T H S I S ' “1mm. FOR THE; DEGREE OF mg; ‘ MIG—{EGAN STATE. umvmsm i 9172 .— LIBRARY ”n Michigan State University This is to certify that the thesis entitled Socioeconomic Modernization, Political Institutionalization and Instability in European Politics presented by Elizabeth Ann Kelley has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for PLD. degree in Weience 7‘94. Major professor Date (774,“ 42? #71 0-7639 PSLIT Seve the literatu applied to p cation of in :larify the ' Stability wh. One : fire on inst Praduct of d fall to atta 0“ the SOUI‘C emciations ABSTRACT SOCIOECONOMIC MODERNIZATION POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND INSTABILITY IN EUROPEAN POLITICS By Elizabeth Ann Kelley Several models of instability have been proposed in the literature of political science; however. few have been applied to post-war EurOpean political systems. This appli- cation of instability models to Europe should help both to clarify the validity of the model and to illuminate the in- stability which has been found in Europe. One recurrent theme appearing throughout the litera- ture on instability suggests that political unrest is the product of discontent which occurs when members of society fail to attain their expectations. While theorists differ on the source of these expectations, there is agreement that expectations shift dramatically during the process of moder- nization, industrialization. and urbanization. When these changes occur rapidly, expectations may diverge from actual achievements to a greater extent and discontent is more likely to emerge. Samuel Huntington1 asserts that economic moderniza- tion is a dualistic process which both raises social expecta- tions through social mobilization and raises the capacity of the society to meet new expectations through economic growth. d f ‘6- sv $3 'On 0 «Orr Q -n q :ere Ila" ‘ Is \ alys h p . in a: i U. H n.» b I “. Fow‘ :o J I ““5. .203 V on o'... :‘di’ Elizabeth Ann Kelley The gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic deve10pment is a determinant of political instability. Both political institutions and repression can be viewed as polit- ical variables which limit the destabilizing impact of the deve10pmental gap. Correlational analysis of twenty-seven European soci- eties fails to indicate patterns predicted by Huntington and others. In contrast to the predictions posited in the model repression is positively associated with instability. The introduction of the levels of socioeconomic development into the analysis increases the degree of comparability of the rates of social mobilization and economic growth occurring at different levels of deve10pment. Negative relationships linking both institutionalization and the rate of economic growth to political stability are revealed by the extended analysis, while both the rate of social mobilization and eco- nomic growth and the deveIOpmental gap are positively, al- though weakly, associated with instability. The scope of the analysis is also extended by an ex- amination of individual EurOpean countries. While repression seems often to be used to end ongoing unrest, it also seems to prevent unrest in many cases. Consequently, repression is a useful addition to Huntington's model when examining an individual political system. In the less deve10ped EurOpean societies, the gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth is positively related to political Elizabeth Ann Kelley instability when political institutionalization and repres- sion are held constant. The investigation of twenty-seven European societies indicates that the rate of socioeconomic change has an impact on political stability only if a soci- ety has not yet achieved a high level of modernization. The introduction of the concept of a theshold of modernization clarifies some of the discrepancies found in the data of several West European societies. Most of the East European countries and a number of West European coun- tries fall below that threshold: in these cases, Huntington's model, with the addition of repression, is an effective tool for understanding and predicting political instability. 1 Samuel P. Huntington, olitical Order in Chan n Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19335. SOCIOECONOMIC MODERNIZATION, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND INSTABILITY IN EUROPEAN POLITICS By Elizabeth Ann Kelley A THESIS Submitted to ' Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR or PHILOSOPHY ' Department of Political Science @ Copyright by ELIZABETH ANN KELLEY 1972 O I .0 L’lSClI‘ETlOH . ' ‘l APE " . 'IV-M. 0‘. U I . f ' ~fi A . I ~ A. 1" an fight can. H o '“‘ a» r: ..""“’ raot ‘F’A‘An .Uy“° . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Several people have given me assistance and even inSpiration in undertaking this task. Frank A. Pinner, John N. Collins, and David V. J. Bell all helped clarify many logical and analytical questions related to political instability. Their comments and support were invaluable. James C. Work gave both his time and advice when he was as busy as I. Darlene Heckenlaible, a long-suffering friend, not only typed this work but tolerated my varied moods. Finally, I would like to thank my father for al- ways supporting me in this often grueling undertaking. ii .‘ ,an"fi"‘.?‘f\\' J | “\...\..a. u .&U orfi" «$1.. -‘ ’ v h«.m- TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Chapter 1 THE MODEL 0 O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O 0 Impact of Socioeconomic Modernization Institutionalization Adaptability Complexity Autonomy Coherence The Huntington Model Revisions of the Model 2 INSTABILITY IN EUROPE: THE SEARCH FOR A PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Analyses of European Politics Political Impact of Socioeconomic Change Theories of Political Instability Operational Considerations Summary 3 MEASURENIENT O I O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O 0 Social Mobilization Economic Deve10pment Institutionalization Repression Political Instability Examining the Model # A CROSS-NATIONAL EXAMINATION OF THE MODEL . . . Summary 5 INSTABILITY, THE MODEL, AND WEST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O The Observations The Data and the Model Summary iii 23 47 76 87 R' A ’ in Ina-'9‘ ‘ tip-aw. lJD.n ' ‘1‘“ I v Uvsuho H". P ..5- S..- \L flh‘vflQl 7 :JL‘O‘JA- H “3.; .0. - my: ‘0. — 9 A" -~ MA . Q‘s-v v.4. ‘I.:..'A~D .h..v ’— '0d~.V‘:. .5. .. 1.~!‘." I'I l| ... .MJJ.‘ A The ‘- 3 P' ~ an- ‘ fl fi v- “ ZED“. t.) Chapter 6 INSTABILITY, THE MODEL AND EAST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 The Observations Summary 7 CONCLUSION O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 112 The Literature The Findings Additions to the Model Summary BIBLIOGRAPHY 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 123 APPENDIX A The Level of Socioeconomic Modernization . . 130 B The Rate of Socioeconomic Change . . . . . . 137 C Institutionalization Indices . . . . . . . . 1u6 D Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 E Instability Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 F Relationship of Variables in West European Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 G Relationship of Variables in East European countries 0 o e o o o o o o o o o e 207 iv *1 fi‘. Correlé and Le? Zero-Cr Social Zero-C: Ennr ' . n ‘VV‘OObIO D 11 + LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Correlation Coefficients: Institutionalization and Legitimacy and Instability Indices . . . . . 2. Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients: Social Mobilization Indices . . . . . . . . . . 3. Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients: Economic GrOWth Indices o o o o o o o o o o o o 4. Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients: Institutionalization Indices . . . . . . . . . . 5. Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients: Indices of Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Zero-Order Correlation Coefficients: InStability Indices o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 7. Correlation Coefficients: The Degree of Association Between Instability and the Other Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. Correlation Coefficients: The Degree of Association Between Instability and Other variables 0 O O I I O O O O O O O O O 9. Partial Correlation Coefficients: The Degree of Association Between Instability and the Other Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. Partial Correlation Coefficients: The Degree of Association Between Instability and the Other Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. Partial Correlation Coefficients: The Degree of Association Between Instability and the Other variables 0 o o o o o o o o o o o 12. Partial Correlation Coefficients: The Degree of Association Between Instability and the Other Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . q u C and ye e . V .0. est ". 1 I .eJe yountr; edic* la " T. Dr 1| .23 1“.“ 1: A a]. A. I 1:. 3: 4!. v4. . . J . ~ . I .s. flu ha I. 1 V. v . C. Cy r. .uu _.. n. i, . . .. . v. AIW . I; i. I. AU : a. flu a. :1. run AC .: ad 4. a nu ad a. :1 e . r: A}. n .n.. n. .. . 2r.” +1. h. in n. I“ h. s a h. I fly .no u,» Wu an nib 2w 3: 9a h. e e h. r.. QC 9. as O. Q. a ‘9.» a «U G. 0 e a. e .. . e e ..a O O O» V «T. n: h.. V 6‘ n1 h. a: J A a). n a .... 11 nu... ..... v-.. D. n a ”N v:. ...I In 0 If. {.u A 0 :5. i« 3- A7 a .111 Iv rkd (“v I- 0 .4- .. I ,0 i a [in ll“ Ill: Inn A A... Mu!“ M. .1 tn“. sumo) . I A O a V b I C I Table 13. 1h. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. A1. A2. A3. Ah. A5. A6. B1. B2. B3. B4, B5. West Europe: Increasing DeveIOpmental Gap . . . . . . . West EurOpe: Decreasing DevelOpmental Gap . . . . . . . Countries of West Europe with the Predicted Pattern . . . . . . . Delayed Reactions to an Increasing Gap Between the Rates of Social Mobilization and Economic Growth East EurOpe: Increasing Developmental Gap . . . . . . . East EurOpe: Decreasing Developmental Gap . . . . . . . Countries of East Europe with the Predicted Pattern . . . . . . . Mean Number of Radios Per 1,000 Inhabitants . . . . . . . Mean Level of Enrollment in Higher Education . . . . . . . Mean Infant Mortality Rate . . Per Cent of Inhabitants in Cities Over 20,000 0 o o o o 0 Working POpulation Employed in Non-Agricultural Occupations . West EurOpe: Per Capita Income, Average Annual Rate of Increase Of Radio DifoSion o o o o o 0 Average Annual Rate of Increase in Education 0 o o o o o o o 0 Average Annual Rate of Decline of Infant Mortality Rates . . . Average Annual Rate of Increase in Per Capita Income . . . . . Rate of Social Mobilization . . vi 9O 92 95 98 106 108 110 131 132 133 13L: 135 136 138 139 1&0 141 142 .A l .v. M 1.. 8L W n. "4 do. :5! at, Rate 0: Rate 0: H . 5 ”HF Ly ulVoA: Rate 0: . O y: ‘39! ans b. v in” t .736'V. Inst: &. ...D V. :1 Fill Zuwz-é ’/ Q I In Oct. .1. :1“, ”57“: n3 “U55 V“. Index Table B6. B7. B8. Cl. CZ. C3. C4. D1. E1. E2. Rate of Economic Growth . . . . . . Rate of Growth 1952-65: Socio- Economic Change Indicators . . . . Rate of Growth 1952-65: Socio- Economic Change Indices . . . . . . Institutionalization Indices: 1952-65. unChanged o o o o o o o o Institutionalization Indices: 1952-65. With Change 0 o o o o o o Institutionalization: Elite Continuity............ Index Value of Institutionalization Frequency of Reported Repression . Frequency of Reported Unrest . . . Factor Analysis of Indices of InStability. 1952-65 a o o o o o o 143 144 145 147 148 11:9 150 152 154 155 _. .: -vfi .‘L‘. Fl. Ans: :8. 3131 v: a... ‘ J. a.“ 'u ox 1‘: (D (I) 0 P‘D. . Q“. J. 31 LIST OF FIGURES Figure F 1. Austria: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 158 2. Belgium: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 161 3. Denmark: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 164 4. Finland: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 166 5. France: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 170 6. West Germany: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . 174 7. Greece: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 177 179 9. Ireland: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 181 8. Iceland: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . *IJ’IZI‘UWWW’II'U F10. Italy: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . . 185 F11. Luxembourg: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . 187 F12. Netherlands: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . 189 F13. Norway: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 191 F14. Portugal: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . 194 F15. Spain: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . . 197 F16. Sweden: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 199 F17. Switzerland: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . 202 F18. U. K.: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . . 205 G 1. Albania: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 209 G 2. Bulgaria: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . 212 G 3. Czechoslovakia: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . 215 viii Figure G 4. East Germany: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . 219 G 5. Hungary: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . 222 G 6. Poland: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . . 226 G 7. Rumania: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . 229 G 8. U.S.S.R.: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . . 232 G 9. Yugoslavia: Variable Values, 1952-65 . . . . 235 ix Since he b- :ome r reap-case to t cently begun enor. of polii 5:13:91: pl'Od‘1 processes 3311 T Politics. To a :3 5118‘; 300 {‘35: the DTOC figs. MOSJ‘ «CTEd in t, :70}: ° I J1 Ins: :c‘ INTRODUCTION Since World War II, political unrest and instability have become regular features of politics in many areas. In response to this phenomenon, political scientists have re- cently begun to shift some of their attention to the phenom- enon of political instability and its role in the political system, producing a broader view of political behavior and processes and ultimately a more sophisticated understanding of politics, particularly in the context of change. To achieve this broader view. theorists of instabil- ity must accept the challenge of recognizing and understand- ing the processes of instability in a variety of national set- tings. Most current models of instability cited in the lit- erature utilize cross-national correlational analysis: this approach. however, does not approach the insights that can be drawn from a more intense study of the same model in a number of contexts. Likewise. theories of instability have often been ig- nored in the analysis of contemporary EurOpean politics even though instability has frequently evidenced itself in their political systems. The purpose of this study, then. is to examine how effectively a model of instability can be utilized 1 1:. achieving systems whic process. the =‘.:.e influenc in achieving a more comprehensive study of many political systems which share only certain characteristics. In this process. the writer hOpes to gain a better understanding of the influence of instability in European politics. Poli 1:30 tne na’. to evaluate Firs isPends on r 'u “l 3“ D38: 1:: this Stuc lam of S: variables . CHAPTER 1 THE MODEL Political theorists have made extensive inquiries into the nature of change and instability as it relates to the political system. However, when these theories are to be developed into a meaningful model which can be used in many different situations. additional criteria must be added to evaluate the model. First, the precision and adaptability of any model depends on how well the variables are linked together in use- ful and predictive relationships. It is the writer's intent in this study to delineate a model which can interpret the impact of socioeconomic change on politics, necessitating a model which incorporates both socioeconomic and political variables. Therefore, a useful model of change must clearly de- find the relationship between socioeconomic change and polit- ical variables, i.e. the specific relationships between change in one variable and change in the others. Both the direction and rate of change contribute needed information to understand the interaction between socioeconomic change and political processes and institutions. 3 Only pact of soci ”no a compr- I. linking mode is one such the relation | pozents of s ution and J terminam oil ‘miiation . Hund final Procesg 4‘ increases A a u m c o Soci ec omic Modern za n Only a few theorists have attempted to link the im- pact of socioeconomic modernization on political stability into a comprehensive model of change. Huntington's theory linking modernization, institutionalization, and instability is one such model. (Huntington. 1968) In his model, it is the relationship between the rates of change of specific com- ponents of socioeconomic modernization (i.e. social mobili- zation and economic growth) that constitutes the primary de- terminant of political instability due to socioeconomic mod- ernization. ‘ Huntington views socioeconomic modernization as a dual process having two main effects on the political system. It increases frustrations which lead to political demands. .and, at the same time. it increases the productivity of so- ciety which may help alleviate those frustrations and help . decrease political demands. These two processes are defined as social mobilization and economic development.1 Because the process of social mobilization results in the creation of new views and expectations about the world. it puts increased pressure on the existing political process. Economic development. on the other hand. increases the ca- pacity of society to meet the needs of expectations of its members. 1Economic development and economic growth will be used interchangeably throughout this work to denote the .m process 0 'W‘JM Dent-i breaking doe". available to: behavior. (‘ Ecirone and strated, thi and is folio sure, and 18 Urba cozponent pr] bers of indfl °°mtryside ' profitable 12' 5°" t0 the I hi‘asuialil friends, thf tralliitional 5 Deutsch defines social mobilization as a process of breaking down traditional commitments. making individuals available for new social. economic. and political modes of behavior. (Deutsch. 1961, p. h9u) As Outright (1963), McCrone and Cnudde (1967), and Lerner (1965) have demon- strated. this process tends to originate with urbanization and is followed by increases in literacy. mass media expo- sure, and levels of political participation. Urbanization ranks highest in importance of all the component processes of economic modernization. Large num- bers of individuals leave their traditional villages and countryside and move to cities, neually in search of more profitable means of support. As large numbers of people move to the city widespread literacy. media exposure. and industrialization occur. Uprooted from his family and friends, the individual feels removed from the security of traditional roles he has always performed as he is exposed to a more complex world and alternate life styles. The tra- ditional roles which the non-urban individual fulfilled be- come inapprOpriate in an urban setting: relationships which defined his life space in the countryside no longer apply to him. Particularly. the removal of the individual from the extended family forces him to seek new social and economic relationships which will replace the old ones. Once in the urban setting. removed from traditional ties. the individual encounters a larger. more heterogeneous vorld throng? ac'v'ies, telex lifestyles a As Lerner cor 3f li‘fng, e5 53:195. "’- Of attitx sad to Scr ‘ifiae t0 be Skills. The 32.29; and a hil' SCCiall JuSt ‘i‘e 0e. ' e. ‘ 1c ll '0.» “5:8 0 h in» 6 world through personal contact and mass media. The radio. movies, television. and newSpapers expose the individual to life styles and standards of living different from his own. As Lerner contends, he learns to have empathy for other ways of living, eSpecially to identify with more modern life styles. Studies have shown increases in literacy and educa- tion after a rise in urbanization. The educational process gives the individual not only a set of skills, but also a set of attitudes and expectations. As the individual is ex- posed to schooling, there is a rise in his expectations with respect to his life style, occupation, and income: he also ex- pects to be better rewarded simply because he has better skills. Therefore, the individual expects to have a greater number and a better variety of opportunities available to him, socially and economically. Just as urbanization, education, and communications mobilize the individual into ”modern" roles, economic growth mobilizes resources into more efficient patterns of produc- tion. As a society becomes increasingly industrial it both produces greater quantities of goods which will be available to the population and provides a greater number and a greater diversity of jobs for the urban dweller. During industri- alization the individual is introduced to less personal, more efficient work roles and to social contact with other workers. While urbanizing starts the process of breaking away from traditional life, industrialization begins to integrate th vices opport expectations and relation The soveoents i flanges asso creases in p of the new e 5’." improveme soiility. the Fate of {1295 Since Efo‘lth will sOtial mobi In Zion leads fem-153’ it 7 integrate the mobilized individual into modern life. It pro- vides opportunities for mobility which meet newly acquired expectations. and it introduces the individual to new roles and relationships. The process of industrialization brings about im- provements in the standard of living. For example. two changes associated with economic development are general in- creases in per capita income and in life expectancy. Some of the new expectations due to social mobilization are met by improvements in income. life expectancy. and occupational mobility. If the rate of economic growth can keep pace with the rate of social mobilization. frustration will be mini- mized since the mobility and productivity due to economic growth will help to meet the new aspirations resulting from social mobilization. In summary. while the process of economic moderniza- tion leads to increases in social. economic. and political demands. it also leads to greater opportunities for meeting those challenges through economic growth. However. if eco- nomic growth is inadequate to meet the expectations of the rapidly modernizing population. frustration will increase. While Huntington asserts that social frustration is determined by the rates of social mobilization and economic development. he suggests that the rate of growth of mobility opportunities determines the likelihood that social frustra- tion will result in political participation. Expanding ep- portunities due to geographic or occupational mobility ,. Magma-Lemma:- due to Ice por‘unitie high level point in t 110 politi political effect of 1 8 increases the likelihood that the urban educated individual will be able to fulfill his social and economic aspirations and. consequently. to decrease his frustration. However. if social frustration is at a high level. due to low rates of economic deve10pment and growth in op- portunities coupled with high rates of social mobilization. high levels of political participation will occur. At this point in the development of his model. Huntington introduces two political variables. political institutionalization and political instability. which are related to the political effect of socioeconomic change. at 0 al tion Huntington views political institutions as those structures and processes which make and implement authori- tative decisions. These institutions contribute to the functional effectiveness as well as the legitimacy of the political system. Political instability is a manifestation of the failure of popular acceptance of political institutions. i.e. legitimacy. It results in the channeling of political activity into organizations and procedures which are not part of the "authoritative decision-making process.” Ex- isting political institutions are not able to monopolize political activity since part of the political community does not accept them as the preper organizations and pro- cedures for maintaining order and making decisions. Hmt‘ the effectivi me by the‘ institution 3) autonomy, is the comp txionali zat cal process levels of g The on tzeir ab- ww. . Dedub CESpi. e ”hamstanm ’0 [J H 9-1 r!- P (D 9 Huntington suggests four dimensions which determine the effectiveness of political institutions and their accep- tance by the community. The four dimensions. or factors. of institutionalization are 1) adaptability. 2) complexity. 3) autonomy. and 4) coherence. (Huntington. 1968. p. 12) As the complexity of society increases. the degree of insti- tutionalization necessary for a stable and accepted politi- cal process increases: the political system requires higher levels of each of these characteristics. Adaptability The adaptability of the political institutions hinges on their ability to maintain continuity and effective Opera- tions despite the change of incumbents or of environmental circumstances. Unless the institutions are able to adapt to new circumstances. they will tend to be fundamentally altered or destroyed in time. For example. the monarchy in Great Britian is an adaptable institution which has accepted dif- ferent functions in British society over a long period of time. At one time the most powerful political institution in Britian. it currently symbolizes the nation and political authority. In comparison. the French monarchy. unable to adapt successfully to the changing political world around it. ended its institutional life and that of other institutions firmly tied to it. French Republics also have faced similar crises of adaptability. In the Fourth Republic. when colonial tests for I . ' '- . mutations it was replz Eur: rational as" aod functio: :essf‘ol co; tion reflec enVironaem tion increa as a oontin m ‘Ihlc‘n : W. we 1' f0?! 3“”. 10 demands for independence surpassed the Republic's ability to institutionally handle the conflicting interests generated. it was replaced by a highly personalized regime. Huntington suggests three main indicators of insti- tutional adaptability: chronological age. generational age. and functional adaption. Since survival itself means suc- cessful coping with the environment. the age of an institu- tion reflects the success that it has had in adapting to the environment. Generally speaking. as the age of an institu- tion increases. both the habit of using it and its standing as a continuing institution is increased. The issues of generational age and functional adap- tion are both part of the larger question of chronological age. Generational age involves the ability of institutions to continue as the incumbents change_and reflects the degree to which institutions have a life of their own rather than being an extension of a personality or event. For example. the failure of the R. P. F. to continue when deGaulle re- nounced political life in the late 19h0's is an indication of a weak institution. The issue of generational age goes beyond this ques- tion of a simple change of incumbents to a consideration of how well an institution survives the change in leadership based on one kind of formative experiences to another with other formative experiences. For example. this type of change can be seen in the shift in the U. S. S. R. from a leadership which developed during the Revolution to one iric‘n develo he ability orange refle you the pet instimtions sauce and < cessful con‘ Pig “1 thus ll: \- times. 11 which developed during the period of rapid industrialization. The ability of an.institution to survive such a fundamental change reflects a strength and stability which extends be- yond the personal power and charisma of those creating the institutions. The institutions of the Fifth Republic of France and of Yugoslavia have to face this issue. The suc- cessful continuation of Fifth Republic politics under Pom- pidou. thus far. indicates a degree of institutional strength in France. In Yugoslavia. however. only after Tito and his war-time cohorts pass from the scene will the institutional ability of Yugoslavia to adapt to generational changes be known. If Yugoslavia survives these changes. not only would this indicate a degree of strength of institutions but the experience itself would also increase the ability of the in- stitutions to survive other generational changes. The ability of an institution to survive changes in its function is another aspect of adaptability. To the ex- tent that institutions can continue to function in a chang- ing world. they demonstrate a strength. stability. and ef- fectiveness which extends beyond particular situations. Functional adaptability enables an institution to continue to exist over long periods of time; its continued effective- ness with different functions tends to reinforce the com- munity's habit to support and utilize the institution. The degree to which institutions can adapt to chang- ing times. generations. and functions are important indica- tors of their level of institutionalization. Institutional aiaptabilit; tution whict tltions. F. Republic ma smived a le‘C-aulle's less person Political pl A s by Killing] VI “93 More a Stage and individual: 33' "Filing 12 adaptability leads to the continuation of an effective insti- tution which tends to reinforce continued use of those insti- tutions. For example. the U.N.R./U.D.R. in the French Fifth Republic may well be showing such adaptability since it has survived a generational change in leadership. No longer deGaulle's party. the ability of the party to adapt to a less personalized function and to reflect a more responsive political program indicates the level of institutional strength and stability of the party. Complexity A second dimension of institutionalization suggested by Huntington is that of complexity. As an organization cre- ates more and a greater variety of sub-units. its ability to secure and maintain the loyalty of members increases since individuals are able to find a place within the institution. By working in an organization. individuals identify more strongly with it. thus increasing their willingness to main- tain that institution. Thus. a complex organization also indicates a higher level of institutional loyalty and strength. Aside from the question of institutional support. in- creasing institutional complexity is a determinant of in— creasing functional adaptability. Organizational complexity enables the institution to divide labor in an efficient and productive way. For example. separate structures for teach- ing. brainstorming. publishing. accounting. etc. make a uni- versity a more efficient organization which can take on new factions . police and neling and ‘ cal decisiol of the task organzatic Vital. tion to mes | | hers and m: I also incre; I. I tronally a: ity is moi ! alization 13 functions. In government. having separate bureaucratic. police and judiciary structures is an efficient way of chan- neling and resolving problems and of administering politi- cal decisions. As the environment increases the complexity of the tasks facing the organization. complexity within the organization is increasingly necessary for functional sur- vival. Thus. organizational complexity enables an institu- tion to meet the needs of large and diverse numbers of mem- bers and maintain broader support for the institution. It also increases the probability that an institution can func- tionally adapt to rapid and complex changes. Thus. complex- ity is another manifestation of a high level of institution- alization of organizations in a heterogeneous society. Autonomy The third dimension of institutionalization suggested by Huntington is that of autonomy. The extent of institu- tional autonomy is the extent to which organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and patterns of behavior. (Huntington. 1968. p. 20) A high level of political institutionalization would be mani- fested in a society where political activity and political structures could be easily identified as being political. rather than religious or economic. The existence of assoc- iational interest groups. political parties. or electoral‘ campaigns would be indicative of these kinds of autonomous political 8‘ iron non-poi strictures : poles can political l The tions is pa groups into only lia'te :ivity, ma j established "’91“. if an 1“? 01’ new "0 those '1: the isstit: ihOSe who 2 litical 1: : c‘«~. we QISC ‘. .lonal bow: 1“ political structures or modes of behavior because they differ from non-political groups and procedures. Other political structures such as the civil service. the military. or the police can be viewed as independent and insulated from non- political life. The question of the autonomy of political institu- tions is particularly relevant to the incorporation of new groups into the political process. In political systems with only limited autonomy from non-political structures and ac- tivity. major political groups can gain power without having established loyalty to existing political institutions. How- ever. if autonomous political institutions do exist. the en- try of new groups into the political process can be limited to those institutions. and continuity will be achieved by the institutional socialization process which rewards only those who accept and support the institutional basis of po- litical life. . Autonomy. then. is also an important dimension of institutionalization. It manifests an institutional strength and stability which encourages new groups to support and identify with these institutions since they are the sole channels of meaningful political behavior.- Coherence Finally. the last aspect of institutionalization cited is coherence. the existence of a consensus on the func- tional boundaries of the groups and procedures involved in attaining the politic autonomy. i he politi ical activi bondaries cations, fc discipline, holding pos act in ways institatio; W in whic? interdeper; A is One Will disciMine scores in Filth hold the 301139 W. “‘s h fie: kn| I + “Fathers 2 *4 "es! in: 0" 15 maintaining order and resolving disputes. The separation of the political from the non-political sphere. institutional autonomy. is related to the development of this consensus in the political community of what constitutes legitimate polit- ical activity. The concept of coherence includes more than boundaries which keep them distinct from non-political insti- tutions. for it also reflects the degree of coordination. discipline. and unity within these boundaries. Incumbents holding positions in a coherent political institution will ' act in ways which maintain that coordination and unity. Such institutions should manifest high levels of morale and loyal- ty in which incumbents identify with and act to maintain the interdependence of the institutional framework. A system with coherent political institutions. then. is one which maintains itself through coordination. unity. discipline. and morale. As complexity increases. coherence becomes increasingly important for it is like the cement which holds the system together. For instance. the rules of the House of Commons tend to reflect this type of coherence. .A high degree of discipline and coordination between back benchers and the party leaders as well as between the par- ties. make it an effective legislature. particularly in com- parison with the Italian Chamber of Deputies or the French National Assembly (or perhaps even the American Senate) where the deputies often are neither unified nor coordinated ‘Within or between parties. This absence of parliamentary coherence leads to a decline in institutional capabilities and institu failure of its cost in torn, ulti: bility. F: “ UN with the la nation. In have more 1 mity and f ‘47“; «canon of tional Strg 3*“ ~ . "me. Sf! pchtical 16 and institutional loyalties. A failure of coherence is a failure of institutional solidarity which ultimately exacts its cost in terms of effectiveness and support. This. in turn. ultimately leads to a weakening of institutional sta- bility. High turnover of incumbents is closely associated with the lack of unity. discipline. and. possibly. coordi- nation. Institutions with a high turnover rate consequently have more limited socialization periods. Thus. a failure of unity and discipline may result in a failure of the socia- lization of the elite and a further weakening of institu- tional strength. The Hgntiggton Model In his discussion. Huntington has suggested that strong. stable institutions are effective both at fulfilling political functions and at building and maintaining loyalty within the ranks of the politically active. Both institu- tional effectiveness and legitimacy are discussed in rela- tion to adaptability. complexity. autonomy. and coherence. His own discussion implies that legitimacy is the result of effective and rewarding political institutions. For exam- ple. in the discussion of the four characteristics of insti- tutions. the growth of loyalty to institutions is the result tof'political rewards available only through institutional 'participation. i.e. political positions. prestige. and power. and the res“ parthiPate Hun 10 be 8659n lately. t0 istitg Poli litical a0t activities if politica politicalllv’ uliiely ”‘0 lied to thc 17 and the resulting effective socialization of groups which participate.in those institutions. Huntington. thus. considers political institutions to be essential to the development of legitimacy and. ulti- mately. to political stability. The acceptance of the ex- isting political institutions as the prOper avenues for po- litical activity insures that groups will not channel their activities outside of the accepted institutions. Conversely, if political institutions are ineffective at rewarding the politically active. support for those institutions will be unlikely to develop. and political activity will not be lim- ited to those institutions. Instability is likely to result. Huntington's model has importance because it com- bines his interpretation of the political impact of socio- economic modernization with that of political institutiona- lization in his analysis of social change and political in- stability. The rates of social mobilization, economic de- velopment. and mobility opportunities only indirectly con- tribute to political instability. According to Huntington. rising frustration culminates in increasing levels of polit- . ical activity. Unable to achieve demands for new opportun- ities and life styles. urban groups increasingly seek polit- ical solutions to their plight. However. it is the institu- tional capacity to reward and socialize these groups which determines the extent to which political participation will ‘be channeled through the accepted institutional organiza- ‘tions and procedures: i.e. the extent of political stability. The pclitical i7. med’cted only v; toaccomtodate _t cf the variables Economié; Among be ~E.’ instability” U ..'fic, ”dew: atiOn and 18 The political impact of socioeconomic modernization can be predicted only when the capacity of political institutions to accommodate participation is known. The interrelationship of the variables has been stated in the form of three ratios: Social Mobilization Economic Development Social Frustration Social Frustration Mobility Opportunities Political Participation . . . . Political Institutionalization. POlltlcal InStablllty Political Participation Revisions of the Model Among both theorists of modernization and of politi- cal instability, Huntington's approach is valued for its innovation and for the theoretical contribution it repre- sents. However, the model poses several limitations for em- pirical analysis. Thus. three alterations were made to in- crease the precision of the model without changing the main relationships suggested by Huntington. First, the model explains only the participation and instability that results from social mobilization with the result that instability originating from other sources of social frustration, e.g. communal cleavages, cannot be pre- dicted. The use of equations as a means of expressing the model was deemed inappropriate since they indicate social frustration as a function of social mobilization exclusively. Similarly, the occurrence of mobilization without concurrent economic growth renders the model meaningless. i.e. infinite ‘ tion due to es: 0"”9'1. *3 in!“ vJ-AuUACIl Aeuon Q past 1 rate 0 ttteitpzent on accurate renre I wait have mgr & .tl‘l. Spatial itemization \ 4‘ w. IRA, ' UHVIio‘mlC .V‘I“ ..3gbn 19 i.e. infinite frustration is predicted. If social mobiliza- tion due to economic modernization is not occurring, the equations indicate that no political participation will oc- cur. While the equations do manifest characteristics of the relationships discussed by Huntington (particularly the im- pact of rate of social mobilization as compared to economic development on the development of frustration). they are not accurate representations of those relationships. Huntington could have more accurately expressed his model in a non-ratio form. Social Mobili zation + . ‘+ Frustration ““-Political ‘+ - -' - - Participation Economic Mobility . . Institutionalization- However, Huntington views socioeconomic change as the primary source of instability. Mobility Opportunities and political institutionalization are variables which miti- gate its impact. Thus, the model might be better expressed in a form which maintains the primary causal relationship. This model is stated below: Rate of Social _ Rate of Economic = Social Mobilization Deve10pment Frustration Social _ Mobility a Political Frustration Opportunities Participation Political Political _ Political Participation ' Institutionalization ’ Instability Second‘ tense among ti] Huntint ities is linke' tent. 'rie view of expanding 0' ability which general proces tivitual acce; Urbanization i Mtility Since loosens faIHilj and moves to : 'iseo OCCupat; PTOCBSS 0f ec. eranSion of of occupation flies. is pro“ tional mobili. 18 “Wally ir 20 Second, the model is hampered by mutual interdepen- dence among the socioeconomic variables. Huntington's conceptualization of mobility opportun- ities is linked to social mobilization and economic deve10p- ment. He views mobility Opportunities, in part, as a process of expanding opportunities in occupational and geographical mobility which are related to economic modernization. The general process of social mobilization tends to increase in- dividual acceptance of mobility. both geographic and social. Urbanization itself is an important example of geographic mobility since it is a process during which the individual loosens familial and other traditional social-economic bonds and moves to locations with employment opportunities. Like- wise. occupational mobility is closely associated with the process of economic growth. Industrialization leads to an? expansion of the class structure and to a greater diversity of occupations. Industrialization. for non-industrial soci- eties, is probably the greatest single initiator of occupa- tional mobility. Thus. the concept of mobility Opportunities is mutually interdependent with social mobilization and eco- nomic modernization. In order to avoid empirical as well as the theoreti- cal difficulties associated with this problem. mobility cp- jportunities should be eliminated as an independent variable in.the model. Despite this change. the concepts of geographic and.occupational mobility are not entirely disregarded since they will be CC tilization and Third. _ I. that variab'i teetiteness of ant reward poi: tines, groups There effectiveness ' tent or repres ‘59 Support of tions. presti‘j east limited participatior. rather than 5 ”38831031 1] tie We. Repr ered in re la teneficially Stability by 310.11 char «D the benefi ts at‘tivi ty Outs e’. . Seth (Hunting- 21 they will be considered as integral parts of the social mo- bilization and economic development variables. Third. Huntington has introduced one independent po- litical variable. institutionalization. dealing with the ef- fectiveness of institutions in their ability to accommodate and reward politically active groups. As effectiveness con- tinues, groups will increasingly support those institutions. There is. however, an alternative to institutional effectiveness which limits political instability: contain- - ment or repression of political activity. Instead of wooing the support of groups by rewarding participants with posi- tions. prestige and power, a regime may inhibit any but the most limited political activity and use coercion to prevent participation in spite of existing frustration. In this case, rather than increasing the reward for institutional support. repression increases the cost of participation in unaccepta- ble ways. Repression. then. is a factor which must be consid- ered in relating frustration to political instability. While beneficially effective institutions mitigate political in- stability by building acceptance of (support for) institu- tional channels. repression limits instability by decreasing the benefits (and the likelihood of success) of political activity outside of the accepted institutions (i.e. repres- sion is used to limit other channels of political activity). Both (Huntington's conceptualization of) institutionaliza- tion and repression, the carrot and the stick. are factors which inhibit r it is both 1118‘ level of repre instability re 0n the has been revis 1) to de.‘ 3) to va These 1 relationships in Order to i The r 22 which inhibit non-institutional political activity. Thus, it is both institutional effectiveness and rewards and the level Of repression which determine the extent of political instability resulting from social frustration. On the basis of this discussion the Huntington model has been revised to resolve three problems: '1) to eliminate the statement Of the model in the equation form. 2) to remove mobility Opportunities as an indepen- dent variable, and 3) to include repression as another political variable. These revisions, however, have not altered the basic relationships suggested by Huntington: they have been made in order to increase the precisions and utility Of the model. The revised model is stated below. Rate of Social _ Rate of Economic = Developmental Mobilization Development Gap DevelOpmental _ Political a Political Gap Institutionalization Participation Gap Political _ Political Participation Gap ' Repression ’ Instability This model suggests that the gap between each set Of’independent variables is the main causal mechanism of jpolitical instabilityt While this model offers an explana- tion.of instability resulting only from socioeconomic mod- ernization. it should be a useful basis for empirical in- vestigation. iiSThEiLIT‘i The tire ple of the ex: lance and poli 1960'8. The s isciplinary 1 W1 anthropol. Oi cross-sect tone that we}; stability. 'vfnn. Brogan 30C £03113“ Upon '11“ Bill‘Ope h Change and p riots. demon Water 01' Eu; Society and 1 Portugal! and mimion. 1 mg. educéltio CHAPTER 2 INSTABILITY IN EUROPE: THE SEARCH FOR A PERSPECTIVE The theory proposed by Huntington is only one exam- ple of the extensive discussions concerning political vio- lence and political instability taking place during the 1960's. The study of these phenomena. generated across disciplinary lines including political science, sociology, and anthrOpOlogy, most frequently employed the techniques of cross-sectional analysis to identify and explore the fac- tors that were related to or thought to cause political in- stability. While no valid reason seems evident for excluding European societies from these studies. they generally have focused upon non-European. ”Third World“ societies. Post- war Europe has. in fact, experienced considerable economic change and political upheaval since 1945 with instances of riots. demonstrations. coups d'etat, and rebellions in a number of’EurOpean countries. Virtually every East European society and many West EurOpean societies (including Spain. Portugal. and Italy) have undergone rapid increases in ur- banization, industrialization. and other social processes, e.g. education and communications. 23 There: mental and ins basis for exa: 593‘»: #30 While Stales Tilly gested that sc flict and inst COTJEIlpOI‘ary E tion. In fac conflict and j 2# Therefore the theoretical insights of the develop- mental and instability literature may well provide a valuable basis for examining change and instability in the EurOpean setting. Analyses of EurOpegg Politics While theorists such as Barrington Moore (1966), Charles Tilly (1969). and E. J. Hobsbawm (1959) have sug- gested that socioeconomic change resulted in increased con- flict and instability in pre-war Europe, many analysts of contemporary EurOpe fail to follow this line of interpreta- tion. In fact they Often seem to separate the issues of conflict and instability. For example, both Lijphart's discussion of "consoci- ational democracy” (Lijphart. 1968) and Lorwin's discussion of ”segmented pluralism” (Lorwin. 1971) have been concerned with the success of smaller European democracies at stabi- lizing conflict within their political systems. Both Lijp- hart and Lorwin are concerned with understanding the mecha- nisms which limit the likelihood Of political cleavages leading to political instability. As in the work of Lijphart and Lorwin. the failure to examine explicitly the link between conflicts of interest and instability occurs in a number of important and respected works concerning Western democracies. For example. Lipset and Rokkan's discussion of conflicts in party politics (Lipset and Rokkan. 1967). MacRae's analysis of extremism flu] pm I fia/ 4 o a. A in 6'»: b... ores 8 EH 1 4 o'rg ‘ ices-r i: 5: upquw wide-u e a» a: :- .IA he!» 01 e.&‘ as. Q has a... I‘:' l Q» :a a. . .n O S .‘ U Ia § AH. .. H a: m. e w. v .fi.‘ 8 .... B. an a.» an. n ck a t‘ ‘1 Q adv .r .3 I I ‘lu‘ t at 3‘ »d r AU he he .\ . U MI. a. sew 25 in the Fourth Republic of France (MacRae. 1967), Dahl's study Of democratic oppositions (Dahl, 1966), and Lipset's general discussion Of social conflict and democracy (Lipset, 1959a) all have considered the impact of cleavages within the institutional framework of the political system. These works emphasize the way in which conflicts are managed with- in the existing political institutions (parties. interest groups, and parliaments) rather than on how these conflicts result in political instability and violence. A consideration Of institutionalized conflict Often has been coupled with an emphasis on the effectiveness and stability of democratic institutions. For instance, Lipset thas been concerned with the emergence of authoritarian ex- tremist politics, rather than instability, as a consequence Of conflicts which extend beyond the accepted political in- stitutions. Like Lipset, many theorists have failed to ex- amine politics outside of institutional channels, but rather have been concerned with the shifting of politics from one set of legal institutions to another set of institutions. This has been particularly true of analysts of politics in Europe where institutions have been more prominent and more effective. On the one hand, then, there is a sizeable body Of literature which is concerned with conflict but which fails to consider instability and violence in EurOpe. On the other hand. there are a number of analyses of specific cases of instability: these emphasize the importance of 1) political institutions . economic Chang Ehrnan comp-ls of the 155): he has v lines of divis esblic trust 0 of cleavages a oodern. The L 1’s Size and 5.4. :l'oup in a ch; decline in tr: °f Clea‘v'azes , A “e“ Protest p result“ fr on Students and .» I m @‘OUps hf litical ins ti‘ Just ; ’en . Fretatlons 26 institutions, 2) social and economic cleavages, and 3) socio- economic change in determining the likelihood of instability. 'Ehrmann's interpretation Of French instability is an example Of the latter kind of analysis (Ehrmann, 1971, p. 185): he has viewed instability as the result of continuing lines of division running through society. the decline in public trust of political processes, and the intensification of cleavages as the country becomes more industrial and more modern. The unrest of both French students. a group of grow- ing size and importance, and French farmers. a traditional group in a changing society. could be explained by both a decline in trust in the government and an intensification of cleavages due to change. Similarly, analyses of the stu- dent protest movement in Germany have indicated that protests resulted from the divergence of ideological demands between students and governmental suppOrters and the fact that stu- dent groups had failed to be incorporated into accepted po- litical institutions. '(Merritt, 1969 and Shell, 1970) Just as in analyses of West European countries, in- terpretations of conflicts of interests in East EurOpean so- cieties emphasize the importance of institutional capabili- ties and sOcial cleavages. For example. Bzrezenski has sug- gested that institutional. as well as ideological, consisten- cy has been a unifying factor in East EurOpean politics. (Bzrezenski, 1967) He has examined major cases of conflict within the institutional framework of Soviet domination. Likewise, in analyzing East European politics Ionescu has mined elm“ framework of when confliCt iceta'oility it sponse to bot‘r tion, and the ;’3rzezenski. 1 While ity in conten; corned with s: theses appear between socioe- first! CORfllC is} he to class. seas of eoono'c u as Nell as fire fe~*~'~ "“9. aeoe M.‘ 27 examined pluralism, but mainly within the institutional framework of communist systems. (Ionescu, 1967) However, when conflict has been discussed in relation to political instability in East Europe it has been interpreted as a re- sponse to both rapid socioeconomic change, Soviet domina- tion, and the weakness of national political authorities. (Brzezenski. 1967. p. 200) While there has been some consideration of instabil- ity in contemporary EurOpe. most analysts have been more con- cerned with stable. institutional politics. However, certain themes appear throughout the literature which suggest links between socioeconomic change and political instability. First, conflicts have resulted from divisions within society due to class, religion, and nationality. Second, the pro- cess of economic deveIOpment has exacerbated these conflicts as well as created new ones. Third, the deveIOpment of ef- fective, accepted institutions has tended to keep these con- flicts from leading to violence and instability. There are some empirical findings which suggest that the links between socioeconomic change and instability are valid not only for analyzing instability in the European setting, but for instability generally. For example. re- search by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold suggests that high rates of economic modernization are associated with in- stability. In comparing transitional European countries, with presumably high rates of develOpment, with modern ones; the e be 135 «’ H ‘— "Wit: F. , 'l‘?‘ ' I Ewe-aw "Ned H: e- ' .431?! lvb“. ‘ " L I: “A A ‘3’“ a"! 28 the transitional countries had over twice the likelihood of instability. (Feierabend, gt_gl;, 1969, p. 656) Similarly. there is evidence that institutions tend to inhibit the outbreak of instability in societies. Gurr, for instance, found significant negative correlations be- tween instability and levels of institutionalization and levels of legitimacy in a cross-sectional global study (see Table 1). (Gurr, 1968, p. 1119) TABLE 1 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND LEGITIMACY AND INSTABILITY INDICES k Institutionalization Legitimacy Magnitude of Conspiracy - .35 - .29 Magnitude of Internal War - .23 - .23 Magnitude of Turmoil - .26 - .29 Total Magnitude of Strife - .33 - .37 N a 11“ This negative relationship is even more strongly demonstrated in Bwy's study of political instability in Latin America. Bwy found that shifts in legitimacy in a five-year period (1950 - 1955) were highly and negatively correlated with or- ganized violence (r- -.71. N a 20). (Bwy. 1968. pp. 51-52) There is some evidence in the literature. then. to support the contentions found in idscussions of EurOpean in- stability. However, no systematic investigation of instabil- ity in contemporary Europe has been attempted. v...“ .05.. ' I 4“.""41r, Iv "Id‘..: “"‘s it FHA. I a. C ‘ Ail 1315 v y~ J5 K b 29 Political Impact of Socioeconomic Change In order to consider systematically the relationship between socioeconomic change and political instability, it is necessary to understand the impact of socioeconomic change on politics and the impact of other political variables on instability. Major theorists of economic modernization suggest - .mj that socioeconomic changes. e.g. shifts in urbanization, in- dustrialization, wealth, communications, and education, have ' resulted in political changes.2 First, Deutsch and others i have suggested a link between economic change and rising socioeconomic expectations and capabilities. Second. a causal relationship among urbanization, education. media ex- posure and the deveIOpment of democracy has been examined by Lerner, Lipset and others. Third, several theorists, in- cluding Moore and Tilly, have linked socioeconomic change to shifts in class cleavages and consequent increases in polit- ical instability. Deutsch has defined social mobilization as that pro- cess which occurs in populations moving from traditional to modern ways of life, socially and economically. Social mo- bilization includes changes in urbanization, literacy, 2 See Daniel Lerner. The Passin Of Traditional Soci ety, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1965: Seymour Mar- tin Lipset, ”Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. LIII. March 1959, pp. 52-68: Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development,“ American Political Science Review, Vol. LY, September 1961, pp- 93-51 0 geographic not break down old available for This process ' cal system, t p of life, and neat those dea productivitv. expectations The 3‘)“. ML lath 3o geographic mobility, income, and mass media exposure which break down old ties and commitments. making the population available for ”modern“ life. (Deutsch. 1961. pp. h93-h94) This process increases both the demands made on the politi- cal system. through social upheaval and exposure to new ways of life. and the capabilities of the political system to meet those demands. through increasing centralization and productivity. The comparability of the rates of increase of expectations and of capabilities is viewed as a fundamental determinant of political stability during the period of so- cial mobilization. As Deutsch argues. ”. . . a major trans- formation Of the underlying political and social structure of a country could occur -- and could pose a potential threat to the stability of any insufficiently reform-minded govern- ment there -- even during a period of substantially rising per capita income.” (Deutsch, 1961, p. 504) The ability of the government to meet these new demands is based on the de- gree to which the rate of increasing capabilities keeps pace with the rate of increasing expectations. This interpreta- tion has been utilized by Huntington in his analysis of mod- ernization and instability. The Feierabend, et al, study included evidence which supports these contentions. For example, in this cross- national comparison. high positive correlations were found between instability and the rates of change of primary edu- cation (r - .h9) and telephone ownership (r a .4“) while a high negative association was found between instability and national inc p. 650) The iissatisfact exposure, we an index of aultiple cor education a: high (1‘ = .5 M with the L511. 1969 Report Dent lea-is to inc 31 national income (r = -.34). (Feierabend, et al,, 1969, p. 680) Those indices which were associated with increasing dissatisfaction and demands. education and communications exposure, were correlated with instability, while income. an index of capability. was associated with stability. The multiple correlation Of instability with rapid increases in education and slow changes in income was also significantly high (r I .56 with a static measure Of instability and r = F .44 with the instability trends over time). (Feierabend. gm” 1969. p. 680) The empirical findings of this study ) support Deutsch's interpretation that social mobilization leads to increasing demands for political action. If the regime is unable or unwilling to respond. instability can result. A second theoretical concern found in the litera- ture is the association of modernization with democracy. Studies by Lerner (1965), Lipset (1959b). Outright (1963). and McCrone and Cnudde (1967) have been concerned with es- tablishing a cuasal link between certain aspects of moderni- zation and democratic political deveIOpment. Lerner fOund high correlation between levels of urbanization. literacy, media participation. and political participation. McCrone and Cnudde have applied more sophisticated analytical techniques, path analysis, to investigate Lerner's contention that this association results from a specific causal sequence. The model can be simply stated: ur' W "at? one an p. L on Va ‘ .n C '7‘“ their 1 . e le nor 0 32 1) Democratic political development occurs when mass communications permeates society. 2) Mass communications occurs when literacy and edu- cational levels rise in society. 3) Education and literacy develOpment occur in urbanizing societies. (McCrone and Cnudde, 1967, p. 78) McCrone and Cnudde found a ”remarkable correSpondence" be- tween their empirical findings and the model postulated by Lerner. . There has been notable consistency in the findings concerning this issue. Unlike Deutsch's approach. this body of theory is concerned with levels of development. or moder- nization. and is not aimed at understanding any relation be- tween economic modernization (level Or rate) and political instability. It explicitly defines modernization as a lin- ear process which culminates in the develOpment of complex, specialized. and presumably democratic institutions. How- ever, if this model is based on the assumption that high lev- els of political participation result from these processes by opening new alternatives and awareness in the population, it is possible to foresee that process leading to increased instability in societies which more slowly develop democrat- ic political institutions. It is important to note that Lerner's narrow defini- ‘tion.of development includes only the indices which Deutsch would view as increasing aspirations and expectations and not those on tends to is pact on pol plain great nosic clean; tigation (e democracy is the model. tion and met 33 not those which increase capabilities. Thus, this approach tends to ignore factors which may have a direct. negative im- pact on political mobilization and, therefore. which may ex- plain greater variance among societies undergoing socioeco- nomic change. The limitation of the variables under inves- tigation (e.g. the failure to consider wealth) and the way democracy is measured raises questions about the utility of the model. Even within these limits. the growth of educa- E tion and media exposure in the undemocratic societies of East EurOpe indicates that the model may be inadequate for I analyses of certain societies. The third theme found in literature concerning moder- nization is a consideration of the impact of change on the class structure Of society. e.g. Barrington Moore's interpre- tation of the development of modern political institutions. In contrast to the second. "development of democratic insti- tutions.” approach, Moore has argued that urbanization and industrialization. i.e. the movement from a traditional to a modern economy. had resulted in several distinct forms of ‘political institutions. (Moore, 1966) Specifically. he has suggested that the kind of political revolution which re- sulted from economic change was determined by the relative jpower positions within the new class structure, and by the rates of develOpment Of the different emerging classes. In other words. the difference between bourgeois and fascist revolutions was the result of differences in the rate of eaerjence of sition of th Far to usher in process dest the conseque q )8? 0f diffs . n: a vnar l alization as economic nod: men {JOUDS the process a been most in' Oh the 111591: hillty Fathez llations. (Ti Both result of the arrow “sz Soci 34 emergence of the bourgeois class and the shifting of the po- sition Of the landed aristocracy in the class structure. Far from viewing modernization as a process destined to usher in democratic institutions, Moore argued that the process destabilizes traditional class alignments and that the consequent shifting of alignments has resulted in a num- ber of different political arrangements. _ Charles Tilly also viewed urbanization and industri- alization as resulting in instability. He suggested that economic modernization increases the struggle for power be- tween groups which are both losing and gaining power during the process of socioeconomic change. Unlike Moore, Tilly has been most interested in the impact of socioeconomic change on the likelihood of instability and on the forms of insta- bility rather than on the ultimate change in political insti- tutions. (Tilly. 1969) Both Moore and Tilly have viewed instability as a result of the shifting power positions of groups in a mod- ernizing society. Several themes can be derived from the literature concerning economic modernization. First. socioeconomic change affects individuals and groups within society. It jeopardizes the position of traditional groups while in- creasing social expectations and demands of mobilized indi- ‘viduals and groups. Second, the social impact of change re- sults in political responses to modernization. The political arena becomes one in which conflicts and frustrations are acted out. or lesser ch inability of terests and tion which n Stability. 35 acted out. Political activity by those who demand greater or lesser change increases: instability results from the inability of the government to accommodate conflicting in- terests and demands. It is the social impact of moderniza tion which results in political activity and political in- Stability s The r es Pol' nst bil t While theorists of economic modernization have linked socioeconomic change to political participation and political instability, analysts of political activity also have been concerned with relating societal change to poli- tics. Theorists of political instability have been con- cerned with how the political aspects Of socioeconomic change are related to political instability. There are two main causal models of instability which support the interpretatiOns of the impact of moder- nization. While the views of violence either 1) as a re- sponse to frustration or 2) as a consciously chosen politi- cal tactic consider the same circumstances and responses. they are based on different assumptions about the motiva- tions involved in outbreaks of instability. Many theorists assert that political instability is the result of relative deprivation and consequent frustra- ‘tiont This approach has been utilized by Midlarsky and Tan- ter'(Midlarsky, 1967. p. 215). Davies (1962), Feierabend. g3; al. (1969). Huntington. and Gurr (1968). One of the oost succinc word by Davi revolution. to occur whe social devel reversal. . than the tar 8UFillies of revolution . ' the gap beo. due to socic sults in the leie aPPI‘Oach in economic moi of economic Lo Sogial as A lead t0 incr 36 most succinct expressions of this approach has been put for- ward by Davies in his develOpment of the J-Curve model of revolution. He contended that, "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social develOpment is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. . . . It is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of 'adequate' or 'inadequate' supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produced the revolution.” (Davies, 1962, p. 6) Frustration results from the gap between falling satisfaction and rising expectations due to socioeconomic trends: this frustration ultimately re- sults in the outbreak of violence. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold have adapted this approach in an effort to examine the destabilizing affect of economic modernization. They have suggested that rapid rates of economic modernization will lead to even greater increases in social aSpirations. The contrast between aspirations for a modern standard of living and the actual state of life will lead to increasing social frustration. and, consequently, violence. (Feierabend, et al,. 1969, pp. 6h6-6u7) Like Davies. then, they view frustration as the result of the gap between expectations and satisfactions. Their findings are consistent with the model they suggest. For example. their index of the combined rate(s) of change was highly correlated with instability (r = .66). (Feierabend, et a1,, 1969. p. 680) This correlation, also. was reflected in the generally high association of individual indicators with instability. Both Deutscl bility and ‘ fumes 01" of the utilf change. Gum aggression e concerned WJ' proposed a c to economic (independent concluded in persisting d leted (at th (Guru, 1963, The 5‘! theorists causes of fr in Viewing t 37 Both Deutsch and Huntington have develOped models of insta- bility and change which are parallel to this approach. The findings of Feierabend, gt_al; can be viewed as indications of the utility and validity of this view of socioeconomic change. Gurr also has been interested in the frustration - aggression approach to instability. While not Specifically concerned with the impact of economic modernization, he has proposed a causal model of civil strife with frustration due to economic and political deprivation as the main causal (independent) variable. (Gurr, 1968) In his findings, he concluded that both short-term deprivation (r - .h8) and persisting deprivation (r - .36) were significantly corre- lated (at the .01 level) to the total magnitude of strife. (Gurr, 1968, p. 1117) The frustration - aggression model has been applied by theorists to different kinds of situations with different causes of frustration. Their models are similar, however. in viewing the outbreak of instability as an instinctive re- sponse to frustration. A second approach used to interpret outbreaks of in- stability is based on the assumption that violence and insta- bility is a tactic rationally used to achieve political goals. Both Charles Tilly. in considering violence in EurOpe, and Merle Kling, in viewing instability in Latin America. view ‘violence as a normal extension of institutional politics. Till grow most d: in the stru- mming a lent protes ganized, pe- their objec has suggest lization on shifting of Sin 13’ Violent “It 01" the cel Office 31‘. QCOQQmiC of the 130131; the risk of Thi 38 Tilly stated that ”. . . violent protests seem to grow most directly from the struggle for established places in the structure of power. . . . Furthermore. instead of con- stituting a sharp break from 'normal' political life, vio- lent protests tend to accompany. complement. and extend or- ganized, peaceful attempts by the same people to accomplish their objectives.” (Tilly, 1969, p. 10) Furthermore. he has suggested that the impact of urbanization and industria- lization on violence in EurOpe is due to the creation and shifting of groups contending for power. | Similarly, Kling has viewed the chronic and frequent- ly violent political instability of Latin America as a re- sult of the limited accesses to economic power. ”As politi- cal office provides a uniquely dynamic Opportunity to acquire an economic base of power. . . sufficiently large segments of the papulation are prepared to take the ultimate risk, the risk of life. in a revolt, in a coup d'etat. . .' (Kling. 1956. p. 33) W This approach is implicit in most analyses of Euro- pean instability. where violence is often viewed as the re- sult of disillusionment with the political system. In comparing Tilly's view with that of Feierabend, f greater occupational opportunities and a middle class to 1the fulfillment of "intellectual” aspirations. see James S. Coleman. Educatio and Political Develo ment. Princeton. N. J'.: Princeton University Press. 19 5. especially pp. 230- ‘3L33: and Joseph Ben-David. ”Professions in the Class System 01' Present-Day Societies.” Current Sociology: Vol. XII. #3. 159(53-64. especially p. 276. '1 55 period in a nation. the rate of increase in higher education will be included in the composite measure. However. the lack of correlation between this index and the other two compris- ing social mobilization suggest that caution be used when interpreting the results. For a cross-national analysis. these three variables were combined into a composite indicator of social mobiliza- tion by averaging their rates of change. The following pro- cedure yielded the measure of the rate of social mobilization: rate of social mobilization = URBN + Education + Radio 3 For an examination of shifts within each nation. however. only the rates of education and media exposure were averaged to obtain the rate of social mobilization since the rate of urbanization would not have varied throughout the period. In this case: rate of social mobilization = Ed + Rnd 2 Economic Develgpment Indices of wealth. standard of living. and occupa- tional shifts have been included in other empirical exami- nations to measure socioeconomic change. For example. Lip- set (1959b) suggests four categories of indices: wealth. industrialization. education. and urbanization. His indices 0f industrialization reflect definite trends in economic A 0‘ h 6...: Bus . HP; Veai -P1 be“ 0 : a, I 56 growth: both employment in agriculture and energy consumption reflect increased productivity in the industrial sector. Lipset's indices Of wealth include not only those of income. but also Of standards of living. e.g. number of doctors. and of communications. e.g. telephones. Since the present model includes among its variables the opportunities arising from economic growth. the indices chosen for this study utilize some of Lipset's categories: three Of them reflect trends in the levels of industrializa- tion. wealth. and standard of living. The rate of industrialization is measured by the rate of change in the prOportion of the labor force employed in occupations other than agriculture. hunting. fishing. or for- estry.9 The shifting of employment into the non-agricultural sector indicates increasing Opportunities in the industrial and tertiary sectors. and an increase in occupational mobil- ity opportunities. Like the measure of urbanization. employ- ment by sector tends to be only sporadically reported for each country. Therefore. the indicator for industrialization was included only in the composite measure of economic growth for cross-national analysis and was not used in examining changes within each country. The following procedure indicates how this measure was obtained: 9 Source: I. L. 0. learbook of Labor Statistics. m the m '( KQTAQL anti ’1‘ Q‘l-N m as" Q» 5? I1 = the prOportion of the employed population in non-agricultural occupations for the earliest year with data available between 1950 and 1965 ‘ 8 the proportion of the employed pOpulation in non-agricultural occupations for the latest year with data available between 1950 and 1965 T the number of years between 11 and 12 Indust = the average annual rate of change in the prOportion of the labor force employed in r non-agricultural occupations I2'11 Indust = II i T Change in wealth is measured by the rate of increase 10 While the in- in the per capita gross domestic product. creased income per capita does not necessarily reflect the actual shifts in income of the average man in society. it is an index of increasing productivity and increasing capital at large in society. Changes in productivity and capital reflect changes in resources available to society which in- creases its capacity to meet new expectations and to make new commitments. This measure was Obtained by using index numbers showing changes in per capita income found in the gt_nt Stntigticgl Yennbook. The procedure presented below yielded the measure for each two-year period. 10 Source: U. N. Statistical Yearbook. 58 income1 = the mean index number for the per capita income of a two-year period income2 = the mean index number for the per capita income of the following two-year period T = the number of years between the first and second two-year periods Income = the rate of increase in per capita income in the second period e - ' e Income = incom 2 incom L T income1 The measure of the average annual rate of change in the per capita income between 1952 and 1965 was similarly obtained. gdp1 = the mean index number for the per capita income of the earliest two-year period with available data gdp2 = the mean index number for the per capita income of the latest two-year period with available data T = the number of years between measures of gdpl and gdpz GDP = the average annual rate of change in per capita income gdpz ' gdpl GDP = gdP1 T One measure of the standard of living is the infant 11 This is a direct measure of improved mortality rate. health conditions and life expectancy and has been obtained ‘by the following procedure: 11 Source: U. N. Demographic Yearbook. ea‘ \ A: ”1.. V - 59 For the measure of the rate of change in infant mor- tality rates in each two-year period. m1 = the mean infant mortality rate for a two-year period the mean infant mortality rate for the m 2 following two-year period T = the number of years between the first and second two-year period M = the rate Of decrease in infant mortality rates for the second period A similar procedure was used to obtain the measure of the average annual rate of decrease for the 1952-65 period. mort1 = the mean infant mortality rate for the first two-year period with available data the mean infant mortality rate for the last mort2 two-year period with available data T = the number of years between these two periods Mort the average annual rate of decline in the infant mortality rates between 1952 and 1965 mort1 - mort2 mort1 T Mort = Correlation analysis was used to investigate the de- gree of association among these three indices. Table 3 shows the zero-order correlation between each Of these indices for twenty-two observations. each for a fourteen-year period. (Observations for Albania. Bulgaria. East Germany. Rumania. and the U.S.S.R. were not included due to missing data.) Y Aun‘ 60 TABLE 3 ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: ECONOMIC GROWTH INDICES Indust GDP Mort Indust 1.00 .35 .28 GDP 1.00 .80 r Mort 1.00 l N = 22 As with the index of social mobilization. economic growth is a composite index. an average of the raw rates of change of the component indices. The measure of the rate of economic growth between 1952 and 1965 then was Obtained in the following manner: Indust + GDP + Mort 3 rate of economic growth = In the examination of changes within the individual countries. economic growth will include only the rates of change of in- come and infant mortality rates. the indices with a high lev- el of association. For each two-year period the rate of economic growth will be obtained by a similar procedure. '- O A '3395 0- O I U la? 13 re seial fl \ h as: E A. 61 rate of economic growth = Incomg + M Huntington postulates that it is the gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic develOpment which is related to social frustration: thus. the cross-national analysis will include this gap as a distinct variable. The gap will be considered the difference between the rate of social mobilization and economic growth between 1952 and 1965. It will be determined by the following method: GAP = rate of social mobilization (1952-65) - rate of economic growth (1952-65) Lnstitutionaltzation Using Huntington's conceptualization. institutionali- zation must be measured in terms of adaptability. complexity. autonomy. and coherence. Gurr has attempted to Operationalize institutionali- zation by using a measure which includes indices of the num- ber of political parties. the stability of the party system. the proportion of workers belonging to unions. and the bud- geted governmental expenditures as a prOportion of the GNP. (Gurr. 1968. pp. 1108-1110) These indices measure several aSpects Of the Huntington model. e.g. complexity in the num- ber of parties and coherence in the stability of the party system: however. they are too limited to encompass as \a 4‘ J. ‘l 0 L ‘ q ‘+‘\* wt. “\Q S *1}! a combines ‘ . M m l \ Ab U “3301‘ 0 Jan ins l I‘ll‘ o ,‘ F). - A. a I D e .. l I. ,4. Ah :7 A: e , \ ‘1 I. it I i \U A u A h A b A V \ \ \ Ad‘ e‘l‘ 62 Huntington's broad conceptualization of institutionalization. In the same study. Gurr operationalizes legitimacy indepen- dently of institutionalization in contrast to Huntington who combines them. Of Gurr's indices of legitimacy. rank scores of the origin and the durability of the national political institutions. the latter would be considered a viable indi- cator of the adaptability of institutions. A better measure of institutionalization can be obtained by combining Gurr's Operationalizations of both institutionalization and legiti- macy. (Gurr. 1968. p. 1117) The indices selected for this study were 1) the dura- bility of the institutions. 2) the distribution of power among the governmental institutions. 3) the status of the legislature in decision-making. h) the degree of bureaucratic development. 5) the relationship between institutional and associational interest articulation. 6) the continuity of the party system. and 7) the degree of elite continuity. These 12 were rated on a five-point scale (a five indicating indices high institutionalization) and added for each country. The highest score possible for any country was thirty-five. 12 The data for the durability of institutions. the distribution of power. the status of the legislature. degree of bureaucratic develOpment. interest articulation. and party continuity were taken from A Cross-Polit Surve by Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor: (Cambridge: The MIT Press. 1963) and revised to fit new five-point scales for the pur- pose of this study. The data on elite turnover were col- lected by Feierabend. Feierabend. and Nesvold and was made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Polit- ical Development. .1 we st t‘ wit-ear. :J'ceafle s differenc: in the flu lowest pc “38% in: enerlen five, ‘1; mated D: O 63 The index durability of institutions was based on the date of the origin of contemporary institutions and. if of post-war origins. the change in incumbents indicating a no- ticeable shift in terms Of generational. ideological. or other differences. Several EurOpean countries experienced a shift in the durability of institutions between 1952 and 1965. The lowest point on the scale. one. indicated a political system whose institutions originated since 1945 and which has not experienced a major change in incumbents. The highest score. five. indicated a political system whose institutions origi- nated prior to 1800.13 This measure seemed to accurately rank chronological and generational age. both cited by Hunt- ington as aspects of a system's ability to adapt to changes. in throughout governmental The distribution of power institutions is an index which measures the complexity Of po- litical institutions. If institutions maintain separate bases of power for the performance Of specific tasks. it indicates 13The complete scale: 1. Established since 19h5 with no significant change in incumbents. 2. Established since 1955 with a significant change in incumbents. 2. Established between 191k and 19h5. . Established between 1800 and 1914. 5. Established prior to 1800. 1“The distribution of power scale: 1. Negligible (complete dominance of government by one branch or by non-governmental agency). 3. Limited (more than one governmental branch with limited functional autonomy). 5. Significant (effective distribution of power to functionally autonomous branches of gov- ernment). pOW'. .‘IFQ .OOV 61» the development of sets of institutions which divide the functions and the power within the government. For example. the separation of power between the courts and the cabinet represents a higher level of institutional complexity than does judicial decision-making by the cabinet. NO European country experienced a major change in the distribution of power between 1952 and 1965. 15 is also an index of The status of the legislature the complexity Of political institutions. but reflects the degree of the separation of power and functions of the leg- islature from other governmental institutions. The status of the legislature also indicates the degree of coherence in the political system since it reflects the interrelationship of the legislature to other governmental institutions. The only changes in the status of the legislature reported in Europe between 1952 and 1965 were reported in France. 16 like distri- The level Of bureaucratic development. bution of power and legislative status. is an index of com- plexity: it indicates the extent to which a separate bureau- cratic structure has develOped which is Specifically con- cerned with the administration of governmental decisions. No 15 Legislative status scale: 1. Wholly ineffective. 3. Partially effective. 5. Fully effective. 16 Bureaucratic develOpment scale: 1. Post-colonial transitional. 3. Semi-modern. 5. Modern. *‘lr H4. 2.”! b4. ‘1. u ‘r V: 65 EurOpean society experienced a major change in the level Of bureaucratic development during 1952-65. Unlike the status of the legislature or the level of bureaucratic develOpment which reflects the interrelations among governmental institutions. the balance between insti- tutional and associational interest articulation indicates the way in which societal interests are linked to those gov- ernmental institutions. Well functioning associational groups allow interest articulation to occur while maintaining the autonomy of political institutions. 0n the other hand. in- terest articulation by institutional groups. such as the po- lice or religious groups. allows political activity to take place outside Of distinctly political institutions. thus fa- cilitating a breakdown of the boundary between the political and social systems. A ranking of the degree Of institutional and associational interest articulation was used as an index of the autonomy of political institutions in this study.17 No European society experienced a major change in the forms of interest articulation between 1952 and 1965. 17 Interest articulation scale: 1. Negligible articulation by associational groups. significant by institutional groups. 2. Moderate articulation by associational groups. significant by institutional groups. 3. Moderate articulation by both associational and institutional groups. a. Significant articulation by associational groups and moderate articulation by insti- tutional groups. 5. Significant articulation by associational groups. limited articulation by institu- tional groups. 66 A ranking of the continuity of the party system was used to indicate the institutional strength of one kind of political institution (political parties) in the face of sit- uational and personality changes. It was measured in an in- dex of the adaptability of political parties and of the de- gree Of coherence in the role of parties in the political system.18 Finally. a ranking of the frequency of events indi- cating elite disunity and turnover was used as a measure of continuity.19 This measure included falls of cabinets. dis- missals or resignations of politically significant persons and executions. which was highly correlated (r = .75) with dismissals. For example. a country may experience a fall of a cabinet once every several years without manifesting a weakening of institutional support. However. as the fre- quency of such falls increases. it suggests that the regime is unable to work within existing institutions. Elite turn- over also indicates more limited Opportunities for elite soc- ialization and. consequently. more limited institutional co- herence. 18 Party system continuity scale: 1. Unstable. situational. personalistic. or ad hoc. 3. Relatively infrequent system changes. mixed situational - permanent party structure. 5. Stable. non-personalized. 19 Elite continuity scale: for each two years. 1. More than five events reported. 2. Four or five events reported. a. Two or three events reported. . One event reported. 5. NO change reported. essoeiai relation observai dex V811 67 These seven indices were analyzed to determine the association between them. Table 4 shows the zero-order cor- relation which resulted from the analysis of twenty-seven observations. The mean score was used to determine the in- dex value for the fourteen-year period. The distinct split between the two indices of coher- ence. party and elite continuity. and the other indices is quite Obvious. Since these indices are consistent with Hunt- ington's interpretation. the lack of correlation is theoret- ically interesting. It seems to suggest that a political system can be rated quite highly with regard to one dimension of institutionalization and still be lacking in another. While these indices may occur independently of one another. Huntington maintains that each is a factor which determines the strength of political institutions. Because these seven measures are reasonable indices of institutionalization. they will all be included in a combined score Of institutionaliza- tion. The score of these seven indices for each two-year period. then. was totaled for each nation and constituted a measure Of the level of institutionalization of the EurOpean countries. It was possible that a country would have a change in its institutional score through the 1952-65 time period as leadership or institutions changed. e.g. the in- stituting of the Fifth French Republic. The combined insti- tutionalization value for the fourteen-year period was Ob- tained by totaling the mean score for each index. 68 oo.H szscwvcoo opfiHm ms. oo.H seesaw apnea mo avassavcoo Ha. so. : oo.H coapwasoapnm poops» ::a no 580:0954 me. :0. mm. oo.H Pcmamoao>oc owvmmosmonsm ma. mo. : mm. mm. oo.a onspmamawoa “0 mapspm ma. am. : mm. om. mm. oo.H nosom mo soapsnwupmdn mN. on. us. no. :0. cm. oo.H meowpsvfipmsw no spwflwnapnme< V m as new am an. mm up I. Rnu n+1;+ A 9.8 s 8.: 1. .+.+ 1.90 39 TM dn «to a .2. 3w as w. m: :m o g.m .Ls.m .dxu a 9.x mgu . 5.. us. an in am, an. m. mm m. n we. m a mm. H o u spa 1. T0 KT! mMUanH ZOHBwo mo. : oo.H pmpO.O msoo mo. . mm. co.H pao>mm mo. I mm. #3. oo.H mummudz maawnmezo no. : NH. : ma. no. oo.H swaponmm mo. : em. ms. om. mo. oo.H measopv< sowPOCwmmmmm< we. : :m. m:. mm. no. mm. oo.H amfinosnoe 0H. : ma. mm. 0:. we. no. em. oo.H meowpmmvmsosmn ma. mm. ms. em. «0. u we. am. on. oo.H mmxfiupm o 0 H MD S 11V Tm 1.0 S I. o a mm B 8T.S e 1.9 n. A n A a nu mnvs .u mom I. .a O reJ O Haul: .4 "ac I. .L .L m.a T. .+ s O snu «A P 1. I. e .suvs a s e M : e.L as net. I. n+ s m m m. a .w m m w. . . mmoHQZH MBHQHm];>ortion Of non- zaLgricultural employment .16 Infant mortality rate level - .03 Le"!E>l of urbanization .10 vsealsof'radio diffusion - .11 LeV’el of higher education enrollment .07 N = 22 \ Table 11 shows that. when the level of modernization is entered into the analysis. both the rate of economic gt‘owth and the level of institutionalization are related to x 20 Levels of per capita income were not included be- cause of the difficulty in comparing per capita incomes re- POrted in West Europe with those reported in East EurOpe. 84 instability in the posited manner. While the rate of social mobilization is positively associated with instability. in a relationship consistent with the model. the level of cor- relation is not significant. explaining less than 2 per cent of the variance. The multiple correlation coefficient of this analysis was .58. explaining 34 per cent of the variance. TABLE 12 PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: _ THE DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INSTABILITY AND THE OTHER VARIABLES Partial Correlation * Gap between the rates of social tnobilization and economic growth .20 \resl of institutionalization - .43 C>]portion of non-agricultural (employment .26 Infant mortality rate level - .16 I'<'3“rel Of urbanization .06 vel of radio diffusion - .25 Val of higher education enrollment - .02 N = 22 k Similarly. Table 12 shows that the relationships pos- ited in the model are found in the data but that they cannot acc=<3unt for most of the variance. The multiple correlation COe :E'ficient for the analysis shown in Table 12 is .56. i.e. the analysis accounted for 31 per cent of the variance. Therefore the relationships posited by Huntington be- 9blue apparent in the data only when the level of economic de- velepment was entered into the analysis. 85 imam This correlation analysis has not fully tested the three-way relationship between the develOpmental gap. the political participation gap. and political instability. How- ever. several relationships have been illuminated. The re- sults of the correlational analysis indicated that repres- sion was related to instability in a manner which calls into question the assumptions discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Be- cause Of the question about the causal link between repres- sion and instability. it was deleted from the analysis. How~ ever. repression will be retained in the examination of in- dividual countries. in order to better understand its role in maintaining or achieving political stability. Further analysis indicated that the rates of social mobilization and economic growth and the gap between those rates could be investigated meaningfully only when the level of modernization was taken into account. When these factors were considered. the relationships suggested by Huntington were found in the data. However. the strength of association of both the rate of social mobilization and the gap between social mobilization and economic growth with instability was fairly limited. This limited correlation may be partially due to the fact that the medal is explicitly limited to explaining in- stability due to socioeconomic change. Instability precipi- tated by other factors was not accounted for in this analy- sis. which may explain some of the residual variance. 86 In addition. this analysis has not considered the question of whether the posited socioeconomic change must always result in instability. The consideration of individual countries will pre- sent an Opportunity to examine several possible relation- ships between socioeconomic change and instability: 1) that socioeconomic change will always lead to frustration that. without sufficiently strong institutions. will result in instability: 2) that under certain conditions socioeconomic change will lead to frustration that. without sufficiently strong institutions. will result in instability: and 3) in- stability can result from other factors even without suffi- cient social frustration due to socioeconomic change. The second and third alternatives would indicate that other var- iables must be considered before meaningful prediction of instability can be made. The examination of changes occurring in each society over a fourteen-year period should present a basis for eval- uating these alternatives. CHAPTER 5 INSTABILITY. THE MODEL. AND WEST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES The cross-national analysis did not reveal any con- clusive evidence that the relationships suggested in the model are found in the data. An examination of patterns within each country was initiated to determine if other factors obscured the predicted relationships between the rate of social mobi- lization. the rate of economic growth. the level of institu- tionalization. and instability. Particular attention was paid to the role of repression in these relationships. Appendix F presents a summary of the examination of the West EurOpean countries. Among the eighteen West European countries investigated there was a great diversity in political institutions. in the level of economic modernization. and in the frequency of in- stability. The political systems of West Europe include long- standing democracies like those Of Great Britian or Sweden. the recent democracies such as the German Federal Republic or Italy. and the fascist dictatorships Of pro-World War II vin- tage as found in Spain or Portugal. The differences among these systems account for a range in the level Of institution- alization from very high levels to moderately low levels. 87 88 The levels Of modernization. too. range from among the highest in the world. found in Sweden. to those that are quite low. such as Portugal and Greece where the peasant life is common. The range in the level of modernization coincides with a wide range in the rates of social mobilization and eco- nomic growth. The tremendous expansion of higher education since 1950 is found at all levels of modernization in West EurOpe: this accounts for high rates Of the social mobiliza- tion index in modern societies. Within these diverse societies. instability has oc- curred fairly frequently. with some West EurOpean countries exhibiting the highest levels of instability found in all of EurOpe. Concomitantly. stability. the absence of any report- ed instability. also was found more commonly in West Europe than in East EurOpe. Within these diverse societies. then. patterns may emerge which illuminate the revised model. The patterns found in the West EurOpean data varied widely: at one extreme was the insurrection of the French army in Algeria during a period of diminished institutionalization and only a slightly in- creased gap between the rates of social mobilization and eco- nomic growth. In contrast to the French case. the Netherlands reported no instability at a time of an extreme rise in the rate of social mobilization and a slight decline in the level Of institutionalization. 89 The Observations Tables 13 and 14 summarize the results of the consid- eration of the variables in Specific national settings. The data for all countries were perused to see if a change in the size of the gap between social mobilization and economic growth resulted in changes in instability. This examination also investigated the impact of shifts in the levels of insti- tutionalization and repression to see if they help to explain the relationship between socioeconomic change and political instability. Table 13 summarizes the West EurOpean countries which experienced increases in the developmental gap. The observa- tions are categorized by increasing (I). declining (D). or constant (C) levels of both institutionalization and insta- bility. The observations summarized in Table 13 show a sub- stantial diversity of patterns. For example. the increase of repression in France just after the establishment of the Fifth Republic (1958-59). a time of decreased institutionalization. seems to have inhibited instability at that time. There are cases like that Of Belgium in 1960-61 in which a growing gap between social mobilization and economic growth is accompa- nied by major linguistic discontent and instability. 0n the other hand. the relationship between instability and socioec- onomic change is not found in a number Of observations where Institutionalization c: WEST EUROPE: I 90 TABLE 13 INCREASING DEVELOPMENTAL GAP Instability C D Finland 1954-55 France 1960-61 Greece 1960-61 N-3 1a Denmark 1954-55 Finland 1958-59 Iceland 1964-65 Norway 1956-57 Sweden 1960-61 Switzerland 1962-63 N-6 2a France 1956-57 N=1 3a Austria 1958-59 Belgium 1962-63 Denmark 1956-57 W. Germany 1958-59 Greece 1964-65 Ireland 1962-63 Netherlands 1» 125‘“? or uga 1962-63 Nae ua Austria 1956-57 Denmark 1960-61 Iceland 1958-59 Ireland 1954-55. 1958-59 Luxembourg 1956-57 Netherlands 1958-59 Norway 1 95““‘55 : 1958-59 Portugal 1954- 55. 1956-57 Switzerland 1953-59 N312 5a Austria 1954-55 Belgium 1956-57 France 1962-63 W. Germany 1955-57 Italy 1956-57 Spain 1958-59 Switzerland 1956-57 N=7 6a Belgium 1960-61 Italy 1960-61 Iceland 1962-63 Finland 1962-63 Finland 1956-5g France 1958-59 Portugal Netherlands Greece 1958-59 1958-59 1960-61 Netherlands Spain 1956-57 Norway 1962-63 1956-57 b Switzerland Sweden 1956-57 Spain 1962-63 U 0K 0 1958-59 N26 7a N25 83 N26 93 17 23 14 a cell identification number b the decrease in instability. An increase in repression may have accounted for 10 27 17 54 91 the developmental gap increased. e.g. Austria in 1954-55 or Denmark in 1960-61. Considering the data in this general way leads one to conclude that the model seems to have little explanatory power concerning the impact of an increasing develOpmental gap. From the observations presented in Table 13. it seems that a country with an increasing gap between the two socioeconomic factors and a diminished level of institutionalization. a situation posited to be the most destabilizing. is equally likely to have increased or decreased levels of instability. In fact. even removing 1958-59 France and 1962-63 Spain from consideration. due to the apparent impact of repression. only 10 per cent of the Observations with increased levels Of in- stitutionalization had decreases in instability. while five out of fifteen. or 30 per cent. of the observations with de- creased institutionalization had decreased instability which is the reverse of the predictions of the model. Superficially. then. the data does not suggest that increases in the gap be- tween social mobilization and economic growth is associated with increases in instability or that the level of institu- tionalization mitigates this relationship. Table 14 summarizes the West European Observations with a declining gap between the two socioeconomic factors. The observations are categorized by increasing (I). decreas- ing (D). or constant (C) levels of institutionalization. In- stability is divided into four categories: 1) an increasing Institptionalization 92 TABLE 14 WEST EUROPE: DECREASING DEVELOPMENTAL GAP Instability Italy Austria Denmark Belgium 1958-59 1962-63 1964-65 1964-65 Spain b U.K. Finland France 1964-65 1960-61 1960-61. 1964-65 Switzerland 1964-65 Italy 1954-55 Iceland 1962-63. 1960-61 1964-65 Netherlands Portugal 1962-63 196 -65 Norwgz U.K. 19 -65 1964-65 Sweden 1953-59 N=3 1a N=2 2a Na? 38 N26 43 Belgium Greece Denmark 1954-55 1954-55 1958-59 Greece Ireland Ireland 1956-57 1956-57 1964-65 Ireland Norway 1960-61 1960-61 Portugal Sweden 1960-61 1962-63. Spain 1964-65 1954-55b 1960-61 ire-6 53 Nero 68L N-s 7a N=8 83‘ 18 19 93 TABLE 14 -- Continued I C1 02 D Austria France Belgium W. Germany 1960-61. 1954-55 1958-59 1960-61 1964-65 Denmark Iceland W. Germany 1962-63 1956-57 1962-63 Luxembourg Switzerland D Greece 1958-59 1964-65 14 1962-63 Netherlands Italy 1964-65 1954-55 Sweden UOK o 1951+-55 1962-63 N=5 9a N=1 1oa N25 11a N=3 12a 14 3 17 17 51 a cell identification number b A decline in repression may account for the increase in instability. level (I). 2) a decreasing level (D). 3) a constant. unchang- ing level with some instability present (C1). and 4) a con- stant level with no instability present (02). In contrast to the data summarized in Table 13. that presented in Table 14 does seem to contain patterns consistent with the model. Twenty-eight out of forty-six of the obser- vations. 61 per cent. either had decreased levels of instabil- ity or had no instability. Of those observations with an in- crease in the level of institutionalization. only 16.7 per cent showed increases in the level of instability while 72.2 per cent had declines in instability or a continued absence of unrest. In contrast. of those Observations with declines 94 in the level of institutionalization. 40 per cent had in- creases in instability while 53.3 per cent had declines in the dependent variable. In this case the data contain the predicted relationships between institutionalization and po- litical instability when the gap between social mobilization and economic growth is declining. In addition. the data on repression demonstrated pat- terns predicted in the model. Most commonly. repression in- creased at times when unrest had risen. which seems to sup- port the conclusion that repression was used to end unrest. The arrests of terrorists in France during the Algerian crisis in 1960-61 and that of anti-regime demonstrators and rioters in Portugal between 1960 and 1965 illustrate this pattern. Occasionally. the data suggest that repression was used to limit unrest in a time of decreasing institutionalization or of an increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth. e.g. the rise in repression in Spain during 1956-57 and in 1962-63. The Spanish data contain the clearest pat- tern: after 1959. every rise in repression is accompanied by a decline in unrest. Of the West EurOpean countries. none has data which diSplay the predicted patterns throughout the fourteen-year period. though several have patterns which are consistent with the model. Five countries contain the predicted relationships between the size of the developmental gap. institutionaliza- tion. and instability. Two other countries seem to reflect the predictions of the model only when repression is taken into WIFE-III 95 consideration. Table 15 presents these countries and the times the data seems consistent with the model. TABLE 15 COUNTRIES OF WEST EUROPE WITH THE PREDICTED PATTERN Times with pre- Country dicted patterns present The Huntington Model: Ireland 1960-65 Italy 1960-65 Portugal 1962-65 Switzerland 1960-65 Belgium 1960-65 The Huntington Model + Repression: Greece 1960-65 Spain 1962-65 Of these seven countries. five (Ireland. Italy. Spain. Portugal and Greece) are the poorest. least industrialized and least mobilized of the eighteen West European countries examined. Possibly there is a threshold effect which should be considered in linking social mobilization and instability. and these five countries are below that threshold. A thres- hold would exist if the relationship between the developmen- tal gap and political instability is positive until a certain level of socioeconomic develOpment is surpassed. At that point the impact of socioeconomic change on political sta- bility would decline dramatically. 96 The Data and the Modei How well does this data reflect patterns suggested in the model? Assuming that the levels of institutionalization and repression are held constant. four possible patterns have appeared in the data which are particularly relevant to the model under consideration:21 1) As the gap between social mobilization and economic growth increases. instability increases. 2) As the gap increases. instability decreases or re- mains at zero. 3) As the gap decreases. instability increases. 4) As the gap decreases. instability decreases or re- mains at zero. Of these possibilities. patterns 1) and 4) are consistent with the model. Pattern 3) may be explained by the limited nature of the model. i.e. that it dOes not take into account other sources of social frustration and instability. The occurrence of pattern 2). however. is most unaccountable and most chal- lenging to the validity of the model. Table 14 indicates that observations with a decreasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth are more likely to contain pattern 4). The fewer examples of pattern 3) found in this category should be explained by other causal factors. Examples of such instances can be found in the 21 For observations which experienced a constant level of instability the interpretation of the data was less clear. and therefore these Options were eliminated from this discussion. § . Y! .9. mode 97 Italian demonstrations over the policy toward the Tyrol in 1958-59 and Greek demonstrations over the British Cyprus pol- icy in 1954-55 where dissatisfaction and frustration due to international factors were the source of instability. It may also be that socioeconomic changes may result in social frus- tration only after several years. a delayed result of a pre- vious rise in social mobilization. Patterns 1) and 2) can be examined by considering Table 13. While pattern 1) did occur. thus satisfying the model. pattern 2) was equally likely to appear. What other factors might explain a decline in insta- bility which accompanies an increasing gap between social mo- bilization and economic growth other than institutionaliza- tion and repression? Perhaps the countries which exhibit pat- tern 2) have reached a level of develOpment that makes the model irrelevant. i.e. they have passed a threshold of moder- nization. Few of the countries in cells #6 and #9 of Table 13. however. are among the most industrialized of EurOpe: in fact. Italy. Spain. and Greece are among the least industria- lized and least mobilized societies in West Europe. It is also of interest to note that Of the countries listed in these two cells. Italy. Switzerland. Belgium. West Germany. Greece and Spain are among those listed in Table 14 as conforming to the model during other time periods. The degree of overlap be- tween these two lists does not support the view that the level of develOpment is an intervening factor. Cons Jecli 98 However. in view of the question of a threshold effect raised earlier in this discussion a closer examination may be useful. It can be determined that a number of these countries experienced instability in the immediately following two-year period. e.g. 1958-59 in Italy. and 1960-61 in Spain. Table 16 lists the observations which contained a decline in insta- bility while experiencing a growing gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth and a constant or de- clining level of institutionalization. TABLE 16 DELAYED REACTIONS TO AN INCREASING GAP BETWEEN THE RATES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH Immediate following observation. shift in instability Constant level of institutionalization: Austria 1954-55 none Belgium 1956-57 none France 1962-63 decrease West Germany 1956-57 increase Italy 1956-57 increase Spain 1958-59 increase Switzerland 1956-57 none Declining level of institutionalization: Finland 1956-57 none France 1958-59 increase Greece 1958-59 increase Netherlands 1956-57 none Spain 1962-63 increase U. K. 1956-57 increase in ‘e'a 99 It is possible that social mobilization will result in social aspirations after the two-year period in which it was recorded. Instability. then. can occur as a delayed re- action to rising social frustration. Also. none of the coun- ‘tries which experienced delayed instability was among the most modernized or mobilized countries of West Europe. For instance. while the United Kingdom is the most urbanized na- tion of West EurOpe. there are eight countries with lower in- fant mortality rates and ten with greater radio diffusion and higher education enrollment. Similarly. both France and West Germany ranked in the middle of the West European nations in terms of income. infant mortality rates. radio diffusion and higher education enrollment. Italy. Spain and Greece were among the West EurOpean countries with the highest infant mor- tality rates and the lowest incomes. education enrollment. and radio diffusion.22 22This delayed reaction may also be seen in some of the Observations which reported no change in the level Of in- stability (cells #5 and #8. Table 13). Only four Of the sev- enteen observations in cells #5 and #8 showed increases in instability immediately following the recorded time: Austria (1956-57). Ireland (1958-59). Portugal (1954-57), and Swit- zerland (1958-59). Ireland and Portugal are among the least modern countries in West Europe and none of the other coun- tries with this delayed unrest are among the richest or most modern in Europe. For example. Switzerland ranked twelfth in the level of radio diffusion. fourteenth in higher educa- tion enrollment. and seventeenth in urbanization. Only Ire- land in 1954-55 among the less develOped countries in these categories failed to have a delayed reaction to the growing gap between the rate Of social mobilization and that of eco- nomic growth. pt ._..J i in ‘A0; h: 1 .,. 16?: + t to b._ 100 This Observation suggests that there may be not only a delayed reaction to an increasing gap between social mobi- lization and economic growth but a threshold of modernization below which the relationships suggested in the model are ac- curate. Some of the Observations. then. which fall into pat- tern 2) at first glance actually seem to reflect a delayed reaction of instability: thus fulfilling the requirements of jpattern 1). Summary In summary. an examination of the West EurOpean coun- ‘tries does reveal several patterns. The study of individual Ilations has indicated that repression is both a reSponse to iJlstability and used as an inhibitor Of instability. For ex- aunple. in examining the data of Spain and Portugal. repression ewrhances the utility and precision of the model. It is apparent that a declining gap between social mo- lxilization and economic develOpment does not insure a decreased 1&rvel of political instability. Factors beyond the SCOpe of 'the model can. and do. intrude into politics causing social frustration and instability. However. examining shifts in the Variables within the West European countries indicates that a declining gap is frequently associated witha similarly declin- ing level of instability. The impact of an increasing gap between social mobili- zation and economic growth on unrest is not as clear. The data 101 indicate that instability has both increased and declined in different cases. While the increases in unrest are predicted by the model. declines are not. This problem was examined further by considering other factors. specifically the impact of the level of modernization and the likelihood of a delayed reaction to socioeconomic change. An examination of the West EurOpean data has suggested that the level of modernization is important in determining the validity of the model. The cases in which the data re- flect the predicted patterns tend to be among the least mobi- lized and least industrialized West EurOpean societies. This coincidence suggests that. as the level of modernization in- creases. social mobilization results in less social frustra- tion due to the general affluence and opportunities available in society. i.e. the society and economy can absorb and accom- modate further mobilization. If this interpretation is correct. the data of highly develOped societies would not fit the predictions Of the model. thus accounting for pattern 2) in West European societies. In the case of countries with levels of modernization falling be- low the critical threshold. a delayed reaction to social mobi- lization could be found in the data. Together these findings suggest that the relation of social mobilization with political stability is a complex one. The low level of association found in Chapter 4 is probably the result of this complexity. While introducing the level Of E5 Ii w! 102 modernization into the correlation analysis helped to illumi- nate the relationship. the existence of a critical threshold of modernization would decrease the strength of association between social mobilization and economic growth. The investigation of the West EurOpean countries has offered some observations that help clarify the model and which were not apparent in the cross-national analysis. CHAPTER 6 INSTABILITY. THE MODEL. AND EAST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES Unlike the countries of West EurOpe. those of East Europe show a remarkable consistency. The hegemony of the Soviet Union in this region has led to similarities of polit- ical institutions and socioeconomic goals which are reflected in the data under study. East European societies tend to be less “modern" than their West EurOpean neighbors. However. a strong commitment to rapid industrialization is demonstrated in rates of eco- nomic growth which are somewhat higher than those found in West Europe. Virtually all East EurOpean societies showed major shifts in both economic growth and social mobilization. There is a great similarity in the political institu- tions of different East EurOpean societies due to the domina- tion of the national Communist Parties over the political sys- tem and the socialist nature of the regime. The differences that do occur between East European societies can be viewed as resulting from the divergence from a common model of soci- ety and politics. This institutional similarity has been re- inforced by the influence of Soviet politics throughout the bloc: for example. the de-Stalinization crisis in the Soviet Union resulted in strains on the institutions Of most of the 103 104 other East European countries. East EurOpe. then. includes countries with moderately low levels of institutionalization which are susceptible to bloc-wide strains. The East EurOpean data contain frequent reports of repression and more moderate levels of instability. Since the societies tend to report similar data. it is expected that similar patterns will be found throughout the analysis of the individual countries. The most apparent relationship found in the East Euro- pean data was the occurrence of instability at times of de- creasing institutionalization. The institutional crisis of de-Stalinization from 1953 through 1957 was accompanied by ma- jor unrest in East Germany. Poland. and Hungary. with the Sov- iet Union and Czechoslovakia recording lower levels of insta- bility. This crisis. which shook all of the East European nations. brought about the highest levels Of instability found in post-war East EurOpe. The predicted relationship between instability and re- pression seemed valid in the data from the East EurOpean coun- tries. Two patterns emerged concerning this relationship. First. repression was a reSponse to instability. i.e. it was used to stop unrest already in progress. as it was in Hungary and Poland in 1956-57. A second pattern found in the East EurOpean data was the occurrence Of repression at times when either the gap between social mobilization and economic growth increased or institutionalization declined. i.e. when the like- lihood Of instability increased. The seeming use of repression 9.: 105 to prevent instability from breaking out can be found in East Germany after 1960. the Soviet Union after 1961. and in Ru- mania in 1960-61. The Observatipns The East European data have been summarized in Tables 17 and 18 for easier recognition of the patterns found in the data. Table 17 categorizes the Observations containing a growing gap between social mobilization and economic growth. The observations are categorized by increasing (I). declining (D). or constant (C) levels of both institutionalization and instability. The East European observations show an immediate contrast to those of West EurOpe: the predicted interaction between institutionalization and the developmental gap is readily apparent in the data. Of the Observations showing in- creasing levels of institutionalization. 0 per cent had in- creasing instability and 57 per cent had declining levels of unrest. while 36 per cent of those with decreasing levels of institutionalization had increases in instability and 0 per cent had declines. This data seem to have patterns which are consistent with the prediction of the model. The cases in which an increasing gap is not associated with increasing in- stability are explained by the shifts in institutionalization which help to alleviate social frustration and by increases EAST EUROPE: 106 TABLE 17 INCREASING DEVELOPMENTAL GAP Instability I C D E. Germany Czechoslovakia 1964-65 1954-55 Rumania 1954-55 E. Germany U. s. S.R. 1954-55 1958-59b Poland 1958-59 Yugoslavia 1960-61 N-O 1a N=3 2a N=4 3a Rumania Hungary 1960-61 1960-61b U. S. S.R. 1962-63b N=1 ha N=2 53. N=o 6a Czecholevakia E. Germang 1956-57 1960-61 b Hungary 1956- -57 Albania 1960-61 Poland 1956-57 Bulgaria Yugoslavia 1956- 57. 1958-59 1960-61 Czechoslovakia 1962-63 Hungary 1962-63b Poland 1962-63b N=4 7a N=7 Ba N=o 9a 5 12 4 a b cell identification number rises in instability. An increase in repression may account for no 11 21 107 23 in repression which inhibits expressions Of instability. In comparison. the West EurOpean data cannot be explained so completely by the shifts in the level of institutionaliza- tion. However. the Observations with a declining gap be- tween social mobilization and economic growth show less clear cut patterns. The observations are categorized by increasing (I). decreasing (D). or constant (C) levels Of institutiona- lization. Instability is divided into four categories: 1) an increasing level (I). 2) a decreasing level (D). 3) a con- stant. unchanging level with some instability present (C1). and 4) a constant level with no instability present (C2). As Table 18 indicates. 31 per cent of the Observations with in- creasing levels of institutionalization reported rises in the level of instability. while 62 per cent had declines in insta- bility or a continuing lack of instability. In comparison. of those observations with decreasing levels Of institutionaliza- tion. 25 per cent had increases in instability and 75 per cent 23 There were two cases having no change in the level of instability which could be explained by neither an increase in the level of institutionalization nor in repression (cells #5 and #8. Table 17). However. both Bulgaria in 1962-63 and Czechoslovakia in 1964-65 experienced increased levels of in- stability at times of increasing institutionalization and a decreasing developmental gap. This suggests that the increas- ed rate of social mobilization resulted in instability in the following two-year period. The intensity in social frustration may have been exacerbated by the shifts in rate of economic growth. It is also interesting to note that these were the only observations containing no change in instability which were immediately followed (the following two-year period) with increased instability. The repression used in the other cases may have had a prolonged effect in inhibiting instability. Institutionalization C) EAST EUROPE: 108 TABLE 18 DECREASING DEVELOPMENTAL GAP Instability I C C2 D Czechoslo- Poland Albania Hungary vakia 1964-65 1962-63 1958-59 1964-65 Bulgaria Bulgaria 1958-59 1962-63 Czechoslo- Poland vakia 1960-61 1960-61 Yugoslavia Hungary 1956-57 1964-65 Rumania 1956'57: 1964-65 U.S.S.R. 1964-65 N=4 1a N=1 2a N=7 3a N=1 43 Bulgaria Albania Czechoslo- 1964-65 1958-59. vakia E. Germany 1964-65 1958-59 1956-57 Poland E. Germany 1954-55 1958-59 Rumania Rumania 1958-59 1962-63 Yugoslavia 1962-63 N=2 5a N=O 6a N=4 7a N=4 8a Yugoslavia E. Germany Hungary 1964-65 1962-63 1954-55 U.S.S.R. 1960-61 N=1 9a N=o loa N=1 11a =2 12a 7 1 12 7 a cell identification number 13 10 27 109 had either decreasing unrest or a continuing lack of unrest. Of the twenty-seven observations with a decreasing gap be- tween social mobilization and economic growth. a greater pro- portion. 70 per cent. contained instability measures which did not conflict with the model. This data then tend to support the predictions of the model. The increases in the level of instability found in some of the observations may be explained by other factors. For example. the unrest in Poland during 1960-61 was the result of church-state con- flicts. the demonstration reported in Yugoslavia during 1956- 57 occurred because of the Opposition of the Yugoslavs to Soviet intervention in Hungary. and the unrest in both Czechoslovakia in 1964-65 and Bulgaria in 1962-63 seems re- lated to declines in the rate of economic growth following periods of rapid increases in social mobilization. Other factors. independently of social mobilization and socioeco- nomic modernization. can be linked to political instability in East EurOpe. Of the nine countries included in the East EurOpean sample. six have patterns which are consistent with the mod- el without considering the possibility of delayed instability. In all but one of these. however. the appropriateness Of the model is reflected in the data only if repression is taken into consideration. Table 19 lists these cases. 110 TABLE 19 COUNTRIES OF EAST EUROPE WITH THE PREDICTED PATTERN Country Times with pre- dicted patterns present The Huntington Model: East Germany* 1958-65 Poland* 1954-59 Hungary* 1956-55 Rumania 1954-65 U.S.S.R..} 1958-65 Yugoslavia* 1958-65 * Repression must be considered in conjunction with the Huntington model. Summary In summary. the East EurOpean countries tend to con- tain patterns which are consistent with the Huntington model particularly when the immediate and long-range impact of re- pression is taken into account. The level of institutionali- zation is strongly related to the likelihood of shifts in in- stability when the developmental gap is increasing. i.e. it seems to be the determinant of the level of instability. All four of the patterns discussed in Chapter 5 are found in the East EurOpean data. First. as the gap between social mobilization and economic growth increases. instability has been increased. pattern 1). and decreased. pattern 2). With the introduction of institutionalization into the rela- tionship. however. shifts in the level of institutionalization 111 explains the differences in the changes in instability. Con- sequently. both patterns meet the requirements of the model. In observations in which the gap between social mobi- lization and economic growth declined. several patterns were found: instability both increased. pattern 3). and decreased. pattern 4). Decrease in the frequency of instability were prOportionately greater. a pattern which supports the predic- tions of the model. The cases of increased instability can be viewed as a delayed reaction to early rises in the rate of social mobilization (e.g. Bulgaria 1962-63 and Czechoslovakia 1964-65) and by factors not considered in the model (e.g. the continued impact of previous repression in Poland 1960-61 and East Germany 1956-57). The question of a critical threshold of economic mod- ernization was not raised while considering the East European data since an increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth was associated with instability in the pre- dicted manner. Because the lower levels of industrialization and mobilization are found throughout East EurOpe. the East European countries probably fall below the threshold: this would account for the degree to which the East EurOpean data contains patterns posited by the model. The predictions of the Huntington model. with the ad- dition of repression as a variable. can be found in East EurOpe. To a greater extent than in West EurOpe. the model is a useful tool of analysis. CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION This study was initiated in an attempt to find a model of instability which seemed apprOpriate in the post-war Euro- pean setting. For while many political scientists have con- centrated on EurOpean political institutions in order to aid understanding of the management Of conflict in EurOpe. few have made detailed studies of instability in EurOpe dealing with the relationship between unrest and other factors. The Literature Several models of instability have been proposed in the literature: however. few have been applied to contemporary EurOpean political systems. The underlying assumptions and the posited relationships of these models should both be valid in the EurOpean setting and may help to cast light on the oc- currence Of instability in EurOpe. One recurrent theme appearing throughout much of the literature on instability suggests that political unrest is the product of discontent which occurs when members of society fail to attain their expectations. Theorists differ on the source of these expectations: for example. Davies suggests 112 113 that they are derived from past experiences while Huntington believes that they are the result of social mobilization. However. whatever their source. theorists contend that ex- pectations shift dramatically during the process of moderni- zation. industrialization and urbanization. When these changes take place rapidly. expectations may diverge from actual achievements to a greater extent and the discontent is more apt to emerge. A consideration of socioeconomic change in interpre- ting the outbreak of instability seemed appropriate in post- war Europe because major shifts in income and education have occurred throughout most of EurOpe and rapid industrializa- tion and urbanization have been evident in East EurOpe. If socioeconomic change is related to unrest. this association should be found in the European data. Of the models Of instability considered. Huntington's was selected since it included both the factor of socioeco- nomic change. considered important by theorists primarily con- cerned with instability. and that of political institutions. considered important by political scientists concerned with EurOpean politics. Huntington views economic modernization as a dualis- tic process which both raises social expectations through so- cial mobilization and raises the capacity of the society to meet new expectations through economic growth. It is the re- lation of the rates of these two processes which determines the likelihood of discontent. When this discontent cannot be 114 alleviated by mobility Opportunities. it leads to greater po- litical participation. according to Huntington. However. the participation itself does not account for instability. but rather it is the degree to which participation cannot be chan- nelled through the established political institutions that produces actual instances of instability. Huntington argues that the level of institutionalization of a political system is the critical factor in maintaining stability during periods of increasing participation. Thus. stability is linked to so- cial mobilization. economic growth. mobility opportunities and institutionalization. After a careful consideration Of this model. the con- cept of mobility Opportunities was removed as an independent variable because it was related to both social mobilization and economic growth. However. the relationships between social mobilization. economic growth. institutionalization. and in- stability were viewed as both illuminating and capable of be- ing examined empirically. Finally. another variable. repression. was added to the model. While Huntington implies that institutionalization limits instability by rewarding participants. thus eliminating discontent. and by building a sense of loyalty to the esta- blished institutions. other theorists have suggested that re- pression also limits instability. by punishing those who par- ticipate outside of the accepted channels of politics. This variable was introduced into the model. then. to increase its power of explanation. 115 The Findings The predicted patterns did not appear in a cross- national correlational analysis. The positive association between repression and instability called the posited causal nexus into question. Consequently. the correlational analy- sis was revised to exclude this variable. The analysis was further clarified by taking into account the level of devel- Opment already achieved in order to increase the degree of comparability of the rates Of change at different levels of development. Negative relationships linking both institutionaliza- tion and economic growth to political instability were reveal- ed by the analysis. Both the rate Of social mobilization and the gap between it and economic growth were positively assoc- iated with instability: however. the strength of the rela- tionship was quite weak. The results of the cross-national correlational analysis were suggestive of the relationships posited by Huntington: however. the relative weakness of some of the patterns left both doubts and questions about the va- lidity of the model. The profound differences in the level of moderniza- tion. the types of institutions. and the degree of influence of outside powers in domestic affairs suggest that the cross- national analysis may have failed to reveal the predicted re- lationships found within each country. It was believed that general patterns could be examined by isolating these 116 differences. In addition. the correlation analysis could not relate changes in one variable to changes in another but rather only indicate the degree of associations between dif- ferent variables found in a number of societies. Consequent- ly. each country was examined independently for the relation- ships suggested in the revised model. While the fourteen-year time Span reflected long-term trends in the various EurOpean countries. the examination of consecutive two-year periods in individual countries allowed the investigator to view the impact of interaction of short- term shifts in the different variables on the frequency of political unrest. The examination of the individual EurOpean countries indicated several patterns between the variables. There were major differences found between the East European and West European countries and between countries with West Europe. An examination of the East EurOpean countries revealed a clear relationship between political instability and the gap between social mobilization and economic growth. When the gap was increasing. the relationships suggested in Huntington's model were quite evident. Likewise. when the gap was decreas- ing in size the level of instability either declined or re- mained at zero in well over a majority of the cases. The patterns found in the West EurOpean countries when they experienced declines in the gap between social mobiliza- tion and economic growth paralleled that found in East EurOpe. 117 In most instances. instability either declined or remained at zero. In both East and West EurOpe. the cases in which a de- creasing gap was accompanied by increasing instability were not considered as major challenges to the model.‘ Huntington never contended that his model included all factors which caused instability. but rather that it examined the relation- ship between a major process of change. socioeconomic devel- Opment. and political stability. Since other sources of in- stability have not been considered. it is not unreasonable to assume that they are the cause Of unexplained increases in instability. However. the discrepancies found in the West EurOpean data which reported increases in the gap between social mobi- lization and economic growth call Huntington's model into question. It was found that. when taking the level of insti- tutionalization into account. an increasingdevelopmental gap was as likely. if not more likely. to have decreasing rather than increasing instability. While the model does not suggest that all increases in the developmental gap should be accompa- nied by similar increases in instability. assuming that insti- tutionalization is held constant. the validation of the model would require some evidence that there was a greater tendency for instability to increase than to decrease. The observations of West EurOpe did not provide this evidence. 118 Additions to the Mode; Since the introduction of the level of modernization had increased the utility of the model in cross-national cor- relation analysis. this factor was again considered as a means Of explaining this problem. It was found that the less mod- ernized countries in West EurOpe tended to exhibit the pre- dicted relationships. while the most modern. i.e. those with the higher levels of mobilization. industrialization. and standard of living. reported data which could not as easily be explained. This phenomena was consistent with the view that the process of modernization and that of social mobilization have a threshold. i.e. a level of development. beyond which the process is decreasingly destabilizing. As the level Of moder- nization increases. the strength Of the relationship of the gap between social mobilization and economic growth with po- litical instability. declines. Presumably. the strength of the relationship would approach zero as the level of develOp- ment. as Huntington defines it. approaches its maximum. The analysis suggested that there were a number of West EurOpean societies near the threshold of modernization which resulted in confusing patterns among the variables. The introduction of the notion of a threshold of mod- ernization into the model clarified some of the discrepancies found in the data of different West EurOpean societies and be- tween the East European and the West EurOpean findings. Most 119 of the East EurOpean countries and a number of West European countries fell below that threshold: in these cases the model was an effective tool for understanding and predicting polit- ical instability. Once the threshold of modernization has been surpassed. the model becomes less useful in interpreting the sources Of instability. In addition. if economic modernization has been the main source Of unrest. once a society has passed that threshold a sharp drop in the level Of instability should occur. The West European countries may have demonstrated this indi- rectly. for it was quite clear that the countries with the highest standards of living. the Scandinavian ones. had the lowest levels of unrest. In contrast. the countries with the lowest standards Of living were among the most unstable. e.g. Portugal. Spain. and Greece. For the EurOpean Countries which fell below this thres- hold. several other observations have helped to clarify the analysis further. First. socioeconomic change can have a con- tinuing or delayed impact on political stability. Second. re- pression can act as an inhibiting factor and help to maintain stability. The apparent delayed effect of social mobilization found in the data may be the result of the use Of two-year periods for the analysis of individual countries. There were a number of instances in which instability would decrease as the gap between social mobilization and economic growth would increase. In many cases this often was followed by a rise in 120 the level of unrest in the next two years. even when other factors might act to limit it. Since this sequence tended to occur in the case Of less develOped countries. i.e. in coun- tries where the impact of social mobilization should be felt (e.g. Italy or Greece). it was interpreted as a manifestation of a delayed impact of socioeconomic change. The translation Of increased social mobilization into social frustration and ultimately instability may require more than two years time: this would be manifested in a delayed response of instability. While there was no real test of the validity of this interpre- tation. the examination of individual societies has revealed patterns which suggest that. in some cases. a rise in insta- bility may lag behind its initial source. a rise in the gap between social mobilization and economic change. A second factor which helped to clarify the analysis was the consideration of repression in the examination of in- dividual countries. Repression was not a variable in Hunting- ton's original statement of the model and proved an unreliable variable in the cross-national analysis. However. the exami- nation of individual nations indicated that repression has been used throughout EurOpe to limit political instability. In most instances repression was used only after un- rest had broken out: thus accounting for the positive associ- ation between repression and instability found in the correla- tion analysis. Examples of this can be found in Hungary. Spain. or the United Kingdom. However. repression also was found to occur when shifts in the develOpmental gap and the 121 level of institutionalization would seem to increase the like- lihood of instability. This pattern was particularly rele- vant in East European countries such as East Germany after the Berlin Wall was erected. Rumania. or the Soviet Union. Because of the dual nature Of the relationship between instability and repression. it is only in the examination of a specific society that the addition of repression to the Huntington model enhances its utility and precision. Summary In summary. with some revisions. the application of the Huntington model to post-war EurOpe illuminated the rela- tionships between socioeconomic modernization. institutiona- lization. and political stability. The introduction Of re- pression into the analysis increased the utility of the model in East European and less developed West European nations. In addition. the analysis indicated that the impact of social mobilization may extend beyond the two-year period which was used. When a delayed reaction of instability is taken into account. the relationships in the data even more closely fit those stated in the model. Finally. it was found that the data of the more develOped West European nations did not re- flect the posited relationships. This suggested that there was a critical threshold of modernization at which point the impact of social mobilization on political stability declines. 122 The analysis of individual EurOpean nations suggested that a substantial number of these countries fall at or below this threshold. However. the analysis also indicates that the model can be used with precision only within certain limits. i.e. it is useful only in understanding societies which have not yet achieved high levels of modernization. It is not only the relationship between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth which determine instability. but these rates can have a destabilizing influence only if a society is in the process of becoming modern. The findings of cross-national analysis. then. will be Of limited value if they include the most modern. and. possibly. the least modern. nations. This study also suggests that the application of the model to a Specific society should be most useful. 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These figures have been rounded to one decimal place, al- though calculations of the rate of change were based on three place decimals. 130 131 TABEE A1 MEAN NUMBER OF RADIOS PER 1,000 INHABITANTS M In N O\ H M VN n n n "a “a “a “a A .3. J. 00 o N :r \n W n \fi \0 \O \O ox ox ox 0: (h ox ox .-: .-: H H H v-l H Albania 10.0 -- 16.4 22.2 34.9 38.9 41.9 Austria 234.4 244.5 260.2 272.7 284.2 292.9 296.3 Belgium 205.3 232.4 252.8 269.5 295.1 321.2 324.1 Bulgaria 45.8 47.2 85.2 148.5 191.8 222.2 245.6 Czechoslo- vakia 205.7 213.9 227.8 249.8 260.7 264.2 263.1 Denmark 299.6 301.7 319.3 327.1 349.3 354.2 338.3 Finland 214.2 237.9 255.3 266.9 283.0 301.4 325.8 France 191.7 203.8 230.9 238.1 260.7 298.7 311.5 East Ger- many 265.3 297.7 323.5 334.7 346.6 354.9 361.? West Ger- Greece 52.2 62.9 77.6 87.6 98.4 91.0 101.8 Hungary 256.2 274.6 280.9 283.4 285.8 289.1 291.2 Iceland 250.9 259.7 277.3 276.4 281.7 302.7 328.1 Ireland 133.7 148.9 162.2 171.4 175.2 186.1 203.1 italy 96.7 115.5 127.5 139.3 165.7 184.4 205.4 uxem- bourg 233.3 240.0 278.0 299.0 308.1 325.5 355.1 Nether- lands 217.9 242.4 263.2 270.4 267.8 259.6 254.8 Norway 256.2 274.6 280.9 283.4 285.8 289.1 291.2 Poland 83.? 99.8 135.9 161.9 180.3 185.5 182.5 Portugal 43.9 53.7 65.2 84.6 98.8 115.1 125.6 Rumania -- 67.2 84.1 96.3 112.8 131.3 144.2 Spain 45.9 56.3 67.0 79.5 96.8 121.0 135.8 Sweden 319.8 335.3 351.3 359.2 372.5 388.2 383.3 Switzer- land 235.3 250.8 253.3 259.1 270.3 273.8 277.5 U.S.S.R. 92.8 130.9 155.6 185.7 205.2 302.1 318.8 3.x. 256.6 269.1 282.3 285.6 288.9 293.2 296.0 ugo- slavia 23.3 34.2 45.0 66.2 91.6 115.0 142.2 Source: U. N, Statistical Yearbook 132 TABLE A2 MEAN LEVEL OF ENROLLMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION no-38aa mmumoma Honooma omcmmma nm:omma mmuamma mmummma 7704 0619 I O O I O O O O 6682 0989 1 9690 9082 O O O C O O O I 6622 9868 1.1 6061 1432 3659 1.656 5852 6751 O I O O O O O O 1.444 3245 7624. 5u90 O O O O O 1.345 3 34 6059 4964 O O O O O O O O 324 3233 a. "912 0944 234 6233 . O ala numiaikd. ariuhaua. tggcvmlm bslle nm lueuz e h AABBC DF East Ger- 3.3 3.6 3.6 7.0 5.1 4.8 1.6 many West Ger- 2J3:Vq!4.3 664 575 224948 64 74 54 656581. 5334 34 381423 422433 042 .1 many Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Luxem- 1.8 1.0 .2 .3 .3 .23 bourg Nether- 797.5796 14 736 38 6093626 046 3536 6084563 93524 2 5 1:):r4.)<{4 32 52 324 9843425 2142423 77.615 . 9 21423 2 564 772 8 3151 32 2 lands Norway Poland Portugal Rumania Spain Sweden Switzer- 437 3-3 1.7 3.1 land U.S.S.R. U.K. Yugo- 3.6 4.9 8.5 8.4 9.2 3-7 slavia U. N. Statistical Yearboo Source: * 1950-51 133 TABLE A3 MEAN INFANT MORTALITY RATE M In (\ O\ H m m 7 "n "a ‘1‘ 9 9 “.3 s a :2 s e s s O\ O\ O\ O\ O\ O\ O\ H H H H H H H Albania -- 103.9 84.2 72.4 81.2 91.3 84.1 Austria 50.8 46.9 43.7 40.2 35.1 32.0 26.7 Belgium 43.3 41.0 37.6 30.8 29.6 27.3 24.9 Bulgaria 89.2 84.3 69.1 54. 41.4 36.5 31.8 Czechoslo- vakia 50.2 35.8 32.4 27.6 23.1 22.4 23.2 Denmark 28.0 26.0 24.1 22.4 21.6 19.6 18.7 Finland 33.6 30.1 26.6 24.0 20.9 19.3 17.2 France 43.5 39.6 34.9 30.5 26.5 25.5 22.7 East Ger- many 56.3 49.6 46.0 42.6 36.2 31.5 27.0 West Ger- many 47.2 42.6 37.3 35.1 32.7 28.0 21.2 Greece 46.6 46.9 1. 39.0 39.9 9.8 35.0 Hungary 70.3 60.3 60.9 55.2 45.8 5. 39.4 Iceland 19.8 20.3 17.2 17.5 16.2 17.1 16.3 Ireland 40.4 37.2 34.2 33.7 29.8 27.8 25.9 Italy 61.0 51.9 49.4 6.8 42.8 40.6 35.5 Luxem- bourg 42.8 41.3 37.7 36.0 28.8 29.8 26.9 Nether- lands 22.3 20.6 18.1 18.3 17.4 16.4 14.6 Norway 22.8 21.0 20.8 19.3 18.4 17.3 16.6 Poland 91.4 82.0 73.8 72.3 55.4 51.7 44.7 Portugal 94.9 87.8 87.9 86.3 83.1 75.8 66.9 Rumania 100.5 83.5 81.8 73.7 73.5 57.7 46.3 Spain 59.8 55.2 52.3 48.2 44.9 41.0 37.6 Sweden 19.4 18.0 17.5 16.2 16.7 15.4 13.7 Switzer- land 29.4 26.8 24.3 22.2 21.0 20.8 18.4 U.S.S.R. 71.5 64.0 42.8 40.6 33.5 31.4 28.0 0.x. 27.8 26.0 24.1 23.2 22.3 22.1 20.1 Yugo- slavia 110.8 107.2 99.9 89.1 84.8 80.8 73.7 Source: U. N. Demographic Yearbook PER CENT 0F INHABITANTS IN CITIES OVER 20,000 TABLE A4 134 % Pop. Year % Pop. Year 1960 Albania 8.0 1950 18.4 1955 28.9* Austria 39.8 1951 38.2 1961 38.4* Belgium 32.0 1947 34.3 1961 34.1* Bulgaria 24.6 1946 33.6 1956 38.0* Czechoslo- vakia 21.6 1950 25.3 1961 25.0* Denmark 44.8 1950 48.5 1960 48.5 Finland 22.2 1950 33.7 1960 33.? France 31.4 1946 37.4 1962 36.6* East Ger- many 41.5 1950 West Ger- many 41.5 1950 47.5 1961 4?.0* Greece 28.1 1951 37.4 1961 36.5* Hungary 33.4 1949 37.0 1960 7.0 Iceland 39.1 1950 40.5 195? 1.1* Ireland 28.3 1951 35.6 1961 24.9* Italy 41.2 1931 7.0 1961 6.4* Luxembourg 30.6 19 7 31.6 1960 31.6 Nether- lands 49.7 1947 51.8 1960 51.8 Norway 32.8 1950 34.8 1960 34.8 Poland 25.6 1950 31.3 1960 31.9 Portugal 16.5 1950 16. 1960 16.4 Rumania 23.4 1948 21.2 1956 35.38 Spain 39.8 1950 5. 1960 5. Sweden 33.0 1950 40.8 1960 40.8 Switzer- land 29.2 1950 29.9 1960 29.9 U.S.S.R. 47.9 1959 55.0 1967 48.8‘ U.K. 68.2 1951 66.9 1961 67.0* Yugo- slavia 12.2 1948 18.6 1961 18.1* Source: U, N. Demoggaphic Yearbook * estimated TABLE A5 WORKING POPULATION EMPLOYED IN NON-AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS % Year % Year 1960 Austria 68.0 1951 77.2 1961 76.3: Belgium 87.9 1947 90.0 1958 90.4a Bulgaria 35.8 1956 55.6 1965 44.6 Czechoslo- vakia 62.0 1950 74.1 1960 74.1 Denmark 75.0 1951 82.5 1960 82.5 Finland 54.0 1950 64.5 1960 64.5 France 64.0 1946 80.2 1962 78.2a East Ger- many 70.8 1946 81.0 1958 82.93 West Ger- a many 76.8 1950 86.0 1959 87.0 Greece 51.8 1951 46.1 1961 46.7a Hungary 47.1 1949 62.0 1960 62.0 Iceland 60.0 1950 77.1 1960 77.1 Ireland 60.0 1951 65.8 1961 65.2a Italy 57.8 1951 71.0 1960 71.0 Luxem- bourg 74.0 1947 85.0 1960 85.0 Nether- lands 80.7 1947 89.0 1959 89.7a Norway 74.0 1950 80.5 1960 80.5 Poland 43.0 1950 52.3 1960 52.3 Portugal 52.0 1950 57.5 1960 57.5 Rumania 30.5 1956 42.8 1966 35.3a Spain 51.5 1950 58.7 1960 58.7 Sweden 79.7 1950 87.0 1960 87.0 Switzer- land 83.5 1950 88.0 1960 88.0 U.S.S.R. 87.5 1956 87.7 1965 87.5a 0.x. 94.9 1951 96.9 1966 95.8a Yugo- slavia 33.2 1953 42.8 1961 41.6a Source: International Labor Organization, Yearbook of Labor Statistics estimated Source: U. N . Demograohic Yearbook WEST EUROPE: 136 TABLE A6 PER CAPITA INCOME, 1958 U. S. Dollars Austria $ 662 Belgium 1030 Denmark 1090 Finland 815 France 947 West Germany 912 Greece 338 Iceland 1104 Ireland 447 Italy 528 Luxembourg 1333 Netherlands 767 Norway 1035 Portugal 228 Spain 326 Sweden 1391 Switzerland 1195 U. K. 1091 Sources U. N. Statistical Yearbook APPENDIX B THE RATE OF SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE The data presented here are the rates of change for the individual indicators of socioeconomic change and for the combined indices of social mobilization and economic growth. All of these rates were obtained by the formulas presented in Chapter 3. Tables Bi through B6 indicate the rates of change calculated for each of the two-year periods, while Tables B7 and B8 indicate those for the 14-year period, 1952-65. 137 138 El TABLE AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF INCREASE OF RADIO DIFFUSION ms-a6aa mo-moma Honome mmummofi nmumwma mm-smma mmlmmmH 9653 C . O C 3 5 ”(<24n7 . . . pD1f4nl 6186 8244 2 l 6431 72 37 1 1244 6340 1 Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czechoslo- 2311 O .0 O 242 .— 7.723 2.407 923:)4. 2892370 .4.1921 3966 32 36 94 52 1 53 7LD115/ vakia Denmark Finland France East Ger- 6.1 4.3 1.7 1.8 1.2 many West Ger- many Greece Iceland Ireland Hungary Italy Luxem- 7.9 3.8 1.5 2.8 4.5 1.4 5.0 bourg Nether- 9486 916 5.464698 580001. . l 4468 331 lands Norway Poland Portugal Rumania Spain Sweden Switzer- land U.S.S.R. U.K. Yugo- 23.3 23.3 23.5 19.2 12.8 11.8 4.6 slavia 139 ASE IN EDUCATION fl :4 Ll AVERAGE ANNUAL RA E OF INCR mn-anaa mwumoma Honome mmummmfi nmuwmmfi mm-smmH mmummma Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czechoslo- vakia Denmark Finland France East Ger- -13.9 - 2.8 47.1 50.3 4.7 0.0 many West Ger- hwaibqioid .1113; .1 many Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Luxem- 19.6 -35.9 13.8 85.1 0.0 bourg Nether- 3568 393 8588016 000000 0 51602 1.. . .1. ROG/.nu./cnu (do .u..n(Ao . . . . S .l d aa anyauafl n aamnummnne 1.w .t aid rlir.mnanc onuonunrw NPPRSS Switzer- 323 000 562 . . h40/4 623 1.61. l 6 A73 land U.S.S.R. U.K. Yugo- 4.4 .4 36.6 17.5 - 3-0 8-9 slavia 140 TABLE 33 AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF DECLINE OF INFANT MORTALITY RATES moudwmfi mmumwmfi Holowmfi mmummma mmummma mmusmmfi mmummma 914 3 3546 3390/ 6435 1.30/7 6611 0000/ 0000 7490 1 4410 9340/ HDnr7A/ 3322 5107 3088 1 Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czechoslo- QUQK4HD . .loasib 3667 1.4.31 1843 8163 h». 593 . . . 7.9/46 7>O:JQ, .4qjqib 3615 .4354 1 7Ayu11 16. 2. 7. 7 vakia Denmark Finland France East Ger- 701 3-5 3.7 7-4 6-5 6.0 805 many West Ger- many Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Luxem- 4-4 2-3 9-9 - 1-7 4.9 1.8 bourg Nether- 5089912 33538 33 6688265 Rumania lands Spain Norway Poland Portugal Sweden Switzer- 845 fifiDu. 44411 453 074 265 land URS.S.R. U.K. Yugo- 3.3 5.4 2.4 2.4 4.4 1.6 7.2 slavia ‘ estimated from 1951 data 141 TABLE B4 AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF INCREASE IN PER CAPITA INCOME mwuaw¢a nmlmwma Hoaomma mmummaa umuomma mmuemoa nmumnma 0555 0448 Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czechoslo- 200 305 6.0 11.5 6.0 9-5 vakia Denmark Finland France East Ger- many West Ger- 500055 484432 050505 365445 50 5555 648 55 5550 0 0 330 31... 5 1 000050 4612.4 500005 962125 1.. "05 u 55 55 24 Vue ydd m.¢mmy me 111 eme e a r Ort GHIII Luxem- ‘200 205 3.5 2.0 -" -- bourg Nether- 5000005 5666 N65 0 55550 0 2 3356 04 1 550 550 0 ,Dzz4pbmW4hw 0500005 0 .53822 505508 0 326 344 2 5005500 4:49Y4nlza4 0550505 n41.41i92411 lands Norway Poland Portugal Rumania Switzer- Spain Sweden 000 374 520 231 585 453 000 091. 005 491 565 land U.S.S.R. U.K. Yugo- 7-5 5-5 9.0 10.0 2.5 7 slavia 1h2 TABLE BS RATE OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION mwudwmfi mwumwma Holommfi mmummmfi mmuwmmfi mmusmmfi mmummmfl 37.35 193 8380/ C C C . <1)UJI 2 1fl 0 3355 978/0 4 3 Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czechoslo- vakia Denmark Finland East Ger- France “'05 102 24.5 - 6.1+ " 1.0 28.2 many West Ger- 630/262 000000 278124 1 .. . many Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Hungary Luxem- -16.1 7.7 43.9 2.5 13.8 .7 bourg Nether- 204 7154 262 378 7 0030/5480 1855017 111 1782523 77.54 366 4 1 0510588 480/9286 . 307/0388 13 47.9. .7 124 .92. .1; .. S l d aa mngi n amumne lw t id rlrmae oooupw NPPRSS Switzer- 350/ 24 688 7}01I 9000/ 650 820/ land U.S.S.R. U.K. Yugo- 11.3 20.5 27.9 6.2 8.1 16.1 slavia 1113 TABLE B6 RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH mwudoma mwlmmma kuooma mm-mmmH mmuommfi mmnzmmfi mmnmmmfi 98.4” 1.4.4 7. 7.42.4 124,3 90/26 53a. 8052 I... <fi4:21 00/82 7h». 37 Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czechoslo- 6585 0000 925.4 62.45 12 2 u 4 vakia Denmark Finland France East Ger- 7.6 6.7 4.2 5-3 4.7 7.7 many West Ger- anVQZLUK4 many Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Luxem- 3.9 2.1 2.1 Portugal Rumania Spain .422 I462 517 13 527 18.4 251 land U.S.S.R. Switzer- U.K. Sweden 7.? 4.9 3.“ 6.7 2.9 u.5 slavia Yugo- 144 SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE INDICATORS TABLE B7 RATE OF GROWTH 1952-65: .mpmm spHHmpuos pcmocH newshoamem HmuSPazowpm~ :3 >' :» Albania 1 1952-65 1 1952-65 Austria 3 1952-65 5 1952-65 Belgium 4 1952-65 5 1952-65 Bulgaria 1 1952-53 2 1954-65 1 1952-65 Czechoslo- vakia 1 1052-53 2 1954-65 1 1952-65 Denmark 4 1952-65 5 1952-65 Finland 3 1952-65 5 1952-65 France 4 1952-57 1 1958-65 5 1952-57 3 1958-65 East Ger- many 1 1952-65 1 1952-65 West Ger- many 1 1952-63 2 1964-65 5 1952-65 Greece 1 1952-63 2 1964-65 3 1952-65 Hungary 1 1952-55 2 1956-57 1 1952-65 Iceland 3 1952-65 5 1952-65 Ireland 3 1952-65 5 1952-65 Italy 1 1952-61 2 1962-65 5 1952-65 Luxem- bourg 4 1952-65 5 1952-65 Nether- lands 5 1952-65 5 1952-65 Norway 4 1952-65 5 1952-65 Poland 1 1952-55 2 1956-65 1 1952-65 Portugal 3 1952-65 1 1952-65 Rumania 1 1952-55 2 1956-65 1 1952-65 Spain 3 1952-65 1 1952-65 Sweden 5 1952-65 5 1952-65 Switzer- land 5 1952-65 5 1952-65 U.S.S.R. 3 1952-65 1 1952-65 U.K. 5 1952-65 5 1952-65 Yugo- slavia 1 1952-65 1 1952-65 1119 TABLE 03 INSTITUTIONALIZATION: ELITE CONTINUITY 1952-53 1954-55 1956-57 1958-59 1960-61 1962-63 1964-65 Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Denmark Finland France East Germany West Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Rumania Spain Sweden Switzerland U.S.S.R. UIK. Yugoslavia mmummmmc—tmmtmmmtmmuPres-m4? wrwmtmwmttmmwmmttmmNtmmmlrmw mm tumour-Pm NV‘ FU‘KAUK NPUIUIU‘I NU‘FT-PC‘UXKA r-‘Nmme'c'irtt'mkw tUI-F'43'WU‘UIHWUIFU‘NUIKR mmr—etmtttmmwmmmmtm##Ncmmum Nb.) thmmmtzmmtmNmtwNNHNwCNSwmm -P'U\ Nwmirmmmtw NU‘WJ‘ tr—sw FU‘UIUIUI C'C‘KQUX 150 TABLE C4 INDEX VALUE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION m m (\- O\ H m 1n me) \n U\ V\ V\ \o \o \o w>c I I I I I I I I (U 01 .3 \o G) c> 01 a- 019 U\ m m m \0 \O \0 mo) Ox 0\ O\ O\ O\ ox 0\ ox> r-I H H r-I H H H Hd Albania 16 15 17 17 15 17 17 16.3 Austria 31 31 31 31 28 31 29 30.3 Belgium 32 32 32 30 31 31 32 31.4 Bulgaria 16 18 17 113 16 17 17 17.0 Czechoslo- vakia 16 18 17 17 113 15 18 17.0 Denmark 33 34 34 34 34 33 34 33.7 Finland 31 32 3o 31 32 31 33 31.4 France 27 26 29 20 21 21 24 24.0 East Ger- many 16 17 17 17 113 13 16 16.0 West Ger- many 30 30 3o 30 29 27 29 29. Greece 20 20 20 19 21 18 18 19. Hungary 18 17 17 18 18 17 18 17.6 Iceland 32 32 31 31 32 31 32 31.6 Ireland 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31.0 Italy 26 25 25 26 24 25 26 25.3 Luxem- bourg 34 34 34 32 34 34 33 33.6 Nether- lands 311L 34 33 33 32 3AL 32 33-1 Norway 33 33 3“ 34 34 32 33 33.3 Poland 17 17 16 18 19 17 19 17.6 Portugal 20 20 20 19 19 19 20 19.6 Rumania 14 15 17 17 17 17 18 16.4 Spain 20 2o 19 19 19 18 19 19.1 Sweden 35 3“ 33 34 35 35 35 3“-1+ Sw1tzer-- land 33 34 34 34 33 34 32 33-5L U.S.S.R. 18 18 17 18 16 16 17 17.1 U.K. 35 34 33 32 35 34 35 34.0 Yugoslavia 18 16 18 17 18 18 17 17.4 APPENDIX D REPRESSION Table D1 indicates the frequency or reported re- pression in each of the European countries for both the two-year periods and the 1952-65 fourteen-year period. These data were obtained by combining the frequency of reports of government action against specific groups and of arrests found in the data collected by Feierabend. Feierabend. and Nesvold. 151 PRESSION T.‘ J..; IE D1 152 W H [‘1 TA NCY 0F REPORTED R -‘ %mm 17' .L fleece mcummmfi mcuawma moumoma Holomma mmummma smuommfi mmuammfi mm-mmmfi 2025 0012 0011 2000 0000 0001 0000 0001 Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czechoslo- 900/0 1000 2005 1006 1 1003 1000 1001 2001 vakia Denmark Finland France 16 East Ger- many West Ger- 89503202182542 111 23 5 57100002150010 1 1 90301100094011 1 1 2 30200000035050 00000000002160 10702100061081 00100000010130 021000000140300 s Wed u m 1 y Ydd AII aa nernn brngi n ancanaauym.eaamnuwnue meglllehw t id eneeaxtrlrmae rucrtueoooupw GHIIILNNPPRSS Switzer- 0.4.0 010 010 land U.S.S.R. U.K. 15 slavia Yugo- APPENDIX E INSTABILITY INDICES Table E1 presents the frequency of events of unrest or instability reported in the data collected by Feierabend. Feierabend. and Nesvold. Table E2 indicates the results of a factor analysis which included all of the individual in- dices reported for the 1952-65 period. 153 154 TABLE E1 FREQUENCY OF REPORTED UNREST fleece mmummma mmudomfi mmlmmma leoomfi mmummma mmummma mmudmma mmummma o 10 o 5 03.43 0270 0100 0000 0020 0211 Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czechoslo- 14.112 7 2002 0005 000/0 3 0001 1102 0013 1003 vakia Denmark Finland France East Ger- many West Ger- 110023 010018 100001 037000 300103 001001 many Greece Iceland Ireland Hungary Italy Luxem- bourg Nether- 10 20 02 O/ 23 In». 0022000 1 2 002-4090 1 00214220 1 0002020 001400140 1 1000020 0000000 lands Norway Poland Portugal Rumania Spain Sweden Switzer- 8.437 1 1002 2050 2031 0233 0201 2020 land U.S.S.R. U.K. Yugoslavia 155 TABLE E2 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF INDICES 0F INSTABILITY. 1952-65* Variable 1 2 Strikes - .8923 ,ou97 Demonstrations - .3632 .8027 Terrorism - .9582 .1206 Sabotage .0987 .7205 Guerrilla Warfare - .9597 .1492 Revolts - .5284 .0127 Assassinations - .8820 .337“ Coupe d'etat - .3991 .0395 Civil Wars .0103 .1389 * orthogonal factor matrix. Varimax APPENDIX F RELATIONSHIP OF VARIABLES IN WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES The individual countries were examined for relation- ships between the variables throughout the 1952-65 period. The following discussions draw upon political, social. and economic factors to illuminate the shifts in the variable index values. The graphs indicate the index values of each variable for each two-year period which were obtained by the formulas indicated in Chapter 3. ustr' From 1952 through 1965, the rates of social mobili- zation and economic growth were moderate in Austria. An in- crease in the proportion of the population enrolled in higher education during 1956-61 resulted in a higher rate of social mobilization than of economic growth during that period. While not the least industrial country in Europe. Austria ranked well below the Scandinavian countries and other West European countries in per capita income and infant mortality rates during this period. It is interesting to note that the ending of allied occupation in 1955 coincided with these in- creases in social mobilization. 156 157 Except for anti-American demonstrations reported in the 1952-53 data, instability is not reported until 1958-59. This unrest occurred at a time of increasing social mobili- zation and decreasing economic growth. The continued rise in unrest during 1960-61. deepite a decline in the gap be- tween the rates of social mobilization and economic growth, was related to political factors. During this time disunity in the parliamentary elite, manifested in the declining level of institutionalization, may have encouraged demonstrators in their political protests. While instability during 1958-61 was primarily related to political factors, both the socio- economic and institutional changes during this time tended to exacerbate frustration and inhibit institutional protest. Despite the still smaller gap between social mobili- zation and economic growth, economically motivated unrest occurred in 1962-63. Demonstrations and strikes for higher wages. however, may have resulted from a decrease in the rate of economic growth rather than the gap between that and social mobilization. Previous gains in economic growth. rather than social mobilization. may have created expectations of similar gains in the future, expectations which went unmet during 1962-63. ‘ 196h-65 was a period of elite disunity within the ruling coalition. and a consequent decline in the level of institutionalization: instability increased during this time. Again. a political issue rather than an economic one, the Tyrol question. seemed to be the basis of much of the unrest. INDEX VALucs 158 00000000 ‘N61'TU‘10NAL‘zaY‘m '- .- ‘N$TAQ|LITV -- - Ram: or Econowc Gnoum —- MVWON -'°'- RR“ 0P gown. MomuerDN 50 HS ‘10 3S ”J.....O0.0.0.0...000OOIOOOOOOOOCOOOOOCCOOOO0.0.... ....... ....... .............. 25 1C! \5' :o f" . .0 Q .‘.. .’ .o 0‘. 5 \\ .’.- fi’,;’\,_. \‘\ .$.;”-—----"” “w pal- \ ’ ‘.:.-.-' =zfio‘:.o-ooo .-.’.‘.—o‘ ’-O-.-o-O*‘...~ O ~'W"’"°‘ "o. “'52- “5+ \asc- Ms - \460- mm NOW £953 «15‘s :45? MS lam n53 lass FIGURE F1 AUSTRIA: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65 159 As in 1960-61, then, a decline in institutionalization was apparent during a period of politically motivated unrest. This phenomena supports Huntington's belief that weakened institutions are less able to channel political activity in acceptable ways. The Austrian data do not present a clear set of rela- tionships which support or refute Huntington's model. While there is some support for the linking of low institutionali- zation and instability, there is little to suggest the pos- ited relationship between socioeconomic change and instabil- ity. Belgium As in the case of the other members of the Common Market, Belgium is a developed country. Between 1952 and 1965, media exposure, per capita income. and infant mortal- ity rates underwent steady moderate changes. Enrollment in higher education fluctuated from a high of 65 per cent an- nual increase during 1962-63 to a 19 per cent annual decrease during 1964-65. These fluctuations are apparent in the rate of social mobilization. High levels of institutionalization are found in the data for Belgium. However. some declines in institutionali- zation occurred during 1952-65 due to elite disunity and turnover. Numerous instances of unrest are found in the data. This includes demonstrations against government policies ill? WNE in] 160 toward Nazi collaborators in 1953, protests against govern- ment discontinuation of church school subsidies in 195h-55, and Walloon protests in 1960-65 as well as economic pro- tests. The incidents of unrest which occurred during 1952-53 and 195h-55 were not motivated by economic discontent, and the patterns found in the data. i.e. rates of socioeconomic change and levels of institutionalization, during that period are not explained by the relationships posited in the model. Instability did not again occur until 1960-61. In 1960, the losses accrued in the Congo resulted in new econom- ic policies, including increases in taxes and changes in so- cial security programs. These new policies had an eSpecially strong impact in the Walloon region of Belgium and led to pro- test strikes there. The resentment over the regionally felt economic burden later expanded into general ethnic dissatis- faction. The even higher levels of instability found in 1962- 63 indicate the expansion of the ethnic dispute when the pro- posed constitutional reform to alleviate Walloon discontent only resulted in more demonstrations. This dispute continued into 196h-65. The fact that economic policies precipitated the ethnic diapute suggests that there may be a relationship be- tween socioeconomic change and unrest during 1960-65. At least. the rise in the rate of social mobilization tended to increase frustration and discontent and exacerbate existing 161 - ' - -- - - INsTIwnouauzqnou - - - - \Nstasmrv _ .. .. Rm 0.: gem“ (mom-u Remesmm _.u— Rm: 09 Sm|AL MGQLJZAT‘ON I” 35 o L . 01". 3o ooo..?ooo"' I 3 25’ I: ‘. ’° \ n ' '- .‘ g .1 °\ I . \. g 15' : , 3 .’ \ ‘- I '- ’ ‘ \ g .0. \. :I .l \'\.o w 3 ' ’ ' 5 ..’ \ ,. If \ N . 0.. / g ’0 :0 5‘..\ I .—-""\7‘ " -’ :3" ‘N‘ a...” .0/ ?‘\—"’.—‘—-- 3* ‘oA'.’.~:.~o~.~ /. ‘ 0 '~ - M 2 \~., 0 \ -5 a \ -30 1 |q$3 ass '45? 195'! Mm N63 | 65' FIGURE F2 BELGIUM: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65 rn 162 ethnic resentments. The diminished level of institutionali- zation during this period may have increased the likelihood that discontent would be expressed through unrest. The data after 1959, then. seem to have patterns which are consistent with the relationships in the model. Socioeconomic change, however, cannot be related to unrest during 1956-57. The gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth was greater than that in 1960-61: however, no instability occurred. The higher level of institutionalization in 1956-57 may suggest some explana- tion. The instability in 1960-61 occurred after several years of elite disunity and turnover. The resulting decline in trust and faith in the parliamentary institutions may have increased the likelihood that even lower levels of discon- tent would result in instability. Institutionalization seems to be a major factor in determining instability in Belgium. The two factors of socioeconomic change and institu- tionalization seem to be related to unrest as posited by the model. Denmark The data for Denmark show low stable levels of eco- nomic growth, with an extreme jump (1960-61) in an otherwise stable rate of social mobilization. A high level of institu- tionalization was reported between 1952 and 1965 with occa- sional declines due to elite turnover. 163 Only one incident of unrest and no repression was reported. The only case of instability which occurred was the anti-Soviet demonstration at the time of the Hungarian revolt. This demonstration was consistent with the policies of the government and cannot be viewed as an outgrowth of dissatisfaction with the regime. Only during 1960-61 were there sufficient conditions, to suggest that unrest was likely: i.e. the rate of social mobilization was almost ten times greater than that of eco- nomic growth. Despite this phenomenal gap between social A mobilization and economic growth, no instability occurred. The high rate of social mobilization was the result of a tre- mendous increase in higher education enrollment, but appar- ently it did not have the destabilizing affect suggested by Huntington. Probably, the high and fairly stable level of institutionalization enabled the Danish political system to accommodate any political participation due to discontent. Except for 1960-61, the low (and even negative) rates of social mobilization may account for the lack of instabil- ity. In addition. the high level of income and standard of living, over $2,000 per capita by 1965, may inhibit the im- pact of social mobilization on social frustration and polit- ical discontent. If the assumptions about the stabilizing influences of institutionalization and the standard of living are cor- rect, then the data on Denmark are not in conflict with the predictions of the model. lumen Vague: 164 ...... \Ns-rnmmukuzmwou ---- \Ns'mmuw ---— WA“. on ECONOMK‘ Gm“ """Remessmfl —- ..... Rm oe- SOCIAL. MOCIU‘LATIDN Ac 3'5 30 (0 ~l0 i \N —'———-“----—=‘ ‘ b—-‘——-_-"’ ’ OhI-l-I-Iflwp.“.“=I-.-° : ’0 0’. / N52. M $«- Kwa- msc- Hoo- [462- Heu- mm [q s: MS? H 5‘! WM Me's Has FIGURE F3 DENMARK: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65 165 Elalaad Like the other Scandinavian countries. Finland ex- perienced little instability during 1952-65. While the mod- erate rates of social mobilization and economic growth may have limited the impact of socioeconomic change on Finland, the disunity among the elite and the limited coherence of institutions, indicated by a fluctuating level of institu- tionalization, would suggest a limited institutional capac- ity for dealing with frustration and discontent. Throughout the 1950's and the early 1960's two main issues dominated Finnish politics. the economy and Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. The latter problem has had profound implications: for example, the difficulty of find- ing a cabinet strong enough to uphold its policies had been complicated by Soviet attitudes toward various national lead- ers. The leader of the Social Democrats was unacceptable to the Soviet Union: consequently. they were kept out of the cabinet despite the domestic advisability of such a move. The constant reminder of the Soviet Union across the border may have inhibited the Finns from publicizing their frustration and dissatisfactions for fear their neighbor might exploit unrest and instability. The high level of institutionalization and the low rates of social mobilization and economic growth may be the underlying bases of domestic stability. DeSpite the occur- rence of a strike of civil servants for better wages in 1955 166 ~--- RAT: cc Economc 3mm — REPR€$5WN _..... Ran-e or Soon“ Momuza'non 50 ‘IS ‘0 3S m . .."0.0....oeieeeeeeo0"” ..' W ‘5' a 3' > ‘ 3 an .5 K n ..’...-... -.. -. ”I a"‘ .0:- "’¢.-.. \ 5"... oo'- ':.~‘:;:;.:;-” ‘\\—"'—" o 0'. .—0"-°~'-0-. . . o-e-e-e-o-e-e iesz- nsq- :eu- ms'e- \ em :952- Net:- can IQS'S' “is? IQ“ \ 0| l963 ‘96: FIGURE Fl} FINLAND: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65 167 when the rate of economic growth was greater than that of social mobilization. there is little in the Finnish data to suggest whether the model is valid or not. France During the 1950's and early 1960's. France had the greatest change in its institutions and the most frequent instability of all the European countries, in addition to some socioeconomic growth. The rate of economic growth between 1952 and 1965 was moderately low and stable in France, and that of social mobilization steadily increased after 1953 until 196“ when it drOpped to pre-1956 levels. This increase in social mo- bilization is indicative of the growth in educational enroll- ments after 1958. By 1965, France had achieved high levels of media exposure, increased educational opportunities, and a per capita income of $1,732, second only to Luxembourg in the Common Market. The French data also include the greatest shift in the level of institutionalization. The institutions of the Fourth Republic, with limited coherence and autonomy. were replaced by the untried institutions of the Fifth Republic. Thus. the period of institutional change and those years following the change were periods of institutional crisis and weakness. Both the levels of instability and repression exhib- ited increases following the period of institutional decline. 168 From 1952 until 1958, the leaders of the Fourth Re- public were unable to respond adequately to the colonial crises because of continuing disunity both within and be- tween the coalition parties. During this time, unrest oc- curred at a relatively stable level. Figure F5 indicates this trend. In 1958, the Fourth Republic was ended when deGaulle formed a new government and asked for a new constitution. The great drop in the level of institutionalization from 1956-57 to 1958-59 is indicative of this change. The advent of the Fifth Republic resulted in new lows in the level of institutionalization. For example. the new institutions were so untried that institutional adapta- bility was at an all-time low. The new institutional ar- rangement also resulted in a decline in the power of the legislature and the consolidation of both legislative and executive powers in the office of the president, or more pre- cisely, in the person of deGaulle. This shift meant a de- cline in the complexity and autonomy of the institutional framework of government. Finally. the return of deGaulle resulted in an extreme turnover in the governing elite: e.g. many members of the new cabinet had no previous experience as politicians. This resulted in a drop in institutional coherence. While these dramatic institutional changes were tak- ing place, unrest was minimized by the banning of demonstra- 169 tions and the arrest of extremists. However, by 1960, those in Opposition of deGaulle's policy on Algeria rebelled. The period from 1960 through 1962 was filled with insurgencies, demonstrations, acts of terrorism, and assassination at- tempts. While these incidents of unrest were in response to the Algerian policy of deGaulle, limited institutional authority and legitimacy of the new governmental structures increased the likelihood that discontent would result in instability. i.e. non-institutionalized politics. Repres- sion was used during this period to limit. if not prevent, further unrest.' Many rebel leaders. including a number of generals, were arrested: some were executed. In addition. during the most unstable part of the. Algerian crisis, it is interesting to note the increasing gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth. This factor may be related to the outbreak of dem- onstrations for better economic benefits and working envi- ronments by farmers, workers, and even university faculties from 1961 through 196h. As in the case of the anti-deGaulle demonstrations on Algeria, the low level of institutionali- zation of the Fifth Republic only increased the likelihood of unrest. In viewing the French experience in the early years of the Fifth Republic, two main sources of discontent emerge, the Algerian policy of deGaulle and the economic conditions of certain sectors of the economy. In the case of the former 170 le'rrl'tmounuza'nON ----- MVBSIUTV -"- WAT: o: Rome“: GM _' RVR‘”'°N .000_ “an 0; sfiflL ML'I‘M 50 ‘5” 35 Vchs Iwoex I957: Iqsq- my!» use- Meo- nqaz- HEN- NS‘: NS; HS"! [95“! 1%: no: me: FIGURE F5 FRANCE: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65 tiai of 2 occu ofs COun CUrre tions aliza1 my a ‘10» i. and 1965 171 both the levels of institutionalization and of repression were related to the unrest. In the latter, both the level of institutionalization and the gap between social mobili- zation and economic growth were related to unrest. In both cases, relationships suggested in the revised model are con- sistent with the data. West Germany The German Federal Republic underwent total economic recuperation during the 1950's, and by 1965, it was recog- nized as a leading industrial power with increasingly wealthy and educated population. While the per capita income in West Germany, $1,667 by 1965, remained below Scandinavian.levels. it almost doubled between 1950 and 1960. Similarly. substan- tial increases in higher education enrollment, e.g. in excess of 20 per cent annual gains in 1958-59 show the rapid growth occurring. During this time. West Germany had higher rates of social mobilization than did some of the Scandinavian countries. The first case of unrest reported in the data oc- curred in 195h-55 in the form of anti-rearmanent demonstra- tions. These occurred during a period of stable institution- alization and declining social mobilization. due to a tempo- rary decline in higher education enrollments. This situa- tion is not consistent with the model. 0f the instability which was reported between 1952 and 1965, only once did it occur during a period of rising Wi in ru: ens the Smo: tier liti iCall this . liViné 172 social mobilization and declining economic growth. The un- rest which occurred during this time, 1958-59, was directly related to the discussion of reunification and the Oder- Neisse line. While the growing gap between social mobili- zation and economic growth may have added to the frustration felt by the refugee population, who led the demonstrations, it was these discussions which were the primary cause of the demonstrations.- Finally, instability was reported in the data for 1962-65. As in the case of unrest during 195u-55. this oc- curred during a time of declining social mobilization and rising economic growth. While socioeconomic change does not seem related to unrest in the predicted manner, institu- tionalization and repression do. From 1961 through 1965. there were a series of events within the Cabinet and Bundestag which indicated a decline in the level of institutionalization. ‘The end of Adenauer's rule, the gg;,Spiege; affair and the cabinet crisis which ensued, and the resignation of the Minister of Justice when the War Crimes deadline was extended all seemed to test the smooth and efficient workings of the parliamentary institu- tions. It is not surprising that during this time the po- litical institutions were less able to contain discontent. It was during 1962-63 that the only case of econom- ically motivated unrest was reported in the West German data: this unrest involved a strike protesting the low standard of living. Since this protest occurred in a time of declining social does n econom time 0 model. lated and th occur: reache increa tional tUtior repreE 1960—g relatj Perioc bilizi wires. of the 173 social mobilization and gradually rising economic growth. it does not fit the predictions of the model concerning socio- economic changes. However. this unrest did occur during a time of declining institutionalization as predicted by the model. The continued low level of instability in 196h-65 re- lated to the increased tensions over the War Crimes decision and the growth of the alleged neo-Nazi N.P.D. Instability occurred when the level of institutionalization had not yet reached previous highs. While economic conditions maintained increasing rates of economic growth. the level of institu- tionalization may have failed to limit the use of non-insti- tutional channels for expressing political discontent. The apparent relationship between rising levels of repression and declining levels of institutionalization during 1960-65 is an interesting phenomenon in the German data. This relationship may indicate that repression was used during a period of diminished institutionalization to limit the desta- bilizing impact of institutional shifts. The low level of unrest reported during this period may indicate the success of that strategy. The data on West Germany from 1952 through 1965 pre- sents some confusing elements. Socioeconomic change seems unrelated to unrest. institutionalization may be related only in a minimal way. The model does not aid the observer in un- derstanding the instability reported here. ’50 45 ‘IO x. m await) «Got. l0 5*. [Mon VALost 5O 45' ‘IO 17L» eeee ee e ee .NST ‘TQT‘ON‘L‘2“‘\°N - 0 -e - |N$TAB“'\TV -- -- RATE 0:: ECONOWuC GM“ —— Rmessmu —- ...- Rare 0‘: Socufig MtAZR “ON ”1 OOOOOOIOOOOCOOOQOOOOO0.0... OIOOOOOIOOOOOOOOOOO00...... 10 IS IO 54 W52- use- less.- use- Heo- Woz— new use ms:- m": [451 mm mes mar FIGURE F6 WEST GERMANY: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65 1‘. (11 C9! uli Bio: 581‘ With 175 9.119229. Greece was the poorest country in Europe to have functioning parliamentary institutions. By 1965, only For- tugal had a lower per capita income in West EurOpe. Rapid increases in media exposure in 1952-53 which then decreased steadily and the increasing rate of growth of educational enrollment in the 1960's resulted in the fluc- tuating rate of social mobilization between 1952 and 1965. The low rate of economic growth indicates the failure of the Greek economy to achieve a rapidly increasing standard of living. The low level of institutionalization during 1952-65 indicates only moderate levels of institutional complexity and autonomy, and low levels of institutional adaptability and coherence. The declines in institutionalization during 1952-65 indicate further declines in coherence due to elite disunity and turnover. There was a slight increase in insti- tutional adaptability in 196h-65 when the Karamanlis was suc- ceeded by Papandreou as Prime Minister: however. this shift ultimately led to greater divisions within the elite. Both instability and repression occurred only occa- sionally before 1960. However, after 1961, instability in- creased dramatically and repression increased. but to a les- ser extent. At first glance, Greek data is somewhat inconsistent with the model. While unrest broke out in the early 1960's for 9 gap t ‘1 great to t? occur The I dicai tion inst: 61 t} jOF < °nSt1 01‘ t1 Cline anti. ties 176 for economic reasons, it failed to occur in 1952-53 when the gap between social mobilization and economic growth was much greater. The unrest reported in the 1956-57 data was related to the Cyprus crisis. A number of riots and demonstrations occurred in Athens in protest of the British Cyprus policy. The relation of this unrest to a non-economic matter is in- dicated in Figure F7 where the gap between social mobiliza- tion and economic growth actually declined during 1956457. Despite an increasing gap and a decreasing level of institutionalization during 1958-59. it was not until 1960- 61 that economic unrest developed. Similarly, despite a ma- jor drop in the rate of social mobilization during 1962, dem- onstrations against the economic situation continued. Both of these instances may suggest that the develOpment and de- cline of discontent lag behind actual economic conditions. Also during 1962-63, there were a number of major anti-governmental demonstrations after the assassination of Deputy Gregory Lambrakis. This unrest followed a prolonged period of disunity and contention between the political par- ties over the validity of the 1961 General Election. The drOp in the level of institutionalization during 1962-63 indicates this crisis of parliamentary institutions: it was a crisis which continued through 1965 and was accompanied by a steady rise in instability. The increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth in 196h-65 may have intensified discontent. putting increased pressure on the 5 w 3 » mUDJ¢> fiUOZ. 177 e e . e e e e e ‘NST‘T ”T‘ONR‘.‘ 2 “T‘ON - ’ - ‘NS‘. RB|LtTV ”beee:‘eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eeeeeeeeeee.... .0"... ....e ’ 19 3 s 3* G o ‘ee .e' '0. e 5 \ eeeoe.....0' 00.... :452- :454- \956- "153- 1%0- \902- N64- ussa «ass ms: msq He! net ! 10S FIGURE F7 GREECE: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65 polit; betwe‘ ness 1 can b4 sis. onomil put 01 stitu tion 1 repre cate force zatio. allev event tutio zatio bilit 178 political institutions. The lack of a meaningful relation between repression and unrest may be indicative of the weak- ness of institutions. The data on both socioeconomic change and repression can best be understood in the light of the institutional cri- sis. The increasing gap between social mobilization and ec- onomic growth in 196h-65 could have intensified the pressure put on the political institutions. The weakness of the in- stitutions made it extremely unlikely that governmental ac- tion would alleviate discontent. Similarly, the decline in repression during 196h-65, despite growing unrest. may indi- cate the inability of the political institutions to utilize force to prevent unrest. The low level of institutionali- zation. then. left the political system unable either to alleviate discontent or to forcefully prevent unrest and eventually resulted in a take-over of the political insti- tutions by the military. The relationships among the rates of social mobili- zation and economic growth. institutionalization, and insta- bility suggested in the model seem valid in the case of Greece. Icelggg Iceland, also. experienced stability between 1952 and 1965. Since the data indicate high levels of institu- tionalization and low rates of both social mobilization and economic growth. this virtual lack of instability is consis- 50 HS 35 Q. 179 Inflnunouauumeu IN 51'1“:an Rate as Economc (some Remission RAW. 09 Sound Mannie-non 50 a: ‘Io 35‘ 30 g 25 c > x to 8 .2 \S \o s - °’° II- — — — - .. ’ -\ \ fl 1— _. .. .. _ P" -" :‘:..m‘ \ 4‘53” car-1“" ‘°“‘l‘|--&e-e%~£-W. _ ,. \ .‘zl' \/ 2- NS - new 1458- :%O- IQGZ- No"- ‘2553 as? “IS? an («I lees no? FIGURE F8 ICELAND: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65 tent ciety weak to St tende expee duri ceed spai mode mort grow r01] rate is: f fle: era. Repi 180 tent with the model. Iceland cannot be described as a so- ciety undergoing rapid economic modernization or one with weak political institutions. The very high income of Iceland in 1965, second only to Sweden of the 27 European countries studied, may have tended to diminish the impact of other sources of discontent. On the basis of the model. instability would not be T‘ expected in Iceland. The model seems valid in the light of the Icelandic data. i- Ireland Ireland was the poorest nation in northwestern Europe during 1952-65. Its per capita income. $816 in 1965, ex- ceeded that of only three West European countries: Portugal, Spain and Greece. The low rate of economic growth shows the moderate to low increases in income and decreases in infant mortality rates. High and subsequently declining rates of growth of media exposure and later growth in educational en- rollment. up to a 21 per cent annual increase during 1962-63. are indicated by the 1952-53 and 1960-65 moderately high rates of social mobilization. Despite this growth. Ireland is still far outdistanced by her North European neighbors. The stable, high level of institutionalization re- flects the high level of complexity and coherence and mod- erately high levels of adaptability and autonomy of the Irish Republic's political institutions. '15' ’40 B m w 3<> will w ‘0 Xch. 181 ------- - hsTn-unoumtzanon '”"‘ ‘NSTRB‘UTV ---Rmt or Ecnnowc Gama REW€$9°N -m—RA11: 5:: €0¢|fik MO‘tLIZR‘nbN its 40 D...... .............. 0......0... ..............O.... ...O..... ...........................0......... INDEX VALues .10 ~ eee-...-. IO .. '\ 5 "' ..\ ”“ ~~ . — - ~ ~ -- ~ .. .o.’. ./ ~ - -- ~ ...‘ / ‘0’.-. ’0'. A -e e ~.-. \ o -O-I-O-l-O- thsz- 149% MS!» 1458- "'60- '462- Nb"- I'ISB «as: mg) mg. Hb‘ 1463 H6: FIGURE F 9 IRELAND: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65 of 1! ity 5 mode] visic rise that exacq r8po] late: that rela dire Repu of f Zati or f the dic1 ic ‘ inc] 182 Between 1952 and 1965. the data contained low levels of instability and repression. The occurrence of instabil- ity shown in Figure F9 seems to fit the predictions of the model. While the source of the instability which occurred during 1960-65 is not economic discontent but rather the di- vision of Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. the rise in the rate of social mobilization and the decline in that of economic growth probably increased frustrations and exacerbated nationalistic tensions. The repression which is reported was used to prevent border raids in 1956-57 and later. The unchanging level of institutionalization suggests that. in the case of Ireland. political institutions were not related to instability. The fact that most of the unrest was directed at the regime of Northern Ireland rather than the Republic of Ireland tends to support this assumption. While socioeconomic change may have raised the level of frustration and the likelihood of unrest. institutionali- zation does not seem related to instability. The importance of factors beyond the scope of the model are demonstrated in the failure of the data to consistently follow patterns pre- dicted by the model. Italy Italy experienced only moderate rates of socioeconom- ic change between 1952 and 1965. Variations in the rates of increase of enrollment in higher education and. to a lesser exten of so in 19 ucati shift the r to he fest The r in tr ducti data1 Cont] the . ing Much DEri dies the ling 183 extent. of media exposure led to sharply fluctuating rates of social mobilization. The decline in social mobilization in 1958-59 is the result of a 13 per cent annual drop in ed- ucational enrollment during that period. More moderate shifts in income and infant mortality rates are evident in the rate of economic growth. As a functioning parliamentary system. Italy tends to have complex institutions. However. they tend to mani- fest low levels of adaptability. autonomy. and coherence. The high rate of cabinet turnover is shown in the declines in the level of institutionalization in 1952-65. The intro- duction of a left-center coalition in 1962 indicated a rise in the level of institutional adaptability. Instability appeared fairly frequently in the Italian data. peaking during 195h-55 and again during 1960-61. In contrast. only two instances of repression were reported in the data. Much of the instability which occurred in Italy dur- ing 1952-65 does not seem consistent with the revised model. Much of the unrest reported in the 1958-59. 1960-61 and 1962- 63 data was due to international issues. In each of those periods. demonstrations and terrorism were used to express dissatisfaction with the Italian policy on the Tyrol. As in the case of French instability due to the Algerian situation. unrest over disputed territory cannot be directly linked to socioeconomic change. but rather to historical. national. and linguistic differences. gest peri tion was it w as m in G The prec nomi rela Drot ever IPOm time byt rela grew does ellt inSt Stat bili 184 The relationships posited in the revised model sug- gest that the greatest unrest would occur during the 1961-62 period because of the decreased level of institutionaliza- tion and the increased rate of social mobilization. Not only was 1960-61 a time of increasing terrorism over the Tyrol. it was also a time of turnovers and elite disunity as well* as major anti-fascist demonstrations. e.g. a general strike in Genoa protesting the M. S. I. Congress being held there. The cases of instability reported for 1960-61 may have been precipitated by the gap between social mobilization and eco- nomic growth. Only during 1952-53 and 1954-55 was there instability related to economic causes. At that time. there were strikes protesting dismissals and others demanding higher wages. How- ever. since there is a complete reversal in the relationship from 1952-53 to 195h-55. the instability during these two time periods does not seem to follow the patterns suggested by the model. The data on Italy do not contain all of the posited relationships: the rates of social mobilization_and economic growth seem only occasionally related to unrest. repression does not occur in the postulated manner. However. continued elite disunity and lack of coherence within the parliamentary institutions may be an underlying cause of most Italian in- stability: it is interesting that. except in 1958-59. insta- bility is found only in periods which have low levels of 3| 2 2 w U312) KUOZ. 185 ¢ ° ' ° ' " ' INs‘nTu-non Au‘zanon °- ' - "Sultana"? ---- Runs; o: Ecouevuc 6:er REPfl€$$|ON 50 1‘ «o 35 30 W 25 ..... "OeOOeog...eeeeOeeeeeeeue...ee 0"".."e .00... eeeeeeeee ..... 00 U .. . .00 ...... 2 > ZOI z D .. a“ \.. \. e. '0‘. lo \. I "\,. .e e: .A. .‘5 )"~ J .. .. .‘OOC-seO-Ofi SI ’ .'. ‘ s "‘ s .'- ” \ ‘\-—-—--’7’ ~‘fia‘”’- ’.‘.’efih..~.-.ooe—u\. ’0 :e .\.. 0‘ ‘0- . ... w, r/‘r- H. e\. I .\.. lesz- taste W56- use. muo- :qoz- nub HEB RES .157 I454 \em 1463 lQGS' FIGURE F10 ITALY: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 ins1 a ii the pres exp: men“ mobi lizz have is 1 Of; one: to: tic: Wit] in . may 01“] thaq Catj 186 institutionalization. The strength of institutions remains a likely deterrant to unrest. W As in the case of some of the Scandinavian countries. the data on Luxembourg indicate that no instability nor re- pression occurred during 1952-65. However. Luxembourg did experience a phenomenal growth in higher education enroll- ment which is indicated by the an per cent rate of social mobilization in 1962-63. The great gap between social mobi- lization and economic growth which this resulted in would have increased the likelihood of instability. if the model is correct. None occurred! The Luxembourg data also indicate a fairly high level of institutionalization. comparable to that of Norway. Only once in fourteen years did institutionalization decline due to elite disunity. It is possible that this level of institu- tionalization could account for the lack of instability. even with the extremely high rate of social mobilization. Since many students of Luxembourg go to universities in other European countries. the rate of social mobilization may not reflect the actual rate of enrollment in institutions of higher education. While it is impossible to verify. it seems likely that the high rate of social mobilization due to higher edu- cation enrollment would not have had a destabilizing affect «a ’42 3t NI 2 .1- mm “go-C) {.02— ‘II ‘18 187 eeeeeeee ‘R‘T‘rut‘°M&‘z “no" . - .- 'N‘TRGHJ" _...... KAT: of: Some; MemutAfloN ’18 42 ."°. e, \O. 3". .................................................... ,i. ..... 3 ..... b oooooooooo I. ‘1. i \. 1‘! ’5 .' H g 5 >3 n OI " I: . g '2 .A\ o: O. 3 " °. I / ° : '- 3. \ . - 6 / O‘. I °. a... — — -~.‘ ~ e. ' I =. ‘- - I \ 0W I '3 I y’ \ -e °-. ,1 \o. 1' -ll .' \'-. .’ \-’ ~18 nsz- \qsq- nsb- \asa- \Qeo- tqco2- IM- 1153 [455' as? RS“! Hm mas IQGS’ FIGURE F11 LUXEMBOURG: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 “’1 becat sump‘ predi bili: highq fluc medi ment educ Cial els to e Neth Stat One tier nied tier 188 because of the very low levels of enrollment. If this as- sumption is correct. then the data would not follow patterns predicted in the model. Since the composite measure of the rate of social mo- bilization does not reflect the actual changes occurring in higher education enrollment. the model cannot be investigated in a valid manner for the Luxembourg data. Nexherlands Between 1952 and 1965. the Netherlands had a low. but fluctuating. rate of economic growth. Moderate shifts in media exposure and. but for 1960-61. in educational enroll- ment occurred during this period. A dramatic jump in higher education enrollment is indicated in the 1960-61 rate of so- cial mobilization. The data also report moderately high lev- els of institutionalization with declines during 1952-65 due to elite turnover and only limited unrest and repression. As in the case of the Scandinavian countries. the Netherlands' recent history has been remarkably free of in- stability. In the data from 1952 through 1965 there is only one reported instance of instability. The predicted relationships between social mobiliza- tion. economic growth. institutionalization. and instability are not evident in the data. After 1955. there were shifts in the level of institutionalization which were not accompa- nied by any unrest. During 1960-61. when institutionaliza- tion reached its lowest level. the rate of social mobilization 189 ....... 1N9! mmowauza-nou ---.- ‘NSTABHJTV --- RATE 0? ECONONHC (”mama -—— fim’s‘ON ---~-- Rate or Scam Moan-121mm: 50 5 as ’1 :’ \ so :I ‘\ as ............... I \. L oooooooooo 1’ ..... .eeee‘0.. so -' E I \ a 2“ ’ ‘=. \ g 20 I 'z 5 :' \ “5 :I 1 IO 5’ o‘. I ‘\ W51 tesq- use- less lqeo- \qez- NM- NS‘? Mes H57 msq Mm new. mar FIGURE F12 NETHERLANDS: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 190 far exceeded the rate of economic growth. It is during this period that unrest should be most likely: its failure to oc- cur casts doubts on the validity of the model. The only case of unrest reported was during 195h-55. at the time of the Indonesian crisis. The low level of un- rest experienced in the Netherlands at this time contrasts sharply with the French and Belgium domestic crises precipi- tated by the loss of colonial holdings. The high level of institutionalization and the fact that the rate of economic growth was higher than that of social mobilization may have helped to limit discontent and unrest. Throughout the 1952-65 period. it is possible that the Netherlands maintained a sufficiently high level of in- stitutionalization to make discontent less likely to result in instability. It may also be that the Dutch had a much greater threshold of discontent. or that the culture itself mitigated against the use of violent or unstable political activities. In any case. the model is not consistent with the findings of the data on the Netherlands. Norgay The Norwegian data indicate that no instability oc- curred during 1952-65. This lack of instability is accom- panied by low rates of economic growth and social mobiliza- tion. although increases in higher education enrollment ac- count for some rise in social mobilization after 1957. The failure of instability to occur during a time of limited lawn WM! :5 50 20 1S 1 91 as e e eeee 'NStnuTmu‘z “m“ -'-‘- 1N$TRBILIfV ——— (at: or Scones“: (assure —— M$$CON .. ee‘OOOOOOOOOOOeee Coeeeeeeeeeo... ieee eeeeee eleue‘0°°..... 'eeeee I ...~...~eee“.. ‘...‘e. e. .\.°e / ‘~- k‘~ 0.. ——‘ s / ’----_-- h ' ” Iasz- NS‘H- tqse- Msa- \eeo- 1%2- WA- 1119} H55 HS"! H51 1461 1463 was FIGURE F1 3 NORWAY: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 192 socioeconomic change is consistent with the model. While the data on Norway indicate lower levels of institutionalization than those of Iceland or Sweden. the strength of political institutions seems sufficient to ac-. commodate the low level of dissatisfaction resulting from socioeconomic change. Also. the relatively high standard of living. $1.717 per capita income by 1965. probably mini- mized discontent. As in other Scandinavian countries. then. the lack of unrest. high levels of institutionalization. and moderate rates of change found in the data support the predictions of the model. Portu Portugal remained the poorest country in West EurOpe from 1952 through 1965. By 1965. the annual per capita in- come was still only $373. Steady increases in media exposure and fluctuating ones in education resulted in moderately high. but fluctuating. rate of social mobilization. Steady gains in income and uneven declines in the infant mortality rate are reflected in the lower rates of economic growth. The data for Portugal demonstrate a moderately low level of institutionalization. Although the regime dates to preéWorld War II. in 1965 it had yet to undergo a major change in leadership. The centralization of decision-making resulted in low levels of institutional complexity and mod- erately low levels of autonomy. Elite turnover during 1952- 193 65 was indicated by declines in the level of institutionali- zation after 1957. Portugal was one of the two non-communist dictator- ships in Europe during 1952-65. No instability was reported in the data until 1958-59. Until then. institutionalization had remained at a low but constant level and the gap between social mobilization and economic growth fluctuated with the rate of social mobilization remaining higher than that of ec- onomic growth. However. in 1958-59. there was a decline in the level of institutionalization which was maintained through 1962963. From 1958-59 through 196h-65. a period of low institutionali- zation. instances of unrest occur with increasing frequency. Only in 196h-65. when institutionalization increased in lev- el. did instability decline. ' In 1958. presidential elections set off violent dem- onstrations in Lisbon. This was the beginning of a series of anti-regime incidents which were climaxed in 1962 by an attack on a government garrison outside of Lisbon. Student demonstrations and riots were still occurring in 1965. Throughout this unrest. the regime continued to arrest of- fenders and to use force to stop dissent and demonstrations. Instability seems to have occurred in times of high repression and low institutionalization. While the gap be- tween the rates of social mobilization and economic growth does not maintain a patterned relationship with instability. it is interesting to note that the rapid increase in unrest hues-x Venues 50 ‘15 38' 20 194 .00 eeeeee ANS-t ‘wf‘°”fi L‘ZA'nON -e-e - “MEANT? - -- Rare 0‘: Emon\c GROUT“ —— WESS‘ON — ... - RATE: 0:: Sean; MomuzAHON 19:2- msq- nse- tiss- noo- no.2. new m3 use nst use 1%: M53 mes FIGURE F114 PORTUGAL: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 195 during 1962-63 occurred when the size of the gap greatly in- creased. While the main source of discontent was the polit- ical posture of the regime. increasing economic dissatisfac- tion may have exacerbated tensions. The relationships between institutionalization. re- pression. and instability suggested in the model seem to have validity in the case of Portugal. Socioeconomic change does not seem to have a direct relationship with unrest: however. it may act as a contributing factor. Spaaa Spain. like Portugal and Greece. is a relatively un- industrial. poor country. The decreases in infant mortality rates. from 60 per 1000 live births in 1952-5“ to 37.6 in 196h-65. and increases in media exposure. from 46 radios per 1000 inhabitants in 1952-53 to 136 in 1964-65 demonstrate that progress has been made even though Spain is still at a fairly low level of development. ' Coupled with this low level of economic modernization' was low institutionalization. The fact that the regime had not yet had a change in leadership. the lack of independence between government structures and the dominance of certain non-political groups. e.g. the army. resulted in low levels of institutional adaptability. complexity. and autonomy. Al- so. increased disunity within the regime resulted in decreases in coherence during the 1952-65 period. 196 Along with fairly rapid socioeconomic changes and low levels of institutionalization. the data also report high levels of instability. As Figure F15 shows. the gap between social mobili- zation and economic growth remained moderate in size through- out the 1952-65 period. The jumps in the level of instabil- ity are not related to similar increases in the gap between a social mobilization and economic growth. Despite this fact. F“ there were a number of strikes and demonstrations throughout ; this period which protested inadequate economic conditions: A these included demonstrations against inflationary rises in costs in 195#. spontaneous workers' strikes in 1956. and strikes in 196a and 1965 for both better wages and freer unions. The occurrence of economic protest. however. does not seem associated with the gap between social mobilization and economic growth in the data. While instability motivated by economic discontent occurred. the greater part of the instability and repression reported in the data was associated with protests against the regime itself and demands for liberalization. The low level of institutionalization found in the data and the issue of succession after Franco seemed related to the unrest after 1955-57. While Franco attempted to forestall such an institu- tional crisis with his support for the heir to the throne as his apparent successor. repression was also used to keep the 197 e e e e e e e e 'NST “ “T‘ONAL‘1A1‘ON . - . - .NSTGQ‘L‘T ‘l - - '- RATE 0:: Economc Gaston: —" REFRESS‘ON — ---— RAT: or Sousa Mommas-non 50 ‘15 35 20 0.0000000000000000... 'NDEX Vaults: 1492- :esq- \ase— use- new \QbZ‘ HM- 1453 ms: W51 ies-o. 1%: met mes FIGURE F15 SPAIN: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 198 lid on political demands for institutional revision. It is apparent from Figure F15 that after 1959. whenever repression declined. instability rose. The data indicate that repres- sion may have been the only factor which could control in- stability. _ The instability reported in Spain during 1956—65 in- cluded student demonstrations. distribution of leaflets and strikes for greater freedom of unions. 1960-61 also had a number of incidents of protest against government policies concerning the Catalans and the Basques and demanding great- er regional freedom. Both the ”liberal” and regional pro- testers seemed to have been encouraged by the institutional crisis. These protests also increased the likelihood that Franco's disappearance from the scene would initiate a crisis of major proportions. While socioeconomic changes do not seem related to unrest. institutionalization. repression. and unrest seem to be interacting in such a way as to propel Spain into a break- down of authority. legitimacy. and domestic peace. Swedea Both per capita income and standard of living indi- cate that Sweden must be acknowledged the richest country in Europe. The data also show that Sweden has one of the highest levels of institutionalization in Europe. These two factors alone suggest that instability would be at a very low level in Sweden. From 1952 through 1965. no instance of moss VALUEs 199 e e e s e eee .NSTV‘. ““0"“L‘2 ““0“ - . - ’ - ‘N‘tmlerv _ ---RRT€ OF MONK- Gmm * RENE“°N ....... - Rate as Scam. Meantime“ 35 eeeeee.......... ......e-..e000.00e..eeeeeeeeeeeeoeeeeeee F i IS heu- iesq- use- 1453- Moe 1452- met:- 1‘53 1456' 14:? H“ 1‘10: {453 ”55‘. FIGURE F1 6 SWEDEN: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 200 instability is recorded in the Swedish data. It was a period of fairly low rates of social mobilization and economic growth accompanied by high institutionalization. Only after 1955 did the rate of social mobilization exceed 5 per cent an- nually due to accelerated increases in higher education: by 1965. higher education enrollment was increasing in excess of 15 per cent a year. During this 14 year span. the main political issues included both domestic economic matters and defense policies. The two instances of repression reported in the data were arrests of alleged Soviet spies. incidents which illuminate issues of defense and neutrality. It is not possible to link these cases of “repression" with matters of social frustra- tion or economic dissatisfaction. The recent history of Sweden. then. suggests that the model is valid in linking high institutionalization. low socioeconomic change. and domestic stability. Sw tzerl d The Swiss data report limited cases of instability between 1952 and 1965. This period had only moderately low rates of economic growth and social mobilization and high levels of institutionalization. Also during 1952-65. only two cases of repression were reported in the data. The unrest of the early and mid-1950's occurred at a time when the rate of economic growth was greater than that 201’ of social mobilization: 1952-55 was also a time of high and increasing institutionalization. The data for these times do not contain patterns consistent with the model. However. the instability during 1960-63 coincided with an increasing gap between social mobilization and eco- nomic growth. Protest demonstrations by farmers in 1961 were directly related to economic conditions: they were protest- ing the government's agricultural policy which failed to keep prices in line with costs. This unrest also occurred at a time of a slight decline in institutionalization. The insta- bility of 1962-63 was related to the protests of Jura separa- tists who demanded a change in Canton boundaries: terrorist activity by the separatists led to arrests which are shown in the repression of 1962-63. At this time the rate of so- cial mobilization was rising and that of economic growth was declining. possibly suggesting that economic conditions in- tensified Jura dissatisfaction. However. unrest due to Jura separatists continued into 196h-65. a period of an actual de- crease in the level. as well as rate. of social mobilization and an increasing rate of economic growth. While socioeco- nomic conditions do not agree with those which the model sug- gests are the cause of instability. the continuation of un- rest in 196h-65 at a time of declining institutionalization is consistent with the relationship between instability and institutionalization posited in the model. While unrest was directly related to socioeconomic concerns only during 1960-61. the patterns among social '-———_' 114967. Venues 202 as e e e e e e ‘Ns'r‘f WON“ ‘IRT‘ON e- e - \WB‘LWV - — -— Rm 0: Eamon“ Genera —— Wesson — ..._. Rm: OF 500m. MoeIu‘LwnoN SO ‘15 I.“ as P so t - 25 20 15 10 S — - — —~ .e". \..° ”” ~.:3“~.:"" ~~ e ’ rr—,-.-—;~.’v.—...o"' ’"a ‘-'-°N»(—K, — ’ ... 0- e - e- e . ’ . . 0 _—I'—“—"".. M \ 1957' msu- 145‘s- :qya- 101(4)- 1%2- neu- 1453 1‘155' MS? last: lam 1%3 1105 FIGURE F1 7 SWITZERLAND: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 203 mobilization. economic growth. institutionalization. and in- stability found in the Swiss data after 1959 can be viewed as consistent with the predictions of the model. The lack of instability during 1956-57 is also consistent with the model. However. the instability of 1952-55 cannot be ex- plained in view of the model. United Kingdom 1‘.“ The data on the United Kingdom reported low levels of economic growth. extremely high rates of social mobiliza- tion in 1958-61 due to an expansion of higher education en- rollment. moderate levels of instability. and some instances of repression. The data also indicate a high level of in- stitutionalization during this period. Throughout the 1952-65 time period. there were con- tinued disputes over economic conditions which led to strikes. demonstrations. and riots in the United Kingdom. As early as 195#. after some of the post-war economic controls were abolished. strikes for better economic controls occurred in many industries. Again throughout 1958-63 there were demonstrations. strikes. and even rent riots in protest against the lack of economic growth and the stagnant stan- dard of living. The occurrence of these disturbances in a period of low and often declining rates of economic growth and of high social mobilization. 1958-63. is consistent with the model. 20h Political discontent may also have been exacerbated by the gap between social mobilization and economic growth. During 1960 and 1961. ”Ban the Bomb“ rallies and demonstra- tions were a frequent occurrence: also. during 1962. a neo- fascist rally in Trafalgar Square occurred and triggered counter demonstrations. It was these politically motivated activities which often led to the arrests and use of repres- sive tactics reported in the 1960-63 data. Although there were shifts in the level of institu- . tionalization during 1952-65. there is no consistent pattern A relating the level of unrest to that of institutionalization. The turnover and disunity in the leadership displayed in Eden's succession to Churchill. the Suez crisis and the con- sequent replacement of Eden by Macmillan. as well as a cabi- net crisis over the budget in which the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer and his colleagues resigned in 1958 all contributed to the declining level of institutionalization in 1953-58. The later decline. in 1962-63. indicates the disunity and de- cline in coherence which resulted from the exposure of Pro- fumo's indiscretions. Deepite these shifts in the level of institutionalization. Figure F18 does not show any obvious pattern in relating institutionalization to the other vari- ables. The high level of institutionalization of the United Kingdom. with an institutionalization combined rating of 32 or better. may be so high that even a small decline in insti- tutionalization will not decrease the ability of the govern- |NOEX Venue; 205 ius‘rrrunounu‘LA‘rmN """"' IN‘aTfifilL‘TV - — -' Ran-e o: EDMMtC Genet-u RCMSSMON _...._ RATE. OF Scone Mouuaemon '50! «5 4‘0 35. ...... ................ 0e ............................. . ‘; .. ._ ... 30 .I '. I: \’ m: . z -' \ I . no .‘ \ I '-. -' \ F I '. c . I ‘.. '0 3 I \ l Vlfif‘z- HS 4- fish- 11 5‘8- l‘lbo- 1462- 1‘16"- HQ, "155' ms? 1‘: :1 late: 1463 :165' FIGURE F1 8 U.K.: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 206 ment to accommodate political participation and political discontent. Despite the failure to relate social mobilization and economic growth to the 195h-55 instability in the pre- dicted manner. the data on the United Kingdom seem to sup- port the relationship between socioeconomic change and in- stability which is posited in the model. APPENDIX C RELATIONSHIP OF VARIABLES IN EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Each East European. socialist country was examined for the postulated relationships from 1952 through 1965. The shifts in the index values were supplemented with an understanding of political. social and economic factors of this period. The index values themselves were obtained by the formulas for the two-year measurements set forth in Chapter 3. Albania Of all the European countries. least is reported about Albania. This has resulted from a conscious policy of isolation from both western democratic and EurOpean soc- ialist countries. Consequently. there are major limitations to the data on Albania. Information about socioeconomic conditions has been available only occasionally since 1952. Rates of neither social mobilization nor economic growth could be calculated prior to 1956. However. high rates of social mobilization since then indicate rapid growth in both media exposure and higher education enrollment. Similarly. the extremely few cases of repression and unrest reported in 207 208 the data. unusually low compared with other East European countries. raises a question about the validity of the data. The low level of institutionalization during 1952-65 indicates the low levels of adaptability. complexity. and au- tonomy found through the East EurOpean states. As in the case of Bulgaria. the data cannot be ex- plained by the model. This is particularly the case in the 1956-57 and 1960-63 data where extreme gaps between social mobilization and economic growth coincide with continued sta- bility. The levels of institutionalization during those per- iods also do not indicate why unrest failed to occur. Par- ticularly in 1960-61. the drop in institutionalization and the rapid increase in social mobilization make the lack of * instability a glaring ommission. However. the only reported instance of repression in the data. in 1960-61. may help ex- plain the continued stability during this time. A number of Albanian communists were arrested and tried for complicity in a plot against the regime. The fact that any repression was reported may indicate a major governmental crack-down. In general. the lack of other reported instances of repression. and of any instability is probably due to the lack of information about Albania. Consequently. it is most likely that it is impossible to utilize any model in inter- preting domestic politics in Albania since reliable data can- not be found. 209 . ------- |N$T1TUT10NRU2AT\ON .-.- lus‘raamrv —---Rare. 0:: Esouomm Geo-on: RENE-$560“! —----RM’: a: Scam Mfliu‘lfl‘flm ‘50 e ‘-.. i\ as 1" .'\ \o ' ..\ ’10 1 I 15 ‘ 5' \ 1. I ‘ so '\ ,I \, L ’3‘ °\ .’ ‘a a 25 " \ > \ I la : \ é \ I ". ‘5.". \ I ' t 1 p ‘. 1952- qu- less» :ese- Hw— iabz- new- 1‘153 145-5 1451 1‘1 5‘! He: He? mos- FIGURE GI ALBANIA: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 210 Bulgagaa Like many East European countries during 1952-65. Bulgaria had fairly high rates of socioeconomic change and fairly low levels of institutionalization. During 1956-59. the growth of media exposure was very high. reaching over no per cent annual growth in 1956-57. Later on. in 1960-61. rapid increases in higher education enrollment occurred. an annual rate of growth of over 58 per cent. The high rates of growth in media exposure and education enrollment account for the two peaks in the rate of social mobilization in 1956- 57 and 1960-61. The fairly high rate of economic growth dur- ing 1958-61 indicates the steadily accelerating per capita income at that time. The low level of institutionalization indicates the low levels of autonomy. complexity. and adaptability which are typical of the highly centralized. party dominated po- litical systems of East Europe. The level of adaptability increased after Zhivkov became the First Secretary of the par- ty in 195“. Shifts in the level of institutionalization also occurred due to elite disunity and declines in institutional coherence. During 1952-65. both repression and instability were only occasionally reported: both were found in the 1952-53 and the 1962-65 data. When looking for relationships between the variables in the Bulgarian data. it seems questionable whether the data 211 is consistent with the model. Unrest in 1952-53 and 1962-63 were related to economic policies. However. in 1962-63. when data is available. the gap between social mobilization and economic growth was considerably smaller than in periods of stability. i.e. 1956-57. 1960-61. While the rise in re- pression in 1956-57 may have accounted for the lack of un- rest at that time. the stability of 1960-61 is less easily .. explained. particularly since institutionalization declined during that period. is The rapid rate of economic growth between 1956 and 1961 may offer another means of explanation. The unrest in 1962-63 occurred during a period of rapid decline in econom- ic growth. from over 1“ per cent annual growth in 1960-61 to less than 6 per cent in 1962-63. The patterns in the data suggest that a continuing rise in the rate of economic growth may have limited discontent prior to 1962: however. the sharp decline in the rate of growth may have increased doubts that aspirations due to social mobilization. past and present. would be achieved. During 196h-65. unrest occurred which involved an alleged plot against the government by high ranking adminis- tration and military officials. This incident occurred dur- ing a time of stable institutionalization. declining social mobilization. and rising economic growth. The rise in re- pression at this time is an indication of the government ac- tion taken against the conspirators. As in earlier periods. 212 . - INsnwnoueuzAnoel ----- Newt-1W -- -- RATE OF Ecouemc 6000111 RsmafioN ‘—"'- “It 0? 50¢un Wmuzanou 50 q; ‘10 35' .A’. I 1 so I \ a ’5 I ‘ r-. 1 \ g 4° f: \"- : E .5 ooooooooooooooo i ‘0' """"""" 9’ ‘0. ............... a °'°"'-..., .........s---""""°'°'°"’ 1S / \.. I 1 e... \ '\.'° I ’ A\ w I ‘,” \ \ / \ ‘. I I’ \ .Aa d 5 .r”’. \"" ' J ‘5 ’ @52- Iqsq- nsc- ness- mo- tqez- HUI- use my: [es-7 m-q \ nu ma mes- FIGURE G2 BULGARIA : VARIABLE VALUES . 1 952 -6 5 213 the data do not demonstrate the relationships posited in the model. A The data for Bulgaria do not seem consistent with the model. The rate of economic growth seems to be the dom- inant factor related to instability in Bulgaria. Cgechoslavakia Czechoslovakia is one of two East European countries. East Germany being the other. which had achieved fairly high levels of industry and urbanization prior to 1950. The rates of socioeconomic change during 1952-65. then. are based upon different levels of development than are found in other Eur- opean communist countries. The unusually fluctuating rate of social mobilization is based on low rates of growth in media exposure and ex- treme shifts in educational enrollment. The declining rate of economic growth indicates a slowing down and ultimate de- cline in the standard of living. both income and infant mor- tality rates reflecting this decline. The low level of institutionalization found in Czech- oslovakia is due to low levels of institutional autonomy. com- plexity and adaptability. There was a slight rise in the lev- el of institutional adaptability after Gottwald's death and Novotny's succession to power. Elite disunity during the deb Stalinization period and during 1962-63 when there was fre- quent turnover in high positions is indicated by the decline in institutionalization. 21“ Consistent with data for Poland and Hungary. Czech- oslovakia also had instability reported during the de-Stali- nization period. 1953-56. Demonstrations and riots in 1953 occurred during and after major regime reorganization. The change in political leaders. e.g. the trial of Slansky in 1952 and the death of Gottwald in 1953. as well as the on- going reorganization of the party. had resulted in public uncertainty and lower levels of institutionalization. Simi- larly. the instability found in 1956-57 was accompanied by a decline in institutionalization. In contrast to Poland and Hungary. however. the 1956 instability in Czechoslovakia was minor. Nevertheless. the decline in the level of insti- tutionalization in each of these countries seems related to the instability which occurred. Unlike institutionalization. the socioeconomic change occurring in Czechoslovakia was different'from that in other East EurOpean countries: the rate of economic growth steadi- ly declined between 1952 and 1965. This pattern was accom- panied by a sharp rise. and then a decline in the rate of so- cial mobilization in 1962-65. It is particularly during this period that the situation in Czechoslovakia contrasts with the revised model. In 1962-63 the rate of social mobiliza- tion was far greater than that of economic growth. There was also a decline in institutionalization due to elite turnover in both the party and the government. The model would sug- gest that instability should be most likely to occur during ‘l—Al. Incas Venues 215 ' ' ' " " 1Nsn1'unouau'zn'noe: "-'- 1Nsrnatu'rw """"" We": as Ecouowuc Gaels“: @9055sz —°°‘- «are es Seem; Memu‘LA'noN so t 100 :1 '15 .I 1‘ 190 to :’ 1‘ loo , E Ho 35 ; ‘ so : \ :20 ! : e .- \ .. I '. '5' 5 \ 8 as I . 00 " .. °. . < ' . s .0 ea 0 ....o\' ' I" m" .’ ° 3 6°§ t x I ‘ T M ‘\ : - to \ \ \ \L ! \ d ’ an" "" "" "'"'"' '. 3 5' V . \ \ 10 A I x -. ° \ o i ...N T )<,‘o — e—ee -— .\.. : ‘6 “15'2- HS’ - 1‘15'6- 1‘158- “160- 1962- MH- nn as"; 1157 mm new no: user FIGURE G3 CZECHOSLOVAKIA: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 11L..." _..' I 216 this period: it did not. This lack of instability may be explained by increases in the level of repression. The 196h-65 data contains patterns which are not pos- ited by the model. Disturbances over the rising cost of living during 1964-65 broke out at an unlikely time. during a period of increased institutionalization and a greatly de- creased gap between social mobilization and economic growth. However. the instability in 196b-65 coincided with a decline in the level of economic development (e.g. per capita income). This coincidence suggests that a decline in the level of ec- onomic development either can increase the impact of the gap or. independently. can lead to high levels of frustration. The decline in the rate of economic growth may have resulted in fears that sepirations could not be achieved. thus result- ing in social frustration. .The unrest in 196h-65 may have been the result of a decline in the rate of economic growth occurring soon after there were major increases in the rate of social mobilization. Eas: Gegmaay While the German Democratic Republic was a fairly modern country in 1952. the moderately high rates of econom- ic growth indicate that. despite this level of development. the German economy expanded considerably between 1952 and 1965. Although media exposure was extended at moderate rates. education enrollments fluctuated greatly. actually declining 217 in 1962-65. The rapid increases and occasional decreases in enrollment signified the dramatic shifts in the rate of so- cial mobilization. In 1965. the German Democratic Republic.had yet to undergo a major change in leadership. Due to Ulbricht's longevity and power. institutional adaptability remained at a low level. Similarly. institutional autonomy and complex- ity were at low levels due to the over-centralization of the I’M F at”: q I regime and the overwhelming dominance of the party over all other political institutions. Declines in institutional co- A herence. the result of elite disunity and turnover. also were reported during 1952-65. Both instability and repression were reported in the data. While unrest was reported only in the early years of the 1950's. repression was at a low level during 1952-57 and later increased to high levels during 1960-61. As in other East European countries. the de-Stalini- zation years. 1953-56. evidenced greater instability than la- ter years. Extreme measures of repression were used in re- sponse to a popular uprising. 1953 was the year of the East German uprising against the regime: it grew out of strikes occurring in response to new economic quotas and policies. Because of incomplete data. neither the rate of social mobilization nor economic growth can be determined for 1952-53: however. it is known that mas- sive repression was used by the Soviet army to put down the 218 uprising and that the casualty rate was quite high. The only other period with instability found in the data is 1956-57. Student demonstrations in 1956. however. seem more easily explained by the winds of change sweeping through all of Eastern Europe. demanding greater freedom and national control. than by domestic events in East Germany. As Figure G4 indicates. the rate of social mobilization is actually slightly less than that of economic growth. This fact. as well as the unchanged levels of repression and in- stitutionalization. suggest that the 1956 demonstrations re- sulted from factors not included within the model. During the 1960's. a second type of pattern seemed to emerge in East German politics. In 1961 the Berlin wall was erected which effectively cut off the flow of refugees into West Berlin. It is logical to assume that. prior to 1961. many of those dissatisfied.with the regime could ”vote with their feet.” This safety valve tended to inhibit the destabilizing affects of discontent since action other than participating in strikes or demonstrations was available. It may be that economic conditions would be more highly re- lated to refugee flow than to unrest. Since access to the west inhibited instability. the erection of the wall should be related to levels of insta- bility as well. Until 1961. only low levels of repression were reported in East Germany: however. since1961. there has been a significant tightening up of internal control. The data suggest that. after 1960. higher levels of repression 219 e eeeeee 'NsT‘Tm.°Nfl‘-|zfifl°~ -.-.- lmTI‘ILITV ---- Rate or Economc Gee-nu —— Rename: .....- an op seam. Mawmrnw 35' so \0 25 1. . 1 IE \ .' \ » ... . I \ .’ -. . ..................... ’{eeeeeee'eeeeeeeeeeeeeee'eee'ooo...,: ...... \ ... a I: \ : .00: ............... 2 '-. f \ °°°°°°°°° > \ i .5 - 10 -II -2o 1492- :1 W- ‘ HS'b- 1‘15‘0- Hu- 1‘162- Hw- 1‘5‘3 145's NS"? 1134 110: 1463 N6: FIGURE G4 EAST GERMANY: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 220 were used to maintain stability during times of discontent. The use of repression from 1960 through 1965 is quite consistent with the revised model. It increased in 1960-61 as the gap between social mobilization and economic growth reversed and widened and also in 1962-63 when insti- tutionalization dropped. However. when institutionalization increased at a time of declining social mobilization. in 196“- 65. repression also dropped dramatically. It seems as though~ ”Al-“'13” the regime used repression to counteract the destabilizing affects of rapid social mobilization and declines in the lev- el of institutionalization. Prior to 1960-61. when the refugee traffic was halted. socioeconomic change did not seem related to unrest. Since 1960. however. the lack of unrest could be the result of re- pression inhibiting expressions of discontent despite high social mobilization and declining institutionalization. This ‘ would be consistent with the model. Hungary Hungary experienced fluctuatbng rates of socioeconom- ic change between 1952 and 1965. The fluctuations in social mobilization indicate dramatic shifts in education enroll- ment coupled with stable. low increases in media exposure. The uneven rate of economic growth demonstrates the fluctu- ating shifts in the standard of living. The low level of institutionalization is the result of limited institutional adaptability. complexity. and auton- 221 omy. After 1956. there was a slight increase in the level of adaptability as the party underwent its first significant change in leadership after Rakosi and Gero were replaced. Elite turnover and disunity brought about declines in insti- tutional coherence in 195h-55. 1956-57. and 1962-63. Throughout the entire 1h year period. moderate levels of repression occurred. However. only prior to 1958 was in- stability reported in the data. The removal of General Farkas from the Politburo in 1953 signalled the beginning of de-Stalinization: the elite disunity which continued through 1957 was a result of this process. The only unrest reported in the data occurred dur- ing this period. At the times of reported instability. 1952-53 and 1956- 57. the rate of social mobilization was not greater than that of economic growth. Thus. Huntington's view of the impact of socioeconomic change on stability is not supported by these data. However. the institutional crisis occurring throughout East Europe and the continuing decline in the rate of econom- ic growth may have reinforced non-institutional expressions of discontent. The tremendous unrest in 1956 may have been the result of discontent which was building up through 195k- 55. when no instability was reported. The actual decline in higher education enrollments in 195h-55 may have inhibited discontent during those years. only to have a return to past levels of enrollment set off an explosive chain of discontent 222 . . o . o . - 1N3?" UTtON RUZATION s - - - le‘TflB‘UTV - — — RATE OF Emma Gm“: RCVQESSION —eee— RaTt a: $(JAL W8k‘lA-V‘ON ‘10 33 1Noex Venues t; e \ .. 1452- 1451+ F156— Hss- cqoo- 1461- law. 1953 less 19?? :qsq Incl |963 1469 FIGURE G5 HUNGARY: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 223 in a time of institutional uncertainty. The increase in re- pression indicates the increase in arrests of both public officials and active rebels as well as massive Soviet inter- vention. After 1957. unrest failed to occur. even at times of major increases in social mobilization. It seems likely that the resumption of moderate levels of repression and the belief that the Soviet Union would intervene again if condi- tions warranted it inhibited expressions of dissatisfaction. even at times of majdr discontent. While the Hungarian data do not support Huntington's contentions about socioeconomic change. there does seem to be a relationship between institutionalization. repression and instability. Po d Despite a limited level of economic modernity. Poland experienced only moderate rates of social mobilization and economic growth during 1952-65. No major gaps between social mobilization and economic growth occurred during this time. Like its East European neighbors. Poland also had fairly low levels of institutionalization due to the short life and high centralization of the political institutions and the dominance of the party over them. While the consol- idation of power by Gomulka in 1956-57 resulted in a slight rise in institutional adaptability. elite turnover and dis- unity during that period and at other times resulted in de- 224 clines in institutional coherence. Fluctuating levels of repression and instability oc- cur in the data from 1952 through 1965. Between 1952 and 1957 unrest occurred in Poland which could be explained by the relationships posited in the model: however. later cases of instability seem unrelated to econom- ic modernization. Demonstrations and riots broke out in June of 1956: they continued sporadically for most of the last half of the year. The riots in Poznan began as peaceful demonstrations by workers protesting their low standards of living: the dem- onstrations soon spread to other industrial areas. Only after some casualties was order restored. 'Later that year. demon- strations were held in support of the Hungarians. The unrest during 1956-57 occurred during a period of increasing social mobilization and declining economic growth: with the rate of social mobilization becoming somewhat higher than that of economic growth. During this period there was also a decline in the level of institutionalization due to elite turnover. i.e. ma- jor changes in both party and governmental elite. Bierut died. Barman resigned from the Central Committee. several ministers were dismissed or transferred. and Gomulka was re- leased from internment and by August was back on the Central Committee. Since before the rioting broke out. there had been open disunity among the elite with the continued removal 225 of old line Stalinists at all levels of the administration. It was only in 1957 that the results of this change became more apparent and more regulariZed: in particular. the power of the police declined. Since instability in 1956 coincided with a declining level of institutionalization and a growing gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth. the data for that period seems quite consistent with Huntington's mod- el. The use of repression to limit the instability suggests that the regime was unwilling to allow disturbances: but it is interesting to note that many of the workers demands were met. In the following two years. instability did not occur despite an even greater gap between social mobilization and economic growth. During 1958-59. the reassertion of a unified party over other organizations (e.g. workers' councils) was indicated by‘a higher level of institutionalization. It is possible that this increase in institutionalization as well as remembrance of past levels of repression were sufficient- ly inhibiting to prevent further unrest. From 1960 through 1965 a constant level of instabil- ity was maintained. This unrest seems to be unrelated to shifts in social mobilization. economic growth. or institu- tionalization found in the data: consequently. it remains unexplained by the model. Most of the repression during this period was aimed at domination of the Church and of the intel- lectual community. It is probably that the increasing levels MOE: VALUES SO '15 ‘10 35 1‘5 10 15 10 226 . .. lust n uneunuzm-wn _ ._. lN‘eTRBfl-VT v .. .. Rpm: 0F CcoNOMK Geo-on: _ RemesslcN .....- RATE OF Scum Moan-Lancet .\_.....,.\ ’ x 2 - \I ‘ 1‘152- [‘153 lass. mss POLAND I 1454. 1625- 1490- 1962- 145“? 195‘! Ma: HE'S FIGURE G6 VARIABLE VALUES . 1 952 ~65 Maw- 1465 227 of repression in 1962-63 were used to discourage political activities outside of institutional channels during a period of institutional decline. Interestingly. demonstrations oc- curred to protest the state's actions these_only led to fur- ther repression. In the first half of the 1960’s, then, un- rest occurred which was not related to economic factors but as a response to political policies. The source of frustra- tion lay in factors outside the model's consideration. While Poland did not experience extreme rates of so- cial mobilization, the variables suggested by the model do help to interpret unrest in Poland. illegals. From 1952 through 1965. the rate of socioeconomic change fluctuated in Rumania. The data on social mobiliza- tion reflect the extreme expansion of media exposure during 1952-55, over 75 Per cent annual rates of increase in that period. and the fairly high rates of growth of higher educa- tion enrollment during 1960-63, with an 18 per cent annual increase in 1960-61. Between 1952 and 1965, economic growth also continued at moderately high levels with a slight de- cline between 1956 and 1961. Low scores were apparent on a second major variable, institutionalization: these scores slowly increased through the years. As in other East European states, low autonomy and complexity are indicated by the low institutionalization 228 rating. The rising level of institutionalization is the re- sult of increased elite unity, which was particularly low during the 1952-53 purges. and increased adaptability. dem- onstrated by the emergence of new leadership under Georghiu- Dej and his final consolidation of power during 1956-57. Perhaps it is due to the steady rise in the level of institutionalization that little instability is reported in the data. The only instability reported occurred in 1960-61, a period of stable institutionalization, declining repression, increasing social mobilization, and decreasing economic growth. While this instability was related to increasing nationalism among the Hungarian minority. the changing economic situation was likely to have exacerbated tensions. On the basis of the propositions of the model, 1960-61 would be the period most likely to have unrest betweenthe years 1958 and 1965. Hunt- ington's model is of some use in explaining the lack of vio- lence in the early 1960's. Prior to 1958, however, the model seems inapprOpriate, less able to explain the data. Perhaps the lack of instabil- ity during 1956-57. which had similar socioeconomic change to that in 1960-61. may be the result of a rising level of insti- tutionalization. However, the gap between the rates of so- cial mobilization and economic growth during 195h-55 exceeds that of 1960-61. Similarly. the level of institutionaliza- tion was also lower than in later years. The repression which occurred from 1952 through 1955 VALOES 'NDEK . . . .. msrwu'non AuzemON 229 ...... Ins-mauve --- - RM: 06? EcoNonm GROW-a -— Remessuou —eee- Rafa OF $CJKK MOB‘L'ZM‘ON F" BO ‘05 ‘IO ‘0 39 °\. ‘. x ‘. \ *5 '-. \O 20 \. .. .\.O'Ooooooooo00.000000.I.eeooooeoooeooooooooooooo0.0.0. ° ‘5 .............o°"... .- .oee \. \ '5 o. ' \ i ‘ 0., ‘6 5‘- ' .0. I ‘0 ~ ‘~ \ \. ./ ”—" q. \\ a. ’ - e ”’ 5 \\ \g” ..A- ~’ \/ ' I .’e~ .-.~ 0 bo-e-e-e-o-e .-‘.~..O ’ .~M 0., N52 - \QSH - use» Ifiss- moo - mez— I453 Hss W57 W54 mm He's FIGURE G7 RUMANIA: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65 23o involved not only arrests of former leaders, but also arrests of alleged sabateurs, the deportation of thousands. and a continuing anti-Semetic campaign. The introduction of re- pression as a factor into the model increases its userlness in interpreting that period. The revised model, then. helps to explain the limited instability in Rumania. U. S . R. The Soviet Union is the dominant European power, and like Yugoslavia and Albania. it is one of the few communist countries which is not heavily dominated by an outside power. Throughout the 1952-65 period. the Soviet Union maintained fairly low levels of institutionalization due to a lack of institutional autonomy, limited complexity and coherence, and moderate adaptability. The disunity apparent in the elite after Stalin's death resulted in further declines in insti- tutionalization both in 1956-57 and 1960-63. Increases in re- pression are also noticeable during the 1960-63 period. Socioeconomic change was also occurring during this time. Rapid increases in media exposure. for example. a tripling of radios in the Soviet Union between 1952 and 1965. and higher education enrollment are indicated by the moderate- ly high rate of social mobilization. A declining. yet posi- tive, rate of growth of per capita income and an uneven rate of decline of infant mortality rates is shown in a declining rate of economic growth. 231 The Soviet Union is interesting. not because of the correlation between instability and the gaps between social mobilization and economic growth. but because of the appar- ent use of repression to prevent unrest. The instability which is found in the data is re- ported for only 1956-57 and 1958-59 and seems unrelated to economic change. At least in part, the instability was a result of the crisis of de-Stalinization. For example, this unrest includes demonstrations in 1956 by students loyal to Stalin. However. the lack of instability during 1962-63. a time of rapid social mobilization, declining economic growth. and low institutionalization. may be explained by the high level of repression which occurred. After 1959. there were increasing arrests of both dissenting intellectuals and eco- nomic exploiters. e.g. black marketeers. The regime seemed to be forcefully imposing its authority over "liberalizing" elements. The data suggest that the level of institutionaliza- tion may be the key factor in determining the likelihood of instability. The de-Stalinization of the mid- and late-1950's threatened the authority and legitimacy of the party: the un- rest during this period seems to be directly related to the decline in the level of institutionalization. When institu- tionalization again declined in the early 1960's. a concomi- tant increase in repression seemed to limit instability. INDEX Venues 232 ee 0 e o e co .Nsr ITUT‘ONKL‘ZRT‘m -'- ’ - INSTAGlLt TY -—- RATE or Emma GROUT“ -— REPREbeION -eee-OCRAT‘E 0" Soc.“ MoaL|zATDN 50 HS ’40 35 30 2.5 20 ‘S’ 0000 e 0... :IO . I’ \\ I \O ’I \ . I \ ’ \ '~ '3' ..’.. '00 ‘ ...fl' \““"0.”’ \\ S \ . .’o-e-e-o-e~ . Obe-e-e-e"A ’ v ~.‘0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0‘ "52‘ HS‘I- HSG- HS‘O- [900* I461- I‘lb‘b Ifl93 less use? IQSQ (so: lacs uses" FIGURE G8 U.S.S.R.: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 233 While economic change may not be a factor in deter- mining Soviet unrest, both institutionalization and repres- sion seem to be related to instability in the U.S.S.R. be- tween 1952 and 1965 and may account for the lack of insta- bility during periods of increased socioeconomic change. Yugoslavig Since 195a, Yugoslavia has undergone rapid increases in media exposure and occasionally of rapid expansions in higher education enrollment. These increases are manifested in a fluctuating, sometimes moderately high. rate of social mobilization. The more moderate rate of economic growth be- tween 1952 and 1965 indicates the limited changes in per cap- ita income and the infant mortality rate. By 1965, however. Yugoslavia could not be considered a ”modern" country by Eur- opean standards. For example, the Yuglslav infant mortality rate was over 70 per 1000 live births in 1965. three times greater than that of the U.K.. over twice that of Spain. and only exceeded by that of Albania. Similarly, by 1961 only Albania, Greece. Portugal, and Spain had fewer radios per inhabitants. Coupled with the low but rising standard of living was a low level of institutionalization. The continuation of Tito in power had postponed the first major crisis of adaptability. The maintenance of dominance of the League of Communists is manifested in a moderately low level of 2 an institutional autonomy and complexity. Elite disunity dur- ing 1952-65 also accounted for declines in the level of in- stitutionalization. The ousters and arrests of Djilas and his defended Dedijer during 195h-55 were cases which partic- ularly threatened the unity of the elite and, consequently, led to a decline in institutional coherence. From 1952 through 1965, Yugoslavia experienced mod- erate levels of instability. As Figure G9 shows, the rate' of economic growth and the level of instability followed very similar patterns in the Yugoslav data. While this is an_in- teresting phenomenOn. it is the relationship of the gap be- tween the rates of economic growth and social mobilization to instability which is at the core of the model. On the basis of the predictions of the model. insta- bility most likely should occur during 195h-55, 1958-59. and 1960-61. It would be least likely during 1962-63 and 1964-65. Figure G9 indicates somewhat inconsistent results. The in- stability which occurred during 1958-61 does coincide with high rates of social mobilization and significantly lower rates of economic growth. The slight decline in the level of institutionalization during 1958-59 may also account for the highest level of instability between 1952 and 1965 even when other periods had greater socioeconomic changes. However. the lack of instability during 195h-55 followed by instabil- ity during 1956-57 when both the gap between social mobiliza- tion and economic growth was smaller and the level of insti- lNosx VALUES 50 He ’40 235 e o e 00.00. leT ‘T UT‘ON AL‘2M\°N - 0 -0 ‘NSTABlL‘TV - -- Rare a: Ecoummc Cams —- Remesuou -'-'- RATE 0? Soon; Wmu‘znflou ....oeoooeoo':ooooooee...... ‘5 '\ .- '°. I“ 2- \4 54- HS!» - uqse- neo- Haz- [16H- Ms'z |q55 HS"? mm mm I‘M-'5 Hos FIGURE G9 YUGOSLAVIA: VARIABLE VALUES. 1952-65 236 tutionalization was higher is quite inconsistent with Hunt- ington's model. The data on repression do not explain this inconsistency since level of repression was stable during these two periods. . However, the demonstration reported in 1956-57 was related to the Hungarian Revolt and did not challenge regime policy. The instability reported in the data of 1956-57. then, was the result of a factor, i.e. Soviet intervention in East Europe, which is not included in the model and did not indicate dissatisfaction in the Yugoslav regime. Similarly, the outbreaks of instability reported dur- ing 196u-65 were the result of Croat separatists. Unlike the instability during 1958-61, this unrest was the result of in- creasing nationalism and ethnic disharmony and coincided with a decreasing gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth. This ethnic unrest. unlike that of 1956, is consistent with the patterns predicted by the model. The lack of instability during 195h-55, however. is more difficult to explain. The similarity in the conditions of 195h-55 and 1958-59 suggest that random factors may have accounted for the occurrence of unrest at one time and not at another. A consideration of the level of repression does not illuminate this paradox. At best. the model permits only limited insights into the events in Yugoslavia. "'mummymmmmgmr‘