This is to certify that the thesis entitled The Career of Sir John L. Harrington: Empire and Ethiopia, l88h—l918. presented by Edward Coltrin Keefer has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph. D Hi story degree in 490*"Ggfiv ’V( l£1$“”¢4¢ovo Major professor mm 0-7 639 h! it 'I I“ .34 'v- 21': T—7’ ABS TRAC T THE CAREER 0F SIR JOHN L. HARRINGTON: EMPIRE AND ETHIOPIA, 1884-1918 by Edward Coltrin Keefer John Harrington was born in Swansea, Wales, in 1865, ofnuddle-class Catholic parents. The premature death of histather caused his family financial difficulties. He wassent to one of the better Catholic public schools, but ladrof money and a difference of opinion with his guardian cmmwlled him, upon leaving school, to enter the British army as a private. Within the army Harrington rose quickly through the rmms, became a staff-officer, and then a member of the Bmflny Political Service. He performed administrative duty inthe Kathiawar native states, Aden, and the Somali pro- technates. At Zeila on the Somali coast, Harrington was drmniinto neighboring Ethiopian affairs. While Harrington was at Zeila, three events led to Bntiflidiplomatic recognition of Ethiopia: reconquest of theSudan, frontier conflicts with the expansionist Ethic- pimiempire, and the French attempts to gain a foothold in Hm Upper Nile Valley. Harrington assisted the first Spmnal diplomatic mission to Addis Ababa, and was then dmsmito represent Great Britain in Ethiopia on a more pmmmnent basis. In 1898, he went to Addis Ababa to (7’70 Edward col trin Keefer stabilize Anglo-Ethiopian relations, to settle outstanding border conflicts, and to gain security for the main Anglo- Egyptian interest in the Solomonic empire, the source and effluents of the Blue Nile. In these goals Harrington was basically successful, but he inescapably became involved in the intricate inter— play of European national purposes in EthiOpia. London's policy was to guarantee and bolster Ethiopian independence as the best security for the Upper Nile, and Harrington rightly concluded that plans for a French-controlled Ethiopian railway system threatened the integrity of the empire itself. Harrington helped alert Emperor Menilek II to the danger, and together they sought to defeat the French. Ethiopia naturally required the assistance and SuPport of London in the fight, but the Conservative gov- ernment in Whitehall, hard—pressed for funds for defence and social services at home and stung by earlier railway failures in Africa, shied away from the logical step of building or supporting a rival line. Instead, the British government took advantage of a general détente in Anglo- French relations to settle differences in Ethiopia by direct negotiation. By late 1906, London, Paris, and Rome had signed the Tripartite Treaty, which ostensibly guaran- teed Ethiopian independence, but was more important for its categoric definition of the special interests of the three European powers, should the Solomonic empire disintegrate uD011 the death of Menilek. 1:: Edward Coltrin Keefer After 1906, London felt less compelled to support Ethiopian independence since it had reinsured its major interest, the Ethiopian Nile basin, by the tripartite agreement. Harrington, nevertheless, continued to warn of the French danger, especially since France retained a prac— tical monopoly of the existing and future railways in Ethiopia. Meanwhile in London, the Conservative and the‘ Liberal governments, reinforced by anti—German elements in the Foreign Office, were determined to cultivate closer relations with France. Harrington's anti—French posture was an embarrassment and irritant to intimate relations, as the Quai d'Orsay was quick to point out. When Great Britain no longer promised support against French influ- ence, Menilek and his advisers cooled on Harrington. Unfortunately for Sir John, his superiors no longer trusted him because he was so firmly wedded to anti-French policy. He was eased out of the diplomatic corps in 1908. After his retirement Harrington made three abortive tries for Parliament as a tariff reformer—imperialist, and he served at the front during the First World War, but his important work was done. Harrington had played a crucial role in stabilizing Anglo-Ethiopian relations and had alerted the Ethiopian government to the economic threat inherent in the French rail system. He was, however, something of a literalist, and believed in the immutability of the British diplomatic Promises to maintain Ethiopian independence. He could not Edward Coltrin Keefer readjust his thinking to the realities of the German threat and the need for a closer relationship with France, at least so long as he remained in the heated atmosphere of Addis Ababa. The methods of this study are those of intensive his- torical research in governmental archives, private papers, contemporary and secondary printed sources. Throughout, I have tried to combine biography with institutional history. THE CAREER 0F SIR JOHN L. HARRINGTON: EMPIRE AND ETHIOPIA, 18810-1918 by Edward Coltrin Keefer A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 197# @ Copyright by Edward Coltrin Keefer 197a For Carol and Sophie 11 AC KNO WLE DGMEN’I‘S I would like to thank Professor Harold G. Marcus for suggesting that I study the career of Sir John Harrington. Throughout the research and preparation of the disserta- tion, Professor Marcus's suggestions and comments were of great value. Professor Donald N. Lammers merits equal appreciation for his encouragement, assistance, and kind- ness during my entire graduate career. I would also like to thank Professor Thomas L. Bushell. Notwithstanding the demands of an increasing number of scholars, the Public Record Office and the India Office Library were conscientious in their assistance. The Library 01' the Royal Commonwealth Society afforded me use of their extensive secondary collection and their pleasant surrouns- dings. The Graduate Office of Michigan State University deserves special thanks for the financial assistance they gave me while I was in England. My wife. Carol, typed drafts of this dissertation and made useful suggestions. I would also like to thank Maribeth Rose for efficiently and quickly typing the final manuscript , 111 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I: CHAPTER II: CHAPTER III: CHAPTER IV: CMWTMIV: CHAPTER VI: CHAPTER VII: CHAPTER VIII: CHAPTER IX: CHAPTER X2 CONCLUSION APPENDIX, MAPS TABLE OF CONTENTS EARLY LIFE, 1865-189“ ADEN'S BARREN ROCKS, 1890-1895 ZEILA AND THE SOMALI COAST PROTECTORATE, 1895-1898 BRITISH MISSIONS TO ADDIS ABABA, 1897-1898 FASHODA AND THE ETHIO-SUDANESE FRONTIER, 1398-1902 THE LAST ANGLO-ETHIOPIAN FRONTIER, SETTLEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1898—1907 THE ETHIOPIAN RAILWAY IMBROGLIO, 1898-190“ THE TRIPARTITE TREATY AND THE SEEDS OF MISTRUST, 190U-1906 THINGS FALL APART, RESIGNATION, 1908 EPILOGUE, POLITICS AND WAR, 1909-1918 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ES 5 AY 30 it? 93 136 199 251 301 337 388 blb, u26 n29 INTRODUCTION This dissertation recounts the life of Sir John Har- rington, the first permanent diplomat to represent Great Britain in Ethiopia, with special consideration of the formulation of British imperial policy in northeast Africa from 1895 to 1908. As senior diplomat in Addis Ababa, Harrington greatly influenced relations between the British and Ethiopian empires. Admittedly, the era of the indepen- dent plenipotentiary, relatively free from Whitehall's control, had passed; but because of the remoteness of his post and because of the propensity of the Ethiopian sover- eign, Menilek II, for direct and decisive diplomacy with resident representatives, Sir John enjoyed considerable flexibility. In matters of timing and tactics during nego- tiations for Anglo-Ethiopian frontiers and generally in its assessment of Addis Ababa's reaction to questions related to Ethiopia, Whitehall relied heavily on their man-on-the- spot. Within the diplomatic corps, still the sanctuary of the British upper classes, Harrington was something of an oddity. His parents were middle-class Catholics, and, al. though he attended a public school, he joined the Army as a private. After working his way through the military ranks l _ ,_ ,‘_.____ in India, he joined the Bombay Political Service. While serving as agent and consul for Zeila on the Somali coast, he was drawn into Ethiopian affairs, and his conspicuous efficiency in preparing for the special 1897 Mission to Menilek won him the post of permanent Ethiopian represen- tative. Three major considerations account for the British decision to establish diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. With the Anglo-Egyptian reconquest of the Sudan, British imperial policy developed a solid interest in preventing an entente, especially in the form of an arms trade, between Addis Ababa and Omdurman. The rise of expansionist Ethiopia resulted in conflict between Menilek's claims for the his- toric frontiers of the Solomonic empire and British spheres of influence in East Africa, as defined by European agree- ments. Finally, the French campaign for influence in the Upper Nile Valley and the possibility of a Franco-Ethiopian alliance there argued for a permanent British presence at Addis Ababa. While in Ethiopia, Harrington acted in a dual capacity similar to that of Stratford Canning in Turkey; he was agent of the major imperialist power in northeast Africa And unofficial adviser to the Ethiopian government engaged in a careful diplomatic struggle to maintain its hard-won independence vis-‘a-vis covetous European powers. Such duality was possible because London perceived, until 1906, that an independent Ethiopia was the best means of assuring 3 its overriding interest in the Ethiopian empire, the security of the source and effluents of the Blue Nile. During his years in Addis Ababa, Harrington became resolutely anti-French, believing Paris sought to under- mine Ethiopian independence through control of the empire's economy. When Whitehall agreed to a colonial accommodation with Paris, Sir John strove to include Ethiopia in its scope. He soon became convinced that France still sought to transform the Solomonic empire into another Morocco, notwithstanding the Entente Cordiale of 1901‘ nor the Tri— partite Treaty of 1906, a convention ostensibly engineered to guarantee the integrity of Ethiopia. In 1908 he resigned in protest and disgust. Harrington's career convincingly illustrates three major themes of British and Ethiopian history. First, Bri- tish imperial policy in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa was always a compromise arrived at by balancing major competing considerations: security for the water supply of Egypt and the Sudan, the prerequisites of London's European policy, and the limitations of the British Treasury. Second, not- Withstanding its overall technological superiority, the British empire was surprisingly ill-suited to compete for disputed African territory with its Ethiopian counterpart. This curious diSparity was particularly evident in the out- come of Anglo-Ethiopian frontier negotiations. Only on the Ethic-Sudan frontier, where London had a vast prior Anglo- Egyptian commitment (the army for the reconquest of the 14 Sudan), did Harrington manage to achieve a frontier which he considered favorable to British imperial interests. Finally, Harrington's inability to adjust his anti-French stance in the face of the larger priority of the threat from Germany was symptomatic of the lag between British imperial and European considerations during the first de- cade of the twentieth century. The retreat from isolation, with the concomitant movement towards France and Russia, no doubt, caught a great number of other British imperialists off stride. In examining Harrington's career, no claim is made for universality. He was not the archetypical British imperial- ist (if that creature ever really existed). While ‘Harring- ton displayed certain attitudes generally held among late- nineteenth century practitioners of imperialism, his position as agent and unofficial advisor to the sole major independent African monarch places him in an almost unique category. Rather than serving as a model for British imperialism, Sir John's experience provides a tool for understanding the Particular composition of the British empire's policy to- wards Ethiopia. Harrington himself was an intriguing personality. Like Kitchener, he suffered from doubts and anxiety to the point where his effectiveness as a diplomat was impaired. He was sensitive to criticism, easily excited, quick to Speak his mind even at the risk of giving offense, and insistent on proper respect of his position as Britannic H—F___‘_..—-._ - - - 5 representative. Nonetheless, during a good part of his tour in Addis Ababa, Harrington enjoyed a close personal relationship with Menilek, which was, in turn, conducive to effective negotiation and mutual trust. With the men of the diplomatic corps and Foreign Office, however, Har- rington usually felt slightly ill at ease. He had earned his position not because breeding and educational back- ground predisposed him towards the exclusive club of pro- fessional diplomacy, but because he was knowledgeable, capable, and available for his difficult post in 1898. Harrington always realized that Ethiopia would be his only important position; he had no claim to further service in the capitals of Europe. Addis Ababa itself was a truly exceptional diplomatic post. Ethiopia, with its separate Christian church, rugged mountains, and independent inhabitants has always fascin- ated Europeans. After the stunning victory over the Italians in 1896, the flotsam and jetsam of Europe, freebooting ad- “abusers, outright swindlers, and dubious concessionaires, descended upon the Ethiopian capital. Harrington continually suffered from these "undesirables" throughout his years in Ethiopia. Conditions in the new capital were primitive by European or Egyptian standards. For a good part of his tour Harrington lived in tents and. a series of interconnected mud and wattle huts which passed for a legation. Notwithstanding Menilek's program of modernization, Addis Ababa remained one of the most remote and difficult posts available to a 6 diplomat. The small European community in the Ethiopian capital, especially the representatives of the rival limitrophe powers, engaged in a hectic and relentless struggle for influence, often using palace intrigues, rumors, threats, and canards to achieve their ends. To this demanding assignment Harrington came as a young, in-. experienced lieutenant on loan from the Bombay Political Service. For the next ten years, he played an important role in stabilizing Anglo-Ethiopian relations and alerting Ethiopia to the danger of the Frenchesupported railway, but he could overcome the overriding logic of British foreign policy during the first decade of the twentieth century. CHAPTER I: EARLY LIFE, 1865-18914 John Lane Harrington was born on January 16, 1865 in Wales, where thelindustrial revolution was in the process of transforming both countryside and society. Since capi- talization of resources was based on previous experience, relatively advanced mining technology was introduced into Wales to exploit its coal deposits. Whereas the English had experienced relatively slow industrial growth, the Welsh economy underwent rapid industrialization, with extreme social consequences. Demand for labor brought an influx of immigrants from southwest England and nearby, famine-racked Ireland. In the first forty years of the nineteenth cen- tury the population of Wales more than doubled.1 Among the newcomers were the Harringtons, Irish Catho- lies who settled in Swansea. John Harrington's father, Nicholas, had a surgical practice whose clientele, Irish artisans and laborers, could afford only modest fees. The Harringtons lived a comfortable middle—class life in pro- Vincial Swansea until August 1875, when Nicholas Harrington died, leaving his widow and three children only $800. To 1David Williams, A History 2!. Modern Wales (London, 1950), pp. 229-30. '" " Set 19455 (Lon 8 nmke ends meet the whole family had to work, and John, aged ten, licked stamps in an office part-time for five shillings a week.2 Swansea was a drab Victorian industrial town dominated by blackened and rusting metal works and rows of red-brick houses (two rooms up and two down). The town was not pleasant to the eye; yet the atmOSphere was not grim. within walking distance of the center of the metal works-- the heart of industrial Swanseac-was the beautiful country» side of the Gower peninsula. Slightly farther away were the hills and wild moorlands of the Tawe River valley. Swansea itself had a seaside with sands and a wide bay. Despite Agnes Harrington's reduced circumstances, there is no reason to conclude young John's childhood was an unhappy one. In 1882, John Harrington embarked upon what was to be a formative experience of his life. He was sent to Stony- hurst College, one of the older and more renowned of 2 Will of Nicholas Harrington (d. Aug. 30, 1875), Somer- set House, London; Crewe Guardian, Jan. 5, 1910. 3Eilvned and Peter Lewis, The Land of wales (London, 1995): PP. 60-6h; H. L. V. Fletcher, The Coasts of Wales (lhndon, 1969), p. 35. 9 England's Catholic public schools.“ Under the direction of the Jesuits, Stonyhurst boys received a full measure of cold Catholicism in the classroom, cold dips in the swim- ming bath, and cold sweat on the playing fields. Although the Catholic public schools were a system separate from their Anglican counterparts, they nonetheless adopted and inculcated similar values: they "lauded public loyalty and limited individual privacy; they cultivated the 'thick skin' and usually ignored the tender heart."5 Har— rington attended Stonyhurst during a period in which head- masters, almost to the man, believed that their principal duty was to mould character and to prepare their boys for roles of leadership in British society. One method of pre— paration was through "the moral glorification of Games" on the house and inter-school level. At Stonyhurst, Harrington fitted into the category of "all-rounder.” He took the challenging university course and enjoyed sports, at which he continued to play throughout his public career. A second ingredient in character formation was christian morality; astonyhurst College was founded abroad to provide edu- cation for Catholic youths prevented by the Penal Laws of Elizabeth I from obtaining Jesuit schooling. The school moved several times to avoid persecution; in 179“, it re- 0Pened in England at Stonyhurst, near Preston. Like most public schools, Stonyhurst College expanded greatly in the nineteenth century. Frances Irwin and Cecil Chichester- Constable, Stonyhurst War Record (Derby, 1927), passim; John Gerard, A stEEFEEFEE‘HEfiabook (Stonyhurst, 1927):—ST-3; J. G., hemorials 25 Stonyhurst College (London, 1881), pp. l-RO. 5Rupert Wilkinson, The Prefects, British Leadership and the Public School Tradition ILondon, 196%), pp. x-xi. 10 as schoolmasters dedicated to Catholicism in a sea of some- times hostile Protestantism, the Jesuits at Stonyhurst worked diligently to cultivate their charges' religious lives. Besides this emphasis on "muscular Christianity," the pre- fectorial system played a large part in conditioning the boys for lives of public service. In the 1880's, prefects of the upper form, or "Higher Line" as it was called at Stonyhurst, enjoyed immense power; they generally ran house activities, helped to legislate rules, kept order, and judged and usually punished offenders.6 The similarity be- tween the prefect's function and that of the district offi- cer of the empire is obvious. During his three years at Stonyhurst, Harrington obtained what he most likely later considered invaluable experience. Although the Victorian public school shied away from specialized or vocational training in favor of a general education (mostly the classics), conditions of school life acclimatized young men to the kinds of material disadvan~ tages they would face if they chose an imperial career, either civilian or military. The «monastic isolation” of school previewed the family sacrifice usually demanded of a servant of empire, and unheated dormitories and cold baths found their rough' equivalent in the rigors of life in the tropics or along the frontier. But the military character- istics of the public school are perhaps most striking: 6 Ibid., pp. 30-31; Gerard, Stonyhurst Handbook pp. 26- 28, bu:337' ’ 5P so! sch tion the u} on to ”basic the 9d! W at: —7 ll discipline, hierarchy, hardship, barrackroom living, house ‘ spirit and teamwork, and finally, the reverence paid to school tradition. It is not surprising that so many public school boys chose military careers; their education was tailor-made for it.7 Harrington,himself a future soldier, left no record of his immediate reaction to Stonyhurst; he did, however, remember his school days fondly in later life.8 In Victorian England the public school was the culmina- tion of the education of the vast majority of the sons of the upper-middle class and aristocracy. Even if a boy went 1 (unto oxford or Cambridge, the public school remained the «basic conditioner"; university was only a continuation of ‘uuaeducational process, not a new experience.9 For those who attended, university was a transition from adolescence 7Wilkinson, Prefects, pp. 16-17. Stonyhurst, as one of unloldest Catholic-Efifirfc schools, carefully nourished those eccentricities which became hallowed school tradition. Not to be outdone by Rugby, they played their own form of fbotball, and threw in a rudimentary form of criket, sup- ;msedly a holdover from Elizabethan days before exile. The .cmmbination of fervent Catholicism and a long history made sunwhurst as tradition-conscious as any of the famous "Seven," the most influential and long-established Anglican schools. Gerard, Stonyhurst Handbook, pp. 26L28, 56. 81h 1909, Harrington became president of the Stonyhurst (“H.Boys Association. When Harrington’s sister died in 1955. she offered his portrait to Stonyhurst College. Gerard, Stonyhurst Handbook, pp. 27, 35; Hill of Agnes Francis Harrington (d. Dec. 2“, 1955), Somerset House, London. 9Robert Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of 333 British colonial Service (Eyracuse, fink, I953}, .‘T07. lic‘ atte um um In 01 12 to manhood in which the lessons of public school became self-evident. Graduates were generally more polished, more sophisticated, than their friends without the Oxbridge .‘ experience. Harrington considered attending university; yet, to use the words of one of his closest friends, "finan- cial complications and a difference of opinion with his guardian . . . led him to enlist in the Dublin Fusiliers."1° Actually, the chronology is not quite complete. Upon leav- ing Stonyhurst after his eighteenth birthday in January 188h, Harrington tried to earn his living by teaching at fifteen shillings a week, but found he could not do so. Only then did he enlist in the British Army as a private. Enlistment in the ranks was an unusual way for a pub- lic-school boy to begin his army career; such a step attests to Harrington's impulsive nature and to the bitter- ness of the argument with his guardian. In the 1880's the reputation of the common British soldier was unsavory; he was often considered a miscreant who spent his leisure time in either gambling, drinking, whoring, or fighting, and 10Sir James Rennell Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories, 189h-l901, Egypt and AEyssInIa (London, I§23), p. l. ...__..___. *-—'~—_ I0! 19! tisl 13 there was considerable truth in that generalization.11 The men of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Harrington's regiment, were probably no better nor worse than the rest of the Bri- tish Army. The Royal Dublin Fusiliers had been formed by linking the lOBrd Royal Bombay Fusiliers and the 102nd Royal Madras Fusiliers, both European units in the Indian Army, and by transfering the new regiment into the British Army. There were actually five battalions; but only the 102nd and the 103rd, the First and Second Battalions respectively, were on active service. Harrington joined the Second Battalion at Gibraltar in 188“. At the end of February 1885, Harrington's unit pro- ceeded to Egypt and landed in Alexandria. The battalion did garrison duty there and in Ramleh for about six months. 2 In the autumn of 1885, the regiment received orders to proceed up the Nile and join the Anglo-Egyptian Frontier Force headquartered at Aswan. At the last moment, 11The British Army, even in the 1880's, drew manpower mainly from the down-and-outs of society. "Jack Frost" (the approach of a hard winter) was the army's best recruiter, and criminals were often given the choice of a prison/trans- portation sentence or service in the army. To those who joined voluntarily, army life had little correlation to the rosy picture painted by recruiting sergeants; reality made them bitter, resentful, and cynical. It was not until the mass enlistment and conscription of the Boer and First World wars that the "Tommy" became a sympathetic figure. Donald F. Featherstone, All For a Shilling a Day (London, 1966), pp. 13, n. 2, 122721;.“ ' _—" " ‘- 1 2A. E. Mainwaring, Crown and Company, The Records of 223 Second Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers lLonHon, I9TT), pp‘ " 9 569-110 to 1 Mid bogll India duty. India: and at “grog ration: liniu] hours 0 (the a, “CNN; lb these orders were countermanded, and the men of the Second Battalion were mortified to see another regiment go instead. They read later that their replacement had arrived in time to take part in the successful fight against an advanced Mahdist army at Qinis (Ginnis) in December 1885.13 By the beginning of 1886, the Second Battalion was on its way to India, where there was every prospect of still more garrison duty. In peacetime, an ordinary soldier's life outside of the Indian Empire was unrewarding and.monotonous. The men slept and ate in the same barracks room. Discipline was strict, segregation between the ranks absolute, and pay and daily rations, insufficient.1u By modern standards training was minimal. For an infantry regiment, drill consisted of three hours of parade a day, one hour of saluting practice a week (the men detested it), compulsory boxing, and occasional lectures on the history of the regiment. The Army was no 13 Mainwaring, Crown and Company, p. 311; P. M. Holt, The Mahdist state in the Sn an, [881— 1898 (oxford, 1958), p. -1237——WEiTE—tfie_ opposition Conservatives castigated the Liberal government for not reconquering the Sudan and avenging the death of Gordon, they did nothing to effect these ends when they took office in June, 1885. The war against the Mahdists was even more limited under Conserva- tive leadership. Before the Battle of Qinis was fought, the N110 Expeditionary force was replaced by a reduced Anglo- ESYPtian Frontier Force. The British commanders did not even follow up their success at Qinis by giving chase to the Mahdist army. See also Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians (Garden city, NOYO’ 1968). pp. 1%“ 1“Frank Richards, Old Soldier Sahib (London, 1965), pp. 31- 330 15 place to make a fortune. What little money was left to the private soldier after all the "extras" were extracted by his non-commissioned officers, was usually spent on cheap, watery beer in the canteen, or gambled away. Things were better in India. The pay of one rupee a day--worth slightly more than the shilling a day soldiers received for duty in Great Britain-owes more than adequate to provide for the needs of a soldier. Indian servants were hired to do all manual labor around the camp, includ- ing cleaning equipment. In fact, the only work a soldier need do was to take care of his rifle. Costs were low; and everything from contraceptives to bicycles were sold in the regimental bazaar.15 Soldiers generally spent most of their time in their self-contained world-—the canton. Still, service in India was physically exhausting in another way. Summer in the plains was oppressive because of the heat and the threat of disease. Naturally, brutal and headless treatment of Indian camp-followers was taken 15Ibid., pp. 33-36. 16At some stations the army even ran whites-only brothels patrolled by military police and inapected by military doctors. There were other diversions: troupes of acrobats and fakirs of amazing skill toured the camps and hill stations; a full complement of sports on an infor- mal and regimental basis was arranged; and libraries were provided for the edification of the troops. Ibid., pp. 197-99, 238-h3. I‘m non Mm mg [on- nth prob: and t gent} he on: Of Can rank 0 0f '1'; office: 16 for granted.1‘7 John Harrington spent four years as a private and a non-commissioned officer in the Dublin Fusiliers. His education and ambition insured him an early promotion to sergeant.18 These were difficult years for Harrington. Non-commissioned officers were forced to associate only with men of equal rank. The wide gulf between ranks was probably greatest between the regimental-sergeant major and the youngest commissioned officer. Harrington dili- gently set out to improve his own position; in June 1888, he earned a commission in the Second Battalion of the Duke of Cambridge's Own Middlesex Regiment. Harrington's background was such, and his rise to the rank of officer so rapid, that he did not gain the stigma of "ranker"--one who worked his way up from private to 2 officer, but was never really accepted by fellow officers. 17If a soldier had to remain on the plains during the summer, he was most likely to be covered from head to foot with agonizing prickly heat rash. Bails and water blisters were common minor ailments; malaria, heat apoplexy, dysen- tery, and cholera posed greater risks. Soldiers were only undershorts during the day and spent as much time as possible in swimming baths. Naturally, they were often irritable and took out their frustrations on Indian camp followers. The private soldier was the cutting edge of racism, a phenomenon which had been worsening since the Indian Mutiny in 1857. Ibid., p. 75; V. G. Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind (Boston “3 Toronto, 1969), pp. h7-u8. 18Rennell Rodd, Memories, p. 121-22. l9H‘T'he India List, Civil and Military (London, Jan. 1889), passim. Tfie Soutfiwark_ and 8Bermonsey Recorder and South ZLondon Gaze tte, Dec. 3, mRichards, Old Soldier, pp. 156-57. P130 1:53:55:- 1? As a second lieutenant, Harrington enjoyed numerous privi- leges: he received a large rise in salary; he could estab- lish his own residence; and he could enter rigidly orthodox Anglo-Indian society. As one observer of the British in India noted, the lifestyle of the Anglo-Indians was "much closer to the tennis party tradition of the low gentry at home than fin-deosiecle London society."2; In general, life in India was often deadly dull. There were few single-Englishwomen (those that went out to India were either married or soon-techs). Society was male-oriented, revolving around drinks and billiards at the club, polo, pig-sticking, lawn tennis, and occasional hunt and race meetingsf22 If an officer were ambitious, he had to learn Hindustani; for without that language proficiency, only purely regimental jobs were open.23 If a subaltern really wished to get ahead, he could pass a battery of examinations and become a member of the Indian Staff Corps. The latter organization provided officers for the Indian Army, or more properly the three Presidential Armies (Bombay, Bengal and Madras) which made up British India's 21James Morris, Pax Britannica, The Climax if. Empire (London, 1968), p. 219. __.._..__ 2 2A. T. Moore, Notes for Officers Proceeding 2 India (Chatham, 1901‘), pp. 27-31; J. E. Power, Vade Mecum for Officers and Civilians Proceeding 22 India (London, U132). 23Power, Vade Mecum, p. 121. 1m slow tary or y: nam three minat becaum minati dustan read a; charm '33 tea "id mil Ha; *he sm My 3 micers ”1° Indn 1" "1° Br ""1133 10 18 land forces.2u The regulations and examinations for admis- sion into the Staff Corps were complex--just like all mili- tary undertakings in India. Second lieutenants twenty-five or younger with one year regimental duty in India joined a native corps as probationary officers. They were given three years to pass a higher standard native language exa- mination and a professional examination; thereafter, they became full members of the Staff Corps. The language exa- mination assumed a rudimentary ability to converse in Hin- dustani, and required proof of a candidate's ability to read and translate Hindustani in both Persian and Hindi characters. In the professional examination, a candidate was tested on strategy, field fortification, topography, and military law and procedure in the Indian Army.2. Harrington was both ambitious and capable. He joined the Staff Corps as a probationary officer in 1889 and ini- tially served with the First Bombay Grenadiers.26 Among officers without private financial resources, transfer to the Indian Army was frequent. The_ pay was 50% better than in the British Army, and furlough pay for a subaltern (any commissioned officer below captain) was slightly more. For a second lieutenant in the infantry, such as Harrington, the 2% Morris, Pax Britannica, pp. bio-12. 251ndia List, Civil and Military (London, Jan. 1890), {Regulations for Admission to the Indian Staff Corps," pp. ii'lvie 19 8 251bid., passim; Southwark . . . Gazette, Dec. 6, l . "“ ‘-—‘—‘ ‘—“"“‘ ‘——“—‘ m kit the orga one I rife mostl moans rank 1 from t A Mrs, Corps 5 Years 1 0f the Army of links 1, 1378, a d1“tray "n- m to be 1'01 3«as fol. Sir “on. 1938) 19 cost of joining the Indian Army was minimal (uniform and kit was much the same as in the British Army).27 Once in the Indian Army, a British subaltern found himself in an organization with a vastly different character from the one he left. While the British Army was amateurish and rife with class-consciousness, the Indian was officered mostly by men of the upper-middle class, without private means. To these men soldiering was a job.28 The army's rank and file were, of course, all volunteers mostly drawn from the traditional warrior castes and peoples of India. After passing the required examinations in under two years, Harrington became a full member of the Indian Staff Corps and a first lieutenant. In all, he spent over three years in the corps with the Bombay Army. Under the command of the Duke of Connaught, the self-sufficient Presidential Army of Bombay had earned a reputation as one of the weak links in the Indian Army. During the Second Afghan war in 1878, a field force of the army's units broke and fled in disarray when charged for the third time by Afghan swords- man. The field force then was besieged at Kandahar and had to be relieved from Kabul.g9 Contemporaries cited two roe- sons for the weakness of the Bombay Army: it was organized 22 Power, Vade Mecum, pp. 107—10. 23, Morris, Pax Britannica, p. #10. 29 Sir Patrick Cadell, History of the Bombay Army (Lon- don, 1938), pp. 236-kh. do m 0010] Hm tant, Infan throw taryn Hon 0 mm [in Inc ”a Li Here ya fully b: of the : GWon ( Kat Gulf: of nut“,e s ‘ 20 along the old system of mixed castes, and developing indus- try in Bombay successfully competed for manpower.36 During his seven years of military service, Harrington saw no combat-~not an unusual state of affairs because the colonial wars of the 1880's and 1890's were few and short~ lived. Harrington's most important duty was that of adju- tant, or executive officer, with the Fourteenth Bombay Infantry. His career was remarkable for rapid progress through ranks. In 1892, he received what ambitious mili- tary men would consider an important assignment, the posi— tion of assistant-superintendent for agency police in Kathiawar province. His job was to help suppress dacoitry (an Indian term for armed banditry) by assuming the duties of a Lieutenant Gordon, who had been killed by the dacoits.31 Here was a challenge the likes of those described so color- fully by Kipling and Henty. Harrington could rid Kathiawar of the scourge of outlaws and avenge the death of Lieutenant Gordon (no relation to General "Chinese" Gordon). Kathiawar, a peninsula in western India between the Gulfs of Kutch and Cambray, consisted of 188 contiguous native states, whose population totalled about two million 301“ 1895, as part of a general military reform, the Presidential armies of India were abolished. Bombay Indians were replaced by Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Moslems from the west and northwest frontiers. The reformed regiments of the old Bombay army performed adequately when called to fight in the Somali campaigns of the first decade of the twentieth century and in the First World War. Ibid., pp. 2&8-50. 31The Southwark . . . Gazette, Dec. 6. md whose territory in mm.32 The Britist through its indigenous ofIndh, gave up sove theoretically retainin In practice, Kathiavar advice and consent of in the first two deem British East India Com] mile British indirect “Why in the peninsul any which looted and k s geog t 9': :ns c as 1 “Shag. ,1 , 03 ha 11 k tureforrtoenth ““31:de Gaekca mutton, and r i dependr of Baroda rul 61 91h oncies of th 9‘1 In: toenth centu 0 Him 5 hand rom . H. r a he Earn 21 and whose territory was approximately equal to that of ceylon.32 The British controlled Kathiawar indirectly through its indigenous rulers, who, as protected princes of India, gave up sovereignty to the British Raj while theoretically retaining independence in internal affairs. In practice, Kathiawar's Indian rulers governed with the advice and consent of the Bombay Political Service. Dur- ing the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the British East India Company gained suzerainty over Kathiawar. While British indirect rule eliminated the major cause of anarchy in the peninsula, the annual visit of a neighboring army which looted and killed in the name of collection of 32Kathiawar's geographic position made it part of the gateway to India; every invasion, except Alexander the Great's, affected the province directly or indirectly. For the British side, it is necessary to pick up the history of Kathiawar in the late eighteenth century, when it consisted of small Rajput and Kathi kingdoms, who were reluctant tri- butaries to their neighboring power, the Gaekwar of Baroda. The Kathie were fifteenth century immigrants to Kathiawar from Kutch; the Rajuts were a military caste recruited by the Hindus to defend against Mughal invasion. That defence was unsuccessful. Those Rajputs who refused to admit defeat established small kingdoms in Rajputana and Kathiawar during the fourteenth century and after, thus preserving the cul- ture, tradition, and religion of the Indo-Aryan Age. The Gaekwar of Baroda ruled one of the five, largely autonomous dependencies of the Hindu-Maratha Confederacy of the eighteenth century. H. Wilberforce—Bell, The History of Kathiawad from the Earliest Times (London,-T913$, pp. T37; §TF—WTTTIam Lee:W§rFEFT—7E3tfiiawar,fl Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, LXI, 31h5 (1913), p.‘§9?7-Fe?EiVET §EE§?, Tfi'i‘s'EB'ry oT—ndia, v. II (Baltimore. 1956). p. “7; Sir William Barton, L59 Princes of India (London, l93h), pp. 13-18. "'_‘——' tribute, armed bandit Outlavry was a " long tradition in Kat ination, Kathi outlaw Despite their acts of bandits, with the hell the wretched cultivatt uploitative systems. of India beyond direct ”The cause oi“ th method of collecting 8: its Gaekvar of Baroda var during the harvest my bad no commissari inhabitants those who remained in iiulkgiri army's demand rulers loose allial .1507, 11 sent their a $1 Kathiavar '1‘ "“130 or if he max “on f me reside ielab aratha for m r d 0 fix nail the; uni payment. ioctinut 3:511“ °f P u c i minqui in his clung“: douina oupany mad cloa m ”rpover 1 ferti Vince. ohibiti the Bomb pp. ‘ overzzphdmimuraiztn” in, ‘1 the o ° ‘ r t “My 1:: 22 tribute, armed banditry remained, even grew, in Kathiawar.33 Outlawry was a "highly respectable institution" with a long tradition in Kathiawar. During periods of alien dom- ination, Kathi outlaws often provided the only resistance. Deepite their acts of murder, looting, and blackmail, these bandits, with the help of a strong oral tradition, inspired the wretched cultivators of Kathiawar who bore the brunt of exploitative systems. The states of Kathiawar, like most of India beyond direct British control, were more freebooting 331be cause of the chaos in Kathiawar was the Maratha method of collecting tribute there-othe Mylkgiri system. The Gaekwar of Baroda set an undisciplined army into Kathie- war during the harvest to extort all possible tribute. The army had no commissariat, so it lived off the land. Most inhabitants of Kathiawar sought the safety of walled towns; those who remained in the countryside could not meet the Mulkgiri army's demand for tribute. Kathiawar's indigenous rulers offered no resistance. By an unofficial arrangement with the Marathas, they suspended their own internecine wars and retired to their forts until the Mulkgiri army departed after ravaging the province. The East Indian Com- pany had a loose alliance with the Gaekwar of Baroda. In 1807, they sent their agent in Baroda with the Mulkgiri army into Kathiawar with authority to fix reasonable tribute and discover if the march of the predatory army was as bad as reputed. The resident was appalled at the annual inva- sion of the Maratha forces and, during the next ten years, he labored to fix realistic levels of tribute and security for punctual payment. The East India Company then forced the Maratha Peshaw of Poona, who leased the right of col- lecting tribute in Kathiawar to the Gaekwar of Baroda, to relinquish his claims in the province. In 1820, the East India Company made clear their intention of becoming the dominant power in fertile and commercially important Kathie- war by prohibiting the Gaekwar from interfering in the pro- vince. Wilberforce-Bell, Kathiawad, pp. 179-89; Lee-warner, 'Kathiawar," pp. 39h—95. issss'aathors were members of the Bombay administration. It is conceivable they could have overemphasised the destructiveness of the Mulkgiri system in order to justify British takeover of Kathiawar. thanBrltlsb Indih 7‘ tlons allowed criminal substantial exp-"ditu' ofton failed to coordi mum. nnaun ’1 m mm were given vm continual family . lages; outlaw-y noted I younger son of a ruler, might become an outlaw lcftmte to justify b It was the duty of head and to coordinate “it“ in a campaign agn mo in both the north ”8°": the British res: lithium a scheme for 1 all the states to chase furnished their quotes 1' of fort was not enough to "cup of outlaws, . salami"; 'n "m“: on. 331;“ .R: ubOrfOl‘c..B°ll 23 than British India. The patchwork of different jurisdic~ tions allowed criminals greater scope for escape. Despite substantial expenditures on law enforcement, the police often failed to coordinate their efforts in putting down banditry. Finally, since all sons of rulers of most Kathie- war states were given estates for their maintenance, there were continual family quarrels over the distribution of vil— lages; outlawry acted as the 'safety valve of society." A younger son of a ruler, if he felt himself unjustly treated, might become an outlaw with his dependents. His lands were left waste to justify his action.3u It was the duty of the British Agency Police to spear- head and to coordinate the police departments of the native states in a campaign against dacoitry. In response to out- lawry in both the north and south of Kathiawar during the 1880's, the British resident submitted to the rulers of Kathiawar a scheme for raising a mounted police force from all the states to chase down dacoits. All but one state furnished their quotas for the unit, but even this concerted effort was not enough to end banditry. In early 1892 a group of outlaws, led by Wale Namori, notorious for his daring deeds during the 1880's, began looting throughout the northern part of the province. For almost a year the gang evaded capture.35 3gAndrew Wilson, "A Run Through Kathiawar-Junghar,~ Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, CXX, no. DCCXXX (1876), pp. - Lee:WEFHE?T_~EEtEIEV§r,F pp. 395—96 and Protected Princes, pp. 17-18. -_-—_—‘——- “— 3SWilberi‘orceoBell, Kathiawad, pp. 239-“1, 2&6. Th0 political ll explanations for his cohorts. The P011“ thanutlavs; unless a indigenous gondamrl bandits because the 11 mod. The gang was 4 Miana population (Nana suspected that the ban in tho Mali government In December 1892, "Sistant superintendel <10”. and his mounted cc ldisused watercourse, police to attack. Gord sauit. With rifles and Iountad police charged 1m. In the battle ,e '9" "he killed. hated Butv vi "5hr Ollivantt ill/ "6"“;ng s: :3th ’02:“ Wilberfor::-Boll, 2a The political agent, Sir E. C. K. Ollivant, had several explanations for his failure to apprehend Namori and his cohorts. The police of the native states were no match for the outlaws; unless accompanied by a European officer, the indigenous gendarmarie refused to make contact with the bandits because the latter were better shots and better armed. The gang was given food and shelter by the whole inane population (Namori's native state). Ollivant even suspected that the bandit leader had wellolocated accomplices in the Mali government with whom he shared his plunder.? In December 1892, Namori's band was cornered by the assistant superintendent for Agency Police, Lieutenant Gor- don, and his mounted contingent. The outlaws took cover in a disused watercourse, hoisted a flag, and challenged the police to attack. Gordon rashly decided on a frontal as- sault. With rifles and swords at the ready, Gordon and his nmunted police charged the trench and finished off the out- laws. In the battle, Gordon himself and two of his police- men were killed. But while Namori and his band were elim- inated, the roots of dacoitry lingered on in Kathiawar.37 Harrington assumed the post of the fallen Gordon in late 1892. He sought to discover and indict those who had collaborated with Namori. The superintendent of Agency 36011ivant to Lee-Warner (1°t~)s RRJkOt: J01? 219 18929 Western Indian States Agency Records (hereafter VISAR), R/l/Z, box 605, sor. no. 1‘55. 37Wilberforce-Bell, Kathiawad, PPo 2h?-b8. Police reckon“ that ‘ favorably inclined ‘0‘ quarters of Kathie“? against those she SUP! eodolothifls to “1° °l investigation. rirstl tion over the larger 3 they furnish evidence. cooperate with the in from the outlaws' rele Police were able to co collaborators, there at be brought to Justice. subjects of the larger lish Jurisdiction did I “ll complicity in arm allegedly aided the dee their various states . 25 Police reckoned that at least twenty-nine villages had been favorably inclined towards the outlaws. From Rajkot, head- quarters of Kathiawar agency, Harrington collected evidence against those who supplied guns, ammunition, food, shelter, and clothing to the outlaws.38 Two problems hindered his investigation. Firstly, the Agency Police had no Jurisdic- tion over the larger states; Harrington could only ask that they furnish evidence. Secondly, many people hesitated to cooperate with the investigation for fear of retaliation from the outlaws' relatives. If Harrington and the Agency Police were able to construct an air-tight case against collaborators, there was no assurance that the guilty would be brought to justice. The collaborators were almost all subjects of the larger states of Kathiawar, in which Bri- tish Jurisdiction did not apply to criminal cases dealing with complicity in armed robbery or murder.39 Those who allegedly aided the dacoits were tried in the courts of their various states. As it turned out, Harrington did not remain in Kathiawar long enough to see that his investigations bore less fruit than the British had 38E. V. Hackay to A. H. Denys (let.), Rajkot, Jan. 28, 1893, WISAR, all/2, box 656, ser. no. 110; G. E. Handcock to c. U. H. Sealy (let.), RaJkot, march 1%, 1893, WISAR, R/l/Z, box 656,.501‘0 nae Ills 3%. nanny to c. w. a. scary (tom. aaokot. Aug. 3, 1893 and Mcmoranda by Harrington, Rajkot, Aug. 25, 28, 29, 31, 1893, nsnn, 3/1/2, box 656, ser. no. 111. llO the xathiavar A34 had four assistant pol assistants to act as s appointed officials of no sore than villages. Corps, Harrington was agent.2n In 1893, he agent in two prants. aonthe) was spent in G peninsula. In relation to the node dual function: 1 tire of the Insperial Go the native ruler-«089°C fence and the inplement “literary replacement, he a "incluofu cos 0 we: "to "8 Jul icti m. linunication «y, M War rear states 1‘ N 10043:“), 3 "“1 :2. or ‘ 99' 396.97. PNtOcted P ll 81 rm- c,“ 26 expected.“ The Kathiawar Agency of the Bombay Political Service had four assistant political agents and five Indian deputy assistants to act as advisers to native rulers and the appointed officials of the smallest political states, often luommre than villages. As a member of the Indian Staff COrps, Harrington was eligible for the post of political agentauh In 1893, be filled in as assistant political agent in two prants. The bulk of Harrington's time (four months) was spent in Gohelwad Prant in the southeast of the peninsula. In relation to the native ruler, the political agent ~had a