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dissertation entitled

CULTURAL IMAGERY AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS AS
SOURCES OF US. SOFT POWER IN WEST AFRICA:
UNFOLDING U.S. CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH WEST
AFRICA FROM 1957 TO 1991

presented by

Amzat ASSANI

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for the

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CULTURAL IMAGERY AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS AS SOURCES OF US.
SOFT POWER IN WEST AFRICA:
UNFOLDING U.S. CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH WEST AFRICA FROM 1957
TO 1991.

By

Amzat ASSAN I

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

American Studies

2010

 

ABSTRACT

CULTURAL IMAGERY AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS AS SOURCES OF US.
SOFT POWER IN WEST AFRICA:
UNFOLDING U.S. CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH WEST AFRICA FROM 1957 TO
1991

By
Amzat ASSANI

This dissertation examines U.S. cultural relations with Africa from the
independence of Ghana in 1957 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Using
primary sources as well as secondary sources, newspapers and unpublished documents, it
explores the correlation between the policy of communism containment and the
development of US. program of cultural relations with African countries throughout the
Cold war era. It argues that, educational exchanges, cultural activities, and international
visitors programs, conceived and operated by the State Department and the United States
Information Agency on one hand, and the program of volunteerism operated by the Peace
Corps were all used as sources of US. Soft Power in West Africa during the period
studied. With their participation in these different programs, many American citizenS,
African-American diplomats, jazz performers, intellectuals, and artists helped project
during the Cold War era the image of the US. as a country of freedom and democracy, a
land of Opportunities for everyone. Through their action they became passive agents,
Contributing indirectly to the objective of the government to persuade African leaders,
intellectuals and other politics of public opinion of the values and beneﬁts of liberal

democracy by using the United States as primary reference.

 

From a general perspective, this dissertation seeks to expand through the study of
Benin and Ghana, the existing knowledge on US. program of cultural relations. In doing
so it attempts to examine, how states and individuals experience a policy globally
conceived and regionally applied. It notices that US. program targeted mainly the heart
and mind of the elite of these countries in order to raise its soft power, and that US.
cultural policy was foremost conditioned politically by the ideological inclination of the
beneﬁciaries of American assistance. Analyzing the reports of some participants in
exchange programs ﬁ‘om Benin and Ghana and the how Jazz artists view the jazz
program, it notices how discrepancies existed between the expectations and objective of
the government and the personal experience of individuals agents in most of the
programs. Despite this gap, this dissertation notes that all is all the above mentioned
activities of cultural exchange contributed to presenting some facets of American culture
and institutions and touched the lives of many Aﬁicans in rural areas. However, as many
of these programs were inﬂuenced by the Cold War, this dissertation ends with an

interrogation about the future of US. soft power in Africa.

 

 

 

 

Copyright by .
AMZAT ASSANI
2010

DEDICATION

 

YA ALLAH, AL HAMDULLILAHI RABIL ALAMINA.

I would like to dedicate this work to:

- My parents: my Father, Saoudou M.ASSANI and my late Mother Monique
AKUESSON, my late half mother Sidicatou BANGO.

- Special dedication to Mohamed Irfane ASSANI and his mother Karen ADIN,
may this work inspire you and make you proud.

- My brothers and Sisters among whom I would mention Latifatou, Isbatou and
Zinatou: thank you all for your encouragement.

- My sister Moussiliatou and her husband, thanks for everything you have done to

facilitate my stay in Benin.

 

- My siblings Thiamiyou, Bachirou and his family, Chefﬁou and his family
Djemilou, Faouzih and all the rest of my other brothers and sisters. May you ﬁnd
in this dissertation an example of perseverance and patience.

- All my nieces and nephews.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The road to success is usually paved with so many bumps and hurdles to the point that it

is very rare for someone to claim to have made it all by himself. It is therefore logical that

I sincerely express here my gratitude to everyone who has contributed to the realization

of this dissertation, from the conceptual form to the completion of the manuscript.

Many thanks and gratitude to Dr Pero G. DAGBOVIE, my advisor who has been
supportive since my comprehensive exam until this ﬁnishing line with a special
thought to his late wife.

My gratitude goes also to the other members of my committee: Ann LARABEE,
Kiki EDOZIE and Barry STEIN.

Many thanks and gratitude to the Director of the Outreach Program at the African
Studies Center of Michigan State University John METZLER. John has been very
helpful and supportive in the process of completing my degree.

My thanks to LATTICE for offering me a fellowship at a critical moment in my
write-up period.

In Benin, my gratitude to all the people who have been helpful in collecting the
information I needed to write my dissertation. I want to mention: the personnel at
the National Archive of Benin in Porto Novo, my friend Maurice MAHOUNON
who introduced me to the ORTB documentation Service, the personnel people at
INFOSEC, Francoise LEMA KAN KERA of Peace Corps Benin. My gratitude
also goes to the people who help me access theses at F ASJEP and FLASH at the

Université d’Abomey-Calavi.

vi

In Ghana, my gratitude to: the chief of the documentation service at the
Ghanaian National Archive, Mr. David McNally of Peace Corps Ghana, all the
people who helped at the University of Ghana, Legon to ﬁnd a shelter on campus

A special thanks to Michelle ALBAUGH-PAGE and her parents.

A special thanks to Ismaila LASISI whose assistance made a big difference in my
ﬁnal years.

Suraj LAWAL and his family, a very humble and supportive brother.

My friends from Halaqa and everybody who gave me moral support and
ﬁnancial assistance through this socio-academic journey, I cannot thank you
enough.

A special thank to the Islamic Center of Lansing.

To my special friend and brother Valery ADJAKIDJE you have shown me
support throughout this program, thank you.

Thanks also to my ﬁiend and brother Pierre ADJ OBOGOUN

I ask for your indulgence if due to oblivious reasons your name was not
mentioned here, a small help always goes a long way. May the almighty reward

you.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................... x
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
Historical Background to the Development of Cultural Relations ......... 7
Why Aﬁica Gained Visibility and Importance ......................................... 13
Literature Review ....................................................................................... 15
Methodology and Scope ............................................................................ 33
CHAPTER 1
US. POSTWAR FOREIGN POLICY: ASSUMING A GLOBAL LEADERSHIP ...... 41
Section I: Devising a Policy of containment ........................................... 41
George Kennan Long Telegram .............................................................. 49
The Iron Curtain Speech ......................................................... 53
The implementation of the Containment policy .............................. 54
The Truman Doctrine ......................................................... 56
The Marshall Plan... ........................................................... 58
The Kennedy Era .................................................................. 61
Section 2: Evolution of US. Program of Cultural Relations Program ............... 65
Institutional Beginning ........................................................... 71
Division of Cultural Affairs ....................................................... 72
Impact of World War II ......................................................... 77
The Cold War .................................................................... 80
People-to-people Program ...................................................... 83
The Peace Corps ................................................................. 84
CHAPTER 2 '
U.S. RELATION WITH AFRICA: FROM MIN IMALISM TO IDEOLOGICAL
BATTLEGROUND ................................................................................. 88
Decolonization and Independence ............................................. 93
Evolution of U.S.-Aﬁica Relations aﬁer World War II ..................... 97
Soviet and other Communists Cultural Activities in Africa ............... 107
American cultural policy in Africa ............................................ 112
Educational Exchanges ....................................................... .1 15
Cultural exchanges .............................................................. 116
The Jazz Diplomacy in Aﬁica ................................................. 121
Impact of Jazz diplomacy in Africa ........................................... 125
The Peace Corps in Africa ..................................................... 130
CHAPTER 3
US. CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH A PERIPHERAL AFRICAN COUNTRY: THE
CASE OF REPUBLIC OF BENIN ............................................................. 134
Section lzBenin and its Foreign policy .................................................... 135
viii

-¥—#_

Political evolution after the independence .................................. 137

The Guiding Principles of Benin Foreign policy . ....................... 142
Benin -U.S. Relations since 1960 ............................................ 145
l. / Political Differences ............................................. 147
2. / Crises over Economic Interests ............................... 149
Section 2: US. cultural relations with Benin .......................................... 151
The United State Information Agency ..................................... 153
Educational exchanges .............................................. 154
US. Cultural Activities in Benin .................................... 156
Peace Corps Benin ............................................................ 157
Evolution of the Peace Corps Benin ................................ 158
Making a difference: the Impact of the Peace Corps ............ 159
Problems Encountered ................................................ 161
International Visitors Programs ............................................ 163
Power through the Space Race .............................................. 172
CHAPTER 4
US. CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH GHANA. ........................................... 174
Section 1: The Republic of Ghana ......................................................... 174
Overview of Ghana political history ...................................... 176
Evolution of Ghana’s Foreign policy ..................................... 179
USA-Ghana Relations ........................................................ 185
Section II: US. Cultural relations with Ghana ........................................ 187
The United State Information Service (U.S.I.S.) ......................... 188
Educational exchanges: ............................................... 190
Cultural Presentation .................................................. 192
Visits and Other Type of Exchanges ....................................... 193
Peace Corps Ghana ........................................................... 201
Evolution of the Peace Corps ........................................ 202
Making the difference: impact on the country
and on the population .......................................... 206
Impact on Volunteers: An Example of Mutual
Understanding ......................................................... 207
CHAPTER 5
THE PROMISES AND THE LIMITS OF US SOFT POWER IN AFRICA ............. 213
Benin, Ghana and the US: two bilateral relations. ........................ 213
Characteristics of US. Soft Power in Aﬁica ................................. 214
Did Cultural Relations Generate U.S. Soft Power in Africa? ........... 222
The Challenges posed to the sources of US. Soﬁ power in Africa 233
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 239
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................. 250

ix

 

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AF GRAD: African Graduate Fellowship Program

A.F.R.C: Armed Force Revolution Council

A.D.P. : Agence Dahoméenne de Presse

A.O.F: Afrique Occidentale Francaise

A.S.P.A.U.: Aﬁican Scholarship Program of American Universities
A.T.L.A.S.: Advanced Training for Leadership and Skills

C.E.P.S: Customs Excise and Preventive Services

C.I.A.: Central Intelligence Agency

CIAA: Coordinator for Inter American Affair

C.P.P: Convention People’s Party

C.U.: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

E.C.O.W.A.S.: Economic Community of West African States

I.C.C: Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics
IMF: the International Monetary Fund

I.R.C: the Information Resources Center

M.C.C.: Millennium Challenge Corporation

N-A.S.A.: National Aeronautic and Space Administration

NA.T.O; North Atlantic Treaty Organization

N0.0.: Non-Govemmental Organizations

N-L.C: National Liberation Council

NRC: National Redemption Council

O.W.I.: Office of War Information

P.N.D.C.: Provisional National Defense Council

P.N.P: People’s National Party

P.P.: Progress Party

R.P.C.V.: Returned Peace Corps Volunteer

S.E.A.T.O.: South East Asia Treaty Organization

S.P.S.S.: Special Protocol Service Section

TEXACO: The Texas Company

U.G.C.C.: United Gold Coast Convention

U.N.: United Nations

U.N.E.S.C.O.: United Nations Educational Science and Communication Organization
U.S.A.I.D.: United States Agency for International Development
USIA: United State Information Agency

U.S.I.S: United States Information Service

U.S.S.R.: Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics

xi

INTRODUCTION

On July 1 1th, 2009, the President of the United States, Barack Obama, visited
Ghana on his ﬁrst ofﬁcial trip to a sub-Saharan African country since he took ofﬁce as
the 44th president. As soon as he landed, thousands of people welcomed him and his
family in a country that is now considered by his administration as one of the few
successful democracies in sub-Saharan Africa. The “Obama effect” took Accra, the
capital city, like a storm for a few days with many Ghanaians wearing uniforms
embellished with the president’s picture while waving Ghanaian and US. ﬂags. This was
not the ﬁrst time that an American President had such a positive effect on how Africans
perceived the US. Prior to Obama, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton had
their moments of glory and praise on the continent. Even today many on the continent
still hold them in high respect and admiration.

There are, however, many reasons why President Obama’s visit to Ghana was so
important to Aﬁican people. Obama’s personality, skills as an orator, and his message of
hope and peace resonated in Aﬁica and contributed to his own popularity and that of the
US. in Africa. In addition to these elements, the President’s African heritage, his father
being Kenyan, inﬂuence many Africans to view him not only as the ﬁrst African-
American President but also as an Aﬁican in the White House. Besides the idiosyncratic
elements, for a continent like Aﬁica where racial issues have created in the past some
diplomatic tensions with the U. 8., Obama’s presidency represents a positive statement in
stark contrast to the negative ideas people may have forged about the chances of black

PCOple to make it in America.

If in the past the appointment of black diplomats as ambassadors was intended to
raise U.S. soft power in sub-Saharan Africa, today the symbolism attached to Obama’s
presidency adds an exceptional dimension to that soﬁ power especially when he declared
before the Ghanaian parliament: “l have the blood of Africa within me.”1 Obama’s
presidency thus reinforces the belief that the US. is a country where many dreams can be
achieved, regardless of racial or ethnic background, and contributes to creating a new
momentum for the US. soft power in Africa.

Like Barack Obama many American and Aﬁican-American diplomats, jazz
performers, intellectuals, and artists helped project during the Cold War era the image of
the US. being a country of ﬁeedom and democracy and a land of opportunities for
everyone. Many citizen ambassadors were sent to different parts of the world, including a
signiﬁcant number to the newly independent African countries through the govemment’s
programs of cultural exchanges. By participating in sponsored concerts, lectures, and
related cultural activities they became active agents of containment, assisting in
countering the negative image of the US. portrayed by the Soviet Union and communist
Propaganda during the Cold War. The Cold War followed the Second World War and it
Was characterized by the ideological battle between the former Soviet Union and the
United States. One of its consequences was the active interest that the US. government
invested in the political evolution of sub-Sahara Aﬁican countries, especially in the years

after their independence. Despite the seemingly minor role that Aﬁica plays in the US.

 

 

l

RI’vIIIIaI’ks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament, http:r/wwwamcrica.gov'stl’tcxttrans-
en llsh/2009/July/200907ll l lOOSOabrctnuhOJ079783.html&distid=ucs#ixzzOdgquiPGW accessed
September 30*,2009.

national security, one of Washington’s concerns was the spread on the continent of the
communist ideology supported by Moscow.

Through its foreign policy, America sought to prevent the expansion of
communist inﬂuence on the continent. This policy, known as the containment of
communism, became the cornerstone of US. strategy against Soviet Union’s expansive
ambitions. To a large degree, it shaped not only American political, economic, and
military interventions on the continent but it also inﬂuenced its program of cultural
exchanges with many African countries from 1957, the year Ghana became the ﬁrst black
African country to gain independence, until 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed as an
international sovereign entity.

Using Ghana and Benin as primary cases, this dissertation examines how the
United States’ cultural relations were aimed at curbing the anti-American propaganda
orchestrated by the Soviet Union and other communist countries in so-called “Third
World” countries. Through cultural exchange programs, the US. somewhat successfully
attempted to increase the appeal of the American political system and cultural values in
sub-Saharan Africa countries between 1957 and 1991. This dissertation explores how
cultural activities such as movies, news outlets, and concerts sponsored abroad by the
US. government and exchange programs to the US. were used as part of the strategy to
Project the ideals of democracy and freedom in these countries while simultaneously
PTOVing the capacity of America as a global leader. The exchanges included study and
PYOfessional development programs like the Humphrey, Fulbright, and the Aﬁican
Gr'dduate Fellowship Program (AFGRAD)/ Advanced Training for Leadership and Skills

(ATLAS) and other similar programs. They were usually two way exchanges that

allowed many citizens from both countries to visit or stay in the US. and similarly
sponsored many Americans (students, scholars, artists) to travel abroad for research,
teaching, academic or professional activities. If some of the programs were framed as
assisting the newly independent countries in their effort of national development, their
ultimate goal was to increase the appeal of the American democratic system, its culture
and also to consolidate U.S. global leadership. This power to attract or to appeal is what
Joseph Nye refers to as soft power, that is the “ability to shape the preferences of
others.”2
From the Cold war perspective, the use of soft power was aimed at inﬂuencing

the ideological preferences adopted by African countries to guide and shape for their
policy of national development. Like many Third World countries, after decolonization
Aﬁican nations were confronted with the choice between socialism with its economic
mode of development and liberal democracy with capitalism as its mode of economic
development. Inﬂuenced by the ideas of the Bandung conference of 1955, many among
these countries claimed to be non-aligned, that is not following any particular ideology,
especially in their international relations.3 However the international system of aid did not
leave them with much freedom for such an option.4

When studying US. foreign relations, military assistance, economic cooperation,
and regional alliances are usually prioritized over cultural relations. In the mid-1960’s,

historian Charles Frankel already deplored the little attention given to cultural exchanges

in the scholarship on US. foreign policy when he characterized the “American

 

2Joseph S. Nye Soﬂ Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 2.

3 Kenneth D. Kaunda, The Origin and Growth of Non-Alignment (Lusaka, Zambia: Neczam, 197 I ), 4.

4 Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison
of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Jan, 1998): 310.

4

 

educational and cultural policy abroad” as the neglected aspect of foreign affairs. 5 Today
the scholarship on US. foreign relations has expanded to cover a wide range of interests
including cultural relations. But despite this growing interest, the scholarship on cultural
relations is still comparatively smaller. Moreover, in the available scholarship not much
said about the Aﬁican continent. This silence on Aﬁica may prompt the conclusion that
there are no cultural exchanges between the US. and the continent. This dissertation
disagrees with such a conclusion and argues that educational exchanges, cultural
activities, sponsored visits of media men from Benin and Ghana, the Peace Corps
programs, and other related activities have signiﬁcantly contributed to maintaining the
US. cultural relations with Aﬁica with the objective of increasing its soft power on the
continent. While many countries welcomed the exchanges, the overall US. foreign
policy, the controversial role played by the US. in the Congo-Kinshasa crisis of 1960-
1965, the civil right movements in the US, and the American attitude on many
international issues like the apartheid in South Africa, counterbalanced the positive
impression the above mentioned exchanges were supposed to generate and failed to
create a favorable opinion that could help establish long term and peaceful political
relations between the US and these countries.

Through the study of US. relations with Benin and Ghana, this dissertation seeks
t0 contribute to the existing knowledge on the US. foreign policy especially on its
cultural diplomacy with signiﬁcant countries in West Aﬁica. This study addresses the
f0110wing major questions: What were the sources of soft power in the US. relations with

West Aﬁica and what role did they play? How did the US. government use soft power in

¥

sCharles Frankel, The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Aﬂairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy
Abroad (Washington: Brookings Institution 1966), 2.

5

its Aﬁican diplomacy? Were the US. cultural exchanges with Africa effective to the
point of inﬂuencing the political relations with Aﬁ'ican countries? What difference did
the colonial past of the two countries make in their relations with the US? How
successful was U.S. cultural diplomacy in promoting a more positive image of the US.
western styled democracy, and the ﬁee market, with the context of the Cold War?

To address these questions, an Anglophone and a Francophone country have been
chosen as case studies. Ghana, a former British colony, was the ﬁrst sub-Saharan African
country to become independent in 1957 under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah.
Nkrumah was one of the pioneers of Pan-Africanism, a movement that aimed at the
complete liberation of the African continent from foreign domination. With Ghanaian
independence, Nkrumah set the stage for an era that was going to be politically very
important for the Aﬁican continent. Geopolitically, the US. - Ghana relations could
inﬂuence other bilateral relations on the continent. However, the political evolution of the
Ghana after the independence did not fulﬁll that promise. The political climate between
the two countries deteriorated after series of military putsches, affecting thereby many
aspects of their cooperation.

Benin, on the other hand, is a French speaking country with a notorious history of
political instability between 1960, the year independence was gained, and 1972, when a
military coup brought Major Mathieu Kerekou to power. After the coup, the government
t00k series of decisions about the political future of the country and its ideological
Orientation. The country’s name was changed from Dahomey to Benin and Marxism-
I«eninism was adopted in 1975 as the driving ideology. The political rhetoric changed

thereafter with a constant criticism of the western nations. These western nations were

considered as the source of international imperialism and neocolonialism with a
particular emphasis on France, the former colonizer. Since its independence, Benin and
the US. entertained good relations. The US. was among the very ﬁrst countries that
recognized Benin as an independent country and the two countries signed a bilateral
agreement on technical cooperation that was later on extended to other areas like
educational or other cultural exchanges. After the 1972 coup and the adoption of
Marxism, the nature of US. relations with Benin changed dramatically.
As a concluding remark on this section it is important to note that transnational cultural
activities among nations predated any formal involvement of governments. Cultural
diplomacy became part of governments’ foreign policy mainly in the 19th century but it
took a particularly different dimension after the Second World War.
Historical Background to the Development Cultural Relations

The twentieth century was dominated by many conﬂicts and wars. The two World
Wars are among the most violent conﬂicts humanity has ever known. The international
order that followed the end of the Second World War took its roots in many conferences
that were held in Cairo, Tehran, and Yalta while the allied forces were still ﬁghting the
Axis. The Yalta conference of 1945 addressed different issues related to the organization
0f the postwar order. To secure an enduring postwar peace, Stalin, Churchill, and
Roosevelt agreed on the creation of an international organization, the United Nations and
they made a declaration on all the liberated countries particularly those of Eastern
Europe. This declaration called for the organization of free and democratic elections in all

the liberated countries of Europe including those liberated by the Red Army.6 But the

y

6 See the Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference, Section II Declaration of Liberated Europe
mr’fwww.fordham.cdufhalsallx’modrl 945yaltalrtml accessed June lst, 2010.

7

lack of cooperation from the Russians on the organization of free and democratic
elections in Eastern Europe -liberated by the Red Army- raised suspicions in the West
about the real intentions of the Soviet Union. The adoption of the Truman Doctrine (in
1947) announced the beginning of the ideological confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union. This rivalry created an international climate of conﬂicts
where the Soviet Union developed an expansive ideological policy toward Third World
countries and the United States determined to counter this advance for the sake of
freedom and democracy. A Cold War ensued between the two super powers which
resulted quite often in open conﬂict as in Congo-Kinshasa (1960-1965) or violent long
lasting wars like the cases of Vietnam and Angola (1975-1991).

On the diplomatic front, the soviet policy was characterized by the ambition of
increasing its inﬂuence at international level. In Washington, since George Kennan’s
“Long Telegram” of February 1946, the Truman doctrine of 1947 and chieﬂy the NSC-68
of 1950, the prevention of communism expansion became an important matter in U.S.’s
relations with the rest of the world. This policy known as the containment of communism
characterized the American diplomacy throughout in the Cold War. From military
dissuasion to political or economic sanctions, different approaches were used by the US.
to stop or discourage the rise of communist regimes around the globe. But the Cold War
Was not only about direct or indirect military confrontations. The propaganda machines
0f the two superpowers used extensively their existing cultural assets to project an image
Ofa successful ideological system. The famous “kitchen debate” between President
Richard Nixon and the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was one of those instances

Where cultural values were projected as symbols of ideological and economic success.

¥

Historian Elaine May Tyler has suggested:

In a lengthy and often heated debate with Soviet premier Nikita

Khrushchev at the opening of the American national Exhibition in

Moscow, Nixon extolled the virtues of the American way of life, while his

opponent promoted the communist system. What was remarkable about

this exchange was its focus. The two leaders did not discuss missiles,

bombs, or even modes of government. Rather they argued over the relative

merits of American and Soviet washing machines, televisions, and electric

ranges- in what came to be known as the “kitchen debate.”7
The debate showed how in addition to strategic and economic containment, the Cold War
became a cultural battleﬁeld where both leaders praised the merits and values of their
respective ideological system. It pioneered what Tyler characterized as an “ideological
struggle fought on a cultural battleground” and shows how culture became an important
side-show in the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.8

People are usually impressed by the military and economic might of a country.
Likewise, Tyler and other scholars argue that the average citizens of post-colonial nation-
states could be seduced by the standard of living and the way of life of average US. or
Soviet citizen. This explains in part why cultural diplomacy became an important
component of states’ foreign policy after World War 11. But apart from the Cold War
propaganda or competition purposes, the development of cultural relations can also be
understood as an alternative solution to military intervention that could contribute
positively to the promotion of international peace. Mutual appreciation and understanding
0f cultural values or ways of life can facilitate peaceful relations between two nations

While reducing conﬂict among them. These preoccupations about peace inform the

cUltural policies of nations like France, England, and Germany that had suffered much as

 

 

7Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound .° American Families in the Cold War Era (New York : Basic Books,
1988), 10.
8May, Homeward Bound, ll.

a result of two world wars, and later on the US, who have respectively invested in
programs of cultural exchanges with other nations by creating special agencies that were
speciﬁcally in charge of presenting and interpreting their respective ideas and values
abroad.

In 1947, historians Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee published one of the pioneering
books on post World War II cultural relations programs, The Cultural Approach, Another

Way in International Relations. Although outdated, as a reference work on how cultural

 

diplomacy took a different shape after World War II the book is still relevant today. It
gives an insight on the general purposes and characteristics of many programs of cultural
relations starting with the French program. McMurry and Lee’s studies show how France
was the ﬁrst among western nations to have recognized the importance of a large-scale
cultural relations program between the late 19th century and the First World War. Limited
in resources and area of coverage, the French program covered in those days only the
Near East and the Far East and consisted of philanthropic and educational activities. As
Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee explain, “the French Government, through the French
Catholic teaching missionaries, carried on extensive religious, educational, and
Philanthropic works in the Near and in the Far East. Schools, hospitals, orphanages,
diSpensaries, and agricultural institutions were established in the Mediterranean Basin.”9
Despite the atrocities of both world wars, the French program was maintained.
During the Second World War it was continued by the Vichy regime. French refugees in
England and North America also contributed to the diffusion of French culture abroad

through smaller scale cultural activities. After the war, the French government made an

k

9 Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee, The Cultural Approach, Another Way in International Relations (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947), 9.

10

extra effort to sharpen and clarify the content of its programs so as to meet the challenges
of the new international environment. The main focus was to spread the true French
thought in “all countries, large and small.” According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the ofﬁcial organ in charge of the program, “the France that which is beloved in the

world and which the modern world needs is the France of the French Revolution and the

rights of men.”'0

The French example was emulated by other countries that joined the group of
nations seeking to project a positive, non distorted image of their countries abroad. For a
long time a bystander of the international commitment to cultural relations and
propaganda, the British created in 1934 the British Council for Relations with Other
Countries, an organization which objective was to articulate and reﬂect the national
interpretation of the British culture abroad. ” This organization was created, according to

Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee, as a way to ﬁght against propaganda from other great

powers:

British representatives and members of British trade missions in many
parts of the world became increasingly aware of the harm that was being
done to British interests abroad by the propaganda activities of certain
Great powers, and repeatedly made recommendations that the British
Government take steps to counteract these activities. After a long and
careful consideration of the problem, plans were laid for the British
program. They stressed cultural relations rather than cultural propaganda.
It was not until November, 1934, however, that on the advice of Foreign
Ofﬁce, the British Council for Relations with Other Countries was

established to carry a program of cultural expansion or ‘national
interpretation’ abroad. '2

V

‘0 McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach, 35.

H Ali Fisher, “A Story of Engagement: the British Council 1934—2009”, 17, The British Council 75 years
Of Cultural Relations.
MWWWbritishcouncil.org/‘ncw/PachHes/5236/’A%ZOSlrort‘?bZOI-iiston=%200i%20the‘l-‘iIZOBritislr”i.20C
wil°xa202009pdf Accessed January I", 2010.

McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach, 137-138.

11

This interpretation consisted in promoting abroad “a wider knowledge of the
English language, literature, art, music, science, educational institutions and other aspects
of our national life, and thereby to encourage a better appreciation of Great Britain and
to maintain closer relations between this and other countries.”13 The agency became the
British Council and its history ever since its creation has been that of modernization,
adaptation, and more importantly, expansion over the 75 years of its existence. Today,
the British Council has “over 220 ofﬁces in 110 countries and territories across the world,
a turnover of more than £600 million and 7,400 employees — 15 per cent of whom are in
the UK and 85 per cent in the other countries in which we operate.”'4

About four years after the British, the US. of America ofﬁcially launched its
program by creating in 1938 Division of Cultural Relations within the Department of
State. The Division was in charge of the Department’s international activities of cultural

intent. Being a latecomer in the ﬁeld did not actually affect the dynamism and the
vibrancy of the US. program. The American program grew over the years to become one
of the most effective elements of US. post world war II diplomacy. According to the
Departmental Order 367 that created the Division, its (Division) activities abroad
consisted in the exchanges of professors, teachers, and students and include also
cooperation in the ﬁelds of music, art, and literature. Furthermore, the division was also
in charge of the “formulation and distribution of libraries of representative works of the

United States and suitable translations thereof.”15 As described, these activities are not

 

‘3 McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach 138.

'4 Neil Kinnock Foreword to A Story of Engagement: the British Council 1934-2009 by Ali Fisher, The
British Council, 75 years of Cultural Relations.
Lug/Avrvwbritishcouncil.org/new/PageFilcs/S236/'A9’8208110119~6201Iistorv‘l-‘oZOof'l’éIZOthcmiIZOBritiSIP/620C
ouncil%202009.pdf Accessed January I", 2010.

'5 McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach, 208-209.

12

much different from the goal set by the French and the British agencies. The role of these
agencies was also viewed as non-political, projecting a facade of an apolitical program.
The Second World War brought some changes in the way cultural relations were

viewed in US, the apolitical nature of the Division was revised but not fully changed.
Faced with the Nazi propaganda machine, the State Department debated the role of the
cultural policy in responding to negative propaganda. The result was the creation in 1942
of a separate agency, the Ofﬁce of War Information (O.W.I.) which disseminated
information abroad on the US. war effort while explaining its overall objectives in the
war. After the war, the Nazi propaganda was replaced by the Soviet propaganda machine
in the cold war context. Europe was economically crippled and the colonized world was
becoming more and more vocal about its right to self-determination. This new context
called for the restructuration of old agencies and the creation of new ones. More

importantly there was an increase in budget size of these agencies and an expansion of

their coverage area.
Why Africa Gained Visibility and Importance

In 1938 when the US. program of cultural relations was ofﬁcially launched,
many African countries were still under colonial domination and the US. had virtually no
Strategic interest on the continent. Aﬁica was considered by US ofﬁcials, as an
appendage of Europe."6 However, with much of Europe being severely weakened by the
war, the rise in relative power of the Soviet Union, along with the growing nationalism in

Asia and Africa, the US. was forced to radically change its perspective of Africa. Africa

was to become a real strategic concern of the US.

 

'6 Peter Schraeder, “Speaking with many Voices: Continuity and Changes in US Africa Policies,” “Journal
of Modern African Studies vol. 29, issue 3 (Sep., 1991): 375-6.

13

Increasingly in the 19508 with African colonies, anti-colonial activist groups
fueled with nationalist sentiment of their leaders, were asking for independence and
liberation from foreign domination. Among these leaders was Kwame Nkrumah who
successfully led Ghana to independence in 1957. Ghana’s independence launched the
beginning of a new era in the political evolution of the continent. In 1958 its example was
emulated by Guinea (Conakry), that under the leadership of Sekou Toure voted against
the French referendum on the constitution of the Fifth Republic. This new development

in world affairs would herald the undoubted changes that awaited the US. approach to
world realities, particularly, Aﬁican realities.

In response to those changes, a separate African Affairs bureau was created in the

State Department in 195 8'17 This was a positive move in the US. foreign policy reﬂecting
the reality that by the end of 1960, seventeen Aﬁican countries became independent,
sovereign states. These countries were soon faced with the challenges posed by the
Construction of stable country and a prosperous nation. Despite the natural resources that
many of them have, the lack of sufﬁcient ﬁnancial means to solve the problems created

by the independence made them dependent on foreign powers-often their former colonial
masters. But aids and assistance, especially in the Cold War, were bound by allegiance to
the ideology supported by each of the superpowers and their allies. '8 Right after their
independence, numerous sub-Saharan Africa countries signed cooperation agreements

with Moscow. The latter offered economic, military and educational assistance to those

countries with no real strings attached.

 

l7Schraeder, “Speaking with Many Voices,” 377.

18Peter Schraeder, Steven W.Hook, and Bruce Taylor “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle” World Politics,
50.2 (Jan., 1998): 305.

14

 

As far as the US. is concerned, despite the recognition of these countries’
independence, the United States was still ambivalent as to a full commitment on the
continent considering the fact that these were territories ruled by their allies. That
ambivalence changed with the election of President Kennedy in 1961. Kennedy believed
that the previous administration focused more on Europe and consequently neglected
third world countries like those of sub-Saharan Africa. He felt that by not paying much
attention to these newly independent countries the Soviet Union would be presented with
the unprecedented opportunity to spread its inﬂuence throughout the continent of Aﬁica.
This preoccupation led to the extension of US. containment policy in Aﬁica, developing

an approach that include, apart ﬁ'om economic and military assistance, a cultural policy
that emphasized inter alia cooperation in the ﬁeld of education and cultural exchanges.
In addition to the activities of the agencies like the United State Information Agency
(U.S.I.A.), and the program of exchanges, his administration created the Peace Corps, an
Organization of volunteers in 1961. This was an innovative decision which in retrospect,

was an important contribution to the promotion of US. soft power in third world

countries. '9

Literature Review

It has been argued that culture as instrument of foreign policy has not received
appropriate attention in the scholarship on US. foreign affairs. Walter Hixson, for
example, notices with regret in 1997 that “cultural diplomacy is yet to receive the

attention it deserves.”20 If this statement is accurate, it is also important to notice that

 

'9 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman All You Need is Love: T he Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 3- 5.

2° Walter L Hixson, Porting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1 945-1961 (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1997), x.

15

since the end of the Cold War and in the post 9/11 era, there has been a growing interest
of scholars from different backgrounds in studying the impact of cultural exchange in the
victory over communism and, building on those ﬁndings, there is a call for using more
and more cultural exchanges as a way to reduce misunderstanding and conﬂict with the
Islamic world in the aftermath of 9/1 1.

From the preoccupation of the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to
the study of speciﬁc institutions of propaganda, scholars have written on different aspects
of cultural relations. The ﬁrst group includes books that are historical in nature and
explain the birth, the purpose, and modes of operation of the cultural programs in general.
These books address the role cultural policy within the preoccupations of postwar peace.
They thus have an international perspective on the subject and question, through their
analysis of the birth, development, and evolution of cultural programs, how they
Contribute to world peace. In this category Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee’s The Cultural
Approach, Another Way in International Relations, Cultural A ﬂairs and Foreign
Relations by Thomson and Laves’, and Frank Ninkovich’s The Diplomacy of Ideas: U. S.
foreign policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 could be listed. 2'

McMurry and Lee in their book The Cultural Approachzzanalyze and study the
programs of nearly twenty countries France, Great Britain, Germany, the United States,
the Soviet Union and Japan and come to the conclusion that that despite differences in
these countries’ policies, their cultural programs share all some speciﬁc characteristics.

This pioneering work shows how important cultural relations are among nations and how

 

2' Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: US. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1 938-1950
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981)

22 Ruth Emily McMurry and Muna Lee, The Cultural Approach, Another Way in International Relations
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947).

16

a successful postwar peace depended on the level of mutual understanding among

nations. It is a good reference for any work to be done within this ﬁeld because it

contains useful information on the inception and the characteristics of cultural relations

mainly as developed in wake of the Second World War. But the world has evolved since
the end of then, there is a tremendous development in the ﬁeld of communication and
many of the programs studied in the book have changed or disappeared. It was published
at a time when the American program was just about a decade old. For these reasons this
source in only good for general information about cultural policy and should be
necessarily be complemented by more recent and publications on the topic.

Addressing the post Second World War context, Cultural Affairs and Foreign
Relations, ( 1963 ), outlines the main ideas of a cultural policy especially in the context of
the Cold War, emphasizing the importance of educational exchange as a way to promote
understanding among nations in general but particularly as a way to explain the American
values to the citizens of other nations. It listed three major tasks that the US. was
supposed to tackle to survive and win the cold war. Among these was the need to
familiarize other nations with the “values for which American democracy stood.”23

Reﬂecting on the beginning of cultural relations, Charles A. Thomson and Walter
H.C. Laves in Cultural Relations and US. Foreign Policy trace its origin to the 19th
century and underline the pioneer role played by private and philanthropic
organizations.24 They explain that governments felt the need to intervene in the ﬁeld for

three reasons. The ﬁrst was “the advance of science, democracy, and education which

 

23 American Assembly, Cultural Aﬂairs and Foreign Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
1963), 17.

24 Charles A. Thomson and Walter H.C. Laves, Cultural Relations and US. Foreign Policy (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1963).

17

had accompanied the industrial revolution.”25 The second reason was because of “the
extension of political democracy [which] had enhanced the importance of common
people everywhere.”26 Finally the third reason has a lot to do with access to education.
They explain that education has endowed the larger portion of educated public with new
knowledge:

The voice of the people was increasingly heard in the formulation of

foreign policy. Thus the growing importance of the new public its new

knowledge and power, joined to the stepped-up facilities for international

communications, led to the demand that peoples should speak to peoples.

This demand was reﬂected in the adoption bzy7 governments of programs to

reach the minds and hearts of other peoples.

If the above listed books provide a general understanding on the origin and
evolution of the practice, the following category gives an insight on the speciﬁcities of
bilateral cultural relations. The ﬁrst cases in US. cultural relations were with Latin
America, China, Germany, and Japan to name but a few. These studies help understand
the component and purposes of these ﬁrst programs and shed light on some of their
Shortcomings. J. Manuel Espinosa’s Inter-American Beginnings of US. Cultural
Diplomacy: 1936-1948 ﬁts in this category. 28 Here the author analyzes one of the ﬁrst
programs in the beginning of the American cultural relations that is the Latin American
program. The book is informative by nature and helps explains how the program took
shape. He notes in the book how the bases of this program were initiated at the

Conference of Buenos Aires in 1936. In an assessment of a decade and half of the

program he noted how the success of that pioneering effort of people-to-people

 

25 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations, 31.

26 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations, 32.

27 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations, 32

28 J. Manuel, Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U. S. Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-1 948 (Washington:
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, US. Dept. of State, 1977).

18

diplomacy opened a new road to international understanding and “established the basic

policies and patterns which, in the following decades, have governed the Department-

sponsored educational and cultural program,”29

The Chinese program that followed in 1942 inspired from key elements of the
cooperation with Latin America. In America ’3 Cultural Experiment in China: 1942-1949,
Wilma F airbank studies the US. cultural policy with China before the communists under
Mao’s leadership took control of the country. This program ofﬁcially started on January
14’”, 1941 and concluded with the end of the Fulbright program in 1949. It was
characterized by the exchange of experts from the US. going to China and Chinese
coming to America. There were also exchanges of important scientiﬁc journals in
microﬁlm format. This program was modeled out of the Latin American experience but
soon the peculiarities of the realities of the Chinese situation convinced the State
Department of the necessity to adapt its cultural policy to the country. Fairbanks
Characterizes these years as the period of “trial and error” and argued that the US.
cultural relations in those years that were perceived more as a government public
rftlations service. For F airbank this shouldn’t have been the case. They recommend that
interdependence that characterizes the postwar international relations reality guide any
fllture US. policy toward China. The Latin American experience and the Chinese
C0Operation paved the way for the US. cultural policy in Germany after the defeat of the
Nazis.

Like Espinoza and Fairbanks, Henry Kellerman, in Cultural Relations as an
I"Strument of US. Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program between the

United States and Germany 1945-1954, assesses ten years of cultural exchanges with

\

29 ,
ESprnosa, Inter-American Beginnings, 319.

19

between the U.S. and Germany and concludes that these exchanges had a positive on
how both countries perceived each other. The ﬁrst contacts between U.S. and Germany

occurred as a consequence of the respect and admiration that American scholars had for

the German science and scholarship in the pre-war time.30 The situation changed after the

defeat of the Nazis that caused the occupation and the administration of the Federal
Republic of German by the U.S. and their Allies. Cultural exchanges during the
occupation were rather part of the overall US policy during the occupation. Evaluating
the U.S. program in Germany, Kellerman asks whether the result met the expectations.

He asked “whether and to what extent the U.S. investment in the program had any

tangible, lasting, and traceable effect.”3 1 Hrs answer to that question is nuanced although

it acknowledges a certain positive impact of the cooperation on the Germans and the
p01itica1 institutions of the country. He observed that based on “testimonials by high
Pliblic officials in Germany and in the United States; of institutional evaluations; of
reports and letters written by sponsors and participants” there is evidence of the
effectiveness of the program especially on the institutional reform in post Nazi
Cicrmany.32 But in his views, although personal and national pride in Germany may
Prevent many observers from acknowledging any correlation between the exchanges and
the post Nazi reform, there is evidence of U.S. inﬂuence on the “governmental system, in

national legislation, in administrative procedures, in academic life, educational

Institutions and so on.”33

‘¥

Henry J. Kellermann, Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy: The Educational

Exchange Program between the United States and Germany, 1945-1954 (Washington: Dept. of State,
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1978), 3.

3;,Kellerman Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy, 209.
:Kellerman, Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy, 209.
”,Kellerman Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy, 2 l 0- 21 1,216.

20

A third group of publications focuses on the Cold War and studies it as a cultural
battleﬁeld and usually claim that culture made an undeniable contribution to the demise
of communism in Eastern European or the Soviet Union. They can be ranked as case
studies but they are limited in scope, examining mainly cultural relations as instrument of
foreign policy and propaganda during the Cold War. Hixson’s Parting the Curtain:
Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961, for example, shows how the
collapse of Soviet Union was partly due to U.S. cultural inﬁltration in the Soviet Union.
Hixson wrote in that “Washington sought to destabilize the Soviet and East European
Communist Party (C.P.) regimes, ﬁrst through “psychological warfare” and then through
an ultimately more effective, albeit longer term, program of gradual inﬁltration. Despite
misperceptions and a lack of priority accorded to such efforts, Washington had succeeded
in parting the “Iron Curtain” by the end of the Eisenhower years.”34 As it appears, for
Hixson, it was not an iron ﬁst that helped disintegrate the Soviet system, rather it was
cultural inﬁltration that over time complemented the other means used by the U.S. and
the West to overcome the Soviet regime. This is shared by Richmond Yale in Cultural
Exchange and the Cold War in which the author asks what caused communism to
collapse and the cold war to come to a close? To answer that question, Yale went over
different theses before concluding that cultural contact with the west played a major role
in the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to him,

the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism were
consequences of soviet contacts and exchanges with the west, and with the
United States in particular, over the thirty-ﬁve years that followed the
death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. Moreover, those exchanges in culture,
education, information, science and technology were conducted by the

United States openly, for the most part, under agreements concluded with
Soviet government, and at a cost that was minuscule in comparison with

\—

34 . .
Hlxson, Parting the Curtain, rx.

21

U.S expenditures for defense and intelligence. over the same period. The

result was an increase in Western inﬂuence among the people in Russian

who count- the intelligentsia.35

It is the evolution of these exchanges that are highlighted in the book. This
valuable source of information on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy supports the
claim that although culture plays a complementary role in relations among nations, it
does have a political impact that can go far beyond any tangible expectation.

The last category of books studies the history by some federal agencies, the role
played by individuals in the evolution and development of U.S. cultural program. Here
scholars choose to study either educational exchanges, exchanges of documents, the use
and impact of jazz performers or other artistic modes of expression as instruments of
public diplomacy. In Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold
War, Penny M. Von Eschen studies the use of Jazz performers as cultural ambassadors in
the Cold war era. In the effort to counter the Soviet Union cultural offensive in Third
world countries, the State Department capitalized on the success and popularity of a host
of famous jazz performers like Louis Armstrong, Dizzie Gillespie, Duke Ellington and
many others less famous. These artists lent their fame and talent to the government to
show how the success of many among them (who were African- Americans) was the
proof that America is place where all its citizens have the opportunities to upliﬁ
themselves.

The U.S. turned to jazz because unlike other genres, jazz is seen to reﬂect a truly

American identity and the American system as the freedom of expression. Lisa

Davenport studied jazz as an instrument of U.S. Cold War diplomacy and notes how the

 

35 Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 2003), xiv.

22

damaging effect of violence in urban areas and racial discrimination in the ﬁﬁies and the
sixties forced the Eisenhower administration to seek for solutions to improve the image
of the U.S. as a world leader abroad. But not only jazz or plastic arts generated interest
among the scholars of U.S. cultural policy. Many also chose to write about the use of
books and libraries as strategy to inﬂuence the elite in the third world particularly in
Africa. Mary Niles Maack’s article “Books and Libraries as Instruments of Cultural
Diplomacy in Francophone Africa during the Cold War,” explains how books and
libraries were used as part of U.S. cultural policy in French-speaking Aﬁica during the
Cold War. She observed that “Book donations, translation and publishing programs, and
the creation of cultural center libraries were all means by which foreign governments
sought to inﬂuence the Aﬁican elite during the Cold War era.”36 As far as the former
I“much colonies in Aﬁica were concerned, their close economic and political ties with
FrElnce put them “on the periphery of the ideological struggles between the United States
and the Soviet Union.”37 But this fact did not prevent foreign powers including the U.S.
from being drawn to those countries and to use “books as a signiﬁcant element of their
cultural diplomacy.”38 Unlike Maack who focused her studies on francophone Africa,
Kal'en B. Bell’s chapter “Developing a "sense of community”: U.S. Cultural Diplomacy
and the Place of Africa during the early Cold War period, 1953—64” 39 argues that
AIl'lerican cultural policy in the Cold War aimed at preventing the spread of soviet as a

Way to contain communism by creating a sense of community with west African nations.
6\

6Niary Niles Maack, “Books and Libraries as Instruments of Cultural Diplomacy In Francophone Africa
Ruling the Cold War," Libraries & Culture 36 (Winter 2001). 58 59.

3ﬁsh/law Niles Maack, “Books and Libraries,” 59.

3:IVIar-y Niles Maack, “Books and Libraries,” 59.

39Karen B. Bell, “Developing a "sense of community": U. S. Cultural Diplomacy and the Place of Africa
during the early Cold War period, 1953- 64” in The United States and West Africa: Interactions and

[felations ed. Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2008),]25-
46.

23

The above listed books show from different perspectives the importance of culture in
U _S . foreign policy. But out of all only a handful of them directly address Africa as an
area of interest and importance in the U.S. cultural policy. These are Mary Niles Maack,
Karen B. Bell, Lisa Davenport and Penny M. Von Eschen who touch on Africa related
issues. This limited publication on Aﬁica makes it a real challenge for this project to ﬁnd
enough secondary sources addressing U.S. cultural policy with sub-Saharan Aﬁican
countries. On another level almost none of these books used a speciﬁc theory in their
study of the American cultural relations. Only Karen B.Bell draws on Josiah Royce’s
concept of “beloved community” in her Chapter to discuss the main objective behind the
U.S. cultural relations with West Aﬁica in the early Cold War period .While this project
does not argue for the necessity to use a theory, it somehow offers an alternative
approach to look at U.S. cultural relations by considering how it can potentially
contribute to enhancing the appeal of the country abroad. This explains the choice of soft
Power as conceptual framework.

Power is essential in international relations, because it conditions states’ behavior
and can coerce or inﬂuence their behavior. In his important book Soft Power: The Means
’0 Success in World Politics, Joseph Nye notes the changing nature of the concept of
Power in International Relations. “Power is like the weather,” he explains, “Everyone
depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it.”40 Nye deﬁnes power as “the

ability to inﬂuence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants. But there are
Several ways to affect the behavior of others. You can coerce them with threats; you can

1nduce them with payments; or you can attract them and co-opt them to what you

\

4o
Nye, Soft Power, 2.

24

Want.”41 Nye thus distinguishes among military power, that he characterizes as coercive;
economic power, that he ﬁnds inducing; and soft power that in his explanation is
attractive.

Nye argued that the soft power of a country is based on three main resources: “its
culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (where it lives up to
them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and
having moral authority)”42 Culture, he argued, is not only commercially transmitted but
can also be transmitted “through personal contacts, visits, and exchanges.” He explains
that “the ideas and values that America exports in the minds of more than half a million
foreign students who study every year in American universities and then return to their
home countries, or in the mind of the Asian entrepreneurs who return home after
succeeding in Silicon Valley, tend to reach elites with power.”43 Nye thus confers a
Certain ﬂuidity to culture, ﬂuidity that goes beyond the control of any governmental
policy or institutions.

If culture is a source of soft power, then what is culture? How does cultural
representation operate? What role does human agency play in cultural relations? And
how do governmental institutions participate in the promotion of a national culture
abroad? How is culture understood, particularly in the context of interstates relations?.
Nye Deﬁnes culture as “the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society.
It has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as

liteI‘ature, art, and education, which appeals to elites, and popular culture, which focuses

\

4|

42 Nye, Soft Power, 2.

43 Nye, Soft Power, ll.
Nye, Soﬁ Power, 13.

25

on mass entertainment.”44 Nye distinguishes then between elite and popular culture. This
distinction is important when a government is devising its cultural policy as it is shown
later on in this dissertation. For example, when sending artists abroad the State
Department set the guideline to be followed in selecting the members of the audience.
Similar practices can be observed with the cultural policy of the former Soviet Union
who gave priority to intellectual and opinion leader over the common man in identifying
their target audience. The most important thing to retain at this level is the key terms of
his deﬁnition that are values and practices. Projecting values and practices that appeal to
foreign elite is an effective way to use soft power. Here one may ask what is to be
understood by value and how can is it expressed or represented.

The notion of culture as value is also shared by Richard Johnson et al. in The
Practice of Cultural Studies. These authors assert that culture is perceived as value
understood as the aesthetic and moral values of art, literature music. These values
according to them are not the one that determines the sense of belonging in or that
exclusion from these ﬁelds. For example, it is the not the kind of value that make Ernest
Hemingway a great writer or literature man but it is the kind of values that make The Old
Man and the Sea an important and beautiful piece of literature accessible to an average
reader who can appreciate the beauty of the prose without being necessarily an English
major student or a literary critique. Culture is also viewed, they argue, narrowly as the

P01icy of large-scale institutions like government. Here it is more about organization and

\

‘4 N
ye, SOﬁ Power, 11.

26

regulation of a particular ﬁeld of conduct. 45 Culture as a cohesion is associated with
policy and is viewed as a source of social cohesion and belonging. 46

Scholar Tony Bennett took on the question of the inclusion of institutional policy
(or governmental dimension) in the forms and ﬁelds of culture. He believes that in order
to do so, there should be a review of the deﬁnition of ‘culture’ as it is traditionally
understood. “The most important single inﬂuence here,” he explains, “ has been
Raymond Williams’ work, especially in the distinction it proposes between culture as “a
particular way of life, whether of a people, a period or a group” and culture, in its more
restricted sense, as “works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity.”47
Bennett suggests:

Culture is more cogently conceived, I want to suggest, when thought of as

a historically speciﬁc set of institutionally embedded relations of

government in which the forms of thought and conduct of extended

populations are targeted for transformation-in part via the extension

through the social body of the forms, techniques, and regiments of

aesthetic and intellectual culture.48

Bennett thus recognizes that a government does have a role to play in the culture
Of a nation. It implies that culture is dependent on the relations between institutions and a
group of populations. It suggests the transformative role played by these institutions in
Sl“ping through their policy the thought and cultural practices of a certain population.
Government does not deﬁne the culture of a nation but it participates in the process of its

trarleormation through policy making whether on a large scale or on a smaller scale. The

challenge of this way of conceiving culture is to apply it to relations among nations

\

45
46 RiChard Johnson, et al, The Practice of Cultural Studies (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE, 2004),11.
4-, Johnson et al., The Practice of Cultural Studies, 1 I.
Y Orly Bennett, “Putting Policy into Cultural Studies” in Cultural Studies Lawrence Grossberg et al. (New
4,,0rk: Routledge, 1992), 25.

Bennett, Cultural Studies 26 -27.

27

without raising questions about cultural imperialism. If as Bennett explains it “thought
and conduct” are targeted for transformation, for this to be achieved in the international
context, the government policy will intentionally create the conditions that facilitate the
process of transformation.

For example, by legislating the conditions of acquiring a new technology like the
computer or a cell phone, the government is participating in the process of transformation
of a national culture, changing the patterns of communication in that society. Applied to
the relations among nations, cultural policy may involve the decision of a superpower to
influence political values or social habits of citizens of other nation-states. This could
happen through an inﬂuence on the way a particular group of people design their
government institution or their social organization. The promotion of western democratic
values in third world countries would be a good example here. Somehow in this case
there is the absence of the historical relations that exist between the population of a
colllltl'y and the institutions that govern the country. This makes cultural policy at
international level, especially if considered from the perspective of Tony Bennett, an
inter-states matter. A superpower will act on the type of transformation a national
gOVernment of less developed country would wish for the well being of its population.
This would occur through the mechanism of cooperation, the import and export of
cultural goods and more importantly through its policy of receptivity of foreign ideas.

From the above deﬁnitions it appears that values, ideas and meaning are essential
in the notion of culture. These values and ideas inﬂuence the daily practices that give
meﬁning for a particular group of populations, thereby helping deﬁne their way of life

and their identity. Having deﬁned culture, one may ask why is culture important in the

28

 

relations among nations and why has it become such an important aspect of many
countries’ foreign policy especially after World War II?

Differences in values and ideas could create conﬂict among nations and
jeopardize the chances of building a peaceful world unless each actor recognizes its
responsibility and act accordingly to create conditions of mutual understanding with other
actors. Exchanges, dialogue, and other forms of contacts among actors of the
international system are thus important to prevent misunderstandings and a distorted or
inaccurate perception of the other or his values. A distorted perception of one actor in
international relations by another quite often leads to the rejection of that actor’s values
thereby creating antagonism and conﬂicts. Cultural understanding is thus important for
the stability of international relations as explained by Dominique Joacquin-Berdal et al:

Cultures inﬂuence world politics in numerous ways. Cultures partly

constitute the international system: they make up people’s ethnic, national

and political identities. Also, often ingrained within different cultures are

alternative visions of how the world system should be regulated. Within

the international system, the goals that actors seek to achieve, as well as

the means with which they try to do so , are informed by the cultures to

which these actors belong.49

Joacquin-Berdal et al. explore the inﬂuence of culture on the “alternative visions
0f how the world should be regulated.”50 One may argue that at the core of the
ideological battle of the Cold War was the battle over which vision of the international
SyStem should prevail. Each of the two sides involved in the competition was ﬁghting for

the Prevalence of its political and ideological values whether it was the democratic liberal

Values or the ideology of communism. This ideological battle altered the nobility attached

\

49

J Dominique Joacquin-Berdal et al, “Introduction” to Culture in World Politics edited by Dominique
Pacqllin-Berdal, Andrew Oros, and Marco Verweij (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, New York: St. Martin's
soress, 1998),7.

0aequin-Berdal et al, “Introduction,” 7.

29

to cultural relations viewed as a way to promote international peace. What is cultural
relations and how does it relate to the notion of soft power?

The phrase cultural relations refer to interactions between cultures whether these
interactions are direct or indirect. Akita Iriye explains that “Direct interactions include
physical encounters with people and objects of another culture. Indirect relations are
more subtle, involving such things as a person's ideas and prejudices about another
people, or cross-national inﬂuences in philosophy, literature, music, art, and fashion.”5 '
Cultural relations among nations or groups of people do not need the intervention of
government to occur. Interactions between people have always occurred in the history of
nations without the intervention of governments. But the interactions at stake in this study
is the one in which the government is involved. People’s interaction although cultural
may not be subjected to any political agenda. Governments’ interventions inﬂuence the
nature of contact individuals have and quite oﬁen place the interactions in the frame of a
SPeCiﬁc agenda. This is why Akira argues that “when cultural interactions deal with such
matters as ofﬁcially sponsored exchange programs or dissemination of books and movies,
they may be called cultural policies.”52 Since this dissertation studies the exchanges
SPonsored by the U.S. government, its focus is therefore U.S. cultural policy in West

Aﬁ‘ica. The objective of the cultural policy of a nation is to correct “the image of that

nation formed abroad by those who know it only through its soldiers or its diplomats or

\

51 _
Aklra Iriye “Cultural Relations and Policies” Encyclopedia of the New American Nation

231 i/fuwvwamericanforeimclations.com/’A-D/CulturaI—Relations-and-Policies.html Accessed October
5

2 ’ -
h Aklra Iriye Cultural Relations and Policies Encyclopedia of the New American Nation
Wwamcricanforcignrclations.c0m/A-D"Cultural-Relations-and—Policieshtml Accessed October

92009.
30

its men of business—through its political and military and commercial enterprise in

foreign markets and in foreign places.”53

To avoid confusion between cultural relations and related notions like
propaganda, there is the need to deﬁne what propaganda stands for. Nicholas Cull et a1
give a good deﬁnition of propaganda as:

The deliberate attempt to inﬂuence public opinion through the
transmission of ideas and values from a speciﬁc purpose that has been
consciously devised to serve self-interest of the propagandist, either
directly or indirectly. Whereas information presents its audience with
straightforward statement of facts, propaganda packages those facts in
order to elicit a certain response. Whereas education-at least in what I take
to be the liberal notion of education— teaches us how to think in order to

enablesus to make up our own minds, propaganda dictates what one should
think.

More explicitly, the CIA when reporting on the Soviet and communist cultural policy in
Third World countries distinguished between cultural activities and propaganda:

Communist foreign propaganda activities involve the manipulation of
mass media to disseminate information and ideas designed to obtain the
maximum possible support for communist policies. For example, a list of
these propaganda activities may include broadcasting, publishing, news
agencies activities, ﬁlm showing and exhibit. Communist cultural
activities, in contrast, seek to depict Communist artistic and literary

achievements and include the exchange performing troupes and literary
works.55

P r 0paganda has turned into a negative term although originally the word referred to
dissemination of information. Because of the negative connotations that usually come

With the word, propaganda will not be used as often as cultural relations or cultural

\

53
54 Maeleish, Introduction to The Cultural Approach by McMurry and Lee, ix.
_Cu11, Nicholas John, David Holbrook Culbert, and David Welch. Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A
g'S’Orical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLlO, 2003), xix.
1A Intelligence Report No 118, Communist Cultural and Propaganda Activities in the Less Developed
Ountries, 3. http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp accessed 6/19/2009

31

activities. From these deﬁnitions it appears that propaganda can be part of cultural
relations program but cultural relations do not mean propaganda.

Cultural relations programs share overall the same characteristics. After
comparing the French, the British, the German, the American and other programs, Ruth

McMurry and Muna Lee list what they see as the main characteristics of cultural

program:

1. / from the beginning, most programs of cultural relations abroad have
been initiated and controlled or supervised by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs or the Foreign Ofﬁce, in which budgets a large proportion of the
funds for carrying them is placed. In only a few cases were they initiated
by the Ministry of Education, although this ministry usually cooperates
closely with the Foreign Office cultural projects abroad. By and large, the
programs have become an important arm of foreign policy.2. / Each
country has a strong belief in the importance of its own culture and a
desire to have other countries know and appreciate this culture. 3. / each
country believes that the improvement of cultural relations leads to better
economic and political relations.4. / Each country centers much of its
effort in the teaching of the national language (French, German, and
English) in foreign lands as a basis for better cultural and economic
relations.5. / Each country, having decided to develop a program of
cultural relations with other nations, has given it strong moral and
ﬁnancial support. All have recognized the need for a permanent program
of cultural relations abroad to carry out certain of their foreign policies.56

As important as these characteristics are, there is an important footnote for the list
to be complete, the signature of cooperation agreements between two or more countries.
These bilateral or multilateral agreements are necessary for cultural policy to be carried
out legally without any suspicion of cultural imperialism. They make a big difference in
how a state or a government intervenes in the ﬁeld of cultural relations. lf individuals’
Iapports or contacts are at the heart of cultural relations, through “treaties of ﬁiendship or
in“migration or emigration policies,” governments make those contacts much easier and

56\
McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach, 4—5.

32

perhaps more effective.57 But government intervention is not conﬁned to the legislative
or facilitating role, governments’ cultural programs takes different forms.

In their study on government cultural activities, McMurry and Lee identify “ the
establishment and support of cultural centers or institutes and schools in foreign
countries; the interchange of technical experts, professors, teachers, students, and leaders
in various ﬁelds of intellectual and artistic expression; the exchange of books and other
printed materials, lectures, concerts, and exhibitions.”58 They also note how radio,
motion pictures and new media were increasingly used as part of the means to present the
national cultural identity abroad.59 If in the postwar context these activities and media
were very useful and effective, they appear somewhat obsolete today with the advent of
intemet and other faster modes of communication. This poses real challenges to the new
approach governments should adopts in its cultural policy. But as this dissertation is
limited to a speciﬁc time period, issues related to the challenges posed by new form of

c0mmunications will not be addressed here.

MEthodology and Scope

As an American studies project, this dissertation adopts an interdisciplinary
approach and draws on the methodologies used in history, cultural studies, and
international relations. It uses primary sources collected through archival research in
Benin and Ghana and in library of Michigan State University. Without the daily
nt3WSpaper like “la nation,” “A ube Nouvelle” in Benin and the “Daily Graphic” in Ghana,

It Would not have been easy to ﬁnd out how news men felt about their experience in the

:\
Bcharles Alexander Thomson and Walter H.C. Laves, Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy
£8 loornington, Indiana University Press, 1963), 23.
59 l\'t<31\’lurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach, 5.
McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach ,5

33

United States. These sources were complemented by ofﬁcial publications, dissertations
and memoirs at the Universite d’Abomey-Calavi and the University of Ghana, Legon.
The statistical data on U.S. educational exchanges and volunteers would not have been
possible without ofﬁcial records and publications available at the library of Michigan
State University. Among these were the records of the Fulbright Comﬁssion on
educational exchange, the State Department publications, Congressional reports and other
ofﬁcial documents. It is important to mention how the Peace Corps website has been a
great asset for statistical data on the number of volunteers dispatched abroad.

The project is primarily the study of two cases of bilateral cooperation that is the
relations between the United States and two distinct third world countries of Africa,
Benin and Ghana. Consequently it emphasizes state-to-state relations and uses ofﬁcial
documents like bilateral agreements and other relevant primary sources in its analysis.
However, cultural exchanges involve public diplomacy. In the explanations of Nicholas
CUII, “public diplomacy is an international actor’s attempt to conduct its foreign policy
by engaging with foreign publics.”60 A mere act of signing a bilateral agreement is not
enough to reach the goals set for a bilateral cooperation. Individuals are important as
active or passive agents in the delivery of the cooperation. This brings another level of
analysis to the study that is the individual to individual level. Here personal accounts,
individual experiences are important for this kind of analyses. But there is a third
POSSible level which is related to the relations between state and individuals. It deals with
the impact of the government on the foreign public opinion through the exchange of

at'tiSts but also through exhibition, photo display and the distribution of free literature and

W
P J- Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and
“blic Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xv.

34

the use of broadcasting media. Today with the development of digital media there is no
boundary to that type of interaction between a government and foreign audience.
The dissertation covers the period between 1957 and 1991 that is the time

between the independence of Ghana (1957) and the fall of Soviet Union (1991) the other
major power who was engaged in a Cold War with the United States. The time frame was
chosen because decolonization in Africa happened in the context of the Cold War when
the two superpowers were vying for ideological inﬂuence in several third world
countries. It is primarily the study of the cultural relations as conducted by the
government of the United States. Identifying a speciﬁc theory about cultural relations is
a challenge that has not been fully solved. There is no speciﬁc theory about cultural
relations among nations. The interdisciplinary nature of the subject makes it difficult to
identify which theory better applies to the study of culture among nations. However as
this project is looking at how culture may inﬂuence the behavior of other international
actors through, the notion of soft power seems appropriate and therefore will be referred
to as the main theory. It should be made clear however that the primary objective is the
StUdy of cultural relations.

This project does not intend to provide answer to all the questions relevant to U.S.
cnltural relations with West Aﬁica, the magnitude of the task and the limited resources
aVailable discourage any such ambitions. In its modest way, it aims at contributing to the
understanding of how after a period of indifference, hesitancy and ambivalence, the
United States acknowledged the changes that were taking place in the colonial territories
of West Aﬁica and indulged in a Cold War against the spread of communism in those

areaS. It is a contribution to the understanding of the way cultural containment played out

35

on the Aﬁican front. It seeks to explore what Walter Hixson called “the transmission and
dissemination of culture across international boundaries” by considering among others,
the “sharing and transmitting of consciousness. . .communication of memory, ideology,
emotions, lifestyle, scholarly and artistic works, and other symbols.”61 In retrospect the
transmission of a lot of these values listed by Hixson occurred during the period
considered here especially the sharing of ideology. For many of these values to be easily
and lawﬁrlly transmitted, there should be a favorable political environment either at
internal or at international level. This makes thus cultural policy largely inseparable from
foreign policy in general. Operating on this idea, the present project will start with the
survey of the political context in which U.S. program was conceived. This logic of
understanding cultural relations through the political environment that create them guides
the content and structures each of the chapters of this project that are brieﬂy summarized
as follows:

Chapter 1, “U.S. Postwar Foreign policy: Assuming a Global Leadership,”
Studies mainly the evolution of U.S. program of cultural relations after the Second World
War. Since that evolution cannot be understood unless analyzed within the frame of the
general changes that occurred in the U.S. foreign policy aﬁer the war the chapter will be
diVided into two sections. The ﬁrst section examines how moral, economic, security,
military and strategic reasons were behind the U.S. decision to abandon its traditional
isole‘ltionism and embrace a policy of intervention. lt analyzes how the Kennan Long
Telegram of 1946, the Churchill Iron Curtain’s speech, the Truman doctrine, and the

adoDtion of NSC- 68 all informed the postwar approach to what was then perceived as

 

61
S Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, I 945 -I 96 I (New York:
‘- Martin's Press, 1997), x.

36

the U.S. responsibility in assuming a global leadership. In assuming that role the U.S.
claimed that its objective was to protect the free world against the rising threat of
totalitarian communist regime. The chapter analyzes in the second section the evolution
of the U.S. cultural relations program. It traces the birth of the program to the prewar era
and identiﬁes the different agencies and institutions that have shaped its development
from 1938 onward. The chapter shows how, although apolitical in theory, the different
international crises have inﬂuenced not only the institutional make up of the program but
also its objective. Agencies like the Ofﬁce of War Information, the Coordinator for Inter
American Affairs have all been reorganized into a new interim agency after the war. The
different exchange programs and cultural activities initiated by the State Department
became part of the U.S. propaganda machine although the ofﬁcial rhetoric avoided the
term propaganda. This section also shows how the containment of Soviet and communist
expansion inﬂuenced the development of the postwar U.S. cultural relations program.
New federal agencies were thus created and the program was expanded to many regions
0f the world notably the decolonized areas among which the African continent. By the
time of Aﬁican Decolonization in the 1960’s, almost all the mechanism of the execution
of U.S. cultural policy were already in place.

Chapter 2, “U.S. Relations with Aﬁica: From Minimalism to Ideological
Battleground,” studies speciﬁcally the rising stake for U.S. in Aﬁica. It shows how
initially, the United States’ government, for different reasons political or strategic, stayed
awayfrom the Aﬁican continent and from nearly all Aﬁica related issues before the
Sec0nd World War. This period of indifference contrasted with that of decolonization

and independence that helped the continent gained gradual visibility in U.S. foreign

37

policy. These changes in the political situation of Africa brought Washington to have a
different approach from its traditional, very minimalist attitude toward the continent. As a
result of Washington’s change of policy the Aﬁican bureau was created in 1958. The
chapter links U.S. intervention on the continent to the competition caused by the growing
inﬂuence of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology in many emerging nations of
Africa. Thus U.S.-Aﬁica relations in the Cold War years could not be dissociated with
the policy of the containment of communism. As the Soviet Union provided educational
scholarships to citizens of many Aﬁican countries and signing cultural agreements with
many of them, African countries, so did the U.S. extend its cultural program to Aﬁican
countries, sending many artists, musicians, speakers to these countries while welcoming
many Aﬁicans to the U.S. for visit, study and others. The chapter examines the role
Played by these agents of cold war and the impact of the volunteer while addressing the
racial question and how it presents a threat to the promotion of a positive image of the
U.S. in Aﬁica.

Chapter 3, “U.S. Cultural Relations with a Peripheral African Country: The Case
of Republic of Benin,” analyzes how the political crisis in the relations between the two
COuntries affected the cultural exchanges program. The chapter explores U.S. cultural
re1ations with the Republic of Benin as peripheral country, to use the Mary Niles phrase,
bl“ also as an example of Aﬁican Marxist regimes. It ﬁrst examines the political
evolution of the country before analyzing its cultural relations with the U.S. It goes over
the history of the political relations between the two countries and notes how these
political relations affected the country’s cultural exchanges with the United States of

America. Through a study of the activities of the U.S. Cultural center in Benin and the

38

l
J

accounts of students and media men like Rene Ewagnignon and J. Vieyra, who have
visited the U.S., the chapter analyzes how the cultural programs affected opinion makers
and their perceptions of the U.S. as a country and the U.S. as a civilization or culture. The
study of their construction of what U.S. image along with the impact of the Peace Corps
volunteers on the life of rural populations give a hints on the effectiveness of U.S.
cultural policy in generating U.S. soft power in the Benin .

Chapter 4, “U.S. Cultural Relations with Aﬁica: The Case of a Pivotal State,
Ghana,” examines U.S. cultural relations with Ghana between the independence of the
country and the fall of the Soviet Union as a world superpower. It will have an in-depth
look at the evolution of the cooperation between the two countries and analyze to what
extent their political relations affected U.S. cultural policy with Ghana. Ghana was the
ﬁrst sub-Sahara African countries to gain independence in 1957. As a nationalist leader
and a former Lincoln University and University of Pennsylvania student Nkrumah
Persona inﬂuenced the relations between the U.S. and Ghana countries in the ﬁrst years
after the independence. Ghana independence and Tanzania were the ﬁrst Aﬁican
cOuntries to have received the Peace Corps volunteers. The peculiarities of its position on
the African continent and the presence of a non negligible community of Aﬁican-
American plus the commonality of language with the U.S. may have generated more
cultural proximity with the latter making cultural relations more possible than the ﬁrst
0336 studied that is Benin. But such a contention would be neglecting the internal
political situation in Ghana that has also had its share of political instability. Whether this

has negatively inﬂuenced its relations with the U.S. is one of the questions this chapter

addl‘esses.

39

Chapter 5, “The Promises and the Limits of Soft Power in Africa” compares U.S.
relations with Ghana and Benin and evaluate how exchanges of students, volunteers and
the jazz diplomacy inﬂuenced the perception of the U.S. in the two countries. It also takes
a critical looks at these programs by analyzing through them the promises and the limits
of U.S. soft power in the period studied. The chapter touches on the conﬂicts that
impeded U.S. exchanges from generating long lasting peaceﬁrl political relations with
these two countries. These were the crisis in Congo, the apartheid situation in South
Aﬁica, the Angola and the controversial role the U.S. intelligence played in many crises
that did not facilitate the promotion of peaceful relations on one hand between US, and
Ghana and on the other between the U.S. and Benin.

The dissertation ends with a conclusion that summarizes the main ideas of the
Project and questions the future of U.S. soft power in the post cold war Africa. It also
aSks what impact the Obama presidency could have on the future of U.S.-Africa
relations. This structure helps understand how the U.S. cultural program was created and
hOW it has been extended to Aﬁican countries. 'By starting with the change in U.S.
1308th foreign policy, this structure hopes to provide a good historical and political
baCkground information about the international context in which the two cases that will
be Studied occurred and evolved. The structure of the dissertation thus helps trace the
Political and spatial evolution of the cultural policy from its inception to its adjustment to
the Cold War context. To better understand how the U.S. postwar cultural diplomacy
evOlved, this dissertation will thus start with the study of the political evolution that led

the country to abandon isolationism and embrace a policy of global leadership.

40

CHAPTER 1

U.S. POSTWAR FOREIGN POLICY: ASSUMING A GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
This chapter studies the change of policy that occurred in U.S. foreign relations

aﬁer World War II and its implications for the U.S. program of cultural relations. The
chapter is divided in two sections, the ﬁrst section examines the adoption of the policy of
containment after the Second World War and the second section deals essentially with
the evolution of U.S. program of cultural relations from its beginnings to its adjustment to
the Cold War context.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union became two superpowers competing ideologically
in the postwar years in many parts of the world. Unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S.
reached a military and economic development that in the words of the British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill, was never before matched in human history.] This new level
of development combined with the changing balance of power in the postwar world, the
destruction of Europe and the rise of the Soviet Union as an expansive, ideological global
POWer, led the United States to revise its traditionally isolationist attitude towards world

affairs and adopt a policy that will prevent the expansion of communist ideology backed

by Moscow.
Section I: Devising a Policy of Containment

The adoption of containment in the late 40’s occurred as a major change in U.S.
poStwar foreign policy. This change was brought about by a combination of factors
(eoonomic, military development) but more importantly it came as a response to the
perCieived threat of the Soviet Union ideological expansion ﬁrst in Europe and gradually
in Other parts of the world. Containment marked the end of isolationism, a principle

I\

willston Churchill Centre Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain)
- . . a eid= 429 (accessed March 23'“, 2009)

 

   

drawn from the ideas of George Washington that has inﬂuenced the American foreign
policy for about a century and half. Isolationism can be explained as the deliberate choice
by the U.S. to refrain from entangling in world affairs and follow it own political destiny.
In his farewell address, George Washington warned his fellow citizens about alliances
and called for the United States to stay away from European affairs:

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in

extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political

connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let

them be fulﬁlled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set

of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation.

Hence she must be engaged infrequent controversies, the causes of which

are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise

in us to implicate ourselves by artiﬁcial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of
her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships

or enmities.

A close reading of this statement suggests that Washington does not deny that the
U. S . maintains trade ties with other nations however these ties should not be followed by
Strong political entanglements. But if there were any engagements formed at the
foundation of the Republic, these engagements should be respected and fulﬁlled with
800d faith. Analyzed within its historical context, isolationism reveals that the founders
of the young Republic had two major concerns that, in retrospect, justiﬁed the choice to
Stay away from Europe. The ﬁrst concern was that because it was the only democracy in
eXistence in the late 18th century, the U.S. could not expect any sympathy from
Elll‘opeans for its liberal ideology and the second concern was about the serious

Challenges of nation building that America was confronted with.3 Therefore the

\

2
hAValon Project, George Washington Farewell Address 1796
3Wavalon. law. vale. edit/I81}? centgnfwashing asp (accessed March 6th, 2009).
Omas M. Magstadt, An Empire if you Can Keep it: Power and Principle in American Foreign Policy

42

 

ilnperatives of nation building and that of the protection of its political system combined
With the fact that “a vast ocean protected America from Europe’s armies and insulated it
from Europe’s wars,” justiﬁed the rationale behind isolationism.4

This doctrine is important in the study of U.S. foreign policy because it left its
marks on the American foreign policy for a century and half. No other political doctrine
has shaped the way America interacts with the rest of the world as isolationism had for
such a long time. Isolationism was sometimes reinterpreted, as historian Ernst Van
Beugel observes, or expanded but the core ideas have always remained: “other words
would be used, different ideologies preached, various actions adjusted to different
circumstances, but Washington’s words formed the basis for the famous doctrine of
isolationism which for such a long period would dominate American Foreign Policy.”5
Washington’s original statement was concerned with the political fate of the young
republic among other nations particularly U.S. relations with the old continent of Europe.
But Presidents James Monroe and Theodore Roosevelt through their interpretation
e"(panded the application of isolationism to the whole continent of America.

In his annual message to Congress in December 1823, President James Monroe

Stated that it was not part of the United States’ policy to intervene or take part in any
coliflict that opposes the European powers and that the U.S. would have nothing to do
With the existing colonies of the European powers. On the other hand, European powers

did not have anything to do with the Republics of the Americas as far as colonization or

 

\

gwashington, D.C.: co Press, c2004), 41.

5 agstadt, An Empire if you Can Keep it, 41.
Erlist Van Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership; European Integration as a Concern of

American Foreign Policy,( New York: Elsevier Pub. Co., 1966), 3.
43

Other related matters were concerned.6 Any such attempts, according to Monroe would be
considered dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. That declaration,
known ever since as the Monroe doctrine, became famous for closing the door to
European inﬂuence in the Americas. In doing so it expanded the initial doctrine of
isolationism to the continent of America and consecrated the rise of the U.S. as a regional
power. Somehow it is important to note that if the Monroe Doctrine extended
isolationism to Latin America, it was not necessarily for altruistic reasons. It was done for
mainly strategic, national interest and national security purposes. Besides, the Monroe
Doctrine would not have been effective if Spain had not lost its position as a great power
and if it was not implicitly supported by the British.7

President Theodore Roosevelt also expanded isolationism by reemphasizing the
ideas of the Monroe Doctrine in his ﬁfth annual message in 1905. In his address
Roosevelt explained that it was part of the duty of the United States to intervene in the
Caribbean and Latin American countries to protect life, property, and to bring order.
Together the Monroe doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary consolidated U.S. isolationism
While asserting its rise as a regional power.

But despite its apparent dominance on U.S. foreign policy, isolationism did not
necessarily create a consensus among the Americans for over time the debate about U.S.
' f0l‘titign policy has generated different schools of thought. Historian Esmond Wright
distinguishes among those who share and support the ideas of Washington that is the

ISOlationists and those who have an alternative vision about how U.S. should interact with

the rest of the world that is the Internationalist.

\
6
W ade Richard C. Wade, Howard B. Wilder, Louise C. Wade, A History of the United States (Boston:

5°ughton Mifﬂin, c.1968), 222.
agstadt, An Empire if you Can Keep It, 48.

44

In his explanations, isolationists use a set of arguments to justify the claim that
Amaica should refrain from being involved in European affairs. They claim that the U.S.
is geographically isolated and enjoys therefore an inexpugnable position against any
foreign attacks. In addition they argue that the U.S. can be “economically self-sufﬁcient,
and does not need a policy of Free Trade.”8 Beside in their analysis, the cosmopolitan
nature of the American racial and ethnic fabric commands that the country remains
isolated to help “fuse its many people into one, to ﬁnd its own special character and
culture.”9 To these claims, intemationalists respond that the development of modem
means of transportation made the ocean that separates the U.S. from the rest of the world,
particularly Europe, a possible path of conquest and not a barrier that could separate the
Country from the other parts of the world. They argue that despite its economic success,
the U.S. still depend on the European economy, especially U.S. farmers and cattle raisers
Who need European markets for their surplus of crops. To complete their arguments,
intemationalists draw the attention of isolationists on U.S. dependency on foreign nations
for raw materials like “tin, nickel, tungsten, chrome, rubber, coffee, tea and tropical
dl'ugs, and increasingly for extra supplies of oil.”lo Wright notes that two main
31’ guments hold against lsolationists, one historical and the other practical. He wrote that
hiStorically “the United States has always valued the promotion of democracy more than
Sterile isolationism.”ll Such an ideological commitment is therefore perceived by Wright
as against any idea of self withdrawal from world affairs. On a practical level Wright

Shares intemationalists claim that “peace must be organized and protected by a system of

\
8
lgEgsnmnd Wright, The American Dream: ﬁ'om Reconstruction to Reagan (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell,
6) 282.
9 9
lowﬁght, The American Dream, 282.
Wright, The American Dream, 282.
right, The American Dream, 282.

 

45

collective security” but not by being negative like the isolationists.12

Along the same line, drawing from George Kennan’s view on U.S. national
Security, John Lewis Gaddis distinguishes between the Universalists and the
Particularists. Gaddis explains that Americans who advocate universalism seek
“congeniality through homogeneity, by working to make the world resemble the United
states as much as possible, on the assumption that , once it did, nothing in it could pose a
serious threat.”13 The ‘particularists’ argue that what is important is to ensure that the
world does not threaten the United States, whether it resembles it or not. ‘4 Security from
the particularists’ perspective lies in diversity not uniformity, other countries do not need
to resemble to the U.S. In fact U.S. can even live with a hostile country provided this
country does not have the means to threaten its national security or interest. Universalists
think harmony is possible and supports the claim that security will come through it while

Particularists see security rather through a “careful balancing of power, interests, and

amtagonismsf”5

Isolationists inﬂuenced U.S. foreign policy for over a century and half from
Washington’s address in 1796 until the outbreak of the Second World War. At the end of
World War I, isolationism was brieﬂy abandoned when President Wilson took an active
P311 in the Treaty of Versailles, issued the fourteenth points and played an important role
in the resolution of the conﬂict and the creation of the League of Nations.16 But his

Participation in the creation of the League was not materialized since the U.S. Senate

\

12
,3 wright, The American Dream 282-283.

John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National
ﬁeCur-izy Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 26.
r 5 Gaddis, Strategr of Containment, 26.
.6 Gaddis, Strategy of Containment, 26.

wright, The American Dream, 283.

46

refused to ratify the treaty, an act that brought America back to isolationism until
December 7th, 1941 when the Japanese attacked the Pearl Harbor military base during the
Second World War. U.S. engagement in the war thereafter marked the beginning of its
change of attitude toward international issues. This process culminated, after the war,
with its rise as a global leader of the international crusade against communism.

If Pearl Harbor caused the U.S. to join the battle against the Axis during the
Second World War, the choice to remain involved in world affairs aﬁer the conﬂict came
as a result of the realization by the United States that “isolationism was no longer a
. possible alternative and that its future was tied to every part and section of the world.”17
The international realities changed so rapidly at the end the war with European countries
facing very tough economic and social situations but mainly with the appearance of two
new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. These two countries became
the two dominant players that inﬂuenced greatly the international relations of the postwar
time. Unlike the destroyed Soviet Union, the U.S. came out of the war economically
stronger and with better military potentials. In spite of these capabilities that gave him an
edge over many other countries, including the Soviet Union, the U.S. was still hopeful
for a one-world system free of division where every nation would be able to express and
enjoy its free sovereignty.18 But ideological differences combined with a sequence of
events soon transformed that hope into an illusion and brought about changes in the
general conduct of the U.S. foreign policy notably in its attitude towards the Soviet

Union.

At the Yalta Conference of February 1945 the three leaders Franklin D.

 

 

r7

Ernst Van Der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership; European Integration as a Concern
faf American Foreign Policy, 17.

Van Der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership 17.

47

Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill agreed on the organization of free
elections in the territories freed by the Allied forces.'9 The non respect of this clause by
the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe liberated by the Red Army made the West question
Moscow’s real intentions and its good faith in respecting the resolutions of Yalta. More
and more the Soviets developed an attitude of imperial power particularly in Eastern
Europe. In addition to this mounting Soviet threat, Western European countries were
faced with very disastrous economic situations, their political system called for reform
while their population was still under the fresh memory of one of the most terrible
tragedies in human history.

The combination of the above described factors made the U.S. decides that
despite the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, the new turn in Moscow attitude did
not help maintaining good relations with it anymore. Such was the international context
in which George Kennan published in 1947 the article “The Source of Soviet Conduct” in
Foreign Affair, an anonymous article signed Mister X which main purpose was to explain
to the American public opinion the reason behind the change of U.S. attitude toward the
Soviet Union and the necessity to adopt a new policy at international level. If the article
has the historical privileged to have propelled the concept of containment to the attention
0f the American and international public opinion, its content was drawn from the more

0f’ﬁCial document the Long Telegram of 1946. The Telegram laid the foundation for U.S.

 

 

’9 Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference, Section II Declaration of Liberated Europe:

“TO foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments
_Will JOintly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their

Judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency relief
measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly
representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible
esIt'lblishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to
acrlitate where necessary the holding of such elections.”

\Lhtt 1//www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/ l 945yalta.html accessed 6/1/2010.

48

postwar policy of containment by depicting the Soviet regime as a potential danger to
U.S. and its western allies security and interest and by strongly recommending that the
US provide guidance and support for European countries.20

George Kennan Long Telegram

In the Long T elegramz I sent on February, 22nd, 1946 Kennan explains how the
Soviet Union’s leaders viewed the post war international order and what they believed
should be the Soviet Union policy both at national or international level. The Soviet
perception of the world order after the war was highly inﬂuenced by their strong belief in
the ideological division between socialism and capitalism and that both systems could not
coexist or cooperate in peace. In Kennan’s views, this perception was founded on the
historical Russian sense of insecurity developed over the centuries as a consequence of
the constant invasion the old agrarian, czarist Russian empire was subjected to. This
belief, although factually inaccurate, determined the Soviet policy both at national and
international levels. And to understand how the soviet power acted, it has to be viewed
from its two levels of operation that were ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial or subterranean.

Kennan explains that: “(1) Ofﬁcial plane represented by actions undertaken
Officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) Subterranean plane of actions
undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.” But
regardless of the level, the main objective of the soviet government was to increase the
Power and inﬂuence of their country at international level while snatching every

Opportunity to weaken the power and inﬂuence of western capitalist nations. For this

\

20
Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy,
211945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 63.

0therwise stated, most of the quotes in this section are from George Kennan’s “The Long Telegram”
wwgwuedu/msarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm accessed June 5"” 2010.

49

q .

 

purpose, they exploited differences among capitalist nations and encouraged their friends
to do the same.

The implication of this division on ofﬁcial level was an “internal policy devoted
to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state.” This resulted in an
increase of military industrialization and in an impressive display of military power
which purpose was to convince the international opinion of the soviet power while
maintaining a policy of autarky devoted not to reveal its weakness. At international level,
there were efforts to advance the ofﬁcial limits of the Soviet power either through ofﬁcial
participation in international organizations or through assistance to territories still under
colonial domination. Here the main goal was to weaken western inﬂuence and favor the
rise to power of government that will be ﬁiendly toward the Soviet Union.

This ofﬁcial policy was complemented by several actions posed underground
through a network of various groups, individuals or organizations acting on behalf of the
Soviet power even though the latter did not publicly claim responsibility or refuse to
Claim responsibility for any of their actions. Among these underground agents were the
“inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries,” the “rank and ﬁle of
C0mmunist Parties,” or a variety of national associations like labor unions, youth,
Women, or other social organizations, racial societies, cultural groups and other similar
groups. These underground elements were used by Moscow to “undermine general
Political and strategic potential of major western powers.” In short Kennan concludes
that, “all Soviet efforts on unofﬁcial international plane will be negative and destructive
in Character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control.”

S“Imnarizing the Soviet threat, Kennan described the Soviet regime as a political force

50

“committed fanatically to the belief that with us [U.S.] there can be no modus vivendi,
that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our
traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if

”22 This diagnosis made, Kennan reassured however that the

Soviet power is to be secure.
Soviet power was still weak compared to the West and could be dealt with without any
military operation: “I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our
power to solve-~and that without recourse to any general military conﬂict.” For this to
happen, Kennan emphasizes the role of education of the American people about the
soviet system but also about the virtues of the American system and values.

He ﬁrst recommended that the U.S. study carefully the new soviet system with a
complete detachment then strongly recommended that the American public be educated
about the Russian threat for much depended on the health and vigor of the American
society. World communism, he explained was like a malignant parasite, which feeds only
on diseased tissue. For him “Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal
problems of our own society, to improve self-conﬁdence, discipline, morale and
community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow.”23 He
recommended that the U.S. show guidance and leadership to other nations otherwise the
Russian will take the American place:

We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more
positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than

we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop
political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at

 

 

22 George Kennan, “George Kennan’s Long Telegram,” 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United States,
VOL VI Eastern Europe: the Soviet Union( Washington DC, U.S. government 1946, Printing Ofﬁce,
213969),pp.696-703, 706-709.

Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy,

1945-1950, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.), 63.

51

least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less
interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance
rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give
them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.24

As this survey of the telegram shows, the term containment did not appear in the
Telegram but the idea did. It was in the article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”
published the following year that deducting from all his explanations on the Soviet’s
leaders outlook on world affairs, what policy they would adopt and how they intended to
deal with the capitalists that Kennan explained how the U.S. should respond to the Soviet
as follows:

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure

against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be

contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series

of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to

the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or

talked out of existence.25

Containment as enunciated by Kennan raised many questions about the means and
the objective that this dissertation cannot claim to fully address. At this level what is
important to ask question is how to understand containment and in what ways was the
Soviet threat actually dealt with. These questions will be addressed further down. But
ﬁrst let’s notice that Kennan concerns about the Soviet behavior and his calls for
responsible U.S. leadership were also shared by the former British Prime Minister

Winston Churchill in his ever since famous speech of March 1946 the “Sinews of Peace

commonly known as the “Iron Curtain Speech.”

\

24ThOmas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy,
945-1950’, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978 ), 63

7t1:1‘1'16 Sources of Soviet Conduct” By X http: //ww.w historvguide. org/europemennan. html Accessed June
2010.

52

The Iron Curtain Speech

The former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who led the country
through the dire moments of the war, was invited to address a group of graduates at the
Westminster College in Fulton (Missouri) in March 1946. In his personal address,
Churchill painted a negative picture of the situation in Europe and particularly stressed
the fact that America has become a world power that should feel in addition to a sense of
duty done (the victory over the Nazis), a sense of responsibility for the generations of the
future. He declared that “the United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world
power. It is a solemn moment for the American Democracy. For with primacy in power is
also joined an awe inspiring accountability to the future. If you look around you, you
must feel not only the sense of duty done but also you must feel anxiety lest you fall
below the level of achievement.”26 This means that the victory was meaningless and less
efﬁcient unless the U.S. embraces the sense of responsibility that comes with it. After
that observation, in one of the most quoted excerpts of his speech, Churchill drew the
attention of the President and the audience on the gravity of the situation in Europe that is
the division de facto of the continent:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has

descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the

ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague,

Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Soﬁa, all these famous cities

and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere,

and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet inﬂuence but

to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from

Moscow.27

In Churchill’s view the urgency of the above described situation called for a new

\

26 Winston Churchill Centre Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain)

wwwwinstonchurchilI.org/m/pages/indexcfm?paaeid=429 (accessed March 23”, 2009)
Winston Churchill Centre Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain)

meinstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=429 (accessed March 23”, 2009)

53

‘deal’ in Europe; that is the unity of all the European nations without any permanent
outcast because “the safety of the world requires” it. That urgency also recommended that
the U.S. shows no indifference to the duty and responsibility that history has made his.
From this perspective, the Churchill’s speech appeared as a call for the abandonment of
isolationism. It was also a call for U.S. leadership and a warning against Moscow policy.
Above all, it was a call for caution and prudence but action against the new directions in
Moscow. Churchill’s Speech and Kennan’s Telegrarn’s are two important documents that
were very inﬂuential in the adoption of the Truman Doctrine an important political and
strategic move toward to the implementation of the doctrine of the containment.
The implementation of the Containment policy

At this juncture it is probably important to ask what containment means. John
Lewis Gaddis deﬁnes ‘Containment’ as “the word most often used to characterize United
States Foreign and military Policy during the early years of the Cold War.”28 Although
accurate that deﬁnition tends to restricts the application of the containment policy only to
the ﬁrst decade that followed the end of the Second World War. In actual fact
containment inﬂuenced U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War years that is from
1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Each president after Harry Truman
ad0pted a variant of this policy, causing containment to expand geographically and
embrace, apart from Europe, other areas in the World including Asia and Aﬁica.
Strategically, “Kennan’s original formula called for a ﬂuid combination of diplomatic,

economic, military and propaganda efforts around the Soviet perimeter.”29 In application

‘

2810M Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National
gemrity Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 4.

Simon Davis, and Joseph Smith, The A to Z of the Cold War, (A to Z guides, 8. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow
Press, 2005), 118.

54

of Kennan’s idea the U.S. government took a series of measures that became the major
policies of the containment era. Thus the Truman doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the creation
of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N .A.T.O.) and other regional alliances like the
South East Asia Treaty Organization (S.E.A.T.O.) ranked among some of the earlier
strategies used by Washington to counter the expansion of Soviet inﬂuence in Europe.
But under the inﬂuence of Paul Nitze, Kennan’s conception of containment was seriously
challenged in 1950 with the adoption of the NSC-68, a document that “awarded
containment a permanent globally militarized character.”30 The choice of the military
option reﬂects the opposing views of both men on how to handle the Soviet threat.
Kennan viewed containment as “a political strategy for combating a political threat. Nitze
deﬁned the word the way it was really used: as a military strategy for combating a
military threat.”3 1 While Kennan did not rule out the military option he did not view the
militarization of the Cold War and the arm race that ensued as the best approach to
containment. Unlike Universalists mentioned earlier in this chapter, Kennan identiﬁed
himself, according to Gaddis, as a ‘particularist.’ This explains his belief that the
American interest “would be best served not by trying to restructure the international
order -the “universalistic” solution- but through the “particularist” approach of trying to
maintain equilibrium in it, so that no one country, or group of countries, could dominate
it.”32 Restoring the balance of power was thus crucial to Kennan’s particularistic
approach.

According to Gaddis, two corollaries can be drawn from Kennan’s Logic. The

¥

2’ Davis, and Smith, The A to z ofthe Cold War, 1 18.

Thompson, Nicholas, The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze. George K ennan, and the History of the Cold
3War (New York: Henry Holt, 2009), 3.

Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 28.

55

ﬁrst was that not every parts of the world were vital to U.S. national security, “Industrial
capacity, together with the access to raw materials necessary to sustain, was the key to
power in the world, Kennan believed; the United states could tolerate the existence of
unfriendly regimes in many areas provided they lacked the means of manifesting that
hostility in ways that could threaten the United States.”33

Another implication of Kennan’s thought was “that the internal organization of
other states was not, in and of itself, a proper matter of concern for American foreign
policy.”34 For Kennan U.S. could coexist and draw some advantages from diversity,
“what was dangerous was the combination of hostility with the ability to do something
about it.”35 When analyzed properly, the only country that could present a major threat to
the United States in the post war context was the Soviet Union.36 These ideas were
fundamental in shaping President Truman’s administration response to the Soviet
communist threat.
The Truman Doctrine

Kennan suggestions were very inﬂuential in the elaboration of the Truman
doctrine that is “the anti-communist principle of the foreign policy enunciated by
President Truman in a message to Congress at a time when Greece and Turkey were in
danger of Communist subversion.”37 The Truman Doctrine set the stage for a more
interventionist U.S. foreign policy in the aftermath of the Second World War and it is

considered one of the ﬁrst foreign policy decisions that launched the Cold War. President

k

3:Gaddis, Strategies of Contamment 27.
:Gaddis, Strategies of Containment 30.
:Gaddis, Strategies of Containment 30.
6Gaddis, Strategies of Containment 32.

1Esmond Wright, The American Dream: From Reconstruction to Reagan (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell,
996). 336.

56

Truman’s decision to ask Congress to give U.S. government the authorization to provide
economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, constitute a major step in implementing
containment.

Truman stated in his address how each nation should have the freedom to choose
between alternative ways to rule their country. That alternative present these nations with
the option of choosing a system based on the will of the majority “distinguished by free
institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of freedom of speech
and religion, and freedom from political oppression.”38 Truman opposed this system to
the one that is based on “the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority.” Such
a regime he claims “relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, ﬁxed
elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.”39 Without direct allusion to any
speciﬁc countries, it is clear that the President’s speech drew from the Kennan’s piece
and Churchill’s remarks on the division of Europe in two. Between the lines it clearly
identiﬁes the two ideological systems that were competing for inﬂuence: capitalism and
communism.

Elaborated in response to the crises that were about to develop in Turkey and
Greece, Truman’s speech pioneered through the program of assistance to these countries,
the use of economic help as a way to contain the spread of communism. The doctrine
stated that “one of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the
creation of conditions in which we and the other nations will be able to work out a way of
life free of coercion.”40 The threat of communists seizing power in Europe explains why

this objective became the main characteristic of the U.S. foreign policy. The American

‘

:: Podell and Anzovin. The Truman Doctrine, 540.
POdell and Anzovin. The Truman Doctrine, 540
POdell and Anzovin. The Truman Doctrine, 540

57

assistance was necessary if democratic values were to be preserved in Western Europe
and other parts of the world. As Truman stated “it must be the policy of the U.S. to
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outsides pressures?“ The nature of the assistance was explicitly stated in the following
line in his speech, U.S. “help should be primarily through economic and ﬁnancial aid
which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.”42 In the
application of the ‘Truman Doctrine,’ the United States provided an economic assistance
of about 400 millions dollars to the government of Greece and Turkey.

The Truman doctrine represented a paradigm shift in the history of U.S. foreign
policy. Smoothly but certainly, the country was abandoning isolationism and was
embracing a policy of intervention based the defense and the promotion its democratic
ideals. That type of economic assistance was extended to the entire Western Europe with
an invitation. That assistance was awarded to about ﬁfteen nations of the Western
Europe. The plan was known as the European Recovery Plan (E.R.P) usually referred to
as the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan

As mentioned earlier, the situation of Europe in 1947 was very desperate with the
economy down and almost everything to be reconstructed. “Anyone who visited Europe
in the late spring or early summer of 1947” wrote Allen W. Dulles “came away with
serious forebodings. The pump priming which the United States had one for a very sick

continent was coming to an end as Europe, emerging from the worst winter in decade,

 

 

:; P Odell and Anzovin. The Truman Doctrine, 540.
POdell and Anzovin. The Truman Doctrine, 540.

58

was facing the most devastating drought of recent times.” 43 The old continent was facing
serious challenges that called for immediate assistance otherwise things could get worse.
Besides, due to the importance of the European economy in the world, its “desperate
economic situation” could soon affect the international trade if serious measures were not
taken to rescue Europe. More seriously, although the American economy was doing
comparatively much better after the war, “State Department ofﬁcials were worried that
the shift from war-time to peace-time economy might cause domestic economic
problems. Facing a large export surplus, ofﬁcials feared that the dwindling dollar reserves
of European nations and, thus their inability to pay for imports, could easily spell
unemployment and even new depression for the United States.” 44 It was thus in the
interest of the U.S. to provide economic assistance to the Europeans countries because
“In June 1947, the United States had political, strategic, and economic interests in helping
the countries participating in the Marshall Plan.” 45
But that economic advantage was not the sole reason behind the plan. Despite
Marshall’s claim that U.S. policy was not directed against any “country or doctrine but
against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos,” it would be shallow analysis to
dissociate the Plan from the containment policy. The Marshall Plan was part of the ﬁrst
strategies of containment for “by stabilizing democratic institutions through economic aid
and by urging close cooperation among the West European nations, American policy

makers sought to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its inﬂuence in Western

Europe.” ’6 Somehow the major purpose of the plan remained as Marshall “the revival of

y

:Allen W. Dulles, The Marshall Plan (Providence, RI, U. S. A. Berg, 1993), 2.

“Michael Wala, Introduction to The Marshall Plan by Allen W. Dulles (Providence, R. 1.: Berg, 1993), x.
46Sturgis “Government and Politics” in American Decades Primary Sources, 241.

46Michael Wala 1n Introduction to The Marshall Plan by Allen W. Dulles (Providence, RI, U. S. A: Berg,

59

a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social
conditions in which free institutions can exist.” 47 The Secretary of State George Marshall
explains the consequence of inaction: “the truth of the matter is that Europe’s
requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products -
principally from America - are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she
must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration
of a very grave character.”48 In addition to these economic and social problems, there
was a geostrategic dimension of the communist threat which seemingly explained the
domino theory. There was the fear that the rising inﬂuence of communist parties could
spill over the entire Western Europe if nothing was done to stop it. The Plan was adopted
in June 1947 under the name of the European Recovery Plan. Not only economic,
strategic and political reasons were behind the adoption of this plan but there was also a
moral and humanitarian reason as well.

History shows that in 1951 when the plan ended, its general objectives were
fulﬁlled: “when the European recovery Program came to an end in 1951, it had
revitalized the economies of the sixteen participating countries.”49 Not only did the plan
help promote and consolidate economic cooperation among European countries, but it
“stiffened their resistance to communist aggression, meeting its objective of “restoring
the conﬁdence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and

of Europe as a whole.”50 The plan was a success in bringing “Europe back to its feet”5 I

~

1993), ix.

:Sturgis “Government and Politics” in American Decades Primary Sources, 241.

8Amy H. Sturgis “Government and Politics” in American Decades Primary Sources vol. 5 pp 205-251,
editor Cynthia Rose (Detroit: Gale, 2004), 241.
so Wade, Wilder, Wade, A History of the United States, 760.
1 Wright, The American Dream 338.

Sturgis, “Government and Politics” in American Decades Primary Sam, 239.

60

 

 

and in consolidating the United States’ position as leader and superpower in the world.
Because of the Marshall plan the country “gained a power unimaginable only a few years
earlier” and European were able to increase their Gross National Product from 15 to 25.52
The Marshall Plan was also a success in that it became a model in how the U.S. offered
assistance to other nations.53

While the Marshall Plan was helping to rebuild the European nations, another
development was going on in the rest of the world. More and more, claims for self-
detennination were multiplying in the colonized world. Many of the population of these
areas were receptive to nationalist rhetoric. But the U.S. who actively contributed to the
Atlantic Charter, showed an ambivalent position as far as the independence of the
colonized world particularly Africa was concerned. One of the reasons was that as U.S.
still focused on Europe recovery, a support for the independence of the Third World
might affect its western allies who depended largely on raw materials from these areas. It
was in this context that Kennedy was elected in 1960.
The Kennedy Era

The sixties brought a new direction to the development of U.S. diplomacy and its
leadership. The Marshall Plan and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
brought relative stability in Europe but Washington still focused more on Europe than
other parts of the world. Meanwhile decolonization has already started and new nations
were joining the international community. In 1947 India became independent, 1957 it

was Ghana in Africa who became one of the ﬁrst African countries to gain its

independence. The following year, Guinea-Conakry also became independent in 1958

 

’2 Sturgis, Government and Politics, 240.
53 Sturgis Government and Politics, 240.

61

after having voted no to the French referendum which called for all the French colonies
in Aﬁica to remain in the French federation. In all these countries, nationalism was an
important driving force behind the anti-colonial success. Kennedy, in many of his trips as
Senator, found out that the U.S. paid less attention to those nations. He felt deeply
concerned afterward that nationalist sentiment might be turned against the U.S.
Furthermore many of these newly independent countries were turning toward the Soviet
Union for assistance to build their countries. The positive response given by the Soviet to
those countries make them regard the Russian with high esteem. Like many European
countries after the war, there was the urge to replace the colonial administration and to
fulﬁll the needs of the populations. These were challenges that many of the new third
world leaders were not accustomed to. Unlike the European countries that were
economically and technologically advanced before the war, the third world countries
were in need of speciﬁc assistance. The kind of assistance that should solve the problems
created by independence, that is education, salary, ﬁght against poverty health policy and
so on. Kennedy seriously criticized the Eisenhower administration saying that it focused
too much on the western European countries.54 In fact by the time Kennedy sworn in as
President, many in third world countries did not have good impressions about the U.S.
Kennedy thought that Moscow’s help could eventually create the avenue for
communist in-roads in the ‘third world’, particularly in Aﬁica. With Kennedy,
containment would go global and include a more social and cultural dimension in the

cooperation with the newly independent nations.55 The tone was set from the inaugural

g

5’ Elizabeth C. Hoffman, All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 60 ’5 (Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1998) 112.

55 Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin “The Kennedy Inaugural” in Speeches of the Presidents (New York: the
H.W Wilson company, 1988), 604.

62

speech as he made it clear that the U.S. was attached to freedom and its survival and
success. A commitment he made obvious when addressing the newly independent
nations, he warned: “To those new states we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge
our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be
replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect them to support our
view. But we shall always hope to ﬁnd them strongly supporting their own freedom.”56
When the president talked about ‘a far more iron tyranny’ he was alluding to
communist government that according to him would deﬁnitely prevent these nations from
preserving basic human rights and freedom. In a more persuasive tone Kennedy pursued
“to those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds
of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever
period is required—not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free
society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.”57 This
statement denotes a whiff of humanitarian aspect brought to U.S. involvement in third
world countries. There is also an implicit commitment to alleviate poverty in those parts
of the world. He would argue in others instances, the conditions in the Third world were
different for those of the Northern countries whose level of development before the war
was not too different from that of the U.S.; thence the assumptions that the infrastructure
that could ease the reconstruction of the European continent did not exist in the third
world. As a matter-of-fact the type of cooperation the U.S. should have with those states

must different from the kind of cooperation it had with the western European countries.58

k

:Sturgis “Government and Politics, ” 240.
Sturgis , “Government and Politics, ” 240.

Elizabeth C. Hoffman, All You Need Is Love: the Peace Corps and the spirit of the 60 ’s( Massachusetts:
Harvard University press, 1998,), 91.

58

63

However it is important to mention that an involvement of the U.S. in the Third World
did not imply a complete change in its policy with the European nations. The President
made it clear at the beginning of his speech “To those old allies whose cultural and
spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United there is little
we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do--for we
dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.”59

All in all, from Truman to Kennedy, the U.S. moved deﬁnitely away from
isolationism and became not only deeply involved in world affairs but playing actively
the role of world leader. The construction of a peaceﬁrl world has thus brought the U.S.
to intervene in many geographical areas in the world. This intervention took a variety of
forms including military, like in Vietnam, economic in Europe and political. The
promotion of peace could not only be economic or military. For the promotion of
democratic principle cannot be forceful otherwise it may well jeopardize the nobility
attached to it.

Permanent peace in the world could not only be achieved through economic
assistance or military alliances. Securing a strong and solid alliance with the goal of
preserving the international peace and stability required also a policy that helps reduce
misperceptions of each other and concomitantly increase understanding among the people
and nations of the world. Archibald MacLeish, one of the most prominent librarians of
Congress, wrote that “the world’s hope for peace, which is another way of referring to the
”60

world’s hope of survival, is directly dependent upon mutual understanding of peoples.

Preserving that survival, especially in the late forties, called for more understanding

 

 

1:: POdell and Anzovin “The Kennedy Inaugural,” 604.
Archibald MacLeish Introduction to The Cultural Approach, Another Way in International Relations by
RUth Emily McMurry and Muna Lee (Chapel Hill, Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1947), v.

64

between leaders and elites of different nations.

For the U.S. program of cultural relations, the objective will be to increase mutual
understandings where cultural similarities already existed (like in Western Europe) or to
establish the bases for a more elaborate policy of the promotion of cultural relations,
especially in areas where signiﬁcant cultural differences exist with the U.S. These efforts
led to the development of the American program in the post Second World war years.
Section 11: Evolution of U.S. Program of Cultural Relations

Cultural contacts between people from different areas, countries, culture or
civilizations are not recent phenomena of international relations. They are as old as “the
ﬂow of people and ideas across national boundaries.”61 Throughout history, “traders,
missionaries, military personnel, tourists, and an assortment of emerging international
types bred by industrialism”62 have all reﬂected through their actions some aspects of
cultural interactions between different nations, group of people or different continents.
Although their action could not be visibly linked with any foreign policy objective, the
probability of some remote connections could not be completely dismissed.63 People like
Christopher Columbus, Savorgna de Brazza, Stanley and many others have all been
involved in adventure, explorations with the blessing of some rulers or royalties. Their
discovery, had, one way or the other, some remote relations with foreign policy

Obj ectives.
The American program of cultural relations started ofﬁcially by the end of the

thil'ties, in 1938. However transnational cultural activities were quite signiﬁcant before

 

61
“Robert Blum, Introduction to Cultural Aﬂairs and Foreign Relations American Assembly. (N.J.:
nintice-Haﬂ Englewood Cliffs, 1963), 1.

l‘ank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy ofldeas: U. S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, [938-] 950
(yew York: Cambridge University Press, 1981 ), 8.
lnkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 8

65

that year and were mostly held by private actors. Their actions were largely independent
and were not connected with any government and thus could not be seen as a
continuation of the foreign policy of any administration. With the changing context of
international relations such separation between cultural action and governmental policy
could not last forever. Gradually, governments stepped into the ﬁeld of transnational
cultural activities, guided by the prospect for political or strategic advantages At the ﬁrst
the US government’s intervention was more regulatory. This type of interventions was
also complemented by its encouragement of collaboration between public and private
organizations. These collaborations betrayed mainly at the beginning of the twentieth
century, some remote interest in exerting some inﬂuences on cultural activities held by
private actors. For Frank Ninkovich, “it was only with the formation of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in 1910 that cultural relations were institutionalized
and tied, however tentatively, to foreign policy objectives.”64
Private actors included philanthropic organizations like the Carnegie Endowment,
the Rockefeller Foundation and others. In initiating at different levels and in different
areas exchange programs either in technical or educational ﬁelds, these actors pioneered
What would later become the official practices in the American cultural relations with
Other nations. Referring to the work of the Carnegie Endowment for example, Franck
NiIlkovich wrote that it “pioneered in arranging interchanges of important personages in
the attempt to create more cordial relationships between national elites, especially with
Latin America and the Far East?“ Likewise the Rockefeller Foundation, established in
19 1 3, after a decade on scientiﬁc and medical research also showed interest by the 1920’s
\

6‘ o
65 Nlnkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 8.
Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 12.

66

in cultural relations. Its program of international medicine, according to Ninkovich, “was
the technical model for all forms of cooperation.”66 Many of them worked with the
conviction that to build a peaceful world one needs to promote cultural exchanges among
people, nations and countries for an increase in mutual understanding brings a decrease in
conﬂicts. For Andrew Carnegie “international conﬂicts were caused by diplomatic
misunderstandings?“ For him, leaders tend to be mutually suspicious and stranger to one
another as a matter of fact their differences usually end in strife. On the other hand
difference between two ﬁiends end up in peaceful settlement either by these two friends
or through arbitration of some of their friends.68 Nevertheless, the prevalence of private
philanthropic organizations did not prevent the U.S. government from initiating culturally
related actions on its own. According to Charles Thompson and Walter Laves attempts by
officials to present U.S. culture abroad could be traced as far back as to people like
Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson whose book “Notes on Virginia” was ﬁrst
published in Paris."9 More formally, it was in the nineteenth century that one could see

the American government intervene although intermittently and sporadically, in
transnational cultural activities. Many of these interventions were more regulatory in
Character and they were resolutions taken by Congress or executive decisions about
eXChanges of documents or printed material between the U.S. Library of Congress and
Other foreign libraries. Thomson and Laves summarized few of them:

In 1840 what might be called the ﬁrst continuing activity in ofﬁcial

cultural relations originated in a joint resolution of Congress, providing for
exchange of published materials between the library of Congress and

\

66

67 Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 15

68 N inkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 8

69 Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, 8
’ Charles Alexander Thomson & Walter H.C. Laves, Cultural Relations and U. S. Foreign
OIicy,(Bloomington: 1ndiana University Press, 1963), 29.

67

foreign libraries. In 1867 the Smithsonian Institution was assigned

responsibility for interchange of public documents with institutions

abroad. In 1868 the ﬁrst annual report of the United States Commissioner

of Education carried information on education in other countries; and

beginning in 1892 his ofﬁce was charged with the task of making and

issuing studies of education abroad. In 1892 the National Bureau of

Standards was authorized to receive as guests foreign scientists and

technicians.70

All in all, on the eve of World War I, the American government was quasi-absent
from the ﬁeld of transnational cultural relations. With only a handful of regulations that
could be listed In assessment this self-restraint could have resulted from the isolationist
policy that characterized the U.S. foreign policy for almost a century and half or a lack of
interest in the cultural matter as even in domestic policy there was hardly a cultural
policy of the government. It could also be the fact that the U.S. at the turn of the century
was not yet a global power and therefore viewed cultural expansion differently from
countries like France or Great Britain that were both imperial powers. It would take three
more decades, owing to the rise of the U.S. as a regional power and assuming its
leadership in containing the inﬂuence of totalitarian regimes in the western hemisphere,
to see the government becoming more pro-active in the promotion of cultural relations’
with other nations. This occurred by the end of the thirties when changes in the
international political environment affected the American traditional policy toward Latin
American countries. Favored by the depression many totalitarian regimes emerged in
Germany, Italy and Japan. These regimes relied and heavily used propaganda as a key
tool to govern and indoctrinate their populations of counties but also tried to inﬂuence

other nations that could likely become more receptive to their ideology. Quite often this

propaganda goes beyond the national borders and spill over to other part of the world like

 

70 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 29.
68

Latin American. This raised serious concerns among the ofﬁcials in the US, concerns
that were justiﬁed as at the beginning of the twentieth century, many Latin American
countries seemed to have closer ties with European countries than they had to the U.S.
Many of them might become more receptive to those ideologies and that could eventually
jeopardize the American position in an area considered important for the U.S. national
security. In addition to this the overall perception of the United States policy in Latin
America was not very pleasant nor was the image of the American as a human being.
Talking about the U.S-Latin America relations, Thomson and Laves explained:

in the early years of the twentieth century, our relations with Latin

America were strained by Theodore Roosevelt’s action in Panama, later

pithily summarized in the phrase, “I took the Canal Zone”; by a series of

armed interventions in the Caribbean area; by Theodore Roosevelt’s

tutelary interpretation of the Monroe doctrine, which sought to justify such

interventions by attributing a regional police power to the United States;

and later by Woodrow Wilson’s nonrecognition policy.7|

From Latin American perspective the U.S. power was characterized by arrogance
supported by force and unilateralism; the country itself seemed “distant and alien”. In
Thomson’s explanations, on average the American was not seen as a scholar, an artist or
a humanitarian, or simply put an ordinary, understandable human being”. Rather he was
popularly viewed as “a vigorous people, but rude and crude, avid for money and material
goods. Too prevalently it was symbolized by the invading marine with his trampling

boots or the exploiting and corrupting capitalist.”7

These preconceived ideas about the
U.S. and the American could not really help establish good and constructive relations
with the Latin American people. It could also be very damaging for the US policy in the

region. For any policy to be effective a climate of trust and conﬁdence was to be

 

7' Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 33.
72 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 34.
73 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 34.

69

established between the American republics and the United States and for this to happen,
the above mentioned apprehensions and stereotypes “had to be corrected and humanized
if the people of Latin America were to accept the United States as any sort of “good
neighbor” 7" as Roosevelt wished it in his ﬁrst inaugural speech of March 4th, 1933.

Franklin D. Roosevelt is generally referred to as the father of the ‘good neighbor
policy’, but this policy was not the ﬁrst attempts in the history of the American presidents
to create good relations with the Latin American countries. It was rather a consecration of
a trend laid down by previous administrations. Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover
for example showed similar patterns of good relations with Latin America as they
managed to avoid armed interventions in that area. The Clark memorandum released by
Hoover in 1930 was an example of diplomatic appeal that separated the Roosevelt
corollary from the Monroe doctrine. The Memorandum recognized any US intervention
in Latin America as part of its right as a sovereign state and not linked with the Monroe
doctrine. Following that trend was the Roosevelt’s policy of ‘good neighbor’ of the
thirties that fall in the trend of diplomatic appeal.

The ‘good neighbor policy’ was Roosevelt’s foreign policy that essentially
targeted the Latin American republics. Enunciated in his inaugural, that policy was
articulated at the 7th Pan—American Conference in Montevideo by the US Secretary of
State Cordell Hull. Its purpose was to do away if not completely at least to a large extent
with armed intervention in Latin and promote change and a new type of relations with
the US neighbors of the south.

U.S. cultural relations program was launched in favor of that policy. In

application of the resolution of the many pan American conferences held in Latin

 

7" Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy 35-36.
70

America, the changes in U.S. diplomacy toward Latin America and the will to reinforce

relations between the Latin American republic through cultural relations led to the

creation of two institutions: the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the

American Republics (ICC) and the Division of Cultural Relations at the Department of

State.
Institutional Beginning

Born out of oral instruction from the president in 193 6, the ICC was formally

authorized in 1930 with the Public Law 355 that came into force on August 9th, 193 9.
The goal of this legislation was to improve the relationship between the American
Republics, using the government agencies “in carrying out reciprocal undertakings and
cooperative purposes” expressed in various actions taken by the Buenos Aires
Conference of 1936 and the Lima Conference of 1938.”75 The ICC covered a wide range
area of cooperation that can be divided according to Thomson and Laves’ analysis, into
three groups: the ﬁrst group included cooperative, scientiﬁc and technical projects. The
second group comprised the exchange of specialized information and that of materials on
educational methods and labor standards, scientiﬁc and technical books and publications,
library catalog cards, and albums of folk music. Finally the last area of cooperation dealt
with the exchange of persons for education and training in as many ﬁelds as agriculture,
civil aviation and others.76 These projects were planned and executed on a bilateral basis
with the expectation that they would beneﬁt both parties. It was agreed upon that the
ﬁnancial costs would be shared by the parties and determined by the nature of the project.

The ICC dealt with what later on became the US technical cooperation and worked

 

75 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 36.
76 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 37.

71

mainly with government agencies, to carry out its project. This technical aspect was
complemented with the task of the Division of Cultural Affairs, an agency that was
directly involved with academic and artistic exchanges.
Division of Cultural Affairs

The Division of Cultural relations in the Department of State was another agency
that came out of Roosevelt’s diplomacy. Created by a Departmental Order in 193 8, this
Division was in charge of carrying out the ofﬁcial international activities of cultural
intent; that is,

embracing the exchange of professors, teachers, and students;

cooperation in the ﬁeld of music, art, literature and other intellectual and

cultural attainments; the formulation and distribution of libraries of

representatives works of the United States and suitable translations

thereof; the participation by this Government in International radio

broadcasts; encouragement of a closer relationship between unofﬁcial

organizations of this and of foreign Governments engaged in cultural and

intellectual activities; and , generally, the dissemination abroad of the

representative intellectual and cultural works of the United States and the

improvement and broadening of the scope of our cultural relations with

other countries.77
This intent summarized all the main characteristics and goals of the United States cultural
relations program. It appears that the exchange of people in education, the arts and letters
or the dissemination of information about the U.S. are key elements of this program.
Compared to the French or British models, these objectives were not very different.

The Division of Cultural Relations thus emphasized initially “the more traditional
academic and artistic exchanges” predominant for intellectual cooperation under the

League of Nations.78 Unlike the Interdepartmental Committee the Division operates

mostly with private organizations. If philanthropic organization were crucial in

 

77 McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach, Another Way in International Relations, 208-209.
78 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 36.

72

pioneering many cooperative and exchange practices in transnational cultural activities,
the ofﬁcial American program owes a lot to the work of the ICC and the Division of
Cultural Affairs. The Division posed the main principles that guided U.S. cultural policy
in wartime as well as in the postwar years. The role of the Division was important in the
beginning and in the implementation of the U.S. cultural relations program. One of the
ﬁrst elements the agency retained was the emphasis on the exchange of persons. The
collaboration with the private organizations that marked the early stage of the
government intervention was probably one of the most salient aspects of cultural
relations. However as the scale of exchanges was going to get higher and higher with the
government’s involvement, it would have been hazardous to leave private organizations
deal with this alone. H. Bradford justiﬁed the government role of the government in this
task: “. . .an impressive ﬂow of foreigners to the United States, to develop a feeling for
American life in its native habitat, was bound to require some special governmental
assistance for surmounting the obstacles. The consequence was a great expansion in
organized public and private programs for the “exchange of persons” with foreign
countries.”79
This collaboration was soon confronted with concerns about the real objectives of
the program and foreign policy goals. The question was “whether a cultural relations
effort should be disinterested in character, or whether it ought frankly (or upon occasion
covertly) to serve propagandistic purpose.”80 Some of the officials thought that the

cultural program should advance the “Good neighbor policy” in Latin America and

thereby counter the Axis’ inﬂuence. The objective of the Interdepartmental Committee

 

79 H. Bradford Westerfield The Instruments of America ’s Foreign Policy, (New York: Crowell c1963), 245.
8° George N. Schuster, Cultural Aﬂairs and Foreign Relations American Assembly. (N.J.: Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs, 1963), 10.

73

was instead to strengthen political solidarity among the American republics.

After many debates, a consensus was reached in 1944 toward the end of the war.
The Advisory Committee ﬁnally proposed that “to the degree that the United States
foreign policy sought to achieve mutual international understanding, and a peaceful,
secure, and cooperative world order, cultural relations could serve to implement that
policy?“ But the committee made sure that this statement did not create confusion in its
interpretation. Consequently as to clarify it further, in June 1944 a resolution of the
General advisory committee declared that“ No program of international cultural
relations should be an instrument by means of which one people attempts to impose its
ideas or conceptions upon another, or to achieve cultural ascendency, or to accomplish
non-cultural objectives.”82 Any cultural programs thus in the words of the Advisory
Committee “must be collectively agreed upon as between peoples and must be mutually
acceptable and reciprocally carried out.”83 This is a very important point as it goes
against any kind of unilateralism in cultural relations.

The principle of reciprocity was retained for the activities of the Division as a
group of congressmen argued that a “one way road’ may not help acquire the knowledge
of the many activities being carried on by the Latin American peoples and government
that will be both educational and inspirational to us as well as valuable to our national
life.”84 The early exchange activities of the Division were elitist but later on the General
Advisory Committee revised that on the argument that cultural activities and economic

cooperation were interdependent and that to use the words of Vice President Henry A.

 

8' Minute of the general Advisory committee cited in Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US
Foreign Policy, 44.

82Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 44.

33 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 44.

34 Thomson and Laves Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy ,38.

74

Wallace “cultural activities should be thought of in terms of social functions.” This
recognition brought the advisory committee to have an all inclusive view of cultural
activities, embracing thus not only the ﬁne arts but also other ﬁeld like agriculture or
public health in their cooperation.85 It was then argued by the prominent members of the
Advisory Committee that cultural relations “should be planned to help men to acquire
skilled trades, to improve agricultural methods, and to forward ﬂood control and
irrigations projects.”86 The Division also supported the idea of creating American
libraries abroad and even considered the possibilities for the U.S. govermnent to support
or encourage the creation of American schools or college abroad.

Having identiﬁed the different types of activities the program of cultural relation
should cover, the division answered the question of ‘how’ to deliver cultural relations
but has not yet provided an adequate response to that of “who” should be in charge of
delivering cultural relations because traditional diplomats are trained to carry out more
political and administrative functions. Agency in cultural relations is important for the
fact that cultural relations is not only sending books abroad or building libraries. It is
also projecting ideas or ideology and “the best way to convey an idea is to embody it in a
human being and send him to the place where the idea should be implanted, or to bring
someone ﬁ'om that place to watch the idea embodied in action.”87 The choice of agents
for cultural delivery becomes thus delicate when it is understood that is rarely a
consensus on what best represent a national culture. It becomes even more of a daunting

task when the projection of this culture is ofﬁcially sponsored in a country like the United

 

8’ Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 39.

86 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 40.

87 H. Bradford Westerﬁeld The Instruments of America ’s Foreign Policy, (New York: Crowell c1963),
245.

75

States where there is certain “apprehensiveness about government playing an active role
in the promotion of ideas.”88 How should a professional cultural attache present that
culture, especially if he happens to develop ideas that are in conﬂict with the ofﬁcial
representation. This is the belief that is implicit behind the logic of exchange and that
added to the challenges faced by the division in its early days to select a person who is
able to qualitatively deliver the program in the host country and vice versa.

In solving that problem the Division created and deﬁned the post of cultural
Relations Ofﬁcer, known as Cultural attache. Quoting McMurry and Lee, his
prerogatives are described as “assisting the head of the Diplomatic mission in matters of
cultural signiﬁcance and keeping the Department at Washington fully informed of local
developments in the cultural ﬁeld.”89 Beside this administrative position the General
Advisory Committee of the Department of State required that the attaché’s proﬁle should
include a suitable personality that would help them develop a good working relation with
the people in the host country. Furthermore he must have ‘broad intellectual and cultural
interest’ enabling them to appreciate matters beyond their specialty. They must have
‘constructive imagination and enthusiasm’ and show ‘maturity’ ‘education’ and ‘good
judgment’ in their viewpoint. Last but not least, they must show some readiness to learn
local language if they don’t have a ‘ﬂuent command of it already.90 Additionally he must
be knowledgeable about the culture and institutions of the U.S. and be ready to do the
same about his host country. He is considered a new kind of diplomat and “was supposed

to possess a broad and rounded knowledge of the social, educational, scientiﬁc, and

 

88 Frank A Ninkovich, U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy, Headline series, no. 308. (New
York, N.Y.: Foreign Policy Association, 1996), 7.

89 McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach, Another Way in International Relations ,214.

9° McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach, 215.

76

 

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artistic life of the United States, and of the leading public and private organizations in
those areas of activity. Correspondingly he was to inform himself of similar activities and
trends in the country where he was stationed.” 9' His role was broadly deﬁned and
consisted among others in keeping a “benevolent eye” on American cultural centers and
schools abroad.

By the end of the war the American cultural program was well in operation,
having solved many of the challenges posed by government intervention in the ﬁeld and
by its collaboration with private actors. Some of these problems were related to the way
its programs should be delivered in the host countries or what are the qualiﬁcations of the
cultural attache. But the grey area between cultural relations and foreign policy objectives
was not ﬁrlly solved. The outbreak of the Second World War brought the matter to the
table again, forcing the ofﬁcials to create new agencies.

Impact of World War II

World War II inﬂuenced greatly the U.S. program of cultural relations. The war
forced the government to revise its cultural program notably its agencies and its
objective. The war sharpened the strategic importance of Latin America for the U.S.
national security. The war also brought more pressure on using cultural activities to
fulﬁll the objectives of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in helping the fulﬁllment of the
wartime foreign policy goal. It was expected that cultural activities strengthen the
solidarity among the American Republics but also that they help these countries develop
a positive attitude toward the U.S. These expectations were important because in the

context of the war a successful cultural program could add to the prestige of the U.S. and

 

9' Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 45.

77

It

thereby create a natural shield against the Axis propaganda. 92 It was to meet all these
new expectations that in addition to the previous agencies, two new agencies were
created: the Coordinator (or Ofﬁce) of Inter American Affairs and the Ofﬁce of War
Information. If the ICC and the Division were expected to neutral and mostly apolitical,
the wartime context that generated these new agencies dictated their objective and made
them act clearly as instruments of American propaganda.

The Coordinator for Inter American Affair ( C.I.A.A.) was created in 1939 by
President Roosevelt who appointed Nelson Rockefeller as the head of this new agency
which major purpose was the defense of the western hemisphere against the Nazi
inﬂuence. Its activities were “economic and informative” and they were mostly carried
out through “press, radio, and motion pictures.” Owing to the experience of its staff in
private sector the CIAA was able to develop cooperation with the private organizations
while at the same time energetically expand the role in “stimulus, sponsorship, and
operation.” The CIAA and its staff were essential in bringing the arts and the
entertainment in the realm of cultural exchanges. In fulﬁllment of its goals and following
the objectives of its creation, the CIAA as a wartime strategy “produced Spanish-
Language newsreels and documentaries and also made effective use of entertainment
ﬁlm. Walt Disney studios, for example, created Saludos Amigos, a feature-length cartoon
using Disney’s famous character in Latin Americas settings, as a contribution to good
neighborliness. The OIAA’s radio division broadcast twenty-four hours a day to Latin
America by 1941, compared to twelve hours a week in 1939. The OIAA supplied

neWSpaper clients throughout the hemisphere with news and photos.”93

 

92 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy 47.
93 Stanley 1. Kutler et al, Encyclopedia of the United States in the Twentieth Century. (New York: Charles

78

By 1941, the CIAA launched the translation program which consisted in
translating U.S. book into Portuguese or Spanish or vice versa. Toward the end of the
CIAA in 1943 when the translation project along with other activities were transferred to
the Department of State, the American Council of Learned Societies and other
organization that were deeply involved in the project had signed about 116 books’
contract out of which 57 were published.94 McMurry and Lee the distribution process of
the books translated: “government assistance is usually conﬁned to a payment for
translation rights or the purchase of a certain number of copies of each book in lieu of a
translation fee. The books are then brought out by recognized publishers and distributed
through commercial bookstores without government responsibility for proﬁt or loss.”95

Since the Department of State and the CIAA were all involved in cultural relations
there were undoubtedly some overlap in their competence. The difference was that one
agency was created by the White House and had a short term goal for wartime
“emergency” while the other has a long-term goal that goes beyond the time of conﬂict.
This distinction became signiﬁcant when in 1943 almost all the activities of the CIAA
were transferred to the State Department. Nevertheless, the works of the CIAA were
positive in complementing the cooperation developed by the Department of State with
U.S. educational organizations.

The Ofﬁce of War Information (O.W.I.) is the second agency created in the
middle of the Second World War. It was established in 1942 with the goal of facilitating

“the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, abroad, of the status and

progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the

 

Scn'bner's Sons, 1996— ), 703.
9’ McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach ,219.
9’ McMurry and Lee, The Cultural Approach, 219.

79

Government.”96 With this aim, the new agency almost completely absorbed the Division
and made the opinion that the “democratic philosophy of the United States must always
be the true purpose of cultural activities, however discreetly camouﬂaged it might be.”97
Information was the key factor in the OWI operations and cultural activities even
if they did intervene, were just used as a way to supplement its information activities. The
Ofﬁce of War had characteristically three kinds of activities that had all informative
character. The ﬁrst was a small scale program of travel for individuals, usually mass
media and communication people. The Ofﬁce was also involved in books and magazines
distribution abroad through the 28 information libraries it then had abroad. These books
were either in English or they were translated. In Thomson and Laves’ explanations,
“these collections contained a wide range of books on the history, life, and thought of the
U.S.” The collections were mostly available for editors, scholars or public ofﬁcers while
a less sophisticated audience was served by exhibits.98
The Cold War
As discussed earlier in this chapter, with the general political atmosphere that
followed the war, the dream of one world soon became evanescent. Bipolarity ensued
with antagonistic ideological competition between the two superpowers that emerged
from the conﬂict: the United States and the Soviet Union. Each power showed the
interest in inﬂuencing as many countries as possible especially the emerging Third

World countries. That situation generated the Cold War. If the Second World War forced

revision and restructuration in U.S. cultural program, the ideological competition with

 

96 McMurry and Lee

97 George N. Schuster “The Nature and Development of United States Cultural Relations” in Cultural

gnaw and Foreign Relations by American Assembly. (N.J.: Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, 1963), 12.
Thomson and Laves, 52

80

the Soviet Union will have a much stronger impact on its scope and character. As

explained by George N. Schuster the Cold War:
immensely broadened the scope of our cultural activities and then it gave
it a radically different character. The Soviet Union was beyond any doubt
determined to establish the dominion of communism over the world; and
though it was at ﬁrst difﬁcult for many to believe that this was the case,
the grim evidence became more and more overwhelming. One of
communism’s most thoroughly tested methods was forming elites, usually
comprised of unhappy and unemployed intellectuals in disaffected areas,
so that through them propaganda carefully tailor-made for the purpose
could be widely disseminated. The most effective contention of that

propaganda no doubt was that the Russian system was technically the
most efﬁcient and at the same time the most ardently dedicated to peace.

99
So the elite and the poor were the target of Soviet cultural activities. By extension this

includes poor countries as well. To counter this propaganda and strategy of the Soviet, a

revision of the apolitical nature of the U.S. cultural relations program was necessary.

maintaining a separation between foreign policy objectives and cultural relations

threaten to jeopardize the future of program as many Congressmen may not vote for it

unless it serves the purpose of the overall U.S. foreign policy.

The agencies involved in the program had to be reformed and further differences
need to be clariﬁed between cultural relations, educational exchanges and so on. The
Ofﬁce of Inter-American Affairs, the Ofﬁce of War Information all disappeared after the
war, they were all absorbed by an Interim Information Service that paved the road, in a
four months a period, for the Organization of International Information and Cultural
Affairs, created in 1946 the new agency show some expansions in the program as it

covered ﬁve regions.

Meanwhile, the Fulbright Act was passed in 1946. Initiated by Senator J .William

 

99 George N. Schuster “The Nature and Development of United States Cultural Relations” in Cultural
Aﬂairs and Foreign Relations, 16-17.

81

Fulbright, its objective was to convert the cash credit generated by the purchase of U.S.
property left in the war devastated countries into money that would be used for
educational exchange program. Items like machine tools, bulldozers and stocks of foods
and clothing”100 very useful to those war torn countries could only be paid in dollars and
this dependence on foreign currency could negatively affect their economy. The newly
voted act provided a solution to that problem by allowing those countries to use the ﬁrnds
in national currency for the purpose of “ﬁnancing studies, research, instruction, and other
educational activities” of American citizens in those countries. '01 However the
counterpart was not possible since non Americans could not have access to those funds
for studying or teaching or researching in the U.S. This loophole in the provision of the
Act was ﬁlled with appropriation of dollar funds from other U.S. government funds,
some private organizations either American or foreign. The Fulbright program operates
with a Board of Foreign Scholarships in and the US and most countries they have a
binational commission to select the candidates to study in the U.S. The Fulbright program
is one of the most successful achievements of the postwar years, its worldwide impact is
nowadays undeniable.

Not long after, the Smith-Mundt Act was also voted in 1948 after many delays,
interrogations and trips in Europe to witness the reality of Soviet anti-American
propaganda. It is officially known as the “United states Information and Educational
Act.” Its objective were “to enable the government of the United states to promote
better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual

understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other

 

'00 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy , 60.
'0' Thomson and Laves Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 60

82

countries.”102

These two acts show how U.S. outlook on culture in its relations with other
nations changed after the war. The American active participation in the foundation of the
UNESCO and the voting of important Bills related to international cultural exchange
reﬂect how important culture has become in US postwar diplomacy. The Fulbright Act
passed in 1946 and later on complemented by the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948 show how
cultural relations and exchange programs have made their way successfully to the ﬁeld of
American diplomacy, becoming one of the “key features of U.S. leadership in the
postwar world.”103 But the mounting propaganda of the Soviet Union and the decision of
the government not to let the world know the truth about the U.S., its system and way of
life led to the adoption of the program of citizen diplomacy under the 3 suggested by
President Eisenhower.

People-to-people Program

This could be called President Eisenhower contribution to the development of the
United States cultural relations program. Following an idea he defended at the Baylor
University in Texas in 1956, asking for more sympathetic understanding among citizens
of the world, the president invited a group of leaders from different professional, business
or voluntary organization at the white house. Their task was to discuss the idea of
bringing private citizens and groups to join in the effort of creating a “people-to-people
Partnership.” '04 As a result:

the movement encouraged American towns and cities to affiliate with

 

 

1:: Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 67.
Liping Bu, “Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War” in The Cultural Turn:

Essays in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations Frank A. Ninkovich, Liping Bu eds. (Chicago: Imprint
Publications, 2001), 10.

'04 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy 131.

83

municipalities abroad, American corporations and business forms

operating overseas to cultivate better community relations, American

individuals to write letters, contribute books, and send past issues of

magazines to individuals in foreign countries and to provide home and

community hospitality to foreigners visiting the United states, numerous

and varied organizations to adopt overseas project or to engage in

exchanges with their corresponding associations abroad.10

The result of this movement was mitigated. It helped create some contact between
Americans people or groups and their counterpart abroad. But the result are nothing
comparable to what have been done by “foundations and by educational, scholarly,
religious, and industrial groups and organizations.”106 In 1961, the idea of citizen
participating in the cooperation program of the government was taken to another level by
a critique of Eisenhower foreign policy toward the emerging nations, President Kennedy,
the result was the creation of the Peace Corps of the United States.
The Peace Corps

The list of U. S. agencies that intervene in its cultural relations program would be
incomplete if the Peace Corps is not included. Created in 1961 by the US President John
F. Kennedy with the Executive Order 10924, the Peace Corps function was to “be
responsible for the training and service abroad of men and women of the United States in
new programs of assistance to nations and areas of the world, and in conjunction with or
in support of existing economic assistance programs of the United States and of the

”'07 As the Executive Order shows,

United Nations and other international organizations.
the main goal of the agency at its beginnings was to assist newly independent countries or

other developing nations in their policy of national development. In actual fact the agency

 

’05 Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 133.

'06 Thomson and Laves Cultural Relations and US Foreign Policy, 133.

'07 SEC. 2. Functions of the Peace Corps. (a)
M/Mww.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/itkeo/eo/10924.htm (accessed June 23rd, 2009 8:03pm.)

84

explains that President Kennedy’s intention was to “promote world peace and
friendship.” It is to attain that objective that a threefold objective has been assigned to
the Peace Corps:
To help the people of interested countries in meeting their need for
trained men and women.
To help promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the
. peoples served.

To help promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of
Americans.108

The Peace has quickly become a special instrument in US cooperation with the
rest of the world particularly the third world countries. Over the years the program has
increased in number of volunteer, appropriations and countries covered. Since its official
establishment on March 1St 1961, the Peace Corps has dispatched about 195,000

volunteers in about 139 countries around the world.109

Volunteers have greatly
contributed to the development of the host countries and improve the image of the
American by showing other aspect of the ‘American character’ to the populations of host
countries. Volunteers have served in various ﬁelds from the beginning. Today they serve
as “education, youth outreach, and community development; business development;
agriculture and environment; health and HIV/AIDS; and information technology?” '0
H. Bradford Westerﬁeld wrote that “the comforts’ of an era of western hegemony
over the rest of the world were- and would continue to be- undeniably pleasurable for the

United States; and some inclination to restore as much of them as possible can be

detected in a very large part of American policy since World War II.”1 11 Perhaps this

 

'08 http://www.peacecorpsgov/index.cﬁn?s_he1l=leam.whatispc.mission, (accessed June 23rd, 2009
8:30pm.)
'09 http://www.pez_1cecorns.gov/multimedia/ndf/aboumrc factspdf accessed June, 2rd, 2009 at 7:43pm

“0 http://wwwpeacecoms.gov/multimedia/pdf/about/pc factspdf accessed June, 2rd, 2009 at 7:43pm
' ” Westerﬁeld The Instruments of America 's Foreign Policy, 243.

85

explains the changes noticed in the US postwar foreign relations as shown in this
chapter: end of isolationism, more interventionist policy and rise to world leadership
have all characterized U.S. foreign policy since the end of the war. American
involvement in world affairs was characterized by economic assistance like the Marshall,
military alliance, and to the development of a program of cultural exchange that has
gradually covered almost all the regions of the World helping the U.S. to reach an
undeniable level of cultural preeminence. This achievement resulted from a constellation
of different factors, starting from the Second World War:

World War II brought new and unparalleled opportunities for extending

US inﬂuence. New wartime propaganda agencies, the presence of U.S.

army troops around the globe, the Americanization associated with

postwar occupations, postwar aid and informational programs, and the

anticommunist cultural offensive launched in the early 19505 all helped

the United states attain preeminent cultural, as well as military, power in

the post-world war II era.l '2

This chapter has shown how the international context of the post World War II
brought about changes in U.S. foreign relations and how America became a world leader
involved in an ideological competition with the Soviet Union. That change of policy
inﬂuenced the evolution of the American program of cultural policy after the war to ﬁt
the context of Cold War of the late 40’s and the 50’s.

By the sixties, when many African nations became independent, almost all of the
institutional instruments of the postwar U.S. foreign policy were in place, particularly its
institutional mechanism of cultural exchanges. If decolonization did not bring much

change in the ideological basis and the institutional operation of the program, it somehow

brought about a geographical expansion in its delivery. In 1958 the African Bureau was

 

”2 Stanley 1. Kutler, et al. Encyclopedia of the United States in the Twentieth Century (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1996- ), 703.

86

created in the State Department This creation was an important administrative change in
the history of the U.S. relations with Aﬁica. Until then the continent had not received any
proper attention from Washington despite the fact that the relations between the two
entities go as far back as the foundation of America. The next chapter will show how
after a period of indifference and minimalism, Africa started gaining more recognition in

U.S. foreign policy especially in the years after the independence.

87

CHAPTER 2
U.S. RELATIONS WITH AFRICA:
FROM MINIMALISM TO IDEOLOGICAL BATTLEGROUND

The previous chapter shows how the contemporary U.S. —African relations
developed in an international context of bipolarity marked by the ideological rivalry
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As a consequence of this rivalry, the United
States adopted a policy of communism containment with the goal of preventing the
Soviet Union spreading its ideological and political inﬂuence to other countries,
especially the emerging countries of the decolonized world. The prior chapter also
demonstrated how containment played a highly inﬂuential role in U.S. foreign policy,
conditioning to a large extent every aspect of its relations with the rest of the world,
particularly with the “Third World” countries after decolonization. From military
cooperation to economic assistance, and cultural exchange, U.S. foreign policy was
inﬂuenced by the power dynamics imposed by the bipolar context of the cold war. If the
Marshall Plan, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked
the economic and military strategies that help stabilize Europe after the war, cultural
exchanges and information policy transmitted through the ofﬁce of the United States
Information Agency (USIA) transformed the Cold War into a total war with the aim of
winning hearts and mind of both the elite and the masses in the newly independent
countries of Aﬁica and Asia. This was the context in which the political independence of
many African countries occurred in the 19605.

This chapter examines the development of U.S. cultural relations with West
African countries after their independence. It starts with the analysis of the change in the

official U.S. attitude toward Aﬁica in general from indifference to minimal yet

88

signiﬁcant involvement in the post independence economic and political development of
African countries. Despite several changes of administrations in Washington, the chapter
notes how the American engagement in Africa, regardless of the political party that
controlled the White House, was primarily aimed at preventing the newly independent
countries from becoming hotspots in the Cold War, through the development of “socialist
policy” and accepting economic and political support from the Soviet Union or their
allies in the Eastern Bloc.

West Africa is located in sub-Saharan Africa, spanning from the Saharan desert in
the north to the Gulf of Guinea in the south. It is made up of 16 countries with a colonial
heritage from the major European colonial powers: France, Britain and Portugal. The
French had controlled Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Burkina F aso, Benin, C6te d'Ivoire Niger,
and Mauritania and gained part of Togo after the First World War. British had controlled
Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, and Nigeria. The Portuguese were present in Guinea
Bissau and Cape Verde—colonies that did not gain their independence until 1975. As a
region, West Aﬁica is important for this study not only for its rich cultural heritage that
has some ramiﬁcations with aspects of American culture but also for the indirect impact
it has on the U.S. relations with the western European allies.

In general, when discussing U.S. Cold War intervention in Aﬁica, the Congo
crisis, the Angola War, or the Horn of Aﬁica are usually mentioned. West Africa is
usually regarded as marginal and less relevant to the Cold War competition between the
two superpowers. Yet, although no major cold war related conﬂicts occurred in that part
of Africa, West Africa was not entirely free from the ideological competition between the

United States and the Soviet Union. In fact it is one of the ﬁrst areas in Aﬁica where the

89

U.S. tried to stop the emergence of Soviet inﬂuence.' Besides from 1960 until the end of
the decade, the ﬁrst ofﬁcially proclaimed socialist regimes of Africa were located in West
Africa. These were the regimes of Sekou Toure in Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana,
Modibo Keita in Mali, who all declared themselves non-capitalist.2

Until the Second World War, with the exception of Liberia, ofﬁcial contacts
between the U.S. and Africa were almost inexistent. U.S. had practically no major
interests on the continent and most of these African territories were still under colonial
domination. Apart from missionary churches operating on the continent, there was no
particular political interest to make ofﬁcial America sensitive and inquisitive about
African issues. Apart from Liberia and few and the southern part of Aﬁica, there was no
colonial interest and no real economic stake as such on the continent. This may explain
why the U.S. stayed aloof and let Europeans control and exploit the resources of the
continent. Yet the links between the two entities go back to the founding of the United
States of America. Peter Duignan and L.H.Gann observed, “contacts between Africa and
the United States are of ancient origin. They are closer perhaps than those that exist

between Aﬁica and any European country.”3

A similar argument is made by Toyin Falola
and Alusine Jalloh who recall that U. S.—West African relations can be traced back to the

era of the transatlantic slave trade that saw “between nine and thirteen million Africans

 

' Sergey Mazov argue during a talk in 2003 that “Archival evidence suggests that West Africa became a
Cold War issue in January 1956 when the United States prevented exchanging of Embassies and
developing relations between the USSR and Liberia. In West Aﬁica Americans challenged Soviets in every
sphere — political, diplomatic, economic, social and military. Each major Soviet move caused counter or
pre-emptive measures that contributed much to frustrate its plans.” Synopsis of the talk on “Soviet Policy
in West Africa (1956-1964) as an episode of the Cold War.

http://www.wilsoncentcr.orgx’indexcfm‘.’topic id=14l7&catcuorvid=09BoBF65-6SBF-E7DC-
40F567F157F96E158;fuseaction=topics.events itcm topics&cvcnt id=27557

2 While these governments claimed to be socialists, none of them embraced Marxism which is based on the
classes struggle.

3 Peter Duigan & L.H. Gann, The United States and Africa: A History (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1984), xiii.

90

transported to the American continent. Although the majority went to Brazil and the
Caribbean, an estimated 400,000 slaves, or roughly 4 percent of the total, were carried to
British North America.”4 F alola and J alloh argue that “this group of Aﬁicans and their
Aﬁican American descendents established the basis for the relationship between the
United States and West Africa.”5 Ever since, that connection has left an indelible imprint
on the way Africa is viewed by the U.S. greatly, inﬂuencing American diplomacy as
many African nations rose to statehood.

After the end of the Atlantic slave trade in early 19th century and the abolition of
slavery, Africa has become less visible on U.S. diplomatic map. America became more
focused on its own domestic problems and found no particular interest in developing
political ties with Africa. The ﬁrst connection of U.S. with Africa in the modern time
would be made with the foundation of Liberia as a settlement for freed slaves in 1822.
Between the creation of Liberia and the beginning of World War I, the American
concerns for African affairs according to Duignan and Gann were almost nonexistent:

Ofﬁcial America, until the outbreak of World War I, had but little concern

in African affairs. The United States had taken no part in the partition of

Aﬁica. The state department largely considered the Aﬁican continent an

extension of Europe in both the political and the diplomatic sense.

American empire builders looked to Cuba and the Philippines, not the so-

called Dark Continent. Similarly, the American economic stakes in Africa

amounted to little. Most America capital was invested at home, what there

was of U.S. trade was centered on Europe and the Americas.6

However, there were rare occasions where America intervened in Africa related

issues. In 1880, U.S. took part in a conference dealing with Morocco and similarly it took

part in the Algeciras conference in 1906. The U.S. was also present at the Berlin

 

4Jalloh and Falola eds., The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations (Rochester:
University Press of Rochester, 2008), 1.

5 Jalloh and F alola, The United States and West A frica, l.

6 Duignan and Gann, The United States and Africa, 185.

91

conference of 1884-1885 that consolidated the scramble for Africa and attributed most of
the continent to European colonial power. It was at this conference that the Belgian
Congo was attributed to King Leopold of Belgium who ruled that territory as a private
property and committed some of the worst crimes and human right abuses of colonial
history. Here the U.S. made its first policy statement applicable to sub-Saharan Africa.
The statement “endorsed free access for American commerce and benevolent treatment
of the Africans.”7 Despite these concerns for a humane treatment of Africans, the ﬁnal act
of the conference was not submitted to the U.S. senate for ratiﬁcation by President
Cleveland. David Dickson explains that the then Secretary of State justiﬁed the position
by asserting that the United States was “unprepared to accept political engagements in so
remote and undeﬁned a region as that of the Congo Basin.”8 This statement explains well
why the U.S. adopted a neutral attitude toward Africa until the Second World War.

The war was a turning point in how the United States viewed Africa. As a
consequence of the important role that Africa—its territory, people (as soldiers) and raw
materials—played in World War II, the continent gained more visibility in U.S. policy.
According to Andrew de Roche the Second World War had impacted the U.S.—Aﬁica
relations in many ways. He explains that it established in the mind of leading American
policymakers the strategic importance of Africa. More and more ofﬁcials from the State
Department increased their attention to African issues, including pondering ideas on how
to end colonization.9 He notes that African—Americans particularly developed an interest

in Aﬁica, showing some concerns over the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 but also

 

7 David A. Dickson, United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa (Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, 1985), 2.

8 Dickson, United States Foreign Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa, 2.

9 Andrew DeRoche, "Relations with Africa since 1900" In A Companion to American Foreign Relations.
Schulzinger, Robert D. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 106.

92

because ﬁve thousand African-Americans soldiers among the “black units of the U.S.
army were stationed there” in Liberia that served as a military basis during the war. '0
Serving as a military base was beneﬁcial to Liberia because the U.S. reconstructed most
of the country’s infrastructure, both countries signed an agreement on mutual defense and
the U.S. also helped Liberia with the Lead Lease Act funds. But this change of attitude in
the American perception of Africa had little impact on the overall perception of Africa
and Aﬁicans. Some among the higher ofﬁcials, like undersecretary of State Sumner
Welles, still doubted that Africans were ready for independence because for him,
Africans were “in the lowest rank of Human beings.”ll

For African-Americans, the independence of Africa was part of the “double
victory” they aimed for after the war. De Roche saw a parallel between ﬁght for
liberation in Africa and the African American struggle for civil rights in the U.S., he
wrote that “just as the war gave a boost to the civil rights movement in the United States,
it sparked the struggle for Liberation in Africa.”12 Indeed right after the war there more
and more claims for self-government and an increase in the number of nationalist
movements toward independence on the African continent. This announced the era of
decolonization in the world still under foreign domination --particularly in Africa.
Decolonization and Independence

Favored by their experience in the war and by a growing number of intellectuals
who could validly challenge their European counterparts, many “Third World leaders

became more vocal about the right to self— determination and independence. These

demands were channeled through nationalist movements that sprang up in many areas

 

'0 DeRoche, "Relations with Africa since 1900," 106.

l‘DeRoche, "Relations with Africa since 1900," 107.
”DeRoche, "Relations with Aﬁica since 1900," 107.

93

and that in the long run, led to the independence of India, Ghana and many other Africans
countries. Many factors explain the rise of nationalism in Africa. These include the
impact of the Second World War and the inﬂuence of Pan-Africanism and education.

Some may argue that a man suffering needs not to be reminded that he is. But
sometime the astute and subtle way the mechanism of oppression is implemented requires
a certain leadership to make the victims aware of their situation. Modern education
through the elite provided this leadership in colonial Africa. Missionary churches were
among the ﬁrst institutions to have started modern education in colonial Africa. In that
respect they played a catalytic role (indirectly probably or more speciﬁcally an
unintentional role) in developing African nationalism as Vincent Khapoya explains: “In
many African colonies, mission schools were the main educational institutions, and the
expense of educating Aﬁicans was oﬁen borne entirely by the missions. In other
colonies, the colonial government provided the ﬁnding, but the teaching staff and the
curriculum were the responsibility of the missions”'3 Apart from spreading the gospel,
these missionary churches were not only imparted the mission of asserting the superiority
of the western values but they were also expected to help increasing the level of
productivity of the Africans by giving them the appropriate education. This shows clearly
that the civilizing mission of colonization, the motto of some colonial powers like France,
was just a cover for the real goal: to serve the interest of the colonial power.

During the process of colonization, despite initial resistance, most Africans found
it useful and important to have a western education. It is a common belief that educated

Africans would become the link between Africans and the Europeans. As it turned,

 

'3 Vincent B. Khapoya, The Aﬁ'ican Experience: An Introduction (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1998), 153.

94

Leaders like J omo Kenyatta and Leopold Sedar Senghor’s respectively from Kenya and
Senegal show that Africans were right about acquiring western. Both through their
mastery of European languages were able to present the beauty of African values and
culture to the west while at the same time criticizing the horrors of colonialism on the
African people. They both became president of their country. '4 African elite through
modern education acquired the skills that helped them articulate their demands and
question the legitimacy of colonial authorities. Education also became a powerful
medium of acculturation of Western Christian (and political) values, values that the
African very cleverly and ingenuously, to the utter surprise of her/his colonial master,
incorporated into politicalidebate over their struggles. According to Ali Mazrui, “The
destruction of the ‘pagan’ Aﬁican culture was naturally accompanied by attempts to
replace it with some aspects of the English way of life. Next to making the boys and girls
upright Christian, this was an important aim of the Christian educators.”l5 He concludes
that missionary education was perhaps far more successful at producing a new cultural
African than a consistent Christian. Many of the ﬁrst leaders of independent Africa were
products of missionary education. One could name few among them -apart from Senghor
( Senegal), and Kenyatta ( Kenya), the list include Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Kenneth
Kaunda ( Zambia), Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria), and Kamusu Banda ( Malawi). ‘6

By showing the dichotomy between its teachings and its daily practices, the
Church contributed to the grth of Aﬁican nationalism. Its contemptuousness attitude to

African traditions and cultures contradicted sharply with its doctrine of spiritual kinship

 

'4 Khapoya, The Aﬁican Experience, 154-5.
'5 Khapoya, The African Experience ,155
'6 Khapoya, The A ﬁ'ican Experience, 155

95

of every human being regardless of his ethno-racial origins. '7 The church’s silence on
colonial oppression, its constant way of shutting down any attempt by Africans to discuss
political affairs and issues related to Africa at school provoked the birth of African
Initiative Churches (AIC) lead by Africans who pinpointed the double standard of the
colonial church. ' 8

Until the eve of the Second World War, the myth of the white man superiority on
which most of the colonial enterprise rested was not seriously challenged. It would take
the two world wars to persuade Aﬁicans (with the experience of ex-service men) that in
peace as in war human experiences-whether white or black-were the same and therefore
there was no difference between Europeans and Aﬁicans. The Second World War played
an important role in weakening the colonial powers. France for example was humiliated
by Germany, a defeat that “helped to destroy the myth of its imperial invincibility.”
England was impoverished by the war and was forced within a couple of years to let go
of India (1947).19

For Basil Davidson there is not much difference between African nationalism and
European nationalism. Just like the rights of man was the main pedestal of European
nationalism, so were the principles of equality and freedom to the Aﬁican nationalism.
“In Africa, as in Europe,” he explained, “the driving inspiration was not that all men
should be divided by becoming nationals, but that all men should be united by becoming
free.”20 Most of the effort of resistance or deﬁance developed under the colonial

Oppression would eventually lead to the independent movement of the post second war

 

'7 Khapoya, The African Experience 155

'8 Khapoya, The African Experience, 157—8

l9Ari Mazrui, “Seek Ye First the political Kingdom” in General History ofAfrica (UNESCO.Volume vm:
Africa Since 1935 Edited by A.li A. Mazrui 1993), 1072 p. 112. '

2° Basil Davidson, Africa in History: Themes and Outlines (London: Phoenix, 1992), 325.

96

period. By the end of the War, African nationalism became more established probably
because of the inﬂuence of the African intellectuals in Africa and from the Diaspora
community, particularly within the Pan-Aﬁican movement. Pan-Africanism in the
beginning was a “protest movement against the racism endured by black people in the
new world”? It then slowly evolved into an anti-colonial struggle instrument, “dedicated
to bringing about African leaders and intellectuals who hoped that perhaps in the future,
African states might be federated as the United States of Africa?” If some Africans were
more conciliatory with the colonial administration, an important number among the rest
was also'deﬁant of those administrations. Many of those who challenged the colonizers
intellectually were the pioneers of the independence movement. Their nationalistic and
Pan-Africanist feelings evolved into an undeniable political force worth being
acknowledged by Washington for the ﬁiture of its political relations with Aﬁica.
Evolution of U.S.-Africa Relations after World War II

American attitudes toward the political situation in Africa were gradually revised
by the mid ﬁfties. Looking towards the future of U.S. relations with the emerging nations
of Aﬁica ofﬁcials in Washington became aware of the need for their country to
acknowledge the increasing desire for self-determination expressed widely across sub-
Saharan Africa. These ofﬁcials also stressed the need for the U.S. to become proactive in
supporting those changes without alienating the interest of their European allies. This
change of attitude was clearly demonstrated in point 13 of a policy guidance to the U.S.
government which recommended that the U.S. government:

a. Support the principle of self-determination (self-government or

independence) consistently and in such a way as to assure that evolution
toward this objective will be orderly; making clear, however, that self-

 

2‘ Khapoya, The Aﬁican Experience ,166
97

government and independence impose important responsibilities which the

peoples concerned must be ready and able to discharge

b. / encourage those policies and actions of the metropolitan powers which

lead the dependent peoples toward responsible self-government or

independence.22

That change in rhetoric did not fundamentally touch U.S. traditional Eurocentric
attitude toward the colonized world: that is, Europe ﬁrst, Africa second. Despite the
change of administration in Washington, this Eurocentric approach remained constant
throughout the Cold War. The United States was caught between its loyalty to their
European allies and the support for the right to self determination that drew on the
principles of equality and freedom so central to American democracy. Historians Peter
Duignan and L.H. Gann explain how the U.S. tried to move out of this ambivalent
position: “the American responded to the Africans challenge in a slow and ambivalent
fashion. They stood committed to decolonization; yet they had no wish to alienate their
NATO allies by hurrying the pace. Washington tried to escape from this dilemma by
backing the reformers within the metropolitan countries.”23 But the situation in the
colonies was evolving so rapidly that Washington was forced to change its policy
particularly in the second term of President Eisenhower.

In 1953 when President Dwight Eisenhower became president, he gave little
attention to the European colonies in Africa and the aspirations of their populations.
Eisenhower maintained the same Eurocentric policy of the administration of President
Harry Truman toward the colonized territories of Africa. On important international

issues related to Africa, like the question of Apartheid, he maintained a middle road

policy, condemning South Africa at the United Nations while maintaining at the same

 

22 “Statement of U.S. Policy toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar year 1960” Foreign
Relation of the United Sates 1958-1 960 vol. XIV Africa, 28.
23 Duignan and Gann, The United States and Africa, 286.

98

time relations with the Apartheid regime. But in his second term, Eisenhower realized the
force of global decolonization and acknowledged the aspirations of the African
populations for their autonomy. Signs of change of policy were visible in 1957 when on
March 6th Ghana became independent. High-level ofﬁcials led by Vice-president Richard
Nixon represented the Eisenhower administration at the celebration of that historical
event. As a result of the vice-president’s trip, the strategic importance of sub-Saharan
Aﬁica gained a boost. Upon his return to Washington, Nixon submitted a report in which
he emphasized the “importance of Aﬁica in the Cold War struggle against the Soviets.”24
No doubt Nixon’s assessment of the evolution of Africa inﬂuenced the creation of a
separate Bureau for African Affairs in the State Department in August 1957.

For Political scientist Peter Schraeder “the primary mission of the Africa Bureau
is the maintenance of smooth and stable political relationships with all Aﬁican
governments. The emphasis is on quiet diplomacy and the negotiated resolution of any

conﬂict that may arise.”25

With the creation of the African Bureau, the prospect for a
better future for U.S.-Africa relations could be clearly noticed. One of the ﬁrst
implications in the change of policy in Washington was the change in rhetoric on
decolonization, “anti colonialism came to be interpreted as a policy that was moral in
itself, as a device for expanding American trade, and as a means for strengthening the
American position where the newly independent states were endowed with a voting

strength in the United Nations quite out of keeping with their military or economic

power.”26 Here it is legitimate to ask whether African countries held any grudge against

 

24 De Roche, "Relations with Africa since 1900," 109.

25 Peter Schraeder, “Speaking with many Voices: Continuity and Changes in US Africa Policies, “Journal
of Modern African Studies vol. 29, issue 3 (Sep., 1991), 377.

26Duignan and Gann, The United States and Africa, 288.

99

U.S. previous indifference toward decolonization and if consequently this could affect the
future of their relations with the U.S. Political scientist Rupert Emerson ruled out such a
possibility on the basis that,

Aﬁican Leaders ordinarily came to power in their own countries with no

deep and immediate sense of grievance, however vehemently they

repudiated colonialism as an institution, and they continued to utilize the

services of a large number of expatriate ofﬁcials and experts during an

extended interim period. The fact that the United States was intimately

allied with the former colonial power was therefore not a matter to which

any great attention needed to be paid, even though the universal driﬁ was

toward some version of neutralism.27

Moreover, Emerson contends that even though the U.S. was hesitant in endorsing
the independence of a country like Guinea ‘out of deference’ to France, the American
image was “enhanced by its traditional aura of anti-colonialism.” Emerson asserts that
the U.S. had reason to be optimistic about its ﬁiture relations with newly independent
African nations. Africans expected the U.S. to be “sympathetic to their needs and
desires, be a source of material bounty and technical assistance, and open up another door
to the great outside world than that provided by the colonial powers.”28 Similarly, the
Americans thought that the development the newly independent countries “should be
promoted both for their own sake and to aid them in evading the dangerous wiles of
communism, whose policies might be expected to be in general accord with those of the
United States.”29

In Emerson’s analysis, Africa and U.S. were starting their relations almost on a

‘clean slate’ because on one hand, Africans states were like newborns and did not have

any previous established foreign policy other than the one inherited from the former

 

27Rupert Emerson, Africa and United States Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1967),4.

28 Emerson, Africa and United States Policy 5.
29 Emerson. Aﬁ'ica and United States policy 5-6.

100

colonizer or the one established by the independence movement. On the other hand,
although the U.S. past relations with Aﬁica were so old and multiform, “the continuing
ties in the present century were so slight and inconsequential that it was both possible and
necessary to make virtually a new beginning.”30 On the whole, Emerson argues, the
interest of both parties, the United States and African countries, were not clearly
identiﬁable in the early years of independence, better they seemed “not to be in conﬂict
with each other.”3 '

At this juncture it is important to ask if this optimism about U.S.-Africa relations
could resist the effect of time but more importantly ask if Emerson analysis includes
national security and national interest that are crucial in U.S. foreign policy. If the answer
is positive, then it is legitimate to investigate the variables that determined US policy
towards to continent, and to ask whether there could be any compatibility between
American interests and Aﬁican interests.

Back in the sixties the idea of identifying U.S. interests or advocating the rising
stake for the American national security in an area that has been under European
domination for over a century, was not widely shared. Nonetheless the idea was not as
ludicrous as such. While Rupert Emerson was not very speciﬁc about the nature of
interest that could be at stake for the U.S. in Africa, Steven Metz argues that there were
three kinds of interests for US in Aﬁica on the eve of its independence: economic,

ideological or altruistic and global communism containment.32 Metz thinks that there

were some economic interests for the U.S. in Africa even if these interests were not as

 

3° Emerson, Africa and United States Policy 6.

3' Emerson, Africa and United States Policy, 7.

32 Steven Metz “American Attitudes Toward Decolonization in Africa” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
99, No. 3 (Autumn, 1984), 517-518.

101

signiﬁcant as American interest in Europe or Latin America. He wrote that “it was the
pure potential of the African market that awed American businessmen.”33 However, the
African market in the 19605 was one of the most underdeveloped in the world and thus
despite its potential for future U.S. economic relations, the focus of American business
men on the reconstruction of Europe cause economic interests to play a very minimal
role in U.S. policy formulation.

Metz adds to this potential economic interest, the ideological interest of the U.S.
which he links to the continuation of strains of Wilsonian idealism in the debates over the
U.S. foreign policy in the mid ﬁfties and early sixties. This type of thinking which
reﬂected U.S. longstanding commitment to self-determination, explains why high
officials like Paul Nitze argued that support for colonialism was "abhorrent to American
sensibilities." Metz categorized this antinomy between American principle and the idea
of colonialism as the ideological or altruistic interest of the United States in post
independence Africa.

Finally a third type of interest for the US in Africa was the global containment of
communism. This preoccupation became much clearer and more emphasized aﬁer the
visit of Vice-President Richard Nixon to the continent in 1957. The vice president
realized that a non-negligible part of the Cold War was likely to be played in Aﬁica and
that Moscow could exploit any political instability on the continent for the expansion of
its ideology. That realization inﬂuenced the strategic importance of the continent. But
despite that boost, only few among the high ranking ofﬁcials in Washington attached any
strategic importance to sub-Saharan Africa. Yet it is area that is present in the analysis of

David Dickson’s three identiﬁable strategic interests for the U.S. in the sixties.

 

’3 Metz “American Attitudes,” 517.

102

L .’

‘-

 

l‘l

According to him, sub-Saharan Africa “commanded sea and air passages which affected
the West’s economic and military wellbeing.” In case of conﬂict between the Soviet
Union and the West he asserted that “Soviet control of airﬁelds, ports, and support
facilities in the Horn of Aﬁica or the Western bulge of Aﬁica could jeopardize
communication between the Persian Gulf area, North America, and Western Europe.”34
Moreover, Dickson pointed out that at this time the United States had some tracking
stations and bases in Africa, speciﬁcally in countries like Nigeria, Zanzibar, South Africa
and Madagascar. These space-tracking facilities were deemed important to the National
Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA). Finally, the U.S. has some mineral
interest in sub-Saharan Aﬁica as well, but according to Dickson this interest was not very
important.35

On the eve of the 1960’s Presidential elections, there was apparently some ﬁxity
in U.S. policy toward Africa. Washington operated with the premise that maintaining
Africa in the Western sphere of inﬂuence was essential in preventing Moscow from
gaining any sort of inﬂuence in sub-Saharan Africa?6

John F. Kennedy’s election as president brought a change to that Eurocentric
ﬁxity in the American attitude toward Africa. Kennedy attempted to break away from
that premise of using the tight bond between Africa and the West as a strategy of
containment. Dickson explains that “[a] new slogan arose which soon found its way into

many administration statements. This statement is that the cold war was to be kept out of

Aﬁica was to be free to follow its own destiny removed from the manipulation of the

 

34 Dickson, United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa ,12
35 Dickson, United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa 12-13.
3" Dickson, United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Aﬁica 18.

103

superpowers?”7 But Despite that desire to move away from the cold war preoccupation in
Africa and despite the peculiarity of President Kennedy’s diplomacy in Africa, for the
political scientist Donald Rothchild, there was no fundamental change in the U.S. policy
toward the continent under his administration. Rothchild notes that the Kennedy
administration continued to advocate ties with Western Europe as a way of maintaining
the international order that came out of decolonization.38
Euro-centrism and containment thus inﬂuenced the American policy in Aﬁica
throughout the Cold War era and conditioned Washington’s attitude toward many West
African countries. However, although containment remained constant with most of the
different administrations that followed one another in Washington, there were some
differences in how each of them, from Eisenhower to Reagan, implemented their Africa
policy. Usually the American policy was shaped by the preferences and priorities set by
the new administration. President Richard Nixon, for example, promoted ties with
conservative African leaders and relaxed the U.S. stance on the White racist regimes of
southern Africa while President J immy Carter appeared more principled in his Aﬁican
policy. He supported self-governance and democracy for Africans as a way to efﬁciently
contain the Soviet inﬂuence in Aﬁica. His successor Ronald Reagan was more direct, if
not more assertive, when it comes to containing communism in Africa and the Third
World in general. During his presidency, Reagan attached much importance to the

prestige of the U.S., the sense of purpose, and military credibility, and subordinated the

issues of democracy, human rights, to the imperative of “effective response to the

 

37 Dickson, United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub-Saharan A ﬁ'ica, 18.
38 Donald S. Rothschild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa” SAIS Review - Volume 21,
Number 1, Winter-Spring 2001, 180.

104

perceived Soviet threat.”39 President Reagan thus raised the cost for antagonizing U.S. for
many Marxist or socialist Aﬁican countries. As a matter of fact Soviet allies in Aﬁica
were viewed as enemies and their neighbors or internal insurgents were given proper
assistance by the United States.

So far I have argued that contrarily to the prevailing belief, there was a
recognition in Washington of the importance of Aﬁica to U.S. policy even if it is not as
strategically important as other continents. But one may ask if this importance was
signiﬁcant enough to justify Washington intervention on the continent. On another level
if containment aimed at countering the Soviet Union from gaining ideological inﬂuence
in Africa, what was the nature of the Soviet threat in Africa? What strategies did the
Soviet and eastern bloc use in order to gain inﬂuence on the continent, but also in the
third world in the general? How did the U.S. respond to those threats? How did the
United States develop an interest in Aﬁica and newly independent Aﬁica? Addressing
these questions help us understand why and how the United States developed its cultural
policy with African countries and mainly, why it can be considered a branch of U.S.
foreign policy. However, before coming back to the American containment strategy it is
necessary to look at the Soviet Union and communist countries’ cultural policy in post
independence sub-Saharan Aﬁica.

Soviet and other Communists Cultural Activities in Africa
The Soviet’s attempt to woo Aﬁica dated back to Lenin. But like the United

States, the Soviet Union had little contact with sub-Saharan Africa prior to the Second

 

39 Donald S. Rothschild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Aﬁica” SAIS Review - Volume 21,
Number 1, (Winter-Spring 2001): 182-183.

105

World War and the decolonization era.4o Among other explanation for this lack of contact
was the fact that from the Soviet perspective, Sub-Saharan Africa lacked in real
progressive organizations that could function like a political party. To Lenin an efﬁcient,
well organized party is the essential “vanguar ”to a successful revolution. In the Soviet
analysis, while there were some African nationalist movements ﬁghting for the liberation
of many colonies, such movements were not progressive enough and not representative
enough to be categorized as parties or even to be considered for any assistance from the
Soviet Union. Robert Legvold, a specialist of the soviet foreign policy, explains that “It
took Soviet commentators nearly a decade to decide that the nationalist movements of
Aﬁica were essentially progressive enough and deserve support.” By that time he argued,
the Soviet policymakers were confronted with the independence of Ghana which
launched the era of decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa.41

Ghana’s independence caused the Soviet Union to change its attitude towards
African colonies and it led to a gradual reduction of the distance between Moscow and
sub-Saharan Africa. The development in the Soviet relations with the African continent
increased aﬁer the independence. It took many forms, economic assistance, military
agreements, educational exchanges and most of all the increasing promotion of cultural
activities with these areas. Of course these different co-operations were not philanthropic
in nature. Moscow and the other communist countries had their respective agenda.
Frederick Charles Barghoom summarizes Moscow policy and its purposes as follows:

The long-run objective of soviet policy in the underdeveloped countries
remains that of smoothing the path for the eventual accession of

 

40 Frederick Charles Barghoom, The Soviet Cultural Oﬂensive; the Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet
Foreign Policy,( Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960), 19.
4' Robert Legvold Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 19.

106

communists to power. The short-run objectives are several. Highest
priority, perhaps, is assigned to the undermining of western inﬂuence.
Another major purpose is to present to the peoples, and particularly to the
intellectuals, of these countries an appealing picture of Soviet life and of
Soviet domestic and foreign policy. A related purpose is the establishment
of personal and organizational inks between Soviet artistic, scientiﬁc, and
academic institutions and counterparts in target areas. An attempt is also
made to use cultural exchanges to inﬂuence the policies and attitudes of
local noncommunist political leaders.“

More and more politicians and other prominent ﬁgures among the Soviet
intellectuals pressured citizens, professionals, artists, sportsmen or people from different
categories of the working class to show sympathy to the anti-colonial struggle of the
Asian and African people while trying to win their hearts and minds. Soviet scholars
were able to demonstrate how the “republics of the Soviet East” had, with the active help
of the Great Russian people, overcome their former backwardness in the shortest possible
time and had become “the lighthouse of communism in the East.”43 The aim was to
project in Africa as well as in Latin America an image of the Soviet Union as a capable
and serious partner in their policy of national development. To this end, two major
techniques were used by the Soviet:

One of these was to utilize exchange visits as occasions for publicizing
these Soviet achievements most calculated to convince Asians, Africans,
and Latin Americans of Soviet of solicitude and respect for them. The
other and closely related technique consisted in the careful cultivation of
the predispositions and susceptibilities of peoples whose traditions,
aspirations, and grievances had been carefully studied?4

Soviet effort seemed to have paid off within a decade after Africa’s independence.

Apart from elevating the image of the Russians among some Aﬁican elite, communists’

 

42 Baghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Oﬂensive, 189
43 Baghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Oﬂensive ,192.
44 Baghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Oﬂensive ,192.

107

ideology was able to ﬁnd its way to a number of professional and social organizations in
many African countries. Duignan and Gann explain that “communists in sub-Saharan
concentrated on inﬁltrating trade unions; on African nationalist movement; on building
networks of agents and supporters through local “peace movements,” cultural fronts,
youth leagues, women’s associations , and scholarship programs for study in the Soviet
Union and on similar measures.”45 All these activities played important roles in the
Soviet and the communists’ cultural strategies in Aﬁica--which the American Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) categorized as pr0paganda. The CIA asserted that “communist
foreign propaganda activities involve the manipulation of mass media to disseminate
information and ideas designed to obtain the maximum possible support for communist
policies. For example, a list of these propaganda activities may include broadcasting,
publishing, news agencies activities, ﬁlm showing and exhibit.”46 The CIA states that
Soviet promoted cultural activities “seek to depict Communist artistic and literary
achievements and include the exchange of performing troupes and literary works.”47
In general the communist goal in using both practices, was to “establish and
strengthen rapport with the people of less developed countries” by identifying with their
political and economic aspirations. Most of all, “Soviet propaganda in the
underdeveloped countries appeals particularly to the radical anti-western nationalism

which has developed in recent years.” 48 Likewise, they exploit any dissatisfaction and

help overthrow ‘unfriendly regimes.’ Communists were selective when it comes to their

 

45 Duignan and Gann, The United States and Africa, 286.

4" CIA Intelligence Report No 118, Communist Cultural and Propaganda Activities in the Less Developed
Countries, 3. http://wwwfoiacia.gov/browsc_docs.asp

‘7 CIA Intelligence Report No 118, Communist Cultural and Propaganda Activities in the Less Developed
Countries, 3.

48 Baghoom The Soviet Cultural Ojfensive, 190.

108

target groups. They quite often weigh their importance and receptivity to their message
but also studying the type of media to use for them. Poor and illiterate people are not
included in their potential groups. As the report states, “the illiterate and the poor are
rarely the target of communist propaganda. They have the least access to propaganda
media, exert little pressure on government policies, and usually are not a revolutionary
force. Those groups typically targeted are youth and students, young government and
military ofﬁcials, leaders of trade unions, and employees of information media.”49
Cultural agreements were used to establish presence in less developed countries.
From 1956 and 1964, for example, the number of agreements signed with African
countries went from 0 to 46. In 1965 alone they signed a total of 39 agreements.50 The
report states that “in every year since 1960, communist agreements with Aﬁican
countries have accounted for one-half to two-thirds of the total number of agreements and
protocol signed?” ' These agreements legally provided a pretext for the Soviet and
eastern bloc to organize cultural activities in third world countries and also to initiate
exchange programs with them. These agreements facilitated the establishment of
friendship and cultural societies, especially bi-national ﬁiendship societies or cultural
centers were established in many countries around the globe. These organizations were
“responsible for conducting many activities, including exhibits, language lessons, ﬁlm
presentations, distribution of propaganda materials, and sponsor\ship of travel to

communist countries.”52 Books and periodicals also occupied an incredibly important

place in the communist cultural propaganda. Millions of copies of books were published

 

‘9 CIA Intelligence Report No 118, 3.
5° CIA Intelligence Report No 118, 7.
5’ CIA Intelligence Report No 118, 7.
’2 CIA Intelligence Report, No 118, 9.

109

and distributed in the less developed countries. Usually many of these books were
ideological containing the ideas of Lenin, Marx or Engels or the account of the Soviet
Communist Party activities. Other types of literature included magazines; newspaper and
publication of the Tass News Agency. But occasional there were ﬁction works depicting
stories of bravery during the war of national liberation that is the Second World War
There were usually distributed for free to students or other visitors of the cultural centers
or the libraries in the host countries. These printed media were complemented by a
growing program of mass media communication as shown by a comparison between the
broadcasting time of Radio Moscow and that of ‘The Voice of America’ the broadcasting
branch of the United States Information Agency. In 1964 for example, while the VOA
was broadcasting only 46 hours to Africa in 1964, radio Moscow was broadcasting 129
hour in the same period with the inclusion of some native African language like
Bambara, Hausa and Somali.53

While television was not as developed in many African countries in the sixties,
the Soviet bloc used alternative visual media in their cultural activities. Films and
exhibits of photos or artistic works and later on video and similar media were extensively
used both in host countries and at international level. Films were usually distributed “by
Communist diplomatic missions, cultural centers, and friendship societies” and the
admission to the projection session was usually free.54 This was an important asset of
their propaganda apparatus as movies can reach a far larger audience than other media.
Its effectiveness was increased by the strategy of free admission, the connection between

the audience and most of the themes explored by or the questions addressed in these

 

5’ CIA Intelligence Report,, No 118, 12.
5" CIA Intelligence Report No 118, 19.

110

movies. Quiet often these themes were related to the direct experience of many
populations in third world despite a heavy emphasis on the depiction of the achievement
of communist societies.55 The Soviets generally made an effort to be represented at
international ﬁlm festivals and present competitive ﬁlms which usually win many
awards.

The importance of human agency in enabling cultural persuasion was also
emphasized in the communist strategy to make their ideological appeal to Aﬁican
countries. This was reﬂected through the different exchanges program they maintained
throughout the entire cold war period. Not only were the large mass of populations
targeted, but the elite was particularly targeted through the program scholarships or
educational or cultural exchanges. According to the CIA report “the communist
countries promote extensively the exchange of delegations, performing groups, and sports
teams in order to establish personal contacts with selected groups in the least developed
countries. Because these contacts are easily adapted to all ﬁelds, they afford opportunities
to establish friendly relations and gain inﬂuence. In the 60’s on average the annual cost of
all of all Chinese and Soviet exchange programs could be estimated as high as $100
million, and out of this total amount the less developed countries accounted for an
important share.56 That trend continued with an ongoing increase in exchange as shown
in the CIA report:

During 1964, communist and less developed countries exchanged a

large number of delegations representing the ﬁelds of art, music, science,

education, writing, and journalism and representing trade Unions, youth

organizations, and student organizations. At least 1500 delegations

(compared to about 800 during 1955) ranging in size from one or two
members to large groups of 50 to 100 traveled between communist and

 

5’ CIA Intelligence Report, No 118, 19
”CIA Intelligence Report, No 118, 20.

Ill

less developed countries during the year. India and Indochina were the

major less developed country participants, exchanging about 200 and 170

delegations, respectively. Among other important participants, Ghana and

Algeria each account for 120 delegations, Mali for almost 90, and Guinea

and Tanzania for about 60 each. 57

In addition to these different programs, the Soviet Union and its allies used economic

and technical assistance to promote good relations with many new states in Africa.
The eastern bloc Cultural offensive in Africa may not have presented a direct and
important threat to the United States’ interest, but that offensive could become over the
years a serious threat to the interest of U.S. allies of Europe What made this cultural
inroad a plausible threat was the negative depiction of the United States and western
democracy that was an important component of the propaganda activities. With such a
threat, it is not surprising that Africa became one of the areas where the U.S. cultural
policy was eventually extended to alter the decolonization. Among others the objective of
this policy was to tell the truth about the U.S., its culture and its institutions.
American Cultural Policy in Africa

The battle to win hearts and minds of the African populations brought the U.S. to
promote the development of cultural ties with Africa. Karen Bell referred to this policy as
the attempt to “develop a sense of community” with West African countries. Elaborating
on that concept she drew on the philosopher Josiah Royce claim that a “community can

only exist where individual members are in communications with one another so that

there is to some extent and in some relevant respect, a congruence of feeling, thought,

 

57 CIA Intelligence Report, No 118, 20.
I 12

and will among them.”58

The ideal community in Royce sense is what she called the
“beloved community” in which members pursue the “cause of loyalty, truth, and reality.”
Karen argues:

America’s perceptions of truth and reality became instruments of cultural

diplomacy and served to complement the high politics of power and

security throughout the cold war. The diffusion of truth, reality, and

ideological loyalty by exporter of cultural values to the recipient

undergirded this form of diplomacy and formed the central features of

U.S. information, propaganda, and cultural matrix for expanding U.S

activities on the African continent.59
This statement echoed the views expressed in the late 50’s, on the eve of African
independence in different ofﬁcial documents like memoranda and policy statements on
Aﬁica. Making projections on the future of the region in those days and searching for
ways and means to maintain good relations with the new countries, in most of them there
was a recurring emphasis on cultural ties and education as part of U.S. cooperation with
newly independent African countries.

From May 30th to June 2nd, 1960, there was the “Conference of Principal
Diplomatic and Consular Ofﬁcers of North and West Aﬁica” held in Tangier chaired by
U.S. Assistant Secretary Satterwaithe.60 It was attended by about 19 diplomatic and
consular missions in Aﬁica and ofﬁcial representatives from the Departments of State,
Defense, Commerce, and the U.S.I.S. The conference, which comprehensively addressed
U.S. policy in Aﬁica, produced a document that contained conclusions and

recommendations in four different domains for U.S. policy: political, economic, culture

and information, and administration. As far as cultural recommendation is concerned, the

 

58 Karen Bell, "Developing a sense of Community: U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and the place of Aﬁica during
the Early Cold war Period 1953-1964” in The United States and West Africa Jalloh and Falola eds., 126.
59 Karen Bell “Developing a Sense of Community,” 126.

6° Department of State “General US Policy Toward Africa” Foreign Relations of the Unites States. 1958-
1960 volume XIV, Africa, (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1992),137.

113

conference emphasized three points to make the cultural ties between the U.S. and the
region possible. First the conference mentioned the “need for greatly expanded
information and cultural activities in Africa especially tailored for various regions. The
Conference expressed a hope that the United States Information Service posts in the
newly emerging countries would be fully staffed, equipped and ﬁnanced in the shortest
possible time.”61 The second point of the recommendations stated:

One element of primary importance for the achievement of American

policy objectives in Africa is a wider dissemination of knowledge of the

English language. As far as the former French dependencies are

concerned, however, this encounters a special degree of sensitivity and

resentment on the part of the French government. It was concluded that

the United States must, without renouncing its objective of creating a

wider knowledge of English in the countries concerned, take into account

the attitudes of the French Government."2
The last point addressed issues related to the programs that brings Africans on visits to
the U.S. It was recommended that there be more ‘coordination and planning’ between the
different programs involved and that the agencies that were involved “should be
particularly careful to so arrange grantee programs as to minimize the danger of racial
incidents.”63

F rom the 60’s through the end of Soviet rule, the United States maintained a
policy of cooperation and assistance with many African countries including Benin and
Ghana. Likewise its cultural relations included different programs like the cultural

presentations, the program of educational exchanges, professional visits to the U.S.,

exchange of volunteers through the Peace Corps and many other types of technical

 

6' Department of State “General US Policy Toward Aﬁica”, 140.
62 Department of State “General US Policy Toward Africa”, 140.
63 Department of State “General US Policy Toward Africa”, 140.

114

assistance and cultural cooperation through the United State Information Agency posts,
the book distribution programs, and other programs.

Education (formal schooling) was essential to the changes that led to the
independence of Aﬁican countries. The American government did not lose sight of the
long-term impact that formal education could have on the destiny of the new nations.
Besides, educational exchanges were a big part of the Soviet bloc cultural activities in
Africa. For the U.S. to carry out any cultural program, the country receiving or hosting
artists must agree to such activities. This explains why right after the independence, the
U.S. signed many bilateral agreements with most of these countries of West Africa. They
covered different areas ranging from economic to military assistance with in many cases
a special emphasis on educational assistance.

Educational exchanges

Education is an important aspect of the U.S. exchange program with Africa.
Assessing the situation of the West African states, soon after independence, the U.S.
government recognized the need to provide assistance in education sector. Ideas and
communications are important in cultural relations and they can be validly transmitted
through education.64 Educational exchange is thus one of the key elements in cultural
relations especially when dealing with nations in construction like Aﬁican countries at
the independence. The leadership in the African Bureau ﬁrmly believed that contributing
to the formation of a new class of elite and leaders in every walk of life, not only would

generate a lasting friendship between the U.S. with Africa, but the exchanges of students,

 

6" Frank Ninkovich wrote that the “trust in transcultural capacity of ideas to hasten the arrival of
generalized “understanding” comprised the intellectual core of the U.S. approach to cultural
relations.” The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950, (Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 182.

115

teachers and others would pave the road for an easy and indirect penetration of American
thought, American values, in short the American way of life. This, they were convinced
would reﬂect on how institutions are established, the exposure to the American lifestyle
could eventually inﬂuence Africans who had studied in the U.S. and that inﬂuence would
show through their decision-making. Mindful of the importance of the educational
exchange on the relations between two nations the U.S., extended the beneﬁt of the F3

Fulbright scholarships to many African countries. The total number of Fulbrighters from

 

Africa has reached 9, 703 including Humphrey fellows in 2007.65 *
The Hubert H. Humphrey North-South Fellowship program was announced late in i

1978 by the White House but it started effectively in September 1979. The goal of this

new fellowship was to bring approximately “50 young professionals in public service

from developing nations to study at institutions in the United States for one year of post-

graduate work.”66 According to the Fulbright commission, the Humphrey scholarship is

directed toward ‘career development of the next leadership generation in the developing

nations.” For this reason, Humphrey fellows have both a rich academic and professional

background and their “Study programs are geared to problem solving rather than to

academic disciplines. Emphasis has been placed on professional work in the ﬁelds of

agriculture, public health, planning and resource management, and public

administration.”67

Cultural Exchanges

Cultural exchanges played an important role in US foreign Policy. The Bureau of

Educational and Cultural affairs helped deliver these programs of the State Department

 

65 Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, Annual Report 2007-2008, 70.
6’ Report on Exchanges 16'” Annual Report December 1978,.9.
‘57 Fulbright Program Exchanges 18’” Annual Report, December 1980, 7.

116

abroad. The 1966 report of the Bureau indicated that: “Cultural presentations” are major
part of the US cultural exchange program. The Government attaches great importance to
the sending abroad of our best and most representative cultural attractions, including
performing artists in music, the dance and drama.”68 In application of that program, the
Bureau provided USIS post with books, records of American music and also sponsored
exhibits of photography and paintings. The Bureau justiﬁed the use of arts as a means of
cultural diplomacy: “There are two basic and essential reasons for the State Department’s
cultural Presentation’s program. First, the arts portray the diversity and vitality of the
American scene. Secondly, since the arts appeal to certain human aspirations, the
unifying artistic experience helps reduce cultural barriers among peoples of the world.”69
Arts are fungible and can reach even the portrayed enemies of the U.S.A. However, it is
important to ask if it is necessary that the government use music groups, for example, if
commercially transmitted American music was already ﬂowing over the shortwave
airways to many parts of the world. In their book about U.S. African relations, Peter
Duignan and LB Gann wrote that American goods that were successful on African
markets included among others “movies, which had a near monopoly of the African
market. American musical instruments, phonographs, and records also dominated the
market.”70 This shows how the U.S. popular culture was widely consumed in Africa in
the 19605 and that it exerted a strong appeal on the African youth. A lot of this inﬂuence
came from commercial sourcesand its distribution in Africa is hard to track down just

like its impact. A possible way to make an assessment of the impact could be done would

 

68 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Annual Report to Congress on the International Educational
and Cultural Exchanges Programs Fiscal Year I 966, 57.

”Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Annual Report] 966, .57.

7° Duignan and Gann, The United States and Africa 207.

117

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be the study of musical bands and their creation in Francophone and Anglophone Aﬁica;
bands of Soul, Jazz or Rhythm and Blues music. There are certainly a great number of
such bands that are inﬂuenced by the American popular music, however for numerous
reasons this issue cannot be elaborated on in this part. Rather, it is more important to
focus on the ofﬁcial approach to what best reﬂect the U.S. culture and which cultural
activities are likely to project what America stands for.

Music, arts, books, and periodicals have been used to show what reﬂect American
life and institutions. These were part of the program initiated by the State Department in
1954 that was called ‘Cultural Presentation.’ The different activities that followed the
program became an important part of the U.S. effort to contain the inﬂuence of
communism in Aﬁica, in reaction to the sponsoring by the Soviet government of
international African tours by Russian artists and ballet or dancing groups. U.S. response
to this cultural offensive was what it has best to offer in music at the time: Jazz.

The Jazz program was one of the programs initiated under the administration of
President Eisenhower who personally believed in the impact relation between citizens
from different countries could have on promoting peace and mutual understanding
among nations. It was in that spirit that the people to people, the sister cities, and the
jazz diplomacy program was created. By the 19505, and throughout the cold war, the
Soviet cultural propaganda was comprised of all kind of exchanges as shown above,
artists, ballets sponsored by the government. The artists selected were touring “Third
World” countries to show the success of the Soviet achievement in the arts, music and on
other cultural fronts. These activities complemented the already widespread propaganda

against the West and the U.S. liberal democratic system, particularly focusing on the

118

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double standard in the way America treated its citizens of color. While undeniably there
were civil rights issues in the U.S. the government found it suitable to present the truth to
the world instead of letting the Soviet portray and distort the image of the U.S. and the
Western democracy. In July 1954 President Eisenhower asked Congress to allocate funds
for Cold War Cultural Exchange. In his request the President declared:

In the cultural and artistic ﬁelds... we need greater resources to assist and

encourage private musical, dramatic and other cultural groups to go forth

and demonstrate that America too can lay claim to high cultural and artistic

accomplishments. The contribution which such presentations make

toward a better understanding of America can scarcely be exaggerated. I

consider it essential that we take immediate and vigorous action to

demonstrate the superiority of the products of our free enterprise.7|

The jazz program started in 1956, following the authorization by Congress in
1954 that the President Emergency Fund could be used for participation in international
Affairs. The fund became permanent through “the International Exchange and Trade Fair
Participation Act 1956.” That act created the Advisory Committee on the Arts that had
the power to recommend participants in the program to the President.72 The advisory
committee established a musical Panel and the Department of State though the Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs (C.U.) appoint ﬁve jazz experts to the panel. This
included Willis Conover who was selected in 1967. In 1964, this panel formed a
subcommittee to select jazz and folk music groups that will be sent on cultural
presentations tour around the world.

When the panel ﬁrst met in 1954, the objective of the tour was clearly stated by

the State Department that is to “counteract Russian propaganda.” Jazz was chosen out of

 

7’ Lisa Davenport “Jazz and the Cold War” in Crossing boundaries: Comparative History of Black People
in Diaspora by Darlene Clark Hine and Jacqueline McLeod eds. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1999), 286.

72 Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War” 286.

119

 

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information sent by the US embassy in Hungary about the success of jazz concert in that
country and its popularity among the youth.73 After considering a host of musicians and
jazz singers artists, the panel suggested that Dizzie Gillespie go on the ﬁrst tour abroad.
Some artists were eliminated for logistic reasons. Gillespie was judged. “intelligent” and
“cultivated.” Gillespie and his band were given $92,000 for a tour to the Middle East
that lasted about ten weeks.

The ﬁrst tours were in the Near East but later on the tours included areas like
Russia and Africa. Although, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs indicated in
its annual report of 1966 that “it would be undesirable for the U.S. Government to
manipulate the arts for political or ideological purposes” the context compelled the
Bureau to provide some guidelines for the attendance of the presentations.74 The State
Department usually targeted ﬁve groups of people as audience for these American jazz
concerts. These were “young people, students, labor organizations, intellectuals, and the
diplomatic corps.”75 The expectations of the State Department were that these tours
would help fulﬁll four sub- objective of containment. These were: “1./ to depict the
position of Aﬁican Americans in American life 2./ to promote social discourse between
American and foreign diplomats and dignitaries 3./ to increase cultural and diplomatic
contacts; and 4./ to foster general good feelings and faith in the United states competence
as a world leader.”76

While these objectives were carefully studied and designed to make a positive

impact on the audience, objective number four seems irrelevant in my judgment. It is

 

73 Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,” 287.
74 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Annual Report to the Congress I 966, 57.
75 Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War”.288.
7" Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,”288.

120

 

fl

questionable to argue that people would construct their belief in U.S. as a world leader
only from attending jazz concerts. To attain these goals, jazz groups had to choose to
engage in a minimum of one among these activities: “a VIP reception with the
ambassador of the host country; buffet luncheons; practice sessions and rehearsals; radio
interviews; performances for television; performances and receptions with students at
universities; jazz workshops, lectures and demonstrations; and informal jam sessions with
local musicians.”77 Judging by these objectives, the targeted audience and the activities,
there is no doubt that the cultural presentations programs were minutely crafted to
generate a positive attitude toward the United States abroad. One of the places where this
cultural presentation operated the most beside the Middle East and the Eastern Europe
was Africa.
The Jazz Diplomacy in Africa

The racial connection between the U.S. and Aﬁica inﬂuences the way the U.S.
sees and interacts with the continent. In the ﬁfties and sixties, this element became so
crucial because it threatened to damage the international image of the U.S. as a world
leader. Critiques pointed at the treatment of African Americans, particularly as it was an
antinomy to everything the U.S. stood for: democracy, freedom of individuals and all the
fundamental rights and civil liberties attached to the person of the citizen in a democratic
society. The U.S. domestic situation with increased violence against Blacks and urban
problems sharply contrasted with, as Davenport pointed out, the U.S. international
leadership in thel950’s.

As America was promoting its positive image as a world leader in the Aﬁican

countries, such violence against black people at home raised serious questions about any

 

’7 Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,”288.
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trust African nations could have in the United States. Race was a sensitive issue
especially when dealing with countries whose populations were entirely black, like those
of sub-Saharan Africa. This demonstrates how American domestic issues, can at times,
develop international repercussions. In the 19605, Aﬁican diplomats who were appointed
to Washington DC. were confronted with the problem of segregation that was still

lingering in spite of the achievement of local desegregation in many public places like

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restaurants, theaters. As African diplomats were appointed to the federal capital city,
they soon discovered the difﬁcult and sour reality of racial segregations in the U.S. This
included the difﬁculty to ﬁnd houses for their family and the denial of access to better
restaurants or other public businesses. Life became difﬁcult for many of them.
According to Renee Romano “the Metropolitan Club, which admitted most ambassadors
for free, refused to allow Africans or Asians to join.” Moreover, he continued, “African
dignitaries were also victims of more serious harassment. In 1961, Tesﬁya Roba, the
second secretary of the Ethiopian embassy, received menacing phone calls, the tires in his
car were repeatedly ﬂattened, and large rocks were left on his front steps.”78 In normal
circumstances the Washington DC. and suburban Maryland and Virgina police forces
were supposed to give a hand in tracking down the culprits. To the dismay of the
diplomat, the police gave no response to his request for investigation.79 African diplomats
believed they were high ranking dignitaries, who deserved, just like their white

Europeans peers; the same treatment attached their status. But this expectation could only

 

78 Renee Romano “No Diplomatic Immunity: African Diplomats, the State Department, and Civil Rights,
1961-1964” in The Journal of American History, Vol. 87, No. 2 (Sep., 2000), pp. 546-579: Organization of
American Historians, 551.

79 Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity,” 551.

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make things worse as it increased “the likelihood that they may be disrespected by White
Americans.”80
These types of incidents led to the creation in 1961 of the Special Protocol
Service Section (SPSS) within the Ofﬁce of Protocol at the State Department. Its mandate
was to prevent “racial incidents involving African diplomats” however Romano
continues, “it quickly took the lead in campaign to pass a fair housing law in Washington
DC, and a public accommodations bill in Maryland.”81 The SPSS was headed by Pedro
Sanjuan, who assessed the growing number of such incidents, feared that its impacts
could reach the US position and voting power at the United Nations. As the ruling class
in the newly independent countries were very close-knit, reasoned Sanjuan, “what affects
one or more members of these groups is likely to have a strong inﬂuence on the opinions
and the attitudes of their governments.”82 Whether these concerns were exaggerated was
a matter of personal judgment and outlook in the issue. That is how many ofﬁcials in the
administration reacted, they treated these concerns according to their personal judgment
and consequently provided no real solution for the problem of the African diplomats.
From the State Department’s suggestions of buying “an apartment building to house
African Aﬁicans diplomats” to Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, making his ofﬁce
available for an African diplomats to come to his personal barber for a haircut, different
ideas were expressed as a way to solve the problem faced by African diplomats. President

Kennedy himself suggested that Aﬁican diplomats, who faced discrimination on road or

rail trips between Washington and New York, ﬂy instead.83

 

8° Romano, “No Diplomatic Irmnunity,” 552.
8' Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity,” 548.
82 Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity. . .,” 551.
83 Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity. . .,” 551.

123

At international level these kind of incidents were heavily exploited by the US
adversaries in the Cold War competition: “Chinese propaganda harshly criticized the
State Department for seeking to establish a vacation beach for foreign diplomats since
most beaches within driving distance of Washington DC, were segregated.” The
Russians could only snatch that opportunity to foster the fact that the United States was
trying “ to isolate the victims of discrimination” instead of facing the problem. The
Soviet press went on saying that while the U.S. propagandists were criticizing other
nations for “creating “Potemkin villages” to conceal their internal problems from
visitors,” America was the leader in such deceptions.84 In the midst of these unfortunate
racial incidents, some diplomats were asked to wear their African dresses when going out
or to identify themselves as ambassadors before entering a restaurant. These suggestions
prompted negative reactions among the Aﬁican diplomats. Some preferred to be recalled,
rather than going through the humiliation of having to identify themselves as diplomats,
before being served.85

These incidents with African diplomats certainly distorted the image of the U.S.
abroad. In counteract the entire negative image Aﬁican people may have forged out of
the communist propaganda on these issues, the State Department found no alternative
other than presenting the problem in an alternative light. Jazz diplomacy on the Aﬁican
continent from the cold war perspective was expected then to convey a speciﬁc message
about the position of Aﬁican American in the American society. It has become a way to
articulate the possibility that America offered the black man to be a successful career man

and live a better life. For this reason, starting from the 19605, Robert H. Thayer, who

 

8" Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity. . .,” 559.
85 Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity. . .,” 559

124

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was the Assistant Secretary of State for the Coordinator of International Educational and
cultural Relations, and the United States cultural affairs ofﬁcers in Africa emphasized
that the Bureau of educational and Cultural Affairs (C.U.) should send performing arts
groups to every country on the continent.”86 In compliance with the department political
agenda, the “performing arts groups had to be racially integrated or consist entirely of
African-Americans. In ﬁrlﬁlling those requirements, the Department was trying to convey
two messages: 1) America’s sympathy with the freedom struggles of African peoples;
and 2) cultural connection between Africa and the America.”87
Impact of Jazz diplomacy in Africa

The African public reacted with enthusiasm to jazz tours. Reports ﬁ'om the
American embassies stated how diverse the reactions from government ofﬁcials to
students, throughout West Africa were. Following the Cozy Cole concerts the Vice
President of the Republic of Niger told U.S. Ambassador that “the Cozy Cole [jazz]
group was the most effective weapon against the diatribes [sic] of radio Moscow with
obvious reference to the race problem.” The success of jazz concerts in Africa thus
created an interconnection between the effort to counter the Soviet harsh criticism of the
American race problem jazz, and integrated groups.88

One of the challenges in Washington was to suggest the works of African artists
or composers to the selected groups. Ofﬁcials in charge of the jazz policy for Africa
knew little about African music or cultures and were not therefore able to suggest any
works of African composers. As a solution to this ﬂaw in their policy the panel in charge

of the program had to direct some groups traveling to Aﬁica to the Library of Congress to

 

86 Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,”288.
87 Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,” 289.
88 Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,”289.

125

search for more information about African music. The lack of knowledge about the
sophisticated nature of African music and of African audiences led many among the
panelists to draw unveriﬁed conclusions about the African audiences. Davenport note that
they pointed out that “American standards were too “highbrow” of Africa; and while
C.U. wanted to reach the “natives with jazz music, some feared that jazz was beyond
their ken.”89 The consequence of all these preconceived ideas was for the CU. to endorse F
percussion and brass ensembles instead of string instruments. !
Wilbur DeParis and his band was one of ﬁrst American jazz bands to have toured
for the state department in Aﬁica. “During his tour from March 31 to May 19, 1957, i
DeParis performed for a momentous event, “the festivities marking the independence of
Ghana.” On the impact of the tours, the bureau of educational and cultural affairs note
that “the band won friends for the United states, left a “ﬁne impression among’ African
people, and gained the respect of Emperor Haile Selassie, who gave each member of the
group a gold medal at a special performance.” But the tour had unexpected impact on the
common man like the Ethiopian guard who did not believe that African American could
have property of their own until he talked to a member of the group who told him, he
‘just bought a new house and owned his own car’.90
The Herbie Mann jazz band toured Mali and many other African countries in
1959. But it was Armstrong’s tour in 1960 from October 24‘h to December 4‘“, and in part
of January 1961, that had one of the biggest impacts on the African public as it led to
creating more positive images about of the American race relations in Africa. The USIS

post report in Senegal note that “the presentation of the great American Negro artist

 

89 Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,” 290.
9° Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,” 291.

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added measurably to the prestige of the United States and at the same time it gave jazz
lovers the thrill of a lifetime.”91 From Mali, the report analyzed Armstrong appearances in
the country raised doubt about the socio economic status of Black in America. The report
stated that “the spectacle of an American Negro musician leading an orchestra composed
of three colored, one white, and one Filipino musician. . .cannot help but raise doubts in
many minds regarding the image of the American Negro propagated here.” All this praise
were summed up in the Nairobi’s editorial that called Armstrong “America’s ﬁnest
ambassador.”

But all was not excitement and acceptance. If jazz has African roots, it also has
western or American ﬂavor and taste. So it was still foreign music to many Aﬁican
audiences. Consequently the Bureau was not fully satisﬁed with the jazz program. Many
among the ofﬁcials of the Bureau shared the thought that the three groups sponsored to
Africa did not fully meet the expectations for the program. Some Aﬁican post reports
went in the same direction. For example, the cultural charge at the American embassy in
Lagos reported that Armstrong music had “little impressions on Nigerians. They don’t
dig him.”92

One of the most successful groups of the jazz tour in the sixties was the Cozy
Cole band. Reports from embassies stated that the” the Cozy Cole quintet and revue
seemed to triumph wherever it went.” During a period of six months the group performed
in about 14 countries and enjoyed special media publicity with the French newspapers,

NBC correspondents, and others. Its audience included leaders, spouses of ofﬁcials and

 

9‘ Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,” 291.
92 Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,” 293.

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students while the groups performed also on special occasions like the “Independence
Day dinner” in Cameroon.93

Through music and entertainment, the CU. was able to reach audience in Aﬁica
as the continent. It was a good policy at some point to calibrate the diplomacy to the
audience and the country by using the racial element to convey a speciﬁc message of the
chances that America and its ideology and system gives every citizen to self uplift to
success, proving that the American dream is achievable by anyone regardless of its ethnic
or racial background. Whether these concerts and the interactions artists had with their
peers actually fulﬁll these objective is strongly arguable. So is the full adherence of
many among the jazz artists to the government’s objectives in sponsoring the concerts.
So far the discussion of the jazz diplomacy gives the impression that the artists adhered
to jazz program and were ﬁllly supportive of the image of America a land where “ a
shared, core adherence to material abundance ultimately transcended differences” that the
U.S. government intended to project through their concerts. 9" But prudence needs to be
observed here for such a conclusion is not accurate. According to Frank Ninkovich it is
even contradictory to the general apprehensiveness many Americans have traditionally
about any government involvement in cultural matters. In his words:

the widespread belief that diplomacy is about power, combined with an

underlying suspicion of the state as potential Big Brother, has produced a

chronic apprehensiveness about government playing an active role in the

promotion of ideas. The absence in this country of a ministry of culture, a

commonplace organ in other lands is indicative of an aversion to “ofﬁcial
culture.” Americans, with their deeply rooted hostility to the political

 

93 Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold War,”293
9"Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War, (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 255.

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control of ideas, have never been entirely comfortable with a tight
governmental link to culture and information. 95

Perhaps this statement explains the disparities that existed in the course of the jazz
diplomacy between the objectives of U.S. government and the way many jazz artists
approached the tours. If the State Department objective was to contain Soviet’s anti-
American propaganda by showing through these concerts, the beneﬁts of the American
democratic values, American material success and more importantly how this material
abundance was accessible to every citizens, jazz artists used the tours for personal
statement about their situation at home, especially black musicians who were denied their
rights as artists and citizens.96 As Penny Von Eschen explains it the fact that for over
two decades “, America was associated with jazz, civil rights, African American culture,
and egalitarianism” did not mean that artist obediently accepted to project the image of a
free country. These artists rather used the program to identify with the global struggles

for freedom. She wrote that:

Musicians were not simply tools or followers of this policy. In the most
fundamental sense, they were cultural translators who inspired the vision
and shaped its contours, constituting themselves as international
ambassadors by taking on the contradictions of cold war intemationalism.
They called for increased government support of the arts; they spoke
freely about their struggles for civil rights; and they challenged the State
Department’s priorities. They asserted their right to “play for the
people.”97

 

95 Frank A Ninkovich, U. S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy, Headline series, no. 308. (New
York, N.Y.: Foreign Policy Association, 1996), 7

9" Von Eschen “ musicians such as Louis Armstrong, Dizzy Gillespie, and Duke Ellington embraced the
tours as opportunities to make claims on a nation that had long denied them recognition as artists, and
human and civil rights as African Americans.” Satchmo Blows up the World, 250.

97 Von Eschen Satchmo Blows up the World , 252.

129

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As long as these disparities between jazz performers objectives and the government goal
did not end up in open conﬂicting collaboration, the jazz program continued its course
until its end

After the leisure provided by the entertainment, other burning issues were still to
be tackled by the politicians that is the problem of development. If economic and political
relations target the elite, the question of improving the lives of many among the
populations of the newly independent African countries remained an important challenge
to the African leaders. The beginning of the Peace Corps volunteers program in 1961 by
the Kennedy administration was part of the American government’s effort to help Aﬁican
countries facing those challenges.

The Peace Corps in Africa

In identifying the mechanisms through which the United States promotes mutual
understanding with other nations, we listed the great contribution brought by President
Kennedy with the creation of the Peace Corps. If the elite enjoyed jazz, students have the
opportunity to improve their knowledge and education in the U.S. and other professionals
visit America on business tour, the common person in Africa does not have all those
possibilities that are offered the elites and the intellectuals. Here volunteerism of the kind
that the Peace Corps provides was an enormous opportunity for the U.S. technical
assistance in various ﬁelds to directly touch a larger portion of the population and
improve to some degree their daily lives. This is actually an important source of US soft
power in Aﬁica. It is probably one of the areas where cultural diplomacy or cultural

relations can be seen as effective in the sense that it touches directly average citizens in

130

 

 

1'1

‘14

remote areas who do not have access to the running water and lack basics to enjoy a
decent or acceptable life.

Peace Corps has been involved in the development of the African continent right
from the beginning of its operation. In the 19605, many Aﬁican nations became
independent and they were facing the challenges of development with limited resources,
an administration that was in serious need of civil servants, the need to build schools and
make education accessible and affordable to many in urban as well as rural areas. On top
of these concerns was the vacuum left by European expatriates who were serving in
administration, school, health and so on. The primary challenge and thus the primary
need of the sixties was education. Peace Corps was able to help many nations facing
those challenges by providing an important number of volunteers who served in
education. For example in 1965, of a total of 3,131 volunteers sent to Africa, 2433 were
serving in education, that is about 78 % of the total. The next ﬁeld was community
action 8% followed by agriculture 5% and health 4% of the volunteers.98 That trend
would remain throughout the period of the cold war. Education would remain among the
top priority as the years went by. As the 1985 annual report indicated it

Volunteer involvement in education dates from the beginning of Peace

Corps. About 40% of projected host country Volunteer requests relate to

primary education, secondary mathematics, science, and TEFL education.

Peace Corps will also respond to increased demand for vocational and

teacher training. Teacher training is particularly important since it

increases the impact of Volunteer transmittal of skills.99

But other development projects requested assistance from the Peace Corps for areas like

agriculture, health and rural development. Overall the Peace Corps made an important

impact on many populations in Africa. Timothy Maga noted that:

 

9“ Peace Corps, Congressional Report I 965, 5.
99 Peace Corps, Annual Report 1985, 16.

131

The Peace Corps had its greatest impact where Kennedy thought it would

be truly a “lost adventure”, Africa. The locations were too remote and the

cultures too primitive, he believed, for the Peace Corps to make a

difference. He was wrong. In Sierra Leone, for example, the political

leadership agreed that “the Peace Corps has shown us a world we never

knew existed. Some of us had never seen a truck or lorry or people from

the outside who wanted to help us. We had heard of America, but now we

know what it means. '00

Perhaps it was its success that helped the Peace Corps expanded its program in
Africa. Starting with Ghana and Tanganyika in 1961 other African countries signed
agreements with the organization. This could be seen as a success of cooperation and if
viewed as a creation of the cold war, the Peace Corps is then a victory for the U.S. by the
collapse of the Soviet empire (1991), only a handful of Peace Corps ofﬁces were not in
operation (Liberia closed in 1990). As of today peace Corps is present in the whole West
Africa but because of unstable political situation it is not operative in ﬁve countries:
Liberia, Nigeria, Ivory Coast (Cote D’Ivoire), Sierra Leone, Bissau Guinea.

U. S. attitude toward African countries moved from indifference to that of full
engagement with containment as the background ideology. This background ideology
became a rally cry for all the western allies and tempered any frictions they may have in
their relations over Africa. Consequently, during this time period, they showed a subtle
solidarity which ended with the demise of the Cold War. This prompted scholars like
Peter Schraeder to talk about the Cold Peace replacing the Cold War in Africa. '0'

Containment also shaped U.S. aid, economic and military cooperation with West African

countries and many African countries and also led the U.S. to extend its cultural program

 

'00 Timothy MAGA “Visionary Diplomacy: the Peace Corps and Food for Peace” pp. 51-67 in “John F
Kennedy and the New Frontier Diplomacy, 1961-1963” (Malabar Florida: Krieger Publishing company
1994), 58.

101Peter J Schroeder wrote that “Francophone Africa has emerged as the most publicly contested arena of
Great Power competition on the African continent” in the years after the end of the Cold War.” “Cold War
to Cold peace: Explaining U.S.-French Competition in Francophone Africa”

Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 115, Iss. 3 (New York: Fall 2000): 396.

132

.._..;:J

to African countries. In establishing its cooperation with these countries, the U.S. did not
approach them based on their relative importance. The following chapters will look at

two distinct individual cases of U.S. cultural relations with two West African countries.

133

CHAPTER 3
U.S. CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH A PERIPHERAL AFRICAN
COUNTRY: THE CASE OF REPUBLIC OF BENIN

As the previous chapter showed, within a few years after decolonization, Aﬁica
became one of the regions where ideological rivalry opposed the United States and the
Soviet Union. Each side exploited different means to establish and promote good
relations with the newly independent countries. The United States extended the
containment of communism to Africa and thus used among others military, economic or
cultural cooperation to project a good image of the western democratic system in the
newly independent countries. But the U.S. did not approach African countries on equal
basis; some countries, because of their colonial past and the economic or strategic
advantage they presented, had more priority in U.S. -Aﬁica relations than others. As
argued by Mary Niles African Francophone countries are believed to be on the periphery
of U.S. relations with the continent.I Despite this status, U.S. still had relations with
almost all the francophone countries of Africa including the Republic of Benin.

This chapter will study U.S. cultural relations with Benin from 1960 to 1990, the
year of a Democratic Renewal (Renouveau Democratique) in the political history of the
country. Benin was recognized as independent state by the United States in 1960 and
both countries signed the following year the Economic, Technical and Related
Agreement signed at Cotonou on May 27 m, 1961.2 This document reﬂects their consensus

tomutually determine in which areas they are going to cooperate.

 

lMary Niles Maack "Books and Libraries as Instruments of Cultural Diplomacy In Francophone Africa
During the Cold War." Libraries & Culture 36 (Winter 2001):58-59.

2 Economic, Technical and Related Assistance Agreement
h_ttp://www.pcrsonnelcoop.org’rncmbcrsonly/‘Bcninpdf. August 3rd, 2009.

134

:4»

U.S. and Benin enjoyed good relations till 1974 when the choice of Marxism as
an ideological guide signaled the beginning of a period of deterioration that reached its
highest point with the end of their diplomatic relations. The post independence political
history of Benin is divided in three periods: from 1960 to 1972, 1972 to 1990 and the
period running from 1990 onward. Benin became independent as the Republic of
Dahomey in 1960. Aﬁer 12 years of instability On October 26th, 1972 the day of last
successful coup, its political history would never be the same again. The new direction in
the country launched a series of measures that included that adoption of a new ideology,
the change of name from Dahomey to Benin and the revision of the principle guiding the
foreign relations of the country. Like many of the former French West African countries
(Aﬁique Occidentale F rancaise, A.O.F.), Benin still had very close ties with France, its
former colonial power despite its adherence to the non-alignment movement. As a result
of the decision to revise and reorganize its foreign policy, the privileged status of the
relations with France was cleared after the putsch of 1972 and in the process the new
leaders called for a revision of the ﬁrst agreements signed with the latter after the
independence.

Section I: Benin and its Foreign policy

Located in West Aﬁica, the Republic of Benin formerly known as Dahomey is a
small country composed of about 46 ethnic groups. Among these groups are the Yoruba,
the Adja, the Fon, the Dendi and the Bariba. Apart from the Adja and the Fon most of the
rest migrated from the neighboring states or have simply been the victims of the artiﬁcial

division brought by the colonization. Benin shares its borders with Nigeria on the East,

135

My 21.733,

Republic of Niger on the Northern side Burkina F aso on the northwestern and the
Republic of Togo on the west side.

Benin became ofﬁcially a French colony in 1894 with a decree of June 22’”, 1894
which organized the colony of Dahomey and its dependent territories.3 Like in many
French speaking countries of West Africa, political activities toward self-determination,
did not start until the post Second World War. It was after the war that the colony of
Dahomey (that was its name then) “acquired direct representation (through a single
deputy) in the French National Assembly and its own territorial council in 1946.”4 The
council was elected by both Dahomeans with French citizenship and the rest of the elite
or other people eligible to vote for the representations. With the reforms of 1951 and
1957, the limited number of electorate of the 40’s increased considerably in the 50’s and
it “created a powerful territorial assembly.”5 The consequence of these reforms, «
especially the ﬁrst one was that it forced potential leaders to speak with the rural
electorate. Many among them were thus confronted with the obligation of bargaining
with local leaders about what could be done to create or improve some facilities in their
communities. This led to the rise of ‘clientelism’ in the political practice of the major
parties that came out of these reforms. ‘Clientelism’ in politics consist in exchanging
“blocks of votes, usually communities or organizations , for valued good such as a
school, piped water or pay increase.”6 These goods are provided by national politicians
using the state resources and channeling them through local or sectional leaders. This

exchange in Allen’s words “help to conﬁrm the local leader in his leadership status and

 

3 Robert Comevin, La République Populaire Du Bénin: Des Origines Dahoméennes Al Nos Jours, (Paris:
Maisonneuve & Larose, 1981), 409.

4 Christopher Allen, Michael Radu, et al, Benin and the Congo (London; New York: Pinter, 1989.), 21.

5 Allen, Radu et a1 Benin and the Congo, 2].

6 Allen, Radu et a1 Benin and the Congo, 22.

136

provides the politicians with votes.”7 Clientelism was common among the political
parties even after the independence and to a large extent contributed to the instability that
preceded thel972 coup.
Political evolution after the independence

Benin gained its independence on August 15', 1960 as the Republic of Dahomey
with Hubert K.MAGA as the ﬁrst President of the Republic of Dahomey. In November of F“
the same year a new constitution was adopted. But problem started to arise after three
years with strikes and political demands that end up on October 28th, 1963 with a putsch
by General Christophe Soglo who controlled the government temporarily before handing l
power over to the civilians by December 1963. Soglo took it back in 1965 for a period of
two years before Commandant Kouandete took control of the country in 1967 after a
successful coup and asked Lieutenant Alley to form a new government. On June 26th,
1968 the army decided to hand power to Dr. Emile Derlin Zinsou who was ousted a year
after by Kouandete on December 10th, 1969. Three days after on December 13‘“, Paul
Emile de Souza took control of the government but a few months after on May 7th, 1970,
a Presidential Counsel was installed. This Counsel was composed of three members:
Hubert K. Maga, Justin T. Ahomadegbe, and Sourou M. Apithy. The new formula was
to allow each member of that counsel to be appointed President for a period of two years.
Unfortunately this solution did not last long enough to prove its efﬁcacy before a new
coup was made.

On October 26th, 1972 once again Benin was subjected to another putsch. The
“Conseil Presidentiel” the triumvirate composed of three members in charge of governing

the country from 1970, was suddenly overthrown by a group of young army led by

 

7 Allen, Radu et al Benin and the Congo, 22.
137

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Commandant Mathieu Kerekou. The group quickly formed a transition government, the
Gouvernement Militaire Revolutionnaire (G.M.R.), and launched a month after in
November 1972 its program, the “Discours Programme” an ofﬁcial document, in which
its main agenda was highlighted. Kerekou observes in that speech program:

Dahomean people are proud and love justice. They are rich in natural

resources as well as spiritual strength. It is capable of sacriﬁce and

heroism and it is a people that are impatient to take care of its own destiny.

Therefore, the only way out for us is that of a New Policy of National

Independence.

(“Le peuple Dahoméen est un people fier, épris de justice, riche des

ressources de son pays et de son esprit, capable de sacrifice et

d 'héroisme, impatient de prendre en main son destin. C 'est pourquoi, la

seule voie qui s ’ofﬁe a nous aujourd ’hui est celle d ’une politique nouvelle

d ’ina'épendance nationale. ”) 8

The coup and the installation of a new government heralded a revolution in how
the country was ruled. By declaring that the New Policy of National Independence was
the only way, the transition government made a bold move toward change in how the
country has been governed since the independence. The main objective of the
government was to change the system by changing the men and the structure that
supported it. To this end as explained by Major Kerekou, three tasks needed to be tackled
by the interim team. As stated in the excerpt below in French, among these tasks were,
the articulation and implementation of a policy of self-reliance which reﬂects a true
independence; the reorganization of the economic, cultural and social structures of the
country; and a policy of open or universal cooperation with every country without

ideological or any other discrimination. More importantly however the ﬁrst major task of

the new team was to assert the authority of the State.

 

8 Mathieu Kerekou, Dans la Voie de l'Ea'iﬁcation du Socialisme, Recueil des Discours de notre Grand
Camarade de Lutte le President Kerekou (République Populaire du Be'nin, Editions Graphic Africa, 1979),
9.

138

11 s ’agira de liquider déﬁnitivement l’ancienne politique a travers les
hammes, les structures et l’idéologie qui la portent.

Compter d ’abord sur nos propres forces, sur nos propres ressources, sur
l’initiative créatrice des larges masses dans notre lutte pour nous libérer
de la domination étrange‘re, pour développer notre économie et pour
donner a notre people la dignité et la personnalité d ’un people Iibre;
Re'organiser toute la structure économique, culturelle et sociale de notre
pays dans le sens d ’une liberation de la domination étrangére, d ’une
éradication de la corruption, de la concussion et du népotisme, et d ’une
plus grande efficacité;

Développer nos relations extérieures avec tous les pays sans
discrimination sur la base du respect de la souveraineté... nationale, de
l’égalité et de l'avantage réciproque; A ﬂermir l’autorité de l’état.’

Foreign relations were undoubtedly another important matter of concern for the new

team. While it did not particularly innovate as far as the basic principles of Benin

diplomacy is concerned it did expand on the list of principles and emphasized the need

for mutual respect and dignity in its relations with foreign nations:

Dahomey relations with foreign countries must be based on the principles of

non-alignment, equality, mutual respect of sovereignty, reciprocal advantages

and national dignity.”
(“Les rapports du Dahomey avec les pays étrangers doivent reposer sur les

principes de non-alignement, d ’égalite', de respect mutuel de la souveraineté,

des avantages réciproques et de la dignité nationale. ”'0

Beside, the interim government reassured the international community that it

would respect and support the existing regional and international organizations like the

Organization of African states and the United Nations. In addition it expressed its

solidarity with nations that were still ﬁghting for their liberation, among these countries
were Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Vietnam
and so on.ll The adoption of the ‘Discours Programme’ was just one step although a

major one in the list of events that materialized the transformation in the ruling of the

 

9 Kerekou, Recueil des Discours, 9-10.
‘0 Kerekou, Recueil des Discours, 14.
n Kerekou, Recueil des Discours, 15.

139

 

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country. A year aﬁer the ‘Discours Programme’, in 1973, a National Counsel of the
Revolution (“Conseil National de la Revolution”) was created and the following year that
is 1974, a new development occurred in domestic policy. The ofﬁcial ideology that
would guide the new revolution was declared that is scientiﬁc socialism informed/guided
by Marxism-Leninism. This decision has some implications not only on domestic policy
but also on the exchanges between the country and the outside world.

In addition to the asserting the authority of the government and identifying the
general principles guiding its foreign policy, the interim leaders believed that
establishing a strong and successful policy of development requires an ideological
orientation. This ideology would galvanize all the effort of development and bring
positive changes in the life of every citizen of the country. Furthermore, they believed
this ideology would help preserve the dignity of the country and its equality among other
nations. That logic led to the adoption of a Marxism- Leninism on November 30”, 1974.
This was justiﬁed in the National Orientation Speech (‘Discours d ’Orientation
Nationale ') delivered on the same day which explain why it was important for the
country to have an ideology. In his speech, the President declared:

Dahomean men and Dahomean women, to be prosperous, master of its

destiny and to be truly powerful, a country needs foremost a well studied
political guide that should be followed with the ultimate rigor, in domestic
as well as in foreign policy. That is why, for a new beginning of the
Dahomean revolution, we have understood the necessity to clearly deﬁne
our political orientation, that would guide our action. . .( “ Dahoméennes,
Dahoméens, pour étre prospére, maitre de soi-méme et réellement
puissant, un pays a besoin avant tout d ’avoir une ligne politique bien
étudiée et qui doit étre suivie avec la plus grande rigueur, a l’intérieur
comme a l’extérieur. C ’est pourquoi, pour un nouveau départ de la

revolution dahoméenne, nous avons compris la nécessité de de'ﬁnir
- n o a c u 9 ’1' 12
clatrement notre orientation politique, le guide de notre action... )

 

'2 Mathieu Kerekou, Recueil des Discours, 16.

140

Kerekou concluded that for the aforementioned reasons he solemnly proclaimed this day
Saturday November 30th, 1974 that the New Society where life would be good for each
Dahomeans citizen would be a socialist society. (“Nous proclamons solennellement ce
jour, Samedi 30 Novembre 1974 que la Société Nouvelle ou ilfera ban vivre pour chaque
Dahoméenne et pour chaque Dahoméen, sera une SOCIE T E SOCIALIST E. ”) '3
Thus socialism was the path and the guide of the revolutionary action was Marxism-
Leninism. He explains that Marxism-Leninism was:

a philosophy, a guide for revolutionary action, an instrument of scientiﬁc

analysis, a rational working method, an exemplary line of behavior in

everyday social life, that aims essentially at freeing/franchising the

popular mass of any reactionary ideologies and their manifestations in any

forms .

(“Le WMSAE-LENINISAE est une philosophie, un guide pour l’action

révolutionnaire, un instrument d ’analyse scientiﬁque, une méthode

rationnelle de travail, une ligne de conduit exemplaire dans la vie sociale

quotidienne, qui vise essentiellement libérer les masses populaires de

toutes les ideologies réactionnaires et de leurs manifestations sous toutes

lesformes. ”) '4
The implication of socialism as the ideological guide for the development policy was the
control by the government of most of the means of production and the economic unit of
the country. Right after the adoption of Marxism Leninism by Benin, there was a wave
of nationalization of almost all the existing economic units and other vital enterprises of
the country that belonged in large part to private operators some of which were
American. Not long after the relations with the United States would suffer from this

ideological shift while there would follow an increase in exchange with the former Soviet

Union.

 

'3 Kerekou, Recueil des Discours, l9.
'4 Kerekou, Recueil des Discours, 20.

141

:4F‘J"

The Guiding Principles of Benin Foreign policy

Any current study of the Benin’s foreign relations, should consider three major
periods: the ﬁrst 12 years after the independence (1960 - 1972) and the Years of the
militaro-Marxist regime (1972 — 1990) and the era of new democracy (1990- onward).

In spite of the many putsches that characterized the ﬁrst phase (1960-1972) it was
still a period of relative continuity in the country’s foreign policy, at least in principle.
Almost all the government that took power after the several putsches in this period
implicitly pledged allegiance to the west and kept special relations with France. Because
of the ideological competition of the Cold War many third world countries chose after
decolonization, not to identify with any of the leading superpower or their ideology. This
position is referred to since the Afro-Asian conference of Bandung in April 1955 as the
non-alignment movement.15 At the independence, Dahomey/Benin has joined that group
by making Non-alignment one the major characteristic of its foreign policy. But as Benin,
was confronted with the challenges of national development, the choice of non-alignment
was seriously weakened by its limited resources. This situation created its dependency on
foreign aids and forced the country to rely on France, the former colonizer. France was
thus granted a privileged status among foreign partners. As a result there was an
unconditional diplomatic solidarity with France, Benin was expected to consult with the
French authority on major international issues and align its decision on the French
position.16

Nonetheless following the independence the ﬁrst President Hubert K. MAGA laid

down the main principles of the country’s diplomacy on the eve of the celebration of the

 

'5 Kenneth D. Kaunda, The Origin and Growth of Non-Alignment, (Lusaka, Zambia: Neczam, 1971 ), 4.
'6 Amzat Assani and Thierry C.O. Gnanho, “Point sur les accords de Cooperation signes entre la France et
le Benin del972 a 1992”, (Abomey-Calavi : FASJEP U.N.B.), 16-17.

142

ﬁrst national day on July 315’, 1961.Those principles were: “mutual respect for
independence, sovereignty, equality and dignity of neighboring states and partners; on-
interfering in the internal affairs of the states; good neighborliness relations; Peaceful
settlement of conﬂicts, peace-keeping and international security; international
cooperation based on reciprocal interests.”l7

Despite the political instability of the ﬁrst decade after the independence, these
principles remained largely unchanged since 1960.18 However between the coup of 1972
and the adoption of the resolutions of the 1990 national conference the main ideas behind
Benin foreign relations derived from the ‘Discours Programme’, a speech program made
by the leader of the putsch . The ‘Discours Programme’ called for a new turn in the
country’s foreign policy and strongly emphasized the need to do away with diplomacy as
it was held before the putsch. The goal of the new orientation was to free the nation of
foreign domination which was seen as the primary cause of the Benin’s
underdevelopment. '9

Benin foreign policy operated on two main guiding principles from 1972 to 1989:
the New Policy of National Independence and the ﬁght against neo-colonialism. In
application of the New Policy of National Independence, Benin identiﬁed “nonalignment,
equality, mutual respect, sovereignty, mutual advantage and national dignity” as key

elements of its new foreign policy. In pursuance of this policy many goals were set for

national development of the country, and to meet this objective, the country needed more

 

'7 National Chart of the Republic of Dahomey, edited by the Secretary of States, pp. 17-20, 1961 cited by
Raoul Senankpe Ahouangansi, “Cooperating for Development: Benin-United States Relations Since 1990”
(memoire Maitrise FLASH, DELLCE 2004-2005) 8.

‘8 Ahouangansi, Cooperating for Development, 8.

19 Zinsou Donatien Ogoubiyi “et la domination étrangére sera dénoncée comme “source premiere de

I ’arriération de notre pays.” La Cooperation Bénino-Ame'ricaine (Abomey-Calavi : FASJEP UNB 1983)
,15.

143

resources.20 An increase and a diversiﬁcation in the number of foreign partners became
necessary. A matter of fact, Benin thus increased its diplomatic representations abroad
from 12, to 18 and ended, as explained earlier, the privileged relations with France.”
New countries joined the circle of foreign partners; Benin established diplomatic
relations with the People’s Republic of China right after the revolution of 1972, North
Korea and the Democratic Republic of Germany in 1973.22

The new diplomacy had a mitigated success. If it helped broadening the circle of
ﬁiends and partners, it suffered from the international context of Cold War. The new
diplomacy generated some beneﬁts for the country by contributing to its diplomatic
expansion. This expansion resulted in more assistance in the ﬁeld of education mainly in
the form of scholarship that helped training the manpower needed for the task of national
development. For some analysts “Benin diplomacy knew its hours of glory during the
Revolutionary period. Most of the factories were built then. Links with the People’s
democracies of Europe, the USSR, China and North Korea were strengthened. More
than 2,000 students were trained in those countries.”23 But these gains were only partial
and could not help fulﬁll all the objective of national development. The diversiﬁcation in
partnership partially failed, victim as mentioned earlier of the ideological competition of
the Cold War. Few years after the decision to adopt socialism and Benin’s relations with
many western countries started deteriorating. Despite its non-alignment, the shift in its
ideological option of development affected the country’s image abroad and caused it to

be isolated diplomatically. This made some analysts claim that “Benin diplomacy during

 

2° Ogoubiyi, La Coopération Bénino-Américaine, l6

2' Ogoubiyi, La Cooperation Bénino-Américaine, 17.

22 Ogoubiyi La Coopération Bénino-Américaine ,18.

23 Raoul Senankpe Ahouangansi Cooperating for Development, 18.

144

the Marxism-Leninist political regime (1975-1990) caused serious damages to the
country’s image, strained its international relations and brought about diplomatic
isolation and even its neglect by other countries”24

All in all, the combination of the factors like the Cold War context, the new
ideological direction in the country and its diplomatic expansion towards the eastern bloc
and other communist countries, created political ﬁiction with other nations. For example
since Benin became closer to the communist North- Korea, its diplomatic relations with
South Korea were ended. Similarly due to some misunderstanding and
miscommunication over economic and political matters, its relations with the U.S.
suffered severely to the point where the US reduced the size of its representation in
Benin 25

Benin-U.S. Relations since 1960

Domestic political realities usually inﬂuence the way actors interact at
international level. This statement applies to the relations between the United States and
Benin. In either country, major domestic actors and political climate have inﬂuenced the
evolution of these bilateral relations. Studying U.S.-Benin relations thus requires that
the three phases identiﬁed earlier in this chapter be considered. This section will ﬁrst
analyze the political context in which the relations between the two countries evolved
before studying the cultural exchanges between the two countries.

The United States and Benin enjoyed fairly good relations between 1960 and

1972. But after 1972 their relations suffered from ideological differences as well as from

clashes over economic interests. Benin was recognized by the U.S. Right after its

 

2‘ Ahouangansi, Cooperating for Development, 21.
25 Ahouangansi, Cooperating for Development, 21.

145

independence and the two countries established diplomatic relations as early as October
1960. In the State Department’s Press release No. 596 of October 13'“, 1960 we could
read:

Immediately upon their attainment of independence in August of this year,

the United States entered into diplomatic relations with these nations... In

the cases of Dahomey, Niger and Upper Volta, Donald R. Norland,

Charge d’affaires resident at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, also presented

credentials as Charge on their dates of Independence. 26
Nearly a month after their independence, the U.S. upgraded its representation in these
ex-colonies to a diplomatic mission with Mr. Borden Reams appointed on October 14‘“,
1960 as Ambassador to the three Republics of Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, and Dahomey
(Benin).27 Ever since, the relations between the two countries followed a normal constant
evolution until the crises of the 70’s. The following year Benin and the United States
signed their ﬁrst bilateral Agreement which launched their cooperation in every possible
area that is still in effect. Many other agreements were signed later on with the U.S. on
small or large scale development projects in Benin. The major agreement between the
two countries was the Economic, Technical and Related Assistance Agreement signed on
May 27th, l961at Cotonou. Although there is no cultural agreement speciﬁcally signed,
the spirit of the ﬁrst article gives enough room for any such cooperation between both
countries. It states:

the Government of the United States of America will furnish such

economic, technical and related assistance hereunder as may be requested

by representatives of appropriate agencies of the Government of Dahomey

and approved by representatives of the agencies designated by the

Government of the United States of America to administer its
responsibilities hereunder, or as may be requested and approved by the

 

2“ Department ofState Bulletin Vol. XLIII no 1114, October 315‘, 1960, 702.
27 Department of State Bulletin, 702.

146

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Government of the United states of America and the Government of
Dahomey.28

Change in the domestic political situation of Benin in 1972 signiﬁcantly impacted
its relations with United States. Between 1972 and 1974 the American government was
cautious about the new regime in place in Benin because of the uncertainty and lack of
clarity in the new direction in country. However this short period of observation did not
prevent the continuation of the American assistance in social and rural development
through 1976.29 In 1974 the choice of Marxism triggered an era of crisis that brought
changes in the good relations entertained from the independence onward.3o
l. / Political Differences

The political differences between the two countries came from their ideological
differences. The choice of socialism by Benin as the driving ideology for its development
in 1974, caused the American to be distant from the new regime as it has become
estranged to the principle of the American democracy. The implications of these
differences transpired in their respective views on important international issues like the
war in Angola, the Iran situation in 1978, the American military operation in
Guantanamo and other sensitive international issues.3 I Two additional factors made the

U.S. adopt a much tougher position vis-a-vis Benin between 1976 and 1982: the

 

23 Economic, Technical and Related Assistance Agreement
http://www.pcrsonnclcoop.org/mcnrbcrsonlv/Benin.pdf. August 3rd,2009.

29 Benoit C. Arigbo and Etienne D. Doukan “La Politique Américaine d ’Aide Bilatérale au Développement
de la République du Benin de 1960-1996.” (Abomey-Calavi: F ASJ EP Université Nationale du Benin.
1996-1997), 3.

3° Michel Houndjahoue "Le Différend Américano-Béninois de 1976 a 1983" Le Mois en Aﬁique, 219-220,
(Avril-Mai 1984): 25.

31 Zinsou Donatien Ogoubiyi La Cooperation Bénino-Américaine (Abomey Calavi : FASJEP UNB
1983), 63-64.

147

establishment of diplomatic relations between Benin and the Republic of Libya and the
numerous meeting and sessions of ideological indoctrination.32
The lack of communication resulting from other incident, contributed to the
deterioration of the already shaky situation between the two countries. On Thanksgiving
Day (November 26th, 1981) two Americans were drunk and were trying to ﬁnd their way
home. Unfortunately they lost their way and entered the military camp of Ghezo at night
despite the warning of the guard. The latter shot the two Americans and one of them was
injured on his legs. The other was detained for interrogation. The injured was transferred
to Europe. They were shot by the guard and one of them was injured. The American
ambassador took appropriate measure to ﬂy him overseas without any consultation with
the ofﬁcial in Benin. The Benin ofﬁcial did not appreciate the fact that the American was
transferred without any further explanation. As a consequence Benin authorities
requested that the American Embassy move their venue ﬁom the vicinity of the camp.
That decision was qualiﬁed “unfriendly and unacceptable” by the American government
who retaliated with a suspension of its ﬁnancial assistance to Benin.33 In addition to that
sanction the main instrument of U.S. representation in Benin like the Embassy in
Cotonou, the American Cultural Center and the U.S. Agency for lntemational
Development ofﬁce (USAID) Bureau in Cotonou were all closed with the USAID ofﬁce
transferred from Cotonou to Lome (Republic of Togo). The political crises were only one

aspect of the issue, other problem arose over American economic interests mainly

detained by American companies and individual operating in Benin.

 

’2 Interview with Mr. George TIMANTI 25/07/1996 by Arigbo and Doukan.
33 Ogoubiyi, La Cooperation Benino-Americaine, 71.

148

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2. / Crises over Economic Interests

These crises developed mainly over issues of nationalization by Benin of
American economic interests.34 Following the adoption of socialism in 1974, the
government decided to take control of most of the private companies and other business
operating in the country. The choice of socialism and Marxism Leninism brought Benin
to nationalize the majority of companies (private bank and other business) operating in
the country particularly the most vital for the economy. In the process, it also took control
of many companies belonging to foreign investors among which four American
companies belonging all to the American ﬁrms the Texas Company (TEXACO) and
Mobil. Other American interest touched by the decision was the 20 % of the share of the
bank BIAO owned by American citizens that were seized by the government.35

Other problems arose between the Benin government and the leaders of the Watch
Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania, commonly referred to as “the Jehovah
witnesses.” Some of their practices and belief were antagonistic with the new regime.
Consequently, the government not only forbade the witness to practice their cult and
forced their leaders (who were Americans) of the church to leave the country, it also
seized almost everything that belonged to the Bible and Tract Society including their
estate. An important portion of this belonged to American citizens.36

These incidents had diplomatic repercussions and brought the American

government to exercise economic pressures on the government of Benin. Among these

was the suspension of any kind of ﬁnancial, technical or economic assistance to any

 

34 Ogoubiyi, La Cooperation Benino-Americaine, 65.
35 Ogoubiyi La Cooperation Benino-Americaine, 65.
36 Ogoubiyi La Cooperation Bénino-Américaine, 65.

149

projects that were initially ﬁnanced in part by the U.S.37 the American position that was
as enforced by the Trade Act of 1974 , was that unless the government of Benin redresses
the situation by paying the American companies or citizens what they are due, these
projects were no longer to be ﬁnanced by the U.S. government.38

With such a pressure one hand and the expectation of Benin authorities to
improve the relations, the Beninese government ﬁnally decided to give back what it took
from the witness. But despite that sign of good will, the situation did not improve. It got
worse when at the beginning of 1976, “troops forced their way into the American
ambassador’s residence.”39 The reason behind this unjustiﬁable breach in diplomatic
norms was the suspicion by Benin ofﬁcials that the Ambassador’s residence was hiding
arms that could be used against the regime.

As a consequence of this series of events, that is the breach in diplomatic norms,

the absence of communication and the pressure from U.S. Congress, Benin and the U.S.A
suspended their diplomatic relations in 1976. It was only in 1984 that the relations were
restored and a new Ambassador, Mr. George Moose was appointed to Benin.40
The combination of these factors and the idea that Benin like many francophone
countries are on the periphery of the U.S. diplomacy in Aﬁica may prompt many
observers to support the claim that the American government did not try to promote the

values of liberal democracy by creating a friendly atmosphere between the two nations.

On the contrary, in attempting to assist the country to attain its development objectives,

 

37 Ogoubiyi La Cooperation Benino-Americaine, 66.

38Ogoubiyi La Cooperation Benino-Americaine, 67

39 Allen, Christopher, Michael Radu, et a1 Benin and the Congo (London; New York: Pinter, 1989.), 115.

4° Benoit C. Arigbo & Etienne D. Doukan “La Politique Américaine d’Aide Bilatérale au Développement
de la République du Benin de 1960-I996.” (Abomey-Calavi: FASJEP Universite Nationale du Benin.

1996-1997), 5.
150

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the U.S. used economic assistance and different programs of exchanges to present the
achievement of the American system and persuade ( if necessary) the elite of the beneﬁts
of the ideals of the capitalist system. These programs created an interface where leaders,
elite, students and other professional could witness the cultural and technological
achievements of the U.S. system. Most of these are initiated and centralized by the U.S.
State Department through the Bureau of Educational and Cultural affairs.

Section 2: U.S. cultural relations with Benin

U.S. cultural relations program with Benin is characterized essentially by
educational exchanges, the International Visitor program and other cultural activities
organized under the supervision of the United State Information Service in Cotonou.
Complementary cultural activities include the book and audio visual loan service
organized through the American cultural centers, currently known as the Information
Resource Center.

Apart from technical and economic assistance, another category to consider is
visit of American ofﬁcials to Benin. A simple visit can have an unimaginable impact on
the public opinion. During the ﬁrst decade after the independence there were many
official visits ﬁ'om Washington to Dahomey/Benin. The purpose was to reinforce the
relations between the nations. These types of visit leave a good impression on the public
opinion particularly in an underdeveloped country where the low literacy rate prevents a
large portion of the population to access the newspaper and thereby develop a critical
appraisal of such visit.

Other sources of inﬂuence although very remote and not directly related to any

government policy could be the Non-governmental Organizations (N GO’s). They project

151

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indirectly some aspect of the American values, either humanitarian or a system of belief,
religious or others. Before the nineties they were only a few of these organizations, the
political stability brought by the new wave democracy in the 90’s has favored the
increase in the numbers of foreign NGO’s in Benin.

Cultural relations have existed between the United States and the Republic of
Benin since 1960. Despite the volatile political situation in Benin in the ‘603 U.S.
educational exchanges still continue and different types of cultural activities were
occasionally organized through the mechanism of cooperation in place in the country.
These activities were concerts, arts exhibition seminars, exhibits of books on speciﬁc
topics on the U.S. institutions or lifestyle. The main objective of these activities was to
present to the public the different aspects of the American society and way of life. This
included new development science and technology or the recent achievement of the U.S.
space program. These types of activities are here considered as the sources of U.S. soft
power in Benin. They aim of winning the heart and mind of the populations guided many
of those activities. Most of all, it was an active effort to create contact zone between the
intellectual of the country and the American culture, this was done quite often through
the representation of the United States Information Service (USIS).
The United State Information Service

Ofﬁcially opened in 1961 the American Cultural Center of Cotonou is the place
The Cultural center is part of the United States Information Service (U.S.I.S) post and it
hosts many activities organized through the sponsoring of the State Department programs

of cultural exchange. Apart from the library service it also plays an important role in the

152

selection of the candidates to the educational exchange programs like the Fulbright
Scholarship, the Humphrey .

At its inauguration, the USIS post of Cotonou started with limited operations “as
the Post’s principal attention has been focused on locating and readying suitable quarters
for an information center.”4| These programs will upgrade years after to include
“program assistance to the local radio station, distribution of press releases, USIS
pamphlet and periodicals such as Perspectives Americaines, produced by USIS in
Leopoldville.” 42 Film loans and other activities followed a few years after.

The U.S.I.S. post in Cotonou hosts the Cultural Center and has remained
operational until the incorporation of the USIA into the State Department. As a result of
the recent changes in the administration of the service, the American Cultural Center has
changed into an “Information Resource Center.” The Center Operates a library and has an
English Ianguage Program. It also used to distribute a newsletter “Aﬁique-Etats- Unis’
that informed its readers on current issues in the relations between the U.S. and Africa
but particularly between the U.S. and Benin. These types of newsletters help increase the
understanding of the U.S. policy and culture by the subscribers, usually students or civil
servants. The American cultural Center is one of the cultural facilities that participate in
animating the intellectual life in the country. Its policy of free access enables students,
civil servants or other professionals to use books that could help enrich their intellectual
and professional background. These books cover different aspects of U.S. history, culture

and institutions.

 

’1 Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Educational, Cultural
and related activities for African Countries South of the Sahara August 1961,83.
42 Department of State International Educational, Cultural and related activities, 83.

153

In 1991, the American Cultural Center in Cotonou had about ﬁve thousands
volumes and can host up to 94 peoples. 48% of the books it carried were in French while
the remainder was in English. The center was carrying about 64 titles of newspapers and
magazines and had close to 22,900 visitors in 1991.43 Assessing the cultural cooperation
from the perspective of the American Cultural Center, Eudes Enagnon M. Adounkpe
notes that it targeted more the elite which has access to as much information on the
United States as possible. (“La diﬂ"usion culturelle ici est beaucoup plus oriente'e vers
l’élite intellectuelle, a la disposition de laquelle elle met des informations sur les Etats-
Unis.” ) 44 This assessment is correct, considering the program of educational exchanges
with Benin.

Educational exchanges

Unlike other Aﬁican countries, the United States did not sign a separated
agreement in educational exchange with Benin at the independence. The Economic and .
Technical Assistance Agreement of May 27th 1961 could be easily extended to this area
provided that both parties adhere to this extension. Despite this absence of a separate
agreement on educational exchanges, the American assistance to Benin is predominantly
in education. Either through the Peace Corps volunteers who are teaching math, science
or English at high schools in Benin or through the different educational exchanges
programs managed through the American Cultural Center of Cotonou.

Since 1960 U.S. educational exchanges with Benin have consisted of three main
scholarships: the Fulbright exchange programs, the Humphrey program and the

Advanced Training for Leadership and Skills (ATLAS)/ the African Graduate Fellowship

 

43 Eudes Enagnon M. Adounkpe “Les Echanges Culture/s Internationaux entre le Benin et ses Partenaires

en 1 991, 3.
44Adounkpe Les Echanges Culturels Internationaux, 3.

154

Program (AF GRAD) scholarship managed by the Africa-America Institute (AAI). Benin
citizens could have access to these scholarships through the U.S. cultural center. They
cover many ﬁelds and disciplines and most are award for a degree program in graduate
studies. The Fulbright scholarship has begun since the sixties. The recent statistics from
the Fulbright report shows a total of 104 grantees from Benin between 1949 and 2007.45

The Humphrey Program started much later on in 1978 but the ﬁrst award to a
Beninese grantee would not be made until 1984, when the relations between the U.S. and
the country became normal again. That year a new U.S. ambassador was appointed to
Benin and his arrival actually contributed to an improvement of the bilateral relations
between the two countries. The extension of the Humphrey program to Benin can be
counted as one of the advantages that came with the normalization of their relations.
Compared to other countries the number of scholarship awarded to Benin students and
other professionals was minimal. Between 1978 and 1987 for example, the number of
grantees from Benin was only 4 while Togo a neighboring country, that is half the size of
Benin and who has observed a political line not ideologically colored but favorable to
western countries had a total of 8. Between 1984 and 2004, the total number of
Humphrey scholarship granted to Beninese citizen was 22.46

Atlas/AF GRAD degree program, administered by the Aﬁican -—American
Institute, this program started as African Graduate Fellowship Program in 1963 and ran
through 1990. That year it was replaced by Advanced Training for Leadership and Skills

which would also end in 2003. Together these two programs have helped bring about 96

 

’5 Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, Annual Report 2007-2008, 70.
461. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board The 41st Annual Report
Washington: U. S. Department of State, 2005, 55.

155

Students to the U.S. for Master’s or PhD program at American universities47 But U.S.
educational assistance was not only limited to scholarships, there were also occasionally
professional seminars and workshop organized through the U.S. Agency for International
Development ( USAID) or other federal agencies. These seminars target civil servants,
university teachers or diplomats and are usually led by American scholars or
professionals sponsored by the U.S. government.48 Other cultural programs between the
two countries developed after the appointment of a new Ambassador to Benin in 1984
and a new atmosphere of good relations prevailed notably in the late eighties and early
nineties. Thus the two Benin cities have become sister cities with American cities,
Ouidah is sister city with Pritchard in Alabama and Cotonou is sister city with Atlanta
(Georgia).
U.S. Cultural Activities in Benin

These activities include concerts, exhibition of arts (paintings, photography).
Seminars and lectures open to the public can also be included in this category. Concerts
here refers to the one sponsored by the U.S. Department of State as part of its cultural
exchanges program initiated since 1956. As it is discussed in chapter 2 of this
dissertation, the jazz diplomacy was an important aspect of the American cultural
program abroad. Benin like many other countries hosted many artists sponsored by the

State Department. They had the opportunity to present American music like the Negro

 

47 Generations of Quiet Progress The Development Impact of U.S. Long- Term University Training on
Aﬁ'icaﬁom 1963 to 2003, Final Report 2004 Annex D, Table l.

’8 Benoit C. Arigbo & Etienne D. Doukan “La Politique Américaine d 'Aide Bilatérale au De'veloppement
de la République du Benin de 1960-I996,” (M.A Thesis, FASJEP Université Nationale du Benin. 1996-
1997, 28.

156

spirituals, jazz and blues to the public of Benin from the 1960’s on. Among them were:
The Phoenix trio May 4”, 1966; the Cozy Cole 1963; Golden Gate quartet 1962 negro-
spirituals; Southern University Jazz, a jazz band from Louisiana June 22-23'd, 1973;
Eddie Clearwater, 1987; Talib Kibwe, 1990. The American cultural center since its
inauguration has played a role in presenting some of American artists to the public of
Benin. In a country where few American artists produce show the activities of the
American cultural center in Benin become very the important not only for the fulﬁllment
of the political agenda of the U.S. government but also to offer the opportunity to the
Beninese audience to have a live experience of music they are commercially exposed to.
Peace Corps Benin

The Peace Corps has become over the years, one of the most permanent instruments
of the U.S. cultural relations with Benin. Despite the political instability of the sixties or
the diplomatic crisis of the seventies, it has remained active even though the number of
volunteers and the range of its activities have been affected by that political climate
between the countries. The positive note is that it never stopped operating. The work and
devotion of the volunteers of the Peace Corps if politically motivated or generated make a
big difference in the lives of many people around the world and certainly in Benin as
well.

The agreement between the Peace Corps and the government of Benin was signed
in 1967. This apparent delay, compared to many other countries in the region, was
probably due to the political instability in the country as explained above. The Corps
became operational the following year with a group of 26 volunteers making the ﬁrst

contingent group sent to Dahomey/Benin. Peace Corps volunteers are trained before they

157

 

 

are dispatched to their destinations. This gives them the opportunity to learn French but
also to learn about the country and acquire basic knowledge for everyday conversation
with the rural population. Many would then learn how to speak Fon, Dendi, Bariba or
other local language of Benin.
Evolution of the Peace Corps Benin

Since the ﬁrst group of 26 volunteers in 1968, the peace has been sending
constantly volunteers to Benin with the numbers varying each year based on the
availability and the request of the government of Benin. However during the years of
crisis like in 1978 the number of volunteers serving went down to 2. To these days,
between 1967 when the agreement between the Peace and the government of Benin was
signed until 2009, l631volunteers have served in Benin. Many of them like in most
African countries served in education usually teaching math, physics but mainly English
at high school. Peace Corps also intervenes in many other areas like health, agriculture or
environment.
Making a difference: the Impact of the Peace Corps

Between 1968 and 1990, the cooperation with the Peace Corps has overall been a
story of fruitful collaboration. The work of volunteers has made a big impact on the lives
of the rural population and in many respects has helped achieve the government’s
development goals. For example the Guinea worm disease was a real issue in the city of
Dassa-Zoume in North Zou (Benin). The local population was happy and relieved to ﬁnd
out that the Peace Corps volunteers assisted by Benin health personnel, were able to wipe
out the guinea worm from their village. In recognition of that success, the population

organized a recreational activity, song and dance to express their gratitude to the USAID

158

 

 

 

and the volunteers.49 In general the populations of Benin have good impression about the
Peace Corps Volunteers. Many among the country population highly impressed by the
volunteers getting quickly involved in their social life and them learning successfully
how to speak their languages and even taste and eat some of their dishes.50 The villagers
really appreciate volunteers work and have no problem establishing a relation of trust
with them. Benin ofﬁcials also appreciate their work and wish at times that they stayed
longer. Although there have been some moments of crisis, there is overall a positive
appreciation of the work of the volunteers “The peace corps activities are appreciated by
both authorities and local populations. Most of Benin authorities recognize the use of
volunteers and wish that their presence could last longer.”5 '

The local populations are also satisﬁed with the volunteers and it is with gratitude
and joy that many among them embrace any innovation made through their assistance.
One of the most illustrative examples in Benin is that of “the economical fumaces” which
has gained a common use all over the country.52 The satisfaction reached even the higher
level of the sates as the former president of Benin declared recently in a letter to the
Peace Corps, "Your Volunteers offer to the citizens of my country a model and another
view of what they themselves can contribute to the development of the Republic of

Benin. The reports I receive from the people, as well as from the Ministers of my

government, bear witness to the need and the durability of Peace Corps activities in

 

49Benoit C. Arigbo & Etienne D. Doukan “La Politique Américaine d ’Aide Bilatérale au Développement
de la République du Benin de 1960-I996.” (M.A Thesis, Abomey-Calavi: FASJEP Universite Nationale du
Benin. 1996-1997), 43.

soJeanne G. Koudogbo, and Rassiatou Yaya NADJO “The American Foreign Policy throughout the Peace
Corps: the case study of Benin "_ (Abomey-Calavi: DELLCE, FLASH 1992-1993), 79.

5' Koudogbo and Nadjo, The American Foreign Policy, 80.

52 Koudogbo and Nadjo ,T he American Foreign Policy, 80

159

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Benin's development."53 These praise and satisfaction cannot easily upstage the problems
encountered by the volunteers in fulﬁlling their duties in Benin.
Problems Encountered

These problems are related to the difﬁculty of language, the attitude of some
volunteers on the ﬁeld and the fact that the peace is doing a fantastic job assisting the
population and yet has comparatively kept at national level a low proﬁle. While overall
the impressions generated by the peace corps volunteers among the local authorities, the
government and the populations was great it appeared that nonetheless they were areas
where things need to be improve and few problem in the collaboration of the volunteers
with certain ministries. The authorities express some concerns about the way some
volunteers carry out their function “Others come just as tourists and want to be ﬂee from
all local authorities. Sometimes they disappear for a while from the country for a trip in
Ghana, Togo.” 5"

Beside there is a problem of communication with many volunteers. Granted on
their training program, volunteers in Benin are taught some of the languages and many
are also trained in French. But for class to be taught at high school level, conversational
French may not be all that is needed. The result “Most of the Peace Corps volunteers
speak poor French and have problems of communication with the populations.” 55 In

classroom, this problem could get even more serious as volunteers are expected to

transmit knowledge. It becomes a serious problem for knowledge transmission, especially

 

53 http://www.pcacecorpsgov/indcx.cfm‘?shcll=lcarn.u'herqrcafricabcnin&noﬂash=vcs

5" Koudogbo and Nadjo, “The American Foreign Policy throughout the Peace Corps: the case stuafv of
Benin, ” 80.

55 Koudogbo and Nadjo The American Foreign Policy, 80.

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when they have to teach subject like math, physics or natural science in High school.“ If
communication does not ﬂow well between student and their teachers, there will not be
learning and the purpose of the mission may not be reached. The problem is probably
addressed by the power-that-be at country level.

Benin Department of Agriculture for example, complained about the lack of
collaboration with the Peace Corps. Beside the Peace for a long time has kept a low
proﬁle in the country. Many did not know about the organization even though they are
working on a daily basis with the volunteer. “In spite of its 25 year-presence in Benin, the
Peace corps still remains unknown to many Benin people. Its discretion puts a shadow on
its activities and the whole institution is wrapped in secrecy.”57 This situation changed
slightly by the 90’s as the peace joined other agencies and organization. To better reach
their goal, Peace Corps volunteers should improve their French skills. The Peace Corps in
Benin “may seek to organize or sponsor seminars and conferences aiming at getting itself
more familiar to Benin people.”58

As far as the mutual understanding is concerned it is not easy to track down the
evaluation of some volunteers and hear about their impressions especially volunteers who
served during the time of the cold war. The recent development in web technology
however has proved to be very useful as there now many sites on which current

volunteers are posting blogs, images and other information that could be enlightening as

far as their impression on the country is concerned and how they feel about the whole

 

56Benoit C. Arigbo and Etienne D. Doukan “LA Politique Américaine d ’Aide Bilatérale au Développement
de la République du Benin de 1960-1996.” (FASJEP Universite Nationale du Benin. 1996-1997), 43.

57 Koudogbo and Nadjo The American Foreign Policy throughout the Peace Corps, 8 1 .

58 Koudogbo and Nadjo The American Foreign Policy, 82.

161

 

experience. What have they got from the stay and how were they able to present aspect of
U.S. culture.
International Visitors Programs

The activities of the USIS in Benin was also complemented by visits from ofﬁcial
and semi ofﬁcial of the U.S. and also some from Benin to the U.S. apart from ofﬁcial
state visits, there were many other visits by professional from a variety of walks of life. Fa
On most of these trips, they combined leisure and work to have a better understanding of

the U.S. and its politics and culture but also to help in some cases American understand

 

better their countries. E
The purpose of cultural relations and public diplomacy is to create mutual
understanding by facilitating the contact between people. Interaction can create and
facilitate communication and communication is viewed as a key instrument in cultural
relations. It is in light of this argument that many of the activities sponsored by the U.S.
government can be listed. The government brought people, leaders or professional to visit
the United States, get familiar with the institutions and understand how it works, the
beneﬁts it provides for the citizens and many others. On the part of professional visit and
exchange there are four cases that will be studied. These individual were all journalist
invited by the state Department on various occasion to visit the U.S. Their impressions
reﬂect the way exchange can inﬂuence the opinion of the visitor and create more
understanding of the US culture, institutions, and lifestyle to the visitor. The following
section will relate and analyze the experience of Benin journalist in the U.S. in the sixties
and the seventies. They were invited by the State Department as part of the International

Visitor Program which brings different personalities from the media and other political

162

 

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leaders to the visit the U.S. and see how the institutions and the democratic process work.
Usually it is a thirty days trip which helps them see other aspect of the U.S. culture as
well. J .Vieyra, Rene Ewagnignon and other journalists from Benin were able to beneﬁt
from that program. On their return home they were able to share their experience with
their readers.

In 1962, for example, a journalist from Benin joined a group of other media men
from francophone West African countries to visit the united state on what can be viewed
as professional and cultural visit. In an article published in the daily newspaper of the
independent Dahomey “L ’ Aube Nouvelle, ” Justin Vieyra shares his impressions on the
U.S. with the readers. He explained how from Washington they were free to decide on
the program of their itinerary in the U.S. and were given all the necessary logistic support
to make this happen. Thence they were able to travel to Pittsburgh, San Francisco,
Denver, Dallas, Atlanta New Orleans and Cape Canaveral.

On many of these stops, he mentioned how they were welcomed in American
families and was particularly impressed by the practice of showing your guests around. It
is not a cultural practice in his country and so he found that curious and asked about the
rationale behind. He was told that “Americans are proud of their homes because they pay
attention to every detail about it from the design to the decoration to the point that they
could give the impression that it is the best in the world ”(“Les Américains sontﬁers de
leurs habitations parce qu ’ils mettent beaucoup de soin a les construire suivant des plans
qu ’ils établissent eux-mémes, puis a les entretenir. ”) 59

What they did on the trip, his overall impressions rhymes with what the

government expected foreigners to know about the U.S. Vieyra reﬂecting on their visit to

 

‘9 Aube Nouvelle, 18 Aout 1962, 6.
1 63

 

 

 

the NASA and other government sites that in normal situations were supposed to be
subjected to security restriction said that he believed the fact that they were able to visit
those site without any restriction showed that he was visiting a free country. Freedom for
the individual made it possible for them to access freely those sites like NASA that were
and still are sensitive to the national security of the U.S.

Vieyra thought that visiting the space center, staying on the St. Patrick base in
Florida and being allowed to visit other strategically important places without any
opposition from the American ofﬁcials proved to him that he was visiting a “free world”.
To him it was only in a free world that ofﬁcials would let foreigners visit strategic sites
like the missile site in Cape Canaveral. If freedom was the most important thing Vieyra
retained from his U.S. trip, his compatriot Rene Ewagnignon was amazed by how
diverse the county was and he was particularly struck by the symbols of power that
seemed to exist in different forms in every city he visited in the U.S.

Rene Ewagnignon was one of the most distinguished journalists from Benin
appointed in the sixties with the A gence Dahomeenne de Presse (ADP). In 1965 he was
one of the twenty ﬁve African journalists sponsored by the White House, State
Department and many other ofﬁcial American agencies to visit the U.S. for a one month
period starting with the inauguration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Through his
account of the U.S. trip is the example of how the U.S. effort to create cultural and good
impressions in Dahomey played out. The approach was regional as Ewagnignon was one
of the many journalists sponsored by the Government agencies for this visit. We will try
here to see how the visit impacted him and his impressions about the US system,

government and social and professional images.

164

 

 

Starting with the federal capital Washington DC, they visited three important
places and monuments in Washington: the Lincoln, Washington and Jefferson memorial
and then went to the Arlington cemetery where they visit Kennedy’s tombs. He explained
how the capital city was ‘invaded by delegates from the 50 states and how despite that
busy atmosphere they were able to visit all those monuments and the major building of
the capital. He could still recall when visiting the Lincoln memorial the “I have the
Dream” speech delivered by Dr Martin Luther King. He found in the size of the Lincoln
memorial a metaphor of the magnitude of the Washington march.

La capitalefédérale était envahies par les délégués des cinquante Etats

venus avec leurs folklores pour la parade. A travers tout ce remue-

ménage, nous allions visiter les principaux monuments et édiﬁces de

Washington: le mémorial de Lincoln ou la désormais célébre marche des

Noirs de l’année derniére était venue s ’incliner. Cette marche était a la

mesure de laggigantesque statue érigée a la mémoire de l’émancipateur

des esclaves.

January 20*, 1965 was the inauguration day. Ewagnignon and his other Aﬁican
colleagues attended the ceremony. He remembered Lyndon declaration; ”Justice requires
us to remember that when any citizen denies his fellow, saying, "His color is not mine,"
or "His beliefs are strange and different," in that moment he betrays America, though his
forebears created this Nation?” “ La justice exige que nous nous souvenions de ceci:
quand un citoyen quelconque désavoue l’un de ses compatriotes déclarant: la couleur de
sa peau est différente de la mienne ou ses croyances sont étranges et différentes, a ce
moment-la, il trahit l’Amérique bien que ses ancétres aientfonde cette nation. ”)62

He found their program overwhelming and described as ‘full like an egg’ (French

expressions), rich in meeting and appointment. He was also impressed by the precision

 

6° Aube nouvelle 22 Avril I 965, 6.
6' Johnson Inaugural http://www.baltclbvcom/l24<"'prcs57.lltml accessed August 7th , 2009.
62 Aube nouvelle 29 Avril 1965, 3.

165

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which was observed in the scheduling. He reﬂected that he could hardly explain how he
managed to ﬁnish the stay alive because of the many places and people he had to visit

within such a relatively short period of time. He explains:

Le programme de notre se'jour dans la capitalefédérale était plein comme
un aeuf. Riche en rendez-vous et en conferences, il était également minute
avec une precision qui ne souffrait pas de vide. Rien qu ’a l’idée de penser
au nombre defois queje suis monte dans notre autobus et en suis
descendu, monte dans les ascenseurs, enlevé et mis mon manteau, écoute
des exposes et poser des questions, je me demande encore comment j ’ai pu
terminer debout ce marathon. C ’était certainement unefacon de nous

préparer a afﬁ'onter le pe'riple qui nous conduira a travers sept E tats des
“States.6

The program included trips to many cities, strategic and recreational sites and
other typical sites that could reﬂect the American power in every aspect; military,

technological or entertainment. Thus leaving Washington, they headed to Fort Bragg in

North Carolina. Fort Bragg (North Carolina): It was one of the military bases of the U.S.

but the peculiarity of this basis was that it was created nine months aﬁer Kennedy’s
inaugural. Fort Bragg’s mission is described today as “Maintain America's Contingency
Corps as a strategic crisis response force manned and trained to deploy rapidly by air,
sea, and land anywhere in the world, prepared to ﬁght upon arrival and win.”64

F art-Bragg est l’une des nombreuses bases militaires des Etats- Unis, mais

elle est d ’une importance toute spéciale, et ilfaut l’avoir vue pour en

avoir une idée. Fort Bragg est un groupe uniﬁe créé dans les neufmois

qui suivirent l ’investiture du President Kennedy “11 est dote d 'uneforce

d ’action rapide, eﬂicace, adaptable et sélective-uneforce qui donnerait

aux Etats- Unis la souplesse lui permettant de faire face aux menaces

autres que la guerre nucléaire totale.

The base was led by General Paul D. Adams who was also in charge of the

defense force for the Middle East and Africa. He Described dinner for the evening and

 

 

6’ L ’Aube Nouvelle, 29 Avril, 1965, 3.
m:/'/bcnctits.militarv.com/misc/instzlllations.«’Basc_Contcut.isp‘.’id=3760, accessed August 07, 2009.

166

 

 

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noticed Hammond a black musician playing piano (orgue). The following day they went
to the Champs de tir to watch some the military operation. They observed with interest
and fascination the launch of rockets, helicopters shooting and jetﬁghter launching bombs
and so on. It was an operation of iron and ﬁre that cost in those days 250 millions C.F.A
roughly 541thousand current U.S.Dollars. (“Rockets, hélicopte‘res mitraillant, chasseurs
a réactionjetant des bombes a napalm, brefun carrousel defer et defeu qui dura une
heure, Cout: plus de 250 millions de CFA. ”)65 Here one could see his admiration and his
perception of the US power in his description. Apart from the militaristic aspect it is
important to notice how he was quick to conclude his analysis with the cost of the
operation. If the US can afford that in a single operation then no doubt it is superpower
the persuasive aspect of this visit transpires through this impression. After Fort Bragg
they went to Cape Canaveral in Florida. He noticed the difference with North Carolina’s
weather. They lodged at Patrick Air Base and visited Cape Canaveral where there is the
NASA launching base. If he was impressed by the military base, in Cape Canaveral his
admiration will be go beyond the power of the U.S. it is the recognition of the prowess of
science that one could easily feel in his description of the lift off base. He wrote:

Dedicated to the memory of late President John F. Kennedy, former Cape

Canaveral is the Operational launch of the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) launch area of gear in the Atlantic. Like Derrick,

launch ramps rise into the sky until a rocket is ready to move towards its

mission. Here and there, you could see blockaus, stations of radio

transmitters and receivers, telemetry receivers, radar, hangars mounting

gear. It is busy all day and night ratings. Science never stops.

( “Dédié a la mémoire du regretté president John F. Kennedy, L ’ancien

Cap Canaveral est le centre opérationnel de lancement de la National

Aeronautics and Space Administration WASA) zone de lancement

d ’engins dans l’A tlantique. Pareils a des Derrick, les rampes de

lancement se dressent vers le ciel en attendant une fuse préte (‘1 aller vers
sa mission. Ca et la, des blockhaus, des stations émettrices-réceptrices de

 

65 Aube Nouvelle 29 Avril 1965, 3.
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montage d ’engins. On s ’aﬂaire de tous les cotes nuit etjour. La science ne

connait pas de temps mart?)66

Through this description of the base, Ewagnignon could help but admiring this
culture of technology and praising scientiﬁc advancement in general as he noted that
science never stops. After Cape Canaveral he and the other members of the crew headed
to Nashville in Tennessee.

In Nashville, he visited the Fisk University, an initially black institution
(according to his information) that became integrated later on. In Dallas he went to the
site of Kennedy assassination and attended the Rodeo show at Forth Worth. Here he
admired the cowboy style, the combination of hat, jeans and the whole scenery that
reminded him of the western movies. From Texas the group headed to the largest city of
the U.S. as be qualiﬁed it, that is Los Angeles. There they learnt the city owed its
expansion to the railway that brought in many immigrants. He found Los Angeles similar
to Cannes ( France) with its Palm trees and white painted houses. However if Cannes
was the capital of cinema once a year, Los Angeles he wrote was the capital of cinema
everyday and the mere idea of visiting Hollywood made him happy ( “Cannes est la
capitale du cine'ma unefois par an, Los Angeles l’est tous lesjours et j ’avoue que j ’e'tais
heureux a l’idée de pouvoir visiter Hollywood. 67 ” He was thrilled to have lunch with
Charleston Heston (who acted in ‘Ben Hur” and “The Cid”) and other actor from
Hitchcock movies. 68 Added to this exceptional opportunity, they visited the Universal
Studio, a trip to the Hollywood world of fantasy and the unreal. To complete that

experience into the world of amusement and entertainment they went to Disneyland. He

 

“5 Aube nouvelle 13 Mai 1965, 7.
67 Aube nouvelle I 3 Mai 1965, 7.
68 Aube nouvelle 13 Mai I 965, 7.

168

 

 

 

 

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qualiﬁed Disneyland as “un royaumefe'erique pour grands et petits A fairytale
kingdom for adult and kids. A visit to Disneyland for him was a trip to all the countries of
the world. He think Disney was so amazing to the point that it cannot be described or
narrated you simply have to “on I’admire, 0n la savoure et on repart satisfait avec

l ’impression d’avoir tout vu sur la terre.” A visit to UCLA and a small city of Merced
concluded their trip to Southern California.

From the southern part of the State, they drove to San Francisco. He thought it
was the most beautiful and the most original of the United States cities. With its “golden
gate” and many other attractions San Francisco was so appealing and charming to him,
that it was the American city that would remain in his souvenir for so long. He found the
city so attractive that he was not surprised that it was called “the city” by Californians.
Sadly he pointed out that the prestige and the charm of the city was if Los Angeles was
the capital city of entertainment; San Francisco was the capital of the West. A nickname,
he found diminishing for such a cosmopolitan city with so many attractions. They did a
bit of tourism in San Francisco before leaving the West cost for Omaha in Nebraska. In
Omaha he had a taste of the ‘Omaha steak’ and then visited the Offutt base, home to the
Strategic Air Command (S.A.C). It was the center of communication that would
centralize all commands for interventions on the U.S. territory in case of crises. He
explained that if between the U.S. and the Kremlin, there was a red phone, between the
Offut base and the White House there was a big yellow phone: “C ’est la le centre de
communications qui répercute les ordres d ’opérations immédiates sur le territoire des

Etats- Unis. Si la Maison Blanche est reliée au Kremlin par le téléphone [rouge], la base

169

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d ’Oﬂut (Omaha) est reliée (‘1 la Maison Blanche par un gros téléphonejaune.”69 He
thinks that the fame of the steak was widely deserved for cows that are fed with corns
produce deﬁnitely an excellent meat and tasty meat.

Ewagnignon ﬁnishes his article with the then delicate question of segregation and
racism and pertinently pointed at the paradox of the race question when it comes to the
way America treated Africans compared to the Black from the U.S. He wrote: that “Black
Americans are irritated-rightly he added- about what they call the paradox of their white
compatriots. This paradox consisted in letting non-American Black people enjoy all the
privileges that they, Black Americans, citizens of the U.S. were denied. All it takes for a
Black person is to put a towel around his head or a scarf for the people to revere him.”
Ewagnignon himself was pointed at as example (by Black Americans). They told him
that he would ﬁnd every door was open to him even though he had nothing more than
them. This paradox is explained by Ewagnignon as follows:

Les Noirs Américains qui luttent pour la reconnaissance de leurs droits a

l’intégration totale dans la société américaine sont irrites par ce qu ’ils

appellent — a juste raison d ’ailleurs- le paradoxe de leurs compatriotes

blancs. Ce paradoxe consiste a accorder aux noirs non américains toute

la considération qu ’on leur refuse a‘ eux, citoyens du pays. 11 suffit, nous a

dit l’un d ’eux, qu 'un noir s ’entoure la téte d ’une serviette ou (1 ’un tissu

pour que l’on fasse la révérence devant lui. Vous par exemple, vous

verrez que partout on vous ouvrira toutes les portes qui nous sontfermées

a nous autres, et pourtant avouez que vous n 'avez rien de plus que nous. 70

This was such a delicate question that he had to address and enquire about on his
second trip to the USA in 1970, this aspect will to be elaborate here. Both journalists

have had a taste of American culture and more importantly witness the cultural

achievement of the country. They have shown to a certain degree how the visitor

 

69 Aube nouvelle I3 Mai 1965, 7.
7" Aube Nouvelle 20 Mai, 1965.

170

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program could be a good propaganda tool or an important element of cultural diplomacy

they saw the American power in economy, they saw the military might and witness the

way the American system function as some journalist are invited to follow the electoral

process. This was a very good learning experience, will it generate any political return?

Hard to say but as information tool the mere fact that these journalist were able to publish

their articles without any censorship, can be considered a positive return and who knows a
how many readers would be inﬂuenced by those articles. That is one functional aspect of ii 7“

soft power. In their itinerary they were able to visit Cape Canaveral, a symbolic site from

 

the space age. In the next section, we will have a look at how the race also became part of is;
the battle over the image of power.
Power through the Space Race
One of the main characteristics of the Cold war era was the Space race. Since the
Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin completed the ﬁrst revolution around the earth in 1961,
the race for space has added an extra dimension to the competition between the two
superpowers. In 1969, the American Neil Armstrong became the ﬁrst man to have
landed on the moon. In the battle to win heart and mind, technological prowess can be an
important asset, especially if one of the goals is to prove the capacity of a country to lead
and protect his allies and ﬁiends.

There are different ways scientiﬁc or technological successes can be shown

 

abroad. Benin like many African countries welcomes occasionally U.S. marine’s ships
and visitors would be allowed onboard. At times it could be documentaries shown at the
cultural center or exhibit of pictures of Shuttles, warship or new scientiﬁc discovery.

during the space race era, Benin has also welcomed some American astronaut and its

171

population was given the privilege to see the samples of lunar rocks brought by the
Apollo missions. While Dizzy Gillespie showed what the U.S. had in ﬁne arts and music,
jazz, Neil Armstrong or Aldrin Buzz could also present other aspects of the US
civilization. And that is soft power. It would show the leading spatial technology of
America.

This is one way to look the exhibition of the lunar stones collected by the team of
Apollo 11 from the Tranquility Sea on the Moon Surface. The exhibition was inaugurated
on May 28th, 1970 by the U.S. ambassador to Benin Mr. Matthew Looram. The
exhibition was visited by ofﬁcial and it remained open to the public for two. Thousands
of people according to the news report visited the famous stone that was made accessible
them. People reacted differently to the three billion year old piece. Some found it curious
to spend billions for just a piece of stone other took it as the symbolism of the conquest of
cosmos. The exhibit created a contact zone with the public as well because aside the
stone it included pictures of the astronauts and a sample of the ﬂag from Benin
(Dahomey) that was taken to the moon and brought back. That was probably a way to
convey the message that the exploit of Armstrong was done in the name of all humanity
including Benin people.

The projection of the space race through the media was deﬁnitely another way to
show the U.S. power. This may not have anything to do with US government. The
general public was also curious about that new dimension in scientiﬁc and technological
innovation. the attention given by the main press organ to the constant coverage of the
evolution of the U.S. space program but also to the Russian program shows a general

desire or to know more about recent development in the ﬁeld. But the celebration of the

172

 

 

heroes of space could also be exploited indirectly for ideological agenda. That was what
happened in 1970 when the team of Apollo XII Alan Bean, Richard Gordon and Charles
Conrad toured some African countries including Tunisia, Ivory Coast and Tanzania. They
were welcomed and treated as heroes, and they had the privilege to meet with presidents
and other high ranking ofﬁcials.“

The Peace Corps, the international visitors program, educational exchanges; and n
the different cultural activities organized through the U.S. cultural program in Benin

have contributed in giving the Beninese population an idea of the power and the policy

 

of the U.S. But it is difﬁcult to say if this perception of the American power or culture w
generated enough attraction to the elite or the population. A couple of issues could limit
the capacity to generate soft power in Benin. The ﬁrst is linguistic barrier, the fact that
the ofﬁcial language is French can be a hindrance. But if this remark applies for the 60’s
and the 70’s, it may not be applicable for the 90’s and after since the technological
revolution of the computer has generated an unprecedented interest in learning the
English language.

Another problem is the international policy of the U.S. and its behavior in some
areas of the world. Crises like the war in Congo and the position of the U.S. in southern
Africa seriously inﬂuenced negatively any potential cultural programs could show for
appealing to Benin intellectuals. If linguistic factor prevented the existence of any type
of cultural proximity in Benin, Ghana, presents the advantage of sharing certain cultural
proximity because of this same linguistic. The next chapter will study the case of Ghana
who by its history and the pioneer role it has played in the decolonization process can be

viewed from Washington as a pivotal state in Aﬁica.

 

7‘ Daho Express, Samedi 7 Mars 1970.

 

173

CHAPTER 4
U.S. CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH GHANA

This chapter studies the evolution of the U.S. cultural relations with Ghana. If
Benin is on the periphery of U.S. foreign policy in Africa, Ghana, on the contrary by its
colonial history and especially its accession to sovereignty in 1957, attracted attention
worldwide and consequently ranked higher in the American diplomacy in Aﬁica.
Ghana’s importance as a pioneer in sub-Saharan Aﬁica independence, its leading place in
cocoa production and perhaps the fact that its ﬁrst president studied in the U.S. made it
one of the pivotal countries for U.S. diplomacy in Africa. This position helped Ghana
beneﬁt from the cooperation with America in as many ﬁelds as economic assistance,
military training, educational exchanges or cultural exchanges.

This chapter will be divided in two major parts. The ﬁrst section gives
background information on the colonial history of the country, its political evolution after
the independence ﬁnally examines how its foreign relations have evolved since 1957 with
a special analysis of Ghana relations with the U.S. The second section studies U.S.
cultural relations with Ghana. It looks at the educational exchanges, the volunteer
program, the International Visitors program and other cultural activities that characterize
U.S. program of cultural relations with the country.

Section 1: The Republic of Ghana

Ghana is part of the Anglophone West Africa. It was home to many powerful
kingdoms in the pre-colonial era like the Ashanti kingdom. These kingdom maintained
commercial relations with the Muslim kingdom of the interior of the continent but they
also had contact with the European merchants who were settling along the southern

coastline. Ghana has an area of about 92,000 square miles and is surrounded by three

174

 

 

 

French speaking countries. In the North it is the current Republic of Burkina F aso, on the
east side it shares borders with the Republic of Togo and the Republic of Ivory Coast on
its western side.

There are several ethnic and tribal groups in Ghana. The 1960 census showed that
the country is composed of more than 100 linguistic and cultural groups.I The recent
census of 2000 shows that 49 percent of those groups were Akan, 16.5 percent Mole-
Dagomba, 12.7 percent, Ewe and 8 percent were Ga-Adangbe.2 Because of the colonial
past of the country, and to avoid problems that cultural and linguistic differences may
cause, English is the ofﬁcial language of communication, used in the government and the
formal educational instruction.3

Ghana was known as Gold Coast and became ofﬁcially a British colony in July
1874 after having hosted Dutch, Danish and other Europeans who settled along the coast
and built several castles during the slave trade era. The road to the status of colony was
cleared when the British bought the Danish castle at Christiansborg in Accra in1850 and
did the same with their property in Elmina in 1872. But that road was not as peaceful as
one could imagine. Being the only European power that remained on the coast the British
had to face the antagonisms of the Asante leaders who were uncomfortable with the
British settlement. Conﬂict between them and the British resulted in the British victory.
This led to the occupation of the Asante capital Kumasi in February 1874.4 That incident
opened the way for the consolidation of the British gain that materialized a few months

after in the establishment of the British colony of the Gold Coast. The remaining

 

 

; David Owusu-Ansah Historical Dictionary of Ghana (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2005), 3.
3 OWusu—Ansah, Historical Dictionary ,3
4 Owusu-Ansah, Historical Dictionary 3

Owusu-Ansah, Historical Dictionary, 6.

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territories under the Asante control were gained by the British inl896 after an
unsuccessful attack of their king against the British army. Thereafter the British were able
to annex the northern territories under the governor of the Gold Coast by 1902.5

The British colonial rule in the Gold Coast was characterized by the indirect rule
and thus relied on the local kings in the government of the colony. Aﬁer the conquest of
the Asante and the annexation of the northern territories, the colonial system promoted
the education of the local population with the goal to prepare Ghanaians for the ﬁlture of
the colony. Against its predictions, by the thirties, nationalist sentiment started
developing in the colony. The educated Ghanaians felt less and less comfortable with
“the colonial government’s overreliance on traditional chiefs in the early decades of the

”6 Many among them believed they should be associated with the government of

century.
the colony notably through the emerging legislative councils.

This push for inclusion soon turned into demands for ‘self-rule.’ the members of
the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.) , a party organization created after the
Second World War, advocated autonomy in the shortest time. Despite this call for
independence that formation still welcomed a gradual approach in the achievement of the
independence. The former Secretary General of that party Kwame Nkrumah who has
become the chairman of the Convention People’s Party (CPP), his own formation,
opposed the gradualist approach supported by other members of the UGCC like
J .B.Danquah and added a “sense of immediacy to the call for self-government.”7 Through

its victory in the elections of several legislative councils as well as in the general

elections of March 1957 the CPP led the country to the path of independence.

 

5 Owusu-Ansah, Historical Dictionary 7
6 Owusu-Ansah, Historical Dictionary 8.
7 Owusu-Ansah, Historical Dictionary 8.

176

 

 

 

Overview of Ghana political history

From the independence to 1992, Ghana like many African countries has gone
through many political changes which saw its governments alternate between civilian and
military rule several times. Ghana achieved its independence in 195 7 with Kwame
Nkrumah as 3 Prime Minister. Notwithstanding the hope that came with it, access to
sovereignty came with many challenges not only for Ghana but for the African continent.
There was an implicit obligation for the country to succeed in all ﬁelds, politically,
economically and socially. Nkrumah was aware of that fact and used the necessary tools
to make that success happen. Panafricanist, champion of ﬁeedom for Africans and the
black Diaspora, Nkrumah was ambitious for the development of his country. Among his
priorities was education. During the last years of colonization, education was free to all
Ghanaian in age of schooling. Not only did Nkrumah continued that policy but he also
launched many other development programs social, economic and constitutional reform
that transformed the country into a republic and made him the ﬁrst President of the
Republic of Ghana in 1960. Owusu-Ansah traces the root of the problems that led to the
destitution of Nkrumah as follows:

Committed to the rapid transformation of the national economy along

socialist lines, and politically to the pursuance of a Pan-Afiicanist agenda

toward a free and united Africa, Dr Nkrumah took advantage of the CPP

parliamentary majority to pass laws that allowed him extra constitutional

room to operate. The preventive Detention Act of 1958, for example,

empowered the prime Minister to detain any person suspected of actions

prejudicial to the security of the nation for up to ﬁve year 5 without trial.8

But problems started soon with Nkrumah and the CPP government. Part of it was

how to deal with the legacy of colonialism of indirect rule which allowed the traditional

kings and rules to prevail. With the CPP, it became an issue whether to keep that legacy

 

8 Owusu-Ansah, Historical Dictionary, 9.
177

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of the colonial administration or to transform the system to suit the new directions of the
post independence era. The impasse created by this legacy on hand and the adoption of
the Preventive Detention Act on the other caused many among the Ghanaians to have a
negative judgment about the CPP government especially on issues of democratic
expression, “many in the country felt that the CPP government blocked all the avenues
for true democratic expressions.” 9 The frustrations from these feelings resulted in the
military coup of February 24‘“, 1966 by the National Liberation Council. The E

government that came out of this coup was supposed to be transitory as it was expected

 

 

to hand over power to civilians after the revision of the constitution and the investigations
about corruption and other problems attached to the previous regime were thoroughly
conducted. In 1969 a new civilian government came in power led by Dr. K.A. Busia the
Chairman of the Progress Party (PP) who won 104 of the 140 seats of the Parliament.
Busia became prime Minister and Akuffo Addo substantive President. But the economic
debts from Nkrumah’s years, the Alien Deportation Act of 1969 and the intimidation of
the government against the sympathizers of the Nkrumah increased frustration among the
military and the population. Consequently, Busia’s government was overthrown in
January 1972 by the National Redemption Council (NRC). This military government
tried to appeal to the population by taking populist measures in education (giving
students book fees, banning tuition fees) while at the same time taking radical measures
about the national debt.

But these measures did not prevent the government from facing criticisms and
manifestations from civilians. The culmination of the downfall was the Armed Force

Revolution Council (A.F.R.C) coup of 1979. This government reigned for only four

 

9 Owusu-Ansah Historical Dictionary 10.
I78

months. In 1981, Ghana would return to military rule under the command of Flight
Lieutenant Rawlings and the Provisional National Defense Council (P.N.D.C.) facing
dire economic conditions with national infrastructure severely damaged. On top of all
these challenges, the PNDC had to deal with opposition from the supporters of the
previous regimes. From 1981 until the reform of 1992 that led to the fourth Republic, the
government of the PNDC had to abort about 13 military coups. Despite all these tough
moments, the government was somewhat successful in redressing the national economy
and put the country back to a normal democratic system by the early 1990’s.
Evolution of Ghana’s Foreign Policy

Evaluating the foreign policy of Ghana after ﬁfty years of independence, Ghanaian
scholar Kwame Boafo-Arthur notes that there are two major factors that inﬂuence
Ghana’ foreign policy: the type of leadership and the nature of the national economy.
These two factors in his views have a strong inﬂuence on the country’s international
behavior?°In addition to these two he cautiously underscores the importance of the
international context in which the policy is implemented. Boafo-Arthur wrote about
Ghana that “the governments of the various periods were inﬂuenced by the nature of
global politics during the Cold War and the post Cold War periods.”11 The character of
the leader and the national economic conditions somehow rank higher in his analysis as
he wrote: “It must be stated without equivocation, however, that Ghana’s pioneering role
in Aﬁican diplomacy, the dynamism of her outward projections, and the recklessness on
some occasions especially during the period of nationalist triumphalism had a lot to do

with the leadership style and the buoyancy of the economy.” He made a pertinent

 

IOKwame Boafo-Arthur “Half-a-Century of Ghana’s Foreign Policy: An Assessment” in “Ghana at 50:
Government, Politics and Development” Joseph R.A Ayee ed. (Accra: s.n., 2007), 197.
n Boafo-Arthur, “Half-a-Century of Ghana’s Foreign Policy” 197.

179

 

Inning

ﬁ—“

 

argument to conclude his thoughts that “With diminished economic strength especially
after the ﬁrst military coup, leaders were overly cautious in the mechanisms adopted to
protect the nation internationally.”12

One argument that seems to stand stronger from Boafo-Arthur’s assessment is the
claim about the permanence of the principles posed since the independence. Despite the
political instability, Ghanaian foreign policy has remained overall faithful to the guiding
principles posed since the establishment of the ﬁrst republic. Kwame Boafo-Arthur
argues that: “the shifting settings both domestically and externally notwithstanding, the
core strands of foreign policy orientation did not depart markedly from the foundations
laid by the CPP government of Dr. Nkrumah.”l3

The era of the Convention People’s Party of Nkrumah was one of the best in

the history of the country’s foreign relations as it is qualiﬁed the golden age of Ghana
foreign policy. The Ghanaian diplomacy was deeply shaped by this era and highly
inﬂuenced by the personality of the President. The foundations of that diplomacy were
based on the principle of nonalignment, the commitment to Aﬁican freedom and many
other principles that Kwesi Armah summarizes as follows:

the campaign against colonialism and neo-colonialism; the advocacy of

Aﬁican Unity with the adoption of a common foreign policy; the creation

of a Joint African High Command; an Aﬁican Common Market; and

overall continental economic planning including more equitable system

of international trade; there was, however, complete acceptance of a mixed

economy. There was the belief in Non-Alignment, a Third-Force’

comprising Non-Aligned States which would not depend on East or West

and which would yet have a deﬁnite and concerted policy of its own.

There was, at the United Nations and elsewhere, an assertion of
international equality. Finally, Ghana strenuously worked for co-operation

 

'2 Boafo-Arthur, “Half-a-Century of Ghana’s Foreign Policy” 197.
'3 Boafo-Arthur, “Half-a-Century of Ghana’s Foreign Policy”, 197.

180

 

 

 

between the industrialized nations and the poorer states who comprise the
great bulk of mankind. '4

All these principles have remained the characteristics of Ghana foreign policy for
over ﬁve decades of independence, although at times the international context of Cold
War and the perception of the country’s national interest have caused the leaders not to
follow strictly some of these principles.

The major problems of the CPP government was that although declared as a non
aligned country and therefore neutral country, the regime’s position on some international
issues and crises, made many observers question the validity of that policy of neutrality.
Nkrumah and the CPP left a country with a catastrophic economic and ﬁnancial situation
that will impact the government of the National Liberation Council that took the power
away from him. Because of that economic situation inherited from the CPP, under the
National Liberation Council (N LC), the foreign policy of Ghana emphasized economic
issues more than others. Boafor-Arthur explains that “there was a marked shift from
overly political colorations of Nkrumah’s foreigr policy approach to economic issues
under the NLC.”15 This apparent pragmatism can be explained by the government’s
search for better solution to the economic problems of the country, the result was the
choice of a ‘quiet diplomacy’ by the NLC.

Following the NLC, the government of the Progress Party (PP)dealt more with
economic problem, mainly the question of debt payment. Unsuccessful negotiations with
the United Kingdom and the US about ﬁnancial loans led to the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Under The National Redemption Council (NRC), the

 

'4 Kwesi Armah, Peace without Power: Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966 (Accra: Ghana University
Press, 2004), 16.
'SBoafo-Arthur, “Half-a-century of Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 208.

181

 

 

policy adopted by the previous administration about foreign debt was revised. Some of
the debts due for payment were repudiated. '6 The following military regime under the
leadership of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) ruled only for 4 months
and handed the power over to the People’s National Party (PNP). The latter was heavily
inspired by the CPP of Nkrumah. So it expressed its attachment to international and
regional organization like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
But its real challenges came from its failure to coop with political impasse at home and
its indecision to turn to the international ﬁnancial institutions to solve the economic task
at hand. Consequently these “institutions lost faith in the government and external
ﬁnancial inﬂows dried up.”'7
The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) started its ruling with a
conﬂict between two groups inside the party, the radical and the conservative. The
radicals were in favor of a foreign policy that would be inﬂuenced by the immediate
objective of the revolution process while the conservatives who preferred an “immediate
western support.”18 Radicals won in 1982 and thereafter the PNDC fratemized with other
radical governments like those of Libya and Cuba. But very soon the economic reality of
the country compelled the PNDC government to revise its ideological options and its
international allies, particularly its Eastern European partners who “failed to “embark on
any sustainable economic bailout for the country.” After an unsuccessful attempt to
overthrow Rawlings and the moderate of the PNDC by the radical wing of the party,

Rawlings and the rest of the party were able to comfort their position and hasten the

negotiations with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

 

l6Boafo-Arthur, “Half-a-century of Ghana’s Foreign Policy,” 21 1.
'7 Boafo—Arthur, “Half-a- century of Ghana’s Foreign Policy,” 214
'8 Boafo-Arthur, “Half-a- century of Ghana’s Foreign Policy,”.215.

182

 

 

 

 

USA-Ghana Relations

The United States was one of the ﬁrst countries to have recognized the
independence of Ghana in 1957. Signs of that recognition are listed as follows:

On March 5, 1957, one day prior to the attainment of formal

independence, the State department announced that the U.S. Government

“has ofﬁcially recognized the new state of Ghana, which becomes

independent and a member of the British Commonwealth on 6 March?

This recognition of Ghana’s independence was enhanced by (1) the

Senate’s conﬁrmation of Wilson C. Flake as U.S. Ambassador to Ghana

on May 20, 1957, (2) the United States’ support of Ghanaian’s application

for membership of the United nations, and (3) two Congressional and one

state legislative resolutions congratulating Ghana on the attainment of

Independence. '9

The symbolism of that freedom gained which resembles the U.S. experience as a
colony was certainly an opportunity to create close ties between the two Countries. This
effort was shown in the trip made by Vice-president Richard Nixon from March 3-10 to
the festivities of the Ghanaian independence. When leaving Ghana, the vice-president
declared “The United states by sending this delegation to the ceremonies is indicating its
support and its friendship for this new nation as it enters into the activities in which it will
engage in the years ahead as an independent member of the British Commonwealth.”20
That support will come few years after in forms of bilateral agreements signed between
the two countries. These agreements covered a wide range of areas including educational,
technical, military cooperation and so on. Ever since, despite occasional differences and
divergence on economic issues or international problems, the two countries have

managed to ﬁnd ways and means to contain these differences and maintain their

diplomatic relations over the past ﬁfties years. Two main issues tested U.S. relations with

 

'9 Adapted from Armah, Peace without Power, 180-181.
20 Armah, Peace without Power, 180.

183

 

 

 

Ghana, the economic issues related to the Volta project and the suspicion by different
Ghanaian government of the clandestine intervention of the CIA in Ghanaian internal
affair.

Starting from the early sixties, the good relations between the U.S. and the
Nkrumah government were going downhill, putting the major project that could
symbolize successful cooperation between the two countries, the Volta River project, into
serious doubt. The suspicion of the United States about the nonaligned countries made
them hesitant about ﬁnancing the Volta dam project. Other factors added to this
suspicion. By the end of 1961, Nkrumah started travelling to many eastern European
countries his minister of trade and labor also brought an important delegation to Moscow,
coming back with a lot of “promises of ﬁnancial aid and technical cooperation with
apparently no strings?” The following year the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev came
to Ghana on official visit. All these factors contributed to changes in the course of the
relations between the U.S. and Ghana created some defection from companies who were
involved in the sensitive Volta project. The American participation in the project was
becoming more and more critical because of the suspicion that the regime was moving
leftward. For historian Roger Gocking, the Crisis in Congo contributed to this shift in
Nkrumah’s position.22 But Kwesi Armah did not fully share this interpretation that
Nkrumah was moving leftward. He argued that Nkrumah’s visit to the east had a
diplomatic motivation: “What the United States did not understand was that one of the
most important reasons for Nkrumah’s visit to the East was the ardent desire of the

Ghana Government that China should have a normal diplomatic relations with the United

 

‘1 Roger Gocking, The History of Ghana (W estport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2005), 131.
22Gocking, The History of Ghana, 131.

184

 

States; and that socialist countries must do all in their power to lessen the cold war.”23

According to him Nkrumah was also trying to break the concept of bipolarity as it rest on
a very shaky and risky stability of power where any miscommunication among the
nuclear powers would be fatal to the world and Aﬁica particularly.24 A successful break
of bipolarity for Nkrumah was the admission of China to the United Nations, and the
improvement of its relations with the U.S. Eventually with the assistance of President
Kennedy, the American companies were able to ﬁnance the Volta project not before the

communication between Washington and Accra has been severely damaged.

 

After the coup that overthrows Nkrumah, the following government (N LC)

 

managed to keep good relations with the U.S. The N.L.C government was in good terms
with the U.S. but the situation in Vietnam did not make things easier for them. A country
that has supported decolonization and has been a vocal adversary of any imperialist
intervention in the “Third World” would be at odds with its own principles if cautioning
what came to be known as a war against communism. The NLC saw itself in a dilemma
because of its support for the United States in the Vietnam War. Pressures from the
Organization of the Aﬁican Unity (OAU) forced the NLC to change its position and align
with most African countries on the issue of the Vietnam War.25

After the NLC government, Ghana went through a series of putsches that affected
its international relations and did not provide the kind of stability needed to envision a
durable policy of development. Such was the case of the 1981 coup that brought the

Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) led by Jerry Rawlings to power.

 

23 Armah, Peace without Power 184.
2" Armah, Peace without Power 184.
25 Gocking, The History of Ghana, 149.

185

In 1982 the year after Rawlings’ government came to power, the American Ambassador
reassured the Ghanaians that the relations between the two countries would continue as it
has been in the past. Mr. John Smith declared in an interview that “the ties of friendship
are not easily broken.” For the past 26 years, he noted, the United States had been a
“consistent donor of food, technical assistance and economic aid to Ghana.”26 Similarly
Ghanaian ofﬁcials reassured the U.S. of their readiness “to maintain and strengthen the
good relations between the two countries both in the economic and political ﬁelds within
the framework of her policy of non-alignment.”27
These statements were full of hope and conﬁdent in the nature of the relations
between the two countries. But subsequent events created a climate of suspicion similar
to the one that prevailed in the last years of the Nkrumah regime.28 The Government of
the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) was divided between radical and
conservatives. Radicals were more inclined to enter relations with radical states while the
conservatives advocated relations with the western. The victory of the radicals by 1982
led Ghana to get closer to radicals regimes at international level. This was the beginning
of the tension with the U.S. as Gocking explains, “Ghana’s links with Libya and support
for Cuba and Nicaragua inevitably incurred the displeasure of the United States, and the
C.I.A. clandestinely supported counterrevolutionary groups operating in neighboring
countries like Togo, the Ivory Coast, and Nigeria.” 29

This C.I.A. involvement did not improve the situation between Ghana and the

USA. Gocking found a parallel with the Nkrumah’s last years because more and more,

 

2“ Ghana News vol. II no 2 February 1982, 2.

2’ Ghana News Vol. llNoS may 1982, 3

28 W. Scott Thompson “Nkrumah’s attitude towards the United States changed from suspicion to
hostility?Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1 966; (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1969), 300.

29 Gocking, The History of Ghana, 205.

186

 

there was paranoia about the activities of the agency in the country particularly in helping
dissident to the Rawlings regime. He explained how:

Tensions reached a high point in 1985 when a network of local CIA agents

was uncovered in Accra and eight Ghanaians were “denationalized” and

exchanged for a Ghanaian agent who had been arrested in Washington.

Shortly afterward, four U.S. diplomats were expelled from Ghana for

activities that “were wholly unacceptable and not conducive to good

relations between Ghana and the U.S.” The United States responded by

terminating aid to Ghana and announcing that Ghana was no longer a

serious candidate for further the U. S. aid.30

Somehow by 1987 these relations started to improve. As a sign of this
improvement, three Ghanaians were arrested and tried in the United State for plotting a
coup against the government of their country.31 In addition to this factor, the new changes
brought to international relations, with Glasnost and Perestroika in Russia the internal
problem of Soviet who retreating gradually from the international engagements prompted
the government of Ghana to launch the process of democratization in 1992.
Section II: U.S. Cultural relations with Ghana

Like Benin, U.S. cultural relations with Ghana operated on a diversity of cultural
activities sponsored by the State Department, educational exchanges, the lntemational
Visitor program and the volunteer program. If these activities were the main sources of
U.S. soft power in Ghana, it is also important to mention that the presence of an
important African-American community in the country and the linguistic factors
facilitated the existence of cultural proximity with the U.S. making the exchanges with
Ghana in different cultural arenas perhaps one of the most dynamic and consistent on the

continent. But time constraint and the focus on ofﬁcial exchanges do not permit to touch

on the contribution of the Aﬁican-American community in Ghana to the U.S. soft power.

 

3° Gocking, The History of Ghana, 205.
3' Gocking, The History of Ghana , 206

187

 

 

 

This section will thus study the different activities organized through the cultural
exchange with Ghana and the role of the United State Information Service in the country.
It will also look at the lntemational Visitor program and particularly analyze how the
reactions of former participants to the program show the inﬂuence of exchanges on their
perception of the U.S. and its culture. Quite often while these participants praise the
country for the grandeur of its civilization, they also notice some of the discrepancies that
exist between the projected image of the country and the actual reality.

The United State Information Service (U.S.I.S.)

A central agency in the presentation of U.S. policy and culture abroad, the USIA
plays a catalytic role in the U.S. cultural diplomacy by facilitating and coordinating the
different cultural program run by the Department of States. Before the independence,
Africa was viewed as marginal by the U.S. ofﬁcials and thus initiating programs of
exchanges with that part of the world was not an idea highly entertained in Washington.
As Mary Niles put it, ofﬁcials preferred to focus on containment in the ‘nonaligned
nations in Europe and Asia.’ But a few among African countries hosted American
libraries before the independence and these were mostly Anglophone Africa. The Ghana
bureau was one of the ﬁrst to have been established in Africa south of the Sahara; it was
set up in 1955 in Accra.32 In 1960, the Accra U.S.I.S. post was carrying about 7,000
books with an annual attendance of the library around “40,000 out of which 34 represent
students.”33 Exhibition, motion pictures and other visual media plus printed magazines

like American Outlook were used to present America and the various aspects of its

32 Mary Niles Maack, "Books and Libraries as Instruments of Cultural Diplomacy In Francophone Africa
During the Cold War," Libraries & Culture 36 Winter 2001 , 69.

33 Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs International Educational, Cultural and
related activities for African Countries South of the Sahara August 1961, 111.

188

 

 

 

culture to Ghanaians.34 The magazine carried “stories and pictures on cultural activities in
America.”3'5 Other programs included lecture, seminars and conference but also music
program targeting students and faculties.36

Today the Post has been restructured, the USIA has been incorporated into the
State Department in 1999 but its services are still continued. As far as the USIS post in
Ghana is concerned, it has remained operative but the name of the Cultural service has
changed, as it is the case in many overseas representations, into the Information
Resources Center (I.R.C). The mission of the Ghana service is described as “serves the
U.S. mission to Ghana by providing Ghanaians with timely, accurate information on
American politics, news and opinions, government, society, history, and culture, and on
U.S. policies affecting the bilateral relationship.”37

The new Center has a relatively low volume of circulating books in the library,
only 3,000 books compared to 7,000 in 1960. Perhaps the recent development in
information technology explains that reduction of over ﬁfty percent in the number of
circulating books. In addition to these books, the center also offers to its visitors and
members “50 print periodicals, 350 videos -— including feature ﬁlms -- and 35 CD-ROM.”
Additionally it also provides access to online databases to its users, these include

according to their site, “full-text periodical databases such as Factiva, Lexis-Nexis, First

Search and Ebscohost. Through these databases the IRC has up-to-the-minute access to

3"Department of State, lntemational Educational, Cultural and related activities, 1 l l.
35 Department of State lntemational Educational, Cultural and related activities 1 l l.
36 Department of State, lntemational Educational, Cultural and related activitiesl l 1
37 Mpzﬂghana.usembassvgov/irchtml August 10‘”, 2009

189

 

-_.
1

the full text of over 10,000 magazines, newspapers, wire services, and other information
sources?3’8

The center remains, as it shows through these activities, the contact zone between the
American culture and the people of the host country. The U.S. Information Service
(U SIS) is in charge in host countries of coordinating most of the cultural and educational
program of the Department of state. Clearly as it appeared here the US cultural difﬁlsion
through the USIS and the IRC target the elite, as they are likely to play a leadership role
in shaping the future of the country.
Educational Exchanges

Ghana has enjoyed good relations with the U.S. in educational exchanges. As

early as 1962, the United States and Ghana signed an “Agreement for Financing Certain
Educational Exchanges Programs.” The objective of the agreement stated in its
introductory paragraph was “to promote further mutual understanding between the
peoples of the United States of America and the Ghana by a wider exchange of
knowledge and professional talents through educational activities?According to the ﬁrst
articles both Ghanaian and American citizens would beneﬁt from the funds made
available under the agreement. Those funds will serve “(1) Financing studies, research,
instruction, and other educational activities: Of or for citizens and nationals of the United
States of America in Ghana, and; Of or for citizens and nationals of Ghana in the United
states of America: and (2) Financing visits and interchanges between the United states of

America and Ghana Students, trainees, teachers, instructors and professors.”39 That

agreement is now inactive, however its existence evidences the fact that Ghana was one

 

3" http:Nghana.usembassvgovt’irc.html August 10th, 2009.
39 Article 1, Agreement for Financing certain Educational Exchanges Programs Between the U. S. and the
Republic of Ghana Signed at Accra January 24, 1962.

190

 

 

 

.r.

“I"

{.4

of the ﬁrst beneﬁciaries of U.S. assistance in Education. The history of Ghanaians
studying in the USA goes back to the ﬁrst president of the country. This evolution is
summarized here from the US embassy in Ghana Amannee:

Ghanaians began traveling to the United States for university education in
the early 19003: as we all know, Kwegyir Aggrey attended North Carolina
Central University in the 19208, while Kwame Nkrumah attended Lincoln
University and the University of Pennsylvania in the 1930's. These
pioneers led Ghanaians to recognize that U.S. higher education has much
to offer to nation-builders. In the 19503, Cocoa Board provided U.S.
scholarships, and in the 19605 and 19705, the AASPAU and AF GRAD
programs, ﬁlnded by the U.S. government, opened the door wider. By the
19808, however, these government ﬁnanced programs had given way to
private ﬁnancing, leaving Ghanaians to ﬁnd their own way to international
higher education. That the number of Ghanaians studying in the States has
continued to grow by leaps and bounds is testimony to the high value
placed on education, and the resourcefulness and determination of
Ghanaians.40

The ASPAU and the AF GRAD are both managed by the Africa American
Institute. The ASPAU is the shortest for The African Scholarship Program of
American Universities and it run from 1961 to 1975. In total it brought about 1600
students from 34 Aﬁican countries to the U.S. enrolled in Bachelor’s degree.4| The
African Graduate Fellowship Program (AFGRAD) is also run by run by the Africa-
America Institute. The AF GRAD operated from 1963 to 1990 and was replaced by
the Advanced Training for Leadership and Skills (ATLAS) that was operated until
2003. Together, the AF GRAD and the ATLAS brought more than three thousand
Africans to the United States among these, 215 Ghanaians participants making Ghana
the leading country in Africa followed by Nigeria 203. Another important exchange

program between the U.S. and Ghana is the Fulbright Scholarship. From 1949 when

 

40 Nancy Keteku “Educational advising services Through the U.S. Embassy, AMANEE
November/December 2003. 3.
4‘http://www.aaionli11c.org/Programsx/AfricanScholarshinProgamOfAmcricanUnivcrsiticsasm, August 10,
2009.

 

191

the program started to 2004, 284 Ghanaians students have got the Fulbright
scholarship to the U.S. at the same time the number of Humphrey Fellows is 86.
These numbers do not include research scholars, lecturing scholars or teacher
exchange program that are all part of the Fulbright exchange program.
Cultural Presentation Activities

Under this heading, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchange include the
exchange of artists, musicians, sports coach and other related activities. Most of the
events sponsored through this program were all managed through the United States
Information Service in Accra. The Annual Report of the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural affairs of 1961 shows that cultural activities of this category were already
organized by the USIS in Ghana as early as 1956: “William Warﬁeld, baritone, 1956;
Wilbur de Paris jazz band, 1957; Ruggiero Ricci, violinist, 1957; Florida A& M
university Theatre group, 1958; Camilla Williams, soprano, 1958; Westminster Singers,
1959; Herbie Mann Jazz Group, 1960; Holiday on Ice, 1960; AAU track Team, 1956 and
1959.”42 As it this report shows, not only music but sports, theatre and other ﬁelds were
exploited by the USIA to promote good relations Ghana. The program continued through
the entire Cold War and is still operating in the post Cold War era under other
denominations. The jazz diplomacy brought other famous artists like Louis Armstrong to
Ghana in the 60’s who performed. Interestingly, the Armstrong tour in Africa was one of

those instances where, soft power went hand in hand with soft drink. One of the ads for

 

42 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State International Educational, Cultural and
related activities for African Countries South of the Sahara August 1961, l 10.

192

 

 

 

 

Armstrong ran like “Pepsi Bring you Satchmo” or as quoted by Penny M. Von Eschen

“You Like Satchmo. Pepsi brings you Satchmo. Therefore, you like Pepsi.” 43
Like Armstrong, Gene Kelly, an American ﬁlm star, dancer, and singer, was

sponsored in 1964 by the United States Information for a 4 day visit to Ghana.44 The

program of his stay included performance in Ghanaian cinema and many lectures at the

School of Music and Drama. Ghanaians appreciated Gene Kelly’s performance at the

1' E

Orion Cinema so much to the point where Mr. Kojo Bostio, then Minister of foreign

Affairs did not hesitate to say “Well done” as way to congratulates him.45 A trivial yet

 

very telling detail on this tour was the presence of Mr. Mark Lewis, Director of the Bi
United States Information Service in Ghana, with Gene Kelly on various occasions -
during his tours.
Exchanges in Sports should also be added to complete this tableau of the State
Department’s sponsored activities. Unlike Benin where this type of activities are not
common, Ghana was beneﬁciary of this program that, among others, brought in Ghana
professional players for informal and friendly games between American teams and
Ghanaian teams. Between March 19th and 25th 1968, for example, four American tennis
men were in Ghana. On their trip sponsored by the U.S. government James McManus,
James Osborne, John Pickens and David Power all members of the U.S. Davis cup,
engaged in informal matches, showed some demonstration of their skill as players and
more importantly instruct Ghanaian players on different techniques and style of the game.

All these activities, added to the presence of a sizable African American community in

 

43 Penny M. Von Eschen Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz ambassadors play the Cold War (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004) 67.

44 Daily Graphic, January 21 1964, 4.

45 Daily Graphic, January 25, 1964

193

the country would create in the long run better conditions for cultural proximity with the
U.S.
Visits and Other Type of Exchanges

The American cultural relations with Ghana follows the “two way trafﬁc”
Principle. If it allows American lecturers, entertainers and sportsmen to visit Ghana, it
also helps bring Ghanaians from different walk of life to the U.S. The already rich r}
activities of the USIS posts and the Educational exchanges are complemented by other 1

exchanges programs like the lntemational visitor program sponsored by the State

 

Department and other federal agencies. This Visitors’ program allows the selectees from it
many countries to visit the U.S. for few weeks and travel across the country from coast to ’
coast. This enables them to interact with the American people and share with some of

them information about professional experience while getting from others ﬁrst hand

information on the American culture and institutions. This kind of interactions with the

American people is part of the aim of the programs and its success is depends on how

sustained these contacts between foreign citizens and Americans have remained over

time. Visitors are not only expected to acquire knowledge, they are also encouraged to

discover the multi-facets of the American culture and society and know more about the

American people and its institutions, after all out of this information come the

understanding that would ultimately participate in the construction of a peaceful world.

This knowledge about the U.S. would help them construct their own judgment about the

 

American society and thereby discerning between the false images presented through
propaganda and the actual reality. This is one of the areas where cultural relations are

expected to be effective and inﬂuential. Most of the visitors are involved in some

194

decision making process in their respective countries and any bad experience in the U.S.
may leave them with a negative impression that could affect U.S. relations with these
countries. Similarly the success of a single visit to the U.S. could yield positive result
especially facilitating negotiation between the two countries. Because impressions are
personal and thus subjective they are not easily accessible unless recorded in post
program evaluations. While these documents may exist, our effort to acquire them did not
yield positive result because of time, ﬁnancial and logistic constraints.

The following lines show the alternative to these evaluations and constitute the
impressions of two Ghanaian journalists who were selected by the Department of State to
participate in the lntemational Visitor program in the 1960’s. Their impressions here
seem more reliable for not being conditioned by ofﬁcial administrative guidelines that
sometimes limit the freedom participants have in expressing their true feelings.

Mr. Eddie Agyeman was an editor at the Ghanaian newspaper ‘Daily Graphic’
and Mr. K. A. Sarpong is a legal practitioner in cape coast and a free lance journalist.
Both have beneﬁtted from the State Department programs at different period and both
have experienced America through those exchanges program. These two journalists
show two complementary sides of the importance of the program. Mr. Agyeman during
his stay in the U.S. was attaché to an American newspaper, the “Jersey Journal” and uses
that opportunity to enlighten the reader about Ghana his country but also about the
African continent in general. His article entitled “The Accurate Picture of Ghana” was
republished in the Daily Graphic in Accra.46

In that article, Mr. Agyeman ﬁrst presented his country, Ghana and explained its

policy of “positive neutrality and non—alignment.” Ghana he wrote “is friend to all and

 

4" Daily Graphic, November 23rd 1965, 5.
1 95

 

Knit:

 

 

enemy to none? He explains how his country like many other of the emerging African
countries, was more preoccupied by the question of development instead of being
involved in “international bickering or involving itself with any of the power. Mr.
Agyeman traces the roots of misconception about Ghana to foreigners who visit the
country and spend only few hours in the best hotel, ‘sipping scotch.’ For him such a
shortsighted attitude came from the uncompromising stand the country took against
colonialism and his achievement in a short period of time after the independence.
Agyeman put the question in a larger racial perspective and argued that “Ghana
has proved the falsity of the notion held by many people that the black man is incapable
of managing his own affairs.” He pursued that the country was constantly under attack in
the western press for “not owing automatic allegiance to the west.” In choosing to judge
international issues on their merit, Ghana according to Agyeman ‘asserted its maturity as
a nation? He ﬁnishes the article by listing some of the achievements of the country since
its independence and qualiﬁed those achievements of ‘phenomenal.’ Among others he
mentioned how Ghana was doing ﬁne in education with a special emphasis on adult
learning. He also noted to the readers how women were holding important ofﬁce in the
post independence Ghana. He wrote “women are accorded equal opportunities in Ghana
they are found in almost every ﬁeld of activity.” The rest of the article was about the
economy, the industry and the important Volta River project. Considering the limited
knowledge that the average reader in the US had about foreign country this was a
laudable effort. The challenge back then would have been to question most of the claims
made in the article. He appeared more subjective in the end when he wrote that “As a

small country, Ghana cannot afford the high price of entertaining a multiplicity of

196

 

‘ a
“‘4'”,
l

 

lujﬁt,

”47 This kind of claims ﬁt in the context

political parties and their attendants’ squabbles.
of that period and does not apply anymore for Ghana or any other Aﬁican country in this

new era of democratic governance. It is to credit of Agyeman however to have attempted

to present his country differently than what has been portrayed by foreigners. If he helped

the American readers know more about his country, his compatriot K.A Sarpong would
share his experience in the U.S. with Ghanaians readers nearly six years after him.

Mr. K. A Sarpong was invited by the United States Department of States to
witness the American election but also to get acquainted to the American way of life. On
his return, he published “American Legend” in the same newspaper, reported on his
experience and how he viewed the U.S. In this article he gives his thought and
impression on the American achievement in many areas and reﬂects on the system and
the extraordinary civilization human beings were able to create. His take on the
experience seems to reveal to him that the success of America came from the natural
resources and the human being action. From coast- to-coast trip to a visit to Disneyland,
Sarpong praise the American success and pointed at the ethnocentrism which transpired
in the deliberate way in which other people are denied relevance in individual life and
public space. He started his analysis with the comparison of two symbols at a legendary
place where the world of yesterday coexists quite artiﬁcially with those of today and
tomorrow. That fascinating ability to bring different worlds together can only be
observed in one place that participates so naturally in the history of the American legend:
Disneyland.

Sarpong thus started the story of his experience of the U.S. and its system with

Disneyland. What a curiosity it would be for an African to see his continent portrayed in

 

‘7 Daily Graphic, November 23rd 1965, 5.
1 97

.I mu nun”

 

' !:- I'l-m’

 

a country like the U.S. That curiosity can hardly leave anyone indifferent. That is perhaps
what explains Mr. Sarpong choice of ‘Jungle Africa’ as his ﬁrst ride. About Disney and
the ride he comments that “The meticulousness and the detailed treatment given to this
centre remind one of a trait in the American character-efﬁciency. Natural situation are
created in artiﬁcial forms and true to form good old Africa does not miss a place in
Disneyland.”48

Sarpong could not help but notice the grandeur of the American civilization
through the view of Disneyland and perceive how American self deﬁne or project their
self image and culture. He wrote: “America is a land of superlatives. They deﬁne their
achievements in terms of the world of the world; the tallest building in world, the biggest
building in the world, the richest man in the world and they select their own citizens and
proclaim them as the champions of the world of sports.” No doubt he seems to perceive
here a certain sense of pride with some whiffs of arrogance. Everything in his
interpretation shows that if it is American, it is certainly the best.

From those preliminary views of the whole sight, Sarpong took his reader to the
ride. He asked “And what do we see in ‘Jungle Africa’ in Disneyland? One is invited to
see the head hunters of Africa and to see and to hear the crushing noises of the wild life.
The lions of Aﬁica, leopards etc... who hampered and hamstringed the civilizing
missions of the Christians who claimed to have ﬁrst penetrated the heartland of Africa
and to have “discovered” large areas and note, not that those areas were inhabited.” He
explained that everything was electrically operated and that “The Americans are good at
harnessing electricity! And nothing more bears testimony to than a visit to ‘Beautiful

America’ at Disneyland.”

 

‘8 Daily Graphic, March 13, 1971, 8.
198

 

Beautiful America in contrast “shows in vivid form the American experience- the
world of electricity and the almost sweeping changes wrought by it; the American genius
for creation and what have you? The whole gamut of the American legend of success and
victory, a legend that is not shared by any other people in the world is on display.”49 The
ride and the show express two contrasting messages according to him. “Jungle Aﬁica”
seems to portray the lack of civilization that characterizes the African society before the i 3
European arrived while “beautiful America was a celebration of the American genius.

Sarpong argued that “appreciated in its right proportions and perspective, the contrast

 

does illustrate a point. It illustrates that the Americans deny the relevance or even the

.ﬁ‘ .

existence of historical experience of peoples with which they have become involved.”50
That last sentence referred to Africans and their continent. But what Mr. Sarpong
overlooked in his reading of the Jungle Aﬁica Ride’s symbolism is that may not reﬂect
the view of most Americans. However his argument may become more compelling
owing to the lack of knowledge about Africa among the general public. Thence the ride
may be giving an inaccurate and obsolete view of Africa.

Beyond the show and the ride, Disneyland itself is a celebration of the American
success. That success is apparent in the American character according to him. In his quest
for a legitimate answer to what nourishes the legend of success and victory in the
American character, Sarpong explained that as a nation, America has never tasted defeat.
His view of the U.S. is that of a

Country with an unbelievable reservoir of human and natural resources

and coupled with the character of its citizens for self-application, the will

to succeed and take on the challenges posed by nature and may be by
sheer patriotism? They have achieved economic progress of fantastic

 

‘9 Daily Graphic, March 13, 1971, 8.
5° Daily Graphic, March 13, 1971, 8

199

magnitude. Motivation? That is part of the answer. Exploitation? You do

not need a Marxist analyst to tell you this. It is part of the American

system.5 '

No other evidence could support these claims he contended, other than the
American cities he visited. Each of them bears witness of the American success and
power in different ﬁelds. If you were to consider fantastic economic progress, take a city
like New York. Sarpong observed: “ Flying over New York City by night is the n

incarnation of beauty and couple it with a cruise around it and the skyscrapers unfold

themselves threatening the ﬂying aero planes: or take a ride on the metro to see the

 

underground network of railways. It is a testimony to that trait in the American character £1
of hard work and imagination.”52 He referred to other cities and what they have of
speciﬁc symbolism in the overall American civilization: the steel mills in Pittsburgh for
him are a symbol of the power of steel in the American system. O’Hare lntemational
Airport with the volume of its activities is “perhaps the busiest in America or in the
world.” San Francisco with its Golden Gate is the most beautiful city. More interesting is
his views of Los Angeles. He depicted it as the city “where oil leaks from the backyards
of houses.” 53 How accurate is all this perception, is a matter of personal judgment. It is
apparent here that Sarpong despite some criticism could not hide his admiration for the
country and its civilization.

If “the space center with what it entails is an insignia of the unlimits of the
human ingenuity,” Washington DC. was the symbol of power in many aspects with the
white house, the legislative body in the Capitol and the pentagon “the embodiment of the

almost unlimited power of the military Brass. Such power, no doubt engenders fears from

 

5‘ Daily Graphic, March 13, 1971, 8.
‘2 Daily Graphic, March 13, 1971, 9
53 Daily Graphic, March 13, 1971, 9.

200

the civilian and temptation from the ‘man in charge.” Sarpong found mainly the
temptation to use that power arrogantly “the temptation to react violently with
American ﬁre power against the sneaking communists” coming in to destroy the
beautiful institutions of beautiful America” lives with those who have been entrusted
with their guidance.
Peace Corps Ghana

This section studies the beginning, evolution and impact of Peace Corps Ghana.

It is almost inconceivable to study the relations between the United States and Ghana
without mentioning the Peace Corps. The Organization would rank among the ﬁrst
agencies that promote mutual understanding between the people and the government of
Ghana and the people of the United States. In 1961 when the Peace corps was created, the
Cold War was at its highest point, with the Space Race and the battles for the newly
independent countries of Africa. Ghana was one of the ﬁrst hosts of the Program with the
signature of the agreement of July 19th, 1961.

Not only did Ghana enjoy the title of the ﬁrst sub-Saharan Aﬁican country to
have gained independence, it also enjoyed the title of the ﬁrst country in the world to
have welcomed the Peace Corps volunteers on August 31", 1961. on September 12‘”, of
the same year, Ghana also added to the series of ﬁrst, when “Tom Livingston, Peace
Corps Volunteer, French teacher took up his teaching post at Ghanata Secondary School,
Dodowa, on September 12, 1961.” According to Samuel George Ayi-Bonte, a Peace
Corps Ghana staff, he was ofﬁcially "’designated by the Peace corps as the First
Volunteer in F ield.”54 Peace Corps Ghana has remained since a stable instrument in the

United States relations with the country. From that historical moment on, Peace Corps

 

54 Samuel George Ayi-Bonte Peace Corps Ghana— 30 Years- of Commitment and Service, 4.

201

1"

3.: "2'3

 

has been involved in the process of national development in Ghana, helping the country
to face the difﬁcult challenges left by the departure of the colonial administration and the
vacuum left by many of the British expatriates working in the country. Other countries
have suspended their programs, What is striking in the case of the Peace Corps Ghana is
that despite the period of political instability and economic uncertainty, the peace Corps
has remained active without any suspension of its operations. It has continued its
activities without any major problem. One may ask what explain this success. In
retrospect it may be related to the attitude and devotion of the volunteers or the quality of
the management of the organization on. The volunteer were probably able to do fulﬁll
their obligations with dedication and seriousness this could explain the fact that the
organization keeps operating. Once selected, before being dispatched to the ﬁeld,
volunteers are trained and taught some of the local languages most commonly Twi.

Volunteers intervene in different ﬁelds but education seems to be the number one
priority. Assessing Peace Corps evolution after thirty years of activity, George Ayi-
Bonte notes that “all through these arduous 30 years of service, Peace Corps service in
the education sector has stood supreme”55 But the priorities of the government did not
remain the same over the years. Peace Corps involvement in the development of Ghana
has followed the evolution of the country and the needs expressed by the government
over the years.
Evolution of Peace Corps Ghana

In the sixties, the main challenges of the Republic of Ghana were education. "We

must concentrate all our efforts on education” declared Kwame Nkrumah in July 1961,

 

55 Samuel George Ayi-Bonte, Peace Corps Ghana- 30 Years of Commitment and Service, (obtained from
Peace Corps Ghana), 45.

202

 

“It is only through universal education that we can give our people the full opportunity to
develop their latent abilities and intelligence."56 The government has decided then to
make it free and accessible to all Ghanaian in age of schooling. To meet such a challenge
for a nation that was only three years old would require foreign assistance since the
number of teachers available could not meet the expectation the program. In this context,
the peace volunteers were more than welcome despite the suspicion created by the cold
war context on the real motivation of the volunteers. It was in that context that the group
of 50 volunteers came in Ghana on August 30th, 1961. Part of their ﬁrst assignment was
to teach physics, chemistry, math, history, and geography, Latin, French or English in
Ghanaian high schools.57 The success of those pioneer volunteers led to the request of
more volunteers by the Ghanaian government in the years after. 100 volunteers were
asked for in high school and 35 more for vocational and adult learning. The remaining
teachers that are destined for technical and vocational subject were “scheduled to teach
geology, carpentry, auto mechanics and similar subjects.”58 Teaching will remain part of
the program with extension to other ﬁelds. The decade in retrospect was in general

The seventies were a decade of transformation and changes in the Peace Corps. In
the beginning of the seventies, Joseph Blatchford brought a policy known as “New
Directions” to the Peace Corps. This policy advocated recruiting Peace Corps that were
“more experienced, more highly skilled.” Such a caliber was not easily available. The
consequence was a decrease in the number of volunteers available but certainly this

would mean the few recruited would be more effective on the ﬁeld.

 

5" Peace Corps Presentation of FY I 963 Program United States Congress June 1, 1962, 75.

57 Peace Corps Presentation of FY I 963 Program , 76.
58 Peace Corps Presentation of FY I 963 , 76

203

 

 

 

With the new direction, Peace Corps Ghana also went through its own change and

adaptation. One could argue that the new cooperation brought to the management in
Peace Corps Ghana in the seventies was one of the valuable and most constructive moves
that help established the corps as one of the most vital element of north south cooperation
Peace Corps Ghana in the seventies also went through some transformations.
Three major developments occurred in the life of Peace Corps Ghana. According to
Samuel Ayi-Bonte, “There were three very signiﬁcant events in the life of the peace in
Ghana at that time. The policy of ‘bi-nationalism’ was implemented. “Bi-nationalism”
meant recruiting host country nationals to team up with their American counterparts in
the management of the Peace Corps and in the support of Volunteers in the ﬁeld.”59
Another development was the Pre-training service that was transferred to Ghana in June
1970. With that transfer, “the ﬁrst totally in-country training program was mounted in
Ghana,”60 an American company was a consultant of this program. In 1971, a Ghanaian
company POINTER limited became the ﬁrst Ghanaian contractor to handle all the
logistic of the pre-service training of the volunteers in Ghana. POINTER handled it until
1976 when the Peace Corps decide to use the expertise of experienced volunteer to
conduct ‘in-house training? By the end of the 1980’s, “Ghana had developed and
demonstrated such admirable capacity for training that it became necessary to look for an
institution within Ghana to take over full responsibility for Peace Corps Ghana training
programs?“ No doubt all these development help stabilize Peace Corps Ghana and

contribute to its success and continuity despite economic problems or political instability.

 

59 Ayi-Bonte, Peace Corps Ghana, 9
6° Ayi-Bonte, Peace Corps Ghana, 9
6' Ayi—Bonte, Peace Corps Ghana, 9

204

 

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The ‘80’s came with its lot of economic and political problems. There was
military coup in 1981 and the economic situation of the country was not fairing very well.
This confronted the Peace Corps with new challenges in terms of recruitment and
maintaining the volunteer on their duty as shown in the Annual Report “Expansion in FY
1983 and beyond will be dependent on the policies of the new government and the
precarious economic situation in the country. The shortages of many basic commodities
and lack of service place unusual hardships On Peace Corps volunteers and make the
provision of administration and program support especially difﬁcult.”62

But regardless of those difﬁculties, the Peace Corps continued its activities,
diversifying the ﬁeld of intervention of the volunteers. The Federal year 1983 annual
report of the agency states that “New projects were begun in rural and village
development, agricultural and animal traction, community preventive health, dam
building and irrigation development.”63 Almost a third of the volunteers serving in 1982
were directed to project related to those ﬁelds. Throughout the eighties as in the past,
education would still be one of the focal areas of intervention of the volunteers. There
would be some expansions though. From general education, some volunteers were
dispatched to “pilot project to teach practical agriculture and to develop school projects in
junior secondary and vocational education.64 This is a good sign of the evolution from the
education and geological ﬁeld that were the main ﬁeld of intervention of the Peace Corps

in the sixties. Volunteers are now more involved in rural areas, intervening in agriculture,

health. In some of these communities they were able to establish “beekeeping and soap

 

62 Peace Corps, FY I 982-] 983 Annual Report, .51
63 Peace Corps Federal Year I982-1983AnnualReport,51.
6" Peace Corps, Annual report 1986, 39.

205

 

 

making enterprises, built wells and ﬁsh ponds, trained farmers in animal traction, planted
farms with fuel-wood and fruit trees, and constructed a blacksmith foundry.”65
Making the Difference: Impact on the Country and on the Population
Peace Corps contribute to education of many Ghanaians and also help the government
improving the life of many Ghanaians living in rural areas by working on different
community project and participating in the education of many Ghanaians. As Elizabeth
Hoffman For example, “between 1961 and 1991, 675,000 Ghanaians, equivalent to
roughly ﬁve percent of the 14 million populations, had American teachers.” 66 That is an
important number considering the impact these people will have on the development of
their country. It makes the contribution of the Peace Corps in Ghana hard to estimate.
Aside education Peace Corps also contribute to improve life in rural area. An example of
how Peace Corps contribution to the improvement the life of rural population is given in
this report of the accomplishment of Peace Corps Ghana at the end of the eighties :
Twelve volunteers trained over 140 villages nursery workers and, through
extension activities, contacted over 70 village s with a total population of
35,000 people. ‘Ten volunteers provided assistance in health education,
latrine construction, hand-dug wells, spring catchments, and rainwater
harvesting. One volunteer is working on guinea worm eradication.
Fourteen volunteers provided technical assistance in carpentry and home
building.67
The impact of Peace Corps can be felt in many areas and the recognition Many

Ghanaians would acknowledge the contribution of the Peace Corps Ghana to the

development of the country. Recognition of this role was expressed in different laudatory

 

65 Peace Corps, Annual report FY 1986,.40.

66 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman All you need is love: The Peace Corps and the spirit of the 1960s. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.1998), 179 cited in Julius A Amin. “The Perils of missionary diplomacy: The
United States Peace Corps volunteers in the Republic of Ghana” Western Journal of Black Studies. Vol.
23, Iss. (Pullman: Spring 1999.): 45.

67 Peace Corps, Congressional Report FY 1990, 37.

206

 

 

terms. One of the areas Peace Corps Volunteers worked in the sixties was in the ﬁeld of
geology. George Ayi- Bonte an insider of the Peace Corps note that it was one of the
areas that is the least known to the public is the ﬁeld of geology. By 1963 Peace Corps
volunteers were about 23 Peace Corps geologists. This was an important number as it

was “enough to offset any shortage of geologists that had been created by the mass

 

resignations of the British Geologists during the period 1962-63. After that, other Peace ‘3?
Corps Geologists joined the Geological survey for a period of about 10 years i.e. 1963- ..
73.”68 Not only did they contribute to the shortage of manpower, G.O. Kessey the ;
director of the Geological Survey said about the Peace Corps geologist that “these young b

men had a sense of mission and went about their duties with determination. They
demonstrated quite a capacity to achieve something for themselves and for the beneﬁt of
Ghana. I was indeed happy with them.”69 The same satisfaction could be noted at the
Ghana Institute of Journalism. The director of the Institute notes that they will cherish
forever the Peace Corps who offered their services to the Institute. He remarked how the
volunteers’ contribution “helped to establish a ﬁrm foundation for the teaching of Public
relation, Advertising and English at the Institute. Past Students who passed through their
hands testify to a very high level of dedication, commitment and responsibility. Their
teaching colleagues found them ‘pleasant.’
Impact on Volunteers: An Example of Mutual Understanding

Part of the objective of the Peace Corps was in: “Helping promote a better

understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served; helping promote a better

 

I 68 Ayi-Bonte, Peace Corps Ghana, 46.
69 Ayi-Bonte Peace Corps Ghana, 46

207

understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans.”70

Any assessment of the
volunteers’ work should ultimately include even if it for a short moment how successful
they have been in bridging the gap that may have existed between them and the
community they were serving. This would rank among the success story of the Peace
Corps experience. The Peace Corps story is not only that of helping achieving the
development objective of the host country. The cultural aspect of this type of
cooperation was the promotion of mutual understanding between the two nations that are
interacting through the volunteers. Therefore , in assessing its impact, an important
attention should be paid to how inﬂuential was the peace corps experience in changing
the views of Ghanaian about the U.S. or how the presence of the Peace Corps among
Ghanaians has inﬂuenced their perceptions of the Ghanaians society and their culture and
institutions.

Apart from fulﬁlling their duty, the Peace Corps aims at promoting mutual
understanding between people and nations as well. In the case of Peace Corps Ghana, the
story is not that of the number of Ghanaian students taught by the volunteers, alone. 'By
itself, this ﬁgure is no doubt an incredible contribution of the volunteers to the difﬁcult
task of nation building and the challenges of national development in Ghana. Education is
absolutely one of the major tools of development and the Peace Corps Ghana has made

its contribution. The type of relations or bond developed from the experience is an

essential part of the outcome of the program.

 

7o ,, . . , . . .
httpuwwwpcacccorps.uov/mdcxcfm .’shcll=Lcam.wlratlspcmlssron

208

The ﬁrst group of volunteers in Ghana in Julius Amin’s analysis was not able to
create that type of relations. Reﬂecting on this group, he claimed that they were assigned
a challenging task.

Service in Nkrumah's Ghana was one of the most challenging Peace Corps

sites in the 19605. The delicate political situation combined with

volunteers' naiveté produced mixed results. Their ignorance of

international politics was an added factor. They were good teachers but

poor diplomats. Even after Nkrumah was ousted in 1966, the volunteers

failed to show leadership in development. There were perils in allowin

Peace Corps volunteers to perform jobs designed for career diplomats. '

This analysis is probably dictated by the era Julius focused on in his study. They
were many challenges Volunteers had to face in those years. Among those were the
suspicion that they were secrets agents, the racial violence of the civil rights movement
that many could not explain to Ghanaians, and the war in Vietnam. All these events were
not meant to make daily interaction with Ghanaians easy for the volunteers. As a result
many volunteers failed to interact socially with Ghanaians as these excerpts from their
evaluations show:72

One volunteer wrote about her stay in Ghana “I regret I don't have more
contacts....l'm not getting to know Ghanaian masters well either. I regret that, too. My
only contact with Ghanaians is with students." 73 Another volunteer found the Ghanaians
difﬁcult to interact with; he commented “The Ghanaians are hard to get to know. It's a

long time before they'll invite you to their home."74 Perhaps the last remark explains

better why such interaction was not easy. The Volunteer wrote: "It's nice to talk about

 

7' Julius A Amin. “The Perils of missionary diplomacy: The United States Peace Corps volunteers in the
Republic of Ghana” Western Journal of Black Studies. Pullman: Spring 1999. Vol. 23, Iss. 1, 46.

7‘ All excerpts are adapted from Julius A Amin, The Perils of missionary Diplomacy, 44.

73 Richter, R. (1965). Ghana: Overseas evaluation. National Archives, Washington D C. cited in Julius
A.Amin, The Perils of Missionary Diplomacy 44.

74 Peters, C. (1962). Preliminary Evaluation Report on Ghana. National Archives, Washington DC 1962,
p. 2 cited in Julius A.Amin.44.

209

 

 

 

getting to know Ghanaians but when you have nothing in common, it's hard. It's much

easier to talk to other Peace Corps people who have lots in common with you." 75
If Julius Amin Sees shortcoming in the achievement of other aspect of the Peace

goals, Ayi-Bonte as an insider, pointed at some success stories that could stand as a

partial fulﬁllment of the promises of the idea of behind the peace corps. On a social level

the Peace Corps experience also led to the development of some love stories as Ayi- W

I a
ft-‘n.

Bonte reported. There were love affairs between volunteers or mixed couple (Ghanaian-

volunteers). Some volunteers met, dated and end up getting married. But the story did not

 

end there. Ayi-Bonte note that “The adventurous male Volunteers broke through the k
cultural barrier and took upon themselves Ghanaian wives. Some bold and daring ‘
Ghanaian young men cautiously entered the arena and got themselves Volunteer
wives.”76
Peace Corps volunteers despite the difﬁcult political environment in which many
of them perform their duty the experience also makes a difference in the life of the
volunteers. Two former volunteers share their experience in Ghana. Jeffrey Worthington
served the Peace Corps in Ghana 1977-1979 .his assignment was to teach chemistry at
Kpando secondary school in the Volta region. Jeff recalls how within a year he acquired
local habit as far as his diet is concerned. He could recall “Sometime into the ﬁrst year, I
began a daily ritual of eating fufu for lunch at the "Always Always Chop Bar," near the
lorry park in Kpando. Wanda, the owner of ‘Always, Always’, presided over a large bowl

of soup. The price included the fufu and soup and additional charges were made for the

meat. The meat was usually grasscutter, a large rodent similar to nutria. A typical hunk of

 

75 Peter C., 2 cited in Julius A. Amin. 44.
76 Ayi-Bonte, Peace Corps Ghana ,33

210

 

meat was a large cube tied with plant ﬁber and it often included the skin with some fat.
Eating meat was a real treat.” 77 If Jeffrey remembers, the fufu dish, Don Peirce shares
the learning experience and the development of character that he acquired while serving
in the Volta region.

Don Pierce served in Ghana between 1989 and 1990. He was among the ﬁrst
group of “Small Enterprise Development” volunteers the Peace Corps had. Don recalls T“
how his experience with the local woodcarvers in the Vakpo area (Volta region) helped '

him professionally: “My time there helped me gain great patience and understanding and

 

has made me a better leader and manager. Also gained a great understanding of what %
other people of the world are up against.”78
Another positive contribution of the Peace Corps experience in Ghana is that a
former volunteer in Ghana Ron Marson of Canby in Oregon. Mr. Marson taught math
and general science in Ghana. His experience in helping teacher at the Anloga training
College to teach science without a lab led him to look for locally available materials as
alternative. Upon return to the U.S. Marson developed his ideas and created the TOPS 79
learning system. Mr. Ayi- Bonte explained “GLOBAL TOPS” is a science education
program designed, developed and published by RPCV [Returned Peace Corps Volunteer]
Ron Marson of Canby, Oregon, has been adopted by the Ghana Education Service
(1990) for use in all 38 teacher training Colleges throughout the country to develop their

science education.”80

 

77 http:/./wwwpcacecorpswiki.org/chf rev Worthington August 2, 2009.

7" http:l/www.pcacccorpswiki.org/Don_Picrcc accessed August 3rd, 2009

79 See also http:wawﬂrscience.org/info.t’about_us.html, February 16th 2010.
80 Ayi-Bonte, Peace Corps Ghana, 33.

211

Some Peace Corps volunteers, because of their experience in Ghana, have been
going back or sending teaching materials to the areas or schools they served in. This
example of a lasting bonds between ex-volunteers and their past host community is an
important achievement of the Peace Corps mission. Perhaps one area where the U.S. soft
power could be said to be effective would be in the type of cooperation developed and
maintained by the Peace Corps since its inception in the sixties. The Peace Corps Ghana
is one of the success models on continent which started with hesitancy and suspicion with
the Ghanaian leaders but ended being a successful model of bilateral cooperation with
consistent number of volunteers deployed in every year or every other. The success of the
Peace Ghana has probably encouraged or inﬂuenced other countries to eventually sign

agreements with the American Organization.

212

 

 

CHAPTER 5
THE PROMISES AND THE LIMITS OF U.S. SOFT POWER IN AFRICA
This chapter will address four points, how do Benin and Ghanaian cultural
relations with the U.S. compare, what were the main characteristics of the strategies of

soft power, how did the cultural relations program inﬂuence U.S. cooperation with these

 

two countries in other word what were the gains for each party and ﬁnally what were the ‘1’

main challenges to U.S. soft power in Africa. in“

Benin, Ghana and the US: two bilateral relations. 4
U.S. cultural cooperation with Benin and Ghana during the Cold War followed '

the same characteristics, except that Ghana because of historical and other cultural factors
enjoys some privileges in the amount of funding and in the number of exchanges with the
United States The comparison between Benin and Ghana reveals that the scale tilts in
Ghana’s favor. In 1961 one year after the independence of Benin and four years after the
independence of Ghana, the number of students from Ghana studying in the U.S. for the
academic year 1960-1961 was 160 students. For the same period of time there was only
one student from Benin attending college or University in the U.S.l Five years after, in
1965-66 the number of Fulbright students from Ghana to the U.S. was 6 for the academic
year and 0 for Benin. The cumulative for the period 1949 to 1966 was 62 for Ghana and 1
for Benin.2 That trend was continued throughout the Cold War and in some years the

difference was even much higher. These differences in number conﬁrm the idea that

 

I Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs International Educational, Cultural and
Related Activities for African Countries South of the Sahara August 1961, 40.

2 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Annual Report to Congress on the International Educational
and Cultural Exchanges Programs Fiscal Year I 966. Table l.

213

 

former French colonies are on the periphery of U.S. policy.3 The reason advanced for this
state of affair was the cultural ties that still prevailed between francophone Africa and
France. Other than these differences in ﬁgures, in terms of conception and practice
there is no real difference in the U.S. approach, almost the same strategies have been used
to promote good relations with either one of the two countries. These were bilateral
agreements, educational exchanges, lntemational Visitor Programs, the presence of
American Information Service in each country. The same mechanisms of cultural
cooperation that were used in other parts of the world were used in both countries with
some cultural or linguistic adjustments depending on the colonial past of the country and
the interest at stake. Politically, whether peripheral or pivotal, the containment of
communism was still the dominant criterion in allocating American assistance. This leads
us to make some generalizations about the use of U.S. soft power in Africa.
Characteristics of U.S. cultural strategies in Africa

From the cases of Benin and Ghana, the sources of U.S. soft power present certain
characteristics. It is important to mention however that these characteristics may not all
apply to a single source at the same time. U.S. cultural strategies in Africa were elitist,
they included technical assistance and volunteerism and ﬁnally were conditioned by the
political situation in the receiving country and its effectiveness depends largely on the
international behavior of the American government.

U.S. strategies of cultural relations in Aﬁica were largely elitist in conception and

in delivery. The cultural program targeted groups who were likely to shape the destiny of

 

3 Mary Niles Maack, states for example that “Because of their close economic and political ties with
France, the Francophone states in Aﬁ'ica were certainly on the periphery of the ideological struggles
between the United States and the Soviet Union. " "Books and Libraries as Instruments of Cultural
Diplomacy in Francophone Africa During the Cold War." Libraries & Culture 36 (Winter 2001): 58-59.

214

it ”a
." '~_ J,

 

each country or those who would be playing a leadership role in any aspect of the
domestic as well as international life of Benin or Ghana. Chapter lI’s discussion of the
Jazz diplomacy in Africa, showed that among others students, civil servants, ofﬁcials
were targeted for the audience of the concerts. The same observation can be made about
the allocation of scholarship to citizens of Benin and Ghana that is it is highly
competitive and thus restricted to certain category of people. One thing to mention about
the U.S. educational exchange with the Fulbright is that it grants scholarship only for
graduate studies. Such is the case in Benin for example, unlike most scholarship granted
by the eastern European counties who would include undergraduate studies. Students,
professional or civil servant were the primary beneﬁciaries of American scholarships or
the privileged in experiencing American culture through media, newsletters, libraries and
cultural presentations programs. Aside any subjective judgment, this elitist approach in
cultural diffusion is quite logical, especially in areas where there is a high rate of
illiteracy and where access to education was difﬁcult to the majority of the population.
Therefore any effective approach to cultural diffusion and development policy has to rely
on the helping agents that intellectuals and political leaders were. Appealing successfully
to the hearts and mind of the elite would guarantee an inﬂuence of national or
international policy of the country and pave the way for a more favorable climate of
negotiations or cooperation in any ﬁeld. Prospect for such outcome seemed to have
appeared in the sixties when the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchange assessing
what was done so far and making some projection about the U.S.-Aﬁica relations in
1966 observed:

For future U.S. relations with the new African states the presence of
exchange program alumni in positions of responsibility in their respective

215

governments will be helpful in securing understanding if not agreement. In

one of the African countries during the reporting year, three men who

have been in the United States in lntemational visitor grants were

elevated to important posts in the govemment—one becoming Minister of

Intemal Affairs, another becoming Minister of Health, and a third being

made deputy minister of Foreign affairs.4

This is a promising effect of the educational exchanges with Africa, for people to
negotiate much easier when they understand each other than when they have little in
common and are coming from two completely different backgrounds. Promoting cultural
ties and mutual understanding will help reduce differences by bringing parties to
negotiation to the middle ground, this can be achieved through education. A successful
stay in the U.S. could create a lifetime bonds with these alumni, making the cooperation
between the two agents, easier and possible. In targeting the elite in this type of
exchange, the government is also adopting the ‘trickle-down approach’ according to
which the transformation of public attitude would come from the top (elite) to the bottom
(the rest of the population). 5 But the elite were not the only agents of change used in this
type of cooperation. African leaders were also courted through technical assistance and
aid program with the end of persuading them of the good intentions of the U.S. and its
people.

Technical assistance was also part of the American government’s strategy to
promote good relations with African countries. This type of assistance came through
scholars, university professors and others. But in the case of third world countries and

Africa in particular, the use of volunteers was a modest way to diffuse American

knowledge in science and technology. In creating the Peace Corps, Kennedy thought of a

 

4 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Annual Report to Congress on the International Educational
and Cultural Exchanges Programs Fiscal Year 1966, 16.
5 Frank A Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950,

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 11.
216

 

different type of cooperation for an area that lacks all the technical and economic
development that the Western European had before the war and which facilitated the
implementation of a Marshall Plan type of cooperation. We have seen in the previous
chapters how Peace Corps volunteers have contributed to the education of the hundreds
of thousands of Africans while participating at the same time in the national endeavor of
their host countries to improve the living conditions of their populations. Volunteers
were able to bring innovation and adaptability in their daily task meanwhile attempting
successfully or not to create lasting friendship with the populations they were
professionally involved with. Some were able to have a grasp of the local culture but
may not have been able to project an American lifestyle. In some cases however the work
of the volunteers was severely conditioned by the local political situation and the general
climate of cooperation between the host country and the United States.

Looking at the example of the Peace Corps may suggest that U.S. cultural
exchanges were philanthropic. Such idea would be wrong and deceiving as there were not
and will probably never be philanthropic. It was part of the overall U.S. foreign policy
despite early attempts at the program’s inception to separate the cultural program goals
from the foreign policy objective. In both Benin and Ghana the two governments
experienced this fact regrettably. In 1974 after the socialist ideological orientation in
Benin, the cooperation with the US deteriorated. At the highest point of the political
crisis between the U.S. and Benin, not only did the number of Peace Corps drop to 2, its
ﬁelds of intervention were reduced exclusively to education between 1981 and 1982.‘5

Another consequence of change in ideological orientation was that the ofﬁce of the

 

6 Benoit C. Arigbo and Etienne D. Doukan “La Politique Américaine d ’Aide Bilatérale au Développement
de la République du Benin de 1 960-1996.” (M.A Thesis, Abomey-Calavi: FASJEP Universite Nationale du
Benin. 1996-1997), 41.

217

 

 

United States Agency for lntemational Development (U.S.A.I.D) was closed and moved
to a different country for about ten years. Similar sanctions could be noticed after the
putsch of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana in 1981. The relations between the two countries
gradually deteriorated and the U.S. suspended its aids as a result of number of
misunderstanding on domestic and international issues. This shows how cultural relations
are highly conditional by political relations and can be manipulative in some situations.
Some sources of U.S. soft power in Aﬁica were essentially manipulative in the
sixties especially on racial issues. This was a sensitive issue in the U.S.-Africa relations,
ﬁrst because of the U.S. support for the apartheid system in South Africa, and second
because of African-American facing civil rights issues in the U.S. in addition to these two
considerations was the situation of Aﬁican diplomats in the U.S. With all these three
aspects combined, racial issues became an international and a diplomatic issue. More
importantly in U.S. international standing and particularly in its relations with the newly
independent countries of Africa, it became a really embarrassing question to deal with.
How do you change the perception of the United States as country of racial segregation
that denies civil rights to its citizens of colors and support the apartheid system in South
Aﬁica to the image of a country of democracy and freedom, where opportunities are
within grasp to all its citizens? One of the key solutions found aside domestic political
reforms was the use of jazz diplomacy as discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Jazz
diplomacy was suggested by Adam Clayton Powell an American Congressman based on
his participation in the Conference of the Non Aligned Countries’ of Bandung in 1955.
Clayton made a praised intervention at the conference projecting the U.S. as an example

for the newly independent and non-aligned countries to follow in terms of nation-

218

building. He stressed “the gains made by African Americans, including his own rise to
Congress as the grandson of slaves; and said that other nations should look to the U.S. as
a model for solving their own ethnic divisions.”7 Building on his intervention His
intervention at the conference and after he returned home, his meeting with President
Eisenhower, the government decided to rethink its ‘overseas racial strategy” in sending
Black Americans as goodwill ambassadors.“ Thereafter the jazz diplomacy took a more
elaborate turn. The idea of sending African American abroad as representative of the
government or other federal institutions was extended to foreign affairs as well. Aﬁican
Americans were appointed as ambassadors in Aﬁican countries following in the post-
independence years. The objective was to counter the popularly held apprehension on
U.S. racial policy and thus convey a message of progress about racial relations in the U.S.
In Benin the ﬁrst black Ambassador was Mr. Clinton Knox who was appointed in 1964.
As a proof those racial concerns in Africa was an important issues in Aﬁican diplomacy,
responding to Mr. Clinton, the late President of Dahomey Sourou-Migan Apithy pointed
at the responsibility of U.S. in international peace and added that “les Etats- Unis
c0nséquents avec leur politique d ’égalité raciale, peuvent mener, s 'ils le voulaient, une
action vigoureuse auprés du Gouvemement de Pretoria, qui mettraient un terme au
régime odieux de l’Apartheid.” (Consequent with its racial equality policy, the United
States could take vigorous actions against the government of Pretoria that would put an
end to the odious regime of apartheid.) Reading the symbolism attached to the
nomination of Mr. Knox as Ambassador to Dahomey the newspaper commented that “la

presence d ’un homme de ‘couleur ’ comme Ambassadeur des Etats- Unis au Dahomey

 

7 Elliot Bratton, ‘Jazz and the Cold War’, Crisis, February/March 1998, 16.
8 Bratton, ‘Jazz and the Cold War,’l6.

219

témoigne de la determination du Gouvernement Américain, a assurer aux hommes de

couleur les mémes droits, les mémes possibilités et Iiberte's qu 'a leurs compatriotes

”9

blancs. (The presence of a man of ‘color’ as Ambassador of the United States shows the

determination of the American Government to guarantee to men of color the same rights,
the same opportunities and freedoms as their white compatriots).

But as the years passed by and Dahomeans traveled more and more to the U.S.,
some of the visitors became confused and less admiring about America. Even more, it is
the position of the francophone Aﬁ‘ica in overall American diplomacy that some of them
started questioning. Alexis Gnonlonfoun was one of the Beninese journalists sponsored
by the State Department to tour the U.S. in 1966. Reﬂecting on the racial issue and the
African independence after his return home he wrote:

From private contacts I was able to make, beside the official program, I
came to realize that the independence of African countries generated a
great interest among Black Americans; not because of the attention it was
given in the black media but for other reasons. The creation of new
diplomatic missions in Africa, allowed the Government of the United
States to employ a certain category of Black Americans in Africa. And
that tactic was only a screen, that serve the purpose of showing Africans
that the much debated racial segregation was not that crucial[ in the U.S.].
“Des contacts que j ’ai pu prendre en dehors du programme
oﬂiciel, je suis arrive a comprendre que l’indépendance des E tats
Aﬁ'icains suscitait un grand intérét chez les Noirs Américains, non
seulement a cause de la place que lui consacrait la presse noire, mais
aussi pour d ’autres raisons. La création de nouveaux postes
diplomatiques en A frique, permettait au gouvernement des Etats-Unis
d ’employer une certaine catégorie de Noirs Américains en A ﬁique. E t
cette tactique qui sert de paravent n ’est autre chose que de démontrer aux
Africains ((ue la ségrégation raciale dont on parle n ’est as pour autant
cruciale.” 0
His view of the American program was distorted by the realization that there was

some dichotomy between what was projected outside and what the actual situation in the

 

9 “N ouvel Ambassadeur des U.S.A” L ’Aube Nouvelle, Samedi 22 Aout 1964, l.
’0 Alexis Gnonlonfoun, “Mon Voyage aux Etats-Unis: la Ségrégation Raciale”, L ’A ube Nouvelle,
Dimanche 18 Septembre 1966, 2.

220

 

country was. Gnonlonfoun unlike the other journalists listed in chapter three1 I, concluded
his article with the thought that the U.S. policy toward Africa was not free form Cold
War ideological competition. He also noted how in the administration, the importance
given to each colonial power in American diplomacy was different and this inﬂuenced
how their former colonies (now independent countries) were regarded in Washington. He
analyzed that “a Washington, on estime que les pays Aﬁ'icains de langue anglaise
devraient étre plus proche de la Grande Bretagne que du Marché commun, ou que les
pays d ’expression F rancaise ne mériteraient pas Ia méme attention que ceux de la langue
Anglaise.” (“In Washington, it is held that Anglophone African countries should be closer
to the Great Britain that they should be to the Common market, or that the French
speaking African countries do not deserve the same attention as the Anglophone”)
Gnonlonfoun developed different feeling and impression from his trip to the U.S. He
probably enjoyed the trip but could not get over the idea that there was some ideological
agenda the program. This made him feel uncomfortable about the whole international
situation of that time.

But these views should not overshadow the beneﬁts that come from this policy.
Although manipulative sometimes, cultural relations did help developing nations like
African countries to coop with some burning issues of national development, and also
help them maintain the dialogue with developed nations thereby preserving good
relations with superpowers in general and the United States in particular. For the U.S.,
apart from the negative image developed abroad on its race relations policy, the
lntemational Visitor program has generated positive comments and admirations which

suggest that it was successﬁil in showing a different image of America, its citizens and

 

” See Chapter 3 for Justin Vieyra and Rene Ewagnignon reports on the U.S.

221

institutions, its successes and powers to foreigners. These results can be counted as some
of the ﬁrst gains of the cultural programs.
Did Cultural Relations Generate U.S. Soft Power in Africa?

Arguing that cultural policy could counter balance a situation created by political
misunderstanding and ideological differences would be crediting this source of inﬂuence
with too much power, especially if the expectations is an immediate change of attitude
from the targeted beneﬁciaries. At the same time negating any inﬂuence or long term
impact of cultural exchanges or activities on both countries, the donor and the
beneﬁciary, would be underestimating what cultural exchanges can achieve over a certain
time of period.

It is doubtless that in the long run, programs like the educational exchanges, the
international visitors program and other cultural activities will produce some positive
result in terms of inﬂuence. This section will reﬂect on both programs, assessing how
they have contributed to the effort of mutual understanding and especially the promotion
of good relations between the U.S. and Aﬁican countries. Considering all the competition
from the Eastern Europe and the communist anti-American propaganda, no doubt that
from the sixties until the crisis of Angola in 1975 or the end of Apartheid in South Africa
in 1990, some of the impressions many people around the world held about the United
States of American was that of an imperialist power that denied basic civil rights to some
of its citizens.

It was thus an objective of the cultural program to help change these negative
impressions people constructed about America. Through the educational exchange

programs as well as the International visitor programs, Africans and foreigners were

222

given the opportunity to make their own judgment on America, its people and its system.
They were given the means to travel around the country and encounter Americans from
different walk of life and different background. Quite often these visitors would reﬂect
back on their experience when they return in their home countries. The ﬁrst signs of the
effectiveness of this policy in Aﬁica, came with a report from State Department in 1966.
This report states:

The effect of the exchange program in creating a more understanding

attitude toward the United States was noted in a number of African

countries whose policy of“ nonalignment” usually precludes such

understanding. In Dahomey, for example, a prominent lawyer, as well as a

newspaper owner and editor, had articles in the Dahomean press

describing in favorable terms various aspects of American life of which he

had gained direct knowledge as Department of State grantee. In general

U.S. embassies in Aﬁica reported improved cooperativeness and

understanding by participants in the Department’s international visitor and

educational exchange projects. '2

The experience of Mr. Sarpong from Ghana, Vieyra , Gnonlonfoun and
Ewagnignon from Benin as studied in chapters 3 and 4 supports to some extent this
assessment made by the Bureau. Although their articles made no mention of their
thinking before the trip, their writings were quite indicative of a certain overall change of
perception of the U.S. aﬁer they returned home. As cultural experience about a country
tend to be like reading a book, most of the visitors took America as an open book to read
and draw their own conclusions whether negative or positive. Ofﬁcials in Washington
were aware of the fact that everything visitors saw may not please them or that some
realities may be shocking to them. But the most important thing for these visitors was to

understand it as American reality and treat it accordingly. In 1960 for example when

Robert Thayer was welcoming the ﬁrst group of Aﬁican student to the US, he made the

 

”Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Annual Report to Congress on the International Educational
and Cultural Exchanges Programs Fiscal Year 1966,16-17.

223

students aware of the fact that they would see many things that may be shocking to them.
He addressed the students as follow:

We are not perfect in spite of what they may tell you in any orientation
courses they give you, but we are human beings in the same way that you
are human beings. We have the same capacity for joy and sorrow, for love
and hate, for pleasure and anger as you have. Some of us you will like and
some of us you will not like, but the important thing is for you to
understand us and for us to understand you; and your coming here and
living among us for the months ahead is going to make this possible. '3 T

This was an honest and pragmatic way to break any myth they might have

 

constructed about life in America before their arrival. Although the stay of the Ghanaian
and the Benin journalists was comparatively shorter, this remark could also apply to their
experience in the U.S. from their description of their visit we could speculate here that if
Justin Vieyra, Rene Ewagnignon or Mr. Sarpong form Ghana were asked after their stay
what they think America was, their responses would certainly vary. But many of these
responses would converge toward the idea that the U.S. is a country of wealth and
freedom, a country of success, diversity and also a country of paradox.

On the image of a wealthy nation, almost all of the journalists studied referred to
America as a rich place. They may have referred to this in different terminology, but
overall each one recalled an anecdote, or a detail that suggested that America was a
wealthy nation. For Justin Vieyra he was really impressed by how they made everything
possible for them during his stay. He wrote ”lorsqu ’il vous arrivera d ’étre invite aux
Etats- Unis, on vous dira: “Etablissez vous-meme votre itineraire, voici des dollars, voice

1,114

des interpretes, allez... ”je trouve cela exceptione ( when you get a chance to be

invited to the United States, you will be told: “set yourself an itinerary, here is some

 

‘3 Department ofState Bulletin October 10'“, 1960 vol. xun N01 1 1 1, 560.
‘4 Aube Nouvelle, 18 Aout 1962, 6

224

dollars, here are some interpreters, go ...” I ﬁnd this exceptional”). Perhaps one of the
lasting effects of the trip was his impression on the American freedom. He read this
freedom in the fact of being allowed to visit strategic sites without any restriction, it was
an opportunity you can only have in a country where freedom and democracy exist he
believed. He also saw the beauty of America in the scenery and parks in Washington
DC. He wrote: “les bdtiments y ont un style quoique toujours massifs. Quel charme de
découvrir presque tous les mille me‘tres un parc vert et reposant, un jet d ’eau.”'5 ( The
buildings there are always of a massive style. What a charm to discover at almost every
thousand meters a green and resting park, a fountain”) For Vieyra, America is a rich and
beautiful place where people enjoy freedom of movement. This seemed like the image of
America he would propagate after his stay.

Beauty and power characterized Mr. Rene Ewagnignon’s image of America.
From the Omaha steak to the importance of time in the American life, from Washington
DC. to Los Angeles or San Francisco, he could not help but contemplate the diversity of
the country but also the genius that is behind the achievement of the American
civilization. The military bases were among the sites that impressed him the most for the
operation they witnessed but also for the cost of a simulation exercise of a real military
operation. That cost which reached hundreds of thousand dollars convinced him of the
economic power of the country because a country should be rich in order to afford
spending a tremendous amount of money just for operations of simulation. The military
demonstrations were to add to his already held idea about power, the American
capabilities of protecting its citizens and the free world. Ewagnignon shared some of

Gnonlonfoun’s ideas on the subject of the treatment of African Americans in the U.S.

 

'5 Aube Nouvelle, 18 Aout 1962,6
225

However unlike his compatriot it was more in comparison with Africans. He found that
black Americans were right in criticizing the American government for showing a certain
paradox which consisted in letting Africans access places that were denied to black
Americans. He tried to ﬁnd an answer to that paradox but was not able to get proper
explanations.

Sarpong from Ghana also constructed a different image of America after his stay. I

For him America was a country of success explained by a certain work ethic, a country of

 

wealth and power, efﬁciency, grandeur but also a society of consumers. This last aspect it
according to him was shown through the performance of “Beautiful America” at
Disneyland. He wrote “The Americans are good at harnessing electricity! And nothing
more bears testimony to this than a visit to ‘Beautiful America’ at Disneyland.”
Disneyland obviously left a great impression on him as the design of the theme park
symbolized to him the success and the legend of America. He wrote that “The
meticulousness and the detailed treatment given to this centre remind one of a trait in the
American character-efﬁciency.”16 He described America as “a land of superlatives”, and
saw in the Pentagon and other administrative building in Washington, the idea of power,
particularly ﬁre power that if viewed and analyzed in the context of the Vietnam War can
only generate some concerns about the temptation of power in the U.S. Viewing a
country of success Sarpong tried to explain that success and found that it was in the
character of the American, as reﬂected in his will to succeed and self-application. In his
words, America was a:

Country with an unbelievable reservoir of human and natural resources

and coupled with the character of its citizens for self-application, the will
to succeed and take on the challenges posed by nature and may be by

 

‘6 Daily Graphic, March 13, 1971, s.
226

 

sheer patriotism? They have achieved economic progress of fantastic

magnitude. Motivation? That is part of the answer. Exploitation? You do

not need a Marxist analyst to tell you this. It is part of the American

system.17

These different excerpts reveal that contact with American culture can generate
good impression although a correlation between the impression and a favorable attitude
in terms of cooperation cannot be guaranteed. An idea of a rich America could eventually
help sustain the belief that siding with the west in the international cold war context could
be more beneﬁcial than maintaining good Relations with the Russians. all the problems
of development could be solved adequately. This a subjective response to a foreign policy
program and it help ﬁguring out how information can be processed at the grantee level
and speculate on the long term return in negotiation or cooperation.

From these personal experiences, one may see the complementary character of the
program. It showed the beauty of America as civilization and the capability of the United
States as a world leader and this was undeniable as all the site visited were just part of the
evidence that tell it all about America as a powerful world leader. When talking about
the US as a superpower we should be in mind that it is not only military or economic.
The country is in leading position in other strategic areas as well. Through these visits,
the foreign participants have the opportunity to discover the other aspects of the US
power. Here soft power becomes a support for economic, military, and cultural powers. It
helps create a certain awareness of the real “hard” power of the U.S. this was evidenced
in the visits to military bases and strategic sites like the lift off bases of Cape Canaveral

in Florida, the Offut bases and Fort Bragg. But these visits were only thirty days long.

They help give an idea of the US culture but these ideas and impressions may not be as

 

‘7 Daily Graphic, March 13, 1971, 8.
227

 

accurate as the one constructed over a longer period of time. The ﬂeeting character of
these programs limit the possibilities of a deep experience of America time wise even
though that disadvantage was compensated by money and the number of places visited
through the programs. Likewise its relative brevity was complemented by much longer
programs like the educational exchanges.

The impact of educational exchanges programs on grantees reveals the long-term
beneﬁts of the U.S. educational exchanges with Aﬁica and its positive returns for
American diplomacy in Africa. Many former Fulbright students have been to apply
successfully the knowledge acquired in the US at home. Many were also able to keep
contacts with their American teachers, friends, professional colleagues with whom they
have had the opportunity to interact while on their study stay. The Fulbright scholarship
is among the leading American educational exchange programs. For the nearly ﬁfty years
of existence it has made an incredible impact in terms bringing Americans and foreigners
together and creating academic, professional development or mutual understanding
among them. It is a program that brings people from different background together in a
way that shows how a peaceful world would be like. For its fortieth anniversary the
program has made an assessment of its activities and key advantages of the Fulbright
programs were summarized in its annual report in 1986. As general as the ﬁndings of this
report may be a large portion of it is still applicable to the African countries. The
Fulbright scholarship has made some positive impact around the world and in Aﬁica as
well. There is no study conducted speciﬁcally on the countries we have selected as cases
here. But the Board of Scholarship makes annual assessment of the numbers of grants

awarded by country and cyclical evaluation of the impact of the program. Thus in 1986,

228

in celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the program, ﬁve major impacts have been
identiﬁed. They summarize well what have been achieved on global scale by the program
and as in the report put it; those impacts show that the U.S. citizen’s tax money has been
used for good purposes.

The ﬁrst impact is about knowledge and understanding of other nations, the board
notes that “the program has done much to build our knowledge of foreign peoples and
languages, and thus to contribute to an intellectual context for policy debates in the
United States. It has also improved the quality of foreign scholarship about the culture,
history, and the government of the United States.”18 On that impact the board notes how
the Fulbright encourages and was successful in promoting the teaching of American
Studies as a discipline overseas. It adds that “Approximately 20 percent of the grants in
any given year are likely to be for persons who will study, teach or do research in that

”'9 The Fulbright program was also inﬂuential in the ﬁeld of inter-university

discipline.
cooperation. The reports stated that “The program has fostered institutional relationships
between American and foreign universities. Both research and teaching in the United
States and abroad have beneﬁted from these networks, and on occasion, ties that began
with the Fulbright grants have blossomed into formal agreements on sharing resources,
developing joints projects, or sponsoring regular exchanges of faculty and students.”20
Thirdly, the report also stated that the Fulbright program was inﬂuential in promoting the
American model of University in foreign countries chieﬂy in introducing “key American

educational concepts, such as interdisciplinary collaboration and methods of University

administration” to foreign educational system through “exchange and training programs,

 

’8 Board of Foreign Scholarships, Annual Report December 23’“ 1986, 16.
'9 Board of Foreign Scholarships, Annual Report December 23rd 1986, 16.
2° Board of Foreign Scholarships, Annual Report December 23'“ 1986, 16.

229

of which the Fulbright is sometimes only a small, but often quite a crucial part.”2'On the
fourth impact, the board mentioned how the Fulbright program has been instrumental “in
introducing American concepts and methodology” in disciplines like the social sciences
to Third World countries particularly. Finally one of the most important achievements
over the four decades examined was the success gained in the ﬁeld of mutual
understanding and creation of mutually beneﬁcial professional, academic or social
friendship between Americans and students or participants from other countries.
According to the report “the program has provided an opportunity for future U.S. and
Foreign leaders to forge long-lasting bonds of friendship. This is perhaps the most
subjective and immeasurable goal of the program, but many individual ‘Fulbrightcrs’
would rate it as the most important. The network of ﬁiendships that each participants
form becomes an important link between the personal and professional lives of that
individual and those whom he or she has come to know.”22 These ﬁndings are very
encouraging and show that investment in educational exchanges is not money wasted.
We may not be able to make a conclusive claim here about the harmony that seems to
exist between the United States and many African nations in the post cold war era.
However we could to speculate that the educational exchanges with the continent for the
past forty to ﬁfty years have something to do with it. As former grantees have come to be
in charge, relations with the U.S. have greatly improved. The achievement of the
Fulbright program justiﬁes its continuation to these days. But the Fulbright is not the only

program that deals with educational program with Africa.

 

2' Board of Foreign Scholarships,16-18.
22 Board of Foreign Scholarships,18.

230

 

Perhaps one of the most effective programs apart from the Fulbright, is the one is
the African Graduate Fellowship program AF GRAD and the Advanced Training for
Leadership and Skills (ATLAS) administered by the Africa American Institute (AAI).
Through the AF GRAD and the ATLAS the US brought many African students to the
American Universities for degree programs. Cosponsored by the United States Agency
for International Development, (U.S.A.I.D.) in partnership with other organizations, the
program ran from 1963 through 1990. The goal of the fellowship was explained by the
Institute as to respond “to Africa's need for highly-trained professionals to play
leadership roles in the continent's newly-independent governments.”23 According to the
AAI, the USAID “sponsored this effort as a means of training future African leaders, as
well as accelerating economic and social development throughout Aﬁica. The project
provides fellowships to qualiﬁed Africans for undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate
training on university campuses in the United States.”24 In 1990 when the program was
terminated it was replaced by the ATLAS who ran from 1990 to 2004.

After nearly forty years of involvement in the education of manpower for Aﬁican
countries and the end of both program it was the right thing for the Institute to conduct
with the assistance of the USAID a survey on how the program made a difference in the
life of the students and their countries. Different questions were addressed and many
aspects were considered but they were all related to the professional and the personal life
of the grantees. Together the AF GRAD/ATLAS brought about 3,200 Aﬁicans to the
United States during their forty years of operation. Out of this number according to the

survey 90 percent returned home , a very good result due to the fact that poor economic

 

23 USAID Project No. 698-0455 Capturing the Results of 3 0 Years of AF GRAD Training: Evidence of
Change in Individuals and Institutions Across A ﬁ'ica Final Evaluation Report December, 1995
2" USAID Project No. 698-0455 Capturing the Results of 3 0 Years of AF GRAD Training, 1995,

231

conditions in many countries discourage their grantees from returning home. If that were
the case, the expected impact of the program would not be able to be attained. Upon
return the majority have become leaders in their ﬁeld, some take decisions that will affect
other people’s professional and private life and ultimately it is the learning experience
that would have made a big difference in how they view the U.S. What is important to
draw from this ﬁnding in the frame of this project is how ideas retained from the US
could be inﬂuential in Aﬁica. That is the essence of the exchange program.

After thirty years of AF GRAD, the report of the ﬁeld interview on the impact of
the American training show how the skill and learning acquired have made a signiﬁcant
impact. For example it inﬂuenced the higher education in Ghana. The report mentions
how “At the University of Ghana, AF GRAD alumni have been instrumental in adopting
the U.S. style semester and course module system as well as new teaching methods, such
as case study.” 25 Other inﬂuences that can be traced back to the US training includes the
use of visual aids in classroom. According to the report, “overhead projectors and slides,
are more prominent in classrooms” now thank to the American experience”. Similar
inﬂuences can be noticed in Mali where the AF GRAD alumni have made ‘small but
signiﬁcant contributions and technical innovations in their professions.” one of the areas
where this innovation was noticeable was in the “ Introduction and dissemination of
American approaches and techniques in animal epidemiology via a decentralized
government extension service.”27 At a more personal level Mrs. Dinah Brandful is an
AFGRAD alumnus from Ghana explains how her U.S experience inﬂuenced her. After a

Master in food science from Michigan State University in 1982 she returned to her

25 USAID Project No. 698-0455 Capturing the Results of 30 Years of AF GRAD Training, 1995 Annex 9, l.
26 USAID Project No. 698-0455 Capturing the Results of 30 Years of AF GRAD Training, 1995, 35 .
27 USAID Project No. 698-0455,Annex 9, 3.

232

country in 1983. She explained that she continued with her previous work but joined
the government’s Customs Excise and Preventive Services (CEPS) Department in 1985.
On how her experience in the United States was she wrote “My study in the U.S.” she
explained “ gave me a different positive attitude and equipped me with different skills
and ethics such as hands on approach, conﬁdence and assertiveness as well as insisting

and ﬁghting for my rights as a citizen.”28 By transferring these qualities of conﬁdence

~ I

‘U.

and assertiveness, she is introducing certainly some innovation in her work and adding

‘ ‘ J?! 4i?!“

 

something new. This is not to mean that people are not assertive in Aﬁican countries.
But there some character of the African that may not be expressed at work for cultural or
social reasons. So behaving differently from those norms would not sound Ghanaian, this
may help her to be more productive at work but it could backﬁre and create clashes at
work.
The Challenges posed to U.S. Soft power in Africa

The reactions of international visitors studied in the previous show that the
American experience left many among the visitors with good impressions although some
had a mitigate view of the country. Having analyzed the gains of the strategies of
cultural relations for either partner ( American, Ghana or Benin), in the previous
paragraphs, it is important to address here the question of what prevent good relations
from being constructed alter a successful visit, or long-term stay in the U.S.

One of the questions raised about cultural relations is its effectiveness in creating
better conditions for entertaining good relations between two countries. In the context of

the ideological struggle of the Cold War, it is legitimate to ask whether educational

 

28 U.S. Agency for lntemational Development , Generations of Quiet Progress: The Development Impact of
U.S. Long-Term University Training on Africa ﬁom 1963 to 2003, 2004, 28.

233

exchanges or the international visitor program inﬂuence African elite in expressing their
preference for a speciﬁc ideology.

Before trying to answer that question let’s quote Matsuda Takeshi who, talking
about the object of cultural interchange wrote that it was “the totality of the beliefs,
attitudes, and opinions of the whole population.” It facilitated “the exchange of
knowledge between nations and dealt with the problem of trying to inﬂuence a he

”29

population’s attitudes so that its political behavior might change. If the motivation

behind the cultural relations program was to change the attitude of a whole population as

‘ .V-
I

Matsuda Takeshi observes, then perhaps cultural relations in Africa did not fulﬁll its

 

promises in Africa especially during the Cold War. The numerous students who studied
in the U.S., and the many visitors sponsored by the State Department were not able to
make a big difference in their respective countries’ domestic life to the extent of prevent
the change in ideological option. Otherwise, there would not have been all those putsches
noticed in the history of Benin and Ghana for example and in other African countries.
More curious observation was the fact that many regimes turned Marxist Leninist in the
seventies. Why such a gap between the expected goal and the result obtained? This is
not an easy question to answer. Part of the answers could be related to some ﬂaws in the
idea of soft power as a means of foreign policy. It seems that the politics of the cultural
relations have worked with some fallacies or misconceptions about the delivery of the
programs. Building on Takeshi thought, we would assume that the ideas of soft power on
the Aﬁican continent worked with the principle that winning the hearts of and minds of

the Aﬁican elite and leaders would make liberal democracy inroad in African countries

 

29Matsuda Takeshi, Soft power and its Perils: U. S. Cultural Policy in Early Postwar Japan and Permanent
Dependency, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2007), 101.

234

much easier and pave the way for loyalty to the western allies, thereby stopping
communism from having any sort of inﬂuence. The problem with this idea is that it
apparently seemed to be based on the assumption that the Aﬁican elite might accept
without any critical judgment, anything that is western or American for that sake. Such
approach would be totally miscalculated. As Kazuo Ogoura, the president of Japan
Foundation Center for global Partnership, remarks on Soﬁ power he stated:

The problem with this idea, however, is that it views things from the

perspective of the party exercising power. Seen from the viewpoint of the

party being inﬂuenced by the power, the question of whether accepting the

power accords with this party’s own interests is likely to be a far more

important consideration than the attraction of the power. Here we must

keep in mind that sovereign nations in the international community act not

on the basis of likes and dislikes but in accordance with their own

interests.”30

As pertinent as this remark is, the way it is phrased, suggests the denial of
preference in the choice of a state, or to be precise, Kozuo is arguing that a state
preference is not emotional but instrumental and therefore does not operate according to
mental or emotional norms. But the mere fact that a state is attached to a particular
interest shows the source of its “feeling” or preference. Therefore a state would ‘like’
what is in its best interest or ‘dislike’ what is not in its best interest. It is this logic that
was missing in the general policy of soft power or cultural relations with Aﬁican
countries after the independence. There appeared a certain denial of the ability of Aﬁican
nations to know what was in their best interest, and many cooperation policies operated

ideological battle in mind while minimizing the real needs of African nations. In trying

to win the “hearts and minds of the elite”, they may have won the heart but not the mind.

 

3° Kazuo Ogoura, “The Limits of Soft Power ”
hgpz/l’wwwcunorgindcx.php?option=articlc&task2dcfault&articlcid=34 1 it (accessed July 16'”, 2009)

235

Maybe this is what explains some gains for Marxism on the continent by the end of the
mid seventies as Duigan and Gann noticed:

By the end of the 1970s, Marxism-Leninism had made considerable gains.

More than forty thousand troops-East German, Soviet, but mainly Cuban-

were deployed in Africa to support Marxist-Leninist governments. The

new regimes of Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, the People’s Republic of

the Congo, and Benin all claimed to be based on Marxist Leninist

principles...Nevertheless, the balance of power has begun to change in

Aﬁica. Marxist-Leninism, far from being an exiles’ creed, had become a

continental challenge to the West.’ '

Although this development on the continent could not be solely attributed to the
failure of the cultural cooperation with the west or the U.S. one may wonder what makes
the western type of society lose its appeal for some Aﬁican countries. The challenges
that came in the way of cultural relations with Aﬁican countries had probably historical
roots. After the independence African countries were new to the world system as
Emerson Rupert observed it32 and because many countries were granted independence
through negotiation especially the French colonies their relationship with the former
colonizer overshadowed their international personality. Consequently their level of
receptivity to American ideas in the ﬁeld of politics, arts and other development related
ﬁelds was relatively much higher. But within few years, problems of internal economic,
social, and political development started putting more pressure on African governments.

Many were in needs of resources to face these challenges of national
development. Technical assistance and economic cooperation with the west was certainly

helpful but not enough to meet all these demands. Consequently many governments felt

the need to look for other funding sources. Meanwhile the international context of Cold

 

3lDuigan, Peter and L.H. Gann. The United States and Africa: A History (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1984.), 293.
32 See Chapter 2 of this dissertation, pp 104-5.

236

 

War limited the ﬂexibility many third world countries and Aﬁican countries particularly
had in choosing their development partners. The realization of these limits to the
expression of their international personality had caused some states to turn red. Since the
communists also had a policy of assistance with relatively lower interest, a cooperation
which brought thousands of African students to the Soviet Union and China or other
Eastern European countries, Aﬁican countries started reconsidering the way their interest
should be deﬁned. What was the allegiance to the west bringing and how was its impact
on the national development policy? Figuring out the response to these questions would
perhaps give a clue on the change in the ideological option that occurred in the late
seventies.

Another reason could be related to the behavior of the western allies on issues that
are part of the cornerstones of the many Aﬁican states. These were the situation in South
Africa, the war in Angola, the situation in the former Rhodesia, in short countries that
were still ﬁghting for their liberation from foreign domination. U.S. or other western
European countries policies on these issues were usually brought about differences and
sometime antagonism with Aﬁican leaders. The result was that Aﬁican intellectuals and
some leaders have become disillusioned with the west. So despite the chance of
generating enough soft power, U.S. cultural relations in this context could not counter the
negative impression created by the behavior of the United States at international level.
Julian Aminz'3 alluded to this fact when he discussed the ordeal of the volunteers in
Ghana who were asked all sort of questions about American policy in Vietnam and the
civil rights movement and so on. He wrote about the volunteers difﬁculties in Ghana,

stating that “Even Ghanaian students were not immune from the constant suspicion of the

 

33 See chapter 4 on U.S.-Ghana Relations

237

 

volunteers. They had been informed that the volunteers were "technical experts from
neocolonialist nations." Ghanaians bombarded the volunteers with questions such as:
"You are not a spy, are you?"34

The international engagement of the United States and its intervention in some
conﬂicts like Vietnam or the Congo crisis quickly distorted the image of the U.S. and
remove any good intention African leaders or intellectual may have read in U.S. policy.
This situation was perilous to American Soft power on the Aﬁican front. Many gestures
would become suspicious and volunteers would be regarded as CIA agents. The end of
the Cold War and the rise of new democracies in Africa have now contributed to good
relations with Aﬁica. Good governance has become the rhetoric in the relations between
both parties (that is the U.S. and Aﬁican countries).

All is all it appears that Soft power is strongly dependent on other type of powers.
On its own it cannot do much unless, it is given the proper time, like a plant to grow. But
as it responds to political realities, the limited terms of politicians in power may not help
them believe in its impact. Even Kennedy himself did not believe in the power of the
Peace Corps especially as a means to contain communism. But history has shown how

much difference it can make in people’s life around the world.

 

3’ Julius A. Amin, “The Perils of Missionary Diplomacy: The United States Peace Corps Volunteers in the
Republic of Ghana” Western Journal of Black Studies. Pullman: Vol. 23, Iss.], (Spring 1999):

238

 

CONCLUSION

Drawing on the concept and theory of soft power, this dissertation has studied the
evolution of U.S. cultural relations with West Aﬁican countries from the independence of
Ghana until the fall of the Soviet Union. It has shown how the U.S. program of cultural
relations was gradually extended to the African continent in the post independence years.
This extension was partially due to the growing inﬂuence of the soviet communism in
Africa and the inclination of many early African leaders like Nkrumah, Sekou Toure,
Modibo Keita, Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and Julius Nyerere of Tanzanial
toward socialism. The cultural program was thus part of the overall U.S. government
strategy to counter the rising inﬂuence of the Soviet Union in Aﬁica. As such it can be
viewed as the American response to the Soviet Union and other communist countries
cultural activities in sub-Saharan Africa and therefore considered one of the means used
to contain the extension of communism in Africa. By contextualizing the study in the era
of cold war, the dissertation has shown how emphasizing cultural and educational
exchanges helped increase U.S soft power by somewhat presenting a better image of the
country, its culture and institutions on the continent.

The dissertation has also shown how the extension of the Cultural program was
concomitant to the general change in U.S. attitude toward Africa. That change of attitude
was reﬂected in the evolution of its policy from indifference to the acknowledgement of
Aﬁicans’ aspiration for self—rule before materializing in full recognition of the
independence of many African countries in 1960. Consequently Africa gained more

visibility in U.S. foreign policy after the independence, a visibility that was reinforced by

 

1 Wilbert J. LeMellc, “The OAU and Superpower Intervention in Africa” Africa Today. Denver: Third
Quarter 1988. Vol. 35, Iss. 34; 23.

239

the creation of the United Nations (UN).2 Since their admission to the UN. as
independent and sovereign states, African countries became potential inﬂuential actors of
the post war international relations. African leaders, intellectuals have become subjects of
‘courtship’ or conquest by most of the super powers particularly the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. Either of these two countries developed speciﬁc policies and strategies to create
sympathy, friendship abroad but also used coercion at times to prove that his country had
a better ideological system and its capacity as a world leader.

The American effort to win the hearts and mind of Africans passed through the
Fulbright exchange programs, the A.S.P.A.U., the AFGRAD/ A.T.L.A.S students
exchange programs and other cultural activities like the Jazz diplomacy. The creation of
the Peace Corps Volunteers program in 1961 added another dimension to the sources of
U.S. soft power in Aﬁica. Through their activities across the continent, Peace Corps
volunteers have touched the hearts of many among the rural populations of Aﬁica by
helping them improve their daily life conditions. In addition to these programs, this
project also studied the international visitors program sponsored by the State Department.
Through the experience of Rene Ewagnignon, Justin Vieyra , and Alexis Gnonlonfoun
all journalists from Benin on one hand and Eddie Agyeman, K.A. Sarpong two
Ghanaians journalists on the other, it showed how participation to this program shaped
the selectees’ perception of the United States and its culture. The above mentioned
visitors enjoyed their stay and have had ﬁrst hand analytical look at the U.S., its
institutions, its culture, and its values and paradoxes where necessary. Their analysis and

positive impressions about the U.S. show how cultural relations can positively contribute

 

2 Wilbert J LeMelle “Another major interest of the superpowers was to win diplomatic support from the
new African states for their respective foreign policy objectives, as debated and pursued at the United
Nations and in other international fora.”23.

240

 

to effectively increasing U.S. Soft power in Aﬁica. Almost all of these participants saw
in the U.S. a country of diversity with multiform and multifaceted powers. These positive
reactions of participants partially justiﬁes why the program continued throughout the
Cold War and beyond.

But although the U.S. program continued throughout the Cold War and beyond, it
was not impactful enough to prevent many Aﬁican countries from being tempted by

communism or the Marxist ideology, especially in the seventies. For these countries,

 

liberal ideas seemingly were not welcomed and consequently the model of liberal in
democracy like the American system did not have a particular appeal to them. This lack
of appeal could be explained by a combination of domestic as well as external and
international factors. Among the domestic factors, the necessity to solve the problems
created by the policy of national development forced many Aﬁican countries to look for
external sources of funding different from western European countries. This led many to
turn towards the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The international
factors that affected the appeal of liberal democracy included the international behavior
of the American and other western nations’ government. The support of apartheid in
South Africa, the Vietnam War caused many countries to revise their unconditional
allegiance to western liberal democratic ideas. Consequently western ideas were refuted
in the name of anti-imperialism, anti-apartheid and sometime non-alignment slogans. As
a consequence socialism has exerted a growing appeal on many Africans leaders and
intellectuals since the ﬁrst decade after the independence that is the decade of 1960 —

1970. However, as explained in this dissertation, if the ﬁrst govermnents of Aﬁican

imbued with the nationalist spirit of the decolonization era were more inclined toward

241

socialism they did not necessarily welcomed the class struggle notion of Marxism. On
the contrary, the adoption of Marxism by many countries like the Benin (1974) and
Ghana in the following decade shows some political success for the Soviet Union and the
communist countries, a success that nearly contradicted any assertion about a possible
correlation between soft power and effective containment of communism in Africa.

The choice of Marxism by Benin and Ghana negatively affected their respective
cooperation with the U.S. The economic problems of the late 80’s forced these two
countries to abandon their ideological option and to turn toward international ﬁnancial
institutions that were largely inﬂuenced by western capitalist countries. Among other
conditions, these institutional posed as conditions to sign the Structural Adjustment
programs with them, the recognition of their rights to all political organization and civil
rights and ﬁeedom to all the citizens of the countries. These external pressures combined
with internal strikes and demand for more freedom paved the way for the beginning of
the Aﬁican third wave of democracy. In addition to economic problem, there was the
symbolic impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet
Union as an entity in 1991. With these two events, it was an important page of the history
of the international order that came out of World War II that was turned. The
consequences of this change of the 1990’s were somewhat similar to the consequences of
the Second World War that brought the U.S.iand the Soviet Union to the international
scene as two Superpowers. Unlike the Second world war the changes of the 90’s left the
U.S. as the only survivor of a war that has used ideas, symbolism, arts and at time bullets

to proclaim the superiority of a particular ideology.

242

All in all, the American cultural relations were elitist, manipulative at some point
but ultimately it did contribute somewhat to the development of manpower necessary for
the construction of the Aﬁican nations. Cultural relations may not have been as effective
in containing communism in a short time period but through its educational exchanges,
the program contributed particularly to the rise of a new leadership in many African
countries following the changes of the 1990’s. In the explanations of Professor John Igue
from Benin, this new leadership of Africa was mainly liberal with western education:

“After 1990 the intellectual elites emerged as a political force, this time as
liberals, mainly from international institutions and American and French

business schools. These people took on important political responsibilities,

either as presidents of republics or as prime ministers. Notable examples

are the presidents Abdou Diouf (Senegal), Paul Biya (Cameroon), Albert

Zaff (Madagascar), Alpha Oumar Konaré (Mali), Tijane Kabba (Sierra

Leone), John Kuﬁror (Ghana), Helen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia) and

Nicéphone Soglo (Benin).”3

While this statement bears enough truth to it, attributing this inclination to
liberalism only to their western education and stay could appear too reductionist and
simplistic. Nkrumah studied in the USA and Nyerere studied at Edinburgh in England yet
both them showed some sympathy to socialism. The western educational experience and
the stay in the U.S. and other western countries are only part of a group of factors that led
many African states to realize the necessity to abandon socialism or communism and
embrace a democratic system based on the American or European model. As mentioned

above the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic conditions that forced most

these nations to turn toward the institutions of Bretton-Woods compelled many of them

 

3John O. Igué, “A New Generation of Leaders in Aﬁica: What Issues Do They Face?”, Revue
Internationale de Politique de Développement [En ligne], 1 | 2010, mis en ligne le 11 mars 2010. URL:
http:ﬂioldcvrevuesorg/139 Accessed May 27‘”, 2010.

243

 

to revise their ideological option. Quite often the adoption of the Program of structural
adjustment was subordinated to the promise of democratization and liberalization of the
political system.

It was in this context that in 1990, Benin held its national conference and adOpted
toward the end of the year a new constitution which deﬁnes the country as a democracy
and highlights the main. In 1992, Ghana also adopted a new constitution commonly
referred to as the constitution of the fourth Republic. These 90’s constitutional reforms
saw American ideas of democracy successfully incorporated in many constitutions in
Africa. These were moments when the American constitution became a source of U.S.
Soft power for the theory of separation of power and the concept of check and balances
have been incorporated in many of these new constitutions that came out of the process
of democratization. The choice of a presidential type of government and the limitation of
the president’s terms to two have all become the norms.

The 1990 constitution of Benin for example inspired from many foreign
constitutions among which the American constitution. One of the examples of the
American inﬂuence is the separation of power and the limitation of presidential terms.
Article 41 of the constitution deﬁnes the role of the President and article 42 clearly states
that the President is elected for a term of 5 years and that can only be renewed once:

Article 41 : Le President de la République est le chef de L'Etat. Il est l'élu

de la Nation et incarne l'unite’ nationale.

Il est le garant de l'inde'pendance nationale, de l'intégrité territoriale et du

respect de la constitution, des traite's et accords internationaux.

Article 42 : Le président de la République est e'lu au suffrage universe]

direct pour un mandat de cinq ans, renouvelable une seule fois.
, . . 4
En aucun cas, nul ne peut exercer plus de deux mandats presrdentrels.

 

4 Constitution de la Republique du Benin http:/l’www. gouvb j "IMG «' pd f’la constitutionpdf accessed July
19th, 2010.

244

 

The same provision can be seen in the Ghanaian constitution of 1992 which
deﬁnes in article 5 7. (l) the role of the president “There shall be a President of the
Republic of Ghana who shall be the Head of State and Head of Government and
Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ghana.” In article 66 (l) The constitution
deﬁnes and limits the president’s term: “A person elected as President shall, subject to
clause (3) of this article, hold ofﬁce for a term of four years beginning from the date on
which he is sworn in as President. (2) A person shall not be elected to hold ofﬁce as
President of Ghana for more than two terms.5

With democracy wave sweeping over the continent, Aﬁican countries seemed to
have completely put behind any experience of socialism or Marxism Leninism, a system
that did really ﬁnd its ground on the continent as in it did in other places. At the same
time that democratic reforms was on its way in Africa, two developments raised
questions about the future of governments’ role in transnational cultural activities and the
use of culture as a source of Soft power. The ﬁrst development is the incredible advance
in information and communication technology followed by a global consumption of the
American popular culture and the second is the disappearance of the Soviet Union as the
rival of the U.S. From the eighties onward the global spread of the American popular
culture did not spare the African continent. In urban areas as well as in rural areas, jeans,
hip hop, coca cola and all the possible symbol of American consumerism are gaining
more popularity. In addition to that popularity of the American culture there is an

unprecedented development in information technology that combined with the effect of

globalization forces observers to ask if the role government in transnational cultural

 

5 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1 992
http://www.iudicial.gov.gh/constitution/chaptcrl’chaer.htm accessed July 19th, 2010.

245

relations is still necessary. Today the world has reached a level of development in the
ﬁeld of communication unimaginable a decade ago, relegating the importance of human
agency in delivering cultural relations nearly to a second plan. This raises a question
about the relevancy of the role of government, in this case the U.S. government in the
cultural relations.

On another level all along its history the American program of cultural relations
had to contain either directly or indirectly the negative propaganda of hostile power. It
was the case in the late thirties with the growing inﬂuence of the Nazis. The war forces
the politics of U.S. cultural relations to readjust the program and even create separate
agencies like the Ofﬁce of War Information which role was purely informational and
propaganda on the real purpose of the American participation in the war. After the War
the program had to adapt to the Cold war context and participate indirectly to the
containment of the Soviet and other communist countries cultural inﬂuence in the Third
world and in Africa particularly. But in 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed as an entity
putting an end to the cold war with its ideological competition. That disappearance of the
Soviet Union prompt the question whether the U.S. program of cultural relations is still
relevant as source of soft power. Isn’t there a certain loss of purpose for U.S. soft power
in Aﬁica? With all the changes of the 1990’s and the subsequent development in the
world and speciﬁcally in Aﬁica what could possibly be the best avenue for U.S. soft
power on the continent in the post Cold War era? If there is effectively a loss of purpose,
What then should be the next frontier for the American soft power in Aﬁica? With the
new development bought in U.S. relations with the world in the aftermath of the 9/1 1

attacks, will the next goal be the prevention of the rise of radical Islamism on the

246

 

continent? As far as Africa is concerned what should be the reorientation of the U.S.
program since the communists are now gone? As China is developing a new type of
economic cooperation with Aﬁican countries, will this new cooperation be a threat to the
U.S. and its transatlantic allies in Africa? Is China the next power to contain in Aﬁica?
These are very important questions that cannot be fully answered in this project. It is
somehow necessary to observe that the importance or the use of soft power in Africa
should not always be seen in terms of foreign power to contain. Should that be the case,
there is a high possibility that changes in the stake in Africa will likely lead to a cyclical
loss of purpose for the use of soft power on the continent and it will therefore create a
cyclical lack of objective in U.S. foreign policy on the continent.

A new international context usually calls for a new policy of cooperation among
nations. Despite the fact that there are still some shortcomings, Aﬁica is evolving slowly
toward full democratization. For this process to complete, a new type of partnership
needs to be built between foreign powers and African countries. In the post cold war
Africa, the stake is less about ideology and power game than it is about education, the
commitment to helping the new democracies on the continent to ﬁght against poverty, to
create a reliable health system that is accessible to every citizen and to implement and
support strong institutions that help sustain good governance and democracy. For a
cultural policy to be effective in Aﬁ'ica and generate enough soft power, it has to be
devoted to promote good governance and democracy on the continent.

For this to happen, a lot will depend on how African states are viewed by the U.S.
and mainly what kind of commitment the U.S. has in helping Aﬁican develop

themselves. The creation in 2004 of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) by

247

the US Congress and the approach adopted by this organization to solve the problems of
the beneﬁciary countries is a promising avenue for the future of U.S. soft power on the
continent. Among others, the MCC organization support projects in as diverse areas as
agriculture and irrigation, water supply and sanitation, access to health, anticorruption
initiatives, land rights and access, and access to education.6

With U.S. image abroad severely damaged since the invasion of Irak in 2003,
presenting an alternative image of U.S. power abroad was a challenge for the new
administration that came after George Bush. The advent of the Obama administration
with its new rhetoric about change and a new type of foreign policy helped project a
better image of U.S. globally. The mere fact that he was the ﬁrst African-American
president brought back more credibility to the American system and created an
exceptional pride in Africa. Not only his Aﬁican heritage as mentioned at the beginning
of this dissertation is important for U.S. soft power but his stress on good governance and
the particular importance he recognized for Aﬁica and Aﬁican countries heralds better
relations between the U.S. and Aﬁica. In his speech in Ghana for example Obama notes
the interdependence among all the nations of world including those of Africa and stressed
that Aﬁican countries could impact world affairs just like any other country, developed or
less developed would on international affairs. He declared that “I do not see the countries
and peoples of Africa as a world apart; I see Africa as a fundamental part of our
interconnected world -— (applause) -- as partners with America on behalf of the ﬁrture we

want for all of our children. That partnership must be grounded in mutual responsibility

 

6 Millennium Challenge Corporation, lurpzl’l’www.mcc.gml/nrccfaboutl‘indcxshtml accessed July 20th,
2007.

 

248

and mutual respect.”7

Obama identiﬁes four major areas that his administration will focus
on in building a partnership based on mutual respect and mutual responsibility with
Aﬁican countries, those are: “democracy, opportunity, health, and the peaceful resolution
of conﬂict.”8 By ﬁghting for policy implementation rather than containing a foreign
power, U.S. policy in Africa has made an important shift from the days of the ideological
competition of the Cold War to embrace a new direction that likely will inﬂuence its

sources of soft power on the continent. Will this be more effective than the approach of

the containment?

 

7 Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament, http:l'l'www.amcrica.uovf'st/tcxttrans-
gglish/2009/Julv/200907l l l lOOSOabrctnuhO.l079783.html&distid=ucs#ixzzflduTqF.POW accessed
September 30‘“, 2009.

3 Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament, http:/‘l’wxwz.america.govl’sti’tcxrtrans-
mglish/2009l’July/200907l l 1 10050abrctnuh0. l 079783.html&distid=ucs#iXZZOdgTqEP(iW accessed
September 30'”, 2009.

 

249

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