V‘ m-—._.——' -‘__' Wu: '7 “ "is “1—2"- IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF LEGISLATORS. CIVIL SERVANTS AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS Thesis for tho Dtgm of Ph. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Alan Avian 19.65 ' LIBRARY Michigan State University This is to certify that the thesis entitled Ideological Change in Israel: A Study of Legislators, Civil Servants and Universétg Students presente g Alan Arian has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for __BhD__ degree inBQIiLiLLaJ. Science /?4/ )‘A Major professor Date _.I.une_lQ,__19_6_5__ 0-169 ABSTRACT IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF LEGISLATORS, CIVIL SERVANTS AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS by Alan Arian In this thesis, the attempt was made to study ideology and ideolOgical change in a systematic manner. Ideology was defined as (a) a system of ideas, which is (b) normative in nature in the sense that it depicts and justifies an ideal; (c) based (implicitly or explicitly) on assumptions concerning the nature of man and social reality; and (d) action-oriented. If the last three re- quirements of the definition of ideology were fulfilled, the existence of a system of ideas would still have to be ascertained. Cumulative scalogram analysis was employed to test the coherent interrelationships among the elements; if they formed acceptable Guttman scales, the ideology would be empirically identified. The responses used in constructing the scales were provided by interviewing 100 Israeli Knesset (parliament) members and senior civil servants and by administering a questionnaire to 133 Hebrew University students. The Alan Arian Knesset member-civil servant sample was equally divided between those who are or were kibbutz members and those who were never affiliated with a kibbutz. Two particular sets of ideologies in Israel were studied: the ideologies of the secular political parties and the ideologies of the kibbutz federations. It was found that the political party ideologies share a common dimension. Using the positions which these parties adopted on four key issues, it was possible to speak of a cumula— tive scale of their ideologies. For the second set of ideologies, the kibbutz ideologies, ten common elements were extracted from the literature of the kibbutz movement. These ten elements met all of the requirements of the definition of ideology. In order to inquire into the nature of ideological change, a base point was assumed. In the case of the political party ideologies, the official positions on the ‘four issues were considered the base point of the ideologies. The official positions were compared with the positions of the respondents who were members of the various parties. On this basis, it was found that the ideological left was overrepresented in the Knesset and that the ideological right was underrepresented. The voting loyalties of the electorate remained in tact; the voters' ideological com-_ mitments apparently moved to the ideological right of their parties. Alan Arian Definite positional and generational cleavages were also discovered. Knesset members tended to remain ideolog- ically stable while civil servants tended to undergo con— siderable ideological change. This may be understood by the Knesset members' greater dependence upon the political party. Among the students questioned, a consistent shift to the ideological right when compared to their elders was evident. The kibbutz ideology declined in intensity but re- mained constant in content. Fewer respondents in this sample adhered to the ideology with the same intensity in the present as they did in pre-State days. On the other hand, the kibbutz ideology, as an integrated system of ideas, showed almost identical levels of consistency over time. The greatest amount of ideological change in a direction unfavorable to the kibbutz ideology was evidenced by civil servants who were former kibbutz members. In that case, change in affiliation appeared assOCiated with change in ideological position. It was found that stress often accompanied ideolog- ical change. Stress was caused by contradictions between societal expectations and personal ideological evaluations. In explaining and predicting behavior, ideological evalua- tion was shown to be the crucial variable. The material conditions of existence (or perceptions of them) did not determine ideas. Rather, ideas tended to influence per- ceptions of reality and behavior as well. IDBOLOGICAL CHANGE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY or LEGISLATORS, CIVIL SERVANTS AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS BY Alan Arian A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1965 Copyright by ALAN ARIAN 1966 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS While it has been said that the dissertation is a lonely affair, I was fortunate enough to receive helpful advice and assistance during each phase of this study. To Dr. Samuel Krislov and Dr. Leonard J. Fein I owe thanks for more than their intellectual stimulation. Their friendship and encouragement in the early stages of this project were very important to me. My sincere thanks go to the many Israelis who served as the subjects of this study and to those who aided me in countless other ways. Three special friends, for whose guidance and suggestions I shall always be grateful, are Chaya and Rami Michaeli and Eli Selah. A Research Training Fellowship of the Social Science Research Council provided me the leisure to complete this study. The Computer Institute for Social Science Research of Michigan'State university, and especially Jerry Ralya, were very helpful in providing me with facilities and know— how for the analysis of the data. Dr. Robert Scigliano, as Chairman of the Disserta- tion Committee proved a very discerning reader and stimula- ting discussant. He and the other members of the Committee, ii Dr. Charles R. Adrian and Dr. Harold J. Spaeth, were con- scientious in their reading and insightful in their com— ments. Although all the individuals mentioned above were of great help, the spark which got the project off the ground and kept it in the air was provided by my wife, Zafra. Her understanding and patience, her wise counsel and critical judgment, were crucial elements in completing this work. To her this dissertation may mean the most, for she sacrificed the most in order to have it completed. iii ACKNOWLEDEMENTS. . LIST OF TABLES . . LIST OF FIGURES. . LIST OF APPENDICES Chapter 1. 2. IDEOLOGY. . PROCEDURES. A. The B. The IDEOLOGIBS A. The the B. The C. The Sample Interview Schedule OF ISRAELI Goodland—Guttman Hypothesis and Antonovsky Research Results Compared CONTENTS Scale Expanded POLITICAL PARTIES COMMUNITARIANISM, THE KIBBUTZ AND POLITICS. A. Rural Collectivities B. The Kibbutz System C. The Political Involvement of a Communitarian Movement THE KIBBUTZ IDEOLOGY. . . A. Historical Origins B. The Content of the Kibbutz Ideology IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE. . . . A. Scaling the Kibbutz Ideology: Direction of Ideological Change B. Past and Present Scale Types: Ideological Change and Individuals Content and C. Ideological Change: Extent iv ii vi xi xii Page 17 17 35 37 37 42 64 75 75 84 95 111 111 118. 140 140 151 164 Chapter Page 7. IDEOLOG ICAL STRESS O O O O O O O O O O O D O O I 182 A. The Conceptual Model 182 B. Hypotheses Tested 189 C. Dimensions Correlated 203 8. CONCLUSIONS 0 O O l O O O O O O O O o O O O o O 216 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 251 10. 11. 12. LIST OF TABLES Page Interviewed Knesset Members by Political Party and Kibbutz Membership. . . . . . . . . 19 Profile of Interviewed Civil Servants by Kibbutz Affiliation, Sex, Birthplace and Age 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 2 3 25-39 Year—olds by Kibbutz Affiliation, Birth- place, Educational Level, Years on Kibbutz and Number of Years Ago on Kibbutz. . . . . . 24 Kibbutz Affiliation of Interviewed Civil Servants by Government Ministry . . . . . . . 28 Kibbutz Affiliation of Interviewed Civil Servants by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Government Ministry of Interviewed Civil Servants by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Civil Servants by Grade Category and Ministry; Those Interviewed and Those Employed as of MarCh 31, 1960. o e o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 30‘31 Hebrew University Students, by Faculties, 1963—64 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o e o o o o o 33 Participation and Interest in Politics and Gov— ernment, Social Class of Students by Affilia- tion with the Kibbutz Movement (in percentages). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 A Scale of the Ideologies of Israeli Secular Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Ideological Scale-Types and their Character— istics for Antonovsky's Sample and this Study's Sample (in percentages) . . . . . . . 44 Israel's Secular Parties in the Knesset, their Scale Types and their Representation In vi Table 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. Page Antonovsky's and Arian's Studies (in per- centages) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Political Party Membership by Ideological Scale Type (in percentages) (Arian's data; N=233)o a o o e e o o o o o o o e o o o o o a 50 Sources of Development Capital by Political Party Type and Elite Group (in percentages) . . . . 53 Sector of Economic Emphasis by Political Party Type and Elite Group (in percentages) . . . . S4 Ideological Scale Positions by Subjective Social Class (Arian's data; in percentages). . . . . 60 Kibbutz Members and Former Kibbutz Members by Ideological Scale Type (in percentages) . . . 62 Properties of the Economic and Foreign Policy scales. 0 O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O O 68 The Economic and Foreign Policy Scale Type Positions by Age (in percentages) . . . . . . 71 Economic Scale Type Positions by Elite Group- ings and Kibbutz Affiliation (in per— centages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 The Kibbutz Population and Settlement by Federation and Year 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O 86 Kibbutz Population, By Year, As Per Cent of the Total Jewish Population in Israel . . . . . . 89 Movement of Newcomers to Kibbutzim Between October 1, 1956 and October 1, 1960, by Faderation O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 9 3 Weight of the Kibbutzim in the Population and Economy of Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Kibbutz Member Participation in the Fifth Knesset (1961‘— ) a o o o e o o o o o o o o 98 Voters and Valid Votes by Kibbutz Federation for Five Knesset Elections (in percentages) .lGllOl Characteristics of the Kibbutz Ideology Scale (Ten Elements) for Knesset Members and CiVil $rvants O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O 0 vii 146 Table 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. Page Characteristics of the Socialism and Zionism Dimensions of the Kibbutz Ideology (Five Elements Each) for Knesset Members and Civil Servants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Characteristics of the Socialism and Zionism Scales (Five Elements Each) for the Student smple O O O O O O O O O O I C O O O O O I O O 150 Scale Type Positions of the Knesset Member- Civil Servant Group on the Ideological Present and Past Scales, Ten Elements, Compared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 The Kibbutz Ideology Scales, Past and Present, and Differences between Percentages, by Kibbutz Affiliation and Elite Group Membership (in percentages) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 The Kibbutz Ideology Scales, Past and Present, and Differences between Percentages, by Educational Level (in percentages) . . . . . . 159 The Kibbutz Ideology Scales, Past and Present, and Differences between Percentages, by Political Party Membership (in percentages). . 161 The Kibbutz Ideology Scales, Past and Present, and Differences between Percentages, by Political Tendency (in percentages). . . . . . 163 Per Cent Positive Responses and Rank Ordering of the Ten Elements of the Kibbutz Ideology in the Past and Present and Differences be- tween the Percentages and the Rank Orderings (Past minus Present) for the Knesset Member- Civil Servant Group. (N=98). . . . . . . . . . 166 Spearman £29 and Level of Significance for the Rank Ordering of the Ten Elements of the Kibbutz Ideology, by Elite Group Membership and Kibbutz Affiliation. . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Mean Differences within Groups of Ideological Change and Probability Based on t Test by Elite Group Membership and KibbuIE Affilia- tion (d. f0 = 9) O O O O O O O O O O O O I O 0 172 Ideological Change and Rank Ordering of the Differences of the Kibbutz Ideology's viii Table 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. Page Elements in the Past and Present and the Dif- ferences between the Original Differences and the Rank Ordering of the Former Differ- ences for the Knesset Member and Civil Servant Groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Comparisions Between Groups Using Spearman's rho on Rank Ordering of Amounts of Change on the Ten Elements of the Kibbutz Ideology 176 Comparisons between Groups Using Student's t on Amount of Ideological Change on the Ten Elements of the Kibbutz Ideology (d.f. = 9) . 178 Response Patterns Defined and Labelled. . . . . 192 Response Patterns for the Ten Elements of the Kibbutz Ideology for Knesset Member-Civil Servants and Students (in percentages). . . . 194 Response Patterns for the Ten Elements of the Kibbutz Ideology for Civil Servants by Kibbutz Affiliation (in percentages). . . . .198—199 Response Patterns for the Ten Elements of the Kibbutz Ideology for the Knesset Member- Civil Servant Sample by Political Tendency (in percentages). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .201—202 Simple Correlations between the Ideological Present Score (IdPS), the Instrumental Present Score (InPS), and the Personal Practice Score (PPS), by Elite Group Mem— bership and Kibbutz Affiliation . . . . . . . 207 Partial Correlations between All Combinations of Ideological Present Score (IdPS), Instru— mental Present Score (InPS), and Personal Practice Score (PPS), by Elite Group Mem— bership and Kibbutz Affiliation. (In the calculation, the effect of the variable in parentheses was taken into account.) . . . 211 Simple Correlations between the Ideological Present Score (pres), the Ideological Past Score (past), and the Personal Practice Score (PPS), by Elite Group Membership and Kibbutz Affiliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 ix Table 48. Partial Correlations between All Combinations of Ideological Present Score (pres), Ideolog- ical Past Score (past) and Personal Practice Score (PPS), by Elite Group Membership and Kibbutz Affiliation. (In the calculation, the effect of the variable in parentheses was taken into account.). . . . . . . . . . Page 214 Figure I. . Figure II . LIST OF FIGURES xi LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix Page I. TRANSLATION OF THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 II. ORIGINAL HEBREW INTERVIEW SCHEDULE. 0 O O O O O I O O C O O O 235 xii CHAPTER 1 IDEOLOGY The study of ideology and ideological change in countries all along the develOped—developing continuum is likely to receive increased attention from political sci- entists. Macridis has suggested that ideology be an organizing concept for the comparative study of political systems.1 Apter has recently speculated about the various roles of ideology at different points along the continuum.2 The purpose of this thesis is to inquire into the nature of ideological change in Israel, a country somewhere near the middle of the developed-developing continuum. A conceptual framework and methodology for the study of ideological change in other situations is employed. The findings reported are based upon examination of the literature of communitarianism in general and of the kibbutz movement in Israel in particular. Interviews with Israeli Knesset (parliament) members and senior civil _-_ 1Roy C. Macridis, The Stud of Com arative Govern- ment (New York: Doubleday and Co., I955), Chapfer_7. 2 David E. Apter (ed.), "Ideology and Discontent," Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of lencoe , l 4 ’ pp. -23 o servants and questionnaires administered to Hebrew Uni— versity students provided the data for the analyses which are presented. Procedures are explained in Chapter 2. The study of ideology may be approached on two levels. A student of ideology may concern himself with the relationships between ideology and other elements of the social process: The task of a study of ideology . . . is to Show how, in the whole history of thought, certain intel- lectual standpoints are connected with certain forms of experience, and to trace the intimate interaction between the two in the course of social and intellec— tual change.3 This quotation represents the point of view of a soci— ologist of knowledge. His emphasis is upon the social totality. Ideas can only be studied and understood in relation to all other ideas in the same social context. Another approach to the study of ideology focuses upon the actual, observed content of a specific ideology (one of many discrete ideologies).4 This approach uses attitude studies. The existence of a coherent ordering of attitudes which forms a system of ideas is then explored. For example, Guttman,5 expanding an idea first presented by Goodland,6 suggested that the various attitudes concerning 3Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), p. 81. 4For the distinction between ideology and ideolo— gies see Norman Birnbaum, "The Sociological Study of Ide— ology (1940—60)," Current Sociolo , IX (1961), p. 115. 5Louis Guttman, "Whither Israel's Political Parties?" The Jewish Frontier, XXVII (December, 1961), pp. 14-18. T.M. Goodland, "A Mathematical Presentation of Israel's Political Parties," British Journal of SociologyJ VIII (September, 1957), pp. 263e266. the political issues of Israeli life can be so ordered that they will meet the requirements of a Guttman scale and will correspond to the various ideological positions taken by Israeli secular political parties.7 The two approaches, while analytically disparate, ultimately merge. The sociology of knowledge must even— tually be applied to, or was originally abstracted from, the real world. The approach used by Guttman may serve as a case study for ultimate subsumption under laws of higher degrees of generality. Ideology will be defined here as (a) a system of ideas, which is (b) normative in nature in the sense that it depicts and justifies an ideal; (c) based (implicitly or explicitly) on assumptions concerning the nature of man and social reality; and (d) action-oriented. While either of the two approaches described above may be employed to study ideology as defined here, I shall use the second, attitudinal approach. This study will concentrate upon the systematic interrelationships which make discrete attitudes an ideology. Cumulative scalogram techniques will be employed in order to determine whether attitudes under study which fulfill the last three requirements also meet the condi- tion of being a system of ideas. -___~ 7See Aaron Antonovsky, "Idiologia Dmamad Bey israel," Amot, I (August-September, 1963), pp. 21—28. For a dis- cussion of Antonovsky's data and an expansion, see Chap- ter 3. 4 A word of clarification regarding the "action- oriented" nature of an ideology is in order. This com- ponent of the definition of ideology indicates that the elements of the ideology are regarded as 229E of the particular ideology under study. It is possible, and even likely, that the means for achieving these ends may not be set forth in the ideology. For example, in studying the kibbutz ideology we find that the principle of equality is of paramount importance in the literature. However, the interpretation of the principle of equality (is everyone to have the same amount of education, regardless of abil- ity?) is problematical. Action-orientation in this formu— lation does not presuppose a detailed statement concerning the implementation of an ideological element. Action- orientation does presume the desirability and feasibility of implementing the element, generally leaving the details unclear. The definition of ideology offered here is neutral . 8 . . 1n character. It prescribes no evaluative mood or 8Definitional neutrality is the general orientation found among social scientists. For discussions of negative evaluations of ideology see Henry David Aiken, "The Revolt against Ideology," Commentary, XXXVII (April, 1964), p. 32; Stanley W. Moore, The Critique of Capitalist Democracy (New York: Paine-Whitman, 1957), p.7115. For a thoroughdescus- sion of the many definitions of ideology, see Arne Naess, Jens A. Chistopherson and Kjell Kvalo, Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity (London: Oxford, 1956), Part B, Chapter 1, Sect on . anticipated substance to the ideology under study. It is applicable to the study of ideology from the vantage point of the sociologist of knowledge9 and with the techniques employed by those who study ideology "piecemeal."lo The focus of this study of ideology and ideological change is on two particular sets of ideologies in Israel. The ideologies of the secular political parties comprise the first set. The analysis, presented in Chapter 3, was 11 These ideologies suggested by Guttman's formulation. share a common dimension. Using the positions which these parties adopted on four key issues, it was possible to speak of a cumulative scale of the ideologies of the secular political parties of Israel. The second set of ideologies studied consisted of the ideologies of the kibbutz federations in Israel. Because they differ only in detail and are very similar in principle, these ideologies were studied as one ideology--the kibbutz ideology. In this analysis, ten key elements which were extracted from the literature of the kibbutz movement com— prised the kibbutz ideology. For the four elements of the party ideologies model and the ten elements extracted from the kibbutz literature, 9A recent attempt by a political scientist to em- ploy a sociology of knowledge framework is Robert E. Lane, Pglitical Ideology (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe,l962). 10Lane describes this as the approach "which attacks attitudes and beliefs piecemeal," p. 415. llGuttman, "Whither Israel's Political Parties?" the last three requirements of the definition of ideology are met. In both of the models, the attitude toward Social- ism, for example, is predicated on an evaluation of man and society and takes the form of a normative, action-oriented statement. Cumulative scalogram analysis is applied to the elements to ascertain the existence of a system of ideas. If the four elements of the party ideologies model and the ten elements from the kibbutz literature form acceptable Guttman scales, these ideologies will have been empirically identified. This analysis will be based upon the data pro— vided by the 233 Knesset members, senior civil servants and university students who were interviewed or questioned. The model of the ideologies of secular parties in Israel is based upon the official positions of the parties. The existence of many political parties is explained by the Israeli electoral system. Israelis elect their Knesset under a system of proportional representation. This system tends to perpetuate the existence of many political parties. Parties under this system tend to compete with ideologically adjacent parties for the votes of the electorate. Parties are likely to adopt rigid ideological positions which they hope will be remembered by the voters. In the Opinion of a politician working under this system, a party with a similar platform presents a greater threat to the politician's party than does a party with a very different platform. The electoral system of prOportional representation also tends to cause political communication to be passionate and the message to be rigid. The system is likely to ex— aggerate the differences between the ideological positions of two adjacent parties. The existence of a broad ideolog- ical consensus in the community may be obfuscated by the nature and intensity of ideological debate. This situation lends itself to a systematic study of the ideologies adOpted by the competing parties. In Chapter 3, the assumption is made that the party platform Irepresents the official party ideology. Party members and their ideological positions regarding the party ideologies are then compared with the positions espoused by the parties. Antonovsky has conducted research based upon a party ideologies model.12 In Chapter 3, I expand the model by enlarging each element of the scale used by Antonovsky to form four three—item sub-scales. These expanded scales were formed by adding two questions to the question orig- inally in the model. These added questions were designed to measure the same dimension that the original question measured. The kibbutz ideology represented the broad ideolog— ical consensus in Israel during the period immediately before and after the founding of the State in 1948. While many parties existed, the ideology of the kibbutz movement was influential in most of them. Each of the eight major parties had (and has) contacts with the kibbutz movement. 12Antonovsky, "Idiologia Umamed Beyisrael." 8 Many of the party platforms stressed elements of the kibbutz ideology: physical labor, agriculture, socialism and Zionism. The kibbutz movement as a Communitarian experiment is not unique. Similar communities existed as long ago as Biblical days. None, however, has existed as long as the kibbutz. None was as influential as the kibbutz is in Israel. The kibbutz movement has been extremely important in Israeli life and politics. Historically, the kibbutz movement has been a source of manpower for the political, economic and military struggles of Israel. It has served the state as a symbol of dedication to higher values and of self-sacrifice to the needs of the nation. The "leftist" orientation of the country during this period and the in- security of facing independence with an unstable economy and the possibility of war, made the kibbutz and its ideology symbols which could be called upon to promote unity. The movement's place in the history of communitarianism and its role in Israeli politics are discussed in Chapter 4. The model used to study the kibbutz ideology is composed of ten elements. These ten elements, extracted from the kibbutz literature, are discussed in Chapter 5. They meet the last three requirements of the definition of ideology used in this thesis. Based on the responses given by the interviewed and questioned subjects, it will be as— certained whether or not these ten elements form an accep- table Guttman scale. If they do, this will demonstrate the coherent ordering of these attitudes into a system of ideas --an ideology. 9 The "official" position of the kibbutz movement is ten positive responses to the ten ideological elements. Ten negative responses would indicate disagreement with the ideology. Guttman scaling techniques will allow us to ex- plore in what ways the elements are interrelated, if non— unanimous responses are obtained. Ideological change is a major concern of this thesis. It was expected that the writings of the "end of ideology" school would be helpful in explaining ideological change. Unfortunately, this was not so. The narrators of the end of ideology fail to be consistent or clear in their discussions. Their failure to make assumptions explicit has resulted in unnecessary confusion. It has caused the litera— ture concerning the end of ideology to lose direction. The writers on the end of the ideology13 fail to explain what is meant by "end" and what is meant by "ide- ology." When the end of ideology is discussed, it is never clear exactly what is happening to ideology or exactly what is ending. At least two alternative explanations are pos- sible. when discussing the end of ideology, these writers 13See Edward Shils, "The End of Ideology?" Encounter, V (November, 1955), pp. 52-58; Otto Kirchheimer, "The WanIng 0f Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes," Social Research, XXIV (Summer, 1957), pp. 127—156; Daniel BeII, Tfie End of Ideolo (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 3 -4 ; eymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1960), pp. 453-4I7; LIpset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary EurOpean Politics," Daedalus, XCIII (1964), pp. 271-303; Henry David Aiken, "The Revolt Against Ideology," pp. 29-39; and Bell and Aiken, "Ideology ;g A Debate," Commentary, XXXVIII (October, 1964), pp. 69- 10 may be referring either to variation in the content of ideas which comprise the ideology or to the lessening of intensity on the part of the believers in these ideas. Either view could be substantiated by examining the relevant sources. Shils, for example, refers to the "end of ideological en- thusiasm."14 But later he contends that There are great tasks to be undertaken amidst the ruins of the ideologies. We must reconstruct our be- liefs without yielding to the temptation -- which can never die out completely among intellectuals —- to con- struct new ideologies, as rigid, as eager for consistency and for universal observance as those which have been now transcended.15 What is it that has ended? Is it the "passion" to 16 which Bell refers? Or is Bell confusing the end of ideology (understood as intensity of ideological commitment) with the fact that "the old ideologies have lost their 'truth' and their power to persuade"?17 He reports that the " 'end of ideology' has become a call for an end to apocalyptic beliefs that refuse to specify the costs and consequences of the 18 changes they envision" and that, on the other hand, "ideology . . . is intellectually devitalized, and few issues can be formulated any more, intellectually, in ideological terms."19 The end which the Shils and Bells describe may refer to content, intensity or both. h l4311115, p. 53. ls;2ig., p. 57. 16Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 400. l7;p;g., p. 402. :zBell, "Ideology —- A Debate," p. 70. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 404. 11 In order to avoid the difficulties found in the "end of ideology" writings, the meaning of ideological change, as I use it, must be made clear. To do so, we must first distinguish between the content of an ideology and the intensity with which it is held. We may find a change in neither, either or both. Ideology will be identified with the aid of cumulative scaling. Ideological change will be identified by comparing the scale properties for the same elements and population over time. Ideological change may occur in one of two directions: we may find a decline of ideological content and/or intensity or an increase of ideological content and/or intensity. The content of an ideology may change in a positive or a negative manner. A positive change in ideological con- tent is indicated when the properties of the Guttman scale formed from the elements of the ideology were more acceptable in the past than they are in the present. Should the ele- ments of an ideology form an acceptable Guttman scale in the past and not do so in the present, we would be justified in asserting that the content of the ideology had disintegrated over time. If the Opposite were true, if in the past no scale could be formed but an acceptable scale is formed in the present, we would have discovered the existence of a "new" ideology. If the levels of acceptability of the scales remain constant (and acceptable) over time, we may say that no change has occurred in the content of the ideology under study. 12 The intensity with which an ideolOgy is held may de- cline or increase. Whether a decline or increase in inten— sity has occurred may be ascertained by comparing the num- ber of extreme scale position occupants in one time period with the number of extreme position occupants in the other period. If many respondents were in the unanimous positive position in the past and few are in that position in the present, for example, a decline of ideological intensity is indicated. If the opposite were true, an increase of ide— ological intensity has occurred. Ideological content and ideological intensity are intimately related in my understanding of ideological change. If ideological content were not identified, i.e., if an acceptable Guttman scale were not generated by the elements, ideological intensity or the number of respondents who fall in extreme positions could not be discussed. On the other hand, were everyone to fall into an extreme position, this model would again be rendered unable to discuss ideological change. For if only unanimous or near—unanimous positions were held regarding the elements under study, an acceptable scale could not possibly be generated, as unanimous and near-unanimous positions are ignored in computing the co- efficients of the scale. These considerations, while theoretically interes— ting, do not threaten the usefulness of the understanding of ideological change presented here. This is true for two reasons. First, the elements chosen to be considered as 13 ideological elements were related to one another. They were chosen because they were thought to be components of the yet—to-be-identified ideology under study. When it is found that these elements do indeed form a Guttman scale, this is a gratifying, but not altogether surprising, discovery. Second, when using a sample of over 200 respondents, it is improbable that unanimous acceptance or rejection of all the elements will be recorded. Given the nature of the model of ideology and the sample, my understanding of ideological change will prove to be a powerful tool in discovering dif- ferences of ideological content and intensity over time. When longitudinal methods of research are not pos— sible, ideological change may be studied by assuming a base point. In Chapter 3, the base point is assumed to be the party's ideological position. Change is then studied by comparing the respondents' answers with the official posi— tions of the parties. Differences between elite, genera- tional and kibbutz groups are also studied. In Chapter 6, a quasi-longitudinal technique is employed. Respondents were asked how they felt about the kibbutz ideology elements 15 or 20 years ago. There too, analyses are made comparing differences among groups based on political and demographic variables. Understanding "action-oriented" principles as refer— ring to desirable, feasible goals which are to be attained, but without any specific statements concerning the means of achieving these ends, facilitates the study of ideological 14 change over time. The elements of an ideology may remain constant while the means of achieving and fulfilling these elements may vary. As we shall observe in Chapter 5, nine of the ten elements of the kibbutz ideology have remained constant over the past fifty years. Debate has centered upon the means by which these ends should be implemented. The methodology employed in this thesis to study ideological change is applicable to other situations. How- ever, the ideological change which is studied here refers to two specific ideologies: the ideologies of the secular political parties in Israel (Chapter 3) and the kibbutz ideology (Chapter 6). In this thesis, ideological change is studied in reference to those ideologies which fulfill the last three requirements of the definition of ideology and which have been identified as ideologies by scalogram analysis of the responses of the subjects of this study. Other ideological positions which these respondents may hold must of necessity be ignored. At what point an ideolOgy "changes" for an individual is a topic beyond the scope of this study. The "end of ideology" —- the end of all ideolog- ical thinking -- would have to be studied by analyzing all ideologies. In Chapter 7, I explore the consequences of ideolog— ical change in a society. I assume that the kibbutz ideology was the accepted ideology of Israel in the pre-State period and that the kibbutz ideoloqy has declined in public accep- tability during the period between 1948 and the present. Role 15 theory is employed to analyze the effects of ideological change on legislators and civil servants. The hypothesis studied in Chapter 7 is that de- creased public acceptability of the accepted ideology causes stress, over time, in those members of a society expected to function in terms of that ideology. This approach allows me to explore the importance of the ideological atmosphere to the public official. In Chapter 7, I develop a model of ide010gical stress based on the formulation presented in Gross, Explorations in Role Analysis.20 Ideological position, instrumental evalua- tion and a statement of personal practice based upon a hy— pothetical situation are analyzed for each element of the kibbutz ideology. The response patterns for these three variables indicate the presence or absence of stress. My behavioral attempt at studying ideological stress follows the analysis of Sutton's The American Business Creed.21 Sutton attempts to explore his theory of ideology by studying the publications of the business community in the United States. His study endeavors to understand the ideology of American businessmen in terms of the strains they experience in their occupations. This is basically a Parsonian orientation to ideology. The businessmen attach 20Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, Alexander W. McEachern, Ex lorations in Role Anal Sis (New York: John Wiley and ons, . 21Francis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Keysden and James Tobin, The American Business Creed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). 16 themselves to those aspects of the "system of free enter— prise and the "American way of life" which are comforting for them. Sutton's summary statement, "Ideology is a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a social role,"22 agrees with Parson's view of ideology as a mech- anism of integration.23 In sum, the purpose of this thesis is an inquiry into ideological change in Israel, emphasizing the ideologies of the secular political parties and the kibbutz movement. Ideology has been defined in a way which would make it a useful concept for a sociologist of knowledge or for a student of attitudes. My understanding of ideological change has been explicated. The methodology which I employ in studying ideological change has been explained. My con- cern with the consequences of change in public acceptability of the accepted ideology on the public servant has been pre- sented. Having introduced the definitions and methodology which will be employed in this study, we are ready to turn to the procedures followed in gathering the data. 22Ibid., pp. 307-308. 23Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), p. 349. CHAPTER 2 PROCEDURES A. The Sample Three elite groups were used as subjects for this study. These three groups were Knesset members, senior civil servants and university students. The first two groups are members of one generation and represent the legislative and administrative elite groups in Israel. The students are members of the coming generation and represent the future elite. The field research was conducted between September, 1963 and June, 1964. Knesset members and civil servants were classified into two groups: kibbutz members and former kibbutz members on the one hand and non-kibbutz members on the other. An equal number of each group was interviewed. In the case of the Knesset members, their kibbutz affiliation (or lack of it) is public knowledge. My original plan was to sample the Knesset using a weighting which would reflect both the strength of each party in the Knesset and the number of kibbutz members in each party's parliamentary delegation. This plan had to be changed. Some members were out of the country, one was involved in discussions with an economic 17 '18 mission and could not break away, another refused to be interviewed claiming that "When I have something to say I say it from the floor of the Knesset; I don't like being asked direct questions." Two members of the original sample who refused to be interviewed were still extremely helpful. They helped me meet other Knesset members both on and off my original sample list and even made the appointments for me in two cases. This warm reception coupled with the wary reticence to participate in the interview situation was typical of the difficulties presented by the Knesset sample. Another difficult problem was presented by the Knesset members who consented to the interview as long as it was not centered upon the interview schedule. These individuals agreed to answer the open ended questions and to speak generally-~and occasionally quite Specifically—- about the problem at hand, but preferred not to commit themselves to any definite answers in the structured sec— tions of the interview. Table 1 indicates the party affili- ation of the interviewed Knesset members as well as those members whose interviews were only partially completed. The Knesset members interviewed were not a repre- sentative sample of the Knesset membership. Nevertheless, the personal backgrounds of the sixteen Knesset members with whom interviews were completed are similar to the background of the leadership group in Israel. Most of them were born in Eastern Europe, one was born in Iraq and only one was 19 .HomuwH mo Hmucwum ucoscuo>ow .3ow>uousa orb mo uumo haco pouoaosou osoum was» CH wounnsm oco IU .a umudmro .mm manna com an .Hmm .a .xamma ”ETHMmSHOhV .emma .HomumH Mo #omuumnd Hmuwundumuw scum Im H m Ammv Aomflv ooa A4909 0 o o o naom.m uflflo o o o o fleas N.aa usumm N a H Ass m.m Lass ~.as mamumnaa N H A fine 5.6H Ame o.m smegma um as A “no m.m “may 0.0H Hanna: 04 m UH Ame H.mH Away o.mm names a m m Ape o.ms Ame a.m rmposamm users ua H Um Ape p.66 Ame m.s seems um UN 0 o Ame m.a unacsssoo Hmuoa pm30H>HMDGH p030fl>umucH Q.Qflx Eoum .QEoz muomnwnx muumm .mnsms .nasucoz .mnSms .nas pompous no a no a narmumnses nephews pea spams Hmuauaaoa an muonsoz summons pmzmasuoucHuu.H mamas 20 born in Israel. It is significant for Israel's leadership recruitment that the two interviewed Knesset members born outside of Eastern EurOpe were the only two Knesset members below the age of 44. Of the membership of the Knesset, 35 per cent and 34.2 per cent are in the 45-54 and 55—64 age groups, respectively. In my sample, six members fell in the former grouping and seven in the latter. One interviewed member was among the 3.3 per cent of the Knesset's member— ship over 75 years of age.24 The interviews all took place in the Knesset build- ing, with the exception of interviews with two Knesset members who also serve as Deputy Ministers: these inter— views took place in the respondents' offices. In inter— viewing both Knesset members and civil servants, the time of the interview ranged from forty minutes to two and one half hours. Usually, between one hour and one hour and fifteen minutes was enough to complete the entire inter- view. In order to make the questions perfectly clear, the respondent was offered a copy of the interview schedule in order to follow the flow of questions, especially from Part Five. Flash cards which had reproduced on them the various keys were also used. They were handed to the inter- viewee at the appropriate time so that his response choices would be clear to him. The sample of the senior civil service was also drawn so as to include equal numbers of persons who were or 21Asher Zidon, Beit Hanivcharim (Jerusalem: Achiasef, 1964), p. 394. 21 had been kibbutz members and persons who had no kibbutz affiliation. The names of the civil servants never affili- ated with a kibbutz were obtained through a random sample of the Government YearbookLl963—64.25 This yearbook lists the senior officials of each ministry. Eighty names were picked from the yearbook using a table of random numbers. From these, 35 complete inter— views of non-kibbutz members were obtained. Twelve indi- viduals could not be located in the ministries under which they were listed. Seventeen of the individuals were on assignment out of Jerusalem. Three were no longer in gov- ernment service. Ten individuals refused to be interviewed, usually pleading an exceedingly busy schedule. Three names were not used. Other names on the randomly selected list were substituted for those who could not be interviewed. The other sub-group of civil servants consisted of those who were or had been members of a kibbutz. A list of present members was requested from the various kibbutz federations. These names were supplemented with lists given me by personal and professional contacts who were active in administration circles. Once the names were obtained they were handled exactly as the random names were. No attempt was made to draw a random or representative sample of the names. The discrepancy between the 35 names drawn from the random lists and the 42 individuals never affiliated with a 25(Jerusalem: Government Printer of Israel, 1964). 22 kibbutz who were interviewed resulted from inaccurate in- formation supplied me by informants who sometimes provided me with the names of individuals who spent a number of years on kibbutzim but were never formal members. On the other hand, three individuals from the random list were former kibbutz members. Six interviews were conducted "in the field." These were with regional agricultural extension service directors who live in neighboring kibbutzim. Technically, they were government civil servants whose jobs ranged from adminis— tering the extension service in the region to supervising the raising of fish in artificial pools in the region. These names were obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture. These six subjects came from three different kibbutzim. Initial telephone contact was made at the prospec- tive respondent's office. The interviews were held in the offices of the officials. Occasionally, if the time allotted for the appointment ran out before the interview was com- pleted, a second session would be held either at the respon- dent's home or office. Eighty-four civil servants were interviewed. They are described in Tables 2 and 3. Although very small num- bers appear in most of the subcategories and while the sample is not representative, instructive hypotheses may be suggested by careful study of these data. Table 2 represents a partial profile of the respon— dents interviewed. From it we have indicators of well known 23 b.0H o.mm a.Hm m.mm m.~s ~.H m.a m.aH N.a H.mm m.am m.a N.mm a kamnzs m Hm ma mm m a a NH 6 mm mm a cm 2 dance m.m m.HH m.aH m.as N.H . N.H H.ms m.a H.0H m.HH w.m a.pa a Imanzv mousse: s OH ma NH a o H HH 6 ma 0H m mm 2 sunbeam Hu>mz a.~ m.m u a.m n u s I ~.H s.os a.m : m.aH a Imfinzo unease: N m o m o o o o H m m 0 NH 2 unannfix ucomoum I w.m H.h s.mm m.HH ~.~ o.m N.H N.H m.w N.oN N.H m.¢m x Aomuzv _ muonsoz o m m vH a H m a H a be H mm 2 nusnnax HQEOh mm mm mm mm mm muwum< .HOE< .vm34 .Mflm .Hsm .HmH m_lll 2 tom tom tom tom Imm mww< m a z .Euow ummx puma xum om< oomam.ruuam cod cam cowamsyuam .xom .cowumwafimm< nusnaax ha mucm>uom HH>HU cosoa>uounH mo oHHmoumtt.N mqmoz csocx 0H elm mIH ouoe use» .os .08 msoHoHp emoHHoo .u084 .Euoo .usm .me 0mm 11 In: cane cane owoz mm pouHmH> oo< mucus wasnon 0» uHmH Hm>ma Hmaoanmuspm oumHarsuHm m m m m a N a HH NH m N o N 6H H4909 o H N o H H H o N H H o H H mm III Imm HHNuzv m m N H H H N a n m o o 0 HH em senses Iom nuanon uosuom o o m N N o H a a v H o H m mN ImN ouos CHIN hlv mIH ouos OHIm ale mIH mEoHQHo omoHHoo .uoe< .Euow .usm .umH 004 mooHHoo 060m uncm Home»: 004 mums» wusnon so mums» H0>0H HmSOHumoscm oomHoruuHm NDSQQHH :0 00¢ macaw mo nonesz one nusnon no nude» .Ho>oq Hmcoaumuspm .oumHaruuHm .coHumHHamm4 ausnnas an mnHqumo» mmummun.m mam-U m E u 1H o o o o 0 0:0 3 o o s H O o. h.m m mjm m '< L>hr§ H_Q H B 54 Through high school 0 2 l 0 l l 2 8 0 0 0 l 0 l 1 18 Some college 6 2 0 l l 1 l 2 3 0 0 3 l l 2 24 College diploma and above 8 7 3 1 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 3 4 3 2 42 TOTAL 14 ll 4 2 4 4 5 10 5 2 2 7 5 5 4 84 accounted for by the extension service directors who immi— grated to Israel in the 1920's just after they had completed high school and who went to and remained on kibbutzim. Israel's civil service is characterized by many grading categories. For example, administrators, lawyers, practical nurses, registered nurses, journalists, doctors, engineers, laborers and others all have different base pay, fringe benefit scales and classifications within their categories. This makes the comparative analysis of senior civil servants within different categories laborious. To give some idea of the range of senior civil servants inter- viewed, the reader is referred to Table 7 which compares the grades of the civil servants interviewed with the total num- ber of civil servants in that grade, by Ministry. 30 HUTSQHDCOUV O H O H O O O H O O O O O H ¢ m UT3UH>M0¥CH m o 0 pH H o v N N H o o o N va NNH munHHTCHSOb o o H o o N o o o o o o o o o m p030H>uwu2H m N a b m omH NH 6 H m m m N we N mVN mMOHSMH o o o N o o o w o o o o o o o m posoH>uoysH mm mm mH mom 0 m 0H am N o H ooa N Hm m moe.H mcaHUHcrume H o m H o o N o N o o H o N m mH 6030H>uoucH om Nm Hm mam m mH mOH Nam mH m 0 mm wH am 04 mpa.H unnouchcm H o o o o o o H o o o o o o N v 6030H>uopsw mm as a NNH mN mm am >6 mm Nm mH mNH am «me me mN¢.H w . D H m H H H o N N N N N o H v 8 mm posoH>uowcH ea mm «H am Hm mm moH am pm amH mm Ha mm pHa on Hma.H mIm H H o N o o H o o H H H o a H NH 6030H>uoucH m 0H m m m H m N a mm H h v 5N 6H HmH NIH II. a nummmmsmmosmmusa 4A Istn 1.19? u.Tw “33014.4. T.D adv-tquW V. s 1 I 3 e .I P o e I. .b s 4 N T d I. o J 3 . . 6 . u. 3 I o o .d a a I u a u 3 J . u . whommumu 4 P E o 3 To 0 u smock can m.ommH .Hm roam: mo mm UOHOHQEH 6030H>uousH emone “wuuwHCHz use xuomoumu upmuo HQ mucm>uvm HH>HUII.N MHmHpmuumHCHEUHm mHmuoe .pouuHEo duos unusuumooc ecu cam moHuomoumu 0>HumuuchHEcm uoon or» user .ommH Hm some: mo mm mucosbumooo cam moHuuchHz he moHuomoumu HHm moosHocH coHrs .mm .o .H oHnt Eoum oo>Huop mH oHQMD mH£B .ombH .roumzimcm .mMmH .nuumz .mmmH econ mo mm oUH>uwm HHbHU or» moummsoo deum mHfiB .HHmmHv Humm>rmmm umxruoz .COHmmmsEou oua>uom HH>Hm .HomumHIm e m m b N N m CH m e v N 6 HH vH em U030H> luvucH MHmvoa o o o o o o o o o H H o o o o o p0030H> IuoucH unusuo o o o o o o o o H o o o o o o H pm30H>uoucH o o o N NON o o m NNH o m o m o o Hmm muoumusom o o o o H o o o o o o o o o o H U030H>umucH o o o o NON o o o N o H O OH o o NmN muoxuoz HMHuom o o o o o o o o o o o o m o o m p030H>uou:H o o o o H o 0 we H o o 0 one o H mmm muouuom I I .ummamsmmasasmsa W a A I s m J n J I S e u . l e o 3 3. r. o a r. 3. I e V s 1 I 1 e I. E 3 e I. ,b s m u N T d I. 0 J 3 . . 5 . 3 I 00d 99 I u GU J J . u . 4 P a . q T.- O u “poacanaouo a woman 32 The third group in this study consists of Hebrew University undergraduates. Viewed as members of a future elite group, these students were administrered a question- naire based on the original interview schedule. Five classes of students were used. Four of them were polled during a class meeting of their Basic English Studies course, a compulsory course training students in the han- dling of professional material written in English. The fifth group questioned was from the School of Social Work. In no case did the administration of the questionnaire take more than one 45—minute class period. Seventeen of the student respondents belonged at one time to a kibbutz; only one belonged at the time of the study. The kibbutz member was a student of agriculture; seven of the seventeen former kibbutz members were also first year students of agriculture. Five others majored in social work, three in the social sciences, one in law and the major field of one was unknown. Nine of the seven- teen were girls. The seventeen tended to live in large urban centers and tended to be Israeli-born. Suggestive differences were found in the occupa- tional and political backgrounds when former kibbutz and non-kibbutz student groups were compared. With seventeen in the former kibbutz group and 115 in the non-kibbutz group, it is obvious that conclusions must be drawn cau- tiously. Whereas some 15 per cent of those who had never been affiliated with the kibbutz wanted to establish their 33 TABLE 8.-—Hebrew University Students, by Faculties, 1963-64 a Agri- Social Law culture Science Other Total Students 1,505 281 2,517 b Females 387 23 739 First year 619 99 1,074 Questioned 26 28 73 6b 133 Females 12 3 32 2 49c a — Statistical Abstract of Israel,kl964, p. 518. b - HumafiitIes is represented—by one respondent; Sciences and Medicine are not represented at all. Five re— spondents' faculties unknown. c — The sex of three respondents unknown. own businesses upon completing their studies, not one kibbutz affiliated student aspired to this. Seven of the former kibbutz members saw their occupational future in government and five wished to take positions with commercial enterprises. The percentages for these two occupations were considerably higher among the kibbutz affiliated students than among the never affiliated students. For the latter, the figures are 28 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, compared with 41 per cent and 24 per cent among the former kibbutz affiliated, respectively. Table 9 indicates some differences in the political predispositions of the respondents. The differences between those-students who were formerly affiliated and those who were never affiliated with a kibbutz in the extreme positive 34 TABLE 9.——Participation and Interest in Politics and Gov— ernment, Social Class of Students by Affiliation with the Kibbutz Movement (in percentages) Kibbutz Membership Present Never (N=115) Former (N=l7) (N=1) I. Anticipated Participation in Politics Very much 0 0 10.4 As a side interest 11.8 0 24.4 None 82.4 100 60.0 No answer 5.8 0 5.2 II. Interest in Politics Very much 5.9 O 24.4 Somewhat 53.0 0 53.3 Not too 35.2 100 14.8 Not at all 5.9 0 1.7 No answer 0 0 .9 III. Interest in Government Very much 17.7 0 40.9 Somewhat 70.6 100 55.7 Not too 11.8 0 2.6 Not at all 0 0 .9 IV. Social Class Upper 0 0 3.5 Upper Middle 5.9 0 13.9 Middle 64.7 0 61.7 Working 23.5 100 12.7 Lower 0 0 .9 No answer 5.9 0 7.8 category concerning participation and interest in politics were great. sample refused to respond to the question probing political Considering that 48 per cent of the student party membership or affiliation, it would be convenient to 35 conclude that the degree of rapport necessary to elicit a response to this question was not established. This same conclusion could be drawn whenever a large number of "safe" responses to "political questions" is observed. But the fact remains that there is a considerable difference between the response pattern of students who were affiliated with the kibbutz movement and students who were never affiliated. Although the sample is hardly representative, the observed differences between the two groups would suggest that interest and participation in politics are influenced by the kibbutz experience. From the responses of the students questioned, only tentative conclusions may be drawn. Perhaps the individual who joined the kibbutz and later left it in order to pursue a career in the university was too absorbed in studies to be interested in politics and government. That kibbutz life was over-saturated with internal political squabbles and participation in the political activity of the national party with which the kibbutz was affiliated was a complaint heard a number of times during the course of this research. Perhaps the decision to leave the kibbutz, in at least a number of cases, was also a decision to ignore politics and government now, after being very involved and interested in politics while a kibbutz member. B. The Interview Schedule A translation of the interview schedule is repro- duced in Appendix I. The original Hebrew version is con- tained in Appendix II. References to the interview schedule 36 in Appendix I are identical to the Hebrew schedule in Appendix II. The schedule consists of four sections: 1. Questions dealing with the recruitment pattern of the civil servant and Knesset member: party involve— ment, kibbutz participation, etc. 2. Questions designed for use with the Goodland— Guttman model of placing individuals on a scale of ideolo- gies of Israeli political parties.27 3. Open—ended questions dealing with the kibbutz movement and its ideology. Many of these questions were suggested in Robert Lane's, Political Ideology.28 4. Questions designed for use with a personal decision-making model based on the role conflict resolution theory in Gross's, Explorations in Role Analysis.29 The schedule was pre-tested and revised. It was then examined by a staff member of the Hebrew University's School of Social Work and revised again. With only five exceptions, I handled every interview. The questionnaire administered to the student sample was similar to the interview schedule. Number (1) of the interview schedule above was altered in the questionnaire. Questions concerning occupational and political aspirations, political efficacy and activity were added. The students questioned were encouraged to work privately and to answer only those questions they wished to. .— 27 28 29 See Chapter 3. Lane, Political Ideology. See Chapter77. CHAPTER 3 IDEOLOGIES OF ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTIES A. The Goodland—Guttman Hypothesis and the Antonovsky Research In the September, 1957, issue of the British Journal of Sociology,30 Goodland suggested that the ideologies of the political parties of Israel could be understood in terms of a single continuum. He chose five issues to represent the major controversies of Israeli political life: capitalism— socialism; activism—non-activism (in dealing with surround— ing Arab countries); religiosity—secularism; pro—Soviet— ism-pro—West-ism; Zionism—anti—Zionism. Goodland found that Israel's existing political parties closely reflected, ideologically, the theoretical combinations which may logically be obtained from the five issues. Louis Guttman, relying heavily on Goodland's formu— lation, recast the model so that scale analysis could be used in studying the ideological relationships of Israel's political parties: Can the parties be arranged from right to left as is traditionally attempted in politics? In sociological language, does a scale exist among these ide010gies which would enable a ranking of the parties along a 30"A Mathematical Presentation of Israel's Political Parties," pp. 263—266. 37 38 single continuum, so that differences among them would be of degree rather than of kind?31 Guttman's interest in the problem was motivated by a desire to explain the high degree of consistent voting that took place over a period of five Knesset elections—-at a time when the social and ethnic fabric of Israeli society was changing dramatically. Guttman suggested that the religiosity issue could be replaced by a "pro—Histadrut-anti~Histadrut" issue. (The Histadrut is the General Federation of Labor.) This sub— stitution strengthened the scale in the area of economics. Omitting the religiosity issue allowed the model to focus on ideological cleavages, since the religiosity issue cuts across all of the other issues of Israeli political life. The scale which Guttman prOposed, with the scale—types identified by political party, is presented in Table 10. Guttman's theoretical work was applied by Aaron Antonovsky.32 He conducted a research project based on Guttman's model; he accepted the Guttman substitution of a pro— and anti—Histadrut issue for the religiosity one, and in his turn eliminated the Zionism-anti—Zionism issue, "since the anti-Zionists were few in number and were not homogeneous on the other issues."33 For his study he inter- viewed a representative sample of the entire adult Jewish 31"Whither Israel’s Political Parties?" p. 16. 32"Idioloqia Umamad Beyisrael," QEQE' 33 Ibid., p. 22. 39 TABLE lO.--A Scale of the Ideologies of Israeli Secular Political Partiesa _— Pro- Anti- Pro- Pro- Pro- Party Type Activist Histadrut Capitalist Western Zionist Commu- nist 1 - - — — - Mapam 2 - — - - + Mapai 3 — _ — + Progres- siveb 4 — - + + + General Zionistb 5 - + + + + - Herut 6 + + + + + Ahdut Haavodah 7 + - - — + a- Aaron Antonovsky, "Political Ideologies of Israelis," p. 2, (Mimeographed). This is a slightly modified English translation of the Hebrew original. b- The Progressives and General Zionists merged before the election of the Fifth Knesset in August, 1961. One sensitive point of difference between the two groups was their stand on the Histadrut. They are now referred to as the Liberal Party. 4O non—kibbutz population (1,170 persons) and a special sample of adult kibbutz members (300 peOple). Antonovsky measured each issue of the scale by response to a single question; for example, the socialism—capitalism question was: Concerning the economic arrangement in Israel, are you more in favor of the capitalist method or the socialist method? a. definitely capitalist b. more capitalist than socialist c. more socialist than ca italist d. definitely socialist.3 The Guttman—Antonovsky approach is consistent with the view that an ideology is a system of ideas; the inter- relationship and the continuity of these ideas are tested in Antonovsky's empirical work based on Guttman's model. The Guttman-Antonovsky scale types do portray political ideologies, for, using the Mapai party (scale-type 3, Table ll) by way of example, its political belief system can be seen to systematize its ideological components as follows: Zionism and the Histadrut and a pro—Western orientation are favored while capitalism and activism are rejected. We may call this formulation systematized since, given the same 34Question 37 in the interview schedule is presented in Appendix I. The other three questions used in the Antonovsky study were: question 35 for the Histadrut ques- tion; question 39 for the activism issue and question 43 for the East-West issue. For scale purposes, Antonovsky col- lapses the capitalism—socialism issue, using "definitely socialist" as one alternative and the other three as the second. This issue he refers to as "not strongly in favor of socialism." This is justifiable in terms of scale anal— ysis and reasonable when it is recalled that the scale identifies only the relative position of the respondent and is in no way an objective measure of position. The other three variables he dichotomizes using a two-two split. His procedures are followed in this study well. 41 five issues, all other political parties will react to them in different overall patterns. If their different re- sponses take the form of a unidimensional scale, we have demonstrated their interrelatedness. I had two objectives in using the Guttman—Antonovsky scale. First, I wanted to employ the four—item Antonovsky scale (Table ll)and the responses Antonovsky received in order to compare his representative sample with my highly selective one, which consisted of 233 Knesset members, senior civil servants and university students. A compari— son of his results and mine is presented in Section B of this chapter. My second objective in using the model was to test its unidimensionality by expanding Antonovsky's four items by otnstructing three—item sub—scales based on his original questions. For instance, I added Antonovsky's original socialism-capitalism question to a question asking how far the government should go in its nationalization policy and a question relating to whether pay should be based on ability or family situation to form the socialism—capitalism sub- scale. The construction of these sub-scales was intended to test the observed unidimensionality of the original single items. These four three-item sub—scales could then be combined to form one scale. I thought that the expanded twelve-item scale would either provide a more exact instru— ment for scaling the ideologies of Israel's secular poli- tical parties, or indicate some of the difficulties in 42 doing so with the instruments at hand. The report of this segment of the research is the subject of Section C. B. The Results Compared Implicit in Antonovsky's work and most evident in Tables 11 and 12 are two assumptions which will be accepted in this study. First, Antonovsky assumed, following both Goodland and Guttman, that it is possible to differentiate between parties according to four ideological issues. Identifying the Liberal party with scale—type 4, for ex- ample, is based on the correspondence between the official ideological statements of the party and its stands on the issues (represented in Table 11). Assigning scale—type 2 to Ahdut Haavodah and not Mapai is based on the stronger support for socialism the Ahdut Haavodah party evidences in its official statements. The second implicit assumption upon which this analysis rests is that Mapai be regarded as a leftist party and not as a party of the ideological center. Considering that the third scale type is mid-way between the two ex- tremes, it might be argued that Mapai should be assigned the center position. This would be misleading. Although it is true that Mapai's positions may be centrist in the Israeli context, on any traditional or international continuum Mapai has to be characterized as left of center. Mapai's espousal of socialist principles is sufficient evidence that the party's official ideological position is left of 43 center and not center. Btzioni's reference to Mapai as "a center party, with a 'hard core' of more than 30 per cent 35 of the votes" connotes an arithmetic center and not an ideological one. While it seems to be true that "no stable government can be formed without the center party,"36 the content of the "center party's" ideology is not at issue. Another indication that Mapai does not occupy the center pos— tion in an ideological continuum of Israel's parties comes from the members of Mapai themselves. When asked "With which political trend do you tend to sympathize?" almost 75 per cent of the 61 Mapai reSpondents answered "the moderate left." Only 22 per cent answered "the center." By contrast, each of the eight Liberal Party members inter- viewed responded that he tended to sympathize with the center. The assumption that Mapai is left of center, and the leftist tradition of Israeli politics, lead us to break down the left into the three groups presented in Table 12. Table 11 summarizes the response pattern of the scale-types of party ideologies and shows the percentage of Antonovsky's non-kibbutz Jewish population and that of the persons in my sample who fell into each scale-type. If we combine the first three scale-types which represent the k 35Amitai Etzioni, "Alternative Ways to Democracy: the Example of Israel," Com arative Politics, ed. Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 714. 36Ibid. 44 TABLE ll-Ideologica1 Scale-Types and their Characteristics for Antonovsky's Sample and this Study's Sample (in percentages) ‘5 Antonovsky Arian Not Strong- Pro— Scale sample sample Pro- Anti— 1y Pro- Wes- Type (Nall70) (N=233) Activist Histadrut Socialist tern 1 2.0 6.0 — - - '- 2 7.7 3.0 - - - + 3 22.4 18.0 - - + + 4 23.4 34.8 — + + + 5 18.5 18.5 + + + + Non-ideo— logi- cald 16.1 6.0 a-The coefficient of reproducibility of the scale is .926 and its coefficient of scalability is .846. Generally, a coefficient of reproducibility above .9 and a coefficient of scalability above .6 or .65 are considered acceptable. Antonovsky did not follow all the criteria of a Guttman scale. His "essential concern was that . . . I be left with a scale on which at least 80% of the population fitted (this 80% includes the deviant type referred to)." Letter from Antonovsky, Jerusalem, Israel, October 15, 1964. b-The wording here differs from Table 10. This difference is explained by the manner in which the response was dichotomized. See footnote 34 in this chapter. c-The deviant pattern (scale-type 6) is the only one Antonovsky mentions. In my scale, another 9.45% of the sample answered in non-scale-type pattern. Nevertheless, the scale met the tests of reproducibility and scalability (see footnote a). d-Non-ideologicals were "people who did not answer 2 or more of the 4 items . . . For those who answered 3 of 4, the 4th answer was predicted by image analysis, and they were entered in that type." Letter, Antonovsky. These procedures are followed in this study as well. For a discussion of image analysis whereby a response may be predicted on the basis of the pattern of response already observed, see Louis Guttman, "The Israel Alpha Technique for Scale Analysis," in Matilda White Riley, John W. Riley, Jr., and Jackson Toby, Scale Anal sis,(New Bruns- wich,New Jersey: Rutgers UniverSi y Press, 54),pp.4lO-415. 45 left, we find a high degree of discrepancy between the observed scale-types and the general leftist tendency which characterizes Israeli ideological and political life. Scale position four, the political center represented by the Liberal party of Israel, contains in my sample twice the percentage of "centrists" as of Liberal Knesset members (see Table 12). Only in scale-type five do we find a situ- ation closely paralleling party representation in the Knesset, although not one of my respondents identified his party as Herut. We are faced with a perplexing question: Why doesn't the distribution of party ideological positions in the Knesset agree more closely with that in the general The party ideological location of the general population? population is, of course, based on the Antonovsky sample, and the ideological distribution of positions in the Knesset An is inferred from the party distribution in that body. especially close correspondence might have been expected, since the Knesset is chosen under a system of proportional Instead, Table 12 tends to suggest the representation. overrepresentation of the left and the underrepresentation of the center and right in the Knesset. Antonovsky offered a number of answers which touch For example, he rightly claims that the upon the question. meaning of "center" in our scale is relative. It in— cludes a very large number of people who said that they are "more socialist than capitalist" in re: the 46 o I Gounod a non wmau ammom Hmmw n we» cw pummn ma ummnocx any we ucwu non era uwnEoE as» we wanna Hmuwuwaon mo mmvaoummou swamp vasom msowum> any oucw Adam 0 3 coaumwaawmm mum mmHQEmm cwaw< can hum>osouc< can no mummucvuuoa ens .huuma Amos“: omucopcommou mo tamed HMUHmoHooow :Hmwoflmwo: 0:» new sexy oamuw on» wmwndsou roan: mad «H 059 mo needy can consume ounmpconmmmuuou 05 co pummn 093 odmum sumo ou oocmammm mwuwmonw “muwmoHoooH Dom HOQH I. I. ll / pamuamoa m.e m.m t I tomcataoz w mém «.8 I: 1333 a use? o.ma ¢.- m.~e «mews m uvuowu nausea o.m as ~.m 53023: N mo puma uson< umoq O.w O.N NZVH Edam: H umficsssou umaa I vswuubnm oHaEmm wademm mammwcx expand saws co cmwu< >3m>ocouc< samum finance Ammomycouuoa tam m.»um> oamum sauna .ummm ocouc< ca :0 max 0:» CH m 47 economic life of Israel but who were categorized as "not strongly in favor of socialism."3 He also suggested that the "deviant" group, those persons who fell in scale—type 6 in Table 11, is probably largely pro-Mapai.38 Furthermore, religious parties were excluded from the tabulation of Knesset members, although members of those parties are represented in both Antonovsky's sample and my own. Arab voters support leftist parties, but they were not included in the representative sample. Antonovsky points out that Israel's "left-of-center" con- sensus is strengthened by the appeal of Mapai; this party, almost twice as powerful as the other three parties of the left combined (in terms of Knesset seats), is the most moderate of the four, and therefore potentially attractive to large numbers of centrists. Antonovsky's concluding remark seems to me to focus on the core of the problem: We would nonetheless be mistaken in concluding that there is no ideological tension at all between parties Our data suggest that this tension i539 and population. primarily between left leaders and centrist followers. The ideological tension between party leaders and followers is usually explained by the vanguard theory--that the party is filling the role of leader and educator of the people and, of necessity, its ideas and positions will be more advanced than those of its followers. The contrary is 37Mimeographed version, p. 5. See footnote a,Table l. 38Antonovsky, p. 23. This is verified by the findings; see Table 13. 39mm. 48 that perhaps the party must hurry to rarely considered: This catch up because its followers have passed it by. relationship between the party and the people is a crucial factor in the attempt to understand ideological change. Within the Israeli general pOpulation there is little evidence of the predicted correspondence between party affiliation and party ideological position. In general, the members of political parties seem to be to the ideological right of their party leaders. This finding is similar to McCloskey's observation about American poli- tics: "The voters . . . adept stands on issues with little reference to their party affiliation," although he notes tends to be . . .divided 4O McCloskey does not need that "the political elite . . on issues by party affiliation." to indicate the direction of ideological deviation in the American two-party system, because there is none. From his remarks we may infer that among the general electorate there is no correlation between party affiliation and stands on A Democrat will either agree with the political issues. In Israel, with its "Democratic position" or he will not. multi-party political system, we generally find respondents occupying positions to the right of the scale-type predi- cated on the content of the ideological statements of the parties to which they belong (see Table 13). 4oH‘erbert McCloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, LVIII (JUne, 1964), ET 374. 49 The data presented in Table 13, along with the corroborating evidence of Tables 14 and 15, can take us a step beyond McCloskey's findings. The suggestion that correspondence between political-party affiliation and ideological position as measured by scale type is slight seems to be substantiated by Table 13. The respondents represented in Table 13 are the 233 Knesset Members, senior civil servants and university students questioned in this study. If we isolate each of these three groups we find an important difference between them when their political-party affiliation is correlated with their scale The Knesset member most closely identifies with positions. The civil servants repre- his party's official position. sented here (members of another elite group of the legis- lators' generation) and the students (potential elite group members of a coming generation) are not nearly as cohesive in identifying with their parties' ideological positions as are the legislators. When confronted with a series of questions, it would be reasonable to expect variations of opinion in a Although strict party collegial body such as the Knesset. discipline may apply to voting behavior, legislators-~even Of the same party-~are not expected to agree on every issue. 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In fact, rather than the Ihud federation and its members being an appendage of the Mapai political party, there is an organization of Mapai members whose common characteristic is membership in the Ihud federation. The one notable ex- ception is Mapam's relationship with Hakibbutz Haarzi. Here, while there is no formal link between the federation's secretariat and that of the party, The federation assists Mapam with financial support and with the recruiting of members for federation and branch activity. Members of Mapam's secretariat participate occasionally at meetings of the federation in order to present before the federation [the party's] needs and demands. Two members of the Kibbutz Haarzi secretariat are also members of the Mapam secretariat.104 Hakibbutz Haarzi, the most leftist of the kibbutz federations, is also the most selective and demanding in its membership requirements. The basis of its selectivity for membership goes under the name of "ideological collectivism." This Israeli version of democratic centralism demands the concurrence by the membership in any important political decisions taken by the appropriate authorities. This fea- ture of the Arzi federation explains much of its cohesion: selective membership is reinforced by the institutionalized demand for complete consensus. The Mapam-affiliated kibbutzim are regarded as pre- cincts of the party; the members' dues are paid to the party 104Letter from Shlomo Rosen, executive secretary of the Kibbutz Haarzi, Tel Aviv, May 27, 1964. 103 collectively, "although there are minorities of other 105 The kibbutzim federated parties in various kibbutzim." in Hakibbutz Hameuhad are generally associated with Ahdut Haavodah. Their leadership, while refraining from "ideo— logical collectivism," speak in terms of "ideological unity." This slogan is an attempt to be a bit more democratic in approaching the problem of the kibbutz's involvement in politics. The policy of the religious kibbutz federation of establishing formal links with a political party is similar to the policy followed by Hakibbutz Haarzi. Hakibbutz Haarzi's ties are with Mapam and the religious kibbutz federation is formally associated with Mafdal. We find here interesting support for the contention that an extreme secular party (Mapam) has much in common with religious parties. In the case of the religious kibbutz federation, every member of the kibbutz is automatically a member of the religious trade federation. According to the constitu- tion of the religious trade federation, every one of its members is automatically a member of Mafdal. The kibbutz member does have the Option of specifically requesting that he not be considered a party member, although his membership in the religious trade federation is irrevocable.106 loslbid. 106Letter from Moshe Friedman, executive secretary of Hapoel Hamizrachi, Tel Aviv, May 27, 1964. 104 Another indicator of involvement in the political system is the extent to which the federations recruit mem— bers for national (Jewish National Fund, Jewish Agency, etc.) and government service. The recruitment process may be initiated by the federation. The federation may Specif— ically request a specific member to fill a certain post, or it may merely specify that job "x" must be filled by a mem— ber of kibbutz "y". Individual members may work in national or govern- ment posts without having been recruited by the federation. Generally, if a member is recruited by the federation, his salary goes to the federation and his expenses are paid by it. If, on the other hand, he is recruited in some other way, he is employed in this outside position only as a mem— ber of his particular kibbutz; i.e., his salary goes to the kibbutz itself and his expenses are paid by it. In both cases, the arrangement must be approved by the general meeting of the kibbutz membership. A fixed percentage of the membership of each federa tion is "recruitable" by the national federation. This per centage varies: the recruitment committee of Hakibbutz Hameuhad may recruit up to 7 per cent of the total actual population of any given kibbutz; the Ihud and the religious 107 federations have their figures set at 5 per cent each. This figure is not always reached. Hakibbutz Hameuhad had 107The figure for Hakibbutz Haarzi was unavailable. 105 recruited only 4.8 per cent of its membership in May, 1964, for instance. Formal sanctions may be brought to bear against a kibbutz which refuses to fill its quota. Established ad— ministrative channels within the federations handle these cases. In the case of the Ihud, for example, The Office of Public Participation keeps up to date concerning the needs of the various institutions for personnel and also keeps itself informed concerning the level of recruitment in all the kibbutzim. This office applies to the kibbutz either with a concrete proposal to recruit a given member for a defined job, or else it may turn to the kibbutz in more general terms: 'We need so many members to fill such and such positions. You owe us a specific number of members. Please recom- mend apprOpriate candidates.’ If the kibbutz does not fulfill its obligation of recruiting for the movement when a concrete proposal is involved, the kibbutz is invited to appear before the Appeals Committee, whose decision is absolutely binding upon the kibbutz. The conclusions of the Appeals Com- mittee are carried out without exception. If the kibbutz is tardy in providing candidates in cases when there is no concrete proposal, the kibbutz is invited to a general hearing and usually the federa- tion is successful in motivating the kibbutz to fulfill its duty. A kibbutz which does not fill its recruitment quota may be made to pay a fine for every day that the assigned position has gone unfilled. This fine is consistent with the kibbutz's economic ability to pay . . . .108 Kibbutz members are recruited for all levels of government and national service. I requested the names of the most important kibbutz members recruited by the various federations for government service. The following array 108Letter from Senta Josephtal, executive secretary of the Ihud Hakvutzot Vehakibbutzim, Tel Aviv, May 20, 1964. 106 was received (only Hakibbutz Hameuhad and Hakibbutz Haarzi responded to this question): Of the ten recruited members mentioned by Hakibbutz Hameuhad, two were ministers and Knesset members, another was a Knesset member and former minister, a fourth was the general director of an important ministry, and two others held extremely important positions in the Labor and Interior Ministries, respectively. As Mapam is not in the present coalition, the Kibbutz Haarzi members do not hold ministerial portfolios or general direc- torships. Of the eleven members mentioned in the response to my letter to Hakibbutz Haarzi, six are Knesset members. The rigorous enforcement provisions which accompany this planned recruitment are occasionally met with Opposi— tion. A member who has committed himself to kibbutz life, it may be assumed, will not readily agree to live in Tel Aviv while working in the federation's headquarters or in Jerusalem in government or party employ. Other positions which may be filled by the kibbutz federation recruitment program include diplomatic and military positions, leading youth or teaching abroad, and working in one of the coopera- tive ventures in which the kibbutz federation participates. The hesitation to participate in the recruiting program is found not only among the recruited kibbutz mem~ bers, but also within the kibbutz membership as a whole. "In general . . . outside work is not regarded with favor; it tends to lead to a position where the member only half 107 belongs to the kibbutz, as it were."109 The practice of having all members take their turn in various kibbutz duties when in residence (such as having Knesset members wait table, etc.) is based on ideological principle and seems to be a symbolic expression of it. The practice of having "outside working members" weakens the principle of kibbutz equality and social solidarity. A member who has a car at his disposal (as well as a driver, perhaps) will be able to grant preferen— tial treatment to certain other members (such as driving them into town for a play or concert) while necessarily ignoring others. As one respondent pointed out: In town I wouldn't give a damn who (non-kibbutz Knesset member X) invites to his flat; but on the kibbutz if I'm not invited to hear about the inner workings of the government, I want to know why. The problem of "outside working members" has also received consideration at the level of the federation. In a recent seminar sponsored by Hakibbutz Hameuhad, sessions were held on the problems of expertise and retirement in "outside" jobs. While continuity is demanded in order to maintain a certain standard on the job, there comes that inevitable day when a kibbutz member must be told that he is no longer needed at his job outside the kibbutz. Proposals have been made which would raise the prestige of the "outside jobs" in the eyes of the members. Yosef Yizraeli suggested that the kibbutz federations should 109Ben—Yosef, pp. 55—56. 108 provide special training for "public servants" within the movement. Public servants should be as highly regarded by the kibbutz membership as the tractor driver or poultry expert. He deplores the attitude he finds prevalent toward a man who is stationed "outside" for a long time: "Let him come home and have a taste of our life . . . our lives are 110 Yizraeli made his gray and dull and he's living it up." suggestions in order to overcome the conflict created with— in the public servant because of his desire to serve, on the one hand, and his feeling of letting the kibbutz down, on the other. Morale is apparently lowered when members take jobs outside the kibbutz. Spiro listed this as one of the "uni- versal indices of poor morale." He wrote that the practice "enables them to live in the city and to escape many of the rigors of kibbutz life, while sharing its benefits.111 It is obvious that there are disadvantages in the kibbutz movement's program of recruiting a proportion of its members for outside work. Man power is diverted from production activity. Group morale is apparently lowered. Continuing the program indicates that the kibbutz movement perceives the advantages it gains through national service, public relations and key political positions as outweighing the disadvantages. 110Yosef Yizraeli, "Baayot Hashlichut Batzibur," Niv Hakvutza, VI (1957), p. 24. ‘ lllSpiro, Kibbutz, p. 206. 109 Aside from conscious political recruitment and par- ticipation at the highest levels of national government above, the individual kibbutz and the kibbutz federation are extremely active at the levels of national politics and local government and politics. The Kibbutz Haarzi, con- sidered a unit of the Mapam political party, is recognized as the major source of Mapam's manpower and money. As is the case with Hakibbutz Hameuhad in its support of Ahdut Haavodah, the backing of Mapam by the federation is crucial for the party's continued existence as a "party of integra— tion." Besides the evidence of majority kibbutz represen- tation in the Knesset delegations of these two parties, as demonstrated in Table 25, both federations support the newspapers of their respective parties by making the papers "freely available to all members on the basis of collective and compulsory kibbutz subscriptions.112 An important phenomenon of the Israeli political system, currently under study by the Sociology Department of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is the dominant role played by kibbutzim and kibbutz members in the local govern- ments of rural Israel. Two of the respondents in this study--one a government official who is still a kibbutz member and one a former member who left after twenty-one years—~started their government careers as regional council chairmen. 112Ben—Yosef, p. 21. 110 In local politics, each federation is active. Haarzi, for example, has each member kibbutz recruit a staff of political-actives who volunteer to work after their regular working hours in the neigh— boring immigrant villages. Every kibbutz has its own political committees, which concern themselves with political clarifications within the kibbutz and with political activity in the area.113 113Rosen, letter. CHAPTER 5 THE KIBBUTZ IDEOLOGY A. Historical Origins The ideology of the kibbutz movementluad its origins in the social and intellectual ferment which characterized Czarist Russia during the last half of the nineteenth cen— tury. Two revolutions were gaining momentum simultaneously: the populist movements which would culminate in the Bolshevik consolidation of the revolution in 1917 and the Enlighten- ment and Emancipation among the Jews of the Russian Pale of Settlement which would ultimately introduce them to the revolutionary doctrines and aspirations of the day. The interrelationship between these two movements caused a striking crisis of identity in both of these revolutions. The crisis for the Jewish revolutionaries of Russia was novel. Never before had the opportunity for Jews to participate in a non-Jewish Russian mass movement presented itself. Socially isolated, officially limited to movement and trade, the Russian Jew was semi-officially fair prey for the Russian peasantry. As late as the reign of Alexander III, the procurator of the Holy Synod presented his "final solution" of the Jewish problem in, 111 112 a simple arithmetic formula: one third of the Jews would be forced to emigrate, another third would accept baptism and the remaining third would be starved to death. In the last third he might have included those who would perish by the more direct method of the pogrom.ll4 Only after some 1700 years of wandering in Europe did the Jews first enter Russia as a result of the Russian annexation of the Eastern Ukraine in 1654. (Incidentally, that is also the year of the arrival of the first Jewish settlers in New Amsterdam, in the Western hemisphere.) After the first Russian acquisition of a sizeable Jewish community, various measures were enforced to exclude the Jews from Holy Russia. Under the reign of Catherine II, the Pale of Settlement was introduced: A 'Chinese Wall' was erected between the newly acquired Bielorussian Polish provinces and the neighboring lands of Greater Russia—~and the Jews were kept strictly on the Western side of the wall.115 Occasionally altered, the boundaries of the Pale located the Jews of Eastern Europe in that area of Europe which was partitioned and repartitioned between Poland and Russia. By changing the outer limits of the Pale or by forbidding certain types of social and economic activity or areas of habitation (market towns, for instance), the authorities effectively kept most of the Jewish community in an impov- erished, because mobile, condition. This, coupled with the sanctioned program, denied any sense of security to the Jews of the East European center. It also reinforced the image 114Rufus Learsi, Israel (Cleveland: World Publish— ing C00, 1949), p. 4730 115A.L. Patkin, The Ori ins of the Russian-Jewish Labour Movement (Melbourne: F.W. Efiesire Pty., 19477: p. 27. 113 of the Jew as a landless merchant or peddler who was not an organic part of the community around him. The socialist movement afforded the Jews the double opportunity of rejecting the ghetto—tradition of the Pale and of accepting the Challenge to work for the betterment of the people: Jew and non-Jew alike. From these secular activities they could see the coming of the social justice for which their fathers had longed. But the radical move- ments did not accept them completely. Whereas a portion of the leadership of the radicals was Jewish,116 and about fifteen per cent of the politicals arrested in Russia be- tween 1884 and 1890 were Jewish,117 the pogroms which shook the Jewish communities in this period were not entirely or immediately denounced by the revolutionaries. There is evidence suggesting that the pogroms in the Pale were received joyously by both the Court and the 118 The authorities used the anti—Jewish conspirators. riots as safety valves for letting off tensions accumulated under the peasants' hard life and Oppressive government. The pogroms became more savage and yet more tolerated by the local officials shortly after the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. "The reactionary press promptly . . . accused [the Jews] . . . of being chiefly responsible for 116Avrahm Yarmolinsky, Road to Revolutigg (New York: Macmillan, 1959), pp. 247-249; Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution, trans. Francis Haskell (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 503-505; Louis Greenberg, The Jews in Russia (New Haven: Yale university Press,l94Z), Chapter 11. 117Yarmolinsky, p. 247. 118Ibid., pp. 305—310. 114 the death of Alexander II."119 The rioters were urged on in their excesses by statements excusing the Crown's failure to suppress the mob: the programs are due to "the harmful consequences of the economic activity of the Jews for the Christian population."120 In the-radicals' view, the pogroms provided en— couraging evidence that the peasants were capable of par- ticipating in "an authentic mass protest, violent, un— bridled, sweeping aside the barriers of law."121 The orig- inal concern of the radicals in the face of the pogroms was police brutality against the rioters and the indiscriminate attack made upon the Jews, since surely all of them were 122 not to blame. In 1882, after the pogroms had taken their toll for more than a year, the People's Will characterized the pogroms as an "erroneous formula."123 It was not until the 1903 Second Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party that the official stand on the national ques- tion was formulated. There, a policy which guaranteed "the right of self-determination for all nations in the state" was adopted, although the proposal of the representative of the Jewish Bund (the General Jewish Workers Alliance) "to 119Learsi, p. 473. 120Statement attributed to Count Nicholas Ignatiev, Czar Alexander III's Minister of the Interior, cited by Learsi, p. 475. 121Yarmolinsky, p. 307. 122Venturi, p. 520; Yarmolinsky, pp. 307—309. 123Yarmolinsky, p. 309. 115 establish institutions guaranteeing full freedom of cultural development" was soundly defeated.124 But the crisis of identity lingered on in the minds of the conspirators. While agreeing that as revolutionaries they must fight for racial equality, alienating the peasants by championing the cause of the Jews would be political suicide. While the reaction— aries used Jewish blood to douse the fires of revolution, how could the radicals resist the temptation of using the same fuel to feed its flames?125 The conflict which beset the Jewish revolutionaries reversed the priorities. How could a Jew watch with in- difference the exploitation of (or acquiescence in) his people's plight by the socialist revolution? Few could resolve the conflict by identifying totally with the Russian revolutionary party.126 Most responded by reviewing the Jewish problem and by questioning the aid which Russian socialism could bring to its solution. Most significantly, the pogroms effectively curbed the tide of assimilation which had begun and initiated the waves of emigration which redressed the balance of Jewish population until, by 1935, Eastern Europe contained only 40 per cent of the world's Jews and the Americans 30 per cent, compared to 75 and 3 per cent, respectively, in 1880.127 T221Solomon M. Schwartz, The Jews in the Soviet Union (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951), pp. 21-25; 5?. Chapter 2. 12 . 12gYarmolinsky, 308. 127Ibid., p. 310. A. Revusky, Jews in Palestine (New York: Vanguard, 1936), p. 4, n. 2. 116 As the ideology based on class warfare was strug— gling with the notion of nation, nationalist Zionism clashed with the concept of class. The year 1897, which saw the First Conference of the Bund in Wilna, also witnessed the First Zionist Congress in Basle. Zionism——the movement to establish a Jewish state in the Jewish homeland-~arose as a true ideological alternative to Emancipation--the movement to secure civil and political rights for the Jew within the Jews' country of residence. Emancipation had stirred opposition from the religious traditionalists on the grounds that securing the aims of the movement would ultimately mean assimilation. The 1882 pamphlet of Leon Pinsker, A223: Emancipation, was"the first fully-formed articulation of a Zionist doctrine directly stated as a solution for the Jewish problem and openly proposed as a substitute for Emancipation, which it explicitly rejected as a possible solution."128 It added to earlier Zionist thought based on religious motivations and a desire to curb assimilation among Western Europe's Jews the feelings of anxiety which were felt by many Russian Jewish intellectuals about the physical and spiritual future of the Eastern European com- munity. The further develOpments within these two move- ments--Socialism and Zionism--need not be chronicled here. Suffice it to say that the two of them broke like a storm over the Jewish communities and each attracted strong 128Ben Halpern, The Idea o£_the Jewish State (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard university Press, 1961), p. 15. 117 adherents to its cause. The Bundists viewed territorial nationalism as bourgeois and meant by nationalism only the right to self-determination and the development of their 129 The Zionists stressed the own culture and language. barriers to full freedom without the perquisite of national identity: a homeland. Some of these Zionists were also staunch socialists (thought not necessarily Bundists) and among them were the founders of thelcibbutz movement. An exact estimate of the extent of Jewish partici— pation in the radical movements is difficult to make. Cer- tainly only a small minority of Eastern Europe's 5.5 million Jews was included in their ranks. But that small minority is important for Jewish and Israeli history for from that group there emerged the ideological roots which synthesized socialist ideals with Zionist aspirations and utlimately laid the groundwork for the establishment of the state of IIsrael. But in this narrative we must beware of "alarm— clock" history—-the overly-simplified and ordered chrono- logical recounting of complex historical movements. A gram of socialism was not blended with a half-gram of Zionism to produce a kibbutz; Alexander's assassination did not ring a bell which occasioned the start of the pogroms which in turn caused Jewish disenchantment with Russian socialism. Another event of the early 1880's is worthy of atten- tion. A group of Russian Jewish youth emigrated from Russia 129 Chapter 2. Venturi, p. 235; Patkin, Chapter 16; Schwartz, 118 to Palestine under the name of BILU for cooperative settle- ment of the land. Their name was the Hebrew acrostic of Isaiah 2:5: "House of Jacob, come, let us go." ‘Their arrival ushered in the first era of mass modern migration of Jews to Palestine. Centuries of Jewish history seem to be telescoped into those first few years of the 1880's: traditional life for the masses, socialist experimentation for a minority, official blame fOr a political disaster, savage pogroms, Zionist rumblings, the beginning of mass emigration. The future course of the history of the Jews of Russia forked into three distinct paths. Of those who remained behind, many perished during the Nazi occupation, many others are today citizens of the Soviet Union. The great wave of immigration to the United States of East EurOpean Jews contributed to the development of America in many fields. The third fork of Russian Jewry's road led to Palestine where they were to become the political elite as well as the pioneering backbone of a nation in the making. B. The Content of the Kibbutz Ideology The kibbutz movement in Israel, represented by dif- ferent federations each having its own ideology, has within it many ideologies. Notwithstanding the variations among the kibbutz federations and their ideologies, there are definite strands which run through all of the ideologies of the kibbutz federations. Because there is fundamental agreement among federations on the key ideological elements, 119 we are justified in discussing and studying the kibbutz ideology. The ideology of the kibbutz movement can profitably be viewed as a hybrid of Zionist--Jewish nationalist——and socialist ideals.130 It is beyond the scope of the present study to record the nuances of the various stands which come under the banner of the kibbutz ideology; some gen- eralizations will necessarily obscure fine points made by various writers. No attempt will be made to follow the development of an idea or the prOposed ways of implementing an element over the fifty years of existence of the kibbutz movement, nor will the origins of an idea be traced by re- ferring to social or economic thinkers outside the kibbutz movement who wrote in a similar vein. After considering the writings related to the ideology of the kibbutz movement, ten elements were extracted as representative of fundamental principles of the kibbutz ideology.131 These ten elements were then used as the starting point for my analysis of ideological change re- ported in the following chapter. The ten elements are: 1. Complete mutual responsibility according to the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." (cooperation) 2. The establishment of society without any differ- ences in privilege or material possession. (equality) 130The twin themes of socialism and nationalism seem to be dominant in the developing countries. See Apter, Ideology and Discontent, Chapter 1. 131See Spiro, Kibbutz, Chapter 2. 120 3. The abolition of the private ownership of the means of production. 4. Society gives man his character and society stands above the individual. 5. The image of the Jews must be that of a laboring nation. 6. The realization of the principles of the kibbutz ideology must take place within an agricultural framework. 7. The Jews of the world constitute a nation and not only a religion. 8. General immigration of all Jews to Israel. 9. Those Jews in the diaspora who are at the summit of the economic pyramid must form its base in Israel. 10. Kibbutz values should be accepted as the values of all mankind. The first five elements represent the socialist na— ture of the kibbutz ideology. Emphasizing cooperation and equality and the primacy of labor, society and public owner- ship, they may be found in the platforms of many socialist grOUps. The next four elements are more specifically na- tionalist and Jewish in character, although in numbers 5 and 9, Zionism takes on a socialist cast. The tenth element refers to the universality of the ideology's principles-- especially the socialist elements. By identifying these as elements of the ideology of the kibbutz movement, I do not wish to imply that the kibbutz ideology had or has exclusive title to all of them. Other ideologies in Israel have adopted, more or less intensely, most of these elements. Because I view the kibbutz ideology as an extreme statement of the left-of-center consensus in 121 Israel and because the kibbutz ideology is generally re- garded as the accepted ideology of the pre—State period, I shall adopt the elements of the kibbutz ideology in the pre-State period as the base point for this study of ideo— logical change. In reviewing the literature of the kibbutz movement for the past fifty years, I found that nine of the ten ideological elements listed above have remained the same. Debate has centered around the means by which the ends should be attained. Only in the case of "agriculture," has a shift in content occurred in an ideological element. In- creasingly in the post-State period, the introduction of indsutry into the kibbutz has received SUpport in the literature. Using as the base point in this study of ideological change the preaState ideology of the kibbutz movement, the importance of agriculture will be retained as an element of the kibbutz ideology. The kibbutz ideology, as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, meet the requirements of the definition of ideology set forth in Chapter 1. This section will outline the con- . tent of the kibbutz ideology, and some of the historical conditions which led to changes in the implementation of the ideology. The discussion, while selective, aims at introducing the reader to the kibbutz ideology and the changes which have occurred in it. 122 The kibbutz is actually a product of the Second Aliyah132 but ideological and organizational develOpments can be traced back to the First Aliyah. The assumption that cooperation is of critical importance in building a just society has been evident since the earliest days of modern Jewish settlement in Palestine. A cooperative spirit, re— inforced by cooperative living, are essential elements of the kibbutz ideology. The first attempts to set up Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine at the turn of the century had to take into account the realities which the immigrants faced. The principle of cooperation in consumption and production aided them in overcoming the other obstacles which faced them. These immigrants were largely inexperienced in physical labor and agriculture and they were faced with an unfamiliar climate, soil and landscape. In all matters concerning work and the economy of the community, the com- bined communal decision had to take precedence over the will of the individual. In spite of this cooperative effort, all of the early experiments failed.133 The failure was caused by lack of financial support and the physical and climatic differences which Palestine presented them to which the early settlers could not adapt. 132Mass migration to Palestine. The first aliyah is dated as 1882—1904; the second aliyah from 1904-1914 and the third from 1919 to 1924. 133Shumuel Gadon (ed.), Netivay Hakvutza Vehakibbutz (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1958), Chapter—1. 123 The founders Of these early settlements viewed the principle Of COOperation as merely a stepping stone on the road to the equal distribution of land and property. The Jewish settlements which were founded on the bases of pri- vate ownership of property and hired labor to work and deveIOp the owner's property failed. They failed for two reasons, in the view of those kibbutz leaders who today look back on this period: first, they failed due to eco- nomic shortcomings; second, they failed because they did not fulfill their historical national mission of providing a proper base for the absorption of immigrants and a center 134 The for the Jewish proletariat to work in dignity. laborer could not work in dignity because, on the settle— ments based on private property, he was for hire and that, in the eyes Of the socialists, was undignified. Because there was no dignified work on these farms, these farms could not provide a proper base for immigrant absorption. The only answer, in this view, was to have the Jewish worker establish the foundations Of a Jewish economy in Palestine. In the early years of this century, farms were set up to prepare Jewish immigrants for agricultural work. But these farms failed for administrative reasons. The workers saw themselves as sharing the entire responsibility of the settlements and were therefore Opposed to the administrators 135 appointed by the workers' organizations. After the 134Ibid. lBSIbid. 124 failure of these settlements, communes were formed. The communes were established without prior planning or prepara- tion; no constitution or by-laws were provided. The two major principles which guided the communes were cooperation Cooperation was perceived to be the way to and equality. establish an agricultural community which would ensure the productive independence of the worker while creating a new type of community based on "togetherness." Since the BILU movement (1882), with its goal of solving the Jewish problem through immigration to Palestine and the return of the Jews to agriculture, we find the drive to establish the model Jewish settlement based on complete COOperation while abolishing the private ownership Of pro- perty. This goal was realized in the commune: This settlement is the possession of the entire community; everyone will be able to say that it is his; and no one will be able to say that he has there even the smallest parcel of land. All the members of the community will work their land and do all other necessary work in the settlement, but the settlement will be the When an individual is common possession of all considered a member Of the community, he shall sign a statement saying that in the settlement there is nothing which he may claim to be his personal possession. He is also forbidden to aim at this goal; but all of his strength, energy and prowess he must sacrifice for the good of the community. A common treasury shall there be for the entire community. NO one has anything which is his own. Even his belongings, his clothes and all those things which he brings from his home or which he shall receive from there - these are the property of the community.136 Equality has been stressed by the entire organized For the early settlers, it was impossible kibbutz movement. 92, cited 13631'). Yavniali, Sefer Hatzionut, II, p. "Nitzaney Hashituf,Niv Hakvutza,IV(l956),p.l9l. in Kaddish Luz, 125 to conceive Of a society whichvmmld comprehensively involve each member without presuming equality. At first this did not present much Of a problem because there was little which the commune possessed. There was no obvious alternative to the poverty which equalized them all. In addition to that, the commune's membership was homogeneous: the members were all about the same age, had no children, no parents lived with them; in short, there was no generational problem which might have complicated matters economically or ideologically because only one generation was represented. Their ethnic and cultural backgrounds were all very similar; they were all raised in the same area. Even so, the first experiments at communal consumption and production led to poor results. Today, things have changed drastically. The kibbutz is a diverse and heterogeneous organization: in members' ages, backgrounds and desires. Simultaneously, the kibbutz's economic activity has been diversified. The great deal of prOperty which has been accumulated by a kibbutz over the years causes conflicts with the strict equality born of poverty which was applicable in the past. Originally, for example, equality even extended to the use of common bathing and toilet facilities. But the fact that today private facilities are provided brings forth no charges of deviation from hallowed principle. The imple— mentation of the principle of equality (as is true re— garding many Of the principles of the ideology) has changed although the principle itself has been retained. The 126 history of the principle indicates implementation of the principle is relative to the period and to Objective condi- tions. The ends are constant but the means change. The ideals of equality and COOperation have not been fully realized. Although all kibbutz members basically agree upon these goals, the Obstacles in the path to achievement are Obvious: We Often speak Of equality in all phases of living. Today it is clear to us that this equality cannot be mechanical - it must be gradual, according to the ability and capacity for activity Of every man in the kvutza. When a substantial part Of the kibbutz member— ship does not actively participate in the life Of the community, fundamental equality is curtailed, and a serious phenomenon is revealed: natural inequality is revealed.137 The principles of COOperation, equality and the abolition of the_private ownership_of the means of produc- tion, epitomized in the slogan, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need," have accompanied the kibbutz experiment since its inception. All members have agreed to these fundamentals; the debates have con- cerned the proper way in which they should be implemented. The arguments have centered on the prOper way Of preserving the purity of these goals in view of the economic conditions 137 Menachem Rolal, "Diunei Derech," Niv Hakvutza (1943), p. 41. The distinctions between kvutza and kibbutz were once ideologically and realistically clear. The kvutza was a small settlement, planned to be a "large family." Various upper limits were set for growth with the original kvutza aiming at fifteen and, at most, twenty-five adults. Economic and social reality always forced the number up- ward. The kibbutz - the "large collective" - has gradually become accepted until the distinction today is largely moot. 127 of the moment. In order to assure real equality, common ownership had to be achieved. The first principle of the commune is common owner— ship - the absence of private property. We say: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.‘ But the extent of our realizing this principle is limited to the realistic level of our membership's development. When we say: 'From each according to his ability,' that ability is dependent upon how well we developed it when we said: 'To each according to his needs.’ The whole matter depends on the extent Of our actual ability to furnish those needs. These two ele- ments: the development Of the man's ability and the possibility Of furnishing all his needs limit us. We do not provide to each according to his needs for our communal possessions are insufficient for that. We strive for equality, not formal equality, but actual equality. Formal equality is nothing but inequality.138 The ideas Of equality and cooperation outline the kibbutz ideology's basic assumptions concerning the nature of man. The kibbutz individual is not permitted to worry about himself, for with his selfish worry he is liable to injure the general welfare, and inthis manner to injure himself as well. One Of the principles of the kibbutz ideology is that society gives man his character and soci— ety stands above the individual. The individual is per- mitted to perceive himself only as a portion of the entire community, and not as a self-sustaining entity: The individual of the kvutza cannot and may not be cut Off from the community around him. The same test which we are facing concerning the nation and its sal- vation and the building Of the country-~the test of collective responsibility--is also placed in our trust within the kvutza, wherein we attempt to find the solu- tion to the question of realization for the individual also. We want to change the nation to a collective personality. That is the principle. In this principle 138Yitzhak Tabenkin, "Adam Bachevra," Mibifnim, III (November, 1948), p. 483. 128 we aspire to change the kibbutz, the kvutza and the labor movement in general. The individual is only a portion of a cell in the kibbutz personality. The question is this: TO what extent will we succeed in raising man to the stage where he will recognize that he is a cell of this collective personality for which we long.139 When the kvutza was created, these antagonisms be- tween the individual and the community were not especially recognized. The individual worked for the community, for without the community the individual could not survive. This made it clear that society is above the individual and that therefore society gives man his character. With eco- nomic development in the fields of agriculture and industry and the development of skills, the kibbutz member began to feel that he was able to maintain himself by his own efforts and not only through societal benevolence. Although he needed the community for physical existence, individuals began to realize that without their contributions the com- munity could not survive, and the idea that the individual is indestructable in the face of society asserted itself. The branch [economic] began to replace the kvutza. We place the branch, the trade, the fellow-worker above the kvutza, above the life Of society. For this we pay dearly. The existence of this occurrence--that the whole kvutza is dependent upon one branch manager, that it is eager without him and that he does not feel the strength of the kvutza—-is very serious. We must re— place the crown which the community used to wear. The kvutza and its assembly must stand above all, and the individual must realize that before him is the kvutza. He must renounce his Opinion in the face of its opinion, he must give in. I appreciate a trade and a.branch and dedication Of the member to the branch, but the kvutza is above all.l40 4139 Ibid. 140 Tanchum, "Im Tzav Hagadol," Davar Hakvutza (1944), 129 The kibbutz was founded and nourished by immigrants who arrived during the first, second and third aliyot. The kibbutz was created, kibbutz writers argued, in order to revive the Jewish nation—-a nation which had become de- pressed almost to the point of losing its national conscious— ness. The kibbutz was viewed as the ideal way to achieve this task of revival. This is how the kibbutz writers reasoned: the terrible conditions under which the Jews Of the diaspora lived prevented spiritual or political develop- ment. The nations in whose countries the Jews lived hated the Jews. Through immigration and physical labor the nation would be able to forget its inglorious past. The kibbutz would insist that the image of the Jews must be that of a laboriggypation. The new immigrant would have to learn to adjust to physical labor and forget the ways of the peddler and the small businessman. The image Of laborer would erase completely the complexes and negative character which the conditions of the diaspora had produced. A nation Of workers would bring to life the long dead Jewish Common— wealth; such a nationvnuld set the example for those Jews remaining outside of Israel. This glorification Of labor would return the Jew to the soil. Should the Jew merely immigrate and continue at his former trade, he would make Of Palestine another diaspora. Along with providing the immigrant with a new ideal ——physical labor-—the kibbutz movement provided the immi— grant with an institution wherein he could fulfill the 130 ideal. The kibbutz movement saw the ideal of physical labor as a reviving element of the nation, on the one hand, and an element which gave to the individual a new and healthy personality, on the other. "The war of the labor movement against capitalism is to prevent capitalism from creating a new diaspora in Israel."141 The mystique of exclusive self—labor and the Tolstoian romanticization of agriculture are found in the writings of Aaron David Gordon. His writings were instru— mental in establishing the theoretical foundations of the labor-Zionist movement, of which the kibbutz movement is the extreme expression. Believing in the purposeful order- ing of the cosmos, Gordon reflected upon the glories of the noble savage when he explained that the disorder of this world is due to man's adoption of artifical ways of living. The regularities Of the world indicate that man, too, as a creature of a world Of regularities, is naturally a COOpera— tive animal. Cooperation in agricultural physical labor in Palestine was the logical conclusion drawn from his philos- Ophy: Our historic claim to Palestine is not enough, it must be renewed through a creative union with its soil and that can come only through labor, manual labor, which will give us the ultimate right to the ancient homeland of our race.142 The ideal of physical labor negated the image of the Jew which had been created during 2000 years Of existence in 141Tabenkin, "Leshaah Zu," Mibifnim, XV (February, 1951), p. 8. 142Tauber,'p. l3, citing Gordon. 131 the diaspora. The notion of.a nation of laborers has re- mained since the beginning of the kibbutz movement as one Of the most important principles of the ideology. The impor- tance of labor has been stressed in both the economic and spiritual aspects Of kibbutz living. From the first, the kibbutz argued for exclusive self-labor and against hired labor. Although it was occasionally necessary to employ outside help, it was always the sense of the kibbutz that this action extended the exploitation of laborers and made the kibbutz a capitalist employer. As kibbutz industry has developed, the problem of hired labor has intensified. In spite of all the difficulties in implementing the principle, it appears that physical labor done by kibbutz members is still the approved rule: Woe be to the commune due to hired labor. The commune based on hired labor will not survive long. Hired labor will soon become an impediment. Where hired labor is introduced we may expect the loss of working members and that defection will occur by mem- bers seeking easier work. As soon as indigenous labor needs the assistance of hired labor, it has lost the advantage Of being indigenous labor.l43 The kibbutz movement tends to see in hired labor a contradiction to all Of those principles which they hold important; equality, cooperation, abolition of private ownership of property and physical labor. Hired labor is viewed as jeOpardizing the entire kibbutz movement. The kibbutz is founded on the responsibility of each member to work. All the work of a member, all 143Tabenkin, "Bifnay Tmurot," Mibifnim, XIV (August, 1949), p. 22. 132 the production of his work is the prOperty of the commune, and the satisfaction of his needs is also communistic.l44 The idea of labor leads us to an additional princ- iple of the ideology of the kibbutz movement--that the _£ealization Of the principles of the kibbutz ideologyymust take place within an agricultural framework. Since the beginning of the kibbutz movement, the ideology of the move— ment called for the realization of the principle of labor in agricultural settlements doing agricultural work. Working the soil stood in contrast to the image of the Jewish mer- chant created in the diaspora. Agricultural work alone would be able to relievetflszew Of the merchant image and physical labor would literally remake the Jewish personality. They saw in the building of Jewish agriculture the founda- tion of their existence: The fact that the kibbutz has settled on the land is what saved the commune. The most important equality within the kibbutz is the equal value each member con- tributes to this process of settlement. Settlement is what determines the character of our communist society and the nature of the man who lives in that society. The relationship of settlement is the relationship of production to the one responsible for labor. Here we see the positive relationship between work and the product of work as a value, the identification of the value of man with the value of his labor and production. Inequality between the man whose work is of value and the man whose labor is valueless in the eyes Of society and in his own eyes, is the greatest inequality which can exist between men in an agricultural commune.145 Agriculture was the best means to realize the principle of labor. As the years passed, however, and 144Tabenkin, "Adam Bachevra," p. 477. 14SIbid., p. 484. 133 while industry and technology develOped, the kibbutz had to increase productivity, face economic competition and struggle for new markets. Parallel to these developments was the demand for a higher standard of living by the kibbutz membership. Economic realities forced the movement to reconsider its stand on agriculture. In the post-State era, industry has become increas- ingly important to the kibbutz movement. An early ideolog- ical justification of the introduction of industry into the kibbutz system argued that, in a capitalist country, buying industrial goods from outside the kibbutz system would only strengthen capitalism to the detriment of socialism: We said let there be many branches, let industry develop. And we should not regret what we did in this area. Abandoning industrial development in our midst is a con— cession to private prOperty, to private initiative, to capital and therein there is no socialist advancement, rather there is only socialist retreat if we accept this.l46 The economic arguments for the emphasis of industry were powerful: The Kibbutz Hameuhad was the first to see the intro- duction Of industry into the kibbutz economy as a sound economic principle. After it have followed the other kibbutz federations, and today, the mixture of industry and agriculture is characteristic of the entire kibbutz movement. We have seen that our industries have stabil- ized our work schedules, including physically limited members, and it has also stabilized our income charts. We have seen in the industrial income to the kibbutz economy one Of the factors which can mix urban and rural forms in one settlement. All the conflicts in this issue is thus emphasized. In spite of the penetration of mechanization and science in the areas of agricul- tural production, industry has fundamental economic 146Tabenkin, "Lechalutziut Hityashvutit, Medinit Vesotzialistit," Mibifnim (June, 1944), p. 11. 134 advantages over agriculture: a) the number of factors which can effect production levels in industry is much smaller than in agriculture and thus these factors are more easily controlled; b) dependence on natural fac- tors is virtually wiped out in comparison to agricul- ture; c) the area in which industrial production is concentrated is smaller than in agriculture, which also allows for greater efficiency and automation; d) ma- chines are stationary and are not transferred from place to place; e) production surpluses are more easily and cheaply stored.l47 But the ideological arguments for stressing agri— culture over industry are still brought forth. After argu— ing for industrial expansion as early as 1944, Tabenkin wrote in 1960 that Agriculture is, then, a revolutionary phenomenon among the Jews. Not a stubborn fruit Of artificial ideals, but life-revealing, which stems from Jewish reality in the diaspora which lacked agriculture and from which was gone the tradition of physical labor and productivity in nature. Settlement and agriculture - they are the socialistic, economic, ethical and social foundations of the nation in its rejuvenation, in its revival and this foundation sets our ideals . . . . I said that anywhere that the Jews have turned to agri— culture the second generation has fled from it at the first Opportunity afforded it. But that is the fruit of diaspora living. And to the extent that the diaspora, its forms Of livelihood and its sources, overtake Israel too - and the attraction to that way of life is evident within the kibbutz, also — this thing must make us fearful and cause us to worry, inasmuch as the bitterness of the diaspora, as a spur to change, is lacking among the generation growing up and becoming strong in our midst.l48 It appears that Tabenkin's call for ideological purity will go unheeded. The belief that the principles of the kibbutz ideology can be realized only within an 147Danny Noy, "Bemivchan Hatkufah," Mibifnim. XIV (May, 1949), p. 403- ’ 148Tabenkin, "Bechinat Haderech Vecheshbon Hanefesh," Mibifnim, XXIII (October, 1960), p. 17. 135 agricultural framework is no longer stressed in the litera- ture. The development of industry (full scale productive industry and not only service industry for an agricultural community) has introduced a number of problems which were not faced in the past. Unlike agricultural production, industrial production in a modern plant demands technical expertise and division Of labor. Everyone cannot be trained for every job and ultimately, someone must be the foreman. Hired labor is often required. In agricultural production, the challenge to equality was more veiled. The "agriculture" element is the only one of the ten elements under study which has changed. Because the support and develOpment of industry in the kibbutz system are largely post—State developments, the "agriculture" element will be included in the base point of our study Of the kibbutz ideology. The elements which comprise the socialist program of the ideology of the kibbutz movement have been presented. It must be emphasized that the ideology Of the kibbutz develOped amidst the conditions of the Jewish diaspora. The kibbutz ideology was greatly influenced by and has adopted much Of the program Of the Zionist movement. Activ— ity in Palestine and political effort to realize the build— ing of a Jewish national home appealed to dispersed Jewish masses. The culmination of the struggle to establish a Jewish state was achieved by those people living in Pales— tine. All Of the ideological principles mentioned above 136 were perceived as means to the end of establishing a Jewish state. The Jewish people would succeed in establishing a state in its national homeland not by spiritual means alone. The Jews of the world constitute a nation and not only a religion. This Zionist principle was the justification for both immigration and political efforts toward statehood. The kibbutz movement attempted to realize the Zionist ideal of establishing the nation physically, politically and spiritually. Its power would be based on Jewish autonomy and a realistic probability of survival. The burning question is to what extent have the Jews of the world reached the conclusion that the sav— ing of Palestine is a necessity and will perceive a place for itself in the never ending war for their rights there.l49 The question facing the Zionist movement is: Does Zionism demand immigration? This question is clearly answered by the kibbutz movement: the general immigration of all Jews to Israel was made a keystone of its ideology. The creation of the kibbutz and its develOpment was accomplished by immigrants in order to develop the country and to prepare the way for immigrants to come. The kibbutz ideology views itself destined to affect more than those few individuals who are members of kibbutzim. The kibbutz ideology perceives itself as affecting the entire country. Therefore, the develOpment of the kibbutz movement itself is not sufficient to satisfy the principles of the kibbutz 149Tashish, "Heshbonanu Hamedini," Mibifnim, VI (June, 1939), p. 31. 137 ideology. Kibbutz members perceive the kibbutz way of life Accordingly, the eventual ideal for the Jewish people. immigration of all Jews to Israel is desired. Thanks to the successful efforts in immigration and development there is a strong base in Palestine [the kibbutz] which may serve as a foundation for the solu- tion of [Jewish national and] political problems.150 Another instance of changed conditions affecting the implementation of the ideology is seen in the reaction of the kibbutz to the "new" immigration. Largely post- State, largely Jews of the Eastern communities, these immi- grants did not tend to settle within the kibbutz movement. This is in sharp contrast to the predominant role of the Since the kibbutzim in absorbing the pre-State immigrants. state was established, the kibbutz view Of accepting immi— grants into membership has been conditioned by the appli- cant's "ideological absorbability." Our most serious crisis is our isolation from the newer immigration. We were faithful to immigration: Our we extracted our strength from its midst . communes were always receptive under the pressure of mass immigration. That was the secret of our strength. And now we are almost excluded from it. Even when we are among the immigration, the immigrants are not among This is the most serious crisis we have ever faced. Once we appreciated even those immigrants who came with US. lower standards of living or whose contribution to pro— TOday we are a majority [in ductivity was marginal. our settlements] It is easier to live in our own little worlds without paying attention to the immigrants. Our era is signified by mass migration to Israel, by the ingathering Of the exiles until we will have here ten million Jews. If they will not be here - then they will nOt exist. 'Perhaps a few will succeed in remaining minorities in the diaspora, but we have turned to the millions . . . . The vast majggity of the immigrants is lquordechai Lehav, "Shealat Hayehudim Vehasozialism," Hadim, I'(JUne, 1950), p. 2. 138 not prepared to settle in pioneering agricultural communities. This immigration was not trained for that either ideologically or practically. We must remember this simple truth: the vast majority of Jews are now attracted by agriculture; the city and its suburbs attract them. That is a tradition of generations which the pioneering movements have tried to stem, and indeed they have done much in that direction and in training for this type Of settlement, but without a pioneering motivation—-the inertia of the generations is over- whelming.151 The immigrants who develOped the kibbutz movement immigrated, in many cases, regardless of personal cost. The kibbutz ideology still calls for this unselfish immigration. The original principle was formulated by Borochov: those Jews in the diaspora who are now at the summit of the eco- nomic pyramid must form its base in Israel. Ber Borochov was a Marxist who applied Marxist principles to the problem of the Jews. He reasoned that with the advent Of indus- trialization in Russia, the Jewish masses would unsuccess- fully attempt to enter the ranks Of the proletariat. To the extent that the Jewish petit bourgeoisie would be ex— cluded from the sociological phenomenon of proletarianiza— tion, the majority Of Russian Jews would immigrate to Pale— stine. There they would accept working class values. Borochov's analysis, based on Marxian principles, was des- criptive as well as predictive. It became an ideological principle and motivated grOUpS of students and professionals to abandon their undertakings and immigrate to Palestine to jOin and reinforce the kibbutz movement.ls2 jngabenkin, "Leshaah Zu," pp. 4-5. lSZTauber, p. 10. See Ber Borochov, Nationalism and the Class Struggle (New YOrk: 1937). 139 These, then, are the key elements of the kibbutz ideology. Although Spiro's lists of "moral postulates" is cast in a different form, his concluding remark is applicable to the elements of the ideology I have listed: They are important, not only because they consti- tute the basis for the social structure Of the kibbutz, but because they provide a clue to an important premise Of its living: the premise that life is serious. It is serious because the realization of these values, rather than immediate pleasure or self-seeking, is taken to be the purpose Of living.153 The seriousness of the task, coupled with the messianic view of the justice and inevitability of the kibbutz system, leads to the conclusion that the kibbutz values should be accepted as the values of all mankind. This extreme stand is characteristic Of individuals who believe that their ideology contains Truth. The socialist elements of the ideology are the ones they hope to have universally accepted. The entire ideology is viewed as the formula for peaceful and prosperous existence for the Jewish people and the state of Israel: The kibbutz is not meant to be for the small minor- ity of the elite. It can contain nearly every type of individual and find him a niche. Because of this and because of its superiority as an economic unit and way of living, the kibbutz will eventually attract the masses and become, so to speak, a normal way of living . . . . Change is inevitable. If we allow the change to sweep over us, the kibbutz will become another utOpian dream which faded away after a few experimental the kibbutz years. If we know how to plan and control it, will have evergrowing importance in Israel and perhaps the world.154 ISBSpiro, Kibbutz, p. 36. lséMichael Cohen, "The State of the Kibbutz," Jewish Frontier, XXVIII, April 1961, pp. 24-25. CHAPTER 6 IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE A. Scaling the Kibbutz Ideology: The The Direction of Ideological Change In the interview schedule and questionnaire, the component elements of the kibbutz ideology were presented in a number of ways. Six sets of reactions were sought: the past and present reaction to each of the ideological elements, the instrumental position taken regarding each of the elements in the past, present and future, and the personal practice statement for each of the elements. The first two sets of reactions by the respondents to the ideoloqical elements concern us here. The first is the respondents' reaction to the ten ideological elements in the past. Each respondent was asked to recall how he "felt about" (what cognitive ideological position was taken re- garding) these ten elements "fifteen or twenty years ago, that is, before the establishment of the State."155 The same elements were presented to the respondent a second time, and he was asked how he felt about the ideological elements now.156 Issauestions 88—97, in interview schedule in Appendix I. lSGQuestions 78a-87a. 140 141 Two methodological assumptions underlie the analy- sis. First, the assumption is made that an acceptable cumulative scale of the ideological elements will indicate that the ideology, as defined, has been identified empiri— Should the ideological elements fail to form an cally. acceptable scale, the existence of the defined ideology is unproved. This is consistent with the definition of ideology adopted in this study which specifies that the component elements of an ideology must be systematically related. Second, I assume that the respondent accurately recalled and reported his position of twenty years ago. The hypothesis tested was that the kibbutz ideology was relevant in the process of nation building in Israel fifteen or twenty years ago (1945-50), but that the ideology has subsequently declined. This view is generally accepted by observers of the Israeli political scene: Zionism based itself on the assumption that once Jewish peOple are allowed an autonomous existence in a society of their own, their social organization will ultimately be transformed. The idea behind Jewish Eastern European students leaving their schoolbooks and becoming agricultural workers had much to do with the feeling that Jews were too much of a middle-class in Europe, that they had to develop an over-all social structure, with a proletariat and a peasantry, before they could really become a nation. The first 40 years in Palestine seemed to have given birth to a new image of a Jew, and much of the admiration for the Israeli- born, tough sabra cashes in on this anti-middle-class bias of original Zionism. But all that seems to be changing. In Israel today few peOple really believe that one should be a peasant a worker and not a scientist. The and not a doctor, traditional patterns of Jewish society, middle-classness, Studying and making as are reasserting themselves. much money as possible are becoming more and more the general ethos of society. In brief, Israel is 142 approaching not only the normal, bourgeois democracies of the West, but also the traditional patterns of Jewish society in the West against whose "inverted social pyramid" early Zionism rebelled.157 To test the hypothesis of the decline of the kibbutz ideology in Israel, the responses to the ten ideological elements were scaled. This was done twice: once for the responses to the ideological present and once for the responses to the ideological past. The hypothesis could be tested by observing a change in the characteristics of the two scales in the two time periods. For scaling pur- poses, "strongly agree" and "agree" were considered positive responses and "disagree" and "strongly disagree" were con- sidered negative responses. Two interpretations may be given to the phrase "decline of ideology" as used in the hypothesis. It may refer to the content of ideology or the intensity with which the ideology isheld. We have seen that the writers of the "end of ideology" school158 have never specified what they mean by the "end of ideology." I shall explore both meanings in testing the "decline of ideology" hypothesis. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, speaking of the "end of ideology" is unfortunate. Accepting the definition of ideology used in this study, it would be misleading to speak of the "end of ideology." 157Shlomo Avineri, "Israel: Image and Reality," The New Republic, CLI (September 26, 1964), p. 9. 158See footnote 13, Chapter 1. 143 Two empirical tests will be used to test the hypothesis. First, the integrated nature of the elements of the ideology will be examined for both the past and the present. This will measure the consistency of the ideology's content over time. Second, the intensity with which the ideology is supported now will be compared with the support it received in the past. We shall then be in a position to speak with more clarity concerning the "decline of ideology." For the first test, the "decline of ideology" is understood to refer to the content of the ideology. If the ideology has declined, in this sense, we would expect to find that the component elements of the ideology, while systematically integrated in the past, are now no longer interrelated. This disintegration over time would be proved if the components of the ideology manifested the properties of a cumulative scale in the past but no longer do so. Alternatively, the "decline of ideology" may refer to a loss of acceptability--a decrease in intensity. One measure of this decline would be a comparison of the number of unanimous positions for the ideological past and present. In this case, decline would be indicated if an ideology were held with considerably less intensity in the present than in the past--with a lesser number of persons subscribing to all or most elements of the ideology now and a greater num- ber of persons subscribing to few items. 144 The hypothesis was tested on the 98 Knesset members and civil servants interviewed.159 While there was evi- dence of a "better" scale in the past than in the present, in both cases the coefficient of reproducibility was below the conventional .9 (see Table 27). The coefficient of scalability, on the other hand, was relatively high, in both cases above the acceptable .65. As in the case of the coefficient of reproducibility, the coefficient of scala- bility indicated a "better" scale in the ideological past. For both scales, reapondents who had three or more "errors" in responding to the ten elements were not included in the calculations for the coefficients of either scale. In the ideological past scale, seven respondents were thus ex- cluded; eleven were omitted from the ideological present scale. While not fulfilling the criteria of cumulative scaling unequivocally, these scales may be portrayed as 160 "quasi—scales." We found definite indication of the 159Two of the civil servants failed to complete the "past" ideological questions and are therefore excluded from this analysis. 160In the "quasi-scale, " "no matter how low the re- producibility is . . . although they [the elements] lack the essential prOperty of a scale--rank order cannot reproduce persons' characteristics on the items in their area very well--nevertheless the rank order is perfectly efficient for relating any outside variable to the area." Louis Gutt— man, "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis," in Samuel A. Stouffer et al., Measurement and Prediction, Vol. IV of Studies in Social- Psychology‘In World War II (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton university Press, I950), p. 79. ' 145 interrelatedness of the ten elements of the kibbutz ideology in the past scale and in the present scale. This finding justifies the conclusion that the ten elements of the kibbutz ideology are, in the present, and were, in the past, systematically related. Judged on the basis of this data, the hypothesis of the "decline of ideology" (if ideology is defined as content) must be rejected. Employing another dimension of ideology, intensity of ideological belief, we find support for the hypothesis. Relying on the 35 positive unanimous positions for the past and the seven unanimous positions for the present, we may conclude that the kibbutz ideology, within this sample, has lost much of its acceptability in the view of its holders. The ideology itself had not disintegrated; that would have been demonstrated by a more reproducible and scalable past ideological scale than present ideological scale. These data would suggest that the ideology, as a systematic set of ideas remained vital; its acceptability had declined. In Chapter 5, the kibbutz ideology was depcited as being comprised of two major dimensions, Socialism and Zionism. Scaling of these two dimensions independently was attempted. Table 28 reports the results. There we see the change in acceptability of the ideology in this sample when the number of unanimous positions, both positive and nega- tive, are Compared. The Zionism sub-scale in the ideolog- ical present scale met the criterion of .9 for the coef- ficient of reproducibility. Only in that case among the 146 TABLE 27.-~Characteristics of the Kibbutz Ideology Scale (Ten Elements) for Knesset Members and Civil Servants Ideological Ideological Past Present Coefficient of Reproduc- ibility .860 .846 Coefficient of Scal- ability .776 .678 Number of Respondents 91 87 No. of positive unani- mous positions 35 7 Order of Component Questionsa 92,89,96,97,91, 85,80,87,83,81, 95,88,93,94,90 82,79,86,84,78, a- Numbers refer to the interview schedule in Appendix I. TABLE 28.--Characteristics of the Socialism and Zionism Di— mensions of the Kibbutz Ideology (Five Elements Each) for Knesset Members and Civil Servants Socialism Zionism Id. Id. Id. Id.' Past Present Past Present Coefficient of Reproduc- . ibility .885 .876 .893 .907 Coefficient of Scal— ability .743 .710 .769 .759 Number of Respondentsa 91 93 96 92 No. of unanimous pos. 46 25 55 19 positions neg. 5 7 O 0 Order of Com onent Questions 97 83 92 85 95 81 89 80 88 82 96 87 93 86 91 79 90 84 94 78 a- Respondents with two or more inconsistencies were not considered. b- See footnote a, Table 27. 147 scales considered did the coefficient of reproducibility for the ideological present scale improve over the ideolog- ical past scale. The coefficients of scalability, however, retained the familiar pattern of being higher for the ideological past scale than for the present scales. The successful scaling of the elements of the Zionism present scale had to be treated cautiously considering the low co- efficient of reproducibility and the arbitrary nature of .9 as the minimum standard of reproducibility. Scaling an ideology is affected by a unanimous response pattern in two ways: first, that pattern reduces the coefficients of reproducibility and scalability, for in these computations, unanimous decisions are ignored.161 Thus, for example, for the past scale, 37 respondents were actually used for the calculation of the reproducibility coefficient representing 91 people. Whereas omitting the unanimous and near-unanimous respondents does prevent the artificial inflation of the coefficients, this practice magnifies the inconsistencies of the remaining subjects. Second, although the number of unanimous respondents over time within the same population can give us an indication of shifts in intensity, a unanimous position hinders the attempt to ascertain the structure of an ideology by pre- venting the investigation of the interrelationships between 161In the calculation of the coefficient of repro- ducibility, 9—1 and 1-9 splits are also ignored, the rule of thumb being to reject an individual whose answers are more than 80 per cent consistent. 148 elements. In sum, while we need non-unanimous response patterns in order to test the existence of ideology, the existence of unanimous types deflates the measures by which we test interrelatedness. Taking into consideration the large number of posi— tive unanimous scale positions in the four scales under consideration, we found support for understanding the "de- cline of ideology" as referring to intensity of belief but not as disintegration of the content of the ideology. What I have called the kibbutz ideology appears to retain the properties which justify our including it under the defini— tion of ideology in the ideological present as it did in the ideological past. Fewer peOple unanimously identify with the ideology among the Knesset members and civil ser- vants interviewed, but the structure of the ideology remains relatively stable. When the responses of the 133 member university student sample were examined, twenty students had to be immediately omitted from further analysis as they did not complete the relevant sections of the questionnaire. This occurred more as a result of the method of presenting the questions (by questionnaire and not by personal interview) than as an indication of any systematic difference between Knesset members and civil servants on the one hand and students on the other. But in the ten element ideological present scale constructed with the students' responses. 26.5 per cent (30 individuals) scored three or more 149 inconsistencies and were therefore excluded from further analysis. The comparable figure among the Knesset member- civil servant group for the present scale was 11 of 98, or 11.2 per cent. This very large amount of inconsistency among the students made any effort to scale the remaining 83 students' responses of dubious value. The coefficient of reproducibility recorded, .863, was called into question by the large number of unacceptable scale types in the student.sample. The 11 per cent unacceptable rate of the Knesset member-civil servant sample for the ideolOgical present scale was more acceptable on the grounds that many of the 11 "unacceptable" respondents could have been "re- deemed" by discarding "offending" elements. The 26 per cent among the student group, however, was excessive. Zionism and Socialism subscales were constructed from the ten element kibbutz ideology present scale for the student sample. Comparing the ordering of the component questions to the ordering of the Knesset member-civil ser- vant sample, we see suggestive differences.162 For example, while the student group assigned to the "general immigra- tion of all Jews to Israel" premium importance, the Knesset member-civil servant group gave priority to "the image of Israelis as a laboring nation" and "the Jews constitute a nation and not only a religion." We may speculate that we have here a bias on the part of the younger generation in 162 chapter. For a fuller treatment, see Section C of this 150 favor of action and active support of the State and a rejec- tion of the verbal ideological battles of the previous generations. The large number of students whose positions were used in the analysis of the Socialism scale is noteworthy. One hundred and one of the 113 students had one inconsis- tency or less and were included in the scale. This group, reacting to these elements, allowed the construction of the most reproducible scale obtained in this part of the analy- sis. The negative unanimous positions outnumbered the positive unanimous positions for the first time in these analyses and, at that, by more than four to one. The stu- dents' socialism scale indicated a very highly structured TABLE 29.--Characteristics of the Socialism and Zionism Scales (Five Elements Each) for the Student Sample Socialism Zionism Coefficient of Reproducibility .927 .861 Coefficient of Scalability .847 .623 Number of Respondentsa - 101 82 No. of unanimous pos. 5 10 positions neg. 22 6 Order of Component Questionsb 81,83,86,82,84. 87,80,85,79,78. a—See footnote a, Table 28. b-See footnote a, Table 27. 151 negative position on socialism. If the comparison with the Knesset member-civil servant sample were drawn cautiously, Table 28 would indicate that the Knesset member-civil ser— vant group is more structured in ideological position on the Zionism dimension (in a positive direction) than it is on the Socialism dimension. The ideological past responses for the student sample will not be taken into account here. Most of the students were about five years old in the period they were asked to recall. It was originally hOped to overcome this by wording the question "how you felt (or would have felt) fifteen or twenty years ago." Even this wording left too many of the students uneasy with this section of the ques— tionnaire to assign much validity to its results. The stu- dent who commented that he would only be reflecting the views of his history teachers and youth group leaders was probably right. V B. Past and Present Scale Types: Ideological Change and Individuals In order to compare the respondent's scale type position on the ideological present scale with his position on the ideological past scale, I used as an indicator of position the number of positive responses recorded in each individual for each of the two scales. A non-scale indi- vidual was defined as one whose pattern of responses in- cluded three or more inconsistencies. Having shown that the ideology was almost as reproducible in the present as 152 it was in the past, the change within individuals is seen by constructing a matrix based on the scale positions of the respondents in the past and in the present (see Table 30). TABLE 30.—-Scale Type Positions of the Knesset Member-Civil Servant Group on the Ideological Present and Past Scales, Ten Elements, Compared Ideological Past High Middle Low Non- (10) (8,9) (1—7) Scale N High (9,10) 20 3 O O 23 Middle (6-8) 9 18 5 2 34 Ideological , Present Low (0—5) 4 7 15 3 29 Non-scale 2 7 l 2 12 N 35 35 21 7 98 The "high", "middle", and "low" categories used in Table 30 were formed so that each category would contain approximately the same number of respondents. While help- ful in presenting the data, this method, in effect, biased the model in favor of the ideological present. This was because the ideological past "high" and "middle" positions contained fewer scale types (defined by the number of posi- tive responses) than did those positions in the ideoloqical present. Ten positive responses formed the ideological "high" position while eight and nine positive responses formed the "middle" position. The ideological present scale 153 contained nine and ten positive responses in the "high" position and six, seven and eight in the "middle" one. We observed a high degree of correlation between the present "high" and the "high" of the past, the present "middle" and the past "middle", and the present "low" and the past "low." This apparent shift in the acceptability of the kibbutz ideology by the Knesset member—civil servant sample may be explained by the differing definitions of the "high", "middle" and "low" positions for these two scales. The "high"-"high", "middle"-"midd1e" and "low"-"low" cells con- tained more cases than any other cells. This indicated a consistent ideological movement on the part of the respon- dents from a more unanimous position to a less unanimous one in the period from the past to the present regarding the kibbutz ideology. The definition of position in the ideological pre- sent made it more likely that a less favorable evaluation of the kibbutz ideology in the present when compared to the ideological past would go unnoticed. Above and beyond the change from the past to the present contained in the "high"- "high", "middle"-"midd1e", and "low"-"1ow" cells, twenty people moved in a negative direction regarding the kibbutz ideology when their present positions were compared with their positions in the past. These individuals occupied the past "high"-present "middle" and "low", and past "middle"-present "low" cells. Disregarding the ideological change inherrent in the model's method of classification of 154 the past and present positions, these twenty individuals moved from a more positive to a less positive evaluation of the kibbutz ideology over time. In the opposite direction, eight individuals moved from relatively favorable positions in the past to relatively unfavorable positions in the present. The three respondents in the past "middle"-present "high" cell, however, may have scored nine positive responses during both time periods. The twenty respondents whose positions were lowered over time were lowered even while the model was biased in favor of not having these changes re- corded. The non-scale respondents-~those demonstrating three or more inconsistencies——offered an interesting insight into ideological change. Ten individuals who successfully structured their thoughts in the past failed to do so in the present. Five individuals whose responses conformed to the scale in the present did not conform in the past. There were two respondents who were non-scale types in both time periods. These non—scale types show a greater tendency toward ideological deterioration in the ideological present than was evidenced in the past. This indication is the only support (and very fragmentary support, at that) for the hypothesis of the decline of the kibbutz ideology in Israel when the phrase "decline of ideology" is understood as deterioration of ideological content. Other characteristics of the various scale types provided interesting information. Table 31 relates the 155 scale type positions in the past and present to kibbutz affiliation and to Knesset membership or civil service em- ployment. The components of the "high", "middle" and "low" categories for the two scales have been changed, our con- cern here being less with groups of nearly equal size and more with the added capacity of measuring change over time afforded by breaking down the number of positive responses into "High" (8-10), "Middle" (4-7) and "Low" (1-3). Table 31 suggests that it was the former kibbutz members who had undergone the greatest amount of ideological change. Evidently their rejection of the kibbutz as a way of life is more deeply rooted than was supposed by the respondent who remarked: "People leave the kibbutz because their wives want them to." Part of the change which the former kibbutz members exhibited may be explained in terms of the decline of the kibbutz ideology. Within the group of civil servants who never belonged to a kibbutz we wit- ness considerable ideological change over time. This group's positions moved steadily away from the kibbutz ideology. This is demonstrated by the decrease in percen- tages (ideological past to present) among the civil servants in the 8-10 positive response range and the uniform in- crease in percentages among the civil servants in the 4-7 and 1-3 ranges. These consistent patterns indicate the direction as well as the intensity of the change within this group concerning the kibbutz ideology. 156 .11 mm nonsmowm MM ucou non OOH Hmuou no: on momentouwom anon: msou ca mucsaowmcwocsow 0' ol- e HumHv 0 ' OH mm m . mw m mH.I mm.l Hm. mHoQEOE nusnnwx uo>u aH.u mm. H . mbcm>uom Hw>wu O O OH muonEoE nusnnwx uo>oz muobEuE manages muonEvz uommoax AmIHV Ahlvv “OHImV 3oq sauna: now: Aucomeum on enemy mommucvuuum coesuon oucouummwo 1" mm ON Om ON mm OH mm mm .nEoE nusn Q u0>o «N ma om mm mm 0 HH mm .nEoE nusnnawxuosuom HH 0 ma mm HH 0 O OOH muonfios nusnnwx A05 "7: awn. "2V mnqmsruvm HH>HU 5 ea O mm m 0 mm mm .3805 upsnnwx uo>oz O O O OOH b O O OOH muonsoe wuznnwx AMHHZV Amauzv uuonfioz uvmmocx AmIHV “busy AOHimv AMIHV Ahlvv AOHImV 2 30a oHuoaz roam a2 30a oHooaz roam anemone HmuwmoaovoH “mommucuuuoa cwv mesmuonEoz umsm HsUHOOHoopH muons ouaam.enm,coaumaaammauuusnAaslsn smoomucouuom.aouzuon moucoquMHO one .uaomoum cam ummm .monum macaoooH nuannax 0591!.Hm udm<9 157 As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, we find the Knesset members behaving differently from the civil ser- vants. There, unlike the civil servants, the Knesset mem— bers were largely faithful to the ideological positions of their political parties. The most striking impression here is the small amount of change which occurred within the Knesset group compared to the extensive change exhibited by the civil servants. Even among the Knesset members who were never kibbutz members we found almost no change in ideological position between the two time periods under study. Among the Knesset members never affiliated with a kibbutz, one individual who was in the "high" position in the past was not included in the analysis of the present; another Knesset member who scored in the "middle" position in the past, moved to the "low" position in the present. This situation may lead to confusion if only the "differences between percentages" are studied. While technically there is a difference of .18 between the two time periods, this is caused by a change in the number of respondents rather than by a difference in distribution. In the case of the Knesset members never affiliated with a kibbutz, six mem- bers place in the "high" category in both the past and the present. But because in one case the total number of re- spondents is eight and in the other seven, a .18 difference between percentages is recorded. This caveat applies to the following tables as well. 158 The former kibbutz members as a group are today ideologically more similar to the group of civil servants who were never kibbutz members than they are to those civil servants interviewed who are kibbutz members. Their dis- tribution among the categories of positive responses was more like the non-kibbutz member group than it was like the kibbutz member group. The extent of ideological change, too, followed more closely the pattern of the group never affiliated with a kibbutz. Only in the ideological past, when they were kibbutz members, did their responses resemble those of the kibbutz members. Within the Knesset member-civil service sample, there was a tendency for ideological change to be associ- ated with education (see Table 32). In the ideological past, educational level did not greatly influence the strong support given the kibbutz ideology. In the ideolog— ical present, support for the kibbutz ideology declined as educational level rose. This pattern is affirmed when the differences in percentages are studied. There we see a movement away from strong support of the kibbutz ideology. This movement is intensified as education increases. Various explanations for this shift may be suggested. The opening of new horizons which education affords is a pos- sible one. A more reasonable explanation for the finding, given this sample, can be understood by comparing these data with those reported in Table 5 (Chapter 2). There education and kibbutz membership were correlated. Present 159 mma.n mm.u mma. mma.a msm.u om. so.a mv.u om. mo.u m~.u an. o mma.n mmH. 0 mm.: mm. o o o “mime Abuse Acanme 304 causes ream Abdomeum on ummmv mommucvuuom coozuon oucouvmmwo «unmet oussnmuw HoocUm oussumum meow saoaaanomoaaou mmuaaou usom Hoo£Um swam Hoonum new: osom Hoonum wumucueoam seamen mumsosuw as m.m~ mm m.m~ ma m .mm as m m.~H om m.sm m o m.~H m.am Hoonuw mumsomuo oaom as a me am as 0 mm as meoaaao oooaaoo Hm ms mm am am a ma we omosaou «sow we m.NH mm m.~e es m.~s m.NH ma Hoonum roam e O mm me e o o OOH Hoocum some osom m O O OOH m O O OOH Hoocum humuCOEOHm Amlav Ablwv Aoatwv “mlav Ahlwv noalwv z 30a canvas roam 2 son canoe: roam immnze iomuze ucumoum HMUHOQHOOO H unmm HmUHOOHOQOH “mommucouuoa Gav Ho>oa Hmcofiumusom >3 .mumsudouuom coesuun moucouommao one .ucumoum one “use .moamum >moHoopH nunnndx usall.mm mqmmmm uD©£< O HHoI HH. EMQM: “mlav Antsy AOHIOV sod canvas roam Aacwmuum ou pmmmv m mommucvuuvm cvvzuon oucmuommwo 1 r: i as mm mm HH m we ea mm we coabmaaamms oz a mu om mN . m mm mm mm Hauonaq NH mm on mm , as 0 am ms Hosea: em m om as M mm a a mm swam: ms 0 m mm N me 0 NH mm rmno>mmm snore m o as me a m o 0 cos amass Amuse naive ioaumc Amuse “sues Aoaume 2 son manna: news a 2 son canes: roam spams Ammuze H immuzc ucommum HMUHOOHOOUH i ummm HmuHOoHoOUH Ammomucuuuom Gav awsuuonawz wuumm Hmuauflaom ma .mommucouuom coosben neuceumMMHo one .ucomeum pas ummm .mmamum >O0HomoH Nusnnax mcHI|.mm mqmHum mo COHuHHon< H: H.Om OH O.mm . m s.mm pHEsu>m ocHuwv>CH N N.OH O O.mm m m.Hs mude> Hmmuu>acs HI ~.N~ m O.mm s «.ms cowmmommom cw ouconommwa 02 H O.mH m m.em , O m.me abuwuomlespH>HusH N 0.0H m v.ms . m ¢.mm cowumuOHEEH o H.4H a «.ms ‘ a m.em . z. . . rum» 09: s1 m.wm b H.mm m ¢.>m muauHSOHuO< O H.O m m.Om N 0.0m GOHOHHOm >Hco uoc cowumz O O H m.Hm H m.Hm COHumz OCHHOQMH mwoouo m>Hmeon umcuo e>HuHm0Q umpuo 0>HuHmOQ, ucoEon sass as s :a scan a _ game m M HmuwmoflomoH mucoummmao w anemone i name i Ammuzv .asouw udm>uem HH>HUIuenEmz bummecx on» now Ancomoum mscHE bmmmv mOCHquuo game On» one mommucwuumm ecu cassava moucoumWMHO one unwmmum use when was CH mmoHomcH nusnon 0:» mo mucoEmHm cos 0:» mo mcwuopuo xcmm one mumcoawom 0>Hanom ucmu Hamil.mm mqmHU wensos Nbsnnax neenom HO.u.Q won. me wuce>u0m HH>HOIwHoQEOE uoewvcx sunbnflx uosuom use nudnon HH>HUImumnEOS uennocx wasnnflx HO.AuQ Ohm. av noumeHmmm Npfinnflx u0>wc mucm>uom HH>HUImuonEvE uvneonx HO.AHQ ONO. mmH mucoosum HO.APQ 5H0. mm mucm>hom HH>HU ucmuHMHCOHm boz mHm. mH nHOQEmE uommocx HO.AHQ Hmm. mm mucs>uom HH>HOImu0QEOE uoumecx vucmunHcmHm ocu z mDOmO mo Ho>oq .hmoHOUOH wasnon 0:» mo nucoE a ha a N s .x can mfinmuonEez adouw ouHHm ma II. IoncmwM wmwmwm OWHMMWHO xcmm ecu mom vuchHMHcOHm mo Hw>oq use can cmeumaam mm mqm<9 172 mbcm>uom HH>HO nusnon uefiuom Ho.nna mme.a Ha.mm cm mmocx .«m . . m Gm>umm H>HUImHOQEOE um so a mom a as mH me u newness season can manages 04” Q o 9 mufitmm om mes H mm s 0H Ha>Hu:muunEeE bmmmucx nusnon HO.f\.Q ovm.¢ HN. H Uflfiwfiflfimmm Nntagavn H0>0C m as mbcm>uom HH>HUImnmneue hammocx 80.xa mam.m mH.em mma mucocsum Hoo.An ooe.m Ha.aa mm muco>uem Ha>ao O~.Apm me.H em.m mH muenEoE uommocx Ho.«fla mam.a Ha.sa mm mucmsuom Ha>ausuuubeos ummmucs oucmuHMHcmwm M. oucmumm z m0 Ho>oq IMHO can: azouw no .u .oe coaumaaamm< nusnnmx use QHnmuonEmz Ozone muHHm he have u so pommm suaaananoum new vacate HmuamoHouuH mo masons cache; mmucoummuao caazun.am memes 173 kibbutz movement) affected the former kibbutz members as well. Interestingly, the two groups which seem most immune to ideological change are the kibbutz members and the Knesset members. Perhaps in both cases loyalty to the ideology is being manifested. The student group--although we have questioned the relevance of the recall question for this group--demonstrates the greatest mean difference be— tween the two ideological time periods. This might be explained as a reflection of their identification with the glorious past and their rejection of those ideological positions in the present. Using the eight groups reported on in Table 37, twenty-eight comparisons between groups are possible. Some of these overlap and it would thus be unnecessary to con- sider them. For example, comparing the change observed in the civil servant group with the change in the Knesset member—civil servant group would be superfluous. Without attempting to make every possible comparison, the more interesting and revealing relationships will be explored. I have chosen to make six comparisons between groups. The six are: l) Knesset members—civil servants and students; 2) Knesset members and civil servants; 3) Kibbutz and former kibbutz Knesset members—civil servants and Knesset members-civil servants never affiliated with a kibbutz; 4) kibbutz Knesset members-civil servants and Knesset members-civil servants never affiliated with a kibbutz; 5) former kibbutz civil servants and Knesset 174 members-civil servants who have never been kibbutz affil- iated; and 6) kibbutz Knesset members—civil servants and former kibbutz Knesset members-civil servants. The two statistical methods already presented in this section will be employed to measure the comparative change which has occurred within the groups under study. First, the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient will be used to see whether or not the amount of change in the two groups for the ten ideological elements over time was consistent. The amount of change (per cent positive re- sponse for the ideological element in the past minus the per cent positive response for the element in the present) will be rank ordered for each group. In this manner we shall be able to determine whether change has occurred uniformly between groups. Table 38 demonstrates the method of comparison between the civil servant and Knesset member groups. Table 39 contains the data for the other five comparisons. Table 39 points out important relationships in ideological change within this study's sample. The lowest correlation coefficient was obtained comparing the rank order of change between the Knesset members-civil servants and the students. This low correlation reflects more than a generational difference. The student sample, not being aware of the kibbutz ideology in the past and yet being asked to recall how they "would have felt twenty years ago," displayed the greatest degree of ideological change. 175 OH.An a udMUHMHCOHn no: I Q m u .m.p Hem.H n u . u u mm.m u m 7 I, (bow u u m.m a.a: t m.a a.a 6H H.Hu .coamaamm cho no: coaumz H O O O o O COHumz OGHHOQMH m.m o.m a.a a.e m a.a coasaumaesH HI. F.WH m 0 N. NQQH =0 e e 0“. OCchouum cumo 08: Na a.aa m o e a.aH aboauomuHmsoa>aucH ml H.OH O O m H.OH mosHm> Humuo>HcD N a.a m a.mH a m.m~ eacuuoczo obm>Hum mo cOHuHHoc< ml N.ON O O m N.ON COHmmom Imom cH oucouewmao 02 H m.mH| H 0.0m N m.Hm ousuHsUHuO< NI m.mN N O.@ H m.Nm OHEmuhn OCHuuu>CH uupuo omcmcu wepno H.moum msCHe a nepuo Aucomoum mscHE scam CH CH xcmm ummmv omcmcu i came ummmv omcmcu_ ucoEon l mucm>uom Ha>ao HmuamoHoouH OUCOHOMMHQ . unease: bummvcx M masouw ucm>umm HH>HU use Human: beeswax 0c» mom meucmumwMHO uoauom ecu mo mcHuopuo scum ecu one mouse IuOMMHO HmcHOHuO ecu coesuoc moucoquMHo ecu use ucomoum pas ummm ecu cH mucoeon m.>O0H IoOOH nusccHx 0c» mo uuucoanMHO ecu mo mcHuecuo scam use mmcmcu HmuHOoHouUHII.mm mqmnom HH>HU uvsncfix uoEuom An mH mucm>hom HH>HU InnochE bummmcx nusccHx As O ucmuauacmam boz Now. as coumaHHmmm nusnnas uo>mc mbcm>uum HH>HOImuocEwE bommocx an Om mucs>uom HH>HO wusccHx uoeuom Am m Ho..n a ems. ma cosmaaawmm nuancae uo>oc mucs>uom HH>HulmuochE uommocx Ac mH mucm>uom HH>HOImuvche uommocx nuancwx Am w Ho.uv.a was. me coumaHawem nuances uo>oc mucm>uem HH>HUImuvcEvE uommucx An ms mucm>uom HH>HOImu0nEmE newness nusnbax nosuom can nusnnas in m bcauamacmam uoz ooa. mm mucm>uom Ha>au in. mH nuocha newness as N mmH mucotsvm An pcmuHmchHm uoz eOH. mm mucs>uom HH>HuImuecEeE bummecx As H oucmuauacmam unease: nonssz mo Hv>oq ocu z asouo axons OcHHOUHO mama so och m.cseumomm mean: masouu cmozuom mcomHHMQEOUII.mm mqmuom Ha>au nuances stance in OH mucm>uon HH>flUImuensue bounces nuances As O No.., a aam.m Ho.HH ma submaaammm nuances uo>mc mucs>uom HH>Ho|muecEmE newness an Om nucm>uom HH>HO muchHx umEuom Hm m mo..A a mam.m as.» me coumaHauum nuances uo>mc mucm>uem HH>Ho|muochE newness An mH mbcm>uOm HH>HOImuonEmE wommucx NHSQQHX As O ON.-- OOO.H Hm.v mg pouMHHHmmm nusccHx uo>oc mucs>uom HH>HUImnensos newness An mg wucm>uem HH>HUImuocsoE bonuses nusbbae nosuow cam nuances is m OH.(\ Hem.H mm.m mm mucm>uom HH>HU Ac mH muonsos ummmucx Hm N OH.,fl O¢O.H No.0 mmH mucocsum Ac mm mbcm>uom HH>HUImuochE ummmocx As H oucmuHchmHm M. oucouom z unease: necesz mo Ho>oq IMHO cmoz Qsouw msonw Am a .m .oe sooflmucH nuances «cu no mucusuHm can any so oocaco HMUHOoHonH mo 9:3054 so u m.uco05um OGHmD undone covspmc mcomwummeoU|l.Ov mqmde 179 was no radically different change in their evaluation of ideological elements between groups. (This is hardly the case with the former kibbutz members, as shall be seen below.) That the rank ordering of change over time was almost identical between the kibbutz and the never-kibbutz member groups is a suggestive finding. In the case of the former kibbutz members we found a dissimilar rank ordering of change when the rank order- ing of the former kibbutz members was compared with either present kibbutz members or with those who never belonged to a kibbutz. These individuals represented ideological marginal men. The change they displayed was great, witness the 25.11 per cent mean difference in Table 37. Only when they are combined with kibbutz members (group number 3, Table 39) do they contribute to a significant coefficient. Otherwise, they demonstrate the marginality of their posi- tion by not closely associating with any group. The impact of ideological change which stems from the changing of environment seems to be substantiated in this case. One last interesting difference may be noted. That is the intragenerational split between the Knesset members and the civil servants. Referring to Table 37, we observe a 17.11 mean difference for the civil servants and only an 8.54 mean difference for the Knesset members. This indi— cates a difference in rate of change. In Table 39 we have evidence of the two groupscfiumging their ideological stands 180 in different directions. This confirms the findings pre- sented in Chapter 3. Having tested the difference in rank ordering be- tween the two groups, we now turn to actual differences between the two groups. The other calculation presented in Table 38 is the E test measuring the difference between the mean changes among groups. We again use as the null hypothesis the statement that the difference between the mean changes of the two groups does not differ significantly from zero. An acceptable level of significance (p>.05) will warrant the rejection of the null hypothesis and the acceptance of the proposition that the change did not occur by chance. Comparing the students and Knesset member-civil servant groups (Table 38), we found that the probability of thenean difference of the two groups differing from zero by chance was one in ten. This suggests that we accept the null hypothesis and conclude that the difference between the changes in these two groups is not statistically signif- icant. Table 40 explores this relationship for the other groups compared. The analysis provides us with another indication that the former kibbutz member public servant is ideolog- ically least like his colleagues who are now kibbutz mem- bers and those who never were kibbutz members. Table 31 demonstrated that today his ideological position is closest to those Knesset members or civil servants in this study who never affiliated with a kibbutz. In the ideological 181 past the group's position was almost identical to the posi- tion of the kibbutz members. During the interim between the ideological past and the ideological present, change was occurring within each group. But the former kibbutz member, in making the geographic move from kibbutz to city also made the greatest ideological move. In the analyses for groups 5 and 6 in Table 40, we find that, when compared to kibbutz Knesset members-civil servants or Knesset mem- bers-civil servants never affiliated with a kibbutz, the changes which have occurred within the former kibbutz civil servant group are significant. Another finding which again confirms earlier analy- ses in this study is reported for group 2. There we find the mean difference among the mean changes between Knesset members and civil servants to be statistically significant. In Table 31, the fact that even the non-kibbutz Knesset member identified closely with the kibbutz ideology in the ideological present was reported. Here we find the change between the two groups over time to be significant. It is true that the Knesset sample is small and does not include any members of the Herut party, generally considered right- wing. However, two Liberal party members——also right—of center or center--are included among the fifteen inter- viewed. The civil servant sample had no Herut members either while it had a smaller proportion of Liberal party members than did the Knesset member sample. CHAPTER 7 IDEOLOGICAL STRESS A. The Conceptual Model Change is generally accompanied by stress. Revolu- tions and elections both produce stress while facilitating change. Geographical movement, added education and adjust ments in socio-economic positions, produce stresses of varying degree. Ideological change may also be accompanied by stress. This chapter explores this possibility by intro- 166 to the study of ideological change. ducing role theory I attempted to study ideological change with the concepts of role theory167 by measuring the extent and direction of ideological change which had taken place with- in individuals who played fundamental roles in the func- tioning of a political system. 166For applications of role theory, see Gross, Ex~ alorations in Role Analysis; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulafi?’ 1 am BuChanan, LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Le islative S s- ‘Egmp(New York: Wiley, 1962); Howard Jay Ehrlich, "The Analysis of Role Conflict in a Complex Organization: The Police," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Michigan State University, 1959. 167Cf. Lionel J. Neiman and J.W. Hughes, "The Prob- lem of the Concept of Role-—A Re-Survey of the Literature," Social Forces, XXX (December, 1951), pp. 141-149; Stanfield Shrgent} "Concepts of Role and Ego in Contemporary Psychol- ogy," Social Psychology at the Crossroads, ed. JOhn H. 182 183 The public servant in a democratic setting is sub- jected to many pressures. While there are studies which deal with particularistic pressures such as those of interest groups and political parties, the universalistic pressures--the accepted ideology, the "public philsOphy"—- 168 It must be made clear that are generally overlooked. this accepted ideology, although universal, is not adhered to unanimously in a democratic society. It would call the definition of democracy into question if we found unanimous consensus concerning anything within a democratic public, let alone a democratic public service. The existence of an accepted ideology will have its effect upon the individual. Even an individual who is ideologically uncommitted will be affected by the general inclination toward given views. It is likely that.this Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif (New York: Harper, 1951), pp. 355-370; Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory," Handbook of Social Ps cholo , Vol. I, ed. Gardner Lindzey (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 223—255; George Herbert Mead, Mind Self and Societ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 ; W. Coutu, 'Ro e Playing vs. Role Taking: An Appeal for Clarification," American Sociolo ical Review, XVI (April, 1951), pp. 18Oe187; MiChael Argyle, flThe Concepts of Role and Status," Sociological Review, XLIV (1952), pp. 39-50; T.M. Newcomb, Role Behavibrs in the Study of Individual Personality and of Groups," Journal of Personality, XVIII (1950), pp. 273-289. Great confhsion exists concerning these concepts. Sarbin's definition of position as a set of expectations or acquired anticipatory reactions is identical to Gross's definition of role. What is role enactment for Sarbin is role playing for Mead and Coutu and role behavior for Newcomb. 168 Chapter 7. Thisis "macroscopic role consensus." See Gross, 184 exposure will be even more pronounced in the case of a public servant who is highly exposed and contactable. I used role theory to better comprehend the effects of ideological change. Role is defined as a generalized, societal set of expectations.169 Here, role will be a systemic demand to conform to the accepted ideology. The expectation to conform to the ideology may be on the be— havioral as well as the attitudinal level. In this ex- ploratory study, conforming to the ideology will be re- searched on the attitudinal level. The perception the actor held of the accepted ide- ology was of concern to me. The actor who perceived the elements of the accepted ideology as being constructive in the nation's development170 or as being accepted by most of the population171 was acknowledging the existence of the accepted ideology. The actor who did not perceive these elements as being constructive or generally accepted was not cognizant of the role he was enacting. A further aspect of the actor's orientation to the role he enacted was his view of the legitimacy172 of the ideology. The notion of legitimacy is a useful concept in role theory. The question asked of the actor is usually 1691bid., p. 67. 170 Appendix I. 171 Questions 72-77 of interview schedule in Questions 59-62. 172Gross, p. 58. 185 "Does the audience (society) have the right to expect 'x'?" Or the audience (society) might be asked, "Does the actor have the right to 'y'?" In this study, to approximate legitimacy in the usual sense of role theory, a question probed whether the respondent agreed with the elements which comprised the accepted ideology. The problem in this conceptualization was that although agreement with the elements of the ideology may have indicated perceived legitimacy of the accepted ideology, disagreement with them could not be understood as perceiv- ing the accepted ideology to be illegitimate. The actor may have defended society's right to disagree with his opinion. The dimension which could be tapped by asking the question of whether the respondent agreed with the elements of the accepted ideology was really the dimension of identi- fication and not of legitimacy. Identification did for my model what legitimacy did for Gross's. The juxtaposition of the two dimensions, perceived expectations of society and identification with the accepted ideology, may produce a conflict situation. It is this conflict situation which interests us both as an indicator of stress within the system and as an analytic tool which can aid us in operationalizing the concepts of role theory in a meaningful way. The practical advantage of employing a conflict strategy in orienting the theoretical framework of role theory studies is important. Wahlke's study, in which he 186 contended that he was using role theory to study the role of the legislator, reduced itself to a study of the position 173 This was so because role is the dynamic of legislator. aspect of position. Conversely, position is the static dimension of role. As Wahlke used role theory, the actors 174 As Gross used a role conflict were basically motionless. framework, the actors became alive and the term role, taken in conjunction with the notion of conflict, became meaning- ful. Role is the societal set of expectations concerning the ideological position of an actor. He may agree or dis- agree with the elements whidh the research assumes to be the accepted ideology. Should the actor, for example, per- ceive the demand made upon him but disagree with its con- tent, a stress situation would result. Stress, in opera- tional terms, is the incongruency between an actor's percep— tion of society's expectations for him and his own identifi- cation with the accepted ideology. Stress will be manifested in the respondent's reaction when confronted with a hypo- thetical action-oriented statement presented in terms of the stress-generating ideological element. 173Position, called location by Alvin Zander, Arthur R. Cohen and Ezra Stotland, Role Relations in the Mental ‘Health Professions (Ann Arbor: Research Center for Group Dynamits, 1957), p. 21, is defined as social location by Gross, Chapter 4. Sarbin's definition is presented in foot- note 167. 174We may criticize Wahlke's formulation on the same grounds Gross criticizes Sarbin's definition of position as a set of expectations. Gross labels Sarbin's definition of position as predictive and questions Sarbin by imagining no expectations. If there woul be no expectations, would here thus be no position? 187 Decreased public acceptability of an ideology will cause stress, over time, in those members of a society who are expected to function in terms of that ideology. An indicator of the decreasing acceptability of an ideology, then, will be the extent of stress concerning the ideology evidenced by individuals who are in positions in which they are expected to act in accordance with the ideology. Put another way, changes in the system and its values are likely to occur long before they are reflected in the official actors of that system. The personnel of the society's institutions are likely to be caught in an ideological pincer until the systemic changes are integrated into the institutions of the system. This consideration is not tautological. Individual stress is an indicator of an on-going process in the sys— tem. It is not to be thought of (in this framework) as a contributing factor or a causal condition of ideological change within a system. Measuring ideological change in terms of stress is quite different from arguing that where there is change there is stress and where there is stress there is change. Three basic elements are employed in this model: 1) an evaluation of the public acceptance and utility of the ideology-~the instrumental questions; 2) an evaluation of the ideology in both the present and the past--the ideolog- ical questions; and 3) a personal practice statement. The different‘combinations of these three categories will produce 188 different theoretical types. For example: 1) the "ideologue" is one whose responses to the practice state— ments agree with the ideological questions but not with the instrumental questions; 2) the "realist" is one whose responses to the practice statements agree with the instru- mental questions but not with the ideological questions. A word about the actual research subject will be 175 that beneficial. In Israel, the kibbutz ideology, ideology which was instrumental in establishing the nation, no longer reflects the needs or goals of the state ade- quately. Agriculture must give way to industry; physical labor is being replaced by machines. I shall assume that the kibbutz ideology was the accepted ideology of Israel. For purposes of the research, ten discrete ideolog— ical elements, representing the main components of the kibbutz ideology, were extracted. The ten ideological elements were presented to each respondent in six different forms:176 1) evaluating the public acceptance and utility of the ideological elements (subsequently referred to as the instrumental questions); the respondent was asked to express his estimate of the proportion of the general pOpu- 177 lation which might agree with the elements and regarding the contribution the ideological elements made to Israel's 175For the major elements of the kibbutz ideology, see Chapter 5. 176See interview schedule, Appendix I. 177Questions 59-62. 189 development178 in the past, present and future; 2) evalua- ting the ideological elements (referred to as the ideolog- ical questions); the respondent was asked whether he agreed with the ideological elements in the past179 and the present;180 and 3) responding to an action—oriented hypo- thetical situation based on the ideological elements (re- ferred to as the personal practice statements).181 B. Hypotheses Tested Chapter 6 dealt with the nature of the changes which have occurred in the kibbutz ideology based on the responses of a sample of 233 Knesset members, civil ser- vants and university students. The continuing integrated nature of the kibbutz ideology and the decline in its acceptability was demonstrated. We now turn to the effects these changes have had upon the individuals interviewed. Each of the ten ideological elements were presented in a variety of ways. For example, each respondent was asked about the importance of Jewish immigration to Israel. He was aksed whether he agreed with the principle that Jews should immigrate; he was asked to recall how he felt about that twenty years ago; he was asked how the fulfillment of 178Questions 72-77. 179Questions 88-97. 18OQuestions 78—87. 181Questions 49-58. 190 this principle had contributed to the development of Israel in the past, how it contributed in the present and how it would contribute in the future; finally, he was asked to empathize with the position of a professional Jew abroad and report whether he would immigrate to Israel. In this section, we shall be concerned with three of these questions. The respondent was offered four possible answers to the ideological question, either past or present, about whether he agreed with the principle of immigration; "def- initely agree," ”somewhat agree," "somewhat disagree," "definitely disagree." For purposes of this analysis, re- sponses indicating agreement were collapsed into an "agree" category and responses indicating disagreement were col- lapsed into a "disagree" category. A similar process of collapsing was used for the instrumental question. There, for the five-alternative response questions,182 one, two and three were collapsed into "agree," four and five into "disagree." For the other four instrumental questions which 183 concerned public opinion one and two were collapsed into "agree" and three indicated "disagree." The personal practice statements184 were handled differently. In the other two sets of questions only "agree" and "disagree" responses were possible after coding. In the practice series of questions, five legitimate 182Questions 72-77. 183 18 Questions 59-62. 4Questions 49-58. 191 responses existed. "Agree" and "disagree" were legitimate responses.185 A third response, "it depends," was also acceptable. A fourth response, "no answer," demands special explanation. This was recorded for individuals who made some remark concerning the question but gave no codable response. For example, "How should I know how I'd feel?," "I never was an American," and similar responses were coded as "no answer." A fifth possibility was to ignore the question completely. Ignoring the question was a very rare occurrence among the interviewed civil servants and Knesset members. It was much more frequent among the student sample. Table 41 indicates the manner in which the patterns were formed. For the ideological and instrumental ques- tions, only two categories, "agree" and "disagree," were possible. For the personal practice statement, the opera- tion was more complex. Four responses were possible. The "agree" and "disagree" categories were easily handled as positive and negative, respectively. It was decided to code "it depends" as a positive response and "no answer" as a negative one. This was done on the assumption that if a person is Opposed to something he is likely to state his opposition or retreat from the question completely. If he answers "it depends," it is likely that his position is somewhere in between yes and no, but certainly not no. On the other hand, if he refuses to discuss the matter,we may 185Question 53 is an exception. There, from the point of view of the kibbutz ideology, "agree" and "disagree" must be interchanged. 192 be reasonably confident that he does not agree. Thus, "it depends" and "no answer" were coded as "agree" and "dis- agree," respectively. Reviewing the labels for these various response patterns, an ideologue is one whose response to the prac- tice statement agrees with his response to the ideological statement but not with the instrumental statement. TABLE 41.--Response Patterns Defined and Labelled Instrumental Ideological Practicea Label disagree agree agree pro-kibbutz Ideologue agree disagree disagree anti-kibbutz Ideologue agree disagree agree pro-kibbutz Realist disagree agree disagree anti-kibbutz Realist agree agree agree pro-kibbutz Consistent disagree disagree disagree anti—kibbutz Consistent disagree disagree agree Stress agree agree disagree Stress a-The "it depends" response was coded as "agree"; the "no answer" response was coded as "disagree." A realist is one whose response to the practice state agrees with the instrumental statement but not with the ideological statement. Consistency is indicated when one responds to all three statements in a similar manner; stress results from incongruency between the three responses. 193 The frequency distribution for the ten elements of the kibbutz ideology for the Knesset member-civil servant and student groups is presented in Table 42. The "unknown" category is composed of those individuals who failed to answer any one of the three questions which go into forming the reSponse pattern. The levels of stress reported in Table 42 may be understood in one of two ways. Stress, according to the model, may indicate change which has not yet been integrated into the structure of societal values. Alternatively, stress may result from methodological error. Three ex— amples will make this distinction clear. High levels of stress for both the Knesset member—civil servant group and the student group are observed for the "individual-society" element and the "laboring nation" elements. For the "agriculture" element, a relatively low level of stress is recorded. The stress manifested by the "individual-society" element is an example of change which has not yet been integrated into the value system of the society. The primacy of society over the individual, as demonstrated in the kibbutz ideology, is in contrast to the tendency within the society to develop individual initiative and private enterprise. Not only has the ethos of the country become increasingly individual—oriented, measures supported by the "socialist" parties in the Government coalition aid individual—oriented values. The conflict between the statements defending a societal—orientation and the practice 194 rlll GOHHMG OGfluondA mm m l m M MH m . ms . l 53.55 39:3 toummwmmmu l . 0 x v m w . MW MM MM WH MN W m w . :. t . OGHDHOUUM £Um0 OB: mm vH mv N m H d b “ GOHQMUMMOQ CH OUGOHOMMflU OZ wH mH m mm m MH m NH “ COHmfiHmu >HQO uOC GOH¥MZ mN ON «H HH m e m HH m eHsmusa mcHumw>cH 0N pH pH eN m e e 0H “ cOHumwmwemm 5H mH q me m N H N eH . mesam> H0 H oN . Nm . eN m l m o _ m N suuHoomnHmsOHsHtaH L _ L. [V M .II c30dx wmuupm Iwucm Iowa lapse Iowa Ifiucm Ioumw In: ucvuwfimcou umwamom msmoHomcH m newsman AmmHuzv mucmtshm .m H I.at. I» ti! _ HI iii. l a H mm o Nm m NH o N 0 :OHqu mcHuoemq m om ow m mH o H MH awrmuocso vum>wud mo cowuaaond e NH mH eH NN NH e HH musuH:UHum< m mH mH HN NN N H oN e. . . oaHeuouum rum» 09: e m mm ea m H N mm coammmmmon cw oucmuwmmwo 02 e eN 0 He H m H H cOHaHHuu sHeo no: eoHumz OH em . eH eH m e H mH tHsmusa ocHuum>cH e NN m HH me m o a e aoHumumHeeH v mH mm v OH H 0 mm mmSHm> Hmnuu>HCD HH mm RT Hm m _ «N. H . m e auwwuomlaman>HcCH » e ”I czocx mnwuum taped Iowa lapse Iowa Iflucm Iowa . ts: psoumHmcou umemum osmoHomoH ucoEeHm HOOHuzc nucmsuom HH>Huuuonsos newness .< r _ a Amvmmucmuuoa ewe mucous»m can mucm>wwm HH>HUvanEoz nommocx wow hmoHoocH nuznnflx 0:» mo nucoEva cue ecu wow mcuoaumm uncommomll.~v mamme 195 of supporting individual-oriented programs leads to this large degree of stress. This tendency can also be seen in the low percentages of pro-kibbutz responses (agreement with the kibbutz ideology) in the ideologue, realist and consistent categories. The high level of stress which exists concerning the"individual-society" element may be contrasted with the relatively low level of stress for the agriculture element. The "agriculture" element of the kibbutz ideology has been publicly debated and thoroughly discussed in recent years. While ideological change has certainly taken place regarding this element during the past twenty years, the debate has been publicand open. There is little inconsistency between the ideology of public statement and the practice of private interests. While there is no broad consensus concerning the element within the sample studied, there is not a high level of stress concerning the issue either. The high level of stress recorded for the "laboring nation" element is a result, it seems, of a methodological error. This error was due to the personal practice state- ment for the "laboring nation" element (question 58). The question is probably more relevant as an index of democratic predisposition than it is a probe concerning the respondent's readiness to accept in practice the principle of "the Jews in Israel having an image of a laboring nation." To the extent that the question is not reliable, the model's label based on the unreliable question is not valid. 196 The patterns of response reported in Table 42 pre- sent each of the ten ideological elements separately. Originally, it was planned to represent the position of the individual by one comprehensive score. This proved impos— sible. A single score could have represented so many pos— sible variations that it was felt that the more cumbersome method of presenting all of the information would be pre— ferable to obscruing--or even worse, misrepresenting--some of the data. Because no meaningful distinction can be made between individuals regarding the entire kibbutz ideology with these data, the analysis will cross tabulate the response patterns for the ten ideological elements with selected sociological political variables. Based on information gained earlier in this study, we might expect the following regularities: Among civil servants, former kibbutz members will tend to be "realists"; present kibbutz members will score highest as "ideologues"; the respones of those never affiliated with a kibbutz will tend to be distributed among all the categories. As we move from political left to political right, pro—kibbutz responses should decrease, stress will tend to increase. The hypotheses are based on the assumption that one measure of ideological change is the observed stress in the ideological role being enacted by the respondent. As this exploratory model was constructed with civil servants and legislators in mind, the student sample will be ignored in these analyses. The testing of the two hypotheses presented 197 above will provide some indication of the model's ability to interpret reality. The first hypothesis relates to the differences we have observed between the civil servants interviewed who are, were or never have been kibbutz members. In general, of the three groups, the former kibbutz member-civil servants have evidenced the most ideological change. Assuming that the kibbutz ideology was the accepted ideology of the past, this finding leads us to hypothesize that the former kibbutz members will tend to show a higher percentage of "realist" sentiment and that present kibbutz members will tend to show a higher percentage of "ideologue" sentiment. The hypothesis is largely confirmed by the data presented in Table 43. The small sample cautions against drawing firm conclusions. As pointed out before, the "laboring nation" element produces an unusually high inci- dence of stress because of the wording of the personal practice statement. This difference shows up graphically when the stress levels for the "laboring nation" element are compared with those generated by the "no difference in possession" element. For the former element, the ques- tion concerning personal practice was irrelevant; for the latter, the question "Given your present position, would you agree to receive the same salary for your work as does the physical laborer with a comparable family situation?" succeeded in discriminating between those who would and would not act to fulfill the principle of equality postulated 198 Hpmscaucouv Il‘ . w uo>oz NH . am 0 mm N N m N ucomoum m . mN 0 am e o o o nuance a 0 MN 0 m0 0 NH O O COHUflHQH WHCO “0C COM“ 2 uo>oz a mm mH NH 0 0H N e unomoum NH me o o m m 0 mm uoEuom 0 mm OH 0H m o m 0N nasnnsa mcHuno>cH uo>oz n eN eH mN N o eH 0H uconuum o mN m Ne w o m m uosuom o mN e an m o a m eOHueuoHesH wu>uz N NH mu N NH N N «N unomoum o o 0 ea m o 0 mm M Q E m a o 0 am nuance mosHm> Hmnuo>acb 0H mm eH 0H NH N NH 0 xNeuzv uo>oz m mm m 0 Nfl 0 O NH fiNHHZv HCOmvhm m 0H ea 0 em 0 N m Aomuzc nuance muofluomlam9pw>wudH pl IM 0 h A w csocxw unouum lapse Iowa «lauds loud taped Iowa . ucoeoam Ids _ _ ‘F,u:vumwmcou _ uuaamom osmoHoupH — Amommncuuuea may cowumeHmm< unsanax an mucm>uom HH>HU wow NOOHOUUH wasnnwx 0:» mo mucoeon :09 on» how msuouumm uncommomll.mv mqm<9 199 .l....~‘.--..IIJ vN NH N . He N o m 0H um>mz o ow N mm NH o o m umeuom cowumc mcfiwonmq m NH om N NH o N N um>wz m mm o w mN o o mN ucomowm m mH 0m m NH 0 o NH umEuom QHnmumcso vum>Hum Mo cowuwHond m eH HN N mm m NH eH uw>vz o NH 0 mm o NH o m #Commum o N om NH mm N m N uvehom muzuHSUme< N NH mH OH mN N m NH ww>wz o NH 0 mm o NH o m ucwnmwm 0 NH mN ON NH m o mN quuom : . . . OCHuuouum some 09: m 0H ow N N o m NH uo>oz m o 0 Ne o o 0 0m ucmmmum 0 NH me N 0N m 0 MH umewom COHmmwmmom CH mucmwwMMHn oz csocx mmmupm IHucm town IHucm Iowa IHucm loud “ pcmEmHm In: M ucmumHmcou H pmHHmmm I mSNOHomnH l I. . L IN IrH It! HomscHucoov me mHm Hmmuv>wpo o mN o m mm o o w HNHuzv umoH uonwmz m mN mN e NN o m m Hmmnzv MMOH oumwoooz eH mN eH N HN N N o HeHuzv woucou HuoHuomuHman>HocH czocxh mmvuum mlHucm loud IHucm Iowa IHucm 10nd ucoEon ICDPF _ acoumanou W umHHmom . osmoHoooH Hmommucouuoa GHV Nucvocoa HmUHuHHom ha oHQEmm ucm>uom HH>HUIumnEuz vomnocx or» now hmoHomoH nuanon 03» mo mucmeon :09 on» how mcuuuumm uncommomlu.ee mqmHuQ mo GOHMHH0Q< m NH m mm 0 mm o m umoH umewmz « NH mH mH NN N m HH uon oumwoooz N 0 mm N HN o N HN woucuu unapHsoHuu< o m 0 0m mN o 0 NH umoH umewmz m NH 0H 0H NN N N «N umoH oumwuooz o HN HN N om N o N uoucmu : . . . mcHououum some 09: o o o o m o 0 0m umoH umeHmz N HH mm mH HH N o NN l uon oumuoooz o N HN o «H o N o uopcwu COHmmommOQ CH oucowomeo oz _ , csocx mmmuum sHpcm tong IHusm Iowa IHpsm Iowa udoEon ICD ucoumwncou umHHmvm osmoHoeoH HoosaHucoov ea mHmee 203 from this group if the kibbutz ideology had not been the accepted ideology. Out of fear of stretching the data and conclusions drawn from them farther than is warranted, I shall allow these two examples to represent the ability of the model to explain ideological change. I feel that the model is conceptually sound. The significance of the empirical evidence presented here is questionable for two reasons: first, the method of data presentation is too cumbersome to be easily managed or explicated. This is a serious method— ological fault. In the two examples presented, the possi— bilities of the model's explanatory powers are indicated. However, no clear statement of results is allowed by the model's present state of development. ISecond, the possi- bility of methodological error must be more carefully con— trolled. The identification of an unreliable question-- the "laboring nation" practice statement—-was not detected during the pre—testing stage of the study. These two faults should not be confused with an inadequate model. The idea of tapping ideological change by studying stress in respondents has been shown to be a promising road for future analysis. If this exploratory study has laid some ground work for future studies or has cautioned future students, the effort has been well worth it. C. Dimensions Correlated Throughout the analysis the implicit assumption was that all of the elements of the kibbutz ideology and all of 204 the responses used in analyzing the ideology were additive and of equal weight. If, for example, respondent A agreed with four ideological elements and respondent B with eight elements, we could say that respondent B was twice as sup- portive of the kibbutz ideology as respondent A. This assumption, when articulated, can lead to interesting results. In Section B, three dimensions were discussed. They were the statements of the ideological present, the instru— mental present and personal practice. When combined, they formed the model of ideological stress. Another way of using these dimensions is to treat each of them as a separ- ate scale. This was done by weighting the responses given. One point was given for the responses most favorable to the kibbutz ideology. Five points were given for the least favorable response to the instrumental questions. For the practice and ideological questions, four points were given the least favorable responses. Item analysis187 was employed to determine which responses could legitimately be retained to form a scale for each dimension. In item analysis, the scores for each individual are computed. The highest 27 per cent and the lowest 27 per cent are compared using the 5 distribution. If the difference between the means of the two extreme groups (the two 27 per cent groups) for any item is 187Anne Anastasi, Ps chological Testing (New York: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 152-1 . 205 significant below the .05 level, that item is retained in the formation of the total score. The sum of those items which are included in the scale represents the individual's score for that dimension. This method was used in obtaining the scale scores for the ideological present, the instru— mental present, the personal practice statement and the ideological past. Only one of the forty items tested (four questions for each of the ten ideological elements) was not signifi- cant below the .05 level. The item was the "agriculture" element for the ideological present. That question was not included when the ideological present scale score was cal— culated. Accordingly, the ideological present scale score is composed of only nine responses while the scores for each of the other three dimensions is composed of ten items. The scale scores were correlated with one another. This permitted empirical analysis of the relationships between the four dimensions. Two analyses were made. For the first analysis, the three dimensions used were the instrumental, ideological present and practice dimensions. For the second analysis, the three dimensions used were the ideological past, the instrumental present and practice dimensions. The data about to be presented provided answers to the following questions: What are the correlates of ideolog- ical commitment? Assuming that the practice statements bear a close relationship to actual behavior, is behavior more 206 closely related to ideological statement or instrumental perception? Does perception of the instrumental "realities" of life influence behavior or are these phrased in terms of ideological professions? Does controlling for elite group membership change the answers to the questions? What effect does kibbutz membership have upon the answers? Table 45 reports the simple correlations for the instrumental, ideological present and practice scores with one another. For all groups studied and for each of the correlations, a relatively high positive coefficient is evidenced. In each case, the instrumental score had the lowest correlation when correlated with the personal prac- tice score. With one exception, the correlation between the ideological score and the personal practice score results in the highest coefficients. Assuming the measure— ment to be valid and the personal practice score an indi- cator of behavior, we observe that for the groups studied-- except for the kibbutz members--the ideological statement is a more accurate predictor of behavior than is the instru- mental score. For the kibbutz members, the ideological score is still a more accurate indicator of behavior than is the instrumental score, although the correlation obtained between these two variables is not the highest. The data presented in Table 45 do not provide us with a clear estimate of the relationships between the three dimensions. Can we indicate that one of the dimen— sions is an intervening variable? Regarding the personal 207 practice score (behavior) as the dependent variable, what are the relative contributions made by the other two dimensions to the analysis? TABLE 45.--Simple Correlations between the Ideological Pre- sent Score (IdPS), the Instrumental Present Score (InPS), and the Personal Practice Score (PPS), by Elite Group Mem- bership and Kibbutz Affiliation. N Group PPS InPS 201 Complete sample IdPS .697 .532 97 Knesset member-civil servants IdPs .728 .526 PPS - .403 15 Knesset members IdPS .797 .772 PPS - .547 82 Civil servants IdPS .674 .452 PPS — .344 104 Students IdPS .552 .355 PPS - .168 49 Knesset member-civil servants IdPS .707 .634 never affiliated with kibbutz PPS - .537 18 Knesset member-civil servants IdPS .386 .454 kibbutz members PPS — .166 30 Civil servants former kibbutz IdPS .491 .285 members PPS — .161 Blalock188 in his discussion of partial correlation and causal interpretations points out that "regardless of one's philosophical reservations concerning the notions of cause and effect, it is extremely difficult to think 188 Blalock, Social Statistics. 208 theoretically in any other terms . . . . If the partial correlation between [two variables] is reduced to zero, or approximately zero, we may conclude that there is no causal "189 Blalock lists relationship between the two variables. exceptions to his statement. For present purposes, a presentation of the points Blalock makes will serve as an introduction to the subject and a guide to those unfamiliar with partial correlation. Blalock presents ten models of possible causal relationship among X, Y and Z taking Y as the dependent variable and ruling out two way causation. We shall center our attention upon five of the ten models. These are pre— sented in Figure II. Figure IIa 16 X ———-———- >Y x ----~ --—-—-->Y ’ (a) (e) a-Blalock, Figure 19.5, p. 339. Figure II--five models of possible causal relationship among X, Y, and Z taking Y as the dependent variable and ruling out two—way causation. In our analysis, the dependent variable (Y) will be taken as the personal practice score. This score is as close as we come to actual behavior. The first independent 1891bid., pp. 337-338. 209 variable (X) will be understood as the ideological present score. In the analysis of the first set of dimensions, 2 will be the instrumental present score. The direction of the arrow indicates the causal relationship in Figure II. Blalock's remarks190 may be summarized as follows: (1) For figures (b) and (c), "we would expect the correlation between X and Y to be the smallest of the three, ignoring signs." In figures (d) and (e), "we would expect to find that the correlation between Y and Z is smaller in magnitude than either of the other two correlations. (2) For figures (b) and (c), "the partial between X and Y controlling for 2 can be expected to be approxi- mately zero . . . . In (c) we would interpret the relation- ship between X and Y as "spurious" since 2 is operating to cause variation in both X and Y." (3) For figures (d) and (e), the partial between Y and Z controlling for X can be expected to be approxi- mately zero . . . . In (d) we would interpret the relation- ship between Y and 2 as "spurious" since X is operating to cause variation in both Y and Z. (4) Controlling for Z, "the partial would have been zero if (b) were the correct model. In (b) we have Z operating as an 'intervening' variable in the sense that X causes Z which in turn causes Y. But does it make any sense to control for 2 under these circumstances? Probably not. For if X is actually a cause of Z, how can we imagine ourselves holding Z constant while still varying X?" (5) For figure (e), the relationship is directly comparable to model (b) in (4) if X and Z are interchanged. (6) In figure (a), "controlling for Z would increase the magnitude of the relationship between X and Y," if this were the explanatory model. (7) "Suppose in either of situations (b) or (e) that one were to relate the intervening and dependent vari- ables, controlling for the independent variable. In (e), for example, what would happen if we were to obtain the partial between X and Y controlling for Z? . . . . The re- sulting partial would be smaller in magnitude than the total correlation." 190Quotations from Blalock, PPo 349-342: Figure no— tations have been altered to agree with Figure II. 210 Returning to the dimensions of this study (the first analysis, here under consideration, contains the in- strumental, ideological present and practice dimensions) figure (a) appears intuitively to explain the operative relationships. Ideological commitment and instrumental evaluation "cause" behavior (or at least hypothetical be— havior based on action-oriented questions). Controlling for the instrumental present score, however, does not in- crease the magnitude of the relationship between the ideological score and the practice score. (See statement 6.) In reality, figure (d) best fits the data (see Tables 45 and 46). In agreement with statements (1) and (3), we find that ideological commitment "causes" the indi- vidual to evaluate instrumental reality as he does. Ideo- logical commitment will lead to behavior and instrumental positions consistent with the tenets of the ideology. The correlation reported in Table 45 between the instrumental position and the practice statement is found to be spurious. The ideological present score causes variation in both the instrumental present score and the personal practice score. Two explanations are possible for the failure of model (a) to explain the relationships, as hypothesized. The first possibility, and most untestable, is that the methods employed did not measure the dimensions purported to be measured. In a pilot study of this sort, it is dif— ficult to ascertain the degree of relevance of this criti- cism. The second explanation concerns the inadequacy of 211 mNo. ON«. O«N. nwmQEoE nuznnax Hasnom mucm>uom HH>wU Om HHo mmm aNe meee>noe HH>Husmwwmmwm wwwmmww NH meH. Nem.. NNe. nusnan rqu poumHHHNwm no>oc mucm>won HH>HUImhonEoE powwosx m« ©mO.I «mm. aHm. mucvosum «OH mmo. mHm. mHm. mecp>uom HH>Hu Nm NNH.I «ON. mom. mquEuE Honnucx mH «mo. mmm. HNm. mpcm>uom HH>HUImHUQEmE pommocx Nm NmH. mom. H«m. oHQEmn ouoHQEOU HON w m n Ammovaam.MNCH HmmcHOmmmemmoH HmmmvmdeemmoH ozone z .unaouum oucH cogs» no: monocusoumm :H OHQMHum> one No uuowmo on» .eoHemHsuHmu we» eHe .eoHuMHHmee unanon new aHrnuwnsow nacho ouHHm >9 .Hmmmv owoom «UHuumum Hmconwom one .HmNCHV muoum ucemuum Hmucveswumcm Ammoww onoum ucomowm HMUHmoHomoH mo mQOHumCHnEou HH< cassava wGOHumHonwou HMHuwmmll w« mam 212 the original model. Model (d) would argue in favor of the primacy of ideology in decision making and instrumental perception. Using the language of Section A, the orienta- tion of the ideological role-incumbent is more crucial to the relationship than is the extent of identification (per- ceived legitimacy) with the societal position. In a sense, the instrumental dimension becomes a second dependent vari- able which varies directly with the independent variable, ideology. A second set of dimensions was used to complete the analysis (see Tables 47 and 48). Here the instrumental present score was replaced by the ideological past score. What relationships obtain between the ideological past, the ideological present and the personal practice statement? Hypothetically, model (e) holds. The ideological position of the past effects the ideological position of the present which in turn "causes" the personal practice statement. Empirically, based on statement (7), we find this relation— ship to hold. The partial correlations in all cases between the ideological present and practice scores are smaller than the simple correlations between the present and practice scores. Blalock points out that this operation makes little sense unless we are concerned with "the problem of antecedent 191 causes of Y." In this case, that is our concern pre- cisely. 1911bid., p. 342. 213 TABLE 47.——Simple Correlations between the Ideological Pre- sent Score (pres), the Ideological Past Score (past), and the Personal Practice Score (PPS), by Elite Group Member- ship and Kibbutz Affiliation N Group PPS past 182 Complete sample pres .701 .508 98 Knesset member-civil servants pres .720 .764 15 Knesset members pres .790 .966 PPS — .777 83 Civil servants pres .664 .714 84 Students pres .575 .504 49 Knesset member-civil servants pres .710 .780 never affiliated with kibbutz PPS - .591 19 Knesset member-civil servants pres .429 .793 kibbutz members PPS - .412 30 Civil servants former kibbutz pres .453 .598 members Finding that the predicted model agrees with the data for the second set of dimensions strengthens confidence in the measurements employed in this study. With both analyses, the ideological present position was seen as critical in predicting behavior. In one case, the ideo- logical present was the intervening variable between the ideological past and present behavior. With this in mind, it is obvious that ideology is important in human affairs. It appears that it is not the material conditions of 214 ««m. oHN. mN«. muuQEvE nus umewom wucm>w0n Hmmww om OMH «mH m«N. muvafiofi NHDQQNM wpcm>h0w HH>HUImuUQEvE uuwmocx mH ewe. Nae. . eme nusnan rqu owpmHHHmwm uv>mc mucmb luvm HH>HUImuonEOE pommocx m« moo I mmm wm«. mwcoosum «m OOH. «m«. Omm. mucm>uom HH>HU mm wmo. ««N. NHm. mHOQEmE uommecx mH HmH. mw«. mmm. mucm>uon HH>fiUlmquEOE ummmvnx mm who. Hem. 0mm. oHNEpn ouoHeeoo NNH m m w Hmmnmemaa.unma Humane maa.mmna Amine unma.nmna anono z H.pcsouum oucH coxmu mp3 mononucowmm CH mHHMHum> on» mo puemmu one .COHumHsuHmu one :HV .:0HemHHHmm< neanan pap aHrnnmnsmz my owoum ummm HMUHmoHoooH .Hmouov msouw ouHHm Na .Hmmmv ououm euHuumwm Hmcomwom ocm Hume . ououm ucowmum HMOHOoHoooH mo nCOHuocHQEou HH< cmosuon wcowumHouwou HmHuwmmll m« mamée 215 existence (or our perceptions of them) which determine our ideas. Rather, our ideas tend to influence our perceptions of reality and our behavior as well. CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS This thesis has studied ideological change in two sets of ideologies in Israel. The ideologies of the secular political parties of Israel comprised the first set. The second set consisted of the ideologies of the kibbutz federations. One prOposition put to empirical test in this study was that since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the kibbutz ideology has declined. This is an assump- tion made by many writers commenting on the Israeli scene. But in their writing, as in the cases of those who write more broadly about the "end of ideology," no clear indica- tion of what is meant by the decline of the kibbutz ideology is offered. Ideology, as a systematic way of understanding human and social conditions, does not "end": there will always be systematic ideas held by people concerning man and his soci- ety. The content of a particular ideoloqy may change; the intensity with which an ideology 181161d may diminish. Regarding the kibbutz ideology in Israel, from the period of the establishment of the State until this research was 216 217 conducted, I found that the kibbutz ideology had declined in intensity, but not in its content. Fewer respondents in this study adhered to the ideology with the same intens- ity in the present as they did in pre-State days. On the other hand, the kibbutz ideology, as an integrated system of ideas, showed almost identical levels of consitency over time. The decline of ideology refers in the case of the kibbutz ideology to diminished intensity and not to changed content. Cumulative scalogram analysis has allowed the em- pirical identification of the kibbutz ideology. This sys- tematic approach to the study of ideology is a major im- provement over impressionistic, less replicable methods of research in ideology. It has demonstrated that the kibbutz ideology, for the sample studied, has remained a coherent, interrelated system of ideas. Ascertaining the existence of the kibbutz ideology by demonstrating the systematic relationships between the elements of the ideology, however, is viewed as only a first step in the behavioral study of ideology. Also considered in this study were the groups which were most likely to undergo ideological change and the effects of this change on individuals. Three characteristics are of special interest in reporting differences in ideological change among groups. These characteristics are elite group membership (civil service, Knesset, university students), kibbutz membership (present members, former members, never affiliated), and age. 218 An important difference found consistently in this study was between the civil servants and the Knesset mem- bers interviewed. The Knesset member tended to remain ideologically stable. In almost all cases he agreed with the ideological position of his political party. His re- action to the kibbutz ideology in the present was more similar to his reaction in the past than was true of the civil servants. The civil servant tended to undergo more ideological change, given the measurements used, than did the Knesset member. I suggest that this stems from the fact that the elected official in a political system based on proportional representation and party discipline cannot afford to be greatly at variance with the official stand of the political party he represents. The civil servant, on the other hand, not bound by the public statements of the party but still working within a highly politicized atmosphere, may be freer in expressing reservations re- garding the ideology. The discrepancy between the percentages of party electoral strength and the percentage of the representative sample of the pOpulation who identified with the various parties' ideological positions was striking. There was an imbalance between party strength in the legislature and ideological strength in the pOpulation with the bias favor- ing the leftist parties. But when ideological change re- garding the kibbutz ideology is studied, we find that the greatest amount occurs within members of the Mapai and the 219 Mafdal parties. The data presented in this study would suggest that members of these parties are most likely to experience ideological change regarding their ideology. Their voting loyalties remain in tact; their ideological commitments appear to have moved to the ideological right of their parties. Exploration of this relationship should be under- taken in future research. The importance of being in the government coalition should be considered. (These two parties, Mapai and Mafdal, have been in every coalition government since the fOunding of the State.) Seligman's contention regarding the development of Mapai and Mafdal into pluralistic parties must be reconciled with Duverger's proposition that an electoral system of proportional repre— sentation will tend to small, ideologically rigid parties. Being parties of the arithmetic center and of the govern— ment probably mitigates the generality of Duverger's asser- tion for these two parties. It is reasonable to assume that kibbutz membership will be associated with a positive evaluation of the kibbutz ideology. It would be reasonable to hypothesize that less change will occur in the kibbutz member group regarding the kibbutz ideology than in the non-member group. This hypothesis was largely confirmed, but the small number of individuals interviewed cautions against definitive con— clusions. Although the study is exploratory, the extent of ideological change recorded for the group of civil servants 220 who were formerly kibbutz members is instructive. Of all the groups, that consisting of individuals who left the kibbutz evidenced the greatest amount of ideological change in a direction unfavorable to the kibbutz ideology. In the ideological past, the former kibbutz member tended to hold an ideological position close to that of other kibbutz members. (This finding indicates the reliability of the recall question used.) Today his position is closer to the position of those who never were kibbutz members. In this case, change in affiliation appears to be associated with change in ideological position. When age is considered, we find a definite ideolog- ical cleavage along generational lines in Israel. Regarding the political party ideologies, we find a consistent shift to the ideological right among the student pOpulation in comparison with the position of their elders. This finding of a shift between generations supplements the findings of ideological change over time in the Knesset member-civil servant group. The kibbutz ideology, a socialist-Zionist ideology, has lost much of its acceptability among the older generation interviewed; that is, the intensity with which the elements of the kibbutz ideology are held by the Knesset members and civil servants interviewed has declined. Among the younger generation interviewed, socialist princi— ples were largely opposed. Since the shift away from the ideological positions of the party is in an anti-socialist direction, we may infer that a low degree of acceptability 221 for the kibbutz ideology is characteristic of the student pOpulation as well. Ideological change may be measured by the amount of stress which occurs in the individuals of a system. Public servants are especially likely to experience stress situa- tions caused by contradictory demands from the specific ideologies of the ruling parties and the general ideological orientation of the system. A preliminary investigation of this contention was undertaken. While the methodology employed must be refined, the results obtained indicate this approach to be a fruitful one. I would propose a fuller exploration of the results of ideological role con- flict on civil servants based on the model presented in Chapter 7. Even in its present state,resu1ts obtained em- ploying the model were sufficient to suggest that ideolog- ical evaluation in the present is the most crucial variable in predicting behavior based on the ideology. The implications of the further refinement and use of this model in the study of public administration should not be overlooked. The techniques developed here will allow insight into the effects of ideological change on the public administrator. The effects of ideological change on the goals and functions of public administration and the process whereby ideological change is integrated into the planning and execution stages of administrative policy are important subjects for future research. 222 These proposed studies of the role of ideology in administration should not be culturally limited. Cross— national studies are called for. Cultural and social fac- tors should be controlled When searching for regularities in the impact of ideology upon public administration. Ideally, a longitudinal study should be used to ascertain the evaluation of an ideology in the past. The obstacles here would be difficult to overcome, but success- ful solution of the problems involved would add immeasur- ably to the validity of the findings. The model, even if quasi—longitudinal methods must be employed, should be expanded and refined. Its successful use, along with exact empirical identification of ideology, will add mightily to our understanding of ideological change. A P P E N D I X I TRANSLATION OF THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 1. 2. 224 Name- Sex- Part One The purpose of this interview is to determine your point of view concerning some of the more important problems facing the country. In order to get a more general picture of the people we are interviewing, we shall begin with a few per- sonal questions. \omqmmbw 10. Place of birth- Year of birth- Year of arrival in Israel- Country from which immigrated- Ybur father's native land- mother's— Marital status- Children: Name Age f Place of Birth! Present Occupation 1 . ! ‘ 2. E 3. g 4.‘ I i Education Degree Dates | Place; Type of SchoolaGrades Completeleed'd. l. 2 ; E 3- ' 3 ~‘ ; l j ' Occupation 19. (for civil servants only) 11. Ministry 12. Formal position 13. Grade 14. Duties 15. Uhder what circumstances did you get your pre- sent job? (for Knesset members.only) 16. Years in Knesset 17. Committees on which active 18. How did you happen to become a member of the Knesset? Would you say that your job was a. very important 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 225 b. rather important c. not too important d. not important at all. What is your profession? If you were asked to use one of the following terms in order to characterize the social class to which you belong, would you say you are a member of the a. upper middle class b. middle class c. lower class d. working class e. upper class. To which political party do you belong (or identify with)? With which of the following political trends do you tend to sympathize? a. Herut b. the center c. the moderate left d. the Marxist left [Read only the first four] (e. politics doesn't interest me f. Other. Which?) Have you ever been a kibbutz member? Are you a kibbutz member now? (If es) a. w c ? b. movement? c. from when (to when)? (If the answer to question 24 is no) What is the longest period of time you spent on a kibbutz? a. which? b. movement? c. when? Did you enjoy your stay there? a. very much. b. pretty much c. not too much d. not at all. Were you ever a member of a youth movement? a. which? b. when? c. where? d. for how long? e. were you active? 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 226 Would you say you more closely agree with city values or with rural values? What do you mean? (probe) Are you or were you ever active in a political party? Yes/No (If yes) In what ways were you active? (Probe for positions, dates, etc.) Have you ever held any other government position? Yes/No (If yes) Which position? When? What were your duties? Have you ever been active in civic organizations? Yes/No (If yes, probe as above) In your Opinion, do you represent in your work the opinions of a specific group, such as members of your profession, or the citizens of your region, etc.? Yes/No (If yes, which group?) Is it important in your opinion that a Knesset member represent a specific group? Yes/No Is it important in your opinion that a civil servant represent a specific group? Yes/No Part Two In this section, will you please indicate the answer which most nearly expresses your opinion. 35. 36. Do you think that the spheres of activity of the Histadrut should be limited? a. Yes, the Histadrut should be limited to very specific areas. b. Yes, the Histadrut should be kept from spreading out into areas which are not too relevant to its prime concerns. c. No, the Histadrut should not be limited. d. On the contrary, the Histadrut should be en— couraged to enlarge its scope of activities. Which of the following economic branches would you agree to have under direct governmental supervision, given the economic conditions which exist in Israel today? (More than one answer may be checked.) a. the post office b. the train system c. the electric company d. wholesale food distribution e. grocery stores. 227 37. Concerning the economic arrangements in Israel, are you more in favor of the capitalist method or the socialist method? a. definitely capitalist b. more capitalist than socialist c. more socialist than capitalist d. definitely socialist. 38. Should every worker in Israel be obliged to join the Histadrut? a. Yes, definitely b. I think so c. I think not d. No, definitely. 39. To what extent would you agree to an activist foreign policy in relation to the Arabs? a. Definitely agree b. Partially agree c. Not agree too much d. Definitely not agree. 40. If you were forced to choose between living in Moscow and living in New York, what would be your choice? a. Definitely Moscow b. I would tend to prefer Moscow c. I would tend to prefer New York d. Definitely New York. 41. A senior civil servant should: a. consult with others before taking a stand and act according to their advice b. convince others of his position if he is con— vinced he is right, without considering the issue c. consult with others so that his stand is not too different from theirs d. consult with others before making his decision and then decide independently on the basis of the advice received _ e. act according to his own opinion if he is con- vinced of it without paying attention to others. 42. A Knesset member should: (Repeat the above five items and choose one) a. b. c. d. e. 43. Do you prefer the economic system of Russia or of the united States? a. Russia's, definitely b. I prefer Russia's more than the one in the united States c. I prefer the one in the United States more than Russia's d. 228 The one in the united States, definitely. 44. To what extent would you agree to enlarging the coun- try's frontiers? a. I would definitely agree, no matter what the cost b. I would agree only as a result of Arab provocation c. I would agree only if it could be done peacefully d. I would definitely not agree. 45. Considering the present economic situation in Israel, in what areas would you agree to Histadrut activity? (More than one answer may be checked.) a. b. c. do Wages and working conditions Education and cultural matters Services, such as insurance and banking Industrial entrepreneurship. 46. In your opinion, should wage policy be set by size of family or skill? a. b. c. d. According to size of family Principally by size of family and less by skill Principally by skill and less by size of family According to skill. 47. Would you agree to certain concessions to the Arabs in order to gain general solutions to outstanding problems? a. b. c. do Yes, definitely I generally agree I tend not to agree I definitely do not agree. 48. If Israel could choose between signing a defense pact with Russia or with the United States, which policy would you prefer? a. Definitely with Russia b. c. I would tend to favor Russia I would tend to favor the United States d. Definitely with the United States. Part Three Indicate whether you: 1. agree 2. disagree 3. it depends [probe] 49. If society were to dictate to you how to live and even how to decorate your home in a manner which clashed with your personal judgments, would you agree to follow the dictates of society? 1. 2. 3. 229 50. Would you be willing to actively aid in the establishing of the kibbutz's values as the values of mankind? l. 2. 3. 51. Would you agree to nonselective immigration of all the Jews to Israel within a short period of time? 1. 2. 3. 52. If you were an experienced professional in the diaspora, would you be willing to immigrate to Israel even if it meant working at physical labor? 1. 2. 3. 53. If you were an American Jew, would you agree to define yourself as being Jewish by virtue of religion and not by virtue of nationality? l. 2. 3O 54. Given your present position, would you agree to receive the same salary for your work as does the physical laborer with a comparable family situation? 1. 2. 3. 55. Are you willing to share your personal property in order to approach the goal of complete equality among men? 1. 2. 3. 56. Would you agree to assist in the realization of the kibbutz ideology if the condition were that you become a.farmer? 10 2. 3O 57. If you were a stockholder, would you agree to turn over your profits to the government? 1. 2. 3. 58. Would you agree to having only workers' parties in Israel? 1. 2. 3. ' Part Four [Open-ended questions; space for recording answer here omitted] 1. What is your understanding of the ideology of the kibbutz system? 2. What are the advantages of the kibbutz ideology compared to other ideologies? 3. What are the disadvantages of the kibbutz ideology? 4. What do you think is the future of the kibbutz movement? 230 5. What would happen to the State if the kibbutzim no longer existed? 6. What would have happened had the kibbutzim not existed before the State was founded? 7. In your work you are responsible for people who are subordinate to you. Do you regard your work and their work as equal? 8. What are the advantages of the kibbutz way of life com— pared to some others? 9. What are the disadvantages of the kibbutz way of life? 10. What kinds of things do you think go against kibbutz principles? Why? 11. What roles will agriculture and industry, respectively, play in Israel's future development? 12. How do you think modern technology affects the tradi- tional kibbutz values? 13. We have heard a good deal recently about the high rate of defection from various kibbutzim. What do you think are the main reasons for this defection? What type of people leave? About how many? Part Five Public opinion is an important factor in Israel. In the following statements indicate how many people you think agree with the proposition now, how many people in Israel agreed with it in the past and how many people will agree with it in the future. Use the following key: 1. most of the peOple 2. few of the people 3. almost no one 59. Society gives man his character and society stands above the individual. Present: 1. 2. 3. Past: 1. 2. 3. Future: 1. 2. 3. 60. The Jews of the world constitute a nation and not only a religion. Present: 1. 2. 3. Past: 1. 2. 3. Future: 1. 2. 3. 231 61. Kibbutz values should be accepted as the values of mankind. Present: 1. 2. 3. Past: 1. 2. 3. Future: 1. 2. 3. 62. The Jews in the diaspora who are now at the summit of the economic pyramid must form its base in Israel. Present: 1. 2. 3. Past: 1. 2. 3. Future: 1. 2. 3. Indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. A D 63. What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents. A D 64. Most people think that civil servants don't care much about what ordinary people think. A D 65. The way people vote is the main thing that de— cides how things are run. A D 66. Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power. A D 67. If a person doesn't care how an election comes out, he shouldn't vote. A D 68. A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk. A D 69. Voting directly for candidates and not for parties would solve many of our political problems. A D 70. Most people think that members of the Knesset don't care much about what ordinary people think. Before you is a list of six statements. What contribution has each of these ideas made to Israel's development; what is the contribution being made by these ideas now; in terms of Israel's develOpment, how useful will each of these ideas be in the future? Answer according to this key: 72. The image of th Present: 1 1 1 Past: Future: 1. A great contribution, definitely 2. An important contribution 3. Some contribution 4. A minimum contribution 5. No contribution at all. e Jews in Israel as a laboring nation. . 2. 3. 4. 5. . 2. 3. 4. 5. . 2. 3. 4. S. 232 73. The abolition of the private ownership of the means of production. Present: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Past: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Future: 1. 2. 3. 4. S. 74. Complete mutual responsibility according to the . principle: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." Present: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Past: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Future: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 75. The establishment of society without any differences in privilege or material possession. Present: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Past: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Future: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 76. The realization of the principles of the kibbutz ideoloqy within an agricultural framework. Present: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Past: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Future: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 77. General immigration of all Jews to Israel. Present: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Past: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Future: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Each of the following questions are divided into two parts, A and B. Answer according to the following keys: Key for Part A: Key for Part B: I. definitely agree 1. very strong 2. agree quite a bit 2. rather strong 3. don't agree much 3. not too strong 4. definitely don't agree. 4. not strong at all. 78A. Do you agree that those Jews in the diaspora who are now at the summit of the economic pyramid must form its base in Israel? 1. 2. 3. 4. B. How strongly do you feel about that? l. 2. 3. 4. 79A. Do you agree with the assumption that the principles of the kibbutz ideology can only be realized within an agricultural framework? 1. 2. 3. 4. B. How strongly do you feel about that ? l. 2. 3. 4. 80A. Occasionally our opinions aware of the change. twenty years ago and recall items. 233 Do you agree that society gives man his character and that society stands above the individual? 1. 2. 3. 4. How strongly do you feel about that? 1. 2. 3. 4. Do you agree that the Jews of the world constitute a nation and not only a religion? 1. 2. 3. 4. How strongly do you feel about that? l. 2. 3. 4. Do you feel that the values of the kibbutz movement should be accepted by all of mankind? 1. 2. 3. 4. How strongly do you feel about that? l. 2. 3. 4. Do you agree to complete mutual responsibility according to the principle: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"? 1. 2. 3. 4. How strongly do you feel about that? V l. 2. 3. 4. Do you agree to the abolition of the private owner— ship of the means of production? 1. 2. 3. 4. do you feel about that? l. 2. 3. 4. How strongly Do you agree that the image of the Jews in Israel must be that of a laboring nation? 1. 2. 3. 4. do you eel about that? l. 2. 3. 4. How strongly Would you agree to the establishment of society with- out any differences in privilege or in material pos- session? 1. 2. 3. 4. How strongly do you feel about that? l. 2. 3. 4. Do you feel that all the Jews of the world should immigrate to Israel? 1. 2. 3. 4. How strongly do you feel about that? e e 30' 4. change over time without our being to remember back some fifteen or Tr y how you felt about the following Use this key: 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 234 definitely agreed agreed quite a bit didn't agree much . didn't agree at all DWNH Establishment of society without any differences in privilege or in material possession. 1. 2. 3. 4O The Jews of the world constitute a nation and not only a religion. 1 2 3 4 The abolition of the private ownership of the means of production. 1. 2. 3. 40 General immigration of all Jews to Israel. 1. 2. 3. 4. The image of the Jews in Israel as a laboring nation. 1. 2. 3. 4. Kibbutz values should be accepted as the values of all mankind. 1. 2. 3D 4. Those Jews in the diaspora who are at the summit of the economic pyramid must form its base in Israel. 1. 2. 3. 4. Society gives man his character and society stands above the individual. 1. 2. 3. 4O The principles of the kibbutz ideology can only be realized within an agricultural framework. 1. 2. 3. 4. Complete mutual responsibility according to the princi- ple: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." 1. 2. 3. 4O A P P E N D I X II ORIGINAL HEBREW INTERVIEW SCHEDULE «3;. 236 3%. n v i 1 5 1 a 1 1 ’ x n n 1 1 y 3 bay ‘ a 1;"1‘15472-23'w - ============sz======a==aaat=u=st=== .3' {.11 3 ’ 1 fl 0; .1 n111an-3y1nb nah1psn 1i~w1n nJ’WD bu nuiuwn~a1anf n"n1x I 1 1 b x‘w b n 0 ~ J a q 1 (annual (vrgg) :11x1wan an .1 _Ivn .2 111x15 n1Jyn “31D 08 n11111: .: naivnaa .1 311,0 .1 :nVVb: n1avfinn 1'13n 111swn 35 w ' 5‘ “7911 if Vv—r at / 1: :pwa wan 3.0. 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(3 mm ca) (1 (2 (3 DR?! :5 / 1: ?’1:1 ,1y1xpa 101x ,1111ia 7nx1np 111R (1: T . #17 I5 / 1: ?x~no b: nx1np 1:11 nuns-wane nawn :1an 1n915 x5 / 1: ?xvno 5: nx1ap 1:11 9n5onn 1~pao wnwn :1wn 1ny15 on) uxn Dl'fl .28 .30 .31 .32 .33 .34 __.__ —.__—.-—_ hr— ---'-I n nx 155:1 nvunwnnn 1m: 5: 9:1‘7 1230‘? 1mm WPJJ .nmawn run: 5117 nn~w1 zbn‘; 240 ,3 ‘7 n .1ny1b 1n19n nnvxnnn n31wnn ?r1xn 5w 01153531 a1~n1 n111nonn 5v n51ysn ~nuv n3 ighznb yfi axn . .n115’xao 1x: ovnnvb n111nnnn nu 513335 w1h;7: __ (1 .n5 DVnVRnn 13—53-x5 01nnw$ ~10 1n1‘ uasnn R5? n111nonn nx 5’3135 w~ ,7: ‘_‘. 12 ..1n11n 75133 n111nonn nx 5133:» 7~x~,x5 __f (3 .1wnxw no: nnfiwpa vnnw nu avn1n51 n111nonn nx 111yb wv ;191n5 __ ((4 '35 11w~ ~nbwnn nxp’a nnn 11nfiw n1non n~1n uvxan 0115353: uvbnynn 151x (nnx n31wnn 1n1’ znob 1098) ?11vny 71x: canv’pn 0115:53n avxann 1x11n ;__ (1 n331n ___ (2 bnvnn—n1nn __ (3 n’xz1uvo 1113 np15n _;_ (4 nbuab n1Jn __ ((5 1x nvnovvxvx1o nwvan 1n1~ 1a1n nnx axn ,r1x: nvfibaban uvwnn nannb 1wp: ?n1no’buvnp n01}: 1n11 obnn: n’oo’5u19p ___ (1 nvbova~x1c 1wxn n~uo15nfsp 1n1: __ (2 nvnovbavap 1axn n1aovavxwo 1n1~ __ (3 3 abnnn nvbofibxvx1u __ (4 Q; ?n155:n n111non: 1am nuvnb 15K1w7 5y1n 5: :99n5 a, man 1: avnn: (1 73w 15 n31: __ (2 nfiw 15 nn1: ___ (3 J R? 05nd: (4f .35 ?:1y n1x1x 1:15 5x1w1 1xn n’JDPID n1vJ~1nz 1nIn nvvn HT’D IT'KJ. .39 11m nmn __ (1: n1311 n1vn: 1n1n ___ (2 13-53 1n1n x5 ___ (3~ 55:: 1a1n Kb __ (A, ’3‘? n11: ID’n ,7111-19131 napomn: 1115 n11vaxn 71: 11n35 1712 ann as ?1’11;p awpn n5 3 napoan: obnnn __; (1 napum: 1135 1n1’ aux: vnv'1 (2 If . . ; ‘ p111-1’J: 1115 1n11 191: ~n~:n -qje .(3 (‘J'fi' P11’—1‘J: uvnn: _§_ (4 ~ #5] (ad-- 24d. :21’n 19:: 1179 1ny15 oxn 111151 11v»: 1~Jy ’95:.n1ny_up11“R1nv.1:ab.aw1nx,n9211nnw7y3nfib- (1 “*9 ;;;. ° nnxy ~55 19:93 nonnnb 953a ,n: YJD1UD x1n ax ,tny1 nu afiap’v 1:5 o~1nx 31:11 (2 an~n1y1n 1RD nnww 1159 D1735 xgjaov1nx 1w ony1 y1nw5 (3 nvxnxy n91 y1npbw ,1n053 7vzy '95: n1np nnvpa 1391 011nx my ryiannb (4 11 n1xy9nn 11a1-5y 011nxn n1y15'35-nn1vn 15:,n: yaauvn x11 ox,1ny1 '95 11n35 (5 33’1n no::—13n 1ny15 can (tap nnx Inow ,41vnban 5995 nmawnan n1111v9xn nvnn by 111n) (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 ?n~ow1 59 annban nuvvn 1x n"n1u 5U nvbaban nnvrn 1n1~ 1min an: axn n1011 5U n’bnban navv: nbnnn ___ (1 nvo11 5U nibnban nu~cn 1n19 __' (2 :"n1x 5w n~baban novvn 1n1’ . (3 n"n1x bv annban nu'un ubnnn ___ (4 ?r1xn n15131 nnn1n: 1n1n n~1n n1wn 171x: y11rn n13: v1xn n1b1na nan1nn 1n1n 1nv1n nbnn: ,7; .__ (1 :19 n1311n 13D naanpan by nnwzna p1 52x ,1:: 1n1n vn11n ,1: .__ (2 D15fi-’3113 nav1n 17 n3n1n 7: on abs 1:: jean vn’vn x1 ,x5 .__ (3 71x3 n1513: nnn1n: 1n1n vnvvn x5 ,Kb ___ (4 n1$ban n111nonnw ovnon n1~n n1nuv 151x: ,011: m1xn 0’019pn D’Rlnfl 1n? (nnx n31wnn 1n1’ 1505 1wsn) ?n59ya xnn n11:y txzn1 13v 9111): ._; (1 n1n1n1 11:9n ‘J’JFJ‘ ___ (2 n1xpzn finvnyw nun»: 1:139 111: 09n11w .__ (3 (11nyna) n’wyn 11'393 .__ (4 ?~w~xn 711w35 axnnn as 9nnavnn :xnb unnn: 13wn nI’J’WD DR 913?’ W’ 0“" 1:53 ~nn9wnn 3355 Dunn: ___ (1 (2 (3 ~w~xn 111wan nunwnnn: nuns: Vnnswnn axnb oxnn: 1p’Y3 ___ annawnn :xn: n130nnn: n1n91 vvvxn 711wab axnn: 191?: ___ 1:5: vwvxn 111v35 nxnn: ___ (4 n1311na nawn uwb o’n1yn'9nab o1n19aon a~11nv111 ovaon n11n n1vn 171x: 71:117x3 91511: ubnnn o1aon .__. 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""3 3"“3“ ay 1" 1?"?!‘13 my .11112 Dunn a1nn‘7 n11waxn ‘mw1 111:: mm ax , .418 ?1n13 n3~n n11wnx n"n11n Dy ubnn: .__ (1 n"nv1n uy oaunn nn1nn5 1n11 nu13 vnssn l__ (2 3"HWK 0? naonn nnvnnb 1n11 no13 vnvsn -__ (3 :"n1x uy nbnn: '__ (4 r “a y 5 n (1 'on nnan) nan nnsnn 195 nnvxnnn n31wnn nx 1n: asaon (1 avaon x5 (2 (D19) v11n n1 (3 nt 1311 1n~a nu 15~ax1 11~n n11: nu 1105 1x1: 15 nnvnan nnvn n1ann on ..49 ?1:5 avann n~~n can ,vn19n 1nyu1 n19n39n 11n1y15 11313: nvn (3 (2 (1 ?n1w1zxn 1:1y: y131pn 1:1y 153pn9 7yn5 nxbnn 1n11y nu o11n5 1:1n an: can .50 1 (3 (2 (1 ?n13950 u55 137 In! awn: ob1yn v11n9 b: nx nx1x n159n5 yuan nvvn can .51 ' (3 (2 (1 15798 113y51 nx1x n15y5 7:1» nvvn nun ,n5133 11103 by: 1xn1px n1vn an .52 ?1n11n nu1wan n11ny: (3 (2 (1 :51 nvn1 nJvnnn 111n~ 5w nvnxy n113n5 nvnon nvvn nxn 3"n1x3 9111’ nvvn ax .53 ?nva185 n39n3J 911nv (3 (2 (11 593 a1wa 5y19 bnpnw n11awnn nn1x nx bnpb afiaon nun ,15w 11'P933 151’33 054 ?15w5 nn11 9nnawn :1: (3 (2 (1 ?xbn 11911wb n1ann nu 3175 21: vn1an 13’13P n“ P5fi5 131D "n“ 5““ 155 (3 (2 (1 vxann 111: nvn 1n1n on nvx139pn n93151x91’xn n8 0’03“” 131°."”" 0“" ‘56 ?9R5pn5 1nn’nw (3 (2 (1 ?nbwnnb 1~n111 nx 11cm» avnun nssn can ,nu1135 n11JD,15 1’“ D“ -57 (3 (2 (1 .58 ?1353 avby1n nwabnn r133 19nvw ovaon'nvvn axn 243 ?n~x131pn ny1Jnn 5w 193151x1vxn nx Ivan nnx 131: ?n11nx n1~3151x111x5 nx11wn3 v131pn n91151x11vx 5v n1J11n9n on nu I ?n11nx n191151x111x$ nx11wn3 YJJ’Pn nva151x~1vx 5v n1J11onn on an ?n~3139pfl ny13nn 53 n1’n9 1ny15 1”” .1 .2 ..3 .4 2b44 ?owv;.1n1v u1n11p 11a 85 ovx1nvpn 151x n11p nvn nn .5 ?nJ91nn 01p 1:95 nfinfivp 111 Kb ovx1nvpn 159xwanap n1n an .6 hymn? x’x1n nnxw n11nyn nnn .n11nx 5w nn11ny 59 n31nn nnx 1n11ny n12on: .7 ?1vavyn.h11c 1n11n nnn o1s1n3n 5c on11391a ?n11nn o1vn n111xb nx11vn: v131pn 5c ovvnn n11: 5v n15ynn Inn .8 24E; ?n11nx n11n n11135 nx11wnn v1n~p3w n~vnn n11: 5w n1311onn on nn .9 (?y11n) ?a~~n1~n1~n Iasvnn v131pn n1J11py nx 011n10n 011n1n 1ny15 on nu .10 5v nn1n~91 n11n9 DJ’HJD ,1nxy 1393 1nx 5: ,n1xbpnn1 nvvynn 5w n1nyn 1ND .11 ?v1xn ?v1nvpn vany by nyvsmn 13151 5w nnn19nn npnzann can: .12 .0131w a131a~pn n~1nn 1w n5113n nnvryn by n311nx5 139uw .13 1ny15 an nn 1: nnywybnuvv1p~yn n~n113n ?1n915 013119 nn: 7 - 2445 'n p 5 n .a199wn nyn1x 11:9b .v1x: :1wn 9111 n11n9 5nrn nYTv nnann avxx1v 1Jn;x ,1! ny1 9y 9193399 1ny15 71x9 999:: no: o’xnn unnnwnn nyn1xn 1nx 59 9:15 111: .17nya 11 ny15 191991 1ny15 71x3 919:: n991 ,nxr ny15 13y: 191:9n r1x: 91w): n9: (2 '99 nnan) nnn nnann 195 n15an 5y nJy 9:11 (1 an1y’n (2' 1nn 18 Dyna (3 9195 5yn n191y x1n1 13113: nx 9195 an11 n19nn (3 (2 (1 :niin: (3 (2 (1 :1ny: (3 (2 (1 (1vnya 1353 n1 x51 n91: 9111nn a51yn 1'11n9 (3 (2 (1 :n11n: (3 (2 (1 .:1393 (3 (2 (1 :11ny3 n9913xn n13nn 5w 0191p~n1o~91y9 5npnn5 71:1pn 191y 5y (3 (2 (1 :n11nn (3 (2 (1 :13y: (3 (2 (1 :11ny: 5x161: n5 0995 91911: ,n51y: n15953n n1vn119n n399: D’1D17fl n513n ~11n1 9999 (3 (2 (1 :n11n: (3 (2 (1 :19y: (3 (2 (1 :1'ny3 oD’DDD :5 1x 91999 nnn ox nnn 1n: 5: 19:5 nJy .ovnnwn nywn 5v nnvw1 11:95 99909 (1 91909 85 (2 n an911n 1:9 nprn nyuwn 5gp 1n11 9111 1y115 (2 (1 1313*:n n1xn 5v 1ny1n :vnnn5 n91: 1318 1‘33 T’PBW “’3 3“" "’1 (2 (1' awn DJ’R 911n12n'5y on1n151p (2 (1 ,nvn15xn navxw 99wann :11 (2 (1 n1’J’WDfl nu ’WPD 19133 D‘ #195 p1" 7131 n19 un5 11x .59 .61 .62 .63 .65 .66 2437 5599 nynxn ynnv’v 9919 ,n111n9n n1nx1n5 n1a~wn onvvn 131x y1939n on (2 (1 9511:11n1 9~p1nn 599 1n1~ na1195 51y1n5 915199 9~p1n 9111n39 1999 (2 (1 111n1~y99 nn1n 11n95 n~1wy ,n13599n 1y: x51 9119y19 1y: n1swv nynxn n1~91519n (2 (1 ’113’33 91xn 59 1ny1: awnnn5 n91: 1J’K ~xp191519w x1n 311n ny1 (2 (1 111393 11 nyvan n1995 15 5x - ny293 on (2 (1 avxnn n131’y1n9 1nx 5:9 ,1ny15 n5y1nn 1n9 .919999 nww 59 n9191 11:95 .T1xn n1n995 1~ny3 x1211 ,v1xn n1n195 19y: x9nn ,v1xn n1n~95 9199 (3 '09 nn99) xnn nn99n 195 n1? 95nnn n91 n5y1n (1 n31 n5y1n (2 n19~3 n5y1n (3 n9y19 n5y1n (4 n5y1n 919 (5 191y 9y: 5x191 n191 (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 1n11n3 (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :1999 (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :19ny: 11xsn 1y39x 5y n'919n n15y9n 51919 (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :n11n3 (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :1nyn (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :11ny9 ,"1’919 195 918 595 1n519’ 995 91K 599n1p~yn 995 nx59 nv11n n1v1nx (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :n11n: (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :13y9 (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 111ny: nv191n nxaéb n1v191: n1311 ~519n x55 n1nn n9pn (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :n11nn (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :13y9 (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :1vny: .67 .68 .69 .70 .71 3’3?) .72 .73 .74 .75 2413 n113y5 n9191 n1y5pn n1nw1nn 59 n13993 n131nfipn n13151x111xn v1p~y n1993n1 76 I O n91xn (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :n11n: (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :13y9 (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :11nya n91: n51yn ~11nv 59 n1559 n95y .77 (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :n 1133 (S (4 (3 (2 (1 :13y: (5 (4 (3 (2 (1 :1 9nyn ~39 19:95 .(31 (x :D’p5n 9:95 np5nJ n5x9 5999 n15x9 59 n119 11:95 .(3 p5n5 ovxn9n 5 '99.nn991 ,(x p5n5 91xn9n 4 '99 nn99 2n1nn99 . 2 nn99 3‘2339 18D prn (1 95nnn 91:99 (1 1195 71" (2 n1913 n1199 91999 (2 an 19—59 85 (3 ‘ 91:99 19—59 x5 (3 -prn x5 (4 95nn: 91:99 «5 (4 :51y51 n1nn99n ~95 n1x9n n15an 5y nay ”D05 9’3113 n15959n n1~91119n n3993 91191yn n513n ~11n19 91999 nnx nun (x. .78 ?9193 5n1v~n n5 (4 (3 (2 (1 71n19y prun 1n9 (: (4 (3 (2 (1 p1 992nn5 915191 n1x1a~pn n91151x911xn V1p'y9 nan5 91999 nnx nnn (x .79 ?n91xn n119y5 n3191 n135pn n139’nn 59 n13993 (4 (3 (2 '(1 ?1n19y p11n 1n9 (3 (4 (3 (2 ((1 71353 n1 x51-n91x 9'11n9197nnn ~11n19 nn1n5 91:99 nnn uxn(Ko80 (4 (3 (2 (1 71n19y p11n 1n9 (3 (4 (3 (2 (1 ?9195 5y9 n191y x~n1 1:113: nx 9195 n3n13 n1nnn9 195 91999 nnn bin ‘(n '.81 ' (4 (3 (2 (1 (3 71n19y pr1n 1n9 (4 (3 (2 (1 24$) .- . - : H F ' F11” ( I I 7 0' o (4 (3 (2 (1 ?1n19y prwn 1n9 (3 (4 (3 (2 (1 91: 535 1n513~ 195 018 539" 19199 '95 nx59 n~11n n1’1nn5 91399 nnn nun (x .83 "1931: 495 (4 (3 (2 (1 ?1n19y_pr1n nn9 -(3 ,(4 (3 (2 (1 911339 ~yxnx 5y n~919n n15y3n 519935 91399 nnn can (9 .84 (4 (3 (2 (1 73n19y prnn 499 (3 (4 (3 (2 (1 71319 9y 59 9191 919n5 93113 591913 9yn n1919 92399 nnn oxn (x .85 (4 (3 (2 .(1 ?1n19y 9119 1n9 (3 (4 (3 (2 (1 7951919 nx3n31 n111313 91311 ~513n x55 n13n n9pn5 91399 nnn nnn (x .86 (4 (3 \2 (1 ?1n19y 9119 1n9 (3 (4 (3 (2 (1 ?nx1x n15y5 913113 951yn v11n’ 539 135 91399 nnx nnn (x .87 (4 (3 (2 (1 ?1n19y prun 1n9 (3 (4 (3 (2 (1 \ "‘D’5 1n1x WP35 111313 .133 9191319 IJNW 1539 913999 1J~n1y1 91ny5 .1193 939 20 1x 15-3 1395 91x3n 9199y9n 1335 (9'319 nvvn) n931n 1313 319951 .nav1nn 91p 1:95 19153 (6 ’99 nn99) nnn nn99n ~95 n19 95nn3 91399 (1 n13~3 n1993 91399 (2 9299913r53 95 (3 95nn3 91399.x5 (4 .n1191n nx3n31 n191313 91311 a513n x55 n13n nnyn .88 (4 (3 (2 (1 .1353 n1 x51 n91x 911199 951yn 111nv .89 (4 (3 (2 (1 .1131n 1yxmc 5y n~919n n15y3n 51913 .90 ' (4 (3 (2 (1 I -___..._.—44 —-. ‘ “Luv fl. Q. an.“ 1‘..- ___! 25C> 9319 95199 11191 59 91553 9159 (4 (3 (2 (1 1319 99 91913 591913 999 9191 (4 (3 (2 (1 9191399 91399 59 9111p199 913193 539995 1131p9 131y 5y (4 (3 (2 (1 9193 591913 95 9995 91311! 9159539 911911199 93993 9119199 95139 11191 . (4 (3 (2 (1 9195 599 919191 131133 99 9195 93913 91399 (4 (3 (2 (1 911395 93191 919599 9139199 59 913993 91313199 913151911199 119? 9199399 99199 (4 (3 (2 (1 ."1131: 195 919 535 195131 195 919 539" 1p199 195 9959 91119 911199 (4 (3 (2 (1 .91 .92 .93 ,94 ,95 .96 .97 ’Htfi'fiflr’filh" ‘1‘r3 _ . SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Apter, David E. (ed.). Ideology and Discontent. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology. New York: Collier Books, I952. Bestor, Arthur. Backwoods Utopias. Philadelphia: Uni- versity 0? Pennsylvania Press, 1950. Borochov, Ber. Nationalism and the Class Struggle. New York, 1937. Buber, Martin. Paths in UtOpia. New York: Macmillan, 1950. Darin-Drabkin, H. The Other Society. 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Translated by Louis Wirth and E war S 115. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936. Naess, Arne, Christopherson, Jens A., and Kvalo, Kjell. Democrac Ideology and Objectivity, London: Oxford, 1 6. Patkin, A.L. The Origins of the Russian-Jewish Labour Movement. Melbourne: F.W. Che51re Pty., l . Revusky, A. Jews in Palestine. New York: Vanguard, 1936. Seligman, Lester G. (Leadership in a New Nation. New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Senior, Clarence. Land Reform and Democracy. Gainesville, Florida: Univer51ty o F orida Press, 1958. Spiro, Melford E. Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. . Children of the Kibbutz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. Keysden, Carl, and Sutton, Francis X., Harris, Seymour 3., Cam Tobin, James. The American Business Creed. bridge: Harvar Un vers ty Press, . Tauber, Esther. Molding Society to Man. n.p.: Block Publishing, Roots of Revolution, TranSIated by Venturi, Franco. 1fred A. Knopf, 1960. Francis Haskell. 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The Jewish Frontier, XXVIII (December, 1961), pp. 14—18. Honigsheim, Paul. "Rural Collectivities," in Charles P. Loomis and J. Allan Beegle, Rural Social S stems. New York: Prentice—Hall, 1955, pp. QZS-ESS. Kirchheimer, Otto. "The Waning of Opposition in Parlia— mentary Regimes," Social Researgn, XXIV (Summer, 1957), pp. 127‘1560 . Lipset, Seymour Martin. "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," Daedalus, XCIII (1964), pp. 271—303. Sarbin, Theodore R. "Role Theory," in Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. I, ed. Gardner Lin zey. Cam ri ge: A dison-Wesley, 1954, pp. 223—255. Shils, Edward A. "The End of Ideology?" Encounten, V (November, 1955), pp. 52-58. ((11111 L (WM ((1 23 ((1111 (i 31 (WM