growth, the entire two systems were to be
operated as one.” (Miller 1971, 194). A ”joint dispatch center" was established
near Ann Arbor in 1962, from which power plants, transmission lines, and other
facilities belonging to either company could be remotely operated.

Yet it was not only the ownership and operation of entire electricity
systems that was being centralized, but also the physical production of electric
power within those systems (Figure 3.4). As early as 1939 the REA noted this
””tendency. . .toward large—scale developments -- power plants...serving more
than one system” among its utility company competitors (REA 1939, 89). In
Michigan, this was certainly true: by 1956, while Consumers Power operated 50
power plants in the state, more than 90% of all the electricity the company
generated was produced at its four largest facilities (Consumers Power 1956, 1)

Not long after, the REA itself began ”moving with the technology of the
industry toward larger scale generation, which offers lower costs,” (Clapp 1962,
5), claiming that cooperatives ”will have to build generating plants of larger
capacity than ever before. . .[and] construct higher voltage transmission lines
which will interconnect with the facilities of neighboring systems.” (REA 1965,

4). In 1968 alone, more than 2.5GW of REA-funded capacity was under

68

Figure 3.4: The centralization of generating facilities.

 

m

Michigan’s Largest Power Plants]
Size, Ownership, and Capacity Share

 

 

The ten largestfacilities account _ l
for nearly 59% of A’lichigall’s . Dem“ Edison
electricity generating capacity. Consumers Power

Indiana-Michigan

The 25 largestfaclll’tles represent q, Powar Company
89% of the state 5 capaclty.
Independent Power
. Producers

The other hundred or so account
for the remaining 10%. 3‘ .l ‘lll‘sl .111 .4 l l \.
2“"‘\ I‘d-ll \l'1'1.l.l:‘ l x \

.i'llfl .rl‘ :1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ludington
Hydro
1,978.8 MW D. E. Karn
. 66’ l‘. g Nat. Gas
'1. " ' 1,402.3 MW
’ 4.6"13
Midland Li
GEN"; '2?ng St. Clair
s
' ‘ Coal
"8": '1".an 1,547 MW
' h 5.11). .
l. H. Campbell ~-
Coal Belle River
1,585.9 MW New Covert Coal
5.3a. NM. Gm 1.32.: (MW
1,176 MW - ["1
_-. a. 3911, Monroe
ii: 1 Coal
‘—' 3,279.6 MW

 

 

 

 

. 10.9% .
D. C. Cook
. _,. Nuclear . ‘ . . . Fermi II

 

 

 

 

2,285.3MVV ' I ' N uclmr
7.6% 1,217 MW
4.01/2.

 

 

 

 

 

69

construction, more than the combined total of all cooperatively-owned capacity
built in the Aclministration’s 27-year history (REA 1968, 6). Michigan’s RECs and
G+T cooperatives were not directly responsible for the construction of any such
massive power plants on account of the purchasing agreements they had made
with the state’s other providers of electricity. However, they still contributed to
this centralization by channeling REA funding into Detroit Edison and
Consumers Power projects like the Enrico Fermi 11 nuclear facility and Campbell
111 coal plant, respectively (Bailey 1979). The cooperatives’ contribution to Fermi

II topped $220m, equating to a 20% stake in the second-largest nuclear project in

the state (Kuhl 1998).'

The ”progress" paradigm dominated utility, cooperative, and regulatory
thought in Michigan through the 19805, contributing to a centralized and
massively overbuilt electricity landscape. However, as the financial and
regulatory crises surrounding the Midland Nuclear Facility unfolded, many
started to question the logic of increasing electricity consumption and its links to

economic and social advancement.

3.4 Challenges to the ”Progress” Paradigm

In the context of financial disasters like Midland and later, Detroit
Edison’s Fermi II, greater public concern with Michigan’s electricity landscape
was forthcoming. Equally forthcoming was a new tone from the MPSC, which

was forced to admit to the flaws in the regulatory regime that had become

 

' As the costs of the project skyrocketed, the cooperatives’ ownership share was
eroded to 10%, and then eventually 0% as Detroit Edison reached an agreement
to buy out their stake for $550m in the early 19905.

70

apparent during the Midland episode. New attention from both the public and
the MPSC focused on three distinct, yet interrelated concerns: the cost of the
electricity system, its impacts on the natural environment, and electricity
conservation. All of these concerns hinged on the recognition that Michigan’s
electricity landscape had been over-built, and that supply would outstrip
demand for many years to come.

The impetus for change can be first spotted during the hearings related to
Midland. Shortly thereafter the state Department of Commerce organized the
Michigan Electricity Options Study (MEOS), a multi-year undertaking with the
express goal of ”making economically sound judgments. . .for meeting
Michigan’s uncertain electricity needs over the next 20 years.” (MEOS 1987a, 1-1)
The central component of the MEOS was determining the ”least cost” options for
meeting demand, where

Least-cost is defined as the lowest cost (i.e., economic cost that can
be stated in dollar terms) to Michigan individuals and businesses
(i.e., ’societal’ versus ’utility' costs) under specified constraints (e.g.,
financial, regulatory, etc.) and specific assumptions about the
future (e.g., contextual factors such as rate of demand growth,
changes in environmental emissions limits, et.). (MEOS 1987b, 3
emphasis and parentheses in original)
In addition to a consideration of the costs for future electricity planning, MEOS
represents one of the first considerations of the electricity landscape’s
environmental impacts, including explicit references to global warming and even
a calculation that Michigan’s electricity sector accounts for 0.85 percent of global
carbon dioxide emissions and 0.34 percent of global fossil fuel usage (MEOS

1987a, 6-18). Accordingly, the study paid particular attention to options for

meeting demand with minimal recourse to the expanded consumption of fossil

7l

fuels, and especially through electricity conservation (”Demand-Side
Management", DSM). Given Michigan’s capacity surplus, the study found that
DSM could play a central role in offsetting future demand growth, and ”may
well be able to provide up to 2 % or more of the incremental resource
requirements...for capacity and generation over the next 20 years. Demand-side
options were found to be important within all the resource scenarios...” (MEOS
1987a, 7-4)

In the 70 years prior, neither the MPSC nor Michigan’s major utilities had
ever seriously considered electricity conservation as a way to meet demand -- the
”progress” paradigm would not allow it. At one point, the Commission actually
argued that it was not within its ”legislative or constitutional mandate...to
pursue a draconian and socially disruptive program of forced conservation"
(MPSC 1978, 17). In fact, DSM was actively avoided in the state: at the end of the
Midland crisis, Michigan was spending just $1.32 per capita on electricity
conservation efforts, while the nation on average spent nearly $5.30 per person
(Audubon Society 1991, D-15).

One outcome of the MEOS was that both Consumers Power and Detroit
Edison were ordered by the MPSC to produce comprehensive integrated
resource plans (IRPs) demonstrating ways of meeting future demand with
minimal, if any construction. In spite of the explicit aims of the assignment, both
companies returned IRPs arguing for additional construction and making only
minimal attempts to incorporate DSM. The MPSC commented that Detroit
Edison’s plan ”discounts the View that shrewd selection and aggressive
implementation of demand-side resource options (including conservation) can

delay investment in new capacity, improve efficiency, reduce undesirable

72

environmental impacts...without significant affects on rates, sales, or earnings.”
(MPSC 1990a, i)

While Detroit Edison made a token inclusion of bulk power purchases and
distributed generation as a means to offset new construction, Consumers Power
anticipated the addition of more than 2 GW of new fossil-powered capacity
(MPSC 1991a, 19) and developed an overall planning strategy which relied on
”extended operation of its aging, predominantly coal-fired generating
plants. . .whether Commission approved or not.” (ibid, 21) The company would
round out additional demand growth (its estimate of which was some 1 %
higher than the MPSC’s) with electricity purchased primarily from its subsidiary,
the Midland Cogeneration Venture, in one of the most blatant instances of utility
self—dealing in Michigan’s history (ibid, 22-24). Furthermore, the Commission
noted that

Consumers Power’s plan did not mention or analyze ’demand-side’
programs designed to increase future load even though this is an
activity in which the Company is significantly involved... In the
[MPSC] Staff’s view, engaging in load building/ sales marketing
activities while claiming to need to acquire additional supply
resources seems contradictory. ..the bottom line is that Consumers
Power’s planned incorporation of DSM is many orders of
magnitude away from achieving a meaningful integration of DSM
as a utility resource. (ibid, 47-48)

Both companies came under fire from advocacy groups and even private
citizens for their respective plans’ environmental insensitivity, refusal to consider
DSM measures, and general lack of creativity. ABATE, a corporate interest
group, argued that ”Edison’s IRP should be expanded to include a real look at

the efficacy of changes in rate design and allocation methodologies. This will

counter the normal utility preference to simply add more rate base.” (ABATE

73

1990, D-16) Another comment, from a cogeneration engineering firm, related
incidents when Detroit Edison had ”given customers special deals so that they
would not buy a cogeneration plant,” right under the Commission’s nose (Hale
Engineering Corp 1990, D-41).

Consumers Power’s IRP was the subject of even greater concern. The
Lansing Board of Water and Light criticized Consumers Power for not
coordinating any future transmission planning or power purchasing with its
municipal system. One private citizen wrote to ”urge the Commission to dismiss
with prejudice the CPCo’s proffered proposal and to insist that the utility
produce a meaningful plan that addresses in a realistic way the efficiency and
conservation goals that have been a matter of state and national priority for over
a decade.” (Norris 1991, D-37), while environmental advocacy groups lambasted
the company’s continued ”confidence in supply-side options. ..[that] are
becoming less profitable, and irrelevant, for the future.” (Audubon Society 1991,
D-16)

In their defense, Detroit Edison and Consumers Power appealed again to
finances, arguing that under Michigan’s regulatory regime, implementing any
sort of serious DSM would harm their earnings and thus ability to provide
electricity. Consumers Power pointed to three very specific ”economic
disincentives to implementing demand-reducing resource options: recovery of
program costs, under-recovery of its fixed costs, and the need for an incentive
encouraging utility management to invest in DSM activities and alleviate certain
DSM associated risks.” (MPSC 1991a, 45) The MPSC had no choice but to agree:

”Unquestionably, one of the major barriers to utility implementation of DSM

74

options has been. . .the adverse economic effects of energy efficiency on utility
earnings under traditional regulation.” (ibid, 44)

But for the first time in its history, the MPSC took a firm stance against
”utility plans which meet forecasted demand with new power plants,” because
such plans ”are no longer sufficient to address rapid and fundamental changes
occurring in the electric power industry.” (MPSC 1990a, 1) Accordingly, the
Commission ordered the utilities to spend no less than $63m on DSM over two
years (MPSC l99lb). The Commission suggested progressive modifications to
the state’s regulatory regime by offering rate increases to offset aggressive DSM
implementation and a 2 percent rate-of-return on capital invested in conservation
efforts (ibid).

The Commission also placed new emphasis on environmental issues,
adopting as its mission ”to formulate and administer policies and regulations
necessary to ensure that state energy. . .services are provided in an efficient,
reliable, safe, and environmentally acceptable manner. The mission includes
supporting a healthy economy and coordinating. . .activities related to energy
conservation and efficiency, renewable resources, and energy emergency
situations” (MPSC 1988, 4). By 1990 the Commission had set a target to reduce
Michigan’s carbon dioxide emissions by 10% by 2010, and set up study groups to
promote cogeneration, wood biomass, solid waste combustion, and alternative
fuel vehicles (MPSC 1990b; 1993)

Yet, nearly all of these efforts were de-railed by the ”market
liberalization” programs that began in earnest during the mid-19905, halting any

progress towards meaningful electricity conservation or increased environmental

75

sensitivity. Attention from all parties, from utilities to the MPSC to the general
public and even academic researchers turned quickly to hashing out new access
agreements, tariffs, stranded costs, and the formation of a regional market for
electric power sales. It is not entirely clear why the shift in emphasis was so
sudden or so drastic, with the only plausible explanation being that the task of
implementing ”market liberalization” was so great that the limited. human
resources available in the electric power and regulatory communities could not
adequately address the issues of market restructuring and mandatory
conservation programs simultaneously.

Accordingly, by 1996 the DSM and renewables programs so ardently
fought for just five years earlier were phased out completely (MPSC 1996, 7).
The preoccupation with ”market liberalization” has pushed such issues to the
background until only recently, when they have become the focus of new efforts
to resuscitate Michigan’s economy and recover from an economic implosion.
Nevertheless, the state’s electricity landscape will continue to be dominated by
the ageing, dirty artifacts of years past well into the foreseeable future. While
new programs have been unveiled since 2002 by all branches of the state’s
government to encourage investment in renewable fuels and distributed
generation technologies, tellingly, the overwhelming majority of these programs
seek further infrastructural development, revealing a continued apprehension
towards conservation and the reduction of overall electricity consumption.
Before meaningful changes to the state’s electricity landscape can be

implemented, a serious and far-reaching conservation program must be devised.

76

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US. Dept. of Agriculture. 1939. A Guide for Members of REA Cooperatives.
Washington, DC.

Wainwright, J. 2008. Decolonizing Development: Colonial Power and the Maya.
Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.

79

Conclusion

.4. -fi ..._-.. -..w .-- ..__.. -_..- _- . ..m-4 ..a _- H,

There are also significant opportunities for cost-eflectioe, non-utility generation sources
such as cogeneration, renewable resources, and municipal solid waste. As in the case of
other options, economic, environmental, and site-specific political factors will be
important in determining how much of these resources actually will be detieIOped in
Michigan and over what period of time.

-- MEOS Final Report, 1987 (7-5)

It is hopeful that the state officials commissioned to examine Michigan’s
electricity system believe alternatives to the traditional ”tax-and-spend”
infrastructural expansion can be realistically employed to meet future demand.
The pinch of salt included towards the end of the epigraph, however, is an
unwelcome -- but unfortunately accurate -- dose of reality. Despite the fact that
some cogeneration and renewables facilities have come online in Michigan, such
resources remain underutilized on account of the very economic, environmental,
and ”site-specific political factors” that the MEOS report hints at.

There are a number of disincentives to new investment in Michigan’s
electricity landscape, not least of which is the state’s questionable economic
outlook. Additionally, a number of questions remain about the implementation
of many "market liberalization" policies, and more recently, uncertainty about
the future of any carbon tax or cap-and-trade initiative handed down from the

federal government. The tenuous nature of most tax-incentive programs to

80

encourage ”green” and infrastructural investment in the state also acts as a
deterrent. More significant than any of these, however, is the continued
recalcitrance of the state’s major utilities to embrace any sort of reform.
Consumers Power (now, Consumers Energy) and Detroit Edison have retained
their dominant roles in Michigan’s electricity marketplace. Their incumbency
(Figure 4.1), still, essentially, cemented by state law, means that Detroit Edison
and Consumers Power continue to supply most of Michigan’s electricity, and
thus play a major role in the effectiveness of any new energy initiative. That the
companies have waited for orders from the Commission or the federal
government to take part in all pricing reform, transmission access, and
conservation programs since the early 19905 rather than willfully implement
them is indicative of their hesitance to move forward.

Perhaps even more troublingly, the utility companies remain firmly -- and
ostentatiously -- rooted in the ”progress” paradigm of years past (Figure 4.2).
While the shortcomings of this model were thoroughly exposed during the
Midland hearings, ”progress” persists in a very literal sense as Consumers Power
and Detroit Edison regularly extend the life of inefficient, centralized, and aging
facilities while actively opposing the implementation of distributed generation,

electricity conservation, and renewable fuels programs in the state.

81

Figure 4.1: Consumers Power’s depiction of its service area, ca. 2009. The white areas
represent territory that the company does not serve (Consumers Energy 2009).

 

 

82

Figure 4.2. "Powering Michigan 5 Progress. " Photo by author (2009)

 

For its part, legislators and the regulatory Commission have made good—
faith efforts to improve the state’s electricity landscape. Nevertheless, they
continue to encourage and celebrate the old ”progress" paradigm in two distinct
ways. One is through the historical recognition of prominent electricity ”sites” as
places worth commemorating: for instance, when Consumers Power’s Big Rock
Point Nuclear Facility received a State Historical Marker, or with the
establishment of a ”Rural Electric Park” in Ingham County (Figure 4.3).

The other is through the continued linkage of new electricity

83

Figure 4.3: ”Rural Electric Park" commemorating the first rural electrification project
in the state in 1927. Photo by author (2009).

 

i

infrastructure with social advancement -- though currently, the equation

substitutes ”green” infrastructure for the ”massive and complex" component of
years past. An array of “renewable energy programs,” (MPSC 2001) ”21‘“
century electric energy plans,” (MPSC 2007) ”planning consortia,” (MPSC 2008a),
and ”wind energy resource zone boards” (MPSC 2008b) and myriad other master
plans for the deployment of additional energy infrastructure have all been
brought forth in the past decade in the hope that simply adding more generating

capacity will cure both economic and energy infrastructure problems.

84

Echoing an earlier period, the promotion of new infrastructure is still
matched by policies to encourage electricity consumption. Conservation
programs remain voluntary, even as Michigan’s utility customers spend 70 cents
of every energy dollar on imported fossil fuels, and fully one quarter of all
electricity generated is lost during transmission (MPSC 2008c). The MPSC still
approves preferential pricing contracts allowing heavy users to pay less than the
full cost of generation (e.g., MPSC 2005). At any rate, conservation looks
particularly unpalatable in light of the (growing) gap between generating
capacity and stagnating or even declining electricity consumption. This makes
the argument for deploying more, albeit "clean," electricity infrastructure -—
particularly wind, one of the most expensive and least efficient means of power
generation -- as a means to reverse the state's decline seem especially bankrupt.

Accordingly, meaningful ”progress” in Michigan’s electricity landscape
must come in the form of a mandatory, aggressive conservation program that
reduces waste and radically improves efficiency. In this way, the gap between
capacity and demand will be lessened, making it more feasible to remove the
oldest and dirtiest generating facilities from the electricity landscape.
Furthermore, by creating a marketplace in which consumers pay something
closer to the price that electricity costs to generate, economic efficiency will be
rewarded. As new capacity is inevitably needed (even if precipitated only by the
complete collapse of the oldest power plants), facilities with high levels of
efficiency -- such as alternatively-fuelled facilities employing landfill gas and
solid waste incinerators, small-scale hydroelectric, and building-scale geothermal,
solar, and wind -- will become prized. It is only through such long-term

planning and an approach to reform which addresses both economic and

85

infrastructural inefficiencies simultaneously that Michigan's electricity landscape
can meet future demand in a sustainable way.

It has been the goal of this thesis to eXplore the forces that have shaped
Michigan's electricity landscape and led to its current configuration in terms of
both infrastructure and organization. This project has demonstrated that the
massive, fossil—fueled power plants and complex, integrated transmission
network that dominate the state’s electricity landscape are the legacy of a
regulatory regime which rewarded new construction and punished conservation.
The rate-of—return accounting system central to Michigan’s utilities oversight,
alongside pricing policies which artificially inflated consumption and territorial
protections which excluded alternative service providers, all but ensured the
highly-centralized infrastructure that grew out of the pursuit of economies of
scale. Contentious hearings, like those associated with the Midland Nuclear
Facility, comprehensively illustrate the problems with such a system.
Furthermore, they underscore the regulatory Commission's complicity in it, and
demonstrate that the Commission's willingness to ”approve” (through rate
increases and other means) extraneous capacity was premised on the fear that
the entire electricity system would collapse if utility company finances were
chaflenged.

This thesis has also demonstrated that Michigan’s electricity landscape is
permeated by a particular ideal of ”progress” that linked the deployment of
complex electricity infrastructure to social advancement. This ideal, shared by
utilities, regulators, and cooperatives alike, is readily apparent throughout the
historical development of the electric power industry in the state, and can still be

readily witnessed today. Such an analysis has only been possible on account of

86

the research’s single-state focus, which has revealed some of the trends,
exceptions, and particularities that more prevalent national-level analyses are all
but forced to overlook.

In conducting this research, I have looked back on the history of
Michigan's electricity infrastructure. This was done with the hope of
illuminating the forces, processes, and attitudes that have influenced the form
and configuration of the state's electricity landscape, with the goal of making it

more efficient, equitable, and ecologically-sensitive in the years to come.

87

Works Cited
Consumers Energy. 2009. Consumers Energy Service Area Map. Jackson, MI.
<http:/ /www.consumersenergy.com / content.aspx?id=2021&sid=109>,

accessed 3 April 2010.

Michigan Electricity Options Study. 1987. Electricity Options for the State of
Michigan: Final Report. Lansing, MI: Michigan Dept. of Commerce

Michigan Public Service Commission. 2001. U-12915, Lansing, MI.
~--. 2005. U—14692, Lansing, MI.

---. 2007. U-15277, Lansing, MI.

---. 2008a. U-15590, Lansing, MI.

---. 2008b. U-15899, Lansing, MI.

---. 2008c. Michigan Energy Overview. Lansing, MI: Dept. of Labor and Economic
Growth

88

Appendix A

An Inventory of Michigan’s Generating Units

__.._ --_._-_—_ __.._.___ __ ..___. .. -_.._ _ _ . __~. . ..——.._ ~._._..__ ._ .._~_. _—_.__—__._—_——-- - --.fi... inkrflfiu WHhi,

 

89

Table A.1: Michigan ’5 existing coal-fired generating units (after EIA Form 860, 2008
<12ttp://uni.iw.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html>, accessed 31 March 2010)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

County Plant Name Company Initial Nameplate
Year M_W_

Neenah Paper Neenah Paper

Alger Munising Mill Michigan Inc. 1930 6.2

S D Warren

Muskegon Muskegon S D Warren Co 1938 3.5

St Clair Marysville Detroit Edison Co 1943 75

St Clair Marysville Detroit Edison Co 1947 75
Wyandotte
Municipal Serv

Wayne ' Wyandotte Comm 1948 11.5

Wayne Trenton Channel Detroit Edison Co 1949 120
Menominee Cellu Tissue

Menominee Acquisition Holdings Inc 1950 2.5

Wayne Trenton Channel Detroit Edison Co 1950 120

Ottawa James De Young City of Holland 1951 11.5
Consumers Energy

Monroe J R Whiting Co 1952 106.3
Consumers Energy

Monroe J R Whiting Co 1952 106.3

Alpena LaFarge Alpena Lafarge Corp 1952 12
Consumers Energy

Monroe J R Whiting Co 1953 132.8

St Clair St Clair Detroit Edison Co 1953 156.2

St Clair St Clair Detroit Edison Co 1953 168.7

St Clair St Clair Detroit Edison Co 1954 156.2

St Clair St Clair Detroit Edison Co 1954 168.7
Lansing Board of

Ingham Eckert Station Water and Light 1954 44
White Pine White Pine Electric

Ontonagon Electric Power Power LLC 1954 20
White Pine White Pine Electric

Ontonagon Electric Power Power LLC 1954 20
White Pine White Pine Electric

Ontonagon Electric Power Power LLC 1954 20
Consumers Energy

Bay J C Weadock Co 1955 156.3

Alpena LaFarge Alpena Lafarge Cog) 1955 10
Consumers Energy

Muskegon B C Cobb Co 1956 156.3
Consumers Energy

Muskegon B C Cobb Co 1957 156.3

Alpena Decorative Panels Decorative Panels 1957 7.5

 

 

90

 

Table Al, continued

 

lntl

International, Inc.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wayne River Roug Detroit Edison Co 1957 292.5
Consumers Energy

Bay J C Weadock Co 1958 156.3

Wayne River Rouge Detroit Edison Co 1958 358.1
Lansing Board of

Ingham Eckert Station Water and Light 1958 44
Upper Peninsula

Delta Escanaba Power Co 1958 11.5
Upper Peninsula

Delta Escanaba Power Co 1958 11.5
Wyandotte
Municipal Serv

Wayne Wyandotte Comm 1958 22
Consumers Energy

Bay Dan E Karn Co 1959 136
Consumers Energy

Bay Dan E Karn Co 1959 136
Lansing Board of

Ingham Eckert Station Water and Light 1960 47
Consumers Energy

Bay Dan E Karn Co 1961 136
Consumers Energy

Bay Dan E Karn Co 1961 136

St Clair St Clair Detroit Edison Co 1961 352.7
Menominee Cellu Tissue

Menominee Aguisition Holdings Inc 1962 1.5

Ottawa James De Young City of Holland 1962 22
Consumers Energy

Ottawa J H Campbell Co 1962 265.2
Lansing Board of

Ingham Eckert Station Water and Light 1964 80
Wisconsin Electric

Marquette Presque Isle Power Co 1964 54.4
T B Simon Power Michigan State

Ingham Plant University 1965 12.5
T B Simon Power Michigan State

Ingham Plant University 1966 12.5
Stone Container Smurfit-Stone Corp

Ontonagon Ontonagon Mill MI Plant 1966 15.6
. Wisconsin Electric

Marquette Presgue Isle Power Co 1966 57.8

Marquette Shiras City of Marquette 1967 12.5
Consumers Energy

Ottawa J H Campbell Co 1967 403.9

St Clair Cargill Salt Cargill Inc 1968 2

Huron Harbor Beach Detroit Edison Co 1968 121

 

 

9l

 

Table A.1, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wayne Trenton Channel Detroit Edison Co 1968 535.5
Lansing Board of

Ingham Eckert Station Water and Light 1968 80

S D Warren

Muskegon Muskegon S D Warren Co 1968 19.1

Ottawa James De Young City of Holland 1969 29.3

St Clair St Clair Detroit Edison Co 1969 544.5
Wyandotte
Municipal Serv

Wayne Wyandotte Comm 1969 7.5
Lansing Board of

Ingham Eckert Station Water and Light 1970 80

Monroe Monroe Detroit Edison Co 1971 817.2

Marquette Shiras City of Marquette 1972 21

Monroe Monroe Detroit Edison Co 1973 822.6

Monroe Monroe Detroit Edison Co 1973 822.6
Lansing Board of

Eaton Erickson Station Water and Light 1973 154.7

Monroe Monroe Detroit Edison Co 1974 817.2
T B Simon Power Michigan State

Ingham Plant University 1974 15
Wisconsin Electric

Marquette Presque Isle Power Co 1974 90
Wisconsin Electric

Marquette Presque Isle Power Co 1975 90
Wisconsin Electric

Marquette Presque Isle Power Co 1978 90
Wisconsin Electric

Marquette Presque Isle Power Co 1978 90
Wisconsin Electric

Marquette Presque Isle Power Co 1979 90
Consumers Energy

Ottawa J H Campbell Co 1980 916.8
Michigan South

Hillsdale Endicott Station Central Pwr Agy 1982 55
Escanaba Paper NewPage

Delta Company Corporation 1982 54
City of Grand

Ottawa J B Sims Haven 1983 80

Marquette Shiras City of Marquette 1983 44

St Clair Belle River Detroit Edison Co 1984 697.5

St Clair Belle River Detroit Edison Co 1985 697.5
Wyandotte
Municipal Serv

Wayne Wyandotte Comm 1986 32
GM WFG Pontiac DTE Energy

Oakland Site Power Plant Services Pontiac 1987 28.9

 

 

 

 

 

92

 

Table A.1, contii'nied

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

North
S D Warren
Muskegon Muskegon S D Warren Co 1989 28.3
TES Filer City TES Filer City
Manistee Station Station LP 1990 70
Alpena LaFarge Alpena Lafarge Corp 1991 11
T B Simon Power Michigan State
Ingham Plant University 1993 21
Alpena LaFarge Alpena Lafarge Corp 1994 11
Alpena LaFarge Alpena Lafarge Corp 1999 3.2
T B Simon Power Michigan State
Ingham Plant University 2006 24

 

93

 

Table A2: NIIC/ll‘gml'fi existing petroleuiii-fired generating units (after EIA Form 860,

2008 <http://unew.eia.doegov/cneat/electricity/page/eia860.html>, accessed 31 March

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2010)
Initial Nameplate
County Plant Name Company Year MW

Thumb Electric

Huron Ubly Coop of Mich 1938 0.7
Thumb Electric

Huron Ubly Coop of Mich 1938 0.7
Thumb Electric

Huron Ubly Coop of Mich 1938 0.6

Lenawee Clinton Clinton Village of 1939 0.5

Lenawee Clinton Clinton Village of 1939 0.5
City of Grand

Ottawa Diesel Plant Haven 1942 2.7

Calhoun Marshall City of Marshall 1942 1

Gratiot St Louis City of St Louis 1945 0.6

Huron Main Street City of Sebewaing 1947 0.9
Hillsdale Board of

Hillsdale Hillsdale Public Wks 1947 2.7
Thumb Electric

Huron Ubly Coop of Mich 1947 0.9
Newberry Water

Luce Newberry & Light Board 1948 0.7
Wolverine Pwr

Cheboygan Tower SupplLCoop, Inc 1948 1.3
Wolverine Pwr

Cheboygan Tower Supply Coop, Inc 1948 1.3
Thumb Electric

Tuscola Caro Cog) of Mich 1949 1.3
Thumb Electric

Tuscola Caro Coop of Mich 1949 1.3

Ionia Frank Jenkins City of Portland 1950 0.8

Gratiot St Louis City of St Louis 1951 0.9
Wolverine Pwr

Cheboygan Tower Supply Coop, Inc 1951 1.3
City of Grand

Ottawa Diesel Plant Haven 1952 5.5
Thumb Electric

Tuscola Caro Coop of Mich 1952 1.3
City of Grand

Ottawa Diesel Plant Haven 1954 3

Lenawee Clinton Clinton Village of 1955 0.4

Lenawee Clinton Clinton Village of 1955 0.4

Lenawee Clinton Clinton Village of 1955 0.4

Chippewa Dafter Cloverland 1955 1

 

 

94

 

Table .42, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Electric Co-op
Cloverland
Chippewa Dafter Electric Co-op 1955 1
Cloverland
Chippewa Dafter Electric Co-op 1955 1
Gratiot St Louis City of St Louis 1958 1.3
Wolverine Pwr
Montcalm Vestaburg Supply Coop, Inc 1959 3
Cloverland
Chippewa Dafter Electric Co-op 1960 3
Cloverland
Chippewa Dafter Electric Co-op 1960 3
Edison Sault
Schoolcraft Manistique Electric Co 1960 2
Wolverine Pwr
Montcalm Vestaburg Supply Coop, Inc 1960 3
Wayne Dayton Detroit Edison Co 1966 2
Wayne Dayton Detroit Edison Co 1966 2
Wayne Dayton Detroit Edison Co 1966 2
Wayne Dayton Detroit Edison Co 1966 2
Wayne Dayton Detroit Edison Co 1966 2
Monroe Fermi Detroit Edison Co 1966 16
Monroe Fermi Detroit Edison Co 1966 16
Monroe Fermi Detroit Edison Co 1966 16
Monroe Fermi Detroit Edison Co 1966 16
Washtenaw Superior Detroit Edison Co 1966 16
Washtenaw Superior Detroit Edison Co 1966 16
Washtenaw Superior Detroit Edison Co 1966 16
Washtenaw Superior Detroit Edison Co 1966 16
Huron Harbor Beach Detroit Edison Co 1967 2
Huron Harbor Beach Detroit Edison Co 1967 2
Wayne River Rouge Detroit Edison Co 1967 2.7
Wayne River Rouge Detroit Edison Co 1967 2.7
Wayne River Rouge Detroit Edison Co 1967 2.7
Wayne River Rouge Detroit Edison Co 1967 2.7
Consumers
Ottawa J H Campbell Energy Co 1968 18.6
Consumers
Monroe J R Whiting Energy Co 1968 18.6
Wayne Slocum Detroit Edison Co 1968 2.7
Wayne Slocum Detroit Edison Co 1968 2.7
Wayne Slocum Detroit Edison Co 1968 2.7
Wayne Slocum Detroit Edison Co 1968 2.7
Wayne Slocum Detroit Edison Co 1968 2.7
St Clair St Clair Detroit Edison Co 1968 18.5
Tuscola Wilmot Detroit Edison Co 1968 2.7

 

95

 

 

Table AZ, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tuscola Wilmot Detroit Edison Co 1968 2.7
Tuscola Wilmot Detroit Edison Co 1968 2.7
Tuscola Wilmot Detroit Edison Co 1968 2.7
Tuscola Wilmot Detroit Edison Co 1968 2.7
Livingston Colfax Detroit Edison Co 1969 2.7
Livingston Colfax Detroit Edison Co 1969 2.7
Livingston Colfax Detroit Edison C0 1969 2.7
Livingston Colfax Detroit Edison Co 1969 2.7
Livingston Colfax Detroit Edison Co 1969 2.7
Monroe Monroe Detroit Edison Co 1969 2.7
Monroe Monroe Detroit Edison C0 1969 2.7
Monroe Monroe Detroit Edison Co 1969 2.7
Monroe Monroe Detroit Edison Co 1969 2.7
Monroe Monroe Detroit Edison Co 1969 2.7
Escanaba Paper NewPage
Delta Company Corporation 1969 27.2
Huron Oliver Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
Huron Oliver Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
Huron Oliver Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
Huron Oliver Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
Huron Oliver Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
Oakland Placid 12 Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
Oakland Placid 12 Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
Oakland Placid 12 Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
Oakland Placid 12 Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
Oakland Placid 12 Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
St Clair St Clair Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
St Clair St Clair Detroit Edison Co 1970 2.7
Wayne Conners Creek Detroit Edison Co 1971 2.7
Wayne Conners Creek Detroit Edison Co 1971 2.7
Macomb Northeast Detroit Edison Co 1971 21.2
Macomb Northeast Detroit Edison Co 1971 23.4
Macomb Northeast Detroit Edison Co 1971 212
Tuscola Putnam Detroit Edison Co 1971 2.7
Tuscola Putnam Detroit Edison Co 1971 2.7
Tuscola Putnam Detroit Edison Co 1971 2.7
Tuscola Putnam Detroit Edison Co 1971 2,7
Tuscola Putnam Detroit Edison Co 1971 2,7
Wolverine Pwr
Cheboygan Tower Supply Coop, Inc 1971 21.3
Edison Sault
Schoolcraft Manistique Electric Co 1972 2,8
Cloverland
Chippewa Detour Electric Co-op 1973 3
Upper Peninsula
Houghton Portage Power Co 1973 22.6

 

 

 

 

 

96

 

Table AZ, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wayne Mistersky Cityof Detroit 1974

Ottawa Sixth Street City of Holland 1974
Coldwater Board

Branch Coldwater of Public Util 1974
Newberry Water

Luce Newberry & Light Board 1974
Upper Peninsula

Delta Gladstone Power Co 1975
Cloverland

Chippewa Detour Electric Co-op 1976

Marquette Plant Four City of Marquette 1979
Oakwood
Oakwood Hospital Hospital Med

Wayne 8: Medical Center Center 1979

St Clair Belle River Detroit Edison Co 1981

St Clair Belle River Detroit Edison Co 1981

St Clair Belle River Detroit Edison Co 1981

St Clair Belle River Detroit Edison C0 1981

St Clair Belle River Detroit Edison Co 1981

Sanilac Croswell City of Croswell 1982

Sanilac Croswell City of Croswell 1984
Thumb Electric

Tuscola Caro Coop of Mich 1984
City of Hart

Oceana Hart Hydro 1985
City of Hart

Oceana Hart Hydro 1985
Thumb Electric

Huron Ubly Coop of Mich 1987

Sanilac Croswell City of Croswell 1988

Huron Pine Street City of Sebewaing 1988

Huron Pine Street City of Sebewaing 1988

Wayne Hutzel Hospital Hutzel Hospital 1988

Wayne Hutzel Hospital Hutzel Hospital 1988
Newberry Water

Luce Newberry & Light Board 1988

Sanilac Croswell City of Croswell 1990
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1990
Warner Lambert

Washtenaw Warner Lambert Co 1992
William
William Beaumont Beaumont

Oakland Hospital Hospital 1992
William Beaumont William

Oakland Hospital Beaumont 1992

 

97

 

 

Table A2, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hospital
Wolverine Pwr

Osceola George Johnson Supply Coop, Inc 1993 1

Ionia Frank Jenkins City of Portland 1995 2

Sanilac Croswell City of Croswell 1996 1.3

Gratiot St Louis City of St Louis 1996 1.1
Thumb Electric

Tuscola Caro Coop of Mich 1999 2
Great Lakes

Charlevoix Beaver Island Energy Coop 2000 1.2
Great Lakes

Charlevoix Beaver Island Energy Coop 2000 1.2
Thumb Electric

Tuscola Caro Coop of Mich 2000 2
Thumb Electric

Huron Ubly Coop of Mich 2000 2.5
Great Lakes

Charlevoix Beaver Island Energy Coop 2001 0.9
Michigan South

Branch State St Generating Central Pwr Agy 2001 1.8
Michigan South

Branch State St Generating Central Pwr Agy 2001 1.8
Michigan South

Branch State St Generating Central Pwr Agy 2001 1.8
Michigan South

Branch State St Generatin Central Pwr Agy 2001 1.8
Michigan South

Branch State St Generating Central Pwr Agy 2001 1.8
Michigan South

Branch State St Generating Central Pwr Agy 2001 1.8
Michigan South

Branch State St Generating Central Pwr Agy 2001 1.8
Michigan South

Branch State St Generating Central Pwr Agy 2001 1.8
Michigan South

Branch State St Generating Central Pwr Agy 2001 1.8
Thumb Electric

Huron Ubly Coop of Mich 2001 2.5

Ionia Frank Jenkins City of Portland 2002 1
Thumb Electric

Huron Ubly Coop of Mich 2002 1.5
Warner Lambert

Washtenaw Warner Lambert Co 2002 1.5

Gratiot St Louis City of St Louis 2003 1.3

Gratiot St Louis City of St Louis 2003 1.5
Upper Peninsula

Delta Escanaba Power Co 2003 17.9

 

 

 

 

 

98

 

Table AZ, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Washtenaw Warner Lambert

Warner Lambert C0 2005 2.3
Warner Lambert

Washtenaw Warner Lambert Co 2005 2.3
Michigan South

Hillsdale Endicott Station Central Pwr Agy 2006 1.6
Michigan South

Hillsdale Endicott Station Central Pwr Agy 2006 1.6
Oakwood
Oakwood Hospital Hospital Med

Wayne 8: Medical Center Center 2006 2
Oakwood
Oakwood Hospital Hospital Med

Wayne 8: Medical Center Center 2006 0.5
Oakwood
Oakwood Hospital Hospital Med

Wayne & Medical Center Center 2006 2
Warner Lambert

Washtenaw Warner Lambert Co 2007 2.3
Wyandotte
Municipal Serv

Waflie Wyandotte Comm 2007 1.8
Wyandotte
Municipal Serv

Wayne Wyandotte Comm 2007 1.8
Wyandotte
Municipal Serv

Wayne Wyandotte Comm 2007 1.8

 

 

 

 

 

99

 

Table A3: Michigan ’5 existing natural gas-fired generating units (after EIA Form 860,
2008 <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.l1tml>, accessed 31 March

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2010)
Initial Nameplate
County Plant Name Company Year Law

City of Grand

Ottawa Diesel Plant Haven 1948 2.7

Calhoun Marshall City of Marshall 1948 1.7
Consumers Energy

Muskegon B C Cobb Co 1948 69
Consumers Energy

Muskegon B C Cobb Co 1948 69

Wayne Mistersky City of Detroit 1950 44
Consumers Energy

Muskegon B C Cobb Co 1950 69

Wayne Conners Creek Detroit Edison Co 1951 135

Wayne Conners Creek Detroit Edison Co 1951 135

Calhoun Marshall City of Marshall 1953 1.1
Hillsdale Board of

Hillsdale Hillsdale Public Wks 1954 3.5

Kent Lowell City of Lowell 1956 1.1

Wayne River Rouge Detroit Edison Co 1956 282.6

Ottawa Zeeland City of Zeeland 1957 2

Wayne Mistersky City of Detroit 1958 50
Graphic Packaging

Kalamazoo Graphic Packaging Cog 1959 10
Hillsdale Board of

Hillsdale Hillsdale Public Wks 1960 4.1

Huron Main Street City of Sebewaing 1961 1

Ottawa Zeeland City of Zeeland 1963 1.7

Oceana Hart City of Hart Hydro 1964 1.4

Kent Lowell City of Lowell 1965 1.1

Huron Main Street City of Sebewaing 1966 1.3

Huron Main Street City of Sebewaing 1966 1.1

Ottawa Zeeland City of Zeeland 1966 1.4
Consumers Energy

Otsego Gaylord Co 1966 16
Consumers Energy

Otsego Gaylord Co 1966 16
Consumers Energy

Otsego Gaylord Co 1966 16
Consumers Energy

Otsego Ggylord Co 1966 16

Oakland Hancock Detroit Edison Co 1966 41.8

Macomb Northeast Detroit Edison Co 1966 16

Macomb Northeast Detroit Edison Co 1966 16

 

 

 

 

 

 

100

 

Table A3, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Macomb Northeast Detroit Edison Co 1966 16

Huron Main Street City of Sebewaing 1967 0.6

Ottawa Zeeland City of Zeeland 1967 1.1

Oakland Hancock Detroit Edison Co 1967 19

Oakland Hancock Detroit Edison Co 1967 19

Oakland Hancock Detroit Edison Co 1967 19

Macomb Northeast Detroit Edison Co 1967 16
Wolverine Pwr

Allegan Claude Vandyke Supply Coop, Inc 1967 23
Consumers Energy

Kalamazoo B E Morrow Co 1968 18
Consumers Energy

Otsego Gaylord Co 1968 16
Consumers Energy

Bay J C Weadock Co 1968 18.6

Huron Pine Street City of Sebewaing 1969 1.1

Huron Pine Street City of Sebewaing 1969 1.1
Coldwater Board of

Branch Coldwater Public Util 1969 3.5
Consumers Energy

Kalamazoo B E Morrow Co 1969 18
Consumers Energy

Emmet Straits Co 1969 20

Oakland Hancock Detroit Edison Co 1969 19.6
Consumers Energy

Genesee Thetford Co 1970 33.6
Consumers Energy

Genesee Thetford Co 1970 33.6
Consumers Energy

Genesee Thetford Co 1970 33.6
Consumers Energy

Genesee Thetford Co 1970 33.6

Oakland Hancock Detroit Edison Co 1970 41.8

Ottawa Zeeland City of Zeeland 1971 4.5
Consumers Energy

Genesee Thetford Co 1971 17.6
Consumers Energy

Genesee Thetford Co 1971 17.6
Consumers Energy

Genesee Thetford Co 1971 17.6
Consumers Energy

Genesee Thetford Co 1971 17.6
Consumers Energy

Genesee Thetford Co 1971 17.6
Wolverine Pwr

Montcalm Vestaburg Supply Coop, Inc 1972 23.7

Kent Lowell City of Lowell 1973 1.4

 

 

 

 

 

lOl

 

Table [13, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Calhoun Marshall City of Marshall 1973 2.1
Hillsdale Board of
Hillsdale Hillsdale Public Wks 1973 5.6
City of Grand
Ottawa Diesel Plant Haven 1974 7
Ottawa Zeeland City of Zeeland 1974 5.6
Consumers Energy
Bay Dan E Karn Co 1975 692.5
University of University of
Washtenaw Michigan Michigan 1975 12.5
University of University of
Washtenaw Michigan Michigan 1975 12.5
Hillsdale Board of
Hillsdale Hillsdale Public Wks 1976 6
Consumers Energy
Bay Dan E Karn Co 1977 709.8
Calhoun Marshall City of Marshall 1978 5.7
Lenawee Clinton Clinton Villag of 1978 Z
Coldwater Board of
Branch Coldwater Public Util 1978 6
Wayne Mistersky City of Detroit 1979 60
Huron Main Street City of Sebewaing 1979 1.1
St Clair Greenwood Detroit Edison Co 1979 815.4
Water Street
Bay Station City of Bay City 1980 5.7
Ottawa Zeeland City of Zeeland 1980 6
St Joseph Diesel Plant City of Sturgis 1981 6
Water Street
Bay Station Cityof Bay City 1984 6.9
Ford Motor Co
Washtenaw Rawsonville Plant Ford Motor Co 1985 4.5
Romulus
Operations General Motors
Wayne Powertrain Corp-Powertrain 1986 10.7
JHP
Parkedale Pharmaceuticals
Oakland Pharmaceuticals LLC 1986 2.8
University of University of
Washtenaw Michigan Michigan 1986 12.5
Powertrain Warren General Motors
Macomb General Motors Corp-Warren 1988 4
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration
Midland Venture Venture 1989 87.1
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration
Midland Venture Venture 1989 87.1

 

lOZ

 

Table A3, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Midland Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Venture Venture 1989 87.1
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1989 87.1
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1989 87.1
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1989 87.1

Washtenaw Warner Lambert Warner Lambert Co 1989 3
Ada Cogeneration Ada Cogeneration

Kent LP Ltd Partnership 1990 10.1
Ada Cogeneration Ada Cogeneration

Kent LP Ltd Partnership 1990 23
Central Michigan Central Michigan

Isabella University University 1990 3.8
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1990 87.1
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1990 87.1
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1990 87.1
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1990 87.1
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1990 410
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1990 87.1
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1990 380
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration

Midland Venture Venture 1990 87.1
University of University of

Washtenaw Michigan Michigan 1990 3.5

Allegan 491 E 48th Street City of Holland 1992 39.1

Allegan 491 E 48th Street City of Holland 1992 39.1

 

103

 

Table A3, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Kalamazoo Graphic Packaging
Graphic Packaging Corp 1992 1.8
University of University of
Washtenaw Michigan Michigan 1992 3.5
Bay Henry Station City of Bay City 1993 7.7
Bay Henry Station City of Bay City 1993 7.7
Thumb Electric
Huron Ubly Coop of Mich 1993 1.5
DPS Michigan,
Mason Michigan Power LP LLC 1995 96.1
DPS Michigan,
Mason Michigan Power LP LLC 1995 58
Otsego Mill Power
Allegan Plant Otsego Paper Inc 1995 10.6
Otsego Mill Power
Allegan Plant Otsego Paper Inc 1995 10.6
Huron Pine Street City of Sebewaing 1996 1.3
Huron Pine Street City of Sebewaing 1996 1.3
Gas Recovery
Washtenaw Arbor Hills Systems Inc 1996 10
Midland Midland
Cogeneration Cogeneration
Midland Venture Venture 1998 13.4
Kalamazoo River CMS Generation MI
Kalamazoo Generating Station Power LLC 1999 73.1
Livingston CMS Generation MI
Otsego Generating Station Power LLC 1999 42.4
Livingston CMS Generation MI
Otsego Generating Station Power LLC 1999 42.4
Livingston CMS Generation MI
Otsego GeneratingStation Power LLC 1999 42.9
Livingston CMS Generation MI
Otsego Generating Station Power LLC 1999 42.4
Dearborn
Industrial Dearborn Industrial
Wayne Generation Gen Inc 1999 170
St Clair Belle River Detroit Edison Co 1999 85.3
St Clair Belle River Detroit Edison Co 1999 85.3
St Clair Belle River Detroit Edison Co 1999 85.3
St Clair Greenwood Detroit Edison Co 1999 85.3
St Clair Greenwood Detroit Edison Co 1999 85.3
St Clair Greenwood Detroit Edison Co 1999 85.3
Allegan 491 E 48th Street Ciy of Holland 2000 83.5
Wayne Delray Detroit Edison Co 2000 71.1
Wayne Delray Detroit Edison Co 2000 71.1
Wolverine Pwr
Osceola George Johnson Supply Coop, Inc 2000 25

 

104

 

 

 

Till

 

 

 

 

 

_ E :44qu .\ .\ SN \ WV .\I.\ll

 

 

Table A3, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Osceola Wolverine Pwr
George Johnson Supply Coop, Inc 2000 25
Zeeland Consumers Energy
Ottawa Generating Station Co 2001 188.7
Zeeland Consumers Energy
Ottawa Generating Station Co 2001 188.7
Dearborn
Industrial Dearborn Industrial
Wayne Generation Gen Inc 2001 170
Dearborn
Industrial Dearborn Industrial
Wayne Generation Gen Inc 2001 250
Dearborn
Industrial Dearborn Industrial
Wayne Generation Gen Inc 2001 170
Wolverine Pwr
Allegan Claude Vandyke Supply Coop, Inc 2001 24.8
Wolverine Pwr
Otsego Gaylord Supply Coop, Inc 2001 23.4
Wolverine Pwr .
Otsego Gaylord Supply Coop, Inc 2001 23.4
Wolverine Pwr
Otsego Gaylord Supply Coop, Inc 2001 23.4
Zeland-
Ottawa Washington City of Zeeland 2002 1
Zeland-
Ottawa Washington City of Zeeland 2002 1
Zeeland Consumers Energy
Ottawa Generating Station Co 2002 188.7
Zeeland Consumers Energy
Ottawa GeneratingStation Co 2002 188.7
Zeeland Consumers Energy
Ottawa Generating Station Co 2002 213.3
DTE East China DTE East China
St Clair LLC LLC 2002 89.4
DTE East China DTE East China
St Clair LLC LLC 2002 89.4
DTE East China DTE East China
St Clair LLC LLC 2002 89.4
DTE East China DTE East China
St Clair LLC LLC 2002 89.4
FirstEnergy
Wayne Sumpter Generation Corp 2002 85
FirstEnergy
Wayne Sumpter Generation Corp 2002 85
FirstEnergy
Wage Sumpter Generation Corp 2002 85

 

105

 

Table A3, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wayne FirstEnergy
Sumpter Generation Corp 2002 85
Kinder Morgan
Power Jackson Kinder Morgan
Jackson Facility Power Co 2002 60
Kinder Morgan
Power Jackson Kinder Morgan
Jackson Facility Power Co 2002 79
Kinder Morgan
Power Jackson Kinder Morgan
Jackson Facility Power Co 2002 60
Kinder Morgan
Power Jackson Kinder Morgan
Jackson Facility Power Co 2002 60
Kinder Morgan
Power Jackson Kinder Morgan
Jackson Facility Power Co 2002 105
Kinder Morgan
Power Jackson Kinder Morgan
Jackson Facility Power Co 2002 60
Kinder Morgan
Power Jackson Kinder Morgan
Jackson Facility Power Co 2002 105
Kinder Morgan
Power Jackson Kinder Morgan
Jackson Facility Power Co 2002 60
Kinder Morgan
Power Jackson Kinder Morgan
Jackson Facility Power Co 2002 60
Michigan Public
Kalkaska Kalkaska CT #1 Power Agency 2002 75
Renaissance Power Renaissance Power
Montcalm LLC LLC 2002 170
Renaissance Power Renaissance Power
Montcalm LLC LLC 2002 170
Renaissance Power Renaissance Power
Montcalm LLC LLC 2002 170
Renaissance Power Renaissance Power
Montcalm LLC LLC 2002 170
New Covert
New Covert Generating
Van Buren Generating Facility Company LLC 2003 245
New Covert
New Covert Generating
Van Buren Generating Facility Company LLC 2003 147
New Covert
New Covert Generating
Van Buren Generating Facility Company LLC 2003 245

 

106

 

 

Table A3, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Van Buren New Covert
New Covert Generating
Generating Facility Company LLC 2003 245
New Covert
New Covert Generating
Van Buren Generating Facility Company LLC 2003 147
New Covert
New Covert Generating
Van Buren Generating Facility Company LLC 2003 147
Ottawa Zeeland-Riley City of Zeeland 2006 2
Ottawa Zeeland-Riley City of Zeeland 2006 2
Ottawa Zeeland-Riley City of Zeeland 2006 2
Ottawa Zeeland-Riley City of Zeeland 2006 2
Ottawa Zeeland-Riley City of Zeeland 2006 2
T B Simon Power Michigan State
Ingham Plant University 2006 14.3

 

107

 

Table A4: Michigan ’5 existing hydroelectric generating units (after EIA Form 860,
2008 <http://unew.eia.doegov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html>, accessed 31 March
2010)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Initial Nameplate
County Plant Name Company Ygfl M_W

Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1901 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1901 0.6

Dickinson Norway City of Norway 1905 1.2

Dickinson Norway City of Norway 1905 2
Consumers Energy

Newaygo Croton Co 1907 3
Consumers Energy

Newaygo Croton Co 1907 3
Consumers Energy

Ionia Webber Co 1907 3.3
Wisconsin Public

Menominee Grand Rapids Service Corp 1910 1.1
Wisconsin Public

Menominee Grand Rapids Service Corp 1910 1.1

St Joseph Hydro Plant City of Sturgis 1911 0.4

St Joseph Hydro Plant City of Sturgis 1911 0.4
Consumers Energy

Iosco Cooke Co 1911 3
Consumers Energy

Iosco Cooke Co 1911 3
Consumers Energy

Iosco Cooke Co 1911 3
Consumers Energy

Newaygo Croton Co 1912 1.5
Consumers Energy

Iosco Five Channels Co 1912 3
Consumers Energy

Iosco Five Channels Co 1912 3
Wisconsin Electric

Dickinson Twin Falls Power Co 1912 1.6
Wisconsin Electric

Dickinson Twin Falls Power Co 1912 1.6
Wisconsin Electric

Dickinson Twin Falls Power Co 1912 1.6
Wisconsin Public

Menominee Grand Rapids Service Corp 1912 1.5
Consumers Energy

Iosco Loud Co 1913 2

Iosco Loud Consumers Energy 1913 2

 

108

 

Table A4, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Co
Northern States

Gogebic Saxon Falls Power Co 1913 0.6
Northern States

Gogebic Saxon Falls Power Co 1913 0.6

Iron Crystal Falls City of Crystal Falls 1914 0.3
Wisconsin Electric

Dickinson Big Quinnesec 61 Power Co 1914 2.2
Wisconsin Electric

Dickinson Big Quinnesec 61 Power Co 1914 2.2
Consumers Energy

Newaygo Croton Co 1915 1.4
Consumers Energy

Oscoda Mio Co 1916 2.5
Consumers Energy

Oscoda Mio Co 1916 2.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault C0 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault C0 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison‘ Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5

Chippewa Edison Sault Edison Sault Electric 1916 0.5

 

109

 

Table A4, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Co
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1916 0.5
Wisconsin Electric

Dickinson Twin Falls Power Co 1916 1.2
Wisconsin Electric

Dickinson Twin Falls Power Co 1916 1.6
Northern States

Jackson Superior Falls Power Co 1917 0.6
Northern States

Jackson Superior Falls Power Co 1917 0.6
Consumers Energy

Manistee C W Tippy Co 1918 6.7
Consumers Energy

Manistee C W Tippy Co 1918 6.7
Consumers Energy

Manistee C W Tippy Co 1918 6.7
Consumers Energy

Iosco Foote Co 1918 3
Consumers Energy

Iosco Foote Co 1918 3
Consumers Energy

Iosco Foote Co 1918 3
Wisconsin Public

Menominee Grand Rapids Service Corp 1918 1.9

Marquette James R. Smith City of Marquette 1919 1.6

Gratiot St Louis City of St Louis 1919 0.2
Indiana Michigan

Berrien Buchanan Power Co 1919 0.4
Indiana Michigan

Berrien Buchanan Power Co 1919 0.4
Indiana Michigan

Berrien Buchanan Power Co 1919 0.4
Indiana Michigan

Berrien Buchanan Power Co 1919 0.4
Indiana Michigan

Berrien Buchanan Power Co 1919 0.4
Indiana Michigan

Berrien Buchanan Power Co 1919 0.4

French Paper
Berrien Hydro French Paper Co 1921 0.2

 

110

 

Table A4, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Marquette James R. Smith City of Marquette 1922 1.6
Consumers Energy

Mecosta Rogers Co 1922 1.7
Consumers Energy

Mecosta Rogers Co 1922 1.7
Consumers Energy

Mecosta Rogers Co 1922 1.7
Consumers Energy

Mecosta Rogers Co 1922 1.7

French Paper

Berrien Hydro French Paper Co 1922 0.3
Boyce Hydro Power

Gladwin Edenville LLC 1923 2.4
Boyce Hydro Power

Gladwin Edenville LLC 1923 2.4
Boyce Hydro Power

Midland Sanford LLC 1923 1.2
Boyce Hydro Power

Midland Sanford LLC 1923 1.2
Boyce Hydro Power

Midland Sanford LLC 1923 1.2
Boyce Hydro Power

Gladwin Secord LLC 1923 1.2
Boyce Hydro Power

Gladwin Smallwood LLC 1923 1.2
. Indiana Michigan

St Joseph Constantine Power Co 1923 0.3
Indiana Michigan

St Joseph Constantine Power Co 1923 0.3
Indiana Michigan

St Joseph Constantine Power Co 1923 0.3
Indiana Michigan

St Joseph Mottville Power Co 1923 0.4
Indiana Michigan

St Joseph Mottville Power Co 1923 0.4
Indiana Michigan

St Joseph Mottville Power Co 1923 0.4
Indiana Michigan

St Joseph Mottville Power Co 1923 0.4
Wisconsin Public

Menominee Grand Rapids Service Corp 1923 1.9

Iron Crystal Falls City of Crystal Falls 1924 0.3
Consumers Energy

Alcona Alcona Co 1924 4
Consumers Energy

Alcona Alcona Co 1924 4

Menominee Menominee Mill N E W Hydro Inc 1924 0.4

 

lll

 

Table A4, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ma rinette
Menominee Mill
Menominee Marinette N E W Hydro Inc 1924 0.4
Wisconsin Electric
Dickinson Kingsford Power Co 1924 3
Wisconsin Electric
Dickinson Kingsford Power Co 1924 3
Wisconsin Electric
Dickinson Kingsford Power Co 1924 3
Consumers Energy
Wexford Hodenpyl Co 1925 9.5
Consumers Energy
Wexford Hodenpyl Co 1925 9.5
French Paper
Berrien Hydro French Paper Co 1927 0.4
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Buchanan Power Co 1927 0.5
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Buchanan Power Co 1927 0.5
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Buchanan Power Co 1927 0.5
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Buchanan Power Co 1927 0.5
Wisconsin Electric
Menominee Chalk Hill Power Co 1927 3.3
Wisconsin Electric
Menominee Chalk Hill Power Co 1927 3.3
Wisconsin Electric
Menominee Chalk Hill Power Co 1927 3.3
Wisconsin Electric
Menominee White Rapids Power Co 1927 3.3
Wisconsin Electric
Menominee White Rapids Power Co 1927 2.5
Wisconsin Electric
Menominee White Rapids Power Co 1927 3.3
Calhoun Marshall City of Marshall 1928 0.1
Calhoun Marshall City of Marshall 1929 0.1
Indiana Michigan
St Jogph Constantine Power Co 1929 0.3
French Paper
Berrien Hydro French Paper Co 1930 0.4
Consumers Energy
Newaygo Hardy Co 1931 10
Consumers Energy
Newaygo Hardy Co 1931 10
Consumers Energy
Newaygo Hardy Co 1931 10

 

112

 

Table A4, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Baraga Upper Peninsula

Prickett Power Co 1931 1.1
Upper Peninsula

Baraga Prickett Power Co 1931 1.1
Upper Peninsula

Ontonagon Victoria Power Co 1931 6
Upper Peninsula

Ontonagon Victoria Power Co 1931 6
USACE-Detroit

Chippewa Saint Marys Falls District 1932 2
Consumers Energy

Allegan Allegan Dam Co 1935 0.5
Consumers Energy

Allegan Allegan Dam Co 1935 0.9
Wisconsin Electric

Iron Peavy Falls Power Co 1943 7.5
Wisconsin Electric

Iron Peavy Falls Power Co 1943 7.5
Consumers Energy

Allegan Allegan Dam Co 1945 1.2
Consumers Energy

Ionia Webber Co 1949 1
Tower Kleber Ltd

Cheboygan Kleber Partnership 1949 0.7
Tower Kleber Ltd

Cheboygan Kleber Partnership 1949 0.7
Wisconsin Electric

Dickinson Big Quinnesec 92 Power Co 1949 8.9
Wisconsin Electric

Dickinson Big Quinnesec 92 Power Co 1949 8.9
Wisconsin Electric

Iron Way Dam Power Co 1949 1.8
USACE-Detroit

Chippewa Saint Marys Falls District 1951 4.8
USACE-Detroit

Chippewa Saint Mags Falls District 1951 4.8
USACE-Detroit

Chippewa Saint Marys Falls District 1952 4.8
Wisconsin Electric

Iron Hemlock Falls Power Co 1953 3.1
Wisconsin Electric

Iron Michigamme Falls Power Co 1953 5.3
Wisconsin Electric

Iron Michigamme Falls Power Co 1953 5.3

Iron Crystal Falls City of Crystal Falls 1954 0.4
USACE-Detroit

Chippewa Saint Marys Falls District 1954 2

 

113

 

Table A4, continued

 

Chippewa

Edison Sault Electric

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edison Sault C0 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6

Chippewa Edison Sault Edison Sault Electric 1963 0.6

 

114

 

Table A4, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Co
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault C0 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric

Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6

 

115

 

 

Table A4, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chippewa Edison Sault Electric
Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric
Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric
Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Edison Sault Electric
Chippewa Edison Sault Co 1963 0.6
Menominee Mill
Menominee Marinette N E W Hydro Inc 1978 0.5
Menominee Mill
Menominee Marinette N E W Hydro Inc 1978 0.5
St Joseph Hydro Plant City of Sturgis 1983 0.7
St Joseph Hydro Plant City of Sturgis 1983 0.7
Great Lakes Tissue
Cheboygan Cheboygan Co 1984 1.5
STS HydroPower
Kent Ada Dam Ltd 1984 1.4
Dickinson Norway City of Norway 1986 1.2
STS HydroPower
Kent Cascade Darn Ltd-Cascade Dam 1986 1.6
Dickinson Norway City of Norway 1988 1.2
French Landing STS HydroPower
Wayne Dam Ltd-French LDam 1988 1.6
Upper Peninsula
Marmrette Cataract Power Co 1988 2
Upper Peninsula
Marquette Hoist Power Co 1988 2
Upper Peninsula
Marquette Hoist Power Co 1988 1.4
Upper Peninsula
Marquette McClure Power Co 1988 4
Upper Peninsula
Marquette McClure Power Co 1988 4
Four Mile
Hydropower Thunder Bay Power
Alpena Prg'ect Co 1990 0.6
Four Mile
Hydropower Thunder Bay Power
Alpena Pgect Co 1990 0.6
Four Mile
Hydropower Thunder Bay Power
Alpena Project Co 1990 0.6
Ninth Street
Hydropower Thunder Bay Power
Alpena Project Co 1990 0.4
Alpena Ninth Street Thunder Bay Power 1990 0.4

 

 

 

 

 

116

 

Table A4, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hydropower Co
Project
Ninth Street
Hydropower Thunder Bay Power
Alpena Project Co 1990 0.4
Norway Point
Hydropower Thunder Bay Power
Alpena Project Co 1990 1.2
Norway Point
Hydropower Thunder Bay Power
Alpena Project Co 1990 2.8
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Indiana Michigan
Berrien Berrien Springs Power Co 1996 0.6
Four Mile
Hydropower Thunder Bay Power
Alpena Proyect Co 2005 0.2

 

 

117

‘8

gr- Tiff—97‘.

Table A5: Arlichigan '5 existing nuclear generating units (after EIA Form 860, 2008
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cileaf/electricity/page/eia860.html>, accessed 31 March 2010)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

County Plant Name Comrgpy Initial Yea_r Nameplate MW

Van Entergy Nuclear

Buren Palisades Palisades LLC 1972 811.8
Donald C Indiana Michigan

Berrien Cook Power Co 1975 1152
Donald C Indiana Michigan

Berrien Cook Power Co 1978 1133.3

Monroe Fermi Detroit Edison Co 1988 1217

 

 

Table A6: Michigan ’5 existing wind generating units (after EIA Form 860, 2008
<11ttp://wunv.eia.doegov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html>, accessed 31 March 2010)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

County Plant Name Company Initial Year Na:meplate MW
—— Bay Windpower Bay Windpower

Emmet I LLC 2001 1.8
Harvest Harvest Windfarm

Huron Windfarm LLC LLC 2008 52.8
Noble Thumb Noble Thumb

Huron WindPark Windpark 1 LLC 2008 69

 

Table A.7: Michigan’s existing wood- and wood-waste-fired generating units (after EIA
Form 860, 2008 <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html>, accessed
31 March 2010)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Initial W
County Plant Name Com an Ygag MW
L'Anse Warden
Electric Company
Baraga John H Warden LLC 1959 18.7
Escanaba Paper NewPage
Delta Company Corporation 1972 22.1
Verso Paper
Quinnesec Mich Verso Paper -
Dickinson Mill Quinnesec 1985 28
Central
Michigan Central Michigan
Isabella University University 1987 1
Hillman Power
Montmorency LLC Hillman Power Co 1987 20
Viking Energy of Viking Energy
Missaukee McBain Corp 1988 18
Alcona Viking Energy of Viking Energy 1989 18

 

 

ll8

 

 

Table A7, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lincoln Corp
Grayling
Generating CMS Generation
Crawford Station Operating LLC 1992 38
Cadillac Cadillac
Renewable Renewable Energy
Wexford Energy LLC 1993 44
Genesee Power CMS Generation
Genesee Station LP Operating LLC 1995 39.5

 

Table A8: M ichigan's existing landfill gas and municipal solid waste-fired generating
units (after EIA Form 860, 2008
<http://www.eia.doe..gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html>, accessed 31 March 2010)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Initial W
County Plant Name Company Year MW
EQ-Waste
EQ Waste Energy Energy Services
Wayne Services Inc 1986 0.3
EQ-Waste
EQ Waste Energy Energy Services
Wayne Services Inc 1986 0.5
EQ-Waste
EQ Waste Energy Energy Services
Wayne Services Inc 1986 0.3
EQ-Waste
EQ Waste Energy Energy Services
Wayne Services Inc 1986 0.3
Jackson County Jackson County
Jackson Resource Recovery Res Recovery 1987 3.7
Greater Detroit PMCC Leasing
Wayne Resource Recovery Corp 1988 68.4
Riverview Energy Riverview
Wayne Systems Energy Systems 1988 3.3
Riverview Energy Riverview
Wayne Systems Energy Systems 1988 3.3
Kent County Waste
Kent to Energy Facility Kent County 1989 18
Granger Electric
Generating Station Granger Electric
Clinton #2 Co 1991 0.8
Granger Electric
Generating Station Granger Electric
Clinton #2 Co 1991 0.8
Venice Resources Bio-Energy
Shiawassee Gas Recovery Partners 1992 0.8

 

 

119

 

 

Table A8, confirmed

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Shiawassee Venice Resources Bio-Energy

Gas Recovery Partners '1 992 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys

Wayne Associates Inc 1992 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys

Wayne Associates Inc 1992 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys

Wayne Associates Inc 1992 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys

Wayne Associates Inc 1992 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys

Wayne Associates Inc 1992 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys

Wayne Associates Inc 1992 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys

Wayne Associates Inc 1992 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys

Wayne Associates Inc 1992 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys

Wayne Associates Inc 1992 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys

Wayne Associates Inc 1992 0.8
Gas Recovery

Oakland Lyon Development Systems Inc 1993 1
Gas Recovery

Oakland Lyon Development Systems Inc 1993 1
Gas Recovery

Oakland Lyon Development Systems Inc 1993 1
Gas Recovery

Oakland Lyon Development Systems Inc 1993 1
Gas Recovery

Oakland Lyon Development Systems Inc 1993 1

Granger Electric

Generating Station Granger Electric

Clinton #1 Co 1993 0.8

Granger Electric

Generating Station Granger Electric

Clinton #1 Co 1993 0.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

120

.‘Ifl

Table A8, Continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Genesee Grand Blanc Granger Electric

Generating Station C0 1994 0.8
Grand Blanc Granger Electric

Genesee Generating Station Co 1994 0.8
Grand Blanc Granger Electric

Genesee Generating Station Co 1994 0.8

Granger Electric

Generating Station Granger Electric

Clinton #1 Co 1994 0.8
Ottawa Generating Granger Electric

Ottawa Station Co 1994 0.8
Ottawa Generating Granger Electric

Ottawa Station Co 1994 0.8
Ottawa Generating Granger Electric

Ottawa Station Co 1994 0.8
Ottawa Generating Granger Electric

Ottawa Station Co 1994 0.8
Ottawa Generating Granger Electric

Ottawa Station Co 1994 0.8
Ottawa Generating Granger Electric

Ottawa Station Co 1994 0.8
Michigan
Adrian Energy Cogeneration Sys

Lenawee Associates LLC Inc 1994 0.8
Michigan
Adrian Energy Cogeneration Sys

Lenawee Associates LLC Inc 1994 0.8
Michigan
Adrian Energy Cogeneration Sys

Lenawee Associates LLC Inc 1994 0.8
Gas Recovery

Calhoun C & C Electric Systems Inc 1995 1
Gas Recovery

Calhoun C 8: C Electric Systems Inc 1995 1
Gas Recovery

Calhoun C 8: C Electric Systems Inc 1995 1
Peoples Generating North American

Genessee Station Natural Res 1995 3.2
Gas Recovery

Washtenaw Arbor Hills Systems Inc 1996 5
Gas Recovery

Washtenaw Arbor Hills Systems Inc 1996 5
Gas Recovery

Washtenaw Arbor Hills Systems Inc 1996 5

Granger Electric

Generating Station Granger Electric

Clinton #2 Co 1996 0.8

 

 

 

121

 

Table A8, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Clinton Granger Electric .
Generating Station Granger Electric
#1 Co 1997 0.8
Granger Electric
Generating Station Granger Electric
Clinton #2 Co 1997 0.8
Brent Run Granger Electric
Genesee Generating Station Co 1998 0.8
Brent Run Granger Electric
Genesee Generating Station Co 1998 0.8
Michigan
Cogeneration Sys
Macomb Pine Tree Acres Inc 1998 0.8
Michigan
Cogeneration Sys
Macomb Pine Tree Acres Inc 1998 0.8
Michigan
Cogeneration Sys
Macomb Pine Tree Acres Inc 1998 0.8
Michigan
Cogeneration Sys
Macomb Pine Tree Acres Inc 1998 0.8
Michigan
Cogeneration Sys
Macomb Pine Tree Acres Inc 1998 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys
Wayne Associates Inc 1998 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys
Wayne Associates Inc 1998 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys
Wayne Associates Inc 1998 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys
Wayne Associates Inc 1998 0.8
Michigan
Sumpter Energy Cogeneration Sys
Wayne Associates Inc 1998 0.8
Grand Blanc Granger Electric
Genesee Generating Station Co 2000 0.8
Grand Blanc Granger Electric
Genesee Generating Station Co 2003 0.8
Michigan
Cogeneration Sys
Macomb Pine Tree Acres Inc 2003 0.8
Macomb Pine Tree Acres Michigan 2003 0.8

 

122

 

Table A8, continued

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cogeneration Sys
Inc
Gas Recovery
Washtenaw Arbor Hills Systems Inc 2005 5.3
Ottawa Generating Granger Electric
Ottawa Station C0 2006 0.8
Gas Recovery
Calhoun C 8: C Electric Systems Inc 2007 2.7
Granger Electric
Generating Station Granger Electric
Clinton #1 C0 2008 1.6
Granger Electric
Generating Station Granger Electric
Clinton #1 Co 2008 1.6
Granger Electric
Generating Station Granger Electric
Clinton #1 Co 2008 1.6

 

Table A9: Michigan ’5 existing pumped storage units (after EIA Form 860, 2008

<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html>, accessed 31 March 2010)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

flag Initial
County Name Company m Nameplate MW
Mason Ludington Consumers Energy Co 1973 329.8
Mason Ludington Consumers Energy Co 1973 329.8
Mason Ludington Consumers Energy Co 1973 329.8
Mason Ludington Consumers Energy Co 1973 329.8
Mason Ludington Consumers Energy Co 1973 329.8
Mason Ludington Consumers Energy Co 1973 329.8

 

123

 

 

Appendix B

An Electricity Atlas

.m—..__. -__—._._._.._____.—.—-._ ——-'-mv

 

124

ll- “\
lo

'..-e—.Anur~ A1

Figure B.1: Michigan '5 power plants, 2000

 

 

 

 

 

 

‘.
. e
(:2
1* -' -3 0
_ “ t5.)
9.. ’i
“I. y
\L’
0
Consumers Energy a
0 Detroit Edison
.. . r. i.
' .: Other Private Utility
: fl“.
{3 Municipality V ”J
a} Electric Cooperative ‘.
‘3 Independent Power
, Producer . A -
a!
i‘",
MW=Megawatt. orim watts . ‘3'
7‘7.
<100 MW (me
101 Mw-iOOOMW ‘7’" F“
m.) ,9
fl.
>1001 MW 6 . 00

Michigan Power Plants, 2000

County, Capacity, and Ownership

9%
O
Q.
P!
g'v‘.
‘u
. A». 5"“9 -
Q. 1“»! ‘i’ as a
O t.
0
OD .
.7 6.0
r" A Q!
1,, a
Vivi ‘. . ‘
O o P .
its
Fifi ’
«9 °
«no
on it‘s -
we
a i" w @-

 

125

 

Figure 8.2: Michigan ’5 transmission system

 

 
  
   
    
   

E3113 3317.45 filisgfltad ‘ - J smission System
' Lin-35 -f 11kV or greater

 

 

Approximate

      
 

z 140 kV lines ‘
f '5 ‘ ‘in—L‘
11kV 5 lines s 140 kV ‘é filyquJI' \ ‘0

 

I .
a TI‘IVL ‘
. Major power I; '1“ y i
plant ‘l:!
m EIA 2009; ESRIeAt' cMa ADUSA 1

nd :Con srPowe 1956.
mom otEco .SDeve. i949

 

 

 

 

126

Fi

 

Figure 33: Michigan '5 REC service areas

 

7/

 

Alger Delta E.C.
Cherryland E.C.
Cloverland E.C.

Fruit Belt E.C.

0&A E.C.

Oceana E.C.
Ontonagon Cty Rural
Electrification Assoc.
Presque Isle Electric
and Gas Co-op
Southeastern MI R.E.C.
10. Thumb E.C.

11. Top 0’ Michigan E.C.
12. Tri-County E.C.

13. Western MI E.C.

NP‘S’IPP’NE‘

9°

1°

 

 

 

 

Michigan REC Service Areas

Approximate Service Areas, ca. 1940

.Mj Indicates REC
v power plant

3 3 l
.- , u \
11". - x ,
2 O 3 . .
2
.13 .
10
5 12 \
‘ O
5
12
O
4
_._. A .3” .

 

127

 

Figure 3.4: Michigan '5 ten largest power plants

Michigan’.s Largés ' gm... Mt.

i _ 5
a... gar;- up ..a '5’"; " t , ‘

 

  
  
 

The ten largest facilities account 6 "
for nearly 59% of Michigan ’5
electricity generating capacity.

0 Detroit Edison

Consumers Power

   
   
 
        

  

 

    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.4 ' . . Indiana-Michigan
\ ~ . _
t The 25 largest fnaithe’b represent 59 Power Company
(A, 89% of the state 5 capacrty.
El . Independent Power
The other hundred or so account Producers
for the remaining 10%. I‘L!‘ \H‘g( 2w» l l \
:nm, l 5m ,\rr\l.1p L5 \
limit .mnda
Ludington
Hydro
1,978.8 MW
6.6%
iv:
F“
Midland ‘WJ
Cogen. Venture
Nat. Gris
1,848.6 MW
6.1%
W J. H. Campbell . .
eiv Co“, 3 Belle River
1 1,585.9 Mw New Covert Coal :3;-
M 5.3% {‘4 Nat Gas 1,395 MW .
' 1,176MW M 4' "' 1w
_ i 4‘... 3.9‘,” onme
"‘7 ‘L .: 0 Coal
5' 3,279.6 MW
. 10.9";
D. C. Cook
...._._.._. Nuclear ..—_..——-.
2,285.3 MW W
7.69}.

 

 

 

 

 

 

128

 

Figure 3.5: Michigan ’3 coal-fired power plants

Michigan’s Coal Power Plants
County, Capacity, and Ownership

 

 

Consumers Energy
0 Detroit Edison
1 l Other Private Utility

{3 Municipality ‘ Q
(.5 Electric Cooperative '
Independent Power

Producer .

MW = Megawatt, or 1m watts

«O

-‘"... to. P
< lOO MW ‘~

.
101 MW- TOOOMW
>100] MW . e

 

 

 

 

 

129

Figure 3.6: Michigan ’5 hydroelectric plants

 

Michigan’s Hydroelectric Power Plants
County, Capacity, and Ownership

 

(O
l 3
1
Consumers Energy .
0 Detroit Edison 8
l
Other Private Utility _ i
_, Ludington ,3 .
fl 3,. Municipality . Pumped Storage ‘3 T
1' k Electric Cooperative V 0
{*3 Independent Power .
9 Producer 4 .
a
0
MW = Megawatt, or 1m watts
< lOO MW
101 MW- 1000 MW 0 0 . I
f
19%
> 1001 MW . U a
l

 

 

 

 

 

 

130

Figure 8.7: Michigan '5 natural gas-fired power plants

 

 

Consumers Energy
;; Detroit Edison

Other Private Utility

Municipality

{:1 3 Electric Cooperative

‘ Independent Power
1:3 Producer

MW = Megawatt, or 1m watts

<100MW

101 MW— 1000 MW

>1001 MW

 

 

 

 

Michigan’s Natural Gas Power Plants
County, Capacity, and Ownership

 

131

 

Figure 3.8: Michigan ’5 petroleum (distilled fuel oil) power plants

 

Michigan’s Petroleum Power Plants
County, Capacity, and Ownership

 

O O
6 11
’
O
O k
Consumers Energy
0 Detroit Edison
Other Private Utility
---. . . . o , .1
:1 1; Municrpallty ‘3.
Electric Cooperative . O .
(a independent Power 8* C
J Producer 9 9
3 e 6
MW = Megawatt, or 1m watts
. (0 .
< 100 MW
101MW-1000MW C (I a“
> 1001 MW 5' 1'0 0 8i

 

 

 

 

 

 

132

Figure 8.9: Michigan '5 nuclear facilities and commercial wind generators. The nuclear
plants are the three largest symbols.

 

Michigan’s Nuclear and Wind

Power Plants
County, Capacity, and Ownership

 

Consumers Energy

f Detroit Edison

Other Private Utility

Municipality ‘3

5 Electric Cooperative

I
‘C‘L‘W

1...». Independent Power
‘Lw' Producer

MW = Megawatt, or 1m watts

<100MW

101 MW- 1000 MW

> 1001 MW

 

 

 

 

 

 

133

Figure 8.10: Michigan ’5 wood- and wood-derived fuel power plants

 

Michigan’s Wood and Wood Waste Power Plants
County, Capacity, and Ownership

 

Consumers Energy 0 0

j_ I Detroit Edison
Other Private Utility

Municipality

5

Electric Cooperative O

1 I
1.51""

1.
1

Independent Power
Producer

.5
Le

MW = Megawatt, or 1m watts

<100MW

”g 101 Mw- 1000 MW

>1001 MW

 

 

 

 

 

 

134

Figure 8.11: Michigan '5 landfill gas and municipal solid waste-powered electricity
generating facilities

 

Michigan’s Landfill Gas and Solid
Waste Power Plants
County, Capacity, and Ownership

 

Consumers Energy
‘ _ Detroit Edison
Other Private Utility

Municipality

.31.} Electric Cooperative

1“:- lndependent Power

1

“'3' Producer

0.3
MW=Megawatt,or1mwatts . ‘9 . l
. l
O
<100MW
i"?
‘ 101MW-1000Mw 0 0 ins
>1001MW O

 

 

 

 

 

 

135

Works Cited in Maps

Consumers Power Company. 1956. Data on Plant Location at Saginaw, Michigan.
Jackson, MI: Consumers Power Company

Energy Information Administration. 2000. Form 860a -- Existing Generators,
2000. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of Energy.
<http:[ [www.eiadoeggv] cneaf/electricity[ page/eia860a.html>,
accessed 23 March 2010.

---. 2008. Form 860a -- Existing Generators. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of
Energy. <http:[jwwweiadoegov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html>,
accessed 23 March 2010.

---. 2009. State Energy Profile: Michigan. Washington, DC: US. Dept. of Energy.
<httpz//tontoeiadoegovjstate/state energy profiles.cfm?sid=MIg
accessed 7 February 2010.

ESRI Data and Maps. 2009. Redlands, CA: Environmental Systems Research
Institute.

Michigan Department of Economic Development. 1949. Michigan Power
Resources for Industry. Lansing, MI

Michigan Public Service Commission. 2008. Michigan Energy Overview.
Lansing, MI: Michigan Dept. of Labor and Economic Growth

Rural Electrification Administration. 1939. Annual Report. Washington, DC:
US. Dept. of Agriculture

136