EEGEEGLEEE- A THEORE’EECAL BASEFORi-ijjff_'_f;§;1: LEEEE‘EELEL ARTS EDUCA? 0N “ BEES rtaEiEr? for the Degrea'? 0E Ph D LE: EGHEGAN STATE UNIVERSE"? 7 STANEEY F. KASPRZYK 1973 LIP”? “3" Michigan 3? ALL: University wi‘fifii; .5: ‘53.. '7‘§t*'-ve-.'--i r:- "aaflfiJtfl.mg-E _-..... r,- I'Enéq: _-..... I '- 'I- ' I Iu£lnl Ii‘..|'. - ‘r_ . -' _ ' . .. ‘l .' h -I .' -. . -. J {J ._ . .3 ' . .. ."-.'-"." "-_".= ._ l ‘ ' " a. b- - -. - . I. _ ' n L . .._, _, ' ’ m» - .m '------- -- d:~‘:h-c'i&i'9.?;r . © ' 1974 STANLEY F. KASPRZYK ALL RIGHTS RESERVED —»— _, ‘2‘ ABSTRACT TECHNOLOGY: A.THEORETICAL BASE FOR INDUSTRIAL ARTS EDUCATION BY Stanley P. Kasprzyk During the past two decades, "technology" has emerged as a major tOpic of discussion in virtually every field of scientific and.philo- sophic inquiry. Mbreover, some of our most respected universities have been serving as centers for projects, programs, seminars and conferences on "the impact of tedhnology," and.not a few of our most influential social critics have turned their attention to the prdblems that technology supposedly engenders. The apparent import of these developments to Industrial Arts education had been noted in 1947, at which time a teChnology-centered "curriculum" was projected and formally pr0posed to the profession for acceptance. Since then, "technology" has come to occupy a dominant place in Industrial Arts discussions, and several.modified versions of the original idea have been pr0posed. In Chapter I it is argued that none of the several versions of the technology-centered concept had been established on sound theo- retical grounds; and that the need for clarifying the meaning of -technology had not been considered an essential prerequisite in establiShing suCh grounds. It was further argued that on that meaning depend the conceptual framework for selecting and ordering the subject matter of instruction, as well as the rationale for including the selected subject matter in the curriculum. Assuming then that Industrial Arts ought to center on the study of technology, the purpose here was to inquire into the meaning and sc0pe of technology with a view toward framing a theOretical base for a technology-centered curriculum. With that end in view, Chapter II inquires into the origin of the word ‘teChnology' and its.meaning in an historical perspective; and.Chapter III subjects a number of contemporary definitions of technology to a critical analysis. The preliminary inquiry reveals a discernible pattern of common referents which in Chapter IV provide a basis for clarifying the meaning of technology. There the concept of technology is located and defined in the context of human activity and is identified with science and technic as a form of human work. In the process, a conceptual scheme is devised for purposes of identifying and structuring the essential elements of technology in any_given realm of work. In.Chapter V it is argued that if technology does in fact have a place in Industrial.Arts education, then the subjectmatter of instruction ought to reflect the technology of a significant reahn of work. On that basis it is shown that the logical source of subject matter is the realm of engineering. Given engineering as the source of subject matter (scientific and technological), and given the con- ceptual scheme for identifying and ordering that subject matter, it should be readily apparent that place for technology in.Industrial Arts education.has been.substantiated. TECHNOLOGY: .A THEORETICAL BASE FOR INDUSTRIAL ARTS EDUCATION By Stanley P. Kasprzyk A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Secondary Education and Curriculum 1973 4.313. ‘39:: I 1. 1?" \. ,géii’ re at Copyright by STANLEY F. KASPRZYK 1973 To the memory of my mother Louise Sikora Kasprzyk (1894-1969) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS While I alone am.to be held accountable for any errors or short- comings in this dissertation, I wish to express my deep and sincere appreciation to all who have in various ways contributed to its develop- ment and completion: To my dissertation committee, Drs. Lawrence Borosage, John.A. Fuzak, Carl Gross, C. Blair MacLean.(Chairman), and John.F.A. Taylor, for their guidance and invaluable criticisms; To Drs. Kenneth W. Brown, of the State University of New York, and Yuji Yonemori, of the University of the Ryukyus, fer their genuine personal interest and continuing encouragement, as well as their critical literary assistance; Tb Drs. Robert S. WOodbury, of the Massachussets Institute of Technology, and.Henryk Skolimowski, of the University of Southern California, for sharing with me some pertinent germinal concepts in the History and Philosophy of Technology; To Congressman.RiChard D. MhCarthy and Dr. Richard L. Lesher, .Assistant Administrator for Technology Utilization (NASA), fOr providing me with pertinent governmental documents; To Drs. Charles A, Messmer and Martin B. Fried, of the State University of New York, Fr. J. Olszewski, SCA, and Joachim.Niestroj, Esq., for their help in translating passages from the classics, and from contemporary foreign literature; iv till To Messrs. Edward E. Reitz, poet, and William J. Sommers, technical consultant, for their interest and advice from a layman's point of view; To those of my students , too numerous to mention, who helped in the development of my embryonic ideas; To the Encyc10pedia Americana Corporation, for permission to use material from the Encyclopedia; To Donna L. Stagner and Mary Ann Ratajczak, for typing the original and revised drafts of my work; and to Patricia A. Warner, for typing the dissertation in its final form. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ....................... LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ................... Chapter I. II. III. IV. THE STATUS OF INDUSTRIAL.ARTS EDUCATION ....... The Eroblem Related Studies On the Concept of Technology TECHNOLOGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ...... The Origin of Techne Aristotle: On Science and Art The Origin of Technologia Natural Science and Naturalistic Technology PREVALENT VIEWS ON TECHNOLOGY ............. The Status of Technology Prior to WOrld war II The Status of Technology After the war Current Concise Definitions of Technology Two Extended Definitions of Technology Summary THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF TECHNOLOGY .......... Toward a Functional Definition of Technology Technology as a Form.of HUman.Activity The Basic Forms of HUman WOrk Technology as a Form of Knowledge Summary and Concluding Statements THE PLACE OF TECHNOLOGY IN INDUSTRIAL ARTS EDUCATION . Preliminary Considerations Engineering as a Source of Subject Matter Implications for Industrial Arts Education Concluding Statement vi Page viii ix 29 69 108 137 APPENDIX. . . ........ SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... Vii ......... LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Classification of the Elements in Group I Definitions ........... . . . 84 2. Classification of the Elements in.Group II Definitions ............. 87 3. Classification of the Elements in.Group III Definitions ............. 97 4. Summary of the Elements of Definition from the Preceding Tables . . . . . . . 99 viii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page 1. Aristotle's p§r_genus et_differentiam Definition of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2. The Place of Technology in the Framework of HUman.ActiVity . . ....... . .121 3. Scheme for Ordering the.Aims, Means, and Consequences of Scientific Technological and Technical WOrk ....... . . . . . . . .122 4. Schematic Illustration.of the Principal Characteristics of Scientific, Tedhnological, and Technical WOrk . .p. . ........... 134 5. Processes of Production and Related Functions of Engineers ........ . . . . .145 ix CHAPTER I THE STATUS OF INDUSTRIAL ARTS EDUCATION In 1947, the President's Commission on Higher Education, charged 'with the task of reexamining the objectives, methods, and facilities of higher education, observed that: For many years they [the colleges] had been healthily dissatisfied 'with their own accomplishments, significant though these have been. Educational leaders were troubled by an uneasy sense of shortcoming. They felt that somehow the colleges had not kept pace with changing social conditions, that the programs of higher education would have to be repatterned if they were to prepare youth to live satisfyingly and effectively in contemporary society...in a world in which tech- nology is acting as a solvent of cultures.1 This observation was an appropriate appraisal of the conditions ‘within.the realm of Industrial Arts teacher education. Industrial Arts educators who were aware of the shortcomings of traditional curricular patterns, and.the need for restructuring their technical subject matter, had already been addressing themselves to the problem. The same year, in fact, that the Commission made its report to the President, a group of graduate students at The Ohio State University, under the leadership of 2 William E. warner, proposed a New Curriculum fOr Industrial Arts educa- tion. Unlike the existing curricula of the time the proposal was 1Higher Education for.American Democragy_:.A Report of the Presi- dent's Commission on Higher Education, VO1.1(Washington:The Commission, 1947) pp. 1 and 15. 2William E. Warner, et al., The New Industrial Arts Curriculum (Newark: American Industrial Arts Association, 1947). patterned around a new focal point-~technology. Since then, and.mbre notably during the past decade, technology has come to occupy a dominant place in Industrial Arts discussions--at national, state, and local conferences, symposiums, and conventions, generally, but particularly in.professional meetings devoted to the 3 The apparently genuine interest in resolution of curricular problems. technology is indicative of the growing dissatisfaction with the status of Industrial.Arts education. For example, those programs of instruction which have been in.vogue since the turn of the century are now widely conceded to be educationally untenable; their effectiveness in an era of ”scientific and technological revolution,” so-called, is increasingly being challenged by the profession. Instead, there appears to be a growing trend toward some kind of technology-centered curriculum for Industrial Arts. ~But what is most significant, the trend acknowledges a need and intimates a desire on the part of the profession to change. The Problem Acknowledgment of the need to change, albeit an indispensable pre- requisite, is hardly sufficient to institute Change; nor will the mere specter of a novel idea suffice to bring it about. .As so often happens in the realm of education, there is a readiness to adopt novel ideas and attempt to put them to practice befOre they have been seriously 3See, for example, Improving_1ndustrial.Arts Teaching: A Conference Report (Washington: Office of Education, HEW, 1962); Marshal Schmitt and .Albert L.Pe11ey, Industrial.Arts Education: .A Survey Programs, Teachers, Students, and Curriculum (Washington; Office Of’Education, HEW, 1966); and HOward S. .Decker, "The washington Symposium, " The JOurnal of Industrial Arts Education, XXXVIII CNOvembereDecember 1968) pp. 14- 16. See also, the.AIAA Convention Proceedings, (washington: .American Industrial Arts Association) 1965 through 1972. considered from a theoretical point of view. Premature adoption, regard- less how pregnant the idea, usually results in arbitrary implementation which in turn impedes further development. The presumed need for Industrial Arts to change to a technology- centered curriculum is the case in point. Of the several prOposals which have been presented to the profession for acceptance since 1947, none furnishes the requisite guide lines fOr identifying the subject matter of instruction. Generally speaking, they attend to certain prac- tical matters that pertain to classroom instruction, and disregard or give only cursory attention to the theoretical requirements of curriculum construction. Mbre importantly, none of the proposals appears to give serious attention to the fUndamental requirement of clarifying the meaning of technology. As a result, there are as many conceptions of technology as there are proposals, each suggesting a different structure for Indus- trial Arts content. To add to the confusion, many in the profession, eager to change to some kind of technology-oriented program of instruction, are devising Industrial Arts courses and curricular schemes based on their own conceptions (or misconceptions) of technology. In view of the growing conviction that the Industrial Arts curric- 4 ulum should "reflect technology," there is an urgent need to clarify the meaning of technology on sound theoretical grounds. Without theoretical guide lines, the process of delimiting the field of study, of determining and organizing subject matter, and selecting the tools and methods of instruction, cannot be anything but an arbitrary enterprise. 4See, for example, Industrial Arts in_Senior High SchOOls, Twenty- second Yearbook of the.American Council on Industrial Arts Teacher Education, 1973; particularly the articles contributed by John Mitchell, Paul W. DeVOre, Donald F. Hackett, Donald G. Lux and Willis E. Ray. Hence the problem for which a solution will be sought in the present study is: Can the meaning of technology be sufficiently clari- fied so as to provide a theoretical base fOr a technology-centered Industrial Arts curriculum? Importance of the Problem: Scholars in various fields of scienti- fic and phiIOSOphic inquiry-~sociology, psychology, economics, history of technology, philosophy of science and technology--are seriously address- ing themselves to the manifold problematic dimensions of technology~- e.g., the SUpposed "impact of technology” on polity, on work, on human values, on.man and.his institutions in general. various agencies in government, commerce, and industry, are also concerned with technology, particularly with its supposed relation to matters of immediate practi- cal significance--e.g., ”technological unemployment,” "technology transfer," "technology assessment." The point is, if technology has a place in the Industrial.Arts curriculum, thenthe fund of knowledge that issues from.these sources is relevant to that curriculum. Aside from its generally acknowledged instrumental value in improving material standards of living, technology is said to be a dis- ruptive social force with far-reaching psychic, political, and economic consequences. That being the case, its ambivalent character needs to be understood.by man if he is to exert rational control over its direction. To provide for an understanding of that social force is a function of general education; and Industrial Arts in its general-education purpose shares the responsibility. It is to that end that the Industrial Arts curriculum.must be relevant. Its relevance, however, can be ascertained only in light of a clear and unequivocal meaning of technology. For on that meaning depend the conceptual framework for selecting and ordering the subject matter of instruction, and the rationale for including that subject matter in a curriculum geared to general education. The purpose of the present study, then,is to inquire into the meaning and scOpe of technology with a view toward framing a theoretical base for a technology-centered Industrial Arts curriculum. Limitations of the Study: The ensuing inquiry into the meaning and scope of technology will consider the concept in its broadest acceptation, i.e., its import in any and all realms of human activity-- industrial, educational, agricultural, medical, political, domestic, economic, for example. It is assumed that the essential characteristics of technology in any one realm of human activity are, in principle, congruous with those in each and every other realm; the technology of education, for example, ought to have certain essential characteristics in common with, say, industrial technology. On that assumption, the inquiry will, for the.most part, be limited to a consideration of those elements of'meaning Which are attributable to technology in general; the ”technology of" this or that particular realm will not be considered, except by example. By the same token, no attempt will be made to identify the actual subject matter of instruction. It is hoped, however, that the theoreti- cal model of technology (to be developed in the ensuing discussion) will furnish the guide lines for delineating and structuring the subject matter. In view of this limitation, the present study should not be construed as another "curriculum proposal” for Industrial Arts. Definition of Terms: The major part of the study is addressed to conceptual clarification. It need only be noted here that technology 'will be located and.defined within a conceptual scheme which in its extended treatment is herein referred to as the theoretical model of technology. The theoretical model coupled with the rationale fOr justifying the place of technology in a curriculum geared to general education constitute the theoretical base fOr Industrial Arts education. The term 'Industrial Arts' (capitalized) is herein used with refer- ence to a branch of general education; whereas 'industrial arts' (not capitalized) refers to the various manipulative technics employed in industrial production. Related Studies Since 1947, when warner and.his associates proposed the New Curric— ulum.for Industrial Arts education, several other ”technology-centered" studies have been presented to the profession for acceptance. Some of them--e.g., Olson's Technology and Industrial Arts (1958), and DeVOre's Technology: A,Structure fOr Industrial Arts Content (1965)--have received a great deal of attention in the Industrial Arts literature, and at Industrial.Arts conventions and conferences. Curiously, none of the proposals have, to date, been accepted by the profession at large; and it is even more curious that none appear to have been subjected to criticismr—in the literature or at professional meetings--to determine why they have been tacitly rejected by the profession. Assuming that the studies by Warner, Olson, and DeVOre more or less bespeak the prevailing mood of the profession to orient Industrial Arts toward the study of technology, perhaps a critical review of them, in terms of their basic assumptions, principal concepts, sources of content, and content structures, will help to bring into perspective the problem undertaken in the present study. 5 .A Curriculum to Reflect Technology: The main features of warner's Curriculum, those which distinguish it from.the then existing curriculum concepts in Industrial Arts, are: a) its allusion to "technology” (prior to that time no consideration had been given to that concept); b) its attention to "socio-economic trends,” to "research,” ”experiment,” and ”laboratory" activity; and c) its ”large divisions of subject matter 6 resources." WEth.regard to the latter, warner asserts that the Content in the new Industrial Arts curriculum is derived via a socio-economic analysis of the technology and not by trade ana- lysis as of old from.the commoner village trades such as those of the carpenter, the blacksmith, the cabinet maker. M: the SUbject.matter classifications are conceived of as including: a. Power: tidal, solar, atomic, electric, muscular, hydraulic, combustion, . . . . ; b. Transportation: land, sea, and air; c. Manufacturing: includes the basic industrial methods of Changing raw materials into finished products such as foods, textiles, ceramics, metals, woods, plastics, and leathers, similar but broader in concept and application than has been developed in the so-called ”general” shOp of the past forty years; d. Construction: simple fabrication, housing, public works, industrial, national defense, ....; e. Communication: graphic arts including drawing, letterpress, planography, intaglio, and the miscellaneous processes in addition to electricity, electronics, and other communications media; and f. Personnel Management: including Line and Staff as in 7 business and.industry, or labor as well as management. SWilliamE. warner, §§,§l,, A Curriculum §9_Reflect Technology (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1953). .A reprint of the New Curriculum. 6Ibid., p.3. 7Ibid., p.6 (The authors' own italics). With the new classificatory scheme for organizing subject matter, the proposal signaled a radical departure from the prevailing Industrial Arts "subjects"—~woodworking,:metalworking, drafting, and the like. This feature, coupled with a seeming concern fOr laboratory activity to supplant the traditional "shop work", the allusion to research and experiment to supplement the narrowly conceived "project method", and the ostensible attention to socio-economic trends, constitute the prin— cipal innovations WhiCh were supposed to orient Industrial Arts toward the study of technology. From a theoretical point of view, the proposal evidences certain inherent weaknesses, which may account fOr the fact that it had not, in its original fOrm, fOund acceptance in practice: warmer and his associates either ignored or found it unnecessary to attend to the fun- damental task of clarifying the meaning of technology. Instead, they assumed that Power, Transportation, Manufacturing, Construction, Communi- cation, and Management constitute the principal elements of technology.8 These "divisions" were supposed to have been ”discovered" in their "examination" of the Census gijanufactures,9 indicating that warner and his associates had preSUpposed a semantic association between 'technology' and Pmanufacture' (or 'industry'), a presupposition that is arbitrary and 'Without apparent meaning. ijreover, the claim that the ”content in the new Industrial Arts curriculum is derived via a socio-economic analysis” is neither clarified nor sUbstantiated in the proposal. 8Ibid. 9"we examined the census," says warner, ”to discover five or more large divisions of subject matter resources..." Ibid., p.3. The Census pf Manufactures is discussed below. Despite its superficial treatment and resultant weaknesses, the proposal did, nevertheless, signal a new direction fOr Industrial Arts education; and.not a few in the profession (intrigued perhaps by the aura surrounding the concept of technology) ultimately embraced it in substance. Yet, it is not a little curious that during the quarter century since the Curriculum was proposed, and subsequently adOpted as a model for restruc- turing existing curriculum.patterns, only token dgnfag§9_Changes have actually been effected in educational practice. 10 Technology and Industrial Arts: Olson's study is essentially an extension of warner's ideas and assumptions. He holds to the notion that Industrial Arts "should reflect the technology,"11 and like warner, turns to the Census 9f Manufactures as the principal source of subject matter.12 From the Census and other industrial literature, Olson first Obtains ”eight categories of industries” which establish the basis fOr his study. The categories thus obtained, include Manufacturing, Construction, Power, Transportation, Electronics, Research, Services, and.Management. These, he says, ”are assumed to account for all of.American industry as would be essential for a curriculum study in industrial arts.”13 Additional elements fOr his classificatory scheme are drawn from the list oijanufacturing industries enumerated in the Cen3us report. ”with the aid of this information,” Olson says, 10Delmar W; Olson, TechnOlggy and Industrial.Arts (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1958). 11Ibid., p.3. 12Ibid., p.41. 13Ibid., pp.3 and 41. —i—,—‘ -1._.----._~.-. .. . , 1 —- 10 the classification of the manufacturing industries fOr this study was relatively simple, and was done largely on the basis of materials categories: ceramics, chemicals, fOods, leather, metals, paper, plastics, rubber, textiles and woods, plus graphic arts, and tools and.machines. These categories were selected as being most analyzable.14 The two ”category groups”, as Olson refers to them, are then combined to give him the following classification of industries: Ceramics industries Graphic arts industries Chemicals industries Tools and.machines industries Foods industries Construction industries Leather industries Power industries jMetals industries Transportation industries Paper industries Electronics industries Plastics industries Industrial research Rubber industries or Research industries Textiles industries Industrial management 15 WOods industries Services or Service industries The combined "categories of industries" constitute the proposed structure for Industrial Arts subject matter. Supposedly, by way of an ”analysis of industries,”16 and a consideration of what are supposed to be the "functions of Industrial Arts,”17 Olson finally arrives at what ; he terms a “Master List of Curricular Components as Categories of subject I Matter.”18 The list in its entirety includes the fOllowing: j .Aesthetics Equipment Materials Representations Analysis Exhibits Mathematics Reproduction Application Experiment Mechanics Research Assembly Evaluation IMechanisms Safety Automation Fastening Mfining Salvage Chemistry Finishes Nblds Selection Circuits Fixtures Mbdels Services Communications bebies Occupations Solutions 14Tbid., p.42. 15Ibid., pp.107-166. 16Ibid. 17Ibid., pp.77-106. 18Ibid., p.169. ll Computers HUman Engineering Operation Specifications Conservation InSpection Organization Standards Construction Installation Physics Structures Controls Instruments Planning Study Creating Integration Power Supervision Decorating Interpretation Presentations Supplies Design Invention Preserving Surveys Development Investigation Principles Synthetics Diagnosis Jigs Processes Systems Dies Legislation Problems Techniques Discovering Library work Production Testing Distribution Lubrication Products Theories Drawing Machines Records Tools Editing Management Recreation Transportation Engineering iManufacturing Regulation Utilization This list of ”curricular components" is the sum.and substance of Olson's I study-~in his words, "the final version of the body of industrial arts subject matter to reflect technology."19 Despite its extended and detailed treatment,20 Olson's proposal evidences several inherent weaknesses which are central to the problem undertaken in the present study: a) The sporadic references to "techno- logy" appear to be totally irrelevant to Olson's thesis. The concept itself is not clearly defined, nor is its relevance to the "curricular components" explained. b) The proposed categories of subject matter and the categories of industries from which they supposedly derive, appear to have been arbitrarily conceived. The former, Olson admits, ”were found by trial to be most revealing and most logical for the respective groups of industries."21 With regard to the latter, Olson says: 19Ibid., p.244. 2OApproximately half of Olson's 250-page studyconsists in protracted lists of industrial materials, processes, products, and occupatlons, ”industrial arts functions", and "student experience un1ts." See pp. 77- 225. 21Ibid., p.107. (Italics mine) 12 The categories were decided on after considerable study and search of industrial literature, and after numerous trial groupings, as the best, simple yet inclusive, classification this writer could arrange. The classification employed.in.theANew Curriculum [warner's prOposal] was influential in the selection.ZZ c) In view of Olson's admissions, it is evident that the requisite theoret- ical grounds for selecting the categories and components have not been established; and as such, they cannot be accepted, much less defended, as §h§_subject matter for Industrial.Arts education. 23 The Census pnganufactures: It should perhaps be noted that the pggpgpg, to which both warner and Olson turn fOr Industrial Arts subject matter, is a survey report on various aSpects of "the thousands of more or less distinct lines of manufacturing activity," compiled biennially by the Bureau of the Census.24 The survey data pertaining to these activ- ities are tabulated (all but a few pages of the Census consists of tables) according to processes and products, arbitrarily grouped for the conven- ience of reporting. As new industrial processes and products are intro- duced, the system fOr grouping them in the survey reports is changed, both in number and in designation. The §§p§p§_fOr 1947 (the one referred to in Olson's study) classifies the "industry groups" in the following manner: Food and kindred products Tobacco manufactures Textile—mill products Apparel and related.products Lumber and products Furniture and fixtures Paper and allied products . Printing and.publishing Industries Chemical and allied products Petroleum and coal products OOOOVOLD-boqNT—A l—l 22Ibid., p.41. 23The Census of Manufactures, VOl. I (washington:.Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1947). 24Ibid., p.2. 13 11. Rubber products 12. Leather and leather products 13. Stone, clay and glass products 14. Primary metal industries 15. Fabricated.metal industries 16. .Machinery (except electrical) 17. Electrical machinery 18. Transportation equipment 19. Instruments and related.products 20. Nfiscellaneous manufactures 21. Ordinance and accessories25 .As noted above, the Census is primarily concerned with the manu- facturing industries; but it does make an incidental reference to what are therein termed "the broader sectors of the Nation's economy," namely: | 1. Manufacturing 2. .Agriculture, fOrestry and fisheries 3. jMining _ 4. Contract construction _ I 5. Wholesale and retail trade ’ 6. Finance, insurance and real estate 7. Transportation J 8. Communication and.public utilities 9. Services 10. Government enterprises26 These "sectors" are mentioned in the C§p§p§_merely to point to the fact that manufacturing ranks first in terms of the gross national product. NOte that warner includes sectors 1, 4, 7 and 8 in his ”divisions of subject matter resources,” whereas Olson includes sectors 1, 4, 7 and 9 in his "categories of industries." NOte too, that all but three Of the industries named in the preceding list (namely, items 2, 10 and 19) are in one way or another incorporated into warner's and Olson's proposals: Items 3 and 4, for example, are combined under the name ”textiles", or "textile industries"; the elements in item l3--stone, clay and glass products--are included in the "ceramics" category. ZSIbid. 26Ibid. 14 That the §§p§p§_provides a sound basis fOr identifying and struc- turing Industrial Arts subject matter, is open to question. In the first place, it furnishes specific economic data that is of questionable value in general education; moreover, that data pertains to manufacturing activities only. Secondly, inasmuch as the classification of these activities is altered from time to time, commensurate with changes in the manufacturing industries, that classification does not provide a stable structure for educational purposes. But more importantly, the broad sectors of the economy, which warner and Olson consider pertinent to a technology-centered curriculum, are not dealt with in the Cepgps. In fact, the word 'technology' is not even mentioned. Technology: A Structure fOr Industrial.Arts Content:27 In his prOposal for a new curriculum structure, DeVOre calls for "an abandon- r ment of many of the previous curricular approaches including trade and job analysis, occupational analysis, material oriented courses," and the I like.28 He argues that curriculum concepts such as those are narrowly conceived, and are inflexible to accommodate changes in content.29 Because the Industrial Arts profession holds tenaciously to outdated, inflexible concepts, is reason why, DeVOre asserts: the efforts of the profession have failed to establish this area of education as an.intellectual discipline. Without this attain— ment, those engaged in industrial arts, both individually and collectively, continually dissipate their energies justifying their existence, formulating objectives and defining and redef1n1ng the field of study.30 27Pau1 W. DeVOre, Technology: A Structure fOr Industrial Arts Con- tent (A paper presented at Eastern Michigan UniverSIty, January 1965). 28Ibid., p.14. 291bid. 3OIbid., p.3. 15 As a corrective, DeVore advances warner's thesis, that the Industrial Arts curriculum should "reflect the technology,"31 Technology, he holds, 32 is an intellectual discipline; and as suCh, will provide "a strong central integrating purpose and foundation for a curriculum structure,"33 a structure ”with external stability and.internal flexibility and adaptability'39_technological change."34 The curriculum structure DeVOre proposes, is based on the assumption that technology is a human creation, identifiable with.man's intellectual achievements which reach back to "the dawn of civilization."35 On that assumption, he fUrther assumes that ”an analysis of history and present society can serve as a.means to identify...certain.major areas of technological endeavor which.may serve as a common ground.fOr a curric- ulum foundation” fOr Industrial.Arts.36 The historical-social analysis, DeVore says, ”identifies” man as a builder, man as a communicator, man as a producer, man as a developer, man as a transporter, man as an organizer and.manager of work, and man as a craftsman.37 Having identified these "teChnological endeavors," DeVore then associates them with correlative major industries which he considers to be the ”significant components of man's technology;"38 and these in turn constitute the "core areas" of study in the proposed struc- ture for Industrial Arts content: STERiér: p.15. SQIEiér: p.16. 32Ibid., p.9. 37;§;§,, p.17. 33Ibid., p.17. 33gpig, 34Ibid., p.3. 351bid., p.4. 16 The Major Areas of Technolggical Endeavor Man the Builder ......... .Man the Communicator ....... .Man the Producer . . . . . . . an.the DevelOper ..... Man the Transporter ........ an.the Organizer ......... iMan the Craftsman ....... The Core Areas of the Curriculum ..A Study of the . A.Study of the Construction Industries A Study of the Communication Industries . A Study of the Manufacturing, Power and Energy Producing Industries ..A Study of the Research and Development Industries A Study of the Transportation Industries .A Study of Work: Its Management and Organization in Industry Craft and Service Industries39 DeVore asserts that the structure satisfies the criterion of external stability "since the areas identified for study have established themselves as being significant components of man's technology by virtue of their historical and social base;" and it satisfies the criterion of internal flexibility because ”internal changes can be adapted as man's technology advances in a given area...without Changing the terminology of - 4 a given area." 0 That the Industrial Arts curriculum should center on man and his technological endeavors, that the subject matter for suCh a study can be obtained by way of an historical and social analysis, that the instruc~ 3?Ibid., p.19. NOte that_DeVOIe's "components.of;manls.technOlogy SyntheSIZe warner's "divisions of technology" and Olson's ”categories of industries." 4OIbid. , p.17. 17 tional content should rest upon an externally stable and an internally flexible structure, that Industrial Arts needs to be established as an intellectual discipline: all of these considerations in DeVore's proposal, doubtless are pertinent to a technology-centered.program.of studies. The degree to Which they have in fact been considered, however, leaves certain equally pertinent questions unanswered: HOw, for example, does DeVOre make the transition from “man's technological endeavors"--man the builder, man the communicator, etc.--to a study of the industries? Are industrial activities ipso facto technological? In that connection, What aspects of technology are Characteristically intellectual? Can questions suCh as these be answered satisfactorily without first having clarified the meaning of technology? That that basic theoretical requirement has been met, is not evident in DeVOre's proposal. The above critical reviews reveal some striking similarities in basic assumptions, concepts, and curriculum structures, which seem to reflect the opinions and persuasions of a large segment of the Industrial Arts profession. But they also reveal some shortcomings, which may account fOr the fact that the proposed concepts and structures have not been implemented noticeably in educational practice. In their survey of Industrial Arts education, Schmitt and Pelley note that ”the new curric- ulum suggests new structures which would reorganize the instructional content to reflect the technology;” but they emphatically add, that: Wipe current industrial arts curriculum does not even measure pp_§9_§he_ pgograms recommended py the profession lg £9_2Q years §£23"41 _ 419p, gi£,, p.30. (their italics). 18 On the Concept of Technology What has happened in Industrial Arts is indicative of What has taken place elsewhere. During the past quarter-century, technology has emerged as one of the major topics of discussion among teachers and administrators in other branches of education (in the social studies,42 and in.vocational education,43 for example), and among scholars in ‘virtually every field of scientific and philosophic inquiry. Unfortu- nately, as is often the case with'vague and ambiguous words for which Specific referents cannot readily be discerned or pointed to, the meaning Of 'technology' is generally taken on its face to be self-evident. And as such, it has yielded to loose interpretation and indiscriminate usage 1 1 which, in turn, has perverted an indispensable concept and generated i confusion in the realm of education. Sources of Confusion: Deliberate attention to its current usage in A the literature reveals several likely sources of confusion. .At this W juncture, they need only be marked out and briefly described in order to f bring the problem.into perspective. ' 1. .A clear-cut distinction is seldom made between the broad meaning of 'technology' and the more popular, narrow acceptation of it. Broadly used, its meaning is extended into various realms of human activ- it --economic, domestic, medical, political, educational, industrial, etc. In its narrow application, the meaning of teChnology is commonly fl 4ZSee, fOr example, Science and the Social Studies, TWentyHSeventh Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, Edited.by HOward H. Cummings (Washington: The Council, 1957). 43Vocational Education, The Sixty-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society fOr the Study of Education, Edited by Melvin L. Barlow (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965). 19 restricted to the realm of industry and fOr practical purposes remains synonymous with 'industrial technology'. Such usage does not get by without criticism; Perry, for example, states that, Technology may be drawn from natural knowledge, as when the judgments of chemistry mediate the interests of industry. The term 'technology' is sometimes used in a restricted sense to refer only to such naturalistic technology. But this restric- tion is arbitrary.44 The French writer, Jacques Ellul, who has devoted considerable attention to problems of technology makes the following observation: Whenever we see the word technology or technique, we automatically think of machines....It is a mistake to continue with this confusion of terms, the more so because it leads to the idea that, because the machine is at the origin and center of the technical problem, one is dealing with the whole problem when one deals with the machine. And that is a greater mistake still. Technique has now become almost completely independent of the machine, which has lagged far behind its offspring. It must be emphasized that, at present, technique is applied outside industrial life. The growth of its power today has no relation to the growing use of the machine.4 2. In the restricted sense, 'technology' is often used synonymously with 'technic' and 'technique', and sometimes with 'praxiology'. A certain amount of confusion in this regard stems from the loose trans— lations into English of works by French, German, Slavic, and other foreign writers who use the terms die Technik, la technique, and technologie, and similar derivatives of the Greek techné. For example, Klemm's work, Technik: Eine Geschichte ihrer Probleme (Technik: On the History of its Problems), appears in the English translation under the title, A_Histo§y 9f_Western Technology;46 Daumas' Histoire Generale dengechnigpes (General 44RalphBarton Perry, Realms gf_Value (Cambridge: Harvard univer- sity Press, 1954), p.182. 45Jacques Ellul, The Technolo ical Socie , translated from the French by John WilkinsohIINew ork: Al re Knop , 1956), pp.3<4. 46Friedrich Klemm, A;Histo§y 9f_Western Technology, translated by Dorothea Woley Singer (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964). 20 History of Techniques) was recently published under the English title, A Histoyy‘qf Technology_and Invention;47 Karmarsch's Geschichte der Techno— lqgi§_is referred to as "The History of Technology.”48 Inasmuch as each writer uses two or more derivative forms of EEEEEE in the same work one cannot arbitrarily assume that the terms are synonymous, much less that they all mean the same thing as the English 'technology'. Ellul's La Technique qq l'enjeu‘dq siecle (Technique or the wager of the Century) appears in.the English translation under the title, 1h§_lechnological Sociepy, yet Ellul himself emphatically states that ”the term technique, as I use it, does not mean...technology.”49 And in their translation of Max Weber's The Theqry_9f.§ggial_apd Economic Organization,50 to cite another example, Henderson and Parsons note that "the German word Technik which Weber uses covers both the meanings of the English words 'technique' and 'technology'," and that a "distinction is not explicitly made in Weber‘s terminology;"51 they go on to say that the terms are introduced according to the context, yet they do not clarify the distinction, in neither the French nor the English. To show that the problem is not something new, Espinas called attention to it eighty years ago in ”Les 47Maurice Daumas, A Histo of Technology and Invention, trans- lated by Eileen B. Hennessy_(Ne%XYork: Crown Puinghers, 1969). 4:R. Oldenbourg, "The History of Technology, " The Practical Arts Magazm ,111, No.1 (1874), pp. 107 111; see footnote“ on p. 107. 492h§_Technological Sociegy, op. cit., p. xxv. 50Max Weber, The The oyy_ of Social and Economic Organization, trans- lated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1947). 51Ibid., footnote on p.160. IIIlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII:::—————f—————————————f* 21 origines de la technologie."52 Therein.he says that the term technique, technologie, and.pyaxeologie "are badly misunderstood;” and after a lengthy discussion on their distinctive differences, he says that he will use the latter two terms "indiscriminately one or the other."53 Other examples could very well be cited; let it suffice to add that the champions of "modern" English usage, though they recognize the problem, have not been very helpful in resolving it. Follett's Modern.American USage, for example, states that: The logos of a thing or activity, from which we derive our fast- multiplying ologies, is its reason or theory--the discourse about it. The very length and roll of the word thus formed tempts the heedless to use it whenever the thing or activity itself, and not its theory, is what they have in.mind. The flagrant example is technology, Which should mean the theory of our mechanized world, instead of the maChinery itself. This confusion.has led some modern.writers to use technics, techniques, and techne (Greek for a££_or craft) to mark the forgotten difference and properly desig- nate the maChine civilization. 5ZAlfred Espinas, in Revue Philosophique (XV-XXX, 1890), pp.ll4- 115. Espinas defines the terms as follows (translated and paraphrased by this writer): Technique is a complex of established rules. The term ppaxiologie signifies the science underlying technique comprehended in their entirety, i.e., the science of the most general forms and the highest principles of activity in the world of living beings. Techno- logie_generale signifies the greater part of praxiologie that deals with 1) analytical description, classification and systematization of teCh- niques ("des arts utiles the useful artS")The Greeks called them TeXVQL; 2) investigation.of conditions and laws whiCh indicate the effectiveness of human activities; and 3) tracing the origin and development of teChniques, and their progress driven by the forces of tradition and invention. .A similar distinction is made in Tadeusz KOtarbinski, Traktat Q_ Dobrengobocie (Warsaw: Polska Akademia NaUk, 1965) Annex 4, pp.358- 377. There the author appropriates the term.Prakseologia for his "theory of efficient work." 53ESpinas, Ibid., p.115 (mais il_nous d'employer indifferment l'un .qp'l'autre). 54Wilson Follett, Mbdern.American Usage (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966), under 'ology, ologies", p.238. 22 The emphasis on theory may be a point well taken, but the implication that all of the derivatives of the Greek Eeghp§_should be restricted to the machine industry is an arbitrary interpretation. The further develop- ment of the present study will argue against that point of View. 3. Despite the recent claims that ”the history of technology has begun to establish itself as a discipline,"55 historians of technology are far from agreeing on the nature and extent of their subject matter. Forbes, for example, treats the sUbject as a history of "discovery, in- ventions and engineering;"56 Derry and Williams treat it as a ”connected account of the evolution of:modern industry."57 Bronowski treats it as ”the detailed and.orderly story of men and their machines," concentrating on "specific materials, particular techniques, and certain well-defined "58 while Kranzberg and Purcell perceive fields of technological endeavor; the history of technology as "a branch of social history” encompassing the "intellectual, economic, political, art, military, and even religious history."59 The Historians themselves are well aware that their field is ill-defined: Derry, for example, admits that "the Choice of What to include in such a work and what to omit muSt necessarily be very 55Robert.A..IMerrill, ”The Study of Technology," International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, VOl. 15 (New York: TheiMacmillan Co. and the Free Press, 1968), p. 582. S6R.J.Forbes, Man.the Maker: .A.History of Technology and.Engi- neering (London: Abelard-Schuman Ltd., 1958). 57T. K..Derry and Trevor I. ‘Williams, .A.Short Histopy of Technology (New York: Oxford'University Press, 1961), p. 2. S8Jacob Bronowski (Ed.), TeChnolOgy (Garden City, New York: Double- day 8 Co., 1964), p. 7. 5gMelvin Kranzberg. and Carroll W'. Pursell Jr., TeChnOlOgy in w‘jfi“ p. Vi. 23 60 ‘Mbreover, they are their own best critics. Whereas Singer, subjective." for example, defines the history of technology "as covering the field of how things are commonly done or made,"61 Daniels argues that'"how things are done or made' is not, strictly speaking, a historian's question;"62 Kranzberg asserts that "such a definition is so broad and loose that it encompasses many items that scarcely can be considered as technology;"63 WOodbury agrees with these assertions, and adds that "the editors seem to have made no clear distinction between technology and the arts and crafts.”64 That such discrepencies generate confusion among writers and educators goes without saying. "we are entitled to look to the historian of technology for a better understanding of technology;" says Drucker, "but how can he give us such an understanding unless he himself has some concept of technology?"65 4. Many writers treat 'technology' and 'science' ('pure' and 'applied') as correlative or corresponding terms, suggesting that techno- logy and science naturally, logically, or necessarily go together. The arguments, pro and con, that technology is dependent on science (and vice versa) are so prevalent in the literature that they need not be cited. 6Q§ Short History_gf Technology, 9p, git,, p.vii. 61Charles Singer, gt, al., A History 9f_Technology, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p.vii. 62GeorgeH. Daniels, ”The Big Question in the History of American Technology," Technology and Culture, 11, No. 1 (January 1970), p.2. 63Technology in western Civilization, op, cit., p.5. 64Robert S. woodbury, "The SCholarly Future of the History of Technology," Technology and Culture, 1, No. 4 (Fall 1960), p.348. 65Peter F. Drucker, ”Work and Tools," TeChnolOgy and CultUre, I, No. 1 (Winter 1959), pp.36-37. 24 The confusion arises when these terms are used interchangeably. Snow, for example, states that he cannot "draw a clear line between pure science and technology;"66 Singer, on the other hand, asserts that since the nineteenth century, technology acquired a scientific content and "67 came ”to be regarded as almost synonymous with applied science. 5. unlike the scientific fields of inquiry identified by nouns with the terminal ending 'ology', the word ’technology' is frequently used, even by important writers, in a plural sense, as 'technologies'. Consequently, the historians' reference to ancient, medieval, and modern technologies; the anthropologists' reference to hunting, herding, fishing, and gathering technologies;68 the engineering profession's reference to .mechanical, electrical, civil, and chemical technologies; and the Indus- trial Arts profession's reference to wood, metal, and ceramic techno- logies; all suggest somewhat different referents. Needless to say, such usage results in a diversity of interpretations, both within and between the various fields of inquiry and the professions. .QplDefininngechnology; .Attempts to rectify the terminological problem have focused on definition of technology. IMany scholars have given serious attention to the problem and numerous definitions have been formulated; but there is little evidence to indicate that they have succeeded in reaching any measure of agreement. As one philosopher of 66C.P.Snow, The Two Cultures: and a Second Look, (New York: The New.American Library, 1964): p.64, This writer's italics. 67Charles Singer, et. al., A Histogx 9£_Technology, (London: Oxfbrd university Press, 1954), vol. I, p.vii., This writer's italics. 68See, fer example, Leslie White, "The Evolution of Culture," and Stanley.H2 Udy, Jr., "Preindustrial Forms of Organized WOrk," in , (New York: The Peter B. Hammond, Cu1tural and Social.AnthropolOgy .Mbcmillan Company, 1964), pp.406-426 and pp.llS-124, respectively. IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIllllllllIII::————————+———————————_______11MW”.W. 25 technology sees the situation, ”any definition.is inevitably colored by the way in which it has been reached. This is the reason," he writes, "69 or "why there are so many definitions of technique and technology ”men of affairs everywhere are prone consciously or as Bernard puts it, t.'f70 unconsciously to warp definitions in their own interes .Here again, lexicographers are of little help, and sometlmes add Burns writes in the Dictionagyugf the Social Sciences to the constion. that, Early uses of the term, at the very beginning of the 18th century, adhere closely to the sense of the original Greek: the first Oxfbrd English Dictionary_reference is to a book title (1706) 71 "Technology,.A Description of.Arts, especially the.Mechanica1". The citation is in error on two counts: a) The original Greek word, technologia, from which 'technology' derives, had no connectlon Wlth (This point will be clarified in the next chapter). .Mechanical arts. b) The Oxford English Dictionary makes reference not to a book t1t1e but rather to a definition of 'technology' which appears (as quoted by Burns) in Kersey's Dictionafl, published in 1706.72 Several dictionaries, including the Oxford, define 'technology' in one of 1ts senses as "the scientific study of the practical or industr1a1 H Despite its restriction to a kind of "arts”, the abbreV1ated arts. It does not follow, however definition appears to be etymologically valid. 69Andrew G. van.Melsen, Science and Technology (Pittsburg, Pa Duquesne university'Press, 1961),p pp 247- 248. 7 OL.L.Bernard, "Definition of Definition," Social Forces, Vol 19 No. 4, (May 1941), p. 508. 711nm Burns, "Technology,”.A.Dictionary of the Social SCienCes, Edited by JUlius Gould and William.L.Ko15'(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 716. 72thn Kersey, Dictionarium.Anglo-Britanicum.9:_A;General Eng11sh Dictionagy, (London: J. Phillips, 1706). Z6 that Industrial Arts is ipso facto the scientific study of technology. This illogical transfbrmation of terms is sometimes sued by educators as a basis for defining Industrial Arts education. Industrial Arts indeed can, and many educators agree that it should, center on the study of technology, but the basis for such a study would have to be established on firmer grounds. The transfbrmed dictionary definition is at best a tautological statement which leaves both Industrial Arts and technology undefined, and as such, merely compounds the terminological problem. Many, or perhaps most, definitions appear to be arbitrary state- .ments about technology, or statements based on quasi theories about technology. The latter are of course no more genuine than the arbitrary statements inasmuch as any "theory” about technology already implies an antecedent meaning 9f technology. Needless to say, a ”theory" about technology is no substitute fOr a theory of definition.which determines the criteria, or the requirements, fer a genuine definition. "There must be," according to Perry, ”a control or set of criteria, by which the definition is justified or rejected."73 Even a cursory acquaintance with some of the well known theories-~the.Aristotelian.per genus e; differentiam definition,74 Bridgman's ”operational” definition,75 Ogden fl 73Perry, _op. _c__i_t., p.2. 74"There is nothing else in definition," says.Aristotle, "but the pri- .mary genus and the differentia...But further we must also divide by the differentia of the differentia...the ultimate differentia will be the sUb- stance and definition of the thing." The Metaphysics, BOOK VII, xii-xiii, Trans. by Hagh Tredennick, (London: William Hbinemann Ltd., 1933) pp.373-5. 75”...the proper definition of a concept is not in terms of its properties but in terms of actual operations...In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of Operations; the Concepti§_s%%0nzmous In P.W.Bri gman's,’ e LOgic with the corres ondin set 9f_gperations." .9; Modern Physics, (New Yerk: ThejMacmillan Company, 1951), pp.5-6. c~ ‘IIL <\ (L ‘Ill 27 and RiChard's ”referential" definition76-~supports the foregoing asser- tions. Granted, theorists disagree, sometimes polemically; Ogden and RiChards, for example, argue (in 1923) that no theory of definition, particularly the.Aristotelian, is "capable of practical application under normal circumstances;"77 Korzybski, on the other hand, criticizes all theories, (in 1941), particularly those based on ”referential” and "Operational":methods, arguing that on such bases ”most terms are 'g%§%f defined'."78 SuCh disagreements among important theorists serve more to emphasize the indispensability of theory fer resolving terminological problems than they do to discredit opposing theoretical views. Disagreements notwithstanding, some theorists seem to agree that a definition should take into account the antecedent usage of a word. According to Perry's criteria, for example, a definition names, or fixes a verbal label which is "usually secondhand; that is, the name has an antecedent usage, which renders its present usage apprOpriate or inap- propriate."79 Its appropriateness, he states, "must be judged by its history and suggestiveness.”80 Peirce agrees, asserting that the history . 76"...the essential prOblem of how we define, or attain the sub- st1tute symbols required in any discussion...is, in all cases to find the referent." In C.K. Ogden and ILA. Richards, The Meaning 9f Meaning, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & world), p.113, 1946. 77Ibid., p.109. _ 78Most terms, according to Kbrzybski, are over-defined by inten- s1on, or belief in verbal definitions, and are hopelessly under-defined by extension i.e., verbal definitions do not correspond to the exten- 51ona1 facts of the objects defined. In.Alfred Kerzybski, Science and Sanity (Lakeville, Conn,: The International NOn-Aristotelian Library?“— Publishing Co., Fourth Edition, 1958), p. 7999, gig , p.3. 801bid., p.4. 28 of words is "the key to theirmeanings."81 Ogden and Richards suggest that ”at the beginning of a serious examination of an ambiguous word we 82 and look for should collect as wide a range of uses as possible" common elements of meaning. Inasmuch as the word 'technology' is ”secondhand”, an inquiry into its origin.and history should provide the basis for an ensuing discussion on its meaning. Chapter II opens first with a study of the etymological roots of 'technology' and its related concepts, followed by a synoptic account of its history and the context in whiCh it was used. .Against this background, Chapter III critically examines and compares current definitions given to the word by important writers from.various fields of scientific and philosophic inquiry. There the essential elements of definition are identified, and in Chapter IV they are structured into a theoretical model of technology. Finally, Chapter V shows how the model can be used to select and structure subject matter for Industrial.Arts education. 81Charles S. Peirce, Proceedings of the American.Academy of Arts and Sciences, (Boston,'VII, 1868), p. 295. 8292. 933., p.128. CHAPTER II TECHNOLOGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The word 'technology' derives from the ancient Greek TevaAOYLa (technologia), the roots of which are Texvn (techné) and Aoyos (lgggs). These commonly accepted facts which any etymological dictionary or lexicon readily substantiates are frequently introduced into discussions on the meaning of technology suggesting that the ancient Greek terms have something in common with their derivatives. The mere reference to them alone, however, sheds little if any light on the meaning of techno- logy so that in themselves they are hardly worth noting. To be of epis- temic value, other pertinent Observations need to be brought into the discussions, e.g., the various connotations of Eeghp§_and lggps, as well as the original meaning of technologiat Mbreover, the terms technologia, techne, and logos need to be perceived in historical perspective in conjunction with other related Greek terms (e.g., episteme, theoria, praxis) and their derivatives. Assuming that an etymological and.historical inquiry can help to clarify the meaning of technology, the object of the present Chapter is to go beyond dictionaries and lexicons into primary sources to find out ‘what specifically the ancient Greek writers meant when they used the terms in question; when and in what context they originated; how and in what context the word 'teChnology' evolved; how it came to be associated with science and the industrial arts; and what effects the evolving 29 30 concept of technology has had on educational thought. .A consideration of these points should, accordingly, bring into relief a distinction between the ancient concept of technology and the modern concept of "ancient technology." The following discussion takes into account the history of the ‘word 'technology' as well as the historical context in which it evolved; hence, it is neither exclusively etymological, nor is it definitively historical. It is presented, rather, in the form of a chronological sketch consisting only of pertinent observations as they apply to the present object of inquiry. The Origin of Techné Even befbre the great literary period of ancient Athens the terms techné and logos were already embodied in the Greek language. They are 1 though first met with in the epic poems of Homer and.Hesiod,‘whiCh, uncertain, are supposed by many scholars of classical literature to have been committed to writing in the sixth century B.C. during the time of Solon and the reign of Pisistratus, the "tyrant" of.Athens.Z The uncer- tainty of their origin notwithstanding, the fact that they are the ear- liest sources of reference to the ancient Greek language, the works of Hemer and Hesiod furnish a useful vantage point from which to observe the origin and evolution of the concept of technology. 1"The time of Hesiod and Homer," says Herodotus (C485a425 B.C.), ”was not more than four hundred years befOre my own" (II. 53); whiCh places the ancient poets in the ninth century B.C. or thereabouts. From .Herodotus, translated by AJD.God1ey, volume I (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1920), p.341. 2J.J.Eschenbung,‘Mhnualnglassical Literature, translated by N.W.Fishe (Philadelphia: Edfiard C. Biddle, 1844), p.450. 31 Techne and the Manual Crafts: We find in the epics sufficient evidence to indicate that numerous manual crafts must have flourished in Greece prior to the time of Homer. His vivid descriptions of them in terms of craft processes, tools, and crafted products, indicate that Homer's acquaintance with them was more than passing. In the Iliad and Odyssey he talks about the potter (nepaueug), the worker in leather (suurorouog), the carpenter and joiner (Teurwv), the smith or worker in metal (xaAucUg).3 He alludes to the processes of working bronze, iron, gold, and silver; of fashioning armour and "sturdy shields"; of forging "much cunning handiwork, brooches, and spiral arm-bands, and rosettes and necklaces” (ll. 18.401-2); of ferging rivets; of inlaying ivory; of boring holes; of hewing beams. He gives equal attention to craft tools and crafted objects; for example, he talks about the smith who came bearing in his hands his tools of bronze, the implements of his craft, anvil and hammer and well-made tongs wherewith he wrought the gold (0d. 3.432-5). First fashioned he a shield, great and sturdy, adorning it cunningly in every part, and round about it set a bright rim, threefold and glittering, and therefrom made fast a silver baldric. Five were the layers of the shield itself; and on it he wrgught many curious devices with cunning skill (11. 18.477- 482). Homer's references to the crafts are, of course, incidental to the epics, often introduced merely as metaphors or literary embellishments, Nevertheless, the fact that they are accorded so much attention suggests 3The term TEMTwV is used to refer to a builder (Od. 17.384), a shipwright (Od. 9.126), a craftsman (Od. 19.56), in addition to a car- penter (11. 15.411); see Homer, The Odyssey, translated by A.T1Murray, Vbls. I and II (London: William.Heinemann, 1919); Homer, The Iliad, translated by A.T.MUrray, Vbls. I and II (London: William Heinemann, 1923). 4Note: All of the references to the Iliad and Odyssey in this chapter are taken from the Murray translations. ;_i 32 that perhaps the crafts were recognized in.Homer's time as worthy human activities (activities which the aristocratic Greeks of a later period were to consider unworthy, below human dignity). There was even a place in their mythology for Daedalus (Aabfiakog), the "ideal crafts- man" (11. 18.592); and among their gods, the high-ranking god of fire and metal-working, ”the famed craftsman”, Hephaestus (Hodtotov KAUIorexvnv) (11. 18.491). It is in this context that the modern mechanical-industrial concept of Eeghp§_has its origin. TeChne and the verbal Arts: .At the time the epics appeared in writing there was not yet a direct connection between techne and logos. The meaning of techné was more or less restricted to ”manual" craft or "cunning" skill;5 and logos conveyed the unequivocal meaning of a word or words, in the sense of thespokenword.6 With the subsequent growing interest in the literary arts, however, Egghp§_gradually acquired the connotation of skill_in oratory; and in the same context, lgggg acquired the broader connotations of discourse or treatise. The "verbal" context in which they merged came about in consequence of a chain of circum— stances in which the epics played a significant and decisive role. The literary ferm of the epics provided the ancient Greeks a model for literary expression; the poet, the statesman, the critic, the 5It is sometimes used in the "bad sense” of one being crany, (0d. 4.455; 8.327; 8.332);.Hesiod uses the term in this sense only; see Hesiod, "The Theogony", in The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, translated by HUgh G. Evelyn-White (London: William.Heinemann, 1914), lines 160 and 770, pp.91 and 135 respectively. 6According to Liddell, ”Aoyos never means a;word in the grammatical sense, as the mere name of a thing or act, but rather ngOrd as the thin referred 39, the material, not the formal part"; in Henry G. LiddEIl and Robert Scott,.A GreeknEnglish Lexicon, Seventh Edition (London: Oxfbrd University Press, 1884), p.901. 33 philosopher, all wrote in the poetic style of Homer and Hesiod. "Such indeed was the preference fer metrical composition," Eschenburg observes, "that Parmenides taught his philOSOphy in verse, and Solon published his laws in the dress of poetry."7 In content, the epics furnished the SUbstance for a new way of life that was to have a profbund effect and a lasting influence on every class of the people. From Hesiod, the common.man—-the shepherd, the husbandman, the merChant--drew his simple ethics for daily conduct and practical rules for industry.8 From Homer, on the other hand, Pope writes that, the poets drew their inspiration, the critics their rules, and the philOSOphers a defence of their opinions; every author was fond to use his name, and every profession writ books upon him till they swelled the libraries. The warriors formed themselves upon his heroes, and the oracles delivered his verses for answers. Homer's portrayal of brave and gallant heroes and their military prowess infused in the people a spirit of national pride. This attitude, coupled with the spread of literacy and the Hesiodic precepts for industry, brought forth a renaissance in Greek art, commerce, science, and philosophy, and a movement toward pOpular fbrms of government. In .Athens, Solon had already layed the foundation for a democracy.10 When the transition came in the latter part of the sixth century, and the tyranny of Pisistratus gave way to a democratic form of government, oratory superseded epic poetry as an indispensable fbrm of literary 7Manual 9g Classical Literature, _p. 915., p.483. .8Hesiod, ”The Wbrks and.Days”, in The Homeric Hymns and'Homerica, 22. 211- QAlexander Pope, quoted in the Manual g£_Classical Literature, 9p,{gi£,, p.450. 10Herodotus, (1.19), 92. gig, p.33. tion of numerous treatises on the ”art” of rhetoric. 34 expression. One of the immediate consequences of the transition, Jebb observes, ”was a mass of litigation on claims to property, urged by democratic exiles who had been dispossessed" by the tyrants,and the new "art" of oratory ”was primarily intended to help the plain citizen who had to Speak before a court of law."11 Oratory as a genuine form of artistic expression had not as yet been develOped on the theoretical level; the principles, and the prac- tical rules deduced therefrom, were yet to be systematized. Here again, the epics fUrnished the model; in the Iliad there is evidence, for example, of Achilles' practical skill of exhorting warriors into battle, and of Nestor's oratorical eloquence in proving a.point, and Homer's description of Nestor as: the clear-voiced orator of the men of Pylos, he from whose tongue flowed speech sweeter than honey (Il. 1.247.9). The beauty of style exemplified in the speeches of Homer‘s heroes doubtless suggested to the early Greek statesmen the advantage of care- ful attention to the language and.manner of oratorical delivery. "From the time of Solon," writes Eschenburg, political eloquence was much.practiced at.Athens, and.by emulation of great Speakers was ere long advanced to high perfection. Rhetoric and oratory soon became objects of systematic study, and were indiSpensable in the education of suCh as wished to gain any public office, or any influence in the affairs of the state.12 The urgent demand for some method of teaching the craft of speech writing and the skill in.public speaking was soon met in the publica- l1R.C.Jebb, "Rhetoric" EnQYClopedia'Britannica, Ninth Edition, Vol. xx, p.509. 1%M332a1”9£_C1assical Literature, 9p, cit. ”As often.happens,” Fogarty observes, conscious theory seemed to follow unconscious art. Syracuse, one of the many who must have seen this social need, “worked out a theoretical way to prepare speeches in'What'was the first techne, or art of rhetoric. Corax of New, teChné was used synonymously with Ehenagp_of rhetoric; and logos came to be associated with techné in the same context. What we know about Corax (fl. 5th century B.C.) and the other compilers of the "art" comes from.Aristotle's accounts (c.330 B.C.) of its history in his own Texvns PnToanns ("Art" of Rhetoric).14 .Aristotle: On Science and Art .Almost a century before Aristotle's appearance in the history of Athens, Greek culture in general had already passed its zenith of excellence. The cultural development launched in the sixth century cul- minated in the great.Athenian.Age of Pericles in the fifth century. The degree to which the arts and crafts had proliferated and learning had advanced is reflected in the works left to posterity by the Greek writers and artist-craftsmen of that age. In Athens flourished the poets Sophocles and Euripides, the philosophers Anaxagoras and Socrates, the astronomer Mbton, the painter Polygnotus, the architect Ictinus, the sculptors Phidias and Polyclitus; and elsewhere, Herodotus, ”the father of history"; Hippocrates, ”the father of medicine"; and the philosopher Democritus, who with Leucippus, authored the first "atomic theory". This was the age in which the architectural techné of Ictinus erected the 13Daniel Fogarty, S.J., Roots fOr a New Rhetoric. (New York: Columbia university, 1959), p.10. 14Aristotle, The “Art" 9f Rhetoric, translation by John Henry Freese, (London: William Heinemann, 1926). NOte: all citations from.the Rhetorlc in this chapter are taken from the Freese translation. 36 Parthenon, and the sculptural Eeghpe_of Phidias created the Athena. But this was also the age in.which the "physical" phiIOSOphy of.Anaxagoras gave way to the "ethical" phiIOSOphy of Socrates. BefOre Socrates, philosophic speculation had been, in Tredennick's words, "almost entirely scientific and.materialistic." Beginning in the sixth century with Thales of Miletus, ”the father of philosophy", to the time of Democritus of Thrace, a string of “physicists” and "atomists" sought to find a rational explanation (logos)16 of the processes of nature. "But with the growth of rhetoric," observes Tredennick, ”men began to think in.more abstract terms."17 They found their best spokes- man in Plato, disciple of Socrates, who turned rational inquiry from cosmology to the fOundations of knowledge and the criticism of value. Thenceforth, scientific-materialistic speculation expired, not to be revived, as we shall see, until the seventeenth century. These conflicting world views were inherited by Aristotle when he appeared on the scene in the feurth century B.C. It was his endeavor to compromise the differences between these views and to systematize the existing philosophic and scientific knowledge.18 ijreover, he was l5Hugh Tredennick, in the Introduction to Aristotle'stetaphysics (London: William Heinemann, [1933] 1961), p.xx. Note: all citations from the.Metaphysics in this chapter are taken from the Tredennick translation. 16For Heraclitus (fl, 500 B.C.), one of the most important pre- socratic philosophers (he wrote Qp_Nature), the term.Aoyog means, accord- ing to Tredennick: "explanation to account systematically for the variation in the perceptible world"; in the "Introduction" to Aristotle's .Metaphysics,.gp. cit., p.xi. 1399. cit. l8See George Sarton, A Histo 9f Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard university Press, 1952), p.496; also J0hn.A. Symonds, Studies of the Greek Poets. (London: .A. and C. Black, 1920), p.19. '__ 37 particularly concerned with ”working toward a more precise terminology."19 By the fourth century B.C. the Greek language had undergone considerable change, so muCh so that ”muCh of Hemer was as unintelligible to an .Athenian," says Rutherford, "as Chaucer is to an ordinary Englishman of the present century."20 Net only had words changed in form.and.meaning, but several terms were used to convey the same or similar meanings. Among the ambiguous terms, logos had acquired the connotations of (1) that WhiCh is said or spoken, and (2) the power of mind Which manifests itself in . . . .21 speech, or as one lex1cographer puts 1t, logos came to mean. (A) the word or outward form by which the inward thought is expressed; and (B) the inward thought itself; so that the A0705 comprehends the ratio [reason] and oratio [discourse]. At the same time several terms other than techne came to signify "skill", among them, oooto (sophia)22 and ansTnun (epistémé),23 two important 19Martin Ostwald, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (New York: The BObbs and Merrill Co., 1962), p.312. NOte: all citations from the Ethics in this Chapter are taken from Ostwald's translation. 20W. Gunion Rutherford, The New Phrypichus (Hildesheim: George Olms 'Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1881), p.1. 21Lidell and Scott's Lexicon, 9p, gig, 22Homer used the term in the Iliad to mean ”skill in handicraft" (15. 412); Ostwald notes that "in.popular usage, so hia first appears in Greek to describe the skill of a clever craftsman, and also of poets and artists, a concept which was then extended to other fields of endeavor, e. g. , to the itinerant teachers of rhetoric...and finally to the *wisdom' of the scientist and phiIOSOpher." 19p, gi£,, in a fbotnote on pp.155-156. ZSHomer used the term in several forms, e. g. anonTo "manifold Skill in handiwor ” (I1. 23.705), and entorouchL "skilled in fighting" (0d. 4. 49). The term conveys, in addition to mere skill, the idea of intellectual understanding or knowledge of some particular activity, e.g., anoraLTo "man.who hath understanding" (11. 14.92), and cutorooeot ”knowl- edge of handiwork (Od. 2.117). 38 concepts in Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle reserved the term.§gphia to signify the highest intellectual excellence of whiCh the human.mind is capable, namely, ”theoretical wisdom;” and to episteme, (the key to the present terminological problem) he assigned the specific meaning of ”scientific knowledge". Aristotle's Definition of Scientific Knowledge: .All of the Greek terms relevant to the present discussion are embodied in.Aristotle's per genus e§_differentiam definition of episteme. (See Figure l). A.syn0psis of the definition should help to show their interrelationships, and will provide a useful frame of reference for the reaminder of the discussion. Under the genus episteme (scientific knowledge), Aristotle recog- nizes three general divisions: theoretiké (theoretical or pure, science), praktiké (practical science) and.poietiké (productive science). The differentia theérétike subsumes three specific branches of science: meta- physics, physics, and mathematics; praktike includes ethics and politics; poiétiké subsumes rhetoric and poetics. These branches of science, according to Aristotle, encompass all human knowledge which, governed by logos (reason, the rational principle), constitute the bases for all rational human activity. Theoretical activity is characterized by thedria (contemplation) and sophia (theoretical wisdom); its end is intellectual excellence, i.e., knowledge as an end in itself. Practical activity is characterized by praxis (moral action) and phronésis (practical wisdom); its end is moral excellence. Productive activity is Characterized by poiésis (production; literally, ”making") and.§eghp§_(flwisdom” in the arts); its end is excel— lence in artistic accomplishment. 39 Theérétiké IIIII“‘-11\\\\\‘\\\‘\N\~PhYSiCS (Theoretical Science) Characterized by: Mathemat1cs - theOria (study and contemplation) sophia (theoretical wisdom) - things learned intellectual excellence, its end man as contemplator of nature Ethics Episteme (Scientific Knowledge) Praktike (PractiCal Science) . . Polltlcs Characterized by: -~ raxis (action) FronESis (practical wisdom) - ghings done moral excellence, its end man as moral agent I Rhetoric W (Productive Science) . Poetlcs Characterized by: - poiésis (production) teChné (”wisdom" in teChnics) - things brought into being - excellence in technics, its end - man as producer Figure l. Aristotle's per genus e£_differentiam.Definition of Epistemé. (This writer's schematic interpretation.) 40 The foregoing adumbrated definition of scienCe brings into perspec~ tive several conceptual relationships which are central to the problem under discussion. These relationships are of particular note in view of the general acceptance of Aristotelianism as £he_unquestionable foundation of philoSOphic and scientific thought and its subsequent authoritative influence in virtually every realm.of human activity fer more than two thousand years.24 Coetaneously with the prevailing Aristotelian world ‘view, Greek terminology remained fundamentally unchanged. ”A very large part of our technical vocabulary, both in science and in philosophy,” iMorrow observes, "is but the translation into modern tongues of the terms used by Aristotle."25 .Aristotle's Conception of Theoretical Science: It may be argued that Aristotle had no intention of assigning to "productive science" a special place in his classification of sciences;26 on this point he him: self is not consistently clear. In any event, what is more important to the present study is the fact that he draws a clear line between "pure” science and the other realms of scientific inquiry--between theoretiké on the one hand, praktiké and.poietiké on the other, i.e., between ”knowing," "doing,” and ”making." Theoretical science centers on Objects which exist of necessity, the "eternal”, as Aristotle labels them; "for everything that exists of necessity in an unqualified sense is eternal,” . 24George Sarton,.ALHisto§y 9f_Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Unlversity Press, 1952), p.496. _ 25Glenn R, Morrow, "Aristotelianism,” in Dagobert D. Runes, Dic- EPELICZ 9_f_ Philosorahy (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. , 1960TI—p.23. . 26See for example,.A.E.Taylor, Aristotle (New York: Dover Publica- tlons, Inc., 1955), pp.19-20. g 41 he says, ”and what is eternal is ungenerated and imperishable and hence cannot be otherwise;"27 e.g., that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles. The practical and productive sciences, on the other hand, attend to "things whiCh admit of being other than they are," namely ”things made and things done."28 In this respect, pga§i§_(action) and poiesis (production), though categorially consonant, are characteristic- ally different forms of rational activity: pyayi§_identifies with "what man does", e.g., good deeds, ndble and just acts; whereas poiésis identi- fies with ”what man brings into being," e.g., the production of good health, of fine paintings, of useful objects. Of these forms of activity, Aristotle considers pgayig worthier of higher esteem; ”for production has an end other than itself, but action does not: good action is itself an end."29 In like manner, he judges theoria (contemplation) to be intrin- sically superior to both.p:a§i§_and‘poiesis; for "among the sciences," says Aristotle, ”we consider that that science which is desirable ig itself and for the sake gf_knowledge is more nearly Wisdom [Sophia] than that which is desirable for its results.”30 It is here that the modern dualisms of theory and practice, abstract knowledge and sensual eXperi- ence, ”pure” science and "applied" science, have their origin. Agistotle's Conception of.Art: Aside from clarifying the relation- ship of techne and logos to episteme,.Aristotle's classificatory scheme shows techne and.praxis to be categorially different concepts: praxis, a 27NicomacheanEthics, 9p3‘Ei33, p.150. 28Ibid. , p.151. 291bid. , p.153. 3OAristotle'sMetaphysics, op. cit., p.11. (Italics added) 42 characteristic of practical science, is a human activity; whereas techne, a Characteristic of productive science, is a human attribute, a kind of ‘wisdom.or disciplined faculty. "we attribute 'wisdom' in the arts," says Aristotle, to the most precise and perfect masters of their skills; we attribute it to Phidias as a sculptor in.marble and to Polyclitus as a sculptor in bronze. In this sense we signify by ”wisdom' nothing but excellence of art or craftsmanship. The distinction.between techne and.pgaxi§_is stressed at this junc- ture because these terms, like their respective derivatives--e.g., 'tech- nical' and 'technological', 'practical' and 'praxiological'--are, in current usage, commonly associated with, and often restricted to, the so- called "useful” or industrial arts. In the first place, Aristotle's conception of Eeghp§_does not differentiate between the production of "useful arts" and the production of "fine arts". ”All art," he says, is concerned with the realm.of coming-to-be, i.e, with contriving and studying how something which is capable both of being and of not being may come into existence, a thing whose starting point is in the producer and not in the thing produced. Mbreover, since techné is a kind of wisdom, it follows that neither that which is produced nor its actual production constitute art; they are but outward manifestations of techné. Nbr does it necessarily follow that every instance of excellent production reflects wisdom in the arts; for it is possible to attain excellence unconsciously, either by Chance or by knack acquired through experience. A.particular instance of producing something is a matter of experience; ”art is produced.when from many 31NicomaChean Ethics, op. cit., p.155. 32Ibid., p.152. 43 notions of experience a single universal judgment is formed with regard to like objects."33 In short, experience is knowledge of particulars, whereas art is knowledge of universals, i.e. , knowledge of the causes of excellent production. Hence it is not because of their greater success in producing things that we judge the master craftsmen as being superior in wisdom, says Aristotle, "but because they possess a theory and know the causes."34 The Origin of Technologia The foregoing conception of art is exemplified in The "Art” 9g Rhetoric, which enters upon the subject with Aristotle's observation that,35 all men in a manner have a share of both [rhetoric and dialectic]; for all, up to a certain.point, endeavour to criticize or uphold an argument, to defend themselves or to accuse. New, the majority of people do this either at random or with a familiarity arising from.habit. But since both these ways are possible, it is clear that matters can.pe_reduced.£9_a;system, for it is possible to examineIthe reason [lo 05] why some attain.their end.by familiarity and others by chance; and such an examination all would at once admit to be the function of an art [teChné]... In other words, to succeed in upholding a particular rhetorical argument by chance or habit is a.matter of experience; but to inquire into, and come to know, the underlying causes and guiding principles of sound per— suasive argument is a matter of art. The function of the "art" is not to persuade, says Aristotle, but ”to find.the existing means of persuasion.”36 3SAristotle's Metaphysics, op. cit., p.5. 34lbid. , p.7. 35Aristotle's Rhetoric, op. cit., p.3. 361bid. , p.13. 44 It is in this context that technologia--the parasynthetic derivative of techne and logos-~has its origin. Technologia and the verbal Arts: When.Aristotle coined the term technologia (c.330 B.C.) its meaning was unequivocal, viz., ”the system- atic treatment of rhetoric."37 Despite his assertion that the rational principle of reducing rhetoric to a system "holds good in respect to all other arts"38 (and is in fact applied in Aristotle's Poetics), technolo- gia is met with in no work other than The "A__l_“_t_:_" ef_ Rhetoric. Nor does the term appear to have been used by any other ancient writer until the first century B.C. at Which time it still conveyed the unambiguous Aristotelian meaning. We find it used in that sense, for example, in the VOlumina Rhetorica, compiled around 60 B.C. by Philodemus, the Greek 39 Epicurean.philosopher. About the same time, attention was gradually shifting from rhetoric to the art of grammar. This is not to say that grammar had not thereto- fore been a subject of study among the Greeks; on the contrary, Plato had already assigned it a prominent place among the "liberal arts" in.his Republic. Net until the first century B.C., however, had the art of 37The term.appears in the Rhetoric several times with various case endings (1. 1,9; 1. 1,10; 1.1,11; I.2,4; I.2,5). Lexicographers and scholars of the classics generally agree with Freese' s etymological definition of the term; see for example, Liddell and Scott's Greek— —EngliSh Lexicon,o ep_. cit. 38Aristotle's Rhetoric, 9p, cit. 39Phi1odemi , Volumina Rhetorica, Edited by Siegfried Sudhaus (Lipsiae: B.G.Teubneri, 1892) (1.1283) p.128. The passage in WhiCh the term appears was translated for the writer by Dr. Charles A.. Messner, Professor Emeritus of Foreign Language, State UniverSity College at Buffalo, New York. 45 grammar been subjected to systematic treatment. Perhaps the earliest evidence of it is the Tcxvn Ppauuattnn, compiled around 60 B.C. by the .Alexandrian grammarian, Dionysius Thrax.40 Following the Roman conquest of Greece, Roman sCholars had taken a more serious interest in Greek literature, necessitating a working knowledge of both languages; the study of grammar was an indispensable prerequisite. .At that juncture in its history, technologia acquired a new connotation, to wit, "the systematic treatment of grammar." PlutarCh, the Greek historian, uses the term in 41 and the Alexandrian grammarian, Appolonius 42 this sense in.his Moralia; Discolus, uses it in the same sense in De_Coniunctione. In addition to its etymological association with the arts of rhe- toric and grammar, technologia gradually acquired other connotations: the neo-Pythagorian philosopher, NicomaChus of Gerasa (lst century.A.D.), uses the term with reference to the "systematic treatment ofmathematicsf'43 the philosophical skeptic, Sextus Empiricus (f1. 200-250), uses it with reference to the "systematic treatment of definitions;"44 the Athenian 40E..A.S0phocles, Greek Lexicon e£_the Roman and.Byzantine Periods (New York: Frederick Ungar PUblishing Co., 1957), p.5. Also in EsChen- burg, Manual e£_Classica1 Literature, 9p, ei§,, par. 135, p.497. 41Plutarch,.MZoralia,‘V'ol.‘VI, Translated.by'W.C.Helmbold (London: ‘William.Heinemann Ltd., 1962) (514) pp.460-46l. 4ZAppollonii Dyscoli, De Conjunctione, Liber XVI, in Grammatici Graeci, Pars. II, Vol. III, Edited by RiChardus SChneider and Gustauus Uhlig (Lip51ae: B.C.Teubneri, 1910). In the Preface, p. v, reference is made to ”Apollonii Dyscoli Techne Grammatiké?’ln.the Index, p.271, reference is made to Technologia Grammatike. 43NicomaChus, ”Introduction to Arithmetic," Translated.by Martin Luther D'Ooge, et al, in Great Books e£_the WesteranOrld,'Vol. 11, Edited by Mertimer Adler (Chicago: er Benton, PUb., 1952) (1.5,3) p.813. 44Sextus Empiricus, Outlines ei-Pyrrhonism,'Vol. 1, Translated by R.G.Bury (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961) (11.205) pp.284-285. 46 philosopher and rhetorician, Longinus (c. 213-273), uses it with reference to his "systematic treatise” on sublimity.45 With the exception of Cicero's Letters £9 Atticus (c. 60 B.C.),46 and Iamblichus"De_Vita Pythaggrica (c. 3OOA.D.),47 wherein technologia conveys the transliteral connotation (sic) "artificial discussion", the term appears to have re- tained the essence of its original etymological meaning, to wit, "system- atic treatment of..." Technologia and the Manual Arts:48 wahere in the ancient Greek and Roman literature does the term.technologia appear to have been asso- ciated with the manual or mechanical arts. Nbr does there appear to be any evidence that the ancient writers addressed themselves to the task of systematizing suCh arts. "we must not imagine," observes EsChenberg, the first notions concerning the arts to have constituted any thing like a system reduced to a regular form.and fixed.princip1es. With regard to the theory, there were at first only disconnected obser- vations and isolated.maxims, the imperfect results of limited ex- perience. As to the practice, there was little but a meChanical routine, some process marked out by chance or imperious necessity.49 45Longinus, Qp_the Sublime, Translatedey A.O.Prickard (London: Oxford university Press, 1906)’(I.l,7) p.l. 46Cicero, Letters to.Atticus, Translated by E.D.Winstedt‘(London: wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1912)'[IV}16,3) pp.314-315. 471amblichi,_DeVita gythagorica, Edited.by Augustus NauCk (Amster- dam: Adolf M; Hakkert, 1965 XXX.182 p.132; the English translation appears in.1amblichus' Life e§_Pythagoras, Translated by Thomas Taylor (London: Jehn M. watkins, 1818) p.96. 48Henceforth the terms "arts" and "crafts", and the terms "manual" and ”mechanical", will be used interChangeably according to their usage by the authors cited, many of whom do not make a distinction between them. Generally speaking, lexicographers give the terms "art", "craft", and ”skill" as English equivalents of the Greek teChne. No attempt will be made in the present Chapter to clarify their distinctive connotations. 49Manuale£Classical Literature, 9p, ei£,, p.308. 47 The Greek philosophers embraced the Aristotelian.predilection for the abstract, verbal arts. Considering the circumstances, their position, though in a way unfortunate, was quite understandable. Aristotle's breadth of knowledge in virtually all of the then acknowledged realms of philosophic and scientific inquiry, as evidenced in his imposing literary treatises, coupled with his seemingly incontrovertible syllogistic logic, established him.as £§e_philosopher among philOSOphers whom none would dare queStion. Even though he holds that all arts are'in principle amen- able to systematic treatment, he asserts that all of the arts pertaining to the necessities of life had already been invented and "fully developed."50 ijreover, "art and science and the other kindred.mental activities" are to be pursued "for the sake e£_know1edge, and not fer any practical uti- ligy;”51 Is it any wonder then that the manual and meChanical arts had not become objects of systematic treatment? Those among the aristocratic class who had the intellectual ability, the literary skill, and the leisure to pursue contemplative study f0cused on the abstract, verbal arts. The working class, on the other hand, those who provided the necessities of life—-the smith, the potter, the joiner, the builder-ewere for the most part slaves and.alien craftsmen, skilled in their narrow pursuits but un- tutored in theoretical knowledge. Denied the rights of the citizen class, slaves and aliens were excluded from.the privilege of ”liberal" education. The privileged class, on the other hand, pursued a "universal curriculum” in.which there was no place for the manual or mechanical subjects. As Taylor sums up the Aristotelian bias in education, 5OAristotle'sMetephysics, 9p, cit., p.9. S¥£Ri§:: 9, 13. (Italics added to emphasize the fact that for Aristotle, art, like science, was an intellectual pursuit.) 48 care must be taken that only those ”usefu1” studies (e.g., reading, and writing) which are also "liberal" should be taught; ”illiberal” or ”mechanical" subjects must not have any place in the curriculum. A."liberal" education.means, as the name shows, one which will tend to make its recipient a "free man", and not a slave in body and soul. The mechanical crafts were felt by Aristotle to be illiberal because they leave a man no leisure to make the best of body and mind; practice of them sets a stamp on the body and narrows the ‘mdnd's outlook. In principle, then, no study should fbrm a subject of the universal curriculum if its only value is that it prepares a.man for a.profession followed as a.means of making a living.5 Conditions in the expanding Roman Empire appear to have been more conducive to the proliferation of mechanical arts but were no more appre— ciative than they were in.Greece. There too an unbridgeable gap existed between the theoretical and practical realms of human activity with the latter assuming controlling influence. The relationship between these divergent realms, however, was curiously paradoxical: although the Romans surpassed the Greeks in practical pursuits--e.g., the building of bridges, military roads, war engines, ships, and aquaducts, all of which ‘were vital to the security and maintenance of the Empire--they exhibited a certain contempt fer theoreticalsciences which were supposed to possess the essential characteristics of things mechanical. The "practical Ro- .mans," writes Libby, eminent in war, in polite literature, and civil policy, showed at all times a remarkable indisposition to the pursuit of mathematical and physical science. Geometry and astronomy, so highly esteemed by the Greeks, were not merely disregarded by the Romans, but even considered beneath the attention of a.man of good birth and liberal education; they were imagined to partake of a.meChanical and therefore servile character. The tenuous relationship between theory and.practice inherited from the Greeks prevailed in Roman thought; the theorist and the practical man 52Tay1or, Aristotle, 92. 9:39., p.107. 53Walter Libby, ApLIntroduction.§e_the History e§_Science (Boston: HOughton Mifflin Company, 1917), p.41. ._._.__ -—-.__ 49 remained worlds apart. This dichotomous notion was bequeathed in turn to the medieval European civilizations which embraced and fostered the Aristotelian precepts and predispositions.54 Technolegia in the Latin Literature: As early as the second cen- tury A.D. the Greek language "had deviated perceptibly from the ancient standard," SOphocles observes: Old words and expressions had disappeared, and new ones succeeded them. In addition to this, new meanings were put upon old words. The syntax, moreover, was undergoing some changes. Further, Latin- isms and other foreign idioms were continually creeping into the language of common life. The purists of the day made an effort to check the tendency, but they were steadily opposed by usage...The grammarians...took it upon themselves to annihilate every word and phrase that had not the good fortune to be under the special protection of a Thucydides or a Plato. 5 With the passing of Greek as the dominant language in the literary field technologia seems to have vanished from the literature. Soon after the fall of Rome in the fifth century, Latin suffered a similar fate having been "most miserably torn in pieces by the Goths and other Barbarians" who invaded the Empire.56 During the greater part of the medieval period that followed, learning in general had fallen to a very low ebb. Aside from the doctores scholastici who taught the liberal arts in the Cloister and cathedral schools, a good secular scholar was a rare phenomenon until the close of the eleventh century.57 Throughout the period, popularly referred to as the Dark Ages, such Latin works as may 54Bertrand Russell, A.Histo§y_ of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p.234. SSSophocles, Greek Lexicon, 9p, cit., p.6. S6John Twells, Grammatica Reformata, or A General EXamination of the Art of Grammar (London: Robert Clavell, 1683), pp. 11 12. 57%. 933,1).10. 50 have made reference to technologia are very rare or nonexistent. The situation in the literary field Changed considerably around the twelfth century. Exposure of the European culture to that of the Middle East during the first Crusades Sparked a revival of interest in the Greek scientific and philosophic literature. The ancient classics pre- served for centuries by.Arabic Scholars began to appear in Latin transla- tions. With their recovery there followed a corresponding interest in the verbal arts, particularly the art of grammar; and coincident with it the term technologia again came into prominent use in that context.58 .According to DuCange's Latin Glossarium of medieval literature (1688) the Latin.technikoi and its Greek equivalent technologoi came to be used "59 synonymously with ”grammarian, or Doctores of the art of grammar. DuCange notes that the term technologia appears "repeatedly" in treatises on grammar and elsewhere; he cites, fer example, the works of Eustathius, a twelfth century Byzantine teacher of rhetoric and grammar, and the Tech- 60 nologia'9£_Grammar, compiled by Lecapeni in the fourteenth century. It is not surprising that technologia should reappear restrictively 58gp_. c__i__t. , 59Carolo DuCange, "TEXNIKOI", Glossarium.Ad Scriptures Mediae 8 Infimae Graecitates (Graz: Akademische Druck, 'V. 'Verlagsanstalt, 1958; printed in—facnmile from the 1688 edition). Excerpts from the Latin passage appear as follows: "TEXNIKOI, 8 TexvoAYOL, Grammatici, seu Grammatica Artis Doctores, ur est apud Eustathium, Iliad, a.. pag. 14.22 8 alibi passim.: apud Allatium in Syntagm, de Georgiis pag. 320, 8 ex quo Phavorinus Gamers pleraque in sua cornocopia collegit. Laudatur in eodem syntagmata pag. 362, Georgii Lecapeni TexvvoyLa neon Ppouuottnng. (Interpreted for this writer by Fr. J. Olszewski, SCA of Buffalo, New York.) 60Georgii Lecapeni, sometimes called Georgius Lecapenus "lived about the.mnddle of the fourteenth century, and wrote on grammar and rhetoric;" in.William,Smith, Dictionarygof Greek 8 Roman Biography and mythology, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1867), vo1.II, Art. 30, p. 252. 51 in the context of the verbal arts. .At the same time it seems inconceiv- able that the status of the natural sciences and the kindred crafts should not have made any appreciable progress during the Middle.Ages, and that medieval scholars should have totally ignored these realms of human activity. ‘Yet if one takes into consideration the medieval world View in.its temporal context—~the social and.political instability of western Eur0pe following the barbaric invasion of the Roman Empire; the ensuing establishment of feudalism with its inherent class structure and its economic isolation; the concurrent spread of Christianity as an influen- tial‘worldawide social and political ferce holding power over the minds of me --the prevailing attitude among medieval sCholars is understandable. .A detailed account of the manifbld implications of the medieval attitude toward.practical concerns goes far beyond the limitations of the present discussion. Suffice it to say that neither feudalism.nor the Christian.mpvement fUrnished the desirable conditions for the advancement of natural science and.practical activities. Under feudalism.trade and industry were controlled for the most part by craft guilds which regula- ted prices, wages, work hours, standards of quality, and other economic factors. "The minute supervision of work and the innumerable regulations," Ferguson notes, "tended to check individual enterprise and to retard invention or progress of any kind.”61 Christianity, on the other hand, supported by the traditional philosophic systems of Plato and Aristotle, fixed medieval thought on a supernatural course. .Divine revelation coupled with reason fUInished the means to "real" knowledge the end of 61WallaceD. Ferguson.and Geoffrey Bruun, ALSurVe 9§_European Civilization (Boston: HeughtoniMifflin.Company, 1969 , p.239. 52 which was to come to ”know" God and to have faith in His omnipotence. There was no place in intellectual pursuits for the secular sciences and the practical crafts. ”It was natural," writes Guthrie, that religion, which played a.paramount role in the culture of the middle ages, should bring influence to bear on the medieval, rational view of life. Revelation was held to be at once a norm and an aid to reason. Since the philosophers of the period were primarily scientific theologians, their rational interests were dominated by religious preoccupations. Hence, while in general they preserved the fermal distinctions between reason and faith, and maintained the relatively autonomous character of philosophy, the choiceo féprOblems and the resources of science were controlled _Jg# theolo The prevailing medieval attitude toward the purely intellectual, as opposed to the mundane practical, concerns "profoundly influenced men's subsequent thinking and their ideas about education,” says Dewey: .Medieval philosophy continued and reenforced the ancient Greek tradition. To know reality meant to be in relation to the supreme reality, or God, and to enjoy the eternal bliss of that relation. Contemplation of SUpreme reality was the ultimate end of man.to which action is subordinate. Experience had to do with mundane, profane, and secular affairs, practically necessary indeed, but of little import in comparison with supernatural objects of know- ledge. When we add to this motive the force derived from the literary Character of the Roman.education and the Greek philOSOphic tradition, and conjoin to them the preference for studies whiCh. obviously demarcated the aristocratic class from the lower classes, we can.readi1y understand the tremendous power exercised by the persistent preference of the 'intellectual' over the 'practical' not simply in educational philosophy but in the higher schools.63 Moreover, when one bears in.mind the economic conditions in the feudal states ”where such practical activities as could be successfully carried on.were mostly of a routine and external sort and even servile in nature, one is not surprised," Dewey adds, "that educators turned their baCk 62Hunter Guthrie, ”Scholasticism“ (in DagObert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, New York: Philosophical Library, 1960), p.280. 63John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New'York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), pp. 310- 311. 53 upon them as unfitted to cultivate intelligence.”64 Natural Science and Naturalistic Technology Cultural progress during the centuries that fellowed the close of the Middle.Ages-—the Renaissance in the fburteenth century, the invention of printing and the development of oceanic navigation in the fifteenth century, the rebirth of the scientific spirit in the sixteenth century, the establishment of academies of science in.the seventeenth century, the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth cent --brought corresponding changes in the sciences and arts, in language and in terminology. New knowledge required.new words, or "secondhan " ones, with new or extended meanings. The term.'technology' yielded to the latter; arts other than rhetoric and grammar begged systematic treatment, and 'technology' gradually acquired various connotations associated with objects of a manual or mechanical nature—-the medical, the military, the agricultural, the industrial arts. When the term first appeared in the English literature it conveyed the.meaning of "a discourse or treatise” On some teChnical subject, or the "technical nomenclature” of a particular art or science. In 1615, for example, George Buck uses 'technologie' (perhaps the earliest writer known to have used the.Ang1icized derivative of technologia) with refer- ence to his "Treatise of the foundations of all the colleges, ancient sChooles of priviledge, and of houses of learning, and liberall arts” at the University of London, which systematically catalogues and describes 64Ibid. , p.321. 54 "all the arts and sciences" (among them the arts of rhetoric and grammarO taught there at the time.65 Several years later (1628) Thomas Venner used the term 'technology"with reference to.a discourse on the tech- niques of bathing;66 and in 1658, Thomas Browne used the term.to denote the technical nomenclature in the mystical "science" of cabalism.67 It should perhaps be noted that as late as 1683, at least one scholar still adhered to the ancient concept of technology. ln.his _"ufi" to refer to grammatical "essays"; and.he may well have been one of the last grammarians to have restricted its meaning to the verbal arts. But what is curious about his restricted usage is the fact that he seems to have been well aware of the trend in the manual arts and of the terms generally associated with "modern" science. He writes, for example: What could impede these two last Ages, Ages of Projects and Ex— periments, from exploding the old Hypothesis, and founding a New Grammar on truer Principles; For 'tis very Obvious, that since Printing and Navigation have given a general Converse650 Mankind; all Arts and Sciences have been exceedingly improved. Modern science had, in fact, already taken root more than a half- century earlier, and with it a new concept of art had begun to find 653hmd finally, the better to attayne to anie of these arts, sciences, and faculties, and to retaine their principles, and rules, in minde and remembrance," Buck writes, "I must not omit that the Art of Memorie is taught within this Universitie...which.may also serve for an apt close of this general Technologie" Sir George Buck, "The Third Universitie of England," in John Stow, The Annales (London: Thomas Adams, 1615) pp.957 (in.the text) and 988 (in the footnote). 66Thomas‘Venner, ”The Baths of Bath" (1628), in The Harleian Miscellany, Vol. IV (London: R. Button, 1809) p.116. 67Sir Thomas Browne, "Garden of Cyrus" (1658), in Simon Wilkin, The werks of Thomas Browne, Vol. 11 (London: H.G.Bohn, 1852) p.558. 68JohnTwells, Grammatica Reformata, _p, 913,, p.17. 691bid., pp.20—21. {ul‘l’l‘ll r?|\/I|||| 55 expression in the literary field. The period marks the transition from the traditional.Aristotelian concept of the world to the new dynamic Baconian concept; from the abstract supernatural world view to a concrete natural one. Natural Science: With the Renaissance and the Reformation man's thought and action turned from the mysteries of supernature over which he had no control, to the facts of nature and his potential power over the ferces of nature. “Mechanics became the new religion," to quote Mumford, "and it gave to the world a new Messiah: themac'hine."70 The hundred year period from 1550 to 1650 which produced the telescope and the com- pound.mdcroscope, the barometer and the thermometer, witnessed the inventions of the calculating.machine, the knitting maChine, the screw cutting machine, and the iron rolling machine, and spanned the productive years of Napier, Gilbert, Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, and Francis Bacon. They all played a major role in founding the new scientific movement; but Bacon deserves the distinction of having "had the most direct apprehension of the full extent of the intellectual revolution which was in progress." Unlike the Aristotelian concept of science based on 2;221221.Prin' ciples and deductive syllogistic logic, Bacon's concept centered on the observable facts of nature and "genuine induction". ”The syllogism," Bacon‘writes, consists of propositions, propositions of words; words are the signs of notions. If, therefore, the notions (whiCh form the basis of the whole) be confused and careleSSly abstracted from 7OLewisiMumf0rd, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt,. Brace and WOrld, 1962), p.45. 71Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern world (New York: The New American Library, 1964), pp.44-45. 56 things, there is no solidity in the superstructure. Our only hOpe is a genuine induction. In the new science (sometimes referred to as natural philosophy, or the philosophy of nature) direct observation.SUperseded Speculation as the means, and utility supplanted contemplation as the ultimate end, of scientific inquiry. .Mbreover, the proper goal of scientific knowledge was consummated in its usefulness in practice; for "it is safer to begin and raise the sciences from those foundations Which have relation to practice," Bacon insists, "and to let the active part itself be as the seal which prints and determines the contemplative part."73 These views, which are embodied in the famed "New Organon, or True Directions Con- cerning the Interpretation of Nature” (1620), along with Bacon's proposal for a "Natural and Experimental History for the Foundations of Philosophy" (1622),74 catalyzed the new science and the manual arts, and layed the fOundation for "naturalistic technology". Naturalistic Technology: .Although the term 'technology' does not appear in any of Bacon's published works, his outline for a.natural history, particularly the history of "meChanical and illiberal arts," contains the genminal ideas whiCh fOund literary expression in subsequent treatises so named-~agricultural technology, industrial technology, and the like. An excerpt from Bacon's "preparative Towards a Natural and 72Francis Bacon, "The Great Instauration," Part I,.Aphorism.XIV in Advancement 9f_Learnin and NOVum Organum, Revised and Edited by Timothy Dwight, et al lNew York: The Colonial Press, 1899), p.316. 73Francis Bacon, "The Great Instauration," Part II, Aphorism.FV, in Essa s, Advancement of Learning, New Atlantis and Other Pieces, Edited By Richard P. Jones (New York: The OdysseyKPreSS, 1937i, p.333. 74In "The Great Instauration," ibid. 57 Experimental History” should suffice at this juncture to convey his thoughts on the subject: History of Arts and of Nature as changed and altered by Man, or Experimental History, I divide into three. For it is drawn either from mechanical arts, or from the operative part of the liberal arts, or from a number of crafts and experiments which have not yet grown into an art properly so called, and'Which some- times indeed turn up in the course of most ordinary experience, and do not stand at all in need of art... .Among the parts of history which I have mentioned, the history of Arts is of most use, because it exhibits things in motion, and leads more directly to practice. ‘Mbreover it takes off the mask and veil from natural objects, whidh are commonly concealed and obscured under the variety of shapes and external appearance. Finally, the vexations of art are certainly as the bonds and handcuffs of Proteus, which betray the ultimate struggles and efforts of matter. For bodies will not be destroyed or annihilated; rather than that they will turn themselves into various forms. Upon this history therefore, mechanical and illiberal as it may seem, (all fineness and daintiness set aside) the greatest diligence must be bestowed. Again, among the particular arts those are to be preferred ‘which eXhibit, alter, and prepare natural bodies and materials of things, such as agriculture, cookery, chemistry, dyeing, the manu- facture of glass, enamel, sugar, gunpowder, artificial fires, paper, and the like. Those which consist principally in the subtle motion of the hands or instruments are of less use, such as weaving, carpentry, arChitecture, manufacture of mills, clocks, and the like; although these too are by no means to be neglected, both because many things occur in them which relate to the altera- tions of natural bodies, and because they give accurate information concerning local motion, which is a thing of great importance in very many respects. But in the whale collection of this history of Arts, it is especially to be observed and constantly borne in mind that not only those experiments in each art whiCh serve the purpose of the art itself are to be received, but likewise those which turn up anyhow by the way...For though this be an object which in.many. cases I do not despise, yet my meaning plainly is that all mechani- cal experiments should be as streams flowing from all sides into the sea of philosophy.75 Bacon's blueprint for a "History of.Arts” aroused immediate interest in the utilitarian value of scientific knowledge--at first through private correspondence between the elite and the erudite adherents to the Baconian ‘r—firw fl 75Ibid., pp.355-357. 58 concept, and subsequently through the publication of collected scholarly papers, scientific gazettes and journals which reached a wider audience.76 But it took more than a century of literary activity before anything that even approached Bacon's idea of a comprehensive history had been publish- ed; and not until then did the derivatives of the Greek technologia come to be associated with the mechanical arts. Begkmann's Conception of Technologie: The earliest reference to the term technologie in the context of the mechanical arts is found in the literary works of Johann Beckmann, professor of philosophy and economics at Gottigen University (1770-1881): viz., his Beitrage Egg Okonomie, Technologie, Polizei gpd_Kameral-wissenschaft (1777—1791), and Entwurf Elna: allgemeinen Technologie (1806).77 Neither of these treatises had ever been translated into English; however, the latter is generally referred to as an ”Introduction to Technology”.78 Beckmann is best known among English and American historians through his Beitrage zur_Geschichte der_Erfindungen (1786-1805), two volumes of which were translated from the German in 1797 by William Johnson under the title: A_Histo§y 9f_Inventions apd_Discoveries.79 This classic work, which ran into several editions (the fourth in 1846), traces the history, and describes the existing conditions, of the various sciences and arts and Kegan Paul, 1965), ppT‘z‘a-Zb‘." "" ’— 77Librarngf Congress Catalogue, Vbl. 11, p.440. 78Lit., An Outline of General Technology. 79The fourth edition carries the title: A HistOry‘ofyInventiOns, Discoveries and Origins, revised by William Francis and J.W1Griffith (London: Henry~G. Bohn, 1846). 59 employed in trade and domestic use. It treats in a quasi cyclopedic fashion a wide range of subjects--from alum.to zinc, clocks to sawemills; various machines, instruments, utensils, plants, fbods and processes-- that fill five volumes. The Contents of the first volume of the English edition will give the reader a synopsis of the extent of Beckmann's work: Italian Book-keeping Sawemills Odometer Stamped Paper MaChine for noting down Music Insurance Refining Gold 6 Silver Ore Adulteration of Wine by Quicksilver Artificial Pearls Cold or Dry Gilding Paving of Streets Gold varnish Collections of Natural Curiosities TUIips Chimneys Canary Bird .HUmgary water Archil Cork Magnetic Cures Apothecaries Secret Poison Clocks and watches WOoden Bellows Quarantine Coaches Paper-hangings water-clocks, Clepsydras Kermes. Cochineal Tourmaline writing-pens Speaking-trumpet Wire-drawing Ananas.--Pine-apple Buckewheat Sympathetic Ink Saddles Diving-bell Stirrups Coloured Glass.--Artificial Gems Herse-shoes Sealingewax Floating of WOod Cornrmills Lace 'Vedigris, or Spanish Green Ultramarine Saffron Cobalt, Zaffer, Smalt .Alum TUrkeys Falconry Butter Turf Aurum Fulminans Artichoke Garden-flowers Beckmann's History, according to one authoritative source, entitles him ”to be regarded as the feunder of scientific technology, a term which he was the first to use in 1772"80 in connection with his lectures on agriculture, economics, mineralogy, manufacture, and related subjects. 8O"Beckmann, Johann,” Encyclopedia Britanica, V01. III, Eleventh edition (1911) p.610. ‘ —i— 60 Other sources concur in the assertion.81 jMOre importantly, Johnston notes that Beckmann (l) "united an extensive knowledge of nature, with a decided turn for applying it to practical purposes;” and (2) it was his especial endeavor to bring all that is practical in human knowledge under "systematic rules, based upon fundamental principles."82 These observa- tions bespeak Beckmann's concurrence with Bacon's attitude toward the practical and utilitarian value of scientific knowledge; moreover, they support the contention that his use of the term technologie is essentially in accord with the ancient Greek concept of technologia. Bigelow's Conception of TeChnology: In 1816, two decades after Beckmann's.Histogy‘gf_Inventions first appeared in the English translation, Jacob Bigelow, professor of materia medica, accepted the Count Rumford professorship at Harvard to deliver a course of lectures on the ”Appli- cation of the Sciences to the USeful.Arts." Bigelow reasoned that: .A certain degree of acquaintance with the theory and scientific principles of the common arts, is found so generally important, that most educated.men, in the course of an ordinary practical life, are obliged to obtain it from.some source or to suffer incon- venience for the want of it. Directed toward that end, the lectures were continued for over a decade. And in 1829, they were edited and published under the title Elements of Technology-~that being the first known use of the word 8lArmytage states that the word 'technology' ”was coined by Jehann Beckmann," pp, 915,, p.37; webster's Biographical Dictionary refers to Beckmann as a "German Technologist" (Springfield, Ness.: G.& C4Merriam Co., 1966), p.123. 82Beckmann, A Histozy 9f_Inventions, Discoveries and Origins, op. cit., Vbl. I, p.xx. 83Jacob Bigelow, Elements 9f Technology (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Wilkins, 1829) p.iv. 61 'teChnology' in American literature, with reference to mechanical- industrial arts.84 .More importantly, this work presents us with the first explicit definition of the term in that context. To quote Bigelow: I have adopted the general name Technology, a word sufficiently eXpressive, which is found in some older dictionaries, and is beginning to be revived in the literature of practical men at the present day. Under this title it is attempted to include an account as the limits of the volume permit of the principles, processes, and nomenclatures of the more conspicuous arts, particularly those which involve applications of science, and which.may be considered useful, by promoting the benefit of 85 society, together with the emolument of those who pursue them. Bigelow, like Beckman, was concerned with the practical ends of human knowledge; but unlike Beckman, who attempted to cover all of the sciences and arts, Bigelow limited his literary efferts to the mechanical arts and certain ”fine” arts related to industrial production. .Aside from being more discriminating, moreover, he is more systematic in organization. The whole of his work is treated under the following major headings: I Of the Materials used in the Arts II Of the Form, Condition, and Strength oijaterials III The Arts of writing and Printing IV .Arts of Designing and Painting V' Arts of Engraving and Lithography ‘VI Of Sculpture, Medeling, and Casting 'VII Of Architecture and Building 'VIII Arts of Heating and ventilation IX .Arts of Illumination 84Ibid. .According to the Encyclopedia.Americana, Bigelow ”is credited with inventing the term 'technology'" (See ”Bigelow, Jacob,” 1958 Edition, Vel. 3, p.659). According to Oliver, ”the term 'techno- logy"was revived from.the classics and given a new meaning by applying it to the arts, industry, manufacture, and agriculture: John W. Oliver, Histogy 9f American TeChnology_ (New Yerk: The Ronald Press Co., 1956), p.146. 859p, gifr’ p.iV-v. 62 X Arts of Locomotion XI Elements of Machinery XII Of the Moving Forces used in the.Arts XIII .Arts of Conveying water XIV" Arts of Dividing and Uniting Solid Bodies XV .Arts of Combining Flexible Fibres XVI .Arts of Horology XVII Arts of Metallurgy XVIII .Arts of Communicating and Medifying Color XIX .Arts of Vitrifaction XX .Arts of Induration of Heat 86 XXI On the Preservation of Organic_Substances These divisions of Bigelow's treatise should not, of course, be construed as the elements of technology. In his definition, "the prin- ciples, processes, and nomenclatures" constitute the elements. And in- asmuch as the emphasis is placed on the underlying principles, Bigelow's definition is in harmony with the Greek concept of teChnologia. By the same token, his concern for the ”application of science" to "usefu1" arts coincides with the Baconian.attitude toward the place of natural sciences in human affairs. .At any rate, Bigelow's adoption of ”the general name Technology" seems to satisfy the criterion of appropriateness. Its use in connection with "the:more conSpicuous arts" according to the definition does not imply a definite restriction, but rather a tentative one dictated by the "limits of the volume” and its intended purpose of serving as a basic text for "courses of elementary education."87 Its appropriateness notwithstanding, critical reviewers of Bigelow's ‘work expressed some reservations regarding his choice of term. In Emer- son's Opinion, for example, the word Technology gives but an imperfect idea of the contents of this (Bigelow's) volume. The end of a name would have been better 86Ibid., pp.ix~xx. 87Ibid. , p.iv. 63 answered by some title showing that it treated of the scientific and practical principles of many of the useful, curious, and elegant arts. .At the same time (1830) a review by Treadwell was somewhat more sympathetic toward Bigelow's use of the term; he states that: the word 'teChnology' is not so familiar in our language as could be desired in order to convey, at once, a full idea of the subject here arranged under it. Some word of the kind, however, has become necessary, both fOr precision, and to avoid the use of an unwieldy phrase. This, as Dr. Bigelow Observes, is suffi- ciently expressive, and has lately been revived; and, although not egerfectly grateful to the ear, 'will probably come into general Dictionary Definitions Of 'Technology': Despite its earlier use in English literature, the word 'technology' does not appear in any of the extant English dictionaries or encyclOpedias published prior to 1676. NOr can it be found in any of those published between 1757 and 1832. Hence, Bigelow's reference to "Older dictionaries” would have included only those which were published between 1676 and 1757. 'Technology' appears for the first time in Coles' 1676 edition of _AgEnglishiDictionary,90 and again in two later editions, 1658 and 1692; all three define the word as: "a treating of Arts or WOrkmanship." In 1708, the word appears in Kersey's General English Dictionagy'with the definition: "a Description of.Arts, eSpecially the Mechanical." The same 7 definition appears in the 1727 edition of Bailey's UniverSal'EtymologiCal English Dictionagy, and again in Scott's dictionary published in 1755 88G.B.Emerson, ”Elements of Technology," NOrth American ReView, V01. XXX, No. LXVI (1830) p.338. 89D. Treadwell, "Elements of Technology,” Christian Examiner, V01. 'VII (NOV. 1830), p. 187. 90See Appendix for complete descriptions of dictionaries cited here. ‘ 64 under the same title. Two other dictionaries published during the period, namely, Martin's Neg Universal English Dictionagy (1754) and Buchanan's NEE English Dictionagy (1757), both define 'technology' as: ”a Descrip— tion of the Arts, especially the Mathematical.” It is not unusual to find in the older dictionaries identical statements of definition; for it is safe to say, as Barnhart does, that "each succeeding dictionary maker borrowed liberally from his predeces- 91 Yet it seems strange that the foregoing eighteenth century sor." definitions of 'technology' should be identical except in point of em- phasis on the "mechanical" or the "mathematical" arts. Considering, however, the great upsurge of scientific achievement during the eighteenth century and the collaboration between the practical minded mathematicians and the skilled craftsmen that brought it about, perhaps both dictionary connotations are appropriate. "These were the days before the age of specialization when", to quote Sadler, there were few divisions between the sciences, or between 'pure' and 'applied' science, or between theory and practice; it was in fact the great age of the Mathematical Practitioners, in the broadest and finest sense of the term. In spite of the obvious differences of rank, education, calling, methods or thought and expression, whether they were thinkers or doers, great or humble, they all had in common a practical attitude towards their problems, loosely associated with a mathematical approach.92 In any event, it is more important to note here that the dictionary defi~ nitions do not correspond with the actual usage of 'technology' in the 91Clarence L. Barnhart, ”Dictionary,” The Encyclopedia Americana, 1958 Edition, VOl. 9, p.88. 92D.H.Sad1er, in the "foreword” to E.G.R. Taylor, The Mathematical Practitioners (London: The Cambridge University Press, 1965), p.v. 65 literature of the eighteenth century. The word does not appear again in the extant dictionaries until after the first edition of the Encyclopedia Americana in 1832 defined it as "the science which treats of the Arts, particularly the mechanical.”93 By contrast with Bigelow's earlier definition of 'technology' as ”the application of science to the arts,” the emphasis had shifted from phe application_pf science to the science. This analytic distinction has an hnportant bearing on the subsequent literary usage of the word and the terminological problem that ensued. In the short period of only three years between the publications of Bigelow's treatise and the first edi- tion of the Americana, when the word had just begun to re—appear in the literature, its meaning had already undergone a degree of interpretive change. Compare Bigelow's definition with the further statement given in the Americana: Tecm ology _~y_be divided into two kinds, a higher and a lower, of which the latter treats of the various arts themselves, and their principles, their origin, history, improvement, etc. ; the former, of the connexion of the arts and trades with the political condi- tions of a nation, and the important influence which they have exercised ever since the mechanical occupations have come 9&0 honor: i. e. since the growth of free cities in the middle ages. Wilson's Conception of Technology: Among the arts which Bigelow terms ”useful", he includes the ”fine arts” such as painting and sculpture; like Aristotle, he does not differentiate between them. In 1855, George Wilson, who occupied the then newly established chair of Technology at the University of Edinburgh, discussed this issue in his inaugural lecture 931n Vol. XII under the article ”Technology", p.163. 94Ibid. 66 titled "What is Technology?"95 ”It is by a quite conventional limitation,’ says Wilson, that the word Art, Texvng (technesl, denoted by the first dis- sylable of Technology, is held to signify useful, utilitarian, economic, or industrial art...for no arts call for more skillful workmen than Painting, Sculpture, and Music, and none are more technical in their modes of procedure.9 These remarks, as far as they go, appear to be compatible with Bigelow's views, and in harmony with the Aristotelian concept of techné. But then he goes on to define 'technology' as ”the Science of the Useful Arts”97 and arbitrarily excludes certain arts which in his estimation are not useful. ”It is not,” Wilson asserts, because the utility of the Fine Arts is questioned that they are excluded from the domain of Technology. Neither is it because the feeling of their usefulness is lost in that of their delight- fulness; but because they are not useful in the sense of being indispensable...Their defining characteristic is not that they deal with what is beautiful or unbeautiful, but with what is essential to man's physical existence. Wilsonls assertions raise certain philosophical questions which strike at the roots of quasi theories about technology: e.g., Which arts are in fact ”essential to man's physical existence"? What criteria deter- mine ”their defining characteristics"? On what grounds shall the criteria be established? Inasmuch as the process of defining essential arts is no less arbitrary than that of defining useful arts, Wilson's definition of technology might just as well have been worded, "the ScieHCe of the 95George Wilson, ”What is Technology?" The_Canadian Journal pf Industpy, Science, §B§;A££> V61. 1 (1856), pp.53—58. 96Ibid., pp.54 and 55. 97Ibid. 981bid., pp.55-56. (Italics mine) *‘ \,- 67 essential Arts.” The substitution of terms would, according to his inter- pretation, have been more appropriate although it would not have rendered a definition any more genuine. Technology and Education: By mid-nineteenth century, with the rapid expansion of the machine industries in America, 'technology' came to be associated almost exclusively with the ”useful" or industrial arts. And in its restricted literary usage the term paradoxically ceased to sym- bolize an invariant reference. The interim between Bigelow's lectures on technology at Harvard and Wilson's inaugural address on the subject at Edinburgh, a period of about twenty-five years, marks the genesis of the terminological problem. It coincides with the radical changes which were occurring in the tradi- tional programs of higher education in consequence of the growing demands by the machine industries for trained engineers. To meet the demands new engineering programs were established at existing educational institutions under a variety of titles, several of which were adopted as names of new institutions: e.g., the Rensselaer Polypechnic Institute (1824), the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard (1847), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1861), the Case School of Applied Science (1880), the Newark College of Engineering (1881). Unfortunately, all of the programs functioning under names such as these, irrespective of their curricular orientation, came to be commonly referred to as 'technical' pp 'technolo- gical'. A similar situation developed at the secondary-school level during the latter part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the present centu- ries with the introduction of various forms of manual-arts training (some ..l[f|l||'|}\l’lull 68 imported from abroad) into existing liberal-arts-oriented programs. The new concepts brought about radical changes in American education with consequent problems in terminology. Educational labels such as Manual Training, Manual Arts, Arts and Crafts, Practical Arts, Applied Arts, and Industrial Arts, among others, all came to be associated synonymously with the terms 'technical' and 'technological' by writers who would use these terms indiscriminately. The literature abounds in such indiscriminate usage. An appropriate example is herein singled out as an apt close to the present chapter: In an article from a century-old scientific jour- nal, titled ”Examinations in Technology,” the writer states: No subject has been more talked about of late years than Technical Education. No term has been more vaguely or indefinitely used than this, even in education, that region of loose definitions; yet it cannot be doubted that at the present time no subject is of more vital importance to this country, to enable it to maintain its manufacturing position, than a general diffusion of sound technical knowledge--a knowledge, that is, which rests on a thorough appre- hension of the scientific principles which lie at the root of the various arts and manufacturing processes. 99”Examinations in Technology,” Nature, A Weekly Illustrated Jour- nal of Science, Vol. VI OMay 16, 1872) p.41. (Italics added for emphasis) CHAPTER III PREVALENT VIEWS ON TECHNOLOGY For more than a century after it emerged as a naturalistic concept, technology rarely found literary expression in other than a mechanical— industrial context. Despite its prominent place in the "institutes of technology” where it first found its clerisy,l or perhaps because of its connection with mere'"technical" matters, the concept received scant recognition in scholarly literature. Ironically, even the institutes soon lost sight of its significance,2 whereupon the word ‘technology' assumed little more than a nominal existence, at best as a fortuitous appendage to 'science' which itself had been slighted by important writers. ”It is curious that science and technology have always occupied so small a place in literature,” Huxley writes: This is all the more extraordinary when one considers that literature is supposed to hold the mirror up to life. In life people spend a great deal of time involved in the technology of the period in which they live. They work, and their jobs are connected with technology and the organizations technology engenders. Yet one sees little evidence of this in literature. lJacob Bigelow introduced the concept at Harvard University in his lectures (1816—1827) on ”The Application of the Sciences to the Useful Arts”. He published these lectures in 1829 under the title Elements pf Technology (see sppra.,pp.60-3). Bigelow's pioneering work was instru- mental in establishing the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard in 1847, fggerunner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, established in 2See ”Trends Toward VOcatiOnal Training" in Report of the Committee on Educational Survey, (Cambridge: The Technology Press, 1949), pp.ll-l4. 3Aldous Huxley, ”Achieving a Perspective on the Technological Order”, in Carl Stover, The Technological Order, (Detroit: wayne State University), 1963, p.257. 69 70 The Status of Technology Prior to WOrld war II The situation changed somewhat during the early 1900's. A few hnportant writers began to call attention to the significance of techno— logy in the expanding industrial economy, and the effects of industrial expansion on established cultural institutions. Thorstein Veblen, best known perhaps for his vehement attacks upon big business and the profit system, prophetically noted that "science and technology combined had come to be the dominant ferce in modern life."4 He Observed (in 1906) that: MOdern civilization is peculiarly matter-of-fact...This character- istic of western civilization comes to a head in modern science, and it finds its highest material expression in the technology of the machine industry...ln the modern culture, industry, industrial processes, and industrial products have progressively gained upon humanity, until these creations of man's ingenuity have latterly come to take the dominant place in the cultural scheme: and it is not too much to say that they have become the chief force in shaping men's daily life and therefore the chief factor in shaping men's habits of thought.5 In these premonitory prenouncements, Veblen stood conspicuously alone in the literary field for some twenty years, and was one of few writers who at the time made explicit reference to technology in that regard.6 4John W. Oliver, Histopy pf American Technology (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956), p.455. 5Thorstein Veblen, ”The Place of Science in Modern Civilization,” The American Journal pf Sociology, XI, No. 5 OWarch, 1906), pp.585-609. 6See Veblen's, The_Engineers apd.phe Price S stem (New York: The Viking Press, 1921) Chapter II; and his Instinct p__Wbrkmanship (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914) Chapters V and VII. 71 John Dewey presented (in 1915)7 a comparable characterization of industry and the "changed social conditions”; but it was not until the 1930's that he explicitly referred to technology, noting that: The rise of scientific method and of technology based upon it is the genuinely active force in producing the vast complex of changes the world is now undergoing...If we lay hold upon the causal force exercised by this embodiment of intelligence we shall know where to turn for the means of directing further change. Elsewhere Dewey noted that "reference to science and technology is rele— vant because they are the forces of present life which are finally signi- ficant.”9 Among the few social critics who wrote on technology long before that word came into popular use, one who still writes on its cultural significance, is Lewis Mumford.10 Around 1930, he instituted an ”Exten- sion Course" on ”The Machine.Age" which, in his words, was ”the first course of this kind, dealing with the cultural as well as the economic and practical aspects of technology, to be offered anywhere.”11 And in a recent edition of Technics and Civilization, the first draft of which was written in 1930, Mumford asserts that: 7John Dewey, ”The School and Social Progress, ” in The Child and the Curriculum and The School and Society, (Chicago: The University of* Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 8-9. 8John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1935), p. 74. See also Dewey's ”Science and Society,” (1931) reprinted in Max H. Fische, Classic American Philosophers (New York: Appleton— Century- Crofts, 1951) pp. 381- 389. 9John Dewey, Individualism 91§_epg Ney (New York: Milton, Black and Company, 1930) pp.98-99. 10See, for example, his recent work: Ih§.MZth pf phe_Machine (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1967). 11Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace & WOrld, Inc. , 1934), in the “”Introduction" to the 1963 Harbinger Books edition. 72 The reader who, a generation ago, understood the second half of my book would not have been unprepared for the overwhelming scientific and technical achievements, nor for the perversions and paranoid compulsions, that have since taken place. The pertinent points to be emphasized at this juncture are these: a) reference to technology in the literature published during the latter half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries is at best sporadic;13 b) the few writers who explicitly referred to tech- nology during that period appear to have been primarily concerned with the cultural effects of industrial technology; c) it should perhaps be noted that despite their common concerns they did not necessarily enter- tain the same philosophical points of view;14 d) most writers either ignored or inadvertently underestimated the vast complex of changes the world was undergoing. The few Who did were the harbingers of what was yet to come; and their ronouncements on the ”' act of technology” so— P Imp called, have for the contemporary reader a familiar ring. 12Ibid. 13Note that Poole's Index pp Periodical Literature (1802-1906), documents only seven articles under the caption ”Technology”; The Inter- national Index pe Periodicals documents only three articles under ”Technology" for the twenty-year period, 1907-1927, and over 250 articles for the ten—year period, 1958-1968. It may be of interest to note also that the Industrial Arts Index, first published in 1913, was renamed Applied Science epd Technology Index in 1959, with no significant change either in format or in subjects indexed. 14See, for example, the series of polemic arguments between John Dewey and Lewis MUmford on the concepts of Pragmatism and Instrumentalism and their relations to Science and Technology, in Pragmatism epe American Culture, Edited by Gail Kennedy (Boston: D.C.Heath and Company, 1950); viz., MUmford's ”The Pragmatic Acquiescence” (1926) pp.36-49; Dewey's "The Pragmatic Acquiescence” (January 5, 1927) pp.49-53; MUmford's ”The Pragmatic Acquiescence: A Reply” (January 19, 1927) pp.54-57. Dewey takes the position that science and technology conceived as instruments is central to understanding of these agencies and their dominant tendencies in human life. Mumford, argues that "the sum total of life has a much greater sphere than that which science, technology, or its philosophic counterpart, instrumentalism, habitually covers." (”A Reply,” p.55) 73 The Status of Technology After the war A significant change occurred in the literary field after WOrld war II. Coincident with the release and subsequent control of atomic energy (1942-1945), ”technology" re-emerged in a new scientific role that stirred the scientific and academic community of scholars. A far more noticeable change occurred in 1957, after the first artificial satellite was successfully launched into space. Henceforth, ”technology" virtually dominated the literature. The Government's Concern for Technology: "In 1957", Swain writes, the United States found itself suddenly jolted into an awareness that a new age had dawned. By orbiting the first earth satellite, the Soviet Union not only inaugurated the Space Age but shocked the American Government into a re-examination of its vast scientific program. Congress responded the same year by establishing the National Aero- nautics and Space Administration (NASA), with the Division of Technology Utilization as part of its organizational structure. In 1959, the Federal Council for Science and Technology was established; and the same year, the President appointed James Killan of Massachusetts Institute of Technology to the newly created post of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. When the existing organization was changed in 1962 to provide a channel of communication between the President and 6 Congress, the Office of Science and Technology was established.1 And in 1964, the President appointed a National Commission on Technology, 15Donald C. Swain, "Organization of Military Research," in Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll W. Purcell, Jr., Technology ip_Western Civilization (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.546. l6Federal Sppport pf Basic Research ip Institutions pf Higher Learning (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1964) pp.53-55. 74 Automation and Economic Progress, which in its last report (1966), concluded that ”if there is one predominant factor underlying current social change, it is surely the advancement of technology.17 With the growing concern for technology on the governmental scene vast amounts of "technical” knowledge accrued in the newly established agencies which had potential value in industry.18 The resultant changes that occurred on the industrial scene, in turn, had a compelling effect in the literary field. ”The intellectual ferment and curiosity inspired by technological advances in industry,” writes warner of Columbia, ”led to the opening of vast areas for scholarly inquiry and research."19 Concern for Technolegy on the Academic Scene: Since WOrld war II, the most significant scholarly work on technology and its attendant problems has taken place at, or in cooperation with, the universities via collective interdisciplinary effort. At this juncture, let it suffice to outline briefly several of the scholarly activities in order to identify the principal sources of literature relevant to the further development of the present study. In 1945, the Yale University Technology Project got under way with Charles R. walker as its director. In a pioneering joint effort, a group of social scientists undertook a series of field studies which focused on ”the human impact of modern technology." Their investigations into l7Technology _i__n_ Western Civilization, 92. ei_t., Vol. II, p.695. 18On the problems of channeling the new knowledge into industry and education, see Richard L. Lesher and George J. Howick, ASSessing Technolo Transfer (washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Utilization, NASA, 1966). 19Aaron W. warner, ”Introduction,” in Technology epd_Social Change, Edited by Eli Ginzberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) p.1. i 75 specific human problems covered the range from on-thetjob assembly-line monotony to community effects of plant shut-downs. Many of the field notes were published in monograph form, others appeared in walker's Technology, Industry, egg ygg1.20 All of the notes, including some which 1 are classified, are catalogued at the Yale University Library.2 In 1947, the same year that warner, of The Ohio State University, proposed fOr Industrial Arts education the Curriculum §e_Ref1ect Techno— logy,22 the Faculty of Massachusetts Institute of Technology appointed a Committee on Educational Survey, to re-examine the principles of education that had served as a guide to academic policy at M.I.T. for almost ninety years, and to determine whether they are applicable to the conditions of a new era emerging from social upheaval and the disasters of war.23 The Committee's findings, and its recommendations to broaden M.I.T.'s educational base in harmony with ”technological trends,” were published in 1949.24 In 1960, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology invited a group of distinguished scholars to its centenary celebration to present papers and discuss problems on the topic ”Science and Technology in Contemporary Society.” Seven of the papers appear under that title in the journal of 20Charles R. walker GWCGraw-Hill, 1947); see also his MOdern Techno- logy epd Civilization GMcGraw-Hill, 1962). len this writer's conversation with Dr, Stanley H. Udy, Sociolo- gist at Yale University, and present Director of the Technology Project airy 5, 1970). 2%5 Curriculum pp Reflect Technology, sppra., pp.l and 6-8. 23Re ort of phe Committee pp_Educational Survey (Cambridge: The Technology Pressj'1949)’p.3. 24Ibid., the entire report. 76 The American Academy of Sciences.25 In 1962, the Columbia University Seminar on Technology and Social Change was formed as a new addition to an existing program of seminars. According to warner, of Columbia, it brings together "groups of experts” from various disciplines for “a continuing exploration of the frontiers of change in a world in which technology plays an increasing dominant role.”26 They meet monthly to present and discuss papers on topics re- lated to predetermined annual themes, e.g., ”Technology and Change”, ”The Impact of Science on Technology”, ”Technological Innovation and Society”. The papers and discussion notes are edited and published in book ferm under their respective titles.27 In 1964, the Harvard University Program on Technology and Society began functioning under the direction of Emmanuel Mesthene of Yale, with the expressed purpose of inquiring into the effects of technological change on the economy, on public policies, and on the character of society, as well as into the reciprocal effects of social progress on the nature, dimension, and direction of scientific and technological developments.28 The Program organizationzg encompasses an active membership of well 25Daedalus (Spring 1962). 26Dean MOrse and Aaron W. warner, Technological Innovation epd Society, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) Preface. 27See Eli Ginzberg, Technology epg Social Chepge, 1964; and Aaron W. warner, Dean Merse, and Alfred S. Eichner, The_lmpact pf Science pp Technology, 1965. Both are published by the Columbia University Press. 28This statement appears on the inside cover of every Research Review, Reprint, and Annual Report published by the Program. 29For a more detailed description of the Program, see Emmanuel G. Mesthene, ”On Understanding Change," Technolggypepe Culture, VI, No.2 (Spring 1965) pp.222-235. 77 over a hundred, including a faculty committee, an advisory committee, a study group, a staff of associates and specialists, and research personnel representing various academic disciplines-~business administration, economics, law, sociology, education, linguistics, mathematics, history, psychology, and the physical sciences. The Program publishes research reviews, monographs, selected reprints, and a yearbook which summarizes its annual activities. The breadth of the Program's studies is reflected in the titles of its Research Reviews:30 Implications of Biomedical Technology (Fall 1968) Technology and values (Spring 1969) Technology and WOrk (Winter 1969) Technology and the Polity (Summer 1969) Technology and the City (In preparation) Technology and the Individual (In preparation) Significant Events in the Community of Scholars: 'Technology' was accorded especial recognition in the field of History with the 1954 publication of Singer's first volume of A_Histopy pi Technology,31 a collective work by scholars from various disciplines. This work appears to be the earliest history published in the English language under the rubric 'technology'.32 Whether all, or any of the subject matter or its method of treatment is worthy of the title will not be debated at this 30Harvard University Program on Technology and Society, Fifth Annual Report, 1968—1969 (Cambridge, Mass.: The Program, 1969) p.70. (Note: As of this writing, the Program has published its final report in 1972). 31Charles Singer, E.J. Holmyard, and A.R. Hall, Editors, 5_Histopy p§_Technology (London: Oxford University Press) 1954. 32An earlier German work, Geschichte pep_Technologie seit pepyMitte des achtzehnten Farhhunderts (The History of Technology from the Middle Efifthe Eighteenth Century) By Karl Karmarsch, GWunich: 1872), was reVlewed by R. Oldenbourg, in "The History of Technology," The_Practlcal Arts Magazine, III, N0. 1 (London: 1874) p.107. 78 point;33 nor will the fact that most or perhaps all of the subjects have been treated in much the same manner under other titles,34 for example: 1846 - Beckman: A.History of Inventions and Discoveries 1895 — Mason: The Origins of Invention 1921 - Osgood: A History of Industry 1925 — Brocklehurst: A History of Engineering 1929 - Clark: History of Manufactures 1929 ~ Chase: Men and Machines 1929 - Usher: A History of Mechanical Inventions What is of significance here is the fact that after 1954, "history of technology” was widely accepted as a genuine extension of History proper.35 Thereafter, other historical treatises were published under similar titles,36 among them: 1956 - Oliver: History of American Technology 1958 - Forbes: Man the Maker, A History of Technology and Engineer- lng 1959 - Klemm: A History of Western Technology 1961 - Derry: A Short History of Technology 1964 — Hughes: The Development of Western Technology 1967 - Kranzberg: The Technology and Western Civilization 1969 — Daumas: A History of Technology and Invention In 1958, a meeting of the Advisory Committee for Technology and Society at Case Institute of Technology led to the formation of the Society for the History of Technology. Its purpose, according to Kranzberg, is to promote the scholarly study of the history of technology, to show the relations between technology and other elements of culture, and to make these elements of knowledge available 33See, for example, Robert S. Woodbury's criticism in "The Scholar- ly Future of the History of Technology," Technology epp_Culture, I, No.4 (Fall 1960) pp.345-348. 34A complete description of these works appears in the Bibliography. 35Robert S. Merrill, ”Technology," InternatiOnal Encyclopedia pf the Social Sciences, XV (New York: The Macmiilan Company and The Free Press, 1968) p.582. 36See the Bibliography for full description. 79 and comprehensive to the educated citizen...37 through the Society's quarterly journal, Technology pep Culture. In 1962, the publishers of the Encyclopedia Britannica called a "Conference on the Technological Order" in Santa Barbara, California. They invited scholars from this country and abroad to discuss ”the nature of technology and its significance fer human affairs."38 Several papers focused on the meaning of technology and its relation to science, a concern which Carl Stover of the Britanica staff summarizes by stating that, the modern scientific-technology promises to be both the hope of man's future and the instrument of his enslavement or destruction. If we are to avoid the disasters it lays open to us and take advantage of the Opportunities it presents, we must put it in the control of reason. To do so9 we must understand what modern tech- nology is, what it means... The papers and commentaries by the participants were edited by Stover, and published in 1962 by the Society for the History of Technology.40 In 1963, a panel of historians of technology convened at the University of Wisconsin to discuss the feasibility of developing a course in the history of technology for the Armed Forces Institute (USAFI). They examined the existing works on the history of technology and con- cluded that ”no single available text stressed sufficiently the cultural, 37Melvin Kraanerg, ”At The Start,” TeChnology epp Culture, I, No. 1 (Winter 1959) p.9. 38Carl F. Stover, "Introduction," Technology egg Culture, III, No.4 (Fall 1962) p.383; also in Carl F. Stover, The_Technological Order (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1963). 39Technology epp_Cu1ture, Ibid. 401bid. 80 economic, and social implications of technology and history."41 The ensuing joint undertaking by some seventy scholars from various academic disciplines, the business field and government, culminated in a two volume anthology of related historical essays which were published in 1967 under the title, Technology _i_n_ Western Civilization.42 In 1965, the Society for the History of Technology scheduled a session at its Conference to be devoted to a discussion on the philoso- phical dimensions of technology. Expressing the Society's concern, Kranzberg writes that, ”despite the major role played by technology in human and social development, there has been little in the way of system- atic philosophical investigation of technology."43 Several scholars, from this country and abroad, presented papers addressed specifically to the problem of defining technology. These often quoted papers and related commentaries appear in the Summer 1966 issue of the Society's journal.44 The fact that some of our most respected universities are serving as centers for projects, programs, seminars, and conferences on technolo- gy, coupled with the fact that so many social critics have turned their attention to technology and the problems it supposedly engenders, leaves little doubt as to its omnipresence in human affairs. Aside from con— firming the premonitory observations made by Veblen, Dewey, Mumford, and 41Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., Technology in West— e§p_Civilization, Volume I (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1967) p.v. 42Ibid., Volumes I and II. 43Melvin Kranzberg, ”Toward a Philosophy of Technology,” Technology epp_Culture, VII, No. 3 (Summer 1966) p.301. 44Ibid. , p.30l—390. 1 81 others during the early decades of the present century, the facts clearly indicate a need for continuing scholarly inquiry into the social impli— cations of technology. NOr should there be any doubt as to its implica- tions for general education. warner and his colleagues at The Ohio State University sensed its significance mOre than two decades ago when they foresaw "the critical need for Industrial Arts to reflect the technolo— gy."45 Current Concise Definitions of Technolqu In a paper read before the Britannica Conference on the Technolo- gical Order, Buchanan stated that: 'the current discussion of technology in books and journals, both learned and popular, can be heard as a desperate clamor for a definition of terms...There may be wisdom at the present stage in refusing to yield to the clamor...There perhaps is need at present of a more patient ruminating discussion tpgt will identify and arrange the materials for a later definition. A decade has passed since Buchanan made that statement and we are no nearer to resolving the terminological problem than we were then. Judging from the papers presented at the above mentioned scholarly gatherings, the need for clarifying the meaning of technology is urgent. That was the primary purpose of the Britannica Conference.47 Admittedly, the task is a difficult one. ”The phenomenon of tech— nology has so many forms,” says Skolimowski, ”that there is no simple 4%5 Curriculum pp_Reflect Technology, pp, pip,, p.3. 46Scott Buchanan, "Technology as a System of Exploitation,” Tech- nology epp Culture, 111, No. 4 (Fall 1962) p.535. 47Carl F. Stover, pp, pip. —————“’ 82 description of it. But define it we must."48 The remainder of the present Chapter is directed to that end. On Classifying Current Definitions: In a manner somewhat similar to Kroeber and Kluckhohn's treatment of a collection of definitions of 'culture',49 forty definitions of 'technology' from the above scholarly sources are hereunder subjected to critical analysis in order to elicit common elements of meaning, as per Ogden and Richards' suggestion. All but three of the definitions come from literary works published since World war II; and of these, most have been formulated during the past decade. In a few instances, two characteristically different statements by the same writer are classified as separate definitions; others are but adumbrations of lengthier conceptions. The object of the present inquiry is to analyze only what appear to be concise definitions, without reference to any qualifying statements in the context of which the defi- nitions are framed. A11 definitions of technology, their apparent differences notwith- standing, evidence one, two, or three qualities or characteristics. Mere to the point, every definition is made up of one or more defining elements, each of which signifies: a) something that is characteristically human, i.e., something that is attributable only to individual human beings—- like one's knowledge or one's skill; b) something that exists outside of and apart from an individual human being~-like machines and instruments 48Henryk Skolimowski, ”On the Concept of Truth in Science and in Technology," roceedings_ of the XIVth International Congpess_ of Philoso- phy, II (Vienna: University of Vienna, 1968) p.553. 49A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture, A.Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge, Mass. Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, 1952). —:: 7 83 (including other human beings); or c) something that mediates between a and b—-like procedures or procedural systems. The first kind are here- in referred to as an intrinsic elements; the second, as extrinsic ele- ments, and the third, as transactional elements. To the extent that human beings invent systems and employ procedures, such things are in a sense human. But what sets them apart from intrinsic characteristics is that they stand as means to be utilized by epy human being. They are not immanent human faculties per se. Of the forty definitions to be subjected to analysis, three evi— dence intrinsic, extrinsic, and transactional elements; these definitions are hereunder assembled into Group I. Nine definitions evidence combina- tions of two kinds of elements; these constitute Group II. The remaining twenty-eight definitions evidence one of the three kinds of elements; these constitute Group III. Following each group, the specific elements of definition are excerpted and classified into intrinsic, extrinsic, and transactional categories. And in the last analysis, all of the elements will be categorially summarized. Group I — Definitions Embodying Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Trans- actional Elements: Each of the following definitions is preceded by the name and title of the definer, and the year that the definition appeared in print. A complete description of the source is given in the footnotes. The same procedure is followed for Group II and III definitions. 1. Schon, Industrial Psychologist (1967) 'Technology' will mean any tool or technique, any product or process, any physical equipment or method of doing or making, by which human capability is extended. 50Donald A. Schon, Technology epd_Change (New York; Delacorte Press, 1967) p.1. 84 2. Markovic, Philosopher (1966) Technology is the totality of all knowledge, material resources and practical procedures which are most suitable for achieving a certain given aim.51 3. Walker, Sociologist (1962) Technology includes both physical objects and the techniques associated with them...In such a definition, scientific manage- ment and other kinds of engineering rules which impinge on people are included under the term ”technology”.52 The elements of definition are excerpted and classified in Table 1, and are therein numbered to correspond with the numbered definitions. Table l. CLASSIFICATION OF THE ELEMENTS IN GROUP I DEFINITIONS INTRINSIC ELEMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ELEMENTS EXTRINSIC ELEMENTS 1. any technique any process; any tool; any method of doing or any physical equip— making ment; any product 2. all knowledge I all practical procedures all material resources 3. techniques scientific management; physical objects engineeringprules The element ”technique" is herein taken to be an immanent, human faculty, something peculiar to an individual; as such, it fits the in- trinsic category. The element "method”, sometimes associated synonymous- ly with "technique”, is herein classified as a transactional element. Method is viewed here as a systematic procedure which can be adhered to by any individual regardless of his technique. For the same reason, 51Mihalo Markovic, "Man and Technology," Praxis, II, No. 3 (1966) p.346 52Charles R. Walker, Modern Technology ppd_Civilization (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962) pp.2-3. 85 "procedures", ”processes”, ”rules”, etc. are classified as transaction- al.53 Most definitions of technology include an appended purpose--to serve some human end, or words to that effect; these will be commented upon in the summarizing statement. Group II - Definitions Embodying Combinations of Two Kinds of Elements: 4. Merril, Professor of Anthropology (1968) Technology in its broad meaning connotes the practical arts... Technologies are bodies of skills, knowledge, and procedures for making, using, and doing things. They are techniques, means of accomplishing recognized purposes. Melsen, Philosopher of Science and Technology (1961) Technology is the realization and consequently the embodiment of human ideas in matter.5 6. Hammond, Professor of.Anthropology (1964) Technology refers to the tools and techniques used to modify natural resources to meet human needs. 7. Derry, Professor of History (1961) Technology comprises all the bewildering varied body of knowledge and devices by which man progressively masters his natural environment. 53Inasmuch as the object here is to show that the elements of all of the definitions of technology submit to the trichotomic scheme, a more de— tailed analysis of the specific elements is deemed unnecessary at this stage of the present study. The point is that the elements do fit into the scheme; where they fit is a matter of interpretation. _—_ 54Robert S. Merril, International Encyclopedia gf_§he Social Sciences, Ed. David L. Sills, volume 15 (New York: The Macmillan Company G The Free Press, 1968) pp.576 and 585. 55Andrew G. van Melsen, Science and Technolo (Pittsbur h, Pa.: . ___._______£X g Duquesne Univer51ty Press, 1961} p.261. 56Peter B. Hammond, Cultural and Social Anthropology (New Yerk: The Macmillan Company, 1964) p.95. 57T.K.Derry and Trevor T. Williams, A Short History 9f Technology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961) p.3. 10. ll. 12. 86 Feibleman, Professor of Philosophy (1961) Every undertaking has its special technology, its tools, and the skills to use them, Technology is the material side of an enterprise, the discipline which is equally necessary at every level. Thus both tools and skills are required for art, reli— gion, and philosophy as much as for economics and politics.58 Schilling, Political Scientist (1968) Technology can be generally conceived of as encompassing man's methodssgnd tools for manipulating material things and physical forces. Baranson, Economist (1966) Technology refers to characteristics of production systems including their scale and organization; factor combinations of labor, materials, and equipment; managerial aspects; and design characteristics of the products themselves. Childe, Professor of Prehistoric European Archaeology (1954) Technology should mean the study of those activities, directed to the satisfaction of human needs, which produce alterations in the material world. In the present work LA History of Technolo- ) the meaning of the term is extended to include the results of %hose activities. Singer, Editor of'A_History of Technology (1954) 'Technology' should mean the systematic treatment of any thing or subject...The editors (of A History of Technology) have treated it as covering the field of how things are commonly done or made ex- tending it someWhat to describe what things are done or made.62 The principal elements from Group II definitions Cnumbers 4-12) are classified in Table 2. 58James K. Feibleman, ”Technology as Skills,” in Technology_and Culture, VII, No.3 (Summer 1966) pp.3l8-328. 59Warner Schilling,”Technology and International Relations” Inter- national Encyclopedia gf Social Sciences, 22-.Ei£-: p.58 . 6OJack Baranson, ”The Challenge of Underdevelopment” in Technology 7 and Western Civilization, op. cit., p.51 . 61V} Gordon Childe, ”Early Forms of Society” in A.Histo§y of Tech- nology,.gp..git., p.38. 62Charles Singer, in the Preface of‘A History 9f Technolggy, p.vii. 87 CLASSIFICATION OF THE ELEMENTS IN GROUP II DEFINITIONS EXTRINSIC ELEMENTS Tfiflez. INTRINSIC ELEMENTS TRANSACTIONAL ELEMENTS 4. bodies of skills; procedures for making; knowledge; tech- using, and doing things; niques means of accomplishing purposes 5. realization of embodiment of ideas in ideas matter 6. techniques tools 7 body of knowledge devices 8. skills tools 9. methods tools 10. production systems, combinations of la- their scale and bor, materials and organization; equipment; managerial aspects design characteris- tics of the products 11. activities which results of I produce alterations activities things done or 12. systematic treatment of any thing; how things are done or made made 88 It should perhaps be noted that the classification of elements under a particular category depends on one's interpretation of a given term. van Meslen's use of the term 'embodiment', for example, is here taken to mean ”the act of embodying"; hence, it is classified as a trans- actional quality; And Baranson's use of the term 'design characteris- tics' might be taken to denote ”a conception” or ”idea”, in which case it would logically fall into the intrinsic category. The term is inter~ preted here in an objective, after—the—fact sense, as accomplished, objectified forms. In any event, regardless of how one interprets a specific defining element, it can theoretically be subsumed under one of the three general categories. Note that Feibleman views technology in the broad sense as an aspect of ”every undertaking”—-in art, religion, philosophy, as well as in economics and politics. Few writers, to reiterate a prior observation, conceptualize technology in other than a naturalistic, industrial sense. Group III - Definitions Embodying One of TWO Kinds of Elements: The following definitions are assembled into six subegroups. Three of the definitions focus on ”techniques”, an intrinsic characteristic;_five, on ”knowledge”, an intrinsic characteristic; six, on "application of knowledge”, a transactional characteristic; five, on ”application of science", a transactional characteristic; three, on "human work”, a trans- actional characteristic; and the remaining six emphasize kinds of human activity, herein viewed as transactional characteristics. Sub-group IIIa - Characteristically intrinsic with emphasis on ”techniques": 89 13. Dewey, Philosopher-Educator (1930) 'Technology' signifies all the intelligent techniques by which the energies of nature an man are directed and used in.satisfaction of human needs. 3 14. Bronowski, Mathematician (1963) Technology is the sum total of all thg different techniques by which man changes his environment. 4 15. Lesher, Administrator for Technology Utilization, NASA (1969) Technology is basically a collection of techniques to perform functions to serve mankind. 5 The three statements, except for slight differences in wording, convey similar conceptions of technology, to wit, techniques as means for attaining desired ends. Elsewhere, Dewey defines 'technique' as "intelligent means and methods for securing results.”66 Sub-group IIIb - Characteristically intrinsic with emphasis on ”knowledge”: 16. veblen, Economic and Political Theorist (1921) Technology-~the state of the industrial arts--is in an eminent sense a joint stock of knowledge and experience held in common by the civilized peoples.67 63John Dewey, "What I Believe," Forum, LXXXIII, No. 3 (March 1930) pp.l76-182. Quoted ig_Pragmatism ggd_American Culture, op, gi§., p.25. 64Jacob Bronowski, Editor, Technology: M§n_Remakes Hi§_World (New York: Doubleday 8 Company, 1964) p.8. 65Richard L. Lesher: in a personal letter, April 23, 1969. 661ndividualism _o_1_c_1_ ind Ne_w, 92. £15., p.29. 67Thorstein veblen, Th3 Engineers and the Price Systan,_l§ Eéfs: 90 17. Perry, Professor of Philosophy (1954) Technology is knowledge selected and processed for some ulterior use. 18. Zvorikine, Historian, Philosopher (1961) Modern technology is the embodiment of the knowledge man has accumulated in his struggle to harness the forces of nature.69 19. Schmookler, Professor of Economics (1966) Technpéogy is the social pool of knowledge of the industrial arts. 20. Skolimowski, Philosopher of Technology (1966) Technology is a form of human knowledge.71 In the above sub—group, emphasis is placed on the one intrinsic element, "knowledge", with the exception of veblen's definition which includes the element "experience”. The latter term is herein interpreted in an imminent sense; thus, like knowledge, it fits the intrinsic cate- gory. Only Perry's definition stresses a particular kind of knowledge, otherwise the definitions are similar. Sub-grogp ITIb — Characteristically transactional with emphasis on the "application of knowledge”: 68Ralph Barton Perry, R§a1m§_of_yalge_(Cambridge: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1954) p.309. 69A4 Zvorikine, “The History of Technology as a Science and as a Branch of Learning: A Soviet View,” Technology agd_CultUre, II, No. 1 (Winter 1961) p.1. 7OJacob Schmookler, Invention §§d_Economic Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) p.1. 71Henryk Skolimowski, ”Technology and Philosophy,” in Raymond Klibansky, Contemporary Philosophy II (Firenze: La NUOva Italia Editrice, 1968) pp.426—437, p.435. 91 21. Chandler, Professor of Economics (1947) Technology is but the application of knowledge, primarily scientific knowledge, to economic progress. 22. Bronowski, Mathematician (1963) Technology is t9? application of scientific knowledge to human problems. 23. weisner, Dean, School of Science, MIT (1965) Technology is the application of organized knowledge to help solve problems in our society. 24. Galbraith, Economist and Political Theorist (1967) Technology means the systematic application of scientific or other organized knowledge to practical tasks.75 25. Lesher, Asst. Administrator for Technology Utilization, NASA (1969) Technology is the application of new scientific knowledge, and in its broadest sense, includes t2e application of the products of the management sciences. 26. Mesthene, Lecturer in Business Administration (1968) we define technology7 as the organization of knowledge for practical purposes. 72Lester V1 Chandler, A Preface to Economics (New York: Harper 8 Brothers, 1947) p.39. 73Jacob Bronowski, Editor, Technology: MEE Remakes Big Wbrld, op. £13., p.9. 74Jerome B. Wiesner, ”Technology and Innovation," in Technological Innovation and Society, op. cit., p.11. 75John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: The New American Library, 1967) p. 24_ 76Richard L. Lesher: in a personal letter, op. gig. 77Emmanuel G. Mesthene, ”The Role of Technology in Society: Some General Implications of the Program’ 5 Research, ” Fourth Annual Repart of the Harvard University Program on Technology and Society, 1967- 1968 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Program, 1968) p. 44. 92 Five of the six definitions, each by a writer from a different field, emphasize the “application of knowledge”. In the definition by Mesthene the term "organization” is interpreted in a transactional sense, i.e., as the ”process of organizing knowledge". Sub—grogp IIIb — Characteristically transactional with emphasis on "applied science”: 27. Jennings, Professor of History (1957) Technology is a word in large part synonymous with applied science...the process of transforming theoretical conceptions into practical, useful realities. 28. Lachman, Professor of Psychology (1965) Technology = Applied Science. Field utilizing the findings of science to solve practical problems...application of the data, principles, and theories of one or more fields of science for 79 the purpose of obtaining practical solutions to human problems. 29. Bunge, Theoretical Physicist and PhiIOSOpher of Science (1967) The terms ”technology” and "applied science” will be taken here as synonymous...the application of the scientific method and of scientific theories to the attainment of practical goals. 0 30. Forbes, Professor of History and Ancient Science and Technology (1958) In our modern world both technology and engineering are branches of applied science; they follow very closely in the footsteps of scientific research as conducted in laboratories and universities.81 78Manson Jennings, ”Teacher Education,” in Science and Ehg Social Studies, TWenty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Council fof-the Social Studies (washington, B.C.: the Society, 1957) p.217. 798heldon J. Lachman, Th2 Foundations of Science (New YOrk: vantage Press, 1965) pp.lS and 109. 8OMario Bunge, "Technology as Applied Science,” Technology_agd Culture, VII, Nb. 3 (Summer 1966) p.329. 81R.J.Forbes, Man the Maker: A Histogy_gf Technology gpd Engineer— igg, (New Yerk: AbelafdlSEEuman Limited, 1958) p.3. 31. 'applied science', and 'applied science' with the 'application of science 93 Levi, Professor of Philosophy (1959) The intrinsic meaning of technology is the application of the method of science to the productive problems of the industrial arts. Five of the definitions in this group equate 'technology' with In this respect they differ little from the previous definitions which emphasize 'application of knowledge'. others in two respects: a) it stresses the 'method of science' and b) restricts its application to industrial problems. The others could be interpreted in a broad sense to include other fields of human activity. Sub-groop IIIb - Characteristically transactional with empha51s on ”wor ": 32. Drucker, Professor of Management (1959) We might define technology as human action on physical objects or as a set of physical objects characterized by serving human purposes. Either way the realm and subject matter of the study of technology would be human work.83 33. Zvorikine, Historian & Philosopher (1962) Technology may be defined as the means of work, the means of human activity developing within a system of social production and social life. The means of work begome technology only within a system of social production. 82Albert William Levi, Philosophy and the Mbdern werld (Blooming- ton: Indiana university Press, l959 p.15. No. 83Peter F. Drucker, "work and Tools,” Technology and Culture, I, 1 (Winter 1959) p. 30. 84A. Zvorikine, ”Technology and the Laws of Its Development," Technology 22d Culture, III, No. 4 (Fall 1962) p.443. Levi's definition differs from the 94 34. Kranzberg, Professor of History (1967) In its simplest terms, technology is man's efforts to cope with his physical environment and his attempts to subdue or control that environment by means of his imagination and ingenuity in the use of available resources... It deals with human work, with man's attempg to satisfy his wants by human action on physical objects. 5 Insofar as the three definitions focus on human work or human activity they are similar. In one respect Drucker's and Kranzberg's definitions are identical, to wit, "human action on physical objects." What sets Zvorikine's definition apart from the other two is its em- In this respect Zvorikine, a Soviet "Techno- phasis on "social production.” professor of history, is influenced by Karl Marx's writings. logy," Marx writes, ”discloses man's mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations."86 This con- ception of technology, Marx extends beyond hgm§p_activity to plants and animals. He terms this activity, ”Nature's Technology,” and defines it as ”the formation of the organs of plants and animals, which organs serve as instruments of production fer sustaining life."87 Sub—grogp IIIb - Characteristically transactional with emphasis on human activity: 85Technology god western Civilization, op, £13,, pp.5 and 6. 86Karl Marx, Capital, translated from the German by Samuel Moore and Edward Areling (New York: International Publishers, 1947) footnote on p.367. Also in Karl Marx, Dag Kapital, Vbl. I (German reprint of the original 1867, werke. Berlin, Dietz verlag, l962) footnote on . 393. p 87Ib1'd. 95 35. Toynbee, Historian (1961) Human activities are numerous and various. ngre is technology: the invention, manufacture, and use of tools. 36. Daumas, MUseum Curator (1969) ...a form of activity conventionally designated by the term ”technology”, as distinct from both simple applied techniques and the science of discovery.89 37. Watson-Watt, Physicist (1962) Technology is the selective adaptation of one or more of the processes and materials identified and described by science, and their embodiment in devices designed to serve the needs of mankind in 5ts progress from savagery toward advanced social evolution.9 38. White, Professor of History (1962) Technology is defined as the systematic modification of the physical environment for human ends. 1 39. McKay, Professor of Applied Physics (1967) Technology is essentially a codified way of doing things, and much of this is based on systematic theoretical knowledge, which is science, but 5083 simply on codified experience, which is what I mean by "art". 88Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of Histoyy, XII (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961) p.658. 89Maurice Daumas, A_History of Technology §_Invention, Vbl. II, (Translated from the French by Eileen B. Hennessy, New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1969) p.11. 90Sir Robert watson-Watt, ”Technology in the Mbdern World,” Thg Technological Order, op. cit., p.l. 91Lynn White, Jr. "The Act of Invention: Causes, Contexts, Con- tinuities and Consequences," The Technological Order, op, cit., p.114. 9ZGordon MCKay, "Applied Science and Technological Progress,“ Science, Vol. 156 (30 June 1967) p.1706. 96 40. Kockelmans, Philosopher of Science (1966) Technology should be conceived as a mode of bringing to light, of dis—covering...things which cannot dis-close themselves.93 Note that the twenty-eight definitions in Group III evidence only the intrinsic and transactional characteristics. The elements of definition for this group are classified in Table 3. Summayy: The foregoing analysis brings into relief distinct patterns of thought which warrant consideration in any discussion on the meaning of technology. In sum: a) There appears to be general agreement on the instrumental function of technology--"to extend human capability,” "to serve human purposes," ”to solve practical problems.” b) The naturalistic, industrial connotation of technology is either implied or literally expressed in most of the definitions: For Merrill, technology connotes the ”practical arts"; for Veblen and Levi, the ”industrial arts”; for Zvorikine, ”industrial production”; for Forbes, "engineering.” ‘ c) Several writers include extrinsic elements in their definitions, but none define technology in those terms alone; there appears to be a general consensus that ”technology is much more than tools and artifacts.'94 d) Most of the definitions evidence only one characteristic, predominantly the transactional; and all of the defining elements in the transactional category either name or imply some kind of human activity. 93Joseph J. Kockelmans, Phenomenology and Physical Science (Pitts- burgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1966) p.173. ‘94Kranzberg and Pursell, Technology in western Civilization, Vol. 1, %Eé c1t., p.6. See also, Markovic, Praxis, 9p, gi£., p.343;’GaI5raith, Industrial State, 0 cit 24‘ ‘ . .__3’ p. , Mesthene Fourth Annual Report. PFEgram.TecEEology and oc1ety, 2p: cit., p.44; Kockelmans,’Phenomeno- logy and Physical Science, 92: El: ,‘57173; and Drucker, Techfiology and .___—.___._. Culture, V01. I, No. 1, Op. cit., p.30. 97 Table 3. CLASSIFICATION OF THE ELEMENTS IN GROUP III DEFINITIONS Intrinsic (Techniques) Transactional (Applied Science) 13. all intelligent techniques 27. applied science - process of transforming theoretical 14. all the different techniques conceptions 15. collection of techniques 28. applied science — application of the data, principles, and theories of science Intrinsic (Knowledge) 29. applied science — application 16. joint stock of knowledge of scientific method and and experience scientific theories l7. knowledge selected and 30. branch of applied science processed 31. application of the method 18. embodiment of knowledge of science 19. social pool of knowledge Transactional (Human Work and 20. form of human knowledge Human Activity) _ 32. human work; human action Transactional (Application of Knowledge) 33. means of work; human activity 21. applicatiOn of knowledge, 34. human work; man's efforts to cope primarily scientific with physical environment 22. application of scientific 35. human activities: invention, knowledge manufacture, and use of tools 23. application of organized 36. form of activity knowledge 24. systematic application of Transactional (HUman activity scientific or other in other terms) organized knowledge 37. selective adaptation of proc- 25. application of new scientific esses and materials; their knowledge, application of the embodiment in devices products of the management sciences 38. systematic modification of the physical environment 26. organization of knowledge 39. codified way of doing things 40. mode of bringing to light, of dis—covering 98 It can be argued, and rightly so, that a concise definition does not of itself convey a writer's total conception of 'technology',that it should be examined in the light of its supporting statements. The argu- ment can, of course, be leveled at any dictionary-type definition. The fact is, writers do make such statements, presumably with the intent of conveying something. It is that something which was subjected to scru- tiny, and only for the purpose of eliciting common elements of meaning. (The elements from Tables 1, Z, and 3 are summarized in Table 4.) Two Extended Definitions of Technology Allusion has already been made to the arbitrariness of most defini— tions of technology, and the urgent need to clarify its meaning on sound theoretical grounds. Before that task is undertaken (in Chapter IV), let us first examine briefly two theoretically conceived definitions, one by Ralph Barton Perry, the other by Charles Merris, each of whom locates technology in a different context, yet provides an equally plausible conception of it. Perry views technology as a form of knowledge, whereas Morris views it as a form of human activity. Technology as Knowledgg: Perry's definition of technology is an incidental outcome of his theory of value. It is framed in the context of what Perry conceives to be the dominant realms of value; and in that context technology plays an important role in the methodology for promoting cultural values. A synopsis of Perry's treatment of the realms of value should suffice to show how he arrives at his definition of technology. 1. Perry defines value in terms of interst; in his words, ”any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, 99 Table 4. A SUMMARY OF THE ELEMENTS OF DEFINITION FROM THE PRECEDING TABLES INTRINSIC ELEMENTS Knowledge; a form of human knowledge; selected and processed knowledge; scientific knowledge; all knowledge Realization of ideas Skills; bodies of skills ' Techniques; any technique; all techniques; all intelligent techniques TRANSACTIONAL ELEMENTS Human activities; a form of activity; human action on physical objects; activities which produce alterations in the material world Human work Application of knowledge; application of organized knowledge; application of scientific knowledge Application of scientific theories; application of the data, principles, and theories of science; application of the methods of science Process of transforming theoretical conceptions; process of production; any process Scientific management Systematic modification of the physical environment; systematic treatment of any thing; systematic application of knowledge Selective adaptation of processes and materials Embodiment of ideas in matter Embodiment of selected processes in devices Mode of dealing with Nature Mode of bringing to light Mode of dis-covering Invention, manufacture, and use of tools Means of human activity; means of work; means of accomplishing purposes Methods; any method of doing or making . Procedures for making, using, and doing things; all practical procedures Codified way of doing things; how things are done or made Engineering rules Productive systems EXTRINSIC ELEMENTS Materials; all material resources Tools; any tool Machinery Devices Physical objects Any physical equipment Combination of labor, materials, and equipment Any product; design characteristics of products Things done or made Results of activities 100 is taken in it.”95 50 defined, the concept of value may be considered from the standpoint of individual interest or from that of group interest. When a group of individuals seeks to achieve a common object of interest, that object assumes the status of a value; and a group so organized defines an institution.96 In so far as every individual within a group pursues various objects of interest, an institution comprises a complex of interests. Conversely the same individuals, each with a variety of interests, belong to a number of institutions. ”If an institution is a specific way in which the members of a society organize for the promotion of common interests," says Perry, ”there can be as many institutions, in the broad sense, as there are interests.”97 Certain institutions, how— ever, are deemed more important than others because of the significant role they play in human life. 'According to Perry, there are those which are by general consent regarded as the major cultural institutions, namely, the institutions of conscience or custom, of polity, law, economy, science, art, education, and religion.98 These, Perry holds, are the "institutions of which there always have been, always are, and always will be, eligible members.”99 The interests they claim are universal. When these universal interests are systematically described, and ”the master concept of such a description is given the name 'value', then these major realms of human 95Ralph Barton Perry, General Theo£y_of_yglg§ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926) pp.llS—ll6. 96Perry, Maxim, _gp_. £15., pp.152 ff. 971331, p.154. 98M” p.156. 9?;p;g., pp.l4 and 155. 101 life are specifically described as realms of value.”100 2. The pursuit of interests and their description implies know- ledge. There is no institution, says Perry, without some degree of knowing; and insofar as institutionalized knowledge is generalized and systematized, it merits the name of 'science'. For ”science is simply knowledge; or, in a more restricted sense, knowledge when this has reached a certain pitch of perfection."101 Hence, for every cultural institution there is a corresponding social or cultural science which mediates social action. Conscience has its science of conscience to promote collective approval or disapproval; polity has its political science to centralize the direction and control of human affairs; law has its jurisprudence to define and defend human rights; economy has its economics to produce and distribute material needs. Likewise, science has its science of science; art, its science of art; education, its science of education; and religion its science of religion.102 Perry draws a distinction between the cultural sciences (knowledge of the world which man has made for himself) and the natural sciences (knowledge of the world which man takes as he finds it).103 But he argues that both divisions of science are concerned with facts (verifiable descriptions of their respective worlds) arrived at via one over-all method of knowing. "The method of the cultural sciences," Perry asserts, like that of all sciences, is descriptive. If knowledge consists in.well—grounded expectations, then there is one over-all method loqlpig. 102;p;g., pp.l68-l73. 101lbid., p.174. 103Ibid., p.169. 102 of knowing, which is to form expectations I82 then look to see whether things are or are not as expected. That the cultural sciences focus on non—existent norms or ideals as their objects of interest does not nullify Perry's assertion. On the contrary, ”the pursuit of them as standards of comparison do exist," he says, "and the ideals and norms are a part of their description."105 3. The methodology of cultural science distinguishes three ”branches” of the descriptive method: explanatopy, normative, and Eggp- nological. The method most frequently employed by the cultural sciences is the explanatory method: It ”takes the total fact of interested endeavor with its objects, and makes statements concerning its origins, constituents, conditions, and causal relations."106 The normative method takes norms or standards as objects of interest, compares them with human achievements, and on that basis makes normative judgments. Given the norms, the technological method determines the most efficient means for achieving them.107 Hence, every cultural institution has its corresponding technology: Conscience or custom has its ethical technology; polity, its political technology; law, its legal technology; economy, its technology of econo- my; and so on. When normative approvals or disapprovals go unheeded, or polity fails to control, or law fails to direct and control human affairs, or economy fails to produce, technological judgments become the targets of criticism; technology has ceased to be effective. ”Technology,” says Perry, "is knowledge selected and processed for 104Ibid., pp.l74-175. 106Ibid. 105Ibid., p.176. 107Ibid., pp.l76-l77. W 103 ”108 Hence the test of technology is its efficiency some ulterior use. in practice, in achieving desired ends or objects of interest. One who assumes the role of ”a technologist” is, by virtue of his instrumental role, prepared to give advice on how one ought to go about pursuing his object of interest. His primary concern.gp§ technologist is not that of practice per se, but rather of the theory underlying practice. In that capacity he searches in the corpus of existing knowledge for what pro— mises to be useful in practice; ”but in knowledge, including knowledge of practice, it is theory which speaks the last word."109 4. Perry's use of the term 'science' has three distinct, though related, connotations: general, specific, and methodological. He uses it in a general sense with reference to a major cultural institution, namely, the institution of science (the community of ”scientists” whose object of interest is verifiable knowledge). In the particular sense, the term is used with reference to a specific body of verifiable knowledge; the knowledge obtained and classified by each of the cultural institutions (including the "science of science“). In the methodological sense, the term 'science' is used with reference to the ways and means employed by each institution in the pursuit of its objects of interest. It is in the latter sense that technology joins with science in the service of insti- tutionalized pursuits. Unlike science, technology is not an institution; it functions only in a methodological capacity, namely, to convert scientific knowledge into ”how to” knowledge. Given the object of in- terest as an end to be pursued, technology provides the means to attain it: hence, the ”technology of science.”110 1081b1d., pp.309-310. 1101131101., pp.296 ff. 109Ibid., p.182. 104 Technology as HUman Activity: Mbrris' conception of technology emerges from his discussion on ”the major types of discourse” and their relations to "the dominant forms of human activity.”111 The discussion is grounded in what Mbrris terms "a behavioral theory of signs,”112 certain aspects of which are essential to an understanding of his con- ception of technology. 1. The theory of signs distinguishes three dimensions of sign functioning: the semantical, syptactical, and pragmatical. The seman- tical function relates signs to the objects they signify; the syntacti— cal relates signs to other signs; the pragmatical relates signs to interpreters. The three dimensions of sign functioning, in turn, corres- pond to three major types of discourse: scientific, aesthetic, and tech— nological. As Morris explains it: scientific discourse brings into prominence the relations of signs to objects (the semantical dimension), aesthetic discourse accents in a distinctive way the sign structure itself (the syntactical dimension), technological discourse emphasizes the efficacy of 113 signs in the practice of the users (the pragmatical dimension). 2. The major types of discourse are the components and products of what Morris conceives to be the dominant forms of human activity, namely, science, ppp, and technology. It follows, then, that an analysis 111Charles W. Morris, "Science, Art and Technology," Thp Kenyon Review, Vol. I (1939), p.420. 112Morris defines 'sign' as ”something that directs behavior with respect to something that is not at the moment a stimulus." This ”rough" definition a ears in the glossary of his Sigps, Langppge and Behavior (New York: PEEntice-Hall, 1946) p.354. His emph351s on bEEEvior” links the theory of signs with human needs and activities. See also Charles S. Pierce, "Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs," in Justus Buchler, Philgsophical writings of Peirce (New York: Dover Publications, 1955) pp.9 —119. 113Footnote in ”Science, Art and Technology," 9p, pip,, p.411. 105 of the types of discourse in terms of their components and products can throw light on the nature of their corresponding forms of human activity and their interrelations; or as Morris puts it: The activities of the scientist, the artist, and the technologist are mutually supporting activities, and their differences and interrelations may be discerned in the differences and interrela- tions of scientific, aesthetic, and technological discourse.11 Scientific discourse is characterized by statements of fact which accurately describe space-time objects and phenomena, statements which empirical evidence confirms (or disconfirms), and on the basis of which accurate predictions can be made regarding the world of fact. The instrumentalities and the procedures by means of which such discourse is obtained, defines scientific activity.115 Aesthetic discourse, according to Morris, is ”that specialized type of language which is the actual work of art (the poem, the painting, the music).”116 Unlike scientific discourse whose signs are restricted to confirmable truths, aesthetic discourse communicates values which are embodied in the works of art. ”In works of art,” says Merris, ”men and women have embodied their experience of value, and these experiences are communicable to those who perceive the molded medium.”117 Technological discourse issues in prescriptiVe-informative state- ments, the purpose of which is ”to induce a mode of action.”118 Sudh discourse is characterized by statements which suggest or inform how something ought, should, or must be done if a given end is to be attained. They are essentially ”how to” statements, which aim at efficacy in practice. 1141bid., p.420. 117Ibid., pp.415-4l6. 1151bid., pp.411-413. 118ibid., p.417. 1161bid., p.414. 106 Technological discourse, Mbrris writes, aims to give information concerning the techniques for attaining specific ends, whatever they may be. It is "how to" discourse: discourse informing one how to rivet, how to play the flute, how to cook a duck, how to speak Spanish. Since the goals may be anything whatever, there is technological discourse relevant to science, to morality, to religion, to mathematics, etc. Such technological discourse neither appraises the goal for which it is relevant nor aims to incite the actions it prescribes for reaching a goal; a manual on flute playing does not extol the significance of the flute nor tell the person that he ought to acquire flute~playing techniques: it merely tells how to play the flute. And the case is similar for technological treatises in engineering, medicine, agriculture, and the like. A oal is taken for granted; the treatises tell how to attain it. 3. The important points to be gleaned from the foregoing brief analysis are these: a) Morris' conception of technology explicitly centers on human activity, and can be understood only in the context of his theory of discourse. b) Because it stems from a theory, the theory furnishes the grounds for its validity. c) On these grounds, technolo- gical activity can be distinguished from other forms of activity by its distinctively pragmatic function; and as a theoretical construct it has a wide range of applicability. d) In its pragmatic function, it agrees with the original Aristotelian meaning, to wit, a manual on flute play- ing does not differ in principle from a manual on rhetoric; each provides the means (in the form of systematized prescriptive-informative state- ments) for pursuing given ends. e) It is important to note that techno— logical activity ceases with the provision of the means--the actual performance of a flute player, though it exhibits the efficacy of the means in practice, is not a technological activity. f) Technological discourse recognizes scientific facts as human values, and provides the most expedient means for their objectification in concrete or abstract ends. 11981 , Language gpd Behavior, op. cit., p.143. 107 Summapy The above discussion should suffice to substantiate the prior assertions that ”technology” is an indispensable concept in contemporary thought, and that writers who deal with the subject entertain variegated conceptions of it. The inquiry centered first on a collection of dictionary-type statements of definition, selected from scholarly papers representing various fields of study. An analysis of the statements revealed significant patterns of defining elements, indicating that there is some semblance of meaning in their collectivity. A consideration of these elements is deemed essential to the ensuing discussion on the nature and scope of technology. The inquiry then shifted to an analysis of two extended defini- tions, each framed in a totally different theoretical matrix. It was found that Perry locates ”technology” in the context of the Theory of Value, and defines it as §_fgpm of_knowledge; Morris, on the other hand, locates the concept in the Theory of Signs, and defines it as §_fppm_pf hpmgp activipy. In so far as their conceptions of technology emerge as incidental by-products of their more immediate objects of interest, their theoretical models are not sufficiently developed for purposes of identifying and ordering specific subject matter of instruction. They do, nevertheless, underline the urgent need of a sound theoretical approach to the problem of clarifying the concept. As Durcker puts it: "we desperately need a real understanding, and a real theory, a real model of technology.”120 The discussion to follow is directed toward that end. 120Peter F. Drucker, ”work and Tools," Technology gpd Culture, pp, git,, p.36. CHAPTER IV THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF TECHNOLOGY The analysis in the preceding chapter more or less substantiates the previous claim that there is no one consensually received definition of 'technology'; that different scholars use the word to mean different things in different contexts. NOtwithstanding their disparate individual points of view, however, the definitions they proffer, when taken collect- ively, do mark out a vaguely discernible field of common referents; i.e. they seem to convey a general notion of what the word is supposed to mean. But more importantly, the analysis reveals a pattern of inter- related elements which should prove useful in establishing a basis for working toward a meaningful synthesis. Given the elements of definition most often attributed to, and the concepts usually associated with, 'technology'-—taking into consi- deration the history of the word since its origin in Greek thoughtl-- the object of the present chapter is to try to integrate certain essential characteristics into a conceptual model in the context of which a functional definition of 'technology' can be framed. Or what amounts to the same thing, to fix the meaning of an old word in order 1This consideration is predicated on the assumption that ”symbols, words, phrases, and expressions of any kind always possess a content due to previous employment;...there always remains a residue of the original content." Ernest H. Hutten, Ihp_0rigins of Science (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962) p.123. '—_ 108 109 to render it serviceable for effective communication in contemporary thought. "In fixing the meaning of words," Mill advises that, we ought to endeavour to render them significative of the most important distinctions which, without too glaring a violation of received usage, they can be made to express. we ought further, when we are restricted to the employment of old words, to endeavour as far as possible that it shall not be necessary to struggle against the old associations with those words. It may not be superfluous to recall that 'technology' originated in the context of the abstract-verbal technics; and that for two millenia its use had been limited (by convention) to "technology of rhetoric” and ”technology of grammar.” Only after its introduction into American literature3 with reference to the principles and nomenclatures of the manual—mechanical technics did the word gradually come into wider use; acquiring different connotations in different contexts. Perhaps the most familiar terms in current literary usage are those which emerged in connection with things of a mechanical nature: terms such as agri- cultural technology, military technology, industrial technology; tech- nology of manufacture, of transport, of construction, of communication, and the like. But countless other applications of the word have become common-place in scholarly discourse: e.g. those associated with human institutions, such as the technology of economy, of polity, of religion; those with a historical connotation, namely, prehistoric technology, ancient technology, medieval technology, modern technology; and various others, like general technology, scientific technology, craft technology; biomedical technology, behavioral technology, genetic technology, 2John Stuart Mill, Egppygipp.§pmp_Unsettled estions on Political Economy (London: Longmans, Green, Readerj—ahdFDyer9218747—pr80f__—_———_— 3Jacob Bigelow, Elements pf Technology (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little and Wilkins, 1830). 110 psychotechnology, pd infinitum. In order to satisfy the aforementioned requirements, 'technology' has to be given a precise, yet comprehensive, meaning: a meaning which at once fits all genuine acceptations of the word, and discriminately rules out all pseudo "technologies" (colloquialisms which have inad- vertently crept into scholarly discourse).4 It will be attempted here to ascertain the genuineness of the various uses to which the word 'technology' is commonly put, by identifying the principal characteris- tics that the so-called "technologies" hold in common: e.g., what does "technology of rhetoric” have in common with ”technology of economy”, or what does ”industrial technology" have in common with ”educational technology”; in short, what does technology mean? Toward a Functional Definition of 'Technology' A consideration of the question "What does technology mean?" is inevitably a study of the symbolic function of the word 'technology', as well as the propositional function of the statements in which it, among other words, is embodied as a constituent element. The first pertains to statements of definition, the second to assertions. The present discussion is concerned with definition; however, insofar as in- direct reference to propositions cannot be avoided—-not to mention the numerous semantic problems encountered in the process of defining words with words—-perhaps a somewhat superficial treatment of a few relevant 4The word 'technologies' is usually used colloquially as a synonym for 'techniques' or 'technics'. It is employed here in an ad hgg_semantic sense with_reference to the list of supposed branches 6f'technology. lll concepts may help with the task at hand. 1. The question ”What does 'technology' mean?” is not the same as the question "What does writer X mean by 'technology'?” The first question implies that the word hp; a meaning, that 'technology' un- equivocally signifies some definite object (thing, event, idea). The second suggests that its meaning is not fixed; it asks for an opinion or a special sense in which the word is to be understood. In answer to the question ”What does technology mean?” one may inadvertently state that "technology means” such and such (a logical expression) when what he really intends is ”'technology', §§_I_p§g'ppg term, means” such and such (a psychological expression).5 Since both kinds of statements fall within the purview of ”definition” the distinction is not of little import to the task of clarifying the meaning of technology. 2. The statement that "technology is the scientific study of the industrial arts"6 is not the same as the statement that ”technology is studied in Industrial Arts (or that ”Industrial Arts centers on the study of technology”).7 The first statement is a definition (to be construed here as a hypothetical one) which purports to answer the question ”What is technology?” The second statement, on the other hand, begs the question, for in order to know specifically what is studied in Industrial Arts depends on how 'technology' is defined. Hence the second statement 5See Susan K. Langer' 5 discussion on the logical and psychological aspects of meaning in Philosophy_ in a NeWK (New York: A Mentor Book, The New American Library of World Literature, 1962) pp. 54— 55. ézhp Qxfppd English Dictionapy, Vol. XI, all editions. 7A notion widely subscribed to in the Industrial Arts profession. Cf. Chapter I 112 is an assertion, the truth of which can be ascertained only in light of the definition. In other words, the assertion that "technology is studied in Industrial Arts” is true if, and only if, Industrial Arts education does in fact center on the "scientific study of the industrial arts." Whether the given hypothetical definition is “true” or not is of course another matter, irrelevant to the formal distinction between an assertion and a definition. 3. In common parlance it may suffice to say that a definition is an explanation of the meaning of a word, stated in other, more familiar, words. For purposes here, we need to qualify the statement by first ‘ noting that the meaning of a word (a word that is the name of a subject of discourse) has two aspects: a denotation or extension and a connota- j pigp or intension. In the first instance, the word 'teacher', for example, denotes ”Socrates,” "Pestalozzi," 'WMIia MOntessori," ”Anne M. Sullivan," "John Dewey," and many others; instances such as these consti— tute the extension of the word 'teacher'. In the second instance, ‘teacher' connotes "skilled in the technics of instructing,” ”knowledge- able," ”humanitarian,” and the like; qualities such as these, which are attributed to, or predicated of, 'teacher' constitute its intension. The latter aspect is logically important; for it constitutes the definition of the word.8 With regard to definition, one further distinction needs yet to be noted: i.e., the distinction between a lexicographic definition and a 8Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (New York: Harcourt, Bra—Ce and Company,—l_934i "— pp.3l—32. 113 stinulative definition. A.Stipulative definition is one that is deliberately legislated in order to delimit vagueness and to eliminate ambiguity. Either a new word is invented to unequivocally signify one referent, or a new, precise definition is stipulated fer an existing but heretofOre vague or ambiguous word. Definitions of this kind are exemplified in dictionaries of science, medical dictionaries, mathematical treatises, legal documents, and the like. A.Iexicographic definition is one which has been established.by custom or common usage. SuCh defini- tions are compiled in.general, abridged and comprehensive dictionaries wherein succinct phrases, along with synonymous and analagous terms, are supposed to eXplain the various meanings commonly attributed to a word. Needless to say, dictionaries are not the original sources of meanings; nor are dictionary makers the sole arbiters in instances of equivocation. words originate with people who use them and give them meanings; dictionary makers, on the other hand, function as historians, in the capacity of whiCh they systematically ferret out, and provide laconic accounts of, the various ways in whiCh they find words used.9 That being the case, their definitions of 'technology' merely reflect the most common acceptations of the word. In.view of the critical analysis of such acceptations in.the previous chapter, wherein they were deemed unacceptable, lexicographic definitions based upon them certainly cannot be honored. 9Examples of definitions supported by historical references may be found in the Oxford English.Dictionary. It may be of interest to note that the entry under "teChnology" in every edition of the OED (1928-1961) is a carbon copy of the original one whiCh.appears in its 1919 forerunner, A.New English.DiCtionary oaniStoriCal'PrinCiples, 'Wherein the latest historical reference to—the term is dated 1882. _______._~——- ..._._._— —'—————————'———'_—- 114 If 'technology' is to be retained as a useful word to symbolize an indispensable concept, obviously its meaning needs to be sharpened. As an alternative to the numerous unacceptable lexicographic definitions, it will be attempted here to give 'technology' a new connotation, to stipulate a definition.10 A Preliminggy Generalization: From an etymological standpoint, technology may at once be viewed as a form of human activity and as a form of human knowledge, what man does and what man knows. Hence what— ever else may be said of technology, it is first of all a human concern, something peculiar to man as actor—knower, and its meaning can be defined only in terms of the acting-knowing relationship. This preliminary generalization narrows down somewhat the scope of the present inquiry, for it embraces the aggregate of elements identi- fied in the previously analyzed definitions and at the same time rules out as inadequate those definitions which tend to restrict the meaning . . . . - . . . ll of technology to any one 1ntr1n51c, transactional, or extrin51c quality. But as far as it goes the generalization reveals little if anything that is peculiar to technology alone. For science too may be generalized as a human concern--a form of human activity and a form of human knowledge. The same may likewise be said of art, of economy, of polity, or religion, 10”It is a curious aradox, uzzling to the s bolic mind, that .. .P P. m . definitions, theoretically, are nothing but statements of symbolic abbreviations, irrelevant to the reasoning and inserted only for practi— cal convenience, while yet, in the development of a subject, they always require a very large amount of thought, and often embody some of the greatest achievements of analysis." (Bertrand Russell quoted by Weitz in ”Analysis and Real Definition”, pp. cit.) llSppra, Chapter III. 115 etc., whether these human concerns are labeled "human activities"12 or ”human knowledge"13 or "human institutions”14 or ”provinces of civili- zation."15 Hence the task here is to invent a classificatory system which at once embraces all realms of human concern, and shows where technology logically fits into the scheme. Technology as a Form of Human Activipy The concept of ppm§p_activipy blankets a broad range of things that man does which doubtless submit to no one tidy system of classification. They might, for example, be grouped according to conscious and unconscious activities, overt and covert activities, or mental and physical activi- ties; or on the basis of theoretical and practical activities, work and play activities, or purposive and ahnless activities. Although none of these dichotomous pairs is likely to provide an all-embracing system, the latter pair is presumed to be the most useful in establishing a basis for the discussion to follow. Purposive and Aimless Human Activities: Purposive human activity presupposes aims in mind, or ends in view-—the things that man does ”on 12Cf., Charles w. Morris, ”Science, Art and Technology,” Tho Kenyon Review, Volume I (New York: AMS Reprint Company, 1939) pp.409—423. Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study pf_Histopy (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) pp.658-662. Ernst Cassirer, Ap_Essay pp_M§p_(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944) pp.72—221. and Brothers, 1962) pp.5-28. Philip H. Phenix, Realms pf_Meaning (New York: MCGraw—Hill Company, 1964) pp.28-57. l4Ralph Barton Perry, Realms 9f_Value (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954) pp.lSZ-l67. 15Paul Schrecker, Work gpd_Histopy (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967) pp.lZ-18. 116 purpose". Such activity includes both mental and physical acts, covert as well as overt acts, acts which are consciously directed toward pre- determined ends. (Granted, unconscious acts often enter into purposive endeavours; but such acts though they may serve predetermined ends are not in and of themselves done on purpose). Aimless human activity, on the other hand, includes mental or physical acts, overt or covert acts, conscious as well as unconscious acts, acts which collectively serve no particular predetermined end. were we to match a list of descriptive adjectives, such as 'intentional', 'deliberate', 'reasoned','voluntary', 'planned', 'considered', and 'serious', against a second list, such as 'unintentional', 'precipitate', 'instinctive', 'automatic', 'accidental', 'casual', and 'frivolous', it would be safe to say that those of the first group characterize purposive activity, the latter group, aimless or random activity. Frivolous doodling during an academic lecture, for example, is an aimless activity, whereas serious copying of lecture notes is purposive; an accidental trip or stumble is an aimless act, whereas the intentional stumble, of say a circus clown, is purposiVe. An ongoing human activity need but satisfy the condition of having a predetermined end in view (whether or not it does in fact proceed as planned, or whether that end is or is not ultimately realized) to qualify as a pur- posive human activity. Work and Play as Purposive Activities: Every purposive activity involves an expenditure of effort or exertion directed toward the accomplishment of some predetermined end. The principle applies to both 117 work and play.16 The concept of wgpk immediately suggests numerous determinate substantives generally associated with industry, e.g., 'labor', 'chore', 'toil', 'drudgery', 'grind', and the like, or the less deter- minate (and somewhat less pejorative) ones, like 'occupation', 'profession', 'employment', 'business', and so forth. The concept of plpy, on the other hand, is usually thought of as pastime activity commonly associated with 'sport', 'games', 'fun', 'frolic', and the like, terms which suggest the absence of any end except that of amusement, recreation, or pure enjoyment. Play may be either deliberate or pgpdpm; when play is deliberate, it fits the category of purposive activity, but when play is random, it is simply classified as an aimless activity. Take chess playing, for I example: to play the game for the sheer joy of outwitting an opponent, defines deliberate playing; but to casually toy with captured pieces between moves defines random playing. The first activity is purposive, the second, aimless. Again with reference to chess: playing the game merely for the joy and satisfaction of outwitting the opponent is not the same as that in which the game is played to win a wager or a tourna- ment trophy. Both activities are purposive by virtue of their having definite ends in view; both involve an expenditure of effort (mental and physical); the latter may be every bit as enjoyable as the former; and the involvement in one could lead to an involvement in the other. But the first, insofar as it is performed primarily for the sake of enjoyment, 16According to John Dewey, ”both involve ends consciously enter~ tained and the selection and adaptation of materials and processes den signed to effect the desired ends;” in Democragy ppd Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916) p.237. See also Paul Schrecker's concept of work in work gpd Histopy, op. ict., pp.l7-l8. 118 is play; the second, inasmuch as its purpose transcends mere enjoyment, is work.17 Human werk and Technology: On the basis of the foregoing chain of reasoning it may tentatively be concluded that technology is essentially human work, as opposed to play. Having logically arrived at that con- clusion, it may not be superfluous at this juncture to take a closer look at some of the elements of definition identified with 'technology' in the preceding‘chapter. It was stated there that all definitions of the term exhibit certain qualities which readily submit to a classifica- tory system of intrinsic, extrinsic, and transactional elements. The latter, as summarized in Table 4,18 appear as follows: 1. Human activities; a form of human activity; human action on physical objects; activities which produce alterations in the material world Homan work Application of knowledge; application of organized knowledge; application of scientific knowledge 4. Application of scientific theories; application of the data, principles and theories of science; application of the methods of science 5. Process of transforming theoretical conceptions; process of production; any process 6. Systematic modification of the physical environment; systematic treatment of anything; systematic application of knowledge 7 Scientific management 8 Selective adaptation of processes and materials 9. Embodiment of selected processes in devices 10. Embodiment of ideas in matter 11 Mode of bringing to light 12. Mede of dis-covering (AN 17A similar distinction between work and play is afforded by Herbert Marcuse in Eros ppg Civilization (New York: Vintage Books, 1962) p.196. 18Supra, Chapter III. 119 13. Mode of dealing with Nature 14. Invention, manufacture, and use of tools 15. Means of human activity; means of work; means of accomplishing purposes 16. Methods; any method of doing or making 17. Procedures for making, using, and doing things; all practical procedures 18. Codified way of doing things; how things are done or made 19. Engineering rules 20. Productive systems If there is one c0ncept which embraces and integrates all of these elements, that concept is human work.19 The first fifteen more or less describe kinds of work activities; the last five typify means of work. It is of particular interest to note that most of the elements have connotative significance in various realms of work. For example, the "embodiment of ideas in matter" can be attributed to artistic work; ”productive systems”, to economic work; ”mode of bringing to light”, to religious work. Even those elements which are usually associated with industrial work--e.g., the "use of tools”, "practical procedures", ”in- vention“, "scientific management"—-may be attributed to artistic, economic, political, and religious work; agricultural, military, medical, domestic and educational work. Although they may not be construed as unique attributes of technology they do nevertheless give a general idea of what technology is supposed to mean, and as such, they do provide a basis fOr defining the concept as a form of work. 19They support Peter Drucker's assertion that ”technology must be considered as a system, that is, a collection of interrelated and inter- communicating units and activities. we know that we can study and under- stand such a system only if we have a unifying focus...work might provide the focus...” Quoted from ”werk and Tools", in Technology gpd Culture, V01. I, No. 1 (Winter 1959) p.36. See also George H. Daniels, ”The Big Question in the History of American Technology”, Technology gpd Culture, Vol. II, No. I (January 1970) pp.l-Zl. 120 The Basic Forms of Human work The further consideration of technology as human work is predicated on the assumption that pll_ppm§p_yppk_i§_basically scientific, pp_p§ghpij Egg, op_technological ip_fppp. This assumption is central to the present dissertation. It means that the concept of technology is categorially consonant with the concepts of science and technic;20 together they constitute the three p§§19_fppm§_of human work. In contradistinction, the concepts of art, economy, polity, religion, etc. constitute the various I§§1m§_of human work, and as such are categorially of a different (albeit related) class of concepts. The two classes are in fact so in— dissolubly related and so open to misunderstanding that their differences must be noted if confusion is to be avoided. In the first place, the basic fogm§_of work are implicit in every ppglm of work. Secondly, the things that man does, the multifarious kipd§_of work which distinguish one realm from another, can actually be scrutinized and theoretically classified according to the three basic forms of work. At this stage of its development the conceptual model may be illustrated diagrammatically (Figure 2) to show at a glance where tech- nological work fits within the framework of human activity. Having reached the stage, then, where technology has been identi— fied with the concepts of science and technic as basic forms of human work, it remains now to show how human work of every kind can in prin— ciple be classified according to the three basic fonms. The seemingly 20The term 'technic' is used here as a substantive to denote all of the so—called "fine arts" and ”useful arts”, and in the more general sense includes all sorts of technical tasks which man does "on purpose”. 121 Scientific Work Technological Purposive Technical Human Play Activity Aimless Non-human Figure 2. The Place of Technology in the Framework of Human Activity. arduous task of providing a conceptual scheme for distinguishing their characteristic differences is facilitated somewhat in that the essential determinants have already been furnished in the foregoing preliminary considerations: 1. the concept of work by definition is purposive human activity (which, of course, rules out non-human, aimless, and play activities); 2. the concept of purposive human activity implies the presence of (a) man as the agent or ggppp, (b) with a tentative or fixed aim in mind (c) actively engaged (expending effort) in doing or producing something via certain mpgpp (tools, materials, methods, guides to action) (d) for the purpose of bringing about some desired result or conseguences. This means that every conceivable kind of human work always involves an actor, some aim, certain means, and consequences; and it logically follows that if technology, science, and technic are the basic forms of human work which subsume every kind of human work, their distinguishing characteristics should become evident in the light of their respective aims, means, and consequences. A scheme for ordering the aims, means, and consequences of scientific, technological, and tech- nical work may be diagrammed as shown in Figure 3. 122 AIMS T MEANS CONSEQUENCES Tools - Materials - Methods - Guides Scientific werk Technological werk Technical Work Figure 3. Scheme for Ordering the Aims, Means, and Consequences of Scientific, Technological, and Technical werk. The foregoing conception is a vast oversimplification of this, the second, stage of the profferred model. Although its specific elements deserve extended philosophical analysis, such a treatment would protract the present study beyond its intended limits. Let it suffice to show by example how the aims, means, and consequences of technical, techno— logical, and scientific work can be scrutinized and differentiated according to the foregoing scheme. Technical WOrk: The many kinds of work that man does in the various realms referred to—-artistic, economic, political, religious; medical, military, industrial, domestic-—may be viewed as pimpl§_or complex tasks. For example, laundering, sewing, cooking and baking, in the domestic realm of work, are complex tasks which involve many simple ones like: sorting laundry, threading a needle, dicing vegetables, or preheating an oven; these tasks, in turn, are composites of simpler ones like: striking a match, opening an oven door, turning up the gas, etc. Simple tasks 123 may be viewed as the procedural stages in the process of performing complex tasks. In any event, the point to be made here is that every human.task which involves the manipulation of things, along with the requisite skill to manipulate them, regardless of their simplicity or complexity, defines technical yppk. The principle holds for every kind of work, in every realm of human concern. Tasks such as: turning a knob to activate a washing machine or turning a handwheel to adjust an astronomical telescope; sewing a torn garment or suturing a surgical incision; dicing a vegetable or cleaving a diamond; opening an over door or ”cracking” a bank vault; tying a shoe lace or stamping leather blanks on a shoe factory assembly line; writing a letter or penning a novel; adding up domestic expenses or calculating the gross national product; they all exemplify human work that is basically technical in form. They all involve the manipulation of things--physical objects, words, or mathematical symbols; they all require an expenditure of effort--physical and mental; and they all may actually be done by anyone—-neophite, master craftsman, or specialist in some profession-‘possessing the requisite technical skill and the means to execute them. In the technics of laundering, sewing, cooking and baking, the average homemaker assumes the role of technician whose immediate aims are to wash linens clean, to sew or mend wearable garments, to cook_or bake edible food. Whether or not her ends are successfully achieved depends, ippgp'glig, on the effectiveness of her manipulative skills and the means she employs in the attainment of her desired ends. She may, for example, launder fabrics according to the manufacturers' instructions, sew a garment according to a commercial pattern, cook a 124 meal according to a prescribed dietetic menu, bake a cake according to a §ppd Housekeeping recipe; or she may choose to do these things by rule of thumb or by trial and error. Similarly, a painter may create a land- scape painting in accordance with the rules of perspective drawing; a building contractor may erect a house according to the Graphic Apghi; tectural Standards; a surgeon may remove a human appendix guided by deGraaf's anatomical models; a despot may govern a people according to Machiavelli's precepts; an advocate may defend a client guided by the rules prescribed in Aristotle's Technic pp Rhetoric; or, like the home- maker, they may choose to perform their respective technics by other than prescribed guides. In any event, given the means--tools, materials, and guides to action (be they systematically ordered or randomly selected)-—their role as technicians in their respective realms of work is pp_gp_or pp_produce things. Hence, in the hierarchy of the three basic forms of work, technic is the most basic, and is implicit in both I technological and scientific work. Scientific werk: The concept of science has been more than ade— quately treated in the literature by scholars in various fields of in- quiry, particularly in the philosophy of science. Hewever, something about the aims, means and consequences of science needs to be noted in- asmuch as their distinguishing characteristics are essential to the further development of the present conceptual model. To begin with, science, like technology, may at once be viewed as a form of human knowledge, and as a fonn of human work. Without scienti- fic work there could be no scientific knowledge; man must exert a degree of effort toward its acquisition. But it does not follow that all men are able or willing to work toward its acquisition; nor does it fellow 125 that all work directed toward its acquisition is scientific. The aim of scientific work is to understand the nature of things, to come pp kppp with the highest possible degree of certainty their natural order and their underlying causes. That being the case, man gpp scientist desires positive knowledge, knowledge that within the bounds of human powers meets the criteria of truth, proof, and certainty. By means of rigorous methods peculiar to scientific work, man gpg scientist employs his natural tools--the senses, natural talents, powers of reaso -- along with his artificial (man-made) tools--10gic, mathematics, precise physical instruments--to systematically investigate and study the phenomena of nature (both human and non-human) with the intent of dis— covering new knowledge or to confirm or disconfirm_prior discoveries. Scientific work ends with systematized positive knowledge: truths in the form of theories and laws, verified in proof through rigorous repli- cation, shared through publication, classified and added to the joint stock of theoretical knowledge. The knowledge thus obtained leads to further scientific inquiry, and provides the groundwork for technological work. It should perhaps be noted that theoretical knowledge in the broad— \est sense of the term is not peculiar to science alone. Nor is the theo- retical knowledge of science the only source of guiding principles from which practice may proceed. On the contrary, many theories about the nature of things and their relations are supposedly derived by means other than science, e.g., revelation, intuition, common sense. Like science, they all lay claim to knowledge, and they all furnish principles which may be adopted as guides to action. Even the pseud0*sciences--astrology, 126 cabalism, palmistry, phrenology, and the like--entertain systems of theoretical ”truths”. The point is that even though such ”truths” can in no way be substantiated, demonstrably or experimentally, they are nevertheless relied upon as guides to human action; and even though certain realms (or sub~realms) of human activity do not qualify as "sciences", they nevertheless do have (by virtue of their existence as realms of human activity) their technical and technological work. Technological werk: In the domestic technics of laundering, sewing, cooking and baking, a homemaker is not immediately concerned with theo- retical scientific knowledge, (e.g., the chemistry of laundry detergents, the comparative tensile strengths of synthetic yarns, the nature of enzymes, the concept of antivitamins, the physical properties of heat, and the like). Nor does she, in the role of technician, need to know how theoretical principles apply to her domestic technics. Such concerns transcend the bounds of technical work. Baking a cake according to a recipe, for example, is not the same as working out a recipe according to chemical, physical, and mathemati- cal principles. Both may in fact be done by one and the same homemaker; however, the two undertakings are quite different in form by virtue of their difference in aims, means, and consequences. The first fits the category of technical work; its aim is to bake an edible cake. The second fits the category of technological work; it aims to devise the most expedient pgy:ppfdp_guides for producing an edible cake and ends with the recipe, which specifies the necessary tools and utensils to be employed, the requisite materials and their specific quantities, and the step-by-step procedures to be followed in measuring, mixing, blending and baking. In short, technological work ends with instrumental knowledge which furnishes the directive means for doing the technical work. The means employed in the technological work differ in the kind and quality of physical tools (e.g., thermal and volumetric instruments used in precise measurement), the more exacting methods (e.g., in testing and quality control), and particularly, the prerequisite theo- retical knowledge (chemical, biological, mathematical) upon which the technological work is based. Generally speaking, the aim of technology as a form of human work is to systematize a given technic-'ppy_technic. The principle applies to every realm of human work—-artistic, economic, political, religious; ; agricultural, domestic, medical, military, industrial; educational, I literary, mathematical, rhetorical. All of their respective technics can in principle be reduced to a system. One who functions in the capacity of ”a technologist” selects whatever theoretical knowledge he 5 r deems essential to a given technical problem and transforms that knowledge into a system of guiding principles and expedient rules for doing or producing something. In that capacity one must have a thorough under— standing of the technics he aims to systematize, and must likewise be fully cognizant of the theoretical knowledge related thereto if the guides he prescribes are to prove effective in bringing about desired technical consequences. Technologist, Technician, and Scientist: In the actual conduct of human affairs, individuals seldom assume any one role--technical, tech- nological, or scientific--to the total exclusion of the others. Nor is it unusual to find the same individual occupationally engrossed in all three I: ' ‘; 128 forms of work. A classic example in the industrial realm of work is the Scottish physicist, engineer, and inventor, James watt, who perfected the Newcomen steam engine. In the capacity of scientist, watt studied the physical processes involved in the engine and carried out independent experiments which led to several thermodynamic discoveries; in the capa- ‘ city of technologist he reasoned from the scientific data thus obtained, formulated principles which expressed the conditions for the efficient and economic working of a steam engine, and applied the principles to his inventions; in the capacity of technician he machined the parts and con- structed the prototypes of his inventions.21 In view of the temporal shifting of occupational interests and the inevitable overlapping of technological, technical, and scientific functions in the actual conduct of human affairs one would be hard pressed to distinguish ”a technologist", so—called, from "a technician" or "a scientist". These terms are in fact misleading when they are employed in a generic sense to label an individual according to his main line of work or on the basis of some occupational title. That "a bo- tanist”, for example, may be synonymously associated with ”a scientist" merely follows from the generally accepted definition that botany is ”a science”; the analogy likewise holds for ”a cytologist”, ”a genete- cist”, ”a plant pathologist”, "a plant physiologist”. Similarly, ”a gardener" may be equated.with "a technician" inasmuch as gradening by definition is ”a technic"; the same may be said of "a crop picker”, ”a 21Kerker writes that ”The practical part of watt's career came only after he was well launched upon the inventive part, when it became necessary to construct and to promote a commercial engine.” Milton Kerker, "Science and the Steam Engine," in Thomas Parke Hughes, western Technology Since 1500 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964) p.72. 129 crop duster”, "a tree pruner”. But where in such a scheme of associations would one fit the numerous ill—defined occupational titles, such as "an agriculturist", ”an agriologist”, ”an herbalist", ”a horticulturist”? And more importnatly, which if any such occupations would one unequivo- cally associate with ”a technologist”? The point is that the terms in question have no fixed referents in the actual world of work, and any discussion which attempts to draw sharp lines between ”a technologist”, ”a technician", and "a scientist” as distinct dp_f§ppp entities is purely academic; but more importantly, to presume on such grounds, as some writers do, that a distinction cannot be made between technology, technic, and science is untenable.22 The The terms in question ought instead to be understood as conditional, or §g_ppg attributes; to put it simply: one is in fact ”a scientist” if and when he is primarily engaged in scientific work; ”a technician", if and when he is prnnarily engaged in technical work; ”a technologist”, if and when he is primarily engaged in technological work. But whether one is at any point in time actually engaged in scientific, technical, or technological work depends, gpppp_§1i§, on his ends-in-view, the means he employs in their pursuit, and particularly the motivating in- terest that determines his sought-after ends. Thus when one is motivated by a cognitive or purely theoretical interest--to know for the sake of 22"...to draw a clear line between pure science and technology,” Snow writes, ”is a line that once I tried to draw myself; but, though I can still see the reasons, I should'nt now. The more I have seen of technologists at work, the.more untenable the distinction has come to look...The scientific process has two motives:' one is to understand the natural world, the other is to control it. Either of these motives may be dominant in any individual scientist; fields of science may draw their original impulses from one or the other.” C.P.Snow, Thp Two Cultures: gpd_§ Second Look (New York: The New American Library, 1964) p.64. i IIIIIIIIEIIIIF_________________________——_‘F' ? 130 knowing--he functions in the capacity of a scientist; motivated by a practical or productive interest--to do in order to get something done-— he functions in the capacity of a technician; motivated by a pragmatic 23 or instrumental interest --to know how something ought to be done if it is to be done efficiently and expediently-—he functions in the capacity of a technologist. The consequences of scientific work cannot be I converted into immediate rules of action; an "intermediary inventive mind must make the application.”24 Such is the role of ”a technologist" ? who serves as liaison between "a technician" and ”a scientist” at work. I performed, ip_whatever ppplm.pf_yppk, bridges §h§_g§p_between science and technic, between ”theoretical” knowing and " ractical” doing. Technology as a Form of Knowledgg Thus far in its development, the present study has layed open to view in its barest essentials the central thesis that technology is ba- sically a form of human work. That technology may at the same time be viewed as a form of human knowledge (to reiterate a prior assertion) in 23The foregoing conception of technology is in harmony with thn Dewey's "pragmatic instrumentalism” the essence of which ”is to conceive of both knowledge and practice as means of making goods--excellencies of all kinds--secure in experienced existence...Just as in science the question of the advance of knowledge is the question of what 39 d9, what experiments to perform, what apparatus to invent and use, what calcula- tions to engage in, what branches of mathematics to employ or to perfect, so £p§_problem of practice is what we need to know, how shall we obtain that knowledge and how shall we apply it?” gh§_gpest fpp Certainpy (New York: Milton Balch 8 Co., 1929) p.37. 24WilliamJames, Talks 39 Teachers on Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929) p.8. See also Johfi Dewey, __p_Sources pf Science 9f Education (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1929) p.19. 131 no way negates the central thesis. On the contrary, it merely focuses attention on but one aspect of technology; i.e., technological work ultimately ends in knowledge. But inasmuch as scientific work also ends with knowledge, it remains to show how technological and scienti- fic knowledge differ in form. Technological and Scientific Statements: "Homan knowledge is by its very nature symbolic knowledge;"25 and as such, can be expressed in verbal statements. Scientific knowledge finds expression in the form of descriptive and interpretive statements, statements of fact, the truth of which can be verified in proof; technological knowledge is expressed in the form of prescriptive and instructive statements, the efficacy of which can be ascertained in practice. Scientific statements explain the nature and the natural order of things, why things are as they are and why they behave as they do; such statements are referred to as hy- E potheses, theories, or laws, depending on the level of certainty. Tech— nological statements on the other hand explain how things in nature can be obtained, changed, or altered for some ulterior use; such statements are herein referred to as rules.26 Rules and Laws: Technological rules may (but need not) be based on scientific laws;27 i.e., law-statements may be knowingly accepted as 25Ernst Cassirer, Ap_E§§§y_pp_M§p_(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944) p.57. 26For an interesting distinction between scientific law and tech- nological rule see Mario Bunge, "Technological Rule" in Studies 22.2EE Foundations, Methodology ppd Philosophy of Science, Volume 3, II (New York: Springer-Verlag New York Inc., 1967) pp.l32—l37. 2781mra, p.125. IIIIIIIIEIZIIF_____________________________———rII 132 the guiding principles in formulating systems of rule—statements. Take for example the following elementary laws, and some quasi rules deduced therefrom: Laws: 1. At temperatures below 32° F. water passes from a liquid to a solid state. 2. When water passes from the liquid to the solid state it expands to the amount of l-llth of its volume. 3. This expansion is sufficient to bring about a large quantity of mechanical work (e.g., it is sufficient to heave a concrete roadway). Rules: 1. To prevent concrete roadways from heaving where the temperature drops below 32° F., a layer of coarse aggregate base must be provided to take care of water drainage; and culverts should be installed wherever there is subterranean seepage; or 2. a) Install a heating system along the proposed roadway, and b) construct the concrete bed over the subterranean ducts which convey the heat. 3. If you want to destroy an existing concrete roadway, then a) plug up all drainage passages, and b) just before the temperature drops below 32° F. let water accumulate under the roadway. Note that each of the three Laws is a statement of fact, the truth of which can be Verified empirically. The Rules on the other hand have no truth value; they merely tell what to do in order to attain a desired end. Their positive value rests with their respective effectiveness in practice. Rule 1 is given in the form of an imperative-prescriptive Onust—should) statement; Rule 2, in the form of a directive (do so and so) statement; Rule 3, in the form of a predictive (if-then) statement. Where technical work adheres to a system of technological rules based on scientific laws (which are accepted as guiding principles), that work is principled. (Contrarily, work which proceeds by rule-of—thumb is unprincipled.) The rules, and the laws which govern them, furnish 133 justifiable grounds for the ways and means (the method) by which techni- cal work is performed. What is said here with regard to technical work applies likewise to scientific work. There is, at least in practice, agreement about the method used in scientific work. The rules of that method are laid down and unanimously accepted by men of science as Egg guides to scientific work. The special task of formulating rules for scientific work is of course a technological function—-whence the con- cept ”technology of science”; and these rules exemplify technological knowledge par excellence. Summary and Concluding Statement The foregoing all-too—brief consideration of technology as a form of knowledge should suffice to bring the profferred conceptual model to its final stage of development. At this stage the conceptual scheme for ordering the aims, means, and consequences of scientific, technological, and technical work can be used to illustrate synoptically some of their principal distinguishing characteristics. (See Figure 4) The conceptual model, as illustrated, is of course vastly oversim- plified. But then, the illustration is intended merely as a device to bring some of the aforetreated concepts into perspective; and more im- portantly, to show at a glance the interrelationship and interdependence of scientific, technological, and technical means and consequences. The concept m§§p§_should be understood here in the broadest sense as any and all intermediary agents and instruments (persons as well as things--things abstract as well as things concrete) through or by which scientific, technological, and technical work is or may be performed. 134 .xwea wwowocoee pee .Heowmoaeocoew .owwwoeewom we mowpmwweuoohmcu wwmwoowwm on“ we mowuogumSwa owpmeecom .v eMSMwm ease“ -wo-ewsw as he .mewew GowuospOHm we umehepcw woospewo penwwemeum owumwsepomeono e>wpospewm no we once we meoomam mwawxm one .eosoeem Hwowpowhm m who: mwcwcw an powwow .mwoeu .moecpez we op 09 so pewe>wpez weowocoew eowpomem means Hmeueewwe eewwqueumxm an new cewpce>ew we umeweoow we snow esp emwewzeex owumwsepeoseno Hmooeeoppmow ow empowzeox owuehoeeu wwwwxm one ...ae: Ho owpoewowm m Moos Hepoeeesomcw so powwow .mwoeu .meocpoz sees OH _ an eeue>wuez Hmowmewooeoeh meow one mewseecp spwzoow xue>oomwe we owesepow we show one we means owpwwsepoesmno Hwowueseesp cw emeewseex owoesoumxm wwwwxm one ...pm:o so e>wowomoo a Moos weowuosoeew we powwow .mwoeu .meoguez seox Oh so eeowswuoz owwwooewom zmoz mmezmeommzoe mam: we? do melon 135 Needless to say, its scope comprehends mental as well as physical human resources——i.e., the mental and physical skills, tools, and methods incident generally in the acts of discovering, inventing, and producing things. Discovery and invention are to be understood primarily as 'mental activities: discovery, to denote the mental process of bringing to light existent but heretofore unknown nature and natural order of things; invention, to denote the mental process of designing effective systems for bringing artificial (man-made) things into existence. The point to be stressed here is that invention in the strict sense does not mean things per se; for things are but the objects or ends of invention. Given the systematic means, it is production that brings artificial things into existence. In the actual world of human work, discovery, invention, and production are of course so inextricably bound as to defy distinction. But practical inextricability notwithstanding, they are, from a theore- tical point of view, discernibly different. These analytically discern- ible differences are of paramount importance to a clear conception of the foregoing science-technology-technic model wherein invention is perceived as a unique characteristic of technological work. Keeping in mind the basic considerations just set forth, technology gpd systemizing knowledge fpp_§9mp ulterior Egg, So defined, 'technology' embraces the original (ancient Greek) meaning of the word as well as its modern, naturalistic acceptations. Thus it satisfies the criterion of appropriateness as judged by its history, and at the same time does not 28 glaringly violate received usage-—as per Mill's admonition. "In so 28Supra, p. 136 defining it" (to borrow an appropriate statement from Herbert Spencer), we accept that which is common to the various conceptions of it current among both ancients and moderns-—rejecting those elements in which these conceptions disagree or exceed the possible range of intelligence. In short, we are simply giving precision to that application of the word which is gradually establishing itself. 9 Its dp_facto establishment in Industrial Arts education remains yet to be considered in the concluding Chapter. 29Education--Intellectual, Meral ppd_Physical (New York: A.L.Burt, Publishers, 1881) p.111. CHAPTER V THE PLACE OF TECHNOLOGY IN INDUSTRIAL ARTS EDUCATION In Chapter I it was argued that the proposed technology-centered concept for Industrial Arts education had never been established on sound theoretical grounds, and that from its very inception the need for clarifying the meaning of technology had not been seriously consi- dered an essential prerequisite in establishing such grounds. It was shown that warner and his associates, who conceived the idea, apparently assumed they had defined the scope of technology when they declared Power, Transportation, Manufacture, Construction, and Communication ”the "1 and the proponents of subsequent Principal elements of technology; I versions of the idea appear to have entertained the same erroneous, assumption: they merely differ in opinion as to which of the supposed ”elements" ought to constitute the divisions of subject matter for Industrial Arts education.2 In view of the prevalent misconceptions regarding the meaning and scope of technology (not only in the Industrial Arts profession, but even among noted scholars who write on technology), the major part of the present study was addressed to the fundamental problem of con— ceptual clarification. Chapter II inquired into the origin of the word 42 lWilliamE. warner, A Curriculum pp_Reflect TechnolOgy."_p, pip. 2Supra. pp.6'17- 137 138 'technology' and its meaning in an historical perspective; and Chapter III critically analysed and compared a number of definitions of technology taken from recent scholarly literature on the subject. The preliminary investigation revealed a discernible pattern of common referents which in Chapter IV provided a basis for clarifying the meaning of technology in the broad sense of the term. There the concept of technology was located in the context of human activity and was iden— tified with science and technic as a form of human work. In the process, a conceptual scheme was devised for the purpose of identifying and struc- turing the elements of technology in ppy given realm of work. Assuming that technology gpp§_have a place in Industrial Arts education, and that the subject matter of instruction ought to center on the technology of a significant realm of human work, then given the realm of work and the foregoing conceptual scheme, it should be readily apparent that the place of technology in Industrial Arts education ppp be established. The object of the present Chapter is to suggest how it can be done. Preliminary Considerations A consideration of the place of technology in Industrial Arts education is inevitably a study of the basic fppmp of work--scientific, technical, and technological——implicit in that ppppp of work which deter- mines the source of subject matter for Industrial Arts education. (It is essential in the following discussion to keep in mind the theoretical distinction made earlier between forms of work and realms of work.) Education as a Dominant Realm of Work: Briefly, the concept of education comprehends the numerous and diverse kinds of things that human 139 beings do in all learning situations, informal and formal. The latter may be thought of as the institutions of learning-~graded schools, tech- nical, technological, and.professional schools, colleges, and universi- ties--institutions which are established for the expressed purpose of acquiring and disseminating positive knowledge. That knowledge--the things that man has come to know about himself and the world around hhn with a degree of certainty—~is embodied in the academic disciplines, variously classified under ”the humanities", "the arts”, ”the sciences", "the applied arts and sciences”, or similar designations. The academic disciplines, and the procedures and instrumentalities which are used to promote them, define education as a dominant ppplp of human work. Like any other realm of human work, education has its technical, its scientific, and its technological aspects. (a) To read a fairy tale to kindergarten children, or to demonstrate a scientific theory to college students; to do these things with the aid of a chalkboard, or to do them with sophisticated electronic teaching aids: such tasks exemplify educa- tional work that is basically technical in form. (b) To conduct an experiment in order to find out how kindergarten or college students learn; to replicate experiments in order to confirm or disconfirm learning theories: these complex activities exemplify educational work that is scientific in fOIEL (c) Tb devise systems for effective teaching and learning based on educational theories; to invent more expedient means for conducting educational experiments: such tasks exemplify educational work that is technological in form. The theoretical knowledge derived from experimental work in educa- tion, and the educationally relevant theories drawn from ”the sciences”-- anthropology, biology, psychology, sociology—~may, in their collectivity, ’i— 140 be referred to as ”educational science”. Knowledge drawn from educational science, and systemized to expedite the teaching-learning process~-e.g., the handbooks and.manuals on how to study, how to teach, how to devise courses of study, how to program."teaching:machines”, and the numerous other instructional, supervisory, and administrative "know how" systems used in the teChnics of educationr-may be referred to as ”educational technology”. Industrial Arts as a Branch of Educational werk: Inasmuch as Industrial Arts is considered to be a branCh of education proper, then it too must have its science, its technics, and its technology. These aspects of educational work, however, Industrial Arts has in commen.with all other branches of education: the handbooks and manuals on.how to I study, how to teach, etc., are in principle applicable to all learning situations. What distinguishes one branch from another is the uniqueness of its subjectzmatterw~the disciplined knowledge, instrumentalities, and procedures, based upon that reahm of work which it undertakes to study. It follows then, that Industrial Arts too must have its subject matter of instruction, based upon some realm of human work. _,______.______ _._._.. _._..,_____ H.- ____.H_.i.. . What is the Subject Matter of Industrial.Arts Education? To reiter- ate a prior observation, the nature and source of subject matter for In- dustrial Arts education has yet to be made explicit and generally accepted by teachers and educators in the field. Because of the apparent dissatisfaction with the status quo, and the recent attempts toward establishing some kind of technology-centered curriculum without first having defined the meaning and scope of technology, the Industrial Arts profession is in a quandary as to the nature and source of its subject matter . ——__’—l 141 Ever since warner and his associates introduced the concept of technology into Industrial Arts education the profession has taken one of two tentative positions on the question. Some say that Industrial Arts draws its content from "the technology", and they presume that Transportation, Manufacture, Construction, Communication, and the like constitute "the technology". Others hold to the long-standing notion that "the industries" furnish the subject matter for Industrial Arts education. From our previous discussion, it should be obvious that both positions are erroneous: (a) Transportation,.Manufacture, etc., desig- nate realms of human work (or branches of industrial work); as such, each has its technological aspects: hence,the technology of tranSportation, the technology of manufacture, and so on. But the same may likewise be said of woodworking, Metalworking, and similar realms of work tradition- ally associated with Industrial.Arts education. The former are merely broader in scope than the latter; and breadth alone by no means determines a technology—centered curriculum. (b) To say that "the industries" fur— nish the subject matter for Industrial Arts education is analagous to saying that hospitals or medical clinics furnish the subject:matter for medical education. Needless to say, industries are established and maintained primarily for economic purposes-~to produce consumable goods and render services at a.profit. Moreover, they themselves turn to other sources for knowledge: they turn to the disciplines. Why then should the Industrial Arts profession attempt to structure its own subject matter, based on the hundreds of ill-defined and overlapping industries?3 Why 3In his discussion of ”The Scope and Organization of Industrial .Arts", Bonser observed fifty years ago that: ”By a rather general classi- fication of the industries, there are over five hundred in the United States. But these may be divided into hundreds more. Specialization -.._.—_.._.,-.r.____ . . ——— 142 should it not go directly to a primary source wherein knowledge is al- ready disciplined.and readily accessible for instructional purposes? Engineering as a Source of Subject Matter The logical source of subject matter for Industrial Arts education, and perhaps the most eXpedient, is engineering science and technology. The rationale of such a proposal can be discussed from several points of view. For our purposes, it will suffice to discuss in brief the relation of engineering science and technology to industrial production, and to note some of the implications of that relationship fer Industrial Arts education. Engineering as an Educational Discipline: In its long history as a dominant realm of human work, a history of human achievements which dates back to antiquity, an enormous amount of practical and theoretical knowledge has been amassed by ingenious men, appropriately called "engi- neers". Mbst of what now constitutes the body of engineering knowledge was acquired only since the nineteenth century, when human ingenuity and practical experience based on "rule-of-thumb” gave way to engineering based on.natural philosophy, or what came to be known as ”modern science" (from.whence the term."modern technology"). By then, schools of engineer- ing were being instituted to train potential engineers, and at the same time practicing engineers began to specialize, and to form.themselves has gone so far that there are literally thousands of separate kinds of industrial production existing in our day and generation." FrederiCk G. Bonser and Lois Coffey Messman, Industrial Arts for Elementary Schools. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923) p.19. ......_..._—.-.r ...—14* w—fl _iw.._ _ 41 __,_..—.._.—- IIIlIIlIlllllIlllIIIIIIIII-E::——————————————"* 143 into engineering societies for purposes of promoting the acquisition of knowledge in their respective realms of engineering work. The first of these societies was formed (in 1818) for the general advancement of Mechanical Science, and.more parti— cularly for promoting the acquisition of that species of knowledge which constitutes the profession of a Civil Engineer, being the art of directing the Great Sources of Power in Nature fer the use and convenience of:man, as the means of production and of traffic in states both for external and internal trade, as applied in the construction of roads, bridges, aqueducts, canals, river navigation and docks, for internal intercourse and exchange, and in the construction of ports, harbours, moles, breakwaters and lighthouses, and in the art of navigation by artificial power for the purposes of commerce, and in the construction and adaptation of machinery, and in the drainage of cities and towns. 'With the fOrmation of engineering societies and the founding of engineering sChools, engineering established itself both as a "profession" and as an educational "discipline". In order to do and profess all of the things that the Civil Engineers committed themselves to in the realms of construction, production, transportation, power generation, etc., their theoretical and instrumental knowledge had to be disciplined. To meet the criteria of ”a discipline”, engineering had to have (a) a unique body of knowledge, consisting in clearly defined concepts, verifiable facts, and logically structured categories; (b) the instru- mentalities-~precise instruments, methods of research and development, and norms or standards--for acquiring, evaluating, systemizing, and dis- seminating theoretical and.instrumental knowledge; and (c) unique pur— posive activities-~the scientific, teChnological, and teChnical work that engineers actually engage in in all of the branches of engineering. The BranChes of Engineering: Engineering knowledge WhiCh a century and a half ago constituted the sole province of Civil Engineering has 4Thomas Telford, Charter 9f_The Institution.9f_Civil Engineers, (London: The Institution, 1908) p.7. _,..__.._,...._.-._ _._.—-4-_—~ .... 144 since proliferated to the extent that numerous branches of engineering, and as many educational disciplines had to be created. The broader divisions, those on the basis of which engineering schools structure their curricula, and in the names of which practicing engineers have formed themselves into societies, include Civil Engineering, Mining and Agricultural Engineering, Metallurgical and Chemical Engineering, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering. These divisions in turn subsume the specific branches of engineering work-~e.g., Automotive Engineering, Ceramic Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Nuclear Engineering—~some of which have in recent years developed a highly sophisticated body of scientific and technological knowledge. A scheme for classifying the numerous branches of engineering is afforded in the accompanying diagram (Figure 6).5 There too, the divi- sions of engineering are shown in relation to the processes of industrial production: viz., the relation of Civil Engineering to Construction (of buildings, highways; atomic plants, missile launching pads); Mining and Agricultural Engineering to Production of Raw Materials (of metals, minerals, fuels; of lumber, textile materials, food materials); Metal— lurgical and Chemical Engineering to Processing of Raw Materials (of metals, alloys; of plastics, textiles, foods); Mechanical and Electrical Engineering to Communication (mechanical, electrical, electronic), to Transportation (terrestrial, nautical, aeronautical), to Manufacture (of food, clothing, luxuries; of instruments, weapons, machines), to Power SHarold T. Larsen, "Engineering," Th§_Encyclopedia Americana, V01. 10, (1971 Edition) pp.34l-345; the diagram as suggested by Arthur B. Parsons appears on p.344. Note, that Parsons conception of engineering is perhaps one of many, and is used here merely as a matter of convenience to show the relation of industry to engineering. A59 whomuo .. .9 O mcmomuocdw SwmmoHocrocm . . 05 #395 so}? :onmHEHom 2 n womb .wvm” .m .X oESH0> $.63”me HRH osmoHHmE< Swomofiozocm £9 Eonmv . . mummfimsm mo vcofiwocsm wmuofiom wow cameosmoam mo mommoooam .m ostfim rats: Ell a .l .223. uozmw garbage: 4 new: 2.: Kl! _mE_:< .8; 39: $338 33.8 23.. 825. BEE: 30:65 $9.55 .359; 828:; III . ll‘vlll Eat—BE _m>~z i mumzwam sewage 055m: :35...” mm EqSSUEUQ Ewen: cm E8 h A 1‘ . All» u «a_haculw «is: I J < ”Manage; fixed I! gswmw Wuhan smear.“ 323 um cu mac: Bu» {223:2 c2: 25 250 SEES :55 .35 cm mLcoZuufi 353» 8.332... .32.; rmcm co: 5. BeEmcw 23x . 3:33 3235 3:32 E 52.35 messes... as; j . £5 .22.? . 3.5 :31... 52:“: ESE; a :2 .233“. 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Implications fer Industrial Arts Education: As realms of human work, engineering and industry have one thing in common: generally speaking, both are concerned with the production and transformation of natural resources into economic goods or commodities. In their common concern, however, the two realms of work are essentially and character— istically different. Stated briefly, engineering deals with the proper— ties of matter and energy given in nature (work that is basically scientific in form), and through research and development (work that is essentially technological in form) determines how these natural resources can be directed toward "the use and convenience of man, as the means of production."6 Industry, on the other hand, utilizes the technological means in the actual processes of producing natural resources and in transforming them into economic goods (work that is, for the most part, technical in fornD. In short, industry depends on engineering; or what amounts to the same, engineering science and technology is essential to the technics of industrial production. By the same token, the study of engineering science and technology is, from a pedagogical point of View, essential to an understanding of industry and the technics of industrial production. Or more to the 6Telford, 9p, git. 147 point: if the purpose of Industrial Arts education is to advance an understanding of the technics of Construction, Power Generation, Manu— facture, Transportation, Communication, and the like, the source of its subject matter is the science and technology of Civil, Mining, Agri— cultural, Metallurgical, Chemical, Mechanical, and Electrical Engineering. It may be noted that most of the things that Industrial Arts teachers and educators claim (in word, if not in deed) to be unique to their realm of educational work—-laboratory activity, research and devel- opment, problem solving, product designing, production plannin —-are inherent in engineering. Hence, as a matter of pure expediency, the profession need but turn to engineering science and technology for its subject matter, if only to justify its claims. Given the realm of engineering as the source of subject matter, and given too, the conceptual schemé7by means of which the technical, scienti- fic, and technological elements of engineering (in any or all of its branches) can be identified and structured for instructional purposes, a curriculum may be oriented toward the technics of engineering (for a technic-centered program of studies), toward the science of engineering (for a science—centered program of studies), or toward the technology of engineering (for a technology-centered program of studies). For that matter, a curriculum may be devised to encompass all three forms of engineering work for a general education program. And it matters little whether one holds to the notion that Industrial Arts ought to be con- cerned with_"the industries”, or that it ought to "reflect the techno- logy”: either way, engineering can furnish the subject matter of instruc- tion, as well as the categories for structuring an "externally stable” 783Era, p. 134. and an ”internally flexible” curriculum. Concluding Statement When Charles R. Richards introduced the concept of ”industrial art" into education at the turn of the present century, he asserted that “such a term clearly indicates a specific body of knowledge as the subject- matter of instruction and at once establishes criteria as to (its) selec- tion and organization”.8 Arguing against the narrowly conceived, trade- oriented, "manual training” concept then prevalent in "the common-school curriculum,” Richards held that: The common school cannot teach trades, but it can giVe an insight into the basic operations of a great number of trades and occupa- tions; it can give a wide variety of experiences in the manipula- tion of tools and materials, and a considerable knowledge of typical methods and principles of construction. It_can g9 farther, and trace the course of invention in the primary arts; it can bring out the inthnate dependence of industry upon science; it can develop an insight into the economic relations of industry to social life and give some idea of the laws governing those relations; in short, it can do much to advance an understanding of, and interest in, the facts and forces fundamental to all human art and industry and to define the place of these activities in the life of to-day.9 Richards' concise statement aptly sums up the general-education purposes of Industrial Arts education, and implicitly supports the propo- sition that engineering science and technology is central to an under- standing of industry and of the problems of life related thereto. That the Industrial Arts profession had never openly adopted engi— neering as its primary source of subject matter is indeed curious. 8Charles R. Richards, ”Is Manual Training a Subject or a Method of Instruction," Educational Review, vol. 27 (April 1904) p.373. 9Ibid., p.372. : r 149 Although Richards did not elaborate on the "specific body of knowledge," he states that the term 'industrial art' ”places the subject in company with such intelligible titles as architecture, engineering, and domestic science.”10 Perhaps the term 'industrial art' is in itself too narrow to comprehend Richards' conception of the subject. In any event, Richards' observations are as significant today as they were during his time, perhaps more so. The progressive growth of industrial production, and its attendant socio-economic problems, coupled with the growing disenchantment with science and technology, ironically presumed even by important writers to be at the root of those problems, attests to the significance of Richards' observations. The need ”to advance an understanding of, and interest in, the facts and forces funda- mental to all human art and industry,” needless to say, is critical; and to reiterate a prior assertion, engineering science and technology is central to an understanding of human industry. In view of its social significance as a dominant realm of human work, one which centers on man and his achievements in all of what is sometimes dubbed the "man-made- world", engineering deserves a place of its own in general education (a place yet to be accorded to it) alongside the established disciplines. Perhaps the time is right for what is now called 'Industrial Arts‘ to be repatterned and reoriented toward filling the void under the name 'Engi- neering'. "we have surely reached the point,” to quote Richards, ”where we can afford to call things by their right names.”11 lOIbid., p.373. _— 111b1d., p.374. APPENDIX APPENDIX Bibliography of Extant English Dictionaires and Cyclopedias l6th-19th Centuries 1538 - Thomas Elyot, The Dictionary of §y£ Thomas Elyot knyght. London: 1538. GMicrofilm - Pollard and Redgrave STC 7659) ”The first complete Latin-English dictionary,"l This work i was published about sicty years after Caxton introduced printing into England. The word 'technology' does not appear in this early work. 1547 William Salisbury, A_Dictionary 9: English gnd_Welshe. London: 1547. J The word 'technology' does not appear, nor does its Welsh equivalent 'celfyddiaeth'. 1548 - Sir Thomas Elyot, Bibliotheca Eliotae, (Edited and Enlarged by Thomas Cooper). London: 1548. (Pollard STC 21616) "This Dictionarie now newly imprinted, Anno Domini, M.D. XLVIII, is augmented and inriched with above, xxiij, thousande wordes and phrases.” The word 'technology' does not appear. 1604 - Robert Cawdrey, A Table A1 habeticall 9f En lish werds London: Edmund weaver, 1604. (Pollard STC 4884) Z ”The first English dictionary,” The word 'technology' does not appear. l”Elyot, Sir Thomas," Americana. 1958 Edition, Vol.10, p.269. 2Clarence L. Barnhart, ”Dictionary” Americana, 1958 Edition, Volume 9, p.88. 150 1611 1611 1616 1623 1656 1658 1670 1676 151 John Florio, Qgeen Anna's New WOrld of Words, or Dictionarie. _-~———U—§ ~— London: Edw. Blount, 161 . (Pollard STC 11099) The word 'technology' does not appear. Randle Cotgrave, A_Dictionarie of French and English Tongges. London: Adam Islip, 1611. (PoiErd STC 533T) The word 'technology' does not appear. John Bullokar, An English Expositor. London: John Legatt, 1616. (Pollard—STC 4083 The word 'technology' does not appear. Henry Cockeram, lh§_English Dictionarie. London: Nathaniel Butler, 1623. (Pollard STC 5461) The word 'technology' does not appear. Thomas Blount, Glossographia: or a Dictionary. London: Tho. Newcomb, 1656. (Wing STC B3334) The word 'technology' does not appear. I Edward Phillips, Th§_N§fl Werld 9f English WOrds: Or a General Dictionary. London: Nath. Brooke, 1658. The word 'technology' does not appear in this, the first, nor in the later (1663 and 1678) editions. H.C. Gent, The English Dictionary, or An Expositor of Hard English Word—s.“ London: w. Miller, 1670. The word 'technology' does not appear. Elisha Coles, Ag_English Dictionagy. London: Printed for Samuel Crouch, 1676. In this, the first edition, and in two later editions (1685 and 1692) of Coles' Dictionary the word 'technolggy' 18 defined as: ”a treating of Arts or WOrkmanship. This represents the first appearance of the word in an English dictionary, despite the fact that it had been used in English literature as early as 1615. 1704 - 1708 - 1727 — 1734 - 1754 - 1755 - 1755 - 152 John Harris, Lexicon Technicum or An Universal En lish Dictionary of Arts and Science . London: Printed for Don Brown and others, 1704. The word 'technology' does not appear. John Kersey, Dictionarium Anglo-Britanicum or A General English Dictionary. London: J. Phillips, 1708. 'Technology' is defined as: ”a Description of Arts, especially the Mechanical.” Nathan Bailey The Universal Etymological English Dictionary Vol. II. LonéoF _T. "c_ox","1'727. ’ 'Technology' is defined as: ”a Description of Arts, especially the mechanical Ones.” Peter (Pierre) Boyle, The Dictionary Historical and Critical (5 volumes) translated from French (Dictionnaire historigue gt criti ue. Rotterdam: 1696) London: printed for J.J. an P. Knapton, 1734-38. Carefully collated with the several editions of the original. The word 'technology' does not appear. Benj. Martin, Lingua Britannica Reformata: or, A New Universal English Dictionary. London: Printed for C. Hitch and others, 1754. 'Technology' is defined as: ”a description of arts, especially mathematical ones." Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, Vol.2. London: W. Strahan, 1755. The word 'technology' does not appear. Joseph Nicol Scott, A.N§E Universal Etymological English Dictionary. London: Printed for T. Osborne and others, 1755. This work is a revision and enlargement of Nathan Bailey's Dictionary. 'Technology’ is defined as: ”a description of arts, especially mechanical ones.” ’3’- 1757 1773 1780 1780 1787 1788 1791 153 James Buchanan, New English Dictionary. London: A. M1113 1757. 'Technology' is defined as: ”a description of arts, 1 especially mathematical onesJ William Denrick, A_New Dictionary 2£.Eh§ English Langgage. ———.-. London: John and Francis Rivington, and others, 1773. The word 'technology' does not appear. Charles Marriott, EEE.E§E.R°X31 English Dictionary. London: J. wenman, 1780. This work claims to be a ”complete library of grammatical knowledge. Containing a full and copious explanation of all the words in the English language.” The word 'technology' does not appear. Thomas Sheridan, A_General Dictionary 9£.Eh§ English Language. Vol. 11. London: Dodsley, Dilly and Wilkie, 1780. The word 'technology' does not appear. Ephraim.Chambers, Cyclopedia: or, An Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences. London: J.F.Riv1ngton, 1787. The word 'technology' does not appear. Perry's Royal Standard English Dictionary. Wbrcester, Mass.: Isaiah Thomas, 1788. According to the title page of the Dictionary it is "the First work of the kind printed in America;" and is dedicated to The American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The word 'technology' does not appear. John walker, A Critical Pronouncing Dictionary and Erpositor of the English Langflage. London: Printed for G.G.J. an 3‘? Wins'o'n' ,' 1891. The word 'technology' does not appear. 154 1806 — Noah webster, A;Compendious Dictionary of rhg English 1832 — 1839 - 1845 - 1888 - Language. New Haven, Conn.: Hudson 6 Ceodwin, 1806. The word 'technology' does not appear in this, the first edition of webster's Dictionary. Encyclopedia Americana, First Edition, V61. XII, 1832. 'Technology' is defined as: ”the science which treats of the Arts, particularly the mechanical. Technology may be divided into two kinds, a higher and a lower, of which the latter treats of the various arts themselves, and their principles, their origin, history, improvement, etc.; the former, of the connexion of the arts and trades with the political conditions of a nation, and the important influence which they have exer— cised ever since the mechanical occupations have come to honor; i.e. since the growth of free cities in the middle ages.” Charles Richardson, A_N§w Dictionary pf_rh§ English Langpage. London: William Pickering, 1839. Richardson ”was the first English dictionary maker to use the historical method.”3 The word 'technology' does not appear; the word 'technological' appears as an equivalent of 'technical' with the definition: ”That can or may make; by usage,--of or pertaining to art, to the arts, to any peculiar art." W.T.Brande, A Dictionary pf Science, Literature, apd_Arr. New York: Harper G Brothers, 1845. 'Technology': "A term invented to express a treatise on art or the arts. London: Cassel——E' 1888. Robert Hunter, The Encyclopaedic Dictionary, Vol. VII, Part 1. Company, Lt ., 'Technology' is defined as: "that branch of knowledge which deals with the various industrial arts; the sc1ence or . systematic knowledge of the industrial arts, as of weav1ng, spinning, metalurgy, or the like.” 31bid., p.90 1892 - 155 Alden's anifeld Cyclopedia. New York: J.B.Alden, Pub., 1887—1892. 'Technology' is defined as: ”science or systematic knowledge of the industrial arts. In its widest sense it would embrace the whole field of industry, but it is generally restricted to the more important manufactures. 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