ABSTRACT A CASE STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF FARM SOIL LOSS CONTROLS BY Richard W. Carkner This study investigates the economic impacts of imposing soil loss controls on a case study farm. These controls repre- sent an attempt to regulate environmental quality through legislation. Controls are a response to the concern for improving the quality of our natural environment. Previous studies dealt with the economics of soil con- servation from the standpoint of maintaining agricultural productivity. More current research on soil loss control adds an environmental quality dimension. These studies in- clude conceptual models and large area studies, however, detail is insufficient to accurately assess economic impacts for land users. Sediment and erosion control literature and legal tools available to improve the environment (including recently passed soil loss legislation) are reviewed. The economic impacts of soil loss controls were eval- uated within a theoretical setting, and then modeled using a profit maximizing linear programming model. The cr0p production and soil loss model was based on the detailed r Richard W. Carkner tbgfiy a” characteristics of a case study farm. A case study was used because soil loss legislation applies to individual land users with all their subtle differences in enterprises, loca- tion, and scale of Operation. Results for the case study farm indicate that soil loss constraints specified in the Iowa Conservancy Legislation do not significantly reduce farm profits. This could imply that a wider application of soil loss controls is economically feasible. However, cautions should be considered before generalizing. Soil loss controls are likely to have different impacts on land users depending on their location, soil type and enterprise combinations. For example, soil loss controls eliminate row crop production on steeply leping land regard- less of the tillage system used. Less intensive land use (sod crops) would result in reduced farm income. Additional research is necessary to study a broader range of physical and economic circumstances under which soil loss controls might be imposed. Any of the six combinations of tillage systems and conservation practices can meet the Iowa soil loss limits for the case study farm. Important in reducing soil loss, regardless of the tillage practices used is to match land management systems with soil characteristics and lepe. Further research on the economics of alternative crOp pro- duction soil loss controlling technology is needed. A CASE STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF FARM SOIL LOSS CONTROLS BY Richard W. Carkner A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Agricultural Economics 1974 ‘w. .11 ’v‘. in. ‘. '~¢ ‘. w. - h I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Special appreciation is extended to Dr. Larry Connor who served as thesis advisor. His questions, constructive criticisms and patience were of major assistance. Other thesis committee members Drs. Lester Manderscheid, James Johnson, Milton Steinmueller, Roy Black and Lawrence Libby provided helpful comments. The assistance of Dr. Lester Manderscheid serving as guidance committee chairman is also gratefully acknowledged. A debt of gratitude is due Drs. Anthony Grano and Melvin Cotner, administrators of the Natural Resource Economics Division, (NRED) ERS, for providing technical and financial assistance for the study. Appreciation is extended to John Putman for diverting resources of the North Central Resource Group (NCRG) of NRED and thereby facilitating the completion of this study. Thanks are also due my colleagues in NCRG, ERS at East Lansing and in particular Priscilla Prophet and William Chynoweth for computer programming assistance. For typing assistance I want to thank Helen Barnett, aw wife Terry Ann and the Department of Agricultural Economics secretarial staff. Finally for their encouragement and support I am deeply grateful to my wife Terry Ann, son James and my parents. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I II III IV INTRODUCTION The Problem Research Objectives Method and Procedure Study Area Research Method Procedure REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE ON EROSION AND SEDIMENTATION Introduction Physical Research on Sedimentation The Economics of Soil Conservation From the Standpoint of Maintaining Soil Productivity The Economics of Soil Conservation from the Standpoint of Environmental Quality Research Needs THEORETICAL BASIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY CONTROLS Introduction Why Pollution Exists Techniques for Control Firm Response to Controls ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SOIL LOSS LEGISLATION Introduction Environmental Law Limitations of Legal Solutions Current Nonpoint (Soil Loss) Pollution Control Legislation Iowa Conservancy Legislation Wisconsin Soil Loss Legislation Michigan Soil Loss Legislation Federal Soil Loss Legislation iii Page hbwuum \OG) 16 20 26 26 33 41 54 55 63 64 68 69 7O Table of Contents (Continued) Chapter V VI VII THE ANALYTICAL MODEL Introduction Setting Land Use/Soils Cr0p Yields Soil Loss Calculations Machinery, Labor and Materials Costs Dairy Feed Requirements The Model Crop Production Model Technical Coefficients R.H.S. EMPIRICAL RESULTS Introduction Soil Loss Profit Off-farm Corn Sales Sensitivity of Profitability to Changes in Prices and Yields Land Use Impact of Limited Land Use Adjustment Labor Energy Shortage and Soil Loss Controls Generalization of Results SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Introduction Past Research of Soil Loss Control Legal Considerations Case Study Analysis Study Results Limitations Major Findings Implications Land Users Policy Makers Further Research BIBLIOGRAPHY iv Page 74 75 75 76 87 91 94 100 101 102 103 111 112 114 120 120 122 122 125 128 129 131 132 134 136 137 137 139 143 143 144 145 147 Page APPENDICES Appendix 1. SOILS Table 1. Soil Comparability 154 Table 2. Soils Distribution by Field 155 Table 3. Description of Soils on the Case Study Farm 156 Table 4. Distribution of Soils by Field 158 Appendix 2. CROP YIELDS CrOp Yields by soil conservation practice, tillage, plant and harvest date, and rotation Corn Yields 160 Oat Yields 181 Alfalfa Yields 187 Appendix 3. SOIL LOSS Table 1. Soil Loss Per Acre by Field, Crop Rotation, 187 Tillage System, and Conservation Practice Appendix 4. MACHINERY BUDGETS Table 1. Corn Conventional Tillage, Two Tractors (50 and 70 hp) Up and Down the SIOpe 190 Table 2. Corn Conventional Tillage on the Contour, Two Tractors (50 and 70 hp) 192 Table 3. Corn Minimum Tillage, Two Tractors (50 and 70 hp) Up and Down the Slope 193 Table 4. Corn Minimum Tillage on the Contour, Two Tractors (50 and 70 hp) 194 Table 5. Corn No-Tillage, Two Tractors (50 hp) Up and Down the Slope 195 Table 6. Corn No-Tillage on the Contour, Two Tractors (50 hp) 196 Table 7. Oats Conventional Tillage, CCCOH, CCOHH, CCOHHH, Up and Down the Slope 197 Table 8. Oats Conventional Tillage for Rotations CCCOH, CCOHH, and CCOHHH on the Contour 198 Table 9. Alfalfa Up and Down 199 Table 10. Alfalfa on the Contour 200 Appendix 5. FERTILIZER, HERBICIDE, SEED, AND INSECTICIDE COSTS PER ACRE Table 1. Average Fertilizer Cost Per Acre by Rotation and Tillage System 201 Table 2. Herbicides 204 Table 3. Seed Costs Per Acre for Corn and Oats 205 Table 3a. Alfalfa Seed Cost Per Acre 205 Table 4. Insecticide 206 Appendices (continued) Page Appendix 6. FEED REQUIREMENTS Table 1. Annual Feed Requirements 207 vi A. a“ In ‘ '0 Table 1. Corn Yield Index la. Corn Yield by Planting and Harvest Dates 2. Relative Weights for Indexed Values Influencing CrOp Yields 3. Oat Silage Yields 4. Digestible Dry Matter by First Cutting Date 5. Alfalfa Yield by Cutting Date 6. Alfalfa Yield and Yield Index by Soil 7. Soil Loss Equation Coefficients 8. Cr0p Management Factors 9. Definition of Tillage Systems 10. Summary: Corn and Oats Costs and Labor/Acre 11. Summary: Alfalfa Costs and Labor/Acre 12. Corn, Oats, and Alfalfa Labor Summary 13. Summary: Average Fertilizer Cost Per Acre by Rotation and Tillage 14. Land Constraints 15. Labor Constraints (Seven Day Periods) 16. CrOp Activities 17. Crop Prices 18. Total Soil Loss by Tillage System and Soil Loss LIST OF TABLES Constraint Level (tons) for Up and Down the SlOpe Soil Conservation Tillage System vii Page 78 81 81 83 84 85 85 89 90 93 95 96 97 98 103 105 106 106 113 0‘" qt - .“0 0': List of Tables (continued) Table 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. Total Soil Loss by Tillage System and Soil Loss Constraint Level (tons) for Contour Tillage Profit by Tillage System and Soil Loss Constraint Level Fixed Costs of Tillage Equipment Budgeted Profit per Acre by Tillage System Budgeted Average Profit per Acre for Multiple Tillage Systems Per cent Reduction in Profit Due to Lack of Land Use Adjustment Per cent Reduction in Profit After an Initial Adjustment in Land Use Marginal Value Product of Labor (Periods 0, l, and in Dollars) viii Page 114 115 116 117 119 124 125 126 LIST OF FIGURES Figure l. The Right Amount of Pollution 2. Cost Functions for Crop Production 3. CrOp Production Costs 4. Change in Profit Due to a Change in Corn Yield for all Tillage and Conservation Practices ix Page 38 43 45 121 V Anne. inn: 5;" Es" . In‘. “1, O gu .N‘ (In .. ‘\. ....3 :Iv,‘ CHI ‘ CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Concern for the quality of the natural environment has become widespread and is expressed at all levels of govern— ment. President Nixon in a 1970 address to Congress stated "....this represents the first time in the history of nations that a peOple has paused, consciously and systematically, to take comprehensive stock of the quality of its surroundings."1 This concern has led to the establishment of improving environmental quality as a national policy goal. Agriculture has been identified as a major source of water pollution. Sediment (soil particles washed into streams) in the magnitude of 4 billion tons, are deposited in U.S. streams annually.2 This is the largest single stream pollutant. And more than half of these deposits are estimated to come from agricultural lands.3 Some degree of prOgress has been reported in reducing sediment. However, the nutrient problem (fertilizers 4 It is carried by soil particles) is getting worse. suggested that the problem might best be solved by better watershed management (holding soil in place) than by curtail- ing fertilizer applications. Vbluntary compliance with soil management practices that reduce soil loss has been inade- quate to achieve the degree of control desired. Hence, 1 response to the concern over sediment pollution is manifested in recently passed legislation. Examples include the Iowa Conservancy Law (May 1971), a revision to existing Wisconsin statues (May 1972), and at the Federal level, a Bill to revise the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ($2770) to specifically include nonpoint (sediment) sources of water pollution. The Problem Environmental quality legislation is often passed with— out a complete assessment of the economic implications. These circumstances are common to many types of regulatory legislation. Expediency simply does not allow waiting until all information is available. The Iowa Conservancy Law was chosen for study because it is currently being implemented and it represents a pioneer effort in conservancy legislation. The Law's objective is to preserve and protect the public interest in the soil and water resources of Iowa. This objective will be pursued by an administrative body with authority to impose limits on soil loss. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of the Iowa Conservancy Law on a case study farm. It is hypo- thesized that legislated soil loss controls will increase crOp production costs and in turn, increase the cost of meeting feed requirement needs of livestock enterprises. The magnitude of the impact will depend on the nature and level of soil loss controls, soil types and feed requirements relative to soil productivity and size of farm. In sum, this study is an attempt to evaluate the impact of imposing soil loss limits on a given system of enterprise organization. Research Objectives Objectives of this study include: (1) Review the literature on physical and economic aspects of controlling erosion and sedimentation. (2) Review environmental law, in particular soil loss legislation as it applies to a case study farm. (3) Determine the economic impact of soil loss regulations on a case study farm. Meeting these objectives will provide needed information for policy makers and farmers on the impact of imposing soil loss regulations on farms. Method and Procedure Study Area The case chosen for study is a dairy farm in South Eastern Wisconsin. Dairy enterprises are predominant in the region and hence a logical choice for analysis.5 The region was chosen because an erosion problem exists and because of the technical assistance from a geologist and personnel employed by the Soil Conservation Service, USDA, in Madison. The particular farm was chosen for a number of reasons. The Operator participatesin the Production Credit Association's AGRIFAX prOgram and hence has up-to-date, detailed farm records. Secondly, recent airphotos and soils maps are available for the farm. Thirdly, the farm itself is an economically viable operation, and reasonably repre- sentative of other farms in the area. Lastly and importantly, the operator chose to cooperate and has answered numerous requests for additional data. Research Method A case study has been selected as Opposed to a synthetic firm approach because soil loss legislation applies to individual land users with all their subtle differences in enterprises, location and scale Of Operation. Soil loss is sensitive to differences in the types and distribution Of soils as well as crop management practices employed. Hence, soil loss assessment must be made in a case-by-case basis. Another reason for a case study analysis is the large quan- tity of primary data necessary to assess soil loss accu— rately. Detailed land use information is required by soil type, slope, and other variables for each field farmed. The analytical model used is a profit maximizing linear programming model. A linear programming model has been chosen over simple budgeting procedures because it facili- tates the evaluation Of a large number Of alternatives and allows the consideration Of approximations to real world constraints such as limits on the availability Of land, labor and other resources. Procedure The Objectives were achieved by the following procedure. The first Objective was accomplished by making a review of selected literature on the physical and economic aSpects Of soil loss control. The purpose is to provide background on efforts to control soil loss. The second Objective was fulfilled by a review Of environmental law and in particular, legislation to control soil loss. Legislation is increasingly being used in an attempt to curtail environmental degradation. The basis for this legislation and the Iowa Conservation Law are outlined. Satisfying the first two Objectives is necessary to provide a frame Of reference for the third Objective, evaluating the impact Of soil loss controls - the primary focus Of this study. The first step is to analyze the imposition Of soil loss controls within a theoretical setting. The second step is to design a profit maximizing model for crop production. The impact Of ranged soil loss control levels are evaluated in terms Of labor and average costs Of production required to produce specified outputs. Soil loss control levels evaluated include those established by the Iowa Conservancy Law. Only the crop production enterprises Of the farm are modeled. Soil loss is generally not a direct function Of livestock enterprises except as they dictate the types and mix Of crops necessary to support these operations. A profit maximizing crop production model tied to the feed requirements Of the dairy Operation simplifies modeling and yet meets the Objectives of the study. The feed requirements or demands to be met in the cr0p production model are estimated for the dairy herd using a least-cost dairy ration program developed at Michigan State University. Rations for three levels Of milk production are balanced using feeds currently being grown and fed. For each Of two soil conservation systems, the model determines the appropriate crop rotation subject to ranged soil loss limits under three tillage systems. The systems are conventional, minimum and no tillage. TO be consistent with profit maximization crOp selling transfer activities are included. Also crOp purchasing activities are incorporated. This is to prevent infeasibil- ities in the event the land being farmed is insufficient to produce dairy feed requirements. The analysis is presented as follows: Chapter II discusses the status of physical and economic research on erosion and sedimentation; Chapter III develops the theore- tical basis for environmental quality controls and firm adjustments to controls: Chapter IV reviews environmental legislation and legislation designed to control soil loss, its basis and in particular, the Iowa Conservancy Law; Chapter V describes the linear programming crop production and soil loss model: Chapter VI presents empirical results of the analysis; and Chapter VII provides a summary, conclu- sions and discusses the studies limitations, implications and needed further research. CHAPTER I. FOOTNOTES Council on Environmental Quality. Environmental Quality. The First Annual Report Of the Council on Environmental Quality Transmittal to Congress, Washington, D.C., 0.8. Government Printing Office, Aug. 1970. Wadleigh, Cecil, H. Wastes in Relation to Agriculture and Forestry. U.S.D.A. Misc. Pub. 1065, 1968. Robinson, A. R. "Sediment is Still the Largest Single Pollutant of Water." Farm Journal, p. G4, April 1971. Wall Street Journal. "Environmental Outlays Rising to $287 Billion in 10 Years Through 1980, 0.8. Panel Says," Aug. 8, 1972. Wisconsin Farm Business Summary, 1970 Data Cooperative Extension Programs - University Extension Department of Agricultural Economics: Madison, Wisconsin, 1971. CHAPTER II REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE ON EROSION AND SEDIMENTATION Introduction One Of the questions pertinent to American agriculture is soil conservation. As early as the 1800's George Perkins Marsh, a forerunner Of the conservationist movement, in his book Man and Nature, warned that continued disregard for resource management would curtail the progress which seemed inevitable to early American pioneers. Despite this early warning, conservation was not made public policy until President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the Soil Conser- vation Service in 1935.1 Since that time a considerable body of literature has been amassed pertaining to erosion and sedimentation research. The problems created by erosion and sedimentation cannot be ignored. These two elements reduce the productive power of the land while they mar its aesthetic and physical qualities. They are said to be a multi-edged sword in the deterioration Of the environment.2 While this chapter will not attempt to review or to expand the information now avail- able, it will endeavor to present a characterization Of more recent physical research on sedimentation and a review of 8 soil conservation and Of the economics of soil loss as it relates to environmental quality. Physical Research on Sedimentation Sedimentation is a process which includes erosion, transportation, and deposition Of sediment.3 It exists as a separate field of study and incorporates soil physics and chemistry as well as the fluid dynamics associated with movement Of eroded particles. Published research on soil loss since Hugh Bennett's, "The National Menace Of Soil Erosion", has been continuous.4 Examples Of more recent research can be found in the 1963 Proceedings of The Federal 5 The publication is Inter-Agency Sedimentation Conference. a collection of papers on land erosion and control and sediment in streams, estuaries and reservoirs. Some of this physical research has led to the develOp- ment of a soil loss estimating technique used by agencies planning conservation systems. This method, referred to as the "Universal Soil Loss Equation” represents a synthesis of empirical and theoretical research since 1930 on factors causing soil loss.6 In the equation all pertinent research is incorporated to provide design data for conservation plans, and it can be easily revised to incorporate new research findings. The soil loss equation can be used to estimate erosion. However, if sediment yields are to be predicted, a sediment delivery ratio is required. This presents somewhat Of an intractable problem because there 10 are many variables to consider between the initial detach- ment Of soil particles and their ultimate deposition. Crude techniques have been developed to estimate delivery ratios which are based on the size Of the drainage area, average stream volume, or length.7 Attempts to incorporate more Of the relevant variables for estimating sediment yields have led to the develOpment Of hydrology simulation models. A model develOped by Stanford University is a representation Of the hydrological cycle in a watershed.8 Streamflow hydrographs are produced using daily evapo-transpiration and hourly precipitation data. Simulation models have been used to estimate the effects Of alternative watershed conditions on streamflow characteristics. For example, attempts have been made through simulation to estimate water yields after forest fires.9 Mathematical models have been develOped to assist in 10 Here watershed agricultural watershed engineering. hydrology is reduced to a pattern Of physical probabilities. On a smaller scale, simulation models have been built Of 11 Four subprocesses - soil the erosion process itself. detachment by rainfall, transport by rainfall, detachment by runoff and transport by runoff - describe soil movement. A major problem in develOping sedimentation simulation models is in assembling the required data. The accuracy Of existing suspended sediment data is a source Of considerable 12 uncertainty. Under conditions of rapidly fluctuating 11 discharge sediment concentrations may be continuously changing. With present sampling techniques the actual amount of sediment passinga gage may be measured only by chance. Other problems in develOping hydrological simulation models are that many of the physical relationships have not been theoretically devel- Oped. Further, probability distributions of weather and other data must be estimated. As the number of unknowns estimated outside the model increases, its validity decreases. In an attempt to utilize some of the large amounts of physical research on various aspects of sedimentation, a con- ference was held by the Economic Research and the Agricultural Research Services, USDA in which papers dealing with the entire 13 The continuum of sedimentation problems were presented. consensus seemed to be that sediment control benefits are a public good. Therefore, social and public interest benefits from sedimentation control should be studied. Approximately half of the papers discussed particularly sedimentation prob- lems, some of which appear to be amenable to measurement. For eprle, sediment damages to reservoirs, to navigation as part of flood damages, as a factor in increasing flood frequency, and to fish propagation and production, appear reasonably measurable. However, the content of the remaining papers requires further research before a quantitative evalu- ation can be made. Areas where more research is necessary are : the impact of sediment borne nutrients on water quality, recreation values, and aesthetic considerations. No compre- hens j—Ve attempt was made at the Conference to quantify or to 12 specify all damages enumerated for a specific location. This unauld be a logical starting point in assessing social benefits from erosion control and is an area with potential for research. Besides taking a piecemeal approach to sediment damages, no attempt was made to focus attention on that portion of sedimentation subject to management versus total sedimenta- tion. A certain amount of sedimentation is a function of dissipating the energy of moving water. The Missouri River was filled with sediment before the first pioneer touched a plow to its drainage basin and was called the "Big Muddy" for this reason. This is what can be called natural sedimentation. Damage estimation relative to erosion control efforts should focus on man induced erosion, i.e., agriculture, construction, etc. Damages from natural erosion should be treated sepa- rately. The purpose of making this distinction is to allow the relationship between the costs of erosion control prac- tices, and damages prevented, or benefits, to be prOperly assessed. The Economics of Soil Conservation From the Standppint of Maintaining Soil Productivity Soil conservation is concerned with maintaining soil productivity into perpetuity. Generally, allowable rates of annual soil loss are a function of soil depth and the rate Of soil formation. So-called allowable soil losses have been Getablished for all major soil types. SCil conservation has been national policy for decades and ye t the extent of adaption is less than desired. A number 13 of studies have been made of factors preventing more wide- spread adoption of soil conservation practices. Surveys of 14 land users were made by Held and Timmons in 1958 and by 15 in 1961. They reported that major pro- Blase and Timmons blems preventing wider adoption of soil conservation practices were (1) tenure uncertainty Of non-owner operators, (2) lack of confidence in recommended practices, and (3) lack of adequate finances and the need for immediate income. 16 0 O O 0 Cited economic considerations, customs, In a summary, Held and legal arrangements as important variables explaining adoption of soil conservation practices. Farmers failed to see the need to adopt soil conserving practices during a period when yields per acre were rapidly increasing. Low cost fertilizers easily replaced nutrients lost in soil runoff. Currently, larger farms have additional reasons for not adhering strictly to soil conservation practices.17 Timeliness has been found to be increasingly important and farm Operators consider terraces and other conservation measures as Obstacles delaying field Operations.18 It was recognized that for voluntary compliance to occur, adOption of conservation practices must not have an adverse affect on farm income. This generated interest in the economics of conservation systems. The Soil Conservation Service prepared a handbook on the economics of conservation.19 It outlined crOp budgeting techniques and the use of discount tables to determine present values. Unfortunately, no concrete examples were included to assist in application. A number of 14 other studies, using budgeting techniques, have been completed. 20 In an Iowa study, Ball was unable to establish an accurate relative measure of soil saved per dollar invested, but at least he outlined a tentative ordering. Coutu21 in North Carolina noted after analyzing alternative conservation systems that there is no single answer to the question "Does conservation pay?" because conditions vary so widely. In Kansas, Michael22 found that terraces, grade stabilization, and waterways were uneconomic on most soils. In a report from Tennessee, Atkins states that high levels of conserva- tion (approximately 5 tons/acre/year erosion on most soils) were found not economically justified over time.23 As if the research techniques used might be partially responsible for the results, additional studies were carried out by other researchers using linear and dynamic programming. Using recursive linear programming Smith and Heady studied the impact of alternative conservation systems over time.24 No conclusions were reached about whether conservation yields a positive economic return. However, they did outline import- ant considerations relating to profitability. They found that conservation plans should be tailored to each farm enterprise situation and adjusted over time. In a study using conventional linear programming Langren concluded that an annual soil loss of 5 tons per acre was consistent with 25 When soil losses were his profit maximizing solution. reduced to less than 5 tons per acre, however, profitability was rapidly reduced. Research reported by Anderson concluded 15 that net profit could be increased and still achieve Soil Conservation Service soil loss recommendations.26 Perhaps variability in study circumstances can account for some of the differences in study results both for budget— ing and programming techniques. For example, the studies reviewed were carried out at different points in time and at different locations. Cost and price assumptions obviously affect profitability and vary over time. Differences in the profitability of conservation practices due to location include the distribution and type of soils and the mix of crop and livestock enterprises indigenous to the area. For level, well-drained soils, rainfall erosion is minimal and hence only limited conservation practices are necessary in order to achieve Soil Conservation Service soil loss goals. With steeper sloped, highly erosive soils, more expensive conservation practices (e.g. terraces) are necessary to allow intensive crOpping consistent with soil loss limits. From the studies reviewed it appears that soil conser- vation from the standpoint of maintaining agricultural productivity is not profitable in some circumstances. This is an important reason for the limited success of voluntarily adOpted soil conservation programs. There are, however, differences of Opinion. For example, one researcher explains: ”Experience has shown that land treatment measures (conser- vation practices) usually result in high benefit-cost ratios so that this ratio need not be computed for justification of watershed protection projects.“27 1Parenthesis mine. a a. \ u it “4""! 16 The Economics of Soil Conservation From the Standpoint of Environmental Quality Soil conservation research reviewed in the previous Seetion was focused on maintaining the crOp producing E><>iaential of the nation's soils. The current interest in Soil loss has taken on the added dimension of environmental quality. This represents a broader perspective than earlier ‘Vtark.and involves man's relationship with his total environ- Inent. Frequent reference can be found to sedimentation as air: environmental quality problem.28 When discussing sediment as a pollutant the prOperties of sediment must be considered. Sediment is a complicated substance with physical, chemical, and biological prOperties; all of which influence the environment. The erosion, tranSport and deposition processes are selective since coarse sediment moves differently than fine sediment. Fine sediment is composed of silts, clays, and organic materials which may have chemically active prOperties. It may sorb ions from solution or release ions to solution depending on the chemical environment. Reactions between chemicals and colloidal sediment determine the relative concen- tration Of pollutants in solution and suspension. In general, coarse sediment tends to buffer the dissolved and suspended chemical load. It is primarily coarse sediment that is more readily controlled with available technology. We do not know yet how to control the amounts of clay and colloidal fractions which constitute the bulk of our sediment problems. This is true of both at the sediment source and in the final disposition of the material. In its role as a scavenger, sediment may sorb chemicals from solution and then deposit them in stream channels or reservoirs. The deposited pollutants may or may not stay in place. They may desorb or react to re-enter the stream in another form. Reactions between chemicals and colloidal "I .~ .u A. ill u. .A “I ‘II' ‘9 'U '4 ‘e ‘v 17 sediment may determine the relative concentration of other pollutants that remain in solution or suspension. Eroded soil particles carry plant nutrients and con- tribute to the enrichment of the water-courses they enter. Crime problems caused by this enrichment may be reduced by .lgimuting soil erosion or reducing fertilizer applications cor: agricultural lands. The economic impact of restricting in:itrogen fertilizer in Illinois has recently been estimated.30 thsing Iowa State University's national linear programming Inc>del, nitrogen applications were limited to 50 lbs. per acre. Given these limits the comparative advantage of soybean production increased with respect to corn in Illinois. IELlinois farm income was reduced whereas national farm income (iaicreased. (National farm product price increases from three ‘t&> five per cent resulted from imposing these limits in Illinois) . Other studies have examined the economic implications <31? imposing soil loss controls. Several conceptual models have been developed and will be outlined. A least cost linear programing model for a hypothetical river basin was developed at Iowa State University. Using this model, Seay31 8tudied the impact of parametrically ranging sediment con- st.'|':aints. The sediment constraints were related to water Quality and achieved by selecting from alternative crop ITOtations and soil conservation systems. In a slightly 32 different application of the same model, Jacobs studied the phosphorous content of eroded soil and the water quality 18 ianlications. The studies satisfied the objective of tuiilding a conceptual model but were acknowledged to be severely lacking in reality. Data limitations and the lack of understanding about sediment delivery were cited as rueajor difficulties. The cropping pattern that emerged as <2<>nsistent with limited soil loss and agriculture income <3k>jectives was continuous row crOps using minimum tillage. Swanson and Narayanan33 evaluated the impact on private farm income Of improving water quality in a reservoir. Using a: linear programming model, crOp rotations and tillage systems were related to farm income and soil loss. More detail was added over previous studies. The sediment delivery estimation method considered the distance to the reservoir from agricultural plots. Also a wider variety of soils information was used as Opposed to a single repre- sentative soil found in earlier work. Another river basin linear programming study of sediment and erosion is underway by Rosenberry at Iowa State University.3‘1 UPkLis model will attempt to further refine estimation of a delivery ratio, provide additional detail concerning soils, and include a wider range of soil conservation practices than existing studies. The effect of soil loss limits will be evaluated with respect to (l) farm profits and the need for subsidies, (2) food prices, and (3) benefits to society ftom reducing sedimentation. The studies outlined so far represent a progression from the abstract conceptual model developed by Seay to added 19 realism incorporated in Rosenberry's prOposal. Further, the studies reviewed cover multi-county areas and hence are macro in scope. Some work has also been proposed at the farm firm level. Swanson is collecting data on represen- tative farms to study microeconomic impacts of soil loss 35 His objectives include evaluating the impact controls. (:11 individual producers, evaluating alternative incentive systems and also estimating sediment damages. Research to support the study of the farm firm level impact of soil loss controls is needed. For example, it has been recognized for some time that limited tillage planting methods reduce soil loss. A recent study of no- till planting concluded that its potential for reducing 36 Many technical SOil erosion warrants continued study. relationships need to be established between tillage Systems, crOp yields, soils, planting and harvest dates, and climate. Before this section is concluded, urban sediment and erosion problems will be discussed briefly. Sediment damage from denuded construction sites has long been a source of c=C>ncern. However, only limited economic analysis of alternative control systems has been completed. A notable einception is a study recently completed by the Dow Chemical Company . 3 7 Using cost-effectiveness techniques, it studied alternative erosion and sediment control systems for con- struction sites. They found that conventional systems, cROntrolling approximately 91 per cent Of the erosion, would 20 cost about $1,125 an acre. Damages from uncontrolled erosion could reach a potential of $1,500 per acre. However, major problems exist in estimating damages. The most import- ant problem cited by the study was the uncertainty surround- ing estimation of sediment delivery and transport ratios. These ratios determine the distribution of damages along a water course and are critical to damage estimation. Many areas have enacted erosion control ordinances in 38 the absence of economic analysis. In a study of urban soil erosion and sediment control sponsored by the Federal water Quality Administration the lack of economic analysis was recognized. Insufficient consideration has been given to the economics involved in sedimentation control. On one hand, not enough information is available by which to determine, on a sound basis, the actual costs which stem from soil erosion and sediment problems. On the other hand, little substantive research has been conducted which would provide criteria by which to judge the economic benefits which are derived from sedimentation conggol. Many such benefits are aesthetic in nature... Following urban controls, states are proceeding with uniform sediment and erosion control laws focusing primarily 40 Unfortunately, this too can be supported on agriculture. by only limited research on the economic implications of preposed controls. Research Needs Both physical and economic research is necessary to put current efforts to legislate sedimentation controls in per- 41 42 sPective. On the physical side, a more careful 21 evaluation of the technical relationships between tillage systems, crOp yields, soils, planting, and harvest dates is necessary to facilitate more specific evaluation of the costs of soil loss controls. Other areas of physical research that currently preclude relating costs of control to pre- ventable damages are (1) measurement of sediment delivery and transport between the points of initial detachment and final deposition and (2) separation of man-induced from natural or geologic erosion. DevelOping legislation alone to reduce sedimentation may not achieve the desired results - that of reducing soil loss to within acceptable levels. It is necessary to study the legal, social and political constraints involved in adopting controls. Also the evaluation of alternative incentive systems to generate expanded use of soil conser- vation practices could assist in develOping soil loss con- trols that would be effective. An idea that may result in greater compliance with soil loss controls on commercial agriculture is to combine soil conservation and pollution control programs with existing farm programs, particularly crop production controls.43 l(). 11.. 12 CHAPTER II. FOOTNOTES Udall, Stewart L., The Quiet Crisis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston. "A National Program of Research for Soil and Land Use," prepared by a Joint Task Force of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, April 1969. Water, 1955 Yearbook of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 137. Proceedings, Federal Inter-Agenc Sedimentation Conference, Miscellaneous’Pfiblication NO. 9 , U.S. Department Of5 Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, 1963, p. 4. Ibid. Wischmeier, Walter H. and Smith, Dwight D., "Predicting Rainfall-Erosion Losses from CrOpland East of the Rocky Mountains," Agricultural Handbook NO. 282, U.S. Depart- ment of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1965. Roehl, John W., "Sediment Source Areas, Delivery Ratios and Influencing Morphological Factors," presented at the Symposium on Land Erosion, October, 1962. Negev, Moshe, "A Sediment MOdel on a Digital Computer," Technical Report NO. 76, Department of Civil Engineering, Stanford University, March 1967. Fleming, George, "Hydrologic Simulation Procedures as Applied to Vegetation Management, Hydrocomp International, Palo Alto, California, 1971. U.S. Department of Agriculture, USDA H.L.-70 Model of Watershed Hydrology," Agricultural Research Service draft, 1971. Meyer, L. D. and Wischmeier, Walter H., "Mathematical Simulation of the Process of Soil Erosion by Water,” Transactions Of A.S.E.A., VOlume 12, No. 6, 1969. Roehl, 9p, gi5., p. 2. 22 .J ‘1 9‘4 1 O 2‘. 27 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. .23. 23 ERS - ARS Conference on Sediment Research, ARS Sedimen- tation Laboratory, Oxford, Mississippi, May 18-19, 1971. Held, Burnell R. and Timmons, John F., "Soil Erosion Control in Process in Western Iowa," Research Bulletin 460, Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State College, August 1958. Blase, Melvin G. and Timmons, John F., "Soil Erosion Control in Western Iowa: Progress and Problems," Research Bulletin 498, Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, October 1961. Held, Burnell R., et. al., "Soil Erosion and Some Means for its Control," Special Report NO. 29, Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University of Science and Technologyp August 1962. The rate of soil conservation practice adoption may vary with farm size. Marginal farms may be less willing to adopt soil conserving practices that yield low short run economic returns. Rosenberry, Paul E. and Moldenhauer, W. C., "Economic Implications of Soil Conservation" Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, November-Decemberl971, pp.‘22I:224. "Economic Evaluation of Conservation" prepared by the Engineering and Watershed Planning Unit, Soil Conser- vation Service, Portland, Oregon, January 1958. Ball, Gordon, et. al., "Economic Evaluation of Use Of Soil Conservation and Improvement Practices in Western Iowa," Technical Bulletin NO. 1162, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1957. Coutu, Aurthur J., ”Methods for an Economic Evaluation of Soil Conservation Practices," Technical Bulletin 137, North Carolina Agricultural Experiment Station, January 1959. Michael, Charles C. & Nauheim, Charles W., "Economics of Soil Conservation in Northeastern Kansas," Agricultural Economics Report No. 101, Kansas State University, December 1961. Atkins, S. W., "Economic Appraisal of Conservation Farming in the Grenada-Loring-Memphis Soil Area of West Tennessee," Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 369, University of Tennessee, October 1963. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 24 Smith, Wesley G. 8 Heady, Earl 0., "Use of a Dynamic Model in Programming Optimum Conservation Farm Plans on Ida-Monona Soils,” Research Bulletin 475, Agricul- tural and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University of Science and TechnologY. February 1960. Langren, Norman E. & Andersen Jay C. "A Method for Evaluating Erosion Control in Farm Planning," Agri— cultural Economics Research, U.S. Department of Agriculture, VOl. XIV No. 2, April 1962. Andersen, Jay C. et. al., "Profit-Maximizing Plans for Soil Conserving Farming in the Spring-Valley Creek Watershed in Southwest Iowa," Research Bulletin 519, Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station, Iowa State University of Science and TechnologY. July 1963. Gottschalk, L. C., "Effects of Watershed Protection Measures on Reduction of Erosion and Sediment Damages in the United States," Extract of Publication NO. 59 of the I.A.S.H. Commission of Land Erosion, n.d. A National Program of Research, 9p, cit. and Rosenberry, _p. cit. Robinson, A. R., ”A Primer on Sediment," Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, March-April 1971, p. 61. Swanson, Earl R., "Environmental Aspects of Fertilizer Use,” Paper presented in the Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, September 28, 1972. Seay, Edmond Eggleston, Jr., ”Minimizing Abatement Cost of Water Pollutants from Agriculture: A Parametric Linear Programming Approach,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, Ames, Iowa, 1970. Jacobs, James J., "Economics of Water Quality Management: Exemplified by Specified Pollutants in Agricultural Runoff," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, Ames, Iowa, 1972. Swanson, Earl R. and Narayanan, A.V.S., "Evaluation Of the Effect Of Alternative Agricultural Systems on Water Quality: A Linear Programming Approach," Unpublished, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, 1972. ‘1 I! It ‘- '1 In .J’. t;- 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 25 Rosenberry, Paul E., "Evaluating Soil Management Practices to Reduce Erosion and Sediment in a River Basin," Project underway, Economic Research Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture located at Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, 1973. Swanson, Earl R., "Soil Loss from Illinois Farms: Economic Analysis Of Productivity Loss and Sedimentation Damage," Project prOposal, Department Of Agricultural Economics, University of Illinois, 1972. Doster, D. Howard, "Economics of No-tillage,” Presented at the National No-tillage Systems Symposium, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, February 21, 1972. ”An Economic Analysis Of Erosion and Sediment Control Methods for Watersheds Undergoing Urbanization," A Dow Chemical Company Report, Midland, Michigan, February 1972. Examples are: 1) Soil Erosion Ordinance of Ann Arbor, Michigan, Chapter 63, Title V Of the Code of the City of Ann Arbor, Michigan passed March 1970. 2) Maryland Erosion Control Law applying to non-agri- cultural development in the State, Chapter 245, Maryland Laws Of 1970. ”Urban Soil Erosion and Sediment Control," by the National Association of Counties Research Foundation, 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, May 1970, p. 22. State and Federal erosion and sediment control will be considered in some detail in Chapter IV. See "A National Program Of Research," 9p, cit., p. 55 for a list Of research needs. See "Urban Soil Erosion and Sediment Control," gp.cit. p. 34 for a list Of economic research needs on urban sedimentation. See Rosenberry, Paul E. and Moldenhauer, W. C., 9p. cit., p. 224. CHAPTER III THEORETICAL BASIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY CONTROLS Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical setting for a case study of the effects of erosion controls on a farm firm. The first question is why pollution (environmental degration) exists and what alternatives are available for its ameloriation. The relevant theory encompasses the "new welfare theory" as it relates to rights of the individual in private property.1 The second question is what are the economic alternatives to reduce pollution. These alternatives range from affluent charges to regulatory legislation. At the micro level, the economic impact of controls can be evaluated with firm theory.2 The third question is then, what economic adjustments are relevant to a firm subject to controls. Why Pollution Exists Commercial agriculture has been described as distorting the environment in favor Of man.3 Food crops have replaced weeds and modern livestock have replaced their wild ancestors. Agriculture, according to this description, means radical 26 27 intervention in the ecosystem. Social organizations can be 'viewed in an analogous way. Similar to the farmer distorting the ecosystem, social organizations attempt to distort the social system in favor Of ideals consistent with human wel- fare. An example is the market system. It is a social organization designed to facilitate specialization and the exchange of goods and services and hopefully minimize the "bads" like crime, poverty and pollution. The market system is a highly specialized social organization. "Some func- tions it performs well, some not so well, and some not at all. Unfortunately, matters of environmental quality fall 4 That is, problems mainly into the latter two categories." concerning environmental quality arise from market failure. In traditional economic theory these market failures are labeled externalities. More precisely called nonpecuniary external diseconomies, they are direct effects, not priced in the market, imposed on one decision maker by another. Where the market system is performing well, consumers are expected to pay the full cost of goods purchased and receive full claim to their use. Unfortunately, those who (pay do not always receive all the benefits and payments made may not cover all production costs. As an exwple from agriculture, intensive crop production has typically been (accompanied by soil erosion. Upon entering water courses, ‘these eroded soil particles pollute the water. Pollution is «defined as a reduction in environmental quality caused by 'the disposal of residuals (soil particles). This pollution 28 is a cost not covered in the production of agricultural commodities. These costs are Opportunity costs, i.e., the ‘value of environmental services foregone by using water courses as a soil receptor. Common to many environmental quality problems are external effects such as sediment. These external effects have two important prOperties.5 The first is interdependency, i.e., individual behavior imposes costs and benefits on others. Secondly, there is no compensation; those creating costs are not made to pay nor are those providing benefits adequately rewarded. Compensation can also be thought of as a way to deal with an externality but may not remove its presence. The interaction of buyers and sellers in the market place serves to regulate both parties to the exchange. But in addition, others not users of products exchanged, are also affected. This demonstrates interdependency. Further, there is no way for those not consuming products to influence producers, i.e., lack of compensation. These concepts are illustrated in the diagram below. Goods & Services, l Consumer r 1 Producer J ' V\\ 7 Money //v Pollution Pollution Affected Citizens 29 Externalities are one of the most elusive concepts facing economists.6 What is beneficial to one individual may be harmful to others depending on factors not considered or valued in the market, i.e., time, location, etc. The market system fails to account for many environmental problems. The pervasiveness of externalities can be illustrated by considering the residuals approach.7 The materials residual approach is based on the con- cept of conservation of mass. It follows that residual from consumption and production must be equivalent to the raw materials used in the process. Hence, externalities will exist unless ”(1) all inputs are fully converted to outputs, with no unwanted material residuals along the way, and all final outputs are utterly destroyed in the process of consumption, or (2) property rights are so arranged that all relevant environmental attributes are in private owner- ship and these rights are exchanged in competitive markets."8 This discussion equates residuals with externalities and helps to explain why they exist. Up to this point, it has been suggested that external- ities exist as part Of a market economy and that they are pervasive. They exist because of transaction costs, legal restrictions and gaps in information and prOperty rights. These are some of the same reasons Pareto Optimality is difficult to achieve. Pareto Optimality is an efficient position where no one can be made better Off without making someone else worse Off. It represents a theoretical base 30 against which actual achievement can be compared. Theoretical discussions of the competitive model and Pareto Optimality assume full knowledge. Transmission Of information is costly and it is not likely that enough will be produced. Improving the quality and availability of information would assist those affected by externalities to bargain for a resolution. Since knowledge is scarce and costly, it is important to know what to be efficient about. In a market economy, information is generated to facilitate efficient production, consumption and distribution. Increas- ingly, it is becoming apparent that we must also generate information, hence be efficient about ameliorating adverse environmental effects of production on the environment.9 Reversible and irreversible environmental effects should be considered in allocating information gathering resources. Resource decisions that result in reversible environmental effects pose limited problems. However, when there are irreversible, care should be taken to maintain options for the future. Transactions costs are another facet of externalities. Transactions costs include, but are not limited to, the costs of generating, recording and communicating information and the actual physical movement of goods and services necessary to bring about a mutually beneficial transaction. In some instances, transaction costs may exceed the net individual benefits to be gained from a transaction. Infinitely high transactions costs may result from legal restraints on the 31 use and exchange of resources. Lastly, the existence of environmental problems can be traced to the system of economic incentives based on use rights in prOperty. The structure of property rights in the United States is determined by the Constitution. Con- cepts incorporated in this document are that prOperty is both a natural right and a defense against the State. Pursuit Of self interest, as consistent with general welfare is also present. The rationale for this is well expressed by a quote from de Tocqueville, "If you do not succeed in connecting the notion of right with personal interest, which is the only immutable point in the human heart, what means will you have of governing except by fear." The Constitution, then is based on private property and individual freedom to pursue self interest within a framework of laws. Separation of powers in the Constitution provides individual protection from the State. The courts have tra- ditionally protected individuals against government action to attenuate private use rights without compensation. The current concern is in the state's ability to deal with 10 It has become increasingly clear private prOperty rights. that private decisions do not always lead to desirable social results. Hence, concern has shifted to protecting the majority from individual action or inaction. The functions of property are to..."distribute claims to, and liabilities for, the benefits and burdens of prOperty 11 interests..." This definition makes it clear that prOperty 32 rights have distributive effects. They indicate who may use resources and who will gain or lose from decisions to use resources. The welfare implications of granting property rights should not be taken lightly. Headley raises questions about how granting property rights will influence the economy's performance and that the impact on the economy should be the criterion for granting prOperty rights.12 These questions are concerned with whether granted prOperty“: rights are consistent with social goals, their relative impact on various social groups, and how markets will be affected. Explicit awareness of the interconnectedness Of owner- ship rights, incentives and economic behavior has recently initiated an effort to expand economic theory to specific- ally incorporate property rights. A few basic ideas taken from a recent review article Of prOperty rights and economic theory will help illuminate these relationships.13 First, property rights are defined as "the sanctioned behavioral relations among men that arise from the existence of things and pertain to their use." It is explained that this means prOperty rights define economic and social relations with respect to resource use. Second, profit maximization behavior is rejected as descriptive of the economic man. A shift is made to utility maximization as the central theme in economic behavior. This might seem like a step backward to some economic theorists. However, conceptually, it pro- Vides a broader base from which to study economic behavior. 33 It may also be an admission of the limited applicability and realism of profit motivated behavior. A third important idea is that different property rights systems lead to different behavior.14 Property rights define what choices are permissable as well as the system of penalties and rewards. The contribution of prOperty rights in economics is to show how alternative assignments of prOperty rights affects the economic outcomes of resource use and allocation. Taken to the extreme, economics might be considered as the study of prOperty rights and subsequent resource use. Limi- tations of traditional theory might be traced to glossing over the role of prOperty rights in determining economic behavior. Techniques for Control The costs of agricultural commodities are understated when residuals disposal reduces environmental quality. Agricultural commodities are produced and distributed as desirable outcomes within a marketing framework. However, the concomitant pollution is not desirable and must be dealt with outside normal market channels.15 One of the problems in developing environmental controls to supplement the market system is to determine an acceptable 16 What pollution control levels will amount of pollution. equate marginal social benefits and costs? This amounts to determining what degree of pollution peOple are willing to live with. Another important question is how should costs 34 of pollution be distributed.17 The answer to the latter question is not strictly monetary. Alternative techniques for control are outlined and their relative impacts discussed. Pollution control methods discussed in the literature include both technical alterna— tives and social instruments. Technical alternatives for pollution control outlined by Freeman, et. al. are dis- cussed below.19 They define pollution as reduced environ- mental quality from residuals disposal. The first alterna- tive is to reduce the throughput of materials and energy. The term throughput is offered as a replacement for the terms inputs and outputs used in traditional discussions of the production process. This term encompasses the environment within which the circular flow of goods and services between producing and household sectors takes place. An example of reduced throughput would be to curtail intensive crop pro- duction on erosive soils thereby reducing erosion. Secondly, residuals could be treated to reduce their negative environmental impact. Suspended sediment from eroded soil could be treated to remove plant nutrients or pesticides and the water returned to the watercourse. The third technical alternative is to carefully select the time and place of residuals discharge such that harmful effects are minimized. For example, a fast moving stream could accommodate a higher biological oxygen demand (B.O.D.) imposed on it by nutrient carrying soil particles than a slow moving stream. 35 The last alternative is to invest in the assimilative capacity of environment. The capacity of a stream to handle the B.O.D. from plant nutrients, carried by eroded soil particles, could be argumented by mechanically areating the water. As indicated, the above are technical alternatives to reduce pollution and their implementation would require a system of incentives. Various social instruments to provide incentives include environmental legal action initiated by individuals or by those not personally damaged, systems of effluent charges, taxes or subsidies, and systems Of en- forced standards or regulation.20 Both of the latter systems require government intervention. These systems represent various ways to internalize external costs. The principle is to force or provide incentives for firms to make pollution one of their manage- ment decision variables. Effluent charges are suggested as a control technique 18 The for those who think polluters should bear the costs. concept is economically efficient since costs would be reflected in products reaching consumers. Effluent charges increase production costs, and in the long run could shift supply curves left and thereby reduce output and increase product price. Equity is achieved since payment is made for use of the environment for waste disposal. Effluent charges have the advantage of yielding revenue that could be used to centrally treat waste discharges, provide information, etc. 36 Taxes, if levied on the same basis, would have an effect on producers similar to effluent charges. Taxes could be imposed on polluters and the revenue used to reduce harmful effects or force some firms to cease operations and/or relocate. If taxes were too low the firm would pay the tax and continue to pollute. Both effluent charges and taxes have been called, "licenses to pollute" by the "man on the street." Subsidies are another alternative to control pollution. In this case the polluter is paid not to pollute. Subsidies will Offset pollution abatement costs of the firm. However, there is no incentive for the firm to seek the most efficient abatement technology. Further, there is no economic incentive for the firm to reduce pollution below the subsi- dized level. Subsidies are not an economically efficient solution because pollution abatement costs are not reflected in products reaching the consumer. Firm costs and output are unchanged. Hence, products will be priced too low and too many of them will be produced. The implication Of subsidies for taxpaying consumers is that they are paying for protection. Taxes, subsidies, and appropriate effluent charges require collective government action and a good deal of information to achieve desired results. A balance must be reached between the costs of obtaining this information and the undesirable effects to be reduced. Not satisfied with these alternatives some theorists 37 argue in favor of establishing standards and then using taxes or subsidies to achieve them.21 Baumol attempts to show that with public goods externalities neither taxation nor compensation is compatible with Optimal resource allocation. He suggests that standards, such as a four per cent un- employment rate, have a number of advantages. For example, they require less information, do not use police or the courts, pose no state financial burden and promise at least in principle to reduce pollution. Another means Of internalizing externalities is through voluntary action.22 If bribes were used either by the person causing or bearing the external cost they would have to equal the cost of reducing the externality to the former or equal the benefits foregone to the latter. If perfect bargaining could be achieved a Pareto Optimum could result. However, many barriers exist to achieving such a solution. These difficulties include valuing the externality and excluding free riders. Merging parties to an externality is another form of voluntary control. For this to be possible, as with bribes, the number of parties must be few. A potential problem if the resulting firm is large is inordinate market control or monopoly. For controls to be economically efficient marginal social costs must equal marginal social benefits. Within this framework the "right amount of pollution" can be determined. 38 Costs and benefits MC $/acre I I | I I l I 50% 75% Reduced soil loss (units) Figure l. The Right Amount of Pollution From Figure 1 the Optimum or efficient level of soil loss is 50 per cent of existing levels. Benefits include areas a + d and the costs are represented by area d and, Of course, marginal benefits equal costs at the intersection of these two curves. Additional soil loss control equal to 75 per cent of current levels can be achieved and the incre- mental benefits are represented by area c. The incremental costs, however, equal c + b. Hence, control beyond 50 per cent is economically inefficient since marginal costs exceed marginal benefits. Up to this point we have briefly discussed effluent charges, taxes, subsidies and voluntary action to control externalities. One of the most widely used techniques for 39 23 As with other pollution control is legal restriction. controls, the Optimum level is where the marginal costs of control equal the marginal benefits from control. It is possible, for a particular firm size, that regulations be imposed such that marginal benefits equal marginal costs. Regulations are generally an educated guess and not com- pletely arbitrary. However, the Optimum level of pollution from regulation is less likely to be achieved than with tax subsidies or effluent charges. The reasoning is that regu- lation is an inflexible solution. Because individual firms have different cost curves for pollution control, they should treat different amounts. Each firm, under a tax, could find its Optimum adjustment. Firms with lower cost structures would treat more and pay less tax and the reverse would be true for firms with high cost structures. The effect is to allocate pollution control to the most efficient firms. This result does not follow from regulation. While not economically efficient, regulation does have definite advantages.24 The first is that regulation may simply be easier to institute. Public revenue problems associated with tax collection and allocation are absent. A second point is that regulation could be self policing if provi- sions for private suits against violators were included. This is especially true if provisions for sharing court costs are available. Regulations reducing allowable soil loss represent an attenuation or restriction of the use rights in property and are a means of forcing control costs 40 to be internalized. Soil erosion and subsequent sedimentation is a nonpoint source of pollution. Land users collectively discharge soil materials in a dispersed manner such that no individual discharge can be identified. Bargaining positions individu- ally or collectively are ill-defined, hence it is difficult to determine the right level of soil loss. In lieu of this conceptual optimum, regulated levels have been imposed to provide some degree of soil loss control. Admittedly, this is a satisficing rather than optimizing position. In order to achieve the least disruption of competitive positions, regulation Of polluting firms must be universally applied. If applied in a piecemeal fashion, losses would be incurred by some firms which would result in an improved competitive position for others with similar cost structures. If all firms are affected uniformly costs to each would rise: and assuming a market effect supply curves would shift left and a new equilibrium achieved at a higher price. Another alternative is for efficient firms to acquire inefficient firms and there may be no market effect. The imposition of controls would have the least dis- ruptive effect on the economy if they were phased in over a period of time. This would allow time for resource adjust- ment. An example is the auto exhaust emission standards set for 1975. 41 Firm Response to Controls Soil loss controls set standards and allow the land user to select the most efficient means to meet them. The economic impact of controls can be minimized since the optimum combination of resources in response to controls is possible. Tracing firm response to soil loss controls necessi- tates a look at alternative means to control soil loss. Ultimately control methods are limited by crOp production technology since soil loss is a joint product of crOp pro- duction. Soil loss from agronomic practices due to wind and water erosion can be reduced by limiting tillage and increas- ing crop residue management, using less intensive row crop rotations and in general by adopting soil conserving prac- tices. Investments in durable assets such as tillage equipment are reflected in the fixed costs of the firm. The fixed costs of these tillage tool investments do not change with production. Variable costs Of production are effected when the use of fixed resources is changed. For example, reduced tillage tools require fewer machine Operating hours (variable costs) per unit Of crOp yield. In practice, how an individual land user's economic position will be affected by soil loss controls will vary with the type and mix of current enterprises, soil type, existing land preparation methods and his financial position. 42 The following theoretical discussion focuses on a few of these variables as an example of firm response. Several assumptions are necessary to theoretically analyze firm response to soil loss controls. The first is that the crop production function can be represented in the following way: Y = F (X ....Xa/Xa+1...Xb/Xb+1....Xn) where Y = crop production X1....Xa = variable factors Of production Xa+l...Xb = factors fixed for the firm but variable between enterprises Xb+l...Xn factors fixed for the firm and enterprise The factors (X1...Xa) are combined such that E§§§i = l for i = l...a or that these inputs are combined in a least cost fashion. The factors Xa+l...Xb are fixed for the firm because the value of these factors in production is less than acquisition price but greater than salvage value (00>>Pxiacq >MVPxi> Pxi salZO for i=a+1..b). Thesefactors are variable between enterprises but are expected to be allocated to equate marginal returns between uses. (MVPXij are equal for all i-a+l....b for all j) Examples include family labor and tractors. Some adjustment in the use of these factors can be expected as product prices, input costs or the productivity of inputs change the relationship between MVP's and acquisition and (‘I r ' M A yes he ‘9“ M- (I I“‘ ‘u, 43 salvage prices. Factors fixed for the farm (Xb+l....Xn where MVPxi>'O) but not variable between enterprises (Xa+l....Xb). Examples include terraces, drainage systems and tillage tools. Assuming a normally shaped production function, cost curves can be drawn as indicated below. MC ATC $ ATC AVC Output Figure 2. Cost Functions for Crop Production Figure 2 shows both acquisition and salvage values for fixed factors. Salvage values represent the Opportunity cost of factors Of production. At some level Of soil loss control it can be expected that the productive value of certain factors will be reduced to the point where they will no longer be used in specific types of crOp production. 44 For example, under soil loss controls sloping land may no longer be used for grain production. Further assumptions are that input and crOp prices are constant, that the latter prices are above ATCs and that firms are profit maximizers. CrOp prices must be above ATCs and below ATCa to be consistent with fixed asset theory. If prices were below ATCs fixed factors would be diverted to other uses. If crop prices were above ATCa more of these factors would be purchased or diverted from other uses to crOp production. In essence, these factors are worth more in production than their cost, i.e., additional units would be profitable. The assumption that firms are profit maxi- mizers ensures that production is within stage II of the production function. A likely adjustment to soil loss controls is to adOpt reduced tillage systems. A change to reduced tillage tools affects the productivity of other factors of production and a crOp yield response would be anticipated. Whether the yield response will be positive or negative varies with soil type. variation across soil types for the same tillage system is greater than between tillage systems. Hence, yield variation depends more on the distribution of soils than on the tillage system used. For purposes of illustration it is assumed that there is no yield response to reduced tillage systems. An input affected by reduced tillage is labor, (fixed for the firm but variable between enterprises) its marginal product will be increased. The magnitude of the 45 change will determine whether the new marginal value product of labor exceeds its acquisition price and in turn whether some labor will be transferred to other enterprises. The marginal product of variable factors of production, in the aggregate will be reduced, i.e., more will be required to maintain the previous yield levels. The reduced tillage response to soil loss controls will result in a new set of cost curves for the firm. Those are illustrated in Figure 3. In general, average fixed costs (tillage equipment plus labor) will be reduced. MC' MC ATC ATC $ ATC ATC AVC' AVC i\ \‘v :=::§!ln" " 5% mm mm Output Figure 3. CrOp Production Costs After acquisition the cost of reduced tillage equipment 46 becomes fixed for the firm and not variable between enter- prises. Labor requirements, fixed for the firm but variable between enterprises, are reduced and may more than offset the increased fixed cost of tillage equipment. If this is true the net effect will be a reduction in fixed costs for the firm. Again, in general, variable costs will be increased. To maintain crOp yields reduced tillage must be accompanied by increased seed, fertilizer, and herbicide applications. These costs may more than Offset the reduced costs associated with fewer passes over the land. Assuming the reduction in fixed costs more than offsets the increase in variable costs average total costs will be reduced. These changes are represented by an increase of AVC to AVC' and a decrease in ATCa and ATC8 to ATCA and ATCé. The marginal cost curve will shift up and to the left. If the new ATCa curve is below the crOp prices, the Optimum adjustment for firm would be to acquire more assets for crOp production. On the balance the case for reduced tillage from the standpoint of the land users may rest with saving labor. The importance of saving labor will depend on the opportunity cost of labor and can be expected to vary between land users. Another reSponse to soil loss regulation is to adOpt less intensive row crOp rotations. This means substituting forage production for corn, small grains or other higher valued crOps. This implies no change in production functions 47 for respective crops except that timing of production will be changed. However, there will be a change in the distri- bution of production between row crops and forage crOps. The economic effect is to reduce the total value of crOps produced over the life of a rotation. This in turn may influence total production of these respective crOps by region, and assuming a market effect, crop prices may change. If there is a change in crOp supplies by regions and a con- sequent change in prices, firm adjustments can be expected accordingly. For example, if the price of hay drOps below the ATCs the optimum adjustment for the firm would be to discontinue hay production. Yet another response to soil loss controls is the adoption of soil conservation practices such as contour tillage or contour strip cropping. These practices increase land preparation and harvesting (variable) costs. The con- servation practices themselves may have only a limited impact on crOp yield. In practice firm response to controls will involve some combination of tillage systems, crOp rotations and soil conservation practices. And 3 priori it is difficult to anticipate the combinations of these variables and hence the net response of the firm. Empirical results of the linear prOgramming model will shed more light on this. The previous discussion outlines, in theory, specific firm adjustments to soil loss controls. However, there are a number of variables that could constrain this adjustment. 48 Where will funds come from to implement soil loss regulations? Private capital is an important source; however, credit, tax regulations and cost sharing assistance are also significant. The Rural Environmental Assistance Program (REAP) that provided the majority of cost sharing funds for permanent conservation practices (terraces, etc) was terminated for 1973. A REAP apprOpriation bill was passed for fiscal 1974 but program details are not yet available. Cost sharing assistance is currently limited to tax regulations allowing rapid amortization and investment credit. If rapid amorti- zation is chosen, the investment credit will not be allowed.21 However, it is possible to combine 20 per cent first year depreciation with investment credit. The primary criteria for credit-worthiness is the ability to repay according to a specified schedule. Specific uses for credit are a less important criteria. Assuming controls do not significantly impair a land user's overall net returns, credit should be available for soil conserving systems. Those most affected would be marginal operators or those made marginal through the implementation of con- trols. Whether land users would be willing to borrow and pay from current earnings for a non-income generating investment is another question. Their willingness may not be in question, however, if mandatory controls are insti- tuted. Often cited impediments to the adOption of pollution abatement practices are discussed by Van Arsdall and Johnson. 49 Some of these are outlined below.22 The first and perhaps the most important is uncertainty and lack of knowledge. Two problems face those adOpting soil conserving practices. First, the cost and effectiveness of various control systems will not be fully known until further research is completed. Lack of technical assistance is a related problem. There are nearly unlimited combinations of tillage systems, crop rotations, residue management and other soil management practices. Each combination results in different crOp yields, soil loss and production costs. Second, the control level ultimately demanded by society is unknown. Rational behavior for land users, attempting to avoid being left with obsolete systems and the inability to recapture investments is to delay adoption of soil conserving systems. Another reason for reduced response to controls is the absence of economic incentives. In the long run there is no incentive for land users to reduce soil loss below the natural rate of soil formation. Further control that may be desired for environmental purposes is beyond the decision frame of the profit motivated firm. In the short run it may not even be in the interests of land users to reduce soil loss to the rate of soil formation. An important reason is the age and tenancy status of the land user. The age of the land user determines his planning horizon. Typically, Older men are reluctant to make investments when the returns extend beyond their planning horizon. The tenure status of the land user is also important. 50 Agreements on sharing returns to land improvements may pre- clude adOption of soil conserving systems. Incentives must be provided to tenants before additional conservation land treatment efforts can be expected. 10. 11. CHAPTER III. FOOTNOTES The "new welfare theory” in contrast to the "Old" focuses on a general equilibrium rather than a market by market equilibrium and assumes utility is ordinal and not measurable. No attempts will be made to evaluate off-farm costs and benefits from controls. 1.1." .-.-‘_‘ A... .- ‘ . I. I Boulding, Kenneth, Economics as a Science, McGraw-Hill, 1970, p. 50. Barkley, Paul W. and Seckler, David W., Economic Growth and Environmental Decay: The Solution Becomes the Problem. Harcourt Brace,‘l972, p. 99. Ibid, p. 101. Biniek, Joseph P., "Economics of Water Pollution Control Measures,” paper presented at a meeting, Fort Collins, August 1-13, 1969, p. 7. Kneese, Allen V., "Environmental Pollution: Economics and Policy", AER, VOl. LXI, No. 2, p. 153 and Ayres, Robert U. and Kneese, Allen V.; Production, Consumption and Externalities, RFF Reprint No. 76, July 1969, p. 282. Ibid., p. 283. It should be pointed out efficiency and economic analysis is a sound base from which to deal with environmental problems. The focus must change from what is technic- ally efficient to what is socially efficient, i.e., attempt to broaden our focus to internalize externalities. Wunderlick, Gene, "Emerging Views of Property in Land," in Issues in Natural Resource Use and Development, Report No. 1, North Central Regional Strategy. Committee on Natural Resource DevelOpment, edit., Dan Bromley & Loyd Fischer, October 1971, p. 7. Ibid., p. 4. 51 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 52 Headley, J. Charles, "Agricultural Productivity, Technology and Environmental Quality," AAEA Seminar Papers, August 21, 1972 presented at the University of Florida, p. 10. Furubotn, Eirik, and Pejovich, Svetozar; "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Litera- ture," Journal of Economic Literature, December 1972, VOl. x, NO. 4, pp. 1137-1162. In a recent article, A. Allan Schmid explores the question of what differences do alternative institu- tions have for human behavior. He suggests four institutional alternatives and researchable hypotheses. A.Allen Schmid, "Analytical Institutional Economics: Challenging Problems in the Economics of Resources for a New Environment", Am. J. Ag. Econ. 54:893-901, Dec. 1972. In a recent article Randall discusses conditions necessary for viable market solutions to environmental quality externalities. He explains that institutional change is necessary to reduce the crucial variable, transactions costs. See Randall, Alan, "Market Solu- tions to Externality Problems: Theory and Practice," Am. J. Ag. Econ. 54:175-183, May 1972. Connor, Larry, and Hoglund, C. R., "An Economic Appraisal of Farm Pollution and Waste Management," Ag. Econ. Misc. 1970-4, Michigan State University, Depart- ment of Agricultural Economics, p. 4. Schmid A. Allen, "Impact of Pollution Controls on Agriculture," paper presented at a meeting January 7, 1970, p. 15. Kneese Allen V., "Protecting Our Environment and Natural Resources in the 19703", RFF Reprint # 88, p.196. There is a tendency to identify polluters as villians when in reality it is difficult to determine who or if such a person or group exists. See: Connor L. J., Environmental Pollution - Causes, Costs, Controls, and Tradeoffs," Ag. Econ. Misc. 1971-8, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural Economics, July 1971, p. 5. Freeman A., Myrick III; Havaman, Robert A. and Kneese, Allen V., ”The Economics of Environmental Policy," John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 1973. See Chapter IV for a discussion of environmental law. 21. 22. 23. 24. 53 Baumol, William J., "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities," AER, VOl. LXII, No. 3, p. 307 and Biniek Joseph P., "Economics of Water Pollution Control Measures," paper presented at a meeting Ft. Collins, August 10-13, 1969, p. 7. Davis, Otto, A. and Kamien, Morton I., "Externalities, Information and Alternative Collective Action," in the Analysis and Evaluation Of Public Expenditures: The PPB. System a compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee 9lst Congress p. 77 and Johnson, James, and Connor, Larry J. "Origins and Implications of Environmental Quality Standards for Animal Produc- tion," reprint from Proceedings of the International Symposium of Livestock Wastes, St. Joseph, Michigan. Barkley, Paul 9p. gig., p. 107 and Connor, Larry, J., "Environmental Pollution - Causes, Costs, Controls, and Tradeoffs," Ag. Econ. Misc. 1971-8, Michigan State University, Dept. of Ag. Economics, July 1971, p. 6. Barkley and Seckler, 3p. cit., p. 108. CHAPTER IV ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SOIL LOSS LEGISLATION Introduction -1 As the last chapter indicated, environmental problems can often be traced to gaps in prOperty rights and the results are called externalities. PrOperty rights can be viewed as legal policy guidelines for relationships between people as individuals and groups, and their resources. Also, rules, custom and law become the fabric of social controls and agreements - they provide the framework within which economic systems Operate. The rules men devise to order access to their resources has been called the ”hallmark of economic development."1 However, a counterpart of economic development has been environmental degradation. The amount of pollution created has grown to such enormous proportions and is increasing at such a rapid rate that controls are necessary to prevent the demise of mankind.2 Further, the technical capacity to inflict irreversible environmental insults has reached a danger point. These developments have generated the need for environmental regulation. Environmental regulation is accomplished through environmental law. This chapter contains a brief review of environmental 54 55 law followed by a few comments on the limitations of environmental legal solutions. The last section outlines recent nonpoint pollution control (soil loss) legislation, specifically, the Iowa Conservancy legislation. The latter will be treated in some detail and contrasted with similar legislation in Wisconsin and Michigan. Environmental Law A brief review of environmental law will assist in understanding the degree of erosion control that can be expected from legal solutions. Legal concepts can be grouped into procedural considerations, common law, statu- tory law and constitutional law. Procedural considerations are conditions that must be met before suits can be brought to court.3 The procedures include standing to sue, class actions and burden of proof. Before "standing" is granted ‘the individual or individuals bringing suit must be harmed or have harm threatened in the future by those conducting the pollution emitting activity. Until recently this has xmeant nearly a complete bar to private law suits challenging actions of the federal government. A 1968 case, Flast versus Cohen, decided by the United States Supreme Court, has greatly increased the possibility of private individuals obtaining standing to sue against the federal government. Standing to sue against local governments is founded on ax: individual's status as a taxpayer and is granted in most jurisdictions. Increasingly the trend is to allow action .. Bk. N..B..~of:‘.wx p15! 56 against state governments on the same basis. This more liberal interpretation of standing to sue will allow citizens to bring action forcing government officials to justify their lack of action on, for example, nonpoint pollution laws. Class action is a procedural device that allows courts to provide remedy for an individual who has a small stake in an environmental problem. There are several desirable features of class actions. They allow potentially prohibi- tive costs of a suit to be shared. The larger claims sought may attract better legal talent. And, perhaps as important, it focuses public and judicial attention on environmental problems. The burden of proof rule requires that the party alleging damages must demonstrate that certain activities cause specific harm. This is typically not easy. Further, 'the party alleging damages must counter arguments by the polluter that his conduct is legally justified. A more relaxed burden of proof rule is necessary to prevent legal action from being terminated before the court- room is reached. Recent court cases reduce the burden of proof to showing actual or potential environmental damages. The burden of proof is then shifted to the defendant to demonstrate the reasonableness of his actions. In all three procedural rules discussed above there has been a gradual relaxation in the attitude of the courts, generating greater potential for successful environmental law suits. 57 1 Common law elements often used in environmental suits include nuisance, trespass, liability and negligence.5 Common law is based on judicial decisions, formed largely by transforming customs into rules of law. - A nuisance can be defined as an unreasonable inter— ference in an individual's right to use or enjoy his property.6 A nuisance represents a restriction in the use of property 1 n and can be classed as either public or private. A public nuisance affects the rights to which all people are entitled. A private nuisance applies to individuals in the enjoyment of some private right not common to the public. Courts, in handling nuisance cases, must balance the rights of both parties, a so-called "balancing equities." Past decisions have given the greatest weight to economic damages without carefully considering the natural environment. Trespass is an actionable invasion of interests in the exclusive possession of land. In the past it has applied to only physical invasion, but now applies to visible or in- visible intrusion upon an individual's protected interests. Advantages of trespass over nuisance action are that proof of actual injury is not required and the plaintiff is en- titled to damages. Problems with trespass are that if it has occurred over a long period the trespasser may have acquired prescriptive rights to continue and that the courts may apply the balancing equities test. Liability may be used in conjunction with nuisance or trespass action and damages recovered. However, the absence 58 of a substantial body of case law limits its use in environ- mental problems. Negligence action requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant was negligent and a causal relationship exists between the defendant's action and his injury. The major problem in proving negligence in environmental quality _ cases is that there are no recognized standards to apply. Statutory law, enactments of Congress and state legisla- tures, and local laws or ordinances provide another basis for individual or group action to prevent environmental damages. The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act adopted by 35 states provides courts with the power to declare the rights of parties. A suit under this act would request the court to determine the validity of agency actions and whether the environment was being adequately considered. Another statute, the River and Harbor Act of 1899, prohibits dis- charging refuse in navigable waters or their tributaries. Fines range from $500 to $2,500 per day of violation with half the fine going to the individual leading to the convic- tion. This provision, where the informer shares in the statutory penalty, could provide a strong deterrent against polluters if it were more widely used. A recent statute with potential for improving the environment is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) . The purpose of this Act is to protect the environment. Among its important provisions are the establishment of a Council on Environmental Quality, the requirement that all .- II "43”.. II ..;.n,- . J I n n. 59 federal actions provide for consideration of the environment, and that all federal or federally assisted projects must be accompanied by an environmental impact statement. The impact statement must consider adverse effects, alternatives to the proposed action and any irreversibilities or irretriev- able resource commitments. NEPA has been given much acclaim; however, its substance for improving the environment has been 7 The Act has been interpreted to mean that questioned. agencies consider environmental effects in good faith but judgment rests with the agency. Environmentalists' Opinion can not be substituted and in the absence of "bad faith” the courts will not require that alternatives be used. A few states (Wisconsin and Florida) have statutes permitting private suits to enjoin a public nuisance. However, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff and few actions have been taken because of the prohibitive expense. The State of Michigan used a different approach in their Natural Resources Conservation and Environmental Act of 1970. All the plaintiff must do is make a pgimg fagie_case and then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. The Act also gives citizens the right to enjoin a polluter even though no special individual damage can be shown. State and Federal Constitutions provide potential (environmental remedies under law. It is contended that a 3pollution-free environment is guaranteed by the unenumerated :rights of the Federal Constitution (9th Amendment).9 It is 60 further contended that the due process clause of the 5th Amendment prevents the Federal Government from interfering with these rights and that the 14th Amendment extends these rights to the states. The State of New York amended its constitution in 1969 to, in essence, guarantee the right to enjoy a healthy and safe environment. The Michigan Constitution has had a similar provision since 1963, but neither has been used in environmental litigation. They do, however, offer consider- able potential for abating environmental degradation. The public trust doctrine, recognized as early as 1892 by the U.S. Supreme Court, could become a basis for environ- mental lawsuits. This trust is a precondition assumed by the Government in its statutory right to govern. Further, it is implicit in the beneficiary-trustee relationship between the public and the Government. The public trust concept provides a substantive basis for developing a comprehensive legal approach to environmental problems.10 Unfortunately, a large number of courts do not believe that they are the appropriate forum to examine actions dealing with resources in public trust.11 Currently the public trust concept applies primarily to specific public lands. Defining water and air resources as commodities held ii: the public trust would, in essence, assign prOperty rights 1:: these resources and allow legal action to protect these :rights. Perhaps the time is approaching to modify our con- {cept.of property rights in the direction of a public trust. 61 For a century and a half we have been slowly retreating from a concept Of relatively complete private property rights to a more society-oriented view. We are shifting from the view of prOperty as the deepotic domain of individual owners to a concept of property as a public trust-~as rights that people may hold in land and other objects that must be exercised in the public interest and subject to public direction and guidance.12 Before discussing the limitations of legal solutions it might be worth emphasizing the trend in environmental law. There is a definite shift toward a more liberal inter- pretation of existing laws in favor of environmental cases. Examples are easing of the requirements to Obtain standing to sue, a broader definition of actional trespass, and the courts' recognition of class action suits. Also, there has been a shift from the courts to the state legislatures in environmental management. There has been a good deal of environmental legislative activity at the Federal level also. The emphasis in this legislation is toward laws that will protect the individual plaintiff and the public as well. More fundamental is a rethinking of who should represent the public in environmental cases. In the past law has tended to minimize the role of private citizens and create regulatory agents to Speak for the public. This role is beginning to change in favor of private citizens. Basically, it represents a reversion to a more participatory democratic system and has considerable potential for dealing with environmental problems.13 in I..k..lw.l?,dlv. J K. I. u 62 Limitations of Legal Solutions Changes in environmental law provide potential for reducing the degradation of common prOperty resources; however, the approach is piecemeal. Collectively, common law remedies suffer from a number of shortcomings for dealing with environmental quality problems.14 They are concerned with the rights of individuals and are not readily adaptable to protecting the public interest. More import- antly, they provide no means to prevent pollution, irrevers- ible acts, or provide any general approach. They only supply remedies for past acts and, possibly under enjoinment, prevent specific future occurrences. Individual legal actions to control pollution are said to be relatively ineffective for a number of reasons.1 First, there are many difficulties in the pleading and proof of agricultural pollution cases. Secondly, the courts do not approach agricultural pollution cases with an enlightened attitude. And, thirdly, court action is too unpredictable to base a pollution control program. In addition the adversary element in the courtroom may not result in compre- hensive and sound plans for environmental management.16 There is also some question about whether private legal efforts can be sustained. If a more comprehensive approach is to be taken more resources (dollars) will be required. Current citizen efforts are sporadic because they are dependent on philanthropic financial sources. One alternative .ll .41.. ay’iufilvv. IN I 63 is to expand the use of sharing fines imposed on polluters when citizens bring action. This is a provision of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. In sum, current environmental legal efforts are both fragmented and inadequately funded. Lohrmann concludes that ”given the nature of the pollution problem, anything short of a massive legislative effort at all levels of government will probably not provide an effective and lasting solution."17 In the interim, private environmental litigation in addition to providing some temporary relief, can be used to develop a body of case law useful in drafting future legislation and provides a means of keeping public and private officials alert to environmental problems. Current Nonpoint (Soil Loss) Pollution Compared with other environmental problems, little attention has been given to nonpoint pollution from land runoff.18 Soil erosion has only recently been thought of (as a pollution problem. Historically, the focus has been (n1 reducing erosion to maintain soil productivity for agri- culture. Substantial government efforts have been made to promote voluntary control of erosion over the last 35 years.19 The general conclusion is that voluntary efforts have been inadequate to achieve the level of soil loss desired. The creation of watershed management units with authority to set and enforce standards for water and land resource use has received considerable attention recently. 64 The following discussion outlines the provisions of recent legislation in Iowa and then contrasts this with similar laws in Wisconsin and Michigan. Iowa Conservancy Legislation The Iowa Conservancy Legislation represents a first in the area of agricultural soil loss legislation.20 Since its passage in July of 1971 many other states have followed. The immediate reason for establishing authority to enforce soil loss limits was the expressed need to control siltation of Iowa's lakes and streams.21 Major provisions of the Iowa law will be outlined below followed by a few comments. The objective of the Iowa Conservancy Act is to preserve and protect the public interest in soil and water resources of the State. To accomplish this, the State is divided into six conservancy districts each of which are political sub- divisions of the State. Each conservancy district is governed by the State Soil Conservation Committee and the Chairman of the State Soil Conservation Committee will be ‘the Chairman of each conservancy district. Each district conservation committee (Commissioners) supervises the water resources of the district and has the authority to sue and be sued in the name of the district. The basis for action by commissioners is that soil erosion is declared a nuisance if it results in damage to any conservancy district improvement to property other than that of the owner or occupant of the land on which the erosion is occurring. The Commissioners may require abatement of such nuisances under provisions of the Conservancy law. To determine when a violation has occurred, the Commis- sioners of each soil conservation district will establish and adopt a set of "reasonable" soil loss limits. The limits will be based on tOpography, soil characteristics, current land use and other factors affecting erosion. Limits will be established for agricultural, nonagricultural lands and construction sites. Prior to adopting the soil loss limits, public hearings will be held to give those affected by the regulations an Opportunity to express their concerns. Actual soil loss limits adopted for agricultural lands vary from one to five tons per acre per year. Before any action is undertaken by the Commissions, a written complaint must be filed with the soil conservation district indicating damages from excessive erosion. The Commissioners are required to investigate complaints the burden of proof resting with them.22 The results of the investigation will be given to the alleged violator with a request for voluntary abatement. The Commissioners are required to issue an administrative order to the violators advising them of action required. The Commissioners must also determine if cost-share assistance is available. The Conservancy Law states that cost-sharing funds Of at least 75 per cent must be available for permanent conservation practices and committed to an alleged violator before a court order requiring compliance can be issued. 66 An important question is to determine to what extent the cost-sharing provision of the conservancy legislation will limit its implementation. The primary source of cost- sharing funds was to come from the Rural Environmental Assistance Program (REAP) administered by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS). The REAP program has been cancelled for 1973; however, a REAP appro- priation bill was passed for fiscal 1974. Program details are not yet available. For certain conservation practices, ASCS would cost-share, supporting the conservancy legisla- tion to the extent that funds are available. The Iowa REAP specialist23 explained that each ASCS county committee decides how to allocate its budget for conservation work and that they have indicated a general willingness to support the legislation. The REAP specialist pointed out, however, that the counties had no trouble exhausting their budgets prior to the conservancy legislation. Additional conserva- tion work initiated under the conservancy law would repre- sent another demand on funds currently exhaustible with existing programs. In addition to the fact that REAP funds were fully extended prior to the conservancy legislation, another possible difficulty exists because the REAP Act specifies a rmaximum payment allowable to any one land owner or user. The law states that for each program year, funds for approved practices shall not exceed the sum of $2,500 to any person. This provision would constrain the rate of compliance with 67 the conservancy legislation. The impact would be related to the size of land holdings under a single ownership or control. A land user with extensive acreage may be re- quired to make only relatively minor reductions in annual soil loss because of the cost-sharing limitation. Funding for cost-sharing has been a problem for the legislation from the beginning. An attempt was made to incorporate Iowa State cost-sharing funds into the legis- lation when it was being drafted. This was met with sufficient opposition to get the provision removed from the Act. No funds are now available from the state. Attempts are currently being made to obtain cost-sharing from the 25 A bill has been introduced re- Iowa State Legislature. questing a million and a half dollars for the first year of Operation. The conservancy legislation was amended to allow non- public funds to be used for cost-sharing. This will enable a damaged person or other groups to provide cost-sharing funds. The practical effect of this amendment can only be (guessed at this time. The legislation does enable private citizens to file complaints and the amendment ensures conmfliance with administrative orders if cost-sharing funds (are supplied. If used to supplement REAP cost-sharing funds, assuming they become available, the rate of com- giliance with administrative orders could be accelerated. Another possible source of cost-sharing funds is from the Iowa State Conservation Commission. This agency 68 administers recreation and wildlife programs and they may be willing to cost-share on watersheds above their improvements. The practical effect of the conservancy legislation remains to be determined. Complaints have been filed with the Conservancy District Commissioners, but are pending the availability of cost-sharing funds. Of the limitations affecting the reduction in soil loss and water pollution from the conservancy law cost-sharing is the most important. Another factor affecting progress toward the objectives of the conservancy legislation is the general reluctance of neighbors to act against each other. Perhaps, because of the existence of the law, increased voluntary compliance will result, independent of legal proceedings. To a certain extent, this will be influenced by the effectiveness of the Department of Soil Conservation's education function. ‘Wisconsin Soil Loss Legislation The purposes of Wisconsin law are to provide for the conservation of soil resources, control soil erosion and provide for floodwater and sediment damage prevention, and, in general, to promote the health, safety and welfare of 6 Provisions to provide remedies 'the people of Wisconsin.2 fom'excess soil loss are in an amendment to the Standard State Soil Conservation District Law of 1936. The law allows but does not require that soil conserva- 'tiom.districts be established to set standards for soil loss. 131 contrast with the Iowa law, conservation districts are rust required to set standards nor are standards subject to 69 review and approval by a supervisory state government unit. Once soil conservation districts establish standards the law is potentially stronger than the Iowa law. First, the Wisconsin law provides that if compliance is not accom- plished within a reasonable time, the conservation district supervisors may perform the work and recover costs and expenses from the land occupier. The Iowa law simply pro- vides for contempt of court order. Secondly, the Wisconsin law provides for 50 per cent cost-sharing funds from state sources for permanent conservation practices. There is no provision for state appropriated funds to support the Iowa law. Michigan Soil Loss Legislation The purposes of the Michigan law are to control soil erosion and protect state waters from sedimentation.27 This will be accomplished by prescribing powers, duties and functions of state and local agencies and by developing rules and providing for remedies and penalties. Standards and specifications for sediment and erosion control have {been develOped and will be provided to each enforcing agency.28 firhese standards along with technical assistance can be ob- ‘tained from the local Soil Conservation Districts. The Michigan law, in contrast to either the Wisconsin «or Iowa laws, does not make any provision for cost-sharing. IEvidently, all costs must be borne by the land user or (develOper. Similar to the Iowa law, the Michigan law will Ibe enforced with court injunctions or other processes to 70 prevent violations. The enforcement and administrative responsibilities have been given to local government by the Act. The Michigan law does not allow for these enforcement agencies (counties) to perform corrective action and collect expenses from the violator. Another point at variance with Iowa and Wisconsin laws is that the Michigan law specifically excepts from jurisdic- tion logging and mining. This could be a serious short- coming since these two activities are typically accompanied by significant soil erosion. Federal Soil Loss Legislation The focus of Federal legislation has not been on con- trolling soil loss from agriculture. However, an attempt was madetx>include nonpoint sources of rural runoff in recent Federal legislation.29 An amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Muskie Bill), passed by the Senate in November 1971, specifically dealt with nonpoint sources of water pollution. Section 201 of the Bill required that waste treatment plans provide for control or treatment of nonpoint sources of pollution including urban and rural runoff. Section 301 made it necessary for the Administrator (EPA) to furnish (l) guidelines for identifying and eval- ‘uating the nature and extent of nonpoint sources of water ;pollutants and (2) processes, procedures and methods to control water pollution resulting from, inter alia, agri- cultural and silvicultural activities such as runoff from crap and forest land. 71 The legislation currently in effect, while retaining the essential features Of the Muskie Bill does not allude to establishing Federal standards for nonpoint sources of pollution.30 It may be worth noting that soil or sediment is not included in the law's definition Of a pollutant. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. CHAPTER IV. FOOTNOTES Wells A. Hulchins, Water Rights in the Nineteen Western States, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous PEElIcation No. 1206 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 21. Frank P. Grad., Environmental Law: Sources and Problems (New York: Mathew-Bender, 1971), Chapter I, p. 6. Robert R. Lohrmann, "Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to Control Pollution,” Wayne Law Review XVI, 1970, 1086-1106. Lohrmann, loc. cit., p. 1086. Lohrmann, loc. cit., p. 1106-1122. Donald R. Levi and Dale Colger, ”Legal Remedies for Pollution Abatement," Science CLXXV (March, 1972) 1085. Ibid., p. 1086. Lohrmann, loc. cit., p. 1127. Levi, loc. cit., p. 1086. Levi, loc. cit., p. 1087. Lohrmann, loc. cit., p. 1106. Raleigh Barlowe, "Public Land Policy: Inputs and Con- sequences," paper presented at a conference at Michigan State University, May 18, 1973, p. 15. Sax, Joseph P. ”Legal Strategies Applicable to Environ- mental Quality Management Decisions," in Environmental Quality Analysis: Theories and Methods in the Social Sciences edit. Kneese, Allen V. and Bower, Blair 6., Johns Hopkins Press 1972, p. 402. Levi, loc. cit., p. 1086. Johnson, James B. and Connor, Larry J., "Potential Impacts of Alternative Measures of Minimizing Pollution Originating from Annual Wastes,” Michigan State University, p. 5, 1971. 72 DE 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 73 Freeman, G. Myrick III: Havaman, Robert A. and Kneese, Allen V. The Economics of Environmental Policy (New York: J. Wiley and Sons, I973), p. 166. Lohrmann, 9p. cit., p. 1134. William N. Hines, "Legal Aspects," Agricultural Practices and Water Qualigy, ed. Ted’L. Wallich and Georgel E. Smith (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1970). P. 365. See Chapter II Of this work for a discussion of soil conservation. Iowa House File 73. Enacted by the General Assembly Of the State of Iowa, 1971. . William H. Greiner, Director, Department of Soil Conservation, State of Iowa, "A Legislative Approach to Erosion Control," paper presented at a conference, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, April 25, 1972. The universal soil loss equation will be used to estimate soil loss. The soil loss equation is dis- cussed in Chapter V of this study. This equation is said to offer the best known method for determining soil loss and to provide a sound basis for selecting the right combination of conservation practices to control soil loss. Greiner, _p, 235. Conversation with William White, ASCS, REAP, Specialist for Iowa, June 26, 1972. U.S., Department of Agriculture, ASCS, National Environ— mental Assistance Program for 1971 apd Subsequent Years, Article 701-46. Reprinted fromIEhe Federal Register of September 11 and 24, 1971. Conversation with Richard Wilcox, Iowa Department of Soil Conservation, June 4, 1973. Wisconsin laws, Soil and Water Conservation, Chapter 92, as amended by the 1971 Senate Bi 1 Michigan, Michigan Public Acts of 1972, Act No. 347. Michigan, Department of Agriculture, Michigan's Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Control Program, May 1973. U.S., Congress, Senate Bill 52770. U.S., Congress, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Amendments of 1972. Enacted OctOber 18, 1972. CHAPTER V THE ANALYTICAL MODEL Introduction Impact assessment of soil loss controls can be facil- itated through use of a crop production model. This chapter outlines the input description and specifications of such a model. The model inputs include soils, land use, crop yields, soil loss, budgets, and dairy feed requirements. The basic resource of the farm is, Of course, the soil. The producti- vity of the soil resource is measured by the yield potential given a specific type of management. Crop yields are esti- mated given soil type for each crOp rotation, conservation practice, tillage system, and plant and harvest date. A joint product of crop production is accelerated soil loss. Losses are calculated for each soil type as a function of crop rotation, conservation practice, and tillage system. Budgets outline the machinery and materials costs and labor hours required per acre to produce each crop. Feed require- :ments are necessary to meet the needs of the dairy Operation. These requirements may be produced or purchased Off the farm. The last section describes the activities, constraints, and specifications of the linear programming model. 74 75 As noted in the introductory chapter the case study (rm is a dairy enterprise-in a Southeast Wisconsin dairy rea. The farmstead consists 273 acres of land divided xto twelve fields based on historical land use. The fields re considered management units for purposes of crOp pro- . lotion and soil management. The dairy herd consists of 96 milking and dry cows .th 37 head of replacement stock in various stages of evelopment. The labor used for milking and crop produc- .on is all family supplied with the exception of hay 11ing and stacking which is custom hired. Land Use/Soils Since this is a case study an attempt was made to :construct the farm, i.e., how land was used, the machinery .mplement available, and labor constraints, etc. Land use [formation was Obtained from 1971 airphotos obtained from 1e Soil Conservation Service, United States Department of {riculture. Land use patterns determined from the air- lOtOS were verified by the land user. Each field was .animetered and the land use pattern for the whole farm :veloped. The next step was to identify the soils within each .eld. This was accomplished by overlaying field boundaries 1 soils maps. The soils within each field were planimetered 1d tabulated. 76 Twelve soil groups were identified for the case study farm.1 Five of these (Miami Silt Loam, Calamus Silt Loam, Clyman Silt Loam, Elba Silty Clay Loam, and Ehler Silt Loam) account for approximately 90 per cent of the farm. Three Of the remaining soils (seven per cent) were grouped with the major five based on similarities in soil descriptions, while the remaining soils (three per cent) were allocated to the major soils based on the distribution of the major soils for the total farm. Crop_Yields Crop yields are a function of, inter alia, climate, soil type, soil fertility, soil loss, weeds, insects, and crOp management. CrOp management in this model refers to crop rotations, soil conservation practices, tillage systems, and planting and harvest dates. Given certain assumptions, fertility is maintained, weeds and insects are controlled, etc.; crOp management is the key in determining crOp yields. Crop management is an important variable in explaining soil loss. In order to assess the economic implications of .alternative means to control soil loss it is necessary to determine crop yields associated with each crop management (systemi Also important in choosing crop management systems (are flexibility and timeliness, relative to other required farm Operations . As indicated in the literature survey chapter, knowledge 77 defining the relationship between tillage systems, crop rotations, soil conservation practices, and plant and harvest dates is incomplete. Research exists evaluating the influence of each of these variables on yield by soil type (primarily for corn); however, their interrelation- ships have not been precisely determined. Estimates of the interaction and relative importance of each of the crOp management variables have been made.2 These estimates make it possible to determine a crop yield for each combination of soil, tillage system, conservation practice, crOp rotation, and plant and harvest dates. Each of the variables are listed below. Conservation Tillage Plant and Soil Rotations Practices Systems Harvest Dates Elba CCC Up & Down Conventional Corn 15 Calamus CCCOH Contour Minimum Oats 8 Clyman CCOHH No-Till Hay 12 Ehler CCOHHH Miami HHH The number of combinations of these variables is large, approximately 2,800, requiring use of a computer to estimate each Of the yields. The procedure used was to develOp indices for the influence of relevant variables on corn, oats, and hay yields and then to estimate weights to assign relative importance to each of these indices. After a discussion of the data in Table 1 an example will be used to show how yields were calculated for corn. Similar procedures are used for oats. In the upper left hand corner of Table l are estimated 78 .s 95?: an: n S 33% an: n 3 33A is: n 3 673 as. u 3 «mum Hz u 2 .m .Bflfifl 80 .3ng .H 03 .3868 NH em 1 88 can as H u MODE §U§GOO S me mm mm 3 358$ .62 2 2. we R em as m $92.2 58m N o o o mm s: afifioemfiowwm 368 page 03 E68 5 03 868 e «3 808 m 2: 80 m , 98338 03 3 mm a: Sum an“: a. w 2: SH Be one o 8.2m 5 m 2: 3H a: cue m ES 5 2: 3 mm o: u m mama E 2: 2: m3 m2" e 33 . " gm m: 0 O r) O ‘ ‘ O Wmowoanum.@nmmmmfifimmm. 9 0 II\ ( In\ ( II\ o o . o m R u m . . n m . . m m . m u u ”l n H 3 315 3 3 S mime 2 Sum m a. m m e m m a Nmoumo 9:»:ch Housed? 8338 How E52 REE mean» 8.35?- m £85.. OHM; gal..." 0.33.. 79 yield values by soil.3 These values assume good management, adequate drainage, and over 140 frost-free days annually. These are the base yields to which the indices are applied. Corn yields are influenced by the number of years Of sod in rotation. Yield values for continuous corn were thought to be less when a sod crop (legume) was in the rotation.4 Increased yield for corn following sod was largely a function of added nitrogen from the sod crop. More recent experience indicates yields for continuous corn may be higher than with a sod crOp in the rotation given adequate fertilizer applica- tions.5 Research on tillage and corn yields from Ohio was used. The work was done by soil type and covers recent periods ranging from three to five years in duration. The Ohio soils were matched with Wisconsin soils and the yield values trans- ferred accordingly.7 The influence of tillage on crOp yields by soil is shown at the intersection of columns 10 through 12 and rows 1 through 5 in Table 1. The yield response to tillage was indexed from no-tillage. On three soils conven- tional tillage increased yields and on two soils yields were reduced. All these yield indexes are based on a continuous corn.rotation with adequate fertilizer, insecticide, and herbicide applications. Another set of yield indexes was develOped for corn following sod. The response of corn yields to planting and harvest dates are indicated at the intersection of columns 13 through :r7 and rows 8 through 10. The calculation of these values is 80 presented in Table la as an- example of how all index values are calculated. An index of zero indicates no croP can be produced within the time frame established by the planting and harvest dates. Index values for soil conservation practices are presented at the intersection of columns 18 and 19 with rows 11 and 12.8 They are estimates based on Observed historical relationships. The next step after determining crOp yields by soil and developing indices for crOp management practices is to combine this information with weights indicating the relative importance of each crop management practice. The weights are presented in Table 2. The combination of index values and weights to estimate crop yields for each combination of soil, crop rotation, tillage system, conservation practice, and plant and harvest dates are illustrated with the following formula.9 (1) y=yab (§=x1wi’/§Wi where: y = adjusted crop yield ya b = base yield for crop a on soil b I Xi = index value for cr0p management practice i Wi = weight assigned to index value i These values are presented in Appendix 2. Corn yields for each combination of soil and practice can be estimated using Equation (1). For example, on Elba soil (base yield 125 bu./acre) a particular combination of variables influencing crop yields gives a yield of 122 bu./ ' 81 Table 1a--Corn Yield by Planting and Harvest Dates. Actual Yields by Planting Period :May 3- : May 10-:May 17-:May 24-:May 31- Harvest :May 9 : May 16 :May 23 :May 30 :June 6 Period 2 (1) : (2) : (3) : (4) : (5) (1) Sept.27-Oct.18 f 145 133 o o o (2) Oct. 19-NOV. 8 Z 142 136 132 119 107 (3) Nov. 9-Nov.29 : 136 129 123 110 98 v1 : Indexed Yields by Planting Period (1) Sept.27-Oct.18 f 100 95 o o o (2) Oct. 19-NOV. 8 z 98 94 91 82 74 ’u (3) Nov. 9-Nov.29 : 94 89 85 76 67 ' Source: Howard D. Doster, "Economics of No-Tillage,” presented at the National No-Tillage Systems Symposium, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, February 21, 1972, Table 1. Table 2--Re1ative Weights for Indexed Values Influencing Crop Yields.1 3 Corn f Oats Category : Weights Index : Weights Index Plant & Harvest f 3 Dates 2 1.0 I 1.0 Tillage System : .4 .50 : Rotation ; .1 .125 ; Conservation : : Practice : .3 .375 : .3 .30 Ll. Weights provided by Leyton Nelson, Department of CrOps and Soils, Michigan State University, March 26, 1973. The index weight for plant and harvest dates is used separately so that its full index value will influence crOp yields. 82 acre. This calculation is made in the following way. The index value (from Table 1) for each variable is indicated below in parentheses. The weight (from Table 2) indicating the relative importance of each of these variables is the second number in parenthesis. Assume that a continuous corn rotation (1.07, 0.1) is combined with conventional tillage (1.05, 0.4) on the contour (1.00, 0.3) and is planted between '7 May 10th and 16th and harvested between September 27th and October 18th (0.95, 1.0). Following the formula, the yield indicating the combined influence of these variables equals 122 bu./acre. Oat yields and yield indices are presented in Table 3. The yield values by soil are from the same source as corn yields. The influence of crop management on oat yields is supported by only very limited published research compared to corn. Hence, judgment estimates were made for the in- fluence of planting and harvest dates and conservation practices on oat yields.lo Index values for crop management practices influencing oat yields are presented in Table 3 and similarly based on judgment estimates. Only conventional tillage is used for oat production. They are produced as a Inurse crOp for alfalfa. Alfalfa requires a good seedbed and «Jnly conventional tillage is recommended. Since oats and (alfalfa are planted together only conventional tillage can be used for oats. Alfalfa yields are based on recent research done at Michigan State University. Alfalfa dry matter yields in tons 83 .HHH. .moamam poo so mucosausa o>aumamu os m>oc msoaumuou mono use» ouomouwcu omssmmc ma us mosey modes» cacao mamsvo modes» oomaam mesmmc coo omaomam sou mono onus: o no aawumfiwum owns mum mumo .hosum was» no monomuso now me me on e u we smsumm sauce is. mm mm mm cos n mm Haueaum Hmmmm use " mmumo masseuse OOH " HfiouCOU Abe cm H azoo can do rec " cowuo>ummcou umcaaea em m.m m Heme: Am. NHH «.ma u swarm Ave em H.HH ” emssao inc vm o.oH u msEoHco Ame ooa H.HH" scam AHPIII u maeom mm anummmmmmmmn ”4+ 8 A m a m e e " "MGWT.IDU.W u u 1 m . s " NH HH OH m u m n m m e m N H u H Heom H mummzoz xmozH moqu» owesszmm " Sieqmnn xepuI .4 Sieqmnu Teniov .mcama» mmuaam amounm manna 84 per acre, vary with the cutting date.11 The first cutting date influences the regrowth period for the second and, similarly, the second influences the regrowth period and yield for the third cutting. Feed value also varies with the first cutting date. These two considerations are com— bined with yield variation by soil type in the procedure outlined below. The first step was to graph yields to convert point to period estimates. The second step was to adjust for in vitro dry matter variation by first cutting date,12 (see Table 4). Table 4--Digestible Dry Matter by First Cutting Date. First CuttingADate : May 24-30 May 3I¥June 6 June 7-13 Digestible Dry : Matter per Acre : 3.54 3.58 3.35 Index ; 99.00 100.00 93.00 This was accomplished by generating feed value indexes (Table 4) by first cutting dates and applying these to base yields. The results are presented in Table 5. For modeling purposes there are three possible first cutting dates. For each of these there are two second cutting dates. Given the second cutting date it is assumed that the third cutting date will be made such that optimal yields will be obtained. Each of these yields is then adjusted for 85 Table 5--Alfalfa Yield by Cutting Date. First Cutting : Second Cutting, : Third Cutting Date Yield 3 Date Yield 3 Date Yield may 24-30 1.5 f Ju1y 12-18 1.6 f Aug.23-29 1 ; July 19-25. 1.5 ; Aug.30-sep.5 1 May 31eJune 6 2.0 : July 19-25 1.5 : Aug.30aSep.5 1 : July 26eAug.l 1.4 : Sep. 6-12 1 June 7-13 2.1 f Ju1y 26eAug.l 1.3 f Aug.30-Sep.5 1 ' 1.2 ' sep.6-12 1 = Aug. 2-8 Table 6--A1fa1fa Yield and Yield Index by Soil ‘ Soil Category ; Elba Calamus Clyman Ehler Miami Alfalfa Yield 3 5.7 4.8 5.5 6.0 4.6 Index Value 3 1.04 .87 1.0 1.09 .84 86 differences in soil type using the index values presented in Table 6, followed by an adjustment made for field to storage losses. The resulting yield values by soil type and cutting dates are presented in Appendix 2. Recent experiments at Michigan State University indicate little variance in annual yield over the life of a four or five year rotation.13 Hence, the same set of yields will be used for each rotation containing alfalfa. The second step after determining crOp yields by soil, rotation, conservation practice, tillage system, and plant and harvest dates is to convert these yields to a composite acre basis. This is necessary to compress time into a single frame to facilitate mathematical programming. This is accomplished by factoring an acre according to the distribu- tion Of crops in a given rotation. For example, with rotation CCCOH the composite acre would be 0.6 C, 0.2 O, and 0.2 H. The third step is to convert composite yields by soil to composite yields by field. This is necessary because fields, not soils, are considered management units by the land user. This is accomplished by calculating a weighted average yield by field for each crOp as follows: i=1 (2) YICI = 2311b11/a1 5 where: chl = weighted average yield for crop one in field one. sil = soil i, field one, yield per acre 87 bil = acres of soil i in field one al - acres in field one To convert yields per acre to crOp production an adjustment is necessary for field to storage losses. These adjustments are incorporated in the yields presented in Appendix 2. Soil Loss Calculations In order to assess the imposition of government soil loss controls, it is necessary to estimate soil loss under all relevant circumstances. As indicated in the literature review the "universal soil loss equation" has been developed for this purpose. It is designed to estimate long term (25 years) soil loss from rainfall for individual farm yields. This procedure will be used to estimate soil loss under alternative management conditions for the case study farm. Computed soil loss, as expressed in tons per acre, is equal to the product of five factors: A = Rxpgcp where: A the average annual soil loss in tons per acre w II the rainfall erosion factor locally determined. Soil loss is directly proportional to the product of kinetic energy times the maximum intensity of a rainstorm. The sum of these products for a given period provides a numerical value. K = the soil erodibility factor. It expresses the tons of soil loss per acre for a given R on a nine per cent s10pe 73 feet in length. It represents the loss from continuous cultivated fallow without cover crOps. 88 L = the length of slope factor. It is the ratio of soil loss from a slope of a specific length to the length for which the K value is calcu- lated. S = the steepness of slope factor. It is the ratio of soil loss from a soil with a specific per cent lepe to the slope specified for the K value. C = the crOp management factor. It combines the effects Of crOp sequences and various manage- ment practices. It is the expected ratio of soil loss from land cropped under specified conditions to soil loss for continuous culti- vated fallow on an identical soil, slope, and rainfall. P = the erosion control practice factor. It is the ratio of soil loss with a specific practice to that with up and down hill operations holding other factors constant. Values for RKL and S by field are indicated in Table 7. Crop management factors (C) are displayed in Table 8. The erosion control practice factors (P) are 1 and .6 for up and down the lepe and contour tillage practices, respectively. Soil loss values for each combination of field, crOp rotation, tillage system, and conservation practice are pre- sented in Appendix 3. Note that no soil loss occurs on fields 5, 7, 10, and 11. Fields S and 11 are woodlots under perma- nent vegetation. Field 10 is in marsh hay and field 7 is an exercise lot. These nontilled fields account for 18 per cent of the total farm land. Of the tilled land 62 acres or 25 per cent, 73 acres or 30 per cent, and 112 acres or 45 per cent are subject to heavy, moderate, and negligible rainfall erosion, respectively. 89 .Eoummm confides one moeuomuo sceum>u0mcoo .coeumuou .oamem an mcoeunasoamo mmoa HeOm How m xaocmmda mom .m .oaowm can no whoa so cheap o mucmmoummu Hwom one we cameo OHOE3 o mom moowuomuo cowuo>uomcoo soemoo on own: ma moodm uncommon one sees Haom we» haamowmwa .muo>uomno comauon >uo> oasoo omumsaumm mosam> .semcoomes .scmcno ..<.o.m.o .moeeumm cOHuc>uwmsoo Heom .umecowum>uomcoo poeuumeo .meooo mason he omow>oum ouo3 macaw mo usoo Mom osm macaw mo cumsma Mow mosam> .H a.ms a.~ H.e e.e~ n.4m e.a H.o~ H.o~ e.o~ e.em e.e~ e.e~ m manna em. a o ma. m~.~ me. on. mm. m we me o o m am was as am mm W m 9.4 m. o o m cow m. com ems 03 0mm a 2. m m a... an. m an. m an. an. t... t... a m2 m m mg m2 m was m m3 m3 m3 m2 m «a as as a m a o m a m m a m uouomm aqua “ N .H .musmflowumoou sowumsvm anon HwOMIIn menus 90 Table 8--Crop Management Factors. 3 "c" VALUES : Conventiopal 3 Minimum 3 3 Rotation : Tillage : Tillage I No-Tillage f Plow I Fall Spring CCC : .37 .35 .18 .12 CCCOH : .243 .174 .093 .076 CCOHH : .109 .101 .059 .045 CCOHHH : .092 .087 .050 .038 HHH : .030 .009 .008 .00 1. Conventional tillage Operations include: plow, disk, plant, cultivate,* harvest; residue left. Minimum tillage Operations include: chisel plow, plant, cultivate,* harvest; 3,000 - 4,000 lbs. corn residue left/acre. No-tillage Operations include: plant,* harvest. May be in combination with herbicides. Source: CrOp Management "C" Factor Values for South- eastern Wisconsin, Table 3, Soil Conservation Service, U.S.D.A., Madison, Wisconsin. W116 «in 3H exi fer the 91 Machinery, Labor, and Materials Costs Conventional, minimum, and no-tillage systems are budgeted and defined below. No attempt has been made to determine an Optimum machinery complement for each tillage system which means the least cost system per unit Of yield where the trade Off between machinery cost and yield associated with timely field Operations has been made. The existing farm machinery complement will be used as a base for comparison. Tillage tool size selection is based on the horsepower of existing tractors (50 and 70 horsepower). The case study farm is using a chisel plow as the primary tillage tool. This is in contrast to most other dairy farms in the area which use conventional plows and disks. Aside from soil loss control, conventional tillage has many strong points. These are effectiveness for weed, rodent and insect control and also that future livestock waste regulation, for environmental reasons, may require plowing down of animal wastes as Opposed to broadcasting wastes on the soil surface. Several economic evaluations have been made of reduced 14' 15' 16 They conclude that With and no-tillage corn. limited tillage there is a reduction in machine cost but that this is offset or more than offset by increased cost of sprays for weed and insect control. There is a saving in total labor hours and this may be the deciding variable for dairy farmers. The economic significance of reduced total labor requirements with limited tillage systems has not been 92 assessed. This is an Objective of this study and will be approached by estimating labor requirements by tillage system and evaluating them within the constraints imposed by a dairy farm. What is meant by the terms conventional, minimum, and no-tillage varies widely. The definitions as used in this study are outlined below. The field Operations common to all three tillage systems are shredding corn stalks and harvesting. Differences in equipment are illustrated in Table 9. The differences are further illustrated in the detailed budgets.l7 Man-hours and machine Operation costs per acre are developed for each tillage system for corn and oats. Field efficiency is reduced approximately five per cent for Operations on the contour as Opposed to up and down the slope. Adjustments are made in labor hours and machine costs accordingly. No-tillage systems have seen only limited use in Michigan and Wisconsin, perhaps because no-tillage research is con- centrated in Kentucky and Ohio. The primary benefit from reduced tillage systems is in curtailing erosion and it has been made possible through the use of herbicides for weed control.18' 19’ 20 CrOp yields are generally maintained although results vary by soil and soil surface cover. In addition to herbicide applications other adjustments are necessary to maintain corn yields with reduced tillage systems.21 Pest problems with no-tillage corn are more severe and frequent than with minimum tillage corn. Hence, 93 .mceumm on» se omwammc 2H oz u now." no» » oum>auaso mGOwumowHoom " u one u N .omcum>oo mumHoEOO " omcuo>oo ouoaoeoo "succem cues ooosom u moeownuor mmz ca omega .x a m common m x a .m .2 common a x a .m .z vacuum u Huoueawuuom acaoaaomaaa a weave» a " .Amaamaa Haauuoa .maz o.m ” -omaaa .maz m.m "moaoauooaaa .ea: 4 ” uausa u u cuoou mswumm u 0:02 a soda Humane “ a amen .zoaa " ommaaae 02 u ssEecquu Hocowusm>soo u mowuocum u u n .mfioummm confides mo coauaaamoouua manna 94 insecticide applications are generally recommended. Ferti- lizer rate increases of 20 to 30 per cent are recommended in killed sod because of higher volatilization and leaching losses for no-tillage. Further, reduced seed germination suggests increasing seeding rates 10 to 15 per cent to ensure good stands with no-tillage. These adjustments are made in the budgets that follow. Tables 10 and 11 present machinery costs and labor hours per acre by conservation practice and tillage system. These machine costs and labor budgets are summarized from Appendix' 4, Machinery Budgets. Labor hours per acre are further summarized in Table 12. Labor is broken down into field Operations by crOp. Also, on Tables 10 and 11 seed, herbi- cide, and insecticide costs per acre by conservation prac- tice and tillage system. Fertilizer costs per acre by crOp rotation and tillage system are shown in Table 13. Detailed calculations are presented in Appendix 5, Fertilizer, Herbi- cide, Seed, and Insecticide Costs per Acre. Dairy Feed Requirements The purpose of the crOp production activities, of course, is to meet the feed requirements of the dairy herd and re- placement stock. The dairyman's feeding Objective is to formulate the least cost combination of available feeds such that the dairy herd's nutrient requirements are met.22 The inputs in this calculation are herd characteristics, feeds available, and feeding preferences of the dairyman. 95 mm.v our: vo.m OOO vo.m mmmouu mo.m mmooo mo.m mouom umou mmcum>¢ sowumuom ”coeucuou Mom oom mswaawx mo umoo moonm>¢ .soHumuou ecu cw How» mso muommwoms me cOeuouooo oceaaex ooh HMEOeuaooc cm momaaesnoz Mom .mooaawsaoz can EOEHOHS How oomcuon can oomaaas HcGOAucm>sou Mom cocoon ma ooeoeoumr .m .uaaaa an Hamume How .H canoe .m xwocmmm< mom imamumuommm omumasoaco one whom mom numoo HONHHHuuom .H mo.m oN.m m¢.m mm.m ew.m oo.v on.m mm.m OHO¢\musom Honoq mwuw.J..wwuw....wwumm..wmnmm.....wwumw..mwumm.....wmumm....mmnmw. ..............m¢wmw «m. on. mh.oH mh.oa om.oa om.oa mN.o mm.o NmoHOHQHmm ow.m oo.m mm.~ mm.~ om.~ om.~ mH.N mH.N comm vm.H em.H mm.¢ mm.¢ mm.v mm.v mm.¢ mm.¢ OUHOHuOOde mo.m mm.m mo.m mo.v mb.m mo.v mm.m oH.Q onwumummo hhwcwnomz US$380 3qu gag aloofgamousouemwmgamogsoom Econ 38% moeuomum woman. 3:980 " 08:: H 0933 5552 H H632. 88361.80 coaugummaoo mass M .eao H .mH04\Honmq one mumoo memo one sHOO «mucafism aloe canoe 96 .omuwc Bounce mum mswxomum one mcwaom .mcwuuso moo How musoc Moose one Hmmm.oouo oco haco now one numou .m .uamsfi mo awmumo mom m xwosmodd mom .haououmowm omumasoamo who once Mom mumoo seawawuuom .H he. he. he. he. an. cm. W ~0uo<\musoa moans .o......WWnW.....WWHW.......NWHW.....WWHW......o..W.Wn@..H....WWHWW.W.....o.o.o6.......H¢.w.novam. mm. mm. mm. mm. mm. hm. W museumummo mumcecomz ~m.~ ~m.~ 5v.m ee.m mm.o mm.m m comm m~.~ mm.~ -.~ m~.~ -.~ -.m m NooaoeuoomcH uuuuuuu annuununuunuanuiuwu0¢\umou usmcHnunuuuusunnuuluusnuunutln:m c30o a do usoucou Mason a do tusoucow H ozomI¢ do usoummw H ooeuooum GOfiuouOM mam a :33000 n :prmuom mmOUU " GOHHMUOm 30000 n cOflum>HOmsOU H.UHU¢\Honoq osc muEOUIMMHmmad humEEsmIIHH OHAOB 97 .mHHmumo How v xHocmmod mom .H hr“ cap masermsienxs as. HN. “ imaaxuaua new a 823 6:533 . mdfifiEU.meuEQEHm mm. 8 . SSE a 53% . engage .mpnm m~.m m mHQA\.mum sauce page mean « pastas as. me. “ sauna a named Haas maze “ anaeminm moss ma.m mm m ma.m on.” oe.m mn.m u muua\.aum sauce eo.~ NN.~ ve.~ -.~ ee.~ -.~ " panama: am. as. an. we. aum>auaao am. me. am. mm. mm. mm. a panda mo.a 5H.H an. em. NH.H mH.H " senselmua amoo 88885980“.5a8888bna38a89318ukn EESBBSHOH mmouonma maneeanmsaaE m HSUFQ m .wmaHaaaaauaz_maaqzue.naaaamsanom H .hncfifism uonmq UMHMMHd can .mumo .auoounwa menus 98 Table l3--Summary, Average Fertilizer Cost Per Acre by Rotation and Tillage. Tillage Q ccc 2 cocoa . cconn : CCOHHH : HHHO Conventional E 27.12 29.08 35.45 39.15 49.97 Minimum 2 27.12 29.40 35.81 39.67 51.15 No—tillage E 27.12 29.99 36.38 40.13 52.92 1. See Appendix 5 for detailed calculations 99 With this information a linear programming model is used to compute feed requirements and balance a ration. The result is the least cost means to satisfy feed requirements. Dairy cattle nutrient requirements are based on the National Research Council recommendations and are a function of average cow weight and milk and butterfat production. In addition, there are a number of restrictions incorporated in the model. These restrictions limit dry matter intake, non- protein nitrOgen, the prOportion that certain feeds can be of the concentrate, and ensure that minimum fiber levels are met. Beyond these a management constraint was added to ensure that 20 per cent of the replacement stock's ration consisted of oatlage. The model was run for three different milk production levels and for replacement stock in three weight categories.23 In calculating feed requirements it is assumed that weighted average daily feed requirements over the milk production cycle are incorporated in the least cost ration prOgram. Total feed requirements for the lactation can be approximated by multiplying thisveighted average production level by 305 days. Feed requirements for the remaining 90 calendar days (13 month cycle) is made for nonlactating cows. Feed requirements for replacement heifers assumed that on the average during the year a certain mix would be in one of three weight classes. Annual feed requirements for each of the weight classes was calculated and multiplied by the number of head in each class. 100 The Model The model inputs discussed thus far can be generalized in the following way. Maximize: (3) z = Clxl + czx2 + ... + ijj + ... + Ckxk Subject to: allxl + alzx2 + ... + aijxj + ... + aikxkébl alel + a22X2 + .. + a2:] 3 + ... + aZkXKEbZ ailxl + ai2x2 + ... + aijxj + ... + aikxkfbi anlxl + anZXZ + ... + ankxj + ... + ankxkgbn ij O, for all j. This can be described more simply with the diagram on the following page. The alternative means of producing crops are represented by the column vector Xj (j=l...n) and are included in the box labeled Activities in the CrOp Production Model diagram. They include each combination of field, crOp rotation, and planting and harvest dates. Each activity has associated with it a series of input-output coefficients represented by the column vector aj (j=l...n) or the Technical Coefficients box in the CrOp Production Model diagram. Examples of these coefficients are crop yields, labor requirements, and soil loss per field. The net return associated with each activity is repre- sented by the row vector Cj (j=l...n) or the Net Return box 101 Crop Production Model* Maximize Net Returns (Cj's) Sign convention is as follows: (-) producing activities c1 c2 kn I n=l93 Activities (X.'s) 53m 422‘ mHE-t E 2». $883835: :3 mun 8 8% BEmomg Technical Coefficients a .'s RHS b.'s ~L4ET- ) ( 3 ) + + + 0 b LAND i=1-8 4 + + + 0 - LABOR i=l-33 + + + o E SOIL LOSS i=l-3 - - - - - + ? CROP PRODUCTION i=l-550 - - - = FEED PURCHASE i=l-3 + + + - f CROP SELLING i=l-3 + + + - + = FEED REQUIREMENTS + k CAPITAL (+) consuming or using activities 102 in the Crop Production Model. Machinery operation, repairs, and agronomic inputs per acre are included in these costs. Equation (3), the objective function, indicates the objective is to maximize returns from crop production activities. The column vector of bj's represents the right hand sides (RHS) and includes resource constraints and model requirements. The constraints are comprised of the acreage in each field, the labor hours available, and soil loss limits. The model requirements are based on crop production needed for dairy feed. Technical Coefficients The technical coefficients require little explanation with the exception of labor. CrOp yields and soil loss per acre for each combination of soil, tillage system, etc. are presented in Appendices 2 and 3, respectively. Labor coefficients for field Operations are divided into four classes: pre-plant, plant, cultivate, and harvest. Of these, planting and harvest dates influence crop yields. The time periods selected for these Operations reflect the sen— sitivity of yields to field Operations. For example, corn planting periods are seven days and corn harvest periods are 21 days. Pre-plant field Operations are necessary for conventional and minimum tillage; however, timing is not critical except that they precede planting. For programming purposes pre- planting periods will consist of all periods prior to plant- ing dates. For example, the pre-plant period for plant 103 dates May 18-24 is February 22 to May 17. Labor requirements for alfalfa are complicated by the fact that the first cutting date determines the second and third cutting dates. Table 5 shows the second and third cutting date for each first cutting date. Land constraints, develOped in Appendix 1, are summarized below. Table 14--Land Constraints. Field Acreage : Field Acreage 1 20.6 Q 6 20.1 2 20.4 : 8 84.3 3 34.7 : 9 27.4 4 20.8 : 12 18.1 The acreage in each field indicates the maximum land available with given characteristics for crOp production activities. Labor for cropping activities is limited to that of the Operator. It is assumed that the Operator's family will pro- vide labor for the dairy herd when field operations are being performed. Labor constraints should reflect more than simply calendar days per period. They must be adjusted for actual field working days based on weather and soil conditions. Research at Michigan State University, Departments of Agricul- tural Engineering and Agricultural Economics has generated 104 the probability of a "go" or "no go" day for field operations by calendar day.24 Criteria for defining a "go" or "no go" day for planting and pre-planting field operations are based on the soil moisture profile. Different values are used for harvest activities, by soil type. Expected soil moisture figures are based on 16 years of historical data. Soil moisture levels defining a "go" or "no go" day, by soil type, were developed from several years of field observations. The results are presented in Table 15. The program to determine "go" days for field operators does not determine the number of hours worked per "go" day. It is intuitive that the hours worked per day should vary with the probability of "go" days per period and period length.25 For example, if the probability of a "go" day per period is low, a land user will choose to work longer hours to reduce yield losses. If the period is long and the probability of "go" days are high, the land user will choose fewer working hours per day. Lacking precise values, estimates were made for the maximum labor hours available by week. Soil loss constraints are based on the standards set by the Iowa Conservancy Law. Soil loss values typically range from one to five tons per acre and are a function of the allowable loss that will maintain long term agricultural productivity. Using this criterion soil loss constraints for the case study farm should be three tons per acre per year. CrOp production activities consist of each combination 105 Table 15--Labor Constraints (Seven Day Periods). 2 Period :"Go“ Days :Hours I Total Hours Dates : Number :Out Of TenZWOrked ' Per Period ‘ ‘ 'Per Day ‘ April 5-11 0 1.09 8 8.8 12-18 1 1.75 8 14.0 19-25 2 1.81 8 14.5 April 26-May 2 3 2.50 14 35.0 May 3- 9 4 3.94 14 55.1 10—16 5 3.25 14 45.5 17-23 6 4.75 14 66.5 24-30 7 5.44 14 76.1 May 31-June 6 8 5.19 14 72.6 June 7-13 9 4.75 10 .47.5 14-20 10 4.56 10 45.6 21-27 11 5.06 10 50.6 June 28-July 4 12 5.44 10 54.4 July 5-11 13 5.50 10 55.0 12-18 14 5.94 10 59.4 19-25 15 5.12 10 51.3 July 26-Aug. 1 16 4.44 10 44.4 August 2- 8 17 4.94 10 49.4 9-15 18 5.81 10 58.1 16-22 19 4.94 10 49.4 23-29 20 4.00 10 40.0 August 30-Sept. 5 21 5.44 10 54.4 6-12 22 5.87 10 48.8 Sept. 27-Oct. 4 25 5.09 8 40.8 October 5-11 26 4.75 8 38.0 12-18 27 5.12 8 41.0 19-25 28 4.65 8 37.3 October 26-Nov. l 29 4.15 8 33.3 Nov. 2- 8 30 3.62 8 29.0 9-15 31 3.25 8 26.0 16-22 32 1.90 8 15.3 23-29 33 1.06 8 8.5 106 of field, crop rotation, conservation practice, tillage system, and plant and harvest date. These combinations are illustrated in the table below. Table 16--Crop Activities. f _ 3 Plant and 3 Crop ; Rotations ; Fields ;Harvest Date; Total Corn : 4 E 8 : 12 : 384 Oats : 4 i 3 : 7 i 224 Hay : 1 : 8 : 6 : _18 TOTAL : i i : 656 For each of these combinations for corn (384) there will be three tillage practices and for each tillage practice there will be two conservation practices for a total of 2,304 potential corn activities. In addition to the crOp producing activities are feed purchase, feed selling, and soil loss activities. The latter are joint with crop producing activities. Prices for the crOps fed, sold, and purchased are listed below. Table 17--Cr0p Prices. Category :Corn (bu.); Oatlage (tons); Alfalfa (tons) Crops Purchased S $1.45 f $10.00 S $40.00 CrOps Sold or : 1.17 : 8.00 : 31.00 Fed Source: Prices are 1972 Michigan averages suggested by Ray Hog- lund, Professor, Agricultural Economics, Michigan State Univ. 107 Separate runs are made for each of the three tillage systems. Each tillage system is run with both conservation practices. These runs are necessarily distinct because in practice more than one tillage or conservation practice is not used on the same field. This gives a set of six basic runs, one for each combination of tillage and conser- vation practice. This set of basic runs is made with three different levels of soil loss constraints. The total number of runs is 18. The model only considers variable costs and without assuming some annual usage values for fixed factors as a basis for allocating fixed costs, they cannot be satis- factorily assigned to activities. Hence, relevant fixed costs are handled outside the model. 10. CHAPTER V. FOOTNOTES See Appendix 2 for soil descriptions, inventory of soils by field, and comparability of soils with those in Ohio and Michigan. Professor Leyton Nelson, Michigan State University, Department of CrOps and Soils, provided initial estimates which were reviewed by other crops and soils specialists after yield estimates were made. Yield values obtained from: "Fertilizer Recommendations for Michigan Vegetables and Field CrOps," Extension Bulletin E-550, Farm Science Series, November 1972, p. 31. See also Soils Appendix 2. "Productivity of Soils in the North Central Region of the United States," North Central Regional Research Publication 166, University of Illinois Experiment Station, Bulletin Number 710, Table l, p. 12,May 1965. Conversation with Dr. George McQueen, Shiawassee County, Michigan Extension Director. "1972-73 Ohio Agronomy Guide," Bulletin 472, Cooperative Extension Service, The Ohio State University, p. 53-56. See Appendix 2, Soils. Personal contact with the Soil Conservation Service, USDA, Madison, Wisconsin. An extension of this yield generating program could pro- vide prescription crOp management practices for a given set of circumstances. The opportunity cost in terms of yields forgone, with a given capital expenditure, could be estimated for less than Optimum crOp management practices. Personal contact with Professor Leyton Nelson, Michigan State University, Department of CrOps and Soils, March 1973. 108 11. 12. 13.’ 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 109 Jue Sun Lee, "Productivity, Total Non-structural Carbohydrates in Roots, and in Vitro Dry Matter Dis- appearance of Alfalfa, Given Different Four-Cutting Systems Under Three Different First Cutting Dates," unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Crops and Soils, Michigan State University, 1973, Table 19, page 65. Ibid., Table 14, page 44. Private communication with Professor Milo B. Tesar, Michigan State University, Department of Crops and Soils, May 15, 1973. USDA Soil Conservation Service, Columbus, Ohio, Agronomy Information Release, Number 9, January 2, 1968. Howard D. Doster, "Economic Characteristics of Selected Tillage Systems," Purdue TOp Farmer Workshop Corn Proceedings, August 1968. Cooperative Extension Service, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana. Norman Rask, G. B. Triplett, Jr., and D. M. Van Doren, Jr., "A Cost Analysis of No-Tillage Corn," Ohio Report 52(1), p. 14-15, January-February 1967. See Appendix 4, Machinery Budgets. L. Lloyd Harrold, "Soil Erosion as Affected by Reduced Tillage Systems," a contribution from the North Appalachian Experimental Watershed Corn Belt Branch, Soil and Water Conservation Research Division, Agricul- tural Research Service, USDA, Coshocton, Ohio, in cooperation with the Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center, Wooster, Ohio. L. Lloyd Harrold, G. B. Triplett, Jr., and R. E. Youker, "Less Soil and Water Loss from No-Tillage, Corn," Ohio Report 52(2), p. 22-23, March-April 1967. Roscoe Isaacs, Jr. and Dentis A. Colson, "No-Tillage-- A New Production Management System," Technical Note, Agronomy Number 59, March 26, 1971, Soil Conservation Service, USDA, Lexington, Kentucky. 92, cit., 1972-73 Ohio Agronomy Guide," pp. 53-56. W. W. Gregory, et. al., "1972 No-Tillage Recommendations-- Planting and Pesticide Information," University of Kentucky, CoOperative Extension Service Publication ID-l. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 110 Stephen Harsh, et. 31., "Least-Cost Dairy Rations-~A Telplan Program:1r PrOgram 31, Michigan State University. This work was used for the ration calculation. The herd characteristics, feeds available, and owners' prefer- ences were obtained by interviews from the dairymen. See Appendix 6 for detailed feed requirements calcula- tions. This program was obtained from Benjamin Holtman, Associate Professor of Agricultural Engineering, Michigan State University, April 1973. Period length refers to the period over which there will be a crOp yield reduction for lack of timely field Operations. The hours per day in Table 16 were suggested by Roy Black, Assistant Professor, Agricultural Economics Department, Michigan State University. CHAPTER VI EMPIRICAL RESULTS Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to outline the economic impact of imposing soil loss controls on a case study farm. Assuming forced (legal) compliance, the question becomes one of choosing the apprOpriate compliance strategy and estimating the impact of controls on profit, labor requirements, crOp production, and land use. TO assess the impact of controls, a linear programming cr0p production model,out1ined in the last chapter, is used. The first model runs were made with 40 tons per acre as the soil loss limit. This amounts to no constraint since no combination of soil and management prac- tice exceeds this soil loss value. This level is included so that an evaluation can be made with and without controls. The second run was made with a three tons per acre soil loss constraint. This is the loss level that would be imposed if the farm were under the jurisdiction of the Iowa Conservancy law. A third run was made with a one ton per acre constraint, the most stringent constraint specified in the Iowa law. A set of runs were made for each soil loss level. A "set" means each combination of three tillage systems with two soil conservation practices or a total of six runs. The 111 112 tillage systems are conventional, minimum, and no-tillage. The conventional system includes plowing, disking, and planting; minimum includes chisel plowing and planting; no-tillage system is planting in killed sod. The conserva- tion practices are tillage on the contour and tillage up and down the s10pe. The latter is essentially no soil conserva- tion practice and is included for comparison. Since separate computer runs are made for each tillage and conservation practice, they are in effect held constant while cropping pattern and plant and harvest dates are variable. Hence, given tillage and conservation practice, the model maximizes profit subject to the various constraints. The result is the most profitable distribution of crops across farm fields and over time (plant and harvest dates). Soil Loss The profit maximizing use of each tillage and conserva- tion practice, without soil loss constraints, results in widely differing soil loss. Contrary to expectation, re- duced tillage systems do not necessarily produce the least soil loss. In fact, where no limits on soil loss are imposed, the no-tillage system produces the most soil loss. Constraints on soil loss reduce soil loss but, again the no-tillage system does not necessarily produce the least soil loss. As allowable soil loss is reduced, the number of crap rotations consistent with the constraints is reduced. Hence, 113 with fewer rotations available soil loss becomes more similar between tillage systems. Soil loss constraints force soil conserving crop rotations on sloping land; and it appears that matching rotations with slope is more important than tillage systems, p35 s3 in controlling soil loss. Evidence for this is provided by the fact that with a one ton per acre soil loss constraint total soil loss is similar across tillage systems. Table 18--Total Soil Loss by Tillage System and Soil Loss Constraint Level (tons) for Up and Down the Slope Soil Conservation Tillage System. Soil Loss Tillage System Constraint Conventional Minimum No-Tillage Tons/Acre#:r -------------------- Tons/Farm ................... 40 : 437 212 496 3 : 164 120 116 1 E 59 56 38 As expected soil loss is less when farming on the contour for conventional and minimum tillage. Farming on the contour generates approximately half the soil loss that farming up and down the lepe produces. The exception,as shown in Table l9,is for no-tillage with one and three ton soil loss con- straints. Again, the distribution of crop rotations across fields appears to provide the explanation. 114 Table l9--Tota1 Soil Loss by Tillage System and Soil Loss Constraint Level (tons) for Contour Tillage. Soil Loss Tillage System Constraint Conventional Minimum No-Tillage Tons/Acre : --------------------- Tons/Farm ................. 40 : 173 108 297 3 2 119 56 194 l ; 60 36 51 P_r_acs meson essences .mawom was mmouu mo usefiuusmwn .mowmmuenx mcomsm HOmmmmoum an coausaonuoo meom .H Govmu—OOHm Om.N EMOA “Hunm GOmeOOHm EUOQ “Ham HOHSQ someauomm om.H anon undo sheen oaaa>usor smog swan sheen moan nm>onoo nm.~ smog uaam sanouo soon seam nassao asses mm.~ smog uaam oflmaunmo smog seem mosaano asses 6m.~ smog uaam nmumooz . smog seam Hana: macaw “seasoned: OHSO camcoomfiz aaom anmanoaz wEmz mwaumm Hwom .soeaanonmosou Haom .a means mAHOm .H xHszmm4 155 APPENDIX 1. SOILS (continued) Table 2. Soils Distribution by Field. Field Soils Acres Field Soils Acres I 177-3-1 1.4 VI 55-11-2 1.0 55-6-2 3.3 l78A-l 1.5 l78-2+ 4.4 290A-l 3.3 61-3—1 2.4 215A-l 2.7 l78A-l 4.4 55-7-2 3.7 215A-l 4.9 177-3-1 4.3 2078 215A-l 3.7 20.2 II 61-7-1 2.5 177—3-1 .4 VII l78A-l 2.8 55-6-2 3.0 55-11-2 1.6 l78A-l 5.9 178-3-1 .6 328A+ 4.6 l78A-l 1.0 290A+ 4.0 55-11-2 1.0 20.4 7.0 III 328A+ 1.6 VIII 215A-l 39.2 l78A-l 8.8 215A 36.4 290A-l 3.2 290A-l 4.4 l77A-l 12.8 l78A-l 4.4 177-3-1 6.4 84.4 253-1 2.0 34.8 IX 55-5-2 1.0 215A-l 23.5 IV 55-11-2 10.9 426-2-1 1.5 l77A-1 2.6 226A-l 1.5 l78A-l 4.7 27.5 l77A-1 2.6 20.8 X 215A-l 7.1 V l77A-l 6.3 XI 177-3-1 2.4 177-3-1 3.4 55-11-2 7.1 XII 215-A-l 4.5 55-5-1 1.5 177-2-1 6.3 l77A-l 1.9 178-2-1 4.5 2002 177-3-1 2.7 APPENDIX Table 3. 156 l. SOILS (continued) Description of Soils on the Case Study Farm. Soil Mapping # 25 55 56 61 118 177 178 215 226 Dane silt loam: Well drained, grayish-brown silt loam underlain by brown silty clay loam subsoil which grades into yellowish browy silty material that is underlain by loamy glacial till at about 48 inches. Miami silt loam: Well drained, dark grayish-brown silt loam grading into dark brown silty clay loam into clay loam underlain by loamy glacial till at about 32 inches. Casco loam: Well drained, dark grayish-brown loam grading into dark brown clay loam underlain by loose sand and gravel at 12 to 20 inches. Dodge Silt loam: Well drained, dark grayish-brown silt loam grading into dark brown to dark yellowish brown silty clay loam underlain by loamy glacial till at 36 to 48 inches. Spinks loamy fine sands: Well to excessively drained dark grayish-brown loamy fine sand grading into yellowish-brown loose sand with thin layers of brown sandy loam between 40 and 56 inches. Calamus Silt loam: Moderately well drained, dark grayish brown silt loam grading into silty clay loam with a few yellow and gray mottles underlain by loamy glacial till at about 45 inches. Clyman silt loam: Somewhat poorly drained, very dark grayish brown silt loam grading into brown to grayish brown silty clay loam with many yellow and brown mottles underlain by loamy glacial till at 36 to 50 inches. Elba silty clay loam: very poorly drained, black silty clay grading into olive gray and grayish brown silty clay loam with yellowish brown mottles. Bristol silt loam: Somewhat poorly drained, black silt loam grading into brown to dark brown heavy silt loam with many yellowish brown mottles under- lain at about 45 inches by loamy glacial till. 157 Table 3 (continued) 290 328 426 Ehler silt loam: Poorly drained, very dark gray silt loam grading into grayish brown clay loam and gray silty clay loam with dark brown, gray and yellow mottles, underlain at about 30inches by grayish brown silt loam. Wastenau silt loam: Poorly drained, dark grayish brown silty alluvium, 12 to 30 inches deep, under- lain by dark colored, poorly drained mineral soil. Keyser silt loam: Moderately well-drained, black silt loam grading into dark brown silty, clay loam with faint mottling in the lower part; underlain by loamy glacial material at depths ranging from 3 to 5 feet. 158 APPENDIX 1. SOILS (continued) Table 4. Distribution of Soils by Field. 3 Soil Field 2 Elba Calamus Clyman Ehler Miami : ------------- Percentage distribution --------------- I : 23.7 6.5 54.0 15.8 II : 2.9 51.2 26.5 19.4 III : 63.8 26.6 9.6 IV : 25.0 22.5 52.5 v : 57.4 42.6 VI : 31.7 21.1 7.6 16.6 23.0 VII : 62.9 37.1 VIII : 89.8 5.0 5.2 Ix : 94.4 5.6 x1 : x11 : 25.0 50.0 25.0 Corn Yields Oat Yields Alfalfa Yields APPENDIX 2. 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Footnotes References for budgetary information include: (1) Michigan Farm Management Handbook 1971, Agricultural Economics Report No. 191, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, May 1971; (2) Willet, G. S., 35 al., "Cost of Farm Machinery," Revised Extension Eircular 589, Department of Agricul— tural Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1970; (3) Doster, D. H., Unpublished Budgets. "Field Time Labor and Machinery Cost Worksheets, 1972, Purdue University Agricultural Extension, Lafayette, Indiana; (4) Consultations with Ray Hoglund, Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University. Operating costs per acre include repairs, fuel and grease. Assumes 28" rows. Manhours as a per cent of power hours. 191 192 .H 9..de 5.. mmubfioom on Hmmmm .N .58 magma can £53.“st How 83% flow o: 5? magi» €355.80 mom .mgflmuwmo wmon on» 8.66 can as can» mama ucwo Mom mean was mocofioflmmm 303 ..n 8H; 84 m .52. .E on a 8 flBofle omm. 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