THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF IN AMERICAN STATE PARTIES

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## ABSTRACT

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American political parties have been increasingly enlisting the aid of the professional and the expert to assist them in administration, research and public relations. This study presents an analysis of the role played by the paid professional staff personnel in American state parties and the impact of this role upon the power structure of these parties.

Professional party staff personnel are defined in this study as salaried employees, responsible to the elected political leadership and working full or part-time as consultants or administrators in the headquarters or field office of a political party, candidate or public official. The definiticin arbitrarily excludes both clerical personnel and elected party and/or public officials even though such persons may be engaged in some functions of a technical or professional nature or appear on the party payroll.

The role played in the party by the paid professional and its effect upon the party power structure is approached from two perspectives. First, an inventory of the professional staff structure of America's 104 state and territorial
parties was made. By means of a questionnaire sent to state chairmen, data of a descriptive character were gathered on the types of staff employed by the state parties and their perceptions of future staff needs. In addition, socio-economic and career data were obtained by means of a questionnaire sent to individual party staff persons identified by the questionnaire.

Second, an analysis of a single state (Michigan) as a case study was conducted to determine (1) the perceptions of the political leadership as to the role properly to be played by the professional staff within the political party, (2) the extent to which the professional staff knowingly or unknowingly attempts to or succeeds in violating this "proper role," and (3) the variables making for staff influence within the party.

By means of extended interviews with political leaders and staff persons in the Democratic and Republican parties of Michigan data were gathered on the perceptions by both the staff and the leadership of the proper limits within which staff personnel should exercise discretion in making decisions. Particular attention was directed toward specific situations potentially involving staff people in discretionary power, e.g., writing speeches, dispensing press releases, recruiting local candidates, etc.

As a framework for the analysis, party staff personnel were conceived of as bureaucratically structured and thus subject to the "laws" of behavior common to bureaucratic
organizations as elucidated by such theorists as Robert K. Merton, Philip Selznick, Chris Argyris, Alvin W. Gouldner and Rensis Likert. Thus, it was postulated that staff personnel will seek to maximize their power vis-à-vis the party leadership and engage in behavioral mechanisms designed to protect their prerogatives. This, it was postulated, would tend to place the party leadership and the party staff in competition for the decision-making power in the party.

These hypotheses, however, were found to be largely invalid. The data disclose a relatively high level of agreement between the party leadership and the staff personnel as to the appropriate role to be played by the staff in the political party, namely, that although party staff personnel bring a substantial amount of expertise to the functions of the party with the result that this expertise gives them an impact on party decisions, these functions are perceived as properly exercised within and subordinate to the ideological and decisional framework established by the party leaders. Purthermore, staff personnel manifest a high degree of role acceptance. They tend to view themselves as advice-givers rather than decision-makers. In contrast to the pathological tendencies in bureaucratic behavior described by Merton and others, party staff personnel manifest little desire to usurp authority or to run the party organizations themselves.

It is the conclusion of the study that while theoretically a party staff might be conceived of as bureaucratically structured, the decentralized nature of American
state parties tends to reduce the hierarchic element in the party staff structure. Staff personnel become attached to individual candidates, office holders and party leaders and, while they cooperate with each other, they are not centrally directed. The "cellular" structure of the party staff results in an ease of access by staff people to key party decision-making points in the party which, in turn, has the effect of producing a consensual image between the party leadership and the staff as to what the proper staff role should be not attainable in a strictly hierarchic structure. This is because ease of access (1) enables the staff to have a direct influence over leadership attitudes on the proper staff role, (2) reduces the difficulties placed in the way of performance that would occur if staff were expected to accomplish tasks without either discretionary power or access, (3) provides the staff with a sense of participation in decisions and reinforces its commitment to group norms, and (4) provides continuous consultation which obviates the need for extreme discretionary power.

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In the final analysis, if it were not for the many state party chairmen and members of their staffs who took
the time to answer questionnaires and grant interviews, the study would not have been possible. Thus, it is to these, the unheralded heroes of research, that this work is dedicated.

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## INTRODUCTION

Political parties are increasingly enlisting the aid of the professional and the expert. What is the role (or roles) being played by the professional staff person in the modern party? What impact is he having upon the power structure of our parties? An understanding of these questions is essential to the theory of party behavior.

That the professional staff (or bureaucratic element) constitutes a center of power in the political party is probably an assumed but only occasionally articulated proposition. However, if it be assumed that in a hierarchically structured organization it is likely that persons having specific skills and access to reasonably technical information will tend to form an oligarchic group (and therefore a center of power) within that organization, it is not unreasonable to postulate that the paid, professional staff member will, by the nature of his skills and information, also constitute a power center in the party.

This study is an inquiry into the power role(s) of the professional staff person in American state political parties. It is believed that such an inquiry has implications for two aspects of the science of politics. First,
it seeks to determine what role is actually being played by this growing element in the modern political party and what impact this may have on both the political life and the nature of democracy as practiced in the United States. Second, it has as an objective the testing of a number of the central themes in organization theory within the context of the political party. These themes are (1) the "iron law of oligarchy" as enunciated by Robert Michels; (2) the effects of socio-economic homogeneity upon the power structure of an organization as stated by Bendix; and (3) the power maximizing effects of a monopoly of information and the channels of communication as developed by Bernard, Simon and Selznick.

More specifically, it is the purpose of this research project to determine whether such factors as the degree of homogeneity of a sub-group within a mass organization and its monopoly of special skills, information and channels of communication tends to produce a controling oligarchy as suggested by Michels and, in the case of a political party, where the political and bureaucratic elements constitute actual or potential rival oligarchies, what factors exist which might give the dominance to one or the other.

## CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZED POWER

Social scientists are becoming increasingly concerned with the role that organization plays in the maintenance and distribution of power in modern society. This concern stems from a growing body of data that indicates that the ability to organize the skills, materiel, and attitudes in any social system provides the person who controls this organization with the major instruments of social and political power. ${ }^{1}$

There are, in the iiterature of social science, three basic approaches to the problem of the role of organization in the achievement of political power. These approaches are (1) the inherent power of a highly rationalized, impersonal bureaucracy, (2) the tendency toward oligarchy, and (3) the dominance of certain skill groups. Although these approaches are highly interrelated they warrant discussion as distinct approaches to the problem.

Bupeaucracy. The development of a highly rationalized administrative hierarchy which characterizes most of the public and private institutions in modern society has served as a major conceptual tool in the study of the maintenance and distribution of power. Based on the work of Max Weber, bureaucracy - defined as an administrative system characterized by a high degree of specialization of function whose

[^0]participants are controlled formally by impersonal rules and informally by such incentives as a regular salary, a pension and an "office" - has been viewed as the most highly rational, efficient, and relentlessiy powerful of all forms of human organization. ${ }^{2}$ Bureaucracy "chains" to itself its own partcipants on the one hand and, on the other, completely "overtowers" the person from the outside who seeks to deal with it. 3

There are a number of factors that contribute to the power of bureaucracy as an organizational type. First, since bureaucratic organization is based upon technical specialization, it tends to have a near monopoly over the knowledge and skills related to the matters with which it is concerned. The amateur dealing with a bureaucratic structure in the areas of its competence, as Weber suggests, ". . . finds himself in the position of the 'dilettante' who stands oppostie the expert..... ${ }^{4}$ Second, and related to the above, the hierarchic structure of a bureaucracy is designed to enable it to function in a much more rational manner than either an individual or a non-bureaucratically organized group of people are capable. This stems from the face that the expertise of many specialists are linked together in a communication net that provides the decision-makers with a
of the International Typographical Union (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956): Reinhard Bendix, Higher Civil Servants in American Society (Boulder, Colo.: University of Colorado Press, 1949); and Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon (New York: The McGraw-Hill Company, 1952).
${ }^{2}$ Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," From Max Weber: Essars in Sociology, Ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: 0xford University Press, 1946).

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\text { 3Ibid. , pp. 228-229; 232-233. 4 Ibid. , p. } 232 .
$$

greater amourt of relevant data than is available to either a single individual or an unorganized group. 5

Third, the substitution of rules for indifidual caprice tends to augment the control of the organization over 1 ts own members. Thus, the organization can be controlled from the top like a gigentic machine: This reduces the area of discretion - the area subject to discussion and choice among 1ts members. 6

Bureaucracy, however, has its "other face". More recent empirical researoh has shown that a bureaucratically organized administrative system does not, in fact, behave like a machinc: Rather, its operation more nearly resembles a social systemd Roethlisberger and Dickson, reporting some of the earliest research in this field, have shown that bureauoratic structures tend to break up into informal subgroups which may or may not cooperate with the goals of the entire orgenization. They point out that people are incapable of acting as cogs in an imporsonal machine: Rather, they tead to form small groups based on the face to face relationships which exist in the larger organization. These groups serve the dual function of providing the individual with his reed for a sense of social relatedness and providing the group a measure of proteotion againot preseunee from Whthout end devinate from within: The individumi becomes

[^1]a part of this type of sub-group both because he wants to and because he is forced to by social pressune. 7

Truman, in discussing the legislative process, describes the mamer in which loyalty to the face-to-face group takes precedence over other loyalties - in this case, loyalty to his conception of the legislative office.

Membership in the legislature...tends to set a man somewhat apart from others who have not had that experience and to expose him to competing claims from the legislative group, claims supplementing the influence of expectations concerning public office...... These, like other groups exact a measure of conformity as the price of acceptance: any person entering such an organization, at whatever level, is more or less subject to its claims if he wishes to 'belong' to it or to lead 1t. Once accepted he comes to 1dentify the goals and claims of the unity as in some degree his own. Among those claims may be a body of umwritten rules defining the proper way of hegdiling the claims of various groups outside the unit. 8

The development of sub-groups within bureaueratio structures stems from the basic psychology of the individual. This psyohology is composed of a number of elements.

Flirst, people do not become depersonallzed when they participate in bureaucratic organizations. Rather, they participate as "wholes". Argyris points out that the highly rational, impersonal and specialized nature of a bureaucratic structure tends to run counter to the personality of the average adult. Instead of being allowed to act independently,

[^2]positively and work with a diversity of objects, modern bureaucracy relegates him to a passive and dependent status and anchors him to a limited range of tasks. This creates tensions wich result, he says, in one of a variety of disturbences within the organization. One such disturbsence is the creation of informal groups to sanction deviant behavior. 9

Second, every individual is subject to forces outside of the bureaucracy in which he works. As Truman points out, "the notion of a neutralized public servent without confilcting motivations is an illusion: The public official is not a 'blank sheet of paper on which the orgenization can write what it wills'. As a human being he comes to his position with group affiliations and preferences and he forms additional ones during his temure" 10 The fact that a bureauoratic structure is part of a wider social structure which also generates pressures which impinge upon the loyalties of the individual defines the limits of collaboration. ${ }^{1 l}$

9Chris Argyris, "The Individual and Orgamiration: Some Problems of Mutual Adjustment;" Administrative Sciemee Quarterifo (Jume, 1957), 3-23.
$10_{\text {Trumar, }}$ op. cit., p. 450.
11F. J. Roethlisberger, Menasement and Morale (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univergity Press, 1950), p. 43. Odegard states, for instance, that a pubilo servent has loyalties to (i) political leadere, (2) administrative superiors and subordinates, (3) the courts, (4) members of his profession, (5) the ethical system of the state and society, and (6) his own soul and personal integrity. See Peter H. Odegard, "Tovard A Responsible Bureaucracy," the Annale, 292 (March, 1954), 19.

Third, the individual brings to the orgamization his own irrationalities. Men is motivated as much by emotion as by logic. His values, hopes and fears will have a direct effect upon the way in which he performs his duties. 12 In addition, the very regularlzed procedures of the bureaucracy often result in what Merton calls "trained incapacity". The necessity of following regulations, for instance, produces a bureacrat who is overly concerned with rules. There is developed in him the psychological tenderrey to displace the goals of the orgamization with its regulations. Thus, the docile bureaucrat may become; in effect, a saboteur of the goals of the organization. ${ }^{13}$

Bureaucrecy's "Other face" is well summarized by Philip Selmaick in his article, "An Approach to the Theory of Bureaucracy." He states that sociological research requires that a number of hypotheses be made about bureaucracy. First, that every formal organization oreates an informal organization which works to modify the goals of the formal orgamizationd Second, this process of modification is due primarily to the fact that the professed goals of the orgamization often conflict with or fail to solve the immediate problems of the participents. Third, since people are primamily concerned with the solution of their own persomal

12Roethlisberger, op. oit., pp. 20-31.
$13_{\text {Robert K. Merton, }}$ "Bureaucratic Structure and Persomality," Reader: In Burceucrycy. (ed. Robert I. Merton, Allsa P. Gray, Barbara Hochrey emd Hanem 0 . Selvin; Glencoe, Illino1s: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 364-366.
problems, the actual procedures of the organization (as reflected in the activities of its members) will reflect attempts to solve personal and internal problems of the organization itself rather than accomplish its formal goals. 14

What, then, is the power of bureaucratic organization? Does the existence of a group of specialists orgamized in hierarchic fashion produce an irrestible administrative organism or are there tendencies within such structures that substantially reduce the pover of the bureaucracy to operate effectively? This brings us logically to a consideration of a second approach to the organization of power - the phenomenon of ollgarehy.

011zarchy. The tendency toward ollgarchy, states Robert Michels, "....is a matter of technical and practical necessity. It is the inevitable product of the very principle of organizatiorn 。 15 This is due to the fact that an organization requires a certain corps of expert officials

[^3]ta gulde its affairs. Because it takes time and experience to. acquire these technical skills, the rank and file perceive the incumbent official as indispensable to the organization. Coupled with this is the fact that the leadorship develops the teamiques (such as the control of the election machinery) to perpetuate itself in office. Desoribing the principle of oligarciay as it relates to the leadership of political parties by members of legislative bodies Michels states.

As...experts, intimately acquainted with all the hidden aspects of the subject mader discussion, many of the deputies are adept in the art of employing digressions. periphrases and terminological subtieties, by means of which they suryoumd the simplest matter with a maze of obscurity to which they alone have the clue. In this way, whether aoting in good faith or in bad, they render it impossible for the masses, whose' theoretical interpreters' they should be, to follow them and they elude all possibility of techntical control. They are the masters of the situation. 16

Oligarchy, for Michels, rests upon three essential factors: (1) the incompetence of the ram-and-file menber, (2) the technical indispensability of the expert officials, and (3) the psycholagical and economic compulaion of the official to seek to retain his present position since to return to his former position would mean the loss of income and social status. 17

The "iron law of oligarchy" has been both praised and blamed. Maurice Duverger sees the principle of ollgarehy

[^4]. as a basic phenomenon in Iuropean political parties. 18 In fact, he accepts this notion as descriptive of most all social groups. He states,

In consequence the leadersh1p of political parties like that of most present-day social groups: trade unions, associations, business firms, and so on represent dual characteristics: it is democratic in appearance and oligarchic in reality. 19

Lipset. Troy and Coleman in their study of the Inter.national Typagraphical Union, come to a somewhat less sweeping conclusion. They discovered that many of the oligarchic mechaniams foumd by Michels and his followere ("monopolles of power-status, fumds and commuications chamels which the officials of most ordinarily possess.....") were not noticeable in the ITU; or, if presemt, "their effects were greatly mitigated by other elements in the systerm. 20 On the other hand, at the close of their study, they concluded somewnat circularly that the reason why oligarchy did not.exist in the ITU was because no single clique had a monopoly of the resources of politics. 21

Opposition to the theory of an iron law of oligarahy, then, stems from three major sources. First, as was

18 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties. Trans. Barbara and Robert North (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1954) pp. 133-190.
${ }^{19 \text { IbId., p. } 133 .}$
20 Lipset, ot. al., op. cit. : p. 13.
${ }^{21}$ Ibid.. p. 413. Probably their most valld conclusion 18 that internal organization of associations than the notion of an iron law of oligarchy would imply." See p. 405.
mentioned above, there is no conclusive proof that oligarchy 1s. characteristic of all organizations. Second, the law of oligarchy assumes that the followers are either an inert mass or, in the case of a bureaucracy, that the bureaucracy is. a completely neutral and monolithic organism. The theory naither takes into consideration the possibility of rival oligarchies nor the fact that in bureaucratic organizations there are strong tendencies toward goal modification and, at times, outright sabotage, both of which would have the effect of reducing the power of the oligarcuy. 22 Third, Miahels never developed an operational definition of what oligarohy 1s. nor did he clearly differentiate it from "organization" itself. 23

Skil1-Eilite Theory. A third approach to the problem of organized power centers around the notion that a political system receives its essential character from the types of skill groups that control the instruments of power, i.e.. those orgamizations which have the power to mobilize skill. materlal and consent.

Lasswell and his disoiples seem to vier politioal institutions and the other organized instruments of power as. being essentially neutral and subject to capture by that group whose particular skill either dominates society as a whole or is able to make alliances with other skill groups.

[^5]
## 13

Thus, he sees contemporary revolutionary movements as alliances among experts in propaganda, organization and coercion. 24

While Lasswell is concerned primarily with the types of. skills that become generally dominant within a given political system, other students of organization have focussed upon the power roles of certain organized skill groups within our political and social institutions. Particular attention has been given to the intellectual and the expert. 25

This literature tends to minimize the power of the intellectual and the expert. Merton, for instance, holds that the expert in a social science role experiences a high degree of insecurity due to the imprecision of his discipline. This factor, he asserts, produces a high degree of docility: 26 Reitzier paints the same picture. The expert, he atates, is so enamored with his specialty that he is willing to work

[^6]at it for anyone who recognizes its value to the extent that he is willing to pay for its exercise.

Experts like to be given a chance in their own field. Full of ideas of what could be done there, they are eager to do it. Therefore they are inclined to accept the leader, who can be expected to give them their "chance."27

## The Search For A Conceptual Framework

This inquiry, as was stated at the outset, is an attempt to study the role of a specific group of persons (the professional party staffer) in a mass organization. It is assumed that - because these persons work under some form of hierarchically ordered authority, have specific skills and access to reasonably technical information this group is potentially an organized minority in the party. This assumption rests on two secondary assumptions. First, it is assumed that their access to technical information, skill, etc., provides them with the tools necessary to become an organized minority. Second, it is assumed that Common skills, professional activities, etc., may very well produce group identification that will weld them into an organized minority in the party structure.

This set of propositions necessitates the raising of two related questions. First, what is the nature of this group? Is it a bureaucracy, an oligarchy, or a skill group? Second, which of these approaches is most able to provide us with a valid conceptual framework with which to study the

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\text { 27Reitzler, op. cit., p. } 328 .
$$

power role of the paid professional in modern political parties? It is with this latter problem - the search for a conceptual framework - that this section is concerned. Bureaucracy. One method of approaching the power role of the professional in the political party is to view him as a member of a specialized bureauoracy within the party. His power, in theory, would stem from the inherent power of any "1deal" type bureaucracy as conceived by Weber and his disciples. ${ }^{28}$

The use of the concept of bureaucracy as a conceptual framework, however, has a number of weaknesses. First, while the concept is helpful in a theoretical explanation of how organization maximizes power, it does not, in itself, solve the problem of competing internal sub-bureaucracies which tend to sabotage the formal bureaucracy itself. 29 It is theoretically possible that a formal bureaucratic atructure might be so divided by competing informal internal bureaucratic structures that it has no power at all.

Second, the use of the bureaucratic concept as an explanation of the power inherent in organization is not adequate since the power of bureaucracies are greatly diluted by their own pathological behavior. Sub-group loyalties and cliques, the overlapping group affiliations of 1 ts members, and

[^7]the perversions springing from the "trained incapacity" of its participants all go together to make a bureaucracy something less than the overtowering force which Max Weber envisioned.

Third, even in the early theoretical iiterature, bureaucracy was viewed somewhat paradoxically. On the one hand, the bureaucratic structure was the most powerful of organizations in the areas of 1 is competence. On the other hand, it was looked upon as neutral and subject to control by whomever was in a position to give it orders. The only solution to this paradox lies in the contention that bureaucracy is in a power position vis-à-vis those persons that approach it from without but is completely docile with respect to its own master. What, then, is the power position of a bureaucratically organized group of party professionals? Who are the outsiders and who are its masters?

Must the concept of bureaucracy be disgarded as a framework in which to study organized power? While no actual bureaucracies having all the elements which might logically give them the power theoretically inherent in their formal structure actually exist, the "ideal type" itself can be used as a reference point by which to measure deviation from the ideal. We must look, then, for bureaucracy acting as organizational power wherever we can find it. It is conceivable that actual bureaucratic power may only reside in a very small segment of a formal bureaucratic structure.

Oligarchy. A second method of approaching the power role of the professional party staff person in the political party is to view him as a member of an oligarchy. This approach has at least two advantages. First, it enables the researcher to disregard formal hierarchic relationships as primary evidence of the staff person's power role and allows the researcher to seek for systematic power relations wherever he can find $1 t$. Thus, uminhibited by considerations of formal structure only, Duverger was able to discover various types of ollgarchies in European parties. 30

Second, ollgarchy can be used as a method of more accurately conceptualizing the structure of the cliques and sub-groups which reduce the power of a formally organized bureaucracy.

Probably the major drawback to the concept of oligarchy as it was formulated by Michels is that he never clearly differentiated between ollgarchy and bureaucracy as organizational types. In the final analysis, both conceptions or descriptions of the power role inherent in organization are based on the monopoly of skill and channels of commulication. The major difference between them consists in their formal structure.

An interesting problem is posed when one looks at the power position of the professional party staffer in terms of

30Duverger, op. cit., pp. 151-157.
these two conceptualizations. As far as formal party organ1zation is concerned, the professional staff person is a member of a bureaucracy technically under the control of an ollgarchy, 1.e., a political oligarchy.

Skill-Elite Theory. The third approach to the problem of the power role of the paid professionals in a political party is to view them as a skill ellte whose power rests on the fact that they monopolize certain skills and expertise which are indispensable to the party leadership. This approach, however, also has its weaknesses. First, can it be said that a monopoly of skill by itself constitutes pover? It would seem to this writer that the possession of skill does not necessarily mean that the skill group would work together with the degree of unanimity required to give them power. There would be good reason to belleve that the same forces would be at work as are present within a bureaucracy, namely, cliques, "trained incapacity," etc., which would greatly reduce the actual power of the group to elther materially affect or sabotage the decisions of the formal party leadership.

Second, as Wilenski points out, the political leadership tends to acquire the expertise that the outside expert is originally recrudted to provide. 31 Thus, there gradually develops a rival skill elite which reduces the indispensability of the original one. Thus, the question must be
31 Wilenski, op. cit. , pp. 198-205.
raised - does skill in itself have any long-range power role in a political or social institution?

Third, the same question must be asked of the skillelite construct that was asked of the bureaucratic approach, namely, how does it differ from oligarchy? Are not Wilenski's intellectuals M1chels' ollgarchs?

Conclusion. It is the opinion of this writer that, in spite of its defects, oligarchy presents the most promising framework within which to approach the atudy of organized power. Following Duverger, it is contended that oligarchy manifests itself in a number of structural forms. 32 A given ollgarchy may have the structure of bureaucracy or may be tied together by charlsma or face to face relationships or may have aspects of all three. By using the conception of oligarchy as a theoretical model the researcher is enabled to look at an organization in all of its parts and identify the centers of power and determine what atructural characteristics and technical skills provide them with whatever power they do possess. For instance, some of the elements producing power for which the researcher can look are (1) the delegation of discretionary power, (2) a knowledge of the "ropes," (3) irreplaceable skills and knowledge held by certain individuals and, (4) those customs and procedures which tend to cement the functionary in his position.

[^8]For purposes of this research project the leadership of the political party is viewed as being composed of two actual or potentially rival oligarchies - the political oligarchy and the professional oligarchy. That is, there are or may be two groups within the party that have a subatantial monopoly of skill, knowledge of the "ropes," a network of supporters, etc. The political oligarchy has the essential structure of a "camarilla," 1.e., "a small group which makes use of close personal solidarity as a means of establishing and retaining its influence."33 The group is composed of both legal and "behind the scenes" leaders of the party.

The professional (staff) oligarchy is essentially a bureaucratically organized skill group whose ties are professional in nature. Members of this group are recruited to do a specific job for the party and are pald a salary. Although theoretically the political and professional oligarchies stand in superordinate and subordinate positions respectively, they are viewed as actual or potential competitors for power.

Attempt should be made to state clearly what is meant by power. Power, as it is used in this study, has both positive and negative features. In the positive sense, power can be described as the frequency with which the opinions and viewpoints of either an individull or a group
within the organization become the basis of actual decisions. It is recogalized that technically the power to make decisions rests with the official payty leadership. However, the abillty of elements of either the professional or political oligarchy to see its viewpoints become the official policy of the party is what is meant, in this instance, by power. More simply stated, is the political oligarchy forced to 11sten to and accept the opinions of the professional ollgarchy if it is to surfive or feel that it is in its own best interests to do sol If so, power is said to reside in the hands of the professional oligarchy to the extent to which its advice is accepted. If the survival of the political leadership does not depend upon the adfice of the profese sional oligarchy (or if it fails to perceive that it does) or if it does not belleve that following such advice is in its best interests, power is said pot to reside in the hands of the professional.

In the negative sense of the terity, power denotes the extent to which either an individual or a group of individuals in the organization are capable of sabotaging the legitimate commands or goals of their superiors. It should be noted that this sabotage may stem from deliberate intent or may result from such non-deliberate causes as "trained incapacity." In elther case, it is probably more accurate to say that power, when used in this sense, is more reflective of lack of power on the part of the party leadership than actual power on the part of appointed subordinates.

## Maior Hypotheses

The propositions being tested can be grouped into two areas. A first group of propositions relating to the power position of the bureaucratic element in a political party can be stated as follows:

Proposition I: In general terms, the professional staffs in American political parties will have one of the following two power roles:
a. By virtue of their special skills, access to speciflc types of information, and monopoly of certain chamels of communication, the party professionals will be in a position to either control or materially influence the decisions made at or by the "political" levels of the party. or
b. Due to the fact that the party professionals are either lacking in special skills and information or are trained to be "neutrally competent"34 they will be mampulable by the political elements in the party.

More specifically, their degree of influence will depend upon the following factors:

34 By "neutral competence" is meant essentialily docillity, 1.e., willingress on the part of the party bureaucrats to take orders and do a "good job" irrespective of their own convictions.

## c. Shati Factors

1. The degree to which their skills and information are perceived by the political leadership to be crucial to the success of the party.
2. The degree to which these skills and information are perceived by the political leadership to be of a technical nature and thus not within their competence.
3. The degree to which the channels by which this information reaches major decision points are monopolized by the party professionals.
4. The degree to which the professional having these skills is perceived by the political leadership to be irreplaceable. Irreplaceability can be defined as the difficulty with which an outside staff expert can be recruited and prepared to adequately discharge his duties. Factors making for irreplaceability are (1) lack of adequate replacements for existing persomel, (2) lack of sufficient time (particularly during a political campaign) to train such replacements, and (3) lack of sufficient funds to hire such replacements.

## d. Orgamizational Factors

1. The degree to which the party bureaucracy is structured in such a way as to maximize opportunities for discretion on the part of the professionals. Structural factors making for discretion are (1) size of staff orgamization, thus increasing the need for delegation of authority, and (2) degree of geographic, functional and/or political decentralization, thus increasing the remoteness of centralized authority. That is, the more the party deploys its persomel in the "fleld," breaks up its staff into functional specialties (such as fund raising, orgemizing, publicity) and/or allocates staff to differing political campaigns (state-wide, congressional, state legislative, etc.) the more remote will be the central authority and the more discretionary power will reside in the hands of the professional.
2. The degree to which the party professionals control the instruments of internal party control, i.e., the party press and other media of commulication such as manuals, instructions, rescarch documents, policy statements, reports, etc.

## - Social Factors

1. The degree to which the party professionals are characterized by sufficient socioeconomic homogeneity so as to enable them to act with a fairly high degree of unamimity and agreement of purpose. It is assumed that the existence of sub-groups within the professional bureaucracy will decrease its capacity to act in concert, and thus, to decrease its influence.
2. The degree to which the party professionals perceive themselves as having common values, goals or needs.
3. The degree to which the party professional, individurally or as a group, is perceived by the political leadership to have the support of segments of the party's rank and file or of segments of the society as a whole.
4. The degree to which the professionals themselves establish the "tone" of the party as a result of the fact that they are constantly engaged in verbalizing its attitudes and opinions for the party leadership.

## f. Personal Factors

1. The degree to which the professional perceives the party's goals as being contrary to his personal norms.
2. The degree to which the political leadership requires the professional staff person to engage in activities which violate his perception of his role.
3. The degree to which the professional oligarchy is characterized by the disruptive elements known as "trained incapacity", 1.e., red tape, "playing it safe," etc.

Proposition II: The ability of the political leadership in a given party to resist the power of the professional staff will depend upon:
a. The degree to which the professional staff is imbued with the attitudes of neutral competence.
b. The degree to which the professional staff is recruited from a social stratum that is substantially "inferior" to that of the political element of the party.
c. The degree to which the political leadership in the party has its own expertise and its own sources of information.
d. The degree to which the political leadership does not identify with the frame of reference and/or the attitudes of the professional staff. 35

35 There may very well be a tendency for state chalrmen, for instance, to develop "administrative" interests and attitudes at the expense of "political" ones; to 1dentify with his staff rather than with the party's political leaderBhip.

More specifically, the power of the political leadership vis-a-vis the professional staff rests upon (1) the extent of their independent expertise and knowledge and (2) upon their ability to develop docility on the part of their professional staff through recruftment, training and superVisory tecimiques.

It is assumed that the political leaderehip will seek to insure this docility by the following techniques:
e. By recruiting persomel that is in sympathy with the ideology of the party.
f. By using in-service training programs to develop attitudes of ideological sympathy or neutrality on the part of the professional staff.
g. By employing whatever sanctions are at its disposal such as the power to promote and discharge persomel.

It is also assumed that there may exist within the body of the party professionals certain characterlstics waich will tend to enhemce their tendency toward docillty. These are:
h. A sense of identification with the party and/or its success.

1. A legal-rational attitude which tends to accept unquestioningly the legitimate orders of the political leadership.
2. A code of ethics which militates against organizational sabotage.
k. A feeling of having an "investment" in the organization in the sense of seniority, promotion possibilities and/or salary.
3. A lack of suitable employment alternatives.

Proposition III. A relatively high degree of socioeconomic homogeneity within the bureaucratic element (professional staff), thus producing relative ease of communication and common attitudes within it, will have a reinforcing effect upon either Proposition I or II.

Conversely, lack of such homogeneity will tend to reduce the degree to which the bureaucratic element will be successful in influencing the political element since the chances are great that they will be unable to act in concert. 36

A second area being researched is the extent to which the bureaucratic element in the party exercises a unifying (or disunifying) effect upon the party. One might reasonably expect that a high degree of shared attitudes on the part of the professional staff will tend to produce party unity provided their opinions on matters within their province, e.g., campaign, finance, public opinion, etc., are sought by the political element in the party. This can be set forth in the following proposition:
${ }^{36}$ Lack of homogeneity may, however, be a barrier against neutralization due to the unanticipated consequences" in an organization containing diffuse elements.

Proposition IV: Homogeneity of attitudes on the part of the party professionals will have a unifying effect on the party to the extent that their advice is sought by the political leadership of the party.

## Methodology

The professional staff persion. The professional staff person is a salaried employee, responsible to the elected political leaderrehip and working full or part-time as a consultant in the headquarters or fleld office of a political party, comdiate or public official. He is a "man of knowledge" in the sense that he brings or is expected to bring to the problems to which he is assigued a body of specialized information and skill. This skill way be derived either from formal training or "experiemoe."37

This definition excludes olerical persons, elected officials and politically accoumtable party persomel such as state or county ahairmen, national committeemen, etc. However, it is reoognized that the researcher will find that the line between the political and staff role will often be blurred. Thus, the differing degrees to whioh the staff role is playod by persons participating in the day-to-day activities of the political party can be presented schersatically as follows:

37 Definition based on Wilemsti's definition of the staff person in trade umions. See Wileneki, op. cit., p. 32.
$\qquad$

1. Politiciang with staff functions - e.g., State Chairman. 38
2. Staff persons who have political power or political functions.
a. Hold jobs as a reward for political activity.
b. Hold jobs as a representative of a particular political leader or faction.
3. Staff persons who have no direct political pover or polltical comections.
4. Clerical persomel who engage in certain types of work that can be classifled as a staff or professional function - e.g., the secretary who 39 occasionally speaks to party womens' groupts. 39

As a means of determining the extent to which the above named persons have staff roles (as opposed to political or clerical roles) the following criteria may be applied:

1. They hold appointive rather than elective positions. That is, they do not hold constitutionally prescribed (and thereby protected) positions.
2. Their recruitment is based on their training and/or experience in one of the following types of skills rather than upon their status within the party.
a. Reseapoh
b. Managerial
c. Publicity
3. Pure clerical aotivity consumes no more then. 25 percent of their time.

For purposes of this study, the power role of the professional ataft in state party organizations is being examined. Thus, the professional staff of a state political party can be said to include the following elements:

38 Not a professional staff person under this definition. ${ }^{39}$ Not a professional staff person under this definition.

1. Pald organizers at the state and county level.
2. Full-time public relations men, advisors and administrative alds at the gubernatorial, state legislative and state central committee levels.
3. Consultants and consulting firms retained by the political party or individual candidate to work in specific fields such as advertising and fund raising.

Research Design. The research will viow the role of the staff from two perspectives. At the descriptive level it is the objective of the researcher to determine (1) the essential structural outline of the professional staff at the state level and (2) the basic activities and/or functions performed by these persons. More specifically, the desoriptive section of the project will provide the following information:
I. Organizational status of state professional starfs
A. Number and types of oteff positions in the pacity orgamizations. It is expected that the following types will appear:

1. Functional types 40
a) Organizational, e.g., field organizors, etc.
b) Publicity
c) Research and policy formation
d) Administrative, e.g. administrative assistants, of fice menagers, etc.
e) Fund raising -.g., a publicity man may play a policy role.
2. Organizational types. (The professional staff person may perform a given functional role in any one of the following locations in the total organization.)
a) State or county party organizations
b) Special committee of the state or coumty party orgamization, e.g., county finance committee
c) Candidate's personal staff, e.g., campaign manager
d) Incumbent official's personal staff, e.g., governor's public relations expert
B. Gonditions of employment
3. Salary
4. Terms of employment
a) Consultant fee or per diem
b) "Nine to five" type
5. Type of temure arramgement
a) Career security
b) Subject to capricious dismissal
II. Description of the professional staff person
A. Socio-economic data: Ago, sex, education, social and economic class, reilgious backgroumd, racial and/or othnic background and community of origin.
B. Skill data
6. Types of jobs or functions performed
a) Skills required
b) Level of training required
7. Training
a) Training possessed upon entry
b) Types of in-service training

## C. Career 11ne data

1. Parents' occupation and education
2. Professional staff person's education
3. Occupational history
4. How recruited into staff position
5. Tenure
a) Length
b) Continuous or intermittent
6. Evaluation of future career opportumities
III. Recruitment and training
A. Recruatment
7. Chamnels of entry
a) Reputation for information or skill
b) Professional status
c) Recommendation
(1) By other staff member
(2) By party leader
(3) By other professional person
d) Successful volunteer work
e) Special training, e.g., Citizenship

Clearing House program, Falk Followship in Practical Politics, etc.
2. Requirements
a) Educational level
b) Experience
(1) In politics
(2) In other fields
c) Degree of political and/or ideological commitment
B. In-service training: Schools, workehops, conferemeer, instructional manuals, apprenticeships, professional societies amd/or professional conferences
C. Supervistion

1. Evaluation procedures
2. Disciplinary procedures

The foregoing descriptive data performe two functions for the total research project. First, it provides basic descriptive data about the party professional staff as a developing political institution in our society. Secomd, it provides much of the background information for the more analytical sections of the project.

The descriptive section of the study was conducted on a nation-wide basis involving the following procedures: (1) A questionnaire sent to the state chairman of every state and terpitorial party asking for basic information on the composition of their ataff and the major staff needs of their parties. 41 (2) Upon recelpt of the above questionnaire, an instrument designed to obtain socio-economic and career data on the individual staffer ${ }^{42}$ was sent to staff persons identified in the questiomaire. This desoriptive data on the structure and composition of state party professional staffs is reported in Section II of the study.
${ }^{41}$ See Appendix B.
42 See Appendix $C$.

At the analytical level it is the objective of the researcher to do an analysis in depth of a single state as a case study to determine (1) the perceptions of the political leadership as to the role properly to be played by the professional staff within the political party, i.e., the proper limits within which staff persons should exercise discretion in making decisions, (2) the extent to which the professional staff knowingly or unknowingly attempts to or succeeds in violating this "proper" role, and (3) the variables making for staff influence within the party.

Relative to the perceptions of the political leadership as to the proper role to be played by the professional staff, it has already been stated that the ability of the political leadership in a given party to resist the power of the bureaucratic element will depend in part on the degree to which the former does not identify with the frame of reference and/or attitudes of the latter. ${ }^{43}$ Thus, it was expected that the following would be discovered by the researcher:

1. The political leadership would view itself as both the legitimate and actual source of decisions on political and/or party matters.
2. The political leadership would define the staff role as properly ranging from technical assistance to advice

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{ }^{43} \text { See Proposition II, d, p. } 26 .
$$

but will reject the idea that staff should be allowed the discretion to make polley decisions.
3. That segment of the political leadersh1p which is publicly elected would tend to define the proper staff role more narrowly than the non-office holding segment of the party leadership (state chairmen, county chairmen, etc.). This is due to the fact that: (1) the non-office holding segment has duties similar to those of the staff and will tend to make less of a differentiation between themselves and the staff. (2) The office holding segment will have a keener sense of their role as "officials" - a role placing ultimate responsibility in their hands alone and thus not subject to delegation.
4. The political element will show a limited awareness of the extent to which: (1) discretionary decisions are made directly by the staff, and (2) that the over-all boundaries of their decisions are set by the information, appointments, etc. chameled up to them by the staff.

Relative to the extent to which the professional staff knowingly or unknowingly attempts to or succeeds in violating this "proper" role, it was expected that staff persons, while having a greater awareness of the discretionary aspects of their role than the political element, will not have a clear conception of their true power.

The major theoretical propositions relating to the political leadership have been set formard on pages 22 to 28 of this chapter. The primary system employed in
analysing the extent to which the beharioral patterns suggested by these propositions actually characterize the attitudes and behavior of leaderehip and staff persomel will be to compare the perceptions of the political leadershlp as to what they feel constitutes the proper staff role with respect to those patterns, and the perceptions of staff members as to what they feel the proper staff role to be. Attention will be primarily directed to speciflc tasks and duties engaged in by staff persomel. For instance, the researcher will not be particularly interested in eliciting from party leaders a gemeralized statement of the extent of discretion staff people should have in hemding press releases, but rather, the circumstances under which starfers must clear such releases, the circumstances under which mirror and/or major changes can be made, etc. What emerges from this type of analysis is a composite picture of the gemeral attitudes of the party leadership and party ataff of what properily constitutes the staff role as measured by a series of attitudes toward specific day to day situatioms.

It is thus possible to draw a number of conclusions relative to the types of relationships existing between the leadership and the staff and their relative power positions in the party, in terms of the following questions:

1. Do the leadership and staff elements hold similar or conflicting views of the proper staff role?
2. If similar, do the role perceptions of the leadership tead to produce docility or power seeking on the part
of the staff? That is, to what extent do the expectations of the leadership perfilit amd/or encourage the staff to increase its discretionary authority at the expense of the leadership?
3. If conflicting, do the role perceptions of the staff tend to motivate them to increase their power vis à vis the leadership?
4. What phases of the staff operation tend to be free from control by the leadership, elther because the leadership doubts its own competence, because such freedom conforms to the expectations of the leadership, or because the staff monopolizes expertise in the area in question?

Data pathering procedures. Attention has been called to the fact that the role of the professional staff in American political parties will be fiewed from two perspectives, the descriptive and the analytical. Descriptive data was obtained by the use of two different mailed questionnaires. A one-page questiomatre ${ }^{44}$ was sent to 104 state and termitorial party chairmen in March, 1959 asking them to report the types of ataff persomel assigned to their party organizations, the utilization they make of public relations firms and their perceptions of future staff needs. 45 A total of 94 party chairmen responded for a
${ }^{44}$ See Appendix A.
${ }^{45}$ The mailing of the original questionnaire to state chairmen obtained from lists in the office of the Miohigan Republican State Central Committee and the office of the Michigan Democratic National Committeeman was followed by two subsequent mailings to non-responding chairmen.
reoporse rate of 93.8 per cent. Those not responding were Republican party chairmen in Arkansas, Ohio, Temessee, Wyoming and Hawail and Democratic party chairmen in Mississippe, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio and Temessee. The data obtained from this questiomaire are discussed in Chapters II and III.

A second mailed questiomaire ${ }^{46}$ designed to obtain information on the socio-ecomomic background of party staff persomel, their career patterns and expectations was sent to those persons whose positions were listed on the questionnaire returned from the state chairmen. The questiomalres were sent to a total of 167 persons in two waves in April and May of 1959. From this mail-out there were returned 74 usable questionnadres for a response rate of 44.9 per ceart. 47

$$
{ }^{46} \text { See Appendix } B_{0}
$$

${ }^{47}$ Little consensus exists concerning the relative validity of vanying rates of returns from mailed questionnairee.' Estimates vary frow Herbert A. Toops contention that ". . .one seldom needs to content himselt with less then 95 per cent returms . . "t to the more moderate contemtion of Robert Ferber that ". . .the response rate is usually amywhere from 0 to 50 per centon Lawrence E. Benson states that questionalres mailed to ellte groups will average about 40 per cent. See Herbert A. Toops, "Questionnaires;" Fractolopedia of Educational Research, ed. Walter S. Monore (rex. ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), pp. 949-950, Robert Ferter, "The Problem of Blas in Mail Retumes: A Solution," Pubilo Opinion Quarteril. XII (Winter, 1948), 669 and Lawrence E. Benson, Mall Surveys Can be Valuable, ${ }^{\text {Ibld., }} \mathrm{X}$ (Sumer, 1946) 237.

On the basis of the literature one is foreed to predict that the sample employed in this aspect of the study. tends to slightly over-represent those pereons who are nore

No claim is made for the representativemess of the sample. Some states, notably Michigen where the researcher is fairiy well known showed a greater response them others. However, all of the usable questiomaires were employed in the analysis. 48 Thus, the conclusions drawn from the data are considered to be exploratory and of partial validity in nature. These data are discussed in Chapter IV.

The data for the case study section of the project were obtained by interniews with party leadere and professional staff people in Miohigan duming the Spring of 1959. The universe seleoted for interviewing contained the follown ing individuals:
higily involved in party stafl work and ile in the upper socioneconomic Ievels - in other words, the ellte elemerts among the party staff persomel. However, since it is not unlikely that due to their professional status party starf people will naturally fall in the upper socio-economic levels as far as the sooiety at large is concermed, it can be argued that the factorg motivating replies to mailed questiomatres will work to produce a fairly representative group. It could also be the case that the 44.9 per cent retuming the questiomaire represerts a higher proportion of permenerty now campalign-only staff people: See Philip Salisburg, "Elghteen Elemexts of Danger in Making Mail Surveyס; "Sales Mamagement XIIV (February, 1938) 2815.

For the problem of small mumbers see footmote 50 , p. 44.

48 The mumber of usable questiomalres by state are as follows: Arlzowa 2, Callformia 3, Coloredo 1, Comnecticut 3, Delarame 2, Florida l, Georgia 1, Illinois.2, Indlana 2, Iowa 1, Maine 2, M1chigan 18, Mimesota 2; Hew Hampshive 1, New Jersey 5, New Mexico 2, New Yort 5, North Dakota 2, Oklahoma 1, Oregon 2, Pemerivania 4, South Dakota 1, Texas 2, U'tah 1, Vermont 1, Virgimie 1, Washington 3, West Virgivia 1, Wisconsin 2, Wyoming 1, and Washimgton, D. C. 1 .

## Democratic Party Leaders

Chairmen, Democratic State Central Committee
Democratic National Committeeman
Vice Chairman, Democratic State Central Committee
Democratic National Committeevoman
Governor, State of Michigan
Justice, Michigan Supreme Court
Lt. Governor, State of Michigan
Miahigen Secretary of State
Michigan Attorney General
Minorlty Leader, Michigan House of Representatives

## Republicam Political Leaders

Chairmen, Republican State Central Committee
Republican National Committeeman
Vice Chairman, Republican State Central Committee
Member, Republican State Central Comittee and volunteer gubernatorial campalgn manager, 1958

1958 gubernatorial candidate and titular leader of Michigan Republicen Party

Speaker, Michigan House of Representatives
Chairman, Kent County Republican Committee
Chairman, Oakland County Republican Committee
Chairmen, Wayne Courty Republican Committee
Former Chairman, Republicen State Central Committee

Former gubernatorlal candidate
Former Speaker, Michigan House of Representatives 49

## Democratic Professional Staff Personmel

Press Secretary to the Governor of Michigan
Executive Secretary to the Governor of Michigan and 1958 campaign director

Former Executive Secretary to the Governor of M1chigan

Speech writer for the Governor of Michigan
Researcher and Speech Writer for the Governor of Michigan

Administrative Assistant to the Governor of Michigan

Former Administrative Assistant to the Govermor of Michigan

Administrative Assistant to the Lt. Governor of Michigan

Director of Public Relations, Democratic State Central Committee

Field Organizer, Democratic State Central Comm1ttee

Field Organizer, Democratic State Central Committee

Former Field Organizer, Democratic State Central Committee

Administrative Assistant, Democratic Caucus, Michigen House of Representatives

Republican Professional Staff Persomel
Public Relations Director, Republican State Central Committee

Press Relations Assistant to Republican Gubernatorial Candidate
these three former party leaders must be considered to be a paret of the party leadership and all three have worked closely With stafl members currentiy on the Republicam Party staff.
Administrative Assistant to Republican Gubernatorial Candidate
Assistant to Republican Gubernatorial Candidate and to former State Chairman
Administrative Assistant to the Chairmsen, Republican State Central Committee
Organizational D1rector, Republican State Central Committee
Field Orgamizer, Republican State Central Commi ttee
Executive Secretary, Kent County Republican Committee
Executive Secretary, Wayme County Republican Committee
Executive Secretary, Oakland County Republican Committee
Former Bxecutive Secretary, Genesee County Republican Committee
Executive Secretary; Genesee County Republican Comiltee and former press secretary to the Governor of Michigan
Executive Director, Republican State Flnance Committee
Administrative Assistant, Speaker of the Michigan House of Representatives

A number of considerations went into the selection Of the interfiewees. First, it was decided to limit, in 80 far as possible, the interviewing to current political Ieaders and professional staff personnel. However, due to the high turnover rate in both categories, a few persons Who had recently racated official leadership positions or staff jobs were interviewed. Second, it was relatively difficult to define the boumdaries of the state party
orgemization. That is, it was difficult to decide whether or not a definition of the Michigan Republican or Democratic party should include congresswen, state legislators, county chairmen or atate administrative officers and their respective staffs. The plan followed was to include only those segments of the party leadership and staff structure that are related significantly to state political problems and the statewide campsign. Thus, congressmen, congressional candidates, local officials, local candidates and their staffs were eliminated as not being significantiy related to either state political problems or the state-wide campaign. On the other hand, in addition to the state party chairmen and the staffs attached to the state central committees, the Governor, state legislative leaders and county Chairmen and their staffs were included in the interviewing. In addition, such state party leaders as vice-chairmen, national committeemen and committeewomen who, al though not directly responsible for directing the party staff bat who work closely with them, were also included: It should be noted that, wen defined in this fashion, close to a total universe of state political leaders and staffers was obtained. 50

50 Although amalysis based on a small number of cases involves substantial mikg, in an exploratory study suoh as this, one is necessarily committed to small numbers of cases. It should be noted, however, that the data umder scrutiny is not a sample but rather almost a total universe. Paul T. Daria, Ralph M. Goldmem and Richard C. Bain point out in this comnection that $"$... numbers as smali as 4 to 10 in

A number of the problems in the interviewing situation should be noted. The most recurring difficulty was that of insufficient time for the interview. Political leaders particularly office holders - work under tight schedules. Often it was impossible to obtain sufficient time to complete the interview. Consequently, it was often necessary to omit questions in the interview schedule in order to accommodate the time limit of the interview situation. As a means of over coming this problem, attempt was made to arrange the questions according to their importance without sacrificing the continuity of the interview. However, the interviewer often found it necessary to innovate as he moved through the interview.

A second problem stemmed from the fact that the respondents had such differing fumctions and tasks in the
a single cell of a table can be statistically significant When the relationships lean strongly in one direction; that if an event can happen in only one of two ways, the probam bility that 4 events will happen in the same way by pure chance is approximately 6 in 100; for 5 cases, it is about 3 in 100. In most statistical work, results are considered aignificant when no more than 5 cases in 100 may be expected to devlate due to chance alone.n See The politics of Presidential Nominsting Conventions (washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 125.

Furthermore; George W. Snedeoor states that "It seems reasonable that the possibilities of variation in sample meascs are more and more restricted as the sample size approaches that of the popriation." See Statisticsl Methods (4th Ed.; Ames, Iowa: The Iowa state College Press, 1946), 458.

While it may appear that the small numbers problem arises in conmection with the 74 mailed questiomaire reeponses, that data are being pinmamily ubed for descriptive purposes whereas the Michlgam data are belng offered as partial validation of hypotheses concerning staff behavior.
party that questions applicable to some were inapplicable to others. Thus, there resulted a certain unevemess in the quantity of responses to any single question.

Finally, the interviever met with a certain amount of evasion and stereotyped responses on the part of a number of interviewees. This was particularly characteristic of offlce holders.

The end result of these difficulties is that the researcher was not able to obtain a tightiy lanit set of responses to his questioms. Rather, he obtained a serles of "cases" which, while not susceptible to rigorous statistical analysis, when taken together, however, present a fairly clear picture of politician and staff perceptions of the proper staff role.

## PART II

## THE COMPOSITION OF STATE PARTY STAFPS <br> IN THE UNITED STATES

Section II of this study seeks to outline in some detail the staff organization of the Democratic and Republican state and territorial parties. Chapter II will largely comprise an inventory of the state and territorial party starfs as they are currently organized. Chapter III will examine some of the major variables effecting the composition of party staffs. Chapter IV will describe the socio-economic background and functions of the nation's political staffers.

## THE STAPF ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE PARTIES

Staff organizations of state and territorial parties in the United States are characterized by great diversity. If staff size is used as a measure of this diversity we ind that party staff organizations attached to state central committees range from no staff at all in either party in Nevada to thirty employees attached to the New York Republican organization.

Size of staff is not the only factor differentiating state organizations from each other. Party organizations differ in the functions performed by staff personnel. Many party organizations are content to limit themselves to secretarial help while others apparently feel the necessity to have on their staffs such "luxuries" as full-time directors of women's activities.

This chapter will describe the staff organization of ninety-four state and territorial parties responding to a quesionnaire mailed to state chairmen in March, 1959.1

A general picture of the staff organization of the ninety-four state organizations studied can be obtained from Table $1 .{ }^{2}$

The table discloses a number of interesting phenomena. 3 The most commonly reported staff position, other than clerical, is that of executive secretary, executive director or administrative assistant to the state chairman (Classified together as "general executive"). In fact, forty-four of the state organizations list executive secretary, executive director or administrative assistant as a staff position. The next three most commonly reported positions (public relations, field organization and finance) together total only forty-five. If one adds the position of orfice manager to the general executive category, the number
${ }^{2}$ A number of difficulties relating to the tabulation of this data should be noted. First, it should be remembered that this data is limited in its focus. These staff positions were reported in March, 1959. A number of changes in the over$a 11$ staff organization of the state and territorial parties may well have been made since that date. This is particularly true as the state party organizations prepare for the 1960 presidential campaign. Second, a number of state organizations listing other staff positions did not report having any clerical positions. This might have been an oversight on the part of the respondent or reflect the fact that the data was gathered during a period of low party activity. It can be assumed that many of the states not reporting clerical positions have them during campaign periods at least. In fact, it $1 s$ the assumption of this writer that some of the states reporting no staff at all, employ clerical help during campaigns. Third, in some instances categorization of personnel Was made difficult by the fact that staff persons often "double in brass." For instance, in a Michigan party organization the secretary to the state chairman also acts as a stare specialist for women's activities. Finally, it should be noted that this tabulation does not differentiate between fuli-time, part-time and temporary positions.
$3_{\text {For a more complete presentation of the data see }}$ Appendix E.
TABLE 1.--The composition of Democratic state and territorial party staffs: national two-party totals

| Party | Totals for Each Type of Position Reported by State and Territorial Parties: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | GE | CM | OM | FO | F | PR | R | WA | YA | C | NS | US |
| Republican | 23 | 4 | 1 | 7 | 6 | 14 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 34 | 8 | 3 |
| Democratic | 21 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 11 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 28 | 9 | 3 |
| Totals | 44 | 8 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 25 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 62 | 17 | 6 |


GE - general executive. Includes adminis-
trative assistants to state chairmen,
executive directors and executive
secretaries
CM - campaign manager
OM - office manager
FO - field organizers
F - Pinance directors
Pinance directors and solicitors
Includes
public relations and press men.
or state organizations reporting some type of administrative starf post is greater than the next three most prevalent positions combined.

If one were to postulate what types of positions would be the most common among the state organizations (based on an estimate as to how the political leadership perceives the requirements of a political organization) this writer would hypothesize the following order of preference: public relations or press men, (2) field or precinct organizers, (3) finance directors, (4) general administrators, and (5) researchers in that order. 4 While this postulate seems to reasonably reflect the data it fails completely to explain the ubiquity of the general executive category. An attempt can be made, however, to explain the relative universality of the general executive staff role. This phenomenon probably stems in part from the fact that the questionnaire was designed to obtain information on staff organization under the aegis of the state chairman. It can be postulated for instance that a good share of the public relations staff work is done for the individual candidates and office holders rather than for the state organization as such. This postulate, however, cannot be directiy substantiated from the data of this study. 5

[^9]A second possible explanation stems from the general lack of continuity in state party organization. Staff organizetions are built up for campaigns and then dissolve. The high number of general executive staff positions reported in this study may primarily reflect the fact that this position is the most permanent and on-going of all the state party staff roles.

A final explanation for the preponderance of the administrative staff position is that many state chairmen carry out their duties on a part-time basis and need someone to handle the day to day operations of the party.

This seeming development ${ }^{6}$ in the direction of a fulltime administrator for state party organizations will probably
governorship are more likely to have public relations personnel attached to their staff organizations than those controlling the governorship - the assumption being that governors would have their own public relations men and thus not the state committee. The results of this test, as far as the data of this study is concerned, is inconclusive. Of the eighteen states in which public relations staff positions were reported, only six represented situations in which the state controiling the governorship reported no PR staff men while the opposition party did. Seven states had PR men attached to both parties and five states reported public relations staff only in the dominant party. This data is summarized as follows:
a. States in which only opposition party reported public relations staff attached to state committee: Connecticut, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Wisconsin, Idaho.
b. States in which both parties report PR staff: Illinois, Michigan, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota.
c. States in which only party controlifing governorship reported PR staff: Delaware, Indiana, Colorado, New Jersey, Texas.
${ }^{6}$ Twenty-two state chairmen ilsted this position as one of their one or two most pressing staff needs.
have a formalizing effect on party organization in a number of ways. First, it will tend to increase the professional nature of the entire staff organization. This is true not only because the administrator himself will, of necessity, become more experienced and professionalized, he will also be in a position to supervise the recruitment of other staff and provide them with long-term direction and guidance. Second, it will enable parties to operate more adequately on a yearround basis. Third, it may well facilitate the development of a more programmatic party system by placing in positions of influence people who tend to be issue oriented rather than merely power oriented, thus reducing the tendency for parties to be merely ". . . holding companies for . . . factional groups fighting for local, state and congressional offices." 7 Pourth, the presence of a full-time professional administrator 18 a step toward the revitalization of the minority party in one-party and marginally competitive states. It will enable the minority party to engage in organizational efforts and party activities on a year-round basis.

It is interesting to note in this connection that of the total number of non-competitive states, the minority party has some type of executive officer in only $17.0^{8}$ per cent of

[^10]those states. 9 The picture brightens somewhat when one looks at the marginally competitive states. The minority party has an executive officer in 66.6 per cent of the states reporting. Only Republican party organizations, however, report having such a staff position in the marginally competitive states $1 n$ which they dominate. Democrats in marginally competitive states in which they dominate do not seem to perceive a need for this particular staff role.

The need for a general executive officer to administer party functions seems to be fairly widely perceived by the party leadership. Twenty-two state chairmen stated that this was one of their "one or two most pressing staff needs. ${ }^{10}$ Or these, six were from the chairmen of the minority party in competitive states, six were from the minority party in one-party states and two were from the minority party in marginally competitive states.

A second interesting phenomenon stemming from the data in Table 1 is the low number of party organizations reporting the presence of professional field organizers on their staffs. This is surprising when one considers that implicit in the ifterature and folklore of politics is the notion that, whatever their short-comings, politicians have a healthy respect for precinct organization. This

[^11]$$
{ }^{10} \text { See Table } 10 .
$$
professional competence, however, is a major "perceived need" or twenty-two state chairmen. ${ }^{11}$

A third observation also tends to belie one of the current myths of politics, namely, that public relations budgets are the preserve of the Republican Party. Twentyfive party chairmen reported having one or more professional public relations men on their staff. Eleven, or 44 per cent of the total, were Democrats. More Republican chairmen, however, appear to perceive the need for this type of professional assistance. Twelve Republican as against eight Democratic chairmen cite PR help as their "one or two most pressing staff needs."12

## Regional Patterns In Staff Organization

Party staff organization appears to follow certain regional patterns. Table 2 summarizes the data on staff organization by region.

Again, the most universally reported staff position by region, other than clerical, is that of administrative assistant, executive director or executive secretary with five of eight regions reporting 50 per cent or better of their party organizations having this position filled. Public relations personnel is concentrated in three regions -
${ }^{11}$ See Table 10.
12 See Table 10.
56
TABLE 2.--State party organizations reporting staff positions by region*

|  | No. Reporting GE | CM | OM | FO | F | PR | R | WA | YA | C | NS | US |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| New England States |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican Democratic | $\begin{array}{ll}6 & 1 \\ 6 & 5\end{array}$ | 1 | 0 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 0 | 0 | 4 4 | 2 0 | 0 1 |
| Total | 126 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 1 |
| Middle Atlantic States |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican Democratic | $\begin{array}{ll}5 & 4 \\ 5 & 2\end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | 1 1 | 0 0 | 3 0 | 3 3 | 1 2 | 0 1 | 0 1 | 5 3 | 0 1 | 0 0 |
| Total | 106 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 0 |
| Southern States |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican Democratic | $\begin{array}{ll}9 & 3 \\ 7 & 3\end{array}$ | 2 | 0 0 | 1 | 0 0 | 0 1 | 0 1 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 5 | 3 2 | 0 0 |
| Total | 166 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 5 | 0 |

57
TABLE 2--Continued

|  | No. Reporting | GE | CM | OM | FO | F | PR | R | WA | YA | C | NS | US |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Border States |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican Democratic | 5 5 | 2 0 | 1 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 1 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 | 5 3 | 0 2 | 0 0 |
| Total | 10 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 0 |
| Central States |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican Democratic | 6 | 5 3 | 0 2 | 0 0 | 4 1 | 3 2 | 4 2 | 2 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 0 0 | 1 |
| Total | 12 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 1 |
| Plains States |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican Democratic | 4 | 2 2 | 0 1 | 0 2 | 1 | 0 1 | 2 2 | 0 1 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 3 2 | 0 1 | 0 0 |
| Total | 8 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 |

TABLE 2--Continued

|  | No. Reporting | GE | CM | OM | FO | $F$ | PR | R | WA | YA | C | NS | US |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mountain States |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican Democratic | 7 8 | 4 | 0 1 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 1 | 1 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 15 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 2 |
| Pacific States |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican Democratic | $\begin{aligned} & 4 \\ & 5 \end{aligned}$ | 2 2 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | 0 0 | 0 0 | 2 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 9 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| Territories |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican Democratic | 1 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 1 | 0 0 |
| Total | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |

TABLE 2--Continued
a. New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode

Island, Vermont. $\quad$| b. Mid Atlantic: Delaware; New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C. |
| :--- |
| c. South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North |
| Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia. |
| d. Border: Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia. |
| e. Central: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin. |
| f. Plains: Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota. |
| g. Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, |
| h. Pacific: Alaska, Hawaii, California, Oregon, Washington. |
| i. Territories: Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico. |

the Middle Atlantic, Central and Plains states with the other regions reporting few such positions.

It is difficult to explain why public relations staff positions tend to concentrate in these three regions. Eliminating the Plains States, which appear to be a special case, eight states, stretching in a belt through the center of the country from New York to Chicago, account for 48 per cent of the public relations personnel. Two hypotheses can be advanced to explain this datum. First, as can be seen from Table 6, the larger and more professionalized party staffs are also located in the belt from New York to Chicago, probably reflecting the fact that this is the richer, more populous and politically competitive section of the country. Second, these parties operate in the industrial center of the nation. Big business has not only spawned the public relations industry, it has also created in its communities attitudes favorable to the use of PR techniques for both civic and political activities. In addition, business is in a position to lend its public relations expertise to the parties. In this latter connection it is interesting to note that two-thirds of the state organizations in question are Republican.

The Dakotas monopolize the public relations staff attached to the parties in the Plains States with all four party organizations in the two states having this position filled. They also, like the states in the Middle Atlantic and Central regions, tend to be more highly professionalized.

The explanation of this probably lies in the fact that these states have had a tradition of strong political organization since the turn of the century stemming from the activities of the agrarian movements, particularly the Non-Partisan League and the Farmers Union. 13

All regions reported 50 per cent or better of their state party organizations as having clerical help.

Southern state parties had the highest incidence of party organizations without any professional staff. Of the sixteen party chairmen reporting, two Democratic party organizations (Arkansas and Georgia) and three Republican (Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina) report no staff organization of any kind. This result is not unexpected, however, for at least two reasons. First, in one-party states where the crucial decisions are likely to be made at the primary election, professional political staff work in the majority party is done for individual candidates rather than for the party as a whole. ${ }^{14}$ Second, with little chance of winning and scant resources available, there is little motivation for the minority party to employ a permanent professional staff.

The incidence of field organization presents an interesting phenomenon. It will be noticed from Table 2 that

[^12]only one repion - the Central states - reported any substantial maber of states having professional organizers on their staffs while three other regions reported having a scattering of such personnel. Four of the regions - Middle Atlantic, Border, Mountain and Pacific - reported no such personnel in any of their states. Consequently, when the responses to the question, "What do you consider to be your one or two most pressing staff needs" are analysed it is significant to note that the need for professional field organizers was perceived most strongly by the chairmen in the region already having the greatest number, i.e., the Central states, where seven of twelve chairmen reported this as a need. In the four regions having no professional field organizers, the incidence of perceived need is as follows: (1) Middle Atlantic states, two of ten chairmen; (2) Border states, two of ten chairmen; (3) Mountain states, three of fifteen chairmen; (4) Pacific states, one of nine chairmen. In the remaining three regions which already have a scattering of this professional role, three of sixteen chairmen in the Southern states, three of eight in the Plains states and none in New England reported a need for field organization.

These data seem to indicate that the perception of the need for a particular type of staff function is strongly reinforced by experiencing the benefits of that staff function. In the nation-wide sample, for instance, one-third of the state chairmen reporting field organization as a perceived need already have some such personnel on their staffs. Only
only one recion - the Central states - reported any substantial momber of states having professional organizers on their staffs while three other regions reported having a scattering of such personnel. Four of the regions - Middle Atlantic, Border, Mountain and Pacific - reported no such personnel in any of their states. Consequently, when the responses to the question, "What do you consider to be your one or two most pressing staff needs" are analysed it is significant to note that the need for professional field organizers was perceived most strongly by the chairmen in the region already having the greatest number, i.e., the Central states, where seven of twelve chairmen reported this as a need. In the four regions having no professional field organizers, the incidence of perceived need is as follows: (1) Middle Atlantic states, two of ten chairmen; (2) Border states, two of ten chairmen; (3) Mountain states, three of fifteen chairmen; (4) Pacific states, one of nine chairmen. In the remaining three regions which already have a scattering of this professional role, three of sixteen chairmen in the Southern states, three of eight in the Plains states and none in New England reported a need for field organization.

These data seem to indicate that the perception of the need for a particular type of staff function is strongly reinforced by experiencing the benefits of that staff function. In the nation-wide sample, for instance, one-third of the state chairmen reporting field organization as a perceived need already have some such personnel on their staffs. Only
two chairmen having personnel in this category did not report a need for more. The fact, therefore, that there is little perceived need for field organization in the relatively wealthy Middle Atlantic, New England and Pacific states seems also to indicate that perception of need is more closely related to prior experience than to the financial resources available to the parties.

The utilization of public relations firms. The growth of the public relations industry during the past two decades has caused wide-spread interest in the utilization of professional public relations and/or advertising firms by political organizations. 15 While the two parties are very similar in the extent to which public relations and/or press men are attached to the state party staffs, ${ }^{16}$ there is a fairly pronounced disparity between them in their use of independent public relations firms. Here the stereotype of the Republican Party as spending substantial sums of money on professional public relations advice is more supportable by the data. 17 Eighty-five per cent of the Republican state chairmen indicated that they use a public relations firm or advertising agency on either a year-round basis or during campaign periods while only 56 per cent of the Democratic chairmen so indicated. Seventeen per cent of the Republican
${ }^{15}$ See Stanley J. Kelley, Jr., Professional Public Relations and Political Power, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956).
${ }^{16}$ See Table 13.
${ }^{17}$ See comment on p. 55.
chairmen and twelve per cent of the Democratic chairmen report using PR firms on a year-round basis. The data broken down by region is shown in Table 3.

## The Professionalization of State Party Staffs

As a means of obtaining a clearer conception of staff organization in the states, an index of professionalization has been developed to take into account both type and number of staff attached to party organizations. The index, designed to reflect varying levels of professionalization, was constructed as follows:

1. Four points were awarded to a party organization having a staff person assigned to supervise and coordinate the rest of the staff.
2. Three points were awarded to a party organization for every appearance of the following staff positions involving some supervisory duties but to a lesser degree than in category one: finance director, public relations director or professional publicity man, organizational director and persons classified as general executive but not having supervisory duties.
3. Two points were awarded for every appearance of the following staff positions involving no supervision of professional people: office manager, researcher, field man, campaign manager, director of women's or youth activities.
4. One point was assigned for each clerical position. In the event that the position was part-time or if it
TABLE 3.--Utilization pf public relations firms by state party organizations*

| Region | Party | No, State <br> Parties <br> Reporting | No. Reporting <br> Year-round <br> Utilization | No. Reporting <br> Campaign <br> Utilization | No. Reporting <br> No <br> Utilization | No. Reporting <br> Some <br> Utilization |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Dem. <br> Rep. | 5 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 |

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| Central | Dem. Rep. | 6 | 1 | 3 5 | 2 | 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total |  | 12 (86) | 2 (16.6) | 8 (66.6) | 2 (16.6) | 10 (83) |
| Plains | Dem. Rep. | 4 | 0 1 | 4 2 | 0 1 | 4 3 |
| Total |  | 81100 | 1 (12.5) | 6(75) | 1 (12.5) | 7 (87.5) |
| Mountain | Dem. Rep. | 8 | 0 1 | 2 | 6 0 | 2 |
| Total |  | 15 (94) | 1 (7) | 8 (53) | 6 (40) | 9 (60) |
| Pacific | Dem. Rep. | 5 3 | 0 | 3 2 | 2 1 | 3 2 |
| Total |  | 8 (80) | 0 (0) | 5 (62.5) | 3137.51 | 5 (62.5) |

was activated only during campaign periods it was awarded one-half its original point value. The party organizations and their professionalization scores are show in Table 4. The scores for clerical and professional personnel are shown separately in columns 1 and 2. Column 3 indicates the total points for both colums 1 and 2.

The state party organizations show in rank order as to their professionalization scores can be seen in Table $5 .{ }^{18}$

The Republicans nationally show a higher level of professionalization than do the Democrats with a margin of 31 per cent over the Democrats in professionalization points. When the party organizations are compared on a state by state basis, a similar picture appears. Republicans have a higher professionalization score in twenty-two states; the Democrats in thirteen states; the two parties are equal in ten states and eight states and/or territories are noncomparable due to insufficient data. Similarly, if the average professionalization score for the party organizations reporting is calculated we find that Republican staff organizations average 4.19 while Democratic staff organizations average 3.19 points.

It is interesting to compare the level of staff profssionalization by region. This data is summarized in Table 6.

18 Inasmuch as the actual level of professionalization is not reflected in the clerical score, Table 5 utilizes the professional score only.

TABLE 4.--State party staff professionalization scores

| State | Democratic Party |  |  | Republican Party |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) Clerical | (2) Professional | (3) <br> Total <br> Points | (1) Clerical | (2) <br> Professional | (3) <br> Total Points |
| Alabama | 0 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Arizona | $\frac{1}{2}$ | 0 | $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| Arkansas | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - |
| California | 4 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Colorado | 17 ${ }^{\frac{1}{2}}$ | 3 | 4, $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Comnectticut | 2 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 11 | 16 |
| Delaware | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 ${ }^{\frac{1}{2}}$ | 5 | 61 |
| Florida | 17 ${ }^{\frac{1}{2}}$ | 1 | 27 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Georgia | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\frac{1}{2}$ | 4 | 4退 |
| Idaho | 0 | 63 | 63 | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| Illinois | 1 | 72 | 8글 | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| Indiana | 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 0 | 37 | 512 | 7 | 123 |
| Iowa | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 9 | 14 |
| Kansas | 1 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| Kentucky | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Louisiana | $\frac{1}{2}$ | 0 | $\frac{1}{2}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Maine | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Maryland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Massachusetts | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 |

TABLE 4--Continued

| State | Democratic Party |  |  | Republican Party |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) Clerical | (2) <br> Professional | (3) <br> Total <br> Points | $\begin{gathered} (1) \\ \text { Clerical } \end{gathered}$ | (2) Professional | (3) Total Points |
| Michigan | 2 | 11 | 13 | 3 | 191 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 22글 |
| Minnesota | 12 | 10 | 113 | 0 | 18 | 18 |
| Mississippi | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Missouri | 1 | 0 | 1 | 312 | 7 | 10글 |
| Montana | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Nebraska | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Nevada | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| New <br> Hampshire | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| New Jersey | 8 | 16 | 24 | 3 | 7 | 10 |
| New Mexico | 0 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| New York | 10흘 | 4 | $14 \frac{3}{2}$ | 12 | 14 | 26 |
| North <br> Carolina | - | - | - | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| North Dakota | 0 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| Ohio | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Oklahoma | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Oregon | 0 | 3 | 3 | $1 \frac{1}{2}$ | 4 | 52 |
| Permayl vamia | 8 | 61 | 143 | 7 | 10 | 17 |
| Brade Island | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| South Carolina |  | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 |

TABLE 4－－Continued

| State | Democratic Party |  |  | Republican Party |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | （1） Clerícal | （2） <br> Profes－ sional | （3） <br> Total <br> Points | （1） Clerical | （2） <br> Profes－ <br> sional | （3） <br> Total Points |
| South Dakota | 1 | 13 | 14 | 3 | 71 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 101 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Ternessee | － | － | － | － | － | － |
| Texas | 12 | 11 | 121 ${ }^{\frac{1}{2}}$ | 3妾 | 7 | 102 |
| Utah | 0 | 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 12 | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| Vermont | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| Virginia | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Vashington | 12 | 0 | 13 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| West Virginia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| Wisconsin | 2 | 8 | 10 | 1 | 9 | 10 |
| Wyoming | 32 | 2 | 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ | － | － | － |
| Alaska | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Hawail | 3交 | 0 | 3交 | － | － | － |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Washing- } \\ & \text { ton, D.C. } \end{aligned}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Virgin Islands | － | － | － | － | － | － |
| Puerto Rico | －－ | － | － | － | － | － |

＊Dash（－）designates states not responding to question－ naire．

TABLE 5.--Professionalization scores arranged in rank order

| Democratic Party |  | Republican Party |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| State | Score | State | Score |
| New Jersey | 16 | Michigan | 193 |
| South Dakota | 13 | Minnesota | 18 |
| Michigan | 11 | New York | 14 |
| Texas | 11 | Connecticut | 11 |
| Minnesota | 10 | Pennsylvania | 10 |
| Wisconsin | 8 | Wisconsin | 9 |
| Illinois | 73 | Iowa | 9 |
| North Dakota | 7 | South Dakota | 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Idaho | 63 | Texas | 7 |
| Pennsylvania | 6䂞 | Indiana | 7 |
| Kansas | 5 | Missouri | 7 |
| California | 4 | New Jersey | 7 |
| Connecticut | 4 | North Dakota | 6 |
| Maine | 4 | Vermont | 5 |
| New Mexico | 4 | Delaware | 5 |
| New York | 4 | Illinois | 4 |
| Vermont | 4 | California | 4 |
| Alabama | 3 | Washington, D. C. | 4 |
| Colorado | 3 | Bhode Island | 4 |
| Oregon | 3 | Oregon | 4 |
| Rhode Island | 3 | Utah | 4 |

TABLE 5--Continued

| Democratic Party |  | Republican Party |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| State | Score | State | Score |
| Virginia | 3 | Arizona | 4 |
| Washington, D. C. | 3 | Georgia | 4 |
| New Hampshire | 2 | Montana | 4 |
| Wyoming | 2 | West Virginia | 4 |
| Utah | 17 | New Mexico | 3 |
| Florida | 1 | Idaho | 3 |
| Arizona | 0 | Virginia | 3 |
| Arkansas | 0 | Florida | 2 |
| Delaware | 0 | Nebraska | 2 |
| Georgia | 0 | Washington | 2 |
| Indiana | 0 | Kansas | 0 |
| Iowa | 0 | Maine | 0 |
| Kentucky | 0 | Colorado | 0 |
| Louisiana | 0 | Alabama | 0 |
| Maryland | 0 | New Hampshire | 0 |
| Massachusetts | 0 | Kentucky | 0 |
| Missouri | 0 | Louisiana | 0 |
| Montana | 0 | Maryland | 0 |
| Nebraska | 0 | Massachusetts | 0 |
| Nevada | 0 | Nevada | 0 |
| Oklahoma | 0 | Oklahoma | 0 |
| Washington | 0 | South Carolina | 0 |

TABLE 5--Continued

| Democratic Party |  | Republican Party |  |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :---: |
| State | Score | State | Score |
| West Virginia | 0 | Mississippi | 0 |
| Alaska | 0 | North Carolina | 0 |
| Hawaii | 0 | Alaska | 0 |
| Virgin Islands | 0 | Virgin Islands | 0 |
| Puerto Rico | 0 | Puerto Rico | 0 |

TABLE 6.--Professionalization scores by region

| Begion | Democratio <br> Score | Republican <br> Score | Regional <br> Score | Regional <br> Score |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| New England | 17 | 20 | 37 | 3.08 |
| Middle <br> Atlantic | $29 \frac{1}{2}$ | 40 | $69 \frac{1}{2}$ | 6.95 |
| South | 18 | 16 | 34 | 2.12 |
| Border | 0 | 11 | 11 | 1.10 |
| Central | $36 \frac{1}{2}$ | $66 \frac{1}{2}$ | 103 | 8.58 |
| Plains | 25 | $15 \frac{1}{2}$ | $40 \frac{1}{2}$ | 5.06 |
| Mountain | 17 | 18 | 35 | 2.33 |
| Pacific | 7 | 10 | 17 | 1.89 |

Viewed regionally, an analysis of the two-party professionalization level produces much the same result as the preceeding comparisons. Republican staff organizations achieve a higher score than the Democrats in six of the eight major regions. Democrats are more highly professionalized than the Republicans in the Plains states and also hold a slight edge in the South.

A rank ordering of the regions according to average professionalization score reveals a distinctively higher level of professionalization in the North and East with decreasing averages as one moves South and West. ${ }^{19}$ These
${ }^{19}$ The rank order of the regions is as follows:
results are not surprising. As has been pointed out, party organizations in the richer, more populous and politically competitive sections of the country tend to have larger and more professionalized party staffs while the poorer, more sparsely settled and non-competitive sections feel, apparently, that they can afford to do without this luxury.

It is also interesting to relate professionalization and competitiveness. ${ }^{20}$ One would expect to find the following:

Central states (8.58); Middle Atlantic states (6.95); Plains states (5.06); New England states (3.08); Mountain states (2.33); Southern states (2.12); Pacipic states (1.89); Border states (1.10).
${ }^{20}$ Following the index of competitiveness developed for this study and discussed in detail in Appendix $F$, the states can be classified as follows:

1. Non-competitive: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.
2. Competitive: Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Washington, Wyoming, Utah.
3. Transitional, Currently competitive: Kansas, Maryland, Pennsylvania.
4. Transitionale Marginally competitive:
a. Democratic dominant: Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Rhode Island, West Virginia.
b. Republican dominant: California, Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin.
5. The average professionalization scores will tend to be the highest in the competitive states and lower in the marginally competitive and one-party states.
6. The professionalization scores will tend to closely approximate each other in the competitive states and vary more markedly in the marginally competitive and one-party states.
7. The dominant party will tend to have a higher professionalization score than the minority party.

With respect to proposition number one above, it is true that the one-party states have the lowest professionalization score as expected. However, the marginally competitive states have a higher average score than the competitive states. The tro-party averages can be ranked as follows:

1. Transitional: Marginally competitive - 4.59
2. Competitive - 4.16
3. Transitional: Currently competitive - 3.58
4. Non-competitive - 1.88

Proposition two, that professionalization scores will tend to closely approximate each other in competitive states and vary more markedly in the marginally competitive and one-party states, also is not warranted by the data. The competitive states have the highest average difference in professionalization scores between parties while the oneparty states have one of the lowest. This is demonstrated in the following table where the competitive groupings are
ranked as to the average difference between the two-party professionalization scores.

TABLE 7.--Average differences between the two-party professional scores

| Competitive Grouping | Average Difference |
| :--- | :---: |
| 1. Competitive | 2.29 |
| 2. Transitional: Marginally |  |
| Competitive | 1.47 |
| 3. Non-competitive | .65 |
| 4. Transitional: Currently |  |

Proposition three, that the dominant party will tend to have a higher professionalization score than the minority party, produced mixed results. In one party states the results were even with two states in which the majority party had the highest score, two states in which the minority party had the highest score and one state in which the scores were the same for both parties. In the marginally Competitive states which the Democratic Party dominates, the minority party had a higher score in four states and the parties were even in one state. In the marginally competitive states dominated by the Republicans the majority party had the higher score in seven instances, the minority party in five and in one state the scores were even. This entire data is summarized in Appendix $G$.

In summary, it would appear that neither the competitive structure of the state nor the perception of the competitive situation by the political leadership has any clear influence upon the extent to which a party organization has attempted to build a strong staff organization. ${ }^{21}$ Other variables such as party tradition and party finances must be looked to as more adequate explanations of the phenomena revealed by the data. 22

## Perceptions of Staff Needs

The foregoing pages of this chapter have attempted to describe the actual staff organization of America's state and territorial parties. This section will attempt to briefly lay out the manner in which the state chairmen themselves perceive their own staff organization and their future needs.

In response to the question: "Do you feel that the size of your staff is adequate for the needs of your party?",

21
This is corroborated statistically by computing the rank order correlation between competitiveness and level of professionalization. These results are as follows:

Rank Order Correlation Coefficients

Party
Democratic
Republican
22
For a possible explanation of the role of such variables as party finance and party tradition upon the development of a strong staff organization, see pp. 60-61, 83, 92-93.
a surprising 33 per cent of the state chairmen responded in the affirmative. Fifty-nine per cent responded negatively and eight per cent made no response.

When the data are analysed regionally, Republicans appear to be substantially more dissatisfied with their staff organizations than the Democrats in the Southern, Border and Middle Atlantic states while Democrats tend to manifest these same attitudes in the Central and Plains states. Little difference in attitude between the parties, however, is noticeable in New England, the Mountain or the Pacific states. This data is summarized in Table 8.

An analysis of the data in relation to competitiveness produces somewhat surprising results. State chairmen in the competitive states ( 56 per cent) are the most likely to indicate that they feel that their professional staffs are adequate for their needs whereas only 30 per cent of the chairmen of the marginally competitive states, 25 per cent of the chairmen of the one-party states, and 17 per cent of the chairmen of the currently competitive states Felt that their staffs are adequate. Viewed in relation to party, the competitive groupings show the following results:

TABLE 8.--Perception by state chairmen of adequacy of staff organization

| Region | Response of State Chairman* |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democratic | Republican |
| New England States |  |  |
| Connecticut | A | A |
| Maine | I | I |
| Massachusetts | A | A |
| New Hampshire | I | I |
| Rhode Island | $\bar{I}$ | A |
| Vermont | I | A |
| Middle Atlantic States |  |  |
| Delaware | A | I |
| New Jersey | A | - |
| New York | I | A |
| Pennsylvania | A | I |
| Washington, D. C. | A | I |
| Southern States |  |  |
| Alabama | A | A |
| Arkansas | A | - |
| Florida | I | I |
| Georgia | - | I |
| Touisiana | - | I |
| Mississippi | - | I |
| North Carolina | - | I |
| South Carolina | $\bar{\square}$ | I |
| Texas | I | I |
| Virginia | A | I |
| Border States |  |  |
| Kentucky | A | A |
| Maryland | - | I |
| Missouri | A | I |
| Oklahoma | I | I |
| Tennessee | I | I |
| West Virginia | I | I |

TABLE 8--Continued

| Region | Response of State Chairman |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democratic | Republican |
| Central States |  |  |
| Illinois | I | A |
| Indiana | A | A |
| Iowa | I | A |
| Michigan | I | $\bar{I}$ |
| Minnesota | I | A |
| Ohio Wisconsin | $\bar{I}$ | I |
| Plains States |  |  |
| Kansas |  |  |
| Nebraska | I | I |
| North Dakota | I | A |
| South Dakota | I | A |
| Mountain States |  |  |
| Arizona | I | A |
| Colorado | A | I |
| Idaho | I | A |
| Montana | A | I |
| Nevada | A | I |
| New Mexico Utah | A | I |
| Utah Wyoming | I | A |
| Pacific States |  |  |
| Alaska | I | I |
| California | I | I |
| Hawaii | I | 1 |
| Oregon | I | I |
| Washington | I | 1 |

TABLE 8--Continued

| Region | Response of State Chairman |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democratic | Republican |
|  |  |  |  |

*Abbreviations: $A=$ Adequate; $I=$ Inadequate;

- = No Response.


# Percentage of State Chairmen 

 Viewing Their Professional Staff As AdequateRepublican (Competitive) ..... 70
Democratic (Non-Competitive) ..... 50
Democratic (Marginally Competitive, Democratic Dominant) ..... 50
Democratic (Competitive) ..... 46
Republican (Marginally Competitive, Democratic Dominant) ..... 40
Republican (Marginally Competitive Republican Dominant) ..... 38
Democratic (Currently Competitive) ..... 33
Democratic (MarginallyCompetitive, RepublicanDominant)15
Republican (Non-Competitive) ..... 10
Republican (CurrentlyCompetitive)0

One possible way to explain the high satisfaction level on the part of the state chairmen in competitive states is to postulate that they already have highly developed staff organizations. This proposition is not supported by the data since the competitive states have a lower average professionalization score than the marginally competitive states. Probably the only valid explanation for this phenomenon is that the parties in the competitive states are reasonably successful and therefore do not view the building of a professional staff as a major road to power.

It should be noted in this connection, however, that there is a marked tendency in all competitive groupings for the minority party to be less satisfied with its staff organization than the majority party. This is particularly true in the South where only the Republican organization in Alabama expressed satisfaction with the adequacy of its staff. Thus, it would appear that minority parties feel that the building of a professional staff is at least one source of future electoral success. This data is summarized in Table 9. As a second method of attempting to ascertain the perceptions of state chairmen as to their staff needs, they were asked to indicate what they considered to be their "one or two most pressing staff needs." This data, already discussed earlier, is summarized in Table 10.

Again it will be seen that the Republicans nationally have slightly greater perceived needs than do Democrats. 23 As a means of determining the types of states and regions which have the highest level of perceived needs, a perceived needs index was developed based on the professionalization index employed earlier in this chapter. The formula is as follows:

1. State parties expressing a need for personnel in the "general executive" category were given four points for each item listed.
[^13]TABLE 9.--Perception by state chairmen of the adequacy of staff organization arranged by competitive groupings

| States | Response of State Chairman |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democratic | Republican | Total |
| Non-Competitive Group |  |  |  |
| Alabama | A | A |  |
| Arkansas | A | - |  |
| Florida | I | I |  |
| Georgia | - | I |  |
| Louisana | - | I |  |
| Mississippi | - | I |  |
| North Carolina | - | I |  |
| Oklahoma | I | I |  |
| South Carolina | - | I |  |
| Tennessee | - | - |  |
| Texas | I | I |  |
| Virginia | A | I |  |
| Total Adequate | 3 (50\%) | 1 (10\%) | $4(25 \%)$ |
| Competitive Group |  |  |  |
| Arizona | I | A |  |
| Colorado | A | I |  |
| Connecticut | A | A |  |
| Illinois | I | A |  |
| Indiana | A | A |  |
| Iowa | I | $\bar{\square}$ |  |
| Nevada | A | I |  |
| New Jersey | A | - |  |
| New Mexico | A | I |  |
| Massachusetts | A | A |  |
| Minnesota | I | A |  |
| Washington | I | I |  |
| Wyoming | I | A |  |
| Utah | I | A |  |
| Total Adequate | 7 (50\%) | 7 (64\%) | 14 (56\%) |

TABLE 9--Continued

*Total adequate for marginally competitive group: Democratic Party - 4 (23.5\%); Republican Party - 7 (38.8\%) and total - 11 (31.4\%).
TABLE 10.--Most pressing perceived staff needs reported by state chairmen*

| Party | GE | CM | PR | FO | F | R | WA | YA | $C$ | OM |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Republican | 13 | 0 | 12 | 13 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 |
| Democratic | 9 | 0 | 8 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 |
| Totals | 22 | 0 | 20 | 22 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 0 |

*Por key to abbreviations, see p. 50.
2. State parties expressing a need for personnel in any of the other professional categories were awarded three points for each item listed.
3. State parties expressing a need for clerical personnel were awarded one point for each item listed.
4. State parties expressing a need for a "general increase in staff" but who listed nothing specific were awarded one point.
5. The total points for each party reporting were totaled and the averages for the geographic regions and competitive groupings computed. Table 11 contains the perceived needs scores for the geographic regions arranged in rank order with the adequacy percentages at the right.

TABLE 11.--Rank ordering of perceived needs indices by region*

| Region | Perceived <br> Needs Score | Adequacy <br> Percentage |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Plains States | 5.87 | 25.0 |
| Central States | 3.58 | 36.3 |
| Mountain States | 3.20 | 46.3 |
| Pacific States | 3.10 | 0 |
| Middle Atlantic States | 2.30 | 55.5 |
| New England States | 2.16 | 54.6 |
| Border States | 2.10 | 33.3 |
| Southern States | 2.06 | 28.5 |

[^14]It will be seen from Table 11 that, with the exception of the Border and Southern states, the perceived need scores and adequacy percentages are quite consistent. That is, the higher the perceived needs score the lower the adequacy percentage. This result follows logically. The state chairman who views his professional staff as adequate will also have fewer perceived personnel wants.

Although the Southern and Border states do not follow this general pattern, it is not too difficult to explain their behavior. If one looks at the professionalization level in these two regions one finds that they rank sixth and eighth respectively. 24 In the case of the South, the low adequacy score stems largely from the attitude of the Republican state chairmen. However, since the entire professionalization level of the South is low, these chairmen probably do not perceive the need for as highly developed staff as they would in a region where the general professionalization level is higher. In this case, therefore, it is postulated that they derive their over-all perceptions from the general behavior patterns of their region. The data lends itself to a similar interpretation in the Border states although the general perception of inadequacy on the part of the state chairmen is more equally distributed between the two parties.

When viewed in terms of competitive groupings, attitudes toward staff needs are found to be similar to those expressed toward the adequacy of staff. Chairmen in competitive states have a substantially lower perceived need score than those in the marginally competitive and currently competitive categories. This data is summarized in Table 12.

TABLE 12.--Rank ordering of perceived needs indices by competitive grouping

| Competitive <br> Grouping | Perceived <br> Needs Score | Adequacy <br> Percentage |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Currently Competitive | 6.60 | 20 |
| Marginally Competitive | 3.76 | 30 |
| Competitive | 2.50 | 70 |
| Non-competitive | 1.60 | 25 |

Finally, in relation to party, the competitive groupings can be arranged as to their perception of staff needs as follows:

1. High sense of perceived staff needs. (Competitive groupings with high perceived needs scores and low adequacy percentages.)

Perceived
Needs Score

Adequacy Percentage
a. Republican
(Marginally Competitive, Rep. Dominant 3.96

34
b. Democratic
(Marginally Competitive, Rep. Dominant 3.61 17
c. Republican
(Currently
Competitive)
3.33

0
2. Moderate sense of perceived staff needs. (Competitive groupings with fairly high perceived needs scores and fairly low adequacy percentages.)
a. Republican
(Marginally Competitive, Dem.
Dominant 3.6040
b. Democratic
(Currently
Competitive) 3.33
c. Democratic
(Competitive) 3.1546
d. Republican
(Non-Competitive) 2.7110
3. Low sense of perceived staff needs. (Competitive groupings with low perceived needs scores and high adequacy percentages.)
a. Republican
(Competitive) $\quad 1.84$
60


In conclusion, although the data on the perceptions of state chairmen concerning their staff needs is not totally consistent, the following regularities can be seen. First, party organizations in the competitive groupings tend to have a moderate or low sense of the need for staff. As has already been pointed out, this is probably due to the fact that, since each party wins elections with some degree of regularity, they do not perceive the development of a professional staff as a necessary instrument in the gaining of power. Second, state chairmen in the marginally competitive and currently competitive groupings, with the exception of the Democrats in the marginally competitive states which they dominate, tend to have a relatively high sense of the need for professional staff help. This is most likely due to the fact that the parties in this electoral situation are either "on the make" or are trying to hold on to their position of dominance as best they can. These states tend to have higher professionalization scores to begin with and, in contrast to the competitive states, appear to view staff organization as a road to the gaining or holding of power.

The one exception - the Democratic party organizations in the marginally competitive states which they dominate - can
be partially explained by the fact that the states in this grouping (Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Rhode Island and West Virginia) are predominately Border states which tend to follow Southern behavior patterns.

Finally, the party organizations in the non-competitive grouping tend to have a low perception of the need for staff. The majority parties do not need staff to win elections. The minority party, while having a clear view of the inadequacies of their staffs, apparently perceive their staff needs in relation to the opposition whose staffs are extremely limited to begin with. 25
${ }^{25}$ For a discussion of the phenomenon of Emulation, see Chapter III.

## CHAPTER III

SOME BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PARTY STAFFS

The purpose of this chapter is to develop in somewhat further detail two propositions concerning the behavioral characteristics of state party organizations relative to their utilization of party staffs. These propositions are: (1) that the staffs of the two major parties in any given state will tend to approximate each other in size, general composition and degree of professionalization; and (2) the proposition suggested by Joseph Schlesinger in "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition" that in one-party predominant states the minority party will tend to be weak organizationally.l

## Inter-Party Emulation in Staff Composition

Proposition one, that the professional staffs of the two major parties in any given state will tend to approximate each other in size, general composition, level of professionalization, etc. is based on an assumption concerning the manner in which the political leadership views its chances of electoral success. This assumption can be

[^15]stated as follows: the leadership of a political organization will be greatly influenced by "memory" ${ }^{2}$ in its strategic planning and thus tend to perpetuate organizational and campaign techniques that have been successful in the past. In the case of the majority party this impulse will cause it to perpetuate tried and true techniques; the minority party, on the other hand, will tend to emulate the organizational structure and techniques of the majority party.

This assumption can be extended to other phases of party behavior. That is, it is my assumption that the minority party will tend to emulate the majority party in such matters as leadership and candidate recruitment, ideology and issue position, campaign techniques, etc. However, it is the objective of this chapter to restrict the analysis to emulation in the area of staff organization.

Three indexes will be employed to test the phenomenon of emulation as it relates to the composition and structure of state and territorial party staffs. They are (1) the extent to which the two-party professionalization scores in each state approximate each other, (2) the two-party incidence within each state of four selected staff positions; and (3) the two-party utilization, within each state, of public relations firms.

[^16]
## The two-party approximation of professionalization

 8cores. Forty-four states and territories can be compared $a s$ to their professionalization level by determining the difference between the Democratic and Bepublican professionalization score in each state. These computations are presented in Tables 1 and 2. From Table 1, which includes clerical positions, it can be seen that 20.5 per cent of the states and territories are identical in their level of professionalization, 47.7 per cent have a point spread of two points or less and only 25 per cent have a point spread of over five. 3When clerical positions are removed from the computations similar results are obtained. As is shown in Table 2, states and territories having an identical professionalization score number 22.7 per cent of the total while 47.7 per cent have a point spread of less than three. When one considers that the average point total per staff position 18 three, close to half of the units involved differ in level of professionalization in the equivalent of only one position.
${ }^{3}$ The Spearman rank order correlation between Republican and Democratic parties for the professionalization level for all of the states is.550. In a number of instances, states reporting personnel in the General Executive category did not report having clerical help. Assuming that a party having an executive secretary, executive director of administrative assistant on its staff will have some type of clerical help and that its omission from the questionnaire was an oversight on the part of the respondent, one point was awarded to each state reporting a general executive but no clerical position. States ranked on the basis of this hypothesis achleved a rank correlation of .617.

TABLE 1.--Inter-party professionalization score differences: total points*

| Inter-Party <br> Point Difference | Number of States Reporting This Spread | Per cent of Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 9 | 20.5 |
| $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1 |  |
| 1 | 4 |  |
| 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 3 |  |
| 2 | 4 | 44.7 |
| 212 | 3 |  |
| 3 | 2 |  |
| 31 | 3 |  |
| 4 | 1 |  |
| 4交 | 2 |  |
| 5 | 2 | 75.0 |
| 6 | 1 |  |
| 61 | 1 |  |
| 7 | 0 |  |
| $7 \frac{1}{2}$ | 1 |  |
| 8 | 0 |  |
| 9 | 1 |  |
| 92 | 2 |  |
| 10 | 1 |  |
| 11 | 1 |  |
| 112 | 1 |  |
| 12 | 0 |  |
| 13 | 1 |  |
| 14 | 1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 44 |  |

TABLE 2.--Inter-party professionalization score differences*

| Inter-Party <br> Point Difference | Number of States Reporting This Difference | Per cent of Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 10 | 22.7 |
| 1 | 7 |  |
| 2 | 3 |  |
| 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1 | 47.7 |
| 3 | 2 |  |
| 3交 | 2 |  |
| 4 | 7 |  |
| 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1 | 74.9 |
| 5 | 2 |  |
| 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1 |  |
| 6 | 0 |  |
| 7 | 3 |  |
| 8 | 1 |  |
| 81 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 1 |  |
| 9 | 2 |  |
| 10 | 1 | 100.0 |
| Total | 144 |  |

Pinally, the following graph demonstrates the extent to which the two parties parallel each other in professionalization.

Two-party incidence of staff positions. The degree to which similar positions appear on the staffs of the two parties in any given state is also an index of the phenomenon of emulation. Four staff positions have been selected for analysis: general executive, field organization, finance and public relations. When the two-party incidence of each position for all of the 44 comparable states and territories is computed it is discovered that 56.3 per cent of the units manifest a similar pattern of incidence relative to the general executive category; 90.9 per cent are similar with respect to the presence of field organizers on their staffs; 81.8 per cent are similar with respect to finance personnel; and 75 per cent are similar in their recruitment of public relations personnel.

While the gross data above would indicate a high level of inter-party similarity as opposed to dissimilarity, this appears to be due largely to the fact that in many states neither party has the given position on its staff. Thus, when the similarities and dissimilarities between party organizations in only those states having the staff position are computed, a somewhat different result obtains. Of the 31 states having general executive personnel, 38.7 per cent are similar while 61.3 per cent are dissimilar. of the seven states having field organization personnel on


Koy: - Donocratic Party ---- Bepubilican Party
their staffs, 42.9 per cent are similar while 57.1 per cent are dissimilar. With respect to public relations personnel, 38.8 per cent states were similar; and with respect to finance only one of nine units is similar.

In conclusion, it is the opinion of this writer that the data on the two-party incidence of staff positions in the states supports the hypothesis that the parties tend to emulate each other in the development of staff organization. The fact that the degree of similarity is lower when the states not having a given staff position are removed, can be explained by the fact that there is, of necessity, a time period within which this emulation takes place. That is, one party will tend to lag behind the other in its perception of the utility of a given staff function. Over time, however, emulation will take place. The utilization of public relations firms. The extent to which public relations firms are utilized by the state and territorial party organizations provides a final index of the phenomenon of emulation. Of a total of 35 comparable units, there are eighteen (51.4 per cent) in which both parties utilize a PR firm to some extent; fourteen units ( 40 per cent) in which one party utilizes a PR firm and one does not; and three in which neither party uses such a firm.

Of the eighteen states in which both parties utilize a public relations firm to some extent, in eleven
(61.1 per cent) the level of utilization is identical, 4 and seven ( 38.9 per cent) differed in the extent of their utilization.

Conclusions. The proposition that the two major parties within a state will tend to emulate each other in the size, general composition and professionalization of their staffs is, in the opinion of this writer, supported by the data. The evidence can be summarized as follows:

1. State parties will tend to have similar professionalization scores. Between 20.5 and 22.7 per cent of the states manifest no professionalization point spread between the parties depending upon whether the Total Point Score or Professionalization Score is used. In 47.7 per cent of the states the parties will be within two points of each other out of a total point spread of 14.
2. State parties will tend to show a similar incidence of specific staff positions. Similarity of recruitment of the four staff positions studied - general executive, field organization, finance and public relations - evidences itself in $56.3,90.9,81.8$ and 75 per cent of the instances respectively.
3. State parties will tend to have a similar pattern of utilization of professional public relations firms. In 51.4 per cent of the comparable states both

[^17]parties utilize a public relations firm to some extent and in 31.4 per cent of the states the utilization is exactly similar.

The high level of emulation seen in the data tends to indicate that one party is highly motivated by what it sees the other party doing. There is, apparently, a good deal of trading of perceptions as to what organizational devices will lead to electoral success. Further research is needed to determine whether parties trade perceptions in other areas of activity. The results of such research should cast additional light on the factors producing similarity between the parties and moderation in our party system.

## Party Competition and Staff Composition

The notion that the minority party in the less competitive states is characterized by organizational weakness is relatively common to political science. Schlesinger states that:

It is clear that the distinction between the one-party predominant and the one-party cyclical states lies in the position of the minority party. In the former states, the lesser party gives every evidence of being fragmentary and weak in organization. When it wins, it is most likely to be purely by default, due to some sudden vulnerability of the majority party, a major national trend, or a split within the major party. The electorate is not irrevocably wedded to the dominant party; a majority of the voters can bring themselves to vote for the opposite party. But the
minority organization is so weak that it is unable to follow up its momentary advantage, frequently because of its inability to present attractive and capable candidates. 5

While organizational weakness extends to many party functions other than staff organization, the size and professionalization of a party's professional staff is one index of the organizational strength or weakness of the party.

As a test of the proposition that the minority party is weak in the less competitive states, the Professionalization Total Points Scores ${ }^{6}$ are used as a basis for comparing the two parties on a state by state basis. Looking first at what Schlesinger terms "one-party states" it is found that the minority parties, as a group, have a slightly higher total Professionalization Total Point Score than the majority party. ${ }^{7}$ This can be seen from the following total points scores:
$5^{5}$ Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 1125-1126.
${ }^{6}$ See Chapter 2, Table 4. This score includes clerical positions.
${ }^{7}$ Four states originally included in the one-party category by Schlesinger were excluded. Arkansas, Mississippi and South Carolina were not included due to insufficient data. Vermont can no longer be considered to be a one-party state.

| State | Democratic | Republican |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Alabama | 3 | 1 |
| Florida | $2 \frac{1}{2}$ | 4 |
| Georgia | 0 | $4 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| Louisiana | $\frac{1}{2}$ | 0 |
| Oklahoma | 1 | 1 |
| Texas | $12 \frac{1}{2}$ | $10 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| Virginia | 3 | 3 |
| Total | $22 \frac{1}{2}$ | 24 |

When the seven comparable states above are viewed individually, it is seen that the majority party has a higher score in three, the minority in two, and two states are even. Although the results differ slightly depending upon whether one looks at the total score or at the number of states that have a preponderance of points, it is clear that the minority party is not substantially weaker in professional staff organization in the states compared.

The results are similar when the "one-party cyclical" and "one-party predominant" states are compared. ${ }^{8}$ The

[^18]majority party in the seventeen comparable states classified as one-party cyclical show a one point edge over the minority party (148-147). In the nine one-party predominant states the minority party has a one point edge over the majority party (39-38).

The minority parties in both classifications manifest slightly higher professionalization levels than the majority parties when viewed on a state-by-state basis. In the oneparty cyclical states the minority party has a higher level of professionalization than the majority party in eight states, a lower professionalization score in seven states, and two are even. In the one-party predominant states the minority party has a higher professionalization score in five states, a lower score in two states and two are even.

There is, however, a substantial difference in the level of professionalization between all of the state organizations in the one-party cyclical group and the one-party predominant group with the former averaging 8.70 total points per party and the latter averaging 4.27.

Conclusions. While the attempt to explain the difference between the position of the minority party in the one-party predominant and one-party cyclical states by attributing it largely to weak organization cannot be

New Mexico. One-party Predominant - New Hampshire, North Dakota, Wisconsin, California, Kansas, Delaware, Oregon, Maryland, and Kentucky. See Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Structure of Competition for Office In the imerican States," Behavioral Science, $V$ (July, 1960) 197-210.
invalidated on the basis of one index of organizational strength, the data of this study tend to indicate a possible weakness in that approach. If it be valid to assume that the size and composition of a party's professional staff is somewhat reflective of the attitudes of the party leadership toward organization, then the fact that there is relatively little difference between the majority and minority parties in staff professionalization would seem to indicate similar attitudes toward party organization on the party of both sets of leaders. 9 By the same token, if the structure of a party's professional staff organization is any reflection of its ability to mobilize its volunteer organization, the majority and minority parties tend to enter the political fray quite evenly matched. Thus, while it can be argued that the minority party has fewer volunteers to do its work, a narrower base from which to finance its activities - both definable as organizational weakness and that professional organization does not automatically produce grass-roots organization, the balance among the parties in professional staff development points to the fact that possibly organizational strength has not been as crucial a factor in electoral success as heretofore supposed or that this is one gap that the minority parties are rapidiy closing.

[^19]
## CHAPTER IV

AMERICA'S PROFESSIONAL PARTY STAFF PERSONNEL

## Introduction

Chapter II of this study outlines the basic structure of state party staffs in the United States. Those data, however, tell us nothing about the type of people who assume these positions, their career patterns or their expectations. The purpose of this chapter is to enquire into the socioeconomic background of the nation's party staff people, how they are recruited, the length of their tenure, their general qualifications for the position they hold, and their expectations concerning their jobs and their future careers.

The data of this chapter are based on an analysis of 74 questionnaires received from party staff personnel throughout the country in April and May of $1959{ }^{1}{ }^{1}$

Of the 74 respondents used in this analysis, 89 per cent work on a full time basis and 97 per cent have regular appointments. Less than 3 per cent of the sample work during campaign periods only. Thus, this group of respondents tend to represent the regular employees of the

[^20]state organizations and not those professionals who move in and out of the political arena from election to election.

It will be seen from Table 1 , which summarizes the socio-economic characteristics of American party staff personnel, that the professional staffer is largely an urban Protestant from a relatively privileged background.

Place of origin. Ninety-two per cent ${ }^{2}$ of the group studied have spent their entire lives in an urban area and only 4 per cent were raised in rural farm or non-farm areas. This is in constrast to 26 per cent of the population who, as late as 1950, lived in non-urban areas. Thus, while rural areas tend to place a disproportionate share of their numbers in governmental decision-making positions, particularly at the state level, they do not appear to be represented on the professional staffs of our state political parties in proportion to their numbers. ${ }^{3}$

This datum leads one to suggest the hypothesis that rural groups view their political objectives as being quite specialized rather than broadly programmatic in nature. This would lead them to work in farm organizations which specialize in agricultural policy questions or in direct politico-governmental decision-making positions where they

[^21]TABLE 1.--Socio-economic characteristics of America's party staff personnel

| SES Characteristic | Democrats | Republicans | Total | National Average* |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. Sex |  |  |  |  |
| Male <br> Female | 23 11 $\left(\begin{array}{l}67.6) \\ 32.4)\end{array}\right.$ | 32 8 8 $\left(\begin{array}{l}80.0) \\ 20.0)\end{array}\right.$ | 55 19 | --- |
| Total | $34(100.0)$ | 40 (100.0) | $74(100.0)$ |  |


| Single Married Divorced | 11 21 21 $\left(\begin{array}{l}32.5 \\ \left(\begin{array}{l}10.5 \\ 1 \\ 5\end{array}\right) \\ 5.8)\end{array}\right.$ |  | 15 56 3 $\left(\begin{array}{c}20.3 \\ \binom{5}{( } \\ 4.0\end{array}\right)$ | 24.9 69.6 1.8 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total | 34 (100.0) | 40 (100.0) | 74 (100.0) |  |
| 3. Family Size |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 2 \\ & 3 \\ & 4.5 \\ & 6-7 \end{aligned}$ $\begin{aligned} & \text { of } \\ & \text { over } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Average } \\ \text { fam115 } \\ -3.66 \end{gathered}$ |
| Total | 34 (100.0) | 40 (100.0) | 74 (100.0) |  |

$113$

TABLE l--Continued

| SES Characteristic | Democrats | Republicans | Total | National Average* |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7. Educational Level |  |  |  |  |
| Doctorate | 2 (5.9) | 0 ( 0 ) | 2 ( 2.7) |  |
| Master's degree | 4 ( 11.8) | 4 ( 10.0) | 8 ( 10.8) |  |
| Bachelor's degree | 17 ( 50.0) | 22 (55.0) | 39 (52.7) |  |
| Some College | 4 ( 11.8 ) | 7 ( 17.5) | 11 ( 14.9) |  |
| High school graduate | 6 ( 17.6) | 7 ( 17.5) | 13 ( 17.6) |  |
| Some high school | 1 (2.9) | 0 ( 0) | 1 ( 1.3) |  |
| Less than high school | 0 ( 0) | 0 (0) | $0(0)$ |  |
| Total high school graduates | 33 (100.0) | 40 (100.0) | 73 (100.0) | 41.7 (1960) |
| Total college graduates | 23 (67.6) | 26 (65.0) | 49 (64.8) | 7.3 (1960) |
| 8. Father's Occupation |  |  |  |  |
| Professional |  | 8 ( 21.1) | 16 ( 22.9) | 10.0 (1959) |
| Managerial, Entrepeneurial | 12 ( 37.6) | 14 ( 36.8 ) | 26 ( 37.1) | 10.4 |
| Clerical | $2(6.2)$ | 4 ( 10.5 ) | 6 ( 8.6) | 13.8 |
| Sales | 2 (6.2) | $3(7.9)$ | 5 (7.1) | 6.6 |
| Skilled and service worker | $5(15.6)$ | 5 ( 13.2) | 10 ( 14.3) | 31.2 |
| Farmer | $3(9.4)$ | $3(7.9)$ | $6(8.6)$ | 10.0 14.6 |
| Unskilled worker | 0 (0) | 1 ( 2.6) | 1 ( 1.4) | 14.6 |
| Total | 32 (100.0) | $38(100.0)$ | 70 (100.0) |  |

9. Father's Level of Education

## 5.2 (1940)

|  |
| :---: |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| Total |  | (100.0) |  | (100.0) |  | (100.0) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total high school graduates |  | ( 64.7) | 20 | ( 51.3) | 42 | ( 57.5) | 24.0 | (1940) |
| Mother's Level of Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| College graduate |  | ( 23.5) |  | ( 12.8 ) | 13 | ( 17.8 ) | 3.7 | (1940) |
| Some college |  | ( 14.7 ) | 8 | $(20.5)$ | 13 | $(17.8)$ |  |  |
| High school graduate Some high school |  | ( 38.2$)$ | 15 | $\left(\begin{array}{r}38.5 \\ (7.7)\end{array}\right.$ | 28 | $\left(\begin{array}{r}38.4 \\ (9.6)\end{array}\right.$ |  |  |
| Less than high school |  | ( 11.8 ) | 8 | ( 20.5) | 12 | ( 16.4 ) |  |  |
| Total |  | (100.0) |  | (100.0) |  | (100.0) |  |  |
| Total high school graduates | 26 | ( 76.5) | 28 | ( 71.8) | 54 | ( 74.0) | 28.0 | (1940) |

[^22]
can function as a veto group rather than in the more broadly programmatic political party.

It is interesting to note that the distribution between categories of locality is roughly the same for both parties. Contrary to what might be expected, however, over twice as many Democratic staff people were recruited from the small tows than Republicans. Republican staff personnel were substantially more urbanized with 77.5 per cent coming from localities of over 25,000 as opposed to 58.9 per cent for the Democrats.

Religion. The religious composition of party staffs, while heavily Protestant, parallels the basic religious composition of the nation at large. One might have expected to find a greater representation of Jews in the group due to the fact that they are heavily represented in the legal and intellectual professions. That the parties tend not to recruit persons from minority groups to fill staff positions might be inferred, although such cannot be substantiated by the data.

Social status. It is clear from the data that party professionals are recruited from the upper classes in American society. Sixty per cent of the staffers come from families, the head of which either owned his own business or held a professional or managerial position. In fact, 49 per cent ( 45 per cent of the Democrats and 51 per cent of the Republicans) of the staff members' fathers had at one time managed their own businesses. If the 8.6 per cent
of the group which came from farm families be added to the figure, over 57 per cent of the staffers' fathers either owned or operated their own business enterprises at some period in their lives. Again, it is important to notice that both parties recruit for their professional staffs substantially the same percentage of personnel whose antecedents stem from the business community.

This high percentage of staff people coming from managerial or entrepeneurial families is significant for the data to be presented in Chapters $V$ and $V I$. One might expect the "business point of view" to prevail among a sizeable percentage of the staff. Subsequent data gathered from personal interviews with Michigan staff personnel, however, tends to indicate that the political staffer is prepared to accept the viewpoints of the party or politician for whom he works. Family background does not appear to greatly affect the ability of staff people to adjust to the policy positions of the party to which they are attached.

Education. Professional staff people not only come from successful homes, they come from educated homes as well. Over 24 per cent of the fathers and 17 per cent of the mothers were college graduates, as opposed to percentages of 5.2 and 3.7 for the population at large as late as 1940. Furthermore, a high school education is twice as frequent among the parents of party staff personnel as it is for the population at large.

The staffers themselves manifest this same educational level. A high school diploma is almost twice as common among the party professionals as it is in the population at large based on 1960 figures and the ratio of college degrees held by staffers to that of the national population is 9 to 1.

It is interesting to note both the type of institution and the type of curriculum in which the staff person did his college work. Only 4 per cent attended an IFy League college and only 10 per cent took their degrees from a Big Ten institution. By far the bulk of the group (47.5 per cent) did their college work in lesser known universities with a substantial number (18.4 per cent) choosing a city college.

The majority of the professional staff people did their academic work in social science and liberal arts while law was practically non-existent. A ranking of the respondents' college major or final professional degree produces interesting results. This data is summarized in Table 2.

The academic background of party staff personnel tends to dramatically reinforce the stereotyped image of the two parties. It will be noticed that close to 50 per cent of the Democratic respondents majored in a social science or public administration as opposed to 36 per cent of the Republicans. Conversely, 16 per cent of the Republicans did their work in business as opposed to 3.5 per cent

TABLE 2.--Academic curriculum pursued by party staff personnel

| Curriculum | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Social Science | $12(44.5)$ | $5(19.3)$ | $17(32.1)$ |
| Liberal Arts | $8(29.6)$ | $6(23.1)$ | $14(26.4)$ |
| Business | $1(3.7)$ | $8(30.7)$ | $9(17.0)$ |
| Journalism | $2(7.4)$ | $6(23.1)$ | $8(15.1)$ |
| Public Administration | $2(7.4)$ | $1(3.8)$ | $3(5.6)$ |
| Law | $1(3.7)$ | $0(0)$ | $1(1.9)$ |
| Science-engineering | $1(3.7)$ | $0(0)$ | $1(1.9)$ |
| Total | $27(100.0)$ | $26(100.0)$ | $53(100.0)$ |

of the Democrats. It should be noticed that journalism, a basic source of training for Republican staff people, is negligible among Democrats.

In summary, the data suggests that Democratic state party organizations tend to recruit people with primarily social science and liberal arts training ("egg heads") while Republicans recruit from a broader spectrum of tecmically trained persons. This finding corroborates the data reported in Chapter $V$ that Democratic politicians seek staff people with an ideological affinity for the party whereas Republicans primarily look for expertise in their staff members. ${ }^{4}$

Family situation. A final set of socio-economic characteristics should be briefly discussed, namely, the family situation of the respondent. It will be seen that staffers tend to have settled family life situations. That is, by far the greatest percentage are married and have children. The fact that the number of single staff persons is less than that of the population at large seems to indicate that professional party staff work is not Viewed merely as a temporary stop-over for single people on their way up the career ladder. Over 54 per cent of the group have families of four or more people to support.

The fairly permanent nature of party staff work is corroborated by the fact that 33.3 per cent of the respondents have beem employed by state political organizations for five or more years and an additional 29.4 have worked for at least three years.

Conclusion. We have seen that the professional staff people attached to state party organizations are recruited from the upper socio-economic brackets. It is interesting to hypothecate as to the probable causes of this and speculate on the possible impact this development may have upon politics in the United States.

First, as to cause, it is fairly obvious that the skills required to operate any sizeable organization in a modern industrial society, whether it be a business corporation, labor union or political party, are both substantial and similar. Thus, all organizations will tend to recruit
staff people from the same sources and with similar skills. The staff people attached to labor unions, business corporations, political parties and other organizations have become, for all practical purposes, inter-changeable parts.

In this connection it is interesting to compare the socio-economic characteristics of the party staff personnel in this study with the United States Senators studied by Matthews and the businessmen studied by Warner and Abegglen. 5 It will be seen from this data, presented in Table 3, that as far as the two variables chosen for comparison (father's occupation and respondent's own education) is concerned, the socio-economic status of the party professionals is almost identical with that of the 8562 business men studied by Warner and just slightly lower than the United States Senators holding office during the 81st Congress.

Second, it can be postulated that, given a managerial elite in the United States, it may well be mandatory for political parties to recruit from the same group if it is to engage in successful intercourse with public officials, government agencies and private organizations.

The development of a corps of party staff people drawn from the managerial class may have a definite effect upon the American party system. First, it obviously means

[^23]TABLE 3.--Comparison of socio-economic characteristics of party staff personnel, United States senators and American business leaders (in percentages)

| SES Characteristic | Party <br> Personnel | U.S. <br> Senators | Business <br> Leaders |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Educational Level |  |  |  |
| College Graduates | 66.2 | 87.0 | 58.0 |
| High School Graduates | 32.4 | 10.0 | 35.0 |
| Less than High School | 1.4 | 3.0 | 19.0 |
| Pather's Occupation |  |  |  |
| Professional | 22.9 | 22.0 | 14.0 |
| Manager-Proprietor | 37.1 | 33.0 | 49.0 |
| White Collar | 15.7 | 1.0 | 8.0 |
| Worker | 15.7 | 3.0 | 10.0 |
| Farmer | 8.6 | 40.0 | 9.0 |

that another of the major centers of power in the United States will be increasingly in the hands of the "managers." It is already a fairly common practice for young executives, labor union staff personnel and journalists to move in and out of party staff positions during campaign periods. Second, although the subsequent data of this study produces a picture of the party staffer as manifesting a high degree of role acceptance and docility, and thus a willingness to accept the party viewpoint on most matters, it is very possible that the socio-economic homogeneity of
the party staff and their similarity to the management class generally may act ultimately as a consensus producing factor in the American political system.

## Career Patterns of American Party Staff Personnel

We have seen something of the socio-economic background of state party staff personnel. It is also important to note the structure of the professional party staff career. Specifically, we wish to explore the nature of the position, the skills and experience for which staff members are recruited, the group affiliations of party staff members and the expectations, both immediate and future, of party staff personnel.

The party staff job. Party staff members tend to be generalists. That is, they do not engage, regardless of the special skills for which they might have been originally recruited, in a single function or speciality but rather perform a wide variety of tasks for the party. This is clearly reflected in responses given to a question designed to obtain information on the respondents' position or function in the party. ${ }^{6}$ Respondents were asked to check all of the twelve response categories which they deemed appropriate and to list any additional functions not covered by those categories. Republicans averaged 3.95 and the Democrats 4.09 categories per respondent. In other words,
${ }^{6}$ See Appendix $B$, question 17.
the 74 respondents indicated that their job involved them in at least four different aspects of party activity. Public relations and office management were the most frequently checked categories. These data are displayed in Table 4.

TABLE 4.--Functions of party staff personnel

| Function | Per cent of Respondents Engaging In It |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| Public Relations | 78.7 | 60.0 | 68.4 |
| Political Secretary | 39.3 | 42.5 | 41.0 |
| Legislative Liaison | 30.3 | 35.0 | 32.8 |
| Administrative Assistant | 27.2 | 42.5 | 35.6 |
| Legal Advisor | 0 | 5.0 | 2.7 |
| Organizational Director | 33.3 | 22.5 | 27.3 |
| Organizational Field Man | 30.3 | 25.0 | 27.3 |
| Fund Raising | 33.3 | 22.5 | 27.3 |
| Campaign Management | 39.3 | 27.5 | 32.8 |
| Research | 39.3 | 30.0 | 34.2 |
| Office Management | 57.5 | 50.0 | 53.4 |
| Business Management | 18.1 | 17.5 | 17.8 |

It is interesting to compare this data with the information on staff positions obtained from the state chairmen. 7 If the comparable positions are grouped into mafor classes of function (1.e., executive, public relations, field organization, fund raising and campaign management functions $)^{8}$ and then ranked, there results a remarkable agreement between the party staff respondents and the state chairmen as far as the incidence of types of staff functions is concerned. These rankings are as follows:

|  | State Chairmen | Party Staff |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Executive | 1 | 1 |
| Public relations | 2 | 2 |
| Field organization | 3 | 3 |
| Finance | 4 | 4 |
| Campaign management | 5 | 5 |

A clearer picture of the functions and duties engaged in by party staff members appears when the responses to a question asking them to indicate the functions on which they
${ }^{7}$ See Table 1, Chapter 2.
8
Categories are composed of the following positions: For State Chairmen: Executive - GE, OM; Public Relations PR, R; Field Organization - FO; Finance - F; Campaign Management - CM. Not included were WA, YA, C, US. For staff personnel; Executive - Political Secretary, Administrative Assistant, Office Management, Business Management; Public Relations - Public Relations, Research; Field Organization - Organizational Director, Organizational Field Man; Finance - Finance; Campaign Management - Campaign Management. Not included Legislative Liaison, Legal Advisor.
spend the bulk of their time are analysed. ${ }^{9}$ By using the same five-fold classification and by taking the first recorded response only, ${ }^{10}$ the following results are obtained:

Number of Respondents Checking Function Democrats Republicans Total

| Executive | 9 | 10 | 19 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Public relations | 9 | 14 | 23 |
| Field organization | 8 | 5 | 13 |
| Finance | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Campaign management | 0 | 0 | 0 |

It is clear that public relations is the basic staff specialty and is the function on which most professional staff members spend their time. Management and executive functions run a close second and even assume first place if "second" responses are counted.

The high incidence of these two functions as opposed to field organization, finance and campaign management requires explanation. It can accurately be stated that what emerges from these data is a picture of state party staff functions; that if the staff members attached to individual

$$
{ }^{9} \text { Appendix } \mathrm{B} \text {, question } 18 .
$$

${ }^{10}$ When second responses are added, the totals are as follows: (1) Executive - 33; (2) Public relations - 31; (3) Field organization - 16 ; (4) Finance - 3; and (5) Campaign management - 1. It will be noticed that executive functions replace public relations as the most checked category of function. This, of course, corresponds with the original ranking and indicates that while public relations is the single most important staff job, executive or administrative functions are widely spread among staff members although constituting a secondary function.
candidates were counted, the percentage primarily in campaign management, field work and finance would probably increase. Second, public relations is involved in all phases of party activity. Thus, as is shown in Chapter VI, every staff member becomes a public relations man at some point in the campaign. Third, public relations, as opposed to field organization and fund raising, is a specialized function that cannot be turned over to volunteer party workers as is often the case with the other three functions.

Before concluding this description of the party staff job, notice should be taken of the qualifications respondents feel are vital to party staff work. Respondents were asked to list in order of importance what, in general, ". . . you consider to be the three most important qualifications for staff work."ll Responses were categorized and weighted according to the following formula:

1. Qualification given first rank was assigned 3 points.
2. Qualification given second rank was assigned 2 points.
3. Qualification given third rank was assigned 1 point.

Table 5 presents the results of this data.

TABLE 5.--Rank order of qualifications staff respondents feel are most important for political staff work

| Qualification | Number of Points |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| Ability to work with people | 37 | 31 | 68 |
| Dedication and party loyalty | 21 | 29 | 50 |
| Knowledge of politics and gov | t. 15 | 17 | 32 |
| Knowledge of public relations | 9 | 23 | 32 |
| Political experience | 14 | 14 | 28 |
| Organizational skill | 14 | 10 | 24 |
| Motivation; interest in politic | cs 7 | 14 | 21 |
| Intelligence | 15 | 4 | 19 |
| Attractive personality | 10 | 7 | 17 |
| Administrative ability | 4 | 10 | 14 |
| Understanding of party principles | 4 | 9 | 13 |
| Hard work | 9 | 4 | 13 |
| Flexibility and adaptability | 7 | 2 | 9 |
| Contacts and/or familiarity with the state | 4 | 3 | 7 |
| Broad experience | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| Good judgment | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| Idealism; issue goals | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Imagination | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Self confidence, initiative, aggressiveness | 3 | 1 | 4 |

TABLE 5--Continued

| Qualification | Number of Points |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
|  | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Liberal arts education | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| Good health, energy | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Good appearance | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Ability to take criticism | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Persuasiveness | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Sufficient time | 2 | 0 | 2 |

It is interesting to compare this data with the results of a similar question asked Michigan staff members in personal interviews and reported in Chapter VI. Interpersonal skills rank high on both scales along with public relations skills. The same phenomenon occurs when all Michigan respondents are removed from the sample. This, however, is not surprising since gregariousness and sociability have been found to be directly related to political participation at all levels. ${ }^{12}$

Job tenure. Important to a clear understanding of the party staff structure is the pattern of tenure enjoyed by party staff members. Specifically, do party staff personnel tend to remain in their positions from election to election, serve for one campaign only, or move in and out of party service?

Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate fairly conclusively that staff personnel attached to state party organizations tend to have fairly stable careers. That is, over 64 per cent of the respondents have been in party work for three years or more thus making it highly probable that they will have served in two general elections. Democrats appear to have had more success in holding their staff members than Republicans. Thirty-five per cent of the Democratic respondents have served their party six years or more as opposed to 20 per cent of the Republicans.

[^24]TABLE 6.--Length of service of party staff personnel

| Number of Years | Number Responding |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| 1 | 6 ( 27.6 ) | 7 ( 17.9) | 13 ( 17.8) |
| 2 | 5 ( 14.7) | 8 ( 20.5) | 13 ( 17.8) |
| 3 | $5(14.7)$ | 10 ( 25.6) | 15 ( 20.6) |
| 4 | 3 ( 8.9) | $4(10.3)$ | 7 ( 9.6) |
| 5 | 3 ( 8.9) | 2 (5.1) | $5(6.9)$ |
| 6-10 | 7 ( 20.5) | $4(10.3)$ | 11 (15.0) |
| over 10 | $5(14.7)$ | $4(10.3)$ | $9(12.3)$ |
| Totals | $34(100.0)$ | $39(100.0)$ | 73 (100.0) |

TABLE 7.--Extent to which job tenure of party staff personnel has been interrupted

|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Respondent has <br> remained on job <br> uninterruptedly | $26(76.4)$ | $32(80.0)$ | $58(78.3)$ |
| Respondent has <br> had interrupted <br> service | $8(23.6)$ | $8(20.0)$ | $16(21.7)$ |
| Totals | $34(100.0)$ | $40(100.0)$ | $74(100.0)$ |

It is also important to note that over 78 per cent have remained on their jobs without interruption. Thus, the data indicate that only a minority appear to move in and out of staff jobs. Again, however, it should be cautioned that this is probably reflective of the state party operation only. One would expect to find a substantial number of people working for specific candidates on a campaign by campaign basis.

In general, however, the length of tenure of party staff personnel has been greater and the amount of movement in and out of staff positions has been less than anticipated by the researcher. This data, while fragmentary, points to the tentative conclusion that America's political parties are rapidly moving in the direction of the permanent party staff structure analogous (although decentralized) to the staff organization to be found in Great Britain.

Previous experience. Party staff people are a fairly selectively recruited group. Their experience, skills and occupational background is largely drawn from public relations and administration. Respondents were asked to check the skills or experience they had when they were first hired to a political staff position and then to indicate for which of those types of skill or experience they were primarily hired.

Table 8 displays the types of skills or experience the respondents perceived themselves as having when they

TABLE 8.--Skills and experience staff personnel perceive themselves as having when first hired

| Experience or Skill | Per cent Checking Item |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| Political |  |  |  |
| Previous party work | 47.0 | 50.0 | 48.6 |
| Lobbying | 8.8 | 7.5 | 8.1 |
| Candidate for office | 2.9 | 0 | 1.3 |
| Public Relations |  |  |  |
| Research | 64.7 | 25.0 | 43.2 |
| Newspaper work | 38.2 | 42.5 | 40.5 |
| Speech writing | 20.5 | 37.5 | 35.1 |
| Radio-TV work | 26.4 | 27.5 | 27.0 |
| Advertising | 0 | 10.0 | 5.4 |
| Administrative |  |  |  |
| Administrative experience | 35.2 | 57.5 | 47.2 |
| Business experience | 38.2 | 52.5 | 45.9 |
| Governmental experience | 32.3 | 37.5 | 35.1 |
| Organizational experience | 14.7 | 17.5 | 16.2 |
| Academic | 44.1 | 12.5 | 27.0 |
| Legal | 0 | 2.5 | 1.3 |

accepted party staff employment. It can be seen that most staff members represent themselves as having either public relations or administrative experience and/or skills. It is equally obvious from the preceeding data that most staff members continue performing the same types of functions that they had performed in "private" life.

What is of particular interest, however, is the manner in which the recruitment pattern, as reflected in the data of Table 8 , conforms to the common image of the two parties. Again it will be noted, for instance, that the Democratic respondents check academic and research experience almost three times more frequently than do Republicans. Similarly, Republicans record administrative and business experience at almost an 8 to 5 rate over Democrats. The two parties draw almost equally from the press and the radio-television industry.

The lack of lawyers on party professional staffs is worthy of notice. If, as Lasswell has stated, ". . . the lawyer 18 today . . . the one indispensable advisor of every responsible policy maker of our society - whether we speak of the head of a government department or agency, of the executive of a corporation or labor union, of the secretary of a trade or other private association, or even of the humble independent enterpriser or professional man . . . ${ }^{13}$ one might expect to find a sizable number engaged in party staff work. This, however, is not the case.
$13_{\mathrm{H}}$. D. Lasswell and M. S. McDougal, "Legal Education

A number of explanations can be advanced for their absence from this phase of party activity. First, legal training is not directly related to the types of skills party organizations need on their staffs. The talents of the public relations expert, newsman or experienced organizer are much more in demand. While, as Schlesinger and Matthews point out, the lawyer's skills and general career situation are well suited to his becoming a candidate, i.e., "political generalist", 14 the growing complexity of modern campaigning forces him to employ specialists to do his staff work for him. Second, party staff work does not provide the best source of upward mobility for the lawyer either in the political party itself, in non-political organizations, government or private practice. Political candidacy, on the other hand, provides excellent advertising, and other areas of party work excellent personal contacts.

Organized group affiliations. Over 73 per cent of the respondents were associated in some fashion with at least one organized interest group. 15 Republicans, however, had a greater incidence of group association than Democrats
and Public Policy," The Analysis of Political Behavior, Ed. H. D. Lasswell, (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul Ltd., 1948), p. 27.

14
See Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View," Midwest Journal of Political Science, I, (May, 1957), 26-39 and Donald R. Matthews, op. cit., pp. 30-32.
${ }^{15}$ Appendix B, question 28.
with 80 per cent of the former reporting group affiliations as opposed to 64.7 per cent of the latter. ${ }^{16}$ The participation of staff respondents in organized groups is depicted in Table 9.

As a means of obtaining an index of group participation, weights were assigned to each of the percentages listed in Table 9 as follows:

1. Member - one point per percentage point.
2. Salaried employee - two points per percentage point.
3. Officer - three points per percentage point. By employing this index, the group affiliations of the respondents can be ranked as follows:

| Rank | Type of Affiliation | Points |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| 1 | Religious organizations | 73.3 | 102.5 | 88.9 |
| 2 | Business, Commercial and Industrial associations | 70.3 | 100.2 | 86.3 |
| 3 | Professional associations | 52.8 | 77.5 | 66.0 |
| 4 | Labor Unions | 32.2 | 30.0 | 30.9 |
| 5 | Farm organizations | 14.5 | 7.5 | 10.6 |

[^25]TABLE 9.--Group affiliations of party staff personnel


A number of interesting findings stem from these data. First, there is a perfect rank order correlation in the rank order between the Republican, Democratic and total group of respondents. This tends to provide some evidence for the fact that party staffers are recruited for their skills rather than their ideological identifications. If we eliminate religious organizations from the analysis, a strong case can be made for the logic of this rank order. We have seen that public relations and management functions take up the greatest percentage of the staff member's time and represent the basic skills for which he is hired. Thus, it is evident that the heaviest concentration of group affiliations would fall in the business and professional associations. It should be noted, however, that very few respondents indicated having worked for any of these associations in a staff capacity. Thus, there appears to be little direct recruitment by political parties from organized interest groups.

Second, the affiliations of the staff members in these two types of associations reinforces the picture already drawn of the party staff member as having both upward mobility and a fairly high socio-economic status.

Third, it is interesting to note the fact that not only is labor union affiliation low on the list, the Republican respondents have a slightly higher index of participation than do Democrats. While recognizing the tentative nature of any conclusions based on the sample


#### Abstract

utilized in this study, it is nevertheless fairly safe to conclude that Democratic party organizations do not draw as great a percentage of their staff members from labor organizations as might be expected. A somewhat similar conclusion (although reversed in terms of partisanship) can be drawn from the data on farm association affiliation. This finding is somewhat at variance with the position taken generally in the literature of political science that group membership tends to structure the political environment, reinforce party and ideological identity and act as a channel into political activity in the party generally associated with the group. ${ }^{17}$ Two explanations can be advanced to account for this phenomenon. First, the fact that the staff members of the private associations do not tend to move directly into party organizations tends to reduce the representation of some groups which might logically be expected to place a large number of their people on party staffs. Second, the low level of Democratic staff affiliation with labor unions and the low Republican affiliation with the major farm organizations may be due to the fact that these groups already provide informal staff services to the party they support electorally. ${ }^{18}$


${ }^{17}$ See Lane, op. cit., pp. 189-195 and Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955) pp. 62-64.
${ }^{18}$ For documentation of this point see Fay Calkins, The CIO and the Democratic Party, (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1952) p. 132.

## Influences on Recruitment

An analysis of the major influences which resulted in the respondents taking a party staff position reveals that the party itself is its own best recruiting agency. Most staff respondents entered party work as a result of their association with political officials or candidates although friends ranks a close second. ${ }^{19}$ This data is displayed in Table 10.

TABLE 10.--Persons influencing staff members to enter party staff work

| Type of Influence | Percentage of Respondents <br> Checking Influence |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 20.5 | 20.0 | 20.2 |
|  | 38.2 | 45.0 | 41.8 |
| Fellow workers | 17.6 | 30.0 | 24.3 |
| Political officials and <br> candidates | 2.9 | 7.5 | 5.4 |
| Public school teachers | 35.2 | 60.0 | 48.6 |
| College professors | 2.9 | 0 | 1.3 |

When respondents were asked to indicate the greatest influence on their decision, the rank order displayed in Table 11 resulted.

PABLE 1l.--Rank order of influences motivating professional staff personnel to accept a political staff job

| Type of Influence | Ranking |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total | Democrats | Republicans |
|  | 1 | $1^{*}$ | 1 |
| Friends | 2 | $1^{*}$ | 3 |
| Family | 3 | $3^{*}$ | 2 |
| College professors | 4 | $3^{*}$ | $4^{*}$ |
| Professional or business | 5 | 5 | $4^{*}$ |
| associates | 6 | 6 | $6^{*}$ |
| Fellow workers | 7 | 7 | $6^{*}$ |

*Ties

It is interesting to note the relatively minor role played by business and professional associates and fellow workers in motivating the respondents to enter party staff work. Again, if it be assumed that group membership tends to structure the political attitudes of those participating, the data appear to be at variance with this assumption. A number of explanations, however, can be put forward to
account for the data of Table 9. First, the highly influential role played by political officials and candidates is due, most likely, to the fact that such persons are the actual recruiters of staff and the fact that personal influence tends to emanate from persons of superior status. ${ }^{20}$ Second, if it be assumed that friendship groups play a role similar to business, professional and work associates in influencing decisions, their greater influence is probably due to the fact that friendship groups are entered into voluntarily and involve their members in fewer cross pressures than do business and work groups. To put it another way, ". . . value homophily - or mutual attraction on the basis of shared values. . ." is more characteristic of friendship groups than it is of business and/or work groups. ${ }^{21}$ Third, it is possible that business and professional associates tend to view political participation as an irrelevant career side-track and thus actively discourage such activity.

Although family only ranked third among the influences propelling staffers toward party work, most respondents came from families that were fairly active in politics. ${ }^{22}$ This data is summarized in Table 12.

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\({ }^{20}\) Lane, op. cit., p. 90.
\({ }^{21}\) Katz, op. cit., p. 59.
\({ }^{22}\) See Appendix \(B\), questions 12 and 13.
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TABLE 12.--Political activity of family of party staff

Percentage Reporting

Democrats Republicans Total

| Father |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Held elective office | 14.3 | 7.1 | 10.7 |  |
| Political candidate | 35.7 | 42.8 | 39.2 |  |
| Party staff person | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Volunteer worker | 50.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 |  |
| Mother |  |  |  |  |
| Held elective office | 14.2 | 0 | 5.5 |  |
| Political candidate | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Party staff person | 0 | 9.0 | 5.5 |  |
| Volunteer worker | 85.7 | 90.9 | 88.8 |  |
|  | Other | relative |  |  |
| Held elective office | 11.1 | 14.3 | 13.0 |  |
| Political candidate | 44.4 | 57.1 | 52.1 |  |
| Party staff person | 11.1 | 14.3 | 13.0 |  |
| Volunteer worker | 33.3 | 14.3 | 21.7 |  |

TABLE 12--Continued

| Type of Activity | Percentage Reporting |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Democrats | Republicans | Total |  |
| Moderately active active | 5.8 | 20.0 | 13.5 |
| Slightly active | 29.4 | 35.0 | 32.4 |
| Inactive | 26.4 | 32.3 | 27.0 |
| No response | 38.2 | 17.6 | 25.6 |

It will be seen that the families of Republican respondents display a greater tendency to be politically active than do the families of Democratic staff members. Although there is no data in the study itself to explain this difference, it nevertheless substantiates the observations of other researchers. 23

Staff respondents evidenced mixed motivations for going into party work. Thus, while party work satisfies such idealistic motives as the opportunity to work for the realization of personally held social and economic objectives and as a useful area of endeavor in which to invest ones training and skills, a number were motivated by what appeared to them as an attractive career and an opportunity to obtain good training for other types of work. The basic motivations of the party staffers are displayed in Table 13.

It is interesting to note that both parties are quite similar in the manner in which they rank the alternatives, except for items one and two.
${ }^{23}$ Following Angus Campbell's discussion in "The Case of the Missing Democrats, "New Republic, 135 (1956) pp. 1215, Lane argues that "interested and concerned Democrats" are less likely to participate actively in politics than "concerned Republicans" because (1) a greater percentage of Democrats in the thirties and forties were young people who, traditionally are characterized by low political activity in the United States; (2) the upwardly mobile - those who would normally be active in organized groups - tend to either switch to the Republican Party or become inactive due to cross pressures between their traditional loyalties and their new status; and (3) many of the Democrats mobilized by the new deal were a part of the politically inert segment of the population and who, while motivated to vote the Democratic ticket, nevertheless retained their basic attitude toward political involvement. See also Lane, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

TABLE 13.--Rank order of reasons cited by professional staff members to be important in leading them to accept a political staff job

| Reason Cited | Ranking |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total | Democrats | Republicans |
| Realization of social and economic views | 1 (89)* | 2 (38) | 1 (51) |
| Outlet for training and skills | 2 (87) | 1 (44) | 2 (43) |
| Attractive career | 3 (68) | 3 (31) | 4 (37) |
| Good training for other work | 4 (68) | 4 (29) | 3 (39) |
| Improvement in salary | 5 (36) | 5 (22) | 5 (14) |
| Provides useful contacts | 6 (23) | 6 (13) | 7 (10) |
| Opportunity to help political career of friend | 7 (19) | 7 (6) | 6 (13) |
| Provides desirable social contacts | 8 (0) | 7 (0) | 8 ( 0) |

*Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the categories listed in Table l3. The ranking was determined by assigning weights to the first three choices as follows: 3 points for an item ranked first, 2 points for an item ranked second, and 1 point for an item ranked third. Point totals appear in parentheses. See Appendix B, question 24.

Only a minority of the respondents indicated that they planned to remain in party staff work, although if those who displayed uncertainty or a desire to combine party work with an outside career are added to those who plan to remain in their jobs, the number of respondents who have a fairly substantial commitment to party staff work as a career swell to 41.8 per cent of the total. ${ }^{24}$ This data is displayed in Table 14.

TABLE 14.--Number of party staff members who plan to remain in party staff work

Response
Democrats Republicans Total

*Percentage in parentheses

It is interesting to compare the motivations of those who definitely have other vocational goals to those who retain a substantial commitment to party staff work. If the categories employed in Table 13 are regrouped into party goals, career goals and mobility goals, the two groups rank these goals as follows in Table 15.

TABLE 15.--Employment motivations of party staff personnel: a rank order*

| Motivation | Respondents with Substantial Commitment to: |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Party Staff Work |  | Other Vocational Goals |  |
|  | Group Rank | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank in } \\ & \text { Table } 13 \end{aligned}$ | Group <br> Rank | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rark in } \\ & \text { Table } 13 \end{aligned}$ |
| Party Goals | 2 |  | 1 |  |
| Realization of social and economic views |  | 3 |  | 1 |
| Opportunity to help political career of friend |  | 7 |  | 6 |
| Career Goals | 1 |  | 2 |  |
| Attractive career |  | 2 |  | 4 |
| Outlet for training and skills |  | 1 |  | 3 |
| Improved salary |  | 4 |  | 7 |
| Mobility Goals | 3 |  | 3 |  |
| Useful contacts |  | 6 |  | 5 |
| Social contacts |  | 5 |  | 2 |
| Training for other work |  | 8 |  | 8 |

*Group rank obtained by computing the mean of the total of the rankings from Table 13 in each group. The smaller the figure, the higher the average ranking.

It will be seen, first of all, that neither group receives mobility goals as the major motivation for entering party staff work. Even when asked specifically to list the ways in which their present employment would serve to help them achieve other vocational goals, 25 a greater percentage (50 per cent) listed training, experience, etc., than contacts with potential future employers, etc. ( 35 per cent).

Second, those planning to pursue other careers were substantially more motivated by party considerations than were the careerists. Those who plan to remain in party work, logically, rank career goals as their most compelling motivation.

In summary, it would appear from these data that the bulk of the respondents do not perceive party work as a major spring-board to upward mobility. The party careerists apparently feel that party employment provides them with the most attractive career open to them. Non-careerists, on the other hand, enter party work for basically ideological reasons but perceive career and salary opportunities to be better elsewhere.

Respondents, however, perceived party staff work to provide them with some obstacles to attaining other vocational objectives. Of the forty responding to the query ${ }^{26}$ only 37.5 per cent stated that their present employment in

> 25 Appendix $B$, question 26.
> $26_{\text {Appendix }}$ B, question 27.
no way would hinder them in those objectives; 37.5 per cent stated that being typed as partisan or overly political is a drawback to employment elsewhere. In addition the development of personal antagonisms and jealousies ( 10 per cent), the constant temptation to return to political life (5 per cent), the interruption to one's career by engaging in politics ( 5 per cent) and the dangers of both over specialization and under specialization were each mentioned.

## Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to present an analysis of the socio-economic background and career patterns of a nation-wide group of staff people attached to state party organizations. Although sampling difficulties described earlier require that the data be treated with caution, there emerges a picture of the type of person attached to the party state central committees. It is not descriptive, however, of the many persons who provide professional assistance to the parties and their candidates during campaign periods only.

The major findings of this analysis can be summarized as follows:

1. Party staff members tend to come from families in the upper socio-economic brackets as measured by their father's occupation and the general level of their parents' education.
2. Party staff members themselves tend to have achieved a relatively high socio-economic status as measured by their educational level and the prestiege level of the types of experience and/or skills they had acquired at the time they entered party work.
3. Party staff people come from families that are fairly active politically.
4. Staff people of both parties show marked similarities in their socio-economic characteristics and career patterns although there is a tendency for the party stereotypes to show up in recruitment patterns. That is, more academically and research oriented persons ("egg heads") appear on Democratic payrolls while Republican staff people tend to have technical or business training and/or experience.
5. Professional party staff work provides fairly stable employment as measured by the respondents' job tenure and family situation. A sizeable percentage indicate a substantial commitment to party staff work as a career although the majority have other vocational goals. 27
6. Party staff people tend to be recruited for their managerial skills as measured by their education, skills and experience, official capacity in the party and group affiliations.
[^26]A number of implications for the American party system can be tentatively drawn from the findings of this chapter. First, although it is not its purpose to probe the degree of influence upon party affairs exerted by party staff people, their essential similarity will not make for party articulation. Rather, it is postulated by this writer that, all things being equal, ${ }^{28}$ this socio-economic similarity will tend to perpetuate the consensual nature of our two-party system.

Second, the essentially managerial character of the persons recruited into party staff positions will tend to insure that the staff will reflect the dominant values of the society - values such as political stability, the primacy of economic success, etc. - which characterize the managerial society. Innovating elements will have to enter the party system from outside the formal party staff structure. In fact, it is postulated that whatever innovation is achieved by professional staff people, by far the greatest contributions will emanate from those staffers assigned to individual candidates rather than from the permanent staffs. It is this periodic injection of "new blood" into the party staff arteries that will act as an antidote to the tendency for the permanent staff to become increasingly conservative.

[^27]Third, the development of a corps of party managers may hasten the trend toward engineered consensus evident already in American politics and in many other areas of American society. One may expect to find political parties engaging increasingly in "scientific politics" - the depth interview, the staged politicodrama, the community-directed party fund drive, etc. They bring the "red feather" and the "station break" to politics.

Pinally, the rise of the "new pro" and his skill in the use of modern communication and organizational techniques will probably accelerate the trend toward the nationalization of American politics.

## PART III

THE PARTY STAFF IN ACTION: FUNCTION, ROLE AND INFLUENCE

Political parties are often perceived as conducting political wars on the basis of a grand strategy carefully worked out in the planning councils of the top leadership. While this is not an entirely erroneous conception, a much more realistic picture of party activity is that of a loosely knit organization of candidates, office holders, volunteers and other leadership at various levels making day by day decisions in reaction to the ever changing tides of party fortune.

What is the role of the paid professional staff person in the party decision-making process. What is the extent of his influence on party decisions? Does he act as one of a number of influences on the leadership or does he have decision-making powers of his own?

The basic assumption underlying this study is that the professional staff ". . . by virtue of its special skills, access to specific types of information, and monopoly of certain channels of communication, will be in a poaition to either control or materially influence the decisions made at or by the "political' levels of the party. ${ }^{1}$
${ }^{1}$ See p. 22.

The purpose of Part II is to analyse the influence of the professional staff upon party decisions by contrasting the perceptions of the party leadership concerning the proper role of the staff in decision-making and/or discretionary activities and the perceptions of the professional staff relative to their decision-making role in the party. Chapter V will describe the manner in which the political leadership in Michigan perceives the "ideal" staff role. Chapter VI will describe the perceptions of the professional political staff personnel as to their role. Chapter VII will evaluate a number of propositions put forward in Chapter I concerning the factors producing staff influence in the party.

## THE IDEAL STAFF ROLE AS PERCEIVED BY THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

One of the basic variables affecting the manner in which a staff structure in any type of organization will operate is the perception by the group for which the staff works of the proper staff role. That 18, the freedom of action, the outer limits of discretionary power, in fact, the very functions that the staff performs will be largely dictated by the perceptions of the leadership as to what constitutes the proper role of the staff within the total organization. ${ }^{1}$

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse 22 interviews with Michigan political leaders on the function and role of the party staffs which they supervise and with which they work. These interviews, focusing on the actual operation of the staff and on the way in which each politician actually utilizes his staff assistants in concrete situations, are designed to produce an image of the ideal

[^28]staff role as reflected in the perfections of the political leadership.

## Theoretical Conceptions of the Ideal Staff Role

Political leaders, of necessity, bring to their working relations with the professional staff members attached to their parties a set of conceptions as to the role staff members should properly play in the life of the party and its organization. From a theoretical standpoint, the many different conceptions held by the political leadership can be grouped into three ideal types, designated as "neutral," "committed" and "consultant" staff types. Each of these conceptions involves a particular type of commitment to the party on the part of the staff members, a difference in the degree of discretionary power granted to the staff, and a different approach toward the direction of the staff on the part of the leadership. In addition, each conception derives from a perception by the political leadership of their own competence. A description of each conceptual type follows.

The "neutral" staff. One theoretical conception held by the political leadership concerning the proper role that the professional staff should play in the party is that it should function in a manner similar to a neutral civil service. That is, staff members are recruited for their skills and competencies only and exercise these skills totally under the direction of the leadership. Staff
personnel are not considered to be decision-makers although they might be brought into decisional situations as advice givers.

The "neutral" professional staff member is conceived as bringing a particular type of commitment to his job. He $1 s$ not recruited for his ideological position (although it is expected that he not harbor ideas antagonistic to those of the party) as he is for the skills he can bring to the work situation. It is expected that he will bring with him a relatively low level of commitment to his personal opinions and that he be relatively open to the issue positions taken by the political leadership. If the "neutral" staff brings any type of commitment to its work, it should, in the opinion of the politician holding this view, be a commitment to objective criteria such as integrity, loyalty, the canons of scholarship, etc. In fact, the leadership may actively encourage this type of commitment on the part of its staff by shielding them from the ideological winds blowing within the party.

The "neutral" staff is conceived as rightfully having little discretionary power and little leadership in policy formulation. Instead, it provides technical implementation of policy laid dom by the leadership. It is assumed by the politician holding this view of the staff role that the staff requires a relatively great amount of direction and that clearance of all policy, or otherwise sensitive matters, is essential.

Politicians holding this conception of the staff role perceive themselves as actively carrying on the affairs of the party and as having a high degree of competence. In fact, the neutral staff conception assumes an active leadership.

It is postulated that the conception of a "neutral" staff will be concentrated most heavily among the leadership of parties that have strong contending factions within them; that the holding of this conception is both an attempt to maximize electoral strength without unduly straining party unity, and also a protective mechanism on the part of factional leaders since neither faction wishes to see the other increase its power by the development of an autonomously functioning staff organization. ${ }^{2}$ It should not be thought that this viewpoint is wholly limited to the leadership of factionalized parties, however. Relatively unified parties in which the leadership entertain high self-confidence may also hold similar views.

The "committed" staff. A second theoretical conception held by political leaders as to the proper role of staff is that it should be primarily an extention of the leadership itself. That is, the staff, by virtue of its

[^29]commitment to the ideology and issue positions of the party, acts and speaks for the leadership. In one sense, the "committed" staff actually is absorbed into and becomes a part of the political leadership.

It is obvious that the type of commitment individual staff members are expected to bring to the job is substantially different in this view from that of the "neutral" staff. The staff member is recruited not only for his expertise and skill but also because of a demonstrated predeliction for the party. In fact, he may very well have worked up through the ranks. The politician holding to the conception of the "committed" staff type as the proper staff role may also extend his conception a step further and expect that the staff will be related to the leadership by "charismatic" ties.

The relationship between the staff member and his skill is also different from that of the "neutral" type. Unlike the latter, the expectation is greater that the "committed" staff exercise its skills within the framework of party policy. The political views of the leadership have, in a sense, independent validity and the staff is expected to be as loyal to the party position as it is to objective criteria such as the canons of scholarship.

Because the staff is ideologically committed to the leadership it is assumed that it has the capacity for greater discretionary power than would be true of the "neutral" staff type. In party decision-making they are
perceived as associates rather than merely implementing technicians. Policy decisions are viewed as collective decisions involving both the professional staff and the leadership. Thus, in implementing policy the staff can make many secondary decisions without the necessity of clearing them with the leadership. Also unlike the "neutral" staff, the "committed" staff is perceived as requiring little sustained direction.

This view of the proper staff role is also based on a relatively high level of self-confidence on the part of the political leadership, although staff is seen as materially enhancing this competence. Staff and leadership are viewed as associates, having somewhat different statuses but, where the formulation of party policy is concerned, fulfilling similar roles.

It is postulated that this conception of the proper staff role will most likely be found in parties that are ideologically homogeneous. The committed staff would be too great a disunifying influence in the factionalized party for it to be seriously entertained by the leadership. 3 Rather, the notion of the committed staff will tend to be found in parties enjoying a high degree of consensus. In such parties, total energy can be expended in maximizing party strength rather than in holding together diverse elements. In this connection it is postulated that as a

[^30]party descends into factionalism there will be a change in the conception of the political leadership as to the proper role of the staff.

The consultant staff. The third conception in this typology of theoretical staff roles held by the political leadership is that the party staff should assume major responsibility for conducting the affairs of the party. The leadership, operating under this conception, seeks advice of the staff on matters of policy. In other words, staff members become top-level consultants to the leadership.

The type of commitment expected of staff under this conception differs from that of the "neutral" and "committed" staffs. Staff personnel are expected to bring their own ideas of "what is best for the party" to the working situation. This commitment may be to their own preconceptions or to other ideological or objective criteria.

Under this conception, the staff is granted a relatively large amount of discretionary power. Viewed as experts, they are not only depended upon to come up with policy recommendations; once policy is agreed upon, they are granted the power to carry it out. In fact, they may make innovations in policy previously carried out.

It is also assumed that the "consultant" staff, as opposed to the "neutral" type, requires little direction. It initiates and carries out policy subject only to a veto by the leadership. In this respect it is more nearly similar to the "committed" staff type.

This view of the staff role is based on a low sense of competence on the part of the political leadership. They view themselves as essentially "amateurs" ${ }^{4}$ and in need of professional guidance. This perception of amateurness stems from the fact that they spend only a small percentage of their time on political matters, from the fact of high turnover in party elective offices and/or from the fact that the technical problems a party faces in its operations (i.e., a great number of television appearances by its candidates, particularly complex campaign issues, etc.) requires highly technical and specialized expertise.

It is postulated that the "consultant" staff will most likely be found in parties that require a particularly great amount of technical advice and in the party of perpetual minority status. The latter has few members of the leadership holding public office, and thus they are not in a position to develop their own expertise. It is expected that where a party is in a position both to support its leadership directly, or indirectly by placing them in public office, it will tend to develop the competence of its leadership to the point where the need for a "consultant" staff will be obviated. This factor, on the other hand, may well be counteracted by the growing complexity of campaigning in the modern world.

[^31]It is helpful to construct a "profile" of ideal staff types, based upon previously described attributes, as a means of relating the specific characteristics of each staff type to an overall discretion dimension. This profile appears in Figure $I$.

It will be seen that the "consultant" staff type falls neatly in the left or "high discretion" zone; the "neutral" staff type tends to fall at the right or "low discretion" zone in three of five characteristics with one placed moderately right. The committed staff type is predominately right ("low discretion" zone) but with three characteristics in the moderate zone.

In conclusion it should be stated that these three conceptualizations are presented as ideal types. It is assumed that actual politicians, while tending to hold to one of the three basic viewpoints, will deviate from the pure type in many particulars. It should also be pointed out that one may expect to find elements from each type admixed in the conceptions of any particular politician.

## Perceptions by the Political Leadership in Michigan of the Ideal Staff Role

Attitudes on the part of a leadership group concerning the proper role and function of its professional staff are not generally a part of its consciousness. Rather, its at titudes are imbedded in the warp and woof of the day to day relationships existing between the two groups. These

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Figure 2.--Profile of ideal staff types

| Characteristics | Discretion Zone |  |  | Characteristics |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { High } \\ \text { Discretion } \end{gathered}$ | Moderate Discretion | Low Discretion |  |
| Recruited for skills | Consultant | Neutral! | Committed | Recruited for ideology |
| Staff has high discretion | Consultant | Committed | Neutral | Staff has low discretion |
| Staff under low direction | Consultant | Committed | Neutral | Staff under high discretion |
| Low commitment required | Consultant | Neutral | Committed | High commitment required |
| Leadership has low self-confidence | Consultant | Committed | Neutral | Leadership has high self-confidence |

attitudes are to be found in the types of tasks assigned staff members, expectations of proper staff behavior in concrete situations and the types of communication and/or consultation going on between the leadership and the staff. Thus, research into these attitudes must be directed to concrete situations (i.e., tasks assigned, consultation engaged in, clearance required, etc.) if it is to successfully unveil the real attitudes and perceptions in question. To ask a respondent to verbalize directly about his conceptions of the ideal staff role would probably not only Find him unprepared, but only elicit, inaccurate, unrealistic or insincere responses. The interview questions, therefore, were largely directed toward concrete situations. The interviewer, for instance, was interested in such matters as under what circumstances changes in a press release could be made without clearance, to what extent a candidate Consulted with the staff member on a speech the latter was writing for him, etc. In addition, a number of questions probed concrete situations of a hypothetical character to isolate attitudes on staff discretion more accurately. 5

In this attempt to develop a systematic picture of the attitudes and perceptions of the political leadership as to the ideal staff role, attention will be focused on the following components as the basis for analysis:

1. Perceptions by the political leadership of the staff's proper functions and tasks.
2. Perceptions by the political leadership of desirable personal characteristics to be found in staff members and their general orientation, background and attitudes.
3. Perceptions by the political leadership as to proper staff-leadership relations.
4. Perceptions by the political leadership as to the degree of staff discretion in day to day matters.
5. Perceptions by the political leadership as to their own competence and their role in day to day party operations.

## Staff Functions and Tasks

One source of information on how the political leadership perceives what is properly the role of political staff is to note the types of staff personnel already attached to the party; their functions and duties; and what types of staff additions the leadership would like to make. In other words, it is helpful to ask the question: What type of staff assistance do the politicians want - routine clerical help or specialized expertise involving a measure of discretionary power?

Respondents in both parties displayed an interest in having substantial expertise on their staffs. The staff
positions already attached to the Democratic and Republican state committees in Michigan are as follows: Democratic Party - one public relations director, one finance director, two field organizers, and clerical staff. In addition, during the 1958 campaign it used a state-wide campaign manager and two administrative aids. ${ }^{6}$ Republican Party one public relations director, two finance directors (one for Wayne County), one administrative assistant/orfice manager, two field organizers, three clerical personnel and four county executive secretaries. In addition, during the 1958 campaign, the party employed one United States Senatorial campaign manager, two public relations men (one in Wayne County), one research assistant, two gubernatorial campaign assistants and an executive director for Wayne County.?

A majority of the respondents stated that they would add additional staff help if "they had their way." This, however, was more true of the Republican Party than the Democratic Party with nine of twelve Republican respondents indicating that they would add additional staff. Of the nine Democrats, only six expressed an interest in making additions to their staffs and three of the six felt that

6
Staff members attached to the Governor, Lt. Governor and Democratic legislative caucus are also integrated into the Democratic campaign staff.
${ }^{7}$ In addition, the staff persons attached to the Republican legislative caucus are integrated into the Republican campaign staff.
additional staff, while desirable, was not necessary. Three Democrats and three Republicans stated that they would not add to their staff under any circumstances. This data is summarized in Table 1.

It is interesting to note from Table 1 that party leaders were substantially more interested in making staff additions than were office holders. Two factors account for this phenomenon. First, governmental office holders are not only provided with a number of subordinates by state law (administrative assistants, deputies, etc.) they also receive staff help from members of the administrative agencies, interest groups and study commissions. Party leaders, on the other hand, with their relatively meager funds are almost always undermanned. Second, there appears to be a reluctance on the part of government officials to use staff help for political matters. Statements like, "I don't make many speeches, but when I do I write my own" were more typical of party leaders holding government posts than those holding party positions only. This is no doubt partly "protective coloring" on the part of the politician in the interview situation who does not want to admit to using public servants for political purposes, partly a greater sensitivity to the problems of public relations than that of party leaders to the extent that they hesitate to delegate such tasks, and partly a reflection of their greater sense of confidence in their ow abilities. Public officials are less likely to be "amateurs" than the party
TABLE 1.--Perceptions by political leaders in Michigan of the need to increase their

|  |  |  | Party Leaders | Office Holders |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Coded Responses | Total <br> Dem. | Total <br> Rep. | Combined <br> Total | Dem. | Rep. | Dem. |
| Would make additions <br> to present staff | 3 | 9 | 12 | 2 | 9 | 1 |

leadership. As one member of the Michigan Legislature put 1t, "I don't use my assistant much for research. After all, I have been in the Legislature for some time and know more about these matters than he does."

The types of additions that party leaders would like to make to their professional staffs is also a clue to their perceptions of the ideal staff role. Michigan politicians, for the most part, want more of what they already have, namely, public relations personnel and field organizers. It is significant, however, that research assistant ranks with field organizer as the second most commonly perceived need. Administrative assistance is also a highly felt need. Table 2 summarizes this data. ${ }^{8}$

It is interesting to note that only one respondent mentioned professional campaign management as a need. Two explanations can be advanced to account for this phenomenon. First, campaigns generally must be tailored to fit the candidate. Campaigns, by their very nature, require that the relationship between the candidate and his campaign manager be highly personal and require a substantial amount of candidate-campaign manager empathy. Second, American parties being highly fractionated, candidates do not wish to feel too closely bound to an integrated state-wide campaign. While they are willing to adhere to the general
${ }^{8}$ These results parallel the nation-wide data reported in Chapter II. See p. 87.

TABLE 2.--Staff additions perceived as needed by Michigan political leaders

|  |  | Number Indicating Need |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Type of Position | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
|  | 2 | 6 | 8 |
| Research | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| Pield Organization | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| Administration/Office <br> Management | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| Director of Womens <br> Activities | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Campaign Management | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Finance | 1 | 0 | 1 |

party platform, and accept a certain amount of integrated financing, scheduling and advertising, there are still too many forces propelling candidates toward independence of action, thus militating against the professional, party-controlled campaign manager. Both of Michigan's major parties, however, have used professionals in this capacity for single campaigns. The Democrats have been relatively successful in developing from among their own staff persons capable of running entire state-wide campaigns. Republicans, on the other hand, have brought into Michigan high-priced experts from other states with indifferent success.

The data cited above on the types of staff positions currently attached to Michigan party organizations and the expressed needs of the leadership indicate the type of staff role perceived as proper by the politician. Clearly, they do not want mere low-level clerical skills but, rather, envisage a party staff of highly trained personnel engaged in functions of consequence. As one Republican party official describing his ideal, but mythical administrative assistant, put it, "I want someone who can write a speech for you, take care of ninety per cent of the phone calls, arrange meetings and even dig up candidates to run for county offices." Other typical comments were:

You have no idea of the amount of correspondence that piles up during a campaign. One of my greatest needs was a secretary that could write a decent thank you letter for my signature."

We need a man to develop educational materials.
What the party needs are research men that can come up with new ideas - master strategists; but we could never sell the finance committee on that.

The most commonly perceived functional needs were in the fields of public relations, research and field organization, all of which entail a substantial measure of independence and discretion. 9

[^32]While the majority of the respondents took the position that the parties need broad-gauged staff assistance, some were distrustful, even downright scornful, of the "pros." As one public official put it, "A lot of campaign funds are wasted. The 'pros' take a gullible candidate for a ride. They are usually broken-down newspapermen who don't know any more about politics than the candidate. ${ }^{10}$ Another public official indicated that, while he could use help with his speeches, ". . .it is just too difficult to find the right man." Another public official stated that public relations help is relatively unimportant because ". . . nobody believes what you say anyway. It's your record that you run on and who knows more about that than you do."

## The Political Staff Member as a Person

The general background, political orientation and personality characteristics desired by politicians in their staffers provide additional clues to their perceptions of the ideal staff role. To obtain data on these attitudes, the respondents were asked the following two questions. First, an open-ended question designed to elicit a completely free range of responses was asked, namely, "What do you look for when you hire a staff person? ${ }^{1 l}$ A second question specifically designed to probe desired personality

10 This same respondent, however, indicated that a gubernatorial candidate needs staffing and that Governor Williams has a "dedicated campaign staff."
${ }^{11}$ Appendix $C$, question 3.
traits was also asked, namely, "Are there any particular personality characteristics that you look for? ${ }^{12}$ With each respondent's replies to the first question counted regardless of the number stated, a rank order of responses can be tabulated as follows in Table 3.

TABLE 3.--Rank order of traits desired in staff personnel by Michigan political leaders

| Rank | Response | Democratic Responses |  | Republican Responses |  | Total Responses |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | No. | \% | No. | \% | No. | \% |
| 1 | Special expertise | 2 | 12.5 | 6 | 24.0 | 8 | 19.5 |
| 2 | Ability to get along with people - tact, diplomacy |  | 18.75 |  | 16.0 | 7 | 17.1 |
| 3 | Intelligence | 3 | 18.75 | 4 | 16.0 | 7 | 17.1 |
| 4 | Motivation | 2 | 12.5 | 3 | 12.0 | 5 | 12.0 |
| 5 | Organizational ability | 1 | 6.25 | 3 | 12.0 | 4 | 9.6 |
| 6 | Loyalty | 1 | 6.25 | 2 | 8.0 | 3 | 7.2 |
| 7 | Issue orientation | 2 | 12.5 | 1 | 4.0 | 3 | 7.2 |
| 8 | Political experience | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4.0 | 1 | 2.4 |
| 9 | Creativity and imagination | 1 | 6.25 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2.4 |
| 10 | Good health | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4.0 | 1 | 2.4 |
| 11 | Good education | 1 | 6.25 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2.4 |

${ }^{12}$ Appendix $C$, question $3, a$.

It is helpful to classify the eleven traits held to be desirable in party staffers into three analytic categories: (1) traits conducive to independence of thought and action; (2) traits conducive to commitment to dominant party values; and (3) traits conducive to neither (1) or (2). The traits placed under each category are as follows: Traits conducive to independence

1. Creativity and imagination
2. Special expertise
3. Political experience

Traits conducive to commitment

1. Motivation
2. Loyalty
3. Issue orientation
4. Ability to get along with people

## Neither

1. Intelligence
2. Good health
3. Organizational abilities
4. Good education

It is significant to note that 43.8 per cent of the responses fall into the "commitment" category while only 24.5 per cent can be considered to be "conducive to independence." Furthermore, when the "neither" category is taken into account it is clear that traits considered to be most desirable in the political staff are those that tend to produce attitudes of either commitment or neutrality.

Apart from expertise (which might have been classified as "neither" ${ }^{13}$ the most recurring responses were ability to get along with people, strong motivation and loyalty - all traits which tend to produce commitment. ${ }^{14}$ Creativity, ability to accept responsibility, etc. were almost non-existent responses.

When the two parties are compared, it is found that the Democrats tend to see traits leading to commitment as the more desirable whereas Republicans appear to allow for a higher degree of independence. This data can be summarized as follows:

|  | Democrats |  | Republicans |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | No. | \& | No. |  |
| Traits conducive to <br> independence | 3 | 18.8 | 7 | 28.0 |
| Traits conducive to <br> commitment | 8 | 50.0 | 10 | 40.0 |
| Traits conducive to <br> neither | 5 | 31.2 | 8 | 32.0 |

This is not surprising in view of the strong ideological
nature of the Michigan Democratic Party.

[^33]A breakdown of responses to the second question, designed to narrow questioning down to personality characteristics only, tends to confirm the preceding daia. Close to 64 per cent of the total number of responses to this question by both parties had to do with "getting along with people." The only other significant response was "dependability" which accounted for 18.1 per cent of the responses. A rank order of responses is as follows:

## Number

Ability to work with people 14

Dependability 4
Good judgment 2
Loyalty 1
Initiative 1
Imagination 1
Finally, the respondents were asked whether they found it most valuable to have persons on their staffs who were "primarily experts in a given area or persons who "know their way around." ${ }^{15}$ The responses to this question displayed the same note of ambivalence occuring throughout the data between substantive expertise and inter-personal skills. Six respondents stated that they wanted the expert, seven that they wanted someone who "knows his way around," and four indicated that both were essential.
${ }^{15}$ Appendix $C$, question $3, b$.

Political orientation. Michigan's political leadership, it has been pointed out, seeks the type of staff expertise that logically involves independence and discretionary power. On the other hand, personality characteristics deemed desirable in staffers tend to be either more conducive to commitment to dominant party values or to neutrality. This apparent ambivalence can be explained only by relating both types of requisites to perceptions by the leadership of the political framework within which expertise is believed to rightfully function. That is, if politicians want to have their staff function in highly complex and technical matters, i.e., matters which involve expert, and therefore somewhat autonomous decisions, and at the same time evidence a relatively high level of commitment to the party, it must be postulated that the politicians perceive limitations on the extent to which staffers can apply their expertise to decisions and that they perceive a political framework within which staffers must operate.

Political leaders in Michigan basically expect their staff to be in agreement with them on political matters. "It should be automatic," a Republican respondent stated. "One-hundred per cent," was the reply of a Democrat. ${ }^{16}$ The extent of this agreement, however, may vary. In answer to the question, "To what extent would you say that most of the members of your staff should agree with you on political

[^34]questions," a range of responses is detectable. Table 4 summarizes this data.

TABLE 4.--Political agreement expectations of party leadership in Michigan

|  |  | Number of Responses |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Extent of Staff Agreement | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
|  | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| Staff agreement required <br> only after policy is <br> established <br> Staff agreement required <br> only on broad general <br> policy <br> Staff agreement not <br> required | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Total number of responses | 4 | 3 | 1 |

There appears to be a discernable Republican tendency to require less political agreement on the part of staff than exists among Democrats. If items 1 and 2 in Table 4 can be classified as indicating "high required agreement" and items 3 and 4 as indicating "low required agreement" the parties compare as follows:

|  | Democrats | Republicans |  | Total |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. \% | No. | \% | No. | \% |
| High required agreement | $7 \quad 87.5$ | 6 | 60 | 13 | 62.3 |
| Low required agreement | $1 \quad 12.5$ | 4 | 40 | 5 | 27.7 |

This also accords with the picture of the Democratic Party as being more ideologically oriented than the Republican. 17

The necessity for smooth working relationships between staff and leadership was the reason most often cited why agreement is necessary. As one Democrat put it, "Unless you know that he is in general agreement with you, it's impossible to delegate responsibility." Other typical comments were:

I don't want to get ulcers trying to work with a person who is always disagreeing with me.

They have got to be in agreement with me because I am responsible for what they do.

It's necessary for you to be on the same wave length.
Republicans, as has already been pointed out, were somewhat more willing to tolerate disagreement. A top Republican leader, while also reflecting concern over the fact that authority cannot be placed in unfriendly hands, stated, however, that he "often changed his mind." Another Republican politician stated, "Honesty is the most important thing. You can't get people to agree on everything.

17 Respondents who indicated that they expected a high level of agreement on the part of their staff were asked whether ". . . there [is] room on your staff for the technically qualified person whose viewpoints are not shared by yourself?n (See Appendix C, question 16, b.) Five of seven respondents answered "no"; two answered "yes." Again, the Democratic respondents manifested relatively high required agreement with four of five indicating that there is no room on a political staff for the deviant.

Anyway, I wouldn't want a bunch of rubber-stampers in a campaign."

The "neutral staff" concept also tended to crop up in the thinking of a number of Republicans. Fairly typical comments in response to the query on the necessity for agreement were:

If they are paid staff it shouldn't make any difference. They have a job to do.

It doesn't make any difference if a person 18 willing to do his job.

Once policy is determined it should be obeyed, agreement or not.

These same party differences in attitude toward the degree of political agreement required of staff also occur at the point of recruitment. Democrats tend to want to recruit people for staff jobs who have not had prior experience in order to train them themselves. Republicans, on the other hand, overwhelmingly prefer the already experienced person. 18 In addition, Republicans demonstrated
${ }^{18}$ In answer to the question, "When you hire a new staff person, do you want one with experience, or do you prefer to train him yourself?" (Appendix C, question 6) the responses were as follows:

Response
Wants one with experience

Wants one with experience, yet pliable

Wants to train him himself

Democratic Republican Total
$2 \quad 79$

34

20
2
a greater willingness than Democrats to accept on their staff an experienced person who had worked for someone they personally do not agree with politically. 19 This difference of attitudes shows up in the comments typical of the leaders of each party. As one Democrat put it, "I would rather have inexperience than someone who did not share our philosophy." Other typical Democratic comments were:

Such a person would not be considered.
I would want to know his prejudices.
Training them yourself avoids having to battle with preconceived ideas.

I don't care who he has worked for; if he shares my philosophy - O.K.

Ideology is very important.
Typical Republican comments were:
We would hire him if he is pliable. We couldn't use a hard nose.

Chances are the man would be adaptable. He doesn't formulate policy, but adapts himself to it.

Bespondents were asked whether or not they would employ an experienced person who had worked on the staff of a United States Senator with whom they would tend to disagree politically. (Appendix C, question 6, a.) The responses were as follows:

| Response | Democratic Republican Total |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Would hire such a <br> person | 0 | 2 | 2 |  |
| Would hire such a <br> person but only if <br> pliable | 3 | 2 | 5 |  |
| Would not hire such <br> a person | 3 | 3 | 6 |  |

I would want to know his attitudes. But a man can run a good campaign without being committed to a particular philosophy.

The fact that he is a Republican is sufficient.
Members of both parties, however, expressed views which diverged from those of their party. A top Democrat said, "We have people with Southern background on our staff. We would, however, want a staff member to get into the Michigan Democratic Party and get the feel of it before we hired him." His Republican counterpart stated, "We would have to evaluate the person involved. A person who disagrees with us could be used as an organizer. But hiring him for the public relations department would be another question." A Republican county chairman, when asked whether he would like to get a young junior executive as his executive secretary, replied, "No. We need to get away from the G. M. label."

It is interesting to relate the political agreement expectations of the Michigan political leadership to the theoretical models described earlier in the chapter. Democratic party attitudes on the extent of political agreement required on the part of staff tend to pattern closely after the "committed staff" concept while Republicans appear to carry "neutral staff" conceptions in their heads. Democratic politicians want their staff members to have personality traits more conducive to commitment and to be in agreement with them ideologically. In addition, they evidence substantial concern over the types of persons
recruited into staff jobs, with there existing a fairly substantial body of opinion that staffers should be recruited directly out of the party ranks. These attitudes are in line with the hypothesis that the concept of the "committed staff" would most likely be found in parties that are ideologically homogeneous. 20

Republican party leaders, on the other hand, tend to view prior expertise as a fundamental desideratum for staff work and require less political agreement. They want the person who can "do the job" regardless of his past associations or political beliefs. Apart from expertise, the basic requirements are that he be a Republican and that he be willing to submerge his differences while he is a "member of the team." These attributes are in accord with the "neutral staff" concept. Again, the postulate concerning the relationship between staff type and the political complexion of the party holds up. It was postulated that the "neutral staff" concept would most likely be found in a party that has pairly strong contending factions. 21 This is certainly descriptive of the Republican Party in Michigan.

## The Staff Member's Attitude Toward <br> Discretionary Situations

In addition to a party staff person's political orientation and general background, political leaders have opinions concerning the way in which staff should view their specific functions, duties and day to day problems. If the general orientation of the professional staff person can be considered to form the "warp" of the politician's conception of the ideal staff role, his attitude toward the day to day operations of the party can be considered to be its "woof."

How does the politician perceive the role the staff member should play in the various tasks assigned to him by the party? What is considered to be proper staff conduct in the carrying out of the day to day activities of the party? Respondents were asked a series of questions designed to obtain information on how they utilized their staff in concrete situations, namely, in the writing of speeches, in the drafting of press releases and newsletters, in making office appointments and in handing ocrrespondence. 22 The data obtained from this line of questioning serves the dual purpose of providing clues on what the politicians perceive as the proper staff role and also providing a picture of what the politician perceives the

[^35]ictual influence of the staff to be in the party decisionaking process.

Speeches. Political leaders in Michigan take a oroprietary interest in their speeches and view this task 18 essentially their own responsibility. In answer to the juestion, "Specifically, could you describe for me how you atilize your staff in the writing of speeches," 95 per cent Indicated that they either write their own or provide their speech writer with fairly complete information on what they wish to say. Only two respondents stated that they have ever used their assistant to conceive and draft a speech ie novo. The range of responses to this question is summarized in Table 5.

It can be seen from Table 5 that the general method of handing speeches is for the politician to provide his speech writer with the basic ideas he wishes to develop and then to delegate to him the task of composing a first draft. The second most common method is for the politician to orepare his own speeches.

The various types (or patterns) of relationships existing between politician and staff relative to the oreparation of speeches can best be illustrated by descriptive statements made by the respondents themselves. Typical of the politician who writes his own speeches is the statement by a Democratic office holder:

I usually do my om research and write my om speeches. Once, however, I had to give a speech on unemployment compensation and told my staff to analyse each section of the $\qquad$ Bill.
TABLE 5.--Utilization of the professional staff in speech writing

| Response | Democrats |  | Republicans |  | Totals |  | Grand Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { All } \\ & \text { Time } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Part } \\ & \text { Time } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { All } \\ & \text { Time } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Part } \\ & \text { Time } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { All } \\ & \text { Time } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Part } \\ & \text { Time } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Political leader writes own speech. | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| Political leader gives outline of speech to staff as basis for draft. | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Political leader discusses ideas with staff as basis for draft. | 3 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 10 |
| Political leader provides topic only. Staff writes speech. | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Staffer conceives and writes entire speech. | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Another state official said,
Most political rallies don't call for an elaborate speech. People prefer to hear you speak off the cuff. You kind of develop a standard speech as you move through the campaign. However, if I need a special speech I outline the major ideas and give it to the staff to draft.

Others, while engaging in a good deal of the drafting themselves, involve their staff in extensive and on-going consultation. A top party leader said, "Although I write most of my own speeches, they were almost always discussed with the staff. Most of the ideas were the result of group discussion." Other typical descriptions were as follows:

I usually give the topic I have in mind to and ask him to develop it in writing. Then we talk it over and I reduce it to notes.

Sometimes I write the whole speech myself. Other times I tell the topic, type of group it is, and ask him to put some ideas together. Then we usually go over it together.

There's no single system. Sometimes I give__ an idea and we talk it over. I usually do not work from a written text unless it's a touchy subject. Sometimes he prepares a speech segment that will later go into a press release.

When I have to give a speech I kick various items around with and then tum it over to him to write up. Then I usually rewrite it until he gets a hold of my style.

I have no set rule. Sometimes I write it out myself and give it to my staff to work over. Sometimes we hold a conference to develop ideas.

A number of respondents stated that they depend upon
the professional staff to provide them with basic speech
material. These people place a good deal of reliance upon
the staff. One Democratic party leader said, "When I am on
a speaking tour, $\qquad$ usually prepares press release material for each speech. He selects what should go into it because I don't know what's newsworthy. If I want to write my own speech, I hold a conference with him to keep from saying the wrong things."

One Republican leader gave a fairly complete description of how his speeches develop. He and the party public relations man discuss together what should go into a given speech. The PR man, he states, proceeds to write the speech ". . . in a style I almost used to mistake for my own." While the respondent indicated that he exercised basic control over the speech, he depended upon key staff members to feed him ideas because "they are in the channels of communication." He mentioned one campaign issue that his writer brought to his attention and developed. "I never would have been in a position to evaluate this issue on my own." "I rely," he stated, "on ___ to feed me current and timely issues - anything to give me the initiative." When asked whether he was largely dependent on staff members to keep him abreast of developments in a campaign and prepare materials for him, he replied, "A candidate is on the road for twelve to sixteen hours a day. I had a phone in my car but I didn't even have time to answer it." When asked whether he felt quite helpless with respect to the speeches and press releases prepared for him by his staff he stated that he did but that all candidates were in the "same boat."

Other comments typical of those who rely on their staff to prepare speech material for them are:

I have not had staff members write speeches for me but
I do need information on issues. Often I use the press releases __ sends me, and if an important speech is coming up I want help from either ___ or
$\qquad$ -

## would speak from that.

I usually write my own speeches but $\qquad$ prepares speech material for all of us because he is close to Lansing. We get these regularly on every issue. With these as background I can write my own except when I have to consult with to clarify an issue or get a formal statement. Ialso send speeches to him for editing. I wouldn't give a formal speech without doing this.

Some respondents relied almost completely on their
staff for key speeches. A top Republican stated, "If I feel qualified on the subject $I$ dictate a rough draft, then bounce it against $\qquad$ - On other occasions I ask $\qquad$ to
write the speech for me. The speech on___ was_____ speech." Other comments were:

In my campaign I needed a sustaining operation to compensate for fatigue. Somebody had to watch the operation.

During a campaign, may be asked to jot down some points I ought to cover.

The foregoing illustrations clearly point out the fact that, although a substantial majority of the respondents either write their own speeches or actively participate in their drafting, many of them do lean fairly heavily on their staff for ideas as well as language. And, if it be assumed that, even with instruction and supervision, a
writer cannot help but infuse his own data, interpretations and general orientation into the speech he is writing, the general pattern of political speech drafting involves the delegation of substantial discretion and authority to the staff and brings them into the decision-making process. 23 However, the fact that only 15 per cent of the respondents were willing to delegate total responsibility for their speeches to professional staff persons on any occasion indicates that the general attitude toward the staff role Vis a'vis this activity is that of caution.

This caution is further manifested in what happens to the speech after it has been written. Of the twelve respondents who use professional staff to prepare speech material, ten "erequently" rewrite their speech. 24 only one, a Democrat, indicated that he never rewrote speeches prepared for him.
${ }^{23}$ If the responses in Table 5 are classified as to
degree of discretion delegated to the professional staff
relative to speech writing, the following results obtain:

| Degree of Discretion <br> Delegated to Staff | Response <br> Numbers* | Per cent of Politicians <br> Taking This Position |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 11.1 | 36.4 | 25.0 |
| No discretion <br> delegated | 2,3 | 77.8 | 45.5 | 60.0 |
| Moderate discretion <br> delegated | 4,5 | 11.1 | 18.1 | 15.0 |
| Substantial discre- <br> tion delegated | $4,50 b l i c a n s$ | Total |  |  |

*Number corresponds with numbered responses in Table 5.

It is interesting to note the type of political leader that is willing to delegate responsiblity for his speeches. One might expect that persons holding the most sensitive political positions would be less willing to delegate this responsibility. This, however, is not the case. By and large, the respondent who stated that he "writes his own speeches" held a position of lesser political significance than the one who utilized staff. There are at least three reasons for this. The first is one of time. Positions such as state vice-chairman, county chairman, etc. do not entail an extensive amount of speaking. Thus, such persons have more time than an office holder, candidate or state chairman to prepare a speech. Second, the lower echelons are not required to make a large number of policy statements. The sheer magnitude of the task faced by key party spokesmen in preparing statements on a multitude of questions for innumerable occasions requires that they enlist the help of staff assistance. Third, the complexity of the issues about which thes speak requires specialized expertise in both the research and drafting stages.

The fact that politicians show a reluctance to place their speeches totally in the hands of their assistants does not minimize the influence of the professionals on the finished product. Only two of 20 respondents (one Democrat and one Republican) indicated that they never consult with
their staff on speeches. The remaining eighteen, as has already been noticed, either carry on extensive consultations while the speech is being written or review it carefully after it is in draft form. Thus, the politician, while not wanting to delegate to staff personnel total responsibility for the construction of speeches, do encourage active participation by staff personnel at some stage in the drafting process.

It is important, in this connection, to note the perceptions of the leadership relative to who is responsible, i.e., politician or staff member, for the contents of the speech and whose ideas the speech actually represents. Although the political leadership is cautious about delegating to staff the major responsibility for preparing speeches, they recognize the need to obtain expert assistance in this area. They also recognize that this reduces their autonomy over the speech. As one candidate put it, "The ideas come from everywhere - ___, myself or someone else." Another party leader stated, "Most ideas were the product of group discussion." They do feel, however, that they exercise the final authority.

Press releases. As a general rule, the political leadership manifests a greater willingness to delegate responsibility for the drafting and issuing of press releases than in the preparation of speeches. Michigan politicians were asked, "To what extent do you turn the
task of daily or weekly press releases over to your staff? ${ }^{25}$ Twleve of seventeen respondents queried on this point indicated that major responsibility for getting statements to the press lay with their staff. As one party official put it, "___ issued most of the releases from Lansing. He knew what I wanted to say." Five respondents stated that press releases were initiated directly by themselves. One said, "Generally the same rules apply to press releases as apply to speeches. I pay attention to the details of my campaign."

Political leaders, for the most part, expect staff to clear all press statements with them, however. This data is sumarized in Table 6.

Again, Republicans appear to be slightly less reluctant to delegate responsibility to staff for press statements. From Table 6 it can be seen that only 50 per cent of Republican respondents require clearance under all circumstances or believe that, theoretically, clearance should always occur (responses 1 and 2) whereas 87.5 per cent of Democratic respondents fall in these two categories. In addition, three of the five respondents who initiate the buik of their own press releases are Democrats.

These results, although based on a small sample, go somewhat contrary to the typology laid out earlier in the chapter. One would expect to find in an ideologically

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25 \text { Appendix } C, \text { question } 11, b, 1 .
$$

TABLE 6.--Clearance required on press releases by political leaders in Michigan

| Response |  | Number Responding |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Oriented party, a staff resembling the "committed staff" and that because of its commitment to the party, greater discretionary power would be delegated to it. This, however, does not appear to be the case in Michigan. The Ieadership of the Democratic Party, manifestly more homogeneous and ideological of Michigan's two parties, is quite reluctant to delegate authority to its staff. The answer to this problem probably lies in the fact that most of the top party leaders in the party are office holders and thus are more sensitive to press relations. This is reflected
in the data since two of three Democratic respondents expressing a willingness to delegate responsibility were non-office holding persons.

The respondents were also probed on their attitudes toward the necessity for not clearing some press releases under certain circumstances. They were asked whether or not there are any circumstances when clearance is not required. ${ }^{26}$ Again, although the respondents were slightly more willing to concede that there are circumstances dictating less stringency with respect to the necessity for clearance, the tendency toward requiring clearance on all press releases remained high. Republicans, however, were substantially more willing to relax clearance requirements than were Democrats, probably due again to the high number of office holders included in the sample. A rank order of responses to the question appears in Table 7.

Descriptions by the political leaders as to the manner in which they issue a press release are helpful at this point. Four fairly distinct attitudes are discernable from the data. Typical of the politician who seeks to retain responsibility for his own releases are the following two respondents who view the staff man as essentially a technician.

> I usually choose the topic and suggest the subject matter to my assistant. After he has put it together, I look it over and often rewrite it.
${ }^{26}$ Appendix $c$, question $11, b, 2, a$.

TABLE 7.--Circumstances under which clearance is not required on press releases by Michigan party leadership

| Response | Number Giving Response |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| Clearance always required | 4 | 3 | 7 |
| Clearance not required <br> when politician is cam- <br> paigning or is otherwise <br> too busy | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| Clearance not required <br> when release is not on <br> sensitive subject | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| Clearance not required <br> when pre-written releases <br> are used | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| Clearance not required <br> when release covers policy <br> already established | 0 | 3 | 3 |

I dictate most of my own releases. I have a distinctive way of saying things and a public relations man finds it hard to duplicate my style. His major task was getting it distributed.

Others, while delegating some responsbility, keep close track of their releases.

When I want to get something out I tell what I want to say and he issues the statement. I always read the release before it goes out because I should know what I am saying. Sometimes the press men put language in our mouths. They are always subject to veto, however.
does most of them and then clears with me or with . If we can't be reached, he will clear them with another responsible party official.
always discusses his ideas with me and then enlarges upon them. I always read them over before they go out.

A number of respondents appeared willing to delegate a substantial amount of authority to the staff. One party leader stated, "Press releases are not important anyway." More typical of the comments made by those willing to delegate responsibility were:

Most releases originate with me. However, sometimes I won't see something $\qquad$ puts out before it is issued. If the subject is touchy he always clears it with me.

My deputy looks after this. First we talk it over. I read the final draft and then it goes out.

I would talk things over with ___ from Detroit and he would get out the release.

Finally, a number of respondents lean quite heavily on their staffs.

I don't turn out many releases - most of them come from party headquarters. However, since speeches do not get reported I often have the staff help me get out a release when I speak somewhere. The staff has greater expertise in preparing a statement for the press and I wouldn't feel capable of putting out a release without checking it with them.

Most of the releases are written by the public relations department. Sometimes I write something but I always clear it with .... If he initiates the release, it is not necessary for him to clear it with me unless he quotes me.

I turn all releases on women's activities over to required can go ahead at any time. Clearance is not required.
and $\qquad$ work out all press statements. All policy statements should be cleared with me; but if I can't be reached I would rather have them go ahead and get it out than hold back.

> A lot of my press statement are spoken directly to newsmen. However, own. He knew basically what to say.

In an attempt to refine the data on the attitude of the political leadership relative to the utilization of the staff in press matters, two hypothetical questions were asked. First, respondents were asked, "In writing press releases, you have one release planned but a new situation demands a revision in your original statement. Should your public relations man contact you or go ahead and revise the statement on his own?" 27 The results of this question are presented in Table 8. It can be seen that the responses are almost evenly divided. However, if response number 2 be interpreted as permitting staff discretion, there is a slightly greater tendency toward the delegation of discretion over press matters to the party staff. If, on the other hand, response number 2 be interpreted as limiting staff discretion, one is forced to come to the opposite conclusion.

A second hypothetical question was asked respondents as follows: "If something comes up that your press man thinks would make a good release; if he cannot clear it with you should he bury it or release it anyway?w 28 It can be seen from the results of this question presented in Table 9 that the initiating of a substitute press release

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27 Appendix \(C\), question 12 , b .
28 Appendix C, question 12, b, 1.
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TABLE 8.--The right of public relations personnel to revise press releases

| Response | Total Responding |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| Staff member must contact political leader before making revisions | 3 ( 33.3)* | 6 ( 54.5) | 9 ( 45) |
| Staff member may revise statement if policy has been clearly estabilshed | 1 ( 11.1) | 1 (7.2) | 2 ( 10) |
| Staff member may revise statement on own initiative | 5 ( 55.5) | 4 ( 36.3) | 9 ( 45) |
| Total | 9 (100.0) | 11 (100.0) | 20 (100) |


| Public Officials | Party Officials |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Democrats Republicans Total | Democrats Republicans Total |  |  |  |
| 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 |
| 3 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 |

TABLE 9.--The right of public relations personnel to initiate press releases

| Response | Total Responding |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| ```Staff member must "bury" release``` | $2(50) *$ | $3(60)$ | $5(55.5)$ |
| Staff member may initiate substitute release, but only in an emergency | 1 (25) | 0 (0) | $1(11.2)$ |
| Staff member may initiate substitute release | 1 ( 25) | 2 ( 40 ) | $3(33.3)$ |
| Total | 4 (100) | $5(100)$ | $9(100.0)$ |


| Public Officials |  | Party Officials |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Democrats Republicans | Total | Democrats | Republicans | Total |  |
| 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 |

by a staff member is viewed with greater reluctance than merely revising a press statement. If response number 2 be interpreted as basically restricting discretion, two-thirds of the respondents would restrict discretion in this matter.

It is interesting to note that the two parties tend to reverse positions relative to the willingness of their leadership to delegate authority. It can be seen from Tables 8 and 9 that Democratic respondents, in answer to the hypothetical questions on press release practices, articulated a greater willingness to delegate authority to staff members to revise and/or initiate press releases than do Republicans. Democratic responses to the hypothetical questions appear to paint a different picture than their descriptions of their actual practice. The data indicates that half of these respondents envision the staff role as entailing high discretion while, in practice granting little actual discretion to their staff. Moreover, the data suggests that the Democratic respondents tend to delegate substantially less authority to their staff than they view to be theoretically desirable. 29 This phenomenon occurs somewhat among the Republican sample but its incidence is substantially lower.

[^36]It is also interesting to note that, contrary to the foregoing data of this chapter, the data of Tables 8 and 9 indicate that office holders were no less reluctant than party leaders to allow their public relations personnel, in theory, to revise and/or initiate press releases. Again, this reflects the tendency to hold to staff discretion in theory but not in practice.

Correspondence. A fairly substantial degree of discretionary power is delegated to staff in the handing of correspondence. Only 4 of 19 respondents queried on this subject indicated that staff personnel do not answer some of their mail directly. 30 Ten indicated that this occured Prequently and five stated that it happened occasionally.

For the most part, staff persons are given total responsibility for "routine" mail, variously defined as requests for campaign material, requests for information, complaints, etc. In addition, staff members are given a good deal of correspondence relating to their area of specialization or expertise to handle. A number of respondents indicated that they made direct assignments of
contact you or go ahead and revise the statement on his ow?
Question 11, $b, 2:$ Does your assistant clear subjects and content [of press releases] with you?

Four of eight Democrats rated as permitting "high discretion" on question $12, b$, were rated as permitting "low discretion" on $11, b, 2$.
${ }^{30}$ Appendix $C$, question $11, c$.
letters to staff members and some go through their daily correspondence in the presence of staff members indicating how each item should be answered. The politicians, however, expect correspondence on policy matters to be cleared with them and most letters prepared for their signature are personally reviewed.

Administrative routine. Michigan political leaders were queried about the discretionary power delegated to staff members relative to two administrative matters: the making of office appointments; 31 and (2) the arranging of speaking engagements. 32 In the matter of the kinds of decisions staff members can make on office appointments, the responses were quite evenly divided between a substantial amount of authority on one hand, and insistence by the politicians that they be consulted on all appointments made, on the other. Again, office holders were much less willing to delegate authority in this matter than were party officials.

To probe the attitudes of the political leadership on the role they expect their staff to play in scheduling speaking engagements, the following hypothetical question was asked: "In arranging a speaking engagement, a specific meeting is arranged but circumstances require a change in plans. Does your assistant have the right to change your
$3_{\text {Appendix }} \mathrm{C}$, questions $11, \mathrm{~d}$, and $11, \mathrm{~d}, 1$. 32 Appendix $C$, question 12, c.
itinerary without consulting you or not?n33 Overwhelmingly, political leaders expressed willingness to delegate this responsibility. This stems from sheer necessity. They realize that they cannot personally keep track of changes in their schedule, particularly when they are on tour. In this matter they place themselves in the hands of their staff.

The handiing of disagreements. The attitude of the political leadership toward disagreements with their staff members provides an additional clue to their perceptions of the ideal staff role. While the leadership desires a high level of general agreement on political matters, they do not perceive specific disagreements between themselves and their staff to be a terribly serious matter. Although only 3 of 14 respondents queried ${ }^{34}$ report never having had a disagreement with a staff member, the majority report disagreements as occuring infrequently and their nature relatively minor. Firings are relatively infrequent, and when they do occur, it is largely for incompetence.

Respondents were asked whether they had ever wished that staff members had presented them with more information than they had, or failed to raise problems that should have been called to their attention. 35 Six of thirteen respondents

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33Appendix C, question 12, c.
34}\mathrm{ Appendix c, question 15.
35Appendix c, question 20.
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queried on this point said that this had occurred. It was generally agreed, however, that the with-holding of information, when it did occur, was unintentional. Had such a practice been intentional, however, the leadership felt that this was grounds for the dismissal of the staff member involved.

General attitude toward discretion. The foregoing sections of this chapter have attempted to describe the attitudes of the party leadership in Michigan toward the degree of discretionary power and types of decision-making functions that professional party staff members should rightly have in specific situations. A number of questions were designed to probe the respondents' attitudes on the delegation of power generally.

The generalized attitudes of the interviewees relative to the delegation of discretionary power conforms quite consistently with their attitudes on the delegation of such power to staff members under specific circumstances. In answer to a question as to whether staff members tend to usurp the authority rightfully belonging to duly constituted officials, 36 there was a general feeling that such was the case and that it constitutes something of a danger to the democratic process. There were four general categories of answers to the question as presented in Table 10.

TABLE 10.--Extent to which Michigan party leaders feel that persons in staff positions tend to make decisions rightfully the province of duly constituted officials

| Coded Response |  | Number of Responses |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |

If responses 2, 3 and 4 are classified together as representing an attitude not fearful of delegating authority, it will be seen that 55 per cent of the respondents expressed a fear of delegating authority and 45 per cent did not.

It is interesting to notice the differences in
attitude between the two parties relative to this question. Eighty per cent of Democratic responses tend to be concentrated in the "fearful" category while only 30 per cent of the Republicans articulated this attitude. On the other hand, 50 per cent of the Republicans interviewed said that usurpation of authority never occurs while no Democrat gave this as a response. It should be noted, however, that six
of the seven Democrats giving response number 1 above, stated that this is no problem in their organization. 37

As a means of attempting to pull together the various strands of analysis related to the attitudes of Michigan's political leadership on the matter of staff discretion, each respondent was rated on the basis of his answers to questions 11 through 14 of the questionnaire. Three categories of analysis were established as follows:

1. Respondent would have staff members make important decisions.
2. Respondent would have staff member make decisions, but only within a well established framework set by the leadership.
3. Respondent would prohibit staff members from making decisions.

These ratings are presented in Table 11.

TABLE 11.--Summary ratings of political leadership on their attitudes toward staff discretion

| Category | Number of Respondents |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democratic | Republican | Total |
| I. | 0 ( 0)* | 1 ( 8.3) | $1(4.6)$ |
| II. | 4 (40) | 7 (58.4) | 1 (50.0) |
| III. | 6 (60) | $4(33.3)$ | $10(45.4)$ |

37 Appendix $C$, question 14 , b .

Again, the cautionary spirit noted throughout the entire chapter appears in the data. 38 only one respondent is rated as desiring to see substantial staff discretion while 95.4 per cent of the interviewees would limit discretion to some extent at least. The already perceived differences between the attitudes of the leadership of the two parties also shows up in this data. Democrats tend to concentrate in category III while the majority of Republicans are to be found in category II.

## Leadership - Staff Relationships

The political leaders of Michigan perceive the relationship existing between themselves and their staff as properly quite intimate and close. As one Democrat put it, "The staff are our partners - the relationship is very personal." Another Democratic party leader said, "All decisions are discussed with top staff and regular party people. There is no distinction between the staff and the volunteers." This attitude was more noticeable among Democrats than among Republicans, however.

The respondents overwhelmingly reported that they discuss important decisions with their staff with only one interviewee, a Democrat, out of eighteen responding in the

38 It should be noted that these ratings were made and coded three months before the data was analyzed. Thus, while the ratings are subjective in nature, the fact that they confirm the more objective data, tends to confirm their own accuracy and the validity of the analysis presented in the chapter.
negative. 39 While in actual practice, there was a tendency for staff to be consulted on specific problems rather than broad strategy matters, the higher one moves up the party hierarchy, the greater the perception that staff should participate in policy decisions. One Republican party leader stated, "The type of staff I want should be consulted on all major decisions." Another Republican said, "I won't make decisions until I give an opportunity to express his views." A Democrat said, "Staff and party leaders meet together regularly - and both are equal in the discussions." The respondents were split on the question of whether or not there are matters that should not be discussed with staff. 40 Nine stated that there were such matters; eight said that there were not. For the most part, however, matters considered by the leadership to be beyond the rightful purview of the staff had to do with personnel problems and personality clashes within the party. Only one respondent, a Republican, felt that issues should not be discussed with the staff. A rank order of responses to this question bears this out.

Matters that Should not be Discussed with Staff Number

Personnel matters 5
Disagreements between party leaders 3
Possible party candidates 3
39nno, I haven't yet. The staff are not our advisors." 40 Appendix $C$, question 9.

> Matters that Should not be Discussed with Staff

Finance matters 2
Matters that might break staff morale 1
Issues 1
Matters that have to be kept temporarily secret because of party strategy

1

In general, it is apparent from the data that,
although the politician feels a certain reluctance to delegate actual decision-making responsibility to staff in such sensitive areas as the proparation of speeches, they are not inclined to want to isolate them from the decisionmaking process. It might be said that the leadership expects the staff to participate in, but not actually make decisions.

The data reveal that certain staff members tend to be Consulted more than others. 41 This is particularly true in the Republican party in Michigan where the sensitive staff functions are more centralized. The general pattern of access to the leadership on the part of the staff tends to be through the public relations function. This is due partly to the necessarily close daily contact required between party spokesman and his press officer. It is also due to the high priority given to press and public relations by the politiCian. It is the party ideologist that has the party's ear.

[^37]
## Attitudes of the Political Leadership Toward Their 0 wn Competence

It has been postulated earlier than the extent to which the party leadership feels itself to be competent ill, in turn, influence the type of staff role it perceives as legitimate. Three questions were designed to probe these attitudes:

1. "When a technical point comes up in a piece of
legislation (or a speech) to whom do you usually
go for information"?
2. "Do you use any system for checking the reliability of this data or not"?43
3. "Do you ever feel at the mercy of your staff?"44

Michigan's political leadership has, in general, a hifeh level of self-confidence, although this is substantially more true of the Democrats than the Republicans. Looking first at question number 3, the data indicates that this general perception of competence is reflected in a sense of capability of interpreting and judging information and research provided them by their staff. Only six (35 per cent) Of seventeen respondents indicated that they often were in a position of having to accept staff research at face value. The responses to the question are as follows in Table 11. The relatively marked differences between the leadership of

42 Appendix $C$, question 22.
${ }^{43}$ Appendix $C$, question 23.
44
Question does not appear in the printed interview schedule but was developed early in the course of the interviewing.

TABLE 11.--Extent to which political leadership expressed feeling at the mercy of their staff personnel

| Coded Response | Number Responding |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| Yes - but infrequently | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| No | 1 | 0 | 1 |

the two parties on the extent to which they feel at the mercy Of their staffs can be explained by two factors. First, in Michigan, Democratic party leaders have direct access to governmental information by virtue of the fact that they control the major public offices and can obtain information through the staffs of administrative agencies and study commissions that report directly to them. Second, Democratic pol iticians have a built-in system of checking the data they receive from whatever the source. As one office holder put it : "I hire (my assistant) to bring back the correct information. If he doesn't, I have eighty-eight legislators, 12 reporters and two hundred lobbyists to set me straight."
Republicans, on the other hand, while having access to many Of the same sources, are not able to utilize them (particularly the bureaucracy and study commissions) as efficiently. The remarks of two major candidates from each party illustrates this difference. In answer to question number 2
above, the Democrat stated that, in addition to material prepared by his staff, he received information from many sources, namely, public officials, administrative agencies, study commissions, universities and interest groups. Added to this is the fact that knowledge of the sources of the information plus many years in public office have provided him with a large fund of background for evaluating information presented to him.

The Republican, on the other hand, lamented the fact that he had no method of evaluating staff research other than "common sense." "Some of the stuff was so technical," he said, "I don't know how to use it. A candidate just doesn't have time for creative, reflective thought."

This difference between the two parties is more pronounced with respect to the extent to which the leadership expressed having a system for evaluating the accuracy and reliability of the data prepared for them by their staffs. This can be clearly seen from Table 12.

The respondents articulated four basic approaches to the problem of evaluating staff research. The most commonly reported procedure was that of merely employing their own personal experience and judgment to the research. As one party leader put it, "I read all the time. I don't rely on the staff. In fact, if there is an area $I$ am not familiar with - like the farm problem - I won't accept a paragraph
from a staff member on that subject." Another respondent, an office holder, said:

As a legislator, I have had to do my own research. There's very little new that comes up that has not come up before. 45

TABLE 12.--Extent to which Michigan political leaders articulated a system for evaluating the reliability of staff research

| Coded Response | Number Responding |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Democrats Republicans Total |  |  |
| Stated that they do not have <br> such a system | 5 | 4 | 9 |

Others rely on staff meetings. A state official stated, "You thrash things out in staff meetings. There are only a dozen important questions in a year and you get to know the broad outlines of an issue."

Outside sources were cited by two respondents. A Republican said, "I have no system, but plenty of checks. Newspaper men provide me with facts and candidates are always reporting." Finally, some rely on knowing the source of the data. A Republican office holder said, "I check the source of the information my assistant gives me."
${ }^{45}$ This respondent made it clear that on most matters he had more expert knowledge and background than his assistant.

The above data tends to indicate that although the politicians assign their staff the major research jobs, they view it as "processing" rather than "producing" information. That is, staff appear to be perceived as securing data from well accepted sources and submitting it to the political leadership for scrutiny rather than structuring the information themselves.

## Conclusion

Taken together, there emerges from the data a composite, although at times, conflicting, picture of what Michigan's political leaders perceive the proper staff role to be. Speaking generally, the professional staff member is perceived as bringing a high level of expertise and skill to his work but as exercising these skills within the ideological and decisional framework established by the party leaders. He is not viewed as a mere technician, nor is he viewed as a decision-maker, but rather as contributing to decisions. Top staff members in both parties have become virtually absorbed into the party leadership structure in the sense that they contribute to and profoundly influence decisions up and down the line. Yet their position is perceived as subordinate to that of the leadership.

There exist marked deviations from this composite image, however. Democrats, while tending to perceive as ideal a greater amount of discretionary power for
staff members than do Republicans, delegate less discretionary power in actual practice than their counterparts. Republicans theoretically place the staff in a subordinate role but, in practice, lean quite heavily upon them. This, it has been pointed out, stems largely from the differences in conditions producing perceptions by the leadership as to their own competence.

## CHAPTER VI

THE PROFESSIONAL PARTY STAFF VIEWS ITS ROLE

Perceptions of what constitutes the proper staff role are not limited to the political leadership. The members of the professional staff also carry an image of what their role should be in the party's affairs - an image that greatly affects their activities. To what extent are the role perceptions of the professional staff and political leadership similar? Are the attitudes of the staff and leadership the same with respect to the amount of discretionary power the staff should rightfully exercise? If not, what is the effect of these differing viewpoints on the degree of staff responsibility and the effectiveness of staff operations?

This chapter will describe the manner in which 28 party staffers in Michigan view their role and the extent of the discretionary power they perceive themselves as exercising. The implications of this data for staff responsibility will be discussed.

## Perceptions of the Job

The way in which a professional staff person defines his job will determine, in large measure, his attitude toward the role he perceives himself playing in an organization.

The 28 party staff members interviewed in this study, by and large, define their jobs as involving functions of a relatively broad scope and a high level of expertise and skill. To the question, "What does your job consist of - what do you do?",three general categories of job descriptions emerge: (1) innovation, (2) consultation, and (3) implementation. The "innovators" are those who describe themselves as primarily responsible for setting in motion new projects or programs. Innovators describe their positions as follows:

I was hired to set up an independent operation - to apply business organization principles to politics. The job wasn't defined. I didn't know what they wanted.

I was involved in campaign management for ___ and

- This involved recruiting campaign help, organizing meetings, fund raising, business management, helping write press releases, and just general advisor.

I coordinate and develop finance organization in eighty out-state counties; train county workers in the techniques of fund raising.

The "consultants" define their function as largely
that of providing research, information and advice to the political leadership and/or party workers. Typical of the job descriptions in this category are the following:

My job is helping in the development of 's policy attitude on national and international questions.

Mine is an educational job - training workers in the precincts, bringing organizational techniques to volunteers and following them up. I serve as a communication link between headquarters and the counties.

My job is to provide expert advice on public relations moves.

The "implementors" can be divided into two sub-groups. One group, "executors", while not defining their functions in
terms of innovation, nevertheless have responsibility for the direction of party activities within the framework of previously established policy.


The second sub-group, "administrators" are largely responsi-
ble for implementing policy from a technical or administrative standpoint.

I am assistant to the county chairman. I function in his behalf. He's the boss but he has a job of his own. He gives orders and I implement them and supervise all Republican programs and public relations in the county.

My job was to coordinate 's campaign with the central public relations staff, write feature articles and handle press relations in the counties.

I work on speeches, press releases, researching and answering correspondence, scheduling appointments, and representing $\qquad$ at meetings.

In the above attempt to categorize the job de-
scriptions given by the professional staff people interviewed for this study, the categories employed cannot be considered to be water-tight compartments. It is clearly evident that each job contains elements to be found in the other categories. In addition, it should not be assumed that because a respondent described his duties in a certain fashion it necessarily follows that this represents his actual function.

This is particularly true of public relations personnel who tended to describe their functions as implementory in nature, but who, as will be subsequently noted, have a substantial consultational role in the party organization.

Not only do the specific job descriptions themselves demonstrate something of the scope of the staff function, most respondents view themselves as performing duties outside their specialty. ${ }^{l}$ Public relations, for instance, tends to be a universal staff function. That is, the staffer can expect to be called upon to write a press release or work on a speech in his area of specialization at some point in the party's activities. Campaign management and administrative duties were also often mentioned as "extra duties." As one Democratic respondent put it, "I was hired to do organizational work but ended up running the Spring campaign."

In addition to perceiving their jobs as involving a wide scope of activities, close to 60 per cent indicated that it had changed in nature over time. These data are summarized in Table $I$.
${ }^{1}$ Interview Schedule: Political Staff, Appendix $D$, question $1, a$, "Do you have any duties outside your specialty?" A rank ordering of the responses to this question is as follows:

## Response

Number
Public relations duties 11
Policy advice 9
Administrative duties 4 Campaign management Field organization duties3


TABLE 1.--Perceptions of change in job by Michigan political staff members

| Coded Response | Number Responding |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Democrats | Republicans Total |  |
| Job up-graded to greater <br> responsibility | $2(14.2) *$ | $1(7.1)$ | 3 (10.7) |
| Job broadened at same level | $5(35.8)$ | $3(21.4)$ | 8 (28.4) |
| Job narrowed at same level | $0(0)$ | $1(7.1)$ | 1 (3.6) |
| Job down-graded to less <br> responsibility | $0(0)$ | $2(14.2)$ | $2(7.1)$ |
| Job remained essentially <br> the same | $5(35.8)$ | $5(35.8)$ | $10(35.8)$ |
| Number not reporting | $2(14.2)$ | $2(14.2)$ | 4 (14.2) |

*Percentages in parentheses

Of the 24 that answered the question, 45.8 per cent indicated that their job had broadened in some fashion, 12.5 per cent indicated that it had narrowed and 41.7 per cent saw no change.

The above data demonstrate fairly clearly that the professional party staff members in Michigan tend to perceive their jobs as involving a wide scope of activities and define them in a manner that indicates that they view themselves as performing functions of substance and consequence for the party; functions which, theoretically at least, imply
the need for decision-making powers if they are to be successfully carried out. Furthermore, a substantial number feel that their responsibilities have been broadened and/or up-graded, an assumption which certainly implies, if it does not specifically denote, the fact that there is a range of activity above the mere routine open to the $s t a f f$ person.

It should be noted that, in terms of the definition of the staff function per se, there is relatively little difference between the perceptions of the political leadership and the political staff. We noted in Chapter $V$, however, that the definition by the leadership of the scope of the staff role tended to contract when their responses moved from a theoretical definition of the tasks they would like to see the staff perform to the discretionary power delegated to it in actual practice. This same phenomenon occurs in staff members' responses.

Essential skills and traits. The manner in which a professional staff person perceives his job is not limited solely to a description of his duties. It is also necessary to probe his perception of the skills and personality characteristics essential to the proper performance of those duties. Two questions were designed to probe these perceptions: ${ }^{2}$

1. You have had opportunities to work with or view staff people from both political parties. Do there seem to be any group of traits that characterize most of the people you have met who hold jobs as
${ }^{2}$ Appendix D, questions 6 and 7 .
political staffers? Do they have any particular traits in common?
2. Are there any particular skills that you consider to be indispensable in doing your job?

Relative to the perceptions of respondents as to the personality traits they view each other as possessing, it should be noted that 50 per cent of the twenty staff members queried on this point do not feel that, in actuality, professional party staff people hold a cluster of traits in common or that they constitute a "particular breed" of individual; 37.5 per cent feel that there are group similarities; and 22.5 per cent state that they do not know. However, when asked to specifically list the traits they believe characterize their colleagues, a certain group of attributes tended to crystalize. These data are summarized in Table 2.

A rank ordering of the responses to question number two appears in Table 3.

It is interesting to compare Table 3 with the data of Chapter $V$ on the traits considered desirable in staff personnel by the political leadership. 3 Although the two sets of tables are not completely comparable, it should be noted that both leadership and staff respondents consider similar traits to be the most essential requisites for successful staff work. Inter-personal skills, for instance, rank first on both tables. Imagination, a characteristic one might expect to rank higher in the minds of staff people,

[^38]TABLE 2.--Traits perceived as characteristic of professional party staff personnel by party staff people

| Response | Two-Party Totals |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Volunteered } \\ Y e s \end{gathered}$ | Responded Yes | Total | Responded No |
| 1. Ability to work with people | 7 | 7 | 14 | 2 |
| 2. Aggressiveness, extroversion | 5 | 8 | 13 | 5 |
| 3. Loyalty | 7 | 3 | 10 | 8 |
| 4. Intellectuality-Intelligence | 6 | 6 | 12 | 8 |
| 5. Drive and ambition | 5 | 8 | 13 | 3 |
| 6. Imagination | 0 | 10 | 10 | 4 |
| 7. "Smooth operator" | 0 | 4 | 4 | 12 |
| 8. Friendly, pleasant personality | 2 | 12 | 14 | 3. |
| 9. Cautious | 0 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 10. Idealistic* | 2 | - | 2 | - |
| 11. Detachment | 1 | - | 1 | - |
| 12. Opportunistic, ego-centric | 2 | - | 2 | - |

[^39]TABLE 3.--Skills perceived as essential to their jobs by party staff people: a rank order

| Rank | Response | Number of Responses |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| 1 | Ability to work with people | 4 (21.1)* | $8(32.0)$ | 12 (27.2) |
| 2 | Ability to write press releases and speeches | 4 (21.1) | $1(4.0)$ | $5(11.4)$ |
| 3 | Knowledge of government and politics | 3 (15.8) | $2(8.0)$ | $5(11.4)$ |
| 4 | Ability to handle details | 0 (0) | 3 (12.0) | $3(6.8)$ |
| 5 | Ability to speak publicly | 1 (5.3) | $2(8.0)$ | 3 (6.8) |
| 6 | Discretionary sense | 1 (5.3) | $2(8.0)$ | 3 (6.8) |
| 7 | Imagination | 1 (5.3) | $1(4.0)$ | $2(4.5)$ |
| 8 | Good health | $1(5.3)$ | $1(4.0)$ | $2(4.5)$ |
| 9 | Organizational ability | 1 (5.3) | 1 ( 4.0) | $2(4.5)$ |
| 10 | Flexibility | 1 ( 5.3) | $1(4.0)$ | $2(4.5)$ |
| 11 | Detachment | $1(5.3)$ | 0 (0) | 1 (2.3) |
| 12 | Patience, compromising spirit | $0(0)$ | $1(4.0)$ | 1 (2.3) |
| 13 | Sincerity | $0(0)$ | 1 ( 4.0) | 1 (2.3) |
| 14 | Persistence | 1 (5.3) | 0 (0) | 1 ( 2.3) |
| 15 | Stable emotions | $0(0)$ | $1(4.0)$ | $1(2.3)$ |

[^40]achieved roughly the same percentage of responses from both groups.

It is also interesting to note the extent to which traits and skills conducive either to commitment or neutrality appear among the responses of staff people. Such traits as ability to work with people, sense of discretion, patience, flexibility, sincerity and emotional stability all characteristics conducive to docility - amount to 45.4 per cent of the responses. Technical skills constitute another 40.9 per cent of the total. Traits conducive to independence such as detachment, imagination and persistence make up only 9.1 per cent of the total.

When it comes to those traits which staff members perceive each other as possessing (Table 2), a similar, although somewhat more modified picture emerges. Ability to work with people and loyalty - traits conducive to commitment - were the two most frequently volunteered responses and constitute 37.8 per cent of all responses. However, aggressiveness, drive and ambition, opportunism and idealism - traits conducive to independence - also accounted for 37.8 per cent of the responses. Similarly, when asked specifically to react to certain suggested items, such commitment producing traits as loyalty and caution received a fairly strong negative response. Interpersonal skills, however, remained relatively free of negative responses.

On balance, it appears that both the professional staff and the political leadership have similar perceptions
concerning those traits which are desirable in a professional staffer, namely, traits basically conducive to docility. Two possible hypotheses can be advanced to account for this phenomenon. First, it is suggested that the political leadership seeks to perpetuate its ideas of the proper staff role by hiring persons who adhere to their preconceptions. The ad hoc nature of the recruitment process and the high turnover rate among staffers, however, would tend to make such rational recruitment on the part of the leadership unlikely. 4 A second hypothesis that can be advanced is that the interaction between leadership and staff quickly produces a consensual image of what constitutes the proper staff role. This approach will be explored in subsequent sections of this chapter.

## The Staff Person's Attitudes

In Chapter V, the perceptions of the political leadership concerning what they consider to be the proper attitudes of staff persons toward their specific functions in the party and their relationships to the members of the party were explored. This section will probe the attitudes of staff people relative to these same functions. Specifically, it will view the staff person's attitudes in four areas:

[^41](1) toward the functions and duties he performs, (2) toward his relationship with the political leadership, (3) toward his relationship with other staff personnel, and (4) toward his relationship with non-party elites.

## Staff Attitudes Toward Their Functions and Duties

How does the professional staff person perceive the role he should play in the various tasks assigned to him by the leadership? What does he consider to be proper conduct in carrying on the day to day activities of the party? In order to be as systematic as possible in the comparative analysis of these questions for both the political leadership and the staff, ${ }^{5}$ staff respondents were asked identical questions on how they are utilized in concrete situations, namely, in the writing of speeches, in the drafting of press releases and newsletters, in making office appointments and the handiling of correspondence. ${ }^{6}$ In addition, a special set of questions were asked of field organizers.

Speeches. In general, staff respondents agree with the leadership on the manner in which speeches are developed. That is, staffers also perceive the general method of handling speeches to be a delegation to the staff person by the politician of the mechanics of drafting the speech following a rather intensive discussion of the contents of the speech. There is,
${ }^{5}$ See pp. 167-174.
${ }^{6}$ Appendix $D$, questions 23, 24.
however, a substantial minority ( 35.7 per cent) who perceive themselves as drafting speeches for the leadership de novo. As one of these staff persons put it, "If $\qquad$ tells me he wants a speech for the Elks Club, I draft it and the secretary types it up." These data are summarized in Table 4.7

TABLE 4.--Utilization of the professional staff in speech writing: perceptions of staff respondents

| Coded Response | Number of Responses |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total* |
| Political leader writes own speeches | 0 | 0 | $0(0)$ |
| Political leader gives outilne of speech to staff member as basis for draft | 1 | 0 | 1 (7.2) |
| Political leader discusses ideas with staff member as basis for draft | 5 | 3 | 8 (57.1) |
| Political leader provides topic only - staff member writes speech | 0 | 0 | 0 (0) |
| Staff member conceives and writes speech himself | 3 | 2 | $5(35.7)$ |

[^42]The high degree of caution on the part of the political leadership toward the delegation of responsibility to the staff for speeches displayed in the data of Chapter $\mathrm{v}^{8}$ tends to reappear in the perceptions of the staff. For instance, in answer to the question, "To what extent do you consult with your 'boss' on what should be covered (in a speech)?, 9 per cent of the respondents stated that they engage in extensive discussions with the leadership as the speech is being written. And although six respondents described themselves as developing a speech de novo, five of these stated, in answer to the question, that they engaged in consultation with their superiors after a first draft had been prepared. One, an infrequent speech writer, stated that she always counseled with another staff member. ${ }^{10}$

[^43]These same general perceptions are reflected in response to a question on the extent to which speeches are rewritten by the leadership. These data are summarized in Table 5. A comparison of the data of Table 5 with the data of Chapter $V$ not only tends to demonstrate similar staffleadership perceptions on the role of the professional staff should play in the speech drafting function, the manner in which staff respondents describe their activities implies a high degree of acceptance of that role. In an attempt more specifically to probe the attitudes of the respondents toward their role in the speech drafting process, staff members were asked, "Do you feel that most speeches reflect primarily your own ideas or those of the politician for whom you work?wll

TABLE 5.--Extent to which political leadership rewrites speeches prepared by professional staff: staff perceptions

| Coded <br> Response | Number of Responses |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats |  | Republicans |  | Total |  | Grand Total |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { All } \\ & \text { Time } \end{aligned}$ | Part Time | $\begin{aligned} & \text { All } \\ & \text { Time } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Part } \\ & \text { Time } \end{aligned}$ | All Time | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Part } \\ & \text { Time } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| 1. Frequently | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1* | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| 2. Infrequently | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 6 |
| 3. Never $N-12$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1* | 0 | 1 | 1 |

*Same respondent.
${ }^{11}$ Question was not a part of the original interview schedule.

It is evident from Table 6, in which these data are displayed, that there is relatively little perception by the staff that they are the major influence upon the finished product. Rather, they view themselves primarily as the "processors" rather than the "producers" of speeches ${ }^{12}$ - although not entirely without influence. As one staff person put it, "I usually check his schedule and prepare a draft manuscript of what I think he might want to say. Or, he may call me in and go over the high spots to be included and his idea of the correct approaches. The speech is clearly his speech by the time he finishes with it. He is well aware of the themes within which he likes to work." Other statements typical of the delicate balance existing in the minds of staff people between authority for and influence on a speech are as follows:

I write the entire thing; dig up the ideas and the facts. However, the speech reflects what he is thinking and saying, even to the way he talks.
's speeches were mostly mine - the treatment was mine and the pitch was mine. However, I had to remain within the limits of his policy and program. He never let me exaggerate anything.

It is interesting to note in Table 6 that Republican staff respondents are inclined to assign to themselves greater responsibility for speeches than the Democrats.

Press releases. Staff members also take a cautious approach to their role in the handing of press releases. Of the 22 staff members queried on this matter, only two
${ }^{12}$ See p. 219.
TABLE 6.--Perceptions by professional staff as to extent to which speeches reflect the

*Percentages in parentheses
perceived themselves as having basic responsibility for the drafting and issuing of press releases dealing with policy questions and only one of these stated that he could initiate such releases without obtaining prior clearance from a member of the political leadership. These data are presented in Tables 7 and 8.

It can be seen from both tables that, although staff members do not view themselves as being in a position of discretion relative to the drafting of policy statements, they do perceive themselves to have the authority to act fairly freely within an established policy framework. That is, under circumstances where (1) a policy position has already been established, (2) a politician is not being directly quoted, (3) other (usually superior) staff members can be consulted, or (4) the subject matter dealt with is not felt to be sensitive, 40.8 per cent of the staff respondents perceive clearance as not absolutely necessary. As one Democratic staff member said, "Basically, I have complete discretion although I check all policy statements with $\qquad$ -" Other responses illustrative of this attitude follow: If I think something should be put out, I type it up and ask $\qquad$ about it.

I clear releases with $\qquad$ only when $I$ am quoting him or don't know how he stands.

Clearance wasn't too important unless you needed clarification on a pitch. Then (a top staff member) took the responsibility.

It is interesting to compare the attitudes of the politicians and the staff on the necessity of clearing press

TABLE 7.--Perceptions of staff respondents as to their utilization in the preparation of press releases

| Coded Response | Number of Responses* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| 1. Staff has complete responsibility for press releases on policy matters | $1(9.1)$ | 1 (9.1) | $2(9.1)$ |
| 2. Staff has complete responsibility for press releases on routine matters | $5(45.4)$ | $7(63.6)$ | $12(54.6)$ |
| 3. Staff is expected to inquire whether a release should be issued on a given matter | $4(36.4)$ | 1 (9.1) | $5(22.7)$ |
| 4. Staff expected to wait for instructions in all cases | 1 (9.1) | $2(18.2)$ | $3(13.6)$ |
| Total | 11 (100.0) | 11 (100.0) | 22 (100.0) |

*Percentages in parentheses

TABLE 8.--Perceptions of staff respondents as to clearance required on press releases

|  | Number of Responses |
| :---: | :---: |
| Coded Response | Democrats Republicans Total |
| 1. Clearance with politician required in all cases | $5(45.4) 5(45.4) 10(45.4)$ |
| 2. Clearance with other staff person required in all cases | $2(18.1) 1$ 1 9.05) 3(16.2) |
| 3. Clearance required only when quoting politician | $1(9.05) 0(0) 1$ ( 0.5 ) |
| 4. Clearance required only when release deals with policy question | $2(18.1) 1$ ( 9.05) 3(16.6) |
| 5. Clearance required only if policy position has not been established | $1(9.05) 1$ ( 9.05) 1 ( 4.52) |
| 6. Clearance required but sometimes impossible to do 80 | $0(0) 2(18.1) 2(9.25)$ |
| 7. Clearance not requiredrespondent may issue release on own initiative | $0(0) 1(9.05) 1(4.52)$ |
| Total | 11 (100.0) 11 (100.0) 22 (100.0) |

releases. ${ }^{13}$ Table 9 summarizes the data on both groups by cataloging responses on clearance required into "absolute," "moderate," and "low." It will be seen from that table that the perceptions of the leadership and staff are in remarkably high agreement. This tends to confirm the proposition suggested earlier that there is produced by the interaction between staff and leadership a consensual image of what constitutes the proper staff role.

TABLE 9.--Clearance required on press releases: leadership and staff perceptions compared

| Category | Response Numbers |  | Number of Responses* |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Leadership | Staff | Leadership | Staff |
| 1. Absolute clearance required | 1 | 1 | 9 ( 56.25) | 10 ( 45.4) |
| 2. Moderate clearance required | 2,3,4 | $\begin{aligned} & 2,3,4, \\ & 5,6 \end{aligned}$ | 6 ( 37.4) | 11 ( 50.0) |
| 3. Low clearance required | 5 | 7 | 1 ( 6.35) | $1(4.6)$ |
| Total |  |  | 16 (100.0) | 22 (100.0) |

Note: For leadership responses see Table 6, Chapter V. For staff responses see Table 8, Chapter 6.
"Percentages in parentheses.
${ }^{13}$ See Chapter V, Table 6.

To further probe the attitudes of professional staff members relative to the amount of discretion they perceive to be rightfully theirs in the writing of press releases the following hypothetical questions were asked: 14

1. "In writing press releases, you have one release planned but a new situation demands a revision of your original statement. Are you expected to contact your boss or can you go ahead and revise the statement?
2. If something comes up that you think would make a good release, if you cannot clear it with your boss, do you bury it, release it, or what?"

The data, summarized in Tables 10 and 11 suggest that, just as the political leadership actually delegated to staff personnel less discretionary power than it theoretically deemed to be desirable, staff members see themselves as reacting with greater freedom when asked theoretical questions than they actually describe themselves as having when queried concerning concrete situations.

It is interesting to compare staff and leadership responses (summarized in Tables 12 and 13) to the same hypothetical questions. Professional staffers generally perceive themselves as having less discretion to revise press releases than the leadership appears willing to grant. This response pattern is probably a reflection by the professional staff member of the fact that, in practice, political leaders

[^44]TABLE 10.--Staff perceptions of their right to revise press releases

| Coded Response | Number of Responses* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| Staff member must contact political leader befcre making decisions | $2(18.2)$ | $2(28.6)$ | 4 ( 22.3) |
| Staff member may make minor revisions without contacting political leader if policy position is not affected | $4(36.4)$ | $1(14.2)$ | $5(27.7)$ |
| Staff member may revise press release if policy position is already established | $2(18.2)$ | $2(28.6)$ | $4(22.3)$ |
| Staff member may revise press release completely on own initiative | $3(27.2)$ | $2(28.6)$ | $5(27.7)$ |
| Total | 11 (100.0) | $7(100.0)$ | 18 (100.0) |

[^45]TABLE 1l.--Staff perceptions of their right to initiate press releases

| Coded Response | Number of Responses* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| 1. Staff member must "bury" release | 2 (22.2) | $2(33.3)$ | ( 26.6) |
| 2. Staff member may initiate release only in emergency | 2 (22.2) | 0 (0) | ( 13.4 ) |
| 3. Staff member may initiate release if approved by other staff member | 1 ( 11.2) | $0(0)$ | ( 6.8) |
| 4. Staff member may initiate release if on already established policy | $2(22.2)$ | $2(33.3)$ | ( 26.6 ) |
| 5. Staff member may initiate release under any circumstance | $2(22.2)$ | $2(33.3)$ | ( 26.6 ) |
| Total | $9(100.0)$ | 6 ( 99.9) | (100.0) |

*Percentages in parentheses

TABLE 12.--Right of staff personnel to revise press releases: staff and leadership perceptions compared

|  | Category | Response Numbers |  |  | Number of Responses* |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Leadership |  | Staff |  | adership |  | Staff |
| 1 | No revision permitted |  | 1 | 1 | 9 | $(45.0)$ | 4 | (22.3) |
| 2. | Moderate revision permitted |  | 2 | 2,3 | 2 | (10.0) | 9 | (50.0) |
| 3. | Complete revision permitted |  | 3 | 4 | 9 | (45.0) |  | (27.7) |

Note: For leadership responses see Table 7, Chapter V. For staff responses see Table 10, Chapter VI.
*Percentages in parentheses

TABLE 13.--Right of staff personel to initiate press releases: staff and leadership perceptions compared

| Category |  | Response Numbers |  | Number of Responses* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Leadership | Staff | Leadership |  | Staff |
| 1. | No initiative permitted | 1 | 1 | 5 (55.5) | 4 | (26.6) |
| 2. | Moderate initiative permitted | - 2 | 2,4 | 1 (11.2) | 6 | (39.9) |
| 3. | Complete initiative permitted | - 3 | 3,5 | 3 (33.3) | 5 | (33.3) |

Note: For leadership responses see Table 8, Chapter V. For staff responses see Table ll, Chapter 6.
*Percentages in parentheses
actually do delegate less authority than they theoretically deem desirable. Leadership and staff perceptions on the right to initiate releases are basically similar.

A great many members of the staff, however, do perceive an area within which they are free to exercise a moderate amount of discretionary authority. As one Republican staffer put it, "Generally, I won't release anything without letting ___ know what is in it although sometimes this is difficult to do." Another Republican said, "Releases would go out and $\qquad$ wouldn't even know it. I usually cleared them with ___ (a staff member) so I knew it was safe."

In summary, staff respondents were rated on the basis of all relevant questions regarding their general attitude toward the amount of initiative them might rightfully take in the preparation and releasing of press statements. Three categories of analysis were established as follows:

1. Respondent feels that staff should take initiative in the drafting and releasing of press statements.
2. Respondent feels that staff should take such initiative only in emergencies.
3. Respondent feels that staff should not take the initiative in such matters but rather clear all press releases with the political leadership.

These ratings are presented in Table 14. It is clear from the table that the generalization stated earlier to the effect that while staff members do not view themselves as being in a position of discretion relative to the drafting

TABLE 14.--Summary ratings of professional staff on their attitude toward discretion in the handing of press releases

| Category | Number of Responses* |  |  |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| I | $3(27.3)$ | 1 (14.3) | 4 (22.2) |
| II | $7(63.6)$ | 5 (71.4) | 12 (66.7) |
| III | $1(9.1)$ | 1 (14.3) | 2 (11.1) |

Note: Numbers refer to categories of analysis presented on preceding page.
*Percentages in parentheses
of policy statements but do perceive themselves as having the authority to act fairly freely within an established policy framework, is valid.

Correspondence. Staff members have a substantial amount of authority to handle correspondence coming into the office. Over 78 per cent of the respondents indicated that they answer their "boss's" mail and 63.6 per cent of this group have either complete responsibility for all letters coming into the office or responsibility for all letters affecting his area of specialty.

Clearance is not as crucial a factor in correspondence as it is in the issuing of press releases. Thirty per cent stated that they had complete autonomy over whether or not a politician was consulted in a piece of correspondence and an additional 30 per cent stated that they cleared only
those letters involving policy not already arrived at. However, they reported that most politicians read over letters drafted for them before they leave the office. This practice constitutes an automatic check on all staff-drafted correspondence.

Field organization. Respondents involved in field organization activities were asked to indicate whether or not they were permitted to exercise initiative in the following activities associated with their work: (I) set up local meetings, (2) recruit local workers, (3) spend money on local projects, and (4) recruit people to run for public office. 15

A rank order of negative responses to each of these items reveals that control is tightest over the purse-strings and the recruitment of candidates; almost non-existent over the creation of local campaign organization. These data are presented in Table 15.

It is interesting to note the manner in which these data reflect the realities of the power structure in Michigan's political parties. At first glance it might appear difficult to see why the political leadership seemingly is unconcerned about delegating authority to professional staff people relative to recruiting local workers and setting up local meetings while being chary about permitting them to recruit candidates. That is, if it be assumed that precinct workers form the hard-core of the county and state convention

[^46]TABLE 15.--Initiative permitted staff members in field organization activities

| Function | Number of Responses |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats |  | Republicans |  | Total |  |
|  | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Set up local meetings | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 1 |
| Recruit local workers | 2 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 11 | 1 |
| Recruit people to run for public office | 3 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| Spend money on local projects | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 9 |

delegates, one would think that the leadership would hesitate to delegate to staff people the authority to recruit such people. However, in Michigan, local party workers are effectively isolated from the power structure of state legislation which grants to the successful party candidates in each county the sole power to choose county party officers. Thus, the power to recruit precinct workers does not provide the professional staff with any real potential power because these people are never in a position to challenge the party leadership.

It is also important to note that Democratic staff members, in contrast to Republicans, do have the power to recruit candidates. Two explanations can be advanced to explain this difference. First, it is suggested that the
relatively high level of agreement and homogeneity in the Democratic Party permits the delegation of this function. Given the factional nature of the Republican Party, staff decisions in this area would constantly place the state party leadership in a potentially compromised position both in the counties themselves and in relation to the various wings of the party. Second, since the Democratic Party does not have a strong organization in many of Michigan's counties, their problem is that of getting people to appear on the ballot and, thus, it is willing to procure them by whatever means possible. Republicans, on the other hand, do not have this problem except in Wayne County. Rather, their problem is that of maintaining intra-county and inter-factional harmony.

## Staff attitudes toward their decision-making role.

 Staff respondents were asked a number of questions designed to probe their perceptions of the general role they play in decision-making situations within the party. In answer to the question as to whether they work under close supervision or whether they are allowed a good deal of freedom to organize their own activities, ${ }^{16}$ all but one of the 22 respondents indicated that they work substantially free of supervision by the political leadership. It is important, however, to note the varying manner in which staff people perceive the limits of this freedom. Five categories of responses weredetected. One group stated that their functions were essentially self generating.

I generally develop my own programs and carry them out. I just tell__(a secretary) where I am going to be.

I'm not supervised in any way. I consult with ___ but basically work out problems myself.

We've worked out a mutual arrangement between___ and myself. Generally ___ (a staff colleague) and I pigure out what our problems are and structure our own program. The county committee almost always OK's it.

Another group of respondents described their situation as involving a substantial amount of freedom but within a preexisting policy framework.

I am hired as his advisor and consultant and know what I am supposed to do. __ approves things after I have done them ninety per cent of the time.

I define my own job but it flows out of ___s speaking schedule and toward his objectives.

There was a good deal of freedom within a policy framework. The governor had been in office so long we knew his commitments and predelictions; what he rould accept and what he would reject.

For others, freedom of action stemmed from close association and consultation with their political superiors.

Plenty of freedom but lots of communication. Communication is a better word than freedom.

Supervision is very loose. Sometimes I won't see for a week, but we keep in close touch by phone.

One respondent stated that his freedom resulted primarily from his personal relationship with his superior. A fifth group stated that they obtained their independence of action by default.

I had a good deal of freedom but this was due to our lack of staff. If I had been with $\qquad$ more during the campaign, the supervision would have been closer.

Probably I was supervised more because we were together a lot. Others on the staff took more initiative.

In an attempt to probe more closely the role staff members perceive themselves playing in decision-making, respondents were asked whether they felt that their work largely preceeded the making of decisions by the politician or whether it was largely that of "implementing decisions already arrived at. ${ }^{17}$ of the 26 respondents queried, 62.9 per cent stated that their work preceeded the making of decisions and that this involved them in policy. 18 As one staff member said, who was asked whether he had a hand in deciding policy relative to fund-raising activities or whether this function was limited to "top party brass," "I am a part of the top brass. We could run a lottery and there is nothing _could do about it." Other typical responses are as follows:

A good staff person anticipates problems and takes them up with the party leadership.

I had influence on is policies. It is hard to say whether it was actual influence on policy or influence at the "idea hatching" stage. I certainly could turn off the valve if necessary.

Most policy is the result of staff recommendation.
${ }^{17}$ Appendix $D$, question 12.
${ }^{18}$ In addition, 23 per cent stated that they participate in minor decisions and 7.8 per cent (two respondents) said that their role was entirely implementory in nature.

They always want to know the public relations implications of policy.

I think I influence $\qquad$ on tax matters.

The respondents reported certain types of conditions as being conducive to staff influence. 19 The most commonly cited circumstance ( 42.8 per cent of responses) was the absence or unavailability of the political leader. The second most common occasion for influence ( 38.1 per cent) occurred either when the politician lacked the relevant information on a matter or when the staff person, particularly in the case of public relations, was clearly the expert on the problem. It is interesting to note that two respondents felt that their influence increased when the politician for whom they worked was available and decreased when he was absent from the scene.

Staff respondents perceive themselves as having an advice giving function but not having anything approaching a monopoly on either information or wisdom. Only two of the 27 respondents ( 7.4 per cent) who were asked whether their "boss ever asks their advice on major policy questions," 20 responded negatively. The remainder all indicated that they were consulted on policy questions with tow-thirds of the group stating that they were consulted on a wide range of issues.

Most of the respondents also feel that the political leadership follows their advice. Of the 25 professional staff people queried on this point, only two (one from each
${ }^{19}$ Appendix $D$, question 12, a.
${ }^{20}$ Appendix $D$, question 14.
party) responded negatively while 60 per cent stated that their suggestions were followed quite closely.

The fact that staff members do not view themselves as having anything resembling a monopoly on information is born out by the questioning on the capacity of the political leadership to evaluate the staff advice provided them. Only one respondent (a Republican) stated that his political superior did not have sufficient knowledge and background to evaluate advice given him. ${ }^{21}$ An additional 7 ( 28 per cent) stated that it was either limited or depended on the subject matter. On the other hand, 68 per cent stated that the political leadership has a good deal of background. In fact, 12 of 17 ( 70.6 per cent) respondents stated that their political superior had substantial expertise in the staff person's specialty. ${ }^{22}$

While professional staff personnel do not view themselves as the font of all wisdom, they are willing to contend for the acceptance of their ideas. When asked what they would do if their pet idea were pigeon-holed by the political leadership, 29.6 per cent of the respondents stated that they would drop the issue whereas the majority indicated that they would raise it again. However, although a few respondents indicated that they would take it up with other party leaders or persons outside the party, there was a good

[^47]deal of resistance, to "short-circuiting" the leadership. Role acceptance, as was earlier mentioned, appears to be quite characteristic of the professional staff.

General attitude toward discretion. We have seen that staff persons generally manifest caution toward assuming discretionary power in their day to day tasks and duties. Similar attitudes were displayed in answer to a number of general questions dealing with the problem of discretion in their party. The purpose of this section is to discover what their attitude toward the delegation of power and discretion is generally. That is, is their cautionary spirit a part of their general outlook or a function of the particular employment situation in which they find themselves.

First, it is important to note that the staff respondents interviewed feel that they have sufficient discretion to "adequately do their jobs." 23 In fact, three respondents ( 12 per cent) stated that too much discretion is granted to staff personnel. These dataare presented in Table 16.

While most of the respondents do not feel the necessity to expand their discretionary power in order to more adequately fulfill their functions and tasks, they do not take this position because they see any danger in staff specialists usurping prerogatives rightfully those of the political leadership. This is born out in the answers given

TABLE 16.--Perceptions by staff members of the adequacy of their discretionary power

| Coded Response | Number of Responses* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| 1. Staff has too much discretionary power | 1 ( 7.7) | $2(16.6)$ | 3 ( 12.0) |
| 2. Staff had adequate discretionary power | 10 ( 76.9) | 6 ( 50.0 ) | 16 ( 64.0) |
| 3. Staff has adequate discretionary power - but respondent would like to have more | 1 (7.7) | 1 (8.4) | 2 ( 8.0) |
| 4. Staff has inadequate discretionary power | 1 (7.7) | $3(25.0)$ | $4(16.0)$ |
| Total | 13 (100.0) | $12(100.0)$ | 25 (100.0) |

to the following question: "Some people say that staff specialists make decisions that should only be made by elected officials. Do you think that this is true? ${ }^{24}$ Eighty-four per cent answered negatively and almost the same percentage also indicated that this had never happened in their organization or office.

These same attitudes were double-checked at the end of the interview when respondents were asked, "Do you feel
that the amount of discretion you take in your job in any way violates the manner in which the official party leadership is representative of the rank and file party member? 25 Although answers to this question varied considerably, on balance, only two of the 22 respondents queried on this matter answered affirmatively. Essentially five reasons were given for why discretion granted to staff members does not "short-circuit" representation within the party. First, it was universally pointed out that the political leadership exercises control over the appointment and removal of staff personnel. As one Democratic staff member stated, "There is very little possibility of a hard-core political staff running the show. Most staffs come and go with a change in leadership. If the politician were a complete stranger to government a new man would need orientation. However, he can always bring in a new staff." Second, the leadership has control over the "out-put" of the staff. Typical of the responses reflecting this viewpoint are the following:

Although we have freedom, a great many eyes read your stuff before it goes out. As soon as you reflect your own opinions you get questioned.

Nothing is forced upon anyone. It is always subject to approval. I am always aware of the man I'm working for. I'm a hired hand.

Third, staff irresponsibility is curtailed as a result of their internalzing or otherwise being integrated into the value system of the party. As one Republican staffer stated,

$$
25 \text { Appendix } \mathrm{D} \text {, question } 44 .
$$

"We are not that much out of touch." Fourth, in cases where the politician has seen long service in office, his experience and personal skills enable him to dominate his staff. Typical responses reflecting this viewpoint are the following:

Although $\qquad$ consults with his staff, he has been here longer than any staff member and thus provides the real continuity for the office.
is so closely knit with the party that he keeps the staff and the party together.

A fifty type of response sees the representative principle best protected by a strong staff capable of providing leadership for and continuity to the party. One party staffer put it this way: "The staff is always subject to supervision and control of party leaders. The greater danger is that we will not develop sufficient staff continuity." 0 as a Republican respondent put it, "The staff under an unsure candidate does not have any strength. He will not use them or protect them - he listens to everybody." Other typical comments were:

## People want leadership. There should be a super-party cabinet of politicians and staff people to exercise leadership.

It is important to keep differences of opinion built into the staff.

Even those respondents who expressed mild concern about the possibilities of usurpation of authority by the staff, felt that there are sufficient safe-guards built into the system.
and I talk together on how to handle issues. Yet $\overline{s t a f f}$ does not have undue influence. Before policy statements are made they have to be cleared. A staff operation allowed to run unchecked would be bad. They should not be allowed to make decisions on major issues.

Rank and file party members lack knowledge. Staff people who have knowledge can wield influence. However, I doubt if intelligent political leadership will let the staff run away with the ball. They can get rid of staff just as a corporation can shuffle executives.

To further probe the general attitudes of the staff respondents on discretion they were asked a series of questions designed to ascertain their attitudes toward the discretion exercised in other areas of government and politics. These questions are as follows: ${ }^{26}$

1. Do you feel that a politician's decisions should reflect primarily the thinking of his constituents or his own convictions?
2. Do you feel that legislators consulting with legislative representatives or labbyists in any way represents a violation of the American system of representative government?
3. How often do you feel that our state and federal administrative agencies run things independently of legislative or political control?
4. In your opinion, to what extent do you feel that the public is capable of making a rational decision relative to a major public issue?

With reference to question number one above, only four ( 26.6 per cent) of the 15 respondents queried indicated that the opinions of a politician's constituients should be the sole determinant of his decisions. The remaining 73 per cent indicated that the decision-maker's own viewpoint should enjoy at least equal weight with that of his

[^48]constituents. Similarly, none of the staff respondents feel that the practice of consulting with lobbyists constitutes a violation of the American system of representative government. However, a substantial number ( 37.5 per cent) felt that state and federal administrative agencies sometimes act independently of legislative or political control. Finally, eleven ( 84.6 per cent) of the thirteen respondents queried felt that there are limitations to the public's ability to make a rational decision relative to a major public issue.

Thus, while the smallness of the sample precludes an over interpretation of the responses, the evidence appears to indicate that staff members generally do not take an overly cautious attitude toward discretion in other areas of government. Rather, staff members generally see the need to delegate responsibility to competent administrative agencies, to secure expert advice when needed, and the need for public officials to exercise leadership in public affairs. Consequently, one is driven to accept the notion advanced earlier that there are factors in the work situation itself that produce staff caution. 27

## Staff Attitudes Toward their Relationship with the Political Leadership

It was reported in Chapter $V$ that the political leadership perceives the relationships existing between themselves
and the party staff to be relatively intimate and close. "The staff are our partners. . . ${ }^{28}$ How do the members of the professional staff view this relationship? Do they perceive themselves as being colleagues or subordinates of the politicians? How do they perceive the attitudes of the politicians toward them?

The fact that professional staff members, as has already been pointed out, feel themselves to be quite free to organize their own work is indicative of the fact that there is neither a formal nor rigid superordinate-subordinate relationship between the leadership and the staff. However, it is important to see the extent to which staff members feel pressured to agree (or feel the freedom to disagree) with their superiors on political matters, the circumstances under which they will resist such pressure and the factors producing rapport (or the lack of it) with the political leadership.

Michigan party staff members tend to manifest a high degree of political agreement with the political leadership although there is a substantial amount of grumbling about minor differences. Of the 25 respondents queried on this matter, 40 per cent indicated that they have no disagreements with the leadership while 60 per cent report basic political agreement but with some minor disagreements on strategy, etc. Republicans tended to report more such disagreements (75

See Chapter V, p. 212.
per cent) than did Democrats (46.1 per cent). This, however, was primarily a reflection of the fact that Republican staffers must take directions from, and attempt to harmonize the viewpoints of, two conflicting and fairly evenly balanced party factions. This is born out by the fact that, of the five respondents who reported ever disagreeing with their political superiors on issues, four were Republicans. The most common source of disagreement was over strategy and tactics with eleven respondents reporting this; five reported disagreements over issues and two disagreements over management problems.

Although a fairly high percentage of the respondents reported having some disagreement with their political superiors, there was a very high manifestation of loyalty to the leadership. This was brought out in a series of questions having to do with the attitudes of staffers toward party factional fights. Although 15 of the 22 ( 68 per cent) respondents queried had found themselves in the middle of a factional dispute in their party at some point in their careers, only three indicated that, under such circumstances, their first loyalty would lie with the faction they agree with rather than to their political superior. Of these three (all Republican) two had been recruited from the rank and file of the party and thus had previously achieved positions in the ranks of the middle leadership; the other came to associate himself with a specific wing of the party after he had become a member of the staff.

In short, party staffers manifest a high degree of identification with the leadership. As one respondent put it, "A staff member is never an entrepeneur. He is an arm of the politician." This identification is particularly strong in the Democratic Party where staff members are recruited largely for their ideological affinity for the party. In the Republican Party, on the other hand, where there is a conscious attempt by the state leadership to perpetuate the concept of neutrality, this identification also persists although it may be directed toward the value of intra-factional neutrality.

Similarly, a majority of party staff members feel that ideological identification with the party is the only basis for effective staff work. 29 As one Democratic staffer said, "The essence of this job is balancing non-technical (ideological) with technical public relations considerations. Thus, your basic philosophical commitment is important. You cannot be neutral in a job like this." Another staffer said, "Unless you believe in the program you cannot be onehundred per cent effective. Staff members must be loyal to
$\qquad$ and his convictions." Contrary to what might have been expected, Republican staff respondents hold to this position with substantially the same intensity as do Democrats. These data are summarized in Table 17.

[^49]TABLE 17.--Perceptions by professional staff members of the place of personal convictions in party staff work

| Coded Response | Number of Responses* |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democrats | Republicans | Total |
| 1. Compatible convictions between leadership and staff only basis for effective staff work | 8 (66.7) | 5 (45.4) | 13 (56.5) |
| 2. Staff convictions basis for making suggestions only | 0 ( 0) | 1 ( 9.1) | 1 ( 4.4) |
| 3. Staff convictions important only when clash of opinion occurs within party | 0 ( 0) | 2 (18.2) | $2(8.7)$ |
| 4. Personal convictions have no role in the job-staff person implements leadership decisions only | 4 ( 33.3) | 3 (27.3) | 7 (30.4) |

Patterns of access. The high degree of identification with the political leadership displayed by the professional staff members reflects itself in their attitudes toward the legitimizing of certain channels of access to the leadership and the locus of decision-making. It should be pointed out, first of all, that the Michigan party staffs, with the possible exception of the governor's office, are not bureaucratically organized. Rather, the general pattern of organization is for staffers to be clustered in cells
with a single political leader as the nucleus. There is a good deal of communication and cooperation between cells, but primary allegiance is retained within the cell. For example, all of the respondents report working directly under an immediate political leader. Three of these obtain a portion of their instructions from other staff members and one allocates a portion of his time to a second politician. 30 Thus, access to the leadership and to the party decisional centers is direct. That is, members of the professional staff do not, as a general rule, have to channel communications through a bureaucratic hierarchy in order to reach the political leadership. 31

Since access is relatively simple, direct, and unencumbered, staff members evidence a high degree of satisfaction with their ability to see the "boss" when necessary and to engage in sufficient discussion to explore their ideas and get their work done. In addition, staff members do not evidence any perceived need to "short circuit" 32 the
${ }^{30}$ Appendix D , question 8.
$31_{\text {The }}$ one possible exception is the Governor's Office where the Executive Secretary, in his capacity as chief of staff assigns duties to subordinates, screens ideas, press releases, etc., emanating from the staff. The Executive Secretary does not, however, constitute a major barrier between the individual staff member and the Governor or a member of the Administrative Board, but rather, serves as a coordinator of staff activity.

32For instance, respondents were asked, "To what extent are there people on the staff that take too many things on themselves - make decisions without consulting the boss? The results are as follows:
communication system to function effectively nor is it upsetting to them when the leadership consults with persons outside the staff. 33 In short, staff members find themselves in a diffused access system which, while producing occasional chaos, allows for as free an exchange of viewpoints as possible.

The evidence appears to indicate, however, that even within a diffuse access pattern there emerge fairly stable centers of leadership within the staff structure with which the political leadership carries on systematic consultation. Respondents were probed as to which staff member within their party they felt had the greater amount of "influence with the boss than others." 34 The top public relations person in each party was named by eleven of the twelve respondents queried. Four of the eleven bracketed another name with that of the public relations person but none of those received more than a single mention. Competence was cited by eleven of the twelve respondents as the major factor producing influence. However, in each case, the person named had had a long term of service on the job, and was Democrats Republicans Total

| 1. | Happens is | 1 ( 8.4)* | $2(25.0)$ |  | ) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2. | Happens infrequently | 5 (41.6) | $3(37.5)$ |  | (40.0) |
| 3. | Never happens | 6 (50.0) | $3(37.5)$ |  | (45.0) |

It is interesting to note that Republican staffers perceive this as happening more frequently than Democrats. (*percentages in parentheses).

33 Appendix $D$, questions $36,36, a, 36, b$. 34 Appendix $D$, question 30 .
considered to be the strategy expert in the party. These persons constituted a stable consultative center within a diffuse access system.

It should also be noted that the system of access extends beyond the four walls of the office. Political leaders and staff engage in a fair amount of "mixing" at social functions and politicians are also usually invited to staff parties. Whereas in most bureaucratic and/or corporate structures such activities provide the only occasions for diffuse access, for party people such occasions are merely extentions of the working situation. 35

In contrast to the political leadership, however, the professional staff is substantially isolated from the party rank and file. Although all of sixteen respondents stated that they have contact with rank and file members of the party as an outgrowth of their jobs, only three stated that they were involved in "volunteer" party work and only two considered themselves to be actually a part of a party faction. One interacted socially with party rank-and-filers. 36

## Intra-Staff Relationships

It is postulated in Chapter I that certain features of the "group life" of the party staff organization will help to determine its power position in the party.

[^50]Specifically, it is suggested that the extent to which the staff monopolizes channels of party communication and displays a fairly high degree of unanimity and agreement of purpose, it will tend to maximize its influence on or over policy. The extent to which the conditions essential to unanimity and staff control of the party machinery is the subject of this section.

A majority ( 87.5 per cent) of staff respondents from both parties stated that they were in basic political agreement with the other members of the staff. ${ }^{37}$ This is particularly true for the Democratic Party where only one of thirteen respondents replied negatively. Democratic staff members, however, do differ with each other on such matters as the approach the party should take on public statements and campaign techniques. This was particularly true during the 1959 tax fight in Michigan which produced a fairly distinct cleavage between certain staff members.

Although the evidence on this point is far from massive, the interviews suggest that although party staffs enjoy basic ideological agreement there is sufficient

> 37Party totals are as follows:

Democrats Republicans Total

1. Staff in basic political agreement
2. Staff not in basic political agreement
[^51]12 (93.2)* 9 (77.7) 21 (87.5)
1 (7.7) 2 (22.3) 3 (12.5)
disagreement over specific issues, strategy and tactics (in all, 32 per cent cited some disagreement) to reduce the extent to which the party staff is capable of effective group action. This is augmented by the diffuse nature of the access system which reduces a sense of team solidarity on the part of the staff. This conclusion is supported by the results of a series of questions about the manner in which staff personnel carry on their work. Thus, while all of the respondents interviewed stated that they consult with each other, i.e., 89 per cent stated that consultation was frequent, only 47.6 per cent stated that staff members ever discuss the strategy of getting a proposal accepted by the leadership. As one staff member said, "This occasionally happens, but the relationship is so close that there is little need for this." Typical of the other statements reflecting this attitude are:

There is no attempt to present a sales talk. We present the advantages and the disadvantages of a proposal.

The staff always operates within a framework of what they (politicians) will buy.

We try it out for size, but I don't want to give the impression that the staff ever gangs up on the leadership and plots strategy.

In short, the high degree of role acceptance manifested by the staff tends to forestall the development of "cabalism" on the part of the staff. This tendency is further reduced by the fact that staff members maintain contacts with individual professionals and professional groups outside the party. Staff members with journalistic backgrounds, for
instance, tend to consult with the press corps; those with academic, labor or business background are influenced by those groups. Thus, there is continuously flowing into the staff group a whole range of influences and attitudes which negate the reinforcement process which might occur if the staff operated as a cohesive, air-tight unit.

## Conclusion

## Composite Staff Perceptions: Acceptance

 of SubordinationThere emerges from the data of these interviews a fairly clear picture of the manner in which professional staff people perceive their role in the party, a perception very much akin to that held by the political leadership. Party staffers of both parties agree that, although they bring a substantial amount of skill to the functions of the party, effectively apply that skill to party problems and have an impact on party decisions, these activities are exercised within and subordinate to the ideological and decisional framework established by the party leaders. Staff members evidence a distinct tendency to want to escape final responsibility for party decisions. They view themselves as advice givers rather than decision-makers. There appears to be almost no tendency among staff people to want to "run things themselves." They view as most helpful for effective staff work, traits that are conducive to commitment and docility and tend to perceive each other as possessing these traits.

These attitudes, highly unbureaucratic in many respects, are probably a reflection of the fact that the party staff structure is not bureaucratic in nature. Staff positions are not structured in a hierarchy nor is access to the decisional centers of the parties remote. Access, as we have seen, is direct and decisions are usually collective. The staff, as far as party strategy is concerned, is a part of the actual leadership itself. This crucial factor - the nonbureaucratic nature of the party staff structure - and the relative ease of access which results from it, has some definitely functional effects upon the entire staff operation.

First, ease of access produces staff responsibility. That is, the almost daily contact that exists between the staff and the leadership enables the latter to both mold and control staff deliberations. This continuous molding process serves as a link in the chain binding the professional staff to the party. 38 At the same time, this intense interaction coupled with the cellular structure of the staff structure eliminates a good deal of bureaucratic in-fighting.

On the other side of the coin, ease of access actually serves to heighten the innovating role of the party professional because he is in a position to influence the leadership directly.
$38_{\text {For }}$ a more extensive discussion of this point see Lyman Bryson, "Notes on a Theory of Adyice," Header in Bureaucracy, ed. Robert K. Merton, Alisa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey and Hanan C. Selvin (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), 202-216.

## The congruency of role expectations between the

 political leadership and the staff. We have noted throughout this chapter the relatively high degree of agreement between the leadership and the staff on what constitutes the proper role of the staff in discretionary matters. We have seen, for instance, that staff members are basically satisfied with the extent of their discretionary power, seemingly do not which to impose their own preconceived ideas upon the leadership or, as one respondent put it, "run away with the ball," and in general, manifest substantial caution in usurping any of the functions or prerogatives of the leadership. Role acceptance ("I'm a hired hand.") is high. What is the explanation for this in the light of a substantial body of literature demonstrating that "pathological" and deviationist behavior is endemic to bureaucratic organizations?The data of this study tend to indicate, as has been previously mentioned, that some set of factors in the over-all organizational structure produces a consensual image of what constitutes the proper staff role.

A number of hypotheses can be advanced to explain this phenomena. First, as Riecken and Homans suggest, consensus within a group may be primarily a function of the similarity in social background of the members and the length of time they have been in interaction with each other. 39 While it is true that the leadership and the staff

39Henry W. Riecken and George C. Homans, "Psychological Aspects of Social Structure," Handbook of Social Psychology,
share relatively similar cultural backgrounds, i.e., their socio-economic status is similar as measured by such indices as education and income, neither length in office on the part of the leadership nor the average job tenure of the staff members warrants the conclusion that these factors exercise the prime causal effect upon the role consensus noted. 40 Furthermore, Neal Gross and his associates, in their study of role consensus between school superintendents and school board members, tested these two variables and concluded that there is no relationship between length of interaction and role consensus; and ". . . only very limited support for the homogeneity hypothesis. ${ }^{41}$

Second, it might be postulated that the role consensus displayed by the political leadership and the staff is an example of the staff's conforming to the expectations of the leadership, either initially through the imposition of

> ed. Gardner Lindzey (Campbridge, Mass.: Adison Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1954), p. 788.
> 40 Length of service of the 28 staff members interviewed is as follows:

## Percentage

1. One year or less

$$
22.5
$$

2. One and one-half year or less
3. Three years or less

$$
50.0
$$

4. Five years or less
5. Six years or more

41 Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role (New York: John S. Wiley and Sons, 1958), pp. 180, 186.
external authority upon the staff member or later through the gradual internalization of group and/or party values. 42 There is a fair amount of support for this hypothesis in the data of the study. It has already been seen that staff members view party work as highly unstable employment and recognize the right of the leadership to replace staff as a major check upon their activities. As one party staff member who had survived a number of changes in party leadership put it, "Each chairman has a concept of his job and I had to be acceptable to them."

While, on the one hand, the deprivations resulting from deviation are highly visible to staff people and thus may serve as a deterent to deviation, on the other hand, the very tenuousness of party staff employment could produce a "who cares" attitude on the part of staff. Thus, while there is little doubt but what the imposition of values by the leadership upon the staff does occur, it is necessary to evaluate at least one other possible explanation for the role consensus displayed between the two sets of respondents.

Thus, third, it is postulated that the nature of the interaction between staff and leadership tends to produce a consensual image as to what constitutes the proper staff role. Specifically, the fact that the staff has relatively direct access to the politicians and to party decision-making

[^52]centers produces role consensus in the following ways:
Ease of access enables staff to have a direct influence over the attitudes taken by the leadership on the proper staff role. (2) Ease of access reduces the difficulties placed in the way of performance that would occur if staff were expected to accomplish certain tasks without either discretionary power or access. (3) Continuous consultation obviates the need for extreme discretionary power. (4) Ease of access provides the staff with a sense of participation in decisions and reinforces his commitment to group norms. 43

In summary, the consensual image of what constitutes the proper staff role on the part of both the political leadership and the staff is accounted for by three interrelated factors:

1. The instability of party staff employment may produce conditions under which the role perceptions of the leadership are readily superimposed upon the staff.
2. The direct access system, characteristic of the

43n An organization, therefore, must have an interaction and mutual influence process such that, consistent with their goals and needs, all persons who have an interest in the organization and its activities are able to exert at least some influence on the over-all objectives and decisions of the organization as well as be influenced by them. This interaction must function in such a way that the objectives and methods of functioning established for the organization are reasonably acceptable to all concerned and that major conflicts in interests have been reduced to a minimum." Rensis Likert, "A Motivational Approach to a Modified Theory of Organization and Management," Modern Organization Theory, ed. Mason Haire (New York: John S. Wiley and Sons, 1959), p. 205.
staff structure, produces both compatible role definitions on the part of both groups but also the conditions under which role acceptance is relatively acceptable to the staff and thus easy to achieve.
3. The values of the party organization as a whole (consistency of public message, factional unanimity, etc.) ". . . legitimize the various categories of relatively specific sub-goals and the operative procedures necessary for their attainment. 44

See Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations - I," Administrative Science Quarterly I (June, 1956), 68. Parsons states further, There will be normative rules. . or principles governing the integration of the organization, particularly in defining the obligations of loyalty of participants to the organization as compared with the loyalties they bear in other roles."

## CONCLUSION: THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PARTY STAFF ROLE

The preceeding sections of this study have attempted to describe the manner in which the political leadership and professional staff members in Michigan's two major political parties perceive and describe the role of the permanent professional staff in their party. Particular attention has been directed toward a comparison between the perceptions of leadership and staff respondents. The methodology has been basically descriptive, focusing upon the actual tasks, duties and activities of staff personnel.

It is the purpose of this chapter to return to the theories of how party staff structures are expected to function as laid out in Chapter I with the objective of determining whether or not the empirical data of the study tends to confirm or disconfirm those theories. Specifically, the chapter will attempt to (1) restate the basic theory of organization that served as a frame of reference for the study, (2) summarize the empirical findings of the study in relation to that theory; and (3) lay out the elements of a modified theory of organization to account for the data.

## The Search for a Conceptual Framework Continued ${ }^{1}$

The major purpose of this study of the professional staff in American state parties has been to elucidate the role played by a staff organization in a political party. More specifically, its purpose has been to determine the power position of a highly skilled, full-time, permanent staff group operating within an organization composed largely of volunteers. Thus, a conceptual framework around which to build an adequate theory of this relationship must contain the following elements. First, it must be capable of relating in a meaningful way the power positions of the three major elements within the total party structure, namely, (1) the professional staff, (2) the party leadership (office holders, state chairman, national committeeman, etc.), and (3) the rank and file party activist (state convention delegate, county chairman, precinct committeeman, etc.). Second, inasmuch as the focus of the investigation has been on the role played by organization in the production and maximization of power, ${ }^{2}$ such a framework must adequately describe the power role of organization per se and organized sub-groups within a political organization, i.e., a voluntary association bound together by informal, consensual relationships. It was suggested in Chapter I that three theories in

[^53]in the literature of political science potentially provide such a framework, namely, skill-elite theory, bureaucratic theory and the "law of oligarchy."

Each of the above theories, however, while emphasizing certain aspects of the power producing and power maximizing role of organization, fail both to encompass all of the elements needed in an adequate theory and to differentiate clearly between each other. Skill-elite theory, for instance, takes into account the importance and potential power of expertise in a technological society but fails to deal with the problem of the weakness of unorganized expertise. Bureaucratic theory, on the other hand, comes to grips with the problem of organized skill but deals with it only when arranged in some formal fashion. Bureaucratic and skillelite theory merge in the sense that bureaucratic organization, as viewed by Weber, is primarily a method of mobilizing and eventually monopolizing skills. For instance, Weber states,

The ruled. . cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus or authority once it exists. For this bureaucracy rests upon expert training, a functional specialization of work, and an attitude set for habitual and virtuoso-like mastery of simple yet methodically integrated functions. If the official stops working, or his work is forcefully interrupted, chaos results, and it is difficult to improvise replacements from among the governed who are fit to master such chaos. 3

3H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 229.

Finally, Michels, in his theory of oligarchy does not distinguish adequately between (1) formal organization and informal leadership clique; (2) between "oligarchy" and bureaucracy. The following statement from Michels may serve as an example:

In all the socialist parties there is a continual increase in the number of functions withdrawn from the electoral assemblies and transferred to the executive committees. In this way there is constructed a powerful and complicated edifice. The principle of division of labor coming more and more into operation, executive authority undergoes division and subdivision. Thus there is constituted a rigorously defined and hierarchical bureaucracy. In the catechism of party duties, the strict observance of hierarchical rules becomes the first article. This hierarchy comes into existence as the outcome of technical conditions, and its constitution is an essential postulate of the regular functioning of the party machine.

It is indisputable that the oligarchical and bureaucratic tendency of party organization is a matter of technical and practical necessity. It is the inevitable product of the very principle of organization. 4

It is the opinion of this writer that, in actuality, Michels'
"oligarchy" assumes power in political parties by obtaining control over the bureaucratic processes within the party. The party staff as an oligarchy. As was stated in Chapter I, the concept of oligarchy, in spite of its weaknesses, was chosen as the best framework around which to build a theory of the power role of the professional staff within a party structure. This choice was dictated by three basic considerations. First, the concept of oligarchy,

[^54]while containing a notion of the power of organized skill (as opposed to skill-elite theory) does not refer to a type of organization as does the term bureaucracy, but rather to a characteristic of organization, namely, freedom by the leadership from control by the rank and file party member and/or from other segments in the organization. Thus, Cassinelli, in his helpful exposition of Michels' theory defines oligarchy as

> part of the activities of which it consists, viz. the activities having the highest degree of authority (which have been called 'leadership' or executive' activities" are free from control by any of the remainder of the organizational activities.5 This definition makes it clear that oligarchy may or may not be present in an organization. Furthermore, the theory does not require that all persons holding office in the organization be considered a part of the oligarchy, as is true of a bureaucracy where all members of the administrative structure are a party of the bureaucracy. It merely states that when ". . , the people who hold positions of authority within a organization are not checked by those who hold subsidiary positions within the organization. . ." the organization is characterized by oligarchy. 6

Thus, second, the term can be applied to various types of organization. An oligarchy can be organized as a

[^55]clique or camarilla, as a para-military organization, or as a bureaucracy. 7 It is possible, therefore, when studying an organization to ask two pertinent questions about its power structure. First, is it characterized by a power center free from control by other elements? That is, does it contain an oligarchic element? Second, how is the actual or potential oligarchy structured? Or, to state it in a fashion more directly relevant to this study, what factors in its structure or organization enable it to function as an actual or potential oligarchy?

Third, the concept can be applied to various subgroups within an organization as a means of delineating the extent of their power position and as a means of providing the reasons for whatever power position they do hold. Thus, in viewing the power position of the rank and file, the proressional staff and the leadership in a political party it is possible to project the following possible oligarchic situations: Assuming that both or either the party leadership and the professional staff may be free from control by the party rank and file, (1) if both the party leadership and the professional staff are free from control by the other, they constitute competitive oligarchies; (2) if either the party leadership or the professional staff is controlled by the other, there exists a single oligarciny in the organization.

7 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties,trans. Barbara and Robert North, (New York: John Wiley and Soms. Inc., 1954), pp. 151-157.

In summary, the concept of oligarchy as used in this study is a means of combining in a meaningful manner two important theoretical elements in a description of the power position of an organized sub-group within a formal organization structure: (1) the extent of power (or freedom from control) enjoyed by the group, and (2) the manner in which that power is organized. The party leadership and the professional staff are conceptualized as actual or potential competing oligarchies; ${ }^{8}$ the former organized along the lines of a camarilla or clique, the latter organized bureaucratically.

The party staff as a bureaucracy. The professional staff, viewed in its power relation to the party at large as an actual or potential oligarchy, can be viewed structurally as a bureaucracy. 9 That is, while its power position within the party is potentially or actually oligarchic, its basic structure and method of functioning is viewed as essentially bureaucratic. If such is the case, it is to be expected that it will manifest certain bureaucratic tendencies.

There emerge from the literature of social science four general theories of (or approaches to) the behavior of

[^56]bureaucratic structures. These theories can be used as tools in the analysis of any structure believed to manifest certain bureaucratic characteristics.

First, the "classical" school ${ }^{10}$ of organizational theorists views a bureaucratic organization as essentially a machine. Each member of the organization is perceived as reacting uniformally and predictably to directions or cues from his superior. In turn, the entire structure is completely responsible to those that employ it.

March and Simon describe this approach in the follow-

## ing manner:

The environment (is) a well defined stimulus or system of stimuli. Each stimulus (e.g. an administrative order) evokes in the individual to whom it is directed a well defined and predictable psychological set. The set that is evoked by the stimulus includes a program for generating a specific behavioral response - the response that is appropriate to the stimulus in question. 11

It is the assumption of this study that the classical (or mechanistic) theory of bureaucratic behavior serves as the basic conception of the staff role on the part of the political leadership. That is, it was originally anticipated that the party leadership expected its staff people to function largely as a party "civil service"; to remain essentially politically neutral and to have an implementory rather than a decision-making role in the party. This assumption was tions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), pp. 12-33. ${ }^{11}$ Ibid., p. 34.
largely corroborated by the data although it was found that in a number of instances, staff people were virtually absorbed into the leadership itself. 12

A second general approach to the theory of bureaucratic behavior is that of Max Weber. Although his conception falls largely into the classical framework, in that he viewed bureaucratic organization as functioning as smoothly as a well-oiled machine, contrary to the Taylorites, he san clearly the superior power capable of being generated through the organization of skill. He stated,

The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production.

Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs - these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration. 13

Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter I, Weber held that bureaucratic organization holds a supreme power position vis-à-vis the masses, political representatives and even heads of state. ${ }^{14}$ Por Weber, a bureaucracy is, in actuality, an oligarchy.

This conception is basic to a number of assumptions in this study concerning the behavior of a professional party staff. It is assumed that a professional staff, by virtue
${ }^{12}$ See p. 219.
$13_{\text {Weber, op. cit., p. } 214 .}$
${ }^{14}$ Ibid., pp. 229, 232-235.
of its expertise will be in a power position Vis-à-vis the political leadership unless other factors are at work which reduce this monopoly of skill such as the existence of a highly knowledgeable political leadership with sources of information outside the professional staff.

A third approach developed largely as a criticism of the theories of Max Weber. Reacting against the legalrational model of bureaucracy propounded by Weber, such critics as Robert K. Merton, Philip Selznick, Alvin W. Gouldner and Chris Argyris elucidated the "pathological" tendencies inherent in a bureaucratic structure. For Merton, the pathological consequences of bureaucratic organization are attributable to dysfunctional learning. The executive leadership, placing greatest value on reliability of behavior, organizes the bureaucratic structure around three principles: (1) the institutionalization of rigid rules of behavior, (2) the use of categorization as a decision-making technique, and (3) the reduction in the extent of personalized relationships within the structure. 15

Each of the above principles, designed originally to insure reliability in the functioning of the bureaucracy, results ultimately in pathological behavior. Rules of behavior, originally designed to achieve organizational goals, become internalized by the bureaucrat and assume a value that is independent of the original organizational goals

[^57]they were meant to facilitate. ${ }^{16}$ The employment of categorization, i.e., standard procedures, as a decision-making technique results in the tendency to increasingly restrict the categories employed and to use the first formally applicable category rather than to search for other more feasible categories that might more adequately enhance the decision. 17 Reduction in the extent to which relationships within the organization are conducted on a personalized basis leads to the development at the lower levels of in-group solidarity, particularized interests and mutual defense against outside pressures. 18

Selznick sees the legal-rational bureaucracy as breaking down into dysfunctional competition. In short, his theory holds that delegation of tasks to specialized units leads to (1) an inevitable differentiation between organization goals and unit achievement and (2) bifurcation of interests between units. Thus there is produced competition for resources and a struggle for power both between the individual units themselves and between the individual unit and the organization as a whole. 19

For Gouldner, the necessity for rules in a bureaucratic structure results in the unanticipated consequence of laying out the minimal acceptable standards of behavior

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 16 \text { Ibid. }, \text { p. } 38 . \\
& 17_{\text {Ibid. }} \text {, p. } 34 . \\
& 18 \text { Ibid., pp. } 39-40 . \\
& 19 \text { Ibid. }
\end{aligned}
$$

for its members. Lack of such rules, however, produces uncertainty and doubt. 20

Finally, Argyris sees the mechanistic bureaucratic model manifesting pathological symptoms as a result of the dysfunctional effects of organization upon the human personality. Individuals, he argues, mature from an immature or infantile state (characterized behaviorally by passivity, dependence, subordination, etc.) to a mature or adult state (characterized by independence, self-direction, peer status, etc.). Pathological symptoms in a bureaucratic organization arise because the healthy adult is forced to participate in situations which require infantile behavior. That is, hierarchic organization, directive leadership and managerial controls automatically place the participant in a subordinate situation in which he is expected to manifest behavior which is essentially passive and dependent. As a result, participants in bureaucratic organizations will manifest aggressive, regressive and tensional symptoms and will relieve such feelings by such behavior as (1) non-involvement, (2) substituting personal goals for organizational goals, (3) creating informal groups to sanction deviant behavior, and (4) leaving the organization. 21
${ }^{20}$ Ibid., p. 44.
${ }^{21}$ Chris Argyris, "Understanding Human Behavior in Organizations: One Viewpoint," Modern Organizational Theory, ed., Mason Haire (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 115-154.

These four theories all contributed to the basic assumptions about the behavioral patterns of a professional, bureaucratically organized party staff in a political party as outlined in Chapter I. That is, if it be assumed that the professional party staff is organized bureaucratically, it follows that it can be expected to (1) develop its own frame of reference and values apart from the party leadership, (2) develop such dysfunctional learning processes as internalizing organizational rules, "playing it safe," etc., and (3) institutionalize its values and habits by the creation of a cohesive staff sub-group. In short, one might expect the party bureaucracy to seek freedom from control by the other elements in the party, i.e., seek oligarchic status, precisely because such status is the ultimate expression of the drive of bureaucratized units to institutionalize their values at the expense of the organization as a whole.

A fourth general theory of bureaucratic behavior is the motivational approach as outlined by Rensis Likert. 22 Becognizing the validity of the criticisms directed against mechanistic and/or legal-rational bureaucratic models, Likert suggests that group loyalty, which displays certain dysfunctional consequences, at the same time is helpful in motivating the participants in bureaucratic structures. The greater the loyalty to the group, he argues, the greater the individual is motivated to accept group standards,

[^58]communicate with other members of the group, etc. 23 Units within a larger organizational structure should be overlapped in "linking-pin" fashion so that participants will be related to each other in a supportive, ego-building manner. Such an organizational structure should be characterized by a full flow of information and influence both up and down the hierarchy. 24 This theory is basic to an understanding of the functioning of the Michigan party staffs as determined by the data of this study.

## The Data and The Theory

To what extent does the data of this study confirm the expectations of the researcher as to how a party staff will function as based on the theories of bureaucratic behavior discussed above? More specifically, to what extent are the propositions presented in Figure I confirmed by the data? Chart I gathers together the conclusions of this study by indicating (1) the original proposition, (2) the theoretical formulation upon which it is based, (3) the finding of the data with respect to the proposition, 25 and (4) the evidence behind the finding. Attention is directed to pages 22-29 for a complete statement of the propositions.

[^59]Figure 3.--Summary of Conclusions



1. Political leadership re-
quires clearance on all signil-
cant staff decisions and
activities.

[^60]

1. Political leadership, for
the most part, has its own
competence and sources of
information. 2. Staff members state that uo KTodouom b asby 70u op Kəu7 information.
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 high.
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Negative

Negative

Weber

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { I, c-l: The extent of } \\
& \text { their influence will depend } \\
& \text { upon the degree to which their } \\
& \text { skills and information are } \\
& \text { perceived by the political } \\
& \text { leadership to be crucial to } \\
& \text { the success of the party. }
\end{aligned}
$$

 upon the degree to which

 technical nature and thua within their competence. I, c-3: The extent of
their influence will depend upon the degree to which the channels by which this information reaches major decision points are monopo-




Negative
Partially Partially
positive;
hypothesis
not con-
firmed

Figure 3--Continued

l. Starf respondents report a
high degree of political agree-
ment between themselves and
their political superiors.
l. Staff respondents report a
high degree of consensus with
leadership in their discretion-
ary role within the party.
(This is the basic conclusion
of Chapter VI.) 1. Staff respondents are not
motivated to withhold informa-
tion or otherwise short cir-
cuit" the leadership.

 personalized.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 1. Leadership desires staff } \\
& \text { to manifest traits leading to } \\
& \text { comitment and docility. }
\end{aligned}
$$





II, a: The ability of
the political leadership to resist the power of the professional staff will depend upon the degree to which the staff is imbued with the

[^61]Figure 3--Continued



##  $\sim^{\circ}$ <br> 

| 0 |
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| -1 |
| + |
| 0 |
| 0 | Not

tested


II, d: The ability of
the political leadership to
resist the power of the pro-
fessional staff will depend
upon the degree to which the
political leadership does
not identify with the frame
of reference and/or the
attitudes of the professional
staff.


$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { II, f: The political } \\
& \text { leadership will seek to } \\
& \text { insure docility by using } \\
& \text { in-service training pro- } \\
& \text { grams to develop attitudes } \\
& \text { of ideological sympathy or } \\
& \text { neutrality on the part of } \\
& \text { the professional staff. }
\end{aligned}
$$

Figure 3--Continued

l. Informal code of ethics runs
through attitudes of entire
staff involving (1) respect for
clearing important documents
with leadership, (2) supporting
leadership in factional fights,
and (3) refusal to "short
circuit" leadership or engage
in insubordination.

1. Nation-wide staff respon-
dents report a fairly high
incidence of career goals.
This, however, is not crucial
to their engaging in docile
behavior as most respondents
have career goals outside the
party. 1. Nation-wide staff respon-
dents perceived party work to
present them with some oh-
stables to obtaining non-
political employment. Positive Partially
positive

帚 | 0 |
| :--- |
| -7 |
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| 0 |
| 8 |



|  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

II, j: Certain charac-
teristics of the party pro-
fessionals may enhance their
tendency toward code of
ethics which militiate
against organizational
sabotage.






[^62]In summary, the study found the following to be true: That alternative b of Proposition I most accurately describes the power position of the party staff vis-à-vis the other segments of the party, namely, that due to the fact that professional party staff people are trained to be "neutrally competent" they will be manipulable by the political elements of the party. Thuse the staff does not constitute an oligarchic element within the party.

That the degree of staff influence is reduced because:
( $I, c-1$ ) staff skills and information are not perceived by the leadership to be crucial to the success of the party;
( $I, ~ c-2$ ) the leadership does not perceive the information and skills of the staff to be beyond their own competence;
(I, c-3) the channels by which information reaches major decisional points is not monopolized by the party professionals;
( $I, d-1$ ) the size and structure of the staff does not maximize opportunities for discretionary power on the part of the staff professionals;
(I, d-2) the staff does not dominate the instruments of internal control such as the party press, manuals, instructions, etc.;
( 1, e-2) the party staff does not (nor is perceived by the leadership) to have the support of segments of the party's rank and file.

Furthermore, the party professional staff people are
:
not motivated to resist the authority of the leadership because of the following reasons:
( $1, f-1$ ) the party staff person does not perceive the party's goals to be contrary to his personal norms;
( $1, f-2$ ) the political leadership does not require the professional staff person to engage in activities which violate his perception of his role;
(I, f-3) such disruptive behavior as "red tape," etc. is held to a minimum by the direct access that staff have to decision-making centers in the party.

Conversely, the political leadership is successful in resisting the power of the party staff because:
(II, a) the professional staff is imbued with the attitudes of "neutral competence", and
(II, c) because the political leadership has expertise and sources of information of its own.

Furthermore, the political leadership has successfully developed "docility" on the part of the professional staff by:
(II, e) recruiting personnel that is in sympathy with the ideology of the party;
(II, g) employing the sanctions at its disposal, particularly the power to hire and fire personnel.

There also exist within the body of the professional staff certain psychological characteristics which will enhance their tendency toward docility, namely:
(II, h) a sense of identification with the party;
(II, i) a legal-rational attitude which tends to accept unquestionly the legitimate orders of the political leadership;
(II, j) a code of ethics which militates against organizational sabotage;
(II, k) a fairly substantial "investment" in the organization in the sense of seniority, promotion possibilities and/or salary; and
(II, l) a lack (to some extent) of suitable employment alternatives.

On the other hand, it was found that:
( $I$, e-1) socio-economic homogeneity is not necessarily directly related to unanimity or agreement of purpose on the part of the staff and does not necessarily produce increased power.

However, staff people have some influence over policy due to the fact that:
( $\mathrm{I}, \mathrm{e}-3$ ) they establish the "tone" of the party as a result of the fact that they constantly engage in verbalizing its attitudes and opinions for the party leadership.

It was also found that:
(II, b) the professional staff was not recruited from a social stratum substantially lower than that of the political leadership and thus does not account for the "docility" found to characterize the party staff.

Thus, with respect to the original conceptual framework of the study, it may be concluded that the professional
staff does not constitute an oligarchy within the party structure. This is due, in large part, to the fact that it is not a bureaucratic structure.

## A Reformulation of the Theory

It was the expectation of the researcher to find the staff organization of a political party to behave according to bureaucratic patterns as outlined by the organization theorists referred to earlier in the chapter. Such behavior, it was postulated, would tend to place the staff in an oligarchic position within the party. That is, by virtue of the fact that professional staff people have special skills, access to specific types of information and a monopoly of certain channels of communication, it was expected that they would not only be virtually indispensable to the party leadership which were conceived of as "amateurs", 26 but be in a position to dominate party decision-making. Furthermore, it was expected that the party staff personnel would be motivated to seek the maximization of their power position within the party as an expression of the aberations of bureaucratic behavior articulated by the theorists discussed above. This, however, was not found to be the case. The party staff not only does not dominate the party's skills, channels of communication, and sources of information, it was also found that they tend to be highly docile and perceive their role as definitely a subordinate to the party leadership.

[^63]A number of suggestions have been made in the body of this report to account for this behavior. First, the party staff is not bureaucratically organized, i.e., arranged according to a hierarchy of offices. Thus, the traditional models of bureaucratic behavior cannot be applied to party staffs with any degree of rellability. Second, as has been discussed at some length in Chapter VI, since the party staff tends to be broken into cellular units composed of individual specialists attached to individual politicians, candidates or party leaders, each staff person tends to be autonomous responsible only to the politician for whom he works although maintaining close liaison with other members of the staff. 27 Thus, there results a system of direct access between the staff person and his political superior. The staff person, in a certain sense, is co-opted directly into the party leadership as far as decision-making is concerned without actually becoming a formal decision-maker. This direct access between the staffer and the party decisional centers produces in him those attitudes which Likert expects to achieve through the "linking-pin" structure. Not only are "personalized relationships" restored, ". . .all who have an interest in the organization and its activities are able to exert at least some influence on the over-all objectives
${ }^{27}$ It should not be thought that the staff has no conception of itself as a group. Staff members consult with one another fairly regularly. However, there is no collective or hierarchic responsibility except within the governor's staff. Each staff person operates pretty much as an independent agent.
and decisions of the organization as well as be influenced by them." ${ }^{28}$ Access between the staff member and his political superior and between the staff members themselves is sufficiently direct that ". . .the objectives and methods of functioning established for the organization are reasonable to all concerned and, (thus) major conflicts in interests have been reduced to a minimum. " 29

It is necessary, therefore, that the traditional theories of organizational behavior be modified to account for these findings. Such a theory must be prepared to deal with "organizations" that are not bureaucratized in a formal sense. Such theoretical formulations have been suggested by Simon who defines organization as any ". . .complex pattern of communications and other relations in a group of human beings" 30 and Chester I. Barnard conceives of organization as involving the "customers" as well as the formal members of the organization. 31 However, neither theorist really conceives of an organization composed of relatively autonomous actors related to each other as much by consensus as by authority. Furthermore, such a theory must be prepared to deal with altogether different behavior patterns stemming from a situation in which the vertical relationships are both direct and constant.

[^64]As a first step toward the development of such a theory, the following propositions are suggested:

1. Organization, defined as goal directed, patterned relationships between a number of persons in which the pattern provides the participants with the information, assumptions, attitudes and stable expectations required to achieve a goal, can exist on a non-bureaucratic basis where there are a number of relatively autonomous leadership centers each of which has its own staff structure and (a) the number of staff required at each center are not large, and (b) each staff member has functions distinct from the other.
2. Such an organizational structure will tend to be characterized by: (a) direct acce 309 between individual staff members andthe sficicied leqderituther informal cooperative

保 parcherempathomedriciopthzetaffefery formal leadership in decisionmaking on the basis of informal equality.
3. Such an organizational structure will tend to generate a behavioral pattern on the part of the staff quite distinct from that of a formal bureaucratic organization, namely, a high degree of docility and/or role acceptance on the part of staff persons. This is due to the face that personalized relationships have been restored and all levels participate in decision-making.
It is suggested that further exploration of this type of organization might serve to provide an understanding of a form of organization highly functional for our already overly-bureaucratized society.

## APPENDIXES

## APPENDIX A

## Questionnaire: Political Party Staffs

1. Please list the salaried psoitions on your staff and indicate the terms of their appointment by checking the appropriate column or columns.

(Please list additional personnel on the back of this page)
2. Does any one of the above named individuals act as your chief assistant or in any way coordinate or supervise the work of the other members of the staff?
(Please specify) $\qquad$
3. Do you retain a public relations firm or advertising agency on a year-around basis or only for campaigns?

## ___On a year-around basis <br> During the campaign period only

$\qquad$ Neither
4. Do you feel that the size of your staff is adequate for the needs of your party?
$\qquad$ Yes No

If answer to question 4 is "no," please answer question 5.
5. What do you consider to be your one or two most pressing staff needs?

Party $\qquad$
State $\qquad$

## APPENDIX B

## Questionnaire

Political Party Staff Member

1. Residence (city \& state) $\qquad$ Date $\qquad$
2. Sex: $\qquad$ Male $\qquad$ Female
3. Political Party: $\qquad$ Republican $\qquad$ Democrat
4. Marital Status $\qquad$ 5. Number of children
5. Religious Preference $\qquad$
6. In what state were you born? $\qquad$
7. Please check the type of locality in which you were raised:
_Major U.S. city (500,000 population or over)
_L_Large city (100,000-500,000 population)
__Middle sized city (25,000 - 100,000 population)
__Small city (2,500-25,000 population)
$\square$ Small town (2,500 population or under)
$\qquad$ Farm
8. Please provide the following information about your father's occupation.

Title or name of job $\qquad$
Type of business or industry
Does (or did) he work for himself or someone else?
10. Indicate the highest level of education attained by each of your parents.

Pather Mother
College graduate
Attended college
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
High school graduate
Attended high school Mother
Elementary school
graduate
Other (specify: Father
Mother
11. Please indicate the details of your educational background:

12. Please indicate whether your parents or other relatives have ever engaged in the kinds of political activity listed below by checking the appropriate blanks.

Father Mother Relative $\begin{aligned} & \text { (Specify } \\ & \text { Relationship) }\end{aligned}$
Candidate for elective office

Held elec-
tive office
Worked as
salaried
party staff person

Volunteer political worker

# 13. As a whole, how active politically would you say that your parents and other close relatives have been? 

$\qquad$ Very active
$\qquad$ Moderately active
$\qquad$ Slightly active
$\qquad$ Inactive
14. When did you first accept employment as a salaried member of a political staff? $\qquad$

15. Have you worked uninterruptedly in this or a similar
capacity since that date?
$\square$
Yes No
16. Please list all of your occupations (political and other) since you first started to work professionally for a political party or elected official.Occupation Approximate period of employment
17. What is your present position or function? (Please check all appropriate categories)
$\qquad$ Public relations work
$\qquad$ Political (or patronage) secretary
$\qquad$ Legislative liaison
$\qquad$ Administrative assistant
$\qquad$ Legal Advisor
$\qquad$ Organizational director
$\qquad$ Organizational field man
$\qquad$ Fund raising
$\qquad$ Campaign management
$\qquad$ Research
Office management

## $\qquad$ <br> Business management

$\qquad$ Other (specify)
18. Please indicate on which of the above checked functions you spend the bulk of your time.
19. Which of the following experience or skills did you have when you were first hired to a political staff position?
___Business experience
$\qquad$ Governmental experience
$\qquad$ Newspaper work
$\qquad$ Speech writing
$\qquad$ Research
$\qquad$ Academic experience
___Legal career
Organizational experience (labor union, Farm Bureau, etc.)

Legislative representation for groups or associations
$\qquad$ Radio and/or TV experience
$\qquad$ Other (specify)
20. For which of the types of experience or skills listed in number 19 were you primarily hired? $\qquad$
21. Please list in order of importance what, in general, you consider to be the three most important qualifications for political staff work.

1. $\qquad$
2. $\qquad$
3. $\qquad$
4. On the whole, which of the following were particularly influential in your decision to go into political staff work? (Check all that apply)
$\qquad$ Members of immediate family
$\qquad$ Friends
$\qquad$ Professional or business associates
$\qquad$ Fellow workers
$\qquad$ Political officials or candidates
$\qquad$ Teachers (elementary or high school)
$\qquad$ College professors
$\qquad$ Other (specify) $\qquad$
5. Of those checked above, which one would you say was the most influential in helping you to make your decision?
6. Please rank in order of importance ( $1,2,3$, etc.) those among the following reasons which were important in leading you to accept a political staff job.
$\qquad$ Political work seemed like an attractive career.
I thought that political work provided good training for other kinds of work afterwards.

Political work involved an improvement in my salary.

Political work gave me a chance to help the political career of a friend (or family member).

I felt that political work offered an opportunity to work for the realization of my personal social and economic views.

I hoped that political work would lead to useful business or professional contacts.

Political work seemed to provide the best outlet for my training and skills.

Political work provided opportunities to make desirable social contacts.

Other (specify)
25. Is it your intention to remain in political party staff work or do you have other long-range vocational goals?
$\qquad$ Remain in political staff work
$\qquad$ Have other long-range vocational goals
If rou have other vocational goals, which of the following best describe them:
$\qquad$ Elective political office
$\qquad$ Appointive political office
$\qquad$ Private professional practice (law, public relations, etc.)

Administrative work in industry
Administrative work in government
Administrative work in a professional association
Administrative work in a labor union or trade association
$\qquad$ Private business activity
$\qquad$ Academic or teaching career
Other (specify)

Do you intend to work part-time at a salaried political staff position while engaged in the activities checked above?
$\qquad$
Yes
No
26. In what way do you believe your present employment will help you to achieve these goals?
27. In what ways do you believe your present employment may hinder you in achieving these goals?
28. Of which of the following associations have you ever been a member, officer or salaried employee?

Member Officer Salaried employee
Professional association

Labor Union
Parm organization
$\qquad$

## Industrial

 associationBusiness or commercial association

Religious organization
29. Do you consider political staff work to be:
$\qquad$ Stable employment
$\qquad$ Pairly stable employment
$\qquad$ Unstable employment
30. Are you a full-time or a part-time employee?
$\qquad$ Full-time
Part-time
31. Do you work on a year-around basis or only during campaigns?
___Year-around basis
_Campaign periods only
32. Approximately how many full-time people does your staff employ on a year-around basis?
33. Approximately how many additional full-time people does your staff employ during the campaign period? $\qquad$
34. On which of the following bases are you paid?
Monthly
___Yearly salary
per diem
35. Please check the salary for your position on an annual basis.


## APPENDIX C

## Interview Schedule: Political Leaders

1. First of all, I wonder whether you would tell me how many people you have on your staff and what their positions and functions are.
2. If you had your way, would you want to hire more staff or not?
a. What type of additions would you like to make to your staff?
b. Why these additions?
c. Are there or are there not any obstacles standing in the way of your making these additions?
3. What do you look for when you hire a staff person? (Probe: Qualifications, skills, background)
a. Are there any particular personality characteristics that you look for? (Probe: aggressiveness, creativeness, etc.)
b. Do fou find it most valuable to have men on your staff who are primarily experts in a given area or men who "know their way around?"
4. On the basis of your experience, what would you list as the one or two most important qualifications for political staff work?
5. How do you go about finding staff people? (Probe: universities, business, other organizations)
a. To what extent do you rely on personal recomendations?
(Probe: whose?)
6. When you hire a new staff person, do you want one with experience - or do you prefer to train him yourself? (Probe: does Respondent want to mold staff person after his own image?)

## a. Use hypothetical cases: Javitts staff member; Goldwater, Humphrey, R. Russell

7. What areas of knowledge or types of skill do you feel are absolutely essential to the efficient functioning of your staff?
a. To what extent do you attempt to recruit staff people to fill in the gaps in your background, training or experience?
8. Do you or do you not discuss important decisions with your staff?
a. What kinds of things are you inclined to discuss with them? (Probe: issues, strategy and tactics, routine administrative matters)
b. Is the advice you seek usually of a general or specific nature?
9. Do you feel that there are matters that should not be discussed with your staff or not?
a. What kind of matters should not be discussed with the staff?
10. Is there any one member of your staff with whom you discuss things more than the others?
a. Why? (Probe: similarity of views, competence, good rapport)
11. We have been talking about how your staff operates in a general way. Now I would like to talk with you about some of the more specific details of its operation.
a. Specifically, could you describe for me how you utilize your staff in the writing of speeches?
(1) Do you give your assistant an outline, note on the subjects to be covered, or what?
(2) To what extent do you consult with him on what should be covered?
(3) To what extent do you rewrite a speech that has been prepared for you?
(4) Do you ever get outside help for speeches?
b. How do you handle news letters and press releases?
(1) To what extent do you turn the task of daily or weekly press releases over to your staff?
(2) Does your assistant clear subjects and content with you?
a) Are there circumstances under which clearance is not required?
b) What about during campaigns, are the rules different?
c. What about correspondence, do you have an assistant that answers routine mail?
(1) What do you consider to be "routine"?
(2) To what extent do you read over the letters that are prepared for your signature?
(3) Are there any kinds of correpondence that you feel you must handle yourself or not?
(4) Have you ever had a letter "bounce"?
d. In the matter of office appointments, what kinds of decisions do you leave in the hands of your staff?
(1) What kind of staff person makes these decisions?
12. Now I would like to discuss these same problems by setting up some hypothetical situations.
a. In making appointments, you have Mr. $X$ on your calendar but Mr. Y comes in to see you. Does your appointment secretary have the right to change the original appointment without consulting you if she thinks it is important enough?
(1) Would you approve of your assistant insisting on seeing Mr. Y first to acsertain the nature of the matter he wishes to discuss with you or not?
b. In writing press releases, you have one release planned but a new situation demands a revision in your original statement. Should your public relations man contact you or go ahead and revise the statement on his own?
(1) If something comes up that your press man thinks would make a good release; if he cannot clear it with you should he bury it or release it anyway?
c. In arranging a speaking engasement, a specific meeting is arranged but circumstances require a change in plans. Does your assistant have the right to change your itinerary without consulting you or not?
13. Do people ever complain that they have difficulty in seeing you - that your appointment secretary or administrative assistant is too strict in scheduling your appointments? (Probe: what does R think of these complaints?)
14. Some people claim that staff people make decisions that should only be made by duly constituted officials. Do you think that this is true or not?
a. To what extent do you feel that this is a problem that any elected governmental or party official has to face?
b. Has this been a problem in your organization?

Great
Limited
No problem
c. How do you, in your mind, distinguish between those decisions that are properly staff, properly official or neither?
15. Do you ever find yourself in disagreement with members of your staff on a proposed course of action or not?
a. How frequently does this occur
b. On what types of matters is this most likely to occur?
c. When this occurs, what do you usually do? (Probe: seek outside advice, make up own mind, follow advice of staff)
16. To what extent would you say that most of the members of your staff should agree with you on political questions?
a. On what kinds of questions do you expect that your staff should be in agreement with you? (Probe: issues, strategy and tactics, administrative questions)
b. If RESPONDENT GAVE EVIDENCE OF REQUIRING HIGH AGREEMENT: Is there room on your staff for the technically qualified person whose viewpoints are not shared by yourself but who submerges these views out of loyalty to you or not?
(1) In what types of positions could such a person work?
17. Have you ever had a person on your staff whose views were essentially opposed to yours or not?
a. What position did he hold?
b. How long did he work on the staff?
c. What was the general nature of the disagreement?
(Probe: ideological, strategy, administrative)
d. Would you evaluate the situation as satisfactory, tolerable or unsatisfactory?
18. Under what circumstances do you feel that staff members are likely to take too much authority on themselves?
a. Has this ever been a problem in your organization or not? (Probe: circumstances)
b. Are there any types of positions that tend to generate this problem more than others? (Probe: public relations, men, administrative personnel, or what?)
19. Are there members of your staff, who by the very nature of their location or type of work have greater discretion in making decisions than others?
a. What staff members are these?
b. Have you ever felt that efforts should be made to tighten up your control over these people or not?
20. Have there or have there not been any circumstances when you have wished that your staff had presented you with more information than they did, or raised problems that had not been called to your attention?
a. Under what circumstances has this occurred?
b. How much of this was owing to inadvertence - deliberate?
c. How do you handle cases when you feel that this was inadvertent - deliberate?
21. Have you ever had to dismiss a staff person?
a. What were the circumstances surrounding his dismissal or the reason for his dismissal?
b. IF RESPONDENT SAYS, "NO." In general what do you consider the grounds for dismissing a member of your staff?
22. When a technical point comes up in a piece of legislation (or in a speech), to whom do you usually go for information?

Assign staff member
Outside expert
Administrative agency
a. How frequently does this occur?
23. Do you use any system for checking the reliability or validity of this information or not? (Probe: what kind of system; does he take expert's word for it?)
24. In what two or three areas have you wished that you had more knowledge so that you could check up on the advice given you by a staff member?
25. Generally speaking, at what phase of a solution of a problem do you utilize your staff? (Use examples - assign staff to dig up preliminary data; discuss with staff after you have made up your mind, etc.?)
26. Do you have any staff members that you feel would be very difficult to replace? (Probe: why?)
a. Are there certain periods when replacement is a more difficult problem than at other periods? (Probe: during campaigns, legislative sessions, budget periods, etc.)
b. Is there any sense in which staff members become more difficult to control during these periods or not?
27. In general, what proportion of your time do you spend supervising your staff?
a. What types of problems require your supervision?
b. How do you supervise your staff? (Probe: periodic staff meetings, frequent memos, day by day personal contact)
c. Do you assign any one person the task of overseeing the work of your staff or do you work with each one individually? (Probe: any kind of chain of command?)
d. To what extent do you expect your staff to "work on their own"?
(1) In what areas can they do this? (Probe: public relations, office appointments or what?)
e. Do you require any type of periodic report either written or oral?
28. British political parties have what amounts to a civil service for their staff members. (Explanation: recruit them at the bottom; run schools for them; promote them up the ladder slowly.)

Query: Do you think that this would be a good system for American parties to adopt? (Probe: does respondent view political staffers as neutral, interchangeable parts, free from factional interests, etc.?)
29. Do you think that political science departments in our colleges and universities should seek to train people with special skills for party staff positions?
a. Would you prefer a man with this type of training over the person with "practical" experience?
b. What type of training should be included in such a program?

During the remaining minutes I would like to take up with you some questions that political scientists and public officials have discussed for years.
30. Do you feel that your decisions should reflect primarily the thinking of your constituents or your own convictions?
a. What is your reaction to the need for party discipline when the party position differs with that of your views or those of your constituents?
31. Do you feel that consulting with legislative representatives or lobbyists is helpful or not helpful to you?
a. In what way helpful?
32. Are there any circumstances underwhich you feel it necessary to accept the advice of experts rather than listening to your constituents or party?
a. On balance, do you feel that this in any way represents a violation of the American system of representative government?
33. How often do you feel that our state and federal administrative agencies run things independently of legislative or political control? (Does this constitute a danger to American democracy?)
34. In your opinion, to what extent do you feel that the public is capable of making a rational decision relative to a major public issue?

Now I would like to get a little bit of information on your background.

1. Estimate age or decade
2. In what state were you born?
3. In what type of locality were you raised?

| Major U.S. city | Small city |
| :--- | :--- |
| Large city | Small town |
| Medium sized city | Parm |

4. What was your father's occupation?

Self employed?
5. What was the highest level your father and mother reached in school?

Father $\qquad$
Mother
6. Would you mind giving me the details of your education? School Location Degree Date Major
High School
College
Graduate work
7. What was your occupation before going into politics?

APPENDIX D

## Interview Schedule: Political Staff

1. What does your job consist of - what do you do?
a. Do you have any duties outside your specialty?
$\qquad$ No
2. Are you presently engaged in essentially the same activities as when you first took on your job or not?
_Yes No
If no, how has your job changed in function since you first took it over? (Probe: Has he remade the job himself?)

In general, have things turned out pretty much as you expected when you took the job or not?
$\qquad$ Turned out pretty well as expected
$\qquad$ Turned out quite differently (Probe: In what ways?
3. How long have you been in political staff work?
____Number of years
4. Do you enjoy your work?
_Yes No

Does it have any particular satisfactions?
Enables one to meet nice people
Keeps one in touch with important events
___Is intellectually stimulating
$\qquad$ Well paid
Provides outlet for training and skills (Specify)
___Provides opportunities to get other job offers
_High prestige position
_O_Opportunities for travel
Enables individual to be creative
Provides individual with freedom to work on his own and organize own time

Pleasant co-workers
$\qquad$ Other

Does it have any particular draw-backs or dissatisfactions connected with it?
$\qquad$ Long hours
Low pay
$\qquad$ Too close supervision
___ Person must swallow the "party line"
___Unpleasant associates
___ People in politics are crude or immoral
Little sense of accomplishment provided
Takes person out of the main stream of his profession

Difficult to move to another position
$\qquad$ Unstable future
$\qquad$ Other
5. In general, what are your chances of advancement?

> good poor
a. To what kind of job?
b. How long will you have to wait for advancement?
c. What are your chances for a salary increase?
d. Compared with similar occupations, do you feel that you are being adequately paid for the services you render?
$\qquad$
$\qquad$ No
(1) What would you consider to be the proper remuneration for your job?
(2) Most of us at times think of making a professional move. Can you tell me what circumstances or inducements would make you seriously think of changing jobs?
6. You have had opportunities to work with or view staff people from both political parties. Do there seem to be any group of traits that characterize most of the people you have met who hold jobs as political staffers. Do they have any particular traits in common?
$\qquad$
$\qquad$ No
___Ability to meet and work with people
___Aggressiveness, extroversion
___ Extreme loyalty
___Intellectuality and intelligence
___Dive and ambition
___Imagination
$\qquad$ Smooth operators
$\qquad$ Friendly, pleasant personalities
$\qquad$ Cautious
$\qquad$ Other
7. Are there any particular skills that you consider to be indispensable in doing your job?
$\qquad$ Ability to work with people
$\qquad$ Ability to handle details
Ability to write press releases and speeches
Ability to speak publicly
Ability to do research
Imagination
Other
a. Did you learn these things through on-the-job experience or were you trained before taking a political staff job?
_On-the-job experience
_Previous training (What type: $\qquad$
8. Who tells you what to do - defines your problems for you? (Find out who his boss is)
9. Do you work under close supervision or are you allowed a good deal of freedon to organize your own work?
$\qquad$ Good deal of freedom
$\qquad$ Close supervision (Under whose supervision?)
$\qquad$ Depends
a. In what ways are you supervised?

Prequency
Day by day contact $\qquad$
$\qquad$ Staff meetings $\qquad$ Chain of command Written reports
$\qquad$ Other
10. Are there any particular types of tasks on which you can work quite independent of supervision?

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Writing press releases and news letters } \\
& \text { Writing speeches }
\end{aligned}
$$

$\qquad$ Research
___Campaign coordination - setting speaking engagements, etc.

Setting up conventions and meetings
_Orfice management
_ Organizational rield work
__Correspondence
__Setting up appointments
_O_OTher
a. What are the areas within your specialty in which you are given the freest hand?
11. As you well know, every job has its difficult aspects. Can you give me some idea of the main problems you run into in carrying out your assignments?

| Lack of surficient time <br> Lack of sufficient facilities and materials |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unclear directions |  |  |  |
| Difficulty in getting to consult with superior |  |  |  |
| Difficulty in getting to consult with co-workers |  |  |  |
| Difficult staff relations |  |  |  |
| Difficulty in obtaining cooperation of volunteer workers |  |  |  |
| Lack of sufficient information on which to make decisions |  |  |  |
| Other |  |  |  |

12. Would you say your work largely preceeds the making of decisions by the politician or is it largely that of implementing the decisions already arrived at.
$\qquad$ Preceeds decisions of politician
___ Implements decisions already arrived at
$\qquad$ Other
a. Probe: Under what circumstances are you most likely to influence a decision?
$\qquad$ When political leader lacks information and/or background on a specific matter When political leader is unavailable or out of office
$\qquad$ When politician is engaged in extreme periods of activity
$\qquad$ Other
13. When you have a good idea - one that will help the party - to whom do you go with it? (Probe: Is this the key to decisional point?)
a. What do you do if it gets pigeon-holed?
__Drop the matter
$\qquad$ Take it up with other staff members Take it up with other political leaders in party

Take it up with outside agencies or individuals - pressure group, newspaper man, etc. (Specify)

Raise it again with the political leader
$\qquad$ Other
14. Does your boss ever ask your advice on major policy questions or not?
Yes
$\ldots$ No
Depends
a. Concerning what matters is this most likely to occur?
b. To what extent does he follow your suggestions?

___Drastically reworks them
__Tends to reject them

c. Set up hypothetical situations -- press releases; speeches; speaking engagements, etc. (Probe: what kind of advice given?)
15. To what extent does your boss have the knowledge and background to evaluate the information or advice you give him?
___Good deal
____Limited
___ Depends on area or subject
$\qquad$ None
16. How is your boss at grasping technical details?
$\square$ Good
$\qquad$ Fair
$\qquad$ Poor
$\qquad$ Depends
a. Has he a degree of expertise in the matters you are concerned with?

____Depends
b. To what extent does he say, "You set this up as you think best?"

17. Are there, in your opinion, any circumstances under which information should be withheld from your boss (or an appointment not made)?
$\ldots \mathrm{Mes}$
___Depends
a. Have you ever done this? (Probe for circumstances)
18. Would you say that you are in basic political agreement with your boss or not?
$\qquad$

Yes
No
a. In what areas do you differ?

19. Do you ever find yourself in the middle of a factional dispute in the party?


Yes
$\qquad$ No
a. If yes, what were the circumstances?
b. In matters such as this, where the whole party is involved, do you feel that your first loyalty is with your boss or that faction of the party you feel is right?
_With the boss
With the faction he feels is right
___Depend 8
c. Are there any circumstances under which you would break with your boss?
_Yes No
_ When political leader adopts a policy position opposed to respondents
_ Diametrically
_ Moderately
When political leader refuses to communicate ideas to you

When political leader refuses to make instructions clear

When political leader refuses to make use of your ideas

Over-work
Other
d. Can you do your job without getting involved in matters involving your personal convictions -- what place do you feel that individual convictions should play in a job like yours?


Have no real place - job is to implement the convictions of the boss
___ Are the basis for making suggestions only
Are the only basis for effective party staff work
$\qquad$ Other
20. How would a shake-up in the power structure of the party affect your job?
___Would lose job
Would result in less discretion
_Would result in a reduction in amount of advice
one would give
Would require that one "lay low" for awhile
Would make no difference
21. Would you say that you are in basic political agreement with the other staff members?
_Yes No
a. If no, what are the areas of disagreement?
___Issues (Specify)
___Approach to public statements
___Approach to campaign techniques
____Approach to grass roots organization
$\qquad$ Party leadership
$\qquad$ Finances
$\qquad$ Cand1dates
___Other
b. What are the things that happen that lead you to these conclusions? (Probe both areas of agreement and disagreement)
22. (For legislative staff): To what extent do you engage in the following activities?
a. Brief legislator on issues and bills before the House
b. Prepare speeches for the floor or statements for committee
c. Draft legislation
d. Talk to lobbyists as member's representative
e. Draft letters for member's signature
23. I would like to ask you some questions concerning the way various assignments are handled in your office.
a. When you are assigned to write a speech, are you usually given an outline, notes on the subjects to be covered or what?
_Topic only
___Outline
___Note on the subjects to be covered
___Nothing
__Other
(1) To what extent do you consult with your boss on what should be covered?
___Hold conference on speech to kick around ideas
___Discuss touchy points only
___Hardly any consultation until speech is written
$\qquad$ No consultation
(2) To what extent does he rewrite what you have written?
$\qquad$ Frequently
___Infrequently
$\qquad$ Never
b. In the matter of newsletters and press releases to what extent is the task of daily or weekly releases turned over to you?
Completely

| Respondent asks whether there should be a |
| :--- |
| newsletter or release |

Waits for instructions
(1) Do you have to clear subjects and content with your boss?
_Yes
$\ldots$ No
Depends
a) Are there circumstances under which clearance is not required?

When release or newsletter does not cover controversial or sensitive subject

When boss is out campaigning or otherwise too busy to discuss matter
___Other
c. What about correspondence, do you answer a good deal of the boss ${ }^{\circ} 8$ mail?
_Yes No
(1) What types of letters do you have complete responsibility for?
(2) What types of correspondence do you have to clear with the boss?
(3) To what extent does your boss read over the letters you have prepared for him?
(4) Do the same general rules apply to memos to other politicians, officials, party officials, etc.?
d. In the matter of appointments, what decisions are you free to make?
e. In the area of precinct organization are you free to -
(1) Set up local meetings on your ow?
_Y
Yes
No
Depends
(2) Recruit local workers on your own?
Yes
No
Depends
(3) Spend money on local projects on your own?
$\ldots$ Yes $\qquad$ No $\qquad$ Depends
(4) Get people to run in the campaign?
Yes $\qquad$ No $\qquad$
Depends
24. Let's look at some hypothetical examples.
a. In making appointments, Mr. $X$ is on the calendar but Mr. Y comes in and you think he should see your boss. Do you or the appointment secretary have the right to change the original appointment without consulting the boss?


Yes
$\qquad$ No
$\qquad$ Depends
(1) What would the procedure be - would you talk to Mr. Y first to ascertain the nature of his business with your boss or what?
b. In writing press releases - you have one release planned but a new situation demands a revision of your original statement. Are you expected to contact your boss or can you go ahead and revise the statement?
$\qquad$ Must contact boss
$\qquad$ Can go ahead and revise the statement
$\qquad$ Should present alternatives
$\qquad$ Depends
(1) If something comes up that you think would make a good release, if you cannot clear it with your boss do you bury it, release it, or what?

Bury it
$\qquad$ Release it
$\qquad$ Postpone it
$\qquad$ Other
c. In arranging a speaking engagement - a specific meeting is arranged but circumstances require its cancellation. Do you have the authority to change your boss's itinerary without consulting him?
$\qquad$ Yes
$\qquad$ No

25. Do you feel that you are given enough freedom and discretion for you to adequately do your job or do you sometimes feel that you do not have sufficient discretion to do your job well?
___Adequate discretion
_ Inadequate discretion
__Depends
a. In what areas do you feel it would help the operation if you had more discretion?
26. Are there certain circumstances underwhich you have more discretion than at other times?
a. Are there certain matters on which you are given wider discretion than others?
27. Do you think that certain types of staff jobs lend themselves to greater discretion than others? (Probe: location, nature of work, etc.)
28. To what extent are there people on the staff that take too many things on themselves -- make decisions without consulting the boss?
a. What types of decisions do they make that you feel should be cleared with the boss?
29. Do you think that there are any matters which the political leaders should not discuss with the staff?
$\qquad$ No

What?
30. Is there any particular member of the staff that seems to have more influence with the boss than others?
a. Why?
___Due to particular rapport with the boss
$\qquad$ Pleasing personality
___Common socio-economic background
Due to person's particular competencies or skills
$\qquad$ Job puts him in close contact with the boss
$\qquad$ Job is particularly crucial to the success of the party
$\qquad$ Job is at the top of the staff hierarchy
$\qquad$ Other
31. To what extent do you consult with other staff members?
$\qquad$ Often
$\qquad$ Infrequently
$\qquad$ Depends
a. What types of consultation take place?
$\qquad$ Staff meetings
$\qquad$ Informal discussions
$\qquad$ Regular memos and reports
$\qquad$ Other
b. Do you ever talk over a proposal you plan to present to the political leaders with other staff members before you present it?
$\qquad$ Prequently
$\qquad$
Infrequently
$\qquad$ Never
a) Under what circumstances is this done? (Example)
b) Do you ever plan how a new proposal is to be presented?

32. Do staff members get together for social engagements?
 No
Often
Infrequently
Never
a. What about the boss, is he usually included?

b. Does he attend?

33. In almost any group there are going to be people who stay pretty much to themselves. Do you have some of these people on your staff? (Is this because they do not wish to mingle or because they are excluded, or why?)

Do not wish to mingle
$\qquad$ Excluded
$\qquad$ Other
a. Does this make a difference in the operation of the staff?
Yes
_____Donds
34. What contacts do you have with rank and file members of the party?
___Primarily as an outgrowth of the job
___Social contacts
$\qquad$ Volunteer party work in which R participates outside job
$\qquad$ Part of faction of the party
$\qquad$ Professional or business
$\qquad$ Other
35. To what extent do you maintain contacts with professional people outside the party - social scientists, journalists or other people in a profession similar to yours?
$\qquad$ Other staff people
$\qquad$ Academicians
$\qquad$ Government employees
$\qquad$ Professional people
$\qquad$ Journalists
$\qquad$ Other
a. What is the nature of these contacts?
$\qquad$ Professional
$\qquad$ Social
$\qquad$ Consultative
___Other
36. To what extent does your boss consult with persons outside the staff?
$\qquad$ Frequently
___Infrequently
$\qquad$ Never
$\qquad$ Depends
a. For what purposes?
_To discuss issues (Specify)
___To discuss political strategy
___Types of statements to make
___Advertising media
___Gimmicks
___Organizational problems
b. Does this create any problems for the staff?
Y__ No

| Undercuts advice function of staff - re- |
| :--- |
| duces acceptance of staff ideas |
| Reduces staff discretion |


| Short circuits communication system |
| :--- |
| Other |

37. Going back briefly to the matter of consultation between staff, how do you feel about the degree of consultation among staff members? (Probe: is it sufficient; is there a felt need to obtain unanimity; do staff members want to set the boss straight?)
38. Some people say that staff specialists make decisions that should only be made by elected officials. Do you think that this is true?
$\qquad$ No
a. Has this ever been a problem in your office?

39. Would you say that legislative staff aids, staff aids to elected executive officials, and party staff persons have much the same kind of job or are there major differences?
(Probe: How do they perceive their job -- to what extent are their perspectives similar, communicate with each other, hold attitudes in common?)
$\qquad$ Much the same type of job
$\qquad$ Major differences
40. Do you feel that a politician's decisions should reflect primarily the thinking of his constituents or his own convictions?
41. Do you feel that legislators consulting with legislative representatives or lobbyists in any way represents a violation of the American system of representative government?
42. How often do you feel that our state and federal administrative agencies run things independently of legislative or political control?
43. In your opinion, to what extent do you feel that the pubilc is capable of making a rational decision relative to a major public issue?
44. Do you feel that the amount of discretion you take in your job in any way violates the manner in which the official party leadership is representative of the rank and file party member.
APPENDIX E

| State | States Reporting the Following Staff Positions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | GE | CM | OM | FO | F | PR | R | WA | YA | C | NS | US |
| Alabama |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Arizona | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Arkansas |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| California | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |
| Colorado |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Connecticut |  |  |  | X | X | X | X |  |  | X |  |  |
| Delaware |  |  | X |  |  | X |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Florida |  | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Georgia | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Idaho | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Illinois | X |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Indiana | X |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |  | X |  | X |

$$
\begin{aligned}
& x \\
& x x x \times x \\
& x x x x x \times x \times x \times x \\
& x \\
& x \\
& x \times x \\
& x x x x \\
& x \quad x \quad x \quad x
\end{aligned}
$$


Iowa
Kansas

## Kentucky Louisiana <br> Maine <br> pLRETKNBW

Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey New Mexico New York
Appendix E--Continued

| State | States Reporting the Following Staff Positions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | GE | CM | OM | PO | F | PR | R | WA | YA | C | NS | US |
| North Carolina |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| North Dakota |  |  |  | X |  | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ohio |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oklahoma |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Oregon |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Pennsylvania | X |  |  |  | X | X |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Rhode Island |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| South Carolina |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |
| South Dakota | X |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Tennessee |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Texas | X | X |  | X |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Utah | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Vermont | X | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Virginia | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


Appendix E--Continued

| State | States Reporting the Following Staff Positions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | GE | CM | OM | FO | F | PR | R | WA | YA | C | NS | US |
| Alabama | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Arizona |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Arkansas |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |
| California | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Colorado |  |  | X |  |  | X |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Connecticut | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  | X |
| Delaware |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |
| Florida |  | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Georgia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |
| Idaho | X |  |  | X | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Illinois | X | X |  |  |  | X |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Indiana |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |



[^65]$x$
$x$

## Kansas

Kentucky
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Appendix E--Continued

| State | States Reporting the Following Staff Positions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | GE | CM | OM | FO | F | PR | R | WA | YA | C | NS | US |
| North Carolina |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| North Dakota | $\mathbf{X}$ | X |  | X |  | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ohio |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oklahoma |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Oregon | X |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pennsylvania |  |  | X |  |  | X |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Fhode Island | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| South Carolina |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| South Dakota | X |  | X |  | X | X |  |  |  | X |  |  |
| Tennessee |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Texas | X |  |  | X |  | X | X |  |  | X |  |  |
| Utah | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vermont | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Virginia | X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |



## APPENDIX F

## Indices of Competitiveness

Political Scientists have devised a number of different indices designed to show the degree of inter-party competitiveness in the states. ${ }^{1}$ The validity of any one of these indices depends, however, upon the use to which it is put and the type of political phenomena being studied.

The central problem facing this writer is that of devising an index of inter-party competition that reflects not only the actual competitive situation in any given state but also something of the perception of competitiveness held by the professional politicians who allocate resources and build party staffs. The index, therefore, must reflect three assumptions concerning the manner in which the current party leaders will perceive the competitive situation in their state. These assumptions are:

1. The party leadership will seek to assess its chances of winning any given election in a rational manner. That is, they will seek to allocate resources, build up the type of staff, etc. which will enable them to maximize their chances

[^66]of winning in terms of their perception of those chances.
2. In assessing their chances of winning, the party leadership will be most highly influenced by the ourrent competitive situation.
3. The perception by the party leadership of their current competitive situation will be colored by their "memory" -- the historical competitive structure of their state.

To employ an index used solely to measure party competition over a span of twenty or more years (Schlesinger; Ranney and Kendall systems) is hardly reflective of the perception of the party leadership of the current competitive situation. As Standing and Robinson state, "Candidates and electors are more likely to consider recent than ancient history in assessing the outcome of the next electoral situation. ${ }^{2}$ on the other hand, indices that take into account merely the immediate situation (Turner; Standing and Robinson) overlook the psychological effect of "memory".

To overcome these difficulties, an index has been devised for this study that takes into account both the contemporary and historical competitive situation. Assuming that the major motivation for developing a party staff is the perception by the party leadership of their chances of winning the gubernatorial contest, that office is used as

[^67]the basis for determining inter-party competition. This index can be described as follows:

First, the states were classified as "competitive", "cyclically competitive", or "one-party"3 over the period 1900-1958 on the basis of the Schlesinger Two-Dimensional scheme. 4 This was called the state's "historical rating". A second step involved the determination of the state's "contemporary rating". To determine this an adaptation of the Standing-Robinson formula was employed. 5 This formula is as follows:

1. The last five elections constitute the contemporary period. 6
2. The states in which the minority party won two of the five elections were designed as competitive for the period.
3. States in which the minority party won one election in the period were designated as marginally competitive for the period.

[^68]4. All other states were designated as non-competitive for the period unless the winning margin in the last election was less than the median vote fluctuation for the period 1900-1958. In such instances the state was classified as marginally competitive. 7 Third, a "final rating" was established for each state by combining the historical and contemporary ratings as follows:

1. States which had one-party (or non-competitive) ratings for both historical and contemporary periods were designated as "historically non-competitive".
2. States which had competitive ratings for both historical and contemporary periods were designated as "historically competitive".
3. All states whose historical and contemporary ratings differed were placed under a classification marked "transitional" and further sub-divided as follows:
a. Currently non-competitive
b. Currently competitive
c. Currently marginally competitive

Following is a summary of the ratings for each state.

[^69]
## State Party Competitiveness Ratings for Governor

| State | Contemporary Rating | Historical Rating | Final Rating |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alabama | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| Arizona | C-B | C-D | C |
| Arkansas | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| California | M-R | 0-R | T:MC-R |
| Colorado | C-D | C-D | C |
| Connecticut | C-D | C-R | C |
| Delaware | M-R | O-R | T:MC-R |
| Plorida | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| Georgia | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| Idaho | M-R | C-R | T:MC-R |
| Illinois | C-R | C-R | C |
| Indiana | C-R | C-R | C |
| Iowa | C-R | Cy-R | C |
| Kansas | C-R | 0-R | T: C |
| Kentucky | M-D | O-D | T:MC-D |
| Louisiana | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| Maine | M-R | Cy-R | T:MC-R |
| Maryland | C-D | O-D | T: C |
| Massachusetts | C-D | MC-R | C |
| Michigan | M-D | C-R | MC-D |
| Minnesota | C-D | MC-R | C |
| Mississippi | O-D | O-D | O-D |


| State | Contemporary Rating | Historical Rating | Final Rating |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Missouri | M-D | C-D | T:MC-D |
| Montana | M-R | C-D | T: MC-R |
| Nebraska | M-R | Cy-R | T:MC-R |
| Nevada | C-D | C-D | C |
| New Hampshire | M-R* | O-R | T: MC-R |
| New Jersey | C-R | C-D | C |
| New Mexico | C-R | C-D | C |
| New York | M-R | C-D | T:MC-R |
| North Carolina | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| North Dakota | $M-R^{*}$ | O-R | T: MC-R |
| Ohio | M-D | C-D | T:MC-D |
| Oklahoma | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| Oregon | $\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{R}^{*}$ | O-R | T: MC-R |
| Pennsylvania | C-R | O-R | T:C-R |
| Rhode Island | M-D | Cy-D | T-MC-D |
| South Carolina | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| South Dakota | M-R | O-R | T: MC-R |
| Tennessee | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| Texas | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| Utah | C-B | C-D | C |
| Vermont | $\mathrm{M}-\mathrm{R}^{*}$ | O-R | T:MC-R |
| Virginia | O-D | O-D | O-D |
| Washington | C-R | C-R | C |


| State | Contemporary Rating | Historical Rating | Final <br> Rating |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| West Virginia | M-D | C-D | T:MC-D |
| Wisconsin | M-R | O-R | T: MC-R |
| Wyoming | C-D | C-D | C |
| Alaska |  |  |  |
| Hawaii |  |  |  |
| *State whose winning margin in last election was less than median vote fluctuation of the period 1900-1958. |  |  |  |
| Note: Abbreviations are as follows: |  |  |  |
| $0=0 n e-p a r t y$ |  |  |  |
| $C=$ Competitive |  |  |  |
| $M=$ Marginally competitive |  |  |  |
| Cy = Cyclically competitive |  |  |  |
| MC = Marginally competitive |  |  |  |
| $T=$ Transitional |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{R}=$ Republican Party dominant |  |  |  |
| $D=$ Democratic Party dominant |  |  |  |

For purposes of this study, therefore, the states can be classified as to their inter-party competitive structure as follows:

## Historically Non-Competitive for Governor

Democratic Dominant: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia

Republican Dominant: None

## Historically Competitive for Governor

Colorado, Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, Wyoming

## Transitional

Currently non-competitive for governor
Democratic Dominant: None
Republican Dominant: None
Currently competitive for governor
Democratic Dominant: Kansas, Maryland
Republican Dominant: Pennsylvania

## Currently marginally competitive

Democratic Dominant: Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Rhode Island, West Virginia

Republican Dominant: California, Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin
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| States | Professionalization Scores |  | Two-party Average | Average Difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democratic | Republican |  |  |
| Non-Competitive States |  |  |  |  |
| Alabama <br> Arkansas <br> Florida <br> Georgia <br> Louisiana <br> Mississippi <br> North Carolina <br> Oklahoma <br> South Carolina <br> Tennessee <br> Texas <br> Virginia | $\begin{array}{r} 3 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ - \\ \hline 0 \\ - \\ \hline 11 \\ 3 \end{array}$ |  |  |  |
| Total | 18 (2.25) | 16 (1.6) | 1.88 | . 65 |
| Competitive States |  |  |  |  |
| Arizona Connecticut Illinois Indiana | $\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & 4 \\ & 7 \frac{1}{2} \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 4 \\ 11 \\ 4 \\ 7 \end{array}$ |  |  |

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| Iowa <br> Massachusetts <br> Minnesota <br> Nevada <br> New Jersey <br> New Mexico <br> Utah <br> Washington <br> Wyoming | $\begin{gathered} 0 \\ 0 \\ 10 \\ 0 \\ 16 \\ 4 \\ 1 \frac{\frac{\pi}{2}}{} \\ 0 \\ 2 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 9 \\ 0 \\ 18 \\ 0 \\ 7 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 2 \\ - \end{array}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total | 45 (3.46) | 69 (5.75) | 4.16 | 2.29 |
| Transitional: Currently Competitive States |  |  |  |  |
| Kansas Maryland Pennsylvania | 5 0 $6 \frac{1}{2}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0 \\ 0 \\ 10 \end{array}$ |  |  |
| Total | 113 (3.80) | 10 (3.33) | 3.58 | . 47 |
| Transitional: Marginally Competitive States |  |  |  |  |
| A. Democratic Dominant <br> Kentucky <br> Michigan <br> Missouri <br> Ohio <br> Rhode Island <br> West Virginia | $\begin{array}{r} 0 \\ 11 \\ 0 \\ \overline{3} \\ 0 \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0 \\ 19 \frac{7}{2} \\ 7 \\ \hline \\ 4 \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Total | 14 (3.80) | $34 \frac{1}{2}$ (6.90) | 4.85 | 3.10 |

Appendix G--Continued

| States | Professionalization Scores |  | Two-party Average | Average Difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Democratic | Republican |  |  |
| B. Republican Dominant <br> California <br> Delaware <br> Idaho <br> Maine <br> Montana <br> Nebraska <br> New Hampshire <br> New York <br> North Dakota <br> Oregon <br> South Dakota <br> Vermont <br> Wisconsin | $\begin{gathered} 4 \\ 0 \\ 6 \frac{1}{2} \\ 4 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 2 \\ 4 \\ 7 \\ 3 \\ 13 \\ 4 \\ 8 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4 \\ 5 \\ 3 \\ 0 \\ 4 \\ 2 \\ 0 \\ 14 \\ 6 \\ 6 \\ 4 \\ 7 \frac{1}{2} \\ 5 \\ 9 \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Total | 551 (4.26) | 61雨 (4.73) | 4.88 | .47 |
| Group Total | (3.86) | (5.33) | 4.59 | 1.47 |

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[^0]:    $l_{\text {For example see Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow }}$ and James S. Coleman, Union Democracy: The Internal Politics

[^1]:    5Noel P. G1at and L. A. Helbert, Urben Society, (4th ed.; New Yoris; Thomas Y. Crowell Compeny, 1956) pp.
    ${ }^{6}$ Lipset, ot. al., op. git., pp. 403-404.

[^2]:    7F. J. Roethilisberger and William J. Dicksony Mengegment and the Norker (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.-1950, pp. 523-560.
    ${ }^{8}$ David B. Trusam, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 453-454.

[^3]:    ${ }^{14} \mathrm{Ph} 111 \mathrm{p}$ Selznick, "An Approach to the Theory of Bureaucracy Amertcan Sociological Review, VIII (February, 1943), 47-54. For empirical studies of the modification of goals within a bureaucratic structure see Melville Dalton, "Unofficial Union Managenent Relations," American Sociological Reviev, XV (October, 1950), 611-619; Seymour Martin Lipset, Agravian Socialism: The Intermal Politics of the Typographical Untion, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954); and Melville Daltorf, "Managing the Managers," Human Organization, XIV (Fa.lI, 1955), 4-10.

    15Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Soctological
    Study of the 011garchical Tendemcies of Modern Democrecy, Trans, Eden, and Cedar Paul (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949) p. 35.

[^4]:    16 Intio. p. 85. see also pp. 83-84.
    ${ }^{17}$ Ib1d. 2 pp. 86, 206-207. See 21so C. W. Cassinel11, "The Law Of Oiligarchy." The American Political Science. Reriew. XLVII (September, 1953), 781.

[^5]:    ${ }^{22}$ Bendix, ope cites p. 71.
    ${ }^{23}$ Cassinel11, op. o1t., pp. 773-784.

[^6]:    ${ }^{24}$ Harold D. Lasswell, The World Revolution of Our T1me: A Framework For Basic Policy Research (Stanford. Califormia: Stanford University Press, 1951); Daniel Lemer, The Nazt Elite (Stanford, Califormia; Stanford University Press, 1951); and Harold D. Lasswell. "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," The American Journal of Sociology, XLVI (Jamuary, 1941) 455-468.
    ${ }^{25}$ See Robert K. Merton, "The Intellectual In A Public Bureaucracy," in Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illino1s: The Free Press, 1949); Kurt Reltzier, "On the Paychology of the Modern Revolution," Social Research, X (September, 1943), 320-336; and Harold I. W1lenski, Intellectuals In Labor Unions: Organizational Pressures On Professional Roles (Giencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956).
    ${ }^{26} \sigma_{\text {Merton, }}$ op. cit., pp. 162-165.

[^7]:    ${ }^{28}$ See pp. 3-4.
    ${ }^{29}$ Melville Dalton, "Conflicts Between Staff and Line Managerial Officers," American Sociological Review, XV (June, 1950), 342-351.

[^8]:    32Duverger, op. cit., pp. 151-157.

[^9]:    4This hypothesis is based solely on the writer's impressions of the priorities given various staff functions by party organizations gained during two tours of duty as a member of a state political staff.

    Sone relatively simple way to test this proposition 18 to see whether state organizations not controiling the

[^10]:    7 James Macgregor Burns, "Republicans, Democrats, Who's Who? N Names Macgregor Buras, Japury 2, 1955 . Reprinted in Gerald Stourzh and Robert Lerner, Beadings in American Democracy, (Chicago: American Poundation for Political Education, 1957, 1958), p. 253.

    8This rigure does not include the minority parties in Arkansas and Tennessee which did not respond to the questionnaipe.

[^11]:    ${ }^{9}$ See Appendix F for a discussion of the index of Competitiveness used in this study.

[^12]:    $13_{\text {For }}$ a description of the organizational techniques of the Non-Partisan League see Robert L. Morlan, Political Prairie Fire: The Non-Partisan League, 1915-1922 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), Chapter 2.
    ${ }^{14}$ v. 0. Key, Southern Politics In State and Nation, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 400-405.

[^13]:    23
    Democrats nationally had a three per cent higher level of satisfaction with their staff than Republicans.

[^14]:    *The adequacy percentages designate the percentage of state chairmen in the group who stated that their party staff is adequate for their needs.

[^15]:    $1_{\text {The American Political Soience Review, XLIX }}$ (December, 1955), 1125-1126.

[^16]:    2
    ${ }^{2}$ See Appendix F.

[^17]:    4
    Respondents were asked to indicate whether they utilized a pubiic relations firm on a year-round basis, during campaign periods only, or neither.

[^18]:    8 1122 has been up-dated to 1958. Thus a number of states fall into a different competitive classification than they did in the origiral article which dealt with the period 1900-1950. Currently, the states can be classified as follows: Competitive - Indiana, Washington, Idaho, New Jersey, Montana, Colorado, Nevada and Wyoming. One-party Crclical - Massachusetts, Minnesota, Connecticut, Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Iowa, South Dakota, Maine, Illinois, New York, Utah, Ohio, Arizona, Missouri, West Virginia,

[^19]:    ${ }^{9}$ There is also relatively inttle difference between the attitude of the majority and minority party leadership relative to their perception of the adequacy of their staffs. 64.0 per cent of the chairmen of the minority parties stated that their current staff is inadequate for their needs and 65.2 of the chairmen of the majority parties made a similar statement. See pp. 78-93.

[^20]:    ${ }^{1}$ See Questionnaire: Political Party Staff Member, Appendix B. For a discussion of the methodology employed in this chapter see pp. 38-40.

[^21]:    ${ }^{2}$ Two respondents in the "moved" category were raised in urban areas entirely. See Table 1.
    ${ }^{3}$ See Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers ("Short Studies in Political Science"; New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954), Table 7.

[^22]:    United States Department of Current Population Reports, 2 and 3 , 1959.

    The World Almanac. 1960.
    For SES characteristics 7,8 and 9 , United States Department of Commerce,
    "Projections of Educational Attainment in the United States, op. cit., (1959) Series
    P-20, No. 91.

[^23]:    ${ }^{5}$ See Donald R. Matthews, "United States Senators and the Class Structure," Political Behavior, Ed. Heinz Euean, Samuel J. Eldersveld and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956) 187-188 and W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, Big Business in America, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), pp. 14-15, 20, 35, 48.

[^24]:    ${ }^{12}$ See Robert E. Lane, Political Life, (Glencoe; Illinois: The Free Press, 1959) pp. 164-165.

[^25]:    16
    These percentages represent those who have been associated with at least one group in some fashion. Not represented in the statistic are the many respondents who listed more than one type of group affiliation.

[^26]:    27Twenty per cent of the respondents indicated that party staff work is stable employment, 43.2 per cent indicated that it is fairly stable, and 33.7 indicated that it is unstable. See Appendix B, question 29.

[^27]:    28 It will be argued in Chapter VI, however, that there are important elements in the work situation that tend to break up and/or nullify the tendency of socio-economic homogeneity to produce anything approximating "cabalism."

[^28]:    1
    The term role can be defined as the behavior expected or deemed appropriate for an individual in a given social situation. As Walter Coutu states, "With every social position there are socially prescribed duties or functions to be performed, and rights to be enjoyed... Every role involves a whole system of behaviors more or less expected and enforced by various groups." "Role Playing vs. Role Taking: An Appeal for Clarification," American Sociological Review, (April, 1951), 180.

[^29]:    2
    In actual practice, competing party factions will of ten develop their own staffs. For instance a legislative group may have a staff loyal to it whereas the party organization may have a staff organization loyal to it. Communication between these two staff structures may be a factor for increasing party unity, however.

[^30]:    3 Although various factions may develop a staff committed to them, the forces driving the party to unify during election campaigns tends to reduce the level of staff commitment to factional leaders.

[^31]:    ${ }^{4}$ See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 415.

[^32]:    ${ }^{9}$ It should be noted that the respondents were asked whether or not there were ". . any obstacles in the way of [their] making these [staff] additions." Only 2 of the 11 persons responding to this question indicated reluctance on the part of the party people to having a professional staff. The most common "obstacle" cited was that of insufficient funds." Four Republicans, however, stated that the party lacked sufficient leadership and know-how to properly direct and supervise a professional staff.

[^33]:    13
    Although Robert K. Merton sees the intellectual and expert as essentially docile, for purposes of this typology, specialized expertise was felt to provide the st.aff member with a substantial amount of independence vis a vis his own specialty. See "The Intellectual In A Public Bureaucracy," in Social Theory and Social Structure, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 161-178.
    ${ }^{14}$ As one politician put it, "Politics is an endess chain of human relationships. A staff person should be able to identify the natural leaders and work with them." Another respondent put it more bluntly. "I look for someone I can get along with."

[^34]:    16
    Appendix C, questions 16-17.

[^35]:    22
    See Appendix C, question 11.

[^36]:    ${ }^{29}$ For instance, respondents were rated as permitting "high discretion" or "low discretion" on the following two questions:

    Question 12, b: In writing press releases, you have one release planned but a new situation demands a revision in your original statement. Should your public relations man

[^37]:    41 Appendix $C$, questions 10,10 , a.

[^38]:    ${ }^{3}$ See Table 3, Chapter V.

[^39]:    Note: The term "volunteered" refers to responses given to question one when asked in open-ended fashion. After obtaining the volunteered responses, the interviewer asked
    the respondent to respond to each of the items. These latter responses are termed
    "responded yes" and "responded no."
    "Items 10,11 and 12 were not pre-coded in the interview and were recorded under
    "other." Thus no attempt was made to elicit a definite response to them.

[^40]:    *Percentages in parentheses

[^41]:    ${ }^{4}$ Twenty-five per cent of the interview sample had served in a political staff capacity for one year or less; 60 per cent for two years or less. The national sample of staff respondents had a higher tenure rate, however. See Chapter IV, Table 6.

[^42]:    *Percentages in parentheses.

[^43]:    $8_{\text {No staff }}$ respondent indicated that his political superior prepared his own speeches although eight political leaders indicated doing so. This occurs for at least two reasons. First, staff respondents were not asked whether their political superiors ever wrote their own speeches; and second, most of the politicians that indicated doing so did not have staff members specifically assigned to them who would thus $s 0$ have indicated.
    ${ }^{9}$ Appendix $D$, question 23, $a, 1$.
    ${ }^{10}$ These data can be summarized as follows:

    ## Coded Response Democrats Republicans Total

    1. Extensive consultation $4 \quad 2 \quad 6$ (50.0)
    2. Discussion of "touchy" points only

    10
    1 (8.3)
    3. Little consultation until speech is written 3

    32
    $5(41.7)$
    4. No consultation

    0
    00

[^44]:    14 Appendix $D$, questions $24, b, 24, b, 1$.

[^45]:    *Percentages in parentheses

[^46]:    ${ }^{15}$ Appendix $D$, question 23 , e.

[^47]:    ${ }^{21}$ Appendix $^{D}$, question 15.
    $22_{\text {Appendix }} D$, question 16 , a.

[^48]:    ${ }^{26}$ Appendix D, questions $40-43$.

[^49]:    ${ }^{29}$ Appendix $D$, question 19 , d.

[^50]:    35 Appendix $D$, questions $32,32, a, 32, b$.
    36 Appendix $D$, question 34.

[^51]:    *Percentages in parentheses

[^52]:    42 See Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), p. 198.

[^53]:    ${ }^{1}$ See Chapter $I$.
    ${ }^{2}$ For a definition of power as used in this study, see pp. 20-21.

[^54]:    ${ }^{4}$ Robert Michels, Political Parties, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1915, 1949), pp. 34-35.

[^55]:    5c. W. Cassinelli, "The Law of Oligarchy," The American Political Science Review XLVII (September, 1953), p. 779.
    $6^{6}$ Ibid.,$~ p .778$.

[^56]:    8Theoretically, the two "oligarchies" can be conceived of as controlling different techniques of power. The political leadership may be said to control party finances and staff recruitment; the staff may control the flow of information and technical skills.
    $9^{9}$ Por an exposition of this viewpoing in connection with America's national party organizations, see Hugh A. Bone, Party Committees and National Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958).

[^57]:    15 This discussion is based largely on a summary of the theories of Merton, Selznick and Gouldner in March, op. cit., pp. 34-63.

[^58]:    ${ }^{22}$ Rensis Likert, "A Motivational Approach to a Modified Theory of Organization and Management," Haire, op. cit., pp. 184-217.

[^59]:    ${ }^{23}$ Ibid., pp. 192-193.
    ${ }^{24}$ Ibid., pp. 209-212. See also Chapter VI, note 43. ${ }^{25}$ If the finding is indicated as "positive" or "negative," it means that, with confirming or disconfirming the hypothesis, the staff is or 18 not characterized by the behavioral pattern suggested in the proposition. If the words "hypothesis confirmed" or "hypothesis disconfirmed" are indicated under "finding" it means that the hypothesis itself is either valid or invalid.

[^60]:     intentionally witholding in-
    formation.

[^61]:    attitudes of neutral compe-

[^62]:    Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to numbered sub-points in each writer's theory. See pages 8-10.
    *Concept of "identification" taken primarily from Herbert A. Simon, Administrative
    Behavior, ( 2 nd Ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), Chapter X.

[^63]:    ${ }^{26}$ Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 415. See also, p. 163.

[^64]:    28 Likert, op. cit., p. 205.
    29 Ibid.
    30 Simon, op. cit., p. xvi.
    $31_{\text {Chester }}$ I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938).

[^65]:    $x$

[^66]:    ${ }^{1}$ See Austin Ranney and Wilmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," The American Political Science Review, XLVIII (June, 1954), 477-485; Joseph Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," Ibid., XLIX (December,1955), 1120-1128; V. 0. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1956), 户. 99; and Julius Turner, "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in 'Safe' Districts," Joumpal of Politics," XV (May,-1953), 197-210.

[^67]:    $2_{\text {William H. Standing and James A. Robinson, "Inter- }}$ party Competition and Primary Contesting: The Case of Indiana," The American Political Science Review, LII (December, 1958), 1068.

[^68]:    3Each classification was further subdivided into categories marked "marginal" when the classification was too difficult to accurately determine.
    ${ }^{4}$ Schlesinger, op. cit. Data was taken from his "The Structure of Competition for Office in the American States," Behavioral Science, V (July, 1960), 197-210.

    5standing, op. cit., pp. 1068-1069.
    ${ }^{6}$ Although the use of an arbitrary number of elections involves a different span of time from state to state, it was assumed that psychologically, party strategists are more inclined to think in terms of recent elections than in terms of a span of years. Also, in almost every instance, no election occurred before 1942, making the time span for most states the late World War II or post-war period to the present.

[^69]:    7This data taken from Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Pluctuations in the Vote for Governor" (unpublished table):

