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GERMAN POLICY CONCERNING
ATTACK UPON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

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I

INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the thesis

The involvement of the United States in the Second World War was a reason for the defeat of the chief Axis power, Germany, and German policy toward the Western Hemisphere had been a vital factor in causing American participation in the war. The Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor was merely the immediate incident precipitating America's entry into the conflict. Moreover, the evidence shows that Germany's alliance of 1940 with Japan was not the chief reason for her declaration of war upon the United States. Relations between the two countries had long been strained because of Germany's policy toward the Western Hemisphere during the Nazi regime. This thesis is concerned with the aspects of that policy which included attack upon certain areas deemed vital for hemispheric defense by the United States. Aside from military plans, it is clear that subversive activities, propaganda and economic warfare propagated by Germany in the New World, primarily in Latin America, resembled the preliminaries of her aggressions in Europe.

Equally important are the things which this thesis does not attempt to do. There is no effort here to make a comprehensive survey of the political and economic relations between Germany and the Americas. Nor has the question whether Germany incited Japan to make war upon the United States been treated. The evidence pertaining to that problem is fragmentary, and the subject itself is too large for consideration here. Finally, I have not tried to answer the question whether the United States should have gone to war with Germany because the

the Western Hemisphere was endangered. That issue is largely academic since Germany declared war and thus forced the conflict. It is safe to conclude, however, that U.S. leaders feared a German attack upon the New World, that Germany planned to seize certain points which the United States would have defended, and that, had these contemplated German attacks been attempted as scheduled, the United States would have gone to war months before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The totalitarian nature of the National Socialist Party and the German state under Hitler was responsible for a singular unity of purpose in foreign affairs. Hitler's dogma later became German policy. It seems prudent, therefore, to seek out the Nazi Party's attitude toward the Americas even before it came to power in Germany. Only in this respect does the thesis deal with the period before 1933.

As indicative of German policy the content of material from the following sources has been accepted: Hitler's writings and speeches, the writings and speeches of German cabinet ministers and National Socialist Party leaders, military directives signed by Hitler, operational plans and orders of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), captured records of secret conferences speeches, diaries, and correspondence of Germany's political and military leaders, and diplomatic dispatches to and from the German Foreign Office. Additional indications of German policy and intent toward the Western Hemisphere are found in the reactions and countermeasures of the United States and other states of the Western Hemisphere to what they judged to be German policy. Intelligence sources not now available for research were used by these governments as a basis for their political and military moves toward Germany. Therefore, one seeks to determine, in-

directly, German policy toward the Western Hemisphere as revealed in the actions and statements of those charged with the responsibility of protecting the New World against possible attack.

Germany did not attempt some of the military operations which will be described. All German war plans mentioned in this thesis are integral parts of a scheme to conquer all Europe, to hold western Russia, and to seize control of the Atlantic Ocean with a view to future war with the United States. The failure of Germany to fulfill the intentions which might have endangered the Western Hemisphere was due, primarily, to her insufficient power to conduct offensives simultaneously against both East and West.

B. Atlantic Invasion Routes

Any attack planned by Germany against the United States or the Western Hemisphere would, of necessity, have come from Europe or Africa westward to the New World. Hence, attention is drawn to the Atlantic Ocean, at once a barrier and a highway. Two indirect routes from Europe to the Americas avoid the vast expanses of water in the middle of the North Atlantic. The northern of these two passes out of the North Sea to Iceland, thence to Greenland and Newfoundland or directly to the continent. The way to the North American industrial centers is via Nova Scotia or the St. Lawrence River valley. By air this trip from Europe to the New World can be made in several short flights under nine hundred-fifty miles in length to established air fields. The southern route from Europe to the New World extends through the Iberian Peninsula or the Mediterranean Sea to western Africa, thence down the coast to a point on its shoulder opposite the bulge of Brazil. Alternately, a jump may be made to the Azores, Cape Verde, or Canary

Islands. The African coast between the French naval base at Dakar and the British naval base at Freetown, Sierre Leone is barely sixteen hundred miles from Brazil. The nearest U.S. naval base at Georgetown, British Guiana is, however, over eighteen hundred miles by air from the Brazilian bulge.

South of Cabo de Sao Roque lies the most populous and the wealthiest portion of South America. This region is almost equidistant from Europe and North America, and it is closer to bases in Africa or the Atlantic Islands than to the outposts of the United States. Consequently, the maintainance of U.S. naval and aerial superiority in this vital ^{area} is very difficult.

Had Germany moved southwestward toward the Western Hemisphere she would have made use of the Atlantic Islands to throw up a shield of air and naval protection for her land operations in western Africa.. These islands, the Azores, Madeira, the Canaries, and the Cape Verde Islands, also flank the great maritime highways of the Atlantic Ocean. All the lifelines of Great Britain which pass through the Mediterranean, around the Cape of Good Hope, and down to the La Plata in South America pass through the area dominated by the islands. Indeed, the air age has reduced the Atlantic narrows between Africa and South America to a mere strait. Through the strait pass the trade routes from eastern South America to North America. In the same manner, Iceland, Greenland and Newfoundland dominate the bustling great circle route from North America to Great Britain. Clearly, German control of these vital island areas would have jeopardized the communication and trade of all nations of the Western Hemisphere.

All speculation over the geographical and military factors involved

will not answer the question whether German could have attacked the Western Hemisphere. We know that the "broad Atlantic" had been reduced to a mere puddle; that German aircraft might easily have made one-way attacks upon the east coast of the United States from Atlantic bases; that Germany in 1938 planned aircraft for 1942 whose minimum range was to be 4800 miles¹; that German domination of the Azores, Iceland, and the Cape Verde Islands would have probably severed Britain's lifelines, caused her downfall, and netted Germany a good chance at control of the Atlantic Ocean. None of these things occurred. But the fact remains that Germany planned military operations which, had they been pursued with success, might have placed the Western Hemisphere in danger of domination or attack.

C. Bounding the Western Hemisphere

The definition of the term, "Western Hemisphere," is vital to an understanding of planned German operations on its periphery and efforts by the United States to defend it. The Second World War was truly a global conflict made possible, in large part, by the belligerent's ability to use improved means of communication and transportation to attack thousands of miles from the political and industrial heartlands. It is unrealistic, therefore, to define the Western Hemisphere in purely geographic terms as including merely the two American continents and the islands perched near their coasts. Since wars are fought between states, one must accept the definition of the Western Hemisphere as put forth by the political and military leadership of the

1 Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, 1946), VII, 790; from the German Air Force's "Organization Study 1950," dated 2 May, 1938, describing Luftwaffe performance goals for 1942.

states concerned. German leaders gave little heed to the question because no geographical concept or Monroe Doctrine, unilateral or supported by many nations, would stand in the way of aggrandizement of Germany. But the United States and the other American states, faithful to tradition and conscious of their national sovereignties, were definite in marking the limits of the New World, extending it steadily eastward into the Atlantic.

The Declaration of Panama, approved on 3 October, 1939 by the American Republics is a starting place for the political delineation of the Western Hemisphere. A "security zone" which was three hundred to one thousand miles wide and went around the American continents below the U.S.-Canadian border was established. As a response to the outbreak of war in Europe and the possibility of its extension to American waters and shores the nations declared that all hostilities by non-American belligerents were prohibited in this area. Great Britain and Germany repeatedly violated this new zone, and the running naval battle ending in the scuttling of the Graf Spee at Montivideo on 16 December, 1939, also sunk the American states' concept of the "zone of security." The farthest eastward extension of the zone had been to 24° Longitude West between 5° North and 20° South Latitude.¹

Throughout the next months the subject of hemispheric defense drew much attention as Germany demonstrated her might in Europe. Congresswoman Edith N. Rogers requested a definition of the limits of the New World from the State Department. S.W. Boggs, State Department geographer, replied that the political demarcation was more extensive than the geographical or historical limitation. There was, he said, no

¹ S.S. Jones and D.P. Myers(eds.), Documents on American Foreign Relations, July, 1939-June, 1940(Boston, 1940), II, 115-121.

common agreement on the geographical definition of the Western Hemisphere. The State Department maintained, however, that it comprised "...North America(including Central America and the West Indies, and also Greenland) and South America, together with all the islands appertaining to the two continents."¹

Nearly a year after the American nations had pushed the boundary of the New World far eastward by the Act of Panama, the United States concluded the famous destroyers-for-bases transaction with Great Britain. By this agreement of 3 September, 1940 the United States obtained leases on eight advanced sea and air bases in the Atlantic and Caribbean. They were located in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Georgetown in British Guiana, Exuma in the Bahamas, and Antigua, St. Lucia, and Trinidad in the Lesser Antilles.² Sea and air patrols from these points extended for hundreds of miles the United States' control of the Atlantic. Thus, in a military sense, Western Hemispheric waters now included all that were controlled from the newly acquired bases.

With the coming of spring in 1941 there was fear that Germany might resume her offensive against Britain and defeat the last force standing between Hitlerism and the New World. Accordingly, President Roosevelt extended the U.S. "security zone" and "patrol areas" to include all North Atlantic waters west of 26° Longitude West.³ The U.S. would use aircraft and naval vessels based on Greenland, Nova Scotia, the U.S.A., the eight leased bases and possibly Brazil. The American patrol would broadcast warnings of "aggressor" ships or planes operating within

1 letter of 8 June, 1940 from Boggs to E.N. Rogers; Ibid., II, 95-96.

2 see the large folded map at the end of this thesis for the location of the leased bases.

3 Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 April, 1941 as quoted in W.S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance(Boston, 1950), p. 140.

this huge area. Roosevelt publicly announced the extension of the patrol a month later in his address of 27 May, 1941, but he did not specifically mention the twenty-sixth meridian, a boundary which included the Azores and barely missed the Cape Verde Islands. Admiral Ernest J. King officially designated this new hemispheric boundary line in his "Operation Plan No. 3," dated 18 April, 1941. Included were all of Greenland, all of the Azores Island group, and the Gulf of the St. Lawrence River, the Bahama Islands, the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico.¹

President Roosevelt's speech of 27 May, 1941 went further in extending the New World's eastern limits. The United States, he said, was ready to resist with all force at its disposal any effort by Germany to gain domination over the Western Hemisphere or to move into positions from which it could mount an attack. He pointed out that Germany could occupy at any time the Iberian Peninsula, French North Africa, Dakar, and "...the island outposts of the New World--the Azores and Cape Verde Islands."² The latter were in easy flying range of Brazil and dominated South Atlantic shipping routes. Roosevelt warned,

The war is approaching the brink of the West Hemisphere itself. It is coming very close to home.

Control or occupation by Nazi forces of any of the islands of the Atlantic would jeopardize the immediate safety of portions of North and South America and of the island possessions of the United States and of the ultimate safety of the continental United States itself.³

Greenland and Iceland were described as the stepping stones for invasion of North America, and the same was said for the Azores and Cape Verde Islands in relation to Brazil. Apparently, the President was now in-

cluding the Cape Verde islands and Iceland within the Western Hemisphere.

1 S.E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume I, The Battle of the Atlantic, Sept., 1939-May, 1943 (Boston, 1943), p. 61; from Navy Operations files for 1941.

2 U.S. Department of State, Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), p. 665.

3 Ibid., p. 666.


This concern over Iceland dated back to the time before war broke out in Europe. At that time the U.S. government was concerned about the safety of the great circle route to Europe from the United States. This route passed strategic Iceland where the United States thought Germany might establish air and U-boat bases. In the spring of 1940, after Denmark fell, Germany did, indeed, exert pressure to get such concessions from the Icelandic government. At this time, the State Department came to the decision that "...Greenland was wholly, and Iceland largely, in the Western Hemisphere."¹ In April of 1941, a year later, an agreement with the Danish Minister in Washington established a U.S. protectorate over Greenland and authorized the construction of naval and air bases there by the United States. And on 7 July, 1941, Roosevelt announced that an occupation force had been sent to Iceland to cooperate with the British in guarding the island from German attack. Thus, by early July of 1941 the Western Hemisphere included, according to U.S. political and military leaders, all area west of the twenty-sixth meridian and also Iceland, the Azores, and the Cape Verde Islands.

In conformance with these developments Admiral King redefined the limits of the Hemisphere in his "Operation Plan No. 5," dated 15 July, 1941. It said, "The occupation of Iceland by a power, other than one which has sovereignty over Western Hemisphere territory, would constitute a serious threat against Greenland and the northern portion of the North American Continent...."²

In mid-July Roosevelt's special envoy, Harry Hopkins, conferred with Churchill and showed him the President's latest extension eastward of the Hemispheric boundary. On a map from the current National

1 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (N.Y., 1948), I, 753.

2 as quoted in Morison, op. cit., p. 74.



Facsimile of President Roosevelt's delineation of the Western Hemisphere's Atlantic boundary. In mid-July of 1941 Roosevelt gave such a marked map, torn from the July, 1941 National Geographic, p. 77, to his aide, Harry Hopkins. See R.E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 310.

Geographic Roosevelt had drawn a line down the tenth meridian, around Iceland at a two hundred mile radius, and thence down the formerly established limit of the twenty-sixth meridian to the equator.¹ The United States was to police the vast area west of the line. Churchill later described the President's concept in a communication to General Smuts of South Africa on 14 September, 1941.² At the Atlantic meeting of the Anglo-American political and military leaders in early August the U.S. concept of the Western Hemisphere's limit was further clarified. Roosevelt said that the United States was feeling out the Portuguese government for permission to occupy the Azores with American troops in the manner of the Iceland undertaking.³ This Roosevelt had done to forestall any German effort to occupy the islands and threaten the New World.

At this conference we find another indication of the military measures which the United States would undertake to safeguard the New World. Churchill told Roosevelt of Britain's fear that Germany would march into the Iberian Peninsula.⁴ To meet such a move Britain had prepared "Operation Pilgrim" for the seizure of Spain's Canary Islands. Churchill told Roosevelt that the British might take the Canaries even before any move in that direction was made by Germany and this action might provoke "...a crisis in the [Iberian] Peninsula." Both men agreed that such a move might provoke Germany to attempt the seizure of Portugal's Azores and Cape Verde Islands. It had already been made clear that the United States considered these islands vital to hemispheric defense and, hence, on the eastern perimeter of the Americas.

1 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History (N.Y., 1948), p. 310; see opposite page.

2 text of cable from Churchill to Smuts, 14 September, 1941 in Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 517.

3 Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 355-56.

4 see Chapter V of this paper for a discussion of Germany's plan of attack through Spain.

Roosevelt promised Churchill that: "In these circumstance he would none the less be ready to come to the aid of Portugal in the Atlantic Islands, and was holding strong forces available for that purpose."¹

The furthest extent to which anyone in the U.S. government would push the eastern limit of the Western Hemisphere was Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles. He disagreed with Hull's careful policy of applying constant pressure to Vichy to prevent the ceding to Germany of French African bases on the Atlantic. Early in May of 1941 Welles got the President's ear and drew up a tentative presidential message to Congress which would extend tremendously the U.S. concept of the Western Hemisphere. The message stated that

...the seizure, or control over...areas, some of which are barely sixteen hundred miles from the coast of South America, by powers which are bent on world conquest, would constitute so immediated a threat to the peace and safety of the Western Hemisphere that the situation arising therefrom could not be regarded passively by the United States.²

Such a policy would have placed under the Monroe Doctrine most of western Africa's coast north of the equator and have included territory of Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, and Liberia. Although the President did not deliver the message, its drafting shows the extent to which an American statesman was willing to push the American hemispheric boundary.

In conclusion, it may be said that by mid-August of 1941 the Western Hemisphere's eastern boundary had been pushed far out into the Atlantic toward Europe and Africa. The United States, dominant power in and protector of the New World, defined the Western Hemisphere as including all area north of the equator, east of the international dateline, and west of a line drawn down the tenth meridian to the

1 W. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 458; Roosevelt saw and approved Churchill's message to the War Cabinet describing the committment.

2 as quoted in C. Hull, Memoirs, II, 959.

vicinity of the Faeroes Islands, thence around Iceland at a two hundred mile radius, thence down the twenty-sixth meridian--- including all of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands---to the equator.

II

GERMAN POLICY REGARDING ATTACK UPON OR DOMINATION OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The specific objectives of German policy concerning the Western Hemisphere from 1933 until the outbreak of war with the United States can best be understood in the light of the general aim pursued during that period. One turns to Hitler's blueprint, Mein Kampf, as an authoritative source for the long-range policy of National Socialist Germany. The basic foreign policy aim of Nazi Germany was territorial aggrandizement. The dicta of the space-hungry National Socialist brand of geopolitics, the demand for Lebensraum, the great "crimes" of the Versailles diktat---all these can be rectified by the seizure of territory.

"Germany will either be a world power or will not be at all. To be a world power, however, it requires that size which nowadays gives its necessary importance to such a power...."¹ The Fuehrer, never setting the limits of "Greater Germany," exhorted his Party comrades to "...cling unflinchingly to our foreign-policy aims, that is to guarantee the German nation the soil and territory to which it is entitled on this earth."² The land of Germany must be harmonized with the population, thus making "Soil and territory...the goal of German foreign policy...."³ As early as 8 November, 1938 Hitler threatened to wage war in order to fulfill Germany's "rights" of territorial aggrandizement.⁴ A year later he confessed secretly to his military subordinates that he had wanted war from the time he began the clandestine rebuilding of Germany's armed might.⁵

1 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Complete and Unabridged(N.Y., 1939), p. 950.

2 Ibid., p. 947.

3 Ibid., p. 944.

4 Monica Curtis(ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1938(London, 1943), II, 26.

5 as quoted in Peter de Mendelssohn, Design For Aggression(N.Y., 1946), p. 1.

Keeping in mind this greed for forceful seizure of territory, one considers how the desire was manifested in Germany's policy toward the New World. A policy is found having two marked and conflicting trends, the first and subordinate of which may be termed non-warlike, the second and predominant trend being an aggressive policy of conquest or domination. The non-aggressive tendency is first considered here and is treated roughly in the chronological order of its development.

In 1938 and 1939 German leaders disavowed any desire for world conquest or attack upon the Americas. Propaganda Minister Goebbels told the Nazi Party Congress on 10 September, 1938: "Never have we left any doubt that National-Socialism is not for export....We do not aim at world domination."¹ Four months later Hitler ridiculed the accusation that Germany might soon attempt military conquest of the world. He said:

The assertion that National Socialism will soon attack North and South America, Australia, China, or even the Netherlands, because different systems of government are in control in these places is on the same plane as the statement that we intend to follow it up with an immediate attack on the full moon....²

On 28 May, 1939 the Fuehrer made another disavowal of any intention to attack the Western Hemisphere. Hitler was replying to President Roosevelt's appeal of 15 April asking for a ten year truce, disarmament, unfettered international trade, and non-aggression guarantees for thirty-one states. Sarcastically, the Fuehrer brushed aside Roosevelt's proposals and solemnly declared:

1 M. Curtis(ed.), op. cit., 1938, II, 19; see also Hitler's similar declaration on 24 February, 1940 in a speech at Munich in A. Hitler, My New Order(N.Y., 1941), p. 785.

2 speech in Reichstag of 30 January, 1939; My New Order, p. 570.

...all the assertions which have been circulated in any way concerning an intended German attack or invasion or in American territory are rank frauds and gross untruths, quite apart from the fact that such assertions, as far as the military possibilities are concerned, could only have their origin in stupid imagination.¹

Field Marshall Goering, commander of the Luftwaffe, testified at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials that even air attack from Germany upon the Western Hemisphere was impossible:

Even if Germany had completely dominated the nations of Europe, between Germany and the American continent there are...about 6,000 kilometers of water....In view of the smallness of the German fleet, and the regrettable of bombers to cover this distance...there was never any question of a threat against the American continent.²

Aside from the fact that Goering's apologia indicates an unspoken desire to have been able to attack the New World, he obviously ignored three pertinent facts. First, air attack upon any part of the Americas would have involved the United States because of its role as protector. Secondly, conquest of Britain would have given Germany control of the Atlantic; and finally, the distance from the Old World and its Atlantic Islands is at many points but a fraction of 6000 kilometers.

German naval leaders were well aware of the crucial role which submarine warfare might play in causing the United States to enter the war. A memorandum found in the captured files of the German Navy described the possible entry of the United States into the war as "decisive" and not to be risked until Axis naval resources were sufficient to defeat the United States on the seas. The line taken by the Navy was that economic warfare at sea should be waged as ruthlessly as possible without provoking the United States.³ As a result of this decision

Hitler was willing on 23 February, 1940 to forbid the use of U-boats

1 speech in Reichstag on 28 May, 1939; Ibid., p. 671; a similar statement was made by Rudolf Hess in England on 15 May, 1941; see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VIII, 45.

2 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, Proceedings(Nuremberg, 1947), IX, 402.

3 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supp.A, 845.

off Newfoundland "...owing to the psychological effects on the U.S.A."¹ Later, in the face of increased U.S. aid to Britain, Hitler rejected Admiral Raeder's requests to allow U-boats to operate up to the three-mile international sea boundary of North America. These powers were sought in the Spring of 1941,² and by 9 June Hitler had refused the request because he "...wished to avoid anything which could lead to incidents with the United States."³ The captured records of the German Navy indicate that Hitler, acutely aware of the danger of provoking the United States to war by excesses in sea warfare, held his fleet in check.

Germany's cautious attitude toward the United States, apparent in the statements of Hitler, seems to have developed around the beginning of 1941, and for many reasons. The attempt to conquer Great Britain had failed; vast military commitments had already been made; a huge effort was being made to hurl one hundred twenty-five divisions against the Soviet Union in June of that year. It would be folly, then, to provoke the United States to war just at a time when so many irons were already in the fire. Incidents and provocations were to be avoided in the fields of foreign affairs and in the conduct of the war. The German Embassy in Washington believed that its warnings to Berlin not to allow incidents nor to let U-boats operate too close to American waters were understood and acted upon. The policy of the German Foreign

1 entry in Admiral Assmann's diary of 23 February, 1940, Ibid. Supp. A, 1017.

2 Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ritter(Ambassador to the U.S.), Ibid., Supp. A, 970-71.

3 Ritter's memorandum dated 9 June, 1941; Ibid., Supp. A, 871.

Office and its representatives "...was to avoid anything that might harm political relations between Berlin and Washington."¹

During the spring and summer of 1941 Hitler began to express himself as definitely opposed to war, at that time, with the United States. He held to this opinion at a time when American aid and sympathy for Germany's enemies were rapidly increasing. German leaders ~~know~~ that Japan was preparing new operations which might result in war with the United States in the Pacific. In that case, Germany's duty by the Tripartite Pact of 1940 would be to declare war and join her ally. No doubt Hitler had this eventuality in mind when, in a conference on 4 April, 1941 with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, he "...pointed out that Germany...considered a conflict with the United States undesirable...."² A week later, Matsuoka told U.S. Ambassador Steinhardt in Moscow that he didn't expect Germany to declare war on the United States since both Hitler and Ribbentrop were opposed to such a move.

In the summer of 1941 German leaders were confident that the Soviet Union would crumble in a matter of five months. Japan was assuming a more adamant stand on its demands in the Pacific where only the United States held her in check. Hoping for a quick victory and then freedom to act against the Western Hemisphere, Hitler told Admiral Raeder on 9 July

...it is vitally important to put off America's entry into the war for another one or two months. Hence avoidance of all incidents....As before, only merchant ships can be attacked without warning in the prohibited area, but American ships are to be excluded from this.⁴

1 testimony of Dr. Heribert von Strempel, First Secretary at the German Embassy in Washington from 1938 to 1941; Ibid., Supp. A, 561.

2 Ibid., IV, 523; notes of the conference.

3 C. Hull, Memoirs, II, 983; dispatch to Washington from Moscow of 11 April, 1941.

4 Assmann's diary entry of 9 July, 1941 as quoted in Morison, Op cit., I, 37-38.

Germany's decision not to provoke the United States appears to have held good until Japan unleashed her attack in the Pacific. As winter approached Hitler's armies were being dragged deeper into the scorched Russian spaces. It was clear that the Soviet Union would hold out at least until warm weather arrived in 1942. From across the Atlantic came American arms to succor Germany's tottering foes. In this atmosphere President Roosevelt went on the radio, denounced Germany's "rattlesnakes of the Atlantic," and announced that the German U-boat attack on the U.S.S. Kearny was, in fact, an attack on the people of the United States. The Nazi braintrust was accused of harboring plans for the domination of the seas and of the Western Hemisphere.¹ Apparently, the strong language of the President caused a further retrenchment of any German plan of immediate aggression against the Western Hemisphere. Italy's Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, recorded in his diary that "Roosevelt's speech made a great impression. The Germans have firmly decided to do nothing which will accelerate or cause America's entry into the war."² As the Japanese negotiated in Washington and prepared war in the Pacific, Germany became very apprehensive of the consequences of the attack upon the United States which Japan was holding ready. On 4 December, when the European Axis members learned that the outbreak of war was impending, there was much serious thought given to whether it was wise for Germany to fulfill her treaty obligations. Ciano noted: "Berlin reaction to the Japanese step is extremely cautious. Maybe they will go ahead, because they can't do otherwise, but the idea of provoking American intervention is

1 Peace and War, pp. 737-42, 767-72; speeches of 11 Sept. and 27 Oct., 1941.

2 Count Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943 (Garden City, 1946), p. 398.

less and less liked by the Germans."¹ Thus, on the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor Germany was reluctant to go to war with the United States.

Another aspect of German policy toward the Western Hemisphere which may be termed non-warlike is her attempt to intimidate the United States with an array of three totalitarian powers. The Tripartite Pact of 25 November, 1940 was aimed specifically at keeping the United States out of the war. Article three read:

They [the three powers] ...undertake to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means, if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or the Chinese-Japanese conflict.²

Germany's decision to join such a compact grew out of the steadily increasing aid from the United States for Great Britain, the primary enemy of Germany. Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop told Ambassador Oshima that "plain language" must be used by the Axis powers to insure that

...the U.S. realized that they were confronting firm determination.... The people in the U.S. did not like National Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and therefore were against an entry into the war....our politics with the U.S. should be plain and firm, but not, of course, aggressive. In the U.S. they must realize that Germany, Italy, and Japan....would confront [the United States with] an iron front of determined people, a front...which includes practically the whole world.³

The German Armed Forces High Command Basic Order No. 24 Regarding Collaboration with Japan, dated 5 March, 1941, stated that the "...common aim [of Japan and Germany in] the war is...forcing England to the ground as quickly as possible and thereby keeping the United States

1 Ibid., p. 414.

2 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, V, 356.

3 report of a conference between Ribbentrop and Oshima, 13 February, 1941; Ibid., IV, 473-74.

out of the war."¹ This same thought was expressed at a conference in Tokyo at the end of August, 1941.² Ribbentrop confirmed the validity of these statement at Nuremberg where he said German leaders considered the American attitude in the fall of 1940 as "unfriendly." They had hoped, however, to strengthen isolationism and "reasonable forces" here by confronting the United States with an overwhelming instrument of force in the form of the Axis Alliance of 1940.³

Still another element of Germany's non-warlike policy toward the Western Hemisphere was the use of the technique of making Germany appear wronged, persecuted or attacked by the United States. In Europe Hitler had used this strategem to turn the tables on his enemies in order to justify, at a later time, an attack upon them. The tactic had preceded assaults on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Norway. Perhaps the best illustration of Germany's application of this device to her relations with the United States was Hitler's vivid rejection of President Roosevelt's request in the spring of 1939 for guarantees of peace and for a conference to settle outstanding international disputes. In a speech at the Reichstag on 28 April the Fuehrer said that Germany abhorred war while the western democracies allowed their presses to spread lies and to agitate for hostilities. Hitler accused Roosevelt of attempting to force Germany to abandon war while ignoring that the United States, itself, had never failed to resort to force when necessary. Finally, Hitler told the President and the American people, European affairs were not, legitimately, any of their business. Germany would not be intimidated; she would eradicate the evils of the

1 Ibid., VI, 907.

2 Ibid., IV, 546-51; "Gist of a consultation held between German Ambassador Ott and Vice-Minister Amsel--29 August, 1941." See Ibid., IV, 551 for the record of a similar interview the next day.

3 Ibid., Supp. B, 1190.

odious Versailles Diktat.¹ Here we find a fantastic perversion of the content and intent of Roosevelt's message into a tirade aimed at showing the United States to be a meddler in the affairs of an oppressed Germany.

A similar tone is found in Hitler's address of 30 January, 1941 when the German colossus towered over beaten Europe. Britain would fall despite any American help. Germany had not one single quarrel with "the American people." (Perhaps that people should repudiate its "warmongering" government ?) Germans had fought to secure independence for the United States but would now be forced to sink "...every ship, with or without convoy, that comes within range of our torpedo tubes"² These bombastic utterings probably indicated that Germany sought no direct conflict with the United States, and yet she was bent on knocking out Britain and controlling the seas.

Hitler's fanatical hate of Jews manifested itself in his opinion of the United States as simply another side of his effort to make Germany appear wronged. "Jews are the regents of the stock exchange power of the American Union. Every year they manage to become increasingly the controlling masters of the labor power of 120,000,000 souls...."³ This cabal of "Jewish international finance" was linked with those who sought "...not only the thorough economic smashing of Germany, but also its complete political enslavement."⁴ Those in the United States who opposed Germany were either Jews or stirred up to hatred by "Jewish-capitalistic propaganda" in which there was not a

1 A. Hitler, My New Order, pp. 656-77.

2 Ibid., p. 920.

3 A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 930.

4 Ibid., p. 905.

shred of truth. American politicians would not be allowed to interfere in German affairs.¹ Here was an effort to separate those who opposed Germany from the "true" Americans. As an answer to the agreement between Canada and the United States setting up a joint board of defense in the summer of 1940 Hitler fulminated against the "...international plutocracies, the Jewish newspapers, the Stock Exchanges...." which hated Germany and controlled the democracies. He told Germans that it was now a fight to a finish for Germany's sacred national foundations.² Ribbentrop revealed after the war that Hitler actually believed that "...very strong forces in the United States...worked against Germany. He was absolutely convinced...it [existed in] very important circles of the government...."³

Hitler's speeches and the controlled German press repeatedly branded American leaders as "warmongers" who prolonged the war against the interests and wishes of the peoples involved. Responsible U.S. leaders were accused of supporting Winston Churchill's alleged decision in 1936 to destroy Germany by war.⁴ Here again we find Germany pictured as the peace-loving nation oppressed by the United States.

As a final aspect of Germany's efforts to appear on the defensive and thus non-aggressive toward the Western Hemisphere we consider her interpretation of American defensive efforts. These American defense measures are discussed in Chapter VII of this paper, and it is shown that they were undertaken solely to meet the threat of aggression upon the New World by Germany or her allies. Germany's leaders, how-

1 My New Order, pp. 580-93; speech of 30 January, 1939.

2 Ibid., p. 850; speech of 4 Sept., 1940.

3 testimony at interrogation in Nuremberg on 31 August, 1945; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supp. B, 1197.

4 My New Order, p. 951, speech of 4 May, 1941.

ever, were prone to regard them as aggressive moves. Ribbentrop termed the arrival of U.S. troops in Iceland as "...an aggression against Germany and Europe."¹ He told his Japanese allies that by early July, 1941 it was absolutely established that the United States was an aggressor against Germany. At his interrogation in Nuremberg on 31 August, 1945 Ribbentrop named many other acts of the U.S. government which were considered hostile by Germany. Among these were the large-scale deliveries of war supplies to Britain, the appearance of American volunteers in the British Army and Air Force, and the trading of fifty over-age destroyers to Britain, a deal which shocked Hitler, according to Ribbentrop. Also irritating to Germany were the recalling of the U.S. Ambassador when Jewish persecutions broke out and the sending home of German consular personnel as propaganda and intelligence agents. However, Hitler's chief reason for Germany's declaration of war upon the United States was another example of his effort to make Germany appear on the defensive. He told Ribbentrop, "...the United States is shooting against our ships. They have been a forceful factor in this war, and they have, through their actions, already created a situation, which is practically, let's say, a situation of war."² Indeed, this is the main issue cited in the German declaration of war upon the United States, that American naval forces had, under presidential orders of 11 September and 27 October, attacked German vessels.³

Thus, we find that Germany's non-warlike policy toward the Western Hemisphere had many facets. There were repeated and vehement disavowals of a desire for world conquest or for territory in the New World.

The German Navy and all other branches of the government were restricted

1 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI, 564-65; code telegram from Ribbentrop to Ambassador Ott at Tokyo, 10 July, 1941.

2 Ibid., Supp. B, 1196-1200.

3 Ibid., VIII, 432-33.

during 1941 from causing provocation of the United States. Elaborate efforts were made to make Germany's cause seem defensive toward the United States, and in so doing to cloud the issue of German designs in the Americas. The three-power Axis Alliance of 1940 had as a specific purpose the prevention of American participation in the war.

Over against all this is the belligerent trend of German policy toward the Western Hemisphere. This hostility grew out of the basic precepts of National Socialism. Hatred of democracy, the doctrine of Aryan superiority, and the intention of world domination based on racial superiority were all concepts incompatible with the peoples and governments of the Western Hemisphere. Since the United States was the only American state capable of protecting the hemisphere from a possible German attack, she was singled out for the brunt of Germany's vituperation directed across the Atlantic.

National Socialism's fanatic hate of democracy was a prime factor in Germany's attitude of hostility toward the governments of the Western Hemisphere. Hitler thought democracy to be the forerunner of the universal plague, communism.¹ Nazi Party philosopher Alfred Rosenberg called for "...the utter destruction of the shameful democracy... which will bring about today the perdition of all states in the name of the people unless the religion of the Blood be lived...."² Rosenberg made it clear, as early as 1922, that the principles and ideology of National Socialism would "...lead the way in the unavoidable struggles for power in the other countries of Europe and America."³

¹ Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 99.

² Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1941), p. 671 as quoted in U.S. Dept. of State, National Socialism (Washington, 1943).

³ Ibid., p. 56 as quoted from Rosenberg's Wesen, Grundsätze, und Ziele der NSDAP (Munich, 1933), first edition, 1922, p. 48.

At the peak of his power Hitler announced the concept of two worlds locked in a struggle for survival in his speech of 10 December, 1940. He said no reconciliation was possible since the war was an ideological struggle in which defeat for Germany would mean the end of the German people.¹

A second aspect of Germany's belligerent attitude toward the United States and the Western Hemisphere grew out of her intention to mobilize the German master race in order to rule the world. The original Nazi Party program, never altered, called for a pan-German state including all Germans.² Obviously, the outcome of the fulfillment of such a plan would affect vitally the American continents where large German elements reside. Hitler yearned for a "herd-like unity" in Germans so that Germany might become mistress of the globe, ruling with "...the victorious sword of a master race which places the world in the service of [its] higher culture."³ Hitler would include all prime racial elements within this mighty German state in order to lead them to a position of domination.

After National Socialism came to power in Germany in 1933, both the state and the Nazi Party began work to fulfill Hitler's dream of world conquest by the master race. In a prophetic statement the Fuehrer opened his regime by claiming for Germany all culturally allied peoples for whose rights the German government was "...resolved to use all means at its disposal to support...."⁴ In fulfillment of this promise the National Socialist Party maintained the Ausland Organization,

1 Hitler, My New Order, pp. 874-889.

2 Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 686.

3 Ibid., pp. 437-38; "We all sense that in the distant future problems could confront man for the conquest of which only a highest race, as the master nation, based on the means and possibilities of an entire globe, will be called upon." Ibid., p. 581.

4 Hitler, My New Order, p. 158; speech of 23 March, 1933.

the AO, in foreign lands to organize Germans into Greater Germany. At the sixth rally of these "Germans from Abroad" in Stuttgart on 4 September, 1938 Goebbels told the visitors to return home as "...the Fuehrer's henchmen throughout the world, bearers of his idea and his achievement to Germans wherever they may be."¹ The same day, Deputy Fuehrer Rudolf Hess said:

Many of you Germans living abroad formed germ-cells of Germanism just at the most critical time....You have bonded yourselves together in the foreign organization of the National-Socialist Party in order to foster your Germanism and to become good National Socialists.²

Hitler clung to his unshakable desire for world domination by Germany even in the face of catastrophic defeat. He told Goebbels in the spring of 1943 that "...the way to world domination was practically certain..."³ after Germany won the war in Europe.

The outcome of this policy of political action based on racial affiliation was, in the New World, the building of espionage and subversive groups. In South America espionage groups and clandestine radio stations were active. The Brazilian government, sympathetic to the United States and wary of its own sovereignty, crushed its Nazi-inspired fifth column.⁴ Secretary of State Hull was informed that German penetration into South American universities, social life, and business circles was widespread. The German plan for domination of South America included control of carriers and of the vital European market. Germany would undersell the United States and its agents would overthrow any government which failed to cooperate. Ultimately, Germany planned to "...take over the Latin American countries as

1 Monica Curtis(ed.), op.cit., II, 17.

2 Ibid., II, 14-15.

3 Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries(1942-1943) ed. by Louis P. Lochner(N.Y., 1948), p. 359; entry of 8 May, 1943.

4 Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision(N.Y., 1944), p. 221.

virtual dependencies."¹ Hull was convinced that Germany would have pressed this scheme had she conquered Britain, and he ordered vigorous moves be taken to counteract the German pressure.²

American leaders became convinced that Germany actually intended to attack South America as soon as it was militarily feasible. Prime Minister Reynaud of France had told Ambassador Bullitt in May of 1940 that he had evidence showing a German plan of attack on the United States after the defeat of France and Britain.³ A year later, on 14 May, 1941, Secretary of State Hull told Japanese Ambassador Nomura that the United States had irrefutable evidence of Germany's plan to attack the New World. "It all depends," he said, "on whether Hitler conquers Great Britain. If he should, he would probably or possibly come into control of the high seas and would make his first attack on South America."⁴ Hull was sure that the inter-American policy of unity and common defense, promoted by the United States after 1933, prevented the coming to power of several Latin American pro-German cliques which would have readily given naval and air bases to Germany.⁵ Two

1 Hull, Memoirs, I, 813-14.

2 Harold Callendar wrote in the New York Times of 17 June, 1941, p. 11 about the "German High Command in South America." He said economic warfare, propaganda, the air lines, and the services of German residents were all being used by Germany to gain hegemony. Callendar reported a scheme to carve up South America by the aggrandizement of Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia; all the small nations were to be eliminated. There was planned, he said, a Nazi state in Patagonia and German bases in the Guianas. Callendar reported that a dozen Nazi propaganda newspapers were directed against the United States. Storm trooper units and the Gestapo were active among the German element.

3 Hull, Memoirs, I, 772-73.

4 Ibid., II, 1001.

5 Ibid., II, 995-96; conversation with Nomura in April, 1941.

months later, Secretary of War Stimson warned of Germany's active fifth column groups in Latin America. The Vichy government might at any time yield to Germany African bases from which South America could be attacked. South American defenses, said Stimson, were weak, and possession of bases there would make possible a German attack on the vital Panama Canal. Stimson, like Hull, predicted that if Britain should fall, the United States would face outright invasion by huge and superior Axis forces.¹

On 27 October, 1941 President Roosevelt sounded the danger signal of a possible German attack to the American people. The speech was also a warning to Germany, and it caused, as has been noted, a further retrenchment by Germany. Roosevelt pointed to the German aim of a new world order and her efforts to seize control of the Atlantic as indicative of her scheme to dominate the Western Hemisphere. He made a startling revelation:

...I have in my possession a secret map made in Germany by Hitler's government....It is a map of South America and Central America as Hitler proposes to reorganize it. Today in this area there are fourteen separate countries. The geographical experts of Berlin, however, have ruthlessly obliterated all existing boundary lines and have divided South America into five vassal states, bringing the whole continent under their domination. And they have also arranged it so that the territory of one of these puppet states includes the Republic of Panama and our great lifeline---the Panama Canal.

This map makes clear the Nazi design not only against South America but also against the United States itself.²

At a press conference shortly thereafter Roosevelt emphasized that the map was authentic despite the ranting of the German propaganda

machine to the contrary. The abuse of the German spokesmen knew no

1 text of speech in N.Y. Times, 16 August, 1941, p. 6. Hull backed up Stimson's speech the next day and said that the most significant symptoms which had preceded German attacks elsewhere were evident in South America; see N.Y. Times, 17 August, 1941, p. 5.

2 Peace and War, pp. 768-69.

bounds as they branded the map as an "old forgery" and the President as a "political criminal," a "tool of international Jewry," as "idiotic," and as a "warmonger."¹ This outburst indicates the sensitivity of the German government to so damning a charge. A noted American geopolitician, Derwent Whittlesey, endorses the existence and authenticity of such a map although it has never been made public.²

Germany's efforts to seize footholds in the New World were dramatized in Roosevelt's radio address of 11 September, 1941. Nazi-inspired intrigues, plots and sabotage, said the President, were simply the forerunners of a German attempt at achieving hegemony in this hemisphere. The President noted that plots in Uruguay, Argentina, and Bolivia had been broken up and that secret air fields in Colombia within easy bombing range of the Panama Canal had recently been discovered.³ Since early in August the United States had received reports of secret landing fields prepared by Nazis or Nazi-hired workers in Dutch Guiana within two hundred seventy-five miles of the source of sixty percent of America's aluminum ore sources. Around 17 November an occupying force was sent to Dutch Guiana to prevent severe damage to the U.S. defense effort by attacks on these bauxite mines from the secret airstrips.⁴

Nazi Party Philosopher Alfred Rosenberg looked forward hopefully to the day when a pro-German, National Socialist regime might rule the United States. The U.S. had the great task, according to Rosenberg, of "...throwing off the worn-out idea upon which it was founded..."

1 New York Times, 29 October, 1941, pp. 1, 4, 5.

2 Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest(N.Y., 1942), pp. 247-48. As of November, 1950 the map was not to be found among President Roosevelt's papers at the Franklin D. Roosevelt library at Hyde Park, New York.

3 Peace and War, pp. 739-40.

4 Hull, Memoirs, II, 1015. See Appendix to this paper for short summaries of several periodical articles discussing Germany's activities in South America.

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and putting into force the new racial-state idea which a few awakened Americas have already foreseen."¹ Specifically, Rosenberg would have the new "racial state" deport all Jews, Asiatics, Negroes, and other "undesirable" racial types. The resemblance of this program to that of Nazi Germany is obvious. The AO and the Foreign Section of the Nazi Party conducted vigorous propaganda activities in the United States which were aimed at enlisting the support of isolationists, American fascists, anti-Britishers, and anti-Semites.²

The responsible military leaders of Germany were aware that the outbreak of war in Europe might bring the United States into the conflict. Field Marshall Goering expression this opinion to German aircraft manufacturers in a secret speech on 8 July, 1938. The German Naval High Command on 15 October, 1939 noted in a memorandum that the United States would probably aid the Western Powers in a war against Germany. It was only a matter of time, thought the German Navy, as to when the United States should be forced to go to war by intense German sea warfare.³

Because they were convinced of American sympathy for the Allies, these German militarists were willing to make war upon the United States. Goering demanded new weapons from the German aircraft manufacturers on 8 July, 1938 so that he could strike at America. He said:

I hope, this is my private wish and dream, a miracle will happen. I still hope that I am shown some day a motor or a weapon or a plane or a bomb, the qualities of which will be fantastic....I still am not yet in possession of the stratosphere bomber which overcomes space at a height of 25 to 30 km....I still am lacking rocket motors which will enable us to effect such flying. I still am missing entirely the

1 as quoted from Rosenberg's Myth of the Twentieth Century in U.S. Department of State, National Socialism, p. 33.

2 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supp. A, 550-585; testimony of von Strepel, First Secy. at Washington Embassy, 1938 to 1942.

3 Ibid., VIII, 557.

bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there.¹

To this bellicosity can be added the decision by Hitler and Admiral Raeder on 10 October, 1939, that, regardless of the effects of unrestricted submarine warfare, "...all objections by neutrals have to be rejected even in case of a danger of the USA entering the war...."

Hitler was determined to wage war "brutally" in disregard of any consequences to Germany's relations with the United States.²

In conclusion, the German policy toward the Western Hemisphere revolved around her effort to defeat Great Britain and seize control of the Atlantic. Then South American trade would be monopolized, and pro-German puppet governments would gradually be installed. Conflict with the United States was to be avoided until all other major enemies had been defeated. However, the U.S. policy of aiding Germany's enemies and the Japanese attack in the Pacific caused Hitler to go to war prematurely with the United States. It should be pointed out that no German plans of military attack upon the American continents have yet been discovered. Clearly, however, Germany planned to seize economic and political hegemony in South America. The plan to invade Great Britain was evolved in a matter of weeks after the Wehrmacht had already reached the English Channel. Hence, military plans for the invasion of the Western Hemisphere could easily have been prepared after tenacious Britain had been removed as an obstacle to further westward expansion.

1 Ibid., VIII, 235; Goering established the authenticity of the record of this speech at his interrogation at Nuremberg; see International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, Proceedings, IX, 282.

2 entry of 10 October, 1939 in Admiral Assmann's diary; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supp. A, 1015.

III

THE GERMAN PLAN OF INVASION OF GREAT BRITAIN

Had Germany's scheme to invade and conquer Great Britain been successful, America's first line of defense (according to U.S. military leaders) would have fallen. The U.S. staffs were counting on the Royal Navy to guard the Atlantic while the bulk of America's one-ocean navy was stationed in the Pacific. The defeat of Britain might have meant the sinking, capture, or scuttling of the British Navy. The combined naval strength of all German Europe plus its ship-building capacity might have made an attack upon the Western Hemisphere militarily feasible. For all Germany needed was decisive naval superiority in order to transport her overwhelming land power to the New World.

By 23 May, 1939 Hitler had decided that war with Great Britain was imminent and that "...the conflict with England will be a life and death struggle."¹ After analyzing the strength and weakness of Britain Hitler concluded that she would be forced to capitulate after her food supply routes were cut.² The Fuehrer thought air power alone could not defeat Britain, but he was ready to divert production from the German Army to the Navy and the Air Force.³ Therefore, it seems clear that in the spring of 1939 Hitler thought Germany could defeat Britain by seizing the continent, by waging a war of attrition against British supply lines, and by gaining, eventually, naval supremacy.

These same decisions regarding war against Britain appeared again on 15 October, 1939 in a memorandum⁴ by Admiral Raeder, Commander-

1 Ibid., VII, 830; secret minutes of a conference in Berlin of Hitler and top military officers.

2 Ibid., VII, 851.

3 Ibid., VII, 853.

4 Ibid., VIII, 545-72.

in-Chief of the German Navy. With the "utmost ruthlessness" the maritime trade of the principal enemy, Britain, was to be destroyed. The total economic warfare was to include the use of submarines, surface forces, aircraft, political organs, economy, and propaganda.¹

After the complete victory of the German Army in the West in the spring of 1940 and the successful evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk, Germany turned upon its enemy lying across the English Channel. Hitler's "General Order No. 16 for the preparation of a landing operation against England" described the over-all invasion scheme,² the preparations of which were to be completed by the middle of August, 1940. Called "Operation Sea Lion" and dated 16 July, 1940, the directive tells the various branches of the German Armed Forces their general tasks in the invasion attempt. The aspects of the plan which are pertinent here are the missions required of the Luftwaffe and the German Navy.

Though out-numbered and out-gunned the German Navy was to engage the British fleet and prevent it from intercepting the invasion attempt. British forces in the North and Mediterranean Seas were to be attacked and tied down. Air and torpedo strikes were to prevent the British Home Fleet from reaching the invasion concentrations. German vessels were to sweep a corridor from the continent to England free of mines. On each flank of this invasion pathway a heavy mine-barrier was to be layed and guarded to repel the British fleet. The Navy was to cooperate with the Air Force in protecting the flanks of the entire operation. Finally, the German Navy was to secure, mostly from conquered nations, a flotilla of transport craft sufficient to trans-

1 Ibid., VIII, 546.

2 Ibid., III, 399-403.

port the invasion army to England.

The primary task assigned to the Luftwaffe by Hitler was to defeat the Royal Air Force. "The English air-force," he said, "must morally and actually be so far overcome, that it does not any longer show any considerable aggressive force against the German attack."¹ Specifically, the Luftwaffe was to perform the role of the artillery in the attack.

Some of its other tasks were:

To hinder interference from the enemy air force. To overcome coastal defenses which could do damage to landing positions, to break the first resistance of enemy troops and to smash reserves which may be coming up....to destroy important transportation routes for the bringing up of enemy reserves, and to attack enemy naval forces, which are coming up, while they are still far away from the crossing points.²

Since the German Navy and Air Force could not carry out these assigned tasks the invasion was not thrown at England's beaches. These preparatory operations were, however, an integral part of Operation Sea Lion as Hitler conceived it. Hence, it is correct to say that Britain defeated Germany's attempt at invasion.

A vital factor in the British victory was the damage inflicted upon the German surface fleet by air and naval attacks off the coast of Norway in the spring of 1940. Although Germany's Army was totally victorious on the continent by the end of June, Raeder had at his disposal at this crucial time an effective naval force(surface) consisting merely of one heavy and two light cruisers and four destroyers.³ Four days before Hitler's intended date of completed preparations Germany had repaired and returned to service a few non-capital ships, but its heavy units were still not available. Prime Minister Churchill

1 Ibid., III, 400.

2 Ibid., III, 401-402.

3 W.S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm(Boston, 1948), p. 657.

wrote to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand on 11 August, 1940:

The German Navy is weaker than it has ever been. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are both in dock damaged, Bismarck has not yet done her trials, Tirpitz is three months behind Bismarck. There are available now in this critical fortnight, after which the time for invasion is getting very late, only one pocket battleship, a couple of eight-inch Hippers [heavy cruisers], two light cruisers, and perhaps a score of destroyers.¹

Churchill thought any attempt to transport a German army to Britain and maintain it there with such a meager sea force would be unreasonable. Furthermore, the German Navy had failed to design or build any special invasion craft of the type necessary for such an operation² and had confined its frantic efforts to the massing of a conglomeration of boats and barges gathered from all over western Europe.

The chief reason for the defeat of Operation Sea Lion was the failure of Goering's Luftwaffe to knock out the RAF as directed by Hitler. The Fuehrer told Admiral Raeder on 31 July, 1940 that he would give the Air Force eight days of intensive attacks to destroy the British Air Force, harbors, and naval units. If this assault did not achieve considerable destruction, the invasion was to be postponed until May of 1941.³ It appears that these intensive attacks began on 8 August when 2750 German aircraft went into action and nearly one hundred were lost.⁴ Winston Churchill, however, cites Hitler's Directive No. 17 to show that the big push began on 5 August, three days earlier. At any rate, a major air battle was fought on 15 August and resulted in the loss of nearly one hundred of a thousand German aircraft in action while British losses were about half that number.

1 Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston, 1949), p. 437.

2 Ibid., p. 283.

3 Ibid., p. 320.

4 Asher Lee, The German Air Force (N.Y., 1946), p. 70.

Churchill sets the Luftwaffe strength at this time as follows:
2669 operational aircraft; 1015 bombers, 346 dive bombers, 933
fighters, 375 heavy fighters.¹

During August and September, 1940 the Luftwaffe lost had put out
of action over half of its first line combat aircraft. Goering
switched his target from military areas to cities, and on 7 September
the Luftwaffe did severe damage to London while losing eighty planes.
In a huge air battle on 15 September the RAF shot down or disabled
185 German aircraft. The last large daylight attack occurred on 27
September, and by the end of October the Luftwaffe had obviously
given up its mission of knocking out the RAF.

Although the exact date of the planned invasion of Britain is not
known, the whole operations was postponed on 17 September of 1940.
In view of the heavy losses sustained by both the Luftwaffe and the
concentrations of German invasion craft on 15 September, that date is
set as the defeat of Operation Sea Lion.² The German Naval Staff had
difficulty in preparing for the invasion as outlined by Hitler to be
ready by August 15. Hence, the Navy delayed the operation a month,
until 14 September, at which time the weather was unsuitable. Ad-
miral Raeder told Hitler that after the middle of September the weather
in the Channel becomes bad for invasion purposes with fogs starting
in mid-October.³ It seems reasonable to assume that Hitler, realizing
that air supremacy was the key to Britain, demanded that the main in-
vasion attempt be made by 15 September after which air support of land
operations would have been unreliable. On 17 September Admiral Raeder
noted in his diary the indefinite postponement of Operation Sea Lion.⁴

1 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 323.

2 Ibid., p. 337; see also P. De Mendelssohn, Design for Aggression, p. 191.

3 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 304.

4 Ibid., pp. 310-11.

The final giving up of the plan to invade Great Britain took place in stages after its indefinite postponement on 17 September, 1940. Despite the fact that the invasion was formally called off on 12 October,¹ the war and armaments economy of Germany completed its preparations for the attack as ordered on 3 December, 1940. Reference to an invasion of England was to cease in favor of "...a seige of England," and the aerial defense of the German homeland was for the first time given top priority²---a tribute to the RAF victory. Although Hitler seemed undecided as to future action against Britain on 19 January, 1941 at a meeting with his Italian allies, he no longer thought of landing troops in England.³ Churchill traces the death of Sea Lion to July of 1941 when the Fuehrer again delayed it until spring of 1942 when he expected to have beaten the Soviet Union. German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop is quoted by the Japanese Ambassador to Germany as saying on 29 November, 1941 that invasion of Britain was unnecessary since Germany would smash the British Empire elsewhere.⁴ Finally, on 13 February, 1942, Raeder convinced Hitler that the whole project should be dropped.⁵

General Jodl, Chief of the German Armed Forces Operational Staff, admitted the reasons for the defeat of Operation Sea Lion in a speech to Nazi Party leaders in Munich on 7 November, 1943. Referring first to Germany's "hopeless inferiority at sea," Jodl said that, "The landing in England, prepared for down to the smallest detail but with impro-

¹ Ibid., p. 337.

² Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, IV, 1083.

³ Ciano, Diaries, p. 338.

⁴ intercepted diplomatic message, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VII, 160-63.

⁵ Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 337.

vised transport resources only, could not be dared while the British Air Arm had not yet been completely beaten. This we were not able to do...."¹ Nearly two years earlier, on 20 January, 1941, Hitler had admitted his dilemma and the importance of the British victory in 1940 to the military leaders of Germany and Italy. He said, "...we are in the position of a man with only one round left in his rifle; if he misses the situation is much worse than before. The landing cannot be repeated, since too much equipment would be lost in case of a failure."²

After Germany's defeat in the Battle of Britain, Hitler's craving sent the German war machine into motion toward the south and east. The attack plans for the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and the Soviet Union were conceived as Goering's Luftwaffe was failing. Instead of throwing his air power against Britain in the spring of 1941, Hitler used it briefly in the balkans and Crete and later to support his gigantic army of invasion in the U.S.S.R. The British victory in the summer and autumn of 1940, climaxed in the air on 15 September, saved Britain from invasion and possible conquest; moreover, it left friendly Britain supreme on the Atlantic between Germany and the Western Hemisphere.

1 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VII, 927-28.

2 Ibid., VI, 943; see also Ciano, Diaries, p. 338, entry of 19 January, 1941.

IV

THE GERMAN PLAN OF INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION

Germany's plan to conquer the U.S.S.R. was conceived as Britain defeated Hitler's Operation Sea Lion. Hence, the bulk of Germany's armed strength was thrust into the Russian vastness, and Britain, America's defensive bastion, was spared. In addition, the German scheme of seizing the Iberian Peninsula and jumping out onto the Atlantic Islands was also abandoned in favor of the drive eastward. U.S. leaders considered these islands vital to the defense of the Western Hemisphere and were prepared to fight to keep Germany out of them. Therefore, the German invasion of the Soviet Union made impossible offensive operations elsewhere which might have involved the United States in the war months before the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

Conflicting evidence makes difficult the establishment of the date when Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union. General Warlimont, Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces(OKW), said his superior, General Jodl, announced on 29 July, 1940 Hitler's intention to invade Russia. Plans were then¹ began concerning troop concentrations on the German-Soviet border. General Halder testified that Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, told him of Hitler's decision at the end of July or the beginning of August, 1940.² The Fuehrer, flushed with victory on the continent, probably anticipated an early triumph over Great Britain. This accounts for the fact that he decided to attack the Soviet Union

1 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supp. B, 1635; testimony at interrogation in Nuremberg on 12 October, 1945.

2 Ibid., Supp. B, 1566; testimony of 26 February, 1946.

before the fate of Operation Sea Lion was decided. The failure of the German Air Force not only wrecked Hitler's plan to invade Great Britain but also caused a greater concentration on the effort to achieve victory in the east.

After this initial decision planning and mobilization took place throughout 1940 and into 1941. The first directive for the operations was camouflaged under the title of "Aufbau Ost" and was issued in August of 1940, its purpose being physical preparation and deployment for the invasion. Actual attack on the Soviet Union was first mentioned as "Case Barbarossa" in Hitler's directive of 18 December, 1940.¹ Warlimont has testified that troop movements up to attack positions at the border began in February of 1941. Postponement of the date of attack from 15 May to 22 June occurred because of Germany's intervention in the Balkan war against Greece and Yugoslavia.²

A personal memorandum from Admiral Raeder to Admiral Assmann, dated 10 January, 1944³ gives insight into why Hitler turned the German war machine eastward. Raeder thought the Fuehrer's "general ideological attitude" was the underlying cause of the decision to attack the U.S.S.R. Raeder, who always stood for knocking out Britain as the principle enemy of Germany, tells how Hitler duped his own top Admiral into thinking that the large-scale movement of troops to the east was a camouflage for Operation Sea Lion.⁴ By 26 September, 1940, when Raeder had a personal talk with him, Hitler is said to have made the "unalterable decision" to strike at the Soviet Union regardless of the Admiral's advice.⁵ Raeder confirms, however, the conclusion that Germany's defeat in the air war for Britain in August

1 Ibid., III, 407-409.

2 Ibid., V, 741; affidavit of 21 November, 1945.

3 Ibid., VI, 887-92.

4 Ibid., VI, 888.

5 Ibid., VI, 889.

and September, 1940 caused Hitler to abandon the planned invasion of Britain and to concentrate upon his last continental opponent.

General Jodl testified at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials that all of Hitler's doubts about invading Russia before defeating Britain were overcome by the first of April, 1941 when he set 22 June as the invasion date.¹ The thinking of Germany's leaders is best revealed by the opening line of Hitler's "Directive No. 21, Case Barbarossa" of 18 December, 1940: "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England...."² The bulk of the Luftwaffe was to support the German Army while the remainder defended German Europe from air attack and maintained harassing raids upon Britain. Hitler had reverted to an air and sea war of attrition against British supplies and was about to carve out Lebensraum in the Heartland. Thus he would fulfill his ambitions as expressed in Mein Kampf and meet the demands of German geopolitics. What is more, Germany was forced to give up plans for breaking out into the Atlantic, gaining control of that Ocean, and threatening to attack the Western Hemisphere.

1 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, Proceedings, XV, 394.

2 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, III, 407.

V

THE GERMAN PLAN OF ATTACK THROUGH THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

A successful attack by Germany through the Iberian Peninsula would have had grave consequences for the United States and the Western Hemisphere. The fall of Gibraltar would have sealed off the Mediterranean to the British and have exposed northwest Africa to German attack. While Britain was forced to use the long, hazardous Cape route to supply the Middle East, the Axis might have achieved victory in Africa and the seizure of Suez. Moreover, as a result of a successful southwestward drive into the Iberian Peninsula and northwest Africa control of the Atlantic Islands, including Madeira, the Canaries, the Azores, and the Cape Verde Islands, would have become mandatory. Since these islands were considered defensive outposts of the Western Hemisphere by U.S. leaders, the United States most assuredly would have opposed any German move into them.

After Germany's sweeping continental victory in the spring of 1940 the British government feared a German attack on Gibraltar through Spain.¹ As a countermeasure the British held ready for nearly two years a complete task force to seize Spain's Canary Islands in order to carry on air and sea warfare against U-boats and to keep open the Cape route to the east.² By the beginning of 1941 Britain was ready to invoke the Anglo-Portuguese alliance of 1373 and occupy the Cape Verde Islands in case Spain allied herself with Germany.³

Prime Minister Churchill summarized the threat to the Western

1 W.S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 520. Apprehension grew after 27 June, 1940 when the German Army reached the Spanish border.

2 Ibid., p. 519.

3 Ibid., p. 625.

Hemisphere which would arise from a German seizure of power in north-west Africa as a consequence of having occupied Spain in a highly important letter to President Roosevelt on 8 December, 1940. There is evidence that this letter prompted the President to conceive and propose the lend-lease act. Churchill described the result of possible full cooperation by the Vichy French government with Germany: "If the French Navy were to join the Axis, the control of West Africa would pass immediately into their hands, with the gravest consequences to our communications between the Northern and Southern Atlantic, and also affecting Dakar and of course thereafter South America."¹ Thus, we see outlined the menace to the Western Hemisphere from an alternate German move, that of extorting from Vichy the use of the French Navy or bases on the French African coast. It is obvious that this move would also make necessary a German attack upon the Atlantic Islands paralleling the coastline.

Hitler's top secret Directive No. 18, dated 12 November, 1940 describes the plan of attack southwestward.² Spain was to be brought into the war as an Axis ally. German forces were then to intervene in the Iberian Peninsula (code name Felix) in order to capture Gibraltar, to close the Iberian Peninsula to Britain, and to bar the Atlantic Islands to Britain. The latter could only be accomplished, thought Hitler, by a German occupation of the islands, and preparations for such a move were prerequisite to any German attack through Spain. Both Goering³ and Jodl⁴ have testified that detailed plans were worked out in the fall of 1940 for the attack through Spain upon Gibraltar.

1 Ibid., p. 562.

2 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI, 957-60.

3 testimony at interrogation at Nuremberg on 29 August, 1945; Ibid., Supp. B, 1109.

4 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, Proceedings, XV, 371.

Probably the most important reason why Germany did not fulfill the aims outlined by Hitler in his Directive No. 18 is the fact that the necessary military strength was diverted elsewhere. By March, 1941 the Axis attack eastward in northern Africa toward Suez (Operation Sonnenblume) had bogged down, and the Italians needed armored and motorized divisions. A huge concentration of forces was being built up in the east to be thrown against the U.S.S.R. In addition, the High Command had to assure victory in the Balkans. At a secret war planning conference held on 3 March, 1941 with Hitler and German military leaders present the Chief of the Army General Staff reported:

Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on Attila [code name for the intended occupation of Vichy France] can only be carried out under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements... Felix [code name for the attack on Gibraltar] is now no longer possible as the heavy artillery is being entrained.¹

It appears, therefore, that the magnitude of German military operations elsewhere, particularly against the Soviet Union, made any attack on Gibraltar, northwest Africa, or the Atlantic Islands impossible.

A second reason why Germany did not attack southwestward was that Spain refused to cooperate with Germany, an essential condition of Hitler's Directive No. 18. This was attested to by General Jodl in a secret speech to Nazi Party leaders in Munich on 7 November, 1943.² Toward the end of August, 1940 Germany began efforts to bring Spain into the war as an ally. General Franco's demands, however, included full partnership status within the Axis, modern arms for the

1 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, III, 630.

2 Ibid., VII, 928.

Spanish Army, commodities such as petroleum and cereals which war-ravaged, hungry Spain was then buying from the Western Powers, and the territorial gains of Gibraltar, Morocco, and Oran district of Algeria. The negotiations dragged along until 19 September when Ribbentrop became sure that Spanish intervention was imminent.¹ A week later, however, Hitler apparently gave up Operation Felix, for Ciano was told by the Fuehrer in Berlin that Germany opposed Spanish intervention "...because it would cost more than it is worth."² Apparently, the Fuehrer was convinced that he must have French cooperation to build his New Order in Europe. He was unwilling, therefore, to antagonize the Vichy regime or loosen its hold on French Africa by paying off Spain with French territory.³

By the end of 1940 Hitler was ready to send his army through Spain regardless of Franco's attitude. The Fuehrer wrote Mussolini on 31 December, 1940 deploring the Caudillo's reluctance to allow Germany to pass through the peninsula. Hitler complained of Franco's

1 Ciano, Diaries, p. 294; see also Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, IV, 478 for notes of a conference of Ribbentrop, Mussolini, and Ciano in Rome on 19 September, 1940.

2 Ciano, Diaries, p. 296.

3 Carlton J.H. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945 (N.Y., 1945), p. 64; Hayes concludes, after confidential talks with Spanish and Italian diplomats, that Franco was determined not to go to war or to permit passage of German troops since the Spanish people would not have stood for such a move. Hence, Franco merely temporized with Hitler's demands for immediate alliance and Spain's entry into the war in 1941; pp. 61-70. See also William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (N.Y., 1947), pp. 114 and 126-27; Langer's version, based on captured German records is that on 12 December, 1940 Franco told German Intelligence Chief, Admiral Canaris, that Spain would not enter the war. Franco reiterated this stand to Hitler by correspondence in February, 1941.

"naive" attitude in taking Allied "bribes" of food and oil to stay neutral. Said Hitler:

...from our side we had completed our preparations for crossing the Spanish frontier on January 10, and to attack Gibraltar at the beginning of February. I think success would have been relatively rapid. The troops picked for the operation have been specially chosen and trained. The moment the Straits of Gibraltar fell into our hands the danger of the French change-over in North and West Africa could be definitely eliminated.¹

It is apparent from this letter and the other evidence that Spanish opposition helped prevent the German attack through the Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and into northwest Africa. Franco told Mussolini in Rome in February, 1941 that it was the Spanish people as well as he, himself, who opposed the Germans.² However, the extent of German preparations to take Gibraltar in the winter of 1941, as outlined by Hitler in his letter to Mussolini, was shown by the appearance of German divebombers in the Mediterranean around 10 to 15 January, 1941. Strong German air attacks sunk the heavy cruiser Southampton and seriously damaged the carrier Illustrious and another cruiser.³ This air attack had been outlined in Hitler's original directive on 12 November, 1940.

Although thwarted by Spain and busy with war on other fronts German leaders still aimed at seizing Gibraltar in 1941. The High Command was confident of rapid victory over the Soviet Union, for it set forth the scheme of a great pincers movement about the Mediterranean: the capture of Asia Minor, the Middle East, and Suez while "...the seizure of Gibraltar with the active participation of Spain, must be

1 as quoted in Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 12.

2 W.D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time(N.Y., 1950), p. 19.

3 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 240-41.

executed in 1941."¹ Allied and American leaders had for some time expected such a move. In a memorandum to President Roosevelt, dated 10 January, 1941, Harry Hopkins described Churchill's estimate of the prospect: "He [Churchill] said he believed Hitler would not strike because the population is stirring and Hitler does not want sullen people around his armies---he has enough of that already---but the spring might tell a different story---and [he] left with the impression that Spain would be overrun in the spring."² U.S. Intelligence Chief, Colonel William J. Donovan, discussed with Hopkins the possibility of the attack in the spring of 1941.³ And U.S. Naval Intelligence uncovered information leading to the conclusion that Germany would occupy Spain and Portugal after victory in the Balkans. Typical German tools of psychological warfare came into use as German radio propaganda became anti-Portuguese and accused the United States of wanting to annex the Azores. Spanish nationalism was fanned in Madrid with the slogan "Sea to Sea."⁴ To meet the threat Dr. Salazar asked Portugal's ally, Great Britain, to protect the Azores and Cape Verde Islands. He also shifted part of the Portuguese Army to the Azores and prepared to move there with his government if Germany should attack.

Hitler's regret over the failure to seize the Iberian Peninsula is demonstrated in an extract from Admiral Assmann's diary entry of 12-14 May, 1943.⁵ In a discussion of U-boat warfare the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, Admiral Doenitz, said that a new Allied

1 letter of the German Navy Staff to Commanding Generals in Groups West, North, and South, 8 August, 1941; International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, Proceedings, VII, 343.

2 as quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 239.

3 Ibid., p. 283.

4 S.E. Morison, op. cit., p. 66.

5 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supp. A, 1025.

detection device (high frequency radar) made necessary the occupation of Spain and Portugal to secure more advance submarine bases. "To this the Fuehrer says that this was still possible in 1940 carrying Spain along with us, but that our forces are not sufficient for this purpose now against Spain's will...."¹

Though hindered by insufficient military strength and Spanish resistance Germany still made efforts to break out into the Atlantic through the southwest. The Vichy collaborationist, Admiral Darlan, Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy, reached a negotiated agreement with Germany on 28 May, 1948.² The agreement would have allowed German use of French installations in Tunisia, and the port of Dakar was to be made available as a supply base for German submarines, surface raiders, and aircraft. Because of strong pressure applied through Admiral Leahy, U.S. Ambassador to the Vichy government, and the opposition of General Weygand, Darlan failed to win over the Vichy Cabinet despite Hitler's threat that Germany would take French Africa by force through Spain if France turned down the arrangement.³ Apparently, Germany was planning to seize the African bases after the Russian front had been "stabilized."⁴ After a conversation on 4 November of 1941 with Marshall Petain Admiral Leahy was convinced that the aged Chief of State at Vichy wanted to prevent this move but was powerless to do so. With France prone before the conqueror and Spain's military strength of questionable character Germany still would not march into

1 Ibid., Supp. A, 1025.


2 text in Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, Appendix II, pp. 402-412.

3 Hull, Memoirs, II, 962-63.

4 W.D. Leahy, I Was There, p. 57.

the peninsula. One concludes that the major factor preventing a German drive southwestward must have been the magnitude of her tremendous offensive against the Soviet Union. Because Germany could not take Spain, Portugal or French Africa, it was impossible for her to make a thrust out into the Atlantic Islands as Hitler had contemplated in the fall of 1940.

CONVOY ROUTES



Iceland and the Atlantic Islands dominate the vital supply lines.

Map after War Department Bureau of Public Relations, The Background of Our War (N.Y., 1942), p. 103.

VI

THE GERMAN PLAN OF ATTACK UPON THE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

Before proceeding with a discussion of German plans of seizing certain islands in the Atlantic Ocean one must note the reasons behind such a move.

German military leaders considered the conquest or occupation of the Atlantic Islands as an integral part of both Operation Felix and the plan to occupy or conquer northwest Africa. Having closed the Straits of Gibraltar to the British, German air and sea forces operating from the islands would cut British supply lines and attack convoy assembly points near the island outposts. In addition, the newly acquired bases at sea might be used to operate the Luftwaffe against the United States "...in order to pin down the latter's air defenses."¹ Certainly, Goering had long wished to be able to bomb the United States, his secret speech to German aircraft manufacturers in 1938² being the earliest occasion of such an expressed desire. The Luftwaffe would undoubtedly have played a major role in any operations based on the islands in view of Britain's supremacy on the seas. It must also be recalled that these islands lie close to South America and may have served as a springboard for a German invasion of the New World.

But it is by no means certain whether German aircraft operating from these eastern Atlantic Islands could have held down U.S. air defenses. The reason for this incapacity lies in the nature of the German Air Force, itself, which was built primarily to support the German Army in a concentrated, "blitz," type series of campaigns in

1 as quoted from an unidentified German source in S.E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, p. 34.

2 see pp. 30-31 in Chapter II of this paper.

a two-year war. It is true that in 1940 and 1941 German **aircraft** sunk many ships and did valuable reconnaissance for U-boats in the Atlantic. But Germany did not have the aircraft types needed for a long-range protracted aerial war.¹ Furthermore, by 1941 its long-range bombers were fighting in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the southern Arctic Ocean as well as in the Atlantic. To have operated from the Atlantic Island bases over vast distances and to have tied down even the aerial defenses of the most advanced U.S. bases would seem to have been a physical impossibility for the Luftwaffe.

The only exception to this statement appears to be the sporadic long-range reconnaissance flights to Greenland undertaken by the Luftwaffe from bases in Norway. This three thousand mile trip stretched to the limit the range of German bombers, and it did not greatly occupy American aerial defenses. Had Germany occupied Iceland, as indeed her leaders contemplated in 1940 and 1941,² aerial attacks upon the continent of North America would have been possible. This eventuality was, however, prevented by British and American occupation of Iceland.

The first reference in German sources to the possibility of a German attack upon the Atlantic Islands is found in a letter from Major von Falkenstein to General von Waldau, Air Forces Operations Staff, dated 29 October, 1940. In it Falkenstein tells his replacement about current and pending war plans. Spain is pictured as being non-cooperative and not willing to allow German troops passage in order to attack Gibraltar. Nevertheless, Operation Felix had not yet been dropped, and German intelligence agents were soon to leave for spying

1 Asher Lee, The German Air Force, p. 206.

2 see General Jodl's secret speech to Nazi Party leaders in Munich on 7 November, 1943 in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VII, 172.

in Spain. Indeed, all future operational plans, including those against the U.S.S.R., Greece, Crete, and the British in North Africa, seemed to be standing still while Hitler pondered a new campaign:

The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of the war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here [the Luftwaffe operational planning section]. Essential conditions are at the present:---

- a. No other operational commitment,
- b. Portuguese neutrality,
- c. Support of France and Spain.

A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and the question of supply is needed from GAF German Air Force.¹

Falkenstein then mentions plans for compilation of the information necessary to make the estimates asked by Hitler.

In Hitler's Directive No. 18,² dated 12 November, 1940 we find that the Fuehrer's thinking has now ripened to the point where he actually was ready to send an occupying force far out to sea:

As a result of operation 'Gibraltar', the Atlantic Islands (in particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain increased importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, as well as for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy and Air Force are examining how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.

I also request that the question of the occupation of Madeira and the Azores be examined and also the advantages and disadvantages that would arise from this for the conduct of the war at sea and in the air. The results of this examination are to be given to me as soon as possible.³

General Jodl has testified that the occupation of the Atlantic Islands was "...a thing the Fuehrer always wanted to do...."⁴ But Jodl claimed that the operation was considered only "in theory" since the Navy, the

1 Ibid., III, 288-90.

2 Ibid., III, 403-407.

3 Ibid., III, 405; unfortunately, the conclusions of Hitler's military planners regarding the feasibility of such an operation are not available in detail.

4 International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, Proceedings, XV, 397.

Armed Forces Operational Staff(Jodl's command), and the High Command of the Armed Forces(Keitel's command) all definitely rejected the idea.

It appears, however, that Hitler did not give up the intention. In spite of advice by Admiral Raeder that Britain still held sea supremacy, the Fuehrer continued to demand action by the Navy and thereby caused friction and agitation between himself and Raeder. He is said to have become very strained and nervous at the failures of the German Navy. According to Raeder, Hitler demanded "...impossible or too far-reaching political-military plans, as especially before the war with Russia and in connection with the demand for occupation of islands and bases in the Atlantic(Azores, Cape Verde, and the Canary Island)."¹

Both Hitler's determination to take the islands and the military impossibility of doing so in view of other operational commitments are shown by events during the spring of 1941. The timetable of preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, prepared by the High Command of the Armed Forces, made the following claim regarding the islands: "Attila [i.e., the planned occupation of all France and French Africa] or...Isabella [seizure of Spain and the Azores] can be executed at ten days' warning (this holds good also for the air force)."² Thus, twenty-one days before Germany hurled one hundred twenty-five divisions against the Soviet Union we find the OKW making a claim of strength which appears aimed only at mollifying Hitler's desire to take the Atlantic Islands. For Germany had only forty-two divisions and little armor in the west at the time of the invasion of the U.S.S.R.

1 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VIII, 716; from Raeder's "My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to the Party," written in Moscow in fall, 1945; text on pp. 707-35.

2 Ibid., VI, 859.

And the Chief of the Army General Staff had said three months earlier on 3 March, 1941 at a secret war planning session which Hitler attended that the planned attack upon Gibraltar, a vital preliminary move in Hitler's scheme of jumping out to the Atlantic Islands, was impossible because the artillery had been shifted to the eastern front.¹ The occupation of Vichy France and French North and West Africa, "Attila," was at the same time called difficult. It seems legitimate to assume, therefore, that three more months of break-neck mobilization directed to the east could not have made any of the auxiliary, southwestward operations less difficult.

1 Ibid., III, 630.

VII

SUSPICIONS OF A GERMAN PLAN OF ATTACK ON THE NEW WORLD
AND COUNTERMEASURES TO MEET IT

It is not only from German sources that one can determine the policy of Germany toward the Western Hemisphere. The governments of the United States and other American nations had at their disposal sources of secret information upon which they based their evaluation of German policy. Since their decisions indicate considerable suspicion of Germany's motives and the undertaking of defense measures against possible German attack, one assumes that these governments were sure such an attack was being contemplated. These governments were responsible to their peoples for the maintainance of the territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of their respective states. Should war come to the traditionally neutral Americas, each government should have discharged its responsibility of anticipating the attack and fending it off.

As early as 1937 the United States government began to realize the danger to the democratic way of life in this hemisphere caused by the rise of powerful totalitarian states in Europe. The conviction within the administration grew that Germany, intent on world conquest, would attack the Western Hemisphere. President Roosevelt's first public statement of this fear was his famous "quarantine" speech in Chicago on 6 October, 1937. Referring to the reign of terror in Spain and the horrors resulting from German and Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War, he said:

If those things come to pass in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that it may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and arts of

civilization....

It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to¹ protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

By the next summer Roosevelt was ready to assure Canada that the United States would not tolerate any change in her status in the British Commonwealth of Nations. In a speech on 18 August, 1938 the President said: "The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will stand by idly if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire."² Roosevelt struck out at the smug isolationism so common at the time:

We in the Americas are no longer a far-away continent, to which the eddies of controversies beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm. Instead, we in the Americas have become a consideration to every propaganda office and to every general staff beyond the seas. The vast amount of our resources, the vigor of our commerce and the strength of our men have made us vital factors in world peace whether we choose it or not.³

Shortly after he delivered this address Roosevelt was in his railroad car at Rochester, Minnesota listening to Hitler's speech from Nuremberg on 12 July, 1938. Greatly aroused by the Fuehrer's sword-rattling outburst, the President ordered his aide, Harry Hopkins, to go to the west coast immediately and survey the aircraft industry with a view to its expansion for war production. Hopkins made a careful and quiet evaluation and reported to Roosevelt who told him⁴ that he

"...was sure then that we were going to get into the war and he be-

¹ Peace and War, pp. 384 and 386.

² Hull, Memoirs, I, 588; quotation from Roosevelt's speech.

³ Ibid., I, 589.

⁴ Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 99-100.

lieved that air power would win it." The time of this decision can be estimated at fall or winter of 1938.

Secretary of State Hull, at this same time, was aware of real and imminent danger to the Western Hemisphere. It will be recalled that evidence of German penetration into Latin America began to accumulate in the late '30's. Hull feared German efforts to seize control of South America, not merely by military invasion, but also through propaganda, the organization of fifth column political parties, and by espionage. Hitler had employed the same techniques in Austria and the Sudetenland prior to their annexation, and Hull was informed that similar methods were being used in South America.¹

Shortly after the German Army rolled into Poland and touched off the second World War, President Roosevelt called a special session of Congress to make changes in the Neutrality Act. The administration sought repeal of the arms embargo and the right to prohibit U.S. ships from entering the zones of conflict. Passage of the former would greatly aid the enemies of Germany. In the public debate over the issue Henry L. Stimson, later a bulwark of the wartime government, gave the reason for such an abandonment of strict neutrality. In a radio address on 5 October, 1939 he said that if Germany defeated Britain and France, the war would "...become our own battle." Repeal of the arms embargo "...would help prevent a subsequent attack upon us and our hemisphere in case the dictators should win this war."² Apparently, Congress saw the impending danger to the New World, for on 3 November, 1939 it made the suggested changes in the neutrality statute.³

1 Hull, Memoirs, I, 602.

2 New York Times, 6 October, 1939, p. 15; text of speech.

3 Jones and Myers, Documents on American Foreign Relations, II, 656-69.

When Germany overran the low countries, Denmark, Norway, and France, a new sense of urgency gripped Hull and Roosevelt. The President became convinced that if Germany could defeat Great Britain, Hitler would immediately assemble a huge fleet and attack the Western Hemisphere, probably in South America.¹ Hull spoke out vigorously on 13 May against isolationism in the face of the great danger:

I am profoundly convinced that [the Axis] menaces the civilized existence of mankind---of every nation and of every individual... Our own nation...is not secure against that menace. We cannot shut it out by attempting to isolate and insulate ourselves. We cannot be certain of safety and security when a large part of the world...is dominated by forces of international lawlessness.²

Three days later President Roosevelt told Congress that the speed, surprise, and striking power of mechanized warfare endangered the New World. Prophetically, Roosevelt listed several points from which air attack could be undertaken: Greenland, the Azores, Bermuda, the Lesser Antilles, and the Cape Verde Islands.³ In view of the subsequent acquisition of control over these areas it is clear that the United States actually acted out of the fears expressed by the President. Keeping in mind Germany's desire to capture such Atlantic bases and, later, the cataclysmic attack upon Pearl Harbor, one concludes that the apprehensions of Hull and Roosevelt seem to have been manifestly justified.

Secretary Hull became aware at this time that German subversive groups were reaching for power in South America just as the German Army rolled westward in Europe. British and U.S. intelligence reports showed that the small, weak, but strategically located state

1 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 125-26.

2 speech to the American Society of International Law on 13 May, 1940; Hull, Memoirs, I, 764-65.

3 text in Peace and War, p. 528.

of Uruguay was the center of the German effort to seize power. In June of 1940 the Uruguayan police broke up the plot and "...discovered a document in the home of a local Nazi leader indicating that Montevideo was to be the headquarters of a movement to fuse all South America into a world-wide Germany."¹

The hearings on the Senate confirmation of Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War in July, 1940 were another instance when the government's fear of a German attack was clarified. Stimson spoke as an official whose duty was to protect the territory and rights of the United States. He said that Germany's attack upon Britain endangered Canada, Newfoundland, and the heart of American industry. Because of air warfare Stimson would abandon the purely "defensive defense" and extend U.S. protective forces "...far out into the Atlantic Ocean to Puerto Rico, Bermuda, Newfoundland and Northeastern Canada." Seizure of any of these areas by Germany would jeopardize the Eastern seaboard of the United States. "As a result of these convictions on my part," said Stimson, "I feel that we are faced with an unprecedented peril."²

Again, on 26 October, 1940, Secretary Hull spoke of the grave menace to peaceful nations from states bent on "widespread domination or conquest" with no geographic or time limits on their programs of war. It must be recalled that triumphant Germany was master of Europe and knocking at the gates of England. Hull noted that Germany sought to gain control of the seas, and he told Americans that the ocean barriers might soon be turned into highways of invasion. The Axis

¹ Hull, Memoirs, I, 920.

² text of prepared statement to Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 2 July, 1940; N.Y. Times, 3 July, 1940, p. 12.

scheme of world conquest, according to Hull, was as follows:

Should the would-be conquerors gain control of other continents, they would next concentrate on perfecting their control of the seas, of the air over the seas, and of the world's economy; they might then be able with ships and with planes to strike at the communication lines, and the life of this hemisphere; and ultimately we might find ourselves compelled to fight on our own soil, under our own skies, in defense of our independence and our very lives....¹

Twice at the arrival of the new year Roosevelt spoke of the great danger to the Americas from a German victory in Europe. Axis control of all continents and seas would then result with "...all of us in the Americas...living at the point of a gun---a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military."² The President warned that an honorable peace with Germany was impossible since Nazism demanded total surrender. A week later he told the Congress that the United States faced an era of "unprecedented danger" in which emergency situations would have to be met.³

By spring of 1941 U.S. leaders were aware that Germany might strike southwestward through the Iberian Peninsula or into French Africa. Germany's plan of attack in that direction at the time has already been noted.⁴ Persistent reports came to the State Department concerning German ambitions in that direction.⁵ The President had been deeply concerned since before the outbreak of war in Europe with the possible seizure by Germany of bases in northwest Africa.⁶ On 24 April, 1941 Hull reiterated his charge that Germany had designs on the New World;

1 Peace and War, p. 588.

2 radio address of 29 December, 1940; Ibid., p. 601.

3 message to Congress of 6 January, 1941; Ibid., pp. 608-611.

4 see Chapter V of this paper.

5 Hull, Memoirs, pp. 939-40.

6 John G. Winant, Letter From Grosvenor Square: An Account of a Stewardship (Boston, 1947), pp. 248-49; see also W. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 222 and Hull, Memoirs, I, 804.

he had evidence, he said, which had piled up over several years pointing to that conclusion. German plans of world domination inevitably included the wealth and freedom of the Western Hemisphere as a prime target.¹ And Secretary of the Navy Knox re-echoed the fears of the chief executive in a speech on the same day in New York City. Should Germany secure from conquered France the use of Dakar, he said, "... her surface ships, submarines and long-range bombers...could substantially cut us off from all commerce with South America and make the Monroe Doctrine a scrap of paper."²

Two weeks later, Secretary of War Stimson spoke by radio to the American people and told them in clear, simple terms the nation's defensive policy and the reasons for its necessity. Germany, he said, was avowedly out to conquer the world. She was steadily encircling the Western Hemisphere and was building strategic airlines in South America which could easily be used to bomb the Panama Canal. Her armed forces might at any time seize West Africa and jump off to Brazil. Only the control of the seas, said Stimson, could secure the New World from attack. The friendly but weak buffer states of Canada and Latin America might not be able to prevent the establishment of German airbases from which U.S. industry might be devastated. Americans might have to die to preserve their freedom.³ The President had approved Stimson's speech in advance as indicative of the administration's viewpoint.⁴

1 address of 24 April, 1941 to the American Society of International Law; Peace and War, p. 650.

2 text of address of 24 April, 1941; N.Y. Times, 25 April, 1941, p. 10.

3 text of radio address of 6 May, 1941; N.Y. Times, 7 May, 1941, p. 14; two days later the Times published the results of a survey of nineteen large U.S. dailies; all had supported Stimson's viewpoint.

4 Henry L. Stimson and M. Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (N.Y., 1947), p. 370.

The firmness of the administration's stand against Germany's military operations is shown by Roosevelt's message to Congress on 20 June, 1941 in which he described the action of the government resulting from the unwarranted sinking on 21 May of the Robin Moor. He charged Hitler's government with trying to frighten nations into surrendering to German attempts at universal conquest. He warned, "The Government of the German Reich may however be assured that the United States will neither be intimidated nor will it acquiesce in the plans for world-domination which the present leaders of Germany may have."¹

A week after the sinking occurred Roosevelt took another step toward meeting Germany's challenge. He told the American people on 27 May, 1941 that Hitler had always intended to conquer Europe in order to dominate the world. Germany planned to enslave South America just as she had the Balkans. By economic warfare and threats Germany, said Roosevelt, would "strangle" Canada and the United States after she had taken Latin America. Her advance must be "forcibly checked" or else the New World would be within range of her weapons. Declaring an unlimited national emergency, Roosevelt reasserted the solidarity of the American democracies. He had ordered the strategic deployment of the armed forces in order to actively resist any German attempt to attack or gain bases from which to attack the Western Hemisphere.²

The government's stand was then made clear to Japanese envoy Konoye who asked whether it was "...really the intention of the President or the American Government to intervene in the European War." Hull replied on 16 July, 1941 that "...our policy toward Nazi Germany's movement of world conquest was solely that of self-defense...." and

1 Peace and War, p. 676.

2 Ibid., pp. 662-72.

that Germany would not be allowed to gain advantages which threatened American security.¹ The measures undertaken to meet the German threat were outlined in Roosevelt's radio address of 11 September, 1941 when he said the U.S. would shoot-on-sight the "rattlesnakes of the Atlantic." This was necessary to defeat the German plan of control of the seas and "...domination of the United States and Western Hemisphere by force"²

On 9 October, 1941 the President told Congress that Germany planned actual warfare within the United States: "I say solemnly that if Hitler's present military plans are brought to a successful fulfillment, we Americans shall be forced to fight in a defense of our own homes and our freedom in a war as costly and as devastating as that which now rages on the Russian front...." Roosevelt said that the United States defense policy was based on maintaining the security, integrity, and honor of the country against "...domination by any foreign power which has become crazed with a desire to control the world."³

As tension between the United States and Germany grew stronger, two Cabinet members warned the American people of the great danger. In a speech at Providence, Rhode Island on 11 November, 1941 Secretary of the Navy Knox said Germany had from the beginning of the war pursued "...a well defined plan and purpose to establish, by force of arms, a world-wide dominion...." He warned, "...we are met here in the presence of grave dangers. It is impossible to overemphasize or exaggerate them. We are...confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic...."⁴ The same day, Under-

1 Hull, Memoirs, II, 1012.

2 Peace and War, p. 739.

3 Ibid., pp. 765.

4 Ibid., pp. 777 and 779.

secretary of State Welles drew a picture in vivid terms of the peril confronting America:

Beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror has reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom. It is his boast that his system shall prevail even unto the ends of the earth....

Can we afford again to refrain from lifting a finger until gigantic forces of destruction threaten all of modern civilization, and the raucous voice of a criminal paranoic, speaking as the spokesman for these forces from the cellar of a Munich beer hall, proclaims as his set purpose the destruction of our own security, and the annihilation of religious liberty, of political liberty, and of economic liberty throughout the world ?¹

A more forceful statement by a responsible U.S. official of the fear of a German attack against the Western Hemisphere does not exist.

Less than a month before Germany's declaration of war upon the United States Secretary of State Hull summed up the whole development of the suspicion that Germany would attack the Western Hemisphere. He said: "When Hitler started on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes, and with unlimited invasion objectives, the United States from then on was in danger, and that danger has grown each week until this minute. This country has recognized the danger and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too late."²

We have seen that Germany's sweeping victories in the spring of 1940 caused great anxiety within the administration. Steadily, a conviction grew that the Western Hemisphere's freedom from German attack depended upon the continued resistance by Britain and the control of the Atlantic by the British Navy. Germany's attack on the Americas, it was felt, would probably start in South America where U.S. naval power would be hard pressed to hold its own against the

combined naval might of German Europe. Hence, the decision was made

1 address in Washington on 11 November, 1941; Ibid., pp. 785 and 787.

2 conference at the White House of Hull, Roosevelt, Nomura, and Kuru-su on 17 November, 1941; Hull, Memoirs, II, 1064.

to aid Britain as a foe of Germany in order further to safeguard the New World.

Late in May of 1940 Secretary of State Hull and State Department experts concluded that German victories in Europe had put the Allies in a desperate position. It was vital that the British and French fleets not fall to Germany. With them Germany might dominate the Atlantic and the United States' one-ocean fleet would be easily surpassed. If the Pacific fleet were moved to the Atlantic to hold off Germany, Japan "...would inevitably swallow the whole of Southeast Asia."¹ On 18 June, 1940 Henry L. Stimson announced this decision to the American people with President Roosevelt's approval. He was convinced that Britain and France were fighting for the United States and that a German victory would be "...an appalling prospect." Only the British fleet, said Stimson, stood between Hitler and the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, the United States should do its utmost to maintain British rule of the seas.²

The first major step implementing the policy of aiding Britain as an enemy of Germany was the destroyers-for-bases trade, an executive agreement signed on 2 September, 1940. Britain was straining all its resources to beat off Germany's Operation Sea Lion and the U-boat attacks against her sea lifelines. She needed destroyers desperately for convoy and coastal defense duty. The United States agreed to the transaction to meet Britain's needs and to "...enhance the national security of the United States and greatly strengthen its ability to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the

1 Ibid., I, 771.

2 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 318 ff.

defense of the Americas of the Western Hemisphere."¹ Fifty overage and reconditioned U.S. destroyers were exchanged for the eight Atlantic and Caribbean bases described in Chapter I of this paper. In addition, ten 250-foot Coast Guard cutters, well suited for convoy duty, were included by the United States.

Three months after this unprecedented act of national defense was consummated President Roosevelt took pains to make clear to the American people the reason for the policy of aid to Britain. At a press conference on 16 December, 1940 the President claimed hopefully that "...a very overwhelming number of Americans [think] that the best immediate defense of the United States is the success of Britain in defending itself."² Two weeks later, as we have noted, Roosevelt warned that German lawlessness placed the country in an unparalleled danger. America's ability to keep out of war, he said, would depend on the survival of Great Britain as the spearhead of democratic opposition to the Axis movement of world conquest. Realistic military policy demanded that U.S. security be protected by supplying arms to Germany's enemies. He called for iron determination and unstinted effort to produce arms so that the country would become "the arsenal of democracy" and stave off Axis victory and resulting slavery.³

While this kind of plain talk was aimed at the American people in 1940, more tangible evidence of the U.S. policy was forthcoming in the form of arms aid to the Allies. Eighty-five percent of U.S. arms exports in 1940, amounting to some \$280,000,000, were sold to

1 Hull to British Ambassador Lothian, 2 September, 1940; Peace and War, p. 567.

2 as quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 225.

3 radio address of 29 December, 1940; Peace and War, pp. 599-608. see also Hull, Memoirs, II, 919.

Canada, Britain and France.¹ Export controls on the latest U.S. war-planes were lifted and all such planes were allowed to be flown out of the United States for delivery. Hard-pressed Britons gained arms lost at Dunkirk when the Attorney General ruled that technically obsolete war materiel could be sold to private buyers in the United States for resale to Britain. A priority was awarded for the production of twelve thousand warplanes for Britain, and a huge program of cargo ship construction for Britain was begun.

The passage of the lend-lease act on 11 March, 1941 indicated that Congress now realized the need for protecting the hemisphere by aiding the foes of Germany. Shortly thereafter, \$7,000,000,000 was appropriated to meet the end sought by the law, "...to Promote the Defense of the United States."² Our attention, however, is directed to the compelling reasons for the need of such legislation as revealed in the testimony of administration leaders at the Congressional hearings on the bill. Hull said that a German victory over Great Britain would make it easy for her to invade South America. It was imperative "...in our own vital interest, to give Great Britain and other victims of attack the maximum of material aid in the shortest possible space of time."³ Secretary of the Navy Knox explained that the Axis naval power would outrank by three times the strength of the United States

1 according to the table of monthly reports of the National Munitions Control Board printed W.H. Shepardson and W.O. Scroggs, The United States in World Affairs, 1940(N.Y., 1941), p. 337.

2 Jones and Myers, Documents on American Foreign Relations, III, 720.

3 statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 15 January, 1951; Peace and War, p. 616.

Navy should Britain fall. He thought Germany would immediately seek bases in the New World, perhaps in South America, from which to attack the United States. To oppose this great German threat, said Knox, "...we should now prevent Germany from overturning the British sea power which holds the Nazis in Europe."¹ Former Ambassador to France, William C. Bullitt, presented the arithmetic of inadequate U.S. sea power to Congress. "If the British Navy should be eliminated, we would still have a one-ocean Navy but we should have two oceans to defend." The defeat of the British would herald an attack on the Panama Canal thus immobilizing the fleet and making it impossible to meet aggression on either seaboard. Fifth columns would seize power in South America, said Bullitt; it would be impossible to prevent the bombing of the Panama Canal from German bases in Latin America or from aircraft carriers at sea.²

After the huge program of lend-lease got under way, Secretary of State Hull vigorously defended the administration's policy of halting Germany before she controlled Europe, Africa, and the high seas. Aid for Britain was vital since only British resistance and sea power kept aggressive Germany from the Western Hemisphere. Hull struck out at those who depended on the Atlantic Ocean to halt Germany:

The reason why the English Channel has not been successfully crossed is that the British have maintained control of that Channel. Forty million determined Britons in a heroic resistance have converted their island into a huge armed base out of which proceeds a steady stream of sea and air power. It is not water that bars the way. It is the resolute determination of British sea power and British arms. Were the control of the seas by the resisting nations lost, the Atlantic would no longer be an obstacle---rather, it would become a broad highway for a conqueror moving westward. Our protection would be enormously lessened.³

1 text of statement of 17 January, 1941 in N.Y. Times, 18 January, 1941, p. 4 ; see also text of statement of 31 January, 1941, Ibid., 1 February, 1941, p. 6.

2 text of statement of 25 January, 1941, Ibid., 26 January, 1941, p. 5.

3 address of 24 April, 1941; Peace and War, pp. 650-51.

As Germany conquered the Balkans and drove into the Soviet Union Secretary Stimson feared that Hitler had finally approached victory over all free nations save those of the New World. He urged President Roosevelt in a confidential memorandum on 3 July, 1941 that the United States should "...add...every effort, physical and spiritual as well as material, to the efforts of those free nations who are still fighting for freedom in this world...."¹ Roosevelt, however, did not endorse this viewpoint since, in effect, it called for a declaration of war by the United States in order to aid Britain and the other enemies of Hitler.

The formulation of the Atlantic Charter by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt during the early days of August, 1941 demonstrates that the United States was assuming a semi-belligerent status alongside Great Britain against Germany. The "common principles" agreed on were, in fact, a peace program anomalously agreed to by a technically neutral United States. This was an important step forward by the administration in bolstering Britain in order to defend the Western Hemisphere.

The signing of the Atlantic Charter, however, was only a public manifestation of the Anglo-American concord. Combined defense measures with Great Britain dated back to the summer of 1940 when U.S. military "observers" were sent for exploratory conversations. The fundamental decision was reached that, should the United States become involved in the war against the Axis, Germany should be defeated first. Arrange-

1 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp. 372-73.

ments were made for the exchange of military and technical information. Meanwhile, the War Plans Division of the U.S. Navy was planning measures to be taken in event America went to war. On 29 January, 1941 the first secret Anglo-American military staff conversations began. Their culmination was the "ABC-1 Staff Agreement" of 27 March, 1941. While this was not a secret military alliance, it was an understanding of both British and American military responsibilities in event of U.S. involvement in the war. There were, however, stipulations that collaboration and planning should continue despite the neutral status of the United States; that the maintainance of the security of the United Kingdom and of the Western Hemisphere and the control of the Atlantic were the prime strategic objectives; and that intelligence data should be exchanged. Again, it should be emphasized that most of this staff agreement would not become operative unless the United States became involved in the war. The immediately operating aspects of the agreement were meant to aid Britain against Germany in order further to safeguard the United States and the Western Hemisphere.¹

In accordance with the ABC-1 Staff Agreement the United States Navy War Plans Division set 1 April, 1941 as the date of readiness to take over convoy duty in the Atlantic. Germany's U-boats were sinking supply ships at such a great rate that it was feared Britain's ability to resist Germany might be irreparably harmed. Convoy duty might involve firing upon attacking U-boats, but this consequence the administration was apparently willing to risk. Vessels for the new Atlantic

¹ S.E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, I, 40-49. Morison's account is based on documents found in Joint Congressional Committee on Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15.

Patrol were taken from the Neutrality Patrol¹ and forty-eight aircraft were assigned to the task. It was first necessary, though, to establish a base far out in the Atlantic.

The U.S. occupation force arrived in Iceland on 7 July, 1941. A naval base was built near Reykjavik and Task Force 1 was organized to protect Iceland and "...to escort convoys of United States and Iceland flag shipping, including shipping of any nationality which may join such United States or Iceland flag convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland...and to provide protection for convoys in the North Atlantic Ocean as may be required by the strategic situation."² The catchall wording of the Operation Plan made it possible for Allied ships to "join" the convoys maintained by the neutral United States for belligerent Britain.

Later, the U.S. Navy began convoying belligerent vessels to and from the meridians of Iceland at mid-ocean meeting points where British escorts picked up or left off ships for voyage to or from North America. Admiral King's Operation Plan No. 7 of 1 September, 1941 authorized this new arrangement which greatly aid the thin and hard-pressed escort resources of Britain and Canada.³ The first such escort made up of American warships was based on the new naval installation at Argentia, Newfoundland and met its convoy at sea on 16 September, 1941. It guided them without incident to the mid-ocean meeting point with the Royal Navy south of Iceland. From there the U.S. vessels peeled off with the Iceland bound cargo ships to Reykjavik.

Throughout the fall of 1941 these operations continued as a

1 the Neutrality Patrol will be discussed under U.S. and Pan-American defense measures later in this chapter.

2 Cinclant Operation Plan 6, 19 July, 1941 as quoted in S.E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, I, 78.

3 Ibid., I, 84-85.

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3 Ibid., I, 84-85.

means of protecting valuable shipping bound to and from Britain. The length to which the United States would go to aid Germany's enemies is demonstrated by the convoying in American transports of over 20,000 British soldiers from Canada to Capetown, South Africa. The U.S. vessels, including the three largest ships in the United States Merchant Marine and eighteen warships, left Halifax, Nova Scotia on 10 November, 1941 and did not return until after Germany had declared war upon the United States.¹

As a result of this unneutral aid in the form of convoys of British supplies and the patrol activity of U.S. vessels in North Atlantic waters, there soon began actual combat with German naval vessels. The first of the incidents occurred on 4 September, 1941 when the destroyer Greer engaged a German U-boat off Iceland. The result was Roosevelt's "shoot-on-sight" speech in which the President denounced the "rattlesnakes of the Atlantic" who, he said, had violated U.S. defensive waters. Roosevelt's orders to the Navy and subsequent Congressional action on 17 November,² authorizing the arming of U.S. merchantmen to resist U-boat attacks, are evidence that the German opposition to the policy of aiding Britain drove the United States to further measures of safeguarding the Western Hemisphere and its waters. Moreover, the aid to Germany's enemies and the vigorous defensive measures undertaken are real evidence of the validity of Hitler's complaint to Ribbentrop that America had "...been a forceful factor in this war...."³

1 Ibid., I, 74-81.

2 Jones and Myers, Documents on American Foreign Relations, IV, 112.

3 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supp. B, 1199.

In addition to the aid given by the United States to Britain as Germany's enemy many diplomatic and military countermeasures were planned and executed in order to defend the Western Hemisphere. In a sense, the administration's pointed efforts at arousing public awareness of the danger of German attack may be considered as defensive mobilization. However, we are concerned here with the actual conduct of foreign relations and military policy in a manner obviously meant to prevent or defeat any attempt by Germany to attack or dominate the Western Hemisphere. The most comprehensible organization of this material appears to be roughly chronological since it thus follows the parallel and increasing intensity of the German menace.

The first guarantee of defensive military action given by the U.S. government to withstand attack by Germany was contained in President Roosevelt's address at Kingston, Ontario on 18 August, 1938. The President told Canadians, as has been noted, that the United States would not allow Canada to be snatched from under Britain's wing by another empire.¹ It was in the summer of 1940 when victorious Germany dominated Europe that this guarantee began to be translated into actual military preparations. On 18 August, 1940 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King signed the "Ogdensburg Agreement" setting up a Permanent Joint Board of Defense to "...consider in a broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere."² A conference of military advisors and political leaders on 20 April, 1941 led to far-reaching agreements on wartime economic cooperation between the two countries and the granting of bases in Newfoundland and Labrador to the United States Navy.³

1 Jones and Myers, Documents on American Foreign Relations, I, 25.

2 Ibid., III, 161.

3 Ibid., III, 151-52, 227-28.

As an outgrowth of the outbreak of war in Europe President Roosevelt on 5 September, 1939 ordered the U.S. Navy to establish a Neutrality Patrol. The Navy was to locate, follow and report all belligerent war vessels and aircraft near the American continents. In so doing the United States would show that it would defend the Western Hemisphere. Less than a month later, on 3 October, the Conference at Panama of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics approved the idea.¹ The American states declared their determination to keep out of the war and established the hemispheric "safety belt," a three hundred to one thousand mile-wide zone in which belligerents were forbidden to pursue hostilities. By 12 October, 1939 the Neutrality Patrol was fully organized with the U.S. Navy covering the area from Newfoundland to the Guianas---an example of the vulnerability of South America due to its distance from the centers of U.S. naval strength.

By the spring of 1940 Germany's conquests in Europe posed a difficult problem for the American nations, for they were now confronted with German claims of sovereignty over colonial possessions in the New World held by defeated nations. The prospect of Germany's occupation and use of the American possessions of Denmark, the Netherlands, or France as bases for further acts of aggression was unacceptable to the United States and to Latin America. The resolutions passed on 30 June, 1940 at the Havana Conference of the American Republics, in effect, made the Monroe Doctrine a multi-lateral policy; the transfer of territory in the Western Hemisphere from one non-American state to another was not to be allowed. To iron out any problems arising from this

1 the Declaration of Panama, *Ibid.*, II, 115.

2 joint Congressional resolution to that effect passed on 17 and 18 June, 1940; *Ibid.*, II, 89-90,

declaration the Conference set up an Inter-American Commission for Territorial Administration which was to govern any such territory whose transfer was attempted. In addition, the Neutrality Patrol, mainly the responsibility of the U.S. Navy, was again endorsed. The American nations agreed, further, to continue to suppress subversion, propaganda and other fifth-column activities in each state and to aid each other in doing so.¹

At this stage it was the U.S. Navy which bore most of the burden of protecting the hemisphere against possible German attack. The holes in the Atlantic and Caribbean defense were quite adequately filled with the acquisition of the eight advanced bases in the destroyers-for-bases trade with Great Britain on 2 September, 1940. It was not only to aid faltering Britain that the administration agreed to the British proposal, for as Secretary of State Hull put it, the new bases were needed "...to enhance the national security of the United States and greatly strengthen its ability to cooperate effectively with other nations of the Americas in the defense of the Western Hemisphere."² President Roosevelt explained to Congress that the nation's military and naval leaders considered the bases "...essential to the protection of the Panama Canal, Central America, the Northern portion of South America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico, and our own Eastern and Gulf Seaboards."³ The Navy's task according to the Commander-in-Chief, was to coordinate its "...efforts in every conceivable manner to the end that our fleet shall be a deterrent to those nations which would plant the heel of

¹ Ibid., III, 63-90.

² Hull to British Ambassador Lothian, 2 September, 1940; Peace and War, p. 567.

³ message to Congress of 3 September, 1940; Jones and Myers, Documents on American Foreign Relations, III, 206.

dictatorship across this hemisphere."¹

The Axis threat on the seas presented a dilemma to the U.S. leadership. While Germany tied down the British Navy and threatened to gain control of the Atlantic, the bulk of the United States Navy was forced to remain on watch in the Pacific to deter any further Japanese depredations. After its proposal in the fall of 1939 and ensuing lengthy debate a \$4,000,000,000 program for a "two-ocean navy" was finally enacted on 14 June and 19 June, 1940. This program, while greatly strengthening and modernizing the U.S. fleet, would take years to be implemented during which time Germany might capture or sink the British fleet and thus gain rule over the Atlantic. Stepped-up construction schedules could only shorten the gap to two years during which the administration was counting on its program of aid to the enemies of Hitler to protect the Americas.

The political and military leaders responsible for defending the United States and the Western Hemisphere prepared and executed plans for the acquisition or occupation of certain strategic areas in the Atlantic Ocean. This took place prior to the involvement of the United States in the war. Hence, one concludes that Germany was suspected of planning the seizure of these points in order to launch an attack upon the hemisphere. It is necessary, then, to take note of these U.S. military countermeasures in order to deduce from them the German policy with regard to attack upon the Western Hemisphere.

By the spring of 1941 extensive military plans were drawn up for the occupation of Greenland, Iceland, the Azores and Martinique.² An

1 Roosevelt's Navy Day message to Secretary of the Navy Knox on 26 October, 1940; text in N.Y. Times, 27 October, 1940, p. 4.

2 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 271.

indication of the administration's thinking along these lines is found in Senator Claude Pepper's fiery speech of 6 May, 1941. Pepper's statements had sometimes been indicative of contemplated action by the administration. Taking a vigorous interventionist viewpoint, he advocated a "get tough" attitude toward Germany. The United States, he said, should "...occupy the points of vantage from which the monstors are preparing to strike at us. In that category I include Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, the Canary Islands, and Dakar."¹

It was in Greenland where the United States established the northern end of its Atlantic defense system. Early in the war Britain had decided that the defense of Greenland was, primarily, the responsibility of the United States. On 19 April, 1940, a week after the German Army overran the mother country of Denmark, the State Department rejected a proposal by Danish Minister de Kaufman that the United States establish a protectorate over Greenland. On 3 May, 1940 the local government, the Greenland Councils, reaffirmed its allegiance to King Christian X and also asked for American protection.² The response was the drawing up of plans by the U.S. Coast Guard for the defense of Greenland. In May, American equipment and supplies were brought to the vital cryolite mines at Ivigtut where it was feared the Germans would shell the mines from submarines. They had already established important meteorological stations on the east coast and were undertaking air reconnaissance of Greenland from bases in Norway.³

1 N.Y. Times, 7 May, 1941, p. 12.

2 Jones and Myers, Documents on American Foreign Relations, III, 235.

3 Hull, Memoirs, I, 753-58.

After extensive survey operations had been completed Hull and de Kaufman signed an agreement on 9 April, 1941 whereby Greenland became a protectorate of the United States, retained its Danish allegiance, and gave to the United States extensive rights to build defense bases.¹ Two landing fields, several seaplane bases, harbor facilities, radio, radar, and weather installations were soon built with U.S. Army units stationed there for defense. On 1 June, 1941 the Greenland Patrol was established as duty for the Coast Guard to protect the supply lines to Britain from German attack and to ward off German efforts at establishing new bases on Greenland, i.e., within the Western Hemisphere.² The State Department emphasized that the U.S. decision to defend Greenland was merely the application of the Monroe Doctrine and the decision of the American Foreign Ministers at Havana in 1940.³

President Roosevelt's address of 27 May, 1941 made clear the U.S. policy of hemispheric defense founded on a series of forward bases. He noted that Germany could readily drive into the Iberian Peninsula or French northwest Africa. From there, said Roosevelt, it was an easy jump to "...the Atlantic fortress of Dakar, and to the island outposts of the New World---the Azores and Cape Verde Islands." Truly, Roosevelt had guessed actual German war plans very accurately. The President categorically denied Germany the right to occupy any islands in the Atlantic: "Control or occupation by Nazi forces of any of the islands of the Atlantic would jeopardize the immediate safety of portions of North and South America and the island possessions of the United States and of the ultimate safety of the continental United

1 text of the agreement and exchange of notes in Peace and War, pp. 642-48.

2 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, I, 58-64.

3 Department of State Bulletin, IV, 443; statement of 10 April, 1941.

States itself."¹ Roosevelt described the battle for control of the Atlantic as extending "...from the icy waters of the North Pole to the frozen continent of the Antarctic." A huge number of sinkings were occurring, many of which, claimed the President, had actually taken place in the waters of the Western Hemisphere. Here, he was obviously referring to the fullest extension of the Western Hemisphere as described in Chapter I of this paper. Roosevelt stressed that German occupation of Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, or the Cape Verde Islands, would directly endanger the safety of the United States and the countries of Latin America. "The attack on the United States can begin with the domination of any base which menaces our security---north or south."² The President ended his address by proclaiming an "unlimited national emergency" in which stringent measures were invoked to meet the German effort to conquer the world. The United States would decide when and where its interests were threatened and would forestall the seizure by Germany of any of the islands of the Atlantic.³

Three days previous to this speech the President had ordered the Marines to prepare to occupy the Azores Islands. But on Prime Minister Churchill's advice this force was instead sent to Iceland since British Intelligence was sure that Germany would soon strike at the U.S.S.R. and that Franco had refused the peaceful occupation of Spain. Hitler, it was thought, would not risk entering hostile Spain while he tangled with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Iceland had a highly strategic location in the Battle of the Atlantic.⁴

In mid-June, 1941 the President reached the decision to join the

1 Peace and War, p. 665.

2 Ibid., p. 668.

3 text of the proclamation in N.Y. Times, 28 May, 1941, p. 1.

4 Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, I, 67.

the British occupation of Iceland with United States forces. While this measure was a necessary preliminary to the use of American naval vessels for convoy duty of ships bound for Britain, it was also aimed at establishing an outpost to prevent direct German aggression against the Western Hemisphere. "The United States," said Roosevelt, "cannot permit the occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere." The same reasons, Roosevelt told Congress, that had caused the U.S. to dispatch substantial forces to Trinidad and to British Guiana made necessary the occupation of Iceland: i.e., to forestall a German pincer movement which might involve seizure of bases in South America or in the North Atlantic. Specifically, Germany's occupation of Iceland would be a menace in the following ways:

The threat against Greenland and the northern portion of the North American Continent, including the islands which lie off it.

The threat against all shipping in the North Atlantic.

The threat against the steady flow of munitions to Britain--which is a matter of broad policy clearly approved by Congress.¹

The troops arrived in Iceland on 7 July, 1941, the same day that the United States-Iceland agreement was made public. There was to be a gradual replacement of the British garrison so that it might serve elsewhere on a more active front against Germany. Admiral King ordered the Atlantic Fleet "...to support the defense of Iceland... capture or destroy vessels engaged in support of sea and air operations against Western Hemisphere territory [defined as including Iceland on 15 July] or United States or Iceland flag shipping."² As a result

1 Roosevelt's message to Congress of 7 July, 1941; Peace and War, p. 686.

2 as quoted in Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, I, 78.

of these orders German submarines and U.S. destroyers Greer, Kearny, and Reuben James engaged in naval battles during September and October of 1941.

At the Anglo-American Atlantic Conference at Argentia Bay off Newfoundland in August, 1941 U.S. military leaders gave indication of even a greater extension eastward of the Western Hemispheric defensive perimeter. Their discussions closely paralleled the thinking of Undersecretary of State Welles who, as has been noted, drafted a message for President Roosevelt early in May advocating extension of the Monroe Doctrine to northwest Africa and the nearby Atlantic Islands. Repeatedly, the U.S. chiefs-of-staff emphasized their responsibility for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. However, they considered the control by friendly nations of the Azores, Cape Verde Islands, the Canary Islands, Dakar, French Morocco, and Spanish Morocco as vital to that task.¹

The chief documentary source available indicating U.S. military planners' judgment of Germany's cupidity for areas of the Western Hemisphere is the "Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-all Production Requirements."² This remarkable document, dated 11 September, 1941 and signed by chiefs-of-staff Marshall and Stark, was directed to President Roosevelt as the product of two years' work by U.S. military planners and a years' cooperation with the British. The fundamentals of this report appeared previously in the United States Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, drafted in May, 1941. This, in turn, was based on similar decisions of Roosevelt, Stark, Marshall, Hull, Knox and

³
Stimson in November, 1940. Four points in the Joint Board Estimate are

¹ Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 358; based on the official records of the conference.

² Ibid., pp. 410-18; vital parts of the text printed here.

³ Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, I, 46.

related to the problem of deducing Germany's policy concerning attack upon the Western Hemisphere from defense measures of the United States.

To safeguard the United States, said the military planners, it was necessary to preserve "...the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and the remainder of the Western Hemisphere...." To that end the government should strive toward the "...eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions...and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty."¹

Should Germany conquer all Europe, i.e., her two remaining enemies, Britain and the Soviet Union, she might then attempt the conquest of the Western Hemisphere. While "...Germany might at once seek to gain footholds...." in the New World, she might, instead, pursue a long-range cold war leading up to invasion of South America and victory over the United States. According to the U.S. military planners Germany would:

wish to establish peace with the United States for several years, for the purpose of organizing her gains, restoring her economic situation, and increasing her military establishment, with a view to the eventual conquest of South America and the military defeat of the United States. During such a period of 'peace' it seems likely that Germany would seek to undermine the economic and political stability of the countries of South America, and to set up puppet regimes favorable to the establishment on that continent of German military power. In such circumstances, Germany would have better chances to defeat the United States.²

In a section on the probable character of German strategy to conquer the Americas it was noted that in the "current phase of the war"

she sought to conquer north and west Africa, and to occupy "...Spain.

¹ Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 410-11.

² Ibid., p. 411.

Portugal, Morocco, French West Africa, Senegal, and the Atlantic Islands...." The Joint Board thought it would take less sea, land, and air power to complete this drive southwestward than to conquer the Middle East. At any rate, the security of the Western Hemisphere demanded that friendly powers control northwest Africa and the Atlantic Islands because these were the jumping-off places for invasion of the hemisphere. With a view to ultimate participation in the war, the U.S. military planners concluded:

Prevention of Axis penetration into Northwest Africa and the Atlantic Islands is very important, not only as a contribution to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, but also as security to British communications and as a base for a future land offensive. In French North and West Africa, French troops exist which are potential enemies of Germany, provided they are re-equipped and satisfactory political conditions are established by the United States....a large proportion of the troops of the Associated Powers employed in this region necessarily must be United States troops.¹

It will be recalled that less than a year earlier Hitler had set his war planners upon the task of driving southwestward "...with a view to the prosecution of the war against America at a later date."² By 11 September of 1941 American military planners had sensed the German intent and had recommended that American troops be used to oppose Germany in the vital area.

In addition to these decisions by the military, United States political leaders were making parallel efforts to safeguard the hemisphere from German attack. It will be recalled that President Roosevelt had promised Prime Minister Churchill at the Atlantic Conference that the United States would occupy the Azores and Cape Verde Islands even if Britain provoked Germany by seizing the Canary Islands.³ The United

¹ Ibid., p. 417.

² Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, III, 288-290.

³ see Chapter I, pp. 10-11, of this paper.

States was at the time trying to induce Portugal to ask aid as had the the Icelandic government. Ambassador Leahy had been sent to Vichy to see that the French Navy was kept out of Germany's hands and that bases in North and West Africa were not ceded to Germany.¹ Darlan had nearly engineered the latter concession in the spring of 1941.

There seems to be no evidence that, before the United States became involved in the war, military operations were planned for the seizure of any part of Africa as a defensive measure. The administration seemed content to state that Americans had never been neutral in thought and grew increasingly apprehensive of the threat to America which Germany presented. "We know," said Roosevelt to Congress on 9 October, 1941, "that we could not defend ourselves in Long Island Sound or in San Francisco Bay. That would be too late. It is the American policy to defend ourselves wherever such defense becomes necessary under the complex conditions of modern warfare."²

Under this policy a most significant commitment was made to Great Britain as a result of the extension of the hemispheric boundary far eastward into the Atlantic. Despite the sinking of the mighty Bismarck on 27 May, 1941 Germany still held as a threat her great sister ship, Tirpitz, and battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Any of these ships could have wrecked havoc with a plodding North Atlantic convoy. Consultations in Iceland led to agreement that the British Home Fleet should guard against such a sally in the region between the Faeroes and Iceland; a heavy U.S. task group, based on Iceland, was to cover the Denmark Strait. The agreement was made over a month before Germany declared war upon the United States. In a letter of instructions,

1 Roosevelt's instructions to Leahy, 20 December, 1940; Peace and War, pp. 596-599.

2 Ibid., p. 762.

dated 5 December, 1941, concerning cooperation with British naval forces, Admiral King said: "The existing arrangements for joint action (coordination) between detachments of the Atlantic Fleet and of the British Home Fleet are designed to prevent the undetected passage of Axis heavy raiders to the southeastward of Iceland, and to deal with such raiders when detected."¹ In addition, King agreed to put available U.S. Navy vessels under temporary British command in order to hunt down the German ships should they appear.² From September of 1941 until well into 1942 a powerful group of American warships patrolled north of the mined Denmark Strait awaiting the emergence of the backbone of the German surface fleet. On 5 November, over a month before war came, Rear Admiral Giffen dashed after Tirpitz and other large ships when they came out of their Norwegian bases to go after a convoy. The Germans turned back and a major naval battle between Germany and the "neutral" United States was averted.

Should there be any doubt as to the reason for the long-range defensive military measures pursued by the United States, one need only consider the invasion of North Africa by U.S. forces in November of 1942. Throughout 1942 the danger had grown of Vichy's yielding North African bases to Germany. Bugged down in Russia, the German Army might transfer some of its power to the west and drive through Spain into Africa, or, alternately, through southern France or Italy to the same objective. President Roosevelt wrote to General Franco on 9 November, 1942 on the eve of the invasion:

We have accurate information to the effect that Germany and Italy intend at an early date to occupy with military force French North Africa.

1 as quoted in Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, I, 81.

2 Ibid., I, 82; based on Morison's interview with King.

With your wide military experience you will understand clearly that in the interests of the defense of both North America and South America it is essential that action be¹ taken to prevent an Axis occupation of French Africa without delay.

Operation "Torch" was intended not only to take the initiative in the battle against Germany but also to deny the vital northwest African area to the enemy. Hence, it, too, became a matter of hemispheric defense.

¹ as quoted in Carlton J.H. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945 (N.Y., 1945), p. 91.

CONCLUSION

The evidence indicates that Germany did not plan a military attack upon North or South America or the islands on their continental shelves. It has, however, been established that Germany undertook measures which resembled the prelude to her aggressions in Europe. Subversive political groups loyal to Germany were fostered in Latin America. An attempt was made to mobilize the German minorities in these countries, and to place them in power so that Germany might secure dominant influence there. Furthermore, Nazi spokesmen and Goebbels' propaganda machine harped continually during the critical period of American aid to the Reich's enemies before Pearl Harbor on the familiar theme that Germany was being oppressed by the "Jewish," "warmonger," "meddling" United States. U.S. defensive measures were interpreted as showing that the Roosevelt administration was hoodwinking the American people into an unjust and criminal war against the persecuted Reich. All this may have been an indication of the intention to wage another "defensive" war for the protection of German rights and minorities---this time against the United States and in the Western Hemisphere.

From these outward manifestations and from intelligence reports those responsible for the defense of the United States deduced that the Americas were in danger of attack by Germany. This conclusion, reached in mid-July, 1940,¹ was supplemented five months later on 16 December by the decision of Secretaries Knox and Stimson, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark that the country would eventually have to go to war.² During the next few months, as we have seen, a joint Army-

1 Stimson, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 332.

2 Ibid., p. 366; diary entry of 16 December, 1940.

Navy war plan, based on an estimate of possible German aggression directed toward the New World, was developed. Indeed, the U.S. policy of aiding Britain and extending the American defense perimeter far eastward to a line based on Iceland and British Guiana was aimed at meeting the threat of German attack. Thus, under the administration's interpretation the Western Hemisphere was extended hundreds of miles eastward of the American continents to include islands belonging geographically to the Old World.

German war plans, as we have seen, included moves deemed by U.S. leaders as jeopardizing the security of the Western Hemisphere. However, the German plan to invade Great Britain, Operation Sea Lion, failed. Later, schemes to seize the Iberian Peninsula and northwest Africa could not be attempted. The desire to take Iceland, the Azores, the Cape Verde and the Canary Islands did not get past the planning stage. These westward drives became impossible when Hitler decided to send the Wehrmacht against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Anglo-American plans to counter Germany's intention of driving southwestward and of seizing the Atlantic Islands were developed and held in readiness. As the German armies plunged deeper into the Russian defense, it became clear to British and American leaders that the menace to the Western Hemisphere was declining.¹ Significantly, the first step on land against Germany by the Western Powers was the capture of the vital African buffer area where Germany might have struck first. Even the Reich's attitude toward the United States grew

1 see memorandum of Stimson to Roosevelt of 23 June, 1941 in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 303-304; texts of documents by Churchill on 24 April, 16 December, and 23 December, 1941 in The Grand Alliance, 143-45, 651, 654; see also C.J.E. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945, p. 101.

cautious and non-provocative when the bulk of the German war machine was engaged in the east.

It would be wrong to assume that because no German plan of attack upon the Americas has been uncovered, the intention did not exist. First, it must be noted that there seems to have been no over-all, long-range German plan of conquest. Hitler did, however, intend to conquer Europe with the intention of exerting a dominant influence upon the world from that position. Since the Fuehrer allowed only four weeks for the development of all of Operation Sea Lion after his armies had reached the English Channel, it cannot be assumed that he never intended to strike the Western Hemisphere because no plan of attack has been found. Had Germany been able to defeat Britain and gain control of the Atlantic, there would have been both reason and opportunity to plan and execute an assault upon the New World. Since Germany's naval power was never sufficient to protect an army destined for the American continents, no military plans of attack were developed. There is, however, little reason to believe that a victorious Third Reich would have allowed the last outposts of democracy and racial tolerance to survive in the New World.

The United States could have been drawn into the war with Germany months before the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor. The German High Command began considering the seizure of the Iberian Peninsula, northwestern Africa, and the Atlantic Islands in the fall of 1940. The drive to take the first of these objectives appears to have been scheduled for January of 1941 with the other operations to follow in the first half of 1941. By August of that year the United States was ready to

abandon its neutrality and fight Germany in order to keep the vital islands in friendly hands. At this time, however, the forces necessary to drive southwestward were engaged in Russia. As the great debacle in the east overtook the Wehrmacht, the possibility of the involvement of the United States in the war due to a German attack on the outposts of the Western Hemisphere declined markedly.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Because the subject of this thesis is so recent in nature very little has been written on it. There are no bibliographical aids although the literature on National Socialism and the Second World War is very voluminous. Bibliographical notes will be found here on only those works containing important material used in the writing of this thesis.

A. Documentary material

Over two thousand of a group of one hundred thousand captured German documents are found in the Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 8 volumes(Washington, 1946), two supplementary volumes in 1947 and 1948. In this set are included official papers from the German governmental archives, Nazi Party archives, diaries, letters, captured reports and orders, excerpts from governmental and Party decrees and from the official German press, and the affidavits and interrogations of the defendants at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. The work was prepared by the American and British prosecution staffs to prove Count I, the planning and preparation of aggressive war. Most of volumes I and II are brief historical essays incorporating documentary evidence, and they are valuable leads to documents on specific subjects. A very poor index for the first eight volumes is found at the end of volume VIII.

The official record of the Nuremberg Trials is published as International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, 42 volumes(Nuremberg, 1947). Volume I contains the official trial documents, and the proceedings occupy volumes II through XXII. All documents-in-evidence are printed in German in volumes XXV through XLII. There are excellent chronological, subject, and document indices. This set does not contain some of the documents printed in the U.S. prosecutions publication noted above; but the oral testimony of the war criminals is very useful in establishing the validity of the trial documents and uncovering new evidence of German intentions toward the Western Hemisphere.

Two documentary sources were used to ascertain U.S. and Pan-American policy and countermeasures toward Germany. The Department of State's volume, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941(Washington, 1943) is made up of a short essay and two hundred seventy-four documents concerning U.S. foreign affairs during a crucial decade. Included are texts of speeches, executive agreements, and diplomatic notes. This work is excellent on U.S. fears of German attack and the reaction of the government to that apprehension. Little new material is found in it because most of the documents had been published before by the State Department. S.S. Jones and D.P. Myers(eds.), Documents on American Foreign Affairs is a series of annual volumes of topically arranged documents whose texts are usually printed in full. There is no editorial comment, a good index, and a simple organization. Published in Boston by the World Peace Foundation since 1939, the set was useful on Pan-American defense measures and the eastward extension

of the boundary of the New World. Volumes I through IV published from 1939 through 1942 were used. When the speeches or testimony of administration leaders was not available in either of these two works, the texts of such addresses or testimony was found in the New York Times.

Royal Institute on International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1938, vol. II(London and New York, 1945), edited by Monica Curtis is devoted solely to German policy. It has a fruitful section on general German policy and texts of speeches by German leaders. The U.S. Department of State published a volume by R.E. Murphy and others called National Socialism: Basic Principles, Their Application By the Nazi Party's Foreign Organization, and Their Use of Germans Abroad For Nazi Aims(Washington, 1943). Material is included from standard Nazi sources as well as the contents of documents, laws and official records concerning Nazi fifth columns.

B. Other primary sources

Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Complete and Unabridged(New York, 1939) is a tedious essential to a study of this nature. Surprisingly little is found in this, Hitler's blueprint, about his intentions toward the Western Hemisphere. His speeches, edited with comment by the astute political journalist, Raoul de Roussy de Sales, under the title of My New Order(New York, 1941) cover the period from 1922 to 22 June, 1941. This work is an excellent sequel to Mein Kampf and is generally concerned with foreign policy.

Although some historians think an abridgment has taken place, Count Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943(Garden City, N.Y., 1946) is a very useful source, quite apart from the question of its completeness. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War(New York, 1947) is a record of government service by a distinguished public servant. Since it was written from correspondence and a diary, it can be considered an autobiography based on contemporary sources. The work shows the wartime Secretary of War's early preoccupation with the German menace and his efforts to meet the threat to Western Hemispheric security. Of a similar nature is William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time(New York, 1950) which contains valuable material on the period when Leahy was Ambassador to Vichy France. Leahy shows the U.S. policy of keeping the French fleet and the African bases out of German hands. The correspondence of Leahy with Roosevelt and Admiral Darlan is included in the appendix. Carlton J.H. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945(New York, 1945) is an account by a noted historian and former Ambassador to Spain. It is based on a diary, letters, and papers and is unofficial and autobiographical in nature. Included by Hayes is valuable material on Spanish opposition to involvement in the war on the side of the Axis and the steps taken by Franco to block Hitler's Operation Felix. Two other diaries, Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943, ed. by Louis P. Lochner(Garden City, N.Y., 1948) and William E. Dodd, Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938(New York, 1938) are both of little use because of the time periods they cover although

both give insight into the functioning of the German government.

Of all the war memoirs those of Winston Churchill were most useful in this study. The first three volumes of The Second World War are subtitled The Gathering Storm(Boston, 1948), Their Finest Hour (Boston, 1949), and The Grand Alliance(Boston, 1950). These indispensable sources by one of the great allied leaders are based on his papers and his long experience as a statesman and writer; about one-fourth of the text consists of quotations from otherwise unpublished documents. One wishes, however, that Churchill would succumb to the requirements of scholarship and cite the sources of his quotations, especially in the case of German documents. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 volumes(New York, 1948) is generally referred to as a significant historical document. It is a detailed, sometimes tedious, and apparently well documented treatment of American foreign policy. Hull has made a clear effort to defend his policies. John G. Winant, Letter from Grosvenor Square: An Account of a Stewardship(Boston, 1947) by the U.S. wartime Ambassador to Britain is a short, frank, and simply written account revealing nothing important except Winant's personality and the pro-British attitude of the "neutral" United States. Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision(New York, 1944) by the Undersecretary of State reveals his hate for National Socialism and some of the U.S. and Pan-American defense measures to meet the German threat. Its great value lies in Welles' account of his peace mission to Europe in 1940. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe(Garden City, N.Y., 1948) shows how vital to hemispheric defense was the northwestern African area where Eisenhower commanded the first undertaken by the United States against Germany. Doctor Felix Kersten, Memoirs(Garden City, N.Y., 1947) is by the physician of Himmler, Hitler, and other top Nazi leaders and contains references to the extent of "Greater Germany" which was to extend from the Channel to the Urals, from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Sea. It was to dominate the world. This concept, deeply rooted in the hard core of National Socialists, is indicative of Hitler's fundamental aim of conquering European Russia.

C. Secondary sources

Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume I, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943(Boston, 1947) is the first of a twelve volume series by the famous Harvard historian commissioned especially to write such a work. Although not an "official" history it is based on U.S. Navy records, eyewitness observation, and interviews with participants. The German Admiralty records were also available. This volume is excellent on defense measures of the U.S. Navy to meet German sea power operating against the United States long before the war broke out, in what were termed by the administration, the waters of the Western Hemisphere. As is the case with Churchill's work, German sources are not properly identified.

Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1948) is an outstanding biography very useful to this study. Sherwood's access to records of the lend-lease administration, the Atlantic Conference, and pre-war defensive military plans has made

available much documentary material and summaries of such papers not to be found published elsewhere. In this work one finds much of the text of the "Joint Board Estimate" which plays so important a role in showing that U.S. military leaders would have fought to protect the Atlantic Islands which Germany planned to seize.

William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble(New York, 1947) is a history of U.S. relations with the French government at Vichy. This famous historian, working from OSS and State Department archives, shows conclusively the U.S. apprehension over possible German seizure of the French Navy and northwestern Africa; Franco's opposition to German seizure of Gibraltar in late 1940 and later; German hopes of extorting bases in Africa from Vichy and the United States' successful policy of preventing such a cession.

Asher Lee, The German Air Force(New York, 1946) was written by a Wing Commander of the RAF and an outstanding British expert on the Luftwaffe. Written in a non-technical and somewhat dramatic style, the work emphasizes the failures of the German Air Force. Lee furnishes much authentic material on the air battle for Britain.

Peter de Mendelssohn, Design For Aggression: The Inside Story of Hitler's War Plans(New York and London, 1946) is a study of German war plans during the period 1937-1941 and is based largely on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials documents. The treatment is strictly military, ignoring the political aspects of many of Hitler's aggressions. The story is necessarily incomplete because of the absence of the Allied side of the story. Quotations from German sources are generally authentic but are not cited or otherwise identified.

An excellent source of war maps is F. Brown and E. Herlin, The War in Maps: A Handbook of Maps and Facts(New York, 1942). Material is drawn from the maps of the New York Times and many especially drawn for the book. Short texts explain the significance of each map of the Axis campaigns. The drawings are not detailed since they are meant for mass presentation via newspaper. In War Department Bureau of Public Relations, The Background of Our War(New York, 1942) one finds excellent maps of the Axis campaigns and an imaginative but accurate picture of Germany's intention to execute a pincer movement on the Western Hemisphere via Africa, the Atlantic Islands, and South America---and the North Atlantic. The text is made up of a series of articles based on lectures for the indoctrination of Army personnel.

Robert H. Jackson, The Nurnberg Case(New York, 1947) is a good starting point for the use of the documentary material turned up at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. The author was the American prosecutor at the trials and gives many clues as to the identification of documents bearing on the subject of this thesis.

Although the German school of geopolitics has not figured prominently in this thesis, it was necessary to study Haushofer's ideas as a clue to German strategy. Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest(New York, 1942) is basically a piece of war propaganda aimed at showing Germany to be the historical aggressor. But the author is a prominent student of Geopolitik and has an excellent summary of Haushofer's "science" and a very extensive bibliography on German geopolitics. Johannes Mattern, Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-

Sufficiency and Autarchy (Baltimore, 1942) is a penetrating discussion of the origin of geopolitics and its evolution through the work of Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen; excellent bibliography; little material on Haushofer. Russell H. Fitzgibbon (ed.), Global Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1944) is a series of lectures delivered under the auspices of the Institute of Political Geography at the University of California at Los Angeles; outstanding scholars contributed and there is a short piece on Haushofer. Certainly the most attractive presentation of the heartland thesis is Robert Strausz-Mape's "Geopolitics," Fortune, November, 1941. Charles Kruszewski discusses in a difficult and scholarly manner "Germany's Lebensraum" in The American Political Science Review, October, 1940.

APPENDIX

The following are summaries of periodical articles concerning German penetration into South America prior to the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany. Material from them was not incorporated in this thesis, but it cannot be doubted that these articles were signs of the times. It has been noted that both military and political leaders of the United States were aware of and apprehensive over German activities in Latin America. Although the official intelligence reports are not available, one does have these contemporary reports by journalists as a measure of German activities and intentions in Latin America.

Wilbur Burton, "Dictators for Neighbors," Current History, October, 1937, pp. 63-68. Fascist-like governments and incipient Nazi movements are described.

Wilbur Burton, "South American Grab-bag," Current History, November, 1937, pp. 54-58. This article includes a map and the total numbers of German, Italian, and Japanese elements in important South American states. A brief description is made of a Nazi-like fascist party in Brazil, Axis economic infiltration, and German military advisors to several South American governments.

Norman A. Ingrey, "Fascism in South America," Contemporary Review, 28 August, 1938, pp. 218-28. This is a comprehensive article by a foreign correspondent discussing Axis penetration into economic fields, racial minorities, military leadership, and propaganda media. Conclusion: despite Axis attractions and some natural fascist proclivities South America will stay democratic if the United States remained democratic and pursued a non-exploitive good neighbor policy.

George Duhamel, "South America Next ?", Current History, July, 1940, p. 52. This article is a reprint of one appearing in the Paris daily, Le Figaro, immediately prior to the entry of German troops into Paris. The author describes a hypothetical German attack upon Brazil aided by fifth columnists. He says the same thing might happen in Uruguay or Argentina. Only control of the Atlantic Ocean will save Latin America from German invasion.

Captain J.A. Gainhard, "The Key to the Americas," Commonweal, 23 August, 1940. This article by a merchant marine captain of wide ex-

perience in the Latin American area puts strong emphasis on the need for Pan-American cooperative defense to meet possible German aggression. A hypothetical invasion is described; fifth column, Axis navy, troop transports, the seizure of airfields in Brazil from bases at Dakar, Freetown, the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira, and the Canary Islands. The weakest country was Uruguay where a Putsch had recently been suppressed.

Anon., "South America's Wartime Importance," National Geographic, October, 1942. A large map shows vital railroads, air routes, a nearly completed Pan-American highway. The text describes vital strategic raw materials and agricultural products obtained from South America.

When Germany overran Denmark in the spring of 1940 there was fear that Greenland might become a German base. Colonel Henry Breckinridge discusses this possibility in "Nazis in Greenland," Current History, May, 1940, pp. 13-14. Breckinridge, a lawyer, air power expert, and assistant Secretary of War in 1913-16, shows that Iceland is five hundred twenty to six hundred eighty-five miles from Europe and only one hundred ninety to four hundred seventy-five miles from Greenland; Greenland and North America are only two hundred ten to seven hundred twenty-five miles apart. Fighters and bombers could easily cover these short distances. The United States must prevent the seizure of Greenland by Germany.

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