“ONLY THE FOURTH CHIEF”: CONFLICT, LAND, AND CHIEFLY AUTHORITY IN
2OTH CENTURY KWAZULU-NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA
By
Jill Elizabeth Kelly

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
History
2012

ABSTRACT
“ONLY THE FOURTH CHIEF”: CONFLICT, LAND, AND CHIEFLY AUTHORITY IN 20TH
CENTURY KWAZULU-NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA
By
Jill Elizabeth Kelly
This dissertation examines the local nature of South Africa’s transition-era political violence
(known in isiZulu as uDlame). While common explanations for the conflict focus on the struggle
for political legitimacy between the rural and traditionalist Zulu ethnic nationalist movement
Inkatha and the young and urban African National Congress (ANC), I argue that for the
individuals and communities involved, politics were local.

For the peri-urban Nyavu and

Maphumulo chiefdoms in the Table Mountain region outside of Pietermaritzburg, KwaZuluNatal, these larger struggles were embedded in a century-old debate over land and what it meant
for a chief to be legitimate. Drawing on a rich combination of written and oral sources, the
dissertation examines the role of colonial and apartheid governments in the appointment and
succession of Zulu chiefs, the engendering of debates over legitimacy and chiefly authority,
boundary conflicts, “faction fights,” and competing claims on land.
In the Table Mountain region, the Nyavu, whose chiefdom predated the rise of the Zulu
state under Shaka, made land claims based on their hereditary status against the chiefdoms
established in the area by the British such as the Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo (chapter one).
The construction of a dam during the segregation era and the establishment of Tribal Authorities
and bantustans under apartheid exacerbated these contests over access to land and political
legitimacy (chapter two). The rise of the ethnic nationalist movement Inkatha in the KwaZulu
bantustan, forced relocations, and an increasing population meant many parties competed over
scarce land in the Table Mountain region (chapter three).

As political violence erupted across KwaZulu-Natal and in the Gauteng townships during
the late 1980s, the Table Mountain region initially remained a haven of peace under the “peace
chief” Mhlabunzima Maphumulo of the Maphumulo chiefdom. In offering himself as
peacemaker and protector, Chief Mhlabunzima attracted new Maphumulo members onto the
contested land, sparking the deadly transition-era violence with the neighboring Nyavu (chapter
four). Maphumulo’s actions also caused a rift within his chiefdom (chapter five). Local actors
used both the national and local contest between Inkatha and the ANC as an opportunity to
decide the land dispute through violence. The final chapter (six) turns away from the maledominated experience of the violence to analyze how women’s discussions about it reveal both
their claims on ethnicity and uses of Zulu culture as a coping mechanism.
The historiographical significance of these findings is threefold. First, my dissertation
builds on earlier concerns of African historians about the importance of land for chiefly
legitimacy, but goes beyond them by examining other claims to authority, such as hereditary
descent, resource allocation, and security and protection during conflict. Second, after the
advent of democracy, historical research and public history in South Africa has emphasized
commemorative liberation history that tends to overlook the relatively recent painful, divisive
years of warfare that almost scuttled the 1994 elections. Third, my study has relevancy in
contemporary South African and African human rights debates over state/peasant relations and
the role of chiefs and land reform in postcolonial African politics and democracy.

Copyright by
JILL ELIZABETH KELLY
2012

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The popular isiZulu proverb “ubuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” has it that a person is a person
through other people. Here I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who have
helped in my scholarly, professional, and personal development, contributing to this project in a
multitude of ways.
At Michigan State University, the African Studies community and History Department
has been a nourishing and challenging home. I am especially grateful to my advisor, Peter Alegi,
for his unwavering support and expert guidance that pushed me to become a better researcher,
writer, and engaged scholar. Peter Limb gave graciously of his time and knowledge, helping me
access invaluable sources and rethink the historiography. I must also thank my other committee
members, Walter Hawthorne and Laura Fair, whose insights into African and oral history have
helped me envision history as I do. Bob Hitchcock, David Wiley, Chris Root, and John Metzler
kindly shared their expertise. Susan Graff of the MSU Library doggedly tracked down resources
for me. The oral project portion of this project would not have been possible without the FLAS
support of the MSU African Studies Center and my isiZulu instructors both here and in South
Africa. To Lindile Ndlebe, Thokozani Langeni, Nonhlanhla Mbeje, Ndela Ntshangase, and
Happiness Msibi—Ngiyabonga kakhulu!
I am also grateful for my Africanist cohort at MSU and the colleagues and friends made
on the Fulbright-Hays Zulu GPA. At MSU, Leslie Hadfield, Assan Sarr, Lindsey Gish, Bala
Saho, Lumumba Shabaka, Joshua Grace, and Breanne Grace have supported me in many ways
both in and out of the classroom. It has been both a pleasure and enriching experience to
continuously cross paths and share interests with GPA mates Nicholas Rush Smith, Lauren
Jarvis, and Meghan Healy.

v

A Fulbright Dissertation Development Research Abroad fellowship and support from the
MSU Department of History allowed me to spend time in South Africa where many people
guided and supported me in my research. Most importantly, I would like to thank the people of
Mbambangalo, KwaNyavu, and Haniville who opened their homes and shared their lives and
memories with me. I am particularly grateful to umndeni wami, the Gcabashes, for welcoming
me into their family, and to the Maphumulos, for sharing their stories and helping me track down
relatives and colleagues of the late chief. Happiness Memela, Agnes Nxumalo, and Phyllis
Ngubane gave graciously of their time and introduced me to so many of the men and women
interviewed. Special thanks are necessary for Thandeka Majola, not only for her research
assistance but for her friendship, dedication, and the ability to make everyone laugh.
Many people in academic and archival institutions in South Africa facilitated my research
and made me feel at home. I found a warm intellectual community at the University of
KwaZulu-Natal. Jabulani Sithole encouraged me and provided valuable information on the Natal
Midlands. Jeff Guy graciously imparted his knowledge and provided me with important leads.
Discussions with Radikobo Ntsimane about oral history greatly impacted my methodology for
the better. I appreciate the help of Archivist Peter Nel at the Pietermaritzburg Repository of the
National Archives. Ntokozo Njoko at the Ulundi Repository went above and beyond the call of
duty. Mwelele Cele at the Killie Campbell Collections was a great help and friend. Special
acknowledgement is reserved for Jewel Koopman and Estelle Liebenberg-Barkhuizen who not
only shared their expertise and friendship but made the Alan Paton Centre a home-away-fromhome for me.
Finally, I would like to thank my family, particularly my mother. She may joke that she
doesn’t know where I came from, but this would not have been possible without her hard work,

vi

love, and support. Most of all, I am grateful to have shared this experience with Brandon, whose
intellectual insight inspires me and whose humor keeps me sane.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………….ix
List of Maps……………………………………………………………………………………....xi
Note on Terminology…………………………………………………………………………….xii
Glossary (English-isiZulu)………………………………………………………………………xvi
Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………………xviii
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..2
Chapter 1: “He said he wants to be registered as a chief:” Hereditary Chiefs and “Government
Tribes,” pre-colonial-1905……………………………………………………………………….59
Chapter 2: “I would like to suggest Mr. Ferreira’s farm”: Boundaries, Betterment, and Chiefly
Authority on Onverwacht and Goedverwachting, 1905-1973………………………………….111
Chapter 3: “Only the fourth chief”: Zulu Politics and Land Jurisdiction, 1973-1988 …………187
Chapter 4: “Because my people are in the MDM, I have to be with them”: uDlame and the Peace
Chief, 1983-1990 ………………………………………………………………………………244
Chapter 5: “Do you understand being chased out with your chief?” uDlame and Chiefly
Authority, 1990-1994 …………………………………………………………………………..317
Chapter 6: “So that the bullet can’t hit you”: Women, Violence, and Zuluness, 1990-1994 .....376
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………..402
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………………...411

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Misspelled road sign for the renamed Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo Road, 2011….4
Figure 2: Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo……………………………………………………….4
Figure 3: Sketch of Table Mountain from Zwartkop Road, c. 1864……………………………..59
Figure 4: Chief Ngoza with izinduna……………………………………………………………93
Figure 5: Chief Swayimana kaManyosi and other chiefs………………………………………..93
Figure 6: Common lineage of Nyavu and Njilo chiefdoms…………………………………….109
Figure 7: Division of Qamu chiefdom………………………………………………………….110
Figure 8: Table showing sale of Goedverwachting…………………………………………….141
Figure 9: Table showing increase in local population………………………………………….166
Figure 10: Maphumulo succession……………………………………………………………..183
Figure 11: Nyavu succession…………………………………………………………………...184
Figure 12: Sketch of betterment plan for Goedverwachting, 1948……………………………..185
Figure 13: Sketch of betterment plan for Onverwacht, 1958…………………………………...186
Figure 14: The young Mhlabunzima Maphumulo and Thami Mkhize at Bhekuzulu College....208
Figure 15: Mhlabunzima Maphumulo at the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 1983…………..208
Figure 16: Mhlabunzima Maphumulo in Lusaka with Steve Tshwete, Alfred Nzo, and Chris
Hani, 1989………………………………………………………………………………………279
Figure 17: Mhlabunzima Maphumulo with Winnie Mandela at Contralesa rally, 1989……….279
Figure 18: Gaye (Ma Shembe) Maphumulo in front of a burning store, 1990…………………298
Figure 19: Women and children whose tents were destroyed, 1990…………………………...298
Figure 20: Convoy of returning refugees, 1990………………………………………………...303
Figure 21: Mhlabunzima Maphumulo with Harry Gwala……………………………………...311

ix

Figure 22: Alfred Madlala……………………………………………………………………...329
Figure 23: Maphumulo men meet at the Maqongqo bottle store, 1990………………………...329
Figure 24: Phikilithetwa Ngubane at the Mboyi Massacre site, 1993………………………….360
Figure 25: SADF at the Mboyi Massacre site, 1993……………………………………………360
Figure 26: Male amaqabane at Table Mountain, 1990…………………………………………376
Figure 27: Table Mountain women waiting to leave during uDlame, 1990……………………376

For interpretation of the references to color in figures, the reader is referred to the electronic
version of this dissertation.

x

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1: KwaZulu-Natal (showing Table Mountain and other places of interest)…………………1
Map 2: The Upper Umngeni-Upper Mkhomazi River, 1830s…………………………………...62
Map 3: Inanda Location………………………………………………………………………...108
Map 4: South African Provinces, 1910-1994…………………………………………………..178
Map 5: Contested Boundary between the Maphumulo and Nyavu, 1882-1914..………………179
Map 6: Land acquisition for Nagle Dam project……………………………………………….180
Map 7: Tribal Authority boundaries, 1957..………………………………...………………….181
Map 8: Land acquisition by Trust after promulgation of tribal authority boundaries, 1958…...182
Map 9: Bantustans, 1984………………………………………………………………………..241
Map 10: KwaZulu Legislative Districts, 1985………………………………………………….242
Map 11: Table Mountain region showing disputed Trust land…………………………………243

Maps 1, 3, 5-8, and 11 were created by Justin Booth and Sarah J. AcMoody, GISP, Remote
Sensing & GIS, Michigan State University. They were designed by the author and should be
interpreted only as rough estimates.

For interpretation of the references to color in maps, the reader is referred to the electronic
version of this dissertation.

xi

NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY AND TRANSLATION

South African racial and ethnic terminology, morphology, and place names have changed over
time and in some cases are still open to debate. Terms such as “bantu,” “native,” “nonEuropean,” and “non-white” were deployed by segregation and apartheid laws and thus are used
here only in historically specific contexts or when in quotes from oral and written sources.
“African,” “white,” “Coloured,” and “Indian” are also problematic because they reflect apartheid
racial constructs that were wielded as instruments of surveillance and control. Classification
informed every aspect of a person’s life. Despite the repeal of the Population Registration Act
that bureaucratized these notions, racial categories still remain the norm for identification of
social actors and hold lingering salience within social consciousness.

1

Here, I follow this

identifying norm. African refers largely to Nguni and Sotho-Tswana speaking people while
“black” refers to all people of color as Black Consciousness activists used it.
Even the label “Zulu” can be contested. As we will see in chapter one, Natal’s Africans
have not always embraced Zulu identity. Only in the early 20

th

century did a diverse group of

Natal Africans begin to mobilize around Zuluness in the face of increasing discrimination and
2

repression. Today, the term holds common currency to refer to isiZulu-speaking peoples. It is
widely accepted as real by many while others promote alternative identities from their clan
histories.
1

For more on this topic, see Deborah Posel, “Race as Common Sense: Racial
Classification in Twentieth-Century South Africa,” African Studies Review 44, no. 2 (2001): 87–
113.
2
See John Wright, “Reflections on the Politics of Being ‘Zulu’,” in Zulu Identities:
Being Zulu, Past and Present, ed. Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole
(Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), 35–43.
xii

Similarly, the use of isiZulu words versus their English “equivalents” is a matter of
concern. The English appellation “chief” is increasingly objected to because it reflects the
colonial understandings of traditional authority and the isiZulu term inkosi is preferred (similarly
ubukhosi for chieftaincy, isizwe for chiefdom). I respect this preference but am faced with both
theoretical and practical issues. What of the colonially appointed leaders? Can and should
“inkosi” be used for both the hereditary and appointed figures? While perhaps distinguishing
between the two for the colonial period is historically accurate, should the distinction be made
for other periods in this study, including the contemporary context? Labeling the hereditary as
“inkosi” and the appointed as “chief” disregards the legitimacy many leaders who descend from
appointed officials acquired amongst their people over the years and ignores the fact that many
traditional leaders popularly associated with hereditary status were appointed by Shaka. I thus
use chief and chiefdom across the board with the qualification that no disrespect for preference is
intended. I do, however, in the fifth chapter, employ isizwe as the analytical term more
appropriate for understanding the non-static nature of the chiefdom. Induna is kept throughout as
a more precise term for the local leaders of the chiefdoms. Except when quoting a primary
source, I use modern orthography for isiZulu words.
I also employ udlame as the isiZulu description of the violence. There has been a
semantic shift in the meaning of the word and many older dictionaries do not translate the word
3
as “violence.” While many isiZulu-speakers recall using udlame to mean “violence” for all of
their lives, dictionaries did not reflect this definition until 2010. Early dictionaries translate the
4
word only as “framework of hut” or “main hut rafter.” One 1992 dictionary gives two
3

Thanks to Adrian Koopman and Sifiso Ndlovu for correspondence on the subject of
translating udlame.
4
See Clement M Doke and B. W Vilakazi, Zulu-English Dictionary (Johannesburg:
Witwatersrand University Press, 1964), 153; Scholar’s Zulu Dictionary: English-Zulu, ZuluEnglish, Third ed. (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1995), 333; English-Zulu, ZuluEnglish Dictionary, 1st combined ed. (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1990),
153.
xiii

meanings, “izintingo zexhiba sezimizwe zahlanganiswa” (the rafters of a hut), and appropriate
here, “ukusebenzisa amandla nobudlova ekuphumeleliseni inhloso ethile, indlovuyangena” (the
5
use of savagery in achieving aims). The latter clearly reflects the now widely accepted
translation of “violence,” as suggested in “indlovuyangena” (literally, “an elephant has entered,”
6
or “violence, forceful actions, high-handedness, hooliganism).” Only in 2010 does a dictionary
7

translate it as “violence” and omit any reference to the hut rafters. William Beinart attributed
8

the coinage of udlame to Radio Zulu. I chose to use uDlame not only because of its use by
informants, but because I believe the second 1992 definition best connotes the severity of the
violence experienced between 1987 and 1994, not only on account of the “savagery” but also the
resultant chaos, such as that which might result from an elephant storming through one’s home.
For the chiefdoms under examination, there are the many morphological changes possible
9

for their izibongo (clan names). The izibongo of the main subjects of this dissertation, the
Maphumulo and Nyavu, can occur in many forms. One member of the Maphumulo, is
uMaphumulo. The clan members are the abaMaphumulo. AbakwaMaphumulo can also be used
for all clan members, but more often means those of the Maphumulo house (the chiefly line).
Colloquially acceptable is amaMaphumulo. However, given the diversity across chiefdoms and
in order not to break up the flow of writing with all of these prefixes, I opt to use the simpler
English of clan root only—the Maphumulo.
This morphology is similar for the other chiefdoms discussed here, but special note
should be taken regarding the people of KwaNyavu. In 1924, when the “register of tribes” was
redone by the Pietermaritzburg Magistrate, Chief Ngangezwe Mdluli noted his desire the clan be
5

C. L. Sibusiso Nyembezi, AZ: Isichazimazwi Sanamuhla Nangomuso, 1st ed
(Pietermaritzburg: Reach Out Publishers, 1992).
6
English-Zulu, Zulu-English Dictionary, 160.
7
Gilles-Maurice De Schryver, ed., Isichazamazwi Sesikole Esinezilimi Ezimbili: IsiZulunesiNgisi: Esishicilelwe Abakwa-Oxford (Oxford Bilingual School Dictionary: Zulu and English)
(Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa, 2010).
8
Beinart also suspects the root is related to the root of indlavini, used in Pondoland for an
assertive male association of the 1930s. William Beinart, “Introduction: Political and Collective
Violence in Southern African Historiography,” Journal of Southern African Studies 18, no. 3
(1992): 485.
9
On izibongo morphology, see Adrian Koopman, Zulu Names (Pietermaritzburg:
University of Natal, 1999), 284–6. Special thanks to Koopman and A.M. Maphumulo for the
recommendations.
xiv

recognized by the chiefly family’s isibongo—the abakwaMdluli. Previously the register had
included both abakwaMdluli and abaseNyavini (the people of Nyavu). Prior to the establishment
of the Bantu authorities boundaries Chief Nongalaza Mdluli expressed the preference for
amaNyavu. Still other archival documents on the same clan list them as the amaCoseni. Mdluli,
Nyavu, and Coseni are all ancestors of the same chiefly lineage. I choose to use Nyavu because it
was used most frequently in interviews and in the contemporary press to describe the neighbors
of the Maphumulo.
Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations of oral history interviews in isiZulu are by
Thandeka Majola - though we frequently went back and forth over how best to do justice to the
translations. For those who speak isiZulu, the transcriptions in isiZulu are included in footnotes.

xv

GLOSSARY

iBambabukhosi (ibamba for short)

regent

isiBongo (plural, izibongo)

lineage or clan name; praise name

iButho (plural, amabutho)

regiment, organized by age

amaDlozi

ancestral spirits

uDlame

violence

inDuna (plural, izinduna)

an officer or official

inDunenkulu

principal official (head induna)

isiGodi (plural, izigodi)

district, ward

ukuHlonipha

to respect, act according to system of respect

inHlonipho

respect

inKantolo

court

iKholwa (plural, amakholwa)

believer; African Christian convert

ukuKhonza

to pay allegiance to

ubuKhosi

chieftaincy

inKosi (plural, amakhosi)

chief

iLala (plural, amaLala)

classification of second-class subjects in Zulu
kingdom

iMpi

army, battle

izimpi zemibango

wars of dispute

iziMpi zezigodi

section wars

iMpi yamakhanda

war of the heads, or poll tax rebellion of 1906





See explanation of translation in “Notes on Terminology and Translation.”
xvi

umNdeni

family, most often used in the dissertation to refer to
relatives of the chief

ukuNgena

to “raise seed,” procreate with a widow; marriage
practice where brother impregnates deceased
brother’s wife

iNthelezi

protective medicine, protective charm

iNtungwa (plural, amantungwa)

classification of commoner subjects in Zulu
kingdom close to the Zulu aristocracy

umNumzane (plural, amanumzane)

gentleman, homestead head

iNyanga

healer

iziPhakanyiswa (plural, izinphakanyiswa)

one who has been promoted

imPhepho

incense

iSiko (plural, amasiko)

culture, custom, tradition

umuThi

medicine, medicinal charm

ukuValelisa

to take one’s leave

umuZi (plural, imizi)

homestead

iZimu (plural, amazimu)

cannibal

ubuZimuzimu

often translated as cannibalism; more accurately
absence of social order

isiZwe

chiefdom

xvii

ACRONYMS

ANC

African National Congress

APC

Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives

BAD

Bantu Administration and Development

BOSS

Bureau for State Security

COGTA

Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs

CONTRALESA

Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa

COSATU

Congress of South African Trade Unions

DCD

Department of Cooperation and Development

DDA

Department of Development Aid

FOSATU

Federation of South African Trade Unions

IFP

Inkatha Freedom Party

KCAL

Killie Campbell Africana Library

KDC

KwaZulu Development Corporation

KZLA

KwaZulu Legislative Assembly

KZP

KwaZulu Police

MAWU

Metal and Allied Workers Union

MDM

Mass Democratic Movement

MI

Military Intelligence (of South African Defense Force)

MK

Umkhonto weSizwe (Spear of the Nation)

MP

Parliament Member

NAD

Native Affairs Department

xviii

NAR

National Archives Repository (Pretoria)

NIS

National Intelligence Service (the civilian agency)

NP

National Party

PAR

Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository

PRD

Department of Plural Relations and Development

PTO

Permission to Occupy

SABT

South African Bantu Trust

SACP

South African Communist Party

SADF

South African Defense Force

SADT

South African Development Trust

SANT

South African Native Trust

SAP

South African Police

SB

Special Branch (of the South African Police)

SNA

Secretary for Native Affairs

SSC

State Security Council

TRC

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UAR

Ulundi Archives Repository

UDF

United Democratic Front

UWUSA

United Workers Union of South Africa

xix

Map 1: Table Mountain and Areas of Interest, KwaZulu-Natal. For interpretation of the references to color in maps, the reader is
referred to the electronic version of this dissertation.
1

Introduction
On February 25, 1991, Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo, the chief of the Maphumulo people at
Table Mountain in KwaZulu-Natal, was shot dead as he pulled into the driveway of his
Pietermaritzburg home. Mhlabunzima was the fourth chief of the Maphumulo, a chiefdom
established by the British colonial administration in 1905. He believed his name, meaning “the
earth that is heavy” in isiZulu, foretold that he would live in troubled times and have many
1

responsibilities. Indeed, he led his people in an era of unprecedented repression and internecine
violence and lived in a changing South Africa. Only a year before his assassination, South
African president F.W. de Klerk unbanned the liberation movements, including the African
National Congress (ANC) of Nelson Mandela, paving the way for the transition to democracy in
South Africa. De Klerk told South Africans, “The season of violence is over. The time for
2

reconstruction and reconciliation has arrived.” But as Mandela walked proudly out of Victor
Verster prison on February 11, 1990 after 27 years in jail, KwaZulu-Natal was burning and Chief
Maphumulo’s people had deserted their Table Mountain homes for refugee camps.
The world watched with bewilderment as civil war erupted in Gauteng’s townships and
across KwaZulu-Natal. The media labeled it “black-on-black” and “tribal” violence, especially in
Gauteng where reporters often simply labeled the conflict as one between the Zulu ethnic
nationalist movement Inkatha and the rest (Xhosas, Sothos, Swazis, etc.) under the ANC.
Headlines such as “Tribal Feuds Won’t Let Up in South Africa” and “In South Africa, Violence

1

Ann Skelton, correspondence with the author, February 8, 2011.

2

F.W. de Klerk, (speech given to Parliament, Pretoria, February 2, 1990), Times Live,
http://blogs.timeslive.co.za/hartley/2010/02/02/fw-de-klerks-speech-to-parliament-2-february1990-full-text/.
2

3

Takes on Tribal Overtone” dominated the international press. They compared the viciousness of
the violence to Belfast and Beirut. Increasingly, ANC activists and the people under siege
pointed to Inkatha as an obstacle to liberation. As the conflict raged on, irrefutable evidence
began to emerge that the apartheid government had funded Inkatha activities and provided
paramilitary training as part of the state’s counterrevolutionary efforts. Violence monitoring
reports suggest that between 1987 and 1994, 20,000 people died as a result of the civil war,
12,000 in KwaZulu-Natal.

4

Maphumulo’s assassination sent shockwaves across the Pietermaritzburg communities
that had come to know him as “the peace chief.” This Table Mountain traditional leader
promoted political tolerance, organized peace efforts, and traveled around the world to call
attention to uDlame and assure a place for traditional authority in the new South Africa. In the
midst of the tumultuous civil war and the revelations about the state support for Inkatha, the
ANC embraced the deceased chief as one of their own and contended his murder was the work
of apartheid death squads. No killer was ever found, but testimony given at the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) suggests state and Inkatha involvement in the assassination
and cover-up.

3

Christopher S. Wren, “Tribal Feuds Won’t Let Up in South Africa,” New York Times
February 25, 1990; Roger Thurow, Wall Street Journal August 20, 1990.
4
The most commonly cited numbers appear from John Jacques William Aitchison,
“Numbering the Dead: The Course and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal Midlands:
1987-1989” (M.A. thesis, University of Natal, 1993); Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: Sixteen
Years of Conflict (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997).
3

Figure 1-2: left, misspelled street sign for the renamed Table Mountain Road, 2011, photo
by author; right, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, n.d., Thobekile Maphumulo Private
Papers. For interpretation of the references to color in figures, the reader is referred to the
electronic version of this dissertation.
In 2005, the ANC-led city of Pietermaritzburg renamed the road to Table Mountain after
the late chief. Maphumulo’s name was misspelled and news of the renaming misdated his death.

5

The publicly promoted memory of him as a neutral “peace chief” obscures the history of conflict
over land in this region and challenges to Maphumulo’s chiefly authority—major factors behind
the eruption of deadly violence in 1990. This superficial treatment of the past in a public
memorialization stemmed from the nation-building process promoted by the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of the late 1990s. The TRC tended to focus on covert state
aggression, often masking the violence where neighbor killed neighbor.

6

But it is this localized

violence that most affected the daily lives of the people of the KwaZulu-Natal villages and
townships engulfed in flames during the final years of apartheid. By requiring perpetrators to tie

5

“Baynes Drift Road–new name: Chief Mhlabunzima Road,” Natal Witness June 20,

2005.
6

Philip Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and
the Pursuit of ‘Social Truth’: The Case of Kathorus,” in Commissioning the Past: Understanding
South Africa’s Truth Adn Reconciliation Commission (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University
Press, 2002).
4

their acts to political motivations, the TRC obscured other factors contributing to inter and intra
community violence.
This study of Chief Maphumulo’s Table Mountain region reveals that political ideology
played a less significant role in uDlame than fierce local disputes over historically contested land
and over chiefly legitimacy. While explanations about uDlame in the scholarly literature
highlight the struggle for power between supporters of a rural, “traditionalist,” and
collaborationist Zulu ethnic nationalist movement, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, and those of a
young, modern, and urban liberation movement, the African National Congress, I argue that for
individuals and communities, the politics were local. For the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms
in the Table Mountain area outside of Pietermaritzburg, these larger struggles were embedded in
a century-old debate over land and what it meant for a chief to be a legitimate leader.
This dissertation then is a micro-history of conflict over land and chiefly authority in a
small place. Despite its attention to local causes for the violence, this study does not, of course,
deny the fact that the apartheid government sponsored violence against anti-apartheid
movements through its own organs and allies. Instead, I argue that the manner in which the
tentacles of the state and its allies wound themselves into African people’s lives enabled existing
tensions to flourish, and came perilously close to undermining South Africa’s transition from
apartheid to democracy.
This study builds on existing scholarship on the South African transition-era violence, as
well upon the larger literature on land, collaboration, and chiefs in Africa. I make three
arguments. First, that uDlame in Table Mountain erupted from a century-old dispute over land
and chiefly authority. I locate the origins of the conflict between the Nyavu and Maphumulo in
the colonial practice of indirect rule, including the creation of “native locations” and

5

“government tribes” and the establishment of boundaries. The Nyavu, who date their chiefdom
to the pre-Shakan era (pre-19th century), made claims on land under the authority of the newlycreated Maphumulo chiefdom based on their hereditary authority and occupation of the land.
During conflicts labeled as “faction fights” by the colonial officials, the Maphumulo and Nyavu
contested the jurisdiction of land and the legitimacy of their chiefs. Tensions between the
hereditary Nyavu and appointed Maphumulo escalated during the segregationist era when the
Native Administration Department (NAD) purchased adjoining white farms to relocate some
Maphumulo members from a portion of Inanda location to be excised for the Nagle Dam project.
However, the establishment of apartheid era-tribal authorities in the midst of NAD’s piecemeal
acquisition of the farms created further confusion over jurisdiction as a strip of desirable land
divided the chiefdoms. The claims on this contested land continued into the era of uDlame. The
shortage of land for African settlement and growth and the definition and manipulation of chiefly
authority was at the heart of these conflicts.
Second, I argue for more inclusive definitions of chiefly authority and political
legitimacy. While leaders of hereditary descent such as the Nyavu chiefs readily made claims on
land and authority based on their lineage, attention to the proverb “inkosi yinkosi ngabantu” (a
chief is a chief because of the people who khonza or pay allegiance to him) and the fluid manner
in which imizi (homesteads) joined and left an isizwe (chiefdom) enables us to focus on other
ways in which chiefs earned legitimacy. The mutually beneficial social contract of khonza held
chiefs responsible, though some took the relationship more seriously than others. While the
colonial administration had sought to constrain this practice of personal loyalty, during uDlame
Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo welcomed people into his chiefdom and onto the contested land
if they were willing to khonza him. Maphumulo’s followers remember the chief nostalgically

6

because they believed he kept that contract in mind. He may have been “only the fourth chief” of
an appointed chiefdom, as one opponent put it, but Maphumulo sought to provide land and water
to residents, and to spark economic development in his region. In the context of war, he
promoted peace and attempted to provide protection. Maphumulo’s critics expressed their dissent
and moved to depose him through an alliance with the neighboring pro-Inkatha chiefdom. While
the legitimacy of traditional authority is often thought of in the dichotomy of western
democracy’s consent of the governed and an African cultural sanction for hereditary leadership,
attention to the practice of khonza shows how Zulu chiefs historically gained and maintained
legitimacy based on consent of their subjects.
Third, this dissertation challenges earlier understandings of Zulu chiefs and Inkatha
supporters as merely collaborators of the apartheid regime. By taking into account a larger range
of strategies of survival and accommodation in the context of apartheid and civil war, this study
questions the meanings and persistent dichotomies of collaboration and resistance, warlords and
freedom fighters, government stooges and progressive chiefs. The actions of local Table
Mountain political figures and the life of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, a man who shifted
from royalist Zulu politician to neutral chief and finally to ANC leader on the both the local and
national levels, reveal the range of methods and changing tactics employed by traditional leaders
and their supporters—ones that do not fit easily into dichotomous categories.

Historical Context to the Violence
The “long decade” leading to South Africa’s first national democratic elections was an era of
tremendous social and political upheaval. Beginning in the late 1970s, the National Party
government under President P.W. Botha embarked on a program of reform and repression

7

designed to guarantee the stability necessary to ensure the country’s economic future. The
centerpiece of reform efforts was the adoption of a new constitution in 1983 that created a new
Tricameral parliament with separate bodies for whites, Asians, and Coloureds but no
7

representation for Africans outside of their bantustan governments. While the 1976 Soweto
uprising had not led to explosive resistance among youth in either the Natal Province or the
KwaZulu bantustan, the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 as an umbrella
organization of grassroots organizations opposed to the so-called Tricameral constitution
changed local political dynamics. The leaders of the UDF coalition of civic, church, student,
worker, and sport organizations sought to avoid an outright affiliation with the banned ANC, but
in practice membership was often overlapping and the movement’s character was influenced by
the strategies and tactics of the ANC.

8

Alongside its reforms, the apartheid state also embarked on a vicious campaign of
counterrevolutionary repression that included covert action (the so-called third force) to spread
fear and insecurity among the black population and to foment internal divisions within resistance
9

movements. In KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng townships, Inkatha participated in this campaign.
Formed in 1975 as a Zulu ethnic nationalist movement, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe aspired to
7

The ratio of white, coloureds, and Indians in the tricameral parliament would be 4:2:1
so that whites would always outnumber the rest, making their inclusion only symbolic. Gail M.
Gerhart and Clive L. Glaser, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African
Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990, vol. 6: Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990 (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2010), 7.
8
Jeremy Seekings, The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa,
1983-1991 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000); Ineke van Kessel, Beyond Our Wildest
Dreams: The United Democratic Front and the Transformation of South Africa (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 2000).
9
Jackie Dugard, “Low-Intensity Conflict,” in The Role of Political Violence in South
Africa’s Democratisation, ed. Ran Greenstein (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social
Enquiry, 2003), 1–5.
8

national prominence. Inkatha, led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, linked itself politically,
geographically, and ethnically with the KwaZulu bantustan. In its early days, Inkatha enjoyed the
standing of an internal liberation movement with the blessing of the ANC, but Buthelezi’s
growing cooperation with the apartheid government and his opposition to international sanctions
earned him and Inkatha the reputation of being government puppets.
Inkatha began to train young Zulu men at its paramilitary camp located at
Mandleni/Matleng as early as 1980 and later sent over 200 young men to South West Africa
(Namibia) to be trained by the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Caprivi Strip. These
“Caprivians” were deployed across KwaZulu-Natal in September 1986, often as KwaZulu Police
officers. These men were responsible for some of the most deadly incidents of violence in the
townships surrounding Pietermaritzburg, the provincial capital of Natal.
In the same year as the launching of the United Democratic Front, violence spiked across
the country. In the Eastern Cape and the Orange Free State, squads known as ama-Afrika and the
A-Team assaulted UDF activists. In KwaNdebele, Mbokodo members attacked anyone resisting
bantustan rule. In the Western Cape witdoek vigilantes razed shacks in Old Crossroads and KTC
under the watchful gaze of apartheid security forces.

10

Violence wracked KwaZulu-Natal,

especially in the Midlands region surrounding Pietermaritzburg. A riot broke out on the campus

10

For more on these movements and the violence, see Nicholas Haysom, Mabangalala:
The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa (Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal
Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986); Jason Conrad Myers, Indirect Rule in South
Africa: Tradition, Modernity, and the Costuming of Political Power (Rochester: University of
Rochester Press, 2008), chapter three. On witdoeke and resistance to forced removals in
Crossroads and KTC, see Sipho S. Maseko, “Civic Movement and Non-Violent Action: The
Case of the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee,” African Affairs 96 (1997): 353–69; Koni
Benson, “Crossroads Continues: Histories of Women Mobilizing Against Forced Removals and
for Housing in Cape Town South Africa, 1975-2005” (PhD dissertation, University of
Minnesota, 2009). Also visit www.cvet.org.za for video footage of the razings and interviews
with residents.
9

of the University of Zululand in 1983 when students protested a visit by Inkatha president and
KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha Youth Brigade, resulting in the
death of five students.
Tensions began to rise in Pietermaritzburg’s Imbali township and in Hammarsdale (on
the national road between Pietermaritzburg and Durban) as Inkatha launched campaigns of
forced recruitment in the face of increasing UDF popularity. Civic organizations formed selfdefense units in response. The assassination of Durban lawyer and UDF executive member
Victoria Mxenge and a Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)/UDF stayaway in
support of striking BTR-SARMCOL workers in Mpophomeni in 1985 sparked a spiral of
violence in and around Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Inkatha supporters killed 14 people at
Mxenge’s funeral in August and murdered three Mpophomeni shop stewards in December.
Tensions escalated into large-scale battles and attacks. A vicious cycle of death and destruction
erupted, with each side accusing the other of instigation. The climate of intolerance and fear
raged unabated and by 1987 the conflict had escalated into a regional civil war. The violence
spread to nearly every urban township, and later to the rural areas as well.
One local woman I spoke with proclaimed this war was unlike the others they had
known. “We used to hear about uDlame in other places but we did not know anything about it.
We only knew izimpi zezigodi (section wars).”

11

The post-1987 violence was unprecedented due

to the intensity and scope of death, arson, rape, the territorialization of loyalty and affiliation that
turned areas into no-go zones for supporters of UDF or Inkatha, and for the generational rupture

11

“uDlame luqale ngokuthi sihlale sizwa kwazinye izindawo ukuthi kunodlame kodwa
singazi nokuthi luyini ngoba thina sazi izimpi zezigodi.” Phumzile Mathonsi, interview with
author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21, 2011.
10

embedded in the larger politicization of youth.

12

For example, at KwaMakhutha in 1987, Inkatha

supporters ambushed the home of a UDF supporter and killed eight children and five adults. In
December 1988, a joint Inkatha-SAP force killed eleven people at Trust Feed. Then in March
1990, more than 200 people died and hundreds of homes were destroyed in what became known
as the Seven Days War, a conflagration that created 20,000 refugees. 34 people died in
Bruntville between November and December 1990. A KwaZulu Police-Inkatha hit squad in
Esikhawini murdered another 100 people between 1991 and 1993. On the South Coast, 32
Inkatha supporters died at Bomela and Folweni. In 1993 at Table Mountain, two ambushes on
vehicles killed 23. In Pietermaritzburg, high profile local leaders, such as Jerome Mncwabe and
Arnold Lombo of Inkatha and Reggie Hadebe and S’khumbuzo Nwenya of the ANC were
assassinated.

13

The year 1990 also saw the spread of the war to Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging
(PWV) area, now part of Gauteng province. Between 1990 and 1992, 112 massacres occurred in
the region. Local circumstances played a major role to the PWV violence, due to simmering
tensions between Zulu migrant workers livings in prison-like hostels and permanent residents of
the adjacent townships and settlements. Township rent boycotts, apartheid reforms, and ANC
plans for the conversion of hostels alienated migrant laborers, dramatically changing the
relationship between hostel dwellers and townships residents and sparking large scale attacks and
counter-attacks. Inkatha deployed the “Black Cats” hit squad to Wesselton and Ermelo. Conflict
12

Belinda Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid (Athens, Ohio: Ohio
University Press, 2004); Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in
Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-Natal, 1987-1993” (PhD dissertation, University of
Witwatersrand, 2007), 2–5.
13
This is just a sampling of some of the violations described in Chapter Three on
KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles (London: Macmillan, 1999).
11

erupted between hostel dwellers and the surrounding townships, resulting in unprecedented
numbers of deaths in Alexandra, Phola Park and Kathlehong. Massacres in 1991-2 in
Swanieville, Boipatong, and Sebokeng killed over one-hundred more.

14

For a long time scholars and analysts seemed reluctant to describe the violence of 19871994 as a war. Matthew Kentridge’s investigative journalism popularized the phrase “an
unofficial war.”

15

What might be perceived as a hesitancy to label the conflict of the late 1980s

and early 1990s simply as a “war” is perhaps the result of a cultural and political position.
According to Steven Collins, neither Inkatha nor the UDF/ANC wanted to admit that they were
participating in warfare because they sought to present themselves as victims to domestic and
international public opinion.

16

Kentridge points out that white South Africans knew little of what

happened in the black townships and rural areas and notes how the apartheid regime refused to
acknowledge the breakdown of law and order. But violence had become the day-to-day reality.
Any other label trivializes and diminishes the extent and effects of the conflict.

17

With at least

20,000 dead, 200,000 plus refugees, and thousands more injured, raped, and abducted, there can
be little doubt that many residents of KwaZulu-Natal and the Gauteng townships were actually at

14

Chapter six of volume three covers the former Transvaal region. South Africa Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report
Volume 3: Regional Profiles; South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 5: Findings and Recommendations
(London: Macmillan, 1999).
15
Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape
Town: David Philip Publishers (Pty) Ltd, 1990), 14–7.
16
Steven Collins, “‘Things Fall Apart’: The Culture of Violence Becomes Entrenched,”
in Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research
Council, 1992), 95.
17
Kentridge, An Unofficial War, 14–7.
12

war. The word used to describe this conflict in isiZulu, udlame, reflects the manner in which the
violence disrupted every aspect of daily life.

18

The scale and ferocity of uDlame in what is today KwaZulu-Natal province was brought
into stark relief during the TRC process of the 1990s. Nearly half of individual statements
reporting gross human rights abuses at the TRC came from KwaZulu-Natal, making the
proportion of submissions relative to population four times higher for this province than for the
rest of the country. Over half of all “politically motivated killings” and “severe ill treatment”
(which included arson, assault, stabbing, incarceration, shooting, burning, and destruction of
property) reported nationally occurred in KwaZulu-Natal.

19

The TRC found the apartheid state

and its allies, including the KwaZulu bantustan government, the KwaZulu Police, and Inkatha
20

responsible for most of the human rights violations in question.

Historiography of uDlame
Violence has been central to the history of South Africa, embedding itself into nearly every facet
of South African society.

18

21

From the genocide of the Cape Khoisan, the rise of the Zulu

Nyembezi, Isichazimazwi Sanamuhla Nangomuso.

19

South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles, 157–8.
20
South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa Report Volume 5: Findings and Recommendations, 227–32.
21
William Beinart, “Political and Collective Violence in Southern African
Historiography,” Journal of Southern African Studies 18, no. 3 (1988); Jacklyn Cock, Colonels
& Cadres: War & Gender in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991);
Catherine Campbell, “Learning to Kill: Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal,” Journal
of Southern African Studies 18, no. 3 (1992): 614–28; Gary Kynoch, “Crime, Conflict and
Politics in Transition-Era South Africa,” African Affairs 104, no. 416 (2005): 493–514; Clifton
Crais, Poverty, War, and Violence in South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011).
13

kingdom, the South African War, and the everyday brutality of the apartheid regime to studies of
post-apartheid crime and sexual violence, violence has been a persistent theme in the historical
literature.
But contemporary historical work and much of public history in post-apartheid South
Africa has overlooked the relatively recent painful, divisive years of warfare that almost scuttled
the 1994 elections. The South African historiography of the liberation movement focuses mainly
on the ANC and its allies and is complemented by a proliferation of memoirs and biographies of
the liberation struggle’s high-profile members.

22

Central to the post-apartheid examination of the liberation struggle has been the multivolume history produced by the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), a project
commissioned by then President Thabo Mbeki. SADET’s international and regional studies bring
to light the activities and strategies of revolutionary organizations and the counter-revolutionary
actions of the state. As many of these histories are not easily discerned from the few surviving
written records, SADET embraced as one of its mandates the collection of oral histories of South
Africans from all political persuasions. Particular emphasis was placed on capturing the life
22

South African Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Africa,
vol. 1–4 (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2004); Raymond Suttner, “Women in the ANC-Led
Underground,” in Women in South African History (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007); Raymond
Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa, 1950-1976 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009).
In addition to the numerous new biographies of Nelson Mandela, see Raymond Suttner, Inside
Apartheid’s Prison: Notes and Letters of Struggle (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press,
2001); Ben Turok, Nothing But the Truth: Behind the ANC’s Struggle Politics. Ben Turok
(Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2003); Ahmed Kathrada, Memoirs (Cape Town: Zebra
Press, 2004); Ronald Kasrils, Armed and Dangerous: From Undercover Struggle to Freedom
(Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2004); Ray Alexander Simons, All My Life and All My Strength,
ed. Raymond Suttner (Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 2004); Luli Callinicos, Oliver Tambo: His
Life and Legacy 1917-1993 (STE Publishers, 2006); Padraig O’Malley, Shades of Difference:
Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa (New York: Viking, 2007); Pippa Green,
Choice, Not Fate: The Life and Times of Trevor Manuel (Johannesburg: Penguin Books, 2008);
Janet Smith, Hani: A Life Too Short (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009); Mark Gevisser, Thabo
Mbeki: The Dream Deferred (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009).
14

histories of former exiles, members of the internal wings of the liberation movements, and the
veterans.

23

SADET’s extensive use of oral sources built on the tradition of the Wits History
Workshop. A cohort of scholars inspired by the increasing militarization and resistance of
African youth in the 1970s and influenced by the historical materialist approach turned towards
“history from below”. The Southern African Societies seminar series at the University of London
and the History Workshop conferences set out politically relevant subjects for social histories
and promoted research into the lives of everyday people.

24

Oral tradition and personal testimony

enabled radical scholars to more fully consider identity formation and popular consciousness as
experienced by black South Africans themselves, a trend that continues in recent publications.

23

25

Gregory F. Houston, “The South African Democracy Education Trust’s ‘Road to
Democracy’ Project: Areas of Focus and Methodological Issues,” African Historical Review 42,
no. 2 (2010): 3–26. See South African Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Democracy in
South Africa.
24
Philip Bonner, “New Nation, New History: The History Workshop in South Africa,
1977-1994,” The Journal of American History 81, no. 3 (1993): 977–85.The edited collections
include: Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone, eds., Industrialisation and Social Change in South
Africa: African Class Formation, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870-1930 (New York: Longman,
1982); Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, eds., The Politics of Race, Class, and Nationalism in
Twentieth-Century South Africa (New York: Longman, 1987); Belinda Bozzoli, ed., Class,
Community, and Conflict : South African Perspectives (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987).
25
Robert Morrell, Changing Men in Southern Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of
Natal Press, 2001); John Edwin Mason, Social Death and Resurrection: Slavery and
Emancipation in South Africa (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003); Peter Alegi,
Laduma!: Soccer, Politics and Society in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of
KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004); Mohamed Adhikari, Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial
Identity in the South African Coloured Community (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005); Jacob
Abram Tropp, Natures of Colonial Change: Environmental Relations in the Making of the
Transkei (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006); Nomboniso Gasa, ed., Women in South African
History: They Remove Boulders and Cross rivers = Basus’iimbokodo, Bawel’imilambo (Cape
Town: HSRC Press, 2007); Hans Erik Stolten, ed., History Making and Present Day Politics:
The Meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007);
Bernard Mbenga and Andrew Manson, “People of the Dew”: A History of the Bafokeng of
15

It is this central position for the oral source and oral history within programs of recovering the
African past that served as the clearest signature of and for African historiography.

26

While laudatory for its scope, oral history methodology, and insight into previously
unstudied aspects of South Africa’s liberation struggle, SADET is worthy of the critiques of
“struggle history” as laid out by Stephen Davis in his doctoral dissertation on Umkhonto
weSizwe (MK) and the (mis)representation of its rank-and-file soldiers.

27

These “struggle

histories” too often conform to the contemporary narrative of liberation offered by the ruling
party and suggest the necessity of histories written to support the legitimacy of the post-apartheid
state. The critique exists not to automatically demote all struggle histories but to highlight the
preclusion of other narratives of the struggle.

28

SADET’s fourth volume on the 1980s is nearly 2,000 pages long but lacks a chapter that
addresses uDlame in and of itself. That such a significant event as a regional civil war does not
merit a chapter raises questions about ideological choices to gloss over deadly divisions in an
effort to produce a history that would serve the purpose of national unity and racial
reconciliation. Episodes of uDlame are treated individually in chapters on the ANC underground

Phokeng-Rustenburg Region, South Africa, from Early Times to 2000 (Auckland Park: Jacana,
2010).
26
David William Cohen, Stephan Miescher, and Luise White, “Introduction: Voices,
Words, and African History,” in African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral
History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 1–27.
27
The ideological position of SADET has also been debated by Martin Legassick and
Jabulanit Sithole. See Martin Legassick, “Debating the Revival of the Workers’ Movement in the
1970s: The South African Democracy Education Trust and Post-Apartheid Patriotic History,”
Kronos no. 34 (2008): 240–266; Jabulani Sithole, “Contestations Over Knowledge Production or
Ideological Bullying?: A Response to Legassick on the Workers’ Movement,” Kronos no. 35
(2009): 222–241; Houston, “The South African Democracy Education Trust’s ‘Road to
Democracy’ Project”; Stephen Davis, “Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters: Everyday Life in the
Ranks of Umkhonto We Sizwe (1961--Present)” (PhD dissertation, University of Florida, 2010).
28
Davis, “Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters,” 11–2.
16

in the Midlands and Northern and Southern Natal by historian Jabulani Sithole, but doing so
seems to privilege both the ANC perspectives and political explanations for the deadly
conflict.

29

While Inkatha’s actions may not be interpreted as contributing to “the road to

democracy,” the years of uDlame without a doubt impacted the negotiated transition and require
empirical research and deeper analysis. The harsh impact of uDlame became a potent factor in
forcing the apartheid government to make concessions to the liberation movements. Conflict
projected an image of instability in South Africa that threatened economic investment and
harmed the country’s international relations.

30

There is a small but significant body of literature on uDlame. Explaining violence within
African communities has been more difficult than understanding the armed response of Africans
to conquest, dispossession, and the authoritarian nature of colonial rule and apartheid.

31

The

majority of this literature was written contemporaneously to the violence as scholars (mostly
sociologists and political scientists) and activists sought to understand and end the social and
political upheaval.

32

Brief case studies were written on Edendale, Sundumbili, Molweni,

29

Jabulani Sithole, “The ANC Underground, Armed Actions and Popular Resistance in
Pietermaritzburg and the Surrounding Natal Midlands Townships,” in The Road to Democracy in
South Africa, vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010); Jabulani Sithole, “The ANC
Underground and Armed Actions in Northern Natal,” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa,
vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 279–312; Jabulani Sithole, “The ANC
Underground and Armed Actions in Southern Natal,” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa,
vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 313–360.
30
Adrian Guelke, “Interpretations of Political Violence During South Africa’s
Transition,” Politikon 27, no. 2 (2000): 251–2.
31
Beinart, “Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography,” 465.
32

See for instance, Haysom, Mabangalala; Fatima Meer and Institute for Black
Research, Resistance in the Townships (Durban: Madiba Publications, 1989); Kentridge, An
Unofficial War; Anthony Minnaar, ed., Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu: Historical
Perspectives (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1991); Anthony Minnaar, ed.,
Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research
17

Bruntville, and the Durban and Rand townships and hostels.

33

Since then, many organizations

and individuals who experienced or were involved in monitoring the conflict have published
firsthand accounts of the era and critical analyses of the state’s involvement.

34

UDlame also

been examined as central to analyses of contemporary struggles of land reform, development,
and crime.

35

The most extensive works to date include doctoral dissertations by anthropologist

Council, 1992); Ari Sitas, “The Making of the ‘Comrades’ Movement in Natal, 1985-91,”
Journal of Southern African Studies 18, no. 3 (1992): 629–641; Simon Bekker, ed., Capturing
the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region, 1986-1992, Indicator South Africa (Durban:
Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, 1992); Aitchison, “Numbering
the Dead.”
33
Douglas Booth and Mlandu Biyela, “Exploring the Spatial Dimension of Black
Resistance and Political Violence in South Africa: The Case of Durban,” Urban Geography 9,
no. 6 (1988): 629–53; Nkosinathi Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in
Pietermaritzburg,” Journal of Southern African Studies 15, no. 3 (1989): 506–524; Stavros
Stavrou and Andrew Crouch, “Molweni: Violence on the Periphery,” Indicator South Africa 6,
no. 3 (1989): 46–50; Stavros Stavrou and Lwazi Shongwe, “Violence on the Periphery: Part
Two: The Greater Edendale Complex,” Indicator South Africa 7, no. 1 (1989): 53–7; Anthony
Minnaar, “Locked in a Cycle of Violence: The Anatomy of Conflict in Bruntville, 1990-1992,”
in Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research
Council, 1992), 143–62; Hilary Sapire, “Politics and Protest in Shack Settlements of the PretoriaWitwatersrand-Vereeniging Region, South Africa, 1980-1990,” Journal of Southern African
Studies 18, no. 3 (1992): 670–697; Lauren Segal, “The Human Face of Violence: Hostel
Dwellers Speak,” Journal of Southern African Studies 18, no. 1 (1992): 190–231; Paulus Zulu,
“Durban Hostels and Political Violence: Case Studies in KwaMashu and Umlazi,”
Transformation 21 (1993): 1–23; Mary de Haas, “Sorrow in Sundumbili,” Indicator South Africa
11, no. 3 (1994): 23–7.
34
Lou Levine, ed., Faith in Turmoil: The Seven Days War (Pietermaritzburg:
Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness, 1999); Greg Marinovich and João
Silva, The Bang-Bang Club: Snapshots from a Hidden War (New York: Basic Books, 2000);
Lou Levine, ed., Hope Beyond Apartheid: The Peter Kerchhoff Years of PACSA, 1979-1999
(Pietermaritzburg: Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness, 2002); Ran
Greenstein, ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg:
Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003); Andrew Ragavaloo, Richmond: Living in the
Shadow of Death (Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 2008); Laurence Piper and Brian Morrow, To
Serve and Protect: The Inkathagate Scandal (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010).
35
Kynoch, “Crime, Conflict and Politics”; Mario Krämer, Violence as Routine:
Transformations of Local-Level Politics and the Disjunction between Centre and Periphery in
KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa) (Köln: Köppe, 2007); Sarah Mathis, “After Apartheid: Chiefly
18

Jason Hickel on tensions between the Inkatha and COSATU-affiliated unions in the sugar
industry in Zululand and another by sociologist Debby Bonnin on Mpumalanga; the oral history
work of Philippe Denis and Radikobo Ntsimane in Nxamalala; and research by Gary Kynoch in
Kathlehong on the East Rand.

36

Much of this literature rejects monocausal explanations for uDlame. Keeping this in
mind, I organize the literature according the manner which scholars emphasized some theories
over others.

37

I adopt and add to the five approaches as outlined by German anthropologist

Mario Krämer as explanations for political violence: cultural, gender, economic, instrumentalist,
or political.

38

Cultural approaches to studying uDlame tend to be concerned with an alleged Zulu
culture of feuding (so-called faction fights) and the growing divide between young and old and
between “traditional” and “modern.”

39

The international media often lazily relied upon this

explanation to portray the feuding as some primordial characteristic of the warring parties.
Authority and the Politics of Land, Community and Development” (PhD dissertation, Emory
University, 2008).
36
Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity”; Krämer, Violence as Routine; Gary Kynoch,
“‘Our Township Turned into Beirut’: Narratives of Violence in Thokoza/Katlehong, 1990-94,”
in Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association (Chicago, 2008); Philippe Denis, Radikobo
Ntsimane, and Thomas Cannell, Indians Versus Russians: An Oral History of Political Violence
in Nxamalala (1987-1993) (Dorpspruit: Cluster Publications, 2010); Jason Hickel, “Democracy
and Sabotage: Moral Order and Political Conflict in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa” (PhD
dissertation, University of Virginia, 2011). Jabulani Sithole and Mxolisi Mchunu are also
completing dissertations on the violence.
37
For general overviews, see Beinart, “Introduction: Political and Collective Violence in
Southern African Historiography”; Guelke, “Interpretations of Political Violence During South
Africa’s Transition.”
38
Krämer, Violence as Routine, 25–8.
39

Krämer, Violence as Routine, 25; John Argyle, “Faction Fights, Feuds, Ethnicity and
Political Conflict in Natal: A Comparative View” (presented at the Ethnicity, Society and
Conflict in Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1992); Collins, “‘Things Fall Apart’: The Culture of
Violence Becomes Entrenched.”
19

Sociologists Heribert Adam and Kagila Moodley highlighted the divisions between a
traditionally-oriented older and rural Inkatha and the young, modern and urban ANC.

40

Philippe

Denis’s extensive oral history work also points to the manner in which the conflicting parties
labeled their enemies according to perceived cultural differences. In Nxamalala, opponents of
Inkatha designated the movement’s supporters otheleweni (“those who push others down the
cliff”) and “Russians” (most likely a reference to the gangs of Basotho migrant laborers on the
Witwatersrand known for the rural values)—terms that spoke to notions of Zulu traditionalism,
conservatism, and even backwardness. On the other hand, Inkatha supporters declared
ANC/UDF members non-Zulus and derisively called them amaIndiya (Indians) and amaKula
(Coolies) because they perceived UDF and COSATU to be “Indian organizations” rather than
“African” ones.

41

Hickel offers the most in-depth examination of cultural differences between the warring
parties. Building on Mahmood Mamdani’s insights, he argues that the bifurcation of urban and
rural Africans under colonial native administration policies resulted in the creation of two
radically disparate moral orders, which then fed the violence. Hickel focuses on the Zulu
migrants who bore the brunt of critique as the agents of war, examining the structure of the Zulu
family and what he calls a cultural imperative of rural Zulus towards the “collective well-being.”
He argues these men resisted the ANC “because they explicitly reject the egalitarian project of
‘democracy’ (idemokrasi) and ‘human rights’ (amalungelo) that the party promotes.”

42

Interpreting democratic transformation through their culturally particular moral paradigm in
40

Heribert Adam and Kagila Moodley, “Political Violence, ‘Tribalism,’ and Inkatha,”
The Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 3 (1992): 485–510.
41
Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, Indians Versus Russians, 22–5.
42

Hickel, “Democracy and Sabotage,” 7.
20

which hierarchical social relations govern for the collective well-being, rural Zulus sought to
defend themselves through violence directed against ANC supporters.

43

Scholarship on uDlame has also drawn on gender studies. This literature focuses on the
role of men in the conflict, especially the historical and masculinist discourse of Inkatha and
Buthelezi. This approach is inherently tied to the cultural, as many explanations of the maledominated violence stress the historical precedent of faction fighting and male youth associations
where young male members employed violence as sport and as a means of empowerment.
Gender scholars tend to explain political violence in late apartheid South Africa as a product of a
crisis of masculinity related to the long-term decline of African patriarchal power and
generational tensions between juniors and elders. Violence in KwaZulu-Natal operated as a
means not only for men to reassert their masculinity but for older men to reassert age-linked
masculinity.

44

Thokozani Xaba contended that young African male “comrades were impatient

with the elders who either seemed to be tolerating or accommodating apartheid and this created
tensions between young and the old.”

45

Mxolisi Mchunu suggests that this tension emanated

from culture change as two different views on manhood held by youth and elders were
accentuated during the conflict.

46

Thembisa Waetjen’s gendered analysis of Inkatha highlights

that the movement’s rhetoric of martial masculinity resonated deeply with migrant laborers

43

Hickel, “Democracy and Sabotage,” 11.

44

Campbell, “Learning to Kill: Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal.”

45

Thokozani Xaba, “Masculinity and Its Malcontents: The Confrontation Between
‘Struggle Masculinity’ and ‘Post-Struggle Masculinity’ (1900-1997),” in Changing Men in
Southern Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001), 110.
46
Mxolisi Mchunu, “Culture Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in
the Context of Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991),” in From Boys to Men: Social
Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society (Cape Town: Juta & Company, 2007).
21

committed to rural homesteads, but less so with those factory workers who more readily
supported COSATU, the ANC-affiliated trade union movement.

47

Another set of theories locates the main cause for uDlame in the material conditions of
apartheid and its structural inequalities. This theory was heavily promoted by Inkatha’s research
arm, the Inkatha Institute, led by Gavin Woods. Woods argued that while the conflict was
political, it would not have become violent if the communities involved were economically
stable and black politics had been allowed to develop.

48

Similarly, Rupert Taylor and Mark

Shaw specifically point to the creation of mass informal settlements under apartheid as the
breeding ground of desperate poverty and therefore conflict.

49

On the other hand, Mike Morris

and Doug Hindson pointed to apartheid’s gradual demise: the collapse of apartheid institutions,
including bantustans, and a deep recession that generated high rates of urban migration,
heightened competition over land, housing, employment and other scarce material resources.

50

Instrumentalist approaches to the study of uDlame stress careful orchestration by
individuals and groups who stood to gain from violence and African disunity. The “Third Force”
thesis is the most prominent illustration of this approach, alleging elements within the South

47

Thembisa Waetjen, Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in
South Africa (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004).
48
See for instance, “Two opposing monitors explain why the violence hasn’t been
stopped,” Sunday Times October 14, 1990; Gavin Woods, “Black Township Violence in South
Africa, with Particular Reference to Natal: A Comprehensive Model,” in Conflict and Violence
in Natal/KwaZulu: Historical Perspectives (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1991),
178–80; Gavin Woods, “Natal Violence: A Contemporary Analysis of Underlying Dynamics,” in
Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research
Council, 1992), 37–48.
49
Rupert Taylor and Mark Shaw, “The Natal Conflict,” in Restructuring South Africa
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
50
Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, “South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and
Reconstruction,” Review of African Political Economy 19, no. 53 (1992): 43–59.
22

African security forces instigated the violence to weaken the strength of the ANC and diminish
its popularity. While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found little substantiation of a
centrally directed or formally constituted “third force,” TRC testimonies, judicial commissions,
assassins’ confessions, and investigative reporting uncovered irrefutable evidence that a
“network of security and ex-security force operatives, frequently acting in conjunction with
right-wing elements and/or sectors of the IFP, was involved in actions that could be construed as
fomenting violence and which resulted in gross human rights violations, including random and
target killings.”

51

Covert collaboration aside, the South African Police, South African Defense

Force, and the KwaZulu Police consistently intervened (or failed to intervene) for the benefit of
Inkatha supporters.
The instrumentalist literature thus focuses on the role of the state and its collaborators.
Political scientist Morris Szeftel, academics with the monitoring group Community Agency for
Social Enquiry (CASE), and sociologist Bernard Magubane examined the state’s “total strategy”
and “low intensity conflict” campaign and their implications.

52

Both before and after the TRC

findings, scholars and activists extensively examined Inkatha. Some studies focused solely on

51

South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa Report Volume 6, 2003, 584. See also Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart
of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid’s Assassins (Johannesburg: J. Ball, 1997); Eugene De
Kock and Jeremy Gordin, A Long Night’s Damage: Working for the Apartheid State
(Saxonwold: Contra Press, 1998); Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War
Crimes Investigator (Yale University Press, 2000); James Sanders, Apartheid’s Friends: The
Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service (London: John Murray, 2006); The Goldstone
Commission, 1991-1994 (Braamfontein: Human Rights Institute of South Africa, 2009); Piper
and Morrow, To Serve and Protect.
52
Morris Szeftel, “Manoeuvres of War in South Africa,” Review of African Political
Economy no. 51 (1991): 63–76; Greenstein, The Role of Political Violence; Bernard Magubane,
“The Collapse of the Garrison State,” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol. 4 [1980–
1990[ (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 1621–1646.
23

Inkatha’s growth and the characteristics of its leadership.
critical.

54

53

Other analyses have been more

Historian Shula Marks, for example, saw Buthelezi and Inkatha as the most recent

example of the “ambiguity of dependence” in which Africans leaders found themselves as they
attempted to survive in a contradictory world.

55

Georgina Hamilton and Gerhard Maré’s analysis

interpreted Inkatha as an opportunistic black elite advancing a petit bourgeois agenda.

56

Other

works probed Inkatha’s contradictory declarations of non-violence and simultaneous
manipulation of Zulu history and martial masculinity in a bid for power.

53

57

In a recent book, J.C.

Lawrence Schlemmer, “The Stirring Giant: Observations on the Inkatha and Other
Black Political Movements in South Africa,” in The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and
Racial Domination (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980);
John Brewer, “The Membership of Inkatha in KwaMashu,” African Affairs 84, no. 334 (1985):
111–35; John Brewer, “Official Ideology and Lay Members’ Beliefs in Inkatha,” Plural Society
XVII (1987): 45–53; Wessel De Kock, Usuthu! Cry Peace! The Black Liberation Movement
Inkatha and the Fight for a Just South Africa (Cape Town: Open Hand Press, 1986); John KaneBerman, “Inkatha: The Paradox of South African Politics,” Optima 30, no. 2 (1992); Ben
Temkin, Buthelezi: A Biography (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
54
Roger Southall, “Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise,” African Affairs
80, no. 321 (1981): 453–481; Colleen McCaul, “Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe”
(B.A. Honours thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1983); Michael Sutcliffe and Paul
Wellings, “Inkatha Versus the Rest: Black Opposition to Inkatha in Durban’s African
Townships,” African Affairs 87, no. 348 (1988): 325–60.
55
Shula Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and
the State in Twentieth-Century Natal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
56
Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and
South Africa, First ed. (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987).
57
Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda (Zed
Books, 1988); Daphna Golan, “Inkatha and Its Use of the Zulu Past,” History in Africa 18
(1991): 113–26; Carolyn Hamilton, Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits
of Historical Invention (Harvard University Press, 1998), chapter one; Waetjen, Workers and
Warriors.
24

Myers neatly identifies Buthelezi as a “thoroughly serviceable tool” within the apartheid
regime’s “total strategy.”

58

The political rivalry between the ANC and Inkatha is by far the most accepted and
widespread explanation for uDlame. It dominates the TRC Report and the scholarly literature, as
well as non-academic sources.

59

These diverse accounts essentially argue that rival political

organizations utilized the violence to maximize their support in anticipation of democratic
elections.

60

Anthea Jeffery (head of Special Research at the South African Institute of Race

Relations) attributes the violence to politics and claims to tell the whole “Natal story” by giving
equal weight to the ANC and Inkatha views on the violence.

61

Jeffery’s seemingly meticulous

research amounts to a voluminous compilation and summary of press reports with little
analysis—but John Aitchison has pointed out that in at least three cases he selected from her
work, Jeffery omitted evidence that questioned Inkatha’s stance.

62

Debby Bonnin’s convincing analysis of the fighting in Mpumalanga Township, an area in
which the conflict was most brutal, shows the intersection of local, regional, and national

58

Myers, Indirect Rule in South Africa, chapter three.

59

Marinovich and Silva, The Bang-Bang Club; Bill Berkeley, The Graves Are Not Yet
Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa, 1st ed (New York: Basic Books, 2001);
South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
South Africa Report Volume 6.
60
Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control”; Sutcliffe and Wellings,
“Inkatha Versus the Rest: Black Opposition to Inkatha in Durban’s African Townships”; Beinart,
“Introduction: Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography”; Guelke,
“Interpretations of Political Violence During South Africa’s Transition.”
61
Jeffery, The Natal Story.
62

John Aitchison, review of Anthea Jeffery’s The Natal Story, shared with me during
interview, Pietermaritzburg, November 22, 2010. Jeffery’s sympathies for Inkatha are also
replete in Anthea Jeffery, People’s War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa
(Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009).
25

political dynamics as engines of violence. This framework reveals how local authority was
established and affected political identity and the politics of generations; how local level
interpretations of the regional tension between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF resulted in atrocities;
and the manner in which a faction of the declining apartheid state fueled the local and regional
conflict.

63

What the instrumentalist and political rivalry theories have in common is that they tend to
obscure on-the ground participants and their reasons for going to war. One area in which
individual motivations are better considered is the conflict on the Rand between Inkathaaffiliated hostel dwellers and their neighboring ANC-supporting township residents. Mahmood
Mamdani, Lauren Segal, and Glen Elder explored the perspectives of the rural migrants who felt
alienated by cleavages within the labor movement and the ANC’s hostel conversion program of
the late 1980s that they felt attacked their urban base (and therefore their income) and
“heteropatriarchal” kinship patterns.

64

Most recently, several studies point to the significance of local understandings of
uDlame.

65

Krämer and Kynoch draw upon political scientist Stathis Kalyvas’ framework for

analyzing civil war that invites us to think about modalities linking distinct actors and
motivations and to see civil wars as “concatenations of multiple and often disparate local

63

Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity.”

64

Segal, “The Human Face of Violence”; Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject:
Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1996); Glen S. Elder, “Malevolent Traditions: Hostel Violence and the Procreational Geography
of Apartheid,” Journal of Southern African Studies 29, no. 4 (2003): 921–935.
65
Krämer, Violence as Routine; Kynoch, “‘Our Township Turned into Beirut’:
Narratives of Violence in Thokoza/Katlehong, 1990-94”; Philip Bonner and Vusi Ndima, “The
Roots of Violence and Martial Zuluness on the East Rand,” in Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past
and Present (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008).
26

cleavages, more or less loosely arrayed around the master cleavage.”

66

Krämer also argues that

the transition-era political violence did not end in KwaZulu-Natal with the 1994 elections;
revenge violence became a routine means of acting in local-level politics. Most important for this
study, Krämer convincingly shows through a case study of Inchanga that violent conflict in
KwaZulu-Natal is characterized by a disjuncture between the centre and periphery (between the
local and the provincial/national politics) in the post-apartheid era.

67

Similarly, Bonner and

Ndima’s study of clashes in East Rand townships locates their proximal cause in bloody taxi
rivalries over control of routes and passengers while migrant laborers sought to generate income
to sustain themselves and their rural families.

68

This brings us to Table Mountain. Situating uDlame there in the 150 years of conflict
over land and leadership illustrates that there is no single cause for the eruption of violence
between the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms and within the Maphumulo themselves. As
Lauren Segal observed about the role of hostel dwellers in the political violence on the East
Rand, “Violence as constructed from below… is far more complex than most media or political
accounts portray. It becomes clear that the actors in the violence are motivated by a host of
factors, which at times intersect with, and at other times radically diverge from, popular
explanations or expressed party political lines.”

69

An examination of uDlame in Table Mountain

casts new light on the disjuncture between local meanings and understanding of violent conflict
and the explanation of a Third Force-fomented national struggle between the ANC and Inkatha
66

Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil
Wars,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (2003): 486.
67
Krämer, Violence as Routine.
68

Bonner and Ndima, “The Roots of Violence and Martial Zuluness on the East Rand,”

69

Segal, “The Human Face of Violence,” 192.

363–5.
27

for political power. The parties in Table Mountain fought less because of Inkatha or ANC/UDF
ideological affinity and organizational loyalty but rather because of historically contested land
ownership and hotly debated socially defined meanings of authority and membership in the
chiefdoms.
Land shortage, as elsewhere in South Africa, has been the most pressing factor behind
violence in rural Natal since the late 19th century.

70

But land dispossession and lack of access

for Africans alone does cannot explain why violence erupted at Table Mountain when it did.
Relying on resource mobilization theory, Johan Olivier convincingly theorizes that grievances
turn into insurgency when an increase in the level of resources available to support collective
protest occurs.

71

At Table Mountain, the pro-Inkatha Nyavu capitalized upon the national

struggle for political power between the ANC, Inkatha, and the dying apartheid government to
invade Mbambangalo and stake claim to historically contested land. Moreover, dissatisfied
individuals among the Maphumulo allied themselves with Inkatha and the Nyavu to contest the
legitimacy of Chief Mhlabunzima.

Land, Chiefly Authority, and Membership in isiZwe

70

Jonathan Clegg, “Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - Bringing Back the Body: An Examination
into the Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations, 1882-1944,” in
Working Papers in Southern African Studies, ed. Philip Bonner, vol. 2 (Johannesburg: Ravan
Press, 1981); Minnaar, Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu; D.R. Edgecombe, John Laband,
and Paul Thompson, eds., Roots of Conflict in Natal: A Selection of Papers on Violence in the
Colony and Province (Pietermaritzburg: Department of Historical Studies, University of Natal,
1994).
71
Johan Olivier, “Political Conflict in South Africa: A Resource Mobilisation
Approach,” in Capturing the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region, Indicator South Africa
(Durban: Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, 1992), 1–14.
28

As I will discuss below, I had not set out to write a dissertation on land and chiefly authority in
KwaZulu-Natal. But oral and archival sources pointed me to the centrality of century-long
disputes over land and other material resources to the unfolding of uDlame at Table Mountain. In
this section I lay out the background of indirect rule and its impact on land and chiefs, issues that
thread throughout the chapters. But first we must understand the organization of the polities to be
briefly considered.
The umuzi (plural, imizi), or homestead, formed the central kinship construct around
which daily life revolved. The umndeni (homesteads that share a very proximate common
ancestor and interact for purposes of dispute arbitration and important ceremonies) as well as the
administrative structure of the isigodi (ward) linked imizi to one another and to the inkosi (chief).
The polity under a chief often called itself by the name of one of his ancestors.
As historian Paul Landau has recently argued, hybridity was at the core of southern
African political traditions between the 15th and 20th centuries. The relationships between
homesteads and polities changed over time.

72

Norman Etherington describes the important

movements of 19th century southern Africa not as movements of chiefdoms but of chiefs whose
followings could and did include people from all backgrounds.

73

Fealty to a chief depended

upon a contract between the traditional leader and a homestead head. Membership was open to
any who wished to owe allegiance to a chief. The African custom of paying allegiance to a chief,
ukukhonza, was founded on a personal and mutually beneficial relationship whereby an umuzi

72

South Africa was not originally a place of “tribes.” Paul Stuart Landau, Popular
Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400-1948 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010).
73
Norman Etherington, The Great Treks: The Transformation of Southern Africa, 18151854 (New York: Longman, 2001).
29

placed itself under the protection of a chief to whom he reciprocated by giving loyalty.

74

The

proverb “Inkosi yinkosi ngabantu,” best reflects this relationship – a chief was a chief because of
the people who khonza’d him.

75

The polity of the chief, the isizwe (chiefdom), was not

territorially bounded and it was not uncommon for members of a polity to establish imizi far
from that of their chief. Imizi could also break allegiance from their chief, paying ukukhonza to
another. This contract, hereditary descent, and the possession of inkatha yesizwe

76

by the

reigning inkosi (chief) provided legitimacy to the authority of the ubukhosi (chieftaincy).
The British colonial system of indirect rule worked with a single model of so-called
customary authority that presumed a king at the center of every polity, a chief on every piece of
ground, and a patriarch in every homestead.

77

The best known application of indirect rule was in

the administration of Northern Nigeria under Frederick Lugard in the early 1900s, but actually
dates back in Africa to the 1850s in Natal. Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes (later Secretary
for Native Affairs) Theophilus Shepstone began to devise and implement a system of African
administration based on his extensive knowledge and attention to African forms of

74

W. D. Hammond-Tooke, “In Search of the Lineage: The Cape Nguni Case,” Man 19,
no. 1, New Series (March 1, 1984): 77–93; Mduduzi Percival Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi
Authority from ‘Personal to Territorial’: An Historical Analysis of the Limitations of Colonial
Boundaries on African Socio-Political Relations in Natal’s Maphumulo/Lower Thukela Region,
1890-1910” (M.A. thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2012).
75
C. L. Sibusiso Nyembezi, Zulu Proverbs (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University
Press, 1963).
76
Inkatha is a coil of grass incorporating materials that give the possessor strength over
hostile forces. (More commonplace ones are used to help carry water pots on the head.) Inkatha
yesizwe (of the nation) symbolized the strength of the chief and facilitated the unity of the
chiefdom.
77
Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 39.
30

governance.

78

Shepstone used the position of the chiefs, modeling himself upon Shaka to cast

himself as the de facto Supreme Chief of ruling Africans in Natal. But the colonial notion of
African society ossified in the Natal Code of Native Law actually was “a faithful mirror
reflection of the decentralized despotism created under colonial rule.”

79

Most scholars agree the

development of indirect rule resulted from the demands of colonial competition and the scarcity
of resources, though recently J.C. Meyers has argued that it operated as part of a strategy
designed to build legitimacy for the colonial and segregationist states with a large white settler
population.

80

But reality on the ground for colonial administrators was much more complex than the
theoretical model they envisioned. Shepstone and administrators like him across Africa
encountered societies without chiefs or their equivalents.

81

In Natal, the upheavals associated

with the rise of the Shaka and the Zulu kingdom seriously disrupted local societies and
Shepstone found many Africans without traditional leaders. Just as Shaka and Dingane had
replaced chiefs feared too powerful with family members and officers known to be loyal,
Shepstone appointed men likely to follow British orders where suitable hereditary leaders could
78

David Welsh, The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845-1910
(Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971); Thomas V McClendon, White Chief, Black Lords:
Shepstone and the Colonial State in Natal, South Africa, 1845-1878 (Rochester: University of
Rochester Press, 2010).
79
Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 39.
80

Welsh, The Roots of Segregation; Norman Etherington, “The ‘Shepstone System’ in
the Colony of Natal and Beyond the Borders,” in Natal and Zululand: From Earliest Times to
1910 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1989); Mamdani, Citizen and Subject; Myers,
Indirect Rule in South Africa.
81
Robert L. Tignor, “Colonial Chiefs in Chiefless Societies,” The Journal of Modern
African Studies 9, no. 3 (October 1, 1971): 339–359; Welsh, The Roots of Segregation; John
Lambert, Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal (Scottsville: University of
Natal Press, 1995); Heather Hughes, “Politics and Society in Inanda, Natal: The Qadi Under
Chief Mqhawe, C1840-1906” (PhD dissertation, University of London, 1995).
31

not be found.

82

These iziphakanyiswa (commoners elevated to the position of chief) were often

magisterial izinduna who had earned favor through their positions. Their chiefdoms became
known in official parlance as “government tribes.”
Colonial administrators in Natal also found the dispersion of imizi pledging allegiance to
a chief across the colonial magisterial districts administratively challenging. They sought to
proscribe the process by which imizi could join a chiefdom, requiring permission from the native
administration in order to do so. After the 1906 impi yamakhanda (war of the heads, also known
as Bambatha’s Rebellion and the Zulu Rebellion), Natal colonial authorities believed loyalty to
chiefs motivated the extensive travel and “war doctoring” that occurred during the uprising.

83

Authorities thus set out to undermine the “personal” nature of political relations through a
redefinition of isizwe into territorially bound “tribes.” As Percy Ngonyama has convincingly
shown, the colonial equivalent to “inkosi yinkosi ngabantu” became “inkosi yinkosi ngendawo,”
meaning a chief is a chief because of the territory in which he rules.

84

The British translation and conception of isizwe as “tribe” was fundamentally tied to the
colonial power’s interest in presenting African societies as inherently uncivilized, barbarous, and
violent. The belief about an African tendency towards violence permeated colonial explanations
for “tribal unrest” and “faction-fights” in rural areas and later in the industrial compounds. Such
conflicts emerged not because of some “tribalism” of the people involved, but as a result of
colonial efforts “to order the changing present according to supposedly stable body of
82

Adam Kuper, “The ‘House’ and Zulu Political Structure in the Nineteenth Century,”
The Journal of African History 34, no. 3 (January 1, 1993): 30–1; Lambert, Betrayed Trust.
83
Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority.” On the “war doctoring” of the
rebellion, see Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law And Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion
(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2005).
84
Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority,” 20.
32

85

custom.”

The tying of chiefly authority to territory produced a countless number of izimpi

zemibango (wars of disputes) between chiefdoms over boundaries and authority. Leaders who
enjoyed hereditary descent made claims on land and disputed boundaries based on this status.
The Nyavu chiefs examined here contested the initial boundary set down between them and their
neighbors on the Inanda Location, the appointed Maphumulo chieftaincy, and repeatedly
attempted to regain territory by claiming hereditary right to land during the segregationist and
apartheid eras. In the years preceding the outbreak of uDlame in Table Mountain, magisterial
officials answered numerous letters and made trips to region in attempts to mitigate the dispute.
This manipulation of chiefly authority for the benefit of the white minority continued into
the segregation and apartheid eras. The 1927 Native Administration Act made chiefs agents of
the government and gave the Governor General the power to appoint and depose chiefs and
regulate their functions at will. The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act attempted to pull chiefs deeper
into the system of African administration. Those chiefs who resisted, such as ANC President
Albert Luthuli, were deposed and replaced with someone more compliant. The ANC campaign
against the Bantu Authorities Act urged chiefs to resist the implementation of tribal authorities or
risk becoming stooges of the apartheid regime. Anti-apartheid activists applied the label of
collaborator to traditional leaders who did not openly resist the tribal and territorial authorities.
The centrality of chiefs to the projects of indirect rule and apartheid as well as their
continued significance in a democratic South Africa has attracted considerable scholarly
attention. Revisionist scholars turned towards “history from below,” partly inspired by the
radicalization of black youth in the late 1970s and the increasing militarization of resistance of in
the 1980s. This shift towards African perspectives produced some of the benchmark studies of

85

Myers, Indirect Rule in South Africa.
33

nineteenth-century southern African chiefdoms and state formation (and disintegration) amongst
the Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Pondo, Swazi and southern Tswana.

86

The numerous studies of

Shepstone and the policy of indirect rule in Natal shed light on the manipulation and creation of
chieftaincies.
colonialism.

87

88

Less research has been done on the hereditary and created chiefdoms under

This literature, as well as that of chiefs outside of South Africa, portrays indirect

rule as a useful tool of colonialism that empowered chiefs but caused them to lose popular
legitimacy.

89

86

Jeff Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 18791884 (University of Kwazulu Natal Press, 1979); Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore, eds.,
Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa (London: Longman, 1980); Peter Delius,
The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi Polity, the Boers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century
Transvaal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); J. B Peires, The House of Phalo: A
History of the Xhosa People in the Days of their Independence (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1982); Philip Bonner, Kings, Commoners, and Concessionaires: The Evolution
and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983); Kevin Shillington, The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900 (Braamfontein:
Ravan Press, 1985); J. B Peires, The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa CattleKilling Movement of 1856-7 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).
87
Welsh, The Roots of Segregation; Etherington, “The ‘Shepstone System’ in the Colony
of Natal and Beyond the Borders”; Lambert, Betrayed Trust; McClendon, White Chief, Black
Lords.
88
Important exceptions being John Wright, The Hlubi Chiefdom in Zululand-Natal: A
History (Ladysmith: Ladysmith Historical Society, 1983); Hughes, “Politics and Society in
Inanda, Natal”; Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority.” Anthropological work such as
that on the Nyuswa and Makhanya is more prevalent. See Absolom Vilakazi, Zulu
Transformations: A Study of the Dynamics of Social Change (Pietermaritzburg: University of
Natal Press, 1962); D. H Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition: The Makhanya of Southern Natal
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966); Harriet Ngubane, Body and Mind in Zulu
Medicine: An Ethnography of Health and Disease in Nyuswa-Zulu Thought and Practice (New
York: Academic Press, 1977).
89
Outside of South Africa, see Randall Packard, Chiefship and Cosmology: An
Historical Study of Political Competition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); Martin
Chanock, Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Marshall S Clough, Fighting Two Sides:
Kenyan Chiefs and Politicians, 1918-1940 (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1990); Bruce
Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa, Eastern African
34

But as Heather Hughes has pointed out in her doctoral work on the Qadi in Natal, where a
scholar focuses one’s attention deeply affects the outcome of the analysis. By examining the
colonial administrations, Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, John Lambert, and others only
reveal the ways in which chiefly authority slid precipitously into paternalistic authoritarianism.
The result is the “oversimple conclusion that chiefs everywhere became corrupt and oppressive,
the popular support they were deemed once to have enjoyed ineluctably eroded by their methods
of coping with their ambiguous, not to say invidious, positions within the colonial order.”

90

That

a large number of chiefs fit this portrayal is not denied, but as Hughes points out, the idea that
chiefs could act in the interests of their followers as a way of enhancing their own legitimacy
appears to be an unthinkable possibility in most of the literature. Hughes suggests more research
needs to be done on the ideology of chieftaincy as perpetuated not only by colonial outsiders but
by the chiefs and their followers. In her focus on the Qadi chief Mqhawe, Hughes shows how the
Qadi elite employed all possible resources that the colonial conditions could provide in order to
rebuild the material and political coherence of a people relocated to Natal during the rise of the
Zulu kingdom.
Just as Hughes turns the scholarly focus away from the colonial administration, Mduduzi
Percival Ngonyama’s focus on the practice of ukukhonza provides a much-needed analysis of the
relationship between chiefs and subjects. Ngonyama, examining the Magwaza under the
appointed chief Guzana ka Seketwayo and the Luthuli under hereditary chief Njubanjuba, argues
that the colonial changes in structure of boundaries between chiefdoms attached new meanings

Studies (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992); Richard Rathbone, Nkrumah & the Chiefs: The
Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-60 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).
90
Hughes, “Politics and Society in Inanda, Natal,” 31.
35

to ukukhonza, effecting a shift from a personal relationship between chiefs and followers to one
based on land.

91

The relationship of chiefs and access to land is central to understanding some of the
current debates over the role of traditional leadership in the new South Africa. The country’s
Interim Constitution of 1993 and the new Constitution of 1996 advocated democracy based on
representation at all levels of government while also recognizing the institution of traditional
leaders. The exact powers and functions of these leaders, however, were ambiguous until 2003
when the ANC-led government passed the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework
Act and Communal Land Right Acts. These bills resulted from pressure and mobilization on the
part of “a very articulate portion of the country’s traditional leadership,” the Congress of
Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa) under Inkosi Pathekile Holomisa.

92

Most

surprising to activists who hoped 1994 would bring the decline of the chieftaincy, traditional
leadership has proved resilient and a groundswell of support accompanied the ANC’s recognition
93

of the institution.

91

The first bill recognized tribal authority bodies (now named Traditional

Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority.”

92

Annika Mokvist Uggla, “Democratisation, Traditional Leadership and Reform Politics
in South Africa” (PhD dissertation, Uppsala University, 2006), 2. For more on Contralesa and
Holomisa, see Phathekile Holomisa, According to Tradition: A Cultural Perspective on Current
Affairs (Somerset West: Essential Books, 2009); Nkosi S. P. Holomisa, A Double-Edged Sword:
A Quest for a Place in the African Sun : Archival Records on the Formation and Missions of the
Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Cape Town: Real African Publishers, 2011);
Tim Gibbs, “Ah! Dilintzaba! ‘The One Who Breaks Down Barriers’: Pathekile Holomisa, a
Networked Chief,” in Politics and Sociology Seminar (Rhodes University, 2011).
93
Peter Delius, A Lion Amongst the Cattle: Reconstruction and Resistance in the
Northern Transvaal (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1996); J.B. Peires, “Traditional Leaders in
Purgatory Local Government in Tsolo, Qumbu and Port St Johns, 1990–2000,” African Studies
59, no. 1 (2000): 97–114; Barbara Oomen, Tradition on the Move: Chiefs, Democracy and
Change in Rural South Africa (Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, 2000);
36

Councils) that were set up under the apartheid Bantu Authorities Act. As under apartheid, the
councils are 60 percent unelected members. The second act authorized the councils to administer
and allocate communally held land in the rural areas. The Traditional Courts Bill, which would
give chiefs’ courts legal power, is currently under debate in Parliament.
Anthropologist Deborah James points out that it has become more-or-less conventional
wisdom that access to land in Africa is dependent on connections such as that between chiefs and
94

their followers.

But the value of land in and of itself has long been in debate in African studies.

Scholarship on slavery suggests African societies generally valued people more than land and
that land ownership was a colonial and modern imposition.

95

These scholars generally only trace

land ownership from the onset of colonial rule, when land access became scarce and Europeans
introduced notions of property rights.

96

However, historian Assan Sarr has recently argued that

these emphases ignore the political and social value pre-colonial Africans placed on land.

97

Barbara Oomen, Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power and Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era
(James Currey, 2005).
94
Sara Berry, Chiefs Know their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past
in Asante, 1896-1996 (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2000); Kristine Juul and Christian Lund, eds.,
Negotiating Property in Africa (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002); Deborah James, Gaining
Ground? “Rights” and “Property” in South African Land Reform (New York: Routledge, 2007).
95
For example, see Martin Klein, ed., Peasants in Africa: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980); Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death:
Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830 (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1988); John K Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic
World, 1400-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
96
Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of
Modernity on a South African Frontier, vol. II (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press,
1997); Sara Berry, No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in
Sub-Saharan Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); Berry, Chiefs Know their
Boundaries.
97
Assan Sarr, “Land and Historical Change in a River Valley: Property, Power and
Dependency in the Lower Gambia Basin, Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries” (PhD
dissertation, Michigan State University, 2010).
37

Chiefly control of land as a colonial invention is the focus of Lungisile Ntsebeza’s
scathing analysis of chieftaincy in the Transkei. Ntsebeza, a sociologist and Chief Research
Specialists in the Democracy and Governance Research Programme at the Human Sciences
Research Council, argues that the post-1994 legitimacy of traditional authority rests solely on the
control of land distribution as first enabled by colonial and apartheid practices. Ntsebeza
contends that South Africa’s democracy has been compromised by the accommodation of
traditional leaders. He traces resistance to the chieftaincy in Xhalanga (Eastern Cape) across
colonial, segregationist, and apartheid rule.

98

The value of Ntsebeza’s analysis comes from its

geographical location, a region without a tradition of chiefs or centralized leadership. The case
study of Xhalanga warns against generalizations of the experience of chiefly authority,
illustrating how rural governance varied across place and time. While Ntsbeza argues the
accommodation of traditional authority as compromised democracy, his emphasis on variation in
experience from place to place leaves open the possibility of a range of relationships such as in
Natal where even appointed chiefs could gain legitimacy.
That chiefs accrued benefits from land is beyond doubt, but that they were motivated
only by greed for land after colonialism ignores the social contract of khonza and other cultural
forms of sanctioning chiefly legitimacy. The status of chiefs was dependent upon a social
contract made with followers, a relationship that could not be honored without control of land.
Furthermore, when the Nyavu chiefs of Table Mountain made their claims on contested territory,
they did so on account of their hereditary status and maintained the land as the home and burial
place of their ancestors. Historian Sara Berry’s work on Ghana convincingly argued for viewing
property as a social process rather than a set of initial conditions, and she has drawn attention to
98

Lungisile Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in
South Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
38

the ways in which Asante claims on property and power invoked the past and debated its
significance for people’s contemporary lives.

99

In colonial and segregationist South Africa, the

Nyavu chiefs were not just making claims on land to bolster their local authority, but stressing a
particular kind of chiefly authority: hereditary descent, which they recognized as under attack by
colonial and Union governments that deposed and appointed chiefs at will. For these local chiefs,
the land was important not only due to its scarcity, but because of its ancestral worth and
political value.
As mentioned earlier, this examination of uDlame in Table Mountain reveals a centurylong dispute over land and chiefly legitimacy. The claims made on land at Table Mountain in the
archive, in the press, and by those interviewed reveal the manner in which membership in a
chiefdom changed and chiefly legitimacy was debated. This resonates with the findings of
Scandinavian anthropologist Anna Bohlin in her study of land reform in the Western Cape.
While the TRC produced historical narratives as part of a nation-building and reconciliation
process, the land claim process was less subjected to these pressures—and was thus able to
produce new history and memories. However, making particular land claims often required the
establishment of new forms of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” in order to fulfill
state-sanctioned definitions of community and an “authentic” identity, whether based on
geography, genealogy, language, ethnicity, culture, or race.

99

100

Outside of the land restitution

Berry, Chiefs Know their Boundaries, xxii–xxvii.

100

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991); Anna Bohlin, “Claiming Land and Making Memory:
Engaging with the Past in Land Restitution,” in History Making and Present Day Politics
(Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007), 114–28; Derek Fay and Deborah James, “Giving
Land Back or Righting Wrongs? Comparative Issues in the Study of Land Restitution,” in Land,
Memory, Reconstruction, and Justice: Perspectives on Land Claims in South Africa (Athens:
Ohio University Press, 2010), 45–6; William Ellis, “The Khomani San Land Claim Against the
39

process and the nation-building process of the TRC, this analysis points to reasons other than
political or ideological affiliation for the explosion of deadly violence between the Maphumulo
and Nyavu. In fact, land, contestation over chiefly legitimacy, and the changing meanings of
membership in the isizwe were at the heart of uDlame in Table Mountain.

Sources, Methodology, and Positionality
The analysis in this dissertation is based upon documentary evidence unearthed in public
archives, personal collections, and popular press in South Africa. In addition to the archival
record and the secondary literature, I also draw upon over 60 oral history interviews that I
conducted with my research assistant Thandeka Majola in KwaZulu-Natal. Having been trained
in the methodology of history and oral history at Michigan State University, I am a firm believer
in laying out how I came to study land, chiefly authority, and violence, and navigated not only
the archives but the difficult terrain of an oral history of a sensitive and recent subject.

101

My original interest in Zulu history came out of an undergraduate semester study abroad
in Durban in 2003 during which I lived with an isiZulu-speaking family near the University of
KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) and took courses with the School for International Training. While
studying Inkatha’s refusal to participate in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I began to

Kalahari Gemsbok National Park: Requiring and Acquiring Authenticity,” in Land, Memory,
Reconstruction, and Justice: Perspectives on Land Claims in South Africa (Athens: Ohio
University Press, 2010), 185–7.
101
On the importance of placing the researcher within the research and examples
see,Gracia Clark, Onions Are My Husband: Survival and Accumulation by West African Market
Women (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Susan Geiger, TANU Women: Gender
and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965 (Portsmouth: Heinemann,
1997); Laura Fair, Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition
Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001); Nwando Achebe, Farmers,
Traders, Warriors, and Kings: Female Power and Authority in Northern Igboland, 1900-1960
(Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2005).
40

think about “victims” and “perpetrators.” With so much popular and scholarly attention devoted
to Buthelezi’s collaboration with the apartheid regime and to Zulu martial masculinity, I wanted
to study the members of Inkatha, the everyday supporters, particularly the women. I did not
envision women as only victims of war nor rank and file members in the pay of the apartheid
regime. What made them support or join Inkatha? What made them fight for it? What role did
women play in socializing the men who went to war? I hoped to contribute to the
problematization of “collaboration” in South African history and show women – wives, mothers,
and daughters - as actors and participants.

102

I had not yet decided to study uDlame.

I chose Table Mountain as my field site because of a homestay I enjoyed there in 2007 as
part of the Fulbright-Hays Zulu Group Project Abroad. I lived with the Gcabashe family, who
knew me as Nokulunga (“mother of goodness,” the name I was given by my first isiZulu
instructor with SIT), in the Maqongqo isigodi of Mbambangalo, a region of the Maphumulo
chiefdom. This family and the community members who helped me with my isiZulu spoke
frankly about local deaths during uDlame. The eldest daughter of the Gcabashe family had lost
her parents during the conflict and many others could point out where loved ones and community
members died. The young Gcabashe children wore Buthelezi t-shirts under their white school
uniforms. These conversations piqued my interest, and before returning to South Africa to
undertake several months of pre-dissertation research, I decided on Maqongqo as a field site
because of these personal connections and gripping stories. When I returned the following year
102

On collaboration and resistance, see Frederick Cooper, “Conflict and Connection:
Rethinking Colonial African History,” The American Historical Review 99, no. 5 (1994): 1516–
1545; David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial
Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000);
Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2005); Jacob Dlamini, Native Nostalgia (Auckland Park, South Africa:
Jacana Media, 2009); Shireen Ally and Arianna Lissoni, “‘Let’s Talk About Bantustans’,” South
African Historical Journal 64, no. 1 (2012): 1–4.
41

to begin preliminary archival research, I returned to visit with the Gcabashes and asked for help.
I told them of my interest in Inkatha, to which Ma Mbongwa, the matriarch of the family,
answered in English: “This house is Inkatha.” As I began to read the violence monitoring reports
and newspaper articles at the Alan Paton Center Struggle Archives (APC) at the University of
KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) in Pietermaritzburg, I realized Ma Mbongwa’s claim meant more than
just affiliation. Her late husband, Sabelo, and his brother Thomas Mshoki, had been powerful
local Inkatha leaders.
During this short visit in 2008, I spent most of my time getting to know what research
materials were available and where they were located. I quickly realized there was more to the
violence in Table Mountain than the political competition between Inkatha and the ANC. In
addition to the Gcabashe brothers, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo littered the pages of the
regional press. When these men spoke to reporters, they repeatedly referred to a land conflict
over the Goedverwachting farm between the Maphumulo and Nyavu. I began to piece together a
story that I envisioned as an early chapter, the background to the violence, rather than the story
itself.
Funded by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad fellowship, I
returned to KwaZulu-Natal September 2010 for a year of fieldwork. I lived in Pietermaritzburg
and was formally affiliated with the UKZN-Pietermaritzburg History Department and the Centre
for Critical Research on Race and Identity in Durban. I returned to the Alan Paton Centre, where
I made use of the vast documentation produced by contemporary violence monitors. The manner
in which these records came to life is worth discussing.
As the violence escalated in the Pietermaritzburg region, a network of concerned
individuals, civic organizations, and the University of Natal’s Centre for Adult Education (CAE)

42

banded together to record the extent of the violence and provide support where possible. Often
membership overlapped in these groups, including the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian
Social Awareness (PACSA), the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA), the Detainees’
Support Committee, the End Conscription Campaign, the Natal Midlands Black Sash, and the
Midlands Information Centre and Research Unit (MICRU). The papers of PACSA and CAE
Director John Aitchison at APC were critical to this project.

103

PACSA had become a political home for many young local activists and played a central
role in the launch of the Pietermaritzburg branch of the UDF in 1983. According to PACSA
member Monika Wittenberg, the PACSA office often looked more like a first aid station as she
sought to treat injuries from the increasing violence.

104

From 1986, the organization began

monitoring the unfolding violence and referring their findings to the CAE to be compiled as part
of a database. According to Aitchison, CAE had been subcontracted by the Community Agency
for Social Enquiry (CASE) as part of a computer literacy project set up to provide support to the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and non-governmental organizations to

103

For more on PACSA generally, see Levine, Hope Beyond Apartheid;
Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness, Journeying for Justice: Stories of an
Ongoing Faith-Based Struggle (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster, 2009). On AFRA, see Anne Harley
and Romy Fotheringham, AFRA: 20 Years in the Land Rights Struggle, 1979-1999
(Pietermaritzburg: Association for Rural Advancement, 1999); Chizuko Sato, “Forced Removals,
Land NGOs and Community Politics in KwaZulu-Natal, 1953-2002” (PhD dissertation,
University of Oxford, 2006), especially chapter four. On the Black Sash, Mirabel Rogers, The
Black Sash: The Story of the South African Women’s Defence of the Constitution League
(Johannesburg: Rotonews, 1956); Cherry Michelman, The Black Sash of South Africa: A Case
Study in Liberalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); Kathryn Sprink, Black Sash: The
Beginning of a Bridge in South Africa (London: Methuen, 1991); Mary Burton, “The Black Sash
Story: Protest and Service Recorded in the Archives,” English Academy Review 27, no. 2 (2010):
129–33.
104
Monika Wittenberg, “PACSA as Refuge and First Aid Station,” in Hope Beyond
Apartheid: The Peter Kerchoff Years of PACSA (Pietermaritzburg: Pietermaritzburg Agency for
Christian Social Awareness, 2002), 154–5.
43

computerize. This provided CAE with the opportunity to enter monitoring information into a
database.

105

Information poured into CAE from PACSA, Wendy Leeb who worked with

COSATU in Mpophomeni, and Cheadle, Thompson, and Haysom, the law firm for COSATU.
Leeb and Vaughn John also worked for CAE on the database. John recalls feeling the obligation
to respond. “We work in Pietermaritzburg and as a university adult education centre we’re
working very much with the people who were being affected by the violence and one can’t do
adult education work while people’s lives are in turmoil.”

106

While the apartheid state actively

concealed much information about the violence, the Centre saw its opportunity to play a role in
disseminating reliable information to raise awareness of the conflict in South Africa and beyond.
CAE attempted to compare vague police unrest reports, press clippings, and the statements of
victims to quantify and document the violence. Aitchison’s master’s thesis analyzes the scale and
scope of conflict in the years 1987-89.

107

When the Seven Days War broke out in 1990 these organizations doubled their efforts
and partnered with the Democratic Party (DP) in what temporarily became known as the Ad Hoc
Crisis Committee and later the Midlands Crisis Relief Committee (MCRC). MCRC met daily for
several weeks and less frequently thereafter as it sought to mitigate the crisis.

108

As refugees

from the violence poured into the DP offices and camps, CAE moved their computers into the

105
106
107

John Aitchison, interview by author, Pietermaritzburg, November 22, 2011.
Vaughn John, interview by author, Pietermaritzburg January 25, 2011.
Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead.”

108

MCRC had several sub-committees of Monitoring, Police, Relief and Displacees,
Press and Publicity, Missing Persons and Identification, Funerals, Legal, and Medical Health.
Peter Kerchoff submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, November 21, 1996,
available in Levine, Hope Beyond Apartheid, 158–63.
44

DP offices. MCRC volunteers manned the office and phones, taking nearly 200 victim
statements and reporting incidents to the authorities.
Radley Keys, Regional Director for the DP at the time, launched the Trust for Peace in
Natal (PIN) in 1989 as a response to the violence. In addition to working with MCRC, PIN’s
local field workers cooperated with local leaders to better understand and help the communities
under siege undertake localized peace initiatives. Keys himself was very active in the Table
Mountain area, maintaining contacts with key figures of the different parties and acquiring keen
insight into the local causes of the conflict. Keys generously provided me with his notes and
reports on the region, which complemented the general PIN files available at the APC.
The monitors attempted to follow ethical research processes and to provide a balanced
analysis of the violence, though several individuals and organizations had their own affiliations.
The effort of the database compilers to include different sources does lend credence to the
monitoring reports’ neutrality. However, the majority of the refugees that poured into the city for
help were unaffiliated or ANC/UDF supporters and there are few firsthand Inkatha statements in
the records. The documentation of both PACSA and John Aitchison is now archived at the APC,
where I sorted through statements, reports, press cuttings, and conference papers focused on the
Table Mountain region. These monitoring efforts later became part of the Network of
Independent Monitors (NIM), whose records I accessed in the Community Agency for Social
Enquiry (CASE) Collection at the University of Witwatersrand Cullen Library Historical Papers.
I interviewed several former violence monitors (including academics, activists, and
politicians) familiar with the region. Radley Keys and Tim Houghton, a volunteer with MCRC,
graciously granted me access to personal documents and files regarding uDlame, including
reports and notes and minutes from PIN and MCRC meetings. Thobekile and Thandokuhle

45

Maphumulo, the wife and son of the late Mhlabunzima, kindly shared with me a folder of press
clippings and documents about the chief.
On the subjects of Inkatha and the KwaZulu bantustan, I utilized the Inkatha collections
at Wits Historical Papers and Killie Campbell. At the Ulundi Archive Repository, I combed
through what is left of the KwaZulu Cabinet files. Archivist Ntokozo Njoko went above and
beyond the call of duty in helping me locate all that was available there, but regrettably the ExKwaZulu Cabinet files were incomplete. Walter Felgate, the long-time speech writer for
Buthelezi and central committee member, defected to the ANC in 1997, taking with him an
archive of invaluable documents, some of which he presented when subpoenaed by the TRC.
Today, no one is certain of their location.

109

The Natal Room Collection at the APC included a

wealth of information on Inkatha as part of Gerhard Maré’s research on Buthelezi and the
movement. The collection of full KZLA reports, speeches, memoranda, press releases, and press
clippings on the violence, provided some of the most significant evidence for a conflict over land
and leadership—including a memorandum of complaint from Inkatha-allied Mbambangalo
residents concerning Chief Maphumulo.
As my initial research and the interviews alerted me to the historical nature of the
conflict between chiefdoms over land, I extended my search to the Pietermaritzburg Repository
of the National Archive. Here I explored the histories of the chiefdoms and the acquisition of
farms for the Maphumulo in the records of the Pietermaritzburg (PMB) and Camperdown (CPD)
magistrates. In addition, I examined the files of the Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA), Chief
Native Commissioner (CNC), and the Department of Development Aid (DDA). The

109

Felgate deposited them at the Campbell Collections at the University of KwaZuluNatal, but they were taken into temporary custody by the TRC when he was subpoenaed. Efforts
to locate them, including correspondence with the Department of Justice, are ongoing.
46

centralization of “native administration” after apartheid required additional research in the
National Archive in Pretoria. There, I accessed Native Affairs Department (NTS), Bantu
Administration and Development (BAD), and Department of Land (LDE) files.
Unfortunately, the historical records of the Mpumalanga Magistrate, established in 1972,
have not yet been transferred to an archive and are instead in government offices at the
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) where they are not as
easily accessible. When I met with a COGTA land official hoping to access the files (after
months of a wild goose chase before finally locating them) he willingly shared the files on
Goedverwachting but claimed to have no other documents on the chiefdoms. The deeds registries
and maps at the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform were essential to following
the land transfers and changing boundaries.
These government documents obviously provide insight into the colonial, segregationist,
and apartheid government perspectives, but they also shed light on African perspectives. The
records must be used carefully; they are usually written in English and given the circumstances
of court transcribers are probably paraphrased and possibly distorted. Those Africans giving
testimony may not have been as frank as the historian would hope in the formal and hostile
environment of the colonial courts. On the other hand, the courts provided some Africans with a
stage to promote their own interests, whether it was an appointed chief declaring his loyalty to
the administration or the hereditary chief expressing grievances against neighboring chiefs. As a
result, such first-hand testimony provides the historian with glimpses into African motivations.
While I was doing this archival work, I also made regular trips up the winding Chief
Mhlabunzima Maphumulo Road into Mbambangalo and KwaNyavu both to conduct research
and to spend time in the community with family and friends. Language was crucial. While I

47

studied isiZulu to an advanced level, including a semester in Durban, FLAS-funded tutoring at
MSU, and the Zulu GPA in Mbambangalo, I did not want to miss any important details or
misconstrue the intentions of my interviewees due to a lack of understanding of figurative
speech, idioms, or vocabulary. Radikobo Ntsimane of the Sinomlando Centre for Oral History
and Memory Work in Africa at the University of KwaZulu-Natal introduced me to Thandeka
Majola, a part-time employee at the Centre trained in oral history methodology and willing to
join me in the field.
We began our interviews in Mbambangalo, where Phindi Gcabashe introduced us at the
Maphumulo inkantolo (literally court, here meaning the court of the chiefdom). The Maphumulo
secretary, Cindy Mkhize, told the chief and izinduna about the project and all assented. Inkosi
Nhlakanipho Maphumulo recommended an ANC-affiliated induna from the Stingini isigodi,
Amos Ndlela, and the Inkatha councillor, Mdu Ntuli, to help us find interviewees. Inkosi
Maphumulo agreed to be interviewed and connected us with his uncle Baningi, an important
figure in the history of Mbambangalo and the Maphumulo Umndeni. His brother Thando
facilitated several other interviews with people close to the late Inkosi Mhlabunzima. At the
same time, I sought other means to find interviewees. I had no connections in KwaNyavu and
initially interviewed few outside of Maqongqo, where Ma Mbongwa lived, and Stingini, where
Induna Ndlela introduced us to men and women working with him on a community crèche
project.
By far the biggest breaks came by luck. Through Sinomlando, Thandeka met someone
who recommended we visit the nearby Kenosis Community Trust. Through Kenosis, we met
four remarkable Maphumulo and Nyavu women who had been trained as volunteers to assist
their communities in health and child care. Through these women, our interviews began to shift

48

into Esinyameni (KwaNyavu), Echibini, and other parts of Stingini. Toward the end of my
fieldwork, a government official gave me the number of Chief Siphosiki Mdluli, enabling us to
interview the man considered to be the Nyavu historian. After 1994, many refugees from the
violence across KwaZulu-Natal moved to a new township between Table Mountain and the city
named after the struggle hero Chris Hani. We met former Mbambangalo residents now living in
Haniville through Happiness Memela, a colleague of the son of another interviewee.
Convinced of the significance of land and the chiefs in the conflict, I began the oral
history portion of my fieldwork. In all of the interviews, I adopted the “life history”
methodology. Opening with broad questions about a person’s background and family not only
enabled the interviewee to become comfortable with answering questions, it often produced very
useful information about whether or not the person had always lived at Table Mountain or when
they had moved there. Because I was concerned with the gendered experience of the war and
ethnicity, we asked everyone similar questions about what it meant to be Zulu, how they taught
their children to be Zulu, and how the war affected their ability to practice Zuluness in addition
to general questions about the unfolding and causes of the violence. People had a lot to say about
uDlame, but not necessarily about what it meant to them to be Zulu.

110

Rather than impose my

interests, I listened attentively to what people said about uDlame. In one instance, Induna Ndlela
introduced us to the community elder, Goge Balothi, and then took over the questioning midinterview. Thandeka and I sat back and listened as the induna asked for specific information
about land and development in the region, providing some of the most important details to this

110

As Barbara Cooper points out, getting people to talk about such issues requires a great
deal of prompting because they regard the information as obvious and uninteresting. Asking
what it meant to be Zulu got us quite a few confused looks. Barbara M. Cooper, “Oral Sources
and the Challenge of African History,” in Writing African History (Rochester: University of
Rochester Press, 2005), 191–215.
49

study.

111

As a result of this and other such interviews, we started to ask questions about the

chiefdoms, refugees, and the flooding that caused some Nyavu to move onto the contested land
at Echibini. I began to think more deeply about the dissertation as a study of land and chiefly
authority in 20th century South Africa.
Thandeka and I were a conspicuous pair in these communities. While Mbambangalo had
for several years hosted American students (including myself) as part of the Zulu Group Project
Abroad, a white person regularly in the village was still an interesting occurrence for many
school-age children. While Thandeka was a young, isiZulu-speaking South African female, she
was still an outsider to the village, and an urban one at that. Jokes about my long (and therefore
culturally respectable) skirt and her fashionable jeans often provided humorous moments during
the interview process. While many women queried if I had children yet, more women asked
Thandeka why she was not yet married. Her affability and ability to empathize helped to
overcome obstacles posed by my own background. Our relatively young age certainly was
advantageous in asking questions about gender, culture, and ethnicity (it was indeed these
questions that usually sparked comments about Thandeka’s attire). The elders openly shared how
things used to be and my position as a white American researcher allowed me to ask for details
when respondents expected Thandeka to understand. My ability to participate also brought many
moments of lightheartedness – the umlungu (white person) speaks Zulu!

111

On doing privileging informants’ words and “field plagiarism,” see James Clifford,
The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1988); Abdullahi A. Ibrahim, “The Birth of the Interview: The Thin
and Fat of It,” in African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 103–24; Luise White, “True Stories: Narrative,
Event, History, and Blood in the Lake Victoria Basin,” in African Words, African Voices:
Critical Practices in Oral History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 281–304;
Achebe, Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings.
50

I was ever mindful of my positionality in the field – but many others were too. My
relationship with the Gcabashe family had to be delicately maneuvered, stressed in some
contexts and minimalized in others as I sought to demonstrate my own political neutrality. We
were outsiders asking questions about a very sensitive subject in the recent past. The
implications of uDlame were very present for families who had lost loved ones and
breadwinners, who had to rebuild homes, who had not returned to Mbambangalo after the
conflict. In some cases, the people responsible for their pain still lived in the community. While I
had anticipated some resistance to interviews on account of the pain and recentness of the
subject, my time in the community led me to believe, correctly as it turned out, that some people
would be willing to talk. Others were not, however, as became clear in the reactions of Inkatha
members at a meeting in January 2011 where Thandeka and I introduced ourselves and this
research project.
The Inkatha councillor Mdu Ntuli, after some negotiation, allowed us to garner interest at
an Inkatha election meeting. I got many giggles as I stood with Thandeka before the community
hall and introduced ourselves and the project in isiZulu. Thandeka repeated some things where
she thought perhaps I had not been clear. A verbal barrage began, largely directed at the resilient
Thandeka because they were not certain I understood. Women made up the majority of speakers.
This was a painful subject with which the community had only recently come to terms. There
was no need to reopen wounds. Why now, in a local municipal election year? What would they
get out of this? One woman suggested I should build a library for the community, rather than
give copies of the interviews to the individuals and the local university archive. After each
interview, I took photographs of the people with whom we spoke. None shrunk from offers to
have their picture taken, which for many was the second time only to their I.D. booklets. Before

51

returning to the U.S. I gave copies of not only these photographs, but the interviews on CD (and
paper copies where transcription had been completed) to everyone who participated. This was
my small way of way of thanking those who gave so freely of their time and stories without
compromising funds or the interview process. From the excited responses as people shared their
photographs or ran to listen to their interview, I believe it was meaningful.

112

While the

woman’s library question was justifiable (what should participants get out of this project), Ma
Mbongwa believed the question was politically motivated; the woman was jockeying for Ntuli’s
position and Thandeka and I had become a way to contest Ntuli.
On the other hand, several people did speak out on behalf of the project. Ntuli’s wife
spoke to the need for the younger generation to learn what had happened. Another man proposed
we go to regional office of Inkatha to ensure their permission, that then people might be more
willing to speak with us. Discouraged, we retreated to the Gcabashe umuzi. After the meeting,
people I already knew and who had agreed to be interviewed began to withdraw. Kindly, Ntuli
later promised to introduce us to others he knew would speak to us despite the meeting, but
proved to be quite busy and none materialized.
As suggested by this Inkatha meeting, we were operating in a tense contemporary
context. My year or fieldwork coincided with local municipal elections, heightening community
tensions between Inkatha and ANC. While Inkatha established dominance in the entire Table
Mountain region during and immediately after uDlame, the ANC began to gradually erode
112

The ethics of gift giving or payment and recognizing the limits of your abilities and
methodologies has largely been discussed amongst feminist scholars, see Daphne Patai, “Is
Ethical Research Possible? US Academics and Third World Women,” in Women’s Words:
Feminist Practice of Oral History (New York: Routledge, 1991), 137–53; Diane Reay, “Feminist
Research: The Fallacy of Easy Access,” Women’s Studies International Forum 18 (1995): 205–
13; Bev Gatenby and Maria Humprhies, “Feminist Participatory Action Research:
Methodological and Ethical Issues,” Women’s Studies International Forum 23, no. 1 (2000): 89–
105.
52

Inkatha’s support in Mbambangalo in 2004 with the installation of the heir Nhlakanipho (a
member of Contralesa perceived to be an ANC supporter) as chief of the Maphumulo. During
my research there in 2010-11, the parties campaigned intensely, aware of the potential for an
ANC victory.

113

In KwaNyavu, the splintering of Inkatha and the establishment of the National

Freedom Party (NFP) in 2010 further increased existing tensions and resulted in the death of an
NFP candidate, Elias Dube, prior to the 2011 elections.
victory in at least one voting district.

115

114

The Inkatha split also caused an ANC

Agnes Nxumalo, a Nyavu woman known for her

community service (we met her through Kenosis), invited several women to her home a month
after the death of Dube so we could introduce ourselves and the project. Upon hearing we
wanted to discuss uDlame, one woman immediately got up and left.
In addition to this range of challenges, I also had to be mindful of the ongoing land
conflict and its legacy. The way people responded to us and our questions about land convinced
me it should be central to the dissertation. While Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo deployed Ntuli
and Induna Ndlela to help us find interviewees, our effort to get the Echibini induna to help us
was blocked. He avoided my phone calls for some time before he inally acknowledged that he
had been told we had enough help from Ndlela. I felt strongly this was not about “enough help,”
but about the contested jurisdiction of Echibini. The Cooperative Governance and Traditional
113

Voting wards in the Mbambangalo region show steady gains for the ANC, with
Nkanyezini going to the ANC as early as 2006. But it was only in the 2009 National election
with the isiZulu-speaking Jacob Zuma as ANC president that the ANC won additional districts.
The Inkatha stronghold of Mboyi remained IFP until the 2011 election. Results accessed from
http://www.elections.org.za, June 22, 2012.
114
“Camperdown: masked men shoot councillor,” Natal Witness April 14, 2011; “End
intimidation, MEC tells parties,” Natal Witness May 3, 2011.
115
Inkatha still won one ward while the ANC narrowly took the others. In the 2009
Zuma elections, only one ward voted predominantly ANC. Results accessed from
http://www.elections.org.za, June 22, 2012.
53

Affairs official I spoke with believed that by appointing this new induna in Echibini, the
Maphumulo were again staking their claim on the disputed land. Similarly, when I asked Ndlela
to show us the boundaries of Mbambangalo, he wanted to first obtain permission from the chief;
it never happened. While some Maphumulo and Nyavu interviewed admitted the land did not
belong to either chiefdom, others treated the land as their own and failed to disclose (or did not
know) the land was in dispute. Another former induna central to the conflict who I anxiously
hoped to interview was forbidden from speaking about “matters of the isizwe (chifdom),” When
my connection told me this, he said it was because the man had been accused of telling lies about
the Maphumulo chiefdom. Whether he was telling lies or simply stories the Maphumulo wished
not to be told, the charge made me want to interview him even more.
The more technical aspects of oral history in the 21st century also impacted the manner in
which interviews unfolded. Michigan State University’s Institutional Review Board declared the
project “non-reviewable” after considering my interview questions and determining that the
interviews would produce “unique narratives” rather than “generalizable knowledge.” But I
wanted to deposit copies of the interviews at the Alan Paton Centre in Pietermaritzburg and
desired to illustrate good faith efforts of informed consent in order to do so. Initially, Thandeka
and I read the form in isiZulu prior to each interview. Those who could read and sign did so, but
the majority of those interviewed were illiterate. The combination of an umlungu with forms and
popular illiteracy made the initial moments of interviewing stiff and awkward. As the project got
underway, we stopped asking for written consent except when we knew it could be given;
instead we clearly asked for permission prior to beginning the interview. In some instances,
when people learned what we wanted to discuss they launched into stories before we could ask
for consent! Rather than ruin the flow we turned on the digital recorder and asked for consent

54

afterwards. In very few instances did the recorder seem to negatively affect storytelling, an
achievement I attribute to Thandeka’s affability and skill as an oral historian.
Analyzing these oral interviews thus requires consideration of layers of context,
experience, and public (both of the nation and dominant political movements) and private
interpretation.

116

That the current dispute affected how locals talked about the land

unambigulously is clear. That it affected people’s memories of the cause of the violence seems
less likely. As we will see, the attribution of uDlame to the historical land conflict resonated with
contemporary local explanations for the violence. Furthermore, even as people assigned blame to
the political parties they also acknowledged they were fighting for Echibini. Unlike conflicts
within communities over the territorialization of an area by a particular political party (like that
in Mbambangalo after Maphumulo’s assassination), the fight for Echibini was between two
chiefdoms long in debate over the jurisdiction of the land. As well, the nostalgic manner in
which some current and former Mbambangalo residents remember the late chief Maphumulo
may reflect not only the way their lives have changed but hopes for the future, particularly in the
midst of debates over the role of traditional authority in South Africa.

117

Oral history was invaluable to this study. The stories of fighting in and over
Goedverwachting pushed me to look at the history of the farms and chiefdoms in the archives

116

On the present context and interview dynamics, see: Helena Pohlandt-McCormick, “I
Saw a Nightmare”: Doing Violence to Memory: The Soweto Uprising, June 16, 1976 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Sarah Nuttall and Carli Coetzee, Negotiating the Past:
The Making of Memory in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998); Cherryl
Walker, Land, Memory, Reconstruction, and Justice: Perspectives on Land Claims in South
Africa (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2010).
117
Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Jennifer
Delisle, “Finding the Future in the Past: Nostalgia and Community-Building in Mhlophe’s ‘Have
You Seen Zandile?’,” Journal of Southern African Studies 32, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 387–401;
Dlamini, Native Nostalgia.
55

and revealed the existing tensions in the region that led up to uDlame. The oral sources counter
the voices of the various white authorities who sought to control the lives of Africans and give
insight into local understandings of history. The interviews not only speak to over 100 years of
contest over land and chiefly authority in this part of KwaZulu-Natal, it shifts our focus to those
men, women, and children who bore the brunt of the violence.

Chapter Outline
The first narrative chapter introduces the peoples of Table Mountain with whom this dissertation
is concerned. It explores the deep historical roots of uDlame in this part of KwaZulu-Natal by
locating the origins of the violence in the colonial creation of chieftaincies. It introduces the
Nyavu, a chiefdom dating to the pre-Shakan era that found itself on the run during the rise of the
Zulu kingdom in the early 19th century. The chapter examines the impact of indirect rule upon
the Table Mountain region, particularly how the hereditary Nyavu chiefs positioned themselves
against newly created chiefdoms such as the nearby Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo. The
Nyavu made claims on scarce land and attempted to delegitimize the newly appointed chiefs by
calling upon their hereditary descent (pre-colonial-1905).
Chapter two follows these chiefdoms into the early to mid-twentieth century, setting the
scene for the land conflict during uDlame over a portion of the Goedverwachting farm. It
introduces the concept of izimpi zemibango, or wars of disputes, to enable an examination of a
variety of actors, issues, and interests that contributed to frequent fighting between the
Maphumulo and Nyavu. The chiefs attributed conflict to the disputed boundary and
acknowledged the increasing tension between the hereditary and appointed chiefdoms. In the
1930s, plans for the construction of the Nagle Dam on Inanda Location land forced the relocation

56

of the Maphumulo onto formerly white-owned farms. While the farms had been under the
jurisdiction of the Maphumulo from the chiefdom’s creation, the Nyavu laid claim to one of the
farms—Goedverwachting—and attempted to purchase it. The chapter also examines how the
solidified boundaries of the apartheid-era Bantu Authorities system exacerbated contests over
this farm and over the political legitimacy of chiefs. Chapter three elaborates on the proliferation
of factions contesting the available Table Mountain land after the establishment of the KwaZulu
bantustan in the 1970s. The rise of the ethnic nationalist movement Inkatha in KwaZulu, forced
relocations from across Natal, and an increasing population meant not only the Maphumulo and
Nyavu sought control of the Goedverwachting farm. KwaZulu and the apartheid officials
overseeing forced removals also had a stake in the land’s jurisdiction. The young chief
Mhlabunzima Maphumulo thrust himself into the midst of KwaZulu politics and attempted to
use both KwaZulu and apartheid officials to his chiefdom’s advantage.
Beginning with chapter four, the focus turns to the outbreak of uDlame. Chapter four
situates the civil war against the backdrop of a changing South Africa. As political violence
engulfed KwaZulu-Natal in the late 1980s, the Table Mountain region initially remained a haven
of peace under the “peace chief” Mhlabunzima Maphumulo of the Maphumulo chiefdom. In
offering himself as a peacemaker and protector, Chief Mhlabunzima attracted new Maphumulo
members onto with the contested land, sparking the deadly transition-era violence with the
neighboring Nyavu. Chapter five turns to the chief’s murder and the ways in which his actions
had caused a rift within his chiefdom. Central to understanding the debate over Maphumulo’s
chiefly authority is the definition of the Maphumulo isizwe. The late chief considered the new
Goedverwachting residents to be members of the Maphumulo because they had khonza’d him.
Those who paid the chief their allegiance remember him nostalgically on account of his efforts to

57

provide them with access to scarce land and protection. But another faction of older residents
was unhappy with the chief’s actions and forged an alliance with the Nyavu and attempted to
depose Maphumulo. These chapters show that local actors used the national contest between
Inkatha and the ANC as an opportunity to decide the land dispute and the struggle over chiefly
legitimacy by violent means. The sixth and final chapter turns away from the male-dominated
experience of the violence to analyze how women’s discussions about the upheaval reveal both
their claims on ethnicity and their uses of Zulu cultural practices and beliefs as a coping
mechanism.
The conclusion revisits the major outline and themes of the dissertation. It also places this
history of conflict over land and chiefly power within the context of the highly volatile
contemporary debates over land reform and the place of traditional leaders in a democratic South
Africa. The rich diversity of sources, written and oral, that inform this study has allowed me to
convey the complexity of the transition-era violence in the Table Mountain region. In doing so I
intend to humanize the past in order to enhance our understanding of this deadly civil war, the
reasons people take up arms, and the ways that Mhlabunzima Maphumulo and other chiefs
sought authority from the people. Although the struggle for power between the apartheid state,
Inkatha, and the ANC affected the Table Mountain violence, the conflict’s most immediate
causes were local ones. The members of the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms fought bitterly
for access to desperately needed material resources and to define the meaning of territorial
boundaries, clan membership, and chiefly authority.

58

Chapter One:
“He said he wants to be registered as a chief:” Hereditary Chiefs and
1
“Government Tribes”: (pre-colonial—1905)

Figure 3: “P.M.Burg from Zwartkop Road. Table Mountain. Kaffirwomen carrying
wood.” Water-colour sketch c. 1864 by George Hamilton Gordon. PAR. C7866.
Cape Town’s Table Mountain is one of South Africa’s most recognizable sites, an iconic natural
wonder that attracts national and international visitors to its heights. But it is not South Africa’s
only table-top mountain. Lesser known to those outside of the Natal Midlands,
Pietermaritzburg’s own 3,143-foot-high Table Mountain sits roughly forty kilometers northeast
of KwaZulu-Natal’s provincial capital, at the confluence of the Umsunduzi and Umngeni Rivers.
T.V. Bulpin, in his popular history of KwaZulu-Natal, describes it aptly:
To the people of the valley, this mountain was a natural fortress of a strength and
splendor far surpassing that of any man-made castle. From a distance its summit
seemed just a level surface. But to those who climbed the pathways providing
access up the western slopes, this flat-topped mountain was revealed as one of the
natural wonders of the land.
1

“Yebo, ngoba wathi yena ufuna ukuthi abhalwe abe inkosi.” Bhekumuzi Sibiya,
interview by author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, August 9, 2011.
59

The summit is an undulating meadow, richly grassed with hillocks, valleys
and wooded grottoes. The whole atmosphere is that of an island-world of its own,
drifting through the ages in a sea made of hills and dreams. From the edges of this
island-summit there is a view beyond description. The thousand hills of the Mgeni
valley lie in a superb jumble all around. Eastwards is a glimpse of the distant
ocean; westwards, on the far horizon, lies the Drakensberg, and in between is all
2
Natal.
To those who live in its shadow, the mountain is eMkhambathini. This name is the
locative form of the noun umkhambathi, the Paperback Acacia tree (acacia sieberiana) dominant
3

in the eMkhambathini area. It is the peoples in eMkhambathini’s shadow, particularly the
Nyavu and Maphumulo, with whom this dissertation is concerned. This chapter serves not only
to introduce them and outline their early histories, but also to locate the origins of conflict
between hereditary and created chieftaincies over land and legitimacy that reemerge during
uDlame (the civil war of late 1980s-early 1990s KwaZulu-Natal). This chapter will first examine
the pre-Shakan existence of the Nyavu, their relationship vis-à-vis the rising Zulu kingdom, and
the significance of hereditary descent through the oral tradition of the 19th century Nyavu chief,
Nomsimekwana Mdluli. It will then turn to the impact of colonial land and indirect rule policies,
specifically looking at the creation of locations and “government tribes” such as the Qamu,
Gcumisa, and Maphumulo. The resulting succession debates and land conflicts between the
hereditary and appointed chiefdoms highlight the continued significance of hereditary status
amongst both colonially established chiefdoms and hereditary chieftaincies and the manner in
which chiefs deployed notions of legitimacy to bolster their claims on land.

2

Thomas Victor Bulpin, Natal and the Zulu Country (Cape Town: Books of Africa,
1966), 12–3.
3
Adrian Koopman argues the word umkhambathi has long been misidentified as the
camel-thorn tree (acacia xanthophloea). Koopman, Zulu Names, 140.
60

Pre-State Polities, Oral Tradition, and the Hereditary Chiefs
For an unknown period before the consolidation of the Zulu nation under Shaka, small-scale
chiefdoms populated central and southern Natal. They spoke a variant of the tekeza dialect, a
Nguni language cluster now almost completely displaced by isiZulu, and culture varied from
locality to another. These chiefdoms were small in both area and population and fluid in
structure. Hybridity was the core of southern African political traditions between the 15th and
4

20th centuries. The relationships between homesteads and polities transformed over time. The
peoples depended largely on agriculture, but cattle herding was socially important. Agricultural
production was firstly based within an umuzi, or homestead (pl. imizi). Relations between
individuals and imizi were regulated primarily through an extensive network of relationships.
Imizi were drawn into relations with other imizi in order to exchange goods and to cooperate in
defense, hunting, and ritual performance. A certain amount of cohesion developed under a group
of male elders. Fealty to a chief depended upon a contract between the traditional leader and a
homestead head. The followers of a chief made up an isizwe (chiefdom). These chieftaincies
were loosely bounded and imizi could break allegiance to their chief and move to settle under the
authority of another.

5

In the Table Mountain region, these pre-Zulu chiefdoms were the Njilo, Nyavu,
Dlanyawo, and Dlanyoka (See Map 2). They were known to new arrivals in the late 18th Century

4

South Africa was not originally a place of “tribes.” Landau, Popular Politics.

5

John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu: The Upper Umngeni-Upper Mkhomazi Region
in the Early Nineteenth Century,” in Pietermaritzburg, 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African
City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press : Shuter & Shooter, 1988); John Wright and
Carolyn Hamilton, “Ethnicity and Political Change Before 1840,” in Political Economy and
Identities in KwaZulu-Natal (Durban: Indicator Press, 1996), 15–32.
61

6

Natal as the ‘Debe’, or ‘those who scarify their faces’. The Njilo and Nyavu shared a common
ancestor, Sali of Mdluli (See Figure 6). Of particular interest here, the Nyavu are so-named after
one of the common forebears, Nyawe. They are also often referred to as the Mdluli, after another
ancestor from whom the isibongo (clan name) of the chiefs comes, or the Coseli, yet another
predecessor. According to Mfunelwa Mdluli, an elder and keeper of an Nyavu “archive,” the
land of this region, stretching from Mkhambathini to Cato Ridge has always been the land of the
Nyavu people.

7

Map 2: The Upper Umngeni-Upper Mkhomazi Region in the 1830s. Source: John Wright,
"Before Mgungundlovu"
6

Somquba Mdluli, Nomsimekwana of Emkambathini (Table Mountain, Kwazulu), ed.
Robert Papini, Durban Local History Museums Educational Pamphlet Series 2 (Durban: Durban
Local History Museums, 1999), 26–7.
7
Mfunelwa Mdluli, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, August 7,
2011.
62

But in the late 18th Century, the Nyavu were forced from their “natural fortress.” Political
centralization, geographical expansion, and social transformations taking place among more
northern polities such as the Mabhudu, Ndwandwe, Mthethwa, Dlamini-Ngwane, Hlubi, Qwabe,
8

and ultimately the rising Zulu state did not initially impact the lives of the Nyavu. But the
southward movement of polities away from the Qwabe, the Thuli and allied chiefdoms began to
encroach on the easterly settlements of the Nyavu under Chief Mcoseli.
How these migrations and Zulu state-building did eventually affect the Nyavu can be
garnered from the oral tradition of the youthful adventures of Mcoseli’s heir, Nomsimekwana.
Robert Papini has argued that the story of Nomsimekwana is a vivid example, though perhaps
not typical, of the kind of tribulations endured by smaller chieftaincies during the expansion of
the Zulu kingdom in the 1820s and related transformations south of the Thukela River.
Nomsimekwana’s escapades and the attacks on his people by so-called cannibals were well
known, perhaps not only for the value of its excitement but also because of the process of
colonial mythmaking that sensationalized such tales of amazimu (cannibals). These stories
benefited many, including African fugitives at Port Natal dependent on British asylum, the
colonizers who desired to project an image of Zulu kings as bloodthirsty tyrants, and the
missionaries who sought justification for bringing “civilization.” Historians have instead argued

8

This process of Zulu state formation has historically been referred to as the mfecane,
but in the late 1980s scholars began to question and debate not only the forces behind the rise of
the Zulu nation but also the applicability of the term mfecane. What is without doubt and of
importance here, the expansion of the Zulu state sparked significant social and political change
throughout Zululand and what would become the Colony of Natal. For more on the debate, see:
Julian Cobbing, “The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo,” The Journal of
African History 29, no. 3 (January 1, 1988): 487–519; Elizabeth Eldredge, “Sources of Conflict
in Southern Africa, C. 1800-30: The Mfecane Reconsidered,” Journal of African History 33, no.
1 (1992); Carolyn Hamilton, ed., The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern
African History (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995); Etherington, The Great
Treks.
63

that what prevailed in the lands beyond the order of the Zulu kingdom was called ubuzimuzimu.
Often translated as “cannibalism”, it is more accurately an “absence of social order” such as that
occurring in Natal during the expansion of the Zulu kingdom with the loss of crops and herds
and the ensuing food shortage. Those designated “cannibals” were outlaws responsible for
“eating up” or rather, “living on,” others by seizing women and cattle. When present in oral
traditions such as that of Nomsimekwana, amazimu stories should be seen as cautionary tales
stressing the frightful consequences of the downfall of authority.

9

So Nomsimekwana and his amazimu tales were most likely sought out by many colonial
officials. The most thorough of Zulu translators, chroniclers, and administrators, James Stuart,
10

included them in his Zulu Reader, uVusezakiti.

Chief Native Commissioner H.C. Lugg wrote

11

Theophilus Shepstone boasted, “I have myself

about them in Historic Natal and Zululand.

conversed with several men, who escaped after having been captured by these “man-eaters”
[including]…a Chief still living in this Colony, who was compelled to carry the vessel in which
he was told he would himself be cooked…”

12

When in the late 1930s the members of the Zulu

9

See Mdluli, Nomsimekwana, 35–40; John Wright, “The Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region of
Natal,” in The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995), 176.
10
KCAL. James Stuart, “uNomsimekwana ubanjwa amazimu,” in UVusezakithi (New
York: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1926).
11
H. C Lugg, Historic Natal and Zululand, Containing a Series of Short Sketches of the
Historical Spots (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1949), 46.
12
Theophilus Shepstone. “Historic Sketch of the Tribes anciently inhabiting the Colony
of Natal-as at present bounded-and Zululand” Report and Proceedings. Cape of Good Hope
Commission on Native Laws and Customs. January 1883 (Cape Town: W.A. Richards & Sons,
Government Printers, 1883): 418.
64

13

Society

set out to record the stories and izibongo of various KwaZulu notables, among the

interviews conducted was one with the then-chief of the Nyavu, Somquba Mdluli, grandson of
Nomsimekwana. The extent and detail of Somquba’s recorded narration caught the attention of
Durban’s local history KwaMuhle museum, which translated it, set it in the context of the
mfecane, and compared it with the oral account of Nomsimekwana cited by missionary, amateur
anthropologist, and isiZulu linguist, A.T. Bryant.

14

This oral tradition is also invaluable for the detailed genealogical information it provides.
With the establishment of the various forms of Native Affairs Departments across the colonial,
segregation, and apartheid periods came the recorded genealogies of the “government
anthropologists,” but seldom do these extend as far back as the oral tradition of Nomsimekwana.
And in cases such as the Nyavu, where succession disputes were few if any after the
establishment of the Natal Colony, the family lineages that exist in government records are scant
in detail. On the other hand, the publication of this recorded oral tradition has certainly impacted
contemporary memory and tradition. During my first interview with a Nyavu elder, he asked if I
was aware of the book about Nomsimekwana before he related the roll call of Nyavu chiefs.

13

The Zulu Society was formed in 1936 for the purposes of “the study and preservation
of the Zulu language and culture” by Zulu intelligentsia in the context of radical segregationist
visions of ‘retribalization’ or cultural adaptionism as the basis for a uniform ‘native policy’. Zulu
intellectuals appropriated this developing state ideology in order to further their political claims
as a distinct social group and refashion their collective cultural identity. Marked by ideological
tensions and contradictions, the organization was “an elitist, almost arcane, cultural nationalist
organization without any constituency beyond its office holders.” Paul La Hausse, Restless
Identities: Signatures of Nationalism, Zulu Ethnicity, and History in the Lives of Petros Lamula
(c. 1881-1948) and Lymon Maling (1889-c. 1936) (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press,
2000), 143–5, 268–9.
14
A. T Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, Containing Earlier Political History
of the Eastern-Nguni clans (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929); Mdluli, Nomsimekwana.
65

Ongoing land disputes in the region make the people particularly aware of the hereditary descent
of their chief.
The examination that follows is primarily based on this longest and most detailed of these
15

accounts, that by Chief Somquba Mdluli.

Somquba was around 70 years-old in 1939 when the

Zulu Society interviewed him for their planned publication. He told the recorder of the tradition,
“I knew my grandfather in person. To look at, he was an ordinary man, with an ample forehead.”
Born c.1870, there is a strong possibility that Somquba heard the story from the protagonist
himself before Nomsimekwana’s death in 1901, and if not Nomsimekwana, then Ngangezwe
(Somquba’s father and Nomsimekwana’s heir), who we know knew the story well as he related it
in a statement to the Under Secretary for Native Affairs Robert Samuelson in 1894 during a land
dispute with neighbors, the Ximba.

16

As told by chiefs, this story should be recognized as an

“official history” of the Nyavu people.
As both an oral tradition and an official history it should be critiqued on several levels.
The many adventures of Nomsimekwana and twists of the plot are the “chief artistic
requirements” of all narratives that keep the listener “waiting with bated breath for the
denouement.”

17

But Nomsimekwana’s troubles, in addition to the amazimu tales, should be seen

as also evidence of the social disorder associated with the rise of the Zulu kingdom and the
changes the Nyavu experienced. Somquba’s attention to the Nyavu’s forced migration and
eventual return to Mkhambathini testifies to his belief in his people’s rightful claim to the land.
Further, several of characters illustrate the respect expected for chiefly authority. While
15
16
17

Mdluli, Nomsimekwana.
PAR. SNA 1/1/180. Petition of Ngangezwe kaNomsimekwana. 9 Jan 1894.
Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition as History (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,

1985), 74.
66

Somquba’s view of the past may be “more the product of the exigencies of the present than of a
dispassionate desire to portray past events as they actually occurred,” his narration provides
insight into how the Nyavu envisioned themselves and their relationship to neighboring peoples
and the Zulu kingdom.

18

A critical analysis of this infamous tradition about the young Nyavu

chief, Nomsimekwana, affirms the “outsider” status of Nyavu vis-à-vis the emerging Zulu state
and highlights the significance of hereditary descent for the narrators.
“Shaka’s attack on the country” resulted in the Nyavu being disturbed during the rule of
Mcoseli, the father of the protagonist, Nomsimekwana. As the Zulu drove off the Ngwane under
Matiwane, Mcoseli followed them in hopes of finding safety from the expanding Zulu kingdom.
According to an oral account given by a Nyavu man named Nombiba for a report sent to the
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal Sir John Scott, Mcoseli opted for sanctuary with the Ngwane
because he had just refused to pay allegiance to another of Shaka’s adversaries, Macingwane of
the Chunu.

19

Mcoseli also would have been aware of the significant loss of cattle by his brother,

Sibenya, when Sibenya refused to render allegiance to Shaka’s ally, Zihlando of the Embo.

20

Mcoseli’s people thus took refuge with Matiwane at Njasuthi, where they complained of
hunger and missed Mkhambathini. The oral tradition has it that they preferred to return to their
land and grow their own food, despite the danger.

21

18

But before the Nyavu left, their consumption

David P Henige, The Chronology of Oral Tradition: Quest for a Chimera (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1974), 11.
19
“Inhabitants of the Territory (Now the Colony of Natal) during the Time of Jobe,
Father of Dingizwayo, before the Extermination of Tribes by Chaka: Enclosure No. 1 in
Lieutenant-Governor Scott’s Dispatch No. 12, 26 Feb 1864” in John Bird, The Annals of Natal,
1495-1845, vol. 1 (Pietermaritzburg: P. Davis & Sons, 1888), 137.
20
Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, 410.
21

Mdluli, Nomsimekwana.
67

of Ngwane grain raised the ire of the Ngwane and, according to Nombiba, resulted in the death
of Mcoseli.

22

So the Nyavu returned to Mkhambathini without Mcoseli. But they did not find peace. At
home they “came upon an evil portent. It was occupied by people who ate others—amazimu.
These people were said to belong to the Mbambo who wandered after their scattering by Shaka,”
and finding nothing to eat, adopted the habit of eating others.

23

Some Nyavu were caught and

cooked, including Ma Mbongwa, the mother of Nomsimekwana. Others, including
Nomsimekwana, found refuge in the forests and caves prevalent at Mkhambathini, but they had
nothing to eat and it was not long before the amazimu surrounded them. Nomsimekwana and
many other Nyavu were captured. But some of the men had been away, looking for wild
pumpkins and greens, as had another woman who had left with a running stomach.
Nomsimekwana joined a “long file of people, some carrying these pots on their heads,
others the firewood that would be used to cook them.” He made several attempts to escape and
once was wounded when the amazimu pierced his calf with a spear as he fled. They forced him
to carry a large lid to the pot in which he would be cooked to hamper his ability to escape. But as
Nomsimekwana became more troubled about his pending fate, a hippopotamus appeared in a
pool of the Umsunduzi where the Mpushini flows into it. “His heart said that it was better to be
killed by the hippo than, in full consciousness, slaughtered like a beast and then cooked and
eaten.” He threw himself into the pool and swam underwater, with only his nose out of the water

22
23

“Inhabitants of the Territory,” 138.
Mdluli, Nomsimekwana, 2.
68

to breathe. He heard the amazimu, who wondered if he had been eaten by the hippopotamus or
drowned.

24

With the amazimu safely out of sight, Nomsimekwana returned to the cave where he had
been captured and found the woman with the running stomach. He also eventually located the
men who had gone searching for food and told them about his escape from the amazimu. They
agreed to go to Zululand and make a plea for asylum.
These remnants of the Nyavu traveled north. As soon as they crossed the Thukela River,
they were surrounded by Zulu soldiers and taken captive. Among the Nyavu captives was a
powerful old man by the name of Yengqwa. Yengqwa was taken separately from
Nomsimekwana and he pleaded with the soldiers. “Wo! You Zulu, I am here as I am homeless. I
am wandering with a young cockerel of our chief, of the Mdluli.” He pleaded that he not be
separated from Nomsimekwana, “the only prince left alive from his house.” The soldiers queried,
which prince was this? Yengqwa recited the forefathers of Nomsimekwana and the soldiers
acquiesced. Yengqwa became known as the “Mdluli chief’s cub” and Nomsimekwana received
preferential treatment on account of Yengqwa’s efforts.
But despite the preferential treatment offered to Nomsimekwana, he was still not afforded
the respect offered to chiefs of peoples between the Thukela and Black Mfolozi Rivers where
Shaka had established direct domination. Chiefdoms on the periphery of the expanding Zulu
state such as the Nyavu and others subordinated in these later phases tended to be incorporated
less as subjects and more as “despised outsiders.” Their chiefly houses were kept separate from

24

H.C. Lugg, who garnered the information for his tale from another of
Nomsimekwana’s grandsons Baningi Mdluli, estimates this occurred in 1818. Lugg’s version
also has a hippo shepherding Nomsimekwana to safetyLugg, Historic Natal and Zululand, 46.
69

the Zulu royal house and their young men considered menial laborers rather than warriors.

25

The

Nyavu became laborers upon their capture north of the Thukela. Nomsimekwana was assigned to
look after Embo children and to tend the cooking pots and the calabashes of souring milk.
These labor assignments illustrate the ways in which a clear social and political
distinction was made in order to justify the subordination of peoples outside of the growing Zulu
kingdom such as the Nyavu. The Ntungwa (upcountry) were those of “commoner” chiefdoms
subordinated but encouraged to align politically with the Zulu aristocracy. Those lesser
chiefdoms speaking the tekeza or tekela dialect became known as Lala. The term Lala is an
invention of the Shakan period that denoted contempt for peoples of real or ascribed lowly status.
The term found expression in several slurs, including “those who sleep (ukulala) with their
fingers up their anuses” and those “who farted on the mimosa tree and dried it up,” that were
used to ideologically justify discrimination and exploitation.

26

Somquba’s oral narrative

repeatedly calls attention to the differences in language between the Nyavu and their captors.
The Zulu soldiers who surrounded them shouted the oath, “Zihanyo! Zihanyo!” but the Nyavu
did not understand. When they made an oath to their captors, they said “Zihango!” and spoke “in
the Lala tongue.” While A.T. Bryant treats Ntungwa and Lala as pre-existing clans,

27

the story

of Nomsimekwana and the Nyavu affirms Wright and Hamilton’s argument for Lala as a social
and political class that initially kept polities such as the Nyavu on the periphery of the Zulu
kingdom. Heather Hughes also argues that the variety of the chiefdoms and fragments of

25

Carolyn Hamilton and John Wright, “The Making of the AmaLala: Ethnicity, Ideology
and Relations of Subordination in a Precolonial Context,” South African Historical Journal 22
(1990): 3–23.
26
Hamilton and Wright, “The Making of the AmaLala.”
27

Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, 7–9.
70

chiefdoms such as the Nyavu that regarded themselves as Lala suggests that the term became one
used by those seeking protection in Natal.

28

While under the authority of the Embo, Yengqwa again came to the rescue of his young
chief. While Nomsimekwana was at play with the children he was to care for, another of the
“menials” drank from an Embo calabash. Nomsimekwana was accused and was to be put to
death for the offense. But Yengqwa heard about the affair and “pleaded against having to see the
Prince killed before his very eyes…After having heard Nomsimekwana absolutely deny the
allegation, with tears in his eyes, Yengqwa went back to the householders, pleading that a
thorough investigation be undertaken among the menials so as to find out who had really drunk
29

the milk.”

It was only Yengqwa’s entreaties that enabled Nomsimekwana’s acquittal. The two

remained together there until the time of Shaka’s Balule campaign (1828) when Yengqwa took
up arms with the king’s troops and Nomsimekwana went to join other youths of his age, tending
the king’s calves at Nhlonhlweni.
Nomsimekwana enjoyed his time as a calf herd at the royal house. Here he came under
the guidance of the indunenkulu there, Somadaka, who appointed him to stir the amasi gourds to
make the moisturizer used by the royal wives. But again, Nomsimekwana fell prey to danger, as
two young cows fell down a cliff. The cowherds were threatened with death, and a lieutenant
warned Nomsimekwana to flee. “You are all going to be killed, you too Scarface,” a reference to
a facial scar prevalent amongst the peoples of central Natal.

30

So Nomsimekwana sought refuge

28

Heather Hughes, First President: A Life of John Dube, Founding President of the ANC
(Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2011), 8–9.
29
Mdluli, Nomsimekwana, 10.
30

The incisions can be for ornamentation (impimpilisa) or as an entry way/incision
(umgcabo) for preventative or curative medicine made by sangoma (diviner/diagnostician) or
71

with an aunt Ntelelo who had also escaped the amazimu and found asylum in Zululand. But he
was hungry and missed the royal house and the indunenkulu Somadaka. He attempted to return
to Nhlonhlweni, but his aunt intercepted him and they instead went back to Table Mountain.
Back in Mkhambathini, they built an umuzi and began to till the fields. It was not long
before their peace was again interrupted, as the Afrikaners arrived under the leadership of
Andries Pretorius, or Potolozi (1838). The Afrikaners put Nomsimekwana in charge of their
flocks of sheep and goats. They put their cattle under a Zondi man, Dlaba. They killed Dlaba for
selling some of their cows, and Nomsimekwana feared the same when sheep and goats began to
disappear, attacked by lions, leopards and servals. Nomsimekwana dreamed that his father
Mcoseli was calling him, warning him to escape from the Afrikaners, so he gathered the Nyavu
men and told them about his dream. One of the Nyavu, Sojuba Majola, volunteered to go to the
Afrikaners in Nomsimekwana’s place. Nomsimekwana and his fiancée, the daughter of Gijimi,
escaped. While they wandered the countryside, she became pregnant with Ngangezwe.
The Afrikaners pursued them, and there were several close calls. The first occurred when
Nomsimekwana returned home for a visit. By chance, this visit happened on the same day
Hendrik Pretorius arrived looking for Nomsimekwana. A member of the family, Idi Mdluli,
helped Nomsimekwana hatch yet another plan to escape, and this time Nomsimekwana collected
his cattle, his fiancée, and their children and headed for the low country where the Mlaba chiefs

inyanga (healer). On impimilisa, see A. T Bryant, A Zulu-English Dictionary (Pinetown: The
Mariannhill Mission Press, 1905), 17; Eileen Jensen Krige, The Social System of the Zulus
(Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1988), 375. On umgcabo, see Ngubane, Body and Mind in
Zulu Medicine, 25; Frank Jolles and Stephen Jolles, “Zulu Ritual Immunisation in Perspective,”
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 70, no. 2 (January 1, 2000): 229–248.
72

of the Ximba chiefdom were later established.

31

The nascent family stayed there and the Nyavu

began to recollect, until word arrived that the Afrikaners had come to know of their whereabouts.
Nomsimekwana instructed his men and Ngangezwe to drive away his cattle, first this way
and then that, in an attempt to prevent the Afrikaners from finding them. The daughter of Gijimi
fled to the bush with their other children while Nomsimekwana armed himself and took to the
hill to wait for the Afrikaners. Nomsimekwana alerted Gxwala, son of Nombiba, who in turn
warned the remaining Nyavu to flee into the bush. The Afrikaners followed and captured all but
two of Nomsimekwana’s cattle. When the Nyavu reconvened at home, they decided to relocate
away from the Afrikaners. They returned to stay among the Embo, now at Mtebele, where they
stayed while the “English and Boers were at war in Durban” (this refers to the British occupation
of Durban, 1842).When the Afrikaners were defeated and trekked back over the Drakensberg,
the English told Nomsimekwana he could return to his place at Mkhambathini and that “nothing
whatsoever would happen to him.”

32

In addition to being an exciting example of the tribulations of a small chiefdom on the
periphery of the growing Zulu state, Nomsimekwana’s adventures as narrated by Chief Somquba
reveal the significance of hereditary descent and the dedication afforded to hereditary chiefs. The
relationship between Nomsimekwana and Yengqwa in particular sheds insight into the
relationship of chiefs to their people. The “Mdluli chief’s cub”, Yengqwa, was one of the most
prominent characters when Somquba narrated the tradition in 1939. Yengqwa was not only
dedicated to the chief, he was responsible for arranging preferential treatment for the young

31

This is a very important event in the oral tradition, for it continues to be cited by
Nyavu as evidence in an ongoing land conflict with the government-created Ximba similar to the
conflict below with the Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo.
32
Mdluli, Nomsimekwana, 22.
73

Nomsimekwana when the Nyavu lived amongst the Embo. Later, when Nomsimekwana was
wrongly accused of drinking from the Embo’s calabash, it was Yengqwa who pleaded and
insisted upon the investigation that saved Nomsimekwana from death. In these ways, Yenqwa
takes on a regent-like role in overseeing the safety of the Nyavu heir.
A.T. Bryant’s account does not mention Yengqwa or relate Nomsimekwana’s treatment
by the Embo. This could be for several reasons. Firstly, as Wright has shown, Bryant’s Olden
Times is primarily a product of a process of colonial mythologizing about African history. It
must be rejected as definitive or even reliable.

33

With his focus on Zulu militarism, Bryant could

only see the Nyavu as victims of the Zulu and other chiefdoms on the move. While it is likely
Somquba’s narration of Nomsimekwana itself was mythologized since his grandfather’s time, it
is worthy of analysis for what it reveals about the values of the Nyavu at the time of recording.
While some have critiqued the worth of oral traditions as historical sources, they must also be
seen as valuable reflections of “ideological struggles between the rulers and ruled in a society.”

34

As discussed above, we have the biographical and circumstantial information for our
narrator, Somquba. While Bryant’s account in Olden Times is rarely based on accounts collected
by himself (he relies upon testimonies collected by Theophilus Shepstone for which we have no
biographical information), it is likely that Somquba heard the account firsthand from
Nomsimekwana himself or from his father Ngangezwe, Nomsimekwana’s son and heir. Witness
to the governance of his father and grandfather before him, Somquba’s repeated attention to
hereditary descent and the dedication of Yengqwa, Sojuba Majola, and Idi Mdluli suggests that

33

John Wright, “A.T. Bryant and ‘The Wars of Shaka’,” History in Africa 18 (1991):

409–25.
34

Carolyn Hamilton, “Ideology and Oral Traditions: Listening to the Voices ‘From
Below’,” History in Africa 14 (1987): 67–86.
74

by the time of his rule (1931-40) there was a need to assert the level of respect traditionally
attributed to a hereditary chief by his people. Emphasizing this principle would be particularly
important to a hereditary leader such as Somquba, aware of decades of assault upon his people
and their land by their white rulers and the white-appointed chiefs encroaching to their east and
west.
Somquba’s character Yengqwa stressed that Nomsimekwana was the “only prince left
alive from his house” and earned a reputation as dedicated to the young chief. Somquba also
emphasized the hereditary line later when Nomsimekwana planned to escape the Afrikaners at
Mkhambathini. Sojuba Majola, a Nyavu elder, offered himself for punishment on behalf of
Nomsimekwana, insisting Nomsimekwana not die. “You don’t have even a single child, so that
if you die, your house dies… No, at least I can die on your behalf, Mdluli, because I already have
children. I also have a house. If I die, my name will not perish.”

35

Sojuba and Idi Mdluli, another

Nyavu man, both remained dedicated to their leader even through severe beatings by the
Afrikaners. Somquba’s traditional story also gave more attention to the conception of
Ngangezwe, his father and the heir to Nomsimekwana, thus illustrating the family line from
which he received his own authority.

Natal Land Policy: Aboriginals and Refugees, Speculators and Missionaries
While the English promised Nomsimekwana “nothing whatsoever would happen to him” under
the Colony of Natal, much change would occur and indeed already had. The neighboring peoples
of Dlanyawo and Dlanyoka had dispersed completely. The remaining Njilo had amalgamated
with the Nyavu. With these peoples on the move when the first white traders settled permanently

35

Mdluli, Nomsimekwana.
75

at Port Natal in 1824, the land was presumed empty and open for settlement. The arrival of the
Voortrekkers in 1837 further complicated the balance of power as Mpande revolted against
Dingane and allied with the Afrikaners. The land ceded by Mpande in return for Boer support
against Dingane became the short-lived Republic of Natalia with its capital at Pietermaritzburg,
only forty kilometers from Table Mountain. The Republican government granted land to its
citizens according to the traditional Cape-Dutch fashion, though many claims remained on paper
only.

36

This land presumed empty and open for settlement began to quickly refill between 1839
and 1842 with the returning Lala such as the Nyavu and an estimated 60,000 refugees moving
south of the Thukela.

37

As the African population rose steadily with returning displacees, the

Republican government resolved to move by force the large majority of the Africans who they
believed “had no right or claim to any part of the country, having only come amongst us after the
emigrants had come hither.”

38

Their pursuit of Nomsimekwana prior to his second stay with the

Embo was certainly part of Afrikaner farmers’ raids to forcefully remove Africans from the land.
Growing British concern over these raids, as well the Afrikaner threat to British strategic
interests, led to the several occupations of Durban between 1838 and 1842 and the formal
annexation of Natal to the Cape Colony in 1844. It was only then that Nomsimekwana
permanently returned to the Nyavu home at Mkhambathini.

36

A.J. Christopher, “Colonial Land Policy in Natal,” Annals of the Association of
American Geographers 61, no. 3 (1971): 565.
37
Charles Ballard, “Traders, Trekkers, and Colonists,” in Natal and Zululand: From
Earliest Times to 1910 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1989), 123.
38
Cited in Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, 11.
76

The idea of a vacant interior prior to the arrival of whites in parts of Natal continued into
the period of British colonial administration. Her Majesty’s Commissioner for Natal, Henry
Cloete, distinguished between “aboriginal” and “refugee” Africans and proposed the
establishment of locations for the removal of the latter category who unlike the aboriginals did
not have rights to the land. According to Cloete, these aboriginal African groups were only
fifteen in number and did not include the Nyavu.

39

The first Locations Commission in 1846,

with the recently appointed Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes Theophilus Shepstone as a
member, demarcated seven reserves (Zwartkop, Umlazi, Umvoti, Inanda, Impofana, Umzinyathi,
and one on the Thukela) and provided the basis for what would become the system of “native
administration.” But the Commission’s recommendations were not implemented and in 1849
Governor Harry Smith dismissed it and set up the Lands Commission of 1852-3, which was to
take a far less sympathetic view to African land rights in the colony.

40

Across these commissions, Shepstone fought for the recognition of territory for African
occupation in Natal. At the behest of Lieutenant-Governor John Scott in 1863, Shepstone
undertook research on the historical grounds for African land claims in Natal. In comparison to
Cloete’s fifteen aboriginal entities, Shepstone found evidence for 94 chiefdoms that historically
occupied the Colony of Natal prior to being disturbed by movements related to the rise of the
Zulu kingdom. Those thought to be refugees by Cloete were actually “aboriginals” returning to
their ancient homes.

41

The reports of this research provided the historical justification for

39

“Mr. Cloete’s Schedule of Aboriginal Zulu Tribes Settled in the Natal Territory dated
Nov. 10, 1843,” in Shepstone, “Historic Sketch,” 426.
40
Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, 11–6.
41

Shepstone, “Historic Sketch,” 422. For an analysis of Shepstone’s research for LtGovernor Scott, see Wright, “A.T. Bryant and ‘The Wars of Shaka’.”
77

African rights to the land.

42

With the establishment of the Natal Native Trust in 1864, legal title

to the African locations in Natal was secured.
In addition to the reserves for these African populations and land set aside for mission
stations, the Government made grants from the Crown for Afrikaners and British immigrants.
These farms were subject to quit-rent and a condition of these grants was that cultivation was to
take place “as far as the land is capable.”

43

As Afrikaners emigrated out of Natal in the wake of

these land policies and the government’s unwillingness to force the African population into
slavery, they cheaply sold their land claims to speculators, trekkers who remained, or to local
merchants to settle outstanding debts.

44

As a result of the Land Commission and Afrikaner

emigration, nearly two million acres of Natal were divided among only 360 claimants, with
leading speculators amongst them. These claimants and speculators sought to make good on their
investments by presenting Natal as a desirable destination for immigrants. Between 1849 and
1852, some 5,000 British immigrants bought up land under various schemes promoted by
landholders. But few possessed the desire, skills, or capital necessary to make it as farmers and
many soon sold off their claims, increasing speculation. By 1860, the fifteen leading speculators
controlled 700,000 acres of colonial Natal.

45

Despite the “beneficial occupation conditions,” it

42

Jeff Guy, “An Accommodation of Patriarchs: Theophilus Shepstone and the
Foundations of the System of Native Administration in Natal,” in Colloquium: Masculinities in
Southern Africa (University of Natal-Durban, 1997), 11.
43
In the quit-rent tenure system a farm was not initially subject to survey but the holder’s
name was registered in the office of the secretary to the governor. At first, quit-rent farms were
subject to 15-year leases, but later were held in perpetuity. Robert Ababrelton, “The Colonial
Lands of Natal,” The Economic Journal 16, no. 3 (1906): 455–61.
44
By the end of 1843 it was estimated that only 365 Voortrekker families remained; by
1847 only 60. Henry Slater, “Land, Labour and Capital in Natal: The Natal Land and
Colonisation Company 1860-1948,” Journal of African History 16, no. 2 (1975): 258–9.
45
Slater, “Land, Labour and Capital in Natal,” 260–2.
78

was estimated that by 1874 no less than five million acres of the lands in hands of private
colonists or land companies were in practice occupied by Africans.

46

Around Table Mountain where the Nyavu had reassembled, many of the newly surveyed
farms to the south and west became the property of whites and land speculators though they
continued to be occupied by Africans. These included Onverwacht (3,875 acres), granted to
Adolph Coqui, who became one of the two largest landowners in Natal at the time,

47

and

Aasvogel Krans (4,458 acres) and Goedverwachting (6,000 acres), granted to Afrikaners Willem
Abraham Swanepoel and Johannes Henricus Bruwer. Tenure on these farms in the early years
was never long. Land registers reveal quick turnovers by the initial grantees and subdivision of
the grants. In 1855 Goedverwachting was vested in the name of Natal Lieutenant-Governor Sir
Benjamin Pine in anticipation of a grant to the Bishop of Natal for a mission station.

48

Goedverwachting was just one of the several pieces of property that made up Bishop of Natal
John W. Colenso’s Bishopstowe residence and Ekukhanyeni mission station. Bishopstowe and
Ekukhanyeni, with a chapel, training centers, printing press, and school for the sons of chiefs,
became a hive of religious, political, and intellectual activities extensively examined
elsewhere.

49

46

Slater, “Land, Labour and Capital in Natal,” 272.

47

Slater, “Land, Labour and Capital in Natal,” 263.

48

Pietermaritzburg Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land
Reform, KwaZulu-Natal Province. Land Registers for Onverwacht No. 1225, Aasvogel Krans
No. 1226, and Goedverwachting No. 1349, 1850s-present.
49
On the Colensos and Bishopstowe, see: Wyn Rees, ed., Colenso Letters from Natal
(Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1958); Shula Marks, “Harriette Colenso and the Zulus,
1874-1913,” The Journal of African History 4, no. 3 (January 1, 1963): 403–411; Jeff Guy, The
Heretic: A Study of the Life of John William Colenso, 1814-1883 (Pietermaritzburg: University
of Natal Press, 1983); Jeff Guy, The View Across the River: Harriette Colenso and the Zulu
Struggle Against Imperialism (University of Virginia Press, 2002); Hlonipha Mokoena, Magema
79

The greater impact of white arrival occurred to the north and east of Table Mountain
where the Nyavu land now fell within the northwestern-most part of the African reserve known
as Inanda Location. A small portion was carved out for the Table Mountain Mission Reserve
under the American Zulu Mission (AZM) in the heart of Nomsimekwana’s territory. After the
visit of Sir George Grey to Natal in 1855, 174,000 acres of land was set aside for mission
reserves. By 1870, the AZM had successfully applied for 12 reserves, including one at Table
Mountain. At 5,623 acres, the Table Mountain station was one of the smallest of the 20 total
mission reserves existing at the time of 1885 Native Mission Reserve Commission. It was poor
and off the beaten track, existing at a considerable distance from other AZM stations. The
Commission members found no mission buildings, no missionary, and no teacher upon their visit
in 1885. The amakholwa (believers, or Christian Zulu) there had gone at least 15 years without a
resident white missionary. Chief Nomsimekwana (who had been baptized) and 35 imizi of his
people, occupied the mission reserve. Nomsimekwana complained about the depasturing of Boer
cattle there during winter months and related that for many years firewood was cut from the land.
The moneys collected, subject of course to his commission, were paid into the office of the
Secretary for Native Affairs. Unable to see any betterment or missionary work from the income
at Table Mountain, the Commission criticized the AZM and found that the reserve land “is not
being utilized for the purposes for which it was granted.”

50

The lack of a resident missionary

was a source of anxiety for some years until in 1888 the mission assigned a young and promising
Zulu preacher, Simungu Shibe, to the station. Shibe “tended to his small flock admirably,” but he
soon became the public symbol of a conflict between the Table Mountain congregation and the

Fuze: The Making of a Kholwa Intellectual (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press,
2011). A special thank you to Jeff Guy for correspondence regarding Bishopstowe.
50
PAR. NCP 8/3/25. Report of Native Mission Reserve, October 20, 1886: 6.
80

AZM. In the wake of the 1886 critical report, the AZM attempted to replace Shibe with a local
white Natal Congregation Union missionary. The activities amongst the Table Mountain
congregation then became central in the rise of the Zulu Congregational Church (ZCC).

51

The Government Tribes and Appointed Chiefs
While the Nyavu fell under the status of “aboriginal” peoples and their leader a “hereditary”
chief, other isiZulu-speaking people who began to encroach upon Nyavu territory became known
as the “government tribes.” In addition to being responsible for moving Africans onto the
reserves, Theophilus Shepstone took on the task of designing and implementing a system of
African administration. While Shepstone’s “Historic Sketch” and “Inhabitants of the Territory”
were later used as the main sources of the mfecane “devastation hypothesis,” Hamilton has
pointed out that they were also influential in shaping colonial thinking at the time of their
preparations. In studying African forms of governance, Shepstone found in Shaka a model for
ruling Africans in Natal.

52

Without sufficient financial or colonial support, Shepstone modeled

himself as the de facto Supreme Chief (though formally this title was accorded to the Lieutenant
Governor under Ordinance 3 of 1849). He utilized the position of the chiefs in what became
known as the system of indirect rule.

53

51

For an in-depth account of tensions between the Table Mountain congregation and the
AZM, see Robert J. Houle, Making African Christianity: Africans Reimagining their Faith in
Colonial Southern Africa (Maryland: Lehigh University Press, 2011), Ch 6.
52
Hamilton, Terrific Majesty, 90–3.
53

Theophilus Shepstone proved to be one of Britain’s most influential African
administrators. His measures and system of indirect rule introduced in Natal have been the
subject of multiple accounts, including: Welsh, The Roots of Segregation; Etherington, “The
‘Shepstone System’ in the Colony of Natal and Beyond the Borders”; John Lambert, Betrayed
81

But the upheavals described above seriously disrupted local societies and Shepstone
found a large proportion of the African population lacked hereditary chiefs. He first attempted to
attach fragments of groups to other chiefly groups, but met resistance. Often chiefs refused
jurisdiction of the newly attached peoples or would find unfairly against those not considered a
“real member” of his group. Just as Shaka and Dingane had replaced chiefs feared too powerful
with family members and officers known to be loyal, Shepstone appointed men known to be
faithful as new chiefs where hereditary chiefs could not be found.

54

The men appointed were

often magisterial izinduna who had earned favor through their positions. These iziphakanyiswa,
or commoners elevated to the position of chief, came to lead an estimated one-third to one-half
of the African population without chiefs in Natal. Their polities became known as “government
tribes.” Undersecretary for Native Affairs S.O. Samuelson understood these two “distinct and
antagonistic forms of tribal government,” run by hereditary chiefs and appointed chiefs, as
central to “giving effect to the principle of divide and rule.”

55

As Samuelson undoubtedly knew,

and as this and the next chapter show, tensions did emerge between hereditary and appointed
chiefdoms.
The Nyavu found their territory encroached upon by these new “government tribes”. To
their east, it was the first Mlaba chiefs, Mdepa and Mqundane, of the Ximba chiefdom. To their
north/northwest, it was the Majozi chiefs of the Qamu. It is these latter peoples and the
chieftaincies created out of them that are of concern here.

trust : Africans and the state in colonial Natal (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 1995);
Guy, “An Accommodation of Patriarchs”; McClendon, White Chief, Black Lords.
54
Kuper, “The ‘House’ and Zulu Political Structure in the Nineteenth Century,” 30–1;
Lambert, Betrayed trust.
55
PAR. SNA. 1/4/12. 96/1903. Under-Secretary for Native Affairs report on chiefdoms,
15 June 1903.
82

The Qamu and the man who would become their chief, Ngoza Majozi kaLudaba, are
often cited as exemplifying the relationship between created and appointed chiefs and the
colonial government. They are also an illustrative example of the ensuing land and jurisdiction
conflicts. Appointed chiefs’ authority rested on the support of the colonial administration rather
than that of their followers. These chiefs were not entitled to nominate heirs to the chieftainship.
But the support offered by the colonial government enabled them to rise to positions rivaling that
of hereditary chiefs.
Ngoza Majozi grew up in the Zulu kingdom during the early nineteenth century and
56

served as a soldier in the Zulu army during the reign of Dingane kaSenzagakhona (1828-40).

During the early 1840s, possibly in association with Dingane’s defeat, Ngoza crossed the
Thukela River into what became the Colony of Natal. Ngoza first worked in a settler’s kitchen in
Pietermaritzburg before attracting Shepstone’s attention. He participated in the 1847 attack
organized by Shepstone on the recalcitrant Chief Fodo in southern Natal, after which he was
appointed as an induna in the office of the SNA. Shepstone rewarded Ngoza for this loyalty with
the position of “induna in charge” over a large number of Africans arriving to the colony and
settling in the Umngeni valley. As the number of people increased, Ngoza became a government
57

chief, one of the iziphakanyiswa.

56

See Ngoza’s account of his years as a soldier, particularly during the impi yaseNcome
and impi yaseThukela, “Indaba kaNgoza,” in: Church of England, Izindatyana zaBantu kanye
nezindaba zas’eNatal (Natal: May & Davis, 1859). Sifiso Ndlovu has examined Ngoza’s
testimony in Izindatyana zaBantu as part of the African archive about King Dingane. For this
reason, Ndlovu considers Ngoza an important public intellectual. Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu, “The
Changing African Perceptions of King Dingane in Historical Literature: A Case Study in the
Construction of Knowledge in 19th and 20th Century South African History” (PhD dissertation,
University of Witwatersrand, 2001), 55–60.
57
Jeff Guy, “‘A Paralysis of Perspective’: Image and Text in the Creation of an African
Chief,” in Art and the British Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 337–56.
83

The people over whom Ngoza was placed came from various places and have been called
by various names. Some originally lived under Jangeni of the Ngome before he left the Umngeni
Valley for the Greytown area.

58

Another portion came down to Estezi kwaMaphumulo (near

Wartburg), according to oral tradition, on account of a family conflict between brothers.

59

Lacking the control of any particular chief, this collection of heterogeneous remnants was
“organized under Ngoza and his headmen as to be an excellent provision for offensive and
defensive purposes in the interests of the Government.”
general, were also called the “Thintandaba.”

61

60

These “Government tribes,” in

In the early days of the colony when there was a

certain prestige and status attached to these chiefs in favor with important government officials,
“government tribe” was a proud moniker and indeed part of the Qamu referred to themselves as
such as late as 1903.

62

Ngoza’s people became known as the amaQamu (amaQanyeni,

58

PAR. SNA 1/1/318. 670/1905. Minute Paper Resident Magistrate Umngeni Division.
March 16, 1905.
59
Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo,
January 27, 2011.
60
PAR. SNA 1/4/12. 96/1903. Under-Secretary for Native Affairs report on chiefdoms,
June 15, 1903;
61
Thintandaba is the name of the mixed tribes according to archival records such as
SNA 1/1/203; Bryant, A Zulu-English Dictionary, 760.
62
Shula Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1970), 322.
84

amaKanya), though it is not clear from where this name comes.
chiefs is Majozi.

63

The isibongo of the Qamu

64

While the creation of government tribes benefited the interests of the government, those
men raised up also had much to gain. Passages from the diary of Bishop John William Colenso,
who met Ngoza when he first toured Natal in 1854, illustrate the authority Ngoza had come to
wield as well as the makeup of his followers in the Table Mountain area:
Ngoza is Mr. Shepstone’s head man, and, though not an hereditary chief, has
acquired considerable power, and is practically a chief of as much authority as
any in the district, which he owes partly to Mr. Shepstone’s patronage, partly to
his own modest and amiable character. There are, probably, (by reason of
refugees having flocked to him, who had left their own chiefs behind,) more pure
65
Zulus under Ngoza than under any other chief in Natal.
Ngoza dressed “neatly enough as a European,”

66

owned and hired out a wagon, sent his sons and

relatives to be educated at Bishop Colenso’s mission station Ekukhanyeni, and announced to
Colenso, “I should like to be the last fool of my race.”

63

67

AmaKanya also refers to another group ascertained by Shepstone to have their ancient
residence on the right bank of the Thukela River that was dispersed and incorporated by Shaka,
but became reconstructed on the occasion of the “Zulu revolution.” Shepstone, “Inhabitants of
the Territory (Now the Colony of Natal) during the Time of Jobe, Father of Dingizwayo before
the Extermination of Tribes by Chaka,” 152;Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition.
64
Izibongo, the plural of isibongo, can be translated as “praises,” “praise names,” “praise
poems,” or “praise poetry.” Izibongo are concerned with naming, identifying, and giving
significance to the named person or object. These often provide links with one’s community,
lineage, and origins, which Buthelezi is doing here. See Elizabeth Gunner and Mafika Pascal
Gwala, Musho! Zulu Popular Praises (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1991);
Koopman, Zulu Names.
65
“Pure Zulu” is a reference to the distinction between Africans of Zululand and those
indigenous to Natal, between those close to the Zulu kingdom and those on its periphery (the
Lala). John William Colenso, Ten Weeks in Natal: A Journal of a First Tour of Visitation Among
the Colonists and Zulu Kafirs of Natal (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1855), 46.
66
Colenso, Ten Weeks in Natal, 45.
85

But despite the privileges of power, Ngoza and appointed chiefs like him had difficult
roles to play. They carried a conflicting ideological burden, expected to move autonomously in
both the official British colonial and the colonized Africans worlds. Jeff Guy has argued that
contemporary photographic and newspaper descriptions of Ngoza reflected a man whose very
essence was contradiction. He was “enlightened and barbaric, progressive and traditional, savage
and controlled.” He could lead his men in traditional war dances, but was also “enlightened,
loyal, cash-crop-growing, wagon-owner, a harbinger of the future.”

68

These chiefs enjoyed their positions of privilege but still found themselves subject to
ridicule for their lack of hereditary status and cooption by the colonial government. Several of
James Stuart’s informants derogatorily referred to Ngoza as “Sir T. Shepstone’s induna” and one
recalled that Cetshwayo had demanded Shepstone turn over “that dog Ngoza.”

69

Mqundane,

another government chief, was still viewed by Bishop Colenso only as a “very valuable
servant.”

70

But Ngoza once more profited from his colonial loyalties when Shepstone asserted
authority over another unyielding chief, Matyana in the Klip River district. Shepstone deposed
Matyana and dissolved his chiefdom. He gave the territory to Ngoza, certainly as an example of
67

John William Colenso, “On Missions to the Zulus in Natal & Zululand: A Lecture,” in
Bringing Forth the Light: Five Tracts on Bishop Colenso’s Zulu Mission (Pietermaritzburg:
University of Natal Press, 1982), 225–6; Lewis Grout, Zululand: or, Life among the Zulu-Kafirs
of Natal and Zululand, South Africa (London, 1861), 250–1.
68
Guy, “Paralysis of Perspective,” 342.
69

In the face off between Shepstone and Cetshwayo where Cetshwayo called Ngoza a
dog, Shepstone ordered Ngoza not to heed, to “Stay!” Gxubu kaLuduzo, taken on 27 January
1912, in C. De B. Webb and J.B. Wright (eds), The James Stuart Archive Volume 1
(Pietermaritzburg and Durban: University of Natal Press, 1976), 158-9; for other references to
“Shepstone’s induna,” see that of John Gama, 18 Dec 1898, ibid, 135-7; and Magidigidi
kaNobebe, 5 May 1905, ibid. (Vol 2, 1979), 83-97; Guy, “Paralysis of Perspective,” 355.
70
Colenso, Ten Weeks in Natal, 79.
86

the benefits of loyalty to the colonial government and a warning to those who opposed it.

71

Thus

in 1869, Ngoza left the Umngeni Valley with a number of his followers and moved back north to
the Msinga area. Ngoza’s chiefdom then stretched across both the Natal Colony and Zululand
and consisted of so many fugitives and remnants of chiefdoms that at the time of his death that
same year, it was the largest chiefdom in the colony.

72

The portion of the Qamu in the Msinga

Division fell under seven sections, each ruled by its own headman.

73

The peoples of the Msinga region, including Ngoza’s Qamu, were encouraged by the
colonial authorities to see the colonial administration as the effective power above the authority
of the chiefs, rather than the Zulu king.

74

In fact, when Ngoza passed away, a hereditary

successor was not chosen. Klip River Resident Magistrate G.A. Lucas contended Ngoza was not
so much a chief as an “induna in charge” who represented the real power of the Supreme Chief
to whom the Qamu belonged. According to Lucas, Ngoza himself was aware his position was
not hereditary, and when he realized his death was imminent, he appointed his son Lutyungu as
only the head of the family. The position of chief was decided by “His Excellency [who] saw fit
to confirm Maziana [who held the next highest rank in the tribe] in his office of Induna in charge
of the whole tribe preceding any arrangements as to one of Ngoza’s sons taking his place or

71

McClendon, White Chief, Black Lords, 72; Guy, “Paralysis of Perspective,” 347.

72

PAR. SNA. 1/4/12. 96/1903. Under-Secretary for Native Affairs report on chiefdoms,
June 15, 1903.
73
PAR. SNA 1/1/203. Minute. Resident Magistrate Msinga H.F. Fynn to the Hon.
Secretary for Native Affairs. July 5, 1895.
74
Jonathan Clegg, “Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - Bringing Back the Body: An Examination
into the Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations, 1882-1944,” in
Working Papers in Southern African Studies, vol. 2 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981), 171.
87

otherwise.”

75

When G.A. Lucas found Maziana neglecting the administration of the Qamu,

Manqatsha Ndlovu replaced him.

76

This of course contributed to the manner in which Ngoza

was remembered by some Msinga residents as “Shepstone’s tea-boy” and his people as those
“without ancestors.”

77

But despite government efforts to insist this position was not hereditary, the Qamu people
conceptualized it otherwise. In evidence recorded by G.A. Lucas during his investigation into
Maziana’s misadministration of the Qamu, there are several indications that the Qamu, whilst
aware of the government stance against the position being hereditary, still respected it as such.
All of the izinduna who testified before Lucas highlighted Maziana’s failure to look out for both
the Qamu people and the Majozi family. The testimony of Uzinwehlana is illustrative:
Ngoza took care of us, looked to our interests, and now it appears that if Maziana
had his will his sons would be turned adrift. It cannot be supported that the tribe
has no feeling towards the sons of the man who took care of us for years. We
don’t ask that Lutyungu be placed in his father’s shoes but we hope to be taken
from under the tender mercies of Maziana. Do no separate us from the sons of our
old chief.
Gitshana, Sogweba, and Faku echoed the sentiment that the Qamu could not separate themselves
from the interests of Ngoza’s sons and Majozi’s family.

78

It is also interesting to note that while Lucas held firmly to the charge that the position of
head of the Qamu was not hereditary, he still found Maziana guilty of losing sight of “what was

75

PAR. SNA 1-1-203 1386/95. Minutes of Evidence re: Tribe Tintandaba.

76

PAR. SNA 1/1/203. 987/1873. “Report upon matters connected with that portion of
the Tintandaba Tribe resident in the Umsinga Location by the Resident Magistrate Klip River
Division”
77
Guy, “Paralysis of Perspective,” 348.
78

PAR. SNA 1/1/203. G.A. Lucas report and evidence on the Tintandaba, 1873.
88

79

due to the Supreme Chief, the Tintandaba Tribe, and N’goza’s family.”

There is a clear

contradiction here between claiming the position is not hereditary and asserting the rights of
Ngoza’s family. If the position is not hereditary and does not remain with Ngoza’s heir, why is
there a need to ensure attention to the family? In recommending Maziana’s dismissal, Lucas
suspects they would be unable to secure another man with the “necessary social standing, tact
and cleverness to take the office of induna-in-charge” and thus recommended that Lutyungu be
appointed. Despite this recommendation, the government appointed another induna, Manqatsha.
In recognizing these complaints about Maziana’s neglect of Ngoza’s sons, the
administration allowed the significance of hereditary descent to continue. When Manqatsha died,
it was Lutyungu’s son Kula who succeeded him. While the SNA was quick to remind both
officials and the Qamu that there was “no hereditary right to chieftainship in the tribe over which
Ngoza was chief and should a member of his family be appointed it will be on account of his
supposed fitness,” the Qamu still recognized Kula’s right based on hereditary descent. When the
headmen and official witnesses of the seven sections appeared before the SNA to request Kula’s
appointment, they petitioned the government “to appoint Kula the son of Luntyungu (deceased)
as our chief. We do not wish any longer to be in divisions as we have been, we wish to have a
head over us, and to be united under him who we regard as our chief” (my emphasis).

79

80

PAR. SNA 1/1/203. G.A. Lucas report and evidence on the Tintandaba, 1873.

80

The case of the Qamu in Msinga is unique and worthy of further in-depth study, not
least because of the collection of money and purchase of the “Hollywood” farm by the people
that transferred from Ngoza’s estate to his grandson Kula, but here we must focus on the Qamu
in the Natal Colony.
89

Back in the Umngeni valley, Ngoza left an induna, Mahoiza, in charge of the Qamu who
remained behind when he went to Msinga.

81

As Ngoza had been rewarded for his loyalty first in

his appointment of the Qamu and later in the addition of people and territory in Umsinga,
Mahoiza would also be rewarded for his service to the government. An induna of the
magistrate’s court in Pietermaritzburg, Ngoza’s induna Mahoiza is most likely the very same
Mahoiza with a penchant for exaggeration whose 1873 report that he had been humiliated and
stripped by the Hlubi precipitated the order for a colonial assault on Langalibalele.

82

Mahoiza

resided on the Bishopstowe mission station (on Goedverwachting) for fifteen years. During the
Langalibalele trial, Bishop Colenso and other Hlubi residents of Colenso’s mission station who
knew Mahoiza well provided evidence that Mahoiza had lied.

83

But Shepstone respected him

and contended Mahoiza and the other messenger had “behaved with wonderful pluck and
propriety.”

84

And thus Mahoiza became another of the iziphakanyizwa, an appointed chief over the
Qamu in the Umngeni, Camperdown, and New Hanover districts. He is first recorded in the
archive as “Chief Mahoiza” in 1878.

85

Within four years, the colonial government found

Mahoiza unreliable as a leader, or rather, that he failed to comply with their orders. Umngeni
Resident Magistrate James Forder reported that “Mahoiza has little control over his men” when it

81

PAR. SNA 1/1/81. 153/1885. Petition of Umjiba, Usikoteni, Umajozi, and Unguga to
SNA H.C. Shepstone.
82
Wright, The Hlubi chiefdom in Zululand-Natal, 56–62; Guy, The View Across the
River, 38–40; McClendon, White Chief, Black Lords, 82–99.
83
Guy, The View Across the River, 39.
84

Quoted in Guy, The Heretic, 201.

85

PAR. CSO 677. 1878/4737. Minute Paper Resident Magistrate Umngeni, “Natives to
be supplied by Chief Mahoiza…”
90

came to requisitioning men for Public Works projects.

86

Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs

J.W. Shepstone considered him unfit to retain his position over the whole of the Qamu remaining
in the Umngeni valley due to his utter indifference and inability. Additionally, he was hopelessly
in debt, given to hard drinking, and constantly being brought before the Magistrate’s Court. This
was not his first failure to supply men as during the Zulu war he could not be relied upon.
Instead, his headmen Manyosi and Mbobo supplied men and showed a readiness to obey. J.W.
Shepstone recommended Mahoiza’s jurisdiction be divided among them.

87

Bulwer, perhaps on

account of Mahoiza’s earlier services, recommended that the latter be brought in to explain
himself, though there is no evidence of Mahoiza’s defense.

88

Thus, in 1882 Mahoiza’s jurisdiction was confined to private lands and the remainder put
under Manyosi Gcumisa and Mbobo, the heir of Mfulatelwa (a brother of Ngoza).

89

Mbobo had

applied to Theophilus Shepstone to be made chief and was given authority over a portion of
Mahoiza’s Qamu, but without distinct boundaries or location land and with the intention that the
people under Mbobo and Manyosi could intermingle peacefully.

90

The then acting chief

Mhlahlo, half brother of Mbobo, explained it thus in 1902:
When Ngoza went North he left his induna Mahoiza in charge of the Amaqamu
Tribesmen, who remained behind. For some time matters remained in this state
86

PAR. SNA 1/1/53. 126/82. Minute. Resident Magistrate Umngeni Dviision to SNA.
March 13, 1882.
87
PAR. SNA 1/1/53. 124/82. Report by ASNA Shepstone. March 24, 1882.
88

PAR. SNA 1/1/53. 126/82. Minute. Lt. Governor H.E. Bulwer. March 25, 1882.

89

PAR. SNA 1/1/54. 1882/272. Minute by ASNA Shepstone to Resident Magistrate
Umngeni Division. July 14, 1882. It should also be noted that even after Mahoiza’s jurisdiction
was restricted to a smaller territory, his offenses continued as he illegally sold/lent guns without
permits and sent his son rather than an official witness to act at a wedding. See PAR. SNA 1/1/70
and 1/1/78.
90
PAR. SNA 1/1/112. 1889/68. “Application of chief Manyosi.”
91

and the tribe still recognized Ngoza as it’s [sic] chief. Time went by and then
Mbobo, the fraternal nephew of Ngoza, came to Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone) and
made application to be appointed a chief in his own right over the section of the
Amaqamu Tribesmen who were left behind by the late Ngoza. Sir T. Shepstone
91
was pleased to appoint Mbobo.
Manyosi, on the other hand, another induna of the magistrate’s court, was given authority
over those of Mahoiza’s Qamu people who lived on location lands (in addition to some on
private lands). This portion of the Qamu would take Manyosi’s surname, Gcumisa, as its name in
1897 after Manyosi’s heir Swaimana petitioned the government to change the name. (For the
sake of distinguishing between this section and the Qamu section under Mbobo, this section will
hence forth be called Gcumisa.)

92

While the Qamu under Mbobo were given no specific territory,

93

J.W. Shepstone

decided the Manzamnyama Stream as the boundary line separating Gcumisa location lands from
that of the neighboring Nyavu in 1882.

94

The appointment of Mahoiza and Manyosi as chiefs

caused great friction as Chief Nomsimekwana saw Nyavu land increasingly encroached upon. In
addition to the pressure resultant from policies establishing new chieftaincies, existing chiefs felt
hemmed in by the established boundaries.

91

PAR. SNA 1/1/298. 3846/1902. Statement of Acting Chief Mhlahlo. June 16, 1903.

92

PAR. SNA 1/1/267. 2711/1897. “Application of the Chief Swaimana to have his tribal
name altered from ‘Qamu’ to ‘Gcumisa.’”
93
The fate of Mbobo’s landless section of the Qamu in the Umngeni Valley is as
fascinating a story as that of Ngoza’s successors in the Msinga region but will have to be
followed elsewhere. It will continue to come up throughout the dissertation.
94
See SNA 1/1/56. 1882/450.
92

Figure 4 and 5: Left, The famously reproduced “Zulu Chief Goza in full war costume and
indunas,” Killie Campbell Collections, Album C59-048; Right, “Depicts a group of men.
Left to right, front row: Sotobe, Umbozana, Umqhawe, Ncapayi, Deliweyo, and Swayimana
kaManyosi” (Swaimana, discussed below, was the son of Manyosi, the first chief of the
Gcumisa discussed above). Killie Campbell Collections, Album A42-020.
Nomsimekwana was not alone in feeling cornered. As the colonial administration plowed
forward with the creation of new chieftaincies, they also established boundary lines to restrict
chiefly authority to specific territories and stem “faction fights.” Michael Mahoney highlights the
manner in which colonial officials acted as amateur ethnographers that tended to understand
African polities as wholly homogenous and discrete units and did not recognize a problem with
setting up boundaries.

95

However, the government struggled throughout the early colonial period

to enforce their understanding of “tribe.” Act 37 of 1896 amended the Code of Native Law to fix
Africans to designated tribes with designated land and thus made it difficult for Africans to move
between chiefdoms and divisions. A concept of boundaries and borders was not alien to African
society, but when the location system was established chiefdoms saw some of their villages,

95

Michael Robert Mahoney, “Between the Zulu King and the Great White Chief:
Political Culture in a Natal Chiefdom, 1879-1906” (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles,
1998), 218–9.
93

wards, and districts fall within divisions in which the chief was not resident.

96

Several scholars

illustrate well the manner in which these boundaries exacerbated existing competition and
produced fresh conflicts over scarce resources.

97

In the Umngeni District, Resident Magistrate

Forder explained that many location chiefs “are becoming very jealous of any encroachment on
their lands owing to their people entering locations as they are turned off private lands.”

98

The records of these resultant boundary conflicts provide excellent insight into the
division of chieftaincies briefly examined above, as well as the creation of the Maphumulo out of
the newly established Gcumisa. These records are, of course, tainted by the fact that those
making the statement sought to gain from their testimony, but they are significant nonetheless
because they reveal the manner in which hereditary chiefs positioned themselves against and
attempted to delegitimize their appointed counterparts. This section will examine conflicts over
land between appointed chiefs, such as those of the Qamu and Gcumisa, and also between the
Gcumisa and the hereditary Nyavu. In so doing, it is possible to uncover not only the manner in
which chieftaincies proliferated but the ways in which chiefs deployed notions of legitimacy to
bolster their claims to land.

96

Mduduzi Percival Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority from ‘Personal to
Territorial’: An Historical Analysis of the Limitations of Colonial Boundaries on African Sociopolitical Relations in Natal’s Maphumulo/Lower Thukela Region, 1890-1910” (M.A., University
of KwaZulu-Natal, 2012), 36; Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 320.
97
Clegg, “Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - Bringing Back the Body: An Examination into the
Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations, 1882-1944”; Lambert,
Betrayed trust; Jabulani Sithole, “Land, Officials, Chiefs and Commoners in the Izimpi
Zemibango in the Umlazi Location of the Pinetown District in the Context of Natal’s Changing
Politial Economy, 1920-1936” (M.A., University of Natal, 1998); Mahoney, “Between the Zulu
King and the Great White Chief”; Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority.”
98
PAR. SNA 1/1/117. 870/89. RM Umngeni Forder to SNA, September 14, 1989.
94

Less than ten years after the 1882 establishment of a boundary line on location land
between the Nyavu and the Gcumisa, Nomsimekwana’s son, Ngangezwe, appealed to the
Secretary for Native Affairs on behalf of his aged father regarding a further land dispute where
Manyosi applied to have several of Nomsimekwana’s people removed from what the Gcumisa
chief deemed his own territory. J.W. Shepstone had marked the Manzamnyama Stream as the
line between Nomsimekwana and Manyosi on the eastern side of the mountain, but failed to
point out a boundary on the northwestern corner. Thus, in 1889, Ngangezwe appealed that the
government intervene and decide the boundaries, once and for all. Ngangezwe alleged that the
land in question to the northwest of the mountain belonged to the Nyavu. Ngangezwe explained,
“My father is a hereditary chief over the Mcoseli or Mdhuli [sic] Tribe, and was chief over the
land in dispute when the Boers conquered Natal. When the British Government took Natal from
the Boers my father still remained Chief and is still a Chief.” Ngangezwe positioned his father as
the hereditary chief, having been on this land before the arrival of Europeans, in stark contrast to
Mahoiza and Manyosi. He described at length how these latter two obtained jurisdiction over
land belonging to the Nyavu thus:
Chief Ngoza and Nomsimekwana were great friends and in consequence Ngoza
asked for and obtained leave from Nomsimekwana to build one kraal this side of
the Umngeni. This kraal was the Hlahleni kraal. After this more of Ngoza’s
people came across the Umngeni and lived near to the Hlahleni kraal with
Nomsimekwana’s people. Some time elapsed after this then Ngoza left with part
of his Tribe for Msinga and entrusted his Tribe by the Umngeni to Mahoiza who
is now Chief Mahoiza. The owners of the kraals which had come across the
Umngeni to Nomsimekwana’s side of the river then expressed their wish to
remain under Nomsimekwana; but Mahoiza claimed that the land had been
Ngoza’s and that the people who were occupying it should move or remain under
him. This matter then came before Mr. J.W. Shepstone as Secretary for Native
Affairs for settlement.
Chief Manyosi gave evidence in favour of Nomsimekwana but judgment was
given in favour of Mahoiza. Shortly after this Nomsimekwana applied to said
Secretary for Native Affairs for a review of this whole matter and the application
95

was granted. The matter was then gone into, the decision in favour of Mahoiza
was upset, and a decision in favour of Nomsimekwana was given. Kilani and
Ngalonkulu were then sent by the said Secretary for Native Affairs to inform the
people of the Locality in dispute, and Mahoiza, of the new decision. In the
meantime, Manyosi was appointed Chief of that part of Ngoza’s tribe which lived
on Location lands. After his appointment Manyosi built a kraal on the locality
which had been in dispute and then laid claim to the locality for himself and his
people. This claim then came before Mr. J.W. Shepstone as Secretary for Native
Affairs who decided in favour of Manyosi as regards the land up to the stream
99
Manzamyama formerly Gobeni…
The SNA found in favor of Manyosi on account of the 1882-set boundary line and
pointed out a boundary to the northwest of the mountain taking the Manyzamnyama as its
source. He did not order Nomsimekwana’s people, Ngulube and Magcimana, to remove to
Nyavu territory, but declared that no further Nyavu settlement should take place in the area now
that jurisdiction had been decided.

100

But the issues over this same boundary line were again

raised in 1895, the Gcumisa now under the authority of Manyosi’s son, Swaimana.

101

Relations

of Ngulube and Magcimana had moved into the abandoned imizi ordered to remove earlier and
the SNA again referred to the earliest set boundary line and ordered Nomsimekwana’s people to
102

move.

Despite the repeated decisions in favor of the Gcumisa, Ngangezwe appealed yet again in
early 1905 that the matter be reopened. Ngangezwe lamented what he saw as an injustice done to

99

PAR. SNA 1/1/117. 870/1889. Petition of Ngangezwe representing Chief
Nomsimekwana. August 21, 1889.
100
PAR. SNA 1/1/117. 870/1889. Minute Paper, R.C. Samuelson, 1889-1890.
101

In 1894, Swaimana, the son and heir of Manyosi appeared before Administrator
Foxon on behalf of his ill father. Swaimana reported that Manyosi asked that Swaimana be
appointed regent of his portion of the Qamu pending his recovery. See PAR. SNA 1/1/183.
361/1894. “Illness of Chief Manyosi.”
102
PAR. SNA. 1/1/197. 169/1895. Resident Magistrate, Umngeni: Application for
Previous Correspondence Relative to Land Dispute Between Late Chief Manyosi and Chief
Nomsimekwana. February 5, 1895.
96

his people and stressed that Manyosi had no prior right to the land. “Manyosi laid claim to the
ground himself and it was given to him. I fail to understand how this could be done, seeing that
in the first place he was only concerned in the matter as a witness. This is a point over which I
grieve sorely.”

103

While ultimately Undersecretary for Native Affairs Samuelson refused to

reconsider the case on account of the earlier decisions and boundary line, Umngeni Resident
Magistrate Thomas Bennett pleaded on Ngangezwe’s behalf on account of the Nyavu’s
“aboriginal” status. Bennett surprisingly argued against the appointed chief, saying: “knowing all
the circumstances of the case I must say that in dealing with this matter, the fact of Ngangezwe’s
father Nomsimekwana and his people being one of the aboriginal tribes resident at Table
Mountain at the time this territory was taken from the dutch [sic], was not fully considered.”

104

As we will see throughout the next several chapters the Nyavu chiefs repeatedly relied on
this hereditary, aboriginal status in their claims on land. Nomsimekwana and Ngangezwe
contrasted their legitimacy against the colonially appointed authority of Mahoiza and Manyosi.
While the fact that Ngoza was an appointed chief had not prevented a friendship between Ngoza
and Nomsimekwana, increasing competition for land and authority motivated the Nyavu chiefs
to attempt to delegitimize other appointed chiefs. Nomsimekwana’s son called into question the
legitimacy of Mahoiza and Manyosi’s claims by emphasizing their non-hereditary status.
Nomsimekwana had inherited his chiefly legitimacy and jurisdiction over land. When Mahoiza
was entrusted with the land, he was not then a chief, but only an induna. When Manyosi was
awarded the land he was only a witness.

103
104

PAR. SNA 1/1/320. 1051/1905. Statement of Ngangezwe to SNA, May 3, 1905.
PAR. SNA 1/1/320. 1051/1905. Minute Paper, Umngeni Resident Magistrate. June 8,

1905.
97

While Manyosi was favored by the SNA in these land claims, colonial confidence in the
chief dwindled after repeated complaints regarding his “campaign of contention with all his
neighboring chiefs and their tribes” and would eventually result in the division of his
chiefdom.

105

Chief Mhlahlo, a successor of Mbobo’s landless portion of the Qamu, complained

about Swaimana’s interference with his people on a regular basis. Their relationship was tense
on account of the expected sharing of land. Mhlahlo continued for several years to make
statements before the magistrates and SNA for boundaries to be set. The New Hanover
Magistrate Ritter outlined Mhlahlo’s complaints, principal of which was that Swaimana claimed
all of the land upon which Mhlahlo’s people in the New Hanover District resided and interfered
with his ability to call out people for road works.
While the SNA steadfastly adhered to the decision not to allocate specific territory to this
portion of the Qamu, several officials expressed concern regarding Swaimana’s actions.
Samuelson found Swaimana’s conduct regarding several of Mhlahlo’s people, including
Nombinda kaMnukwa and Mzingwa, reprehensible. In the case of the former, Swaimana had
ordered the removal of a white rag that had been hung to signify Nombinda’s engagement.
Regarding the latter, Swaimana gave one of Mfuyana’s (Mhlahlo’s induna) gardens to Mzingwa,
who fell under the authority of Swaimana, and ordered that the remainder of Mfuyana’s gardens
be used as grazing grounds for his own cattle.

106

It is interesting to note that in these complaints Chief Mhlahlo, himself the heir of an
appointed chief, chose to highlight his familial relationship to Ngoza. Swaimana, on the other

105

PAR. SNA 1/1/298. 3846/1902. Statement of Mhlahlo, Chief of the Amaqamu Tribe,
Umngeni Division, June 16, 1903.
106
PAR. SNA 1/1/307. Statement by Chief Mhlahlo and headman Mfuyana relative to
boundary dispute…
98

hand, was “but an upstart sprung from the appointment of my late uncle Ngoza’s induna
Manyosi… who is as bumptious as a man can be, [and] is snapping up the land all round him and
increasing the dimensions of his tribe as fast as he can.”

107

Mhlahlo argued his right to land due

to his kinship relations with Ngoza, in contrast to Swaimana who was only the heir of Ngoza’s
induna.
But Chief Mhlahlo was not the only one appearing before colonial officials with
complaints regarding Swaimana. By 1905, even members of Swaimana’s own people had had
enough. Several members of the Gcumisa, including Butsha (an induna), Mpinkulu, Tayi, and
Mazingela, appeared before the Umngeni Magistrate as representatives of umuzi heads residing
on private lands in the Umngeni and New Hanover divisions, requesting to be transferred to the
authority of Chief Bhambatha. The representatives complained that Swaimana arbitrarily placed
strangers in their homesteads to live and would not redress their concerns. This was not the first
complaint the Umngeni Magistrate received regarding Swaimana, for “even his own relatives
108

residing on Location Lands have made application to be emancipated from his control.”

The

previous New Hanover Magistrate Ritter, aware of the increasing complaints, saw no surprise
that some of Swaimana’s followers wished to leave him. “Swaimana is a most clever, sharp
Native and requires to be kept close in hand by his Magistrate. He is partial and unjust; many of
his own brothers dislike him.”

109

Ritter’s successor Thomas Maxwell felt that while he had not

much opportunity to judge the character of Swaimana, he found the “casual way he has behaved

107

PAR. SNA 1/1/298. 3846/1902. Statement of Mhlahlo, Chief of the Amaqamu Tribe,
Umngeni Division, June 16, 1903.
108
PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Magistrate Umngeni to U.S.N.A. March 16, 1905
109

PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Ex-Magistrate A. Ritter to U.S.N.A. September 13,

1905
99

in the matter of supplying natives for the P.W.D.” as reason to keep the chief under close watch.
He pointed out that Swaimana was “not a hereditary Chief hence he is not looked up to with the
great respect shown by natives to such.”

110

Prior to colonial rule, the possibility that a disaffected section of a chiefdom “might hive
off was a powerful check on chiefly rule: chiefs would be careful not to dissipate their power,
which was measured in terms of the number of subjects, by alienating a section of their
people.”

111

Under the Shepstonian system, this process was carefully regulated and permission

from the SNA was required not only for sections to hive off but also for individuals and imizi to
transfer allegiance. This permission could be granted or refused depending on the interpretation
of its effect. Where a request for separation was granted, a new chiefdom formed under the
leadership of the person leading the request for separation or a commoner who had performed
some useful service and earned such a reward.
Samuelson objected to Butsha and others’ application to fall under Bhambatha.
Bhambatha already had the reputation of a “difficult man,” though the rebellion that took his
name had not yet erupted (of which we will learn more in the next chapter). Samuelson argued
Butsha and the other complainants lived too far from Bhambatha’s jurisdiction. The unhappy
applicants could relocate to Bhambatha’s district, or place themselves under another chief of the
area in which they resided. The Umngeni Magistrate suggested the creation of a new chiefdom

110

PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Magistrate New Hanover to U.S.N.A. October 3,

1905.
111

Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, 119.
100

for he believed that since there were “many small sections of tribes in this locality” it might be
best “to consider the question of grouping these kraals and placing them under one head.”

112

While never cited by officials as an official reason for the separation, certainly they took
into consideration the izimpi zezigodi (section wars) between peoples on each side of the
Umngeni River under Swaimana.

113

As will be seen below, members of the Maphumulo believe

these izimpi zezigodi were certainly part of the reasoning for the creation of a new chieftaincy.
Rumors reached the SNA that Swaimana and his brother had been aware of a fight before it took
place and did nothing to prevent it.

114

Butsha and Ngcazi, another member of Swaimana’s

people looking to break away and join with Bambatha, were both izinduna on land below the
Umngeni River. Aware of their desire to leave his jurisdiction, Swaimana responded in defense,
alleging the matter was one of long standing and one in which he was not at fault. Prior to
Swaimana’s chieftaincy, Bambatha had attempted to claim these same imizi through the
Secretary for Native Affairs but was refused. More recently, he had attempted to mobilize these
people at a wedding at the umuzi of Ziswana, Butsha’s father. Now Butsha was claiming fees for
civil cases and valelisa (removing oneself from under the jurisdiction of a chief). The people
below the Umngeni refused to follow Swaimana and instead listened to Ngcazi.

115

The

magistrate later reported that the tensions amongst Swaimana’s people and between them and
Swaimana were so great he feared it was impossible for Swaimana to continue to operate as
112

PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Magistrate Umngeni to U.S.N.A. March 16, 1905 and
U.S.N.A to Magistrate Umngeni, March 21, 1905.
113
This fight between the sections of Swaimana on each side of the Umngeni River is in
need of more analysis than allowed here. It is also the subject of a play in isiZulu. Mlindeli S. S
Gcumisa, Awuwelwa Umngeni! (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1993).
114
PAR. SNA 1/4/13. 69/1904. Report of Intelligence Officer No. 1, November 12,
1904.
115
PAR. SNA. 1/1/320. Statement of Swaimana kaManyosi. April 17, 1905.
101

chief.

116

Dividing Swaimana’s jurisdiction at the Umngeni thus served as a convenient way for

the colonial government to settle an ongoing dispute between the izigodi on each side of the river
and also address the complaints leveled against Swaimana.
Umngeni Magistrate Bennett and several government officials thus recommended that
Maguzu kaMganu Maphumulo be appointed as chief of the section below the Umngeni. Maguzu
was until then a “native sergeant” of the Natal Police and an induna at the Ndwedwe and
Umngeni Magistrate’s Courts.

117

Bennett spoke highly of Maguzu, on account of his most

excellent character.
He came to this Colony from Zululand with his father Umganu, prior to the
Umbulazi Cetwayo fight of 1858 and settled under Chief Ngoza at the Umkabela
near the Umngeni River and has resided in that neighbourhood ever since. He
entered the services of the Govt. as policeman when this Magistracy was first
established about 1873, and became Induna of the Magistrate’s Court at
Ndwedwe, and subsequently about eleven years ago, was removed from
Ndwedwe to this Court in the same capacity, a position he has held with great
118
credit ever since.
Bennett met with the principal umuzi heads of his district under Swaimana and they
unanimously agreed on the appointment of Maguzu as their chief.

119

In a November 1905 Order

under the provisions of Section 54 of the Courts Act of 1898, which conferred power to the
Governor to proscribe the limits of territory within which chiefs could exercise jurisdiction,
Henry McCallum restricted Swaimana’s jurisdiction to the 442 imizi in the Magisterial District
of New Hanover (whereas previously he governed over the Gcumisa in both New Hanover and

116

PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Report of the Magistrate Umngeni Division in
connection with papers SNA 670/05 and V.225/05. July 5, 1905.
117
The following all allude to Maguzu as court induna or native sergeant: PAR. AGO
1/8/50 355A/1895; SNA 1/1/236 61/1897; SNA 1/1/250 1474/1897.
118
Magistrate Umngeni to U.S.N.A. August 22, 1905.
119

PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Magistrate Umngeni to U.S.N.A. September 6, 1905.
102

Umngeni Districts).

120

At the recommendation of the Umngeni magistrate, 121 kraals located in

the district (41 on Location Land and 80 on private lands) were removed from Swaimana’s
control. This section of the Gcumisa was designated as the “Maphumulo tribe” and became
known as Mbambangalo. The induna of the Umngeni Magistrate’s Court, Maguzu, was
appointed as chief on December 1, 1905. Shula Marks cited this new polity as an example of the
dual process of chief and chiefdom “making.”

121

And thus again, another loyal induna was raised up from within the ranks of Ngoza’s
followers on account of committed service to the colonial establishment. While the colonial
officials cited Maguzu’s most excellent character and good work, Maphumulo and Nyavu alike
today say that Maguzu was given the position as his impesheni, or pension. There are, however,
differing interpretations over who sought the division and whether or not the separation was
amicable. These can best be seen in explanations of the name to be given to the Maphumulo
territory, Mbambangalo. Literally, this place name means to hold (bamba) the arm (ingalo).

122

Maphumulo Chief Nhlakanipho and several of his izinduna concurred on their
interpretations of bamba ingalo. They related that after receiving the chieftaincy as a pension,
Maguzu had said, “let us hold on to one another’s arm, showing that we understand each other
and can stay together well.” Baningi Maphumulo, a former ibamba (regent) of the Maphumulo
chieftaincy, said that this referred to the various izigodi (sections) that fell within
120

PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Order by His Excellency the Governor November 13,

1905.
121

Marks also argues that there should be no doubt that it was from Maguzu (as the
Umngeni induna) that the magistrate heard much of the information about Swaimana. Marks,
Reluctant Rebellion, 323.
122
The section that follows would greatly benefit from oral history interviews with
Gcumisa followers. Unfortunately, at the time of interviews, I did not have the time or means of
access to conduct interviews in KwaSwayimane.
103

Mbambangalo.

123

This explanation could certainly be interpreted as an attempt to legitimize the

manner in which Maguzu became chief. It ignores the friction caused by the removal of a section
of people from under the Gcumisa chief and highlights that Maguzu’s position was earned.
However, another induna contended that the place was called Mbambangalo because
Maguzu was asked to help Chief Swaimana govern the people across the Umngeni River. At the
time there were many izimpi zezigodi and Swaimana lived too far from the area that would
become Mbambangalo to mediate such conflicts. Baba Ndlela recounted that Maguzu was given
the chieftaincy “because he wanted him to help look after this place, meaning Chief Maphumulo
was assisting Chief Gcumisa. So that is why this place is called Mbambangalo.”

124

But Nkanyiso Ndlovu, a young man raised in Mbambangalo, tells a slightly different
version of the story where the help lent by Maguzu was not welcomed by Swaimana—who
favored the isigodi above the Umngeni River over the isigodi below. Ndlovu alleges the
government gave Maguzu the isigodi below in an effort to mediate where Chief Swaimana
could, or rather, would not.
I can say that they call this area Mbambangalo because they said Maguzu must
hold Gcumisa’s arm across the river, although he, Gcumisa, was saying that he
would not grasp it. Maguzu held Gcumisa’s arm and that is how the place got
named Mbambangalo. I am not certain, but this is the explanation I received from
125
my elders.
123

“Asibambane ingalo, okukhombisa ukuzwana ukuze sihlalisane kahle.” Nhlakanipho
Maphumulo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011; Baningi
Maphumulo and Bernard Mkhize by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 31, 2011.
124
“Ngoba esezomuphathela lendawo. Okuchaza ukuthi iNkosi uMaphumulo wabamba
ingalo yeNkosi uGcumisa. Kungakho ke igama lithi uMbambangalo.” Mazipho Amos Ndlela,
B.A. Msomi, Bongumuzi Mbhele, and Mfikiseni Khumalo, interview by author and Thandeka
Majola, Maqongqo, February 17, 2011.
125
“Ngingathi kuthiwa uMbambangalo ngoba kwathiwa kuMaguzu akabambe ingalo
lena engaphesheya ngoba uGcumisa ethi ayishawe kwathiwa yena akayibambe. Wayibamba
kanjalo kwaze kwathiwa kuseMbambangalo. Noma ngingenalo iqiniso lalokho ngoba nami
104

Not surprisingly, given the still ongoing land dispute between the Maphumulo and Nyavu
over land in this region (to be examined throughout the dissertation), one Nyavu induna used an
explanation of bamba ingalo in an attempt to delegitimize the first Maphumulo chief as an
appointee of the colonial government. He also interpreted Maguzu’s appointment as pension and
related that it was a decision not agreed upon by the other chiefs and as one sought out by a
status hungry Maguzu.
Yes, he said he wants to be registered as a Chief. Indeed, they did as he requested
and registered him as a chief. They sent all the documents to Pretoria. They did
this without consulting (speaking) with other chiefs. He was appointed by the
126
white people as a pension.
When Chief Swaimana heard of the decision to restrict his jurisdiction, he had “nothing
to say as the Government have seen fit.”

127

But three months later he applied to make an

appearance before the Minister for Native Affairs where he made the following statement. While
restrained, his response indicates his displeasure. “I have been deprived of part of my Tribe in
the Umngeni Division and it has been put under Maguzu as Chief… It is not for me to show
disaffection or discontent at the decision of the Government – the matter is done and I have just
come in to express my thanks for the Government’s decision.” The minister in return emphasized
that it was neither the government nor Maguzu who had sought this, but the people.

128

ulwazi engiluthola kubantu abadala kunami.” Nkanyiso Ndlovu, interview by author and
Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, April 8, 2011.
126
“Yebo, ngoba wathi yena ufuna ukuthi abhalwe abe inkosi. Nangempela bamubhala
njengeNkosi izincwadi zahamba zayosayinwa ePitoli. Lokho kwenzeka ngaphandle kokuthi
kukhulunywe namanye amakhosi. Wabekwa abelungu ngempesheni.” Bhekumuzi Sibiya,
interview by author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, August 9, 2011.
127
PAR. SNA 1/1/318. Minutes, Native Affairs Department, February 5, 1906.
128

PAR. SNA 1/1/337. Minutes, Native Affairs Department. March 1, 1906.
105

But what oral history interviews make clear is that the government had been influenced
by the conflicts between sections of the Gcumisa. When Butsha and several other Gcumisa
appeared before the SNA to request leave from Swaimana’s control, the government found what
they hoped would be a solution to Swaimana’s misconduct and failure to mediate between his
peoples. These interviews also reveal the manner in which Maphumulo seek to legitimize their
descent from an appointed chief and the ways in which the Nyavu contested the authority of their
appointed neighbors.

Conclusion
This chapter has not only introduced the key players in the Table Mountain region, but it also
examined the origins of the conflict over land and chiefly legitimacy between the hereditary
Nyavu and the appointed Maphumulo that reemerges in deadly political violence in the years
preceding the 1994 elections. The oral tradition of the youthful Nyavu chief Nomsimekwana is
not just an entertaining “official history” of the Nyavu. This crucial source is valuable for its
insights into the position of the Nyavu on the periphery of the growing Zulu kingdom and the
significance of hereditary descent to the narrators of the tradition. As early as the 1880s, the
proliferation of “government tribes” and the overcrowding of location lands as initiated by the
colonial government sparked boundary conflicts between and amongst the hereditary and
appointed chieftaincies. The Nyavu began citing their historical occupation and hereditary right
to authority in land claims against the government-established chieftaincies such as the Qamu,
Gcumisa, and Maphumulo. These land conflicts and how they are remembered and discussed
over time reveal the manner in which chiefs, descendants of both hereditary and appointed rulers,
attempted to delegitimize others without hereditary connections. An understanding of these

106

origins of land and legitimacy conflicts is crucial to understanding how and why deadly violence
broke out between the Nyavu and Maphumulo over a century later during uDlame. The next
chapter will examine the Nyavu and Maphumulo during the segregation and apartheid eras. The
focus will be on the so-called faction fights between the newly created chiefdoms and the
hereditary Nyavu, as well as the relocation of the Maphumulo to state-bought farms claimed by
the Nyavu to facilitate the construction of the Nagle Dam. The creation of apartheid divide and
rule “tribal authorities” laid down specific legal boundaries that had ramifications for not only
this ongoing land dispute but in the eruption of uDlame.

107

Map 3: Inanda Location, Showing Area of Interest and Relevant Farms
108

Mzelemu

Nyawe

Luyeme

Yengeza

Mdluli

Sali

Sibenya (Njilo)

Mcoseli (Nyavu)

Noqomfela (Njilo)

NOMSIMEKWANA
d. 1901

NGANGEZWE

Chief 1901-1931

Figure 6: Common Lineage of the Nyavu and Njilo Chiefs according to Oral Tradition

109

Qamu
(Ngoza )
Qamu

Qamu

Gcumisa

(Mahoiza, 1869)

(Mfulatelwa,deceased)

(Manyosi, 1882)

Qamu

Qamu

Gcumisa

(Mjiba, 1892)

(Mbobo, 1882)

(Swaimana, 1894)

Gcumisa

Maphumulo

(Swaimana)

(Maguzu, 1905)

Figure 7: Division of Qamu Chiefdom in Umngeni Valley (Appointed Chiefs, Year Chieftaincy
Commenced)

110

Chapter Two:
“I would like to suggest Mr. Ferreira’s Farm”: Boundaries, Betterment, and
1
Chiefly Authority on Onverwacht and Goedverwachting, 1905-1973

On December 1, 1905, Maguzu kaMganu became the first chief of the Maphumulo in the
shadow of Table Mountain. Like the establishment of new chiefdoms and boundary definitions
examined in the previous chapter, this appointment and the boundaries of the newly established
Maphumulo chiefdom would spark one hundred years of conflicts rather than stem them as the
colonial administration intended. This chapter will examine some long-term explanations for
uDlame, including “faction fights,” boundary disputes, relocations, and resistance that
contributed to the outbreak of violence during uDlame over a portion of the farm
Goedverwachting. The shortage of land for African settlement and growth and the definition and
manipulation of chiefly authority was at the heart of the conflict. The chapter will first examine
the conflicts that ensued between the Gcumisa, Maphumulo, and Nyavu from the creation of the
Maphumulo chiefdom and in the wake of the Union and the 1913 Natives Land Act. It will also
analyze the removal of the Maphumulo from their original territory for the construction of the
Nagle Dam. The Maphumulo were relocated in stages onto to South African Native Trust
(SANT)-purchased farms Aasvogel Krans, Onverwacht, and Goedverwachting--the last also
claimed by the Nyavu. It will then consider the implementation of and resistance to apartheid-era
“tribal authorities” and betterment planning, leading up to the establishment of the KwaZulu
homeland and division of jurisdiction of these farms between the SADT and KwaZulu. This
solidifying of contested boundaries around a desirable portion of land and the parceling out of

1

PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/1920. “Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native
Affairs. Mdhluli Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhluli,” January 30, 1937.
111

jurisdiction by the apartheid authorities exacerbated existing conflicts over boundaries and
authority that would later reignite during uDlame.

Izimpi zemibango and Boundary Conflicts in the Table Mountain Region
So-called “faction fighting” was rampant in the Table Mountain region from the time of the
appointment of the government tribes. This is not to suggest there was no conflict prior to
colonial rule, but the sources available reveal friction between the newly created chiefs and their
hereditary counterparts. As examined in the previous chapter, the chiefs in KwaNyavu did not
take lightly to encroachment on their territory. The creation of new chiefdoms, increasing
tensions in the colony with impi yamakhanda (“war of the heads,” the Bhambatha Rebellion, or
Zulu Rebellion) as well as the establishment of the Union in 1910 and the passing of the Union’s
1913 Natives Land Act ensured increased competition over land and resources.
Tensions between white settlers and Africans grew steadily with Natal’s increasing
efforts to force Africans into working for whites in the mines and on the farms included land
evictions and taxes. The final straw for many Africans came in the form of a 1906 poll tax on all
African men not already paying the hut tax. Africans recognized the fee as an attempt to end
their economic independence and refused to pay the tax. Natal’s paranoid and heavy-handed
response sparked disturbances that erupted into rebellion around the figure of Chief Bambatha
who refused to heed a summons for his arrest related to his inability to get his followers to pay
the tax. Natal seized thousands of African cattle, torched villages, and killed more than three
thousand Africans in contrast to less than thirty white deaths. Following the uprising, the colony
enforced tax laws even more strenuously, achieving the desired effect of increased African labor.

112

The industrial revolution also produced a conviction amongst white politicians that a
union government would ensure minority rule and profit. The Act of Union in 1910 brought
together the previously separate colonies of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State to
form the Union of South Africa. The Union government enacted a barrage of discriminatory laws
that strengthened its grip on the African population. The segregation policy of the Union had
precedents in the demarcation of land and authority set up under colonialism and was the product
of South Africa’s industrial revolution. However, rather than a rigid and “unified ideological
package,” it was only between the end of the South African War in 1902 and the 1930s that a
2

cogent policy of segregation emerged. The Mines and Works Act (1911) imposed a color bar
and the Native Labour Registration Act (1911) reserved African workers for white agriculture.
The Natives (Urban Areas) Act (1923) provided for residential segregation in towns. The
Industrial Conciliation Act (1924) legalized collective bargaining power of trade unions but
excluded from the definition of worker all pass-bearing Africans.

3

By far the most influential Union laws for Africans were those governing land and
“native administration.” The Natives Land Act of 1913 incorporated the different African reserve
systems of each province to form the basis of the Union’s African land policy. It defined the
boundaries of “scheduled areas,” including land Africans had acquired by grant, previously
created locations, land owned under trusteeship and land already purchased by Africans in the
Cape and Natal. This land amounted to about nine-million hectares, or roughly 7% of all land in
South Africa. The act also prohibited Africans from purchasing land outside of these areas and

2

Saul Dubow, Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919-36
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989).
3
Martin Chanock, The Making of South African Legal Culture, 1902-1936: Fear,
Favour, and Prejudice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 437–8.
113

terminated (at least in theory) Africans’ ability to rent white-owned land unless they were labor
4

tenants or full-time wage workers. These restrictions ensured many Africans would have to
work for others, either as labor tenants or migrant laborers.

5

The Native Affairs Act (1920) ensured segregated administration, setting up “tribal
councils” for the administration of the reserves and advisory councils for Africans in urban areas,
both under the authority of the Native Affairs Department (NAD) and the Prime Minister. A
more uniform system emerged under the Native Administration Act (1927), accepting the
Shepstonian principles of bolstering traditional authorities in the reserves under the “Supreme
Chief,” the Governor-General of South Africa. The Native Administration Act made chiefs
responsible for paying taxes of the people under their jurisdiction and subject to a more codified
system of “Native Law.” NAD now played a more regulatory role, able to discipline chiefs and
relocate communities to fit the government’s “retribalization” efforts.
In the face of the intensification of measures designed to restrict African mobility and
prosperity, a group of influential elite African men began to organize and protest the loss of their
rights. During the first decade of the 20th century, several African initiatives such as the Natal
Native Congress of John Dube and the South African Native Congress and Native Vigilance
Association of the Cape emerged and then came together in a call for a national African political
organization. By 1912, the South African Native National Congress was launched with an
African nationalist message in opposition to segregation. The movement, later renamed the
4

For an account of the persistence of sharecropping (where white landlords and African
tenants entered into agreements to share harvests in proportion to the economic inputs they made
to the farms) for nearly half a century after they were outlawed, see: Charles Van Onselen, The
Seed is Mine : The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper, 1894-1985 (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1996).
5
Laurine Platzky, Cherryl Walker, and Surplus People Project, The Surplus People :
Forced Removals in South Africa (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985), 83–7.
114

African National Congress (1923), provided for an upper house of chiefs despite tensions
between the political philosophy of the western-educated elite and the traditions of the
chieftainship.
In the Table Mountain region, in Natal’s Inanda location (see Map 3), the segregationist
policies and increasing resistance resulted in contestation over chiefly authority and competition
for scarce land. The Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefs sought to ensure their own authority – Chief
Maguzu through professions of his loyalty to the colonial administration and Chief Ngangezwe
with claims to hereditary descent. But before we can examine the clashes that erupted, this
section must include a brief discussion of the term “faction fight.”
Scholars now agree the conflicts labeled “faction fights” by colonial and Union
administrators occurred in the context of particular material crisis conditions, including social
dislocation and disintegration as a result of urbanization, land shortages, and natural disasters.

6

Many also eschew the oversimplified and generalized term “faction fight” that often reflects a
7

stereotypical belief about the inherent violence of Africans. The widespread use of “faction
fight” and “native unrest” also obscures the roles of several non-African players in the making of
violent conflict within and between African communities. Jabulani Sithole instead suggests the

6

Jabulani Sithole, “Land, Officials, Chiefs and Commoners in the Izimpi Zemibango in
the Umlazi Location of the Pinetown District in the Context of Natal’s Changing Political
Economy, 1920-1936” (M.A. thesis, University of Natal, 1998); Mahoney, “Between the Zulu
King and the Great White Chief.”
7
Clegg, “Ukubuyisa Isidumbu”; Beinart, “Introduction: Political and Collective Violence
in Southern African Historiography”; Lambert, Betrayed Trust; Sithole, “Land, Officials, Chiefs
and Commoners.”
115

phrase izimpi zemibango, or wars of disputes, enables the possibility of a variety of agents,
issues, and interests that must be considered in examinations of violent conflict.

8

Izimpi zemibango often erupted between chiefdoms, between izigodi (sections) within a
chiefdom, or between factions that formed around leaders competing for the position of chief. In
his examination of conflict in the Maphumulo division of colonial Natal, Michael Mahoney
shows this kind of fighting challenged individual chiefs while sanctioning the institution of
chieftaincy. Where Africans rejected their chiefs, they did so by transferring their allegiance to
another chief, as was done by Butsha, Ngcazi, and others after the appointment of Maguzu as
chief of the new Maphumulo polity. Succession disputes also enabled Africans to express
dissatisfaction by siding with other claimants to the chieftaincy. The fighting usually reflected
youthful initiative and coincided with alcohol consumption, most often at weddings and on
9

holidays. Colonial efforts, sometimes in collusion with chiefs and homestead heads, to quell the
faction fighting included both direct means such as fines, imprisonment, hard labor, and corporal
punishment and indirect efforts such as stringent regulations on events where alcohol was
consumed and the removal of imizi from one chiefdom to another.

10

The conflicts in the Table Mountain region involved many actors, including migrant
laborers (most often youths) who regularly returned home on weekends and holidays from
nearby Pietermaritzburg, the chiefs, women, and the colonial officials that sought to quell the
troublesome and threatening conflicts. At stake were a variety of interests, ranging from
boundary conflicts and contestation of chiefly authority to “drunken brawls” and defense of
8

Sithole, “Land, Officials, Chiefs and Commoners.”

9

Benedict Carton, Blood from your Children: The Colonial Origins of Generational
Conflict in South Africa (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000).
10
Mahoney, “Between the Zulu King and the Great White Chief,” 175–6, 216–9.
116

masculinity.

11

The analyses of these conflicts by Sithole and Michael Mahoney both involve

boundary and specific succession disputes. The hiving off of the Maphumulo in the Table
Mountain region resulted in similar contestation over chiefly authority but also between the new
polities and the hereditary Nyavu. Contestation over boundary lines and izimpi zemibongo were
central to this competition between chiefs.
Within months of his appointment, Chief Maguzu began to shore up his authority by
positioning himself as a loyal supporter of the colonial administration during impi yamakhanda.
The chief made the trip to Pietermaritzburg to call upon the Secretary for Native Affairs with
several of his men, including the induna Ngcazi who had been amongst the men petitioning to
break away from Swaimana and join Bhambatha’s jurisdiction. The significance of this visit is
twofold. During the April 26, 1906 visit, Maguzu first thanked the government for placing under
his authority imizi previously under Chief Bambatha of the Zondi. On February 23, 1906, the
government deposed Bhambatha kaMancinza for resisting the introduction of the poll tax. From
Maguzu’s gratitude, it appears that in addition to the chief’s deposal, imizi were also removed
from the jurisdiction of the Zondi and given to Maguzu. Maguzu, formerly a magisterial induna,
was clearly cognizant of fomenting rebellion in the colony and that as an appointed chief his
power came from the colonial administration. This visit was the first of two where Maguzu
positioned himself as a chief loyal to the colonial administration. Later that year, in October,

11

There are several izimpi zemibongo within the Maphumulo associated with “drunken
brawling” on holidays and at weddings that will not be examined here. There is little detail given
to them in the records, most likely because the officials deemed them not related to “tribal
jealousy.” See PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2 MC405/13 and CNC 184. 1914/1486. For more on South
African masculinities, see Morrell, Changing Men in Southern Africa.
117

Maguzu again called upon the Umngeni Magistrate, this time with Chief Mveli

12

of the Fuze

chiefdom. The two had just heard of the death of Mjongo, one of the leading rebels in what Shula
Marks has called the “most important of the initial incidents of defiance over the collection of the
13

Poll Tax.”

Maguzu and Chief Mveli expressed “in no measured terms their satisfaction that

Majongo [sic] had at last met with his deserts and had suffered the death penalty. As they voiced
it, ‘It would now be seen that there was a Government in the country.’”

14

In addition to voicing his support at the April meeting, Maguzu asked for a clear
definition of his jurisdiction. Maguzu complained that frequent fights and disturbances occurred
because of the intermixing of followers and that members of imizi under the authority of other
chiefs disregarded him. He asked that certain imizi under the chiefs Mhlahlo (Qamu), Mafahleni
(Nxamalala), and Cupukumuku (Qamu) on both location and private lands under his jurisdiction
be transferred to him. He recognized that in making the request for this definition he would lose
imizi as well. The Natal administration saw this request as an opportunity to consider the ward
system for the Umngeni District, as was to be first implemented in the Maphumulo magistracy in
the wake of the impi yamakhanda where authorities believed the “tribal mixup” of followers of
12

Mveli kaHemuhemu was the acting chief of the Fuze at the time of the impi
yamakhanda. During the disturbances, Mveli promptly reported his followers’ refusal to pay the
poll tax and hunted out the rebels with zeal. As Muzi Hadebe and Shula Marks have pointed out,
Chief Mveli had several reasons for his loyalty to the administration. As the regent for the Fuze
heir Langalakhe, Mveli sought to prove his support to the colonial government given his
dependency on the administration for his status. As well, Mveli used the rebellion as an
opportunity to rid himself of dissident elements. Moses Muziwandile Hadebe, “A
Contextualization and Examination of the Impi Yamakhanda (1906 Uprising) as Reported by
J.L. Dube in Ilanga Lase Natal, with Special Focus on Dube’s Attitude to Dinuzulu as Indicated
in His Reportage on the Treason Trial of Dinuzulu” (M.A. thesis, University of Natal, 2003), 68;
Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 324.
13
Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 174.
14

PAR. SNA 1/1/352. 3388/1906.” Rebels. Actg Chief Mveli and Chief Maguzu express
their satisfaction of the execution of Mjongo,” 1906.
118

various chiefs contributed to the extent of the rebellion, and advised the Umngeni Magistrate
Bennett to report on the feasibility of doing so.

15

Maguzu’s chiefly authority and territorial jurisdiction, in particular the boundary between
the Maphumulo and Nyavu, would remain the contentious subject of izimpi zemibango and
boundary disputes reported by the Umngeni Magistrate over the next 25 years. Scattered remarks
between 1906 and 1913, when tensions came to a head, suggest the increasing animosity
between the Maphumulo and Nyavu and their chiefs. These comments also suggest that despite
the initial tensions between Swaimana and Maguzu over the creation of the Maphumulo out of
the Gcumisa, the two found common cause against the Nyavu.
Several times during this period the colonial administration investigated the alleged
arming of the Gcumisa. In June 1906, a “loyal chief living at Table Mountain” informed the
magistrate Chief Swaimana had ordered his people to assemble at his umuzi. The unnamed loyal
chief did not know the purpose of the meeting but considered it worthy of note given the
disturbances in the Maphumulo and Lower Thukela Divisions.

16

Whether this chief was Maguzu

or Ngangezwe cannot be known for certain, but given the fledgling alliance it was probably the
latter. In 1912, the Acting Chief Native Commissioner again investigated the Gcumisa,
convinced that Swaimana ordered an arming to take sides in unrest between the Chiefs Maguzu
and Ngangezwe. All of the men and women interviewed during the investigation reported the
arming had been a mistake. Chief Swaimana had called for men to hunt cane rats from his

15

PAR. SNA 1/1/340. 1302/1906. “Boundaries. Chief Maguzu asks that his district be
defined,” April 26, 1906. On the ward system in Maphumulo in the wake of the Zulu Rebellion,
see Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 355; Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising; Ngonyama, “Redefining
Amakhosi Authority,” 89.
16
PAR. SNA 1/1/344. “Native Unrest: alleged meeting of natives of Swaimana
kaManyosi at his kraal,” June 30, 1906.
119

gardens.

17

But despite these claims, the administration had every reason to suspect Swaimana’s

men were arming to assist the Maphumulo against the Nyavu. The months that elapsed between
the initial reporting and the investigation certainly enabled the Gcumisa men and women the
time necessary to agree on the story.
These tensions between the chiefdoms erupted in violence at a November 1913 wedding.
Young male supporters of Ngangezwe attacked Maphumulo and Gcumisa spectators at a
wedding at KwaNyavu. In the aftermath, the chiefs and officials testified to years of strain
between Maguzu/Swaimana and Ngangezwe. Assistant Magistrate von Gerard reported that no
evidence of “inter-tribal enmity” emerged when he tried the case, but the statements of the chiefs
in the days afterwards suggest otherwise. On December 4, Maguzu made a statement so that the
authorities would understand the state of his chiefdom. Maguzu blamed the conflict on
Ngangezwe and his people. He claimed that when Ngangezwe’s people attended weddings in his
ward, no violence occurred. But when his own people attended the wedding at KwaNyavu in
November, one of Ngangezwe’s izinduna told the boys to attack Maguzu’s men as they had no
right to be there. Since his appointment, Maguzu had always known Ngangezwe to be in a state
of conflict with the surrounding appointed chiefs, including the late Mdepa (Ximba), the late
Cupukumuka (Qamu), and the late Mhlahlo (Qamu). Maguzu also testified to several other
instances of conflict or near-conflict over the previous years. Chiefly authority was at the center
of the friction.
At the bottom of all these fights is that Ngangezwe claims to be an hereditary
chief and as such claims that the tribes of Mdepa, Swaimana, and myself should
be under his control. At the time of my appointment he came and asked the
Magistrate (Mr. Bennett) to give him that portion of Swaimana’s tribe, over which
17

The mistake was blamed on an error in transmission between Swaimana and his
followers. One man apologized for foolishly trusting a woman to communicate the call. PAR.
CNC 68. 493/1912. “Alleged arming of Gcumisa tribe,” March 20, 1912.
120

I am now chief. But he does not make his claim openly but allows his people to
go about with the idea that their chief is a more important one than any other by
18
reason of his birth.
Many of the characteristics of the November 1913 conflict match those examined by
Mahoney: the youth carried out the brunt of the violence; the men had been drinking heavily
during the wedding festivities; and the officials recognized the punishments proscribed would do
little to prevent further violent clashes. Assistant Magistrate Von Gerard fined the Nyavu
“ringleader” £5, the attackers £3 each, and the rest involved £2. Chief Native Commissioner
Addison demanded the chiefs be reprimanded and issued an order that no members of the
chiefdoms attend festivities in each other’s territory. He further expressed the opinion that the
fines were not enough. Fines had no deterrent effect and served only to impoverish the umuzi so
that women and children suffered.

19

Von Gerard found the conflict between the chiefdoms so

serious and frequent he sought the establishment of a police station at Bishopstowe to better
serve the Table Mountain region. The nearest station was over 20 miles away and thus Table
Mountain was not regularly patrolled.

20

Indeed, the officials’ warnings did little to prevent further violence. Within a month of
the wedding, on Christmas Day 1913, two African police constables observed an armed impi of
over 800 (later reported as over 1,000) of Maguzu and Swaimana’s men moving towards
Ngangezwe’s area with the intention of cutting off migrant laborers from KwaNyavu en route to

18

PAR. CNC 149. 1913/2086. “Faction Fights. Faction Fight between members of
Chiefs Ngangezwe’s and Maguzu’s Tribes,” December 4, 1913.
19
PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2. MC405/1913. “Faction fights;” CNC 149. 1913/2086,
“Faction Fights.”
20
The record suggests there was a chronic shortage of both African and European police
more generally. PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2. MC446/1913. “Inter-tribal feuds. Establishment of
Police Station near Table Mountain.”
121

Pietermaritzburg. Ngangezwe’s men had been warned of the impi and took a longer route back
into the city to work. Conflict was thus avoided, but the presence of such a large armed impi so
close to Pietermaritzburg alarmed the Chief Native Commissioner R.H. Addison. He ordered the
three chiefs to come before him in the city and on January 13, 1914, Ngangezwe, Maguzu,
Swaimana, and a number of their izinduna appeared at the Umngeni Court.
All three men denied any prior knowledge of the Christmas day incident and testified to
years of fighting and their own efforts to keep peace. In what seems like a well-rehearsed
performance, Maguzu and Swaimana blamed Ngangezwe; Ngangazwe blamed Maguzu and
Swaimana. Maguzu reported none of his men were amongst the armed men, and that those who
assembled worked in town and had been organized by Ngwenya (also known as Nojulumba) in
defense. Swiamana contended the tensions dated to his father’s appointment and the original
boundary disputes between Manyosi and Nomsimekwana (1889-90, 1895, and 1905). The feud
between Swaimana and Ngangezwe’s people had carried on since. To illustrate his lack of ill will
to any other chiefs, Swaimana said if he held such feelings they would be towards Maguzu, to
whom a portion of his people had been given. But he believed he was on perfectly friendly terms
with both of the other chiefs, though Ngangezwe would not meet him and Maguzu to reconcile
this matter of fighting.
Just as his father before him, Ngangezwe reminded those present of his lineage. His
father was a hereditary chief who had held the position before the British arrived. The disputed
land to which Swaimana referred belonged to the Nyavu. Ngangezwe complained about both
Swaimana and Maguzu and their people. Swaimana’s men had taunted Nyavu “for being a lot of
women” on account of their earlier defeat in a conflict with the Ximba. He alleged Maguzu had
been spreading rumors about his authority to the court officials, calling him a second Shaka

122

because he wanted to conquer everyone around him – a moniker that would particularly offend
the son of Nomsimekwana who had traversed the countryside as a refugee during Shaka’s
consolidation of power. Ngangezwe denied taunting Maguzu as just an appointed chief and
complained that Maguzu’s impi had closed off the road to town. When Addison pressured him to
discuss Christmas Day, Ngangezwe said one of his men in Pietermaritzburg had been chased by
some of Maguzu’s men who stole his concertina and umbrella shortly before Christmas. Since
then, people took the longer road to town. Addison was clearly exasperated and on numerous
occasions attempted to direct the men back to Christmas Day. By the end of the interview, he
warned the chiefs that if they could not control their people the government would appoint others
who would.

21

In November 1914, Maguzu reported that Mali, a follower of Ngangezwe, breached the
previously defined boundary line. Asst. Magistrate H. von Gerard visited the site while in the
area for Hut Tax Collection the following year. In his meeting with the chiefs, von Gerard
scolded Ngangezwe for claiming he was not aware of the boundary. But within two months,
Maguzu again reported that Ngangezwe had ordered one of Maguzu’s followers to leave the
same area. On October 13, 1915, von Gerard and Chief Native Commissioner R.H. Addison
visited Table Mountain in hopes of finalizing the dispute. In an amusing attempt to solve a
deeper problem, the officials laid down beacons according to the line decided in 1890.

22

The beacons did little, however, to quell the tensions between people of the two
chiefdoms. Within two years, another conflict broke out at a December 1917 wedding at the

21

PAR. CNC 149. 2086/1913. “Faction Fights.”

22

SAB. NTS 369. 2053/15/F.123A.”Inanda Location: Maguzu-Ngangezwe Boundary
Dispute,” October 22, 1915; PAR. CNC 188 1914/1731. “Boundaries. Boundary dispute between
Chiefs Maguzu and Ngangezwe.”
123

umuzi of Sibindi under Chief Maguzu on the Onverwacht farm. Pietermaritzburg Magistrate
Frank Foxon, who knew Maguzu well from his time as induna, reported the wedding between
Mjijwana kaSibindi (Chief Maguzu) and the sister of Msolwa kaMaralarala (Chief Ngangezwe)
ended in disarray when Ngangezwe’s people numbering nearly 200 attacked about 100 of
Maguzu’s men. Hayeyana kaJazi (Chief Maguzu) died and several others of Maguzu’s men were
injured.

23

The next year, 100 of Ngangezwe’s men were charged for the death and violence, out

of which 12 were convicted for culpable homicide and fined £20 (or in default, 12 months of
imprisonment with hard labor). Thirty-four others pled guilty to the violence and were sentenced
to fines of £5. The Umngeni Magistrate Frank Foxon recommended that Ngangezwe’s stipend be
disallowed on account of “the careless manner in which he has controlled his tribe.”

24

Repeatedly turned down and scolded by the administration, Ngangezwe sought other
ways to bring the land in question under his authority. In April 1921, Ngangezwe announced his
intent to purchase the neighboring farm Goedverwachting from Nicolaas P.H. Ferreira on behalf
of his people. Goedverwachting had passed from the hands of the Church of England in Natal in
1910 through several other owners before Ferreira purchased it in 1919.

23

25

But the Nyavu could

SAB. JUS 260. 4/394/1917. “Faction Fight at Table Mountain between Ngangezwe’s
and Maguzu’s tribes – report by Magte. P.M.Burg;” and PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2. MC405/1913.
“Faction Fights,” December 18, 1917.
24
PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2. MC405/1913. “Faction Fights”; SAB. BAO 5/363.
F54/1524/5. “Kapteins en Hoofmanne Mapumula Stam Pietermaritzburg.”
25
The property and other Church of Natal-owned properties transferred in 1910 as a
result of the Church Properties Act IX of 1910. The Act reintegrated the land of Bishop John
William Colenos’s schism Church of England in Natal with the Church of the Province of South
Africa. The Act was a measure to end the schism in the Anglican Church, but the sale of these
farms, including Goedverwachting, certainly was also to spite Harriette Colenso, a vociferous
defender of the Zulu who would be evicted from the Bishopstowe residence with the sale. Marks,
“Harriette Colenso and the Zulus, 1874-1913,” 404–5; Guy, The View Across the River, 446–7.
124

not enter into negotiations with Ferreira and his agents alone. Section I (I) A of Act 27 of 1913
prohibited the transfer of lands outside of the reserves to Africans without the Governor
General’s approval. When Mr. Ferreira’s advocates first contacted the Chief Native
Commissioner to seek said approval, they argued the farm was previously “owned by the
forefathers of this chief.”

26

Ngangezwe sent several izinduna and William Gwamande to

spearhead the negotiations with the Additional Umngeni Magistrate and Ferreira. Ferreira agreed
to sell the 6,000 acre farm to the Nyavu at £3 per acre and was willing to accept an initial
payment of £10,000 cash with two later installments of £4,000 in 1922 and 1923. Despite the
magistrate’s confidence in Gwamanda, who he described as “an educated native who has a very
good idea of business requirements,” he expressed concern about the Nyavu’s capability to raise
adequate funds. Over the course of the next several months, William Gwamanda managed to
raise £465. Kristian Gwamanda, who sought approval from the Acting Chief Native
Commissioner A.N. Banen, also reported raising another £400. (It is likely these were men
attached to the Table Mountain Mission Reserve.) But the Chief Native Commissioner informed
the Gwamandas he would not approve the sale of a portion of the farm, only the farm in its
entirety.

27

Upon Ferreira’s death in 1923, the farm was subdivided and the largest remnant of

nearly 5,000 acres transferred to his heir, Christina G. (Ferreira) Leslie.

28

A 1926 letter from the

For sale information, see Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform,
KwaZulu-Natal Province. Land Register for Goedverwachting No. 1349, 1850s-present.
26
PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/20. “Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native
Affairs. Mdhluli Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhluli.”
27
PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/20. “Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native
Affairs. Mdhluli Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhluli.”
28
Pietermaritzburg Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land
Reform, KwaZulu-Natal Province. Land Register for Goedverwachting No. 1349, 1850s-present.
125

Pietermaritzburg law firm Arthur Hime & Co. on behalf of the Nyavu suggests that they
endeavored for several years to purchase the remainder.

29

During these negotiations over the sought-after land at Goedverwachting, Chief Maguzu
Maphumulo died on February 4, 1922. Ndlovu, the son of Maguzu’s wife Mamootwa, succeeded
him, despite a 1918 “confidential” minute paper in which Umngeni Magistrate Foxon recorded
Maguzu’s appointment of Mxamana, son of his wife Manoningwa, as his heir. Maguzu reported
he, as well as all of his people, knew Mamootwa committed adultery while he was employed as a
court induna under Foxon and that Ndlovu was not his son. When Maguzu appointed Mxamana,
he told Foxon he did not want the people to know for fear the heir might be poisoned. Upon
Maguzu’s death, the Maphumulo izinduna thus asked for the appointment of Ndlovu and the
Umngeni Magistrate and Acting Chief Native Commissioner concurred without reference to
Maguzu’s earlier request. All subsequent correspondence on the Maphumulo lineage treats
Ndlovu unquestionably as son and heir of Maguzu. As Maguzu’s statement appears in a
magisterial file on “Chiefs” not linked to any papers on the Maphumulo succession, with the
turnover of officials it is likely none recalled his naming of an heir.

30

(See Figure 10.)

While Ndlovu Maphumulo was chief in 1928, Ngangezwe attempted to reopen the
boundary issue. Ngangezwe did not dispute that there should be a boundary line, but that the line
was incorrect. Henrique Shepstone’s 1890 line made the Manzamnyama stream the boundary
between the chieftaincies. In his 1928 request, Ngangezwe claimed the line should start at the
source of the Nonzila stream, an assertion that would extend his territory significantly and give

29

PAR. 1/CPD 3/2/2/3. 2/1/2/3/1. Administration (Black Affairs) Chiefs and Headmen
Mdhluli Tribe. Nongalaza Mdluli.
30
PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/2/1. 152/14”Chiefs,” May 23, 1918; SAB. BAO 5/363.
F54/1524/5. “Kapteins en Hoofmanne Mapumula Stam Pietermaritzburg.”
126

all of the top of Table Mountain to the Nyavu.

31

(See both streams on Map 5). At the same time

Ngangezwe was even more persistent with letters to the Camperdown Magistrate regarding land
under the Ximba that he argued was the birthplace of the Nyavu ancestors. In the correspondence
between the Camperdown Native Commissioner and the Chief Native Commissioner, the
Camperdown official attributed Ngangezwe’s persistence to his very old age and suggested
Ngangezwe was “constantly turning back to the days of his youth before the present tribal
boundaries were laid down.”

32

The officials in Pietermaritzburg and Camperdown agreed the

matter could not be reopened and went out to point out the beacons and boundary yet again.
They also refused Ngangezwe permission to erect a fence across the top of Table Mountain to
separate Nyavu cattle from that of the Maphumulo, yet another way the chief sought to contest
the boundary.

33

But while the magistrate attributed Ngangezwe’s insistence upon his hereditary right to
the land to his old age, his son and heir, Somquba, was most likely involved in the requests as
well. Ngangezwe became seriously ill in 1929. Pietermaritzburg Additional Native
Commissioner B.W. Martin visited the elderly chief at his Mpangeleni umuzi to record
Ngangezwe’s heir. Ngangezwe reported that it was not the custom of his people to take a chief
wife as others did. He had paid ilobolo (bridewealth, often in the form of cattle) for all of his
wives himself and considered his first wife Notuyana (Ma Gwala) to be his chief wife. He
identified Somquba, his eldest son with Ma Gwala, as his heir. Almost immediately after this
31

PAR. CNC 188. 1914/1731. “Boundary Dispute between Chiefs Maguzu and
Ngangezwe.”
32
PAR. 1/CPD 3/2/2/3. 2/1/2/3/1. “Administration (Black Affairs) Chiefs and Headmen
Mdhluli Tribe. Nongalaza Mdluli.”
33
PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/1/1. 2/17/16/1920. “Boundary Dispute. Amanyavu and
Amapumulo Tribes. Table Mountain.”
127

visit, Ngangezwe expressed his desire to abdicate in favor of Somquba. His izinduna supported
his wish, as Nomsimekwana had done the same for him. Martin initially said this was not
necessary, as the Umngeni office recognized Somquba had been acting for his father for many
years. Ngangezwe and his izinduna insisted, and Martin acquiesced, but before the transfer of
power could be acknowledged, Ngangezwe passed away on January 8, 1930. Somquba was
immediately appointed acting chief until the period of mourning for Ngangezwe ended and
subsequently confirmed.

34

Ngangezwe’s unrelenting attempts, and those made in his name by Somquba, to have the
boundary with the Maphumulo line reconsidered in his favor were based upon his hereditary
right to the land. As seen in the previous chapter with Somquba’s narration of the oral tradition
about Nomsimekwana, Somquba was keenly aware of the assault on hereditary chiefs.

35

But

these actions must not be seen only as attempts to gain back land assigned to the jurisdiction of
appointed chiefs. These Nyavu chiefs were also reasserting the significance of hereditary
authority in the wake of the constriction of their powers by the white government and also vis-àvis the appointed chiefs who had been amply rewarded by the white administration for their
loyalty. Historian Sara Berry’s work on Ghana convincingly argued for viewing property as a

34

The question begs just how long Somquba had been acting as chief for his elderly
father and who instigated the persistent appeals to reopen the boundary issue. The records
suggest Ngangezwe’s own trips to the Umngeni court were becoming fewer and fewer in the
years preceding his death when he sent izinduna to negotiate the failed Goedverwachting
purchase. PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/20. “Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native
Affairs. Mdhluli Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhluli.”
35
Outside of the scope of this dissertation, the Nyavu chiefs also made regular attempts
to gain ancestral lands under the authority of the Ximba. Ngonyama shows these types of appeals
were frequent but rarely re-opened. The boundary conflicts examined here provide further
evidence for Ngonyama’s argument that chiefs began to internalize and naturalize the colonial
notion of territorial authority over personal authority. Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi
Authority,” 84.
128

social process rather than a set of initial conditions, and she has drawn attention to the ways in
which Asante claims on property and power invoked the past and debated its significance for
people’s contemporary lives.

36

In colonial and segregationist South Africa, the Nyavu chiefs

were not just making claims on land to bolster their local authority, but stressing the supremacy
of a particular kind of chiefly authority: hereditary descent, which they recognized as under
attack by colonial and Union governments that deposed and appointed chiefs at will.

The Nagel Dam: Relocation and Goedverwachting
These land disputes and izimpi zemibongo continued into the 1930s with the passage of the 1936
Native Trust and Land Act and plans for the construction of a dam in the Table Mountain region
to supply the city of Durban. Relocation, removal, and resettlement are terms most often
associated with the overall policy of state-sponsored removals of the apartheid era. But for Table
Mountain residents, these words earned significance over a decade earlier with the negotiations
for a dam on the Umngeni River in Inanda Location. The piecemeal acquisition of land for the
water scheme and in the wake of the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act not only affected the
boundaries of the Table Mountain chiefdoms already in conflict but contributed to the long-term
long-term land dispute that erupted during uDlame.
The Natives Trust and Land Act, No. 18 of 1936, created a legal body known as the
South African Native Trust (SANT) (later the South African Bantu Trust, and even later the
South African Development Trust) in which the ownership of African reserves was vested. The
Trust was to be administered for “the settlement, support, benefit and material and moral welfare

36

Berry, Chiefs Know their Boundaries, xxii–xxvii.
129

of the natives of the Union.”

37

The act released additional lands to be added to the reserves, as

had been recommended by the 1916 Beaumont Commission. According to Laurine Platzky and
Cherryl Walker, the Botha government accepted that the initial nine-million hectares scheduled
for African reserves by the 1913 Land Act was inadequate for all of the people expected to live
there. The Botha government appointed the Beaumont Commission to recommend which
additional land could be acquired. The Commission proposed an additional seven-million
hectares for African reserves but few farmers were willing to part with land and the
recommendations were shelved. Later Local Committees scaled down the proposals and the
government accepted the new 1918 recommendations but passed no legislation. The 1936 Act
formalized the recommendations of the 1918 proposals, though in practice this addition of land
would be slow and ineffectual.

38

The Act also hastened the removal of “black spots” excluded

from scheduled areas and forced removals in Natal began as early as 1953. A 1956 amendment
to the act tightened control over labor tenancy and provided for registration of labor tenant
contracts.
It is in this highly charged context of increasing constraints on land tenure that the
construction of a dam in the Table Mountain region needs to be examined. Negotiations began in
1935 for the placement of a dam on the Umngeni River in the Inanda Location to supply
additional water to the growing city of Durban. The Durban Corporation (the city council) had
undertaken a similar project in the 1920s on the Umlaas River in the Umlazi Location. Durban
Waterworks (Private) Act 24 of 1921 enabled the Corporation to obtain sufficient water supply
for the city and granted powers of expropriation for the reservoir, its works (purification system,

37
38

Native Trust and Land Act, No. 18 of 1936.
Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, The Surplus People, 87–92.
130

aqueducts, tunnels, conduits and pipe lines), and access roads. It further granted that
compensation for the land expropriated could be provided through the transfer of other land. The
bill (and land exchange) undertaken for the Shongweni Water Works on the Umlaas River would
be replicated for the Umngeni scheme in the Inanda Location.

39

From the first phase of the Umngeni water scheme, the project impacted the residents of
the Table Mountain region. Immediately, the Durban authorities sent in surveyors and engineers
to formulate the plan for the dam and accompanying roads. The city council anticipated no
resistance from local residents given the opportunity for local wage labor created by the project.
But complaints did begin to circulate when the surveyors marked a road through Chief Ndlovu’s
territory without discussing purpose or compensation and surveyors prematurely informed
members of the Gcumisa they would have to move. Local residents and the Pietermaritzburg
Native Commissioner A.S. Hudson encouraged the construction of the road given the area’s
inaccessibility to vehicular transport. Chief Ndlovu himself first objected, as his gardens would
be disturbed by the road, but when his people approached him to urge no obstacles to the
construction of the road and waived their own rights to compensation, the chief acquiesced.
Because of the rocky and hilly nature of the area, the planned road construction was expensive
and the Corporation sought to share the costs with Native Affairs Department before abandoning
the project for another road stretching from the N3, a national road (now highway/tollroad)
further to the east. This road project through Ndlovu’s territory was later funded in 1936 as part
of famine relief efforts.

40

39

NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works.” Exchange of Lands,
Inanda Location. Part 1,” folio 7-75.
40
Under famine relief efforts, local males were paid £1.5/- per month to construct the
road connecting the Table Mountain Road to B.A. MacDonnell’s store near the Umngeni River.
131

The most pressing part of negotiations included the attempts to reach an agreement over
the transfer of land. Durban Corporation required 4,725 acres of the Inanda Location for dam
construction. Ownership was required so as to prevent any conflict with agricultural or other
interests of the local Africans such as soil erosion relating to nearby plowing of hills, straying
cattle, and proximate contamination. Before a new bill could be put before Parliament for the
water project, the Corporation needed to agree with the Native Affairs Department on cost
responsibilities and on what land would be transferred. The Corporation identified farms owned
by Robert Mattison adjacent to Inanda Location as a possibility for exchange with the NAD.
Mattison owned Onverwacht and a portion of Aasvogel Krans totaling 5,518 acres (See Map 6).
The Corporation proposed that in order to cover the difference in land to be transferred, the
South African Native Trust should pay for the relocation of Africans from the land to be
appropriated. The NAD, however, was adamant that all costs were to be covered by the
Corporation. Chief Native Commissioner H.C. Lugg recommended the land transfer as
Mattison’s farmland was more fertile than the land currently occupied by the Africans to be
relocated and believed it so desirable that they might waive their rights to compensation.

41

While Lugg believed these residents would desire the fertile land, the project met with
local opposition. After the first official notices of the planned relocation were served in late
1936, Chief Matshikiyana Gcumisa and 20 imizi heads called on the New Hanover District
MacDonnell volunteered to oversee the construction because of the benefits to him as the local
shopowner. The road construction was plagued with hindrances as the Africans downed tools to
demand meals and the initial funds expired. When additional funds became available, the pay
was a at lower scale of 25/- and MacDonnell refused to oversee the project any longer. PAR.
2/PMB. 3/1/1/2/32. “Location. Roads. Inanda Location” and NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. NAR. NTS
7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works.” Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location. Part 1”
and PAR. CNC39A 28/68. “Catchment Area, Umgeni River, Durban. Water Works in
Pietermaritzburg District, Inanda Location.”
41
NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works.” Exchange of Lands,
Inanda Location. Part 1,” folio 118-148.
132

Magistrate to demand an explanation. Regardless of the desirability of the new land, they asked
not to be moved from sites “where they had lived for years.” The New Hanover Native
Commissioner believed he was safe in saying that every person served notice dissented from the
proposed undertaking.

42

Neighboring white farmers also complained, vehemently objecting to the encroachment
of Africans on their boundaries with the purchase of Mattison’s land. Unlike the affected
Africans, the white farmers could utilize their elected representatives to lodge their opposition to
the proposed waterworks bill and the state was forced to respond. Farmers on other portions of
Aasvogel Krans, Doernhoek, and Goedverwachting worked through their Member of Parliament
William John O’Brien (House, 1918-38; Senate, 1939-48) to voice their concerns. They
demanded a white supervisor be placed on the portion of Aasvogel Krans to be sold and that
Aasvogel Krans remain a buffer land (for grazing only) between the white farms and location
land. They additionally demanded fences at no cost to them despite the Fencing Act No. 17,
1912, which required that landowners pay half the cost of the fencing. They further
recommended that instead of Mattison’s land that nearly divided the concerned farmers, the
Corporation instead purchase Goedverwachting. Chase A. Edmunds, the owner of Faulklands
farm (another portion of Aasvogel Krans) who led the petition against the exchange, related that
the current owner of Goedverwachting, Mrs. Christina G. Leslie (Ferreria’s heir) was particularly
apprehensive about the manner in which she was already “surrounded by native location” and
that the planned transfer would expose more of her boundaries to African neighbors. To move
the project forward, the Corporation agreed to meet some of the white farmers’ demands. They
would pay the salary of a “trusted native induna” to live on and police the buffer piece of the
42

PAR. CNC39A. 28/68. “Catchment Area, Umgeni River, Durban. Water Works in
Pietermaritzburg District, Inanda Location.”
133

farm and to pay for and maintain the fence. The NAD also planned to appoint an additional
superintendent and agricultural officer to oversee the new farm and adjoining location.

43

With

the Corporation, the Trust, and the white farmers in agreement, the bill for the water scheme
could be put before parliament.
But word of Mrs. Leslie’s desire to sell Goedverwachting sparked local interest. The
possibility that the SANT might purchase Goedverwachting led Chief Somquba to write to the
Umgeni Magistrate to ask for the farm. If the Nyavu could not buy Goedverwachting, they
would still settle on it. Somquba sent a letter on January 1, 1937 to make it clear he would like to
settle Nyavu on the land if the SANT purchased it. Somquba complained about the overcrowding
of his location due to evictions of his people from private lands and suggested Goedverwachting
be added to his jurisdiction.
Uma lomthetho ungase ube kona noma uphumelele otinta ukwendgela
amaLocations bengingacela uma letintwa lelizwe lika Mr. Frerra [sic] ngesiza ku
liseduze nami kakhulu nangobu indawo endala kakulu elakiwe abantu bami
kungakuhle uHulumeni angandisele ngalo.
If there be an Act passed in connection with the enlargement of Locations, I
would like to suggest that Mr. Ferreira’s farm be put into consideration on the
grounds that it is the nearest farm adjoining my area also because it is the place on
which my people have dwelled for a long time. It would be advisable for the
44
Government to prefer it for such an enlargement.
43

NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works.” Exchange of Lands,
Inanda Location. Part 1,” folio 167-7 and 175-88. There are ample records covering the
placement of an agricultural overseer, improvements to the existing homestead for the overseer’s
occupation, repairs to the irrigation system to water the existing citrus orchard that could not be
trusted to Africans’ care, and the establishment of a nursery plot to try out various grasses seeds
procured at the most recent Pietermaritzburg Agricultural Show. See NAR. NTS 3383. 2528/307.
“Trust Farms Onverwacht and Aasvogelskrans, Pietermaritzburg” and NTS 6992. 250/321.
“Nursery Plot. Table Mountain Farm, Aasvogelkrantz and Onverwacht, Pietermaritzburg.”
44
The isiZulu is the transcription of Somquba’s letter and the English is the Native
Commissioner’s translation (not my own). PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/1920. “Native
Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs. Mdhluli Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhluli,”
January 30, 1937.
134

The Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner recommended Somquba’s suggestion to the Chief
Native Commissioner.

45

That same year, the Durban Waterworks (Private) Act No. 20 of 1937 passed through
parliament.

46

It enabled the Durban Corporation to move forward with the £1,572,000 project to

store 5.3 billion gallons of water and ultimately divert 30 million gallons per day for the city’s
use. On August 26, 1937, Mattison’s Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans transferred to the Durban
Corporation.

47

The land exchange between the Corporation and Trust was to take place

immediately, but was delayed for nearly three years while legal details were finalized.

48

In the midst of these land acquisitions and the planning for removal, another impi
yemibongo broke out between the Maphumulo and Nyavu at a wedding of one of Maphumulo’s
followers on July 23, 1937. As a result, Sandhlana Wanda, a Maphumulo elder, died. Several
others were injured by sticks, stones, and assegais. Sixty men were arrested and another 30 under
investigation. The Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner could not believe the outnumbered 28
visitors from KwaNyavu had started the fight, but he did note that they arrived at the wedding
armed with assegais. Chief Ndlovu reported the men had not been invited and that “it is no
45

The Chief Native Commissioner also rejected another passionate application to
purchase Goedverwachting from one Johannes Hlongwane who hoped to buy the farm on
payments, just as a white man would do. Hlongwane had heard of the sale through his
employment. No further details regarding Hlongwane could be located. PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4.
2/14/1920. “Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs. Mdhluli Tribe. Chief
Somquba Mdhluli.”
46
No. 20, 1938, Private Act. Union Gazette Extraordinary, April 23, 1937.
47

For date and cost, see NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works.
Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location. Part 1.” For water estimates, see PAR. CNC40A. 28/68.
“Catchment Area, Umgeni River, Durban. Water Works in Pietermaritzburg District, Inanda
Location.”
48
NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works, Exchange of Lands,
Inanda Location, Part 2,” folio 358-97.
135

longer usual for visits to be paid between the members of the two tribes on account of the illfeeling that exists.” He reported the tensions were long standing, but Somquba’s induna Msolwa
disagreed. Msolwa thought that the groups were on friendly terms and that visits were frequently
paid. Both parties alleged the other commenced the throwing of stones that precipitated Wanda’s
death.

49

There is little detail in the two-page report on this impi yemibongo to suggest specific

causes of the conflict, but there should be no doubt that uncertainty and disruptions to everyday
life accompanying the negotiations for the Umngeni scheme and land transfers brought to the
surface the ongoing tensions between the Maphumulos and Nyavu. For over two years, the
people of the region waited and watched as the water project changed their landscape and
threatened their removal.
The actual removal was undertaken in stages between 1937 and 1950. At first the
numbers removed were small. Durban Mayor Fleming Johnston broke ground at the dam’s
inauguration ceremony on December 8, 1937, but construction on the road to the dam from the
N3 (the major thoroughfare from Durban to Pietermaritzburg) had begun months earlier. Those
affected by the road construction, 12 imizi head under Chief Ndlovu and 39 under Chief
Somquba, were compensated at £3/hut and £1/quarter acre of field. The three abanumzane
(gentlemen, homestead heads) with imizi affected were the first forced to relocate, though it is
not clear to where they moved. A fourth umnumzane needed to only move his umuzi some 100
yards from the road. While all involved initially agreed to the recommended compensation,
several imizi heads later contested the amounts based on trees or huts they believed had been
overlooked. Local Africans employed for the road excavation work at 2/- per day with food,
quarters, beer and Saturday meat almost immediately downed tools and demanded more money.
49

PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/2020. “Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native
Affairs. Mdhluli Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhluli.”
136

The men continued to refuse work and the contractor replaced them with Africans from Durban
at 1/8 per day.

50

Between the initial relocations and labor disputes, African frustration with

government interference in the region could only increase.
The removal of Africans from the planned dam area onto Onverwacht and Aasvogel
Krans was to be undertaken over a three to five year period. Native Affairs officials planned the
forced resettlement on the new farms according to the ideas of “rational land-use planning”
promulgated by South African planners as the only feasible solution to overstocking and land
degradation. This betterment planning, or “rehabilitation,” was also rooted in the Native Trust
and Land Act and refers to attempts by the successive governments to combat erosion, conserve
the environment, and improve agricultural production in areas reserved for Africans.

51

William

Beinart has pointed out that while the accompanying removals have not been quantified, in scale
these localized removals within the reserves were greater than any other type under the apartheid
era.

52

While the forced shifting of entire villages would take place under apartheid betterment

schemes,

53

the Umgeni water project provided NAD officials with the opportunity to implement

betterment planning amongst the Africans already being relocated.
In anticipation of the pending land exchange between the Corporation and the Trust,
Senior Agricultural Officer Norton and local magistrates set out a scheme to closely control the
relocation and conserve the new farms. In 1938, Norton’s ideal plan for Onverwacht and
50

PAR. CNC 40A. 28/68. “Catchment Area, Umgeni River, Durban. Water Works in
Pietermaritzburg District, Inanda Location.
51
Chris de Wet, “Resettlement and Land Reform in South Africa,” Review of African
Political Economy 21, no. 61 (1994): 359–61.
52
William Beinart, “Beyond ‘Homelands’: Some Ideas About the History of African
Rural Areas in South Africa,” South African Historical Journal 64, no. 1 (2012): 16.
53
For instance, see Ivan Thomas Evans, Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration
in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 255.
137

Aasvogel Krans recommended no more than 1,000 people and 1,000 cattle to prevent
overcrowding and degradation. Norton identified over 130 Maphumulo, Gcumisa, and Mdluli
imizi to be relocated, an estimated 900 people and 1,500 cattle. There were already 26 imizi,
including 114 humans and 1,246 cattle on the farms. Given the large number of livestock and the
location of arable land only along the Umngeni River, he recommended communal plowing and
dairying projects, separated residential areas, and the reduction of cattle.

54

This betterment plan made it clear to officials that Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans could
not sustain the number of people to be relocated. As well, the pending eviction of Africans
(including the Chief Mankonto Majozi of the Qamu whose landless ancestors were examined in
the previous chapter) from the farm Dadelfontein (also owned by Robert Mattison) to the east of
Table Mountain in the Camperdown district forced the NAD officials to open negotiations for
the purchase of additional land.
the Trust in July, 1940,

56

55

When Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans finally transferred to

Native Affairs officials set out to oversee the first wave of removal, to

negotiate for additional land, and to approve the appointment of the new Nyavu chief after the
death of Somquba. The appointment of Somquba’s successor proved no difficulty, as the late
chief had named Nongalaza, the eldest son of his third wife, as his heir prior to his death and the

54

NAR. NTS 3383. 2528/307. “Trust Farms Onverwacht and Aasvogelskrans,
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 4-7.
55
NAR. NTS 3243. 814/307. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting;”
56

NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works. Exchange of Lands,
Inanda Location, Part 2,” folio 397; Pietermaritzburg Deeds Registry, Department of Rural
Development and Land Reform, KwaZulu-Natal Province. Land Registers for Onverwacht No.
1225 and Aasvogel Krans No. 1226, 1850s-present.
138

Nyavu unanimously recommended the appointment.

57

(See Figure 11.) The acquisition of

additional land was more troublesome.
The archival records do not reflect just how this removal unfolded, but oral history
interviews suggest it did not occur according to the betterment plan and that initially the people
could live anywhere.

58

Archival records on a later betterment plan for the region suggest they

could move anywhere within the residential areas.

59

When Mattison first moved to Onverwacht,

he ordered many residents to vacate an area known as eStingini because they had too much cattle
to share grazing. But when Mattison sold the farm to the trust, many moved onto the farm as they
pleased. Induna Amos Ndlela stressed this freedom, which he recalls most likely because of the
story’s association with how one of the Maphumulo izigodi got its name.
When whites left the place where the [primary] school is at [Onverwacht], they
said our fathers can choose any places to stay because they were leaving. Baba
Myeza was staying there and then he moved to the bush in Nyanika isigodi there
at the Umgeni because everyone was allowed to build houses anywhere. His name
remained there because his name was Maqongqo and the place was named after
60
him, Maqongqo Myeza.
57

NAR. BAO 5/364. F54/1524/9. “Kapteins en Hoofmanne. B Mdluli. Stam. Mdluli.
Lokasi No 163/3 Called Table Mountain. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 28-38.
58
I can find no record of the actual removal. The files on the dam and related exchange
of lands (NTS 7900 3/337) are arranged in six chronological parts, with a gap in the years 1940-2
between parts two and three. Several references in other files were made to CNC 22/1202 B of
which I could not locate.
59
NAR. NTS 10261. 47/423(8). “Rehabilitation. Pietermaritzburg. Onverwacht Group,”
folio 22.
60
“Yebo, lapha kwakhiwe khona isikole, ngesikhathi sebehamba abelungu sebethi obaba
sebengakhetha lapho bengakha khona ngoba bona sebeyayishiya lendawo. Ubaba uMyeza
wayakhe laphaya wasukake wahamba waya kokwakha ehlanzeni eNyanika lapha eMngeni.
Ngakho ke ubaba uMyeza naye wasuka lapha wayakhe khona waya kokwakha lapha eNyanika
ngoba, kwasekukhululekiwe ukuthi umuntu usengakha noma kuphi lapho ethanda khona. Lasala
ke igama lakhe laphaya ngoba uMyeza igama lakhe kwakunguMaqongqo, kwasala igama
kwathiwa iseMaqongqo. Njengoba wayakhe lapha nje indawo lena ayakhe kuyona yabizwa
ngokuthi kuseMaqongqo.” Mazipho Amos Ndlela, B.A. Msomi, Bongumuzi Mbhele, and
Mfikiseni Khumalo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, February 17, 2011.
139

However, Goge Balothi, a young boy at the time, remembers when the agricultural
overseer, whom the locals called Mqangabhodwe (most likely because he was tall and lanky like
the tall, jointed panicum proliferum grass after which he was nicknamed), moved into Mattison’s
former home to manage the trust farm.

61

Balothi’s father worked for Bob Mattison and then for

Mqangabhodwe. But Mqangabhodwe came with tractors to divide the land into plots and ordered
the culling of cattle. According to Balothi, the men initially refused to destroy their cattle but in
the end did as they were told.

62

With the first wave of the removal underway after 1940, the NAD began to negotiate the
purchase of more land for the remaining Africans that could not be removed to Onverwacht.
Between 1940 and 1984, the Trust purchased six portions (See Map 8) of Goedverwachting. The
property was not situated in a released area (land set aside by the 1936 Trust and Land Act to be
purchased by the Trust for African occupation), but was adjacent to Inanda Location and was
thus eligible for purchase. Extensive negotiations took place between the NAD, the Land Affairs
Department, and the various owners of subsections of Goedverwachting. Approval was required
for lists of improvements, land valuation, offers to purchase, offers to counter, and so on.
Correspondence wove back and forth from the Chief Native Commissioner to the Secretary for
Native Affairs to the Board of Land Affairs. Scholars often note that acquisition of land after the

61

It is not entirely certain, but Mqangabhodwe may be S.A. Landsberg. Records suggest
Landsberg was the first to move into Mattison’s former homestead to serve as the Trust’s local
foreman. Approval for him to live there free of charge was granted in March 1941. NAR. NTS
6992. 250/321. “Nursery Plot. Table Mountain Farm, Aasvogelskrantz and Onverwacht.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 24. For the translation of mqangabhodwe, see Doke and Vilakazi, ZuluEnglish Dictionary, 688. On the naming of employers and coworkers by African employees, see
Adrian Koopman, Zulu names (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal, 1999), 66–7.
62
Goge Balothi, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, eStingini, March 4, 2011.
140

1936 Act was slow and ineffectual, evidenced here in the level of bureaucracy, farmers’
resistance to sale, and the continued desperate need for additional land.

63

Figure 8: Sale of Goedverwachting Sub-divisions. For clarity, South African Native Trust
(SANT) is used, though it was later called Bantu Trust and Development Trust.
Portion
Goedverwachting
(whole)

Acreage

Transfer

Transferor

Transferee

6,000

1919

J.A. Vanderplank

Nicholas P.H. Ferreira

1923
1948
1954
1984
1924
1943
1948
1968

Nicholas P.H. Ferreira
Lucas J. Potgieter
Reginald Raw
Brian L. Raw (Estate)
Nicholas P.H. Ferreira
Robert Mattison
Damjee S. Vather
Anan E. Maney

5,170

1924

Nicholas P.H. Ferreira

4170

1948

Christina G. Leslie

Lucas J. Potgieter
Reginald Raw
Brian Lawrence Raw
SANT
Robert Mattison
Damjee S. Vather
Anan E. Maney
SANT
Christina G. (Ferreira)
Leslie
SANT

1948

C.R.T.

Christina G. Leslie

1961

Christina G. Leslie

SANT

1948

C.R.T.

Christina G. Leslie

1950
1961

Christina G. Leslie
Barbara A. Ferreira

Barbara A. Ferreira
SANT

1948

C.R.T.

Christina G. Leslie

1958
1961

Christina G. Leslie
Nicoline P. Ferreira

Nicoline P. Ferreira
SANT

Goedverwachting
A

700

Goedverwachting
B

139

Goedverwachting
Remnant
Goedverwachting
D
(of Remnant)
Goedverwachting
5
(of Remnant)
Goedverwachting
6
(of Remnant)

39

930

137



The Trust was not initially successful in its endeavors, failing to purchase
Goedverwachting subsection A, owned by Lucas J. Potgieter, who refused sale outright in

63


Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, The Surplus People.

C.R.T. is Certificate of Registered Title. Act No. 47 of 1937 enabled the registrar to
issue a certificate of registered title on newly surveyed land, especially where two or more
defined portions of land were surveyed (here meaning, the subdivision of Goedverwachting).
141

64

1940.

It took two years of correspondence and evaluations before Robert Mattison, who sold

Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans to the Durban Corporation in 1937, refused sale of his property,
subsection B (and Subsection A of Onverwacht that he retained in the sale to the Corporation).
Mattison earned significant income on these small pieces of land, which included a wattle
plantation and a general store leased by an Indian, and found the Trust’s offer unacceptable.

65

The owners of the largest “Remnant” portion, Nicholas Ferreira and later his heir, Mrs.
Christina G. Leslie née Ferreira, attempted to sell the farm to local actors on several occasions,
including that examined above in 1921, as well as in 1929 again to the Nyavu and in 1937 to an
individual, Johannes Hlongwane, as well as the Trust.

66

Negotiations took several years and

eventually Leslie refused the Trust’s 1942 offer and counter offer because the worth of the land
had significantly increased since her initial offer of £3 an acre in 1937. But within six months,
Leslie’s son I.S. Ferreira called to reopen negotiations. I.S. Ferreira lived and worked on
Goedverwachting and held the power of attorney to negotiate for Leslie, who lived on the East
Rand. The zeal with which Leslie and Ferreira pursued the sale most likely resulted from
struggles to make mortgage payments, given persistent letters from the Land and Agricultural
Bank of South Africa to the Department of Land between 1946 and 1948 regarding arrears on the
property. When the transaction finally concluded in September 1948, the Trust paid off the

64

NAR. LDE-N 931. 1200/413. Goedverwachting (Subdivision A) Number 1349
District Pietermaritzburg Owner LG Potgieter, 1940.
65
NAR. LDE-N 931. 12200/414. Goedverwachting (Subdivision B) Number 1349
Onverwacht (Subdivision A of Portion B) Number 1225 District Pietermaritzburg, Owner R.
Mattison, 1940-2.
66
PAR. 2/PMB. 3/1/1/2/4. “Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs.
Mdhluli Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhluli;” NTS 3243. 814/307. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm
Goedverwachting;” and LDE-N 931. 12200-412. “Remainder of Goedverwachting Number
1349, Pietermaritzburg: Owner Mrs. CG Leslie.”
142

mortgage and the remainder of the purchase price was sent to Leslie. Part of the final agreement
enabled Leslie to keep 1,000 acres wedged between the remnant portion and the Onverwacht
farm on which her son continued to farm.

67

As we will see below, the trust would later acquire

this strip of farmland, but not until after the designation of the Maphumulo and Nyavu
boundaries that accompanied the establishment of tribal authorities according to the 1951 Bantu
Authorities Act.
But it was not just the acquisition of additional land that posed a problem for NAD
officials. The removal of residents from the Inanda Location to Onverwacht and
Goedverwachting for the dam resulted in a number of anomalies and legal difficulties.
Onverwacht was not a scheduled piece of land according to the 1936 Trust and Land Act,
therefore when the first wave of people moved onto Onverwacht in 1940 they were legally
subject to rental fees. But the SNA believed it would be unfair to call upon the new residents to
pay the fees on account of their compulsory relocation for a public works project. He
recommended that Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans be treated as location land, thus exempting
even those already resident on the farm from rent. All would continue to pay taxes.

68

But when

Goedverwachting transferred to the Trust in 1948, the former labor tenants resident on the land
became rent payers. NAD officials expressed concern that difficulties would arise between the
old and new residents on Goedverwachting if the second wave of displacees were exempt from

67

NAR. NTS 3243. 814/307. Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting; LDE-N 931.
12200/412. Remainder of Goedverwachting Number 1349, Pietermaritzburg: Owner Mrs CG
Leslie, 1940-8.
68
Again, no file could be found providing any details of the first wave of relocation.
What follows is gleaned from the records of the second removal after the purchase of
Goedverwachting. A later betterment planning document reported that the removal onto
Onverwacht was undertaken in a haphazard manner. NAR. NTS. 10261. 47/423(8)
“Rehabilitation. Pietermaritzburg. Onverwacht Group, 1959.”
143

rent. Hesitant to volunteer the loss of rental fees that would result in exemption of all
Goedverwachting residents, the officials eventually acquiesced given:
The settlement of Natives on Onverwacht and Goedverwachting is not to be
compared with that on the ordinary Trust farm – the residents on them are or will
be persons arbitrarily moved from the location for public purposes and the drastic
changes in their mode of occupation should not be made harsher by an increase in
69
their financial liabilities.
While in fact there was nothing more arbitrary about this removal (this relocation was planned
and forced, just as any other), the Chief Native Commissioner thus recommended the three farms
be added to the list of scheduled land so that all residents could be exempt from Proclamation
92/1949 that prescribed dwellers on Trust-owned land to pay rent. Government Notice 52/1950
exempted Goedverwachting, but Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans were initially overlooked.

70

With the legal difficulties settled and the anticipated completion of the dam, the planning
of the Goedverwachting remnant and the removal took on a new level of urgency throughout
1949. Agricultural Officer Tidbury’s 1948 plan for the farm identified 33 imizi, 230 cattle, and
320 small livestock already on the farm from former labor tenants. Tidbury had earlier despaired
that despite the size of the farm, only 400 arable acres remained when Leslie opted to keep the
most desirable portion of the farm, a flat plateau suitable for agriculture. He thus estimated the
carrying capacity of the farm for cattle to be only 834 units and recommended the elimination of
all small stock and donkeys. Beacons were erected to demarcate residential plots and fences
planned for the arable and grazing portions.

71

(See Figure 12.)

69

NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting,” folio 159-72.

70

NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting,” folio 159-72.

71

NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting,” folio 101-2

and 154.
144

Chief Ndlovu Maphumulo died in 1949 prior to the removal. No male children of
Ndlovu’s chief wife, Ma Mkhize/Nozipegula, or his ikohlwa wife (second wife, of the left-hand
hut), Ma Ntuli/Nomakolwa, survived. Ndlovu thus associated his third wife, also Ma Mkhize
(Nomahlazo, cousin of Nozipegula), with his chiefly house, and their son Funizwe became the
heir. But the Native Administration Act 38/1927 required approval from the Secretary for Native
Affairs for the appointment of a chief. The Maphumulo requested Funizwe succeed his father,
but Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner felt the young man (only 21 or 22 at the time) was
not yet mature enough to lead and the Secretary for Native Affairs denied approval. Izinduna
then nominated Sigciza Maphumulo (the son of Mkhowe, grandson of Maguzu, and uncle to
Funizwe – though at various time he was described by officials as a brother of Funizwe) to act as
ibambabukhosi (a regent, one expected to carry out the duties of office on behalf of the heir)
until Funizwe could be appointed. Ndlovu’s widows obtained the services of an attorney to
oppose Sigciza’s nomination on account of ill-feeling between him and their late husband, but
the izinduna and other Maphumulos requested him regardless. The Chief Native Commissioner
and Secretary for Native Affairs approved.

72

Thus, it was Acting Chief Sigciza who oversaw the removal of some of the Maphumulo
in early 1950. Sigciza requested the Durban Corporation pay those slated for removal in advance
so they could meet all necessary expenses. Additionally, he asked that lorries be provided to aid
the people in the move. The Agricultural section provided a three-ton truck and the NAD
advanced £100 for the petrol, oil, and driver’s wages for the relocation of 85 imizi (130 families)

72

NAR. BAO. 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 15-22. URU 2672. 2852. “Verlening van Siviele en Kriminile Regsmag
aan Waarnemende Kaptein S Mapumulo van die Mapumulo Stam Distrik Pietermaritzburg.”
145

a distance of six miles.

73

As the South African government transitioned into the apartheid era,

many members of the Maphumulo had already rebuilt or began to remake their homesteads on
Onverwacht and Goedverwachting. The imposition of apartheid would bring further interference
in their daily lives with additional land planning, formalized boundaries, and the organization of
the clan as a tribal authority.

Bantu Authorities, Boundaries, and Betterment at Table Mountain during Apartheid
In 1948, the National Party (NP) won the election with campaign promises of apartheid, or
separate development for different so-called racial groups. An increase in African urbanization
accompanied the post-war expansion of South African manufacturing and industrialization. The
NP won a narrow election, elected by white South Africans threatened by African competition in
the city and angered about the loss of control over African farm workers. Building on
segregationist policies with a greater degree of ideological fervor, the NP built a political system
that intruded in every aspect of African life with concepts of separate development of African
“nations” in ways that earlier segregation did not. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages (1949),
Immorality Act (1950), Population Registration Act (1950), Group Areas Act (1950), Bantu
Authorities Act (1951), Abolition of Passes and Consolidation of Documents Act (1952), Bantu
Education Act (1953), and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) transformed the
administration and livelihoods of the African population. South African society was divided
according to rigid categories of white, Coloured, Indian, and “Native”/“Bantu” and the latter
further divided into ten separate “tribes” or “nations.”

73

NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting,” folio 171-3.
146

While apartheid was long attributed to a single “grand plan” binding the Afrikaner
nationalist class together from the late 1940s, Deborah Posel’s examination of the processes
whereby influx control policies were made illustrates the manner in which apartheid was forged
through a series of struggles within and beyond the state in several phases.

74

The election of

1948 did not mark a decisive break from the past as significant continuities between segregation
and apartheid can be seen in a number of central themes which came to define apartheid – urban
labor controls, planned urban locations, and the conversion of reserves into bantustans. While
significant changes in these policies did occur, they were spread out across the 1950s and
introduced inconsistently thereafter. The most arresting feature of apartheid Native
Administration was its dispersal into everyday life. Historian Ivan Evans aptly wrote, “After
1948, virtually every aspect of [African] lives was subjected to the intrusive hands of clerks,
bureaucrats, and administrators of one sort or another.”

75

Native administrators after 1948 moved away from the paternalist and gradualist ethos of
the segregation years and came to dominate apartheid policy. The urgency of the so-called
“Native question” brought about by increasing African urbanization enabled the Native Affairs
Department under E.G. Jansen (1948-50) and the autocratic H.F. Verwoerd (1950-8), hitherto
less prestigious or developed, to dominate the design of apartheid policies. The NAD grew in
importance and size, with two assistant Ministers of Native Affairs appointed in 1951 (no
comparable positions existed elsewhere in government) and 308 new positions for whites and
230 African posts. By 1960, the number of white officials employed by the NAD had nearly
doubled (to exceed 3,000) since 1948. The NAD usurped control of African housing, labor, and
74

Deborah Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
75
Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 1–8.
147

the reserves from various other departments, setting the stage for the NAD to become a “state
within a state.”

76

The department also reorganized in 1954 into a highly centralized structure

with a series of subdivisions, new managerial positions, and lines of communication to connect
the new system. While never completely successful in centralizing power, the department was
markedly more authoritarian than during the segregation years when control was often held by
the local “man on the spot.” The division of South Africa into African and white spheres was
further fragmented into “tribal sovereignties” with the adoption of the Bantu Authorities Act. In
“the illusion of decentralization” the department established the conditions necessary to
transform the paternalist administration into bureaucracies controlled by African administrators
and politicians.

77

The NAD initially pursued a “practical” attitude to apartheid that postponed fully
“separate development” for future generations. In 1958, the NAD split into two departments, the
Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) and the Department of Bantu


Education. According to Posel, only in the 1960s did the BAD fully launch the program of
social engineering that sought to deny Africans citizenship and forcefully remove them to the
ethnic bantustans. During this “second phase” of apartheid, the BAD turned to the development
of the reserves as a central component of preventing further African urbanization and the
establishment of separate “nations.” The major impetus for the restructuring of these urban
policies was the escalation of African resistance in the townships that peaked in 1960 after the

76
77


Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 63–4.
Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 16.

From here I will use both NAD and BAD, depending on the year in question. When the
NAD became BAD, Native Commissioners became Bantu Administration Commissioners
(BAC) and the South African Native Trust became the Bantu Trust (SABT).
148

shooting of protestors in Sharpeville.

78

However, the sluggishness of the land acquisition

enabled by the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act delayed the pace at which the apartheid
government could pursue this policy of separate development.

79

The extent to which betterment planning remained a central tenet of government policy
during the first phase of apartheid remains contested. Posel and Evans suggest the development
of the reserves had largely been neglected prior to the 1960s due to conflict within Afrikanerdom
over the findings of the Tomlinson Commission for Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu
Areas of South Africa. While intellectuals and cultural entrepreneurs associated with the South
Africa Bureau for Racial Affairs envisioned the reserves as the “moral fountainhead of apartheid
practices,” apartheid pragmatists expressed concern about the impingement of the reserves on
key Afrikaner groups of businessmen, white workers and white farmers.

80

The Commission,

assembled by the NAD, advocated a vigorous program for improving agriculture and
transforming the reserves into modern economies capable of constraining African urbanization.
The land-use plan promoted by the Commission was quite similar to the existing betterment
scheme, providing for residential units divided into plots, arable lands divided into units, and
common grazing grounds. But unlike the previous betterment system, the Commission
recommended that the number of families settled as farmers not exceed the number of “economic
units.” The notion of an economic unit entailed that a family should have access to an amount of

78

Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 228–46.

79

Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, The Surplus People, 92–3.

80

Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 224.
149

arable land and grazing that would provide it with a minimum annual income of £60. Viable
agriculture could be achieved by removing surplus peoples into rural villages.

81

However, white farmer opposition (to competition from peasant farmers as well as the
possible extension of reserve lands) resulted in a lack of dedication to the reserves on the part of
Jansen and Verwoerd. The proposals of the commission were only partially implemented and
funding for items crucial to the success of the recommended rural villages was withheld.
Verwoerd aimed merely to confine the “surplus” African population to the labor needs of white
areas.

82

In practice, locations were still divided into residential, arable, and grazing areas but no

people were to be removed; this meant that few families received economic units that enabled
them to farm and graze stock. Land unsuitable for cultivation was removed from use.

83

But De

Wet argues that despite the limited implementation of the Tomlinson Commission’s
recommendations, stabilization efforts including irrigation schemes, soil conservation, and
investment in sugar production and afforestation on Northern Natal were the first of three steps
to rehabilitation and thus marked the height of betterment planning.

84

But the limits of the

betterment planning and the reserves greatly impacted the unfolding of Bantu Authoritires.
The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 promised to grant Africans greater administrative
authority in an illusion of decentralization and false autonomy. It tied chiefs to a failing
economic development system where their people had no economic prospects in the reserves and

81

C. J De Wet, Moving Together, Drifting Apart: Betterment Planning and Villagisation
in a South African Homeland (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995), 45–51.
82
Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 71, 240–1; De Wet, Moving Together, Drifting Apart,
45–51.
83
De Wet, Moving Together, Drifting Apart, 45–51.
84

De Wet, Moving Together, Drifting Apart, 224.
150

few chances of entering the urban labor market.

85

The Bantu Authorities Act made provision for

three levels of administration for Africans, at the tribal, regional, and territorial levels. The tribal
authorities consisted of a chief with councillors; the authorities were granted administrative,
executive and judicial powers. A chief could appoint half of his council, subject to state
approval, while the state nominated the other half based on the size of the polity. Regional
authorities exercised control over two or more areas with tribal authorities and governed the
establishment and maintenance of educational and health institutions, public works, and
agricultural and stock affairs. The highest tier governed over two or more areas for which
regional authorities had been established. These territorial authorities held the same powers as
regional authorities but also powers relating to the administration of Africans as prescribed by
86

law.

What Minister for Native Affairs Hendrik Verwoerd called an imitation of “traditional

tribal democracy” was widely recognized as a farce.

87

The Bantu Authorities system replaced

the council system and Native Representative Council to emphasize ethnic fragmentation over
racial division. The Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms were two of the first in Natal to establish
tribal authorities. The manner in which these were created and the accompanying boundaries are
central to the manner in which local tensions continued to build over land and chiefly authority.
Before examining the impact of apartheid and the introduction of tribal authorities in the
Table Mountain region, we need to link back to the chiefly succession of the Maphumulo. In
May 1952, Funizwe took over as chief from Acting Chief Sigciza. By then married with two

85
86

Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, 244.
Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda, 48–50.

87

Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power; Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised; D. A
Kotzé, African Politics in South Africa, 1964-1974: Parties and Issues (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1975); Evans, Bureaucracy and Race.
151

children, Funizwe was deemed sufficiently mature to succeed his late father. But Funizwe died
of tuberculosis on April 9, 1954. Native Commissioner F. de Souza recommended Sigciza again
act as chief until the successor could be named after the mourning period to accompany the
chief’s death. There would be no debate over an heir, as Funizwe had only one wife, Ma
Mdlalose/Nosibhedlela, and two sons, Mhlabunzima and Kwenzokuhle. (See Figure 10.)

88

But a contentious debate did ensue over who would act as ibambabukhosi for the young
Mhlabunzima, only four at the time of his father’s death. Examining this dispute is not only
important for understanding the state of the chiefdom in the era of Bantu Authorities, but also
because several of the key players will again emerge during uDlame. When the period of
mourning ended, izinduna, Maphumulo members, and de Souza gathered at the late Funizwe’s
umuzi on Onverwacht to nominate an acting chief. Factions formed around two nominees,
Baningi Maphumulo and Sigciza Maphumulo. Umndeni member Mpini Maphumulo and induna
Lugagadu Ntuli first nominated Baningi, who they described as the highest ranking of three
brothers of the late Funizwe. Umndeni literally translates as “circle of relatives of the second
order, [those] not included in the immediate family.”

89

Here, umndeni implies the Maphumulo,

the members of the extended chiefly family responsible for important decisions such as these.
Several others also spoke in favor of Baningi, born of Mamnyeni and Ndlovu and given to
Ndlovu’s childless second wife Ma Ntuli (Nomakolwa) to raise.

88

NAR. URU 2974. 1143. “Appointment of F Mapumulo as Chief of the Mapumulo
Tribe, Pietermaritzburg;”BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 30-40 and 47-9.
89
Doke and Vilakazi, Zulu-English Dictionary, 538. These agnatic clusters interact for
dispute arbitration and religious ceremonies. See Hammond-Tooke, “In Search of the Lineage,”
84–5.
152

But several others objected to the umndeni’s nomination of Baningi.

90

Those who spoke

against Baningi’s nomination did so for several reasons. They protested because the umndeni had
not consulted them and because they believed Baningi was ineligible for the position given his
ancestry. Mabibi Mdunge complained they did not know Baningi as they knew Sigciza, who
already advised them. Zofa Gumede positioned himself as a member of the chiefdom versus
those of the “Maphumulo family” who had made the decision without consulting them. Induna
Muziwake Mhlangu explained why they believed Baningi’s nomination was unusual:
I say it is strange that a man who is the son of a woman who was not even married
to the late Chief Ndhlovu should be appointed as Regent. I say how can he be
appointed as Regent? It is strange that when we came to your office to report the
death of the late Chief Funizwe we were not even able to talk about Baningi. We
don’t know him and we don’t even know where he comes from… The so-called
mother of Baningi was not known to any of us Indunas. What we know is that
Makolwa never gave birth to a living child. The majority of the tribe say that the
present Acting Chief Sigciza is the right man to be appointed as Regent during the
91
minority of Funizwe’s heir.
Mdingi Maphumulo called on Sigciza to attest that he had previously agreed Baningi should take
over, but Sigciza denied doing so. De Souza took a vote and the umndeni members, izinduna,
and Maphumulo members present voted in favor of Baningi by a narrow margin of 65 to 62. De
Souza stated that Sigciza would continue to act until the government approved Baningi’s
nomination and warned against “faction fighting or tribal unrest” that might erupt on account of
the decision.

92

90

NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 51-3.
91
NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 53.
92
NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 51-4.
153

De Souza recommended Baningi’s appointment to the Chief Native Commissioner.
Sigciza was nearly 70 years-old and not likely to survive the duration of the heir’s adolescence.
Baningi was then 29, married, gainfully employed as a “boss boy” in Pietermaritzburg, and
maintaining Funizwe’s widow and children. Ma Mdlalose herself expressed her favor for
Baningi.

93

Only five years earlier Ndlovu’s wives had vehemently objected to Sigciza’s

nomination and the zeal with which some backed Baningi suggests the family still held ill
feelings towards Sigciza. Because the record does not reflect the names of all who voted, it
cannot be known for certain whether the count reflected the division that Zofa Gumede claimed,
one between the umndeni and chiefdom. But three of those who spoke in favor of Baningi were
of the Maphumulo isibongo (surname), including Mpini Maphumulo, Qubokwakhe Maphumulo,
and Mdingi Maphumulo. When Baningi later withdrew his claim, one of his supporters, induna
Seni Mlaba, insisted on an opportunity to bring around “the blood relations of late Chief
Funizwe.”

94

Despite both the umndeni and Native Commissioner’s recommendation, Secretary of
Native Affairs T.F. Coertze would not recommend Baningi’s appointment on such a narrow
margin of votes. The potential for conflict between the factions was a great concern of the
officials involved. When Baningi appeared before the new Native Commissioner C.D. Nel in
January 1955 to ask for advice regarding his claim to the regency, Nel advised Baningi to drop
the claim on account of his unlawful heritage. Nel claimed it was “unknown in Native Law and
Custom that an illegitimate son can oust other lawful claimants” and furthered that Baningi had

93

NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 55-6.
94
NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 63.
154

not been included when Ndlovu listed his wives and heirs prior to his death. Nel informed
Baningi that the heirs of the ukungena union, Khangela and Qeda, could also make claims before
Baningi because an alleged disinheritance of these sons had not been made publicly (or at least,
had not been recorded).

95

Two weeks later, Baningi returned to Nel’s office to abandon his

claim. He told Nel he would support Sigciza’s appointment and asked that a meeting of izinduna
be called so he could make the announcement. At the February 1955 meeting, Baningi informed
the izinduna of his withdrawal and most threw their support behind Sigciza. One of Baningi’s
original supporters, induna Seni Mlaba, agreed to as well, but remained adamant that the widows
of Ndlovu and Funizwe be informed of Baningi’s decision first. Those izinduna who wished to
consult the people and those who expressed concern that doing so would cause bloodshed
debated the matter, but Nel concluded that since all had agreed to support Sigciza, the
appointment would be recommended.

96

But before the meeting was closed, Native Commissioner Nel took the opportunity to
introduce the Bantu Authorities Act.

97

As under indirect rule and Union policy, Bantu

Authorities enabled apartheid officials to manipulate chiefly authority, rewarding or demoting
those who did not cooperate with these administration and betterment policies. Most chiefs
found themselves in the precarious position described best by Shula Marks as the “ambiguity of
dependence,” but as will be seen below, the Maphumulo regents whose positions were more
dependent on the government than the hereditary heirs for whom they acted were particularly
95

NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 59.
96
NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 62-3.
97
NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 62-3.
155

susceptible to manipulation by the apartheid government.

98

The ANC President Chief Albert

Luthuli was among the leaders deposed for his opposition to the Bantu Authorities. While a
range of resistance to Bantu Authorities and betterment projects emerged across South Africa, in
the Table Mountain region the manner in which communities reacted was influenced by the
continued impact of the Nagle Dam project.
A month later after Nel first breached the subject, the Maphumulo held a meeting on
Onverwacht with Nel, Agricultural Officer I.R. Matheson and Inspector of Bantu Education F.B.
Oscroft to finalize Sigciza’s appointment and consider the establishment of a tribal authority.
The government officials addressed those present regarding the Bantu Authorities Act, local
roads and educational matters, particularly the construction of a school on Onverwacht. Many
izinduna and other men present had questions and comments, most important of which were
grievances about the restriction of cattle and support for a local school. The men complained that
Ferreira could introduce stock to his neighboring farm, but they could not on the Trust farm.
They wanted roads, businesses, plantations, and education for their children. Sigciza directed the
men back to the matter at hand and declared the Maphumulo wanted a tribal authority. Those
present unanimously accepted the Act and charged Sigciza to appoint councillors.

99

The extent to which the Bantu Authorities Act required this consultation and approval has
been the subject of much consideration, particularly around the person of Mangosuthu Buthelezi,
the chief of the Buthelezi clan whose rise to power as Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland
and President of the ethnic nationalist movement Inkatha Yenkululeko yeSizwe (to be examined

98
99

Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa.
NAR. NTS 8900. 211/362(5). “Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Tribal Authority,” folio

1-2.
156

in the next chapter) coincided with the growth of Bantu Authorities.

100

The Act provided that its

implementation could only be preceded by consultation with the people to be affected. In later
years, when Buthelezi was labeled a collaborator by the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups for
his participation in the Bantu Authorities system, Buthelezi justified his position in the system
based on its forced imposition. But Mzala argued that this clause allowed for a range of
reactions, thus making the case for Buthelezi’s collaboration.

101

On the other hand, Robert

McIntosh’s examination of Bantu Authorities suggests that threats of deposal made at several
propagandistic conferences for chiefs may have left them feeling they had little choice but
102

accept.

According to Sithole, in Natal this schism between those who supported and resisted

the authorities thus slowed implementation during the 1950s and 1960s. Many chiefs and
izinduna resented being drawn deeper into native administration. Some feared a loss of control
given the ability of the state to interfere in tribal council nominations. Still others supported
Bantu authorities because of the power and status conferred to them by the apartheid state.
Middle class Africans too stood to benefit from the accompanying employment and business
opportunities. By 1964, of 282 chiefdoms in KwaZulu/Natal, 111 had asked for tribal authorities
to be established, 133 remained undecided, and 38 opposed the system altogether.

103

100

Temkin, Buthelezi; Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power; Mzala (Jabulani
Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda.
101
Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda.
102

Indeed, Between 1950 and 1956, a total of eight chiefs, four acting chiefs, 40
headmen and six acting headmen were deposed for various reasons. Between 1955 and 1958, 34
chiefs and headmen were deposed and three deported. Robert McIntosh, “State Policies in Rural
South Africa C1948-c1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy Fomation and Local Responses” (PhD
dissertation, School of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of London, 1999), 159, 167.
103
Sithole notes the difference of 43 included in the figures he cites. Jabulani Sithole,
“Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” in The Road to Democracy
in South Africa, vol. 2 [1970–1980] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006), 811–2.
157

The Maphumulo and Nyavu were two of the initial 111 to ask for an authority. Sigciza
Maphumulo, as a government-supported acting chief whose position had been very recently in
dispute, must have felt a certain obligation to the government to implement the Bantu Authorities
Act in his region. The heir Mhlabunzima was only four years old, and the acting chief, with the
support of the government, could serve for some time. It is thus not surprising that it was Sigciza
who ultimately decided to do the government’s bidding, announcing at the conclusion of the
meeting, “We want a tribal authority to go into our domestic affairs.”

104

The extent to which

izinduna expressed their support, on the other hand, was tied to the construction of a school and
the establishment of a tribal fund for the projects they had discussed. As several expressed the
need for schools, roads, and businesses, their support for the act came from a belief that a tribal
authority would bring improvement to their community.
Educational desires also guided the reasonings behind the Nyavu request for an authority.
In the same month as the meeting with the Maphumulo at Onverwacht, Nel, Oscroft, and a Mr.
Skinner met with the Nyavu Chief Nongalaza Mdluli, several izinduna, mission board members,
and nearly 100 other Nyavu. Induna Robert Mdluli told those present that the education of
children was the first priority. They had heard rumors about the shortcomings of Bantu
Education but told the local American Board missionaries they would accept the new act.
Another meeting attendee asked how they might replace a teacher, suggesting that the state of
missionary education on the reserve, one of the smallest American Board missions, may have

104

NAR. NTS 8900. 211/362(5). “Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Tribal Authority,” folio

1-2.
158

influenced the decision to accept Bantu education and authorities. Nongalaza expressed his own
favor and another concluded they did not want to be left behind.

105

The support of the Maphumulo and Nyavu at these meetings transformed into “tribal
resolutions” and the Native Commissioner recommended the creation of their authorities to the
SNA.

106

But the establishment was delayed until a point by point description of the portions of

Inanda Location under each authority could be obtained. Over a year after the Native
Commissioner’s recommendation, Secretary for Native Affairs C.B. Young anxiously pushed for
these authorities’ establishment.

107

The recently promoted Young, who believed that the

authorities should be compulsory, took an active role in the promotion and implementation of the
authorities more generally.

108

But extra incentive may have spurred him to push the Maphumulo

and Nyavu to establish authorities. Many Zulu chiefs, including Buthelezi, had adopted a wait
and see attitude to the Bantu Authorities Act and the adoption of tribal authorities in the Table
Mountain region would serve as exemplary precedent.
The Maphumulo and Nyavu Tribal Authorities were promulgated in July of 1957, several
months before the Zulu Paramount Chief (King) Cyprian Bhekuzulu convened a meeting of
chiefs at KwaNongoma to announce his acceptance of the act. Government Notice 957/1957

105

NAR. NTS 8991. 211/362(9). “Manyavu Tribal Authority,” folio 3.

106

This “resolution” was a fill-in-the-blank document provided by the Department of
Bantu Administration and Development that formalized consent. There were lines for the
signature of the chief, three of his councillors, two witnesses, and the native commissioner. The
copies in the archive have no signatures or handwritten X marks; the names and marks have been
typed. “Good governance” required written documentation. See NTS 8900. 211/362(5).
“Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Tribal Authority,” folio 3 and NTS 8991. 22/362(9). “Manyavu
Tribal Authority,” folio 4.
107
NAR. NTS 8991. 211/362(9). “Manyavu Tribal Authority,” folio 11.
108

McIntosh, “State Policies in Rural South Africa C1948-c1960: Bantu Authorities,
Policy Fomation and Local Responses,” 153–60.
159

defined the boundaries of the Maphumulo and Nyavu tribes, in terms of paragraph (a) of
subsection (1) of section five of the Native Administration Act 38 of 1927, and established the
Maphumulo Tribal Authority and Nyavu Tribal Authority, in terms of section two of the Bantu
Authorities Act 68 of 1951. The attached schedules gave detailed boundary definitions. The
Maphumulo area included the trust-owned remnant of Goedverwachting, the trust-owned portion
of Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans on the Pietermaritzburg side of the boundary between the
Pietermaritzburg and New Hanover magisterial districts, and a portion of the Inanda location.
The Nyavu area encompassed the whole of the Table Mountain Mission Reserve (excluding any
portion registered in the American Board’s name) and a portion of the Inanda location. (See Map
7.) The Maphumulo could have between 12 to 18 councillors and the Nyavu 9 to 15.

109

While the Maphumulo and Nyavu may have resolved to form tribal authorities, they did
little afterwards that evidences continued support for the new form of administration and efforts
to make the tribal authorities active came largely from BAD officials. By 1961, the
Pietermaritzburg district had successfully established seven authorities, compared to the
neighboring Camperdown and New Hanover Districts that established none. But BAC Rowen
recognized these authorities did nothing to justify their existence without his labors.

110

The same

year as the Nyavu initially expressed their desire for a tribal authority, a trust account was
created by the BAD “to secure the funds of the Tribal Authority until such time as the tribe are
able to control their own funds.”

111

Bantu Education Inspector Oscroft also instigated efforts for

109

Government Gazette 975/1957. Accessed from NAR. NTS. 8991. 211/362(9); NAR.
URU 3672. 1215. “Omskrywing van de Gebiede van die Mapumulo en die Amanyavu Stam
Owerheid: Distrik Pietermaritzburg.”
110
NAR. BAO 5/87. 53/1524. “Stamowerhede. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 1-8.
111

NAR. NTS 11166. 211/362(9) “Pietermaritzburg. Manyavu Tribal Authority.”
160

the construction of the first Maphumulo “community school” in the region (now known as
Maqongqo Primary School), as local parents had expressed desire to not send their children to
the “Aided Mission school,” even prior to the establishment of the tribal authorities.

112

The

BAC completed all of the financial estimates for each of the authorities and even then struggled
to get the chiefs to sign the forms.
into more open resistance.

113

As time passed, this apathy on the part of the chiefs turned

114

Clear opposition began to emerge amongst the Nyavu after the death of Nongalaza in
1960. Mdelelwa Mdluli, one of Nongalaza’s brothers, served as acting chief for nearly four
months until Nongalaza’s eldest son Bangubukhosi married to meet the requirements of the
BAD.

115

Once Bangubukhosi took over later that year, tribal authority functions came to a

standstill. A 1961 account by the Pietermaritzburg BAC indicated complete failure: the authority
did not function, no secretary had been appointed, there was no income, and the men refused to

112

NAR. NTS 668. 2002/108. “Pietermaritzburg. Application for a School Site at
Magongqo [sic] on the farm Onverwacht: Table Mountain School Board.”
113
NAR. NTS 8991. 211/362(A). ). “Pietermaritzburg. Manyavu Tribal Authority,” folio
11; BAO 13/1022. J76/97/1524/7. “Begroting, Bantoewerhede. Finansiele Aangeleenthede.”
114
Several reasons for this opposition will be examined below, but due to the constraints
of the dissertation, the extent to which ANC resistance impacted the region will not be examined
here. While Tom Lodge has suggested rural areas as one of the ANC’s most neglected
constituencies, Colin Bundy and Peter Delius have more recently highlighted ANC attention to
rural areas in the Eastern Cape and Sekhukhuneland. Given Table Mountain’s close vicinity to
the city, it is likely ANC protest against the Bantu Authorities reached the region. This section
will benefit from follow-up. See Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (London;
New York: Longman, 1983), Ch 11; Colin Bundy, “Land and Liberation: Popular Rural Protest
and the National Liberation Movements in South Africa, 1920-1960,” in The Politics of Race,
Class and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa, ed. Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido
(London: Longman, 1987); Peter Delius, “Sebatakgomo: Migrant Organization, the ANC and the
Sekhukhuneland Revolt,” Journal of Southern African Studies 15, no. 4 (1989): 581–615.
115
NAR. BAO 5/364. F54/1524/9. “Kapteins en Hoofmanne. B Mdluli. Stam. Mdluli.
Lokasi No 163/3 Called Table Mountain. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 70-91.
161

pay the levy that had been approved in 1959.

116

After his appointment, Bangubukhosi asked that

BAC V.P. Ahrens again explain the Bantu Authorities system to the Nyavu, who remained
suspicious and cautious. Those present agreed to cooperate but asked for more time to consider
all of the implications. Over the next several years, the cooperation was anything but
forthcoming. At some point in 1962 or 1963, the people destroyed local dipping tanks.

117

Ahrens began to suspect that Bangubukhosi opposed the system, but was too weak to announce
it. Bangubukhosi refused to sign several years’ worth of the annual financial estimates for the
tribal authority because he would not go against his people, who alleged that Nongalaza had
accepted the Bantu Authorities without consulting them. Aware that there had at least been some
support expressed at the initial Nyavu meeting that approved the tribal authority, the BAC
believed that the shift against the system came as a result of opposition to local betterment
projects.

118

Indeed, in 1964, Chief Manzolwandle Mlaba of the neighboring Ximba complained

that people opposed to Bantu Authorities and rehabilitation left his area to settle under
Bangubukhosi because the Nyavu chief only minimally acknowledged Bantu Authorities and his
area had no rehabilitation projects.

119

While the BAC dismissed Bangubukhosi as disinterested and lacking prestige among his
own people, the chief walked the tightrope and navigated the ambiguity of his dependence.

116

120

NAR. NTS 9013. 228/362. “Natal. Bantu Authorities.”

117

This is mentioned in passing in BAO 13/1022. J76/971524/7, folio 14 but no further
record of the destruction could be located.
118
NAR. NTS 8991. 211/362(9). “Pietermaritzburg. Manyavu Tribal Authority,” folio 513.
119
NAR. BAO 5/364. F54/1524/9. “Kapteins en Hoofmanne. B. Mdluli. Stam. Mdluli.
Lokasi No 163/3 Called Table Mountain. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 15.
120
Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa.
162

The chief recognized the precariousness of his position and restrained himself from openly
opposing the tribal authorities, but made no effort to implement any authority projects for fear of
going against the Nyavu. The BAC employed both the carrot and the stick in efforts to gain
Bangubukhosi’s cooperation. During the first four years of the chief’s appointment, BAC Bowen
attempted to manipulate the chief through reduction and removal of the annual bonus paid to
chiefs for good behavior. By 1964, Bowen considered recommending the chief’s suspension.
Bowen withdrew the authority’s ability to collect dog tax independently and deposited any
amounts collected directly into the trust account, though the revenue from dog tax collection was
virtually non-existent until Bowen oversaw the employment of a more reliable collector. On the
other hand, Bowen sought to give the chief more authority when he encouraged the conferment
of criminal jurisdiction to the chief, a tenet of Bantu Authorities designed to give more power to
the chiefs. He hoped the increase in revenue from court fees might persuade the chief to comply,
as well as raise the status of the chiefdom.

121

Bowen further recommended that the monies

received by the SANT from the sale of sand in Bangubukhosi’s jurisdiction be paid into the
Nyavu account so that the people could see the fruit of their labor. While the BAD granted
criminal jurisdiction, it refused to turn over the sand funds, insisting that all monies deposited
from the BAD could only be in the form of a grant for specific development projects. Bowen
lamented the decision and felt local opposition continued for this very reason, admitting that the
people had seen no real benefits from the creation of the tribal authority.

121

122

NAR. BAO 5/364. F54/1524/9. “Kapteins en Hoofmanne. B. Mdluli. Stam. Mdluli.
Lokasi No 163/3 Called Table Mountain. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 1-18.
122
NAR. BAO 13/1022. J76/97/1524/7. “Begroting. Bantoewerhede. Finansiele
Aangeleenthede,” Folio 18-29.
163

While the BAC suspected the Nyavu resistance to Bantu Authorities was tied to
betterment schemes, amongst the Maphumulo this fusion of opposition to tribal authorities and
planning projects was more explicit. Proclamation 116/1949 “Limitation and Improvement of
Livestock and of Pastoral and Agricultural Resources in Native Areas” gave the Native
Commissioner power to alienate any land for the prevention of soil erosion and the protection of
water sources. Non-compliance was made a criminal offence and all Trust lands thus became
“betterment areas.”

123

An “Ad Hoc Committee” including the Bantu Administration

Commissioner V.P. Ahrens, Principal Agricultural Officer McKay, Senior Agricultural Officer
Tidbury, and the regional Agricultural Officer I.R. Matheson thus set out the rehabilitation
scheme for Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans trust farms in 1959. The 14-page plan divided the
farm into residential, agricultural, and grazing allotments that translated into 97 economic units
for 198 families. (See Figure 13.) While Tidbury had previously recommended the purchase of
the remaining portions of the Goedverwachting farm for the establishment of a rural township to
house non-farmers, until the land was acquired there was no plae to which the “surplus people”
could be relocated. The plan thus divided the available economic units amongst the families,
with the intention of allocating full portions to the “best farmers” and partial portions to the rest.
The “worst farmers” would be weeded out and full allotments built up for the former category.
The scheme detailed plans for a dairy project, a grazing system, and crop rotation.

124

The

records do not reflect the extent to which this plan was ever carried out; but as examined below,

123

On the limits of and debate over Proclamation 116, see McIntosh, “State Policies in
Rural South Africa C1948-c1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy Fomation and Local Responses,” Ch
7.
124
NAR. NTS 10261. 47/423(8). “Rehabilitation. Pietermaritzburg. Onverwacht Group,”
folio 3-16.
164

resistance to the local Bantu Agricultural Assistant’s efforts to implement the recommendations
suggests the plan was not welcomed.
Overcrowding was of great concern and not only to the members of the Ad Hoc
Committee that planned Onverwacht. Despite the purchase of the Goedverwachting remnant to
add to the land for those forcefully relocated from the dam site, population continued to outstrip
available land as sons sought to break away and establish their own imizi in the region. The
neighboring Table Mountain location was also grossly congested.

125

(See Figure 9.) Such

overcrowding was not limited to the Table Mountain Region; Lodge notes that between 1955 and
1969 the average population density in the reserves rose from 60 persons per square mile to
126

110.

During the initial phases of the planning, Tidbury had recommended the purchase of the

Goedverwachting subdivisions to establish a township to accommodate the growing population
and “to sort out the farmer from the non-farmer.” Tidbury’s recommendation was quickly
approved and negotiations began again with Leslie and her family for Goedverwachting portions
D, 5, and 6.

127

Conditions set by S.D. Vather, the owner of portion B, and Brian L. Raw, owner

of portion A, as well as objections from the local farmers’ association prevented the Trust from
entering into negotiations with them during 1958.

128

125

NAR. NTS. 3244. 814/307. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting. Part Two,”
1958-60, folio 193.
126
Charles Simkins, “Agricultural Production in the African Reserves of South Africa,
1918-1969,” Journal of Southern African Studies 7, no. 2 (April 1, 1981): 271; Lodge, Black
Politics in South Africa, 266.
127
NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307 Part Two. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting,”
1958-60, folio 178-9.
128
NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307 Part Two. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting,”,
folio 204.
165

Figure 9: Increase in local population. 1904-5 and 1924 figures shown in “imizi” and 1935
and 1957 shown in “taxpayers.” It is regretted that the data given is not uniform (it cannot
be known for certain whether tax-payer means umuzi head only or any adult male). But
these figures, however rough, still provide insight into the growing population that
129
increased tensions over land.
Maphumulo
(Umgeni District)

Year

Location
WhiteLand
Owned
41
80
109
195
579
150
Details not given

1904/5
1924
1935
1957

Total
121
304
729
1,150

Nyavu
(Umgeni, Camperdown, and New Hanover
Districts)
Location
Mission
WhiteTotal
Land
Land
Owned
114
88
103
218
117
147
238
502
1,014*
1,014
Details not given
1,340

While negotiations with Leslie and her family moved rather quickly in comparison to the
previous purchase of the Goedverwachting remnant, the acquisition hit several snags. Apartheid
planners had no shortage of modernizing schemes for this portion of Goedverwachting, yet land
shortages resulted in conflict over how best to use the farm. The Trust hoped to establish the
recommended rural village on the land, but additional needs arose. Silt build-up resultant from
overcrowding and overgrazing in the region shortened the expected life of the Nagle Dam.
Corporation officials considered several options for additional water supply, all of which
required the removal of people. The new scheme adopted by the city in 1959 involved the

129

Numbers for Nyavu 1904 from NCP 8/2/5. Colony of Natal, Ministerial Department
of Native Affairs. Blue Book on Native Affairs 1904 (Pietermaritzburg: Times Printing and
Publishing Company, Ltd., 1905). Numbers for Maphumulo 1905 from SNA 1/1/318. 670/1905.
Numbers for 1924 from South Africa. Dept. of Native Affairs, Index to Natal tribes register.
(Pietermaritzburg: Natal Witness, 1926). Numbers for 1935 from N. J Van Warmelo, A
Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1935). *
indicates Warmelo error; he lists the 1,014 Nyavu as all resident on privately-owned land.
Numbers for 1957 from NAR. NTS 8900. 211/362(5). “Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Tribal
Authority,” folio 4 and NTS 8991. 22/362(9). “Manyavu Tribal Authority,” folio 5.
166

construction of Intake Works at the east end of the Nagle Dam, a new dam upstream of the Nagle
Dam (on Onverwacht), and a new aqueduct to the city.

130

The Trust’s initial efforts to negotiate with Leslie were ignored; she instead had offered
the land to Durban Corporation.

131

But in 1960 the Corporation withdrew from the negotiations,

choosing to construct the Midmar Dam on the Umngeni River to the northwest of
Pietermaritzburg instead of a second dam at Table Mountain. Africans in the region would only
be affected by a second aqueduct to carry the new water supply. These disturbances would be
significantly less as the burying of the piping would only temporarily disturb arable land.

132

When the second Table Mountain dam project fell through, the Trust then turned to
acquire the Goedverwachting sub-divisions. C.G. Leslie, her daughter-in-law B.A. Ferreira, and
daughter Nicoline P. Botha accepted the trust’s initial offers of R3,120 (39 acres), R62,805 (930
acres), and R7,833 (137 acres). Leslie and Ferreira could only sell their portions if Botha also
sold hers due to the regulation that all non-scheduled land adjoin trust-owned land. The portions
D, 5, and 6 thus simultaneously transferred to the Trust in December 1961.

133

From the records

it appears that BAD officials did not initially discuss the jurisdiction of this newly acquired
terrain. Envisioned as a rural village site, they may not initially have considered the need for
130

NAR.NTS 7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works. Exchange of Lands,
Inanda Location, Part 4,” folio 629-31.
131
NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307 Part Two. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting,”
folio 208.
132
NAR.NTS 7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works. Exchange of Lands,
Inanda Location, Part 4,” folio 629-31.
133
NAR. LDE-N 931. 12200/412. “Onderverdeling D van Goedverwachting Nommer
1349, Pietermaritzburg, CG Leslie;” NAR. LDE-N 971. 12200/860. “Gedeelte 5 van
Goedverwachting Nommer 1349, Distrik Pietermaritzburg. Mrs. B.A. Ferreira;” NAR. LDE-N
971. 12200/861. “Gedeelte 6 van Goedverwachting Nommer 1349, Distrik Pietermaritzburg. NP
Botha;” Pietermaritzburg Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform,
KwaZulu-Natal. Land Register for Goedverwachting No. 1349, 1850s-present.
167

chiefly authority on the strip of land dividing the Maphumulo territory. Despite the shortage of
land for African settlement, the BAD did not immediately resettle the farm strip or allow the
surrounding peoples to expand there.
Resistance to betterment schemes across South Africa has been well documented, but
amongst the Maphumulo it was tied to their relocation and the division of the Maphumulo land
by this much-desired thousand-acre strip of Goedverwachting.

134

Those Maphumulo who had

been relocated to the Trust farms resented the implementation of betterment regulations and
constantly reminded officials that they had been promised their status would not change when
they moved from the location. While they complied with stock reductions, they complained
bitterly. In the wake of Tidbury’s 1959 report that recommended the creation of residential areas,
the Chief BAC recommended not asking this “difficult crowd” to move again for betterment
purposes; they would certainly demand payment.

135

Their neighbors on the trust farm, the

Gcumisa, had armed in opposition to the construction of anti-erosion banks on the New Hanover
side of Onverwacht.

136

While the Chief BAC warned against removals for betterment purposes he also
acknowledged the increasing frustrations of the Maphumulo with continued interference in their
lives. In late 1959 before the cancellation of the second dam project, Ahrens served notice to the
local chiefs whose people would be affected, including the Gcumisa, Maphumulo and Nyavu.
134

William Beinart and Colin Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics
& Popular Movements in the Transkei & Eastern Cape, 1890-1930 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1987); Kotzé, African Politics in South Africa; Lodge, Black Politics in South
Africa; De Wet, Moving Together, Drifting Apart.
135
NAR. NTS 10261. 47/423(8). “Rehabilitation. Pietermaritzburg. Onverwacht Group,”
folio 22.
136
NAR. NTS 10261. 47/423(8). “Rehabilitation. Pietermaritzburg. Onverwacht Group,”
folio 14.
168

Those who had been relocated to Onverwacht would be inundated by water in the second dam.
While Ahrens expressed relief that their opposition “does not appear to be as strong as might
have been expected,” his further comments suggest those to be affected felt quite despondent.
“Although the Natives concerned do not relish the idea of being moved, the consensus of opinion
(after the position had been fully explained) was to the effect that all that they could do in the
circumstances was to lodge a protest which was done via the notices which had been served on
them” (my emphasis).

137

These multiple dam and the various betterment projects certainly contributed to
Maphumulo aggravation. When Maphumulo Acting Chief Sigciza died in 1961 (the same year
that the Goedverwachting subsections transferred from Leslie and the Ferreiras to the Trust), the
new regent was faced with increasingly hostile followers. The Maphumulo unanimously
nominated Khangela to act as ibamba, certainly aware his claim to the regency would be honored
before that of Baningi given the dispute only six years earlier.

138

dismissed all of the previous authority councillors but for two.

Upon appointment, Khangela
139

Like Sigciza before him,

Khangela was initially “cooperative with rehabilitation and tribal authority activities,” earning an
initial increase in his annual bonus in 1963.

140

137

Like the Nyavu authority, the Maphumulo

NAR.NTS 7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works. Exchange of Lands,
Inanda Location, Part 4,” folio 601.
138
NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 85-95.
139
NAR. BAO 5/88. F53/1524/5. “Bantoestamowerhede. Mapumulo. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 2-3.
140
NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 107-10, 120-3.
169

authority showed meager dog tax collection and thus little revenue in its initial years.

141

But

over the years, Khangela’s cooperation declined, as did his bonus, and by 1970, the BAC was
certain it was Khangela who encouraged the resistance to betterment planning and Mafakadolo.
Increasing dissatisfaction with the constant interventions and the implementation of
betterment planning in the Maphumulo region culminated in an attack on the Xhosa Bantu
142

Agricultural Assistant Edward Mafakadolo.

Bantu Agricultural Assistants were often

despised as outsiders and agents of apartheid.

143

Mafakadolo’s arrival marked the

implementation of rehabilitation projects, particularly the culling of small stock, a regulation that
Khangela had overlooked. Mafakadolo was also responsible for ensuring that settlement on the
farms was undertaken according to the betterment schemes set in place for the trust farms. It is
not clear from the record whether or not Mafakadolo’s jurisdiction extended to the newly
purchased strip of Goedverwachting, but given the shortage of land it seems unlikely that local
chiefs and izinduna would strictly enforce the boundaries. Mfakadolo put an end to the payment
of fees, or as one councillor described them, bribes, for illegal sites.

141

144

NAR. NTS 89900. 211/362/5(A). “Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Tribal Authority;”
BAO 13/1022. J76/97/1524/3. “Begroting. Bantoeowerhede. Finansiele Aangeleenthede.
Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Stamowerheid.”
142
Not surprisingly for an official representative of a government obsessed with labels
and ethnicity, the Assistant BAC mentioned that Mafakadolo’s ethnicity may have played a
factor in the disturbances. However, none of the statements made by witnesses attest to such.
143
According to Robert McIntosh, local Bantu Administrations Commissioners had a
predisposition to recruit “educated and progressive Bantu, such as teachers and agricultural
assistants” who could promote the Bantu Authorities even when the Commissioners were not
present. McIntosh, “State Policies in Rural South Africa C1948-c1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy
Fomation and Local Responses,” 162.
144
N AR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 147.
170

The BAC believed that these rehabilitation schemes agitated the Maphumulo people and
the official allocation of sites angered the chief, councillors, and izinduna who could no longer
control (and possibly abuse) the allocation of sites. Despite overcrowding, the BAD had granted
no local peoples permission to move onto the Goedverwachting strip of D, 5, and 6. This tension
came to a head in December 1969 when Bellina Dhlomo, an applicant for a beer hall, accused
Mafakadolo of prejudicing her application. Dhlomo’s sons attacked him with iron-shod sticks
and she threatened to burn down his home. It was alleged that at a meeting prior to the assault,
Khangela had warned that if Dhlomo’s application was denied, there would be bloodshed.

145

The Dhlomos’ attack on Mafakadolo should not be seen as a single incident of violence
resultant from a personal dispute. Men such as Mafakadolo, the marangera or rangers, were
often the target of resistance to betterment schemes because of the role they played policing the
activities of residents on the Trust farms. It is significant that another of the men who gave
testimony against Khangela in the investigation into the attack on Mafakadolo was a BAD
ranger. In Sekhukhuneland, for example, attacks on these rangers occurred after the deportation
of Godfrey Sekhukhune and others who had vocally condemned Bantu Authorities and
betterment schemes.

146

Because another Bantu Agricultural Assistant had recently been shot

dead in Umsinga, the Agricultural Officer Olivier temporarily transferred Mafakadolo to the
Zwartkop location for fear of his safety. But BAD officials agreed Mafakadolo would have to
return after Khangela had been warned so the department did not lose face. Chief BAC F.W.C.
Aveling made Khangela responsible for the safety of Mafakadolo and warned that “as a

145

NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 134, 139-49.
146
Delius, “Sebatakgomo: Migrant Organization, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland
Revolt,” 611–2.
171

government appointed [chief] it is expected of him to lend full support to government policy and
assist the Bantu Agricultural Assistant in his area at all time.” Aveling further ordered the
Pietermaritzburg BAC to collect statements in the event that the chief did not repent and the
147

department needed to depose the chief (in terms of section 31 of Proclamation 110/1957).

By the end of the year, in December 1970, further evidence of Khangela’s misconduct
compelled the Pietermaritzburg BAC K.G. Harvey to open an investigation into the chief’s
administration. The BAC reported there had been dissention amongst the councillors, izinduna,
and the umndeni for some time. While Khangela complained of a lack of cooperation, the
izinduna and councillors made serious allegations against Khangela, including those described
above regarding the chief’s opposition to Mafakadolo and betterment planning. Khangela had
dismissed several of his councillors without consulting the Pietermaritzburg BAC. One of the
men, councillor Aaron Mkhize, had made a statement against the chief during the investigation
of the Mafakadolo incident. Mkhize also believed Mafakadolo was doing good work in the
region. Mkhize, induna Ndoda Gwala, induna Muntu Sithole, and constable Numa Dladla
attributed the trouble to Khangela’s attachment to Mdingi Maphumulo. Mdingi, the illegitimate
son of a Maphumulo woman, was a strong character who up until now had been considered an
umndeni member. At a March meeting held to discuss the unharmonious state of administration,
the BAC concluded that Mdingi was the instigator. Tension had grown between Khangela and
the councillors over Mdingi’s status and at the meeting all agreed Mdingi had no right to be
regarded as an umndeni member. Those present accepted Mdingi as a councillor on the tribal
authority, but he resented his expulsion particularly because it was by non-members of the

147

NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 134, 139-49.
172

chiefly family that the complaint was lodged. The same night, one of the councillors who spoke
against Mdingi was threatened.

148

Several umndeni members also complained in private that the chief neglected his duties
to the heir and his mother, who was so persistent in her complaints that the BAC issued her with
pauper rations. Khangela regularly failed to arrange for funds for the heir Mhlabunzima’s
education at KwaDlangezwa High School, an elite Bantu education boarding school in Mtunzini
that opened in 1971.

149

Harvey thus asked that a full inquiry be undertaken into the chief’s

administration so that appropriate measures could be adopted. The Chief BAC recommended
Harvey, who was about to retire, hold a meeting with the umndeni to determine their opinion.
Harvey’s successor D.B. Maytham met with umndeni members Chief Khangela, Baningi,
Pemba, and Mpini Maphumulo to advise them of the complaints against Khangela. The men
undertook to discuss the matter with the entire umndeni and reply with a recommended course of
action. Thereafter, Khangela refused to attend two umndeni meetings and threatened Bhekumuzi,
considered the head of the umndeni. With Mdingi no longer a member of the inner-circle of
decision makers, the family unanimously decided upon Khangela’s suspension. They believed it
was time for the heir to take control, but Maytham informed them Mhlabunzima did not yet meet
the requirements of chieftaincy, most likely because of his age. The umndeni thus again
nominated Baningi to act as ibamba and Maytham, unaware of Baningi’s ineligibility as
examined above, recommended his appointment. But Khangela refused to resign and Chief

148

NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 136-8.
149
P.G. Koornhof, “Dlangezwa High School Officially Opened,” Bantu Education
(1971): 14–7. Thanks to Meghan Healy for the reference.
173

Bantu Administration Commissioner J.J. van der Watt instructed the Pietermaritzburg BAC to
initiate the inquiry earlier considered that would enable Khangela’ deposal.

150

The following year, the umndeni decided that the heir should take over. With no
prompting, the Maphumulo councillors and umndeni, including Khangela, arrived at the
Magistrate’s office in September 1972. They informed Mpumalanga Magistrate H.F.W.
Reibeling they had come to discuss the ongoing discord between the izinduna and the chief.
They reported approximately R360 had been collected to enable the heir to marry and qualify to
assume the chieftainship. The magistrate encouraged those present to pull together in the
interests of the people and report back after the heir’s marriage.

151

Several months later in

December, the representatives retuned and asked that Mhlabunzima be appointed in May, 1973,
when he would be 25 years of age, or if possible sooner. They reported the absent Khangela
continued to refuse to attend umndeni meetings. The umndeni urged expediency because
Khangela had ceased to perform the functions of chief after the previous meeting where he
agreed Mhlabunzima should be appointed. Khangela later appeared at the magistrate’s office to
confirm he agreed to step down on behalf of the heir. He also claimed he was not neglecting

150

The records indicate no inquiry ever took place, but during the interim administration
of the Maphumulo transferred to the Mpumalanga Magistracy. This is gleaned from the
Department of Bantu Administration and Development correspondence about the succession.
During fieldwork, I was unable to fully access the records of the Mpumalanga Magistrate, which
are not held at the Pietermaritzburg or Durban Archive Repositories but were transferred from
the magistrate to the offices of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional
Affairs. NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 155-60.
151
NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 166-7.
174

chiefly duties, but that he was being pushed out of affairs. He too hoped Mhlabunzima could be
appointed immediately.

152

It is also important to note that Mdingi Maphumulo was not included on the list of
umndeni and izinduna present at the first meeting where umndeni elder Bhekumuzi listed the
family members in attendance. However, at the second meeting Reibeling, who had admitted to
only perusing the clan’s file when the izinduna and umndeni first appeared at his office, listed
Mdingi as an umndeni member. In the changing of the magistracy from Pietermaritzburg to
Mpumalanga, details were overlooked that would later have repercussions for the chieftaincy.
And while the BAD continued to see Baningi as an illegitimate son of the late chief Ndlovu, he
continued to be viewed as a member of the umndeni by its other members. He remained active in
umndeni affairs and appears on both lists of umndeni at the 1972 meetings. These details will be
central to the unfolding of uDlame in the Table Mountain region, when Mdingi allied himself
with Inkatha and attempted to claim the Maphumulo chieftaincy. Similarly, through an alliance
with Inkatha, Baningi would successfully claim the regency. These will again be examined in
chapter five.
The reactions of the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefs and their people to Bantu Authorities
and betterment schemes were neither entirely cooperative nor rebellious. Across South Africa, a
range of responses by chiefs and to chiefly authority emerged in rural resistance movements. The
Lingangele movement in the Witzieshoek reserve (Free State Province) attempted to maintain
the integrity of the chieftaincy, even when they rejected the chief for his unwillingness to resist
the Bantu Authorities. In Dinokana of the Tswana reserves (Northwest Province), the deposed

152

NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 125.
175

Chief Moiloa acted more akin to the chiefs examined, treading a cautious path.

153

Sensitive to

public feeling but aware of their precarious positions, these men neither eagerly cooperated nor
openly resisted. They recognized the potential for their dismissal by the apartheid government or
rejection by their people, the former of which resulted from Chief Albert Luthuli’s vocal
condemnation of the Bantu Authorities and the latter of which occurred in Mpondoland and
Xhalanga.

154

In Sekhukhuneland, a major blow to resistance came when Morwamotse died and

his wife, the regent, accepted the establishment of a tribal authority.

155

The regents held the

most insecure of traditional positions and were more dependent on government sanction for their
authority. Thus, Maphumulo regents Sigciza and Khangela initially attempted to support the new
system of administration. When Khangela began to flagrantly disobey betterment regulations,
BAD officials sought to depose him--just not on their own. Officials sought the cooperation of
the Maphumulo umndeni who pointed to other reasons for Khangela’s bad governance, not his
resistance to the rehabilitation policies. Bangubukhosi Mdluli and the Maphumulo regents tread
careful ground between their people and the apartheid government.

Conclusion
When the Maphumulo heir Mhlabunzima was appointed chief in July, 1973, the young man
became embroiled in these ongoing tensions over chiefly authority and land in the Table
Mountain region. From the creation of the Maphumulo chieftaincy in 1905, its chiefs carefully

153

Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, 268–79.

154

Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 808–9;
Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, 279–82; Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised.
155
Delius, “Sebatakgomo: Migrant Organization, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland
Revolt,” 614.
176

managed their authority. The first, Maguzu, made sure to express his support for the colonial
administration in the midst of the impi yamkhanda and to define his jurisdiction. Across the
segregation and apartheid eras, the chiefs and people of the region experience increasing
interference in their daily ability to govern and provide for their families. In the decades-long
conflict between the Maphumulo and Nyavu over territorial boundaries and the meaning of
chiefly authority, the Nyavu chiefs employed several means in attempt to gain jurisdiction over
contested land, repeatedly positioning themselves as the hereditary rulers against their neighbors
and even attempting to purchase the land. But the construction of the Nagle Dam, the
implementation of Bantu Authorities, and the introduction of betterment schemes in the region
disturbed existing claims to land and redefined boundaries. The piecemeal manner in which the
Trust acquisitioned land for African settlement contributed to the increasing tensions as
overcrowded reserve and trust farm residents looked eagerly to the empty thousand acre piece of
Goedverwachting, thereby setting the scene for the conflict that erupts in deadly violence in
1990.
This chapter also questions the label of collaborator when applied to chiefs. The actions
of the traditional leaders examined here suggest that they were not always as compliant with the
apartheid Bantu Authorities Act as many have argued. The threat of deposal surely impacted the
chiefs’ decisions as few were willing to risk punishment for resistance. When the Maphumulo
and Nyavu chiefs and izinduna agreed to cooperate with the new act, they did so because of the
improvements—roads, schools, and businesses—they believed would accompany the creation of
tribal authorities. While they may have resolved to form the new bodies, the Maphumulo and
Nyavu chiefs did little afterwards that evidences continued support for the administration.

177

Map 4: Map of South African Provinces, 1910-1994. Source:
www.overcomingapartheid.msu.edu, MATRIX, Michigan State University

178

Map 5: Contested Boundary between the Maphumulo and Nyavu, 1882-1914
179

Map 6: Land Acquisition for Nagle Dam Project
180

Map 7: Tribal Authority Boundaries, 1957
181

Map 8: Land Acquisition by Trust after Promulgation of Tribal Authority Boundaries
182

MAGUZU
1905-22
NDLOVU
1922-49

1. Nozipegula
Mkhize
(Chief Wife)
Four
daughters

3. Nomahlazo
Mkhize
(placed in
chief house)

Mxamana

Sigciza
Acting
1949-52,
1954-61

2.
Nomakolwa
Ntuli (iKohlwa
House)
Ntombana
Ma
Gcumisa

Children
deceased

Three
children w/
Mxamana

FUNIZWE
1952-54
Nosibhedlela
Mdlalose
MHLABUNZIMA
1973-91

Mkhowe

4. Nomakwezi
Zondi

Khangela
Acting
1961-73

Two
Daughters

Mamnyeli

Qeda

Kwenzokuhle

Baningi
Born out of
marriage,
Given to
Makolwa

Marriage:
Non-Marital Relations:
Ukungena Relationship:
CAPITALIZATION:

Figure 10: Maphumulo Succession
183

Chief

NOMSIMEKWANA
d. 1901
NGANGEZWE
1901-31
Notuyana

SOMQUBA
1931-40
1. Ma Nene

2. Ma Ntombela
3. Ma Dlamini
4. Ma Zondi
NONGALAZA
1940-60

Mdelelwa
Acting
1960
Ma Gasa

BANGUBKHOSI
1960-?

Figure 11: (Limited) Nyavu Succession
184

Figure 12: Sketch of Betterment Plan for Goedverwachting, 1948, NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307.
185

Figure 13: Sketch of Betterment Plan for Onverwacht, 1958. NAR. NTS 10261. 47/423(8)

186

Chapter Three:
1

“Only the Fourth Chief”: Zulu Politics and Land Jurisdiction, 1973-1988

In 1973, Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo was appointed chief of the Maphumulo by the
Executive Council of KwaZulu and with the approval of the South African State President and
Prime Minister.

2

The early years of Chief Maphumulo’s chieftainship coincided with the

creation of the KwaZulu bantustan and the rise of the Zulu ethnic nationalist movement Inkatha,
led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Maphumulo dove into his duties with vigor, immediately
pushing for the incorporation of the remaining strip of Goedverwachting into the Maphumulo
chiefdom and becoming active in KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KZLA) in 1974. He earned
the ire of Buthelezi and was suspended from the KZLA due to his involvement in the royalist
opposition party.
At Table Mountain, the young chief sought to bring the thousand acre piece of
Goedverwachting dividing his jurisdiction into the Maphumulo Tribal Authority. While
apartheid officials originally planned a “bantu village” for the strip of land, forced removals
across KwaZulu-Natal made the farm an important area for the relocation of people forcibly
removed from “black spots,” land owned or occupied by Africans in white areas. Apartheid
officials recognized the potential for tension with their plans for a closer settlement on the strip
of Goedverwachting wedged between Maphumulo territory. But the intense pressure to make
land available for people forcibly removed outweighed those concerns and officials moved
forward with the plan. However, a shortage of water and increasing criticism of the forced

1

APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third
Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 191-206.
2
NAR. URU 6336. Minute No. 456.
187

relocations stalled the Goedverwachting project. Before officials finalized the jurisdiction issue,
violence erupted in the Natal Midlands.
This chapter will first lay out the establishment of the KwaZulu bantustan and the Zulu
ethnic nationalist movement, Inkatha, in order to understand Chief Maphumulo’s rise as a
controversial local politician. It will then examine some of the Zulu opposition parties that
sought to contest Inkatha dominance with the help of the royal family and possibly the apartheid
government. The next section looks at the contested claims of the apartheid government, the
KwaZulu government, Chief Maphumulo and Chief Mdluli over the Goedverwachting trust
farm. Tensions over the shortage of land and water in the Table Mountain region increased as the
various interests each made claims on the trust farm. In the context of bantustan politics and
increasing resistance to apartheid, the situation became volatile. As will see in the next chapter,
this conflict over chiefly authority and the land jurisdiction erupted between the Maphumulo and
Nyavu chiefdoms under the guise of political violence during uDlame.

KwaZulu and the Rise of Buthelezi
The 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act extended the three-tiered system of the 1951
Bantu Authorities Act (discussed in the last chapter) with the promise of self-government and
independence for African “national units.” With this and subsequent actions, the Department of
Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) of the apartheid government embarked on more
drastic measures to reduce the urbanized African population. A renewed commitment to separate
development now defined as “multi-nationalism” and “ethnic self-determination” was an
3

ideological attempt to legitimize the denial of the franchise to Africans. Indeed, over the next

3

Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 228–31.
188

several decades the Department of Bantu Administration and Development would restyle itself
according to this mission when deemed necessary, becoming the Department of Plural Relations
and Development (PRD) in 1978, the Department of Cooperation and Development (DCD) in
4

1979, and the Department of Development Aid (DDA) in 1986. With these redefinitions,
apartheid officials attempted to move away from the language of race and segregation towards a
discourse of modernity and separate development.
5

The bantustan plan was only gradually developed. BAD turned to the reserves for the
establishment of ten separate African “nations,” each with its own “ethnic homeland.” (See Map
9.) The 1970 Homeland Citizenship Act and the 1971 Homeland Constitution Act imposed
bantustan citizenship on all Africans, even those who may never have visited their supposed
homelands. The apartheid state intended for this ethnic loyalty to replace national political
aspirations. However, from the passage of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, it took 25 years for
the first of the territorial authorities to opt for independence, the highest level of selfgovernment. Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981) were
the only four to do so. The bantustan project led to forced relocations on an unprecedented scale,
stimulated and entrenched ethnic divisions, and created a new class of bantustan administrators.
To give effect to the bantustan project, the apartheid government embarked on an
ambitious program of forced relocations. Urban pass controls were intensified, thereby expelling
the unemployed from the urban areas, and so-called squatters removed from “unauthorized”
4

After the 1978 name change, “African” replaced “Bantu” to describe black South
Africans. When BAD became DCD, the South African Bantu Trust becomes the South African
Development Trust. With the DDA, officials formerly called Commissioners became Regional
Representatives. Throughout, I will use the titles appropriate for the year.
5
Here I use the term bantustan without capitalization or inverted comments as the term is
now recognized in common usage to embed a critique of the idea of racial-ethnic encampments
as pernicious political projects. See Ally and Lissoni, “‘Let’s Talk About Bantustans’.”
189

areas. Forced removals of so-called “black spots,” land owned or occupied by Africans in white
areas, also began in earnest. These Africans deemed “surplus” were obliged to resettle in the
already overcrowded bantustans and in newly created townships near urban areas or attached to
the homelands. The Surplus People Project conservatively estimated 3.5 million people were
removed between 1960 and 1983, a number that does not include the majority of people affected
by influx control in the urban areas nor the number of people moved within the bantustans for
betterment planning.

6

While each “nation” was intended to “develop along its own lines” in the bantustans,
these scattered entities were the legacy of the reserve system and thus lacked the ability to attract
Africans from the cities or even sustain the people already living there. Central to the homeland
project was a four-part plan for land consolidation. In 1975, after the proclamation of legislative
assemblies for each of the bantustans, the Minister of BAD set out to define areas which could be
released to add to the bantustans; clear “black spots;” excise “poorly situated Bantu reserves,”
(land desirable for whites); and attempt to consolidate the scattered areas by the aforementioned
7

actions. But as with the 1936 Land Act attempts to add to land for Africans, the consolidation
process would be slow, ultimately impacting the path of the KwaZulu bantustan.
It was within this larger, shifting context that a meeting of chiefs in 1970 decided upon
the establishment of the Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA). Intended as a transitional body
towards full bantustan independence, the ZTA consisted of all the chiefs or representatives of the
22 regional authorities, an elected chief executive officer (who had to be a chief), and five other
executive councillors. At the inaugural meeting of the ZTA, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was

6
7

Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, The Surplus People, 9.
Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, The Surplus People, 125.
190

elected the chief executive officer, Prince Clement Zulu as chairperson of the Territorial
8

Authority, and Chief Charles Hlengwa as the Deputy Chairperson. Buthelezi used this platform
to “launch himself into the leadership of conservative politics in Natal, while simultaneously
9

striving to establish himself as a major player on the national stage.” As seen in the previous
chapter, Buthelezi neither opposed nor resisted the Bantu Authorities system during his early
years as chief.
But during the mid-1970s, Buthelezi came out against independence for KwaZulu due to
growing frustration with the apartheid government’s unwillingness to fast-track land
consolidation, as well as increasing pressure by anti-apartheid movements within South Africa.
KwaZulu consisted of 48 pieces of land broken up by white farming areas, rural towns, and cities
of Natal province. In the Table Mountain region, the Inanda location land of the Maphumulo and
Nyavu Tribal Authorities now came under the jurisdiction of the newly formed KwaZulu
government while the majority of the trust farms transferred in 1986. (See Map 11). During his
first years as Chief Minister, Buthelezi appealed to the state government for more land for
KwaZulu and contended that scattered pieces of land were not conducive to setting KwaZulu up
as an independent country.

10

In mid-1972 the apartheid state published plans to consolidate

KwaZulu into six pieces of land; twenty-eight white-owned farms would be added to KwaZulu
and 40 outlying areas would be excised. But growing opposition to the proposals forced the state

8

According to Buthelezi’s biographer Ben Temkin, a Department of Information official,
Paul Zulu, lobbied for Hlengwa, a close confidant of the regent Prince Israel Zulu, to become
chief executive officer. Temkin, Buthelezi, 115–6.
9
Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 806.
10

Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 820.
191

to sketch new plans.

11

KwaZulu officials complained these drafts did not go far enough, while

white farmers criticized the costs and the negative impact upon whites, their farms, and their
water sources. Land earmarked for consolidation required forced removals, creating further
complications for KwaZulu officials.

12

In 1972 the ZTA agreed upon a constitution for “stage one” of self-government according
to the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of
1971. The South African Government drafted a constitution for KwaZulu that was hotly debated
in the ZTA and central to the understanding of the unfolding bantustan politics. The draft
retained the Zulu king as a member of nascent legislative assembly, but Buthelezi and other
executive councillors insisted that his role should be limited to that of a figurehead, removed
from party politics. Royalists, including Prince Clement Zulu who had led an investigative
delegation to Swaziland, wanted an executive monarch such as the Swazi king.

13

Clement

stepped down as chairman of the ZTA and inexplicably seconded the motion to remove the king
from the Legislative Assembly.

14

The approved constitution was gazetted in March 1972 as

Proclamation R69/1972 and on April 1, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KZLA) was
established. Buthelezi had won out and the KZLA included only a personal representative of the

11

Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1972 (Johannesburg: South African Institute
of Race Relations, 1973), 171; Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1973 (Johannesburg:
South African Institute of Race Relations, 1974), 148.
12
Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 821–5.
13

Muriel Horrell, The African Homelands of South Africa (Johannesburg: South African
Institute of Race Relations, 1973), 54; Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power, 41–2; Temkin,
Buthelezi, 127–8.
14
Temkin, Buthelezi, 131.
192

king, three chiefs appointed by each of the 22 regional authorities, and 55 elected members.

15

The king’s status became ceremonial, a personification of the unity of the Zulu nation, despite
the disunity of KwaZulu’s borders. The king or his representative could attend meetings and had
to be furnished with the agenda, which he could ask the KZLA to meet and discuss with him in
advance. An apartheid government representative, the commissioner-general, could attend at
least one KZLA function per year. The KZLA had limited legislative and executive powers,
excluding the ability to establish townships and business undertakings, appoint and dismiss
chiefs, and create educational syllabi that accompanied the “second stage” of homeland
government.

16

The constitution also provided for elections, but the KZLA’s insistence upon KwaZulu
“citizenship certificates” (as opposed to the hated reference books of apartheid) delayed voting.
Sithole has argued that this postponement served as a means of buying time for the KZLA
leaders (and later Inkatha) to ensure control, particularly in relation to a number of short-lived
political parties to be examined below.

17

Between 1974 and 1976, the KZLA asked twice to

move to the next phase of self-government status, a request turned down until elections could be
held or at the very least scheduled.

18

This second phase would be granted in 1977, after the

February 1978 elections were announced.

15

Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power, 42; Robert Thabo Sabela, “KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly” (M.A. thesis, University of Zululand, 1989), 25–6.
16
Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power, 41–2; Sabela, “KwaZulu Legislative
Assembly,” 24–6; Horrell, The African Homelands of South Africa, 54; Sithole, “Neither
Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 825.
17
Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 827.
18

NAR. BAO 12/652. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en
Persoonlikhede, folio 68-79.
193

During its initial years the KZLA met only once a year (except for when special sessions
were called) with all of the formalities of a parliament: sergeants-at-arms, maces, chairmen and
vice-chairmen. Members were religiously reminded to operate according to proper procedure.
Frequent translations of the many chiefs who spoke only isiZulu made proceedings extremely
time-consuming. For many years, the bulk of the legislature’s time revolved around the
consideration of the budget, roughly half of which was appropriated from the South African
Parliament.

19

The KZLA met in a simple hall at Bhekuzulu College in Nongoma (see figure 15)

before the opening of the impressive R15 million KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Buildings in
KwaZulu’s capital Ulundi on October 25, 1983.

20

Zulu Opposition Parties and Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo
Buthelezi’s political ascendancy was not without hiccups. The dispute between the Chief
Minister and the royalist faction over the king’s executive powers continued with the creation of
several political parties. The royalists found allies in the state and later a Zulu petty bourgeoisie
disgruntled with white business interference in KwaZulu.

21

The young chief of the Maphumulo

too would become involved in this opposition, setting the stage for years of dispute between
Mhlabunzima and Mangosuthu and within the Maphumulo people over the political affiliation of
their chief.

19

Jeffrey Butler, Robert I Rotberg, and John Adams, The Black Homelands of South
Africa: The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1977), 60–4.
20
Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1983 (Johannesburg: South African Institute
of Race Relations, 1984), 347.
21
Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power, 41–2.
194

As Buthelezi cemented the position of the KwaZulu chief minister as senior to the Zulu
king, the dissatisfaction of royalist factions spurred the creation of several political parties. Much
has been written on the royalist-Buthelezi divide and the manner in which Buthelezi shored up
his own support by linking the opposition to the apartheid regime. The centrality of the King to
each of these parties led Roger Southall to describe them as “King’s Parties … representing the
immediate interests of a royalist clique excluded from office, [that] were funded and/or assisted
by Pretoria and advocated an openly collaborative road, thereby seeking to undermine
Buthelezi’s own support.”

22

Historian Jabulani Sithole calls attention to the manner in which

Buthtlezi’s “dismissal of political opponents as apartheid agents was repeated so much that it
became some form of orthodoxy.”

23

An overview will be provided here to understand not only

the early bantustan politics, but also the long conflict between Buthelezi and Chief Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo of Table Mountain.
Tensions between Buthelezi and the royal family, particularly King Cyprian Bhekuzulu’s
brothers, Israel Mcwayizeni and Clement, started soon after the death of Cyprian in 1968.
Buthelezi had criticized Prince Israel who was acting as regent for the young heir, Goodwill
Zwelethini. Israel too had backed Chief Charles Hlengwa for the position of Chief Minister.

24

But in January 1971, Israel announced to the ZTA that the matter was resolved. Still the royal
family chose to exclude Buthelezi from the installation of Zwelethini as king in December 1971,
and the rift continued.

25

After the king’s coronation, many speculated that the apartheid

22

Southall, “Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise,” 459.

23

Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 832.

24

Temkin, Buthelezi, 117.

25

Temkin blames this exclusion exclusively on Israel but the Drum coverage of the
coronation suggests Israel was at this point loosely allied with Buthelezi. Throughout the years
195

government was working with the Zulu brothers to undermine Buthelezi by supporting executive
power for the king. Also at the coronation, Prince Israel Mcwayizeni announced the formation of
a royal council, designed as a group of advisors for the king, with Israel as its chair.

26

Thereafter, rumors abounded that this Royal Council sought the removal of Buthelezi with the
aid of the government.

27

The first opposition party attack on Buthelezi’s ascendancy in 1972 attempted to benefit
from these ongoing tensions between the royal family and the KwaZulu government under
Buthelezi. Journal editor and small business owner Lloyd Ndaba formed the Zulu National Party
(ZNP) with the promise of securing executive powers for the king.

28

Despite being married to

an Irish woman with whom he could not reside in South Africa due to apartheid laws, Ndaba
promoted apartheid ideology. Ndaba attacked Buthelezi in his short-lived pro-apartheid journal,
29

Africa South,

in 1971 and later told Drum that the party opposed Buthelezi’s idea of a multi-

racial South Africa. Ndaba claimed the support of the royal brothers Israel and Clement, the
popular Zulu trade unionist, politician, and businessman A.W.G. Champion, the Soweto
millionaire Ephraim Tshabalala, and Mpumalanga politician and football administrator Roger
examined, Drum reporters wrote in staunch support of Buthelezi and never failed to criticize the
royalists for aspiring to higher positions and relying on undemocratic methods to achieve them.
Regular letters to the editor from a “Loyal Zulu” also showed support for Buthelezi as an elected
official over the hereditary royal family. “Rain Brought the Mud… Politicians did the MudSlinging,” Drum (January 1, 1972), 23-8; Temkin, Buthelezi, 124–5.
26
“Rain Brought the Mud…”
27

“Rain Brought the Mud…”; Kotzé, African Politics in South Africa, 56.

28

Several places claim Ndaba was a former information officer of the Department of
Administration and Development, but never with any evidence. The first is “Mix-Up in the
Party,” Drum (March 22, 1972), 14-7. Ndaba told the Drum reporter he would not answer any
personal questions, most likely on account of his Irish wife living in Swaziland, so the reporter
gave Ndaba’s background on what s/he already knew.
29
As pointed out by Mzala and Sithole, this journal should not be confused with that of
the same name edited by Ronald Segal between 1956 and 1960.
196

Sishi. But when the Drum reporter confronted Tshabalala, Sishi, and several others alleged by
Ndaba to be executive members, they all denied the assertion.

30

Buthelezi discredited Ndaba by linking the ZNP to the apartheid government. He alleged
the Commissioner General for KwaZulu Henri Torlage shared the addresses of chiefs in Natal so
that Ndaba could circulate bulletins to earn support for the ZNP. Buthelezi also charged the party
was financed by the Department of Information’s Bureau for State Security (BOSS) or the
Special Branch of the South African Police.

31

The ZNP ultimately proved little threat to

Buthelezi because it had no legislative presence, though the challenge may have deepened
Buthelezi’s conviction to hold off elections until assured of power.

32

The paradoxical Ndaba

would later call for the creation an African republic formed of Johannesburg townships before he
was gunned down in Meadowlands in April 1978. While the police charged his death to “mafiatype” fighting, Ndaba’s mother suspected the death was politically motivated.

33

The royalist/Buthelezi divide deepened in 1972-1973 during the Natal labor unrest. In
1973 the largest strikes in South Africa since World War II sent over 100,000 workers into the
streets. Because the apartheid government had effectively suppressed the South African Council
of Trade Unions in the 1960s, these strikes marked a major turning point for resistance in South

30

“Mix-Up in the Party”; Kotzé, African Politics in South Africa, 54; Mzala (Jabulani
Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda, 89–90.
31
Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda, 89–90.
32

Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 828;
Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda, 90.
33
Matthews Makobane, “Ndaba burial drama,” Post (April 25, 1978); “‘Mafia-type’
Soweto killings,” Rand Daily Mail (April 25, 1978); “Slain man a political enigma,” Star (April
29, 1978); Peter Mann, “Exiled wife at the graveside,” Sunday Tribune (April 30, 1987);
“Mystery still surrounds the death of homelands politician,” The Voice (May 6, 1978).
197

Africa.

34

According to Buthelezi’s biographer Ben Temkin, someone in the Zulu Royal Council

looked to the strikes as an opportunity to promote the king as executive. In January 1973,
Coronation Brick Works invited the king to speak to striking workers. But the king’s speech had
no effect upon the work stoppage and many thought the king’s involvement was unwise.
Buthelezi believed the king had been exploited and attacked the Zulu Royal Council in the
KZLA for allowing it. He also believed the council had taken an oath to oust Buthelezi from the
KZLA.

35

At the May 1973 gathering of the Legislative Assembly, MPs moved to dissolve the

royal council in order to protect the king from controversial and political involvement, but the
king had already done so at Buthelezi’s suggestion.

36

The same year, Chief Charles Hlengwa of Umbumbulu, the first deputy chairperson of
the ZTA and second chairperson of the KZLA, announced the formation of another party,
Umkhonto kaShaka (Spear of Shaka). Hlengwa had sparred with Buthelezi over the position of
the king after he (as chair of the assembly) allowed King Zwelethini to address the KZLA on his
activities at the Brick Works, resulting in a vote of censure of Hlengwa by the legislative
assembly. Hlengwa was forced to apologize.

37

In October 1973, Hlengwa announced in a press

release that he would resign as chair of the KZLA to become the national leader of Umkhonto.

34

See: Institute for Industrial Education, The Durban Strikes, 1973: “Human Beings
with Souls” (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1974); David Hemson, “In the Eye of the Storm: DockWorkers in Durban,” in The People’s City: African Life in Twentieth-Century Durban
(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1996), 145–73; Grace Davie, “Strength in
Numbers: The Durban Student Wages Commission, Dockworkers and the Poverty Datum Line,
1971-1973,” Journal of Southern African Studies 33, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 401–420.
35
Temkin, Buthelezi, 144–5.
36

Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 3 First Session (May 1973), 77-80; Temkin,
Buthelezi, 144–5.
37
Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 3 First Session (May 1973), 17-25, 60; Temkin,
Buthelezi, 145; Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 828.
198

The new party would honor traditional institutions in a democratic government under the Zulu
king. Its executive council members included Ndaba, Chief A.N. Ngcobo, A.N. Mpungose, and
A.M.S. Mhlongo. The party’s constitution suggested a willingness for KwaZulu independence
with statements that the organization would “do everything in its power to promote the interests
of the Zulu nation so that it could proudly take its rightful place amongst the nations of the
world” and that it stood for “mutual and reciprocal co-operation and friendly relations with the
various peoples and nations in South Africa.”

38

A significant amount of evidence exists to show that the Department of Information
instigated the Umkhonto kaShaka Party. Former intelligence agent Martin Dolinchek, who
defected to the ANC in 1986, disclosed that BOSS had indeed established Umkhonto to
deliberately discredit it and thereby boost Inkatha and Buthelezi.

39

When criticism of Chief

Hlengwa emerged in the press, the Department of Information attempted to manage his image,
publishing a glowing background story on the politician in its monthly isiZulu magazine,
Izindaba, and tried to quell the spread of news that King Zwelethini’s dismissed the party.

40

The

Department also retained copies of the party’s constitution and press releases—a level of

38

NAR. BAO 12/652. R218/5. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge
en Persoonlikhede, folio 8-9, 22-39.
39
Martin Dolinchek was a BOSS, then NIS agent responsible implicated in the
assassination of white activist Rick Turner. Dolinchek defected to the ANC after an attempted
coup in Seychelles. On Dolinchek and Rick Turner, see TRC testimony of Jane Turner, October
24, 1996, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvdurb3/day1.htm Accessed June 12, 2012. On
Seychelles, see Peter Stiff, Warfare by Other Means: South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s
(Alberton: Galago Publishers, 2001), 17–74; Sanders, Apartheid’s Friends, 376. On Dolinchek’s
allegation about Umkhonto, see Piper and Morrow, To Serve and Protect, xv.
40
A translated copy of this article is on file with the BAD. Follow-up review of Izindaba
(1966-93), held at the South African National Library, may prove fruitful for analysis of
garnering the role of the state in promoting Mkhonto and the other parties. NAR. BAO 12/652.
KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 40-5.
199

organization not reached by the other parties.

41

That Ndaba, a member of both ZNP and

Mkhonto, worked as an information officer for BAD lends credibility as well, though the source
of this information has never been cited.

42

Buthelezi produced deposit slips given to him by an

Umkhonto defector proving BOSS financing of the party. Executive members of the new party
withdrew R150/month and Chief Hlengwa R300/month.

43

Grineth Mageba made an affidavit to

the SAP that gave a detailed account of the formation of the party by members of the Zulu royal
family, the Department of Information and a BOSS official, Frans Fouche.

44

That not all the

members of the party were aware of its state support is suggested in a letter from member Chief
A.N. Ngcobo asking BAD officials whether or not chiefs and their people could legally join
KwaZulu political parties and if doing so would jeopardize traditional leaders’ position as far as
the KwaZulu government was concerned.

45

41

NAR. BAO 12/652. R218/5. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge
en Persoonlikhede, folio 7-9, 22-39.
42
Langner cites Kotze, who does not cite his source but may have read the Drum article
on Ndaba (he elsewhere cites Drum). Kotze may have had access to this information as then
head of UNISA’s Department of Development Administration and Politics, a discipline in South
Africa dating to the founding of “native law and administration” with a one-year course first
offered in 1918. Buthelezi would later use Kotze’s writing on “royal intrigues” in African
Politics as a reference to illustrate Pretoria’s involvement in KwaZulu political parties. Mzala
and Sithole do not cite their reference. See APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KwaZulu
Legislative Assembly, Vol 7,. Special Session (Jan 1976), 984-7; D. A Kotzé, “Development
Administration: The State of the Discipline,” Development Southern Africa 2, no. 2 (1985): 218–
25; Kotzé, African Politics in South Africa, 50; Ernst Johann Langner, “The Founding and
Development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe” (M.A. thesis, University of South Africa, 1983),
53; Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda, 89–90; Sithole,
“Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 828.
43
Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda, 91.
44

Langner, “The Founding and Development of Inkatha,” 53.

45

NAR. BAO 12/652. R218/5. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge
en Persoonlikhede, folio 48.
200

Buthelezi would later point to his handling of Hlengwa in this conflict as evidence of his
tolerance for opposition parties (see below). But in fact, Buthelezi allowed the chief’s regional
authority to do his dirty work. While Hlengwa had not been officially deposed, there was a
drawn out debate in the KZLA regarding his loyalty. The KZLA moved, at Buthelezi’s
suggestion, that they would not rescind Hlengwa’s membership in the legislative assembly, but
that they would refer the matter to his regional authority to take the necessary measures.

46

In

February and March 1974, the Umbumbulu Regional Authority held several meetings in which
Winnington Sabelo (later a powerful local Inkatha leader known for his violent system of
patronage) from Umlazi pushed for Hlengwa’s removal from the Authority. Hlengwa sent
pleading letters in his own defense to the KwaZulu Executive Council in which he recognized
that his only crime joining the Umkhonto party.

47

After Hlengwa refused to step down, 25 of the

authority’s 26 members resigned, leaving an absent Hlengwa alone on the authority. The KZLA
then disbanded the regional authority, thus ousting Hlengwa from the legislative assembly.

48

The KwaZulu executive council decided in November 1974 to ask the Minister of BAD
to give power to the KZLA to control or forbid the formation of politics parties prior to
independence. In an irony not lost on the liberal press, the apartheid state denied the KZLA’s
request on account that the motion “cannot be said to reflect the view of all those Zulus who at
present have no representation” and because “the formation of political parties and the
participation by the people in the activities of such parties are natural corollaries of democracy

46

APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 2 Special Session (January
1973); Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol 4 Second Session (May 1974).
47
NAR. BAO 8/419. “KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Lede Van Die Uitvoerende
Raad.”
48
Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 829.
201

and are tolerated in all democratic countries except in so far as a particular party or particular
activities may be subversive of duly constituted authority…”.

49

A Natal Mercury editorial

humorously found KwaZulu’s desire to suppress political activity and the state’s encouragement
of tolerance “so out of character in parts that one might suspect there had been some mix-up
involving an exchange of scripts.”

50

While Buthelezi had been calling for unity and the outlaw of political parties, one of his
own had been in the works for several years. In the KZLA in 1972, Buthelezi referenced an early
twentieth-century Zulu nationalist movement, Inkatha kaZulu (1924-33), that he would later
revive.

51

In 1973 Buthelezi received support from the exiled ANC during discussions on the

formation of an organization to develop Zulu national consciousness and pride on the condition
that it be open to all Africans. Buthelezi would exploit this ANC link for years to come.

52

Also

in 1973, Buthelezi distributed the 1928 constitution of the first Inkatha to KZLA members.
Throughout these years a “think tank” of “leading Zulus” began meeting to strategize the
founding of a national movement against separate development and to encourage African culture

49

NAR. BAO 12/652. R218/5. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge
en Persoonlikhede, folio 68-79.
50
“Smoothing the Road,” Natal Mercury November 23, 1974.
51

Inkatha kaZulu was founded by King Solomon Nkayishana kaDinizulu to foster “the
spirit of unity among the people of the Zulu Nation throughout the Union of South Africa and to
keep alive the Nation’s fine traditions.” Nicholas Cope’s detailed examination of Solomon
highlights Zulu nationalism as a twentieth-century construction of Zulu social and political elites.
Nicholas Cope, To Bind the Nation: Solomon kaDinuzulu and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933
(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993). For a comparison of the first Inkata and
Buthelezi’s Inkatha, see Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power, 46–53. For more on the
constructed and contested nature of “Zuluness,” see Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani
Sithole, Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZuluNatal Press, 2008).
52
Temkin, Buthelezi, 141; Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a
Double Agenda, 122–8.
202

and self-reliance. This body developed into Ubhoko, a vehicle for the KwaZulu cabinet to liaison
with the public in the interests of the Zulu nation. Ubhoko adopted the United National
Independence Party Constitution of Zambia for Inkatha.

53

The proliferation of political parties

and the state’s refusal to allow KwaZulu to forbid political parties certainly forced Buthelezi to
act.

54

On March 22, 1975, KwaZulu leaders retreated from their non-party stance when Inkatha
Yakwa Zulu was launched at KwaMzimela in Melmoth. More than 100 delegates from Natal, the
Orange Free State, and Transvaal, including representatives from 18 of the 26 regional
authorities, all of the executive councillors, and several prominent Zulu women revived the first
Inkatha as a national cultural liberation movement.

55

With the name Inkatha, Buthelezi was

evoking a deep-rooted cultural sentiment among the Zulu people. Inkatha is a sacred coil, created
with grass from the royal umuzi, dirt from the king’s body, and herbs known only to the royal
herbal doctors, which symbolizes the unity of the Zulu people.

56

While Buthelezi would regularly emphasize the organization as a cultural movement
rather than a political party, Inkatha became so entwined with bantustan administration that
political party more aptly describes its nature. (Inkatha did become an official political party, the
Inkatha Freedom Party in July 1990, several months after the unbanning of the liberation
movements.) The exact relationship of Inkatha to the KZLA was deliberated when Buthelezi
introduced the movement to the assembly. The first constitution included a clause stipulating that

53

Langner, “The Founding and Development of Inkatha,” 17; Maré and Hamilton,
Appetite for Power, 54–5.
54
Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 829.
55
56

Langner, “The Founding and Development of Inkatha,” 20.
Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda, 116–7.
203

should any decision of the Inkatha Central Committee conflict with the decision of the KZLA
Cabinet, the decision of the Central Committee would prevail. After a debate in which member
Paul Sibeko challenged Buthelezi’s argument that such a clause reflected “African democracy,”
the clause was amended so that the KZLA cabinet would be required to “consider seriously the
views of the Central Committee before arriving at a final decision.”

57

The Legislative Assembly

passed the amended Inkatha constitution unanimously, thus binding the assembly members to it.
This constitution also stipulated that only Inkatha members could stand for election and made the
president of Inkatha the chief minister of KwaZulu.

58

It made the king, chiefs, and heads of all

regional authorities patrons of the movement, placing upon them the responsibility for building
the organization’s membership.

59

Before the publication of its constitution, Inkatha changed its

name to Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe to emphasize its national aspirations.

60

With the formation of Inkatha, Buthelezi solidified his earlier resistance to KwaZulu
independence. The first annual conference of the Inkatha met in July 1975 and resolved to
support the KZLA’s decision not to ask for independence for KwaZulu. The resolution was

57

This clause was also of concern to the BAD officials monitoring the formation of the
party. They deemed the clause illegal according to the law by which KZLA was promulgated.
See NAR. BAO 8/419. X218/5. “KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergardering. Politieke Strominge en
Persoonlikhede,” folio 6-27 (constitution unnumbered).
58
Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 829.
59

Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power, 59–60.

60

The constitution sent to the Bantu Administration and Development (BAD)
Department in 1975 was still headed “Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation
Movement, otherwise known as Inkatha YakwaZulu.” According to Temkin, the constitution
was amended in May 1975 (when it was introduced to the assembly), and indeed this one in the
BAO files the penciled amendment regarding the relationship of the assembly and Inkatha. The
Bureau for State Security (BOSS) sent the constitution to BAD in June and suggested it be
spread within the department only on a “need to know basis.” NAR. BAO 8/419. X218/5.
“KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergardering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede,” folio 6-27
(constitution unnumbered).
204

worded in such a way to let the apartheid government know that this opposition was tied to
KwaZulu’s lack of a seaport (Buthelezi specifically desired Richard’s Bay) and slow land
consolidation. It read, “This conference fully supports the decision of the KwaZulu Legislative
not to ask for independence for the separate pieces of inadequate portless land for the Zulus”
(my emphasis).

61

But not even the formation of Inkatha shielded Buthelezi from continued opposition.
Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo became a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in
August 1974.

62

His early participation in the KZLA gave no evidence of the impending

confrontation with Buthelezi, though he was absent the day the Inkatha constitution was debated
in the assembly. But shortly after Inkatha’s formation in 1975, Maphumulo became involved in
the nascent Inala Party.

63

Formed by several members of the Zulu royal family, Zulu

businessmen, and initially with the blessing of the King Goodwill Zwelethini kaBhekuzulu, the
group opposed several aspects of the Inkatha constitution, such as article 7(3) that required a
chief to be a patron of the movement, as well as KZLA encouragement of tripartite businesses
(tripcos) that enabled white investment in the bantustan. According to Maphumulo, the party was
only formed “in principle” because they had neither a constitution nor funds.”

64

According to a statement made by Maphumulo in late 1976 on file with the Department
of Cooperation and Development, he was first invited to a gathering in Ndaleni (Richmond) to
discuss the formation of a political party by Prince Clement Zulu. Maphumulo said those at the
61

NAR. BAO 8/419. X218/5. “KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergardering. Politieke
Strominge en Persoonlikhede,” folio 45-8.
62
CAMP. Karis-Gerhart Collection, Reel 92, Biographical file on Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo; APC. 1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 5 Special Session (1974).
63
Inala is the name of King Goodwill Zwelethini’s regiment.
64

Langner, “The Founding and Development of Inkatha,” 169–71.
205

meeting voted him to chair the December 12, 1975 meeting at the home of Chief Mbhele.

65

In

addition to the king, the prince, Maphumulo and Mbhele, those present included businessmen,
friends of the king, and high level members of KwaZulu and Inkatha: S.J. Goqo (a prominent
Mpumalanga businessman and member of executive council for Inyanda, the Natal and
Zululand African Chamber of Commerce), Chief Simon Gumede of Ubombo (a close friend of
the king), Hertzog Zuma (an Impendle businessman and member of Inkatha’s central
committee), and a Mr. Nkabinde (a Ndaleni businessman).

66

According to Ilanga’s informants,

who also recorded the license plates of all the vehicles at the meeting, the king was present but
he sat in silence during the six-hour gathering.

67

The men criticized tripcos and the Inkatha

constitution, which they complained was copied from Zambia, and discussed the eventual need
for an opposition party. The young Maphumulo, 27 at the time, made it clear that he was not
criticizing the policy of separate development, but that of the Inkatha movement that had allowed
its leader to become a dictator. He further alleged that Inkatha had the aims of the banned
African National Congress.

68

While it is difficult to pinpoint Maphumulo’s exact motivations at this point, his
education and business networks played a part in the chief’s decision to throw his lot in with
Inala. The young man could have been influenced by the Prince Clement Zulu, who first invited

65

NAR. SON 836. D10/3/9/2/969. “Regsadministrasie en Prosedures. Hofgedinge Teen
Departement, Amptenare en Ander Instansies. M. Maphumulo Teen Hoofminister van KwaZulu
Regering en Ander,” folio 8-11.
66
Mr. Nkabinde could possibly be Sifiso Nkabinde, the regional leader of the ANC in
Richmond turned warlord in the early 1990s. See Ragavaloo, Richmond.
67
“Inkosi yamaZulu eqembini elisha,’ Ilanga December 12, 1975.
68

NAR. SON 836. D10/3/9/2/969. “Regsadministrasie en Prosedures. Hofgedinge Teen
Departement, Amptenare en Ander Instansies. M. Maphumulo Teen Hoofminister van KwaZulu
Regering en Ander,” folio 8-11.
206

him to the meeting, as well as King Zwelethini, who he knew from his short time at Bhekuzulu
College. Bhekuzulu College for the sons of chiefs and headmen was established to prepare
“future traditional leaders for active participation in local and territorial government and
development administration, but also to introduce them to western civilization.”

69

These

Bantustan educational institutions also played key roles in the creation of regionally-rooted elite
networks.

70

Zwelethini and the royal family may have drawn upon schooling networks to garner

support against Buthelezi. Maphumulo did not graduate from Bhekuzulu (he left in 1971 during
Form IV or grade 11), but during his short time at the apartheid institution would have been
introduced to its ideology.

71

Maphumulo was also a budding businessman, as evidenced by his later applications for a
general store and a larger shopping center, the latter to be funded by the KwaZulu Development
Corporation (KDC).

72

Maré and Hamilton have shown that Zulu traders threatened by the

69

Bhekuzulu College officially opened in October 1965 at the instigation of King
Bhekuzulu. The college was to serve only the sons of chiefs and headmen and served Zulu,
Swazi, and Ndebele. Simon Mbokazi, “The Role of Bhekuzulu College in the Training of Chiefs
and Headmen in KwaZulu,” Africanus 7, no. 1–2 (1977): 21–32.
70
Tim Gibbs, “Chris Hani’s ‘Country Bumpkins’: Regional Networks in the African
National Congress Underground, 1974-1994,” Journal of Southern African Studies 37, no. 4
(2011): 677–91; Tim Gibbs, “Transkei’s Notables, African Nationalism and the Transformation
of the Bantustans, 1954-1994” (PhD dissertation, Oxford University, 2010).
71
However, the school’s students were not always compliant. The school closed down
temporarily in April 1976 after a “breakdown in negotiations between the education authorities
and the students” and again in 1980 after school boycotts. Rebusoajoang, “Education and Social
Control in South Africa,” African Affairs 78, no. 311 (April 1, 1979): 232; Southall, “Buthelezi,
Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise,” 477.
72
The KDC is the successor of the Bantu Investment Corporation and predecessor of the
KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation, the development agency ran by the KZLA
through which KwaZulu made loans See PAR. DDA 389. (36(N2/7/2.”Land. SADT Land.
Farms or Blocks,” folio 11-2; DDA 395. (36)N2/4/2. “Rural Trading and Business Sites”; DDA
397. (36)N2/4/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land (Bantu
207

expansion of white capital into KwaZulu with tripcos found political allies with the royalists,
traditionalists, and the central state who all saw the king as a rallying point against Buthelezi and
Inkatha’s total control.

73

The young chief, present in the assembly during several of the debates

over Hlengwa’s loyalty, told Ernst Langner he joined Inala because Inkatha “allowed no scope
for differences of opinion.”

74

Figure 14-15: The young Mhlabunzima Maphumulo (left) with Thami Mkhize at
Bhekuzulu College, n.d., Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers; Maphumulo (third row,
end) at a KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Session at Bhekuzulu College, prior to October
1983, UIundi Archive Repository.
Buthelezi singled out Maphumulo and another Mpumalanga MP, Simon Goqo, as the
“two main actors in this drama” after the two refused to attend an extraordinary Inkatha National
Council Conference.

75

Buthelezi was also incensed by Maphumulo’s December 31 letter in

Ilanga explaining the formation of the party and denouncing Inkatha for the “total destruction of

Affairs). Trading in Bantu Areas. Sites. MJ Maphumulo. Table Mountain. Trust Farm,
Goedverwachting.”
73
Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power, 108–13.
74
Langner, “The Founding and Development of Inkatha,” 169–71.
75
APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Vol 7.
Special Session (Jan 1976), 977.
208

the King’s dignity.”

76

Buthelezi called upon this statement in Ilanga as the “final stamp on the

overt attempts by Chief Maphumulo and his mentors to involve the King in politics.”

77

The

“mentors” Buthelezi refers to here are members of the Department of Information that he
believed to be instigating the formation of opposition parties as part of its “unsurpassed record in
interfering in the politics of KwaZulu.” In particular, Buthelezi alleged that a Joseph Madlala had
been instructed by a certain Mr. Els to liaise with African workers in attempts to undermine
Buthelezi and the KwaZulu government. Madlala had organized meetings at Newcastle,
Pietermaritzburg, and at Ndaleni (where Maphumulo attended) in November and December to
discuss the party’s formation. He also blamed Prince Clement Zulu as the prime instigator at the
first meeting.

78

Buthelezi’s reaction was to call a special meeting of the Inkatha National Council on
January 15, 1976, and a special session of the KZLA for January 19, 1976, to address the
participation of the King in politics and the creation of political parties. The National Council
resolved that the “King is above politics” and his only involvement need be through consultation
with Inkatha and the National Council. Any person contravening the constitution with regards to
the King could be penalized “in any manner to be determined by the Legislative Assembly.” It
furthered that as long as “we are still in bondage and our primary objective is to free the nation
from this bondage, about this there can be no argument and division, and we therefore see no

76

News of the new party and its nighttime Ndaleni meeting made front page headlines in
Ilanga for several weeks and sparked letters of support for Buthelezi. “uChief Maphumulo
uchaza azokwenza,” Ilanga December 31, 1975.
77
APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Vol 7.
Special Session (Jan 1976), 977; Ilanga lase Natal December 31, 1975.
78
APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 7 Special Session (Jan 1976),
975-84.
209

need for formation of parties.”

79

At the special session of the KZLA, Buthelezi and Chairman

Chief V. Mbhele queried Maphumulo and Goqo at length about their participation in the
meetings to form the party. Maphumulo responded often with humor and sarcasm, further
angering the assembly. Goqo clearly outlined his belief that the king deserved executive
powers.

80

King Zwelithini capitulated to Buthelezi’s demand that he pledge to withhold himself

from participation in politics. Zwelethini signed the oath in the presence of the Assembly,
signaling Buthelezi’s emergence as unrivaled leader of KwaZulu.

81

The session ended at nearly

midnight.
Buthelezi also advocated an inquiry in terms of Section 11 of the KwaZulu Chiefs and
Headmen’s Act, Act No. 8 of 1974 under Enseleni Magistrate E.C. Holmes and Umbumbulu
Additional Magistrate D.S.V. Ntshangase into Maphumulo’s conduct as a result of the king’s
involvement in the Inala Party. The inquiry commenced on March 8, 1977 and concluded on
November 25, 1977.

82

Its findings were presented to the KwaZulu Cabinet in January 1978. It is

probable that the possibility of Maphumulo’s victory in the Mpumalanga elections motivated the
timing of the report’s release. The inquiry found Maphumulo guilty of involving the king in
politics. He was also charged, but found not guilty, of taking part in activities that aimed to

79

APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 7 Special Session (Jan 1976),

972-5.
80

APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 7 Special Session (Jan 1976),

999-1016.
81

APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 7 Special Session (Jan 1976),

1034-7.
82

NAR. SON 836. D10/3/9/2/969. “Regsadministrasie en Prosedures. Hofgedinge Teen
Departement, Amptenare en Ander Instansies. M. Maphumulo Teen Hoofminister van KwaZulu
Regering en Ander.”
210

overthrow the bantustan government.

83

Based on these findings, the KwaZulu Cabinet decided

on January 24, 1978 to suspend Maphumulo as both chief and member of parliament for two
years.

84

At the same time, Buthelezi was busy canvassing for the KwaZulu elections. On
February 18, 1978, two days before the scheduled bantustan vote, Buthelezi staged a campaign
rally for Inkatha in the “trouble spot” of Mpumalanga. Inkatha victory was less certain in
Mpumalanga where Maphumulo stood to win as an independent candidate with support from the
Mpumalanga Residents Association (MPURA). Mpumalanga residents and local businessmen
had launched MPURA because they felt Inkatha did not represent their interests.

85

In his

address, Buthelezi again drew on the “opponents as apartheid agents” orthodoxy. Buthelezi
emphasized that the Cabinet had suspended Maphumulo because of “the unwholesome
activities” in which he and Goqo and participated, dragging the king into politics.

86

He

countered Maphumulo’s claims that Buthelezi had fired him because he dared oppose Inkatha,
recalling the Chief Hlengwa had not been deposed – a far stretch of the truth (as seen above).
Despite Buthelezi’s canvassing and the suspension, Maphumulo won in Mpumalanga and
was the sole independent candidate to win a seat in the legislature. Of the 55 elected KZLA

83

NAR. BAO 5/363.F54/1524/5. “Kapteins en Hoofmanne Mapumula Stam
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 179-81.
84
UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978, “Resolutions adopted by the
Cabinet of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly,” January 24, 1978.
85
Debby Bonnin, “Changing Spaces, Changing Places: Political Violence and Women’s
Protests in KwaZulu-Natal,” Journal of Southern African Studies 26, no. 2 (2000): 306.
86
APC. PC126/2/1/2. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, “Election Meeting,” Hammarsdale
February 18, 1978.
211

seats, only 27 were contested, of which Inkatha won all but Mpumalanga.

87

(See Map 10,

KwaZulu magisterial districts.) But given the suspension, the Mpumalanga Regional Authority
replaced him. The Maphumulo umndeni met and nominated Mhlabunzima’s younger brother,
Kwenzokuhle Hamilton Maphumulo, to act as chief until the suspension ended. The umndeni
reported their choice to the Mpumalanga Magistrate G.C. Pitcher, who acknowledged the
decision would be unpopular.

88

In his report, Pitcher does not elaborate on the potential origins

of opposition, but he does attach a list of persons present at the meeting where the decision was
made. Two men with whom the decision would have been unpopular, Baningi and Mdingi, were
not present.

89

The KwaZulu Cabinet appointed Kwenzokuhle as acting chief on August 22,

90

1978.

These opposition “King’s parties,” as well as Buthelezi’s exclusion from the king’s
installation ceremony and the continued intransigence of King Zwelethini, warranted a special
session of the KZLA in July 1979 and the opening of an investigation into the “matter
concerning certain people who are involved in creating friction between the King and the
KwaZulu Government.”

91

The king was compelled to attend after the KZLA voted to reduce the

87

629,000 voters were registered, representing only half of those entitled to vote. Survey
of Race Relations in South Africa 1978 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations,
1979), 291–2.
88
NAR. B AO 5/363.F54/1524/5. Kapteins en Hoofmanne Mapumula Stam
Pietermaritzburg, folio 179-84 and UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978.
“Memo to the Chief Minister on Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo: Suspension,” April 6, 1978.
89
UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978. “Memo to the Chief Minister
on Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo: Suspension,” April 6, 1978.
90
UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978. “Resolutions of Cabinet
Adopted at Meeting on August 22, 1978.
91
NAR. BAO 12/652. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en
Persoonlikhede, folio 209-28.
212

king’s annual salary for his earlier refusal to answer invitations. Zwelethini denied the charges of
misconduct against him, which included: alleged mistreatment of members of the Usuthu (the
chiefdom of which the king was chief); his alleged participation in political activities; and his
alleged assault on unnamed individuals. The KZLA urged him to ask for the investigation to be
dropped, but he refused and professed his innocence. After a heated debate that included threats
of deposition, the KZLA voted to abandon the inquiry into the king’s misconduct.

92

They did continue, however, with an inquiry into the causes of friction between the king
and KwaZulu. Appointed per KwaZulu Resolution 26/1979, the committee interviewed an often
uncooperative royal family, including nearly 20 princes, princesses, and chiefs.

93

Their report

expressed concern that some interviewees gave the same evidence, suggesting conspiracy. The
majority of those interviewed pointed to Prince Clement Zulu as the instigator of tensions
between the King and KwaZulu as he was present at meetings of all of the above described
opposition parties. According to those interviewed, Clement also questioned the hereditary status
of the Prime Minister’s position, a claim Buthelezi cited often as justification for his occupation
of the highest KwaZulu post, and denied Buthelezi the privilege of emceeing the installation of
Zwelethini as king. He promised the other princes they would replace the chiefs if he became

92

Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 834.

93

The investigation committee included the Minister of Justice C.J. Mthethwa and
KZLA MPs Chief A. Ndwalane (Ezingolweni), Chief T.J. Cebekhulu (Enseleni), Chief C.E.
Zungu (Mahlabathini), and Mr. C. Buthelezi (Ongoye). NAR. BAO 12/652. KwaZulu
Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 209-28.
213

94

chief minister.

As Buthelezi’s biographer, Ben Temkin, pointed out, Clement would have been

the king’s choice as prime minister.

95

The extent to which followers of these royalist parties were aware of state involvement
has not been thoroughly investigated, but the manner in which Buthelezi continued to wield this
issue as evidence against opponents is of more concern here. When Maphumulo later came under
attack for alleged collaboration, he contended, “[this] theory is something that Buthelezi uses to
attack someone that he does not like.”

96

Maphumulo described Buthelezi’s collaboration

allegations as a “double standard.” Prominent members of Inkatha such as Steven Sithebe and
Simon Huhumeni Gumede, KwaZulu Minister of Health and Deputy Secretary General of
Inkatha respectively, had been members of Inala but did not have similar allegations made
against them.

97

Those willing to reconcile with Buthelezi and Inkatha were allowed to do so.

Hlengwa, for instance, would later be re-elected to the KZLA. Those who continued to be at
odds with Buthelezi’s control over KwaZulu political life, such as Maphumulo, received the
brunt of his criticism. Regarding the accusation that a white Department of Information official
had helped to found Inala, Maphumulo countered that a white person had been present at this
third meeting as the driver of none other than Prince Clement Zulu. Joseph Madlala was also
present, but “as a concerned Zulu, not a representative of BOSS,” nor had he been invited by
Maphumulo.

98

94

NAR. BAO 12/652. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en
Persoonlikhede, folio 209-28.
95
Temkin, Buthelezi, 131.
96

“Contralesa chief hits back.” New African (26 Nov 1989).

97

“Contralesa chief hits back”; Maphumulo in Langner, 171.

98

“Contralesa chief hits back”; Maphumulo in Langner, 171.
214

Maphumulo fought his suspension at the High Court by applying for a staying order and
a review of the magistrate’s findings. Alleging that there was no evidence of pre-arrangement on
his part to chair the Ndaleni Inala meeting or invite the Zulu king to the gathering, he challenged
the magistrate’s findings. After a delay by KwaZulu’s attorney, the High Court overturned the
magistrate’s findings on November 20, 1979, by which time the duration of the suspension had
nearly finished.

99

Maphumulo then applied for remuneration for lost pay, claiming suffering due

to the loss of occupation as the chief, tribal authority head, regional authority chair, and
legislative authority member as well as the esteem he enjoyed in the community. The normal
term of his chairmanship (five years, 1975-80) had concluded, so Maphumulo did not regain the
position. Despite initial confusion over whether or not he could return to the KZLA (he had been
replaced with Chief N. Ntshangase by the members of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority upon
his suspension), Maphumulo was reinstated as a member of the KZLA during 1980.

100

Maphumulo’s actions during and immediately after his suspension sparked the first
questions by his community over the legitimacy of his leadership. During the chief’s suspension,
the Mbambangalo branch of Inkatha was formed with induna Thomas Gcabashe as its
chairman.

101

Maphumulo continued to criticize and resist Inkatha in the press and at home.

Upon his reinstatement as chief in early 1980, Maphumulo banned Inkatha meetings in his area
when Inkatha officials failed to seek his permission to hold a meeting. When Buthelezi

99

NAR. SON 836. D10/3/9/2/969. “Regsadeministrasie en Prosedures. Hofgedinge Teen
Departemente, Amptenare en Ander Instansies. M Maphumulo Teen Hoofminister van KwaZulu
Regerin en Ander.”
100
NAR. SON 836. D10/3/9/2/969. “Regsadeministrasie en Prosedures. Hofgedinge
Teen Departemente, Amptenare en Ander Instansies. M Maphumulo Teen Hoofminister van
KwaZulu Regerin en Ander,” folio 95-7.
101
“Rebel chief bans Inkatha gathering,” Sunday Post March 16, 1980.
215

announced his intention to speak at an Inkatha rally in Maqongqo, Maphumulo ordered his
people to boycott and called a rival meeting. He claimed the Inkatha officials’ disrespect created
a rift amongst the Maphumulo people.

102

In his first session back in the KZLA, Buthelezi

rebuked him for this activity and for attacking Inkatha in the press. Buthelezi read the letter from
Maphumulo to Ilanga and declared the letter was an assault on the King and commoners and
made a historical parallel, comparing Maphumulo’s actions to the actions of a “petty chief” from
Natal (referring to Bhambatha) that resulted in King Dinuzulu’s exile.

103

During the same session, Buthelezi also read a letter from members of the Maphumulo
outlining why they believed Mhlabunzima was not fit to be chief. Their complaints included the
engendering of conflict between the people and KwaZulu, the selling of land at exorbitant prices,
allowing homes to be built on grazing and arable land, calling for levies to congratulate him on
defeating the KwaZulu Government (presumably referring to the successful appeal), and other
misuse of Maphumulo funds. Baningi and Mdingi Maphumulo, as well as several other men who
would later become prominent local Inkatha leaders, had signed the letter.

104

The Minister of

Justice Mthethwa and the Chief Khawula of the Umzumbe District (who Buthelezi would later
describe as “an ideal chief”

105

) joined the attack, chiding Maphumulo for his lack of respect as a

102

“Rebel chief bans Inkatha gathering”; “Chief hits back at Gatsha for Inkatha rally
attack,” Rand Daily Mail April 21, 1980.
103
APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third
Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 64-9.
104
APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third
Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 115-7.
105
APC. PC126/2/1/6. Buthelezi, “Speech at Chief Calalabakubo Khawula’s HouseWarming Party,” August 1, 1981.
216

young chief and again alleging that Maphumulo cooperated with the apartheid government.

106

Mthethwa, clearly aware of the Maphumulo chiefdom’s history, told the KZLA that
Mhlabunzima needed to remember his place.
He should remember that the history of his chieftainship is very short. He is only
the fourth chief. His grandfather got this chieftainship simply because he was a
policeman in the service of the White Government. He was paid by means of a
portion of the Swayimani [sic] land at Gcumisa. I think that one of the reasons
why he is deviating as he says he does not want independence but wants to remain
Pretoria’s slave, is that the history of his chieftainship originated in a payment. He
then thinks, when he hears it being said that because of the loyalty of his
grandfather to the Police Force he obtained the chieftainship, therefore if he is
107
loyal to Pretoria, he too may be given this country…”
This use of the Zulu past to draw support and achieve political gains was an important
tactic for Chief Buthelezi. While Buthelezi often referred to his own ancestry as a way of
presenting himself as the traditional heir to the prime minister position, here we see other Inkatha
members using Maphumulo’s ancestry as a way to discredit his authority. Maphumulo briefly
defended himself and his grandfather but absented himself from the Assembly upon learning that
his car had been stolen. In further attacks, the Minister of Works not so subtly implied that
Maphumulo’s car might have been paid for through extortion or collaboration.

108

Several weeks later during the same 1980 legislative session, MP Simon Chonco, who by
this point had earned the reputation of a Buthelezi “yes man,” made a motion in reaction to the
report of the inquiry into friction between the king and KwaZulu that identified Prince Clement
as the instigator in the royalist plot to involve the king in politics. Chonco moved to pass
106

APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third
Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 191-206.
107
APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third
Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 191-206.
108
APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third
Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 191-206.
217

legislation to punish those found guilty. Maphumulo stood up to support the motion, despite his
Supreme Court case against his suspension as punishment for similar activities. He apologized to
the Assembly for his previous behavior and promised future cooperation. He emphasized that he
was making this overture of his own accord and that he believed in the need for unity. Upon
inquiry by another MP, he also promised to invite the Minister of Justice to his area to inaugurate
a branch of Inkatha. Chonco also moved to punish chiefs involving the king in politics to be
punished according to regulations governing the chieftainship.

109

While Maphumulo made this overture of peace, it was most likely more for the purpose
of self-preservation than ideological conversion. Instrumental to Maphumulo’s apology and
subsequent joining of Inkatha was the Reverend Amos K. Shembe of the Church of the
amaNazaretha. The Church of the amaNazaretha is an African-initiated church whose founder
Isaiah Shembe was a highly esteemed prophet who molded elements of Zulu religious beliefs
with Christian theology. Maphumulo was a devout follower of the amaNazaretha.
Maphumulo had formerly served as the church’s secretary general and became embroiled
in the church’s affairs through his personal relationships with the Shembe family. As is custom
for the heir to the chieftaincy, Mhlabunzima grew up away from Mbambangalo. He stayed in
Edendale with an influential member of the Shembe church and took as his third wife, Gaye
Shembe, the sister of Londa Shembe. Maphumulo supported Londa, the son of Isaiah Shembe’s
heir Johannes in the succession dispute with Amos after Johannes’ 1976 death because he
wanted to see an educated man as leader.

110

109

APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 20 Third Session of Third
Assembly (May-Jun 1980), 1153-61.
110
Hitler Sifiso Mbambo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Edendale, May
20, 2011.
218

In May 1980, Amos Shembe wrote to Buthelezi to inform him that the amaNazaretha had
suspended Maphumulo as secretary general and ex-communicated him until he repaired his
relations with the KZLA.

111

It is not clear when Maphumulo began to support Londa in the

succession dispute, but if it was before his dismissal as secretary-general, Amos may have had
ulterior motives in firing Maphumulo. However, this removal from office may have spurred
Maphumulo to swing his support behind Londa.

112

Either way, with both his people and his

church pressuring him to improve relations with Buthelezi and the KZLA, Maphumulo
acquiesced and apologized to the KZLA.
Despite the Shembe-negotiated peace, Maphumulo’s towing of the Inkatha line was
short-lived. While campaigning for KwaZulu’s second elections under self-governing status in
1983, Maphumulo and Chonco had an altercation at an election meeting in Mpumalanga, where
Maphumulo pulled out the table on which Chonco was standing to address the gathering from
under him. Maphumulo insisted Chonco had not asked for permission to address the meeting that
he had already closed and accused him of trying to force his people to join Inkatha. Chonco
accused Maphumulo of pulling a pistol on him and Maphumulo was later charged with attempted
murder for firing at another attendee.

113

Buthelezi accused Maphumulo and Rogers Ngcobo of

Inanda for sowing disunity by promoting independent candidates for the election.

111

114

“Rebel chief bows to Inkatha,” Natal Witness Echo August 14, 1980.

112

Londa was assassinated in 1989. Many suspected it was due to his sympathies with
the ANC-affiliated United Democratic Front.
113
“Chief Whip ‘floored,’” Natal Witness Echo August 18, 1983; “Stones fly in poll
flight,” Natal Witness Echo September, 8, 1983; “Murder charge dropped,” Natal Witness Echo
May 3, 1984.
114
Khaba Mkhize, “Inkatha disunity – MPs accused,” Natal Witness Echo August 25,
1983.
219

In the September 1983 elections, Maphumulo won re-election as an MP for Mpumalanga,
which was one of only four constituencies where independent candidates such as Maphumulo
had contested seats.
Authority.

116

115

He was also re-elected as the chairman of the Mpumalanga Regional

During the first session of the new KZLA in October, at the new parliament

building, Chonco and Chief Khawula launched a corporal attack on Maphumulo. Members of the
KwaZulu police and a massive crowd watched as Maphumulo was beaten unconscious, allegedly
for his renewed refusal to join Inkatha and the earlier affront to Chonco. In the KZLA, Buthelezi
again accused Maphumulo of working for the National Intelligence Service and of unleashing
violence against Inkatha during the elections canvassing in Mpumalanga. Buthelezi explained the
attack on Maphumulo, contending, “whoever challenges me, does not challenge me as
Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi but in fact challenges the people, and the people will deal with
117

them.”

While Maphumulo recovered in the hospital, he sent H.D. Gumede to represent him in

the KZLA.

Goedverwachting: The Contested Land and a Closer Settlement
When Chief Minister Buthelezi read a letter at the KZLA session in 1980 from Maphumulo
members complaining about Mhlabunzima’s sale of sites on grazing and agricultural land at
exorbitant prices, he was touching on a much larger issue than just the allegation of corruption.
As established in the last chapter, the population of the Table Mountain region was increasing,

115

CAMP. Karis-Gerhart Collection, Reel 92, Biographical file on Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo.
116
Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1983, Johannesburg (1984), 347
117

APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 30 First Session of the Fourth
Assembly (Oct 1983).
220

but the land available for African settlement was in fact decreasing as living patterns became
more regimented by the government’s betterment planning. The vicinity of a thousand acres of
Trust-owned arable land surely only increased the frustrations of the expanding polities of the
Maphumulo and Nyavu. Chief Maphumulo was particularly active in attempts to bring this
contested piece of Goedverwachting farm under his own jurisdiction, even during his suspension.
This section examines the competing interests of the involved parties in the land dispute over the
trust farm. DCD desperately needed land to resettle forcefully removed families across Natal.
The Maphumulo desired land for their own population increase, especially as they encroached on
the buffer land between them and the neighboring white farmers. KwaZulu initially identified the
farm as land for consolidation. In the midst of this contestation, the Nyavu identified an
opportunity to again boost their hereditary status and claim land lost in colonization.
Back at Table Mountain, no development had been made on the “Bantu Village” planned
for the strip of Goedverwachting purchased in 1961-8, a common scenario during the early years
of apartheid betterment planning. At first, BAD prioritized resettlement in these villages
according to betterment needs. People already living on Trust farms but with no access to arable
land were at the top of the list. Squatters from European farms and “black spots” and labor
tenants given notice to quit also made the list, but only when they could not be resettled on other
European farms as servants or tenants.

118

But by the time of the Goedverwachting settlement in

1980, priorities had changed. Despite the overcrowding of the surrounding trust farms and
reserve land at Table Mountain, the clear priority for the Goedverwachting strip was the
relocation of those people forcefully removed elsewhere.

118

McIntosh, “State Policies in Rural South Africa C1948-c1960: Bantu Authorities,
Policy Fomation and Local Responses,” 191.
221

Permission for locals to utilize the land was limited. BAD granted a Permission to
Occupy (PTO) to the Maphumulo Tribal Authority to construct the inkantolo (courthouse) and a
secondary school on this strip of Goedverwachting during 1975. Chief Maphumulo also was
allowed to build his own umuzi on the property, moving from his father’s homestead on
Onverwacht.

119

These permissions led the Maphumulo to believe the strip of Goedverwachting

would be given to them. Incredibly though, very few moved onto the farm without authorization.
When the Trust purchased the thousand acre strip, only 6 imizi already occupied the land. In
1977 when the Department of Plural Relations and Development (PRD) followed up on the
establishment of the village, the KwaZulu Regional Director I.R. Matheson (formerly the
Agricultural Officer for the farms) believed only three new imizi had been established there
120

without permission.

Meanwhile, trouble brewed across the border on Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans. Under
Chief Maphumulo’s watch, 213 imizi settled on arable and grazing land, including the Aasvogel
Krans buffer zone between the Maphumulo and the neighboring white farmers (see previous
chapter). Complaints from Mr. Raw, who owned a portion of Doornhoek farm and Sub A of

119

Funds had been made available for all tribal authorities to construct courthouses as
early as 1964, but the Native Affairs Department would not disperse the grants until matching
funds were raised by the authorities. By 1967, the Maphumulo Tribal Authority had collected no
matching funds and the Natal Chief BAC recommended the authority build a smaller courthouse
with the R900 grant in a way that additions could be added when more funds were raised. No
evidence exists to suggest the inkantolo was built prior to 1975, when the Permission to Occupy
(PTO) for the inkantolo and Maphumulo’s umuzi was granted. See Mpumalanga Magistrate’s
letter of May 1979, PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 20-1; NAR. BAO 13/1022. J76/97/1524/3. “Begroting. Bantoeowerhede. Finansiele
Aangeleenthede. Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Stamowerhied,” folio 48.
120
PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 2.
222

Goedverwachting, and the local Baynesdrift Farmers’ Association went to the Ministry-level,
prompting local officials to react. The farmers protested the theft of livestock and produce,
cutting of sugar cane, damage to fencing, and the gathering of firewood without permission.
While officials initially hoped to purchase a portion of Raw’s farm as a further buffer, he
considered it the best portion of his farm and at first refused. Natal PRD Chief Commissioner
Dreyer then decided in 1979 that the 23 imizi in the buffer zone should be relocated to the future
village on the Goedverwachting strip.

121

The Trust purchased Raw’s Sub A of Goedverwachting

from his estate in 1984, but complaints from the Baynesfield farmers continued for years.

122

When PRD officials appeared at the farm in mid-1979 to demarcate 400 sites for what
would become a “relocation closer settlement,” Maphumulo Acting Chief Kwenzokuhle and the
Maphumulo councillors went to Mpumalanga Magistrate Pitcher to voice their own concerns.
“Closer settlement” is the official term used to describe land intended for the resettlement of
African people on reserve or Trust land that is for residential purposes only. Despite the absence
of urban or township infrastructure and employment, as well as the distance from urban and
metropolitan centers, no agricultural land was attached to closer settlements. People removed
from “black spots” and white farms were generally relocated to these settlements and given only
temporary accommodation, often tents or tiny corrugated iron huts called fletcraft, and expected
to build their own permanent houses.

123

The Goedverwachting closer settlement would be for

121

PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 2, 6-10.
122
Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, KwaZuluNatal Province. Land Register for Goedverwachting No. 1349, 1850s-present.
123
Surplus People Project, Forced Removals in South Africa : Volume 4 Natal. (Cape
Town: Surplus People Project, 1983), xii and 61.
223

relocated peoples, not for the relief of Onverwacht and the Goedverwachting remnant as once
intended by the betterment plan for the farms.
Kwenzokuhle and his councillors convinced Magistrate Pitcher with their case. Not only
did they believe that the trust farm was to be turned over to them, they expressed worry about the
relocation of “strangers who are not subjects of their chief” to the land dividing their community.
The people were not opposed to the settlement as such; they had at least 70 families willing to
build their imizi there. Pitcher believed if outsiders were relocated to the village site without the
consent of the Maphumulo, it could only give rise to a very unpleasant situation.

124

He passed

this concern on to the Pietermaritzburg DCD Commissioner, who forwarded it up the
bureaucratic chain. The apartheid officials sought out the advice of the recently retired Chief
Agricultural Officer McKay due to his intimate knowledge of the Nagel Dam project.
Indeed, these officials had reason for concern in relocating strangers onto the strip of land
surrounded by Maphumulo. Chizuko Sato has keenly illustrated how the mass resettlement of
evicted Weenen labor tenants in the late 1960s and early 1970s on the Tugela Estates, land
traditionally considered to belong to the Mthembu north of the Tugela River, increased tensions
among local Africans. At Sahlumbe, a newly constructed settlement, a violent clash erupted in
the mid-1970s that lasted for more than five years and claimed over 30 lives.

125

Over the next several months, Acting Chief Kwenzokuhle, the suspended Mhlabunzima,
and Maphumulo councillors were frequent visitors to Pitcher’s office for a resolution of their
concerns. The Maphumulo needed more land to support their growing popolation and wished to

124

PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 19-20.
125
Sato, “Forced Removals, Land NGOs and Community Politics,” Chapter 6.
224

be consulted on all matters concerning resettlement on the Goedverwachting strip. The leaders
eventually conceded that they would not oppose the resettlement of people, but they did not want
any chiefs to be relocated there—a clear reference to the still-landless Qamu Chief Majozi who
the Trust had in mind when they purchased the farm nearly two decades earlier (see previous
chapter).

126

Upon Mhlabunzima’s reinstatement, he asked for half of the sites on the strip to be

given to the Maphumulo and that the remainder settled to come under his authority.

127

In October 1979, KwaZulu requested permission from the DCD Secretary for the
Goedverwachting strip to be incorporated into the Maphumulo Authority.

128

Despite the tension

between Buthelezi and Mhlabunzima, the slow pace of land consolidation remained central to
Buthelezi’s criticisms of the state. He did not pass up the opportunity to add land to KwaZulu,
which could result from granting the farm to the Maphumulo. KwaZulu had earlier in 1976
requested that all SADT-governed trust farms be turned over to the bantustan.

129

DCD officials

did not oppose eventual transfer of the property to KwaZulu, but balked at the idea of losing
control over the closer settlement. The DCD desperately needed land to resettle people forcefully
removed from across the Camperdown, New Hanover, Pietermaritzburg, and Richmond districts.
A water shortage had prevented prior settlement (an irony given the purchase of the land in

126

PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 26-36.
127
PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 60.
128
PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 39.
129
Verbatim Report of the KZLA,Vol. 8, Second Session of the Second Legislative
Assembly, May 11, 1976.
225

relation to the Nagle Dam project), but no other land was available in the district. Given the
urgency, the Chief Commissioner granted permission for 400 fletcraft huts to be sent to the
Goedverwachting strip in anticipation of relocations. As McKay validated the Maphumulo claim
to the land, Chief Commissioner H.J. Backer recommended that the people to be resettled on
Goedverwachting khonza to the Maphumulo chief.

130

The term ukukhonza literally means “to pay homage, pay respect to; subject oneself to
serve. Ngizokhonza Nkosi; ngifake ikhanda lapha kuwe. (I have come to serve, O Chief; that I
put my head in your control.”

131

Historian Percy Ngonyama argues ukukhonza provided the

foundation for relations between political heads and their subjects. Ukukhonza structured both
sides of this relationship, establishing a contract between ruler and subject predicated on tribute
132

and the granting of land for the establishment of imizi.

While Zulu society understood this

mutually beneficial relationship according to the proverb “inkosi yinkosi ngabantu” (a chief is a
chief because of the people who khonza him), the colonial administration sought to redefine
133

chiefly authority through jurisdiction based on territory, or inkosi yinkosi ngendawo.

Colonialism transformed the relationship between chiefs and their subject, but as we will see
here, khonza as a personal relationship was not obliterated.

130

PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 40.
131
Clement M Doke and B. W Vilakazi, Zulu-English dictionary (Johannesburg:
Witwatersrand University Press, 1964), 404.
132
Mduduzi Percival Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority from ‘Personal to
Territorial’: An Historical Analysis of the Limitations of Colonial Boundaries on African Sociopolitical Relations in Natal’s Maphumulo/Lower Thukela Region, 1890-1910” (M.A., University
of KwaZulu-Natal, 2012), 35–6.
133
Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority.”
226

By January 1980, 21 families had already been relocated to the Goedverwachting closer
settlement. Five families were moved from Mandisa (Richmond) and another 16 from Bob
Mattison’s farm on Greytown Road. Some of these families arrived by the infamous “GG”
trucks, known as such because of the registration plate numbers GG denoting state transport.

134

These families carried building materials from their old homes but the settlement needed poles so
that the new residents could build permanent dwellings. DCD Commissioner for
Pietermaritzburg Muggleston requested that latrines urgently be sent from storage at Edendale as
at least 20 more families would arrive later that month. Muggleston and Senior Settlement
Officer H.A. Roux recommended the construction of a clinic. The nearest hospital for Africans
was 40 kilometers away in Edendale and this trip would take three buses for the
Goedverwachting residents to get there, an expense few of the mostly unemployed men and
women could afford. Those relocated were issued PTOs and were expected to pay rent for their
sites on the trust farm.

135

Several people interviewed recalled moving to Goedverwachting from a Greytown farm
known as Mshwathi because they no longer wanted to work as labor tenants. Ntombinazi Zakwe
said her brothers (in-laws) worked for six months, but did not want to work for low wages any
longer.

136

Labor tenants supplied their labor to the landowner for part of the year (three to nine

months) as a form of rent in exchange for land. In 1964, the 1936 Land Act was amended to
134

For more on the gap between government accounts and what people experience as
they were forced away on GG trucks, see Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, The
Surplus People, Chapter 6.
135
PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 68-9 and 72-4.
136
Ntombinazi Zakwe, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March
25, 2011.
227

abolish the tenancy system, but the practice continued in Natal until 1980. Surplus People Project
interviews suggest that the poor conditions of labor tenancy caused many tenants to willingly
leave the farms.

137

Ntombinazi’s brothers fit this latter category. For them it was better to try

anew in the relocation area than continue to work for harsh employers earning low wages. By the
end of 1982, the DCDC had relocated 130 families to the trust farm.

138

Government officials paid close attention to the development of the closer settlement due
to increasing pressure from non-governmental organizations and the local Natal press. From
Cosmas Desmond’s 1970 first account of the enforced removal of people from Meran to
Limehill in Natal, a number of individuals and groups set out to document the nature and extent
of the apartheid resettlement program and the resultant poverty and suffering.

139

In Natal, this

included the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA), an organization set up to publicize
issues surrounding forced removals and provide legal aid to those removed (or threatened by
removal).

140

AFRA contributed to the Surplus People Project, which also began in late 1979 as a

national research project to investigate the removals and whose 1983 five-volume report remains
the most in-depth examination of the removals.

137

141

Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, The Surplus People, 30–2.

138

PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of
Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,” folio 93.
139
Cosmas Desmond, The Discarded People: An Account of African Resettlement in
South Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970); T. R. H Davenport and K. S Hunt, The Right to
the Land (Cape Town: D. Philip, 1974); Gerhard Maré, African Population Relocation in South
Africa (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1980).
140
On AFRA, see Harley and Fotheringham, AFRA; Sato, “Forced Removals, Land
NGOs and Community Politics.”
141
Surplus People Project, Forced Removals in South Africa (Cape Town: Surplus
People Project, 1983); Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, The Surplus People.
228

By the time DCD relocated the 130 families to the Goedverwachting closer settlement,
the department felt intense pressure from these groups. The Natal Chief Commissioner
bemoaned the manner in which they celebrated “any conceivable grievance that can be unearthed
in the closer settlements” in attempts to discredit the department and the state. The
Commissioner laid out a plan for settlements such as Goedverwachting that he believed would
improve the image of the department and these sites, central to which was the establishment of
community councils and trust accounts so that the community could be managed by an authority
of its choice.

142

Thus, DCD officials attempted to stir up support for a community council at the
Goedverwachting settlement, to little avail. Muggleston felt certain this would come with time,
after the people from various areas came to know each other and trust the department.

143

In

1984, Mqnath Rodgers Maphanga became the new ranger, the DCD’s man on the ground whose
primary responsibility was to ensure that no new persons took up residence on the trust farm
without permission from the Pietermaritzburg Commissioner.

144

Maphanga did his job well, as

the number of families resettled remained at 130 until after this death. By 1987, a small local

142

NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe.
Pietermaritzburg,” folio 189-93.
143
PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 105.
144
PAR. DDA. 393. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,”
folio 38-9.
229

committee had formed, consisting of three individuals empowered to hear residents’ complaints
and report them to the Pietermaritzburg Commissioner.

145

Pressure against forced removals also probably influenced Pretoria’s May 1982 order that
no further settlement could take place until the shortage of water at the site could be
addressed.

146

Desperate for the land to settle more evictees, DCD officials set out to solve this

vexing problem. Four boreholes had been drilled and fitted with hand pumps but by October
1982, only one still worked. The situation was made worse as Maphumulo on the KwaZulu
territory also used this water pump. The Goedverwachting settlement residents dared not chase
them away.

147

Numerous attempts to alleviate the problem failed.

148

In 1985, Chief Maphumulo

attempted to manipulate the water shortage to the Maphumulo’s advantage. In a request to have
the land turned over to him, Chief Mhlabunzima reported the tribal authority had made a
representation to the Umgeni Water Board for the laying of a pipeline.

149

If the government

could not provide the residents with land, the chief would. This shortage in water certainly also

145

PAR. DDA. 393. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,”
folio 22-3.
146
PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of
Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,” folio 45.
147
PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of
Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,” folio 83.
148
PAR. DDA 385. (36)N5/1/2. “Engineering Services: Water Supplies,” folio 17-8;
PAR. DDA 393. (36)N5/1/2. “Engineering Services: Water Supplies.”
149
PAR. DDA 391. (36)N2/7/2. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Land, Farms or Blocks. Sevontein No. 131, Wilgefontein No. 869 and
Goedverwachting,” folio 162-3.
230

contributed to growing tensions between the new settlers and those Maphumulo seeking to
establish new imizi on the trust farm.
Both the Natal DCD and the Maphumulo anxiously awaited a response from Pretoria
regarding permission for the residents to khonza to Chief Maphumulo. While the settlement was
supposed to be managed by DCD, the new Table Mountain residents turned to Chief Maphumulo
with requests to record births, marriages, and deaths and to register as work-seekers and
pensioners. Because permission had not been granted for the people to khonza him and join the
Maphumulo, the chief initially turned them away.

150

But the Tribal Authority did begin to

provide many services for the settlement residents, including the use of schools and cattle
dipping tanks.

151

To complicate matters further, KwaZulu also asserted its claim on the land, undertaking
several public works and education projects on the trust-governed land without first consulting
Natal’s DCD officials. Major state investments helped bantustan revenues increase fourfold
during the first half of the 1970s from around R120 million to R520 million and they continued
to grow afterwards.

152

In the Table Mountain region, these funds helped to build a clinic, a

secondary school, employment projects, and a new home for the agricultural officer. When
KwaZulu approved finances for the construction of a clinic for Table Mountain, the Mpumalanga
Magistrate, an Edendale Hospital representative, and the Senior Agricultural Officer consulted

150

PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,” 70.
151
PAR. DDA 391. (36)n2/7/2. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Land, Farms or Blocks. Sevontein No. 1313, Wilgefontein No. 869, and
Goedverwachting,” folio 161-3.
152
Beinart, “Beyond ‘Homelands’: Some Ideas About the History of African Rural
Areas in South Africa,” 13.
231

with the local traditional authorities. They chose a site near to the Maphumulo inkantolo and the
chief’s homestead because of its location between the two halves of the Maphumulo territory. A
contractor was already on site to begin the construction when DCD was alerted; they granted the
PTO because the site they had chosen for a clinic had no water while this one could be serviced
153

by water available to the inkantolo.

Furthering the confusion over the jurisdiction of the

settlement, DCD in Pretoria granted KwaZulu’s request to construct the Mbambangalo High
School on the edge of the property without consulting the Natal Chief Commissioner.

154

The business and church sites began to fill. One of the first PTOs granted for a business
site was to Mfanoza Frazer Zimu, who also became the chair of the Goedverwachting
community council. Chief Maphumulo himself proposed the construction of a trading center that
would include a post office, bank, filling station, supermarket, restaurant, dry cleaning depot,
furniture store, clothing outlet, herbalist, shoemaker, dressmaker, and an “arts, crafts, and curios”
shop. It would be funded by a loan from the KwaZulu Development Corporation and located
next to the inkantolo. Maphumulo retained Nkululeko J.M. Msimanga of “Big Guys Business
Coordinators” to initiate a project for the supply of electricity to the site. The Pietermaritzburg
Commissioner supported the project in principle, but ultimately denied the application because

153

PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 103-5; DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Lad. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual
Areas. Goedverwachting,” folio 11-3.
154
PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of
Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,” folio 10-34.
232

he wanted the trust land for settlement purposes.

155

Maphumulo later successfully applied for

permission to build only a general store and tea room next to his homestead (in 1983 and again in
1986 when it was realized the first application had been lost).

156

This portion of the Goedverwachting strip was quickly becoming the center of the
Maphumulo community and the chief took actions to ensure his jurisdiction over it. The school
and the clinic, named after the first Maphumulo chief Maguzu, only furthered the Maphumulo
feeling that the land belonged to them. Despite the earlier tensions, Chief Maphumulo invited
Buthelezi to officially open the new inkantolo and the Maguzu Clinic in December 1987, surely
hoping to keep the KwaZulu Chief Minister on his side in efforts to have the trust farmed turned
over to the Maphumulo.

157

The two chiefs reconciled in November 1984 when the two men met

unplanned during a KZLA caucus. According to Maphumulo, Buthelezi apologized for the
Maphumulo’s assault and that he in turn apologized for blaming Buthelezi. To demonstrate his
commitment to their peace, Maphumulo accompanied Buthelezi to a rally in Soweto.

158

During Buthelezi’s visit to Mbambangalo, the Inkatha and KwaZulu leader addressed the
Maphumulo, praising them as a people who knew the meaning of “putting differences aside and
joining with your Zulu brothers and sisters wherever they may be for the sake of your

155

PAR. DDA 389. (36)N2/7/2. “Lands. SADT Lands: Farms or Blocks: Main File,”

folio 9-36.
156

PAR. DDA 397. (36)N2/4/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Trading in Bantu Areas (Section 24, Act 18/1936). Sites. MJ
Maphumulo. Table Mountain. Trust Farm, Goedverwachting.”
157
Apparently, 1987 was a year of reconciliation and development for Buthelezi, who
also opened the Thoyana inkantolo after “burying the hatchet with Inkosi Hlengwa. APC.
PC126/2/1/15. Buthelezi, “Official Opening of the Offices and Courthouse of the Thoyana
Tribe” Umbumbulu, August 14, 1987.
158
Khaba Mkhize, “Chiefs Make Peace,” Natal Witness Echo November 22, 1984.
233

community.”

159

He commended Chief Maphumulo for the hard work he had done to bring the

clinic there despite attempts by the Commissioner of Pietermaritzburg to prevent it because it
was not on KwaZulu land. In a stark contrast from just seven years earlier when members of the
KZLA attacked the Maphumulo chieftaincy, Buthelezi paid tribute to Maphumulo with his
isibongo, or praise name,

160

“Mashimane” and “for this quality of leadership which does credit

to the line of Maphumulo leaders” from whom he descended.

161

The same month, Maphumulo

parroted the Inkatha line regarding causes of the Pietermaritzburg violence with a letter to the
Natal Witness’s “My View” column that responded to an earlier article by John Wright and
Simon Burton attributing the violence to Inkatha.

162

In a complete break from his Inala days,

Maphumulo began to publicly identify as an “Inkatha man.”
Despite the inability of DCD to utilize the land due to the water shortage and a lack of
sufficient funding, it refused permission for certain other projects in hopes that money would
become available to address the problem.

Discussed earlier, they turned down Chief

Maphumulo’s application for a business center site. Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli was also denied
permission for a site in 1982. Mdluli applied to rebuild the Nyavu’s Gcina School on the trust
farm’s boundary but the department prioritized resettlement. Natal Chief Commissioner Backer
sympathized with the Nyavu’s need, but argued: “Although funds are not available at this stage
159

APC. PC126/2/1/15. Buthelezi, “Official Opening of the Maphumulo Administration
Offices and Courthouse, and the Maguzu Clinic,” Maqongqo, December 11, 1987.
160
The plural, izibongo, can be translated as “praises,” “praise names,” “praise poems,”
or “praise poetry.” Izibongo are concerned with naming, identifying, and giving significance to
the named person or object. These often provide links with one’s community, lineage, and
origins, which Buthelezi is doing here. See Gunner and Gwala, Musho!.
161
APC. PC126/2/1/15. Buthelezi, “Official Opening of the Maphumulo Administration
Offices and Courthouse, and the Maguzu Clinic,” Maqongqo, December 11, 1987.
162
Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, “My View: Apartheid’s to Blame,” Natal Witness
December 15, 1987.
234

for settlement of squatters the situation could improve… Land, however, cannot be enlarged and
therefore the reason for turning down the Tribal Authorities [sic] application.”

163

As the Baynesdrift farmers’ complaints continued throughout 1984 and 1985, DCD
officials began recommending the transfer of a portion or all of the Goedverwachting trust strip
to the Maphumulo. They echoed Natal Chief Commissioner Dreyer’s earlier recommendation
that transfer of jurisdiction to the Maphumulo Tribal Authority might temporarily absorb the
increasing population and quell the concerns of the neighboring white farmers.

164

But as the

stance of the DCD on the farm changed, so too did that of KwaZulu. Proclamation 232/1986
announced the transfer of trust-owned land to the bantustan government, including Aasvogel
Krans, Onverwacht, and the Goedverwachting remnant.

165

But KwaZulu refused to accept the

contested strip of Goedverwachting D, 5, and 6 until the water and “tribal problems” were
166

sorted.

The “tribal problems” to which KwaZulu referred were competing claims over the
Goedverwachting strip between the Maphumulo and Nyavu Tribal Authorities. The Nyavu had
begun to make their own claims on the trust farm. The tribal authority’s 1982 application for the
Gcina school site suggested the Nyavu recognized the trust farm was to be turned over to the
Maphumulo. Attached to the application was a letter of approval from Chief Maphumulo stating

163

PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of
Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,” folio 90.
164
NAR. BAO 5/88. F53/1524/5 . “Bantoestamowerhied. Mapumulo. Pietermaritzburg,”
folio 18-9 and 22-3.
165
R232/1986. Government Gazette No.10560, Vol 258. December 24, 1986.
166

PAR. DDA. 393. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,”
folio 20.
235

that he had no objection to the proposed school site.

167

But in 1986, the Nyavu Tribal Authority

sent a letter to DCD requesting not only the trust-governed portion of Goedverwachting, but the
rather the entire farm, as well as Onverwacht! Just as his father and his father had done before
him, Chief Bangubukhosi argued that the Nyavu claim on the farms stemmed from their
hereditary right to the land. The territory belonged to their ancestors, before they were made into
farms, and included the tombs of their forefathers.
KwaZulu.

169

168

The Nyavu also took their request to

KwaZulu initially backed the Maphumulo Tribal Authority’s request for the land to

be incorporated into their jurisdiction. But as the Nyavu began to assert their claim, KwaZulu
refused to accept the property. The bantustan government wanted land, but they did not want the
accompanying problems.
These tensions between the Maphumulo and Nyavu increased after the death of Ranger
Maphanga in 1986 as Chief Maphumulo began to allocate sites on the trust farm. The District
Representative of Home Affairs visited the disputed land in April 1987 and found that already
four homes had been constructed on the trust land opposite the closer settlement. Chief
Maphumulo’s Induna Msongelwa Mkhize had been selling residential sites for R200.

170

The

sites had been marked out by tractors and were four times the size of the closer settlement plots.
The chief had also given permission for the cutting of trees on the farm to make way for a power
167

PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of
Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,” folio 72.
168
Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Province of
KwaZulu-Natal. Chief B. Mdluli to the Magistrate Office,” November 29, 1986.
169
PAR. DDA. 393. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,”
folio 110.
170
Oral history interviews suggest Mkhize was not the only induna selling sites; several
also mention izinduna Dotsheni Gwala and Alfred Madlala.
236

line, a right that he did not have given his lack of jurisdiction.

171

The Mpumalanga Magistrate

suspected that the chief had begun to allocate sites in order to pre-empt the conflict over the
jurisdiction of the farm.

172

No documents have been found that acknowledge permission given by Pretoria for the
trust farm residents to khonza to Chief Maphumulo, but in practice some trust farm residents did
begin to pay their respects to the chief. Historically, khonza fees were payable to the chiefs
personally but with the implementation of Tribal Authorities (and the accompanying salaries for
the chiefs), the khonza payments could be paid into the account of the tribal account or to the
chief. Indeed, those who mentioned payments in their testimonies differed as to where the funds
went. According to one elder, the monies paid would be taken to the chief but were funds for the
173

isizwe.

the chief.

Another woman said the small fee was for ngesihlalo seNkosi, or the seat (support) of

174

Without strict regulation, this practice became so rife with corruption that in 1988

Chief Minister Buthelezi proposed an amendment to the KwaZulu legislature to enable a uniform
procedure for the paying of allegiance and to restrict the amount payable to less than R100.

171

175

COGTA. District Representative Home Department of Home Affairs to Magistrate
Mpumalanga, April 15, 1987.
172
COGTA. Magistrate Mpumalanga to District Representative Department of Home
Affairs, May 15, 1987.
173
“Leyomali isizothathwa iyiswe eNkosini kube imali yesizwe ke leyo.” Goge Balothi,
interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 4, 2011.
174
Fikelephi Sibisi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 16,
2011.
175
Indeed, this practice continues to be controversial as the price of fees skyrocket and
was a source of major complaint for former residents interviewed who fled and attempted to
return to Mbambangalo after the end of uDlame. UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and
Minutes, 1988, “Memorandum to the Cabinet from Department of Chief Minister, re: Khonza
Fees,” August 16, 1988.
237

However, in 1987, several Nyavu families moved onto the farm and refused to khonza to
Maphumulo. In the wake of devastating floods in the Umsunduzi floodplain, at least three Nyavu
families moved across the boundary onto the Trust farm.

176

Chief Maphumulo, convinced of his

jurisdiction over the land, complained to Mpumalanga Magistrate Webber that the Nyavu had
encroached “onto land which has been regarded as land allocated by the Government to the
Maphumulo Tribal Authority for control by such authority and settlement thereon of members of
the Maphumulo Tribe on [sic] persons paying allegiance to the Tribe.”

177

As DCD transitioned into its new life as the Department of Development Aid, officials
sought to end these “tribal problems” tied to land. Government officials wanted to turn the land
over to KwaZulu. It was clear no future settlement would be done given the increased resistance
to forced relocations. Prior to the flooding, the Regional Representative for the DDA D. Varty
attempted to end the dispute with a response to Chief Mdluli’s repeated queries about the
jurisdiction of the farms. Varty sent the Nyavu chief a copy of the government gazette that
delineated the boundaries of the Maphumulo and Nyavu tribal authorities. Onverwacht and the
remnant of Goedverwachting were legally the territory of the Maphumulo.

178

Mpumalanga Magistrate Webber used the same logic after he visited Table Mountain in
1988 in an attempt to settle the land conflict. Webber found that all knew the boundary, but the

176

Prolonged and heavy rains in September produced nearly 400 millimeters in 36
hours, resulting in severe flooding. John Laband and Robert F. Haswell, eds., Pietermaritzburg,
1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City, 1st ed (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal
Press : Shuter & Shooter, 1988), 11.
177
COGTA. Mpumalanga Magistrate to Secretary Department of the Chief Minister,
November 25, 1988.
178
PAR. DDA. 393. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District
Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,”
folio 25-8.
238

Nyavu believed the farms to have been erroneously given to the Maphumulo. Webber’s report
cites the gazetted tribal boundaries to conclude that the Nyavu had no legal claim to Onverwacht
or Goedverwachting. What is less clear is whether or not Webber’s understanding of
“Goedverwachting” includes the latter purchased portions of B, D, 5, and 6 (the strip in dispute).
In one numbered point, the magistrate states “There is therefore no question in my mind of any
doubt about which Tribal Authority according to statute is legally in control of any of the Trust
farm Goedverwacht [sic], namely the Maphumulo Tribal Authority who were moved on to land
purchased as compensation for land transferred to the Durban Corporation…(my emphasis).” In
the next numbered point, he lists the subsequently purchased portions of Goedverwachting
before closing that the land in dispute is that on which the new inkantolo and clinic were
opened.

179

It is not clear whether “any of the Trust farm” includes the subdivisions or not.

Whether or not Webber believed the strip of trust farm to be under the jurisdiction of the
Maphumulo, the proclamations outlining the boundaries of the tribal authority were never
amended so there is no legal evidence that the strip of trust farm belongs to either.

180

However,

Fred Kockett, a reporter for the Natal Witness who followed the Table Mountain region closely,
and members of the Maphumulo later cited this visit of Webber to the contested land as evidence
that the government acknowledged Maphumulo jurisdiction.

181

At no point during these

disputes did the government officials acknowledge the possible legitimacy of Chief Mdluli’s
179

COGTA. Mpumalanga Magistrate to the Secretary, Department of Interior,
November 25, 1988.
180
Fields notes from meeting with Bhekani L. Shabalala, General Manager, Traditional
Affairs Branch, Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs,
Pietermaritzburg, August, 3 2011.
181
For example, see Fred Kockett, “Maqongqo: looking for answers in the ashes,” Natal
Witness March 1990 and Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka
Majola, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011.
239

claim that the land given to the Maphumulo was not the government’s to give away. Over a year
later, the conflict erupted in deadly violence in Table Mountain. It is to this conflict the next
chapter turns.

Conclusion
Mhlabunzima Maphumulo became chief in the midst of tumultuous times. The battle for political
supremacy in the newly formed KwaZulu bantustan was just beginning. His umndeni had been
divided over the regency. His community was starved for land. Many competing claims on the
thousand acres of land dividing his jurisdiction contributed to the shortage of land. The centuryold conflict between the Maphumulo and the neighboring Nyavu chiefdom continued over this
parcel of land as both chiefs wanted jurisdiction and employed various means to acquire it.
Complicating matters in the 1970s, both the apartheid government and the newly formed
KwaZulu government saw the contested farm as a means to address shortage of land for forced
resettlement and the need for increased acreage to consolidate the KwaZulu bantustan. Chief
Maphumulo took on these complex challenges with vigor, becoming embroiled in royalist Zulu
politics while frequenting apartheid government offices in attempts to resettle his own people on
the Goedverwachting farm strip. But as we will see in the next chapter, the eruption of uDlame
across KwaZulu-Natal ignited old conflicts. The civil war drew Mhlabunzima back into conflict
with Buthelezi as the Maphumulo chief pushed for peace. The land conflict with the Nyavu
broke into deadly violence as Maphumulo welcomed refugees from the violence onto the
contested land.

240

Map 9: Bantustan Map, 1984. Source: www.overcomingapartheid.msu.edu, MATRIX, Michigan
State University

241

Map 10: 1985 Map of KwaZulu Legislative Districts. Key below with number of MPs in
parentheses. Source: Robert Thabo Sabela, “KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.” M.A. Thesis,
University of Zululand, 1989.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Ingwavuma (5)
Sindlangentsha (5)
Ubombo (4)
Nongoma (6)
Hlabisa (5)
Mahlabathini (5)
Enseleni (6)
Madadeni (6)
Nquthu (6)

10) Nkandla (5)
11) Msinga (6)
12) Emnambithi (6)
13) Okhahlamba (9)
14) Inkanyezi (5)
15) Ongoye (5)
16) Maphumulo (6)
17) Ndwedwe (5)
18) Mpumalanga (6)
242

19) Ntuzuma (1)
20) Umlazi (4)
21) Umbumbulu (6)
22) Vulindlela (6)
23) Hlanganani (5)
24) Vulamehlo (5)
25) Umzumbe (6)
26) Izingolweni (5)

Map 11: Table Mountain Region Showing KwaZulu Boundary, Disputed Trust Land, and Other Places of Interest.
243

Chapter Four:
1

“Because my people are in the MDM, I have to be with them” :
uDlame and the Peace Chief, 1983-1990
The gradual erosion of apartheid institutions in the midst of South Africa’s deepening recession
and rising youth unemployment led to an escalation of social tensions and increased violence
throughout South Africa. The rise of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983—an umbrella
organization of grassroots anti-apartheid movements aligned with the ANC—placed strain not
only on the apartheid government but also Inkatha. In KwaZulu, the possibility of the demise of
the homeland system threatened many chiefs and legislative assembly members who benefited
from the institutions and offices of the KwaZulu government. Morris and Hindson argue that the
roots of political violence need to be sought in this collapse of apartheid social controls. As the
previous mode of regulating political cohesion broke down and the role of the state changed,
competing power centers emerged at all levels of society in a struggle to establish new forms of
2

political hegemony. A devastating civil war, fueled by Pretoria as part of its policy of “total
strategy,” broke out across KwaZulu-Natal and in the Gauteng townships. By the first
democratic elections in 1994, 20,000 had died in the conflict, 12,000 in KwaZulu-Natal.

3

In KwaZulu-Natal, powerful local leaders often directly shaped the unfolding of local
conflict. The term “warlord” became everyday parlance, particularly in reference to local Inkatha
leaders. Violence often emanated from the specific areas controlled by warlords, who were

1

Maphumulo, “Interview with Chief Maphumulo,” Sechaba (1990), 8.

2

Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, “South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and
Reconstruction,” Review of African Political Economy 19, no. 53 (1992): 43–59.
3
Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead”; Jeffery, The Natal Story; Denis, Ntsimane, and
Cannell, Indians Versus Russians.
244

responsible for identifying non-members, busing in armed supporters, collecting protection fees,
and conscripting fighters.
It is in this context of growing warlordism in KwaZulu-Natal that Chief Maphumulo and
his politics must be examined. This is not to argue that Pietermaritzburg’s “peace chief” was a
warlord. Colin Darch, in his examination of Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)
banditry has illustrated the utility of examining “the concept of the warlord as the local chieftain
who controls the men with the guns,” even when the actors in question do not necessarily meet
4

all of the conditions of warlordism. Examining the “peace chief” in the context of Natal’s
warlordism serves to break down the dichotomies of Inkatha warlord/ANC freedom fighter and
Inkatha vigilantes/ANC youth and allows for an analysis of conflict that acknowledges victims
and perpetrators across the political spectrum.
As we will see, Maphumulo’s politics shifted over time and required new methods in his
quest for an end to the civil war wracking KwaZulu-Natal. As uDlame ravaged Mbambangalo,
Maphumulo relied on a network of contacts for protection and mobilization of his people, not
always employing peaceful means. As shown in chapter three, Chief Maphumulo had a
contentious relationship with Inkatha, Buthelezi, and the KwaZulu government. The existing
land dispute fueled tensions within and between the chiefs and people of KwaNyavu and
Mbambangalo. These factors combined with Chief Maphumulo’s crusade for peace as both a
chief and as president of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), a new
body of traditional leaders united against apartheid, to ignite in deadly violence. This chapter
first lays out the background to and eruption of violence in the Pietermaritzburg region.
Maphumulo welcomed refugees from this conflict onto the disputed Goedverwachting trust farm.
4

Colin Darch, “Are There Warlords in Provincial Mozambique? Questions of the Social
Base of MNR Banditry,” Review of African Political Economy 45/46 (1989): 34–49.
245

It then examines the context of growling warlordism in Natal before turning to Maphumulo’s
reactions to the violence as well as the almost mythical reputation he gained as “peace chief.” It
will then consider how he was recruited into the progressive organization of traditional leaders,
Contralesa, and his relationship with the ANC. Next, it will outline the eruption and patterns of
violence in Mbambangalo and the relationship of the conflict to the land dispute before
concluding with an analysis of Chief Maphumulo’s UDF network of security, fighters, and
weapons that influenced his shift away from peaceful methods towards fighting for peace.

Background to uDlame: Inkatha, the UDF, and the Third Force
The National Party under the leadership of P.W. Botha embarked on a decade of reform and
repression in the 1980s. Strategically calculated policy innovations were intended to win public
support and international legitimacy for apartheid South Africa while heightened security was
aimed at curbing the country’s increasingly radical popular resistance in the wake of the 1976
Soweto uprising.

5

The centerpiece of Botha’s reform efforts was the creation of a new

constitution in 1983 under which separate parliaments were created for whites, Asians, and
Coloureds, while Africans (nearly three-fourths of the South African population) had
representation only in their bantustan governments. The new constitution caused fissures among
white politicians and galvanized black opposition.
Several national anti-apartheid campaigns formed in opposition to the proposed
Tricameral Parliament that excluded Africans from representation. The national Anti-South
African Indian Council (Anti-SAIC) sought to mobilize resistance against the South African
Indian Council elections scheduled for late 1981. At a Transvaal Anti-SAIC conference in 1983,

5

Gerhart and Glaser, From Protest to Challenge, 6: Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990.
246

Reverend Allan Boesak made a call for a “united front” against apartheid. The conference took
up his call and set up a committee to determine and outline the form and process of organizing a
6

national front. In August 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) emerged as an umbrella
organization of grassroots community groups opposed to Botha’s constitutional reforms. The
broad coalition of civic, church, student, worker and other organizations adopted a non-racial and
non-collaborationist approach. The UDF leaders initially sought to avoid an outright affiliation
with the banned ANC, but in practice many were ANC members and the UDF’s character was
influenced by the strategies and tactics of the ANC. In UDF rallies across the country, ANC
freedom songs rang out again, rejuvenated by the new militant spirit.

7

To justify repressive measures against growing anti-apartheid resistance, South Africa
under Botha adopted a “Total Strategy” to counter the “total onslaught” of international
communism. Botha declared that the South African Communist Party (SACP) was using the
ANC as a front for communist penetration, comparing the situation to Mozambique and Angola
where Marxist governments accompanied independence. All radical opposition was put down as
“furthering the aims of communism” as South Africa set out on a campaign of “low-intensity
conflict.” According to Jackie Dugard, a researcher then with the Community Agency for Social
Enquiry (CASE) that monitored South Africa’s political violence, low-intensity conflict pursued
by the regime in South Africa was characterized by the use of covert action and nonconventional methods of warfare that served to spread fear, insecurity, and internal divisions
among target populations. This type of warfare had the benefit of being cost effective and less
internationally visible than conventional war. Repression was effected through bannings,
6

Seekings, The UDF, 49.

7

Bernard Magubane, “The Crisis of the Garrison State,” in The Road to Democracy in
South Africa, vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 48–9.
247

detentions, assassinations, kidnappings, and torture and included forming pacts with dissatisfied
and marginalized elements of society that resulted in hit squads and vigilante groups, which in
8

South Africa would soon be known as “third force.” South Africa employed this warfare both
internally and externally. Its wars of destabilization in Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia
attempted to protect the buffer ring of “white states,” destabilize recently freed black-run
countries, and limit the external threat of the ANC in southern Africa. These wars served as trial
runs for the apartheid regime’s internal low-intensity conflict.

9

Botha, formerly the Minister of Defense under Prime Minister B.J. Vorster, built the
formerly minor cabinet of State Security Council (SSC) into a “nerve center for coordinating the
policy, army, and key civilian departments.”

10

This massive security apparatus operated along

three lines: implement infrastructural projects and social programs to ameliorate conditions and
“win hearts and minds”; identify local activists so that the security police could apprehend them;
and execute a covert operation of dirty tricks and lethal violence. The restructured security
establishment consisted of the Department of Defense and the South African Defense Force
(SADF); specialized training institutes; the intelligence community of Military Intelligence (MI)
of SADF, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the Security Branch of South African
Police (SAP); an intellectual community of think-tanks and the Institute for Strategic Studies at
the University of Pretoria; the armaments industries, including the state-owned Armaments
Development Corporation (Armscor); and the SAP.

8

Dugard, “Low-Intensity Conflict,” 1–5.

9

11

Dugard, “Low-Intensity Conflict,” 18–20.

10

Gerhart and Glaser, From Protest to Challenge, 6: Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990,

32.
11

Dugard, “Low-Intensity Conflict,” 10.
248

South Africa’s “total strategy” was never constant or uniformly effective. It went through
changes in response to the shifting conditions and undertook its covert actions within flexible
parameters. Dugard identified three phases: the first between 1980 and 1986 coupled reform with
repression; the second counter-revolutionary war phase between 1986 and 1990 utilized the
“Win Hearts and Minds” strategy but witnessed the trial run of low-intensity conflict in KwaZulu
and Natal. The third phase between 1990 and 1994 employed the dual strategy of negotiations
12

and destabilization.

States of Emergency were declared in 1985 and in 1986 when the

government declared the UDF an “affected organization” so that it could no longer receive
international funding.

13

The success of Pretoria’s low-intensity conflict in KwaZulu-Natal relied heavily on
Inkatha. While Buthelezi spoke of Inkatha as founded upon the “principle of nonviolence” and
continued to project Inkatha as the inheritor of the ANC’s mantle inside the country, the two
organizations fell out after an October 1979 meeting in London. Mzala contends Buthelezi called
for the meeting in order to publicize his links with the ANC in the midst of growing criticism of
him as a traitor and apartheid collaborator.

14

Buthelezi’s biographer argues the Inkatha

president’s mission for the meeting was to have the ANC agree on a multi-strategy approach that
would enable each group to fight apartheid in its own way—the ANC could continue with the
armed struggle but Inkatha would promote non-violence.

15

Ultimately, the two organizations fell

12

Jackie Dugard, “South Africa’s Internal Low-Intensity Conflict,” in The Role of
Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: Community Agency for
Social Enquiry, 2003), 23.
13
Magubane, “The Crisis of the Garrison State,” 49–51.
14
15

Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda, 127.
Temkin, Buthelezi, 207–8.
249

out over which one would lead the liberation struggle. Buthelezi attempted to dismiss the ANC
in exile as the “external mission” and wished to supplant the ANC in South Africa.

16

By the end of the 1970s, KwaZulu leaders perceived Inkatha as the only legitimate
liberation movement and were becoming increasingly intolerant of differing political opinions. It
was not long before these clashes turned violent. According to Sithole, KwaZulu leaders began
to rely heavily on amabutho (armed regiments) in altercations with political opponents as early
as 1978. By 1980, Inkatha had begun to train youths at its paramilitary camp Mandleni/Matleng
in Zululand and armed Inkatha supporters patrolled the streets of KwaMashu (a Durban
17

township) in attempts to quell boycotting students.

This violence was further fomented by the involvement of the state security apparatus as
seen in the paramilitary training of Inkatha recruits for deployment against persons and
organizations perceived to be opposed to the South African government and Inkatha. From at
least 1982, the State Security Council fomented conflict between Inkatha, the ANC, and black
consciousness organizations.

18

In 1984, Buthelezi began to voice concerns in the KZLA about

the position of Inkatha supporters on the ground and encouraged preparation for defensive and
retaliatory action.

19

The following year, the Central Committee decided the whole of KwaZulu

and Natal needed to be a “no-go area” for the UDF. Allegations of a plan to assassinate Buthelezi
resulted in his request to the government and SADF for assistance. In September 1985, the

16

Gerhart and Glaser, From Protest to Challenge, 6: Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990,

29.
17
18

Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 840.
Gerhart and Glaser, From Protest to Challenge, 6: Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990,

113.
19

Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 34, Second Session of the Fourth Assembly, May
28, 1984, 916.
250

Minister of Defense, Magnus Malan, approved a national “contra-mobilization” program that
recommended paramilitary training for Inkatha for use against the UDF and ANC and warned of
special cover-up measures that would be necessarily accompany. According to Investigative
Task Unit Head Howard Varney’s submission to the TRC, approval had been supplied “at the
highest level.”

20

In what became known as “Operation Marion,” in 1986 the SADF gave paramilitary
training to 200 Inkatha supporters in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia (then a South African colony).
The training included the use of Soviet weapons, heavy artillery such as mortars and RPG7s,
explosives, landmines, and hand grenades as well as techniques to avoid arrest or interrogation.
These so-called Caprivians were then deployed across KwaZulu and Natal in September 1986,
often in the guise of KwaZulu Police and particularly in the townships surrounding
Pietermaritzburg. Many served as security and personal henchmen for Inkatha leaders, chiefs,
izinduna, and the men who earned the moniker “warlord.” The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission found Caprivians responsible for many of the most infamous and deadly incidents,
including instigation of violence in Mpumalanga and Clermont townships, the Sarmcol
shopsteward murders, the KwaMakhutha massacre of 1987, the Midlands War in Edendale and
Vulindlela, and the 1990 Seven Days War.

21

In addition to military training, Botha’s government approved a propaganda project that
included SAP funding for several Inkatha and United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA)

20

Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The Caprivi Trainees,
August 4, 1997. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/submit/caprivi.htm (accessed June 16,
2012).
21
South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles, 219–28.
251

rallies, including the March 25, 1990 Durban rally that sparked the Seven Days War.

22

Throughout the negotiations for the democratic transition, the police supplied weaponry to
Inkatha, fueling the violence. While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found little
evidence of a centrally directed or formally constituted “third force,” evidence was irrefutable
that a “network of security and ex-security force operatives, frequently acting in conjunction
with right-wing elements and/or sectors of the IFP, was involved in actions that could be
construed as fomenting violence and which resulted in gross human rights violations, including
random and target killings.”

23

This brutality made news headlines worldwide, giving international divestment
campaigns momentum with immediate effect. After the 1985 State of Emergency, one of the
biggest lenders, Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, stopped rolling over its loans to South
Africa ($500 million) and recalled its credit. Other banks began to withdraw credit, the rand
began falling, and big business began to plan its exit, undermining P.W. Botha’s assurances of
South African economic stability.

24

South Africa was in crisis.

uDlame in Pietermaritzburg: Refugees Come to Goedverwachting
The 1976 Soweto uprising that marked an escalation in anti-apartheid resistance in South Africa
did not initially spill over to KwaZulu-Natal, a phenomenon some attribute to the discipline of
Inkatha. But tensions began to run high in the Midlands region after the announcement of plans

22

South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa Report Volume 6, 582–3; Piper and Morrow, To Serve and Protect.
23
South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa Report Volume 6, 584.
24
Magubane, “The Collapse of the Garrison State.”
252

to transfer the administration of Imbali, Edendale, and Ashdown to KwaZulu in 1980 and the
formation of the Pietermaritzburg UDF branch in 1983. Existing civic organizations in Imbali
increased resistance after the visit of the Minister of Cooperation and Development Piet
Koornhoff to Imbali township in 1984.

25

Most descriptions of the violence in Natal take as a

turning point the August 1985 murder of Victoria Mxenge, a Durban lawyer and local UDF
executive whose husband Griffiths was assassinated in 1980.

26

In Pietermaritzburg, the start of

the violence is usually associated with a stayaway organized by the UDF/Federation of South
African Trade Unions (FOSATU)

27

in support of striking workers in Mpophomeni Township.

28

On May 1, 1985, BTR-SARMCOL rubber factory workers went on strike to get the
Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) recognized. BTR-SARMCOL dismissed over 900
MAWU members, resulting in unemployment for virtually all of the UDF-allied Mpophomeni.
FOSATU established a workers’ cooperative to assist the unemployed and organized a citywide
stayaway and consumer boycott to demand their reinstatement. Chief Buthelezi called upon
Inkatha members to resist the stayaway and boycott. As the UDF and trade union movement in
Natal gained strength, the South African government funded the formation of the Inkatha-led
workers’ organization, the United Workers’ Union of South Africa (UWUSA) in 1986 as an

25

Sithole, “The ANC Underground,” 239.

26

Bill Freund, “The Violence in Natal, 1985-1990,” in Political Economy and Identities
in KwaZulu-Natal, ed. Robert Morrell (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1996), 180–
1.
27
FOSATU gave way to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU),
which was formed in mid-1985 in the midst of the FOSATU-sponsored stayaway.
28
Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control”; Kentridge, An Unofficial
War; Minnaar, Patterns of Violence.
253

alternative to the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
According to one document uncovered during what became known as the Inkathagate scandal,

29
30

UWUSA was a SAP-controlled project that was also supported by the American labor federation
AFL-CIO.

31

In 1987, BTR-SARMCOL replaced striking workers with UWUSA members.

On December 5, 1986, Inkatha held a rally in the Mpophomeni community with
supporters bussed in from the nearby areas of Vulindlela and Edendale. After the meeting, the
Inkatha supporters spread out through the township, attacking residents and property. Four
prominent MAWU members, Phineaus Sibiya, Micca Sibiya, Simon Ngubane, and Flomena
Mnikathi were abducted and then assaulted by armed men in KwaZulu Police uniforms. The
charred bodies of Phineaus Sibiya, Ngubane, and Mnikathi were found the next day, but Micca
Sibiya escaped. A formal inquest into the killing found nine known Inkatha members (including
Caprivi trainee Vela Mchunu) responsible for the deaths, but none were charged. The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission found that these killings set in motion the lengthy period of political
conflict that ensued.

32

29

Buthelezi launched UWUSA on May Day at Durban’s King’s Park Stadium. An
estimated 50,000 were transported in (probably on busses paid for by the state government) for
the rally. “Transport for 50 000 laid on for UWUSA launch,” Natal Witness Echo May 1, 1986.
30
In July 1991, the Weekly Mail and UK Guardian published irrefutable evidence, stolen
from the SAP Special Branch by Brian Morrow, that the apartheid government had secretly
funded Inkatha. The scandal became know n as Inkathagate. See Piper and Morrow, To Serve
and Protect.
31
Szeftel, “Manoeuvres of War in South Africa,” 74; Piper and Morrow, To Serve and
Protect, 53, 79.
32
South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles, 238–9. See also Radley Keys,
“Mpophomeni: The ANC’s Dilemma,” in Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal
(Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 129–42.
254

Thereafter, the violence across the Pietermaritzburg region spiraled as the conflict
escalated into a struggle for control of the townships and Inkatha embarked on forced
recruitment campaigns in the face of increasing UDF popularity.

33

Nkosinathi Gwala, writing at

the time of the violence, saw the real spark as this recruitment, particularly in the Harewood
section of Edendale, an African freehold area.

34

Local strongmen, chiefs, izinduna and warlords

often organized Inkatha supporters for attack. In Harewood, the young and fearsome Sichizo
Zuma operated with impunity, committing murder, arson, kidnapping and assault.

35

the Inkatha chairman Councillor Mncwabe managed Caprivians from his home.

36

In Edendale,
The Inkatha

recruiters earned the name Otheleweni, or “those who push others down the cliff,” terrorizing the
Edendale community.
Civic organizations formed under the ambit of the UDF in Imbali, Edendale, and
Ashdown and youth set up self-defense units independently in response to the attacks.

37

According to Gwala, the Inkatha recruitment campaigns provided the first common issue to unite
Edendale,

38

but Sithole has highlighted the earlier popular youth struggles of Edendale’s D.C.O

Matiwane Youth League that served as the nucleus from which ANC underground structures
operated in Pietermaritzburg’s black townships.

39

While some have sought to explain this large-

scale social movement of comrades, or amaqabane, in terms of youth finding their way amidst

33
34
35

Minnaar, Patterns of Violence, 7.
Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control.”
Kentridge, An Unofficial War, 184.

36

Sithole, “The ANC Underground,” 264.

37

Sithole, “The ANC Underground,” 242, 261.

38

Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control,” 515.

39

Sithole, “The ANC Underground,” 229.
255

unemployment and the breakdown of social norms, Ari Sitas has shown the movement to be one
of relative autonomy involving voluntary (and sometimes coerced) participation, cultural
dynamics, and a new volatile social identity shaped through mobilization and conflict. They saw
themselves as soldiers of the liberation movement. Their gatherings were characterized by
militant songs and gestures, public display of weapons, toyi-toyi, and khaki or military-style
attire.

40

The amaqabane operated under the ANC’s directive to make the country ungovernable.

There was a growing perception that the authorities were not impartial.
And the UDF youth were not alone. In late 1960 and early 1961, the underground South
African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC began independent discussions about a turn
towards the armed struggle. A decision was made to meet state violence with violence.

41

Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), or the “Spear of the Nation” was formed as the ANC’s military wing
to complement mass action. MK embarked on a thirty-year campaign of armed struggle and
sabotage. ANC and SACP guerillas trained across Africa, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe
before attempting to infiltrate South Africa. During the Pietermaritzburg violence of the 1980s,
the ANC underground and MK units actively participated in mobilizing self-defense units. Youth
were given crash courses and subjected to intense political education in order to defend their
communities. Men such as Dumezweni Zimu, Sipho Gcabashe, and Cassius Lubisi operated in
Pietermaritzburg and provided military equipment to the defense units.

40

42

Sitas, “The Making of the ‘Comrades’ Movement in Natal, 1985-91.”

41

For more on the debate over and establishment of MK, see Bernard Magubane et al.,
“The Turn to Armed Struggle,” in The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol. 1 [1960–1970]
(Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004), 53–146.
42
Sithole, “The ANC Underground,” 261–9.
256

A cycle of vicious violence erupted with each side accusing the other of instigation. The
violence spread to nearly every Pietermaritzburg township, with skirmishes an almost everyday
occurrence. The climate of political intolerance raged unabated, especially after the release from
Robben Island of ANC veteran Harry Gwala, who despite a debilitating motor neuron disease
threw himself into the mobilization of counterattacks and became known as the “Lion of the
43

Midlands.”

Various peace attempts failed because of an inability to impose discipline at the local
level. Conservative estimates hold that nearly 12,000 people died in the civil war between 1985
and 1996 in KwaZulu-Natal.

44

Thousands more were wounded, raped, or abducted. Many

disappeared. Between 1987 and 1989 alone, over 1,100 homes and nearly 300 vehicles were
destroyed or damaged.
country.

46

45

An estimated 200,000-500,000 became refugees in their own

“Every road, ditch, yard, river, house and hillside is a war zone,” wrote reporter and

43

The TRC found that Gwala functioned as a self-styled ANC warlord, facilitating a
climate in which gross human rights violations could take place. For more on Gwala, see Charles
Nqakula, “Harry Gwala - Man of Steel,” African Communist, 1995,
http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2370#Harry; O’Malley, Shades of Difference, 285–7;
South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles, 214–5.
44
12,000 remains the most readily accepted number for this region. As Philippe Denis
has recently pointed out, while Anthea Jeffery’s pro-Inkatha views may be controversial, her
figures for the Natal Midlands are not substantially different from those of John Aitchison, the
coordinator of the Unrest Monitoring Project at the University of Natal. Aitchison, “Numbering
the Dead,” 114; Jeffery, The Natal Story, 1; Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, Indians Versus
Russians, 5.
45
Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead,” 106–7; Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, Indians
Versus Russians, 5.
46
Eduardo Mariño, KwaZulu-Natal Emergency: The 1994 Emergency in KwaZulu-Natal,
Republic of South Africa: Statements & Observations from the International Observer to the
Emergency (Durban-Johannesburg: E. Mariño, 1994), 14; Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, Indians
Versus Russians, 5.
257

political analyst Matthew Kentridge.

47

These places became politically territorialized and “no-go

areas” emerged as the UDF and Inkatha fought for dominance. Some neighborhoods were
renamed; Harewood became Ulundi, signifying it as an Inkatha stronghold and Dambuza took on
the name Maputo after the then anti-apartheid friendly city. People were killed simply for being
in the wrong place. Life for local people became a daily struggle against life-threatening danger
and insecurity.
By 1989, the violence began shifting towards the rural areas, with major conflicts
erupting around the rural Midlands towns of Richmond, Mooi River, Greytown, Estcourt, and at
Port Shepstone on the South Coast. According to violence monitor John Aitchison, the rural
violence was underreported and poorly understood. Many simply labeled the tensions as those
between “modernising comrades” and “KwaZulu’s traditionalist tribal structures.”

48

But Chief

Maphumulo’s Table Mountain remained quiet.
Families and individuals across KwaZulu-Natal began to flee, some forced to do so by
the destruction of their homes. Some found refuge with family and sympathetic employers away
from the raging violence. The same hesitancy to label the conflict a “war” resulted in an
unwillingness on the part of government officials to label these persons as “refugees.” No war
meant no refugees and therefore no institutional requirement to help them. They instead became
“displacees.”

47
48

49

With initially no organization monitoring the displacement, as well as the

Kentridge, An Unofficial War, 18.
APC. PC11 John Aitchison, “Can Inkathagate be closed?” unpublished and undated

paper.
49

Wendy Leeb, “Death, Devastation and Destruction - Refugees in Natal” (Centre for
Adult Education, University of Natal-Pietermaritzburg, n.d.).
258

manner in which people first sought refuge with others they knew, numbers for this initial wave
of refugees remain obscured.
Some of the people fleeing from the Pietermaritzburg violence began to flock to Chief
Maphumulo. The Table Mountain region initially remained a haven in the midst of the storm.
Many of these refugees settled in the isigodi known as Echibini on the disputed trust farm. Some
moved very early in the violence and were able to take with them furniture and housing
materials. MaZondi recalls moving after her brother was killed when uDlame broke out in
KwaShange in 1987. After the same men threatened her father, the family decided it was time to
leave. Their pastor’s family told them about sites in Maqongqo, so they packed all of their
belongings and moved temporarily into a two-roomed house until her mother found a site and
began to build their new home.

50

Others were less fortunate, and fled with nothing.

By October 1988, Maphumulo estimated that already 500 families had fled to his region,
camping at his inkantolo and paying khonza fees for access to their own pieces of land. By 1989,
the number of refugees had reached 10,000.

51

In the beginning they were largely Inkatha

supporting refugees, but later influxes brought unaffiliated and UDF-aligned families.
Maphumulo welcomed all, as long as they understood the necessity of political tolerance. But the
strain on resources became significant. Maphumulo told the press, “More keep on coming, but I
do not have enough land.”

52

50

Thobile Ngcobo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNxamalala,
January 17, 2011.
51
“Maphumulo – the ‘peacemaker’,” New African April 17, 1989.
52

“Maqongqo chief to ask for more land to accommodate refugees,” Natal Witness
October 13, 1988; “Local chief offers refuge to all on a non-political basis,” Natal Witness Echo
October 13, 1988.
259

Maphumulo further explained the expectation that the refugees khonza to him. “People
are not made to pay money to live in the area, but in our tradition they are expected to pay
‘khonza’ – a tribute to the chief – just like when they leave the area they are supposed to pay
‘valelisa’ to the chief they have been staying under.” He admitted that the state of war prevented
many from paying the valelisa fee. He also explained that khonza could range from a goat to
small sum of money, dependent upon the person’s circumstances.

53

The leader began to earn a

reputation as the “peace chief.”

The Warlords and a “Peace Chief”
Central to the conflict across Pietermaritzburg were local strongmen such as the infamous
Thomas Shabalala of Lindelani and David Ntombela, the local Inkatha chairman and induna of
Vulindlela. Men such as these were notorious for their ruthless manipulation of land and
resources and complex systems of patronage and clientalism. The term warlordism has been used
loosely and descriptively to “designate a local military commander who has acquired some civil
powers, and uses them by force.”

54

It was first used to describe the process in China in the 1910s

where the collapse of central state authority led to the emergence of powerful regional overlords
who ruled by force. These individuals were often former state functionaries who gained control
as the state lost power. The applicability of the term “warlord” to African leaders has been in
debate for some time and in South Africa the question centers on the alternate usage of “vigilante

53

“Maqongqo chief to ask for more land to accommodate refugees,” Natal Witness
October 13, 1988.
54
Darch, “Are There Warlords in Provincial Mozambique?”
260

leader” or “gang leader.”

55

Morris Szeftel argued for the applicability of the warlord concept to

Africa on account of Inkatha and Sudanese militias, but the term can be relevant for Ethiopia,
Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo as well.

56

That the term warlord can apply to Africa should no longer be in doubt. But these
scholarly studies do highlight the variability of warlord types. For South Africa, scholars have
often referred to a detailed definition of warlords as put forth by the academic and violence
monitor John Aitchison. His definition is worth citing at length:
Warlords are powerful local leaders who rely on the force of arms to maintain
their power. They tend to gather a group of professional strong-arm men around
them and they pay for their services by screwing the local populace. Now to that
extent, you could say that they are no more and no less than gang leaders, but the
key difference is that they are not motivated exclusively by the acquisition of
personal wealth and power, but in addition they owe allegiance to a central power,
namely Inkatha. You could say the difference lies in the form of extortion: gang
leaders fight for money and territory, whereas warlords are also crusaders for a
political cause. There’s one other reason for calling these people warlords, and
that’s the hype that surrounds them, and I don’t just mean in the media, I mean
among their own communities. Their exploits become the stuff of modern-day
legend, like fairy-tale villains, attributed with special powers, personal
57
invulnerability.

55

The term is still critiqued as an ideological weapon. On the applicability to Africa
more generally, see the special issue of Review of African Political Economy 45/46 (1989). On
South Africa, see “Warlords” in Kentridge, An Unofficial War, 181–95.
56
Morris Szeftel, “Editorial: Warlords and Problems of Democracy in Africa,” Review of
African Political Economy 45/46 (1989): 3–6; Mordechai Abir, Ethiopia: The Era of the princes:
The challenge of Islam and Re-unification of the Christian Empire, 1769-1855. (New York:
Praeger, 1968); Robert L Hess, Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1970); M.A. Mohamed Salih, “‘New Wine in Old Bottles’: Tribal Militas and
the Sudanese State,” Review of African Political Economy 45/46 (1989): 168–74; Roger Charlton
and Roy May, “Warlords and Militarism in Chad,” Review of African Political Economy 45/46
(1989): 12–25; William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1998); Toyin Falola and Dare Oguntomisin, Yoruba Warlords of the Nineteenth
Century (Trenton, NJ; Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press, 2001).
57
Aitchison quoted in Kentridge, An Unofficial War, 81. Also cited in the most thorough
but by no means comprehensive examination of warlords in South Africa to date, Anthony
261

Aitchison, Anthony Minnaar, and Morris and Hindson distinguish types of Inkatha-allied
warlords in opposition to the leaders of ANC/UDF-allied youth organizations that varied from
politically disciplined defense committees that extracted “taxes” to criminal gangs that looted
and extorted for personal gain. Minnaar builds upon Aitchison’s definition to delineate the
specific South African types as the semirural/traditional induna type; the enforcer/hitman; the
urban town councillor; and the squatter-lord type. These can be only Inkatha-affiliated warlords
and “there is nothing directly equivalent to warlords in the ranks of the UDF/ANC
structures…”

58

Similarly, at the member level, the term “vigilante” tends to be associated with

armed gangs of men intent on intimidating or killing anti-apartheid activists.

59

This association

links vigilantism with Inkatha, rather than taking into consideration the applicability of the
concept across the political divide to incorporate instances where ANC/UDF affiliated youth
policed territory and ensured justice via people’s courts and necklacings. While Minnaar, Morris,
and Hindson have called attention to the vulnerability of local ANC leaders to warlord
tendencies, there remains a propensity to label local Inkatha leaders as warlords and ANC
leaders as freedom fighters.

60

Minnaar, “‘Undisputed Kings’: Warlordism in Natal,” in Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of
Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 61–94.
58
Minnaar, “Undisputed Kings,” 62–6; Morris and Hindson, “South Africa,” 51.
59

Haysom, Mabangalala; Meer and Institute for Black Research, Resistance in the
Townships; Minnaar, “Undisputed Kings,” 69.
60
The noted exception here is Sifiso Nkabinde, the Richmond ANC leader who
instigated a small-scale civil war after his expulsion from the party for being a police spy. See
Rupert Taylor, “Justice Denied: Political Violence in KwaZulu-Natal After 1994,” African
Affairs 101, no. 405 (2002): 473–508; Ragavaloo, Richmond. As well, Sarah Mathis has
examined several ANC-affiliated Umbumbulu leaders who meet many of the criteria of
warlords. Sarah Mathis, “From War Leaders to Freedom Fighters: Forms of Violence in
Umbumbulu in the 1980s and 90s,” 2005. As well, Harry Gwala was suspended from the SACP
262

Mhlabunzima Maphumulo’s rise as a powerful local figure must be examined in this
context. In contrast to the warlords associated with Inkatha, he first emerged in the press as a
“peace chief” and “maverick” leader dedicated to quelling the Midlands violence. Maphumulo
appears to have had the best interests of his people at heart and did not rely on force to govern,
but as he was drawn into ANC/UDF networks through Contralesa he gathered strong-arm men
around him, crusaded for a political cause, turned to the armed struggle, and earned a largerthan-life reputation. Because Maphumulo so frequently visited the offices of the Natal Witness
and drew upon his platform with Contralesa it is much easier to track his actions and legendary
reputation, but the Table Mountain men with whom he clashed, such as the Nyavu chief
Bangubukhosi Mdluli and the Gcabashe brothers, Thomas Mshoki and Sabelo, inspired fear and
awe in their communities. As we will see, Mdluli’s followers not only invaded Mbambangalo but
also were implicated in the attacks of the Seven Days War in March 1990. The Gcabashe
brothers, Thomas Msoki and Sabelo, spearheaded many of the Inkatha meetings designed to oust
Chief Maphumulo that resulted in violence.

61

Maphumulo had been recognized as a “rebel chief” and “maverick” in the press as early
as 1980 in the wake of the formation of the opposition Inala Party in KwaZulu. But he was first
recognized as the “peace chief” in late 1988 after a series of well-publicized peace initiatives and
attacks on the South African Police. In August, Maphumulo organized a new effort to bring
in 1994 on account of allegations of sectarian behavior that may also be interpreted as
warlordism. See Nqakula, “Harry Gwala”; O’Malley, Shades of Difference, 285–7.
61
For evidence of Nyavu involvement in the Seven Days War in Vulindlela, see
Timothy Smith, testimony to the TRC, Pietermaritzburg, November 1996,
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_11.htm (accessed 24 December 2011).
For evidence of Gcabashe’s collaboration with South African Police, see Affidavit of Chief
Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, February 1, 1990, in the Supreme Court of South Africa Natal
Provincial Division in the Matter between Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo and The Minister of
Law and Order, the Commissioner of South African Police, and Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli
Case No. 280/90.
263

peace to the Pietermaritzburg region. He convened a meeting of clergymen, Inkatha members,
and representatives of the Edendale Crisis Committee with the assistance of Inkatha Central
Committee member Ben Jele, but senior Inkatha officials ignored the meeting.

62

In October, a month before Mpumalanga Magistrate Peter Webber visited the trust farm
in an attempt to sort out the land dispute, Maphumulo threw a “peace party” at his court in
Maqongqo to celebrate his 15-year reign as chief and the calm that had prevailed there under his
rule. Indeed, the numbers analyzed for 1987-89 unrest events by Aitchison attest to Table
Mountain’s peace. Eight “events” occurred in the region in contrast to 37 in nearby Ehlazeni,
350 in Imbali township, and 830 in the Vulindlela region.

63

Peace party attendees included

Mpumalanga mayor Roger Sishi, the Mpumalanga magistrate Peter Webber, and both
“traditional stick-wielding warriors and young maqabane (comrades) displaced from the
violence-torn Pietermaritzburg townships.”

64

Speakers Ben Jele and COSATU regional

coordinator Bheki Ngidi attributed the lack of violence during Maphumulo’s rule to his
neutrality. The chief described his success, “I am an Inkatha man, but that does not mean I have
to discriminate. I have to accommodate every member of my tribe irrespective of their political
allegiance, be it UDF, Cosatu, Inkatha, or Azapo. I will not tolerate people who go house to
house forcing others to join their organization.”

65

62

“New peace initiative for city’s townships,” Natal Witness, August 9, 1988; Wyndham
Hartley, “The resurgence of violence,” Opinion, Natal Witness August 12, 1988.
63
For the purpose of his analysis, Aitchison used “events” more or less synonymously
with what the press and Police Unrest Reports described as “events” or “incidents.” An “event”
could describe a single incident or several, but ranges from an attack on a house to murder.
Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead,” 83–110.
64
Fred Kockett, “Cosatu, Inkatha leaders meet at chief’s party,” Natal Witness, October
10, 1988.
65
Kockett, “Cosatu, Inkatha leaders meet at chief’s party.”
264

However, not all local leaders supported Maphumulo’s peace efforts. At the peace
gathering, Maphumulo told the press about opposition he faced from other chiefs of
Pietermaritzburg who “do not like what I am doing and say I must not accept any UDF members
in my community.”

66

After the meeting, Maphumulo received multiple threats on his life,

allegedly from militant elements within Inkatha. Callers to the chief threatened that he would die
like his friend, the neighboring Ximba chief, Msinga Mlaba, who had been gunned down near
Camperdown (east of Pietermaritzburg) the same year due to his UDF connections. In the
context of the Natal violence, Maphumulo and his councillors decided to hire bodyguards to
protect the chief and his people.

67

Displeasure with Maphumulo at the highest levels of Inkatha became clear when the
KZLA called on the chief to appear before it, allegedly because of his decision to hold the peace
party and ask for more land for the refugees. Chief Minister Buthelezi also announced there had
been allegations of the chief’s interference in Gcumisa affairs. The summons stated he would
again be charged under the KwaZulu Chiefs and Headmen’s Act should he fail to attend.
Maphumulo refused to attend the inquiry, recalling his earlier suspension and assault in Ulundi
when the recently assassinated Chief Mlaba helped him. He alleged, “I know they and the chief
minister want me deposed for not towing the Inkatha line.”

68

Chief Maphumulo thus brought to

an end his short-lived identification as an “Inkatha man.”

66

Local chief offers refuge to all” and “Death threats force Chief Maphumulo to hire
guards,” Natal Witness Echo October 27, 1988.
67
Local chief offers refuge to all” and “Death threats force Chief Maphumulo to hire
guards.”
68
Fred Kockett, “Chief fears Buthelezi may strip him of his title,” Natal Witness
November 23, 1988; “Death threats;” “Verbatim Report of the First Session of the Fifth
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly,” April 7, 1989.
265

Maphumulo also spearheaded peace efforts in the neighboring war-torn Mpumalanga
township where he was still chairman of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority. Violence was
rampant in the township since the mid-1980s when existing tensions between local organizations
erupted after the murder of regional UDF leader Victoria Mxenge.

69

By 1989, Mpumalanga had

the reputation as the most unstable area in the province. Maphumulo initially attempted to
arrange meetings where residents could air their grievances with senior police officials regarding
the actions of kitkonstabels (special constables) who many believed were the source of much of
the violence. Several protests were organized by women who called for the replacement of the
kitkonstabels with South African Defence Force (SADF) troops. Maphumulo too began to call
outright for the removal of the kitkonstabels who were then replaced with KwaZulu Police
(KZP).

70

The KZP force had been established in 1980 after negotiations between the KwaZulu and
South African governments. The process of handing over South African Police (SAP) stations in
KwaZulu territory to the KZP began as early as 1981, though the South African government
initially refused to relinquish control of some of the largest Natal townships to the KZP.
KwaZulu and Inkatha continued to push for the handover of these stations (including one at
Mpumalanga). Complaints against the KZP arose almost immediately after local handovers.
Violence monitors outlined several KZP trends: collusion with Inkatha/involvement in unlawful
acts; failure to investigate complaints and crimes; failure to protect the people; bias towards

69

For more on Mpumalanga, see Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity.”

70

“Meeting over violence postponed,” Natal Mercury October 22, 1988; “Mpumalanga
meeting on violence,” Natal Witness, November 16, 1988; Khaba Mkhize, “Mpumalanga
magistrate flees home after death threat,” Natal Witness Echo June 15, 1989.
266

Inkatha; and involvement in covert military activities.

71

With such a notorious reputation, it

seems incredible that Mpumalanga residents would prefer KZP control. But Debby Bonnin’s
research on Mpumalanga shows that the dynamics between the SAP, SADF, and KZP enabled
those on the ground to exploit the power play between these state security groups to their own
advantage. Within the first month, community leaders were praising the KZP and reporting that
violence had greatly subsided. Women remained steadfastly opposed to any attempts to have the
kitkonstabels returned.

72

Given Maphumulo’s later efforts to have kitkonstabels removed from

his own territory and his break with Inkatha, it seems more likely that the chief helped to
negotiate the handover to KZP based on the desires of Mpumalanga residents than because of
any push by Inkatha.

“Because my people are in the MDM, I have to be with them”

73

Another arena through which Chief Maphumulo strove to bring peace to the Natal region was the
Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa). He utilized the organization to
sponsor a commission of inquiry into the violence after he was refused by the central
government, traveled to Lusaka to meet with the ANC in exile, and later drew upon its networks
for protection. While the memory of Maphumulo is one of a neutral peace chief, his leadership of
Contralesa illustrates both a more progressive affiliation and an inclination towards militarism
than usually recognized.

71

Jenny Irish and Howard Varney, “The KwaZulu Police: Obstacle to Peace?,” in
Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research
Council, 1992), 49–55.
72
Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity,” 258.
73

Maphumulo, “Interview with Chief Maphumulo,” Sechaba (1990), 8.
267

From its formation in 1983, the United Democratic Front had failed to develop a coherent
strategy towards rural issues and the institution of the chieftaincy beyond calls for abolition of
the bantustans and the return of land to the people. Chiefs were generally equated with bantustan
structures and believed to be a dying institution, as famously announced by then publicity
secretary Terror Lekota, to be replaced by democratically elected officials. But a 1987 “rural
report” came to a more noncommittal conclusion, recognizing that chiefs were both a “suitable
issue to unite a broad range of people” against and a possibly expedient alliance.

74

When Prince

Klaas Makhosana Mahlangu fled to Pretoria in fear for his life during the successful antiindependence movement in KwaNdebele, Northern Transvaal UDF leaders found themselves
uncertain about how to respond. “Could ‘progressive’ chiefs be organized to further the
75

liberation struggle?”

Klaas Makhosana Mahlungu was one of these ‘progressive’ traditional leaders. A
member of the Ndzundza royal family, Mahlangu fled KwaNdebele in December 1985 after he
nearly 100 armed vigilantes dragged him and his family from their homestead. The Ndzundza
royal family headed an anti-independence alliance in the wake of the incorporation of Moutse
(originally slated as part of the homeland Lebowa), the planned independence for KwaNdebele,
and the brutal activities of the pro-independence organization Mbokotho.

76

Sekibakiba Peter

Lekgoathi argues the royal family “chose to act as a symbolic centre of protest in part because
74
75

van Kessel, Beyond Our Wildest Dreams, 76–85.
van Kessel, Beyond Our Wildest Dreams, 83.

76

Transvaal Rural Action Committee and Black Sash, KwaNdebele: The Struggle
against “Independence” (Johannesburg: Transvaal Action Committee, 1986); Edwin Ritchken,
“The KwaNdebele Struggle Against Independence,” in South African Review, vol. 5
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989), 426–45; Sekibakiba Peter Lekgoathi, “The United
Democratic Front in Lebowa and KwaNdebele During the 1980s,” in The Road to Democracy in
South Africa, vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 658.
268

they perceived that the Bantustan rulers were threatening to undermine the authority of chiefs by
subordinating it to the KwaNdebele government structures.” By taking sides with their people,
the Ndzundza family re-established a great degree of popular legitimacy for the chieftainship.

77

Youth Congresses were also organized in KwaNdebele and Moutse, the area on the northeastern
boundary of KwaNdebele excised from Lebowa and incorporated into KwaNdebele in early
1986, and linked to the national South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) under Peter Mokaba.
Mokaba approached the ANC and UDF with a proposal to form a body of traditional
leaders comprised of men and women like Mahlungu who had signaled their disillusionment
with apartheid.

78

After Mahlungu escaped to KwaZulu (his wife, Princess Nonhlanhla was sister

of King Goodwill Zwelethini)

79

and ultimately to Mamelodi, Mahlungu met Richard Mothupi,

who introduced him to activists of UDF, SAYCO, and the Construction and Allied Workers’
Union (CAWU) from the Transvaal regions. With the guidance of Mokaba, 38 chiefs and
subchiefs from KwaNdebele and Moutse launched an organization committed to uniting
traditional leaders against apartheid and the homeland system in September 1987.

80

Membership

was open to all traditional leaders, including members of royal families and the children and

77

Lekgoathi, “The United Democratic Front in Lebowa and KwaNdebele During the
1980s,” 656.
78
Paul Holden and Sello Mathabatha, “The Politics of Resistance: 1948-1990,” in
Mpumalanga: History and Heritage (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007),
427–9.
79
Colleen McCaul, Satellite in Revolt: KwaNdebele: An Economic and Political Profile
(Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1987), 78.
80
van Kessel, Beyond Our Wildest Dreams, 83; Holden and Mathabatha, “The Politics of
Resistance: 1948-1990,” 427–9.
269

wives of traditional leaders.

81

Thus, Contralesa was born. The organization initially took

responsibility for many of the refugees from KwaNdebele and Moutse, accommodating and
catering for them and in the process running up a large debt it would battle to settle for several
years. A committee was elected and deputed to recruit traditional leaders. It opened an account
with Standard Bank and solicited funds from the South African Council of Churches, South
African Catholic Bishops Conference, Kagiso Trust, and the UDF.

82

Ineke van Kessel argued that from its inauguration, Contralesa’s relationship with the
UDF and the ANC remained ambiguous. The involvement of SAYCO in the launch of
Contralesa gave rise to reasonable suspicions that the organization’s main goal was the
abolishment of the institution of the chieftaincy. Several of the activists involved in the
formation were indeed motivated by the belief there was no place for chiefs in a classless
society. But in the meantime, recruiting traditional leaders to the progressive cause would
prevent them from subverting the struggle. However, this combination of “‘struggle’ rhetoric
with wooing chiefs” sometimes proved difficult. Contralesa employed UDF methods, advertising
itself as a progressive grassroots and community-based organisation and handed out t-shirts to its
distinguished members, “who would have preferred a tie or a classy briefcase.”

81

83

Patekile Holomisa, interview by Padraig O’Malley, October 16, 1996,
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv00017/04lv00344/05lv00965/06lv0
1042.htm (accessed January 1,2012).
82
“Minutes of the Meeting to Elect Interim Committee, held at Johannesburger Hotel, on
Jun 10-11, 1989,” in Holomisa, A Double-Edged Sword, 4.
83
van Kessel, Beyond Our Wildest Dreams, 84.
270

While Contralesa strove to present itself as an unaffiliated organization, the influence of
the ANC and the UDF in its early development and decision-making cannot be denied.

84

Chief

Sango Phatekile Holomisa, the current Contralesa president, acknowledged that the ANC
(through the UDF) did initiate the formation of Contralesa and ever since the organization has
been associated with the ANC.

85

From its very founding, UDF activists were central to

recruitment. Richard Mothupi, who had first introduced Prince Klaas Makhosana Mahlungu to
the UDF activists, served as the organization’s initial National Organizer. The ANC sought out
Holomisa for his legal expertise and asked him to join.

86

Similarly, Chief Maphumulo was

actively recruited by ANC/UDF activists at a meeting at the University of Natal in
Pietermaritzburg.

87

At the first Contralesa meeting of national representatives in June 1989, the members
present resolved not to align with any political organization, but decided to hold consultations
with progressive organizations such as the ANC. An address by R.S. Ndou and a message from
UDF president Albertina Sisulu both encouraged Contralesa to meet with the ANC.

88

Over the

next several months, the message of the meetings was similar: the organization needed to pursue
84

It must be noted that Contralesa and the ANC later fell out during the constitutional
negotiations where Contralesa’s arguments in favor of preserving the chieftaincy too closely
resembled those of the Inkatha Freedom Party. The organization has since been sidelined amidst
its critiques of the local election ward system; S.P. Holomisa has intensified efforts to publicize
these critiques, including several publications and an upgraded website for Contralesa. See
Holomisa, A Double-Edged Sword.; and http://contralesa.org/, upgraded in 2011.
85
Patekile Holomisa, interview by Padraig O’Malley, August 20, 1997,
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv00017/04lv00344/05lv01092/06lv0
1149.htm (accessed January 1, 2012).
86
Gibbs, “Ah! Dilintzaba!”.
87

Jabulani Sithole, correspondence with the author.

88

“Minutes of the Meeting to Elect Interim Committee,” Holomisa, A Double-Edged
Sword, 4–13.
271

talks with the ANC, but not affiliate, for if Contralesa was seen as supporting specific
organizations it would be in danger of losing support from other chiefs.

89

In late July 1989,

Contralesa did send a delegation to Lusaka and the trip was widely covered in the press, which
also often described the congress as an UDF-affiliate. After the unbanning of the ANC,
Contralesa made calls for the people to support the ANC.

90

Pragmatism guided Contralesa’s unaffiliated stance, as clearly the organization was
ideologically inclined towards progressivism of the ANC and UDF. Holomisa said that the ANC
was supportive of the decision for Contralesa to project itself as an independent body in order to
attract leaders from across the political spectrum.

91

The interim committee members were aware

that an affiliation to the UDF or ANC could not only prevent other traditional leaders from
joining, it could put their own lives in danger in the midst of civil war. Indeed, after the
organization’s launch, several leaders and their homes were targeted for attack.

92

Archival records do not suggest exactly when Maphumulo joined the organization but
Contralesa records suggest that he had been aware of planning meetings as early as February

89

“Interim Committee Meeting: Laying down Policies and Procedures of Contrales, June
24, 1989”; “Meetings with Regional Chiefs: A Report: Contralesa meeting with Ciskeian Chiefs
at Horseshoe Motel on November 12, 1989”; all in Holomisa, A Double-Edged Sword.
90
“Support ANC – Contralesa chiefs,” Natal Witness Echo March 1, 1990.
91

Holomisa by O’Malley, October 16, 1996,
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv00017/04lv00018/05lv00110/06lv0
0123.htm (accessed January 1, 2012).
92
National Organizer and former trade unionist Siphiwe Thusi escaped an abduction
attempt in June 1989 and in September 1989 Chief Elphas Molefe was suspended by KwaZulu
for “sowing disunity.” Later, arsonists destroyed the still anti-Inkatha Prince Israel Mcwayizeni’s
home after he announced his membership. “Abduction attempt on Contralesa man,”;
Contralesa’s Thusi nearly abducted,” New African June 26, 1989; “Nquthu chief suspended from
duty,” Natal Witness September 21, 1989; “Home of Zulu Prince attacked by arsonists,” Natal
Witness November 15, 1989.
272

93

1989.

It is clear that for some time Maphumulo chose to keep this information secret and on at

least one occasion denied being a member.

94

In April, Maphumulo refused Inkatha officials

from Imbali and Inadi access to his people. Fearful of the violence plaguing nearby Edendale,
Ashdown, and Imbali, Maphumulo forbid Inkatha recruitment drives in Maqongqo.

95

Cognizant

of Inkatha’s existing animosity towards him, Maphumulo may have hoped to protect himself by
keeping his membership private.
Additionally, he would not have wanted any affiliation to derail his latest peace initiative.
In the same month he refused Inkatha recruitment campaigns in Maqongqo, Maphumulo
spearheaded efforts to establish a commission of inquiry into the violence in Natal. Throughout
1988, Anglican Bishop of Natal, Michael Nuttall corresponded with State President P.W. Botha
regarding the unrest. Bishop Nuttall had called for a judicial commission of inquiry into the
violence but Botha refused, claiming that senior police officials had carried out an investigation
and found “clear signs that calm has returned to the area.”

96

Pressure mounted as the Natal

Witness, COSATU, the Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches (PCC), the Pietermaritzburg
Agency for Christian Social Awareness (PACSA), the Progressive Federal Party, and the
Anglican Church all threw their weight behind the call. Even Buthelezi said he supported the
commission’s establishment “in principle.”

93
94

97

Holomisa, A Double-Edged Sword, 5.
“Peacekeeper not surprised at attack,” Natal Witness April 19, 1989.

95

Lakela Kaunda, “Inkatha ‘recruitment’ drive in Maqongqo worries chief,” Natal
Witness Echo April 6, 1989.
96
“Unrest inquiry refused,” Natal Witness March 4, 1989.
97

Bryan Pearson, “Collusion claim: pressure grows,” Natal Witness March 31, 1989.
273

Maphumulo announced another petition to Botha. The state president’s refusal,
Maphumulo said, was based on an incorrect assessment that the violence had receded. As
chairman of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority and chief of an area welcoming refugees,
Maphumulo witnessed firsthand the scale and impact of what he called a civil war. “The
continuing state of chaos and violence has resulted in a condition of fear, confusion and
hopelessness among my people,” the chief said.

98

Ordinary administrative, police, and legal

processes had broken down. As chaos replaced order in daily life, he felt it was his duty to
petition the president and bring peace to his people. He believed that “a chief is a shield for his
people, protecting them at all times ‘like an umbrella’ and that the violence increased when
chiefs took sides and the people lost that umbrella.”

99

Maphumulo dedicated himself to understanding the violence so that he could operate as
that umbrella. The chief utilized his education and connections to undertake research—including
interviews with hundreds of people and extensive reading on the matter—because of his concern
for his people. He placed himself in a position to record what he believed to be the common
perceptions of his people concerning the violence.

100

He trusted a commission of inquiry could

establish the causes and prevent further violence. The final petition included maps, charts
illustrating the scale of violence as recorded by the violence monitors at the Centre for Adult
98

Pearson, “Chief Maphumulo makes bold bid for peace,” Natal Witness April 8, 1989.

99

Quraish Patel, “Rebel Chief,” Sunday Tribune April 16, 1989. Maphumulo’s use of
umbrella is interesting here given his connections with the amaNazaretha church. Under
Johannes Galilee Shembe, black umbrellas became part of the uniform for Shembe women at the
annual amaNazaretha festivals. See Peter Larlham, “Festivals of the Nazareth Baptist Church,”
The Drama Review: TDR 25, no. 4 (December 1, 1981): 59–74; Robert Papini, “Dance Uniform
History in the Church of Nazareth Baptists: The Move to Tradition,” African Arts 37, no. 3
(October 1, 2004): 48–92.
100
Patel, “Natal Midlands townships in middle of ‘bloody civil war,’” Sunday Tribune
April 9, 1989.
274

Education at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, and copies of civil interdict
applications.

101

On April 7, 1989, Maphumulo and Pietermaritzburg Lawyers for Human Rights
advocates Ann Skelton, Pat Stillwell, and Jules Browde handed the petition to Botha’s
representatives at his Tuynhuys residence in Cape Town. “We sat drinking tea out of delicate
cups whilst we waited and waited. Eventually Botha sent out one of his male secretaries to tell us
he had received the petition and he would consider it,” Skelton remembers.

102

Upon their return

to Natal, Maphumulo began to criticize Inkatha openly in the press, pointing to the movement as
the instigator of the violence.

103

Despite Buthelezi’s earlier support of such a commission, “in principle,” he angrily
condemned Maphumulo, alleging that the chief was part of a Contralesa plot to infiltrate Natal’s
traditional leaders. Buthelezi warned members of the KZLA that party politicization of chiefs
presented a threat to each and every one of them. Maphumulo denied his involvement with
Contralesa, but declared that “I will find out what it stands for and if it is a good organisation I
will join it.” He furthered questioned why Buthelezi, as a traditional leader, would be so opposed
to an association that represents the people. He cited Buthelezi’s failure to act as the impetus for
his own efforts. He had hoped the chief minister, as a “person with a platform,” would throw his
weight behind the petition.

104

101

“Petition to the State President from Mhlabunzima Maphumulo,” April 7, 1989 in
Verbatim Report of the First Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Vol. 51.
102
Ann Skelton, correspondence with the author, February 8, 2011.
103

Quraish Patel, “Natal Midlands townships in middle of ‘bloody civil war,’” Sunday
Tribune April 9, 1989.
104
Lakela Kaunda, “No response to chief’s petition on Natal violence,” Natal Witness
Echo April 13, 1989; “Peacekeeper not surprised at attack,” Natal Witness April 19, 1989.
275

Buthelezi grasped onto technicalities that he believed invalidated Maphumulo’s
submission of the petition and the KZLA spent nearly three whole days berating the chief and the
petition. Buthelezi contended that Maphumulo’s petition should have been directed through him,
as chief minister, rather than to President Botha. He reminded the KZLA of Maphumulo’s
involvement with Inala and alleged that if the State President entertained Maphumulo’s petition
it would be evidence of the continuation of Maphumulo’s relationship with the Department of
Information. He alleged Maphumulo’s chairmanship of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority had
expired and that the petition was thus made ineffective.

105

Indeed, Maphumulo ceased to serve

in this position from April 26, 1988, but only days after Buthelezi’s allegations, the press
reported that the Mpumalanga town council backed Maphumulo’s call for a commission.
Maphumulo also told reporters he was aware of a hit squad stationed at neighboring
KwaSwayimane with orders to kill him.

106

Less than two weeks after Maphumulo submitted the petition, the Minister of Law and
Order Adriaan Vlok met with Buthelezi in Ulundi to discuss the violence. Days later, Vlok
announced in a statement on behalf of the president in the House of Assembly that Botha had
refused Maphumulo’s petition. He laid the blame for the violence on “revolutionary agents of the
ANC-SACP alliance, namely the UDF and Cosatu,” and incredibly proclaimed “there is

105

One article cites that Maphumulo left his position as MP in anticipation of a bursary
to study abroad. “Chief Maphumulo’s authority questioned,” Daily News April 11, 1989; “No
KwaZulu Members back chief’s appeal,” Natal Witness April 15, 1989; “Maphumulo the peace
maker,” New African April 17, 1989. For Buthelezi’s point-by-point rebuttal and KZLA critique
of the petition, see Verbatim Report of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Vol. 51, April 10-13,
1989.
106
“Hit-squad assigned to assassinate me – Maphumulo,” Natal Witness April 20, 1989.
276

absolutely no question of a breakdown of law and order in the greater Pietermaritzburg area.”

107

Botha wrote to Maphumulo that he and the Cabinet did not believe a commission could solve the
problem and could indeed cause more problems. Botha asked Maphumulo and all those who
supported the petition to assist “by calling upon and demanding of the ANC (which remain the
main organisation committed to the violence by policy pronouncement) that it should abandon
violence and terrorism…”
influenced by Buthelezi.

108

Maphumulo felt certain the government’s decision had been

109

Chief Maphumulo was understandably disappointed but remained undeterred. His
membership of Contralesa became public in June when the press announced he had been elected
President of the interim committee designed to draft its constitution.

110

Maphumulo later said

that he joined Contralesa because he believed that “one has to move with the people. If one is
leading people who are progressive I think it is right and proper to be also progressive as a
leader. Because my people are in the MDM [Mass Democratic Movement], I have to be with
111

them.”

At the meeting where he was elected President, he gave a report on the ongoing

violence in the Pietermaritzburg region in which he told the leaders about his failed petition:
I sent a petition to State President, PW Botha, appealing to him to appoint a
commission of inquiry into the current conflict in Pietermaritzburg and the
surrounding areas. I pointed out that the violence between UWUSA/INKATHA
107

“Vlok meets Buthelezi,” Natal Witness April 21, 1989; “PW rejects probe into city
violence,” Weekly Mail April 1989.
108
P.W. Botha to Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, May 2, 1989, CAMP, Karis-Gerhart
Collection, Reel 92, Biographical file on Mhlabunzima Maphumulo.
109
“Chief Maphumulo claims: ‘Government decision was influenced by Buthelezi’,”
Natal Witness May 18, 1989.
110
“Maphumulo elected,” Natal Witness June 15, 1989; Khaba Mkhize, “Chief
Maphumulo elected president of Contralesa,” Natal Witness Echo June, 1989.
111
Maphumulo, “Interview with Chief Maphumulo,” Sechaba (1990) 8-10.
277

and UDF/COSATU had reached a critical level that threatened our existence as
people, affecting our youth, our women, our senior citizens, our institutions of
traditional leadership and our values.
While we are not responsible for the external factors that systematically create
social disorder, internally it is our responsibility to do everything we can to solve
112
the problem.
Over the next several months, Maphumulo dedicated himself to Contralesa activities and
never gave up the quest for a commission. At the end of July, Maphumulo, Contralesa Vice
President Patekile Holomisa (the current Contralesa president), and Contralesa members from
Bophuthatswana, Venda, and the Transkei visited the ANC in Lusaka for a “Peace Conference.”
While Holomisa cautioned against the meeting, not wanting to give the government the
impression Contralesa had affiliated, Maphumulo believed it was imperative to know what the
ANC had in store for chiefs. The delegation met with ANC Secretary General Alfred Nzo,
military commander of Umkhonto weSizwe Chris Hani, Steve Tshwete, John Nkadimeng, Steve
Dlamini, Eric Mtshali, Mswai Piliso, Jacob Zuma, and Joe Slovo. Lakela Kaunda, the Natal
Witness Echo journalist who accompanied the delegation, entertainingly related the story of their
visit that included Zambian discos, battered taxis “that would never cross the Edendale/Imbali
intersection robots without giving traffic chief Geoff Pascoe a heart attack,” and forgotten
protocol. “Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo reminds the military commander of Umkhonto
Wesizwe Chris Hani, ‘Ukhuluma neNkosi, Hani, khuleka,’ (You are talking to a chief, Hani,
show respect.)” He later joked with Steve Tshwete, “You might be thrown out of here and come
begging for a site at Maqongqo!”

113

The ANC told Contralesa there would always be a place

112

“Report on On-going Violence by Chief Maphumulo,” June 11, 1989, in Holomisa, A
Double-Edged Sword, 10.
113
Lakela Kaunda, “ANC delegates forget protocol when they meet the amakhosi,”
Natal Witness Echo August 1989.
278

for “progressive chiefs” in the struggle and that “it was a lie that they would liquidate the offices
of chiefs.”

114

Figures 16-17, Chief Maphumulo (second from left) in Lusaka in August 1989 with Steve
Tshwete, Alfred Nzo, and Chris Hani. Natal Witness Echo August 1989; Maphumulo
(second from right) with Winnie Mandela at the December 1989 Contralesa/MDM rally in
Edendale. Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers.
Upon the delegation’s return on August 1, Maphumulo continued with public pleas for a
peace initiative and urged that members of communities affected by the war should be included
in peace talks.

115

Maphumulo and other Contralesa chiefs traversed South Africa as part of

organizing drives and sent letters to editors publicizing Contralesa’s mission.
rallies and invited such major public figures like Winnie Mandela.

117

116

They organized

The KwaNgwane chief

minister Enos Mabuza announced his support for the movement on a visit to

114

Lakela Kaunda, “Traditional leaders have a role in the struggle,” Natal Witness Echo
August 1989.
115
“Interim Committee Meeting: Laying down Policies and Procedures of Contralesa,”
June 24, 1989, in Holomisa, A Double-Edged Sword, 14–6.; “Peace above party interests,” Natal
Witness August 2, 1989; Khaba Mkhize, “Call for broader base to future peace talks,” Natal
Witness Echo August 3, 1989.
116
For examples, see Mhlabunzima Maphumulo to the Editor, Natal Witness Echo
September 21, 1989; “Meetings with Regional Chiefs: A Report, Contralesa meeting with
Ciskeian Chiefs at Horseshoe Motel on November 12, 1989,” in Holomisa, A Double-Edged
Sword, 18–22.
117
“Man killed as police break up Edendale rally,” Natal Witness December 4, 1989.
279

Pietermaritzburg.

118

Maphumulo arranged a meeting to introduce the organization to the Zulu

King, but failed to attend when the meeting was scheduled in Ulundi, a location still disagreeable
to Maphumulo on account of his assault there only four years earlier.

119

This failed meeting, and Contralesa’s activities in general, attracted the ire of Buthelezi.
Contralesa leadership anticipated resistance from KwaZulu, as well as from Ciskei,
Bophutatswana, and Venda.

120

Buthelezi and King Goodwill Zwelethini met with chiefs in

Ulundi to discuss Maphumulo and Contralesa. Buthelezi called efforts by Maphumulo to
organize Contralesa in Natal “an attempt to thrust the spear into the very heart of Zulu unity.”

121

He criticized Maphumulo for keeping company with revolutionaries “bitterly opposed to the
ubukhosi institution” and chastised him for attempting to recruit the king and turn him against
Buthelezi. He concluded the chiefs must “close ranks and to rejoice in our unity and to tell Inkosi
Maphumulo to go to hell.”

122

The king, now firmly allied with Buthelezi, also instructed the

chiefs: “Let the amakhosi of kwaZulu now speak finally and let us bury Inkosi Maphumulo in
yesterday’s problems. Let us make him totally irrelevant for the future.”

123

The chiefs thus

118

Khaba Mkhize, “Chief Minister backs Contralesa and MDM,” Natal Witness Echo
August 24, 1989.
119
“Chief Maphumulo’s absence at meeting angers King,” Natal Witness Echo
September 14, 1989.
120
“Interim Committee Meeting”
121

APC PC126/2/1/17 “Address by Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi at Meeting with the
Amakhosi of KwaZulu,” Ulundi, September 14, 1989; Carmel Rickard, “Buthelezi blasts the
chief who brought peace,” Weekly Mail September 15-21, 1989.
122
APC PC126/2/1/17 “Address by Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi at Meeting with the
Amakhosi of KwaZulu,” Ulundi, September 14, 1989; Carmel Rickard, “Buthelezi blasts the
chief who brought peace,” Weekly Mail September 15-21, 1989.
123
Carmel Rickard, “Me go to hell? Hell no, says Contralesa’s defiant Maphumulo,”
Weekly Mail October 6, 1989.
280

resolved to isolate any leaders connected to Contralesa. Subsequently, Chief Elphas Molefe from
Nqutu was suspended by the KZLA for “sowing Zulu disunity”
with Ciskeian delegates to speak out against Contralesa.

125

124

and King Zwelethini met

The conflict deepened as Prince

Israel Mcwayizeni, still in conflict with Buthelezi, joined Contralesa.

126

But despite these

setbacks, Maphumulo believed the organization had made serious inroads in the KwaZulu-Natal
region.

127

When President Botha resigned after a stroke, Maphumulo immediately requested a
meeting with the new president F.W. de Klerk. As the violence continued to devastate the
midlands, Maphumulo directed all of his energies at stemming disorder in the region, placing his
upcoming British-sponsored trip to study community development at the University of
Manchester on hold to remain at home.

128

His calls for a commission drew increasing support

from violence monitors, as well as the Democratic Party (the major South African opposition
party).

At the end of November, Maphumulo announced there would be a joint

124

Another factor should be noted. Chief Molefe also attributed tension between himself
and Buthelezi to “ethnic hostility,” because Molefe claimed his people were not “ethnic Zulus”
but descendants of Basothos who had fought against the Zulu in the Anglo-Zulu War. Prior to
1979, Chief Molefe attempted to secede from KwaZulu because of this Basotho ancestry. Fred
Kockett, “Regional peace talks put on hold by Inkatha,” Natal Witness September 25, 1989;
“Suspension challenged,” Natal Witness October 7, 1989; Carmel Rickard, “Contralesa chief
stripped of title by Buthelezi to take court action,” Natal Witness October 19, 1989; Survey of
Race Relations in South Africa 1979 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations,
1980), 323.
125
“Contralesa under fire from Zulu king again,” Natal Witness November 22, 1989.
126

Carmel Rickard, “Congress wins more members,” Weekly Mail October 6, 1989;
Carmel Rickard, “Home of Zulu prince attacked by arsonists,” Natal Witness November 15,
1989.
127
“Contralesa chief hits back,” The New African November 20, 1989.
128

Sam Sole, “Man of Peace,” Sunday Tribune October 8, 1989.
281

Contralesa/MDM rally to welcome newly released ANC leaders and that Contralesa had
arranged the long-awaited commission of inquiry.

129

Contralesa complained when permission was denied for the rally at Edendale’s Wadley
Stadium. Despite paying a R700 fee for use of the stadium (though Inkatha had not paid a fee for
a rally there six months earlier), the magistrate and police refused authorization. Maphumulo was
not surprised, as he felt Contralesa was “not a sweetheart organisation” of the government. As
the organization had anticipated the refusal, it made alternative arrangements and at the last
moment moved the rally to the much smaller Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre, a building at the
heart of the mass democratic movement in Edendale.

130

On December 3, 1989 Maphumulo took

the stage with Winnie Mandela, Molefe, and Democratic Party MP Pierre Cronje. While the rally
was considered legal inside the Centre, the nearly 3,000 who attended could not all fit into the
hall. As a result, those who gathered outside the hall constituted an illegal open-air gathering and
the police used force to break it up. Police opened fire with rubber bullets and stun grenades.
Linus Ngubane later died in the hospital from injuries inflicted by township police and six others
were injured.

131

Two days later, the first sitting of the commission commenced. Exactly what proceeded
can only be garnered from the attention paid to the commission by the press. The commission
would eventually disband without completion, producing no final report. Contralesa mandated
129

Khaba Mkhize, “Mandela message prepared for Contralesa rally,” Natal Witness
Echo November 30, 1989; “Chiefs set up commission of inquiry into killings,” Natal Witness
December 2, 1989.
130
“DDA explains why Contralesa had to pay for hire of stadium,” Natal Witness Echo
December 21, 1989.
131
Christelle de Jager, “Man killed as police break up Edendale rally,” Natal Witness
December 4, 1989; Nicola Cunningham-Brown, “Organisers says rally violence unnecessary,”
Natal Mercury December 5, 1989.
282

the commission to hear evidence on the violence and to investigate and report on the reasons
behind the inefficiency of law enforcement in relation to the violence. Contralesa appointed
Advocate Robert S. Douglas to act as commissioner. Pat Pillay, a Durban attorney, led evidence.
The South African Council of Churches (SACC) sponsored the commission by way of bridge
funding with the expectation that Contralesa would repay the SACC at a later date. The
commission opened at Pietermaritzburg’s Ubunye House on December 5, 1989 as workers
returned to work from a stayaway to mourn recent deaths in Hammarsdale. Chief Zibuse Mlaba,
brother of the assassinated Chief Msinga Mlaba, gave testimony. Witnesses from Trust Feed,
KwaSwayimane, Imbali, Nxamalala, and Mpumalanga testified to fatal shootings of
schoolchildren by white policemen, forced recruitment by Inkatha, and the corruption of town
councillors. Several attested to their approval of the deployment of SADF troops, who they
believed to be more impartial either the SAP or KZP.

132

One former Inkatha Committee member

from Mpumalanga who asked not to be named (as most witnesses did) told the commission he
resigned from Inkatha because of its forced recruitment drives and possession of guns.

133

As the press ran headlines such as “Forced Inkatha recruitment to blame,” Buthelezi
threatened to sue Douglas for defamation. Douglas corresponded with Buthelezi’s counsel,
Friedman and Friedman, to assure the KwaZulu chief minister and Inkatha president that he was
in no way prejudiced against Inkatha. Referring to the tension between Maphumulo/Contralesa
and Buthelezi/Inkatha, Douglas wrote (and copied Maphumulo):
I must stress that I am in no way partisan in relation to any such hostility or
antagonism. I was approached to act as Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry
and undertook to do so on the basis of strict impartiality and on the basis of
assurances that people representing all points of view, including Inkatha, would
132

“Mpumalanga peace ‘not permanent’,” Daily News December 13, 1989.

133

“Former Inkatha man gives evidence,” Daily News December 15, 1989.
283

appear before me. If the prospects of their doing so are now remote that seems to
me an unfortunate result of the attitude adopted by your client and expressed by
134
you in your letters to me.
Early in February 1990, the commission moved to Durban and shifted its focus to the
violence in the townships surrounding the city. But the commission was delayed by a dispute
with Contralesa.

135

It is likely this disagreement is related to an interim report of the commission

submitted by Douglas that also expressed serious concerns about untimely payments and
disorganization.

136

Maphumulo’s ability to promptly respond may have been impacted by the

eruption of violence in Mbambangalo only a week earlier. When the commission sat again, it
heard of forced recruitments in Umlazi from an Inkatha councillor, extortion by chiefs in
Ngcolosi, and the targeting of those cheering Nelson Mandela’s release.

137

The world watched with anticipation as Mandela walked free after 27 years in prison.
But it also watched with shock as parts of Mandela’s country erupted in civil war. At the end of
March, Maphumulo, Pillay, and Douglas flew to Geneva to present an interim report on the
evidence to the International Commission of Jurists. Based on the testimonies of nearly 100
witnesses, the report identified Inkatha as perpetrators of the violence. After the presentation,
Maphumulo held a press conference in London and announced it was unlikely Contralesa would
ever meet with Buthelezi, who held his position only on account of the apartheid government.
Ben Skosana, Inkatha’s London representative, responded that the commission was “inevitably
134

Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers, “R.S. Douglas to J. Friedman,” n.d.

135

“Douglas commission sitting again,” Natal Witness February 14, 1990.

136

Thobekile Maphumulo Collection, “R.S. Douglas to Messrs Pat Pillay & Company,”
February 8, 1990.
137
“Lecturer explains Natal violence,” Daily News February 14, 1990; “Violence started
with squatters, inquiry hears,” Daily News February 22, 1990; “Claims made at Douglas inquiry
denied,” Daily News February 22, 1990; “Woman tells commission how violence erupted at
Malagazi after Mandela rally,” Daily News March 2, 1990.
284

one-sided and superficial,” but the commission had clearly persuaded the International
Commission of Jurists. The organization agreed to send a delegation because it was increasingly
convinced that the South African government had encouraged the violence.

138

The commission never came to an official close and as far as can be ascertained, no final
report exists.

139

After the press report on the planned trip to Geneva, there are no further articles

about the commission though it was planned to sit in public until April 1990. As violence
erupted in Table Mountain and Edendale valley in the Seven Days War, it is likely that few
witnesses appeared and even if they did there is no record as the media turned its attention to the
civil war. A confidential letter uncovered in the Ulundi Repository of the National Archive from
Advocate Douglas to Buthelezi suggests that the work of the commission came to a premature
end. In April 1991, Douglas wrote, “My work on that commission has now ceased. There are a
number of reasons for this and I believe that you are entitled to know what they are. I am
satisfied that you will find them very interesting.”

140

Douglas’ outreach to Buthelezi is certainly intriguing in its own right, but particularly
because of Douglas’ 1992 appointment by the International Freedom Foundation (IFF) to
investigate human rights abuses by the ANC and SACP in exile.

141

In what became known as

138

“Natal violence focus in Geneva,” Natal Mercury March 23, 1990; “Contralesa: talks
with Buthelezi ‘doubtful’.” Natal Witness April 9, 1990; “Inkatha responds to Contralesa,” Natal
Witness April 10, 1990; Heidi Gibson, “International Commission of Jurists to probe Natal
violence,” Natal Witness Echo April 12, 1990; Mzala, “The violence in Natal,” Natal Witness
May 3, 1990.
139
My attempts to locate and contact Robert Douglas in South Africa failed.
140

UAR, Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1990, “R.S. Douglas, SC to Dr.
Buthelezi,” April 4, 1991.
141
Groups such as the IFF appeared out of the blue, putting out well-sourced, often
accurate, and thoroughly discrediting news reports on the wire. Most of these initiatives stopped
in their tracks with the Inkathagate scandal. C. D Schutte, Ian Liebenberg, and Anthony Minnaar,
285

the “Douglas Commission,” Douglas found evidence implicating senior ANC and SACP
members in murder, torture, and detention without trial in prison camps. The IFF alleged to be a
pro-capitalist lobby with board members such as United States senator Jesse Helms and British
MP Sir George Gardiner but was in actuality a front created by South African military
intelligence to “win friends and influence people internationally, and to campaign against the
African National Congress.”

142

The IFF continued to receive funding from the apartheid

government until 1993 and several times arranged for Buthelezi to address conservative MPs in
Britain. Phillip Van Niekerk alleges it appointed the Douglas Commission, “mindful of the
damage that exposure of Swapo atrocities had caused that liberation movement in Namibia’s first
elections.”

143

Journalist (and editor of the underground journal of MK) Paul Trewhela suggests

it is extremely likely that the IFF in South Africa stood close to Inkatha and Buthelezi and
therefore part of the strategy to delegitimize the ANC and SACP. He adds that this link to the
regime does not reflect on the standing of Douglas as a barrister or the quality of his evidence,
though he also suggests Douglas at time overstressed evidence in his report.

144

We cannot know

for certain whether Douglas was aware of the IFF as a front for apartheid or if any personal
leanings influenced his findings. His attempts to include Inkatha in the 1989-90 violence
commission and his willingness to hold the organization responsible suggests he did his job
The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research
Council, 1998), 341.
142
Philip Van Niekerk, “How Apartheid Conned the West,” The Observer July 16, 1995.
143

As part of its low-intensity conflict in Southwest Africa, South Africa sponsored
investigations into the Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO) in an attempt to
discredit the movement and decrease its support prior to the first elections. David Iron, “Touting
for South Africa: International Freedom Foundation,” Covert Action Information Bulletin 31
(1989), 62-4; Van Niekerk, “How Apartheid Conned the West.”
144
Paul Trewhela, Inside Quatro: Uncovering the Exile History of the ANC and SWAPO
(Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2009), 83–6.
286

responsibly. A cryptic footnote in Anthea Jeffery’s The Natal Story citing an interview with
Douglas suggests his findings in the first commission were less conclusive than the headlines
revealed.

145

It is likely that at least one of the reasons for the cessation of the commission was the
disorganization and irregularity of payment on Contralesa’s part that Douglas had complained
about in his interim report to Contralesa and that may or may not have been related to the
corruption charges directed at Chief Maphumulo. In August 1990, Contralesa’s General Council
suspended Maphumulo’s presidency for his failure to attend meetings (a perhaps insensitive
charge given the violence directed at his family and people in the previous six months), his
practice of taking unilateral decisions without consultation, and his failure to respect and abide
by the interim National Executive Committee’s decisions. Contralesa also resolved to take legal
action for the recovery of R120,000 donated to Contralesa by a Swedish donor that Maphumulo
allegedly diverted into an unauthorized account in Pietermaritzburg.

146

Maphumulo’s estate file

reveals a R100,000 fixed deposit made into his First National Bank account six months prior to a
September 1990 maturation date, though whether or not the funds are the same is difficult to
prove.

147

As a new organization with limited funding, this sort of misappropriation could have

impacted Contralesa’s ability to repay the SACC, who in turn may have been unwilling to pay
Douglas without promise of reimbursement.

145

Jeffery, The Natal Story, 227.

146

“Press Statement on the National Conference of Contralesa, September 1990” and
“First National Executive Committee Meeting of Contralesa held at the Contralesa Offices on
October 27, 1990,” in Holomisa, A Double-Edged Sword, 28–32.
147
Mpumalanga Magistrate, 12/5/2, 110/91, Estate file of Mhlabunzima Joseph
Maphumulo.
287

But while the commission may not have ended with a formal report, Douglas’ interim
report to Pillay, Contralesa, and SACC suggests many of its successes. The availability of the
commission as a forum for Mpumalanga residents to air their grievances contributed to the
temporary cessation of local hostilities. Imbali residents were willing to risk their lives to give
evidence so that warlords could be publicly exposed. Inkatha’s bitter and hostile reaction
suggests the organization may have been shaken out of complacency and could just yet attempt
“to restrain some of its over zealous members.” Indeed, from the beginning, advocate Pillay
expressed surprise at the number of people willing to testify.

148

The commission heard from a

wide spectrum of people, including academics, “businessmen, tribal chiefs, the Black Sash,
ordinary housewives, fathers and mothers.”

149

Despite Buthelezi and Inkatha’s official

opposition, card-carrying Inkatha members testified as well. This turnout attests to the support
the commission had garnered not only from organizations but also from residents and victims
themselves desperate to realize an end to the conflict.
During the Contralesa commission, Contralesa leaders Maphumulo, Prince Israel
Mcwayizeni Zulu, Siphiwe Thusi, and Alfred Ndlovu met with Minister of Law and Order
Adriaan Vlok. The Contralesa representatives walked out of the January 1990 meeting,
discouraged that Inkatha had been invited to discuss their call for a judicial inquiry into the
violence. “We feel it is not right and proper for us to be sitting here with them, Inkatha, giving

148

“Inquiry into township violence gets under way,” Natal Witness December 6, 1989.

149

Nomusa Cembi, “Commission into violence calls on witnesses to come forward,”
December 14, 1989.
288

them credibility,” said Maphumulo.

150

The next day, the chief’s “haven of peace” erupted in

flames.
151

“Natal’s haven of peace on fire”

Residents of “Natal’s haven of peace” began to fear the spread of the violence several months
before its outbreak. As the fighting spread amongst their rural neighbors in KwaSwayimane and
KwaNyavu, the pledge by Zulu chiefs to ostracize any traditional leaders affiliated to Contralesa
heightened their sense of dread. Anthony Minnaar has suggested that until the unbanning of the
ANC in 1990, violence had largely been contained within the Greater Durban area and the
152

Pietermaritzburg/Edendale complex.

But Aitchison’s analysis shows that the conflict took

root in rural areas as early as 1989 in Richmond, KwaSwayimane, Ehlanzeni (KwaXimba),
Shongweni and even earlier in Vulindlela. In KwaSwayimane, an area neighboring “Natal’s
haven of peace,” violence went hand-in-hand with Inkatha recruitment drives starting in July
153

1989.

In September, Inkatha members from KwaSwayimane went to Maphumulo schools to

force residents to attend a meeting called by Chief Prince Gcumisa, the Inkatha-aligned leader of
the Gcumisa. At that meeting, Chief Gcumisa warned that those refusing to join Inkatha should
leave the area.

154

Violence also escalated in Ehlanzeni, near Camperdown, between the Nyavu

of Chief Mdluli and the Ximba under the Contralesa-affiliated Chief Zibuse Mlaba. Peace efforts
there initially provided a short respite starting in October 1989, despite Inkatha instruction to

150
151
152

“Congress men walk out of Vlok peace talks,” Daily News January 25, 199.
The New African February 12, 1990.
Minnaar, Patterns of Violence, 14.

153

Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead,” 76–9.

154

“Eviction by Inkatha chief feared,” Natal Witness September 30, 1989.
289

Mdluli not to become involved in any peace pacts, but ultimately failed when violence resumed
in December.
Mbambangalo residents were keenly aware of the spreading violence. Beyond the
presence of the newly settled refugees, Maphumulo people “started hearing about violence from
far places; then later that violence started in our place.”

155

The Maphumulo understood that this

violence, or uDlame, was distinct from earlier types of conflict. One woman related, “We used to
hear about uDlame in other places but we did not know anything about it. We only knew izimpi
zezigodi (section wars).”

156

Exactly when and how violence began at Table Mountain, or “who fired the first shot” is
often the great preoccupation of historians. But as Aitchison has pointed out, uncovering the
specific origin for Natal’s violence “could involve one in a process of endless regression.”

157

Indeed, for Table Mountain, one can ask: Did the violence commence with the invasion of
Mbambangalo by the Nyavu? Was it the murder of a Nyavu man who worked at the Maguzu
clinic? Was it the Maqongqo youth’s boycott of shops owned by Inkatha-affiliated persons? Did
it date to Chief Maphumulo’s “peace party”? Residents of Mbambangalo and KwaNyavu have
their own memories and interpretations of how and why uDlame began. These interpretations
will be explored both here and in the following section as they contribute to the debate over

155

“uDlame saqala ngokuluzwa ezindaweni ezikude, emva kwesikhathi lwangena
nalapha endaweni yethu…” Khanyisile M., interview with author and Thandeka Majola,
Echibini, June 21, 2011.
156
“uDlame luqale ngokuthi sihlale sizwa kwazinye izindawo ukuthi kunodlame kodwa
singazi nokuthi luyini ngoba thina sazi izimpi zezigodi.” Phumzile M., interview with author and
Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21, 2011.
157
Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead,” 45.
290

Chief Maphumulo’s authority. For now, however, the primary concern is with the key players
and general patterns of violence.
Eunice Dladla recalled when the violence first erupted in the isigodi where she lived, near
Chief Maphumulo’s umuzi. “I remember when uDlame started, it was summer and we were
plowing and our food was about to be ripe. Some woman said to me, ‘weMa Maphumulo, run!’ I
saw smoke….coming over Samvula hill. People were coming from that side and coming towards
us…. I heard a gunshot from people who were coming from the Nyavu section.”

158

Over the

weekend of January 26-28, 1990, a group of 300-600 men bearing firearms, spears, sticks, and
other weapons from the neighboring KwaNyavu area repeatedly invaded Echibini, the isigodi on
the strip of Goedverwachting.
According to Chief Maphumulo, in an interdict filed only days after the eruption of the
violence on Friday, January 26, Indunenkhulu Albert Madlala spotted Maphumulo induna
Thomas Mshoki Gcabashe with police and kitkonstabels on their way to Echibini, pointing out
homes. Gcabashe was in disguise, but had been identified by his gait and eventually
unmasked.

159

Kitkonstabels Bheki Phethas and Bheki Buthelezi camped at the home of Tobias

Mdlalose, an Inkatha member in Mbambangalo, from where they launched attacks on

158

“Ngikhumbula ngosuku okwasuka ngalo uDlame, kwakusehlobo silimile nokudla
sekuqala ukuvthwa. Ngezwa ngomunye unkosikazi ethi weMaMaphumulo baleka nakho!
Sasingale nazi nezinkungu.Yaqhamuka ngale kwalentabe enkulu. Isamvula. Uma ngithi
ngiyabheka, ngibona izinkungu ziza ngalapho ngingakhona. Uma ngisabheka izinkungu ngizwe
umsindo wezibhamu baqhamuka kaNyavu.” Eunice Dladla, interview by author and Thandeka
Majola, March 7, 2011. Maqongqo.
159
Affidavit of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, February 1, 1990, in the Supreme
Court of South Africa Natal Provincial Division in the Matter between Chief Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo and The Minister of Law and Order, the Commissioner of South African Police, and
Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli Case No. 280/90.
291

“comrades.”

160

Youth who had been boycotting a shop owned by Inkatha-affiliated Chitumuzi J.

Maphumulo were harassed. Induna Bhekuyise Maphumulo witnessed two white constables and
several kitkonstabels tie a tube around the face of a youth, Doctor Mdu Ngcobo, and assault him.
According to Chief Maphumulo, kitkonstabels and police members attacked youth and searched
homes for weapons over the course of the weekend.

161

On Monday, heavily armed Nyavu men attacked Echibini, but were initially dispersed
after Maphumulo contacted the Bishopstowe police. The Nyavu men gathered at Mathondo
Ngcobo’s beer hall while Maphumulo went to the Bishopstowe police station to discuss the
possibility of a meeting with the police and Chief Mdluli. But during his absence, the Nyavu
launched a second attack, killing Zibonele Dladla and destroying at least ten homes, including
that of Emma Mabaso.

162

It was alleged that Mathondo Ngcobo and the kitkonstabel Bheki

Phethas were transporting the Nyavu men to attack homes.

163

Self-described “comrades” stood guard and set up roadblocks in retaliation and
Maphumulo returned to find approximately 3,000-4,000 of his people gathered at his
inkantolo.

164

Indeed, Eunice Dladla remembers that upon seeing the smoke and hearing

gunshots, she and others ran towards enkosini (the place of the chief).

165

Theni Ngcoya recalls

160

APC. PC11 PACSA Collection March 1990 Affidavits of Seven Days War, Bhunu
Dladla, May 14, 1990.
161
Maphumulo affadavit.
162

Maphumulo affidavit; Fred Kockott, “Fighting comes to peace area,” Natal Witness
January 31, 1990.
163
Maphumulo affidavit; APC. PC11 March 1990 Affidavits, Thulani Mthethwa, May
14, 1990.
164
Maphumulo affidavit.
165

Dladla interview.
292

seeing the crowd chase her eldest son over a cliff before giving her youngest son a dress and hat
so that he would not be recognized as male and running with her daughters towards
Maphumulo’s umuzi. From there, she watched her home burn.

166

Ngenzeni Mbambo and her

family also ran to enkosini where Maphumulo advised them to find family with whom they could
stay.

167

By Monday, Echibini was deserted. Hundreds fled to the city to seek assistance from

churches, COSATU, and the Midlands Democratic Party under Radley Keys, known for his
efforts to quell the violence.

168

Of course, at the time several KwaNyavu residents explained the eruption differently.
Mathondo Ngcobo, the shop owner accused of transporting the Nyavu men, maintained they had
not raided Echibini but that only 40 men had retaliated after the burning of several KwaNyavu
homes and the looting of his shop. Ambrose Mweli, an Inkatha-affiliated Nyavu man, reported
his home had been petrol bombed by UDF youth from Maqongqo and that amaqabane had been
stopping buses and taxis and blocking delivery vans from supplying KwaNyavu.

169

Cycles of attack and retaliation engulfed Mbambangalo. Daily police “Unrest Reports”
gave little detail on the unfolding conflict beyond listing casualties and infrastructural damage,
such as “one dead,” “twelve houses burnt,” or “man, boy die.” Chief Maphumulo made several
statements to the press and filed a Supreme Court interdict against the Minister of Law and
Order, the South African Police Commissioner, and Chief Mdluli as advised by Robert Douglas
at several commission hearings.
166

Theni Ngcoya, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, May 27, 2011.

167

Ngenzeni Ma Vidima Mbambo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola,
Haniville, August 8, 2011.
168
“Hundreds flee as mob rampages through Table Mountain Area,” Natal Witness
January 30, 1990.
169
Fred Kockott, “Fighting comes to peace area,” Natal Witness January 31, 1990.
293

On Friday, February 2, as President F.W. de Klerk made the historic announcement
releasing political prisoners and unbanning of the ANC, PAC, SACP, and other liberation
movements, in Table Mountain the Nyavu attacked the Maphumulo umuzi. Chief
Mhlabunzima’s third wife, Gaye Shembe, was at home with their children when the Nyavu set
her home alight. One of the Maphumulo who had sought refuge at the chief’s place alleged a
white police officer had turned on a gas canister within Gaye’s home, but Gaye shot him and a
kitkonstabel. Another man was injured trying to help a child escape.

170

Another Maphumulo

man who had escaped the assault on the umuzi watched the businessman Zimu lead the
attackers.

171

Over the course of the weekend, thousands fled Mbambangalo for Pietermaritzburg.
Rumors abounded of continued violence but no police statements were made. Reports began to
circulate that Chief Maphumulo too had fled, seeking asylum in the Transkei. Indeed,
Maphumulo had traveled to the Transkei on Contralesa business on Saturday, February 3, and to
Johannesburg on Monday, February 5, to speak at a press conference organized by the Reverend
Beyers Naudé, but was in Pietermaritzburg and Maqongqo at several points over the weekend.
Maphumulo later condemned the rumors. “There is simply no way that I would abandon my
people now as they need me. Under no circumstances would I go to Transkei, this is my home
and it [is] here I intend to die if I have to.”

172

At the Johannesburg press conference,

Maphumulo made an impassioned plea for peace in Natal, but acknowledged that it was
becoming increasingly more difficult to continue with peace proposals. He repeatedly called on
170
171

APC, PC11, March 1990 Affidavits, Bongiwe Zondi, April 30, 1990.
APC, PC11, March 1990 Affidavits, Bongani Isaac Mkhize, April 30, 1990.

172

“Chief has not fled Table Mountain,” Natal Witness February 6, 1990; Prakash
Naidoo, “Bring in the troops,” Sunday Tribune February 18, 1990.
294

Buthelezi to take responsibility for Inkatha’s violence and asserted that the people could not rely
on the South African Police to keep peace when they joined in on the attacks.

173

The sheer number of testimonies in the press, in victim statements, and in oral history
interviews that cite the invading Nyavu certainly leaves little doubt that an armed group of men
did attack Echibini. But further evidence does lend credence to Mathondo Ngcobo’s “retaliation”
assertion, as well as suggest a possible reason for Thomas and Sabelo Gcabashe’s cooperation
with the Nyavu beyond personal ambitions (to be examined in the next chapter). Several
residents, including an Inkatha man from Mbambangalo, attested that prior to the outbreak of the
violence, an older Nyavu man “from Gcabashe’s family” who worked as a security guard at the
Maguzu clinic was stabbed to death. None of those who cited his death as the first signal of the
war knew the man’s first name or were even certain about his surname. Nor did they know when
he had died. But they did know he was “from Gcabashe’s family.” They also pointed to the
presence of new people, people who had been bussed in, people who were toyi-toying at night—
the refugees living at Echibini. The Inkatha-affiliated Maphumulo man said, “I am not sure about
the surname, but I think he was from the Gcabashe family because I was down there at Mboyi
section. That is how the violence started. Nyavu wanted revenge for that old man’s death. When
they came here [to Mbambangalo] they found those who were busy toyi-toying at night and they
shot them because they assumed that they were the ones who killed the old man.” He also said
that the Nyavu were ready to fight because they had also been in conflict with their neighbors to

173

SAHA. AL2431. The United Democratic Front (UDF) Collection, Box 20, 1.22.2
Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), “Press Release by Chief
Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, President of Contralesa,” n.d.
295

the east, the Ximba.

174

But the possible significance of the dead Nyavu man’s relation to the

Gcabashe family should not be overlooked. As we will see in the next chapter, the Maphumulo
community divided over the chief’s actions during uDlame, and the Gcabashe brothers Thomas
and Sabelo were often at the forefront of the attack on the chief’s authority.
Violent episodes continued sporadically in Table Mountain over the course of the next
two weeks as the city council struggled to come to terms with the refugees at the Sawubona
Youth Trust in Winterskloof and at the COSATU house in the city center. On Friday, February
9, a delegation of refugees visited Maqongqo but deemed it unsafe to return. The
Pietermaritzburg City council saw the refugees as a threat to public health and the Mount
Michael Health Committee threatened legal action against Reverend Dennis Bailey, who ran the
Youth Trust, for contravening the Squatter Act and stipulation of the town planning scheme. The
city only agreed to establish a camp as Mason’s Mill on Edendale Road after the city’s medical
officer intervened and demanded action. On February 12, 1990, the day after Nelson Mandela’s
release from prison, the Table Mountain refugees from Sawubona and COSATU house moved
into tents at Mason’s Mill.

175

As the refugees worried over their fate, Chief Maphumulo was on the move, traveling to
Lusaka with Contralesa to consult with the ANC, back to Mbambangalo, and then to Sweden to
meet with the Swedish Foreign Minister in order to raise funds for Contralesa. During his stop
back in Maqongqo, Maphumulo called a meeting at the inkantolo for residents, violence

174

“Angisazi kahle noma kwakungowakaGcabashe ngoba mina ngangiphansi eMboyi.
Kulapho ke udlame lwasuka khona. Abantu bakaNyavu sebefuna ukuphindiselela lomkhulu
oshonile. Uma befika bathole laba abshaya itoyitoyi ebusuku bafike badubula ngoba bona
babebona ukuthi ibona laba ababulele umkhulu.” Nkanyiso Ndlovu, interview with author and
Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, April 4, 2011.
175
Fred Kockott, “Refugee camps set up in city,” Natal Witness February 12, 1990.
296

monitors, and the Mpumalanga magistrate to discuss the situation. A plan was set in motion for
the installation of SADF troops and the return of the refugees. On Tuesday, February 27, the last
of the refugees at Mason’s Mill returned to Maqongqo under the direction of the SADF. These
80 people, largely women and children whose husbands were away at work, lost their homes
during the violence of the previous month. They moved into tents provided by the Department of
Development Aid that they erected at the inkantolo.
While Maphumulo was abroad, on March 3, a group of Nyavu men again attacked the
area around his umuzi. The less-than-a-week old refugee camp was destroyed. The refugees fled
back to Mason’s Mill and the COSATU House. One newspaper article printed a litany of the
casualties: four elderly men dead, several people injured, 13 houses and a shop gutted, at least 10
other houses damaged, two dogs stabbed, two cars burnt out, two KwaZulu buses damaged, and
the inkantolo damaged.

176

Sbu Ernest Gcabashe identified Mdingi Maphumulo, Sabelo

Gcabashe, “Muguguli,” and Ngane Zimu as the men who shot at him and his kombi.

177

Fleeing

residents lamented the absence of the SADF unit they had been reassured would protect them. A
SADF spokesman responded that they had been asked to oversee the refugees’ return, not stay
indefinitely.

178

Thomas Gcabashe organized meetings for those Mbambangalo residents who

remained behind to discuss the violence and began to make calls for Chief Mhlabunzima, who
they believed to be the cause of the conflict, to be removed.

176

179

Christelle de Jager, “Returning refugees attacked, 4 die,” Natal Witness March 5,

1990.
177

APC, PC11, March 1990 Affidavits, Sbu Ernest Gcabashe, April 30, 1990.

178

“The human agony of Maqongqo,” Natal Witness Echo March 8, 1990.

179

“Chief blamed for violence,” Natal Witness March 13, 1990.
297

Figure 18-19: Gaye (Ma Shembe) Maphumulo stands in front of a burning store near her
home after the February 2 assault on her home. Natal Witness February 3, 1990. Figure 19:
Women and children whose tents were destroyed in the March attacks. Radley Keys
Private Papers.
Following the early March attack, sporadic attacks on homes and individuals occurred in
the Table Mountain region, but the Nyavu men also stirred up trouble across the city. A busload
of armed men emptied into the lower end of the city and stabbed Dumisane Dlamini and
threatened a garage owner, Saleem Cassim. Police confiscated weapons and arrested another
group of Nyavu men the same day for trespassing in East Street.

180

The Nyavu also traveled to

Inadi during the Seven Days War, the height of the Midlands violence.
The Seven Days War broke out in Vulindlela, Edendale, Ashdown, and Imbali to the
west of Pietermaritzburg on March 25, 1990. In actuality, this war comprised of three days of
large-scale attacks and then a month of skirmishes. It is one of the most analyzed periods of the
violence, so attention here will focus on the involvement of Table Mountain residents and
violence in Table Mountain during the same period. The war began as a result of several
explosive factors: the existing state collusion and prevalence of violence, the incitement to action
180

Fred Kockott, “Busload of armed men prowls east end of city,” Natal Witness March
8, 1990; “Armed groups bring violence into town,” Natal Witness Echo March 8, 1990.
298

by Buthelezi at a meeting of chiefs in Ulundi on March 23-24 and the stoning of buses from
Vulindlela as they traveled through Edendale where non-Inkatha youth had taken refuge. On
March 25, exactly one month after a welcome rally for Nelson Mandela at King’s Park stadium,
Inkatha held a rally, funded by the security police, at the same venue. Buses returning to
Vulindlela from the rally passed through Edendale, and what followed has since been largely
disputed. Some alleged youth stoned the passing buses, while others alleged Inkatha supporters
alighted from the buses and chased people at Edendale’s Qokololo stadium. From there, war
ensued. As many as 12,000 Inkatha members attacked a number of areas in Vulindlela, Caluza,
and Ashdown over the course of the next week. The police and army, present in full force, did
nothing to stop the carnage and in fact provided logistical support for Inkatha combatants. Large
lorries ferried in platoons of armed men—including men from KwaNyavu.

181

The KwaNyavu

group arrived in unmarked lorries with their number plates covered in mud on March 28,
indicating a degree of advanced planning and support. These men were sprinkled with izinthelezi
(protective medicines) and set off to attack soon after dawn.

182

Jabulani Sithole has recently argued that the intervention of a special MK unit on March
28 changed the course and character of Seven Days War violence.

183

But at least one large

group of the Inkatha attackers, the Nyavu men, absented themselves after March 28, turning their
attention closer to home—to Mbambangalo. Just as one informant had noted that KwaNyavu

181

John Aitchison, “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-Election Wars of the 1990s,” in The Role
of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: Community Agency for
Social Enquiry, 2003); Sithole, “The ANC Underground.”
182
Statement of Father Tim Smith, St Martin de Porres Catholic Church to the Truth and
Reconcilation Commission, Pietermaritzburg, November 18-21, 1996,
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_11.htm (accessed January 20, 2011).
183
Sithole, “The ANC Underground,” 269..
299

men turned their attention to the Maphumulo after fighting with their Ximba neighbors to the
west, one day after their participation in raids in Vulindlela, the Nyavu men again attacked
Mbambangalo. It may never be known who requested the lorries to transport the Nyavu to
Vulindlela—was it Chief Mdluli, Inkatha, or an agent of the apartheid regime—or if they
returned to Table Mountain of their own volition or by order. Without a doubt, their absence
decreased the number of Inkatha assailants in Vulindlela and certainly changed the character of
the violence in Vulindlela and Edendale.
Police colluded with the Nyavu men not just in the transport to and from Vulindlela. The
TRC testimony of police officer William Basil Harrington of Riot Unit 8 reveals that some time
after the attack on Chief Maphumulo’s homestead and before the unfolding of the Seven Days
War, the police were stationed at Echibini:
to prevent Chief Maphumulo’s people launching an attack on the other area.
Whilst we were having our braai and drinking beer [with Inkatha members] an
Inkatha group came around the hillside [meaning from KwaNyavu] unseen and
launched a new attack on the ANC area. We were assured by the group that were
providing the meat and the beer that they were Inkatha people and we had nothing
to fear regarding the attack. According to them it also wouldn’t last for very long.
After the valley had been burnt we then fired 1000 feet flares for two reasons,
namely, firstly to see whether any groups were moving in the direction of the
koppie to attack people in the Inkatha area, and secondly, to prove to the ANC
184
people that we were present in the area…
On March 29, after their involvement in Vulindlela, Nyavu again attacked the area
surrounding the Maphumulo inkantolo where the refugees stayed. The number of refugees from
Table Mountain and Vulindlela at Mason’s Mill and now a church at Esigodini swelled to 600

184

Statement of William Basil Harrington to the TRC, November 20, 1996.
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_1.htm (accessed January 20, 2012).
300

and 4,000 respectively.

185

Over the next ten days, reports by the Crisis Committee revealed

increasing numbers of deaths, injuries, burning homes, and police partisanship. At least 14 died
during the weekend alone. When Radley Keys and a news team visited Maqongqo on April 5,
they found the area nearly deserted with only 300 pro-Inkatha people left. The attackers boasted,
“Yes! We are Manyavus! We will kill the comrades if we find them here. We are going to take
over the chieftainship.”

186

Other reports also suggested that the attackers were led from within

Maqongqo by “Ntshiya Ntshiya” Goba and Ngane Zimu from a camp near Maphumulo’s Bottle
Store, owned by C.J. Maphumulo. At the camp, men were given liquor and Mandrax (similar to
Quaaludes and commonly smoked in South Africa, often with marijuana) and encouraged to
fight by both Inkatha leaders and the police. During this time, Chief Maphumulo was abroad
presenting the interim report of the Douglas Commission to the International Commission of
Jurists. Threats abounded that he would be killed upon his return.

187

The violence continued into April as the Nyavu and Inkatha-affiliated Maphumulo
worked to weed out any remaining comrades and used this as opportunity to plunder. Homes
were looted, liberated of their iron roofs, and often razed. Women who attempted to return and
protect their homes from looting were harassed and forced to leave. Izimpi were repeatedly
reported at the Maphumulo Bottle Store and now at the Nonzila store where the owner had
arranged a truck-full of weapons for the remaining young men. Another local name began to

185

APC, PC11, Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Report 1, March 25-31,

1990.
186

Fred Kockott, “14 killed as fighting hits Table Mountain,” Natal Witness April 4,

1990.
187

APC, PC11, Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Report 2, April 1-7,

1990.
301

surface as an instigator; “Professor” Dlamini organized looting from his shop and earned a
reputation for his ability to deceive the police.

188

At the Mason’s Mill camp to the west of the city, the Table Mountain refugees began to
lose hope. The police raided the camp for weapons on April 23, prompting fears of helplessness
in the event of an Inkatha attack. The 24-Hour Ad Hoc Crisis Committee, now operating under
the name of the Midlands Crisis Relief Committee, and Chief Maphumulo held a meeting at the
camp in early May in an attempt to get the refugees to return to Table Mountain for a meeting
with Bishopstowe police. But the refugees hesitated and expressed concern that the chief, with
his travels abroad, had abandoned them in their time of need.

189

On June 6 some of the refugees returned to Mbambangalo. An estimated 1,000 refugees
moved back home under the watchful eyes of two armed Nyavu groups at C.J.Maphumulo’s
store on the main road to the inkantolo. For many, the joy of returning home overcame the
scenes of destruction they encountered. One woman declared, “there is no better feeling than to
feel at home.” Deputy chief Albert Madlala concurred that while “this might not be the best
sight, and I agree it is not beautiful but being at Maqongqo is like I am at home. It is better than
Mason’s Mill. I felt like I was in exile there. Now I am back home. The day will come when I
will go back to my house and try to rebuild.”

190

Chief Maphumulo oversaw the loading of

municipal and SADF-supplied vehicles at Mason’s Mill and announced his own plans to

188

APC, PC11, Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Reports 3-6, April 8May 5, 1990.
189
APC, PC4/1/2/5. Natal Black Sash, “Minutes of the Midlands Crisis Relief
Committee,” May 7, 1990.
190
Nomusa Cembi, “A tense homecoming,” Natal Witness Echo June 14, 1990.
302

return.

191

Figure 20 The convoy of returning refugees. Natal Witness Echo June 14, 1990.
But the winter months of June and July continued to be a dangerous struggle for the
returned refugees. The refugees built temporary accommodation and erected tents around the
inkantolo and confined themselves to that area for fear of attack. C.J. Maphumulo refused to sell
to the returned residents at his shop and the International Red Cross stopped food deliveries on
account of the volatile situation. Tim Houghton, a white volunteer from Durban with MCRC,
asked for an SADF escort to take in supplies. MCRC also negotiated with the Department of
Development Aid to supply water trucks when the refugees began to run out of water and could
not leave the camp to resupply.

192

For over a month, the returned refugees suffered constant harassment at the hands of
Inkatha, SAP, and SADF members. Assault often took place at bus and taxi stops. Fana
Ntombela was beaten at an eStingini bus stop and Jabu Ndlovu was thrown out of a moving bus.
Police regularly raided the camp at the inkantolo for weapons, leaving the residents with a sense
of defenselessness. Small groups of refugees began to pour back into the city, but the city refused

191
192

“KZT move hampers refugee return,” Natal Witness June 7, 1990.
APC, PC11, Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Reports 13-14, June 17-

30.
303

to accommodate them again. By July 23, 1990, only 100 of the returned refugees remained in
Mbambangalo.

193

The winter months were also dangerous for Chief Maphumulo. On June 10, an ambush
on his car killed brothers Alson and Nelson Kunene and injured Edendale businessman Deda
Hlophe. The attempt on Maphumulo’s life failed as he had caught a taxi when the car failed to
arrive on time. Maphumulo alleged that the KwaZulu government had ordered his assassination
and sent an Mpumalanga-based hit squad, including Caprivi-trained Daluxolo Luthuli and Sbu
Bhengu, to complete the mission.

194

In Durban in July, police chased Chief Maphumulo and his

bodyguard before detaining them overnight.

195

From July until the end of October, large scale attacks on Mbambangalo ceased. Few of
Maphumulo’s supporters remained behind to be targeted and those who stayed attempted to hide
their support. The country’s attention had turned to the Reef where Inkatha bussed in supporters
from KwaZulu-Natal to agitate. In August, Contralesa suspended Chief Maphumulo from the
presidency despite the protests of its representatives from the Natal region. But he remained the
center of debate in Table Mountain. After a community/Inkatha meeting at the end of October
new attacks were launched on the chief and his family. Shots were fired at what was left of his
homestead in one instance and in another in November, his mother, Nosibhedlela, was assaulted
and arrested along with eight youth at her home. In an attack on Nonzila Mkhize’s home,

193

Isabel Koch, “City closes its doors to refugees,” Natal Witness July 19, 1990;
Nomusa Cembi, “Maqongqo residents pour back,” Natal Witness Echo July 26, 1990.
194
Later testimonies reveal the chief’s suspicions were correct (to be examined in the
next chapter). Heidi Gibson, “Hit squad was sent to kill me - chief,” Natal Witness Echo June 14,
1990; Amnesty statement of Daluxolo Luthuli to the TRC, August 5, 1997
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/special/caprivi/caprivi2.htm (accessed January 20, 2012).
195
“Chief held after car chase,” Natal Witness July 10, 1990.
304

Mandondela Mkhize was shot and paralyzed. Induna Steven Xaba was pulled off a bus and
killed. Chief Maphumulo’s cousin and aunt were killed in a car ambush. Several reports attest to
the death of Inkatha members.

196

By the end of November, conflict had returned to Table

Mountain in full force.
In December, the violence escalated and Chief Maphumulo made calls for the SADF,
who he no longer believed to be impartial, to be removed from Table Mountain. Attacks were
again directed at the chief’s umuzi after the ANC announced it would launch a Table Mountain
branch on December 16 at the inkantolo. Maphumulo cautioned that anyone who wanted to join
must do so voluntarily and emphasized that the scared should remain at home. Inkatha expressed
serious reservations on account of the existing tensions and Maphumulo threatened legal action
against Buthelezi after Mbambangalo Inkatha chairman Thomas Gcabashe allegedly led a group
of KwaZulu policemen into Maphumulo’s home where the men confiscated licensed weapons.
The group also captured 14 people who had been staying at the chief’s home, assaulting them at
a nearby SADF camp until the Bishopstowe SAP rescued them.

197

Deaths, injuries, burning homes, and allegations of police and military partisanship saw
in the new year in Mbambangalo. Throughout January and February 1991, Maphumulo
continued to highlight the police and SADF partiality. He said that three victims of an Inkatha
assault, Mthandeni Maphumulo, Philani Buthelezi, and Mkhishwa Makhanyela, had been
196

Lakela Kaunda, “Inkatha group fires shots at Chief Maphumulo’s home,” Natal
Witness Echo November 1, 1990; Kaunda, “Chief’s mother kicked, claim” Natal Witness Echo
November 29, 1990; Craig Urquhart, “Violence flares in Table Mountain,” Natal Witness
December 1, 1990; Urquhart, “Table Mountain clashes: 7 dead,” Natal Witness December 3,
1990.
197
Heidi Gibson, “Maphumulo accuses SADF of one-sidedness,” Natal Witness Echo
December 6, 1990; “ANC to launch Table Mountain branch on Sunday,” Natal Witness Echo
December 13, 1990; “ANC branch to open in Table Mountain,” Natal Witness December 14,
1990; “Maphumulo attack: ANC takes action,” Natal Witness December 18, 1990.
305

arrested and assaulted by police during questioning. Police killed Sihle Dlamini in what they
described as a shootout where they were under attack. Maphumulo alleged the police had beaten
Dlamini to death in an assault on ANC supporters at Maqongqo by SAP that arrived in six
vehicles. In other violent incidents, Daphne Gumede was killed while Mabashe Mkhize and
Fekile Shozi suffered injuries. Maphumulo claimed that he escaped another assassination attempt
when a bus he was riding in eSitingini was attacked. Schools began to demand Inkatha
membership cards for student registration. Both Maphumulo and the Maqongqo Inkatha
Freedom Party organized separate meetings to discuss the ongoing violence.

198

Fighting for Echibini
When uDlame spread to the Table Mountain region, many individuals involved pointed to the
existing land conflict and Chief Maphumulo’s invitation to refugees to relocate on the
Goedverwachting trust farm as the main causes. The shortage of land and water intensified not
only the conflict between the Nyavu and Maphumulo. As we will see in the next chapter, it
would also spark debates within the Maphumulo about membership of these new residents and
the legitimacy of the chief.
Chief Maphumulo was keenly aware of Inkatha disapproval of his increasingly
progressive politics but still contended that the manner in which the Table Mountain conflict
with the Nyavu unfolded was directly related to the struggle over Goedverwachting. Maphumulo
spoke to the newspapers about the violence but also made it clear he believed the trust farm was

198

“Cops accused of fueling conflict,” New African January 24, 1991; Lakela Kaunda,
“Police blamed for ‘fuelling conflict,’” Natal Witness Echo January 24, 1991; Kaunda,
“Maphumulo calls for meeting on Sunday,” Natal Witness January 31, 1991; “Maphumulo shot
at,” Natal Witness February 6, 1991; “Violence at Table Mountain,” Natal Witness February 20,
1991; APC, PC126/3/11, Inkatha Freedom Party Press Release, February 10, 1991.
306

now under the jurisdiction of the Maphumulo. “The Manyavu are trying to claim for themselves
a portion of our land which was a trust farm called Goedverwagding [sic], which was officially
handed over to us,” the chief said.

199

After the first outbreak of violence, Maphumulo requested

that the police “tell the Manyavus to vacate our land, those that have encroached. If they can do
that peace is sure to be restored.”

200

In interviews, Mbambangalo and KwaNyavu residents cited the land conflict and the
influx of refugees onto the disputed land as cause for the conflict. The elder Maphumulo, Goge
Balothi made it sound quite simple. “Nyavu people started the war… conflict started because we
were fighting for Echibini. They said it was theirs and we said it was ours.”

201

One young

Nyavu believed the overlap of the land dispute with politics was a clever orchestration of Chief
Maphumulo. “He was too clever; he changed the land dispute and called it a political war. He
said IFP members are beating him because he is a member of the ANC… it was not a war
between IFP and ANC. It was a land dispute.”

202

Another woman told me she was uncertain

199

Nomusa Cembi, “Large group of armed men attack Maqongqo” Natal Witness Echo
February 1, 1990.
200
Kockett, “Fighting comes to peace area” Natal Witness January 31, 1990.
201

“Impi ivele ngoba sekufike abantu bakaNyavu...nakhona kuze kuliwe kwakubangwa
lendawo yase Chibini. AbakaNyavu babethi indawo yabo nathi sithi eyethu.” Goge Balothi,
interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 4, 2011.
202
“Inkosi yakaMaphumulo yayihlakaniphe kakhulu yayijika indaba yombango
yawubiza ngepolitiki, yathi ishawa abantu be IFP ngoba yona iyi ANC... lwasuka kanjalo ke
udlame kwakungakhona ukuthi bekushayana abantu be IFP ne ANC kwakungoba kubangwa
indawo.” Zazi Cyrpian Dlaimini, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Esinyamini, June
21, 2011.
307

whether the Maphumulo chief was clever or a criminal, but she knew that he wanted to take the
Nyavu land, thus sparking the violence.

203

Baningi Maphumulo and Bernard Mkhize specifically cited the encroachment of the
Nyavu into Echibini as the genesis of uDlame. Baningi explained the benevolence of the
Maphumulo. “The war started due to a land dispute…That place was called Echibini. Those
[Nyavu] people were fighting us after our Chief gave them a place to stay. They came to
Echibini after suffering in their places, but after they settled we started to not see eye-to-eye.”
Mkhize went on to say, “We tried to sit down with them and talk sense in such a way. We had
boundaries but we ended up disputing the boundaries.” He dated the conflict to the 1950s when
the farm was bought from “Mr. Ferreira” for the Maphumulo, fusing the piecemeal purchase of
Goedverwachting into one transaction. This conflation may reflect an error in memory or may
speak to the Maphumulos’ interpretation that the land was always intended for them.

204

It is also important to remember that Baningi and Mkhize were (and continue to be)
influential members of Inkatha and the Maphumulo family and chiefdom. Baningi was the
ibamba for the Mhlabunzima’s son and the current chief, Nhlakanipho, while Mkhize, who
appears in the next chapter, was an induna and chair of an Mbambangalo Inkatha branch. Upon
Nhlakanipho’s appointment to the chieftaincy in 2004, he made Mkhize the indunenkhulu (head

203

Bancomile Msomi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Esinyameni, August

4, 2011.
204

Baningi: “Impi yona ken je iqale ngoba kwakubangwa ndawo le… Indawo
eyayibangwa yayibizwa ngokuthi kuseChibini. Balwa lababantu kodwa benikezwe inkosi yethu
indawo. Bekade befike ngosizi lapha eChibini. Kwaqala lapho ke ukungezwani.” Mkhize:
Sazama ukuthi sihlale phansi nabo sibakhombise indlela kukhulunyiswane, kwaze kwenziwa
nemingcele kwasekubangwa wona lomngcele.” Baningi Maphumulo and Bernard Mkhize,
interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 31, 2011.
308

induna) in recognition of his efforts to bring the heir back to Mbambangalo.

205

As men of high

position amongst the Maphumulo concerned with the ongoing land dispute, the story told is that
of the land being purchased for the Maphumulo.
Attendees at Contralesa meetings too traced the violence to the trust farm. At an August
1990 meeting of Contralesa in Durban with COSATU/UDF, a “comrade from Maqongqo” also
suggested that the conflict “appeared to have arisen from the fact that a group of Mdluli’s people
were settled in an area under the jurisdiction of Maphumulo.” One comrade stated that there was
a court case between the two over this piece of land, but others had no knowledge of it.

206

One young woman remembered that the some of the new residents were amaqabane and
that they ignored the chief’s plea to keep their politics secret. These comrades encouraged the
unaffiliated to sing ANC songs with them and labeled the Nyavu as Inkatha.

207

This resonates

with the pattern noticed by sociologist Anthony Minnaar (particularly in the South Coast region
of KwaZulu-Natal) in which politicized youth from the townships fled to the countryside and
undermined traditional authorities.

208

However, at Echibini the young comrade refugees found

instead a chief increasingly sympathetic to their cause. While Chief Maphumulo was being
drawn into progressive and explicitly ANC circles, the land dispute remained the most central

205

Bernard Mkhize remained head induna until his December 2011 murder. Police
suspect robbery was the motive, as the murder took place at Mkhize’s tuck shop. The press
report of his death admits the “bad history” of the community and hints at the fragile peace and
stability that the chief and izinduna attempted to build after 2004. “Head of izinduna gunned
down,” Natal Witness December 5, 2011.
206
Holomisa, A Double-Edged Sword, 17–8. I have thus far been unable to find any
evidence of a court case.
207
Thandazila Vidima, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, August 8,
2011.
208
Anthony Minnaar, Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria,
1992), 14-15.
309

concern for many Nyavu and Maphumulo—highlighting the disjunction between national
politics and local concerns.

Fighting for Peace?
Throughout the cycles of conflict in the Table Mountain region, Chief Maphumulo remained a
powerful and almost legendary force. He spoke to the local press, traveled internationally,
publicly criticized the military and police, looked out for his people, and survived multiple
assassination attempts. But as he was drawn into networks of the UDF and ANC, his mission
began to shift. Maphumulo began to operate in a network of weapons and izinthelezi, fighting for
peace. The chief had always pushed for the end of apartheid, even during the years when he
towed the Inkatha line, but he began to doubt the possibility of peaceful change and employed
new methods.
As the violence escalated in the Table Mountain region, Chief Maphumulo’s words
turned from peace to arms and self-defense. Certainly, his firsthand experience of the
government’s inability or unwillingness to enforce law and order and the police/kitkonstabel
attacks on his umuzi influenced this strategic shift. His increasingly close relationship with the
militant and uncompromising ANC regional leader Harry Gwala, the “Lion of the Midlands,”
with whom he planned the launch of the Table Mountain ANC branch, also would have bolstered
the chief’s militarism. The two often shared platforms at rallies and press conferences and
expressed skepticism at continued peace talks. “The only realistic, meaningful and long term
solution to this problem is to arm the people in self-defence,” Maphumulo told the ANC stalwart
Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo) on one of his Contralesa trips to London. “The total elimination of

310

apartheid and its structures lies to the centre of the irreversible solution to the Natal violence.
Any suggested solution that falls short of this will be shortlived.”

209

Figure 21: Chief Maphumulo (left) with the "Lion of the Midlands," Harry Gwala. n.d.
Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers
Indeed, arms did begin to move in and out of Maphumulo’s inkantolo. While it is likely
that community members took up collections to purchase weapons for defense, as they did
elsewhere, there is evidence that suggests the presence of arms in Mbambangalo in a quantity
that goes beyond well beyond individual ownership or communal defense. MCRC volunteer Tim
Houghton recalled unknowingly transporting an ammunition cache out of Mbambangalo in June
1990 when he gave a ride to a group of comrades staying near the inkantolo to a meeting in
Edendale. An SADF roadblock set up as part of a peacekeeping patrol stopped Houghton and the
comrades on their way down the windy road from Maqongqo.
Without speaking, the platoon sergeant motioned us to stand away from the car
with our hands on our heads as he directed the dog handler (with his magnificent
golden Labrador) into the car. Within seconds, the dog began to wag its tail and
pant excitedly, pawing at the back seat. Two young soldiers immediately sprang
forward and began excavating in the upholstery. For 15 minutes, I watched
flabbergasted as the beautiful but ruthlessly efficient hound unearthed over 2000
rounds of assorted ammunition from behind the seats and under the carpets. At the
end of it, I just stood there, staring at the gleaming pile of brass in utter
209

Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), “Opinion: The Violence in Natal,” Natal Witness (May 3,

1990).
311

amazement. While I had been running around with Thami, rounding up the rest of
our passengers, others in the camp must have stashed the ammo in the car…
There had obviously been more to this mission all along than getting the
210
comrades to a meeting.
Albert Sbangeliso Maseko, an ANC-affiliated TRC amnesty applicant from
KwaSwayimane, testified in 1999 that he received weapons, including an AK47, an R1, two 303
rifles, and a shotgun, from Baba Madlala in Maqongqo. According to Maseko, Madlala was the
ANC chairman in Maqongqo before his death and that ANC members from Maqongqo joined
Maseko in an attempt to kill Thulane Mkhize, an Inkatha member in Nqalika isigodi of
Swayimane.

211

One confidential source suggested that Chief Maphumulo continued his public

presentation of his area as a peaceful, neutral zone in order to provide cover for the presence of
MK underground operatives and their arms cache.
Several Mbambangalo residents also attest to Maphumulo’s shift to the UDF/ANC and
212

war activities including the rallying of youth and provision of izinthelezi.

Once the violence

began in Table Mountain, Maphumulo “collected all the young adults to join. I asked what they
were joining. He said he wanted everyone to join the ANC. Then they joined and started to use
izinthelezi after that war started… Inkosi used to call them to come with their spears and sticks
210

Tim Houghton, “Guns and posers at Table Mountain,” Natal Witness October 31,

2008.
211

Maseko testified Madlala gave him the weapons and that Mroxegu Mathe, who
succeeded Madlala as ANC leader, gave the order to attack Thulane Mkhize. During cross
examination, there was some confusion as to who gave the order and Advocate Bosman
concluded that Mathe did not give the order. The amnesty decision states Mathe gave both the
weapons and the order. Amnesty statement of Albert Sbangeliso Maseko to the TRC, November
17, 1999. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99111518_dbn_991117db.htm (accessed
February 8, 2012).
212
Izinthelezi (protective medicines) are used in rituals of purification and fortification to
fulfill the objectives of those participating in the rituals. Here, the intention would be the means
to strengthen and protect men in combat. For an example of a historical ritual ceremony in
which izinthelezi was deployed, see Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising.
312

to dip them in inthelezi. Then immediately havoc started.”

213

Another woman said that she was

visiting with the chief’s mother, Ma Mdlalose, when several young boys came to the chief’s
214

umuzi to ask for inthelezi.

Another man who served on Chief Maphumulo’s development

committee told me in an interview that, “I want to believe that everything Mhlabunzima was
doing, he was getting advice from the ANC. He started Contralesa for traditional leaders…
Mhlabunzima recruited a lot of people for the ANC. Some they agree that they were recruited by
him underground, like Meshack Hadebe for example.”

215

Maphumulo also utilized his UDF/ANC connections to increase his personal security.
After the repeated attempts on his life, Maphumulo hired a MK member as a body guard. He had
begun to surround himself with security as early as 1988 following receipt of threats as a result
of his welcoming of refugees. Two of his friends and bodyguards died, and another was injured
in the ambush attempt on the chief’s car in June 1990 described above. When Maphumulo and a
friend drove to Durban next month to pick up the MK bodyguard, they were chased and held

213

“Inkosi yacela abantwana abancane ukuthi bajoyine, ngibuze ukuthi yini ejoyinwayo.
Wathi ucela ukuthi abantu bakhe bashintshe babe i-ANC bahambake abantu abasha bajoyina,
baqala manje bagezwa ngezintelezi emva kwalokho kwaqala kwaliwa…iNkosi ibabiza abafana
ukuthi abafike nezinduku zabo nemikhonto bazoyifaka entelezini kwasekuqala lomsindo ke.
Dladla interview. See also Florence Ngcobo, interview with author and Jill Kelly, eStingini,
March 7, 2011.
214
“uDlame lwaqala ngilapha eNkosini uMhlabunzima. Ngangihleli nomama
uMaMdlalose weNkosi uMhlabunzima. Kwafika abafana abathathu babuza inthelezi. Kwasuka
lapho umsindo baqala bagijimisana abantu.” Mancane M., interview with author and Thandeka
Majola, Echibini, June 10, 2011.
215
“I want to believe ukuthi izinto ayezenza uMhlabunzima imibono eminye
wwayeyithola kwi-ANC. Waphinda uMhlabunzima baqala i-Contralesa yabaholi traditional
leaders… uMhlabunzima warecruter abantu abaningi ebafaka kwi ANC abanye bayakuvuma
lokho oyedwa wabo uMeshack Hadebe underground.” Meshack Hadebe, born in Mbambangalo,
is the former ANC Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Community Development in
KwaZulu-Natal and current MEC for Agricultural and Environmental Affairs. Ndela N.,
interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Pietermaritzburg, April 15, 2011.
313

overnight by police who questioned Maphumulo as to why he was “not obedient to Chief
Buthelezi” and why he wanted to be “led by Xhosas,” a reference to the ANC. The police
released Maphumulo but held the bodyguard in terms of the Internal Security Act. Maphumulo
alleged the bodyguard had been identified and greeted by his MK name by askaris, or ANC
members-turned-spies.

216

Rumors too suggest that Maphumulo’s support for the ANC may have strongly impacted
his community beyond sparking internal division (to be examined in the next chapter). The same
confidential source that alleged Maphumulo hid an arms cache in Mbambangalo suggested that
Maphumulo expected patronage from the local shop owners in order to accommodate the
comrades. When one refused, not because he was Inkatha-affiliated (though his brothers were)
but because any further patronage would destroy his business, youth targeted the shop for attack.
However, a woman from Edendale remembers looting and petrol bombing this same store when
she went to Maqongqo for the late chief’s funeral, calling into question whether or not
Maphumulo approved of the action.
When Mhlabunzima died in 1993 [sic], we went to his funeral. Comrades
destroyed that bottle shop and we got inside to pick up goods. Some people were
at the burial while we took everything we wanted for free in the shop. Boys got
into his bottle store and took beer. After we took whatever we needed from the
shop, we sucked petrol from the cars and made petrol bombs. We took that petrol
217
bomb and threw it into the shop.
216

Samantha Weinberg, “Narrow escape for Table Mountain chief,” Natal Witness June
11, 1990; “Chief escapes ambush attempt on car,” June 11, 1990; “Chief held after car chase,”
Natal Witness July 10, 1990.
217
“Ngoba ngesikhathi kushone uMhlabunzima ngo 1993, kuthe uma siyongcwaba.
Amaqabane asishaya asibhodloza lesositolo sangena sazithathela izimpahla. Kuyangcwatshwa
kwelinye isayidi kuleli elinye isayidi thina siyathatha izinto esitolo. Abafana bangena nakwi
bottle store yakhe bathatha utshwala. Nemuva kokuzithathela esitolo samoma upetrol
ezimotweni senza amapetrol bomb. Sashisa isitolo.” The woman recalling this story said the
shop was owned by a Mr. Zimu; It is not clear whether this is Ngane Zimu, who had been
identified as an Inkatha leader earlier or his brother Mfanazo Frazer Zimu who owned a shop on
314

Conclusion
Chief Maphumulo’s quest for peace earned him an almost mythological reputation amongst the
Pietermaritzburg communities that knew him. His assassination, to be examined in the next
chapter, and the renaming of the road to Table Mountain after him 2005 nearly solidified the
memory of him as “the peace chief.” From as early as 1988 Maphumulo welcomed refugees
from the Pietermaritzburg violence to his “haven of peace.” He forbid political recruiting in his
area and pushed for a judicial inquiry into the causes of the violence. When the government
failed to respond, Chief Maphumulo joined Contralesa as yet another venue through which to
push for peace. While this organization of traditional leaders attempted to portray itself as a nonaffiliated organization, its instigation by ANC/UDF activists resulted in a close relationship
between the organizations that drew Maphumulo into the network of the ANC/UDF. Through
Contralesa, the chief succeeded in convening a commission of inquiry into the violence that
highlighted the role of Inkatha in perpetrating the Natal violence. The high profile nature of the
commission and Maphumulo’s condemnation of the violence and its perpetrators drew the ire of
Inkatha, the KwaZulu government, and the SAP and Natal’s “haven of peace” burst into flames.
When violence erupted at Table Mountain, however, it was not all related to Maphumulo’s
increasingly progressive politics. The continued tensions over the disputed portion of
Goedverwachting and the influx of refugees onto the land, welcomed by Maphumulo, fueled the
conflict.
Maphumulo’s mission for peace had a tremendous impact on the communities touched by
his leadership. But as this chapter has shown, the chief employed a multitude of strategies in his
quest for peace, some not always peaceful. In the context of powerful local leaders with

the strip of trust land. Happiness Memela in interview with Ngenzeni Mbambo, by author and
Thandeka Majola, August 8, 2011.
315

legendary reputations, access to arms and powerful protective medicines, and political crusades,
Chief Maphumulo certainly could hold his own. But unlike the warlords with whom he stood at
odds, those who called Maphumulo their chief were not coerced into following him. With the
eruption of uDlame in Mbambangalo, Maphumulo’s chiefly authority became the center of a
contentious debate that highlights a multitude of ways chiefs earned and maintained legitimacy
amongst their people. This contested chiefly authority will be examined in the next chapter when
the conflict shifts from one between the Maphumulo and Nyavu to one within the Maphumulo
community itself.

316

Chapter Five:
1

“Do you understand being chased out with your chief?” :
uDlame and Chiefly Authority in Mbambangalo/Mkhambathini (1990-1994)
On February 25, 1991, Chief Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo was shot dead. Like the many
Mbambangalo residents who fled to refugee camps and other safe havens, Maphumulo found
that life in the shadow of Table Mountain had become simply too dangerous. Instead, he and his
family rented a house at 95 Havelock Road in Pietermaritzburg. On the day of his death, the
chief was returning home after a parent meeting at Clarendon Primary School, which several of
his children attended. As he pulled into the driveway around 8 p.m., bullets from a 9mm pistol
struck him in the back and head eight times as the killers shot through the doors and windows of
his car. Neighbors found him slumped at the wheel but still alive. They rushed the chief to
Northdale Hospital but he was certified dead on arrival. Maphumulo was 42 years old and had
been chief for almost 18 years. During these years he “became dearly loved by his followers and
2

sympathizers, and deeply hated by opponents.” His assassination so soon after a January 29,
1991 peace accord between the ANC and Inkatha at the Royal Hotel in Durban sparked fears that
the nascent peace talks between Inkatha and the ANC would halt.
Violence began in the Table Mountain region over a year before the assassination of “the
peace chief” but it did not culminate in his death. Up until the 1994 elections (and sporadically
after), conflict continued unabated as the political parties struggled for control and factions
sought to install an Ibambabukhosi sympathetic to their cause. How do we interpret the outbreak

1

“Uyakwazi ukukhishwa abantu bangaphandle abaneNkosi yabo bazonikhipha
ngaphandle endaweni yenu kanye neNkosi yenu?” Mantombi Manyoni, interview by author and
Thandeka Majola, Haniville, August 8, 2011.
2
Pat Stillwell, “Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo (1950-1991) Natalia 21 (1991).
317

of uDlame and the cycle of conflict that erupted in the Table Mountain region? For what did the
chief die? John Aitchison contends that while the black-on-black interpretation is fueled by racist
attitudes and “intellectual and journalistic laziness,” there is a real existence of “the so-called
faction fight” in Natal. He suggests that modern political conflict began to overlay such faction
fighting but that the two can be clearly distinguished, citing Msinga, Richmond, and Table
3

Mountain as examples of this. But as Sithole has argued for the Umzinto and Umbumbulu
districts of the 1930s, there is a danger of generalizing conflicts and ignoring local contexts when
4

using the term “faction fight” to explain such violence. This is particularly dangerous for the
Table Mountain region where the groups in conflict were not clearly defined factions but
communities in flux. Membership is culturally defined, and the creation of boundaries, the
purchase of additional farms, forced relocation, and later Chief Maphumulo’s welcoming of
refugees resulted in changing meanings of membership and the erosion of existing relationships.
Analyzing these complex dynamics of the Table Mountain area enables a more complete
understanding not only of the relationship between these two communities and their chiefs, but
also of the tension within the Maphumulo chiefdom that led to the violence. As the violence
raged on, the conflict shifted from one between chieftaincies over land to one over the authority
of the chief.
This chapter will examine the multiple layers of conflict in the Table Mountain region,
between chiefs, within the Maphumulo isizwe, within the Maphumulo umndeni, and between the
political parties. It will first outline actions taken by umndeni members and izinduna in

3

Aitchison, Interpreting the Violence, 4.

4

Jabulani Sithole. “Conflict and Collective Violence: Scarce Resources, Social Relations
and the State in the Umzinto and the Umbumbulu Districts of southern Natal during the 1930s.”
BA Honours thesis (University of Natal, 1992): 58.
318

cooperation with KwaZulu in attempt to undermine Chief Maphumulo’s authority and have him
deposed. These players found unlikely allies in the neighboring Nyavu under the Inkathaaffiliated Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli. Political affiliation enabled them to push for their own
interests with near immunity from law enforcement. The next section will consider the
assassination of the chief and the botched inquest into his death. It will also examine the patterns
of violence that continued when the conflict shifted to one within the Maphumulo people and
between Inkatha and the umndeni over the installation of an ibamba for the young heir,
Nhlakanipho. Finally, it will analyze the contentious debate that followed concerning
Maphumulo’s chiefly legitimacy during his lifetime and in the wake of his death. Intimately
connected to this debate over legitimacy is the definition of isizwe. Who were the Maphumulo?
The chapter will ultimately illustrate not only the manner in which uDlame in Table Mountain
was directly tied to debates over chiefly authority but also alternative conceptions of legitimacy.
While his political opponents in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly chided Maphumulo as “only
the fourth chief,” members of his isizwe and those who moved to his jurisdiction during the
violence remained dedicated to him for his attempts to maintain peace, critique the police and
apartheid government, and provide them with safety and resources both before and during a civil
war. UDlame in Mbambangalo was a conflict over chiefly authority and land in which the main
actors relied upon political affiliations to pursue their own ambitions.

“In anticipation of Inkosi Maphumulo’s Discharge”
The real likelihood of the demise of the homeland system directly threatened many chiefs,
legislative assembly members, and izinduna who benefitted either directly or through patronage
from the KwaZulu government. Thus, many of them had a stake in instigating and perpetuating

319

violence and positioning themselves as legitimate local leaders.

5

But in Mbambangalo,

individual attempts to undermine the authority of Chief Maphumulo began before the outbreak
of uDlame and continued until his death. These efforts highlight the manner in which uDlame in
the Table Mountain region broke out over more than just the struggle for power between Inkatha
and the ANC. These efforts were spearheaded by a number of Maphumulo umndeni members,
izinduna, and other residents out for personal gain, including Mdingi Maphumulo, Moses Zondi,
and izinduna Norman “Dotsheni” Gumede and Thomas Mshoki Gcabashe.
These personal aspirations of members of the umndeni have been cited by other members
of the Maphumulo as one of the causes of uDlame in Mbambangalo. The son of Mhlabunzima
and the current Maphumulo chief, Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, said violence came to
Mbambangalo because “there were members of the family who were in dispute, basically, who
wanted the chieftaincy for themselves, you see, so they used politics in order to acquire this
position. The violence here didn’t start because of politics, really. It was because of the family
6

dispute.” Ivy Gumede, a daughter of Chief Ndlovu Maphumulo and aunt of Mhlabunzima, said
that the conflict had begun as early as Mhlabunzima’s installation. “When Khangela was still
acting on behalf of Mhlabunzima, the Maphumulo conflict started because they were all saying
that they should act for Mhlabunzima. Then it came to a point where they fought over it until
7

Mhlabunzima passed on.” While these individuals’ closeness to the chieftaincy might suggest
an interest in telling the story this way, others outside the family support their claims. Manini

5
6

Morris and Hindson, “South Africa.”
Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, interview by author, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011.

7

“Kuthe uKhangela esabambele uMhlabunzima kwavuka umbango lapha endlini
yakaMaphumulo ngoba bonke babethi nabo kufanele ukuthi babambele uMhlabunzima.” Ivy
Gumede, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Imbali, August 8, 2011.
320

Mbokazi, a supporter of Chief Mhlabunzima who fled Mbambangalo during the violence said,
“This thing [referring to the violence] started from the Maphumulo clan because Mhlabunzima’s
uncles were against him and that led to the fighting in Maqongqo.”

8

Mdingi Maphumulo, it should be recalled, was the son of an unmarried Maphumulo
woman who had gained the favor of Ibamba Khangela Maphumulo. Mdingi was displeased
when members of the Maphumulo asserted that Mdingi’s illegitimate heritage did not entitle him
to be a member of the umndeni. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner N.G. Harvey believed that
Mdingi had been so disappointed by his relegation that he may have threatened one of the
9

councillors who had objected to his umndeni status. This man with a history of ambition and
menacing behavior found allies and set out to depose the chief.
Despite his relegation from the umndeni, Mdingi began to position himself as a potential
candidate for the chieftaincy and attempted to delegitimize Mhlabunzima’s authority in late 1989
and early 1990. He partnered with Gumede and Zondi, who had themselves fallen out of favor
with the chief and members of the Maphumulo. In late 1989, Mdingi, Gumede, and Zondi, as
well as C.J. Maphumulo and Thobiyase Mdlalose (whose names should be familiar as Inkatha
supporters from the previous chapter; the former was also an umndeni member) held an
unauthorized meeting with Psychology Ndlovu, the infamous Inkatha strongman of the Gcumisa
and KwaZulu MP for KwaSwayimane. After this meeting, the Maphumulo “decided that the
abovenamed persons must be removed from the area” and Chief Mhlabunzima informed the men

8

“Lento yasuka ozalweni lwakaMaphumulo ngoba obaba bakaMhlabunzima
babengahambisani naye okwadala ukuthi kugcine kuliwa endaweni yaseMaqongqo.” Maningi
and Zabazendoda, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 21, 2011.
9
PAR. BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5 “Bantu Affairs Commissioner Pietermaritzburg to Chief
Bantu Affairs Commissioner,” March 11, 1970.
321

10

about the decision against them.

Because the KwaZulu documents citing this meeting do not

mention the date (only “several months earlier”) we do not know if this is the same meeting or
whether it was related to the September 1989 meeting where Gcumisa Inkatha supporters forced
Maphumulo members to attend a meeting at KwaSwayimane and Chief Gcumisa ordered
everyone to join Inkatha. Whether or not it is the same or related, the meeting would have been
interpreted as political canvassing due to the invitation of Ndlovu. The decision to ostracize the
men involved was thus in line with Mhlabunzima’s practice of refusing political meetings. Given
the meeting’s timing in late 1989, after the chief publicly joined Contralesa and failed to attend a
meeting he requested with the Ngonyama Goodwill Zwelethini, there is a strong possibility the
men involved recognized an opportunity to advance their own ambitions through an alliance with
Inkatha. As well, given Buthelezi’s call for chiefs to ostracize Maphumulo in September, Inkatha
may have instigated the meeting after identifying the men as possible allies.
Sometime in late 1989, Mdingi, Gumede, and Zondi went to Ulundi and alleged that
Chief Maphumulo had misappropriated Maphumulo funds. One allegation questioned whether or
not Maphumulo had pocketed payments for sites on the SADT-controlled portion of
Goedverwachting. KwaZulu launched an investigation under the auspices of the Mpumalanga
Magistrate on January 12, 1990, but could not find evidence of Maphumulo’s fault. According to
the investigative report by a Mr. Nyandu, the site fees had not been deposited into the
Maphumulo account, but none of the receipts for sites had been signed by Maphumulo. Gumede
and Induna Alfred Madlala had been responsible for the fee collection. Maphumulo himself
countered that Gumede had run off with the fees. Nyandu further found that allegations
regarding Maphumulo’s misuse of funds for a block making project and KwaZulu-owned
10

UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1990,”Report on the Alleged
Misappropriation of Public Funds: Maphumulo Tribal Area,” n.d.
322

furniture were without foundation. Ultimately, Nyandu stated, “The problem is that, with due
respect Sir, our informants are not reliable, they seem to be working for recognition in
anticipation of Inkosi Maphumulo’s discharge. Mr Mdingi Maphumulo is claiming ubukhosi. Mr
Gumede hopes to be a Senior Induna when Mdingi is appointed as Inkosi. Mr Zondi is trying to
cover-up for the money misappropriated by him [in the block-making project].”

11

These attempts to find Maphumulo guilty of misconduct must be seen in the context of
the manipulation of chiefly authority by Buthelezi and KwaZulu. Such manipulation was
previously the domain of the colonial, segregation, and early apartheid governments. With the
creation of KwaZulu and the founding of Inkatha, as examined in chapter three, some of this
manipulative power shifted to the bantustan government. As the demise of homeland rule
became more certain, the exploitation of chiefly authority intensified in the 1980s and early
1990s. Troublesome chiefs continued to be targeted. Caprivians under Daluxolo Luthuli
assassinated Ximba Chief Msinga Mlaba in 1988 for “educating people with ANC policy and
information.

12

After the launch of Contralesa in 1989, Inkatha endeavors to delegitimize

progressive chiefs intensified. Immediately after the meeting at which Buthelezi and Zwelethini
attacked Contralesa and Maphumulo as a “spear into the heart of Zulu unity,” the KZLA
suspended Chief Elphas Molefe of Nquthu, who had traveled with Maphumulo to Lusaka as part
of the Contralesa delegation in August 1989.

11

UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1990, “Report on the Alleged
Misappropriation of Public Funds: Maphumulo Tribal Area,” n.d.
12
Bheka Ntshangase, "Brave Enough to Build Bridges through Dialogue: The Case of
Chief Zibuse Mlaba" The Synergos Institute (2003); J. Beall and M. Ngonyama, “Indigenous
Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Elite Coalitions for Development: The Case of Greater
Durban, South Africa” (2009).
323

While an inquiry into Molefe’s authority found him guilty on two charges of conducting
himself in a “disgraceful and improper manner as an appointed Inkosi” and one charge of
disobeying the “lawful order of the Chief Minister by refusing to attend a meeting with the
Cabinet,” Contralesa chiefs and the wider public recognized that Molefe had been targeted for
“sowing Zulu disunity.”

13

Molefe received notice to attend a KwaZulu cabinet meeting in April

1989, but failed to attend. He was uncertain of what was to be discussed and given his
membership of Contralesa and the recent assassination of his ANC/UDF-affiliated son, Sechaba
Thobang Molefe, the chief was hesitant to attend. In September 1989, he received notice of his
suspension pending inquiry. The charges regarding his “improper” behavior as a chief were on
account of a 1986 conviction for receiving stolen property (as a gift from one of his izinduna)
and his 1984 trial in absentia of five men who failed to pay their levies.

14

While there is no

doubt of Molefe’s guilt regarding the receipt of stolen property, the second charge of improper
behavior is more complicated and was no doubt pursued on account of Buthelezi’s vendetta
against Contralesa-affiliated chiefs. The delay between Molefe’s inquiry and these improper
behaviors further suggests that Molefe’s political affiliation was the impetus for the suspension.

13

Original emphasis. UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1990, “Inquiry
Proceedings into a Charge of Misconduct against Inkosi Elphas Molefe,” April-July, 1990;
Memorandum to the Cabinet from the Department of the Chief Minister, “Misconduct Inquiry:
Inkosi Elphas Molefe,” October 29, 1990. “Nquthu chief suspended from duty,” Natal Witness
September 21, 1989; “Suspension challenged,” Natal Witness October 7, 1989; Carmel Rickard,
“Contralesa chief stripped of title by Buthelezi to take court action,” Natal Witness October 25,
1989.
14
“Inquiry Proceedings into a Charge of Misconduct against Inkosi Elphas Molefe”;
“Misconduct Inquiry: Inkosi Elphas Molefe.”
324

Given KwaZulu’s efforts to find evidence to justify action against Maphumulo, it is likely that
similar endeavors were made in the case of Molefe—only here Buthelezi succeeded.

15

On November 7, 1993, sixty to eighty armed men attacked Molefe’s homestead. During
the massacre, Molefe was shot several times and his son Sipho and ten others died. The
following night, armed men attacked again, this time killing three, including Molefe’s senior
induna. The Goldstone Commission found that the KwaZulu Police covered up the identities of
the perpetrators. Themba Khoza, Inkatha chairman of the Transvaal region who had received
large quantities of weapons from Eugene de Kock (the South African Police colonel known as
“Prime Evil” for his counterinsurgency tactics), had allegedly approved the disruption of an
ANC rally at Nqutu Stadium but when the rally was cancelled the armed men turned to Molefe’s
homestead.

16

Given KwaZulu’s antagonism towards Maphumulo and its success in eliminating and
ostracizing other progressive chiefs, Nyandu’s failure to find evidence for abuse of office was
surely met with scorn by Buthelezi. The Inkatha leader would have to find other means to
delegitimize the peace chief—turning now to his allies from within the Maphumulo. When
violence broke out in Mbambangalo a month after Nyandu’s report, several of these same men
15

Indeed, Inkosi Molefe was again suspended for neglect of duties in February 2006,
suggesting that his leadership was less than exemplary. It should also be noted that the suspended
Molefe believed there was an element of ethnic hostility in his persecution because the Molefe
are not “ethnic Zulus” but descendants of the Basotho who were still “South Sotho in culture,
outlook and language.” When Elphas Molefe testified before the TRC, his language of choice
was SeSotho. Similarly, the Ximba of the Mlaba amakhosi are descendants of the Basotho who
found their way into Zululand during the times of Shaka and Dingane before being dispersed by
British settlers. Rickard, “Contralesa chief stripped…;” Ntshangase, “Brave Enough to Build…”
16
WHP, AG2838 (Community Agency for Social Enquiry), G, “Interim Report on
Criminal Political Violence by Elements within the South African Police, the KwaZulu Police
and the Inkatha Freedom Party,” March 18, 1994; Testimony of Inkosi Elphas Molefe to the
TRC, Vryheid, April 17, 1997, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/vryheid/vryheid2.htm
(accessed February 1, 2012).
325

who went to Ulundi with the allegations, as well as induna Thomas Gcabashe, directed its
unfolding and blamed Chief Maphumulo for the violence. Several Maphumulo interviewed
attested to divisions within the Maphumulo before and after the start of the violence and the fact
that many people from Maqongqo sided with the Inkatha-affiliated Chief Mdluli rather than their
own chief.

17

Before the outbreak of the violence over the weekend of January 26-28, 1990, Albert
Madlala claims to have spotted induna Thomas Gcabashe pointing out homes to the police. The
possibility exists for competition between these men. While Chief Maphumulo may have
recognized Madlala as his indunenkulu (head induna), Madlala was not registered as such in the
magistrate’s office as required by the Bantu Authorities Act. He was registered as deputy chief in
anticipation of Maphumulo’s overseas studies, but because Maphumulo postponed the bursary
Madlala was never served letters of appointment.

18

According to Madlala’s son, Bhekizazi

Japhet Madlala, Mhlabunzima appointed Albert to the position because of his record of service
to the chief. After an injury that made Albert no longer able to work, he earned the favor of the
chief, serving as a community assistant,

19

the overseer of the isizwe’s cattle dip, and an induna

before his appointment as indunenkulu. When Maphumulo traveled on Contralesa business, he

17

Veronica Dlamini, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Stingini, May 23, 2011;
Nkanyiso Ndlovu, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, April 8, 2011.
18
Radley Keys Private Papers. Maqongqo meeting notes, February 24, 1992.
19

B.J. Madlala used the term iphoyisa, which literally means police, but in the context
suggests that Alfred Madlala was sent to help the community, the izinduna, and chief. “Inkosi
yaseyicabanga ukumenza iphoyisa layo, umsebenzi wakhe kwakufanele athunywe ukusiza
umphakathi kanye nokusiza izinduna zeNkosi. Wawenza lowomsebenzi ngouqotho, waphinde
wabekwa ukuthi abe ngumdiphu…”
326

left Madlala in charge.

20

Maphumulo interviewees variously cited both Madlala and Thomas

Gcabashe as indunenkulu, while the press (who most often got their information from
Maphumulo) attributed the title to Madlala. This lack of clarity surrounding titles and positions is
not unique. Gumede considered himself an induna, as did several Maphumulo interviewed, but
the inquiry into the alleged misappropriation of funds found Gumede had never been registered
by the magistrate as an induna and had only been a community councillor prior to 1988.
Thomas Gcabashe spearheaded several attempts to remove the chief. After more than a
month of conflict at Table Mountain, a meeting at the Maqongqo Bottle store owned by Inkatha
supporter and umndeni member C.J. Maphumulo called on the KwaZulu government to remove
Mhlabunzima from the chieftaincy. Gcabashe reported to the Natal Witness that the meeting
attendees concluded that the trouble in Table Mountain began when Maphumulo set up a training
camp at his court in November 1989 “designed to turn youths into amaqabane (comrades),” in
reference to the refugees settled at Echibini. Gcabashe claimed to be speaking in his personal
capacity, despite being the chairman of the local Inkatha branch. He said people attending the
meeting complained that the violence over the Goedverwachting farm, or Echibini, at the end of
January was caused by amaqabane who attacked those at the farm because they refused to
become amaqabane.

21

In April, the Inkatha-owned Ilanga reported another meeting of people

from Nyaninga and Maqongqo organized to express dissatisfaction with Mhlabunzima.

20

Bhekizazi Japhet Madlala, interview with author, Thandeka Majola,and Thando
Maphumulo, Scottsville, August 8, 2011.
21
“Chief blamed for violence,” Natal Witness March 13, 1990.
327

According to Ilanga these people included relatives of the chief—in all likelihood, a reference to
Mdingi Maphumulo.

22

Gcabashe again called into question the support of Maphumulo’s leadership in June,
when KwaZulu called an election to test the chief’s support. Maphumulo saw the election as an
attempt by the Chief Minister to oust him. Buthelezi dismissed Maphumulo’s allegations and
contended “members of the Maphumulo, who are not necessarily Inkatha members, appear to
have lost confidence in Maphumulo.” Chief Mhlabunzima, who said that he was quite prepared
to test his support, alleged the election fell through because Inkatha supporters first agreed that
the voting could take place at his inkantolo but later objected to the venue and cancelled the
event. Inkatha chairman Gcabashe denied this, arguing the election did not take place because
Maphumulo failed to show.

23

In late October, Gcabashe again served as a press spokesperson, declaring that
Maphumulo must leave Maqongqo because “he is not wanted by his people.” Gcabashe alleged
that people had fled because of the violence, not because they were Maphumulo supporters.
Gcabashe welcomed them back but warned that Maphumulo should stay away. Gcabashe made a
thinly-veiled threat, “I want to warn Maphumulo. If he has troubles or problems it should not be
easy for him to use Inkatha’s name because we have not touched him yet. If his people beat him
it will not help him to blame Inkatha.”

24

Maphumulo, on the other hand, believed that he

enjoyed the support of his people. “When my home was burned by Inkatha, about 70 percent of

22

Ilanga lase Natal April 26, 1990, cited in Verbatim Report of the Second Session of
the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Vol 55, April 27, 1990.
23
Isabel Koch, “Table Mountain accusation,” Natal Witness June 29, 1990.
24

Kaunda, “Inkatha orders chief out of area,” Natal Witness Echo November 8, 1990.
328

my people vacated the area...”

25

These conceptions of the Maphumulo, “his people,” and “my

people” are central to understanding uDlame in the Table Mountain region. We will return to
them at the end of this chapter.

Figure 22: Alfred Madlala, Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers; Figure 23: “Men crowd
main road in Maqongqo before a meeting which suggested Chief Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo should be ousted.” Natal Witness Echo March 15, 1990.

Death of the Peace Chief
A little over a year after the outbreak of uDlame in Table Mountain, Chief Maphumulo was
assassinated on February 25, 1991. Shot dead in the driveway of his Pietermaritzburg home, his
wife Gaye, her sister, Fano Zuma’s wife, and three children were inside the house. Ma Shembe
phoned the police and Maphumulo’s brother-in-law, Fano Zuma, when she heard the shots.
Zuma and neighbors rushed to the scene, but it was too late to save the chief. The death sent
shockwaves across Pietermaritzburg and many called attention to Maphumulo’s flagrant
disregard for danger. Lakela Kaunda, the Natal Witness journalist who knew the chief well,

25

CAMP, Karis-Gerhart Collection, Reel 92, Biographical file on Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo, Maphumulo Interview with Paul Bell, “Fifth Column,” Leadership 9 (May 1990),
18.
329

described him as such: “Some people are born non-conformists and do not change—even if it
kills them. Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, the chief of Maqongqo, is one such person.”

26

Another

journalist eulogizing the late chief quoted a variety of colorful portrayals and analyses by
unnamed politicians: showman, crusader, martyr, rebel, “political kamikaze phenomenon,” an
“original democratic guerilla,” and a man with true leadership skills and a disregard for his own
life. “Had he really wished to stay alive, he would have departed for safer climes, or adopted a
lower profile. Perhaps it was simply his leadership imperative that drove him to take such
enormous risks.”

27

The community reaction to this polarizing leader’s death, the subsequent

inquest into his assassination, and the TRC-revelation that a hit squad team of Caprivians and
KwaZulu Police had orchestrated his murder illustrate, among other things, the continued
struggle over land and chiefly authority.
Two days after Maphumulo’s assassination, Buthelezi released a memorandum to the
press that points to the significance of land, Maphumulo’s politics, and his leadership in gaining
a more complex understanding of the factors driving the local violence. Buthelezi contended that
the document had been submitted to police authorities the week prior, but he had only seen the
copy faxed to him on February 26, 1991. Attributed to “Residents of Maqongqo Area
(Mbambangalo Tribal Authority),” the memo has no clear author or composition date. While the
memo itself puts forth that “most of the people who are party to this memorandum, though not
necessary all, are members of the IFP or subscribe to its principles,” the meeting at which it was
alleged to have been composed was an Inkatha meeting held on February 10, 1991, after many

26

Lakela Kaunda, “Chief Maphumulo – The Last Interview,” Natal Witness Echo
February 28, 1991.
27
Johan Beukes, “The maverick crusader,” Natal Witness February 27, 1991.
330

non-Inkatha aligned Mbambangalo residents had fled to the city.

28

It is probable that Gcabashe

was involved in its creation, as much of the rhetoric is similar to his language usage in the
contemporary press.
It is also uncertain from the memo to which “police authorities” the document was sent.
Captain Meyer of the SAP Riot Unit and the SADF had been invited to the February 10 Inkatha
meeting to discuss allegations of partiality. The meeting announcement declared a memorandum
on the subject was being prepared for the Ministers of Defense and Law and Order.

29

The press

reported that the KwaZulu Minister of Police and Chief Minister Buthelezi received the
memorandum, but it is not clear whether the South African Police or Ministers of Defense and
Law and Order did as well. In addition, at different places in specific articles, the media
attributed the February 26 press release to both “KwaZulu’s minister of police and chief minister
Mangosuthu Buthelezi” and “Inkatha” or “the Inkatha Freedom Party,” revealing the prevailing
assumption that KwaZulu police authorities and Inkatha were one and the same.

30

Despite these ambiguities, the memo is especially important for the insight it provides
into the local interpretation of uDlame. Whether or not Inkatha instigated the memo’s creation, it
is unlikely that Buthelezi would have released it to the press if Inkatha had nothing to gain from
its content becoming public knowledge. The memorandum contended that violence began when:
28

The only date on the memo is the date of transmission, February 26, from KwaZulu to
Roy Rudden, the Inkatha press manager, to Carmel Rickard of the Natal Witness. APC,
PC126/3/11, Memorandum from Residents of Maqongqo Area (Mbambangalo Tribal Authority)
to Police Authorities (no date); “Community document reveals grievances with slain Chief
Maphumulo,” Daily News February 28, 1991.
29
APC, PC126/3/11, Inkatha Freedom Party Press Release, February 10, 1991.
30

Both “Inkatha releases document of complaints about Maphumulo,” Natal Witness
February 28, 1991 and “Community document reveals grievances with slain Chief Maphumulo,”
Daily News February 28, 1991 attribute the release to KwaZulu Minister of Police and Chief
Minister and Inkatha.
331

…some newcomers, under the leadership of our chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo,
came into our area, he (Chief Maphumulo) instigated a conflict with neighboring
Chief Mdluli, so as to provide the newcomers with land already occupied by
Chief Mdluli’s people. The majority of the indigenous residents, i.e. Chief
Maphumulo’s people, opposed this. They saw it would automatically lead to a
serious faction fight between the two tribes. Residents who opposed
Maphumulo’s plan were immediately targeted for attack by those favouring it. A
lot of violence thus occurred within the Mbambangalo tribal area which ended up
in Chief Maphumulo fleeing the area.
Interestingly, the author claimed that Inkatha members supported the memorandum, but
he then highlights the conflict over the strip of Goedverwachting rather than political violence.
The author makes clear that those who support the memorandum believed the land in question
was Nyavu land rather than that of the Maphumulo, an interpretation necessary for an alliance
with the Inkatha-affiliated Nyavu chief. But a clear distinction is made between “tribal residents”
and “Maphumulo’s comrades.” The memo reveals:
The tribal residents reported a long time ago that the troublemakers are not
indegeneously [sic] from the area and that they are all comrades brought in by
Chief Maphumulu [sic] from areas like Dambuza, Edendale etc, to suppress tribal
residents. Residents have continually pointed out that if the security forces
instruct these comrades to return to their original places, peace can prevail in the
area. However, till [sic] today no action had been taken.
The people behind the memorandum hoped that by raising these grievances they could
contribute towards proper policing of the area. They complained about the alleged SAP and
SADF bias in favor of Maphumulo’s comrades, a surprising charge given oral history interviews
that discussed SADF protection of local Inkatha families.

31

But the timing of its release to the

press immediately after Maphumulo’s death was certainly convenient if not coordinated.
In the weeks and months following Maphumulo’s assassination, the ANC embraced the
chief as a struggle hero, organized a mass political funeral for him, and when Sipho Madlala later

31

Some examples include those with E.T. Gcabashe, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011 and
with Thobile Ngcobo, Maqongqo, January 17, 2011.
332

confessed to being a member of the hit squad that assassinated him, pushed for a high-profile
inquiry into the claim. The Jwili chief in Dundee, Mzomdanza Mpungose, was killed the same
day and allegations of apartheid hit squads began to circulate. Contralesa’s Natal publicity
secretary Siphiwe Thusi expressed little surprise at Maphumulo’s death and said that numerous
chiefs were aware their names were on a hit list. The chief’s memorial service and funeral
embodied the “political theatre” described by Belinda Bozzoli. These ceremonial rituals became
the arena for the formation of African identities and sites of mobilization in the struggle against
oppression.

32

On March 7, a memorial service was held at Edendale’s Lay Ecumenical Centre with
representatives from the ANC, Contralesa, and COSATU. An estimated 2,000 gathered at the
service marked by ululating and toyi-toying. Speakers, including SACP Midlands organizer
Cassius Lubisi and ANC Youth League (ANCYL) representative Mzwandile Mbongwa blamed
the government and its “surrogates” for the death and called upon the people to defend
themselves.
ANC, SACP, and Contralesa leaders repeated the call for self-defense at the chief’s
funeral that weekend. Sunday, March 10, 1991, was the hottest March day in more than twenty
years at nearly 96 degrees Fahrenheit (35.3 Celsius). Estimates of the crowd ranged from 7,000
to 25,000 (the former by journalists and the latter by the ANC). ANCYL President Peter Mokaba
believed Maphumulo’s killing was an indication war was still continuing. He and others called
upon the youth to take up the chief’s spear and join MK. The SACP’s Blade Nzimande
heightened the intensity of the moment, declaring, “You can kill a comrade but you cannot kill
the struggle. Maphumulo laid down his life so as to attain the aims of the Freedom Charter.

32

Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid.
333

Those of us who continue to live must fight on with his spear until the objectives of the Freedom
Charter are realised.” Also present were ANC NEC member John Nkadimeng, Prince
Mcwayizeni kaDinuzulu, COSATU’s Sydney Mafumadi, Contralesa representatives from
Venda, KaNgwane, Lebowa, Transkei and Gazankulu, and DP MP Pierre Cronje. Three of
Maphumulo’s four wives sat near the stage, including Nombulelo (Ma Mabandla) with the onemonth old Nqobile the chief had not yet met before his death. Ma Shembe later told the New
African that she did not stay at the funeral because she had received a cold-shoulder from the
chief’s relatives. Tensions between Ma Shembe and others of Maphumulo’s family would
continue during the later inquest into his death.

33

From the mass funeral, a cavalcade of cars and buses traveled to Maqongqo to bury the
late chief. Family members and mourners found a crowd of Inkatha supporters awaiting them at
the Maqongqo bottle store near the route to Maphumulo’s umuzi. Several women recalled the
Inkatha intimidation; supporters at the shop and in the hills sang songs and slogans while
izinduna, presumably including Gcabashe, attempted to prevent the mourners from attending the
burial.

34

Police told journalists that they could not disperse the crowd because they were on

private property but did stand between the two groups to prevent a clash. The mourners
33

Carmel Rickard and Craig Urquhart, “Natal chiefs fear hit list,” Natal Witness
February 27, 1991; Frazer Mtshali, “Maphumulo’s killers spotted,” New African February 28,
1991; “Murdered chief’s funeral on Sunday,” Daily News March 7, 1991; “Chief’s killers ‘will
not be found,’” Natal Witness March 8, 1991; “All ‘young comrades’ urged to join Umkhonto
weSizwe,” Daily News March 11, 991; Sonya Schoeman, “MK call to arms at chief’s funeral,”
Natal Witness March 11, 1991; Fraser Mtshali, “Pick up his spear,” New African March 14,
1991; “Grieving widow speaks out,” New African March 14, 1991; Khaba Mkhize, “Why not a
bounty for the sake of justice?” Natal Witness Echo March 14, 1991; Lakela Kaunda,
“Maphumulo’s burial marked by tension,” Natal Witness Echo March 14, 1991; “Still no news
about Maphumulo’s killers, “ Natal Witness Echo March 14, 1991.
34
Thobekile Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Camperdown,
February 8, 2011; Ngenzeni MaVidima Mbambo and Happiness Memela, interview with author
and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, August 8, 2011.
334

proceeded to the umuzi. Happiness Memela recalled that Jacob Zuma, Chris Hani, and Tokyo
Sexwale were there, and that during the salute of the late chief, Hani leapt upon the grave.

35

Just days after Maphumulo’s death, a man claiming to be a state intelligence agent with
information about the chief’s death phoned The Natal Witness Echo. Attempts to follow up with
him proved futile for nearly two months. But in late April, Sipho Madlala walked into the
paper’s Pietermaritzburg office and confessed to the murder. Madlala claimed that he had
operated as part of a five-man team acting on the orders of officers of the Security Branch and
SADF Military Police based at Natal Command. Witness reporter Lakela Kaunda, who had
earlier traveled to Lusaka with Chief Maphumulo, sat down with Madlala for an interview in
which he detailed the events leading up to the assassination. Madlala’s admission and the
subsequent investigation and inquest into Maphumulo’s death further complicate the contestation
over this chief’s leadership.
The dispute over his support as a leader moved beyond the local land and political divide
within his isizwe and with the neighboring Nyavu and Inkatha to explicitly implicate the
apartheid state. The Commissioner of the SAP, General Johan van der Merwe, announced a
special team under the command of Major General Ronnie van der Westhuizen, or “General FixIt,”

36

to begin investigations into Madlala’s claims. Major General van der Westhuizen’s

involvement implicates the police and security forces in the conspiracy on account of his
reputation for cover-ups or less-than zealous investigations of police complicity. Van der
Westhuizen was previously CID chief in the Western Cape when witdoek vigilantes razed shacks
35

“Yebo [uChris] wayekhona ngoba kwakuthi uma sekukhuzwa iSalute, uyena
owayegxuma phezu kwethuna.” Mbambo and Memela, Haniville, August 8, 2011.
36
Jacques Pauw says van der Westhuizen was first dubbed “General Fix-It” after he
attempted to abort a murder investigation against a security policeman in 1988. Pauw, Into the
Heart of Darkness, 85.
335

in Old Crossroads and KTC under the watchful gaze of police in 1986.

37

In the KTC trial, he

testified that he saw no need to investigate allegations of police complicity because no formal
complaints had been made.

38

He was also assigned to the Harms Commission of Inquiry into

political killings. Human rights lawyer Peter Harris felt that the involvement of such senior
police officers was akin to wolves guarding sheep while journalist Jacques Pauw quipped, “death
squads had to investigate themselves.” During the inquiry, Van der Westhuizen and Colonel
John Wright seized Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) files and refused to allow investigators
access and later enabled the files’ destruction. Judge Louis Harms was widely criticized for
ignoring substantial corroborating evidence and concluding that there was no evidence of a statesanctioned police hit squad at Vlakplaas while others considered him the victim of a massive
cover-up. The commission was considered a farce.

39

Van der Westhuizen had also been assigned to “assist” the investigation into the
December 3, 1988 massacre in Trust Feed where eleven people died and two were injured. Van
der Westhuizen only investigated these cases until SAP Captain Frank Dutton realized that Van
der Westhuizen had been sent to obstruct his work and prevailed upon the Natal Attorney
General to remove the major general. When police captain Brian Mitchell and four special
constables were found guilty of the massacre in April 1992, Judge Andrew Wilson accused the

37

For more on witdoeke and resistance to forced removals in Crossroads and KTC, see
Maseko, “Civic Movement and Non-Violent Action: The Case of the Cape Areas Housing
Action Committee”; Benson, “Crossroads Continues: Histories of Women Mobilizing Against
Forced Removals and for Housing in Cape Town South Africa, 1975-2005.” Also visit
www.cvet.org.za for video footage of the razings and interviews with residents.
38
Gaye Davis, “Clean-up or cover-up?” Weekly Mail & Guardian August 30, 1991.
39

Peter Harris, In a Different Time: The Inside Story of the Delmas Four (Roggebaai:
Umuzi, 2008), 269–315; Stiff, Warfare by Other Means, 415–9; Pauw, Into the Heart of
Darkness.
336

police of a high-level cover-up and called for a public inquiry. The TRC found Van der
Westhuizen’s efforts to cover-up SAP involvement in the Trust Feed massacre constituted gross
human rights violations.

40

SAP Colonel and Vlakplaas counter-insurgency commander Eugene

de Kock testified to knowledge of security cover-up actions and that van der Westhuizen was the
one responsible for “dealing with sensitive matters…”

41

Similarly, Brian Mitchell, the police

officer who led the Trust Feed operation testified that after van der Westhuizen, Brigadier Marks,
and Captain van Zyl arrived he knew the mistake would be covered up.

42

While the SAP appointed the special investigation team into Madlala’s claims, the ANC,
the opposition Democratic Party, and the press called upon President de Klerk to step in
personally and to ensure an open inquiry. Many expressed disbelief that a police investigation
would carry the weight of a judicial enquiry.

43

Indeed, Van der Westhuizen announced that he

had completed the investigation only days after arriving in Natal and without speaking with
Madlala. The police complained about their lack of access to Madlala, who remained in hiding,
but eventually acquired a tape of Madlala’s interview after obtaining search warrants for The
Natal Witness premises, as well as deputy editor Martin Williams’ home. Police began to
discredit Madlala, labeling him an unreliable police informer, and on April 30 announced that
40

South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles, 198; Mary McGovern and
Bronwen Manby, South Africa Half-Hearted Reform: The Official Response to the Rising Tide of
Violence (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), 45–51.
41
Amnesty testimony of Eugene de Kock to the TRC, September 6, 1999,
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99090616_pre_990906pt.htm (accessed February
17, 2012).
42
Amnesty testimony of Brian Mitchell to the TRC, October 15-16, 1996,
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/pmb/mitchell.htm (accessed February 19, 2012).
43
Chris Whitfield, “Hit squad outcry,” Natal Mercury April 27, 1991; ‘Death squads still
wiping out opponents of apartheid,” Daily News April 27, 1991; “Clear this up fast,” Natal
Mercury April 27, 1991; “Allegation,” Natal Witness April 27, 1991.
337

Van der Westhuizen’s investigations had revealed no evidence to substantiate Madlala’s claims.
President de Klerk then announced an offer of protection for Madlala where Natal AttorneyGeneral Les Roberts would meet Madlala in the presence of his and police lawyers.

44

In the midst of these investigations into Maphumulo’s death, further evidence of state
involvement in other covert operations began to emerge at the national level. While the Harms
Commission judge disregarded Dirk Coetzee’s admissions of state-sponsored hit squads,
irrefutable evidence for covert operations and state collusion began to accumulate. In June,
retired army general Nico Basson, who had been responsible for attempts to discredit SWAPO
prior to Namibian elections in 1989, revealed the SADF had supplied weapons and covert
assistance to Inkatha.

45

In July, South Africa’s Weekly Mail in cooperation with The Guardian in

London revealed the scandal known as Inkathagate. Special Branch police officer Brian Morrow
secretly photocopied and stole police documents that provided indisputable evidence of
government collusion with Inkatha. The Special Branch funneled R250,000 to Inkatha for rallies
in November 1989 and March 1990—the latter of which sparked the Seven Day War in
Pietermaritzburg. The scandal undermined the standing of the de Klerk government as he was
forced to acknowledge these and other payments to Inkatha and UWUSA.

44

46

President de Klerk

Vasantha Angamuthu, “My job is now complete, says general,” Sunday Tribune April
28, 1991; “ANC-Govt deal over Madlala’s safety – claim,” Natal Witness April 29, 1991;
“Madlala an informer, says Vlok spokesman,” Natal Witness April 30, 1991; “Police find no
evidence to back Sipho Madlala’s ‘hit squad’ claims,” Natal Mercury May 1, 1991; Craig
Urquhart, “Maphumulo: dramatic claim,” Natal Witness May 1, 1991; Lakela Kaunda, “No
evidence to back claims, say police,” Natal Witness Echo May 2, 1991; “Protection offer for
‘assassin,’” Natal Mercury May 3, 1991.
45
Szeftel, “Manoeuvres of War in South Africa,” 74; Ivor Powell, “Aspects of
Propaganda Operations,” in The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa, 2nd ed.
(Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1998), 335–41.
46
Piper and Morrow, To Serve and Protect.
338

also admitted to the training of 150 Inkatha members in security and VIP protection from 1986
and that trained members were incorporated into the KZP. He claimed that he had been unaware
of the training prior to the revelations by the press.

47

The SAP also set up the Mkuze “Tshaneni

Leadership and Development Project” for Inkatha military training with financial and material
assistance.

48

As evidence for collusion between the state and Inkatha mounted, a formal inquest was
set up in August 1991 to investigate Maphumulo’s death. Such inquests into unnatural deaths
usually took place at the magisterial level, but because of the high profile nature of the
assassination, Madlala’s claims, evidence of state involvement in other covert operations, and
pressure from the ANC, the inquest was undertaken at the High Court. On the eve of the inquest,
Jabulani Dennis Hudla, a close friend of the chief who often drove Maphumulo’s car as a
diversion before his murder, was shot and killed. The court suspected that this assassination was
meant as a threat to potential witnesses, even though Hudla had not been subpoenaed.

49

Uncooperative witnesses and the tampering of evidence rendered investigations into Hudla’s
death futile, suggesting the threats of intimidation were real.

50

When the inquest opened on August 15, public interest was so great that the proceedings
had to be relocated to a larger room in the Supreme Court building. Justice N.S. Page and two
47

Mono Badela, “De Klerk admits SADF-Inkatha link,” New Africa August 1, 1991;
Eddie Koch, “SADF-trained Zulus: The Story that was denied now confirmed,” Weekly Mail
August 2, 1991.
48
Dominic Mitchell, “Mystery of Mkuze ‘leadership development school’” Natal
Mercury August 9, 1991.
49
“Maphumulo’s driver killed on eve of inquest,” Natal Witness August 15, 1991;
Khaba Mkhize, “Chief’s slain friend to be buried this weekend,” Natal Witness Echo August 22,
1991.
50
“Case ‘damaged by unhelpful witnesses and lawyers,’” Natal Witness September 5,
1991.
339

assessors heard evidence. During the first few days, Madlala failed to appear, but several of
Maphumulo’s Havelock Road neighbors testified to hearing the shots fired and witnessing three
black men run away before escaping in a light-colored car. The testimonies of Fano Zuma and
Ma Shembe heightened the dramatics as allegations swelled that Ma Shembe helped plot the
chief’s death.

Zuma testified that Ma Shembe showed more concern for the location of

Maphumulo’s wristwatch and pistol than for his well-being when he arrived on scene; Zuma also
alleged Ma Shembe was having an affair. The police cross-examination of Ma Shembe proposed
she may have been an accomplice in the plot, a suggestion that stirred murmurings of affirmation
in the crowd. Ma Shembe denied helping or even knowing Madlala. When she testified she also
did not know the location of Maphumulo’s missing pistol, the late chief’s mother, Ma Mdlalose,
shouted out in isiZulu that Shembe did know, and ran from the room crying.

51

Sipho Madlala took the stand in early September amidst much anticipation. At various
points during his testimony when he switched from isiZulu to English, the public gallery
demanded he testify in isiZulu so they could understand. Over the course of two weeks, the
former military policeman claimed he had been recruited by the SAP’s security branch to
assassinate, amongst others, Chief Maphumulo. Madlala testified that he had been a security

51

Vicky Quinlan, “Inquest begins into the murder of Maphumulo,” Natal Witness
August 16, 1991; “Shots head on night chief slain,” Daily News August 16, 1991; “Assassin
likely to testify,” Natal Mercury August 21, 1991; Nonceba Levin, “Key witness absent at
Maphumulo inquest,” Natal Witness Echo August 22, 1991; “Views conflict in city inquest,”
Natal Witness August 27, 1991; John Nichols, “Maphumulo’s wife denies helping killers,” Natal
Witness August 28, 1991; Sue Segar, “Court drama as slain chief’s widow speaks,” Daily News
August 28, 1991; Ingrid Oellermann, “Chief’s wife denies murder plot,” Natal Mercury August
28, 1991;“Maphumulo shot six times, inquest hears,” Natal Witness August 29, 1991;
“Assassination fears haunt chief’s inquest,” New Nation August 29, 1991; John Nichols,
“Witness thinks chief’s wife had an affair,” Natal Witness August 30, 1991; “Slain chief’s wife
tells inquest her husband always carried a gun,” New Nation August 30-September 5, 1991;
“Chief ‘talked of those after him,’” Natal Mercury August 30, 1991; Sue Segar, “Surprise at
reaction of chief’s wife,” Daily News August 31, 1991.
340

police informer from the age of 15 and was later recruited into the military police under the
supervision of Warrant Officer Wolfgang Rolf Warber

52

and a Sergeant Grobler.

53

He claimed

to have received training in explosives at a La Mercy beach and in firearms at a Hammarsdale
shooting range. He attested to aiding the Lindelani warlord Mandla Shabalala in attacks;
participating in a retaliatory attack on people alleged to have attacked the home and shop of
Umlazi Inkatha councillor Edward Sishosonke Shozi; shooting UDF recruiter Nato Mkhize in
Imbali in 1987; and attacking the home of Dr. Ndlovu at the University of Zululand in 1989 or
54

1990.

Then in February, 1991, he was part of five-person team supplied with firearms and

overalls by Security Branch police at the Alexandra Police Station in Pietermaritzburg and paid
R5,000 to kill Maphumulo. According to Madlala, the men were told that the chief was a
“danger to the Government and a bad influence on the general public.” Warber informed them
that someone living on Maphumulo’s property would “cue” the assassins by switching off his
52

At the time of the inquest, Warrant Officer Wolfgang Rolf Warber was the subject of
an inquiry into the supply of arms to Inkatha members – a matter to which Madlala also testified.
Madlala alleged Warber was a good friend of Mangosuthu Buthelezi and identified the receivers
of weapons as the warlords Christopher Sichizo Zuma of the early Harewood Inkatha Branch,
Thulani Ngcobo of Imbali Unit 1, and Jerome Hlengwa. This inquiry into the weapons resulted
from evidence that emerged during the Trust Feeds Trial proving that Warber had assisted in the
purchase of 24 revolvers on behalf of Imbali Inkatha members. Three of those for whom he
purchased weapons were implicated in murder cases, including Abdul Awetha, Skweqe Mweli,
and Toti Zulu, all notorious Imbali warlords. Warber also served as an instructor at the SAP
Koeberg base where 130 Caprivians received additional training in 1988. Masheila Sewpaul,
“Policeman ‘supplied arms to Imbali Inkatha leaders,’” Natal Witness September 7, 1991; South
Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South
Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles, 195, 240–1.
53
Press articles spell it Grobler, Grobbler, and Grobbelaar but never include a first name.
I use Grobler out of the suspicion this is the same J.J. Grobler who had earned a reputation as an
efficient and ruthless investigator with the Durban Murder and Robbery Squad. See Kasrils,
Armed and dangerous, 37–53.
54
This is probably Dr. Aaron Ndlovu, an ANC member of staff at the University of
Zululand in Ngoye who in 1990 believed his name was on a hitlist of people opposed to Inkatha
in the Mtunzini and Empangeni areas. His home had been attacked. Jeffery, The Natal Story,
227.
341

sitting room light (to which Ma Shembe had earlier denied any knowledge). Madlala also stated
that Maphumulo’s name was on a hit list of people to be killed, topped by ANC Midlands leader
Harry Gwala.
But inconsistencies between Madlala’s initial claims in the interview with the Witness
and his court room testimony arose. Contrary to his initial confession, Madlala testified that he
had followed Maphumulo for surveillance purposes but that four other men acted as triggermen.
Madlala claimed the assassins, Warrant Officer van Rooyen, Corporal James Sabasaba, Lance
Corporal Roy Gumede, and another man whose name he did not recall, undertook the mission
while he remained at the Alexandra Police Station. Piet Scott was also there during the planning
and supply of the weapons. Madlala testified that Warber and Grobler later encouraged him to
confess to The Natal Witness as part of a plan to infiltrate the ANC. Madlala claimed that he
recognized this as an opportunity to leave their pay and chose to tell the truth. When crossexamined about this “rather elaborate scheme” by the SAP counsel Kobus Booyens, Madlala
alleged that the police knew how to dispute any information Madlala revealed.
Other disputed facts began to cast doubt upon Madlala’s credibility in the eyes of Justice
Page. Madlala claimed that he had stayed with DP MP Pierre Cronje after meeting with the
Witness’ Kaunda but Cronje testified that he had never met Madlala in person but only arranged
for his safety. Kaunda stated that she accompanied Madlala to the DP offices where she
personally handed Madlala over to Cronje. Counsel Booyens suggested that Madlala had only
been a police informer and provided handwritten reports and receipts supposedly signed by
Madlala. Madlala countered that he never provided information to the SAP after he began
working for the Military Police in 1986 and that he had only given verbal reports and received
money from the SADF. Madlala refused to answer questions based on a tape-recorded interview

342

that he insisted had been edited. He alleged the documents had been forged and there was a
conspiracy to discredit him, an accusation not out of the realm of possibility given the extent of
cover-up by police and defense forces in other cases, including Trust Feed and the Harms
Commission.
Madlala then confused security police officers he had implicated in a courtroom lineup.
Madlala recognized one man, Constable Kruger, as “van Tonder” and pointed out another, whose
name he could not remember, but that was in fact Sergeant van Tonder. He also was unable to
recognize Warrant Officer van Rooyen. Despite the confusion, Madlala insisted that the men he
identified were involved and that they had changed their names to confuse him. In a lineup of 14
SADF personnel, Madlala did positively identify Sergeant Grobler and Mr. Sabasaba, but SADF
Counsel van Schaikwyk alleged that was because Madlala had previously attempted to sell
information to the SADF. Van Shaikwyk also suggested that high-ranking ANC officials had
briefed Madlala as to how to testify.

55

55

“Man tells of his role in killing of chief,” Daily News September 5, 1991; Sue Segar,
“Policeman friend of Buthelezi, inquest hears,” Daily News September 6, 1991; “Ex-policeman
tells of plot to kill chief,” Natal Mercury September 6, 1991; Masheila Sewpaul, “Cop ‘tried to
pin killing on IFP chief,’” Natal Witness September 6, 1991; Sue Segar, “‘I was told to kill UDF
men,’” Daily News September 7, 1991; Witness tells of ‘killings,’” Natal Mercury September 7,
1991; Masheila Sewpaul, “Policeman ‘supplied arms to Imbali Inkatha leaders,’” Natal Witness
September 7, 1991; Prakash Naidoo, “Missions of murder,” Sunday Tribune September 8, 1991;
Sue Segar, “Story given to the press a ploy – Madlala,” Daily News September 10, 1991; “Story
of murder leaked ‘to infiltrate ANC’” Natal Mercury September 10, 1991; “MP ‘protected’ key
witness, court hears,” Natal Mercury September 11, 1991; “Inquest witness denies writing police
reports,” Natal Mercury September 12, 1991; Vickie Quinlan, “Dramatic evidence at
Maphumulo’s inquest,” Natal Witness Echo September 12, 1991; Vicky Quinlan, “Evidence is a
conspiracy, says Madlala,” Natal Witness September 12, 1991; “Court line-up confuses key
inquest witness,” Natal Mercury September 18, 1991; “Witness fails to identify security police,”
Daily News September 18, 1991; Vicky Quinlan, “Madlala picks the wrong ‘Van Tonder,’”
Natal Witness September 18, 1991; “Chief’s inquest hears evidence of an alleged ‘hit list’ by
police,” Natal Mercury September 19, 1991; “Maphumulo chief witness rejects SAP claim,”
Daily News September 21, 1991; “Inquest witness claims he was in ‘hit squad,’” Natal Mercury
September 23, 1991; “Inquests witness tells of secret explosives training,” Natal Mercury 1991;
343

The inconsistencies and confusion continued unabated until September 27, 1991, when
Lucky James Mntambo also came forward to admit his own participation in the hit squad. Justice
Page adjourned the inquest until late October to enable investigation into Mntambo’s claims and
ordered protective custody for the alleged assassin who claimed that the police had already shot
him. When the inquest resumed on October 22, Mntambo additionally claimed to be part of a
police team responsible for the shooting of Hudla. According to Mntambo, Captain Pieterse
ordered the attack and he, Pieterse, Warrant Officer Warber, Constable Brooks, and another
police officer (Potgieter) went to the Federal Theological Seminary in Imbali where an informer
pointed out Hudla’s home. Mntambo was then ordered back to the vehicle, but heard the
gunshots. Counsel for the SADF and SAP challenged Mntambo’s detailed descriptions of two
earlier attempts on Maphumulo’s life in which he claimed he participated. Mntambo also alleged
that SAP members who sought to obtain a statement from him attacked him in protective custody
at Westville Prison. Justice Page referred the assault to the Attorney General because he was not
satisfied with the conduct of the prison officials concerned. Counsel Booyens attempted to
discredit Mntambo with questions about false entries in the pocket book where he recorded
duty.

56

Bob Frean, “Documents are cover-ups, states witness,” Daily News September 24, 1991; “Hit
squad man didn’t tell ANC ‘everything,’” Daily News September 25, 1991; Ingrid Oellermann,
“Inquest witness ‘not debriefed’ by ANC leaders,” Natal Mercury September 25, 1991; Sue
Segar, “Witness asked about ‘sale’ of information,” Daily News September 26, 1991; “DP MP
tells court key witness was mistaken,” Natal Mercury October 23, 1991.
56
“‘Jail’ protection for witness,” Natal Mercury September 28, 1991;Sue Segar,
“Dramatic turn in Maphumulo trial,” Daily News September 28, 1991; Ryan Cresswell, “I
attacked chief’s car, admits cop,” Sunday Tribune September 29, 1991; Prakash Naidoo,
“Witness terrified after alleged police attempt to kill him,” Sunday Tribune September
29,1991;Vicky Quinlan, “Attacks on people linked to Maphumulo continue,” Weekly Mail
October 4, 1991; Sue Segar, “Witness implicates himself in shooting,” Daily News October 24,
1991; “Judge orders probe into scuffle with inquest witness,” Natal Mercury October 24, 1991;
“Witness’s account of ambush challenged,” Daily News October 25, 1991; “Witness says he was
344

Several of the police and defense force officers implicated took the stand. Detective
Warrant Officer Pieter Scott of the Riot Unit denied being part of a hit squad or knowing other
members of the alleged team. He had been assigned to investigate Maphumulo’s assassination
but was recalled after Madlala’s allegations. When asked why so few statements were taken from
neighbors, family members, and other potential witnesses under his investigation he said that
they had only heard the shots and thus he did not think it relevant. Warrant Officer Warber also
took the stand and denied involvement, knowing Buthelezi, supplying weapons to Inkatha, or
any other involvement. He alleged that Madlala had been an informer but had become unreliable.
Security police Captain Arnold Vosloo, branch commander in Pietermaritzburg, testified that the
security branch monitored Maphumulo’s movement and telephone activity from 1980 up to the
time of his death. He agreed to turn over the chief’s file, but not before certain sensitive
documents that might reveal the names of informers were removed. He also pointed out that
Mntambo had incorrectly identified him as Captain Pieterse. Another police officer testified that
Mntambo had been his informer in the riot unit. Family members of the implicated policemen
provided alibis.

57

paid R3 000 to kill chief,” Natal Merucry October 25, 1991; “Judge queries police access to
witness,” Natal Mercury October 29, 1991;Andre Jurgens, “Inquest witness tells court of false
entries in pocket book,” Daily News November 7, 1991; Catherine Payze, “The Elimination of
Political Opponents: The Maphumulo Assassination,” in Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of
Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 252–4.
57
“Policeman denies killing chief,” Daily News November 11, 1991; “SAP officer
denies being part of murder conspiracy,” Natal Mercury November 12, 1991; “‘Hit squad’
policeman in the dock,” Daily News November 14, 1991; “Policeman denies giving firearms to
Inkatha,” Natal Mercury November 15, 1991; Andre Jurgens, “Inquest told about revolver
purchases,” Daily News November 15, 1991; “Family alibi for assassination accused,” Daily
News November 16, 1991; ”Court told of security branch interest in Maphumulo,” Daily News
November 19, 1991; “Security police admit having ‘monitored’ chief’s movements,” Natal
Mercury November 19, 1991; “Policeman ‘in Pretoria’ when Maphumulo died,” Daily News
November 23, 1991.
345

One of the last people to testify was induna Thomas Gcabashe. Gcabashe testified the
Maqongqo community blamed Maphumulo and his youthful supporters for the violence. He said
that Maphumulo moved to town because the community no longer wanted him. Gcabashe denied
that he and the chief had been in conflict, but that “many years ago” there had been trouble
between Maphumulo and Inkatha. He further alleged that Maphumulo had “many enemies” and
had been “chased away” by Contralesa, the KwaShembe church, and a football club at
Maqongqo. He also testified that the late chief was not on good terms with his brother.

58

In the end, Justice Page had little choice but to find that unknown persons had murdered
the chief.

59

Charges brought against the SAP officer who assaulted Mntambo during protective

custody were dropped without explanation. Not long after the completion of the inquiry,
Catherine Pazye argued that Madlala and Mntambo’s testimonies, the inconsistencies, and state
actions made it abundantly clear that a conspiracy to kill the chief existed. Any of the SAP,
SADF, and Inkatha could have been the culprit.

60

But evidence presented at the TRC does shed

light on state, Inkatha, and local involvement in the chief’s death. Maphumulo’s wives,
Thobekile Ma Majozi and Nombulelo Ma Mabandla, testified about their loss, but according to
Ma Majozi, they were never informed of any findings.

61

The TRC special hearing on Caprivi trainees and the amnesty application of Daluxolo
Wordsworth Luthuli, the grandson of one-time ANC President and Nobel Peace Prize winner
58

“Inquest told chief blamed for violence,” Natal Mercury November 27, 1991.

59

The inquiry ended in March, 1992. Initial efforts to locate the court records of the
inquiry failed as court employees claimed the records had been turned over to the archive. The
archive, in its temporary housing due to renovations, could not locate the record without a case
number.
60
Payze, “The Elimination of Political Opponents: The Maphumulo Assassination,” 255.
61

Thobekile Maphumulo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Camperdown,
February 8, 2011;
346

Albert Luthuli, suggest that the women should have heard back from the TRC. Luthuli left South
Africa in 1963, at only the age of 14, to join Umkhonto weSizwe (MK). He went to Tanzania
before training for two years in Odessa (USSR) and was initially deployed in the 1967 Wankie
Campaign in Rhodesia. He was arrested when attempting to re-enter South Africa and spent
1968 in Pretoria Central Prison before serving a ten-year sentence on Robben Island. Prior to his
1979 release, a senior ANC leader from Natal, Curnick Ndlovu, told him to join Inkatha, with
which the ANC broke after a meeting in London the same year, as a cover to recruit and conduct
MK activities. For several years after his release, Luthuli remained both a member of both ANC
and Inkatha, periodically updating the ANC on Inkatha activities.

62

Luthuli became very active in Inkatha with the launch of UWUSA in 1985. Luthuli told
Thula Bopela that he began to think and act like an Inkatha follower only after he felt betrayed
by the ANC. When Inkatha undertook the formation of a paramilitary wing, its leadership sent
Siegfried Bhengu, who had also left MK and since become a member of Inkatha’s Central
Committee, M.Z. Khumalo, and Mangaqa Mncwango to recruit Luthuli. They asked Luthuli to
become a Central Committee member and the Commissar of Inkatha’s new paramilitary wing on
account of his MK training and experience. The ANC maintained that this appointment had not
been part of Luthuli’s mission, but Luthuli believed he could not refuse a senior position without
arousing suspicions and considered it a valuable opportunity to gain sensitive information. When

62

Daluxolo Luthuli, amnesty testimony to the TRC, Durban, April 7, 1998,
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/durban/dbn1.htm (accessed February 21, 2012); Thula
Bopela and Daluxolo Luthuli, Umkhonto we Sizwe: Fighting for a Divided Nation (Alberton:
Galago, 2005).
347

rumors circulated that an invitation for him to meet with the ANC in Swaziland was part of a
plan to kill him, Luthuli parted ways with the ANC and fully embraced Inkatha.

63

Upon appointment as commissar, Luthuli immediately departed for paramilitary training
in the Caprivi Strip. The returned Caprivians were deployed to local Inkatha leaders and chiefs
across KwaZulu-Natal in “contra-mobilization” squads, defensive groups, offensive teams, and
VIP protection units. The contra-mobilization squads served as Inkatha field organizers and
recruiters and also identified local UDF leaders. The defensive squad under Sitwell Mkhwanazi
and Phumlani Mshengu was responsible for intelligence gathering while the offensive squad,
located at Port Dunfort under Commander J.P. Opperman, undertook ambushes, abductions, and
assassinations.
According to Luthuli, there was great reliance upon local leadership to identify targets. In
theory, the defensive group would report targets to the offensive squad that would then carry out
the attack. But from the beginning “things did not go as planned” and some contra-mobilization
and defensive squads were directly involved in violence. After an attack on ANC/UDF
supporters identified by local leadership, the Caprivians would then report back to Luthuli. He
63

In his amnesty testimony, Luthuli attributes the loss in contact to South African
operations in Swaziland and Lesotho, rather than his decision to break it off as suggested in the
memoir. Otherwise, the memoirs repeat, even cite, his testimony. Other items covered in detail in
his testimony, such as his lack of cooperation at the Goldstone Commission and the details of his
Inkatha activities, are not surprisingly left out of the memoir. While his defection back to the
ANC just prior to the 1994 elections may call into question Luthuli’s intentions for both his
testimony and the memoir, the book is a scathing attack on the ANC and MK treatment of
soldiers that presents both Bopela and Luthuli as integral components in the last minute decision
of Inkatha to participate in the 1994 elections. While there are certainly shortcomings to both
Luthuli’s TRC testimony and his memoir, one especially needs to question the layered voices
and timing of Luthuli and Bopela’s memoirs. While co-authored, the story is narrated by Bopela
as remembered by him and told to him by Luthuli. Published by Galago Publishing Company
under Peter Stiff, the author of several invaluable yet problematic books on covert operations in
southern Africa, Stiff’s editorial position should also be questioned. Bopela and Luthuli cite from
Stiff’s books and details and names that were absent from Luthuli’s TRC testimony are included
in the memoir. Bopela and Luthuli, Umkhonto we Siswe, 194–201.
348

did not need to report the activity to Khumalo, for Khumalo often already knew, thus suggesting
a level of planning or communication between the local leadership and Khumalo. Luthuli pointed
to the 1988 assassination of Chief Mlaba and the 1992 Esikhaweni massacre as such instances
where a Caprivian came to him to report hit squad activity. While the TRC often prioritized
stories of state-sanctioned violence and national cleavages between the Inkatha and the
UDF/ANC, Luthuli’s testimony reveals the extent of on-the-ground initiative in the conflict.
When asked directly about Maphumulo’s death, Luthuli told the commission that a


Caprivian named Phumlani Masengo, who worked with the KwaZulu Police’s Bureau of State
Intelligence (BSI) in KwaMashu, informed him that he had taken part in the chief’s murder.

64

Luthuli’s testimony during the special session on Caprivi confirms that Maphumulo’s
assassination occurred during his time as Caprivi Commissar and that a Captain Khanyile of BSI
was involved.

65

These testimonies illuminate the fact that many not only had a stake in Chief
Maphumulo’s death, but also that many hands were involved in the assassination. It cannot be
known from these sources whether it was local Table Mountain Inkatha leaders, themselves
aspirant to positions of authority or angered by his welcoming of the refugees onto contested
land, or someone closer to Buthelezi, himself tired of the peace chief’s opposition, who
identified Maphumulo as a target. But Luthuli’s testimonies directly connect Inkatha, KwaZulu
Police, and the South African Defense Force to the chief’s death. Luthuli admitted Caprivians
 It is uncertain whether this is a transcription error and Luthuli meant Phumlani
Mshengu, identified as a Caprivi leader earlier, or another individual, but given the frequency of
transcription errors/misspellings, I am willing to venture it is the same Mshengu.
64
Daluxolo Luthuli, amnesty testimony to the TRC.
65

Daluxolo Luthuli, TRC Caprivi Hearing testimony, Durban, August 5, 1997,
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/special/caprivi/caprivi2.htm (accessed January 20, 2012).
349

targeted not only Maphumulo, but also Chief Msinga Mlaba, Zazi Khuzwayo, Reggie Hadebe,
and other Pietermaritzburg leaders. The involvement of Phumlani Masengo, the locally deployed
SADF-trained Caprivian acting as part of a hit squad under the command of the KwaZulu
Police’s BSI, does not rule out the involvement of Sipho Madlala or Lucky Mntambo.

Violence and Succession
In the wake of the chief’s assassination, violence continued in the Table Mountain region—but
now within the Maphumulo chiefdom as the umndeni and both political parties struggled to
promote an ibamba sympathetic to their cause. Local leaders were killed, one by one, and the
violence garnered national attention as the murders culminated in the Mboyi and Nkanyezeni
massacres. After the highly contested appointment of Baningi Maphumulo as ibamba, violence
continued in a cycle of revenge killings. From Maphumulo’s death up until the historic 1994
elections, harassment, shootouts, and ambushes dictated everyday life in the Table Mountain
region. Police regularly found the bodies of men, women, and children, some only months old.
Several characteristics of the violence include attacks on members of the umndeni and those
close to Chief Maphumulo, sophisticated weaponry and planning, and the targeting of
transportation. These patterns resonate with those identified by Antoinette Louw for Natal
generally from 1990 to 1992 where the most common type of violence involved small-scale
attacks on people and an increase in the targeting of key officials.

66

The harassment of and attacks on umndeni members and the umndeni favorite for the
ibamba highlight the contestation over the chieftaincy as central to the continued violence after
Chief Mhlabunzima’s death. Maphumulo’s step-father and umndeni member, Dinzy Jack
66

Antoinette Louw, “Conflict Trends in Natal, 1989-April 1992,” in Patterns of
Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992).
350

Maphumulo was killed in a shootout in March 1991. Kwenzokuhle Maphumulo, Mhlabunzima’s
brother who had acted as chief for him during the 1978 suspension and the umndeni’s choice for
ibamba, reported police harassment after being called to the Alexandra Police Station by police
who said they wanted to set up a peace committee in Maqongqo. After a brief conversation
regarding peace negotiations, the officers asked Kwenzokuhle why he supported Mandela and
communists such as Harry Gwala. The police also queried his opinion of Baningi Maphumulo,
who was the Inkatha-favorite for the ibamba position. Fano Zuma also reported police
harassment after an interrogation related to the Madlala claims. Zuma alleged three policemen
(two white and one black) attempted to recruit him to implicate Maphumulo in gun smuggling
and that upon release from the station was followed and shot at by white men in a blue Nissan
Skyline. Several more attacks took place in the vicinity of the late chief’s umuzi. In January
1992, Acting Chief Madlala reported that Inkatha supporters burnt the homes that remained at
Maphumulo’s homestead and vandalized the Maphumulo inkantolo after a meeting in Maqongqo
headed by David Ntombela. Ntombela said the 14 buses of supporters had come for a meeting on
the National Peace Accord, which had been signed on September 14, 1991.

67

Attackers targeted local ANC and Inkatha leadership. Acting Chief Albert Madlala was
shot dead by unknown gunmen. Police alleged that his death occurred during a botched robbery
attempt and charged the dying man with attempted armed robbery.

68

Madlala had been a close

confident of Maphumulo during his lifetime and had joined both the ANC and Contralesa. After

67

“Stepfather murdered,” Natal Mercury March 26, 1991; “Maphumulo snr killed,”
Natal Witness March 26, 1991; “Police taking sides – late chief’s brother,” Natal Witness Echo
April 18, 1991; Craig Urquhart, “Maphumulo: dramatic claim,” Natal Witness May 1, 1991;
“Huts burned, shots fired at Inkatha meeting,” Natal Witness January 28, 1992; Nomusa Cembi,
“IFP members ‘burnt Maphumulo’s home,’” Natal Witness Echo January 30, 1992.
68
Radley Keys Private Papers. Minutes of Peace in Natal board meeting, June 30, 1993.
351

the chief’s death, Madlala worked in earnest with Peace in Natal as this non-profit run by the
Democratic Party’s MP Radley Keys attempted to negotiate peace for Mbambangalo. But one
Maqongqo ANC member implicated Madlala in the distribution of weapons.

69

Madlala had been

a target of harassment and attacks since Maphumulo’s death. He survived an April attack for
which a KZP man was charged when a bus he was traveling on was ambushed and the passenger
next to him killed. At the time of his death, Madlala had been organizing a ceremony to unveil
the late chief’s tombstone.

70

Madlala’s son Japhet was adamant that Albert Madlala “was not

beaten for the ANC but beaten for Mhlabunzima” and said that Madlala had earned the support
of many local youth.

71

It was believed that after Madlala’s death, many of the remaining ANC

followers fled.
Local Inkatha officials were also hard hit. The systematic nature in which four local
leaders were taken out and the automatic weapons used to do so lends credence to allegations of
the presence of trained amaqabane and an arms cache in Mbambangalo. After the adjournment
of the Maphumulo inquest, Sabelo Gcabashe was seriously wounded as he drove near his home
in Maqongqo on December 15, 1991. Three bullets struck him as six men with AK-47s opened
fired on his Mazda 323. His wife remembers that the car had been sprayed with 38 bullets. Two
days later, Thomas Gcabashe was struck five times and killed in his car as he turned into his city
driveway in a manner almost identical to the assassination of Maphumulo. In April 1992,
Nyaninga (an Mbambangalo isigodi) Inkatha chairman Tobias Mdlalose and his daughter were
69

Amnesty statement of Albert Sbangeliso Maseko to the TRC, November 17, 1999.
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99111518_dbn_991117db.htm (accessed February
8, 2012).
70
“Table Mountain chief Madlala shot dead,” Natal Witness August 8, 1992.
71

“Ubaba akashawelanga ukuthi uyi ANC kodwa washawela uMhlabunzima…” Japhet
Madlala, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Scottsville, August 8, 2011.
352

killed in an ambush on his home and the KZP officer who guarded him was wounded. The
assailants used a variety of 9mm pistols, R1 rifles, shotguns, and petrol bombs. Later that month,
John Khanyile, Inkatha chairman of Enkanyezeni (another isigodi), was assassinated at a bus
stop where 14 spent cartridges were found. In June, Mdlalose’s son Skumbuzo was shot and
seriously wounded, and in September, Enkanyezeni Inkatha Branch Secretary Bheki Shelembe
was also shot at a bus stop by occupants of a passing vehicle armed with AK47s and shotguns.

72

A press statement by the IFP after Shelembe’s death alleged that this assassination “yet again
provides continuing evidence of ANC hit-squad activity in Natal and the existence of a
systematic pattern of elimination against IFP leadership and members.”

73

While Inkatha leaders

often made such assertions regarding the death of its officials, the scale and success of antiInkatha forces in the Table Mountain region seem to support this allegation.
Another characteristic of the advancing Table Mountain violence were the numerous
attacks on public transportation. Early morning bus ambushes were frequent, ensuring maximum
damage by targeting workers on the two major routes from the region to the city, Lion Park Road
and Table Mountain Road (refer to figure in previous chapter to see major routes). Ambushes on
Lion Park Road were interpreted as attacks on KwaNyavu’s Inkatha members while vehicles on
Table Mountain Road carried both KwaNyavu and Mbambangalo residents. In March 1991, a
bus ambush on Lion Park Road injured nine Table Mountain residents and in May, the shooting
and petrol bombing of a bus on Table Mountain Road killed three, injured 35, and caused
KwaZulu Transport (KZT) to suspend their services to the region in the interest of the safety of
72

“Inkatha leader wounded in ambush,” Daily News December 17, 1991; Interview with
Thombi Gcabashe, by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011; “Inkatha
leader is gunned down in his car,” Daily News December 18, 1991;
73
APC. PC126/3/11. Press Statement issued by Ed Tillet, IFP Information Centre,
September 9, 1992.
353

passengers and drivers. Residents continued to come under attack at various bus stops in the
region where they waited for non-KZT transport.

74

In the midst of this violence, a week after the murder of Acting Chief Madlala and
eighteen months after the assassination of Chief Maphumulo, the KwaZulu Cabinet adopted a
resolution appointing Baningi Maphumulo as ibambabukhosi. A Department of the Chief
Minister memorandum dated July 2, 1992 and presented at the August 14 Cabinet meeting
reports a conflict within the umndeni as evidenced by two umndeni “factions.” According to the
report, two umndeni meetings were held. Mdingi Maphumulo (who died sometime after the first
meeting, presumably a casualty of the violence) convened the first at which the former ibamba
Khangela proposed Baningi Maphumulo for the position. The report acknowledged that Baningi
was an illegitimate son of the late Chief Ndlovu, but did not allude to the fact that he had
previously been overlooked for the position on account of this heritage. Khangela later denied
that the first was a legitimate meeting of the umndeni, but rather stated that the men had gathered
to drink and discussed the topic. Khangela also attended the second meeting organized by
Anthony Maphumulo, as did the mother of the late chief, Ma Mdlalose. This meeting
recommended the appointment of Kwenzokuhle.
It is likely that Khangela’s denial of the first nomination happening at an umndeni
meeting is accurate. Mdingi, who had been dismissed from the umndeni at the time of
Mhlabunzima’s appointment would not have been welcomed at an umndeni meeting while
74

Masheila Sewpaul, “Nine hurt in ambush,” Natal Witness March 14, 1991; “Death bus
catches fire after ambush,” Daily News May 6, 1991; “Bus attack in Table Mountain kills 3
people,” Natal Witness May 7, 1991; “Bus ambush death toll rises to three,” Natal Mercury May
7, 1991; “Gunmen shoot bus passengers,” Natal Mercury July 24, 1991; “Two killed in Table
Mountain,” Natal Witness August 21, 1991; Craig Urquhart, “Woman dies, eight hurt in ambush
on ‘IFP bus,’” Natal Witness February 12, 1992; Niall Aitcheson, “Bus attacks leave 5 dead,”
Natal Witness April 22, 1992; “Commuter shot dead while boarding bus,” Natal Witness June 9,
1992.
354

Khangela and Anthony would attend. Without a doubt, Mdingi was aware that he was in no
position to claim the position of ibamba and thus attempted to nominate Baningi as a malleable
ally and umndeni member. While it is likely that Baningi’s politics also influenced the remainder
of the umndeni to nominate Kwenzokuhle (who held the same political sympathies as his late
older brother), it should also be remembered that the umndeni had earlier supported
Kwenzokuhle for the regency during Mhlabunzima’s suspension.
With the umndeni at odds, KwaZulu intervened and manipulated the succession in its
favor. In three points of “motivation,” the memorandum acknowledges Kwenzokuhle’s
nomination by the umndeni but attempts to discredit it. It is worth quoting at length:
3.

MOTIVATION:
3.1.
Kwenzokuhle was previously placed in charge of the tribe during
the period of suspension of the late Inkosi Mhlabunzima. He has
the backing of the majority of the Umndeni, but is not very loyal to
the Government of KwaZulu.
3.2.
He is a full uncle of Mhlabunzima and it is not policy to appoint
such a person as Ibambabukhosi. My Department is reluctant to
point this out to the Umndeni, who are known to be very stubborn.
It would be appreciated if cabinet could give its guidance in this
regard, as this is a very delicate matter.
3.3.
The appointment of Kwenzokuhle is not recommended on account
75
of his affiliations with Anti-government organisations.

The memorandum makes clear that Kwenzokuhle was not a desirable appointment on
account of his anti-apartheid political affiliations. But what is more subtle is the manner in which
the Department of the Chief Minister attempted to further discredit Kwenzokuhle on account of
his position within the family. Despite the memo’s claim, Kwenzokuhle was not the full uncle,
but rather, the younger brother, of Mhlabunzima. As such, his appointment to the Ibambabukhosi
for the young son of Mhlabunzima would have been in line with “policy” as it was during
75

UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1992, “Memorandum to the Cabinet
from the Department of the Chief Minister: Appointment of Ibambabukhosi:Maphumulo Tribe:
Mpumalanga District,” July 2, 1992.
355

Mhlabunzima’s suspension. Baningi, on the other hand, was the uncle (Mhlabunzima’s father
Funizwe and Baningi shared the late Chief Ndlovu as father) of Mhlabunzima. Did the memo
here mean Baningi? Certainly on account of Baningi’s birth out of wedlock, his appointment was
out of line with policy, as evidenced by the Bantu Affairs Department’s earlier dismissal of his
nomination as Ibamba for Mhlabunzima. The Department rightly anticipated that the umndeni
would respond to Baningi’s appointment unfavorably. The Department of the Chief Minister
requested that the Mpumalanga Magistrate advise it on a course of action, but the Magistrate
made no recommendation.
According to Ivy (Ma Maphumulo) Gumede, a daughter of the late Chief Ndlovu
Maphumulo, the Magistrate asked the umndeni to appear at his office and provide the family
history and successor. She and many of her family had gone into hiding after Mhlabunzima’s
death and refused to go to the court after men warned them they would be shot if they did so. Ma
Maphumulo had been hesitant to be interviewed initially, both on account of her age and
memory as well as the pain she knew would accompany the subject. While her family convinced
her to share, she was adamant that she did not want to talk much about Baningi. She said Baningi
asked Khangela if he would take back the position of Ibamba. When Khangela refused, Baningi
then went to the Mpumalanga Magistrate to report he was willing to take over the chieftaincy.
Voto, another member of the umndeni, supported him. Many umndeni members felt that Voto
had betrayed them.

76

Peace in Natal reports, though, suggest at least some umndeni members did

go to the Magistrate to point out that Baningi could not stand for election because he did not

76

Ivy Gumede, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Imbali¸ August 8, 2011.
356

appear in the family genealogy. These members of the umndeni nominated Kwenzokuhle and
believed that the ethnologist would take the report to Ulundi.

77

With the appointment of Baningi, the dynamics of the Table Mountain violence
continued to shift. Peace in Natal members working in Mbambangalo doubted Baningi’s ability
to control his council—possibly why Mdingi favored Baningi for the position—and believed that
Sabelo Gcabashe actually made the decisions.

78

Khanyisile Maphumulo, an aunt of

Mhlabunzima who sought refuge at Baningi’s home, remembers the Ibamba being visited by the
79

Inkatha-affiliated Chief Mdluli.

The brunt of the violence was now intra-community as supporters of Inkatha and ANC
sought to cement control. Indeed, the culprits of two Table Mountain massacres to be described
below were ANC and Inkatha members from two izigodi within Mbambangalo—Mboyi and
Nkanyezeni. These 1993 massacres were the most brutal episodes of uDlame in Table Mountain
and the culmination of the vehicular attacks. While sophisticated weaponry still accompanied the
attacks, revenge fueled ambushes demonstrating a lack of discipline and careless mistakes that
characterized the violence at this point. Some believed that purposeful destruction designed to
disrupt the national negotiations undergirded these attacks.
At the end of February, three ANC-affiliated Table Mountain men, Joseph Mlambo,
Johannes Bhengu, and Themba Ngwenya were killed in the ongoing violence. In the wake of
their deaths, several other local ANC members who hid together in the mountains discussed a
retaliation attack on the Inkatha leader whose truck they had identified in the ambush on the
77
78
79

Radley Keys Private Papers. Minutes of Peace in Natal meeting, April 14, 1992.
Radley Keys Private Papers. Minutes of Peace in Natal meeting, April 14, 1992.
Khanyisile Maphumulo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21,

2011.
357

three men. According to Aaron Zibuse Zulu’s amnesty testimony before the TRC, after
dispersing, he, Saul Mkhize, Sishe Madlala, and Khumbu Nsthangase decided to take revenge
themselves. On March 2, 1993, the men dug up previously hidden weapons, including two
AK47s, a V11 and a 303 rifle,

80

and positioned themselves along a road in the Mboyi isigodi

where they knew the target frequently travelled. When they saw the truck approach, Saul Mkhize
stepped into the road to block the path and the men opened fire without ascertaining the vehicle’s
occupants.
Zulu testified at the TRC that the targeted IFP official was Makhekhe Siphiwe Zondi,
though many local residents believed and the prosecutor argued that the target was Bernard
Mkhize, the Inkatha leader of the Mboyi isigodi. Aaron Zulu’s relatives, Sibusiso and Qeda Zulu,
confessed before their 1993 murder trial that they aimed to ambush Bernard Mkhize, but
throughout the trial the men alleged that they had been forced to sign blank confessions. During
Aaron Zulu’s 1999 TRC testimony, the Commission accepted that Jeremiah and Qeda had been
wrongly accused (and ultimately refused Aaron amnesty believing he had not undertaken full
disclosure). Whether or not Mkhize was the target, three of his children

81

were amongst the

thirteen travelling in the back of the ambushed vehicle. They had been en route to school via the
truck on account of a bus boycott. Thulani Mkhize (19), Nduda Mkhize (13), Thule Mkhize (9),

80

In his TRC amnesty application, Albert Sbangeliso Maseko, an ANC member from
KwaSwayimane, alleged these weapons were the same he and other ANC members from
Maqongqo used in the attempted assassination of KwaSwayimane Inkatha leader Thulane
Mkhize. Maseko is the same who alleged Madlala distributed weapons. Amnesty statement of
Albert Sbangeliso Maseko to the TRC, November 17, 1999,
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99111518_dbn_991117db.htm (accessed February
8, 2012).
81
The three children were biologically offspring of Bernard Mkhize’s sister but he was
raising them and acting as their guardian.
358

Wanda Ngubane (12), Nomusa Gwala (12), and Ngce Mkhize (10) lost their lives. Six other
children and the 23-year old Inkatha-affiliated driver, Phikalithethwa Ngubane, were wounded.

82

This slaughter of innocent children in the Mboyi Massacre shocked the entire nation and
prompted retaliatory attacks in Table Mountain. A furious Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who
visited the massacre site as part of a delegation of South African Council of Churches leaders
also including the Bishop of Natal Michael Nuttall and Reverend Frank Chikane, described the
event as “utter madness” and the “diabolical work of the devil.”

83

Nhlanhla Radebe, a local

violence monitor with the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness (PACSA),
led the delegation to visit the victims’ families and remembers his concern. “When we got there
[to Mboyi], it was clear that people were armed and there was going to be some kind of
84

retaliation… they were very, very antagonistic. Philip Powell was there.”

Philip Powell had

become known as a notorious gun-runner for Inkatha. A former intelligence officer turned
Inkatha member, Powell was assisted by Eugene de Kock in the supplying and training of
Inkatha “self-defense units” at the Mlaba camp.

85

82

“Murder of the innocents,” Daily News March 3, 1993; Keith Ross, “Natal massacre
shocks police,” Daily News March 3, 1993; Mary Papayya, “Schoolkids massacred,” Natal
Witness March 3, 1993; Wyndham Hartley, “Killers ‘trying to derail the talks,’” Natal Witness
March 4, 1993; Lakela Kaunda, “Massacre: R250 000 award,” Natal Witness March 4, 1993;
Mary Papayya, “Slaying of the innocents,” Natal Witness Echo March 4, 1993; Keith Ross,
“Massacre: man claims police assaulted him,” Daily News March 11, 1993.
83
“Madness: something has gone wrong,” Sunday Tribune July 7, 1993; “Clergy visit
murder scene,” Daily News March 5, 1993; “Local leaders to blame for murders,” Natal Witness
March 5, 1993.
84
Nhlanhla Radebe, interview with author, Pietermaritzburg, March 31, 2011.
85

Xhawulani Thulasizwe Ngcobo testified in his amnesty application that Philip Powell
delivered weapons to Bernard Mkhize, Tswalitye Ntombela and Bongani Phethwa, all local
KwaNyavu/Mbambangalo Inkatha leaders. Ngcobo gave no concrete dates, but the weapons had
been delivered prior to the 1992 events about which Ngcobo was testifying. Amnesty testimony
of Xhawulani Thulasizwe Ngcobo to the TRC, November 29, 1999.
359

Figure 22 and 25 Driver Phikilithetwa Ngubane stands outside of the blood-soaked bakkie
after the Mboyi Massacre, left, and SADF at the scene, right. Natal Witness, March 3, 1993.
Immediately, the police arrested Sibusiso Zulu, Jeremiah Qeda Zulu, and an unnamed
youth and charged them with the massacre.

86

But the arrests did not prevent retaliation. On

March 5, 1993, Mabhungu Dladla, Nkanyiso Wilfred Ndlovu, and Makhekhe Siphiwe Zondi
opened fire on a kombi in Nkanyezeni. Ten men and women died: Sindisizwe Ndlovu, Joyce
Babazile Khanyeza, Bhekayena Dlaimini, Bonisizwe Ngcobo, Bongiwe Lambede, Bongani
Ndlovu, Sipho Dlamini, Pretty Hlongwa, Flora Thembani Ntombinkulu Khoza, and Bhekizwe
Joseph Mncwabe. According to Dladla, when he rushed to the scene of the Mboyi massacre, the
children told him Qeda Jeremiah Zulu had been amongst the attackers. Dladla and Zondi decided
to retaliate. They approached Ndlovu for assistance on account of his knowledge of Zulu’s
kombi route. Makhekhe supplied them with an AK47, shotgun, an R1 shotgun, and muthi. While

http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/9911291203_pmb_991129pm.htm (accessed
February 8, 2012; Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness, 131–2.
86
“Three held, four more still sought,” Natal Witness March 6, 1993; John Nichols,
“ANC men in court for kids’ murder,” Natal Witness March 9, 1993.
360

the men opened fire on a kombi that they believed carried Nkanyezeni ANC supporters, many of
the dead included Inkatha members or non-affiliated residents.

87

Local residents and the press recognized the retaliatory motivation behind the attack. But
distraught Nkanyezeni residents also cited internal divisions within the Maphumulo, in particular
long-running tensions between them and Inkatha members from Mboyi. One woman claimed
that Nkanyezeni residents were all Inkatha members, though some had been coerced into joining
and pressured to pay “membership fees” to the local officials. But because youth had refused to
attend night camps, they had been identified as ANC members. Other residents reported that
after the Mboyi massacre two well-known Inkatha leaders had threatened to kill their children.
The ANC Midlands office made a statement condemning the killings and connected the attacks
to their plans to launch a branch there.

88

Dladla testified to the TRC that Inkatha members from

Mboyi could not use the quickest route to town through Nkanyezeni because it was an ANC
stronghold. He had hoped that avenging the first massacre would also open the Nkanyezeni route
for Mboyi residents.

89

Further evidence that hints at intra-community violence emerged from the

TRC cross-examination of Ndlovu. The attorney for the families of the Nkanyezeni massacre
asked whether or not Bernard Mkhize had been responsible for the death of Makhekhe. Ndlovu
responded that he only knew that Makhekhe had been killed when he attacked Mkhize’s home.

87

90

John Nichols, “Second massacre claims ten lives,” Natal Witness March 6, 1993;
Mabhungu Absalom Dladla, testimony to the TRC, Durban, March 26, 1998,
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/durban/myeza.htm (accessed March 2, 2012).
88
Lakela Kaunda and Khaba Mkhize, “The agony of yet another ambush,” Natal Witness
March 6, 1993; Prakash Naidoo, “Stop the killing – plea,” Sunday Tribune March 7, 1993.
89
Absalom Mabhungu Dladla, testimony to the TRC.
90

Nkanyiso Wilfred Ndlovu, testimony to the TRC, Durban, March 27, 1998,
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/durban/ndlovu.htm (accessed April 8, 2011). Without
accessing the trial record for the Mkhize case, one can only imagine what reason there might
361

A man claiming to represent the South African Republican Army (SARA) called the
press to claim responsibility for the second massacre. He alleged that the attack “on targeted
ANC supporters” was part of SARA’s “Operation Change of Heart” campaign to discourage
support for the ANC. The man also claimed that the campaign was linked to murders in
Daveyton and Alexandra and that of ANC Natal Midlands leader Reggie Hadebe. But the police
quickly arrested Mabhungu Dladla, Nkanyiso Wilfred Ndlovu, and Phi Sifiso Mkhize. Mkhize
was not charged, as Dladla had implicated him in the attack only because he believed Mkhize
had informed on them.

91

Dladla and Nkanyiso were later sentenced to death on ten counts but

granted amnesty for the killings in 1998.
The massacres in the region continued when on March 8, 1993, gunmen attacked a bus of
ANC supporters from KwaSwayimane en route to the Pietermaritzburg court hearing of those
arrested in connection with the Mboyi massacre. Four, including the driver Mafuta Ndlovu, were
killed and 16 were wounded.

92

People began to again flee Table Mountain for the city. Three

ambushes in eight days increased the national attention. Law and Order Minister Hernus Kriel
visited Table Mountain and mediated a meeting between the ANC/IFP. Kriel also accepted a
memorandum from hundreds of Table Mountain refugees who marched on his hotel demanding
the removal of biased police and support to ensure unconditional return to their homes. Buthelezi
and Mandela announced their intentions to attend the funerals. Buthelezi hoped that these
have been for tension (that results in death) between two Inkatha men from the same isigodi,
both with reputations for distributing weapons. From available evidence, it appears Mkhize was
acquitted. Since completion of fieldwork, Mkhize was killed in what police suspect was an
armed robbery. Police did acknowledge the death of this indunenkhulu had the potential to
undermine community stability in an area with “a bad history dating back to the days of political
violence.” “Head of izinduna gunned down,” Natal Witness December 5, 2011.
91
John Nichols, “Three held after quick police work,” Natal Witness March 8, 1993.
92

Mary Papayya, “Third ambush in a week,” Natal Witness March 9, 1993; Keith Ross,
“Horrors of massacre described,” Daily News March 10, 1993.
362

funerals could be a shared public platform between the two leaders. Mandela desired to mourn
the children’s deaths that he believed were deliberately planned to fan hostilities. But the plans
failed to materialize and Buthelezi attended the burial of six of the Mboyi children while
Mandela attended the funeral of two KwaSwayimane ANC members. The next day, the IFP
buried five more of the Nkanyezeni victims whose families had asked for their assistance.

93

These targeted attacks and devastating massacres illustrate the shift to a battle within the
Maphumulo. But who were the Maphumulo?

Chief by the People? Defining Membership and Legitimacy
Central to understanding uDlame and the contestation over land and chiefly authority in the
Table Mountain is the definition of the Maphumulo and chiefly legitimacy. As uDlame in this
region shifted from conflict between communities to one within the Maphumulo, local leaders
employed claims to “the people” in need of further examination. Thomas Gcabashe’s reference
to Maphumulo’s followers as “his people,” Chief Maphumulo’s use of “my people,” and the
memories of Mbambangalo residents suggest different understandings of membership in the
Maphumulo and of chiefly authority. There are two isiZulu terms critical to this examination –
ukukhonza and isizwe. Ukukhonza was examined earlier in the context of the disputed land
jurisdiction. The second term, isizwe, can be translated into English as “nation, tribe, clan,” or

93

Keith Ross, “Refugees start to flee Table Mountain area,” Daily News March 9, 1993;
Ross, “Kriel plays mediator,” Daily News March 12, 1993; “Refugees present demands to Kriel,”
Natal Witness March 12, 1993; Lakela Kaunda, “Mandela to visit sites of violence,” Natal
Witness March 12, 1993; Mary Papayya, “Tour of massacre scenes,” Natal Witness March 12,
1993; Lakela Kaunda and Khaba Mkhize, “Mandela’s trip to funeral is in doubt,” Natal Witness
March 13, 1993; Prakash Naidoo, “Victims buried,” Sunday Tribune March 14, 1993; Lakela
Kaunda, “Requiem for innocence,” Natal Witness March 15, 1993.
363

“state,” here referring to the concept of chiefdom.

94

Exact terminology is crucial. These words

can conjure up notions of essential, static entities. They can carry ideological baggage. In an
interview, the current Maphumulo chief referenced contemporary recognition of the colonial
influence on language. He said, “But we don’t use chieftaincy now because we are no longer
95

called chiefs. [We use] ubukhosi.”

Thinking of the Maphumulo as an isizwe rather than that implied by “tribe” enables an
examination of the culturally defined meanings of membership. The colonial reclassification and
manipulation of ubukhosi and isizwe into the boundary-defined tribe brought new ideas about the
relationship between subjects and chiefs but did not obliterate the old. While Zulu society
understood this mutually beneficial relationship according to the proverb inkosi yinkosi
ngabantu, a chief is a chief because of the people who khonza him, the colonial administration
sought to redefine chiefly authority through jurisdiction based on territory, or inkosi yinkosi
96

ngendawo.

Applying “tribe” to the Maphumulo falsely implies that this polity during uDlame

was essentially the same as it has been since its creation during the colonial era.
However, even isizwe as an analytical term is worthy of some of the same critiques as
scholars have brought to bear on the concepts of “nation,” “tribe,” and “community.” Belinda
Bozzoli questioned the usefulness of “community” as a term that can obscure class differences
and be used as an ideological device, as it certainly was by the apartheid era “Department of

94
95
96

Doke and Vilakazi, Zulu-English dictionary, 902.
Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, interview with author, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011.
Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority.”
364

Community Development.”

97

Cherryl Walker also highlighted this in her critique of the master

narrative informing the post-apartheid land restitution process. This master narrative contains
assumptions such as the notion of homogenous “communities” of claimants, void of internal
98

divisions or conflicts.

In using isizwe I do not wish to simply substitute an isiZulu word for

“nation,” “community” or “tribe” in my analysis of uDlame. The well-worn narrative that pits
Inkatha-allied Nyavu against the Maphumulo conceals the changes and divisions within each
isizwe and local explanations for the violence. Exactly because these entities are not static or
timeless, it enables us to analyze the social units in the Table Mountain region in a manner that
allows for the movement and change that accompanied relocation during colonialism,
segregation, apartheid, and uDlame.
In particular, the influx of people forcefully relocated and other refugee populations into
Echibini prior to the outbreak of the Table Mountain violence calls into question the makeup of
the Maphumulo chiefdom. Who did the chief consider to be members of the Maphumulo? What
did the other local leaders mean when they called on the Maphumulo? And what of the people
who moved onto the contested land? Defining this membership and legitimacy is closely related
to land access, khonza, and also the qualities of leadership admired by the chief’s followers, the
people that made the chief a chief.
Maphumulo considered all of the people in his territory as “my people,” especially as he
demanded that those fleeing from the political violence elsewhere khonza in order to access land.
Recall the allegations of Maphumulo’s misuse of those khonza/site fees above as well as his

97

Belinda Bozzoli, “Class, Community and Ideology in the Evolution of South African
Society,” in Class, Community, and Conflict: South African Perspectives (Johannesburg: Ravan
Press, 1987).
98
Cherryl Walker, “Relocating Restitution,” Transformation 44 (2000): 2.
365

comments to the press when he first began to welcome the refugees: “People are not made to pay
money to live in the area, but in our tradition they are expected to pay ‘khonza’—a tribute to the
chief.”

99

Ukukhonza was the basis on which relations between political heads and subjects were

founded. While the colonial administration sought to eradicate these personal relations,
expectations continued to exist on both sides.
In the context of moving into the jurisdiction of a chief, khonza implies an offer of
allegiance. John Lambert, in his examination of the chieftainship in colonial Natal, rightly points
out the difficulties of understanding the extent to which these shifts of allegiance undermined the
bonds of kinship and whether kinship redefinition accompanied political transference. Lambert
argues transfer of allegiance would have done little to strengthen kinship ties, especially in
created chiefdoms. He even cites the splintering of the Maphumulo predecessor, the chiefdom of
Ngoza, as an example of the way in which these redefined kinship ties did not hold.

100

However, the testimonies of several residents of Mbambangalo who paid a fee upon their
arrival over one hundred years later do suggest a redefinition of membership. Indeed several
were keen to explain their relation to Chief Maphumulo, whether their mother and his mother
were sisters or that they went to the same amaNazaretha church. None used the term khonza to


describe fees paid but the majority still recognized Maphumulo as their chief. Some did not
mention paying a fee but imply such in relating that Induna Gumede arranged for them to access

99

“Maqongqo chief to ask for more land to accommodate refugees,” Natal Witness
October 13, 1988.
100
John Lambert, “Chiefship in Early Colonial Natal, 1843-1879,” Journal of Southern
African Studies 21, no. 2 (June 1, 1995): 283.


It is important here to note that early in my research I did not recognize the significance
and did not specifically ask about khonza or fees, but only how individuals accessed land. I
intend to return to this in future follow-up interviews.
366

sites. Chief Maphumulo may never have received these fees (either personally or for the
Maphumulo) given his charge that Gumede ran away with them. But Maphumulo appears to
have treated the fees as not only as recognitions of his authority but also as signals of a person’s
right to use that land. While Chief Maphumulo expected khonza, at least one woman who moved
to the contested Echibini recalled getting a piece of paper in return for her payment that
recognized her rights to land. When Mantombi Manyoni moved to Echibini from Nkanyezeni,
she felt fortunate. “I was lucky at the time because they said that those who want title deeds must
buy them. I bought a title with R25 and I still have it now.” Manyoni expressed her absolute
allegiance to Chief Maphumulo when she spoke about uDlame and passionately queried, “Do
you understand being chased out with your inkosi by people from another inkosi?”

101

Only those individuals or families moved to the trust farm by the DCD received the same
“Permission to Occupy” forms that the Department gave to business owners and the Maphumulo
authority for businesses, schools, and the inkantolo on the trust-governed land. Manyoni may be
referring to a PTO or receipt for her payment, such as those kept by Ma Shembe as Maphumulo
secretary (and copied by Mdingi Maphumulo, Zondi and Gumede when they went to KwaZulu
to complain about Chief Maphumulo).
Balothi Goge, whose father had been one of Chief Ndlovu Maphumulo’s izinduna as well
as a foreman for the agricultural officer on the Onverwacht farm, said that Maphumulo wanted
everyone, not just the relocating refugees, to have this right. Balothi also attributes the chief’s
assassination to this conviction. “When Mhlabunzima started to rule over this land he said we

101

“Mina ngaba nenhlanhla ngalesosikhathi ngoba kwathiwa abafuna amatayitela
abawathenge kodwa amatayitela sasiwathenga ngoR25 namanje ngisanalo.” Mantombi M.,
interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, August 8, 2011.
367

have to take our IDs and register our own plots. He said that he did not want people to call the
place the Inkosi’s land but point to their own places. They killed him.”

102

But Maphumulo’s desire to transform Mbambangalo was just one reason that Balothi
admired the chief. He described the loss of Mhlabunzima as having a crippling effect on the
community. “The thing that I am saying is that we lost a powerful man in this place because we
cannot compare Mhlabunzima with other chiefs. He was too clever. Another thing about him, he
was well educated. With the other chiefs, we were all the same. They did not even know how to
write their names. I was schooling with [Ibamba] Khangela, learning our A.E.I.O.U.!”

103

However, not all who moved to Goedverwachting recognized Maphumulo’s authority.
Some of those that moved onto the contested portion of the farm known as Imijondolo [literally,
shacks] recognized they were not under the jurisdiction of any chief. Albertina Ndimande, who
moved to Table Mountain during the violence from Hammarsdale, told me, “I did not get to
know much about the Maphumulo clan because the place we stayed in was called Imijondolo.

102

“uMhlabunzima wathi eseqala ukubusa wathi nizothatha wonke amapasi enu nibhale
izindawo okungezenu ukuthi zingakanani. Wathi akafuni ukuthi abantu balokhu bethi indawo
yeNkosi kodwa abantu abakhombe izindawo zabo; bambulala ke uMhlabunzima... Into
engingayisho ukuthi salahlekelwa kakhulu kulendawo ngoba ayikho Inkosi eyofana
noMhlabunzima wayehlakaniphe kakhulu loyamuntu. Kanti ke wayefundile uMhlabunzima
ngoba laba abanye babengakwazi ngisho nokubhala. Sasizifanela nje nabo. OKhangela sasifunda
nabo esikoleni o A,E,I,O,U! [Kuyahlekwa] Manje ke kungasizani ukuthi?” Goge Balothi,
interview by author and Thandeka Majola, eStingini, March 4, 2011.
103
“uMhlabunzima wathi eseqala ukubusa wathi nizothatha wonke amapasi enu nibhale
izindawo okungezenu ukuthi zingakanani. Wathi akafuni ukuthi abantu balokhu bethi indawo
yeNkosi kodwa abantu abakhombe izindawo zabo; bambulala ke uMhlabunzima... Into
engingayisho ukuthi salahlekelwa kakhulu kulendawo ngoba ayikho Inkosi eyofana
noMhlabunzima wayehlakaniphe kakhulu loyamuntu. Kanti ke wayefundile uMhlabunzima
ngoba laba abanye babengakwazi ngisho nokubhala. Sasizifanela nje nabo. OKhangela sasifunda
nabo esikoleni o A,E,I,O,U! [Kuyahlekwa] Manje ke kungasizani ukuthi?” Goge Balothi,
interview by author and Thandeka Majola, eStingini, March 4, 2011.
368

We were not in KwaNyavu or at Mhlabunzima’s place but we stayed in a small portion of
land.”

104

Gcabashe opposed the settlement of these refugees and did not include them in his
definition of the Maphumulo. When he alleged that Maphumulo’s followers wanted the chief to
leave he was surely referring only to those from Mbambangalo prior to the influx of outsiders.
Those Maphumulo attending the meetings designed to oust Maphumulo would have only been
those who remained behind when the unaligned and ANC-affiliated fled to town. Gcabashe
maintained that Maphumulo’s only local supporters were the youth that Maphumulo had brought
in from other areas to prop up his flailing support. Gcabashe argued that Maphumulo “recruits
the youths from outside and uses them to burn houses and kill other people…”

105

Gcabashe’s

attention to these outsiders is not surprising. One of the recurring Inkatha explanations for the
violence was that it was engineered by outsiders.

106

Indeed, several people who moved into Mbambangalo from as early as the 1970s and
recognized Maphumulo as their chief still felt the distinction between themselves and those
originally from the area. Veronica Dlamini said that because they were not originally from Table
Mountain, her family joined Inkatha to protect themselves, but in doing so she felt that she had
betrayed the chief.

107

Phyllis Ngubane, who had moved to the disputed Echibini from

104

“Asimjwayelanga kakhulu uMaphumulo ngoba indawo esasihlal kuyona yayibizwa
ngemijondolo. Sasingekho kaNyavu noma kaMhlabunzima kodwa kwakuyindawana nje
esayithola sahlala kuyona.” Albertina Ndimande, interview by author and Thandeka Majola,
Haniville, June 21, 2011.
105
“Leaders trade blame for the violence” Natal Witness (5 Dec 1990).
106

Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power, 200.

107

“Thina ke ngoba singabokufika lapha endaweni senza lokho okwenziwa iwona
wonke umuntu, nathi saxokizela Inkosi ngoba sincenge indawo yokuhlala.” Veronica Dlamini,
interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Stingini, May 23, 2011.
369

Sweetwaters during the violence, recalled that when Chief Maphumulo moved to town, he told
those who had moved to Echibini to do what the Nyavu told them to do. “He said this to protect
his place from being taken by Inkosi Mdluli, but he never came back. He passed on where he
was hiding.”

108

When Chief Maphumulo proclaimed to shift to progressive politics out of the conviction
that a leader “must move with his people,” his people here included the refugees who had
become members of the Maphumulo when they khonza’d or paid for their plots. The people for
whom he became progressive remember him almost as an ideal chief. Few spoke ill of him and
even when they did it was only to consider him naïve for believing that he could maintain peace
in Mbambangalo during a civil war. Jennifer Delisle and Svetlana Boym have pointed out that
this kind of nostalgia for the past is often oriented towards the future in very specific political
contexts. While many relegate nostalgia to “selective forgetting,” it can be means of projecting
desires for the future.

109

Jacob Dlamini, in his self-described “creative non-fiction” about fond

memories of life under apartheid, too suggests nostalgic sentiments are one way to understand
contemporary South Africa. They confirm that people’s lives have changed, but not always in the
way often imagined.

110

As Jon Soske has pointed out in his biography of Dr. Abubaker “Hurley”

Asvat, memories of popularly venerated figures “often assume a dual character. They are highly

108

“Lokho wayekusholo ukuthi sikwazi ukubamba indawo yakhe ukuthi ingadliwa enye
Inkosi kodwa akazange esabuya washonela khona lapho ayecashe khona.” Phyllis Ngubane,
interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, May 26, 2011.
109
Boym, The Future of Nostalgia; Delisle, “Finding the Future in the Past.”
110

Dlamini, Native Nostalgia, 12.
370

personal and yet charged with an underlying political valence… they convey the meanings and
values that a political life came to represent.”

111

Those interviewed could remember their own interactions with the late chief. But they
also recalled specific actions and principles that they admired. For them, Maphumulo embodied
the values of a legitimate traditional leader that had been contested within the Maphumulo
throughout uDlame. The memories of the Maphumulo point to other kinds of chiefly legitimacy
that, even if selectively remembered, are desired by people in a country struggling to reconcile
traditional authority with democracy, by people who complain about skyrocketing site fees and
the challenges of returning to the area from which they fled during uDlame. The chief was
educated, known for his development efforts, and attempted to provide security in the midst of
unprecedented violence.
Foremost amongst the chiefly values spoken of was the chief’s push for development in
Mbambangalo. This was directly related to Maphumulo’s education. According to several, the
chief had a vision for Mbambangalo that he pursued with vigor.

112

Mancane Mlaba recalled with

pride that when they moved to Goedverwachting her husband and many others were contributing
R2 for the young Mhlabunzima to be educated.

113

111

Balothi scoffed because he had as much

Jon Soske, “The Life and Death of Dr Abu Baker ‘Hurley’ Asvat, 23 February 1943
to 27 January 1989,” African Studies 70, no. 3 (2011): 339.
112
Indeed, Goge Balothi described Mhlabunzima as a “prophet” who had fulfilled the
predictions of Mqangabhodwe, one of the white farmers who sold his farm to the SADT and told
the Maphumulo izinduna about the planned closer settlement to be built there. Interview with
author and Thandeka Majola, Estingini, March 4, 2011. See also interviews with Mantombi
Manyoni and Ndela Ntshangase.
113
“Mina ngifike lapha endaweni uMhlabunzima efunda isikole. Imali yokufunda ka
Mhlabunzima yayikhokhwa abayeni bethu, babekhokha uR2 ukuze afunde uMhlabunzima njalo
ngoyaka kwakuphuma imali yeNkosi iye esikoleni.” Mancane Mlaba, interview with author and
Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 10, 2011.
371

education as one of the Ibamba for Mhlabunzima. The chief oversaw and/or attempted to initiate
projects including water provision, electrification, education and job opportunities (including
crèches, often cited by women as important to them), and other facilities. When asked about
Chief Mhlabunzima, Veronica recalled, “He was a humble person, respectful, and he wanted to
create job opportunities for us. When he left here he was building a crèche in Cabazini isigodi; it
was even fenced. Then the war started and they ripped up the fence while we watched.” For
Veronica, this was in stark contrast to the leaders following Mhlabunzima. “After the violence I
opened a crèche…some IFP members came to me and I was told not to renew something which
was built by a comrade.”

114

Some recalled he had wanted to build amafemu (literally, firms, but

meaning businesses and factories).

115

Ndela Ntshangase attributes the existing water and

electricity lines in Mbambangalo to the efforts of Chief Maphumulo. Ntshangase was the
chairman of a community development council in Mbambangalo under the sponsorship of Shell
and Umgeni Water Board. In addition to the water and electricity, Ntshangase says Maphumulo
dreamed of sanitation projects and a technical school and thus sought assistance from
Mangosuthu Technikon students in town planning.

116

Even neighboring Nyavu admitted part of the tensions may have been envy and fear
related to Maphumulo’s education and vision. Maphumulo “was fighting for development.
114

“Ubengumuntu olungile, ehlonipha wayethanda futhi nokusivulela amathuba
emisebenzi. Lapha eCabazini wahamba eqala ukwakha inkulisa yabantwana, kwasekubiyeliwe
sekwakhiwe. Kwafika impi ke, baqaqa lonke ucingo sibhekile… Uma seludlulile udlame
ngavula inkulisa ekhaya lami… Kwafika abanye abantu beNkatha bathi kimina ngivusa into
yeqabane, ngakho ke akufanele ngivuse lento yeqabane,” Veronica Dlamini, Estingini, May 23,
2011.
115
Khanyisile Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June
21, 2011; Nto Ndlela, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Estingini, May 23, 2011.
116
Ndela Ntshangase, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Pietermaritzburg, April
15, 2011.
372

Nyavu residents thought Mhlabunzima wanted to rob them because he had connections in town.
Another thing was that Inkosi Mhlabunzima was more educated than the Nyavu inkosi. Inkosi
Mdluli never went to school so that caused friction.”

117

Ngitheni Ndlovu too compared

Maphumulo to Mdluli: “Mhlabunzima was younger than Bangubukhosi so he did things the way
he thought suitable and he was well educated.”

118

The other characteristic of chiefly authority admired by those interviewed was the chief’s
efforts to provide peace and security. Lungisile Ntsebeza has argued that the capacity to allocate
land is central to chiefly legitimacy.

119

Maphumulo’s authority is undoubtedly partially tied to

his ability to offer access to land, but in the context of uDlame, it was not just the provision of
ground but the supply of land in a peaceful area. Maphumulo’s reputation as the peace chief
attracted a particular kind of follower – one seeking security from the violence s/he was fleeing.
As seen in the previous chapter, several women testified that with the outbreak of uDlame in
Mbambangalo, they ran to the chief for security. People remembered that Maphumulo visited
them in the refugee tents and advised them to protect themselves by fleeing, or if staying, to do
as was required by Inkatha and the Nyavu.

117

“Ngizwa kuthiwa kwakungubaba onenhliziyo enhle futhi owayelwela intuthuko lapha
endaweni kodwa, inkinga kwaba ukuthi abantu balapha kaNyavu ababoni ngaso linye naye.
Abantu balapha babona ukuthi ngoba uMhlabunzima ujwayelene nabantu basemadolobheni
mhlawumbe kukhona afuna ukubarobha ngakho nokuthi yena wayefundile kuneNkosi yalapha
kaNyavu. uMdluli wayengakaze aye esikoleni manje iyona into eyenza ukuthi bangazwani
noMhlabunzima.” Philisile Nxumalo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Esinyameni,
May 24, 2011.
118
“UMhlabunzima ubemncane kunoBangubukhosi manje uMhlabunzima izinto
ubezithatha ngobungane nangokuthi yena ufundile.” Ngitheni Antonia Ndlovu, interview with
author and Thandeka Majola, Esinyameni, August 4, 2011.
119
Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised.
373

Conclusion
In 2005, the city of Pietermaritzburg renamed the Baynes Drift Road to Table Mountain after
Mhlabunzima Maphumulo. The ANC-led municipality commended the late chief, who was
“widely respected for leading a peaceful community at the height of the violence in the province.
He did not side with either the ANC or the IFP and was admired for showing even-handedness to
people of different political persuasions in his area.”

120

Just like those interviewed for this

project, the city’s memorialization of the peace chief remembers a complicated individual with a
simplified sense of nostalgia.
But as this chapter has shown, the authority of this “peace chief” and the composition of
“his people” were highly contested by Mbambangalo residents throughout uDlame. The
neighboring isizwe, Inkatha and KwaZulu under Buthelezi, the apartheid government, and
members of his own isizwe sought to delegitimize the peace chief to promote their own ends.
The early attempts of several Mbambangalo men to have the chief deposed, the messy inquest
into his death and subsequent TRC hit squad admissions, as well as the succession disputes
reveal the extent to which parties contested Maphumulo’s leadership. The composition of his
isizwe, the Maphumulo, varied based on when and who was making claims on “the people.”
Maphumulo considered the refugees from uDlame elsewhere to be new members of the
Maphumulo and sought to “be with the people.” On the other hand, induna and Inkatha leader
Thomas Gcabashe and his followers sought to define the Maphumulo as only those people who
lived on the original portion of Goedverwachting and Onverwacht. Gcabashe allied with the
Nyavu and thus alleged the disputed portion of Goedverwachting fell under the authority of
Chief Mdluli.
120

Thobekile Maphumulo Papers, “Baynes Drift Road – New Name: Chief
Mhlabunzima Road,” News clipping, June 20, 2005.
374

The majority of those who moved to this land during forced removals or as refugees from
uDlame recognized Chief Maphumulo as their leader. Some recalled paying fees to get their sites
from induna Dotsheni Gumede. Despite attempts by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to
delegitimize Maphumulo’s authority on account of his descent from an “appointed chief” and by
members of the Maphumulo on account of his failure to address their complaints versus those of
the new isizwe members, Chief Maphumulo’s legitimacy increased amongst many of his
followers as he spoke out against apartheid and the violence and sought to offer peace and
protection. While evidence of corruption and rumors of violence-related extortion exist, large
numbers of “his people” nostalgically remember the chief with respect and lament his death.
When the people recall his development, peace, and anti-apartheid efforts they suggest
alternative forms of chiefly authority that they value and desire.

375

Chapter Six:
1

“So that the Bullet Can’t Hit You” :
Women, Violence, and Zuluness (1990-1994)

Figures 26-27: Male amaqabane with their weaponry (both plastic and real) and women
waiting for help, both by Clint Zasman, Natal Witness January 30, 1990.

The story of the Table Mountain thus far has been largely a story of men, of chiefs and izinduna,
of male government administrators, and masculine fighters. Indeed, the predominant image of
uDlame is that of Zulu men wielding cultural weapons on the march. Contemporary media
images of the conflict portrayed Zuluness as an ethnic identity bound up with ‘tradition,’ martial
culture, and patriarchy. When women made it into the newspapers it was as “innocent victims,”

1

APC. HC07C03. Thuleleni M., Irinah G., Thokozile T., interviews by Lindiwe Mkasi,
Inadi, September 16, 2005.
376

fleeing the conflict and living in refugee camps, or as “peace makers,” marching against police
inaction and favoritism. This is no different for the images of uDlame in the Table Mountain
region. Cultural notions of warfare use and maintain a gendered construct in which soldiers go to
war to uphold an image of social order which is symbolized by “womenandchildren” (as Cynthia
2

Enloe has coined) as “the protected” and “the defended.” While many women were indeed
3

victimized and indeed mobilized against the violence, these depictions of the “protected” and
the “peacemaker” obscure women’s own uses of and claims on Zuluness during a tumultuous
time marked by masculinity, violence, and rapid social change.
But it is not just cultural notions of warfare or contemporary media depictions of uDlame
that obscure African women’s claims and uses of ethnicity. Up until the 1990s, women as ethnic
subjects had been as invisible to analysts of ethnic movements as they have been to the southern
4

African communities who often cite the Tswana proverb that “women have no tribe.” But
5

despite the growing literature on women and ethnicity in Africa, there is a tendency, particularly

2

Cock, Colonels & Cadres; Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender & Nation (London: Sage
Publications, 1997); Cynthia Enloe, “Womenandchildren: Making Feminist Sense of the Persian
Gulf Crisis,” The Village Voice, September 1990.
3
For an examination of women’s protests against the violence, see Bonnin, “Changing
Spaces, Changing Places.”
4
Deborah James, “‘Bagagesu’ (Those of My Home): Women Migrants, Ethnicity, and
Performance in South Africa” American Ethnologist 26:1 (Feb 1999), 69-89.
5
Diana Jeater, Marriage, Perversion, and Power: The Construction of Moral Discourse
in Southern Rhodesia, 1894-1930 (Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press, 1993); Barbara
MacGowan Cooper, Marriage in Maradi: Gender and Culture in a Hausa Society in Niger,
1900-1989 (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997); Geiger, TANU Women; Deborah James, Songs of
the Women Migrants: Performance and Identity in South Africa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press for the International African Institute, 1999); Dorothy Louise Hodgson, Once
Intrepid Warriors: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Cultural Politics of Maasai Development
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001); Achebe, Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and
Kings; Elizabeth Schmidt, Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the
Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939-1958 (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2005); Heidi
377

in the South African nationalist historiography, to focus on women in resistance and African
6

nationalism. This preference for studying women and the political most likely reflects not only
the sources available, but our own contemporary ideologies as well.

7

Indeed, archival sources for uDlame, such as violence monitoring reports, press coverage,
and Inkatha or UDF speeches, press releases, and statements, lend themselves to studies of
women as protestors or victims and investigations into masculinity, Inkatha, and the manner in
which Buthelezi drew upon a particular Zuluness, that of the Shakan military past, to mobilize
8

Zulu men. But oral history has gained a prominence in enabling women’s voices as an
alternative to the narratives (and silences) of the archive. But it must be recalled that oral history
is still a methodology molded by the researcher. Susan Geiger has argued that one of the
objectives of feminist (though I believe, all) oral history methodology should be the acceptance
of women’s own interpretations of their identities, their experiences, and social worlds. It follows
Gengenbach, Binding Memories: Women as Makers and Tellers of History in Magude,
Mozambique (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
6
For South African examples, see: Judy Kimble and Elaine Unterhalter, “‘We Opened
the Road for You, You Must Go Forward’: ANC Women’s Struggles, 1912-1982,” Feminist
Review 12 (1983); Debby Gaitskell and Elaine Unterhalter, “Mothers of the Nation: A
Comparative Analysis of the Nation, Race, and Motherhood in Afrikaner Nationalism and the
African National Congress,” in Women-Nation-State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989);
Cherryl Walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa (London: Onyx Press, 1982); Julia C.
Wells, We Now Demand!: The History of Women’s Resistance to Pass Laws in South Africa
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1993); Gasa, Women in South African History.
7
Nancy Rose Hunt, “Placing African Women’s History and Locating Gender,” Social
History 14, no. 3 (1989). Jeff Guy has also noted a similar trend regarding the influence of
capitalist and feminist ideas of oppression in his examination of the appropriation of women’s
labor by men in precapitalist southern African societies. Jeff Guy, “Gender Oppression in
Precapitalist Societies,” in Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945 (Cape Town: David
Philip Publishers (Pty) Ltd, 1990).
8
Maré and Hamilton, Appetite for Power; Campbell, “Learning to Kill: Masculinity, the
Family and Violence in Natal”; John Aitchison, “They Just Give You Labels and Then They
Come and Kill You: A Failed Search for Ethnicity in the Natal Midlands Violence,” 1992;
Waetjen, Workers and Warriors; Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, Indians Versus Russians.
378

then that the framing of the researcher’s questions must be done in a manner that allows
women’s own interpretations to be voiced.

9

Thus I need to insert myself and my oral history methodology into the analysis. The
examination below is based on oral history interviews conducted by myself (with oral history
methodology training and four years of isiZulu language study) and with an accompanying
female Zulu research assistant. Thandeka and I interviewed over 60 male and female current and
former residents of the rural Mbambangalo and Mkhambathini regions of Pietermaritzburg.

10

I

set out interested in women’s experience of uDlame and their understanding of what it meant to
be Zulu during such a time of unprecedented turmoil. I had prepared a list of questions to guide
the interviews but set them within the larger framework of “life history” to enable women to tell
me about their lives. I wanted to know what it meant to them to be Zulu, how they learned to be
Zulu, and how they taught their children to be Zulu. Were these life lessons and the ability to
practice Zuluness impacted by the years of uDlame? How did women protect themselves, sustain
themselves, and mourn?
Over the course of twelve months of fieldwork, I was repeatedly frustrated by the
challenges I outlined in depth in the dissertation introduction. My research coincided with local
municipal elections and thus heightened community tensions (unplanned). There was sensitivity
to discussing so recent a civil war (predicted). There was gendered resistance to interviewing
women, where men failed to understand why I wanted to talk to women (also anticipated). Only

9

Susan Geiger, “What’s So Feminist About Doing Women’s Oral History?,” Journal of
Women’s History 2, no. 1 (1990): 169–183.
10
In addition to the interviews undertaken by myself in Mbambangalo and
Mkhambathini, this paper also draws upon the interviews conducted by Sinomlando fieldworkers
in rural Nxamalala, to the west of Pietermaritzburg, and housed at the Alan Paton Centre. These
interviews focused on the role of religion and the church during uDlame.
379

community elder said exclaimed, “Women did nothing at the time; it was the men who were
fighting!”

11

Another community elder who lost several children in the Mboyi massacre was

adamant we would not speak to his wives. Whether or not he was concerned about the pain such
an interview might revive or what they might disclose, he did not ask them so that they could
make the decision for themselves.
But perhaps what was the most surprising was my initial failure to hear what women
were telling me.

12

Most women agreed with the men; they did not take part. They did not fight

or carry weapons. They did not go to political meetings. They ran away. They could not mourn
properly because of the dangers of war. But what I could not hear at first was that through these
complaints, these rural Zulu women were making claims on what it meant to them to be Zulu
during a time of turmoil. They wielded their own “cultural weapons,” using customs to cope and
aid in decision-making.
This chapter is premised on the idea promulgated in the recent edited collection Zulu
Identities that Zuluness is a malleable but lived construct functioning through linguistic and
cultural norms. As historian Jabulani Sithole noted, ubuZulu bethu, an idiom capturing the
shifting, hybrid, and even contradictory meanings and practices of ‘our Zuluness’, provides an
analytical lens through which to examine the many ways in which individuals and groups
utilized language, culture, and historical events to construct a useable Zuluness.

13

Here the

“cultural stuff” of Zuluness must be described as a rich resource used selectively by different
social agents in various social projects within specific power relations and political discourse.
11

Jill E. Kelly, field notes, January 30, 2010.

12

Nwando Achebe discusses a similar experience in her own fieldwork in the
introductory chapter of Achebe, Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings.
13
Carton, Laband, and Sithole, Zulu Identities.
380

Gender, age, ability, and the like affect access and availability of resources.

14

As well, it must be

kept in mind that the ‘cultural stuff’ of ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’ can be real or invented but not
fixed. Hobsbawm has called attention to the more frequent ‘invention of tradition’ during rapid
transformation of society.

15

In the midst of the negotiations for a transition from apartheid to

democracy and the revolt of youth, women’s laments about the absence of cultural practices
should be seen also as evidence of a changing social order.
While this chapter largely focuses on the cultural aspects of ethnicity as employed by
rural Zulu women, I recognize that ethnicity or Zuluness cannot be reduced to “culture.” But
particularly because access to and availability of resources are gendered, the rural women
interviewed here had few political or economic resources to wield. They utilized culture and
custom as coping strategies and, in relating such, make claims on what it meant to them to be
Zulu. Excluded from the masculine warrior heritage espoused and promoted by Inkatha and the
KwaZulu Chief Minister and Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi and drawn upon by men
both young and old, women employed other aspects of Zuluness, such as spiritual beliefs and
mourning rituals, as coping strategies, and bemoaned the absence of inhlonipho (respect) and
proper funeral practices.
For those interviewed, Zuluness was not politicized but an inherent aspect of day-to-day
life governing their actions. Whereas historian Philippe Denis found the two communities at
conflict in rural Nxamalala came to be labeled as both politically and culturally different,
interviewees in Table Mountain made no distinction in cultural practices across the political

14

Yuval-Davis, Gender & Nation, 43.

15

Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
381

divide.

16

Women saw the carrying of weapons, violent conflict, and defense as the realm of men,

but by no means envisioned Zuluness as a male construction. Women across the political divide
made assertions about the use of their cultural heritage as coping strategies and complained about
when they could not. In these conversations and claims, women shape and define what Zuluness
meant to them ngesikathi soDlame, at the time of the violence, an era usually thought of as
defined by aggressive masculinity and martial Zuluness.
This chapter will begin with a brief overview of women’s experiences of uDlame at
Table Mountain. The following sections on spiritual values and mourning rituals will then
consider the manner in which Zulu customs and beliefs were used as cultural coping strategies,
as well as the absence of Zuluness, the ways in which the women interviewed spoke about what
they were not able to do, or not able to practice. The final section tells the story of Ma Majozi,
the first wife of the late Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, whose story illustrates the ways in
which women used and experienced Zuluness.

“Sabaleka!”: Women’s Experience of uDlame in Mbambangalo
At the time of uDlame, some of the women interviewed supported Inkatha or the UDF/ANC,
though the majority claimed they had not joined either or were simply “doing what was
happening in our place.”

17

Several of them still assert no affiliation. Few of them had attended

any political party meeting or heard local or national political figures speak. None knew of any
efforts by these leaders to speak to or organize women in their area. There was then no local
branch of the Inkatha Women’s Brigade or ANC Women’s League. The calls to be mothers of
16

Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, Indians Versus Russians.

17

“Sasivumela okwenzeka endaweni.” Veronica Dlamini, interview by author and
Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo. 23 May 2011.
382

the nation by Inkatha or the ANC/UDF in speeches and literature did not reach these women.
The majority of those interviewed understood uDlame as a conflict about “politics” and
“meetings” and between two chiefs (Maphumulo and Mdluli) over land. The war “was not the
usual fight like war between izigodi… it was coming while you were not aware.”

18

The women interviewed indicated that the conflict was a male (both young and old)
domain. Most agreed “women were not supposed to fight… because they are parents… because
women know how to give birth.”

19

During the violence they felt their roles were to look after

children and cook and wash for their children and the fighters. Ma Majozi, who will be
considered in greater detail below, suggests this may have been because they were from a rural
area. “Women from rural areas, they only know this, that the only person who is supposed to
protect the home is the head of the house. It is rare to find women in rural areas having guns and
other weapons. They believe that if there is a problem a man of the house must be always in the
front.”

20

This is of course by no means universal, as several scholars have examined women’s

participation in the ANC underground, Umkhonto weSizwe, and the South African Defence
Force.

21

Few interviewees related that other women took part. Khethi Zondi believed that

18

“Kwakungasiyona impi ejwayelekile njengezimpi zezigodi…ngoba impi yayiqhamuka
ingalindelekile.” Thombi Gcabashe, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo.
January 27, 2011.
19
“Omama kwakungafanele ukuthi balwe… Ngoba bangabazali... umama uyakwazi
ukuthwala umntwana.” Nikiwe Mdlalose, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo,
March 4, 2011; See also Gcabashe interview; Khethi Zondi, interview by author and Thandeka
Majola, Imbubu, March 2, 2011; Ntombinazi Zakwe, interview by author and Thandeka Majola,
Maqongqo, March 25, 2011.
20
“Omama basemakhaya bazi ukuthi umuntu okufanele avikele ikhaya inhloko yekhaya.
Akujwayelekile ukuthi uthole omama basemakhaya benezibhamu nezinye nje izikhali. Bazi
ukuthi uma kukhona inkinga ekhaya obaba okufanele bahambe phambili. Thobekile Maphumulo,
interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Camperdown, February 8, 2011.
21
Cock, Colonels & Cadres; Suttner, “Women in the ANC-Led Underground.”
383

women who carried weapons or got involved were doing so because “they were big-headed
women” who wanted positions.

22

Doris Mbokazi set up women as only assisting. “They carried

bush knives. Their husbands were shooting and the women would come and finish you with bush
knives while you were laying down helpless.” Her daughter shared that women would also help
23

their husbands by coming out to ululate (babekikiza).

The majority of women interviewed fled the conflict (and indeed some now live in
Haniville, a township developed in the years after the violence for refugees from various warstricken communities). They laughed as they explained, “Sasibaleka!” “We were running! We
were not even able to cook because it might happen that you would leave the pot before the food
was ready.”

24

The women expressed that it was always their decision to flee. Many husbands,

fathers, and brothers were migrant laborers or were gathered in camps for both offensive and
defensive purposes. The izinduna were also fighting. So when conflict broke out, the women
took their own actions. They found refuge in camps, the nearby forests, the chief’s inkantolo or
at the local school under the protection of the police or SADF. Others fled to safer areas, staying
with family or employers, both indefinitely and permanently. This applied to not only females,
but some of their husbands and sons too. One woman joked about moving to the farm at which
her husband worked, “I was married to a coward but I prefer a coward to a fearless person

22

Khethi Zondi interview.

23

“Babephatha ocelemba, amadoda ayefike akudubule bona bafike bakuqedele
ngocelemba uma sewuwile.” Doris Mbokazi, interview by author and Thandeka Majola,
Haniville, June 16, 2011.
24
“Lapha sasibaleka ngalendlela yokuthi angeke ukwazi nokupheka ngoba
kunokwenzeka ukuthi ulishiye lingavuthiwe.” Veronica Dlamini interview.
384

because they die!”

25

Some dressed their sons up as girls so the young boys could escape with

them, rather than be called to join in the fighting.

26

Still others chose not to flee. Ntombi Ngcobo

refused to flee with her mother and sister; her brother died earlier in the conflict and she was
scared of leaving her father (who as a male was expected to stay and take part in the conflict).

27

Some of these conventional gender roles identified resonate with the conservatism
examined by Shireen Hassim in her analyses of the Inkatha Women’s Brigade. Hassim highlights
the manner in which Inkatha’s success in organizing women occurred not in spite of its
conservative, patriarchal, hierarchical, and essentialist discourse but precisely because these
constructions resonated with women’s experience.

28

While “women in the homelands were

rarely called upon as Zulus but entreated to political action on the basis of their identities as
Christians, South Africans, and the backbone of family and community life,”

29

these calls based

on Christian identities should not be interpreted as non-Zulu. Oral history interviews with rural
isiZulu-speaking women reveal their own definitions, production, and exercise of what it meant
to be Zulu.

25

“Ngangigane igwala mina kodwa lihle igwala ngoba isiqhwaga siyafa.” Florence
Ngcobo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 7, 2011.
26
Theni Ngcoya, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, May 27, 2011.
27

Ntombi Ngcobo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Imbubu, Janueary 17,

2011.
28

Shireen Hassim, “Family, Motherhood and Zulu Nationalism: The Politics of the
Inkatha Women’s Brigade,” Feminist Review 43 (1993): 1–25.
29
Waetjen, Workers and Warriors, 65.. See also Shireen Hassim, “Reinforcing
Conservatism: An Analysis of the Politics of the Inkatha Women’s Brigade,” Agenda 2 (1988):
3–16.
385

“So that the bullet won’t hit you”
One of the most prominent responses regarding how women coped and protected themselves and
their family during uDlame surrounded faith and spirituality. Whether they spoke of using
izintelezi or muthi, calling upon amadlozi, praying to Nkosi (God), or the manner in which the
conflict prevented them from practicing, women revealed the significance of their religious
beliefs as a coping and protective strategy during uDlame. This section builds upon the argument
of historian of Christianity Philippe Denis that survival and resilience during the conflict was
enabled by spiritual beliefs both African traditional and Christian, but goes further to argue that
prayers to Nkosi or Nkulunkulu should also be seen as assertions of a particular kind of Zuluness
rather than solely as religious coping strategies.
In research based on interviews with 23 men and women in the rural Nxamalala area
(Pietermaritzburg), Denis attributed the lack of resentment so soon after the violence to the
religious faith of the interviewees. Asked by fieldworkers associated with the School of Religion
and Theology of the University of KwaZulu-Natal about the role of religious beliefs in traumatic
situations, interviewees expressed a “conviction that the conflict, as painful as it might have
been, had been wanted by God.” Denis further pointed to the varying overlap of “African
traditional religion” and Christian practice. Denis found while many did normally adhere to Zulu
customs, the majority could not perform rituals to the ancestors during the violence because there
was not the time or space, or when able only simplified rituals with small attendance would be
performed.

30

30

Philippe Denis, “Prayers and Rituals to the Ancestors as Vehicles of Resilience:
Coping with Political Violence in Nxamalala, Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991),” Journal of
Theology for Southern Africa 128 (2007): 37–52.
386

Denis himself has elsewhere shown amasiko (literally translated as customs, more
commonly as culture) to be the Zulu word used most often in oral accounts for “religion” though
not in the sense “religion” is used in the western world.

31

The use of amasiko suggests that for

some Zulus, Christian beliefs had become part and parcel of being Zulu. While Hassim and
Waetjen’s interpretations of Inkatha’s Christianized discourse aimed at women suggests
Christianity as a realm outside of Zulu practices, women’s revelations about their prayers during
uDlame should be seen as claims about the particular type of Christian Zulu (amakholwa) they
saw themselves as. Some women simply responded to questions about coping strategies with the
comment, “We believe in God.”

32

Prayers became particularly important to women when their husbands were about to
leave for camp, or when they themselves were on the run, hiding in the forests or gathered for
protection by the SADF at the local school. “Every night before we went hiding and our
husbands left for their spot, we prayed.”

33

Thombi Gcabashe described nights at the school,

“Life was not good. Everyone was always complaining about the situation we were living under.

31

Philippe Denis, “African Traditional Religion and Christian Identity,” Missionalia 32,
no. 2 (2004): 177–89.
32
“Thina siyakholwa kuNkulunkulu.” Ntombikayise Madlala, interview by author and
Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 16 2011.
33
“Uma sekuhlukwana amadoda nathi sesihamba siya ezindaweni esihlala kuzona
ebusuku, sasiguqa phansi sithandaze.” Ntombinazi Zakwe interview.
387

Sometimes we would hear that somebody had passed on and we would pray hard.”

34

Nikiwe

Mdlalose also related, “We were praying to get strength for what was happening in our land.”

35

But spiritual coping strategies were not always limited to those of prayers to Nkosi. Thombi
Gcabashe related that they would pray to the amadlozi, even when they could not burn impepho
(incense). “We were praying while we were standing, we were always running. We could not
kneel down or burn incense to talk to our ancestors. We were talking to our ancestors on our way
running.”

36

Several other women spoke about the hope that they had that amakhathakhatha (lit.

household remedies) and the inyanga could protect them. Even women who did not usually call
upon inyanga related, “You would hear that so and so was helping over there and you would also
go there to protect yourself… to protect the whole family so that the bullet can’t hit you.”

37

Another woman believed in the power of a woman “with real medicine” in Nxamalala
who instructed a small group of Inkatha men to defend their area. Nompumelelo described the
attack on her neighborhood, largely affiliated to Inkatha, by several buses of ANC supporters.
One day buses of ANC people came to attack, a big crowd, people from a
different district. This woman sprinkled muthi at them, there were only five of
them. We were all watching, standing on a hill. She told them to go and fight. She
advised them that they shouldn’t look back. What they did there that day shocked
everyone. They were only five but they killed a lot of people... I am telling what
34

“Kwakungasiyona impilo emnandi ngoba wonke umuntu wayekhuluma ngesimo
esinzima esiphila ngaphansi kwaso. Ngesinye isikhathi wawuthola ukuthi sihleli lapho sicashe
khona kodwa sizwe sekuthiwa ubani useshonile, sasithandaza kakhulu ngalesosikhathi.” Tombi
Gcabashe interview.
35
“Sasibalisa uma siqeda sikhuleke ukuthi siqine kulento esibhekene nayo kanye nalento
evukele izwe lakithi.” Nikiwe Mdlalose, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo,
March 4, 2011.
36
“Sasithandaza simile ngoba sasihlale sibaleka, sasingekho nesikhathi sokuguqa phansi
noma ushise impepho ukuthi ukhulume namadlozi. Sasikhuluma namadlozi sibe sibaleka.”
Tombi Gcabashe interview.
37
APC. HC07C03. Thuleleni M., Irinah G., Thokozile T., interviews by Lindiwe Mkasi,
Inadi, September 16, 2005.
388

happened there is indescribable… They had guns and knives. I know two of them
although now they are mentally disturbed. They fought and killed and they came
back. This woman used muthi in her house before she left. They tried to burn it,
throwing a bomb at it and shooting at it, and the bullets would fall down, nothing
38
would happen. It didn’t burn; it is still there today.
Women’s discussion of the use of muthi and intelezi also reveals a gender and
generational divide. Women saw intelezi as something largely used by males and often at the
instruction of a chief prior to a conflict.

39

“I did not use muthi. We were praying,” said Nikiwe.

“My husband was not staying at home,” suggesting that had he been home their strategies may
have changed.

40

However, Busisiwe—who lived in Msinga during uDlame and whose mother

was a sangoma—related, “those who were fighting were using izintelezi for their protection. We
were also using izintelezi in our homes to sprinkle our yards [for protection].” Busisiwe
continued that though women were not supposed to fight, they were instructed to put muthi in
their hair to prevent injury to the men. “They were saying it would protect the fighters from
getting hurt…We did not do that, although our mothers were telling us to do it. We were
questioning ourselves about this. Our mothers were widows but they still believed that putting
the muthi would help us although it did not work for them.”

38

41

APC. HC07C16. Nompumelelo M. and Mirriam T., interviews by Lindiwe Mkasi,
Imbubu, September 16, 2005.
39
For example, see interviews with Bonangani Ngcobo and Florence Ngcobo in
Maqongqo on 28 February and 7 March 2011, respectively.
40
“Angizange ngiwusebenzise umuthi kuphela nje sasikhuleka. Ubaba wakwami
wayengahlali ekhaya.” Nikiwe Mdlalose interview.
41
“Laba abebesuke belwa bebesebenzisa izintelezi, nathi uma sisele emakhaya
besiyichela intelezi emagcekeni.” and “Kuyaye kuthiwe uqinisa umuntu wesilisa kodwa thina
ngesikhathi sethu asikwenzanga lokho noma omama bethu babethetha bathi kufanele sigcobe
insoyi ekhanda... kwakungumubuzo esasizibuza wona ukuthi kungani kuthiwe asiqinise amadoda
kodwa omama nabo sebehleli abasenawo amadoda afela empini kodwa, bebeyigcoba lento futhi
namanje basathi asiyigcobe kodwa nabo ingabasizanga.” Bhusisiwe Thusi, interview by author
and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 21, 2011.
389

‘We were mourning, but there was no respect’
Funeral and mourning practices were also central to women’s discussion of uDlame. The stress
of violent conflict, displacement, injury and death were one thing. But the inability to properly
mourn or bury a loved one furthered the distress, especially as mourning customs are “the means
by which the social sentiments of the survivors are slowly reorganized and adapted to the new
conditions produced by the death…”

42

Woman after woman commented on the intrusiveness of

guns, police, and soldiers and the hijacking of the services, a terrain usually covered by elders,
by the youth. Women could not wear proper attire, sit in mourning for the usual amount of time,
or even attend funerals in other areas due to the danger and politicization of territory. The people
were mourning but there was no respect for custom, thus magnifying the sense of turmoil.
Ntombi Ngcobo, who grew up and lived in KwaShange during the first outbreak of the
violence, moved to Mbambangalo when it was still known as a haven of peace. She and her
family stayed there for only two years before the unrest followed them. Inkatha burnt down their
new home and they again fled the violence. Having lost her older brother to the conflict in
KwaShange, Ntombi related the cooption of funerals:
We were mourning, but there was no respect… There were funerals, but they
were not dignified. They used to sing iziqubulo (war-related songs) and shoot
guns, because if you die by the gun at your funeral they would be shooting in the
air. Youth were taking care of the funeral. As far as I know, people who used to
43
take care of the funeral are old people, but at the time it was the youth.

42

Krige, The Social System of the Zulus, 159.

43

“Kwakuhlalwa phansi kuzilwe, kodwa kwakungenayo lenhlonipho ejwayelekile…
Nayo yayiba khona, kodwa ingenaso isizotha. Kwakuba neziqubulo, kuphinde kuqhunyiswe
izibhamu khona lapho emngcwabeni. Uma umuntu eshone ngokudutshulwa kwakuqhunyiswa
izibhamu, kwakuba umngcwabo ongenasizotha uphathwa yintsha. Ngokwazi kwethu
umngcwabo uphathwa abantu abadala, kodwa ngalesosikhathi wawuphathwa yintsha.” Ntombi
Ngcobo interview.
390

Here, Ntombi not only laments the presence of guns and war songs, she complains about the
absence of inhlonipho amongst funeral goers. She is also attesting to another aspect of uDlame
and the wider liberation struggle, the generational tensions.

44

The youth’s cooption of funerals in

contrast to the values and desires of their elders resounds with recent arguments by Thokozani
Xaba and Mxolisi Mchunu about KwaZulu-Natal’s civil war. Xaba contended that young
comrades were impatient with their more tolerant elders.

45

Mchunu locates this tension as

particularly emanating from culture change, or two different views on manhood held by youth
and elders accentuated during conflict.

46

Belinda Bozzoli argued this usurpation of “an unquestionably acceptable ceremonial
ritual” transformed funerals into “political theatre” in Alexandra township during the rebellion.

47

But whereas Bozzoli highlights the willingness of most families concerned to adopt the
redefinition of their deceased loved ones as “children of the township” and to participate in
political funerals, the women interviewed in Maqongqo and Nxamalala indicated dismay with
the directorship of the youth and the presence of soldiers, guns, and iziqubulo. “Funerals were
truly painful,” said one Nxamalala woman. “We walked on the watch just like that. We walked

44

Generational tensions within and between the movements of the era have been
examined by both Belinda Bozzoli and Ari Sitas. Bozzoli highlights the internal division
between youth and adults during the Alexandra Rebellion while Sitas shows the ways in which
the ‘comrades’ movement was more than just unemployed black youth. Bozzoli, Theatres of
Struggle and the End of Apartheid; Sitas, “The Making of the ‘Comrades’ Movement in Natal,
1985-91.”
45
Xaba, “Masculinity and Its Malcontents,” 110.
46
47

Mchunu, “Culture Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict.”
Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid, 210.
391

with weapons about us and here is the grave, you have to bury someone…Yes, funerals were an
ordeal, truly difficult.”

48

Others indicated the difficulties of mourning properly because they were constantly under
assault. These attacks included the use of guns and petrol bombs. “There was no time because
you would not know if they got into the house what they would do… If there was a funeral, we
were supposed to make it fast and leave the place before havoc starts. If a person died by a gun,
they would shoot guns at the funeral.”

49

Eunice Dladla and her family fled to the home of her

husband’s employer, a nearby farmer, because of the violence. “We could not [sit in] mourning
in our places. It was possible to get hit by petrol bombs inside the house.”

50

Women, often as

chief mourners or the company of the bereaved, are expected to withdraw from the community
and be confined to the house, a responsibility nearly impossible to fulfill when one is not safe at
home or when one is sleeping in group camps or in the forests. Bonangani Ngcobo says, “Yes,
we were mourning, but we were running with a black cloth. We used to mourn for one week but
it was no longer working accordingly. Even when your husband passed on you were not
mourning as we used to because we were always on the run.”

48

51

APC. HC07C04. Tryphina G. by Cosmos Mzizi, KwaNxamalala, March 13, 2003.
(My own translation)
49
“Sasingekho ngoba wawungazi ukuthi uma bengena endlini bazofike bakwenzeni.
Uma nisemngcwabeni kufanele kusheshiswe ukuze nihlukane kungakasuki thuthuva. Uma
umuntu oshonile ebulewe ngesibhamu kuqhunyiswa sona nasemngcwabeni wakhe noma
umkhonto.” Florence Ngcobo interview.
50
”Wawungakwazi ukwenzela kulendawo ngoba babengafike bakushaye ngebhomu
ufele endlini.” Eunice Dladla, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 7,
2011.
51
“Yebo sasikwazi, wawugijima naso isidwedwe esimnyama. Kwasekuzilwa isonto
elilodwa nje kuphela; kwakungasekhona lokhu okujwayelekile noma ushonelwe umyeni wakho
wawungazili ngendlela ejwayelekile ngoba kwakugijinywa.” Bonangani Ngcobo interview.
392

While Bonangani showed no concern about the wearing of black during mourning, others
complained that they could not wear mourning clothes because of the affiliation of particular
colors with political parties. Khethi Zondi “mourned [for my son] but at the end it was not
happening because you were judged by the dressing code and particular colors. If you wore a
black skirt, that meant you were in a particular organization… Inkatha used to wear black
52

skirts.”

Even when attempts were made to mourn according to custom, stress still accompanied
the dangers of holding the services in the midst of war. Nikiwe related the worry for her own
safety as well as the disappointment that many felt when relatives from other izigodi (sections) or
areas could not attend the funerals. “You were supposed to be brave because you had to do
things accordingly. But our relatives could not attend the funerals since the place was a no-go
area.”

53

Other women expressed concern about leaving their communities and children behind
during uDlame because of their mourning-related responsibilities. Alzina related that many
women in Nxamalala were encouraged by “the whites” to leave their areas for safer ones. But
when considering whether or not to run away, “our children cried, if you leave us, who is going
to close our eyes when we die?” When an unmarried child dies, it is the (married) mother who
serves as the “chief mourner.” It is her responsibility to close the eyes and mouth of the dead,
wash the body, and straighten the limbs in preparation for burial, as well as sit in mourning on

52

“Ngazila mina kodwa kwagcina sekungasazileki ngoba kwasekubhekwa ukuthi ufake
inzila eyimuphi umbala. Uma uzile ngesiketi esimnyama kwakuthiwa uyinhlangano ethile...
Inkatha yayifaka iziketi ezimnyama.” Khethi Zondi interview.
53
“Kwakufanele ube nesibindi nje ngoba, kwakufanele kwenziwe izinto okufanele
zenziwe kodwa izihlobo zazingasakwazi ukuza ngoba zazisaba ukuzongena.” Nikiwe Mdlalose
interview.
393

the bare floor covered in a blanket. After burial, she continues in mourning until she is ritually
released, much later than other members of the family. The passage of the deceased’s spirit is
effected through the married woman.

“We felt at home”: Ma Majozi

54

55

The account of Thobekile (Ma Majozi) Maphumulo, the first and head wife of the late Chief
Maphumulo and now the ANC mayor of Mkhambathini Municipality, illustrates several of the
themes examined above. Like many of the women of Mbambangalo, she sought refuge away
from home during the violence. She too shows Christian beliefs as part of being Zulu and the
dangers, disruption, and comfort of mourning practices after the assassination of her husband.
But unlike the others, Ma Majozi’s experience was magnified by her status as the first wife of the
chief and the mother of the heir to the Maphumulo chieftaincy. Despite positioning herself as an
educated, not necessarily “traditional” ANC stalwart, Ma Majozi’s narrative indicates the
centrality of Zulu customs in her coping strategies.
Born in Dambuza, Ma Majozi met the chief of the Maphumulo, Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo, through a friend while she was a student at Ohlange High School. They married
and she moved to Maqongqo. She could not recall the date nor year of their marriage. “I do not
remember my wedding date; what is on my mind is my husband’s death. It was 25 February
1991. His death made me forget about my wedding date.”

54

56

Ngubane, Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine, 83, 141.

55

Unless otherwise noted, this section draws upon an interview with Thobekile
Maphumulo, Camperdown, February 8, 2011.
56
“Angisalukhumbuli usuku lomshado wami, into esengqondweni yami usuku
umkhwenyana wami ahamba ngalo emhlabeni. Kwakungumhlaka 25 February 1991 iyona
394

MaMajozi remembers being welcomed into the Maphumulo family as she was and never
felt pressured to be a “Zulu woman [who] has to follow culture as old people used to.”
There was this tendency which was, if you are a Zulu women there are cultures
you have to follow, like you have to be at home and are not allowed to go to
work. Fortunately I did not have that problem, my husband was very progressive.
This means he allowed me to do anything I want, we were doing everything
together. I remember when I just came to this family; I was going to town wearing
my wig. New wives are not supposed to wear a wig in terms of Zulu culture.
[Zulu women had to put a scarf on their head to show respect.] My mother in law
used to wear isidwaba (a skin petticoat) but she told me to do what I think is good
for me. I realised that this family welcomed me for who I am and I was living a
good life in my marriage though it was a rural area but I did not feel that.
Normally people say a Zulu woman has to follow culture as old people used to do
57
but I did not engage myself in that situation.
Ma Majozi and the late chief had four children (one deceased), including the current
chief, Nhlakanipho. Despite her less than “rural” ways, she still believed in instilling her children
with inhlonipho and ensuring they knew “their roots” and other aspects of Zulu culture. Raised
as a Lutheran, she began to also follow the practices of the amaNazaretha Church (an Africaninitiated church that molds elements of Zulu religious beliefs with Christian theology) when she
married into the Maphumulo family, though not as faithfully as her in-laws. Ma Majozi worked
for an NGO, the Community Care Centre of the Trust for Christian Outreach and Education, and
ngampela engiyikhumbulayo, okuchaza ukuthi ukushona kumkhwenyana wami kwavala nosuku
lomshado ngoba ngampela angisalukhumbuli.”
57
“Mina ngingathi nje bekunalento yokuthi uma ungumama womZulu, kukhona
lamasiko okufanele uwagcine njengokuthi; kufanele ube sekhishini ungayi emsebenzini. Kodwa
mina angizange ngihlangabezane naleyonkinga ngoba, umkhwenyana wami he was very much
progressive, ngaleyondlela umkhwenyana wami wayehleli evule izandla. Uma uthi kukhona
okufanele kwenziwe wayenganqabi yonke into sasiyenza ndawonye. Ngikhumbula ngolunye
usuku ngisafika, ngiya edolobheni ngifake iwigi ekhanda kanti omakoti basemakhaya
bayathwala emakhanda. Umamezala wami wayegqoka isidwaba kodwa, wayethi kimina angenze
lokho okuzwana nami. Ngabona ukuthi lapha kulelikhaya ngiphatheke kahle, ngemukelwa
njengoba nginjalo. Impilo yami kuleliyakhaya yayimnandi kakhulu, noma kwakuyindawo
yasemakhaya kodwa angizange ngikuzwe kakhulu lokho. Isikhathi esiningi kuthiwa umama
womZulu kufanele enze amasiko njengoba abadala babenza kuqala. Ngenhlanhla angizange
ngihlangabezane nalesosimo.”
395

traveled often. During the first outbreak of violence in Maqongqo in 1990, she was at a
conference in Holland and came home to find refugees from the violence camped at her
husband’s inkantolo and their umuzi. Because of attacks on the chief’s umuzi, her mother-in-law
convinced her to take her youngest child (the other two were at boarding school) to stay with her
family in Dambuza. On the very day she left for Dambuza, her home within the umuzi was burnt
to the ground. Within a year of her fleeing, her husband was assassinated outside of the city
home he rented.
In the passages below, Ma Majozi describes the burial of her husband who had become
deeply loved by his supporters and hated by his enemies. Her account highlights the presence of
police, the disruption of food preparation associated with a funeral, the (in this instance, quite
brave) slaughtering of a cow, and the significance of the land of your father. It also indicates the
comfort she found in his rural burial.
When asked about mourning and funerals during uDlame, MaMajozi immediately spoke
of the burial of her husband at their umuzi in Maqongqo. She originally did not mention the mass
political funeral held for him by the UDF at Wadley Stadium in Edendale.

58

This seemed

particularly interesting given her assertion that she and her Dambuza family had always been
ANC activists and her current position as an ANC politician, but when I brought up the subject
in a follow-up meeting she explained that there are many things she forgot. Due to the stress of
losing her husband, she said she often needed to be reminded of things that happened, that she
“was not normal at that time.” That she recalled Mhlabunzima’s burial suggests that which
comforted her most was his final burial rather than the political service.

58

I was, at the time of the first interview, unaware of the mass political funeral for the

late chief.
396

59

An estimated 7,000-25,000

youth to join Umkhonto weSizwe.

attended his funeral in Edendale where the ANC called on

60

His funeral program read, “Pick up his spear!”

61

As

Bozzoli has shown of mass political funerals in Alexandra township, Chief Maphumulo’s funeral
was utilized to promote a canonical national liberation discourse. While the politicians speaking
adopted a discourse of peace and human rights, implicit was the apocalyptic vision of the ANC
that time was running out for problems to be solved peacefully.

62

At Maphumulo’s funeral, this

discourse was led by his friend, the fiery Harry Gwala—who took ‘sarcastic swipes’ at the
police—and Peter Mokaba—who exhorted the “young lions” and boasted that “if we cannot win
liberation at the negotiating table, then we will win it through the barrel of the gun.” Blade
Nzimande tied this discourse to Maphumulo, saying the chief “laid down his life so as to attain
the aims of the Freedom Charter. Those of us who continues to live must fight on with his
spear…”

63

Here, the funeral organizers and speakers sought the mobilizing potential of a public

funeral, overpowering the sense of a person lost and certainly impacting the family’s ability to
mourn.
After the proceedings in Edendale, Ma Majozi and two other wives were part of a parade
of police, cars, and buses that met an Inkatha crowd at the Maqongqo shop en route to the

59

7 000 according to police, 25 000 according to the ANC. Martin Williams, “Fair play:
reporters under threat” Daily News March 11, 1991; “ANC denies journalists were intimidated at
funeral,” Natal Witness March 14, 1991.
60
Sonya Schoeman, “MK call to arms at chief’s funeral” Natal Witness March 11, 1991.
61
62
63

Fraser Mtshali, “‘Pick up his spear!’’ New African March 14, 1991.
Bozzoli, 225.
Mtshali, “Pick up his spear!”
397

Maphumulo umuzi where the late chief was to be buried.

64

The crowd watched the motorcade,

singing Inkatha songs. Because of this political intimidation and the potential for violence, police
presence dominated burials during this era. Here, Ma Majozi related her husband’s burial to that
of most deceased. “There are people who got buried in their yards because they had to call the
police to police the burial. Police stayed until the funeral finished before they left. My husband’s
funeral, we did the very same thing.” While police willingness to guard the burials at people’s
homes dictated the practice according to Ma Majozi, Maqongqo had no cemetery so most were
buried within their homesteads, as is also custom.

65

Ma Majozi continued to describe the burial:

We were escorted by the police all the way from town to Maqongqo. Even people
who were digging the grave were under the police surveillance. We did not even
cook at Maqongqo because we did not know what was going to happen. We
carried parcels prepared in town for the people. The izinduna that we had at the
time sympathized with us because when we arrived home we found they already
slaughtered the cow and it was boiling in the pots. We felt at home yet we were
no longer living there. Those izinduna were the ones who said they were not
going to leave this land, because the children will not know their place of origin.
66
They felt that if they leave the land they will lose it. They took a stand.
While the police presence was certainly an intrusion, here it also allowed the burial to
take place without Inkatha interference. Several other women attributed a lack of problems at
64

Lakela Kaunda, “Maphumulo’s burial marked by tension,” Natal Witness Echo March

14, 1991.
65

Ngubane, Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine, 84.

66

“Ngingathi nje kukhona amathuna abantu asemagcekeni ngoba kwakufanele kubizwe
amaphoyisa ukuthi azogada umngcwabo. Amaphoyisa ayehlala kuze kube kuqedwa yonke into
kuyima behamba. Njengomyeni wami washonela lapha edolobheni sasigadwe amaphoyisa yonke
indlela, ngoba nabantu ababemba ekhaya babegadwe amaphoyisa, kangangokuba akuzange
kuphekwe ekhaya eMaqongqo ngoba kungaziwa ukuthi kuzokwenzakala kanjani. Abantu
benzelwa amaphakethe okudla edolobheni sasesihamba nawo. Kodwa izinduna ezazikhona
ngalesosikhathi ngaphakathi futhi ezazizwelana nathi, safika sekuhlatshwe nenkomo khona
ekuseni kwabekwa amabhodwe. Sazibona sengathi impela sesihlala khona kanti asihlali khona,
konke lokho kwakweziwe izinduna lezi engithi zathi angeke zihambe endaweni ngoba izingane
angeke zayazi imvelaphi yazo. Nokuthi uma kungabe beshiya lendawo bazoyiluza, bakwazi
ukuthi baphumele obala ngokwenza konke lokho.”
398

funerals to the presence of the police and soldiers. “Soldiers used to come to that house [of a
family who had lost a member] to protect us until the funeral. After the funeral service, we
would go to our own homes and the soldiers would leave.”

67

The danger of returning to Maqongqo without the police prompted Ma Majozi and other
family members to prepare food parcels to carry with them for those digging the grave and other
funeral goers as necessitated by amasiko. But Ma Majozi was relieved that upon arrival in
Maqongqo she found izinduna brave enough to slaughter a cow, despite the threats of the Inkatha
followers nearby—a ritual significant for a head of umuzi and chief such as the late
Maphumulo.

68

Ma Majozi’s testimony also reveals the added stresses of being the mother of the heir to
the Maphumulo ubukhosi. When it came time for her son to take up his position as chief, Ma
Majozi hesitated to return to Mbambangalo because of the devastation she had experienced.
…My house burnt down and I lost everything… It is very hard to go back where
you think you passed that route and you wanted to move to other things. But
circumstances forced you to go back and start from the beginning. After losing all
your material and also losing the man who you rely on, all of those things were
hurting me in a way that, at the time I even lost weight in such a way that I could
not recognize myself. While I was a deputy mayor and even now I am a mayor,
people were always saying, I look like I am a cruel person. Then I say to them,
no, it is just that I am hurting inside. And they ask me why do I not forget the
69
past? Then I said it is not easy to let go of something which pulled me back…
67

“Kwakuba khona amasosha sihlale siqashwe iwona, silale ke kulowomuzi isonto lonke
silinde usuku lomngcwabo. Emva komngcwabo sesihamba ke siye ezindaweni zethu, uma nathi
sesihlukene namasosha ayahamba.” Ntombinaze Zakwe interview.
68
Ngubane, Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine, 84.
69

“ Into njena yokuqala engingayisho ukuthi, impi ingithintile ngokuthi ngishelwe
ikhona konke enginakho... Ukuqala phansi ngesikhathi sengibona ukuthi sengisebenze
kangakanani, futhi usafuna ukudlulela uyokwenza okunye. Kodwa kwafanele ukuthi ngiqale
phansi. Khona lapho usashiselwe izimpahla zakho, bese kuthi nalendoda ebenibonisana nayo
isiyashona. Konke nje lokho kwangivuvukalisa ikhanda ngalendlela, kangangokuba
ngalesosikhathi ngancipha ngalendlela yokuthi ngangithuka ukuthi kwakusayimina ngampela
399

But ultimately, Ma Majozi chose to return on account of Zulu customs and life that she
did not want her children to lose. So when Nhlakanipho finished his schooling and married, and
ibamba Baningi Maphumulo called for the family’s return, she acquiesced.
I think I have only been back in Maqongqo for three years from the violence
period. I told myself that I have to go back home to Maqongqo because my
children will grow up not knowing their roots and they will lose the culture. Also
their relatives, they will never know them. Some of the extended family stayed
behind for the sake of keeping the land, and they say they would be members of
the organisation that we were suppose to join. They also said the reason for them
to stay behind was that they wanted Nhlakanipho to take his father’s position
70
when he was of age. That was my reason to go back to Maqongqo.

Conclusion
Ma Majozi’s narrative is by no means entirely representative of women’s experience of the
violence because of her marriage to not only a chief but a prominent political leader. She is
comparatively well-educated and proud of her ability to not entirely conform as “women used
to” with Zulu cultural practices. But still her interview is replete with the ways in which she
relied upon Zulu custom to cope and help her make decisions about her family’s future. It
resonates with the interviews of women from Mbambangalo examined above. While the
dominant images of uDlame focus on Zulu martial masculinity and women as victims, this
yini lowayana. Yonke lento yenza ukuthi isithombe salento eyayenzeka singapheli kalula,
kangangokuba ngisho ngisewu Deputy Mayor namanje noma ngiyi Mayor. Abantu baze basho
ukuthi kungathi nginenhliziyo embi bese ngithi cha anginayo inhliziyo embi ngenziwa
ubuhlungu benhliziyo. Bangibuze ukuthi kungani ngingakhohlwa? Ngithi angikwazi ukuthi
ngikhohlwe ngoba yonke lento yangihlehlisela emuva.”
70
“Ngicabanga ukuthi ngineminyaka emithathu ngibuyelile eMaqongqo. Ngazitshela
ukuthi kufanele ngibuye ekhaya ngoba abantwana bami abazoyazi imvelaphi yabo, futhi
bazoluza ububona njengamasiko noma bagcine beluze nezihlobo zabo ezikhona lapha endaweni.
Ngoba bekuzohamba sigcine singasakwazi ukuhambelana, ngoba abanye basala bathi bazoba
iyona lenhlangano okufunakala ukuthi sibe iyona. Ngoba noma sihleli kodwa asihleli ngoba
sithanda, sihleli ngoba sifuna ukuthi ngelinye ilanga ingane ikhule ibuye izothatha isikhundla
sikababa wayo. Kwaba iyona indlela engabuyela ngayo ekhaya.”
400

analysis indicates the ways in which rural isiZulu-speaking women utilized their culture as
coping strategies and made claims on what it meant to be Zulu during this time of turmoil
through their complaints on what they were not able to practice. Those who saw themselves as
Zulu Christians, amakholwa, called upon Nkosi in their prayers. Others prayed to the amadlozi,
even when they were unable to do so properly by burning impepho, or believed in the powers of
sangoma and inyanga to protect, “so that the bullet can’t hit you.” They sought comfort in the
Zulu mourning practices and complained about the presence of guns and police and the lack of
inhlonipho by the youth at funerals, as well as their inability to wear proper mourning attire and
sit in seclusion for the appropriate periods of time. In these discourses, women assert what it
meant to them to be Zulu during an era of unprecedented turmoil.

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Conclusion
This story of persistent tensions between the neighboring Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms
illustrates the local nature of uDlame during South Africa’s transition to democracy, an era of
painful, divisive warfare often overlooked by contemporary historical work and much of postapartheid public history. My examination of more than a century of conflict in Table Mountain,
KwaZulu-Natal casts new light on the disjuncture between local understandings of the political
violence and the explanation of a Third Force-fomented national struggle between the ANC and
Inkatha for political power often advanced by journalists, social scientists, and the post-apartheid
state. The parties in Table Mountain fought less because of Inkatha or ANC/UDF ideological
affinity and organizational loyalty, and more over historically contested land and fiercely
debated and socially defined meanings of authority and membership in their chiefdoms—issues
hotly disputed today.
As I write this, South Africa’s 18-year old democratic government debates a Traditional
Courts Bill, legislation proposing to grant legal power to chiefs’ courts. The position of
traditional authorities in the new South Africa was just one of the concerns of Chief
Mhlabunzima Maphumulo as he consulted with the ANC in Lusaka and of the Zulu traditional
leaders aligned with the Inkatha movement that promised to defend their power as chiefs. Those
who support the current bill argue that the affordable, familiar legal process in rural areas
promotes “Afrocentric values” within the bounds of the Constitution. Some people strongly
support the system out of deep disillusionment with South Africa’s democracy and its

402

1

institutions.

But the bill also sparks serious concerns about the regression of hard-won

constitutional rights, particularly for women and sexual minorities, and the entrenchment of
practices developed under white minority rule. The bill is widely recognized as an effort by the
ANC to ensure polling support from rural leaders.
Amidst this unfolding debate, historian Jeff Guy wrote about the challenges of
restructuring this bill to recognize both its intention and human rights and equality. As historians
do, Guy calls attention to the historicity of the key concepts at the heart of the bill – custom and
tradition. While systems of customary law used features of pre-colonial African law, they also
exploited them. The chiefs who implemented customary law were often colonial appointees –
such as several of those we met here in this dissertation amongst the Qamu, Gcumisa, and
Maphumulo – or were manipulated in the services of colonialism, segregation, and apartheid.
Attempts to portray traditional leaders and customary law as tenants of a pre-conquest African
past ignore the 350 years of contact with the greater world since the Dutch East India Company
first arrived in southern Africa.

2

It is this same conundrum in which South Africa’s Cooperative Governance and
Traditional Affairs (COGTA) authorities find themselves at Table Mountain. Much has changed
there, but the land continues to be disputed. After a ten-year reign that began with Inkosi
Mhlabunzima’s death, Ibamba Baningi Maphumulo asked Mhlabunzima’s son and heir to return
to Mbambangalo and accept his position. In 2004, Nhlakanipho Maphumulo became the then
youngest chief in KwaZulu-Natal. In the 2006 local elections, his mother, the first wife of the
late Mhlabunzima, became the ANC mayor of the Mkhambathini District Municipality under
1

Lydia Polgreen, “South Africa debates law to support tribal courts,” New York Times
June 16, 2012.
2
Jeff Guy, “A chief rules by people power,” Mail & Guardian June 14, 2012.
403

which the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms fall. In KwaNyavu, a regent governed after the
death of Bangubukhosi Mdluli until Inkosi Siphosiki Mdluli came of age. One young man from
Mbambangalo who had been sentenced to jail for his role in the 1993 Nkanyezini massacre
applied for amnesty at the TRC. Upon his release, he initiated a University of KwaZulu-Natalsponsored peace program in Maqongqo to show his remorse and facilitate reconciliation in the
community. Some who had fled during the violence returned to Mbambangalo and rebuilt their
homes (on new sites, if they found theirs already occupied). But many others did not and now
live across KwaZulu-Natal, including in the newly constructed township Haniville (named after
MK leader Chris Hani) on Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo Road between the city and Table
Mountain. Some people had hoped to return, but found their sites occupied. Others did not want
to return. Still others, who had never before lived in Mbambangalo, moved into the region
because of the availability of land.
As I was leaving South Africa in August 2011, COGTA officials had plans to visit the
still-disputed portion of Goedverwachting. One official admitted the dilemma. The Nyavu claim
that the land had been theirs prior to the arrival of Europeans to the region now known as
KwaZulu-Natal. But in the intervening century, successive governments established and
consistently recognized the Maphumulo chiefdom. To grant jurisdiction of the Goedverwachting
farm to the Nyavu would recognize a historical claim to the land that ignores all that has
happened in the region during the last century. To turn the land over to the Maphumulo would be
to prioritize colonial, segregation, and apartheid understandings of land and community
membership. How could officials grant jurisdiction to one, the other, or both, in a way that
acknowledges this complicated past? How can they establish a boundary when people claiming
allegiance to both the Nyavu and Maphumulo dot the contested land? In seeking to define the

404

jurisdiction of the farm, COGTA officials continue to prioritize the territorially-bound authority
first implemented in South Africa under indirect rule. But that an official expressed concern that
a boundary could not be drawn down the middle because of the scattering of Maphumulo and
Nyavu followers suggests that at least this government representative recognizes the continued
existence of personal allegiance as means of membership in a chiefdom.
As can be seen in this dissertation, land and chiefly authority were at the heart of conflict
between the Nyavu and Maphumulo chiefdoms when uDlame broke out in Table Mountain in
1990. I locate the origins of the conflict between the Nyavu and Maphumulo in the colonial
practice of indirect rule, including the creation of African land reserves, boundaries, and
“government tribes.” The establishment of new chiefdoms and the implementation of territorially
bounded authority transformed the relationship between chiefs and their subjects from one based
on personal connections to landed boundaries. The Nyavu chiefs sought to bolster their authority
by calling upon their hereditary status through relentless claims to the land by contesting their
boundaries with the newly appointed chiefs of the Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo. Izimpi
zemibango between the chiefdoms took the form of disputes not only over this land, but over the
legitimacy of the newly appointed chiefs. The Nyavu chiefs recited their oral tradition to tie
themselves to the land and repeatedly attempted to delegitimize the appointment of their new
neighbors with stories about new chiefdoms as ipheshini (pension) given as rewards for service
to the white government.
Tensions between the chiefdoms continued, particularly as South African Native
Administration officials sought to purchase white-owned farms that neighbored Inanda Location
for the relocation of Maphumulo from a site to be excised for the construction of the Nagle Dam.
In 1940, the South African Native Trust purchased Onverwacht and a portion of Aasvogel Krans

405

to these ends. Betterment plans designed to lengthen the agricultural life of the farms made it
clear this land could not sustain the numbers of Maphumulo scheduled for relocation. The Trust
turned to buy Goedverwachting, but when it became known the white farmers were willing to
sell, the Nyavu chief too attempted to acquire the farm. Rebuffed, Chief Ngangezwe asked the
Native Administration Department that his people be allowed to settle on the land where their
ancestors had lived. The Trust purchased a large portion Goedverwachting in 1948, the same
year in which the National Party won the election with the promise of apartheid.
The Trust’s piecemeal acquisition of the neighboring farms heightened tensions between
the chiefdoms under apartheid. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 made provision for three
levels of administration for Africans at the local, regional, and territorial levels and legalized the
boundaries of chiefdoms, or “tribal authorities.” When the Maphumulo and Nyavu tribal
authorities were established in 1957, a one-thousand acre strip of Goedverwachting still owned
by white farmers cut through the Maphumulo chiefdom and bordered the Nyavu, setting the
stage for uDlame.
When the Trust finally purchased this band of Goedverwachting (in portions, 1961, 1968,
and 1984), there was no shortage of designs for this valuable farm land. Government officials
initially planned for the land to become a “bantu village” for the relocation of people from the
crowded Inanda Location and trust-owned farms. But forced removals across KwaZulu-Natal
that accompanied the eradication of so-called “black spots” and the consolidation of land for the
KwaZulu bantustan (the highest level of the Bantu Authorities system) compelled apartheid
officials to use the farm as a closer settlement where they could relocate people forcibly
removed. The settlement of non-members of the Maphumulo to the land dividing his chiefdom
concerned Chief Mhlabunzima as he sought permission for the new Goedverwachting residents

406

to khonza him. The Chiefs Maphumulo and Mdluli both desired the land for the natural
expansion of people in the region and attempted to utilize the KwaZulu government to gain
jurisdiction there. KwaZulu recognized the land as a potential piece for consolidation.
When uDlame broke out across KwaZulu-Natal in the late 1980s, Chief Maphumulo
began to welcome refugees of all political persuasions from the conflict onto this historically
contested piece of land with the provision that they khonza him. Maphumulo considered these
new residents to be members of his chiefdom. He proclaimed, “Because my people are in the
MDM, I have to be with them” and devoted himself to anti-apartheid efforts such as Contralesa.

3

Maphumulo’s actions sparked the ire of the neighboring Nyavu, the Zulu ethnic national
movement Inkatha, and people within his chiefdom. Individuals among the Maphumulo
dissatisfied with Chief Mhlabunzima’s authority contested his definition of membership and
allied with the pro-Inkatha Nyavu who capitalized upon the national struggle for political power
between the ANC, Inkatha, and the dying apartheid government to invade Mbambangalo and
stake claim to historically contested land.
The dissertation also builds on the earlier concerns of African historians about the
significance of land for chiefly legitimacy and the contradiction between democratic consent of
the governed and African cultural sanction for hereditary leadership. While some scholars have
pointed to the colonial imposition of chiefly control over communal land as an explanation for
the continued importance of traditional leadership in a democratic South Africa, this study points
to other claims to authority. The Nyavu chiefs made claims on land to provide a needed resource
for their people, but also as a means of bolstering a particular kind of chiefly authority—their
hereditary descent—and delegitimizing their appointed neighbors. The Nyavu leaders’ claims on

3

Maphumulo, “Interview with Chief Maphumulo,” Sechaba (1990), 8.
407

the earth in which their ancestors were buried illustrate the political and social worth of land to
not only the chiefs but also their people.
The colonial government sought to transform the relationship between chiefs and their
subjects from one based on personal relations to one based on land, but they did not eliminate the
mutually beneficial social contract of khonza that held chiefs responsible. Chief Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo, the fourth chief of a “government tribe,” continued to rely upon the personal
relations of khonza as he welcomed followers into his chiefdom. He sought to provide land,
water, economic development, and employment for his people. In the midst of a regional civil
war, he promoted peace and attempted to provide security. Attention to the practice of khonza
shows how Zulu chiefs could gain and maintain legitimacy based on consent of their subjects.
The dissertation also challenges common understandings of Zulu chiefs and Inkatha
supporters as apartheid collaborators, as well as the persistent binaries of collaboration and
resistance, warlord and freedom fighter, government stooge and progressive chief. The actions of
these Table Mountain Nyavu and Maphumulo chiefs illustrate a range of methods and tactics that
do not easily fit into neat dichotomous categories. Under indirect rule, both hereditary and
colonial chiefs such as Nomsimekwana and Ngangezwe Mdluli and Maguzu Maphumulo sought
to use the Native Administration Department not only to bolster their authority, but also to
ensure their people’s right to land. Nomsimekwana and Ngangezwe made frequent claims on
contested territory and attempted to delegitimize their appointed counterparts through statements
to NAD officials. During the segregation era, government investigations into izimpi zemibongo
between the chiefdoms provided the Nyavu chiefs with an opportunity to defend their hereditary
status and gain access to disputed land for their people.

408

Under apartheid, chiefly cooperation and resistance to Bantu Authorities was not as clear
cut as previously argued. Chiefs and izinduna were aware of the potential for deposal and thus
took actions to ensure their survival. The Nyavu and Maphumulo chiefs agreed to the
establishment of tribal authorities in their region but did little afterword to suggest either
collaboration or open resistance. The minutes of meetings in which these traditional leaders
agree to the bantu authorities system suggest that they were tempted by the promise of education,
roads, and development for their chiefdoms—motivations in keeping with the social contract
created through khonza. The leaders often refused to implement apartheid betterment planning
regulations, thus making enemies out of the Bantu Administration African rangers (such as
Mafakadolo who was attacked in Mbambangalo) employed to ensure compliance.
Bangubukhosi Mdluli walked a fine line between the resistance of his people and the
expectations of the government, employing delay tactics to appease his followers without
earning the ire of apartheid officials.
An examination of local Table Mountain political figures and Chief Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo during uDlame reveals the range of survival and accommodation strategies
employed by traditional leaders and their supporters. Maphumulo shifted from royalist Zulu
politician to neutral chief and finally to ANC strongman on the both the local and national levels.
His mission shifted, first fighting for peace and then for land and the end of apartheid. He
employed a variety of weapons, ranging from a commission of inquiry into the violence to more
militaristic language and the recruitment of youth for self-defense, to ensure not only his own
survival but material resources and security for his people.
While there is no shortage of source material on colonial, segregation, and apartheid era
manipulation of chiefly authority and uDlame, ranging from government documents and

409

violence monitoring reports to the highly attentive press, oral sources enabled me to convey the
complexity of not only the transition-era violence but the changing relationship between chiefs
and their followers and the reasons people go to war. Although the political contest between the
dying apartheid state, Inkatha, and the ANC helped to shape the violence in Table Mountain, the
causes of conflict were local. The pro-Inkatha Nyavu and their allies within the Maphumulo
sought to use the national struggle to decide the local century-old land conflict and depose Chief
Mhlabunzima. The nostalgia of the Maphumulo for their late leader highlights multiple forms of
chiefly authority based on a social contract that held him responsible for land and resource
allocation and the provision of security. These memories, even if selectively remembered, point
to alternative kinds of chiefly legitimacy that are desired by people in a country struggling to
reconcile traditional authority with democracy, by people who complain about skyrocketing site
fees, and the challenges of returning to the area from where they fled during uDlame. It is these
historical origins of the conflict and the alternative forms of chiefly legitimacy that need to be
considered as South Africa and other African countries seek land reform and administrative
policies that reconcile traditional leadership with democratic values.

410

BIBLIOGRAPHY

411

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412

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413

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Ngcobo, Thombi Mavis. June 13, 2011. Mbambangalo.
Ngcoya, Theni Florence. May 27, 2011. Haniville.
Ngidi, B.N. May 5, 2011. Edendale.
Ngubane, Phyllis. May 26, 2011. Mbambangalo.
Ntshangase, Ndlela. April 15, 2011. Pietermaritzburg.
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