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ABSTRACT

THE PERSONALITY CORRELATES OF, AND THE EFFECT OF
REWARD AND COSTS ON, SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR

.i\
by Irwin AkéHorowitz

The present study was undertaken to reveal the per-
sonality correlates of socially responsible behavior and
to delineate the conditions under which such behavior
would occur.

The experiment was designed as a 3'x 3 x 2 factorial.
Three levels of probability ofshock, high, moderate, and
none constituted one independent variable. The second
independent variable, publicity, had two levels, high and
none. 'SubJects'were differentiated into three groups by
the Byrne (1963) repression-sensitization scale.

Social responsibility was defined as the amount of
electric shock the subject was willing to submit to on
behalf of a dependent person.

Under conditions of no publicity, the hypothesis,
derived from Homan's exchange theory, that social respon-
sibility scores decrease as a direct function of increase
in costs (electric shock), was supported.

The findings concerning the effect of high publicity
on social responsibility were equivocal. Sensitizers, as

predicted, exhibited higher social responsibility scores

Irwin A. Horowitz

than repressors or the non-defbnsive middle group under
high publicity. The social responsibility scores of these
latter two groups, however, seemed to have been lowered by
high publicity. Furthermore, under high publicity, there
were no differences between probability of shock conditions.

It was suggested that under conditions of high pub-
licity, the experimental situation lost some of its
credibility. Subjects may have been role—playing under the
assumption that they were being evaluated with respect to
something other than helping a dependent person.

The differences between the personality subgroups were
discussed in terms of differential responsiveness to social
comparison pressures. It was suggested that repressors and
the non-defensive middle group were concerned with giving
the socially desirable response in terms of honesty and,
therefore lowered their social responsibility scores.
Sensitizers, on the other hand, being more unsure of them—
selves, raised their social responsibility scores in order
to be favorably compared with the peers in a public situation.

Future research was discussed in terms of a clearer
specification of the effects of the dependent person on
eleciting socially responsible behavior. Variation of the
type of public one's act will be exposed to was also sug—
gested. The possibility of employing the repression-
sensitization scale for partialling out the effects of

evaluation apprehension was presented.

THE PERSONALITY CORRELATES OF, AND THE EFFECT OF
REWARD AND COSTS ON, SOCIALLY

RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR

By

_<\
Irwin A“? Horowitz

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

College of Social Science
Department of Psychology

1966

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very appreciative of the guidance and assist-
ance of my major professor, Dr. Alfred Dietze.

I offer many thanks to my committee, Drs. James
Phillips, Donald Johnson, and Dozier Thornton who acted

in a socially responsible manner throughout this project.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGMNT Q 0 0 O O O O O O O 0 I 0 11
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF FIGURES o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 v1
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Theoretical Considerations and Review of
Literature. . . . . 1
The Application of Exchange Theory to
Social Responsibility . . . . . . l2
Personality Correlates of Social
Responsibility . . . . . . . . 21
The Repressor-Sensitizer Dimension. . . 2A
Restatement of Hypotheses. . . . . . 28
II o MTHOD o o o o o o o o o o o 0 o 29
Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Apparatus . . . . . . . . 29
Experimental Conditions . . . . . . 30
Procedure . . . . . . . . . . 33
Dependent Measure . . . . . . . . 3A
Questionnaires . . . . . . . . . 3”
III 0 RESULTS 0 o o o o o o o o o 0 Q o 36
Effectiveness of Experimental
Manipulation . . . . 36
Performance on the Experimental Task . . Al
Questionnaire Data . . . . . . . . 49
IV. DISCUSSION. . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Further Research. . . . . . . . . 59
V0 SUMMARY 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O 62
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6N
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
APPENDIX A.—-The Repressor-Sensitizer Scale . . 69
APPENDIX B o --TableS o o o o o I o o o 0 80

iii

APPENDICES Page

APPENDIX C.—-The Candidate's Messages . . . . 85
APPENDIX D.--Distribution of Dependent Variable. 91

iv

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

3.1 Means and variances of all experimental
conditions for the question, "To what
degree do you believe that the level
of shock you are willing to take in this
experiment is related to the candidate's
chances of obtaining the research

position?" . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Summary table for the analysis of variance

of scores on the degree of confidence

question. . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Mean social responsibility scores and vari-

ances for the eighteen experimental

conditions 0 o o o ‘0 o o o I Q 9 “0

3.A Summary table for the 3 x 3 x 2 analysis of
variance of the social responsibility

scores . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5 Impressions of the stimulus person under

conditions of high publicity and no

publicity . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.6 Number of subjects in each experimental

conditions who gave a hedonistic reason

for the level of shock they selected~ . . 52

3.7 The relationship between subjects predicted
score for "the average individual in a
similar situation" and their actual
social responsibility scores for N of 216. 53

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

2.1 Predicted amount of socially responsible
behavior for subjects in a non-external
reward (no publicity) situation, as a
function of probable cost. . . . . . 16

2.2 Predicted amount of socially responsible
behavior for subjects in a high external
reward (high publicity) situation as a

function of probable cost. . . . . . 20
3.1 Mean social responsibility scores for

subjects in no publicity and high

publicity conditions (B x C). . . . . A3
3.2 Mean social responsibility scores for the

three personality categories under
condition of no publicity and high
publicity . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3.3 Mean social responsibility scores of
repressors under conditions of high and
no publicity . . . . . . . . . . A6

3.4 Mean social responsibility, scores of non-
defensive group under conditions of high
and no publicity. . . . . . . . . A7

3.5 Mean social responsibility scores of
sensitizers under condition of high and
no publicity . . . . . . . . . . 48

3.6 Mean social responsibility scores as a
function of the number of messages
received from the stimulus person . . . 54

D. Distribution of the dependent variable, the
mean social responsibility scores . . . 92

vi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Hartshorne and May are known, primarily, for their
pioneering research with children on honesty as a trait.
Less popular are their efforts in exploring a related
characteristic which they labeled service (Hartshorne and
May, 1930). They defined service as the extent to which
children were willing to work for others rather than them—
selves. Operationally, service was defined in terms of
the extent to which a child shared the contents of his
play Kit with needier children. As was the case with
honesty, the extent to which children exhibited "service
like" behavior depended on such situational and personal
factors as classroom code and school adjustment.

More recently, Berkowitz and his associates (Berkowitz
and Daniels, 1963; Daniels and Berkowitz, 1963; Berkowitz
and Daniels, 196A; Goranson and Berkowitz, 1966) have (I
studied a similar phenomenon called social responsibility.
Berkowitz and Daniels (1963) defined socially responsible
behavior as actions which are carried out for another's
benefit. In the laboratory investigations carried out by
Berkowitz and his co-workers, socially responsible behavior
was defined as increased effort by an individual (A) under

conditions where such effort is apparently unrelated to A's

l

own goal attainment but is seen as instrumental for
another person's (B's) goal attainment. These studies
reveal that social responsibility is maximized when: (l)

A perceived B as highly dependent on his (A's) performance,
(2) A believed that B perceived the goal as highly desir-
able, and when (3) A experienced help in a similar situa-
tion prior to being asked to help B.

Berkowitz and Daniels (196A) account for this seemingly
altruistic behavior in terms of a cultural norm prescribing
that the individual should help those who are dependent upon
him. This general approach is based on the assumption ".
that persons in our society may be motivated to help others
simply because others are dependent upon them" (Goranson
and Berkowitz, 1966). Following this line of thinking,
Berkowitz and Daniels (196A) posit a social responsibility
norm. This internalized norm prescribes that people ". . .
act on behalf of others not for material gain or social
approval, but for their own self-approval, for the self—
administered rewards from doing what is right" (Goranson
and Berkowitz, 1966).

Gouldner (1960) has taken a similar approach, but is
more concerned with long-term social interaction. Gouldner
(1960) postulates that the socialization process internalizes
complimentary rights and obligations in persons even before
they begin to participate fully in the social system. He

states that there is a universal norm of reciprocity and

"it . . . engenders motives for returning benefits even
when power differences might invite exploitation" (Gouldner,
1960). This norm serves as a kind of all purpose "moral
cement." The implication is that A's adherence to B's
expectations reinforces B's conformance to A's expectations.
The norm of reciprocity maintains a stable, shared value
system.

Specifically, Gouldner (1960) has suggested that the
norm of reciprocity entails two demands: (1) people should
help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not
injure those who have helped them. These obligations of
repayment are contingent upon the imputed value of the
benefit received (Gouldner, 1960).

What Gouldner (1960) is proposing essentially is a
social standard principle which gives impetus to the pay-
ment and repayment of social debts. The norm of reciprocity
may serve as a starting mechanism in social interaction.

It enables the individual, with only a modicum of risk,
to initiate interaction. The impasse of "you go first"
is obviated (Gouldner, 1960).

Gouldner (1960) would view socially responsible
behavior as actions carried out in accordance with the
reciprocity norm. While Gouldner's approach specifies the
payment and repayment of debts, it is not totally an econ-
omic or utilitarian model. In the short—term, the payment

of debts may not be entirely equalized. It may not be

economically reasonable for A to repay B for B's help.
Gouldner (1960) argues, however, that the reciprocity norm
obliges A to repay the debt at some time. Thus A, having
confidence that B will honor his debts, is more willing

to incur costs for B. Furthermore, the reciprocity norm
provides safeguards against exploitation of less powerful
individuals by more powerful persons. This norm regulates
the exchange pattern and inhibits exploitive relations
(Gouldner, 1960).

Another way of looking at socially responsible
behavior is offered by the economic models of social inter-
action devised by Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and by Homans
(1961). Homans (1961) sees behavior as a function of its
payoff; an individual's responses depend on the quantity
and quality of reward and punishment his actions elicit
(Gullahorn and.Gu11ahorn, 196A). Thibaut and Kelley (1959)
have developed a similar model employing the economic
principle that each individual tends to maximize the differ-
ence between his rewards and costs. The basic premise of
the economic model of social interaction is that individuals
act in such a manner as to maximize their advantages.

In this study we will try to apply the economic model
to socially responsible behavior. We will attempt to reveal
some of the personality correlates of socially responsible
behavior and delineate the conditions under which such

behavior is most likely to occur.

Theoretical Considerations and Review
of the Literature

 

 

The theoretical formulations of Thibaut and Kelley.
(1959) and Homans (1961) attempt to explain behavior in
terms of rewards exchanged and the costs incurred during
social interaction. Very simply, profit = reward - cost.

According to Homans (1961) for an activity to incur
cost, an alternative and rewarding activity must be
forgone. Cost, then, "as a value forgone, is a negative
value" (Homans, 1961, p. 60). :The cost of an activity
would also include the punishment incurred in carrying
out that activity (Secord and Backman, 196A).

Homans (1961) defines psychic profit as reward less
cost. Profit is then the difference between a value of
the reward of one activity and the value of the reward
obtainable by emitting another activity (Homans, 1961).

The social responsibility norm may be translated
into reward and cost terms. Let us consider the case of
an individual highly proficient in mathematics who receives
a request for aid from a student less highly skilled.

The Work of Berkowitz suggests that the inferior student's

dependency requires that the superior individual give aid.

The proficient student gives up a certain amount of time
(cost) and in return receives approval (reward). The
request for aid may be seen as a cue for arousing the
social responsibility norm (Schopler and Bateson, 1965).
Deviation from this norm may bring about feelings of
anxiety and guilt (Schopler and Bateson, 1965). This
results in the lowering of the potential value of an
alternative activity. The cost of £93 being socially
responsible therefore may be greater than being socially
responsible.

There are factors which may change the reward-cost
outcome with respect to socially responsible behavior.
Berkowitz and Daniels (196A) have demonstrated that
perceived dependency is an important factor in eliciting
socially responsible behavior. Subjects in the high de-
pendence condition were told that their supervisors would
be rated on how well they (the subjects) performed in the
experiment. The subjects performance would reflect the
supervisors ability to motivate her workers (Berkowitz and
Daniels, 1964). Low dependency was created by telling the
subjects that their performance would not be related to
their supervisor's ratings. The experiment was purported
to be concerned with the evaluation of supervisory skill.
Subjects were told either that their work would determine
whether their supervisor would receive a $5.00 gift

certificate or that their performance was unrelated to the

supervisor's chances of receiving the gift certificate
(Berkowitz and Daniels, 196A). The subject's task.was to
build boxes in cooperation with the supervisor. Social
responsibility was defined in terms of the number of
boxes the subject built. The high dependence group con—
structed significantly more boxes than the low dependence
group.

This paradigm for manipulating dependence has been
employed by Berkowitz in all of his studies. In each
experiment subjects in the high dependence group did more
work in order to aid their partner or supervisor. Subjects
gave aid to the dependent person in absence of return pay-
ment. It would seem that subjects are willing to incur
greater costs for a highly dependent person.

There are, however, distinct limits to the effective-
ness of dependency as an eliciting factor. Schopler and
Mathews (1965) were concerned with the perceived locus of
B's dependence as a limiting factor. These investigators
found that if A perceives B's dependence to be beyond B's
control than A is more likely to give aid.

The subjects in the Schopler and Mathews (1965)
experiment were males. In this connection Schopler and
Bateson (1965) have proposed that the extent of a partner's
dependence instigates the norm--conforming process differ—
ently in males and females. These findings are in accord

with results reported in the Walker and Heyn's (1962)

monograph on conformity. In the experimentalisituatibn
devised by Walker and Heyns (1962) subjects were asked by
their partner to help them solve an anagram puzzle. To
accede to this reguest meant that the subject would
decrease his own chances of winning. Walker and Heyns
(1962) report that females yielded to the request, while
males did not. The cost of yielding in this situation
outweighed any advantages which might accrue to the subject
for obeying the social responsibility norm. When male B
is too dependent upon male A, it threatens A's own freedom
to act. It would appear that to retain their own indepen—
dence, males forgo the approval of acting in a socially
responsible manner when that independence is threatened.
The alternative act is more highly valued.

Walker and Heyns (1962) have suggested that there
is a general cultural pattern of sex differences Whereby
males have a greater need for achievement while females
have a greater need for affiliation. To conform to the
social responsibility norm in the Walker and Heyns (1962)
experimental situation required that males forgo the more
highly valued activity, winning the game. The importance
of a norm, as Homans (1961) has stated, is not that a
certain behavior conforms to the norm, but that the behavior
is valued. If the cost of conforming to the norm, in this
case the social responsibility norm, is greater than the
cost embodied in another activity, then we should not

expect socially responsible behavior.

One way to overcome these barriers to socially respon-
sible behavior is to increase the subjects awareness of
the social responsibility norm. Berkowitz and Daniels
(196A) have shown that if one increases the saliency of
the norm one can expect socially responsible behavior.
These investigators reasoned that since the norm prescribes
giving aid to others, a person should be most aware of this
cultural prescription after someone has voluntarily helped
him. In the prior help condition in this experiment,
subjects were given a boring task to work on for ten minutes.
At the end of this period, a confederate entered the room,
explained that her (all subjects were female) task was
relatively easy, and offered to help. Both individuals
then worked together completing the letter cancellation
task. The second half of the experiment, described earlier
in this discussion, required that the subject give aid to a
supervisor in order that the latter might win a prize.

Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) sought a direct
comparison of the reciprocity principle and the social
responsibility norm with respect to prior help. The three
conditions in this experiment which most directly concern
the present discussion were based on whether prior help
to the subject was: (1) voluntary, (2) compulsory, or (3)
refused. The basic assumption was that if prior help was
voluntary then the saliency of the social responsibility

norm was increased. The second part of the experiment

lO

pertained to the amount of help the subject gave to the
same or different partner in a box building task. The
findings were, as predicted, that persons in the voluntary
help condition gave more aid in the second part of the
experiment. More aid, however, was given to the original
partner than to the different partner.

Goranson and Berkowitz conclude that the observed
behavior should not be considered "simply as an instance
of 'rational' or economic interchange" (p. 232). They
point out that subjects had no reason to assume any
material return. They further note that the "perceived
voluntariness" of prior help does not conform to a
utilitarian notion.

It would seem that, if anything, the results of the
above experiment conform to a utilitarian view of social
interchange. Certainly, Gouldner's (1960) reciprocity
principle prescribes the repayment of debts. If B has
given aid to A, then A is obligated to repay B. Why, then,
should more aid have been given to the same partner than a
different partner?

What exactly was interchanged in these series of
studies reported by Berkowitz and his colleagues? The
subjects costs were in terms of effort and time. To give
aid to a dependent person requires that the subject help
solve some problems and give some of this time. However,

there were no alternative activities inherent in the

ll

situation. The subjects all spent the same amount of

time on the experimental situation and received equal
credit. The subjects reward consisted, presumably, of
self-approval, for giving this aid. The costs appear to
be minimal. When Walker and Heyns (1962) asked their
subjects (males) to forgo the reward of winning an anagram
solving game and aid another person, these subjects refused.
Social or self-approval did not outweigh the advantages of
winning.

Altruism, in the sense of giving aid to a dependent
person without receiving material reward, apparently has
many strings attached to it. The social responsibility
norm may apply to a limited domain of behavior in which
costs are kept to a minimum. Schopler and Bateson (1965)
have reported that a person whose outcomes are consider-
ably reduced by yielding will in fact yield less than one
whose outcomes are only slightly reduced. The Schopler
and Bateson (1965) experimental situation was in the form
of a mixed motive game. In the high dependence situation,
in order for the partner to win money, the subject had to
cooperate by yielding to the partner's preferred answer.
0n the critical trials, the subject could choose another
alternative which would maximize his gains. Cost was
defined by the size of the decrement of probability of
winning from each of four alternatives. If the partner
picked an alternative which increased the subjects cost

of yielding, the subject was not likely to yield.

12

The kind of social responsibility Berkowitz seems to
be dealing with is on the order of the norm-conforming
processes which impel someone to buy Girl Scout cookies,
despite their taste. The attempt to minimize one's costs
seems to be a pervasive theme in these experiments even
when the costs are minimal to begin with.

One would expect subjects to be more willing to
incur costs for someone they felt they liked. It is not
surprising then to find that in the Berkowitz and Daniels
(196A) study subjects in the prior help condition tended
to have a relatively high liking for the supervisor to
whom they extended aid.

The Application of ExchanggTheqry to
ISocial Responsibility

One may legitimately ask of Berkowitz's studies if
aising someone on a simple motor or intellectual task is
analogous to aiding a dependent person when one's prin-
ciples or even one's life and limb may be at stake? The
costs incurred in this type of situation far outweigh
those observed in previous experimental studies. It may
involve exposing oneself to harmful stimuli. This con-
ception of social responsibility is one in which A is
willing to incur great costs for dependent B. But these
costs will not be borne in absence of tangible rewards.
The reward-cost outcome may, however, be initially unfavorable.

Furthermore, there must be an alternative form of behavior

13

available. A person listening to someone's screams on
the street has several alternatives, one of which is not
to do anything. This person incurs costs in any event.
If he does not give aid, he will feel guilty. If, how-
ever, he does give aid his costs may be infinitely
greater for he is exposing himself to dangerous stimuli.
This does not mean that the person giving aid automatically
assumes an unfavorable reward-cost outcome. Giving aid
to a dependent person will bring approval not only from
the dependent individual but also from the community in
general.

In the present study socially responsible behavior
is defined by the costs, in terms of noxious stimuli, an
individual is willing to incur for a dependent person.
Using the profit = reward - cost formula, and following
the results of the Schopler and Bateson (1965) experiment,
we would expect that, with the absence of tangible external
rewards (publicity), as costs increased, subjects would
exhibit fewer socially responsible acts. Since subjects
will have before them the alternative of not submitting
themselves to a situation involving great costs, it is
expected that this latter activity will be more highly
valued.

One way to increase the probability of socially
responsible behavior, following Berkowitz, is to increase

the saliency of the social responsibility norm. In this

14

situation, the reward-related aspects of being socially
responsible are brought to the subject's attention. We
would expect that a more favorable reward-cost outcome
would be apparent if subjects knew that their acts would
be brought to the attention of a group of people likely
to give approval for such acts.

Rewards and costs are both intrinsic and extrinsic.
Consider the situation in which an individual receives a
request for aid under circumstances in which his actions
will bring him into contact with noxious stimuli. Further-
more, he is aware that B, the dependent individual, is not
in a position to reciprocate. A is further aware that he
will remain completely anonymous during the entire episode.
There are no extrinsic rewards for giving aid. Internally
he may be rewarded with feelings of self-satisfaction.

The value of internal rewards may not counterbalance the
lack of external reward. In the Walker and Heyns (1962)
experiment, it was noted the reward of feeling self-
satisfied did not overcome the subject's desire to win the
game.

External costs in this situation are defined in
terms of the amount of noxious stimuli the person may
receive by giving aid to a dependent individual. Internally,
costs may be defined in terms of the experienced guilt and

anxiety if A does not go to B's aid.

15

We assume that in a short-term situation, particularly
one in which the dependent person is not a friend of the
subject, external rewards and costs will be the determining
factors in eliciting socially responsible behavior. There-
fore, in the situation described above, we would expect
socially responsible behavior to decrease as the cost of
giving aid increases. Figure 1 presents these predictions.
It shows that when extrinsic reward is zero, we predict
that social responsibility decreases in a linear fashion
as the probable costs of such acts increase.

If we increase the value of external rewards then
the reward-cost outcome is altered. This outcome can be
altered by making a person aware that his acts will become
known to a public, providing he values this publicity,
which will give him approval for aiding a dependent person.
In this situation the difference between A's rewards and
costs are not as great as in a situation where external
rewards are not present.

Consider the situation in which A knows that his
acts will be made public, but that his probable costs are
zero. This would be somewhat analagous to a lifeguard
saving a pretty girl wading in two feet of water. In a
laboratory situation in which probable cost is varied from
none to high, one might expect, under condition of high
publicity, that the zero probable cost group would exhibit

the highest social responsibility scores.

Mean Predicted Social Responsibility Scores

16

Moderate“

 

 

None Moderate High

Probable Cost

Figure 2.1.--Predicted amount of socially responsibile
behavior for subjects in a non external reward (no
publicity) situation, as a function of probable cost.

17

However, it has been shown by many writers that an
individual defines an experimental situation.in light of
his own conceptions (Kelman and Eagly, 1965)v Orne (1962)
has pointed out that subjects inevitably formulate hypo-
theses about the experimental situation and then may respond
in ways related to these hypotheses rather than the experi-
mental stimuli. Rosenberg (1965) has shown that the.
typical subject enters a psychological experiment with.the
notion that he is to be evaluated. If this idea is con-
firmed then subjects will experience evaluation apprehen-
sion; "that is, an active anxiety-toned concern that he
(the Subject) wins a positive valuation from the experi-
menter, or at least that he provides no grounds for a
negative one" (Rosenberg, 1965, p. 29).

It is proposed that under conditions of high publicity,
the profit = reward a cost formula is no longer additive as
was the case when external rewards were absent. Instead,
it is proposed that profit is a function of reward x cost.
External reward, in terms of publicity, remains stable at

a value of let us say 1.0. The profit that accrues to an
individual for giving aid to a dependent person depends
upon the costs he is willing to incur for that dependent

individual. Costs may, for example, range from 1 to 10.

Profit = reward x cost 1.0.x C1 to 10)
The greater the costs A is willing to incur on B's behalf,

the greater the profit A will receive in this situation.

18

The costs A incurs for B is directly related to a favor—
able reward-cost outcome.

One's costs, however, must have a real value. A
must make a definite investment to help B in terms of, at
least in the present situation, A exposing himself to
noxious stimuli. If A is asked to give aid to a dependent
B in a situation wherein no cost expenditure is necessary,
the question arises for A as to what aspect of his
behavior is being looked at. If it is not necessarily
his willingness to incur great costs for B, for there are
no costs involved, then it could very well be A's honesty;
"Would I really go these great lengths if I knew I was
actually going to incur these costs?" The expectation is
that A will respond in a manner which would tend to
decrease his social responsibility scores. This will be
done in order to conform to what A believes his actions
might be under conditions of real threat. Since A does
not have a real.criterion as to what kind of behavior
would typically be expected, his social responsibility
score may be quite low.

Consider a situation in which A may or may not,
depending on pure chance factors, be asked to assume the
costs of his actions in helping a dependent individual, B.
The probability that A will incur these costs are
P = .5. In this instance A has a chance to maximize

cost

his profit for his actions are credible since there are

19

very real costs involved. McClelland (1956) has demon-
strated that an individual who is motivated to achieve
tends to take moderate (Psuccess = .5) or calculated

risks in preference to very speculative or very safe
undertakings. When the probable costs are moderate, A

has the opportunity to maximize profit while keeping his
costs at a reasonable level. With Pc = .5, A may not be
asked to assume the costs he may be willing to incur. This
does not change the imputed value of his actions. A man
saving a woman from an attacker does not receive any less
approval if that attacker does not strike him and runs
away. A's investment in terms of costs remains real
whether or not he actually incurs these costs. It is
hypothesized that when PC = .5, A will be willing to
assume greater costs than in any other probable cost situ-
ation.

The limiting case of profit as a function of reward x
cost occurs when the cost of one's acts becomes prohibitive.
This would occur when A is certain that he would have to
assume the costs of his actions when giving aid to B. When
the cost of an act becomes too great, the value of that
act is decreased. The more valued alternative in this
instance is to avoid the harmful stimuli. Behavior con-
forming to the social responsibility norm decreases in

value. Figure 2 presents the above predictions.

Mean Predicted Social Responsibility Scores

20

High‘*

Moderatew

 

Low ‘ ? ‘
None Moderate High

Probable Cost

Figure 2.2.--Predicted amount of socially responsible
behavior for subjects in a high external reward (high
publicity) situation as a function of probable cost.

21

Following the findings of Berkowitz and Daniels
(1964), we expect that individuals who do give aid to the
dependent person (B) will have a higher degree of liking
for B than persons who give a lesser amount of aid. This
is not to say that I must first decide if I like a drowning
person before I jump in to save him. Though it is to be
expected that the degree of liking we have for an individ-
ual does effect the amount of cost we are willing to incur
for him. It may be that the act of helping a dependent
person, at some risk to ourselves, puts us in a good mood.
Our rewards are both intrinsic and extrinsic. We have in-
vested costs in the dependent person and this may account
for the relatively high degree of liking that Berkowitz
and Daniels (196A) found.

Personality Correlates of
Social Responsibility

 

 

Social responsibility may be seen as an orientation
held by certain individuals. This orientation may be seen
simply as a conception in the minds of individuals of the
degree to which they should be helpful to others. As a
personality variable, social responsibility may range from
a weak to a strong orientation. The stronger the orienta-
tion, the greater should be A's willingness to incur costs
for B. If social responsibility, as an orientation, plays
any part in determining A's behavior, then the more depen-

dent B is, the more willing A will be to help.

22

There have been few attempts at delineating the
personality correlates of socially responsible behavior.
Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) have suggested that
individuals are socially responsible in order to gain
self-approval. Harris (1957) has attempted to measure
the social responsibility tendencies of individuals by
deve10ping a self-report scale. Berkowitz and Daniels
(1964) modified the Harris self-report scale (it was
originally devised for children) and found that the
scores on this scale correlated significantly with depen-
dent variables designed to measure social responsibility.
Berkowitz and Daniels (196A) suggest that high scores on
the Harris scale reflect more than just a willingness to
reciprocate for past favors. They state that individuals
who scored high on the Harris scale have strong moral
standards and have sufficient ego strength to conform to
those standards.

Stone (1965) has contended that the items used in
the Berkowitz and Daniels (1964) modification of the Harris
scale do not appear to be subtle at all and if a person
(who was answering the items) wished to present a favorable
picture of himself, he could do so without much difficulty.
Stone argues that the Harris scale was, to a significant

extent, confounded by a social desirability bias.

23

Berkowitz (1965), in a rejoinder to Stone, argues
that it is these very individuals who tend to do the
socially desirable thing who are in fact the socially
responsible people in our society.

It may very well be that social desirability and
social responsibility are highly correlated in the
studies carried out by Berkowitz and his colleagues. The
tasks Berkowitz typically requires of his subjects are
rather innocuous and demand only a small amount of extra
time and effort on their part. A's cost for helping B
are minimal. .

In the present study, in which socially responsible
behavior is seen as imposing an unfavorable reward-cost
outcome upon A, social desirability is not at all synony-
mous with social responsibility. In terms of Homan's
exchange theory, an individual is expected to maximize
his profits. Homans (1961) law of distributive justice
implies that to increase one's profits is the socially
desirable course to follow.

In a situation in which A is asked to incur costs
in terms of exposing himself to noxious stimuli for a
dependent B, with whom A has had no previous contact, the
socially desirable action, we expect, is for A to minimize
his costs. This is particularly true of a situation in
which only a single exchange is involved and is transient

in nature.

2“

Assuming the absence of pathOIOSY. we predict that
the typically self-critical individual, the person who,
in Rotter's (195“) terms has a "generalized expectancy"
for punishment deriving from the violation of or failure
to attain an internal standard, will be most likely to
respond in a socially responsible manner. Individuals
who usually have strong feelings of self-criticism and
self-blame may be expected to incur greater costs in
helping a dependent person in order to attain these
(violated) internal standards. The greater the costs these
individuals incur the more they will meliorate their own
self-criticism. Since we have defined socially responsible
behavior in terms of A accepting a highly unfavorable
reward-cost outcome to help B, then we expect those individ-
uals who are characterized by strong feelings of self-doubt,
and self-criticism, to be more socially responsible than

individuals not characterized by such feelings.

The Repression-Sensitization Dimension
The repression-sensitization dimension, the terms
having been applied by Gordon (1957) to a categorization
employed by Lazarus, Eriksen, and Fonda (1951) in their
work on perceptual defense, is one which categoriezes
individuals along a continuum with respect to their chara—
cteristic mode of response to threatening stimuli. Eriksen

(1951) noted that the concept of perceptual defense implies

25

the use of the ego or self, which is responsible'forbthe
selection and screening of stimuli. Lazarus, Eriksen,
and Fonda (1951) found that sensitizers had lower thres-
holders for the perception of threatening materials than
did repressors. Byrne (1963), who designed the scale
which measures repression-sensitization, points out that
the repressive pole of the scale involved the use of
avoidance defenses, while the sensitizing end refers to
approach defenses.

We have hypothesized that the typically self-critical
individual will be prone to incur costs for a dependent
person. We have also suggested that the greater A's
orientation towards socially responsible behavior, the
greater is the eliCiting power represented by B's depen-
dence. The repression-sensitization scale seems to be
particularly effective in distinguishing individuals with
respect to anxiety and defensiveness.

Tempone (1962) was able to predict, from scores on
the Byrne repression-sensitization scale, differential
thresholds for the perception of failure and success words
following a failure experience. Sensitizers perceived
significantly more failure words than did repressors.
These findings corroborate the work of Gordon (1975) who
found that repressors and sensitizers were characterized

by differential recall of threat and non-threat materials.

26

Gordon (1959) reports that sensitizers, whose recall for'
threat-related material is sharpened, rather than dee
pressed, reflect little defensiveness and a high degree
of anxiety.

We have suggested that the self-critical individual
who has failed to attain internal standards.will be the I
more socially responsible person. Evidence points to the
fact that sensitizers fit this description. Altrocchi,
Parsons, and Dickoff (1960) found that sensitizers manifest.
larger self, ideal-self discrepancies than do repressors.

We have further assumed'that in the present study in
which socially responsible behavior‘is defined in terms of
A incurring great costs to aid dependent B, social desir-
ability and social responsibility will not be related; It
has been noted that responses by repressors are typically
socially desirable in nature, while the sensitizers pole
of the scale is not so characterized (Byrne, 1963; Jackson
and Messick, 1962). Based on the experimental evidence
and our theoretical formulations,,we expect that sensitizers
will exhibit more socially responsible behavior than
repressors.

More specifically, it is hypothesized that sensitizers
will have higher social responsibility scores than repres-
sors in a situation in which external rewards (high pub-

licity) are present. Since reassurance of self-worth can

27

only be attained by a social comparison with other people,
it is expected that sensitizers will be more socially
responsible under conditions of high publicity. The nec-
essary defense against feelings of self doubt is to obtain
reassurance from others about one's reality and importance
(Watson, 1963).

A subsidiary hypothesis pertains to Gordon's.(1957)
finding that repressors emphasize similarities between
themselves and others, while sensitizers emphasize the real
or imagined differences between themselves and others. It
is hypothesized that repressors, when asked to predict the
social responsibility scores of others under similar con-
ditions, will assume that others act much the same as they
do. Conversely, it is predicted that sensitizers will see
others as giving higher social responsibility scores than
they themselves give.

Berkowitz and Daniels (196A) have suggested that as
the social responsibility norm is made more salient, more
norm-conforming behavior is observed. Following Berkowitz
and Daniels (1964) it is predicted that social responsi-
bility scores will increase as the number of requests for

aid from the dependent person increases.

II.

III.

IV.

28

Restatement of Hypotheses
Under conditions of no publicity, social respon-
sibility scores will decrease in a linear fashion
as costs increase.
Under conditions of high publicity, a

curvilinear relationship betWeen social

Iresponsibility scores and costs as presented by

Figure 2 is predicted.

Sensitizers will have higher social responsibility

scores under condition of high publicity than will

repressors.

A. Repressors predicted scores for others in a
similar circumstances will closely correlate
with their own social responsibility scores.
Conversely, sensitizers will predict higher
social responsibility scores for others as
compared to their own scores.

Subjects with higher social responsibility scores

will exhibit a higher degree of liking for the

dependent person that subjects with lower social
responsibility scores.

Social reSponsibility scores will increase as a

function of the number of requests for aid from

the dependent person.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subjects

The subjects were 216 undergraduate male volunteers
from the introductory psychology course at Michigan State
University. The subjects were participating for experi-
mental points to be added to their grades. Prior to
entering the laboratory, subjects were questioned to
insure that they were not previously acquainted. Subjects
were assigned to the six experimental conditions in a

1 2 3 A 5 6 order.

Apparatus

 

Facing each subject was a black box with a (control)
panel of eleven single-pull, single-throw toggle switches.
Above each switch was a numerical designation ranging from
zero to ten. Above these numbers were verbal descriptions
which were as follows: 0-2 mild; 3-5 moderate; 6-8 moder-
ately severe; 9-10 severe. Panels were arranged so that
subjects were not able to see the responses of any of the
other subjects.

Each of the four boxes was connected, by prominently

displayed wiring, to the experimenter's control panel. On

29

30

this panel were four sets of eleven lights corresponding
to the eleven toggle switches on the subject's control

panel. Each toggle switch activated one of these lights.

Experimental Conditions

 

Subjects were run in groups ranging from two to four.
Subjects in all groups were given the following instructions:

Instructions

 

First, I'd like to thank you for coming. Your
participation in the experiment is much appreciated.

There are two parts to this experiment. In the
first part of the experiment, which will take place
in this room, we would like you to help us select a
research assistant for a long-term, follow-up project.
The primary concern that this assistant will have is
to convince people to submit themselves to electric
shock. This, as you might well imagine, is a dif-
ficult task.

The procedure that we are using is to have each
candidate write five fairly brief messages, each one
conveying a different argument pertaining to the use
of electric shock on human subjects. The candidate,
in order to better understand the requirements of
his job, will usually be present, and will actually
go through the same experiment that you will.
Naturally, in order not to prejudice anyone's chances,
I will not point that individual out.

After you read each of this candidate's messages,
which have been placed on your table, please press
one of the switches in front of you indicating the
level of shock which you would be willing to sub-
mit to. Please leave the switch on until you finish
reading the next argument. After you have finished
reading the next argument, reset the switch, and make
another response. You may make the same resonse more
than once.

As you can see each switch denotes a specific level
of shock. We have described the type of shock it is
in verbal terms (i.e. mild, moderate, etc.) in order
to aid you in making your responses. The research
candidate's job is to persuade you to submit to as
high a level of shock as possible. To be fair, I
must tell you that his chances of getting this job
depend on your performance. I have not restricted
the type of arguments that the candidate may use in
any way.

31

There is, however, a second part to this experi—
ment, which will take place in a specially designed
room in another part of the building. Essentially,
it is concerned with performance under stress. You
will be given more details after this part of the
experiment.

Indgpendent Variable Manipulation

A. Probability of Shock

1. High probability.

Subject in this group were then informed
that "What you will be doing, in essence, is
setting your own level of shock for the
second part of the experiment. This second
part will be concerned with learning under
Stress and the five levels of shock that you
indicate you are willing to take correspond
to the five learning trials you will be re-
quired to go through later on. You will all
be requested to participate in the second
part of this experiment.

2. Moderate probability.

Subjects in this group were given the
same instructions as the high probability
group with the additional information that
". . . due to limitations in time and space,
only one-half of this group will be asked to
go through the second part of the experiment.

These subjects will be randomly selected

after we finish the present task."

32

Subjects in this group were run in sets
of two or four in order to keep the prob-
ability of shock constant at PS = .5.

3. No probability.

Subjects in this group were given the same
basic instructions with the additional infor-
mation that ". . . due to limitations in time
and space we are not going to require anyone
to go through the second part of the experi-
ment today. However, we would like you to
try to respond as if you would be asked to
participate in the second part of the experi-
ment."

B. Publicity
1. High Publicity.

Subjects in this condition were told that:
"In addition, you will have a chance to air
your feelings, and report your reactions to
your 151 lecture class. We have been asked
to set up a discussion session pertaining to
this experiment. You will be asked to parti-
cipate, so please write your name, class
section, and student number on the sheet of
paper requesting this information. I must
point out that your responses here will be an

important part of that discussion session."

33

2. No publicity.

Subjects in this condition were told that
anonymity was an important factor in this
experiment. To protect this anonymity, sub-
jects were given a number. They were
informed that their individual responses

would not be shown to anyone.

Procedure

 

After experimenter was certain that the instructions
were understood, the subjects were given five written
messages composed by "candidate #3."

The text of each message was composed in a manner
which endeavored to keep the stimulus person as neutral
as possible in order not have the subjects responses
influenced by attraction or dislike for the candidate.

Each message contained a sentence which explicity pointed
out that the "candidate" needed the subject's aid. Messages
were rated for "persuasibility" prior to the experiment by
ten judges on a one to ten scale. Persuasibility scores

had a very narrow range of four to six. Messages were
presented in a random order.

Subjects were told to read each message and to indi—
cate, by pressing one of the eleven switches, the amount of
electric shock they would be willing to submit to in the

second part of the experiment.

3A

Dependent Measure

 

Social responsibility scores were computed by taking
the average of each subject's five responses. Thus, if
after each message the subject pressed levers 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
his social responsibility score would be 7. The higher the
score, the more socially responsible the subject was deemed

to be.

Questionnaires

 

After termination of the experimental manipulations,
subjects were given a post-experimental questionnaire
designed to elicit their reactions to the experiment, their
reasons for selecting their particular levels of shock, and
their impressions of the stimulus person. Subjects were
also presented with a question designed to check on the
effectiveness of the experimental manipulations. They were
asked to indicate, on a ten point scale, the degree of
confidence they had that their performance was related to
the candidate's chances of getting the job.

The Byrne (1963) repression-sensitization scale was
then given to the subjects. This instrument is a modifica-
tion of several scales of the MMPI. As developed by Byrne
(1961), the scale has a split-half reliability of .88 and a
test-retest reliability, after six weeks, also at .88.

High scores on the scale indicate sensitization, low scores

indicate repression.

35

Subjects scoring 0 to 33 on the Byrne scale were
designated as repressors. Scores from 3A to A9 were
categorized as the middle, or non—defensive, group.
Sensitizers scored from 50 to 90.

Subjects then were told the purpose of the experi-
ment. The need for deception was explained. They were
asked for their reactions and suggestions. The person-
ality test was explained by telling the subjects that we
were only trying to categorize people on a scale and we

were not looking for pathology.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS

Effectiveness of Experimental Manipulations

The postexperimental questionnaire included one item
designed to determine the effectiveness of the experimental
manipulations. Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten
point scale the degree to which they believed that their
performance (i.e. the level of shock they selected) was
related to the candidate's actual chances of obtaining the
research position. The means for this degree of confidence
item for all conditions are presented in Table 3.1. Table
3.2 summarizes the analysis of variance of the responses to
this questionnaire item.

The data presented Table 3.1 indicates that subjects
in the high and moderate probability of shock groups felt
that their performance was strongly related to the can-
didate's chances of getting the research job. The signifi-
cant probability of shock main effect, presented in Table
3.2, reveals that as the probability of shock decreased
(i.e. no probability), the relationship between subjects
performance and the candidate's job possibilities became
ambiguous. This is a reasonable finding because subjects

in the no probability of shock conditions were not asked to

36

37

TABLE 3.l.——Means and standard deviations of all experimental

conditions for the question, "To what degree do you believe

that the level of shock you are willing to take in this

experiment is related to the candidate's chances of obtain-
ing the research position?"

 

 

 

 

High Publicity No Publicity
>.
+> m >. >5 m >. a
r+>. .p o4: +3 .9 m4: 9
r+n *1 +3?! *1 vi +>v4 -H
(00 H (UH H ,&H (UH t-‘I
Q50 3'!" “H 'H #4 NH 0'!“
om we on on an on Zn
m4: *1“ Tim zzm z:m rim a
pm mm on n n on 9
wt) 0 2:0 0 0 2:0 0
c. n n n a a h
a. a. SM n. a. a.
Repressors E 7 2 7.3 5.5 7.3 7.2 5.1
O 1.36 1.33 1.0“ 1.18 1.35 2.01
Non-defensive I 6.8 7.0 5.9 7.0 7.1 5.8
o 1.41 1.45 1.05 1.29 1.20 1.08
Sensitizers E 8.0 7.5 6.5 7.6 7.5 5.1
o 1.35 1.55 1.50 1.60 1.58 1.03

 

Note: The higher the score, the greater the degree of
confidence.

N =_12 in each.cell.

38

TABLE 3.2.--Summary table for the analysis of variance
of scores on the degree of confidence question.

 

 

Source d.f. M.S. F
A (Repressor-Sensitizer) 2 A.5 2.27
B (Probability of Shock) 2 AA.5 22.A7*
C (Publicity) l 3.0 1.51
A x B A 1.5 --
A x C 2 3.0 1.51
B x C 2 2.5 1.26
A x B x C A <1.00 ---
Error 198 1.98

 

39

submit to the shock levels they choose. This finding
lends credence to our hypothesis concerning the effect
of evaluation apprehension under conditions of no prob-
ability of shock. There were, however, no significant
differences between personality categories on this item.
The subjects' degree of confidence in the dependence
of the candidate's job on their performance, is not directly
related to whether they actually believed that they would
eventually be asked to submit to shock. An item directly
related to this problem was not included for fear of
arousing the subject's suspicion. It may be stated with
some degree of confidence that the threat of shock was
credible. Table 3.3 reflects the fact that when there
was any probability of shock present, subjects selected
levels in the mild, and moderate ranges. It is not until
the no publicity, no probability of shock condition that
subjects are willing to venture forth into the moderately
severe range. The post-experimental session gave further
evidence that subjects felt the threat of shock to be real.
Subjects related that while they felt the threat of shook
to be real, they doubted that it would involve severe pain
for it was being conducted under the aegis of the University.
Subjects were most anxious to ascertain their "standing"
in the experiment but were told that the information was

not at the experimenter's disposal at the moment and all

A0

TABLE 3.3.--Mean social reSponsibility scores and standard
deviations for the eighteen experimental conditions.

 

 

 

High Publicity No Publicity
>3 >> >: >: >5! >5 >3
9 p m+> .p p 04: 9
rim *4 p~4 r1 *4 p~4 'H
HS—c r-l air-1 H ,CH air-i H
“<3 .Cvi psi r! wvi and -fi
Chi) 110.0 on 0.0 HD 0.0 0.0
on) Ha! '05 2a! use on: an
m+> :39 (DD .0 n 01: .0
ha! 0 20 O 0 20 0
(DO 84 $4 $4 $4 $2. $0
9.: a. a. ti: 0.. CL. (1.
Repressors f 3 70 A.55 A.03 3.03 A.25 A.8l
o 2.19ab 1.22bc 1.55ab 1.42ab 1.21bc 1.91Cd
Non-defensive E 3 37 A.55 u.u5 3.22 3.72 6.75
o 1 7Bab 1 12bc 0.93bc 1.33ab 1.u7ab 1.72c
Sensitizers 2 5 25 5.30 5.A1 2.75 4.21 5.90‘
c 1 27Cd 0.68°d 1.u9°8 1.73a 1.86ab81.81ed

Note: Means with common subscripts are not significantly
different (at .05 level) by Duncan Multiple range
test.

The higher the score, the higher the level of
shock the subject was willing to take.

N = 12 in each cell.

A1

that could be said is that they were at least "average."
Most subjects reported that they felt anxious about the
experiment, however, they pointed out that this anxiety
was mitigated by the realization that they could control
directly the amount of shock they would subsequently

receive.

Performance on the Experimental Task

A 3 x 3 x 2 analysis of variance was performed on
the soCial responsibility scores. The mean social respon-
sibility scores for each condition is presented by Table
3.3, while the analysis of variance of these scores is
summarized by Table 3.A.

The only significant main effect was probability of
shock (p. < 001). As the probability of shock increased,
subjects lowered the levels of shock that they were willing
to take on behalf of the candidate. The significant prob-
ability of shock x publicity (B x C) interaction (p. < .05),
presented in Figure 3.1, clarifies the exact nature of this
relationship. VUnder conditions of no publicity, it can be
seen that social responsibility scores decrease as a direct
function of an increase in probability of shock. Thus,
hypothesis I is supported.

The relationship between social responsibility scores
and probability of shock is not as clear in the high pub-

licity condition. A Duncan multiple range test was

42

TABLE 3.A.--Summary table for the 3 x 3 x 2 analysis of
variance of the social responsibility scores.

 

 

 

Source d.f M.S. F
A (Repressor-Sensitizer) 2 6.35 2.69
B (Probability Of Shock) 2 60.85 25.78**
C (Publicity) 1 0.60 --
A X B A 1.82 0.77
A X C 2 11.70 4.95”
B x C 2 37.60 15.95”“
A x B x C A 1.A2 0.60
Error 198 2.36 --

*p < 05

amp < .001

Mean Social Responsibility Scores

10--

9.04
8.04-
7.0»
6.0‘~
5.0-.
14.0--
3.0 «—
2.0-~
1.0.».

 

A3

High Publicity
________ No Publicity

: i
0 .5 1.0

Probability of Shock

_J..

Figure 3.l.--Mean social responsibility scores for
subjects in no publicity and high publicity condi-

tions (B x C).

AA

performed on the means for each experimental condition and
the results of this analysis is presented by Table 3.3.
There were no significant differences between probability
of shock conditions under high publicity.

The Duncan multiple range test reveals that under
conditions of high publicity and high probability of shock,
sensitizers were willing to submit to a significantly
higher (p. < .05) level of shock than either repressors or
the non-defensive group. Table 3.3 also reveals that
sensitizers were willing to submit to a higher level of
shock (p. < .05) than repressors in the high publicity, no
probability of shock condition. Repressors and sensitizers
did not differ significantly from the non-defensive group.

The moderating effects of personality on social
responsibility scores under conditions of high publicity
is presented in Figure 3.2. Figures 3.3, 3.A, and 3.5
present a closer look at the social responsibility scores
of each personality category under high publicity and no
publicity conditions. Particularly striking are the large
differences between scores in the high publicity, no prob-
ability of shock and no publicity, no probability of shock
conditions for repressors and the non-defensive group. For
the same two conditions, sensitizers show only a negligible

difference in social responsibility scores.

Mean Social Responsibility Scores

A5

 

 

 

1000 W'
High Publicity
9.0 ”
———~——— No Publicity
8.0 “r
7.0 +
6.0 4'
5.0 «- '5 1 ‘\-~\
“*0
A.0'-L
3.0 v
2.0 x
1.0 x
A1 A2 A3
Repressors Non-Defensive Sensitizers

Figure 3.2.--Mean social responsibility scores for
the three personality categories under conditions
of no publicity and high publicity.

Mean Social Responsibility Scores

10 or
900 1}-

8.0-*-
7.0.“
6.0 -7,

5.0 1-
4.0.-
3.0-7
2.0 ..
1.01-

 

A6

 

High Publicity
_____ No Publicity

d.-

1
.5 1.0
Probability of Shock

Figure 3.3.--Mean social responsibility scores of
repressors under conditions of high and no publicity.

Mean Social Responsibility Scores

“7

10 -

1

High Publicity
8-~ ————— No Publicity

 

N
{_

 

J

. I
.5 1.0

Probability of Shock

.4:-

Figure 3.A.--Mean social responsibility scores of
non-defensive group under conditions of high and
no publicity.

Mean Social Responsibility Scores

A8

 

 

 

 

 

 

10.T
9 .-
High Publicity
.8 1 _____ No Publicity
7--0-
6 4-
k\ ____.
1‘ _ -
5.4 °—* \\\
u-F ‘*~\
\\\
3- \\\
\‘o
2 m
l-A
i i i
0 .5 1.0

Probability of Shock

Figure 3.5.—-Mean social responsibility scores of
sensitizers under conditions of high and no publicity.

A9

Questionnaire Data

The postexperimental questionnaire, in addition to
the item designed to check the effectiveness of the experi-
mental manipulation, endeavored to elicit the subjects
reasons for their shock level selections, and to reveal
the impressions subjects had formed of the job candidate,
the stimulus person.

The most obvious fact reflected by by the question4
naire data as presented in Table 3.5, is that significantly
more subjects viewed the stimulus person in a negative
manner than a positive one. In both the high publicity
and no publicity conditions, forty-four subjects reported
a positive impression of the stimulus person, while sixty-
four subjects reported a negative impression. These
results differ significantly from chance (x2 < .001). A
point biserial correlation was performed between impressions
of the stimulus person and social responsibility scores.
This correlation yielded an rpbi = .52. A t test revealed
this correlation to be significant (P. < .001). This is in
accord with hypothesis IV.

Table 3.5 shows that sensitizers formed significantly
more positive impression (X2 < .001) of the dependent person
under conditions of highpublicity than no publicity. The
dependent person elicited significantly more favorable im-

pressions (X2 < .01) from the non-defensive group under

50

conditions of no publicity than high publicity as seen
in Table 3.5. These subjects did give higher social
responsibility scores in the no publicity condition, but
this was primarily in the no probability of shock group.

Table 3.5 shows that repressors formed, predominately
a negative impression of the dependent person in both high
and no publicity conditions.

Table 3.6 presents the distribution among groups of
one of the least often reported reasons for choosing a
particular level of shock. This reason was termed hedonis-
tic because these subjects reported they had chosen their
particular shock level in order to minimize the effects of
that shock. What is interesting about this finding is
that while only 33 subjects reported fear of shock as the
determining factor, eleven of these were in the high pub-
licity, no probability of shock condition. This, we inter-
pret, as lending credence to our suggestion that evaluation
apprehension would be an important determinant of behavior
in the latter condition. While these subjects were aware
that shock would not be forthcoming, they still reported
that their actions were based on fear of that shock. It
is argued that subjects were trying to give a response
that would satisfy the hypotheses that their honesty was
being evaluated.

A fuller presentation of the questionnaire data

will be found in the Appendix.

51

TABLE 3.5.--Impressions of the stimulus person under
conditions of high publicity and no publicity.

 

 

High Probability No Probability
szzgnglity Positive Negative Positive Negative
g y Impression Impression Impression Impression
Repressors 1A 22 1A 22
Middle 6 30 l9 l7
Sensitizers 2A 12 ll 25

Total an on nu cu

 

52

TABLE 3.6--Number of subjects in each experimental condi-
tions who gave a hedonistic reason for the level of shock
they selected.

 

 

 

High Publicity Low Publicity

z m >. m >5 z a

4.) .0 m4: 4: 4: m4.» 4—)
«4% H 431-! H H 43H 'r-l
Hi! r-i (UH H H Gr-i H
(00 .Cw-‘l $4074 H .354 “H H
cw me an: on we on on

o 0 e+m rim zzm rld 'Ucd 2:w
nu mg on n mg on n
i.m o 23o o 0 2:0 o
mt) a h n A h a

m m c. m c. m m
Repressors O 2 6 2 1
Middle 0 0 A '3 2 l
Sensitizers 0a 1 1 2 3 2

 

aTotal number of subjects in each cell was 12.

53

Table 3.7 presents the relationship between the
subject's predicted score for "the average individual in
a similar situation" and his own social responsibility
score. While the trend is in the hypothesized direction,
a chi square test proved these differences not to be
significant (X2 = 2.53). A further analysis, by experi-
mental conditions did not reveal any significant results.
Hypothesis IIIa is not supported.

Figure 3.6 presents mean social responsibility
scores as a function of the number messages read. While
there is an increase in mean social responsibility scores
from message one to message two, there is no discernible
pattern subsequent to message two. Hypothesis V is not

supported.

TABLE 3.7.--The relationship between subjects predicted
score for "the average individual in a similar situation"
and their actual social responsibility scores for N of 216.

 

 

Personality

Category Higher Scores Same Scores Lower Scores
Repressors 31 31 10
Middle 35 26 11

Sensitizers 38 22 12

 

‘105-

Social Responsibility Scores

5‘1
L71.
3...

l-r-

 

1),

5A

in

1‘ V y

3 A
Number of Messages

dt

Figure 3.6.--Mean social responsibility scores as
a function of the number of messages received from
the stimulus person.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The present data indicates that social responsibility
scores decrease as a direct function of an increase in costs
under conditions of no publicity. This supports Hypothesis
1. The utilitarian model of social interaction as stated
by Homans (1961) proved to be the most effective predictor
of socially responsible behavior when external rewards, in
the form of publicity, were absent.

The nonlinear relationship predicted between social
responsibility scores and costs under conditions of high
publicity as stated in Hypothesis II was not established.
Under conditions of high publicity, there were no differ-
ences between probability of shock groups.

It can be argued that subjects in the high publicity
condition were role-playing. There is no reason to believe
that they expected shock to any less extent than subjects
in the no publicity condition. It would appear, however,
that the publicity variable was not entirely credible.
Evaluation apprehension as to what course to follow in
light of subsequent public exposure, may have been the

determining factor in this condition. Except for the

55

56

sensitizer group, publicity seems to have had an inhibiting
effect upon the social responsibility scores of all subjects.

It was expected that evaluation apprehension would be
operative in the high publicity, no probability of shock
group. There is some evidence that this in fact happened.
Despite the fact that shock would not be forthcoming, '
almost half of the non-defensive and repressor subjects
in the latter condition reported that their reasons for
selecting a shock level was related to their fear of
shock. It appears that these subjects tried their best
to give an "honest" response.

It may be suggested that in all the conditions under
high publicity, the uniformly low social responsibility
scores of repressors and the non-defensive group are in
response to their hypothesis that they were being evaluated
as to their honesty. Credibility could have been vitiated
to the extent that these subjects may have felt exposure
to this type of audience, their own psychology class,
entailed some kind of deception in the experimental situa-
tion.

Hypothesis III was supported. The data shows that
sensitizers gave significantly higher social responsibility
scores under conditions of high publicity than did
repressors. These higher scores, in what may essentially

have been a role-playing situation, may be explained by

57

suggesting that sensitizers were reacting to different
kinds of pressures than were the other two groups.

Since there was no criterion or standard against
which sensitizers could judge the adequacy of their
response, in order to satisfy the need to be favorably
compared with their peers, sensitizers were more willing
to assume greater costs than other subjects. Repressors
and non-defensive subjects, more aware that they know what
the socially desirable action is, gave lower scores. It
is suggested that sensitizers were reacting to the need
to be favorably compared with their peers, while the other
groups attempted to be positively evaluated as to their
honesty. The subjects' definition of the rewards in the
situation were different. Sensitizers may have defined
rewards in terms of public approval while repressors and
the non-defensive group saw rewards in terms of being
socially desirable by being "honest." Whether sensitizers
were "role-playing" or not, they were more socially respon-
sible in the sense of their willingness to incur costs to
a greater extent for a dependent person.

The explanation of the subjects' social reSponsibility
scores in the high publicity condition in terms of differ—
ential responses to social comparison pressures seems to
fit both the theory and the data. However, this explanation

would be more tenable had there been a statistical difference

58

between the personality subgroups in regard to their pre-
dicted scores for "the average person in a similar situa-
tion." Sensitizers did not, however, predict that the
average person would be willing to assume greater costs
than themselves. One possible explanation for the lack
of statistical support for this hypothesis (IIIa) is the
presence of a ceiling on predicted scores. Since sensi-
tizers did respond with comparatively higher social respon-
sibility scores, under high publicity, the range thay had
to predict from was fairly narrow. Since any predicted
score which differed by less than one from the subject's
actual social responsibility score was deemed to be the
"same," sensitizers, for all practical purposes, had a
"higher” range of approximately 6.5 to 8.0. Very few
individuals predicted that the "average person" would be
willing to select shock levels in the 9 to 10 range, the
very severe shock.

Hypothesis IV concerning degree of liking for a
dependent person as a function of costs incurred for
helping him was only partly supported. Sensitizers dis-
played a significantly higher degree of liking for the
dependent individual in the high publicity conditions
than they did under low publicity. Repressors did not
change their impression at all under high and no publicity,

but neither did their social responsibility scores change,

59

except for the no publicity, no probability of shock con-
dition. In this latter circumstance, the costs they
incurred were minimal and since their investments were

low, degree of liking for the stimulus person had little
effect on their responses. Data for the non-defensive
group are also equivocal. Their degree of liking for the
dependent person Changed significantly from high publicity
to no publicity conditions, but their social responsibility
scores changed little, except, again, but the no publicity,
no probability of shock condition.

The fact that Hypothesis V was not supported presents
certain doubts as to the credibility of the experimental
situation. The finding that successive requests for aid
did not elicit higher social responsibility scores may be
taken as evidence that the social responsibility norm was
not made salient. There are two mitigating factors, how-
ever. The first Concerns the possibility that each
additional message increased B's dependence upon A. If
this is true, then male subjects would tend not to incur
great costs for the dependent person (Schopler and Bateson,
1965). Secondly, each message had different informational
content. Subjects may have reacted favorably to one kind

of argument and not another.

Further Research

 

Further research is required to give a clearer delinea-

tion of the effect of publicity on socially responsible

6O

behavior. We would suggest that an audience divorced
from the academic setting may have a greater effect upon
subjects' responses. The type of public used in this
experiment may have only served to elicit evaluation
apprehension.

Related to this is the use of shock as part of the
experimental design. While we wanted to employ noxious
stimuli, electric shock has been used so frequently, par-
ticularly in deception-types of experiments so that it
may immediately arouse the subject's suspicions.‘

Perhaps the most important limiting factor in this
study is that the dependent person, though his presence
was implied, remained unidentified. A hypothetical
individual is never going to persuade people to incur
great costs on his behalf. An actual stimulus person
could be used in this type of experiment. His qualities
might be varied along the dimensions of perceived depen—
dence, strength, and attractiveness. Given the fact that
the stimulus person was unidentifiable, and he presented
primarily a negative impression, it is surprising to find
subjects Choosing even moderate levels of shock on his
behalf.

Finally, the possibility exists that the repression-
sensitization scale could be used as a device for cate—
gorizing subjects prior to evaluation apprehension. Van

de Castle (1960)has shown that repressors tend to reject

61

the experimenter's suggestions, while sensitizers are
prone to accept them. It may be that repressors are

more prone to define an experimental situation in light
of what they feel will be the socially desirable course
to follow. This may be in terms of hypotheses concerning
the testing or one's honesty, gullibility, or some other

characteristic.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY

The present study was undertaken to reval the per—
sonality correlates of socially responsible behavior and
to delineate the conditions under which such behavior
would occur.

The experiment was designed as a 3 x 3 x 2 factorial.
Three levels of probability of shock, high, moderate, and
none constituted one independent variable. The second
independent variable, publicity, had two levels, high and
none. Subjects were differentiated into three groups by
the Byrne (1963) repression-sensitization scale.

Social responsibility was defined as the amount of
electric shock the subject was willing to submit to on
behalf of a dependent person.

Underconditions of no publicity, the hypothesis,
derived from Homan's exchange theory, that social respon—
sibility scores decrease as a direbt function of increase
in costs (electric shock), was supported.

The findings concerning the effect of high publicity
on social responsibility were equivocal. Sensitizers, as
predicted, exhibited higher social responsibility scores

than repressors or the non-defensive middle group under

62

63

high publicity. The social responsibility scores of these
latter two groups, however, seemed to have been lowered by
high publicity. Furthermore, under high publicity, there
were no differences between probability of shock conditions.

It was suggested that under conditions of high pub-
licity, the experimental situation lost some of its
credibility. subjects may have been role-playing under
the assumption that they were being evaluated with respect
to something other than helping a dependent person.

The differences between the personality subgroups
were discussed in terms of differential responsiveness to
social comparison pressures. It was suggested that
repressors and.the non-defensive middle group were con-
cerned with giving the socially desirable response in
terms of honesty and, therefore lowered their social
responsibility scores. Sensitizers, on the other hand,
being more unsure of themselves, raised their social
responsibility scores in order to be favorably compared
with the peers in a public situation.

Future research was discussed in terms of a clearer
specification of the effects of the dependent person on
eliciting socially responsible behavior. Variation of the
type of public on's act will be exposed to was also sug-
gested. The possibility of employing the repression-
sensitization scale for partialling out the effects of

evaluation apprehension was presented.

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APPENDICES

68

APPENDIX A

THE REPRESSOR-SENSITIZER SCALE

69

7O

HEALTH AND OPINION SURVEY

 

 

This inventory consists of numbered Section of
statements. Read each statement and de- answer sheet
cide whether it is true as applied to you correctly
or false as applied to you. marked.

You are to mark your answer on the T F
answer sheet you have. Look at the example
of the answer sheet shown at the right. A
If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE, as
applied to you, blacken between the lines B

in the column headed T. (See A at the
right.) If a statement is FALSE or NOT
USUALLY TRUE, as applied to you, blacken
between the lines in the column headed F.
(See B at the right.) If a statement does
not apply to you or if it is something
that you don't know about, make no mark on
the answer sheet.

Remember to give YOUR OWN opinion of yourself.
Do not leave any blank spaces if_you can avoid it.

In marking your answers on the answer sheet, be sure
that the number of the statement agrees with the numEer on
the answer sheet. Make your marks heavy and black. Erase
completely any answer you wish to change. Do not make any
marks on this booklet.

 

Remember, try to make some answer to every statement.

One point is given for each item answered in the
predicted direction. High scores indicate sensitization.

NOW OPEN THE BOOKLET AND GO AHEAD

\oooxloxmc-wmp—J

l—’
O

11.
12.

130
1A.

15.
l6.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.
2A.

71

I have a good appetite.

I wake up fresh and rested most mornings.

I am easily awakened by noise.

I like to read newspaper articles on crime.
My hands and feet are usually warm enough.
My daily life is full of things that keep me interested.
I am about as able to work as I ever was.

There seems to be a lump in my throat much of the time.
I enjoy detective or mystery stories.

Once in a while I think of things too bad to talk about.
I am very seldom troubled by constipation.

At times I have fits of laughing and crying that I
cannot control.

I am troubled by attacks of nausea and vomiting.

I feel that it is certainly best to keep my mouth shut
when I'm in trouble.

At times I feel like swearing.

I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job.

I seldom worry about my health.

At times I feel like smashing things.

I have had periods of days, weeks, or months when I
couldn't take care of things because I couldn't "get
going."

My sleep is fitful and disturbed.

Much of the time my head seems to hurt all over.

I do not always tell the truth.

My judgment is better than it ever was.

Once a week or oftener I feel suddenly hot all over,
without apparent cause.

25.

26.

27.

28.
29.

30.
'31.
32.
33.

3A.
‘35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

A0.

A1.

A2.
A3.
an.
A5.

72

I am in just as good physical health as most of my
friends.

I prefer to pass by school friends, or people I know
but have not seen for a long time, unless they speak
to me first.

I am almost never bothered by pains over the heart
or in my chest.

I am a good mixer.

Everything is turning out just like the prophets of
the Bible said it would.

I do not read every editorial in the newspaper every
day.

I sometimes keep on at a thing until others lose their
patience with me.

I wish I Could be as happy as others seem to be.
I think a great many peOple exaggerate their mis-

fortunes in order to gain the sympathy and help of
others.

.I get angry sometimes.

‘Most of the time I feel blue.

I sometimes tease animals.
I am certainly lacking in self-confidence.
I usually feel that life is worthwhile.

It takes a loss of argument to convince most people of
the truth.

Once in a while I put off until tomorrow what I ought
to do today. ,

Ithinknmmt people would lie to_get ahead.

I.do many things I regret afterwards.

I go to church almost every week.

I have very few quarrels with members of my family.

I believe in the second coming of Christ.

A6.
A7.

A8.
A9.
50.

51.

52.

53-

5A.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.
60.
61.

62.

63.

6A.

73

My hardest battles are with myself.

I have little or no trouble with my muscles twitching
or jumping.

I don't seem to care what happens to me.
Sometimes when I am not feeling well I am cross.

Much of the time I feel as if I have done something
wrong or evil.

I am happy most of the time.

Some people are so bossy that I feel like doing the
opposite of what they request, even though I know
they are right.

Often I feel as if there were a tight band about
my head.

My table manners are not quite as good at home as
when I am out in company.

I seem to be about as capable and smart as most others
around me.

Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain
profit or an advantage rather than to lose it.

The sight of blood neither frightens me nor makes me
sick.

Often I can't understand why I have been so cross and
grouchy.

I have never vomited blood or coughed up blood.
I do not worry about catching diseases.

At times my thoughts have raced ahead faster than I
could speak them.

If I could get into a movie without paying and be
sure I was not seen I would probably do it.

I commonly wonder what hidden reason another person
has for doing something nice for me.

I believe that my home life is as pleasant as that of
most people I know.

650
66.

67.
68.
69.

70.

71.
72.

73.

7A.

75.
76.

77.
78.

79-

80.
81.

82.

83.
8A.

85.

7A

Criticism or scolding hurts me terribly.

My conduct is largely controlled by the customs of
those about me.

I certainly feel useless at times.
At times I feel like picking a fist fight with someone.

I have often lost out on things because I couldn't
make up my mind soon enough.

It makes me impatient to have people ask my advice or
otherwise interrupt me when I am working on something
important.

I would rather win than lose in a game.

Most nights I go to sleep without thoughts or ideas
bothering me.

During the past few years I have been well most of the
time.

I have never had a fit or convulsion.
am enither gaining or losing weight.
cry easily.

cannot understand what I read as well as I used to.

HHHH

have never felt better in my life than I do now.

I resent having anyone take me in so cleverly that I
have to admit that it was one on me.

I do not tire quickly.

I like to study and read about things that I am
working at.

I like to know some important people because it makes
me feel important.

What others think of me does not bother me.

It makes me uncomfortable to put on a stunt at a party
even when others are doing the same sort of thing.

I frequently have to fight against showing that I am
bashful.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

9A.
95.
96.
97-

98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
10A.

105.
106.
107.

108.

75

I have never had a fainting spell.
I seldom or never have dizzy spells.
My memory seems to be all right.

am worried about sex matters.

find it hard to make talk when I meet new people.

am against giving money to beggers.

frequently notice my hand shakes when I try to do
omething.

I

I

I am afraid of losing my mind.

I

I

s

I can read a long while without tiring my eyes.
I feel weak all over much of the time.

I have very few headaches.

Sometimes, when embarrassed, I break out in a sweat
which annoys me greatly.

I have had no difficulty in keeping my balance in
walking.

I do:not have spells of hay fever or asthma.

I do not like everyone I know.

I wish I were not so shy.

I enjoy many different kinds of play and recreation.
I like to flirt.

In walking I am very careful to step over sidewalk
cracks.

I frequently find myself worrying about something.
I gossip a little at times.

I hardly ever notice my heart pounding and I am seldom
short of breath.

I have at times stood in the way of people who were
trying to do something, not because it amounted to
much but because of the principle of the thing.

109.
110.
111.

112.

113.
11A.
115.

116.

117.

118.
119.
120.
121.

122.

123.

12A.

125.
126.

127.

128.
129.

76

I get mad easily and then get over it soon.
I brood a great deal.

I have periods of such great restlessness that I can
not sit long in a chair.

I dream frequently about things that are best kept to
myself.

I believe I am no more nervous than most others.

I have few or no pains.

Sometimes without any reason or even when things are
going wrong I feel excitedly happy, "on top of the

world."

I can be friendly with people who do things which I
consider wrong.

Sometimes at elections I vote for men about whom I
know very little.

I have difficulty in starting to do things.

I sweat very easily even on cool days.

It is safer to trust nobody.

Once a week or oftener I become very excited.

When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of
the right things to talk about.

When I leave home I do not worry about whether the
door is locked and the windows closed.

I do not blame a person for taking advantage of someone
who lays himself open to it.

At times I am all full of energy.
My eyesight is as good as it has been for years.

I have often felt that strangers were looking at me
critically.

I drink an unusually large amount of water every day.

Once in a while I laugh at a dirty joke.

130.

131.
132.

133.

13A.
135.
136.

137.

138.
139.
1A0.
1A1.
1A2.

1A3.

1AA.
1A5.

1A6.

1A7.
1A8.

1A9.
150.

77
I am always disgusted with the law when a criminal is
freed through the arguments of a smart lawyer.
I work under a great deal of tension.

I am likely not to speak to people until they speak
to me.

I have periods in which I feel unusually cheerful
without any special reason.

Life is a strain for me much of the time.
In school I found it very hard to talk before the class.

Even when I am with people I feel lonely much of the
time.

I think nearly anyone would tell a like to keep out
of trouble.

I am easily embarrassed.

I worry over money and business.

I almost never dream.

I easily become impatient with people.

I feel anxiety about something or someone about all
the time.

Sometimes I become so excited that I find it hard to
get to sleep.

I forget right away what people say to me.

I usually have to stop and think before I act even in
trifling matters.

Often I cross the street in order not to meet someone
I see.

I often feel as if things were not real.

I have a habit of counting things that are not impor-
tant such as bulbs on electric signs, and so forth.

I have strange and peculiar thoughts.

I get anxious and upset when I have to make a short
trip away from home.

151.

152.

153.

15A.

155.

156.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

163.
16A.
165.

166.

167.

168.
169.

170.

78
I have been afraid of things or people that I knew
could not hurt me.

I have no dread of going into a room by myself where
other people have already gathered and are talking.

I have more trouble concentrating than others seem
to have.

I have several times given up doing a thing because I
thought too little of my ability.

Bad words, often terrible words, come into my mind and
I cannot get rid of them.

Sometimes some unimportant thought will run through my
mind and bother me for days.

Almost every day something happens to frighten me.

I am inclined to take things hard.

I am more sensitive than most other people.

At periods my mind seems to work more slowly than usual.
I very seldom have spells of the blues.

I wish I could get over worrying about things I have
said that may have injured other people's feelings.

People often disappoint me.
I feel unable to tell anyone all about myself.

My plans have frequently seemed so full of difficulties
that I have had to give them up.

Often, even though everything is going fine for me,
I feel that I don't care about anything.

I have sometimes felt that difficulties were piling up

so high that I could not overcome them.
I often think, "I wish I were a child again."

I have often met people who were supposed to be experts
who were no better than I.

It makes me feel like a failure when I hear of the
success of someone I know well.

171.

172.
173.

17A.

175.

176.

177.

178.
179.

180.

181.
182.

79
I am apt to take disappointments so keenly that I
can't put them out of my mind.
At times I think I am no good at all.
I worry quite a bit over possible misfortunes.
I am apt to pass up something I want to do because
others feel that I am not going about it in the
right way.

I find it hard to set aside a task that I have under-
taken, even for a short time.

I have several times had a change of heart about my
life work.

I must admit that I have at times been worried beyond
reason over something that really did not matter.

LI like to let people know where I stand on things.

I have a daydream life about which I do not tell
other people.

I have often felt guilty because I have pretended to
feel more sorry about something than I really was.

I feel tired a good deal of the time.

I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces.

APPENDIX B

TABLES SHOWING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBJECTS' REASON
FOR SUBMITTING TO SHOCK, DESCRIPTION OF DEPENDENT
PERSON, AND REPRESSOR SENSITIZER DIMENSION

80

81

Questionnaire Data: Tables presented below show the rela-
tionship between subjects' reasons for submitting to shock,
description of the dependent person, and the repressor-
sensitizer dimension.

CONDITION: HIGH PUBLICITY, HIGH PROBABILITY OF SHOCK

 

 

 

g s
p >v~ mrx w
H>z 00) 00 -H
Fifi cz> c:> > p
(60 (DH (Dr! H w
Ctfl '64: '04: +> m H
on: ee4 rim 0 o a
03+) mm (Dbl) (D H O
:.m czo she to o 'o
00 0m 02 o p o
n. nxx (all (3 a: m
Repressors 2 6 2 Positive
2 Negative
Middle 1 7 1 Positive
3 Negative
Sensitizers 5 1 3 Positive 1 Negative
2 Negative

 

aTypical statement classified as stoic would be
"I feel I can take it."

82

CONDITION: NO PUBLICITY, HIGH PROBABILITY OF SHOCK

 

 

U)
>, 4-3
13>. 6’75 ‘5’]? 5’3.
ran c:> c:> > P
‘30 (DH (DH H U)
:tfl '64: '64: .p «A
C>0 Cad c:m o o c
n+3 dim a)u) o H 0
he as as P 3 '3
8 8v Qv O U) :I‘.
Repressors 2 3 A Positive 3 Negative
Middle 3 A 2 Positive 2 Positive
1 Negative

Sensitizers 1 5 2 Positive 2 Negative 2 Negative

 

CONDITION: HIGH PUBLICITY, MODERATE PROBABILITY OF SHOCK

 

 

03

>5 4-3

”e. 6’78 6‘... 33

H

was c:> ::> > .9

£50 0H (DH H U)

Clfl vo+a 'o.o .p -H

ocv sea ecu o o c

(043 0(1) (Du) (D H O

as Q0 Q0, n o c

an) mm 02 n p 0

(.1, av Qv O U) :11
Repressors 1 A 3 Negative 2 Positive 2 Negative
Middle 5 1 Positive 1 Negative

5 Negative

Sensitizers 3 3 2 Positive 1 Positive

 

83

CONDITION: NO PUBLICITY, MODERATE PROBABILITY OF SHOCK

 

 

a :2
p >r~ mr~ m
rih cam c>m H
rip c=> ::> > u
do 032-! (DH H m
cm '04-) “04-3 4-3 H
(>0 cqa gen 0 o c
(04-) (DID 0130 d) H O
::m QC) Q0) *7 o o
oo om oz :2 p o
a. (3&4 caxz o a) m
Repressor 2 7 1 Positive 2 Positive
Middle 3 5 2 Positive 2 Negative
Sensitizers 5 2 Positive 2 Positive 1 Negative
2 Positive

 

CONDITION: HIGH PUBLICITY, NO PROBABILITY OF SHOCK

 

 

m
h p
p zr~ mr~ m
H>a 0(1) 0(1) H
pip ::> c:> > p
w<3 o~4 owa r! m
:tfl 'U+J '64» p H
00) Sad ecu o o c
m+> a>m a:m) m *4 o
scm cmo cmo *3 o o
oo om oz 9 p m
m c3~a an»! (3 a) m
Repressors 2 3 Positive 1 Positive 5 Negative
1 Positive
Middle 1 5 2 Positive A Negative

Sensitizers 6 l A Positive 1 Negative

 

7’

'{l—fl rfil‘ ‘ L““' t! l n I Md I--
‘x '1

o

A

8A

CONDITION: NO PUBLICITY, NO PROBABILITY OF SHOCK

 

 

(0
>3 4-)
u >v~ >v~ m
r1>3 (>0 c>o r!
ran ::> c:> > u
«30 (DH (Dr! H U)
cm I!» '64-) p H
on) cz-H Ca! 0 o s:
n+3 a1m a)u) m r4 0
‘4“ (L0 (no r: o vo
mo mm 02 x: p m
04. Qv Qv O U) :I‘.
Repressors 1 3 1 Positive 1 Positive 1 Negative
A Negative 1 Positive
Middle 1 2 A Positive 2 Positive 1 Negative

2 Negative

Sensitizers 5 A Negative 2 Positive 2 Negative

 

 

APPENDIX C

THE CANDIDATE'S MESSAGES

85

86

In order to get this Job as a research assistant
I am going to have a try to convince you to submit your-
self to some level of shock in the later part of the
experiment. I don't know how the other candidates did
it, but I must admit I'd like to have this Job very much,
so here goes.

The first reason I can give you for submitting
yourself to shock is that it is one way you can help
to advance our knowledge. It is true that sometime
individuals must subject themselves to some form of dis-
comfort in order for psychologists to learn something
bout the way people behave.

It is difficult, of course, to want to take any
kind of shock. You must know your own ability to take
this kind of paid and, of course, you can choose your
own level of shock. For my sake, of course, I wish you

would submit to the highest level possible.

87

Many people fear the pain of electric shock. One
of the things I have done in my effort to get this
research Job is to undergo various levels of electric
shock to find out Just how painful it was. I felt I had
to do this because the main part of my Job would be to
convince other people to do the same thing.

It does seem to me that the pain was hardly as bad
as I imagined. It was over very quickly. I have been
told by medical experts that electric shock of the type
that you will be asked to take is not damaging to the
tissues or cells and leaves no after-effects at all. I
can vouch for this.

Of course, I must admit that I am biased on this
account for it is important to me that you take shock.
Nevertheless, I feel that I can be somewhat objective in
saying that I can assure you that the pain is not as bad
as you might think, particularly if you were as anxious

about it as I was when I decided to apply for this Job.

88

I think that we all feel anxious when we are asked
to do something that involves some kind of stress or pain.
I know I certainly do. In a certain sense you really owe
it to yourself to find out, in a scientific way, how you
react under stress. I think this is very important. All
our lives we have to perform under one kind of stress or
another.

In the second part of this experiment, you can get
a very clear and precise idea of how you perform when
:shock is applied. From my own experience in going
through this experiment, I know some of you may be tempted
to indicate the lowest shock levels you can possibly agree
to submit to. But this would not be a true test, would
it? Now, I'm not asking you to go to great extremes, but
I think you ought to at least give yourself a reasonable
chance to be tested. From the experimenter's viewpoint
I know this is not the reason or the purpose of the
experiment. But since my chances of getting this Job
depend on your performance, I feel you should get the

most out of it.

89

Another reason why you might submit to electric
shock is to learn about certain forms of psychological
experiments. Besides money, of course, one of the main
reasons I applied for this Job is to gain experience in
psychological research. Of course, you may not want,
as I do, to enter this field in the future. Nevertheless,
since everyday, you would gain a great deal by going
through with the entire experiment.

One reason why psychologists use shock upon
occasion is to test people's reactions, particularly in
a learning situation, under stress. I think by going
through an experiment such as this you can gain some
insight into the effects of stress on behavior. When the
experiment is over we will try to explain to you the exact
purpose of the experiment. In this way you might be able
to gain some very real psychological knowledge. I think
this is a very valid reason for submitting yourself to

shock.

90

Trying to conjure up these arguments has honestly
not been an easy job for me. Frankly, right now I've
just about run out of "logical" arguments which might
convince you to submit yourself to electric shock.

Again, I don't know what the other candidates did,
but let me try a personal sort of argument. Some of you
may ask "why should I take shock for this person?" Well,
I've given four reasons up until now. Let me just add
that I'd like, and even need, this job. Would I do the
same for you if things were truned around? Honestly, I
don't know. I like to think I would. But I guess we
never know unless we are put in this position.

Well, that's about all I have to say.

APPENDIX D

91

Number of Subjects

55

A5

35

25

15

92

 

_L

 

A A A A L A 1 A J
"I I l 1 I I V r 1 I

005 105 205 305 [‘05 5‘5 605 70 805 905
Mean Social Responsibility Scores

Figure D.--Distribution of the dependent variable, the

mean social responsibility scores.