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Socioeconomic Modernization,
Political Institutionalization
and Instability
in European Politics

presented by

Elizabeth Ann Kelley

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Frank A. Pinner
Major professor

Date June 13, 1972

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ABSTRACT

SOCIOECONOMIC MODERNIZATION
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND INSTABILITY
IN EUROPEAN POLITICS

By

Elizabeth Ann Kelley

Several models of instability have been proposed in the literature of political science; however, few have been applied to post-war European political systems. This application of instability models to Europe should help both to clarify the validity of the model and to illuminate the instability which has been found in Europe.

One recurrent theme appearing throughout the literature on instability suggests that political unrest is the product of discontent which occurs when members of society fail to attain their expectations. While theorists differ on the source of these expectations, there is agreement that expectations shift dramatically during the process of modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. When these changes occur rapidly, expectations may diverge from actual achievements to a greater extent and discontent is more likely to emerge.

Samuel Huntington[1] asserts that economic modernization is a dualistic process which both raises social expectations through social mobilization and raises the capacity of the society to meet new expectations through economic growth.

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Elizabeth Ann Kelley

The gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic development is a determinant of political instability. Both political institutions and repression can be viewed as political variables which limit the destabilizing impact of the developmental gap.

Correlational analysis of twenty-seven European societies fails to indicate patterns predicted by Huntington and others. In contrast to the predictions posited in the model repression is positively associated with instability. The introduction of the levels of socioeconomic development into the analysis increases the degree of comparability of the rates of social mobilization and economic growth occurring at different levels of development. Negative relationships linking both institutionalization and the rate of economic growth to political stability are revealed by the extended analysis, while both the rate of social mobilization and economic growth and the developmental gap are positively, although weakly, associated with instability.

The scope of the analysis is also extended by an examination of individual European countries. While repression seems often to be used to end ongoing unrest, it also seems to prevent unrest in many cases. Consequently, repression is a useful addition to Huntington's model when examining an individual political system. In the less developed European societies, the gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth is positively related to political

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instability when political institutionalization and repression are held constant. The investigation of twenty-seven European societies indicates that the rate of socioeconomic change has an impact on political stability only if a society has not yet achieved a high level of modernization.

The introduction of the concept of a theshold of modernization clarifies some of the discrepancies found in the data of several West European societies. Most of the East European countries and a number of West European countries fall below that threshold; in these cases, Huntington's model, with the addition of repression, is an effective tool for understanding and predicting political instability.

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[1]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

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SOCIOECONOMIC MODERNIZATION, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND INSTABILITY IN EUROPEAN POLITICS

By

Elizabeth Ann Kelley

A THESIS

Submitted to
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in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

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Several people have given me assistance and even inspiration in undertaking this task. Frank A. Pinner, John N. Collins, and David V. J. Bell all helped clarify many logical and analytical questions related to political instability. Their comments and support were invaluable.

James C. Work gave both his time and advice when he was as busy as I. Darlene Heckenlaible, a long-suffering friend, not only typed this work but tolerated my varied moods.

Finally, I would like to thank my father for always supporting me in this often grueling undertaking.

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INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, political unrest and instability have become regular features of politics in many areas. In response to this phenomenon, political scientists have recently begun to shift some of their attention to the phenomenon of political instability and its role in the political system, producing a broader view of political behavior and processes and ultimately a more sophisticated understanding of politics, particularly in the context of change.

To achieve this broader view, theorists of instability must accept the challenge of recognizing and understanding the processes of instability in a variety of national settings. Most current models of instability cited in the literature utilize cross-national correlational analysis; this approach, however, does not approach the insights that can be drawn from a more intense study of the same model in a number of contexts.

Likewise, theories of instability have often been ignored in the analysis of contemporary European politics even though instability has frequently evidenced itself in their political systems. The purpose of this study, then, is to examine how effectively a model of instability can be utilized

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in achieving a more comprehensive study of many political systems which share only certain characteristics. In this process, the writer hopes to gain a better understanding of the influence of instability in European politics.

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CHAPTER 1

THE MODEL

Political theorists have made extensive inquiries into the nature of change and instability as it relates to the political system. However, when these theories are to be developed into a meaningful model which can be used in many different situations, additional criteria must be added to evaluate the model.

First, the precision and adaptability of any model depends on how well the variables are linked together in useful and predictive relationships. It is the writer's intent in this study to delineate a model which can interpret the impact of socioeconomic change on politics, necessitating a model which incorporates both socioeconomic and political variables.

Therefore, a useful model of change must clearly defind the relationship between socioeconomic change and political variables, i.e. the specific relationships between change in one variable and change in the others. Both the direction and rate of change contribute needed information to understand the interaction between socioeconomic change and political processes and institutions.

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Impact of Socioeconomic Modernization

Only a few theorists have attempted to link the impact of socioeconomic modernization on political stability into a comprehensive model of change. Huntington's theory linking modernization, institutionalization, and instability is one such model. (Huntington, 1968) In his model, it is the relationship between the rates of change of specific components of socioeconomic modernization (i.e. social mobilization and economic growth) that constitutes the primary determinant of political instability due to socioeconomic modernization.

Huntington views socioeconomic modernization as a dual process having two main effects on the political system. It increases frustrations which lead to political demands, and, at the same time, it increases the productivity of society which may help alleviate those frustrations and help decrease political demands. These two processes are defined as social mobilization and economic development.[1]

Because the process of social mobilization results in the creation of new views and expectations about the world, it puts increased pressure on the existing political process. Economic development, on the other hand, increases the capacity of society to meet the needs of expectations of its members.

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[1]Economic development and economic growth will be used interchangeably throughout this work to denote the same process.

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Deutsch defines social mobilization as a process of breaking down traditional commitments, making individuals available for new social, economic, and political modes of behavior. (Deutsch, 1961, p. 494) As Cutright (1963), McCrone and Cnudde (1967), and Lerner (1965) have demonstrated, this process tends to originate with urbanization and is followed by increases in literacy, mass media exposure, and levels of political participation.

Urbanization ranks highest in importance of all the component processes of economic modernization. Large numbers of individuals leave their traditional villages and countryside and move to cities, usually in search of more profitable means of support. As large numbers of people move to the city widespread literacy, media exposure, and industrialization occur. Uprooted from his family and friends, the individual feels removed from the security of traditional roles he has always performed as he is exposed to a more complex world and alternate life styles. The traditional roles which the non-urban individual fulfilled become inappropriate in an urban setting; relationships which defined his life space in the countryside no longer apply to him. Particularly, the removal of the individual from the extended family forces him to seek new social and economic relationships which will replace the old ones.

Once in the urban setting, removed from traditional ties, the individual encounters a larger, more heterogeneous

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world through personal contact and mass media. The radio, movies, television, and newspapers expose the individual to life styles and standards of living different from his own. As Lerner contends, he learns to have empathy for other ways of living, especially to identify with more modern life styles.

Studies have shown increases in literacy and education after a rise in urbanization. The educational process gives the individual not only a set of skills, but also a set of attitudes and expectations. As the individual is exposed to schooling, there is a rise in his expectations with respect to his life style, occupation, and income; he also expects to be better rewarded simply because he has better skills. Therefore, the individual expects to have a greater number and a better variety of opportunities available to him, socially and economically.

Just as urbanization, education, and communications mobilize the individual into "modern" roles, economic growth mobilizes resources into more efficient patterns of production. As a society becomes increasingly industrial it both produces greater quantities of goods which will be available to the population and provides a greater number and a greater diversity of jobs for the urban dweller. During industrialization the individual is introduced to less personal, more efficient work roles and to social contact with other workers. While urbanizing starts the process of breaking away from traditional life, industrialization begins to

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integrate the mobilized individual into modern life. It provides opportunities for mobility which meet newly acquired expectations, and it introduces the individual to new roles and relationships.

The process of industrialization brings about improvements in the standard of living. For example, two changes associated with economic development are general increases in per capita income and in life expectancy. Some of the new expectations due to social mobilization are met by improvements in income, life expectancy, and occupational mobility. If the rate of economic growth can keep pace with the rate of social mobilization, frustration will be minimized since the mobility and productivity due to economic growth will help to meet the new aspirations resulting from social mobilization.

In summary, while the process of economic modernization leads to increases in social, economic, and political demands, it also leads to greater opportunities for meeting those challenges through economic growth. However, if economic growth is inadequate to meet the expectations of the rapidly modernizing population, frustration will increase.

While Huntington asserts that social frustration is determined by the rates of social mobilization and economic development, he suggests that the rate of growth of mobility opportunities determines the likelihood that social frustration will result in political participation. Expanding opportunities due to geographic or occupational mobility

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increases the likelihood that the urban educated individual will be able to fulfill his social and economic aspirations and, consequently, to decrease his frustration.

However, if social frustration is at a high level, due to low rates of economic development and growth in opportunities coupled with high rates of social mobilization, high levels of political participation will occur. At this point in the development of his model, Huntington introduces two political variables, political institutionalization and political instability, which are related to the political effect of socioeconomic change.

Institutionalization

Huntington views political institutions as those structures and processes which make and implement authoritative decisions. These institutions contribute to the functional effectiveness as well as the legitimacy of the political system.

Political instability is a manifestation of the failure of popular acceptance of political institutions, i.e. legitimacy. It results in the channeling of political activity into organizations and procedures which are not part of the "authoritative decision-making process." Existing political institutions are not able to monopolize political activity since part of the political community does not accept them as the proper organizations and procedures for maintaining order and making decisions.

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Huntington suggests four dimensions which determine the effectiveness of political institutions and their acceptance by the community. The four dimensions, or factors, of institutionalization are 1) adaptability, 2) complexity, 3) autonomy, and 4) coherence. (Huntington, 1968, p. 12) As the complexity of society increases, the degree of institutionalization necessary for a stable and accepted political process increases; the political system requires higher levels of each of these characteristics.

Adaptability

The adaptability of the political institutions hinges on their ability to maintain continuity and effective operations despite the change of incumbents or of environmental circumstances. Unless the institutions are able to adapt to new circumstances, they will tend to be fundamentally altered or destroyed in time. For example, the monarchy in Great Britian is an adaptable institution which has accepted different functions in British society over a long period of time. At one time the most powerful political institution in Britian, it currently symbolizes the nation and political authority. In comparison, the French monarchy, unable to adapt successfully to the changing political world around it, ended its institutional life and that of other institutions firmly tied to it. French Republics also have faced similar crises of adaptability. In the Fourth Republic, when colonial

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demands for independence surpassed the Republic's ability to institutionally handle the conflicting interests generated, it was replaced by a highly personalized regime.

Huntington suggests three main indicators of institutional adaptability: chronological age, generational age, and functional adaption. Since survival itself means successful coping with the environment, the age of an institution reflects the success that it has had in adapting to the environment. Generally speaking, as the age of an institution increases, both the habit of using it and its standing as a continuing institution is increased.

The issues of generational age and functional adaption are both part of the larger question of chronological age. Generational age involves the ability of institutions to continue as the incumbents change and reflects the degree to which institutions have a life of their own rather than being an extension of a personality or event. For example, the failure of the R. P. F. to continue when deGaulle renounced political life in the late 1940's is an indication of a weak institution.

The issue of generational age goes beyond this question of a simple change of incumbents to a consideration of how well an institution survives the change in leadership based on one kind of formative experiences to another with other formative experiences. For example, this type of change can be seen in the shift in the U. S. S. R. from a leadership which developed during the Revolution to one

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which developed during the period of rapid industrialization. The ability of an institution to survive such a fundamental change reflects a strength and stability which extends beyond the personal power and charisma of those creating the institutions. The institutions of the Fifth Republic of France and of Yugoslavia have to face this issue. The successful continuation of Fifth Republic politics under Pompidou, thus far, indicates a degree of institutional strength in France. In Yugoslavia, however, only after Tito and his war-time cohorts pass from the scene will the institutional ability of Yugoslavia to adapt to generational changes be known. If Yugoslavia survives these changes, not only would this indicate a degree of strength of institutions but the experience itself would also increase the ability of the institutions to survive other generational changes.

The ability of an institution to survive changes in its function is another aspect of adaptability. To the extent that institutions can continue to function in a changing world, they demonstrate a strength, stability, and effectiveness which extends beyond particular situations. Functional adaptability enables an institution to continue to exist over long periods of time; its continued effectiveness with different functions tends to reinforce the community's habit to support and utilize the institution.

The degree to which institutions can adapt to changing times, generations, and functions are important indicators of their level of institutionalization. Institutional

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adaptability leads to the continuation of an effective institution which tends to reinforce continued use of those institutions. For example, the U.N.R./U.D.R. in the French Fifth Republic may well be showing such adaptability since it has survived a generational change in leadership. No longer deGaulle's party, the ability of the party to adapt to a less personalized function and to reflect a more responsive political program indicates the level of institutional strength and stability of the party.

Complexity

A second dimension of institutionalization suggested by Huntington is that of complexity. As an organization creates more and a greater variety of sub-units, its ability to secure and maintain the loyalty of members increases since individuals are able to find a place within the institution. By working in an organization, individuals identify more strongly with it, thus increasing their willingness to maintain that institution. Thus, a complex organization also indicates a higher level of institutional loyalty and strength.

Aside from the question of institutional support, increasing institutional complexity is a determinant of increasing functional adaptability. Organizational complexity enables the institution to divide labor in an efficient and productive way. For example, separate structures for teaching, brainstorming, publishing, accounting, etc. make a university a more efficient organization which can take on new

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functions. In government, having separate bureaucratic, police and judiciary structures is an efficient way of channeling and resolving problems and of administering political decisions. As the environment increases the complexity of the tasks facing the organization, complexity within the organization is increasingly necessary for functional survival.

Thus, organizational complexity enables an institution to meet the needs of large and diverse numbers of members and maintain broader support for the institution. It also increases the probability that an institution can functionally adapt to rapid and complex changes. Thus, complexity is another manifestation of a high level of institutionalization of organizations in a heterogeneous society.

Autonomy

The third dimension of institutionalization suggested by Huntington is that of autonomy. The extent of institutional autonomy is the extent to which organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and patterns of behavior. (Huntington, 1968, p. 20) A high level of political institutionalization would be manifested in a society where political activity and political structures could be easily identified as being political, rather than religious or economic. The existence of associational interest groups, political parties, or electoral campaigns would be indicative of these kinds of autonomous

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political structures or modes of behavior because they differ from non-political groups and procedures. Other political structures such as the civil service, the military, or the police can be viewed as independent and insulated from non-political life.

The question of the autonomy of political institutions is particularly relevant to the incorporation of new groups into the political process. In political systems with only limited autonomy from non-political structures and activity, major political groups can gain power without having established loyalty to existing political institutions. However, if autonomous political institutions do exist, the entry of new groups into the political process can be limited to those institutions, and continuity will be achieved by the institutional socialization process which rewards only those who accept and support the institutional basis of political life.

Autonomy, then, is also an important dimension of institutionalization. It manifests an institutional strength and stability which encourages new groups to support and identify with these institutions since they are the sole channels of meaningful political behavior.

Coherence

Finally, the last aspect of institutionalization cited is coherence, the existence of a consensus on the functional boundaries of the groups and procedures involved in

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maintaining order and resolving disputes. The separation of the political from the non-political sphere, institutional autonomy, is related to the development of this consensus in the political community of what constitutes legitimate political activity. The concept of coherence includes more than boundaries which keep them distinct from non-political institutions, for it also reflects the degree of coordination, discipline, and unity within these boundaries. Incumbents holding positions in a coherent political institution will act in ways which maintain that coordination and unity. Such institutions should manifest high levels of morale and loyalty in which incumbents identify with and act to maintain the interdependence of the institutional framework.

A system with coherent political institutions, then, is one which maintains itself through coordination, unity, discipline, and morale. As complexity increases, coherence becomes increasingly important for it is like the cement which holds the system together. For instance, the rules of the House of Commons tend to reflect this type of coherence. A high degree of discipline and coordination between back benchers and the party leaders as well as between the parties, make it an effective legislature, particularly in comparison with the Italian Chamber of Deputies or the French National Assembly (or perhaps even the American Senate) where the deputies often are neither unified nor coordinated within or between parties. This absence of parliamentary coherence leads to a decline in institutional capabilities

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and institutional loyalties. A failure of coherence is a failure of institutional solidarity which ultimately exacts its cost in terms of effectiveness and support. This, in turn, ultimately leads to a weakening of institutional stability.

High turnover of incumbents is closely associated with the lack of unity, discipline, and, possibly, coordination. Institutions with a high turnover rate consequently have more limited socialization periods. Thus, a failure of unity and discipline may result in a failure of the socialization of the elite and a further weakening of institutional strength.

The Huntington Model

In his discussion, Huntington has suggested that strong, stable institutions are effective both at fulfilling political functions and at building and maintaining loyalty within the ranks of the politically active. Both institutional effectiveness and legitimacy are discussed in relation to adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. His own discussion implies that legitimacy is the result of effective and rewarding political institutions. For example, in the discussion of the four characteristics of institutions, the growth of loyalty to institutions is the result of political rewards available only through institutional participation, i.e. political positions, prestige, and power,

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Huntington, thus, considers political institutions to be essential to the development of legitimacy and, ultimately, to political stability. The acceptance of the existing political institutions as the proper avenues for political activity insures that groups will not channel their activities outside of the accepted institutions. Conversely, if political institutions are ineffective at rewarding the politically active, support for those institutions will be unlikely to develop, and political activity will not be limited to those institutions. Instability is likely to result.

Huntington's model has importance because it combines his interpretation of the political impact of socioeconomic modernization with that of political institutionalization in his analysis of social change and political instability. The rates of social mobilization, economic development, and mobility opportunities only indirectly contribute to political instability. According to Huntington, rising frustration culminates in increasing levels of political activity. Unable to achieve demands for new opportunities and life styles, urban groups increasingly seek political solutions to their plight. However, it is the institutional capacity to reward and socialize these groups which determines the extent to which political participation will be channeled through the accepted institutional organizations and procedures; i.e. the extent of political stability.

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The political impact of socioeconomic modernization can be predicted only when the capacity of political institutions to accommodate participation is known. The interrelationship of the variables has been stated in the form of three ratios:

$$\frac{\text{Social Mobilization}}{\text{Economic Development}} = \text{Social Frustration}$$

$$\frac{\text{Social Frustration}}{\text{Mobility Opportunities}} = \text{Political Participation}$$

$$\frac{\text{Political Participation}}{\text{Political Institutionalization}} = \text{Political Instability}$$

Revisions of the Model

Among both theorists of modernization and of political instability, Huntington's approach is valued for its innovation and for the theoretical contribution it represents. However, the model poses several limitations for empirical analysis. Thus, three alterations were made to increase the precision of the model without changing the main relationships suggested by Huntington.

First, the model explains only the participation and instability that results from social mobilization with the result that instability originating from other sources of social frustration, e.g. communal cleavages, cannot be predicted. The use of equations as a means of expressing the model was deemed inappropriate since they indicate social frustration as a function of social mobilization exclusively.

Similarly, the occurrence of mobilization without concurrent economic growth renders the model meaningless.

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i.e. infinite frustration is predicted. If social mobilization due to economic modernization is not occurring, the equations indicate that no political participation will occur. While the equations do manifest characteristics of the relationships discussed by Huntington (particularly the impact of rate of social mobilization as compared to economic development on the development of frustration), they are not accurate representations of those relationships. Huntington could have more accurately expressed his model in a non-ratio form.



However, Huntington views socioeconomic change as the primary source of instability. Mobility opportunities and political institutionalization are variables which mitigate its impact. Thus, the model might be better expressed in a form which maintains the primary causal relationship. This model is stated below:

Rate of Social Mobilization - Rate of Economic Development = Social Frustration

Social Frustration - Mobility Opportunities = Political Participation

Political Participation - Political Institutionalization = Political Instability

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Second, the model is hampered by mutual interdependence among the socioeconomic variables.

Huntington's conceptualization of mobility opportunities is linked to social mobilization and economic development. He views mobility opportunities, in part, as a process of expanding opportunities in occupational and geographical mobility which are related to economic modernization. The general process of social mobilization tends to increase individual acceptance of mobility, both geographic and social. Urbanization itself is an important example of geographic mobility since it is a process during which the individual loosens familial and other traditional social-economic bonds and moves to locations with employment opportunities. Likewise, occupational mobility is closely associated with the process of economic growth. Industrialization leads to an expansion of the class structure and to a greater diversity of occupations. Industrialization, for non-industrial societies, is probably the greatest single initiator of occupational mobility. Thus, the concept of mobility opportunities is mutually interdependent with social mobilization and economic modernization.

In order to avoid empirical as well as the theoretical difficulties associated with this problem, mobility opportunities should be eliminated as an independent variable in the model. Despite this change, the concepts of geographic and occupational mobility are not entirely disregarded since

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they will be considered as integral parts of the social mobilization and economic development variables.

Third, Huntington has introduced one independent political variable, institutionalization, dealing with the effectiveness of institutions in their ability to accommodate and reward politically active groups. As effectiveness continues, groups will increasingly support those institutions.

There is, however, an alternative to institutional effectiveness which limits political instability; containment or repression of political activity. Instead of wooing the support of groups by rewarding participants with positions, prestige and power, a regime may inhibit any but the most limited political activity and use coercion to prevent participation in spite of existing frustration. In this case, rather than increasing the reward for institutional support, repression increases the cost of participation in unacceptable ways.

Repression, then, is a factor which must be considered in relating frustration to political instability. While beneficially effective institutions mitigate political instability by building acceptance of (support for) institutional channels, repression limits instability by decreasing the benefits (and the likelihood of success) of political activity outside of the accepted institutions (i.e. repression is used to limit other channels of political activity). Both (Huntington's conceptualization of) institutionalization and repression, the carrot and the stick, are factors

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which inhibit non-institutional political activity. Thus, it is both institutional effectiveness and rewards and the level of repression which determine the extent of political instability resulting from social frustration.

On the basis of this discussion the Huntington model has been revised to resolve three problems:

1) to eliminate the statement of the model in the equation form,
2) to remove mobility opportunities as an independent variable, and
3) to include repression as another political variable.

These revisions, however, have not altered the basic relationships suggested by Huntington; they have been made in order to increase the precisions and utility of the model.

The revised model is stated below.

Rate of Social Mobilization	-	Rate of Economic Development	=	Developmental Gap
Developmental Gap	-	Political Institutionalization	=	Political Participation Gap
Political Participation Gap	-	Repression	=	Political Instability

This model suggests that the gap between each set of independent variables is the main causal mechanism of political instability. While this model offers an explanation of instability resulting only from socioeconomic modernization, it should be a useful basis for empirical investigation.

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CHAPTER 2

INSTABILITY IN EUROPE: THE SEARCH FOR A PERSPECTIVE

The theory proposed by Huntington is only one example of the extensive discussions concerning political violence and political instability taking place during the 1960's. The study of these phenomena, generated across disciplinary lines including political science, sociology, and anthropology, most frequently employed the techniques of cross-sectional analysis to identify and explore the factors that were related to or thought to cause political instability.

While no valid reason seems evident for excluding European societies from these studies, they generally have focused upon non-European, "Third World" societies. Postwar Europe has, in fact, experienced considerable economic change and political upheaval since 1945 with instances of riots, demonstrations, coups d'etat, and rebellions in a number of European countries. Virtually every East European society and many West European societies (including Spain, Portugal, and Italy) have undergone rapid increases in urbanization, industrialization, and other social processes, e.g. education and communications.

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Therefore the theoretical insights of the developmental and instability literature may well provide a valuable basis for examining change and instability in the European setting.

Analyses of European Politics

While theorists such as Barrington Moore (1966), Charles Tilly (1969), and E. J. Hobsbawm (1959) have suggested that socioeconomic change resulted in increased conflict and instability in pre-war Europe, many analysts of contemporary Europe fail to follow this line of interpretation. In fact they often seem to separate the issues of conflict and instability.

For example, both Lijphart's discussion of "consociational democracy" (Lijphart, 1968) and Lorwin's discussion of "segmented pluralism" (Lorwin, 1971) have been concerned with the success of smaller European democracies at stabilizing conflict within their political systems. Both Lijphart and Lorwin are concerned with understanding the mechanisms which limit the likelihood of political cleavages leading to political instability.

As in the work of Lijphart and Lorwin, the failure to examine explicitly the link between conflicts of interest and instability occurs in a number of important and respected works concerning Western democracies. For example, Lipset and Rokkan's discussion of conflicts in party politics (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), MacRae's analysis of extremism

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in the Fourth Republic of France (MacRae, 1967), Dahl's study of democratic oppositions (Dahl, 1966), and Lipset's general discussion of social conflict and democracy (Lipset, 1959a) all have considered the impact of cleavages within the institutional framework of the political system. These works emphasize the way in which conflicts are managed within the existing political institutions (parties, interest groups, and parliaments) rather than on how these conflicts result in political instability and violence.

A consideration of institutionalized conflict often has been coupled with an emphasis on the effectiveness and stability of democratic institutions. For instance, Lipset has been concerned with the emergence of authoritarian extremist politics, rather than instability, as a consequence of conflicts which extend beyond the accepted political institutions. Like Lipset, many theorists have failed to examine politics outside of institutional channels, but rather have been concerned with the shifting of politics from one set of legal institutions to another set of institutions. This has been particularly true of analysts of politics in Europe where institutions have been more prominent and more effective.

On the one hand, then, there is a sizeable body of literature which is concerned with conflict but which fails to consider instability and violence in Europe. On the other hand, there are a number of analyses of specific cases of instability; these emphasize the importance of 1) political

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institutions, 2) social and economic cleavages, and 3) socio-economic change in determining the likelihood of instability.

Ehrmann's interpretation of French instability is an example of the latter kind of analysis (Ehrmann, 1971, p. 185); he has viewed instability as the result of continuing lines of division running through society, the decline in public trust of political processes, and the intensification of cleavages as the country becomes more industrial and more modern. The unrest of both French students, a group of growing size and importance, and French farmers, a traditional group in a changing society, could be explained by both a decline in trust in the government and an intensification of cleavages due to change. Similarly, analyses of the student protest movement in Germany have indicated that protests resulted from the divergence of ideological demands between students and governmental supporters and the fact that student groups had failed to be incorporated into accepted political institutions. (Merritt, 1969 and Shell, 1970)

Just as in analyses of West European countries, interpretations of conflicts of interests in East European societies emphasize the importance of institutional capabilities and social cleavages. For example, Bzrezenski has suggested that institutional, as well as ideological, consistency has been a unifying factor in East European politics. (Bzrezenski, 1967) He has examined major cases of conflict within the institutional framework of Soviet domination. Likewise, in analyzing East European politics Ionescu has

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examined pluralism, but mainly within the institutional framework of communist systems. (Ionescu, 1967) However, when conflict has been discussed in relation to political instability in East Europe it has been interpreted as a response to both rapid socioeconomic change, Soviet domination, and the weakness of national political authorities. (Brzezenski, 1967, p. 200)

While there has been some consideration of instability in contemporary Europe, most analysts have been more concerned with stable, institutional politics. However, certain themes appear throughout the literature which suggest links between socioeconomic change and political instability. First, conflicts have resulted from divisions within society due to class, religion, and nationality. Second, the process of economic development has exacerbated these conflicts as well as created new ones. Third, the development of effective, accepted institutions has tended to keep these conflicts from leading to violence and instability.

There are some empirical findings which suggest that the links between socioeconomic change and instability are valid not only for analyzing instability in the European setting, but for instability generally. For example, research by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold suggests that high rates of economic modernization are associated with instability. In comparing transitional European countries, with presumably high rates of development, with modern ones;

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the transitional countries had over twice the likelihood of instability. (Feierabend, et al., 1969, p. 656)

Similarly, there is evidence that institutions tend to inhibit the outbreak of instability in societies. Gurr, for instance, found significant negative correlations between instability and levels of institutionalization and levels of legitimacy in a cross-sectional global study (see Table 1). (Gurr, 1968, p. 1119)

TABLE 1

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND LEGITIMACY AND INSTABILITY INDICES

	Institutionalization	Legitimacy
Magnitude of Conspiracy	- .35	- .29
Magnitude of Internal War	- .23	- .23
Magnitude of Turmoil	- .26	- .29
Total Magnitude of Strife	- .33	- .37
		N = 114

This negative relationship is even more strongly demonstrated in Bwy's study of political instability in Latin America. Bwy found that shifts in legitimacy in a five-year period (1950 - 1955) were highly and negatively correlated with organized violence (r= -.71, N = 20). (Bwy, 1968, pp. 51-52)

There is some evidence in the literature, then, to support the contentions found in idscussions of European instability. However, no systematic investigation of instability in contemporary Europe has been attempted.

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Political Impact of Socioeconomic Change

In order to consider systematically the relationship between socioeconomic change and political instability, it is necessary to understand the impact of socioeconomic change on politics and the impact of other political variables on instability.

Major theorists of economic modernization suggest that socioeconomic changes, e.g. shifts in urbanization, industrialization, wealth, communications, and education, have resulted in political changes.[2] First, Deutsch and others have suggested a link between economic change and rising socioeconomic expectations and capabilities. Second, a causal relationship among urbanization, education, media exposure and the development of democracy has been examined by Lerner, Lipset and others. Third, several theorists, including Moore and Tilly, have linked socioeconomic change to shifts in class cleavages and consequent increases in political instability.

Deutsch has defined social mobilization as that process which occurs in populations moving from traditional to modern ways of life, socially and economically. Social mobilization includes changes in urbanization, literacy,

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[2] See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1965; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, Vol. LIII, March 1959, pp. 52-68; Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, September 1961, pp. 493-514.

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geographic mobility, income, and mass media exposure which break down old ties and commitments, making the population available for "modern" life. (Deutsch, 1961, pp. 493-494) This process increases both the demands made on the political system, through social upheaval and exposure to new ways of life, and the capabilities of the political system to meet those demands, through increasing centralization and productivity. The comparability of the rates of increase of expectations and of capabilities is viewed as a fundamental determinant of political stability during the period of social mobilization. As Deutsch argues, ". . . a major transformation of the underlying political and social structure of a country could occur -- and could pose a potential threat to the stability of any insufficiently reform-minded government there -- even during a period of substantially rising per capita income." (Deutsch, 1961, p. 504) The ability of the government to meet these new demands is based on the degree to which the rate of increasing capabilities keeps pace with the rate of increasing expectations. This interpretation has been utilized by Huntington in his analysis of modernization and instability.

The Feierabend, et al. study included evidence which supports these contentions. For example, in this cross-national comparison, high positive correlations were found between instability and the rates of change of primary education (r - .49) and telephone ownership (r = .44) while a high negative association was found between instability and

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national income (r = -.34). (Feierabend, et al., 1969, p. 680) Those indices which were associated with increasing dissatisfaction and demands, education and communications exposure, were correlated with instability, while income, an index of capability, was associated with stability. The multiple correlation of instability with rapid increases in education and slow changes in income was also significantly high (r = .56 with a static measure of instability and r = .44 with the instability trends over time). (Feierabend, et al., 1969, p. 680) The empirical findings of this study support Deutsch's interpretation that social mobilization leads to increasing demands for political action. If the regime is unable or unwilling to respond, instability can result.

A second theoretical concern found in the literature is the association of modernization with democracy. Studies by Lerner (1965), Lipset (1959b), Cutright (1963), and McCrone and Cnudde (1967) have been concerned with establishing a cuasal link between certain aspects of modernization and democratic political development. Lerner found high correlation between levels of urbanization, literacy, media participation, and political participation.

McCrone and Cnudde have applied more sophisticated analytical techniques, path analysis, to investigate Lerner's contention that this association results from a specific causal sequence. The model can be simply stated:

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1) Democratic political development occurs when mass communications permeates society.
2) Mass communications occurs when literacy and educational levels rise in society.
3) Education and literacy development occur in urbanizing societies. (McCrone and Cnudde, 1967, p. 78)

McCrone and Cnudde found a "remarkable correspondence" between their empirical findings and the model postulated by Lerner.

There has been notable consistency in the findings concerning this issue. Unlike Deutsch's approach, this body of theory is concerned with levels of development, or modernization, and is not aimed at understanding any relation between economic modernization (level or rate) and political instability. It explicitly defines modernization as a linear process which culminates in the development of complex, specialized, and presumably democratic institutions. However, if this model is based on the assumption that high levels of political participation result from these processes by opening new alternatives and awareness in the population, it is possible to foresee that process leading to increased instability in societies which more slowly develop democratic political institutions.

It is important to note that Lerner's narrow definition of development includes only the indices which Deutsch would view as increasing aspirations and expectations and

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not those which increase capabilities. Thus, this approach tends to ignore factors which may have a direct, negative impact on political mobilization and, therefore, which may explain greater variance among societies undergoing socioeconomic change. The limitation of the variables under investigation (e.g. the failure to consider wealth) and the way democracy is measured raises questions about the utility of the model. Even within these limits, the growth of education and media exposure in the undemocratic societies of East Europe indicates that the model may be inadequate for analyses of certain societies.

The third theme found in literature concerning modernization is a consideration of the impact of change on the class structure of society, e.g. Barrington Moore's interpretation of the development of modern political institutions. In contrast to the second, "development of democratic institutions," approach, Moore has argued that urbanization and industrialization, i.e. the movement from a traditional to a modern economy, had resulted in several distinct forms of political institutions. (Moore, 1966) Specifically, he has suggested that the kind of political revolution which resulted from economic change was determined by the relative power positions within the new class structure, and by the rates of development of the different emerging classes. In other words, the difference between bourgeois and fascist revolutions was the result of differences in the rate of

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Far from viewing modernization as a process destined to usher in democratic institutions, Moore argued that the process destabilizes traditional class alignments and that the consequent shifting of alignments has resulted in a number of different political arrangements.

Charles Tilly also viewed urbanization and industrialization as resulting in instability. He suggested that economic modernization increases the struggle for power between groups which are both losing and gaining power during the process of socioeconomic change. Unlike Moore, Tilly has been most interested in the impact of socioeconomic change on the likelihood of instability and on the forms of instability rather than on the ultimate change in political institutions. (Tilly, 1969)

Both Moore and Tilly have viewed instability as a result of the shifting power positions of groups in a modernizing society.

Several themes can be derived from the literature concerning economic modernization. First, socioeconomic change affects individuals and groups within society. It jeopardizes the position of traditional groups while increasing social expectations and demands of mobilized individuals and groups. Second, the social impact of change results in political responses to modernization. The political arena becomes one in which conflicts and frustrations are

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acted out. Political activity by those who demand greater or lesser change increases; instability results from the inability of the government to accommodate conflicting interests and demands. It is the social impact of modernization which results in political activity and political instability.

Theories of Political Instability

While theorists of economic modernization have linked socioeconomic change to political participation and political instability, analysts of political activity also have been concerned with relating societal change to politics. Theorists of political instability have been concerned with how the political aspects of socioeconomic change are related to political instability.

There are two main causal models of instability which support the interpretations of the impact of modernization. While the views of violence either 1) as a response to frustration or 2) as a consciously chosen political tactic consider the same circumstances and responses, they are based on different assumptions about the motivations involved in outbreaks of instability.

Many theorists assert that political instability is the result of relative deprivation and consequent frustration. This approach has been utilized by Midlarsky and Tanter (Midlarsky, 1967, p. 215), Davies (1962), Feierabend, et al. (1969), Huntington, and Gurr (1968). One of the

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most succinct expressions of this approach has been put forward by Davies in his development of the J-Curve model of revolution. He contended that, "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. . . . It is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of 'adequate' or 'inadequate' supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produced the revolution." (Davies, 1962, p. 6) Frustration results from the gap between falling satisfaction and rising expectations due to socioeconomic trends; this frustration ultimately results in the outbreak of violence.

Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold have adapted this approach in an effort to examine the destabilizing affect of economic modernization. They have suggested that rapid rates of economic modernization will lead to even greater increases in social aspirations. The contrast between aspirations for a modern standard of living and the actual state of life will lead to increasing social frustration, and, consequently, violence. (Feierabend, et al., 1969, pp. 646-647) Like Davies, then, they view frustration as the result of the gap between expectations and satisfactions. Their findings are consistent with the model they suggest. For example, their index of the combined rate(s) of change was highly correlated with instability (r = .66). (Feierabend, et al., 1969, p. 680) This correlation, also, was reflected in the generally high association of individual indicators with instability.

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Both Deutsch and Huntington have developed models of instability and change which are parallel to this approach. The findings of Feierabend, et al. can be viewed as indications of the utility and validity of this view of socioeconomic change.

Gurr also has been interested in the frustration - aggression approach to instability. While not specifically concerned with the impact of economic modernization, he has proposed a causal model of civil strife with frustration due to economic and political deprivation as the main causal (independent) variable. (Gurr, 1968) In his findings, he concluded that both short-term deprivation (r - .48) and persisting deprivation (r - .36) were significantly correlated (at the .01 level) to the total magnitude of strife. (Gurr, 1968, p. 1117)

The frustration - aggression model has been applied by theorists to different kinds of situations with different causes of frustration. Their models are similar, however, in viewing the outbreak of instability as an instinctive response to frustration.

A second approach used to interpret outbreaks of instability is based on the assumption that violence and instability is a tactic rationally used to achieve political goals. Both Charles Tilly, in considering violence in Europe, and Merle Kling, in viewing instability in Latin America, view violence as a normal extension of institutional politics.

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Tilly stated that ". . . violent protests seem to grow most directly from the struggle for established places in the structure of power. . . . Furthermore, instead of constituting a sharp break from 'normal' political life, violent protests tend to accompany, complement, and extend organized, peaceful attempts by the same people to accomplish their objectives." (Tilly, 1969, p. 10) Furthermore, he has suggested that the impact of urbanization and industrialization on violence in Europe is due to the creation and shifting of groups contending for power.

Similarly, Kling has viewed the chronic and frequently violent political instability of Latin America as a result of the limited accesses to economic power. "As political office provides a uniquely dynamic opportunity to acquire an economic base of power. . . sufficiently large segments of the population are prepared to take the ultimate risk, the risk of life, in a revolt, in a coup d'etat. . ." (Kling, 1956, p. 33)

This approach is implicit in most analyses of European instability, where violence is often viewed as the result of disillusionment with the political system.

In comparing Tilly's view with that of Feierabend, et al. and Huntington, basic similarities exist in the interpretations of the impact of modernization on political stability. The indices used to measure either structural change or shifts in expectations are the same, e.g. urbanization, education, industrialization. If it can be assumed

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that the tactical use of violence is in response to the increasing frustration of emerging classes and groups due to their failure to achieve new aspirations and expectations, then the tactical use of violence, like an instinctive outbreak of violence, can be viewed as a response to frustration.

The development of frustration is the main link between theories of modernization and theories of instability. Socioeconomic change results in rising frustration due to shifts in expectations and aspirations and the relations of classes and groups. Frustration, then, leads to increased political activity and instability.

While frustration is a main intervening variable in both theories of modernization and instability, theories of political instability often include other political variables which are related to instability, and which should illuminate the role of frustration. For example, Huntington has included institutionalization within his model and Gurr has included institutionalization, legitimacy, and the coercive potential of the regime. (Gurr, 1968) Eckstein has suggested that the efficacy of elites, effective repression, adjustive concessions, and the organizational capacity of the opponents are variables related to internal war. (Eckstein, 1965) Feierabend, et al. have considered the relation of the coerciveness of the regime to instability. (Feierabend, et al., 1969) Bwy has included legitimacy and retribution in his analysis. (Bwy, 1968)

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Because this study is concerned with instability, rather than internal war or revolution, in Europe, three political variables seem particularly appropriate for consideration: institutionalization, legitimacy, and coerciveness of the regime or repression.

Institutionalization commonly has been viewed as a factor which mitigates instability. In Huntington's model institutionalization is a four dimensional variable. The effectiveness of institutions in maintaining popular support is based on institutional adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence.[3] Unlike Gurr, Huntington has combined the notions of effectiveness and legitimacy of institutions into his definition of institutionalization. Both Gurr and Huntington, however, have suggested that effective institutions limit instability by providing channels for expressing frustrations and opportunities for achieving political satisfactions. Nevertheless, Gurr's cross-sectional analysis yields a zero-order correlation between institutionalization and

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[3] Another view of institutionalization has been suggested by Spencer Wellhofer. Similar to Huntington, he has suggested three dimensions of institutional development: specificy (boundary maintenance), complexity (internal differentiation) and continuity. These three characteristics seem to reflect Huntington's dimensions of autonomy, complexity, and adaptability (and, even possibly, coherence). Wellhofer contends that each of these dimensions is reflected systemically, behaviorally, and attitudinally as the institution develops. See E. Spencer Wellhofer, "Dimensions of Party Development: A Study in Organizational Dynamics" (unpublished paper, East Lansing, Michigan, June 1971).

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civil strife of -.33 which virtually disappears (r = .07) when other variables (economic and political deprivation, persisting deprivation, coercive potential, past civil strife, social and structural facilitation, and legitimacy) are controlled. (Gurr, 1968, p. 1119) While institutionalization may be related to stability, it also seems to be related to other associated variables.

Gurr and Bwy both have suggested that legitimacy should be examined independently of institutionalization. The association between legitimacy and instability is based on the assumption that when political processes and organizations are accepted as legitimate, considerable frustration will be tolerated; it will be perceived as a normal and expected fact of life in society and resulting political activity will be limited to the channels provided by the official institutions. Both Gurr and Bwy found significant negative correlations between legitimacy (or shifts in legitimacy) and instability in their data. For example, in Gurr's analysis a zero-order correlation of -.37 between legitimacy and instability was reduced to a partial correlation of -.26 when the other variables were controlled. (Gurr, 1968, p. 1119) Thus like institutionalization, legitimacy is directly related to instability.

Merelman has suggested a direct causal link between the development of legitimacy and effective institutions which may account for these differences in the correlations of institutionalization and legitimacy with instability.

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(Merelman, 1966) These two variables are linked through a learning process of reinforcement. The effectiveness of political institutions at providing benefits, e.g. security of material rewards, to its citizens is the first step in a three-stage process which results in the development of legitimacy. Benefits associated with political institutions lead to the development of positive affect for those institutions during the second stage. This affect is transformed into legitimacy as the political institutions and processes become the source of symbolic benefits in the third and final stage of the process of legitimacy formation. The consideration of institutionalization, consequently, may be useful only when it is coupled with legitimacy.

A final political variable which has been related to instability is repression or the coercive potential of the regime. Gurr, Eckstein, and Feierabend, et al. have asserted that democratic structures and a potential for repression tends to deter extralegal political activity, particularly violent activity. Gurr concluded that coercive potential was a "crucial" variable in his causal model, but this was partly the result of the relationship between coerciveness and legitimacy. In his correlational analysis, Gurr found that coerciveness was related with the total magnitude of civil strife, $r = -.51$, which was reduced to $r = .17$ when the other variables (institutionalization, legitimacy, and deprivation) were controlled. (Gurr, 1968, p. 1119) However, Feierabend, et al. found that countries which had

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moderate levels of coerciveness also had the most turmoil; i.e. the two variables were related in a curvilinear manner. Their findings seem to contradict Eckstein's supposition that too much or too little repression may result in greater resistance to the regime.

Theoretical discussions have indicated that institutionalization, legitimacy, and repression should mitigate the impact of frustration. Many theorists have viewed institutional effectiveness and legitimacy as factors which indicate that effective channels are open for expressing discontent and that there is popular support for the institutions. Effectiveness and legitimacy, then, result in the utilization of institutional channels for political activity. Repression inhibits non-institutional activity since it creates higher costs and lower probability of success of such activity. Some of the existing data indicates that these relationships can be usefully explored.

The literature suggests that certain considerations should inform the selection of a model for analyzing political instability due to economic modernization. The model should allow a direct measure of the levels of frustration during the process of change; it should be concerned with the <u>rates</u> of change; and it should attempt to incorporate measures of intervening political factors, institutionalization, legitimacy, and repression. With the revisions made in the previous chapter, the Huntington model fulfills these requirements.

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Operational Considerations

Certain operational issues must be confronted in this kind of analysis. Obviously, economic modernization, institutionalization, legitimacy, repression, and instability must be operationalized in a theoretically meaningful way. Also, the mode of analysis must be suited to the context of change since the main dependent variable is one of socioeconomic change. The problem of measurement of the political variables is a particularly difficult one in cross-sectional analysis. For example, Wellhofer's interpretation of institutionalization resulted in a nine-fold typology. (Wellhofer, 1971) He then operationalized institutionalization in an examination of the Argentine Socialist Party. Shifts in rules and formal structural development were used as measures of systemic institutionalization; organizational longevity and incumbent experience and turnover as measures of behavioral institutionalization. While this approach has contributed to both the theoretical understanding of institutionalization and the operational richness of the model, the success with which the operational indicators were used is, in part, a measure of the limited nature of the study (a single national political party).

The task of operationally applying the concept of institutionalization becomes increasingly difficult as the institution under study approaches the size and complexity of a national, or international, political system. This

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problem is magnified if one attempts to compare several complex institutions. What would be a consistent measure of systemic boundary maintenance in a study comparing several countries? Citizenship laws? Voting requirements? Measuring the systemic or formal level of institutionalization seems simple when compared to devising a reliable measure of attitudinal or behavioral institutionalization in a cross-national study.

While measures of instability, repression, and socio-economic change are available for meaningful comparisons across European societies, institutionalization and legitimacy remain a problem. Huntington's development of a four-dimensional view of institutionalization enables the researcher to meaningfully operationalize the concept for cross-national analysis.

Huntington has argued elsewhere that it is precisely the ability to combine political and non-political variables in a model of change which leads to meaningful insights about the impact of modernization on politics. (Huntington, 1971) The utility of this type of model is enhanced by an analysis which enables the observer to view related changes in the variables over a period of time in one society.

Summary

In summary, the discussion of the literature has indicated common themes and variables. First, economic

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modernization results in rising expectations and capabilities and shifts in class alignments. Second, it is these changes which determine the level of social frustration. Third, social frustration results in political activity and political instability. Fourth, certain political variables, e.g. institutionalization and legitimacy, mitigate the relationship between frustration and instability. A fruitful analysis should incorporate these assumptions in an examination of change over a period of time. The Huntington model is based upon these assumptions and should be the basis of a useful examination of socioeconomic change and political stability in post-war Europe.

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CHAPTER 3

MEASUREMENT

The model presented in the first chapter is a theoretical discussion of how political instability may be related to social and economic change. It investigates the validity and utility of the postulated relationships, using the variables of the rate of social mobilization, the rate of economic growth, levels of institutionalization, repression, and political instability. The study is based on observations for two-year periods in twenty-seven European countries[4] from 1952 through 1965, or approximately seven observations per country.

Social Mobilization

In Lerner's original study of development the levels of urbanization, literacy, and media exposure were the variables interrelated with levels of political participation.

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[4] The study will include all major European countries, but will exclude such small nations as Lichtenstein or San Marino. The twenty-seven countries are: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, The German Democratic Republic, The German Federal Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.S.S.R., the U.K., Yugoslavia.

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(Lerner, 1965) These indicators were later used by Cutright (1963) and by McCrone and Cnudde(1967) in further investigation of the Lerner thesis.

The operational devices utilized in these studies are remarkably similar. For instance, in measuring urbanization, Lerner chose the percentage of the population residing in cities over 50,000 while Cutright chose cities of 100,000 as a cut-off point. Literacy was used in both studies as a main indicator; however, Cutright supplemented it with the number of students (per 100,000 inhabitants) in institutions of higher education to gain a more inclusive measure of the level of education. In contrast, theorists have used different indices of levels of communication. Lerner combined newspaper circulation, the proportion of radio receivers, and the cinema seating capacity (all of which correlated highly with literacy) into a composite index of communications. Cutright, on the other hand, employed the number of newspaper readers, the newsprint consumption, and the volume of domestic mail, plus the number of telephones to measure communications.

The focus of the present study on the rate rather than the level of social mobilization and the need for data covering several two-year periods per country made it difficult to find reasonable indices of social mobilization. For example, literacy is usually reported only in census years, if it is reported at all. The failure to find measures of literacy for most European countries left it an inadequate measure. Thus, there were two criteria for selecting indices

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for social mobilization: 1) that data were available for virtually all European countries and 2) that, ideally, measures could be obtained periodically from 1950 to 1965.

The measure of urbanization could not meet the two desired requisites for the data. Reports of population distribution in communities of different size tend to occur only in census years. Thus, in each country only one measure of the change in urbanization was available. This can be reported as an average annual rate of change of the proportion of the population in cities over 20,000.[5] This measure was obtained by the following procedure.

U_1 = per cent of the population in cities over 20,000 reported early in the 1950-65 period

U_2 = per cent of the population in cities over 20,000 reported late in the 1950-65 period

T = number of years between U_1 and U_2

URBN = average annual rate of urbanization

$$\text{URBN} = \frac{\frac{U_2 - U_1}{U_1}}{T}$$

The rate of change in the proportion of the population enrolled in institutions of higher education[6] was chosen as the indicator of literacy and education because, of the available data, it seemed best to fulfill the demands of the analysis. For example, data on literacy are not available

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[5] Source: U. N. Demographic Yearbook.

[6] Source: U. N. Statistical Yearbook.

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for all the European countries and generally is not reported except in census years. Data on the enrollment in primary institutions of education are available for virtually all of the twenty-seven countries and is reported annually; however, shifts in the enrollment of primary education cannot be logically related to immediate, within a two-year period, changes in political attitudes and aspirations, thus making this measure of questionable use as an index in the analysis of individual countries. Data on the enrollment in institutions of higher education was also available throughout the fourteen-year period under investigation. Since the main recipients of this education are adults, the impact of higher education on political demands could be logically expected to appear within a fairly short period of time. This index is appropriate for the analysis of trends in individual countries.

A second justification for using this index is that higher education enrollment has been identified with the process of social mobilization. Huntington suggests that higher education creates individuals who have high level skills, thus increasing the enrollment in higher education creates great demands for opportunities to use these skills. This represents a challenge to the highest capabilities of a society to fulfill the increasing and increasingly high expectations of its population and, perhaps, its greatest threat. "In general, the higher the level of education of the unemployed, alienated, or otherwise dissatisfied person, the

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The measure of the rate of change in higher education enrollment for each two-year period was obtained in the following manner:

e_1 = the mean number of students enrolled in higher education per 1,000 inhabitants for a two-year period

e_2 = the mean number of students enrolled in higher education per 1,000 inhabitants in the following two-year period

Ed = rate of change in higher education enrollment for the second period

T = the number of years between the first and second two-year periods (e.g. if they are consecutive two-year periods, T = 2)

$$Ed = \frac{e_2 - e_1}{T\ e_1}$$

The measure for the average annual rate of increase in higher education enrollment for 1952-65 was obtained by this procedure:

E_1 = the mean number of students enrolled in institutions of higher education per 1,000 inhabitants in the earliest period with available data

E_2 = the mean number of students enrolled in institutions of higher education per 1,000 inhabitants in the last two-year period with available data

T = the number of years between these two periods

Education = the average annual rate of change in higher education enrollment

$$\text{Education} = \frac{\frac{E_2 - E_1}{E_1}}{T}$$

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The third index of social mobilization was the rate of change in the number of radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants.[7] Radio is a powerful link in a changing society since it does not require increased literacy to expose the individual, in both the city and the countryside, to a wider world, national politics, and modern life styles.

The measure of the rate of change in the spread of radio receivers was obtained in the following manner:

r_1 = the mean number of radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants in a two-year period

r_2 = the mean number of radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants in the following two-year period

Rad = the rate of change in the diffusion of radio receivers in the second period

T = the number of years between the first and second two-year periods

$$\text{Rad} = \frac{r_2 - r_1}{T\, r_1}$$

The single measure for the 1952-65 period was obtained in a similar way.

R_1 = the mean number of radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants in the first two-year period with available data

R_2 = the mean number of radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants in the last two-year period with available data

T = the number of years between these time periods

Radio = the average annual rate of change in the diffusion of radio receivers

$$\text{Radio} = \frac{\frac{R_2 - R_1}{R_1}}{T}$$

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The strength of association between these three indices was analyzed by correlational analysis. Table 2 shows the zero-order correlation between each of these indicators when analyzed for twenty-two fourteen-year observations. (Due to missing data the observations of Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. were not included in this analysis.)

TABLE 2

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
SOCIAL MOBILIZATION INDICES

	URBN	Education	Radio
URBN	1.00	- .10	.42
Education		1.00	- .04
Radio			1.00
			N = 22

The lack of correlation of the rate of change in higher education enrollment with the other indices is perplexing since enrollment in higher education is logically

[7] Source: U. N. Statistical Yearbook.

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consistent with the model.[8] It must be remembered that all three indices are included in this measure because they result in the same effect on society, social mobilization, not because the individual processes are coincidental.

One possible reason for this lack of correlation may be that the sequence of change of aspects of social mobilization varies from one society to another. Thus, higher education enrollment may expand very late in the process of modernization in one society, but fairly early in another.

Because of the theoretical validity of the index and because there is no other measure of education which would be suitable for the analysis of change over a fourteen-year

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[8] A number of theorists concur with Huntington's interpretation of the relation of higher education to social aspirations. The failure of a society to provide suitable employment for its "intellectuals" has been viewed as the main cause of dissatisfaction associated with higher education. Several theorists have suggested that the expansion of higher education without the development of a middle class and broad occupational opportunities will lead to frustration and dissatisfaction, a view which parallels Huntington's understanding of the relationships between social mobilization (which includes increased education), economic growth (which includes increasing occupational opportunities), and social frustration. For an examination of this relationship in developing areas, see: Gregory Henderson, Korea, The Politics of the Vortex, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 170-171; Bert F. Hoselitz and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India," Dissent 8 (Spring 1961), p. 173; and David Abernathy and Trevor Coombe, "Education and Politics in Developing Countries," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 35 (Summer 1965), pp. 287-303. For a discussion of the relation of the development of greater occupational opportunities and a middle class to the fulfillment of "intellectual" aspirations, see James S. Coleman, Education and Political Development, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965, especially pp. 230-233; and Joseph Ben-David, "Professions in the Class System of Present-Day Societies," Current Sociology; Vol. XII, #3, 1963-64, especially p. 276.

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period in a nation, the rate of increase in higher education will be included in the composite measure. However, the lack of correlation between this index and the other two comprising social mobilization suggest that caution be used when interpreting the results.

For a cross-national analysis, these three variables were combined into a composite indicator of social mobilization by averaging their rates of change. The following procedure yielded the measure of the rate of social mobilization:

$$\text{rate of social mobilization} = \frac{\text{URBN} + \text{Education} + \text{Radio}}{3}$$

For an examination of shifts within each nation, however, only the rates of education and media exposure were averaged to obtain the rate of social mobilization since the rate of urbanization would not have varied throughout the period. In this case:

$$\text{rate of social mobilization} = \frac{\text{Ed} + \text{Rad}}{2}$$

Economic Development

Indices of wealth, standard of living, and occupational shifts have been included in other empirical examinations to measure socioeconomic change. For example, Lipset (1959b) suggests four categories of indices: wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization. His indices of industrialization reflect definite trends in economic

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growth; both employment in agriculture and energy consumption reflect increased productivity in the industrial sector. Lipset's indices of wealth include not only those of income, but also of standards of living, e.g. number of doctors, and of communications, e.g. telephones.

Since the present model includes among its variables the opportunities arising from economic growth, the indices chosen for this study utilize some of Lipset's categories; three of them reflect trends in the levels of industrialization, wealth, and standard of living.

The rate of industrialization is measured by the rate of change in the proportion of the labor force employed in occupations other than agriculture, hunting, fishing, or forestry.[9] The shifting of employment into the non-agricultural sector indicates increasing opportunities in the industrial and tertiary sectors, and an increase in occupational mobility opportunities. Like the measure of urbanization, employment by sector tends to be only sporadically reported for each country. Therefore, the indicator for industrialization was included only in the composite measure of economic growth for cross-national analysis and was not used in examining changes within each country.

The following procedure indicates how this measure was obtained:

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[9] Source: I. L. O. Yearbook of Labor Statistics.

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I_1 = the proportion of the employed population in non-agricultural occupations for the earliest year with data available between 1950 and 1965

I_2 = the proportion of the employed population in non-agricultural occupations for the latest year with data available between 1950 and 1965

T = the number of years between I_1 and I_2

Indust = the average annual rate of change in the proportion of the labor force employed in non-agricultural occupations

$$\text{Indust} = \frac{\frac{I_2 - I_1}{I_1}}{T}$$

Change in wealth is measured by the rate of increase in the per capita gross domestic product.[10] While the increased income per capita does not necessarily reflect the actual shifts in income of the average man in society, it is an index of increasing productivity and increasing capital at large in society. Changes in productivity and capital reflect changes in resources available to society which increases its capacity to meet new expectations and to make new commitments.

This measure was obtained by using index numbers showing changes in per capita income found in the U. N. Statistical Yearbook. The procedure presented below yielded the measure for each two-year period.

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[10] Source: U. N. Statistical Yearbook.

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$income_1$ = the mean index number for the per capita income of a two-year period

$income_2$ = the mean index number for the per capita income of the following two-year period

T = the number of years between the first and second two-year periods

Income = the rate of increase in per capita income in the second period

$$\text{Income} = \frac{income_2 - income_1}{T\ income_1}$$

The measure of the average annual rate of change in the per capita income between 1952 and 1965 was similarly obtained.

gdp_1 = the mean index number for the per capita income of the earliest two-year period with available data

gdp_2 = the mean index number for the per capita income of the latest two-year period with available data

T = the number of years between measures of gdp_1 and gdp_2

GDP = the average annual rate of change in per capita income

$$\text{GDP} = \frac{\frac{gdp_2 - gdp_1}{gdp_1}}{T}$$

One measure of the standard of living is the infant mortality rate.[11] This is a direct measure of improved health conditions and life expectancy and has been obtained by the following procedure:

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[11] Source: U. N. Demographic Yearbook.

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For the measure of the rate of change in infant mortality rates in each two-year period,

m_1 = the mean infant mortality rate for a two-year period

m_2 = the mean infant mortality rate for the following two-year period

T = the number of years between the first and second two-year period

M = the rate of decrease in infant mortality rates for the second period

$$M = \frac{m_1 - m_2}{T\ m_1}$$

A similar procedure was used to obtain the measure of the average annual rate of decrease for the 1952-65 period.

$mort_1$ = the mean infant mortality rate for the first two-year period with available data

$mort_2$ = the mean infant mortality rate for the last two-year period with available data

T = the number of years between these two periods

Mort = the average annual rate of decline in the infant mortality rates between 1952 and 1965

$$Mort = \frac{\frac{mort_1 - mort_2}{mort_1}}{T}$$

Correlation analysis was used to investigate the degree of association among these three indices. Table 3 shows the zero-order correlation between each of these indices for twenty-two observations, each for a fourteen-year period. (Observations for Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. were not included due to missing data.)

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TABLE 3

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
ECONOMIC GROWTH INDICES

	Indust	GDP	Mort
Indust	1.00	.35	.28
GDP		1.00	.80
Mort			1.00
			N = 22

As with the index of social mobilization, economic growth is a composite index, an average of the raw rates of change of the component indices. The measure of the rate of economic growth between 1952 and 1965 then was obtained in the following manner:

$$\text{rate of economic growth} = \frac{\text{Indust} + \text{GDP} + \text{Mort}}{3}$$

In the examination of changes within the individual countries, economic growth will include only the rates of change of income and infant mortality rates, the indices with a high level of association. For each two-year period the rate of economic growth will be obtained by a similar procedure.

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$$\text{rate of economic growth} = \frac{\text{Income} + M}{2}$$

Huntington postulates that it is the gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic development which is related to social frustration; thus, the cross-national analysis will include this gap as a distinct variable. The gap will be considered the difference between the rate of social mobilization and economic growth between 1952 and 1965. It will be determined by the following method:

GAP = rate of social mobilization (1952-65) -
rate of economic growth (1952-65)

Institutionalization

Using Huntington's conceptualization, institutionalization must be measured in terms of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence.

Gurr has attempted to operationalize institutionalization by using a measure which includes indices of the number of political parties, the stability of the party system, the proportion of workers belonging to unions, and the budgeted governmental expenditures as a proportion of the GNP. (Gurr, 1968, pp. 1108-1110) These indices measure several aspects of the Huntington model, e.g. complexity in the number of parties and coherence in the stability of the party system; however, they are too limited to encompass

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Huntington's broad conceptualization of institutionalization. In the same study, Gurr operationalizes legitimacy independently of institutionalization in contrast to Huntington who combines them. Of Gurr's indices of legitimacy, rank scores of the origin and the durability of the national political institutions, the latter would be considered a viable indicator of the adaptability of institutions. A better measure of institutionalization can be obtained by combining Gurr's operationalizations of both institutionalization and legitimacy. (Gurr, 1968, p. 1117)

The indices selected for this study were 1) the durability of the institutions, 2) the distribution of power among the governmental institutions, 3) the status of the legislature in decision-making, 4) the degree of bureaucratic development, 5) the relationship between institutional and associational interest articulation, 6) the continuity of the party system, and 7) the degree of elite continuity. These indices[12] were rated on a five-point scale (a five indicating high institutionalization) and added for each country. The highest score possible for any country was thirty-five.

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[12] The data for the durability of institutions, the distribution of power, the status of the legislature, degree of bureaucratic development, interest articulation, and party continuity were taken from A Cross-Polity Survey by Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor; (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1963) and revised to fit new five-point scales for the purpose of this study. The data on elite turnover were collected by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold and was made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Development.

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The index durability of institutions was based on the date of the origin of contemporary institutions and, if of post-war origins, the change in incumbents indicating a noticeable shift in terms of generational, ideological, or other differences. Several European countries experienced a shift in the durability of institutions between 1952 and 1965. The lowest point on the scale, one, indicated a political system whose institutions originated since 1945 and which has not experienced a major change in incumbents. The highest score, five, indicated a political system whose institutions originated prior to 1800.[13] This measure seemed to accurately rank chronological and generational age, both cited by Huntington as aspects of a system's ability to adapt to changes.

The distribution of power[14] throughout governmental institutions is an index which measures the complexity of political institutions. If institutions maintain separate bases of power for the performance of specific tasks, it indicates

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[13]The complete scale:
1. Established since 1945 with no significant change in incumbents.
2. Established since 1955 with a significant change in incumbents.
3. Established between 1914 and 1945.
4. Established between 1800 and 1914.
5. Established prior to 1800.

[14]The distribution of power scale:
1. Negligible (complete dominance of government by one branch or by non-governmental agency).
3. Limited (more than one governmental branch with limited functional autonomy).
5. Significant (effective distribution of power to functionally autonomous branches of government).

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the development of sets of institutions which divide the functions and the power within the government. For example, the separation of power between the courts and the cabinet represents a higher level of institutional complexity than does judicial decision-making by the cabinet. No European country experienced a major change in the distribution of power between 1952 and 1965.

The status of the legislature[15] is also an index of the complexity of political institutions, but reflects the degree of the separation of power and functions of the legislature from other governmental institutions. The status of the legislature also indicates the degree of coherence in the political system since it reflects the interrelationship of the legislature to other governmental institutions. The only changes in the status of the legislature reported in Europe between 1952 and 1965 were reported in France.

The level of bureaucratic development,[16] like distribution of power and legislative status, is an index of complexity; it indicates the extent to which a separate bureaucratic structure has developed which is specifically concerned with the administration of governmental decisions. No

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[15] Legislative status scale:
1. Wholly ineffective.
3. Partially effective.
5. Fully effective.

[16] Bureaucratic development scale:
1. Post-colonial transitional.
3. Semi-modern.
5. Modern.

European society experienced a major change in the level of bureaucratic development during 1952-65.

Unlike the status of the legislature or the level of bureaucratic development which reflects the interrelations among governmental institutions, the balance between institutional and associational interest articulation indicates the way in which societal interests are linked to those governmental institutions. Well functioning associational groups allow interest articulation to occur while maintaining the autonomy of political institutions. On the other hand, interest articulation by institutional groups, such as the police or religious groups, allows political activity to take place outside of distinctly political institutions, thus facilitating a breakdown of the boundary between the political and social systems. A ranking of the degree of institutional and associational interest articulation was used as an index of the autonomy of political institutions in this study.[17] No European society experienced a major change in the forms of interest articulation between 1952 and 1965.

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[17] Interest articulation scale:

1. Negligible articulation by associational groups, significant by institutional groups.
2. Moderate articulation by associational groups, significant by institutional groups.
3. Moderate articulation by both associational and institutional groups.
4. Significant articulation by associational groups and moderate articulation by institutional groups.
5. Significant articulation by associational groups, limited articulation by institutional groups.

A ranking of the continuity of the party system was used to indicate the institutional strength of one kind of political institution (political parties) in the face of situational and personality changes. It was measured in an index of the adaptability of political parties and of the degree of coherence in the role of parties in the political system.[18]

Finally, a ranking of the frequency of events indicating elite disunity and turnover was used as a measure of continuity.[19] This measure included falls of cabinets, dismissals or resignations of politically significant persons and executions, which was highly correlated ($r = .75$) with dismissals. For example, a country may experience a fall of a cabinet once every several years without manifesting a weakening of institutional support. However, as the frequency of such falls increases, it suggests that the regime is unable to work within existing institutions. Elite turnover also indicates more limited opportunities for elite socialization and, consequently, more limited institutional coherence.

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[18] Party system continuity scale:
1. Unstable, situational, personalistic, or ad hoc.
3. Relatively infrequent system changes, mixed situational - permanent party structure.
5. Stable, non-personalized.

[19] Elite continuity scale: for each two years,
1. More than five events reported.
2. Four or five events reported.
3. Two or three events reported.
4. One event reported.
5. No change reported.

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These seven indices were analyzed to determine the association between them. Table 4 shows the zero-order correlation which resulted from the analysis of twenty-seven observations. The mean score was used to determine the index value for the fourteen-year period.

The distinct split between the two indices of coherence, party and elite continuity, and the other indices is quite obvious. Since these indices are consistent with Huntington's interpretation, the lack of correlation is theoretically interesting. It seems to suggest that a political system can be rated quite highly with regard to one dimension of institutionalization and still be lacking in another. While these indices may occur independently of one another, Huntington maintains that each is a factor which determines the strength of political institutions. Because these seven measures are reasonable indices of institutionalization, they will all be included in a combined score of institutionalization.

The score of these seven indices for each two-year period, then, was totaled for each nation and constituted a measure of the level of institutionalization of the European countries. It was possible that a country would have a change in its institutional score through the 1952-65 time period as leadership or institutions changed, e.g. the instituting of the Fifth French Republic. The combined institutionalization value for the fourteen-year period was obtained by totaling the mean score for each index.

TABLE 4

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: INSTITUTIONALIZATION INDICES

	Adaptability of institutions	Distribution of power	Status of legislature	Bureaucratic development	Autonomy of interest articulation	Continuity of party system	Elite continuity
Adaptability of institutions	1.00	.60	.64	.65	.77	.30	.25
Distribution of power		1.00	.98	.90	.89	- .21	.15
Status of legislature			1.00	.98	.89	- .08	.17
Bureaucratic development				1.00	.88	.04	.18
Autonomy of interest articulation					1.00	- .04	.11
Continuity of party system						1.00	.45
Elite continuity							1.00

N = 27

Repression

As suggested in the preceding chapter, institutional development is only one aspect of the capacity of a political system to meet the demands of increasing political activity. The use of repression is a common factor related to instability, but unlike institutionalization, it does not indicate the capacity of the system to incorporate political activity or to meet new demands, but rather to ignore them.

Many empirical works have considered the impact of repression on the outbreak of domestic violence. The measure often used to indicate repression is that of the proportion of the military personnel to the population or the military proportion of the national budget. (Bwy, 1968) In view of the common usage of this measure it was one of several indicators of repression considered. Two indices of acts, rather than the threat, of repression also were selected from the Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold events data. A total of reported instances of governmental action against specific groups (ACTN) and the frequency of politically motivated arrests (ARRT) were collected, and the data on the proportion of the military personnel as a proportion of the total population (MILT) was selected from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. (Russett, et al., 1964, pp. 72-74)

As Table 5 indicates, the use of military force size as an indicator of repression is not associated highly with overt acts of repression.

TABLE 5

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
INDICES OF REPRESSION*

	ACTN	ARRT	MILT
ACTN	1.00	.73	.12
ARRT		1.00	.25
MILT			1.00

*ACTN, ARRT: frequency of events 1950-59

The use of the size of the military as an indicator is based on the presumption that the maintenance of a large military establishment is used as a threat of repression by the regime and/or that it is perceived as one by the population. In considering the determinants of a large military force, it would seem logical to assume that the size of and expenditure for military forces is as responsive to foreign circumstances as to domestic discontent.

Because of the low correlation of military force with the other indices and the questionable theoretical basis for its consideration as a measure of repression, the military index was not used. Consequently, a composite measure of repression was calculated by summing the raw scores of the remaining variables, the number of recorded politically

motivated arrests and the number of times government action against specific groups was reported for each two-year period. The measure of repression for the fourteen-year period was the total number of events reported for all the two-year periods.

Political Instability

The dependent variable of the model is political instability, which is political activity in unauthorized channels. The most commonly accepted types of political instability include strikes, demonstrations, terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, assassinations, revolts, civil war, and coup d'etats.

The limited frequency of events in any two-year period for most European countries necessitated combining these instability events. However, it seemed appropriate to compare the European experience with instability with that found in other empirical works.

The correlational and factor analysis by Rummel (1963), Tanter (1966), and Bwy (1968) were used to combine the occurring events into larger dimensions of violence. Rummel (1963, p. 12) concluded that turmoil, revolution, and subversion were the underlying dimensions in his indicators of instability. Loading highly on the dimension of turmoil were assassination (.59), general strikes (.52), riots (.79), and anti-government demonstrations (.85). Loading highly on the revolutionary dimension were general strikes (.60),

revolutions (.85), and the number of domestic killed. Assassinations (.66) and guerrilla war (.90) loaded highly on the subversive dimension. Tanter's work, intended to replicate Rummel's analysis, indicated that the number of dimensions uncovered by factor analysis was dependent upon the period used in compiling the data. In comparison with Rummel's findings, Tanter found that 1958-59 data tended to combine the dimensions of subversion and revolution into one larger dimension which he labeled Internal War; this dimension, however, was not found when analyzing the 1955-57 data. (Tanter, 1966, pp. 49-51) Bwy's work supported Rummel's and Tanter's findings on the turmoil dimension. (Bwy, 1968, p. 41)

These findings suggest that the types of instability can be combined into larger dimensions of violence. The data used for the present study were collected by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold. The measures for each type of violence or unrest were the number of instances recorded for each two-year period from 1952 through 1965. To investigate the interrelationships between these indicators, correlation and factor analysis was used on the combined data for the fourteen-year period.

The factor analysis did not replicate the findings of Rummel, Tanter, or Bwy but elicited the factors of stability. Little theoretical meaning could be derived from the factor matrix. (See Table E2.)

In examining the correlations between the indices, it was found that a cluster of strong relationships did

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occur but they differed from tendencies found in the Rummel or Tanter analysis, as evidenced in Table 6. The data on Europe, taken separately, tends to remove some of the consistent interrelationships found in the analysis of a worldwide sample. The emerging pattern yields a single cluster of all indices except those for revolts, civil war, and coup d'etats. Since this pattern is not consistent with other empirical work, the indices were combined on the basis of theoretical considerations of the impact and focus on the political system.

Two main dimensions of instability were created. First, a turmoil dimension was derived from the frequency of demonstrations and non-economic strikes for each two-year period and serves as an indicator of mass participation in events which only indirectly threatened the existing political system. The other types of events were combined into an internal war dimension, characterized by events which are direct threats to the political system due to either their magnitude (e.g. civil war) or their avowed purpose (e.g. coup d'etat).

These two dimensions, correlated with a $r = .66$, were also combined into a general index of political instability since the Huntington model indicates little differentiation between modes of instability.

TABLE 6

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: INSTABILITY INDICES

	Strikes	Demonstrations	Terrorism	Assassination Attempts	Sabotage	Guerrilla Warfare	Revolt	Coup d'etat	Civil war
Strikes	1.00	.36	.87	.76	- .01	.86	.49	.32	.13
Demonstrations		1.00	.36	.64	.48	.40	.33	.15	- .10
Terrorism			1.00	.88	.07	.99	.43	.34	- .06
Assassination Attempts				1.00	.09	.90	.43	.34	- .08
Sabotage					1.00	.07	- .15	- .12	- .07
Guerrilla Warfare						1.00	.44	.35	- .05
Revolt							1.00	.33	- .08
Coup d'etat								1.00	- .06
Civil war									1.00
									N = 27

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Examining the Model

These measurements will be applied to examining the model by using both a cross-national correlational analysis and an investigation of individual countries. The data will be examined in a cross-national analysis to determine if different absolute levels or rates in the variables are related to the levels of unrest found in different countries.

In addition, the model will be applied to each country individually to determine if the posited relationships are found within specific national settings. The relationship of shifts in one variable to shifts in another will be the main concern of this analysis. In this way, for example, it is not the level of institutionalization which is related to levels of instability; rather, it is the change in one which is related to a change in the other.

Certain predictions about the data can be made on the basis of the model. As the rate of economic growth increases proportionate to social mobilization, the frequency of instability should decrease. As the level of institutionalization and repression increase relative to the gap between social mobilization and economic growth, political instability should decrease.

The empirical investigation will limit the use of statistical verification; however, the analysis will examine the validity of the model as presenting a sufficient but not necessary cause of political instability in the post-war European setting.

CHAPTER 4

A CROSS-NATIONAL EXAMINATION OF THE MODEL

The measurements outlined in the preceding chapter were first employed to examine the model in a cross-national analysis. Since Huntington defined social mobilization and economic growth as separate variables while emphasizing the gap between their rates as the main determinant of social frustration, this analysis considered the appropriateness of all three concepts as aspects of the model.

Table 7 shows the results of the analysis correlating 1) the rate of social mobilization, 2) the rate of economic development, 3) the level of institutionalization, and 4) repression with instability. The partial correlations indicate the strength of relationship between instability and one of the variables when the other three are partialled out of the analysis.

Other than the relationship between instability and repression, no significant correlations are found in the data. While there is a strong association between repression and instability (significant at the .001 level), the model suggests that repression should inhibit unrest and be correlated in a negative manner, opposite to the results found in the data.

TABLE 7

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
THE DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INSTABILITY
AND THE OTHER VARIABLES

	Correlation Coefficient	
	Zero-Order	Partial
Social Mobilization	- .14	- .02
Economic Growth	- .10	- .18
Institutionalization	- .21	.03
Repression	.68	.59
		N = 27

Comparable results were exhibited in the degree of association of 1) the gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth, 2) the level of institutionalization, and 3) repression with instability, as shown in Table 8.

TABLE 8

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
THE DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INSTABILITY
AND OTHER VARIABLES

	Correlational Coefficient	
	Zero-Order	Partial
Developmental gap	.12	.06
Institutionalization	- .21	.26
Repression	.68	.67
		N = 27

Again, these results are inconsistent with the model. The relationships of the rate of social mobilization and the gap between social mobilization and economic growth with instability are not significant (at the .05 level of significance) nor do they follow patterns consistent with those posited in the model.

In considering the positive correlation between repression and instability (significant at the .001 level), one could suggest that repression does not act as a deterrent to instability. There are several interpretations which may shed light on these findings: 1) Repression, rather than inhibiting instability, precipitates it, i.e. repression causes instability; 2) Instability elicits repression from the political regime, i.e. instability leads to repression; 3) Repression and instability may be the end product of a third variable and, consequently, they are not causally related. Interpretations 1) and 2) both seem probable in many political systems where the use of repression is a response to unstable situations in an attempt to restore stability. An example of repression as a response to instability can be found in Hungary in 1956 and in East Germany in 1953. Interestingly, in these two cases repression merely intensified unrest and precipitated major revolts.

Since the correlation between repression and instability fails to support the relationship cited in the literature, it suggests a more complex relationship between instability and repression. Since it is possible that the causal

nexus may be the reverse of that posited in the revised model, repression will be removed as a variable in the cross-national analysis. Tables 9 and 10 indicate the partial correlations which are obtained in the revised analysis.

TABLE 9

PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
THE DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INSTABILITY
AND THE OTHER VARIABLES

	Partial Correlation
Rate of social mobilization	- .30
Rate of economic growth	- .40
Institutionalization	- .48
	N = 27

TABLE 10

PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
THE DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INSTABILITY
AND THE OTHER VARIABLES

	Partial Correlation
Developmental gap	- .20
Level of institutionalization	- .26
	N = 27

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These results show that the rate of social mobilization is again associated with instability in a manner inconsistent with the model. However, both the rate of economic growth and institutionalization are related to instability in the posited manner.

Table 10 shows that when the gap between social mobilization and economic growth is utilized instead of the two separate variables, inconsistencies also appear. The relation of the gap to instability is a negative one, opposite to that suggested by the model. While the analysis of the data yields a negative relationship between institutionalization and instability, the degree of association is low, explaining only 6.8 per cent of the variance.

The positive association of the gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth with instability found in the data may be a manifestation of the negative relationship between instability and the rate of social mobilization. The results of this part of the correlation analyses may be interpreted in several ways. First, social mobilization, in contradiction of many theorists of economic modernization, may be viewed as a stabilizing process during socioeconomic change. However, since Table 9 indicates that both the rates of social mobilization and economic growth are negatively associated with instability, this interpretation leaves us in the uncomfortable position of suggesting that all the processes of economic modernization are stabilizing when there is significant evidence to the contrary throughout

the literature. A second possible interpretation is that other factors are needed to clarify the relationship between social mobilization and instability.

This second interpretation may be an appropriate one. It is important to reiterate that the rates of social mobilization and economic growth do not indicate how much absolute change is taking place, but rather how much change is occurring in relation to the level of modernization already achieved. For instance, a country exhibiting higher levels of social mobilization may well have low absolute amounts of change, e.g. smaller increases in radios per 1,000 population or in enrollment in higher education, in relation to other countries because its original level of modernization is much lower.

Similarly, a country with a low level of economic development may experience a high rate of growth in its economy and its health standards without actually having substantial changes occurring throughout society. If, concurrently, the same society was experiencing moderate increases in radio diffusion or higher education enrollment when considerable mobilization had already occurred, the data for that society could indicate moderate or low rates of social mobilization, high rates of economic growth, and, consequently, a small or negative gap between social mobilization and economic growth. However, these rates would not indicate that the amount of change due to mobilizing processes was greater than that due to economic growth.

Stated in its simplest terms, the examination of rates of change without considering the levels of modernization from which they are determined can be misleading. The interrelationship between levels and rates of change may lead to meaningless results in an analysis which investigates only the relation of the rates of change with other variables.

Deutsch (1961) has cited another factor which would muddy the relationship between social mobilization and instability. He has suggested that there exist thresholds of social mobilization at which points the impact of the rate (and, logically, the amount) of social mobilization is altered, i.e. the relationship between frustration and social mobilization changes. After a society has reached a certain level of media exposure or urbanization, the future impact of increases in these variables may decline. Likewise, the relation of the rate of social mobilization to frustration may decline once the level of economic growth has reached a certain level. The relationship of the extension of higher education enrollment, the development of a middle class, and social frustration suggested by several theorists (Coleman, 1965) seems to support this interpretation.

Since the impact of the rates of social mobilization and economic growth could not be meaningfully investigated without considering the level of economic modernization in the analysis; the correlation analysis was continued by including the levels of non-agricultural employment (per cent of the total population), infant mortality rates,

urbanization (per cent of the population), radio diffusion per 1,000 inhabitants, and the proportion of the population in institutions of higher education.[20] Tables 11 and 12 show the partial correlations of instability with another variable when the other eight variables are partialled out of the analysis. (Due to missing data the observations of Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. were not included.)

TABLE 11

PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
THE DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INSTABILITY
AND THE OTHER VARIABLES

	Partial Correlation
Rate of social mobilization	.13
Rate of economic growth	- .24
Institutionalization	- .46
Proportion of non-agricultural employment	.16
Infant mortality rate level	- .03
Level of urbanization	.10
Level of radio diffusion	- .11
Level of higher education enrollment	.07
	N = 22

Table 11 shows that, when the level of modernization is entered into the analysis, both the rate of economic growth and the level of institutionalization are related to

[20] Levels of per capita income were not included because of the difficulty in comparing per capita incomes reported in West Europe with those reported in East Europe.

instability in the posited manner. While the rate of social mobilization is positively associated with instability, in a relationship consistent with the model, the level of correlation is not significant, explaining less than 2 per cent of the variance. The multiple correlation coefficient of this analysis was .58, explaining 34 per cent of the variance.

TABLE 12

PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS:
THE DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INSTABILITY
AND THE OTHER VARIABLES

	Partial Correlation
Gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth	.20
Level of institutionalization	- .43
Proportion of non-agricultural employment	.26
Infant mortality rate level	- .16
Level of urbanization	.06
Level of radio diffusion	- .25
Level of higher education enrollment	- .02
	N = 22

Similarly, Table 12 shows that the relationships posited in the model are found in the data but that they cannot account for most of the variance. The multiple correlation coefficient for the analysis shown in Table 12 is .56, i.e. the analysis accounted for 31 per cent of the variance.

Therefore the relationships posited by Huntington become apparent in the data only when the level of economic development was entered into the analysis.

Summary

This correlation analysis has not fully tested the three-way relationship between the developmental gap, the political participation gap, and political instability. However, several relationships have been illuminated. The results of the correlational analysis indicated that repression was related to instability in a manner which calls into question the assumptions discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Because of the question about the causal link between repression and instability, it was deleted from the analysis. However, repression will be retained in the examination of individual countries, in order to better understand its role in maintaining or achieving political stability.

Further analysis indicated that the rates of social mobilization and economic growth and the gap between those rates could be investigated meaningfully only when the level of modernization was taken into account. When these factors were considered, the relationships suggested by Huntington were found in the data. However, the strength of association of both the rate of social mobilization and the gap between social mobilization and economic growth with instability was fairly limited.

This limited correlation may be partially due to the fact that the model is explicitly limited to explaining instability due to socioeconomic change. Instability precipitated by other factors was not accounted for in this analysis, which may explain some of the residual variance.

In addition, this analysis has not considered the question of whether the posited socioeconomic change must always result in instability.

The consideration of individual countries will present an opportunity to examine several possible relationships between socioeconomic change and instability; 1) that socioeconomic change will always lead to frustration that, without sufficiently strong institutions, will result in instability; 2) that under certain conditions socioeconomic change will lead to frustration that, without sufficiently strong institutions, will result in instability; and 3) instability can result from other factors even without sufficient social frustration due to socioeconomic change. The second and third alternatives would indicate that other variables must be considered before meaningful prediction of instability can be made.

The examination of changes occurring in each society over a fourteen-year period should present a basis for evaluating these alternatives.

CHAPTER 5

INSTABILITY, THE MODEL, AND WEST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

The cross-national analysis did not reveal any conclusive evidence that the relationships suggested in the model are found in the data. An examination of patterns within each country was initiated to determine if other factors obscured the predicted relationships between the rate of social mobilization, the rate of economic growth, the level of institutionalization, and instability. Particular attention was paid to the role of repression in these relationships. Appendix F presents a summary of the examination of the West European countries.

Among the eighteen West European countries investigated there was a great diversity in political institutions, in the level of economic modernization, and in the frequency of instability. The political systems of West Europe include long-standing democracies like those of Great Britian or Sweden, the recent democracies such as the German Federal Republic or Italy, and the fascist dictatorships of pre-World War II vintage as found in Spain or Portugal. The differences among these systems account for a range in the level of institutionalization from very high levels to moderately low levels.

The levels of modernization, too, range from among the highest in the world, found in Sweden, to those that are quite low, such as Portugal and Greece where the peasant life is common. The range in the level of modernization coincides with a wide range in the rates of social mobilization and economic growth. The tremendous expansion of higher education since 1950 is found at all levels of modernization in West Europe; this accounts for high rates of the social mobilization index in modern societies.

Within these diverse societies, instability has occurred fairly frequently, with some West European countries exhibiting the highest levels of instability found in all of Europe. Concomitantly, stability, the absence of any reported instability, also was found more commonly in West Europe than in East Europe.

Within these diverse societies, then, patterns may emerge which illuminate the revised model. The patterns found in the West European data varied widely; at one extreme was the insurrection of the French army in Algeria during a period of diminished institutionalization and only a slightly increased gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth. In contrast to the French case, the Netherlands reported no instability at a time of an extreme rise in the rate of social mobilization and a slight decline in the level of institutionalization.

The Observations

Tables 13 and 14 summarize the results of the consideration of the variables in specific national settings. The data for all countries were perused to see if a change in the size of the gap between social mobilization and economic growth resulted in changes in instability. This examination also investigated the impact of shifts in the levels of institutionalization and repression to see if they help to explain the relationship between socioeconomic change and political instability.

Table 13 summarizes the West European countries which experienced increases in the developmental gap. The observations are categorized by increasing (I), declining (D), or constant (C) levels of both institutionalization and instability.

The observations summarized in Table 13 show a substantial diversity of patterns. For example, the increase of repression in France just after the establishment of the Fifth Republic (1958-59), a time of decreased institutionalization, seems to have inhibited instability at that time. There are cases like that of Belgium in 1960-61 in which a growing gap between social mobilization and economic growth is accompanied by major linguistic discontent and instability. On the other hand, the relationship between instability and socioeconomic change is not found in a number of observations where

TABLE 13

WEST EUROPE: INCREASING DEVELOPMENTAL GAP

Institutionalization	Instability: I	Instability: C	Instability: D	
I	Finland 1954-55 France 1960-61 Greece 1960-61 N=3 1[a]	Denmark 1954-55 Finland 1958-59 Iceland 1964-65 Norway 1956-57 Sweden 1960-61 Switzerland 1962-63 N=6 2[a]	France 1956-57 N=1 3[a]	10
C	Austria 1958-59 Belgium 1962-63 Denmark 1956-57 W. Germany 1958-59 Greece 1964-65 Ireland 1962-63 Netherlands 1954-55 Portugal 1962-63 N=8 4[a]	Austria 1956-57 Denmark 1960-61 Iceland 1958-59 Ireland 1954-55, 1958-59 Luxembourg 1956-57 Netherlands 1958-59 Norway 1954-55, 1958-59 Portugal 1954-55, 1956-57 Switzerland 1958-59 N=12 5[a]	Austria 1954-55 Belgium 1956-57 France 1962-63 W. Germany 1956-57 Italy 1956-57 Spain 1958-59 Switzerland 1956-57 N=7 6[a]	27
D	Belgium 1960-61 Italy 1960-61 Portugal 1958-59 Spain 1956-57 Switzerland 1960-61 U.K. 1958-59 N=6 7[a]	Iceland 1962-63 Finland 1962-63 Netherlands 1960-61 Norway 1962-63 Sweden 1956-57 N=5 8[a]	Finland 1956-57 France 1958-59[b] Greece 1958-59 Netherlands 1956-57 Spain 1962-63[b] U.K. 1956-57 N=6 9[a]	17
	17	23	14	54

[a] cell identification number

[b] An increase in repression may have accounted for the decrease in instability.

the developmental gap increased, e.g. Austria in 1954-55 or Denmark in 1960-61.

Considering the data in this general way leads one to conclude that the model seems to have little explanatory power concerning the impact of an increasing developmental gap. From the observations presented in Table 13, it seems that a country with an increasing gap between the two socioeconomic factors and a diminished level of institutionalization, a situation posited to be the most destabilizing, is equally likely to have increased or decreased levels of instability. In fact, even removing 1958-59 France and 1962-63 Spain from consideration, due to the apparent impact of repression, only 10 per cent of the observations with increased levels of institutionalization had decreases in instability, while five out of fifteen, or 30 per cent, of the observations with decreased institutionalization had decreased instability which is the reverse of the predictions of the model. Superficially, then, the data does not suggest that increases in the gap between social mobilization and economic growth is associated with increases in instability or that the level of institutionalization mitigates this relationship.

Table 14 summarizes the West European observations with a declining gap between the two socioeconomic factors. The observations are categorized by increasing (I), decreasing (D), or constant (C) levels of institutionalization. Instability is divided into four categories: 1) an increasing

TABLE 14

WEST EUROPE: DECREASING DEVELOPMENTAL GAP

Institutionalization	Instability: I	C_1	C_2	D	
I	Italy 1958-59 Spain 1964-65[b] Switzerland 1954-55 N=3 1[a]	Austria 1962-63 U.K. 1960-61 N=2 2[a]	Denmark 1964-65 Finland 1960-61, 1964-65 Iceland 1960-61 Netherlands 1962-63 Norway 1964-65 Sweden 1958-59 N=7 3[a]	Belgium 1964-65 France 1964-65 Italy 1962-63, 1964-65 Portugal 1964-65 U.K. 1964-65 N=6 4[a]	18
C	Belgium 1954-55 Greece 1956-57 Ireland 1960-61 Portugal 1960-61 Spain 1954-55, 1960-61[b] N=6 5[a]	N=0 6[a]	Greece 1954-55 Ireland 1956-57 Norway 1960-61 Sweden 1962-63, 1964-65 N=5 7[a]	Denmark 1958-59 Ireland 1964-65 N=8 8[a]	19

TABLE 14 -- Continued

	I	C_1	C_2	D	
D	Austria 1960-61, 1964-65 W. Germany 1962-63 Greece 1962-63 Italy 1954-55 U.K. 1962-63 N=5 9[a]	France 1954-55 N=1 10[a]	Belgium 1958-59 Denmark 1962-63 Luxembourg 1958-59 Netherlands 1964-65 Sweden 1954-55 N=5 11[a]	W. Germany 1960-61 Iceland 1956-57 Switzerland 1964-65 N=3 12[a]	14
	14	3	17	17	51

[a] cell identification number

[b] A decline in repression may account for the increase in instability.

level (I), 2) a decreasing level (D), 3) a constant, unchanging level with some instability present (C_1), and 4) a constant level with no instability present (C_2).

In contrast to the data summarized in Table 13, that presented in Table 14 does seem to contain patterns consistent with the model. Twenty-eight out of forty-six of the observations, 61 per cent, either had decreased levels of instability or had no instability. Of those observations with an increase in the level of institutionalization, only 16.7 per cent showed increases in the level of instability while 72.2 per cent had declines in instability or a continued absence of unrest. In contrast, of those observations with declines

in the level of institutionalization, 40 per cent had increases in instability while 53.3 per cent had declines in the dependent variable. In this case the data contain the predicted relationships between institutionalization and political instability when the gap between social mobilization and economic growth is declining.

In addition, the data on repression demonstrated patterns predicted in the model. Most commonly, repression increased at times when unrest had risen, which seems to support the conclusion that repression was used to end unrest. The arrests of terrorists in France during the Algerian crisis in 1960-61 and that of anti-regime demonstrators and rioters in Portugal between 1960 and 1965 illustrate this pattern. Occasionally, the data suggest that repression was used to limit unrest in a time of decreasing institutionalization or of an increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth, e.g. the rise in repression in Spain during 1956-57 and in 1962-63. The Spanish data contain the clearest pattern; after 1959, every rise in repression is accompanied by a decline in unrest.

Of the West European countries, none has data which display the predicted patterns throughout the fourteen-year period, though several have patterns which are consistent with the model. Five countries contain the predicted relationships between the size of the developmental gap, institutionalization, and instability. Two other countries seem to reflect the predictions of the model only when repression is taken into

consideration. Table 15 presents these countries and the times the data seems consistent with the model.

TABLE 15

COUNTRIES OF WEST EUROPE WITH THE PREDICTED PATTERN

	Country	Times with predicted patterns present
The Huntington Model:	Ireland	1960-65
	Italy	1960-65
	Portugal	1962-65
	Switzerland	1960-65
	Belgium	1960-65
The Huntington Model + Repression:	Greece	1960-65
	Spain	1962-65

Of these seven countries, five (Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) are the poorest, least industrialized and least mobilized of the eighteen West European countries examined. Possibly there is a threshold effect which should be considered in linking social mobilization and instability, and these five countries are below that threshold. A threshold would exist if the relationship between the developmental gap and political instability is positive until a certain level of socioeconomic development is surpassed. At that point the impact of socioeconomic change on political stability would decline dramatically.

The Data and the Model

How well does this data reflect patterns suggested in the model? Assuming that the levels of institutionalization and repression are held constant, four possible patterns have appeared in the data which are particularly relevant to the model under consideration:[21]

1) As the gap between social mobilization and economic growth increases, instability increases.
2) As the gap increases, instability decreases or remains at zero.
3) As the gap decreases, instability increases.
4) As the gap decreases, instability decreases or remains at zero.

Of these possibilities, patterns 1) and 4) are consistent with the model, Pattern 3) may be explained by the limited nature of the model, i.e. that it does not take into account other sources of social frustration and instability. The occurrence of pattern 2), however, is most unaccountable and most challenging to the validity of the model.

Table 14 indicates that observations with a decreasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth are more likely to contain pattern 4). The fewer examples of pattern 3) found in this category should be explained by other causal factors. Examples of such instances can be found in the

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[21] For observations which experienced a constant level of instability the interpretation of the data was less clear, and therefore these options were eliminated from this discussion.

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Italian demonstrations over the policy toward the Tyrol in 1958-59 and Greek demonstrations over the British Cyprus policy in 1954-55 where dissatisfaction and frustration due to international factors were the source of instability. It may also be that socioeconomic changes may result in social frustration only after several years, a delayed result of a previous rise in social mobilization.

Patterns 1) and 2) can be examined by considering Table 13. While pattern 1) did occur, thus satisfying the model, pattern 2) was equally likely to appear.

What other factors might explain a decline in instability which accompanies an increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth other than institutionalization and repression? Perhaps the countries which exhibit pattern 2) have reached a level of development that makes the model irrelevant, i.e. they have passed a threshold of modernization. Few of the countries in cells #6 and #9 of Table 13, however, are among the most industrialized of Europe; in fact, Italy, Spain, and Greece are among the least industrialized and least mobilized societies in West Europe. It is also of interest to note that of the countries listed in these two cells, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, West Germany, Greece and Spain are among those listed in Table 14 as conforming to the model during other time periods. The degree of overlap between these two lists does not support the view that the level of development is an intervening factor.

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However, in view of the question of a threshold effect raised earlier in this discussion a closer examination may be useful. It can be determined that a number of these countries experienced instability in the immediately following two-year period, e.g. 1958-59 in Italy, and 1960-61 in Spain. Table 16 lists the observations which contained a decline in instability while experiencing a growing gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth and a constant or declining level of institutionalization.

TABLE 16

DELAYED REACTIONS TO AN INCREASING GAP BETWEEN THE RATES OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

	Immediate following observation, shift in instability
Constant level of institutionalization:	
Austria 1954-55	none
Belgium 1956-57	none
France 1962-63	decrease
West Germany 1956-57	increase
Italy 1956-57	increase
Spain 1958-59	increase
Switzerland 1956-57	none
Declining level of institutionalization:	
Finland 1956-57	none
France 1958-59	increase
Greece 1958-59	increase
Netherlands 1956-57	none
Spain 1962-63	increase
U. K. 1956-57	increase

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It is possible that social mobilization will result in social aspirations after the two-year period in which it was recorded. Instability, then, can occur as a delayed reaction to rising social frustration. Also, none of the countries which experienced delayed instability was among the most modernized or mobilized countries of West Europe. For instance, while the United Kingdom is the most urbanized nation of West Europe, there are eight countries with lower infant mortality rates and ten with greater radio diffusion and higher education enrollment. Similarly, both France and West Germany ranked in the middle of the West European nations in terms of income, infant mortality rates, radio diffusion and higher education enrollment. Italy, Spain and Greece were among the West European countries with the highest infant mortality rates and the lowest incomes, education enrollment, and radio diffusion.[22]

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[22]This delayed reaction may also be seen in some of the observations which reported no change in the level of instability (cells #5 and #8, Table 13). Only four of the seventeen observations in cells #5 and #8 showed increases in instability immediately following the recorded time: Austria (1956-57), Ireland (1958-59), Portugal (1954-57), and Switzerland (1958-59). Ireland and Portugal are among the least modern countries in West Europe and none of the other countries with this delayed unrest are among the richest or most modern in Europe. For example, Switzerland ranked twelfth in the level of radio diffusion, fourteenth in higher education enrollment, and seventeenth in urbanization. Only Ireland in 1954-55 among the less developed countries in these categories failed to have a delayed reaction to the growing gap between the rate of social mobilization and that of economic growth.

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This observation suggests that there may be not only a delayed reaction to an increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth but a threshold of modernization below which the relationships suggested in the model are accurate. Some of the observations, then, which fall into pattern 2) at first glance actually seem to reflect a delayed reaction of instability; thus fulfilling the requirements of pattern 1).

Summary

In summary, an examination of the West European countries does reveal several patterns. The study of individual nations has indicated that repression is both a response to instability and used as an inhibitor of instability. For example, in examining the data of Spain and Portugal, repression enhances the utility and precision of the model.

It is apparent that a declining gap between social mobilization and economic development does not insure a decreased level of political instability. Factors beyond the scope of the model can, and do, intrude into politics causing social frustration and instability. However, examining shifts in the variables within the West European countries indicates that a declining gap is frequently associated witha similarly declining level of instability.

The impact of an increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth on unrest is not as clear. The data

indicate that instability has both increased and declined in different cases. While the increases in unrest are predicted by the model, declines are not. This problem was examined further by considering other factors, specifically the impact of the level of modernization and the likelihood of a delayed reaction to socioeconomic change.

An examination of the West European data has suggested that the level of modernization is important in determining the validity of the model. The cases in which the data reflect the predicted patterns tend to be among the least mobilized and least industrialized West European societies. This coincidence suggests that, as the level of modernization increases, social mobilization results in less social frustration due to the general affluence and opportunities available in society, i.e. the society and economy can absorb and accommodate further mobilization.

If this interpretation is correct, the data of highly developed societies would not fit the predictions of the model, thus accounting for pattern 2) in West European societies. In the case of countries with levels of modernization falling below the critical threshold, a delayed reaction to social mobilization could be found in the data.

Together these findings suggest that the relation of social mobilization with political stability is a complex one. The low level of association found in Chapter 4 is probably the result of this complexity. While introducing the level of

modernization into the correlation analysis helped to illuminate the relationship, the existence of a critical threshold of modernization would decrease the strength of association between social mobilization and economic growth.

The investigation of the West European countries has offered some observations that help clarify the model and which were not apparent in the cross-national analysis.

CHAPTER 6

INSTABILITY, THE MODEL, AND EAST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

Unlike the countries of West Europe, those of East Europe show a remarkable consistency. The hegemony of the Soviet Union in this region has led to similarities of political institutions and socioeconomic goals which are reflected in the data under study.

East European societies tend to be less "modern" than their West European neighbors. However, a strong commitment to rapid industrialization is demonstrated in rates of economic growth which are somewhat higher than those found in West Europe. Virtually all East European societies showed major shifts in both economic growth and social mobilization.

There is a great similarity in the political institutions of different East European societies due to the domination of the national Communist Parties over the political system and the socialist nature of the regime. The differences that do occur between East European societies can be viewed as resulting from the divergence from a common model of society and politics. This institutional similarity has been reinforced by the influence of Soviet politics throughout the bloc; for example, the de-Stalinization crisis in the Soviet Union resulted in strains on the institutions of most of the

other East European countries. East Europe, then, includes countries with moderately low levels of institutionalization which are susceptible to bloc-wide strains.

The East European data contain frequent reports of repression and more moderate levels of instability. Since the societies tend to report similar data, it is expected that similar patterns will be found throughout the analysis of the individual countries.

The most apparent relationship found in the East European data was the occurrence of instability at times of decreasing institutionalization. The institutional crisis of de-Stalinization from 1953 through 1957 was accompanied by major unrest in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia recording lower levels of instability. This crisis, which shook all of the East European nations, brought about the highest levels of instability found in post-war East Europe.

The predicted relationship between instability and repression seemed valid in the data from the East European countries. Two patterns emerged concerning this relationship. First, repression was a response to instability, i.e. it was used to stop unrest already in progress, as it was in Hungary and Poland in 1956-57. A second pattern found in the East European data was the occurrence of repression at times when either the gap between social mobilization and economic growth increased or institutionalization declined, i.e. when the likelihood of instability increased. The seeming use of repression

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to prevent instability from breaking out can be found in East Germany after 1960, the Soviet Union after 1961, and in Rumania in 1960-61.

The Observations

The East European data have been summarized in Tables 17 and 18 for easier recognition of the patterns found in the data.

Table 17 categorizes the observations containing a growing gap between social mobilization and economic growth. The observations are categorized by increasing (I), declining (D), or constant (C) levels of both institutionalization and instability. The East European observations show an immediate contrast to those of West Europe; the predicted interaction between institutionalization and the developmental gap is readily apparent in the data. Of the observations showing increasing levels of institutionalization, 0 per cent had increasing instability and 57 per cent had declining levels of unrest, while 36 per cent of those with decreasing levels of institutionalization had increases in instability and 0 per cent had declines. This data seem to have patterns which are consistent with the prediction of the model. The cases in which an increasing gap is not associated with increasing instability are explained by the shifts in institutionalization which help to alleviate social frustration and by increases

TABLE 17

EAST EUROPE: INCREASING DEVELOPMENTAL GAP

	Instability I	Instability C	Instability D	
I	N=0 1[a]	E. Germany 1964-65 Rumania 1954-55 U.S.S.R. 1958-59[b] N=3 2[a]	Czechoslovakia 1954-55 E. Germany 1954-55 Poland 1958-59 Yugoslavia 1960-61 N=4 3[a]	7
C	Rumania 1960-61 N=1 4[a]	Hungary 1960-61[b] U.S.S.R. 1962-63[b] N=2 5[a]	N=0 6[a]	3
D	Czechoslovakia 1956-57 Hungary 1956-57 Poland 1956-57 Yugoslavia 1958-59 N=4 7[a]	E. Germany 1960-61[b] Albania 1960-61[b] Bulgaria 1956-57, 1960-61 Czechoslovakia 1962-63 Hungary 1962-63[b] Poland 1962-63[b] N=7 8[a]	N=0 9[a]	11
	5	12	4	21

[a] cell identification number

[b] An increase in repression may account for no rises in instability.

in repression which inhibits expressions of instability.[23] In comparison, the West European data cannot be explained so completely by the shifts in the level of institutionalization.

However, the observations with a declining gap between social mobilization and economic growth show less clear cut patterns. The observations are categorized by increasing (I), decreasing (D), or constant (C) levels of institutionalization. Instability is divided into four categories: 1) an increasing level (I), 2) a decreasing level (D), 3) a constant, unchanging level with some instability present (C_1), and 4) a constant level with no instability present (C_2). As Table 18 indicates, 31 per cent of the observations with increasing levels of institutionalization reported rises in the level of instability, while 62 per cent had declines in instability or a continuing lack of instability. In comparison, of those observations with decreasing levels of institutionalization, 25 per cent had increases in instability and 75 per cent

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[23] There were two cases having no change in the level of instability which could be explained by neither an increase in the level of institutionalization nor in repression (cells #5 and #8, Table 17). However, both Bulgaria in 1962-63 and Czechoslovakia in 1964-65 experienced increased levels of instability at times of increasing institutionalization and a decreasing developmental gap. This suggests that the increased rate of social mobilization resulted in instability in the following two-year period. The intensity in social frustration may have been exacerbated by the shifts in rate of economic growth. It is also interesting to note that these were the only observations containing no change in instability which were immediately followed (the following two-year period) with increased instability. The repression used in the other cases may have had a prolonged effect in inhibiting instability.

TABLE 18

EAST EUROPE: DECREASING DEVELOPMENTAL GAP

Institutionalization	Instability: I	C_1	C_2	D	
I	Czechoslovakia 1964-65 Bulgaria 1962-63 Poland 1960-61 Yugoslavia 1956-57 N=4 1^a	Poland 1964-65 N=1 2^a	Albania 1962-63 Bulgaria 1958-59 Czechoslovakia 1960-61 Hungary 1964-65 Rumania 1956-57, 1964-65 U.S.S.R. 1964-65 N=7 3^a	Hungary 1958-59 N=1 4^a	13
C	Bulgaria 1964-65 E. Germany 1956-57 N=2 5^a	N=0 6^a	Albania 1958-59, 1964-65 Poland 1954-55 Rumania 1958-59 N=4 7^a	Czechoslovakia 1958-59 E. Germany 1958-59 Rumania 1962-63 Yugoslavia 1962-63 N=4 8^a	10
D	Yugoslavia 1964-65 N=1 9^a	N=0 10^a	E. Germany 1962-63 N=1 11^a	Hungary 1954-55 U.S.S.R. 1960-61 N=2 12^a	4
	7	1	12	7	27

[a] cell identification number

had either decreasing unrest or a continuing lack of unrest. Of the twenty-seven observations with a decreasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth, a greater proportion, 70 per cent, contained instability measures which did not conflict with the model. This data then tend to support the predictions of the model. The increases in the level of instability found in some of the observations may be explained by other factors. For example, the unrest in Poland during 1960-61 was the result of church-state conflicts, the demonstration reported in Yugoslavia during 1956-57 occurred because of the opposition of the Yugoslavs to Soviet intervention in Hungary, and the unrest in both Czechoslovakia in 1964-65 and Bulgaria in 1962-63 seems related to declines in the rate of economic growth following periods of rapid increases in social mobilization. Other factors, independently of social mobilization and socioeconomic modernization, can be linked to political instability in East Europe.

Of the nine countries included in the East European sample, six have patterns which are consistent with the model without considering the possibility of delayed instability. In all but one of these, however, the appropriateness of the model is reflected in the data only if repression is taken into consideration. Table 19 lists these cases.

TABLE 19

COUNTRIES OF EAST EUROPE WITH THE PREDICTED PATTERN

	Country	Times with predicted patterns present
The Huntington Model:	East Germany*	1958-65
	Poland*	1954-59
	Hungary*	1956-65
	Rumania	1954-65
	U.S.S.R.*	1958-65
	Yugoslavia*	1958-65

* Repression must be considered in conjunction with the Huntington model.

Summary

In summary, the East European countries tend to contain patterns which are consistent with the Huntington model particularly when the immediate and long-range impact of repression is taken into account. The level of institutionalization is strongly related to the likelihood of shifts in instability when the developmental gap is increasing, i.e. it seems to be the determinant of the level of instability.

All four of the patterns discussed in Chapter 5 are found in the East European data. First, as the gap between social mobilization and economic growth increases, instability has been increased, pattern 1), and decreased, pattern 2). With the introduction of institutionalization into the relationship, however, shifts in the level of institutionalization

explains the differences in the changes in instability. Consequently, both patterns meet the requirements of the model.

In observations in which the gap between social mobilization and economic growth declined, several patterns were found: instability both increased, pattern 3), and decreased, pattern 4). Decrease in the frequency of instability were proportionately greater, a pattern which supports the predictions of the model. The cases of increased instability can be viewed as a delayed reaction to early rises in the rate of social mobilization (e.g. Bulgaria 1962-63 and Czechoslovakia 1964-65) and by factors not considered in the model (e.g. the continued impact of previous repression in Poland 1960-61 and East Germany 1956-57).

The question of a critical threshold of economic modernization was not raised while considering the East European data since an increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth was associated with instability in the predicted manner. Because the lower levels of industrialization and mobilization are found throughout East Europe, the East European countries probably fall below the threshold; this would account for the degree to which the East European data contains patterns posited by the model.

The predictions of the Huntington model, with the addition of repression as a variable, can be found in East Europe. To a greater extent than in West Europe, the model is a useful tool of analysis.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This study was initiated in an attempt to find a model of instability which seemed appropriate in the post-war European setting. For while many political scientists have concentrated on European political institutions in order to aid understanding of the management of conflict in Europe, few have made detailed studies of instability in Europe dealing with the relationship between unrest and other factors.

The Literature

Several models of instability have been proposed in the literature; however, few have been applied to contemporary European political systems. The underlying assumptions and the posited relationships of these models should both be valid in the European setting and may help to cast light on the occurrence of instability in Europe.

One recurrent theme appearing throughout much of the literature on instability suggests that political unrest is the product of discontent which occurs when members of society fail to attain their expectations. Theorists differ on the source of these expectations; for example, Davies suggests

that they are derived from past experiences while Huntington believes that they are the result of social mobilization. However, whatever their source, theorists contend that expectations shift dramatically during the process of modernization, industrialization and urbanization. When these changes take place rapidly, expectations may diverge from actual achievements to a greater extent and the discontent is more apt to emerge.

A consideration of socioeconomic change in interpreting the outbreak of instability seemed appropriate in postwar Europe because major shifts in income and education have occurred throughout most of Europe and rapid industrialization and urbanization have been evident in East Europe. If socioeconomic change is related to unrest, this association should be found in the European data.

Of the models of instability considered, Huntington's was selected since it included both the factor of socioeconomic change, considered important by theorists primarily concerned with instability, and that of political institutions, considered important by political scientists concerned with European politics.

Huntington views economic modernization as a dualistic process which both raises social expectations through social mobilization and raises the capacity of the society to meet new expectations through economic growth. It is the relation of the rates of these two processes which determines the likelihood of discontent. When this discontent cannot be

alleviated by mobility opportunities, it leads to greater political participation, according to Huntington. However, the participation itself does not account for instability, but rather it is the degree to which participation cannot be channelled through the established political institutions that produces actual instances of instability. Huntington argues that the level of institutionalization of a political system is the critical factor in maintaining stability during periods of increasing participation. Thus, stability is linked to social mobilization, economic growth, mobility opportunities and institutionalization.

After a careful consideration of this model, the concept of mobility opportunities was removed as an independent variable because it was related to both social mobilization and economic growth. However, the relationships between social mobilization, economic growth, institutionalization, and instability were viewed as both illuminating and capable of being examined empirically.

Finally, another variable, repression, was added to the model. While Huntington implies that institutionalization limits instability by rewarding participants, thus eliminating discontent, and by building a sense of loyalty to the established institutions, other theorists have suggested that repression also limits instability, by punishing those who participate outside of the accepted channels of politics. This variable was introduced into the model, then, to increase its power of explanation.

The Findings

The predicted patterns did not appear in a cross-national correlational analysis. The positive association between repression and instability called the posited causal nexus into question. Consequently, the correlational analysis was revised to exclude this variable. The analysis was further clarified by taking into account the level of development already achieved in order to increase the degree of comparability of the rates of change at different levels of development.

Negative relationships linking both institutionalization and economic growth to political instability were revealed by the analysis. Both the rate of social mobilization and the gap between it and economic growth were positively associated with instability; however, the strength of the relationship was quite weak. The results of the cross-national correlational analysis were suggestive of the relationships posited by Huntington; however, the relative weakness of some of the patterns left both doubts and questions about the validity of the model.

The profound differences in the level of modernization, the types of institutions, and the degree of influence of outside powers in domestic affairs suggest that the cross-national analysis may have failed to reveal the predicted relationships found within each country. It was believed that general patterns could be examined by isolating these

differences. In addition, the correlation analysis could not relate changes in one variable to changes in another but rather only indicate the degree of associations between different variables found in a number of societies. Consequently, each country was examined independently for the relationships suggested in the revised model.

While the fourteen-year time span reflected long-term trends in the various European countries, the examination of consecutive two-year periods in individual countries allowed the investigator to view the impact of interaction of short-term shifts in the different variables on the frequency of political unrest. The examination of the individual European countries indicated several patterns between the variables. There were major differences found between the East European and West European countries and between countries with West Europe.

An examination of the East European countries revealed a clear relationship between political instability and the gap between social mobilization and economic growth. When the gap was increasing, the relationships suggested in Huntington's model were quite evident. Likewise, when the gap was decreasing in size the level of instability either declined or remained at zero in well over a majority of the cases.

The patterns found in the West European countries when they experienced declines in the gap between social mobilization and economic growth paralleled that found in East Europe.

In most instances, instability either declined or remained at zero. In both East and West Europe, the cases in which a decreasing gap was accompanied by increasing instability were not considered as major challenges to the model. Huntington never contended that his model included all factors which caused instability, but rather that it examined the relationship between a major process of change, socioeconomic development, and political stability. Since other sources of instability have not been considered, it is not unreasonable to assume that they are the cause of unexplained increases in instability.

However, the discrepancies found in the West European data which reported increases in the gap between social mobilization and economic growth call Huntington's model into question. It was found that, when taking the level of institutionalization into account, an increasing developmental gap was as likely, if not more likely, to have decreasing rather than increasing instability. While the model does not suggest that all increases in the developmental gap should be accompanied by similar increases in instability, assuming that institutionalization is held constant, the validation of the model would require some evidence that there was a greater tendency for instability to increase than to decrease. The observations of West Europe did not provide this evidence.

Additions to the Model

Since the introduction of the level of modernization had increased the utility of the model in cross-national correlation analysis, this factor was again considered as a means of explaining this problem. It was found that the less modernized countries in West Europe tended to exhibit the predicted relationships, while the most modern, i.e. those with the higher levels of mobilization, industrialization, and standard of living, reported data which could not as easily be explained.

This phenomena was consistent with the view that the process of modernization and that of social mobilization have a threshold, i.e. a level of development, beyond which the process is decreasingly destabilizing. As the level of modernization increases, the strength of the relationship of the gap between social mobilization and economic growth with political instability, declines. Presumably, the strength of the relationship would approach zero as the level of development, as Huntington defines it, approaches its maximum. The analysis suggested that there were a number of West European societies near the threshold of modernization which resulted in confusing patterns among the variables.

The introduction of the notion of a threshold of modernization into the model clarified some of the discrepancies found in the data of different West European societies and between the East European and the West European findings. Most

of the East European countries and a number of West European countries fell below that threshold; in these cases the model was an effective tool for understanding and predicting political instability.

Once the threshold of modernization has been surpassed, the model becomes less useful in interpreting the sources of instability. In addition, if economic modernization has been the main source of unrest, once a society has passed that threshold a sharp drop in the level of instability should occur. The West European countries may have demonstrated this indirectly, for it was quite clear that the countries with the highest standards of living, the Scandinavian ones, had the lowest levels of unrest. In contrast, the countries with the lowest standards of living were among the most unstable, e.g. Portugal, Spain, and Greece.

For the European countries which fell below this threshold, several other observations have helped to clarify the analysis further. First, socioeconomic change can have a continuing or delayed impact on political stability. Second, repression can act as an inhibiting factor and help to maintain stability.

The apparent delayed effect of social mobilization found in the data may be the result of the use of two-year periods for the analysis of individual countries. There were a number of instances in which instability would decrease as the gap between social mobilization and economic growth would increase. In many cases this often was followed by a rise in

the level of unrest in the next two years, even when other factors might act to limit it. Since this sequence tended to occur in the case of less developed countries, i.e. in countries where the impact of social mobilization should be felt (e.g. Italy or Greece), it was interpreted as a manifestation of a delayed impact of socioeconomic change. The translation of increased social mobilization into social frustration and ultimately instability may require more than two years time; this would be manifested in a delayed response of instability. While there was no real test of the validity of this interpretation, the examination of individual societies has revealed patterns which suggest that, in some cases, a rise in instability may lag behind its initial source, a rise in the gap between social mobilization and economic change.

A second factor which helped to clarify the analysis was the consideration of repression in the examination of individual countries. Repression was not a variable in Huntington's original statement of the model and proved an unreliable variable in the cross-national analysis. However, the examination of individual nations indicated that repression has been used throughout Europe to limit political instability.

In most instances repression was used only after unrest had broken out; thus accounting for the positive association between repression and instability found in the correlation analysis. Examples of this can be found in Hungary, Spain, or the United Kingdom. However, repression also was found to occur when shifts in the developmental gap and the

level of institutionalization would seem to increase the likelihood of instability. This pattern was particularly relevant in East European countries such as East Germany after the Berlin Wall was erected, Rumania, or the Soviet Union.

Because of the dual nature of the relationship between instability and repression, it is only in the examination of a specific society that the addition of repression to the Huntington model enhances its utility and precision.

Summary

In summary, with some revisions, the application of the Huntington model to post-war Europe illuminated the relationships between socioeconomic modernization, institutionalization, and political stability. The introduction of repression into the analysis increased the utility of the model in East European and less developed West European nations. In addition, the analysis indicated that the impact of social mobilization may extend beyond the two-year period which was used. When a delayed reaction of instability is taken into account, the relationships in the data even more closely fit those stated in the model. Finally, it was found that the data of the more developed West European nations did not reflect the posited relationships. This suggested that there was a critical threshold of modernization at which point the impact of social mobilization on political stability declines.

The analysis of individual European nations suggested that a substantial number of these countries fall at or below this threshold.

However, the analysis also indicates that the model can be used with precision only within certain limits, i.e. it is useful only in understanding societies which have not yet achieved high levels of modernization. It is not only the relationship between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth which determine instability, but these rates can have a destabilizing influence only if a society is in the process of becoming modern. The findings of cross-national analysis, then, will be of limited value if they include the most modern, and, possibly, the least modern, nations. This study also suggests that the application of the model to a specific society should be most useful. For it is here that the impact of repression can be taken into account and the model will allow more precise predictions about the probability of political stability.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE LEVEL OF SOCIOECONOMIC MODERNIZATION

The level of modernization was obtained for a number of indices and is presented in tables here. Table A1, A2, and A3 show the level of each indicator obtained by averaging the measures available during each two-year period. Tables A4 and A5 indicate the level of modernization reflected in urbanization and employment for specific years between 1952 and 1965. The 1960 figures listed on these tables indicate the figures used when the level of modernization was introduced into the correlation analysis.

All estimated figures were obtained by calculations based on data preceding and following those time periods. These figures have been rounded to one decimal place, although calculations of the rate of change were based on three place decimals.

TABLE A1

MEAN NUMBER OF RADIOS PER 1,000 INHABITANTS

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65
Albania	10.0	--	16.4	22.2	34.9	38.9	41.9
Austria	234.4	244.5	260.2	272.7	284.2	292.9	296.3
Belgium	205.3	232.4	252.8	269.5	295.1	321.2	324.1
Bulgaria	45.8	47.2	85.2	148.5	191.8	222.2	245.6
Czechoslovakia	205.7	213.9	227.8	249.8	260.7	264.2	263.1
Denmark	299.6	301.7	319.3	327.1	349.3	354.2	338.3
Finland	214.2	237.9	255.3	266.9	283.0	301.4	325.8
France	191.7	203.8	230.9	238.1	260.7	298.7	311.5
East Germany	265.3	297.7	323.5	334.7	346.6	354.9	361.7
West Germany	253.8	254.9	278.4	295.1	299.9	306.7	--
Greece	52.2	62.9	77.6	87.6	98.4	91.0	101.8
Hungary	256.2	274.6	280.9	283.4	285.8	289.1	291.2
Iceland	250.9	259.7	277.3	276.4	281.7	302.7	328.1
Ireland	133.7	148.9	162.2	171.4	175.2	186.1	203.1
Italy	96.7	115.5	127.5	139.3	165.7	184.4	205.4
Luxembourg	233.3	240.0	278.0	299.0	308.1	325.5	355.1
Netherlands	217.9	242.4	263.2	270.4	267.8	259.6	254.8
Norway	256.2	274.6	280.9	283.4	285.8	289.1	291.2
Poland	83.7	99.8	135.9	161.9	180.3	185.5	182.5
Portugal	43.9	53.7	65.2	84.6	98.8	115.1	125.6
Rumania	--	67.2	84.1	96.3	112.8	131.3	144.2
Spain	45.9	56.3	67.0	79.5	96.8	121.0	135.8
Sweden	319.8	335.3	351.3	359.2	372.5	388.2	383.3
Switzerland	235.3	250.8	253.3	259.1	270.3	273.8	277.5
U.S.S.R.	92.8	130.9	155.6	185.7	205.2	302.1	318.8
U.K.	256.6	269.1	282.3	285.6	288.9	293.2	296.0
Yugoslavia	23.3	34.2	45.0	66.2	91.6	115.0	142.2

Source: U. N. Statistical Yearbook

TABLE A2

MEAN LEVEL OF ENROLLMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65
Albania	--	.6	1.7	1.5	3.6	6.9	6.7
Austria	2.9	3.0	3.6	4.8	6.0	6.6	6.7
Belgium	3.1	2.5	4.2	4.5	5.6	12.9	8.0
Bulgaria	4.2	4.9	5.4	4.2	9.1	12.0	12.4
Czechoslovakia	6.0*	3.4	3.5	3.6	1.1	9.9	10.0
Denmark	2.9	2.9	--	2.7	6.4	8.0	9.6
Finland	3.4	3.6	3.9	4.5	5.3	6.8	8.1
France	3.4	3.4	4.0	5.1	6.2	8.2	9.9
East Germany	1.6	3.3	3.6	3.6	7.0	5.1	4.8
West Germany	2.6*	2.5	3.0	4.3	5.6	6.2	6.5
Greece	1.6*	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.5	4.2	6.3
Hungary	4.8	3.3	3.2	2.1	3.6	7.4	4.9
Iceland	4.3*	4.8	--	4.4	4.5	4.9	5.7
Ireland	2.8	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.8	5.4	7.4
Italy	4.8	4.3	4.4	3.3	4.1	4.8	5.5
Luxembourg	.23	.2	.3	.3	.4	1.0	1.8
Netherlands	3.5*	2.7	2.9	3.3	9.6	10.6	11.7
Norway	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.3	3.0	4.0	4.9
Poland	5.4	4.6	4.4	5.1	5.8	6.9	7.7
Portugal	1.7	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.4	3.3	3.5
Rumania	3.7	3.5	4.4	3.3	4.5	5.6	6.7
Spain	2.2	--	2.2	2.5	2.6	3.2	3.9
Sweden	2.8	2.9	3.5	4.4	5.3	6.6	8.6
Switzerland	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.8	4.7	6.0	5.4
U.S.S.R.	--	9.5	9.8	10.8	12.1	14.5	16.3
U.K.	1.7	--	1.9	--	6.5	5.9	5.7
Yugoslavia	3.1	3.7	3.6	4.9	8.5	8.4	9.2

Source: U. N. Statistical Yearbook

* 1950-51

TABLE A3

MEAN INFANT MORTALITY RATE

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65
Albania	--	103.9	84.2	72.4	81.2	91.3	84.1
Austria	50.8	46.9	43.7	40.2	35.1	32.0	26.7
Belgium	43.3	41.0	37.6	30.8	29.6	27.3	24.9
Bulgaria	89.2	84.3	69.1	54.0	41.4	36.5	31.8
Czechoslovakia	50.2	35.8	32.4	27.6	23.1	22.4	23.2
Denmark	28.0	26.0	24.1	22.4	21.6	19.6	18.7
Finland	33.6	30.1	26.6	24.0	20.9	19.3	17.2
France	43.5	39.6	34.9	30.5	26.5	25.5	22.7
East Germany	56.3	49.6	46.0	42.6	36.2	31.5	27.0
West Germany	47.2	42.6	37.5	35.1	32.7	28.0	21.2
Greece	46.6	46.9	41.4	39.0	39.9	39.8	35.0
Hungary	70.3	60.3	60.9	55.2	45.8	45.4	39.4
Iceland	19.8	20.3	17.2	17.5	16.2	17.1	16.3
Ireland	40.4	37.2	34.2	33.7	29.8	27.8	25.9
Italy	61.0	51.9	49.4	46.8	42.8	40.6	35.5
Luxembourg	42.8	41.3	37.7	36.0	28.8	29.8	26.9
Netherlands	22.3	20.6	18.1	18.3	17.4	16.4	14.6
Norway	22.8	21.0	20.8	19.3	18.4	17.3	16.6
Poland	91.4	82.0	73.8	72.3	55.4	51.7	44.7
Portugal	94.9	87.8	87.9	86.3	83.1	75.8	66.9
Rumania	100.5	83.5	81.8	73.7	73.5	57.7	46.3
Spain	59.8	55.2	52.3	48.2	44.9	41.0	37.6
Sweden	19.4	18.0	17.5	16.2	16.7	15.4	13.7
Switzerland	29.4	26.8	24.3	22.2	21.0	20.8	18.4
U.S.S.R.	71.5	64.0	42.8	40.6	33.5	31.4	28.0
U.K.	27.8	26.0	24.1	23.2	22.3	22.1	20.1
Yugoslavia	110.8	107.2	99.9	89.1	84.8	80.8	73.7

Source: U. N. Demographic Yearbook

TABLE A4

PER CENT OF INHABITANTS IN CITIES OVER 20,000

	% Pop.	Year	% Pop.	Year	1960
Albania	8.0	1950	18.4	1955	28.9*
Austria	39.8	1951	38.2	1961	38.4*
Belgium	32.0	1947	34.3	1961	34.1*
Bulgaria	24.6	1946	33.6	1956	38.0*
Czechoslovakia	21.6	1950	25.3	1961	25.0*
Denmark	44.8	1950	48.5	1960	48.5
Finland	22.2	1950	33.7	1960	33.7
France	31.4	1946	37.4	1962	36.6*
East Germany	41.5	1950			
West Germany	41.5	1950	47.5	1961	47.0*
Greece	28.1	1951	37.4	1961	36.5*
Hungary	33.4	1949	37.0	1960	37.0
Iceland	39.1	1950	40.5	1957	41.1*
Ireland	28.3	1951	35.6	1961	34.9*
Italy	41.2	1951	47.0	1961	46.4*
Luxembourg	30.6	1947	31.6	1960	31.6
Netherlands	49.7	1947	51.8	1960	51.8
Norway	32.8	1950	34.8	1960	34.8
Poland	25.6	1950	31.9	1960	31.9
Portugal	16.5	1950	16.4	1960	16.4
Rumania	23.4	1948	31.3	1956	35.3*
Spain	39.8	1950	45.4	1960	45.4
Sweden	33.0	1950	40.8	1960	40.8
Switzerland	29.2	1950	29.9	1960	29.9
U.S.S.R.	47.9	1959	55.0	1967	48.8*
U.K.	68.2	1951	66.9	1961	67.0*
Yugoslavia	12.2	1948	18.6	1961	18.1*

Source: U. N. Demographic Yearbook

* estimated

TABLE A5

WORKING POPULATION EMPLOYED IN NON-AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS

	%	Year	%	Year	1960
Austria	68.0	1951	77.2	1961	76.3[a]
Belgium	87.9	1947	90.0	1958	90.4[a]
Bulgaria[b]	35.8	1956	55.6	1965	44.6[a]
Czechoslovakia	62.0	1950	74.1	1960	74.1
Denmark	75.0	1951	82.5	1960	82.5
Finland	54.0	1950	64.5	1960	64.5
France	64.0	1946	80.2	1962	78.2[a]
East Germany	70.8	1946	81.0	1958	82.9[a]
West Germany	76.8	1950	86.0	1959	87.0[a]
Greece	51.8	1951	46.1	1961	46.7[a]
Hungary	47.1	1949	62.0	1960	62.0
Iceland	60.0	1950	77.1	1960	77.1
Ireland	60.0	1951	65.8	1961	65.2[a]
Italy	57.8	1951	71.0	1960	71.0
Luxembourg	74.0	1947	85.0	1960	85.0
Netherlands	80.7	1947	89.0	1959	89.7[a]
Norway	74.0	1950	80.5	1960	80.5
Poland	43.0	1950	52.3	1960	52.3
Portugal	52.0	1950	57.5	1960	57.5
Rumania	30.5	1956	42.8	1966	35.3[a]
Spain	51.5	1950	58.7	1960	58.7
Sweden	79.7	1950	87.0	1960	87.0
Switzerland	83.5	1950	88.0	1960	88.0
U.S.S.R.	87.5	1956	87.7	1965	87.5[a]
U.K.	94.9	1951	96.9	1966	95.8[a]
Yugoslavia	33.2	1953	42.8	1961	41.6[a]

Source: International Labor Organization, Yearbook of Labor Statistics

[a] estimated

[b] Source: U. N. Demographic Yearbook

TABLE A6

WEST EUROPE: PER CAPITA INCOME, 1958

	U. S. Dollars
Austria	$ 662
Belgium	1030
Denmark	1090
Finland	815
France	947
West Germany	912
Greece	338
Iceland	1104
Ireland	447
Italy	528
Luxembourg	1333
Netherlands	767
Norway	1035
Portugal	228
Spain	326
Sweden	1391
Switzerland	1195
U. K.	1091

Source: U. N. Statistical Yearbook

APPENDIX B

THE RATE OF SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE

The data presented here are the rates of change for the individual indicators of socioeconomic change and for the combined indices of social mobilization and economic growth. All of these rates were obtained by the formulas presented in Chapter 3. Tables B1 through B6 indicate the rates of change calculated for each of the two-year periods, while Tables B7 and B8 indicate those for the 14-year period, 1952-65.

TABLE B1

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF INCREASE OF RADIO DIFFUSION

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65
Albania	--	16.1	16.1	17.6	28.6	5.7	3.9
Austria	7.0	2.2	3.2	2.4	2.1	1.5	.6
Belgium	4.4	6.6	4.4	3.3	4.8	4.4	.5
Bulgaria	--	1.5	40.4	37.1	14.6	7.9	5.3
Czechoslovakia	.7	1.9	3.3	4.8	2.2	.7	- .2
Denmark	2.5	.4	2.9	1.2	3.4	.7	- 2.3
Finland	5.1	5.5	3.6	2.3	3.0	3.2	4.1
France	4.5	3.2	6.6	1.6	4.7	7.3	2.1
East Germany	--	6.1	4.3	1.7	1.8	1.2	.9
West Germany	11.1	.2	4.6	3.0	.8	1.1	--
Greece	39.5	10.3	11.7	6.5	6.1	- 3.8	5.9
Hungary	1.2	3.6	1.2	.4	.4	.6	.4
Iceland	1.3	1.8	3.4	- .1	.9	3.7	4.2
Ireland	10.4	5.7	4.5	2.8	.6	3.1	4.6
Italy	11.4	9.8	5.2	4.7	9.5	5.6	5.7
Luxembourg	5.0	1.4	7.9	3.8	1.5	2.8	4.5
Netherlands	3.1	5.6	4.3	1.4	- .5	- 1.5	- .9
Norway	1.2	3.6	1.2	.4	.4	.6	.4
Poland	15.0	9.6	18.1	9.6	5.6	1.5	- .8
Portugal	9.8	11.2	10.8	14.8	8.4	8.3	4.6
Rumania	78.4	78.4	12.6	7.3	8.6	8.2	4.9
Spain	--	11.2	9.5	9.3	10.9	12.5	6.1
Sweden	1.3	2.4	2.4	1.1	1.8	2.1	- .6
Switzerland	1.6	3.3	.5	1.2	2.2	.6	.7
U.S.S.R.	--	20.5	9.5	9.6	5.3	23.6	2.8
U.K.	--	2.4	2.5	.6	.6	.7	.5
Yugoslavia	4.6	23.3	23.3	23.5	19.2	12.8	11.8

TABLE B2

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF INCREASE IN EDUCATION

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65
Albania	--	--	82.8	- 5.9	70.0	45.8	- 1.4
Austria	- 4.7	1.0	10.8	16.7	12.5	5.0	.8
Belgium	9.6	- 9.7	34.0	3.6	12.2	65.2	-18.9
Bulgaria	--	8.3	5.1	-11.1	58.3	15.9	1.7
Czechoslovakia	-10.8	-10.8	1.5	1.4	-34.7	400.0	.7
Denmark	-19.8	0.0	- 1.7	- 1.7	68.5	12.5	10.0
Finland	- 5.3	2.9	4.2	7.7	8.9	14.2	9.6
France	2.8	0.0	8.2	13.9	11.3	16.3	10.3
East Germany	0.0	50.3	4.7	.6	47.1	-13.9	- 2.8
West Germany	- 1.0	- 1.0	10.3	22.2	14.9	5.1	2.2
Greece	8.8	8.8	6.4	8.0	13.8	9.5	24.7
Hungary	5.8	-16.2	- .8	-18.1	38.5	52.2	-16.8
Iceland	2.7	2.7	- 2.3	- 2.3	1.4	4.1	8.1
Ireland	1.1	8.2	- 1.9	2.3	9.5	21.0	18.2
Italy	23.6	- 5.3	1.4	-13.0	12.8	7.9	7.3
Luxembourg	--	0.0	19.6	-35.9	13.8	85.1	.4
Netherlands	- 5.8	- 5.8	4.2	6.5	94.7	5.0	5.3
Norway	- 6.5	1.5	2.7	16.5	15.0	16.0	11.5
Poland	--	- 6.8	- 2.8	8.6	6.0	10.3	5.6
Portugal	- 4.0	10.8	4.3	3.1	0.0	22.6	2.8
Rumania	--	- 2.0	11.9	-12.2	18.3	12.5	9.3
Spain	- 7.6	.1	.1	8.3	1.4	11.0	10.9
Sweden	6.0	1.6	11.1	12.4	10.8	11.8	15.3
Switzerland	- 3.1	- 1.7	2.5	6.4	11.6	14.5	- 5.3
U.S.S.R.	--	--	1.7	4.7	6.2	9.9	6.2
U.K.	--	3.3	3.3	61.3	61.3	- 4.3	- 2.3
Yugoslavia	- 3.0	8.9	- .8	17.5	36.6	- .4	4.4

TABLE B3

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF DECLINE OF INFANT MORTALITY RATES

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65
Albania	3.5*	3.5*	9.4	7.0	- 6.1	- 6.3	3.9
Austria	10.1	3.7	3.4	4.0	6.3	4.3	5.1
Belgium	8.0	2.7	4.1	9.0	1.9	3.9	4.4
Bulgaria	8.7	2.7	9.0	10.9	11.7	5.9	6.3
Czechoslovakia	16.7	14.3	4.7	7.4	8.1	1.3	- 1.8
Denmark	2.9	3.6	3.6	3.5	1.8	4.6	2.3
Finland	7.4	5.1	5.5	4.9	6.4	3.6	5.4
France	7.1	4.5	5.9	6.3	3.3	1.7	5.5
East Germany	8.5	6.0	3.5	3.7	7.4	6.5	7.1
West Germany	6.6	5.2	5.7	3.1	3.4	7.2	12.1
Greece	- 8.2	- .1	5.9	1.4	- 1.2	.1	6.0
Hungary	8.0	7.1	- .5	4.7	8.5	.5	6.6
Iceland	9.4	- 1.3	7.6	-10.2	3.7	2.8	2.3
Ireland	5.7	3.8	3.9	.9	5.6	3.4	3.4
Italy	3.1	7.5	2.4	2.6	4.8	1.9	6.3
Luxembourg	.9	1.8	4.4	2.3	9.9	- 1.7	4.9
Netherlands	5.6	3.8	6.1	- .6	2.2	2.9	5.5
Norway	7.6	3.9	.2	3.6	2.3	3.0	2.0
Poland	7.8	5.1	4.9	1.0	11.7	3.3	6.8
Portugal	- 1.8	3.7	0.0	.9	1.8	4.4	5.9
Rumania	7.2	8.5	1.0	4.9	.1	10.7	9.9
Spain	6.6	3.8	2.6	3.9	3.3	4.3	4.1
Sweden	4.5	3.4	1.4	3.7	0.0	2.5	5.2
Switzerland	2.0	4.4	4.7	4.3	2.5	.5	5.8
U.S.S.R.	6.7	5.2	16.6	2.6	8.7	3.0	5.4
U.K.	5.4	3.1	3.6	1.9	1.9	.4	4.5
Yugoslavia	7.2	1.6	3.3	5.4	2.4	2.4	4.4

*** estimated from 1951 data**

TABLE B4

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF INCREASE IN PER CAPITA INCOME

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65
Albania	--	--	4.6	4.6	4.2	4.9	0.0
Austria	3.0	.5	6.5	4.0	5.5	2.5	4.5
Belgium	2.5	3.0	3.5	2.0	4.5	4.5	4.5
Bulgaria	--	5.5	5.5	11.5	17.5	5.0	8.5
Czechoslovakia	8.5	5.0	6.0	7.0	7.0	1.0	0.0
Denmark	1.5	1.5	1.0	3.5	5.5	3.5	4.5
Finland	1.5	6.5	1.0	2.0	7.5	3.5	4.5
France	2.0	4.5	4.5	2.5	4.5	4.0	4.0
East Germany	--	9.5	6.0	11.5	6.0	2.0	3.5
West Germany	--	9.5	4.0	3.5	6.5	3.0	4.5
Greece	5.0	6.0	6.0	3.5	4.0	6.5	8.0
Hungary	5.5	2.0	1.0	10.5	8.5	5.0	4.0
Iceland	--	11.0	2.0	3.0	.5	4.5	4.0
Ireland	2.5	2.0	- .5	1.0	5.5	4.0	3.5
Italy	4.5	5.5	4.0	5.0	5.5	5.5	2.5
Luxembourg	-2.0	2.5	3.5	2.0	--	--	--
Netherlands	2.0	5.5	3.5	0.0	5.5	2.0	5.5
Norway	1.5	2.0	2.0	- .5	5.5	3.5	6.0
Poland	5.5	8.0	6.5	5.0	4.0	3.5	6.0
Portugal	1.0	4.5	3.5	3.0	5.5	5.5	6.0
Rumania	12.5	7.5	4.0	8.0	10.5	6.5	10.0
Spain	5.0	5.0	4.8	2.0	4.0	10.0	6.0
Sweden	1.5	4.0	2.0	2.5	4.0	4.0	5.5
Switzerland	1.5	3.5	4.0	0.0	4.5	2.5	3.0
U.S.S.R.	--	10.6	9.0	9.0	5.8	3.2	7.0
U.K.	2.0	3.5	1.5	1.0	3.5	1.0	4.0
Yugoslavia	--	7.5	2.5	10.0	7.5	5.5	9.0

TABLE B5

RATE OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65
Albania	--	--	49.5	5.9	49.3	25.8	1.3
Austria	1.1	1.6	7.0	9.5	7.3	3.3	.7
Belgium	7.0	- 1.5	19.2	3.4	8.5	34.8	- 9.3
Bulgaria	--	4.9	22.7	13.0	36.5	11.9	3.5
Czechoslovakia	- 5.1	- 4.4	2.4	8.1	-16.3	200.3	.2
Denmark	- 8.7	.2	.6	- .3	35.9	6.6	3.9
Finland	- .1	4.2	3.9	5.0	6.0	8.7	6.9
France	3.7	1.6	7.4	7.8	8.0	11.8	6.2
East Germany	--	28.2	4.5	1.2	24.5	- 6.4	- 1.0
West Germany	5.1	- .4	7.5	12.6	7.9	3.1	--
Greece	24.2	9.6	9.1	7.3	10.0	2.9	15.3
Hungary	3.5	- 6.3	.2	- 8.9	19.5	26.4	- 8.2
Iceland	2.0	2.3	.6	- 1.2	1.2	3.9	6.2
Ireland	5.8	7.0	1.3	2.6	5.1	12.1	11.4
Italy	17.5	2.3	3.3	- 4.2	11.2	6.8	6.5
Luxembourg	--	.7	13.8	-16.1	7.7	43.9	2.5
Netherlands	- 1.4	- .1	4.3	4.0	47.1	1.8	2.2
Norway	- 2.7	2.6	2.0	8.5	7.7	8.3	6.0
Poland	--	1.4	7.7	9.1	5.8	5.9	2.4
Portugal	2.9	11.0	7.6	9.0	4.2	15.5	3.7
Rumania	--	38.2	12.3	- 2.5	13.5	10.4	7.1
Spain	--	5.7	4.8	8.8	6.2	11.8	8.5
Sweden	3.7	2.0	6.8	6.8	6.3	7.0	7.4
Switzerland	- .8	.8	1.5	3.8	6.9	7.6	- 2.3
U.S.S.R.	--	--	5.6	7.2	5.8	16.8	4.5
U.K.	--	2.9	2.9	30.9	30.9	- 1.8	- .9
Yugoslavia	.8	16.1	11.3	20.5	27.9	6.2	8.1

TABLE B6

RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65
Albania	--	--	7.0	5.8	- .9	- .7	1.9
Austria	6.6	2.1	4.9	4.0	5.9	3.4	4.8
Belgium	5.2	2.8	3.8	5.5	3.2	4.2	4.4
Bulgaria	--	4.1	7.2	11.2	14.6	5.4	7.4
Czechoslovakia	12.6	9.6	5.3	7.2	7.5	1.1	- .9
Denmark	2.2	2.5	2.3	3.5	3.6	4.0	3.4
Finland	4.4	5.8	3.2	3.4	6.9	3.5	4.9
France	4.5	4.5	5.2	4.4	3.9	2.8	4.7
East Germany	--	7.7	4.7	7.6	6.7	4.2	5.3
West Germany	--	7.3	4.8	3.3	4.9	5.1	8.3
Greece	- 1.6	2.9	5.9	2.4	1.4	3.3	7.0
Hungary	6.7	4.5	.2	7.6	8.5	2.7	5.3
Iceland	--	4.8	4.8	- 3.6	2.1	3.6	3.1
Ireland	4.1	2.9	1.7	.9	5.5	3.7	3.4
Italy	3.8	6.5	3.2	3.8	5.1	3.7	4.4
Luxembourg	- .5	2.1	3.9	2.1	--	--	--
Netherlands	3.8	4.6	4.8	- .3	3.8	2.4	5.5
Norway	4.5	2.9	1.1	1.5	3.9	3.2	4.0
Poland	6.6	6.5	5.7	3.0	7.8	3.4	6.4
Portugal	- .4	4.1	1.7	1.9	3.6	4.9	5.9
Rumania	9.8	8.0	2.5	6.4	5.3	8.6	9.9
Spain	5.8	4.4	--	2.9	3.6	7.1	5.0
Sweden	3.0	3.7	1.7	3.1	2.0	3.2	5.3
Switzerland	1.7	3.9	4.3	2.1	3.5	1.5	4.4
U.S.S.R.	--	7.9	12.8	5.8	7.2	3.1	6.2
U.K.	3.7	3.3	2.5	1.4	2.7	.7	2.2
Yugoslavia	--	4.5	2.9	7.7	4.9	3.4	6.7

TABLE B7

RATE OF GROWTH 1952-65: SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE INDICATORS

	Urbanization	Higher Education Enrollment	Radio Diffusion	Per Capita Income	Non-Agricultural Employment	Infant Mortality Rate*
Albania	26.2	94.7	26.6	4.3	--	2.0
Austria	- .5	7.8	3.1	7.0	1.4	3.8
Belgium	.6	14.8	5.1	4.2	.2	3.7
Bulgaria	4.5	16.3	36.3	8.9	6.1	5.1
Czechoslovakia	1.4	4.8	2.1	5.1	1.9	4.5
Denmark	.9	7.1	1.3	3.5	1.1	2.6
Finland	7.2	8.1	4.8	4.9	2.0	4.0
France	1.3	12.5	5.5	4.6	1.6	4.0
East Germany	--	14.1	3.0	9.2	1.3	4.4
West Germany	1.2	10.7	4.0	6.7	1.3	3.8
Greece	3.2	21.5	17.8	8.4	- 1.1	2.0
Hungary	.9	1.0	1.2	5.8	3.0	3.8
Iceland	.5	2.2	2.4	3.9	2.8	2.1
Ireland	2.5	12.6	6.0	3.0	1.0	3.0
Italy	1.5	4.8	11.5	6.3	2.5	2.9
Luxembourg	.3	57.2	4.8	3.4	1.1	3.2
Netherlands	.4	16.5	1.7	4.1	1.0	2.9
Norway	.6	11.8	1.2	3.6	.9	2.7
Poland	2.3	3.6	13.1	7.2	2.1	4.1
Portugal	0.0	6.4	17.3	5.4	1.2	2.1
Rumania	4.3	6.8	56.3	10.9	3.9	4.1
Spain	1.5	3.7	16.3	5.3	1.4	3.1
Sweden	.3	17.6	1.6	3.9	.9	2.4
Switzerland	.3	3.8	1.6	3.2	.6	2.9
U.S.S.R.	1.9	7.1	20.3	9.9	3.4	4.4
U.K.	- .1	20.1	1.3	2.9	.1	2.5
Yugoslavia	4.1	12.5	40.5	10.7	3.6	2.6

* rate of decline

TABLE B8

RATE OF GROWTH 1952-65: SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE INDICES

	Social Mobilization	Economic Growth	Gap
Albania	51.3	3.1*	48.1
Austria	3.5	4.1	- .6
Belgium	6.8	2.7	4.1
Bulgaria	19.0	6.7	12.3
Czechoslovakia	2.8	3.8	- 1.1
Denmark	3.1	2.4	.7
Finland	6.7	3.6	3.1
France	6.4	3.4	3.0
East Germany	8.6*	5.0	3.6
West Germany	5.3	3.9	1.4
Greece	14.2	3.1	11.0
Hungary	1.0	4.2	- 3.1
Iceland	1.7	2.9	- 1.2
Ireland	7.0	2.3	4.7
Italy	5.9	3.9	2.0
Luxembourg	20.7	2.6	17.2
Netherlands	6.2	2.7	3.5
Norway	4.5	2.4	2.1
Poland	8.7	4.5	4.2
Portugal	7.9	2.9	5.0
Rumania	22.5	6.3	16.1
Spain	7.2	3.3	3.9
Sweden	6.5	2.4	4.1
Switzerland	1.9	2.2	- .4
U.S.S.R.	9.8	5.9	3.8
U.K.	7.1	1.8	5.3
Yugoslavia	19.0	5.6	13.4

* missing data on one index

APPENDIX C

INSTITUTIONALIZATION INDICES

These tables present the values of the institutionalization indices and of the value of the combined index. These values were obtained from the scales presented in Chapter 3. Table C1 contains the values of indices which remained unchanged throughout the 14-year period. The individual indices in Table C2 and C3, durability of institutions and the status of the legislature in Table C2 and elite continuity in Table C3, experienced shifts during 1952-65. Table C4 presents the combined index value of each country both for each two-year period and for the 1952-65 period.

TABLE C1

INSTITUTIONALIZATION INDICES: 1952-65, UNCHANGED

	Power Distribution	Bureaucratic Development	Interest Articulation	Continuity of Party System
Albania	1	3	1	5
Austria	5	5	3	5
Belgium	5	5	4	5
Bulgaria	1	3	1	5
Czechoslovakia	1	3	1	5
Denmark	5	5	5	5
Finland	5	5	5	5
France	3	5	4	3
East Germany	1	3	1	5
West Germany	5	5	4	5
Greece	5	3	3	1
Hungary	1	3	2	5
Iceland	5	5	4	5
Ireland	5	5	3	5
Italy	5	5	3	3
Luxembourg	5	5	5	5
Netherlands	5	5	4	5
Norway	5	5	5	5
Poland	1	3	2	5
Portugal	1	3	2	5
Rumania	1	3	1	5
Spain	1	3	2	5
Sweden	5	5	5	5
Switzerland	5	5	4	5
U.S.S.R.	1	3	2	5
U.K.	5	5	4	5
Yugoslavia	1	3	2	5

TABLE C2

INSTITUTIONALIZATION INDICES: 1952-65, WITH CHANGE

	Durability of Institutions				Status of Legislature			
	Value	Years	Value	Years	Value	Years	Value	Years
Albania	1	1952-65			1	1952-65		
Austria	3	1952-65			5	1952-65		
Belgium	4	1952-65			5	1952-65		
Bulgaria	1	1952-53	2	1954-65	1	1952-65		
Czechoslovakia	1	1052-53	2	1954-65	1	1952-65		
Denmark	4	1952-65			5	1952-65		
Finland	3	1952-65			5	1952-65		
France	4	1952-57	1	1958-65	5	1952-57	3	1958-65
East Germany	1	1952-65			1	1952-65		
West Germany	1	1952-63	2	1964-65	5	1952-65		
Greece	1	1952-63	2	1964-65	3	1952-65		
Hungary	1	1952-55	2	1956-57	1	1952-65		
Iceland	3	1952-65			5	1952-65		
Ireland	3	1952-65			5	1952-65		
Italy	1	1952-61	2	1962-65	5	1952-65		
Luxembourg	4	1952-65			5	1952-65		
Netherlands	5	1952-65			5	1952-65		
Norway	4	1952-65			5	1952-65		
Poland	1	1952-55	2	1956-65	1	1952-65		
Portugal	3	1952-65			1	1952-65		
Rumania	1	1952-55	2	1956-65	1	1952-65		
Spain	3	1952-65			1	1952-65		
Sweden	5	1952-65			5	1952-65		
Switzerland	5	1952-65			5	1952-65		
U.S.S.R.	3	1952-65			1	1952-65		
U.K.	5	1952-65			5	1952-65		
Yugoslavia	1	1952-65			1	1952-65		

TABLE C3

INSTITUTIONALIZATION: ELITE CONTINUITY

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65
Albania	4	3	5	5	3	5	5
Austria	5	5	5	5	2	5	3
Belgium	4	4	4	2	3	3	4
Bulgaria	4	5	4	5	3	4	4
Czechoslovakia	4	5	4	4	5	2	5
Denmark	4	5	5	5	5	4	5
Finland	3	4	2	3	4	3	5
France	3	2	5	1	2	2	5
East Germany	4	5	5	5	4	1	4
West Germany	5	5	5	5	4	2	3
Greece	4	4	4	3	5	2	1
Hungary	5	4	3	4	4	3	4
Iceland	5	5	4	4	5	4	5
Ireland	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Italy	4	3	3	4	2	2	3
Luxembourg	5	5	5	3	5	5	4
Netherlands	5	5	4	4	3	4	3
Norway	4	4	5	5	5	3	4
Poland	4	4	2	4	5	3	5
Portugal	5	5	5	4	4	4	5
Rumania	2	3	4	4	4	4	5
Spain	5	5	4	4	4	3	4
Sweden	5	4	3	4	5	5	5
Switzerland	4	5	5	5	4	5	3
U.S.S.R.	3	3	2	3	1	1	2
U.K.	5	4	3	2	5	4	5
Yugoslavia	5	3	5	4	5	5	4

TABLE C4

INDEX VALUE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65	1952-65 Average
Albania	16	15	17	17	15	17	17	16.3
Austria	31	31	31	31	28	31	29	30.3
Belgium	32	32	32	30	31	31	32	31.4
Bulgaria	16	18	17	18	16	17	17	17.0
Czechoslovakia	16	18	17	17	18	15	18	17.0
Denmark	33	34	34	34	34	33	34	33.7
Finland	31	32	30	31	32	31	33	31.4
France	27	26	29	20	21	21	24	24.0
East Germany	16	17	17	17	16	13	16	16.0
West Germany	30	30	30	30	29	27	29	29.3
Greece	20	20	20	19	21	18	18	19.4
Hungary	18	17	17	18	18	17	18	17.6
Iceland	32	32	31	31	32	31	32	31.6
Ireland	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31.0
Italy	26	25	25	26	24	25	26	25.3
Luxembourg	34	34	34	32	34	34	33	33.6
Netherlands	34	34	33	33	32	34	32	33.1
Norway	33	33	34	34	34	32	33	33.3
Poland	17	17	16	18	19	17	19	17.6
Portugal	20	20	20	19	19	19	20	19.6
Rumania	14	15	17	17	17	17	18	16.4
Spain	20	20	19	19	19	18	19	19.1
Sweden	35	34	33	34	35	35	35	34.4
Switzerland	33	34	34	34	33	34	32	33.4
U.S.S.R.	18	18	17	18	16	16	17	17.1
U.K.	35	34	33	32	35	34	35	34.0
Yugoslavia	18	16	18	17	18	18	17	17.4

APPENDIX D

REPRESSION

Table D1 indicates the frequency of reported repression in each of the European countries for both the two-year periods and the 1952-65 fourteen-year period. These data were obtained by combining the frequency of reports of government action against specific groups and of arrests found in the data collected by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold.

TABLE D1

FREQUENCY OF REPORTED REPRESSION

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65	1952-65 Total
Albania	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Bulgaria	1	0	1	0	0	1	2	5
Czechoslovakia	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	9
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	1	1	0	3	16	5	0	26
East Germany	2	1	1	0	5	6	1	16
West Germany	0	0	1	0	3	9	5	18
Greece	2	0	0	0	0	10	7	19
Hungary	1	1	7	0	2	3	1	15
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	3
Italy	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Poland	4	1	6	0	3	9	5	28
Portugal	0	0	1	2	5	14	10	32
Rumania	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	5
Spain	0	3	8	6	5	21	11	54
Sweden	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
Switzerland	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
U.S.S.R.	2	1	0	1	3	7	4	18
U.K.	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	4
Yugoslavia	0	2	2	4	3	3	1	15

APPENDIX E

INSTABILITY INDICES

Table E1 presents the frequency of events of unrest or instability reported in the data collected by Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold. Table E2 indicates the results of a factor analysis which included all of the individual indices reported for the 1952-65 period.

TABLE E1

FREQUENCY OF REPORTED UNREST

	1952-53	1954-55	1956-57	1958-59	1960-61	1962-63	1964-65	1952-65 Total
Albania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Austria	2	0	0	1	2	2	3	10
Belgium	1	2	0	0	7	16	4	30
Bulgaria	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	5
Czechoslovakia	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	4
Denmark	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Finland	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
France	3	3	2	1	36	25	2	72
East Germany	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	5
West Germany	0	3	0	1	0	1	1	6
Greece	0	0	3	0	1	11	21	36
Hungary	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	8
Iceland	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Ireland	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	4
Italy	1	3	0	1	8	3	0	16
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	0	14	0	2	2	2	20
Portugal	0	0	0	2	4	14	12	32
Rumania	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
Spain	0	2	4	2	12	9	20	49
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland	1	2	0	0	2	2	1	8
U.S.S.R.	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	4
U.K.	0	2	0	3	3	5	0	13
Yugoslavia	0	0	1	3	1	0	2	7

TABLE E2

FACTOR ANALYSIS OF INDICES OF INSTABILITY, 1952-65*

Variable	1	2
Strikes	- .8923	- .0497
Demonstrations	- .3632	- .8027
Terrorism	- .9582	- .1206
Sabotage	.0987	- .7205
Guerrilla Warfare	- .9597	- .1492
Revolts	- .5284	- .0127
Assassinations	- .8820	- .3374
Coups d'etat	- .3991	.0395
Civil Wars	.0103	.1389

* orthogonal factor matrix, Varimax

APPENDIX F

RELATIONSHIP OF VARIABLES IN WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The individual countries were examined for relationships between the variables throughout the 1952-65 period. The following discussions draw upon political, social, and economic factors to illuminate the shifts in the variable index values. The graphs indicate the index values of each variable for each two-year period which were obtained by the formulas indicated in Chapter 3.

Austria

From 1952 through 1965, the rates of social mobilization and economic growth were moderate in Austria. An increase in the proportion of the population enrolled in higher education during 1956-61 resulted in a higher rate of social mobilization than of economic growth during that period. While not the least industrial country in Europe, Austria ranked well below the Scandinavian countries and other West European countries in per capita income and infant mortality rates during this period. It is interesting to note that the ending of allied occupation in 1955 coincided with these increases in social mobilization.

Except for anti-American demonstrations reported in the 1952-53 data, instability is not reported until 1958-59. This unrest occurred at a time of increasing social mobilization and decreasing economic growth. The continued rise in unrest during 1960-61, despite a decline in the gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth, was related to political factors. During this time disunity in the parliamentary elite, manifested in the declining level of institutionalization, may have encouraged demonstrators in their political protests. While instability during 1958-61 was primarily related to political factors, both the socio-economic and institutional changes during this time tended to exacerbate frustration and inhibit institutional protest.

Despite the still smaller gap between social mobilization and economic growth, economically motivated unrest occurred in 1962-63. Demonstrations and strikes for higher wages, however, may have resulted from a decrease in the rate of economic growth rather than the gap between that and social mobilization. Previous gains in economic growth, rather than social mobilization, may have created expectations of similar gains in the future, expectations which went unmet during 1962-63.

1964-65 was a period of elite disunity within the ruling coalition, and a consequent decline in the level of institutionalization; instability increased during this time. Again, a political issue rather than an economic one, the Tyrol question, seemed to be the basis of much of the unrest.



FIGURE F1

AUSTRIA: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

As in 1960-61, then, a decline in institutionalization was apparent during a period of politically motivated unrest. This phenomena supports Huntington's belief that weakened institutions are less able to channel political activity in acceptable ways.

The Austrian data do not present a clear set of relationships which support or refute Huntington's model. While there is some support for the linking of low institutionalization and instability, there is little to suggest the posited relationship between socioeconomic change and instability.

Belgium

As in the case of the other members of the Common Market, Belgium is a developed country. Between 1952 and 1965, media exposure, per capita income, and infant mortality rates underwent steady moderate changes. Enrollment in higher education fluctuated from a high of 65 per cent annual increase during 1962-63 to a 19 per cent annual decrease during 1964-65. These fluctuations are apparent in the rate of social mobilization.

High levels of institutionalization are found in the data for Belgium. However, some declines in institutionalization occurred during 1952-65 due to elite disunity and turnover.

Numerous instances of unrest are found in the data. This includes demonstrations against government policies

toward Nazi collaborators in 1953, protests against government discontinuation of church school subsidies in 1954-55, and Walloon protests in 1960-65 as well as economic protests.

The incidents of unrest which occurred during 1952-53 and 1954-55 were not motivated by economic discontent, and the patterns found in the data, i.e. rates of socioeconomic change and levels of institutionalization, during that period are not explained by the relationships posited in the model.

Instability did not again occur until 1960-61. In 1960, the losses accrued in the Congo resulted in new economic policies, including increases in taxes and changes in social security programs. These new policies had an especially strong impact in the Walloon region of Belgium and led to protest strikes there. The resentment over the regionally felt economic burden later expanded into general ethnic dissatisfaction. The even higher levels of instability found in 1962-63 indicate the expansion of the ethnic dispute when the proposed constitutional reform to alleviate Walloon discontent only resulted in more demonstrations. This dispute continued into 1964-65.

The fact that economic policies precipitated the ethnic dispute suggests that there may be a relationship between socioeconomic change and unrest during 1960-65. At least, the rise in the rate of social mobilization tended to increase frustration and discontent and exacerbate existing



FIGURE F2

BELGIUM: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

ethnic resentments. The diminished level of institutionalization during this period may have increased the likelihood that discontent would be expressed through unrest. The data after 1959, then, seem to have patterns which are consistent with the relationships in the model.

Socioeconomic change, however, cannot be related to unrest during 1956-57. The gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth was greater than that in 1960-61; however, no instability occurred. The higher level of institutionalization in 1956-57 may suggest some explanation. The instability in 1960-61 occurred after several years of elite disunity and turnover. The resulting decline in trust and faith in the parliamentary institutions may have increased the likelihood that even lower levels of discontent would result in instability. Institutionalization seems to be a major factor in determining instability in Belgium.

The two factors of socioeconomic change and institutionalization seem to be related to unrest as posited by the model.

Denmark

The data for Denmark show low stable levels of economic growth, with an extreme jump (1960-61) in an otherwise stable rate of social mobilization. A high level of institutionalization was reported between 1952 and 1965 with occasional declines due to elite turnover.

Only one incident of unrest and no repression was reported. The only case of instability which occurred was the anti-Soviet demonstration at the time of the Hungarian revolt. This demonstration was consistent with the policies of the government and cannot be viewed as an outgrowth of dissatisfaction with the regime.

Only during 1960-61 were there sufficient conditions to suggest that unrest was likely; i.e. the rate of social mobilization was almost ten times greater than that of economic growth. Despite this phenomenal gap between social mobilization and economic growth, no instability occurred. The high rate of social mobilization was the result of a tremendous increase in higher education enrollment, but apparently it did not have the destabilizing affect suggested by Huntington. Probably, the high and fairly stable level of institutionalization enabled the Danish political system to accommodate any political participation due to discontent.

Except for 1960-61, the low (and even negative) rates of social mobilization may account for the lack of instability. In addition, the high level of income and standard of living, over $2,000 per capita by 1965, may inhibit the impact of social mobilization on social frustration and political discontent.

If the assumptions about the stabilizing influences of institutionalization and the standard of living are correct, then the data on Denmark are not in conflict with the predictions of the model.



FIGURE F3

DENMARK: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

Finland

Like the other Scandinavian countries, Finland experienced little instability during 1952-65. While the moderate rates of social mobilization and economic growth may have limited the impact of socioeconomic change on Finland, the disunity among the elite and the limited coherence of institutions, indicated by a fluctuating level of institutionalization, would suggest a limited institutional capacity for dealing with frustration and discontent.

Throughout the 1950's and the early 1960's two main issues dominated Finnish politics, the economy and Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. The latter problem has had profound implications; for example, the difficulty of finding a cabinet strong enough to uphold its policies had been complicated by Soviet attitudes toward various national leaders. The leader of the Social Democrats was unacceptable to the Soviet Union; consequently, they were kept out of the cabinet despite the domestic advisability of such a move.

The constant reminder of the Soviet Union across the border may have inhibited the Finns from publicizing their frustration and dissatisfactions for fear their neighbor might exploit unrest and instability.

The high level of institutionalization and the low rates of social mobilization and economic growth may be the underlying bases of domestic stability. Despite the occurrence of a strike of civil servants for better wages in 1955



FIGURE F4

FINLAND: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

when the rate of economic growth was greater than that of social mobilization, there is little in the Finnish data to suggest whether the model is valid or not.

France

During the 1950's and early 1960's, France had the greatest change in its institutions and the most frequent instability of all the European countries, in addition to some socioeconomic growth.

The rate of economic growth between 1952 and 1965 was moderately low and stable in France, and that of social mobilization steadily increased after 1953 until 1964 when it dropped to pre-1956 levels. This increase in social mobilization is indicative of the growth in educational enrollments after 1958. By 1965, France had achieved high levels of media exposure, increased educational opportunities, and a per capita income of $1,732, second only to Luxembourg in the Common Market.

The French data also include the greatest shift in the level of institutionalization. The institutions of the Fourth Republic, with limited coherence and autonomy, were replaced by the untried institutions of the Fifth Republic. Thus, the period of institutional change and those years following the change were periods of institutional crisis and weakness.

Both the levels of instability and repression exhibited increases following the period of institutional decline.

From 1952 until 1958, the leaders of the Fourth Republic were unable to respond adequately to the colonial crises because of continuing disunity both within and between the coalition parties. During this time, unrest occurred at a relatively stable level. Figure F5 indicates this trend.

In 1958, the Fourth Republic was ended when deGaulle formed a new government and asked for a new constitution. The great drop in the level of institutionalization from 1956-57 to 1958-59 is indicative of this change.

The advent of the Fifth Republic resulted in new lows in the level of institutionalization. For example, the new institutions were so untried that institutional adaptability was at an all-time low. The new institutional arrangement also resulted in a decline in the power of the legislature and the consolidation of both legislative and executive powers in the office of the president, or more precisely, in the person of deGaulle. This shift meant a decline in the complexity and autonomy of the institutional framework of government. Finally, the return of deGaulle resulted in an extreme turnover in the governing elite; e.g. many members of the new cabinet had no previous experience as politicians. This resulted in a drop in institutional coherence.

While these dramatic institutional changes were taking place, unrest was minimized by the banning of demonstra-

tions and the arrest of extremists. However, by 1960, those in opposition of deGaulle's policy on Algeria rebelled. The period from 1960 through 1962 was filled with insurgencies, demonstrations, acts of terrorism, and assassination attempts. While these incidents of unrest were in response to the Algerian policy of deGaulle, limited institutional authority and legitimacy of the new governmental structures increased the likelihood that discontent would result in instability, i.e. non-institutionalized politics. Repression was used during this period to limit, if not prevent, further unrest. Many rebel leaders, including a number of generals, were arrested; some were executed.

In addition, during the most unstable part of the Algerian crisis, it is interesting to note the increasing gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth. This factor may be related to the outbreak of demonstrations for better economic benefits and working environments by farmers, workers, and even university faculties from 1961 through 1964. As in the case of the anti-deGaulle demonstrations on Algeria, the low level of institutionalization of the Fifth Republic only increased the likelihood of unrest.

In viewing the French experience in the early years of the Fifth Republic, two main sources of discontent emerge, the Algerian policy of deGaulle and the economic conditions of certain sectors of the economy. In the case of the former



FIGURE F5

FRANCE: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

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both the levels of institutionalization and of repression were related to the unrest. In the latter, both the level of institutionalization and the gap between social mobilization and economic growth were related to unrest. In both cases, relationships suggested in the revised model are consistent with the data.

West Germany

The German Federal Republic underwent total economic recuperation during the 1950's, and by 1965, it was recognized as a leading industrial power with increasingly wealthy and educated population. While the per capita income in West Germany, $1,667 by 1965, remained below Scandinavian levels, it almost doubled between 1950 and 1960. Similarly, substantial increases in higher education enrollment, e.g. in excess of 20 per cent annual gains in 1958-59 show the rapid growth occurring. During this time, West Germany had higher rates of social mobilization than did some of the Scandinavian countries.

The first case of unrest reported in the data occurred in 1954-55 in the form of anti-rearmanent demonstrations. These occurred during a period of stable institutionalization and declining social mobilization, due to a temporary decline in higher education enrollments. This situation is not consistent with the model.

Of the instability which was reported between 1952 and 1965, only once did it occur during a period of rising

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social mobilization and declining economic growth. The unrest which occurred during this time, 1958-59, was directly related to the discussion of reunification and the Oder-Neisse line. While the growing gap between social mobilization and economic growth may have added to the frustration felt by the refugee population, who led the demonstrations, it was these discussions which were the primary cause of the demonstrations.

Finally, instability was reported in the data for 1962-65. As in the case of unrest during 1954-55, this occurred during a time of declining social mobilization and rising economic growth. While socioeconomic change does not seem related to unrest in the predicted manner, institutionalization and repression do.

From 1961 through 1965, there were a series of events within the Cabinet and Bundestag which indicated a decline in the level of institutionalization. The end of Adenauer's rule, the der Spiegel affair and the cabinet crisis which ensued, and the resignation of the Minister of Justice when the War Crimes deadline was extended all seemed to test the smooth and efficient workings of the parliamentary institutions. It is not surprising that during this time the political institutions were less able to contain discontent.

It was during 1962-63 that the only case of economically motivated unrest was reported in the West German data; this unrest involved a strike protesting the low standard of living. Since this protest occurred in a time of declining

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social mobilization and gradually rising economic growth, it does not fit the predictions of the model concerning socioeconomic changes. However, this unrest did occur during a time of declining institutionalization as predicted by the model.

The continued low level of instability in 1964-65 related to the increased tensions over the War Crimes decision and the growth of the alleged neo-Nazi N.P.D. Instability occurred when the level of institutionalization had not yet reached previous highs. While economic conditions maintained increasing rates of economic growth, the level of institutionalization may have failed to limit the use of non-institutional channels for expressing political discontent.

The apparent relationship between rising levels of repression and declining levels of institutionalization during 1960-65 is an interesting phenomenon in the German data. This relationship may indicate that repression was used during a period of diminished institutionalization to limit the destabilizing impact of institutional shifts. The low level of unrest reported during this period may indicate the success of that strategy.

The data on West Germany from 1952 through 1965 presents some confusing elements. Socioeconomic change seems unrelated to unrest, institutionalization may be related only in a minimal way. The model does not aid the observer in understanding the instability reported here.

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

FIGURE F6

WEST GERMANY: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

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Greece

Greece was the poorest country in Europe to have functioning parliamentary institutions. By 1965, only Portugal had a lower per capita income in West Europe.

Rapid increases in media exposure in 1952-53 which then decreased steadily and the increasing rate of growth of educational enrollment in the 1960's resulted in the fluctuating rate of social mobilization between 1952 and 1965. The low rate of economic growth indicates the failure of the Greek economy to achieve a rapidly increasing standard of living.

The low level of institutionalization during 1952-65 indicates only moderate levels of institutional complexity and autonomy, and low levels of institutional adaptability and coherence. The declines in institutionalization during 1952-65 indicate further declines in coherence due to elite disunity and turnover. There was a slight increase in institutional adaptability in 1964-65 when the Karamanlis was succeeded by Papandreou as Prime Minister; however, this shift ultimately led to greater divisions within the elite.

Both instability and repression occurred only occasionally before 1960. However, after 1961, instability increased dramatically and repression increased, but to a lesser extent.

At first glance, Greek data is somewhat inconsistent with the model. While unrest broke out in the early 1960's

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for economic reasons, it failed to occur in 1952-53 when the gap between social mobilization and economic growth was much greater.

The unrest reported in the 1956-57 data was related to the Cyprus crisis. A number of riots and demonstrations occurred in Athens in protest of the British Cyprus policy. The relation of this unrest to a non-economic matter is indicated in Figure F7 where the gap between social mobilization and economic growth actually declined during 1956-57.

Despite an increasing gap and a decreasing level of institutionalization during 1958-59, it was not until 1960-61 that economic unrest developed. Similarly, despite a major drop in the rate of social mobilization during 1962, demonstrations against the economic situation continued. Both of these instances may suggest that the development and decline of discontent lag behind actual economic conditions.

Also during 1962-63, there were a number of major anti-governmental demonstrations after the assassination of Deputy Gregory Lambrakis. This unrest followed a prolonged period of disunity and contention between the political parties over the validity of the 1961 General Election. The drop in the level of institutionalization during 1962-63 indicates this crisis of parliamentary institutions; it was a crisis which continued through 1965 and was accompanied by a steady rise in instability. The increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth in 1964-65 may have intensified discontent, putting increased pressure on the

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

FIGURE F7

GREECE: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

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political institutions. The lack of a meaningful relation between repression and unrest may be indicative of the weakness of institutions.

The data on both socioeconomic change and repression can best be understood in the light of the institutional crisis. The increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth in 1964-65 could have intensified the pressure put on the political institutions. The weakness of the institutions made it extremely unlikely that governmental action would alleviate discontent. Similarly, the decline in repression during 1964-65, despite growing unrest, may indicate the inability of the political institutions to utilize force to prevent unrest. The low level of institutionalization, then, left the political system unable either to alleviate discontent or to forcefully prevent unrest and eventually resulted in a take-over of the political institutions by the military.

The relationships among the rates of social mobilization and economic growth, institutionalization, and instability suggested in the model seem valid in the case of Greece.

Iceland

Iceland, also, experienced stability between 1952 and 1965. Since the data indicate high levels of institutionalization and low rates of both social mobilization and economic growth, this virtual lack of instability is consis-

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

FIGURE F8

ICELAND: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

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tent with the model. Iceland cannot be described as a society undergoing rapid economic modernization or one with weak political institutions.

The very high income of Iceland in 1965, second only to Sweden of the 27 European countries studied, may have tended to diminish the impact of other sources of discontent.

On the basis of the model, instability would not be expected in Iceland. The model seems valid in the light of the Icelandic data.

Ireland

Ireland was the poorest nation in northwestern Europe during 1952-65. Its per capita income, $816 in 1965, exceeded that of only three West European countries: Portugal, Spain and Greece. The low rate of economic growth shows the moderate to low increases in income and decreases in infant mortality rates. High and subsequently declining rates of growth of media exposure and later growth in educational enrollment, up to a 21 per cent annual increase during 1962-63, are indicated by the 1952-53 and 1960-65 moderately high rates of social mobilization. Despite this growth, Ireland is still far outdistanced by her North European neighbors.

The stable, high level of institutionalization reflects the high level of complexity and coherence and moderately high levels of adaptability and autonomy of the Irish Republic's political institutions.

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

FIGURE F9

IRELAND: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

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Between 1952 and 1965, the data contained low levels of instability and repression. The occurrence of instability shown in Figure F9 seems to fit the predictions of the model. While the source of the instability which occurred during 1960-65 is not economic discontent but rather the division of Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland, the rise in the rate of social mobilization and the decline in that of economic growth probably increased frustrations and exacerbated nationalistic tensions. The repression which is reported was used to prevent border raids in 1956-57 and later.

The unchanging level of institutionalization suggests that, in the case of Ireland, political institutions were not related to instability. The fact that most of the unrest was directed at the regime of Northern Ireland rather than the Republic of Ireland tends to support this assumption.

While socioeconomic change may have raised the level of frustration and the likelihood of unrest, institutionalization does not seem related to instability. The importance of factors beyond the scope of the model are demonstrated in the failure of the data to consistently follow patterns predicted by the model.

Italy

Italy experienced only moderate rates of socioeconomic change between 1952 and 1965. Variations in the rates of increase of enrollment in higher education and, to a lesser

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extent, of media exposure led to sharply fluctuating rates of social mobilization. The decline in social mobilization in 1958-59 is the result of a 13 per cent annual drop in educational enrollment during that period. More moderate shifts in income and infant mortality rates are evident in the rate of economic growth.

As a functioning parliamentary system, Italy tends to have complex institutions. However, they tend to manifest low levels of adaptability, autonomy, and coherence. The high rate of cabinet turnover is shown in the declines in the level of institutionalization in 1952-65. The introduction of a left-center coalition in 1962 indicated a rise in the level of institutional adaptability.

Instability appeared fairly frequently in the Italian data, peaking during 1954-55 and again during 1960-61. In contrast, only two instances of repression were reported in the data.

Much of the instability which occurred in Italy during 1952-65 does not seem consistent with the revised model. Much of the unrest reported in the 1958-59, 1960-61 and 1962-63 data was due to international issues. In each of those periods, demonstrations and terrorism were used to express dissatisfaction with the Italian policy on the Tyrol. As in the case of French instability due to the Algerian situation, unrest over disputed territory cannot be directly linked to socioeconomic change, but rather to historical, national, and linguistic differences.

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The relationships posited in the revised model suggest that the greatest unrest would occur during the 1961-62 period because of the decreased level of institutionalization and the increased rate of social mobilization. Not only was 1960-61 a time of increasing terrorism over the Tyrol, it was also a time of turnovers and elite disunity as well as major anti-fascist demonstrations, e.g. a general strike in Genoa protesting the M. S. I. Congress being held there. The cases of instability reported for 1960-61 may have been precipitated by the gap between social mobilization and economic growth.

Only during 1952-53 and 1954-55 was there instability related to economic causes. At that time, there were strikes protesting dismissals and others demanding higher wages. However, since there is a complete reversal in the relationship from 1952-53 to 1954-55, the instability during these two time periods does not seem to follow the patterns suggested by the model.

The data on Italy do not contain all of the posited relationships; the rates of social mobilization and economic growth seem only occasionally related to unrest, repression does not occur in the postulated manner. However, continued elite disunity and lack of coherence within the parliamentary institutions may be an underlying cause of most Italian instability; it is interesting that, except in 1958-59, instability is found only in periods which have low levels of

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

FIGURE F10

ITALY: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

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institutionalization. The strength of institutions remains a likely deterrant to unrest.

Luxembourg

As in the case of some of the Scandinavian countries, the data on Luxembourg indicate that no instability nor repression occurred during 1952-65. However, Luxembourg did experience a phenomenal growth in higher education enrollment which is indicated by the 44 per cent rate of social mobilization in 1962-63. The great gap between social mobilization and economic growth which this resulted in would have increased the likelihood of instability, if the model is correct. None occurred!

The Luxembourg data also indicate a fairly high level of institutionalization, comparable to that of Norway. Only once in fourteen years did institutionalization decline due to elite disunity. It is possible that this level of institutionalization could account for the lack of instability, even with the extremely high rate of social mobilization.

Since many students of Luxembourg go to universities in other European countries, the rate of social mobilization may not reflect the actual rate of enrollment in institutions of higher education.

While it is impossible to verify, it seems likely that the high rate of social mobilization due to higher education enrollment would not have had a destabilizing affect

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

FIGURE F11

LUXEMBOURG: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

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because of the very low levels of enrollment. If this assumption is correct, then the data would not follow patterns predicted in the model.

Since the composite measure of the rate of social mobilization does not reflect the actual changes occurring in higher education enrollment, the model cannot be investigated in a valid manner for the Luxembourg data.

Netherlands

Between 1952 and 1965, the Netherlands had a low, but fluctuating, rate of economic growth. Moderate shifts in media exposure and, but for 1960-61, in educational enrollment occurred during this period. A dramatic jump in higher education enrollment is indicated in the 1960-61 rate of social mobilization. The data also report moderately high levels of institutionalization with declines during 1952-65 due to elite turnover and only limited unrest and repression.

As in the case of the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands' recent history has been remarkably free of instability. In the data from 1952 through 1965 there is only one reported instance of instability.

The predicted relationships between social mobilization, economic growth, institutionalization, and instability are not evident in the data. After 1955, there were shifts in the level of institutionalization which were not accompanied by any unrest. During 1960-61, when institutionalization reached its lowest level, the rate of social mobilization



FIGURE F12

NETHERLANDS: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

far exceeded the rate of economic growth. It is during this period that unrest should be most likely; its failure to occur casts doubts on the validity of the model.

The only case of unrest reported was during 1954-55, at the time of the Indonesian crisis. The low level of unrest experienced in the Netherlands at this time contrasts sharply with the French and Belgium domestic crises precipitated by the loss of colonial holdings. The high level of institutionalization and the fact that the rate of economic growth was higher than that of social mobilization may have helped to limit discontent and unrest.

Throughout the 1952-65 period, it is possible that the Netherlands maintained a sufficiently high level of institutionalization to make discontent less likely to result in instability. It may also be that the Dutch had a much greater threshold of discontent, or that the culture itself mitigated against the use of violent or unstable political activities. In any case, the model is not consistent with the findings of the data on the Netherlands.

Norway

The Norwegian data indicate that no instability occurred during 1952-65. This lack of instability is accompanied by low rates of economic growth and social mobilization, although increases in higher education enrollment account for some rise in social mobilization after 1957. The failure of instability to occur during a time of limited



FIGURE F13

NORWAY: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

socioeconomic change is consistent with the model.

While the data on Norway indicate lower levels of institutionalization than those of Iceland or Sweden, the strength of political institutions seems sufficient to accommodate the low level of dissatisfaction resulting from socioeconomic change. Also, the relatively high standard of living, $1,717 per capita income by 1965, probably minimized discontent.

As in other Scandinavian countries, then, the lack of unrest, high levels of institutionalization, and moderate rates of change found in the data support the predictions of the model.

Portugal

Portugal remained the poorest country in West Europe from 1952 through 1965. By 1965, the annual per capita income was still only $373. Steady increases in media exposure and fluctuating ones in education resulted in moderately high, but fluctuating, rate of social mobilization. Steady gains in income and uneven declines in the infant mortality rate are reflected in the lower rates of economic growth.

The data for Portugal demonstrate a moderately low level of institutionalization. Although the regime dates to pre-World War II, in 1965 it had yet to undergo a major change in leadership. The centralization of decision-making resulted in low levels of institutional complexity and moderately low levels of autonomy. Elite turnover during 1952-

65 was indicated by declines in the level of institutionalization after 1957.

Portugal was one of the two non-communist dictatorships in Europe during 1952-65. No instability was reported in the data until 1958-59. Until then, institutionalization had remained at a low but constant level and the gap between social mobilization and economic growth fluctuated with the rate of social mobilization remaining higher than that of economic growth.

However, in 1958-59, there was a decline in the level of institutionalization which was maintained through 1962-63. From 1958-59 through 1964-65, a period of low institutionalization, instances of unrest occur with increasing frequency. Only in 1964-65, when institutionalization increased in level, did instability decline.

In 1958, presidential elections set off violent demonstrations in Lisbon. This was the beginning of a series of anti-regime incidents which were climaxed in 1962 by an attack on a government garrison outside of Lisbon. Student demonstrations and riots were still occurring in 1965. Throughout this unrest, the regime continued to arrest offenders and to use force to stop dissent and demonstrations.

Instability seems to have occurred in times of high repression and low institutionalization. While the gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth does not maintain a patterned relationship with instability, it is interesting to note that the rapid increase in unrest



FIGURE F14

PORTUGAL: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

during 1962-63 occurred when the size of the gap greatly increased. While the main source of discontent was the political posture of the regime, increasing economic dissatisfaction may have exacerbated tensions.

The relationships between institutionalization, repression, and instability suggested in the model seem to have validity in the case of Portugal. Socioeconomic change does not seem to have a direct relationship with unrest; however, it may act as a contributing factor.

Spain

Spain, like Portugal and Greece, is a relatively unindustrial, poor country. The decreases in infant mortality rates, from 60 per 1000 live births in 1952-54 to 37.6 in 1964-65, and increases in media exposure, from 46 radios per 1000 inhabitants in 1952-53 to 136 in 1964-65 demonstrate that progress has been made even though Spain is still at a fairly low level of development.

Coupled with this low level of economic modernization was low institutionalization. The fact that the regime had not yet had a change in leadership, the lack of independence between government structures and the dominance of certain non-political groups, e.g. the army, resulted in low levels of institutional adaptability, complexity, and autonomy. Also, increased disunity within the regime resulted in decreases in coherence during the 1952-65 period.

Along with fairly rapid socioeconomic changes and low levels of institutionalization, the data also report high levels of instability.

As Figure F15 shows, the gap between social mobilization and economic growth remained moderate in size throughout the 1952-65 period. The jumps in the level of instability are not related to similar increases in the gap between social mobilization and economic growth. Despite this fact, there were a number of strikes and demonstrations throughout this period which protested inadequate economic conditions; these included demonstrations against inflationary rises in costs in 1954, spontaneous workers' strikes in 1956, and strikes in 1964 and 1965 for both better wages and freer unions. The occurrence of economic protest, however, does not seem associated with the gap between social mobilization and economic growth in the data.

While instability motivated by economic discontent occurred, the greater part of the instability and repression reported in the data was associated with protests against the regime itself and demands for liberalization. The low level of institutionalization found in the data and the issue of succession after Franco seemed related to the unrest after 1956-57.

While Franco attempted to forestall such an institutional crisis with his support for the heir to the throne as his apparent successor, repression was also used to keep the



FIGURE F15

SPAIN: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

lid on political demands for institutional revision. It is apparent from Figure F15 that after 1959, whenever repression declined, instability rose. The data indicate that repression may have been the only factor which could control instability.

The instability reported in Spain during 1956-65 included student demonstrations, distribution of leaflets and strikes for greater freedom of unions. 1960-61 also had a number of incidents of protest against government policies concerning the Catalans and the Basques and demanding greater regional freedom. Both the "liberal" and regional protesters seemed to have been encouraged by the institutional crisis. These protests also increased the likelihood that Franco's disappearance from the scene would initiate a crisis of major proportions.

While socioeconomic changes do not seem related to unrest, institutionalization, repression, and unrest seem to be interacting in such a way as to propel Spain into a breakdown of authority, legitimacy, and domestic peace.

Sweden

Both per capita income and standard of living indicate that Sweden must be acknowledged the richest country in Europe. The data also show that Sweden has one of the highest levels of institutionalization in Europe. These two factors alone suggest that instability would be at a very low level in Sweden. From 1952 through 1965, no instance of



FIGURE F16

SWEDEN: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

instability is recorded in the Swedish data. It was a period of fairly low rates of social mobilization and economic growth accompanied by high institutionalization. Only after 1955 did the rate of social mobilization exceed 5 per cent annually due to accelerated increases in higher education; by 1965, higher education enrollment was increasing in excess of 15 per cent a year.

During this 14 year span, the main political issues included both domestic economic matters and defense policies. The two instances of repression reported in the data were arrests of alleged Soviet spies, incidents which illuminate issues of defense and neutrality. It is not possible to link these cases of "repression" with matters of social frustration or economic dissatisfaction.

The recent history of Sweden, then, suggests that the model is valid in linking high institutionalization, low socioeconomic change, and domestic stability.

Switzerland

The Swiss data report limited cases of instability between 1952 and 1965. This period had only moderately low rates of economic growth and social mobilization and high levels of institutionalization. Also during 1952-65, only two cases of repression were reported in the data.

The unrest of the early and mid-1950's occurred at a time when the rate of economic growth was greater than that

of social mobilization; 1952-55 was also a time of high and increasing institutionalization. The data for these times do not contain patterns consistent with the model.

However, the instability during 1960-63 coincided with an increasing gap between social mobilization and economic growth. Protest demonstrations by farmers in 1961 were directly related to economic conditions; they were protesting the government's agricultural policy which failed to keep prices in line with costs. This unrest also occurred at a time of a slight decline in institutionalization. The instability of 1962-63 was related to the protests of Jura separatists who demanded a change in Canton boundaries; terrorist activity by the separatists led to arrests which are shown in the repression of 1962-63. At this time the rate of social mobilization was rising and that of economic growth was declining, possibly suggesting that economic conditions intensified Jura dissatisfaction. However, unrest due to Jura separatists continued into 1964-65, a period of an actual decrease in the level, as well as rate, of social mobilization and an increasing rate of economic growth. While socioeconomic conditions do not agree with those which the model suggests are the cause of instability, the continuation of unrest in 1964-65 at a time of declining institutionalization is consistent with the relationship between instability and institutionalization posited in the model.

While unrest was directly related to socioeconomic concerns only during 1960-61, the patterns among social



FIGURE F17

SWITZERLAND: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

mobilization, economic growth, institutionalization, and instability found in the Swiss data after 1959 can be viewed as consistent with the predictions of the model. The lack of instability during 1956-57 is also consistent with the model. However, the instability of 1952-55 cannot be explained in view of the model.

United Kingdom

The data on the United Kingdom reported low levels of economic growth, extremely high rates of social mobilization in 1958-61 due to an expansion of higher education enrollment, moderate levels of instability, and some instances of repression. The data also indicate a high level of institutionalization during this period.

Throughout the 1952-65 time period, there were continued disputes over economic conditions which led to strikes, demonstrations, and riots in the United Kingdom.

As early as 1954, after some of the post-war economic controls were abolished, strikes for better economic controls occurred in many industries. Again throughout 1958-63 there were demonstrations, strikes, and even rent riots in protest against the lack of economic growth and the stagnant standard of living. The occurrence of these disturbances in a period of low and often declining rates of economic growth and of high social mobilization, 1958-63, is consistent with the model.

Political discontent may also have been exacerbated by the gap between social mobilization and economic growth. During 1960 and 1961, "Ban the Bomb" rallies and demonstrations were a frequent occurrence; also, during 1962, a neo-fascist rally in Trafalgar Square occurred and triggered counter demonstrations. It was these politically motivated activities which often led to the arrests and use of repressive tactics reported in the 1960-63 data.

Although there were shifts in the level of institutionalization during 1952-65, there is no consistent pattern relating the level of unrest to that of institutionalization. The turnover and disunity in the leadership displayed in Eden's succession to Churchill, the Suez crisis and the consequent replacement of Eden by Macmillan, as well as a cabinet crisis over the budget in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his colleagues resigned in 1958 all contributed to the declining level of institutionalization in 1953-58. The later decline, in 1962-63, indicates the disunity and decline in coherence which resulted from the exposure of Profumo's indiscretions. Despite these shifts in the level of institutionalization, Figure F18 does not show any obvious pattern in relating institutionalization to the other variables. The high level of institutionalization of the United Kingdom, with an institutionalization combined rating of 32 or better, may be so high that even a small decline in institutionalization will not decrease the ability of the govern-



FIGURE F18

U.K.: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

ment to accommodate political participation and political discontent.

Despite the failure to relate social mobilization and economic growth to the 1954-55 instability in the predicted manner, the data on the United Kingdom seem to support the relationship between socioeconomic change and instability which is posited in the model.

APPENDIX G

RELATIONSHIP OF VARIABLES IN EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Each East European, socialist country was examined for the postulated relationships from 1952 through 1965. The shifts in the index values were supplemented with an understanding of political, social and economic factors of this period. The index values themselves were obtained by the formulas for the two-year measurements set forth in Chapter 3.

Albania

Of all the European countries, least is reported about Albania. This has resulted from a conscious policy of isolation from both western democratic and European socialist countries. Consequently, there are major limitations to the data on Albania. Information about socioeconomic conditions has been available only occasionally since 1952. Rates of neither social mobilization nor economic growth could be calculated prior to 1956. However, high rates of social mobilization since then indicate rapid growth in both media exposure and higher education enrollment. Similarly, the extremely few cases of repression and unrest reported in

the data, unusually low compared with other East European countries, raises a question about the validity of the data.

The low level of institutionalization during 1952-65 indicates the low levels of adaptability, complexity, and autonomy found through the East European states.

As in the case of Bulgaria, the data cannot be explained by the model. This is particularly the case in the 1956-57 and 1960-63 data where extreme gaps between social mobilization and economic growth coincide with continued stability. The levels of institutionalization during those periods also do not indicate why unrest failed to occur. Particularly in 1960-61, the drop in institutionalization and the rapid increase in social mobilization make the lack of instability a glaring ommission. However, the only reported instance of repression in the data, in 1960-61, may help explain the continued stability during this time. A number of Albanian communists were arrested and tried for complicity in a plot against the regime. The fact that any repression was reported may indicate a major governmental crack-down.

In general, the lack of other reported instances of repression, and of any instability is probably due to the lack of information about Albania. Consequently, it is most likely that it is impossible to utilize any model in interpreting domestic politics in Albania since reliable data cannot be found.



FIGURE G1

ALBANIA: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

Bulgaria

Like many East European countries during 1952-65, Bulgaria had fairly high rates of socioeconomic change and fairly low levels of institutionalization. During 1956-59, the growth of media exposure was very high, reaching over 40 per cent annual growth in 1956-57. Later on, in 1960-61, rapid increases in higher education enrollment occurred, an annual rate of growth of over 58 per cent. The high rates of growth in media exposure and education enrollment account for the two peaks in the rate of social mobilization in 1956-57 and 1960-61. The fairly high rate of economic growth during 1958-61 indicates the steadily accelerating per capita income at that time.

The low level of institutionalization indicates the low levels of autonomy, complexity, and adaptability which are typical of the highly centralized, party dominated political systems of East Europe. The level of adaptability increased after Zhivkov became the First Secretary of the party in 1954. Shifts in the level of institutionalization also occurred due to elite disunity and declines in institutional coherence.

During 1952-65, both repression and instability were only occasionally reported; both were found in the 1952-53 and the 1962-65 data.

When looking for relationships between the variables in the Bulgarian data, it seems questionable whether the data

is consistent with the model. Unrest in 1952-53 and 1962-63 were related to economic policies. However, in 1962-63, when data is available, the gap between social mobilization and economic growth was considerably smaller than in periods of stability, i.e. 1956-57, 1960-61. While the rise in repression in 1956-57 may have accounted for the lack of unrest at that time, the stability of 1960-61 is less easily explained, particularly since institutionalization declined during that period.

The rapid rate of economic growth between 1956 and 1961 may offer another means of explanation. The unrest in 1962-63 occurred during a period of rapid decline in economic growth, from over 14 per cent annual growth in 1960-61 to less than 6 per cent in 1962-63. The patterns in the data suggest that a continuing rise in the rate of economic growth may have limited discontent prior to 1962; however, the sharp decline in the rate of growth may have increased doubts that aspirations due to social mobilization, past and present, would be achieved.

During 1964-65, unrest occurred which involved an alleged plot against the government by high ranking administration and military officials. This incident occurred during a time of stable institutionalization, declining social mobilization, and rising economic growth. The rise in repression at this time is an indication of the government action taken against the conspirators. As in earlier periods,



FIGURE G2

BULGARIA: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

the data do not demonstrate the relationships posited in the model.

The data for Bulgaria do not seem consistent with the model. The rate of economic growth seems to be the dominant factor related to instability in Bulgaria.

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia is one of two East European countries, East Germany being the other, which had achieved fairly high levels of industry and urbanization prior to 1950. The rates of socioeconomic change during 1952-65, then, are based upon different levels of development than are found in other European communist countries.

The unusually fluctuating rate of social mobilization is based on low rates of growth in media exposure and extreme shifts in educational enrollment. The declining rate of economic growth indicates a slowing down and ultimate decline in the standard of living, both income and infant mortality rates reflecting this decline.

The low level of institutionalization found in Czechoslovakia is due to low levels of institutional autonomy, complexity and adaptability. There was a slight rise in the level of institutional adaptability after Gottwald's death and Novotny's succession to power. Elite disunity during the de-Stalinization period and during 1962-63 when there was frequent turnover in high positions is indicated by the decline in institutionalization.

Consistent with data for Poland and Hungary, Czechoslovakia also had instability reported during the de-Stalinization period, 1953-56. Demonstrations and riots in 1953 occurred during and after major regime reorganization. The change in political leaders, e.g. the trial of Slansky in 1952 and the death of Gottwald in 1953, as well as the ongoing reorganization of the party, had resulted in public uncertainty and lower levels of institutionalization. Similarly, the instability found in 1956-57 was accompanied by a decline in institutionalization. In contrast to Poland and Hungary, however, the 1956 instability in Czechoslovakia was minor. Nevertheless, the decline in the level of institutionalization in each of these countries seems related to the instability which occurred.

Unlike institutionalization, the socioeconomic change occurring in Czechoslovakia was different from that in other East European countries; the rate of economic growth steadily declined between 1952 and 1965. This pattern was accompanied by a sharp rise, and then a decline in the rate of social mobilization in 1962-65. It is particularly during this period that the situation in Czechoslovakia contrasts with the revised model. In 1962-63 the rate of social mobilization was far greater than that of economic growth. There was also a decline in institutionalization due to elite turnover in both the party and the government. The model would suggest that instability should be most likely to occur during



FIGURE G3

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

this period; it did not. This lack of instability may be explained by increases in the level of repression.

The 1964-65 data contains patterns which are not posited by the model. Disturbances over the rising cost of living during 1964-65 broke out at an unlikely time, during a period of increased institutionalization and a greatly decreased gap between social mobilization and economic growth. However, the instability in 1964-65 coincided with a decline in the level of economic development (e.g. per capita income). This coincidence suggests that a decline in the level of economic development either can increase the impact of the gap or, independently, can lead to high levels of frustration. The decline in the rate of economic growth may have resulted in fears that aspirations could not be achieved, thus resulting in social frustration. The unrest in 1964-65 may have been the result of a decline in the rate of economic growth occurring soon after there were major increases in the rate of social mobilization.

East Germany

While the German Democratic Republic was a fairly modern country in 1952, the moderately high rates of economic growth indicate that, despite this level of development, the German economy expanded considerably between 1952 and 1965. Although media exposure was extended at moderate rates, education enrollments fluctuated greatly, actually declining

in 1962-65. The rapid increases and occasional decreases in enrollment signified the dramatic shifts in the rate of social mobilization.

In 1965, the German Democratic Republic had yet to undergo a major change in leadership. Due to Ulbricht's longevity and power, institutional adaptability remained at a low level. Similarly, institutional autonomy and complexity were at low levels due to the over-centralization of the regime and the overwhelming dominance of the party over all other political institutions. Declines in institutional coherence, the result of elite disunity and turnover, also were reported during 1952-65.

Both instability and repression were reported in the data. While unrest was reported only in the early years of the 1950's, repression was at a low level during 1952-57 and later increased to high levels during 1960-61.

As in other East European countries, the de-Stalinization years, 1953-56, evidenced greater instability than later years. Extreme measures of repression were used in response to a popular uprising.

1953 was the year of the East German uprising against the regime; it grew out of strikes occurring in response to new economic quotas and policies. Because of incomplete data, neither the rate of social mobilization nor economic growth can be determined for 1952-53; however, it is known that massive repression was used by the Soviet army to put down the

uprising and that the casualty rate was quite high.

The only other period with instability found in the data is 1956-57. Student demonstrations in 1956, however, seem more easily explained by the winds of change sweeping through all of Eastern Europe, demanding greater freedom and national control, than by domestic events in East Germany. As Figure G4 indicates, the rate of social mobilization is actually slightly less than that of economic growth. This fact, as well as the unchanged levels of repression and institutionalization, suggest that the 1956 demonstrations resulted from factors not included within the model.

During the 1960's, a second type of pattern seemed to emerge in East German politics. In 1961 the Berlin wall was erected which effectively cut off the flow of refugees into West Berlin. It is logical to assume that, prior to 1961, many of those dissatisfied with the regime could "vote with their feet." This safety valve tended to inhibit the destabilizing affects of discontent since action other than participating in strikes or demonstrations was available. It may be that economic conditions would be more highly related to refugee flow than to unrest.

Since access to the west inhibited instability, the erection of the wall should be related to levels of instability as well. Until 1961, only low levels of repression were reported in East Germany; however, since 1961, there has been a significant tightening up of internal control. The data suggest that, after 1960, higher levels of repression



FIGURE G4

EAST GERMANY: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

were used to maintain stability during times of discontent.

The use of repression from 1960 through 1965 is quite consistent with the revised model. It increased in 1960-61 as the gap between social mobilization and economic growth reversed and widened and also in 1962-63 when institutionalization dropped. However, when institutionalization increased at a time of declining social mobilization, in 1964-65, repression also dropped dramatically. It seems as though the regime used repression to counteract the destabilizing affects of rapid social mobilization and declines in the level of institutionalization.

Prior to 1960-61, when the refugee traffic was halted, socioeconomic change did not seem related to unrest. Since 1960, however, the lack of unrest could be the result of repression inhibiting expressions of discontent despite high social mobilization and declining institutionalization. This would be consistent with the model.

Hungary

Hungary experienced fluctuating rates of socioeconomic change between 1952 and 1965. The fluctuations in social mobilization indicate dramatic shifts in education enrollment coupled with stable, low increases in media exposure. The uneven rate of economic growth demonstrates the fluctuating shifts in the standard of living.

The low level of institutionalization is the result of limited institutional adaptability, complexity, and auton-

omy. After 1956, there was a slight increase in the level of adaptability as the party underwent its first significant change in leadership after Rakosi and Gero were replaced. Elite turnover and disunity brought about declines in institutional coherence in 1954-55, 1956-57, and 1962-63.

Throughout the entire 14 year period, moderate levels of repression occurred. However, only prior to 1958 was instability reported in the data.

The removal of General Farkas from the Politburo in 1953 signalled the beginning of de-Stalinization; the elite disunity which continued through 1957 was a result of this process. The only unrest reported in the data occurred during this period.

At the times of reported instability, 1952-53 and 1956-57, the rate of social mobilization was not greater than that of economic growth. Thus, Huntington's view of the impact of socioeconomic change on stability is not supported by these data. However, the institutional crisis occurring throughout East Europe and the continuing decline in the rate of economic growth may have reinforced non-institutional expressions of discontent. The tremendous unrest in 1956 may have been the result of discontent which was building up through 1954-55, when no instability was reported. The actual decline in higher education enrollments in 1954-55 may have inhibited discontent during those years, only to have a return to past levels of enrollment set off an explosive chain of discontent



FIGURE G5

HUNGARY: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

in a time of institutional uncertainty. The increase in repression indicates the increase in arrests of both public officials and active rebels as well as massive Soviet intervention.

After 1957, unrest failed to occur, even at times of major increases in social mobilization. It seems likely that the resumption of moderate levels of repression and the belief that the Soviet Union would intervene again if conditions warranted it inhibited expressions of dissatisfaction, even at times of major discontent.

While the Hungarian data do not support Huntington's contentions about socioeconomic change, there does seem to be a relationship between institutionalization, repression and instability.

Poland

Despite a limited level of economic modernity, Poland experienced only moderate rates of social mobilization and economic growth during 1952-65. No major gaps between social mobilization and economic growth occurred during this time.

Like its East European neighbors, Poland also had fairly low levels of institutionalization due to the short life and high centralization of the political institutions and the dominance of the party over them. While the consolidation of power by Gomulka in 1956-57 resulted in a slight rise in institutional adaptability, elite turnover and disunity during that period and at other times resulted in de-

clines in institutional coherence.

Fluctuating levels of repression and instability occur in the data from 1952 through 1965.

Between 1952 and 1957 unrest occurred in Poland which could be explained by the relationships posited in the model; however, later cases of instability seem unrelated to economic modernization.

Demonstrations and riots broke out in June of 1956; they continued sporadically for most of the last half of the year. The riots in Poznan began as peaceful demonstrations by workers protesting their low standards of living; the demonstrations soon spread to other industrial areas. Only after some casualties was order restored. Later that year, demonstrations were held in support of the Hungarians.

The unrest during 1956-57 occurred during a period of increasing social mobilization and declining economic growth; with the rate of social mobilization becoming somewhat higher than that of economic growth.

During this period there was also a decline in the level of institutionalization due to elite turnover, i.e. major changes in both party and governmental elite. Bierut died, Berman resigned from the Central Committee, several ministers were dismissed or transferred, and Gomulka was released from internment and by August was back on the Central Committee. Since before the rioting broke out, there had been open disunity among the elite with the continued removal

of old line Stalinists at all levels of the administration. It was only in 1957 that the results of this change became more apparent and more regularized; in particular, the power of the police declined.

Since instability in 1956 coincided with a declining level of institutionalization and a growing gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth, the data for that period seems quite consistent with Huntington's model. The use of repression to limit the instability suggests that the regime was unwilling to allow disturbances; but it is interesting to note that many of the workers demands were met.

In the following two years, instability did not occur despite an even greater gap between social mobilization and economic growth. During 1958-59, the reassertion of a unified party over other organizations (e.g. workers' councils) was indicated by a higher level of institutionalization. It is possible that this increase in institutionalization as well as remembrance of past levels of repression were sufficiently inhibiting to prevent further unrest.

From 1960 through 1965 a constant level of instability was maintained. This unrest seems to be unrelated to shifts in social mobilization, economic growth, or institutionalization found in the data; consequently, it remains unexplained by the model. Most of the repression during this period was aimed at domination of the Church and of the intellectual community. It is probably that the increasing levels



FIGURE G6

POLAND: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

of repression in 1962-63 were used to discourage political activities outside of institutional channels during a period of institutional decline. Interestingly, demonstrations occurred to protest the state's action; these only led to further repression. In the first half of the 1960's, then, unrest occurred which was not related to economic factors but as a response to political policies. The source of frustration lay in factors outside the model's consideration.

While Poland did not experience extreme rates of social mobilization, the variables suggested by the model do help to interpret unrest in Poland.

Rumania

From 1952 through 1965, the rate of socioeconomic change fluctuated in Rumania. The data on social mobilization reflect the extreme expansion of media exposure during 1952-55, over 75 per cent annual rates of increase in that period, and the fairly high rates of growth of higher education enrollment during 1960-63, with an 18 per cent annual increase in 1960-61. Between 1952 and 1965, economic growth also continued at moderately high levels with a slight decline between 1956 and 1961.

Low scores were apparent on a second major variable, institutionalization; these scores slowly increased through the years. As in other East European states, low autonomy and complexity are indicated by the low institutionalization

rating. The rising level of institutionalization is the result of increased elite unity, which was particularly low during the 1952-53 purges, and increased adaptability, demonstrated by the emergence of new leadership under Georghiu-Dej and his final consolidation of power during 1956-57.

Perhaps it is due to the steady rise in the level of institutionalization that little instability is reported in the data. The only instability reported occurred in 1960-61, a period of stable institutionalization, declining repression, increasing social mobilization, and decreasing economic growth. While this instability was related to increasing nationalism among the Hungarian minority, the changing economic situation was likely to have exacerbated tensions. On the basis of the propositions of the model, 1960-61 would be the period most likely to have unrest between the years 1958 and 1965. Huntington's model is of some use in explaining the lack of violence in the early 1960's.

Prior to 1958, however, the model seems inappropriate, less able to explain the data. Perhaps the lack of instability during 1956-57, which had similar socioeconomic change to that in 1960-61, may be the result of a rising level of institutionalization. However, the gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth during 1954-55 exceeds that of 1960-61. Similarly, the level of institutionalization was also lower than in later years.

The repression which occurred from 1952 through 1955



FIGURE G7

RUMANIA: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

involved not only arrests of former leaders, but also arrests of alleged sabateurs, the deportation of thousands, and a continuing anti-Semetic campaign. The introduction of repression as a factor into the model increases its usefulness in interpreting that period.

The revised model, then, helps to explain the limited instability in Rumania.

U. S. S. R.

The Soviet Union is the dominant European power, and like Yugoslavia and Albania, it is one of the few communist countries which is not heavily dominated by an outside power. Throughout the 1952-65 period, the Soviet Union maintained fairly low levels of institutionalization due to a lack of institutional autonomy, limited complexity and coherence, and moderate adaptability. The disunity apparent in the elite after Stalin's death resulted in further declines in institutionalization both in 1956-57 and 1960-63. Increases in repression are also noticeable during the 1960-63 period.

Socioeconomic change was also occurring during this time. Rapid increases in media exposure, for example, a tripling of radios in the Soviet Union between 1952 and 1965, and higher education enrollment are indicated by the moderately high rate of social mobilization. A declining, yet positive, rate of growth of per capita income and an uneven rate of decline of infant mortality rates is shown in a declining rate of economic growth.

The Soviet Union is interesting, not because of the correlation between instability and the gaps between social mobilization and economic growth, but because of the apparent use of repression to prevent unrest.

The instability which is found in the data is reported for only 1956-57 and 1958-59 and seems unrelated to economic change. At least in part, the instability was a result of the crisis of de-Stalinization. For example, this unrest includes demonstrations in 1956 by students loyal to Stalin.

However, the lack of instability during 1962-63, a time of rapid social mobilization, declining economic growth, and low institutionalization, may be explained by the high level of repression which occurred. After 1959, there were increasing arrests of both dissenting intellectuals and economic exploiters, e.g. black marketeers. The regime seemed to be forcefully imposing its authority over "liberalizing" elements.

The data suggest that the level of institutionalization may be the key factor in determining the likelihood of instability. The de-Stalinization of the mid- and late-1950's threatened the authority and legitimacy of the party; the unrest during this period seems to be directly related to the decline in the level of institutionalization. When institutionalization again declined in the early 1960's, a concomitant increase in repression seemed to limit instability.



FIGURE G8

U.S.S.R.: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

While economic change may not be a factor in determining Soviet unrest, both institutionalization and repression seem to be related to instability in the U.S.S.R. between 1952 and 1965 and may account for the lack of instability during periods of increased socioeconomic change.

Yugoslavia

Since 1954, Yugoslavia has undergone rapid increases in media exposure and occasionally of rapid expansions in higher education enrollment. These increases are manifested in a fluctuating, sometimes moderately high, rate of social mobilization. The more moderate rate of economic growth between 1952 and 1965 indicates the limited changes in per capita income and the infant mortality rate. By 1965, however, Yugoslavia could not be considered a "modern" country by European standards. For example, the Yuglslav infant mortality rate was over 70 per 1000 live births in 1965, three times greater than that of the U.K., over twice that of Spain, and only exceeded by that of Albania. Similarly, by 1961 only Albania, Greece, Portugal, and Spain had fewer radios per inhabitants.

Coupled with the low but rising standard of living was a low level of institutionalization. The continuation of Tito in power had postponed the first major crisis of adaptability. The maintenance of dominance of the League of Communists is manifested in a moderately low level of

institutional autonomy and complexity. Elite disunity during 1952-65 also accounted for declines in the level of institutionalization. The ousters and arrests of Djilas and his defended Dedijer during 1954-55 were cases which particularly threatened the unity of the elite and, consequently, led to a decline in institutional coherence.

From 1952 through 1965, Yugoslavia experienced moderate levels of instability. As Figure G9 shows, the rate of economic growth and the level of instability followed very similar patterns in the Yugoslav data. While this is an interesting phenomenon, it is the relationship of the gap between the rates of economic growth and social mobilization to instability which is at the core of the model.

On the basis of the predictions of the model, instability most likely should occur during 1954-55, 1958-59, and 1960-61. It would be least likely during 1962-63 and 1964-65. Figure G9 indicates somewhat inconsistent results. The instability which occurred during 1958-61 does coincide with high rates of social mobilization and significantly lower rates of economic growth. The slight decline in the level of institutionalization during 1958-59 may also account for the highest level of instability between 1952 and 1965 even when other periods had greater socioeconomic changes. However, the lack of instability during 1954-55 followed by instability during 1956-57 when both the gap between social mobilization and economic growth was smaller and the level of insti-



FIGURE G9

YUGOSLAVIA: VARIABLE VALUES, 1952-65

tutionalization was higher is quite inconsistent with Huntington's model. The data on repression do not explain this inconsistency since level of repression was stable during these two periods.

However, the demonstration reported in 1956-57 was related to the Hungarian Revolt and did not challenge regime policy. The instability reported in the data of 1956-57, then, was the result of a factor, i.e. Soviet intervention in East Europe, which is not included in the model and did not indicate dissatisfaction in the Yugoslav regime.

Similarly, the outbreaks of instability reported during 1964-65 were the result of Croat separatists. Unlike the instability during 1958-61, this unrest was the result of increasing nationalism and ethnic disharmony and coincided with a decreasing gap between the rates of social mobilization and economic growth. This ethnic unrest, unlike that of 1956, is consistent with the patterns predicted by the model.

The lack of instability during 1954-55, however, is more difficult to explain. The similarity in the conditions of 1954-55 and 1958-59 suggest that random factors may have accounted for the occurrence of unrest at one time and not at another. A consideration of the level of repression does not illuminate this paradox.

At best, the model permits only limited insights into the events in Yugoslavia.