NATIONAL IMAGES OF BUSINESS AND POLITICAL ELITES IN TWO BORDER CITIES

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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

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
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A THESIS

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AN ABSTRACT

The present study grew out of a general concern with factors which might affect technological interchange in a cross-cultural situation.

Since national political boundaries offer citizens of different nations opportunity for daily interaction, the United States-Mexico border area was selected as the site for research into this problem. It was assumed that the national images which these citizens had of each other might be influential in the change process. It was further assumed that individuals occupying important positions in the political and business systems of their communities would be influential change agents. The top elites of these two systems for the twin cities of El Paso and Cd. Juarez were chosen for a study which related variables of contact, occupation and nationality to the images which they held of themselves and each other. To achieve this it was necessary to have:

- 1 a description and analysis of the business and political
 elite systems of the two cities;
- 2 a description and analysis of cross-cultural contacts, including an estimate of differential amounts of contact among the four elite groups;
- 3 data on the substantive images which the four elite groups had of themselves and each other.

It was found that the business elite systems of the two cities were similar in general nature, although the El Paso businesses were significantly larger in size. In the political systems the judiciary seemed to be more important in the United States and the executive more important in Mexico. The business and political elites of El Paso formed a well integrated unit with business apparently dominating. In Cd. Juarez there was a cleavage between the two groups with both struggling for power.

It was found that the Cd. Juarez business elites had significantly more cross-cultural contact than any of the other groups; yet their images didn't differ significantly from the political elites of Cd. Juarez.

Moreover, there were no significant differences in images based on amount of contact by nationality. It was further found that nationality was a primary variable in accounting for imagery when the four groups were compared with each other in different ways. Occupation was not significantly related to imagery on the basis of the data of this study. Finally, it was found that the four elite groups tended to have highly favorable images of American businessmen and government officials and their respective practices. The images of the corresponding Mexican groups was much less favorable, with the two American groups having generally negative images while the Mexicans tended to see these practices as about the same in both countries. The Cd. Juarez businessmen were the most self-critical of the four groups tested.

The findings suggest that interaction can take place even when images are not congruent or favorable, if the situation is highly structured so that role behavior is predicated upon the status-equality of the particular actors in the situation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Area Research Center of Michigan State University has sponsored research in Latin America for the part of 10 years, under the directorship of Dr. Charles P. Loomis. In 1954 the United States-Mexico border was selected as a specific site for research into technological and social interchange. At that time the writer was invited to participate in the research. He wishes to express deep gratitude to Dr. Loomis, first, for encouraging him to enter the field of Sociology and Anthropology, and secondly for guidance and friendship throughout the four years during which this dissertation was coming to fruition. He is also appreciative of the financial assistance, through the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, which helped to keep his family alive during this period.

To all the businessmen, government officials and other professional people of El Paso and Cd. Juarez who in any way contributed to this study, the writer is grateful. He also acknowledges the help of several typists and friends who labored to get this dissertation into its final form, and especially Mrs. Robert C. Bealer and Mrs. R. Clyde McCone, who worked far into the night in order to get the final draft finished on time.

The writer wishes to acknowledge the help of the guidance committee for their time, encouragement, and general assistance. In particular, he is indebted to Dr. Joel Smith for critical commentary on Chapters I and II and especially penetrating criticisms with respect to statistical analysis and related matters.

To Professor William H. Form, whose guidance, criticism and friendship have permeated this dissertation from its inception on the border to the final stages of editing, the writer wishes to acknowledge his deep gratitude and heartfelt thanks.

Finally, to his wife, Lorraine, for somehow managing to run the home and keep four children entertained, and still have enough energy to prepare statistical data, proof read, set up tables, and do many other little but important details that give a dissertation its final finished appearance, the writer is deeply grateful. But above and beyond this, was her willingness to go into this "new venture" and forego the pleasures of a normal home life for four years; for this he expresses his abiding love and affection.






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


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



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION


A. Background

Under the leadership of Professor Charles P. Loomis, the Area
Research Center of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of
Michigan State University has been conducting research in Latin America,
especially at the InterAmerican Institute of Agricultural Sciences in
Turrialba, Costa Rica. Much of the research has been of an applied
and directed nature, that is, concerned primarily with the strategy of
social change. In 1954, recognizing the importance of our national
political boundaries as sources for the introduction of technological
and social change into adjacent countries, the department accepted a
grant from the Carnegie Corporation to further research along the United
States-Mexico border aimed at "investigating factors related to processes
of acceptance, rejection, and adjustment to technological and social
innovations."

A basic premise of the general project was that "national political boundaries are areas in which the greatest amount of day-to-day contact occurs between citizens of adjacent countries," and further that "social and cultural differences are emphasized by contrasts presented in border situations, and should, thus, be accessible to study." Another basic

^{1.} For a full statement of the details of this project, see the Proposed Area Research Project entitled "Processes of Technological and Social Change in the Inter-Cultural Setting of the Border Areas of the United States." Mimeographed Pamphlet, 1954. Above quotation is from page 1.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 1.



premise was that "the receptivity to technological innovations is in part a function of the images which potential and actual recipients have of change agents."

Very briefly, the relevant objectives may be summarized as follows:

A general objective was "to increase knowledge of how technological changes are related to national images. . . " Specifically this means:

analyzing the value orientation (e.g., sttitudes, evaluation, national images of group members of both national systems) and social structure of both formal and informal social systems relative to:

- 1 differential rates of adjustment to and acceptance or rejection of technological changes:
- 2 developing a better understanding of the processes whereby national images, attitudes and evaluations related to technological, changes and internalized and maintained.

The present study arose out of the general concern about the nature and extent of technological inter-change that might be taking place along the border in Mexico as a result of contacts with Americans and American border cities. At the same time it was recognized that such technological inter-change might be affected in part by the national images held by people in cities on both sides of the border. It was further recognized that people in important positions in the political and business systems of border cities might be influential in encouraging or impeding the rate of technological inter-change. With the thought that national images might be an important factor in this process, it was decided to find out what sorts of images these people had of themselves and their counterparts on the other side of the border. Since the peculiar ecological conditions of the border seemed to lend

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^{3.} Ibid., p. 5.

^{4.} Ibid., p. 3.

themselves to high rates of interaction in twin city situations, the El Paso - Cd. Juarez metropolitan area offered an excellent site for such a project. Early research revealed that the business and political elites⁵ interacted in such a way that a study could be made of them.

This led to the development of the three major objectives of the present study. These objectives are:


- l description and analysis of the business and political elite structures of the border cities. El Paso and Cd. Juarez.
- 2 analysis of contacts occurring between the elites of the two cities, and the possible relationship between contact and national images.
- 3 a comparative study of the national images of these elite groups based on the variables of nationality and occupation.

Before considering these objectives in more detail, it would be well to discuss briefly some of the ideas, principles and propositions which served as sensitizing guideposts in the development of the research design. In the following discussion the writer will also review some of the literature which, while not used directly in the development of the study, is relevant to some of the hypotheses tested, and may suggest some theoretical implications for future study. Reference will also be made to methods used in other imagery studies as well as to the specific content of national images.

B. Man as an Image-Creating Animal

The known history of homo sapiens indicates that one group of people has always had a propensity to differentiate itself from another and in the process to judge itself superior in comparison with another group.

^{5.} Elites may be defined here as the top influentials in the business and political systems of the respective cities.



Such early writers as Aristotle and Ton-Khaldum asserted the superiority of their own group and the relative inferiority of others. Quite often these writers explained the superiority of the in-group in terms of geographical, climatic, astrological, or "natural" factors.


Religious faith was also in the past a vital factor in in-group and out-group classifications; more recently, race doctrines have served the same purpose. While race doctrines continue to plague inter-group relations in some parts of the world, much current attention has switched to the strongly nationalist vs. internationalist attitudes and aspirations in terms of which groups are differentiating themselves today.

The gravity of the contemporary problem is accentuated by the fact that it becomes daily more difficult for human groups to function as closed systems. Mutual interdependence is one of the outstanding phenomena of our times. But this movement towards interdependence must contend with the ethnocentric ways of man. Whether the individual be Russian, German, American, Mexican, Chinese, or Hottentot, the tendency is for him to see the ways of his culture and nation as "right", and the ways of others as "wrong". 7

From the social psychological point of view this problem may be said to center around the concept of the self as developed by Mead. In Mead's terms the self is a reflexive concept; it refers to the idea that an individual can only become a self by being able to become an object to himself, to see himself as others see him. As Mead developed the idea

^{6.} For a fuller discussion of this point see Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology, Revised Edition, Harper and Bros., N. Y., (1956), p. 656.

^{7.} David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, McGraw-Hill Book Co., N. Y., (1948), p. 595.



the individual gradually develops an image of himself through the constantly repeated processes of role taking, role playing and playing at roles which has its beginnings in early childhood. In the international context most people as representative of national groups have very poorly developed selves; the average American has virtually no idea of how he is perceived by the Russian. Chinese, or Britisher, for example, not does he seem to care particularly. The American has failed to project his self into the International arena. There is no question among Americans about the necessity of the United States controlling the Panama Canal and environs for reasons of National Security, not has there been any hesitance on the part of Americans to condemn and block Russian moves to control the Dardanelles. It was not even difficult for most Americans to condemn Great Britain for attempting to retain control of the Suez Canal. By the same token Americans have in the past been able to condemn what they considered British exploitation of her colonial peoples, and more recently Russia's exploitation of her satellites. At the same time, defending America's business interests in Latin America has been seen as just and proper.

This kind of reasoning is made easy because most people approach problem situations (personal, local, national, or international) with very definite images in their mind about the people involved in the situation. Krech and Crutchfield observe that Americans especially tend to have a high degree of consistency in their stereotyped beliefs about the peoples of the rest of the world, and, while adequate data on other people are lacking, what evidence there is supports the hypothesis that they too act in accord with highly stable stereotyped beliefs. The

^{8. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 596.

popular Americanism that "all furriners" are alike expresses a strongly negative attitude, one tinged with strong nationalist undertones, the idea that our ways are the best ways and the only correct ways.

At first glance, this may appear difficult to understand, as conditions since World War II have seemed propitious for a spirit of internationalism in the United States: military power, economic security, relative prosperity, and the dominant role of the United States in World Affairs in the last fifteen years. Despite all this, internationalist attitudes are not strong.

An explanation for the failure of strong internationalist attitudes to develop in the United States may perhaps be found in the analysis of the problem of inter-group attitudes and behavior by Sherif and Sherif: 10

. . . The Limiting factor in determining favorable or unfavorable intergroup attitudes is the nature of the functional relations between groups. . . If the functional relations between groups are positive, favorable attitudes toward the out-group will be formed. If the functional relations between groups are negative, they will give rise to negative attitudes and stereotypes in relation to the out-group. In time, the attitudes and stereotypes are stabilized in the form of a social-distance scale for various groups and are perpetuated through the vehicle of language, even though the functional relations that gave rise to them are no longer operative.

It may be posited that the present disenchantment of the American people <u>vis</u> a <u>vis</u> all foreigners reflects what to the Americans have been

^{9.} See for example, the Social Science Research Council Study of 1947:

<u>Public Reaction To The Atomic Bomb and World Affairs</u>. The data

clearly show that there was a strong nationalist sentiment pervading
the United States, even at this period when our world prestige was
at its apex. The spirit of nationalism has been on the rise since,
as Americans have become disillusioned by the failure of the Marshall
Plan and the United Nations to produce the expected "miracles."

^{10.} Op. cit., p. 329.



highly unsatisfactory relations, relations which have given stability to the stereotype that "all furriners" are alike.

while the process of creating images and stereotypes is as old as man, its possible significance for understanding interpersonal relations on a national and international level has been of concern to social scientists only in recent years. One of the major interests has been the attempt to find out whether, in fact, stereotyping is a causative factor in the interaction process or merely the symptom of unsatisfactory functional relations between groups.

The concept stereotype was brought into the literature of social science by Walter Lippmann in 1922. 11 As he defined it, a stereotype is an oversimple, fixed, and hence fallacious conception of an individual or group of individuals held by other individuals. More recently, Richter summed up its present usage by sociologists and social psychologists in the following way: "A stereotype . . . is a rigidly established proposition attributing a characteristic to 'all' members of a category. 12 The emphasis on the fixed or rigid quality of the stereotype suggests that it is not amenable to sudden or rapid change. Indeed, much research has been devoted to testing the hypothesis that stereotypes tend to remain stable over time. 13

^{11.} Walter Lippmann, <u>Public Opinion</u>, Harcourt, Brace Co., N. Y., 1922, pp. 29, 79.

^{12.} Maurice N. Richter, Jr., "The Conceptual Mechanism of Stereotyping," in <u>American Sociological Review</u>, Vol. 21, No. 5, October 1956, pp. 568-571.

^{13.} Milton D. Graham, in his study "An Experiment in International Attitudes Research," <u>International Social Science Bulletin</u>, Vol. III, No. 3, Autumn, 1951, a United Nations Publication, found that stereotypes of Americans held by Britishers tended to remain stable over a period of 100 years.



Perhaps because of this definition of the term stereotype, there has been a tendency on the part of researchers in recent years to use the concept images instead of or in conjunction with stereotypes. This is especially true with respect to studies of national groups, and the concept national images has come to replace national stereotypes. The problem of overlapping concepts may be resolved if a stereotype is thought of as an image that is largely distorted and oversimplified, but not necessarily rigid. In this sense it is a sub-type of image.


From the extreme "all 'furriners' are alike" the image may approach an accurate portrayal of social reality, that is, the image which a person has of a "foreigner" may actually correspond to the way in which that foreigner is seen by others and by himself. This is probably as close as an individual can get to social reality. 14

The present study was oriented in terms of national images, as that concept did not imply the prejudgement that the conceptualizations which members of the several sub-systems along the border had of each other were necessarily rigid and not susceptible to change. In reviewing the literature it was found that many of the hypotheses and propositions formulated and tested in the studies on stereotypes would tend to cast doubt on the value of the concept stereotype in its present meaning as defined by Richter. For example James and Tenen tested the hypothesis that stereotypes could be changed by good, personal contacts, and found

^{14.} It is also possible of course that an individual will fail or refuse to develop a conceptualization of a "foreign" individual or group, in which case there will be no image.

^{15.} H. E. O. James and C. Tenen, "Attitudes Toward Other Peoples,"

International Social Science Bulletin, op. cit.



that this indeed was the case. There would seem to be a contradiction in terms here, which could be resolved by using the writer's definition. Where the writer has used the concept stereotype in this study, it should be thought of in this latter sense.

In reviewing the literature on images (stereotypes) the writer has focused on three areas which are relevant to the present study. These are: 1) general propositions and theoretical implications; 2) content of national images, particularly as relevant to the United States and Mexico; and 3) methods of obtaining imagery material, including (a) the sample, and (b) the data gathering instrument. A final section will be devoted to the value orientations of the relevant social systems. Each will be discussed briefly below.

- C An Overview of the Literature with Respect to
- 1) General Propositions and Theoretical Implications;
- 2) Imagery Content; 3) Methods; and 4) Value Orientations
- l) General Propositions and Theoretical Implications. While the literature offers a plethora of ideas and generalizations about stereotypes and images, there are four propositions which seem especially relevant to the present study, either because they bear directly on the hypotheses tested, or because they may suggest some theoretical implications of the findings. Each of the propositions will be discussed in turn.
 - l Images are culturally inherited and transmitted; they are, then, a reflection of one's "reference groups."

Piaget¹⁶ studied a group of Swiss children ages 5 to 13, and through extensive interviews observed the process by which children developed

^{16.} Jean Piaget, assisted by Anne-Marie Weil, "The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of Relations with Other Countries," in <u>International Social Science Bulletin</u>, op. cit.



national images. When queried as to how they came to hold these images they answered invariably that it was what they had heard people say.

He found that a sense of one's own "nationality developed simultaneously with the attribution of different characteristics to other nations."

Freymond¹⁷ made an extensive examination of the images of America held by Europeans and concluded that stereotypes are a function of one's reference groups:

Stereotypes of America differ not only in relation to national prejudices and political ideologies, but also according to the mental cast, so to speak, the frame of mind. Besides the British, French or Italian images of America, there will be, for example, a Communist image, clearly defined in relation to a political policy. But there is also a socialist image, a bourgeois image, and even an intellectual image. (The presumption must be that) one judges others according to one's own personal criteria. 18

That one's images were a resultant of the groups with which one most closely identified oneself was a basic assumption in the present study.

For example, it was assumed that national images would vary according to the nationality and occupational identification of the respondents.


2 - Images of one's self and one's own countrymen are invariably in flattering terms.

This proposition is a commonplace in social psychological literature; it is sufficient to mention Buchanan's 19 nine nation study in support of the proposition. He found a general tendency among respondents of all

^{17.} Jacques Freymond, "America in European Eyes," The Annals, Vol. 295, September 1954, pp. 33-41.

^{18.} Ibid, p. 41.

^{19.} William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations See Each Other, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1953. The nine nations participating in the study were: Australia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Mexico, and The United States.



nine nations to choose the same favorable adjectives to describe themselves. One of the basic hypotheses of the present study was that the
members of the four elite groups would have favorable images of themselves.
Nevertheless, exploratory research did indicate that there might be
certain conditions under which this generalization might not hold. It
will bear further consideration after the findings have been discussed.

3 - The image which an individual has of foreigners tends to vary with the way in which he perceives himself and his own countrymen to be rated by these foreigners.

In his study of a group of foreign students at an American University, Morris²⁰ found that a low rating by Americans did not necessarily mean unfavorable attitudes toward America; it all depended on how closely the student's evaluation, and on his degree of involvement within his own country.

There are several ideas of importance here, some of which are closely related to those expressed in the propositions already cited. In the first place, Morris posited the important notion that a person's nationality did not usually play an important role in the development of his self image if he had lived most of his life within the country and apart from direct international contacts. But when he became a student in an American University, nationality suddenly became an important criterion, perhaps the important criterion, in the determination of his social status and

^{20.} Richard T. Morris, "National Status and Attitudes of Foreign Students,"

<u>Journal of Social Issues</u>, Vol. XII, No. 1, 1956, p. 21. Morris
tested two hypotheses:

l - "The foreign student's image of America varies with his accorded national status, i.e., the student's estimate of how Americans rate his country;

^{2 - &}quot;national status more strongly conditions attitudes if the foreign student identifies and is highly involved in his own country."



and self image. The border situation offered the same kind of opportunity to test the importance of nationality and occupation as factors in the development of self and national images.

In the present study high involvement in the national and occupational systems was assumed and not hypothesized. Nevertheless, as will be shown later, the findings are similar enough to those of Morris to suggest some theoretical implications about this kind of contact.

The Useems²¹ and Lambert and Bressler²² found support for this same proposition in their studies. Lambert and Bressler concluded that:


. . . for amity, contact is not enough, especially if protracted contact serves only to accumulate a series of assaults on the self-esteem of nationals of low status countries. Among other things, friendliness is a function of both personal and cultural security, and only after the viewer has a minimal feeling of security can the hostile elements of an image surrender to a more objective assessment. 23

The important theoretical implications of this proposition would seem to be that better understanding, more accurate images and less stereotyping will come about through increased contact between peoples. But contact alone is not the factor that counts, for contacts that bring assaults on the self-esteem of an individual or national group may impair understanding. Too many contacts between whites and Negroes or Mexicans or between any other in-group vs. out-group combination only tend to reinforce the stereotypes, as when a white drives through a Negro slum

^{21.} Ruth Hill Useem and John Useem, "Images of the United States and Britain Held by Foreign Education Indians," The Annals, op. cit., pp. 73-82.

^{22.} Richard D. Lambert and Marvin Bressler, "Indian Students and the United States," The Annals, op. cit., pp. 62-72

^{23. &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 72.



section and relates the squaler and dirt to the fact that the inhabitants are Negroes. It is only in interaction situations which permit satisfactory²⁴ or status equal contacts that favorable or accurate images can be hoped to form or to replace stereotypes.

The value orientations of such persons as United States soldiers, tourists, students and businessmen have often precluded any possibility of satisfactory contacts occurring with foreign nationals. The implication here is that an individual's images reflect his reference group or groups. Therefore, it may be relevant to know what kinds of structural ties an individual or group of individuals has which may predispose him (it) to one image or another.


One of the important reasons for selecting the business and political elites of El Paso and Cd. Juarez was to test hypotheses about the relationship between the kinds of contacts they had with each other to the images they held of themselves and each other.

4 - There has been considerable theoretical discussion about whether or not images are causative factors in interaction situations, or only sympotomatic of the interaction process. Leighton²⁵ tended to emphasize the important role which stereotypes play in the interaction process, whether on a small group or an international level:

These images are the basis upon which people feel for or against other nations, interpret their behavior as villainous or good, judge their actions, and judge what they themselves as a nation should do in relation to others. . . If the images are false, the resulting action can hardly ever be adequate.

^{24.} A satisfactory contact would be one in which an individual rated himself about as he perceived himself to be rated by the others involved in the contact.

^{25.} Alexander H. Leighton, <u>Human Relations in a Changing World</u>, E. P. Dutton Co., N. Y., 1949, pp. 102-103. Cited by William Buchanan, op. cit., p. 58.



Bulletin cited above implied further support to this notion, for he stated that, "If the people of the world are to learn to live together in peace, they need to know one another better." Evidence to support the contention that stereotypes directly affect interaction was well exemplified by Williams' study on intergroup tensions. 27

On the other hand, Buchanan found evidence for the position that stereotypes are only symptomatic of international relations. After comparing the way in which the stereotype of the Russian had changed between 1942 and 1948, he concluded that the deterioration of Russian-American relations was the main cause. As he stated it, the relations between the two governments led to the formation of the different stereotypes. 28


It will be recalled that one of the general objectives of the border study was to find out in what ways images might act to encourage or impede the rate of technological and social change. An attempt will be made to evaluate the data of this study in terms of its theoretical implications for this problem.

This brief discussion of the literature has suggested a number of hypotheses which may be linked with the more specific hypotheses of the present study. These general hypotheses are:

^{26.} Lambert, op. cit., p. 504.

^{27.} Robin M. Williams, <u>The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: A Survey of Research on Problems of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Group Relations, Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 57, N. Y., 1947.</u>

^{28.} Buchanan, op. cit., p. 57.



- 1 An individual's self image and images of others are a reflection of his reference groups.
- 2 An individual generally has favorable images of himself and of his countrymen.
- 3 An individual's images of others will vary with the way he relates their perceived image of him to his self-image.
- 4 Under certain conditions images will be causative factors in interaction situations.
- 5 Under certain conditions images are symptomatic of the nature of the interaction which has taken place.

These hypotheses will be considered in light of the data of this study in the concluding chapter.

2) Content of national images.

Major concern here is with the various imagery themes which appeared and reappeared in the studies of national images, namely those that have dealt with the way in which the United States, and Americans in general see themselves and are seen by others. Of course, in many cases, the images held of the United States by foreign national groups clearly indicate just what their images are of themselves, in fact may be more revealing of the latter than of the former. (The Indian student who decries the "impersonal American" family is revealing much about the kind of family experiences which were supposedly his.)

For this reason, considerable detail will be devoted to the studies of

^{29.} Comparable studies for Mexico were not found in the literature. In How Nations See Each Other, op. cit., Buchanan stated that the imagery data from Mexico was inadequate for statistical analysis.



Mexican images of the United States in order to be able to imply something about their self-images as well as their images of the United States.

Articles by Beals³⁰ and Humphrey³¹ in <u>The Annals</u> of September, 1954, provide considerable imagery data pertinent to the present research. Both authors commented on the ready acceptance by the Mexicans of the technical and mechanical superiority of the United States, because, as Beals put it "they are convinced of the moral superiority of Mexican culture with its primary emphasis upon spiritual values." 32 Humphrey's statement of the same idea was that ". . . technology as an alleged basis for culture is inferior to poetry, philosophy, and a feeling for art and music, which Mexicans regard as peculiarly Latin concerns . . . The Mexican's image of the American depicts a man of wealth and power, devoid of higher culture and lacking the elements of urbanity." 33

Beals pointed to another image that has previously been noted, namely that ". . . Americans are less egocentric and more sociocentric, more willing to devote themselves to the welfare of society." Again, both writers reported positive images of the political order in the United States. Humphrey stated it this way: "The relative absence of

^{30.} Ralph L. Beals, "The Mexican Student Views the United States,"


The Annals, op. cit., pp. 108-115.

^{31.} Norman D. Humphrey, "The Mexican Image of Americans," The Annals, op. cit., pp. 116-125.

^{32.} Beals, op. cit., p. 108.

^{33.} Humphrey, op. cit., p. 117.

^{34.} Beals, op. cit., p. 109.



graft and the mordida³⁵ creates a favorable imagery," when the Mexican compares the United States with his homeland.³⁶ The problem of discrimination at most causes ambivalent images. Both men reported that the Mexicans they interviewed had suffered little or no personal experiences of prejudice and discrimination and that generally they interpreted American discrimination in "home country" class terms, that is, that "Mexicans are discriminated against because they are poor and ignorant, not because they are Mexicans." Humphrey diverged slightly on this point, however, when he stated that the over-all image of the Mexican vis a vis the United States, and especially Texas "is that of racial bigotry." 38

Beals suggested the source of unfavorable images to lie in three places: 1) American movies, and especially those treating the family life; 2) behavior of tourists and students in Mexico; 3) the sociopolitical environment and historical-intellectual traditions. 39 The War of 1848, Pershing's "Invasion," the Mexican Revolution of 1910, and the failure to resolve the territorial dispute over the "chamizal" area between Juarez and El Paso, all provide ammunition for distorted images, on both sides of the border.


^{35.} The mordida may be translated literally as the bite, or more freely, the pay off. It refers to the fact that in order to proceed through official channels in Mexico you must give a cut or pay off to certain people.

^{36.} Humphrey, op. cit., p. 121.

^{37.} Beals, op. cit., p. 112.

^{38.} Humphrey, op. cit., p. 121.

^{39.} Beals, op. cit., p. 113.



Beals' conclusions about the ways in which favorable images might be expected to develop, closely parallel those already cited above:

*personal contacts seem the primary source for forming favorable impressions. Length of stay, closeness of contacts, and types of interest have much to do with the degree to which images change after arrival . . . Only time and favorable personal contacts can provide opportunities for better understanding.

Humphrey's data led him to state that the Mexican image of the United States was more negative than positive, and his concluding statement was a warning against the kinds of actions that seemed to him to be the cause of this negative imagery: "Any hostile effort, especially American instituted, which impinges on the Mexican's sense of self-worth and personal dignity, will function to perpetuate an unfavorable image of Americans and of American civilization."

Turning to the literature in general, it may be said that these studies reveal "... a series of alternative stereotypes... selected and accepted... to meet ... national and cultural needs..."

The stereotypes and images of America are both positive and negative and will be summarized in that sequence.

On the positive side, Americans are seen as expansive, open-hearted and open minded. 43 The United States is a land of unlimited promise,


^{40.} Beals, op. cit., p. 114.

^{41.} Humphrey, op. cit., p. 125.

^{42.} Richard Lambert, "Foreward to America through Foreign Eyes,"

The Annals, op. cit., p. vii.

^{43.} Jacques Freymond, op. cit., found this image prevailing in Italy.



"God's own country." It is a land from which one can learn much about economic and social order, technological and scientific progress, liberal, democratic family living. The United States is a stable world power characterized by law-abiding citizens who possess good, public manners, and who demonstrate an unusual ability to subordinate their personal interests to the larger interests of the group or the public. They are efficient and enjoy a high educational level as well as great opportunity for achievement and success. Finally, political life is orderly, there is an apparent lack of corruption and the mordida, which, to some foreign nationals at least, is seen as an impressive fact.

Negatively, the following images stood out: America is a powerful, rich country without spiritual values, and Americans are materialistic. dominated by the dollar, with a backward culture. 47 The American family is weak as compared with the more traditional extended family; interaction and functions are limited in scope, and high divorce rates make it a very unstable institution. There is too much concern for the individual and his personality needs, and not enough concern for societal needs (note that this is contradicted by the opposite image of America as socio-centrie). 48


This is the essence of the German image as reported by Norbert Muhlen in "America and American Occupation in German Eyes," The Annals, op. cit., pp. 52-61.

^{45.} See especially John Bennett and Herbert Passin, "The American-Educated Japanese: I and II, The Annals, op. cit., pp. 83-107.

^{46.} Beals, op. cit., and Humphrey, op. cit.

^{47.} Freymond, op. cit.; Useem and Useem, op. cit; Beals, op. cit.; Humphrey, op. cit.

^{48.} Useem and Useem, op. cit., and Humphrey, op. cit.



Politically, Americans are immature indeed, especially in international affairs. American democracy is marked by serious shortcomings, the most notable of which is posed by the race prejudice problem. The two party system, party bosses, vested interest groups, and control of the mass media by the wealthy are seen as deleterious to individual freedom. Finally, as was stated previously, "technology as an alleged basis for culture is inferior to poetry, philosophy and a feeling for art and music . . . " that grappling with the things of the spirit and the soul which so many foreign critics have found lacking in the United States. 50

Americans tend to see themselves as living in the most desirable country in the world. Buchanan found that 96 per cent of Americans polled chose their own country as the one which offered them the best chance of leading the kind of life they wanted to lead. The adjectives they used to describe themselves were, in the order of their frequency: peace loving, generous, intelligent, profressive, hardworking, and brave. 51

The image of the Mexicans is not as adequately developed in the literature, yet some generalizations may be made. Only about half the Mexicans chose their own country as the most desirable, while one-third chose the United States. They generally acknowledge the technical superiority of the United States, but perceive themselves to be superior

^{49.} Lambert and Bressler, op. cit.

^{50.} Freymond, op. cit.; Beals, op. cit.; Rumphrey, op. cit.

^{51.} Buchana, op. cit., pp. 30, 52.

^{52.} Ibid.



in matters of philosophy, art, and poetry.⁵³ In sum, it may be said that the Mexicans are keenly aware of their northern neighbor and have developed their own self-image in part as a result of this, Americans have failed to develop distinctly sharp perceptions and attitudes toward Mexicans.

Since an important objective of the present study is to delineate the content of the national images found on the border, it will be interesting to relate the findings of this study to the images outlined above.

3) Review of methods used in imagery studies. 54


Trom Rice⁵⁵ (1926) to Beals⁵⁶ (1954), it must be observed that more often than any other category of people, students have served as subjects for imagery studies. There are some obvious and some important reasons for this: students are accessible, generally more literate than the average citizen, and by the nature of their activities presumably more likely to be able to express themselves on this particular subject. Time and cost factors are also relevant here as they are for all the other social science studies which have made use of the available students.

^{53.} Beals, op. cit., and Humphrey, op. cit.

^{54.} By "method" is meant the body of techniques (or the technique) by which an investigator bridges the gap between hypothesis and the problem areas with which his study is concerned.

^{55.} Stuart Rice, "Stereotypes: A Source of Error in Judging Human Character," <u>Journal of Personnel Research</u>, 1926, 5: 268-276.

^{56.} Beals, on cit.



Of sourse, some of the studies of student images were carried out for the explicit purpose of evaluating the government sponsored student exchange program. 57 Here there is an immediate practical concern with students as ambassadors of good will, and of finding out just what the images of others are.

There has been a trend towards broader sampling in recent years, such as in the UNESCO⁵⁸ and other studies, but in these cases the major data gathering instrument relied on has been the word and phrase trait lists, which lists were were also quite commonly used in the student studies. This technique limits one to what Buchanan aptly calls a "flash impression," in which the findings are very narrowly restricted by the words chosen. This restriction may in fact force stereotyping. Recent trends towards quided and depth interviews, while more costly and time consuming, and more difficult to administer, may provide data of more long-range significance to stereotype and image analysis. Graham's 61 use of content analysis for setting up a research design,

^{57.} Bennett and Passin, op. cit.

^{58.} Buchanan, op. cit. Approximately 1000 persons in each of nine different countries were polled, using a common questionnaire.

^{59.} See for example the study of Daniel Katz and Kenneth W. Braly, "Verbal Stereotypes and Race Prejudice," in Readings in Social Psychology, Revised edition, ed. Guy Swanson et al., Henry Holt Co., N. Y., 1952, pp. 67-73.

^{60.} In 1950 G. M. Gilbert repeated the Katz and Braly study of Princeton students using a larger sample but otherwise following the same techniques. In his report "Stereotype Persistence and Change Among College Students," <u>Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology</u>, 46: 251 ff., 1951, he stated that there was a recognition on the part of the students that the word lists were forcing them to make oversimplified generalizations, which they were reluctant to do.

^{61.} Milton D. Graham, op. cit.



and his technique of following up the use of questionnaires with intensive group discussions is an extreme example in this regard.

Finally, as an example of research that has focused on a specific hypothesis to be tested in an experimental situation, the study by James and Tenen bears mention here. To test the hypothesis that good personal contacts change stereotypes, the authors secured the assistance of two African Negro women school teachers who were fluent in English and "first-rate teachers, and whose personalities were such that good personal relations with students were probable. They were asked to participate in the experiment with each one having charge of a class of about 30 boys and girls in the same school for a "fortnight." Four non-directive interviews were carried out with each pupil, two before and two after the experience of having the African teachers. The interviews were spread five weeks apart to discover whether or not significant differences in attitudes developed over time; the only focus of the interviews was that the pupils were encouraged to talk about other peoples. The results showed that there was a definite significant difference in attitudes between the before and after interviews. but no significant difference between either the two before or the two after interviews, and no diminution in the attitudes after, even after a lapse of five weeks. The change in attitudes was in the favorable direction.

As will be brought out in detail in Chapter II, the present study has aimed at depth rather than the "flash impression" yielded by adjective lists and questionnaires administered to groups of students or large samples of national groups. To some extent it parallels the type of study done by Graham in its use of historical data, and content analysis,

^{62.} James and Tenen, op. cit.



and in a limited way follows the pattern used by James and Tenen of focusing the study on action situations involving institutionalized patterns of behavior most relevant to the social systems concerned. The present study would seem to go well beyond previous research in that it involves the use of intensive, guided interviews developed out of exploratory research and aimed at testing hypotheses about images relevant to the particular social systems with which the subjects are primarily identified.

The final section in the review of literature is devoted to a brief summary of prevalent ideas about the value orientations of Mexican and American social systems; this summary is necessary to make possible the development of specific hypotheses about national images in terms of the social systems involved in the study.

4) Value orientations of Mexican and American Social Systems. The researchers 63 came to the border area with the notion that Mexico and the United States formed two essentially different socio-cultural systems, and that these differences would be apparent in the behavior and attitudes, images and evaluations of the actors in the cities on either side of the border. There would seem to be ample evidence for this orientation in the literature, from which only a few examples are

^{63.} Professor William H. Form directed the exploratory phase of the project at the research site from September through December, 1954. The writer worked closely together with him during this time.



cited here: Davis⁶⁴, Tannenbaum⁶⁵, Troncoso⁶⁶, Tonnies⁶⁷, Parsons⁶⁸, Northrop⁶⁹, Williams⁷⁰, De Los Rios⁷¹. The important generalizations may be summarized very briefly as follows:

1 - Latin American societies are integrated by a network of affective, ascriptive, particularistic relationships. In contrast, American society owes its integration primarily to relationships which are more affectively neutral, achievement oriented and universalistic.

^{64.} Kingsley Davis, "Political Ambivalence in Latin America," in Readings in Latin American Social Organization and Institutions, ed. by C. P. Loomis and O. Leonard, Michigan State Press, 1953.

^{65.} Frank Tannenbaum, "Personal Government in Mexico," in Readings in Latin American Social Organization and Institutions, op. cit.

^{66.} Moises P. Troncoso, "The Social Content of Latin American Constitution," in Readings in Latin American Social Organization and Institutions, op. cit.


^{67.} Ferdinand Tonnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Tr. and Ed. by Charles P. Loomis, Michigan State University Press, 1957. Tonnies called the United States "the most modern and gesellschaft-like state." p. 221.

^{68.} Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1951. The United States and Latin America were presented as characterizing opposite tendencies of the pattern variables of value orientation, i.e., the United States was more achievemental, universalistic, affectively neutral orientation, while Latin America was more ascriptive, particularistic and affective, pp. 182-199.

^{69.} Filmer S. C. Northrop, in <u>The Meeting of East and West</u>, MacMillan Co., N. Y., 1946, depicted Mexican culture as being distinctly different from that of the United States.

^{70.} Robin Williams, American Society, A. Knopf Co., N. Y., 1955; see especially Chapter 11, "Value Orientations in American Society."

^{71.} Fernando de Los Rios, "Remarks on Intellectual Life in South America," in <u>Social Research</u>, vol. 10: 100-117 (February 1943). The author concluded that the value systems of South Americans "are based on aesthetics, ethics and religion rather than on economics."




- 2 Kinship relationships overlap institutional boundaries in Latin America. In the United States, the nuclear type family predominates, and the focus of its attention is the home.
- 3 The "office" as such is not important in Latin America because of numbers 1 and 2 above. The opposite is true of the United States where the "office" is held to be generally free of the ties suggested by numbers 1 and 2.
- 4 In Latin America political power is centered in a few caudillos or "strong men" who rule through personal power for their own gain. On the other hand, the United States is thought of as a land of law and not of men.
- 5 Business itself is still very much a family affair in Latin America, neither well organized nor well developed, and primary interest still centers in ownership of land. By contrast, there is no place in the world where business has reached a higher point of bureaucratic development than in the United States. Latin Americans are concerned primarily with aethetics and religion, while North Americans are primarily devoted to economics.

With these generalizations in mind we may now consider their implications in terms of "social identifications" or "social references." By these terms is meant any individual or group whose perspective constitutes the actor's frame of reference. That is to say, the norms of an individual or group serve as anchoring points in structuring the actor's perceptual field. In this particular case we may expect that actors within the Mexican national system (taken as the group) will have images of themselves and of others which reflect the

^{72.} See Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, An Outline of Social

Psychology, Revised Ed., Harper and Bros., N. Y., 1956. See
also Robert K. Merton and Alice Kitt, "Contributions to the
Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in Readings in Social

Psychology, ed. by G. Swanson et al, Revised Ed., Holt, N. Y.,
1952.



gemeinschaft-like orientations attributed to the Mexican system, if the Mexican system is their main social reference.

The problem of this study, of course, is not to determine whether in fact Mexico is or is not more gemeinschaft-like than the United States. but rather to determine the degree to which images held by actors in social systems that are propinquitous but theoretically different actually approach the theoretically expected patterns. That is, do Mexicans see themselves as gemeinschaft-like while they see their American counterparts as being gesellschaft-like? And further, do Americans who are in constant contact with Mexicans in highly structured situations generally involving statue-equal interaction, (e.g., bank managers getting together to work out exchange problems. Chamber of Commerce presidents consulting on the problem of tourism. or the city mayors trying to develop a mutually satisfactory sanitary program) have images of Mexico and Mexicans which are gemeinschaft-like in their orientation, at the same time do the see themselves as being gesellschaftlike? Do Americans distinguish between Mexicans as a result of contact. that is, are the orientations of the business system in Mexico seen as being different from the Mexican political system?

It should be recognized that certain historical factors would prevent Mexico from approaching anything like a "pure" type or of being considered as typical of the general Latin American pattern. The avowed aims of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 were to bring social reform and equal justice to all Mexicans, and the accomplishment of these aims is still the central theme of the dominant political party. This would seem to require a more gesellschaft-like system. At the same time American businessmen have invested heavily in Mexico, a fact


which at least in the last ten years has began to have considerable influence on Mexican businessmen. Therefore, Mexican society, at least as regards business and politics must be considered in something of a state of transition. This fact may be expected to produce a certain amount of conflict as individuals learn to interact in more gesellschaft-like ways. The question posed here is whether or not this in fact appears to be the case when comparative images are called for, both within and across national boundaries. With this general orientation as a background, we turn now to the problem of this study.

C. The Problem of This Research

The present study is a report on the findings of research on national images which was carried out along the United States-Mexico border during the academic year 1954-1955. The general orientation to the problem has already been strongly emphasized in the previous paragraphs, to wit, that the kinds of images that individuals hold of themselves and of other individuals and national groups, will depend in part at least on the nature, extent, direction, and degree of contacts they have with others, as well as on their own national and occupational identification.

The border as a research site was found to afford an excellent opportunity for the study of national images as these might be affected and influences by daily interaction of individuals from two allegedly different socio-cultural systems.

^{73.} For details on the historical background of Mexico, see Hudson Strode, <u>Timeless Mexico</u>, Harcourt, Brace Co., N. Y., 1944. Also see William P. Tucker, <u>The Mexican Government Today</u>, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1957.




More specifically, the data for this study were gathered by intensive, guided interviews of the business and political elites of two neighboring border cities. These elites are the top men in the business and political systems of their respective cities. Exploratory research revealed that these elites engaged in extensive interaction with each other, more or less as "status equals," thus suggesting the probability or at least possibility of satisfying contacts resulting for the participants.

The elites comprise four distinct categories which will hereafter be referred to as "groups" under the following classification: El Paso business elites, El Paso political elites, Cd. Juarez business elites, and Cd. Juarez political elites.

The research encompasses three major objectives:

- 1 description and analysis of the business and political elite structures in the two cities.
- 2 analysis of the interpersonal relations occurring between the elites of the two cities, and the possible relationship between contact and national images.
- 3 a comparative study of the national images of these elite groups based on the variables of nationality and occupation.

In order to study the national images of elites in such a cross-cultural setting, one must first designate who are the elites. The first major objective, therefore, is that of uncovering the elites. The objective includes the following: (a) analysis of the results of the voting of respondents and judges as to who the elites are; (b) social background data on the elite groups; and (c) analysis of the nature and degree of functional interpenetration of the elite groups within each city. There will also be a comparative analysis of the power structures,



and finally an attempt to relate the power structures to the generalizations about value orientations.

The second objective is to analyze the various ways in which these elites meet in interpersonal relationships. The concern here is to get a clear picture of interpersonal contacts of the elites both within each city and between cities. Hypotheses concerning the extent of cross-cultural contact and nature of national images will be tested.

The third major objective is to describe and analyze the national images held by these elites of themselves and of each other. In this section the hypotheses to be tested will be concerned with the relationship between the variables of national and occupational identification and national images.

Thus, in considering the objectives of this research it may be said that it goes beyond previous research into national images in giving special emphasis to the importance of proximity and constant interaction involving "status equals." For example, there is much contact at all levels of group activity in the border area and strongly held images within these groups. Exploratory research revealed that most of these images were stereotypic in nature, generally involving superordinate — subordinate contact relations, e.g., the Anglo foreman and the Mexican workers in a textile plant. This is an important problem in itself but it was bypassed in favor of the present study for reasons that will be made clear in the following chapter.

D. An Overview of the Present Study

Chapter II is devoted to a discussion of the methodological problems involved in the development of the Research. This includes the development




of the hypotheses; the nature of the exploratory research and the way in which the imagery themes developed; selection and validation of the groups to be studied; development of the interview schedule; collection of the data; and techniques for the analysis of the data.

Chapter III is concerned with the following: 1) an overview of the research site and a brief sketch of the relevant historical background; and 2) delineation and analysis of the power structures of the two cities, including a comparison of the elites chosen by offices (occupations), and the ways in which the power structures are different and similar.

In Chapter IV the nature and extent of interpersonal relations on an international level between the elites of the two cities are examined. A rough "index of contact" is constructed to test the hypothesis that one elite group (the Juarez businessmen) have more cross-cultural contact than any other elite group. Tests of hypotheses relating national images to extent of contact will follow.

Chapter V will be devoted to testing hypotheses relating images of businessmen and business practices with the elite groups employing their national and occupational identifications as variables. Chapter VI will be devoted to testing hypotheses relating images of government officials and political practices with the elite groups, again employing their national and occupational identification as variables. The last chapter will be devoted to summary and conclusions.

Hopefully, a study of the imagery that elites of neighboring cities in different national systems have of each other will enable a later study of how technological interchange is affected by these images.



CHAPTER II

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

A. Development of the Hypotheses.

The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the guiding hypotheses of this study and the methodological procedures that were followed to test these hypotheses. The previous chapter presented the major objectives of this study and the general orientation which acted as a guidepost in the development of a research design to achieve the objectives. Let us proceed now to the development of the hypotheses.

From the statements on basic theory we may draw the proposition that in a gesellschaft-like society, that is, in a society in which universalistic, achievemental, affectively neutral orientations to action are stressed, there will be closer integration of such highly enacted organizations as business and political systems than in a gemeinschaft-like society, because of the tendency of both business and political systems to become rationalized and harmonious to each other under these conditions.

In predominantly gemeinschaft-like society where highly enacted social systems have only recently come into being, and are in fact only in an emergent state, these will more likely be in conflict because of the differences in the two patterns of value orientations with which the systems are trying to work. Thus, the business and political systems in Mexico are involving their members in the process of exchanging the dominance of one set of orientations for another. Conflict may be expected both within and between the business and political systems in Mexico, because of a differential rate of change.


These two propositions must now be considered in conjunction with the notion that a "national image" is a generalization concerning the members of some national group, which image may be the result of direct contact and interaction between the image bearer and some member or members of the national group under consideration, or may be the product of stereotypes in which direct contact has been lacking, or it may be the result of both. When we add the generalization that members of a national group tend to hold favorable images of themselves and their own group or groups, plus the fact that contacts between members of different groups that do not deprecate the self-esteem of the individual and his national group, but rather may involve a recognition of status equality for him and his group, then the following guiding hypotheses may be stated for this study:

1 - American business and American political elites will have favorable images of themselves and of each other, as individuals and as groups.

The process of rationalization of the business and political structures in the United States has proceeded at a rapid pace, and there is much evidence to suggest that this hypothesis has a strong basis in fact. Hunter's study¹ of Regional City depicts the business and political systems as comprising almost a single integrated entity. Or again, Williams² notes "how thin" is the line that separates the political from the business in American Life today, pointing out the necessity of close cooperation between the two systems in a society marked by ever increasing specialization and bureaucratic control and a popular sharing

^{1.} Floyd Hunter, <u>Community Power Structure</u>, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1953.

^{2.} Robin Williams, American Society, Knopf Co., New York, 1956.



of the same value orientations.

2 - American business and political elites will have generally negative images of Mexican business and political elites, the degree of negativeness varying with the situation and with the nature of the contact.

The most negative images are those held of the Mexican political elites. Here the American image is supported first by the nationally held notion that the American system is the best in the world, and secondly, by contacts, rumors, and heresay about what Mexico and Mexicans are like. The Revolutionary government has been strongly nationalistic and has refused to permit economic exploitation of Mexico on the pre-revolutionary basis; this factor may be expected to lead to negative images. Historical factors and long held stereotypes are only now beginning to be superceded by the kinds of contacts which may bring forth favorable or accurate images.

3 - Mexican business and political elites will have generally favorable images of themselves and of each other.

The elites of the two systems share the same value orientations which emphasize affective, particularistic and familistic relationships. However, examination of the literature revealed something of an historical struggle culminated in The Revolution of 1910 and the establishment of a revolutionary party bent on large scale social reform. The achievement of the specific goals would seem to require a more gesellschaft-like orientation. While the focus of attention of the revolutionary party (The Partido Revolucionario Institucional) has been largely nationalistic, the focus of attention of business has become more and more international.

^{3.} It should be recognized here that a negative image may be an accurate one whereas a favorable one may be stereotypic. To the degree that the image is a gross distortion of reality it is stereotypic.



In effect, this has meant a differential rate of change in which business has more rapidly become more rational, achievemental, universalistic and affectively neutral. This fact has tended to increase the tension and conflict between members of the two systems and prevented the kind of integration which has been found in the United States. It would appear that the ideal of a business-dominated or oriented government is not a goal of the Mexican political elites, while it is a goal of the Mexican business elites. The revolutionary leaders see the businessmen are reactionaries who would return the people to peonage. For their part the businessmen distrust the political leaders and question their motives.

These factors force a modification of the guiding hypothesis in the following way: While the Mexican business and political elites will tend to have favorable images of themselves, they will tend to have negative images of each other. However, since the Mexican businessmen and political leaders are imbued with many of the same values by virture of their common heritage, their images of each other will not be as negative as will be the general American image of the respective Mexican systems.

4 - Mexican business and political elites will tend to have negative images of American business and political elites.

Since their value orientations differ so sharply interaction between the groups will tend to be strained. Furthermore, historical factors have made the Mexicans hostile and suspicious of Americans in general. At the same time, it might be expected that the images which the Mexican businessmen hold might be less unfavorable, at least to the extent that they have become more international and universalistic in their orientation. Since a major concern of political systems is boundary maintenance, and the Mexican system has been consistently concerned with this vis a



vis. The United States over the years, the images held by the political elites toward the United States will be more negative. The apparent business orientation of American government may also be a contributing factor here.

It was with these guiding hypotheses in mind that we proceeded with the initiation of inquiry. In the next section we will consider the method used to test these hypotheses. As will be seen, it became necessary to modify and reformulate these hypotheses as a result of the early phases of inquiry. This reformulation led to the specific hypotheses which will appear in their proper places in succeeding chapters.

B. Method.

By the concept method is meant here the complex of techniques by means of which a hypothesis or series of hypotheses may be tested by relating it (them) to a selected portion of the external world. The following techniques were used to gather the data necessary to test the hypotheses of this study: (a) exploratory research, including observation, content analysis of local newspapers, and broadly focused interviews; (b) development of a formal interview schedule; (c) development of a technique for choosing subjects to be interviewed; (d) administration of interviews; (e) analysis of the data. Each of these techniques will be discussed in detail below.


J. Exploratory research. With the general objectives of the project outline in mind, the metropolitan area of El Paso, Texas, and Juarez, Chihuahua, was chosen as the first site for the five year study. This area was chosen because of the large size of the two cities, the known fact of very high interaction rates between members of both cities,



and the fact that both cities were experiencing a very rapid rate of technological change. Both cities were known to possess bureaucratic structures sufficiently well developed to make fruitful analysis of them possible. All in all, the cities seemed to offer a fruitful area for investigation. Exploratory research covered from the beginning of September to the early part of December, with the main objective being to become as well acquainted with the research site as possible. This meant obtaining data on such factors as the comparative nature of the several social systems (e.g., religious, educational, labor, political, business) of the two cities; extent, nature, and direction of contacts between members of the various systems; comparative land use patterns; evidences of technological borrowing and/or interchange; existence of stereotyped images.

Observation. The technique of observation was used both on a casual and a rather formal basis. By casual is meant that the researchers merely observed the interaction patterns as he traversed through one and the other city, and made notes on these and on other observations such as land use, treatment of individuals at the inspection points on the international bridges, and general shopping habits of the people, particularly the juarenses shopping in El Paso and the tourists in Cd.

Juarez. On the more formal level, the city planner of E.P., and one of the leading contractors of Juarez were called on to provide guided tours through certain sections of their respective cities. Conversations elicited during these tours generally provided valuable background data. Luncheons, lectures, and other civic events were attended when formal inwitations were received. There was no attempt to give definite structure or statistical orientation to these observations.



Content analysis. Since there were important daily newspapers published in both cities, it was necessary to spend considerable time every day in carefully examining the papers for data which might prove of value. Subscriptions to the major dailies of each city were carried from September of 1954 through November of 1955, thus considerably overlapping the time span of this study. Special scrap books were kept of all articles dealing with inter-city activities, or intra-city activities which had international overtones; such articles ranged from summaries of the meetings of the International Chamber of Commerce Committee, to editorials on the mayoralty campaign in El Paso, the varied accounts of the struggle between the Juarez Municipal government and a group of Juarez businessmen, to articles implying or stating negative or positive images of one or the other national systems. Many of these articles served as the foundation for questions in the exploratory interviews, and in the interview schedule that was finally developed.

Exploratory interviews. Doubtless the most important source of background data was the exploratory interviewing. It was necessary to find out in what ways these guiding hypotheses seemed to be relevant to this fairly large metropolitan area, for although it was well known that there was a great deal of interaction between the individuals in the several social systems, it was not known a priori just what the nature, extent, direction and importance of this interaction might be. The problem was to find social systems (particularly the business and political) which were consciously accepting or rejecting technological change or otherwise involved in the process, and further, to find interaction situations which demonstrated the importance in one way or another of contact in the development of national images, and the subsequent effects

of these images on interaction patterns.

The problem was met by interviewing the following people: members of the faculty at Texas Western College in El Paso, who provided considerable background information of value, and graciously offered their time and facilities; the mayor and other officials in both cities; presidents and other members of the Chamber of Commerce in both cities; leaders in finance, commerce, and industry in both cities; several small store owners; and labor, religious and educational leaders in both cities.

For the most part those holding formally recognized positions of importance were chosen, (a) because it was felt that in general they would have more international contacts than the average citizen, (b) because it was expected that contacts between such persons would more nearly approach "status equality" than contacts at other levels, and (c) because it seemed almost of necessity that technological change as conceived in the general objectives would involve the leaders of the two cities. In light of all the data that was gathered, it appears that point (a) above is in need of modification since the average citizen of Juarez spends 80% of his earnings in El Paso, and between 60-70% of the population of El Paso is Spanish-speaking, with almost every family having some relatives living in Mexico. Also to be considered here is the fact that between 15-20% of the working force of Juarez works daily in El Paso. The kind of technological change and image development that all this implies cannot be guessed at here.


Point (b) seemed to hold for at least the majority of leaders interviewed, especially for the ones chosen for the final study. Certainly the 11,000 or more Juarez residents who work daily in El Paso do not work under conditions of status equality, as they hold the most menial jobs.

In fact, several business leaders remarked that "Anglos" in El Paso refused to work in factories and department stores where they would be occupying positions similar to those held by Mexicans. No data at all was gathered on the nature of visiting patterns at other than leadership levels, simply because of lack of time and the fact that the exploratory interviews had quickly revealed an area for research which fitted the gene al objectives of the project and the particular interests of the researcher.

While it became clear from the data that as suggested by point (c) above the leaders are involved in the technological changes that are taking place on the border, they are not the only ones so involved. This study made no attempt to compare the role of the leaders versus the average citizen in this important process, although it is the researcher's impression that the role of the average Juarez citizen at least is an important one.

In the introductory meeting between the researchers and the proposed respondent, the researchers very simply explained the project as one aimed at understanding the nature of international relations on our border. It was explained that we were interested in learning about the kinds of contacts that took place between Mexicans and Americans, and the way that people felt about them. It was suggested that their own experiences in international relations might make possible some insights into


^{4.} The researcher was fairly fluent in Spanish, and so was able to converse directly with the Spanish-speaking leaders of Juarez. His Masters thesis had dealt with the political philosophy of the Mexican Revolution, and he had an extensive background in Latin American studies. Besides, he had previously studied and travelled in Mexico, paying particular attention to the political and economic aspects of Mexican life. Thus, his interests early came to focus on the political and business leaders of the two cities.



how to improve international relations in general. We were approaching the leaders because it was assumed that they would know more about the situation than the average citizen. Most of these respondents were very happy to be of help.


The exploratory interviews were very general and broad and open ended in nature, and respondents were encouraged to speak at length on any matters that they considered important. Such specific questions as were asked were the result of hints from the guiding hypotheses, content analysis of the newspapers, observations, previous interviews, or the researchers' general knowledge about the stereotyped images commonly held by Mexicans and Americans of each other. The aim in each case was to get a clear picture of the extent of contact between members of particular sub-systems, the existence of conscious or planned technological changes or borrowing, and the nature of national images held by various leaders, and finally, the possible effect of these images on interaction.

The major findings of this exploratory phase of the study may be summarized as follows: practically no formal or informal contacts existed between leaders of labor, education, and religion in both cities; this is especially surprising for religion since the Catholic Church is numerically predominant in both cities. Special historico-political problems in Mexico during the last 100 years are at least in part an explanation for the lack of contact among these leaders. In the case of education and labor, the value orientations of the leaders and their systems were so different as to almost preclude any significant contacts. Both education and labor are closely tied in with the political system in Mexico, and leaders in El Paso were frank to admit their hesitancy about attempting any close interchange of ideas or activities under these circumstances.



On the other hand, it was found that there were both extensive and intensive, formal and informal contacts between leaders in the political and business systems, contacts that cut across all four systems. That is, political leaders in both cities had formal and informal contacts with each other and with the business leaders of both cities. There was only little evidence of consciously directed technological interchange, however. It seemed that such change as took place as a result of these contacts was not generally recognized as such. A typical example of this may be cited here: one of the leading bankers of Juarez, a man who was highly respected by El Paso leaders, was recommending to the researcher that the latter should make a trip to Chihuahua City to see what a typical Mexican city was like. "We, in Juarez," he said, "are always in a hurry, we're always rushing around. Chihuahua City is much more relaxed."


- l the fact that good contacts had been established with business and political leaders in both cities:
- 2 the fact that a mayoralty campaign was approaching for El Paso, one in which both business and political leaders of the city were getting involved:
- 3 the fact that a bitter struggle had erupted in Juarez between a group of top business leaders and the municipal government leaders over business, civic and political affairs and how they should be run;
- 4 the fact that there was a high rate of interaction among the leaders concerning business and political matters, especially trying to arrive at satisfactory relations in business and political matters of an inter-city nature, and also the many banquets and other events held for "Good Neighbor" purposes;
- 5 the fact that the leaders as a whold were a highly literate group, with definite but varying national images and attitudes, which for the most part they were willing to discuss;
- 6 the fact that the cities were of such size that groups of leaders within the various systems large enough for some sort of statistical analysis could be delineated.



7 - the above factors suggested that images of the two national systems, which might be latent under other circumstances, could be expected to become clearly focused under these conditions. In other words, the course of events in both cities seemed to offer an ideal setting for contrasting images and attitudes about social systems which theorists and others had long held to be so different.

Hence, the research design became formally focused on a study of the nature and extent of the interaction between the images held by the "elites" of business and government in El Paso and Cd. Juarez, as well as the particular elite structures themselves. The images were to center mainly on selected aspects of social action within these social systems. While the guiding hypotheses seemed to be supported in general by the data, it was found necessary to modify them somewhat, in line with factors which were at least operating along the border. For example, relations between all the elites seemed to be much more friendly than had been anticipated, and this seemed to effect the images. These factors will be covered in more detail in subsequent pages.

Emergence of the major imagery themes. As stated above, the techniques of observation, content analysis, and interviewing were used to obtain initial information about the border setting; the researcher also had a considerable fund of knowledge about commonly held images of Mexicans and Americans which were included in the exploratory interviews wherever possible. In each interview the respondent was asked a few questions about his personal background (e.g., age, education) and then very broad questions relating his particular occupation to the border setting. For example, a banker was asked to explain the different kinds of banking problems that had to be faced in this international situation and how they might differ from strictly national problems. Respondents were encouraged to speak at length on whatever they deemed important, in



their own particular situation, in international relations in general, or on what they thought we should know about Mexico and Mexicans, or America and Americans (more usually Texas and Texans). The interview was always conducted in the language which the respondent preferred.

As interviewing continued, the interviews became more directed in nature, as our fund of knowledge built up, and we came to see certain images and problems as central and tried to focus on them, but always allowing and encouraging the respondent to give us all the time he wanted to.

Some of the following images became quite common: "America is the land of opportunity; "businessmen andpolitical officials get along very well; honesty and effort pay off; if you pay your taxes you never have to worry about the government. On the other side, Mexico was seen as a land torn by conflict between liberals and conservatives, the conservatives usually being allied with the businessmen; family name meant everything, and one was either rich or poor and that was all there was to it. This strongly held image of Mexicans as being either rich or poor with no in-between has a long historical tradition to it, which seemed to be well known on both sides of the border. Comparative images were also in evidence, e.g., "Mexicans are loyal citizens, just like us," or "They have a different system of business ethics; I wouldn't say that ours is better; it is just different." Or again, "As a rule, the businessman in Mexico is against the government; it is just the opposite in the United States." It was on the basis of such data as these that the interview schedule was developed. (The Interview Schedule is reprinted in full in Appendix A.)

These images were generally in accord with those found in the literature about Mexicans and Americans (Cf. Chapter I above). The fact that there was such a strong similarity between the Mexican image of Americans and those images of Americans held by Europeans and Asians found in the literature and delineated in Chapter I raises some interesting questions about images in general and stereotypes in particular, which, while beyond the scope of this study, may be noted in passing. Is there an international distribution of national images, especially stereotyped ones? Does the fact of their similarity imply that more than a "Kernel of Truth" runs through them all? Are they the results of similar or dissimilar kinds of contacts?

2. <u>Development of the Interview Schedule</u>. The interview schedule was gradually developed out of the results of the more than two months of exploratory research, with the questions designed to test specific hypotheses derived from the guiding hypotheses listed above.

The schedule was divided into three parts: part one consisted of questions on personal background (e.g., age, education, occupation, the nature and extent of actual contacts with members of the other systems under study and evaluation of these contacts); part two consisted of questions dealing with the economic system, and included comparative questions on the systems as they functioned within the national systems as a whole and within the two cities; and part with the political systems of the two countries, particularly as they compared with each other.


^{5.} E. Terry Prothro, and L. H. Melikian in "Studies in Stereotypes: V. Familiarity and The Kernel of Truth Hypothesis," from <u>Journal of Social Psychology</u>, 41:3-10 (Feb. '55), considered this problem at some length, and suggested that much research is needed in the field before any conclusions can be drawn.



The interview schedule was sent to the Department of Sociology and Anthropology for critical comment and suggested changes. At the same time it was submitted to several professional people at Texas Western College who were sufficiently well acquainted with the situation to be able to offer helpful advice and suggestions. Finally, the schedule was pre-tested on both sides of the border and among members of all four social systems, and the Spanish translation was carefully checked for accuracy. All respondents were asked to criticize the schedule in any way they saw fit and to make recommended changes of improvements. major changes or questions were added because of this. The most severe problem posed by the schedule after all necessary changes had been made was its length; it was found to require from one and one-half to two hours to complete, and there was some question raised as to whether the respondents would be willing to give us that much time. Actually, of the nearly two hundred interviews that were completed less than five people complained about the length, and the great majority of the interviews were closer to two hours in length.

3. Selection and validation of the subjects to be interviewed.

With the hypotheses and the questions designed to test them all spelled out, the next problem was to decide exactly the size and nature of the groups to whom the study was to be administered. The decision to study the images and contacts of the business and political elites still left open the question of who were the elites. The technique of using a random sample of the known list of businessmen and political or governmental leaders was avoided because it was felt that such a list so derived would not meet the peculiar needs of this study as it had been set forth.




So instead, a modification of the technique used by Hunter⁶ to get the power structure of "Regional City" was adopted.

From the beginning, each person interviewed was asked to give several names of people most influential in the affairs of his city as well as the names of a few people he might know to be influential in the other city. All names thus received were carefully kept on cards indicating the names. Master lists were also kept, so that it was easily possible to know who had been named and how often.

Before the interview schedule was put into its final form it was found necessary to modify and redefine this question somewhat. It had become apparent that in asking merely for the names of some of the more influential people we were not always being provided with the names we wanted. Since we were desirous of having the universe of top business and political elites in order to insure a maximum possible comparability of data about status equals and their contacts, and since the question as originally posed did not make specific reference either to businessmen or political leaders, it often occurred that so called "social" and "civic" leaders not connected with either of these systems were included. So the original question was revised into two questions on the final schedule as follows: at the end of the section of questions on business, the question was asked: "Will you please give us the names of the most influential businessmen in _____ city? (or Whom do you consider to be some of the most influential businessmen in _____ city?)

At the end of the section on politics and government, the question was asked: "Would you please give us a list of names of the people who

^{6.} Hunter, op.cit. Appendix: "Methods of Study."



are and have been the most influential in the government and politics


of _____ city in recent years?" This question was followed by:

"Can you give us the names of a few people who have the greatest influence and power in ____ city (i.e., the one across the border)?"

By the time that the exploratory phase of the study had be completed, between 15 and 20 elites in each city had been clearly identified, and these were interviewed first. An individual was selected to be interviewed as an elite when his name was given by three elites themselves. In some cases the researcher interviewed individuals who were only mentioned once or twice, if it seemed that the individual occupied a strategic position in one of the systems which was not generally recognized by the elites. The researchers were always aware of the danger of certain cliques only naming themselves; the researchers were satisfied that they were able to identify all such cliques and that such a situation did not arise. A small group of individuals did stand out above the rest, and received most of the votes; in many cases they were individuals who were completely opposed to each other. Below this small group was a long list of names of individuals many of whom received only one or two votes. The lists themselves will be carefully analyzed in Chapter III. Towards the end of the study it became apparent that there were more or less two distinct groups within each elite system, the real "tops" and the more or less "knowledgeables". Hunter⁸ made

^{7.} Some of the people who were interviewed in the exploratory phase also became part of the final sample, and thus were interviewed twice. There was a lapse of at least five weeks in all such cases. The only questions emitted were those dealing with factual background data which had already been obtained. Responses to similar questions did not change.

^{8.} Hunter, op.cit., Appendix.



the same finding, only he called his second group the sub-elites whereas they are labelled knowledgeables in this study. The knowledgeables were the members of the systems under study who were closely related to the tops and their activities, but who clearly did not enjoy the same amount of influence as the tops did. On the other hand, in some cases, they seemed to have an even clearer view of the power structure and the problems of international contacts than the top elite did. In other cases, they served as front men for the tops, who used their influence from the shadows. Actually, three groups were asked to choose the elites of their respective communities: The businessmen elite, political elite, and knowledgeables.

In order to attempt to validate this list of elites beyond the researcher's own evaluation of it, the writer made up a number of separate lists of names of all those chosen, and submitted the lists to several judges in both cities. The judges were individuals whom the researcher had come to recognize as having extensive knowledge about the situation and a reasonable ability at objective analysis. (Objectivity became extremely important on a conscious level when one of the leading businessmen of Juarez was approached and asked to be a judge; his dislike of the political leaders was so intense that he just couldn't get himself to acknowledge that any of them had any influence.) Each judge was asked to select in order of their influence, in so far as this was possible, the top twenty elites in each system as labelled on the list, and if need by, to add names of individuals who should have been listed

^{9.} They were labelled knowledgeables because we used them to provide us knowledge and not as representatives of secondary elites, which they were. Thus, we have no systematic sample of secondary elites.



and weren to There was remarkable agreement between the choices of these judges and the overall vote, as well as the evaluation of the researcher himself.

In essence, then, the individuals chosen for this study are the elites of their respective systems insofar as the technique used is a valid one. In fact, the technique provides the image which elites have of the elite structures within their own respective cities. The questions asked regarding influentials were themselves imagery questions, so that there is no final answer to the exact power structure of these two cities, or perhaps of any city.


- 4. Special problems encountered in the alministration of this study. As might have been anticipated, a study in a cross-cultural situation such as is presented by these two large cities on the United States—Mexico border is fraught with difficulties not ordinarily found in research within one culture. This section attempts to delineate some of these difficulties and how they were met. Some limitations of the study will be apparent from the poor strategy used in trying to handle some of these difficulties in the field. Of course, by the same token, the sucess of the study may be attributed in part to overcoming some of these same difficulties. The areas to be discussed here are:
 - a. Language fluency and historical perspective.
 - b. Importance of residence.
 - c. Gaining rapport and defining the study for the respondents.
 - d. Allotment of time for each city.
 - e. Objectivity and the researcher's own images.
- a. Language fluency and the historical perspective. It would have been impossible to carry out this study had not the researcher some



fluency in Spanish. Only a small number of Mexican influentials spoke English well enough to converse in it freely. The ability to speak their language well meant being able to probe for answers, to get beyond the pat answer, to meet them on terms of status equality. Coupled with language fluency was the historical perspective which the researcher had. In the first place, it made the clash between the political and business leaders understandable. Secondly, having this knowledge meant that the researcher could converse knowingly with the respondents on many topics of special interest to them, and could also of course be right up on the news in the Mexican newspapers. Mexican respondents were generally pleased that an American should know something about Mexican history, and it is the researcher's impression that this encouraged respondents to provide more information than they might otherwise have given.

Several El Paso leaders were also clearly pleased with the fact that the research work in Juarez would be carried on in Spanish. Finally, of course, a considerable amount of time and money was saved in not having to rely on an interpreter. And since there was such a cleavage between the two groups in Juarez, probably two separate interpreters would have been necessary, if they were hired in Juarez.

b. Closely tied to point a. was the problem of residence. When presented with the possibility of choosing between and American city and a Mexican city, it is all too easy and perhaps more comfortable for the researcher with family to choose the American city. But aside from personal comfort was the significance of the meaning of residence to the subjects of the study. Several important leaders in both cities asked the writer where he was living. The writer defended his choice on the




grounds that since he had to spend an equal amount of time in both cities, he simply rented the first place that seemed adequate to him.

The writer later learned that there was much resentment both ways against certain members of the United States Consulate who were living in El Paso while their jobs were in Juarez. There was also strong resentment expressed by some Mexican leaders against a certain small segment of their group who were living in El Paso, especially as the El Paso explanation for such residence patterns was the superior living conditions of El Paso. Despite all this the researcher was satisfied that no one resented his choice of residence.

A complication in the residence problem occurred later on. He did consider the worth of moving to Juarez for the experience and change; but by this time leaders of the two opposing groups in Juarez, both of whom owned large amounts of real estate, had offered to provide the writer with "excellent" facilities if he chose to move. It seemed impossible to make the move without offending one or the other party, so the researcher stayed in El Paso. Perhaps an early acceptance of an apartment before knowing about the cleavage could have impaired the study.

c. Naturally, the ability to speak Spanish and the historical knowledge about Mexico were major fators in <u>establishing good rapport</u> with the Mexican leaders. Another factor of significance was that the top leaders of the opposition groups in Juarez were both favorably disposed to such a study. They were impressed that an American University should be interested in them, and they were very willing to provide letters of recommendation (in fact, they suggested the idea) and calling cards to fellow influentials within their own groups or within the group



of neutrals who took no part in the controversy. Ninety five percent of the interviews obtained in Juarez were obtained by the use of a letter of recommendation or the personal calling card of one of the leaders.

On the other hand, the problem of gaining rapport in El Paso was considerably different. While most of the leaders were pleased to help us out, they were not so impressed by the presence of personell from a northern university. There was only one top leader who was willing to provide the researcher with calling cards of any sort. While the general manager of the Juarez Chamber of Commerce had offered to write a letter of recommendation to any businessman in Juarez, the El Paso general manager insisted from the first interview that he couldn't do this, and that we would have to present ourselves to whomever we wanted to speak without the support of an introductory letter. The researcher was then accepted or rejected on the basis of his own ability to convince each "elite" of the value of the study and of the need for his cooperation.

It seemed to the researcher in retrospect that this was a clear illustration of the gemeinschaft-gesellschaft orientations within the various systems. On the Mexican side the researcher could proceed only with some sort of note from one of the top leaders, but when he possessed such a note, he could count on the 100% cooperation of the respondent, without having to make detailed assurances about the nature and backing of the study. Such a particularistic technique was alien to the ways of El Paso elites. Here the researcher had to validate his study to each respondent individually. All of this meant that it was much easier to get to top men in Juarez than it was in El Paso.

d. Allotment of time. Since so many things that were going on in Juarez seemed so unusual and different to the researcher there was



always the temptation to slight El Paso in favor of Juarez. To mitigate against this, however, was the problem of bridge crossing. To get caught in bridge traffic at certain times of the day meant waiting an hour or so in line. This had its value for the observation of "border" activity that it permitted, but it was always a factor to contend with. To arrange appointments in both cities for the same afternoon meant careful timing, and sometimes the fear of cutting a respondent short in order to give oneself time to get back to the other city.


The researcher in such a cross-cultural setting is also caught up in the very concept of "time" and the varying cultural patterns related to "businese" hours. One could be reasonably certain that an appointment would be kept on time in El Paso; and, of course, the researcher was well adjusted to the 8-5 work day there. Neither of these regular culture patterns held for Juarez. The hour of appointment seemed merely a formality to please the American in many cases. The researcher spent many hours sitting and waiting for respondents to appear for their appointment. Records that were kept of these occurrences show that the more a leader tended to be a gemeinschaft-like orientation, the less likely he was to keep his appointment on time. Most if not all of the late or completely forgotten appointments occurred with Mexican political elites.

The writer also had to get used to the fact that all of the elites in Juarez took a two or three hour break in the afternoon (one which the writer himself came to appreciate when he got used to it); at times the writer found himself in Juarez with a morning interview just ended and three hours for lunch, since the afternoon interview wasn't scheduled for three hours or so. (It was frequently on occasions like this that



might not begin until 5:15 or 5:30, if the respondent appeared!) Only once did a political elite apologize on the following day for having forgotten our appointment. To redeem himself, he insisted on granting the interview right in the middle of a busy morning schedule. It was accomplished amid several interruptions in just less than two hours.

Objectivity and the researcher's images. The problem posed in this regard was a personal one for the researcher: how to keep his own images from biasing the situation. The points stressed above give some indication of the kinds of problems facing the researcher as he tried to establish an adequate role for himself in the field. The advantages that the elites offered for this study were somewhat offset by several important factors that had to be taken into account. The elites of El Paso were quite concerned less the writer should do anything or write anything to disturb the harmonious relations which they felt they had labored so long to develop. Some of the questions, especially those dealing with comparative political systems, caused them to be upset. As one man put it, "Sure, there's a lot of corruption there; but we have to do business with them and live near them, and I don't want to lose any customers or friends over this." Those elites of El Paso who hesitated or refused to answer certain questions were doubly disturbed, since they wanted to feel free to point with pride to the superiority of their own system, but hesitated because of what they considered the sensitive nature of the questions. One businessman, after giving what he considered to be a fairly objective and complete answer to a "sensitive" question, turned to me and said: "I'll bet you can't get that kind of information from those fellows in Juarez." Actually, it was my feeling at the time.



and remains so, that I tended to get more adequate answers from Juarez.

On the Juarez side, again there was the business-political split to contend with. The businessmen were outspoken in their condemnation of what they considered to be a corrupt government, and for them there was no such thing as a sensitive area. They had usually answered the "sensitive" questions before we got to them. The problem they posed was that they sought support for their position and wanted acknowledgement that they were right. Remaining objective and detached through some of the interviews was difficult indeed.

On the other hand, there was the real problem of how to approach the political elites on these "sensitive" questions. The researcher tended to spread the sensitive ones out more, and to add in some extra questions which would give the respondent a chance to expound on his political accomplishments. As a result, only two respondents became visibly upset and affronted by these questions, and both were businessmen who were friendly to the government in power.

Naturally, all of these events affected the writer's own images. The American elites began to emerge in his mind as kind of standoffish, willing but not eager to cooperate, and generally afraid to speak out on controversial issues. He had the feeling that all of them had said: "Now, this is off the record," or "Don't quote me on this," Careful analysis of the data revealed that this was true of less than one-third of the respondents and that fully two-thirds cooperated in more or less whole-hearted fashion.

Again, in Juarez, there were two images emerging, that of the businessman and that of the politician. (Another important image, to be discussed in detail in Chapter III was that these two images, i.e.,




of businessmen and politicians, tended to merge into one in El Paso, so that it was difficult to distinguish accurately between the two.) The top men of both groups in Juarez were extremely cooperative, made the writer feel that they believed in the value of the study. There was more willingness to speak out frankly than among the El Pasoans, with the exceptions noted in (d) above.

In short, the writer had the impression that his status-role seemed more important to the Mexican elites and he tended to prefer their company. Besides, events in Juarez seemed to be more exciting, thus adding to the incentive to be there as much as possible. Of course, the fact that the writer spoke Spanish well enough to be complimented about it frequently probably enhanced the favorable image. This led the writer to believe that he was rushing through his American interviews, but a careful check of the time charts that were kept revealed that interviews on both sides averaged about one hour and 45 minutes. The writer is well aware of most of the biases he picked up during the course of the study, and believes that he has managed to keep them out of the data except as herein noted.


5. Analysis of the data. The data for this study are such as not to lend themselves to refined statistical techniques. Since the data are qualitative, and the subjects chosen do not represent a random sample of any clearly known universe and since the N is very small in many cases, the Chi-square statistic was chosen as the major technique for testing the hypotheses of this study. The fact that Chi-square permits collapsing of cells made it helpful in a number of cases.* In this study the Chi-square is called significant if it reaches a probability level of 05 or less.

^{*}In several instances the theoretical frequency fell below 5; correction factors were not employed, as the tables either had 3 or more degrees of freedom, thus minimizing the possible error, or the difference between actual and theoretical frequencies did not affect the Chi-square.



The writer attempted to develop a series of Guttmann scales for the analysis of the data, but in only one case did a Guttmann scale emerge which fit the theoretical requirements e.g., reproducibility; range of marginal distribution; pattern of errors. This scale will be discussed in Chapter VI where it is appropriate.

With this background in mind, it is now possible to turn to Chapter III, the analysis of the top influentials of the border cities El Paso, Texas and Cd. Juarez. Chihuahua.



CHAPTER III

THE BUSINESS AND POLITICAL ELITES OF EL PASO AND CD. JUAREZ

A. The Research Site

The El Paso-Cd. Juarez metropolitan area has a composite population of close to 400,000 persons. The area was first settled by the Spaniards in the late 16th century when all the territory north and south of the Rio Grande was part of Spain's New World Domain. The division of the land which resulted from the Texas War of Independence from Mexico in 1836 and the subsequent events led to the formation of two separate towns, Paso del Norte, Chihuahua and Franklin, Texas. The Mexican town became Cd. Juarez in 1888, while Franklin became El Paso at about the same time.

The towns grew very slowly during the 19th and early 20th centuries, with each having populations of less than 10,000 at the turn of the century. Nevertheless, they served as the scenes for some important historical events: President Juarez made the then Paso del Norte his headquarters in the 1850's-1860's while struggling to oust the French and Maximillan from Mexico; President Porfirio Diaz met with President Taft in Cd. Juarez and in El Paso in 1909; and in 1911, the Treaty of Peace between the forces of President Diaz and Francisco Madero was signed in Cd. Juarez, bringing to an end the thirty-seven year rule of Diaz. The two cities were important focuses of revolutionary activity for the next ten years.

The rate of growth, largely by immigration in the last two decades, has been impressive for both cities, and both at present are experiencing

^{1.} Armando B. Chavez M., Historia de Cuidad Juarez, Chih., segunda edicion, 1951.

"boom town" conditions. Urbanization and industrialization have proceeded at a rapid pace, despite the water shortage prevalent in this dry, semi-arid region.

In 1955. El Paso had a population of approximately 185,000 persons. and was the largest city within a radius of 500 miles. Its economic influence extends deep into Mexico, despite the increasing import and monetary restrictions levelled by the Mexican federal government. The city's economy is specialized around cattle, copper, cotton, natural gas, and large retail and wholesale marts serving as the heart of this large trading center. Closely tied in with some of the above are the following major industries: copper, lead and other ore refining; cement, tile and brick manufacturing; cotton denim clothes manufacturing; oil refining: meat packing: natural gas and butane: leather goods: lumber: and food processings. 2 Of considerable economic importance also is the presence of three large military installations on the outskirts of the city with a military population of well over 40,000 persons. Furthermore, in recent years. Il. Paso has been building itself up as a major recreation area offering sunshine, a dry climate, easy access to "Old Mexico," and a center from which to go forth to the many historic sites nearby. e.g., White Sands, Carlsbad Caverns. Tourist trade has been of increasing importance as a result, and El Paso has become also a stop-over point for East-West and North-South air and auto travel.

El Paso has two daily newspapers, each with a daily circulation of approximately 100,000; also, three Spanish language papers, two published in Juarez, serve the El Paso area. Their combined circulation in about

^{2.} El Paso Times, Special Annual Edition devoted to local economic development, April, 1955.



25,000. Three major and two minor radio stations, plus two television stations associated with national networks serve the area.

Churches and synagogues representing the major religious groupings found in the United States are found in MI Paso. Six public high schools help to give MI Paso unusually good educational facilities; there are also several private and parrochial high schools to serve the area, as well as Texas Western College for higher education.

All the major civic clubs, such as Rotary, Lions, Kiwanis, are well represented in El Paso, which also boasts several large clubs of a more local or regional nature, e.g., the LULAC. There is also a large and active Chamber of Commerce, Jr. Chamber of Commerce, and organizations such as the Community Chest and the like. Of special importance to the city and the area as a whole is the Sun Carnival Committee charged with making each Christmas-New Year's week more "glorious" then the one that had gone before. The most important offices of many of these organizations are held by those who will hereinafter be identified as elites.

Finally, it should be mentioned that at the time of this study El Paso was a typical southern Democratic city with the party primary in effect determining the election of officials.

Cd. Juarez has, like its northern neighbor, grown tremendously in the last two decades. While only a dry river-bed separated Juarez from its neighbor for most of the year, there is considerable difference between the two cities in the manner of their growth and development, and their socio-cultural characteristics.

^{3.} LULAC is the League of United Latin American Citizens, with branches throughout the Southwest.



The chief source of revenue for Juarez comes from tourism. Tourists pour across the border daily to see a bit of "Ol! Mexico," to buy some jewelry, pottery, leather goods, liquor, visit a restaurant or night club, and then return to the United States. More important still is the fact that it serves as a major recreational attraction to the military personnel in El Paso. The city also serves as one of the country's two main ports of entry for tourists and goods going south into Mexico. Estimates made by several bankers indicate that the greater part of the tourists! dollars goes into what are commonly called the "vices," i.e., prostitution, narcotics, and lewd, bawdy shows where cheap liquor is sold at exhorbitant prices. To most Americans this is all that Cd. Juarez means. Yet Juarez does have four banks. several large import-export houses, and several small but important industries. They include: two whiskey distilleries; a brewery; two brick and allied products plants; a textile mill; a foundry; two cotton-seed-oil plants: a meat packing plant, and other small plants as well as wholesale and retail stores which service a large area of northern Mexico.

The Juarez economy also depends to a considerable degree on the fact that between ten and fifteen percent of the city's potential labor force is employed in El Paso by American business firms, and thus earns weekly dollar wages. This does not represent a 100% economic gain for Juarez. Most of these workers, and apparently the great majority of juarenses who do any regular weekly shopping, spend a good deal of

^{4.} See The Monthly Business Review, Vol. 36, No. 7, Published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. This is a special issue devoted to El Paso, Texas.



their earnings in El Paso. It was estimated that about 80% of all food and clothing purchases made by juarenses are made in El Paso. 5


Juarez has two daily newspapers (owned by the same national chain), and several small but important weeklies published by the labor unions and the opposing political groups. Juarez also has a small, locally operated television station and three major and four minor radio stations. One of the radio stations is reputed to be the most powerful in the southwest.

Most of the civic clubs found in El Paso are also to be found in Cd. Juarez although with somewhat smaller membership. Juarez also has a plethora of formal organizations of national significance, particularly those connected directly or indirectly with the Partido Revolucionario Institutional, the "official" political party of the country. The cleavage between business and government, noted above, can be well illustrated merely by looking at the membership lists of these various organizations.

Until recently, the one party politics hypical of El Paso was to be found also in Cd. Juarez, only in the latter case the party was controlled from the state and national levels. 6 In the two most recent elections.

^{5.} Unless otherwise indicated, all statements on border economic conditions represent the combined judgments of the financiers and business leaders of the two cities. Accurate figures were unavailable, but observation by the writer indicated that purchases were made regularly by people from all segments of the population.

^{6.} For full discussion of this situation see William P. Tucker, <u>The Mexican Government Today</u>, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1957, especially Chapters 4, 25 and 26.




however, the Partido Accion Nacional, under energetic and youthful leadership (especially from the business group) began to show real strength, so that indications are that a two party system is beginning to emerge in Mexico, at least at the local level. The implications of this trend go far beyond the scope of the present study, although the party system itself receives considerable treatment in some of the imagery questions that will be analyzed in succeeding chapters.

On the international level, it is worthy of mention that all of the major civic clubs have international committees which meet jointly from time to time and the clubs themselves meet in a large body once or twice a year. Such organizations as the Knights of Columbus and the Masonic Lodge meet jointly on occasion. Finally, in its advertising, the El Paso Chamber of Commerce uses Cd. Juarez as a feature attraction in its campaign to build El Paso as a major recreation and tourist area.

On the governmental level also, there is much daily interaction; the municipal governments have tried, especially in recent years, to work more closely together and to coordinate, where essential, the work of the several branches of their governments, e.g., police, fire, sanitation. Federal government officials must work together to iron out the difficult and intricate problems involved in immigration and customs, as well as in pursuing criminals wanted for federal offenses; the water boundary commissions are involved in the problem of apportionment

^{7.} The Party of National Action is in some ways similar to the Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe, although it has to now not taken on all the formal philosophical aspects of these parties, nor does it enjpy the prestige and stability of these Western European parties. The long Church-state struggle in Mexico, which culminated in the bitter persecutions of the 1920's is an important factor in the still-limited influence and development of this party. For more discussion of this point see Tucker. Ibid, Chapter 4.



that has long been considered outdated, at least by the Mexicans. Beyond the formal levels of interaction the federal governments encourage their officials to meet socially to foster that spirit of "good neighborliness" which is an avowed part of national policies. While considerable friction still arises easily in times of border tensions, (e.g., the spring of 1954 when the Juarez municipal government began to use a piece of land adjacent to the border for garbage disposal purposes), much optimism and some progress was reported on both sides of the border. A serious issue that has yet to be settled to the satisfaction of the Mexicans is that of the Chamizal, a small section of South El Paso. There is some evidence that the land may legally belong to Mexico, and all juarenses seem to be aware of this.

Finally it must be noted that the most outstanding external difference between these cities is the extreme degree of luxury and poverty apparent in Cd. Juarez as compared with El Paso. The most expensive homes were much more ostentatious in Cd. Juarez than in El Paso; and in like manner, poverty was more marked in Cd. Juarez, both in degree and in quantity. Indeed, taking no more into consideration than the outward appearance of homes and general appearance of neighborhoods, there would seem to be strong support here for the old adage about America's being mainly a middle class society, at least when a Mexican city is so close by for comparison. That this is perceived to be important by the elites will be seen in the analysis of the images expressed by the American elites of their Mexican counterparts.

^{8.} See Armando B. Chavez, op. cit., Chapter VIII.



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B. The Elite Structure


The purpose of this section is twofold: to describe and compare
the business and political elite groups of El Paso and Cd. Juarez as
these are seen by those who are identified in this study as business or
political elites or knowledgeables; and to analyze and compare the
nature of the relationships of these groups within their respective cities.

It is hoped that this analysis may give us some insights with respect to the general orientation of this study. Specifically, does knowledge of the elite structure tell us anything about the particularistic-universalistic relations that supposedly characterize the two cities respectively? Will the data here give us any insights into the importance of kinship, or the importance of the "office"? Are the business systems different as regards their elite structure? What about party bossism (caudillismo) within the respective communities?

In this study the concept "elite" is meant to refer to any individual who is thought by peers and judges to be influential within either or both the political and economic systems of his city. Actually, by virtue of the way in which the questions were asked, the element of influence was given explicit emphasis, while the idea of authority was only implied. The purpose of this was to avoid having respondents name those holding authority positions without regard for whether or not they actually exercised personal influence to achieve desired goals. 10

^{9.} See interview in Appendix A, questions 40d and 62.

^{10.} For a discussion of the concept power which is closely related to the problem here, see Charles P. Loomis and J. C. McKinney, Sociology: The Study of Persistence and Change of Social Systems, Mimeo. Ch. 2, p. 7. They consider the major components of power to be authority and influence. "Authority may be defined as the right, as determined by the system, to control the action of others." It resides "in a status-role, not in an individual as such." Influence is more personal in nature, and seems to refer to the ability of the individual to expend



The elite structures to be delineated then are the result of the images of influence which the respondents have of the respective systems.

(a) El Paso, Eighty-nine people were formally interviewed in El Paso for purposes of this study. Of this number 57 have been classified as elites (38 business elites, 19 political elites), and the other 32 have been classed as knowledgeables. The first part of this section will be devoted to a description of the political elite structure.

The Political Elites. The names of over 100 persons were mentioned in interviews as having influence in the politics and government of this city. Of this total 43 were interviewed; thirteen were found to have been considered more influential in the business life of the city, and so were classified as business elites. Nineteen were finally separated out as comprising the political elites, and the remaining 11 were classified as knowledgeables.

Each individual could have been chosen a total of 89 times, if all persons interviewed had seen fit to choose the same twelve persons (respondents refused to answer the questions, so that the maximum actual number of choices for any individual could have been seventy-three. The actual range of choices is from thirty-eight to three, with only the top seven elites being chosen ten or more times. The following table shows the number of votes received by each of the elites.

his control over others to actions not explicitly within the patterned expectations of his status-role.

See also, R. M. MacIver, Web of Government. The MacMillan Co., N. Y., 1947, pp. 82-113.




TABLE I


COMPARISON OF CHOICES OF POLITICAL ELITES OF EL PASO
BY ELITES AND KNOWLEDGEABLES AND BY SIX JUDGES

Elite Identi- fication	Times chosen by Elites and Knowledgeables	Times chosen by six Judges
No.	No.	No.
40	38	4
166	37	6
35	19	5
48	19	5
21	18	2
74	14	4
39	12	4
189	9	3
164	8	1
55	7	2
10	7	4

Note: The other eight elites received an average of four votes and two votes respectively.

A breakdown of the Elite-Knowledgeable choices in Table I into political, business and knowledgeables shows that No. 40 was chosen as a political elite by four out of five political elites and by approximately two out of five of the other two groups. He was the one most often recognized by the elites and knowledgeables of Juarez also, 11 being chosen by one out of four of them. As might be expected, when

^{11.} In response to question no. 63.



the figures are broken down by groups, it appears that the political elites are the most consistent in being able to delineate the political elite structure.

The figures in Table I indicate that there is more general agreement among the judges than among the Elites and Knowledgeables combined about the nature of the elite structure, although the lists correspond to a large degree, as six of the elites rank in the top ten by both voting techniques. 12 A strict statistical comparison is not meant to be implied here, as the few cases make percentages misleading, and techniques used to find political elites were so different. (See Chapter II above).

The following list shows the occupation by which the political elites of El Paso were identified at the time of the study:

Executive (6)


LIST I

OCCUPATIONS OF POLITICAL ELITES OF EL PASO BY BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

Judiciary (8)

Mayor* Ex-Mayor*	Federal district judge* County judge*
Ex-Mayor	Judge
County Clerk*	jugke garee
Ex-federal official*	Judge
Ex-federal official	District Attorney
	Ex-District Attorney
	County Sheriff
Non-governmental (6)	•
Lawyer	Legislative (1)
Lawyer	accipiante (1)
Lawyer	City Councilman
Businessman*	
Lawyer (declined interview)	
Lawyer (declined interview)	TOTAL $N = 21$
Note: * Indicates those who r	eceived 10 or more votes.

^{12.} This pattern of voting was also found by Floyd Hunter in Community Power Structure, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1953, Appendix; and Robert O. Schulze and Leonard Blumberg in "The Determination of Local Power Elites. American Journal of Sociology. November 1957, pp. 291-296.



The most significant point suggested by this is the apparent lack of influence of the legislative branch of the municipal government and the importance of the judiciary. The one city councilman who was chosen as an elite was ranked thirteenth by the elites and eleventh by the judges. Other city councilmen received two votes or less. On the other hand, the contribution of the judiciary as elites seems to be clearly evident, with several possible explanations. The federal district judge is one of the city's most distinguished citizens, and he has been involved in politics and government for more than a quarter of a century. But why the other judges? Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that like the County Sheriff in the South, they are men in prestigeful occupations with whom the businessmen can interact without feeling that they are interacting with "politicians."

Only a cursory examination of the social backgrounds of the elite group may be made here. As a group they averaged just 49 years of age. The ratio of Protestant to Catholic was three to one. They averaged 15.3 years of formal education, with the range from six to nineteen, and the mode at seventeen. The latter reflects the fact that more than half have law degrees.

A rough estimation of socio-economic status was attempted on the basis of the occupational history of the respondent's education and his present job, and father's main occupation. The data suggest that less than 15% of these elites came from families whose father's occupation was represented as upper middle or upper status. The general impression is one of steady but not sharply marked upward mobility. The movement has been from lower to upper middle status. None of the elite would be placed below middle status under these criteria.



The business elites. One hundred and thirty one different names were mentioned in answer to inquiries regarding the most influential businessmen in El Paso. Of these, sixty-one were interviewed, with the breakdown as follows: 38 business elites; nine later classed as political elites; fourteen knowledgeables.

The range in number of choices is from 2 to 44. Since 21 persons refused to answer the question, any single individual could have received a maximum number of 68 votes if all had chosen him as a business elite. Fifteen of the 38 elites were chosen at least 10 times, 13 and the table which follows indicates the number of the actual votes obtained by each of these elites.


TABLE II

COMPARISON OF CHOICES OF BUSINESS ELITES OF BL PASO BY
ELITES AND KNOWLEDGEABLES AND BY SIX JUDGES

Elite Identi- fication No.	Times chosen by 68 Elites and Knowledgeables	Times chosen by Six Judges	
	No.	No.	
33 60	42	4	
	3 8	6	
41	21	4	
34	19	2	
19	17	4	
23	16	4	
54	16	4	
23 54 15 42	14		
42	14	3	
61	14	5 3 2	
12	13	3 4	
71	13	4	
82	13	3	
47	12	3	
ġ	11	3 3 5 2 6 6	
182	8	5	
172	8	2	
Λ*	lyly	6	
Mak	1414	6	

Indicates that these elites declined to be interviewed.

Note: The other twenty-one business elites were chosen an average of five times apeace by those interviewed and once apiece by the six judges.




A breakdown of the Elites-Knowledgeables votes in Table II into three distinct groups, i.e., business, political and knowledgeable, reveals that the top four vote receivers were chosen by more than three out of four business elites and somewhat less often by the others. This consensus exists also with the judges as three out of these four were chosen by all six judges.

There is a high degree of relationship between the judges' choices and those of the elites and knowledgeables, with respect to the fact that nine elites are in the top ten in both groups. Again, clear consensus about who the elites are is lacking beyond this top group, a finding which has been noted above with regard to the political elites. Any strict comparison between the judges choices and the Elite-Knowledgeable choices is impossible because of the differences in total number of cases, and because of the differences in techniques used to obtain the elites (See Chapter II above). The important thing is that the table indicates a general consensus about the top elites.

Another way to point out the relative clarity of the identification of business elite image among the business elites as compared with the knowledgeables and politicos is that two out of three business elites chose six or more elites who are in the top ten in Table II, while only one out of five political elites and one out of four knowledgeables did so.

The following list shows the varying types of business with which these elites were connected:

^{13.} Actually, 17 received 10 or more votes, if the two who declined to be interviewed are also considered here.



LIST II

OCCUPATIONS OF KL PASO BUSINESS KLITES

Bankers (5)

President*
President

Chairman of Board Vice-President*

Vice-President

Industrialists (13)

President*
President*
President*
President*

Chairman of Board*

President President President President Owner

Vice-President Vice-President Gerneral Manager

Utilities (2)

General Manager*
General Manager*

Declined Interview (2)

Bank President*

Industrialist*

Wholesale Trade (5)

President*
President*
President*
President

General Manager

Retail Trade (10)

President*
President
President
President
Owner
Owner

Vice-President Vice-President General Manager General Manager

Communications (3)

Editor of Newspaper*

Owner of newspaper and radio-


TV stations*

Editor and Vice-President of

newspaper

TOTAL N = 40

^{*} Indicates those who received 10 or more votes.




The diagram above would seem to indicate that no particular segment of business completely dominates the elite structure. Top elites, i.e., those receiving ten or more votes are found in the principal business categories, with retail trade least represented in this group. The data regarding these elites show that size and value of the business enterprise may be related to the amount of influence an individual may have. The top elites command enterprises employing up to 1000 men and having annual gross earnings in the millions of dollars.

In terms of social background the business elites were slightly older than the political elites, averaging 55.6 years of age, as compared to 49 years for the latter. The business elite had a mean of formal education of 14.3 years with a range from three to 18 years and a mode of 16. Only one out of six had professional or graduate training as compared with one-half of the political elites. Close to 40% were Protestants, 14% were Jewish, while the Catholics, who comprise the dominant religious group in El Paso (about two-thirds of the population), made up only 20% of the business elite group.

A brief analysis of the data revealed that approximately twothirds of the business elites qualified as upper status on the basis of present occupation, education, father's occupation and the respondents' own occupational history. Just less than half inherited the same occupation as their father had held, in this case generally upper class (president of large retail business, hotel owner, bank

^{14.} See C. Wright Mills, "Middle Classes in Middle Sized Cities," in Class. Status and Power, ed. by R. Bendix, and S. Lipset, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1953, p. 208. Mills found that banks and big business in general control city affairs.



president). Analysis further shows a strong trend toward vertical mobility among 15% of the group, that is, movement from lower middle and upper lower socio-economic status (farmers, manual laborers), to lower upper and even upper upper (bank president, Chairman of the board of a large corporation).

Only one out of four business elites were native born El Pasoans, while almost half of the political elites were native born. On the other hand, about half of both groups were born outside the state of Texas; this perhaps gives some indication of the rapid rate of growth of the city. 15

Interpenetration of the Business and Political Elite Structures.


Keller has stated that a major concern of studying the men who occupy
the key positions in business and government

is with the degree of integration existing at the highest levels of the social system, the extent to which the key decisions made in one sphere do or do not find ready acceptance by the key decision—makers in other spheres. A society, it has been said, is unified to the extent that its elites appear to be unified. One index of this is the degree to which values and perspectives they have in common will result in some coherent direction for the society as a whole. 16

The purpose of this section is to examine the interpenetration of the political and economic elite structures of El Paso and the extent of integration implied therein.

^{15.} Cf. Schulze and Blumberg, op. cit., for their findings on stability of elites over time.

^{16.} Suzanne Keller, "Sociology and Social Stratification," in Sociology in the United States of America, ed. by Hans Zetterberg, UNESCO, 1956, p. 118.




As suggested by some of the data above presented, it was difficult at times to decide whether a person should be classified as political or business elite. In some cases the respondent gave names of the business elites as political elites, and upon further questioning insisted that these individuals should be considered as both. The statistical data are revealing here. Both the political and the business elites named businessmen as political elites in one out of every three names mentioned. Of the nineteen top political elites only ten received some votes as business elites. The number of votes ranged from one to fourteen, with an average of six. Actually, in terms of the number of votes received five of these political elites could rank in the top twenty of the business elites.

Looking at the data on the business elites it is found that fifteen of the thirty eight received votes also as political elites. The range here was from two to eight votes, with the average being only 2.4. Three of these business elites vould have ranked among the nineteen political elites.

The important point is that half of the 57 elites received votes as both political and business elites in the general voting, and the same interpenetration occurred when the judges were asked to rank the lists of names presented to them. The final decision as to how to classify some of them was almost arbitrary. As MacIver, Hunter, Mills and others have pointed out, there is a simple pyramid of power in

^{17.} The number here would be increased to five if the two business elites not interviewed were included.


^{18.} See MacIver, op. cit., pp. 82-113; Hunter, op. cit., Appendix; Mills, op. cit.; Schulze and Blumberg, op. cit.; and D. C. Miller, Industry and Community Power Structure in American Sociological Review, February, 1958, pp. 9-15.



which the political and economic systems are merged, with the economic dominating, expecially the community level. In the following section this will be compared with the situation in Cd. Juarez.


Further clarification of the situation can be gained by analysis of the political party structure. Political conflicts are fought out within the Democratic party. - the Republican party is non-functioning. - which itself is not well organized locally, and according to informants, has not been for the past twenty-flve years. That is to say, there is no official Democratic machine as such, capable of putting forth a slate of candidates and controlling political affairs. But this does not mean that elections are haphazard in El Paso, or that the officials who are elected to office and those whom they employ are free to run the city as they see fit, free from pressures. On the contrary, there are several factions, at least one of which is well-organized, which help to shape and guide the political and economic life of the city in a more or less integrated fashion. These factions are made up for the most part of the business elites of El Paso. A very active, well-organized group known as the City-County Committee (C.C.C.) has been the dominant factor in the political life of the city and of the county at large during the last several years. This committee is made up of about 100 of the leading business and professional people, with an inner core of some eight or ten members popularly called the "Kingmakers." The avowed purpose

^{19.} There appeared to be a gentleman's agreement that neither faction would nominate more than one Spanish-speaking person for the City Council and that these candidates would run against each other. Cf. Floyd Hunter, Ruth C. Schaffer, and Cecil G. Sheps, Community Organization: Action and Inaction, Chapel Hill, North Carolina Press, 1956. They found similar patterns of control over Ethnic minorities by the "Old Yankee" group in a New England community.



of the committee is the backing of the best qualified candidates for public office. In the words of one of their leaders: "We seek good candidates, irrespective of their political affiliation. We are not out to further our own ends in this . . . " It is not the committee as a whole, but the inner core, the so-called kingmakers clique which has been the most active politically in recent years, and which showed itself to be the dominating influence during the research period. However, it is far from being all-powerful; its candidates for office have been defeated on occasion, and most of the opposition comes from within the larger City-County Committee itself, from businessmen who are powerful enough to show their disagreement with the inner core. The challenge may often be of a veto nature, that is, defeat of proposals initiated directly or indirectly by the Kingmakers. A recent example of this was the defeat of the City Charter proposal supported by the Kingmakers. One of the city's leading businessmen and most influential figures, came out against the proposal in a TV appearance the night before the voting. and the charter was defeated. One of the Kingmakers insisted that it was the appearance of this person on TV against the charter that had brought about its defeat.

The most recent elections held during the writer's stay, bring out clearly the nature and extent of influence of the Kingmakers and of the C.C.C. generally. The Kingmakers had difficulty finding a suitable candidate to support for mayor, and finally settled on a businessman who had resided in the city about ten years, but who had been doing well and had served on several important civic committees. The only opposition which developed was from a former mayor whose previous administration had not been a successful one. The C.C.C. candidate had the strong support



of the retiring mayor, whose record was generally acclaimed as the best in the history of the city. The victory was an easy one for the C.C.C. However, the candidate became ill just before being sworn into office and was forced to resign on doctor's orders. According to law it was now the task of the City Council to decide who should be mayor. Two members of the Council itself received strong public backing, but the C.C.C. wanted a man who had previously served as President of the Chamber of Commerce, and who in their view had demonstrated business and administrative ability. The City Council members were reminded of their debt to the businessmen for their support in previous years, and eventually the man desired for the position by the C.C.C. was chosen mayor. Here we can see that the authority was vested in the City Council directly to choose a mayor, but the influence of certain business elites was so great that in this key decision those with influence rather than those with the legitimate authority actually made the decision. Strangely enough, the decision was not bitterly contested: instead, there seemed to be a clear recognition on the part of the City Council of their duty and responsibility to the decision-makers. 20

This interpenetration of the two groups is held by the business elites to be a good and healthy thing, an example of "good city government that might well be copied by other American cities." The word "politics" has an evil connotation which they would like to see eradicated

^{20.} It is the writer's judgment that those in positions of political authority implicitly recognize the legitimate claim of bankers, industrialists and other business elites on the decision-making process, that it may not be the person qua person, but his status-role that is seen to be important. The public also seems to recognize the authority of these individuals.



Cd. Juarez is more sharply identified with the authority structure, and perhaps also because Cd. Juarez is somewhat smaller in size than El Paso.

Of the seventy-eight names mentioned, thirty-six were interviewed, and twenty-two were finally selected as political elites. Nine of the remaining fourteen were finally identified as business elites and the other five were classed as knowledgeables.

An individual could have been chosen eighty-two times if everyone interviewed had selected him among the dozen names asked for. However, since thirteen of the eighty-two refused to answer the question the actual maximum number possible was reduced to sixty-nine. The range is from sixty-three to one, with the top fourteen elites getting ten or more votes. In contrast, only the top seven received ten or more votes in El Paso. The following table shows the number of times each of the top fourteen elites was chosen by the elites and knowledgeables and by the five judges.

This table shows that No. 32 received more support from all groups than any other political elite in either city. Of the thirty-nine El Pasoans who were willing to answer question 63 (Who are some of the most influential people in Cd. Juarez?), twenty-two chose No. 32. Only one other Juarez elite, a businessman about whom more later, was chosen more often. But No. 32 was the only Juarez political elite to receive more than one or two votes from El Pasoans.

While no exact comparison can be made between the votes of the judges and the elites-knowledgeables, there is apparent the same general agreement that was noted for Table I. The same men tend to be the top elites in both groups.



from city affairs. The following words from a newspaper editorial state the position of the majority clearly: "The issue in this campaign stands out clear as a bell. Shall we go on with an administration that treats the City of El Paso as a big business that should be run like a business, or beat a retreat to politics - as usual?"

What little opposition there is to this viewpoint is expressed by the rival newspaper in strong language, to the effect that the business administration policies of the "Kingmakers" group are extravagant, motivated by personal interests, and generally costly to the forgotten taxpayer. This is the viewpoint of only a small minority of the elites, however. The great majority tended to side with the Kingmakers group. In summary, it may be said that from the point of view of the interpenetration of the business and political systems, El Paso was a highly integrated city during the course of this study.

(b) Cd. Juarez. Eightly two persons were formally interviewed in Cd. Juarez. Of this number fifty-nine have been classified as elites (thirty-seven business elites and twenty-two political elites), and twenty-three classified as knowledgeables. The first part of this section will be devoted to a description of the political elite structure; comparison with the elite structure of El Paso will also be made.

Political Elites. While 101 names were offered as political elites in El Paso, only 78 were mentioned in Cd. Juarez. This fact may be explained in part by the fact that the political elite structure of

^{21.} From the El Paso Times of March 2, 1955. The paper is owned by one of the business elites, and the Editor and Vice-President was also names as a business elite. The owner has been identified as one of the Kingmakers.




TABLE III

COMPARISON OF CHOICES OF POLITICAL ELITES OF CD. JUAREZ
BY ELITES AND KNOWLEDGEABLES AND BY FIVE JUDGES

Code No. of Elite Selected	Times Chosen by 69 Elites- Knowledgeables	Times Chosen by Five Judges
32	63	5
65	37	3
122	31	3
69	25	ı
161	24	5
<i>5</i> 0	24	3
3	20	4
120	13	2
103	11	3
170	10	3
147	10	1
141	10	2
136	10	3
119	10	1
A*	27	5

^{*} Declined to be interviewed.

Note: The other eight elites received an average of four votes apiece in the general voting and one apiece from the five judges.



When the Elites-Knowledgeables votes are broken down into their separate groups, the political elites as expected tend to have the most consistent image of the political elite structure.

While both Tables I and III show that there is no clear-cut consensus about who are the political elites in both cities, there does seem to be more clarity in Cd. Juarez, if one considers that just about two thirds of the Cd. Juarez political elites received ten or more votes, while only about one third of the El Paso political elites received at least this number of votes.

The following list shows the way in which these elites were related to the political system at the time of the study:

LIST III

OCCUPATIONS OF POLITICAL ELITES OF CD. JUANEZ BY BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

Executive	(13)

Governor*

Mayor*
Ex-Mayor*
Assistant Mayor*
City Treasurer*
Public Works Commissioner*
City Clerk*
Police Chief*
State Tax Collector*
State Police Inspector*
Federal Immigration Chief*

Federal Medical Official

Declined Interview (1)

Federal Treasurer*

Ex-mayor*

Legislative (4)

Federal Diputado (Congressman) Candidate for Diputado (PAN) City Alderman City Alderman


Judiciary

none

PRI-party personnel (5)
Labor leader*
Labor leader
Labor leader
Lawyer
PRI Leader*

TOTAL N = 23

Note: * Indicates those who received 10 or more votes.




This list confirms the tremendous influence and importance of the executive branch of government in Mexico and the high degree of central-ization of power, which facts have been adequately treated in the 22 literature.

The fact that no members of the judiciary were chosen as political elites strengthens the argument of the business elites that there is no stable, responsible judiciary in Mexico, and that the judiciary is only a tool of the executive branch of government. The list also indicates the relative lack of influence of the legislative branch - the city has ten city alderman, and the two chosen as elites are also labor leaders. Only one other city alderman received even a single vote.

Regarding the social background of these political elites, the following may be said in brief summary. Age wise, the Juarenses average 49.4 years, very close to the El Paso average of just 49 years. They have averaged ten years of formal education (El Paso level was 15.3 years), with a range from three to nineteen years. Four of the twenty-two had at least two years of formal education in the United States. Approximately one in three held degrees in either law, agricultural engineering, or medicine, while about half had the equivalent of a United States high school education. The most significant difference, education wise, between the political elites of Cd. Juarez and of El Paso is that the El Pasoans averaged more than five years more of formal education, with most of this focused on the law school. Slightly less

^{22.} See F. Tannenbaum, "Personal Government in Mexico," in C. P. Loomis and O. Leonard, <u>Latin American Social Organization and Institutions</u>, Michigan State Press, 1953; also, see Tucker, op. cit., especially Chapters 4, 7, 25 and 26.




than half claimed some fluency with the English language, but in the writer's judgment only a small minority of these actually could speak English with any degree of fluency.

In discussing the social mobility and occupational history of the Mexican elites the reader must keep in mind the effect of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 on the whole structure of Mexican society. 23 The Revolution and its afternath made possible a degree of upward mobility hitherto unknown in Mexico. Many of the wealthy aristocracy lost all. The military became one of the major vehicles for achieving power, status and wealth, as the new military men of the Revolution brought about considerable changes in the political and economic structures of the country. For example, among the political elites of Cd. Juarez was the federal diputado whose father had been a mechanic and whose own occupational history included jobs as a mechanic, Army Captain, and small local government posts. Or again, one of the aldermen was a baker and waiter at various times in his life, and still thought of himself mainly as an artisan.

Upward mobility for the group as a whole is somewhat less in evidence than it is for the political elite of El Paso. On the basis of occupational history, father's occupation, and elites present occupation and education, the following can be said in summary: about one-third were of upper middle socio-economic status, with half in the lower middle category, and the remainder in the upper lower status

^{23.} There is a wealth of literature on this subject; see for example, Charles B. Cumberland, The Mexican Revolution, Austin, The Univ. of Texas Press, 1952. Also, see W. V. D'Antonio, "The Political Philosophy of the Mexican Revolution," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1953. Also, Tucker, op. cit.



(it will be recalled that more of the El Pasoans were upper middle status and none were in the lower status). This difference is probably due to the PRI party's ideological commitment to have those of manual skills in the political structure.

The business elites. In response to the question requesting the names of the most influential businessmen in Cd. Juarez, 115 different names were mentioned (the figure for the El Paso businessmen was 131). Of these, 49 were interviewed, with their eventual placement in the groups as follows: 37 business elites; three political elites; nine knowledgeables. What is most significant in these figures, as compared with those of El Paso, is the very small number of political elites who were mentioned also as business elites (one out of seven as compared with one out of two in El Paso).

The number of times business elites were chosen ranged from fortyeight to one. Since fifteen persons refused to answer the questions,
any single individual could have received a raximum of sixty-seven votes.
While in El Paso approximately two fifths were selected ten or more
times, in Ed. Juarez three fifths were chosen that often. Table IV
which follows indicates the number of the actual votes received by
each of the top Juarez elites as well as a comparison with the judges'
choices of elites.

Such comparison as may be possible between the two sets of votes reveals the same pattern of general agreement as noted previously.

The same general statements may be made here as were done on the previous Tables. If the general voting is broken down into their separate groups, the business elites are seen to be the most consistent in choosing the top elites, with the knowledgeables and politicos





TABLE IV

COMPARISON OF CHOICES OF BUSINESS ELITES OF CD. JUAREZ
BY ELITES AND KNOWLEDGEABLES AND BY FIVE JUDGES

Code No. of Elite Chosen	Times Chosen by 67 Elites and Knowledgeables	Times Chosen by Five Judges
77	48	5
13	<i>ւ</i> բւ	3
84	144	3
51	39	4
2	34	3
135	34	5
11	25	3
46	24	3
26	21	2
52	19	4
45	18	3
162	17	3
53	15	3
80	15	3
4	15	1
29	15	1
151	15	4
59	14	1
16	14	2
20	13	2
114	12	-
<i>5</i> 8	11	-

Note: The other fifteen elites received an average of five votes apiece in the general voting and one apiece from the judges. This is similar to the findings recorded on the previous Tables.




somewhat less so. Almost all of the business elites made six or more choices of elites who are in the Top Twenty; in this case, the knowledge-ables did almost as well, while two out of three politicos managed this.

There seems to be somewhat more consensus in the general voting on business elites of Cd. Juarez than on any of the other three groups; the same doesn't hold for the voting of the five judges. As a matter of fact, both Juarez groups averaged three votes apiece from the judges while both El Paso groups averaged close to four votes apiece. It's only on the general voting that there is a greater degree of agreement; most notably the six top business elites of Cd. Juarez were all chosen by more than one out of every two persons voting.

During the early phases of the study, the writer came to appreciate the fact that the businessmen of Cd. Juarez did not form a single homogeneous group. Rather, three groups, one of them more correctly classified as a category, became distinguishable. One group, directly opposing the government, was made up of the Chamber of Commerce leaders and other top business leaders. The second group, much smaller in number, was allied more or less directly with the government. There was little or no interation between this and the first group. The third group — or category — was comprised of those who were independent in the struggle. Privately, they tended to side with the first group, but their policy was to stay out of politics. They tried to carry on interpersonal relations with the other two groups as if nothing was the matter.


That the elites themselves were cognizant of these differences is borne out by the data in Table IV. There was apparently a negative sanction applied against elites, by those who opposed them, by not



naming them as elites, but rather choosing those who were most congenial or at least neutral. While the same may have been true in El Paso, it was not possible to get enough data even to present the idea for El Paso. The presence of a sanction may be inferred from the fact that many leaders mentioned that No. 11 might be considered as an influential by some, but not by them, They would then give a list of reasons why not. Such a thing never occurred in El Paso. Let us turn to a brief review of Table IV to see what light it can throw on this problem.

Numbers 13 and 51 are outstanding in that they were chosen strongly by all groups. They were, however, the only two business elites chosen by more than half of the political elites. Both men were bankers, and both were neutral in the struggle. Their high status in the city and their importance in the economic life of Cd. Juarez was unquestioned; political elites could select them without having to concede anything to the opposition. Numbers 135, 16, 59 and 20 were also neutrals, and as the percentages show, were more strongly supported by the political elites than by the business elites. But the percentages also show a recognition of relative influence; that is, both the political and the business elites recognized the latter neutrals as having less influence than the former. Finally, Mssrs. 11, 151 and 114 are the three progovernment business elites in this Table.

In considering the comparative responses of El Pasoans and Juarenses to this question and the other question about political elites, there is a sharp contrast in tone and attitude shown by these Americans and Mexicans. El Pasoans generally avoided a discussion of the elite structure, simply answering the question as best they could, or refusing to answer, but not volunteering more than the minimal information requested.



On the other hand, the very nature of the social situation in Cd. Juarez helped to clarify the elite sturcture, for the respendents were generally able and willing to identify the various groups involved, and to analyze their various merits and degrees of influence. Who the tep business clites were seemed to be clearer in Cd. Juarez for all groups combined than for El Paso, despite the intense political contreversy in Cd. Juarez, or perhaps because of it.

Once again the choices of the judges supports this image of the business elites. Thirty-two of the thirty-seven elites were chesen at least by one of the five judges, and fourteen of the top seventeen in Table IV were chosen three of mere times, while the comparable figure is 11 out of 15 for El Paso. The evidence seems to suggest that this is about all the consensus that one might expect to get in cities of this size and social structure.

We may now turn briefly to the list which shows the various types of business with which these thirty-seven elites were primarily associated: LIST IV

OCCUPATIONS OF CD. JUAREZ BUSINESS ELITES

Bankers (5)	Wholesale Trade (4)
President*	Partner and General Manager*
President*	Owner*
General Manager*	Owner
General Manager*	General Manager
General Manager	_
_	Retail Trade (13)
Industrialists (13)	Owner*
President*	Owner*
President*	Owner*
President	Owner*
Owner*	Owner*
Owner*	Owner
Owner*	Owner
Owner	Owner
General Manager*	Owner
General Manager*	Partner
General Manager*	Partner and General Manager
General Manager	General Manager*
Vice-President and General Manager*	General Manager
Treasurer and General Manager*	



(LIST IV - continued)

Communication (1)

Utilities (1)

Owner of TV-Radio Station

Partner and General Manager of Busline

<u>Declined Interview</u> (1)
Industrialist - President

TOTAL N = 38

The list is very similar to that of the El Paso business elites, and nothing further need be said about it here.

The average age of these business elites at the time of the study was 51.7 years. In terms of social background the business elites of Cd. Juarez have a mean of 10.9 years of formal education (14.3 in El Pase), with a range running from zero to 18 years. While only one third of the Cd. Juarez political elites had some formal training in El Pase, ever half of the business elites had at least some of their formal education in the United States, including but not limited to El Pase; the mean of formal education in the United States for this group of twenty persons was 8.5 years while eight of them actually had from 12 to 16 years of United States education. The mean of formal education for these twenty elites is 13.5 years, against the general mean of 10.9 years for the elite group as a whole, so that these who received some United States education tended to have more formal education on the average.


More than four fifths of the Juarez business elites (as compared with half of the political elites) claimed some fluency with the English language, and in the writer's judgment, about half actually could speak English well, which is not surprising, considering their educational background.



In considering the occupational history and socio-economic status of these elites, the reader must again bear in mind the effect of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 on Mexican society. Forty-five percent of these business leaders admitted that they came from families with large land holding or professional backgrounds. They insisted that they had lost most of their holdings in the Revolution and had to start over again. The nature of the Revolution helps to explain to some extent the large number of business leaders who had some formal United States education; their families either fled Mexico or took refuge along the border. They made use of United States educational facilities at a time when such facilities were disrupted in Mexico, or when it was dangerous for them to be living in Mexico.

Using the crude index already discussed above in order to get some idea of socio-economic status, that is, present occupation, occupational history, education, and father's occupation, the following generalizations are possible: four out of five are in the upper socio-economic status with the remaining in upper middle. As with the El Paso business and political elites there is much less differentiation of elites between statuses than is found among the Mexican political elites.


Regarding social mobility the data may be summarized as follows: almost three tenths have remained in the upper status in which they began life; about one tenth have been extremely mobile, coming from manual laboring families and beginning their own occupational history as manual laborers, slowly rising to the high positions they now occupy. The Revolution clearly had much to do with preventing more of these elites from inheriting their father's position (by contrast half of the El Paso business elites inherited their father's business position).



While the number of native born El Paso business leaders is low (one in four), the figures for Cd. Juarez are even lower, as only one in six were born in Cd. Juarez, while approximately one half were born outside Chihuahua state (in El Paso, one half were born outside the State of Texas), and one in three were born in Chihuahua state but not in Cd. Juarez.

Interpenetration of the elite groups in Cd. Juarez. While Mexico is nominally speaking 99% Catholic, it is estimated that less than half of the people are active church-goers, while the vast majority see the inside of a church only on the ceremonial occasions related to birth. marriage, and death. But the situation is much more complex than that. For the last 100 years the Church and the State in Mexico have been in almost constant struggle, with state leaders intent on complete separation of church and state. 24 During the period of the 1920's and 1930's the Church in Mexico was severely restricted, the great majority of the clergy either killed or forced underground, and much church property destroyed. Much of the opposition to the Church had stemmed from the antagonism towards the hierarchy and the tremendous economic power that it had amassed from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. The struggle culminated formally in the Consitution of 1917 which specifically banned the Church from owning property, from carrying on educational programs, banned the clergy from appearing in public in clerical garb, from voting, or from holding any public demonstration or celebration. Since then, the Church has been living virtually outside the Constitution in Mexico, depending on the extent to which it

^{24.} See Tucker, op. cit., Chapter 3.



has been violating the above Constitutional prohibitions. ²⁵ Despite the bitter struggles of the '20's it appears to all observers, and this is certainly true of Cd. Juarez, that the church is well on its way to a renaissance. In this situation it is interesting to study the alignment of the elites of Cd. Juarez vis a vis the Catholic Church.


The businessmen, almost without exception, are strong supporters of the Catholic Church, and have given exceptionally strong backing to the Church's rebuilding program in the city. This includes the development of a Boy's Town, a Church affiliated high school for girls and the building of a Cathedral opposite the center plaza, as well as two new churches in other parts of the city. The names of the top businessmen are found either heading committees to develop these projects or heading lists of the contributors of money. Two out of three business elites said that they were regular in their attendance at Sunday Mass, while only one in five said that they attended mass only occasionally or hardly ever. One respondent claimed no affiliation with any church, and two others were of the Jewish religion, one being active and the other not. But whatever their church attendance the essential point is that all of them were willing to lend financial and/or physical support to the Church's redevelopment program. ²⁶

This is in sharp contrast with the attitude and action of the Cd.

Juarez political elites, who represented generally an anti-church group,
with the federal government officials representing the notable exceptions.

^{25.} This explains why none of the local clergy were chosen as "influentials" in this study.

^{26.} The two Jewish leaders contributed just as strongly to the Catholic Church program.



Only one in four claimed that they attended Church regularly, while more than half said that they went occasionally or not at all. For this group as a whole the essential thing is that there is an open hostility towards the Church expressed by the majority; if they attended Church it was only to fulfill social obligations and not because of any espousal of Catholic doctrine. As one of the leaders put it: "I believe in God but not in men; although I was reared in the Catholic tradition I have taken refuge in Masonry." The Church is condemned by them as one of the chief causes if not the chief cause of all of Mexico's ills.

This statement about "taking refuge in Masonry" is further indication of the lack of integration at the local and state levels in Mexico. A number of the business elites asserted that in order to get ahead in Mexico politics, one must join one of the Masonic Lodges, although the writer did not become aware of the implications of this until too late in the study to get full data, some information was obtained which suggests that there is some validity to the assertion. 27 At least five of the political elites were members of a Masonic Lodge, and indications are that others were also, although they neglected to mention this in listing their membership in voluntary associations. In contrast twenty-one of the business elites reputed membership in The Knights of Columbus or some other Catholic organization, while none reported being members of a Masonic Lodge. In El Paso, both political and business elites belong to various churches and masonic orders without relation to their membership in political or business groups. As


^{27.} A history of the struggle for political power in Mexico between the Scotish Rite and the York Rite has been written in Spanish, but the writer has been unable to locate a reference to it.

Williams 28 expresses it, the alternative to active religious participation in the United States is indifference rather than a strong anti-clerical attitude, such as is found in Mexico.

The statistical data show that there is much less interpenetration in terms of a political elite being given strong support as a business elite also, and vice-versa. None of the Juarez political elites would rank in the top twenty business elites of Cd. Juarez (by comparison five of the El Paso political elites would be in the Top Twenty business elites of their city).

Turning to the Cd. Juarez business elites, we find that nine of them (as compared with fifteen pasenos) received support as political elites also. Five of the businessmen (as compared with four pasenos) could have ranked among the top political elites. The data here may suggest an apparent interpenetration in Cd. Juarez, but careful analysis dispells this notion. Three of the five business elites who were chosen also as Political elites were chosen because they were the top leaders of the opposition to the local government. The other two elites were the pro-government business leaders who have been discussed at some length above. Interpenetration, as it was defined previously, referred to the degree of cohesion and unity resulting from commonly shared values and perspectives of the elite groups. The voting patterns discussed above certainly do not indicate this for Cd. Juarez.

The problem of cleavage is revealed even when one looks at the secular organizational affiliations. Until a few years ago the Chamber of Commerce of Cd. Juarez had been functioning as a part of the over-all political system of the city. This has now changed and the business elites 28. Robin Williams, American Society, Alfred Knopf Co., N. Y. 1955, Ch. 9.




are in complete control of the Chamber. As a result, all directorships and other vital posts are held by those who adhere to the program sponsored by the leaders of the main business group. None of the businessmen close to the government have any voice in present Chamber of Commerce affairs. In response to inquiries from the writer, they admitted that they do not even attend meetings any more. The same hold true for the professionals who are PRI leaders and who formerly held important posts in the Chamber of Commerce. Thirty-two of the thirty-seven business elites mentioned the Chamber of Commerce as one of the organizations of which they were members while only two political elites did so. This again is in significant contrast with the situation in El Paso where thirty-six of the thirty-eight business elites and thirteen of the nineteen political elites reported membership in the Chamber of Commerce.

Almost the same thing holds true for such civic clubs as Rotary.

Lions, and Kiwanis, where the 37 business elites of Juarez report a membership of fifty-seven in these organizations while the 22 political elites report only nine memberships. Again, the El Paso situation stands in significant contrast, with the El Paso businessmen reporting 29 memberships and the political elites 14 in these same organizations. Of more significance for Juarez is the fact that of the fifty-seven memberships reported about one-third of these are in an exclusive, newly


^{29.} The Chi Square of Association is 9.505; with one degree of freedom the probability is between 01 and 001. See M. J. Hagood and D. O. Price, Statistics For Sociologists, Henry Holt Co., N. Y., 1952, Chapter 20 for this and all other Chi Squares.

^{30.} The differences are significant at the 05 level since the Chi Square is 5.778 with one degree of freedom, and the probability is between 02 and 01.



Membership in this club has so far been restricted to those business and professional leaders who are in open opposition to the government. There is another group which these same business elites have formed, called the Juarez Civic Association, and it includes in its body all those interested in bringing about "better government" and a "greater awareness of civic responsibilities" by the mass of the people. Such is its avowed program; it has been attacked by the political elites as a political group trying to stir up trouble without cause. Because of the close association of the leaders of this group with those of the Chamber of Commerce, the government has claimed that the businessmen are unjustifiably engaging in politics.

For their part, the political elites have several organizations, government sponsored in some cases, local "literary societies" in others, from which the business elites are more or less excluded. Governmental committees that are supposed to include business and other civic leaders are filled with names of those who are neutral or pro-government in their orientation. Official holiday celebrations no longer include members of both groups on the program, and in some instances, the two groups actually vie with each other for public favor, each sponsoring its own fiesta. As might be expected, this has led to an impasse on many important public problems. For example, the city is in need of an adequate school lunch program, and both sides have publicly recognized this need. The business elites took the initiative by depositing a large sum of money in the bank to support such a program and practically demanded that the government match their sum. The government leaders called the maneuver high-handed and political and have refused to meet



the problem under these conditions. This situation continued for the whole period of the writer's stay with the school children being the most obvious loser.

The two elite groups are most likely to come together on formal ceremonial occasions which involve El Paso elites. On these occasions the elites are forced to let down their guards just a bit, and the feeling afterwards is that "Mr. X is not such a bad person; it's just that he is being misled." Since there are no means by which the initial breakthrough can be followed up — they just don't attend the same club meetings or cocktail parties even — the old attitudes quickly reaffirm themselves. Thus, unity and cohesiveness between the two elite groups are lacking in Cd. Juarez.

Comparison of the Elite systems. As Table V shows, the structure of business in both cities is quite similar, at least in terms of major business categories and occupational titles. The Chi Square test showed no association between place of residence and occupational composition of the business elite structures. However, considerable caution must be exercised to avoid overgeneralizing the similarities. The top elites in El Paso command corporate enterprises that employ as many as 2000 people and have gross annual earnings of as much as \$500,000,000.00. There is nothing to compare with this in Cd. Juarez. While most businesses in Cd. Juarez are incorporated, the corporation generally consists of husbnad, wife and children, and perhaps one or two other relatives. Almost half of the El Paso elites ran enterprises

^{31.} The Chi Square = 1.697 with three degrees of freedom giving a probability reading between 70 and 50.




TABLE V

BUSINESS ELITES OF TWO BORDER COMMUNITIES BY OCCUPATION. ON THE BASIS OF VOTES RECEIVED FROM ELITES AND KNOWLEDGEABLES

KL PASO

CD. JUAREZ

(5) Bankers: (5) Bankers: President* President* President* President General Manager* Chairman of Board Vice-president* Vice-president

(13)Industrialists: President* President* President* President* Chairman of Board* President President President President

> Owner Vice-president Vice-president General Manager

Retail Trade: (10)President* President President President Owner Owner

Vice-president Vice-president General Manager General Manager

Wholesale: President* President* President* President

General Manager

Communications: (3) Editor and President of newspaper* Owner of newspaper, TV-Radio Station*

Editor and Vice-president of newspaper

(2) Utilities: General Manager* General Manager*

General Manager*

Industrialists: (13)Owner* General Manager* General Manager* President* General Manager* President*

Vice-president and General Manager*

Treasurer and General Manager* President Owner General Manager Owner*

(13)Retail Trade:

Owner* Owner* General Manager* Owner* Owner* Owner* Owner Owner Owner

General Manager

Owner Par tner

Partner and General Manager

(4)Wholesale: Partner and General Manager* Owner* General Manager

Owner

(1) Communications: Owner of TV-Radio Station

Utilities: (1) Partner and General Manager of Bus Line

Declined Interview: (1) Industrialist


1 10 on more wotes as elite.

Declined Interview: Bank president*

Industrialist*

TOTAL 40

TOTAL



which employed between 200 and 2000 persons; in contrast, only two Cd. Juarez elites employed as many as 200-365 persons in their business. Table VI provides a complete breakdown of the number of employees involved in the various business enterprises. The differences between cities are significant at the .001 level. 32

TABLE VI


NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF ELITES WHO COMMAND HUSINESS
ENTERPRISES OF VARIOUS SIZES IN EL PASO AND CD. JUAREZ

No. Employed	El Paso		Cd, Juarez*	
	No.	%	No.	%
50 and under	14	37	24	65
51 to 200	7	19	9	24
201 to 2000	17	L l l	2	5

Percentage does not total 100% because two elites failed to answer the question.

Another important difference between the two business groups was that in El Paso the occupation listed in Table V was the major and only occupation for most of the elites; only five were chairmen of the Board of other business enterprises, and beyond stock holding, they had almost three times as many "other" business interests as their El Paso counterpart, being president or owner of two or three businesses at the same time. The explanation may lie in the different sizes of the businesses being compared; the executive in El Paso had a much more complex role to perform, and had to concentrate all his energies on it. The Cd. Juarez businessman's greater diversity seemed to lie in the fact that the business system in which he operated had not yet achieved the

^{32.} Chi Square = 14.394, and with two degrees of freedom the probability is less than 001.



complexity it had in the United States. This fact may also help account for the time he was able to devote to political affairs, time which most American businessmen would find it impossible to give to such endeavor.

Despite all this, the fact that bankers, industrialists, etc. were chosen is almost equal numbers in both cities points to a similarity in ideological orientation which should not be overlooked. This similarity will be examined in more detail in subsequent chapters.

Table VII reveals a sharp difference in the political elite structures. However, because of the small frequencies in the legislation and judiciary cells an overall Chi Square of association between place of residence and nature of the Political Elite structures was not possible. Chi Squares of association were computed for the executive and non-governmental — PRI Party Personnel groups — and Fishers exact probability test was used for the legislative and judiciary groups. The results follow: 33

Executives compared: $x^2 = 3.342$ one degree of freedom Probability between 10 and 05

Legislatives compared: Log Po = -.76742
Probability = .135

Judiciaries compared: Log Po = -2.94000

Probability = .087

Non-governmental compared: $X^2 = .488$ one degree of freedom Probability between 50 p 30

By adding the Chi Squares and converting the exact probability levels into Chi Squares and then adding them to the total, the Chi Square for

^{33.} For the exact probability test see Merle W. Tate and Richard C. Clelland, NonParametric and Shortcut Statistics, Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., Danville, Illinois, 1957, pp. 72-74.



TABLE VII

POLITICAL ELITES OF TWO BORDER COMMUNITIES BY OCCUPATION ON THE BASIS OF VOTES RECRIVED FROM ELITES AND KNOWLEDGEABLES

EL PASO

CD. JUAREZ

(6) · utive: MAYOR* Ex-mayor* Ex-mayor Ex-federal official* Ex-federal official COUNTY CLERK* <u>zislative</u>: (1)

CITY COUNCILMAN

diciary: (8) FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE* COUNTY JUDGE* JUDGE JUDGE JUDGE DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Former District Attorney

COUNTY SHERIFF

Non-governmental: (4) Lawyer Lawyer Lawyer

Businessman*

Declined Interview: (2) Lawyer

Lawyer

Executive: (13)

> GOVERNOR* MAYOR* Ex-mayor*

ASSISTANT MAYOR* CITY TREASURER*

PUBLIC WORKS COMMISSIONER*

CITY CLERK* POLICE CHIEF*

STATE POLICE INSPECTOR* STATE TAX COLLECTOR*

FEDERAL IMMIGRATION CHIEF* FEDERAL TREASURER (INTERNAL REV.)*

FEDERAL MEDICAL OFFICIAL

Legislative: (4)FEDERAL DIPUTADO

Candidate for diputado (PAN)

CITY ALDERMAN CITY ALDERMAN

(o) Judiciary:

None

(5) PRI Party Personnel:

LABOR LEADER* LABOR LEADER Lawyer PRI LEADER*


LABOR LEADER

Declined Interview: (1) Ex-Mayor*

TOTAL 21

TOTAL 23

^{*} Those with asterisk after name received 10 or more votes. UPPER CASE INDICATES PERSON HOLDING OFFICE AT TIME OF STUDY



II as a whole is 8.994. With four degrees of freedom the probis between 10 and 05. While the differences do not reach the
cant level, they approach it closely, and some comment on the
s pertinent.

Juarez the importance of the executive is clearly seen; all xecutive officeholders were chosen as elites, and with only one on they all received ten or more votes. The three treasurers state and federal) were named; as one El Paso elite said: 1 all be rich before they get out of office." The federal er disagreed with this notion, but did acknowledge that he had y turned down a 500 peso gift from a taxpayer who was surprised action. Influence is derived from the executive office; as previously, authority and influence are located at the same . Such offices were never named as influential in El Paso. e mayors of both cities were the top vote receivers, with the the Cd. Juarez mayor approaching unanimity. But this latter on was also more conditional. That is, while he held office. d derive influence from it which he could use to his own personal ge. But, as many respondents remarked, "once he leaves office e's dead politically." Although a few also said this about the f El Paso, most insisted that he would continue to be influential affairs for years to come. More important seemed to be the fact e mayor of El Paso was chosen for his accomplishments in office. he had dominated the political scene in recent years, and bef his phenomenal success as a businessman. People voted for Cd. Juarez, the mayor was important because he was a member of


the FMI party, and had been given an office by the party. This fact alone gives him personal influence.

In both cities the lack of importance of the legislative branch of government is apparent, while there is again some contrast between the influence of the judiciary in El Paso and the lack of influence in Cd. Juarez. This seems to point up the fact that it is not the office as such but the individual who counts in El Paso. The mayor and the ex-mayor were millionnaire businessmen; the county clerk was a young man of Spanish-speaking background who had a strong popular following and had demonstrated considerable administrative skill. The city councilman chosen was also of Spanish-speaking background, a good administrator with popular support. The others chosen were lawyers and businessmen.

There were very few full time government career men in the political lite structure of El Paso as compared with that of Cd. Juarez. The sal political influentials are only partially visible in the formal ite structure of El Paso, while they are wholly visible in Cd. Juarez.

Summary and Conclusions. In this chapter the elite groups within two cities under study were described, and an attempt was made to ineate their significant features by a comparative analysis. This lysis indicates that there is more similarity in the business elite ps than in the political elite groups of the two cities; and that is a definite interpenetration of the two groups in El Paso leader a high degree of cohesiveness. Just the opposite characterizes uarez; that is, there is a cleavage between business and political s leading to an almost complete impasse and structural breakdown in areas of vital city-wide concern.

Another important factor brought out by the analysis is the difference in the distribution of influence as between the two cities. Influence - the ability of an individual to see to it that decisions made by those in authority are in accord with his personal goals is of course more easily defined and analyzed in the political structure than in the business structure. In the political structure there is a legitimized, somewhat hierarchically arranged distribution of power through the authority vested in specific offices. In both Mexico and the United States this has official public sanction. However, while the formal political structures of both cities appear to be very similar. the locus of power is very different because of the different ways in which influence is distributed. In the Mexican system, apparently, influence is an extension of the actual authority positions more than n the United States. The municipal codes may clearly delimit the mount of power vested in any particular position, but the process of stitutionalization of the rational-legal form of government has been nerally lacking. The more gemeinshaft-like orientation makes it sible for those in authority to derive temporary personal influence m the office. Since the Mexican government is strongly centralized-er proceeds downward from the president to the governors of the ral states, and through them to the municipal leaders -- the executive ch has so far been the main source of power, with the judicial and lative branches acting more as stamps of approval than as independent es of power in their own right. At least, this is the image of resulting from the data presented in this chapter, and which conclosely to the historical and actual situation in Mexico as depicted e literature.




A further point related to the above concerns the problem of personalism in Latin American governments. Tannenbaum, 34 Wise, 35 and others have laid great emphasis on the importance of the leader, the candillo, and Mexican literature is replete with references to the same theme. 36 The analysis above would seem to suggest some clarification of this theme along the following lines. Whatever the merits of the caudillo theme historically, it seems evident now that the occupation of a particular office is also a prime factor in the distribution of power in Mexico at least at the local urban level, and that one obtains these offices through PRI party membership. To occupy the office is to have power, both authority and influence, with both diminishing as one descends the hierarchical ladder. From the point of view of the individual, it is the office which limits his power. The lines of people that form three or four times weekly outside a particular governmental office are strong evidence that the mass of the people recognize the locus of power, and the way in which they seek to interact with the particular official shows that it is not his personal dynamism that counts but the kind of influence which his ffice makes possible.

The individual brings a personal element to play when he disibutes bureaucratic offices under his control according to kinship
d particularistic considerations rather than considerations of

Tannenbaum, "Personal Government . . . ", op. cit.

George Wise, Antonio Guzman Blanco, Portrait of a Caudillo Calendara

For a full bibliography on this subject see, W. V. D'Antonio, M. A. thesis, op. cit.




technical competence. Thus, in Chihuahua state, the governor gave important posts throughout the state, including key municipal positions, to his relatives and close friends. This certainly is a form of audillismo.

The situation in the United States is not so simple. Certainly

incoln Steffens uncovered data about American cities not dissimilar this. But recent community studies 38 seem to confirm the findings alyzed in this chapter, namely that authority and influence are not often located at the same address in the United States as they used be. The bureaucracy has advanced to such a degree in cities like Paso that the holding of a political office does not necessarily ly any amount of personal influence on the part of the officeholder. re has been an effective penetration of the political structure by economic structure in recent years, one which on the one hand carey restricts the power of the political officeholder, and on the r exerts tremendous influence on these same officeholders. This s it extremely difficult to locate the locus of influence. ical elites chosen in this study were chosen for their influence. ecause of the offices they occupied. While some political offices as those of City Councilman are like their Cd. Juarez counterparts extent that they are more stamps of approval for decisions reached mers, the difference lies in who has reached the decision. In

hen the governor was removed from office by the President just fter the end of this study, his relatives and friends were also emoved.


unter, op. cit.; Schulze and Blumberg, op. cit.; Mills, op. cit.



, Juarez the decisions which the legislative and judicial officials re asked to approve were arrived at within the executive branch of political group. In El Paso, and other American cities apparently, h decisions are arrived at outside the immediate governmental group. such as bankers, industrialists, lawyers working for businessmen, etc. s, the difference in the power distribution between Cd. Juarez and Paso is that in Cd. Juarez authority and influence are located at same address, or at least within the general address of the political up, while in El Paso this is not so. In fact, effective influence ften brought to bear on the political group by the business elite p. In the pyramid of power in American cities like 12 Paso the tical and business systems tend to merge into a single hierarchy. exican cities like Cd. Juarez, there are two pyramids of power, sed to each other. in an almost constant state of struggle. The le of the school lunch program in Cd. Juarez, alluded to above, is ne of the many that demonstrate how the two groups seek in vain minate each other.

The problem of describing and analyzing the business elite structure for terms is made difficult by the lack of a legitimized formal ity pattern wherein bankers are ranked higher or lower than rialists, etc. Nevertheless, empirically, it seems that the se elites do recognize some such pattern in common, for there is operent similarity between the business elite groups of the two Control of wealth in one form or another seems to be the major

control of wealth in one form or another seems to be the major nant of business elite status in both cities, while ability to conomic power to bear on political power is a recognized and at factor in El Paso which cannot be overlooked.




clusion, the following points may be made concerning the stations with which this study is concerned:

- Mexico or Latin America has no monopoly on particularistic lps. Major decisions reached in El Paso during the course of indicate that such relationships are vital here too, and may t.
- 2 Kinship is certainly important in Mexico; relatives of the seld important posts throughout the state, including Cd. Juarez. This was claimed to be true at the local level with the mayor's this was not true in El Paso; the mayor's brother was retracts although his bids were often better than others presented ame job. 39
- 3 The office is extremely important in Mexico. To hold to have influence; it's authority plus. In the United States eholders are often subject to the influence of "hidden" makers.
- 4 Caudillismo still exists in Mexico, but men interested in goals and ambitions also count in the United States, but not in open and obvious manner.
- 5 There is much similarity between the business systems in and the United States, although business in Mexico is still far he stage to which it has developed in the United States. With es that are local in nature, kinship is important in both

8.

s may be a kind of particularism in reverse.



alizing from El Paso and Cd. Juarez to the larger social which they are a part must be done with care. The elite of El Paso seems to conform closely to what investigators in other cities. 40 with the notable exceptions that labor lous leaders were not found to be top influentials here. This plained by the fact that organized labor is very weak in El it is in most other Southern cities. Nevertheless, two labor re included as knowledgeables in this study. The Catholic ich predominates in terms of numbers is not yet a major force mainly because the large number of Americans of Mexican are not at all united or politically aware. generalize from Cd. Juarez is more dangerous, because this is t community power structure study of a Mexican city that the nows of. All that can be said here is that the elites of both hought that political-business relations in Cd. Juarez were of Mexican cities. It is hoped that the data of this chapter ovide, along with those of the next chapter, sufficient backto make meaningful the comparative study of the national images

these elites.

water, op. cit; Mills, op. cit.; Schulze, op. cit.; Miller, op. cit.

CHAPTER IV


CULTURAL CONTACTS OF THE ELITES OF EL PASO AND CD. JUAREZ ND THE INFLUENCE OF THESE CONTACTS ON NATIONAL IMAGES

much as national images are not only a result of ideas, feel-

the impressions garnered from socialization and intra-national, but also are the product of almost daily interaction of inserviting and between cities in a border situation, it seemed at the consider the amount and nature of these contacts for the te groups. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the cross-cultural contacts of the business and political elites as and Cd. Juarez in order to provide further background to day of their national images. Following this, an index of contact between the four elite groups and the remaining between amount of contact and images.

A. Business Contacts


number of Juarez elites flatly asserted that the two cities "are ly interdependent economically." While this comment seemed to be more at the kinds of daily interaction that were discussed in rechapters, still it remained true that for many of the elites of ities much of their economic well-being depended on their neighbors the river. Whether it was the industrialist in El Paso employees were largely residents of Cd. Juarez, or the large remerchant forty percent of whose business came from Cd. Juarez, or the wholesaler whose Mexican business ran into the millions of



bllars, all were daily aware of the economic importance to them of the exican people. For their part the Mexican retailers who depended on merican tourists, or the Custom House Brokers who handled thousands of ollars of American goods daily, or the bankers who were most immedately aware of the importance of the favorable dollar balance in the exican economy were constantly concerned about their American neighors. These brief remarks give only the slightest indication of the ctent of business contacts between the two cities. A special interitional committee of the Chambers of Commerce has been set up to ster better communication between the business elites of the two ties in the hope of ameliorating or eliminating problems of mutual ncern. One such problem was the traffic congestion in and around the idges connecting the two cities. At a meeting of this committee ich the researcher attended the problem was approached frankly and riously by all the members, and outside experts were called in to try help resolve a problem that was daily becoming more annoying and ublesome.

All of the International Civic Clubs have special committees to dle banquets and luncheons of an international nature, and many inessmen from both cities make it a point to lunch occasionally in neighboring Rotary Club.

El Paso merchants have tremendously increased their amount of adcising in Juarez newspapers in recent years, which has not been withits affect on Juarez merchants and their advertising habits. o stations on both sides do considerable advertising of products in the other country.




B. Political Contacts

t the positive sanctions of the governments concerned. On the level, immigration and customs officials have been learning to a closer harmony to help reduce friction within the areas of their labor to try to seek an equitable distribution of the scarce supply from the Rio Grande.

The mayors of both cities are in constant contact over mutual tems of police, fire, health, and crime. They have set up their international committee to handle these problems. Both cities have military installations, and military reviews, banquets and parades international nature are frequent. The Federal Bureau of Investing has been trying to work more with the Mexican government officials prehend and exchange criminals, and to give police instruction desired.

In recent years the federal government in Mexico has passed some rictive laws regarding the imports of American goods and general or commerce; in turn the Texas legislature has been considering pass-laws that would restrict the importation of certain goods from to, notably liquor which is a major commodity of the Cd. Juarez to. The local government elites are constantly working to minimize legislation and to seek freer trade concessions for the area.

See Chapter III, Part A above, The Research Site, for other comments on these contacts. The F.B.I. actually helped to train a special Juarez police unit called the "Bilingual Police," whose main function was to see that tourists and visitors to Juarez were courteously treated and protected.




remarks on the nature of political contacts are meant to be rather than exhaustive, in order to give the reader some idea applex situation in which these two border cities find them-Among general contacts that occur between all of the elites which take place on the occasion of a major holiday celebrational significance in either city, e.g., the Fourth of July, each of September, Pan American Day, the Sun Carnival. At as elites of the other country are official guests, or often speakers of the occasion.

ally, two interesting areas of contact which could not be exor lack of time were: (1) the extent to which the elites read
y papers of the city or listened to radio broadcasts or watched
on programs originating in the other city; (2) the extent to
arez elites sent their own children to schools in El Paso. Rethe latter, indications were that a majority of the business
and about twenty per cent of the political elites did so. The
nce of these kinds of contacts cannot be underestimated.

C. Measuring Cross-Cultural Contacts

e interview schedule included a number of questions designed to different kinds of cross-cultural contacts; these were mainly in information derived from the exploratory research. The questere designed to give a general idea about such contacts, and to data which would indicate whether any of the elite groups had icantly more cross-cultural contact than the others. It was a hoped that it might be possible to relate these data on contact



be tween amount of contact and the nature of the national ld. No attempt was made to set up a series of questions which independent of each other and possessing absolute values, and possible the creation of an additive scale. Several of the clearly overlapped, but not perfectly. There was the further hat certain kinds of contact might not be relevant to the four this turned out to be the case for formal cross-cultural educaraffic was all one-way from Mexico to the United States. other questions about contact will be discussed in detail below. the construction of the index of contacts each question will be as an attribute, and individuals will be given a score of 0 or ing on whether or not they had no or some contact with respect puestion. This procedure means a collapsing of categories disling between varying amounts of contact in order to reduce the arbitrary weighting of items, for which there is no criteria luating their comparative importance.

nal images, the prediction being that there would be a re-

s following questions were asked regarding cross-cultural con-

Q. 3: How many years of school did you complete, and where?


Q. 3a, 4: How much prejudice did you encounter: as a student, a worker?

Q. 3b: Do you speak the other language? If yes, how well?

Q. 6: Do you have contacts with business and/or government gencies in the other country? What kinds of contacts are they?

Q. 7a: Do the organizations (formal associations such as namber of Commerce, Rotary) of which you are a member have conacts with similar organizations in the neighboring city?

Q. 8: Do you belong to organizations in the other city? tions may be found in the Interview Schedule in Appendix A.



Q. 9: Among your six closest friends do any of them live in neighboring city? How often do you see them?

Q. 11: How often do you go to Juarez (E.P.)?

s-cultural education. The data for question three revealed the Juarez elites had any cross-cultural education, as was , with more than half of the business elites and one-fourth of l elites having some formal education in the United States. that a fifth of the business elites had 10 or more years of ducation in the United States suggests that this was an imporrce of cross-cultural contact for them. Nevertheless, since n was not comparable for El Paso, it is not included in the index. cidents of prejudice. Questions 3a and 4 on amount of prejudice ered in the other country brought forth several isolated cases on t of the Juarez elite, but nothing to suggest any pattern. ntacts of formal organizations. Question 7a revealed nothing more nat such organizations did in fact have cross-cultural contacts asion. This question is not included in the index. ross-cultural formal association membership. Question 8 revealed that Juarez business elites belonged to the El Paso Chamber of Commerce e El Paso business elite belonged to the Juarez Rotary Club. on again gives evidence of the amount of cross-cultural contact Juarez business elites; it is not included in the index. The items that follow form the index of contacts for this study; coring procedure for the items is found in Table VIII below. The

r will find the frequency distribution for each item by elite groups

pendix B, Table XXXIV.




TABLE VIII

SCORING PROCEDURE FOR ITEMS IN INDEX OF CONTACTS

TA .

ltem	Weight		
	0	1	
nguage facility	None-little	Fair-bilingual	
rmal business	None	Some	
vernment for business reasons	None	Some	
vernmental cooperation	None	Some	
ternational committee	Not a member	Member	
remonial	None	Some	
cial-friendship visits	None	Some	
ning, entertaining	None	Some	
st friends in other city	None	Some	
sits to other city	Less than weekly	Weekly	


thout ever coming into contact with a person to whom the langative, yet ability to speak such language without actual intercontact is rare, especially for Americans. At any rate, to be peak another language at all is evidence of contact with another tural system, no matter how indirect. This question revealed jority of all groups had some knowledge of the other language, third of the Mexican businessmen claiming to be completely

ness-government contacts. This was an open-ended question.

of the data revealed that the responses fell into seven diftegories, each of which is considered as a separate attribute
dex. While a person could have mentioned as many contacts as
, actually no one mentioned more than three such contacts.

espondents mentioned all possible contacts or not is not certhe researcher is satisfied that this is a good approximation.

siness, social-friendship and dining-entertaining were the
uently mentioned items. The assumption behind this question



t visiting a "best friend" in the other city makes for important unities in cultural diffusion, exchange of ideas, and comparison of doing things. No attempt was made to distinguish between we and non-relatives as best friends, or Anglos and Mexicans. Destion revealed that all four groups acknowledged having some that with "best" friends* in the other city. This was more true of arez business elites than of the others.

requency of visits to the other city. The question of how often

related to and overlaps some of the other variables in the index. ssumed that the more trips an individual made the more aware he of the other socio-cultural system. He would see more of cusdimmigration officials and perhaps lose some of that suspicion which seemed to annoy the infrequent traveler. Obvious comparf traffic conditions and the ways in which traffic is handled are ed to the daily border crosser.

estion ll revealed that the El Paso elites visit Juarez on the of twice a month while the Juarez elites average weekly visits

coups have. Contacts between Mexican and American elites range to daily, with the latter category representing individuals as which speak the other language well, have best friends in the ty whom they see frequently, visit the other city at least and have extensive business and/or government contacts. The

friend was distinguished as different from social and friendisiting as a matter of business or government policy, which is the contacts listed on question 6.




TABLE IX

QUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ELITES BY GROUPS AND CONTACT RANK

mtact Rank	EPB	EPP	JB	JP	TOTALS
w (0−2)	19	8	4	8	39
odium (3-4)	12	6	8	7	33
igh (5-6)	_7	_5	25	_7	ጥ
Total	38	19	37	22	116

s not purport to demonstrate the extent of contact of the elite ith each other as such. Nor is it a true index of status-equal although it may and in fact does include status-equal contacts. e index gives a rough estimate of the extent of contact which and Mexican elites have in each other's cities.

D. Relationship Between Occupation and Contacts

thesis: The Juarez business elites have significantly greater cross-cultural contact than any of the other elite groups.

se of the chi-square test of association the following re-


e attained:*

Juarez business elites compared with Juarez political es: $X^2 = 9.606$ 01 p 001

Juarez business elites compared with El Paso business es: $X^2 = 19.457$ 001 p

Juarez business elite compared with El Paso political es: $X^2 = 10.061$ 01 p 05

e the probability of such findings by chance is less than one tree cases, the hypothesis is accepted. Several factors would count for this differential cross-cultural association. In place, political systems are primarily concerned with boundary squares had two degrees of freedom. The other groups were not eartly different from each other.



will be largely internal. The peculiar conditions of border life that certain political elites in both systems will have high cultural contacts, but this will not apply to the groups as a This appears to be the case here.

Or the business elites the situation would seem to be different.

the focus of business is less boundary conscious, at least on the the El Paso business elites are sure that their system is the one, and that they do not have to learn from the Mexican. While we keenly aware of their dependence on Mexican customers, their is that the customers will be naturally attracted to El Paso if ernments do not put "unnatural" barriers in the way of this

e Juarez business elites have the greatest amount of contact for r of reasons. In the first place, the Mexican Revolution forced their families into temporary exile in the Southern United where they had much schooling and learned the English language. The trend in business throughout Mexico in recent years has rard the "American way." The border offers Mexican businessmen contact with the American business system. Finally, they need y and technical know-how, and these are available in El Paso. tion may be raised here whether the cleavage between business tical elites in Mexico, discussed in Chapter Three, may be ed by this high degree of contact on the part of the business While business and political groups have been at odds histornamical may be aggravated when the business in a position to compare their lot with that of colleagues



the river who seem to be enjoying just those things which they e are denied to them. This is one of the problems which will be with further in the Chapter on national political images.

Relationship Between Cross-Cultural Contact and National Images
ne question may now be raised as to whether in fact amount of coninfluences the nature of the image which an individual or group
other individuals and groups. In other words, will significant
ences occur in the images held by those with high contact as comwith those who have medium and low cross-cultural contact?
There are significant differences in the images which
ledium, and low contact elite have of Mexican and American business
itical practices.

iness practices and politics and political practices were excarefully. Those questions on which there were data sufficiently ntiated according to high, medium and low to make possible chitests were selected to test the hypothesis; thus, eighteen ns were selected, nine each on business and government lity was held constant, so that in fact two hypotheses were

1) That there would be significantly different images among
1, medium, and low contact elites of El Paso; and 2) that sigt differences in images would be found among the high, medium,
contact elites of Cd. Juarez. Since the business elites of
had the greatest amount of contact, separate chi squares were
uputed for them alone; the results were not significantly difeither as regards contact or in comparison with the nationality

ts: Table X shows that there is no relationship between amount within the elite groups when nationality is held constant.

Evel was reached only once; therefore the hypothesis is rejected.

no change when occupational groups were tested separately.

TABLE X

S AND PROBABILITY LEVELS FOR QUESTIONS RELATING CONTACT WITH OF BUSINESS AND POLITICS HELD BY EL PASO AND CD. JUAREZ BUSINESS AND POLITICAL ELITES


	El Paso Elites		Cd. Juarez Elites	
on*	χ2	Probability between	x ²	Probability between
	.736	7 0 p 50	.550	80 p 70
	2.685	30 p 20	.527	80 p 70
	3.066	30 p 20	•579	80 p 70
	•976	70 p 50	1.435	50 p 30
	1.345	70 p 50	5.454	10 p 05
	2.400	50 p 30	No differentiation	
	1.691	50 p 30	1.596	50 p 30
	4.100	20 p 10	.446	90 p 80
	No diff	erentiation	1.626	50 p 30
	2.515	30 p 20	No differentiation	
	3.674	20 p 10	6.184	05 p 02
	5.270	10 p 05	4.524	20 p 10
	No diff	erentiation	4.945	10 p 05
	No diff	erentiation	4.399	20 p 10
	No diff	erentiation	1.762	50 p 30
	1.776	50 p 30	•603	80 p 70
	0.000		.991	70 p 50
	3.637	20 p 10	3.444	20 p 10

l chi squares have two degrees of freedom.

buestions will found in the Interview Schedule in Appendix A. by which the chi squares were computed will be found in B, Table XI.

ppears that whatever the amount of contact, there is little iation in the images held, within national groups. Nevertheless, ents about the various questions and the frequency distribution order.

aso. On only one of the nine questions regarding business was



real trend toward significance, and that was on Question 33.
ion concerned the relative degree of class consciousness of
d American businessmen vis a vis their workers. The high and
tact elite tended to see the situation as about the same in
ries while the low elites strongly favored the image that the
musinessman was much less class conscious.*
respect to the political questions the same pattern among the
medium as opposed to the low contact elites appeared in quesdedium as opposed to the low contact elites appeared in questhe freedom of religion in both countries. The more contact there
are tendency there was to see the comparative achievement of
als as about equal. Regardless of amount of contact, there was
animous agreement on parts 4, 5, and 6 (honest elections, equal

and protection of property rights) that the United States was

of Mexico. This suggests that there is some discrimination


contact. At least those with considerable contact are not

ally negative in their image of the Mexican.

s by respondents, depending on the question, and perhaps on the

ez elites. It was very difficult to find trends here either.
on 23, comparing business-government cooperation in both cities
contact elites voted two to one that there was much closer

ory note: These comparative questions were derived from the cry research and represent the respondents evaluation of what sed favorable and unfavorable practices. The researchers feel idence that the evaluative statements have been interpreted since they were not only interviewers, but observers who came any of the respondents and the area well.




saying it was the same in both cities and the other half favaso. It is interesting to note that in no question did they ez as opposed to El Paso.

same trend reappears in question 41, parts 2, 3, 4 and 5,

ith basic freedoms and protection. While high, medium, and ct individuals all tend to say that relative achievement is al, the proportion within each group varies greatly. Thus, contact elites think this at about a two to one ratio, while m and low contact elites think so about ten to one. There be some evidence that high contact makes the Mexican more critelf aware. This problem will be explored further in the follow-ters.

inal Note. Since the Juarez business elites had a considerable formal education in the United States, it was decided to try in as a single index of contact related to images. Chi squares uputed for the Juarez business elites alone, and for the Juarez I group as a whole. In neither case did findings even approach cance.


mary. In this chapter an attempt was made to give some idea of ure and extent of cross-cultural contacts which the business and al elites of El Paso and Cd. Juarez have had. An Index of Conas constructed and by use of the chi square test of association found that the Juarez business elites had significantly more conan any of the other three groups, which groups did not differ icantly from each other. This supports the hypothesis that the business elites as a group have more cross-cultural contacts than



e other elite groups.


lly, an attempt was made to test the hypothesis that images vary tact: that is, that the more cross-cultural contact elites have, their images will vary from those with less contact. Eighteen s dealing with business and political practices were submitted square tests, with elite groups tested by nationality and divided ng to high, medium and low contact. The .05 level of signifias reached only once among the two groups tested. On a majority questions the responses within each elite group were not sufficdifferentiated to establish any trend with respect to the esis. However, some evidence for the hypothesis was found on a ty of questions within each of the groups. In these instances it sem that the more contact the more the images varied from those of contact. Thus, an El Paso elite with high contact was more likely ink the Mexican practices were about the same as those of the ed States. On the other hand, the Juarez elite with high contact less likely to think so.

The lack of differentiation in images on the basis of contacts is meant to imply that the elite groups do not see themselves and each er in significantly different ways. It is just that the factor of ass-cultural contact alone does not appear to account for the differences. It should be recognized that it is quite possible that the atter simply did not gather data on all the kinds of contacts that ght be significant in the development of national images. As stated ove, an important kind of contact may be that which takes place within a elite group. If one of the important members of the group has a high agree of cross-cultural contact, and it leads to enhancement of his



steem, his image of the other social cultural system may become age of his friends and colleagues who have less cross-cultural. This suggests that a general border climate exists such that all images are the product of a socialization process involving at contacts which were not measured here. Further study is needed spect to this factor.

the following chapters nationality and occupation will be conas attributes which may be significant in the development of Limages. Chapter V will be devoted to the images of business eter VI to politics.



CHAPTER V

IMAGES OF BUSINESSMEN AND BUSINESS PRACTICES


A. Hypotheses

ne purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to test hypotheses ng occupation and nationality to images of businessmen and business ces; (2) to delineate the substantive images of American and Mexisinessmen and business practices held by the four elite groups of cudy. In the following chapter government officials and their pol practices will be discussed. may be well to review briefly the general hypotheses stated in · II and the modifications that it was necessary to make in light exploratory research. It is assumed that individuals generally vorable images of themselves and of the social groups with which e closely identified. It is further assumed that the more the rientations of one group differ from those of another the more are individuals within the various groups to have negative images other. With specific reference to the groups with which this s concerned it was hypothesized that El Paso elites, business and al, would have favorable images of themselves and of each other. same time since they perceived that their value orientations difo much from those of the Juarez elites they were expected to have ly negative images of Mexican business and political practices. tory research seemed to indicate that there was no need to modify iding hypothesis.

was likewise anticipated that the Mexican elites would have

e images of themselves and each other, but again, because of the

d differences in value orientation would tend to be less favor-



de toward American elites. However, some ambivalence was expected cause of recent influence of American business in Mexico. Exploratory search revealed some factors which made it necessary to modify this dding hypothesis. In the first place, the Juarez business elites seem to have a great deal of cross-cultural contact and to be strongly imported with American business ideology. Therefore, in this instance, it ld be expected that the Juarez business elites would tend to have orable images of their El Paso counterparts, since they represented ideal toward which they were striving.


In the second place, the Juarez political elites, with their long

torical struggle against businessmen as a background factor, and the life which had broken out during the exploratory research as a present for, seemed to hold negative images of Mexican businessmen. On the property hand, they were treated as status equals by El Paso elites, both mess and political. Also to be considered is the fact that if the list of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 are to be achieved in any deamore gesellschaft-like orientation would seem to be required. This guiding hypothesis was modified also. With these modifications and it is now possible to state the specific hypotheses to be tested his chapter. It is predicted that when the four elite groups are to compare American and Mexican business practices, that:

la - El Paso business elites have predominantly favorable images of American Businessmen and American business practices, and predominantly negative images of Mexican businessmen and their practices.

lb - El Paso political elites have predominantly favorable images of American businessmen and their practices, and predominantly negative images of Mexican businessmen and their practices.

lc - Cd. Juarez business elites have predominantly favorable images of Mexican businessmen and their practices, and



- nantly favorable images of American businessmen and their ss, as they see their system as congruent with the American.
- Juarez political elites have somewhat negative images of businessmen and their practices, and they have ambivalent of American businessmen and their practices, i.e., both le and unfavorable images will be expressed about equally.
- ne data permit the testing of a related set of hypotheses at
- ne. This set is based on the notion that there is a signifi-
- onship between group membership and the responses made to
- ertaining to practices common to or known to the group. Spe-
- the following hypotheses are to be tested:
- 2a El Paso business, El Paso political, Juarez business and political elites have significantly different images of essmen and business practices in both countries.
- 2b El Paso elites (combining business and political) when red with Juarez elites (combining business and political) significantly different images of businessmen and their pracin both countries.
- 2c Business elites (combining El Paso and Juarez) when comd with political elites (combining El Paso and Juarez) do not significantly different images of businessmen and their pracs in both countries.
- 2d El Paso business elites when compared with El Paso tical elites do not have significantly different images of nessmen and their practices in both countries.
- 2e El Paso business elites when compared with Juarez busis elites have significantly different images of businessmen and ir practices in both countries.
- 2f El Paso business elites when compared with Juarez polial elites do not have significantly different images of businessand their practices in both countries.
- 2g El Paso political elites when compared with Juarez busis elites have significantly different images of businessmen and ir practices in both countries.
- 2h El Paso poltical elites when compared with Juarez politielites do not have significantly different images of businessand their practices in both countries.

e group memberships to be considered are those of nationality and cupation.



- Juarez business elites when compared with Juarez political ave significantly different images of businessmen and their in both countries.

t set of hypotheses defines the content or direction expecimages. The second set specifically predicts the conditions ciation which will be related to statistically significant in responses.

to formulate the questions which would test these hypothegathered during the exploratory research were analyzed and
ges formulated, so that questions could be raised concernthese images formed the subject matter for the hypotheses
it is pertinent to outline them here.

2 Image of the American Businessman and His Business Practices

owing seemed to be the generally held image of American busiheir practices:


5

He is willing to accept reasonable profits through high unit production and constant reinvestment in his business, made necessary because of keen competition. He prefers broad stockholdings, has achieved rather inherited his position, and conducts his business with impartial treatment to all alike.

His education for business has been superior, with proper emphasis on business ethics. He has definite "cultural" shortcomings, however.

tative images were formulated on the basis of the data obthe exploratory interviews (cf. Chapter II, Part B, Method).

ions are found in the Interview Schedule, Appendix A.



27,29 He thinks of labor more as a competitor for profits than as an enemy, but he is somewhat afraid of labor's growing power.

While he prefers less governmental interference on the national level, he is proud of the happy marriage of business-government in El Paso.

He doesn't have a clear-cut attitude of classconsciousness towards his employees, and moreover,
he believes that the only thing holding back a worker
from becoming a businessman is his own ambition.

His religion is basic to his business conduct, and
he is very definitely civic minded, that is, concerned with community and welfare problems.

Although respectful of the Mexican way of life, he
is perhaps a bit cold and impersonal in his behavior

Image of the Mexican Businessman and His Business Practices

toward Mexicans.

15

He seeks unjustly high profits, which he does not reinvest in his business, and he is satisfied with a limited market, which he can exploit because there is little or no competition in Mexico.

He prefers family ownership to "public" stockholding;
He inherits his position rather than having to achieve
it, and his general business conduct is oriented primarily to family and personal ties.

His education for business which is inadequate, does

not prepare him ethically for business life. However, his education does give him a very broad cultural outlook.

he sees labor more as an enemy than as business partner, and he objects to the power which labor seems to
have relative to management. In this respect he
thinks that the American businessman is in a rela-

tively superior power position.

3,31

18


36

The Mexican government has more power over business than is correspondingly true of the United States situation in labor-management relations. He does not cooperate closely with governmental officials either nationally or in Cd. Juarez, because these officials cannot be trusted.

He is very much aware of social class differences that separate him from from his employees; and he doesn't see the average working man as ever becoming a businessman.

Religion and business do not mix as far as he is concerned; he is not very "civic-minded."

In order to test the hypotheses most effectively and efficiently, the same time gather data which would make possible a more predelineation of the relevant national images, questions of a comparing mature were generally asked, such as, "Comparing Mexican and can businessmen would you say that ----?" However, a number of the tions relating only to one or the other group were asked, e.g., the of the following choices best describes the role of religion in



of the Mexican businessman?" The comparative type question sible obtaining two images at the same time, both of which could a favorable, had the respondent said that practices were similar countries.

was expected that different elite groups would respond differently questions; that is, they would evaluate business and business according to (a) their own national group, and (b) their paroccupation within this national group.

enty-six questions were asked which yielded data permitting Chitests to be made. Fourteen of the twenty-six were comparative in with the remainder concerning either the United States or Mexico.

sults. Tables XII, XIII, XIV give the Chi-Square and probability or each of the twenty-six questions asked, according to the releprothesis.* Table XV summarizes the results in these tables. Let sider briefly the results with respect to each of the nine hypothesia in ationality and occupation to national images. The results valuated by asking the question, what is the probability of r(signal) findings in n(26) number of tests. To find this probability momial was expended to the point where it coincided with the results of findings for the hypothesis. As a short cut, the publication of United States Department of Commerce, The Tables of the Binomial vality Distribution, United States Government Printing Office, agton, 1949, was used to find the probability. The probability of .5 that a significant difference would be found for any single it in the binomial expansion was chosen because it was the most

data for the computation of these Chi-squares are found in Table XVI ppendix B.

rvative. Thus, the hypothesis is accepted or rejected on the basis




TABLE XII

JARES AND PROBABILITY LEVELS FOR QUESTIONS ON BUSINESSMEN AND BUSINESS PRACTICES REGARDING HYPOTHESES 2a, 2b, and 2c*

Hypothesi: EPB_EPP_J			esis 2b _J	Hypothe B-	
X ² p ro bal	bility	x ² pro	obability	x ² pro	bability
22.522 0	l p 001 l p 001 l p	12.799 13.864 ^c 19.754	20 p 10 01 p 001 01 p 001 001 p 02 p 01	.992 1.10 7. 534 ^c 1.314 4.440	70 p 50 70 p 50 10 p 05 70 p 50 20 p 10
26.471 003 17.759 ^a 05	0 p 10 1 p 1 p 5 p 02 1 p	10.223 19.286 15.049 16.035° 35.848	20 p 10 001 p 001 p 01 p 001 001 p	4.216 7.929 10.397 0.577° 1.019	20 p 10 02 p 01 01 p 001 95 p 90 70 p 50
16.038 ^a 16.35.339 ^b 05	0 p 20 1 p 001 0 p 05 1 p 001 1 p 001	1.813 13.477 10.131° 25.892d 17.600	50 p 30 01 p 001 02 p 01 001 p 001 p	0.312 0.460° 2.349d 2.754	10 p 05 90 p 80 80 p 70 80 p 70 30 p 20
4.794 70 33.621 ^a 001	1 p 2 p 01	19.777° 0.776 23.606° 17.135° 7.149	001 p 70 p 50 001 p 001 p 05 p 02	1.943° 1.819 5.762	20 n 10 50 p 30 30 p 20 30 p 20 10 p 05
13.497 09 9.889 20	0 p 05 5 p 02 0 p 10 1 p 001	6.57	05 p 02 05 p 02 02 p 01 001 p	2.059 2.064 0.475 5.991	50 p 30 50 p 30 80 p 70 05 p 02
8.636 20	0 p 10		50 p 30	9.759° 3.549	05 p 02 20 p 10

es otherwise indicated, the Chi-Squares of hypothesis 2a had egrees of freedom, those of hypothesis 2b and 2c had two deof freedom.

- a. Nine degrees of freedom.
- b. Fifteen degrees of freedom.
- c. Three degrees of freedom.
- d. Five degrees of freedom.
- e. See Appendix A for exact statement of the questions.

in identification of the hypotheses, initials indicating the peing compared have been placed under each hypothesis below, ader Hypothesis 2a, EPB-EPP-JB-JP means El Paso Business - Political - Juarez Business - Juarez Political Elites. This is done for each of the three tables.




TABLE XIII

CUARES AND PROBABILITY LEVELS FOR QUESTIONS ON BUSINESSMEN AND USINESS PRACTICES WITH RESPECT TO HYPOTHESES 2d, 2e, and 2f.

	EPI	nesis 2d B-EPP	Hypoth EPE	nesis 2 e B-JB		esis 2f -JP
JSC	x ²	probability	x ² r	robability	x ² p	robability
	0.766ª	95 p 90 05 p 02 80 p 70 70 p 50 80 p 70	16.357b	001 p	4.506 ^a 5.098 ^a 1.974 ^a 3.663 ^a 3.817	20 p 10 10 p 05 50 p 30
	N.T.Pd N.T.Pd 0.217b	1.00 1.00 90 p 80	6.942 9.649 9.899 ^b	20 p 10 01 p 001 01 p 001 02 p o1 001 p	19.826	70 p 50 001 p 001 p 05 p 02 001 p
	0.272 ^a 2.740 ^a 0.038 ^a 2.006 ^b 0.248	90 p 80 30 p 20 98 p 95 70 p 50 70 p 50	9.545° 6.676° 19.948°	20 p 10 01 p 001 05 p 02 001 p 01 p 001	2.951 ^a 5.280 ^a 3.326 ^a 9.570 ^b	30 p 20 10 p 05 20 p 10 05 p 02 05 p 02
) L 2	2.486 ^b 0.842 3.102 ^a 0.997 0.046	50 n 30	19.039b 2.665a 15.892a 12.186a 5.394	001 p 30 p 20 001 p 01 p 001 05 p 02	15.685 ^b 0.276 15.584 ^a 13.132 ^a 0.985	01 p 001 70 p 50 001 p 01 p 001 50 p 30
3 4 5 6	2.495 1.175 0.009 0.185	95 p 90		20 p 10 30 p 20	12.458 ^a 0.261 0.555 8.441	70 p 50 50 p 30
8 9	4.152 ^b 1.530	30 p 20 30 p 20	30.714 ^b 0.026	90 p 90 ק 80	18.777 ² 2.306	001 p 20 p 10

Unless otherwise indicated the Chi-Squares for hypotheses 2d, 2e, and 2f all had one degree of freedom.

- a. Two degrees of freedom.
- b. Three degrees of freedom.
- c. See Appendix A for exact statement of the questions.
- d. N.T.P. means no test possible.



Hypothesis 2i

TABLE XIV

Hypothesis 2g

ES AND PROBABILITY LEVELS FOR QUESTIONS ON BUSINESSMEN AND SESS PRACTICES WITH RESPECT TO HYPOTHESES 2g, 2h, and 21.

Hypothesis 2h

EPP-	JB		P_JP	ny po ches	JP
x ² pro	bability	x ² pr	obability	x ² pro	obability
2.113 ^a	50 p 30		30 p 20	1.711 ^a	50 p 30
8.666 ^b	001 p		001 p	1.795 ^a	50 p 30
6.782 ^a	05 p 02		20 p 10	0.514 ^a	80 p 70
0.031 ^a	01 p 001		20 p 10	2.514 ^a	30 p 20
3.868	05 p 02		10 p 05	0.021	90 p 80
	10 p 05 05 p 02 10 p 05 10 p 05 001 p	1.759 11.789 5.474 6.060 ^b 8.338 ^a	02 p 01 20 p 10	0.247 4.602 0. 6 86 1.452 ^b 0.063	70 p 50 05 p 02 50 p 30 70 p 50 90 p 80
1.683 ^a	50 p 30	4.264 ^a 6.141 ^a 2.121 ^a 8.511 ^b 2.095	20 p 10	3.746 ^a	20 p 10
3.856	05 p 02		05 p 02	3.157 ^a	30 p 20
4.253 ^a	20 p 10		50 p 30	0.599 ^a	80 p 70
4.857 ^b	20 p 10		0f p 02	3.220 ^b	50 p 30
3.481	10 p 05		20 p 10	0.025	90 p 80
9.227 ^b 0.083 ^a 7.222 ^a 7.419 ^a 2.088	05 p 02 98 p 95 05 p 02 05 p 02 20 p 10	7.370 ^a 1.479 6.515 10.919 0.247	30 p 20 02 p ol 001 p	7.255 ^a 2.561 ^a N.T.P. 4.971 ^a 0.843	05 p 02 30 p 20 1.00 10 p 05 50 p 30
5.996 ^a	05 p 02	6.725 ^a	05 p 02	0.149 ^a	95 p 90
0.060	90 p 80	0.149	70 p 50	0.406	70 p 50
0.787	50 p 30	0.304	70 p 50	0.073	80 p 70
3.580	10 p 05	3.777	10 p 05	0.093	80 p 70
1.016	02 p 01	8.564	05 p 02	1.072 ^a	80 p 70
1.843	20 p 10	5.427	02 p 01	1.961	20 p 10

s otherwise indicated the Chi-Squares for hypotheses 2g, nd 2i all had one degree of freedom.

a. Two degrees of freedom.

b. Three degrees of freedom.

c. See Appendix A for exact statement of the questions.




TABLE XV

EVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE REACHED BY CHI-SQUARE TEST ON TWENTY-SIX QUESTIONS RELATING TO AMERICAN AND BUSINESS PRACTICES, ON NINE HYPOTHESES

No. S:	ignific	eant at	Total no. sign. at .05 or below	Total not sign. at .05 level	P
4	7	7	18	8	•03
5	4	11	20	6	.004
3	l	-	4	22	•999
ì	-	-	1	25	1.0
4	9	6	19	7	.014
3	4	5	12	14	.721
9	1	2	12	14	.721
8	-	3	11	15	.836
2	-	-	2	24	•999
	.05 4 5 3 1 4 3 9 8	.05 .01 4 7 5 4 3 1 1 - 4 9 3 4 9 1 8 -	.05 .01 .001 4	No. Significant at sign. at .05 .05 .01 .001 or below 4	No. Significant at sign. at .05 sign. at .05 .01 .001 or below .05 level 4

rpothesis 2a: El Paso business, El Paso political, Juarez es and Juarez political elites, when compared with each other, ignificantly different images of businessmen and their praction both countries.

repothesis is accepted. However, since both nationality and were held constant, it is impossible to determine whether factors is important in the determination of national images. Sis is too general in nature, and should be accepted only ation of this fact.

when compared with Juarez elites (combining business and poliwhen compared with Juarez elites (combining business and es) have significantly different images of businessmen and practices in both countries.

set this hypothesis is accepted. It would appear from this ality may be the more important factor in imagery formation; cupational groups were combined the level of significance well as the number of significantly different questions, upothesis 2a.



Hypothesis 2c: Business elites (combining El Paso and Cd. rez) when compared with political elites (combining El Paso Cd. Juarez) do not have significantly different images of busimen and their practices in both countries.

hypothesis is accepted by the fact that on only four of the

ons was the .05 level of significance reached. It will be ut when hypotheses la, lb, lc and ld are considered, that these s of significant differences do not support this hypothesis; hey reflect extreme answers by one of the four national groups not cancelled out when nationality varies. This hypothesis ther support to the discussion above regarding hypothesis 2a, amely that it is not occupation but nationality which is the actor in national images, at least with respect to the data of

Hypothesis 2d: El Paso business elites when compared with so political elites do not have significantly different images sinessmen and their practices in both countries.

pected, a significant difference occurred only once in 26

This finding is very ample support for the discussion of the ctures in Chapter III and with the general theoretical frameis thesis. This hypothesis is accepted.

Hypothesis 2e: El Paso business elites when compared with business elites have significantly different images of business and their practices in both countries.

orts the hypothesis that nationality rather than occupation is cant factor in national images. While the Juarez business ed to see themselves as similar to their American counterparts, were not reciprocated by the El Pasoans. This hypothesis is




Hypothesis 2f: El Paso business elites when compared with ez political elites, do not have significantly different images usinessmen and their practices in both countries.

evel was not reached on the other 14 questions. However, there dency toward the .05 level on at least six other questions, the probability levels for these six questions were 20 p 10 or The hypothesis is accepted since the probability of such find-21. The factors which appear to be operating here are and of treatment accorded to the Juarez political elites by o elites, and (b) the animosity between the business and polies of Juarez. The data with respect to the hypotheses to follow further insight.

Hypothesis 2g: El Paso political elites when compared with z business elites have significantly different images of business and their practices in both countries.

- and the hypothesis is rejected. Theoretically, the findings have been similar to the El Paso business-Juarez business (2e). Examination of the data shows that the trends are in addirection. Nevertheless, on the basis of the statistical tablished for this study, it is not possible to accept this
- ypothesis 2h: El Paso political elites when compared with political elites do not have significantly different images inessmen and the practices in both countries.
- l of ll questions reached the .05 level or below while the d not. The hypothesis is accepted.
- ypothesis 2i: Juarez business elites when compared with political elites have significantly different images of businand their practices in both countries.



d significance in only three others. This hypothesis is reidently the similarity in value orientations on the basis of
is still a primary factor, even though the groups as in this
strong animosity toward each other. Of course, it should be
here that for different reasons they both have favorable imrican businessmen and their practices, so that this is an
actor in modifying any tendencies toward differences.

Y. The hypothesis that there is a r lationship between group
and national images was tested in nine different ways. Red to support the hypothesis that there is a significant relatween nationality and national images, while it was impossible
y similar conclusion about occupation and national images,
appears that this may also be a factor of some importance.
earch with more refined tools is especially necessary in the

icant differences occurred only twice in 26 questions with a

turning to a discussion and analysis of the first set of one last point may be raised here: were there any questions ed non-significant findings for all nine hypotheses? If so, a supply or suggest explanations, or is the lack of signification of the question asked? Four such questions were found, and 29; each will be discussed briefly below.


estions Not Yielding Statistically Significent Data

12: Generally speaking, when compared to American businessMexican businessmen insist on higher profit rates or not?

Dups tended to respond the same to it, namely, that Mexicans

mer profits than Americans. However, consensus on this doesn't

mean that all four groups considered this equally desirable



rable. Content analysis of statements made by respondents to tion revealed a wide variation of opinion, with the majority g that it was either the custom, or the risk was so great, or off" problem forced them to get what they could while they could. can businessmen even attributed this "fact" to "lack of business e." There is consensus about the image, if not about the rahind it.

Q. 17: Does the Mexican businessman tend to inherit his busiposition more or less than the American?

question reached the 20 p 10 level of significance for six of theses, in the expected direction. The Mexican political elite at this is one of the evils of the business system in Mexico. The ricans have such a strong achievement orientation they could ed to insist that the Mexicans were remiss in this matter. The that the Cd. Juarez business elites split almost evenly on tion, and it is this split which is almost sufficient to bring agnificant difference.

Q. 23: Comparing the degree of cooperation of businessmen covernment officials in El Paso and Cd. Juarez, in which city there closer cooperation?

e-quarters of Cd. Juarez business elites said that the two ked closer together in El Paso, while for both political ir response was just about 50%. About 60% of the El Paso lites gave the same response. Some Americans thought that

Williams, American Society, A. Knopf Co. N. Y., 1955. Ch. 11, Value Orientations."

ted by the fact that approximately 50% of the El Paso elites ted their father's occupation, while only some 25% of the arez business elites inherited their father's occupation.



with the data gathered about the power structures of the two is (see Chapter III). Analysis of comments by the El Paso busing revealed that some of them at least, in saying that cooperates in Cd. Juarez, didn't think of it as better, or as the as enjoyed in El Paso. They suggested that cooperation in Cd. closely connected with the "pay off," that in fact you had to her with the government there in order to protect yourself. The riter's judgement that for some of these very reasons the Cd. These elites saw as more favorable the kind of "working together" believed went on in El Paso.


29: Comparing the labor-management situation in El Paso

We to Cd. Juarez?

was general agreement among all four groups that management werful in El Paso than in Cd. Juarez, vis a vis labor.

ly, there were several other questions which yielded only one ifficant findings, so that it appears that there are some national images held by these elites which are highly conficient data is lacking to make possible any statements which in this congruence. Let us turn now to the first set of hybose concerned with the direction and content of the images.

In and Content of Images of Businessmen and Their Practices twenty-six questions asked only five yielded responses which the expected direction as predicted by hypotheses, la, lb, Before considering these hypotheses let us first look briefly these five questions.




. 24: Is Cd. Juarez typical of other Mexican cities in ss-government relations?

atory research had seemed to indicate that the business-squabble in Cd. Juarez was typical of such relations through-

In the study, however, almost one-half of the El Paso responded "no" to the question. Their rationale was that nce of prostitution, narcotics rings, and other forms of vice ez made business-government relations different. The Mexican also stressed the prevalence of vice as a reason for their ut considered the scuabble typical. It may be that the ere wrong since they had only very limited knowledge of

- . 25: Are labor and management (a) partners, (b) competitors, enemies in the United States?
- han half of the El Paso business and political elites responded partners, whereas the expected response was to (b) competitors.

 ow level of union organization in El Paso this response becomes
- tandable; these elites may be generalizing from their own here. The Cd. Juarez responses were in the expected direction,
- ey saw labor-management more as competitiors than as partners.
- . 26: Are labor and management (a) partners, (b) competitors, enemies in Mexico?
- ed. The majority chose (b), which is somewhat surprising conhistorical factors involved. However, this may well reprege in attitude as a result of being on the border, where workare higher.
- , 34: What is the role of religion in the life of the American ssman?



ergence in responses of the El Paso elites represents one occasions when their images were not congruent. What appears cted the level of significance here was the response of the tical elites. Fifty percent said that business and religion while it was expected that the majority of political elites at religion was an important positive force in the life of businessman. This was certainly seen to be important to the tes; the Juarez elites in both groups were about evenly


34: What is the role of religion in the life of the Mexican sman?

e writer had anticipated that the majority of Cd. Juarez

tes would have a positive orientation, but the opposite opproximately three-quarters of them stated that religion and it mix. The other groups responded in the expected direct to be noted here, however, that among the Cd. Juarez businessented on the question, there seemed to be a strong suggestion rationalization) that if the two didn't mix in Mexico it was be "mordida" which they were powerless to do anything about. On was that they would like religion to be basic to their that corrupt government practices made this impossible.

the American and Mexican Businessman and His Business Practices ssible now to consider hypotheses la, lb, lc, and ld. These edicted that when the four elite groups are asked to compare Mexican businessmen and their practices:

- El Paso business elites have predominantly favorable images can businessmen and their practices and predominantly negates of Mexican businessmen and their practices.



- b El Paso political elites have predominantly favorable of American businessmen and their practices and predominantly ve images of Mexican businessmen and their practices.
- c Juarez business elites have predominantly favorable images rican and Mexican businessmen and their practices, generally them as congruent.
- d Juarez political elites have predominantly negative images ican businessmen and their practices and ambivalent images of an businessmen and their practices, with favorable and unfavormages about equally divided.

ta support hypotheses la and lb, but only support hypotheses

- n part. Let us discuss each of the hypotheses in turn:
 In not a single question did the El Paso business elites give
 response which might be construed as critical of the American
 In. The closest they came to this was on question 20, where
 Isked whether the Mexican or the American educational system
 broader cultural background; one in three thought the Mexican
 orior in this regard. Overall, their "self" image was not only
 it was one which denied that the Mexican could even be compared
- H shows the frequency distribution of responses to the 14 equestions asked; there was an average of 24 favorable responses a practices to all questions and less than four favorable rethe Mexican, or to the perception that the practice was about a both countries. Three-fourths of the El Paso elites asserted merican was superior on at least eight questions of of 146. Intrast, only one individual gave a majority of responses saying mactices were the same in both countries, and only one gave as in responses favorable to Mexico as opposed to the United me evidence indicates strong support for the hypothesis.

les XVIII and XIX, for the individual responses of all four

will be found in Appendix B.

TABLE XVII

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO COMPARATIVE STIONS ON BUSINESS PRACTICES BY EL PASC BUSINESS ELITES ns are in decreasing order of favorableness to the American.)

Nature of Response*

estion		nature of nesponse			
ະລຸເ	.10H	A	S	M	N
3:	Opportunity to advance Education for business	36 35	1	-	1
9: 5: 5:	Civic mindedness	35 34	3	-	ì
5:	Broad stockholding	32	3 1	2	3
†:	Free competition	25	7	3	2 1 3 3
2:	Profit motives	25	4	2	7
2:	Family vs. business	24	3	-	11
3:	Govtbus. cooperation	22	3 9 2 6	6	1
5:	Mass market	21	2	4	11
7:	Achievement	20	6	2	10
3:	Class consciousness	18	2	14	4
l:	Business ethics	16	1	1	20
3:	Reinvestment	15	7	3	13
D:	Cultural background	12	_3	11	12
	Total	335	50	48	99
	Average	23.9	3.6	3.4	7.0

Note: A means that American practice was perceived as favorable.

S means that practice was the same in both systems.

M means that Mexican practice was perceived as favorable.

N means no opinion or no answer.

Table XX reveals approximately the same pattern as that diswe, strongly ethnocentric, with little tendency to see both
similar. A favorable image of the Mexican vis a vis the
bes appear as two questions, with Q. 20 the only one that might
bredicted. As regards individual responses, three-fourths anleast 9 of the 14 questions favorable to the American vis a vis
a while only one gave a majority of responses to the effect
rectices were the same, and more saw the Mexican favorably

A BOAR AND A CONTRACTOR

4

m one-fifth of the questions. The data support this hypothesis

TABLE XX

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO COMPARATIVE tions on business practices by el paso political elites ns are in decreasing order of favorableness to the American)

estion		Nature of Response*			
		A	S	M	N
B :	Opportunity to advance	16	-	-	2
5:	Broad stockholding	15	1	•	3
): 6:	Education for business	15	1	-	3 2 2 6
6 :	Civic mindedness	15	-	2	2
3 =	Class consciousness	12	-	2	6
2:	Family vs. business	11	-	2	6
7:	Achievement	11	2	_	6
3:	Govtbus. cooperation	10	5	2	2
5:	Mass market	10	2	-	7
†:	Free competition	10	2	2	4
2:	Profit motives	9	2	1	6
l:	Business ethics	6	2	2	9
):	Cultural background	6	l	5	9 7
∤ ‡	Reinvestment	4	ユ	_7_	_6
	Total	150	19	26	66
	Average	10.7	1.4	1.9	4.


Note: A means that American practice was perceived as favorable.

S means that practice was the same in both systems.

M means that Mexican practice was perceived as favorable.

N means no opinion or no answer.

Phis hypothesis is supported in part, that is, that the Juarez lites do have predominantly favorable images of American busi-I their practices. But in the majority of questions they did eir own practices as similar. Table XXI shows some ambivalence mages. On six questions more than half of them clearly saw the s favorable and the Mexican as negative; three questions



ajority of "same" responses, and on one question a majority Mexican favorable and the American negative. If "same" and or Mexico responses are added together, then the Juarez busfavorable self images on six of the 14 questions, as opposed e images of the American on nine of 14 questions. Individtwo of the 37 elites gave five or more responses favorable opposed to the United States.

arez business elites seem to be less ethnocentric than their interparts. In other words, when confronted with the task of heir practices with those of Americans, they tended to be eal. The data suggest some interesting implications for more otheses, which will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

TABLE IXX

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO COMPARATIVE STIONS ON BUSINESS PRACTICES BY JUAREZ BUSINESS ELITES ons are in decreasing order of favorableness to the Americans)


Nature of Response*

estion		Macu			
,,,	2011	A	S	M	N
} =	Busgovt. cooperation	28	7	2	-
}:	Opportunity to advance	26	7	1	3
):	Education for business	26	8	3	-
) :	Broad stockholding	24	11	-	2
?:	Family vs. business	22	13	-	2
; :	Civic mindedness	22	13	ı	ı
}:	Profit motives	17	11	ı	8
}:	Class consciousness	17	10	7	
' :	Achievement	16	14	1	3 6
}:	Reinvestment	14	21	1	1
 =	Free competition	11	16	8	2
;:	Mass market	10	21	1	5 5
.:	Business ethics	7	22	3	5
):	Cultural background	5	_2	24	_6
	Total	245	176	53	44
	Average	17.5	12.6	3.8	3.1
ote	A means that American	practio	e was p	erceive	d as f

A means that American practice was perceived as favorable. S means that practice was the same in both systems.

M means that Mexican practice was perceived as favorable.

N means no opinion or no answer.



ld - The data do not support this hypothesis. In the first place the overall image of the American practice is favorable; a clearly negative image appears only on Question 20. Table XXII shows that this group, more than any of the other three groups, tended to see practices as the same in both countries. Comparison of this table with Table XXI shows that both elite groups evaluate many comparative practices similarly.

TABLE XXII

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO COMPARATIVE
QUESTIONS ON BUSINESS PRACTICES BY JUAREZ POLITICAL ELITES
(Questions are in decreasing order of favorableness of the Americans)

Question		Nature of Response			3 6 *
		A	s	M	N
Q. 16:	Broad stockholding	12	5	-	5
Q. 12:	Profit motives	11	5 7	-	4
Q. 15:	Mass market	10	9 7	-	5 4 3 5
	Busgovt. cooperation	10	7	2	3
Q. 19:	Education for business	10	6	1	5
Q. 36:	Civic mindedness	10	6	ı	5
Q. 32:	Family vs. business	10	3	-	9
Q. 13:	Reinvestment	9	3 9 8 5	-	5 9 4 3 9
Q. 18:	Opportunity to advance	9 9 8	8	2	3
Q. 17:	Achievement	8	5	-	9
Q. 33:	Class consciousness	8	6	4	4
Q. 14:		7	7	3	5
Q. 21:	Business ethics	3	10	3 3	5 6 4
Q. 20:	Cultural background	2	3	13	4
	Total	119	91	29	69
	Average	8.5	6.5	2.1	4.9


^{*} Note: A means that American practice was perceived as favorable.

S means that practice was the same in both systems.

N means no opinion or no answer.

Individually, one-third gave seven or more favorable responses to the Americans, while one-quarter said it was the same on seven or more responses. Only one individual elite gave as many as six responses

M means that Mexican practice was perceived as favorable.




favorable to Mexico as opposed to the United States. The overall tendency is to be more favorable to the image of the American practice than to the image that it's the same in both countries. The data do not make it possible to indicate whether historical animosity toward the Mexican businessman or the nature of interaction with Americans on the border is mainly responsible for this favorable image. More refined tools and hypotheses are needed to probe into the factors at work here.

In general then, the data support a much more favorable image of the American businessman than of his Mexican counterpart.

In attempting to give a substantive picture of the image of the American and Mexican businessman, the procedure to be followed here will be to delineate it in terms of the image outlined at the beginning of this chapter. To avoid unnecessary repetition, it may be assumed that the image being described represents the general consensus of all four groups. Where significant differences or strong minority opinions exist they will be brought in separately. We will begin with the American businessman.

Background for business. The American lives in a society where there is almost unlimited opportunity for him to become a businessman if he so desires. Class-consciousness is held to a minimum, and to get ahead the American must be willing to work; he does not count on inheriting his wealth. Another facet of this image is that he keeps his family affairs and his business interests separated. In the matter of religion, the El Paso elites insist that religion is a positive force in the life of the American businessman, but strangely enough the El Paso political



elites do not support this image so strongly. So did the Cd. Juarez political elites, while a majority of the Cd. Juarez business elites responding thought that business and religion do not mix in the United States.

The majority El Paso business image in regard to religion is expressed best by this statement from one El Paso business elite: "(with) most top officials in business you will find this so." The opposing view was expressed best by a Juarez political elite who said: "I don't believe there is a businessman in the world who lets his religious principles influence his business practice."

Education: No educational system in the world is as effective as the American in preparing men for the business life; but more than that, this education is highly ethical in its orientation. On the matter of a broader cultural background through formal education, there is some disagreement. Two-thirds of the Juarez businessmen and more than half of the Juarez political elites saw the American as having a cultural background inferior to that of the Mexican. The following quotations are illustrative of the Mexican position, irrespective of group:

A United States professional knows only his own field; a Mexican professional is educated in a broader sense. He has knowledge of all the fields of learning...

Our government demands more results from the students. The students (Mexican) are geared to a higher pace all along the line.

Our program is broader, based on the European system.

On the other hand, the El Paso groups were much less unanimous than on the previous question of business preparation. About one-third of the El Paso business and political elites asserted that the American

system gave the businessman as good or better cultural background, another one-third of each group said the opposite. Significantly, perhaps, the remaining one-third gave no opinion, among the highest no-opinion responses received for any question. Only one Juarense gave a no opinion response to this. Perhaps no opinion was a way out for El Pasoans who didn't wish to concede any points.

Illustrative of the El Paso comments are the following:

The few (Mexicans) that are educated spend more time for cultural studies; it is a mark of education. United States boys are so dumb, a lot (of them) think Ben Hur was a football star.

You can learn culture ir Mexico, but you come here for a business education.

The higher classes, yes. They are much more gracious and more polite. The United States businessmen are rough and tumble. If you get too cultural, you lose your ability to slug, and then you're lost.

The El Paso businessmen were not at all convinced of the value of "bulture" over business knowledge, as the latter quote clearly indicates.


As a businessman: The American believes in large scale production with reasonable profits which he is constantly reinvesting in his business. Along with this is the strongly held belief that business activity is highly competitive rather than monopolistic.

by a Cd. Juarez political elite: "They approach the ideal."

by two Cd. Juarez business elites: "I admire the way they get together; we wish we had the privileges which the businessmen in El Paso have."

by an El Paso business elite: "I don't know about all cities, but in El Paso the relations are excellent..."

by an El Paso political elite: "Without a doubt we are a shining example of a profound and dignified existence of good government, and respected by business above all."



Business and Labor: The American businessman sees himself as a partner with labor both nationally and locally in El Paso, which is essentially the same image which the El Paso political elites have. However, one-half of the Juarez business elites and slightly more than one-third of the Juarez political elites see the American businessman more as a competitor for business profits than as a partner. However, a strange paradox appears in that many more Juarez than El Paso elites see the power relations between labor and management in the United States as about equally balanced. About 40% of the El Paso elites believe that labor has too much power. When the question is asked about El Paso itself, however, there is general agreement that business has more power than labor, and further that business in El Paso is more powerful than business in Juarez via a vis labor. Again, all feel satisfied that in labor-management relations the United States government has just about the proper amount of power.


The Businessman and the Community: The American businessman is highly motivated to civic action, which he sees as a duty and moral obligation. One of the best statements of this attitude was given by an El Paso business elite:

As an American businessman, I feel that this is my responsibility, as it is yours also, to help out in these (community) programs. This is what has made America strong.

One Juarez busines man expressed it this way:

The American businessman feels more responsible within society and he lives in a more perfect society where he has confidence in his government.

The American Businessman and Mexico: There seemed to be a clear image of the American businessman as respectful of Mexican ways, and



about as warm and personal in his behavior toward Mexicans as they themselves would desire. In view of the more prevalent image of the American as critical and standoffish this image may be surprising. Yet it does follow the favorable pattern that has been delineated above, and seems to lend some support to the hypothesis that increasing amounts of contact between different groups, under conditions favorable to both, leads to favorable images.

The following comments from Juarez political elites illustrate the point:

Americans adapt wonderfully.

Some complain of coldness, but I have never found Americans so.

Any criticism is due to surprise at the differences.

While the Cd. Juarez businessmen in the main held a favorable image, there was a strong negative image held by a minority which some of the following quotes illustrate:

I have known both kinds, but the courteous kind seem to predominate.


Good fellows. One of the fine things about American educated men, they know how to act.

If it is convenient for him he is personal, if not, he is cold.

His interest is in economic exploitation.

Stems from the typical American thinking that the rest of the world is not his equal.

Summary: The image which the El Paso businessman has of American business is strongly supported by the other three groups in this study. Let us turn now to the Mexican businessman.



Background for business: The Mexican lives in a society where the opportunity to work one's way up from the bottom is perceived to be greatly restricted. Especially on the American side, the belief persists that there are only "two classes in Mexico, the rich and the poor, and if you're down you stay down." Only the Cd. Juarez business elites came close (50% to 45%) to saying that the Mexican businessmen don't inherit their businesses any more frequently than their American counterparts. But even they agreed with the rest in large majority that the Mexicans tended to concentrate their businesses in the family rather than in broad stock holdings, and that family and personal concerns do impinge on their business affairs.

A majority of all four groups agreed that business and religion do not mix in Mexico. The fact that the ratio was two to one among the Cd. Juarez elites, while only a little better than one to one for the El Paso elites suggests two possible answers. Either the El Paso elites are projecting their own strong religious orientation into this question, or they tend to confuse the "fact" that hexico is 95% Catholic with the idea that this automatically should mean that religion and business do mix. The latter seems the more likely probability.

The following quotations illustrate the point:

Catholic religion is very powerful.

I have heard stories how powerful the Church has been, but not so much anymore.

It's different there; one religion has tried to set controls.

Looking at some of the comments of the Cd. Juarez business elites for some insight for the apparent paradox of much "Catholic Action"



versus their negative view on this question, the following quotes may be suggestive:

Too often a businessman feels that a small contribution to Church fulfills his duty. Catholicism here is more a claim than a reality.

Most Mexicans are Catholics, but don't let the principles guide them in business.

The Mexican by instinct deceives the customer in business transactions. But here on the border we have been able to learn from the American the honorable way to do business. The American, no matter what his religion, lives up to it in business practice.


Education: The Mexican businessman is generally seen as being courteous, gracious, and highly "cultured," having been educated in the classic European tradition. There was no other question which offered the Mexican businessman such an opportunity for a favorable image. However, some Americans simply could not bring themselves to see the Mexican superior under any conditions. Another interesting facet of this image is that a small minority of Mexicans, while expressing pride in their broad cultural background, did suggest that perhaps a little more practicalicality in their educational program would benefit their business habits considerably.

While both Cd. Juarez groups thought that their ethical preparation for business life was at least as good as that of the American's, the El Paso groups did not share the feeling, expressing a strongly negative view in this respect. Consider the following comments:

No ethics in Mexico; it's the make-up of the people.

It is difficult to understand this but what the American calls ethics seem silly to many Mexicans.

As I have said, most of them have been educated in our schools. They do business with us our way, with their own people another way.



The ethics I have encountered I know could not have been learned in school.


Apparently much of this criticism evolves from the "mordida," about which more later.

As a businessman: The Mexican businessman still prefers high profits from limited production to the "American way." However, a majority of Cd. Juarez businessmen insisted that lack of experience rather than lack of interest was responsible for this continued practice. As to what the businessman does with his profits, the image is not so clear. The El Paso business elites generally thought that he spent it on "high living," or in buying land or in other business ventures. The El Paso political elites hedged more, thought perhaps the Mexicans were reinvesting even more than Americans do. The two Cd. Juarez groups insisted that Mexican businessmen reinvested at least as much as Americans, although each group had large negative minorities.

From the Mexican viewpoint the situation is best summed up by the following:

The mass market idea has finally infiltrated our economy, but we are still many years behind the United States in our thinking. Even chain stores are now appearing backed by men who ten years ago would have been insulted by the idea of investing in such a business.

The groups were split again on the matter of the extent of free competition in Mexico, with the El Paso groups as expected saying that there was no comparison, that all Mexican businesses of any size were monopolies. The Cd. Juarez groups disagreed, saying that there was as much if not more free competition in Mexico. The position of the Cd. Juarez business elites was that the examples of limited competition in Mexico were closely patterned after prevalent practices in the United



States which they were aware of.

Business and government: All groups agree that businessmen and governmental officials do not get along as well in Cd. Juarez as they do in El Paso, and the Cd. Juarez groups in this situation are typical of Mexico in general. As discussed previously above, the El Paso groups split on this, because of what they considered to be "peculiar" border factors. While the Juarez business elites talked much about the "peculiar" border factors, they didn't think it was more than another form of government corruption and dishonesty which made it so difficult for Mexican businessmen in general to work with government officials.

The following statements express the Juarez businessman's views:

Our Chamber of Commerce has always tried to maintain the best possible relations with the local government. It is the government that chooses not to cooperate. We keep hoping for a mayor who will respect our rights, and give us his whole-hearted support in our efforts to improve Juarez business, but this present one has been interested only in enriching himself and has made impossible conditions for cooperation. So we have had to fight for our rights.


Government's fault for split here; most of the men in government today have very low moral standard; as result, the businessmen lack confidence in the government, they cannot trust anything they say.

Our governments don't think they are servants. They think the people are their servants. They are always trying to rob us, and so we retaliate by looking for every chance to gyp them.

In El Paso you can be both businessman and politico; here there is a line of demarcation between the two. If the people waited for the government for help they'd starve.

The Juarez politicos see the picture in a slightly different way:

Our Chamber of Commerce is made up of the rich of the city. They have gotten themselves involved in




politics where they don't belong. They charge the government with being guilty of the high cost of living here, but it is they themselves that are guilty of charging the high prices, and we know that and we have been fighting them. They don't cooperate with the government at all like they should.

Business in the United States is in the habit of solving its own problems. Here the government always steps in to help business solve its problems.

They have never been united here, and now because of the politics they are more separated than ever. The lack of cooperation between business and government is due to two things: 1) personal egoism on the part of the businessmen; 2) the fact that they know that their tax money will not be used for proper purposes. So the fault is only partly of the businessmen.

Business and labor: The majority of Cd. Juarez business elites see labor equally as competitors and as political enemies, an image with which the El Paso elites are in partial agreement. Almost a fifth believe that leaders of labor and management are in collusion against the workers, an image not supported by either Mexican group, for obvious reasons. Strangly enough, the Cd. Juarez political elites, who might have been expected to hold the image of being "enemies," gave majority support to the image of "competitors," with almost 30% saying that labor and management were "business partners." The only explanation the writer can think of is that this reflects their own strong belief in their achievements of better condidtion for labor in Mexico.

The image is even less clear in respect to the relative power of labor, management and the government. It is only clear that labor and the government are closely tied together, although not necessarily to the real benefit of labor. The Cd. Juarez business elites believe that labor has more power than it has in the United States, but the El Paso



groups see management in Mexico as having more power than management in the United States vis a vis labor. The Cd. Juarez political elites think that the situation is about the same in both countries. All but the Cd. Juarez politicos believe that the Mexican government has more power in labor-management affairs than does the American government within its jurisdiction.

The Cd. Juarez political elites see the Mexican government as "the good arbiter" in labor-management affairs. The Juarez businessmen do not agree, insisting that the "Politicos generally use unions for their own ends," expecially near election times, and this, they feel interferes with their legitimate rights.

The El Paso elites see a strange alliance of business and government in Mexico, as the following statements indicate:

"Business has an in with the controlling power; it's all in a major group."


"It is a combination with the government used as a tool when it is needed."

The businessman and the community: Apparently closely tied in with the image of the Mexican businessman as deeply concerned with his family and close friends is the image that he is not "civic minded." The question did not encompass the idea of belonging to such civic clubs as Rotary, Lions, etc. A majority of all groups -- a great majority of the Americans -- said that the Mexican has less concern for general community problems than his American counterparts.

Some comments from El Pasoans indicate this personalistic attitude of the Mexicans:

... I have known some in Mexico to take on a whole community and help everyone in it. They look at it differently than we do.

Each takes care of his own, they don't know about social welfare...



The Juarez business elites saw the problem in a slightly different light:

Mexican businessman limits radius of interest to his business. He lacks preparation for proper attitude towards civic responsibilities. They will gladly help until you ask them to serve on a committee, and then they find that they are too busy.

In Mexico such things were always thought of as government projects until recently. Ideal of service has long history in United States.

The American businessman feels more responsible within society and he lives in a more perfect society where he has confidence in his government.

The business potential of the border. While the El Pasoans were in general uncertain about the border area of Mexico as a source of future economic exploitation, both Cd. Juarez groups thought that Americans were not investing enough. Not only is there no risk involved, but they see the country as having unlimited possibilities.

This is a great region for investment, and Juarez and El Paso should grow hand in hand. We export raw materials from this region which we later purchase as finished products. Why not manufacture these products here where labor is cheaper?


The entire country is an excellent spot for investment. Good guarantees, good prospects.

The savings in taxes, plus profit rate and labor market far outweigh the risks involved.

Some of the Cd. Juarez businessmen did attach reservations to their statements, however:

The whole country is ripe for investment although the border possibilities are somewhat limited to mining, lumber and their byproducts. Also, property restrictions exist on the border, and all manufactured products must go through customs here.

It should be investment which will keep the money in Mexico for reinvestment. We don't gain if the profits leave the country. We are jealous of our



integrity and we don't want to be absorbed by the United States.

The El Pasoans, by contrast, were considerably less optimistic, as these quotations indicate:

There is not enough on this side. On the other the risks are too great to make it worthwhile. You never know what the government will do in Mexico from one day to the next.

On this side of the border all right but in Mexico it is really a risk.

Only a fool would risk capital in Mexico unless he has a partner that is a citizen.

There is an element of risk in any country. The risk is not due so much to the country, but the kind of business and the know-how by the person who is investing.

No risk if he will familiari a himself with all the problems.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter was devoted to the attempt to test two sets of hypotheses about national images and to delineate the images of Mexican and American businessmen and their practices. The first set of hypotheses predicted that when the four elite groups were asked to compare American and Mexican businessmen and their practices, that both El Paso groups would hold more favorable images of the American than of the Mexican; while the Juarez business elites would see both groups as similar, and the Juarez political elites would tend to be negative toward both. The data support the hypothesis with respect to the El Paso elites; the Juarez elites tended to be more self critical and less anti-American than anticipated. While it must be recognized that more adequate hypotheses and instruments are needed than were used here, nevertheless, the data do present a rather clear-cut picture of a highly favorable





image of the American businessman and a much less favorable image of the Mexican by comparison. The border with the high rate of international contacts it makes possible for these elites may be a factor keeping the Mexican from seeing himself in as favorable a light as might be expected theoretically.

The second hypothesis that there is a relationship between one's group association and the kinds of responses one will make to questions dealing with common group practices, was supported at least as regards nationality. Tests failed to produce conclusive evidence of a relationship between business and political occupations and national images. Further study involving more adequate and refined hypotheses is necessary before it can be definitely shown either that occupational group, separate from nationality group, is or is not a significant factor in imagery development.

Finally, the substantive images were delineated, and they tended to approximate the tentative images which had been developed in the exploratory research. The perceived images support the proposition that the American is more gessellschaft-like and the Mexican more gemeinschaft-like.



CHAPTER VI


IMAGES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND POLITICAL PRACTICES A. Hypothesis

The same procedure used in the previous chapter will be followed in the present chapter to examine the data on images of government officials and political practices in the United States and Mexico, and to delineate the substantive images.

It may be well to restate the guiding hypotheses of the study, and the modifications that were made as a result of the exploratory research in order that the hypotheses to be tested in this chapter will be clearly understood.

First, people generally see groups to which they belong in the most favorable light, and have somewhat less favorable images of other groups. Therefore, it was expected that American business and political elites would have favorable images of themselves and of each other because there is a merging of these two identifications in the United States. These groups were expected to have negative images of their counterparts in Mexico because they perceived them to be gemeinschaft-like. The explanatory research did nothing to alter this hypothesis.


The Mexican business and political elites were likewise expected to have favorable images of themselves and each other. And, since their value orientations were supposed to differ from those of the American it might be expected that their images of American business and political elites would tend to be negative. However, the exploratory research revealed an open split between the business and political elites of Cd. Juarez, which had historical roots. Therefore, it was predicted that the business elites of Cd. Juarez would reflect this struggle in



their images of Mexican politics which would tend to be negative rather than positive. They saw themselves as striving for a more gesellschaft-like system but perceived the political elites as operating government for themselves in a particularistic way. The political elites had the opposite image of themselves, as expected.

The problem of the Mexican business and political elite images of the American system could not be derived directly from the basic hypothesis of ethnic ethnocentrism. Since it is assumed that both the business and political systems in Mexico are moving in the direction of more gesellschaft-like orientations, considerable ambivalence may be expected in their images of the American systems, as well as of themselves (Cf. Chapters I and II). The point of concern here is the degree to which they perceive themselves and are perceived to approximate one or the other orientation. In this case the Mexican business elites charge that the governmental system is particularistic, and both American elite groups concur. The Mexican politico denies this situation. and claims to be like the American which he accepts as the "ideal." However, he does not approve of business domination of government so that if he perceives such a situation to exist in the United States, he may tend to become ambivalent in his images of the American political system. Against this negative factor is the actual border situation. in which the Cd. Juarez political elites are treated as status equals by both El Paso elite groups.

In the previous chapter it was found that there were no significant differences in the images of the Mexican and American businessmen held by the two Cd. Juanez elite groups. In other words, the current




controversy, with all its historical considerations, did not make the Cd. Juarez political elites more critical of Mexican businessmen than were the business elites themselves. One of the questions to be answered in this chapter is whether the Cd. Juarez business elites will have images of Mexican governmental officials and political practices that differ from those held by the Cd. Juarez political elites.

With these factors in mind, it is predicted that when the four elite groups are asked to compare Mexican and American government officials and political practices:

- la) El Paso business elites have predominantly favorable images of American government officials and their political practices, and predominantly negative images of Mexican governmental officials and their practices, that is, the image of the Mexican is not in the least congruent with the way they see Americans.
- 1b) El Paso political elites have predominantly favorable images of American government officials and their practices and predominantly negative images of Mexican government officials and their practices, that is, they will not see the Mexican practices as similar to their own.
- lc) Cd. Juarez business elites have predominantly negative images of Mexican government officials and their political practices, while their images of American government officials and their practices are predominantly favorable.
- ld) Cd. Juarez political elites have favorable images of Mexican government officials and their political practices, and predominantly favorable images of American government officials and their practices, because they see the American system as congruent with their own.


While this first set of hypotheses is concerned with the evaluation of images a second set of related hypotheses, testing the relationship of national images specifically to the variables of occupation and nationality, may now be proposed:



- 2a) El Paso business, El Paso political, Cd. Juarez business, and Cd. Juarez political elites, when compared with each other, have significantly different images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.
- 2b) El Paso elites when compared with Cd. Juarez (holding nationality constant in both cases) have significantly different images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.
- 2c) Business elites when compared with political elites (holding only occupation constant) have similar images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.
- 2d) El Paso business elites when compared with El Paso political elites have similar images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.
- 2e) El Paso business elites when compared with Cd. Juarez business elites have similar images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.
- 2f) El Paso business elites when compared with Cd. Juarez political elites have significantly different images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.
- 2g) El Paso political elites when compared with Cd. Juarez business elites have similar images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.
- 2h) El Paso political elites when compared with Cd. Juarez political elites have significantly different images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.
- 21) Cd. Juarez business elites when compared with Cd. Juarez political elites have significantly different images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.

Thus, while the first set of hypotheses defines the direction which the images will take, the second set predicts the various relationships between group association and national images.


From the data gathered during the exploratory phase of the study, tentative images were formulated and from them the specific questions



to test these hypotheses were drawn. The images as tentatively drawn at the time were as follows:

- B. TENTATIVE IMAGE OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIAL AND HIS POLITICAL PRACTICES
- Q. 42, 49 The Mexican governmental officials generally represent lower class backgrounds, and are inclined to graft and corruption. They have institutionalized the "mordida."

 They are still characterized more as caciques or caudillos (political boss) than as true servants of the people. However, this is not the image held by the Mexican politico; he sees government officials as representing all classes and the government as relatively effective and just, even if not efficient.
- Q. 51, 53 Not only are Mexican officials personally opposed to any mixing of politics and religion in their own life, but they are militantly opposed to any effort by the clergy to influence Mexican political life. This is evaluated as bad by all but the Cd. Juarez political elites.
- Q. 54, 56, While government officials would like to get along better with Mexican businessmen they feel that the former are the ones responsible for the rift that exists. The other three groups in this study hold the opposite view. The politicos see government ownership of business as necessary and good for Mexico, but this image is not supported by others.



- Q. 41 While the Mexican official is very proud of his achievements with respect to making real the universally held political ideals of free speech, free press, etc., others see him as mouthing high sounding phrases which have little to do with reality.
 - C. TENTATIVE IMAGE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIAL AND HIS PRACTICES

In contrast with the Mexican, the image of the American governmental official seemed to be more consistently held by all four groups. The following appeared to be the slient features of this image:

- Q. 42, 43, the American politician is generally drawn from all social classes. While he is not above graft and corruption, when compared with his Mexican counterpart, he is considered relatively non-corrupt. Furthermore, political bossism is not generally prevalent in the United States; it is practiced only in certain large cities. The Mexican official concurs less in this.
- Q. 51, 52 The American politician is sensitive to the demands of the clergyman, and does not hesitate to affirm his faith in public. American clergy are perceived to have a healthy influence on political life. Again, the Mexican official concurs less in this.
- Q. 54, 55, Both government and business are happily married in the 57
 United States. Government regulation of business is just, extending itself only where necessary for the general welfare.

- Q. 41 The political ideals for which most of the rest of the world is still striving are realities of everyday life in the United States.
- Q. 60 The one aspect of American government that is open to criticism from all four groups is its foreign policy, especially as involving foreign aid. The United States is ignoring important neighbors to the South, while spending money in dubious ventures in Asia and Europe.

Once again, the questions in the interview were generally of a comparative nature, requiring the respondents to ascertain whether a practice was more, less, or equally, prevalent in his country compared to the neighboring one. There were also several questions dealing with political practices in each country separately. A total of twenty-four questions yielded data for hypotheses 2a - 2i, while thirteen yielded data pertaining to hypotheses 1a - 1a. All twenty-four yielded data on the substantive images.

Let us consider first the relationship between national images and the variables of nationality and occupation. The Chi Square test was used to test hypotheses 2a - 2i.

D. Results. Tables XXIII, XXIV, XXV give the Chi Squares and level of probability for each of the twenty-four questions, according to the relevant hypotheses.* Table XXVI summarizes the results in Tables XXIII, XXIV and XXV. Let us first consider briefly the results with respect to each of the nine hypotheses relating nationality and occupation to national images.

^{*}Data for the computation of these Chi-squares are found in Table XXVII, Appendex B.




TABLE XXIII CHI-SQUARES AND PROBABILITY LEVELS FOR QUESTIONS ON GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PRACTICES WITH RESPECT TO HYPOTHESES 2a, 2b, and 2c

a d	Hypothesis 2a EPB-EPP-JB-JP			esis 2b LJ	Hypothesis 2c B-P		
Questions ^d	x ² probability		\mathbf{x}^2 pr	obability	X ² probability		
41- 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7	27.523 0 36.349b 0 30.885b 0 24.257 0 57.432b 0	01 p 01 p 01 p 01 p 01 p 01 p 01 p	30.657 17.006 31.933° 14.437° 7.578° 53.298° 22.100	001 p 001 p 001 p 001 p 01 p 001 001 p	2.906 9.769 3.764c 8.936c 16.014c 3.678c 2.020	30 p 20 01 p 001 10 p 05 01 p 001 001 p 10 p 05 50 p 30	
42 43 44 45 46	24.452 ^a 14.147 ^a 9.300	01 p 01 p 001 20 p 10 20 p 10 50 p 30		001 p 001 p 20 p 10 50 p 30 70 p 50	10.331 4.342 ^b 4.224 ^b 3.764 2.573	01 p 001 30 p 20 30 p 20 20 p 10 30 p 20	
47 48 49 51 52	28.640 00 17.823 26.407 ^a	01 p 01 p 01 p 001 01 p 001 30 p 20	15.101 14.215 11.830 15.498b 1.272	001 p 001 p 01 p 001 01 p 001 50 p 30	8.734 8.802 13.640 8.141 2.037	02 p 01 02 p 01 01 p 001 05 p 02 20 p 10	
53 54 55 56 57	20.630 45.037 41.666	01 p 01 p 001 01 p 01 p 01 p	19.333 8.037 34.609 33.969 44.343	001 p 02 p 01 001 p 001 p 001 p	3.560 3.538 8.666 3.675 7.000	20 p 10 20 p 10 02 p 01 20 p 10 05 p 02	
58 60		01 p 95 p 90	41.880 0.056b	001 p 100 p 99	1.578 2.925 ^b	50 p 30 50 p 30	

Note: Unless otherwise specified the Chi Square tables of hypothesis 2a had six degrees of freedom; those of hypotheses 2b and 2c had two degrees of freedom.

a. Nine degrees of freedom.

b. Three degrees of freedom.c. One degree of freedom.

d. Questions will be found in the interview schedule in Appendix A.

TABLE XXIV

CHI-SQUARES AND LEVELS OF PROBABILITY FOR QUESTIONS ON GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PRACTICES WITH RESPECT TO HYPOTHESES 2d, 2e, and 2f

• C	Hypothesis 2d EPB-EPP			esis 2e ⊢JB	Hypothesis 2f EPB-JP	
Questions ^C	x ² pro	bability	x ² pr	obability	x ² pro	bability
41- 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7	1.284 3.569 0.410 N.T.P. ^d 1 7.353 0.542 1.044 ^a	100 g 10	20.016 15.171 ^a 15.712 2.909 4.698 29.359 13.610 ^a	001 p	25.073 ^a 3.569 ^a 28.722 20.825 23.024 42.986 15.494 ^a	001 p 10 p 05 001 p 001 p 001 p 001 p
42 43 44 45 46	1.096 0.027 3.899b 1.564 1.513	70 p 50 90 p 80 30 p 20 30 p 20 30 p 20	19.142 ^a 1.899 8.001 ^b 1.254 0.255		40.421 ^a 1.012 2.886 ^b 1.847 0.415	001 p 50 p 30 50 p 30 20 p 10 70 p 50
47 48 49 51 52	0.545 0.053 3.253 ^a 0.424 0.864 ^a	50 p 30 90 p 80 20 p 10 70 p 50 70 p 50	5.053 2.741a 4.959a 1.229 3.51.9a	05 p 02 30 p 20 10 p 05 30 p 20 20 p 10	24.621 ^a 18.940 ^a 3.060 ^a 0.054 0.492 ^a	001 p 001 p 30 p 20 90 p 80 80 p 70
53 54 55 56 57	0.661 0.289 4.046 0.029 5.509	50 p 30 70 p 50 05 p 02 90 p 80 02 p 001	2.794 0.375 27.551 4.836 32.275	10 p 05 70 p 50 001 p 05 p 02 001 p	5.254 4.785 22.518 15.200 13.489	05 p 02 05 p 02 001 p 001 p 001 p
58 60	0.266 3.422ª	70 p 50 20 p 10	11.880 0.255ª	001 p 90 p 80	18.928 0.900 ²	001 p 70 p 50

Note: Unless otherwise specified the Chi Squares for hypotheses 2d, 2e, and 2f all had one degree of freedom.

- a. Two degrees of freedom.
- b. Three degrees of freedom.
- c. See interview schedule in Appendix A for questions.
- d. No Test Possible.





TABLE XXV

CHI-SQUARES AND PROBABILITY LEVELS FOR QUESTIONS ON GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PRACTICES WITH RESPECT TO HYPOTHESES 2g, 2h, and 2i

C	Hypothesis 2g			esis 2h LJP	Hypothesis 2i JP-JB		
Questions ^C	x ² pr	obability	x ² pr	obability	x ² pro	bability	
41- 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6	7.255 3.113 7.299 2.459 0.557 14.509	50 p 30 001 p	18.398 12.672 3.978 25.939	05 p 02 001 p	2.284 0.442 5.790 10.648 9.859 5.549	20 p 10 90 p 80 02 p 01 01 p 001 01 p 001 02 p 01	
- 7 42 43 44 45 46	6.904a 8.605a 0.873 0.112b 0.132 0.663	05 p 02 02 p 01 50 p 30 100 p 99 80 p 70 50 p 30	8.585 ^a 20.861 ^a 0.537 0.962 ^b 4.668 2.397	001 p 50 p 30 90 p 80 05 p 02	1.071 ^a 8.83 ⁴ 0.002 1.893 ^b 4.333 1.025	70 p 50 02 p 01 95 p 90 70 p 50 05 p 02 50 p 30	
47 48 49 51 52	1.358 2.448 ^a 0.995 ^a 0.049 1.137 ^a		10.639 ^a 13.531 ^a 6.604 ^a 0.129 1.8 <i>5</i> 1 ^a	01 p 001 05 p 02 80 p 70	11.497 ^a 10.003 ^a 12.682 ^a 0.421 3.716 ^a	01 p 001 01 p 001 01 p 001 70 p 50 20 p 10	
53 54 55 56 57	0.122 0.003 6.611 2.664 10.228	98 p 95 02 p 01 20 p 10		05 p 02 02 p 01 02 p 01 01 p 001 10 p 05	1.173 8.351 0.356 5.562 N.T.P. ^d	01 p 001 70 p 50	
58 60	6.229 2.239 ^a	05 p 02 50 p 30	12.571 0.773 ^a	001 p 70 p 50	3.150 0.330 ²	10 p 05 9 0 p 80	

Note: Unless otherwise specified all Chi Squares have one degree of freedom.

- a. Two degrees of freedom.
- b. Three degrees of freedom.
- c. Questions may be found in the interview schedule in the appendix.
- d. No Test Possible.



LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE REACHED BY CHI-SQUARE TEST ON TWENTY-FOUR QUESTIONS RELATING TO AMERICAN AND MEXICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND POLITICAL

PRACTICES. ON NINE HYPOTHESES

TARLE XXVI


Hypothesis	Number of Questions		Questi ificar .01		Total No. Sign. at .05 or below	Total not Sign. at .05 level	P*
2a	24	-	5	14	19	5	.003
2b	24	1	3	15	19	5	.003
2c	24	5	4	1	10	14	.84
2 d	24	2	1	-	3	21	•99
2e	24	4	1	8	13	11	.41
2 f	24	2	-	13	15	9	•15
2g	24	4	3	1	8	16	•96
2h	24	7	3	6	16	8	•07
2 i	24	5	6	-	11	13	.72

^{*} P = probability of such findings by use of the binomial expansion.
See Chapter V above.

Hypothesis 2a - El Paso business, El Paso political, Cd. Juarez business, and Cd. Juarez political elites (holding occupation and nationality constant) have significantly different images of Mexican and American government officials and their political practices.

The Chi-Squares reached at least the .05 level of probability on 19 of the 24 questions, and since the probability of such findings is .003 the hypothesis is accepted. However, since both nationality and occupation were held constant, there is no way of being able to suggest which, if either, of the factors is related to the significant differences. The hypothesis is accepted with the reservation that it is too general.

Hypothesis 2b - El Paso elites when compared with Cd. Juarez elites (holding nationality constant in both cases) have significantly different images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.



Since the .05 level or below was reached 19 times out of 24 with respect to this hypothesis also, the hypothesis that nationality may be related to national images is accepted. The fact that occupation varied tended only to increase the level of significance slightly.


Hypothesis 2c - Business elites when compared with political elites (allowing nationality to vary while holding occupation constant) have similar images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.

The .05 level of significance was reached ten times out of 24 with respect to this hypothesis and the probability is .84; therefore, the hypothesis of similar images is accepted. Careful examination of the data revealed that the significant differences were not due to the fact that businessmen irrespective of nationality held different images than political elites irrespective of nationality. On the contrary, on not a single question were the differences in the direction expected on the basis of the hypothesis. Generally, the responses of the Cd.

Juarez political elites differed so sharply from those of the other groups as to result in significant differences even when the occupational groups were combined. So far as the data here presented permit a conclusion it may be questioned whether there is a relationship between a person's occupation taken alone and his images of officials and their practices generally known to him.

Hypothesis 2d - El Paso business elites when compared with El Paso political elites have similar images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.

The .05 level was reached only three times out of a possible 24, which yields a probability of .99 so the hypothesis is accepted. The data seemed to indicate that nationality is an important factor in the formation of national images. It further supports the hypothesis that



business and political elites in American cities share a common value orientation.

Hypothesis 2e - El Paso business elites when compared with Cd. Juarez business elites, have similar images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.

The .05 level of significance was reached 13 times and not reached 11 times; since the probability of this occurrence is .41, the hypothesis is accepted.¹ Several factors may help explain this: first, the Cd.


Juarez business elites had a great deal of cross-cultural contact, significantly more than any other group (see Chapter IV above). Secondly, they were involved in open and serious dispute with the Cd. Juarez political elites during the course of this study. During the exploratory phase of the study they had tended to indicate a strong admiration for "the way things were done in the United States." For these reasons, it was predicted that their images of government officials and their political practices would be congruent with those held by their El Paso counterparts. This finding gives some support to the hypothesis that occupational groups, considered without regard for nationality, may be significantly related to national images.

Hypothesis 2f - El Paso business elites when compared with Cd. Juarez political elites, have significantly different images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.

Fifteen of the 24 questions yielded results at the .05 level or below; in fact, on 13 of the questions, the level reached was .001.

These findings are significant at .07; however, if the four non-discriminating questions are dropped the probability drops to .02. The hypothesis is not clearly rejected and perhaps may be accepted with caution.

^{1.} There were four questions which failed to yield significant differences on any of the hypotheses. Even if they are removed as not sufficiently discriminating in nature, the probability is .33.



Hypothesis 2g - El Paso political elites when compared with Cd. Juarez business elites have similar images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.


The .05 level was reached only eight times in 24 with respect to this hypothesis, and since the probability is .96, the hypothesis is accepted (even if the four non-discriminating questions are removed, the probability remains at .86). Since the images of the two El Paso groups are congruent (hypothesis 2d), it might have been expected that the findings for hypotheses 2e and 2g would be similar. In both cases the prediction of no significant differences was supported. Factors other than nationality quite clearly seem to be affecting the national images; occupation and contact may be among them. Unfortunately, the instruments used must be refined considerably before more conclusive statements can be made.

Hypothesis 2h - El Paso political elites when compared with Cd. Juarez political elites have significantly different images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.

The .05 level of significance was reached on 16 of the 24 questions, which is significant at .07; with the four non-discriminatory questions removed the probability of such findings is .005. This hypothesis may also be tentatively accepted.

Hypothesis 2i - Juarez business elites when compared with Cd. Juarez political elites have significantly different images of Mexican and American government officials and their practices.


In this case significant differences occurred eleven times in twenty-four questions, well within chance expectations since the probability is .72 or .41, so the hypothesis is rejected. It will be recalled that theoretically Latin American societies tend to be oriented around gemeinschaft-like relationships, but that there seemed to be some evidence from exploratory research that the Mexican businessmen on the border tended to be more gesellschaft-like in their orientations than Mexican



government officials as a result of their great amount of cross-cultural contact and the nature of their occupations. Besides, they were engaged in an active conflict with the political elites in their community, and therefore, significant differences were expected for this hypothesis.

In comparing this hypothesis with that of the two El Paso groups (hypothesis 2d) it does appear that there is evidence of a split here which is not apparent there in terms of national images. Yet, there is a congruence among the Cd. Juarenses on a majority of the questions. Nationality again appears to be the dominant variable.

Summary. The general hypothesis that national images are related to particular group identifications was tested with reference to nationality and occupation via nine separate hypotheses. Six of the hypotheses were clearly accepted, two were tentatively accepted and one rejected. Those that were accepted gave strong support to the existence of a relationship between nationality and national images, while casting doubt on the importance of occupation as a primary factor in such imagery development. It is interesting to note that the hypothesis that was rejected was that based on modification of the general theoretical orientation based on the assumption that factors occurring on the border would lead to a change in national images. It was predicted that both Cd. Juarez elite groups, as occupational groups would be affected in different ways by these factors and that, therefore, they would hold significantly different images. The results do not clearly support Thus, although the Cd. Juarez businessmen had a great amount of cross-cultural interaction and seemed to be intent on orienting business



in Cd. Juarez to more gesellschaft-like relationships, their national images as a group were not significantly different from the Cd. Juarez political elites. Nor were they significantly different from either of the El Paso groups, so that perhaps occupation is a factor in this case.

With respect to the hypotheses discussed above it can be said then that nationality seems to play an important part in the development of national images. As far as the data here permit any conclusive statements about the role of occupations as a variable in image formation, its importance is not at all clear, although it may be important for the Cd. Juarez business elites.

Before turning to the first set of hypotheses, those defining the direction and content of the images, let us consider the questions which failed to yield statistically significant data for any of the nine hypotheses. Is it possible that they can shed some further light on the problem under discussion? Examination of Tables XXIII, XXIV, XXV reveals that there are four such questions, which will be discussed briefly below.

E. Questions Not Yielding Statistically Significant Differences

Q. 45 "When you think of graft and corruption in Mexico, in general, which of these applies?"2


The general consensus was that politicians in Mexico connived first and foremost for their own interests, and not in conjunction with

^{2.} The alternatives were: (1) politicians connive for their own interests;

⁽²⁾ politicians connive with businessmen;(3) politicians connive with labor leaders;

⁽⁴⁾ politicians connive with racketeers;

⁽⁵⁾ all of these.




businessmen, racketeers or others. Most of the Chi Square is accounted for in the distribution of responses of the Cd. Juarez political elites, about one third of whom either hedged on the question or wouldn't even consider it. This may lead to the suggestion that had these elites been willing to respond in a more forthright manner, there would have been even more general agreement among the elite groups.

In examining this as well as Question 463 which follows, the writer is drawn to the conclusion that significant differences should not have been expected; at least, the data of this study suggest that all groups know that Mexican politicians connive for their own interests, whether they're in Cd. Juarez or elsewhere.

Q. 52 "What is the American politician's attitude towards the role of religion in American political life?"

All four groups agreed that "religion is basic to political behavior in the United States." The two Mexican groups believe this applies to a much greater degree (two out of three) to American political behavior than to American business behavior (less than half believe this). The American groups have similar images for both questions; they support the above quotation, but not so strongly as do the Mexicans. Nevertheless, the differences are not significant. As one Mexican political elite put it: "Ike invokes God, and Cardinal Spellman is powerful." The fact that Eisenhower seems to be a religious man and actually included a prayer in his inaugural address was mentioned by many Mexicans as showing the important role of religion in American political life. This would seem to illustrate the way in which general images emerge out of particular events.


^{3.} The same question, but for Cd. Juarez in particular.



Q. 60 Do you think that United States Foreign Policy has been wise with respect to its interest in Europe and Asia as compared with Latin America, or not?"

A rather unusual situation developed here of almost complete agreement between the groups regarding this question. The proportions within each cell were almost identical, with slight deviation occurring among the American political elites, almost one half of whom said that American foreign policy had not been wise in this regard. They favored more interest in Latin America, where our help would be appreciated. One might have expected more divided opinion among American business elites also (actually 2 out of 3 agreed fully or with reservations that our policy had been wise). Significant differences were expected from the Mexicans on the assumption that they would perceive themselves neglected by the United States, and were deserving of aid, especially as they were our neighbors. While a minority did express this view ("It hurts our feelings to see so much money spent in Europe and Asia with no help coming here"), the majority took the view that aid to Europ and Asia was necessary. It would seem that the Mexicans had a much more understanding attitude than was anticipated.

The four questions not yielding statistically significant results have in common the fact that they are not comparative in nature, but two treat only of the United States (El Paso) and two Mexico (Cd. Juarez). However, significant differences were reached on other questions of this type, so that the type of question does not necessarily preclude the possibility of significant differences. Apparently, there are certain features about policies and politicians that all agree on.



F. <u>Direction</u> and <u>Content of Images of Government Officials</u> and <u>Political Practices</u>

This section of the chapter will be devoted (a) to analysis of the degree to which the images on 13 questions were in the direction expected on the basis of hypotheses la, lb, lc and ld, and (b) to a delineation of the substantive images as they appear from the data.

It may be well to begin by restating the hypotheses. It is predicted that when the four elite groups are asked to compare Mexican and American government officials and their practices:

- la) El Paso business elites have predominantly favorable images of American government officials and their political practices and negative images of Mexican government officials and their practices.
- 1b) El Paso political elites have predominantly favorable images of American government officials and their practices, while their images of Mexican government officials and their practices are predominantly negative.
- lc) Cd. Juarez business elites have predominantly favorable images of American government officials and practices and predominantly negative images of Mexican government officials.
- ld) Cd. Juarez political elites have predominantly favorable images of Mexican government officials and their practices, and also predominantly favorable images of Mexican government officials and their practices.

The first question to be raised is whether or not the images held by the four groups were in the expected direction.

G. Questions Yielding Images Not in the Expected Direction

There were seven questions yielding data which were not entirely expected. These are reviewed below.

Q. 41 "In which country are these universally accepted political ideals and liberties more closely realized?"

. . - 8 Both American groups and the Cd. Juarez political elites responded as expected. The expectation that the Cd. Juarez business elites would be strongly negative toward Mexico was not confirmed because 60% responded that Mexico had done equally as well as the United States with respect to at least five of the seven political ideals. The factor of nationality identification evidently enters into the picture. Also, perhaps it must be taken into account that not all the business elites felt so strongly against the government, and there may have been a preponderance of strongly anti-government elites in the exploratory phase of the study. The expected image is supported to the extent that they didn't declare Mexico equal with respect to all seven "ideals."


Q. 47 "Is there more political corruption in the United States or in Mexico?"

Actually, the differences were in the expected direction except for the fact that one third of the Cd. Juarez political elites did not answer the question directly, but gave an "other" response, such as "the situation is clearing up in Mexico now. I don't know how it would compare with the United States." Such commentary is not surprising from a group so concerned with its own self-esteem faced with such a threatening question.

Q. 49 "Do you believe that political bossism is more widespread in the United States or in Mexico?"

On this question the El Paso business elites hedged somewhat; while almost 30% responded adversely to Mexico, more than 35% gave a "no opinion" response. The latter is surprisingly high since they had

^{4.} These five were: Freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedom of religion; protection of rights of property and management; and protection of the rights of labor. On the other hand, they were almost unanimous in agreeing that equal justice and free, honest elections were more closely realized in the United States.



previously responded positively to more sensitive questions. On this question the Cd. Juarez political elites also gave a large number of "other" responses, almost 50%. These responses followed the pattern of those in the previous question discussed, namely that political bossism is "disappearing fast from Mexico. I don't know about the United States."


Q. 55 "How do you feel about the amount of regulation of business by government in the United States?"

For both El Paso groups the results were not as expected, as a majority of both said that the government interfered too much in business. This was at first surprising considering the evidence for the "happy marriage" of business and government at local and national levels. However, it did reflect the strong traditional view of laissez-faire economics, with which these elites were evidently still imbued and which led them to perceive any government regulation of business as interference. The Mexican groups responded as expected that government regulation of business was only what it should be.

Q. 56 "What is the situation with respect to government regulation of business?"

While a majority of all groups responded as expected, the majority for the Cd. Juanez business elites was just over 50% complaining of too much government interference, whereas 45% felt that government regulation was about what it should be. The comments from these elites show that the kind of interference they were complaining against were the misuse of tax money and the every-present mordida rather than restrictive legislation as such.

Q. 57 "How do you feel about the government ownerhsip of business in the United States?"



Almost three fourths of the El Paso business elites again responded that there was too much government ownership of business. Most of the comments seemed to suggest that "things have been better since Ike got in." The idea was stressed that the New Deal, Fair Deal practices were socialistic, but that the present business-minded administration was righting the situation. On the other hand, a majority of the other three groups responded as expected that there was no more than a proper amount of government ownership.

Q. 58 "What is the situation in Mexico regarding government ownership of business?"

On this question about 60% of the Cd. Juarez business elites respended that such government ownership as there was was proper. This was in accord with their responses to Question 56 above regarding government regulation of business in Mexico. It is also noteworthy that on Question 57 regarding government ownership of business in the United States, they gave a similar percentage of favorable responses. These responses would suggest that the Mexican businessman has not absorbed completely the laissez-faire, rugged individualism philosophy of the American. Historical and social cultural factors within Mexico indeed influenced his thinking, as some of the foregoing data has suggested. In this case the comments of the Cd. Juarez business elites suggested that government ownership was necessary in Mexico's present state of economic development. Pemex, the national petroleum industry of Mexico headed by Antonio Bermudez who is a native of Cd. Juarez and related to several of these elites, was often cited as the classic example of good government ownership.



In summary, it may be stated that the responses to these seven questions are not so unexpected when one considers certain social cultural factors which are operating to modify images and at times even lead to apparent contradictions. Thus, the American businessman almost simultaneously can pride himself on how well businessmen and governmental officials get along in the United States, and complain about the excessive interference of government in business. Apparently any regulation, except tariff controls, is excessive. The same tendencies occurred with the other elite groups.

Having noted the cases in which the images did not correspond exactly as predicted according to the hypotheses, let us now consider the data in terms of hypotheses la, lb, lc, and ld dealing with the prediction of the degree of favorableness of images which each of the elite groups will have toward government officials and political practices.

With respect to these four hypotheses, it was predicted that all four elite groups would have favorable images of American political practices and ideals and somewhat more negative images of Mexican practices and ideals. Let us consider the images with respect to the hypotheses one at a time.

la - There were 13 questions which compared government officials, their political ideals and practices. On only one of these questions El Paso business elites gave an unfavorable response toward American governmental practices. Table XXVIII shows that two thirds of the elites perceived the American official or practice to be superior to the Mexican on nine of the 13 questions, with the average number of favorable

TARLE XXVIII

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THIRTEEN QUESTIONS COMPARING MEXICAN AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT PRACTICES BY EL PASO BUSINESS ELITES

(Questions are in decreasing order of favorableness to the American)

	A	s	м	N
41 - 4 : Elections	35	1	-	2
41 - 5 : Justice	34	1	-	3
41 - 6 : Property	33	2	-	3
48 : Local political corruption	32	1	-	5
42 : Class background	32	-	1	5
47 : National political corruption	30	2	-	6
41 - 3 : Free religion	28	7	-	3
41 - 2 : Free press	26	7	2	3
41 - 1 : Free speech	26	9	2	1
41 - 7 : Labor	23	8	5	2
54 : Business-government cooperation	20	7	1	10
49 : Political bossism	10	-	8	20
51 : clergy and politics	1	16	19	2
Total	330	61	38	65
Average	25.4	4.7	2.9	5.0

Note: A means that the evaluation was favorable to the American as opposed to the Mexican.

S means that the evaluation was the same for both.

 $^{{\}tt M}$ means that the evaluation was favorable for the Mexican as opposed to the American.

N means no answer was given.



responses being 25.4 while the average number of favorable responses for the Mexican is only 2.9. The image is clearly favorable to the American and negative towards the Mexican. Only two individuals gave responses which approximate an overall favorable image of Mexico, attained by adding favorable to Mexico with same responses. Other than this, there is very little evidence that El Paso business elites see the two political systems as anywhere near congruent. The data support the hypothesis.

lb - The El Paso political elites show the same pattern as that discussed above, with three fifths of them perceiving the American governmental practice as favorable and the Mexican as unfavorable. There was a slight bit more tendency toward seeing the Mexican system as congruent, but nowhere near enough to alter the general image that is predominantely favorable to the American system when compared with the Mexican. The data are found in Table XXIX.

lc - There is again substantial evidence of a highly favorable image of the American political system, but also considerable evidence that the Mexican system is considered to be generally congruent. The expectation that the internal municipal strife coupled with a high degree of cross-cultural contact would lead the Cd. Juarez businessmen to a predominantly negative image of the Mexican political system is not borne out by the data, as Table XXX shows. The summary of individual responses 6 shows that more than half strongly favor the United States as opposed to the Mexican on seven of the 13 questions and two fifths feel the same way

See Appendix B for summaries of individual responses to these questions.
 Table XXXII.

^{6.} See Appendix B for Table XXXIII of individual responses.




TABLE XXXX

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THIRTEEN QUESTIONS COMPARING MEXICAN AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT PRACTICES BY EL PASO POLITICAL ELITES

(Questions are in decreasing order of favorableness to the American)

		A	s	M	N
41 - 4 :	Elections	16	-	-	3
48 :	Local political corruption	16	-	-	3
41 - 6 :	Property	15	2	-	2
47 :	National political corruption	14	-	1	4
42 :	Class background	13	1	2	3
41 - 3 :	Free religion	13	5	-	1
41 - 5 :	Justice	13	5	-	1
54 :	Business-government corruption	13	3	1	2
41 - 1 :	Free speech	10	7	-	2
41 - 2 :	Free press	9	8	-	2
41 - 7 :	Labor	9	5	4	1
49 :	Political bossism	8	-	2	9
51 :	Clergy and politics	1	5	10	3
	Total	150	41	20	36
	Average	11.5	3.2	1.5	2.7

Note: A means that the evaluation was favorable to the American as opposed to the Mexican.

S means that the evaluation was the same for both.

M means that the evaluation was favorable for the Mexican as opposed to the American.

N means no answer was given.



TABLE XXX

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THIRTEEN QUESTIONS COMPARING MEXICAN AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT PRACTICES BY CD. JUAREZ BUSINESS ELITES

(Questions are in decreasing order of favorableness to the American)

		A	s	М	N
41 - 4 :	Elections	30	6	-	1
54 :	Business-government cooperation	29	7	_	1
41 - 5 :	Justice	29	8	_	_
48 :	Local political corruption	26	4	-	7
47 :	National political corruption	21	8	-	8
49 :	Political bossism	18	7	3	9
42 :	Class background	18	1	17	1
41 - 2 :	Free press	11	26	-	-
41 - 3 :	Free religion	11	25	-	1
41 - 6 :	Property	11	26	-	-
41 - 7 :	Labor	9	25	3	-
41 - 1 :	Free speech	7	30	-	-
51 :	Clergy and politics	4	4	23	6
	Total	224	167	46	34


Average 17.2 12.7 3.5 2.6

Note: A means that the evaluation was favorable to the American as opposed to the Mexican.

S means that the evaluation was the same for both.

M means that the evaluation was favorable for the Mexican as opposed to the American.

N means no answer was given.



TARILE XXXI

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THIRTEEN QUESTIONS COMPARING MEXICAN AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT PRACTICES BY CD. JUANEZ POLITICAL ELITES

(Questions are in decreasing order of favorableness to the American)


	A	s	M	n
41 - 4 : Elections	9	11	-	2
41 - 5 : Justice	8	12	-	2
34 : Business-government cooperation	8	11	-	3
48 : Local political corruption	5	3	1	13
47 : National political corruption	4	4	-	14
41 - 2 : Free press	4	17	3	2
41 - 7 : Labor	3	15	2	2
49 : Political bossism	3	2	-	17
42 : Class background	2	-	17	3
41 - 1 : Free speech	1	17	2	2
41 - 3: Free religion	1.	19	-	2
41 - 6 : Property	1	19	-	2
Total.	49	130	24	64
Average	4.1	10.8	2	5.3

Note: A means that the evaluation was favorable to the American as

S means that the evaluation was the same for both.

M means that the evaluation was favorable for the Mexican as opposed to the American.


N means no answer was given.



on at least 10 of 13 questions. At the same time one fourth see both systems as the same on seven of the 13 questions. In all, congruent images are held by a majority on six of the 13 questions, while on one question the majority see the Mexican as superior. While the image is still more favorable to the American than to the Mexican, local issues may not have been responsible. It may be suggested that Cd. Juarez business elites were in a good position to make cross-cultural comparisons, and tried to make an objective appraisal.

ld - In general, the prediction that the Cd. Juarez political elites would compare both systems as congruent appears to be supported by the data in Table XXXI. This is the only table on which the average of the "same" responses is higher than that of the "American." Just about half of these elites answered that the systems were the same on at least seven of the 13 questions. There was no strong preference for either the United States or Mexico separately.

In summary, then, it can be said with reference to these four hypotheses that the overall image of the four groups is more favorable toward the American government official and his practices than toward the Mexicans, (within the limits posed by the questions). Nevertheless, there is a recognizable tendency on the part of the Cd. Juarez elites, especially the political elites, to defend the Mexican image. This tendency leads to an evaluation of both systems as about the same. Let us now turn to the delineation of the substantive images of the American and Mexican government officials and their practices. Unless otherwise indicated, the image being detailed represents the consensus of all four groups. When strong minority or differing majority opinions occur they will be included to round out the picture.




H. The Image of The American Government Official and His Practices
General Character of the American Politician

All except the Cd. Juarez political elites thought that the American politician was drawn from all the social classes. The Cd. Juarez politicial elites thought that there was broader social class representation in the Mexican political system. Unfortunately, their image of the American was not clarified by further explanation. The American politician was not above graft and corruption, which he generally did in pursuit of his own self interest, but he also didn't hesitate to connive with businessmen, racketeers, and labor leaders when it will help him. Yet it was generally agreed that this corruption was more often the exception than the rule in the United States, and was almost non-existant on the home front in El Paso. Even political bossism was not a major problem in America. Some views sustaining this position were:

An American business elite - "The unusual cases (of corruption) in the United States can be traced to sick minds of people in high posttions. They lose their conscience and their souls for money." Another said, "Business and government here (el Paso) are close and fairly virtuous." A Mexican business elite - "The quality of the laws and the high cultural level of the people have eliminated much of this." Another attributed the lack of political bossism of the magnitude of Mexico's to the "two party system" in the United States.


Religion seemed to be basic to the political behavior of the American politician - "Ike invokes God," said one Gd. Juarez political elite. The majority thought this was a good thing; as one El Paso businessman put it: "A good and wise politician recognized this, and so do the people." However, others, while not denying the importance of religion to politics were not sure of the sincerity of the politician, their view being expressed well by this comment of a Gd. Juarez businessman: "I think the politicians use it plenty to gather votes."



It was generally agreed that the clergy in the United States exerted a definite influence on political life, which the El Pasoans considered to be "a good influence." Both Cd. Juarez groups also acknowledged this influence, but with somewhat differing ideas about the meaning. The Cd. Juarez business elites generally thought that the fact that "Cardinal Spellman certainly has been influential in government affairs" was a good thing. They saw clerical influence as "a healthy tendency" in politics, if kept in bounds. The Cd. Juarez political elites, with their historical anti-clerical position were nevertheless not condematory of this influence, because it seemed to be mitigated in part by the fact that there were so many differing religious creeds in the United States; more especially, perhaps, was their image that the great difference between "the two clergies is that the United States group obeys the law of the land."

Finally, as has been emphasized before, the American politician cooperated very closely with businessmen. Only the Cd. Juarez political elite thought that there was as much of this cooperation in Mexico as in the United States. The other three groups saw the United States politico as much more cooperative than his Mexican counterpart. As the El Pasoans expressed it, "It's for the good of all concerned, not for personal gain;" "It's the backbone of our country." A Cd. Juarez business elite saw it this way: "Business is strong enough in the United States to stand on even terms with the government."

<u>Political Ideals and Liberties</u>. The United States was not equalled in its degree of achievement of such universally espoused ideals as: freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedom of religion; free open




and honest elections; equal justice before the law; protection of the rights of property and of management; and protection of the rights of labor. Some of the El Paso businessmen even thought it an insult to suggest a comparison with any other country, let alone Mexico. Some specifically pointed to our educational system as the main reason we were way out in front. The Cd. Juarez elites thought Mexico had done almost as well as the United States in regard to these ideals.

A large number of Cd. Juarez political elites as well as some El Paso elites expressed the view that our labor laws are not so advanced as those of Mexico. Nevertheless, the El Pasoans and the Cd. Juarez business elites insisted that in practice the labor force in the United States was better protected.

A minority of Cd. Juarez elites did express a negative image of of race relations in the United States - no Cd. Juarense mentioned this until Texas Western College in El Paso refused to allow a Negro girl to enroll there in late March, 1955. Following this incident, the Cd. Juarez elites mentionsed this quite regularly for two or three weeks—Said one Cd. Juarez business elite, "We control the vote more, but you keep the Negro down, so it is about even." In similar vein, one Cd. Juarez politico went so far as to say that, "We are still more democratic. The white-negro problem in the United States is bad. A lot of out laws are even better than yours, but are not yet carried out in practice."

<u>Political</u> <u>Practices.</u> Despite the image of the "happy marriage" of business and government in the United States, the El Paso elites were somewhat disturbed by the amount of government regulation and ownership




of business, which they believed was excessive. On the other hand, the Cd. Juarez groups perceived such political practices to be only what was proper and just. Consider these contrasting opinions: From an El Paso political elite: "It (government regulation) has been too strong; Ike if for less government in business and it is working out much better."

From El Paso business elites: "Always too much at the wrong time;"
"It has gone beyond doing good for all; it is helping only the big
business, which it is supposed to be aimed at;" "Regulating is not
helping;" "Let supply and demand and ability be our guide."

Regarding government ownership, one business elite said: "There has been (too much), but we are getting away from it. There should not be ownership of business by government." Another commented: "There is a slow change coming about since Ike got in."

It must be noted that whereas better than four out of five El Paso business elites expressed a negative image with respect to government ownership, the political elites were split almost fifty-fifty, with those holding the above view opposed by those who thought government regulation and ownership was just and necessary and not excessive. This latter was the same view generally expressed by the Cd. Juarez elites, well summed up in the phrase "government regulation as practiced in the United States is good for the country."

With respect to International relations, considerable doubt was raised about the wisdom of the United States politcy of giving more attention to Europe and Asia than to Latin America. Two out of seven El Paso business elites expressed some reservation about this policy, while the same number emphatically said it wasn't wise. Half of the



El Paso political elites called this policy unwise, while one out of three Cd. Juarez business elites and two out of five political elites called it unwise.

The following sentiment seemed to be that of the majority of El Paso business elites:

Our people put their time and energy where it's needed; when it was needed in Europe we put it there; when in Asia likewise. When Latin America needs our help she will get it. I have great confidence in our government.

Nevertheless, a minority expressed strong reaction against our foreign aid program, as the following comments indicate:


We go too far away to accomplish less. With a little more here we can get more. As long as We're going to waste money, we ought to do it closer to home where it will be appreciated. The average Mexican can't understand why we give every one else so much money that don't care to be like Americans, and they want to so badly.

The matter of our future is in our own hemisphere. Here, they are developing a great potential. Asia and Europe is static.

The above reflected essentially the attitudes of the political elite also, as they considered the government's policy as unwise since "These people (the Mexicans) are out closest neighbors and the most neglected,"

Probably the strongest Mexican reaction against American politics and policies was registered on this question, at least in terms of the nature and extent of their comments. The following were representative of the Cd. Juarez political elites:

> Monroe spoke a profound truth when he said, 'America for the Americans.' By the same token I think the United States should not be meddling in European or Asiatic affairs. It hurts our feelings to see so much money spent there, with no help coming here,



Of course, the United States needed Europe and Asia, but this is virgin land here which the United States' money could do wonders for. But Mexico doesn't want to be dominated by United States capital; nutual aid to a less fortunate friend is our hope and the visits of Nixon and Eisenhower's brother augur well for the future.

. . . We just about buy everything from the United States directly or indirectly, so you should help us to live better.

And from the Cd. Juarez business elites came these comments:

European countries are taking over the markets here; don't think that the Latin Americans don't resent the fact that the United States has forgotten them.

The true markets of the United States are in Latin America, not in Europe. The visit of Nixon was well received here. I was talking with a high government official and he was highly impressed with Nixon's sincerity and interest in us.

And perhaps the most extreme comment was;

United States policy toward Latin America is in error. It tried to destroy our traditions and to dominate us economically and politically, including the religious aspect of like. Therefore, they have created absolute, complex hostility toward themselves, which is even more marked in Southern Mexico.

- 1 The United States should respect the tradition and religion of others.
- 2 The United States should give economic aid to block the danger of native communism.
- 3 The United States should solve the Chamizal problem, so that the Mexicans can get this off their chest.

Summary. The general image of politics, political ideals and government officials in the United States is a favorable one. Some of the comments above do suggest that there may be areas, not covered by this

^{7.} The Chamizal is a small area of south El Paso bordering the Rio Grands which the Mexicans claim is rightfully theirs. The problem has been the subject of arbitration, but the United States so far has refused to accept the findings.



study, in which strong negative images are held, particularly with respect to foreign trade, foreign policy, and race relations.

I. The Image of the Mexican Government Official, His Practices and Ideals

The General Character of the Mexican Politician. There is no clear picture as to the social class background of the Mexican politician; all except the Cd. Juarez politicos think that he is drawn more from one particular class. The majority of the El Pasoans think this is the upper class. The Cd. Juarez business elites split, with almost as many stating that there was a broad distribution as asserted that the politician came from either the lower, middle or upper separately. The Cd. Juarez politicos were almost unanimous in their opinion that Mexican politicans are broadly representative of Mexico's social classes.

There was no doubt that the MI Pasoans identified the politico with wealth and education in Mexico; witness the following comments which were typical:


A political elite said: "If you are not wealthy, you don't hold an office."

And from several business elites: "There is only one class to choose from, the money or business class, the rest are provincial."

"Not from all the classes, it's a strange combination, wealthy and educated."

If there was any central tendency among the Cd. Juarez business elites it was expressed by the idea that "they choose the most unscrupulous (from whatever class) and put them in power."

One Cd. Juarez political elite expressed well the idea that just anybody and everybody gets into Mexican politics with the remark that "Why, there are even reactionaries of the Porfirio Diaz Type in Mexican politics."



Graft and corruption have been institutionalized by the Mexican politician who was primarily concerned with serving himself, but who would connive with anyone for "profit." The "mordida" as a factor in Mexican politics was mentioned by almost all who were interviewed, and even the Cd. Juarez political elites themselves recognized it in one way or another. One out of three Cd. Juarez political elites to avoid comparing political corruption in the United States and Mexico, gave an "other" response, the only time any large number resorted to this.

The following represent the way they explained the "problem":

The Cd. Juarez business elites saw it differently:

"It is all over the place here. Even Cortines (the president) can't do anything. The old crooks still hold the vital jobs."

Note how in the following comment the businessman tried to explain the "problem": "The greatest problem is the mordida due to low salaries and lack of moral standards. A policeman must "morder" in order to live. Not so in the United States. United States doesn't have this problem because all public officials are well paid."


This was the same rationalization used by the few Cd. Juarez political elites who were willing to discuss the issue openly.

The El Pasoans considered it as "a big game" to the Mexicans, which will never change as long as their "scale of values differ." Some El Pasoans also pointed to the low salary scale as the reason for the problem.

[&]quot;I can only say that here in Mexico it has diminished greatly. Because of my position I don't feel qualified to say anymore."

[&]quot;Of course, we have the petty men, always looking for their mordida, but the president is honest and fights hard against evil."

[&]quot;The situation is clearing up in Mexico now; I don't know how it would compare with the United States."



Not only was the "mordida" institutionalized, but political bossism, variously called caudillismo and caciquismo, was also perceived to be characteristic. again with the Cd. Juarez political elites hedging.

The El Paso view could be summed up by the phrase that, "It's a chain of bosses, based on fear and physical violence."

As one Cd. Juarez businessman expressed it: "It's a political machine in Mexico. The bosses all depend on the central machine. There is nothing so powerful in the United States. Your two party system prevents this."

And from the Cd. Juarez political elites:

"It's changing now, and almost disappeared. We now have a new class, leaders who are at times almost as bad, though."


"Still exists, especially in the towns; governors are caudillos of a sort."

"Governors here are often chosen by family connections; rule in personal manner."

"In general it has disappeared in Mexico. It exists now only in isolated cases."

There was general agreement that politics and religion did not mix
in Mexico, and that the influence of the Mexican clergy on political
life was much loss than was presumed to be the case in the United States.
But agreeing that this was either a good or bad thing depended generally
on whether the respondent was a Mexican politician or not. For politicos
were violently opposed to this for historical reasons. As one expressed it:

The United States clergy respects the law of the country more than ours does. The Mexican clergy does not, and since the days of Gd. Juarez and the Reform, when they lost their temporal power, they have borne a resentment against the government. They have been engaged and still are in a constant struggle to regain this power, which is bad because the place of the church is not in ruling the government.



Another stated: "I was brought up in the Catholic Tradition, but I have taken refuge in Masonry."

As expected, the Cd. Juarez business elites evaluated this antagonism in a different light; they saw clerical influence as healthy, and almost implied that the politician was so bad because he lacked a religious foundation.

"None of the Mexican politicos are practicing Catholics, nor do they have a religious foundation from which to act."

"Here it is much safer never to mention religion if you're a politician. The word politician has a derogatory definition in Mexico. If a man is good, then he is not a politician."

The El Pasoans did not attempt to evaluate the situation, noting only that while most of them were Catholics, religion in politics was "taboo."

From all of the above, it was not surprising that all but the Cd.

Juarez political elites found much less cooperation between businessmen and governmental officials in Mexico than in the United States.

The El Pasoans found that the word cooperation didn't fit in at all in Mexico that it was a matter of compulsion, and of course included the ever present "mordida." However, their responses didn't indicate that the politician was necessarily at fault.

As expected the two Cd. Juarez groups went much farther in evaluation, along much the same lines already drawn above. From some Cd. Juarez business elites:

"Cooperation needs true representation in local government.
When we have that then businessmen and politicos will be
able to work together for the people as a whole. Right
now the leaders are chosen for us, and often forced on us."

"We'd gladly pay more taxes if the money were going to be used for the benefit of the people."

:

"The mordida is a national institution. In the United States when big men do something wrong and are caught, they get punished, and so all the people don't get the same bad habit. Here the top dogs set the bad example and when nothing happens to them the others follow suit. But since 60% of us don't abide by the law in the first place, we can't compalin too loudly when the government gets its hands dirty."

"The feeling of trust and political friendship between members of opposing parties just doesn't exist yet in Mexico."


And from the political elites:

- *The Asociacion Civica (a businessman's civic group) does nothing but attack and criticize. They are meddling in politics for their own interests.**
- "A group of malcontents wanted to get control for themselves so they attacked the governor and the mayor. But that is common here just before election time. We are all used to it; as I said, we are more passionate and sentimental in our actions, not cool and analytical as you are in the United States."

It is perhaps the latter sentiment, that it's the common thing in Mexico, that led a majority of Cd. Juarez political elites to insist that they cooperate well with business really, and that trouble arises as expected only from a minority of businessmen.

Political Ideals and Liberties. The great majority of Cd. Juarez political elites believed that the universal ideals of the basic freedoms are realized about as well in Mexico as they were in the United States, and they were proud to claim the Revolution of 1910 and their political party as the causes for this achievement. These comments were typical:

"These ideals were always desired, but were made effective by the Revolution and its ideals." "The Constitution and the laws we live by are a direct result of the Revolution, as has been the elimination of social injustices."




The Cd. Juarez business elites were a little more critical, although a majority did state that there had been about equal achievement with respect to five of the seven ideals. Mexico was behind the United States in the matter of "free, open and honest elections," and "equal justice before the law."

They were not so willing to concede that the Revolution and the PRI party were responsible for progress. As one said: "The more time that passes, the more I am disappointed in the Revolution. The progress we have made may have been natural."

Another said: "The Revolution was an important event which brought unity to Mexico; but I'm not sure that it was necessary. Our progress

The scale may be considered as another way of supporting the hypotheses of this chapter.

^{8.} A Guttman Scale was established for the seven questions on basic freedoms and liberties by dichtomizing responses of all four groups as either favorable or unfavorable to Mexico. The error of reproducibility was 0.94, and the marginal distributions for the seven questions ranged from 19% favorable (free, honest elections) to 60% (freedom of speech). The scale met Guttman's criteria as well as those established by Ford. (See R. Ford. "A Rapid Scaling Procedure for Scaling Attitude Questions, " in Riley, et. al., Sociological Studies in Scale Analysis, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1954. Also L. Guttman in Studies in Social Psychology. Vol. IV, ed. by Stouffer, S., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950.) Examination of the scale shows that the Cd. Juarez political elites are clustered at the top or favorable end of the scale. followed by the Cd. Juarez business elites with the El Paso groups at the bottom or unfavorable end of the scale. In general, the scale shows that those Cd. Juarez elites whose responses did not correspond to the occupational group expectancies were those who were least closely alligned with their occupational group in terms of the data discussed in Chapter III. On the other hand, the five Cd. Juarez business elites who gave favorable responses to all seven questions were the ones who either had close ties with the government or who ignored politics completely.



is probably a result of the world progress of the last 40 years; a natural phenomenon.

"We are progressing a little, but to speak out here may mean the jail."

The El Pasoans were not so hesitant to speak out. Their remarks were extremely negative, as exemplified by one political elite, "There are no such things (freedoms) in Mexico." Another added, "They have a lot to learn yet." Some business leaders were more specific: "The Revolution has not done a thing but create bigger rascals." And another: "There are still lots of shootings in the Cd. Juarez elections. The 'pay off' runs the Cd. Juarez courts. Anybody can welch out on a debt and labor lacks strong organization." Finally, "There is more or less a dictatorship in Mexico: They speak freely, blow off a lot, but a stop can be put to it overnight - they shoot them."

Political Practices. In the matter of government regulation of business, only the Cd. Juarez political elites gave whole-hearted endorsement to the program, with the Cd. Juarez business elites again almost evenly split, with only a slight majority complaining against too much regulation. As expected, the El Pasoans were the extreme critics.

The Cd. Juarez political elites put it this way: "There is more control in Mexico than in the United States but it is necessary."

"The government here is a regulator; it intervenes only to protect the national economy and the interests of the people."

"The idea of government control is good, but it is the men who are not good. That is our problem all over the place."


That the Cd. Juarez business elites also made a distinction between the politician whom they strongly condemned and specific governmental regulations was evident in their comments: "The human element interferes sometimes to cause abuses, but the laws are good." "The government inspectors, especially the municipal ones, are always looking for a bite by trying to find something wrong."

The El Pasoans tended to feel that the Mexican government didn't know enough about business. Their restrictions "Don't permit the import of skills and capital. The nationalist aspect is more nationalistic than intelligent. Politics is more important than long run planning for industralization. They need skilled leaders which the government hasn't given them."

With regard to government ownership of business, a minority of El Pasoans stated that "nationalization is necessary at this stage," but the majority are unalterably opposed, in the "best" American tradition.

"Too much politics wrapped up in it. Oil would be better off in private hands." And another, "It stinks if it (business) pays they will own it."


The Cd. Juarez groups came closer to agreeing on government ownership than on any other question, as large majorities of both groups sustained the idea that what ownership there was, was justified and proper. The petroleum industry (managed by a distinguished Cd. Juarez businessman) was pointed to with pride by both groups. One businessman called it "a necessary evil," since "speculation and higher rates would result from private ownership now." Political attitudes ranged from the extreme that, "Things are better with government ownership," to,



industry." It may be suggested here that perhaps the fact that one of Cd. Juarez's most distinguished citizens was in charge of the nation's largest industry, and apparently was operating it successfully, tended to temper feelings here.


Summary and Conclusions. In this chapter two related propositions were tested, one being that individuals have favorable images of themselves and less favorable images of others, and the other that there is a significant relationship between the nationality and occupation of an individual and the nature of his images. The data generally support these propositions. Both the El Paso and the Cd. Juarez political elites saw themselves in a generally favorable light. Furthermore. the business elites of the two cities, who have strong bureaucratic and universalistic orientations, were expected to and did have generally favorable images of American politics, but for the same reason they were expected to and did hold unfavorable images of Mexican politics. The El Paso political elites were even more unfavorable towards Mexico, while the Cd. Juarez political elites, who theoretically might have been expected to have reciprocated in like manner, expressed images of American politics that were congruent with their own. Much of this may be attributed to the status equal treatment they receive from American political elites on the border as well as to the fact that the ideals of the Mexican Revolution are not opposed to what is presumed to be the situation in the United States.

Regarding the second proposition it was found that nationality rather than occupation seemed to be the more important variable in determining the nature of the images held. Highly significant differences



were found when nationality was held constant and occupation varied; these differences tended to disappear when the reverse was tried. However, there is some indication that occupation may be an important variable for the Cd. Juarez business elites.

Finally, composite substantive images of the Mexican and American government officials and their practices were delineated. It is the writer's conclusion that the images delineated here are an accurate portrayal of the situation as it existed during his stay on the border.



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Background of Study

The present study arose out of a general concern with the problem of technological and social change between citizens of Latin America and the United States. Since national political boundaries are known to be areas where there is a great amount of day-to-day contact among citizens of different nations, the United States-Mexico border area was selected as the research site. Among the basic premises for this study of the border was the notion that national images may be a factor in the acceptance or rejection of technological and social innovations, and may otherwise play a role in the relations among citizens of different nations. A second premise was that people in important political and business positions in their communities are influential change agents, especially as the community increases in size and degree of technological and bureaucratic development. The El Paso-Cd. Juarez metropolitan area was chosen as the specific site for this project.

It was decided to study the national images which the business and political elites had of themselves and each other, with respect to three variables, 1) amount of contact, 2) national identification, and 3) occupational identification. In order to do this, three major objectives were established:

- Description and analysis of the business and political elite systems of the two cities;
- Description and analysis of the cross-cultural contacts which the elites of the two cities had, in order to (a) determine whether there was a differential rate of contact among the four




occupational elite groups, and (b) test the hypothesis that amount of contact was related to national images;

3. Study of national images to (a) determine whether the images were related to nationality and occupational variables, and (b) delineate the composite substantive images held by these elites.

The study was carried out during the year 1954-1955 and began with a three month period of exploratory research at the border site. During this time a technique was developed to find the elites and the formal interview schedule was gradually developed to obtain imagery material. The focus of attention of the imagery questions was on some practices and value orientations of businessmen and governmental officials which are commonly related to speculations about gemeinschaft-like and gesellschaft-like societies. Imagery questions concerning the four groups were generally of an evaluative nature and derived from the exploratory research.

Results


1. Fifty-seven elites (38 business and 19 political) were found in El Paso and fifty-nine (37 business and 22 political) were found in Cd. Juarez. Important similarities and differences both within and between cities were found. First, there were no statistically significant differences in the occupational compositions of the business and political elite groups between cities. Bankers, industrialists and retail and wholesale merchants were the top business elites in both cities, with Chairmen of Boards, Presidents and Vice-Presidents dominating the top positions. However, there was a difference in the size



of businesses (as measured by number of employees) managed by these elites, with the El Paso elites managing significantly larger businesses. Secondly, with respect to the political elites there was strong evidence that differences existed between the cities with respect to the proportion in executive and judicial branches of government. The executive branch appeared to dominate the political elites of Cd. Juarez, with the governor of the state as the top influential followed by all top municipal, state and federal officials in this city. In El Paso only two incumbent officials were named as top elites in the executive branch. The reverse trends occurred with respect to representation from the judiciary branch; none were named in Cd. Juarez, while eight were chosen in El Paso. The legislative branch was not found to be a major source of influence in either city. Finally, more non-governmental elites of Cd. Juarez were generally linked to the PRI party (Mexico's controlling political party) through labor unions and other organizations which are more or less party appendages.

The distributions of power within each city seemed to differ considerably. In El Paso there appeared to be a single, integrated system, with the business elites tending to dominate the influence structure. This seemed to have the concurrence of the political elites, and follows the pattern commonly observed by social scientists in other communities in recent years.


In Cd. Juarez, two separate and opposed influence systems emerged, with the business and political elites opposing each other. Both were competing for power, and cooperation was limited to those occasions involving inter-city events with the elites of El Paso. The cleavage in Cd. Juarez was reflected in the fact that there was no overlapping of



memberships among the two groups of the city. The reverse was found in El Paso.

To a considerable degree it appeared that personal influence extended from the political office in Cd. Juarez; hence, authority and influence tended to be located at the same address. The same did not appear to be the case in El Paso where office and authority were clearly defined and circumscribed. The decisionmakers in El Paso tended to be the top businessmen, to whom those in the authority positions looked for advice, support and policy.

- 2. An index of contacts was constructed to measure the amount of cross-cultural contacts which each of the elite groups had. It was found that the Juarez business elites had significantly greater contact than the other three groups, and that the differences among the other groups were not significant. Tests failed to show significant differences between amount of contact and national images held by the groups. The data on some questions showed slight evidence that high contact El Paso elites tended to evaluate comparative practices of the countries as similar while low contact El Paso elites found differences between the two countries. On the other hand, an occasional trend also appeared to show that high contact Mexicans were more self-critical than low contact Mexicans. While the latter tended to evaluate comparative practices between the countries as similar, there were no instances of the reverse pattern.
- 3. Nationality and occupation as variables related to national images were tested with respect both to businessmen and their practices and government officials and their practices. The results will be discussed separately, beginning with the images of businessmen and their practices.




- a. As predicted, the differences were highly significant when groups were compared on the basis of nationality alone or nationality and occupation.
- b. When occupations were compared, letting nationality vary, there were no differences.
- c. When occupations were compared within each city there were no differences.
- d. When occupations were compared cross-culturally, significant differences occurred only once in four tests, that is, when the El Paso businessmen were compared with the Juarez businessmen.

The tests clearly support the hypothesis that nationality is an important factor in national images, but cast doubt on the importance of occupation. The fact that no differences occurred within cities, and that significant differences occurred when the images of the El Paso and Juarez businessmen were compared tends to refute the importance of occupation as a primary variable. While the images of the Juarez political elites are not significantly different from those of both El Paso elites, neither are they significantly different from those of the Juarez business elites, so that there is little evidence to support the argument that the cleavage between the occupational groups in Juarez was reflected in their images of Mexican and American businessmen.

The findings as regards images of government officials and their practices were generally similar in nature:

- a. Highly significant differences occurred between nationality groups.
- b. No differences occurred when occupations were compared, letting nationality vary.



- c. No significant differences occurred when occupational groups were compared internally, although the responses from the Juarez groups were close to significant levels. Highly significant differences occurred on those questions dealing with honest elections, equal justice, and corruption, which seems to reflect the cleavage indicated by the analysis of the elite structures.
- d. When occupations were compared cross-culturally statistical differences occurred between the Juarez political elites and the El Paso elites but not between the Juarez business elites and the El Paso elites. This would seem to be some support for the importance of occupation as a distinguishing variable, but again it is mitigated by the fact that intermally in Cd. Juarez significant differences occurred on only one out of every three questions asked, so that the total probability was not significant.

In summary, the importance of nationality in imagery formation was clearly brought out by the tests, but there was contradictory evidence about the importance of occupation. It seemed to affect some images, but the overall picture was not affected.

The other major concern of this section was with the evaluation and content of the national images. It was found that all four elite groups tended to have more favorable images of American businessmen and government officials and their respective practices than of the Mexicans. The findings revealed that both El Paso groups strongly favored the American as opposed to the Mexican. The Juarez businessmen tended to be self-critical of Mexican business practices and moderately critical of Mexican political practices, although they generally perceived the latter to be similar to the United States practice. The Juarez political




elites generally saw the Mexican businessmen and practices about the same way the Juarez business elites did, while they were less critical of the Mexican government. They generally thought the American and Mexican systems were similar in practice.

The general image of the American businessman held by all four elites is that he is practical, achievement-oriented in a society which allows him much opportunity for advancement and encourages free competition. His guiding rules are moderate profits, mass market, heavy reinvestment, and high business ethics. He gets along fairly well with labor and highly approves of the way in which business and government work together. Finally, he is very civic-minded.

On the other hand, the Mexican businessman appears to be well educated in "Cultural" matters but lacking in practical business "know-how." He lives in a society where opportunity to advance is still limited and there is little business competition. He is just becoming aware of the possibilities of mass market production, and still operates in terms of large profits from low unit production. He trails the American also in the matter of business reinvestment, and his business ethics are strongly influenced by the "mordida". He does not get along with either labor or government as well as the American does and this further hampers his business progress. He is still very much family oriented and has not yet become adapted to the kinds of civic activities which typifies the American businessman.

The American government official, who is recruited from all social classes, is fairly honest and not generally given to political bossism.

He gets along well with business and uses government power justly. He has striven hard to make such basic political ideals as freedom of speech




and of the press a reality of everyday American life. Religion and the clergy in general seem to have some importance in his political life. The greatest area of weakness in American government policy has been in foreign affairs, where there seems to have been too much emphasis on Europe and Asia to the neglect of Latin America.

The Mexican political official is drawn more from one social class (generally seen as the poorer by the Juarez businessmen and the richer by the El Pasoans), and is generally immersed in affairs of political graft and corruption. He has institutionalized the mordida. There is general agreement that perhaps the Mexican Revolution has done some good, but only the Juarez political elites believe that the basic freedoms and protections are all as equally well enjoyed in Mexico as in the United States. He does not yet get along as well with businessmen as his American counterpart does, partly because of the mordida and partly because of the government's long held suspicion of private business. There is some indication that this has diminished at the national level, but mutual mistrust remains the keynote at the local level.

Implications for General Theory

The data on the business and political elite structure of El Paso conform closely to the finds of Mills, Hunter, and others. The Juarez case constitutes the first analytical study of the top elites of a Mexican community of which the writer is aware. The comprative nature of the study helps to point up some of the important features of both communities. similarities as well as differences.


In the introductory chapter to this dissertation several broad generalizations were delineated about the value orientations which



theoretically circumscribe the role behavior of Mexicans and Americans respectively; these may be categorized as gemeinschaft-like and gesell-schaft-like respectively. It is now possible to consider these generalizations in the light of the data on the elite systems and in terms of the way these elites saw themselves and each other.

l. Latin American societies are allegedly integrated by a network of affective, particularistic relationships. On the other hand, the United States is portrayed as the most gesellschaftlike nation, where universalistic relationships dominate.

The data on the elite systems suggests that Mexico has no monopoly on particularistic relations. There is much of particularism in the way in which business elites in American cities use their influence in the political decision-making processes. The difference between the two social-cultural systems would seem to lie in the fact that in Mexico such particularistic relationships are out in the open; people know whom to go to and for what kinds of favors. They also know that their chances of success depend on their place in "the party" or their ability to relate themselves to relevant officials. In the United States, the patterm is harder to define. At certain levels, all citizens do receive "universalistic" treatment from government officials. And yet in the important decision-making process of choosing a mayor, the voices of a few men from behind the scenes may determine the decisions of those in positions of authority. Much more study is needed to analyse these relationships in both societies to be able to determine whether they are of a kind. With respect to the imagery data it seems clear that the United States is perceived as more universalistic and Mexico more particularistic. Perhaps the way in which the elites responded to the question on civic-mindedness illustrates the point. The Americans were




conceded to be much more civic-minded, but what they all seemed to mean was that the American considers it his obligation to devote himself to civic activities for the good of society in general, while the Mexicans stressed the fact that they were more interested in helping specific persons, such as the old gardener who can no longer do much work, but who is kept on and fed and clothed. The perceptions of the elites about contrasting systems support the generalization rather strongly.

2. Kinship ties overlap institutional boundaries in Latin America. By contrast, the nuclear family predominates in the United States, and the focus of its activities is narrowly limited to the homs.

There was much evidence of nepotism within the political structure of Juarez. Close friends and relatives of the governor held important posts in Juarez and throughout the state. There was no evidence of this within El Paso politics. Again, the imagery questions showed that the elites perceived Mexicans to be much more familistic than the Americans.

3. Because of factors one and two above the "office" has been held to be broadly instrumental to influence in Latin America, and rather diffusely defined. Just the opposite is held to be true in the United States.

The data suggest that the political office is very important in Mexico, not because it is well defined, but because it gives the office holder authority plus influence. In the United States, the office holder possesses only a limited amount of authority to act in specifically delimited ways. While he may have the authority to make certain decisions, these decisions may be made by "non-political" officeholders, such as bankers, lawyers, industrialists. What this means is that in the United States, government officials have authority while top business elites have personal influence over them. Family ties may not be vital,




but the officeholder is still bound to others. In Mexico the businessmen are still struggling to secure some of this influence now held by the men in office. In neither case is the interest of the general public necessarily considered.

4. In Latin America political power is centered in a few caudillos or "strong men" who rule for their own interests. On the other hand, the United States is thought to be a government of law and not of men.

Strong central government is still the fact in Mexico; the governor held strong control over political affairs in Juarez. When he was removed from office just after this study was concluded, it was because the opposition to him had succeeded in convincing the supreme power in the country, the president, that he should be removed. This example illustrates the point that opposition is not without influence if it remains within the "official" party structure.

Enough has been said above to illustrate that the United States is far from being only a government of laws. Nevertheless, the imagery data suggest specific areas in which these societies are seen as conforming to the generalization. The question dealing with the basic freedoms and rights yielded data which showed that all groups, with the exception of the Juarez politicos, clearly saw that "free, open and honest elections" and "equal justice before the law" were two rights much more enjoyed by Americans than by Mexicans.

The American government was perceived to be honest and stable, a government whose laws were clear and not subject to arbitrary change or interpretation. The majority perceived the Mexican government to lack just these qualities.



5. Business, still very much a family affair in Letin America, is neither well organized nor developed. It stands in poor contrast with the United States where business has reached its highest point of development. The Letin American is said to be much more concerned about art, poetry and philosophy and leaves economics to the American.

While the data show that there is much similarity between the business structures of the two cities in terms of types of business and particular occupations the great differences in size and stage of development are readily apparent. Nevertheless, a definite trend toward the American ideal is noticeable in the Juarez business structure. Lack of experience rather than lack of desire seem to be the prime factor for the present state of business development.

In general, then, it may be said that El Pascans did in fact tend to see themselves in ways that have been styled here as more geneilschaft-like and the Mexicans as more geneinschaft-like, and the Mexicans tended to concur in this.

Now, let us turn to the question of how the findings of this study may be related to general propositions about images and their meaning in social behavior.

1. Images are said to reflect an individual's reference groups.

In this study it was found that nationality was a primary social referent for all elites. While occupation was also assumed to be an important social referent—for most men this is their primary status—role—the data do not clearly indicate the importance of this variable in the international context. Its importance for El Pascans may have been blurred because the elite groups were so closely integrated and the questions asked did not differentiate this as an important social referent apart from nationality.

The responses of the Juarez business elites showed some evidence that their occupation was important as a social referent to them and so did the political elites. But again, in terms of the questions asked, the findings pertaining to occupation were not significant. The more secure evidence is that they responded as Mexicans rather than as Mexican businessmen or politicos.

2. An individual's images of others will vary with the way he relates their perceived image of him to his own self-image.

This hypothesis adds a new dimension to the reference group hypothesis. It suggests specific ways in which reference groups may influence images. In this study it was found that the Juarez elites were treated as statusequals by the El Paso elites, even though the national systems might not be equal in status. The American, of course, begins by assuming that everyone recognizes the superiority of his system as he does. He doesn't expect to find another system as good, so he doesn't.

For the Mexican the poblem is different; the fact that his own self-esteem is not endangered in interaction with Americans in El Paso makes it possible for him to be self-critical, and at the same time to recognize those features of American life which he would like to enjoy himself. The fact that the low contact elites in Juarez were not less self-critical than the high contact group only suggests that there may have been important kinds of contacts which the index of contact did not measure. Internal contacts within elite groups may be ways by which favorable or unfavorable impressions are passed on throughout a group.


Under certain conditions images are causative factors in interaction situations.



There was no evidence of this turned up by this study, although the writer appreciates that images probably do function as causative factors in the border area. The statement by one business elite of El Paso that Anglos would not work in factories where Mexicans were employed in the same jobs suggests the way in which this hypothesis might be tested in the border area. In the present study the particular groups chosen for study probably reduced the importance of images in the interaction process. As one El Pasoan said: "Sure, a lot of those fellows in Mexico are corrupt, and their business ethics are not like ours, but we have to do business with them just the same."


 4_{\bullet} Images may be symptomatic of the interaction which has taken place.

This assertion would seem to be more relevant to present study. The American image of Mexican business and politics was generally negative, but it didn't prevent interaction from taking place. Most of the El Paso elites knew all about the mordida and how it operated in Mexico, and they did not hesitate to abide by the rules in Mexico if need be for business purposes. Their image arose cut of actual experience or good second-hand knowledge. Nor did the negative images of politics in Mexico keep the American government officials from carrying out their functions properly. This can probably be explained by the remark of one official that, "With us they do things our way and with their own people their way." Personal images of Americans were subordinated to the requirements of their formal occupational role and the institutional patterns it demanded. It would appear then that when situations are highly structured and clearly defined goals have been enunciated for the actors in a given situation, the personal images which these actors



may have of each other may not be important in the achievement of the objectives.

Finally, in relating this study to the problem of technological and social change in a cross-cultural setting, the writer is drawn to the conclusion that change may take place if people get to know one another and to like another and so want to borrow from one another. But whether interaction produces favorable images or not, change will take place when the social structure is such that individuals are forced to interact cross-culturally as status-equals whether they like one another or not. If the objectives are well defined and understood and desired by both parties to the situation and the same institution-alized patterns for role behavior are mutually recognized, then interaction may become merely the means to an end, and personal images will not be disruptive influences in the situation.




APPENDIX A


BORDER STUDY NO.2: CUIDAD JUAREZ-EL PASO AREA*

Cooperating Agencies:	Interviewer:
Michigan State University	Date of interview
Carnegie Foundation	Interview no
Introduction. How do you do? I am	Lations along the United States which we are interested is the way overnment in both countries and solve their own problems and prob- to like to know how you evaluate the
You have been selected as one of the much to interview with respect to these tions whatsoever which you would like the hesitate to do so. Let me assure you to us will be kept in strict confidence your responses because they will be coo others. Our desire is to obtain the winumber of interviews. First we should like to know somethers.	e problems. If you have any ques- to ask before we begin please don't that the information which you give e. No one will be able to identify ded and grouped with those of many idest possible view from a great hing about your educational back-
ground, work experiences, and contacts with Mexico.	
l. What is your official title?	
TYPE OF BUSINESS OR INDUSTRY (OR GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY)	
How many people work here?	
(IF A SUPERVISOR) How many peop	ple are responsible to you?
Do you have interests in other bus IF YES, What are they? Type of	inesses? No
(1)	***************************************
(2)	
(3)	

^{*} The same interview was translated into Spanish for use in Cd. Juarez, and Questions 35b, 40d, 62 and 63 were changed to make them relevant.



interests? No Other
IF YES: What are they? Type of business Office No. of employee
(1)
(2)
(3)
Where were you born? When? SexK_F
Where did you receive your early education?
Where? How far? Course of studies
Primary
Secondary
College
Vocational
VocationalOther
Other
Other 3a. (IF ANY EDUCATION IN MEXICO) How often were you mistreated because you were an American?
Other
Other 3a. (IF ANY EDUCATION IN MEXICO) How often were you mistreated because you were an American?
Other 3a. (IF ANY EDUCATION IN MEXICO) How often were you mistreated because you were an American? 3b. Do you speak Spanish? Yes No Comment
Other 3a. (IF ANY EDUCATION IN MEXICO) How often were you mistreated because you were an American?
Other 3a. (IF ANY EDUCATION IN MEXICO) How often were you mistreated because you were an American? 3b. Do you speak Spanish? Yes No Comment IF YES: How well? Would you please tell me what have been the main jobs you held since
Other 3a. (IF ANY EDUCATION IN MEXICO) How often were you mistreated because you were an American? 3b. Do you speak Spanish? Yes No Comment
Other 3a. (IF ANY EDUCATION IN MEXICO) How often were you mistreated because you were an American? 3b. Do you speak Spanish? Yes No Comment IF YES: How well? Would you please tell me what have been the main jobs you held since you left school?
Other 3a. (IF ANY EDUCATION IN MEXICO) How often were you mistreated because you were an American? 3b. Do you speak Spanish? Yes No Comment IF YES: How well? Would you please tell me what have been the main jobs you held since you left school? Occupation Business Flace From To
Other 3a. (IF ANY EDUCATION IN MEXICO) How often were you mistreated because you were an American? 3b. Do you speak Spanish? Yes NoComment IF YES: How well? Would you please tell me what have been the main jobs you held since you left school? Occupation Business Flace From To (1)
Other 3a. (IF ANY EDUCATION IN MEXICO) How often were you mistreated because you were an American? 3b. Do you speak Spanish? Yes No Comment IF YES: How well? Would you please tell me what have been the main jobs you held since you left school? Occupation Business Flace From To (1)



ha	t was your father's main occupation?
o ; en	you have any contacts at present with Mexican businesses or gov tal agencies? Yes No Comment
	IF YES: What are they? What kinds of problems do you encounter?
	(1)
	(2)
	(3)
	Do you favor increasing these contacts or not?
	In what ways?
	In what ways do your relationships with Mexican firms (or go ment) differ from your relationships with U. S. firms (or go ment)? PROBE
ou	ld you mind telling us the organizations of which you are a me Name of Organization F. of M.* % meeting Officer?
	name of Organization of M. + % meeting Officery attend:


^{*} F. of M. means Frequency of meeting.



	7a. Do any of these organizations have contacts with similar organizations on the other side of the border? Yes No
	Organizations Activities How worthwhile are they? F of M
	(1)
	(2)
	(3)
	Do you belong to any organizations on the other side? No
0.	Organ F. of M. Sattendance Officer?
	IF YES: Specify
9•	Among the half dozen people whom you consider your best friends, do any live in Od. Juarez? No
	IF YES: How often do you see them?
10.	Are you formally affiliated with any political party? No
	IF YES: Which?
11	How often do you go to Cd. Juarez? Never HELOW: TIMES PER MONTH
11.	Shopping Social Business
	-mopping books submood
bord	we would like to ask you your opinions on business relations on the ler. We would like to compare some business practices of Mexicans and icans.
12.	
	Mexican businessmen insist on higher profit rates or not? (1) Mexican-higher profits
	(2) The Same
	(3) Mexican-lower profits (4) No opinion
	(5) Other. SPECIFY
	Why do you feel this way?
13.	Are Mexican businessmen inclined to reinvest more heavily in their
	businesses or not? (1) Mexican reinvest more
	(2) Same (3) Mexicans reinvest less
	(3)Mexicans reinvest less (4)N. 0.
	(5) Other SPECIFY




	Why do you feel this way?
•	Is there more free competition in Mexico or the United States? (1) Mexico more free competition (2) Same (3) Mexico less free competition (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
	Why is this so?
5.	Compared to the American, does the average Mexican businessman thin more in terms of a mass market or is he more satisfied with adequate profits from a limited market? (1) Mexicans believe more in mass markets (2) Same
	(3) Mexicans more satisfied with limited market (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
	Why is this?
•	Is the Mexican more inclined to concentrate ownership in the family does he prefer to have broader stock holdings? (1) Mexican concentrates owning in family more (2) Same
	(3) Mexican has broader stock ownership (4) N. O.
	(5)Other. SPECIFY
	Why†
٠.	Does the Mexican businessman tend to inherit his business position or less than the American?
	(2) Same (3) Mexican inherits less (4) N. O.
	(5) Other, SPECIFY



18.	Does the average Mexican worker have greater or lesser opportunity to become a businessman?
	(1) Mexican has greater opportunity
	(2) The same (3) Mexican has lesser opportunity
	(4) N. O.
	(5) Other. SPECIFY
	Why is this the case?
••	
19.	Which country do you feel has the better educational system to prepare men for business, the United States or Mexico?
	(1) Mexico better
	(2) The same
	(3) U. S. better
	(4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
	()/
	Why do you feel this way?
20.	Does Mexican education provide the businessman with a broader cultural background, compared to the American or not?
	(1) Mexican education provides broader cultural background
	(2) Same
	(3) Mexican education less broad
	(4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
	Why do you feel this way?


21.	Does Mexican education provide a more, or less adequate ethical prep-
	aration for daily business life? (1) Mexican education superior in ethical preparation
	(2) Same
	(3) Mexican education inferior in ethical training
	(4) N. O.
	(5) Other. SPECIFY
	Why is it?



22.	In general, do you feel that the relations between business and government in El Paso are typical of American cities? (1) Yes (2) No (3) N. C. (4) Other, SPECIFY
	IF NO: How do business and government relations differ here?
23.	Comparing the cooperation between businessmen and governmental officials in El Paso and Cd. Juarez, would you say that: (1) They work closer together in Cd. Juarez? (2) They work closer together in El Paso? (3) About the same cooperation in both communities? (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
	IF (1) OR (2): Why is this the situation?
24.	Do you think that Cd. Juarez is typical of other Mexican cities in business-government relations? (1) Yes (2) No (3) N. O. (4) Other. SPECIFY
	IF NO: How do relations differ in Cd, Juarez?
25•	which of these alternatives do you believe best characterizes the relations between labor and management in the United States as a whole? (1) Labor and management are business partners (2) Labor and management are competitors for business profits (3) Labor and management are political enemies (4) Leaders of labor and management are in collusion against workers (5) N. O. (6) Other. SPECIFY
	25a. Is this so in El Paso? (1) Yes (2) No (3) N. 0.
	(4) Which
	IN MIN Why no 7

as a who	1et (2) (3) (4) (6) SPECIFY
26a.	Does the same apply in Cd. Juarez? Yes, IF NO: SPECIFY WHICH ALTERNATIVE APPLIES Why the difference?
in the I	eel that in the present relations between labor and manager nited States that: Business has too much power Labor has too much power The relationship is about right
(4)	Other. SPECIFY
(1) (2) (3) (4)	Dusiness has more power than in the United States Labor has more power than in the United States Labor and business have about the same power as in the U. S N. O. Other. SPECIFY
(1) (2) (3)	the situation in El Paso compared to Cd. Juarez? business has more power in El Paso Labor has more power in El Paso Labor and business have about the same power in both cities N. O.
(5)	Other. SPECIFY
Governme (1) (2) (3)	-management relations in the United States do you feel that the stoo much power Does not have sufficient power Bas a proper amount of power Na, O,

31.	In labor-management relations in Mexico, do you feel that the Government (1) Has more power than in the U. S. (2) Has less power than in the U. S. (3) Has the same power as the U. S. government (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
32•	Are Mexican businessmen inclined to stress family and personal ties more than Americans in the conduct of their business or less? (1) Mexicans stress family more (2) Americans stress family and personal ties more (3) Same emphasis (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY Why is this the case?
33•	Is the Mexican businessman more or less conscious of the social and class background of his employees, than the American? (1) Mexican more conscious (2) Mexican less conscious (3) Same (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
34•	Which statement best characterizes the role of religion in the business life of the American businessman? (1) Religion and business do not mix (2) Religion is an important positive force in his business life (3) No Opinion (4) Other. SPECIFY
35•	Which of these statements (above) best characterizes the Mexican businessmen? (1) (2) (3) (4)
	35a. IF A CATHOLIC: Is the American Catholic businessman aware of the Christian social teachings of the Church? (1) Yes (2) No (3) N.O. (4) D.K.




36.	Do you feel that the American businessman has generally a greater or lesser concern than the Mexican, for general community problems such as social welfare, recreation, youth organizations, etc. (1) Mexican more concern (2) Same (3) Mexican less concern (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
37•	Which group is more interested in protective tariffs (of high tariffs), the American or the Mexican? (1) American more interested in free trade (2) Same (3) American more interested in high tariff (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
38.	How do you feel about the amount of capital investment which the U. S. businessman risks on the border? Does he risk: (1) Too much (2) Not enough (3) About the right amount (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
39•	Do you feel that American businessmen in Mexico generally respect the Mexican way of life, or do they tend to look on it critically? (1) Americans critical (2) Americans respectful (3) N. O. (4) Other. SPECIFY
40.	Does the American businessman in his relationships with Mexicans generally behave too impersonally, too coldly or not? (1)Americans too impersonal (2)Americans personal enough (3)N. 0. (4)Other. SPECIFY
	40a. Economically speaking, do you believe that Cd. Juarez is more dependent on El Paso or vice versa? (1) Cd. Juarez more dependent. (2) El Paso more dependent. (3) D. K. (4) Other. SPECIFY



	4	Ob.	How do	you fe	el ab	out t	his de	pendency?	PROB	.		
	ކ	·0c.	of tou them u Do you (1) (2) (3)	rists h nfairly feel t True Talse D. K.	neadin ragai his i	g for nst t s tru	cd. I the pec- te or r	Pasoans to Juarez; the ople of Cd not?	at the • Juar	y ofte ez.	n pre	
	4	0 d.	-	ou plea ssmen i	_			names of t		t infl	uent	- lal
		1.										_
		. 3∙										-
		4.										-
		5.										-
		7• .										-
		გ• .										_
		٠, ٧٠										
		10.										-
		12 .										
		120 -										
								ions on ce Mexico.	rtain	aspect	s of	govern-
41.	On t	his o	card ar	e liste	ed a n	number	of id	leals comm	only a	ssocia	ted v	vi th
								that both				
								which co				
				alized					•			
			Ideal					Mexico	U.S.	Same	No.	0
	(1)	Free	dom of	speech								
	(2)	Free	dom of	the pre	ess							
				religio						1		
										L		
				ce befo								
	(6)			of righ	nts of	prop	perty					
	/c\		d manae							 		
	(7)	rote	ection	of righ	its of	тарс)r			l	L	

COMMENTARY:



42.	Now what about the governmental officials in Mexico: Compared to the U. S., do you believe they are drawn more from one class or from all classes of the nation? (1) Mexico-drawn from a particular class more (2) Mexico drawn from all classes more (3) Mexico and U. S. the same (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY IF RESPONSE IF (1) or (3): ASK: Which classes?
43.	When graft and corruption does occur in the U. S., in general which of the following do you think is generally the case? (1) Politicians connive for their own interests (2) Politicians connive with businessmen (3) Politicians connive with labor leaders (4) Politicians connive with racketeers (5) All of these (6) No opinion (7) Other. SPECIFY
ተተ•	With reference to El Paso which of these applies? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
45•	When you think of graft and corruption in Mexico, in general which of these applies? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
46.	What is the situation for Cd. Juarez? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
4 7•	Is there more political corruption in the U. S. or Mexico? (1) U. S. more (2) Same (3) Mexico more (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY



48.	Is there more political corruption in El Paso or Cd. Juarez? (1) El Paso more (2) Same (3) Cd. Juarez more (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
49.	Do you believe that political bossism is more widespread in the U. S. or Mexico? (1)
50.	Some Spanish speaking people in El Paso say that they have to work twice as hard as the Anglos to get ahead in business and government. Is this true or not? PROME FOR DIFFERENCES IN EUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT.
51.	Do you feel that the clergy in the U. S. have more or less influence on political life than the clergy in Mexico? (1)
52.	Which of these statements best characterizes the American politicians attitude toward religion? (1) Folitics and religion do not mix (2) Religion is basic to political behavior (3) N. O. (4) Other. SPECIFY
53•	Which statement best characterizes the Mexican politician? (1) (2) (3) (4)

Do you feel that U. S. businessmen and governmental officials cooper more than their Mexican counterparts or not? (1) Work closer in U. S. (2) Same (3) Work closer in Mexico (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
Concerning the regulation of business by government in the U. S., do you feel that: (1) Government interferes too much in business (2) Government regulation of business is as it should be (3) Government does not regulate business sufficiently (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
What is the situation in Mexico? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Do you feel that in the U. S. there is: (1) Too much government ownership of business (2) Proper amount of government ownership (3) Not enough government ownership of business (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY
What is the situation in Mexico? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Do you feel that the U. S. government is more interested in Europe and Asia than it is in Latin America or not? (1) U. S. More interested in Europe and Asia (2) Same interest (3) U. S. more interested in Latin America (4) N. O. (5) Other. SPECIFY

Do you think that the U. S. policy has been wise in this respect or not? (1) Yes (2) Yes, with reservations (3) No (4) No (5) Other. SPECIFY Why do you feel this way?
No matter how well governments of border cities get along, there are always some problems that cause irritation. What things does the government of Od. Juarez do that seem unreasonable and cause irritation to El Paso? AFTER: Does El Paso do things which irritation. Juarez?
What can be done to remedy this?
Would you please give us a list of names of people whom you believe are and have been the most influential in El Paso government and politics in recent years? Name Business or Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)



and powe	r in Cd. Juarez? Name Business or Occupation
(1)	
(2)	
(3)	
(4)	
(5)	***************************************
(6)	
	ald you say are the most vital and pressing problems facing at present?
(1)	
(5)	
(6)	
(6)	
	What are the groups supporting or aiding in the solution
	What are the groups supporting or aiding in the solution
64a.	What are the groups supporting or aiding in the solution of these problems? What groups which might be expected to be working toward



APPENDIX B

TABLE XI

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO COMPARATIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT BUSINESS AND POLITICS FOR EL PASO ELITES, BY HIGH, MEDIUM AND LOW CONTACT, FOR CHI-SQUARE COMPUTATIONS OF TABLE X

Question		mount of			Question	Amount of Contact						
	High	Medium	Low	Totals		High	Medium	Low	Totals			
13.	5	7	6	18	41-1.	5	8	5	18			
	4	7	8	19		6	10	19	35			
	9	14	14	3?		11	18	24	53			
14.	2	6	6 17	14 34	41-2.	6	7 10	4 19	17 34			
	10	15	23	48		11	17	23	51			
15.	2 8	5 8	2 14	9 30	41-3.	3	7	2 22	12 40			
	10	13	16	39		12	16	24	52			
. 20.	4 2	6 7	10 9	20 18	41-4.	0 11	1 16	0 23	1 50			
	6	13	19	38		11	17	23	51.			
23.	5	8 10	9 16	2 2 32	41-5.	1 11	2 13	2 23	5 47			
	11	18	25	5/4		12	15	25	52			
25.	? 5	4 6	14 8	25 19	41-6.	0 11	4 13	0 23	4 47			
	12	10	22	144		11	17	23	51.			
26.	0 7	3 7	4 13	7 27	41-7.	7 5	7 11	8 15	22 31			
	7	10	17	34		12	18	23	53			
33•	7 4	7 9	16 6	30 19	52.	4 5	6 7	8 12	18 2 4			
	11	16	22	49		9	13	20	42			
36.	1 11	2 14	3 23	6 48	54.	4 5	4 12	3 17	11 34			
	12	16	26	54		9	16	20	45			

TABLE XI (Cont.)

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO COMPARATIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT BUSINESS AND POLITICS FOR CD. JUAREZ ELITES, BY HIGH, MEDIUM AND LOW CONTACT, FOR CHI SQUARE COMPUTATIONS OF TABLE X

Question	A	mount of	Cont	act	Question	Amount of Contact						
•	High	Medium	Low	Totals		High	Medium	Low	Totals			
13.	18	7	5	30	41-1.	26	13	9	48			
	12	6	5	23		_ 5	2	1	8			
	30	13	10	53		31	15	10	56			
14.	20	9 5	6	35	41-2.	20	14	9	43			
	8	5	4	17		12	1	2	15			
	28	14	10	52		32	15	11	58			
15.	15	9 5	7	31	41-3.	21	13	10	44			
	11	5	3	19		10	1	1	12			
	26	14	10	50		31	14	11	56			
20.	23	11	8	42	41-4.	6	4	7	17			
	23 5	2	0	7	•	25	10	4	39			
	28	13	8	49		31	14	11	56			
23.	7	7	5	19	41-5.	9	4	7	20			
	24	8	5 4	36		22	11	4	37			
	31	15	9	55		31	15	11	57			
25.	26	13	7	46	41-6.	22	13	10	45			
	2	0	1	3		9	2	1	12			
	28	13	8	49		31	15	11	57			
26.	16	12	9	37	41-7.	25 6	11	9	45			
	8	3	2	13		6	4	9	12			
	24	15	11	50		31	15	11	57			
33.	15 14	<i>5</i> 8	5	25	52.	10	2	4	16			
	14	8	5 5	27	-	20	9	4	33			
	29	13	10	52		30	11	8	49			
36.	12	4	5	21	54.	6	5 9	6	17			
	16	10	6	32		24	9	4	37			
	28	1/4	11	53		30	14	10	54			

.....

TABLE XVI

DATA FOR COMPUTATION OF CHI-SQUARES FOR HYPOTHESES 22 - 21 IN CHAPTER V WITH RESPECT TO INACES OF MEXICAN AND AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN AND THEIR PRACTICES

	Question 12*					q	13		Q							
Elites	A	S	M	N		A	S	M	N		A	S	M	N	Totals	
EPB (38)	25	4	2	7		15	7	3	13		25	7	3		38	
EPP (19)	9	2	1	7		4	i	7	7		10	2	2	3 5 2	19	
JB (37)	17	11	1	8		14	21	i	i		11	16	8	2	37	
JP (22)	11	7	1	4		9	9	-	4		7	7	3	5	22	
Totals 116	62	24	5	28		42	38	11.	25		53	32	16	15		
	q	nest	ion	15		Question 16						Question 17				
	A	S	M	N		A	S	M	N		A	S	M	N		
EPB	21	2	4	11		32	1	2	3		20	6	2	10		
EPP	10	2	-	7		15	1	-	3		11	2	-	6		
JB	10	21	1.	5		24	11	-	2		16	14	1	6		
JP	10	9	-	3		12	5	-	5		- 8	5		9		
	51	34	5	26		83	18	2	13		55	27	2	31		
	q	uest	ion	18		Question 19					9	20				
	A	S	M	N		A	S	M	N		A	S	M	N		
EPB	36	1		1		35	1	-	2		12	3	11	12		
EPP	16	-	~	3		15	1	-	3		6 5 2	1	5	7		
JB	26	7	1	3		26	8	2	-		5	2	24	6		
JP	9	8	2	4		10	6	1	5		2	3	13	4		
	87	16	3	1.1		86	16	4	10		25	9	53	29		
Question 21						Question 23					Question 24					
	A	S	M	X		A	5	M	N		Y		N	N		
EPB	16	1	1	20		22	9	6	1		13		4	11		
EPP	6	2	2	9		10	5	2	2		7		.0	2.		
JB	7	22	3	5		28	7	2	-		25		1	1		
JP	_ 3	10	3	6		10	7	2	2		1.5		4	3		
	32	25	9	140		70	.28	12	5		60	3	9	17		

^{*} A - means that the American was evaluated nore favorably; S - means that both United States and Mexico were evaluated as the same; M - means that Mexico was evaluated more favorably; N - means no opinion or no answer. Several questions were not comparative, but concerned either one or the other country; in these cases the evaluation symbols used here are: F - means practice was favorable; U - means unfavorable; Ne - means neutral, and N - means no opinion. On a few questions, "Other" responses were indicated and are here included as 0. For the non-evaluative questions only the foil numbers are used. The same symbols apply for the Table on political practices also.

(TABLE XVI - continued)

	Question 25 (E.P.)			Question 26 (Juarez					z) Question 27 (U.S.)					
Elites	F Ne	UU		F	Ne	U	N		f	Ne	U	N	_	
EPB	20 8	5 5		6	7	25	-		12	17	-	9		
EPP	11 5	3 -		1	2	15	1		7	7	_	5		
JB	13 18	5 1		7	12	18	-		19	5	_	13		
JP	6 8	5 1 3 5		6	12	4	-		10	_	3	9		
			-											
	50 39	16 11		20	33	62	1		48	29	3	36		
	Question	28 (Mexic	0)	٥	uest	ion	29		Qu	esti	on 2	7 (U	-S ₋)	
	F Ne	UN	٠	A.	S	M	N		F	Ne	U	N		
EPB		14 14		18	8	1	21		13	13	7	5		
EPP	2 6	4 7		10	2	1	6		11	6	i	í		
J B	7 15	1 14		22	4	3	8		24	1	2	10		
JP	8 2	1 11		6	4	í	11		15	_	-	7		
	19 31	20 46	-	56	18	6	46	-	63	20	10	23		
	Question	31 (Mexic	٥)	Q	uest	ion	32		କ୍	uest	ion	33		
	F Ne	U N	•	A	S	M	N		A	S	M	N		
EPB	3 5	18 12		24	3	-	11		14	2	18	4		
EPP		11 7		11	2	_	6		3	_	12	4		
J B	11 4	19 3		22	13	-	2		7	10	17	3		
JP	10 -	6 6		10	3	-	9		4	6	8	3 4		
	24 10	54 28	-	67	21	_	28	•	28	18	55	15		
	Question	34 (v.s.)		Que	stic	n 35	(Me	xico) (uest	ion	36		
	3 3	N			F	บ	N		A	Ş	M	N		
XPB	19 11	8			12	15	11		34	3	-	1		
EPP	8 9				દ	8	5		1.5	_	2	2		
JB	13 17	7			1.1	26	_		22	1.3	1	1		
JP	6 t				6	12	4		10	6	-	6		
	46 42	28		-	35	61.	20		81	22	3	10		
	Quest:	•		Que		n 39	(U.	s.)						
	<u> </u>	M 0			F	Ŭ	N							
EPB	1.7 5	5 10 6 4			27	8	3							
EPP	12 5				9	6	4							
JB	3 28	2 6			26	7	4							
JP	2 11	? 2			1.6	1.	5							
	26 50	20 22		-	78	22	1.6							




TABLE XVIII INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES OF EL PASO BUSINESS AND POLITICAL ELITES TO 14 COMPARATIVE QUESTIONS ON BUSINESSMEN AND THEIR PRACTICES

Business Elites Elite Elite Code No. Code No. Α S М N A S M N ģ 6i -33554 _ 47 172 Political Elites 8 2 _ 5 2 3

Note: A means American practice is evaluated as better. S means practice is the same in both countries. M means Mexican practice is evaluated as better. N means no answer.



TABLE XIX

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES OF CD. JUAREZ BUSINESS AND POLITICAL ELITES TO 14 COMPARATIVE QUESTIONS ON BUSINESSMEN AND THEIR PRACTICES

Business Elites

Elite Code No	· .	Code No.											
	A	s	M	N		A	s	M	N				
67 45 46 81 4 31 80 2	12 11 10 10 9 9 9	1 2 3 4 1 3 1 4	1 1 1 1 2 4 2	2	59 66 24 29 84 20 151 26	6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5	754544667	1 2 2 1 2 1 2 -	0 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 2				
106 11 16 91 13 101 77 53 51	8 8 7 7 7 7 7	2 2 5 4 4 3 4 4	2 4 3 1 3 1 2 2 3	2 2 2 1	112 135 114 79 36 58 75 115 68 148	5554444331	6 6 4 5 7 8 6 8	2 1 16 2 2 1 5 2	1 2 2 3 1 1 -				
				Politic	cal Elites								
3 125 126 147 103 136 65 170 102 15	12 11 10 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 5	1 3 1 5 4 5 2 2	1 2 - 4 2 - 1 1 3	1 1 2 3 1 2 6 7	119 163 141 32 69 139 50 161 149 123	555444331-	5 2 7 10 7 7 5 8 5	2 6 2 1 3 1 -	2 9 1 3 5 2 8 14				

Note: $\underline{\mathbf{A}}$ means American practice is evaluated as better.

S means practice is the same in both countries.

 $[\]underline{\underline{N}}$ means Mexican practice is evaluated as better. $\underline{\underline{N}}$ means no answer.




TABLE XXVII

DATA FOR COMPUTATION OF CHI-SQUARES FOR HYPOTHESES 2a-21 IN CHAPTER VI WITH RESPECT TO IMAGES OF MEXICAN AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THEIR PRACTICES

	Qu	estic	on 41-	-1	Qu	estic	n 41-	-2	Qu	estion	41-3	ŀ
	A	S	M	N	A	S	M	N	A	S	M	N
EPS EPP JB JP	26 10 8 1 45	9 7 29 17 62	2 - 2 4	1 2 - 2 5	26 9 12 <u>4</u> 51	7 8 2 5 13	2 - 3 5	3 2 - 2 7	28 13 12 1 54	7 5 24 19 55	-	3 1 2 7
	Qu	estic	on 41-	1 }	Qı	estic	n 41-	.5	Qı	uestior	41 - 6	5
	A	S	Н	n	A	s	M	N	A	s	M	N
EPB EPP JB JP	35 16 31 9	1 5 11 17	-	2 3 1 2 8	34 13 30 <u>8</u> 85	1 5 7 12 25	- - -	3 1 - 2 6	33 15 12 <u>1</u> 61	2 2 25 19 88	-	3 1 - 2 6
	Qu	estic	on 41-	-7	Qı	estic	on 42		Qı	ıesticr	1 43 ((v.s.)
	Qu A	estic S	on 41- M	-7 N	Qı A	estic S	on 42 M	N	Qı 1	esticr 2-√;	n 43 (5	(v.s.) 6*
EPB EPP JB JP								N 5 3 1 3 12				
EPP JB	23 9 10 3 45	8 5 24 15	M 5 4 3 2 14	N 2 1 - 2 5	32 13 18 2 65	s 1 1 2	M 1 2 17 17	5 1 1 3 12	1 12 6 18 7 33	2-J; 2 1 8 5	5 18 8 7 1 43	6* 6 4 9
EPP JB	23 9 10 3 45	8 5 24 15 52	M 5 4 3 2 14	N 2 1 - 2 5	32 13 18 2 65	s 1 1 2	M 1 2 17 17 37 on 45*	5 1 3 12	1 12 6 18 7 33	2-J; 2 1 8 5	5 18 8 7 1 43	6* 6 4

A means American practice is evaluated as better.


⁵ means practice is the same in both countries.

h means Mexican practice is evaluated as better.

N means no answer or no opinion.

 $[\]underline{\underline{F}}$ means favorable. $\underline{\underline{U}}$ means unfavorable. $\underline{\underline{Ne}}$ means neutral. $\underline{\underline{O}}$ means other.

^{*}Indicates question was non-evaluative; therefore only foil identification numbers are used.



	Q	uest:	ion i	47			Question 48					Question 49				
	A	s	M	N	0	A	s	M	N	0	A	s	M	N	0	
EPB EPP JB JP	30 14 21 4 69	2 8 4 14	- 1 - 1	6 3 6 7 22	1 2 7 10	32 16 26 <u>5</u> 79	1 - 4 3 8	- - 1	5 2 4 6	1 3 7	10 8 18 39	7 2 9	8 2 3 -	20 8 5 7 40	1 4 10 15	
		Quest	tion	51			Ques	tion	52(ຫ . ຣ.)		Ques	tion	53(1	Mexic	(0)
	A	s	M	N			F	U		N		F	U		N	
EPB EPP JB JP	19 10 23 9	1 4 1 7	16 5 4 2 27	2 4 7 10 23			16 8 22 9	11 7 11 4 33		1 4 4 9 8		9 2 5 20 36	20 9 31 1 61		9 8 1 1 19	
		Ques	tion	54		(west	ion	55(U	.s.)		Ques	tion	56(1	Mexic	:0)
	A	s	M	N			F	U		N		F	υ		N	
EPB EPP JB JP	20 13 29 8 50	7 3 7 11 28	1 1 - 2	10 2 1 3		- 2	5 6 2 5 12 48	30 9 7 2 48		3 4 5 8 20		3 2 16 15 36	17 9 20 6 52		18 8 1 1 28	
		Que	stio	n 57	(U.S.)	Que	stio	n 58	(Nex	ico)	Qu	estic	on 6	o (v. s	.)
		F		U	N		F		U	N		F	Ne	U	N	
E	PB PP JB JP	8 9 25 8 50	3	8 1 1	3 2 11 13 29		2 2 22 15 41	1	4 8 2 2 6	22 9 3 5		15 6 15 8 44	10 2 8 4 24	10 9 11 8 38	2	




TABLE XXXII

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES OF EL PASO BUSINESS AND POLITICAL ELITES TO 13 COMPARATIVE QUESTIONS ON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THEIR PRACTICES

Business Elites

Elite.) .	•	24	N	Code No.	٨	S	M	N
	A	S	M	N		A	3	M	IN
42 61 87 37 94 109 9 107 33 62	13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11			1 1 - 1 2	82 71 158 18 182 60 34 15 172 63	10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8	3 - 1 1 2 1 1 -	1 3 1 - 2 1 - 2	3 1 3 1 2 3 - 2 4 3
72 54 41 19 22 175 173 12	11 11 11 10 10 10	1 1 - 1 1 1	1 1 3 1 1 2 1	1 2 - 2 2 1	47 23 56 99 8 73 169 98 28	8 8 7 6 6 3 2	511455441	1 3 2 2 1 - 2 -	3 1 - 6 5 12
				Poli	tical Elit	es			
48 10 44 64 7 74 95 39 38	13 13 13 12 12 11 11 11	2 - 2	- - 1 - - 1 1	1 1 1	189 40 21 130 104 35 164 55 174	99887444	1 - 3344738 -	1 2 2 1 2 1 2 -	2 4 - 1 3 1 4 5 13

Note: A means American practice is evaluated as better.

S means practice is the same in both countries.

M means Mexican practice is evaluated as better.

N means no answer.

TABLE XXXIII

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES OF CD. JUARES BUSINESS AND POLITICAL ELITES TO 13 COMPARATIVE QUESTIONS ON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THEIR PRACTICES

Business Elites

Elite					C- 1- N-				
Code No.	A	s	M	N	Code No.	A	s	M	N
46 45 4 106 16 29 67 11 24	12 11 10 10 9 9	3443333	1 1 1 1 1 1	2 -	112 36 79 53 75 151 59 51 66	7 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 5	554555 7 66	1 1 2 - 1 2	1 2 - 3 - 2 -
31 80 101 26 2 52 77 81 68	9999988888	4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4	1 - 1 1 1 1 1	3	20 162 50 13 58 91 148 114 135	54433321-	5 7 9 7 9 8 7 1	2 1 - 1 - 1	1 2 2 3 6 1
				Politi	cal Elite	<u>s</u>			
125 170 32 126 147 3 141 50 103 122 149	10 8 7 6 5 5 4 3 3 2 2	2 3 4 2 5 6 6 6 9 5 7	1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 3	1 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 3	136 163 65 119 150 123 139 161 69 102 120	1 1	8 6 8 10 8 8 7 8	2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 -	2 5 3 2 13 4 4 5 3 3 13

1714+0

Note: A means American practice is evaluated as better. \underline{S} means practice is the same in both countries. $\underline{\underline{M}}$ means Mexican practice is evaluated as better. N means no answer.

TABLE XXXIV

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR TEN ITEMS IN INDEX OF CONTACTS
BY ELITES GROUPS


Elite	Ite	om and Frequenc	y	Item and Frequency				
1	Langu	age facility		2. Normal	3			
	Some	None	Totals	Some	None	Totals		
EP B	18	20	3 8	26	12	3 8		
EPP	12	7	19	8	11	19		
JB	26	ıi	37	28	9	37		
JP	4	18	22	6	16	22		
Totals	60	56	116	68	48	116		
3	. Gover	nment for busi	ness	-	ent for	mutual		
	reaso	ns		coopera				
	Some	None	Totals	Some	None	Totals		
EPB	2	36	3 8	1	37	3 8		
EPP	. 2	17	19	7	12	19		
J B	7	30	37	1	36	37		
JP	2	20	22	5	17	22		
Totals	13	103	116	14	102	116		
5		national busin	.ess	6. Ceremon	ial			
		ttees		_				
	Members	non-Members	Totals	Some	None	Totals		
EPB	3	35	3 8	3	35	3 8		
EPP	2	17	19	1	18	19		
$J\mathbb{B}$	1	3 6	37	0	37	37		
JP	1	21	22	8	14	22		
Totals	7	109	116	12	104	116		
7	. Socia	l friendship v	isiting	8. Dining,	enterta	ining, shopping		
	Some	None	Totals	Some	None	Totals		
EPB	14	24	3 8	23	15	3 8		
EPP	7	12	19	1	18	19		
J.B	25	12	37	30	7	37		
JP	1.2	10	22	9	13	22		
Totals	58	58	116	63	53	116		
9	-	friends		10. City vi				
	Some	None	Totals	Weekly	Less	Totals		
RPB	9	2 9	<i>3</i> 8	10	28	3 8		
EPP	8	11	19	9	10	19		
JB	26	11	37	33	4	37		
JP	11	11	22	16	6	22		
Totals	54	62	116	68	48	116		

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
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