

“ONLY THE FOURTH CHIEF”: CONFLICT, LAND, AND CHIEFLY AUTHORITY IN
20TH CENTURY KWAZULU-NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA

By

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ABSTRACT

“ONLY THE FOURTH CHIEF”: CONFLICT, LAND, AND CHIEFLY AUTHORITY IN 20TH CENTURY KWAZULU-NATAL, SOUTH AFRICA

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This dissertation examines the local nature of South Africa’s transition-era political violence (known in isiZulu as *uDlame*). While common explanations for the conflict focus on the struggle for political legitimacy between the rural and traditionalist Zulu ethnic nationalist movement Inkatha and the young and urban African National Congress (ANC), I argue that for the individuals and communities involved, politics were local. For the peri-urban Nyavu and Maphumulo chiefdoms in the Table Mountain region outside of Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, these larger struggles were embedded in a century-old debate over land and what it meant for a chief to be legitimate. Drawing on a rich combination of written and oral sources, the dissertation examines the role of colonial and apartheid governments in the appointment and succession of Zulu chiefs, the engendering of debates over legitimacy and chiefly authority, boundary conflicts, “faction fights,” and competing claims on land.

In the Table Mountain region, the Nyavu, whose chiefdom predated the rise of the Zulu state under Shaka, made land claims based on their hereditary status against the chiefdoms established in the area by the British such as the Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo (chapter one). The construction of a dam during the segregation era and the establishment of Tribal Authorities and bantustans under apartheid exacerbated these contests over access to land and political legitimacy (chapter two). The rise of the ethnic nationalist movement Inkatha in the KwaZulu bantustan, forced relocations, and an increasing population meant many parties competed over scarce land in the Table Mountain region (chapter three).

As political violence erupted across KwaZulu-Natal and in the Gauteng townships during the late 1980s, the Table Mountain region initially remained a haven of peace under the “peace chief” Mhlabunzima Maphumulo of the Maphumulo chiefdom. In offering himself as peacemaker and protector, Chief Mhlabunzima attracted new Maphumulo members onto the contested land, sparking the deadly transition-era violence with the neighboring Nyavu (chapter four). Maphumulo’s actions also caused a rift within his chiefdom (chapter five). Local actors used both the national and local contest between Inkatha and the ANC as an opportunity to decide the land dispute through violence. The final chapter (six) turns away from the male-dominated experience of the violence to analyze how women’s discussions about it reveal both their claims on ethnicity and uses of Zulu culture as a coping mechanism.

The historiographical significance of these findings is threefold. First, my dissertation builds on earlier concerns of African historians about the importance of land for chiefly legitimacy, but goes beyond them by examining other claims to authority, such as hereditary descent, resource allocation, and security and protection during conflict. Second, after the advent of democracy, historical research and public history in South Africa has emphasized commemorative liberation history that tends to overlook the relatively recent painful, divisive years of warfare that almost scuttled the 1994 elections. Third, my study has relevancy in contemporary South African and African human rights debates over state/peasant relations and the role of chiefs and land reform in postcolonial African politics and democracy.

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For interpretation of the references to color in maps, the reader is referred to the electronic version of this dissertation.

NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY AND TRANSLATION

South African racial and ethnic terminology, morphology, and place names have changed over time and in some cases are still open to debate. Terms such as “bantu,” “native,” “non-European,” and “non-white” were deployed by segregation and apartheid laws and thus are used here only in historically specific contexts or when in quotes from oral and written sources. “African,” “white,” “Coloured,” and “Indian” are also problematic because they reflect apartheid racial constructs that were wielded as instruments of surveillance and control. Classification informed every aspect of a person’s life. Despite the repeal of the Population Registration Act that bureaucratized these notions, racial categories still remain the norm for identification of social actors and hold lingering salience within social consciousness.¹ Here, I follow this identifying norm. African refers largely to Nguni and Sotho-Tswana speaking people while “black” refers to all people of color as Black Consciousness activists used it.

Even the label “Zulu” can be contested. As we will see in chapter one, Natal’s Africans have not always embraced Zulu identity. Only in the early 20th century did a diverse group of Natal Africans begin to mobilize around Zuluness in the face of increasing discrimination and repression.² Today, the term holds common currency to refer to isiZulu-speaking peoples. It is widely accepted as real by many while others promote alternative identities from their clan histories.

¹ For more on this topic, see Deborah Posel, “Race as Common Sense: Racial Classification in Twentieth-Century South Africa,” *African Studies Review* 44, no. 2 (2001): 87–113.

² See John Wright, “Reflections on the Politics of Being ‘Zulu,’” in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present*, ed. Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), 35–43.

Similarly, the use of isiZulu words versus their English “equivalents” is a matter of concern. The English appellation “chief” is increasingly objected to because it reflects the colonial understandings of traditional authority and the isiZulu term *inkosi* is preferred (similarly *ubukhosi* for chieftaincy, *isizwe* for chiefdom). I respect this preference but am faced with both theoretical and practical issues. What of the colonially appointed leaders? Can and should “*inkosi*” be used for both the hereditary and appointed figures? While perhaps distinguishing between the two for the colonial period is historically accurate, should the distinction be made for other periods in this study, including the contemporary context? Labeling the hereditary as “*inkosi*” and the appointed as “chief” disregards the legitimacy many leaders who descend from appointed officials acquired amongst their people over the years and ignores the fact that many traditional leaders popularly associated with hereditary status were appointed by Shaka. I thus use chief and chiefdom across the board with the qualification that no disrespect for preference is intended. I do, however, in the fifth chapter, employ *isizwe* as the analytical term more appropriate for understanding the non-static nature of the chiefdom. *Induna* is kept throughout as a more precise term for the local leaders of the chiefdoms. Except when quoting a primary source, I use modern orthography for isiZulu words.

I also employ *udlame* as the isiZulu description of the violence. There has been a semantic shift in the meaning of the word and many older dictionaries do not translate the word as “violence.”³ While many isiZulu-speakers recall using *udlame* to mean “violence” for all of their lives, dictionaries did not reflect this definition until 2010. Early dictionaries translate the word only as “framework of hut” or “main hut rafter.”⁴ One 1992 dictionary gives two

³ Thanks to Adrian Koopman and Sifiso Ndlovu for correspondence on the subject of translating *udlame*.

⁴ See Clement M Doke and B. W Vilakazi, *Zulu-English Dictionary* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1964), 153; *Scholar’s Zulu Dictionary: English-Zulu, Zulu-English*, Third ed. (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1995), 333; *English-Zulu, Zulu-English Dictionary*, 1st combined ed. (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1990), 153.

meanings, “*izintingo zexhiba sezimizwe zahlanganiswa*” (the rafters of a hut), and appropriate here, “*ukusebenzisa amandla nobudlova ekuphumeleliseni inhloso ethile, indlovuyangena*” (the use of savagery in achieving aims).⁵ The latter clearly reflects the now widely accepted translation of “violence,” as suggested in “*indlovuyangena*” (literally, “an elephant has entered,” or “violence, forceful actions, high-handedness, hooliganism”).⁶ Only in 2010 does a dictionary translate it as “violence” and omit any reference to the hut rafters.⁷ William Beinart attributed the coinage of *udlame* to Radio Zulu.⁸ I chose to use *uDlame* not only because of its use by informants, but because I believe the second 1992 definition best connotes the severity of the violence experienced between 1987 and 1994, not only on account of the “savagery” but also the resultant chaos, such as that which might result from an elephant storming through one’s home.

For the chiefdoms under examination, there are the many morphological changes possible for their *izibongo* (clan names).⁹ The *izibongo* of the main subjects of this dissertation, the Maphumulo and Nyavu, can occur in many forms. One member of the Maphumulo, is uMaphumulo. The clan members are the abaMaphumulo. AbakwaMaphumulo can also be used for all clan members, but more often means those of the Maphumulo house (the chiefly line). Colloquially acceptable is amaMaphumulo. However, given the diversity across chiefdoms and in order not to break up the flow of writing with all of these prefixes, I opt to use the simpler English of clan root only—the Maphumulo.

This morphology is similar for the other chiefdoms discussed here, but special note should be taken regarding the people of KwaNyavu. In 1924, when the “register of tribes” was redone by the Pietermaritzburg Magistrate, Chief Ngangezwe Mdluli noted his desire the clan be

⁵ C. L. Sibusiso Nyembezi, *AZ: Isichazimazwi Sanamuhla Nangomuso*, 1st ed (Pietermaritzburg: Reach Out Publishers, 1992).

⁶ *English-Zulu, Zulu-English Dictionary*, 160.

⁷ Gilles-Maurice De Schryver, ed., *Isichazamazwi Sesikole Esinezilimi Ezimbili: IsiZulu-nesiNgisi: Esishicilelwe Abakwa-Oxford (Oxford Bilingual School Dictionary: Zulu and English)* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa, 2010).

⁸ Beinart also suspects the root is related to the root of *indlavini*, used in Pondoland for an assertive male association of the 1930s. William Beinart, “Introduction: Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 485.

⁹ On *izibongo* morphology, see Adrian Koopman, *Zulu Names* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal, 1999), 284–6. Special thanks to Koopman and A.M. Maphumulo for the recommendations.

recognized by the chiefly family's *isibongo*—the abakwaMdluli. Previously the register had included both abakwaMdluli and abaseNyavini (the people of Nyavu). Prior to the establishment of the Bantu authorities boundaries Chief Nongalaza Mdluli expressed the preference for amaNyavu. Still other archival documents on the same clan list them as the amaCoseni. Mdluli, Nyavu, and Coseni are all ancestors of the same chiefly lineage. I choose to use Nyavu because it was used most frequently in interviews and in the contemporary press to describe the neighbors of the Maphumulo.

Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations of oral history interviews in isiZulu are by Thandeka Majola - though we frequently went back and forth over how best to do justice to the translations. For those who speak isiZulu, the transcriptions in isiZulu are included in footnotes.

GLOSSARY

<i>iBambabukhosi</i> (<i>ibamba</i> for short)	regent
<i>isiBongo</i> (plural, <i>izibongo</i>)	lineage or clan name; praise name
<i>iButho</i> (plural, <i>amabutho</i>)	regiment, organized by age
<i>amaDlozi</i>	ancestral spirits
<i>uDlame</i>	violence [*]
<i>inDuna</i> (plural, <i>izinduna</i>)	an officer or official
<i>inDunenkulu</i>	principal official (head <i>induna</i>)
<i>isiGodi</i> (plural, <i>izigodi</i>)	district, ward
<i>ukuHlonipha</i>	to respect, act according to system of respect
<i>inHlonipho</i>	respect
<i>inKantolo</i>	court
<i>iKholwa</i> (plural, <i>amakholwa</i>)	believer; African Christian convert
<i>ukuKhonza</i>	to pay allegiance to
<i>ubuKhosi</i>	chieftaincy
<i>inKosi</i> (plural, <i>amakhosi</i>)	chief
<i>iLala</i> (plural, <i>amaLala</i>)	classification of second-class subjects in Zulu kingdom
<i>iMpi</i>	army, battle
<i>izimpi zemibango</i>	wars of dispute
<i>iziMpi zezigodi</i>	section wars
<i>iMpi yamakhanda</i>	war of the heads, or poll tax rebellion of 1906

^{*} See explanation of translation in “Notes on Terminology and Translation.”

<i>umNdeni</i>	family, most often used in the dissertation to refer to relatives of the chief
<i>ukuNgena</i>	to “raise seed,” procreate with a widow; marriage practice where brother impregnates deceased brother’s wife
<i>iNthelezi</i>	protective medicine, protective charm
<i>iNtungwa</i> (plural, <i>amantungwa</i>)	classification of commoner subjects in Zulu kingdom close to the Zulu aristocracy
<i>umNumzane</i> (plural, <i>amanumzane</i>)	gentleman, homestead head
<i>iNyanga</i>	healer
<i>iziPhakanyiswa</i> (plural, <i>izinphakanyiswa</i>)	one who has been promoted
<i>imPhepho</i>	incense
<i>iSiko</i> (plural, <i>amasiko</i>)	culture, custom, tradition
<i>umuThi</i>	medicine, medicinal charm
<i>ukuValelisa</i>	to take one’s leave
<i>umuZi</i> (plural, <i>imizi</i>)	homestead
<i>iZimu</i> (plural, <i>amazimu</i>)	cannibal
<i>ubuZimuzimu</i>	often translated as cannibalism; more accurately absence of social order
<i>isiZwe</i>	chiefdom

ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
APC	Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives
BAD	Bantu Administration and Development
BOSS	Bureau for State Security
COGTA	Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
CONTRALESA	Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DCD	Department of Cooperation and Development
DDA	Department of Development Aid
FOSATU	Federation of South African Trade Unions
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
KCAL	Killie Campbell Africana Library
KDC	KwaZulu Development Corporation
KZLA	KwaZulu Legislative Assembly
KZP	KwaZulu Police
MAWU	Metal and Allied Workers Union
MDM	Mass Democratic Movement
MI	Military Intelligence (of South African Defense Force)
MK	Umkhonto weSizwe (Spear of the Nation)
MP	Parliament Member
NAD	Native Affairs Department

NAR	National Archives Repository (Pretoria)
NIS	National Intelligence Service (the civilian agency)
NP	National Party
PAR	Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository
PRD	Department of Plural Relations and Development
PTO	Permission to Occupy
SABT	South African Bantu Trust
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defense Force
SADT	South African Development Trust
SANT	South African Native Trust
SAP	South African Police
SB	Special Branch (of the South African Police)
SNA	Secretary for Native Affairs
SSC	State Security Council
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UAR	Ulundi Archives Repository
UDF	United Democratic Front
UWUSA	United Workers Union of South Africa



Map 1: Table Mountain and Areas of Interest, KwaZulu-Natal. *For interpretation of the references to color in maps, the reader is referred to the electronic version of this dissertation.*

Introduction

On February 25, 1991, Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo, the chief of the Maphumulo people at Table Mountain in KwaZulu-Natal, was shot dead as he pulled into the driveway of his Pietermaritzburg home. Mhlabunzima was the fourth chief of the Maphumulo, a chiefdom established by the British colonial administration in 1905. He believed his name, meaning “the earth that is heavy” in isiZulu, foretold that he would live in troubled times and have many responsibilities.¹ Indeed, he led his people in an era of unprecedented repression and internecine violence and lived in a changing South Africa. Only a year before his assassination, South African president F.W. de Klerk unbanned the liberation movements, including the African National Congress (ANC) of Nelson Mandela, paving the way for the transition to democracy in South Africa. De Klerk told South Africans, “The season of violence is over. The time for reconstruction and reconciliation has arrived.”² But as Mandela walked proudly out of Victor Verster prison on February 11, 1990 after 27 years in jail, KwaZulu-Natal was burning and Chief Maphumulo’s people had deserted their Table Mountain homes for refugee camps.

The world watched with bewilderment as civil war erupted in Gauteng’s townships and across KwaZulu-Natal. The media labeled it “black-on-black” and “tribal” violence, especially in Gauteng where reporters often simply labeled the conflict as one between the Zulu ethnic nationalist movement Inkatha and the rest (Xhosas, Sothos, Swazis, etc.) under the ANC. Headlines such as “Tribal Feuds Won’t Let Up in South Africa” and “In South Africa, Violence

¹ Ann Skelton, correspondence with the author, February 8, 2011.

² F.W. de Klerk, (speech given to Parliament, Pretoria, February 2, 1990), *Times Live*, <http://blogs.timeslive.co.za/hartley/2010/02/02/fw-de-klerks-speech-to-parliament-2-february-1990-full-text/>.

Takes on Tribal Overtone” dominated the international press.³ They compared the viciousness of the violence to Belfast and Beirut. Increasingly, ANC activists and the people under siege pointed to Inkatha as an obstacle to liberation. As the conflict raged on, irrefutable evidence began to emerge that the apartheid government had funded Inkatha activities and provided paramilitary training as part of the state’s counterrevolutionary efforts. Violence monitoring reports suggest that between 1987 and 1994, 20,000 people died as a result of the civil war, 12,000 in KwaZulu-Natal.⁴

Maphumulo’s assassination sent shockwaves across the Pietermaritzburg communities that had come to know him as “the peace chief.” This Table Mountain traditional leader promoted political tolerance, organized peace efforts, and traveled around the world to call attention to *uDlame* and assure a place for traditional authority in the new South Africa. In the midst of the tumultuous civil war and the revelations about the state support for Inkatha, the ANC embraced the deceased chief as one of their own and contended his murder was the work of apartheid death squads. No killer was ever found, but testimony given at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) suggests state and Inkatha involvement in the assassination and cover-up.

³ Christopher S. Wren, “Tribal Feuds Won’t Let Up in South Africa,” *New York Times* February 25, 1990; Roger Thurow, *Wall Street Journal* August 20, 1990.

⁴ The most commonly cited numbers appear from John Jacques William Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead: The Course and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal Midlands: 1987-1989” (M.A. thesis, University of Natal, 1993); Anthea Jeffery, *The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997).



Figure 1-2: left, misspelled street sign for the renamed Table Mountain Road, 2011, photo by author; right, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, n.d., Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers. For interpretation of the references to color in figures, the reader is referred to the electronic version of this dissertation.

In 2005, the ANC-led city of Pietermaritzburg renamed the road to Table Mountain after the late chief. Maphumulo’s name was misspelled and news of the renaming misdated his death.⁵ The publicly promoted memory of him as a neutral “peace chief” obscures the history of conflict over land in this region and challenges to Maphumulo’s chiefly authority—major factors behind the eruption of deadly violence in 1990. This superficial treatment of the past in a public memorialization stemmed from the nation-building process promoted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of the late 1990s. The TRC tended to focus on covert state aggression, often masking the violence where neighbor killed neighbor.⁶ But it is this localized violence that most affected the daily lives of the people of the KwaZulu-Natal villages and townships engulfed in flames during the final years of apartheid. By requiring perpetrators to tie

⁵ “Baynes Drift Road—new name: Chief Mhlabunzima Road,” *Natal Witness* June 20, 2005.

⁶ Philip Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Pursuit of ‘Social Truth’: The Case of Kathorus,” in *Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2002).

their acts to political motivations, the TRC obscured other factors contributing to inter and intra community violence.

This study of Chief Maphumulo's Table Mountain region reveals that political ideology played a less significant role in *uDlame* than fierce local disputes over historically contested land and over chiefly legitimacy. While explanations about *uDlame* in the scholarly literature highlight the struggle for power between supporters of a rural, "traditionalist," and collaborationist Zulu ethnic nationalist movement, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, and those of a young, modern, and urban liberation movement, the African National Congress, I argue that for individuals and communities, the politics were local. For the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms in the Table Mountain area outside of Pietermaritzburg, these larger struggles were embedded in a century-old debate over land and what it meant for a chief to be a legitimate leader.

This dissertation then is a micro-history of conflict over land and chiefly authority in a small place. Despite its attention to local causes for the violence, this study does not, of course, deny the fact that the apartheid government sponsored violence against anti-apartheid movements through its own organs and allies. Instead, I argue that the manner in which the tentacles of the state and its allies wound themselves into African people's lives enabled existing tensions to flourish, and came perilously close to undermining South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy.

This study builds on existing scholarship on the South African transition-era violence, as well upon the larger literature on land, collaboration, and chiefs in Africa. I make three arguments. First, that *uDlame* in Table Mountain erupted from a century-old dispute over land and chiefly authority. I locate the origins of the conflict between the Nyavu and Maphumulo in the colonial practice of indirect rule, including the creation of "native locations" and

“government tribes” and the establishment of boundaries. The Nyavu, who date their chiefdom to the pre-Shakan era (pre-19th century), made claims on land under the authority of the newly-created Maphumulo chiefdom based on their hereditary authority and occupation of the land. During conflicts labeled as “faction fights” by the colonial officials, the Maphumulo and Nyavu contested the jurisdiction of land and the legitimacy of their chiefs. Tensions between the hereditary Nyavu and appointed Maphumulo escalated during the segregationist era when the Native Administration Department (NAD) purchased adjoining white farms to relocate some Maphumulo members from a portion of Inanda location to be excised for the Nagle Dam project. However, the establishment of apartheid era-tribal authorities in the midst of NAD’s piecemeal acquisition of the farms created further confusion over jurisdiction as a strip of desirable land divided the chiefdoms. The claims on this contested land continued into the era of *uDlame*. The shortage of land for African settlement and growth and the definition and manipulation of chiefly authority was at the heart of these conflicts.

Second, I argue for more inclusive definitions of chiefly authority and political legitimacy. While leaders of hereditary descent such as the Nyavu chiefs readily made claims on land and authority based on their lineage, attention to the proverb “*inkosi yinkosi ngabantu*” (a chief is a chief because of the people who *khonza* or pay allegiance to him) and the fluid manner in which *imizi* (homesteads) joined and left an *isizwe* (chiefdom) enables us to focus on other ways in which chiefs earned legitimacy. The mutually beneficial social contract of *khonza* held chiefs responsible, though some took the relationship more seriously than others. While the colonial administration had sought to constrain this practice of personal loyalty, during *uDlame* Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo welcomed people into his chiefdom and onto the contested land if they were willing to *khonza* him. Maphumulo’s followers remember the chief nostalgically

because they believed he kept that contract in mind. He may have been “only the fourth chief” of an appointed chiefdom, as one opponent put it, but Maphumulo sought to provide land and water to residents, and to spark economic development in his region. In the context of war, he promoted peace and attempted to provide protection. Maphumulo’s critics expressed their dissent and moved to depose him through an alliance with the neighboring pro-Inkatha chiefdom. While the legitimacy of traditional authority is often thought of in the dichotomy of western democracy’s consent of the governed and an African cultural sanction for hereditary leadership, attention to the practice of *khonza* shows how Zulu chiefs historically gained and maintained legitimacy based on consent of their subjects.

Third, this dissertation challenges earlier understandings of Zulu chiefs and Inkatha supporters as merely collaborators of the apartheid regime. By taking into account a larger range of strategies of survival and accommodation in the context of apartheid and civil war, this study questions the meanings and persistent dichotomies of collaboration and resistance, warlords and freedom fighters, government stooges and progressive chiefs. The actions of local Table Mountain political figures and the life of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, a man who shifted from royalist Zulu politician to neutral chief and finally to ANC leader on the both the local and national levels, reveal the range of methods and changing tactics employed by traditional leaders and their supporters—ones that do not fit easily into dichotomous categories.

Historical Context to the Violence

The “long decade” leading to South Africa’s first national democratic elections was an era of tremendous social and political upheaval. Beginning in the late 1970s, the National Party government under President P.W. Botha embarked on a program of reform and repression

designed to guarantee the stability necessary to ensure the country's economic future. The centerpiece of reform efforts was the adoption of a new constitution in 1983 that created a new Tricameral parliament with separate bodies for whites, Asians, and Coloureds but no representation for Africans outside of their bantustan governments.⁷ While the 1976 Soweto uprising had not led to explosive resistance among youth in either the Natal Province or the KwaZulu bantustan, the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 as an umbrella organization of grassroots organizations opposed to the so-called Tricameral constitution changed local political dynamics. The leaders of the UDF coalition of civic, church, student, worker, and sport organizations sought to avoid an outright affiliation with the banned ANC, but in practice membership was often overlapping and the movement's character was influenced by the strategies and tactics of the ANC.⁸

Alongside its reforms, the apartheid state also embarked on a vicious campaign of counterrevolutionary repression that included covert action (the so-called third force) to spread fear and insecurity among the black population and to foment internal divisions within resistance movements.⁹ In KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng townships, Inkatha participated in this campaign. Formed in 1975 as a Zulu ethnic nationalist movement, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe aspired to

⁷ The ratio of white, coloureds, and Indians in the tricameral parliament would be 4:2:1 so that whites would always outnumber the rest, making their inclusion only symbolic. Gail M. Gerhart and Clive L. Glaser, *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990*, vol. 6: Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 7.

⁸ Jeremy Seekings, *The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000); Ineke van Kessel, *Beyond Our Wildest Dreams: The United Democratic Front and the Transformation of South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000).

⁹ Jackie Dugard, "Low-Intensity Conflict," in *The Role of Political Violence in South Africa's Democratisation*, ed. Ran Greenstein (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003), 1–5.

national prominence. Inkatha, led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, linked itself politically, geographically, and ethnically with the KwaZulu bantustan. In its early days, Inkatha enjoyed the standing of an internal liberation movement with the blessing of the ANC, but Buthelezi's growing cooperation with the apartheid government and his opposition to international sanctions earned him and Inkatha the reputation of being government puppets.

Inkatha began to train young Zulu men at its paramilitary camp located at Mandleni/Matleng as early as 1980 and later sent over 200 young men to South West Africa (Namibia) to be trained by the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the Caprivi Strip. These "Caprivians" were deployed across KwaZulu-Natal in September 1986, often as KwaZulu Police officers. These men were responsible for some of the most deadly incidents of violence in the townships surrounding Pietermaritzburg, the provincial capital of Natal.

In the same year as the launching of the United Democratic Front, violence spiked across the country. In the Eastern Cape and the Orange Free State, squads known as ama-Afrika and the A-Team assaulted UDF activists. In KwaNdebele, *Mbokodo* members attacked anyone resisting bantustan rule. In the Western Cape *witdoek* vigilantes razed shacks in Old Crossroads and KTC under the watchful gaze of apartheid security forces.¹⁰ Violence wracked KwaZulu-Natal, especially in the Midlands region surrounding Pietermaritzburg. A riot broke out on the campus

¹⁰ For more on these movements and the violence, see Nicholas Haysom, *Mabangalala: The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986); Jason Conrad Myers, *Indirect Rule in South Africa: Tradition, Modernity, and the Costuming of Political Power* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2008), chapter three. On *witdoeke* and resistance to forced removals in Crossroads and KTC, see Siphosiso S. Maseko, "Civic Movement and Non-Violent Action: The Case of the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee," *African Affairs* 96 (1997): 353–69; Koni Benson, "Crossroads Continues: Histories of Women Mobilizing Against Forced Removals and for Housing in Cape Town South Africa, 1975–2005" (PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2009). Also visit www.cvet.org.za for video footage of the razings and interviews with residents.

of the University of Zululand in 1983 when students protested a visit by Inkatha president and KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha Youth Brigade, resulting in the death of five students.

Tensions began to rise in Pietermaritzburg's Imbali township and in Hammarsdale (on the national road between Pietermaritzburg and Durban) as Inkatha launched campaigns of forced recruitment in the face of increasing UDF popularity. Civic organizations formed self-defense units in response. The assassination of Durban lawyer and UDF executive member Victoria Mxenge and a Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)/UDF stayaway in support of striking BTR-SARMCOL workers in Mpophomeni in 1985 sparked a spiral of violence in and around Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Inkatha supporters killed 14 people at Mxenge's funeral in August and murdered three Mpophomeni shop stewards in December. Tensions escalated into large-scale battles and attacks. A vicious cycle of death and destruction erupted, with each side accusing the other of instigation. The climate of intolerance and fear raged unabated and by 1987 the conflict had escalated into a regional civil war. The violence spread to nearly every urban township, and later to the rural areas as well.

One local woman I spoke with proclaimed this war was unlike the others they had known. "We used to hear about *uDlame* in other places but we did not know anything about it. We only knew *izimpi zezigodi* (section wars)."¹¹ The post-1987 violence was unprecedented due to the intensity and scope of death, arson, rape, the territorialization of loyalty and affiliation that turned areas into no-go zones for supporters of UDF or Inkatha, and for the generational rupture

¹¹ "uDlame luqale ngokuthi sikhale sizwa kwazinye izindawo ukuthi kunodlame kodwa singazi nokuthi luyini ngoba thina sazi izimpi zezigodi." Phumzile Mathonsi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21, 2011.

embedded in the larger politicization of youth.¹² For example, at KwaMakhutha in 1987, Inkatha supporters ambushed the home of a UDF supporter and killed eight children and five adults. In December 1988, a joint Inkatha-SAP force killed eleven people at Trust Feed. Then in March 1990, more than 200 people died and hundreds of homes were destroyed in what became known as the Seven Days War, a conflagration that created 20,000 refugees. 34 people died in Bruntville between November and December 1990. A KwaZulu Police-Inkatha hit squad in Esikhawini murdered another 100 people between 1991 and 1993. On the South Coast, 32 Inkatha supporters died at Bomela and Folweni. In 1993 at Table Mountain, two ambushes on vehicles killed 23. In Pietermaritzburg, high profile local leaders, such as Jerome Mncwabe and Arnold Lombo of Inkatha and Reggie Hadebe and S'khumbuzo Nwenya of the ANC were assassinated.¹³

The year 1990 also saw the spread of the war to Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) area, now part of Gauteng province. Between 1990 and 1992, 112 massacres occurred in the region. Local circumstances played a major role to the PWV violence, due to simmering tensions between Zulu migrant workers livings in prison-like hostels and permanent residents of the adjacent townships and settlements. Township rent boycotts, apartheid reforms, and ANC plans for the conversion of hostels alienated migrant laborers, dramatically changing the relationship between hostel dwellers and townships residents and sparking large scale attacks and counter-attacks. Inkatha deployed the “Black Cats” hit squad to Wesselton and Ermelo. Conflict

¹² Belinda Bozzoli, *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2004); Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-Natal, 1987-1993” (PhD dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 2007), 2–5.

¹³ This is just a sampling of some of the violations described in Chapter Three on KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles* (London: Macmillan, 1999).

erupted between hostel dwellers and the surrounding townships, resulting in unprecedented numbers of deaths in Alexandra, Phola Park and Kathlehong. Massacres in 1991-2 in Swanieville, Boipatong, and Sebokeng killed over one-hundred more.¹⁴

For a long time scholars and analysts seemed reluctant to describe the violence of 1987-1994 as a war. Matthew Krentz's investigative journalism popularized the phrase "an unofficial war."¹⁵ What might be perceived as a hesitancy to label the conflict of the late 1980s and early 1990s simply as a "war" is perhaps the result of a cultural and political position. According to Steven Collins, neither Inkatha nor the UDF/ANC wanted to admit that they were participating in warfare because they sought to present themselves as victims to domestic and international public opinion.¹⁶ Krentz points out that white South Africans knew little of what happened in the black townships and rural areas and notes how the apartheid regime refused to acknowledge the breakdown of law and order. But violence had become the day-to-day reality. Any other label trivializes and diminishes the extent and effects of the conflict.¹⁷ With at least 20,000 dead, 200,000 plus refugees, and thousands more injured, raped, and abducted, there can be little doubt that many residents of KwaZulu-Natal and the Gauteng townships were actually at

¹⁴ Chapter six of volume three covers the former Transvaal region. South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles*; South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 5: Findings and Recommendations* (London: Macmillan, 1999).

¹⁵ Matthew Krentz, *An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg* (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers (Pty) Ltd, 1990), 14-7.

¹⁶ Steven Collins, "'Things Fall Apart': The Culture of Violence Becomes Entrenched," in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 95.

¹⁷ Krentz, *An Unofficial War*, 14-7.

war. The word used to describe this conflict in isiZulu, *udlame*, reflects the manner in which the violence disrupted every aspect of daily life.¹⁸

The scale and ferocity of *uDlame* in what is today KwaZulu-Natal province was brought into stark relief during the TRC process of the 1990s. Nearly half of individual statements reporting gross human rights abuses at the TRC came from KwaZulu-Natal, making the proportion of submissions relative to population four times higher for this province than for the rest of the country. Over half of all “politically motivated killings” and “severe ill treatment” (which included arson, assault, stabbing, incarceration, shooting, burning, and destruction of property) reported nationally occurred in KwaZulu-Natal.¹⁹ The TRC found the apartheid state and its allies, including the KwaZulu bantustan government, the KwaZulu Police, and Inkatha responsible for most of the human rights violations in question.²⁰

Historiography of *uDlame*

Violence has been central to the history of South Africa, embedding itself into nearly every facet of South African society.²¹ From the genocide of the Cape Khoisan, the rise of the Zulu

¹⁸ Nyembezi, *Isichazimazwi Sanamuhla Nangomuso*.

¹⁹ South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles*, 157–8.

²⁰ South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 5: Findings and Recommendations*, 227–32.

²¹ William Beinart, “Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1988); Jacklyn Cock, *Colonels & Cadres: War & Gender in South Africa* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991); Catherine Campbell, “Learning to Kill: Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 614–28; Gary Kynoch, “Crime, Conflict and Politics in Transition-Era South Africa,” *African Affairs* 104, no. 416 (2005): 493–514; Clifton Crais, *Poverty, War, and Violence in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

kingdom, the South African War, and the everyday brutality of the apartheid regime to studies of post-apartheid crime and sexual violence, violence has been a persistent theme in the historical literature.

But contemporary historical work and much of public history in post-apartheid South Africa has overlooked the relatively recent painful, divisive years of warfare that almost scuttled the 1994 elections. The South African historiography of the liberation movement focuses mainly on the ANC and its allies and is complemented by a proliferation of memoirs and biographies of the liberation struggle's high-profile members.²²

Central to the post-apartheid examination of the liberation struggle has been the multi-volume history produced by the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), a project commissioned by then President Thabo Mbeki. SADET's international and regional studies bring to light the activities and strategies of revolutionary organizations and the counter-revolutionary actions of the state. As many of these histories are not easily discerned from the few surviving written records, SADET embraced as one of its mandates the collection of oral histories of South Africans from all political persuasions. Particular emphasis was placed on capturing the life

²² South African Democracy Education Trust, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 1–4 (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2004); Raymond Suttner, "Women in the ANC-Led Underground," in *Women in South African History* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007); Raymond Suttner, *The ANC Underground in South Africa, 1950-1976* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009). In addition to the numerous new biographies of Nelson Mandela, see Raymond Suttner, *Inside Apartheid's Prison: Notes and Letters of Struggle* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001); Ben Turok, *Nothing But the Truth: Behind the ANC's Struggle Politics. Ben Turok* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2003); Ahmed Kathrada, *Memoirs* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004); Ronald Kasrils, *Armed and Dangerous: From Undercover Struggle to Freedom* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2004); Ray Alexander Simons, *All My Life and All My Strength*, ed. Raymond Suttner (Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 2004); Luli Callinicos, *Oliver Tambo: His Life and Legacy 1917-1993* (STE Publishers, 2006); Pdraig O'Malley, *Shades of Difference: Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa* (New York: Viking, 2007); Pippa Green, *Choice, Not Fate: The Life and Times of Trevor Manuel* (Johannesburg: Penguin Books, 2008); Janet Smith, *Hani: A Life Too Short* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009); Mark Gevisser, *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009).

histories of former exiles, members of the internal wings of the liberation movements, and the veterans.²³

SADET's extensive use of oral sources built on the tradition of the Wits History Workshop. A cohort of scholars inspired by the increasing militarization and resistance of African youth in the 1970s and influenced by the historical materialist approach turned towards "history from below". The Southern African Societies seminar series at the University of London and the History Workshop conferences set out politically relevant subjects for social histories and promoted research into the lives of everyday people.²⁴ Oral tradition and personal testimony enabled radical scholars to more fully consider identity formation and popular consciousness as experienced by black South Africans themselves, a trend that continues in recent publications.²⁵

²³ Gregory F. Houston, "The South African Democracy Education Trust's 'Road to Democracy' Project: Areas of Focus and Methodological Issues," *African Historical Review* 42, no. 2 (2010): 3–26. See South African Democracy Education Trust, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*.

²⁴ Philip Bonner, "New Nation, New History: The History Workshop in South Africa, 1977-1994," *The Journal of American History* 81, no. 3 (1993): 977–85. The edited collections include: Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone, eds., *Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870-1930* (New York: Longman, 1982); Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, eds., *The Politics of Race, Class, and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa* (New York: Longman, 1987); Belinda Bozzoli, ed., *Class, Community, and Conflict: South African Perspectives* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987).

²⁵ Robert Morrell, *Changing Men in Southern Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001); John Edwin Mason, *Social Death and Resurrection: Slavery and Emancipation in South Africa* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003); Peter Alegi, *Laduma!: Soccer, Politics and Society in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2004); Mohamed Adhikari, *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in the South African Coloured Community* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005); Jacob Abram Tropp, *Natures of Colonial Change: Environmental Relations in the Making of the Transkei* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006); Nomboniso Gasa, ed., *Women in South African History: They Remove Boulders and Cross rivers = Basus'iimbokodo, Bawel'imilambo* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007); Hans Erik Stolten, ed., *History Making and Present Day Politics: The Meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007); Bernard Mbenga and Andrew Manson, "People of the Dew": *A History of the Bafokeng of*

It is this central position for the oral source and oral history within programs of recovering the African past that served as the clearest signature of and for African historiography.²⁶

While laudatory for its scope, oral history methodology, and insight into previously unstudied aspects of South Africa's liberation struggle, SADET is worthy of the critiques of "struggle history" as laid out by Stephen Davis in his doctoral dissertation on Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) and the (mis)representation of its rank-and-file soldiers.²⁷ These "struggle histories" too often conform to the contemporary narrative of liberation offered by the ruling party and suggest the necessity of histories written to support the legitimacy of the post-apartheid state. The critique exists not to automatically demote all struggle histories but to highlight the preclusion of other narratives of the struggle.²⁸

SADET's fourth volume on the 1980s is nearly 2,000 pages long but lacks a chapter that addresses *uDlame* in and of itself. That such a significant event as a regional civil war does not merit a chapter raises questions about ideological choices to gloss over deadly divisions in an effort to produce a history that would serve the purpose of national unity and racial reconciliation. Episodes of *uDlame* are treated individually in chapters on the ANC underground

Phokeng-Rustenburg Region, South Africa, from Early Times to 2000 (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2010).

²⁶ David William Cohen, Stephan Miescher, and Luise White, "Introduction: Voices, Words, and African History," in *African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 1–27.

²⁷ The ideological position of SADET has also been debated by Martin Legassick and Jabulanit Sithole. See Martin Legassick, "Debating the Revival of the Workers' Movement in the 1970s: The South African Democracy Education Trust and Post-Apartheid Patriotic History," *Kronos* no. 34 (2008): 240–266; Jabulanit Sithole, "Contestations Over Knowledge Production or Ideological Bullying?: A Response to Legassick on the Workers' Movement," *Kronos* no. 35 (2009): 222–241; Houston, "The South African Democracy Education Trust's 'Road to Democracy' Project"; Stephen Davis, "Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters: Everyday Life in the Ranks of Umkhonto We Sizwe (1961--Present)" (PhD dissertation, University of Florida, 2010).

²⁸ Davis, "Cosmopolitans in Close Quarters," 11–2.

in the Midlands and Northern and Southern Natal by historian Jabulani Sithole, but doing so seems to privilege both the ANC perspectives and political explanations for the deadly conflict.²⁹ While Inkatha's actions may not be interpreted as contributing to "the road to democracy," the years of *uDlame* without a doubt impacted the negotiated transition and require empirical research and deeper analysis. The harsh impact of *uDlame* became a potent factor in forcing the apartheid government to make concessions to the liberation movements. Conflict projected an image of instability in South Africa that threatened economic investment and harmed the country's international relations.³⁰

There is a small but significant body of literature on *uDlame*. Explaining violence within African communities has been more difficult than understanding the armed response of Africans to conquest, dispossession, and the authoritarian nature of colonial rule and apartheid.³¹ The majority of this literature was written contemporaneously to the violence as scholars (mostly sociologists and political scientists) and activists sought to understand and end the social and political upheaval.³² Brief case studies were written on Edendale, Sundumbili, Molweni,

²⁹ Jabulani Sithole, "The ANC Underground, Armed Actions and Popular Resistance in Pietermaritzburg and the Surrounding Natal Midlands Townships," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010); Jabulani Sithole, "The ANC Underground and Armed Actions in Northern Natal," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 279–312; Jabulani Sithole, "The ANC Underground and Armed Actions in Southern Natal," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 313–360.

³⁰ Adrian Guelke, "Interpretations of Political Violence During South Africa's Transition," *Politikon* 27, no. 2 (2000): 251–2.

³¹ Beinart, "Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography," 465.

³² See for instance, Haysom, *Mabangalala*; Fatima Meer and Institute for Black Research, *Resistance in the Townships* (Durban: Madiba Publications, 1989); Kentridge, *An Unofficial War*; Anthony Minnaar, ed., *Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu: Historical Perspectives* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1991); Anthony Minnaar, ed., *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research

Bruntville, and the Durban and Rand townships and hostels.³³ Since then, many organizations and individuals who experienced or were involved in monitoring the conflict have published firsthand accounts of the era and critical analyses of the state's involvement.³⁴ *UDlame* also been examined as central to analyses of contemporary struggles of land reform, development, and crime.³⁵ The most extensive works to date include doctoral dissertations by anthropologist

Council, 1992); Ari Sitas, "The Making of the 'Comrades' Movement in Natal, 1985-91," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 629-641; Simon Bekker, ed., *Capturing the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region, 1986-1992*, Indicator South Africa (Durban: Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, 1992); Aitchison, "Numbering the Dead."

³³ Douglas Booth and Mlandu Biyela, "Exploring the Spatial Dimension of Black Resistance and Political Violence in South Africa: The Case of Durban," *Urban Geography* 9, no. 6 (1988): 629-53; Nkosinathi Gwala, "Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in Pietermaritzburg," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15, no. 3 (1989): 506-524; Stavros Stavrou and Andrew Crouch, "Molweni: Violence on the Periphery," *Indicator South Africa* 6, no. 3 (1989): 46-50; Stavros Stavrou and Lwazi Shongwe, "Violence on the Periphery: Part Two: The Greater Edendale Complex," *Indicator South Africa* 7, no. 1 (1989): 53-7; Anthony Minnaar, "Locked in a Cycle of Violence: The Anatomy of Conflict in Bruntville, 1990-1992," in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 143-62; Hilary Sapire, "Politics and Protest in Shack Settlements of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging Region, South Africa, 1980-1990," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 3 (1992): 670-697; Lauren Segal, "The Human Face of Violence: Hostel Dwellers Speak," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, no. 1 (1992): 190-231; Paulus Zulu, "Durban Hostels and Political Violence: Case Studies in KwaMashu and Umlazi," *Transformation* 21 (1993): 1-23; Mary de Haas, "Sorrow in Sundumbili," *Indicator South Africa* 11, no. 3 (1994): 23-7.

³⁴ Lou Levine, ed., *Faith in Turmoil: The Seven Days War* (Pietermaritzburg: Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness, 1999); Greg Marinovich and João Silva, *The Bang-Bang Club: Snapshots from a Hidden War* (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Lou Levine, ed., *Hope Beyond Apartheid: The Peter Kerchhoff Years of PACSA, 1979-1999* (Pietermaritzburg: Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness, 2002); Ran Greenstein, ed., *The Role of Political Violence in South Africa's Democratisation* (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003); Andrew Ragavaloo, *Richmond: Living in the Shadow of Death* (Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 2008); Laurence Piper and Brian Morrow, *To Serve and Protect: The Inkathagate Scandal* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010).

³⁵ Kynoch, "Crime, Conflict and Politics"; Mario Krämer, *Violence as Routine: Transformations of Local-Level Politics and the Disjunction between Centre and Periphery in KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa)* (Köln: Köppe, 2007); Sarah Mathis, "After Apartheid: Chiefly

Jason Hickel on tensions between the Inkatha and COSATU-affiliated unions in the sugar industry in Zululand and another by sociologist Debby Bonnin on Mpumalanga; the oral history work of Philippe Denis and Radikobo Ntsimane in Nxamalala; and research by Gary Kynoch in Kathlehong on the East Rand.³⁶

Much of this literature rejects monocausal explanations for *uDlame*. Keeping this in mind, I organize the literature according the manner which scholars emphasized some theories over others.³⁷ I adopt and add to the five approaches as outlined by German anthropologist Mario Krämer as explanations for political violence: cultural, gender, economic, instrumentalist, or political.³⁸

Cultural approaches to studying *uDlame* tend to be concerned with an alleged Zulu culture of feuding (so-called faction fights) and the growing divide between young and old and between “traditional” and “modern.”³⁹ The international media often lazily relied upon this explanation to portray the feuding as some primordial characteristic of the warring parties.

Authority and the Politics of Land, Community and Development” (PhD dissertation, Emory University, 2008).

³⁶ Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity”; Krämer, *Violence as Routine*; Gary Kynoch, “‘Our Township Turned into Beirut’: Narratives of Violence in Thokoza/Katlehong, 1990-94,” in *Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association* (Chicago, 2008); Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane, and Thomas Cannell, *Indians Versus Russians: An Oral History of Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-1993)* (Dorpspruit: Cluster Publications, 2010); Jason Hickel, “Democracy and Sabotage: Moral Order and Political Conflict in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa” (PhD dissertation, University of Virginia, 2011). Jabulani Sithole and Mxolisi Mchunu are also completing dissertations on the violence.

³⁷ For general overviews, see Beinart, “Introduction: Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography”; Guelke, “Interpretations of Political Violence During South Africa’s Transition.”

³⁸ Krämer, *Violence as Routine*, 25–8.

³⁹ Krämer, *Violence as Routine*, 25; John Argyle, “Faction Fights, Feuds, Ethnicity and Political Conflict in Natal: A Comparative View” (presented at the Ethnicity, Society and Conflict in Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1992); Collins, “‘Things Fall Apart’: The Culture of Violence Becomes Entrenched.”

Sociologists Heribert Adam and Kagila Moodley highlighted the divisions between a traditionally-oriented older and rural Inkatha and the young, modern and urban ANC.⁴⁰ Philippe Denis's extensive oral history work also points to the manner in which the conflicting parties labeled their enemies according to perceived cultural differences. In Nxamalala, opponents of Inkatha designated the movement's supporters *othelweni* ("those who push others down the cliff") and "Russians" (most likely a reference to the gangs of Basotho migrant laborers on the Witwatersrand known for the rural values)—terms that spoke to notions of Zulu traditionalism, conservatism, and even backwardness. On the other hand, Inkatha supporters declared ANC/UDF members non-Zulus and derisively called them *amaIndiya* (Indians) and *amaKula* (Coolies) because they perceived UDF and COSATU to be "Indian organizations" rather than "African" ones.⁴¹

Hickel offers the most in-depth examination of cultural differences between the warring parties. Building on Mahmood Mamdani's insights, he argues that the bifurcation of urban and rural Africans under colonial native administration policies resulted in the creation of two radically disparate moral orders, which then fed the violence. Hickel focuses on the Zulu migrants who bore the brunt of critique as the agents of war, examining the structure of the Zulu family and what he calls a cultural imperative of rural Zulus towards the "collective well-being." He argues these men resisted the ANC "because they explicitly reject the egalitarian project of 'democracy' (*idemokrasi*) and 'human rights' (*amalungelo*) that the party promotes."⁴² Interpreting democratic transformation through their culturally particular moral paradigm in

⁴⁰ Heribert Adam and Kagila Moodley, "Political Violence, 'Tribalism,' and Inkatha," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 3 (1992): 485–510.

⁴¹ Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, *Indians Versus Russians*, 22–5.

⁴² Hickel, "Democracy and Sabotage," 7.

which hierarchical social relations govern for the collective well-being, rural Zulus sought to defend themselves through violence directed against ANC supporters.⁴³

Scholarship on *uDlame* has also drawn on gender studies. This literature focuses on the role of men in the conflict, especially the historical and masculinist discourse of Inkatha and Buthelezi. This approach is inherently tied to the cultural, as many explanations of the male-dominated violence stress the historical precedent of faction fighting and male youth associations where young male members employed violence as sport and as a means of empowerment. Gender scholars tend to explain political violence in late apartheid South Africa as a product of a crisis of masculinity related to the long-term decline of African patriarchal power and generational tensions between juniors and elders. Violence in KwaZulu-Natal operated as a means not only for men to reassert their masculinity but for older men to reassert age-linked masculinity.⁴⁴ Thokozani Xaba contended that young African male “comrades were impatient with the elders who either seemed to be tolerating or accommodating apartheid and this created tensions between young and the old.”⁴⁵ Mxolisi Mchunu suggests that this tension emanated from culture change as two different views on manhood held by youth and elders were accentuated during the conflict.⁴⁶ Thembisa Waetjen’s gendered analysis of Inkatha highlights that the movement’s rhetoric of martial masculinity resonated deeply with migrant laborers

⁴³ Hickel, “Democracy and Sabotage,” 11.

⁴⁴ Campbell, “Learning to Kill: Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal.”

⁴⁵ Thokozani Xaba, “Masculinity and Its Malcontents: The Confrontation Between ‘Struggle Masculinity’ and ‘Post-Struggle Masculinity’ (1900-1997),” in *Changing Men in Southern Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001), 110.

⁴⁶ Mxolisi Mchunu, “Culture Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the Context of Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991),” in *From Boys to Men: Social Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society* (Cape Town: Juta & Company, 2007).

committed to rural homesteads, but less so with those factory workers who more readily supported COSATU, the ANC-affiliated trade union movement.⁴⁷

Another set of theories locates the main cause for *uDlame* in the material conditions of apartheid and its structural inequalities. This theory was heavily promoted by Inkatha's research arm, the Inkatha Institute, led by Gavin Woods. Woods argued that while the conflict was political, it would not have become violent if the communities involved were economically stable and black politics had been allowed to develop.⁴⁸ Similarly, Rupert Taylor and Mark Shaw specifically point to the creation of mass informal settlements under apartheid as the breeding ground of desperate poverty and therefore conflict.⁴⁹ On the other hand, Mike Morris and Doug Hindson pointed to apartheid's gradual demise: the collapse of apartheid institutions, including bantustans, and a deep recession that generated high rates of urban migration, heightened competition over land, housing, employment and other scarce material resources.⁵⁰

Instrumentalist approaches to the study of *uDlame* stress careful orchestration by individuals and groups who stood to gain from violence and African disunity. The "Third Force" thesis is the most prominent illustration of this approach, alleging elements within the South

⁴⁷ Thembisa Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in South Africa* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004).

⁴⁸ See for instance, "Two opposing monitors explain why the violence hasn't been stopped," *Sunday Times* October 14, 1990; Gavin Woods, "Black Township Violence in South Africa, with Particular Reference to Natal: A Comprehensive Model," in *Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu: Historical Perspectives* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1991), 178–80; Gavin Woods, "Natal Violence: A Contemporary Analysis of Underlying Dynamics," in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 37–48.

⁴⁹ Rupert Taylor and Mark Shaw, "The Natal Conflict," in *Restructuring South Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

⁵⁰ Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, "South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and Reconstruction," *Review of African Political Economy* 19, no. 53 (1992): 43–59.

African security forces instigated the violence to weaken the strength of the ANC and diminish its popularity. While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found little substantiation of a centrally directed or formally constituted “third force,” TRC testimonies, judicial commissions, assassins’ confessions, and investigative reporting uncovered irrefutable evidence that a “network of security and ex-security force operatives, frequently acting in conjunction with right-wing elements and/or sectors of the IFP, was involved in actions that could be construed as fomenting violence and which resulted in gross human rights violations, including random and target killings.”⁵¹ Covert collaboration aside, the South African Police, South African Defense Force, and the KwaZulu Police consistently intervened (or failed to intervene) for the benefit of Inkatha supporters.

The instrumentalist literature thus focuses on the role of the state and its collaborators. Political scientist Morris Szeftel, academics with the monitoring group Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), and sociologist Bernard Magubane examined the state’s “total strategy” and “low intensity conflict” campaign and their implications.⁵² Both before and after the TRC findings, scholars and activists extensively examined Inkatha. Some studies focused solely on

⁵¹ South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 6*, 2003, 584. See also Jacques Pauw, *Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid’s Assassins* (Johannesburg: J. Ball, 1997); Eugene De Kock and Jeremy Gordin, *A Long Night’s Damage: Working for the Apartheid State* (Saxonwold: Contra Press, 1998); Richard J. Goldstone, *For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator* (Yale University Press, 2000); James Sanders, *Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service* (London: John Murray, 2006); *The Goldstone Commission, 1991-1994* (Braamfontein: Human Rights Institute of South Africa, 2009); Piper and Morrow, *To Serve and Protect*.

⁵² Morris Szeftel, “Manoeuvres of War in South Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy* no. 51 (1991): 63–76; Greenstein, *The Role of Political Violence*; Bernard Magubane, “The Collapse of the Garrison State,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 1621–1646.

Inkatha's growth and the characteristics of its leadership.⁵³ Other analyses have been more critical.⁵⁴ Historian Shula Marks, for example, saw Buthelezi and Inkatha as the most recent example of the "ambiguity of dependence" in which Africans leaders found themselves as they attempted to survive in a contradictory world.⁵⁵ Georgina Hamilton and Gerhard Maré's analysis interpreted Inkatha as an opportunistic black elite advancing a petit bourgeois agenda.⁵⁶ Other works probed Inkatha's contradictory declarations of non-violence and simultaneous manipulation of Zulu history and martial masculinity in a bid for power.⁵⁷ In a recent book, J.C.

⁵³ Lawrence Schlemmer, "The Stirring Giant: Observations on the Inkatha and Other Black Political Movements in South Africa," in *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980); John Brewer, "The Membership of Inkatha in KwaMashu," *African Affairs* 84, no. 334 (1985): 111–35; John Brewer, "Official Ideology and Lay Members' Beliefs in Inkatha," *Plural Society* XVII (1987): 45–53; Wessel De Kock, *Usuthu! Cry Peace! The Black Liberation Movement Inkatha and the Fight for a Just South Africa* (Cape Town: Open Hand Press, 1986); John Kane-Berman, "Inkatha: The Paradox of South African Politics," *Optima* 30, no. 2 (1992); Ben Temkin, *Buthelezi: A Biography* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

⁵⁴ Roger Southall, "Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise," *African Affairs* 80, no. 321 (1981): 453–481; Colleen McCaul, "Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe" (B.A. Honours thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1983); Michael Sutcliffe and Paul Wellings, "Inkatha Versus the Rest: Black Opposition to Inkatha in Durban's African Townships," *African Affairs* 87, no. 348 (1988): 325–60.

⁵⁵ Shula Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

⁵⁶ Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, *Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa*, First ed. (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987).

⁵⁷ Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (Zed Books, 1988); Daphna Golan, "Inkatha and Its Use of the Zulu Past," *History in Africa* 18 (1991): 113–26; Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Harvard University Press, 1998), chapter one; Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors*.

Myers neatly identifies Buthelezi as a “thoroughly serviceable tool” within the apartheid regime’s “total strategy.”⁵⁸

The political rivalry between the ANC and Inkatha is by far the most accepted and widespread explanation for *uDlame*. It dominates the TRC Report and the scholarly literature, as well as non-academic sources.⁵⁹ These diverse accounts essentially argue that rival political organizations utilized the violence to maximize their support in anticipation of democratic elections.⁶⁰ Anthea Jeffery (head of Special Research at the South African Institute of Race Relations) attributes the violence to politics and claims to tell the whole “Natal story” by giving equal weight to the ANC and Inkatha views on the violence.⁶¹ Jeffery’s seemingly meticulous research amounts to a voluminous compilation and summary of press reports with little analysis—but John Aitchison has pointed out that in at least three cases he selected from her work, Jeffery omitted evidence that questioned Inkatha’s stance.⁶²

Debby Bonnin’s convincing analysis of the fighting in Mpumalanga Township, an area in which the conflict was most brutal, shows the intersection of local, regional, and national

⁵⁸ Myers, *Indirect Rule in South Africa*, chapter three.

⁵⁹ Marinovich and Silva, *The Bang-Bang Club*; Bill Berkeley, *The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa*, 1st ed (New York: Basic Books, 2001); South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 6*.

⁶⁰ Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control”; Sutcliffe and Wellings, “Inkatha Versus the Rest: Black Opposition to Inkatha in Durban’s African Townships”; Beinart, “Introduction: Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography”; Guelke, “Interpretations of Political Violence During South Africa’s Transition.”

⁶¹ Jeffery, *The Natal Story*.

⁶² John Aitchison, review of Anthea Jeffery’s *The Natal Story*, shared with me during interview, Pietermaritzburg, November 22, 2010. Jeffery’s sympathies for Inkatha are also replete in Anthea Jeffery, *People’s War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009).

political dynamics as engines of violence. This framework reveals how local authority was established and affected political identity and the politics of generations; how local level interpretations of the regional tension between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF resulted in atrocities; and the manner in which a faction of the declining apartheid state fueled the local and regional conflict.⁶³

What the instrumentalist and political rivalry theories have in common is that they tend to obscure on-the ground participants and their reasons for going to war. One area in which individual motivations are better considered is the conflict on the Rand between Inkatha-affiliated hostel dwellers and their neighboring ANC-supporting township residents. Mahmood Mamdani, Lauren Segal, and Glen Elder explored the perspectives of the rural migrants who felt alienated by cleavages within the labor movement and the ANC's hostel conversion program of the late 1980s that they felt attacked their urban base (and therefore their income) and "heteropatriarchal" kinship patterns.⁶⁴

Most recently, several studies point to the significance of local understandings of *uDlame*.⁶⁵ Krämer and Kynoch draw upon political scientist Stathis Kalyvas' framework for analyzing civil war that invites us to think about modalities linking distinct actors and motivations and to see civil wars as "concatenations of multiple and often disparate local

⁶³ Bonnin, "Space, Place and Identity."

⁶⁴ Segal, "The Human Face of Violence"; Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Glen S. Elder, "Malevolent Traditions: Hostel Violence and the Procreational Geography of Apartheid," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29, no. 4 (2003): 921–935.

⁶⁵ Krämer, *Violence as Routine*; Kynoch, "'Our Township Turned into Beirut': Narratives of Violence in Thokoza/Katlehong, 1990-94"; Philip Bonner and Vusi Ndima, "The Roots of Violence and Martial Zuluness on the East Rand," in *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008).

cleavages, more or less loosely arrayed around the master cleavage.”⁶⁶ Krämer also argues that the transition-era political violence did not end in KwaZulu-Natal with the 1994 elections; revenge violence became a routine means of acting in local-level politics. Most important for this study, Krämer convincingly shows through a case study of Inchanga that violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal is characterized by a disjuncture between the centre and periphery (between the local and the provincial/national politics) in the post-apartheid era.⁶⁷ Similarly, Bonner and Ndimas study of clashes in East Rand townships locates their proximal cause in bloody taxi rivalries over control of routes and passengers while migrant laborers sought to generate income to sustain themselves and their rural families.⁶⁸

This brings us to Table Mountain. Situating *uDlame* there in the 150 years of conflict over land and leadership illustrates that there is no single cause for the eruption of violence between the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms and within the Maphumulo themselves. As Lauren Segal observed about the role of hostel dwellers in the political violence on the East Rand, “Violence as constructed from below... is far more complex than most media or political accounts portray. It becomes clear that the actors in the violence are motivated by a host of factors, which at times intersect with, and at other times radically diverge from, popular explanations or expressed party political lines.”⁶⁹ An examination of *uDlame* in Table Mountain casts new light on the disjuncture between local meanings and understanding of violent conflict and the explanation of a Third Force-fomented national struggle between the ANC and Inkatha

⁶⁶ Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil Wars,” *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 3 (2003): 486.

⁶⁷ Krämer, *Violence as Routine*.

⁶⁸ Bonner and Ndimas, “The Roots of Violence and Martial Zuluness on the East Rand,” 363–5.

⁶⁹ Segal, “The Human Face of Violence,” 192.

for political power. The parties in Table Mountain fought less because of Inkatha or ANC/UDF ideological affinity and organizational loyalty but rather because of historically contested land ownership and hotly debated socially defined meanings of authority and membership in the chiefdoms.

Land shortage, as elsewhere in South Africa, has been the most pressing factor behind violence in rural Natal since the late 19th century.⁷⁰ But land dispossession and lack of access for Africans alone does not explain why violence erupted at Table Mountain when it did. Relying on resource mobilization theory, Johan Olivier convincingly theorizes that grievances turn into insurgency when an increase in the level of resources available to support collective protest occurs.⁷¹ At Table Mountain, the pro-Inkatha Nyavu capitalized upon the national struggle for political power between the ANC, Inkatha, and the dying apartheid government to invade Mbambangalo and stake claim to historically contested land. Moreover, dissatisfied individuals among the Maphumulo allied themselves with Inkatha and the Nyavu to contest the legitimacy of Chief Mhlabunzima.

Land, Chiefly Authority, and Membership in *isiZwe*

⁷⁰ Jonathan Clegg, "Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - Bringing Back the Body: An Examination into the Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations, 1882-1944," in *Working Papers in Southern African Studies*, ed. Philip Bonner, vol. 2 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981); Minnaar, *Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu*; D.R. Edgecombe, John Laband, and Paul Thompson, eds., *Roots of Conflict in Natal: A Selection of Papers on Violence in the Colony and Province* (Pietermaritzburg: Department of Historical Studies, University of Natal, 1994).

⁷¹ Johan Olivier, "Political Conflict in South Africa: A Resource Mobilisation Approach," in *Capturing the Event: Conflict Trends in the Natal Region*, Indicator South Africa (Durban: Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, 1992), 1-14.

As I will discuss below, I had not set out to write a dissertation on land and chiefly authority in KwaZulu-Natal. But oral and archival sources pointed me to the centrality of century-long disputes over land and other material resources to the unfolding of *uDlame* at Table Mountain. In this section I lay out the background of indirect rule and its impact on land and chiefs, issues that thread throughout the chapters. But first we must understand the organization of the polities to be briefly considered.

The *umuzi* (plural, *imizi*), or homestead, formed the central kinship construct around which daily life revolved. The *umndeni* (homesteads that share a very proximate common ancestor and interact for purposes of dispute arbitration and important ceremonies) as well as the administrative structure of the *isigodi* (ward) linked *imizi* to one another and to the *inkosi* (chief). The polity under a chief often called itself by the name of one of his ancestors.

As historian Paul Landau has recently argued, hybridity was at the core of southern African political traditions between the 15th and 20th centuries. The relationships between homesteads and polities changed over time.⁷² Norman Etherington describes the important movements of 19th century southern Africa not as movements of chiefdoms but of chiefs whose followings could and did include people from all backgrounds.⁷³ Fealty to a chief depended upon a contract between the traditional leader and a homestead head. Membership was open to any who wished to owe allegiance to a chief. The African custom of paying allegiance to a chief, *ukukhonza*, was founded on a personal and mutually beneficial relationship whereby an *umuzi*

⁷² South Africa was not originally a place of “tribes.” Paul Stuart Landau, *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400-1948* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

⁷³ Norman Etherington, *The Great Treks: The Transformation of Southern Africa, 1815-1854* (New York: Longman, 2001).

placed itself under the protection of a chief to whom he reciprocated by giving loyalty.⁷⁴ The proverb “*Inkosi yinkosi ngabantu*,” best reflects this relationship – a chief was a chief because of the people who *khonza*’d him.⁷⁵ The polity of the chief, the *isizwe* (chiefdom), was not territorially bounded and it was not uncommon for members of a polity to establish *imizi* far from that of their chief. *Imizi* could also break allegiance from their chief, paying *ukukhonza* to another. This contract, hereditary descent, and the possession of *inkatha yesizwe*⁷⁶ by the reigning *inkosi* (chief) provided legitimacy to the authority of the *ubukhosi* (chieftaincy).

The British colonial system of indirect rule worked with a single model of so-called customary authority that presumed a king at the center of every polity, a chief on every piece of ground, and a patriarch in every homestead.⁷⁷ The best known application of indirect rule was in the administration of Northern Nigeria under Frederick Lugard in the early 1900s, but actually dates back in Africa to the 1850s in Natal. Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes (later Secretary for Native Affairs) Theophilus Shepstone began to devise and implement a system of African administration based on his extensive knowledge and attention to African forms of

⁷⁴ W. D. Hammond-Tooke, “In Search of the Lineage: The Cape Nguni Case,” *Man* 19, no. 1, New Series (March 1, 1984): 77–93; Mduzuzi Percival Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority from ‘Personal to Territorial’: An Historical Analysis of the Limitations of Colonial Boundaries on African Socio-Political Relations in Natal’s Maphumulo/Lower Thukela Region, 1890-1910” (M.A. thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2012).

⁷⁵ C. L. Sibusiso Nyembezi, *Zulu Proverbs* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1963).

⁷⁶ *Inkatha* is a coil of grass incorporating materials that give the possessor strength over hostile forces. (More commonplace ones are used to help carry water pots on the head.) *Inkatha yesizwe* (of the nation) symbolized the strength of the chief and facilitated the unity of the chiefdom.

⁷⁷ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 39.

governance.⁷⁸ Shepstone used the position of the chiefs, modeling himself upon Shaka to cast himself as the *de facto* Supreme Chief of ruling Africans in Natal. But the colonial notion of African society ossified in the Natal Code of Native Law actually was “a faithful mirror reflection of the decentralized despotism created under colonial rule.”⁷⁹ Most scholars agree the development of indirect rule resulted from the demands of colonial competition and the scarcity of resources, though recently J.C. Meyers has argued that it operated as part of a strategy designed to build legitimacy for the colonial and segregationist states with a large white settler population.⁸⁰

But reality on the ground for colonial administrators was much more complex than the theoretical model they envisioned. Shepstone and administrators like him across Africa encountered societies without chiefs or their equivalents.⁸¹ In Natal, the upheavals associated with the rise of the Shaka and the Zulu kingdom seriously disrupted local societies and Shepstone found many Africans without traditional leaders. Just as Shaka and Dingane had replaced chiefs feared too powerful with family members and officers known to be loyal, Shepstone appointed men likely to follow British orders where suitable hereditary leaders could

⁷⁸ David Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845-1910* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971); Thomas V McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords: Shepstone and the Colonial State in Natal, South Africa, 1845-1878* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2010).

⁷⁹ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 39.

⁸⁰ Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*; Norman Etherington, “The ‘Shepstone System’ in the Colony of Natal and Beyond the Borders,” in *Natal and Zululand: From Earliest Times to 1910* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1989); Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*; Myers, *Indirect Rule in South Africa*.

⁸¹ Robert L. Tignor, “Colonial Chiefs in Chiefless Societies,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 9, no. 3 (October 1, 1971): 339–359; Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*; John Lambert, *Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal* (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 1995); Heather Hughes, “Politics and Society in Inanda, Natal: The Qadi Under Chief Mqhawe, C1840-1906” (PhD dissertation, University of London, 1995).

not be found.⁸² These *iziphakanyiswa* (commoners elevated to the position of chief) were often magisterial *izinduna* who had earned favor through their positions. Their chiefdoms became known in official parlance as “government tribes.”

Colonial administrators in Natal also found the dispersion of *imizi* pledging allegiance to a chief across the colonial magisterial districts administratively challenging. They sought to proscribe the process by which *imizi* could join a chiefdom, requiring permission from the native administration in order to do so. After the 1906 *impi yamakhanda* (war of the heads, also known as Bambatha’s Rebellion and the Zulu Rebellion), Natal colonial authorities believed loyalty to chiefs motivated the extensive travel and “war doctoring” that occurred during the uprising.⁸³ Authorities thus set out to undermine the “personal” nature of political relations through a redefinition of *isizwe* into territorially bound “tribes.” As Percy Ngonyama has convincingly shown, the colonial equivalent to “*inkosi yinkosi ngabantu*” became “*inkosi yinkosi ngendawo*,” meaning a chief is a chief because of the territory in which he rules.⁸⁴

The British translation and conception of *isizwe* as “tribe” was fundamentally tied to the colonial power’s interest in presenting African societies as inherently uncivilized, barbarous, and violent. The belief about an African tendency towards violence permeated colonial explanations for “tribal unrest” and “faction-fights” in rural areas and later in the industrial compounds. Such conflicts emerged not because of some “tribalism” of the people involved, but as a result of colonial efforts “to order the changing present according to supposedly stable body of

⁸² Adam Kuper, “The ‘House’ and Zulu Political Structure in the Nineteenth Century,” *The Journal of African History* 34, no. 3 (January 1, 1993): 30–1; Lambert, *Betrayed Trust*.

⁸³ Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority.” On the “war doctoring” of the rebellion, see Jeff Guy, *The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law And Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2005).

⁸⁴ Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority,” 20.

custom.”⁸⁵ The tying of chiefly authority to territory produced a countless number of *izimpi zemibango* (wars of disputes) between chiefdoms over boundaries and authority. Leaders who enjoyed hereditary descent made claims on land and disputed boundaries based on this status. The Nyavu chiefs examined here contested the initial boundary set down between them and their neighbors on the Inanda Location, the appointed Maphumulo chieftaincy, and repeatedly attempted to regain territory by claiming hereditary right to land during the segregationist and apartheid eras. In the years preceding the outbreak of *uDlame* in Table Mountain, magisterial officials answered numerous letters and made trips to region in attempts to mitigate the dispute.

This manipulation of chiefly authority for the benefit of the white minority continued into the segregation and apartheid eras. The 1927 Native Administration Act made chiefs agents of the government and gave the Governor General the power to appoint and depose chiefs and regulate their functions at will. The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act attempted to pull chiefs deeper into the system of African administration. Those chiefs who resisted, such as ANC President Albert Luthuli, were deposed and replaced with someone more compliant. The ANC campaign against the Bantu Authorities Act urged chiefs to resist the implementation of tribal authorities or risk becoming stooges of the apartheid regime. Anti-apartheid activists applied the label of collaborator to traditional leaders who did not openly resist the tribal and territorial authorities.

The centrality of chiefs to the projects of indirect rule and apartheid as well as their continued significance in a democratic South Africa has attracted considerable scholarly attention. Revisionist scholars turned towards “history from below,” partly inspired by the radicalization of black youth in the late 1970s and the increasing militarization of resistance of in the 1980s. This shift towards African perspectives produced some of the benchmark studies of

⁸⁵ Myers, *Indirect Rule in South Africa*.

nineteenth-century southern African chiefdoms and state formation (and disintegration) amongst the Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Pondo, Swazi and southern Tswana.⁸⁶ The numerous studies of Shepstone and the policy of indirect rule in Natal shed light on the manipulation and creation of chieftaincies.⁸⁷ Less research has been done on the hereditary and created chiefdoms under colonialism.⁸⁸ This literature, as well as that of chiefs outside of South Africa, portrays indirect rule as a useful tool of colonialism that empowered chiefs but caused them to lose popular legitimacy.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Jeff Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884* (University of Kwazulu Natal Press, 1979); Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore, eds., *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (London: Longman, 1980); Peter Delius, *The Land Belongs to Us: The Pedi Polity, the Boers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Transvaal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); J. B Peires, *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of their Independence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Philip Bonner, *Kings, Commoners, and Concessionaires: The Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Kevin Shillington, *The Colonisation of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900* (Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 1985); J. B Peires, *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856-7* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

⁸⁷ Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*; Etherington, "The 'Shepstone System' in the Colony of Natal and Beyond the Borders"; Lambert, *Betrayed Trust*; McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords*.

⁸⁸ Important exceptions being John Wright, *The Hlubi Chiefdom in Zululand-Natal: A History* (Ladysmith: Ladysmith Historical Society, 1983); Hughes, "Politics and Society in Inanda, Natal"; Ngonyama, "Redefining Amakhosi Authority." Anthropological work such as that on the Nyuswa and Makhanya is more prevalent. See Absolom Vilakazi, *Zulu Transformations: A Study of the Dynamics of Social Change* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1962); D. H Reader, *Zulu Tribe in Transition: The Makhanya of Southern Natal* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966); Harriet Ngubane, *Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine: An Ethnography of Health and Disease in Nyuswa-Zulu Thought and Practice* (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

⁸⁹ Outside of South Africa, see Randall Packard, *Chiefship and Cosmology: An Historical Study of Political Competition* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); Martin Chanock, *Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Marshall S Clough, *Fighting Two Sides: Kenyan Chiefs and Politicians, 1918-1940* (Niwtot: University Press of Colorado, 1990); Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa*, Eastern African

But as Heather Hughes has pointed out in her doctoral work on the Qadi in Natal, where a scholar focuses one's attention deeply affects the outcome of the analysis. By examining the colonial administrations, Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, John Lambert, and others only reveal the ways in which chiefly authority slid precipitously into paternalistic authoritarianism. The result is the "oversimple conclusion that chiefs everywhere became corrupt and oppressive, the popular support they were deemed once to have enjoyed ineluctably eroded by their methods of coping with their ambiguous, not to say invidious, positions within the colonial order."⁹⁰ That a large number of chiefs fit this portrayal is not denied, but as Hughes points out, the idea that chiefs could act in the interests of their followers as a way of enhancing their own legitimacy appears to be an unthinkable possibility in most of the literature. Hughes suggests more research needs to be done on the ideology of chieftaincy as perpetuated not only by colonial outsiders but by the chiefs and their followers. In her focus on the Qadi chief Mqhawwe, Hughes shows how the Qadi elite employed all possible resources that the colonial conditions could provide in order to rebuild the material and political coherence of a people relocated to Natal during the rise of the Zulu kingdom.

Just as Hughes turns the scholarly focus away from the colonial administration, Mduduzi Percival Ngonyama's focus on the practice of *ukukhonza* provides a much-needed analysis of the relationship between chiefs and subjects. Ngonyama, examining the Magwaza under the appointed chief Guzana ka Seketwayo and the Luthuli under hereditary chief Njubanjuba, argues that the colonial changes in structure of boundaries between chiefdoms attached new meanings

Studies (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992); Richard Rathbone, *Nkrumah & the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-60* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).

⁹⁰ Hughes, "Politics and Society in Inanda, Natal," 31.

to *ukukhonza*, effecting a shift from a personal relationship between chiefs and followers to one based on land.⁹¹

The relationship of chiefs and access to land is central to understanding some of the current debates over the role of traditional leadership in the new South Africa. The country's Interim Constitution of 1993 and the new Constitution of 1996 advocated democracy based on representation at all levels of government while also recognizing the institution of traditional leaders. The exact powers and functions of these leaders, however, were ambiguous until 2003 when the ANC-led government passed the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act and Communal Land Right Acts. These bills resulted from pressure and mobilization on the part of "a very articulate portion of the country's traditional leadership," the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa) under Inkosi Pathekile Holomisa.⁹² Most surprising to activists who hoped 1994 would bring the decline of the chieftaincy, traditional leadership has proved resilient and a groundswell of support accompanied the ANC's recognition of the institution.⁹³ The first bill recognized tribal authority bodies (now named Traditional

⁹¹ Ngonyama, "Redefining Amakhosi Authority."

⁹² Annika Mokvist Uggla, "Democratisation, Traditional Leadership and Reform Politics in South Africa" (PhD dissertation, Uppsala University, 2006), 2. For more on Contralesa and Holomisa, see Phathekile Holomisa, *According to Tradition: A Cultural Perspective on Current Affairs* (Somerset West: Essential Books, 2009); Nkosi S. P. Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword: A Quest for a Place in the African Sun : Archival Records on the Formation and Missions of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa* (Cape Town: Real African Publishers, 2011); Tim Gibbs, "Ah! Dilintzaba! 'The One Who Breaks Down Barriers': Pathekile Holomisa, a Networked Chief," in *Politics and Sociology Seminar* (Rhodes University, 2011).

⁹³ Peter Delius, *A Lion Amongst the Cattle: Reconstruction and Resistance in the Northern Transvaal* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1996); J.B. Peires, "Traditional Leaders in Purgatory Local Government in Tsolo, Qumbu and Port St Johns, 1990–2000," *African Studies* 59, no. 1 (2000): 97–114; Barbara Oomen, *Tradition on the Move: Chiefs, Democracy and Change in Rural South Africa* (Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, 2000);

Councils) that were set up under the apartheid Bantu Authorities Act. As under apartheid, the councils are 60 percent unelected members. The second act authorized the councils to administer and allocate communally held land in the rural areas. The Traditional Courts Bill, which would give chiefs' courts legal power, is currently under debate in Parliament.

Anthropologist Deborah James points out that it has become more-or-less conventional wisdom that access to land in Africa is dependent on connections such as that between chiefs and their followers.⁹⁴ But the value of land in and of itself has long been in debate in African studies. Scholarship on slavery suggests African societies generally valued people more than land and that land ownership was a colonial and modern imposition.⁹⁵ These scholars generally only trace land ownership from the onset of colonial rule, when land access became scarce and Europeans introduced notions of property rights.⁹⁶ However, historian Assan Sarr has recently argued that these emphases ignore the political and social value pre-colonial Africans placed on land.⁹⁷

Barbara Oomen, *Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power and Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era* (James Currey, 2005).

⁹⁴ Sara Berry, *Chiefs Know their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power, and the Past in Asante, 1896-1996* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2000); Kristine Juul and Christian Lund, eds., *Negotiating Property in Africa* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002); Deborah James, *Gaining Ground? "Rights" and "Property" in South African Land Reform* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

⁹⁵ For example, see Martin Klein, ed., *Peasants in Africa: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980); Joseph C. Miller, *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); John K Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁹⁶ Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier*, vol. II (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Sara Berry, *No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); Berry, *Chiefs Know their Boundaries*.

⁹⁷ Assan Sarr, "Land and Historical Change in a River Valley: Property, Power and Dependency in the Lower Gambia Basin, Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries" (PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, 2010).

Chiefly control of land as a colonial invention is the focus of Lungisile Ntsebeza's scathing analysis of chieftaincy in the Transkei. Ntsebeza, a sociologist and Chief Research Specialist in the Democracy and Governance Research Programme at the Human Sciences Research Council, argues that the post-1994 legitimacy of traditional authority rests solely on the control of land distribution as first enabled by colonial and apartheid practices. Ntsebeza contends that South Africa's democracy has been compromised by the accommodation of traditional leaders. He traces resistance to the chieftaincy in Xhalanga (Eastern Cape) across colonial, segregationist, and apartheid rule.⁹⁸ The value of Ntsebeza's analysis comes from its geographical location, a region without a tradition of chiefs or centralized leadership. The case study of Xhalanga warns against generalizations of the experience of chiefly authority, illustrating how rural governance varied across place and time. While Ntsebeza argues the accommodation of traditional authority as compromised democracy, his emphasis on variation in experience from place to place leaves open the possibility of a range of relationships such as in Natal where even appointed chiefs could gain legitimacy.

That chiefs accrued benefits from land is beyond doubt, but that they were motivated only by greed for land after colonialism ignores the social contract of *khonza* and other cultural forms of sanctioning chiefly legitimacy. The status of chiefs was dependent upon a social contract made with followers, a relationship that could not be honored without control of land. Furthermore, when the Nyavu chiefs of Table Mountain made their claims on contested territory, they did so on account of their hereditary status and maintained the land as the home and burial place of their ancestors. Historian Sara Berry's work on Ghana convincingly argued for viewing property as a social process rather than a set of initial conditions, and she has drawn attention to

⁹⁸ Lungisile Ntsebeza, *Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

the ways in which Asante claims on property and power invoked the past and debated its significance for people's contemporary lives.⁹⁹ In colonial and segregationist South Africa, the Nyavu chiefs were not just making claims on land to bolster their local authority, but stressing a *particular* kind of chiefly authority: hereditary descent, which they recognized as under attack by colonial and Union governments that deposed and appointed chiefs at will. For these local chiefs, the land was important not only due to its scarcity, but because of its ancestral worth and political value.

As mentioned earlier, this examination of *uDlame* in Table Mountain reveals a century-long dispute over land and chiefly legitimacy. The claims made on land at Table Mountain in the archive, in the press, and by those interviewed reveal the manner in which membership in a chiefdom changed and chiefly legitimacy was debated. This resonates with the findings of Scandinavian anthropologist Anna Bohlin in her study of land reform in the Western Cape. While the TRC produced historical narratives as part of a nation-building and reconciliation process, the land claim process was less subjected to these pressures—and was thus able to produce new history and memories. However, making particular land claims often required the establishment of new forms of Benedict Anderson's "imagined community" in order to fulfill state-sanctioned definitions of community and an "authentic" identity, whether based on geography, genealogy, language, ethnicity, culture, or race.¹⁰⁰ Outside of the land restitution

⁹⁹ Berry, *Chiefs Know their Boundaries*, xxii–xxvii.

¹⁰⁰ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991); Anna Bohlin, "Claiming Land and Making Memory: Engaging with the Past in Land Restitution," in *History Making and Present Day Politics* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007), 114–28; Derek Fay and Deborah James, "Giving Land Back or Righting Wrongs? Comparative Issues in the Study of Land Restitution," in *Land, Memory, Reconstruction, and Justice: Perspectives on Land Claims in South Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 45–6; William Ellis, "The Khomani San Land Claim Against the

process and the nation-building process of the TRC, this analysis points to reasons other than political or ideological affiliation for the explosion of deadly violence between the Maphumulo and Nyavu. In fact, land, contestation over chiefly legitimacy, and the changing meanings of membership in the *isizwe* were at the heart of *uDlame* in Table Mountain.

Sources, Methodology, and Positionality

The analysis in this dissertation is based upon documentary evidence unearthed in public archives, personal collections, and popular press in South Africa. In addition to the archival record and the secondary literature, I also draw upon over 60 oral history interviews that I conducted with my research assistant Thandeka Majola in KwaZulu-Natal. Having been trained in the methodology of history and oral history at Michigan State University, I am a firm believer in laying out how I came to study land, chiefly authority, and violence, and navigated not only the archives but the difficult terrain of an oral history of a sensitive and recent subject.¹⁰¹

My original interest in Zulu history came out of an undergraduate semester study abroad in Durban in 2003 during which I lived with an isiZulu-speaking family near the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) and took courses with the School for International Training. While studying Inkatha's refusal to participate in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I began to

Kalahari Gemsbok National Park: Requiring and Acquiring Authenticity," in *Land, Memory, Reconstruction, and Justice: Perspectives on Land Claims in South Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 185–7.

¹⁰¹ On the importance of placing the researcher within the research and examples see, Gracia Clark, *Onions Are My Husband: Survival and Accumulation by West African Market Women* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997); Laura Fair, *Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890-1945* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001); Nwando Achebe, *Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings: Female Power and Authority in Northern Igboland, 1900-1960* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2005).

think about “victims” and “perpetrators.” With so much popular and scholarly attention devoted to Buthelezi’s collaboration with the apartheid regime and to Zulu martial masculinity, I wanted to study the members of Inkatha, the everyday supporters, particularly the women. I did not envision women as only victims of war nor rank and file members in the pay of the apartheid regime. What made them support or join Inkatha? What made them fight for it? What role did women play in socializing the men who went to war? I hoped to contribute to the problematization of “collaboration” in South African history and show women – wives, mothers, and daughters - as actors and participants.¹⁰² I had not yet decided to study *uDlame*.

I chose Table Mountain as my field site because of a homestay I enjoyed there in 2007 as part of the Fulbright-Hays Zulu Group Project Abroad. I lived with the Gcabashe family, who knew me as Nokulunga (“mother of goodness,” the name I was given by my first isiZulu instructor with SIT), in the Maqongqo *isigodi* of Mbambangalo, a region of the Maphumulo chiefdom. This family and the community members who helped me with my isiZulu spoke frankly about local deaths during *uDlame*. The eldest daughter of the Gcabashe family had lost her parents during the conflict and many others could point out where loved ones and community members died. The young Gcabashe children wore Buthelezi t-shirts under their white school uniforms. These conversations piqued my interest, and before returning to South Africa to undertake several months of pre-dissertation research, I decided on Maqongqo as a field site because of these personal connections and gripping stories. When I returned the following year

¹⁰² On collaboration and resistance, see Frederick Cooper, “Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History,” *The American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (1994): 1516–1545; David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000); Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Jacob Dlamini, *Native Nostalgia* (Auckland Park, South Africa: Jacana Media, 2009); Shireen Ally and Arianna Lissoni, “‘Let’s Talk About Bantustans’,” *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 1 (2012): 1–4.

to begin preliminary archival research, I returned to visit with the Gcabashes and asked for help. I told them of my interest in Inkatha, to which Ma Mbongwa, the matriarch of the family, answered in English: “This house is Inkatha.” As I began to read the violence monitoring reports and newspaper articles at the Alan Paton Center Struggle Archives (APC) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) in Pietermaritzburg, I realized Ma Mbongwa’s claim meant more than just affiliation. Her late husband, Sabelo, and his brother Thomas Mshoki, had been powerful local Inkatha leaders.

During this short visit in 2008, I spent most of my time getting to know what research materials were available and where they were located. I quickly realized there was more to the violence in Table Mountain than the political competition between Inkatha and the ANC. In addition to the Gcabashe brothers, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo littered the pages of the regional press. When these men spoke to reporters, they repeatedly referred to a land conflict over the Goedverwachting farm between the Maphumulo and Nyavu. I began to piece together a story that I envisioned as an early chapter, the background to the violence, rather than the story itself.

Funded by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad fellowship, I returned to KwaZulu-Natal September 2010 for a year of fieldwork. I lived in Pietermaritzburg and was formally affiliated with the UKZN-Pietermaritzburg History Department and the Centre for Critical Research on Race and Identity in Durban. I returned to the Alan Paton Centre, where I made use of the vast documentation produced by contemporary violence monitors. The manner in which these records came to life is worth discussing.

As the violence escalated in the Pietermaritzburg region, a network of concerned individuals, civic organizations, and the University of Natal’s Centre for Adult Education (CAE)

banded together to record the extent of the violence and provide support where possible. Often membership overlapped in these groups, including the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness (PACSA), the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA), the Detainees' Support Committee, the End Conscription Campaign, the Natal Midlands Black Sash, and the Midlands Information Centre and Research Unit (MICRU). The papers of PACSA and CAE Director John Aitchison at APC were critical to this project.¹⁰³

PACSA had become a political home for many young local activists and played a central role in the launch of the Pietermaritzburg branch of the UDF in 1983. According to PACSA member Monika Wittenberg, the PACSA office often looked more like a first aid station as she sought to treat injuries from the increasing violence.¹⁰⁴ From 1986, the organization began monitoring the unfolding violence and referring their findings to the CAE to be compiled as part of a database. According to Aitchison, CAE had been subcontracted by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) as part of a computer literacy project set up to provide support to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and non-governmental organizations to

¹⁰³ For more on PACSA generally, see Levine, *Hope Beyond Apartheid*; Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness, *Journeying for Justice: Stories of an Ongoing Faith-Based Struggle* (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster, 2009). On AFRA, see Anne Harley and Romy Fotheringham, *AFRA: 20 Years in the Land Rights Struggle, 1979-1999* (Pietermaritzburg: Association for Rural Advancement, 1999); Chizuko Sato, "Forced Removals, Land NGOs and Community Politics in KwaZulu-Natal, 1953-2002" (PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, 2006), especially chapter four. On the Black Sash, Mirabel Rogers, *The Black Sash: The Story of the South African Women's Defence of the Constitution League* (Johannesburg: Rotonews, 1956); Cherry Michelman, *The Black Sash of South Africa: A Case Study in Liberalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); Kathryn Sprink, *Black Sash: The Beginning of a Bridge in South Africa* (London: Methuen, 1991); Mary Burton, "The Black Sash Story: Protest and Service Recorded in the Archives," *English Academy Review* 27, no. 2 (2010): 129–33.

¹⁰⁴ Monika Wittenberg, "PACSA as Refuge and First Aid Station," in *Hope Beyond Apartheid: The Peter Kerchoff Years of PACSA* (Pietermaritzburg: Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness, 2002), 154–5.

computerize. This provided CAE with the opportunity to enter monitoring information into a database.¹⁰⁵ Information poured into CAE from PACSA, Wendy Leeb who worked with COSATU in Mpophomeni, and Cheadle, Thompson, and Haysom, the law firm for COSATU. Leeb and Vaughn John also worked for CAE on the database. John recalls feeling the obligation to respond. “We work in Pietermaritzburg and as a university adult education centre we’re working very much with the people who were being affected by the violence and one can’t do adult education work while people’s lives are in turmoil.”¹⁰⁶ While the apartheid state actively concealed much information about the violence, the Centre saw its opportunity to play a role in disseminating reliable information to raise awareness of the conflict in South Africa and beyond. CAE attempted to compare vague police unrest reports, press clippings, and the statements of victims to quantify and document the violence. Aitchison’s master’s thesis analyzes the scale and scope of conflict in the years 1987-89.¹⁰⁷

When the Seven Days War broke out in 1990 these organizations doubled their efforts and partnered with the Democratic Party (DP) in what temporarily became known as the Ad Hoc Crisis Committee and later the Midlands Crisis Relief Committee (MCRC). MCRC met daily for several weeks and less frequently thereafter as it sought to mitigate the crisis.¹⁰⁸ As refugees from the violence poured into the DP offices and camps, CAE moved their computers into the

¹⁰⁵ John Aitchison, interview by author, Pietermaritzburg, November 22, 2011.

¹⁰⁶ Vaughn John, interview by author, Pietermaritzburg January 25, 2011.

¹⁰⁷ Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead.”

¹⁰⁸ MCRC had several sub-committees of Monitoring, Police, Relief and Displaced, Press and Publicity, Missing Persons and Identification, Funerals, Legal, and Medical Health. Peter Kerchoff submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, November 21, 1996, available in Levine, *Hope Beyond Apartheid*, 158–63.

DP offices. MCRC volunteers manned the office and phones, taking nearly 200 victim statements and reporting incidents to the authorities.

Radley Keys, Regional Director for the DP at the time, launched the Trust for Peace in Natal (PIN) in 1989 as a response to the violence. In addition to working with MCRC, PIN's local field workers cooperated with local leaders to better understand and help the communities under siege undertake localized peace initiatives. Keys himself was very active in the Table Mountain area, maintaining contacts with key figures of the different parties and acquiring keen insight into the local causes of the conflict. Keys generously provided me with his notes and reports on the region, which complemented the general PIN files available at the APC.

The monitors attempted to follow ethical research processes and to provide a balanced analysis of the violence, though several individuals and organizations had their own affiliations. The effort of the database compilers to include different sources does lend credence to the monitoring reports' neutrality. However, the majority of the refugees that poured into the city for help were unaffiliated or ANC/UDF supporters and there are few firsthand Inkatha statements in the records. The documentation of both PACSA and John Aitchison is now archived at the APC, where I sorted through statements, reports, press cuttings, and conference papers focused on the Table Mountain region. These monitoring efforts later became part of the Network of Independent Monitors (NIM), whose records I accessed in the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) Collection at the University of Witwatersrand Cullen Library Historical Papers.

I interviewed several former violence monitors (including academics, activists, and politicians) familiar with the region. Radley Keys and Tim Houghton, a volunteer with MCRC, graciously granted me access to personal documents and files regarding *uDlame*, including reports and notes and minutes from PIN and MCRC meetings. Thobekile and Thandokuhle

Maphumulo, the wife and son of the late Mhlabunzima, kindly shared with me a folder of press clippings and documents about the chief.

On the subjects of Inkatha and the KwaZulu bantustan, I utilized the Inkatha collections at Wits Historical Papers and Killie Campbell. At the Ulundi Archive Repository, I combed through what is left of the KwaZulu Cabinet files. Archivist Ntokozo Njoko went above and beyond the call of duty in helping me locate all that was available there, but regrettably the Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet files were incomplete. Walter Felgate, the long-time speech writer for Buthelezi and central committee member, defected to the ANC in 1997, taking with him an archive of invaluable documents, some of which he presented when subpoenaed by the TRC. Today, no one is certain of their location.¹⁰⁹ The Natal Room Collection at the APC included a wealth of information on Inkatha as part of Gerhard Maré's research on Buthelezi and the movement. The collection of full KZLA reports, speeches, memoranda, press releases, and press clippings on the violence, provided some of the most significant evidence for a conflict over land and leadership—including a memorandum of complaint from Inkatha-allied Mbambangalo residents concerning Chief Maphumulo.

As my initial research and the interviews alerted me to the historical nature of the conflict between chiefdoms over land, I extended my search to the Pietermaritzburg Repository of the National Archive. Here I explored the histories of the chiefdoms and the acquisition of farms for the Maphumulo in the records of the Pietermaritzburg (PMB) and Camperdown (CPD) magistrates. In addition, I examined the files of the Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA), Chief Native Commissioner (CNC), and the Department of Development Aid (DDA). The

¹⁰⁹ Felgate deposited them at the Campbell Collections at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, but they were taken into temporary custody by the TRC when he was subpoenaed. Efforts to locate them, including correspondence with the Department of Justice, are ongoing.

centralization of “native administration” after apartheid required additional research in the National Archive in Pretoria. There, I accessed Native Affairs Department (NTS), Bantu Administration and Development (BAD), and Department of Land (LDE) files.

Unfortunately, the historical records of the Mpumalanga Magistrate, established in 1972, have not yet been transferred to an archive and are instead in government offices at the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) where they are not as easily accessible. When I met with a COGTA land official hoping to access the files (after months of a wild goose chase before finally locating them) he willingly shared the files on Goedverwachting but claimed to have no other documents on the chiefdoms. The deeds registries and maps at the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform were essential to following the land transfers and changing boundaries.

These government documents obviously provide insight into the colonial, segregationist, and apartheid government perspectives, but they also shed light on African perspectives. The records must be used carefully; they are usually written in English and given the circumstances of court transcribers are probably paraphrased and possibly distorted. Those Africans giving testimony may not have been as frank as the historian would hope in the formal and hostile environment of the colonial courts. On the other hand, the courts provided some Africans with a stage to promote their own interests, whether it was an appointed chief declaring his loyalty to the administration or the hereditary chief expressing grievances against neighboring chiefs. As a result, such first-hand testimony provides the historian with glimpses into African motivations.

While I was doing this archival work, I also made regular trips up the winding Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo Road into Mbambangalo and KwaNyavu both to conduct research and to spend time in the community with family and friends. Language was crucial. While I

studied isiZulu to an advanced level, including a semester in Durban, FLAS-funded tutoring at MSU, and the Zulu GPA in Mbambangalo, I did not want to miss any important details or misconstrue the intentions of my interviewees due to a lack of understanding of figurative speech, idioms, or vocabulary. Radikobo Ntsimane of the Sinomlando Centre for Oral History and Memory Work in Africa at the University of KwaZulu-Natal introduced me to Thandeka Majola, a part-time employee at the Centre trained in oral history methodology and willing to join me in the field.

We began our interviews in Mbambangalo, where Phindi Gcabashe introduced us at the Maphumulo *inkantolo* (literally court, here meaning the court of the chiefdom). The Maphumulo secretary, Cindy Mkhize, told the chief and izinduna about the project and all assented. Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo recommended an ANC-affiliated induna from the Stingini *isigodi*, Amos Ndlela, and the Inkatha councillor, Mdu Ntuli, to help us find interviewees. Inkosi Maphumulo agreed to be interviewed and connected us with his uncle Bangingi, an important figure in the history of Mbambangalo and the Maphumulo *Umndeni*. His brother Thando facilitated several other interviews with people close to the late Inkosi Mhlabunzima. At the same time, I sought other means to find interviewees. I had no connections in KwaNyavu and initially interviewed few outside of Maqongqo, where Ma Mbongwa lived, and Stingini, where Induna Ndlela introduced us to men and women working with him on a community crèche project.

By far the biggest breaks came by luck. Through Sinomlando, Thandeka met someone who recommended we visit the nearby Kenosis Community Trust. Through Kenosis, we met four remarkable Maphumulo and Nyavu women who had been trained as volunteers to assist their communities in health and child care. Through these women, our interviews began to shift

into Esinyameni (KwaNyavu), Echibini, and other parts of Stingini. Toward the end of my fieldwork, a government official gave me the number of Chief Siphosiki Mdluli, enabling us to interview the man considered to be *the* Nyavu historian. After 1994, many refugees from the violence across KwaZulu-Natal moved to a new township between Table Mountain and the city named after the struggle hero Chris Hani. We met former Mbambangalo residents now living in Haniville through Happiness Memela, a colleague of the son of another interviewee.

Convinced of the significance of land and the chiefs in the conflict, I began the oral history portion of my fieldwork. In all of the interviews, I adopted the “life history” methodology. Opening with broad questions about a person’s background and family not only enabled the interviewee to become comfortable with answering questions, it often produced very useful information about whether or not the person had always lived at Table Mountain or when they had moved there. Because I was concerned with the gendered experience of the war and ethnicity, we asked everyone similar questions about what it meant to be Zulu, how they taught their children to be Zulu, and how the war affected their ability to practice Zuluness in addition to general questions about the unfolding and causes of the violence. People had a lot to say about *uDlame*, but not necessarily about what it meant to them to be Zulu.¹¹⁰ Rather than impose my interests, I listened attentively to what people said about *uDlame*. In one instance, Induna Ndlela introduced us to the community elder, Goge Balothi, and then took over the questioning mid-interview. Thandeka and I sat back and listened as the induna asked for specific information about land and development in the region, providing some of the most important details to this

¹¹⁰ As Barbara Cooper points out, getting people to talk about such issues requires a great deal of prompting because they regard the information as obvious and uninteresting. Asking what it meant to be Zulu got us quite a few confused looks. Barbara M. Cooper, “Oral Sources and the Challenge of African History,” in *Writing African History* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2005), 191–215.

study.¹¹¹ As a result of this and other such interviews, we started to ask questions about the chiefdoms, refugees, and the flooding that caused some Nyavu to move onto the contested land at Echibini. I began to think more deeply about the dissertation as a study of land and chiefly authority in 20th century South Africa.

Thandeka and I were a conspicuous pair in these communities. While Mbambangalo had for several years hosted American students (including myself) as part of the Zulu Group Project Abroad, a white person regularly in the village was still an interesting occurrence for many school-age children. While Thandeka was a young, isiZulu-speaking South African female, she was still an outsider to the village, and an urban one at that. Jokes about my long (and therefore culturally respectable) skirt and her fashionable jeans often provided humorous moments during the interview process. While many women queried if I had children yet, more women asked Thandeka why she was not yet married. Her affability and ability to empathize helped to overcome obstacles posed by my own background. Our relatively young age certainly was advantageous in asking questions about gender, culture, and ethnicity (it was indeed these questions that usually sparked comments about Thandeka's attire). The elders openly shared how things used to be and my position as a white American researcher allowed me to ask for details when respondents expected Thandeka to understand. My ability to participate also brought many moments of lightheartedness – the *umlungu* (white person) speaks Zulu!

¹¹¹ On doing privileging informants' words and "field plagiarism," see James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Abdullahi A. Ibrahim, "The Birth of the Interview: The Thin and Fat of It," in *African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 103–24; Luise White, "True Stories: Narrative, Event, History, and Blood in the Lake Victoria Basin," in *African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 281–304; Achebe, *Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings*.

I was ever mindful of my positionality in the field – but many others were too. My relationship with the Gcabashe family had to be delicately maneuvered, stressed in some contexts and minimized in others as I sought to demonstrate my own political neutrality. We were outsiders asking questions about a very sensitive subject in the recent past. The implications of *uDlame* were very present for families who had lost loved ones and breadwinners, who had to rebuild homes, who had not returned to Mbambangalo after the conflict. In some cases, the people responsible for their pain still lived in the community. While I had anticipated some resistance to interviews on account of the pain and recentness of the subject, my time in the community led me to believe, correctly as it turned out, that some people would be willing to talk. Others were not, however, as became clear in the reactions of Inkatha members at a meeting in January 2011 where Thandeka and I introduced ourselves and this research project.

The Inkatha councillor Mdu Ntuli, after some negotiation, allowed us to garner interest at an Inkatha election meeting. I got many giggles as I stood with Thandeka before the community hall and introduced ourselves and the project in isiZulu. Thandeka repeated some things where she thought perhaps I had not been clear. A verbal barrage began, largely directed at the resilient Thandeka because they were not certain I understood. Women made up the majority of speakers. This was a painful subject with which the community had only recently come to terms. There was no need to reopen wounds. Why now, in a local municipal election year? What would they get out of this? One woman suggested I should build a library for the community, rather than give copies of the interviews to the individuals and the local university archive. After each interview, I took photographs of the people with whom we spoke. None shrunk from offers to have their picture taken, which for many was the second time only to their I.D. booklets. Before

returning to the U.S. I gave copies of not only these photographs, but the interviews on CD (and paper copies where transcription had been completed) to everyone who participated. This was my small way of way of thanking those who gave so freely of their time and stories without compromising funds or the interview process. From the excited responses as people shared their photographs or ran to listen to their interview, I believe it was meaningful.¹¹² While the woman's library question was justifiable (what should participants get out of this project), Ma Mbongwa believed the question was politically motivated; the woman was jockeying for Ntuli's position and Thandeka and I had become a way to contest Ntuli.

On the other hand, several people did speak out on behalf of the project. Ntuli's wife spoke to the need for the younger generation to learn what had happened. Another man proposed we go to regional office of Inkatha to ensure their permission, that then people might be more willing to speak with us. Discouraged, we retreated to the Gcabashe *umuzi*. After the meeting, people I already knew and who had agreed to be interviewed began to withdraw. Kindly, Ntuli later promised to introduce us to others he knew would speak to us despite the meeting, but proved to be quite busy and none materialized.

As suggested by this Inkatha meeting, we were operating in a tense contemporary context. My year of fieldwork coincided with local municipal elections, heightening community tensions between Inkatha and ANC. While Inkatha established dominance in the entire Table Mountain region during and immediately after *uDlame*, the ANC began to gradually erode

¹¹² The ethics of gift giving or payment and recognizing the limits of your abilities and methodologies has largely been discussed amongst feminist scholars, see Daphne Patai, "Is Ethical Research Possible? US Academics and Third World Women," in *Women's Words: Feminist Practice of Oral History* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 137–53; Diane Reay, "Feminist Research: The Fallacy of Easy Access," *Women's Studies International Forum* 18 (1995): 205–13; Bev Gatenby and Maria Humphries, "Feminist Participatory Action Research: Methodological and Ethical Issues," *Women's Studies International Forum* 23, no. 1 (2000): 89–105.

Inkatha's support in Mbambangalo in 2004 with the installation of the heir Nhlakanipho (a member of Contralesa perceived to be an ANC supporter) as chief of the Maphumulo. During my research there in 2010-11, the parties campaigned intensely, aware of the potential for an ANC victory.¹¹³ In KwaNyavu, the splintering of Inkatha and the establishment of the National Freedom Party (NFP) in 2010 further increased existing tensions and resulted in the death of an NFP candidate, Elias Dube, prior to the 2011 elections.¹¹⁴ The Inkatha split also caused an ANC victory in at least one voting district.¹¹⁵ Agnes Nxumalo, a Nyavu woman known for her community service (we met her through Kenosis), invited several women to her home a month after the death of Dube so we could introduce ourselves and the project. Upon hearing we wanted to discuss *uDlame*, one woman immediately got up and left.

In addition to this range of challenges, I also had to be mindful of the ongoing land conflict and its legacy. The way people responded to us and our questions about land convinced me it should be central to the dissertation. While Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo deployed Ntuli and Induna Ndlela to help us find interviewees, our effort to get the Echibini induna to help us was blocked. He avoided my phone calls for some time before he finally acknowledged that he had been told we had enough help from Ndlela. I felt strongly this was not about "enough help," but about the contested jurisdiction of Echibini. The Cooperative Governance and Traditional

¹¹³ Voting wards in the Mbambangalo region show steady gains for the ANC, with Nkanyezini going to the ANC as early as 2006. But it was only in the 2009 National election with the isiZulu-speaking Jacob Zuma as ANC president that the ANC won additional districts. The Inkatha stronghold of Mboyi remained IFP until the 2011 election. Results accessed from <http://www.elections.org.za>, June 22, 2012.

¹¹⁴ "Camperdown: masked men shoot councillor," *Natal Witness* April 14, 2011; "End intimidation, MEC tells parties," *Natal Witness* May 3, 2011.

¹¹⁵ Inkatha still won one ward while the ANC narrowly took the others. In the 2009 Zuma elections, only one ward voted predominantly ANC. Results accessed from <http://www.elections.org.za>, June 22, 2012.

Affairs official I spoke with believed that by appointing this new induna in Echibini, the Maphumulo were again staking their claim on the disputed land. Similarly, when I asked Ndlela to show us the boundaries of Mbambangalo, he wanted to first obtain permission from the chief; it never happened. While some Maphumulo and Nyavu interviewed admitted the land did not belong to either chiefdom, others treated the land as their own and failed to disclose (or did not know) the land was in dispute. Another former induna central to the conflict who I anxiously hoped to interview was forbidden from speaking about “matters of the *isizwe* (chiefdom),” When my connection told me this, he said it was because the man had been accused of telling lies about the Maphumulo chiefdom. Whether he was telling lies or simply stories the Maphumulo wished not to be told, the charge made me want to interview him even more.

The more technical aspects of oral history in the 21st century also impacted the manner in which interviews unfolded. Michigan State University’s Institutional Review Board declared the project “non-reviewable” after considering my interview questions and determining that the interviews would produce “unique narratives” rather than “generalizable knowledge.” But I wanted to deposit copies of the interviews at the Alan Paton Centre in Pietermaritzburg and desired to illustrate good faith efforts of informed consent in order to do so. Initially, Thandeka and I read the form in isiZulu prior to each interview. Those who could read and sign did so, but the majority of those interviewed were illiterate. The combination of an *umlungu* with forms and popular illiteracy made the initial moments of interviewing stiff and awkward. As the project got underway, we stopped asking for written consent except when we knew it could be given; instead we clearly asked for permission prior to beginning the interview. In some instances, when people learned what we wanted to discuss they launched into stories before we could ask for consent! Rather than ruin the flow we turned on the digital recorder and asked for consent

afterwards. In very few instances did the recorder seem to negatively affect storytelling, an achievement I attribute to Thandeka's affability and skill as an oral historian.

Analyzing these oral interviews thus requires consideration of layers of context, experience, and public (both of the nation and dominant political movements) and private interpretation.¹¹⁶ That the current dispute affected how locals talked about the land unambiguously is clear. That it affected people's memories of the cause of the violence seems less likely. As we will see, the attribution of *uDlame* to the historical land conflict resonated with contemporary local explanations for the violence. Furthermore, even as people assigned blame to the political parties they also acknowledged they were fighting for Echibini. Unlike conflicts within communities over the territorialization of an area by a particular political party (like that in Mbambangalo after Maphumulo's assassination), the fight for Echibini was between two chiefdoms long in debate over the jurisdiction of the land. As well, the nostalgic manner in which some current and former Mbambangalo residents remember the late chief Maphumulo may reflect not only the way their lives have changed but hopes for the future, particularly in the midst of debates over the role of traditional authority in South Africa.¹¹⁷

Oral history was invaluable to this study. The stories of fighting in and over Goedverwaching pushed me to look at the history of the farms and chiefdoms in the archives

¹¹⁶ On the present context and interview dynamics, see: Helena Pohlandt-McCormick, *"I Saw a Nightmare": Doing Violence to Memory: The Soweto Uprising, June 16, 1976* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Sarah Nuttall and Carli Coetzee, *Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998); Cheryl Walker, *Land, Memory, Reconstruction, and Justice: Perspectives on Land Claims in South Africa* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2010).

¹¹⁷ Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Jennifer Delisle, "Finding the Future in the Past: Nostalgia and Community-Building in Mhlophe's 'Have You Seen Zandile?'," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 32, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 387–401; Dlamini, *Native Nostalgia*.

and revealed the existing tensions in the region that led up to *uDlame*. The oral sources counter the voices of the various white authorities who sought to control the lives of Africans and give insight into local understandings of history. The interviews not only speak to over 100 years of contest over land and chiefly authority in this part of KwaZulu-Natal, it shifts our focus to those men, women, and children who bore the brunt of the violence.

Chapter Outline

The first narrative chapter introduces the peoples of Table Mountain with whom this dissertation is concerned. It explores the deep historical roots of *uDlame* in this part of KwaZulu-Natal by locating the origins of the violence in the colonial creation of chieftaincies. It introduces the Nyavu, a chiefdom dating to the pre-Shakan era that found itself on the run during the rise of the Zulu kingdom in the early 19th century. The chapter examines the impact of indirect rule upon the Table Mountain region, particularly how the hereditary Nyavu chiefs positioned themselves against newly created chiefdoms such as the nearby Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo. The Nyavu made claims on scarce land and attempted to delegitimize the newly appointed chiefs by calling upon their hereditary descent (pre-colonial-1905).

Chapter two follows these chiefdoms into the early to mid-twentieth century, setting the scene for the land conflict during *uDlame* over a portion of the Goedverwaching farm. It introduces the concept of *izimpi zemibango*, or wars of disputes, to enable an examination of a variety of actors, issues, and interests that contributed to frequent fighting between the Maphumulo and Nyavu. The chiefs attributed conflict to the disputed boundary and acknowledged the increasing tension between the hereditary and appointed chiefdoms. In the 1930s, plans for the construction of the Nagle Dam on Inanda Location land forced the relocation

of the Maphumulo onto formerly white-owned farms. While the farms had been under the jurisdiction of the Maphumulo from the chiefdom's creation, the Nyavu laid claim to one of the farms—Goedverwaching—and attempted to purchase it. The chapter also examines how the solidified boundaries of the apartheid-era Bantu Authorities system exacerbated contests over this farm and over the political legitimacy of chiefs. Chapter three elaborates on the proliferation of factions contesting the available Table Mountain land after the establishment of the KwaZulu bantustan in the 1970s. The rise of the ethnic nationalist movement Inkatha in KwaZulu, forced relocations from across Natal, and an increasing population meant not only the Maphumulo and Nyavu sought control of the Goedverwaching farm. KwaZulu and the apartheid officials overseeing forced removals also had a stake in the land's jurisdiction. The young chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo thrust himself into the midst of KwaZulu politics and attempted to use both KwaZulu and apartheid officials to his chiefdom's advantage.

Beginning with chapter four, the focus turns to the outbreak of *uDlame*. Chapter four situates the civil war against the backdrop of a changing South Africa. As political violence engulfed KwaZulu-Natal in the late 1980s, the Table Mountain region initially remained a haven of peace under the “peace chief” Mhlabunzima Maphumulo of the Maphumulo chiefdom. In offering himself as a peacemaker and protector, Chief Mhlabunzima attracted new Maphumulo members onto with the contested land, sparking the deadly transition-era violence with the neighboring Nyavu. Chapter five turns to the chief's murder and the ways in which his actions had caused a rift within his chiefdom. Central to understanding the debate over Maphumulo's chiefly authority is the definition of the Maphumulo *isizwe*. The late chief considered the new Goedverwaching residents to be members of the Maphumulo because they had *khonza*'d him. Those who paid the chief their allegiance remember him nostalgically on account of his efforts to

provide them with access to scarce land and protection. But another faction of older residents was unhappy with the chief's actions and forged an alliance with the Nyavu and attempted to depose Maphumulo. These chapters show that local actors used the national contest between Inkatha and the ANC as an opportunity to decide the land dispute and the struggle over chiefly legitimacy by violent means. The sixth and final chapter turns away from the male-dominated experience of the violence to analyze how women's discussions about the upheaval reveal both their claims on ethnicity and their uses of Zulu cultural practices and beliefs as a coping mechanism.

The conclusion revisits the major outline and themes of the dissertation. It also places this history of conflict over land and chiefly power within the context of the highly volatile contemporary debates over land reform and the place of traditional leaders in a democratic South Africa. The rich diversity of sources, written and oral, that inform this study has allowed me to convey the complexity of the transition-era violence in the Table Mountain region. In doing so I intend to humanize the past in order to enhance our understanding of this deadly civil war, the reasons people take up arms, and the ways that Mhlabunzima Maphumulo and other chiefs sought authority from the people. Although the struggle for power between the apartheid state, Inkatha, and the ANC affected the Table Mountain violence, the conflict's most immediate causes were local ones. The members of the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms fought bitterly for access to desperately needed material resources and to define the meaning of territorial boundaries, clan membership, and chiefly authority.

Chapter One:

“He said he wants to be registered as a chief.” Hereditary Chiefs and “Government Tribes”: (pre-colonial—1905)¹



Figure 3: “P.M.Burg from Zwartkop Road. Table Mountain. Kaffirwomen carrying wood.” Water-colour sketch c. 1864 by George Hamilton Gordon. PAR. C7866.

Cape Town’s Table Mountain is one of South Africa’s most recognizable sites, an iconic natural wonder that attracts national and international visitors to its heights. But it is not South Africa’s only table-top mountain. Lesser known to those outside of the Natal Midlands, Pietermaritzburg’s own 3,143-foot-high Table Mountain sits roughly forty kilometers northeast of KwaZulu-Natal’s provincial capital, at the confluence of the Umsunduzi and Umngeni Rivers.

T.V. Bulpin, in his popular history of KwaZulu-Natal, describes it aptly:

To the people of the valley, this mountain was a natural fortress of a strength and splendor far surpassing that of any man-made castle. From a distance its summit seemed just a level surface. But to those who climbed the pathways providing access up the western slopes, this flat-topped mountain was revealed as one of the natural wonders of the land.

¹ “Yebo, ngoba wathi yena ufuna ukuthi abhalwe abe inkosi.” Bhekumuzi Sibiya, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, August 9, 2011.

The summit is an undulating meadow, richly grassed with hillocks, valleys and wooded grottoes. The whole atmosphere is that of an island-world of its own, drifting through the ages in a sea made of hills and dreams. From the edges of this island-summit there is a view beyond description. The thousand hills of the Mgeni valley lie in a superb jumble all around. Eastwards is a glimpse of the distant ocean; westwards, on the far horizon, lies the Drakensberg, and in between is all Natal.²

To those who live in its shadow, the mountain is *eMkhambathini*. This name is the locative form of the noun *umkhambathi*, the Paperback Acacia tree (*acacia sieberiana*) dominant in the *eMkhambathini* area.³ It is the peoples in *eMkhambathini*'s shadow, particularly the Nyavu and Maphumulo, with whom this dissertation is concerned. This chapter serves not only to introduce them and outline their early histories, but also to locate the origins of conflict between hereditary and created chieftaincies over land and legitimacy that reemerge during *uDlame* (the civil war of late 1980s-early 1990s KwaZulu-Natal). This chapter will first examine the pre-Shakan existence of the Nyavu, their relationship vis-à-vis the rising Zulu kingdom, and the significance of hereditary descent through the oral tradition of the 19th century Nyavu chief, Nomsimekwana Mdluli. It will then turn to the impact of colonial land and indirect rule policies, specifically looking at the creation of locations and "government tribes" such as the Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo. The resulting succession debates and land conflicts between the hereditary and appointed chiefdoms highlight the continued significance of hereditary status amongst both colonially established chiefdoms and hereditary chieftaincies and the manner in which chiefs deployed notions of legitimacy to bolster their claims on land.

² Thomas Victor Bulpin, *Natal and the Zulu Country* (Cape Town: Books of Africa, 1966), 12–3.

³ Adrian Koopman argues the word *umkhambathi* has long been misidentified as the camel-thorn tree (*acacia xanthophloea*). Koopman, *Zulu Names*, 140.

Pre-State Polities, Oral Tradition, and the Hereditary Chiefs


For an unknown period before the consolidation of the Zulu nation under Shaka, small-scale chiefdoms populated central and southern Natal. They spoke a variant of the *tekeza* dialect, a Nguni language cluster now almost completely displaced by isiZulu, and culture varied from locality to another. These chiefdoms were small in both area and population and fluid in structure. Hybridity was the core of southern African political traditions between the 15th and 20th centuries. The relationships between homesteads and polities transformed over time.⁴ The peoples depended largely on agriculture, but cattle herding was socially important. Agricultural production was firstly based within an *umuzi*, or homestead (pl. *imizi*). Relations between individuals and *imizi* were regulated primarily through an extensive network of relationships. *Imizi* were drawn into relations with other *imizi* in order to exchange goods and to cooperate in defense, hunting, and ritual performance. A certain amount of cohesion developed under a group of male elders. Fealty to a chief depended upon a contract between the traditional leader and a homestead head. The followers of a chief made up an *isizwe* (chiefdom). These chieftaincies were loosely bounded and *imizi* could break allegiance to their chief and move to settle under the authority of another.⁵

In the Table Mountain region, these pre-Zulu chiefdoms were the Njilo, Nyavu, Dlanyawo, and Dlanyoka (See Map 2). They were known to new arrivals in the late 18th Century

⁴ South Africa was not originally a place of “tribes.” Landau, *Popular Politics*.

⁵ John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu: The Upper Umngeni-Upper Mkhomazi Region in the Early Nineteenth Century,” in *Pietermaritzburg, 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press : Shuter & Shooter, 1988); John Wright and Carolyn Hamilton, “Ethnicity and Political Change Before 1840,” in *Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-Natal* (Durban: Indicator Press, 1996), 15–32.

Natal as the ‘Debe’, or ‘those who scarify their faces’.⁶ The Njilo and Nyavu shared a common ancestor, Sali of Mdluli (See Figure 6). Of particular interest here, the Nyavu are so-named after one of the common forebears, Nyawe. They are also often referred to as the Mdluli, after another ancestor from whom the *isibongo* (clan name) of the chiefs comes, or the Coseli, yet another predecessor. According to Mfunelwa Mdluli, an elder and keeper of an Nyavu “archive,” the land of this region, stretching from Mkhambathini to Cato Ridge has always been the land of the Nyavu people.⁷



Map 2: The Upper Umngeni-Upper Mkhomazi Region in the 1830s. Source: John Wright, "Before Mgungundlovu"

⁶ Somquba Mdluli, *Nomsimekwana of Emkambathini (Table Mountain, Kwazulu)*, ed. Robert Papini, Durban Local History Museums Educational Pamphlet Series 2 (Durban: Durban Local History Museums, 1999), 26–7.

⁷ Mfunelwa Mdluli, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, August 7, 2011.

But in the late 18th Century, the Nyavu were forced from their “natural fortress.” Political centralization, geographical expansion, and social transformations taking place among more northern polities such as the Mabhudu, Ndwandwe, Mthethwa, Dlamini-Ngwane, Hlubi, Qwabe, and ultimately the rising Zulu state did not initially impact the lives of the Nyavu.⁸ But the southward movement of polities away from the Qwabe, the Thuli and allied chiefdoms began to encroach on the easterly settlements of the Nyavu under Chief Mcoseli.

How these migrations and Zulu state-building did eventually affect the Nyavu can be garnered from the oral tradition of the youthful adventures of Mcoseli’s heir, Nomsimekwana. Robert Papini has argued that the story of Nomsimekwana is a vivid example, though perhaps not typical, of the kind of tribulations endured by smaller chieftaincies during the expansion of the Zulu kingdom in the 1820s and related transformations south of the Thukela River. Nomsimekwana’s escapades and the attacks on his people by so-called cannibals were well known, perhaps not only for the value of its excitement but also because of the process of colonial mythmaking that sensationalized such tales of *amazimu* (cannibals). These stories benefited many, including African fugitives at Port Natal dependent on British asylum, the colonizers who desired to project an image of Zulu kings as bloodthirsty tyrants, and the missionaries who sought justification for bringing “civilization.” Historians have instead argued

⁸ This process of Zulu state formation has historically been referred to as the *mfecane*, but in the late 1980s scholars began to question and debate not only the forces behind the rise of the Zulu nation but also the applicability of the term *mfecane*. What is without doubt and of importance here, the expansion of the Zulu state sparked significant social and political change throughout Zululand and what would become the Colony of Natal. For more on the debate, see: Julian Cobbing, “The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo,” *The Journal of African History* 29, no. 3 (January 1, 1988): 487–519; Elizabeth Eldredge, “Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa, C. 1800-30: The Mfecane Reconsidered,” *Journal of African History* 33, no. 1 (1992); Carolyn Hamilton, ed., *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995); Etherington, *The Great Treks*.

that what prevailed in the lands beyond the order of the Zulu kingdom was called *ubuzimuzimu*. Often translated as “cannibalism”, it is more accurately an “absence of social order” such as that occurring in Natal during the expansion of the Zulu kingdom with the loss of crops and herds and the ensuing food shortage. Those designated “cannibals” were outlaws responsible for “eating up” or rather, “living on,” others by seizing women and cattle. When present in oral traditions such as that of Nomsimekwana, *amazimu* stories should be seen as cautionary tales stressing the frightful consequences of the downfall of authority.⁹

So Nomsimekwana and his *amazimu* tales were most likely sought out by many colonial officials. The most thorough of Zulu translators, chroniclers, and administrators, James Stuart, included them in his *Zulu Reader, uVusezakiti*.¹⁰ Chief Native Commissioner H.C. Lugg wrote about them in *Historic Natal and Zululand*.¹¹ Theophilus Shepstone boasted, “I have myself conversed with several men, who escaped after having been captured by these “man-eaters” [including]...a Chief still living in this Colony, who was compelled to carry the vessel in which he was told he would himself be cooked...”¹² When in the late 1930s the members of the Zulu

⁹ See Mdluli, *Nomsimekwana*, 35–40; John Wright, “The Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region of Natal,” in *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995), 176.

¹⁰ KCAL. James Stuart, “uNomsimekwana ubanjwa amazimu,” in *UVusezakithi* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1926).

¹¹ H. C Lugg, *Historic Natal and Zululand, Containing a Series of Short Sketches of the Historical Spots* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1949), 46.

¹² Theophilus Shepstone. “Historic Sketch of the Tribes anciently inhabiting the Colony of Natal-as at present bounded-and Zululand” *Report and Proceedings. Cape of Good Hope Commission on Native Laws and Customs. January 1883* (Cape Town: W.A. Richards & Sons, Government Printers, 1883): 418.

Society¹³ set out to record the stories and *izibongo* of various KwaZulu notables, among the interviews conducted was one with the then-chief of the Nyavu, Somquba Mdluli, grandson of Nomsimekwana. The extent and detail of Somquba's recorded narration caught the attention of Durban's local history KwaMuhle museum, which translated it, set it in the context of the *mfecane*, and compared it with the oral account of Nomsimekwana cited by missionary, amateur anthropologist, and isiZulu linguist, A.T. Bryant.¹⁴

This oral tradition is also invaluable for the detailed genealogical information it provides. With the establishment of the various forms of Native Affairs Departments across the colonial, segregation, and apartheid periods came the recorded genealogies of the "government anthropologists," but seldom do these extend as far back as the oral tradition of Nomsimekwana. And in cases such as the Nyavu, where succession disputes were few if any after the establishment of the Natal Colony, the family lineages that exist in government records are scant in detail. On the other hand, the publication of this recorded oral tradition has certainly impacted contemporary memory and tradition. During my first interview with a Nyavu elder, he asked if I was aware of the book about Nomsimekwana before he related the roll call of Nyavu chiefs.

¹³ The Zulu Society was formed in 1936 for the purposes of "the study and preservation of the Zulu language and culture" by Zulu intelligentsia in the context of radical segregationist visions of 'retribalization' or cultural adaptationism as the basis for a uniform 'native policy'. Zulu intellectuals appropriated this developing state ideology in order to further their political claims as a distinct social group and refashion their collective cultural identity. Marked by ideological tensions and contradictions, the organization was "an elitist, almost arcane, cultural nationalist organization without any constituency beyond its office holders." Paul La Hausse, *Restless Identities: Signatures of Nationalism, Zulu Ethnicity, and History in the Lives of Petros Lamula (c. 1881-1948) and Lymon Maling (1889-c. 1936)* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000), 143–5, 268–9.

¹⁴ A. T Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, Containing Earlier Political History of the Eastern-Nguni clans* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929); Mdluli, *Nomsimekwana*.

Ongoing land disputes in the region make the people particularly aware of the hereditary descent of their chief.

The examination that follows is primarily based on this longest and most detailed of these accounts, that by Chief Somquba Mdluli.¹⁵ Somquba was around 70 years-old in 1939 when the Zulu Society interviewed him for their planned publication. He told the recorder of the tradition, “I knew my grandfather in person. To look at, he was an ordinary man, with an ample forehead.” Born c.1870, there is a strong possibility that Somquba heard the story from the protagonist himself before Nomsimekwana’s death in 1901, and if not Nomsimekwana, then Ngangezwe (Somquba’s father and Nomsimekwana’s heir), who we know knew the story well as he related it in a statement to the Under Secretary for Native Affairs Robert Samuelson in 1894 during a land dispute with neighbors, the Ximba.¹⁶ As told by chiefs, this story should be recognized as an “official history” of the Nyavu people.

As both an oral tradition and an official history it should be critiqued on several levels. The many adventures of Nomsimekwana and twists of the plot are the “chief artistic requirements” of all narratives that keep the listener “waiting with bated breath for the denouement.”¹⁷ But Nomsimekwana’s troubles, in addition to the *amazimu* tales, should be seen as also evidence of the social disorder associated with the rise of the Zulu kingdom and the changes the Nyavu experienced. Somquba’s attention to the Nyavu’s forced migration and eventual return to Mkhambathini testifies to his belief in his people’s rightful claim to the land. Further, several of characters illustrate the respect expected for chiefly authority. While

¹⁵ Mdluli, *Nomsimekwana*.

¹⁶ PAR. SNA 1/1/180. Petition of Ngangezwe kaNomsimekwana. 9 Jan 1894.

¹⁷ Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 74.

Somquba's view of the past may be "more the product of the exigencies of the present than of a dispassionate desire to portray past events as they actually occurred," his narration provides insight into how the Nyavu envisioned themselves and their relationship to neighboring peoples and the Zulu kingdom.¹⁸ A critical analysis of this infamous tradition about the young Nyavu chief, Nomsimekwana, affirms the "outsider" status of Nyavu vis-à-vis the emerging Zulu state and highlights the significance of hereditary descent for the narrators.

"Shaka's attack on the country" resulted in the Nyavu being disturbed during the rule of Mcoseli, the father of the protagonist, Nomsimekwana. As the Zulu drove off the Ngwane under Matiwane, Mcoseli followed them in hopes of finding safety from the expanding Zulu kingdom. According to an oral account given by a Nyavu man named Nombiba for a report sent to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal Sir John Scott, Mcoseli opted for sanctuary with the Ngwane because he had just refused to pay allegiance to another of Shaka's adversaries, Macingwane of the Chunu.¹⁹ Mcoseli also would have been aware of the significant loss of cattle by his brother, Sibenya, when Sibenya refused to render allegiance to Shaka's ally, Zihlando of the Embo.²⁰

Mcoseli's people thus took refuge with Matiwane at Njasuthi, where they complained of hunger and missed Mkhambathini. The oral tradition has it that they preferred to return to their land and grow their own food, despite the danger.²¹ But before the Nyavu left, their consumption

¹⁸ David P Henige, *The Chronology of Oral Tradition: Quest for a Chimera* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 11.

¹⁹ "Inhabitants of the Territory (Now the Colony of Natal) during the Time of Jobe, Father of Dingizwayo, before the Extermination of Tribes by Chaka: Enclosure No. 1 in Lieutenant-Governor Scott's Dispatch No. 12, 26 Feb 1864" in John Bird, *The Annals of Natal, 1495-1845*, vol. 1 (Pietermaritzburg: P. Davis & Sons, 1888), 137.

²⁰ Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, 410.

²¹ Mdluli, *Nomsimekwana*.

of Ngwane grain raised the ire of the Ngwane and, according to Nombiba, resulted in the death of Mcoseli.²²

So the Nyavu returned to Mkhambathini without Mcoseli. But they did not find peace. At home they “came upon an evil portent. It was occupied by people who ate others—*amazimu*. These people were said to belong to the Mbambo who wandered after their scattering by Shaka,” and finding nothing to eat, adopted the habit of eating others.²³ Some Nyavu were caught and cooked, including Ma Mbongwa, the mother of Nomsimekwana. Others, including Nomsimekwana, found refuge in the forests and caves prevalent at Mkhambathini, but they had nothing to eat and it was not long before the *amazimu* surrounded them. Nomsimekwana and many other Nyavu were captured. But some of the men had been away, looking for wild pumpkins and greens, as had another woman who had left with a running stomach.

Nomsimekwana joined a “long file of people, some carrying these pots on their heads, others the firewood that would be used to cook them.” He made several attempts to escape and once was wounded when the *amazimu* pierced his calf with a spear as he fled. They forced him to carry a large lid to the pot in which he would be cooked to hamper his ability to escape. But as Nomsimekwana became more troubled about his pending fate, a hippopotamus appeared in a pool of the Umsunduzi where the Mpushini flows into it. “His heart said that it was better to be killed by the hippo than, in full consciousness, slaughtered like a beast and then cooked and eaten.” He threw himself into the pool and swam underwater, with only his nose out of the water

²² “Inhabitants of the Territory,” 138.

²³ Mdluli, *Nomsimekwana*, 2.

to breathe. He heard the *amazimu*, who wondered if he had been eaten by the hippopotamus or drowned.²⁴

With the *amazimu* safely out of sight, Nomsimekwana returned to the cave where he had been captured and found the woman with the running stomach. He also eventually located the men who had gone searching for food and told them about his escape from the *amazimu*. They agreed to go to Zululand and make a plea for asylum.

These remnants of the Nyavu traveled north. As soon as they crossed the Thukela River, they were surrounded by Zulu soldiers and taken captive. Among the Nyavu captives was a powerful old man by the name of Yengqwa. Yengqwa was taken separately from Nomsimekwana and he pleaded with the soldiers. “Wo! You Zulu, I am here as I am homeless. I am wandering with a young cockerel of our chief, of the Mdluli.” He pleaded that he not be separated from Nomsimekwana, “the only prince left alive from his house.” The soldiers queried, which prince was this? Yengqwa recited the forefathers of Nomsimekwana and the soldiers acquiesced. Yengqwa became known as the “Mdluli chief’s cub” and Nomsimekwana received preferential treatment on account of Yengqwa’s efforts.

But despite the preferential treatment offered to Nomsimekwana, he was still not afforded the respect offered to chiefs of peoples between the Thukela and Black Mfolozi Rivers where Shaka had established direct domination. Chiefdoms on the periphery of the expanding Zulu state such as the Nyavu and others subordinated in these later phases tended to be incorporated less as subjects and more as “despised outsiders.” Their chiefly houses were kept separate from

²⁴ H.C. Lugg, who garnered the information for his tale from another of Nomsimekwana’s grandsons Bangingi Mdluli, estimates this occurred in 1818. Lugg’s version also has a hippo shepherding Nomsimekwana to safety Lugg, *Historic Natal and Zululand*, 46.

the Zulu royal house and their young men considered menial laborers rather than warriors.²⁵ The Nyavu became laborers upon their capture north of the Thukela. Nomsimekwana was assigned to look after Embo children and to tend the cooking pots and the calabashes of souring milk.

These labor assignments illustrate the ways in which a clear social and political distinction was made in order to justify the subordination of peoples outside of the growing Zulu kingdom such as the Nyavu. The *Ntungwa* (upcountry) were those of “commoner” chiefdoms subordinated but encouraged to align politically with the Zulu aristocracy. Those lesser chiefdoms speaking the *tekeza* or *tekela* dialect became known as Lala. The term Lala is an invention of the Shakan period that denoted contempt for peoples of real or ascribed lowly status. The term found expression in several slurs, including “those who sleep (*ukulala*) with their fingers up their anuses” and those “who farted on the mimosa tree and dried it up,” that were used to ideologically justify discrimination and exploitation.²⁶ Somquba’s oral narrative repeatedly calls attention to the differences in language between the Nyavu and their captors. The Zulu soldiers who surrounded them shouted the oath, “Zihanyo! Zihanyo!” but the Nyavu did not understand. When they made an oath to their captors, they said “Zihango!” and spoke “in the Lala tongue.” While A.T. Bryant treats *Ntungwa* and Lala as pre-existing clans,²⁷ the story of Nomsimekwana and the Nyavu affirms Wright and Hamilton’s argument for Lala as a social and political class that initially kept polities such as the Nyavu on the periphery of the Zulu kingdom. Heather Hughes also argues that the variety of the chiefdoms and fragments of

²⁵ Carolyn Hamilton and John Wright, “The Making of the AmaLala: Ethnicity, Ideology and Relations of Subordination in a Precolonial Context,” *South African Historical Journal* 22 (1990): 3–23.

²⁶ Hamilton and Wright, “The Making of the AmaLala.”

²⁷ Bryant, *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*, 7–9.

chiefdoms such as the Nyavu that regarded themselves as Lala suggests that the term became one used by those seeking protection in Natal.²⁸

While under the authority of the Embo, Yengqwa again came to the rescue of his young chief. While Nomsimekwana was at play with the children he was to care for, another of the “menials” drank from an Embo calabash. Nomsimekwana was accused and was to be put to death for the offense. But Yengqwa heard about the affair and “pleaded against having to see the Prince killed before his very eyes...After having heard Nomsimekwana absolutely deny the allegation, with tears in his eyes, Yengqwa went back to the householders, pleading that a thorough investigation be undertaken among the menials so as to find out who had really drunk the milk.”²⁹ It was only Yengqwa’s entreaties that enabled Nomsimekwana’s acquittal. The two remained together there until the time of Shaka’s Balule campaign (1828) when Yengqwa took up arms with the king’s troops and Nomsimekwana went to join other youths of his age, tending the king’s calves at Nhlonhlweni.

Nomsimekwana enjoyed his time as a calf herd at the royal house. Here he came under the guidance of the *indunenkulu* there, Somadaka, who appointed him to stir the *amasi* gourds to make the moisturizer used by the royal wives. But again, Nomsimekwana fell prey to danger, as two young cows fell down a cliff. The cowherds were threatened with death, and a lieutenant warned Nomsimekwana to flee. “You are all going to be killed, you too Scarface,” a reference to a facial scar prevalent amongst the peoples of central Natal.³⁰ So Nomsimekwana sought refuge

²⁸ Heather Hughes, *First President: A Life of John Dube, Founding President of the ANC* (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2011), 8–9.

²⁹ Mdluli, *Nomsimekwana*, 10.

³⁰ The incisions can be for ornamentation (*impimpilisa*) or as an entry way/incision (*umgcabo*) for preventative or curative medicine made by *sangoma* (diviner/diagnostician) or

with an aunt Ntelelo who had also escaped the *amazimu* and found asylum in Zululand. But he was hungry and missed the royal house and the *indunenkulu* Somadaka. He attempted to return to Nhlonhlweni, but his aunt intercepted him and they instead went back to Table Mountain.

Back in Mkhambathini, they built an *umuzi* and began to till the fields. It was not long before their peace was again interrupted, as the Afrikaners arrived under the leadership of Andries Pretorius, or Potolozzi (1838). The Afrikaners put Nomsimekwana in charge of their flocks of sheep and goats. They put their cattle under a Zondi man, Dlaba. They killed Dlaba for selling some of their cows, and Nomsimekwana feared the same when sheep and goats began to disappear, attacked by lions, leopards and servals. Nomsimekwana dreamed that his father Mcoseli was calling him, warning him to escape from the Afrikaners, so he gathered the Nyavu men and told them about his dream. One of the Nyavu, Sojuba Majola, volunteered to go to the Afrikaners in Nomsimekwana's place. Nomsimekwana and his fiancée, the daughter of Gijimi, escaped. While they wandered the countryside, she became pregnant with Ngangezwe.

The Afrikaners pursued them, and there were several close calls. The first occurred when Nomsimekwana returned home for a visit. By chance, this visit happened on the same day Hendrik Pretorius arrived looking for Nomsimekwana. A member of the family, Idi Mdluli, helped Nomsimekwana hatch yet another plan to escape, and this time Nomsimekwana collected his cattle, his fiancée, and their children and headed for the low country where the Mlaba chiefs

inyanga (healer). On *impimilisa*, see A. T Bryant, *A Zulu-English Dictionary* (Pinetown: The Mariannhill Mission Press, 1905), 17; Eileen Jensen Krige, *The Social System of the Zulus* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1988), 375. On *umgcabo*, see Ngubane, *Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine*, 25; Frank Jolles and Stephen Jolles, "Zulu Ritual Immunisation in Perspective," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 70, no. 2 (January 1, 2000): 229–248.

of the Ximba chiefdom were later established.³¹ The nascent family stayed there and the Nyavu began to recollect, until word arrived that the Afrikaners had come to know of their whereabouts.

Nomsimekwana instructed his men and Ngangezwe to drive away his cattle, first this way and then that, in an attempt to prevent the Afrikaners from finding them. The daughter of Gijimi fled to the bush with their other children while Nomsimekwana armed himself and took to the hill to wait for the Afrikaners. Nomsimekwana alerted Gxwala, son of Nombiba, who in turn warned the remaining Nyavu to flee into the bush. The Afrikaners followed and captured all but two of Nomsimekwana's cattle. When the Nyavu reconvened at home, they decided to relocate away from the Afrikaners. They returned to stay among the Embo, now at Mtebele, where they stayed while the "English and Boers were at war in Durban" (this refers to the British occupation of Durban, 1842). When the Afrikaners were defeated and trekked back over the Drakensberg, the English told Nomsimekwana he could return to his place at Mkhambathini and that "nothing whatsoever would happen to him."³²

In addition to being an exciting example of the tribulations of a small chiefdom on the periphery of the growing Zulu state, Nomsimekwana's adventures as narrated by Chief Somquba reveal the significance of hereditary descent and the dedication afforded to hereditary chiefs. The relationship between Nomsimekwana and Yengqwa in particular sheds insight into the relationship of chiefs to their people. The "Mdluli chief's cub", Yengqwa, was one of the most prominent characters when Somquba narrated the tradition in 1939. Yengqwa was not only dedicated to the chief, he was responsible for arranging preferential treatment for the young

³¹ This is a very important event in the oral tradition, for it continues to be cited by Nyavu as evidence in an ongoing land conflict with the government-created Ximba similar to the conflict below with the Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo.

³² Mdluli, *Nomsimekwana*, 22.

Nomsimekwana when the Nyavu lived amongst the Embo. Later, when Nomsimekwana was wrongly accused of drinking from the Embo's calabash, it was Yengqwa who pleaded and insisted upon the investigation that saved Nomsimekwana from death. In these ways, Yengqwa takes on a regent-like role in overseeing the safety of the Nyavu heir.

A.T. Bryant's account does not mention Yengqwa or relate Nomsimekwana's treatment by the Embo. This could be for several reasons. Firstly, as Wright has shown, Bryant's *Olden Times* is primarily a product of a process of colonial mythologizing about African history. It must be rejected as definitive or even reliable.³³ With his focus on Zulu militarism, Bryant could only see the Nyavu as victims of the Zulu and other chiefdoms on the move. While it is likely Somquba's narration of Nomsimekwana itself was mythologized since his grandfather's time, it is worthy of analysis for what it reveals about the values of the Nyavu at the time of recording. While some have critiqued the worth of oral traditions as historical sources, they must also be seen as valuable reflections of "ideological struggles between the rulers and ruled in a society."³⁴

As discussed above, we have the biographical and circumstantial information for our narrator, Somquba. While Bryant's account in *Olden Times* is rarely based on accounts collected by himself (he relies upon testimonies collected by Theophilus Shepstone for which we have no biographical information), it is likely that Somquba heard the account firsthand from Nomsimekwana himself or from his father Ngangezwe, Nomsimekwana's son and heir. Witness to the governance of his father and grandfather before him, Somquba's repeated attention to hereditary descent and the dedication of Yengqwa, Sojuba Majola, and Idi Mdluli suggests that

³³ John Wright, "A.T. Bryant and 'The Wars of Shaka'," *History in Africa* 18 (1991): 409–25.

³⁴ Carolyn Hamilton, "Ideology and Oral Traditions: Listening to the Voices 'From Below'," *History in Africa* 14 (1987): 67–86.

by the time of his rule (1931-40) there was a need to assert the level of respect traditionally attributed to a hereditary chief by his people. Emphasizing this principle would be particularly important to a hereditary leader such as Somquba, aware of decades of assault upon his people and their land by their white rulers and the white-appointed chiefs encroaching to their east and west.

Somquba's character Yengqwa stressed that Nomsimekwana was the "only prince left alive from his house" and earned a reputation as dedicated to the young chief. Somquba also emphasized the hereditary line later when Nomsimekwana planned to escape the Afrikaners at Mkhambathini. Sojuba Majola, a Nyavu elder, offered himself for punishment on behalf of Nomsimekwana, insisting Nomsimekwana not die. "You don't have even a single child, so that if you die, your house dies... No, at least I can die on your behalf, Mdluli, because I already have children. I also have a house. If I die, my name will not perish."³⁵ Sojuba and Idi Mdluli, another Nyavu man, both remained dedicated to their leader even through severe beatings by the Afrikaners. Somquba's traditional story also gave more attention to the conception of Ngangezwe, his father and the heir to Nomsimekwana, thus illustrating the family line from which he received his own authority.

Natal Land Policy: Aboriginals and Refugees, Speculators and Missionaries

While the English promised Nomsimekwana "nothing whatsoever would happen to him" under the Colony of Natal, much change would occur and indeed already had. The neighboring peoples of Dlanyawo and Dlanyoka had dispersed completely. The remaining Njilo had amalgamated with the Nyavu. With these peoples on the move when the first white traders settled permanently

³⁵ Mdluli, *Nomsimekwana*.

at Port Natal in 1824, the land was presumed empty and open for settlement. The arrival of the Voortrekkers in 1837 further complicated the balance of power as Mpande revolted against Dingane and allied with the Afrikaners. The land ceded by Mpande in return for Boer support against Dingane became the short-lived Republic of Natalia with its capital at Pietermaritzburg, only forty kilometers from Table Mountain. The Republican government granted land to its citizens according to the traditional Cape-Dutch fashion, though many claims remained on paper only.³⁶

This land presumed empty and open for settlement began to quickly refill between 1839 and 1842 with the returning Lala such as the Nyavu and an estimated 60,000 refugees moving south of the Thukela.³⁷ As the African population rose steadily with returning displacees, the Republican government resolved to move by force the large majority of the Africans who they believed “had no right or claim to any part of the country, having only come amongst us after the emigrants had come hither.”³⁸ Their pursuit of Nomsimekwana prior to his second stay with the Embo was certainly part of Afrikaner farmers’ raids to forcefully remove Africans from the land. Growing British concern over these raids, as well the Afrikaner threat to British strategic interests, led to the several occupations of Durban between 1838 and 1842 and the formal annexation of Natal to the Cape Colony in 1844. It was only then that Nomsimekwana permanently returned to the Nyavu home at Mkhambathini.

³⁶ A.J. Christopher, “Colonial Land Policy in Natal,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 61, no. 3 (1971): 565.

³⁷ Charles Ballard, “Traders, Trekkers, and Colonists,” in *Natal and Zululand: From Earliest Times to 1910* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1989), 123.

³⁸ Cited in Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*, 11.

The idea of a vacant interior prior to the arrival of whites in parts of Natal continued into the period of British colonial administration. Her Majesty's Commissioner for Natal, Henry Cloete, distinguished between "aboriginal" and "refugee" Africans and proposed the establishment of locations for the removal of the latter category who unlike the aboriginals did not have rights to the land. According to Cloete, these aboriginal African groups were only fifteen in number and did not include the Nyavu.³⁹ The first Locations Commission in 1846, with the recently appointed Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes Theophilus Shepstone as a member, demarcated seven reserves (Zwartkop, Umlazi, Umvoti, Inanda, Impofana, Umzinyathi, and one on the Thukela) and provided the basis for what would become the system of "native administration." But the Commission's recommendations were not implemented and in 1849 Governor Harry Smith dismissed it and set up the Lands Commission of 1852-3, which was to take a far less sympathetic view to African land rights in the colony.⁴⁰

Across these commissions, Shepstone fought for the recognition of territory for African occupation in Natal. At the behest of Lieutenant-Governor John Scott in 1863, Shepstone undertook research on the historical grounds for African land claims in Natal. In comparison to Cloete's fifteen aboriginal entities, Shepstone found evidence for 94 chiefdoms that historically occupied the Colony of Natal prior to being disturbed by movements related to the rise of the Zulu kingdom. Those thought to be refugees by Cloete were actually "aboriginals" returning to their ancient homes.⁴¹ The reports of this research provided the historical justification for

³⁹ "Mr. Cloete's Schedule of Aboriginal Zulu Tribes Settled in the Natal Territory dated Nov. 10, 1843," in Shepstone, "Historic Sketch," 426.

⁴⁰ Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*, 11-6.

⁴¹ Shepstone, "Historic Sketch," 422. For an analysis of Shepstone's research for Lt-Governor Scott, see Wright, "A.T. Bryant and 'The Wars of Shaka'."

African rights to the land.⁴² With the establishment of the Natal Native Trust in 1864, legal title to the African locations in Natal was secured.

In addition to the reserves for these African populations and land set aside for mission stations, the Government made grants from the Crown for Afrikaners and British immigrants. These farms were subject to quit-rent and a condition of these grants was that cultivation was to take place “as far as the land is capable.”⁴³ As Afrikaners emigrated out of Natal in the wake of these land policies and the government’s unwillingness to force the African population into slavery, they cheaply sold their land claims to speculators, trekkers who remained, or to local merchants to settle outstanding debts.⁴⁴ As a result of the Land Commission and Afrikaner emigration, nearly two million acres of Natal were divided among only 360 claimants, with leading speculators amongst them. These claimants and speculators sought to make good on their investments by presenting Natal as a desirable destination for immigrants. Between 1849 and 1852, some 5,000 British immigrants bought up land under various schemes promoted by landholders. But few possessed the desire, skills, or capital necessary to make it as farmers and many soon sold off their claims, increasing speculation. By 1860, the fifteen leading speculators controlled 700,000 acres of colonial Natal.⁴⁵ Despite the “beneficial occupation conditions,” it

⁴² Jeff Guy, “An Accommodation of Patriarchs: Theophilus Shepstone and the Foundations of the System of Native Administration in Natal,” in *Colloquium: Masculinities in Southern Africa* (University of Natal-Durban, 1997), 11.

⁴³ In the quit-rent tenure system a farm was not initially subject to survey but the holder’s name was registered in the office of the secretary to the governor. At first, quit-rent farms were subject to 15-year leases, but later were held in perpetuity. Robert Ababrelton, “The Colonial Lands of Natal,” *The Economic Journal* 16, no. 3 (1906): 455–61.

⁴⁴ By the end of 1843 it was estimated that only 365 Voortrekker families remained; by 1847 only 60. Henry Slater, “Land, Labour and Capital in Natal: The Natal Land and Colonisation Company 1860-1948,” *Journal of African History* 16, no. 2 (1975): 258–9.

⁴⁵ Slater, “Land, Labour and Capital in Natal,” 260–2.

was estimated that by 1874 no less than five million acres of the lands in hands of private colonists or land companies were in practice occupied by Africans.⁴⁶

Around Table Mountain where the Nyavu had reassembled, many of the newly surveyed farms to the south and west became the property of whites and land speculators though they continued to be occupied by Africans. These included Onverwacht (3,875 acres), granted to Adolph Coqui, who became one of the two largest landowners in Natal at the time,⁴⁷ and Aasvogel Krans (4,458 acres) and Goedverwachting (6,000 acres), granted to Afrikaners Willem Abraham Swanepoel and Johannes Henricus Bruwer. Tenure on these farms in the early years was never long. Land registers reveal quick turnovers by the initial grantees and subdivision of the grants. In 1855 Goedverwachting was vested in the name of Natal Lieutenant-Governor Sir Benjamin Pine in anticipation of a grant to the Bishop of Natal for a mission station.⁴⁸ Goedverwachting was just one of the several pieces of property that made up Bishop of Natal John W. Colenso's Bishopstowe residence and Ekukhanyeni mission station. Bishopstowe and Ekukhanyeni, with a chapel, training centers, printing press, and school for the sons of chiefs, became a hive of religious, political, and intellectual activities extensively examined elsewhere.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Slater, "Land, Labour and Capital in Natal," 272.

⁴⁷ Slater, "Land, Labour and Capital in Natal," 263.

⁴⁸ Pietermaritzburg Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, KwaZulu-Natal Province. Land Registers for Onverwacht No. 1225, Aasvogel Krans No. 1226, and Goedverwachting No. 1349, 1850s-present.

⁴⁹ On the Colensos and Bishopstowe, see: Wyn Rees, ed., *Colenso Letters from Natal* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1958); Shula Marks, "Harriette Colenso and the Zulus, 1874-1913," *The Journal of African History* 4, no. 3 (January 1, 1963): 403-411; Jeff Guy, *The Heretic: A Study of the Life of John William Colenso, 1814-1883* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1983); Jeff Guy, *The View Across the River: Harriette Colenso and the Zulu Struggle Against Imperialism* (University of Virginia Press, 2002); Hlonipha Mokoena, *Magema*

The greater impact of white arrival occurred to the north and east of Table Mountain where the Nyavu land now fell within the northwestern-most part of the African reserve known as Inanda Location. A small portion was carved out for the Table Mountain Mission Reserve under the American Zulu Mission (AZM) in the heart of Nomsimekwana's territory. After the visit of Sir George Grey to Natal in 1855, 174,000 acres of land was set aside for mission reserves. By 1870, the AZM had successfully applied for 12 reserves, including one at Table Mountain. At 5,623 acres, the Table Mountain station was one of the smallest of the 20 total mission reserves existing at the time of 1885 Native Mission Reserve Commission. It was poor and off the beaten track, existing at a considerable distance from other AZM stations. The Commission members found no mission buildings, no missionary, and no teacher upon their visit in 1885. The *amakholwa* (believers, or Christian Zulu) there had gone at least 15 years without a resident white missionary. Chief Nomsimekwana (who had been baptized) and 35 *imizi* of his people, occupied the mission reserve. Nomsimekwana complained about the depasturing of Boer cattle there during winter months and related that for many years firewood was cut from the land. The moneys collected, subject of course to his commission, were paid into the office of the Secretary for Native Affairs. Unable to see any betterment or missionary work from the income at Table Mountain, the Commission criticized the AZM and found that the reserve land "is not being utilized for the purposes for which it was granted."⁵⁰ The lack of a resident missionary was a source of anxiety for some years until in 1888 the mission assigned a young and promising Zulu preacher, Simungu Shibe, to the station. Shibe "tended to his small flock admirably," but he soon became the public symbol of a conflict between the Table Mountain congregation and the

Fuze: The Making of a Kholwa Intellectual (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2011). A special thank you to Jeff Guy for correspondence regarding Bishopstowe.

⁵⁰ PAR. NCP 8/3/25. Report of Native Mission Reserve, October 20, 1886: 6.

AZM. In the wake of the 1886 critical report, the AZM attempted to replace Shibe with a local white Natal Congregation Union missionary. The activities amongst the Table Mountain congregation then became central in the rise of the Zulu Congregational Church (ZCC).⁵¹

The Government Tribes and Appointed Chiefs

While the Nyavu fell under the status of “aboriginal” peoples and their leader a “hereditary” chief, other isiZulu-speaking people who began to encroach upon Nyavu territory became known as the “government tribes.” In addition to being responsible for moving Africans onto the reserves, Theophilus Shepstone took on the task of designing and implementing a system of African administration. While Shepstone’s “Historic Sketch” and “Inhabitants of the Territory” were later used as the main sources of the *mfecane* “devastation hypothesis,” Hamilton has pointed out that they were also influential in shaping colonial thinking at the time of their preparations. In studying African forms of governance, Shepstone found in Shaka a model for ruling Africans in Natal.⁵² Without sufficient financial or colonial support, Shepstone modeled himself as the *de facto* Supreme Chief (though formally this title was accorded to the Lieutenant Governor under Ordinance 3 of 1849). He utilized the position of the chiefs in what became known as the system of indirect rule.⁵³

⁵¹ For an in-depth account of tensions between the Table Mountain congregation and the AZM, see Robert J. Houle, *Making African Christianity: Africans Reimagining their Faith in Colonial Southern Africa* (Maryland: Lehigh University Press, 2011), Ch 6.

⁵² Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty*, 90–3.

⁵³ Theophilus Shepstone proved to be one of Britain’s most influential African administrators. His measures and system of indirect rule introduced in Natal have been the subject of multiple accounts, including: Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*; Etherington, “The ‘Shepstone System’ in the Colony of Natal and Beyond the Borders”; John Lambert, *Betrayed*

But the upheavals described above seriously disrupted local societies and Shepstone found a large proportion of the African population lacked hereditary chiefs. He first attempted to attach fragments of groups to other chiefly groups, but met resistance. Often chiefs refused jurisdiction of the newly attached peoples or would find unfairly against those not considered a “real member” of his group. Just as Shaka and Dingane had replaced chiefs feared too powerful with family members and officers known to be loyal, Shepstone appointed men known to be faithful as new chiefs where hereditary chiefs could not be found.⁵⁴ The men appointed were often magisterial izinduna who had earned favor through their positions. These *iziphakanyiswa*, or commoners elevated to the position of chief, came to lead an estimated one-third to one-half of the African population without chiefs in Natal. Their polities became known as “government tribes.” Undersecretary for Native Affairs S.O. Samuelson understood these two “distinct and antagonistic forms of tribal government,” run by hereditary chiefs and appointed chiefs, as central to “giving effect to the principle of divide and rule.”⁵⁵ As Samuelson undoubtedly knew, and as this and the next chapter show, tensions did emerge between hereditary and appointed chiefdoms.

The Nyavu found their territory encroached upon by these new “government tribes”. To their east, it was the first Mlaba chiefs, Mdepa and Mqundane, of the Ximba chiefdom. To their north/northwest, it was the Majozi chiefs of the Qamu. It is these latter peoples and the chieftaincies created out of them that are of concern here.

trust: *Africans and the state in colonial Natal* (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 1995); Guy, “An Accommodation of Patriarchs”; McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords*.

⁵⁴ Kuper, “The ‘House’ and Zulu Political Structure in the Nineteenth Century,” 30–1; Lambert, *Betrayed trust*.

⁵⁵ PAR. SNA. 1/4/12. 96/1903. Under-Secretary for Native Affairs report on chiefdoms, 15 June 1903.

The Qamu and the man who would become their chief, Ngoza Majozi kaLudaba, are often cited as exemplifying the relationship between created and appointed chiefs and the colonial government. They are also an illustrative example of the ensuing land and jurisdiction conflicts. Appointed chiefs' authority rested on the support of the colonial administration rather than that of their followers. These chiefs were not entitled to nominate heirs to the chieftainship. But the support offered by the colonial government enabled them to rise to positions rivaling that of hereditary chiefs.

Ngoza Majozi grew up in the Zulu kingdom during the early nineteenth century and served as a soldier in the Zulu army during the reign of Dingane kaSenzagakhona (1828-40).⁵⁶ During the early 1840s, possibly in association with Dingane's defeat, Ngoza crossed the Thukela River into what became the Colony of Natal. Ngoza first worked in a settler's kitchen in Pietermaritzburg before attracting Shepstone's attention. He participated in the 1847 attack organized by Shepstone on the recalcitrant Chief Fodo in southern Natal, after which he was appointed as an induna in the office of the SNA. Shepstone rewarded Ngoza for this loyalty with the position of "induna in charge" over a large number of Africans arriving to the colony and settling in the Umngeni valley. As the number of people increased, Ngoza became a government chief, one of the *iziphakanyiswa*.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ See Ngoza's account of his years as a soldier, particularly during the *impi yaseNcome* and *impi yaseThukela*, "Indaba kaNgoza," in: Church of England, *Izindatyana zaBantu kanye nezindaba zas'eNatal* (Natal: May & Davis, 1859). Sifiso Ndlovu has examined Ngoza's testimony in *Izindatyana zaBantu* as part of the African archive about King Dingane. For this reason, Ndlovu considers Ngoza an important public intellectual. Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu, "The Changing African Perceptions of King Dingane in Historical Literature: A Case Study in the Construction of Knowledge in 19th and 20th Century South African History" (PhD dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 2001), 55–60.

⁵⁷ Jeff Guy, "A Paralysis of Perspective': Image and Text in the Creation of an African Chief," in *Art and the British Empire* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 337–56.

The people over whom Ngoza was placed came from various places and have been called by various names. Some originally lived under Jangeni of the Ngome before he left the Umngeni Valley for the Greytown area.⁵⁸ Another portion came down to Estezi kwaMaphumulo (near Wartburg), according to oral tradition, on account of a family conflict between brothers.⁵⁹ Lacking the control of any particular chief, this collection of heterogeneous remnants was “organized under Ngoza and his headmen as to be an excellent provision for offensive and defensive purposes in the interests of the Government.”⁶⁰ These “Government tribes,” in general, were also called the “Thintandaba.”⁶¹ In the early days of the colony when there was a certain prestige and status attached to these chiefs in favor with important government officials, “government tribe” was a proud moniker and indeed part of the Qamu referred to themselves as such as late as 1903.⁶² Ngoza’s people became known as the amaQamu (amaQanyeni,

⁵⁸ PAR. SNA 1/1/318. 670/1905. Minute Paper Resident Magistrate Umngeni Division. March 16, 1905.

⁵⁹ Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011.

⁶⁰ PAR. SNA 1/4/12. 96/1903. Under-Secretary for Native Affairs report on chiefdoms, June 15, 1903;

⁶¹ Thintandaba is the name of the mixed tribes according to archival records such as SNA 1/1/203; Bryant, *A Zulu-English Dictionary*, 760.

⁶² Shula Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 322.

amaKanya), though it is not clear from where this name comes.⁶³ The *isibongo* of the Qamu chiefs is Majozi.⁶⁴

While the creation of government tribes benefited the interests of the government, those men raised up also had much to gain. Passages from the diary of Bishop John William Colenso, who met Ngoza when he first toured Natal in 1854, illustrate the authority Ngoza had come to wield as well as the makeup of his followers in the Table Mountain area:

Ngoza is Mr. Shepstone's head man, and, though not an hereditary chief, has acquired considerable power, and is practically a chief of as much authority as any in the district, which he owes partly to Mr. Shepstone's patronage, partly to his own modest and amiable character. There are, probably, (by reason of refugees having flocked to him, who had left their own chiefs behind,) more pure Zulus under Ngoza than under any other chief in Natal.⁶⁵

Ngoza dressed "neatly enough as a European,"⁶⁶ owned and hired out a wagon, sent his sons and relatives to be educated at Bishop Colenso's mission station Ekukhanyeni, and announced to Colenso, "I should like to be the last fool of my race."⁶⁷

⁶³ AmaKanya also refers to another group ascertained by Shepstone to have their ancient residence on the right bank of the Thukela River that was dispersed and incorporated by Shaka, but became reconstructed on the occasion of the "Zulu revolution." Shepstone, "Inhabitants of the Territory (Now the Colony of Natal) during the Time of Jobe, Father of Dingizwayo before the Extermination of Tribes by Chaka," 152; Reader, *Zulu Tribe in Transition*.

⁶⁴ *Izibongo*, the plural of *isibongo*, can be translated as "praises," "praise names," "praise poems," or "praise poetry." *Izibongo* are concerned with naming, identifying, and giving significance to the named person or object. These often provide links with one's community, lineage, and origins, which Buthelezi is doing here. See Elizabeth Gunner and Mafika Pascal Gwala, *Musho! Zulu Popular Praises* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1991); Koopman, *Zulu Names*.

⁶⁵ "Pure Zulu" is a reference to the distinction between Africans of Zululand and those indigenous to Natal, between those close to the Zulu kingdom and those on its periphery (the Lala). John William Colenso, *Ten Weeks in Natal: A Journal of a First Tour of Visitation Among the Colonists and Zulu Kafirs of Natal* (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1855), 46.

⁶⁶ Colenso, *Ten Weeks in Natal*, 45.

But despite the privileges of power, Ngoza and appointed chiefs like him had difficult roles to play. They carried a conflicting ideological burden, expected to move autonomously in both the official British colonial and the colonized Africans worlds. Jeff Guy has argued that contemporary photographic and newspaper descriptions of Ngoza reflected a man whose very essence was contradiction. He was “enlightened and barbaric, progressive and traditional, savage and controlled.” He could lead his men in traditional war dances, but was also “enlightened, loyal, cash-crop-growing, wagon-owner, a harbinger of the future.”⁶⁸

These chiefs enjoyed their positions of privilege but still found themselves subject to ridicule for their lack of hereditary status and cooption by the colonial government. Several of James Stuart’s informants derogatorily referred to Ngoza as “Sir T. Shepstone’s *induna*” and one recalled that Cetshwayo had demanded Shepstone turn over “that dog Ngoza.”⁶⁹ Mqundane, another government chief, was still viewed by Bishop Colenso only as a “very valuable servant.”⁷⁰

But Ngoza once more profited from his colonial loyalties when Shepstone asserted authority over another unyielding chief, Matyana in the Klip River district. Shepstone deposed Matyana and dissolved his chiefdom. He gave the territory to Ngoza, certainly as an example of

⁶⁷ John William Colenso, “On Missions to the Zulus in Natal & Zululand: A Lecture,” in *Bringing Forth the Light: Five Tracts on Bishop Colenso’s Zulu Mission* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1982), 225–6; Lewis Grout, *Zululand: or, Life among the Zulu-Kafirs of Natal and Zululand, South Africa* (London, 1861), 250–1.

⁶⁸ Guy, “Paralysis of Perspective,” 342.

⁶⁹ In the face off between Shepstone and Cetshwayo where Cetshwayo called Ngoza a dog, Shepstone ordered Ngoza not to heed, to “Stay!” Gxubu kaLuduzo, taken on 27 January 1912, in C. De B. Webb and J.B. Wright (eds), *The James Stuart Archive Volume 1* (Pietermaritzburg and Durban: University of Natal Press, 1976), 158-9; for other references to “Shepstone’s *induna*,” see that of John Gama, 18 Dec 1898, *ibid*, 135-7; and Magidigidi kaNobebe, 5 May 1905, *ibid*. (Vol 2, 1979), 83-97; Guy, “Paralysis of Perspective,” 355.

⁷⁰ Colenso, *Ten Weeks in Natal*, 79.

the benefits of loyalty to the colonial government and a warning to those who opposed it.⁷¹ Thus in 1869, Ngoza left the Umngeni Valley with a number of his followers and moved back north to the Msinga area. Ngoza's chiefdom then stretched across both the Natal Colony and Zululand and consisted of so many fugitives and remnants of chiefdoms that at the time of his death that same year, it was the largest chiefdom in the colony.⁷² The portion of the Qamu in the Msinga Division fell under seven sections, each ruled by its own headman.⁷³

The peoples of the Msinga region, including Ngoza's Qamu, were encouraged by the colonial authorities to see the colonial administration as the effective power above the authority of the chiefs, rather than the Zulu king.⁷⁴ In fact, when Ngoza passed away, a hereditary successor was not chosen. Klip River Resident Magistrate G.A. Lucas contended Ngoza was not so much a chief as an "induna in charge" who represented the real power of the Supreme Chief to whom the Qamu belonged. According to Lucas, Ngoza himself was aware his position was not hereditary, and when he realized his death was imminent, he appointed his son Lutyungu as only the head of the family. The position of chief was decided by "His Excellency [who] saw fit to confirm Maziana [who held the next highest rank in the tribe] in his office of Induna in charge of the whole tribe preceding any arrangements as to one of Ngoza's sons taking his place or

⁷¹ McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords*, 72; Guy, "Paralysis of Perspective," 347.

⁷² PAR. SNA. 1/4/12. 96/1903. Under-Secretary for Native Affairs report on chiefdoms, June 15, 1903.

⁷³ PAR. SNA 1/1/203. Minute. Resident Magistrate Msinga H.F. Fynn to the Hon. Secretary for Native Affairs. July 5, 1895.

⁷⁴ Jonathan Clegg, "Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - Bringing Back the Body: An Examination into the Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations, 1882-1944," in *Working Papers in Southern African Studies*, vol. 2 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1981), 171.

otherwise.”⁷⁵ When G.A. Lucas found Maziana neglecting the administration of the Qamu, Manqatsha Ndlovu replaced him.⁷⁶ This of course contributed to the manner in which Ngoza was remembered by some Msinga residents as “Shepstone’s tea-boy” and his people as those “without ancestors.”⁷⁷

But despite government efforts to insist this position was not hereditary, the Qamu people conceptualized it otherwise. In evidence recorded by G.A. Lucas during his investigation into Maziana’s misadministration of the Qamu, there are several indications that the Qamu, whilst aware of the government stance against the position being hereditary, still respected it as such. All of the izinduna who testified before Lucas highlighted Maziana’s failure to look out for both the Qamu people and the Majozi family. The testimony of Uzinwehlana is illustrative:

Ngoza took care of us, looked to our interests, and now it appears that if Maziana had his will his sons would be turned adrift. It cannot be supported that the tribe has no feeling towards the sons of the man who took care of us for years. We don’t ask that Lutyungu be placed in his father’s shoes but we hope to be taken from under the tender mercies of Maziana. Do no separate us from the sons of our old chief.

Gitshana, Sogweba, and Faku echoed the sentiment that the Qamu could not separate themselves from the interests of Ngoza’s sons and Majozi’s family.⁷⁸

It is also interesting to note that while Lucas held firmly to the charge that the position of head of the Qamu was not hereditary, he still found Maziana guilty of losing sight of “what was

⁷⁵ PAR. SNA 1-1-203 1386/95. Minutes of Evidence re: Tribe Tintandaba.

⁷⁶ PAR. SNA 1/1/203. 987/1873. “Report upon matters connected with that portion of the Tintandaba Tribe resident in the Umsinga Location by the Resident Magistrate Klip River Division”

⁷⁷ Guy, “Paralysis of Perspective,” 348.

⁷⁸ PAR. SNA 1/1/203. G.A. Lucas report and evidence on the Tintandaba, 1873.

due to the Supreme Chief, the Tintandaba Tribe, and N'goza's family."⁷⁹ There is a clear contradiction here between claiming the position is not hereditary and asserting the rights of Ngoza's family. If the position is not hereditary and does not remain with Ngoza's heir, why is there a need to ensure attention to the family? In recommending Maziana's dismissal, Lucas suspects they would be unable to secure another man with the "necessary social standing, tact and cleverness to take the office of induna-in-charge" and thus recommended that Lutyungu be appointed. Despite this recommendation, the government appointed another induna, Manqatsha.

In recognizing these complaints about Maziana's neglect of Ngoza's sons, the administration allowed the significance of hereditary descent to continue. When Manqatsha died, it was Lutyungu's son Kula who succeeded him. While the SNA was quick to remind both officials and the Qamu that there was "no hereditary right to chieftainship in the tribe over which Ngoza was chief and should a member of his family be appointed it will be on account of his supposed fitness," the Qamu still recognized Kula's right based on hereditary descent. When the headmen and official witnesses of the seven sections appeared before the SNA to request Kula's appointment, they petitioned the government "to appoint Kula the son of Luntungu (deceased) as our chief. We do not wish any longer to be in divisions as we have been, we wish to have a head over us, and to be united under *him who we regard as our chief*" (my emphasis).⁸⁰

⁷⁹ PAR. SNA 1/1/203. G.A. Lucas report and evidence on the Tintandaba, 1873.

⁸⁰ The case of the Qamu in Msinga is unique and worthy of further in-depth study, not least because of the collection of money and purchase of the "Hollywood" farm by the people that transferred from Ngoza's estate to his grandson Kula, but here we must focus on the Qamu in the Natal Colony.

Back in the Umngeni valley, Ngoza left an induna, Mahoiza, in charge of the Qamu who remained behind when he went to Msinga.⁸¹ As Ngoza had been rewarded for his loyalty first in his appointment of the Qamu and later in the addition of people and territory in Umsinga, Mahoiza would also be rewarded for his service to the government. An induna of the magistrate's court in Pietermaritzburg, Ngoza's induna Mahoiza is most likely the very same Mahoiza with a penchant for exaggeration whose 1873 report that he had been humiliated and stripped by the Hlubi precipitated the order for a colonial assault on Langalibalele.⁸² Mahoiza resided on the Bishopstowe mission station (on Goedverwaching) for fifteen years. During the Langalibalele trial, Bishop Colenso and other Hlubi residents of Colenso's mission station who knew Mahoiza well provided evidence that Mahoiza had lied.⁸³ But Shepstone respected him and contended Mahoiza and the other messenger had "behaved with wonderful pluck and propriety."⁸⁴

And thus Mahoiza became another of the *iziphakanyizwa*, an appointed chief over the Qamu in the Umngeni, Camperdown, and New Hanover districts. He is first recorded in the archive as "Chief Mahoiza" in 1878.⁸⁵ Within four years, the colonial government found Mahoiza unreliable as a leader, or rather, that he failed to comply with their orders. Umngeni Resident Magistrate James Forder reported that "Mahoiza has little control over his men" when it

⁸¹ PAR. SNA 1/1/81. 153/1885. Petition of Umjiba, Usikoteni, Umajozi, and Unguga to SNA H.C. Shepstone.

⁸² Wright, *The Hlubi chiefdom in Zululand-Natal*, 56–62; Guy, *The View Across the River*, 38–40; McClendon, *White Chief, Black Lords*, 82–99.

⁸³ Guy, *The View Across the River*, 39.

⁸⁴ Quoted in Guy, *The Heretic*, 201.

⁸⁵ PAR. CSO 677. 1878/4737. Minute Paper Resident Magistrate Umngeni, "Natives to be supplied by Chief Mahoiza..."

came to requisitioning men for Public Works projects.⁸⁶ Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs J.W. Shepstone considered him unfit to retain his position over the whole of the Qamu remaining in the Umngeni valley due to his utter indifference and inability. Additionally, he was hopelessly in debt, given to hard drinking, and constantly being brought before the Magistrate's Court. This was not his first failure to supply men as during the Zulu war he could not be relied upon. Instead, his headmen Manyosi and Mbobo supplied men and showed a readiness to obey. J.W. Shepstone recommended Mahoiza's jurisdiction be divided among them.⁸⁷ Bulwer, perhaps on account of Mahoiza's earlier services, recommended that the latter be brought in to explain himself, though there is no evidence of Mahoiza's defense.⁸⁸

Thus, in 1882 Mahoiza's jurisdiction was confined to private lands and the remainder put under Manyosi Gcumisa and Mbobo, the heir of Mfulatelwa (a brother of Ngoza).⁸⁹ Mbobo had applied to Theophilus Shepstone to be made chief and was given authority over a portion of Mahoiza's Qamu, but without distinct boundaries or location land and with the intention that the people under Mbobo and Manyosi could intermingle peacefully.⁹⁰ The then acting chief Mhlahlo, half brother of Mbobo, explained it thus in 1902:

When Ngoza went North he left his induna Mahoiza in charge of the Amaqamu Tribesmen, who remained behind. For some time matters remained in this state

⁸⁶ PAR. SNA 1/1/53. 126/82. Minute. Resident Magistrate Umngeni Division to SNA. March 13, 1882.

⁸⁷ PAR. SNA 1/1/53. 124/82. Report by ASNA Shepstone. March 24, 1882.

⁸⁸ PAR. SNA 1/1/53. 126/82. Minute. Lt. Governor H.E. Bulwer. March 25, 1882.

⁸⁹ PAR. SNA 1/1/54. 1882/272. Minute by ASNA Shepstone to Resident Magistrate Umngeni Division. July 14, 1882. It should also be noted that even after Mahoiza's jurisdiction was restricted to a smaller territory, his offenses continued as he illegally sold/lent guns without permits and sent his son rather than an official witness to act at a wedding. See PAR. SNA 1/1/70 and 1/1/78.

⁹⁰ PAR. SNA 1/1/112. 1889/68. "Application of chief Manyosi."

and the tribe still recognized Ngoza as it's [sic] chief. Time went by and then Mbobo, the fraternal nephew of Ngoza, came to Somtseu (Sir T. Shepstone) and made application to be appointed a chief in his own right over the section of the Amaqamu Tribesmen who were left behind by the late Ngoza. Sir T. Shepstone was pleased to appoint Mbobo.⁹¹

Manyosi, on the other hand, another induna of the magistrate's court, was given authority over those of Mahoiza's Qamu people who lived on location lands (in addition to some on private lands). This portion of the Qamu would take Manyosi's surname, Gcumisa, as its name in 1897 after Manyosi's heir Swaimana petitioned the government to change the name. (For the sake of distinguishing between this section and the Qamu section under Mbobo, this section will hence forth be called Gcumisa.)⁹²

While the Qamu under Mbobo were given no specific territory,⁹³ J.W. Shepstone decided the Manzamnyama Stream as the boundary line separating Gcumisa location lands from that of the neighboring Nyavu in 1882.⁹⁴ The appointment of Mahoiza and Manyosi as chiefs caused great friction as Chief Nomsimekwana saw Nyavu land increasingly encroached upon. In addition to the pressure resultant from policies establishing new chieftaincies, existing chiefs felt hemmed in by the established boundaries.

⁹¹ PAR. SNA 1/1/298. 3846/1902. Statement of Acting Chief Mhlahlo. June 16, 1903.

⁹² PAR. SNA 1/1/267. 2711/1897. "Application of the Chief Swaimana to have his tribal name altered from 'Qamu' to 'Gcumisa.'"

⁹³ The fate of Mbobo's landless section of the Qamu in the Umngeni Valley is as fascinating a story as that of Ngoza's successors in the Msinga region but will have to be followed elsewhere. It will continue to come up throughout the dissertation.

⁹⁴ See SNA 1/1/56. 1882/450.




Figure 4 and 5: Left, The famously reproduced “Zulu Chief Goza in full war costume and indunas,” Killie Campbell Collections, Album C59-048; Right, “Depicts a group of men. Left to right, front row: Sotobe, Umbozana, Umqhawe, Ncapayi, Deliweyo, and Swayimana kaManyosi” (Swaimana, discussed below, was the son of Manyosi, the first chief of the Gcumisa discussed above). Killie Campbell Collections, Album A42-020.

Nomsimekwana was not alone in feeling cornered. As the colonial administration plowed forward with the creation of new chieftaincies, they also established boundary lines to restrict chiefly authority to specific territories and stem “faction fights.” Michael Mahoney highlights the manner in which colonial officials acted as amateur ethnographers that tended to understand African polities as wholly homogenous and discrete units and did not recognize a problem with setting up boundaries.⁹⁵ However, the government struggled throughout the early colonial period to enforce their understanding of “tribe.” Act 37 of 1896 amended the Code of Native Law to fix Africans to designated tribes with designated land and thus made it difficult for Africans to move between chiefdoms and divisions. A concept of boundaries and borders was not alien to African society, but when the location system was established chiefdoms saw some of their villages,

⁹⁵ Michael Robert Mahoney, “Between the Zulu King and the Great White Chief: Political Culture in a Natal Chiefdom, 1879-1906” (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1998), 218–9.

wards, and districts fall within divisions in which the chief was not resident.⁹⁶ Several scholars illustrate well the manner in which these boundaries exacerbated existing competition and produced fresh conflicts over scarce resources.⁹⁷ In the Umngeni District, Resident Magistrate Forder explained that many location chiefs “are becoming very jealous of any encroachment on their lands owing to their people entering locations as they are turned off private lands.”⁹⁸

The records of these resultant boundary conflicts provide excellent insight into the division of chieftaincies briefly examined above, as well as the creation of the Maphumulo out of the newly established Gcumisa. These records are, of course, tainted by the fact that those making the statement sought to gain from their testimony, but they are significant nonetheless because they reveal the manner in which hereditary chiefs positioned themselves against and attempted to delegitimize their appointed counterparts. This section will examine conflicts over land between appointed chiefs, such as those of the Qamu and Gcumisa, and also between the Gcumisa and the hereditary Nyavu. In so doing, it is possible to uncover not only the manner in which chieftaincies proliferated but the ways in which chiefs deployed notions of legitimacy to bolster their claims to land.

⁹⁶ Mduduzi Percival Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority from ‘Personal to Territorial’: An Historical Analysis of the Limitations of Colonial Boundaries on African Socio-political Relations in Natal’s Maphumulo/Lower Thukela Region, 1890-1910” (M.A., University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2012), 36; Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, 320.

⁹⁷ Clegg, “Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - Bringing Back the Body: An Examination into the Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations, 1882-1944”; Lambert, *Betrayed trust*; Jabulani Sithole, “Land, Officials, Chiefs and Commoners in the Izimpi Zemibango in the Umlazi Location of the Pinetown District in the Context of Natal’s Changing Political Economy, 1920-1936” (M.A., University of Natal, 1998); Mahoney, “Between the Zulu King and the Great White Chief”; Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority.”

⁹⁸ PAR. SNA 1/1/117. 870/89. RM Umngeni Forder to SNA, September 14, 1989.

Less than ten years after the 1882 establishment of a boundary line on location land between the Nyavu and the Gcumisa, Nomsimekwana's son, Ngangezwe, appealed to the Secretary for Native Affairs on behalf of his aged father regarding a further land dispute where Manyosi applied to have several of Nomsimekwana's people removed from what the Gcumisa chief deemed his own territory. J.W. Shepstone had marked the Manzamnyama Stream as the line between Nomsimekwana and Manyosi on the eastern side of the mountain, but failed to point out a boundary on the northwestern corner. Thus, in 1889, Ngangezwe appealed that the government intervene and decide the boundaries, once and for all. Ngangezwe alleged that the land in question to the northwest of the mountain belonged to the Nyavu. Ngangezwe explained, "My father is a hereditary chief over the Mcoseli or Mdhuli [sic] Tribe, and was chief over the land in dispute when the Boers conquered Natal. When the British Government took Natal from the Boers my father still remained Chief and is still a Chief." Ngangezwe positioned his father as the *hereditary* chief, having been on this land before the arrival of Europeans, in stark contrast to Mahoiza and Manyosi. He described at length how these latter two obtained jurisdiction over land belonging to the Nyavu thus:

Chief Ngoza and Nomsimekwana were great friends and in consequence Ngoza asked for and obtained leave from Nomsimekwana to build one kraal this side of the Umngeni. This kraal was the Hlahleni kraal. After this more of Ngoza's people came across the Umngeni and lived near to the Hlahleni kraal with Nomsimekwana's people. Some time elapsed after this then Ngoza left with part of his Tribe for Msinga and entrusted his Tribe by the Umngeni to Mahoiza who is now Chief Mahoiza. The owners of the kraals which had come across the Umngeni to Nomsimekwana's side of the river then expressed their wish to remain under Nomsimekwana; but Mahoiza claimed that the land had been Ngoza's and that the people who were occupying it should move or remain under him. This matter then came before Mr. J.W. Shepstone as Secretary for Native Affairs for settlement.

Chief Manyosi gave evidence in favour of Nomsimekwana but judgment was given in favour of Mahoiza. Shortly after this Nomsimekwana applied to said Secretary for Native Affairs for a review of this whole matter and the application

was granted. The matter was then gone into, the decision in favour of Mahoiza was upset, and a decision in favour of Nomsimekwana was given. Kilani and Ngalonkulu were then sent by the said Secretary for Native Affairs to inform the people of the Locality in dispute, and Mahoiza, of the new decision. In the meantime, Manyosi was appointed Chief of that part of Ngoza's tribe which lived on Location lands. After his appointment Manyosi built a kraal on the locality which had been in dispute and then laid claim to the locality for himself and his people. This claim then came before Mr. J.W. Shepstone as Secretary for Native Affairs who decided in favour of Manyosi as regards the land up to the stream Manzamyama formerly Gobeni...⁹⁹

The SNA found in favor of Manyosi on account of the 1882-set boundary line and pointed out a boundary to the northwest of the mountain taking the Manyamnyama as its source. He did not order Nomsimekwana's people, Ngulube and Magcimana, to remove to Nyavu territory, but declared that no further Nyavu settlement should take place in the area now that jurisdiction had been decided.¹⁰⁰ But the issues over this same boundary line were again raised in 1895, the Gcumisa now under the authority of Manyosi's son, Swaimana.¹⁰¹ Relations of Ngulube and Magcimana had moved into the abandoned *imizi* ordered to remove earlier and the SNA again referred to the earliest set boundary line and ordered Nomsimekwana's people to move.¹⁰²

Despite the repeated decisions in favor of the Gcumisa, Ngangezwe appealed yet again in early 1905 that the matter be reopened. Ngangezwe lamented what he saw as an injustice done to

⁹⁹ PAR. SNA 1/1/117. 870/1889. Petition of Ngangezwe representing Chief Nomsimekwana. August 21, 1889.

¹⁰⁰ PAR. SNA 1/1/117. 870/1889. Minute Paper, R.C. Samuelson, 1889-1890.

¹⁰¹ In 1894, Swaimana, the son and heir of Manyosi appeared before Administrator Foxon on behalf of his ill father. Swaimana reported that Manyosi asked that Swaimana be appointed regent of his portion of the Qamu pending his recovery. See PAR. SNA 1/1/183. 361/1894. "Illness of Chief Manyosi."

¹⁰² PAR. SNA. 1/1/197. 169/1895. Resident Magistrate, Umngeni: Application for Previous Correspondence Relative to Land Dispute Between Late Chief Manyosi and Chief Nomsimekwana. February 5, 1895.

his people and stressed that Manyosi had no prior right to the land. “Manyosi laid claim to the ground himself and it was given to him. I fail to understand how this could be done, seeing that in the first place he was only concerned in the matter as a witness. This is a point over which I grieve sorely.”¹⁰³ While ultimately Undersecretary for Native Affairs Samuelson refused to reconsider the case on account of the earlier decisions and boundary line, Umngeni Resident Magistrate Thomas Bennett pleaded on Ngangezwe’s behalf on account of the Nyavu’s “aboriginal” status. Bennett surprisingly argued against the appointed chief, saying: “knowing all the circumstances of the case I must say that in dealing with this matter, the fact of Ngangezwe’s father Nomsimekwana and his people being one of the aboriginal tribes resident at Table Mountain at the time this territory was taken from the dutch [*sic*], was not fully considered.”¹⁰⁴

As we will see throughout the next several chapters the Nyavu chiefs repeatedly relied on this hereditary, aboriginal status in their claims on land. Nomsimekwana and Ngangezwe contrasted their legitimacy against the colonially appointed authority of Mahoiza and Manyosi. While the fact that Ngoza was an appointed chief had not prevented a friendship between Ngoza and Nomsimekwana, increasing competition for land and authority motivated the Nyavu chiefs to attempt to delegitimize other appointed chiefs. Nomsimekwana’s son called into question the legitimacy of Mahoiza and Manyosi’s claims by emphasizing their non-hereditary status. Nomsimekwana had inherited his chiefly legitimacy and jurisdiction over land. When Mahoiza was entrusted with the land, he was not then a chief, but only an induna. When Manyosi was awarded the land he was only a witness.

¹⁰³ PAR. SNA 1/1/320. 1051/1905. Statement of Ngangezwe to SNA, May 3, 1905.

¹⁰⁴ PAR. SNA 1/1/320. 1051/1905. Minute Paper, Umngeni Resident Magistrate. June 8, 1905.

While Manyosi was favored by the SNA in these land claims, colonial confidence in the chief dwindled after repeated complaints regarding his “campaign of contention with all his neighboring chiefs and their tribes” and would eventually result in the division of his chiefdom.¹⁰⁵ Chief Mhlahlo, a successor of Mbobo’s landless portion of the Qamu, complained about Swaimana’s interference with his people on a regular basis. Their relationship was tense on account of the expected sharing of land. Mhlahlo continued for several years to make statements before the magistrates and SNA for boundaries to be set. The New Hanover Magistrate Ritter outlined Mhlahlo’s complaints, principal of which was that Swaimana claimed all of the land upon which Mhlahlo’s people in the New Hanover District resided and interfered with his ability to call out people for road works.

While the SNA steadfastly adhered to the decision not to allocate specific territory to this portion of the Qamu, several officials expressed concern regarding Swaimana’s actions. Samuelson found Swaimana’s conduct regarding several of Mhlahlo’s people, including Nombinda kaMnukwa and Mzingwa, reprehensible. In the case of the former, Swaimana had ordered the removal of a white rag that had been hung to signify Nombinda’s engagement. Regarding the latter, Swaimana gave one of Mfuyana’s (Mhlahlo’s induna) gardens to Mzingwa, who fell under the authority of Swaimana, and ordered that the remainder of Mfuyana’s gardens be used as grazing grounds for his own cattle.¹⁰⁶

It is interesting to note that in these complaints Chief Mhlahlo, himself the heir of an appointed chief, chose to highlight his familial relationship to Ngoza. Swaimana, on the other

¹⁰⁵ PAR. SNA 1/1/298. 3846/1902. Statement of Mhlahlo, Chief of the Amaqamu Tribe, Umngeni Division, June 16, 1903.

¹⁰⁶ PAR. SNA 1/1/307. Statement by Chief Mhlahlo and headman Mfuyana relative to boundary dispute...

hand, was “but an upstart sprung from the appointment of my late uncle Ngoza’s induna Manyosi... who is as bumptious as a man can be, [and] is snapping up the land all round him and increasing the dimensions of his tribe as fast as he can.”¹⁰⁷ Mhlahlo argued his right to land due to his kinship relations with Ngoza, in contrast to Swaimana who was only the heir of Ngoza’s induna.

But Chief Mhlahlo was not the only one appearing before colonial officials with complaints regarding Swaimana. By 1905, even members of Swaimana’s own people had had enough. Several members of the Gcumisa, including Butsha (an induna), Mpinkulu, Tayi, and Mazingela, appeared before the Umngeni Magistrate as representatives of *umuzi* heads residing on private lands in the Umngeni and New Hanover divisions, requesting to be transferred to the authority of Chief Bhambatha. The representatives complained that Swaimana arbitrarily placed strangers in their homesteads to live and would not redress their concerns. This was not the first complaint the Umngeni Magistrate received regarding Swaimana, for “even his own relatives residing on Location Lands have made application to be emancipated from his control.”¹⁰⁸ The previous New Hanover Magistrate Ritter, aware of the increasing complaints, saw no surprise that some of Swaimana’s followers wished to leave him. “Swaimana is a most clever, sharp Native and requires to be kept close in hand by his Magistrate. He is partial and unjust; many of his own brothers dislike him.”¹⁰⁹ Ritter’s successor Thomas Maxwell felt that while he had not much opportunity to judge the character of Swaimana, he found the “casual way he has behaved

¹⁰⁷ PAR. SNA 1/1/298. 3846/1902. Statement of Mhlahlo, Chief of the Amaqamu Tribe, Umngeni Division, June 16, 1903.

¹⁰⁸ PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Magistrate Umngeni to U.S.N.A. March 16, 1905

¹⁰⁹ PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Ex-Magistrate A. Ritter to U.S.N.A. September 13, 1905

in the matter of supplying natives for the P.W.D.” as reason to keep the chief under close watch. He pointed out that Swaimana was “not a hereditary Chief hence he is not looked up to with the great respect shown by natives to such.”¹¹⁰

Prior to colonial rule, the possibility that a disaffected section of a chiefdom “might hive off was a powerful check on chiefly rule: chiefs would be careful not to dissipate their power, which was measured in terms of the number of subjects, by alienating a section of their people.”¹¹¹ Under the Shepstonian system, this process was carefully regulated and permission from the SNA was required not only for sections to hive off but also for individuals and *imizi* to transfer allegiance. This permission could be granted or refused depending on the interpretation of its effect. Where a request for separation was granted, a new chiefdom formed under the leadership of the person leading the request for separation or a commoner who had performed some useful service and earned such a reward.

Samuelson objected to Butsha and others’ application to fall under Bhambatha. Bhambatha already had the reputation of a “difficult man,” though the rebellion that took his name had not yet erupted (of which we will learn more in the next chapter). Samuelson argued Butsha and the other complainants lived too far from Bhambatha’s jurisdiction. The unhappy applicants could relocate to Bhambatha’s district, or place themselves under another chief of the area in which they resided. The Umngeni Magistrate suggested the creation of a new chiefdom

¹¹⁰ PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Magistrate New Hanover to U.S.N.A. October 3, 1905.

¹¹¹ Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*, 119.

for he believed that since there were “many small sections of tribes in this locality” it might be best “to consider the question of grouping these kraals and placing them under one head.”¹¹²

While never cited by officials as an official reason for the separation, certainly they took into consideration the *izimpi zezigodi* (section wars) between peoples on each side of the Umngeni River under Swaimana.¹¹³ As will be seen below, members of the Maphumulo believe these *izimpi zezigodi* were certainly part of the reasoning for the creation of a new chieftaincy. Rumors reached the SNA that Swaimana and his brother had been aware of a fight before it took place and did nothing to prevent it.¹¹⁴ Butsha and Ngcazi, another member of Swaimana’s people looking to break away and join with Bambatha, were both izinduna on land below the Umngeni River. Aware of their desire to leave his jurisdiction, Swaimana responded in defense, alleging the matter was one of long standing and one in which he was not at fault. Prior to Swaimana’s chieftaincy, Bambatha had attempted to claim these same *imizi* through the Secretary for Native Affairs but was refused. More recently, he had attempted to mobilize these people at a wedding at the *umuzi* of Ziswana, Butsha’s father. Now Butsha was claiming fees for civil cases and *valelisa* (removing oneself from under the jurisdiction of a chief). The people below the Umngeni refused to follow Swaimana and instead listened to Ngcazi.¹¹⁵ The magistrate later reported that the tensions amongst Swaimana’s people and between them and Swaimana were so great he feared it was impossible for Swaimana to continue to operate as

¹¹² PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Magistrate Umngeni to U.S.N.A. March 16, 1905 and U.S.N.A to Magistrate Umngeni, March 21, 1905.

¹¹³ This fight between the sections of Swaimana on each side of the Umngeni River is in need of more analysis than allowed here. It is also the subject of a play in isiZulu. Mlindeli S. S Gcumisa, *Awuwelwa Umngeni!* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1993).

¹¹⁴ PAR. SNA 1/4/13. 69/1904. Report of Intelligence Officer No. 1, November 12, 1904.

¹¹⁵ PAR. SNA. 1/1/320. Statement of Swaimana kaManyosi. April 17, 1905.

chief.¹¹⁶ Dividing Swaimana's jurisdiction at the Umngeni thus served as a convenient way for the colonial government to settle an ongoing dispute between the *izigodi* on each side of the river and also address the complaints leveled against Swaimana.

Umngeni Magistrate Bennett and several government officials thus recommended that Maguzu kaMganu Maphumulo be appointed as chief of the section below the Umngeni. Maguzu was until then a "native sergeant" of the Natal Police and an induna at the Ndwedwe and Umngeni Magistrate's Courts.¹¹⁷ Bennett spoke highly of Maguzu, on account of his most excellent character.

He came to this Colony from Zululand with his father Umganu, prior to the Umbulazi Cetwayo fight of 1858 and settled under Chief Ngoza at the Umkabela near the Umngeni River and has resided in that neighbourhood ever since. He entered the services of the Govt. as policeman when this Magistracy was first established about 1873, and became Induna of the Magistrate's Court at Ndwedwe, and subsequently about eleven years ago, was removed from Ndwedwe to this Court in the same capacity, a position he has held with great credit ever since.¹¹⁸

Bennett met with the principal *umuzi* heads of his district under Swaimana and they unanimously agreed on the appointment of Maguzu as their chief.¹¹⁹ In a November 1905 Order under the provisions of Section 54 of the Courts Act of 1898, which conferred power to the Governor to proscribe the limits of territory within which chiefs could exercise jurisdiction, Henry McCallum restricted Swaimana's jurisdiction to the 442 *imizi* in the Magisterial District of New Hanover (whereas previously he governed over the Gcumisa in both New Hanover and

¹¹⁶ PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Report of the Magistrate Umngeni Division in connection with papers SNA 670/05 and V.225/05. July 5, 1905.

¹¹⁷ The following all allude to Maguzu as court induna or native sergeant: PAR. AGO 1/8/50 355A/1895; SNA 1/1/236 61/1897; SNA 1/1/250 1474/1897.

¹¹⁸ Magistrate Umngeni to U.S.N.A. August 22, 1905.

¹¹⁹ PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Magistrate Umngeni to U.S.N.A. September 6, 1905.

Umngeni Districts).¹²⁰ At the recommendation of the Umngeni magistrate, 121 kraals located in the district (41 on Location Land and 80 on private lands) were removed from Swaimana's control. This section of the Gcumisa was designated as the "Maphumulo tribe" and became known as Mbambangalo. The induna of the Umngeni Magistrate's Court, Maguzu, was appointed as chief on December 1, 1905. Shula Marks cited this new polity as an example of the dual process of chief and chiefdom "making."¹²¹

And thus again, another loyal induna was raised up from within the ranks of Ngoza's followers on account of committed service to the colonial establishment. While the colonial officials cited Maguzu's most excellent character and good work, Maphumulo and Nyavu alike today say that Maguzu was given the position as his *impesheni*, or pension. There are, however, differing interpretations over who sought the division and whether or not the separation was amicable. These can best be seen in explanations of the name to be given to the Maphumulo territory, Mbambangalo. Literally, this place name means to hold (*bamba*) the arm (*ingalo*).¹²²

Maphumulo Chief Nhlakanipho and several of his izinduna concurred on their interpretations of *bamba ingalo*. They related that after receiving the chieftaincy as a pension, Maguzu had said, "let us hold on to one another's arm, showing that we understand each other and can stay together well." Bangingi Maphumulo, a former *ibamba* (regent) of the Maphumulo chieftaincy, said that this referred to the various *izigodi* (sections) that fell within

¹²⁰ PAR. SNA 1/1/318 1905/670. Order by His Excellency the Governor November 13, 1905.

¹²¹ Marks also argues that there should be no doubt that it was from Maguzu (as the Umngeni induna) that the magistrate heard much of the information about Swaimana. Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, 323.

¹²² The section that follows would greatly benefit from oral history interviews with Gcumisa followers. Unfortunately, at the time of interviews, I did not have the time or means of access to conduct interviews in KwaSwayimane.

Mbambangalo.¹²³ This explanation could certainly be interpreted as an attempt to legitimize the manner in which Maguzu became chief. It ignores the friction caused by the removal of a section of people from under the Gcumisa chief and highlights that Maguzu’s position was earned.

However, another induna contended that the place was called Mbambangalo because Maguzu was asked to help Chief Swaimana govern the people across the Umngeni River. At the time there were many *izimpi zezigodi* and Swaimana lived too far from the area that would become Mbambangalo to mediate such conflicts. Baba Ndlela recounted that Maguzu was given the chieftaincy “because he wanted him to help look after this place, meaning Chief Maphumulo was assisting Chief Gcumisa. So that is why this place is called Mbambangalo.”¹²⁴

But Nkanyiso Ndlovu, a young man raised in Mbambangalo, tells a slightly different version of the story where the help lent by Maguzu was not welcomed by Swaimana—who favored the *isigodi* above the Umngeni River over the *isigodi* below. Ndlovu alleges the government gave Maguzu the *isigodi* below in an effort to mediate where Chief Swaimana could, or rather, would not.

I can say that they call this area Mbambangalo because they said Maguzu must hold Gcumisa’s arm across the river, although he, Gcumisa, was saying that he would not grasp it. Maguzu held Gcumisa’s arm and that is how the place got named Mbambangalo. I am not certain, but this is the explanation I received from my elders.¹²⁵

¹²³ “Asibambane ingalo, okukhombisa ukuzwana ukuze sihlalisane kahle.” Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011; Bangingi Maphumulo and Bernard Mkhize by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 31, 2011.

¹²⁴ “Ngoba esezomuphathela lendawo. Okuchaza ukuthi iNkosi uMaphumulo wabamba ingalo yeNkosi uGcumisa. Kungakho ke igama lithi uMbambangalo.” Mazipho Amos Ndlela, B.A. Msomi, Bongumuzi Mbhele, and Mfikiseni Khumalo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, February 17, 2011.

¹²⁵ “Ngingathi kuthiwa uMbambangalo ngoba kwathiwa kuMaguzu akabambe ingalo lena engaphesheya ngoba uGcumisa ethi ayishawe kwathiwa yena akayibambe. Wayibamba kanjalo kwaze kwathiwa kuseMbambangalo. Noma ngingenalo iqiniso lalokho ngoba nami

Not surprisingly, given the still ongoing land dispute between the Maphumulo and Nyavu over land in this region (to be examined throughout the dissertation), one Nyavu induna used an explanation of *bamba ingalo* in an attempt to delegitimize the first Maphumulo chief as an appointee of the colonial government. He also interpreted Maguzu's appointment as pension and related that it was a decision not agreed upon by the other chiefs and as one sought out by a status hungry Maguzu.

Yes, he said he wants to be registered as a Chief. Indeed, they did as he requested and registered him as a chief. They sent all the documents to Pretoria. They did this without consulting (speaking) with other chiefs. He was appointed by the white people as a pension.¹²⁶

When Chief Swaimana heard of the decision to restrict his jurisdiction, he had “nothing to say as the Government have seen fit.”¹²⁷ But three months later he applied to make an appearance before the Minister for Native Affairs where he made the following statement. While restrained, his response indicates his displeasure. “I have been deprived of part of my Tribe in the Umngeni Division and it has been put under Maguzu as Chief... It is not for me to show disaffection or discontent at the decision of the Government – the matter is done and I have just come in to express my thanks for the Government's decision.” The minister in return emphasized that it was neither the government nor Maguzu who had sought this, but the people.¹²⁸

ulwazi engiluthola kubantu abadala kunami.” Nkanyiso Ndlovu, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, April 8, 2011.

¹²⁶ “Yebo, ngoba wathi yena ufuna ukuthi abhalwe abe inkosi. Nangempela bamubhala njengeNkosi izincwadi zahamba zayosayinwa ePitoli. Lokho kwenzeka ngaphandle kokuthi kukhulunywe namanye amakhosi. Wabekwa abelungu ngempesheni.” Bhekumuzi Sibiya, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNyavu, August 9, 2011.

¹²⁷ PAR. SNA 1/1/318. Minutes, Native Affairs Department, February 5, 1906.


¹²⁸ PAR. SNA 1/1/337. Minutes, Native Affairs Department. March 1, 1906.

But what oral history interviews make clear is that the government had been influenced by the conflicts between sections of the Gcumisa. When Butsha and several other Gcumisa appeared before the SNA to request leave from Swaimana's control, the government found what they hoped would be a solution to Swaimana's misconduct and failure to mediate between his peoples. These interviews also reveal the manner in which Maphumulo seek to legitimize their descent from an appointed chief and the ways in which the Nyavu contested the authority of their appointed neighbors.

Conclusion

This chapter has not only introduced the key players in the Table Mountain region, but it also examined the origins of the conflict over land and chiefly legitimacy between the hereditary Nyavu and the appointed Maphumulo that reemerges in deadly political violence in the years preceding the 1994 elections. The oral tradition of the youthful Nyavu chief Nomsimekwana is not just an entertaining "official history" of the Nyavu. This crucial source is valuable for its insights into the position of the Nyavu on the periphery of the growing Zulu kingdom and the significance of hereditary descent to the narrators of the tradition. As early as the 1880s, the proliferation of "government tribes" and the overcrowding of location lands as initiated by the colonial government sparked boundary conflicts between and amongst the hereditary and appointed chieftaincies. The Nyavu began citing their historical occupation and hereditary right to authority in land claims against the government-established chieftaincies such as the Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo. These land conflicts and how they are remembered and discussed over time reveal the manner in which chiefs, descendants of both hereditary and appointed rulers, attempted to delegitimize others without hereditary connections. An understanding of these

origins of land and legitimacy conflicts is crucial to understanding how and why deadly violence broke out between the Nyavu and Maphumulo over a century later during *uDlame*. The next chapter will examine the Nyavu and Maphumulo during the segregation and apartheid eras. The focus will be on the so-called faction fights between the newly created chiefdoms and the hereditary Nyavu, as well as the relocation of the Maphumulo to state-bought farms claimed by the Nyavu to facilitate the construction of the Nagle Dam. The creation of apartheid divide and rule “tribal authorities” laid down specific legal boundaries that had ramifications for not only this ongoing land dispute but in the eruption of *uDlame*.



Map 3: Inanda Location, Showing Area of Interest and Relevant Farms




Figure 6: Common Lineage of the Nyavu and Njilo Chiefs according to Oral Tradition




Figure 7: Division of Qamu Chiefdom in Umngeni Valley (Appointed Chiefs, Year Chieftaincy Commenced)

Chapter Two:

“I would like to suggest Mr. Ferreira’s Farm”: Boundaries, Betterment, and Chiefly Authority on Onverwacht and Goedverwaching, 1905-1973¹

On December 1, 1905, Maguzu kaMganu became the first chief of the Maphumulo in the shadow of Table Mountain. Like the establishment of new chiefdoms and boundary definitions examined in the previous chapter, this appointment and the boundaries of the newly established Maphumulo chiefdom would spark one hundred years of conflicts rather than stem them as the colonial administration intended. This chapter will examine some long-term explanations for *uDlame*, including “faction fights,” boundary disputes, relocations, and resistance that contributed to the outbreak of violence during *uDlame* over a portion of the farm Goedverwaching. The shortage of land for African settlement and growth and the definition and manipulation of chiefly authority was at the heart of the conflict. The chapter will first examine the conflicts that ensued between the Gcumisa, Maphumulo, and Nyavu from the creation of the Maphumulo chiefdom and in the wake of the Union and the 1913 Natives Land Act. It will also analyze the removal of the Maphumulo from their original territory for the construction of the Nagle Dam. The Maphumulo were relocated in stages onto to South African Native Trust (SANT)-purchased farms Aasvogel Krans, Onverwacht, and Goedverwaching--the last also claimed by the Nyavu. It will then consider the implementation of and resistance to apartheid-era “tribal authorities” and betterment planning, leading up to the establishment of the KwaZulu homeland and division of jurisdiction of these farms between the SADT and KwaZulu. This solidifying of contested boundaries around a desirable portion of land and the parceling out of

¹ PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/1920. “Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs. Mdhluhi Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhluhi,” January 30, 1937.

jurisdiction by the apartheid authorities exacerbated existing conflicts over boundaries and authority that would later reignite during *uDlame*.

***Izimpi zemibango* and Boundary Conflicts in the Table Mountain Region**

So-called “faction fighting” was rampant in the Table Mountain region from the time of the appointment of the government tribes. This is not to suggest there was no conflict prior to colonial rule, but the sources available reveal friction between the newly created chiefs and their hereditary counterparts. As examined in the previous chapter, the chiefs in KwaNyavu did not take lightly to encroachment on their territory. The creation of new chiefdoms, increasing tensions in the colony with *impi yamakhanda* (“war of the heads,” the Bhambatha Rebellion, or Zulu Rebellion) as well as the establishment of the Union in 1910 and the passing of the Union’s 1913 Natives Land Act ensured increased competition over land and resources.

Tensions between white settlers and Africans grew steadily with Natal’s increasing efforts to force Africans into working for whites in the mines and on the farms included land evictions and taxes. The final straw for many Africans came in the form of a 1906 poll tax on all African men not already paying the hut tax. Africans recognized the fee as an attempt to end their economic independence and refused to pay the tax. Natal’s paranoid and heavy-handed response sparked disturbances that erupted into rebellion around the figure of Chief Bambatha who refused to heed a summons for his arrest related to his inability to get his followers to pay the tax. Natal seized thousands of African cattle, torched villages, and killed more than three thousand Africans in contrast to less than thirty white deaths. Following the uprising, the colony enforced tax laws even more strenuously, achieving the desired effect of increased African labor.

The industrial revolution also produced a conviction amongst white politicians that a union government would ensure minority rule and profit. The Act of Union in 1910 brought together the previously separate colonies of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State to form the Union of South Africa. The Union government enacted a barrage of discriminatory laws that strengthened its grip on the African population. The segregation policy of the Union had precedents in the demarcation of land and authority set up under colonialism and was the product of South Africa's industrial revolution. However, rather than a rigid and "unified ideological package," it was only between the end of the South African War in 1902 and the 1930s that a cogent policy of segregation emerged.² The Mines and Works Act (1911) imposed a color bar and the Native Labour Registration Act (1911) reserved African workers for white agriculture. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act (1923) provided for residential segregation in towns. The Industrial Conciliation Act (1924) legalized collective bargaining power of trade unions but excluded from the definition of worker all pass-bearing Africans.³

By far the most influential Union laws for Africans were those governing land and "native administration." The Natives Land Act of 1913 incorporated the different African reserve systems of each province to form the basis of the Union's African land policy. It defined the boundaries of "scheduled areas," including land Africans had acquired by grant, previously created locations, land owned under trusteeship and land already purchased by Africans in the Cape and Natal. This land amounted to about nine-million hectares, or roughly 7% of all land in South Africa. The act also prohibited Africans from purchasing land outside of these areas and

² Saul Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919-36* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).

³ Martin Chanock, *The Making of South African Legal Culture, 1902-1936: Fear, Favour, and Prejudice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 437-8.

terminated (at least in theory) Africans' ability to rent white-owned land unless they were labor tenants or full-time wage workers.⁴ These restrictions ensured many Africans would have to work for others, either as labor tenants or migrant laborers.⁵

The Native Affairs Act (1920) ensured segregated administration, setting up “tribal councils” for the administration of the reserves and advisory councils for Africans in urban areas, both under the authority of the Native Affairs Department (NAD) and the Prime Minister. A more uniform system emerged under the Native Administration Act (1927), accepting the Shepstonian principles of bolstering traditional authorities in the reserves under the “Supreme Chief,” the Governor-General of South Africa. The Native Administration Act made chiefs responsible for paying taxes of the people under their jurisdiction and subject to a more codified system of “Native Law.” NAD now played a more regulatory role, able to discipline chiefs and relocate communities to fit the government’s “retribalization” efforts.

In the face of the intensification of measures designed to restrict African mobility and prosperity, a group of influential elite African men began to organize and protest the loss of their rights. During the first decade of the 20th century, several African initiatives such as the Natal Native Congress of John Dube and the South African Native Congress and Native Vigilance Association of the Cape emerged and then came together in a call for a national African political organization. By 1912, the South African Native National Congress was launched with an African nationalist message in opposition to segregation. The movement, later renamed the

⁴ For an account of the persistence of sharecropping (where white landlords and African tenants entered into agreements to share harvests in proportion to the economic inputs they made to the farms) for nearly half a century after they were outlawed, see: Charles Van Onselen, *The Seed is Mine : The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper, 1894-1985* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996).

⁵ Laurine Platzky, Cheryl Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People : Forced Removals in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985), 83–7.

African National Congress (1923), provided for an upper house of chiefs despite tensions between the political philosophy of the western-educated elite and the traditions of the chieftainship.

In the Table Mountain region, in Natal's Inanda location (*see Map 3*), the segregationist policies and increasing resistance resulted in contestation over chiefly authority and competition for scarce land. The Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefs sought to ensure their own authority – Chief Maguzu through professions of his loyalty to the colonial administration and Chief Ngangezwe with claims to hereditary descent. But before we can examine the clashes that erupted, this section must include a brief discussion of the term “faction fight.”

Scholars now agree the conflicts labeled “faction fights” by colonial and Union administrators occurred in the context of particular material crisis conditions, including social dislocation and disintegration as a result of urbanization, land shortages, and natural disasters.⁶ Many also eschew the oversimplified and generalized term “faction fight” that often reflects a stereotypical belief about the inherent violence of Africans.⁷ The widespread use of “faction fight” and “native unrest” also obscures the roles of several non-African players in the making of violent conflict within and between African communities. Jabulani Sithole instead suggests the

⁶ Jabulani Sithole, “Land, Officials, Chiefs and Commoners in the Izimpi Zemibango in the Umlazi Location of the Pinetown District in the Context of Natal's Changing Political Economy, 1920-1936” (M.A. thesis, University of Natal, 1998); Mahoney, “Between the Zulu King and the Great White Chief.”

⁷ Clegg, “Ukubuyisa Isidumbu”; Beinart, “Introduction: Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography”; Lambert, *Betrayed Trust*; Sithole, “Land, Officials, Chiefs and Commoners.”

phrase *izimpi zemibango*, or wars of disputes, enables the possibility of a variety of agents, issues, and interests that must be considered in examinations of violent conflict.⁸

Izimpi zemibango often erupted between chiefdoms, between *izigodi* (sections) within a chiefdom, or between factions that formed around leaders competing for the position of chief. In his examination of conflict in the Maphumulo division of colonial Natal, Michael Mahoney shows this kind of fighting challenged individual chiefs while sanctioning the institution of chieftaincy. Where Africans rejected their chiefs, they did so by transferring their allegiance to another chief, as was done by Butsha, Ngcazi, and others after the appointment of Maguzu as chief of the new Maphumulo polity. Succession disputes also enabled Africans to express dissatisfaction by siding with other claimants to the chieftaincy. The fighting usually reflected youthful initiative and coincided with alcohol consumption, most often at weddings and on holidays. Colonial efforts, sometimes in collusion with chiefs and homestead heads,⁹ to quell the faction fighting included both direct means such as fines, imprisonment, hard labor, and corporal punishment and indirect efforts such as stringent regulations on events where alcohol was consumed and the removal of *imizi* from one chiefdom to another.¹⁰

The conflicts in the Table Mountain region involved many actors, including migrant laborers (most often youths) who regularly returned home on weekends and holidays from nearby Pietermaritzburg, the chiefs, women, and the colonial officials that sought to quell the troublesome and threatening conflicts. At stake were a variety of interests, ranging from boundary conflicts and contestation of chiefly authority to “drunken brawls” and defense of

⁸ Sithole, “Land, Officials, Chiefs and Commoners.”

⁹ Benedict Carton, *Blood from your Children: The Colonial Origins of Generational Conflict in South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000).

¹⁰ Mahoney, “Between the Zulu King and the Great White Chief,” 175–6, 216–9.

masculinity.¹¹ The analyses of these conflicts by Sithole and Michael Mahoney both involve boundary and specific succession disputes. The hiving off of the Maphumulo in the Table Mountain region resulted in similar contestation over chiefly authority but also between the new polities and the hereditary Nyavu. Contestation over boundary lines and *izimpi zemibongo* were central to this competition between chiefs.

Within months of his appointment, Chief Maguzu began to shore up his authority by positioning himself as a loyal supporter of the colonial administration during *impi yamakhanda*. The chief made the trip to Pietermaritzburg to call upon the Secretary for Native Affairs with several of his men, including the induna Ngcazi who had been amongst the men petitioning to break away from Swaimana and join Bhambatha's jurisdiction. The significance of this visit is twofold. During the April 26, 1906 visit, Maguzu first thanked the government for placing under his authority *imizi* previously under Chief Bambatha of the Zondi. On February 23, 1906, the government deposed Bhambatha kaMancinza for resisting the introduction of the poll tax. From Maguzu's gratitude, it appears that in addition to the chief's deposal, *imizi* were also removed from the jurisdiction of the Zondi and given to Maguzu. Maguzu, formerly a magisterial induna, was clearly cognizant of fomenting rebellion in the colony and that as an appointed chief his power came from the colonial administration. This visit was the first of two where Maguzu positioned himself as a chief loyal to the colonial administration. Later that year, in October,

¹¹ There are several *izimpi zemibongo* within the Maphumulo associated with "drunken brawling" on holidays and at weddings that will not be examined here. There is little detail given to them in the records, most likely because the officials deemed them not related to "tribal jealousy." See PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2 MC405/13 and CNC 184. 1914/1486. For more on South African masculinities, see Morrell, *Changing Men in Southern Africa*.

Maguzu again called upon the Umngeni Magistrate, this time with Chief Mveli¹² of the Fuze chiefdom. The two had just heard of the death of Mjongo, one of the leading rebels in what Shula Marks has called the “most important of the initial incidents of defiance over the collection of the Poll Tax.”¹³ Maguzu and Chief Mveli expressed “in no measured terms their satisfaction that Majongo [*sic*] had at last met with his deserts and had suffered the death penalty. As they voiced it, ‘It would now be seen that there was a Government in the country.’”¹⁴

In addition to voicing his support at the April meeting, Maguzu asked for a clear definition of his jurisdiction. Maguzu complained that frequent fights and disturbances occurred because of the intermixing of followers and that members of *imizi* under the authority of other chiefs disregarded him. He asked that certain *imizi* under the chiefs Mhlahlo (Qamu), Mafahleni (Nxamalala), and Cupukumuku (Qamu) on both location and private lands under his jurisdiction be transferred to him. He recognized that in making the request for this definition he would lose *imizi* as well. The Natal administration saw this request as an opportunity to consider the ward system for the Umngeni District, as was to be first implemented in the Maphumulo magistracy in the wake of the *impi yamakhanda* where authorities believed the “tribal mixup” of followers of

¹² Mveli kaHemuhemu was the acting chief of the Fuze at the time of the *impi yamakhanda*. During the disturbances, Mveli promptly reported his followers’ refusal to pay the poll tax and hunted out the rebels with zeal. As Muzi Hadebe and Shula Marks have pointed out, Chief Mveli had several reasons for his loyalty to the administration. As the regent for the Fuze heir Langalakhe, Mveli sought to prove his support to the colonial government given his dependency on the administration for his status. As well, Mveli used the rebellion as an opportunity to rid himself of dissident elements. Moses Muziwandile Hadebe, “A Contextualization and Examination of the Impi Yamakhanda (1906 Uprising) as Reported by J.L. Dube in Ilanga Lase Natal, with Special Focus on Dube’s Attitude to Dinuzulu as Indicated in His Reportage on the Treason Trial of Dinuzulu” (M.A. thesis, University of Natal, 2003), 68; Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, 324.

¹³ Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, 174.

¹⁴ PAR. SNA 1/1/352. 3388/1906.” Rebels. Actg Chief Mveli and Chief Maguzu express their satisfaction of the execution of Mjongo,” 1906.

various chiefs contributed to the extent of the rebellion, and advised the Umngeni Magistrate Bennett to report on the feasibility of doing so.¹⁵

Maguzu's chiefly authority and territorial jurisdiction, in particular the boundary between the Maphumulo and Nyavu, would remain the contentious subject of *izimpi zemibango* and boundary disputes reported by the Umngeni Magistrate over the next 25 years. Scattered remarks between 1906 and 1913, when tensions came to a head, suggest the increasing animosity between the Maphumulo and Nyavu and their chiefs. These comments also suggest that despite the initial tensions between Swaimana and Maguzu over the creation of the Maphumulo out of the Gcumisa, the two found common cause against the Nyavu.

Several times during this period the colonial administration investigated the alleged arming of the Gcumisa. In June 1906, a "loyal chief living at Table Mountain" informed the magistrate Chief Swaimana had ordered his people to assemble at his *umuzi*. The unnamed loyal chief did not know the purpose of the meeting but considered it worthy of note given the disturbances in the Maphumulo and Lower Thukela Divisions.¹⁶ Whether this chief was Maguzu or Ngangezwe cannot be known for certain, but given the fledgling alliance it was probably the latter. In 1912, the Acting Chief Native Commissioner again investigated the Gcumisa, convinced that Swaimana ordered an arming to take sides in unrest between the Chiefs Maguzu and Ngangezwe. All of the men and women interviewed during the investigation reported the arming had been a mistake. Chief Swaimana had called for men to hunt cane rats from his

¹⁵ PAR. SNA 1/1/340. 1302/1906. "Boundaries. Chief Maguzu asks that his district be defined," April 26, 1906. On the ward system in Maphumulo in the wake of the Zulu Rebellion, see Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, 355; Guy, *The Maphumulo Uprising*; Ngonyama, "Redefining Amakhosi Authority," 89.

¹⁶ PAR. SNA 1/1/344. "Native Unrest: alleged meeting of natives of Swaimana kaManyosi at his kraal," June 30, 1906.

gardens.¹⁷ But despite these claims, the administration had every reason to suspect Swaimana's men were arming to assist the Maphumulo against the Nyavu. The months that elapsed between the initial reporting and the investigation certainly enabled the Gcumisa men and women the time necessary to agree on the story.

These tensions between the chiefdoms erupted in violence at a November 1913 wedding. Young male supporters of Ngangezwe attacked Maphumulo and Gcumisa spectators at a wedding at KwaNyavu. In the aftermath, the chiefs and officials testified to years of strain between Maguzu/Swaimana and Ngangezwe. Assistant Magistrate von Gerard reported that no evidence of "inter-tribal enmity" emerged when he tried the case, but the statements of the chiefs in the days afterwards suggest otherwise. On December 4, Maguzu made a statement so that the authorities would understand the state of his chiefdom. Maguzu blamed the conflict on Ngangezwe and his people. He claimed that when Ngangezwe's people attended weddings in his ward, no violence occurred. But when his own people attended the wedding at KwaNyavu in November, one of Ngangezwe's izinduna told the boys to attack Maguzu's men as they had no right to be there. Since his appointment, Maguzu had always known Ngangezwe to be in a state of conflict with the surrounding appointed chiefs, including the late Mdepa (Ximba), the late Cupukumuka (Qamu), and the late Mhlahlo (Qamu). Maguzu also testified to several other instances of conflict or near-conflict over the previous years. Chiefly authority was at the center of the friction.

At the bottom of all these fights is that Ngangezwe claims to be an hereditary chief and as such claims that the tribes of Mdepa, Swaimana, and myself should be under his control. At the time of my appointment he came and asked the Magistrate (Mr. Bennett) to give him that portion of Swaimana's tribe, over which

¹⁷ The mistake was blamed on an error in transmission between Swaimana and his followers. One man apologized for foolishly trusting a woman to communicate the call. PAR. CNC 68. 493/1912. "Alleged arming of Gcumisa tribe," March 20, 1912.

I am now chief. But he does not make his claim openly but allows his people to go about with the idea that their chief is a more important one than any other by reason of his birth.¹⁸

Many of the characteristics of the November 1913 conflict match those examined by Mahoney: the youth carried out the brunt of the violence; the men had been drinking heavily during the wedding festivities; and the officials recognized the punishments proscribed would do little to prevent further violent clashes. Assistant Magistrate Von Gerard fined the Nyavu “ringleader” £5, the attackers £3 each, and the rest involved £2. Chief Native Commissioner Addison demanded the chiefs be reprimanded and issued an order that no members of the chiefdoms attend festivities in each other’s territory. He further expressed the opinion that the fines were not enough. Fines had no deterrent effect and served only to impoverish the *umuzi* so that women and children suffered.¹⁹ Von Gerard found the conflict between the chiefdoms so serious and frequent he sought the establishment of a police station at Bishopstowe to better serve the Table Mountain region. The nearest station was over 20 miles away and thus Table Mountain was not regularly patrolled.²⁰

Indeed, the officials’ warnings did little to prevent further violence. Within a month of the wedding, on Christmas Day 1913, two African police constables observed an armed *impi* of over 800 (later reported as over 1,000) of Maguzu and Swaimana’s men moving towards Ngangezwe’s area with the intention of cutting off migrant laborers from KwaNyavu en route to

¹⁸ PAR. CNC 149. 1913/2086. “Faction Fights. Faction Fight between members of Chiefs Ngangezwe’s and Maguzu’s Tribes,” December 4, 1913.

¹⁹ PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2. MC405/1913. “Faction fights;” CNC 149. 1913/2086, “Faction Fights.”

²⁰ The record suggests there was a chronic shortage of both African and European police more generally. PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/1/2. MC446/1913. “Inter-tribal feuds. Establishment of Police Station near Table Mountain.”

Pietermaritzburg. Ngangezwe's men had been warned of the *impi* and took a longer route back into the city to work. Conflict was thus avoided, but the presence of such a large armed *impi* so close to Pietermaritzburg alarmed the Chief Native Commissioner R.H. Addison. He ordered the three chiefs to come before him in the city and on January 13, 1914, Ngangezwe, Maguzu, Swaimana, and a number of their izinduna appeared at the Umngeni Court.

All three men denied any prior knowledge of the Christmas day incident and testified to years of fighting and their own efforts to keep peace. In what seems like a well-rehearsed performance, Maguzu and Swaimana blamed Ngangezwe; Ngangezwe blamed Maguzu and Swaimana. Maguzu reported none of his men were amongst the armed men, and that those who assembled worked in town and had been organized by Ngwenya (also known as Nojulumba) in defense. Swaimana contended the tensions dated to his father's appointment and the original boundary disputes between Manyosi and Nomsimekwana (1889-90, 1895, and 1905). The feud between Swaimana and Ngangezwe's people had carried on since. To illustrate his lack of ill will to any other chiefs, Swaimana said if he held such feelings they would be towards Maguzu, to whom a portion of his people had been given. But he believed he was on perfectly friendly terms with both of the other chiefs, though Ngangezwe would not meet him and Maguzu to reconcile this matter of fighting.

Just as his father before him, Ngangezwe reminded those present of his lineage. His father was a hereditary chief who had held the position before the British arrived. The disputed land to which Swaimana referred belonged to the Nyavu. Ngangezwe complained about both Swaimana and Maguzu and their people. Swaimana's men had taunted Nyavu "for being a lot of women" on account of their earlier defeat in a conflict with the Ximba. He alleged Maguzu had been spreading rumors about his authority to the court officials, calling him a second Shaka

because he wanted to conquer everyone around him – a moniker that would particularly offend the son of Nomsimekwana who had traversed the countryside as a refugee during Shaka’s consolidation of power. Ngangezwe denied taunting Maguzu as just an appointed chief and complained that Maguzu’s *impi* had closed off the road to town. When Addison pressured him to discuss Christmas Day, Ngangezwe said one of his men in Pietermaritzburg had been chased by some of Maguzu’s men who stole his concertina and umbrella shortly before Christmas. Since then, people took the longer road to town. Addison was clearly exasperated and on numerous occasions attempted to direct the men back to Christmas Day. By the end of the interview, he warned the chiefs that if they could not control their people the government would appoint others who would.²¹

In November 1914, Maguzu reported that Mali, a follower of Ngangezwe, breached the previously defined boundary line. Asst. Magistrate H. von Gerard visited the site while in the area for Hut Tax Collection the following year. In his meeting with the chiefs, von Gerard scolded Ngangezwe for claiming he was not aware of the boundary. But within two months, Maguzu again reported that Ngangezwe had ordered one of Maguzu’s followers to leave the same area. On October 13, 1915, von Gerard and Chief Native Commissioner R.H. Addison visited Table Mountain in hopes of finalizing the dispute. In an amusing attempt to solve a deeper problem, the officials laid down beacons according to the line decided in 1890.²²

The beacons did little, however, to quell the tensions between people of the two chiefdoms. Within two years, another conflict broke out at a December 1917 wedding at the

²¹ PAR. CNC 149. 2086/1913. “Faction Fights.”

²² SAB. NTS 369. 2053/15/F.123A.”Inanda Location: Maguzu-Ngangezwe Boundary Dispute,” October 22, 1915; PAR. CNC 188 1914/1731. “Boundaries. Boundary dispute between Chiefs Maguzu and Ngangezwe.”

umuzi of Sibindi under Chief Maguzu on the Onverwacht farm. Pietermaritzburg Magistrate Frank Foxon, who knew Maguzu well from his time as induna, reported the wedding between Mjijwana kaSibindi (Chief Maguzu) and the sister of Msolwa kaMaralarala (Chief Ngangezwe) ended in disarray when Ngangezwe's people numbering nearly 200 attacked about 100 of Maguzu's men. Hayeyana kaJazi (Chief Maguzu) died and several others of Maguzu's men were injured.²³ The next year, 100 of Ngangezwe's men were charged for the death and violence, out of which 12 were convicted for culpable homicide and fined £20 (or in default, 12 months of imprisonment with hard labor). Thirty-four others pled guilty to the violence and were sentenced to fines of £5. The Umngeni Magistrate Frank Foxon recommended that Ngangezwe's stipend be disallowed on account of "the careless manner in which he has controlled his tribe."²⁴

Repeatedly turned down and scolded by the administration, Ngangezwe sought other ways to bring the land in question under his authority. In April 1921, Ngangezwe announced his intent to purchase the neighboring farm Goedverwachting from Nicolaas P.H. Ferreira on behalf of his people. Goedverwachting had passed from the hands of the Church of England in Natal in 1910 through several other owners before Ferreira purchased it in 1919.²⁵ But the Nyavu could

²³ SAB. JUS 260. 4/394/1917. "Faction Fight at Table Mountain between Ngangezwe's and Maguzu's tribes – report by Magte. P.M.Burg;" and PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/2. MC405/1913. "Faction Fights," December 18, 1917.

²⁴ PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/2. MC405/1913. "Faction Fights"; SAB. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Kapteins en Hoofmanne Mapumula Stam Pietermaritzburg."

²⁵ The property and other Church of Natal-owned properties transferred in 1910 as a result of the Church Properties Act IX of 1910. The Act reintegrated the land of Bishop John William Colenso's schism Church of England in Natal with the Church of the Province of South Africa. The Act was a measure to end the schism in the Anglican Church, but the sale of these farms, including Goedverwachting, certainly was also to spite Harriette Colenso, a vociferous defender of the Zulu who would be evicted from the Bishopstowe residence with the sale. Marks, "Harriette Colenso and the Zulus, 1874-1913," 404–5; Guy, *The View Across the River*, 446–7.

not enter into negotiations with Ferreira and his agents alone. Section I (I) A of Act 27 of 1913 prohibited the transfer of lands outside of the reserves to Africans without the Governor General's approval. When Mr. Ferreira's advocates first contacted the Chief Native Commissioner to seek said approval, they argued the farm was previously "owned by the forefathers of this chief."²⁶ Ngangezwe sent several izinduna and William Gwamande to spearhead the negotiations with the Additional Umngeni Magistrate and Ferreira. Ferreira agreed to sell the 6,000 acre farm to the Nyavu at £3 per acre and was willing to accept an initial payment of £10,000 cash with two later installments of £4,000 in 1922 and 1923. Despite the magistrate's confidence in Gwamanda, who he described as "an educated native who has a very good idea of business requirements," he expressed concern about the Nyavu's capability to raise adequate funds. Over the course of the next several months, William Gwamanda managed to raise £465. Kristian Gwamanda, who sought approval from the Acting Chief Native Commissioner A.N. Banen, also reported raising another £400. (It is likely these were men attached to the Table Mountain Mission Reserve.) But the Chief Native Commissioner informed the Gwamandas he would not approve the sale of a portion of the farm, only the farm in its entirety.²⁷ Upon Ferreira's death in 1923, the farm was subdivided and the largest remnant of nearly 5,000 acres transferred to his heir, Christina G. (Ferreira) Leslie.²⁸ A 1926 letter from the

For sale information, see Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, KwaZulu-Natal Province. Land Register for Goedverwaching No. 1349, 1850s-present.

²⁶ PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/20. "Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs. Mdhului Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhului."

²⁷ PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/20. "Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs. Mdhului Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhului."

²⁸ Pietermaritzburg Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, KwaZulu-Natal Province. Land Register for Goedverwaching No. 1349, 1850s-present.

Pietermaritzburg law firm Arthur Hime & Co. on behalf of the Nyavu suggests that they endeavored for several years to purchase the remainder.²⁹

During these negotiations over the sought-after land at Goedverwachting, Chief Maguzu Maphumulo died on February 4, 1922. Ndlovu, the son of Maguzu's wife Mamootwa, succeeded him, despite a 1918 "confidential" minute paper in which Umngeni Magistrate Foxon recorded Maguzu's appointment of Mxamana, son of his wife Manoningwa, as his heir. Maguzu reported he, as well as all of his people, knew Mamootwa committed adultery while he was employed as a court induna under Foxon and that Ndlovu was not his son. When Maguzu appointed Mxamana, he told Foxon he did not want the people to know for fear the heir might be poisoned. Upon Maguzu's death, the Maphumulo izinduna thus asked for the appointment of Ndlovu and the Umngeni Magistrate and Acting Chief Native Commissioner concurred without reference to Maguzu's earlier request. All subsequent correspondence on the Maphumulo lineage treats Ndlovu unquestionably as son and heir of Maguzu. As Maguzu's statement appears in a magisterial file on "Chiefs" not linked to any papers on the Maphumulo succession, with the turnover of officials it is likely none recalled his naming of an heir.³⁰ (*See Figure 10.*)

While Ndlovu Maphumulo was chief in 1928, Ngangezwe attempted to reopen the boundary issue. Ngangezwe did not dispute that there should be a boundary line, but that the line was incorrect. Henrique Shepstone's 1890 line made the Manzamnyama stream the boundary between the chieftaincies. In his 1928 request, Ngangezwe claimed the line should start at the source of the Nonzila stream, an assertion that would extend his territory significantly and give

²⁹ PAR. 1/CPD 3/2/2/3. 2/1/2/3/1. Administration (Black Affairs) Chiefs and Headmen Mdluli Tribe. Nongalaza Mdluli.

³⁰ PAR. 1/PMB 3/1/1/2/1. 152/14"Chiefs," May 23, 1918; SAB. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Kapteins en Hoofmanne Mapumula Stam Pietermaritzburg."

all of the top of Table Mountain to the Nyavu.³¹ (See both streams on Map 5). At the same time Ngangezwe was even more persistent with letters to the Camperdown Magistrate regarding land under the Ximba that he argued was the birthplace of the Nyavu ancestors. In the correspondence between the Camperdown Native Commissioner and the Chief Native Commissioner, the Camperdown official attributed Ngangezwe's persistence to his very old age and suggested Ngangezwe was "constantly turning back to the days of his youth before the present tribal boundaries were laid down."³² The officials in Pietermaritzburg and Camperdown agreed the matter could not be reopened and went out to point out the beacons and boundary yet again. They also refused Ngangezwe permission to erect a fence across the top of Table Mountain to separate Nyavu cattle from that of the Maphumulo, yet another way the chief sought to contest the boundary.³³

But while the magistrate attributed Ngangezwe's insistence upon his hereditary right to the land to his old age, his son and heir, Somquba, was most likely involved in the requests as well. Ngangezwe became seriously ill in 1929. Pietermaritzburg Additional Native Commissioner B.W. Martin visited the elderly chief at his Mpangeleni *umuzi* to record Ngangezwe's heir. Ngangezwe reported that it was not the custom of his people to take a chief wife as others did. He had paid *ilobolo* (bridewealth, often in the form of cattle) for all of his wives himself and considered his first wife Notuyana (Ma Gwala) to be his chief wife. He identified Somquba, his eldest son with Ma Gwala, as his heir. Almost immediately after this

³¹ PAR. CNC 188. 1914/1731. "Boundary Dispute between Chiefs Maguzu and Ngangezwe."

³² PAR. 1/CPD 3/2/2/3. 2/1/2/3/1. "Administration (Black Affairs) Chiefs and Headmen Mdhluli Tribe. Nongalaza Mdluli."

³³ PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/1/1. 2/17/16/1920. "Boundary Dispute. Amanyavu and Amapumulo Tribes. Table Mountain."

visit, Ngangezwe expressed his desire to abdicate in favor of Somquba. His izinduna supported his wish, as Nomsimekwana had done the same for him. Martin initially said this was not necessary, as the Umngeni office recognized Somquba had been acting for his father for many years. Ngangezwe and his izinduna insisted, and Martin acquiesced, but before the transfer of power could be acknowledged, Ngangezwe passed away on January 8, 1930. Somquba was immediately appointed acting chief until the period of mourning for Ngangezwe ended and subsequently confirmed.³⁴

Ngangezwe's unrelenting attempts, and those made in his name by Somquba, to have the boundary with the Maphumulo line reconsidered in his favor were based upon his hereditary right to the land. As seen in the previous chapter with Somquba's narration of the oral tradition about Nomsimekwana, Somquba was keenly aware of the assault on hereditary chiefs.³⁵ But these actions must not be seen only as attempts to gain back land assigned to the jurisdiction of appointed chiefs. These Nyavu chiefs were also reasserting the significance of hereditary authority in the wake of the constriction of their powers by the white government and also vis-à-vis the appointed chiefs who had been amply rewarded by the white administration for their loyalty. Historian Sara Berry's work on Ghana convincingly argued for viewing property as a

³⁴ The question begs just how long Somquba had been acting as chief for his elderly father and who instigated the persistent appeals to reopen the boundary issue. The records suggest Ngangezwe's own trips to the Umngeni court were becoming fewer and fewer in the years preceding his death when he sent *izinduna* to negotiate the failed Goedverwaching purchase. PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/20. "Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs. Mdhululi Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhululi."

³⁵ Outside of the scope of this dissertation, the Nyavu chiefs also made regular attempts to gain ancestral lands under the authority of the Ximba. Ngonyama shows these types of appeals were frequent but rarely re-opened. The boundary conflicts examined here provide further evidence for Ngonyama's argument that chiefs began to internalize and naturalize the colonial notion of territorial authority over personal authority. Ngonyama, "Redefining Amakhosi Authority," 84.

social process rather than a set of initial conditions, and she has drawn attention to the ways in which Asante claims on property and power invoked the past and debated its significance for people's contemporary lives.³⁶ In colonial and segregationist South Africa, the Nyavu chiefs were not just making claims on land to bolster their local authority, but stressing the supremacy of a *particular* kind of chiefly authority: hereditary descent, which they recognized as under attack by colonial and Union governments that deposed and appointed chiefs at will.

The Nagel Dam: Relocation and Goedverwachting

These land disputes and *izimpi zemibongo* continued into the 1930s with the passage of the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act and plans for the construction of a dam in the Table Mountain region to supply the city of Durban. Relocation, removal, and resettlement are terms most often associated with the overall policy of state-sponsored removals of the apartheid era. But for Table Mountain residents, these words earned significance over a decade earlier with the negotiations for a dam on the Umngeni River in Inanda Location. The piecemeal acquisition of land for the water scheme and in the wake of the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act not only affected the boundaries of the Table Mountain chiefdoms already in conflict but contributed to the long-term long-term land dispute that erupted during *uDlame*.

The Natives Trust and Land Act, No. 18 of 1936, created a legal body known as the South African Native Trust (SANT) (later the South African Bantu Trust, and even later the South African Development Trust) in which the ownership of African reserves was vested. The Trust was to be administered for “the settlement, support, benefit and material and moral welfare

³⁶ Berry, *Chiefs Know their Boundaries*, xxii–xxvii.

of the natives of the Union.”³⁷ The act released additional lands to be added to the reserves, as had been recommended by the 1916 Beaumont Commission. According to Laurine Platzky and Cherryl Walker, the Botha government accepted that the initial nine-million hectares scheduled for African reserves by the 1913 Land Act was inadequate for all of the people expected to live there. The Botha government appointed the Beaumont Commission to recommend which additional land could be acquired. The Commission proposed an additional seven-million hectares for African reserves but few farmers were willing to part with land and the recommendations were shelved. Later Local Committees scaled down the proposals and the government accepted the new 1918 recommendations but passed no legislation. The 1936 Act formalized the recommendations of the 1918 proposals, though in practice this addition of land would be slow and ineffectual.³⁸ The Act also hastened the removal of “black spots” excluded from scheduled areas and forced removals in Natal began as early as 1953. A 1956 amendment to the act tightened control over labor tenancy and provided for registration of labor tenant contracts.

It is in this highly charged context of increasing constraints on land tenure that the construction of a dam in the Table Mountain region needs to be examined. Negotiations began in 1935 for the placement of a dam on the Umngeni River in the Inanda Location to supply additional water to the growing city of Durban. The Durban Corporation (the city council) had undertaken a similar project in the 1920s on the Umlaas River in the Umlazi Location. Durban Waterworks (Private) Act 24 of 1921 enabled the Corporation to obtain sufficient water supply for the city and granted powers of expropriation for the reservoir, its works (purification system,

³⁷ Native Trust and Land Act, No. 18 of 1936.

³⁸ Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*, 87–92.

aqueducts, tunnels, conduits and pipe lines), and access roads. It further granted that compensation for the land expropriated could be provided through the transfer of other land. The bill (and land exchange) undertaken for the Shongweni Water Works on the Umlaas River would be replicated for the Umngeni scheme in the Inanda Location.³⁹

From the first phase of the Umngeni water scheme, the project impacted the residents of the Table Mountain region. Immediately, the Durban authorities sent in surveyors and engineers to formulate the plan for the dam and accompanying roads. The city council anticipated no resistance from local residents given the opportunity for local wage labor created by the project. But complaints did begin to circulate when the surveyors marked a road through Chief Ndlovu's territory without discussing purpose or compensation and surveyors prematurely informed members of the Gcumisa they would have to move. Local residents and the Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner A.S. Hudson encouraged the construction of the road given the area's inaccessibility to vehicular transport. Chief Ndlovu himself first objected, as his gardens would be disturbed by the road, but when his people approached him to urge no obstacles to the construction of the road and waived their own rights to compensation, the chief acquiesced. Because of the rocky and hilly nature of the area, the planned road construction was expensive and the Corporation sought to share the costs with Native Affairs Department before abandoning the project for another road stretching from the N3, a national road (now highway/tollroad) further to the east. This road project through Ndlovu's territory was later funded in 1936 as part of famine relief efforts.⁴⁰

³⁹ NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. "Durban Corporation Water Works." Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location. Part 1," folio 7-75.

⁴⁰ Under famine relief efforts, local males were paid £1.5/- per month to construct the road connecting the Table Mountain Road to B.A. MacDonnell's store near the Umngeni River.

The most pressing part of negotiations included the attempts to reach an agreement over the transfer of land. Durban Corporation required 4,725 acres of the Inanda Location for dam construction. Ownership was required so as to prevent any conflict with agricultural or other interests of the local Africans such as soil erosion relating to nearby plowing of hills, straying cattle, and proximate contamination. Before a new bill could be put before Parliament for the water project, the Corporation needed to agree with the Native Affairs Department on cost responsibilities and on what land would be transferred. The Corporation identified farms owned by Robert Mattison adjacent to Inanda Location as a possibility for exchange with the NAD. Mattison owned Onverwacht and a portion of Aasvogel Krans totaling 5,518 acres (*See Map 6*). The Corporation proposed that in order to cover the difference in land to be transferred, the South African Native Trust should pay for the relocation of Africans from the land to be appropriated. The NAD, however, was adamant that all costs were to be covered by the Corporation. Chief Native Commissioner H.C. Lugg recommended the land transfer as Mattison's farmland was more fertile than the land currently occupied by the Africans to be relocated and believed it so desirable that they might waive their rights to compensation.⁴¹

While Lugg believed these residents would desire the fertile land, the project met with local opposition. After the first official notices of the planned relocation were served in late 1936, Chief Matshikiyana Gcumisa and 20 *imizi* heads called on the New Hanover District

MacDonnell volunteered to oversee the construction because of the benefits to him as the local shopowner. The road construction was plagued with hindrances as the Africans downed tools to demand meals and the initial funds expired. When additional funds became available, the pay was at a lower scale of 25/- and MacDonnell refused to oversee the project any longer. PAR. 2/PMB. 3/1/1/2/32. "Location. Roads. Inanda Location" and NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. "Durban Corporation Water Works." Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location. Part 1" and PAR. CNC39A 28/68. "Catchment Area, Umgeni River, Durban. Water Works in Pietermaritzburg District, Inanda Location."

⁴¹ NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. "Durban Corporation Water Works." Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location. Part 1," folio 118-148.

Magistrate to demand an explanation. Regardless of the desirability of the new land, they asked not to be moved from sites “where they had lived for years.” The New Hanover Native Commissioner believed he was safe in saying that every person served notice dissented from the proposed undertaking.⁴²

Neighboring white farmers also complained, vehemently objecting to the encroachment of Africans on their boundaries with the purchase of Mattison’s land. Unlike the affected Africans, the white farmers could utilize their elected representatives to lodge their opposition to the proposed waterworks bill and the state was forced to respond. Farmers on other portions of Aasvogel Krans, Doernhoek, and Goedverwachting worked through their Member of Parliament William John O’Brien (House, 1918-38; Senate, 1939-48) to voice their concerns. They demanded a white supervisor be placed on the portion of Aasvogel Krans to be sold and that Aasvogel Krans remain a buffer land (for grazing only) between the white farms and location land. They additionally demanded fences at no cost to them despite the Fencing Act No. 17, 1912, which required that landowners pay half the cost of the fencing. They further recommended that instead of Mattison’s land that nearly divided the concerned farmers, the Corporation instead purchase Goedverwachting. Chase A. Edmunds, the owner of Faulklans farm (another portion of Aasvogel Krans) who led the petition against the exchange, related that the current owner of Goedverwachting, Mrs. Christina G. Leslie (Ferreria’s heir) was particularly apprehensive about the manner in which she was already “surrounded by native location” and that the planned transfer would expose more of her boundaries to African neighbors. To move the project forward, the Corporation agreed to meet some of the white farmers’ demands. They would pay the salary of a “trusted native induna” to live on and police the buffer piece of the

⁴² PAR. CNC39A. 28/68. “Catchment Area, Umgeni River, Durban. Water Works in Pietermaritzburg District, Inanda Location.”

farm and to pay for and maintain the fence. The NAD also planned to appoint an additional superintendent and agricultural officer to oversee the new farm and adjoining location.⁴³ With the Corporation, the Trust, and the white farmers in agreement, the bill for the water scheme could be put before parliament.

But word of Mrs. Leslie's desire to sell Goedverwachting sparked local interest. The possibility that the SANT might purchase Goedverwachting led Chief Somquba to write to the Umgeni Magistrate to ask for the farm. If the Nyavu could not buy Goedverwachting, they would still settle on it. Somquba sent a letter on January 1, 1937 to make it clear he would like to settle Nyavu on the land if the SANT purchased it. Somquba complained about the overcrowding of his location due to evictions of his people from private lands and suggested Goedverwachting be added to his jurisdiction.

Uma lomthetho ungase ube kona noma uphumelele otinta ukwendgela amaLocations bengingacela uma letintwa lelizwe lika Mr. Frerra [sic] ngesiza ku liseduze nami kakhulu nangobu indawo endala kakulu elakiwe abantu bami kungakuhle uHulumeni angandisele ngalo.

If there be an Act passed in connection with the enlargement of Locations, I would like to suggest that Mr. Ferreira's farm be put into consideration on the grounds that it is the nearest farm adjoining my area also because it is the place on which my people have dwelled for a long time. It would be advisable for the Government to prefer it for such an enlargement.⁴⁴

⁴³ NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. "Durban Corporation Water Works." Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location. Part 1," folio 167-7 and 175-88. There are ample records covering the placement of an agricultural overseer, improvements to the existing homestead for the overseer's occupation, repairs to the irrigation system to water the existing citrus orchard that could not be trusted to Africans' care, and the establishment of a nursery plot to try out various grasses seeds procured at the most recent Pietermaritzburg Agricultural Show. See NAR. NTS 3383. 2528/307. "Trust Farms Onverwacht and Aasvogelskrans, Pietermaritzburg" and NTS 6992. 250/321. "Nursery Plot. Table Mountain Farm, Aasvogelkrantz and Onverwacht, Pietermaritzburg."

⁴⁴ The isiZulu is the transcription of Somquba's letter and the English is the Native Commissioner's translation (not my own). PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/1920. "Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs. Mdhluhi Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhluhi," January 30, 1937.

The Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner recommended Somquba's suggestion to the Chief Native Commissioner.⁴⁵

That same year, the Durban Waterworks (Private) Act No. 20 of 1937 passed through parliament.⁴⁶ It enabled the Durban Corporation to move forward with the £1,572,000 project to store 5.3 billion gallons of water and ultimately divert 30 million gallons per day for the city's use. On August 26, 1937, Mattison's Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans transferred to the Durban Corporation.⁴⁷ The land exchange between the Corporation and Trust was to take place immediately, but was delayed for nearly three years while legal details were finalized.⁴⁸

In the midst of these land acquisitions and the planning for removal, another *impi yemibongo* broke out between the Maphumulo and Nyavu at a wedding of one of Maphumulo's followers on July 23, 1937. As a result, Sandhlana Wanda, a Maphumulo elder, died. Several others were injured by sticks, stones, and assegais. Sixty men were arrested and another 30 under investigation. The Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner could not believe the outnumbered 28 visitors from KwaNyavu had started the fight, but he did note that they arrived at the wedding armed with assegais. Chief Ndlovu reported the men had not been invited and that "it is no

⁴⁵ The Chief Native Commissioner also rejected another passionate application to purchase Goedverwachting from one Johannes Hlongwane who hoped to buy the farm on payments, just as a white man would do. Hlongwane had heard of the sale through his employment. No further details regarding Hlongwane could be located. PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/1920. "Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs. Mdhululi Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhululi."

⁴⁶ No. 20, 1938, Private Act. Union Gazette Extraordinary, April 23, 1937.

⁴⁷ For date and cost, see NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. "Durban Corporation Water Works. Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location. Part 1." For water estimates, see PAR. CNC40A. 28/68. "Catchment Area, Umgeni River, Durban. Water Works in Pietermaritzburg District, Inanda Location."

⁴⁸ NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. "Durban Corporation Water Works, Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location, Part 2," folio 358-97.

longer usual for visits to be paid between the members of the two tribes on account of the ill-feeling that exists.” He reported the tensions were long standing, but Somquba’s induna Msolwa disagreed. Msolwa thought that the groups were on friendly terms and that visits were frequently paid. Both parties alleged the other commenced the throwing of stones that precipitated Wanda’s death.⁴⁹ There is little detail in the two-page report on this *impi yemibongo* to suggest specific causes of the conflict, but there should be no doubt that uncertainty and disruptions to everyday life accompanying the negotiations for the Umngeni scheme and land transfers brought to the surface the ongoing tensions between the Maphumulos and Nyavu. For over two years, the people of the region waited and watched as the water project changed their landscape and threatened their removal.

The actual removal was undertaken in stages between 1937 and 1950. At first the numbers removed were small. Durban Mayor Fleming Johnston broke ground at the dam’s inauguration ceremony on December 8, 1937, but construction on the road to the dam from the N3 (the major thoroughfare from Durban to Pietermaritzburg) had begun months earlier. Those affected by the road construction, 12 *imizi* head under Chief Ndlovu and 39 under Chief Somquba, were compensated at £3/hut and £1/quarter acre of field. The three *abanumzane* (gentlemen, homestead heads) with *imizi* affected were the first forced to relocate, though it is not clear to where they moved. A fourth *umnumzane* needed to only move his *umuzi* some 100 yards from the road. While all involved initially agreed to the recommended compensation, several *imizi* heads later contested the amounts based on trees or huts they believed had been overlooked. Local Africans employed for the road excavation work at 2/- per day with food, quarters, beer and Saturday meat almost immediately downed tools and demanded more money.

⁴⁹ PAR. 2/PMB 3/1/1/2/4. 2/14/2020. “Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs. Mdhluli Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhluli.”

The men continued to refuse work and the contractor replaced them with Africans from Durban at 1/8 per day.⁵⁰ Between the initial relocations and labor disputes, African frustration with government interference in the region could only increase.

The removal of Africans from the planned dam area onto Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans was to be undertaken over a three to five year period. Native Affairs officials planned the forced resettlement on the new farms according to the ideas of “rational land-use planning” promulgated by South African planners as the only feasible solution to overstocking and land degradation. This betterment planning, or “rehabilitation,” was also rooted in the Native Trust and Land Act and refers to attempts by the successive governments to combat erosion, conserve the environment, and improve agricultural production in areas reserved for Africans.⁵¹ William Beinart has pointed out that while the accompanying removals have not been quantified, in scale these localized removals within the reserves were greater than any other type under the apartheid era.⁵² While the forced shifting of entire villages would take place under apartheid betterment schemes,⁵³ the Umgeni water project provided NAD officials with the opportunity to implement betterment planning amongst the Africans already being relocated.

In anticipation of the pending land exchange between the Corporation and the Trust, Senior Agricultural Officer Norton and local magistrates set out a scheme to closely control the relocation and conserve the new farms. In 1938, Norton’s ideal plan for Onverwacht and

⁵⁰ PAR. CNC 40A. 28/68. “Catchment Area, Umgeni River, Durban. Water Works in Pietermaritzburg District, Inanda Location.

⁵¹ Chris de Wet, “Resettlement and Land Reform in South Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy* 21, no. 61 (1994): 359–61.

⁵² William Beinart, “Beyond ‘Homelands’: Some Ideas About the History of African Rural Areas in South Africa,” *South African Historical Journal* 64, no. 1 (2012): 16.

⁵³ For instance, see Ivan Thomas Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 255.

Aasvogel Krans recommended no more than 1,000 people and 1,000 cattle to prevent overcrowding and degradation. Norton identified over 130 Maphumulo, Gcumisa, and Mdluli *imizi* to be relocated, an estimated 900 people and 1,500 cattle. There were already 26 *imizi*, including 114 humans and 1,246 cattle on the farms. Given the large number of livestock and the location of arable land only along the Umngeni River, he recommended communal plowing and dairying projects, separated residential areas, and the reduction of cattle.⁵⁴

This betterment plan made it clear to officials that Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans could not sustain the number of people to be relocated. As well, the pending eviction of Africans (including the Chief Mankonto Majozi of the Qamu whose landless ancestors were examined in the previous chapter) from the farm Dadelfontein (also owned by Robert Mattison) to the east of Table Mountain in the Camperdown district forced the NAD officials to open negotiations for the purchase of additional land.⁵⁵ When Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans finally transferred to the Trust in July, 1940,⁵⁶ Native Affairs officials set out to oversee the first wave of removal, to negotiate for additional land, and to approve the appointment of the new Nyavu chief after the death of Somquba. The appointment of Somquba's successor proved no difficulty, as the late chief had named Nongalaza, the eldest son of his third wife, as his heir prior to his death and the

⁵⁴ NAR. NTS 3383. 2528/307. "Trust Farms Onverwacht and Aasvogelskrans, Pietermaritzburg," folio 4-7.

⁵⁵ NAR. NTS 3243. 814/307. "Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting;"

⁵⁶ NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. "Durban Corporation Water Works. Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location, Part 2," folio 397; Pietermaritzburg Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, KwaZulu-Natal Province. Land Registers for Onverwacht No. 1225 and Aasvogel Krans No. 1226, 1850s-present.

Nyavu unanimously recommended the appointment.⁵⁷ (See Figure 11.) The acquisition of additional land was more troublesome.

The archival records do not reflect just how this removal unfolded, but oral history interviews suggest it did not occur according to the betterment plan and that initially the people could live anywhere.⁵⁸ Archival records on a later betterment plan for the region suggest they could move anywhere within the residential areas.⁵⁹ When Mattison first moved to Onverwacht, he ordered many residents to vacate an area known as eStingini because they had too much cattle to share grazing. But when Mattison sold the farm to the trust, many moved onto the farm as they pleased. Induna Amos Ndlela stressed this freedom, which he recalls most likely because of the story's association with how one of the Maphumulo *izigodi* got its name.

When whites left the place where the [primary] school is at [Onverwacht], they said our fathers can choose any places to stay because they were leaving. Baba Myeza was staying there and then he moved to the bush in Nyanika *izigodi* there at the Umgeni because everyone was allowed to build houses anywhere. His name remained there because his name was Maqongqo and the place was named after him, Maqongqo Myeza.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ NAR. BAO 5/364. F54/1524/9. "Kapteins en Hoofmanne. B Mdluli. Stam. Mdluli. Lokasi No 163/3 Called Table Mountain. Pietermaritzburg," folio 28-38.

⁵⁸ I can find no record of the actual removal. The files on the dam and related exchange of lands (NTS 7900 3/337) are arranged in six chronological parts, with a gap in the years 1940-2 between parts two and three. Several references in other files were made to CNC 22/1202 B of which I could not locate.

⁵⁹ NAR. NTS 10261. 47/423(8). "Rehabilitation. Pietermaritzburg. Onverwacht Group," folio 22.

⁶⁰ "Yebo, lapha kwakhiwe khona isikole, ngesikhathi sebehamba abelungu sebethi obaba sebengakhetha lapho bengakha khona ngoba bona sebeyayishiya lendawo. Ubaba uMyeza wayakhe laphaya wasukake wahamba waya kokwakha ehlanzeni eNyanika lapha eMngeni. Ngakho ke ubaba uMyeza naye wasuka lapha wayakhe khona waya kokwakha lapha eNyanika ngoba, kwasekukhululekiwe ukuthi umuntu usengakha noma kuphi lapho ethanda khona. Lasala ke igama lakhe laphaya ngoba uMyeza igama lakhe kwakunguMaqongqo, kwasala igama kwathiwa iseMaqongqo. Njengoba wayakhe lapha nje indawo lena ayakhe kuyona yabizwa ngokuthi kuseMaqongqo." Mazipho Amos Ndlela, B.A. Msomi, Bongumuzi Mbhele, and Mfikiseni Khumalo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, February 17, 2011.

However, Goge Balothi, a young boy at the time, remembers when the agricultural overseer, whom the locals called Mqangabhodwe (most likely because he was tall and lanky like the tall, jointed *panicum proliferum* grass after which he was nicknamed), moved into Mattison's former home to manage the trust farm.⁶¹ Balothi's father worked for Bob Mattison and then for Mqangabhodwe. But Mqangabhodwe came with tractors to divide the land into plots and ordered the culling of cattle. According to Balothi, the men initially refused to destroy their cattle but in the end did as they were told.⁶²

With the first wave of the removal underway after 1940, the NAD began to negotiate the purchase of more land for the remaining Africans that could not be removed to Onverwacht. Between 1940 and 1984, the Trust purchased six portions (*See Map 8*) of Goedverwachting. The property was not situated in a released area (land set aside by the 1936 Trust and Land Act to be purchased by the Trust for African occupation), but was adjacent to Inanda Location and was thus eligible for purchase. Extensive negotiations took place between the NAD, the Land Affairs Department, and the various owners of subsections of Goedverwachting. Approval was required for lists of improvements, land valuation, offers to purchase, offers to counter, and so on. Correspondence wove back and forth from the Chief Native Commissioner to the Secretary for Native Affairs to the Board of Land Affairs. Scholars often note that acquisition of land after the

⁶¹ It is not entirely certain, but Mqangabhodwe may be S.A. Landsberg. Records suggest Landsberg was the first to move into Mattison's former homestead to serve as the Trust's local foreman. Approval for him to live there free of charge was granted in March 1941. NAR. NTS 6992. 250/321. "Nursery Plot. Table Mountain Farm, Aasvogelskrantz and Onverwacht. Pietermaritzburg," folio 24. For the translation of *mqangabhodwe*, see Doke and Vilakazi, *Zulu-English Dictionary*, 688. On the naming of employers and coworkers by African employees, see Adrian Koopman, *Zulu names* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal, 1999), 66–7.

⁶² Goge Balothi, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, eStingini, March 4, 2011.

1936 Act was slow and ineffectual, evidenced here in the level of bureaucracy, farmers' resistance to sale, and the continued desperate need for additional land.⁶³

Figure 8: Sale of Goedverwaching Sub-divisions. For clarity, South African Native Trust (SANT) is used, though it was later called Bantu Trust and Development Trust.

Portion	Acreage	Transfer	Transferor	Transferee
Goedverwaching (whole)	6,000	1919	J.A. Vanderplank	Nicholas P.H. Ferreira
Goedverwaching A	700	1923	Nicholas P.H. Ferreira	Lucas J. Potgieter
		1948	Lucas J. Potgieter	Reginald Raw
		1954	Reginald Raw	Brian Lawrence Raw
		1984	Brian L. Raw (Estate)	SANT
Goedverwaching B	139	1924	Nicholas P.H. Ferreira	Robert Mattison
		1943	Robert Mattison	Damjee S. Vather
		1948	Damjee S. Vather	Anan E. Maney
		1968	Anan E. Maney	SANT
Goedverwaching Remnant	5,170	1924	Nicholas P.H. Ferreira	Christina G. (Ferreira) Leslie
	4170	1948	Christina G. Leslie	SANT
Goedverwaching D (of Remnant)	39	1948	C.R.T.*	Christina G. Leslie
		1961	Christina G. Leslie	SANT
Goedverwaching 5 (of Remnant)	930	1948	C.R.T.	Christina G. Leslie
		1950	Christina G. Leslie	Barbara A. Ferreira
		1961	Barbara A. Ferreira	SANT
Goedverwaching 6 (of Remnant)	137	1948	C.R.T.	Christina G. Leslie
		1958	Christina G. Leslie	Nicoline P. Ferreira
		1961	Nicoline P. Ferreira	SANT

The Trust was not initially successful in its endeavors, failing to purchase Goedverwaching subsection A, owned by Lucas J. Potgieter, who refused sale outright in

⁶³ Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*.

* C.R.T. is Certificate of Registered Title. Act No. 47 of 1937 enabled the registrar to issue a certificate of registered title on newly surveyed land, especially where two or more defined portions of land were surveyed (here meaning, the subdivision of Goedverwaching).

1940.⁶⁴ It took two years of correspondence and evaluations before Robert Mattison, who sold Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans to the Durban Corporation in 1937, refused sale of his property, subsection B (and Subsection A of Onverwacht that he retained in the sale to the Corporation). Mattison earned significant income on these small pieces of land, which included a wattle plantation and a general store leased by an Indian, and found the Trust's offer unacceptable.⁶⁵

The owners of the largest "Remnant" portion, Nicholas Ferreira and later his heir, Mrs. Christina G. Leslie née Ferreira, attempted to sell the farm to local actors on several occasions, including that examined above in 1921, as well as in 1929 again to the Nyavu and in 1937 to an individual, Johannes Hlongwane, as well as the Trust.⁶⁶ Negotiations took several years and eventually Leslie refused the Trust's 1942 offer and counter offer because the worth of the land had significantly increased since her initial offer of £3 an acre in 1937. But within six months, Leslie's son I.S. Ferreira called to reopen negotiations. I.S. Ferreira lived and worked on Goedverwachting and held the power of attorney to negotiate for Leslie, who lived on the East Rand. The zeal with which Leslie and Ferreira pursued the sale most likely resulted from struggles to make mortgage payments, given persistent letters from the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa to the Department of Land between 1946 and 1948 regarding arrears on the property. When the transaction finally concluded in September 1948, the Trust paid off the

⁶⁴ NAR. LDE-N 931. 1200/413. Goedverwachting (Subdivision A) Number 1349 District Pietermaritzburg Owner LG Potgieter, 1940.

⁶⁵ NAR. LDE-N 931. 12200/414. Goedverwachting (Subdivision B) Number 1349 Onverwacht (Subdivision A of Portion B) Number 1225 District Pietermaritzburg, Owner R. Mattison, 1940-2.

⁶⁶ PAR. 2/PMB. 3/1/1/2/4. "Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg. Native Affairs. Mdhululi Tribe. Chief Somquba Mdhululi;" NTS 3243. 814/307. "Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting;" and LDE-N 931. 12200-412. "Remainder of Goedverwachting Number 1349, Pietermaritzburg: Owner Mrs. CG Leslie."

mortgage and the remainder of the purchase price was sent to Leslie. Part of the final agreement enabled Leslie to keep 1,000 acres wedged between the remnant portion and the Onverwacht farm on which her son continued to farm.⁶⁷ As we will see below, the trust would later acquire this strip of farmland, but not until after the designation of the Maphumulo and Nyavu boundaries that accompanied the establishment of tribal authorities according to the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act.

But it was not just the acquisition of additional land that posed a problem for NAD officials. The removal of residents from the Inanda Location to Onverwacht and Goedverwaching for the dam resulted in a number of anomalies and legal difficulties. Onverwacht was not a scheduled piece of land according to the 1936 Trust and Land Act, therefore when the first wave of people moved onto Onverwacht in 1940 they were legally subject to rental fees. But the SNA believed it would be unfair to call upon the new residents to pay the fees on account of their compulsory relocation for a public works project. He recommended that Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans be treated as location land, thus exempting even those already resident on the farm from rent. All would continue to pay taxes.⁶⁸ But when Goedverwaching transferred to the Trust in 1948, the former labor tenants resident on the land became rent payers. NAD officials expressed concern that difficulties would arise between the old and new residents on Goedverwaching if the second wave of displacees were exempt from

⁶⁷ NAR. NTS 3243. 814/307. Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwaching; LDE-N 931. 12200/412. Remainder of Goedverwaching Number 1349, Pietermaritzburg: Owner Mrs CG Leslie, 1940-8.

⁶⁸ Again, no file could be found providing any details of the first wave of relocation. What follows is gleaned from the records of the second removal after the purchase of Goedverwaching. A later betterment planning document reported that the removal onto Onverwacht was undertaken in a haphazard manner. NAR. NTS. 10261. 47/423(8) "Rehabilitation. Pietermaritzburg. Onverwacht Group, 1959."

rent. Hesitant to volunteer the loss of rental fees that would result in exemption of all Goedverwachting residents, the officials eventually acquiesced given:

The settlement of Natives on Onverwacht and Goedverwachting is not to be compared with that on the ordinary Trust farm – the residents on them are or will be persons arbitrarily moved from the location for public purposes and the drastic changes in their mode of occupation should not be made harsher by an increase in their financial liabilities.⁶⁹

While in fact there was nothing more arbitrary about this removal (this relocation was planned and forced, just as any other), the Chief Native Commissioner thus recommended the three farms be added to the list of scheduled land so that all residents could be exempt from Proclamation 92/1949 that prescribed dwellers on Trust-owned land to pay rent. Government Notice 52/1950 exempted Goedverwachting, but Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans were initially overlooked.⁷⁰

With the legal difficulties settled and the anticipated completion of the dam, the planning of the Goedverwachting remnant and the removal took on a new level of urgency throughout 1949. Agricultural Officer Tidbury's 1948 plan for the farm identified 33 *imizi*, 230 cattle, and 320 small livestock already on the farm from former labor tenants. Tidbury had earlier despaired that despite the size of the farm, only 400 arable acres remained when Leslie opted to keep the most desirable portion of the farm, a flat plateau suitable for agriculture. He thus estimated the carrying capacity of the farm for cattle to be only 834 units and recommended the elimination of all small stock and donkeys. Beacons were erected to demarcate residential plots and fences planned for the arable and grazing portions.⁷¹ (*See Figure 12.*)

⁶⁹ NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307. "Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting," folio 159-72.

⁷⁰ NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307. "Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting," folio 159-72.

⁷¹ NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307. "Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting," folio 101-2 and 154.

Chief Ndlovu Maphumulo died in 1949 prior to the removal. No male children of Ndlovu's chief wife, Ma Mkhize/Nozipegula, or his *ikohlwa* wife (second wife, of the left-hand hut), Ma Ntuli/Nomakolwa, survived. Ndlovu thus associated his third wife, also Ma Mkhize (Nomahlazo, cousin of Nozipegula), with his chiefly house, and their son Funizwe became the heir. But the Native Administration Act 38/1927 required approval from the Secretary for Native Affairs for the appointment of a chief. The Maphumulo requested Funizwe succeed his father, but Pietermaritzburg Native Commissioner felt the young man (only 21 or 22 at the time) was not yet mature enough to lead and the Secretary for Native Affairs denied approval. Izinduna then nominated Sigciza Maphumulo (the son of Mkhowe, grandson of Maguzu, and uncle to Funizwe – though at various time he was described by officials as a brother of Funizwe) to act as *ibambabukhosi* (a regent, one expected to carry out the duties of office on behalf of the heir) until Funizwe could be appointed. Ndlovu's widows obtained the services of an attorney to oppose Sigciza's nomination on account of ill-feeling between him and their late husband, but the izinduna and other Maphumulos requested him regardless. The Chief Native Commissioner and Secretary for Native Affairs approved.⁷²

Thus, it was Acting Chief Sigciza who oversaw the removal of some of the Maphumulo in early 1950. Sigciza requested the Durban Corporation pay those slated for removal in advance so they could meet all necessary expenses. Additionally, he asked that lorries be provided to aid the people in the move. The Agricultural section provided a three-ton truck and the NAD advanced £100 for the petrol, oil, and driver's wages for the relocation of 85 *imizi* (130 families)

⁷² NAR. BAO. 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 15-22. URU 2672. 2852. "Verlening van Siviele en Kriminile Regsmag aan Waarnemende Kaptein S Mapumulo van die Mapumulo Stam Distrik Pietermaritzburg."

a distance of six miles.⁷³ As the South African government transitioned into the apartheid era, many members of the Maphumulo had already rebuilt or began to remake their homesteads on Onverwacht and Goedverwachting. The imposition of apartheid would bring further interference in their daily lives with additional land planning, formalized boundaries, and the organization of the clan as a tribal authority.

Bantu Authorities, Boundaries, and Betterment at Table Mountain during Apartheid

In 1948, the National Party (NP) won the election with campaign promises of apartheid, or separate development for different so-called racial groups. An increase in African urbanization accompanied the post-war expansion of South African manufacturing and industrialization. The NP won a narrow election, elected by white South Africans threatened by African competition in the city and angered about the loss of control over African farm workers. Building on segregationist policies with a greater degree of ideological fervor, the NP built a political system that intruded in every aspect of African life with concepts of separate development of African “nations” in ways that earlier segregation did not. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages (1949), Immorality Act (1950), Population Registration Act (1950), Group Areas Act (1950), Bantu Authorities Act (1951), Abolition of Passes and Consolidation of Documents Act (1952), Bantu Education Act (1953), and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) transformed the administration and livelihoods of the African population. South African society was divided according to rigid categories of white, Coloured, Indian, and “Native”/“Bantu” and the latter further divided into ten separate “tribes” or “nations.”

⁷³ NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwachting,” folio 171-3.

While apartheid was long attributed to a single “grand plan” binding the Afrikaner nationalist class together from the late 1940s, Deborah Posel’s examination of the processes whereby influx control policies were made illustrates the manner in which apartheid was forged through a series of struggles within and beyond the state in several phases.⁷⁴ The election of 1948 did not mark a decisive break from the past as significant continuities between segregation and apartheid can be seen in a number of central themes which came to define apartheid – urban labor controls, planned urban locations, and the conversion of reserves into bantustans. While significant changes in these policies did occur, they were spread out across the 1950s and introduced inconsistently thereafter. The most arresting feature of apartheid Native Administration was its dispersal into everyday life. Historian Ivan Evans aptly wrote, “After 1948, virtually every aspect of [African] lives was subjected to the intrusive hands of clerks, bureaucrats, and administrators of one sort or another.”⁷⁵

Native administrators after 1948 moved away from the paternalist and gradualist ethos of the segregation years and came to dominate apartheid policy. The urgency of the so-called “Native question” brought about by increasing African urbanization enabled the Native Affairs Department under E.G. Jansen (1948-50) and the autocratic H.F. Verwoerd (1950-8), hitherto less prestigious or developed, to dominate the design of apartheid policies. The NAD grew in importance and size, with two assistant Ministers of Native Affairs appointed in 1951 (no comparable positions existed elsewhere in government) and 308 new positions for whites and 230 African posts. By 1960, the number of white officials employed by the NAD had nearly doubled (to exceed 3,000) since 1948. The NAD usurped control of African housing, labor, and

⁷⁴ Deborah Posel, *The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

⁷⁵ Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*, 1–8.

the reserves from various other departments, setting the stage for the NAD to become a “state within a state.”⁷⁶ The department also reorganized in 1954 into a highly centralized structure with a series of subdivisions, new managerial positions, and lines of communication to connect the new system. While never completely successful in centralizing power, the department was markedly more authoritarian than during the segregation years when control was often held by the local “man on the spot.” The division of South Africa into African and white spheres was further fragmented into “tribal sovereignties” with the adoption of the Bantu Authorities Act. In “the illusion of decentralization” the department established the conditions necessary to transform the paternalist administration into bureaucracies controlled by African administrators and politicians.⁷⁷

The NAD initially pursued a “practical” attitude to apartheid that postponed fully “separate development” for future generations. In 1958, the NAD split into two departments, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) and the Department of Bantu Education. * According to Posel, only in the 1960s did the BAD fully launch the program of social engineering that sought to deny Africans citizenship and forcefully remove them to the ethnic bantustans. During this “second phase” of apartheid, the BAD turned to the development of the reserves as a central component of preventing further African urbanization and the establishment of separate “nations.” The major impetus for the restructuring of these urban policies was the escalation of African resistance in the townships that peaked in 1960 after the

⁷⁶ Posel, *The Making of Apartheid*, 63–4.

⁷⁷ Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*, 16.

* From here I will use both NAD and BAD, depending on the year in question. When the NAD became BAD, Native Commissioners became Bantu Administration Commissioners (BAC) and the South African Native Trust became the Bantu Trust (SABT).

shooting of protestors in Sharpeville.⁷⁸ However, the sluggishness of the land acquisition enabled by the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act delayed the pace at which the apartheid government could pursue this policy of separate development.⁷⁹

The extent to which betterment planning remained a central tenet of government policy during the first phase of apartheid remains contested. Posel and Evans suggest the development of the reserves had largely been neglected prior to the 1960s due to conflict within Afrikanerdom over the findings of the Tomlinson Commission for Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas of South Africa. While intellectuals and cultural entrepreneurs associated with the South Africa Bureau for Racial Affairs envisioned the reserves as the “moral fountainhead of apartheid practices,” apartheid pragmatists expressed concern about the impingement of the reserves on key Afrikaner groups of businessmen, white workers and white farmers.⁸⁰ The Commission, assembled by the NAD, advocated a vigorous program for improving agriculture and transforming the reserves into modern economies capable of constraining African urbanization. The land-use plan promoted by the Commission was quite similar to the existing betterment scheme, providing for residential units divided into plots, arable lands divided into units, and common grazing grounds. But unlike the previous betterment system, the Commission recommended that the number of families settled as farmers not exceed the number of “economic units.” The notion of an economic unit entailed that a family should have access to an amount of

⁷⁸ Posel, *The Making of Apartheid*, 228–46.

⁷⁹ Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*, 92–3.

⁸⁰ Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*, 224.

arable land and grazing that would provide it with a minimum annual income of £60. Viable agriculture could be achieved by removing surplus peoples into rural villages.⁸¹

However, white farmer opposition (to competition from peasant farmers as well as the possible extension of reserve lands) resulted in a lack of dedication to the reserves on the part of Jansen and Verwoerd. The proposals of the commission were only partially implemented and funding for items crucial to the success of the recommended rural villages was withheld. Verwoerd aimed merely to confine the “surplus” African population to the labor needs of white areas.⁸² In practice, locations were still divided into residential, arable, and grazing areas but no people were to be removed; this meant that few families received economic units that enabled them to farm and graze stock. Land unsuitable for cultivation was removed from use.⁸³ But De Wet argues that despite the limited implementation of the Tomlinson Commission’s recommendations, stabilization efforts including irrigation schemes, soil conservation, and investment in sugar production and afforestation on Northern Natal were the first of three steps to rehabilitation and thus marked the height of betterment planning.⁸⁴ But the limits of the betterment planning and the reserves greatly impacted the unfolding of Bantu Authorities.

The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 promised to grant Africans greater administrative authority in an illusion of decentralization and false autonomy. It tied chiefs to a failing economic development system where their people had no economic prospects in the reserves and

⁸¹ C. J De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart: Betterment Planning and Villagisation in a South African Homeland* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995), 45–51.

⁸² Posel, *The Making of Apartheid*, 71, 240–1; De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart*, 45–51.

⁸³ De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart*, 45–51.

⁸⁴ De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart*, 224.

few chances of entering the urban labor market.⁸⁵ The Bantu Authorities Act made provision for three levels of administration for Africans, at the tribal, regional, and territorial levels. The tribal authorities consisted of a chief with councillors; the authorities were granted administrative, executive and judicial powers. A chief could appoint half of his council, subject to state approval, while the state nominated the other half based on the size of the polity. Regional authorities exercised control over two or more areas with tribal authorities and governed the establishment and maintenance of educational and health institutions, public works, and agricultural and stock affairs. The highest tier governed over two or more areas for which regional authorities had been established. These territorial authorities held the same powers as regional authorities but also powers relating to the administration of Africans as prescribed by law.⁸⁶ What Minister for Native Affairs Hendrik Verwoerd called an imitation of “traditional tribal democracy” was widely recognized as a farce.⁸⁷ The Bantu Authorities system replaced the council system and Native Representative Council to emphasize ethnic fragmentation over racial division. The Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms were two of the first in Natal to establish tribal authorities. The manner in which these were created and the accompanying boundaries are central to the manner in which local tensions continued to build over land and chiefly authority.

Before examining the impact of apartheid and the introduction of tribal authorities in the Table Mountain region, we need to link back to the chiefly succession of the Maphumulo. In May 1952, Funizwe took over as chief from Acting Chief Sigciza. By then married with two

⁸⁵ Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*, 244.

⁸⁶ Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*, 48–50.

⁸⁷ Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*; Ntsebeza, *Democracy Compromised*; D. A. Kotzé, *African Politics in South Africa, 1964-1974: Parties and Issues* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975); Evans, *Bureaucracy and Race*.

children, Funizwe was deemed sufficiently mature to succeed his late father. But Funizwe died of tuberculosis on April 9, 1954. Native Commissioner F. de Souza recommended Sigciza again act as chief until the successor could be named after the mourning period to accompany the chief's death. There would be no debate over an heir, as Funizwe had only one wife, Ma Mdlalose/Nosibhedlela, and two sons, Mhlabunzima and Kwenzokuhle. (See Figure 10.)⁸⁸

But a contentious debate did ensue over who would act as *ibambabukhosi* for the young Mhlabunzima, only four at the time of his father's death. Examining this dispute is not only important for understanding the state of the chiefdom in the era of Bantu Authorities, but also because several of the key players will again emerge during *uDlame*. When the period of mourning ended, izinduna, Maphumulo members, and de Souza gathered at the late Funizwe's *umuzi* on Onverwacht to nominate an acting chief. Factions formed around two nominees, Bangingi Maphumulo and Sigciza Maphumulo. *Umndeni* member Mpini Maphumulo and induna Lugagadu Ntuli first nominated Bangingi, who they described as the highest ranking of three brothers of the late Funizwe. *Umndeni* literally translates as "circle of relatives of the second order, [those] not included in the immediate family."⁸⁹ Here, *umndeni* implies the Maphumulo, the members of the extended chiefly family responsible for important decisions such as these. Several others also spoke in favor of Bangingi, born of Mamnyeni and Ndlovu and given to Ndlovu's childless second wife Ma Ntuli (Nomakolwa) to raise.

⁸⁸ NAR. URU 2974. 1143. "Appointment of F Mapumulo as Chief of the Mapumulo Tribe, Pietermaritzburg;" BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 30-40 and 47-9.

⁸⁹ Doke and Vilakazi, *Zulu-English Dictionary*, 538. These agnatic clusters interact for dispute arbitration and religious ceremonies. See Hammond-Tooke, "In Search of the Lineage," 84-5.

But several others objected to the *umndeni*'s nomination of Baniŋi.⁹⁰ Those who spoke against Baniŋi's nomination did so for several reasons. They protested because the *umndeni* had not consulted them and because they believed Baniŋi was ineligible for the position given his ancestry. Mabibi Mdunge complained they did not know Baniŋi as they knew Sigciza, who already advised them. Zofa Gumede positioned himself as a member of the chiefdom versus those of the "Maphumulo family" who had made the decision without consulting them. Induna Muziwake Mhlangu explained why they believed Baniŋi's nomination was unusual:

I say it is strange that a man who is the son of a woman who was not even married to the late Chief Ndhlovu should be appointed as Regent. I say how can he be appointed as Regent? It is strange that when we came to your office to report the death of the late Chief Funizwe we were not even able to talk about Baniŋi. We don't know him and we don't even know where he comes from... The so-called mother of Baniŋi was not known to any of us Indunas. What we know is that Makolwa never gave birth to a living child. The majority of the tribe say that the present Acting Chief Sigciza is the right man to be appointed as Regent during the minority of Funizwe's heir.⁹¹

Mdingi Maphumulo called on Sigciza to attest that he had previously agreed Baniŋi should take over, but Sigciza denied doing so. De Souza took a vote and the *umndeni* members, izinduna, and Maphumulo members present voted in favor of Baniŋi by a narrow margin of 65 to 62. De Souza stated that Sigciza would continue to act until the government approved Baniŋi's nomination and warned against "faction fighting or tribal unrest" that might erupt on account of the decision.⁹²

⁹⁰ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 51-3.

⁹¹ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 53.

⁹² NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 51-4.

De Souza recommended Baniangi's appointment to the Chief Native Commissioner. Sigciza was nearly 70 years-old and not likely to survive the duration of the heir's adolescence. Baniangi was then 29, married, gainfully employed as a "boss boy" in Pietermaritzburg, and maintaining Funizwe's widow and children. Ma Mdlalose herself expressed her favor for Baniangi.⁹³ Only five years earlier Ndlovu's wives had vehemently objected to Sigciza's nomination and the zeal with which some backed Baniangi suggests the family still held ill feelings towards Sigciza. Because the record does not reflect the names of all who voted, it cannot be known for certain whether the count reflected the division that Zofa Gumede claimed, one between the *umndeni* and chiefdom. But three of those who spoke in favor of Baniangi were of the Maphumulo *isibongo* (surname), including Mpini Maphumulo, Qubokwakhe Maphumulo, and Mdingi Maphumulo. When Baniangi later withdrew his claim, one of his supporters, induna Seni Mlaba, insisted on an opportunity to bring around "the blood relations of late Chief Funizwe."⁹⁴

Despite both the *umndeni* and Native Commissioner's recommendation, Secretary of Native Affairs T.F. Coertze would not recommend Baniangi's appointment on such a narrow margin of votes. The potential for conflict between the factions was a great concern of the officials involved. When Baniangi appeared before the new Native Commissioner C.D. Nel in January 1955 to ask for advice regarding his claim to the regency, Nel advised Baniangi to drop the claim on account of his unlawful heritage. Nel claimed it was "unknown in Native Law and Custom that an illegitimate son can oust other lawful claimants" and furthered that Baniangi had

⁹³ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 55-6.

⁹⁴ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 63.

not been included when Ndlovu listed his wives and heirs prior to his death. Nel informed Baniangi that the heirs of the *ukungena* union, Khangela and Qeda, could also make claims before Baniangi because an alleged disinheritance of these sons had not been made publicly (or at least, had not been recorded).⁹⁵ Two weeks later, Baniangi returned to Nel's office to abandon his claim. He told Nel he would support Sigciza's appointment and asked that a meeting of izinduna be called so he could make the announcement. At the February 1955 meeting, Baniangi informed the izinduna of his withdrawal and most threw their support behind Sigciza. One of Baniangi's original supporters, induna Seni Mlaba, agreed to as well, but remained adamant that the widows of Ndlovu and Funizwe be informed of Baniangi's decision first. Those izinduna who wished to consult the people and those who expressed concern that doing so would cause bloodshed debated the matter, but Nel concluded that since all had agreed to support Sigciza, the appointment would be recommended.⁹⁶

But before the meeting was closed, Native Commissioner Nel took the opportunity to introduce the Bantu Authorities Act.⁹⁷ As under indirect rule and Union policy, Bantu Authorities enabled apartheid officials to manipulate chiefly authority, rewarding or demoting those who did not cooperate with these administration and betterment policies. Most chiefs found themselves in the precarious position described best by Shula Marks as the "ambiguity of dependence," but as will be seen below, the Maphumulo regents whose positions were more dependent on the government than the hereditary heirs for whom they acted were particularly

⁹⁵ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 59.

⁹⁶ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 62-3.

⁹⁷ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 62-3.

susceptible to manipulation by the apartheid government.⁹⁸ The ANC President Chief Albert Luthuli was among the leaders deposed for his opposition to the Bantu Authorities. While a range of resistance to Bantu Authorities and betterment projects emerged across South Africa, in the Table Mountain region the manner in which communities reacted was influenced by the continued impact of the Nagle Dam project.

A month later after Nel first breached the subject, the Maphumulo held a meeting on Onverwacht with Nel, Agricultural Officer I.R. Matheson and Inspector of Bantu Education F.B. Oscroft to finalize Sigciza's appointment and consider the establishment of a tribal authority. The government officials addressed those present regarding the Bantu Authorities Act, local roads and educational matters, particularly the construction of a school on Onverwacht. Many izinduna and other men present had questions and comments, most important of which were grievances about the restriction of cattle and support for a local school. The men complained that Ferreira could introduce stock to his neighboring farm, but they could not on the Trust farm. They wanted roads, businesses, plantations, and education for their children. Sigciza directed the men back to the matter at hand and declared the Maphumulo wanted a tribal authority. Those present unanimously accepted the Act and charged Sigciza to appoint councillors.⁹⁹

The extent to which the Bantu Authorities Act required this consultation and approval has been the subject of much consideration, particularly around the person of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the chief of the Buthelezi clan whose rise to power as Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland and President of the ethnic nationalist movement Inkatha Yenkululeko yeSizwe (to be examined

⁹⁸ Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa*.

⁹⁹ NAR. NTS 8900. 211/362(5). "Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Tribal Authority," folio 1-2.

in the next chapter) coincided with the growth of Bantu Authorities.¹⁰⁰ The Act provided that its implementation could only be preceded by consultation with the people to be affected. In later years, when Buthelezi was labeled a collaborator by the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups for his participation in the Bantu Authorities system, Buthelezi justified his position in the system based on its forced imposition. But Mzala argued that this clause allowed for a range of reactions, thus making the case for Buthelezi's collaboration.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, Robert McIntosh's examination of Bantu Authorities suggests that threats of deposal made at several propagandistic conferences for chiefs may have left them feeling they had little choice but accept.¹⁰² According to Sithole, in Natal this schism between those who supported and resisted the authorities thus slowed implementation during the 1950s and 1960s. Many chiefs and izinduna resented being drawn deeper into native administration. Some feared a loss of control given the ability of the state to interfere in tribal council nominations. Still others supported Bantu authorities because of the power and status conferred to them by the apartheid state. Middle class Africans too stood to benefit from the accompanying employment and business opportunities. By 1964, of 282 chiefdoms in KwaZulu/Natal, 111 had asked for tribal authorities to be established, 133 remained undecided, and 38 opposed the system altogether.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Temkin, *Buthelezi*; Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*; Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*.

¹⁰¹ Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*.

¹⁰² Indeed, Between 1950 and 1956, a total of eight chiefs, four acting chiefs, 40 headmen and six acting headmen were deposed for various reasons. Between 1955 and 1958, 34 chiefs and headmen were deposed and three deported. Robert McIntosh, "State Policies in Rural South Africa C1948-c1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy Formation and Local Responses" (PhD dissertation, School of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of London, 1999), 159, 167.

¹⁰³ Sithole notes the difference of 43 included in the figures he cites. Jabulani Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 2 [1970–1980] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006), 811–2.

The Maphumulo and Nyavu were two of the initial 111 to ask for an authority. Sigciza Maphumulo, as a government-supported acting chief whose position had been very recently in dispute, must have felt a certain obligation to the government to implement the Bantu Authorities Act in his region. The heir Mhlabunzima was only four years old, and the acting chief, with the support of the government, could serve for some time. It is thus not surprising that it was Sigciza who ultimately decided to do the government's bidding, announcing at the conclusion of the meeting, "We want a tribal authority to go into our domestic affairs."¹⁰⁴ The extent to which izinduna expressed their support, on the other hand, was tied to the construction of a school and the establishment of a tribal fund for the projects they had discussed. As several expressed the need for schools, roads, and businesses, their support for the act came from a belief that a tribal authority would bring improvement to their community.

Educational desires also guided the reasonings behind the Nyavu request for an authority. In the same month as the meeting with the Maphumulo at Onverwacht, Nel, Oscroft, and a Mr. Skinner met with the Nyavu Chief Nongalaza Mdluli, several izinduna, mission board members, and nearly 100 other Nyavu. Induna Robert Mdluli told those present that the education of children was the first priority. They had heard rumors about the shortcomings of Bantu Education but told the local American Board missionaries they would accept the new act. Another meeting attendee asked how they might replace a teacher, suggesting that the state of missionary education on the reserve, one of the smallest American Board missions, may have

¹⁰⁴ NAR. NTS 8900. 211/362(5). "Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Tribal Authority," folio 1-2.

influenced the decision to accept Bantu education and authorities. Nongalaza expressed his own favor and another concluded they did not want to be left behind.¹⁰⁵

The support of the Maphumulo and Nyavu at these meetings transformed into “tribal resolutions” and the Native Commissioner recommended the creation of their authorities to the SNA.¹⁰⁶ But the establishment was delayed until a point by point description of the portions of Inanda Location under each authority could be obtained. Over a year after the Native Commissioner’s recommendation, Secretary for Native Affairs C.B. Young anxiously pushed for these authorities’ establishment.¹⁰⁷ The recently promoted Young, who believed that the authorities should be compulsory, took an active role in the promotion and implementation of the authorities more generally.¹⁰⁸ But extra incentive may have spurred him to push the Maphumulo and Nyavu to establish authorities. Many Zulu chiefs, including Buthelezi, had adopted a wait and see attitude to the Bantu Authorities Act and the adoption of tribal authorities in the Table Mountain region would serve as exemplary precedent.

The Maphumulo and Nyavu Tribal Authorities were promulgated in July of 1957, several months before the Zulu Paramount Chief (King) Cyprian Bhekuzulu convened a meeting of chiefs at KwaNongoma to announce his acceptance of the act. Government Notice 957/1957

¹⁰⁵ NAR. NTS 8991. 211/362(9). “Manyavu Tribal Authority,” folio 3.

¹⁰⁶ This “resolution” was a fill-in-the-blank document provided by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development that formalized consent. There were lines for the signature of the chief, three of his councillors, two witnesses, and the native commissioner. The copies in the archive have no signatures or handwritten X marks; the names and marks have been typed. “Good governance” required written documentation. See NTS 8900. 211/362(5). “Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Tribal Authority,” folio 3 and NTS 8991. 22/362(9). “Manyavu Tribal Authority,” folio 4.

¹⁰⁷ NAR. NTS 8991. 211/362(9). “Manyavu Tribal Authority,” folio 11.

¹⁰⁸ McIntosh, “State Policies in Rural South Africa C1948-c1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy Formation and Local Responses,” 153–60.

defined the boundaries of the Maphumulo and Nyavu tribes, in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section five of the Native Administration Act 38 of 1927, and established the Maphumulo Tribal Authority and Nyavu Tribal Authority, in terms of section two of the Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951. The attached schedules gave detailed boundary definitions. The Maphumulo area included the trust-owned remnant of Goedverwaching, the trust-owned portion of Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans on the Pietermaritzburg side of the boundary between the Pietermaritzburg and New Hanover magisterial districts, and a portion of the Inanda location. The Nyavu area encompassed the whole of the Table Mountain Mission Reserve (excluding any portion registered in the American Board's name) and a portion of the Inanda location. (*See Map 7.*) The Maphumulo could have between 12 to 18 councillors and the Nyavu 9 to 15.¹⁰⁹

While the Maphumulo and Nyavu may have resolved to form tribal authorities, they did little afterwards that evidences continued support for the new form of administration and efforts to make the tribal authorities active came largely from BAD officials. By 1961, the Pietermaritzburg district had successfully established seven authorities, compared to the neighboring Camperdown and New Hanover Districts that established none. But BAC Rowen recognized these authorities did nothing to justify their existence without his labors.¹¹⁰ The same year as the Nyavu initially expressed their desire for a tribal authority, a trust account was created by the BAD "to secure the funds of the Tribal Authority until such time as the tribe are able to control their own funds."¹¹¹ Bantu Education Inspector Oscroft also instigated efforts for

¹⁰⁹ Government Gazette 975/1957. Accessed from NAR. NTS. 8991. 211/362(9); NAR. URU 3672. 1215. "Omskrywing van de Gebiede van die Mapumulo en die Amanyavu Stam Owerheid: Distrik Pietermaritzburg."

¹¹⁰ NAR. BAO 5/87. 53/1524. "Stamowerhede. Pietermaritzburg," folio 1-8.

¹¹¹ NAR. NTS 11166. 211/362(9) "Pietermaritzburg. Manyavu Tribal Authority."

the construction of the first Maphumulo “community school” in the region (now known as Maqongqo Primary School), as local parents had expressed desire to not send their children to the “Aided Mission school,” even prior to the establishment of the tribal authorities.¹¹² The BAC completed all of the financial estimates for each of the authorities and even then struggled to get the chiefs to sign the forms.¹¹³ As time passed, this apathy on the part of the chiefs turned into more open resistance.¹¹⁴

Clear opposition began to emerge amongst the Nyavu after the death of Nongalaza in 1960. Mdelelwa Mdluli, one of Nongalaza’s brothers, served as acting chief for nearly four months until Nongalaza’s eldest son Bangubukhosi married to meet the requirements of the BAD.¹¹⁵ Once Bangubukhosi took over later that year, tribal authority functions came to a standstill. A 1961 account by the Pietermaritzburg BAC indicated complete failure: the authority did not function, no secretary had been appointed, there was no income, and the men refused to

¹¹² NAR. NTS 668. 2002/108. “Pietermaritzburg. Application for a School Site at Magongqo [sic] on the farm Onverwacht: Table Mountain School Board.”

¹¹³ NAR. NTS 8991. 211/362(A).). “Pietermaritzburg. Manyavu Tribal Authority,” folio 11; BAO 13/1022. J76/97/1524/7. “Begroting, Bantoewerhede. Finansiele Aangeleentede.”

¹¹⁴ Several reasons for this opposition will be examined below, but due to the constraints of the dissertation, the extent to which ANC resistance impacted the region will not be examined here. While Tom Lodge has suggested rural areas as one of the ANC’s most neglected constituencies, Colin Bundy and Peter Delius have more recently highlighted ANC attention to rural areas in the Eastern Cape and Sekhukhuneland. Given Table Mountain’s close vicinity to the city, it is likely ANC protest against the Bantu Authorities reached the region. This section will benefit from follow-up. See Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945* (London; New York: Longman, 1983), Ch 11; Colin Bundy, “Land and Liberation: Popular Rural Protest and the National Liberation Movements in South Africa, 1920-1960,” in *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa*, ed. Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (London: Longman, 1987); Peter Delius, “Sebatakomo: Migrant Organization, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15, no. 4 (1989): 581–615.

¹¹⁵ NAR. BAO 5/364. F54/1524/9. “Kapiteins en Hoofmanne. B Mdluli. Stam. Mdluli. Lokasi No 163/3 Called Table Mountain. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 70-91.

pay the levy that had been approved in 1959.¹¹⁶ After his appointment, Bangubukhosi asked that BAC V.P. Ahrens again explain the Bantu Authorities system to the Nyavu, who remained suspicious and cautious. Those present agreed to cooperate but asked for more time to consider all of the implications. Over the next several years, the cooperation was anything but forthcoming. At some point in 1962 or 1963, the people destroyed local dipping tanks.¹¹⁷ Ahrens began to suspect that Bangubukhosi opposed the system, but was too weak to announce it. Bangubukhosi refused to sign several years' worth of the annual financial estimates for the tribal authority because he would not go against his people, who alleged that Nongalaza had accepted the Bantu Authorities without consulting them. Aware that there had at least been some support expressed at the initial Nyavu meeting that approved the tribal authority, the BAC believed that the shift against the system came as a result of opposition to local betterment projects.¹¹⁸ Indeed, in 1964, Chief Manzolwandle Mlaba of the neighboring Ximba complained that people opposed to Bantu Authorities and rehabilitation left his area to settle under Bangubukhosi because the Nyavu chief only minimally acknowledged Bantu Authorities and his area had no rehabilitation projects.¹¹⁹

While the BAC dismissed Bangubukhosi as disinterested and lacking prestige among his own people, the chief walked the tightrope and navigated the ambiguity of his dependence.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ NAR. NTS 9013. 228/362. "Natal. Bantu Authorities."

¹¹⁷ This is mentioned in passing in BAO 13/1022. J76/971524/7, folio 14 but no further record of the destruction could be located.

¹¹⁸ NAR. NTS 8991. 211/362(9). "Pietermaritzburg. Manyavu Tribal Authority," folio 5-13.

¹¹⁹ NAR. BAO 5/364. F54/1524/9. "Kapteins en Hoofmanne. B. Mdluli. Stam. Mdluli. Lokasi No 163/3 Called Table Mountain. Pietermaritzburg," folio 15.

¹²⁰ Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa*.

The chief recognized the precariousness of his position and restrained himself from openly opposing the tribal authorities, but made no effort to implement any authority projects for fear of going against the Nyavu. The BAC employed both the carrot and the stick in efforts to gain Bangubukhosi's cooperation. During the first four years of the chief's appointment, BAC Bowen attempted to manipulate the chief through reduction and removal of the annual bonus paid to chiefs for good behavior. By 1964, Bowen considered recommending the chief's suspension. Bowen withdrew the authority's ability to collect dog tax independently and deposited any amounts collected directly into the trust account, though the revenue from dog tax collection was virtually non-existent until Bowen oversaw the employment of a more reliable collector. On the other hand, Bowen sought to give the chief more authority when he encouraged the conferment of criminal jurisdiction to the chief, a tenet of Bantu Authorities designed to give more power to the chiefs. He hoped the increase in revenue from court fees might persuade the chief to comply, as well as raise the status of the chiefdom.¹²¹ Bowen further recommended that the monies received by the SANT from the sale of sand in Bangubukhosi's jurisdiction be paid into the Nyavu account so that the people could see the fruit of their labor. While the BAD granted criminal jurisdiction, it refused to turn over the sand funds, insisting that all monies deposited from the BAD could only be in the form of a grant for specific development projects. Bowen lamented the decision and felt local opposition continued for this very reason, admitting that the people had seen no real benefits from the creation of the tribal authority.¹²²

¹²¹ NAR. BAO 5/364. F54/1524/9. "Kapteins en Hoofmanne. B. Mdluli. Stam. Mdluli. Lokasi No 163/3 Called Table Mountain. Pietermaritzburg," folio 1-18.

¹²² NAR. BAO 13/1022. J76/97/1524/7. "Begroting. Bantowerhede. Finansiële Aangeleenthede," Folio 18-29.

While the BAC suspected the Nyavu resistance to Bantu Authorities was tied to betterment schemes, amongst the Maphumulo this fusion of opposition to tribal authorities and planning projects was more explicit. Proclamation 116/1949 “Limitation and Improvement of Livestock and of Pastoral and Agricultural Resources in Native Areas” gave the Native Commissioner power to alienate any land for the prevention of soil erosion and the protection of water sources. Non-compliance was made a criminal offence and all Trust lands thus became “betterment areas.”¹²³ An “Ad Hoc Committee” including the Bantu Administration Commissioner V.P. Ahrens, Principal Agricultural Officer McKay, Senior Agricultural Officer Tidbury, and the regional Agricultural Officer I.R. Matheson thus set out the rehabilitation scheme for Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans trust farms in 1959. The 14-page plan divided the farm into residential, agricultural, and grazing allotments that translated into 97 economic units for 198 families. (*See Figure 13.*) While Tidbury had previously recommended the purchase of the remaining portions of the Goedverwachting farm for the establishment of a rural township to house non-farmers, until the land was acquired there was no place to which the “surplus people” could be relocated. The plan thus divided the available economic units amongst the families, with the intention of allocating full portions to the “best farmers” and partial portions to the rest. The “worst farmers” would be weeded out and full allotments built up for the former category. The scheme detailed plans for a dairy project, a grazing system, and crop rotation.¹²⁴ The records do not reflect the extent to which this plan was ever carried out; but as examined below,

¹²³ On the limits of and debate over Proclamation 116, see McIntosh, “State Policies in Rural South Africa C1948-c1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy Formation and Local Responses,” Ch 7.

¹²⁴ NAR. NTS 10261. 47/423(8). “Rehabilitation. Pietermaritzburg. Onverwacht Group,” folio 3-16.

resistance to the local Bantu Agricultural Assistant's efforts to implement the recommendations suggests the plan was not welcomed.

Overcrowding was of great concern and not only to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee that planned Onverwacht. Despite the purchase of the Goedverwaching remnant to add to the land for those forcefully relocated from the dam site, population continued to outstrip available land as sons sought to break away and establish their own *imizi* in the region. The neighboring Table Mountain location was also grossly congested.¹²⁵ (See Figure 9.) Such overcrowding was not limited to the Table Mountain Region; Lodge notes that between 1955 and 1969 the average population density in the reserves rose from 60 persons per square mile to 110.¹²⁶ During the initial phases of the planning, Tidbury had recommended the purchase of the Goedverwaching subdivisions to establish a township to accommodate the growing population and “to sort out the farmer from the non-farmer.” Tidbury's recommendation was quickly approved and negotiations began again with Leslie and her family for Goedverwaching portions D, 5, and 6.¹²⁷ Conditions set by S.D. Vather, the owner of portion B, and Brian L. Raw, owner of portion A, as well as objections from the local farmers' association prevented the Trust from entering into negotiations with them during 1958.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ NAR. NTS. 3244. 814/307. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwaching. Part Two,” 1958-60, folio 193.

¹²⁶ Charles Simkins, “Agricultural Production in the African Reserves of South Africa, 1918-1969,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 7, no. 2 (April 1, 1981): 271; Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa*, 266.

¹²⁷ NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307 Part Two. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwaching,” 1958-60, folio 178-9.

¹²⁸ NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307 Part Two. “Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwaching,” folio 204.

Figure 9: Increase in local population. 1904-5 and 1924 figures shown in “*imizi*” and 1935 and 1957 shown in “taxpayers.” It is regretted that the data given is not uniform (it cannot be known for certain whether tax-payer means *umuzi* head only or any adult male). But these figures, however rough, still provide insight into the growing population that increased tensions over land.¹²⁹

Year	Maphumulo (Umgeni District)			Nyavu (Umgeni, Camperdown, and New Hanover Districts)			
	Location Land	White-Owned	Total	Location Land	Mission Land	White-Owned	Total
1904/5	41	80	121	114	88	103	218
1924	109	195	304	117	147	238	502
1935	579	150	729	1,014*			1,014
1957	Details not given		1,150	Details not given			1,340

While negotiations with Leslie and her family moved rather quickly in comparison to the previous purchase of the Goedverwachting remnant, the acquisition hit several snags. Apartheid planners had no shortage of modernizing schemes for this portion of Goedverwachting, yet land shortages resulted in conflict over how best to use the farm. The Trust hoped to establish the recommended rural village on the land, but additional needs arose. Silt build-up resultant from overcrowding and overgrazing in the region shortened the expected life of the Nagle Dam. Corporation officials considered several options for additional water supply, all of which required the removal of people. The new scheme adopted by the city in 1959 involved the

¹²⁹ Numbers for Nyavu 1904 from NCP 8/2/5. Colony of Natal, Ministerial Department of Native Affairs. *Blue Book on Native Affairs 1904* (Pietermaritzburg: Times Printing and Publishing Company, Ltd., 1905). Numbers for Maphumulo 1905 from SNA 1/1/318. 670/1905. Numbers for 1924 from South Africa. Dept. of Native Affairs, *Index to Natal tribes register*. (Pietermaritzburg: Natal Witness, 1926). Numbers for 1935 from N. J Van Warmelo, *A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1935). * indicates Warmelo error; he lists the 1,014 Nyavu as all resident on privately-owned land. Numbers for 1957 from NAR. NTS 8900. 211/362(5). “Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Tribal Authority,” folio 4 and NTS 8991. 22/362(9). “Manyavu Tribal Authority,” folio 5.

construction of Intake Works at the east end of the Nagle Dam, a new dam upstream of the Nagle Dam (on Onverwacht), and a new aqueduct to the city.¹³⁰

The Trust's initial efforts to negotiate with Leslie were ignored; she instead had offered the land to Durban Corporation.¹³¹ But in 1960 the Corporation withdrew from the negotiations, choosing to construct the Midmar Dam on the Umngeni River to the northwest of Pietermaritzburg instead of a second dam at Table Mountain. Africans in the region would only be affected by a second aqueduct to carry the new water supply. These disturbances would be significantly less as the burying of the piping would only temporarily disturb arable land.¹³²

When the second Table Mountain dam project fell through, the Trust then turned to acquire the Goedverwaching sub-divisions. C.G. Leslie, her daughter-in-law B.A. Ferreira, and daughter Nicoline P. Botha accepted the trust's initial offers of R3,120 (39 acres), R62,805 (930 acres), and R7,833 (137 acres). Leslie and Ferreira could only sell their portions if Botha also sold hers due to the regulation that all non-scheduled land adjoin trust-owned land. The portions D, 5, and 6 thus simultaneously transferred to the Trust in December 1961.¹³³ From the records it appears that BAD officials did not initially discuss the jurisdiction of this newly acquired terrain. Envisioned as a rural village site, they may not initially have considered the need for

¹³⁰ NAR.NTS 7900. 3/337. "Durban Corporation Water Works. Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location, Part 4," folio 629-31.

¹³¹ NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307 Part Two. "Pietermaritzburg. Farm Goedverwaching," folio 208.

¹³² NAR.NTS 7900. 3/337. "Durban Corporation Water Works. Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location, Part 4," folio 629-31.

¹³³ NAR. LDE-N 931. 12200/412. "Onderverdeling D van Goedverwaching Nommer 1349, Pietermaritzburg, CG Leslie;" NAR. LDE-N 971. 12200/860. "Gedeelte 5 van Goedverwaching Nommer 1349, Distrik Pietermaritzburg. Mrs. B.A. Ferreira;" NAR. LDE-N 971. 12200/861. "Gedeelte 6 van Goedverwaching Nommer 1349, Distrik Pietermaritzburg. NP Botha;" Pietermaritzburg Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, KwaZulu-Natal. Land Register for Goedverwaching No. 1349, 1850s-present.

chiefly authority on the strip of land dividing the Maphumulo territory. Despite the shortage of land for African settlement, the BAD did not immediately resettle the farm strip or allow the surrounding peoples to expand there.

Resistance to betterment schemes across South Africa has been well documented, but amongst the Maphumulo it was tied to their relocation and the division of the Maphumulo land by this much-desired thousand-acre strip of Goedverwaching.¹³⁴ Those Maphumulo who had been relocated to the Trust farms resented the implementation of betterment regulations and constantly reminded officials that they had been promised their status would not change when they moved from the location. While they complied with stock reductions, they complained bitterly. In the wake of Tidbury's 1959 report that recommended the creation of residential areas, the Chief BAC recommended not asking this "difficult crowd" to move again for betterment purposes; they would certainly demand payment.¹³⁵ Their neighbors on the trust farm, the Gcumisa, had armed in opposition to the construction of anti-erosion banks on the New Hanover side of Onverwacht.¹³⁶

While the Chief BAC warned against removals for betterment purposes he also acknowledged the increasing frustrations of the Maphumulo with continued interference in their lives. In late 1959 before the cancellation of the second dam project, Ahrens served notice to the local chiefs whose people would be affected, including the Gcumisa, Maphumulo and Nyavu.

¹³⁴ William Beinart and Colin Bundy, *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics & Popular Movements in the Transkei & Eastern Cape, 1890-1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Kotzé, *African Politics in South Africa*; Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa*; De Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart*.

¹³⁵ NAR. NTS 10261. 47/423(8). "Rehabilitation. Pietermaritzburg. Onverwacht Group," folio 22.

¹³⁶ NAR. NTS 10261. 47/423(8). "Rehabilitation. Pietermaritzburg. Onverwacht Group," folio 14.

Those who had been relocated to Onverwacht would be inundated by water in the second dam. While Ahrens expressed relief that their opposition “does not appear to be as strong as might have been expected,” his further comments suggest those to be affected felt quite despondent. “Although the Natives concerned do not relish the idea of being moved, the consensus of opinion (after the position had been fully explained) was to the effect that *all that they could do in the circumstances* was to lodge a protest which was done via the notices which had been served on them” (my emphasis).¹³⁷

These multiple dam and the various betterment projects certainly contributed to Maphumulo aggravation. When Maphumulo Acting Chief Sigciza died in 1961 (the same year that the Goedverwaching subsections transferred from Leslie and the Ferreiras to the Trust), the new regent was faced with increasingly hostile followers. The Maphumulo unanimously nominated Khangela to act as *ibamba*, certainly aware his claim to the regency would be honored before that of Baningi given the dispute only six years earlier.¹³⁸ Upon appointment, Khangela dismissed all of the previous authority councillors but for two.¹³⁹ Like Sigciza before him, Khangela was initially “cooperative with rehabilitation and tribal authority activities,” earning an initial increase in his annual bonus in 1963.¹⁴⁰ Like the Nyavu authority, the Maphumulo

¹³⁷ NAR. NTS 7900. 3/337. “Durban Corporation Water Works. Exchange of Lands, Inanda Location, Part 4,” folio 601.

¹³⁸ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 85-95.

¹³⁹ NAR. BAO 5/88. F53/1524/5. “Bantolestamowerhede. Mapumulo. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 2-3.

¹⁴⁰ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 107-10, 120-3.

authority showed meager dog tax collection and thus little revenue in its initial years.¹⁴¹ But over the years, Khangela's cooperation declined, as did his bonus, and by 1970, the BAC was certain it was Khangela who encouraged the resistance to betterment planning and Mafakadolo.

Increasing dissatisfaction with the constant interventions and the implementation of betterment planning in the Maphumulo region culminated in an attack on the Xhosa Bantu Agricultural Assistant Edward Mafakadolo.¹⁴² Bantu Agricultural Assistants were often despised as outsiders and agents of apartheid.¹⁴³ Mafakadolo's arrival marked the implementation of rehabilitation projects, particularly the culling of small stock, a regulation that Khangela had overlooked. Mafakadolo was also responsible for ensuring that settlement on the farms was undertaken according to the betterment schemes set in place for the trust farms. It is not clear from the record whether or not Mafakadolo's jurisdiction extended to the newly purchased strip of Goedverwachting, but given the shortage of land it seems unlikely that local chiefs and izinduna would strictly enforce the boundaries. Mafakadolo put an end to the payment of fees, or as one councillor described them, bribes, for illegal sites.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ NAR. NTS 89900. 211/362/5(A). "Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Tribal Authority;" BAO 13/1022. J76/97/1524/3. "Begroting. Bantoeowerhede. Finansiële Aangeleentehede. Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Stamowerheid."

¹⁴² Not surprisingly for an official representative of a government obsessed with labels and ethnicity, the Assistant BAC mentioned that Mafakadolo's ethnicity may have played a factor in the disturbances. However, none of the statements made by witnesses attest to such.

¹⁴³ According to Robert McIntosh, local Bantu Administrations Commissioners had a predisposition to recruit "educated and progressive Bantu, such as teachers and agricultural assistants" who could promote the Bantu Authorities even when the Commissioners were not present. McIntosh, "State Policies in Rural South Africa C1948-c1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy Formation and Local Responses," 162.

¹⁴⁴ N AR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 147.

The BAC believed that these rehabilitation schemes agitated the Maphumulo people and the official allocation of sites angered the chief, councillors, and izinduna who could no longer control (and possibly abuse) the allocation of sites. Despite overcrowding, the BAD had granted no local peoples permission to move onto the Goedverwaching strip of D, 5, and 6. This tension came to a head in December 1969 when Bellina Dhlomo, an applicant for a beer hall, accused Mafakadolo of prejudicing her application. Dhlomo's sons attacked him with iron-shod sticks and she threatened to burn down his home. It was alleged that at a meeting prior to the assault, Khangela had warned that if Dhlomo's application was denied, there would be bloodshed.¹⁴⁵

The Dhlomos' attack on Mafakadolo should not be seen as a single incident of violence resultant from a personal dispute. Men such as Mafakadolo, the *marangera* or rangers, were often the target of resistance to betterment schemes because of the role they played policing the activities of residents on the Trust farms. It is significant that another of the men who gave testimony against Khangela in the investigation into the attack on Mafakadolo was a BAD ranger. In Sekhukhuneland, for example, attacks on these rangers occurred after the deportation of Godfrey Sekhukhune and others who had vocally condemned Bantu Authorities and betterment schemes.¹⁴⁶ Because another Bantu Agricultural Assistant had recently been shot dead in Umsinga, the Agricultural Officer Olivier temporarily transferred Mafakadolo to the Zwartkop location for fear of his safety. But BAD officials agreed Mafakadolo would have to return after Khangela had been warned so the department did not lose face. Chief BAC F.W.C. Aveling made Khangela responsible for the safety of Mafakadolo and warned that "as a

¹⁴⁵ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 134, 139-49.

¹⁴⁶ Delius, "Sebatakomo: Migrant Organization, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt," 611-2.

government appointed [chief] it is expected of him to lend full support to government policy and assist the Bantu Agricultural Assistant in his area at all time.” Aveling further ordered the Pietermaritzburg BAC to collect statements in the event that the chief did not repent and the department needed to depose the chief (in terms of section 31 of Proclamation 110/1957).¹⁴⁷

By the end of the year, in December 1970, further evidence of Khangela’s misconduct compelled the Pietermaritzburg BAC K.G. Harvey to open an investigation into the chief’s administration. The BAC reported there had been dissention amongst the councillors, izinduna, and the *umndeni* for some time. While Khangela complained of a lack of cooperation, the izinduna and councillors made serious allegations against Khangela, including those described above regarding the chief’s opposition to Mafakadolo and betterment planning. Khangela had dismissed several of his councillors without consulting the Pietermaritzburg BAC. One of the men, councillor Aaron Mkhize, had made a statement against the chief during the investigation of the Mafakadolo incident. Mkhize also believed Mafakadolo was doing good work in the region. Mkhize, induna Ndoda Gwala, induna Muntu Sithole, and constable Numa Dladla attributed the trouble to Khangela’s attachment to Mdingi Maphumulo. Mdingi, the illegitimate son of a Maphumulo woman, was a strong character who up until now had been considered an *umndeni* member. At a March meeting held to discuss the unharmonious state of administration, the BAC concluded that Mdingi was the instigator. Tension had grown between Khangela and the councillors over Mdingi’s status and at the meeting all agreed Mdingi had no right to be regarded as an *umndeni* member. Those present accepted Mdingi as a councillor on the tribal authority, but he resented his expulsion particularly because it was by non-members of the

¹⁴⁷ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 134, 139-49.

chiefly family that the complaint was lodged. The same night, one of the councillors who spoke against Mdingi was threatened.¹⁴⁸

Several *umndeni* members also complained in private that the chief neglected his duties to the heir and his mother, who was so persistent in her complaints that the BAC issued her with pauper rations. Khangela regularly failed to arrange for funds for the heir Mhlabunzima's education at KwaDlangezwa High School, an elite Bantu education boarding school in Mtunzini that opened in 1971.¹⁴⁹ Harvey thus asked that a full inquiry be undertaken into the chief's administration so that appropriate measures could be adopted. The Chief BAC recommended Harvey, who was about to retire, hold a meeting with the *umndeni* to determine their opinion. Harvey's successor D.B. Maytham met with *umndeni* members Chief Khangela, Banningi, Pemba, and Mpini Maphumulo to advise them of the complaints against Khangela. The men undertook to discuss the matter with the entire *umndeni* and reply with a recommended course of action. Thereafter, Khangela refused to attend two *umndeni* meetings and threatened Bhekumuzi, considered the head of the *umndeni*. With Mdingi no longer a member of the inner-circle of decision makers, the family unanimously decided upon Khangela's suspension. They believed it was time for the heir to take control, but Maytham informed them Mhlabunzima did not yet meet the requirements of chieftaincy, most likely because of his age. The *umndeni* thus again nominated Banningi to act as *ibamba* and Maytham, unaware of Banningi's ineligibility as examined above, recommended his appointment. But Khangela refused to resign and Chief

¹⁴⁸ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 136-8.

¹⁴⁹ P.G. Koornhof, "Dlangezwa High School Officially Opened," *Bantu Education* (1971): 14-7. Thanks to Meghan Healy for the reference.

Bantu Administration Commissioner J.J. van der Watt instructed the Pietermaritzburg BAC to initiate the inquiry earlier considered that would enable Khangela' deposal.¹⁵⁰

The following year, the *umndeni* decided that the heir should take over. With no prompting, the Maphumulo councillors and *umndeni*, including Khangela, arrived at the Magistrate's office in September 1972. They informed Mpumalanga Magistrate H.F.W. Reibeling they had come to discuss the ongoing discord between the izinduna and the chief. They reported approximately R360 had been collected to enable the heir to marry and qualify to assume the chieftainship. The magistrate encouraged those present to pull together in the interests of the people and report back after the heir's marriage.¹⁵¹ Several months later in December, the representatives returned and asked that Mhlabunzima be appointed in May, 1973, when he would be 25 years of age, or if possible sooner. They reported the absent Khangela continued to refuse to attend *umndeni* meetings. The *umndeni* urged expediency because Khangela had ceased to perform the functions of chief after the previous meeting where he agreed Mhlabunzima should be appointed. Khangela later appeared at the magistrate's office to confirm he agreed to step down on behalf of the heir. He also claimed he was not neglecting

¹⁵⁰ The records indicate no inquiry ever took place, but during the interim administration of the Maphumulo transferred to the Mpumalanga Magistracy. This is gleaned from the Department of Bantu Administration and Development correspondence about the succession. During fieldwork, I was unable to fully access the records of the Mpumalanga Magistrate, which are not held at the Pietermaritzburg or Durban Archive Repositories but were transferred from the magistrate to the offices of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 155-60.

¹⁵¹ NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 166-7.

chiefly duties, but that he was being pushed out of affairs. He too hoped Mhlabunzima could be appointed immediately.¹⁵²

It is also important to note that Mdingi Maphumulo was not included on the list of *umndeni* and izinduna present at the first meeting where *umndeni* elder Bhekumuzi listed the family members in attendance. However, at the second meeting Reibeling, who had admitted to only perusing the clan's file when the izinduna and *umndeni* first appeared at his office, listed Mdingi as an *umndeni* member. In the changing of the magistracy from Pietermaritzburg to Mpumalanga, details were overlooked that would later have repercussions for the chieftaincy. And while the BAD continued to see Baningi as an illegitimate son of the late chief Ndlovu, he continued to be viewed as a member of the *umndeni* by its other members. He remained active in *umndeni* affairs and appears on both lists of *umndeni* at the 1972 meetings. These details will be central to the unfolding of *uDlame* in the Table Mountain region, when Mdingi allied himself with Inkatha and attempted to claim the Maphumulo chieftaincy. Similarly, through an alliance with Inkatha, Baningi would successfully claim the regency. These will again be examined in chapter five.

The reactions of the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefs and their people to Bantu Authorities and betterment schemes were neither entirely cooperative nor rebellious. Across South Africa, a range of responses by chiefs and to chiefly authority emerged in rural resistance movements. The Lingangele movement in the Witzieshoek reserve (Free State Province) attempted to maintain the integrity of the chieftaincy, even when they rejected the chief for his unwillingness to resist the Bantu Authorities. In Dinokana of the Tswana reserves (Northwest Province), the deposed

¹⁵² NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. "Chiefs and Headmen. Mapumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg," folio 125.

Chief Moiloa acted more akin to the chiefs examined, treading a cautious path.¹⁵³ Sensitive to public feeling but aware of their precarious positions, these men neither eagerly cooperated nor openly resisted. They recognized the potential for their dismissal by the apartheid government or rejection by their people, the former of which resulted from Chief Albert Luthuli's vocal condemnation of the Bantu Authorities and the latter of which occurred in Mpondoland and Xhalanga.¹⁵⁴ In Sekhukhuneland, a major blow to resistance came when Morwamotse died and his wife, the regent, accepted the establishment of a tribal authority.¹⁵⁵ The regents held the most insecure of traditional positions and were more dependent on government sanction for their authority. Thus, Maphumulo regents Sigciza and Khangela initially attempted to support the new system of administration. When Khangela began to flagrantly disobey betterment regulations, BAD officials sought to depose him--just not on their own. Officials sought the cooperation of the Maphumulo *umndeni* who pointed to other reasons for Khangela's bad governance, not his resistance to the rehabilitation policies. Bangubukhosi Mdluli and the Maphumulo regents tread careful ground between their people and the apartheid government.

Conclusion

When the Maphumulo heir Mhlabunzima was appointed chief in July, 1973, the young man became embroiled in these ongoing tensions over chiefly authority and land in the Table Mountain region. From the creation of the Maphumulo chieftaincy in 1905, its chiefs carefully


¹⁵³ Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa*, 268–79.

¹⁵⁴ Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," 808–9; Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa*, 279–82; Ntsebeza, *Democracy Compromised*.


¹⁵⁵ Delius, "Sebatakomo: Migrant Organization, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt," 614.

managed their authority. The first, Maguzu, made sure to express his support for the colonial administration in the midst of the *impi yamkhanda* and to define his jurisdiction. Across the segregation and apartheid eras, the chiefs and people of the region experience increasing interference in their daily ability to govern and provide for their families. In the decades-long conflict between the Maphumulo and Nyavu over territorial boundaries and the meaning of chiefly authority, the Nyavu chiefs employed several means in attempt to gain jurisdiction over contested land, repeatedly positioning themselves as the hereditary rulers against their neighbors and even attempting to purchase the land. But the construction of the Nagle Dam, the implementation of Bantu Authorities, and the introduction of betterment schemes in the region disturbed existing claims to land and redefined boundaries. The piecemeal manner in which the Trust acquisitioned land for African settlement contributed to the increasing tensions as overcrowded reserve and trust farm residents looked eagerly to the empty thousand acre piece of Goedverwaching, thereby setting the scene for the conflict that erupts in deadly violence in 1990.


This chapter also questions the label of collaborator when applied to chiefs. The actions of the traditional leaders examined here suggest that they were not always as compliant with the apartheid Bantu Authorities Act as many have argued. The threat of deposal surely impacted the chiefs' decisions as few were willing to risk punishment for resistance. When the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefs and izinduna agreed to cooperate with the new act, they did so because of the improvements—roads, schools, and businesses—they believed would accompany the creation of tribal authorities. While they may have resolved to form the new bodies, the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefs did little afterwards that evidences continued support for the administration.




Map 4: Map of South African Provinces, 1910-1994. Source: www.overcomingapartheid.msu.edu, MATRIX, Michigan State University




Map 5: Contested Boundary between the Maphumulo and Nyavu, 1882-1914



Map 6: Land Acquisition for Nagle Dam Project



Map 7: Tribal Authority Boundaries, 1957



Map 8: Land Acquisition by Trust after Promulgation of Tribal Authority Boundaries




Figure 10: Maphumulo Succession




Figure 11: (Limited) Nyavu Succession



Figure 12: Sketch of Betterment Plan for Goedverwaching, 1948, NAR. NTS 3244. 814/307.



Figure 13: Sketch of Betterment Plan for Onverwacht, 1958. NAR. NTS 10261. 47/423(8)

Chapter Three:

“Only the Fourth Chief”: Zulu Politics and Land Jurisdiction, 1973-1988¹

In 1973, Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo was appointed chief of the Maphumulo by the Executive Council of KwaZulu and with the approval of the South African State President and Prime Minister.² The early years of Chief Maphumulo’s chieftainship coincided with the creation of the KwaZulu bantustan and the rise of the Zulu ethnic nationalist movement Inkatha, led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Maphumulo dove into his duties with vigor, immediately pushing for the incorporation of the remaining strip of Goedverwaching into the Maphumulo chiefdom and becoming active in KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KZLA) in 1974. He earned the ire of Buthelezi and was suspended from the KZLA due to his involvement in the royalist opposition party.

At Table Mountain, the young chief sought to bring the thousand acre piece of Goedverwaching dividing his jurisdiction into the Maphumulo Tribal Authority. While apartheid officials originally planned a “bantú village” for the strip of land, forced removals across KwaZulu-Natal made the farm an important area for the relocation of people forcibly removed from “black spots,” land owned or occupied by Africans in white areas. Apartheid officials recognized the potential for tension with their plans for a closer settlement on the strip of Goedverwaching wedged between Maphumulo territory. But the intense pressure to make land available for people forcibly removed outweighed those concerns and officials moved forward with the plan. However, a shortage of water and increasing criticism of the forced

¹ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 191-206.

² NAR. URU 6336. Minute No. 456.

relocations stalled the Goedverwaching project. Before officials finalized the jurisdiction issue, violence erupted in the Natal Midlands.

This chapter will first lay out the establishment of the KwaZulu bantustan and the Zulu ethnic nationalist movement, Inkatha, in order to understand Chief Maphumulo's rise as a controversial local politician. It will then examine some of the Zulu opposition parties that sought to contest Inkatha dominance with the help of the royal family and possibly the apartheid government. The next section looks at the contested claims of the apartheid government, the KwaZulu government, Chief Maphumulo and Chief Mdluli over the Goedverwaching trust farm. Tensions over the shortage of land and water in the Table Mountain region increased as the various interests each made claims on the trust farm. In the context of bantustan politics and increasing resistance to apartheid, the situation became volatile. As will see in the next chapter, this conflict over chiefly authority and the land jurisdiction erupted between the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms under the guise of political violence during *uDlame*.

KwaZulu and the Rise of Buthelezi

The 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act extended the three-tiered system of the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act (discussed in the last chapter) with the promise of self-government and independence for African “national units.” With this and subsequent actions, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) of the apartheid government embarked on more drastic measures to reduce the urbanized African population. A renewed commitment to separate development now defined as “multi-nationalism” and “ethnic self-determination” was an ideological attempt to legitimize the denial of the franchise to Africans.³ Indeed, over the next

³ Posel, *The Making of Apartheid*, 228–31.

several decades the Department of Bantu Administration and Development would restyle itself according to this mission when deemed necessary, becoming the Department of Plural Relations and Development (PRD) in 1978, the Department of Cooperation and Development (DCD) in 1979, and the Department of Development Aid (DDA) in 1986.⁴ With these redefinitions, apartheid officials attempted to move away from the language of race and segregation towards a discourse of modernity and separate development.

The bantustan plan was only gradually developed.⁵ BAD turned to the reserves for the establishment of ten separate African “nations,” each with its own “ethnic homeland.” (*See Map 9.*) The 1970 Homeland Citizenship Act and the 1971 Homeland Constitution Act imposed bantustan citizenship on all Africans, even those who may never have visited their supposed homelands. The apartheid state intended for this ethnic loyalty to replace national political aspirations. However, from the passage of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951, it took 25 years for the first of the territorial authorities to opt for independence, the highest level of self-government. Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981) were the only four to do so. The bantustan project led to forced relocations on an unprecedented scale, stimulated and entrenched ethnic divisions, and created a new class of bantustan administrators.

To give effect to the bantustan project, the apartheid government embarked on an ambitious program of forced relocations. Urban pass controls were intensified, thereby expelling the unemployed from the urban areas, and so-called squatters removed from “unauthorized”

⁴ After the 1978 name change, “African” replaced “Bantu” to describe black South Africans. When BAD became DCD, the South African Bantu Trust becomes the South African Development Trust. With the DDA, officials formerly called Commissioners became Regional Representatives. Throughout, I will use the titles appropriate for the year.

⁵ Here I use the term bantustan without capitalization or inverted commas as the term is now recognized in common usage to embed a critique of the idea of racial-ethnic encampments as pernicious political projects. See Ally and Lissoni, “‘Let’s Talk About Bantustans’.”

areas. Forced removals of so-called “black spots,” land owned or occupied by Africans in white areas, also began in earnest. These Africans deemed “surplus” were obliged to resettle in the already overcrowded bantustans and in newly created townships near urban areas or attached to the homelands. The Surplus People Project conservatively estimated 3.5 million people were removed between 1960 and 1983, a number that does not include the majority of people affected by influx control in the urban areas nor the number of people moved within the bantustans for betterment planning.⁶

While each “nation” was intended to “develop along its own lines” in the bantustans, these scattered entities were the legacy of the reserve system and thus lacked the ability to attract Africans from the cities or even sustain the people already living there. Central to the homeland project was a four-part plan for land consolidation. In 1975, after the proclamation of legislative assemblies for each of the bantustans, the Minister of BAD set out to define areas which could be released to add to the bantustans; clear “black spots;” excise “poorly situated Bantu reserves,” (land desirable for whites); and attempt to consolidate the scattered areas by the aforementioned actions.⁷ But as with the 1936 Land Act attempts to add to land for Africans, the consolidation process would be slow, ultimately impacting the path of the KwaZulu bantustan.

It was within this larger, shifting context that a meeting of chiefs in 1970 decided upon the establishment of the Zulu Territorial Authority (ZTA). Intended as a transitional body towards full bantustan independence, the ZTA consisted of all the chiefs or representatives of the 22 regional authorities, an elected chief executive officer (who had to be a chief), and five other executive councillors. At the inaugural meeting of the ZTA, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was

⁶ Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*, 9.

⁷ Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*, 125.

elected the chief executive officer, Prince Clement Zulu as chairperson of the Territorial Authority, and Chief Charles Hlengwa as the Deputy Chairperson.⁸ Buthelezi used this platform to “launch himself into the leadership of conservative politics in Natal, while simultaneously striving to establish himself as a major player on the national stage.”⁹ As seen in the previous chapter, Buthelezi neither opposed nor resisted the Bantu Authorities system during his early years as chief.

But during the mid-1970s, Buthelezi came out against independence for KwaZulu due to growing frustration with the apartheid government’s unwillingness to fast-track land consolidation, as well as increasing pressure by anti-apartheid movements within South Africa. KwaZulu consisted of 48 pieces of land broken up by white farming areas, rural towns, and cities of Natal province. In the Table Mountain region, the Inanda location land of the Maphumulo and Nyavu Tribal Authorities now came under the jurisdiction of the newly formed KwaZulu government while the majority of the trust farms transferred in 1986. (*See Map 11*). During his first years as Chief Minister, Buthelezi appealed to the state government for more land for KwaZulu and contended that scattered pieces of land were not conducive to setting KwaZulu up as an independent country.¹⁰ In mid-1972 the apartheid state published plans to consolidate KwaZulu into six pieces of land; twenty-eight white-owned farms would be added to KwaZulu and 40 outlying areas would be excised. But growing opposition to the proposals forced the state

⁸ According to Buthelezi’s biographer Ben Temkin, a Department of Information official, Paul Zulu, lobbied for Hlengwa, a close confidant of the regent Prince Israel Zulu, to become chief executive officer. Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 115–6.

⁹ Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 806.

¹⁰ Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 820.

to sketch new plans.¹¹ KwaZulu officials complained these drafts did not go far enough, while white farmers criticized the costs and the negative impact upon whites, their farms, and their water sources. Land earmarked for consolidation required forced removals, creating further complications for KwaZulu officials.¹²

In 1972 the ZTA agreed upon a constitution for “stage one” of self-government according to the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971. The South African Government drafted a constitution for KwaZulu that was hotly debated in the ZTA and central to the understanding of the unfolding bantustan politics. The draft retained the Zulu king as a member of nascent legislative assembly, but Buthelezi and other executive councillors insisted that his role should be limited to that of a figurehead, removed from party politics. Royalists, including Prince Clement Zulu who had led an investigative delegation to Swaziland, wanted an executive monarch such as the Swazi king.¹³ Clement stepped down as chairman of the ZTA and inexplicably seconded the motion to remove the king from the Legislative Assembly.¹⁴ The approved constitution was gazetted in March 1972 as Proclamation R69/1972 and on April 1, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KZLA) was established. Buthelezi had won out and the KZLA included only a personal representative of the

¹¹ *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1972* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1973), 171; *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1973* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1974), 148.

¹² Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 821–5.

¹³ Muriel Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1973), 54; Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 41–2; Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 127–8.

¹⁴ Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 131.

king, three chiefs appointed by each of the 22 regional authorities, and 55 elected members.¹⁵ The king's status became ceremonial, a personification of the unity of the Zulu nation, despite the disunity of KwaZulu's borders. The king or his representative could attend meetings and had to be furnished with the agenda, which he could ask the KZLA to meet and discuss with him in advance. An apartheid government representative, the commissioner-general, could attend at least one KZLA function per year. The KZLA had limited legislative and executive powers, excluding the ability to establish townships and business undertakings, appoint and dismiss chiefs, and create educational syllabi that accompanied the "second stage" of homeland government.¹⁶

The constitution also provided for elections, but the KZLA's insistence upon KwaZulu "citizenship certificates" (as opposed to the hated reference books of apartheid) delayed voting. Sithole has argued that this postponement served as a means of buying time for the KZLA leaders (and later Inkatha) to ensure control, particularly in relation to a number of short-lived political parties to be examined below.¹⁷ Between 1974 and 1976, the KZLA asked twice to move to the next phase of self-government status, a request turned down until elections could be held or at the very least scheduled.¹⁸ This second phase would be granted in 1977, after the February 1978 elections were announced.

¹⁵ Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 42; Robert Thabo Sabela, "KwaZulu Legislative Assembly" (M.A. thesis, University of Zululand, 1989), 25–6.

¹⁶ Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 41–2; Sabela, "KwaZulu Legislative Assembly," 24–6; Horrell, *The African Homelands of South Africa*, 54; Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," 825.

¹⁷ Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," 827.

¹⁸ NAR. BAO 12/652. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 68-79.

During its initial years the KZLA met only once a year (except for when special sessions were called) with all of the formalities of a parliament: sergeants-at-arms, maces, chairmen and vice-chairmen. Members were religiously reminded to operate according to proper procedure. Frequent translations of the many chiefs who spoke only isiZulu made proceedings extremely time-consuming. For many years, the bulk of the legislature's time revolved around the consideration of the budget, roughly half of which was appropriated from the South African Parliament.¹⁹ The KZLA met in a simple hall at Bhhekuzulu College in Nongoma (*see figure 15*) before the opening of the impressive R15 million KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Buildings in KwaZulu's capital Ulundi on October 25, 1983.²⁰

Zulu Opposition Parties and Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo

Buthelezi's political ascendancy was not without hiccups. The dispute between the Chief Minister and the royalist faction over the king's executive powers continued with the creation of several political parties. The royalists found allies in the state and later a Zulu petty bourgeoisie disgruntled with white business interference in KwaZulu.²¹ The young chief of the Maphumulo too would become involved in this opposition, setting the stage for years of dispute between Mhlabunzima and Mangosuthu and within the Maphumulo people over the political affiliation of their chief.

¹⁹ Jeffrey Butler, Robert I Rotberg, and John Adams, *The Black Homelands of South Africa: The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 60–4.

²⁰ *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1983* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1984), 347.

²¹ Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 41–2.

As Buthelezi cemented the position of the KwaZulu chief minister as senior to the Zulu king, the dissatisfaction of royalist factions spurred the creation of several political parties. Much has been written on the royalist-Buthelezi divide and the manner in which Buthelezi shored up his own support by linking the opposition to the apartheid regime. The centrality of the King to each of these parties led Roger Southall to describe them as “King’s Parties ... representing the immediate interests of a royalist clique excluded from office, [that] were funded and/or assisted by Pretoria and advocated an openly collaborative road, thereby seeking to undermine Buthelezi’s own support.”²² Historian Jabulani Sithole calls attention to the manner in which Buthelezi’s “dismissal of political opponents as apartheid agents was repeated so much that it became some form of orthodoxy.”²³ An overview will be provided here to understand not only the early bantustan politics, but also the long conflict between Buthelezi and Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo of Table Mountain.

Tensions between Buthelezi and the royal family, particularly King Cyprian Bhekuzulu’s brothers, Israel Mcwayizeni and Clement, started soon after the death of Cyprian in 1968. Buthelezi had criticized Prince Israel who was acting as regent for the young heir, Goodwill Zwelethini. Israel too had backed Chief Charles Hlengwa for the position of Chief Minister.²⁴ But in January 1971, Israel announced to the ZTA that the matter was resolved. Still the royal family chose to exclude Buthelezi from the installation of Zwelethini as king in December 1971, and the rift continued.²⁵ After the king’s coronation, many speculated that the apartheid

²² Southall, “Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise,” 459.

²³ Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 832.

²⁴ Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 117.

²⁵ Temkin blames this exclusion exclusively on Israel but the *Drum* coverage of the coronation suggests Israel was at this point loosely allied with Buthelezi. Throughout the years

government was working with the Zulu brothers to undermine Buthelezi by supporting executive power for the king. Also at the coronation, Prince Israel Mcwayizeni announced the formation of a royal council, designed as a group of advisors for the king, with Israel as its chair.²⁶ Thereafter, rumors abounded that this Royal Council sought the removal of Buthelezi with the aid of the government.²⁷

The first opposition party attack on Buthelezi's ascendancy in 1972 attempted to benefit from these ongoing tensions between the royal family and the KwaZulu government under Buthelezi. Journal editor and small business owner Lloyd Ndaba formed the Zulu National Party (ZNP) with the promise of securing executive powers for the king.²⁸ Despite being married to an Irish woman with whom he could not reside in South Africa due to apartheid laws, Ndaba promoted apartheid ideology. Ndaba attacked Buthelezi in his short-lived pro-apartheid journal, *Africa South*,²⁹ in 1971 and later told *Drum* that the party opposed Buthelezi's idea of a multi-racial South Africa. Ndaba claimed the support of the royal brothers Israel and Clement, the popular Zulu trade unionist, politician, and businessman A.W.G. Champion, the Soweto millionaire Ephraim Tshabalala, and Mpumalanga politician and football administrator Roger

examined, *Drum* reporters wrote in staunch support of Buthelezi and never failed to criticize the royalists for aspiring to higher positions and relying on undemocratic methods to achieve them. Regular letters to the editor from a "Loyal Zulu" also showed support for Buthelezi as an elected official over the hereditary royal family. "Rain Brought the Mud... Politicians did the Mud-Slinging," *Drum* (January 1, 1972), 23-8; Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 124-5.

²⁶ "Rain Brought the Mud..."

²⁷ "Rain Brought the Mud..."; Kotzé, *African Politics in South Africa*, 56.

²⁸ Several places claim Ndaba was a former information officer of the Department of Administration and Development, but never with any evidence. The first is "Mix-Up in the Party," *Drum* (March 22, 1972), 14-7. Ndaba told the *Drum* reporter he would not answer any personal questions, most likely on account of his Irish wife living in Swaziland, so the reporter gave Ndaba's background on what s/he already knew.

²⁹ As pointed out by Mzala and Sithole, this journal should not be confused with that of the same name edited by Ronald Segal between 1956 and 1960.

Sishi. But when the *Drum* reporter confronted Tshabalala, Sishi, and several others alleged by Ndaba to be executive members, they all denied the assertion.³⁰

Buthelezi discredited Ndaba by linking the ZNP to the apartheid government. He alleged the Commissioner General for KwaZulu Henri Torlage shared the addresses of chiefs in Natal so that Ndaba could circulate bulletins to earn support for the ZNP. Buthelezi also charged the party was financed by the Department of Information's Bureau for State Security (BOSS) or the Special Branch of the South African Police.³¹ The ZNP ultimately proved little threat to Buthelezi because it had no legislative presence, though the challenge may have deepened Buthelezi's conviction to hold off elections until assured of power.³² The paradoxical Ndaba would later call for the creation an African republic formed of Johannesburg townships before he was gunned down in Meadowlands in April 1978. While the police charged his death to "mafia-type" fighting, Ndaba's mother suspected the death was politically motivated.³³

The royalist/Buthelezi divide deepened in 1972-1973 during the Natal labor unrest. In 1973 the largest strikes in South Africa since World War II sent over 100,000 workers into the streets. Because the apartheid government had effectively suppressed the South African Council of Trade Unions in the 1960s, these strikes marked a major turning point for resistance in South

³⁰ "Mix-Up in the Party"; Kotzé, *African Politics in South Africa*, 54; Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*, 89–90.

³¹ Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*, 89–90.

³² Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," 828; Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*, 90.

³³ Matthews Makobane, "Ndaba burial drama," *Post* (April 25, 1978); "Mafia-type Soweto killings," *Rand Daily Mail* (April 25, 1978); "Slain man a political enigma," *Star* (April 29, 1978); Peter Mann, "Exiled wife at the graveside," *Sunday Tribune* (April 30, 1987); "Mystery still surrounds the death of homelands politician," *The Voice* (May 6, 1978).

Africa.³⁴ According to Buthelezi's biographer Ben Temkin, someone in the Zulu Royal Council looked to the strikes as an opportunity to promote the king as executive. In January 1973, Coronation Brick Works invited the king to speak to striking workers. But the king's speech had no effect upon the work stoppage and many thought the king's involvement was unwise. Buthelezi believed the king had been exploited and attacked the Zulu Royal Council in the KZLA for allowing it. He also believed the council had taken an oath to oust Buthelezi from the KZLA.³⁵ At the May 1973 gathering of the Legislative Assembly, MPs moved to dissolve the royal council in order to protect the king from controversial and political involvement, but the king had already done so at Buthelezi's suggestion.³⁶

The same year, Chief Charles Hlengwa of Umbumbulu, the first deputy chairperson of the ZTA and second chairperson of the KZLA, announced the formation of another party, Umkhonto kaShaka (Spear of Shaka). Hlengwa had sparred with Buthelezi over the position of the king after he (as chair of the assembly) allowed King Zwelethini to address the KZLA on his activities at the Brick Works, resulting in a vote of censure of Hlengwa by the legislative assembly. Hlengwa was forced to apologize.³⁷ In October 1973, Hlengwa announced in a press release that he would resign as chair of the KZLA to become the national leader of Umkhonto.

³⁴ See: Institute for Industrial Education, *The Durban Strikes, 1973: "Human Beings with Souls"* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1974); David Hemson, "In the Eye of the Storm: Dock-Workers in Durban," in *The People's City: African Life in Twentieth-Century Durban* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1996), 145–73; Grace Davie, "Strength in Numbers: The Durban Student Wages Commission, Dockworkers and the Poverty Datum Line, 1971-1973," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 33, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 401–420.

³⁵ Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 144–5.

³⁶ Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 3 First Session (May 1973), 77-80; Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 144–5.

³⁷ Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 3 First Session (May 1973), 17-25, 60; Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 145; Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," 828.

The new party would honor traditional institutions in a democratic government under the Zulu king. Its executive council members included Ndaba, Chief A.N. Ngcobo, A.N. Mpungose, and A.M.S. Mhlongo. The party's constitution suggested a willingness for KwaZulu independence with statements that the organization would "do everything in its power to promote the interests of the Zulu nation so that it could proudly take its rightful place amongst the nations of the world" and that it stood for "mutual and reciprocal co-operation and friendly relations with the various peoples and nations in South Africa."³⁸

A significant amount of evidence exists to show that the Department of Information instigated the Umkhonto kaShaka Party. Former intelligence agent Martin Dolincheck, who defected to the ANC in 1986, disclosed that BOSS had indeed established Umkhonto to deliberately discredit it and thereby boost Inkatha and Buthelezi.³⁹ When criticism of Chief Hlengwa emerged in the press, the Department of Information attempted to manage his image, publishing a glowing background story on the politician in its monthly isiZulu magazine, *Izindaba*, and tried to quell the spread of news that King Zwelethini's dismissed the party.⁴⁰ The Department also retained copies of the party's constitution and press releases—a level of

³⁸ NAR. BAO 12/652. R218/5. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 8-9, 22-39.

³⁹ Martin Dolincheck was a BOSS, then NIS agent responsible implicated in the assassination of white activist Rick Turner. Dolincheck defected to the ANC after an attempted coup in Seychelles. On Dolincheck and Rick Turner, see TRC testimony of Jane Turner, October 24, 1996, <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvdurb3/day1.htm> Accessed June 12, 2012. On Seychelles, see Peter Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means: South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s* (Alberton: Galago Publishers, 2001), 17–74; Sanders, *Apartheid's Friends*, 376. On Dolincheck's allegation about Umkhonto, see Piper and Morrow, *To Serve and Protect*, xv.

⁴⁰ A translated copy of this article is on file with the BAD. Follow-up review of *Izindaba* (1966-93), held at the South African National Library, may prove fruitful for analysis of garnering the role of the state in promoting Mkhonto and the other parties. NAR. BAO 12/652. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 40-5.

organization not reached by the other parties.⁴¹ That Ndaba, a member of both ZNP and Mkhonto, worked as an information officer for BAD lends credibility as well, though the source of this information has never been cited.⁴² Buthelezi produced deposit slips given to him by an Umkhonto defector proving BOSS financing of the party. Executive members of the new party withdrew R150/month and Chief Hlengwa R300/month.⁴³ Grineth Mageba made an affidavit to the SAP that gave a detailed account of the formation of the party by members of the Zulu royal family, the Department of Information and a BOSS official, Frans Fouche.⁴⁴ That not all the members of the party were aware of its state support is suggested in a letter from member Chief A.N. Ngcobo asking BAD officials whether or not chiefs and their people could legally join KwaZulu political parties and if doing so would jeopardize traditional leaders' position as far as the KwaZulu government was concerned.⁴⁵

⁴¹ NAR. BAO 12/652. R218/5. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 7-9, 22-39.

⁴² Langner cites Kotze, who does not cite his source but may have read the *Drum* article on Ndaba (he elsewhere cites *Drum*). Kotze may have had access to this information as then head of UNISA's Department of Development Administration and Politics, a discipline in South Africa dating to the founding of "native law and administration" with a one-year course first offered in 1918. Buthelezi would later use Kotze's writing on "royal intrigues" in *African Politics* as a reference to illustrate Pretoria's involvement in KwaZulu political parties. Mzala and Sithole do not cite their reference. See APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Vol 7,. Special Session (Jan 1976), 984-7; D. A Kotzé, "Development Administration: The State of the Discipline," *Development Southern Africa* 2, no. 2 (1985): 218–25; Kotzé, *African Politics in South Africa*, 50; Ernst Johann Langner, "The Founding and Development of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe" (M.A. thesis, University of South Africa, 1983), 53; Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*, 89–90; Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," 828.

⁴³ Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*, 91.

⁴⁴ Langner, "The Founding and Development of Inkatha," 53.

⁴⁵ NAR. BAO 12/652. R218/5. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 48.

Buthelezi would later point to his handling of Hlengwa in this conflict as evidence of his tolerance for opposition parties (see below). But in fact, Buthelezi allowed the chief's regional authority to do his dirty work. While Hlengwa had not been officially deposed, there was a drawn out debate in the KZLA regarding his loyalty. The KZLA moved, at Buthelezi's suggestion, that they would not rescind Hlengwa's membership in the legislative assembly, but that they would refer the matter to his regional authority to take the necessary measures.⁴⁶ In February and March 1974, the Umbumbulu Regional Authority held several meetings in which Winnington Sabelo (later a powerful local Inkatha leader known for his violent system of patronage) from Umlazi pushed for Hlengwa's removal from the Authority. Hlengwa sent pleading letters in his own defense to the KwaZulu Executive Council in which he recognized that his only crime joining the Umkhonto party.⁴⁷ After Hlengwa refused to step down, 25 of the authority's 26 members resigned, leaving an absent Hlengwa alone on the authority. The KZLA then disbanded the regional authority, thus ousting Hlengwa from the legislative assembly.⁴⁸

The KwaZulu executive council decided in November 1974 to ask the Minister of BAD to give power to the KZLA to control or forbid the formation of politics parties prior to independence. In an irony not lost on the liberal press, the apartheid state denied the KZLA's request on account that the motion "cannot be said to reflect the view of all those Zulus who at present have no representation" and because "the formation of political parties and the participation by the people in the activities of such parties are natural corollaries of democracy

⁴⁶ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 2 Special Session (January 1973); Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol 4 Second Session (May 1974).

⁴⁷ NAR. BAO 8/419. "KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Lede Van Die Uitvoerende Raad."

⁴⁸ Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," 829.

and are tolerated in all democratic countries except in so far as a particular party or particular activities may be subversive of duly constituted authority...”.⁴⁹ A *Natal Mercury* editorial humorously found KwaZulu’s desire to suppress political activity and the state’s encouragement of tolerance “so out of character in parts that one might suspect there had been some mix-up involving an exchange of scripts.”⁵⁰

While Buthelezi had been calling for unity and the outlaw of political parties, one of his own had been in the works for several years. In the KZLA in 1972, Buthelezi referenced an early twentieth-century Zulu nationalist movement, Inkatha kaZulu (1924-33), that he would later revive.⁵¹ In 1973 Buthelezi received support from the exiled ANC during discussions on the formation of an organization to develop Zulu national consciousness and pride on the condition that it be open to all Africans. Buthelezi would exploit this ANC link for years to come.⁵² Also in 1973, Buthelezi distributed the 1928 constitution of the first Inkatha to KZLA members. Throughout these years a “think tank” of “leading Zulus” began meeting to strategize the founding of a national movement against separate development and to encourage African culture

⁴⁹ NAR. BAO 12/652. R218/5. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 68-79.

⁵⁰ “Smoothing the Road,” *Natal Mercury* November 23, 1974.

⁵¹ Inkatha kaZulu was founded by King Solomon Nkayishana kaDinizulu to foster “the spirit of unity among the people of the Zulu Nation throughout the Union of South Africa and to keep alive the Nation’s fine traditions.” Nicholas Cope’s detailed examination of Solomon highlights Zulu nationalism as a twentieth-century construction of Zulu social and political elites. Nicholas Cope, *To Bind the Nation: Solomon kaDinizulu and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1993). For a comparison of the first Inkata and Buthelezi’s Inkatha, see Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 46–53. For more on the constructed and contested nature of “Zuluness,” see Benedict Carton, John Laband, and Jabulani Sithole, *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008).

⁵² Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 141; Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*, 122–8.

and self-reliance. This body developed into Ubhoko, a vehicle for the KwaZulu cabinet to liaison with the public in the interests of the Zulu nation. Ubhoko adopted the United National Independence Party Constitution of Zambia for Inkatha.⁵³ The proliferation of political parties and the state's refusal to allow KwaZulu to forbid political parties certainly forced Buthelezi to act.⁵⁴

On March 22, 1975, KwaZulu leaders retreated from their non-party stance when Inkatha Yakwa Zulu was launched at KwaMzimela in Melmoth. More than 100 delegates from Natal, the Orange Free State, and Transvaal, including representatives from 18 of the 26 regional authorities, all of the executive councillors, and several prominent Zulu women revived the first Inkatha as a national cultural liberation movement.⁵⁵ With the name Inkatha, Buthelezi was evoking a deep-rooted cultural sentiment among the Zulu people. *Inkatha* is a sacred coil, created with grass from the royal *umuzi*, dirt from the king's body, and herbs known only to the royal herbal doctors, which symbolizes the unity of the Zulu people.⁵⁶

While Buthelezi would regularly emphasize the organization as a cultural movement rather than a political party, Inkatha became so entwined with bantustan administration that political party more aptly describes its nature. (Inkatha did become an official political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party in July 1990, several months after the unbanning of the liberation movements.) The exact relationship of Inkatha to the KZLA was deliberated when Buthelezi introduced the movement to the assembly. The first constitution included a clause stipulating that

⁵³ Langner, "The Founding and Development of Inkatha," 17; Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 54–5.

⁵⁴ Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," 829.

⁵⁵ Langner, "The Founding and Development of Inkatha," 20.

⁵⁶ Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*, 116–7.

should any decision of the Inkatha Central Committee conflict with the decision of the KZLA Cabinet, the decision of the Central Committee would prevail. After a debate in which member Paul Sibeko challenged Buthelezi's argument that such a clause reflected "African democracy," the clause was amended so that the KZLA cabinet would be required to "consider seriously the views of the Central Committee before arriving at a final decision."⁵⁷ The Legislative Assembly passed the amended Inkatha constitution unanimously, thus binding the assembly members to it. This constitution also stipulated that only Inkatha members could stand for election and made the president of Inkatha the chief minister of KwaZulu.⁵⁸ It made the king, chiefs, and heads of all regional authorities patrons of the movement, placing upon them the responsibility for building the organization's membership.⁵⁹ Before the publication of its constitution, Inkatha changed its name to *Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe* to emphasize its national aspirations.⁶⁰

With the formation of Inkatha, Buthelezi solidified his earlier resistance to KwaZulu independence. The first annual conference of the Inkatha met in July 1975 and resolved to support the KZLA's decision not to ask for independence for KwaZulu. The resolution was

⁵⁷ This clause was also of concern to the BAD officials monitoring the formation of the party. They deemed the clause illegal according to the law by which KZLA was promulgated. See NAR. BAO 8/419. X218/5. "KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede," folio 6-27 (constitution unnumbered).

⁵⁸ Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," 829.

⁵⁹ Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 59–60.

⁶⁰ The constitution sent to the Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) Department in 1975 was still headed "Constitution of the National Cultural Liberation Movement, otherwise known as Inkatha YakwaZulu." According to Temkin, the constitution was amended in May 1975 (when it was introduced to the assembly), and indeed this one in the BAO files the penciled amendment regarding the relationship of the assembly and Inkatha. The Bureau for State Security (BOSS) sent the constitution to BAD in June and suggested it be spread within the department only on a "need to know basis." NAR. BAO 8/419. X218/5. "KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede," folio 6-27 (constitution unnumbered).

worded in such a way to let the apartheid government know that this opposition was tied to KwaZulu's lack of a seaport (Buthelezi specifically desired Richard's Bay) and slow land consolidation. It read, "This conference fully supports the decision of the KwaZulu Legislative not to ask for independence for the *separate pieces of inadequate portless land for the Zulus*" (my emphasis).⁶¹

But not even the formation of Inkatha shielded Buthelezi from continued opposition. Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo became a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in August 1974.⁶² His early participation in the KZLA gave no evidence of the impending confrontation with Buthelezi, though he was absent the day the Inkatha constitution was debated in the assembly. But shortly after Inkatha's formation in 1975, Maphumulo became involved in the nascent Inala Party.⁶³ Formed by several members of the Zulu royal family, Zulu businessmen, and initially with the blessing of the King Goodwill Zwelethini kaBhekuzulu, the group opposed several aspects of the Inkatha constitution, such as article 7(3) that required a chief to be a patron of the movement, as well as KZLA encouragement of tripartite businesses (tripcos) that enabled white investment in the bantustan. According to Maphumulo, the party was only formed "in principle" because they had neither a constitution nor funds."⁶⁴

According to a statement made by Maphumulo in late 1976 on file with the Department of Cooperation and Development, he was first invited to a gathering in Ndaleni (Richmond) to discuss the formation of a political party by Prince Clement Zulu. Maphumulo said those at the

⁶¹ NAR. BAO 8/419. X218/5. "KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede," folio 45-8.

⁶² CAMP. Karis-Gerhart Collection, Reel 92, Biographical file on Mhlabunzima Maphumulo; APC. 1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 5 Special Session (1974).

⁶³ Inala is the name of King Goodwill Zwelethini's regiment.

⁶⁴ Langner, "The Founding and Development of Inkatha," 169-71.

meeting voted him to chair the December 12, 1975 meeting at the home of Chief Mbhele.⁶⁵ In addition to the king, the prince, Maphumulo and Mbhele, those present included businessmen, friends of the king, and high level members of KwaZulu and Inkatha: S.J. Goqo (a prominent Mpumalanga businessman and member of executive council for Inyanda, the Natal and Zululand African Chamber of Commerce), Chief Simon Gumede of Ubombo (a close friend of the king), Hertzog Zuma (an Impendle businessman and member of Inkatha's central committee), and a Mr. Nkabinde (a Ndaleni businessman).⁶⁶ According to *Ilanga's* informants, who also recorded the license plates of all the vehicles at the meeting, the king was present but he sat in silence during the six-hour gathering.⁶⁷ The men criticized tripcos and the Inkatha constitution, which they complained was copied from Zambia, and discussed the eventual need for an opposition party. The young Maphumulo, 27 at the time, made it clear that he was not criticizing the policy of separate development, but that of the Inkatha movement that had allowed its leader to become a dictator. He further alleged that Inkatha had the aims of the banned African National Congress.⁶⁸

While it is difficult to pinpoint Maphumulo's exact motivations at this point, his education and business networks played a part in the chief's decision to throw his lot in with Inala. The young man could have been influenced by the Prince Clement Zulu, who first invited

⁶⁵ NAR. SON 836. D10/3/9/2/969. "Regsadministrasie en Prosedures. Hofgedinge Teen Departement, Amptenare en Ander Instansies. M. Maphumulo Teen Hoofminister van KwaZulu Regering en Ander," folio 8-11.

⁶⁶ Mr. Nkabinde could possibly be Sifiso Nkabinde, the regional leader of the ANC in Richmond turned warlord in the early 1990s. See Ragavaloo, *Richmond*.

⁶⁷ "Inkosi yamaZulu eqembini elisha," *Ilanga* December 12, 1975.

⁶⁸ NAR. SON 836. D10/3/9/2/969. "Regsadministrasie en Prosedures. Hofgedinge Teen Departement, Amptenare en Ander Instansies. M. Maphumulo Teen Hoofminister van KwaZulu Regering en Ander," folio 8-11.

him to the meeting, as well as King Zwelethini, who he knew from his short time at Bhekuzulu College. Bhekuzulu College for the sons of chiefs and headmen was established to prepare “future traditional leaders for active participation in local and territorial government and development administration, but also to introduce them to western civilization.”⁶⁹ These Bantustan educational institutions also played key roles in the creation of regionally-rooted elite networks.⁷⁰ Zwelethini and the royal family may have drawn upon schooling networks to garner support against Buthelezi. Maphumulo did not graduate from Bhekuzulu (he left in 1971 during Form IV or grade 11), but during his short time at the apartheid institution would have been introduced to its ideology.⁷¹

Maphumulo was also a budding businessman, as evidenced by his later applications for a general store and a larger shopping center, the latter to be funded by the KwaZulu Development Corporation (KDC).⁷² Maré and Hamilton have shown that Zulu traders threatened by the

⁶⁹ Bhekuzulu College officially opened in October 1965 at the instigation of King Bhekuzulu. The college was to serve only the sons of chiefs and headmen and served Zulu, Swazi, and Ndebele. Simon Mbokazi, “The Role of Bhekuzulu College in the Training of Chiefs and Headmen in KwaZulu,” *Africanus* 7, no. 1–2 (1977): 21–32.

⁷⁰ Tim Gibbs, “Chris Hani’s ‘Country Bumpkins’: Regional Networks in the African National Congress Underground, 1974–1994,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37, no. 4 (2011): 677–91; Tim Gibbs, “Transkei’s Notables, African Nationalism and the Transformation of the Bantustans, 1954–1994” (PhD dissertation, Oxford University, 2010).

⁷¹ However, the school’s students were not always compliant. The school closed down temporarily in April 1976 after a “breakdown in negotiations between the education authorities and the students” and again in 1980 after school boycotts. Rebusoajoang, “Education and Social Control in South Africa,” *African Affairs* 78, no. 311 (April 1, 1979): 232; Southall, “Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise,” 477.

⁷² The KDC is the successor of the Bantu Investment Corporation and predecessor of the KwaZulu Finance and Investment Corporation, the development agency ran by the KZLA through which KwaZulu made loans See PAR. DDA 389. (36(N2/7/2.”Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks,” folio 11-2; DDA 395. (36)N2/4/2. “Rural Trading and Business Sites”; DDA 397. (36)N2/4/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land (Bantu

expansion of white capital into KwaZulu with tripcos found political allies with the royalists, traditionalists, and the central state who all saw the king as a rallying point against Buthelezi and Inkatha's total control.⁷³ The young chief, present in the assembly during several of the debates over Hlengwa's loyalty, told Ernst Langner he joined Inala because Inkatha "allowed no scope for differences of opinion."⁷⁴



Figure 14-15: The young Mhlabunzima Maphumulo (left) with Thami Mkhize at Bhekuzulu College, n.d., Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers; Maphumulo (third row, end) at a KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Session at Bhekuzulu College, prior to October 1983, UIundi Archive Repository.

Buthelezi singled out Maphumulo and another Mpumalanga MP, Simon Goqo, as the "two main actors in this drama" after the two refused to attend an extraordinary Inkatha National Council Conference.⁷⁵ Buthelezi was also incensed by Maphumulo's December 31 letter in *Ilanga* explaining the formation of the party and denouncing Inkatha for the "total destruction of

Affairs). Trading in Bantu Areas. Sites. MJ Maphumulo. Table Mountain. Trust Farm, Goedverwachting."

⁷³ Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 108–13.

⁷⁴ Langner, "The Founding and Development of Inkatha," 169–71.

⁷⁵ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Vol 7. Special Session (Jan 1976), 977.

the King's dignity."⁷⁶ Buthelezi called upon this statement in *Ilanga* as the "final stamp on the overt attempts by Chief Maphumulo and his mentors to involve the King in politics."⁷⁷ The "mentors" Buthelezi refers to here are members of the Department of Information that he believed to be instigating the formation of opposition parties as part of its "unsurpassed record in interfering in the politics of KwaZulu." In particular, Buthelezi alleged that a Joseph Madlala had been instructed by a certain Mr. Els to liaise with African workers in attempts to undermine Buthelezi and the KwaZulu government. Madlala had organized meetings at Newcastle, Pietermaritzburg, and at Ndaleni (where Maphumulo attended) in November and December to discuss the party's formation. He also blamed Prince Clement Zulu as the prime instigator at the first meeting.⁷⁸

Buthelezi's reaction was to call a special meeting of the Inkatha National Council on January 15, 1976, and a special session of the KZLA for January 19, 1976, to address the participation of the King in politics and the creation of political parties. The National Council resolved that the "King is above politics" and his only involvement need be through consultation with Inkatha and the National Council. Any person contravening the constitution with regards to the King could be penalized "in any manner to be determined by the Legislative Assembly." It furthered that as long as "we are still in bondage and our primary objective is to free the nation from this bondage, about this there can be no argument and division, and we therefore see no

⁷⁶ News of the new party and its nighttime Ndaleni meeting made front page headlines in *Ilanga* for several weeks and sparked letters of support for Buthelezi. "uChief Maphumulo uchaza azokwenza," *Ilanga* December 31, 1975.

⁷⁷ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Vol 7. Special Session (Jan 1976), 977; *Ilanga lase Natal* December 31, 1975.

⁷⁸ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 7 Special Session (Jan 1976), 975-84.

need for formation of parties.”⁷⁹ At the special session of the KZLA, Buthelezi and Chairman Chief V. Mbhele queried Maphumulo and Goqo at length about their participation in the meetings to form the party. Maphumulo responded often with humor and sarcasm, further angering the assembly. Goqo clearly outlined his belief that the king deserved executive powers.⁸⁰ King Zwelithini capitulated to Buthelezi’s demand that he pledge to withhold himself from participation in politics. Zwelethini signed the oath in the presence of the Assembly, signaling Buthelezi’s emergence as unrivaled leader of KwaZulu.⁸¹ The session ended at nearly midnight.

Buthelezi also advocated an inquiry in terms of Section 11 of the KwaZulu Chiefs and Headmen’s Act, Act No. 8 of 1974 under Enseleni Magistrate E.C. Holmes and Umbumbulu Additional Magistrate D.S.V. Ntshangase into Maphumulo’s conduct as a result of the king’s involvement in the Inala Party. The inquiry commenced on March 8, 1977 and concluded on November 25, 1977.⁸² Its findings were presented to the KwaZulu Cabinet in January 1978. It is probable that the possibility of Maphumulo’s victory in the Mpumalanga elections motivated the timing of the report’s release. The inquiry found Maphumulo guilty of involving the king in politics. He was also charged, but found not guilty, of taking part in activities that aimed to

⁷⁹ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 7 Special Session (Jan 1976), 972-5.

⁸⁰ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 7 Special Session (Jan 1976), 999-1016.

⁸¹ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 7 Special Session (Jan 1976), 1034-7.

⁸² NAR. SON 836. D10/3/9/2/969. “Regsadministrasie en Prosedures. Hofgedinge Teen Departement, Amptenare en Ander Instansies. M. Maphumulo Teen Hoofminister van KwaZulu Regering en Ander.”

overthrow the bantustan government.⁸³ Based on these findings, the KwaZulu Cabinet decided on January 24, 1978 to suspend Maphumulo as both chief and member of parliament for two years.⁸⁴

At the same time, Buthelezi was busy canvassing for the KwaZulu elections. On February 18, 1978, two days before the scheduled bantustan vote, Buthelezi staged a campaign rally for Inkatha in the “trouble spot” of Mpumalanga. Inkatha victory was less certain in Mpumalanga where Maphumulo stood to win as an independent candidate with support from the Mpumalanga Residents Association (MPURA). Mpumalanga residents and local businessmen had launched MPURA because they felt Inkatha did not represent their interests.⁸⁵ In his address, Buthelezi again drew on the “opponents as apartheid agents” orthodoxy. Buthelezi emphasized that the Cabinet had suspended Maphumulo because of “the unwholesome activities” in which he and Goqo and participated, dragging the king into politics.⁸⁶ He countered Maphumulo’s claims that Buthelezi had fired him because he dared oppose Inkatha, recalling the Chief Hlengwa had not been deposed – a far stretch of the truth (as seen above).

Despite Buthelezi’s canvassing and the suspension, Maphumulo won in Mpumalanga and was the sole independent candidate to win a seat in the legislature. Of the 55 elected KZLA

⁸³ NAR. BAO 5/363.F54/1524/5. “Kapteins en Hoofmanne Mapumula Stam Pietermaritzburg,” folio 179-81.

⁸⁴ UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978, “Resolutions adopted by the Cabinet of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly,” January 24, 1978.

⁸⁵ Debby Bonnin, “Changing Spaces, Changing Places: Political Violence and Women’s Protests in KwaZulu-Natal,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26, no. 2 (2000): 306.

⁸⁶ APC. PC126/2/1/2. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, “Election Meeting,” Hammarsdale February 18, 1978.

seats, only 27 were contested, of which Inkatha won all but Mpumalanga.⁸⁷ (See Map 10, *KwaZulu magisterial districts*.) But given the suspension, the Mpumalanga Regional Authority replaced him. The Maphumulo *umndeni* met and nominated Mhlabunzima's younger brother, Kwenzokuhle Hamilton Maphumulo, to act as chief until the suspension ended. The *umndeni* reported their choice to the Mpumalanga Magistrate G.C. Pitcher, who acknowledged the decision would be unpopular.⁸⁸ In his report, Pitcher does not elaborate on the potential origins of opposition, but he does attach a list of persons present at the meeting where the decision was made. Two men with whom the decision would have been unpopular, Bangingi and Mdingi, were not present.⁸⁹ The KwaZulu Cabinet appointed Kwenzokuhle as acting chief on August 22, 1978.⁹⁰

These opposition "King's parties," as well as Buthelezi's exclusion from the king's installation ceremony and the continued intransigence of King Zwelethini, warranted a special session of the KZLA in July 1979 and the opening of an investigation into the "matter concerning certain people who are involved in creating friction between the King and the KwaZulu Government."⁹¹ The king was compelled to attend after the KZLA voted to reduce the

⁸⁷ 629,000 voters were registered, representing only half of those entitled to vote. *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1978* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1979), 291–2.

⁸⁸ NAR. B AO 5/363.F54/1524/5. Kapteins en Hoofmanne Mapumula Stam Pietermaritzburg, folio 179-84 and UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978. "Memo to the Chief Minister on Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo: Suspension," April 6, 1978.

⁸⁹ UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978. "Memo to the Chief Minister on Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo: Suspension," April 6, 1978.

⁹⁰ UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1978. "Resolutions of Cabinet Adopted at Meeting on August 22, 1978.

⁹¹ NAR. BAO 12/652. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 209-28.

king's annual salary for his earlier refusal to answer invitations. Zwelethini denied the charges of misconduct against him, which included: alleged mistreatment of members of the Usuthu (the chiefdom of which the king was chief); his alleged participation in political activities; and his alleged assault on unnamed individuals. The KZLA urged him to ask for the investigation to be dropped, but he refused and professed his innocence. After a heated debate that included threats of deposition, the KZLA voted to abandon the inquiry into the king's misconduct.⁹²

They did continue, however, with an inquiry into the causes of friction between the king and KwaZulu. Appointed per KwaZulu Resolution 26/1979, the committee interviewed an often uncooperative royal family, including nearly 20 princes, princesses, and chiefs.⁹³ Their report expressed concern that some interviewees gave the same evidence, suggesting conspiracy. The majority of those interviewed pointed to Prince Clement Zulu as the instigator of tensions between the King and KwaZulu as he was present at meetings of all of the above described opposition parties. According to those interviewed, Clement also questioned the hereditary status of the Prime Minister's position, a claim Buthelezi cited often as justification for his occupation of the highest KwaZulu post, and denied Buthelezi the privilege of emceeding the installation of Zwelethini as king. He promised the other princes they would replace the chiefs if he became

⁹² Sithole, "Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics," 834.

⁹³ The investigation committee included the Minister of Justice C.J. Mthethwa and KZLA MPs Chief A. Ndwalane (Ezingolweni), Chief T.J. Cebekhulu (Enseleni), Chief C.E. Zungu (Mahlabathini), and Mr. C. Buthelezi (Ongoye). NAR. BAO 12/652. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 209-28.

chief minister.⁹⁴ As Buthelezi's biographer, Ben Temkin, pointed out, Clement would have been the king's choice as prime minister.⁹⁵

The extent to which followers of these royalist parties were aware of state involvement has not been thoroughly investigated, but the manner in which Buthelezi continued to wield this issue as evidence against opponents is of more concern here. When Maphumulo later came under attack for alleged collaboration, he contended, "[this] theory is something that Buthelezi uses to attack someone that he does not like."⁹⁶ Maphumulo described Buthelezi's collaboration allegations as a "double standard." Prominent members of Inkatha such as Steven Sithebe and Simon Huhumeni Gumede, KwaZulu Minister of Health and Deputy Secretary General of Inkatha respectively, had been members of Inala but did not have similar allegations made against them.⁹⁷ Those willing to reconcile with Buthelezi and Inkatha were allowed to do so. Hlengwa, for instance, would later be re-elected to the KZLA. Those who continued to be at odds with Buthelezi's control over KwaZulu political life, such as Maphumulo, received the brunt of his criticism. Regarding the accusation that a white Department of Information official had helped to found Inala, Maphumulo countered that a white person had been present at this third meeting as the driver of none other than Prince Clement Zulu. Joseph Madlala was also present, but "as a concerned Zulu, not a representative of BOSS," nor had he been invited by Maphumulo.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ NAR. BAO 12/652. KwaZulu Wetgewende Vergadering. Politieke Strominge en Persoonlikhede, folio 209-28.

⁹⁵ Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 131.

⁹⁶ "Contralesa chief hits back." *New African* (26 Nov 1989).

⁹⁷ "Contralesa chief hits back"; Maphumulo in Langner, 171.

⁹⁸ "Contralesa chief hits back"; Maphumulo in Langner, 171.

Maphumulo fought his suspension at the High Court by applying for a staying order and a review of the magistrate's findings. Alleging that there was no evidence of pre-arrangement on his part to chair the Ndaleni Inala meeting or invite the Zulu king to the gathering, he challenged the magistrate's findings. After a delay by KwaZulu's attorney, the High Court overturned the magistrate's findings on November 20, 1979, by which time the duration of the suspension had nearly finished.⁹⁹ Maphumulo then applied for remuneration for lost pay, claiming suffering due to the loss of occupation as the chief, tribal authority head, regional authority chair, and legislative authority member as well as the esteem he enjoyed in the community. The normal term of his chairmanship (five years, 1975-80) had concluded, so Maphumulo did not regain the position. Despite initial confusion over whether or not he could return to the KZLA (he had been replaced with Chief N. Ntshangase by the members of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority upon his suspension), Maphumulo was reinstated as a member of the KZLA during 1980.¹⁰⁰

Maphumulo's actions during and immediately after his suspension sparked the first questions by his community over the legitimacy of his leadership. During the chief's suspension, the Mbambangalo branch of Inkatha was formed with induna Thomas Gcabashe as its chairman.¹⁰¹ Maphumulo continued to criticize and resist Inkatha in the press and at home. Upon his reinstatement as chief in early 1980, Maphumulo banned Inkatha meetings in his area when Inkatha officials failed to seek his permission to hold a meeting. When Buthelezi

⁹⁹ NAR. SON 836. D10/3/9/2/969. "Regsadeministrasie en Prosedures. Hofgedinge Teen Departemente, Amptenare en Ander Instansies. M Maphumulo Teen Hoofminister van KwaZulu Regerin en Ander."

¹⁰⁰ NAR. SON 836. D10/3/9/2/969. "Regsadeministrasie en Prosedures. Hofgedinge Teen Departemente, Amptenare en Ander Instansies. M Maphumulo Teen Hoofminister van KwaZulu Regerin en Ander," folio 95-7.

¹⁰¹ "Rebel chief bans Inkatha gathering," *Sunday Post* March 16, 1980.

announced his intention to speak at an Inkatha rally in Maqongqo, Maphumulo ordered his people to boycott and called a rival meeting. He claimed the Inkatha officials' disrespect created a rift amongst the Maphumulo people.¹⁰² In his first session back in the KZLA, Buthelezi rebuked him for this activity and for attacking Inkatha in the press. Buthelezi read the letter from Maphumulo to *Ilanga* and declared the letter was an assault on the King and commoners and made a historical parallel, comparing Maphumulo's actions to the actions of a "petty chief" from Natal (referring to Bhambatha) that resulted in King Dinuzulu's exile.¹⁰³

During the same session, Buthelezi also read a letter from members of the Maphumulo outlining why they believed Mhlabunzima was not fit to be chief. Their complaints included the engendering of conflict between the people and KwaZulu, the selling of land at exorbitant prices, allowing homes to be built on grazing and arable land, calling for levies to congratulate him on defeating the KwaZulu Government (presumably referring to the successful appeal), and other misuse of Maphumulo funds. Baniingi and Mdingi Maphumulo, as well as several other men who would later become prominent local Inkatha leaders, had signed the letter.¹⁰⁴ The Minister of Justice Mthethwa and the Chief Khawula of the Umzumbe District (who Buthelezi would later describe as "an ideal chief"¹⁰⁵) joined the attack, chiding Maphumulo for his lack of respect as a

¹⁰² "Rebel chief bans Inkatha gathering"; "Chief hits back at Gatsha for Inkatha rally attack," *Rand Daily Mail* April 21, 1980.

¹⁰³ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 64-9.

¹⁰⁴ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 115-7.

¹⁰⁵ APC. PC126/2/1/6. Buthelezi, "Speech at Chief Calalabakubo Khawula's House-Warming Party," August 1, 1981.

young chief and again alleging that Maphumulo cooperated with the apartheid government.¹⁰⁶

Mthethwa, clearly aware of the Maphumulo chieftom's history, told the KZLA that Mhlabunzima needed to remember his place.

He should remember that the history of his chieftainship is very short. He is only the fourth chief. His grandfather got this chieftainship simply because he was a policeman in the service of the White Government. He was paid by means of a portion of the Swayimani [*sic*] land at Gcumisa. I think that one of the reasons why he is deviating as he says he does not want independence but wants to remain Pretoria's slave, is that the history of his chieftainship originated in a payment. He then thinks, when he hears it being said that because of the loyalty of his grandfather to the Police Force he obtained the chieftainship, therefore if he is loyal to Pretoria, he too may be given this country..."¹⁰⁷

This use of the Zulu past to draw support and achieve political gains was an important tactic for Chief Buthelezi. While Buthelezi often referred to his own ancestry as a way of presenting himself as the traditional heir to the prime minister position, here we see other Inkatha members using Maphumulo's ancestry as a way to discredit his authority. Maphumulo briefly defended himself and his grandfather but absented himself from the Assembly upon learning that his car had been stolen. In further attacks, the Minister of Works not so subtly implied that Maphumulo's car might have been paid for through extortion or collaboration.¹⁰⁸

Several weeks later during the same 1980 legislative session, MP Simon Chonco, who by this point had earned the reputation of a Buthelezi "yes man," made a motion in reaction to the report of the inquiry into friction between the king and KwaZulu that identified Prince Clement as the instigator in the royalist plot to involve the king in politics. Chonco moved to pass

¹⁰⁶ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 191-206.

¹⁰⁷ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 191-206.

¹⁰⁸ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 18 Third Session of Third Assembly (Apr-May 1980), 191-206.

legislation to punish those found guilty. Maphumulo stood up to support the motion, despite his Supreme Court case against his suspension as punishment for similar activities. He apologized to the Assembly for his previous behavior and promised future cooperation. He emphasized that he was making this overture of his own accord and that he believed in the need for unity. Upon inquiry by another MP, he also promised to invite the Minister of Justice to his area to inaugurate a branch of Inkatha. Chonco also moved to punish chiefs involving the king in politics to be punished according to regulations governing the chieftainship.¹⁰⁹

While Maphumulo made this overture of peace, it was most likely more for the purpose of self-preservation than ideological conversion. Instrumental to Maphumulo's apology and subsequent joining of Inkatha was the Reverend Amos K. Shembe of the Church of the amaNazaretha. The Church of the amaNazaretha is an African-initiated church whose founder Isaiah Shembe was a highly esteemed prophet who molded elements of Zulu religious beliefs with Christian theology. Maphumulo was a devout follower of the amaNazaretha.

Maphumulo had formerly served as the church's secretary general and became embroiled in the church's affairs through his personal relationships with the Shembe family. As is custom for the heir to the chieftaincy, Mhlabunzima grew up away from Mbambangalo. He stayed in Edendale with an influential member of the Shembe church and took as his third wife, Gaye Shembe, the sister of Londa Shembe. Maphumulo supported Londa, the son of Isaiah Shembe's heir Johannes in the succession dispute with Amos after Johannes' 1976 death because he wanted to see an educated man as leader.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 20 Third Session of Third Assembly (May-Jun 1980), 1153-61.

¹¹⁰ Hitler Sifiso Mbambo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Edendale, May 20, 2011.

In May 1980, Amos Shembe wrote to Buthelezi to inform him that the amaNazaretha had suspended Maphumulo as secretary general and ex-communicated him until he repaired his relations with the KZLA.¹¹¹ It is not clear when Maphumulo began to support Londa in the succession dispute, but if it was before his dismissal as secretary-general, Amos may have had ulterior motives in firing Maphumulo. However, this removal from office may have spurred Maphumulo to swing his support behind Londa.¹¹² Either way, with both his people and his church pressuring him to improve relations with Buthelezi and the KZLA, Maphumulo acquiesced and apologized to the KZLA.

Despite the Shembe-negotiated peace, Maphumulo's towing of the Inkatha line was short-lived. While campaigning for KwaZulu's second elections under self-governing status in 1983, Maphumulo and Chonco had an altercation at an election meeting in Mpumalanga, where Maphumulo pulled out the table on which Chonco was standing to address the gathering from under him. Maphumulo insisted Chonco had not asked for permission to address the meeting that he had already closed and accused him of trying to force his people to join Inkatha. Chonco accused Maphumulo of pulling a pistol on him and Maphumulo was later charged with attempted murder for firing at another attendee.¹¹³ Buthelezi accused Maphumulo and Rogers Ngcobo of Inanda for sowing disunity by promoting independent candidates for the election.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ "Rebel chief bows to Inkatha," *Natal Witness Echo* August 14, 1980.

¹¹² Londa was assassinated in 1989. Many suspected it was due to his sympathies with the ANC-affiliated United Democratic Front.

¹¹³ "Chief Whip 'floored,'" *Natal Witness Echo* August 18, 1983; "Stones fly in poll flight," *Natal Witness Echo* September, 8, 1983; "Murder charge dropped," *Natal Witness Echo* May 3, 1984.

¹¹⁴ Khaba Mkhize, "Inkatha disunity – MPs accused," *Natal Witness Echo* August 25, 1983.

In the September 1983 elections, Maphumulo won re-election as an MP for Mpumalanga, which was one of only four constituencies where independent candidates such as Maphumulo had contested seats.¹¹⁵ He was also re-elected as the chairman of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority.¹¹⁶ During the first session of the new KZLA in October, at the new parliament building, Chonco and Chief Khawula launched a corporal attack on Maphumulo. Members of the KwaZulu police and a massive crowd watched as Maphumulo was beaten unconscious, allegedly for his renewed refusal to join Inkatha and the earlier affront to Chonco. In the KZLA, Buthelezi again accused Maphumulo of working for the National Intelligence Service and of unleashing violence against Inkatha during the elections canvassing in Mpumalanga. Buthelezi explained the attack on Maphumulo, contending, “whoever challenges me, does not challenge me as Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi but in fact challenges the people, and the people will deal with them.”¹¹⁷ While Maphumulo recovered in the hospital, he sent H.D. Gumede to represent him in the KZLA.

Goedverwachting: The Contested Land and a Closer Settlement

When Chief Minister Buthelezi read a letter at the KZLA session in 1980 from Maphumulo members complaining about Mhlabunzima’s sale of sites on grazing and agricultural land at exorbitant prices, he was touching on a much larger issue than just the allegation of corruption. As established in the last chapter, the population of the Table Mountain region was increasing,

¹¹⁵ CAMP. Karis-Gerhart Collection, Reel 92, Biographical file on Mhlabunzima Maphumulo.

¹¹⁶ Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1983, Johannesburg (1984), 347

¹¹⁷ APC. PC126/1/1. Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 30 First Session of the Fourth Assembly (Oct 1983).

but the land available for African settlement was in fact decreasing as living patterns became more regimented by the government's betterment planning. The vicinity of a thousand acres of Trust-owned arable land surely only increased the frustrations of the expanding polities of the Maphumulo and Nyavu. Chief Maphumulo was particularly active in attempts to bring this contested piece of Goedverwaching farm under his own jurisdiction, even during his suspension. This section examines the competing interests of the involved parties in the land dispute over the trust farm. DCD desperately needed land to resettle forcefully removed families across Natal. The Maphumulo desired land for their own population increase, especially as they encroached on the buffer land between them and the neighboring white farmers. KwaZulu initially identified the farm as land for consolidation. In the midst of this contestation, the Nyavu identified an opportunity to again boost their hereditary status and claim land lost in colonization.

Back at Table Mountain, no development had been made on the "Bantu Village" planned for the strip of Goedverwaching purchased in 1961-8, a common scenario during the early years of apartheid betterment planning. At first, BAD prioritized resettlement in these villages according to betterment needs. People already living on Trust farms but with no access to arable land were at the top of the list. Squatters from European farms and "black spots" and labor tenants given notice to quit also made the list, but only when they could not be resettled on other European farms as servants or tenants.¹¹⁸ But by the time of the Goedverwaching settlement in 1980, priorities had changed. Despite the overcrowding of the surrounding trust farms and reserve land at Table Mountain, the clear priority for the Goedverwaching strip was the relocation of those people forcefully removed elsewhere.

¹¹⁸ McIntosh, "State Policies in Rural South Africa C1948-c1960: Bantu Authorities, Policy Formation and Local Responses," 191.

Permission for locals to utilize the land was limited. BAD granted a Permission to Occupy (PTO) to the Maphumulo Tribal Authority to construct the *inkantolo* (courthouse) and a secondary school on this strip of Goedverwaching during 1975. Chief Maphumulo also was allowed to build his own *umuzi* on the property, moving from his father's homestead on Onverwacht.¹¹⁹ These permissions led the Maphumulo to believe the strip of Goedverwaching would be given to them. Incredibly though, very few moved onto the farm without authorization. When the Trust purchased the thousand acre strip, only 6 *imizi* already occupied the land. In 1977 when the Department of Plural Relations and Development (PRD) followed up on the establishment of the village, the KwaZulu Regional Director I.R. Matheson (formerly the Agricultural Officer for the farms) believed only three new *imizi* had been established there without permission.¹²⁰

Meanwhile, trouble brewed across the border on Onverwacht and Aasvogel Krans. Under Chief Maphumulo's watch, 213 *imizi* settled on arable and grazing land, including the Aasvogel Krans buffer zone between the Maphumulo and the neighboring white farmers (see previous chapter). Complaints from Mr. Raw, who owned a portion of Doornhoek farm and Sub A of

¹¹⁹ Funds had been made available for all tribal authorities to construct courthouses as early as 1964, but the Native Affairs Department would not disperse the grants until matching funds were raised by the authorities. By 1967, the Maphumulo Tribal Authority had collected no matching funds and the Natal Chief BAC recommended the authority build a smaller courthouse with the R900 grant in a way that additions could be added when more funds were raised. No evidence exists to suggest the *inkantolo* was built prior to 1975, when the Permission to Occupy (PTO) for the *inkantolo* and Maphumulo's *umuzi* was granted. See Mpumalanga Magistrate's letter of May 1979, PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwaching. Pietermaritzburg," folio 20-1; NAR. BAO 13/1022. J76/97/1524/3. "Begroting. Bantoeowerhede. Finansiële Aangeleenthede. Pietermaritzburg. Mapumulo Stamowerhied," folio 48.

¹²⁰ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwaching. Pietermaritzburg," folio 2.

Goedverwachting, and the local Baynesdrift Farmers' Association went to the Ministry-level, prompting local officials to react. The farmers protested the theft of livestock and produce, cutting of sugar cane, damage to fencing, and the gathering of firewood without permission. While officials initially hoped to purchase a portion of Raw's farm as a further buffer, he considered it the best portion of his farm and at first refused. Natal PRD Chief Commissioner Dreyer then decided in 1979 that the 23 *imizi* in the buffer zone should be relocated to the future village on the Goedverwachting strip.¹²¹ The Trust purchased Raw's Sub A of Goedverwachting from his estate in 1984, but complaints from the Baynesfield farmers continued for years.¹²²

When PRD officials appeared at the farm in mid-1979 to demarcate 400 sites for what would become a "relocation closer settlement," Maphumulo Acting Chief Kwenzokuhle and the Maphumulo councillors went to Mpumalanga Magistrate Pitcher to voice their own concerns. "Closer settlement" is the official term used to describe land intended for the resettlement of African people on reserve or Trust land that is for residential purposes only. Despite the absence of urban or township infrastructure and employment, as well as the distance from urban and metropolitan centers, no agricultural land was attached to closer settlements. People removed from "black spots" and white farms were generally relocated to these settlements and given only temporary accommodation, often tents or tiny corrugated iron huts called fletcraft, and expected to build their own permanent houses.¹²³ The Goedverwachting closer settlement would be for

¹²¹ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg," folio 2, 6-10.

¹²² Deeds Registry, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, KwaZulu-Natal Province. Land Register for Goedverwachting No. 1349, 1850s-present.

¹²³ Surplus People Project, *Forced Removals in South Africa: Volume 4 Natal*. (Cape Town: Surplus People Project, 1983), xii and 61.

relocated peoples, not for the relief of Onverwacht and the Goedverwachting remnant as once intended by the betterment plan for the farms.

Kwenzokuhle and his councillors convinced Magistrate Pitcher with their case. Not only did they believe that the trust farm was to be turned over to them, they expressed worry about the relocation of “strangers who are not subjects of their chief” to the land dividing their community. The people were not opposed to the settlement as such; they had at least 70 families willing to build their *imizi* there. Pitcher believed if outsiders were relocated to the village site without the consent of the Maphumulo, it could only give rise to a very unpleasant situation.¹²⁴ He passed this concern on to the Pietermaritzburg DCD Commissioner, who forwarded it up the bureaucratic chain. The apartheid officials sought out the advice of the recently retired Chief Agricultural Officer McKay due to his intimate knowledge of the Nagel Dam project.

Indeed, these officials had reason for concern in relocating strangers onto the strip of land surrounded by Maphumulo. Chizuko Sato has keenly illustrated how the mass resettlement of evicted Weenen labor tenants in the late 1960s and early 1970s on the Tugela Estates, land traditionally considered to belong to the Mthembu north of the Tugela River, increased tensions among local Africans. At Sahlumbe, a newly constructed settlement, a violent clash erupted in the mid-1970s that lasted for more than five years and claimed over 30 lives.¹²⁵

Over the next several months, Acting Chief Kwenzokuhle, the suspended Mhlabunzima, and Maphumulo councillors were frequent visitors to Pitcher’s office for a resolution of their concerns. The Maphumulo needed more land to support their growing population and wished to

¹²⁴ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 19-20.

¹²⁵ Sato, “Forced Removals, Land NGOs and Community Politics,” Chapter 6.

be consulted on all matters concerning resettlement on the Goedverwachting strip. The leaders eventually conceded that they would not oppose the resettlement of people, but they did not want any chiefs to be relocated there—a clear reference to the still-landless Qamu Chief Majozi who the Trust had in mind when they purchased the farm nearly two decades earlier (see previous chapter).¹²⁶ Upon Mhlabunzima's reinstatement, he asked for half of the sites on the strip to be given to the Maphumulo and that the remainder settled to come under his authority.¹²⁷

In October 1979, KwaZulu requested permission from the DCD Secretary for the Goedverwachting strip to be incorporated into the Maphumulo Authority.¹²⁸ Despite the tension between Buthelezi and Mhlabunzima, the slow pace of land consolidation remained central to Buthelezi's criticisms of the state. He did not pass up the opportunity to add land to KwaZulu, which could result from granting the farm to the Maphumulo. KwaZulu had earlier in 1976 requested that *all* SADT-governed trust farms be turned over to the bantustan.¹²⁹ DCD officials did not oppose eventual transfer of the property to KwaZulu, but balked at the idea of losing control over the closer settlement. The DCD desperately needed land to resettle people forcefully removed from across the Camperdown, New Hanover, Pietermaritzburg, and Richmond districts. A water shortage had prevented prior settlement (an irony given the purchase of the land in

¹²⁶ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg," folio 26-36.

¹²⁷ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg," folio 60.

¹²⁸ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg," folio 39.

¹²⁹ Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 8, Second Session of the Second Legislative Assembly, May 11, 1976.

relation to the Nagle Dam project), but no other land was available in the district. Given the urgency, the Chief Commissioner granted permission for 400 fletcraft huts to be sent to the Goedverwachting strip in anticipation of relocations. As McKay validated the Maphumulo claim to the land, Chief Commissioner H.J. Backer recommended that the people to be resettled on Goedverwachting *khonza* to the Maphumulo chief.¹³⁰

The term *ukukhonza* literally means “to pay homage, pay respect to; subject oneself to serve. *Ngizokhonza Nkosi; ngifake ikhanda lapha kuwe.* (I have come to serve, O Chief; that I put my head in your control.”¹³¹ Historian Percy Ngonyama argues *ukukhonza* provided the foundation for relations between political heads and their subjects. *Ukukhonza* structured both sides of this relationship, establishing a contract between ruler and subject predicated on tribute and the granting of land for the establishment of *imizi*.¹³² While Zulu society understood this mutually beneficial relationship according to the proverb “*inkosi yinkosi ngabantu*” (a chief is a chief because of the people who *khonza* him), the colonial administration sought to redefine chiefly authority through jurisdiction based on territory, or *inkosi yinkosi ngendawo*.¹³³ Colonialism transformed the relationship between chiefs and their subject, but as we will see here, *khonza* as a personal relationship was not obliterated.

¹³⁰ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 40.

¹³¹ Clement M Doke and B. W Vilakazi, *Zulu-English dictionary* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1964), 404.

¹³² Mduduzi Percival Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority from ‘Personal to Territorial’: An Historical Analysis of the Limitations of Colonial Boundaries on African Socio-political Relations in Natal’s Maphumulo/Lower Thukela Region, 1890-1910” (M.A., University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2012), 35–6.

¹³³ Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority.”

By January 1980, 21 families had already been relocated to the Goedverwaching closer settlement. Five families were moved from Mandisa (Richmond) and another 16 from Bob Mattison's farm on Greytown Road. Some of these families arrived by the infamous "GG" trucks, known as such because of the registration plate numbers GG denoting state transport.¹³⁴ These families carried building materials from their old homes but the settlement needed poles so that the new residents could build permanent dwellings. DCD Commissioner for Pietermaritzburg Muggleston requested that latrines urgently be sent from storage at Edendale as at least 20 more families would arrive later that month. Muggleston and Senior Settlement Officer H.A. Roux recommended the construction of a clinic. The nearest hospital for Africans was 40 kilometers away in Edendale and this trip would take three buses for the Goedverwaching residents to get there, an expense few of the mostly unemployed men and women could afford. Those relocated were issued PTOs and were expected to pay rent for their sites on the trust farm.¹³⁵

Several people interviewed recalled moving to Goedverwaching from a Greytown farm known as Mshwathi because they no longer wanted to work as labor tenants. Ntombinazi Zakwe said her brothers (in-laws) worked for six months, but did not want to work for low wages any longer.¹³⁶ Labor tenants supplied their labor to the landowner for part of the year (three to nine months) as a form of rent in exchange for land. In 1964, the 1936 Land Act was amended to

¹³⁴ For more on the gap between government accounts and what people experience as they were forced away on GG trucks, see Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*, Chapter 6.

¹³⁵ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwaching. Pietermaritzburg," folio 68-9 and 72-4.

¹³⁶ Ntombinazi Zakwe, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 25, 2011.

abolish the tenancy system, but the practice continued in Natal until 1980. Surplus People Project interviews suggest that the poor conditions of labor tenancy caused many tenants to willingly leave the farms.¹³⁷ Ntombinazi's brothers fit this latter category. For them it was better to try anew in the relocation area than continue to work for harsh employers earning low wages. By the end of 1982, the DCDC had relocated 130 families to the trust farm.¹³⁸

Government officials paid close attention to the development of the closer settlement due to increasing pressure from non-governmental organizations and the local Natal press. From Cosmas Desmond's 1970 first account of the enforced removal of people from Meran to Limehill in Natal, a number of individuals and groups set out to document the nature and extent of the apartheid resettlement program and the resultant poverty and suffering.¹³⁹ In Natal, this included the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA), an organization set up to publicize issues surrounding forced removals and provide legal aid to those removed (or threatened by removal).¹⁴⁰ AFRA contributed to the Surplus People Project, which also began in late 1979 as a national research project to investigate the removals and whose 1983 five-volume report remains the most in-depth examination of the removals.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*, 30–2.

¹³⁸ PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwachting," folio 93.

¹³⁹ Cosmas Desmond, *The Discarded People: An Account of African Resettlement in South Africa* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970); T. R. H Davenport and K. S Hunt, *The Right to the Land* (Cape Town: D. Philip, 1974); Gerhard Maré, *African Population Relocation in South Africa* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1980).

¹⁴⁰ On AFRA, see Harley and Fotheringham, *AFRA*; Sato, "Forced Removals, Land NGOs and Community Politics."

¹⁴¹ Surplus People Project, *Forced Removals in South Africa* (Cape Town: Surplus People Project, 1983); Platzky, Walker, and Surplus People Project, *The Surplus People*.

By the time DCD relocated the 130 families to the Goedverwachting closer settlement, the department felt intense pressure from these groups. The Natal Chief Commissioner bemoaned the manner in which they celebrated “any conceivable grievance that can be unearthed in the closer settlements” in attempts to discredit the department and the state. The Commissioner laid out a plan for settlements such as Goedverwachting that he believed would improve the image of the department and these sites, central to which was the establishment of community councils and trust accounts so that the community could be managed by an authority of its choice.¹⁴²

Thus, DCD officials attempted to stir up support for a community council at the Goedverwachting settlement, to little avail. Muggleston felt certain this would come with time, after the people from various areas came to know each other and trust the department.¹⁴³ In 1984, Mqmath Rodgers Maphanga became the new ranger, the DCD’s man on the ground whose primary responsibility was to ensure that no new persons took up residence on the trust farm without permission from the Pietermaritzburg Commissioner.¹⁴⁴ Maphanga did his job well, as the number of families resettled remained at 130 until after this death. By 1987, a small local

¹⁴² NAR. BAO 5/363. F54/1524/5. “Chiefs and Headmen. Maphumula Tribe. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 189-93.

¹⁴³ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. “Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 105.

¹⁴⁴ PAR. DDA. 393. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwachting,” folio 38-9.

committee had formed, consisting of three individuals empowered to hear residents' complaints and report them to the Pietermaritzburg Commissioner.¹⁴⁵

Pressure against forced removals also probably influenced Pretoria's May 1982 order that no further settlement could take place until the shortage of water at the site could be addressed.¹⁴⁶ Desperate for the land to settle more evictees, DCD officials set out to solve this vexing problem. Four boreholes had been drilled and fitted with hand pumps but by October 1982, only one still worked. The situation was made worse as Maphumulo on the KwaZulu territory also used this water pump. The Goedverwaching settlement residents dared not chase them away.¹⁴⁷ Numerous attempts to alleviate the problem failed.¹⁴⁸ In 1985, Chief Maphumulo attempted to manipulate the water shortage to the Maphumulo's advantage. In a request to have the land turned over to him, Chief Mhlabunzima reported the tribal authority had made a representation to the Umgeni Water Board for the laying of a pipeline.¹⁴⁹ If the government could not provide the residents with land, the chief would. This shortage in water certainly also

¹⁴⁵ PAR. DDA. 393. (36)N2/11/3. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwaching," folio 22-3.

¹⁴⁶ PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwaching," folio 45.

¹⁴⁷ PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwaching," folio 83.

¹⁴⁸ PAR. DDA 385. (36)N5/1/2. "Engineering Services: Water Supplies," folio 17-8; PAR. DDA 393. (36)N5/1/2. "Engineering Services: Water Supplies."

¹⁴⁹ PAR. DDA 391. (36)N2/7/2. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Land, Farms or Blocks. Sevontein No. 131, Wilgefontein No. 869 and Goedverwaching," folio 162-3.

contributed to growing tensions between the new settlers and those Maphumulo seeking to establish new *imizi* on the trust farm.

Both the Natal DCD and the Maphumulo anxiously awaited a response from Pretoria regarding permission for the residents to *khonza* to Chief Maphumulo. While the settlement was supposed to be managed by DCD, the new Table Mountain residents turned to Chief Maphumulo with requests to record births, marriages, and deaths and to register as work-seekers and pensioners. Because permission had not been granted for the people to *khonza* him and join the Maphumulo, the chief initially turned them away.¹⁵⁰ But the Tribal Authority did begin to provide many services for the settlement residents, including the use of schools and cattle dipping tanks.¹⁵¹

To complicate matters further, KwaZulu also asserted its claim on the land, undertaking several public works and education projects on the trust-governed land without first consulting Natal's DCD officials. Major state investments helped bantustan revenues increase fourfold during the first half of the 1970s from around R120 million to R520 million and they continued to grow afterwards.¹⁵² In the Table Mountain region, these funds helped to build a clinic, a secondary school, employment projects, and a new home for the agricultural officer. When KwaZulu approved finances for the construction of a clinic for Table Mountain, the Mpumalanga Magistrate, an Edendale Hospital representative, and the Senior Agricultural Officer consulted

¹⁵⁰ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwachting. Pietermaritzburg," 70.

¹⁵¹ PAR. DDA 391. (36)n2/7/2. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Land, Farms or Blocks. Sevontein No. 1313, Wilgefontein No. 869, and Goedverwachting," folio 161-3.

¹⁵² Beinart, "Beyond 'Homelands': Some Ideas About the History of African Rural Areas in South Africa," 13.

with the local traditional authorities. They chose a site near to the Maphumulo *inkantolo* and the chief's homestead because of its location between the two halves of the Maphumulo territory. A contractor was already on site to begin the construction when DCD was alerted; they granted the PTO because the site they had chosen for a clinic had no water while this one could be serviced by water available to the *inkantolo*.¹⁵³ Furthering the confusion over the jurisdiction of the settlement, DCD in Pretoria granted KwaZulu's request to construct the Mbambangalo High School on the edge of the property without consulting the Natal Chief Commissioner.¹⁵⁴

The business and church sites began to fill. One of the first PTOs granted for a business site was to Mfanoza Frazer Zimu, who also became the chair of the Goedverwaching community council. Chief Maphumulo himself proposed the construction of a trading center that would include a post office, bank, filling station, supermarket, restaurant, dry cleaning depot, furniture store, clothing outlet, herbalist, shoemaker, dressmaker, and an "arts, crafts, and curios" shop. It would be funded by a loan from the KwaZulu Development Corporation and located next to the *inkantolo*. Maphumulo retained Nkululeko J.M. Msimanga of "Big Guys Business Coordinators" to initiate a project for the supply of electricity to the site. The Pietermaritzburg Commissioner supported the project in principle, but ultimately denied the application because

¹⁵³ PAR. DDA 383. (36)N2/7/3/8. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. SADT Land. Farms or Blocks. Goedverwaching. Pietermaritzburg," folio 103-5; DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Lad. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwaching," folio 11-3.

¹⁵⁴ PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwaching," folio 10-34.

he wanted the trust land for settlement purposes.¹⁵⁵ Maphumulo later successfully applied for permission to build only a general store and tea room next to his homestead (in 1983 and again in 1986 when it was realized the first application had been lost).¹⁵⁶

This portion of the Goedverwachting strip was quickly becoming the center of the Maphumulo community and the chief took actions to ensure his jurisdiction over it. The school and the clinic, named after the first Maphumulo chief Maguzu, only furthered the Maphumulo feeling that the land belonged to them. Despite the earlier tensions, Chief Maphumulo invited Buthelezi to officially open the new *inkantolo* and the Maguzu Clinic in December 1987, surely hoping to keep the KwaZulu Chief Minister on his side in efforts to have the trust farmed turned over to the Maphumulo.¹⁵⁷ The two chiefs reconciled in November 1984 when the two men met unplanned during a KZLA caucus. According to Maphumulo, Buthelezi apologized for the Maphumulo's assault and that he in turn apologized for blaming Buthelezi. To demonstrate his commitment to their peace, Maphumulo accompanied Buthelezi to a rally in Soweto.¹⁵⁸

During Buthelezi's visit to Mbambangalo, the Inkatha and KwaZulu leader addressed the Maphumulo, praising them as a people who knew the meaning of "putting differences aside and joining with your Zulu brothers and sisters wherever they may be for the sake of your

¹⁵⁵ PAR. DDA 389. (36)N2/7/2. "Lands. SADT Lands: Farms or Blocks: Main File," folio 9-36.

¹⁵⁶ PAR. DDA 397. (36)N2/4/3/8. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Trading in Bantu Areas (Section 24, Act 18/1936). Sites. MJ Maphumulo. Table Mountain. Trust Farm, Goedverwachting."

¹⁵⁷ Apparently, 1987 was a year of reconciliation and development for Buthelezi, who also opened the Thoyana *inkantolo* after "burying the hatchet with Inkosi Hlengwa. APC. PC126/2/1/15. Buthelezi, "Official Opening of the Offices and Courthouse of the Thoyana Tribe" Umbumbulu, August 14, 1987.

¹⁵⁸ Khaba Mkhize, "Chiefs Make Peace," *Natal Witness Echo* November 22, 1984.

community.”¹⁵⁹ He commended Chief Maphumulo for the hard work he had done to bring the clinic there despite attempts by the Commissioner of Pietermaritzburg to prevent it because it was not on KwaZulu land. In a stark contrast from just seven years earlier when members of the KZLA attacked the Maphumulo chieftaincy, Buthelezi paid tribute to Maphumulo with his *isibongo*, or praise name,¹⁶⁰ “Mashimane” and “for this quality of leadership which does credit to the line of Maphumulo leaders” from whom he descended.¹⁶¹ The same month, Maphumulo parroted the Inkatha line regarding causes of the Pietermaritzburg violence with a letter to the *Natal Witness*’s “My View” column that responded to an earlier article by John Wright and Simon Burton attributing the violence to Inkatha.¹⁶² In a complete break from his Inala days, Maphumulo began to publicly identify as an “Inkatha man.”

Despite the inability of DCD to utilize the land due to the water shortage and a lack of sufficient funding, it refused permission for certain other projects in hopes that money would become available to address the problem. Discussed earlier, they turned down Chief Maphumulo’s application for a business center site. Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli was also denied permission for a site in 1982. Mdluli applied to rebuild the Nyavu’s Gcina School on the trust farm’s boundary but the department prioritized resettlement. Natal Chief Commissioner Backer sympathized with the Nyavu’s need, but argued: “Although funds are not available at this stage

¹⁵⁹ APC. PC126/2/1/15. Buthelezi, “Official Opening of the Maphumulo Administration Offices and Courthouse, and the Maguzu Clinic,” Maqongqo, December 11, 1987.

¹⁶⁰ The plural, *izibongo*, can be translated as “praises,” “praise names,” “praise poems,” or “praise poetry.” *Izibongo* are concerned with naming, identifying, and giving significance to the named person or object. These often provide links with one’s community, lineage, and origins, which Buthelezi is doing here. See Gunner and Gwala, *Musho!*

¹⁶¹ APC. PC126/2/1/15. Buthelezi, “Official Opening of the Maphumulo Administration Offices and Courthouse, and the Maguzu Clinic,” Maqongqo, December 11, 1987.

¹⁶² Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, “My View: Apartheid’s to Blame,” *Natal Witness* December 15, 1987.

for settlement of squatters the situation could improve... Land, however, cannot be enlarged and therefore the reason for turning down the Tribal Authorities [sic] application.”¹⁶³

As the Baynesdrift farmers’ complaints continued throughout 1984 and 1985, DCD officials began recommending the transfer of a portion or all of the Goedverwaching trust strip to the Maphumulo. They echoed Natal Chief Commissioner Dreyer’s earlier recommendation that transfer of jurisdiction to the Maphumulo Tribal Authority might temporarily absorb the increasing population and quell the concerns of the neighboring white farmers.¹⁶⁴ But as the stance of the DCD on the farm changed, so too did that of KwaZulu. Proclamation 232/1986 announced the transfer of trust-owned land to the bantustan government, including Aasvogel Krans, Onverwacht, and the Goedverwaching remnant.¹⁶⁵ But KwaZulu refused to accept the contested strip of Goedverwaching D, 5, and 6 until the water and “tribal problems” were sorted.¹⁶⁶

The “tribal problems” to which KwaZulu referred were competing claims over the Goedverwaching strip between the Maphumulo and Nyavu Tribal Authorities. The Nyavu had begun to make their own claims on the trust farm. The tribal authority’s 1982 application for the Gcina school site suggested the Nyavu recognized the trust farm was to be turned over to the Maphumulo. Attached to the application was a letter of approval from Chief Maphumulo stating

¹⁶³ PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwaching,” folio 90.

¹⁶⁴ NAR. BAO 5/88. F53/1524/5 . “Bantoestamowerhied. Mapumulo. Pietermaritzburg,” folio 18-9 and 22-3.

¹⁶⁵ R232/1986. Government Gazette No.10560, Vol 258. December 24, 1986.

¹⁶⁶ PAR. DDA. 393. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwaching,” folio 20.

that he had no objection to the proposed school site.¹⁶⁷ But in 1986, the Nyavu Tribal Authority sent a letter to DCD requesting not only the trust-governed portion of Goedverwaching, but the rather the entire farm, as well as Onverwacht! Just as his father and his father had done before him, Chief Bangubukhosi argued that the Nyavu claim on the farms stemmed from their hereditary right to the land. The territory belonged to their ancestors, before they were made into farms, and included the tombs of their forefathers.¹⁶⁸ The Nyavu also took their request to KwaZulu.¹⁶⁹ KwaZulu initially backed the Maphumulo Tribal Authority's request for the land to be incorporated into their jurisdiction. But as the Nyavu began to assert their claim, KwaZulu refused to accept the property. The bantustan government wanted land, but they did not want the accompanying problems.

These tensions between the Maphumulo and Nyavu increased after the death of Ranger Maphanga in 1986 as Chief Maphumulo began to allocate sites on the trust farm. The District Representative of Home Affairs visited the disputed land in April 1987 and found that already four homes had been constructed on the trust land opposite the closer settlement. Chief Maphumulo's Induna Msongelwa Mkhize had been selling residential sites for R200.¹⁷⁰ The sites had been marked out by tractors and were four times the size of the closer settlement plots. The chief had also given permission for the cutting of trees on the farm to make way for a power

¹⁶⁷ PAR. DDA 386. (36)N2/11/3. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwaching," folio 72.

¹⁶⁸ Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Province of KwaZulu-Natal. Chief B. Mdluli to the Magistrate Office," November 29, 1986.

¹⁶⁹ PAR. DDA. 393. (36)N2/11/3. "Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwaching," folio 110.

¹⁷⁰ Oral history interviews suggest Mkhize was not the only induna selling sites; several also mention izinduna Dotsheni Gwala and Alfred Madlala.

line, a right that he did not have given his lack of jurisdiction.¹⁷¹ The Mpumalanga Magistrate suspected that the chief had begun to allocate sites in order to pre-empt the conflict over the jurisdiction of the farm.¹⁷²

No documents have been found that acknowledge permission given by Pretoria for the trust farm residents to *khonza* to Chief Maphumulo, but in practice some trust farm residents did begin to pay their respects to the chief. Historically, *khonza* fees were payable to the chiefs personally but with the implementation of Tribal Authorities (and the accompanying salaries for the chiefs), the *khonza* payments could be paid into the account of the tribal account or to the chief. Indeed, those who mentioned payments in their testimonies differed as to where the funds went. According to one elder, the monies paid would be taken to the chief but were funds for the *isizwe*.¹⁷³ Another woman said the small fee was for *ngesihlalo seNkosi*, or the seat (support) of the chief.¹⁷⁴ Without strict regulation, this practice became so rife with corruption that in 1988 Chief Minister Buthelezi proposed an amendment to the KwaZulu legislature to enable a uniform procedure for the paying of allegiance and to restrict the amount payable to less than R100.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ COGTA. District Representative Home Department of Home Affairs to Magistrate Mpumalanga, April 15, 1987.

¹⁷² COGTA. Magistrate Mpumalanga to District Representative Department of Home Affairs, May 15, 1987.

¹⁷³ “Leyomali isizothathwa iyiswe eNkosini kube imali yesizwe ke leyo.” Goge Balothi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 4, 2011.

¹⁷⁴ Fikelephi Sibisi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 16, 2011.

¹⁷⁵ Indeed, this practice continues to be controversial as the price of fees skyrocket and was a source of major complaint for former residents interviewed who fled and attempted to return to Mbambangalo after the end of *uDlame*. UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1988, “Memorandum to the Cabinet from Department of Chief Minister, re: Khonza Fees,” August 16, 1988.

However, in 1987, several Nyavu families moved onto the farm and refused to *khonza* to Maphumulo. In the wake of devastating floods in the Umsunduzi floodplain, at least three Nyavu families moved across the boundary onto the Trust farm.¹⁷⁶ Chief Maphumulo, convinced of his jurisdiction over the land, complained to Mpumalanga Magistrate Webber that the Nyavu had encroached “onto land which has been regarded as land allocated by the Government to the Maphumulo Tribal Authority for control by such authority and settlement thereon of members of the Maphumulo Tribe on [sic] persons paying allegiance to the Tribe.”¹⁷⁷

As DCD transitioned into its new life as the Department of Development Aid, officials sought to end these “tribal problems” tied to land. Government officials wanted to turn the land over to KwaZulu. It was clear no future settlement would be done given the increased resistance to forced relocations. Prior to the flooding, the Regional Representative for the DDA D. Varty attempted to end the dispute with a response to Chief Mdluli’s repeated queries about the jurisdiction of the farms. Varty sent the Nyavu chief a copy of the government gazette that delineated the boundaries of the Maphumulo and Nyavu tribal authorities. Onverwacht and the remnant of Goedverwaching were legally the territory of the Maphumulo.¹⁷⁸

Mpumalanga Magistrate Webber used the same logic after he visited Table Mountain in 1988 in an attempt to settle the land conflict. Webber found that all knew the boundary, but the

¹⁷⁶ Prolonged and heavy rains in September produced nearly 400 millimeters in 36 hours, resulting in severe flooding. John Laband and Robert F. Haswell, eds., *Pietermaritzburg, 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City*, 1st ed (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press : Shuter & Shooter, 1988), 11.

¹⁷⁷ COGTA. Mpumalanga Magistrate to Secretary Department of the Chief Minister, November 25, 1988.

¹⁷⁸ PAR. DDA. 393. (36)N2/11/3. “Department of Development Aid. District Pietermaritzburg. Land. Settlement and Rehabilitation of Individual Areas. Goedverwaching,” folio 25-8.

Nyavu believed the farms to have been erroneously given to the Maphumulo. Webber's report cites the gazetted tribal boundaries to conclude that the Nyavu had no legal claim to Onverwacht or Goedverwachting. What is less clear is whether or not Webber's understanding of "Goedverwachting" includes the latter purchased portions of B, D, 5, and 6 (the strip in dispute). In one numbered point, the magistrate states "There is therefore no question in my mind of any doubt about which Tribal Authority according to statute is legally in control of *any of the Trust farm Goedverwacht* [sic], namely the Maphumulo Tribal Authority who were moved on to land purchased as compensation for land transferred to the Durban Corporation...(my emphasis)." In the next numbered point, he lists the subsequently purchased portions of Goedverwachting before closing that the land in dispute is that on which the new *inkantolo* and clinic were opened.¹⁷⁹ It is not clear whether "any of the Trust farm" includes the subdivisions or not.

Whether or not Webber believed the strip of trust farm to be under the jurisdiction of the Maphumulo, the proclamations outlining the boundaries of the tribal authority were never amended so there is no legal evidence that the strip of trust farm belongs to either.¹⁸⁰ However, Fred Kockett, a reporter for the *Natal Witness* who followed the Table Mountain region closely, and members of the Maphumulo later cited this visit of Webber to the contested land as evidence that the government acknowledged Maphumulo jurisdiction.¹⁸¹ At no point during these disputes did the government officials acknowledge the possible legitimacy of Chief Mdluli's

¹⁷⁹ COGTA. Mpumalanga Magistrate to the Secretary, Department of Interior, November 25, 1988.


¹⁸⁰ Fields notes from meeting with Bhekani L. Shabalala, General Manager, Traditional Affairs Branch, Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Pietermaritzburg, August, 3 2011.

¹⁸¹ For example, see Fred Kockett, "Maqongqo: looking for answers in the ashes," *Natal Witness* March 1990 and Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011.


claim that the land given to the Maphumulo was not the government's to give away. Over a year later, the conflict erupted in deadly violence in Table Mountain. It is to this conflict the next chapter turns.

Conclusion

Mhlabunzima Maphumulo became chief in the midst of tumultuous times. The battle for political supremacy in the newly formed KwaZulu bantustan was just beginning. His *umndeni* had been divided over the regency. His community was starved for land. Many competing claims on the thousand acres of land dividing his jurisdiction contributed to the shortage of land. The century-old conflict between the Maphumulo and the neighboring Nyavu chiefdom continued over this parcel of land as both chiefs wanted jurisdiction and employed various means to acquire it. Complicating matters in the 1970s, both the apartheid government and the newly formed KwaZulu government saw the contested farm as a means to address shortage of land for forced resettlement and the need for increased acreage to consolidate the KwaZulu bantustan. Chief Maphumulo took on these complex challenges with vigor, becoming embroiled in royalist Zulu politics while frequenting apartheid government offices in attempts to resettle his own people on the Goedverwaching farm strip. But as we will see in the next chapter, the eruption of *uDlame* across KwaZulu-Natal ignited old conflicts. The civil war drew Mhlabunzima back into conflict with Buthelezi as the Maphumulo chief pushed for peace. The land conflict with the Nyavu broke into deadly violence as Maphumulo welcomed refugees from the violence onto the contested land.




Map 9: Bantustan Map, 1984. Source: www.overcomingapartheid.msu.edu, MATRIX, Michigan State University



Map 10: 1985 Map of KwaZulu Legislative Districts. Key below with number of MPs in parentheses. Source: Robert Thabo Sabela, “KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.” M.A. Thesis, University of Zululand, 1989.

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| 1) Ingwavuma (5) | 10) Nkandla (5) | 19) Ntuzuma (1) |
| 2) Sindlangentsha (5) | 11) Msinga (6) | 20) Umlazi (4) |
| 3) Ubombo (4) | 12) Emnambithi (6) | 21) Umbumbulu (6) |
| 4) Nongoma (6) | 13) Okhahlamba (9) | 22) Vulindlela (6) |
| 5) Hlabisa (5) | 14) Inkanyezi (5) | 23) Hlanganani (5) |
| 6) Mahlabathini (5) | 15) Ongoye (5) | 24) Vulamehlo (5) |
| 7) Enseleni (6) | 16) Maphumulo (6) | 25) Umzumbe (6) |
| 8) Madadeni (6) | 17) Ndwedwe (5) | 26) Izingolweni (5) |
| 9) Nquthu (6) | 18) Mpumalanga (6) | |



Map 11: Table Mountain Region Showing KwaZulu Boundary, Disputed Trust Land, and Other Places of Interest.

Chapter Four:

“Because my people are in the MDM, I have to be with them”¹: *uDlame* and the Peace Chief, 1983-1990

The gradual erosion of apartheid institutions in the midst of South Africa’s deepening recession and rising youth unemployment led to an escalation of social tensions and increased violence throughout South Africa. The rise of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983—an umbrella organization of grassroots anti-apartheid movements aligned with the ANC—placed strain not only on the apartheid government but also Inkatha. In KwaZulu, the possibility of the demise of the homeland system threatened many chiefs and legislative assembly members who benefited from the institutions and offices of the KwaZulu government. Morris and Hindson argue that the roots of political violence need to be sought in this *collapse* of apartheid social controls. As the previous mode of regulating political cohesion broke down and the role of the state changed, competing power centers emerged at all levels of society in a struggle to establish new forms of political hegemony.² A devastating civil war, fueled by Pretoria as part of its policy of “total strategy,” broke out across KwaZulu-Natal and in the Gauteng townships. By the first democratic elections in 1994, 20,000 had died in the conflict, 12,000 in KwaZulu-Natal.³

In KwaZulu-Natal, powerful local leaders often directly shaped the unfolding of local conflict. The term “warlord” became everyday parlance, particularly in reference to local Inkatha leaders. Violence often emanated from the specific areas controlled by warlords, who were

¹ Maphumulo, “Interview with Chief Maphumulo,” *Sechaba* (1990), 8.

² Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, “South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and Reconstruction,” *Review of African Political Economy* 19, no. 53 (1992): 43–59.

³ Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead”; Jeffery, *The Natal Story*; Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, *Indians Versus Russians*.

responsible for identifying non-members, busing in armed supporters, collecting protection fees, and conscripting fighters.

It is in this context of growing warlordism in KwaZulu-Natal that Chief Maphumulo and his politics must be examined. This is not to argue that Pietermaritzburg's "peace chief" was a warlord. Colin Darch, in his examination of Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) banditry has illustrated the utility of examining "the concept of the warlord as the local chieftain who controls the men with the guns," even when the actors in question do not necessarily meet all of the conditions of warlordism.⁴ Examining the "peace chief" in the context of Natal's warlordism serves to break down the dichotomies of Inkatha warlord/ANC freedom fighter and Inkatha vigilantes/ANC youth and allows for an analysis of conflict that acknowledges victims and perpetrators across the political spectrum.

As we will see, Maphumulo's politics shifted over time and required new methods in his quest for an end to the civil war wracking KwaZulu-Natal. As *uDlame* ravaged Mbambangalo, Maphumulo relied on a network of contacts for protection and mobilization of his people, not always employing peaceful means. As shown in chapter three, Chief Maphumulo had a contentious relationship with Inkatha, Buthelezi, and the KwaZulu government. The existing land dispute fueled tensions within and between the chiefs and people of KwaNyavu and Mbambangalo. These factors combined with Chief Maphumulo's crusade for peace as both a chief and as president of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), a new body of traditional leaders united against apartheid, to ignite in deadly violence. This chapter first lays out the background to and eruption of violence in the Pietermaritzburg region. Maphumulo welcomed refugees from this conflict onto the disputed Goedverwachting trust farm.

⁴ Colin Darch, "Are There Warlords in Provincial Mozambique? Questions of the Social Base of MNR Banditry," *Review of African Political Economy* 45/46 (1989): 34–49.

It then examines the context of growling warlordism in Natal before turning to Maphumulo's reactions to the violence as well as the almost mythical reputation he gained as "peace chief." It will then consider how he was recruited into the progressive organization of traditional leaders, Contralesa, and his relationship with the ANC. Next, it will outline the eruption and patterns of violence in Mbambangalo and the relationship of the conflict to the land dispute before concluding with an analysis of Chief Maphumulo's UDF network of security, fighters, and weapons that influenced his shift away from peaceful methods towards fighting for peace.

Background to *uDlame*: Inkatha, the UDF, and the Third Force

The National Party under the leadership of P.W. Botha embarked on a decade of reform and repression in the 1980s. Strategically calculated policy innovations were intended to win public support and international legitimacy for apartheid South Africa while heightened security was aimed at curbing the country's increasingly radical popular resistance in the wake of the 1976 Soweto uprising.⁵ The centerpiece of Botha's reform efforts was the creation of a new constitution in 1983 under which separate parliaments were created for whites, Asians, and Coloureds, while Africans (nearly three-fourths of the South African population) had representation only in their bantustan governments. The new constitution caused fissures among white politicians and galvanized black opposition.

Several national anti-apartheid campaigns formed in opposition to the proposed Tricameral Parliament that excluded Africans from representation. The national Anti-South African Indian Council (Anti-SAIC) sought to mobilize resistance against the South African Indian Council elections scheduled for late 1981. At a Transvaal Anti-SAIC conference in 1983,

⁵ Gerhart and Glaser, *From Protest to Challenge*, 6: Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990.

Reverend Allan Boesak made a call for a “united front” against apartheid. The conference took up his call and set up a committee to determine and outline the form and process of organizing a national front.⁶ In August 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF) emerged as an umbrella organization of grassroots community groups opposed to Botha’s constitutional reforms. The broad coalition of civic, church, student, worker and other organizations adopted a non-racial and non-collaborationist approach. The UDF leaders initially sought to avoid an outright affiliation with the banned ANC, but in practice many were ANC members and the UDF’s character was influenced by the strategies and tactics of the ANC. In UDF rallies across the country, ANC freedom songs rang out again, rejuvenated by the new militant spirit.⁷

To justify repressive measures against growing anti-apartheid resistance, South Africa under Botha adopted a “Total Strategy” to counter the “total onslaught” of international communism. Botha declared that the South African Communist Party (SACP) was using the ANC as a front for communist penetration, comparing the situation to Mozambique and Angola where Marxist governments accompanied independence. All radical opposition was put down as “furthering the aims of communism” as South Africa set out on a campaign of “low-intensity conflict.” According to Jackie Dugard, a researcher then with the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) that monitored South Africa’s political violence, low-intensity conflict pursued by the regime in South Africa was characterized by the use of covert action and non-conventional methods of warfare that served to spread fear, insecurity, and internal divisions among target populations. This type of warfare had the benefit of being cost effective and less internationally visible than conventional war. Repression was effected through bannings,

⁶ Seekings, *The UDF*, 49.

⁷ Bernard Magubane, “The Crisis of the Garrison State,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 48–9.

detentions, assassinations, kidnappings, and torture and included forming pacts with dissatisfied and marginalized elements of society that resulted in hit squads and vigilante groups, which in South Africa would soon be known as “third force.”⁸ South Africa employed this warfare both internally and externally. Its wars of destabilization in Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia attempted to protect the buffer ring of “white states,” destabilize recently freed black-run countries, and limit the external threat of the ANC in southern Africa. These wars served as trial runs for the apartheid regime’s internal low-intensity conflict.⁹

Botha, formerly the Minister of Defense under Prime Minister B.J. Vorster, built the formerly minor cabinet of State Security Council (SSC) into a “nerve center for coordinating the policy, army, and key civilian departments.”¹⁰ This massive security apparatus operated along three lines: implement infrastructural projects and social programs to ameliorate conditions and “win hearts and minds”; identify local activists so that the security police could apprehend them; and execute a covert operation of dirty tricks and lethal violence. The restructured security establishment consisted of the Department of Defense and the South African Defense Force (SADF); specialized training institutes; the intelligence community of Military Intelligence (MI) of SADF, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the Security Branch of South African Police (SAP); an intellectual community of think-tanks and the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria; the armaments industries, including the state-owned Armaments Development Corporation (Armcor); and the SAP.¹¹

⁸ Dugard, “Low-Intensity Conflict,” 1–5.

⁹ Dugard, “Low-Intensity Conflict,” 18–20.

¹⁰ Gerhart and Glaser, *From Protest to Challenge*, 6: Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990, 32.

¹¹ Dugard, “Low-Intensity Conflict,” 10.

South Africa's "total strategy" was never constant or uniformly effective. It went through changes in response to the shifting conditions and undertook its covert actions within flexible parameters. Dugard identified three phases: the first between 1980 and 1986 coupled reform with repression; the second counter-revolutionary war phase between 1986 and 1990 utilized the "Win Hearts and Minds" strategy but witnessed the trial run of low-intensity conflict in KwaZulu and Natal. The third phase between 1990 and 1994 employed the dual strategy of negotiations and destabilization.¹² States of Emergency were declared in 1985 and in 1986 when the government declared the UDF an "affected organization" so that it could no longer receive international funding.¹³

The success of Pretoria's low-intensity conflict in KwaZulu-Natal relied heavily on Inkatha. While Buthelezi spoke of Inkatha as founded upon the "principle of nonviolence" and continued to project Inkatha as the inheritor of the ANC's mantle inside the country, the two organizations fell out after an October 1979 meeting in London. Mzala contends Buthelezi called for the meeting in order to publicize his links with the ANC in the midst of growing criticism of him as a traitor and apartheid collaborator.¹⁴ Buthelezi's biographer argues the Inkatha president's mission for the meeting was to have the ANC agree on a multi-strategy approach that would enable each group to fight apartheid in its own way—the ANC could continue with the armed struggle but Inkatha would promote non-violence.¹⁵ Ultimately, the two organizations fell

¹² Jackie Dugard, "South Africa's Internal Low-Intensity Conflict," in *The Role of Political Violence in South Africa's Democratisation* (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003), 23.

¹³ Magubane, "The Crisis of the Garrison State," 49–51.

¹⁴ Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda*, 127.

¹⁵ Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 207–8.

out over which one would lead the liberation struggle. Buthelezi attempted to dismiss the ANC in exile as the “external mission” and wished to supplant the ANC in South Africa.¹⁶

By the end of the 1970s, KwaZulu leaders perceived Inkatha as the only legitimate liberation movement and were becoming increasingly intolerant of differing political opinions. It was not long before these clashes turned violent. According to Sithole, KwaZulu leaders began to rely heavily on *amabutho* (armed regiments) in altercations with political opponents as early as 1978. By 1980, Inkatha had begun to train youths at its paramilitary camp Mandleni/Matleng in Zululand and armed Inkatha supporters patrolled the streets of KwaMashu (a Durban township) in attempts to quell boycotting students.¹⁷

This violence was further fomented by the involvement of the state security apparatus as seen in the paramilitary training of Inkatha recruits for deployment against persons and organizations perceived to be opposed to the South African government and Inkatha. From at least 1982, the State Security Council fomented conflict between Inkatha, the ANC, and black consciousness organizations.¹⁸ In 1984, Buthelezi began to voice concerns in the KZLA about the position of Inkatha supporters on the ground and encouraged preparation for defensive and retaliatory action.¹⁹ The following year, the Central Committee decided the whole of KwaZulu and Natal needed to be a “no-go area” for the UDF. Allegations of a plan to assassinate Buthelezi resulted in his request to the government and SADF for assistance. In September 1985, the

¹⁶ Gerhart and Glaser, *From Protest to Challenge*, 6: Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990, 29.

¹⁷ Sithole, “Neither Communists nor Saboteurs: KwaZulu Bantustan Politics,” 840.

¹⁸ Gerhart and Glaser, *From Protest to Challenge*, 6: Challenge and Victory, 1980–1990, 113.

¹⁹ Verbatim Report of the KZLA, Vol. 34, Second Session of the Fourth Assembly, May 28, 1984, 916.

Minister of Defense, Magnus Malan, approved a national “contra-mobilization” program that recommended paramilitary training for Inkatha for use against the UDF and ANC and warned of special cover-up measures that would be necessarily accompany. According to Investigative Task Unit Head Howard Varney’s submission to the TRC, approval had been supplied “at the highest level.”²⁰

In what became known as “Operation Marion,” in 1986 the SADF gave paramilitary training to 200 Inkatha supporters in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia (then a South African colony). The training included the use of Soviet weapons, heavy artillery such as mortars and RPG7s, explosives, landmines, and hand grenades as well as techniques to avoid arrest or interrogation. These so-called Caprivians were then deployed across KwaZulu and Natal in September 1986, often in the guise of KwaZulu Police and particularly in the townships surrounding Pietermaritzburg. Many served as security and personal henchmen for Inkatha leaders, chiefs, izinduna, and the men who earned the moniker “warlord.” The Truth and Reconciliation Commission found Caprivians responsible for many of the most infamous and deadly incidents, including instigation of violence in Mpumalanga and Clermont townships, the Sarmcol shopsteward murders, the KwaMakhutha massacre of 1987, the Midlands War in Edendale and Vulindlela, and the 1990 Seven Days War.²¹

In addition to military training, Botha’s government approved a propaganda project that included SAP funding for several Inkatha and United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA)

²⁰ Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The Caprivi Trainees, August 4, 1997. <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/submit/caprivi.htm> (accessed June 16, 2012).

²¹ South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles*, 219–28.

rallies, including the March 25, 1990 Durban rally that sparked the Seven Days War.²² Throughout the negotiations for the democratic transition, the police supplied weaponry to Inkatha, fueling the violence. While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found little evidence of a centrally directed or formally constituted “third force,” evidence was irrefutable that a “network of security and ex-security force operatives, frequently acting in conjunction with right-wing elements and/or sectors of the IFP, was involved in actions that could be construed as fomenting violence and which resulted in gross human rights violations, including random and target killings.”²³

This brutality made news headlines worldwide, giving international divestment campaigns momentum with immediate effect. After the 1985 State of Emergency, one of the biggest lenders, Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, stopped rolling over its loans to South Africa (\$500 million) and recalled its credit. Other banks began to withdraw credit, the rand began falling, and big business began to plan its exit, undermining P.W. Botha’s assurances of South African economic stability.²⁴ South Africa was in crisis.

uDlame in Pietermaritzburg: Refugees Come to Goedverwachting

The 1976 Soweto uprising that marked an escalation in anti-apartheid resistance in South Africa did not initially spill over to KwaZulu-Natal, a phenomenon some attribute to the discipline of Inkatha. But tensions began to run high in the Midlands region after the announcement of plans

²² South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 6*, 582–3; Piper and Morrow, *To Serve and Protect*.

²³ South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission., *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 6*, 584.

²⁴ Magubane, “The Collapse of the Garrison State.”

to transfer the administration of Imbali, Edendale, and Ashdown to KwaZulu in 1980 and the formation of the Pietermaritzburg UDF branch in 1983. Existing civic organizations in Imbali increased resistance after the visit of the Minister of Cooperation and Development Piet Koornhoff to Imbali township in 1984.²⁵ Most descriptions of the violence in Natal take as a turning point the August 1985 murder of Victoria Mxenge, a Durban lawyer and local UDF executive whose husband Griffiths was assassinated in 1980.²⁶ In Pietermaritzburg, the start of the violence is usually associated with a stayaway organized by the UDF/Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU)²⁷ in support of striking workers in Mpophomeni Township.²⁸

On May 1, 1985, BTR-SARMCOL rubber factory workers went on strike to get the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) recognized. BTR-SARMCOL dismissed over 900 MAWU members, resulting in unemployment for virtually all of the UDF-allied Mpophomeni. FOSATU established a workers' cooperative to assist the unemployed and organized a citywide stayaway and consumer boycott to demand their reinstatement. Chief Buthelezi called upon Inkatha members to resist the stayaway and boycott. As the UDF and trade union movement in Natal gained strength, the South African government funded the formation of the Inkatha-led workers' organization, the United Workers' Union of South Africa (UWUSA) in 1986 as an

²⁵ Sithole, "The ANC Underground," 239.

²⁶ Bill Freund, "The Violence in Natal, 1985-1990," in *Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu-Natal*, ed. Robert Morrell (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1996), 180–1.

²⁷ FOSATU gave way to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which was formed in mid-1985 in the midst of the FOSATU-sponsored stayaway.

²⁸ Gwala, "Political Violence and the Struggle for Control"; Kentridge, *An Unofficial War*; Minnaar, *Patterns of Violence*.

alternative to the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).²⁹ According to one document uncovered during what became known as the Inkathagate scandal,³⁰ UWUSA was a SAP-controlled project that was also supported by the American labor federation AFL-CIO.³¹ In 1987, BTR-SARMCOL replaced striking workers with UWUSA members.

On December 5, 1986, Inkatha held a rally in the Mpophomeni community with supporters bussed in from the nearby areas of Vulindlela and Edendale. After the meeting, the Inkatha supporters spread out through the township, attacking residents and property. Four prominent MAWU members, Phineaus Sibiyi, Micca Sibiyi, Simon Ngubane, and Flomena Mnikathi were abducted and then assaulted by armed men in KwaZulu Police uniforms. The charred bodies of Phineaus Sibiyi, Ngubane, and Mnikathi were found the next day, but Micca Sibiyi escaped. A formal inquest into the killing found nine known Inkatha members (including Caprivi trainee Vela Mchunu) responsible for the deaths, but none were charged. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that these killings set in motion the lengthy period of political conflict that ensued.³²

²⁹ Buthelezi launched UWUSA on May Day at Durban's King's Park Stadium. An estimated 50,000 were transported in (probably on busses paid for by the state government) for the rally. "Transport for 50 000 laid on for UWUSA launch," *Natal Witness Echo* May 1, 1986.

³⁰ In July 1991, the *Weekly Mail* and UK *Guardian* published irrefutable evidence, stolen from the SAP Special Branch by Brian Morrow, that the apartheid government had secretly funded Inkatha. The scandal became known as Inkathagate. See Piper and Morrow, *To Serve and Protect*.

³¹ Szeftel, "Manoeuvres of War in South Africa," 74; Piper and Morrow, *To Serve and Protect*, 53, 79.

³² South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles*, 238–9. See also Radley Keys, "Mpophomeni: The ANC's Dilemma," in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 129–42.

Thereafter, the violence across the Pietermaritzburg region spiraled as the conflict escalated into a struggle for control of the townships and Inkatha embarked on forced recruitment campaigns in the face of increasing UDF popularity.³³ Nkosinathi Gwala, writing at the time of the violence, saw the real spark as this recruitment, particularly in the Harewood section of Edendale, an African freehold area.³⁴ Local strongmen, chiefs, izinduna and warlords often organized Inkatha supporters for attack. In Harewood, the young and fearsome Sichizo Zuma operated with impunity, committing murder, arson, kidnapping and assault.³⁵ In Edendale, the Inkatha chairman Councillor Mncwabe managed Caprivians from his home.³⁶ The Inkatha recruiters earned the name *Othelweni*, or “those who push others down the cliff,” terrorizing the Edendale community.

Civic organizations formed under the ambit of the UDF in Imbali, Edendale, and Ashdown and youth set up self-defense units independently in response to the attacks.³⁷ According to Gwala, the Inkatha recruitment campaigns provided the first common issue to unite Edendale,³⁸ but Sithole has highlighted the earlier popular youth struggles of Edendale’s D.C.O Matiwane Youth League that served as the nucleus from which ANC underground structures operated in Pietermaritzburg’s black townships.³⁹ While some have sought to explain this large-scale social movement of comrades, or *amaqabane*, in terms of youth finding their way amidst

³³ Minnaar, *Patterns of Violence*, 7.

³⁴ Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control.”

³⁵ Kentridge, *An Unofficial War*, 184.

³⁶ Sithole, “The ANC Underground,” 264.

³⁷ Sithole, “The ANC Underground,” 242, 261.

³⁸ Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control,” 515.

³⁹ Sithole, “The ANC Underground,” 229.

unemployment and the breakdown of social norms, Ari Sitas has shown the movement to be one of relative autonomy involving voluntary (and sometimes coerced) participation, cultural dynamics, and a new volatile social identity shaped through mobilization and conflict. They saw themselves as soldiers of the liberation movement. Their gatherings were characterized by militant songs and gestures, public display of weapons, *toyi-toyi*, and khaki or military-style attire.⁴⁰ The *amaqabane* operated under the ANC's directive to make the country ungovernable. There was a growing perception that the authorities were not impartial.

And the UDF youth were not alone. In late 1960 and early 1961, the underground South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC began independent discussions about a turn towards the armed struggle. A decision was made to meet state violence with violence.⁴¹ Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), or the "Spear of the Nation" was formed as the ANC's military wing to complement mass action. MK embarked on a thirty-year campaign of armed struggle and sabotage. ANC and SACP guerillas trained across Africa, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe before attempting to infiltrate South Africa. During the Pietermaritzburg violence of the 1980s, the ANC underground and MK units actively participated in mobilizing self-defense units. Youth were given crash courses and subjected to intense political education in order to defend their communities. Men such as Dumezweni Zimu, Sipho Gcabashe, and Cassius Lubisi operated in Pietermaritzburg and provided military equipment to the defense units.⁴²

⁴⁰ Sitas, "The Making of the 'Comrades' Movement in Natal, 1985-91."

⁴¹ For more on the debate over and establishment of MK, see Bernard Magubane et al., "The Turn to Armed Struggle," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 1 [1960–1970] (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004), 53–146.

⁴² Sithole, "The ANC Underground," 261–9.

A cycle of vicious violence erupted with each side accusing the other of instigation. The violence spread to nearly every Pietermaritzburg township, with skirmishes an almost everyday occurrence. The climate of political intolerance raged unabated, especially after the release from Robben Island of ANC veteran Harry Gwala, who despite a debilitating motor neuron disease threw himself into the mobilization of counterattacks and became known as the “Lion of the Midlands.”⁴³

Various peace attempts failed because of an inability to impose discipline at the local level. Conservative estimates hold that nearly 12,000 people died in the civil war between 1985 and 1996 in KwaZulu-Natal.⁴⁴ Thousands more were wounded, raped, or abducted. Many disappeared. Between 1987 and 1989 alone, over 1,100 homes and nearly 300 vehicles were destroyed or damaged.⁴⁵ An estimated 200,000-500,000 became refugees in their own country.⁴⁶ “Every road, ditch, yard, river, house and hillside is a war zone,” wrote reporter and

⁴³ The TRC found that Gwala functioned as a self-styled ANC warlord, facilitating a climate in which gross human rights violations could take place. For more on Gwala, see Charles Nqakula, “Harry Gwala - Man of Steel,” *African Communist*, 1995, <http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?ID=2370#Harry>; O’Malley, *Shades of Difference*, 285–7; South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles*, 214–5.

⁴⁴ 12,000 remains the most readily accepted number for this region. As Philippe Denis has recently pointed out, while Anthea Jeffery’s pro-Inkatha views may be controversial, her figures for the Natal Midlands are not substantially different from those of John Aitchison, the coordinator of the Unrest Monitoring Project at the University of Natal. Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead,” 114; Jeffery, *The Natal Story*, 1; Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, *Indians Versus Russians*, 5.

⁴⁵ Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead,” 106–7; Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, *Indians Versus Russians*, 5.

⁴⁶ Eduardo Mariño, *KwaZulu-Natal Emergency: The 1994 Emergency in KwaZulu-Natal, Republic of South Africa: Statements & Observations from the International Observer to the Emergency* (Durban-Johannesburg: E. Mariño, 1994), 14; Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, *Indians Versus Russians*, 5.

political analyst Matthew Krentz.⁴⁷ These places became politically territorialized and “no-go areas” emerged as the UDF and Inkatha fought for dominance. Some neighborhoods were renamed; Harewood became Ulundi, signifying it as an Inkatha stronghold and Dambuza took on the name Maputo after the then anti-apartheid friendly city. People were killed simply for being in the wrong place. Life for local people became a daily struggle against life-threatening danger and insecurity.

By 1989, the violence began shifting towards the rural areas, with major conflicts erupting around the rural Midlands towns of Richmond, Mooi River, Greytown, Estcourt, and at Port Shepstone on the South Coast. According to violence monitor John Aitchison, the rural violence was underreported and poorly understood. Many simply labeled the tensions as those between “modernising comrades” and “KwaZulu’s traditionalist tribal structures.”⁴⁸ But Chief Maphumulo’s Table Mountain remained quiet.

Families and individuals across KwaZulu-Natal began to flee, some forced to do so by the destruction of their homes. Some found refuge with family and sympathetic employers away from the raging violence. The same hesitancy to label the conflict a “war” resulted in an unwillingness on the part of government officials to label these persons as “refugees.” No war meant no refugees and therefore no institutional requirement to help them. They instead became “displacees.”⁴⁹ With initially no organization monitoring the displacement, as well as the

⁴⁷ Krentz, *An Unofficial War*, 18.

⁴⁸ APC. PC11 John Aitchison, “Can Inkathagate be closed?” unpublished and undated paper.

⁴⁹ Wendy Leeb, “Death, Devastation and Destruction - Refugees in Natal” (Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal-Pietermaritzburg, n.d.).

manner in which people first sought refuge with others they knew, numbers for this initial wave of refugees remain obscured.

Some of the people fleeing from the Pietermaritzburg violence began to flock to Chief Maphumulo. The Table Mountain region initially remained a haven in the midst of the storm. Many of these refugees settled in the *isigodi* known as Echibini on the disputed trust farm. Some moved very early in the violence and were able to take with them furniture and housing materials. MaZondi recalls moving after her brother was killed when *uDlame* broke out in KwaShange in 1987. After the same men threatened her father, the family decided it was time to leave. Their pastor's family told them about sites in Maqongqo, so they packed all of their belongings and moved temporarily into a two-roomed house until her mother found a site and began to build their new home.⁵⁰ Others were less fortunate, and fled with nothing.

By October 1988, Maphumulo estimated that already 500 families had fled to his region, camping at his *inkantolo* and paying *khonza* fees for access to their own pieces of land. By 1989, the number of refugees had reached 10,000.⁵¹ In the beginning they were largely Inkatha supporting refugees, but later influxes brought unaffiliated and UDF-aligned families. Maphumulo welcomed all, as long as they understood the necessity of political tolerance. But the strain on resources became significant. Maphumulo told the press, "More keep on coming, but I do not have enough land."⁵²

⁵⁰ Thobile Ngcobo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, KwaNxamalala, January 17, 2011.

⁵¹ "Maphumulo – the 'peacemaker'," *New African* April 17, 1989.

⁵² "Maqongqo chief to ask for more land to accommodate refugees," *Natal Witness* October 13, 1988; "Local chief offers refuge to all on a non-political basis," *Natal Witness Echo* October 13, 1988.

Maphumulo further explained the expectation that the refugees *khonza* to him. “People are not made to pay money to live in the area, but in our tradition they are expected to pay ‘khonza’ – a tribute to the chief – just like when they leave the area they are supposed to pay ‘valelisa’ to the chief they have been staying under.” He admitted that the state of war prevented many from paying the *valelisa* fee. He also explained that *khonza* could range from a goat to small sum of money, dependent upon the person’s circumstances.⁵³ The leader began to earn a reputation as the “peace chief.”

The Warlords and a “Peace Chief”

Central to the conflict across Pietermaritzburg were local strongmen such as the infamous Thomas Shabalala of Lindelani and David Ntombela, the local Inkatha chairman and induna of Vulindlela. Men such as these were notorious for their ruthless manipulation of land and resources and complex systems of patronage and clientalism. The term warlordism has been used loosely and descriptively to “designate a local military commander who has acquired some civil powers, and uses them by force.”⁵⁴ It was first used to describe the process in China in the 1910s where the collapse of central state authority led to the emergence of powerful regional overlords who ruled by force. These individuals were often former state functionaries who gained control as the state lost power. The applicability of the term “warlord” to African leaders has been in debate for some time and in South Africa the question centers on the alternate usage of “vigilante

⁵³ “Maqongqo chief to ask for more land to accommodate refugees,” *Natal Witness* October 13, 1988.

⁵⁴ Darch, “Are There Warlords in Provincial Mozambique?”

leader” or “gang leader.”⁵⁵ Morris Szeftel argued for the applicability of the warlord concept to Africa on account of Inkatha and Sudanese militias, but the term can be relevant for Ethiopia, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo as well.⁵⁶

That the term warlord can apply to Africa should no longer be in doubt. But these scholarly studies do highlight the variability of warlord types. For South Africa, scholars have often referred to a detailed definition of warlords as put forth by the academic and violence monitor John Aitchison. His definition is worth citing at length:

Warlords are powerful local leaders who rely on the force of arms to maintain their power. They tend to gather a group of professional strong-arm men around them and they pay for their services by screwing the local populace. Now to that extent, you could say that they are no more and no less than gang leaders, but the key difference is that they are not motivated *exclusively* by the acquisition of personal wealth and power, but in addition they owe allegiance to a central power, namely Inkatha. You could say the difference lies in the form of extortion: gang leaders fight for money and territory, whereas warlords are also crusaders for a political cause. There’s one other reason for calling these people warlords, and that’s the hype that surrounds them, and I don’t just mean in the media, I mean among their own communities. Their exploits become the stuff of modern-day legend, like fairy-tale villains, attributed with special powers, personal invulnerability.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ The term is still critiqued as an ideological weapon. On the applicability to Africa more generally, see the special issue of *Review of African Political Economy* 45/46 (1989). On South Africa, see “Warlords” in Kentridge, *An Unofficial War*, 181–95.

⁵⁶ Morris Szeftel, “Editorial: Warlords and Problems of Democracy in Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy* 45/46 (1989): 3–6; Mordechai Abir, *Ethiopia: The Era of the princes: The challenge of Islam and Re-unification of the Christian Empire, 1769-1855*. (New York: Praeger, 1968); Robert L Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970); M.A. Mohamed Salih, “‘New Wine in Old Bottles’: Tribal Militas and the Sudanese State,” *Review of African Political Economy* 45/46 (1989): 168–74; Roger Charlton and Roy May, “Warlords and Militarism in Chad,” *Review of African Political Economy* 45/46 (1989): 12–25; William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Toyin Falola and Dare Oguntomisin, *Yoruba Warlords of the Nineteenth Century* (Trenton, NJ; Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press, 2001).

⁵⁷ Aitchison quoted in Kentridge, *An Unofficial War*, 81. Also cited in the most thorough but by no means comprehensive examination of warlords in South Africa to date, Anthony

Aitchison, Anthony Minnaar, and Morris and Hindson distinguish types of Inkatha-allied warlords in opposition to the leaders of ANC/UDF-allied youth organizations that varied from politically disciplined defense committees that extracted “taxes” to criminal gangs that looted and extorted for personal gain. Minnaar builds upon Aitchison’s definition to delineate the specific South African types as the semirural/traditional induna type; the enforcer/hitman; the urban town councillor; and the squatter-lord type. These can be only Inkatha-affiliated warlords and “there is nothing directly equivalent to warlords in the ranks of the UDF/ANC structures...”⁵⁸ Similarly, at the member level, the term “vigilante” tends to be associated with armed gangs of men intent on intimidating or killing anti-apartheid activists.⁵⁹ This association links vigilantism with Inkatha, rather than taking into consideration the applicability of the concept across the political divide to incorporate instances where ANC/UDF affiliated youth policed territory and ensured justice via people’s courts and necklacings. While Minnaar, Morris, and Hindson have called attention to the vulnerability of local ANC leaders to warlord tendencies, there remains a propensity to label local Inkatha leaders as warlords and ANC leaders as freedom fighters.⁶⁰

Minnaar, “‘Undisputed Kings’: Warlordism in Natal,” in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 61–94.

⁵⁸ Minnaar, “Undisputed Kings,” 62–6; Morris and Hindson, “South Africa,” 51.

⁵⁹ Haysom, *Mabangalala*; Meer and Institute for Black Research, *Resistance in the Townships*; Minnaar, “Undisputed Kings,” 69.

⁶⁰ The noted exception here is Sifiso Nkabinde, the Richmond ANC leader who instigated a small-scale civil war after his expulsion from the party for being a police spy. See Rupert Taylor, “Justice Denied: Political Violence in KwaZulu-Natal After 1994,” *African Affairs* 101, no. 405 (2002): 473–508; Ragavaloo, *Richmond*. As well, Sarah Mathis has examined several ANC-affiliated Umbumbulu leaders who meet many of the criteria of warlords. Sarah Mathis, “From War Leaders to Freedom Fighters: Forms of Violence in Umbumbulu in the 1980s and 90s,” 2005. As well, Harry Gwala was suspended from the SACP

Mhlabunzima Maphumulo's rise as a powerful local figure must be examined in this context. In contrast to the warlords associated with Inkatha, he first emerged in the press as a "peace chief" and "maverick" leader dedicated to quelling the Midlands violence. Maphumulo appears to have had the best interests of his people at heart and did not rely on force to govern, but as he was drawn into ANC/UDF networks through Contralesa he gathered strong-arm men around him, crusaded for a political cause, turned to the armed struggle, and earned a larger-than-life reputation. Because Maphumulo so frequently visited the offices of the *Natal Witness* and drew upon his platform with Contralesa it is much easier to track his actions and legendary reputation, but the Table Mountain men with whom he clashed, such as the Nyavu chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli and the Gcabashe brothers, Thomas Mshoki and Sabelo, inspired fear and awe in their communities. As we will see, Mdluli's followers not only invaded Mbambangalo but also were implicated in the attacks of the Seven Days War in March 1990. The Gcabashe brothers, Thomas Msoki and Sabelo, spearheaded many of the Inkatha meetings designed to oust Chief Maphumulo that resulted in violence.⁶¹

Maphumulo had been recognized as a "rebel chief" and "maverick" in the press as early as 1980 in the wake of the formation of the opposition Inala Party in KwaZulu. But he was first recognized as the "peace chief" in late 1988 after a series of well-publicized peace initiatives and attacks on the South African Police. In August, Maphumulo organized a new effort to bring

in 1994 on account of allegations of sectarian behavior that may also be interpreted as warlordism. See Nqakula, "Harry Gwala"; O'Malley, *Shades of Difference*, 285–7.

⁶¹ For evidence of Nyavu involvement in the Seven Days War in Vulindlela, see Timothy Smith, testimony to the TRC, Pietermaritzburg, November 1996, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_11.htm (accessed 24 December 2011). For evidence of Gcabashe's collaboration with South African Police, see Affidavit of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, February 1, 1990, in the Supreme Court of South Africa Natal Provincial Division in the Matter between Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo and The Minister of Law and Order, the Commissioner of South African Police, and Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli Case No. 280/90.

peace to the Pietermaritzburg region. He convened a meeting of clergymen, Inkatha members, and representatives of the Edendale Crisis Committee with the assistance of Inkatha Central Committee member Ben Jele, but senior Inkatha officials ignored the meeting.⁶²

In October, a month before Mpumalanga Magistrate Peter Webber visited the trust farm in an attempt to sort out the land dispute, Maphumulo threw a “peace party” at his court in Maqongqo to celebrate his 15-year reign as chief and the calm that had prevailed there under his rule. Indeed, the numbers analyzed for 1987-89 unrest events by Aitchison attest to Table Mountain’s peace. Eight “events” occurred in the region in contrast to 37 in nearby Ehlazeni, 350 in Imbali township, and 830 in the Vulindlela region.⁶³ Peace party attendees included Mpumalanga mayor Roger Sishi, the Mpumalanga magistrate Peter Webber, and both “traditional stick-wielding warriors and young maqabane (comrades) displaced from the violence-torn Pietermaritzburg townships.”⁶⁴ Speakers Ben Jele and COSATU regional coordinator Bheki Ngidi attributed the lack of violence during Maphumulo’s rule to his neutrality. The chief described his success, “I am an Inkatha man, but that does not mean I have to discriminate. I have to accommodate every member of my tribe irrespective of their political allegiance, be it UDF, Cosatu, Inkatha, or Azapo. I will not tolerate people who go house to house forcing others to join their organization.”⁶⁵

⁶² “New peace initiative for city’s townships,” *Natal Witness*, August 9, 1988; Wyndham Hartley, “The resurgence of violence,” Opinion, *Natal Witness* August 12, 1988.

⁶³ For the purpose of his analysis, Aitchison used “events” more or less synonymously with what the press and Police Unrest Reports described as “events” or “incidents.” An “event” could describe a single incident or several, but ranges from an attack on a house to murder. Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead,” 83–110.

⁶⁴ Fred Kockett, “Cosatu, Inkatha leaders meet at chief’s party,” *Natal Witness*, October 10, 1988.

⁶⁵ Kockett, “Cosatu, Inkatha leaders meet at chief’s party.”

However, not all local leaders supported Maphumulo's peace efforts. At the peace gathering, Maphumulo told the press about opposition he faced from other chiefs of Pietermaritzburg who "do not like what I am doing and say I must not accept any UDF members in my community."⁶⁶ After the meeting, Maphumulo received multiple threats on his life, allegedly from militant elements within Inkatha. Callers to the chief threatened that he would die like his friend, the neighboring Ximba chief, Msinga Mlaba, who had been gunned down near Camperdown (east of Pietermaritzburg) the same year due to his UDF connections. In the context of the Natal violence, Maphumulo and his councillors decided to hire bodyguards to protect the chief and his people.⁶⁷

Displeasure with Maphumulo at the highest levels of Inkatha became clear when the KZLA called on the chief to appear before it, allegedly because of his decision to hold the peace party and ask for more land for the refugees. Chief Minister Buthelezi also announced there had been allegations of the chief's interference in Gcumisa affairs. The summons stated he would again be charged under the KwaZulu Chiefs and Headmen's Act should he fail to attend. Maphumulo refused to attend the inquiry, recalling his earlier suspension and assault in Ulundi when the recently assassinated Chief Mlaba helped him. He alleged, "I know they and the chief minister want me deposed for not towing the Inkatha line."⁶⁸ Chief Maphumulo thus brought to an end his short-lived identification as an "Inkatha man."

⁶⁶ Local chief offers refuge to all" and "Death threats force Chief Maphumulo to hire guards," *Natal Witness Echo* October 27, 1988.

⁶⁷ Local chief offers refuge to all" and "Death threats force Chief Maphumulo to hire guards."

⁶⁸ Fred Kockett, "Chief fears Buthelezi may strip him of his title," *Natal Witness* November 23, 1988; "Death threats;" "Verbatim Report of the First Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly," April 7, 1989.

Maphumulo also spearheaded peace efforts in the neighboring war-torn Mpumalanga township where he was still chairman of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority. Violence was rampant in the township since the mid-1980s when existing tensions between local organizations erupted after the murder of regional UDF leader Victoria Mxenge.⁶⁹ By 1989, Mpumalanga had the reputation as the most unstable area in the province. Maphumulo initially attempted to arrange meetings where residents could air their grievances with senior police officials regarding the actions of *kitkonstabels* (special constables) who many believed were the source of much of the violence. Several protests were organized by women who called for the replacement of the *kitkonstabels* with South African Defence Force (SADF) troops. Maphumulo too began to call outright for the removal of the *kitkonstabels* who were then replaced with KwaZulu Police (KZP).⁷⁰

The KZP force had been established in 1980 after negotiations between the KwaZulu and South African governments. The process of handing over South African Police (SAP) stations in KwaZulu territory to the KZP began as early as 1981, though the South African government initially refused to relinquish control of some of the largest Natal townships to the KZP. KwaZulu and Inkatha continued to push for the handover of these stations (including one at Mpumalanga). Complaints against the KZP arose almost immediately after local handovers. Violence monitors outlined several KZP trends: collusion with Inkatha/involvement in unlawful acts; failure to investigate complaints and crimes; failure to protect the people; bias towards

⁶⁹ For more on Mpumalanga, see Bonnin, "Space, Place and Identity."

⁷⁰ "Meeting over violence postponed," *Natal Mercury* October 22, 1988; "Mpumalanga meeting on violence," *Natal Witness*, November 16, 1988; Khaba Mkhize, "Mpumalanga magistrate flees home after death threat," *Natal Witness Echo* June 15, 1989.

Inkatha; and involvement in covert military activities.⁷¹ With such a notorious reputation, it seems incredible that Mpumalanga residents would prefer KZP control. But Debby Bonnin's research on Mpumalanga shows that the dynamics between the SAP, SADF, and KZP enabled those on the ground to exploit the power play between these state security groups to their own advantage. Within the first month, community leaders were praising the KZP and reporting that violence had greatly subsided. Women remained steadfastly opposed to any attempts to have the *kitkonstabels* returned.⁷² Given Maphumulo's later efforts to have *kitkonstabels* removed from his own territory and his break with Inkatha, it seems more likely that the chief helped to negotiate the handover to KZP based on the desires of Mpumalanga residents than because of any push by Inkatha.

“Because my people are in the MDM, I have to be with them”⁷³

Another arena through which Chief Maphumulo strove to bring peace to the Natal region was the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa). He utilized the organization to sponsor a commission of inquiry into the violence after he was refused by the central government, traveled to Lusaka to meet with the ANC in exile, and later drew upon its networks for protection. While the memory of Maphumulo is one of a neutral peace chief, his leadership of Contralesa illustrates both a more progressive affiliation and an inclination towards militarism than usually recognized.

⁷¹ Jenny Irish and Howard Varney, “The KwaZulu Police: Obstacle to Peace?,” in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 49–55.

⁷² Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity,” 258.

⁷³ Maphumulo, “Interview with Chief Maphumulo,” *Sechaba* (1990), 8.

From its formation in 1983, the United Democratic Front had failed to develop a coherent strategy towards rural issues and the institution of the chieftaincy beyond calls for abolition of the bantustans and the return of land to the people. Chiefs were generally equated with bantustan structures and believed to be a dying institution, as famously announced by then publicity secretary Terror Lekota, to be replaced by democratically elected officials. But a 1987 “rural report” came to a more noncommittal conclusion, recognizing that chiefs were both a “suitable issue to unite a broad range of people” against and a possibly expedient alliance.⁷⁴ When Prince Klaas Makhosana Mahlangu fled to Pretoria in fear for his life during the successful anti-independence movement in KwaNdebele, Northern Transvaal UDF leaders found themselves uncertain about how to respond. “Could ‘progressive’ chiefs be organized to further the liberation struggle?”⁷⁵

Klaas Makhosana Mahlangu was one of these ‘progressive’ traditional leaders. A member of the Ndzundza royal family, Mahlangu fled KwaNdebele in December 1985 after he nearly 100 armed vigilantes dragged him and his family from their homestead. The Ndzundza royal family headed an anti-independence alliance in the wake of the incorporation of Moutse (originally slated as part of the homeland Lebowa), the planned independence for KwaNdebele, and the brutal activities of the pro-independence organization Mbokotho.⁷⁶ Sekibakiba Peter Lekgoathi argues the royal family “chose to act as a symbolic centre of protest in part because

⁷⁴ van Kessel, *Beyond Our Wildest Dreams*, 76–85.

⁷⁵ van Kessel, *Beyond Our Wildest Dreams*, 83.

⁷⁶ Transvaal Rural Action Committee and Black Sash, *KwaNdebele: The Struggle against “Independence”* (Johannesburg: Transvaal Action Committee, 1986); Edwin Ritchken, “The KwaNdebele Struggle Against Independence,” in *South African Review*, vol. 5 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989), 426–45; Sekibakiba Peter Lekgoathi, “The United Democratic Front in Lebowa and KwaNdebele During the 1980s,” in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol. 4 [1980–1990] (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), 658.

they perceived that the Bantustan rulers were threatening to undermine the authority of chiefs by subordinating it to the KwaNdebele government structures.” By taking sides with their people, the Ndzundza family re-established a great degree of popular legitimacy for the chieftainship.⁷⁷ Youth Congresses were also organized in KwaNdebele and Moutse, the area on the northeastern boundary of KwaNdebele excised from Lebowa and incorporated into KwaNdebele in early 1986, and linked to the national South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) under Peter Mokaba.

Mokaba approached the ANC and UDF with a proposal to form a body of traditional leaders comprised of men and women like Mahlangu who had signaled their disillusionment with apartheid.⁷⁸ After Mahlangu escaped to KwaZulu (his wife, Princess Nonhlanhla was sister of King Goodwill Zwelethini)⁷⁹ and ultimately to Mamelodi, Mahlangu met Richard Mothupi, who introduced him to activists of UDF, SAYCO, and the Construction and Allied Workers’ Union (CAWU) from the Transvaal regions. With the guidance of Mokaba, 38 chiefs and subchiefs from KwaNdebele and Moutse launched an organization committed to uniting traditional leaders against apartheid and the homeland system in September 1987.⁸⁰ Membership was open to all traditional leaders, including members of royal families and the children and

⁷⁷ Lekgoathi, “The United Democratic Front in Lebowa and KwaNdebele During the 1980s,” 656.

⁷⁸ Paul Holden and Sello Mathabatha, “The Politics of Resistance: 1948-1990,” in *Mpumalanga: History and Heritage* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 427–9.

⁷⁹ Colleen McCaul, *Satellite in Revolt: KwaNdebele: An Economic and Political Profile* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1987), 78.

⁸⁰ van Kessel, *Beyond Our Wildest Dreams*, 83; Holden and Mathabatha, “The Politics of Resistance: 1948-1990,” 427–9.

wives of traditional leaders.⁸¹ Thus, Contralesa was born. The organization initially took responsibility for many of the refugees from KwaNdebele and Moutse, accommodating and catering for them and in the process running up a large debt it would battle to settle for several years. A committee was elected and deputed to recruit traditional leaders. It opened an account with Standard Bank and solicited funds from the South African Council of Churches, South African Catholic Bishops Conference, Kagiso Trust, and the UDF.⁸²

Ineke van Kessel argued that from its inauguration, Contralesa's relationship with the UDF and the ANC remained ambiguous. The involvement of SAYCO in the launch of Contralesa gave rise to reasonable suspicions that the organization's main goal was the abolishment of the institution of the chieftaincy. Several of the activists involved in the formation were indeed motivated by the belief there was no place for chiefs in a classless society. But in the meantime, recruiting traditional leaders to the progressive cause would prevent them from subverting the struggle. However, this combination of "'struggle' rhetoric with wooing chiefs" sometimes proved difficult. Contralesa employed UDF methods, advertising itself as a progressive grassroots and community-based organisation and handed out t-shirts to its distinguished members, "who would have preferred a tie or a classy briefcase."⁸³

⁸¹ Patekile Holomisa, interview by Padraig O'Malley, October 16, 1996, <http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv00017/04lv00344/05lv00965/06lv01042.htm> (accessed January 1, 2012).

⁸² "Minutes of the Meeting to Elect Interim Committee, held at Johannesburg Hotel, on Jun 10-11, 1989," in Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 4.

⁸³ van Kessel, *Beyond Our Wildest Dreams*, 84.

While Contralesa strove to present itself as an unaffiliated organization, the influence of the ANC and the UDF in its early development and decision-making cannot be denied.⁸⁴ Chief Sango Phatekile Holomisa, the current Contralesa president, acknowledged that the ANC (through the UDF) did initiate the formation of Contralesa and ever since the organization has been associated with the ANC.⁸⁵ From its very founding, UDF activists were central to recruitment. Richard Mothupi, who had first introduced Prince Klaas Makhosana Mahlangu to the UDF activists, served as the organization's initial National Organizer. The ANC sought out Holomisa for his legal expertise and asked him to join.⁸⁶ Similarly, Chief Maphumulo was actively recruited by ANC/UDF activists at a meeting at the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg.⁸⁷

At the first Contralesa meeting of national representatives in June 1989, the members present resolved not to align with any political organization, but decided to hold consultations with progressive organizations such as the ANC. An address by R.S. Ndou and a message from UDF president Albertina Sisulu both encouraged Contralesa to meet with the ANC.⁸⁸ Over the next several months, the message of the meetings was similar: the organization needed to pursue

⁸⁴ It must be noted that Contralesa and the ANC later fell out during the constitutional negotiations where Contralesa's arguments in favor of preserving the chieftaincy too closely resembled those of the Inkatha Freedom Party. The organization has since been sidelined amidst its critiques of the local election ward system; S.P. Holomisa has intensified efforts to publicize these critiques, including several publications and an upgraded website for Contralesa. See Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*.; and <http://contralesa.org/>, upgraded in 2011.

⁸⁵ Patekile Holomisa, interview by Padraig O'Malley, August 20, 1997, <http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv00017/04lv00344/05lv01092/06lv01149.htm> (accessed January 1, 2012).

⁸⁶ Gibbs, "Ah! Dilintzaba!"

⁸⁷ Jabulani Sithole, correspondence with the author.

⁸⁸ "Minutes of the Meeting to Elect Interim Committee," Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 4–13.

talks with the ANC, but not affiliate, for if Contralesa was seen as supporting specific organizations it would be in danger of losing support from other chiefs.⁸⁹ In late July 1989, Contralesa did send a delegation to Lusaka and the trip was widely covered in the press, which also often described the congress as an UDF-affiliate. After the unbanning of the ANC, Contralesa made calls for the people to support the ANC.⁹⁰

Pragmatism guided Contralesa's unaffiliated stance, as clearly the organization was ideologically inclined towards progressivism of the ANC and UDF. Holomisa said that the ANC was supportive of the decision for Contralesa to project itself as an independent body in order to attract leaders from across the political spectrum.⁹¹ The interim committee members were aware that an affiliation to the UDF or ANC could not only prevent other traditional leaders from joining, it could put their own lives in danger in the midst of civil war. Indeed, after the organization's launch, several leaders and their homes were targeted for attack.⁹²

Archival records do not suggest exactly when Maphumulo joined the organization but Contralesa records suggest that he had been aware of planning meetings as early as February

⁸⁹ "Interim Committee Meeting: Laying down Policies and Procedures of Contralesa, June 24, 1989"; "Meetings with Regional Chiefs: A Report: Contralesa meeting with Ciskeian Chiefs at Horseshoe Motel on November 12, 1989"; all in Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*.

⁹⁰ "Support ANC – Contralesa chiefs," *Natal Witness Echo* March 1, 1990.

⁹¹ Holomisa by O'Malley, October 16, 1996, <http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv00017/04lv00018/05lv00110/06lv0123.htm> (accessed January 1, 2012).

⁹² National Organizer and former trade unionist Sphiwe Thusi escaped an abduction attempt in June 1989 and in September 1989 Chief Elphas Molefe was suspended by KwaZulu for "sowing disunity." Later, arsonists destroyed the still anti-Inkatha Prince Israel Mcwayizeni's home after he announced his membership. "Abduction attempt on Contralesa man,"; "Contralesa's Thusi nearly abducted," *New African* June 26, 1989; "Nquthu chief suspended from duty," *Natal Witness* September 21, 1989; "Home of Zulu Prince attacked by arsonists," *Natal Witness* November 15, 1989.

1989.⁹³ It is clear that for some time Maphumulo chose to keep this information secret and on at least one occasion denied being a member.⁹⁴ In April, Maphumulo refused Inkatha officials from Imbali and Inadi access to his people. Fearful of the violence plaguing nearby Edendale, Ashdown, and Imbali, Maphumulo forbid Inkatha recruitment drives in Maqongqo.⁹⁵ Cognizant of Inkatha's existing animosity towards him, Maphumulo may have hoped to protect himself by keeping his membership private.

Additionally, he would not have wanted any affiliation to derail his latest peace initiative. In the same month he refused Inkatha recruitment campaigns in Maqongqo, Maphumulo spearheaded efforts to establish a commission of inquiry into the violence in Natal. Throughout 1988, Anglican Bishop of Natal, Michael Nuttall corresponded with State President P.W. Botha regarding the unrest. Bishop Nuttall had called for a judicial commission of inquiry into the violence but Botha refused, claiming that senior police officials had carried out an investigation and found "clear signs that calm has returned to the area."⁹⁶ Pressure mounted as the *Natal Witness*, COSATU, the Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches (PCC), the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness (PACSA), the Progressive Federal Party, and the Anglican Church all threw their weight behind the call. Even Buthelezi said he supported the commission's establishment "in principle."⁹⁷

⁹³ Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 5.

⁹⁴ "Peacekeeper not surprised at attack," *Natal Witness* April 19, 1989.

⁹⁵ Lakela Kaunda, "Inkatha 'recruitment' drive in Maqongqo worries chief," *Natal Witness Echo* April 6, 1989.

⁹⁶ "Unrest inquiry refused," *Natal Witness* March 4, 1989.

⁹⁷ Bryan Pearson, "Collusion claim: pressure grows," *Natal Witness* March 31, 1989.

Maphumulo announced another petition to Botha. The state president's refusal, Maphumulo said, was based on an incorrect assessment that the violence had receded. As chairman of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority and chief of an area welcoming refugees, Maphumulo witnessed firsthand the scale and impact of what he called a civil war. "The continuing state of chaos and violence has resulted in a condition of fear, confusion and hopelessness among my people," the chief said.⁹⁸ Ordinary administrative, police, and legal processes had broken down. As chaos replaced order in daily life, he felt it was his duty to petition the president and bring peace to his people. He believed that "a chief is a shield for his people, protecting them at all times 'like an umbrella' and that the violence increased when chiefs took sides and the people lost that umbrella."⁹⁹

Maphumulo dedicated himself to understanding the violence so that he could operate as that umbrella. The chief utilized his education and connections to undertake research—including interviews with hundreds of people and extensive reading on the matter—because of his concern for his people. He placed himself in a position to record what he believed to be the common perceptions of his people concerning the violence.¹⁰⁰ He trusted a commission of inquiry could establish the causes and prevent further violence. The final petition included maps, charts illustrating the scale of violence as recorded by the violence monitors at the Centre for Adult

⁹⁸ Pearson, "Chief Maphumulo makes bold bid for peace," *Natal Witness* April 8, 1989.

⁹⁹ Quraish Patel, "Rebel Chief," *Sunday Tribune* April 16, 1989. Maphumulo's use of umbrella is interesting here given his connections with the amaNazaretha church. Under Johannes Galilee Shembe, black umbrellas became part of the uniform for Shembe women at the annual amaNazaretha festivals. See Peter Larlham, "Festivals of the Nazareth Baptist Church," *The Drama Review: TDR* 25, no. 4 (December 1, 1981): 59–74; Robert Papini, "Dance Uniform History in the Church of Nazareth Baptists: The Move to Tradition," *African Arts* 37, no. 3 (October 1, 2004): 48–92.

¹⁰⁰ Patel, "Natal Midlands townships in middle of 'bloody civil war,'" *Sunday Tribune* April 9, 1989.

Education at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, and copies of civil interdict applications.¹⁰¹

On April 7, 1989, Maphumulo and Pietermaritzburg Lawyers for Human Rights advocates Ann Skelton, Pat Stillwell, and Jules Browde handed the petition to Botha's representatives at his Tuynhuys residence in Cape Town. "We sat drinking tea out of delicate cups whilst we waited and waited. Eventually Botha sent out one of his male secretaries to tell us he had received the petition and he would consider it," Skelton remembers.¹⁰² Upon their return to Natal, Maphumulo began to criticize Inkatha openly in the press, pointing to the movement as the instigator of the violence.¹⁰³

Despite Buthelezi's earlier support of such a commission, "in principle," he angrily condemned Maphumulo, alleging that the chief was part of a Contralesa plot to infiltrate Natal's traditional leaders. Buthelezi warned members of the KZLA that party politicization of chiefs presented a threat to each and every one of them. Maphumulo denied his involvement with Contralesa, but declared that "I will find out what it stands for and if it is a good organisation I will join it." He further questioned why Buthelezi, as a traditional leader, would be so opposed to an association that represents the people. He cited Buthelezi's failure to act as the impetus for his own efforts. He had hoped the chief minister, as a "person with a platform," would throw his weight behind the petition.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ "Petition to the State President from Mhlabunzima Maphumulo," April 7, 1989 in *Verbatim Report of the First Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly* Vol. 51.

¹⁰² Ann Skelton, correspondence with the author, February 8, 2011.

¹⁰³ Quraish Patel, "Natal Midlands townships in middle of 'bloody civil war,'" *Sunday Tribune* April 9, 1989.

¹⁰⁴ Lakela Kaunda, "No response to chief's petition on Natal violence," *Natal Witness Echo* April 13, 1989; "Peacekeeper not surprised at attack," *Natal Witness* April 19, 1989.

Buthelezi grasped onto technicalities that he believed invalidated Maphumulo's submission of the petition and the KZLA spent nearly three whole days berating the chief and the petition. Buthelezi contended that Maphumulo's petition should have been directed through him, as chief minister, rather than to President Botha. He reminded the KZLA of Maphumulo's involvement with Inala and alleged that if the State President entertained Maphumulo's petition it would be evidence of the continuation of Maphumulo's relationship with the Department of Information. He alleged Maphumulo's chairmanship of the Mpumalanga Regional Authority had expired and that the petition was thus made ineffective.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, Maphumulo ceased to serve in this position from April 26, 1988, but only days after Buthelezi's allegations, the press reported that the Mpumalanga town council backed Maphumulo's call for a commission. Maphumulo also told reporters he was aware of a hit squad stationed at neighboring KwaSwayimane with orders to kill him.¹⁰⁶

Less than two weeks after Maphumulo submitted the petition, the Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok met with Buthelezi in Ulundi to discuss the violence. Days later, Vlok announced in a statement on behalf of the president in the House of Assembly that Botha had refused Maphumulo's petition. He laid the blame for the violence on "revolutionary agents of the ANC-SACP alliance, namely the UDF and Cosatu," and incredibly proclaimed "there is

¹⁰⁵ One article cites that Maphumulo left his position as MP in anticipation of a bursary to study abroad. "Chief Maphumulo's authority questioned," *Daily News* April 11, 1989; "No KwaZulu Members back chief's appeal," *Natal Witness* April 15, 1989; "Maphumulo the peace maker," *New African* April 17, 1989. For Buthelezi's point-by-point rebuttal and KZLA critique of the petition, see *Verbatim Report of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly* Vol. 51, April 10-13, 1989.

¹⁰⁶ "Hit-squad assigned to assassinate me – Maphumulo," *Natal Witness* April 20, 1989.

absolutely no question of a breakdown of law and order in the greater Pietermaritzburg area.”¹⁰⁷

Botha wrote to Maphumulo that he and the Cabinet did not believe a commission could solve the problem and could indeed cause more problems. Botha asked Maphumulo and all those who supported the petition to assist “by calling upon and demanding of the ANC (which remain the main organisation committed to the violence by policy pronouncement) that it should abandon violence and terrorism...”¹⁰⁸ Maphumulo felt certain the government’s decision had been influenced by Buthelezi.¹⁰⁹

Chief Maphumulo was understandably disappointed but remained undeterred. His membership of Contralesa became public in June when the press announced he had been elected President of the interim committee designed to draft its constitution.¹¹⁰ Maphumulo later said that he joined Contralesa because he believed that “one has to move with the people. If one is leading people who are progressive I think it is right and proper to be also progressive as a leader. Because my people are in the MDM [Mass Democratic Movement], I have to be with them.”¹¹¹ At the meeting where he was elected President, he gave a report on the ongoing violence in the Pietermaritzburg region in which he told the leaders about his failed petition:

I sent a petition to State President, PW Botha, appealing to him to appoint a commission of inquiry into the current conflict in Pietermaritzburg and the surrounding areas. I pointed out that the violence between UWUSA/INKATHA

¹⁰⁷ “Vlok meets Buthelezi,” *Natal Witness* April 21, 1989; “PW rejects probe into city violence,” *Weekly Mail* April 1989.

¹⁰⁸ P.W. Botha to Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, May 2, 1989, CAMP, Karis-Gerhart Collection, Reel 92, Biographical file on Mhlabunzima Maphumulo.

¹⁰⁹ “Chief Maphumulo claims: ‘Government decision was influenced by Buthelezi,’” *Natal Witness* May 18, 1989.

¹¹⁰ “Maphumulo elected,” *Natal Witness* June 15, 1989; Khaba Mkhize, “Chief Maphumulo elected president of Contralesa,” *Natal Witness Echo* June, 1989.

¹¹¹ Maphumulo, “Interview with Chief Maphumulo,” *Sechaba* (1990) 8-10.

and UDF/COSATU had reached a critical level that threatened our existence as people, affecting our youth, our women, our senior citizens, our institutions of traditional leadership and our values.

While we are not responsible for the external factors that systematically create social disorder, internally it is our responsibility to do everything we can to solve the problem.¹¹²

Over the next several months, Maphumulo dedicated himself to Contralesa activities and never gave up the quest for a commission. At the end of July, Maphumulo, Contralesa Vice President Patekile Holomisa (the current Contralesa president), and Contralesa members from Bophuthatswana, Venda, and the Transkei visited the ANC in Lusaka for a “Peace Conference.” While Holomisa cautioned against the meeting, not wanting to give the government the impression Contralesa had affiliated, Maphumulo believed it was imperative to know what the ANC had in store for chiefs. The delegation met with ANC Secretary General Alfred Nzo, military commander of Umkhonto weSizwe Chris Hani, Steve Tshwete, John Nkadimeng, Steve Dlamini, Eric Mtshali, Mswai Piliso, Jacob Zuma, and Joe Slovo. Lakela Kaunda, the *Natal Witness Echo* journalist who accompanied the delegation, entertainingly related the story of their visit that included Zambian discos, battered taxis “that would never cross the Edendale/Imbali intersection robots without giving traffic chief Geoff Pascoe a heart attack,” and forgotten protocol. “Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo reminds the military commander of Umkhonto Wesizwe Chris Hani, ‘Ukhuluma neNkosi, Hani, khuleka,’ (You are talking to a chief, Hani, show respect.)” He later joked with Steve Tshwete, “You might be thrown out of here and come begging for a site at Maqongqo!”¹¹³ The ANC told Contralesa there would always be a place

¹¹² “Report on On-going Violence by Chief Maphumulo,” June 11, 1989, in Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 10.

¹¹³ Lakela Kaunda, “ANC delegates forget protocol when they meet the amakhosi,” *Natal Witness Echo* August 1989.

for “progressive chiefs” in the struggle and that “it was a lie that they would liquidate the offices of chiefs.”¹¹⁴



Figures 16-17, Chief Maphumulo (second from left) in Lusaka in August 1989 with Steve Tshwete, Alfred Nzo, and Chris Hani. *Natal Witness Echo* August 1989; Maphumulo (second from right) with Winnie Mandela at the December 1989 Contralesa/MDM rally in Edendale. Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers.

Upon the delegation’s return on August 1, Maphumulo continued with public pleas for a peace initiative and urged that members of communities affected by the war should be included in peace talks.¹¹⁵ Maphumulo and other Contralesa chiefs traversed South Africa as part of organizing drives and sent letters to editors publicizing Contralesa’s mission.¹¹⁶ They organized rallies and invited such major public figures like Winnie Mandela.¹¹⁷ The KwaNgwane chief minister Enos Mabuza announced his support for the movement on a visit to

¹¹⁴ Lakela Kaunda, “Traditional leaders have a role in the struggle,” *Natal Witness Echo* August 1989.

¹¹⁵ “Interim Committee Meeting: Laying down Policies and Procedures of Contralesa,” June 24, 1989, in Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 14–6.; “Peace above party interests,” *Natal Witness Echo* August 2, 1989; Khaba Mkhize, “Call for broader base to future peace talks,” *Natal Witness Echo* August 3, 1989.

¹¹⁶ For examples, see Mhlabunzima Maphumulo to the Editor, *Natal Witness Echo* September 21, 1989; “Meetings with Regional Chiefs: A Report, Contralesa meeting with Ciskeian Chiefs at Horseshoe Motel on November 12, 1989,” in Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 18–22.

¹¹⁷ “Man killed as police break up Edendale rally,” *Natal Witness Echo* December 4, 1989.

Pietermaritzburg.¹¹⁸ Maphumulo arranged a meeting to introduce the organization to the Zulu King, but failed to attend when the meeting was scheduled in Ulundi, a location still disagreeable to Maphumulo on account of his assault there only four years earlier.¹¹⁹

This failed meeting, and Contralesa's activities in general, attracted the ire of Buthelezi. Contralesa leadership anticipated resistance from KwaZulu, as well as from Ciskei, Bophutatswana, and Venda.¹²⁰ Buthelezi and King Goodwill Zwelethini met with chiefs in Ulundi to discuss Maphumulo and Contralesa. Buthelezi called efforts by Maphumulo to organize Contralesa in Natal "an attempt to thrust the spear into the very heart of Zulu unity."¹²¹ He criticized Maphumulo for keeping company with revolutionaries "bitterly opposed to the ubukhosi institution" and chastised him for attempting to recruit the king and turn him against Buthelezi. He concluded the chiefs must "close ranks and to rejoice in our unity and to tell Inkosi Maphumulo to go to hell."¹²² The king, now firmly allied with Buthelezi, also instructed the chiefs: "Let the amakhosi of kwaZulu now speak finally and let us bury Inkosi Maphumulo in yesterday's problems. Let us make him totally irrelevant for the future."¹²³ The chiefs thus

¹¹⁸ Khaba Mkhize, "Chief Minister backs Contralesa and MDM," *Natal Witness Echo* August 24, 1989.

¹¹⁹ "Chief Maphumulo's absence at meeting angers King," *Natal Witness Echo* September 14, 1989.

¹²⁰ "Interim Committee Meeting"

¹²¹ APC PC126/2/1/17 "Address by Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi at Meeting with the Amakhosi of KwaZulu," Ulundi, September 14, 1989; Carmel Rickard, "Buthelezi blasts the chief who brought peace," *Weekly Mail* September 15-21, 1989.

¹²² APC PC126/2/1/17 "Address by Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi at Meeting with the Amakhosi of KwaZulu," Ulundi, September 14, 1989; Carmel Rickard, "Buthelezi blasts the chief who brought peace," *Weekly Mail* September 15-21, 1989.

¹²³ Carmel Rickard, "Me go to hell? Hell no, says Contralesa's defiant Maphumulo," *Weekly Mail* October 6, 1989.

resolved to isolate any leaders connected to Contralesa. Subsequently, Chief Elphas Molefe from Nqutu was suspended by the KZLA for “sowing Zulu disunity,”¹²⁴ and King Zwelethini met with Ciskeian delegates to speak out against Contralesa.¹²⁵ The conflict deepened as Prince Israel Mcwayizeni, still in conflict with Buthelezi, joined Contralesa.¹²⁶ But despite these setbacks, Maphumulo believed the organization had made serious inroads in the KwaZulu-Natal region.¹²⁷

When President Botha resigned after a stroke, Maphumulo immediately requested a meeting with the new president F.W. de Klerk. As the violence continued to devastate the midlands, Maphumulo directed all of his energies at stemming disorder in the region, placing his upcoming British-sponsored trip to study community development at the University of Manchester on hold to remain at home.¹²⁸ His calls for a commission drew increasing support from violence monitors, as well as the Democratic Party (the major South African opposition party). At the end of November, Maphumulo announced there would be a joint

¹²⁴ Another factor should be noted. Chief Molefe also attributed tension between himself and Buthelezi to “ethnic hostility,” because Molefe claimed his people were not “ethnic Zulus” but descendants of Basothos who had fought against the Zulu in the Anglo-Zulu War. Prior to 1979, Chief Molefe attempted to secede from KwaZulu because of this Basotho ancestry. Fred Kockett, “Regional peace talks put on hold by Inkatha,” *Natal Witness* September 25, 1989; “Suspension challenged,” *Natal Witness* October 7, 1989; Carmel Rickard, “Contralesa chief stripped of title by Buthelezi to take court action,” *Natal Witness* October 19, 1989; *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1980), 323.

¹²⁵ “Contralesa under fire from Zulu king again,” *Natal Witness* November 22, 1989.

¹²⁶ Carmel Rickard, “Congress wins more members,” *Weekly Mail* October 6, 1989; Carmel Rickard, “Home of Zulu prince attacked by arsonists,” *Natal Witness* November 15, 1989.

¹²⁷ “Contralesa chief hits back,” *The New African* November 20, 1989.

¹²⁸ Sam Sole, “Man of Peace,” *Sunday Tribune* October 8, 1989.

Contralesa/MDM rally to welcome newly released ANC leaders and that Contralesa had arranged the long-awaited commission of inquiry.¹²⁹

Contralesa complained when permission was denied for the rally at Edendale's Wadley Stadium. Despite paying a R700 fee for use of the stadium (though Inkatha had not paid a fee for a rally there six months earlier), the magistrate and police refused authorization. Maphumulo was not surprised, as he felt Contralesa was "not a sweetheart organisation" of the government. As the organization had anticipated the refusal, it made alternative arrangements and at the last moment moved the rally to the much smaller Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre, a building at the heart of the mass democratic movement in Edendale.¹³⁰ On December 3, 1989 Maphumulo took the stage with Winnie Mandela, Molefe, and Democratic Party MP Pierre Cronje. While the rally was considered legal inside the Centre, the nearly 3,000 who attended could not all fit into the hall. As a result, those who gathered outside the hall constituted an illegal open-air gathering and the police used force to break it up. Police opened fire with rubber bullets and stun grenades. Linus Ngubane later died in the hospital from injuries inflicted by township police and six others were injured.¹³¹

Two days later, the first sitting of the commission commenced. Exactly what proceeded can only be garnered from the attention paid to the commission by the press. The commission would eventually disband without completion, producing no final report. Contralesa mandated

¹²⁹ Khaba Mkhize, "Mandela message prepared for Contralesa rally," *Natal Witness Echo* November 30, 1989; "Chiefs set up commission of inquiry into killings," *Natal Witness* December 2, 1989.

¹³⁰ "DDA explains why Contralesa had to pay for hire of stadium," *Natal Witness Echo* December 21, 1989.

¹³¹ Christelle de Jager, "Man killed as police break up Edendale rally," *Natal Witness* December 4, 1989; Nicola Cunningham-Brown, "Organisers says rally violence unnecessary," *Natal Mercury* December 5, 1989.

the commission to hear evidence on the violence and to investigate and report on the reasons behind the inefficiency of law enforcement in relation to the violence. Contralesa appointed Advocate Robert S. Douglas to act as commissioner. Pat Pillay, a Durban attorney, led evidence. The South African Council of Churches (SACC) sponsored the commission by way of bridge funding with the expectation that Contralesa would repay the SACC at a later date. The commission opened at Pietermaritzburg's Ubunye House on December 5, 1989 as workers returned to work from a stayaway to mourn recent deaths in Hammarsdale. Chief Zibuse Mlaba, brother of the assassinated Chief Msinga Mlaba, gave testimony. Witnesses from Trust Feed, KwaSwayimane, Imbali, Nxamalala, and Mpumalanga testified to fatal shootings of schoolchildren by white policemen, forced recruitment by Inkatha, and the corruption of town councillors. Several attested to their approval of the deployment of SADF troops, who they believed to be more impartial either the SAP or KZP.¹³² One former Inkatha Committee member from Mpumalanga who asked not to be named (as most witnesses did) told the commission he resigned from Inkatha because of its forced recruitment drives and possession of guns.¹³³

As the press ran headlines such as "Forced Inkatha recruitment to blame," Buthelezi threatened to sue Douglas for defamation. Douglas corresponded with Buthelezi's counsel, Friedman and Friedman, to assure the KwaZulu chief minister and Inkatha president that he was in no way prejudiced against Inkatha. Referring to the tension between Maphumulo/Contralesa and Buthelezi/Inkatha, Douglas wrote (and copied Maphumulo):

I must stress that I am in no way partisan in relation to any such hostility or antagonism. I was approached to act as Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry and undertook to do so on the basis of strict impartiality and on the basis of assurances that people representing all points of view, including Inkatha, would

¹³² "Mpumalanga peace 'not permanent'," *Daily News* December 13, 1989.

¹³³ "Former Inkatha man gives evidence," *Daily News* December 15, 1989.

appear before me. If the prospects of their doing so are now remote that seems to me an unfortunate result of the attitude adopted by your client and expressed by you in your letters to me.¹³⁴

Early in February 1990, the commission moved to Durban and shifted its focus to the violence in the townships surrounding the city. But the commission was delayed by a dispute with Contralesa.¹³⁵ It is likely this disagreement is related to an interim report of the commission submitted by Douglas that also expressed serious concerns about untimely payments and disorganization.¹³⁶ Maphumulo's ability to promptly respond may have been impacted by the eruption of violence in Mbambangalo only a week earlier. When the commission sat again, it heard of forced recruitments in Umlazi from an Inkatha councillor, extortion by chiefs in Ngcolosi, and the targeting of those cheering Nelson Mandela's release.¹³⁷

The world watched with anticipation as Mandela walked free after 27 years in prison. But it also watched with shock as parts of Mandela's country erupted in civil war. At the end of March, Maphumulo, Pillay, and Douglas flew to Geneva to present an interim report on the evidence to the International Commission of Jurists. Based on the testimonies of nearly 100 witnesses, the report identified Inkatha as perpetrators of the violence. After the presentation, Maphumulo held a press conference in London and announced it was unlikely Contralesa would ever meet with Buthelezi, who held his position only on account of the apartheid government. Ben Skosana, Inkatha's London representative, responded that the commission was "inevitably

¹³⁴ Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers, "R.S. Douglas to J. Friedman," n.d.

¹³⁵ "Douglas commission sitting again," *Natal Witness* February 14, 1990.

¹³⁶ Thobekile Maphumulo Collection, "R.S. Douglas to Messrs Pat Pillay & Company," February 8, 1990.

¹³⁷ "Lecturer explains Natal violence," *Daily News* February 14, 1990; "Violence started with squatters, inquiry hears," *Daily News* February 22, 1990; "Claims made at Douglas inquiry denied," *Daily News* February 22, 1990; "Woman tells commission how violence erupted at Malagazi after Mandela rally," *Daily News* March 2, 1990.

one-sided and superficial,” but the commission had clearly persuaded the International Commission of Jurists. The organization agreed to send a delegation because it was increasingly convinced that the South African government had encouraged the violence.¹³⁸

The commission never came to an official close and as far as can be ascertained, no final report exists.¹³⁹ After the press report on the planned trip to Geneva, there are no further articles about the commission though it was planned to sit in public until April 1990. As violence erupted in Table Mountain and Edendale valley in the Seven Days War, it is likely that few witnesses appeared and even if they did there is no record as the media turned its attention to the civil war. A confidential letter uncovered in the Ulundi Repository of the National Archive from Advocate Douglas to Buthelezi suggests that the work of the commission came to a premature end. In April 1991, Douglas wrote, “My work on that commission has now ceased. There are a number of reasons for this and I believe that you are entitled to know what they are. I am satisfied that you will find them very interesting.”¹⁴⁰

Douglas’ outreach to Buthelezi is certainly intriguing in its own right, but particularly because of Douglas’ 1992 appointment by the International Freedom Foundation (IFF) to investigate human rights abuses by the ANC and SACP in exile.¹⁴¹ In what became known as

¹³⁸ “Natal violence focus in Geneva,” *Natal Mercury* March 23, 1990; “Contralesa: talks with Buthelezi ‘doubtful’,” *Natal Witness* April 9, 1990; “Inkatha responds to Contralesa,” *Natal Witness* April 10, 1990; Heidi Gibson, “International Commission of Jurists to probe Natal violence,” *Natal Witness Echo* April 12, 1990; Mzala, “The violence in Natal,” *Natal Witness* May 3, 1990.

¹³⁹ My attempts to locate and contact Robert Douglas in South Africa failed.

¹⁴⁰ UAR, Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1990, “R.S. Douglas, SC to Dr. Buthelezi,” April 4, 1991.

¹⁴¹ Groups such as the IFF appeared out of the blue, putting out well-sourced, often accurate, and thoroughly discrediting news reports on the wire. Most of these initiatives stopped in their tracks with the Inkathagate scandal. C. D Schutte, Ian Liebenberg, and Anthony Minnaar,

the “Douglas Commission,” Douglas found evidence implicating senior ANC and SACP members in murder, torture, and detention without trial in prison camps. The IFF alleged to be a pro-capitalist lobby with board members such as United States senator Jesse Helms and British MP Sir George Gardiner but was in actuality a front created by South African military intelligence to “win friends and influence people internationally, and to campaign against the African National Congress.”¹⁴² The IFF continued to receive funding from the apartheid government until 1993 and several times arranged for Buthelezi to address conservative MPs in Britain. Phillip Van Niekerk alleges it appointed the Douglas Commission, “mindful of the damage that exposure of Swapo atrocities had caused that liberation movement in Namibia’s first elections.”¹⁴³ Journalist (and editor of the underground journal of MK) Paul Trehwela suggests it is extremely likely that the IFF in South Africa stood close to Inkatha and Buthelezi and therefore part of the strategy to delegitimize the ANC and SACP. He adds that this link to the regime does not reflect on the standing of Douglas as a barrister or the quality of his evidence, though he also suggests Douglas at time overstressed evidence in his report.¹⁴⁴ We cannot know for certain whether Douglas was aware of the IFF as a front for apartheid or if any personal leanings influenced his findings. His attempts to include Inkatha in the 1989-90 violence commission and his willingness to hold the organization responsible suggests he did his job

The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1998), 341.

¹⁴² Philip Van Niekerk, “How Apartheid Conned the West,” *The Observer* July 16, 1995.

¹⁴³ As part of its low-intensity conflict in Southwest Africa, South Africa sponsored investigations into the Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO) in an attempt to discredit the movement and decrease its support prior to the first elections. David Iron, “Touting for South Africa: International Freedom Foundation,” *Covert Action Information Bulletin* 31 (1989), 62-4; Van Niekerk, “How Apartheid Conned the West.”

¹⁴⁴ Paul Trehwela, *Inside Quatro: Uncovering the Exile History of the ANC and SWAPO* (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2009), 83–6.

responsibly. A cryptic footnote in Anthea Jeffery's *The Natal Story* citing an interview with Douglas suggests his findings in the first commission were less conclusive than the headlines revealed.¹⁴⁵

It is likely that at least one of the reasons for the cessation of the commission was the disorganization and irregularity of payment on Contralesa's part that Douglas had complained about in his interim report to Contralesa and that may or may not have been related to the corruption charges directed at Chief Maphumulo. In August 1990, Contralesa's General Council suspended Maphumulo's presidency for his failure to attend meetings (a perhaps insensitive charge given the violence directed at his family and people in the previous six months), his practice of taking unilateral decisions without consultation, and his failure to respect and abide by the interim National Executive Committee's decisions. Contralesa also resolved to take legal action for the recovery of R120,000 donated to Contralesa by a Swedish donor that Maphumulo allegedly diverted into an unauthorized account in Pietermaritzburg.¹⁴⁶ Maphumulo's estate file reveals a R100,000 fixed deposit made into his First National Bank account six months prior to a September 1990 maturation date, though whether or not the funds are the same is difficult to prove.¹⁴⁷ As a new organization with limited funding, this sort of misappropriation could have impacted Contralesa's ability to repay the SACC, who in turn may have been unwilling to pay Douglas without promise of reimbursement.

¹⁴⁵ Jeffery, *The Natal Story*, 227.

¹⁴⁶ "Press Statement on the National Conference of Contralesa, September 1990" and "First National Executive Committee Meeting of Contralesa held at the Contralesa Offices on October 27, 1990," in Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 28–32.

¹⁴⁷ Mpumalanga Magistrate, 12/5/2, 110/91, Estate file of Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo.

But while the commission may not have ended with a formal report, Douglas' interim report to Pillay, Contralesa, and SACC suggests many of its successes. The availability of the commission as a forum for Mpumalanga residents to air their grievances contributed to the temporary cessation of local hostilities. Imbali residents were willing to risk their lives to give evidence so that warlords could be publicly exposed. Inkatha's bitter and hostile reaction suggests the organization may have been shaken out of complacency and could just yet attempt "to restrain some of its over zealous members." Indeed, from the beginning, advocate Pillay expressed surprise at the number of people willing to testify.¹⁴⁸ The commission heard from a wide spectrum of people, including academics, "businessmen, tribal chiefs, the Black Sash, ordinary housewives, fathers and mothers."¹⁴⁹ Despite Buthelezi and Inkatha's official opposition, card-carrying Inkatha members testified as well. This turnout attests to the support the commission had garnered not only from organizations but also from residents and victims themselves desperate to realize an end to the conflict.

During the Contralesa commission, Contralesa leaders Maphumulo, Prince Israel Mewayizeni Zulu, Sipiwe Thusi, and Alfred Ndlovu met with Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok. The Contralesa representatives walked out of the January 1990 meeting, discouraged that Inkatha had been invited to discuss their call for a judicial inquiry into the violence. "We feel it is not right and proper for us to be sitting here with them, Inkatha, giving

¹⁴⁸ "Inquiry into township violence gets under way," *Natal Witness* December 6, 1989.

¹⁴⁹ Nomusa Cembali, "Commission into violence calls on witnesses to come forward," December 14, 1989.

them credibility,” said Maphumulo.¹⁵⁰ The next day, the chief’s “haven of peace” erupted in flames.

“Natal’s haven of peace on fire”¹⁵¹

Residents of “Natal’s haven of peace” began to fear the spread of the violence several months before its outbreak. As the fighting spread amongst their rural neighbors in KwaSwayimane and KwaNyavu, the pledge by Zulu chiefs to ostracize any traditional leaders affiliated to Contralesa heightened their sense of dread. Anthony Minnaar has suggested that until the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, violence had largely been contained within the Greater Durban area and the Pietermaritzburg/Edendale complex.¹⁵² But Aitchison’s analysis shows that the conflict took root in rural areas as early as 1989 in Richmond, KwaSwayimane, Ehlanzeni (KwaXimba), Shongweni and even earlier in Vulindlela. In KwaSwayimane, an area neighboring “Natal’s haven of peace,” violence went hand-in-hand with Inkatha recruitment drives starting in July 1989.¹⁵³ In September, Inkatha members from KwaSwayimane went to Maphumulo schools to force residents to attend a meeting called by Chief Prince Gcumisa, the Inkatha-aligned leader of the Gcumisa. At that meeting, Chief Gcumisa warned that those refusing to join Inkatha should leave the area.¹⁵⁴ Violence also escalated in Ehlanzeni, near Camperdown, between the Nyavu of Chief Mdluli and the Ximba under the Contralesa-affiliated Chief Zibuse Mlaba. Peace efforts there initially provided a short respite starting in October 1989, despite Inkatha instruction to

¹⁵⁰ “Congress men walk out of Vlok peace talks,” *Daily News* January 25, 199.

¹⁵¹ *The New African* February 12, 1990.

¹⁵² Minnaar, *Patterns of Violence*, 14.

¹⁵³ Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead,” 76–9.

¹⁵⁴ “Eviction by Inkatha chief feared,” *Natal Witness* September 30, 1989.

Mdluli not to become involved in any peace pacts, but ultimately failed when violence resumed in December.

Mbambangalo residents were keenly aware of the spreading violence. Beyond the presence of the newly settled refugees, Maphumulo people “started hearing about violence from far places; then later that violence started in our place.”¹⁵⁵ The Maphumulo understood that this violence, or *uDlame*, was distinct from earlier types of conflict. One woman related, “We used to hear about *uDlame* in other places but we did not know anything about it. We only knew *izimpi zezigodi* (section wars).”¹⁵⁶

Exactly when and how violence began at Table Mountain, or “who fired the first shot” is often the great preoccupation of historians. But as Aitchison has pointed out, uncovering the specific origin for Natal’s violence “could involve one in a process of endless regression.”¹⁵⁷ Indeed, for Table Mountain, one can ask: Did the violence commence with the invasion of Mbambangalo by the Nyavu? Was it the murder of a Nyavu man who worked at the Maguzu clinic? Was it the Maqongqo youth’s boycott of shops owned by Inkatha-affiliated persons? Did it date to Chief Maphumulo’s “peace party”? Residents of Mbambangalo and KwaNyavu have their own memories and interpretations of how and why *uDlame* began. These interpretations will be explored both here and in the following section as they contribute to the debate over

¹⁵⁵ “uDlame saqala ngokuluzwa ezindaweni ezikude, emva kwesikhathi lwangena nalapha endaweni yethu...” Khanyisile M., interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21, 2011.

¹⁵⁶ “uDlame luqale ngokuthi sihlale sizwa kwazinye izindawo ukuthi kunodlame kodwa singazi nokuthi luyini ngoba thina sazi izimpi zezigodi.” Phumzile M., interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21, 2011.

¹⁵⁷ Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead,” 45.

Chief Maphumulo's authority. For now, however, the primary concern is with the key players and general patterns of violence.

Eunice Dladla recalled when the violence first erupted in the *isigodi* where she lived, near Chief Maphumulo's *umuzi*. "I remember when *uDlame* started, it was summer and we were plowing and our food was about to be ripe. Some woman said to me, 'weMa Maphumulo, run!' I saw smoke....coming over Samvula hill. People were coming from that side and coming towards us.... I heard a gunshot from people who were coming from the Nyavu section."¹⁵⁸ Over the weekend of January 26-28, 1990, a group of 300-600 men bearing firearms, spears, sticks, and other weapons from the neighboring KwaNyavu area repeatedly invaded Echibini, the *isigodi* on the strip of Goedverwachting.

According to Chief Maphumulo, in an interdict filed only days after the eruption of the violence on Friday, January 26, *Indunenkulu* Albert Madlala spotted Maphumulo induna Thomas Mshoki Gcabashe with police and *kitkonstabels* on their way to Echibini, pointing out homes. Gcabashe was in disguise, but had been identified by his gait and eventually unmasked.¹⁵⁹ *Kitkonstabels* Bheki Phethas and Bheki Buthelezi camped at the home of Tobias Mdlalose, an Inkatha member in Mbambangalo, from where they launched attacks on

¹⁵⁸ "Ngikhumbula ngosuku okwasuka ngalo uDlame, kwakusehlobo silimile nokudla sekuqala ukuvthwa. Ngezwa ngomunye unkosikazi ethi weMaMaphumulo baleka nakho! Sasingale nazi nezinkungu. Yaqhamuka ngale kwalentabe enkulu. Isamvula. Uma ngithi ngiyabheka, ngibona izinkungu ziza ngalapho ngingakhona. Uma ngisabheka izinkungu ngizwe umsindo wezibhamu baqhamuka kaNyavu." Eunice Dladla, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, March 7, 2011. Maqongqo.

¹⁵⁹ Affidavit of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, February 1, 1990, in the Supreme Court of South Africa Natal Provincial Division in the Matter between Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo and The Minister of Law and Order, the Commissioner of South African Police, and Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli Case No. 280/90.

“comrades.”¹⁶⁰ Youth who had been boycotting a shop owned by Inkatha-affiliated Chitumuzi J. Maphumulo were harassed. Induna Bhekuyise Maphumulo witnessed two white constables and several *kitkonstabels* tie a tube around the face of a youth, Doctor Mdu Ngcobo, and assault him. According to Chief Maphumulo, *kitkonstabels* and police members attacked youth and searched homes for weapons over the course of the weekend.¹⁶¹

On Monday, heavily armed Nyavu men attacked Echibini, but were initially dispersed after Maphumulo contacted the Bishopstowe police. The Nyavu men gathered at Mathondo Ngcobo’s beer hall while Maphumulo went to the Bishopstowe police station to discuss the possibility of a meeting with the police and Chief Mdluli. But during his absence, the Nyavu launched a second attack, killing Zibonele Dladla and destroying at least ten homes, including that of Emma Mabaso.¹⁶² It was alleged that Mathondo Ngcobo and the *kitkonstabel* Bheki Phethas were transporting the Nyavu men to attack homes.¹⁶³

Self-described “comrades” stood guard and set up roadblocks in retaliation and Maphumulo returned to find approximately 3,000-4,000 of his people gathered at his *inkantolo*.¹⁶⁴ Indeed, Eunice Dladla remembers that upon seeing the smoke and hearing gunshots, she and others ran towards *enkosini* (the place of the chief).¹⁶⁵ Theni Ngcoya recalls

¹⁶⁰ APC. PC11 PACSA Collection March 1990 Affidavits of Seven Days War, Bhunu Dladla, May 14, 1990.

¹⁶¹ Maphumulo affidavit.

¹⁶² Maphumulo affidavit; Fred Kockott, “Fighting comes to peace area,” *Natal Witness* January 31, 1990.

¹⁶³ Maphumulo affidavit; APC. PC11 March 1990 Affidavits, Thulani Mthethwa, May 14, 1990.

¹⁶⁴ Maphumulo affidavit.

¹⁶⁵ Dladla interview.

seeing the crowd chase her eldest son over a cliff before giving her youngest son a dress and hat so that he would not be recognized as male and running with her daughters towards Maphumulo's *umuzi*. From there, she watched her home burn.¹⁶⁶ Ngenzeni Mbambo and her family also ran to *enkosini* where Maphumulo advised them to find family with whom they could stay.¹⁶⁷ By Monday, Echibini was deserted. Hundreds fled to the city to seek assistance from churches, COSATU, and the Midlands Democratic Party under Radley Keys, known for his efforts to quell the violence.¹⁶⁸

Of course, at the time several KwaNyavu residents explained the eruption differently. Mathondo Ngcobo, the shop owner accused of transporting the Nyavu men, maintained they had not raided Echibini but that only 40 men had retaliated after the burning of several KwaNyavu homes and the looting of his shop. Ambrose Mveli, an Inkatha-affiliated Nyavu man, reported his home had been petrol bombed by UDF youth from Maqongqo and that *amaqabane* had been stopping buses and taxis and blocking delivery vans from supplying KwaNyavu.¹⁶⁹

Cycles of attack and retaliation engulfed Mbambangalo. Daily police "Unrest Reports" gave little detail on the unfolding conflict beyond listing casualties and infrastructural damage, such as "one dead," "twelve houses burnt," or "man, boy die." Chief Maphumulo made several statements to the press and filed a Supreme Court interdict against the Minister of Law and Order, the South African Police Commissioner, and Chief Mdluli as advised by Robert Douglas at several commission hearings.

¹⁶⁶ Theni Ngcoya, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, May 27, 2011.

¹⁶⁷ Ngenzeni Ma Vidima Mbambo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, August 8, 2011.

¹⁶⁸ "Hundreds flee as mob rampages through Table Mountain Area," *Natal Witness* January 30, 1990.

¹⁶⁹ Fred Kockott, "Fighting comes to peace area," *Natal Witness* January 31, 1990.

On Friday, February 2, as President F.W. de Klerk made the historic announcement releasing political prisoners and unbanning of the ANC, PAC, SACP, and other liberation movements, in Table Mountain the Nyavu attacked the Maphumulo *umuzi*. Chief Mhlabunzima's third wife, Gaye Shembe, was at home with their children when the Nyavu set her home alight. One of the Maphumulo who had sought refuge at the chief's place alleged a white police officer had turned on a gas canister within Gaye's home, but Gaye shot him and a *kitkonstabel*. Another man was injured trying to help a child escape.¹⁷⁰ Another Maphumulo man who had escaped the assault on the *umuzi* watched the businessman Zimu lead the attackers.¹⁷¹

Over the course of the weekend, thousands fled Mbambangalo for Pietermaritzburg. Rumors abounded of continued violence but no police statements were made. Reports began to circulate that Chief Maphumulo too had fled, seeking asylum in the Transkei. Indeed, Maphumulo had traveled to the Transkei on Contralesa business on Saturday, February 3, and to Johannesburg on Monday, February 5, to speak at a press conference organized by the Reverend Beyers Naudé, but was in Pietermaritzburg and Maqongqo at several points over the weekend. Maphumulo later condemned the rumors. "There is simply no way that I would abandon my people now as they need me. Under no circumstances would I go to Transkei, this is my home and it [is] here I intend to die if I have to."¹⁷² At the Johannesburg press conference, Maphumulo made an impassioned plea for peace in Natal, but acknowledged that it was becoming increasingly more difficult to continue with peace proposals. He repeatedly called on

¹⁷⁰ APC, PC11, March 1990 Affidavits, Bongiwe Zondi, April 30, 1990.

¹⁷¹ APC, PC11, March 1990 Affidavits, Bongani Isaac Mkhize, April 30, 1990.

¹⁷² "Chief has not fled Table Mountain," *Natal Witness* February 6, 1990; Prakash Naidoo, "Bring in the troops," *Sunday Tribune* February 18, 1990.

Buthelezi to take responsibility for Inkatha's violence and asserted that the people could not rely on the South African Police to keep peace when they joined in on the attacks.¹⁷³

The sheer number of testimonies in the press, in victim statements, and in oral history interviews that cite the invading Nyavu certainly leaves little doubt that an armed group of men did attack Echibini. But further evidence does lend credence to Mathondo Ngcobo's "retaliation" assertion, as well as suggest a possible reason for Thomas and Sabelo Gcabashe's cooperation with the Nyavu beyond personal ambitions (to be examined in the next chapter). Several residents, including an Inkatha man from Mbambangalo, attested that prior to the outbreak of the violence, an older Nyavu man "from Gcabashe's family" who worked as a security guard at the Maguzu clinic was stabbed to death. None of those who cited his death as the first signal of the war knew the man's first name or were even certain about his surname. Nor did they know when he had died. But they did know he was "from Gcabashe's family." They also pointed to the presence of new people, people who had been bussed in, people who were toyi-toying at night—the refugees living at Echibini. The Inkatha-affiliated Maphumulo man said, "I am not sure about the surname, but I think he was from the Gcabashe family because I was down there at Mboyi section. That is how the violence started. Nyavu wanted revenge for that old man's death. When they came here [to Mbambangalo] they found those who were busy toyi-toying at night and they shot them because they assumed that they were the ones who killed the old man." He also said that the Nyavu were ready to fight because they had also been in conflict with their neighbors to

¹⁷³ SAHA. AL2431. The United Democratic Front (UDF) Collection, Box 20, 1.22.2 Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), "Press Release by Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, President of Contralesa," n.d.

the east, the Ximba.¹⁷⁴ But the possible significance of the dead Nyavu man's relation to the Gcabashe family should not be overlooked. As we will see in the next chapter, the Maphumulo community divided over the chief's actions during *uDlame*, and the Gcabashe brothers Thomas and Sabelo were often at the forefront of the attack on the chief's authority.

Violent episodes continued sporadically in Table Mountain over the course of the next two weeks as the city council struggled to come to terms with the refugees at the Sawubona Youth Trust in Winterskloof and at the COSATU house in the city center. On Friday, February 9, a delegation of refugees visited Maqongqo but deemed it unsafe to return. The Pietermaritzburg City council saw the refugees as a threat to public health and the Mount Michael Health Committee threatened legal action against Reverend Dennis Bailey, who ran the Youth Trust, for contravening the Squatter Act and stipulation of the town planning scheme. The city only agreed to establish a camp at Mason's Mill on Edendale Road after the city's medical officer intervened and demanded action. On February 12, 1990, the day after Nelson Mandela's release from prison, the Table Mountain refugees from Sawubona and COSATU house moved into tents at Mason's Mill.¹⁷⁵

As the refugees worried over their fate, Chief Maphumulo was on the move, traveling to Lusaka with Contralesa to consult with the ANC, back to Mbambangalo, and then to Sweden to meet with the Swedish Foreign Minister in order to raise funds for Contralesa. During his stop back in Maqongqo, Maphumulo called a meeting at the *inkantolo* for residents, violence

¹⁷⁴ “Angisazi kahle noma kwakungowakaGcabashe ngoba mina ngangiphansi eMboyi. Kulapho ke udlame lwasuka khona. Abantu bakaNyavu sebefuna ukuphindiselela lomkhulu oshonile. Uma befika bathole laba abshaya itoyitoyi ebusuku bafike badubula ngoba bona babebona ukuthi ibona laba ababulele umkhulu.” Nkanyiso Ndlovu, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, April 4, 2011.

¹⁷⁵ Fred Kockott, “Refugee camps set up in city,” *Natal Witness* February 12, 1990.

monitors, and the Mpumalanga magistrate to discuss the situation. A plan was set in motion for the installation of SADF troops and the return of the refugees. On Tuesday, February 27, the last of the refugees at Mason's Mill returned to Maqongqo under the direction of the SADF. These 80 people, largely women and children whose husbands were away at work, lost their homes during the violence of the previous month. They moved into tents provided by the Department of Development Aid that they erected at the *inkantolo*.

While Maphumulo was abroad, on March 3, a group of Nyavu men again attacked the area around his *umuzi*. The less-than-a-week old refugee camp was destroyed. The refugees fled back to Mason's Mill and the COSATU House. One newspaper article printed a litany of the casualties: four elderly men dead, several people injured, 13 houses and a shop gutted, at least 10 other houses damaged, two dogs stabbed, two cars burnt out, two KwaZulu buses damaged, and the *inkantolo* damaged.¹⁷⁶ Sbu Ernest Gcabashe identified Mdingi Maphumulo, Sabelo Gcabashe, "Muguguli," and Ngane Zimu as the men who shot at him and his kombi.¹⁷⁷ Fleeing residents lamented the absence of the SADF unit they had been reassured would protect them. A SADF spokesman responded that they had been asked to oversee the refugees' return, not stay indefinitely.¹⁷⁸ Thomas Gcabashe organized meetings for those Mbambangalo residents who remained behind to discuss the violence and began to make calls for Chief Mhlabunzima, who they believed to be the cause of the conflict, to be removed.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Christelle de Jager, "Returning refugees attacked, 4 die," *Natal Witness* March 5, 1990.

¹⁷⁷ APC, PC11, March 1990 Affidavits, Sbu Ernest Gcabashe, April 30, 1990.

¹⁷⁸ "The human agony of Maqongqo," *Natal Witness Echo* March 8, 1990.

¹⁷⁹ "Chief blamed for violence," *Natal Witness* March 13, 1990.



Figure 18-19: Gaye (Ma Shembe) Maphumulo stands in front of a burning store near her home after the February 2 assault on her home. *Natal Witness* February 3, 1990. Figure 19: Women and children whose tents were destroyed in the March attacks. Radley Keys Private Papers.

Following the early March attack, sporadic attacks on homes and individuals occurred in the Table Mountain region, but the Nyavu men also stirred up trouble across the city. A busload of armed men emptied into the lower end of the city and stabbed Dumisane Dlamini and threatened a garage owner, Saleem Cassim. Police confiscated weapons and arrested another group of Nyavu men the same day for trespassing in East Street.¹⁸⁰ The Nyavu also traveled to Inadi during the Seven Days War, the height of the Midlands violence.

The Seven Days War broke out in Vulindlela, Edendale, Ashdown, and Imbali to the west of Pietermaritzburg on March 25, 1990. In actuality, this war comprised of three days of large-scale attacks and then a month of skirmishes. It is one of the most analyzed periods of the violence, so attention here will focus on the involvement of Table Mountain residents and violence in Table Mountain during the same period. The war began as a result of several explosive factors: the existing state collusion and prevalence of violence, the incitement to action

¹⁸⁰ Fred Kockott, "Busload of armed men prowls east end of city," *Natal Witness* March 8, 1990; "Armed groups bring violence into town," *Natal Witness Echo* March 8, 1990.

by Buthelezi at a meeting of chiefs in Ulundi on March 23-24 and the stoning of buses from Vulindlela as they traveled through Edendale where non-Inkatha youth had taken refuge. On March 25, exactly one month after a welcome rally for Nelson Mandela at King's Park stadium, Inkatha held a rally, funded by the security police, at the same venue. Buses returning to Vulindlela from the rally passed through Edendale, and what followed has since been largely disputed. Some alleged youth stoned the passing buses, while others alleged Inkatha supporters alighted from the buses and chased people at Edendale's Qokololo stadium. From there, war ensued. As many as 12,000 Inkatha members attacked a number of areas in Vulindlela, Caluza, and Ashdown over the course of the next week. The police and army, present in full force, did nothing to stop the carnage and in fact provided logistical support for Inkatha combatants. Large lorries ferried in platoons of armed men—including men from KwaNyavu.¹⁸¹ The KwaNyavu group arrived in unmarked lorries with their number plates covered in mud on March 28, indicating a degree of advanced planning and support. These men were sprinkled with *izinthelezi* (protective medicines) and set off to attack soon after dawn.¹⁸²

Jabulani Sithole has recently argued that the intervention of a special MK unit on March 28 changed the course and character of Seven Days War violence.¹⁸³ But at least one large group of the Inkatha attackers, the Nyavu men, absented themselves after March 28, turning their attention closer to home—to Mbambangalo. Just as one informant had noted that KwaNyavu

¹⁸¹ John Aitchison, "KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-Election Wars of the 1990s," in *The Role of Political Violence in South Africa's Democratisation* (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003); Sithole, "The ANC Underground."

¹⁸² Statement of Father Tim Smith, St Martin de Porres Catholic Church to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Pietermaritzburg, November 18-21, 1996, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_11.htm (accessed January 20, 2011).

¹⁸³ Sithole, "The ANC Underground," 269..

men turned their attention to the Maphumulo after fighting with their Ximba neighbors to the west, one day after their participation in raids in Vulindlela, the Nyavu men again attacked Mbambangalo. It may never be known who requested the lorries to transport the Nyavu to Vulindlela—was it Chief Mdluli, Inkatha, or an agent of the apartheid regime—or if they returned to Table Mountain of their own volition or by order. Without a doubt, their absence decreased the number of Inkatha assailants in Vulindlela and certainly changed the character of the violence in Vulindlela and Edendale.

Police colluded with the Nyavu men not just in the transport to and from Vulindlela. The TRC testimony of police officer William Basil Harrington of Riot Unit 8 reveals that some time after the attack on Chief Maphumulo's homestead and before the unfolding of the Seven Days War, the police were stationed at Echibini:

to prevent Chief Maphumulo's people launching an attack on the other area. Whilst we were having our braai and drinking beer [with Inkatha members] an Inkatha group came around the hillside [meaning from KwaNyavu] unseen and launched a new attack on the ANC area. We were assured by the group that were providing the meat and the beer that they were Inkatha people and we had nothing to fear regarding the attack. According to them it also wouldn't last for very long. After the valley had been burnt we then fired 1000 feet flares for two reasons, namely, firstly to see whether any groups were moving in the direction of the koppie to attack people in the Inkatha area, and secondly, to prove to the ANC people that we were present in the area...¹⁸⁴

On March 29, after their involvement in Vulindlela, Nyavu again attacked the area surrounding the Maphumulo *inkantolo* where the refugees stayed. The number of refugees from Table Mountain and Vulindlela at Mason's Mill and now a church at Esigodini swelled to 600

¹⁸⁴ Statement of William Basil Harrington to the TRC, November 20, 1996.
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_1.htm (accessed January 20, 2012).

and 4,000 respectively.¹⁸⁵ Over the next ten days, reports by the Crisis Committee revealed increasing numbers of deaths, injuries, burning homes, and police partisanship. At least 14 died during the weekend alone. When Radley Keys and a news team visited Maqongqo on April 5, they found the area nearly deserted with only 300 pro-Inkatha people left. The attackers boasted, “Yes! We are Manyavus! We will kill the comrades if we find them here. We are going to take over the chieftainship.”¹⁸⁶ Other reports also suggested that the attackers were led from *within* Maqongqo by “Ntshiya Ntshiya” Goba and Ngane Zimu from a camp near Maphumulo’s Bottle Store, owned by C.J. Maphumulo. At the camp, men were given liquor and Mandrax (similar to Quaaludes and commonly smoked in South Africa, often with marijuana) and encouraged to fight by both Inkatha leaders and the police. During this time, Chief Maphumulo was abroad presenting the interim report of the Douglas Commission to the International Commission of Jurists. Threats abounded that he would be killed upon his return.¹⁸⁷

The violence continued into April as the Nyavu and Inkatha-affiliated Maphumulo worked to weed out any remaining comrades and used this as opportunity to plunder. Homes were looted, liberated of their iron roofs, and often razed. Women who attempted to return and protect their homes from looting were harassed and forced to leave. *Izimpi* were repeatedly reported at the Maphumulo Bottle Store and now at the Nonzila store where the owner had arranged a truck-full of weapons for the remaining young men. Another local name began to

¹⁸⁵ APC, PC11, Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Report 1, March 25-31, 1990.

¹⁸⁶ Fred Kockott, “14 killed as fighting hits Table Mountain,” *Natal Witness* April 4, 1990.

¹⁸⁷ APC, PC11, Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Report 2, April 1-7, 1990.

surface as an instigator; “Professor” Dlamini organized looting from his shop and earned a reputation for his ability to deceive the police.¹⁸⁸

At the Mason’s Mill camp to the west of the city, the Table Mountain refugees began to lose hope. The police raided the camp for weapons on April 23, prompting fears of helplessness in the event of an Inkatha attack. The 24-Hour Ad Hoc Crisis Committee, now operating under the name of the Midlands Crisis Relief Committee, and Chief Maphumulo held a meeting at the camp in early May in an attempt to get the refugees to return to Table Mountain for a meeting with Bishopstowe police. But the refugees hesitated and expressed concern that the chief, with his travels abroad, had abandoned them in their time of need.¹⁸⁹

On June 6 some of the refugees returned to Mbambangalo. An estimated 1,000 refugees moved back home under the watchful eyes of two armed Nyavu groups at C.J.Maphumulo’s store on the main road to the *inkantolo*. For many, the joy of returning home overcame the scenes of destruction they encountered. One woman declared, “there is no better feeling than to feel at home.” Deputy chief Albert Madlala concurred that while “this might not be the best sight, and I agree it is not beautiful but being at Maqongqo is like I am at home. It is better than Mason’s Mill. I felt like I was in exile there. Now I am back home. The day will come when I will go back to my house and try to rebuild.”¹⁹⁰ Chief Maphumulo oversaw the loading of municipal and SADF-supplied vehicles at Mason’s Mill and announced his own plans to

¹⁸⁸ APC, PC11, Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Reports 3-6, April 8-May 5, 1990.

¹⁸⁹ APC, PC4/1/2/5. Natal Black Sash, “Minutes of the Midlands Crisis Relief Committee,” May 7, 1990.

¹⁹⁰ Nomusa Cembali, “A tense homecoming,” *Natal Witness Echo* June 14, 1990.

return.¹⁹¹



Figure 20 The convoy of returning refugees. *Natal Witness Echo* June 14, 1990.

But the winter months of June and July continued to be a dangerous struggle for the returned refugees. The refugees built temporary accommodation and erected tents around the *inkantolo* and confined themselves to that area for fear of attack. C.J. Maphumulo refused to sell to the returned residents at his shop and the International Red Cross stopped food deliveries on account of the volatile situation. Tim Houghton, a white volunteer from Durban with MCRC, asked for an SADF escort to take in supplies. MCRC also negotiated with the Department of Development Aid to supply water trucks when the refugees began to run out of water and could not leave the camp to resupply.¹⁹²

For over a month, the returned refugees suffered constant harassment at the hands of Inkatha, SAP, and SADF members. Assault often took place at bus and taxi stops. Fana Ntombela was beaten at an eStingini bus stop and Jabu Ndlovu was thrown out of a moving bus. Police regularly raided the camp at the *inkantolo* for weapons, leaving the residents with a sense of defenselessness. Small groups of refugees began to pour back into the city, but the city refused

¹⁹¹ “KZT move hampers refugee return,” *Natal Witness* June 7, 1990.

¹⁹² APC, PC11, Report of the 24-Hour Monitoring Committee, Reports 13-14, June 17-30.

to accommodate them again. By July 23, 1990, only 100 of the returned refugees remained in Mbambangalo.¹⁹³

The winter months were also dangerous for Chief Maphumulo. On June 10, an ambush on his car killed brothers Alson and Nelson Kunene and injured Edendale businessman Deda Hlophe. The attempt on Maphumulo's life failed as he had caught a taxi when the car failed to arrive on time. Maphumulo alleged that the KwaZulu government had ordered his assassination and sent an Mpumalanga-based hit squad, including Caprivi-trained Daluxolo Luthuli and Sbu Bhengu, to complete the mission.¹⁹⁴ In Durban in July, police chased Chief Maphumulo and his bodyguard before detaining them overnight.¹⁹⁵

From July until the end of October, large scale attacks on Mbambangalo ceased. Few of Maphumulo's supporters remained behind to be targeted and those who stayed attempted to hide their support. The country's attention had turned to the Reef where Inkatha bussed in supporters from KwaZulu-Natal to agitate. In August, Contralesa suspended Chief Maphumulo from the presidency despite the protests of its representatives from the Natal region. But he remained the center of debate in Table Mountain. After a community/Inkatha meeting at the end of October new attacks were launched on the chief and his family. Shots were fired at what was left of his homestead in one instance and in another in November, his mother, Nosibhedlela, was assaulted and arrested along with eight youth at her home. In an attack on Nonzila Mkhize's home,

¹⁹³ Isabel Koch, "City closes its doors to refugees," *Natal Witness* July 19, 1990; Nomusa Cembali, "Maqongqo residents pour back," *Natal Witness Echo* July 26, 1990.

¹⁹⁴ Later testimonies reveal the chief's suspicions were correct (to be examined in the next chapter). Heidi Gibson, "Hit squad was sent to kill me - chief," *Natal Witness Echo* June 14, 1990; Amnesty statement of Daluxolo Luthuli to the TRC, August 5, 1997 <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/special/caprivi/caprivi2.htm> (accessed January 20, 2012).

¹⁹⁵ "Chief held after car chase," *Natal Witness* July 10, 1990.

Mandondela Mkhize was shot and paralyzed. Induna Steven Xaba was pulled off a bus and killed. Chief Maphumulo's cousin and aunt were killed in a car ambush. Several reports attest to the death of Inkatha members.¹⁹⁶ By the end of November, conflict had returned to Table Mountain in full force.

In December, the violence escalated and Chief Maphumulo made calls for the SADF, who he no longer believed to be impartial, to be removed from Table Mountain. Attacks were again directed at the chief's *umuzi* after the ANC announced it would launch a Table Mountain branch on December 16 at the *inkantolo*. Maphumulo cautioned that anyone who wanted to join must do so voluntarily and emphasized that the scared should remain at home. Inkatha expressed serious reservations on account of the existing tensions and Maphumulo threatened legal action against Buthelezi after Mbambangalo Inkatha chairman Thomas Gcabashe allegedly led a group of KwaZulu policemen into Maphumulo's home where the men confiscated licensed weapons. The group also captured 14 people who had been staying at the chief's home, assaulting them at a nearby SADF camp until the Bishopstowe SAP rescued them.¹⁹⁷

Deaths, injuries, burning homes, and allegations of police and military partisanship saw in the new year in Mbambangalo. Throughout January and February 1991, Maphumulo continued to highlight the police and SADF partiality. He said that three victims of an Inkatha assault, Mthandeni Maphumulo, Philani Buthelezi, and Mkhishwa Makhanyela, had been

¹⁹⁶ Lakela Kaunda, "Inkatha group fires shots at Chief Maphumulo's home," *Natal Witness Echo* November 1, 1990; Kaunda, "Chief's mother kicked, claim" *Natal Witness Echo* November 29, 1990; Craig Urquhart, "Violence flares in Table Mountain," *Natal Witness* December 1, 1990; Urquhart, "Table Mountain clashes: 7 dead," *Natal Witness* December 3, 1990.

¹⁹⁷ Heidi Gibson, "Maphumulo accuses SADF of one-sidedness," *Natal Witness Echo* December 6, 1990; "ANC to launch Table Mountain branch on Sunday," *Natal Witness Echo* December 13, 1990; "ANC branch to open in Table Mountain," *Natal Witness* December 14, 1990; "Maphumulo attack: ANC takes action," *Natal Witness* December 18, 1990.

arrested and assaulted by police during questioning. Police killed Sihle Dlamini in what they described as a shootout where they were under attack. Maphumulo alleged the police had beaten Dlamini to death in an assault on ANC supporters at Maqongqo by SAP that arrived in six vehicles. In other violent incidents, Daphne Gumede was killed while Mabashe Mkhize and Fekile Shozi suffered injuries. Maphumulo claimed that he escaped another assassination attempt when a bus he was riding in eSitingini was attacked. Schools began to demand Inkatha membership cards for student registration. Both Maphumulo and the Maqongqo Inkatha Freedom Party organized separate meetings to discuss the ongoing violence.¹⁹⁸

Fighting for Echibini

When *uDlame* spread to the Table Mountain region, many individuals involved pointed to the existing land conflict and Chief Maphumulo's invitation to refugees to relocate on the Goedverwaching trust farm as the main causes. The shortage of land and water intensified not only the conflict between the Nyavu and Maphumulo. As we will see in the next chapter, it would also spark debates within the Maphumulo about membership of these new residents and the legitimacy of the chief.

Chief Maphumulo was keenly aware of Inkatha disapproval of his increasingly progressive politics but still contended that the manner in which the Table Mountain conflict with the Nyavu unfolded was directly related to the struggle over Goedverwaching. Maphumulo spoke to the newspapers about the violence but also made it clear he believed the trust farm was

¹⁹⁸ "Cops accused of fueling conflict," *New African* January 24, 1991; Lakela Kaunda, "Police blamed for 'fuelling conflict,'" *Natal Witness Echo* January 24, 1991; Kaunda, "Maphumulo calls for meeting on Sunday," *Natal Witness* January 31, 1991; "Maphumulo shot at," *Natal Witness* February 6, 1991; "Violence at Table Mountain," *Natal Witness* February 20, 1991; APC, PC126/3/11, Inkatha Freedom Party Press Release, February 10, 1991.

now under the jurisdiction of the Maphumulo. “The Manyavu are trying to claim for themselves a portion of our land which was a trust farm called Goedverwagding [sic], which was officially handed over to us,” the chief said.¹⁹⁹ After the first outbreak of violence, Maphumulo requested that the police “tell the Manyavus to vacate our land, those that have encroached. If they can do that peace is sure to be restored.”²⁰⁰

In interviews, Mbambangalo and KwaNyavu residents cited the land conflict and the influx of refugees onto the disputed land as cause for the conflict. The elder Maphumulo, Goge Balothi made it sound quite simple. “Nyavu people started the war... conflict started because we were fighting for Echibini. They said it was theirs and we said it was ours.”²⁰¹ One young Nyavu believed the overlap of the land dispute with politics was a clever orchestration of Chief Maphumulo. “He was too clever; he changed the land dispute and called it a political war. He said IFP members are beating him because he is a member of the ANC... it was not a war between IFP and ANC. It was a land dispute.”²⁰² Another woman told me she was uncertain

¹⁹⁹ Nomusa Cembali, “Large group of armed men attack Maqongqo” *Natal Witness Echo* February 1, 1990.

²⁰⁰ Kockett, “Fighting comes to peace area” *Natal Witness* January 31, 1990.

²⁰¹ “Impi ivele ngoba sekufike abantu bakaNyavu...nakhona kuze kuliwe kwakubangwa lendawo yase Chibini. AbakaNyavu babethi indawo yabo nathi sithi eyethu.” Goge Balothi, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 4, 2011.

²⁰² “Inkosi yakaMaphumulo yayihlakaniphe kakhulu yayijika indaba yombango yawubiza ngepolitiki, yathi ishawa abantu be IFP ngoba yona iyi ANC... lwasuka kanjalo ke udlame kwakungakhona ukuthi bekushayana abantu be IFP ne ANC kwakungoba kubangwa indawo.” Zazi Cyrpian Dlamini, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Esinyamini, June 21, 2011.

whether the Maphumulo chief was clever or a criminal, but she knew that he wanted to take the Nyavu land, thus sparking the violence.²⁰³

Baningi Maphumulo and Bernard Mkhize specifically cited the encroachment of the Nyavu into Echibini as the genesis of *uDlame*. Baningi explained the benevolence of the Maphumulo. “The war started due to a land dispute...That place was called Echibini. Those [Nyavu] people were fighting us after our Chief gave them a place to stay. They came to Echibini after suffering in their places, but after they settled we started to not see eye-to-eye.” Mkhize went on to say, “We tried to sit down with them and talk sense in such a way. We had boundaries but we ended up disputing the boundaries.” He dated the conflict to the 1950s when the farm was bought from “Mr. Ferreira” for the Maphumulo, fusing the piecemeal purchase of Goedverwachting into one transaction. This conflation may reflect an error in memory or may speak to the Maphumulos’ interpretation that the land was always intended for them.²⁰⁴

It is also important to remember that Baningi and Mkhize were (and continue to be) influential members of Inkatha and the Maphumulo family and chiefdom. Baningi was the *ibamba* for the Mhlabunzima’s son and the current chief, Nhlakanipho, while Mkhize, who appears in the next chapter, was an induna and chair of an Mbambangalo Inkatha branch. Upon Nhlakanipho’s appointment to the chieftaincy in 2004, he made Mkhize the *indunenkulu* (head

²⁰³ Bancomile Msomi, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Esinyameni, August 4, 2011.

²⁰⁴ Baningi: “Impi yona ken je iqale ngoba kwakubangwa ndawo le... Indawo eyayibangwa yayibizwa ngokuthi kuseChibini. Balwa lababantu kodwa benikezwe inkosi yethu indawo. Bekade befike ngosizi lapha eChibini. Kwaqala lapho ke ukungezwani.” Mkhize: Sazama ukuthi sihlale phansi nabo sibakhombise indlela kukhulunyiswane, kwaze kwenziwa nemingcele kwasekubangwa wona lomngcele.” Baningi Maphumulo and Bernard Mkhize, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 31, 2011.

induna) in recognition of his efforts to bring the heir back to Mbambangalo.²⁰⁵ As men of high position amongst the Maphumulo concerned with the ongoing land dispute, the story told is that of the land being purchased for the Maphumulo.

Attendees at Contralesa meetings too traced the violence to the trust farm. At an August 1990 meeting of Contralesa in Durban with COSATU/UDF, a “comrade from Maqongqo” also suggested that the conflict “appeared to have arisen from the fact that a group of Mdluli’s people were settled in an area under the jurisdiction of Maphumulo.” One comrade stated that there was a court case between the two over this piece of land, but others had no knowledge of it.²⁰⁶

One young woman remembered that some of the new residents were *amaqabane* and that they ignored the chief’s plea to keep their politics secret. These comrades encouraged the unaffiliated to sing ANC songs with them and labeled the Nyavu as Inkatha.²⁰⁷ This resonates with the pattern noticed by sociologist Anthony Minnaar (particularly in the South Coast region of KwaZulu-Natal) in which politicized youth from the townships fled to the countryside and undermined traditional authorities.²⁰⁸ However, at Echibini the young comrade refugees found instead a chief increasingly sympathetic to their cause. While Chief Maphumulo was being drawn into progressive and explicitly ANC circles, the land dispute remained the most central

²⁰⁵ Bernard Mkhize remained head induna until his December 2011 murder. Police suspect robbery was the motive, as the murder took place at Mkhize’s tuck shop. The press report of his death admits the “bad history” of the community and hints at the fragile peace and stability that the chief and *izinduna* attempted to build after 2004. “Head of *izinduna* gunned down,” *Natal Witness* December 5, 2011.

²⁰⁶ Holomisa, *A Double-Edged Sword*, 17–8. I have thus far been unable to find any evidence of a court case.

²⁰⁷ Thandazila Vidima, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, August 8, 2011.

²⁰⁸ Anthony Minnaar, *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria, 1992), 14-15.

concern for many Nyavu and Maphumulo—highlighting the disjunction between national politics and local concerns.

Fighting for Peace?

Throughout the cycles of conflict in the Table Mountain region, Chief Maphumulo remained a powerful and almost legendary force. He spoke to the local press, traveled internationally, publicly criticized the military and police, looked out for his people, and survived multiple assassination attempts. But as he was drawn into networks of the UDF and ANC, his mission began to shift. Maphumulo began to operate in a network of weapons and *izinthelezi*, fighting for peace. The chief had always pushed for the end of apartheid, even during the years when he towed the Inkatha line, but he began to doubt the possibility of peaceful change and employed new methods.

As the violence escalated in the Table Mountain region, Chief Maphumulo's words turned from peace to arms and self-defense. Certainly, his firsthand experience of the government's inability or unwillingness to enforce law and order and the police/*kitkonstabel* attacks on his *umuzi* influenced this strategic shift. His increasingly close relationship with the militant and uncompromising ANC regional leader Harry Gwala, the "Lion of the Midlands," with whom he planned the launch of the Table Mountain ANC branch, also would have bolstered the chief's militarism. The two often shared platforms at rallies and press conferences and expressed skepticism at continued peace talks. "The only realistic, meaningful and long term solution to this problem is to arm the people in self-defence," Maphumulo told the ANC stalwart Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo) on one of his Contralesa trips to London. "The total elimination of

apartheid and its structures lies to the centre of the irreversible solution to the Natal violence. Any suggested solution that falls short of this will be shortlived.”²⁰⁹



Figure 21: Chief Maphumulo (left) with the "Lion of the Midlands," Harry Gwala. n.d. Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers

Indeed, arms did begin to move in and out of Maphumulo’s *inkantolo*. While it is likely that community members took up collections to purchase weapons for defense, as they did elsewhere, there is evidence that suggests the presence of arms in Mbambangalo in a quantity that goes beyond well beyond individual ownership or communal defense. MCRC volunteer Tim Houghton recalled unknowingly transporting an ammunition cache *out* of Mbambangalo in June 1990 when he gave a ride to a group of comrades staying near the *inkantolo* to a meeting in Edendale. An SADF roadblock set up as part of a peacekeeping patrol stopped Houghton and the comrades on their way down the windy road from Maqongqo.

Without speaking, the platoon sergeant motioned us to stand away from the car with our hands on our heads as he directed the dog handler (with his magnificent golden Labrador) into the car. Within seconds, the dog began to wag its tail and pant excitedly, pawing at the back seat. Two young soldiers immediately sprang forward and began excavating in the upholstery. For 15 minutes, I watched flabbergasted as the beautiful but ruthlessly efficient hound unearthed over 2000 rounds of assorted ammunition from behind the seats and under the carpets. At the end of it, I just stood there, staring at the gleaming pile of brass in utter

²⁰⁹ Mzala (Jabulani Nxumalo), “Opinion: The Violence in Natal,” *Natal Witness* (May 3, 1990).

amazement. While I had been running around with Thami, rounding up the rest of our passengers, others in the camp must have stashed the ammo in the car... There had obviously been more to this mission all along than getting the comrades to a meeting.²¹⁰

Albert Sbangeliso Maseko, an ANC-affiliated TRC amnesty applicant from KwaSwayimane, testified in 1999 that he received weapons, including an AK47, an R1, two 303 rifles, and a shotgun, from Baba Madlala in Maqongqo. According to Maseko, Madlala was the ANC chairman in Maqongqo before his death and that ANC members from Maqongqo joined Maseko in an attempt to kill Thulane Mkhize, an Inkatha member in Nqalika *isigodi* of Swayimane.²¹¹ One confidential source suggested that Chief Maphumulo continued his public presentation of his area as a peaceful, neutral zone in order to provide cover for the presence of MK underground operatives and their arms cache.

Several Mbambangalo residents also attest to Maphumulo's shift to the UDF/ANC and war activities including the rallying of youth and provision of *izinthelezi*.²¹² Once the violence began in Table Mountain, Maphumulo "collected all the young adults to join. I asked what they were joining. He said he wanted everyone to join the ANC. Then they joined and started to use *izinthelezi* after that war started... Inkosi used to call them to come with their spears and sticks

²¹⁰ Tim Houghton, "Guns and posers at Table Mountain," *Natal Witness* October 31, 2008.

²¹¹ Maseko testified Madlala gave him the weapons and that Mroxegu Mathe, who succeeded Madlala as ANC leader, gave the order to attack Thulane Mkhize. During cross examination, there was some confusion as to who gave the order and Advocate Bosman concluded that Mathe did not give the order. The amnesty decision states Mathe gave both the weapons and the order. Amnesty statement of Albert Sbangeliso Maseko to the TRC, November 17, 1999. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99111518_dbn_991117db.htm (accessed February 8, 2012).

²¹² *Izinthelezi* (protective medicines) are used in rituals of purification and fortification to fulfill the objectives of those participating in the rituals. Here, the intention would be the means to strengthen and protect men in combat. For an example of a historical ritual ceremony in which *izinthelezi* was deployed, see Guy, *The Maphumulo Uprising*.

to dip them in *inthelezi*. Then immediately havoc started.”²¹³ Another woman said that she was visiting with the chief’s mother, Ma Mdlalose, when several young boys came to the chief’s *umuzi* to ask for *inthelezi*.²¹⁴ Another man who served on Chief Maphumulo’s development committee told me in an interview that, “I want to believe that everything Mhlabunzima was doing, he was getting advice from the ANC. He started Contralesa for traditional leaders... Mhlabunzima recruited a lot of people for the ANC. Some they agree that they were recruited by him underground, like Meshack Hadebe for example.”²¹⁵

Maphumulo also utilized his UDF/ANC connections to increase his personal security. After the repeated attempts on his life, Maphumulo hired a MK member as a body guard. He had begun to surround himself with security as early as 1988 following receipt of threats as a result of his welcoming of refugees. Two of his friends and bodyguards died, and another was injured in the ambush attempt on the chief’s car in June 1990 described above. When Maphumulo and a friend drove to Durban next month to pick up the MK bodyguard, they were chased and held

²¹³ “Inkosi yacela abantwana abancane ukuthi bajoyine, ngibuze ukuthi yini ejoyinwayo. Wathi ucela ukuthi abantu bakhe bashintshe babe i-ANC bahambake abantu abasha bajoyina, baqala manje bagezwa ngezintelezi emva kwalokho kwaqala kwaliwa...iNkosi ibabiza abafana ukuthi abafike nezinduku zabo nemikhonto bazoyifaka entelezini kwasekuqala lomsindo ke. Dladla interview. See also Florence Ngcobo, interview with author and Jill Kelly, eStingini, March 7, 2011.

²¹⁴ “uDlame lwaqala ngilapha eNkosini uMhlabunzima. Ngangihleli nomama uMaMdlalose weNkosi uMhlabunzima. Kwafika abafana abathathu babuza inthelezi. Kwasuka lapho umsindo baqala bagijimisana abantu.” Mancane M., interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 10, 2011.

²¹⁵ “I want to believe ukuthi izinto ayezenza uMhlabunzima imibono eminye wwayeyithola kwi-ANC. Waphinda uMhlabunzima baqala i-Contralesa yabholi traditional leaders... uMhlabunzima warecruter abantu abaningi ebfaka kwi ANC abanye bayakuvuma lokho oyedwa wabo uMeshack Hadebe underground.” Meshack Hadebe, born in Mbambangalo, is the former ANC Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Community Development in KwaZulu-Natal and current MEC for Agricultural and Environmental Affairs. Ndela N., interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Pietermaritzburg, April 15, 2011.

overnight by police who questioned Maphumulo as to why he was “not obedient to Chief Buthelezi” and why he wanted to be “led by Xhosas,” a reference to the ANC. The police released Maphumulo but held the bodyguard in terms of the Internal Security Act. Maphumulo alleged the bodyguard had been identified and greeted by his MK name by *askaris*, or ANC members-turned-spies.²¹⁶

Rumors too suggest that Maphumulo’s support for the ANC may have strongly impacted his community beyond sparking internal division (to be examined in the next chapter). The same confidential source that alleged Maphumulo hid an arms cache in Mbambangalo suggested that Maphumulo expected patronage from the local shop owners in order to accommodate the comrades. When one refused, not because he was Inkatha-affiliated (though his brothers were) but because any further patronage would destroy his business, youth targeted the shop for attack. However, a woman from Edendale remembers looting and petrol bombing this same store when she went to Maqongqo for the late chief’s funeral, calling into question whether or not Maphumulo approved of the action.

When Mhlabunzima died in 1993 [*sic*], we went to his funeral. Comrades destroyed that bottle shop and we got inside to pick up goods. Some people were at the burial while we took everything we wanted for free in the shop. Boys got into his bottle store and took beer. After we took whatever we needed from the shop, we sucked petrol from the cars and made petrol bombs. We took that petrol bomb and threw it into the shop.²¹⁷

²¹⁶ Samantha Weinberg, “Narrow escape for Table Mountain chief,” *Natal Witness* June 11, 1990; “Chief escapes ambush attempt on car,” June 11, 1990; “Chief held after car chase,” *Natal Witness* July 10, 1990.

²¹⁷ “Ngoba ngesikhathi kushone uMhlabunzima ngo 1993, kuthe uma siyongwaba. Amaqabane asishaya asibhodloza lesositolo sangena sazithathela izimpahla. Kuyangcwatshwa kwelinye isayidi kuleli elinye isayidi thina siyathatha izinto esitolo. Abafana bangena nakwi bottle store yakhe bathatha utshwala. Nemuva kokuzithathela esitolo samoma upetrol ezimotweni senza amapetrol bomb. Sashisa isitolo.” The woman recalling this story said the shop was owned by a Mr. Zimu; It is not clear whether this is Ngane Zimu, who had been identified as an Inkatha leader earlier or his brother Mfanazo Frazer Zimu who owned a shop on

Conclusion

Chief Maphumulo's quest for peace earned him an almost mythological reputation amongst the Pietermaritzburg communities that knew him. His assassination, to be examined in the next chapter, and the renaming of the road to Table Mountain after him 2005 nearly solidified the memory of him as "the peace chief." From as early as 1988 Maphumulo welcomed refugees from the Pietermaritzburg violence to his "haven of peace." He forbid political recruiting in his area and pushed for a judicial inquiry into the causes of the violence. When the government failed to respond, Chief Maphumulo joined Contralesa as yet another venue through which to push for peace. While this organization of traditional leaders attempted to portray itself as a non-affiliated organization, its instigation by ANC/UDF activists resulted in a close relationship between the organizations that drew Maphumulo into the network of the ANC/UDF. Through Contralesa, the chief succeeded in convening a commission of inquiry into the violence that highlighted the role of Inkatha in perpetrating the Natal violence. The high profile nature of the commission and Maphumulo's condemnation of the violence and its perpetrators drew the ire of Inkatha, the KwaZulu government, and the SAP and Natal's "haven of peace" burst into flames. When violence erupted at Table Mountain, however, it was not all related to Maphumulo's increasingly progressive politics. The continued tensions over the disputed portion of Goedverwaching and the influx of refugees onto the land, welcomed by Maphumulo, fueled the conflict.

Maphumulo's mission for peace had a tremendous impact on the communities touched by his leadership. But as this chapter has shown, the chief employed a multitude of strategies in his quest for peace, some not always peaceful. In the context of powerful local leaders with

the strip of trust land. Happiness Memela in interview with Ngenzeni Mbambo, by author and Thandeka Majola, August 8, 2011.

legendary reputations, access to arms and powerful protective medicines, and political crusades, Chief Maphumulo certainly could hold his own. But unlike the warlords with whom he stood at odds, those who called Maphumulo their chief were not coerced into following him. With the eruption of *uDlame* in Mbambangalo, Maphumulo's chiefly authority became the center of a contentious debate that highlights a multitude of ways chiefs earned and maintained legitimacy amongst their people. This contested chiefly authority will be examined in the next chapter when the conflict shifts from one between the Maphumulo and Nyavu to one within the Maphumulo community itself.

Chapter Five:

“Do you understand being chased out with your chief?”¹: *uDlame* and Chiefly Authority in Mbambangalo/Mkhambathini (1990-1994)

On February 25, 1991, Chief Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo was shot dead. Like the many Mbambangalo residents who fled to refugee camps and other safe havens, Maphumulo found that life in the shadow of Table Mountain had become simply too dangerous. Instead, he and his family rented a house at 95 Havelock Road in Pietermaritzburg. On the day of his death, the chief was returning home after a parent meeting at Clarendon Primary School, which several of his children attended. As he pulled into the driveway around 8 p.m., bullets from a 9mm pistol struck him in the back and head eight times as the killers shot through the doors and windows of his car. Neighbors found him slumped at the wheel but still alive. They rushed the chief to Northdale Hospital but he was certified dead on arrival. Maphumulo was 42 years old and had been chief for almost 18 years. During these years he “became dearly loved by his followers and sympathizers, and deeply hated by opponents.”² His assassination so soon after a January 29, 1991 peace accord between the ANC and Inkatha at the Royal Hotel in Durban sparked fears that the nascent peace talks between Inkatha and the ANC would halt.

Violence began in the Table Mountain region over a year before the assassination of “the peace chief” but it did not culminate in his death. Up until the 1994 elections (and sporadically after), conflict continued unabated as the political parties struggled for control and factions sought to install an *Ibambabukhosi* sympathetic to their cause. How do we interpret the outbreak

¹ “Uyakwazi ukukhishwa abantu bangaphandle abaneNkosi yabo bazonikhipha ngaphandle endaweni yenu kanye neNkosi yenu?” Mantombi Manyoni, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, August 8, 2011.

² Pat Stillwell, “Mhlabunzima Joseph Maphumulo (1950-1991) *Natalia* 21 (1991).

of *uDlame* and the cycle of conflict that erupted in the Table Mountain region? For what did the chief die? John Aitchison contends that while the black-on-black interpretation is fueled by racist attitudes and “intellectual and journalistic laziness,” there is a real existence of “the so-called faction fight” in Natal. He suggests that modern political conflict began to overlay such faction fighting but that the two can be clearly distinguished, citing Msinga, Richmond, and Table Mountain as examples of this.³ But as Sithole has argued for the Umzinto and Umbumbulu districts of the 1930s, there is a danger of generalizing conflicts and ignoring local contexts when using the term “faction fight” to explain such violence.⁴ This is particularly dangerous for the Table Mountain region where the groups in conflict were not clearly defined factions but communities in flux. Membership is culturally defined, and the creation of boundaries, the purchase of additional farms, forced relocation, and later Chief Maphumulo’s welcoming of refugees resulted in changing meanings of membership and the erosion of existing relationships. Analyzing these complex dynamics of the Table Mountain area enables a more complete understanding not only of the relationship between these two communities and their chiefs, but also of the tension within the Maphumulo chiefdom that led to the violence. As the violence raged on, the conflict shifted from one between chieftaincies over land to one over the authority of the chief.

This chapter will examine the multiple layers of conflict in the Table Mountain region, between chiefs, within the Maphumulo *isizwe*, within the Maphumulo *umndeni*, and between the political parties. It will first outline actions taken by *umndeni* members and *izinduna* in

³ Aitchison, *Interpreting the Violence*, 4.

⁴ Jabulani Sithole. “Conflict and Collective Violence: Scarce Resources, Social Relations and the State in the Umzinto and the Umbumbulu Districts of southern Natal during the 1930s.” BA Honours thesis (University of Natal, 1992): 58.

cooperation with KwaZulu in attempt to undermine Chief Maphumulo's authority and have him deposed. These players found unlikely allies in the neighboring Nyavu under the Inkatha-affiliated Chief Bangubukhosi Mdluli. Political affiliation enabled them to push for their own interests with near immunity from law enforcement. The next section will consider the assassination of the chief and the botched inquest into his death. It will also examine the patterns of violence that continued when the conflict shifted to one within the Maphumulo people and between Inkatha and the *umndeni* over the installation of an *ibamba* for the young heir, Nhlakanipho. Finally, it will analyze the contentious debate that followed concerning Maphumulo's chiefly legitimacy during his lifetime and in the wake of his death. Intimately connected to this debate over legitimacy is the definition of *isizwe*. Who were the Maphumulo? The chapter will ultimately illustrate not only the manner in which *uDlame* in Table Mountain was directly tied to debates over chiefly authority but also alternative conceptions of legitimacy. While his political opponents in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly chided Maphumulo as "only the fourth chief," members of his *isizwe* and those who moved to his jurisdiction during the violence remained dedicated to him for his attempts to maintain peace, critique the police and apartheid government, and provide them with safety and resources both before and during a civil war. *UDlame* in Mbambangalo was a conflict over chiefly authority and land in which the main actors relied upon political affiliations to pursue their own ambitions.

"In anticipation of Inkosi Maphumulo's Discharge"

The real likelihood of the demise of the homeland system directly threatened many chiefs, legislative assembly members, and izinduna who benefitted either directly or through patronage from the KwaZulu government. Thus, many of them had a stake in instigating and perpetuating

violence and positioning themselves as legitimate local leaders.⁵ But in Mbambangalo, individual attempts to undermine the authority of Chief Maphumulo began before the outbreak of *uDlame* and continued until his death. These efforts highlight the manner in which *uDlame* in the Table Mountain region broke out over more than just the struggle for power between Inkatha and the ANC. These efforts were spearheaded by a number of Maphumulo *umndeni* members, izinduna, and other residents out for personal gain, including Mdingi Maphumulo, Moses Zondi, and izinduna Norman “Dotsheni” Gumede and Thomas Mshoki Gcabashe.

These personal aspirations of members of the *umndeni* have been cited by other members of the Maphumulo as one of the causes of *uDlame* in Mbambangalo. The son of Mhlabunzima and the current Maphumulo chief, Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, said violence came to Mbambangalo because “there were members of the family who were in dispute, basically, who wanted the chieftaincy for themselves, you see, so they used politics in order to acquire this position. The violence here didn’t start because of politics, really. It was because of the family dispute.”⁶ Ivy Gumede, a daughter of Chief Ndlovu Maphumulo and aunt of Mhlabunzima, said that the conflict had begun as early as Mhlabunzima’s installation. “When Khangela was still acting on behalf of Mhlabunzima, the Maphumulo conflict started because they were all saying that they should act for Mhlabunzima. Then it came to a point where they fought over it until Mhlabunzima passed on.”⁷ While these individuals’ closeness to the chieftaincy might suggest an interest in telling the story this way, others outside the family support their claims. Manini

⁵ Morris and Hindson, “South Africa.”

⁶ Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, interview by author, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011.

⁷ “Kuthe uKhangela esabambeke uMhlabunzima kwavuka umbango lapha endlini yakaMaphumulo ngoba bonke babethi nabo kufanele ukuthi babambeke uMhlabunzima.” Ivy Gumede, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Imbali, August 8, 2011.

Mbokazi, a supporter of Chief Mhlabunzima who fled Mbambangalo during the violence said, “This thing [referring to the violence] started from the Maphumulo clan because Mhlabunzima’s uncles were against him and that led to the fighting in Maqongqo.”⁸

Mdingi Maphumulo, it should be recalled, was the son of an unmarried Maphumulo woman who had gained the favor of *Ibamba* Khangela Maphumulo. Mdingi was displeased when members of the Maphumulo asserted that Mdingi’s illegitimate heritage did not entitle him to be a member of the *umndeni*. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner N.G. Harvey believed that Mdingi had been so disappointed by his relegation that he may have threatened one of the councillors who had objected to his *umndeni* status.⁹ This man with a history of ambition and menacing behavior found allies and set out to depose the chief.

Despite his relegation from the *umndeni*, Mdingi began to position himself as a potential candidate for the chieftaincy and attempted to delegitimize Mhlabunzima’s authority in late 1989 and early 1990. He partnered with Gumede and Zondi, who had themselves fallen out of favor with the chief and members of the Maphumulo. In late 1989, Mdingi, Gumede, and Zondi, as well as C.J. Maphumulo and Thobiyase Mdlalose (whose names should be familiar as Inkatha supporters from the previous chapter; the former was also an *umndeni* member) held an unauthorized meeting with Psychology Ndlovu, the infamous Inkatha strongman of the Gcumisa and KwaZulu MP for KwaSwayimane. After this meeting, the Maphumulo “decided that the abovenamed persons must be removed from the area” and Chief Mhlabunzima informed the men

⁸ “Lento yasuka ozalweni lwakaMaphumulo ngoba obaba bakaMhlabunzima babengahambisani naye okwadala ukuthi kugcine kuliwa endaweni yaseMaqongqo.” Maningi and Zabazendoda, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 21, 2011.

⁹ PAR. BAO 5/363, F54/1524/5 “Bantu Affairs Commissioner Pietermaritzburg to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner,” March 11, 1970.

about the decision against them.¹⁰ Because the KwaZulu documents citing this meeting do not mention the date (only “several months earlier”) we do not know if this is the same meeting or whether it was related to the September 1989 meeting where Gcumisa Inkatha supporters forced Maphumulo members to attend a meeting at KwaSwayimane and Chief Gcumisa ordered everyone to join Inkatha. Whether or not it is the same or related, the meeting would have been interpreted as political canvassing due to the invitation of Ndlovu. The decision to ostracize the men involved was thus in line with Mhlabunzima’s practice of refusing political meetings. Given the meeting’s timing in late 1989, after the chief publicly joined Contralesa and failed to attend a meeting he requested with the Ngonyama Goodwill Zwelethini, there is a strong possibility the men involved recognized an opportunity to advance their own ambitions through an alliance with Inkatha. As well, given Buthelezi’s call for chiefs to ostracize Maphumulo in September, Inkatha may have instigated the meeting after identifying the men as possible allies.

Sometime in late 1989, Mdingi, Gumede, and Zondi went to Ulundi and alleged that Chief Maphumulo had misappropriated Maphumulo funds. One allegation questioned whether or not Maphumulo had pocketed payments for sites on the SADT-controlled portion of Goedverwachting. KwaZulu launched an investigation under the auspices of the Mpumalanga Magistrate on January 12, 1990, but could not find evidence of Maphumulo’s fault. According to the investigative report by a Mr. Nyandu, the site fees had not been deposited into the Maphumulo account, but none of the receipts for sites had been signed by Maphumulo. Gumede and Induna Alfred Madlala had been responsible for the fee collection. Maphumulo himself countered that Gumede had run off with the fees. Nyandu further found that allegations regarding Maphumulo’s misuse of funds for a block making project and KwaZulu-owned

¹⁰ UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1990, “Report on the Alleged Misappropriation of Public Funds: Maphumulo Tribal Area,” n.d.

furniture were without foundation. Ultimately, Nyandu stated, “The problem is that, with due respect Sir, our informants are not reliable, they seem to be working for recognition in anticipation of Inkosi Maphumulo’s discharge. Mr Mdingi Maphumulo is claiming ubukhosi. Mr Gumede hopes to be a Senior Induna when Mdingi is appointed as Inkosi. Mr Zondi is trying to cover-up for the money misappropriated by him [in the block-making project].”¹¹

These attempts to find Maphumulo guilty of misconduct must be seen in the context of the manipulation of chiefly authority by Buthelezi and KwaZulu. Such manipulation was previously the domain of the colonial, segregation, and early apartheid governments. With the creation of KwaZulu and the founding of Inkatha, as examined in chapter three, some of this manipulative power shifted to the bantustan government. As the demise of homeland rule became more certain, the exploitation of chiefly authority intensified in the 1980s and early 1990s. Troublesome chiefs continued to be targeted. Caprivians under Daluxolo Luthuli assassinated Ximba Chief Msinga Mlaba in 1988 for “educating people with ANC policy and information.”¹² After the launch of Contralesa in 1989, Inkatha endeavors to delegitimize progressive chiefs intensified. Immediately after the meeting at which Buthelezi and Zwelethini attacked Contralesa and Maphumulo as a “spear into the heart of Zulu unity,” the KZLA suspended Chief Elphas Molefe of Nquthu, who had traveled with Maphumulo to Lusaka as part of the Contralesa delegation in August 1989.

¹¹ UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1990, “Report on the Alleged Misappropriation of Public Funds: Maphumulo Tribal Area,” n.d.

¹² Bheka Ntshangase, "Brave Enough to Build Bridges through Dialogue: The Case of Chief Zibuse Mlaba" The Synergos Institute (2003); J. Beall and M. Ngonyama, “Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Elite Coalitions for Development: The Case of Greater Durban, South Africa” (2009).

While an inquiry into Molefe's authority found him guilty on two charges of conducting himself in a "disgraceful and improper manner as an appointed Inkosi" and one charge of disobeying the "lawful order of the Chief Minister by refusing to attend a meeting with the Cabinet," Contralesa chiefs and the wider public recognized that Molefe had been targeted for "sowing Zulu disunity."¹³ Molefe received notice to attend a KwaZulu cabinet meeting in April 1989, but failed to attend. He was uncertain of what was to be discussed and given his membership of Contralesa and the recent assassination of his ANC/UDF-affiliated son, Sechaba Thobang Molefe, the chief was hesitant to attend. In September 1989, he received notice of his suspension pending inquiry. The charges regarding his "improper" behavior as a chief were on account of a 1986 conviction for receiving stolen property (as a gift from one of his izinduna) and his 1984 trial in absentia of five men who failed to pay their levies.¹⁴ While there is no doubt of Molefe's guilt regarding the receipt of stolen property, the second charge of improper behavior is more complicated and was no doubt pursued on account of Buthelezi's vendetta against Contralesa-affiliated chiefs. The delay between Molefe's inquiry and these improper behaviors further suggests that Molefe's political affiliation was the impetus for the suspension.

¹³ Original emphasis. UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1990, "Inquiry Proceedings into a Charge of Misconduct against Inkosi Elphas Molefe," April-July, 1990; Memorandum to the Cabinet from the Department of the Chief Minister, "Misconduct Inquiry: Inkosi Elphas Molefe," October 29, 1990. "Nquthu chief suspended from duty," *Natal Witness* September 21, 1989; "Suspension challenged," *Natal Witness* October 7, 1989; Carmel Rickard, "Contralesa chief stripped of title by Buthelezi to take court action," *Natal Witness* October 25, 1989.

¹⁴ "Inquiry Proceedings into a Charge of Misconduct against Inkosi Elphas Molefe"; "Misconduct Inquiry: Inkosi Elphas Molefe."

Given KwaZulu's efforts to find evidence to justify action against Maphumulo, it is likely that similar endeavors were made in the case of Molefe—only here Buthelezi succeeded.¹⁵

On November 7, 1993, sixty to eighty armed men attacked Molefe's homestead. During the massacre, Molefe was shot several times and his son Siphon and ten others died. The following night, armed men attacked again, this time killing three, including Molefe's senior induna. The Goldstone Commission found that the KwaZulu Police covered up the identities of the perpetrators. Themba Khoza, Inkatha chairman of the Transvaal region who had received large quantities of weapons from Eugene de Kock (the South African Police colonel known as "Prime Evil" for his counterinsurgency tactics), had allegedly approved the disruption of an ANC rally at Nqutu Stadium but when the rally was cancelled the armed men turned to Molefe's homestead.¹⁶

Given KwaZulu's antagonism towards Maphumulo and its success in eliminating and ostracizing other progressive chiefs, Nyandu's failure to find evidence for abuse of office was surely met with scorn by Buthelezi. The Inkatha leader would have to find other means to delegitimize the peace chief—turning now to his allies from within the Maphumulo. When violence broke out in Mbambangalo a month after Nyandu's report, several of these same men

¹⁵ Indeed, Inkosi Molefe was again suspended for neglect of duties in February 2006, suggesting that his leadership was less than exemplary. It should also be noted that the suspended Molefe believed there was an element of ethnic hostility in his persecution because the Molefe are not "ethnic Zulus" but descendants of the Basotho who were still "South Sotho in culture, outlook and language." When Elphas Molefe testified before the TRC, his language of choice was SeSotho. Similarly, the Ximba of the Mlaba amakhosi are descendants of the Basotho who found their way into Zululand during the times of Shaka and Dingane before being dispersed by British settlers. Rickard, "Contralesa chief stripped...;" Ntshangase, "Brave Enough to Build..."

¹⁶ WHP, AG2838 (Community Agency for Social Enquiry), G, "Interim Report on Criminal Political Violence by Elements within the South African Police, the KwaZulu Police and the Inkatha Freedom Party," March 18, 1994; Testimony of Inkosi Elphas Molefe to the TRC, Vryheid, April 17, 1997, <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/vryheid/vryheid2.htm> (accessed February 1, 2012).

who went to Ulundi with the allegations, as well as induna Thomas Gcabashe, directed its unfolding and blamed Chief Maphumulo for the violence. Several Maphumulo interviewed attested to divisions within the Maphumulo before and after the start of the violence and the fact that many people from Maqongqo sided with the Inkatha-affiliated Chief Mdluli rather than their own chief.¹⁷

Before the outbreak of the violence over the weekend of January 26-28, 1990, Albert Madlala claims to have spotted induna Thomas Gcabashe pointing out homes to the police. The possibility exists for competition between these men. While Chief Maphumulo may have recognized Madlala as his *indunenkulu* (head induna), Madlala was not registered as such in the magistrate's office as required by the Bantu Authorities Act. He was registered as deputy chief in anticipation of Maphumulo's overseas studies, but because Maphumulo postponed the bursary Madlala was never served letters of appointment.¹⁸ According to Madlala's son, Bhekizazi Japhet Madlala, Mhlabunzima appointed Albert to the position because of his record of service to the chief. After an injury that made Albert no longer able to work, he earned the favor of the chief, serving as a community assistant,¹⁹ the overseer of the *isizwe's* cattle dip, and an induna before his appointment as *indunenkulu*. When Maphumulo traveled on Contralesa business, he

¹⁷ Veronica Dlamini, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Stingini, May 23, 2011; Nkanyiso Ndlovu, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, April 8, 2011.

¹⁸ Radley Keys Private Papers. Maqongqo meeting notes, February 24, 1992.

¹⁹ B.J. Madlala used the term *iphoyisa*, which literally means police, but in the context suggests that Alfred Madlala was sent to help the community, the izinduna, and chief. "Inkosi yaseyicabanga ukumenza iphoyisa layo, umsebenzi wakhe kwakufanele athunye ukusiza umphakathi kanye nokusiza izinduna zeNkosi. Wawenza lowomsebenzi ngouqotho, waphinde wabekwa ukuthi abe ngumdiphu..."

left Madlala in charge.²⁰ Maphumulo interviewees variously cited both Madlala and Thomas Gcabashe as *indunenkulu*, while the press (who most often got their information from Maphumulo) attributed the title to Madlala. This lack of clarity surrounding titles and positions is not unique. Gumede considered himself an induna, as did several Maphumulo interviewed, but the inquiry into the alleged misappropriation of funds found Gumede had never been registered by the magistrate as an induna and had only been a community councillor prior to 1988.

Thomas Gcabashe spearheaded several attempts to remove the chief. After more than a month of conflict at Table Mountain, a meeting at the Maqongqo Bottle store owned by Inkatha supporter and *umndeni* member C.J. Maphumulo called on the KwaZulu government to remove Mhlabunzima from the chieftaincy. Gcabashe reported to the *Natal Witness* that the meeting attendees concluded that the trouble in Table Mountain began when Maphumulo set up a training camp at his court in November 1989 “designed to turn youths into amaqabane (comrades),” in reference to the refugees settled at Echibini. Gcabashe claimed to be speaking in his personal capacity, despite being the chairman of the local Inkatha branch. He said people attending the meeting complained that the violence over the Goedverwaching farm, or Echibini, at the end of January was caused by *amaqabane* who attacked those at the farm because they refused to become *amaqabane*.²¹ In April, the Inkatha-owned *Ilanga* reported another meeting of people from Nyanninga and Maqongqo organized to express dissatisfaction with Mhlabunzima.

²⁰ Bhekizazi Japhet Madlala, interview with author, Thandeka Majola, and Thando Maphumulo, Scottsville, August 8, 2011.

²¹ “Chief blamed for violence,” *Natal Witness* March 13, 1990.

According to *Ilanga* these people included relatives of the chief—in all likelihood, a reference to Mdingi Maphumulo.²²

Gcabashe again called into question the support of Maphumulo’s leadership in June, when KwaZulu called an election to test the chief’s support. Maphumulo saw the election as an attempt by the Chief Minister to oust him. Buthelezi dismissed Maphumulo’s allegations and contended “members of the Maphumulo, who are not necessarily Inkatha members, appear to have lost confidence in Maphumulo.” Chief Mhlabunzima, who said that he was quite prepared to test his support, alleged the election fell through because Inkatha supporters first agreed that the voting could take place at his *inkantolo* but later objected to the venue and cancelled the event. Inkatha chairman Gcabashe denied this, arguing the election did not take place because Maphumulo failed to show.²³

In late October, Gcabashe again served as a press spokesperson, declaring that Maphumulo must leave Maqongqo because “he is not wanted by his people.” Gcabashe alleged that people had fled because of the violence, not because they were Maphumulo supporters. Gcabashe welcomed them back but warned that Maphumulo should stay away. Gcabashe made a thinly-veiled threat, “I want to warn Maphumulo. If he has troubles or problems it should not be easy for him to use Inkatha’s name because we have not touched him yet. If his people beat him it will not help him to blame Inkatha.”²⁴ Maphumulo, on the other hand, believed that he enjoyed the support of his people. “When my home was burned by Inkatha, about 70 percent of

²² *Ilanga* lase Natal April 26, 1990, cited in Verbatim Report of the Second Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Vol 55, April 27, 1990.

²³ Isabel Koch, “Table Mountain accusation,” *Natal Witness* June 29, 1990.

²⁴ Kaunda, “Inkatha orders chief out of area,” *Natal Witness Echo* November 8, 1990.

my people vacated the area...”²⁵ These conceptions of the Maphumulo, “his people,” and “my people” are central to understanding *uDlame* in the Table Mountain region. We will return to them at the end of this chapter.



Figure 22: Alfred Madlala, Thobekile Maphumulo Private Papers; Figure 23: “Men crowd main road in Maqongqo before a meeting which suggested Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo should be ousted.” *Natal Witness Echo* March 15, 1990.

Death of the Peace Chief

A little over a year after the outbreak of *uDlame* in Table Mountain, Chief Maphumulo was assassinated on February 25, 1991. Shot dead in the driveway of his Pietermaritzburg home, his wife Gaye, her sister, Fano Zuma’s wife, and three children were inside the house. Ma Shembe phoned the police and Maphumulo’s brother-in-law, Fano Zuma, when she heard the shots. Zuma and neighbors rushed to the scene, but it was too late to save the chief. The death sent shockwaves across Pietermaritzburg and many called attention to Maphumulo’s flagrant disregard for danger. Lakela Kaunda, the *Natal Witness* journalist who knew the chief well,

²⁵ CAMP, Karis-Gerhart Collection, Reel 92, Biographical file on Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, Maphumulo Interview with Paul Bell, “Fifth Column,” *Leadership* 9 (May 1990), 18.

described him as such: “Some people are born non-conformists and do not change—even if it kills them. Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, the chief of Maqongqo, is one such person.”²⁶ Another journalist eulogizing the late chief quoted a variety of colorful portrayals and analyses by unnamed politicians: showman, crusader, martyr, rebel, “political kamikaze phenomenon,” an “original democratic guerilla,” and a man with true leadership skills and a disregard for his own life. “Had he really wished to stay alive, he would have departed for safer climes, or adopted a lower profile. Perhaps it was simply his leadership imperative that drove him to take such enormous risks.”²⁷ The community reaction to this polarizing leader’s death, the subsequent inquest into his assassination, and the TRC-revelation that a hit squad team of Caprivians and KwaZulu Police had orchestrated his murder illustrate, among other things, the continued struggle over land and chiefly authority.

Two days after Maphumulo’s assassination, Buthelezi released a memorandum to the press that points to the significance of land, Maphumulo’s politics, and his leadership in gaining a more complex understanding of the factors driving the local violence. Buthelezi contended that the document had been submitted to police authorities the week prior, but he had only seen the copy faxed to him on February 26, 1991. Attributed to “Residents of Maqongqo Area (Mbambangalo Tribal Authority),” the memo has no clear author or composition date. While the memo itself puts forth that “most of the people who are party to this memorandum, though not necessary all, are members of the IFP or subscribe to its principles,” the meeting at which it was alleged to have been composed was an Inkatha meeting held on February 10, 1991, after many

²⁶ Lakela Kaunda, “Chief Maphumulo – The Last Interview,” *Natal Witness Echo* February 28, 1991.

²⁷ Johan Beukes, “The maverick crusader,” *Natal Witness* February 27, 1991.

non-Inkatha aligned Mbambangalo residents had fled to the city.²⁸ It is probable that Gcabashe was involved in its creation, as much of the rhetoric is similar to his language usage in the contemporary press.

It is also uncertain from the memo to which “police authorities” the document was sent. Captain Meyer of the SAP Riot Unit and the SADF had been invited to the February 10 Inkatha meeting to discuss allegations of partiality. The meeting announcement declared a memorandum on the subject was being prepared for the Ministers of Defense and Law and Order.²⁹ The press reported that the KwaZulu Minister of Police and Chief Minister Buthelezi received the memorandum, but it is not clear whether the South African Police or Ministers of Defense and Law and Order did as well. In addition, at different places in specific articles, the media attributed the February 26 press release to both “KwaZulu’s minister of police and chief minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi” *and* “Inkatha” or “the Inkatha Freedom Party,” revealing the prevailing assumption that KwaZulu police authorities and Inkatha were one and the same.³⁰

Despite these ambiguities, the memo is especially important for the insight it provides into the local interpretation of *uDlame*. Whether or not Inkatha instigated the memo’s creation, it is unlikely that Buthelezi would have released it to the press if Inkatha had nothing to gain from its content becoming public knowledge. The memorandum contended that violence began when:

²⁸ The only date on the memo is the date of transmission, February 26, from KwaZulu to Roy Rudden, the Inkatha press manager, to Carmel Rickard of the *Natal Witness*. APC, PC126/3/11, Memorandum from Residents of Maqongqo Area (Mbambangalo Tribal Authority) to Police Authorities (no date); “Community document reveals grievances with slain Chief Maphumulo,” *Daily News* February 28, 1991.

²⁹ APC, PC126/3/11, Inkatha Freedom Party Press Release, February 10, 1991.

³⁰ Both “Inkatha releases document of complaints about Maphumulo,” *Natal Witness* February 28, 1991 and “Community document reveals grievances with slain Chief Maphumulo,” *Daily News* February 28, 1991 attribute the release to KwaZulu Minister of Police and Chief Minister and Inkatha.

...some newcomers, under the leadership of our chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, came into our area, he (Chief Maphumulo) instigated a conflict with neighboring Chief Mdluli, so as to provide the newcomers with land already occupied by Chief Mdluli's people. The majority of the indigenous residents, i.e. Chief Maphumulo's people, opposed this. They saw it would automatically lead to a serious faction fight between the two tribes. Residents who opposed Maphumulo's plan were immediately targeted for attack by those favouring it. A lot of violence thus occurred within the Mbambangalo tribal area which ended up in Chief Maphumulo fleeing the area.

Interestingly, the author claimed that Inkatha members supported the memorandum, but he then highlights the conflict over the strip of Goedverwaching rather than political violence. The author makes clear that those who support the memorandum believed the land in question was Nyavu land rather than that of the Maphumulo, an interpretation necessary for an alliance with the Inkatha-affiliated Nyavu chief. But a clear distinction is made between "tribal residents" and "Maphumulo's comrades." The memo reveals:

The tribal residents reported a long time ago that the troublemakers are not indigenously [sic] from the area and that they are all comrades brought in by Chief Maphumulu [sic] from areas like Dambuza, Edendale etc, to suppress tribal residents. Residents have continually pointed out that if the security forces instruct these comrades to return to their original places, peace can prevail in the area. However, till [sic] today no action had been taken.

The people behind the memorandum hoped that by raising these grievances they could contribute towards proper policing of the area. They complained about the alleged SAP and SADF bias in favor of Maphumulo's comrades, a surprising charge given oral history interviews that discussed SADF protection of local Inkatha families.³¹ But the timing of its release to the press immediately after Maphumulo's death was certainly convenient if not coordinated.

In the weeks and months following Maphumulo's assassination, the ANC embraced the chief as a struggle hero, organized a mass political funeral for him, and when Sipho Madlala later

³¹ Some examples include those with E.T. Gcabashe, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011 and with Thobile Ngcobo, Maqongqo, January 17, 2011.

confessed to being a member of the hit squad that assassinated him, pushed for a high-profile inquiry into the claim. The Jwili chief in Dundee, Mzomdanza Mpungose, was killed the same day and allegations of apartheid hit squads began to circulate. Contralesa's Natal publicity secretary Sipiwe Thusi expressed little surprise at Maphumulo's death and said that numerous chiefs were aware their names were on a hit list. The chief's memorial service and funeral embodied the "political theatre" described by Belinda Bozzoli. These ceremonial rituals became the arena for the formation of African identities and sites of mobilization in the struggle against oppression.³²

On March 7, a memorial service was held at Edendale's Lay Ecumenical Centre with representatives from the ANC, Contralesa, and COSATU. An estimated 2,000 gathered at the service marked by ululating and toyi-toying. Speakers, including SACP Midlands organizer Cassius Lubisi and ANC Youth League (ANCYL) representative Mzwandile Mbongwa blamed the government and its "surrogates" for the death and called upon the people to defend themselves.

ANC, SACP, and Contralesa leaders repeated the call for self-defense at the chief's funeral that weekend. Sunday, March 10, 1991, was the hottest March day in more than twenty years at nearly 96 degrees Fahrenheit (35.3 Celsius). Estimates of the crowd ranged from 7,000 to 25,000 (the former by journalists and the latter by the ANC). ANCYL President Peter Mokaba believed Maphumulo's killing was an indication war was still continuing. He and others called upon the youth to take up the chief's spear and join MK. The SACP's Blade Nzimande heightened the intensity of the moment, declaring, "You can kill a comrade but you cannot kill the struggle. Maphumulo laid down his life so as to attain the aims of the Freedom Charter.

³² Bozzoli, *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*.

Those of us who continue to live must fight on with his spear until the objectives of the Freedom Charter are realised.” Also present were ANC NEC member John Nkadimeng, Prince Mchayizeni kaDinuzulu, COSATU’s Sydney Mafumadi, Contralesa representatives from Venda, KaNgwane, Lebowa, Transkei and Gazankulu, and DP MP Pierre Cronje. Three of Maphumulo’s four wives sat near the stage, including Nombulelo (Ma Mabandla) with the one-month old Nqobile the chief had not yet met before his death. Ma Shembe later told the *New African* that she did not stay at the funeral because she had received a cold-shoulder from the chief’s relatives. Tensions between Ma Shembe and others of Maphumulo’s family would continue during the later inquest into his death.³³

From the mass funeral, a cavalcade of cars and buses traveled to Maqongqo to bury the late chief. Family members and mourners found a crowd of Inkatha supporters awaiting them at the Maqongqo bottle store near the route to Maphumulo’s *umuzi*. Several women recalled the Inkatha intimidation; supporters at the shop and in the hills sang songs and slogans while izinduna, presumably including Gcabashe, attempted to prevent the mourners from attending the burial.³⁴ Police told journalists that they could not disperse the crowd because they were on private property but did stand between the two groups to prevent a clash. The mourners

³³ Carmel Rickard and Craig Urquhart, “Natal chiefs fear hit list,” *Natal Witness* February 27, 1991; Frazer Mtshali, “Maphumulo’s killers spotted,” *New African* February 28, 1991; “Murdered chief’s funeral on Sunday,” *Daily News* March 7, 1991; “Chief’s killers ‘will not be found,’” *Natal Witness* March 8, 1991; “All ‘young comrades’ urged to join Umkhonto weSizwe,” *Daily News* March 11, 1991; Sonya Schoeman, “MK call to arms at chief’s funeral,” *Natal Witness* March 11, 1991; Fraser Mtshali, “Pick up his spear,” *New African* March 14, 1991; “Grieving widow speaks out,” *New African* March 14, 1991; Khaba Mkhize, “Why not a bounty for the sake of justice?” *Natal Witness Echo* March 14, 1991; Lakela Kaunda, “Maphumulo’s burial marked by tension,” *Natal Witness Echo* March 14, 1991; “Still no news about Maphumulo’s killers,” *Natal Witness Echo* March 14, 1991.

³⁴ Thobekile Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Camperdown, February 8, 2011; Ngenzeni MaVidima Mbambo and Happiness Memela, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, August 8, 2011.

proceeded to the *umuzi*. Happiness Memela recalled that Jacob Zuma, Chris Hani, and Tokyo Sexwale were there, and that during the salute of the late chief, Hani leapt upon the grave.³⁵

Just days after Maphumulo's death, a man claiming to be a state intelligence agent with information about the chief's death phoned *The Natal Witness Echo*. Attempts to follow up with him proved futile for nearly two months. But in late April, Siphso Madlala walked into the paper's Pietermaritzburg office and confessed to the murder. Madlala claimed that he had operated as part of a five-man team acting on the orders of officers of the Security Branch and SADF Military Police based at Natal Command. *Witness* reporter Lakela Kaunda, who had earlier traveled to Lusaka with Chief Maphumulo, sat down with Madlala for an interview in which he detailed the events leading up to the assassination. Madlala's admission and the subsequent investigation and inquest into Maphumulo's death further complicate the contestation over this chief's leadership.

The dispute over his support as a leader moved beyond the local land and political divide within his *isizwe* and with the neighboring Nyavu and Inkatha to explicitly implicate the apartheid state. The Commissioner of the SAP, General Johan van der Merwe, announced a special team under the command of Major General Ronnie van der Westhuizen, or "General Fix-It,"³⁶ to begin investigations into Madlala's claims. Major General van der Westhuizen's involvement implicates the police and security forces in the conspiracy on account of his reputation for cover-ups or less-than zealous investigations of police complicity. Van der Westhuizen was previously CID chief in the Western Cape when *witdoek* vigilantes razed shacks

³⁵ "Yebo [uChris] wayekhona ngoba kwakuthi uma sekukhuzwa iSalute, uyena owayegxuma phezu kwethuna." Mbambo and Memela, Haniville, August 8, 2011.

³⁶ Jacques Pauw says van der Westhuizen was first dubbed "General Fix-It" after he attempted to abort a murder investigation against a security policeman in 1988. Pauw, *Into the Heart of Darkness*, 85.

in Old Crossroads and KTC under the watchful gaze of police in 1986.³⁷ In the KTC trial, he testified that he saw no need to investigate allegations of police complicity because no formal complaints had been made.³⁸ He was also assigned to the Harms Commission of Inquiry into political killings. Human rights lawyer Peter Harris felt that the involvement of such senior police officers was akin to wolves guarding sheep while journalist Jacques Pauw quipped, “death squads had to investigate themselves.” During the inquiry, Van der Westhuizen and Colonel John Wright seized Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) files and refused to allow investigators access and later enabled the files’ destruction. Judge Louis Harms was widely criticized for ignoring substantial corroborating evidence and concluding that there was no evidence of a state-sanctioned police hit squad at Vlakplaas while others considered him the victim of a massive cover-up. The commission was considered a farce.³⁹

Van der Westhuizen had also been assigned to “assist” the investigation into the December 3, 1988 massacre in Trust Feed where eleven people died and two were injured. Van der Westhuizen only investigated these cases until SAP Captain Frank Dutton realized that Van der Westhuizen had been sent to obstruct his work and prevailed upon the Natal Attorney General to remove the major general. When police captain Brian Mitchell and four special constables were found guilty of the massacre in April 1992, Judge Andrew Wilson accused the

³⁷ For more on *witdoeke* and resistance to forced removals in Crossroads and KTC, see Maseko, “Civic Movement and Non-Violent Action: The Case of the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee”; Benson, “Crossroads Continues: Histories of Women Mobilizing Against Forced Removals and for Housing in Cape Town South Africa, 1975-2005.” Also visit www.cvet.org.za for video footage of the razings and interviews with residents.

³⁸ Gaye Davis, “Clean-up or cover-up?” *Weekly Mail & Guardian* August 30, 1991.

³⁹ Peter Harris, *In a Different Time: The Inside Story of the Delmas Four* (Roggebaai: Umuzi, 2008), 269–315; Stiff, *Warfare by Other Means*, 415–9; Pauw, *Into the Heart of Darkness*.

police of a high-level cover-up and called for a public inquiry. The TRC found Van der Westhuizen's efforts to cover-up SAP involvement in the Trust Feed massacre constituted gross human rights violations.⁴⁰ SAP Colonel and Vlakplaas counter-insurgency commander Eugene de Kock testified to knowledge of security cover-up actions and that van der Westhuizen was the one responsible for "dealing with sensitive matters..."⁴¹ Similarly, Brian Mitchell, the police officer who led the Trust Feed operation testified that after van der Westhuizen, Brigadier Marks, and Captain van Zyl arrived he knew the mistake would be covered up.⁴²

While the SAP appointed the special investigation team into Madlala's claims, the ANC, the opposition Democratic Party, and the press called upon President de Klerk to step in personally and to ensure an open inquiry. Many expressed disbelief that a police investigation would carry the weight of a judicial enquiry.⁴³ Indeed, Van der Westhuizen announced that he had completed the investigation only days after arriving in Natal and without speaking with Madlala. The police complained about their lack of access to Madlala, who remained in hiding, but eventually acquired a tape of Madlala's interview after obtaining search warrants for *The Natal Witness* premises, as well as deputy editor Martin Williams' home. Police began to discredit Madlala, labeling him an unreliable police informer, and on April 30 announced that

⁴⁰ South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles*, 198; Mary McGovern and Bronwen Manby, *South Africa Half-Hearted Reform: The Official Response to the Rising Tide of Violence* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), 45–51.

⁴¹ Amnesty testimony of Eugene de Kock to the TRC, September 6, 1999, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99090616_pre_990906pt.htm (accessed February 17, 2012).

⁴² Amnesty testimony of Brian Mitchell to the TRC, October 15-16, 1996, <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/pmb/mitchell.htm> (accessed February 19, 2012).

⁴³ Chris Whitfield, "Hit squad outcry," *Natal Mercury* April 27, 1991; "Death squads still wiping out opponents of apartheid," *Daily News* April 27, 1991; "Clear this up fast," *Natal Mercury* April 27, 1991; "Allegation," *Natal Witness* April 27, 1991.

Van der Westhuizen's investigations had revealed no evidence to substantiate Madlala's claims. President de Klerk then announced an offer of protection for Madlala where Natal Attorney-General Les Roberts would meet Madlala in the presence of his and police lawyers.⁴⁴

In the midst of these investigations into Maphumulo's death, further evidence of state involvement in other covert operations began to emerge at the national level. While the Harms Commission judge disregarded Dirk Coetzee's admissions of state-sponsored hit squads, irrefutable evidence for covert operations and state collusion began to accumulate. In June, retired army general Nico Basson, who had been responsible for attempts to discredit SWAPO prior to Namibian elections in 1989, revealed the SADF had supplied weapons and covert assistance to Inkatha.⁴⁵ In July, South Africa's *Weekly Mail* in cooperation with *The Guardian* in London revealed the scandal known as Inkathagate. Special Branch police officer Brian Morrow secretly photocopied and stole police documents that provided indisputable evidence of government collusion with Inkatha. The Special Branch funneled R250,000 to Inkatha for rallies in November 1989 and March 1990—the latter of which sparked the Seven Day War in Pietermaritzburg. The scandal undermined the standing of the de Klerk government as he was forced to acknowledge these and other payments to Inkatha and UWUSA.⁴⁶ President de Klerk

⁴⁴ Vasantha Angamuthu, "My job is now complete, says general," *Sunday Tribune* April 28, 1991; "ANC-Govt deal over Madlala's safety – claim," *Natal Witness* April 29, 1991; "Madlala an informer, says Vlok spokesman," *Natal Witness* April 30, 1991; "Police find no evidence to back Sipho Madlala's 'hit squad' claims," *Natal Mercury* May 1, 1991; Craig Urquhart, "Maphumulo: dramatic claim," *Natal Witness* May 1, 1991; Lakela Kaunda, "No evidence to back claims, say police," *Natal Witness Echo* May 2, 1991; "Protection offer for 'assassin,'" *Natal Mercury* May 3, 1991.

⁴⁵ Szeftel, "Manoeuvres of War in South Africa," 74; Ivor Powell, "Aspects of Propaganda Operations," in *The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa*, 2nd ed. (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1998), 335–41.

⁴⁶ Piper and Morrow, *To Serve and Protect*.

also admitted to the training of 150 Inkatha members in security and VIP protection from 1986 and that trained members were incorporated into the KZP. He claimed that he had been unaware of the training prior to the revelations by the press.⁴⁷ The SAP also set up the Mkuze “Tshaneni Leadership and Development Project” for Inkatha military training with financial and material assistance.⁴⁸

As evidence for collusion between the state and Inkatha mounted, a formal inquest was set up in August 1991 to investigate Maphumulo’s death. Such inquests into unnatural deaths usually took place at the magisterial level, but because of the high profile nature of the assassination, Madlala’s claims, evidence of state involvement in other covert operations, and pressure from the ANC, the inquest was undertaken at the High Court. On the eve of the inquest, Jabulani Dennis Hudla, a close friend of the chief who often drove Maphumulo’s car as a diversion before his murder, was shot and killed. The court suspected that this assassination was meant as a threat to potential witnesses, even though Hudla had not been subpoenaed.⁴⁹ Uncooperative witnesses and the tampering of evidence rendered investigations into Hudla’s death futile, suggesting the threats of intimidation were real.⁵⁰

When the inquest opened on August 15, public interest was so great that the proceedings had to be relocated to a larger room in the Supreme Court building. Justice N.S. Page and two

⁴⁷ Mono Badela, “De Klerk admits SADF-Inkatha link,” *New Africa* August 1, 1991; Eddie Koch, “SADF-trained Zulus: The Story that was denied now confirmed,” *Weekly Mail* August 2, 1991.

⁴⁸ Dominic Mitchell, “Mystery of Mkuze ‘leadership development school’” *Natal Mercury* August 9, 1991.

⁴⁹ “Maphumulo’s driver killed on eve of inquest,” *Natal Witness* August 15, 1991; Khaba Mkhize, “Chief’s slain friend to be buried this weekend,” *Natal Witness Echo* August 22, 1991.

⁵⁰ “Case ‘damaged by unhelpful witnesses and lawyers,’” *Natal Witness* September 5, 1991.

assessors heard evidence. During the first few days, Madlala failed to appear, but several of Maphumulo's Havelock Road neighbors testified to hearing the shots fired and witnessing three black men run away before escaping in a light-colored car. The testimonies of Fano Zuma and Ma Shembe heightened the dramatics as allegations swelled that Ma Shembe helped plot the chief's death. Zuma testified that Ma Shembe showed more concern for the location of Maphumulo's wristwatch and pistol than for his well-being when he arrived on scene; Zuma also alleged Ma Shembe was having an affair. The police cross-examination of Ma Shembe proposed she may have been an accomplice in the plot, a suggestion that stirred murmurings of affirmation in the crowd. Ma Shembe denied helping or even knowing Madlala. When she testified she also did not know the location of Maphumulo's missing pistol, the late chief's mother, Ma Mdlalose, shouted out in isiZulu that Shembe did know, and ran from the room crying.⁵¹

Sipho Madlala took the stand in early September amidst much anticipation. At various points during his testimony when he switched from isiZulu to English, the public gallery demanded he testify in isiZulu so they could understand. Over the course of two weeks, the former military policeman claimed he had been recruited by the SAP's security branch to assassinate, amongst others, Chief Maphumulo. Madlala testified that he had been a security

⁵¹ Vicky Quinlan, "Inquest begins into the murder of Maphumulo," *Natal Witness* August 16, 1991; "Shots head on night chief slain," *Daily News* August 16, 1991; "Assassin likely to testify," *Natal Mercury* August 21, 1991; Nonceba Levin, "Key witness absent at Maphumulo inquest," *Natal Witness Echo* August 22, 1991; "Views conflict in city inquest," *Natal Witness* August 27, 1991; John Nichols, "Maphumulo's wife denies helping killers," *Natal Witness* August 28, 1991; Sue Segar, "Court drama as slain chief's widow speaks," *Daily News* August 28, 1991; Ingrid Oellermann, "Chief's wife denies murder plot," *Natal Mercury* August 28, 1991; "Maphumulo shot six times, inquest hears," *Natal Witness* August 29, 1991; "Assassination fears haunt chief's inquest," *New Nation* August 29, 1991; John Nichols, "Witness thinks chief's wife had an affair," *Natal Witness* August 30, 1991; "Slain chief's wife tells inquest her husband always carried a gun," *New Nation* August 30-September 5, 1991; "Chief 'talked of those after him,'" *Natal Mercury* August 30, 1991; Sue Segar, "Surprise at reaction of chief's wife," *Daily News* August 31, 1991.

police informer from the age of 15 and was later recruited into the military police under the supervision of Warrant Officer Wolfgang Rolf Warber⁵² and a Sergeant Grobler.⁵³ He claimed to have received training in explosives at a La Mercy beach and in firearms at a Hammarsdale shooting range. He attested to aiding the Lindelani warlord Mandla Shabalala in attacks; participating in a retaliatory attack on people alleged to have attacked the home and shop of Umlazi Inkatha councillor Edward Sishosonke Shozi; shooting UDF recruiter Nato Mkhize in Imbali in 1987; and attacking the home of Dr. Ndlovu at the University of Zululand in 1989 or 1990.⁵⁴ Then in February, 1991, he was part of five-person team supplied with firearms and overalls by Security Branch police at the Alexandra Police Station in Pietermaritzburg and paid R5,000 to kill Maphumulo. According to Madlala, the men were told that the chief was a “danger to the Government and a bad influence on the general public.” Warber informed them that someone living on Maphumulo’s property would “cue” the assassins by switching off his

⁵² At the time of the inquest, Warrant Officer Wolfgang Rolf Warber was the subject of an inquiry into the supply of arms to Inkatha members – a matter to which Madlala also testified. Madlala alleged Warber was a good friend of Mangosuthu Buthelezi and identified the receivers of weapons as the warlords Christopher Sichizo Zuma of the early Harewood Inkatha Branch, Thulani Ngcobo of Imbali Unit 1, and Jerome Hlengwa. This inquiry into the weapons resulted from evidence that emerged during the Trust Feeds Trial proving that Warber had assisted in the purchase of 24 revolvers on behalf of Imbali Inkatha members. Three of those for whom he purchased weapons were implicated in murder cases, including Abdul Awetha, Skweqe Mveli, and Toti Zulu, all notorious Imbali warlords. Warber also served as an instructor at the SAP Koeberg base where 130 Caprivians received additional training in 1988. Masheila Sewpaul, “Policeman ‘supplied arms to Imbali Inkatha leaders,’” *Natal Witness* September 7, 1991; South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report Volume 3: Regional Profiles*, 195, 240–1.

⁵³ Press articles spell it Grobler, Grobbler, and Grobbelaar but never include a first name. I use Grobler out of the suspicion this is the same J.J. Grobler who had earned a reputation as an efficient and ruthless investigator with the Durban Murder and Robbery Squad. See Kasrils, *Armed and dangerous*, 37–53.

⁵⁴ This is probably Dr. Aaron Ndlovu, an ANC member of staff at the University of Zululand in Ngoye who in 1990 believed his name was on a hitlist of people opposed to Inkatha in the Mtunzini and Empangeni areas. His home had been attacked. Jeffery, *The Natal Story*, 227.

sitting room light (to which Ma Shembe had earlier denied any knowledge). Madlala also stated that Maphumulo's name was on a hit list of people to be killed, topped by ANC Midlands leader Harry Gwala.

But inconsistencies between Madlala's initial claims in the interview with the *Witness* and his court room testimony arose. Contrary to his initial confession, Madlala testified that he had followed Maphumulo for surveillance purposes but that four other men acted as triggermen. Madlala claimed the assassins, Warrant Officer van Rooyen, Corporal James Sabasaba, Lance Corporal Roy Gumede, and another man whose name he did not recall, undertook the mission while he remained at the Alexandra Police Station. Piet Scott was also there during the planning and supply of the weapons. Madlala testified that Warber and Grobler later encouraged him to confess to *The Natal Witness* as part of a plan to infiltrate the ANC. Madlala claimed that he recognized this as an opportunity to leave their pay and chose to tell the truth. When cross-examined about this "rather elaborate scheme" by the SAP counsel Kobus Booyens, Madlala alleged that the police knew how to dispute any information Madlala revealed.

Other disputed facts began to cast doubt upon Madlala's credibility in the eyes of Justice Page. Madlala claimed that he had stayed with DP MP Pierre Cronje after meeting with the *Witness*' Kaunda but Cronje testified that he had never met Madlala in person but only arranged for his safety. Kaunda stated that she accompanied Madlala to the DP offices where she personally handed Madlala over to Cronje. Counsel Booyens suggested that Madlala had only been a police informer and provided handwritten reports and receipts supposedly signed by Madlala. Madlala countered that he never provided information to the SAP after he began working for the Military Police in 1986 and that he had only given verbal reports and received money from the SADF. Madlala refused to answer questions based on a tape-recorded interview

that he insisted had been edited. He alleged the documents had been forged and there was a conspiracy to discredit him, an accusation not out of the realm of possibility given the extent of cover-up by police and defense forces in other cases, including Trust Feed and the Harms Commission.

Madlala then confused security police officers he had implicated in a courtroom lineup. Madlala recognized one man, Constable Kruger, as “van Tonder” and pointed out another, whose name he could not remember, but that was in fact Sergeant van Tonder. He also was unable to recognize Warrant Officer van Rooyen. Despite the confusion, Madlala insisted that the men he identified were involved and that they had changed their names to confuse him. In a lineup of 14 SADF personnel, Madlala did positively identify Sergeant Grobler and Mr. Sabasaba, but SADF Counsel van Schaikwyk alleged that was because Madlala had previously attempted to sell information to the SADF. Van Schaikwyk also suggested that high-ranking ANC officials had briefed Madlala as to how to testify.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ “Man tells of his role in killing of chief,” *Daily News* September 5, 1991; Sue Segar, “Policeman friend of Buthelezi, inquest hears,” *Daily News* September 6, 1991; “Ex-policeman tells of plot to kill chief,” *Natal Mercury* September 6, 1991; Masheila Sewpaul, “Cop ‘tried to pin killing on IFP chief,’” *Natal Witness* September 6, 1991; Sue Segar, “I was told to kill UDF men,” *Daily News* September 7, 1991; Witness tells of ‘killings,’” *Natal Mercury* September 7, 1991; Masheila Sewpaul, “Policeman ‘supplied arms to Imbali Inkatha leaders,’” *Natal Witness* September 7, 1991; Prakash Naidoo, “Missions of murder,” *Sunday Tribune* September 8, 1991; Sue Segar, “Story given to the press a ploy – Madlala,” *Daily News* September 10, 1991; “Story of murder leaked ‘to infiltrate ANC,’” *Natal Mercury* September 10, 1991; “MP ‘protected’ key witness, court hears,” *Natal Mercury* September 11, 1991; “Inquest witness denies writing police reports,” *Natal Mercury* September 12, 1991; Vickie Quinlan, “Dramatic evidence at Maphumulo’s inquest,” *Natal Witness Echo* September 12, 1991; Vicky Quinlan, “Evidence is a conspiracy, says Madlala,” *Natal Witness* September 12, 1991; “Court line-up confuses key inquest witness,” *Natal Mercury* September 18, 1991; “Witness fails to identify security police,” *Daily News* September 18, 1991; Vicky Quinlan, “Madlala picks the wrong ‘Van Tonder,’” *Natal Witness* September 18, 1991; “Chief’s inquest hears evidence of an alleged ‘hit list’ by police,” *Natal Mercury* September 19, 1991; “Maphumulo chief witness rejects SAP claim,” *Daily News* September 21, 1991; “Inquest witness claims he was in ‘hit squad,’” *Natal Mercury* September 23, 1991; “Inquests witness tells of secret explosives training,” *Natal Mercury* 1991;

The inconsistencies and confusion continued unabated until September 27, 1991, when Lucky James Mntambo also came forward to admit his own participation in the hit squad. Justice Page adjourned the inquest until late October to enable investigation into Mntambo's claims and ordered protective custody for the alleged assassin who claimed that the police had already shot him. When the inquest resumed on October 22, Mntambo additionally claimed to be part of a police team responsible for the shooting of Hudla. According to Mntambo, Captain Pieterse ordered the attack and he, Pieterse, Warrant Officer Warber, Constable Brooks, and another police officer (Potgieter) went to the Federal Theological Seminary in Imbali where an informer pointed out Hudla's home. Mntambo was then ordered back to the vehicle, but heard the gunshots. Counsel for the SADF and SAP challenged Mntambo's detailed descriptions of two earlier attempts on Maphumulo's life in which he claimed he participated. Mntambo also alleged that SAP members who sought to obtain a statement from him attacked him in protective custody at Westville Prison. Justice Page referred the assault to the Attorney General because he was not satisfied with the conduct of the prison officials concerned. Counsel Booyens attempted to discredit Mntambo with questions about false entries in the pocket book where he recorded duty.⁵⁶

Bob Frean, "Documents are cover-ups, states witness," *Daily News* September 24, 1991; "Hit squad man didn't tell ANC 'everything,'" *Daily News* September 25, 1991; Ingrid Oellermann, "Inquest witness 'not debriefed' by ANC leaders," *Natal Mercury* September 25, 1991; Sue Segar, "Witness asked about 'sale' of information," *Daily News* September 26, 1991; "DP MP tells court key witness was mistaken," *Natal Mercury* October 23, 1991.

⁵⁶ "Jail' protection for witness," *Natal Mercury* September 28, 1991; Sue Segar, "Dramatic turn in Maphumulo trial," *Daily News* September 28, 1991; Ryan Cresswell, "I attacked chief's car, admits cop," *Sunday Tribune* September 29, 1991; Prakash Naidoo, "Witness terrified after alleged police attempt to kill him," *Sunday Tribune* September 29, 1991; Vicky Quinlan, "Attacks on people linked to Maphumulo continue," *Weekly Mail* October 4, 1991; Sue Segar, "Witness implicates himself in shooting," *Daily News* October 24, 1991; "Judge orders probe into scuffle with inquest witness," *Natal Mercury* October 24, 1991; "Witness's account of ambush challenged," *Daily News* October 25, 1991; "Witness says he was

Several of the police and defense force officers implicated took the stand. Detective Warrant Officer Pieter Scott of the Riot Unit denied being part of a hit squad or knowing other members of the alleged team. He had been assigned to investigate Maphumulo's assassination but was recalled after Madlala's allegations. When asked why so few statements were taken from neighbors, family members, and other potential witnesses under his investigation he said that they had only heard the shots and thus he did not think it relevant. Warrant Officer Warber also took the stand and denied involvement, knowing Buthelezi, supplying weapons to Inkatha, or any other involvement. He alleged that Madlala had been an informer but had become unreliable. Security police Captain Arnold Vosloo, branch commander in Pietermaritzburg, testified that the security branch monitored Maphumulo's movement and telephone activity from 1980 up to the time of his death. He agreed to turn over the chief's file, but not before certain sensitive documents that might reveal the names of informers were removed. He also pointed out that Mntambo had incorrectly identified him as Captain Pieterse. Another police officer testified that Mntambo had been his informer in the riot unit. Family members of the implicated policemen provided alibis.⁵⁷

paid R3 000 to kill chief," *Natal Mercury* October 25, 1991; "Judge queries police access to witness," *Natal Mercury* October 29, 1991; Andre Jurgens, "Inquest witness tells court of false entries in pocket book," *Daily News* November 7, 1991; Catherine Payze, "The Elimination of Political Opponents: The Maphumulo Assassination," in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 252-4.

⁵⁷ "Policeman denies killing chief," *Daily News* November 11, 1991; "SAP officer denies being part of murder conspiracy," *Natal Mercury* November 12, 1991; "'Hit squad' policeman in the dock," *Daily News* November 14, 1991; "Policeman denies giving firearms to Inkatha," *Natal Mercury* November 15, 1991; Andre Jurgens, "Inquest told about revolver purchases," *Daily News* November 15, 1991; "Family alibi for assassination accused," *Daily News* November 16, 1991; "Court told of security branch interest in Maphumulo," *Daily News* November 19, 1991; "Security police admit having 'monitored' chief's movements," *Natal Mercury* November 19, 1991; "Policeman 'in Pretoria' when Maphumulo died," *Daily News* November 23, 1991.

One of the last people to testify was induna Thomas Gcabashe. Gcabashe testified the Maqongqo community blamed Maphumulo and his youthful supporters for the violence. He said that Maphumulo moved to town because the community no longer wanted him. Gcabashe denied that he and the chief had been in conflict, but that “many years ago” there had been trouble between Maphumulo and Inkatha. He further alleged that Maphumulo had “many enemies” and had been “chased away” by Contralesa, the KwaShembe church, and a football club at Maqongqo. He also testified that the late chief was not on good terms with his brother.⁵⁸

In the end, Justice Page had little choice but to find that unknown persons had murdered the chief.⁵⁹ Charges brought against the SAP officer who assaulted Mntambo during protective custody were dropped without explanation. Not long after the completion of the inquiry, Catherine Pazye argued that Madlala and Mntambo’s testimonies, the inconsistencies, and state actions made it abundantly clear that a conspiracy to kill the chief existed. Any of the SAP, SADF, and Inkatha could have been the culprit.⁶⁰ But evidence presented at the TRC does shed light on state, Inkatha, and local involvement in the chief’s death. Maphumulo’s wives, Thobekile Ma Majози and Nombulelo Ma Mabandla, testified about their loss, but according to Ma Majози, they were never informed of any findings.⁶¹

The TRC special hearing on Caprivi trainees and the amnesty application of Daluxolo Wordsworth Luthuli, the grandson of one-time ANC President and Nobel Peace Prize winner

⁵⁸ “Inquest told chief blamed for violence,” *Natal Mercury* November 27, 1991.

⁵⁹ The inquiry ended in March, 1992. Initial efforts to locate the court records of the inquiry failed as court employees claimed the records had been turned over to the archive. The archive, in its temporary housing due to renovations, could not locate the record without a case number.

⁶⁰ Payze, “The Elimination of Political Opponents: The Maphumulo Assassination,” 255.

⁶¹ Thobekile Maphumulo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Camperdown, February 8, 2011;

Albert Luthuli, suggest that the women should have heard back from the TRC. Luthuli left South Africa in 1963, at only the age of 14, to join Umkhonto weSizwe (MK). He went to Tanzania before training for two years in Odessa (USSR) and was initially deployed in the 1967 Wankie Campaign in Rhodesia. He was arrested when attempting to re-enter South Africa and spent 1968 in Pretoria Central Prison before serving a ten-year sentence on Robben Island. Prior to his 1979 release, a senior ANC leader from Natal, Curnick Ndlovu, told him to join Inkatha, with which the ANC broke after a meeting in London the same year, as a cover to recruit and conduct MK activities. For several years after his release, Luthuli remained both a member of both ANC and Inkatha, periodically updating the ANC on Inkatha activities.⁶²

Luthuli became very active in Inkatha with the launch of UWUSA in 1985. Luthuli told Thula Bopela that he began to think and act like an Inkatha follower only after he felt betrayed by the ANC. When Inkatha undertook the formation of a paramilitary wing, its leadership sent Siegfried Bhengu, who had also left MK and since become a member of Inkatha's Central Committee, M.Z. Khumalo, and Mangaqa Mncwango to recruit Luthuli. They asked Luthuli to become a Central Committee member and the Commissar of Inkatha's new paramilitary wing on account of his MK training and experience. The ANC maintained that this appointment had not been part of Luthuli's mission, but Luthuli believed he could not refuse a senior position without arousing suspicions and considered it a valuable opportunity to gain sensitive information. When

⁶² Daluxolo Luthuli, amnesty testimony to the TRC, Durban, April 7, 1998, <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/durban/dbn1.htm> (accessed February 21, 2012); Thula Bopela and Daluxolo Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Sizwe: Fighting for a Divided Nation* (Alberton: Galago, 2005).

rumors circulated that an invitation for him to meet with the ANC in Swaziland was part of a plan to kill him, Luthuli parted ways with the ANC and fully embraced Inkatha.⁶³

Upon appointment as commissar, Luthuli immediately departed for paramilitary training in the Caprivi Strip. The returned Caprivians were deployed to local Inkatha leaders and chiefs across KwaZulu-Natal in “contra-mobilization” squads, defensive groups, offensive teams, and VIP protection units. The contra-mobilization squads served as Inkatha field organizers and recruiters and also identified local UDF leaders. The defensive squad under Sitwell Mkhwanazi and Phumlani Mshengu was responsible for intelligence gathering while the offensive squad, located at Port Dunfort under Commander J.P. Opperman, undertook ambushes, abductions, and assassinations.

According to Luthuli, there was great reliance upon local leadership to identify targets. In theory, the defensive group would report targets to the offensive squad that would then carry out the attack. But from the beginning “things did not go as planned” and some contra-mobilization and defensive squads were directly involved in violence. After an attack on ANC/UDF supporters identified by local leadership, the Caprivians would then report back to Luthuli. He

⁶³ In his amnesty testimony, Luthuli attributes the loss in contact to South African operations in Swaziland and Lesotho, rather than his decision to break it off as suggested in the memoir. Otherwise, the memoirs repeat, even cite, his testimony. Other items covered in detail in his testimony, such as his lack of cooperation at the Goldstone Commission and the details of his Inkatha activities, are not surprisingly left out of the memoir. While his defection back to the ANC just prior to the 1994 elections may call into question Luthuli’s intentions for both his testimony and the memoir, the book is a scathing attack on the ANC and MK treatment of soldiers that presents both Bopela and Luthuli as integral components in the last minute decision of Inkatha to participate in the 1994 elections. While there are certainly shortcomings to both Luthuli’s TRC testimony and his memoir, one especially needs to question the layered voices and timing of Luthuli and Bopela’s memoirs. While co-authored, the story is narrated by Bopela as remembered by him and told to him by Luthuli. Published by Galago Publishing Company under Peter Stiff, the author of several invaluable yet problematic books on covert operations in southern Africa, Stiff’s editorial position should also be questioned. Bopela and Luthuli cite from Stiff’s books and details and names that were absent from Luthuli’s TRC testimony are included in the memoir. Bopela and Luthuli, *Umkhonto we Siswe*, 194–201.

did not need to report the activity to Khumalo, for Khumalo often already knew, thus suggesting a level of planning or communication between the local leadership and Khumalo. Luthuli pointed to the 1988 assassination of Chief Mlaba and the 1992 Esikhaweni massacre as such instances where a Caprivian came to him to report hit squad activity. While the TRC often prioritized stories of state-sanctioned violence and national cleavages between the Inkatha and the UDF/ANC, Luthuli's testimony reveals the extent of on-the-ground initiative in the conflict.

When asked directly about Maphumulo's death, Luthuli told the commission that a Caprivian named Phumlani Masengo,^{*} who worked with the KwaZulu Police's Bureau of State Intelligence (BSI) in KwaMashu, informed him that he had taken part in the chief's murder.⁶⁴ Luthuli's testimony during the special session on Caprivi confirms that Maphumulo's assassination occurred during his time as Caprivi Commissar and that a Captain Khanyile of BSI was involved.⁶⁵

These testimonies illuminate the fact that many not only had a stake in Chief Maphumulo's death, but also that many hands were involved in the assassination. It cannot be known from these sources whether it was local Table Mountain Inkatha leaders, themselves aspirant to positions of authority or angered by his welcoming of the refugees onto contested land, or someone closer to Buthelezi, himself tired of the peace chief's opposition, who identified Maphumulo as a target. But Luthuli's testimonies directly connect Inkatha, KwaZulu Police, and the South African Defense Force to the chief's death. Luthuli admitted Caprivians

* It is uncertain whether this is a transcription error and Luthuli meant Phumlani Mshengu, identified as a Caprivi leader earlier, or another individual, but given the frequency of transcription errors/misspellings, I am willing to venture it is the same Mshengu.

⁶⁴ Daluxolo Luthuli, amnesty testimony to the TRC.

⁶⁵ Daluxolo Luthuli, TRC Caprivi Hearing testimony, Durban, August 5, 1997, <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/special/caprivi/caprivi2.htm> (accessed January 20, 2012).

targeted not only Maphumulo, but also Chief Msinga Mlaba, Zazi Khuzwayo, Reggie Hadebe, and other Pietermaritzburg leaders. The involvement of Phumlani Masengo, the locally deployed SADF-trained Caprivian acting as part of a hit squad under the command of the KwaZulu Police's BSI, does not rule out the involvement of Siphso Madlala or Lucky Mntambo.

Violence and Succession

In the wake of the chief's assassination, violence continued in the Table Mountain region—but now within the Maphumulo chiefdom as the *umndeni* and both political parties struggled to promote an *ibamba* sympathetic to their cause. Local leaders were killed, one by one, and the violence garnered national attention as the murders culminated in the Mboyi and Nkanyezeni massacres. After the highly contested appointment of Banningi Maphumulo as *ibamba*, violence continued in a cycle of revenge killings. From Maphumulo's death up until the historic 1994 elections, harassment, shootouts, and ambushes dictated everyday life in the Table Mountain region. Police regularly found the bodies of men, women, and children, some only months old. Several characteristics of the violence include attacks on members of the *umndeni* and those close to Chief Maphumulo, sophisticated weaponry and planning, and the targeting of transportation. These patterns resonate with those identified by Antoinette Louw for Natal generally from 1990 to 1992 where the most common type of violence involved small-scale attacks on people and an increase in the targeting of key officials.⁶⁶

The harassment of and attacks on *umndeni* members and the *umndeni* favorite for the *ibamba* highlight the contestation over the chieftaincy as central to the continued violence after Chief Mhlabunzima's death. Maphumulo's step-father and *umndeni* member, Dinzy Jack

⁶⁶ Antoinette Louw, "Conflict Trends in Natal, 1989-April 1992," in *Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992).

Maphumulo was killed in a shootout in March 1991. Kwenzokuhle Maphumulo, Mhlabunzima's brother who had acted as chief for him during the 1978 suspension and the *umndeni's* choice for *ibamba*, reported police harassment after being called to the Alexandra Police Station by police who said they wanted to set up a peace committee in Maqongqo. After a brief conversation regarding peace negotiations, the officers asked Kwenzokuhle why he supported Mandela and communists such as Harry Gwala. The police also queried his opinion of Banningi Maphumulo, who was the Inkatha-favorite for the *ibamba* position. Fano Zuma also reported police harassment after an interrogation related to the Madlala claims. Zuma alleged three policemen (two white and one black) attempted to recruit him to implicate Maphumulo in gun smuggling and that upon release from the station was followed and shot at by white men in a blue Nissan Skyline. Several more attacks took place in the vicinity of the late chief's *umuzi*. In January 1992, Acting Chief Madlala reported that Inkatha supporters burnt the homes that remained at Maphumulo's homestead and vandalized the Maphumulo *inkantolo* after a meeting in Maqongqo headed by David Ntombela. Ntombela said the 14 buses of supporters had come for a meeting on the National Peace Accord, which had been signed on September 14, 1991.⁶⁷

Attackers targeted local ANC and Inkatha leadership. Acting Chief Albert Madlala was shot dead by unknown gunmen. Police alleged that his death occurred during a botched robbery attempt and charged the dying man with attempted armed robbery.⁶⁸ Madlala had been a close confidant of Maphumulo during his lifetime and had joined both the ANC and Contralesa. After

⁶⁷ "Stepfather murdered," *Natal Mercury* March 26, 1991; "Maphumulo snr killed," *Natal Witness* March 26, 1991; "Police taking sides – late chief's brother," *Natal Witness Echo* April 18, 1991; Craig Urquhart, "Maphumulo: dramatic claim," *Natal Witness* May 1, 1991; "Huts burned, shots fired at Inkatha meeting," *Natal Witness* January 28, 1992; Nomusa Cembali, "IFP members 'burnt Maphumulo's home,'" *Natal Witness Echo* January 30, 1992.

⁶⁸ Radley Keys Private Papers. Minutes of Peace in Natal board meeting, June 30, 1993.

the chief's death, Madlala worked in earnest with Peace in Natal as this non-profit run by the Democratic Party's MP Radley Keys attempted to negotiate peace for Mbambangalo. But one Maqongqo ANC member implicated Madlala in the distribution of weapons.⁶⁹ Madlala had been a target of harassment and attacks since Maphumulo's death. He survived an April attack for which a KZP man was charged when a bus he was traveling on was ambushed and the passenger next to him killed. At the time of his death, Madlala had been organizing a ceremony to unveil the late chief's tombstone.⁷⁰ Madlala's son Japhet was adamant that Albert Madlala "was not beaten for the ANC but beaten for Mhlabunzima" and said that Madlala had earned the support of many local youth.⁷¹ It was believed that after Madlala's death, many of the remaining ANC followers fled.

Local Inkatha officials were also hard hit. The systematic nature in which four local leaders were taken out and the automatic weapons used to do so lends credence to allegations of the presence of trained *amaqabane* and an arms cache in Mbambangalo. After the adjournment of the Maphumulo inquest, Sabelo Gcabashe was seriously wounded as he drove near his home in Maqongqo on December 15, 1991. Three bullets struck him as six men with AK-47s opened fired on his Mazda 323. His wife remembers that the car had been sprayed with 38 bullets. Two days later, Thomas Gcabashe was struck five times and killed in his car as he turned into his city driveway in a manner almost identical to the assassination of Maphumulo. In April 1992, Nyanninga (an Mbambangalo *isigodi*) Inkatha chairman Tobias Mdlalose and his daughter were

⁶⁹ Amnesty statement of Albert Sbangeliso Maseko to the TRC, November 17, 1999. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99111518_dbn_991117db.htm (accessed February 8, 2012).

⁷⁰ "Table Mountain chief Madlala shot dead," *Natal Witness* August 8, 1992.

⁷¹ "Ubaba akashawelanga ukuthi uyi ANC kodwa washawela uMhlabunzima..." Japhet Madlala, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Scottsville, August 8, 2011.

killed in an ambush on his home and the KZP officer who guarded him was wounded. The assailants used a variety of 9mm pistols, R1 rifles, shotguns, and petrol bombs. Later that month, John Khanyile, Inkatha chairman of Enkanyezeni (another *isigodi*), was assassinated at a bus stop where 14 spent cartridges were found. In June, Mdlalose's son Skumbuzo was shot and seriously wounded, and in September, Enkanyezeni Inkatha Branch Secretary Bheki Shelembe was also shot at a bus stop by occupants of a passing vehicle armed with AK47s and shotguns.⁷² A press statement by the IFP after Shelembe's death alleged that this assassination "yet again provides continuing evidence of ANC hit-squad activity in Natal and the existence of a systematic pattern of elimination against IFP leadership and members."⁷³ While Inkatha leaders often made such assertions regarding the death of its officials, the scale and success of anti-Inkatha forces in the Table Mountain region seem to support this allegation.

Another characteristic of the advancing Table Mountain violence were the numerous attacks on public transportation. Early morning bus ambushes were frequent, ensuring maximum damage by targeting workers on the two major routes from the region to the city, Lion Park Road and Table Mountain Road (*refer to figure in previous chapter to see major routes*). Ambushes on Lion Park Road were interpreted as attacks on KwaNyavu's Inkatha members while vehicles on Table Mountain Road carried both KwaNyavu and Mbambangalo residents. In March 1991, a bus ambush on Lion Park Road injured nine Table Mountain residents and in May, the shooting and petrol bombing of a bus on Table Mountain Road killed three, injured 35, and caused KwaZulu Transport (KZT) to suspend their services to the region in the interest of the safety of

⁷² "Inkatha leader wounded in ambush," *Daily News* December 17, 1991; Interview with Thombi Gcabashe, by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011; "Inkatha leader is gunned down in his car," *Daily News* December 18, 1991;

⁷³ APC. PC126/3/11. Press Statement issued by Ed Tillet, IFP Information Centre, September 9, 1992.

passengers and drivers. Residents continued to come under attack at various bus stops in the region where they waited for non-KZT transport.⁷⁴

In the midst of this violence, a week after the murder of Acting Chief Madlala and eighteen months after the assassination of Chief Maphumulo, the KwaZulu Cabinet adopted a resolution appointing Banningi Maphumulo as *ibambabukhosi*. A Department of the Chief Minister memorandum dated July 2, 1992 and presented at the August 14 Cabinet meeting reports a conflict within the *umndeni* as evidenced by two *umndeni* “factions.” According to the report, two *umndeni* meetings were held. Mdingi Maphumulo (who died sometime after the first meeting, presumably a casualty of the violence) convened the first at which the former *ibamba* Khangela proposed Banningi Maphumulo for the position. The report acknowledged that Banningi was an illegitimate son of the late Chief Ndlovu, but did not allude to the fact that he had previously been overlooked for the position on account of this heritage. Khangela later denied that the first was a legitimate meeting of the *umndeni*, but rather stated that the men had gathered to drink and discussed the topic. Khangela also attended the second meeting organized by Anthony Maphumulo, as did the mother of the late chief, Ma Mdlatlose. This meeting recommended the appointment of Kwenzokuhle.

It is likely that Khangela’s denial of the first nomination happening at an *umndeni* meeting is accurate. Mdingi, who had been dismissed from the *umndeni* at the time of Mhlabanzima’s appointment would not have been welcomed at an *umndeni* meeting while

⁷⁴ Masheila Sewpaul, “Nine hurt in ambush,” *Natal Witness* March 14, 1991; “Death bus catches fire after ambush,” *Daily News* May 6, 1991; “Bus attack in Table Mountain kills 3 people,” *Natal Witness* May 7, 1991; “Bus ambush death toll rises to three,” *Natal Mercury* May 7, 1991; “Gunmen shoot bus passengers,” *Natal Mercury* July 24, 1991; “Two killed in Table Mountain,” *Natal Witness* August 21, 1991; Craig Urquhart, “Woman dies, eight hurt in ambush on ‘IFP bus,’” *Natal Witness* February 12, 1992; Niall Aitchison, “Bus attacks leave 5 dead,” *Natal Witness* April 22, 1992; “Commuter shot dead while boarding bus,” *Natal Witness* June 9, 1992.

Khangela and Anthony would attend. Without a doubt, Mdingi was aware that he was in no position to claim the position of *ibamba* and thus attempted to nominate Bangingi as a malleable ally and *umndeni* member. While it is likely that Bangingi's politics also influenced the remainder of the *umndeni* to nominate Kwenzokuhle (who held the same political sympathies as his late older brother), it should also be remembered that the *umndeni* had earlier supported Kwenzokuhle for the regency during Mhlabunzima's suspension.

With the *umndeni* at odds, KwaZulu intervened and manipulated the succession in its favor. In three points of "motivation," the memorandum acknowledges Kwenzokuhle's nomination by the *umndeni* but attempts to discredit it. It is worth quoting at length:

3. MOTIVATION:

- 3.1. Kwenzokuhle was previously placed in charge of the tribe during the period of suspension of the late Inkosi Mhlabunzima. He has the backing of the majority of the Umndeni, but is not very loyal to the Government of KwaZulu.
- 3.2. He is a full uncle of Mhlabunzima and it is not policy to appoint such a person as Ibambabukhosi. My Department is reluctant to point this out to the Umndeni, who are known to be very stubborn. It would be appreciated if cabinet could give its guidance in this regard, as this is a very delicate matter.
- 3.3. The appointment of Kwenzokuhle is not recommended on account of his affiliations with Anti-government organisations.⁷⁵

The memorandum makes clear that Kwenzokuhle was not a desirable appointment on account of his anti-apartheid political affiliations. But what is more subtle is the manner in which the Department of the Chief Minister attempted to further discredit Kwenzokuhle on account of his position within the family. Despite the memo's claim, Kwenzokuhle was not the full uncle, but rather, the younger brother, of Mhlabunzima. As such, his appointment to the *Ibambabukhosi* for the young son of Mhlabunzima would have been in line with "policy" as it was during

⁷⁵ UAR. Ex-KwaZulu Cabinet Memos and Minutes, 1992, "Memorandum to the Cabinet from the Department of the Chief Minister: Appointment of Ibambabukhosi: Maphumulo Tribe: Mpumalanga District," July 2, 1992.

Mhlabunzima's suspension. Baniŋi, on the other hand, was the uncle (Mhlabunzima's father Funizwe and Baniŋi shared the late Chief Ndlovu as father) of Mhlabunzima. Did the memo here mean Baniŋi? Certainly on account of Baniŋi's birth out of wedlock, his appointment was out of line with policy, as evidenced by the Bantu Affairs Department's earlier dismissal of his nomination as *Ibamba* for Mhlabunzima. The Department rightly anticipated that the *umndeni* would respond to Baniŋi's appointment unfavorably. The Department of the Chief Minister requested that the Mpumalanga Magistrate advise it on a course of action, but the Magistrate made no recommendation.

According to Ivy (Ma Maphumulo) Gumede, a daughter of the late Chief Ndlovu Maphumulo, the Magistrate asked the *umndeni* to appear at his office and provide the family history and successor. She and many of her family had gone into hiding after Mhlabunzima's death and refused to go to the court after men warned them they would be shot if they did so. Ma Maphumulo had been hesitant to be interviewed initially, both on account of her age and memory as well as the pain she knew would accompany the subject. While her family convinced her to share, she was adamant that she did not want to talk much about Baniŋi. She said Baniŋi asked Khangela if he would take back the position of *Ibamba*. When Khangela refused, Baniŋi then went to the Mpumalanga Magistrate to report he was willing to take over the chieftaincy. Voto, another member of the *umndeni*, supported him. Many *umndeni* members felt that Voto had betrayed them.⁷⁶ Peace in Natal reports, though, suggest at least some *umndeni* members did go to the Magistrate to point out that Baniŋi could not stand for election because he did not

⁷⁶ Ivy Gumede, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Imbali, August 8, 2011.

appear in the family genealogy. These members of the *umndeni* nominated Kwenzokuhle and believed that the ethnologist would take the report to Ulundi.⁷⁷

With the appointment of Bangingi, the dynamics of the Table Mountain violence continued to shift. Peace in Natal members working in Mbambangalo doubted Bangingi's ability to control his council—possibly why Mdingi favored Bangingi for the position—and believed that Sabelo Gcabashe actually made the decisions.⁷⁸ Khanyisile Maphumulo, an aunt of Mhlabunzima who sought refuge at Bangingi's home, remembers the *Ibamba* being visited by the Inkatha-affiliated Chief Mdluli.⁷⁹

The brunt of the violence was now intra-community as supporters of Inkatha and ANC sought to cement control. Indeed, the culprits of two Table Mountain massacres to be described below were ANC and Inkatha members from two *izigodi* within Mbambangalo—Mboyi and Nkanyezeni. These 1993 massacres were the most brutal episodes of *uDlame* in Table Mountain and the culmination of the vehicular attacks. While sophisticated weaponry still accompanied the attacks, revenge fueled ambushes demonstrating a lack of discipline and careless mistakes that characterized the violence at this point. Some believed that purposeful destruction designed to disrupt the national negotiations undergirded these attacks.

At the end of February, three ANC-affiliated Table Mountain men, Joseph Mlambo, Johannes Bhengu, and Themba Ngwenya were killed in the ongoing violence. In the wake of their deaths, several other local ANC members who hid together in the mountains discussed a retaliation attack on the Inkatha leader whose truck they had identified in the ambush on the

⁷⁷ Radley Keys Private Papers. Minutes of Peace in Natal meeting, April 14, 1992.

⁷⁸ Radley Keys Private Papers. Minutes of Peace in Natal meeting, April 14, 1992.

⁷⁹ Khanyisile Maphumulo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21, 2011.

three men. According to Aaron Zibuse Zulu's amnesty testimony before the TRC, after dispersing, he, Saul Mkhize, Siske Madlala, and Khumbu Nsthangase decided to take revenge themselves. On March 2, 1993, the men dug up previously hidden weapons, including two AK47s, a V11 and a 303 rifle,⁸⁰ and positioned themselves along a road in the Mboyi *isigodi* where they knew the target frequently travelled. When they saw the truck approach, Saul Mkhize stepped into the road to block the path and the men opened fire without ascertaining the vehicle's occupants.

Zulu testified at the TRC that the targeted IFP official was Makhekhe Sipiwe Zondi, though many local residents believed and the prosecutor argued that the target was Bernard Mkhize, the Inkatha leader of the Mboyi *isigodi*. Aaron Zulu's relatives, Sibusiso and Qeda Zulu, confessed before their 1993 murder trial that they aimed to ambush Bernard Mkhize, but throughout the trial the men alleged that they had been forced to sign blank confessions. During Aaron Zulu's 1999 TRC testimony, the Commission accepted that Jeremiah and Qeda had been wrongly accused (and ultimately refused Aaron amnesty believing he had not undertaken full disclosure). Whether or not Mkhize was the target, three of his children⁸¹ were amongst the thirteen travelling in the back of the ambushed vehicle. They had been en route to school via the truck on account of a bus boycott. Thulani Mkhize (19), Nduda Mkhize (13), Thule Mkhize (9),

⁸⁰ In his TRC amnesty application, Albert Sbangeliso Maseko, an ANC member from KwaSwayimane, alleged these weapons were the same he and other ANC members from Maqongqo used in the attempted assassination of KwaSwayimane Inkatha leader Thulane Mkhize. Maseko is the same who alleged Madlala distributed weapons. Amnesty statement of Albert Sbangeliso Maseko to the TRC, November 17, 1999, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/99111518_dbn_991117db.htm (accessed February 8, 2012).

⁸¹ The three children were biologically offspring of Bernard Mkhize's sister but he was raising them and acting as their guardian.

Wanda Ngubane (12), Nomusa Gwala (12), and Ngce Mkhize (10) lost their lives. Six other children and the 23-year old Inkatha-affiliated driver, Phikalithethwa Ngubane, were wounded.⁸²

This slaughter of innocent children in the Mboyi Massacre shocked the entire nation and prompted retaliatory attacks in Table Mountain. A furious Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who visited the massacre site as part of a delegation of South African Council of Churches leaders also including the Bishop of Natal Michael Nuttall and Reverend Frank Chikane, described the event as “utter madness” and the “diabolical work of the devil.”⁸³ Nhlanhla Radebe, a local violence monitor with the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness (PACSA), led the delegation to visit the victims’ families and remembers his concern. “When we got there [to Mboyi], it was clear that people were armed and there was going to be some kind of retaliation... they were very, very antagonistic. Philip Powell was there.”⁸⁴ Philip Powell had become known as a notorious gun-runner for Inkatha. A former intelligence officer turned Inkatha member, Powell was assisted by Eugene de Kock in the supplying and training of Inkatha “self-defense units” at the Mlaba camp.⁸⁵

⁸² “Murder of the innocents,” *Daily News* March 3, 1993; Keith Ross, “Natal massacre shocks police,” *Daily News* March 3, 1993; Mary Papayya, “Schoolkids massacred,” *Natal Witness* March 3, 1993; Wyndham Hartley, “Killers ‘trying to derail the talks,’” *Natal Witness* March 4, 1993; Lakela Kaunda, “Massacre: R250 000 award,” *Natal Witness* March 4, 1993; Mary Papayya, “Slaying of the innocents,” *Natal Witness Echo* March 4, 1993; Keith Ross, “Massacre: man claims police assaulted him,” *Daily News* March 11, 1993.

⁸³ “Madness: something has gone wrong,” *Sunday Tribune* July 7, 1993; “Clergy visit murder scene,” *Daily News* March 5, 1993; “Local leaders to blame for murders,” *Natal Witness* March 5, 1993.

⁸⁴ Nhlanhla Radebe, interview with author, Pietermaritzburg, March 31, 2011.

⁸⁵ Xhawulani Thulasizwe Ngcobo testified in his amnesty application that Philip Powell delivered weapons to Bernard Mkhize, Tswalitye Ntombela and Bongani Phethwa, all local KwaNyavu/Mbambangalo Inkatha leaders. Ngcobo gave no concrete dates, but the weapons had been delivered prior to the 1992 events about which Ngcobo was testifying. Amnesty testimony of Xhawulani Thulasizwe Ngcobo to the TRC, November 29, 1999.



Figure 22 and 25 Driver Phikilithetwa Ngubane stands outside of the blood-soaked bakkie after the Mboyi Massacre, left, and SADF at the scene, right. *Natal Witness*, March 3, 1993.

Immediately, the police arrested Sibusiso Zulu, Jeremiah Qeda Zulu, and an unnamed youth and charged them with the massacre.⁸⁶ But the arrests did not prevent retaliation. On March 5, 1993, Mabhungu Dladla, Nkanyiso Wilfred Ndlovu, and Makhekhe Sipiwe Zondi opened fire on a kambi in Nkanyezeni. Ten men and women died: Sindisizwe Ndlovu, Joyce Babazile Khanyeza, Bhekayena Dlamini, Bonisizwe Ngcobo, Bongiwe Lambede, Bongani Ndlovu, Siphon Dlamini, Pretty Hlongwa, Flora Thembanani Ntombinkulu Khoza, and Bhekizwe Joseph Mncwabe. According to Dladla, when he rushed to the scene of the Mboyi massacre, the children told him Qeda Jeremiah Zulu had been amongst the attackers. Dladla and Zondi decided to retaliate. They approached Ndlovu for assistance on account of his knowledge of Zulu's kambi route. Makhekhe supplied them with an AK47, shotgun, an R1 shotgun, and *muthi*. While

http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/9911291203_pmb_991129pm.htm (accessed February 8, 2012; Pauw, *Into the Heart of Darkness*, 131–2.

⁸⁶ “Three held, four more still sought,” *Natal Witness* March 6, 1993; John Nichols, “ANC men in court for kids’ murder,” *Natal Witness* March 9, 1993.

the men opened fire on a kombi that they believed carried Nkanyezeni ANC supporters, many of the dead included Inkatha members or non-affiliated residents.⁸⁷

Local residents and the press recognized the retaliatory motivation behind the attack. But distraught Nkanyezeni residents also cited internal divisions within the Maphumulo, in particular long-running tensions between them and Inkatha members from Mboyi. One woman claimed that Nkanyezeni residents were all Inkatha members, though some had been coerced into joining and pressured to pay “membership fees” to the local officials. But because youth had refused to attend night camps, they had been identified as ANC members. Other residents reported that after the Mboyi massacre two well-known Inkatha leaders had threatened to kill their children. The ANC Midlands office made a statement condemning the killings and connected the attacks to their plans to launch a branch there.⁸⁸ Dladla testified to the TRC that Inkatha members from Mboyi could not use the quickest route to town through Nkanyezeni because it was an ANC stronghold. He had hoped that avenging the first massacre would also open the Nkanyezeni route for Mboyi residents.⁸⁹ Further evidence that hints at intra-community violence emerged from the TRC cross-examination of Ndlovu. The attorney for the families of the Nkanyezeni massacre asked whether or not Bernard Mkhize had been responsible for the death of Makhekhe. Ndlovu responded that he only knew that Makhekhe had been killed when he attacked Mkhize’s home.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ John Nichols, “Second massacre claims ten lives,” *Natal Witness* March 6, 1993; Mabhungu Absalom Dladla, testimony to the TRC, Durban, March 26, 1998, <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/durban/myeza.htm> (accessed March 2, 2012).

⁸⁸ Lakela Kaunda and Khaba Mkhize, “The agony of yet another ambush,” *Natal Witness* March 6, 1993; Prakash Naidoo, “Stop the killing – plea,” *Sunday Tribune* March 7, 1993.

⁸⁹ Absalom Mabhungu Dladla, testimony to the TRC.

⁹⁰ Nkanyiso Wilfred Ndlovu, testimony to the TRC, Durban, March 27, 1998, <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/durban/ndlovu.htm> (accessed April 8, 2011). Without accessing the trial record for the Mkhize case, one can only imagine what reason there might

A man claiming to represent the South African Republican Army (SARA) called the press to claim responsibility for the second massacre. He alleged that the attack “on targeted ANC supporters” was part of SARA’s “Operation Change of Heart” campaign to discourage support for the ANC. The man also claimed that the campaign was linked to murders in Daveyton and Alexandra and that of ANC Natal Midlands leader Reggie Hadebe. But the police quickly arrested Mabhungu Dladla, Nkanyiso Wilfred Ndlovu, and Phi Sifiso Mkhize. Mkhize was not charged, as Dladla had implicated him in the attack only because he believed Mkhize had informed on them.⁹¹ Dladla and Nkanyiso were later sentenced to death on ten counts but granted amnesty for the killings in 1998.

The massacres in the region continued when on March 8, 1993, gunmen attacked a bus of ANC supporters from KwaSwayimane en route to the Pietermaritzburg court hearing of those arrested in connection with the Mboyi massacre. Four, including the driver Mafuta Ndlovu, were killed and 16 were wounded.⁹² People began to again flee Table Mountain for the city. Three ambushes in eight days increased the national attention. Law and Order Minister Hernus Kriel visited Table Mountain and mediated a meeting between the ANC/IFP. Kriel also accepted a memorandum from hundreds of Table Mountain refugees who marched on his hotel demanding the removal of biased police and support to ensure unconditional return to their homes. Buthelezi and Mandela announced their intentions to attend the funerals. Buthelezi hoped that these

have been for tension (that results in death) between two Inkatha men from the same *isigodi*, both with reputations for distributing weapons. From available evidence, it appears Mkhize was acquitted. Since completion of fieldwork, Mkhize was killed in what police suspect was an armed robbery. Police did acknowledge the death of this *indunenkhulu* had the potential to undermine community stability in an area with “a bad history dating back to the days of political violence.” “Head of izinduna gunned down,” *Natal Witness* December 5, 2011.

⁹¹ John Nichols, “Three held after quick police work,” *Natal Witness* March 8, 1993.

⁹² Mary Papayya, “Third ambush in a week,” *Natal Witness* March 9, 1993; Keith Ross, “Horrors of massacre described,” *Daily News* March 10, 1993.

funerals could be a shared public platform between the two leaders. Mandela desired to mourn the children's deaths that he believed were deliberately planned to fan hostilities. But the plans failed to materialize and Buthelezi attended the burial of six of the Mboyi children while Mandela attended the funeral of two KwaSwayimane ANC members. The next day, the IFP buried five more of the Nkanyezeni victims whose families had asked for their assistance.⁹³ These targeted attacks and devastating massacres illustrate the shift to a battle within the Maphumulo. But who were the Maphumulo?

Chief by the People? Defining Membership and Legitimacy

Central to understanding *uDlame* and the contestation over land and chiefly authority in the Table Mountain is the definition of the Maphumulo and chiefly legitimacy. As *uDlame* in this region shifted from conflict between communities to one within the Maphumulo, local leaders employed claims to "the people" in need of further examination. Thomas Gcabashe's reference to Maphumulo's followers as "his people," Chief Maphumulo's use of "my people," and the memories of Mbambangalo residents suggest different understandings of membership in the Maphumulo and of chiefly authority. There are two isiZulu terms critical to this examination – *ukukhonza* and *isizwe*. *Ukukhonza* was examined earlier in the context of the disputed land jurisdiction. The second term, *isizwe*, can be translated into English as "nation, tribe, clan," or

⁹³ Keith Ross, "Refugees start to flee Table Mountain area," *Daily News* March 9, 1993; Ross, "Kriel plays mediator," *Daily News* March 12, 1993; "Refugees present demands to Kriel," *Natal Witness* March 12, 1993; Lakela Kaunda, "Mandela to visit sites of violence," *Natal Witness* March 12, 1993; Mary Papayya, "Tour of massacre scenes," *Natal Witness* March 12, 1993; Lakela Kaunda and Khaba Mkhize, "Mandela's trip to funeral is in doubt," *Natal Witness* March 13, 1993; Prakash Naidoo, "Victims buried," *Sunday Tribune* March 14, 1993; Lakela Kaunda, "Requiem for innocence," *Natal Witness* March 15, 1993.

“state,” here referring to the concept of chiefdom.⁹⁴ Exact terminology is crucial. These words can conjure up notions of essential, static entities. They can carry ideological baggage. In an interview, the current Maphumulo chief referenced contemporary recognition of the colonial influence on language. He said, “But we don’t use chieftaincy now because we are no longer called chiefs. [We use] *ubukhosi*.”⁹⁵

Thinking of the Maphumulo as an *isizwe* rather than that implied by “tribe” enables an examination of the culturally defined meanings of membership. The colonial reclassification and manipulation of *ubukhosi* and *isizwe* into the boundary-defined tribe brought new ideas about the relationship between subjects and chiefs but did not obliterate the old. While Zulu society understood this mutually beneficial relationship according to the proverb *inkosi yinkosi ngabantu*, a chief is a chief because of the people who *khonza* him, the colonial administration sought to redefine chiefly authority through jurisdiction based on territory, or *inkosi yinkosi ngendawo*.⁹⁶ Applying “tribe” to the Maphumulo falsely implies that this polity during *uDlame* was essentially the same as it has been since its creation during the colonial era.

However, even *isizwe* as an analytical term is worthy of some of the same critiques as scholars have brought to bear on the concepts of “nation,” “tribe,” and “community.” Belinda Bozzoli questioned the usefulness of “community” as a term that can obscure class differences and be used as an ideological device, as it certainly was by the apartheid era “Department of

⁹⁴ Doke and Vilakazi, *Zulu-English dictionary*, 902.

⁹⁵ Inkosi Nhlakanipho Maphumulo, interview with author, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011.

⁹⁶ Ngonyama, “Redefining Amakhosi Authority.”

Community Development.”⁹⁷ Cheryl Walker also highlighted this in her critique of the master narrative informing the post-apartheid land restitution process. This master narrative contains assumptions such as the notion of homogenous “communities” of claimants, void of internal divisions or conflicts.⁹⁸ In using *isizwe* I do not wish to simply substitute an isiZulu word for “nation,” “community” or “tribe” in my analysis of *uDlame*. The well-worn narrative that pits Inkatha-allied Nyavu against the Maphumulo conceals the changes and divisions within each *isizwe* and local explanations for the violence. Exactly because these entities are not static or timeless, it enables us to analyze the social units in the Table Mountain region in a manner that allows for the movement and change that accompanied relocation during colonialism, segregation, apartheid, and *uDlame*.

In particular, the influx of people forcefully relocated and other refugee populations into Echibini prior to the outbreak of the Table Mountain violence calls into question the makeup of the Maphumulo chiefdom. Who did the chief consider to be members of the Maphumulo? What did the other local leaders mean when they called on the Maphumulo? And what of the people who moved onto the contested land? Defining this membership and legitimacy is closely related to land access, *khonza*, and also the qualities of leadership admired by the chief’s followers, the people that made the chief a chief.

Maphumulo considered all of the people in his territory as “my people,” especially as he demanded that those fleeing from the political violence elsewhere *khonza* in order to access land. Recall the allegations of Maphumulo’s misuse of those *khonza*/site fees above as well as his

⁹⁷ Belinda Bozzoli, “Class, Community and Ideology in the Evolution of South African Society,” in *Class, Community, and Conflict: South African Perspectives* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987).

⁹⁸ Cheryl Walker, “Relocating Restitution,” *Transformation* 44 (2000): 2.

comments to the press when he first began to welcome the refugees: “People are not made to pay money to live in the area, but in our tradition they are expected to pay ‘khonza’—a tribute to the chief.”⁹⁹ *Ukukhonza* was the basis on which relations between political heads and subjects were founded. While the colonial administration sought to eradicate these personal relations, expectations continued to exist on both sides.

In the context of moving into the jurisdiction of a chief, *khonza* implies an offer of allegiance. John Lambert, in his examination of the chieftainship in colonial Natal, rightly points out the difficulties of understanding the extent to which these shifts of allegiance undermined the bonds of kinship and whether kinship redefinition accompanied political transference. Lambert argues transfer of allegiance would have done little to strengthen kinship ties, especially in created chiefdoms. He even cites the splintering of the Maphumulo predecessor, the chiefdom of Ngoza, as an example of the way in which these redefined kinship ties did not hold.¹⁰⁰

However, the testimonies of several residents of Mbambangalo who paid a fee upon their arrival over one hundred years later do suggest a redefinition of membership. Indeed several were keen to explain their relation to Chief Maphumulo, whether their mother and his mother were sisters or that they went to the same amaNazareth church. None used the term *khonza* to describe fees paid but the majority still recognized Maphumulo as their chief.* Some did not mention paying a fee but imply such in relating that Induna Gumede arranged for them to access

⁹⁹ “Maqongqo chief to ask for more land to accommodate refugees,” *Natal Witness* October 13, 1988.

¹⁰⁰ John Lambert, “Chiefship in Early Colonial Natal, 1843-1879,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 21, no. 2 (June 1, 1995): 283.

* It is important here to note that early in my research I did not recognize the significance and did not specifically ask about *khonza* or fees, but only how individuals accessed land. I intend to return to this in future follow-up interviews.

sites. Chief Maphumulo may never have received these fees (either personally or for the Maphumulo) given his charge that Gumede ran away with them. But Maphumulo appears to have treated the fees as not only as recognitions of his authority but also as signals of a person's right to use that land. While Chief Maphumulo expected *khonza*, at least one woman who moved to the contested Echibini recalled getting a piece of paper in return for her payment that recognized her rights to land. When Mantombi Manyoni moved to Echibini from Nkanyezeni, she felt fortunate. "I was lucky at the time because they said that those who want title deeds must buy them. I bought a title with R25 and I still have it now." Manyoni expressed her absolute allegiance to Chief Maphumulo when she spoke about *uDlame* and passionately queried, "Do you understand being chased out with your inkosi by people from another inkosi?"¹⁰¹

Only those individuals or families moved to the trust farm by the DCD received the same "Permission to Occupy" forms that the Department gave to business owners and the Maphumulo authority for businesses, schools, and the *inkantolo* on the trust-governed land. Manyoni may be referring to a PTO or receipt for her payment, such as those kept by Ma Shembe as Maphumulo secretary (and copied by Mdingi Maphumulo, Zondi and Gumede when they went to KwaZulu to complain about Chief Maphumulo).

Balothi Goge, whose father had been one of Chief Ndlovu Maphumulo's izinduna as well as a foreman for the agricultural officer on the Onverwacht farm, said that Maphumulo wanted everyone, not just the relocating refugees, to have this right. Balothi also attributes the chief's assassination to this conviction. "When Mhlabunzima started to rule over this land he said we

¹⁰¹ "Mina ngaba nenhlanhla ngalesosikhathi ngoba kwathiwa abafuna amatayitela abawathenge kodwa amatayitela sasiwathenga ngoR25 namanje ngisanalo." Mantombi M., interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, August 8, 2011.

have to take our IDs and register our own plots. He said that he did not want people to call the place the Inkosi's land but point to their own places. They killed him.”¹⁰²

But Maphumulo's desire to transform Mbambangalo was just one reason that Balothi admired the chief. He described the loss of Mhlabunzima as having a crippling effect on the community. “The thing that I am saying is that we lost a powerful man in this place because we cannot compare Mhlabunzima with other chiefs. He was too clever. Another thing about him, he was well educated. With the other chiefs, we were all the same. They did not even know how to write their names. I was schooling with [*Ibamba*] Khangela, learning our A.E.I.O.U!”¹⁰³

However, not all who moved to Goedverwaching recognized Maphumulo's authority. Some of those that moved onto the contested portion of the farm known as Imijondolo [literally, shacks] recognized they were not under the jurisdiction of any chief. Albertina Ndimande, who moved to Table Mountain during the violence from Hammarsdale, told me, “I did not get to know much about the Maphumulo clan because the place we stayed in was called Imijondolo.

¹⁰² “uMhlabunzima wathi eseqala ukubusa wathi nizothatha wonke amapasi enu nibhale izindawo okungezenu ukuthi zingakanani. Wathi akafuni ukuthi abantu balokhu bethi indawo yeNkosi kodwa abantu abakhombe izindawo zabo; bambulala ke uMhlabunzima... Into engingayisho ukuthi salahlekelwa kakhulu kulendawo ngoba ayikho Inkosi eyofana noMhlabunzima wayehlakaniphe kakhulu loyamuntu. Kanti ke wayefundile uMhlabunzima ngoba laba abanye babengakwazi ngisho nokubhala. Sasizifanela nje nabo. OKhangela sasifunda nabo esikoleni o A,E,I,O,U! [Kuyahlekwa] Manje ke kungasizani ukuthi?” Goge Balothi, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, eStingini, March 4, 2011.

¹⁰³ “uMhlabunzima wathi eseqala ukubusa wathi nizothatha wonke amapasi enu nibhale izindawo okungezenu ukuthi zingakanani. Wathi akafuni ukuthi abantu balokhu bethi indawo yeNkosi kodwa abantu abakhombe izindawo zabo; bambulala ke uMhlabunzima... Into engingayisho ukuthi salahlekelwa kakhulu kulendawo ngoba ayikho Inkosi eyofana noMhlabunzima wayehlakaniphe kakhulu loyamuntu. Kanti ke wayefundile uMhlabunzima ngoba laba abanye babengakwazi ngisho nokubhala. Sasizifanela nje nabo. OKhangela sasifunda nabo esikoleni o A,E,I,O,U! [Kuyahlekwa] Manje ke kungasizani ukuthi?” Goge Balothi, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, eStingini, March 4, 2011.

We were not in KwaNyavu or at Mhlabunzima's place but we stayed in a small portion of land.”¹⁰⁴

Gcabashe opposed the settlement of these refugees and did not include them in his definition of the Maphumulo. When he alleged that Maphumulo's followers wanted the chief to leave he was surely referring only to those from Mbambangalo prior to the influx of outsiders. Those Maphumulo attending the meetings designed to oust Maphumulo would have only been those who remained behind when the unaligned and ANC-affiliated fled to town. Gcabashe maintained that Maphumulo's only local supporters were the youth that Maphumulo had brought in from other areas to prop up his flailing support. Gcabashe argued that Maphumulo “recruits the youths from outside and uses them to burn houses and kill other people...”¹⁰⁵ Gcabashe's attention to these outsiders is not surprising. One of the recurring Inkatha explanations for the violence was that it was engineered by outsiders.¹⁰⁶

Indeed, several people who moved into Mbambangalo from as early as the 1970s and recognized Maphumulo as their chief still felt the distinction between themselves and those originally from the area. Veronica Dlamini said that because they were not originally from Table Mountain, her family joined Inkatha to protect themselves, but in doing so she felt that she had betrayed the chief.¹⁰⁷ Phyllis Ngubane, who had moved to the disputed Echibini from

¹⁰⁴ “Asimjwayelanga kakhulu uMaphumulo ngoba indawo esasihlal kuyona yayibizwa ngemijondolo. Sasingekho kaNyavu noma kaMhlabunzima kodwa kwakuyindawana nje esayithola sahlala kuyona.” Albertina Ndimande, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 21, 2011.

¹⁰⁵ “Leaders trade blame for the violence” *Natal Witness* (5 Dec 1990).

¹⁰⁶ Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 200.

¹⁰⁷ “Thina ke ngoba singabokufika lapha endaweni senza lokho okwenziwa iwona wonke umuntu, nathi saxokizela Inkosi ngoba sincenge indawo yokuhlala.” Veronica Dlamini, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Stingini, May 23, 2011.

Sweetwaters during the violence, recalled that when Chief Maphumulo moved to town, he told those who had moved to Echibini to do what the Nyavu told them to do. “He said this to protect his place from being taken by Inkosi Mdluli, but he never came back. He passed on where he was hiding.”¹⁰⁸

When Chief Maphumulo proclaimed to shift to progressive politics out of the conviction that a leader “must move with his people,” his people here included the refugees who had become members of the Maphumulo when they *khonza*’d or paid for their plots. The people for whom he became progressive remember him almost as an ideal chief. Few spoke ill of him and even when they did it was only to consider him naïve for believing that he could maintain peace in Mbambangalo during a civil war. Jennifer Delisle and Svetlana Boym have pointed out that this kind of nostalgia for the past is often oriented towards the future in very specific political contexts. While many relegate nostalgia to “selective forgetting,” it can be means of projecting desires for the future.¹⁰⁹ Jacob Dlamini, in his self-described “creative non-fiction” about fond memories of life under apartheid, too suggests nostalgic sentiments are one way to understand contemporary South Africa. They confirm that people’s lives have changed, but not always in the way often imagined.¹¹⁰ As Jon Soske has pointed out in his biography of Dr. Abubaker “Hurley” Asvat, memories of popularly venerated figures “often assume a dual character. They are highly

¹⁰⁸ “Lokho wayekusholo ukuthi sikwazi ukubamba indawo yakhe ukuthi ingadliwa enye Inkosi kodwa akazange esabuya washonela khona lapho ayecashe khona.” Phyllis Ngubane, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, May 26, 2011.

¹⁰⁹ Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*; Delisle, “Finding the Future in the Past.”

¹¹⁰ Dlamini, *Native Nostalgia*, 12.

personal and yet charged with an underlying political valence... they convey the meanings and values that a political life came to represent.”¹¹¹

Those interviewed could remember their own interactions with the late chief. But they also recalled specific actions and principles that they admired. For them, Maphumulo embodied the values of a legitimate traditional leader that had been contested within the Maphumulo throughout *uDlame*. The memories of the Maphumulo point to other kinds of chiefly legitimacy that, even if selectively remembered, are desired by people in a country struggling to reconcile traditional authority with democracy, by people who complain about skyrocketing site fees and the challenges of returning to the area from which they fled during *uDlame*. The chief was educated, known for his development efforts, and attempted to provide security in the midst of unprecedented violence.

Foremost amongst the chiefly values spoken of was the chief’s push for development in Mbambangalo. This was directly related to Maphumulo’s education. According to several, the chief had a vision for Mbambangalo that he pursued with vigor.¹¹² Mancane Mlaba recalled with pride that when they moved to Goedverwagting her husband and many others were contributing R2 for the young Mhlabunzima to be educated.¹¹³ Balothi scoffed because he had as much

¹¹¹ Jon Soske, “The Life and Death of Dr Abu Baker ‘Hurley’ Asvat, 23 February 1943 to 27 January 1989,” *African Studies* 70, no. 3 (2011): 339.

¹¹² Indeed, Goge Balothi described Mhlabunzima as a “prophet” who had fulfilled the predictions of Mqangabhodwe, one of the white farmers who sold his farm to the SADT and told the Maphumulo izinduna about the planned closer settlement to be built there. Interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Estingini, March 4, 2011. See also interviews with Mantombi Manyoni and Ndela Ntshangase.

¹¹³ “Mina ngifike lapha endaweni uMhlabunzima efunda isikole. Imali yokufunda ka Mhlabunzima yayikhokhwa abayeni bethu, babekhokha uR2 ukuze afunde uMhlabunzima njalo ngoyaka kwakuphuma imali yeNkosi iye esikoleni.” Mancane Mlaba, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 10, 2011.

education as one of the *Ibamba* for Mhlabunzima. The chief oversaw and/or attempted to initiate projects including water provision, electrification, education and job opportunities (including crèches, often cited by women as important to them), and other facilities. When asked about Chief Mhlabunzima, Veronica recalled, “He was a humble person, respectful, and he wanted to create job opportunities for us. When he left here he was building a crèche in Cabazini *isigodi*; it was even fenced. Then the war started and they ripped up the fence while we watched.” For Veronica, this was in stark contrast to the leaders following Mhlabunzima. “After the violence I opened a crèche...some IFP members came to me and I was told not to renew something which was built by a comrade.”¹¹⁴ Some recalled he had wanted to build *amafemu* (literally, firms, but meaning businesses and factories).¹¹⁵ Ndela Ntshangase attributes the existing water and electricity lines in Mbambangalo to the efforts of Chief Maphumulo. Ntshangase was the chairman of a community development council in Mbambangalo under the sponsorship of Shell and Umgeni Water Board. In addition to the water and electricity, Ntshangase says Maphumulo dreamed of sanitation projects and a technical school and thus sought assistance from Mangosuthu Technikon students in town planning.¹¹⁶

Even neighboring Nyavu admitted part of the tensions may have been envy and fear related to Maphumulo’s education and vision. Maphumulo “was fighting for development.

¹¹⁴ “Ubengumuntu olungile, ehlonipha wayethanda futhi nokusivulela amathuba emisebenzi. Lapha eCabazini wahamba eqala ukwakha inkulisa yabantwana, kwasekubiyeliwe sekwakhiwe. Kwafika impi ke, baqaqa lonke ucingo sibhekile... Uma seludlulile udlame ngavula inkulisa ekhaya lami... Kwafika abanye abantu beNkatha bathi kimina ngivusa into yeqabane, ngakho ke akufanele ngivuse lento yeqabane,” Veronica Dlamini, Estingini, May 23, 2011.

¹¹⁵ Khanyisile Maphumulo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Echibini, June 21, 2011; Nto Ndlela, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Estingini, May 23, 2011.

¹¹⁶ Ndela Ntshangase, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Pietermaritzburg, April 15, 2011.

Nyavu residents thought Mhlabunzima wanted to rob them because he had connections in town. Another thing was that Inkosi Mhlabunzima was more educated than the Nyavu inkosi. Inkosi Mdluli never went to school so that caused friction.”¹¹⁷ Ngitheni Ndlovu too compared Maphumulo to Mdluli: “Mhlabunzima was younger than Bangubukhosi so he did things the way he thought suitable and he was well educated.”¹¹⁸

The other characteristic of chiefly authority admired by those interviewed was the chief’s efforts to provide peace and security. Lungisile Ntsebeza has argued that the capacity to allocate land is central to chiefly legitimacy.¹¹⁹ Maphumulo’s authority is undoubtedly partially tied to his ability to offer access to land, but in the context of *uDlame*, it was not just the provision of ground but the supply of land in a peaceful area. Maphumulo’s reputation as the peace chief attracted a particular kind of follower – one seeking security from the violence s/he was fleeing. As seen in the previous chapter, several women testified that with the outbreak of *uDlame* in Mbambangalo, they ran to the chief for security. People remembered that Maphumulo visited them in the refugee tents and advised them to protect themselves by fleeing, or if staying, to do as was required by Inkatha and the Nyavu.

¹¹⁷ “Ngizwa kuthiwa kwakungubaba onenhliziyiyo enhle futhi owayelwela intuthuko lapha endaweni kodwa, inkinga kwaba ukuthi abantu balapha kaNyavu ababoni ngaso linye naye. Abantu balapha babona ukuthi ngoba uMhlabunzima ujoyelene nabantu basemadolobheni mhlawumbe kukhona afuna ukubarobha ngakho nokuthi yena wayefundile kuneNkosi yalapha kaNyavu. uMdluli wayengakaze aye esikoleni manje iyona into eyenza ukuthi bangazwani noMhlabunzima.” Philisile Nxumalo, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Esinyameni, May 24, 2011.

¹¹⁸ “UMhlabunzima ubemncane kunoBangubukhosi manje uMhlabunzima izinto ubezithatha ngobungane nangokuthi yena ufundile.” Ngitheni Antonia Ndlovu, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Esinyameni, August 4, 2011.

¹¹⁹ Ntsebeza, *Democracy Compromised*.

Conclusion

In 2005, the city of Pietermaritzburg renamed the Baynes Drift Road to Table Mountain after Mhlabunzima Maphumulo. The ANC-led municipality commended the late chief, who was “widely respected for leading a peaceful community at the height of the violence in the province. He did not side with either the ANC or the IFP and was admired for showing even-handedness to people of different political persuasions in his area.”¹²⁰ Just like those interviewed for this project, the city’s memorialization of the peace chief remembers a complicated individual with a simplified sense of nostalgia.

But as this chapter has shown, the authority of this “peace chief” and the composition of “his people” were highly contested by Mbambangalo residents throughout *uDlame*. The neighboring *isizwe*, Inkatha and KwaZulu under Buthelezi, the apartheid government, and members of his own *isizwe* sought to delegitimize the peace chief to promote their own ends. The early attempts of several Mbambangalo men to have the chief deposed, the messy inquest into his death and subsequent TRC hit squad admissions, as well as the succession disputes reveal the extent to which parties contested Maphumulo’s leadership. The composition of his *isizwe*, the Maphumulo, varied based on when and who was making claims on “the people.” Maphumulo considered the refugees from *uDlame* elsewhere to be new members of the Maphumulo and sought to “be with the people.” On the other hand, induna and Inkatha leader Thomas Gcabashe and his followers sought to define the Maphumulo as only those people who lived on the original portion of Goedverwaching and Onverwacht. Gcabashe allied with the Nyavu and thus alleged the disputed portion of Goedverwaching fell under the authority of Chief Mdluli.

¹²⁰ Thobekile Maphumulo Papers, “Baynes Drift Road – New Name: Chief Mhlabunzima Road,” News clipping, June 20, 2005.

The majority of those who moved to this land during forced removals or as refugees from *uDlame* recognized Chief Maphumulo as their leader. Some recalled paying fees to get their sites from induna Dotsheni Gumede. Despite attempts by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to delegitimize Maphumulo's authority on account of his descent from an "appointed chief" and by members of the Maphumulo on account of his failure to address their complaints versus those of the new *isizwe* members, Chief Maphumulo's legitimacy increased amongst many of his followers as he spoke out against apartheid and the violence and sought to offer peace and protection. While evidence of corruption and rumors of violence-related extortion exist, large numbers of "his people" nostalgically remember the chief with respect and lament his death. When the people recall his development, peace, and anti-apartheid efforts they suggest alternative forms of chiefly authority that they value and desire.

Chapter Six:

“So that the Bullet Can’t Hit You”¹: Women, Violence, and Zuluness (1990-1994)



Figures 26-27: Male *amaqabane* with their weaponry (both plastic and real) and women waiting for help, both by Clint Zsman, *Natal Witness* January 30, 1990.

The story of the Table Mountain thus far has been largely a story of men, of chiefs and izinduna, of male government administrators, and masculine fighters. Indeed, the predominant image of *uDlame* is that of Zulu men wielding cultural weapons on the march. Contemporary media images of the conflict portrayed Zuluness as an ethnic identity bound up with ‘tradition,’ martial culture, and patriarchy. When women made it into the newspapers it was as “innocent victims,”

¹ APC. HC07C03. Thuleleni M., Irinah G., Thokozile T., interviews by Lindiwe Mkasi, Inadi, September 16, 2005.

fleeing the conflict and living in refugee camps, or as “peace makers,” marching against police inaction and favoritism. This is no different for the images of *uDlame* in the Table Mountain region. Cultural notions of warfare use and maintain a gendered construct in which soldiers go to war to uphold an image of social order which is symbolized by “womenandchildren” (as Cynthia Enloe has coined) as “the protected” and “the defended.”² While many women were indeed victimized and indeed mobilized against the violence,³ these depictions of the “protected” and the “peacemaker” obscure women’s own uses of and claims on Zuluness during a tumultuous time marked by masculinity, violence, and rapid social change.

But it is not just cultural notions of warfare or contemporary media depictions of *uDlame* that obscure African women’s claims and uses of ethnicity. Up until the 1990s, women as ethnic subjects had been as invisible to analysts of ethnic movements as they have been to the southern African communities who often cite the Tswana proverb that “women have no tribe.”⁴ But despite the growing literature on women and ethnicity in Africa,⁵ there is a tendency, particularly

² Cock, *Colonels & Cadres*; Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation* (London: Sage Publications, 1997); Cynthia Enloe, “Womenandchildren: Making Feminist Sense of the Persian Gulf Crisis,” *The Village Voice*, September 1990.

³ For an examination of women’s protests against the violence, see Bonnin, “Changing Spaces, Changing Places.”

⁴ Deborah James, “‘Bagagesu’ (Those of My Home): Women Migrants, Ethnicity, and Performance in South Africa” *American Ethnologist* 26:1 (Feb 1999), 69-89.

⁵ Diana Jeater, *Marriage, Perversion, and Power: The Construction of Moral Discourse in Southern Rhodesia, 1894-1930* (Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press, 1993); Barbara MacGowan Cooper, *Marriage in Maradi: Gender and Culture in a Hausa Society in Niger, 1900-1989* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997); Geiger, *TANU Women*; Deborah James, *Songs of the Women Migrants: Performance and Identity in South Africa* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press for the International African Institute, 1999); Dorothy Louise Hodgson, *Once Intrepid Warriors: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Cultural Politics of Maasai Development* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001); Achebe, *Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings*; Elizabeth Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939-1958* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2005); Heidi

in the South African nationalist historiography, to focus on women in resistance and African nationalism.⁶ This preference for studying women and the political most likely reflects not only the sources available, but our own contemporary ideologies as well.⁷

Indeed, archival sources for *uDlame*, such as violence monitoring reports, press coverage, and Inkatha or UDF speeches, press releases, and statements, lend themselves to studies of women as protestors or victims and investigations into masculinity, Inkatha, and the manner in which Buthelezi drew upon a particular Zuluness, that of the Shakan military past, to mobilize Zulu men.⁸ But oral history has gained a prominence in enabling women's voices as an alternative to the narratives (and silences) of the archive. But it must be recalled that oral history is still a methodology molded by the researcher. Susan Geiger has argued that one of the objectives of feminist (though I believe, all) oral history methodology should be the acceptance of women's own interpretations of their identities, their experiences, and social worlds. It follows

Gengenbach, *Binding Memories: Women as Makers and Tellers of History in Magude, Mozambique* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

⁶ For South African examples, see: Judy Kimble and Elaine Unterhalter, "'We Opened the Road for You, You Must Go Forward': ANC Women's Struggles, 1912-1982," *Feminist Review* 12 (1983); Debby Gaitskell and Elaine Unterhalter, "Mothers of the Nation: A Comparative Analysis of the Nation, Race, and Motherhood in Afrikaner Nationalism and the African National Congress," in *Women-Nation-State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989); Cheryl Walker, *Women and Resistance in South Africa* (London: Onyx Press, 1982); Julia C. Wells, *We Now Demand!: The History of Women's Resistance to Pass Laws in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1993); Gasa, *Women in South African History*.

⁷ Nancy Rose Hunt, "Placing African Women's History and Locating Gender," *Social History* 14, no. 3 (1989). Jeff Guy has also noted a similar trend regarding the influence of capitalist and feminist ideas of oppression in his examination of the appropriation of women's labor by men in precapitalist southern African societies. Jeff Guy, "Gender Oppression in Precapitalist Societies," in *Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945* (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers (Pty) Ltd, 1990).

⁸ Maré and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*; Campbell, "Learning to Kill: Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal"; John Aitchison, "They Just Give You Labels and Then They Come and Kill You: A Failed Search for Ethnicity in the Natal Midlands Violence," 1992; Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors*; Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, *Indians Versus Russians*.

then that the framing of the researcher's questions must be done in a manner that allows women's own interpretations to be voiced.⁹

Thus I need to insert myself and my oral history methodology into the analysis. The examination below is based on oral history interviews conducted by myself (with oral history methodology training and four years of isiZulu language study) and with an accompanying female Zulu research assistant. Thandeka and I interviewed over 60 male and female current and former residents of the rural Mbambangalo and Mkhambathini regions of Pietermaritzburg.¹⁰ I set out interested in women's experience of *uDlame* and their understanding of what it meant to be Zulu during such a time of unprecedented turmoil. I had prepared a list of questions to guide the interviews but set them within the larger framework of "life history" to enable women to tell me about their lives. I wanted to know what it meant to them to be Zulu, how they learned to be Zulu, and how they taught their children to be Zulu. Were these life lessons and the ability to practice Zuluness impacted by the years of *uDlame*? How did women protect themselves, sustain themselves, and mourn?

Over the course of twelve months of fieldwork, I was repeatedly frustrated by the challenges I outlined in depth in the dissertation introduction. My research coincided with local municipal elections and thus heightened community tensions (unplanned). There was sensitivity to discussing so recent a civil war (predicted). There was gendered resistance to interviewing women, where men failed to understand why I wanted to talk to women (also anticipated). Only

⁹ Susan Geiger, "What's So Feminist About Doing Women's Oral History?," *Journal of Women's History* 2, no. 1 (1990): 169–183.

¹⁰ In addition to the interviews undertaken by myself in Mbambangalo and Mkhambathini, this paper also draws upon the interviews conducted by Sinomlando fieldworkers in rural Nxamalala, to the west of Pietermaritzburg, and housed at the Alan Paton Centre. These interviews focused on the role of religion and the church during *uDlame*.

community elder said exclaimed, “Women did nothing at the time; it was the men who were fighting!”¹¹ Another community elder who lost several children in the Mboyi massacre was adamant we would not speak to his wives. Whether or not he was concerned about the pain such an interview might revive or what they might disclose, he did not ask them so that they could make the decision for themselves.

But perhaps what was the most surprising was my initial failure to *hear* what women were telling me.¹² Most women agreed with the men; they did not take part. They did not fight or carry weapons. They did not go to political meetings. They ran away. They could not mourn properly because of the dangers of war. But what I could not hear at first was that through these complaints, these rural Zulu women were making claims on what it meant to them to be Zulu during a time of turmoil. They wielded their own “cultural weapons,” using customs to cope and aid in decision-making.

This chapter is premised on the idea promulgated in the recent edited collection *Zulu Identities* that Zuluness is a malleable but lived construct functioning through linguistic and cultural norms. As historian Jabulani Sithole noted, *ubuZulu bethu*, an idiom capturing the shifting, hybrid, and even contradictory meanings and practices of ‘our Zuluness’, provides an analytical lens through which to examine the many ways in which individuals and groups utilized language, culture, and historical events to construct a useable Zuluness.¹³ Here the “cultural stuff” of Zuluness must be described as a rich resource used selectively by different social agents in various social projects within specific power relations and political discourse.

¹¹ Jill E. Kelly, field notes, January 30, 2010.

¹² Nwando Achebe discusses a similar experience in her own fieldwork in the introductory chapter of Achebe, *Farmers, Traders, Warriors, and Kings*.

¹³ Carton, Laband, and Sithole, *Zulu Identities*.

Gender, age, ability, and the like affect access and availability of resources.¹⁴ As well, it must be kept in mind that the ‘cultural stuff’ of ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’ can be real or invented but not fixed. Hobsbawm has called attention to the more frequent ‘invention of tradition’ during rapid transformation of society.¹⁵ In the midst of the negotiations for a transition from apartheid to democracy and the revolt of youth, women’s laments about the absence of cultural practices should be seen also as evidence of a changing social order.

While this chapter largely focuses on the cultural aspects of ethnicity as employed by rural Zulu women, I recognize that ethnicity or Zuluness cannot be reduced to “culture.” But particularly because access to and availability of resources are gendered, the rural women interviewed here had few political or economic resources to wield. They utilized culture and custom as coping strategies and, in relating such, make claims on what it meant to them to be Zulu. Excluded from the masculine warrior heritage espoused and promoted by Inkatha and the KwaZulu Chief Minister and Inkatha president Mangosuthu Buthelezi and drawn upon by men both young and old, women employed other aspects of Zuluness, such as spiritual beliefs and mourning rituals, as coping strategies, and bemoaned the absence of *inhlonipho* (respect) and proper funeral practices.

For those interviewed, Zuluness was not politicized but an inherent aspect of day-to-day life governing their actions. Whereas historian Philippe Denis found the two communities at conflict in rural Nxamalala came to be labeled as both politically and culturally different, interviewees in Table Mountain made no distinction in cultural practices across the political

¹⁴ Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation*, 43.

¹⁵ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

divide.¹⁶ Women saw the carrying of weapons, violent conflict, and defense as the realm of men, but by no means envisioned Zuluness as a male construction. Women across the political divide made assertions about the use of their cultural heritage as coping strategies and complained about when they could not. In these conversations and claims, women shape and define what Zuluness meant to them *ngesikathi soDlame*, at the time of the violence, an era usually thought of as defined by aggressive masculinity and martial Zuluness.

This chapter will begin with a brief overview of women's experiences of *uDlame* at Table Mountain. The following sections on spiritual values and mourning rituals will then consider the manner in which Zulu customs and beliefs were used as cultural coping strategies, as well as the *absence* of Zuluness, the ways in which the women interviewed spoke about what they were *not* able to do, or *not* able to practice. The final section tells the story of Ma Majozi, the first wife of the late Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, whose story illustrates the ways in which women used and experienced Zuluness.

“Sabaleka!”: Women's Experience of *uDlame* in Mbambangalo

At the time of *uDlame*, some of the women interviewed supported Inkatha or the UDF/ANC, though the majority claimed they had not joined either or were simply “doing what was happening in our place.”¹⁷ Several of them still assert no affiliation. Few of them had attended any political party meeting or heard local or national political figures speak. None knew of any efforts by these leaders to speak to or organize women in their area. There was then no local branch of the Inkatha Women's Brigade or ANC Women's League. The calls to be mothers of

¹⁶ Denis, Ntsimane, and Cannell, *Indians Versus Russians*.

¹⁷ “Sasivumela okwenzeka endaweni.” Veronica Dlamini, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo. 23 May 2011.

the nation by Inkatha or the ANC/UDF in speeches and literature did not reach these women. The majority of those interviewed understood *uDlame* as a conflict about “politics” and “meetings” and between two chiefs (Maphumulo and Mdluli) over land. The war “was not the usual fight like war between *izigodi*... it was coming while you were not aware.”¹⁸

The women interviewed indicated that the conflict was a male (both young and old) domain. Most agreed “women were not supposed to fight... because they are parents... because women know how to give birth.”¹⁹ During the violence they felt their roles were to look after children and cook and wash for their children and the fighters. Ma Majozi, who will be considered in greater detail below, suggests this may have been because they were from a rural area. “Women from rural areas, they only know this, that the only person who is supposed to protect the home is the head of the house. It is rare to find women in rural areas having guns and other weapons. They believe that if there is a problem a man of the house must be always in the front.”²⁰ This is of course by no means universal, as several scholars have examined women’s participation in the ANC underground, Umkhonto weSizwe, and the South African Defence Force.²¹ Few interviewees related that other women took part. Khethi Zondi believed that

¹⁸ “Kwakungasiyona impi ejwayelekile njengezimpi zezigodi...ngoba impi yayiqhamuka ingalindelekile.” Thombi Gcabashe, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, January 27, 2011.

¹⁹ “Omama kwakungafanele ukuthi balwe... Ngoba bangabazali... umama uyakwazi ukuthwala umntwana.” Nikiwe Mdlalose, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 4, 2011; See also Gcabashe interview; Khethi Zondi, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Imbubu, March 2, 2011; Ntombinazi Zakwe, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 25, 2011.

²⁰ “Omama basemakhaya bazi ukuthi umuntu okufanele avikele ikhaya inhloko yekhaya. Akujwayelekile ukuthi uthole omama basemakhaya benezibhamu nezinye nje izikhali. Bazi ukuthi uma kukhona inkinga ekhaya obaba okufanele bahambe phambili. Thobekile Maphumulo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Camperdown, February 8, 2011.

²¹ Cock, *Colonels & Cadres*; Suttner, “Women in the ANC-Led Underground.”

women who carried weapons or got involved were doing so because “they were big-headed women” who wanted positions.²² Doris Mbokazi set up women as only assisting. “They carried bush knives. Their husbands were shooting and the women would come and finish you with bush knives while you were laying down helpless.” Her daughter shared that women would also help their husbands by coming out to ululate (*babekikiza*).²³

The majority of women interviewed fled the conflict (and indeed some now live in Haniville, a township developed in the years after the violence for refugees from various war-stricken communities). They laughed as they explained, “Sasibaleka!” “We were running! We were not even able to cook because it might happen that you would leave the pot before the food was ready.”²⁴ The women expressed that it was always their decision to flee. Many husbands, fathers, and brothers were migrant laborers or were gathered in camps for both offensive and defensive purposes. The izinduna were also fighting. So when conflict broke out, the women took their own actions. They found refuge in camps, the nearby forests, the chief’s *inkantolo* or at the local school under the protection of the police or SADF. Others fled to safer areas, staying with family or employers, both indefinitely and permanently. This applied to not only females, but some of their husbands and sons too. One woman joked about moving to the farm at which her husband worked, “I was married to a coward but I prefer a coward to a fearless person

²² Khethi Zondi interview.

²³ “Babephatha ocelemba, amadoda ayefike akudubule bona bafike bakuqedele ngocelemba uma sewuwile.” Doris Mbokazi, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 16, 2011.

²⁴ “Lapha sasibaleka ngalendlela yokuthi angeke ukwazi nokupheka ngoba kunokwenzeka ukuthi ulishiye lingavuthiwe.” Veronica Dlamini interview.

because they die!”²⁵ Some dressed their sons up as girls so the young boys could escape with them, rather than be called to join in the fighting.²⁶ Still others chose not to flee. Ntombi Ngcobo refused to flee with her mother and sister; her brother died earlier in the conflict and she was scared of leaving her father (who as a male was expected to stay and take part in the conflict).²⁷

Some of these conventional gender roles identified resonate with the conservatism examined by Shireen Hassim in her analyses of the Inkatha Women’s Brigade. Hassim highlights the manner in which Inkatha’s success in organizing women occurred not in spite of its conservative, patriarchal, hierarchical, and essentialist discourse but precisely because these constructions resonated with women’s experience.²⁸ While “women in the homelands were rarely called upon as Zulus but entreated to political action on the basis of their identities as Christians, South Africans, and the backbone of family and community life,”²⁹ these calls based on Christian identities should not be interpreted as non-Zulu. Oral history interviews with rural isiZulu-speaking women reveal their own definitions, production, and exercise of what it meant to be Zulu.

²⁵ “Ngangigane igwala mina kodwa lihle igwala ngoba isiqhwaga siyafa.” Florence Ngcobo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 7, 2011.

²⁶ Theni Ngcoya, interview with author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, May 27, 2011.

²⁷ Ntombi Ngcobo, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Imbubu, January 17, 2011.

²⁸ Shireen Hassim, “Family, Motherhood and Zulu Nationalism: The Politics of the Inkatha Women’s Brigade,” *Feminist Review* 43 (1993): 1–25.

²⁹ Waetjen, *Workers and Warriors*, 65.. See also Shireen Hassim, “Reinforcing Conservatism: An Analysis of the Politics of the Inkatha Women’s Brigade,” *Agenda* 2 (1988): 3–16.

“So that the bullet won’t hit you”

One of the most prominent responses regarding how women coped and protected themselves and their family during *uDlame* surrounded faith and spirituality. Whether they spoke of using *izintelezi* or *muthi*, calling upon *amadlozi*, praying to *Nkosi* (God), or the manner in which the conflict prevented them from practicing, women revealed the significance of their religious beliefs as a coping and protective strategy during *uDlame*. This section builds upon the argument of historian of Christianity Philippe Denis that survival and resilience during the conflict was enabled by spiritual beliefs both African traditional and Christian, but goes further to argue that prayers to *Nkosi* or *Nkulunkulu* should also be seen as assertions of a particular kind of Zuluness rather than solely as religious coping strategies.

In research based on interviews with 23 men and women in the rural Nxamalala area (Pietermaritzburg), Denis attributed the lack of resentment so soon after the violence to the religious faith of the interviewees. Asked by fieldworkers associated with the School of Religion and Theology of the University of KwaZulu-Natal about the role of religious beliefs in traumatic situations, interviewees expressed a “conviction that the conflict, as painful as it might have been, had been wanted by God.” Denis further pointed to the varying overlap of “African traditional religion” and Christian practice. Denis found while many did normally adhere to Zulu customs, the majority could not perform rituals to the ancestors during the violence because there was not the time or space, or when able only simplified rituals with small attendance would be performed.³⁰

³⁰ Philippe Denis, “Prayers and Rituals to the Ancestors as Vehicles of Resilience: Coping with Political Violence in Nxamalala, Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991),” *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa* 128 (2007): 37–52.

Denis himself has elsewhere shown *amasiko* (literally translated as customs, more commonly as culture) to be the Zulu word used most often in oral accounts for “religion” though not in the sense “religion” is used in the western world.³¹ The use of *amasiko* suggests that for some Zulus, Christian beliefs had become part and parcel of being Zulu. While Hassim and Waetjen’s interpretations of Inkatha’s Christianized discourse aimed at women suggests Christianity as a realm outside of Zulu practices, women’s revelations about their prayers during *uDlame* should be seen as claims about the particular type of Christian Zulu (*amakholwa*) they saw themselves as. Some women simply responded to questions about coping strategies with the comment, “We believe in God.”³²

Prayers became particularly important to women when their husbands were about to leave for camp, or when they themselves were on the run, hiding in the forests or gathered for protection by the SADF at the local school. “Every night before we went hiding and our husbands left for their spot, we prayed.”³³ Thombi Gcabashe described nights at the school, “Life was not good. Everyone was always complaining about the situation we were living under.

³¹ Philippe Denis, “African Traditional Religion and Christian Identity,” *Missionalia* 32, no. 2 (2004): 177–89.

³² “Thina siyakholwa kuNkulunkulu.” Ntombikayise Madlala, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Haniville, June 16 2011.

³³ “Uma sekuhlukwana amadoda nathi sesihamba siya ezindaweni esihlala kuzona ebusuku, sasiguqa phansi sithandaze.” Ntombinazi Zakwe interview.

Sometimes we would hear that somebody had passed on and we would pray hard.”³⁴ Nikiwe Mdlalose also related, “We were praying to get strength for what was happening in our land.”³⁵ But spiritual coping strategies were not always limited to those of prayers to *Nkosi*. Tombi Gcabashe related that they would pray to the *amadlozi*, even when they could not burn *impepho* (incense). “We were praying while we were standing, we were always running. We could not kneel down or burn incense to talk to our ancestors. We were talking to our ancestors on our way running.”³⁶ Several other women spoke about the hope that they had that *amakhathakhatha* (lit. household remedies) and the *inyanga* could protect them. Even women who did not usually call upon *inyanga* related, “You would hear that so and so was helping over there and you would also go there to protect yourself... to protect the whole family so that the bullet can’t hit you.”³⁷

Another woman believed in the power of a woman “with real medicine” in Nxamalala who instructed a small group of Inkatha men to defend their area. Nompumelelo described the attack on her neighborhood, largely affiliated to Inkatha, by several buses of ANC supporters.

One day buses of ANC people came to attack, a big crowd, people from a different district. This woman sprinkled *muthi* at them, there were only five of them. We were all watching, standing on a hill. She told them to go and fight. She advised them that they shouldn’t look back. What they did there that day shocked everyone. They were only five but they killed a lot of people... I am telling what

³⁴ “Kwakungasiyona impilo emnandi ngoba wonke umuntu wayekhuluma ngesimo esinzima esiphila ngaphansi kwaso. Ngesinye isikhathi wawuthola ukuthi sihleli lapho sicashe khona kodwa sizwe sekuthiwa ubani useshonile, sasithandaza kakhulu ngalesosikhathi.” Tombi Gcabashe interview.

³⁵ “Sasibalisa uma siqeda sikhuleke ukuthi siqine kulento esibhekene nayo kanye nalento evukele izwe lakithi.” Nikiwe Mdlalose, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 4, 2011.

³⁶ “Sasithandaza simile ngoba sasihlale sibaleka, sasingekho nesikhathi sokuguqa phansi noma ushise impepho ukuthi ukhulume namadlozi. Sasikhuluma namadlozi sibe sibaleka.” Tombi Gcabashe interview.

³⁷ APC. HC07C03. Thuleleni M., Irinah G., Thokozile T., interviews by Lindiwe Mkasi, Inadi, September 16, 2005.

happened there is indescribable... They had guns and knives. I know two of them although now they are mentally disturbed. They fought and killed and they came back. This woman used *muthi* in her house before she left. They tried to burn it, throwing a bomb at it and shooting at it, and the bullets would fall down, nothing would happen. It didn't burn; it is still there today.³⁸

Women's discussion of the use of *muthi* and *intelezi* also reveals a gender and generational divide. Women saw *intelezi* as something largely used by males and often at the instruction of a chief prior to a conflict.³⁹ "I did not use *muthi*. We were praying," said Nikiwe. "My husband was not staying at home," suggesting that had he been home their strategies may have changed.⁴⁰ However, Busisiwe—who lived in Msinga during *uDlame* and whose mother was a *sangoma*—related, "those who were fighting were using *izintelezi* for their protection. We were also using *izintelezi* in our homes to sprinkle our yards [for protection]." Busisiwe continued that though women were not supposed to fight, they were instructed to put *muthi* in their hair to prevent injury to the men. "They were saying it would protect the fighters from getting hurt...We did not do that, although our mothers were telling us to do it. We were questioning ourselves about this. Our mothers were widows but they still believed that putting the *muthi* would help us although it did not work for them."⁴¹

³⁸ APC. HC07C16. Nompumelelo M. and Mirriam T., interviews by Lindiwe Mkasi, Imbubu, September 16, 2005.

³⁹ For example, see interviews with Bonangani Ngcobo and Florence Ngcobo in Maqongqo on 28 February and 7 March 2011, respectively.

⁴⁰ "Angizange ngiwusebenzise umuthi kuphela nje sasikhuleka. Ubaba wakwami wayengahlali ekhaya." Nikiwe Mdlalose interview.

⁴¹ "Laba abebesuke belwa bebesebenzisa izintelezi, nathi uma sisele emakhaya besiyichela intelezi emagcekeni." and "Kuyaye kuthiwe uqinisa umuntu wesilisa kodwa thina ngesikhathi sethu asikwenzanga lokho noma omama bethu babethetha bathi kufanele sigcobe insoyi ekhanda... kwakungumubuzo esasizibuza wona ukuthi kungani kuthiwe asiqinise amadoda kodwa omama nabo sebhleli abasenawo amadoda afela empini kodwa, bebeyigcoba lento futhi namanje basathi asiyigcobe kodwa nabo ingabasizanga." Bhusisiwe Thusi, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 21, 2011.

‘We were mourning, but there was no respect’

Funeral and mourning practices were also central to women’s discussion of *uDlame*. The stress of violent conflict, displacement, injury and death were one thing. But the inability to properly mourn or bury a loved one furthered the distress, especially as mourning customs are “the means by which the social sentiments of the survivors are slowly reorganized and adapted to the new conditions produced by the death...”⁴² Woman after woman commented on the intrusiveness of guns, police, and soldiers and the hijacking of the services, a terrain usually covered by elders, by the youth. Women could not wear proper attire, sit in mourning for the usual amount of time, or even attend funerals in other areas due to the danger and politicization of territory. The people were mourning but there was no respect for custom, thus magnifying the sense of turmoil.

Ntombi Ngcobo, who grew up and lived in KwaShange during the first outbreak of the violence, moved to Mbambangalo when it was still known as a haven of peace. She and her family stayed there for only two years before the unrest followed them. Inkatha burnt down their new home and they again fled the violence. Having lost her older brother to the conflict in KwaShange, Ntombi related the cooption of funerals:

We were mourning, but there was no respect... There were funerals, but they were not dignified. They used to sing *iziqubulo* (war-related songs) and shoot guns, because if you die by the gun at your funeral they would be shooting in the air. Youth were taking care of the funeral. As far as I know, people who used to take care of the funeral are old people, but at the time it was the youth.⁴³

⁴² Krige, *The Social System of the Zulus*, 159.

⁴³ “Kwakuhlalwa phansi kuzilwe, kodwa kwakungenayo lenhlonipho ejwayelekile... Nayo yayiba khona, kodwa ingenaso isizotha. Kwakuba neziqubulo, kuphinde kuqhunyiswe izibhamu khona lapho emngcwabeni. Uma umuntu eshone ngokudutshulwa kwakuqhunyiswa izibhamu, kwakuba umngcwabo ongenasizotha uphathwa yintsha. Ngokwazi kwethu umngcwabo uphathwa abantu abadala, kodwa ngalesosikhathi wawuphathwa yintsha.” Ntombi Ngcobo interview.

Here, Ntombi not only laments the presence of guns and war songs, she complains about the absence of *inhlonipho* amongst funeral goers. She is also attesting to another aspect of *uDlame* and the wider liberation struggle, the generational tensions.⁴⁴ The youth's cooption of funerals in contrast to the values and desires of their elders resounds with recent arguments by Thokozani Xaba and Mxolisi Mchunu about KwaZulu-Natal's civil war. Xaba contended that young comrades were impatient with their more tolerant elders.⁴⁵ Mchunu locates this tension as particularly emanating from culture change, or two different views on manhood held by youth and elders accentuated during conflict.⁴⁶

Belinda Bozzoli argued this usurpation of "an unquestionably acceptable ceremonial ritual" transformed funerals into "political theatre" in Alexandra township during the rebellion.⁴⁷ But whereas Bozzoli highlights the willingness of most families concerned to adopt the redefinition of their deceased loved ones as "children of the township" and to participate in political funerals, the women interviewed in Maqongqo and Nxamalala indicated dismay with the directorship of the youth and the presence of soldiers, guns, and *iziqubulo*. "Funerals were truly painful," said one Nxamalala woman. "We walked on the watch just like that. We walked

⁴⁴ Generational tensions within and between the movements of the era have been examined by both Belinda Bozzoli and Ari Sitas. Bozzoli highlights the internal division between youth and adults during the Alexandra Rebellion while Sitas shows the ways in which the 'comrades' movement was more than just unemployed black youth. Bozzoli, *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*; Sitas, "The Making of the 'Comrades' Movement in Natal, 1985-91."

⁴⁵ Xaba, "Masculinity and Its Malcontents," 110.

⁴⁶ Mchunu, "Culture Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict."

⁴⁷ Bozzoli, *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*, 210.

with weapons about us and here is the grave, you have to bury someone... Yes, funerals were an ordeal, truly difficult.”⁴⁸

Others indicated the difficulties of mourning properly because they were constantly under assault. These attacks included the use of guns and petrol bombs. “There was no time because you would not know if they got into the house what they would do... If there was a funeral, we were supposed to make it fast and leave the place before havoc starts. If a person died by a gun, they would shoot guns at the funeral.”⁴⁹ Eunice Dladla and her family fled to the home of her husband’s employer, a nearby farmer, because of the violence. “We could not [sit in] mourning in our places. It was possible to get hit by petrol bombs inside the house.”⁵⁰ Women, often as chief mourners or the company of the bereaved, are expected to withdraw from the community and be confined to the house, a responsibility nearly impossible to fulfill when one is not safe at home or when one is sleeping in group camps or in the forests. Bonangani Ngcobo says, “Yes, we were mourning, but we were running with a black cloth. We used to mourn for one week but it was no longer working accordingly. Even when your husband passed on you were not mourning as we used to because we were always on the run.”⁵¹

⁴⁸ APC. HC07C04. Tryphina G. by Cosmos Mzizi, KwaNxamalala, March 13, 2003. (My own translation)

⁴⁹ “Sasingekho ngoba wawungazi ukuthi uma bengena endlini bazofike bakwenzeni. Uma niseemngcwabeni kufanele kusheshiswe ukuze nihlukane kungakasuki thuthuva. Uma umuntu oshonile ebulewe ngesibhamu kuqhunyiswa sona nasemngcwabeni wakhe noma umkhonto.” Florence Ngcobo interview.

⁵⁰ “Wawungakwazi ukwenzela kulendawo ngoba babengafike bakushaye ngebhomu ufele endlini.” Eunice Dladla, interview by author and Thandeka Majola, Maqongqo, March 7, 2011.

⁵¹ “Yebo sasikwazi, wawugijima naso isidwedwe esimnyama. Kwasekuzilwa isonto elilodwa nje kuphela; kwakungasekhona lokhu okujwayelekile noma ushonelwe umyeni wakho wawungazili ngendlela ejwayelekile ngoba kwakugijinywa.” Bonangani Ngcobo interview.

While Bonangani showed no concern about the wearing of black during mourning, others complained that they could not wear mourning clothes because of the affiliation of particular colors with political parties. Khethi Zondi “mourned [for my son] but at the end it was not happening because you were judged by the dressing code and particular colors. If you wore a black skirt, that meant you were in a particular organization... Inkatha used to wear black skirts.”⁵²

Even when attempts were made to mourn according to custom, stress still accompanied the dangers of holding the services in the midst of war. Nikiwe related the worry for her own safety as well as the disappointment that many felt when relatives from other *izigodi* (sections) or areas could not attend the funerals. “You were supposed to be brave because you had to do things accordingly. But our relatives could not attend the funerals since the place was a no-go area.”⁵³

Other women expressed concern about leaving their communities and children behind during *uDlame* because of their mourning-related responsibilities. Alzina related that many women in Nxamalala were encouraged by “the whites” to leave their areas for safer ones. But when considering whether or not to run away, “our children cried, if you leave us, who is going to close our eyes when we die?” When an unmarried child dies, it is the (married) mother who serves as the “chief mourner.” It is her responsibility to close the eyes and mouth of the dead, wash the body, and straighten the limbs in preparation for burial, as well as sit in mourning on

⁵² “Ngazila mina kodwa kwagcina sekungasazileki ngoba kwasekubhekwa ukuthi ufake inzila eyimuphi umbala. Uma uzile ngesiketi esimnyama kwakuthiwa uyinhlango ethile... Inkatha yayifaka iziketi ezimnyama.” Khethi Zondi interview.

⁵³ “Kwakufanele ube nesibindi nje ngoba, kwakufanele kwenziwe izinto okufanele zenziwe kodwa izihlobo zazingasakwazi ukuza ngoba zazisaba ukuzongena.” Nikiwe Mdlalose interview.

the bare floor covered in a blanket. After burial, she continues in mourning until she is ritually released, much later than other members of the family. The passage of the deceased's spirit is effected through the married woman.⁵⁴

“We felt at home”: Ma Majozi⁵⁵

The account of Thobekile (Ma Majozi) Maphumulo, the first and head wife of the late Chief Maphumulo and now the ANC mayor of Mkhambathini Municipality, illustrates several of the themes examined above. Like many of the women of Mbambangalo, she sought refuge away from home during the violence. She too shows Christian beliefs as part of being Zulu and the dangers, disruption, and comfort of mourning practices after the assassination of her husband. But unlike the others, Ma Majozi's experience was magnified by her status as the first wife of the chief and the mother of the heir to the Maphumulo chieftaincy. Despite positioning herself as an educated, not necessarily “traditional” ANC stalwart, Ma Majozi's narrative indicates the centrality of Zulu customs in her coping strategies.

Born in Dambuza, Ma Majozi met the chief of the Maphumulo, Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, through a friend while she was a student at Ohlange High School. They married and she moved to Maqongqo. She could not recall the date nor year of their marriage. “I do not remember my wedding date; what is on my mind is my husband's death. It was 25 February 1991. His death made me forget about my wedding date.”⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Ngubane, *Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine*, 83, 141.

⁵⁵ Unless otherwise noted, this section draws upon an interview with Thobekile Maphumulo, Camperdown, February 8, 2011.

⁵⁶ “Angisalukhumbuli usuku lomshado wami, into esengqondweni yami usuku umkhwenyana wami ahamba ngalo emhlabeni. Kwakungumhlaka 25 February 1991 iyona

MaMajozi remembers being welcomed into the Maphumulo family as she was and never felt pressured to be a “Zulu woman [who] has to follow culture as old people used to.”

There was this tendency which was, if you are a Zulu women there are cultures you have to follow, like you have to be at home and are not allowed to go to work. Fortunately I did not have that problem, my husband was very progressive. This means he allowed me to do anything I want, we were doing everything together. I remember when I just came to this family; I was going to town wearing my wig. New wives are not supposed to wear a wig in terms of Zulu culture. [Zulu women had to put a scarf on their head to show respect.] My mother in law used to wear *isidwaba* (a skin petticoat) but she told me to do what I think is good for me. I realised that this family welcomed me for who I am and I was living a good life in my marriage though it was a rural area but I did not feel that. Normally people say a Zulu woman has to follow culture as old people used to do but I did not engage myself in that situation.⁵⁷

Ma Majozi and the late chief had four children (one deceased), including the current chief, Nhlakanipho. Despite her less than “rural” ways, she still believed in instilling her children with *inhlonipho* and ensuring they knew “their roots” and other aspects of Zulu culture. Raised as a Lutheran, she began to also follow the practices of the amaNazaretha Church (an African-initiated church that molds elements of Zulu religious beliefs with Christian theology) when she married into the Maphumulo family, though not as faithfully as her in-laws. Ma Majozi worked for an NGO, the Community Care Centre of the Trust for Christian Outreach and Education, and

ngampela engiyikhumbulayo, okuchaza ukuthi ukushona kumkhwenyana wami kwavala nosuku lomshado ngoba ngampela angisalukhumbuli.”

⁵⁷ “Mina ngingathi nje bekunalento yokuthi uma ungumama womZulu, kukhona lamasiko okufanele uwagcine njengokuthi; kufanele ube sekhishini ungayi emsebenzini. Kodwa mina angizange ngihlangabezane naleyonkinga ngoba, umkhwenyana wami he was very much progressive, ngaleyondlela umkhwenyana wami wayehleli evule izandla. Uma uthi kukhona okufanele kwenziwe wayenganqabi yonke into sasiyenza ndawonye. Ngikhumbula ngolunye usuku ngisafika, ngiya edolobheni ngifake iwi gi ekhanda kanti omakoti basemakhaya bayathwala emakhanda. Umamezala wami wayegqoka isidwaba kodwa, wayethi kimina angenze lokho okuzwana nami. Ngabona ukuthi lapha kulelikhaya ngiphatheke kahle, ngemukelwa njengoba nginjalo. Impilo yami kuleliyakhaya yayimnandi kakhulu, noma kwakuyindawo yasemakhaya kodwa angizange ngikuzwe kakhulu lokho. Isikhathi esiningi kuthiwa umama womZulu kufanele enze amasiko njengoba abadala babenza kuqala. Ngenhlanhla angizange ngihlangabezane nalesosimo.”

traveled often. During the first outbreak of violence in Maqongqo in 1990, she was at a conference in Holland and came home to find refugees from the violence camped at her husband's *inkantolo* and their *umuzi*. Because of attacks on the chief's *umuzi*, her mother-in-law convinced her to take her youngest child (the other two were at boarding school) to stay with her family in Dambuza. On the very day she left for Dambuza, her home within the *umuzi* was burnt to the ground. Within a year of her fleeing, her husband was assassinated outside of the city home he rented.

In the passages below, Ma Majози describes the burial of her husband who had become deeply loved by his supporters and hated by his enemies. Her account highlights the presence of police, the disruption of food preparation associated with a funeral, the (in this instance, quite brave) slaughtering of a cow, and the significance of the land of your father. It also indicates the comfort she found in his rural burial.

When asked about mourning and funerals during *uDlame*, MaMajози immediately spoke of the burial of her husband at their *umuzi* in Maqongqo. She originally did not mention the mass political funeral held for him by the UDF at Wadley Stadium in Edendale.⁵⁸ This seemed particularly interesting given her assertion that she and her Dambuza family had always been ANC activists and her current position as an ANC politician, but when I brought up the subject in a follow-up meeting she explained that there are many things she forgot. Due to the stress of losing her husband, she said she often needed to be reminded of things that happened, that she “was not normal at that time.” That she recalled Mhlabunzima's burial suggests that which comforted her most was his final burial rather than the political service.

⁵⁸ I was, at the time of the first interview, unaware of the mass political funeral for the late chief.

An estimated 7,000-25,000⁵⁹ attended his funeral in Edendale where the ANC called on youth to join Umkhonto weSizwe.⁶⁰ His funeral program read, “Pick up his spear!”⁶¹ As Bozzoli has shown of mass political funerals in Alexandra township, Chief Maphumulo’s funeral was utilized to promote a canonical national liberation discourse. While the politicians speaking adopted a discourse of peace and human rights, implicit was the apocalyptic vision of the ANC that time was running out for problems to be solved peacefully.⁶² At Maphumulo’s funeral, this discourse was led by his friend, the fiery Harry Gwala—who took ‘sarcastic swipes’ at the police—and Peter Mokaba—who exhorted the “young lions” and boasted that “if we cannot win liberation at the negotiating table, then we will win it through the barrel of the gun.” Blade Nzimande tied this discourse to Maphumulo, saying the chief “laid down his life so as to attain the aims of the Freedom Charter. Those of us who continues to live must fight on with his spear...”⁶³ Here, the funeral organizers and speakers sought the mobilizing potential of a public funeral, overpowering the sense of a person lost and certainly impacting the family’s ability to mourn.

After the proceedings in Edendale, Ma Majozi and two other wives were part of a parade of police, cars, and buses that met an Inkatha crowd at the Maqongqo shop en route to the

⁵⁹ 7 000 according to police, 25 000 according to the ANC. Martin Williams, “Fair play: reporters under threat” *Daily News* March 11, 1991; “ANC denies journalists were intimidated at funeral,” *Natal Witness* March 14, 1991.

⁶⁰ Sonya Schoeman, “MK call to arms at chief’s funeral” *Natal Witness* March 11, 1991.

⁶¹ Fraser Mtshali, “Pick up his spear!” *New African* March 14, 1991.

⁶² Bozzoli, 225.

⁶³ Mtshali, “Pick up his spear!”

Maphumulo *umuzi* where the late chief was to be buried.⁶⁴ The crowd watched the motorcade, singing Inkatha songs. Because of this political intimidation and the potential for violence, police presence dominated burials during this era. Here, Ma Majozi related her husband's burial to that of most deceased. "There are people who got buried in their yards because they had to call the police to police the burial. Police stayed until the funeral finished before they left. My husband's funeral, we did the very same thing." While police willingness to guard the burials at people's homes dictated the practice according to Ma Majozi, Maqongqo had no cemetery so most were buried within their homesteads, as is also custom.⁶⁵ Ma Majozi continued to describe the burial:

We were escorted by the police all the way from town to Maqongqo. Even people who were digging the grave were under the police surveillance. We did not even cook at Maqongqo because we did not know what was going to happen. We carried parcels prepared in town for the people. The izinduna that we had at the time sympathized with us because when we arrived home we found they already slaughtered the cow and it was boiling in the pots. We felt at home yet we were no longer living there. Those izinduna were the ones who said they were not going to leave this land, because the children will not know their place of origin. They felt that if they leave the land they will lose it. They took a stand.⁶⁶

While the police presence was certainly an intrusion, here it also allowed the burial to take place without Inkatha interference. Several other women attributed a lack of problems at

⁶⁴ Lakela Kaunda, "Maphumulo's burial marked by tension," *Natal Witness Echo* March 14, 1991.

⁶⁵ Ngubane, *Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine*, 84.

⁶⁶ "Ngingathi nje kukhona amathuna abantu asemagcekeni ngoba kwakufanele kubizwe amaphoyisa ukuthi azogada umngcwabo. Amaphoyisa ayehlala kuze kube kuqedwa yonke into kuyima behamba. Njengomyeni wami washonela lapha edolobheni sasigadwe amaphoyisa yonke indlela, ngoba nabantu ababemba ekhaya babegadwe amaphoyisa, kangangokuba akuzange kuphekwe ekhaya eMaqongqo ngoba kungaziwa ukuthi kuzokwenzakala kanjani. Abantu benzelwa amaphakethe okudla edolobheni sasesihamba nawo. Kodwa izinduna ezazikhona ngalesosikhathi ngaphakathi futhi ezazizwelana nathi, safika sekuhlathshwe nenkomo khona ekuseni kwabekwa amabhodwe. Sazibona sengathi impela sesihlala khona kanti asihlali khona, konke lokho kwakweziwe izinduna lezi engithi zathi angeke zihambe endaweni ngoba izingane angeke zayazi imvelaphi yazo. Nokuthi uma kungabe beshiya lendawo bazoyiluzo, bakwazi ukuthi baphumele obala gokwenza konke lokho."

funerals to the presence of the police and soldiers. “Soldiers used to come to that house [of a family who had lost a member] to protect us until the funeral. After the funeral service, we would go to our own homes and the soldiers would leave.”⁶⁷

The danger of returning to Maqongqo without the police prompted Ma Majози and other family members to prepare food parcels to carry with them for those digging the grave and other funeral goers as necessitated by *amasiko*. But Ma Majози was relieved that upon arrival in Maqongqo she found izinduna brave enough to slaughter a cow, despite the threats of the Inkatha followers nearby—a ritual significant for a head of *umuzi* and chief such as the late Maphumulo.⁶⁸

Ma Majози’s testimony also reveals the added stresses of being the mother of the heir to the Maphumulo *ubukhosi*. When it came time for her son to take up his position as chief, Ma Majози hesitated to return to Mbambangalo because of the devastation she had experienced.

...My house burnt down and I lost everything... It is very hard to go back where you think you passed that route and you wanted to move to other things. But circumstances forced you to go back and start from the beginning. After losing all your material and also losing the man who you rely on, all of those things were hurting me in a way that, at the time I even lost weight in such a way that I could not recognize myself. While I was a deputy mayor and even now I am a mayor, people were always saying, I look like I am a cruel person. Then I say to them, no, it is just that I am hurting inside. And they ask me why do I not forget the past? Then I said it is not easy to let go of something which pulled me back...⁶⁹

⁶⁷ “Kwakuba khona amasosha sikhale siqashwe iwona, silale ke kulowomuzi isonto lonke silinde usuku lomngcwabo. Emva komngcwabo sesihamba ke siye ezindaweni zethu, uma nathi sesihlukene namasosha ayahamba.” Ntombinaze Zakwe interview.

⁶⁸ Ngubane, *Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine*, 84.

⁶⁹ “ Into njena yokuqala engingayisho ukuthi, impi ingithintile ngokuthi ngishelwe ikhona konke enginakho... Ukuqala phansi ngesikhathi sengibona ukuthi sengisebenze kangakanani, futhi usafuna ukudlulela uyokwenza okunye. Kodwa kwafanele ukuthi ngiqale phansi. Khona lapho usashiselwe izimpahla zakho, bese kuthi nalendoda ebenibonisana nayo isiyashona. Konke nje lokho kwangivuvukalisa ikhanda ngalendlela, kangangokuba ngalesosikhathi ngancipha ngalendlela yokuthi ngangithuka ukuthi kwakusayimina ngampela

But ultimately, Ma Majози chose to return on account of Zulu customs and life that she did not want her children to lose. So when Nhlakanipho finished his schooling and married, and *ibamba* Baningi Maphumulo called for the family's return, she acquiesced.

I think I have only been back in Maqongqo for three years from the violence period. I told myself that I have to go back home to Maqongqo because my children will grow up not knowing their roots and they will lose the culture. Also their relatives, they will never know them. Some of the extended family stayed behind for the sake of keeping the land, and they say they would be members of the organisation that we were suppose to join. They also said the reason for them to stay behind was that they wanted Nhlakanipho to take his father's position when he was of age. That was my reason to go back to Maqongqo.⁷⁰

Conclusion

Ma Majози's narrative is by no means entirely representative of women's experience of the violence because of her marriage to not only a chief but a prominent political leader. She is comparatively well-educated and proud of her ability to not entirely conform as "women used to" with Zulu cultural practices. But still her interview is replete with the ways in which she relied upon Zulu custom to cope and help her make decisions about her family's future. It resonates with the interviews of women from Mbambangalo examined above. While the dominant images of *uDlame* focus on Zulu martial masculinity and women as victims, this

yini lowayana. Yonke lento yenza ukuthi isithombe salento eyayenzeka singapheli kalula, kangangokuba ngisho ngisewu Deputy Mayor namanje noma ngiyi Mayor. Abantu baze basho ukuthi kungathi nginenhliziyo embi bese ngithi cha anginayo inhliziyo embi ngenziwa ubuhlungu benhliziyo. Bangibuze ukuthi kungani ngingakhohlwa? Ngithi angikwazi ukuthi ngikhohlwe ngoba yonke lento yangihlehlisela emuva."

⁷⁰ "Ngicabanga ukuthi ngineminyaka emithathu ngibuyelile eMaqongqo. Ngazitshela ukuthi kufanele ngibuye ekhaya ngoba abantwana bami abazoyazi imvelaphi yabo, futhi bazoluz ububona njengamasiko noma bagcine beluze nezihlobo zabo ezikhona lapha endaweni. Ngoba bekuzohamba sigcine singasakwazi ukuhambelana, ngoba abanye basala bathi bazoba iyona lenhlangano okufunakala ukuthi sibe iyona. Ngoba noma sihleli kodwa asihleli ngoba sithanda, sihleli ngoba sifuna ukuthi ngelinye ilanga ingane ikhule ibuye izothatha isikhundla sikababa wayo. Kwaba iyona indlela engabuyela ngayo ekhaya."

analysis indicates the ways in which rural isiZulu-speaking women utilized their culture as coping strategies and made claims on what it meant to be Zulu during this time of turmoil through their complaints on what they were not able to practice. Those who saw themselves as Zulu Christians, *amakholwa*, called upon *Nkosi* in their prayers. Others prayed to the *amadlozi*, even when they were unable to do so properly by burning *impepho*, or believed in the powers of *sangoma* and *inyanga* to protect, “so that the bullet can’t hit you.” They sought comfort in the Zulu mourning practices and complained about the presence of guns and police and the lack of *inhlonipho* by the youth at funerals, as well as their inability to wear proper mourning attire and sit in seclusion for the appropriate periods of time. In these discourses, women assert what it meant to them to be Zulu during an era of unprecedented turmoil.

Conclusion

This story of persistent tensions between the neighboring Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms illustrates the local nature of *uDlame* during South Africa's transition to democracy, an era of painful, divisive warfare often overlooked by contemporary historical work and much of post-apartheid public history. My examination of more than a century of conflict in Table Mountain, KwaZulu-Natal casts new light on the disjuncture between local understandings of the political violence and the explanation of a Third Force-fomented national struggle between the ANC and Inkatha for political power often advanced by journalists, social scientists, and the post-apartheid state. The parties in Table Mountain fought less because of Inkatha or ANC/UDF ideological affinity and organizational loyalty, and more over historically contested land and fiercely debated and socially defined meanings of authority and membership in their chiefdoms—issues hotly disputed today.

As I write this, South Africa's 18-year old democratic government debates a Traditional Courts Bill, legislation proposing to grant legal power to chiefs' courts. The position of traditional authorities in the new South Africa was just one of the concerns of Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo as he consulted with the ANC in Lusaka and of the Zulu traditional leaders aligned with the Inkatha movement that promised to defend their power as chiefs. Those who support the current bill argue that the affordable, familiar legal process in rural areas promotes "Afrocentric values" within the bounds of the Constitution. Some people strongly support the system out of deep disillusionment with South Africa's democracy and its

institutions.¹ But the bill also sparks serious concerns about the regression of hard-won constitutional rights, particularly for women and sexual minorities, and the entrenchment of practices developed under white minority rule. The bill is widely recognized as an effort by the ANC to ensure polling support from rural leaders.

Amidst this unfolding debate, historian Jeff Guy wrote about the challenges of restructuring this bill to recognize both its intention and human rights and equality. As historians do, Guy calls attention to the historicity of the key concepts at the heart of the bill – custom and tradition. While systems of customary law used features of pre-colonial African law, they also exploited them. The chiefs who implemented customary law were often colonial appointees – such as several of those we met here in this dissertation amongst the Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo – or were manipulated in the services of colonialism, segregation, and apartheid. Attempts to portray traditional leaders and customary law as tenants of a pre-conquest African past ignore the 350 years of contact with the greater world since the Dutch East India Company first arrived in southern Africa.²

It is this same conundrum in which South Africa's Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) authorities find themselves at Table Mountain. Much has changed there, but the land continues to be disputed. After a ten-year reign that began with Inkosi Mhlabunzima's death, *Ibamba* Baningi Maphumulo asked Mhlabunzima's son and heir to return to Mbambangalo and accept his position. In 2004, Nhlakanipho Maphumulo became the then youngest chief in KwaZulu-Natal. In the 2006 local elections, his mother, the first wife of the late Mhlabunzima, became the ANC mayor of the Mkhambathini District Municipality under

¹ Lydia Polgreen, "South Africa debates law to support tribal courts," *New York Times* June 16, 2012.

² Jeff Guy, "A chief rules by people power," *Mail & Guardian* June 14, 2012.

which the Maphumulo and Nyavu chiefdoms fall. In KwaNyavu, a regent governed after the death of Bangubukhosi Mdluli until Inkosi Siphosiki Mdluli came of age. One young man from Mbambangalo who had been sentenced to jail for his role in the 1993 Nkanyezini massacre applied for amnesty at the TRC. Upon his release, he initiated a University of KwaZulu-Natal-sponsored peace program in Maqongqo to show his remorse and facilitate reconciliation in the community. Some who had fled during the violence returned to Mbambangalo and rebuilt their homes (on new sites, if they found theirs already occupied). But many others did not and now live across KwaZulu-Natal, including in the newly constructed township Haniville (named after MK leader Chris Hani) on Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo Road between the city and Table Mountain. Some people had hoped to return, but found their sites occupied. Others did not want to return. Still others, who had never before lived in Mbambangalo, moved into the region because of the availability of land.

As I was leaving South Africa in August 2011, COGTA officials had plans to visit the still-disputed portion of Goedverwaching. One official admitted the dilemma. The Nyavu claim that the land had been theirs prior to the arrival of Europeans to the region now known as KwaZulu-Natal. But in the intervening century, successive governments established and consistently recognized the Maphumulo chiefdom. To grant jurisdiction of the Goedverwaching farm to the Nyavu would recognize a historical claim to the land that ignores all that has happened in the region during the last century. To turn the land over to the Maphumulo would be to prioritize colonial, segregation, and apartheid understandings of land and community membership. How could officials grant jurisdiction to one, the other, or both, in a way that acknowledges this complicated past? How can they establish a boundary when people claiming allegiance to both the Nyavu and Maphumulo dot the contested land? In seeking to define the

jurisdiction of the farm, COGTA officials continue to prioritize the territorially-bound authority first implemented in South Africa under indirect rule. But that an official expressed concern that a boundary could not be drawn down the middle because of the scattering of Maphumulo and Nyavu followers suggests that at least this government representative recognizes the continued existence of personal allegiance as means of membership in a chiefdom.

As can be seen in this dissertation, land and chiefly authority were at the heart of conflict between the Nyavu and Maphumulo chiefdoms when *uDlame* broke out in Table Mountain in 1990. I locate the origins of the conflict between the Nyavu and Maphumulo in the colonial practice of indirect rule, including the creation of African land reserves, boundaries, and “government tribes.” The establishment of new chiefdoms and the implementation of territorially bounded authority transformed the relationship between chiefs and their subjects from one based on personal connections to landed boundaries. The Nyavu chiefs sought to bolster their authority by calling upon their hereditary status through relentless claims to the land by contesting their boundaries with the newly appointed chiefs of the Qamu, Gcumisa, and Maphumulo. *Izimpi zemibango* between the chiefdoms took the form of disputes not only over this land, but over the legitimacy of the newly appointed chiefs. The Nyavu chiefs recited their oral tradition to tie themselves to the land and repeatedly attempted to delegitimize the appointment of their new neighbors with stories about new chiefdoms as *ipheshini* (pension) given as rewards for service to the white government.

Tensions between the chiefdoms continued, particularly as South African Native Administration officials sought to purchase white-owned farms that neighbored Inanda Location for the relocation of Maphumulo from a site to be excised for the construction of the Nagle Dam. In 1940, the South African Native Trust purchased Onverwacht and a portion of Aasvogel Krans

to these ends. Betterment plans designed to lengthen the agricultural life of the farms made it clear this land could not sustain the numbers of Maphumulo scheduled for relocation. The Trust turned to buy Goedverwaching, but when it became known the white farmers were willing to sell, the Nyavu chief too attempted to acquire the farm. Rebuffed, Chief Ngangezwe asked the Native Administration Department that his people be allowed to settle on the land where their ancestors had lived. The Trust purchased a large portion Goedverwaching in 1948, the same year in which the National Party won the election with the promise of apartheid.

The Trust's piecemeal acquisition of the neighboring farms heightened tensions between the chiefdoms under apartheid. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 made provision for three levels of administration for Africans at the local, regional, and territorial levels and legalized the boundaries of chiefdoms, or "tribal authorities." When the Maphumulo and Nyavu tribal authorities were established in 1957, a one-thousand acre strip of Goedverwaching still owned by white farmers cut through the Maphumulo chiefdom and bordered the Nyavu, setting the stage for *uDlame*.

When the Trust finally purchased this band of Goedverwaching (in portions, 1961, 1968, and 1984), there was no shortage of designs for this valuable farm land. Government officials initially planned for the land to become a "bantú village" for the relocation of people from the crowded Inanda Location and trust-owned farms. But forced removals across KwaZulu-Natal that accompanied the eradication of so-called "black spots" and the consolidation of land for the KwaZulu bantustan (the highest level of the Bantu Authorities system) compelled apartheid officials to use the farm as a closer settlement where they could relocate people forcibly removed. The settlement of non-members of the Maphumulo to the land dividing his chiefdom concerned Chief Mhlabunzima as he sought permission for the new Goedverwaching residents

to *khonza* him. The Chiefs Maphumulo and Mdluli both desired the land for the natural expansion of people in the region and attempted to utilize the KwaZulu government to gain jurisdiction there. KwaZulu recognized the land as a potential piece for consolidation.

When *uDlame* broke out across KwaZulu-Natal in the late 1980s, Chief Maphumulo began to welcome refugees of all political persuasions from the conflict onto this historically contested piece of land with the provision that they *khonza* him. Maphumulo considered these new residents to be members of his chiefdom. He proclaimed, “Because my people are in the MDM, I have to be with them” and devoted himself to anti-apartheid efforts such as *Contralesa*.³ Maphumulo’s actions sparked the ire of the neighboring Nyavu, the Zulu ethnic national movement Inkatha, and people within his chiefdom. Individuals among the Maphumulo dissatisfied with Chief Mhlabunzima’s authority contested his definition of membership and allied with the pro-Inkatha Nyavu who capitalized upon the national struggle for political power between the ANC, Inkatha, and the dying apartheid government to invade Mbambangalo and stake claim to historically contested land.

The dissertation also builds on the earlier concerns of African historians about the significance of land for chiefly legitimacy and the contradiction between democratic consent of the governed and African cultural sanction for hereditary leadership. While some scholars have pointed to the colonial imposition of chiefly control over communal land as an explanation for the continued importance of traditional leadership in a democratic South Africa, this study points to other claims to authority. The Nyavu chiefs made claims on land to provide a needed resource for their people, but also as a means of bolstering a particular kind of chiefly authority—their hereditary descent—and delegitimizing their appointed neighbors. The Nyavu leaders’ claims on

³ Maphumulo, “Interview with Chief Maphumulo,” *Sechaba* (1990), 8.

the earth in which their ancestors were buried illustrate the political and social worth of land to not only the chiefs but also their people.

The colonial government sought to transform the relationship between chiefs and their subjects from one based on personal relations to one based on land, but they did not eliminate the mutually beneficial social contract of *khonza* that held chiefs responsible. Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo, the fourth chief of a “government tribe,” continued to rely upon the personal relations of *khonza* as he welcomed followers into his chiefdom. He sought to provide land, water, economic development, and employment for his people. In the midst of a regional civil war, he promoted peace and attempted to provide security. Attention to the practice of *khonza* shows how Zulu chiefs could gain and maintain legitimacy based on consent of their subjects.

The dissertation also challenges common understandings of Zulu chiefs and Inkatha supporters as apartheid collaborators, as well as the persistent binaries of collaboration and resistance, warlord and freedom fighter, government stooge and progressive chief. The actions of these Table Mountain Nyavu and Maphumulo chiefs illustrate a range of methods and tactics that do not easily fit into neat dichotomous categories. Under indirect rule, both hereditary and colonial chiefs such as Nomsimekwana and Ngangezwe Mdluli and Maguzu Maphumulo sought to use the Native Administration Department not only to bolster their authority, but also to ensure their people’s right to land. Nomsimekwana and Ngangezwe made frequent claims on contested territory and attempted to delegitimize their appointed counterparts through statements to NAD officials. During the segregation era, government investigations into *izimpi zemibongo* between the chiefdoms provided the Nyavu chiefs with an opportunity to defend their hereditary status and gain access to disputed land for their people.

Under apartheid, chiefly cooperation and resistance to Bantu Authorities was not as clear cut as previously argued. Chiefs and izinduna were aware of the potential for deposal and thus took actions to ensure their survival. The Nyavu and Maphumulo chiefs agreed to the establishment of tribal authorities in their region but did little afterward to suggest either collaboration or open resistance. The minutes of meetings in which these traditional leaders agree to the bantu authorities system suggest that they were tempted by the promise of education, roads, and development for their chiefdoms—motivations in keeping with the social contract created through *khonza*. The leaders often refused to implement apartheid betterment planning regulations, thus making enemies out of the Bantu Administration African rangers (such as Mafakadolo who was attacked in Mbambangalo) employed to ensure compliance. Bangubukhosi Mdluli walked a fine line between the resistance of his people and the expectations of the government, employing delay tactics to appease his followers without earning the ire of apartheid officials.

An examination of local Table Mountain political figures and Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo during *uDlame* reveals the range of survival and accommodation strategies employed by traditional leaders and their supporters. Maphumulo shifted from royalist Zulu politician to neutral chief and finally to ANC strongman on the both the local and national levels. His mission shifted, first fighting for peace and then for land and the end of apartheid. He employed a variety of weapons, ranging from a commission of inquiry into the violence to more militaristic language and the recruitment of youth for self-defense, to ensure not only his own survival but material resources and security for his people.

While there is no shortage of source material on colonial, segregation, and apartheid era manipulation of chiefly authority and *uDlame*, ranging from government documents and

violence monitoring reports to the highly attentive press, oral sources enabled me to convey the complexity of not only the transition-era violence but the changing relationship between chiefs and their followers and the reasons people go to war. Although the political contest between the dying apartheid state, Inkatha, and the ANC helped to shape the violence in Table Mountain, the causes of conflict were local. The pro-Inkatha Nyavu and their allies within the Maphumulo sought to use the national struggle to decide the local century-old land conflict and depose Chief Mhlabunzima. The nostalgia of the Maphumulo for their late leader highlights multiple forms of chiefly authority based on a social contract that held him responsible for land and resource allocation and the provision of security. These memories, even if selectively remembered, point to alternative kinds of chiefly legitimacy that are desired by people in a country struggling to reconcile traditional authority with democracy, by people who complain about skyrocketing site fees, and the challenges of returning to the area from where they fled during *uDlame*. It is these historical origins of the conflict and the alternative forms of chiefly legitimacy that need to be considered as South Africa and other African countries seek land reform and administrative policies that reconcile traditional leadership with democratic values.

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