THE ETH!CAL INTUETEONBM 0F RLCHARD PRICE Thesis far the Degree of Ph. 9. MICHSGAH S‘E'A'E‘E URBVERSITY Hayes! 9. Hays E9625 YHES!F. This is to certify that the thesis entitled The Ethical Intuitionism of Richard Price presented by Lloyd D. Hays has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for M degree in thy l / (2/ / / d / it»). .r ‘ ”I L’ 1 L3 'H/L'f/ 3‘ ( fit” .2 146 L it x. \ / Major professor Date W 0-169 ,7. J; 331% 33:53 RESEMK}: ,,1& . '4. WE} at, ”M '3 . 1258 SE .‘ RCH «MN '5 ABSTRACT TAB ETHICAL ITIUITIONISM OF RICHARD PRICE by Lloyd D. Hays Body of Abstract The mode of procedure has been to examine the ethical intuitionism of Richard Price as contained in his only philOSOphic work, A Review pi the Principal Questions In Morals. Three purposes are undertaken: (l) to give an exposition of a complete encyclOpedic account of Price's life and works; (2) to give an exposition of Price's epistemological and ethical theories; and (3) to give a brief comparison of certain Pricean ethical views with similar positions adopted later by Immanuel Kant. Chapter I delimits the scope of the dissertation to these three purposes. Chapter II is concerned with an encyclopedic account of Price's life and works. Chapters III and IV expound Price's epistemology and his episte- mOIOgy applied to morals. Chapter V is an exposition of his ethics. Chapter VI compares certain aspects of the ethical theories of Price and Kant. Chapter VII serves as a summary and criticism of certain views of Richard Price. It is discovered that while Price and Kant are quite simi- lar in many ways, they are by no means identical. THE ETHICAL IKTUITIONISM OF RICHARD PRICE By fifi\ Lloyd D? Hays A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy 1966 23:" 11"2/332’” - ' I // A . - // '5’], 7, [1,, (5' // // / - ACKNOWLEDGMENT I wish to acknowledge my grateful thanks to my ad- viser, Professor Henry S. Leonard, for his critical but sympathetic supervision of this dissertation. Without his help and his constant extra-curricular encouragement this thesis would have been impossible. I am also in— debted to Professor Craig A. Staudenbaur for his many enlightening suggestions which helped me to understand and interpret the ethics of Richard Price. I am especi— ally grateful for Dr. Staudenbaur's insights which show Price to be a Neo-Platonist and a deontologist. Finally, I am indebted to my wife, Lorraine, for her help, patience, and understanding during the years spent upon this disser- tation. I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memories of two great professors in whose classes I was privileged to sit: my first teacher of PhilosOphy, the late Professor John M. Dehaan, and the late Professor C. I. Lewis who, as Visiting Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, complemented the excellent teaching of my other professors at Michigan State University. ii ated ABBREVIATIONS References to the following works have been abbrevi- as follows: ACKCPR for A Commentary_to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason —by N. K. Smith; CKCPR for A Commentary_on Kant's Critique of Practi- cal Reason by Louis “White Beck; DHC for "Discourse on Homage Due to Country" by Richard Price; DLC for "Discourse on the Love of Country" by Richard Price; DVMM for the Doctrine of Virtue by Mary J. Gregor; EHC for Ethics and The Human Community by M. Rader; ELSR for The Early Life 2: Samuel Rogers by P. w. Clayden; FD for Four Dissertations by Richard Price; IE for Introduction to Ethics by T. S. Jouffroy; KEC for Kant and His English Critics by J. L. Watson; KPCE for Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics by Paul A. Schilpp; KS for Kant Selections, ed. by Theodore Meyer Green; KTE for Kant's Theory g£_Ethics trans. by T. K. Abbott; KTK for Kant's Theory_2£ Knowledge by G. Bird; LE for Lgctures 2§_Ethics trans. by Louis Infield; MHSP for Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings; MPRP for The Moral Philosophy_g£ Richard Price by Lennart Aqvist; OAR for Observations 23_the American Revolution by Richard Price; ORP for Observations 22,Reversiona£y_Payments by Richard Price; PK for The Philosophy_2£_Kant by J. L. Watson; PM for The Principles 2: Morals by J. M. Wilson and T. Fowler; PSR for The Poems 2: Samuel Rogers, with g Memoir by Samuel Rogers; R for the Review by Richard Price; TBF for the Torchbearer of Freedom by Carl Cone; TE for Theory of Ethics by T. K. Abbott. iii COM HNTS Chapter I. NTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . II. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THE REV. RICMARD PRICE, D. D. , LL. D. . . . . . . . . . III. PRICE'S EPISTL MOLOGICAL Tim ORY . . . . IV. EPISTEMOLOGY APPLIED TO MORALS . . . V. AN OUTLINE OF THE ETHICAL THEORY OF RICHARD PRICE . . . . . . . . . . . VI. PRICE AND IMRANUEL KANT . . . . . . . VII. CO} ICLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv Page CHAPTER I NTRODUCTION There is considerable difference of Opinion as to the importance of Richard Price (1723—1791) in the history of philOSOphy. F. C. Sharp claims, for example, that "in clarity and in cogency of defence Price surpasses Kant."1 Jouffroy notes "the intrinsic excellence of Price's expo- sition. . . ."2 and claims that Price . . . proceeds like a master with clear and penetrating View, he grasps at once the essential difficulty and comes directly to the question which must be clearly stated before it can be solved. John M. Wilson and Thomas Fowler claim that Price clearly anticipated Kantian ethics.4 Price's recent bioarapher, a historian, Professor Carl Cone, considers Price in most glowing terms and ". . . Kant's ethics . . . a develOpment of Price's. . . ." (TBF 25) even though ". . . there is no direct evidence of his ever acknowledging an obligation to the Englishman." (TBF 25) John Laird holds Price to be a l"Hume' '8 Ethical Theory and Its Critics," Mind, vol. 50 (1921), p. 163. 2Introduction to Ethics, Boston and Cambridge: James Munroe and 00., 1858, p. 252. 31b1d. 4The Principles of Morals, Wilson, J. M. and Fo~ler, T., Oxford. The Clarendon Press (1886), p. 65. 2 British moralist of the first rank.5 Hastings Rashdall agrees completely with Cone's and Laird's assessments of Price.6 D. D. Raphael, Price's editor in 1948, joins the thinkers who speak of Price's valuable thinking and who hold the view that Price was the doctrinal forerunner of Kant and of contemporary ethical intuitionism. (Rx) William K; Frankena told me in a private conversation that modern ethical intuitionism contributed little that was not already conceived by Price over 150 years earlier. In a doctoral dissertation written on Price in 1951, at Harvard, William Bernard Peach calls Pricean ethics the "culmination of eighteenth century rationalism."7 Broad's article, "Some Reflections on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics," asserts, Until Ross published his book, The R ht and the Good in 1950 there existed, as far as know, no statement and defence of what may be called the "rationalistic" type of ethical theory comparable in.merit to Price's. Price was thoroughly acquainted with the works of other great English philosophers and moralists, such as Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Butler, and he develops his own views in conscious opposition to those. . . .8 5The Idea 9; Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1929}, p. 183. 6Rashdall claims that Price's Review is ". . . the best book published in Ethics till quite recent times. It contains the gist of Kantian doctrine without Kant's con- fusion.” See Theo of Good agg_Evil, I, London: Oxford University Press 19457. PP. 80-81. 7The Ethics 9; Richard Price, p. 100. 8Readiggs in Ethical Theor , New YOrk: The Humanities Press, Inc., 1951, p. 562. 3 Carritt also acknomledges his indebtedness to Price in Ethical and: olitical Thinking in 1947. The most recent writer to acknowledge his gratitude to Price is Lennart qvist who wrote The Moral Philosoghy of Richard Price, a book published at Uppsala, Sweden, in 1960. Aqvist deals with the relationship of Price to his predecessors and gives a semantic analysis of certain terms. Aqvist does not offer, however, a general exposition of Price's theory. On the other hand, Price has had his unappreciative critics. Mackintosh holds that Price's Review "is an attempt to revive the intellectual theory of moral obliga- fl tion, which seems to have fallen under the attacks OI "9 Butler, Hutcheson, and Hume, . . . Iw y “.1 artineau avers that Price merely restates the views of Cudworth and Clark and 10 . . . The historian, Leslie contributes nothing original. Stephen, expresses the opinion that Price is an indistinct writer and that his Review does not merit the effort it takes to read it.11 In this case, as in the case of Carl Cone, the critic was an historian——not a philosopher. Among the critics who praise Price, we have noticed Jouffroy, Wilson and Fowler, Sharp, Cone, Laird, Rashdall, Frankena, Peach, Broad, Raphael and Aqvist. Of hese critics who commend Price, all are twentieth century 9Progress 9: Ethical Philosophy, Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard, 1845, p. 170. logypgg of Ethical Theory, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 11901, p. 476. 11History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Cen- tury, 2 Vols., New York: Peter Smith, 1878, II, p. 3— 4 writers except Jouffroy, Wilson and Fowler. These thinkers belong to the nineteenth century. On the other hand, those critics who disparage Price include Mackintosh, Martineau, and Leslie Stephen. Mac— kintosh, and Martineau were nineteenth century philosophers whereas Stephen (1832-1904), was a nineteenth century his- torian. It is readily apparent that Price is more highly regarded as a thinker by recent ethical theorists than by nineteenth-century critics. Just why this is so is a matter for speculation. It is possible, however, that many of the nineteenth century thinkers were so oriented toward what Fowler calls "a posteriori ethics," that they had little interest in reading Price seriously enough to become sympathetic toward his efforts. In the twentieth century, on the other hand, there has been a resurgence of intuitionism which cannot be ignored. The modern interest in intuitionism has been sufficient to arouse an interest in Price since many philoSOphers and historians regard certain features of his ethical system as similar to sig- nificant characteristics of modern intuitionism. This present writer finds himself markedly drawn to- ward agreement with those who praise Price rather than toward those who disparage him. Price makes, in this writer's opinion, signal contributions to ethical theory and, moreover, he does so in a style and manner that, in certain respects, strike this writer as among the clear- est he has encountered. This is not to say, however, that 5 Price is clear at every point even though his ultimate views and arguments were clear to himself and become clear to one who takes the time to study Price. Furthermore, it might be added that one does not necessarily have to agree with Price's position, as an intuitionist, to realize that interestingly enough he develops views which are similar to Kent's, even though he wrote prior to Kant, and influ- enced Ross in Ross's doctrine of 253mg fagig duties. Price's editor, Raphael, comments concerning Price's simi- larity to Kent and Ross: ". . . his account of the objec- tive content of the moral consciousness, which is so like Kant and even more like the system of Sir David Ross, is, I think, original." (R x) Nevertheless, the purpose of this dissertation is not to reassess Price's place in the history of philOSOphy. Nor is it our purpose to evaluate the superiority of one philos0phical system in the light of others. This study has three purposes. First, it will present an encyclo- pedic summary of the life and works of Richard Price—-a summary which is based on historical documents as well as on facts derived from certain biographers. Second—~and this is the major purpose—-the dissertation will present an exposition of Price's principal epistemological and ethical doctrines as contained in his only ethical work, the Review. It will be seen that certain aspects of his doctrine of what can be known a priori in physics are out— moded in light of modern scientific advances. Finally, a 6 brief comparison and/or contrast of the ethical theories of Richard Price and Immanuel Kant will be undertaken. The interest motivating such a comparison of Kant and Richard Price is that Kant's views, similar to views ex- pressed by Price much earlier in the eighteenth century, achieved universal recognition in philOSOphical circles throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Even today reactions for and against Kant are still occurring. In order to prepare the reader for that which ensues, we shall offer at this point a preliminary statement of Price's ethical theory. Price puts his epistemology first, because he thought that the ideas of right and wrong had to be viewed as ideas of the understanding; and as long as the empirical tradition-—Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Hutcheson--remained unchallenged, this status would be unintelligible. Price believed that he must attack that general epistemological position first; then claim that among other simple ideas deriving from.the understanding are to be listed the ideas of right and wrong. Price feels that the burden of the arguments against rationalism is that the process of dedgg- Eigg cannot supply us with any new ideas. Price agrees but contends that it is the intuition, not deduction,j’ which is the direct source of these new ideas. It is the understanding, Price argues, which gives us our ideas of number, prOportion, and also "identity and diversity, con- nexion, cause and effect, power, possibility and 7 and impossibility; and let me add, . . . of our ideas of right and wrong." (R 37) But before we give a more detailed exposition of Price's ethical and epistemological views, let us turn to a consideration of the life and works of this relatively little known and too long neglected thinker in the history of philOSOphy. CHAPTER II THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THE REV. RICHARD PRICE, D.D., IL.D. Those who best knew him called Richard Price "good." To the cynic the word is soporific, but the cynic has no appreciation for Price's kind anyway. He was a good man in ideas, purpose, and conduct. (TBF 1) Few of his enemies . . . could find it possible to accuse him of having interested views. They had to concede the purity and sincerity of his beliefs. These qualities of Price's character impressed them- selves upon his contemporaries. Even the orange women in the market stalls cried, as they saw his familiar form approaching on the white horse, "Make way! Make way for the good Dr. Price!" (TBF 3) Such is Carl Cone's estimate of the "good" Dr. Price. Richard Price's sole philos0phical work, the Review 9: the Principal Questions Q: Morals, clearly anticipates the modern school of thought known as ethical intuitionism. Editor D. Daiches Raphael's preface to Price's Review opens with the following statement: Richard Price was born in 1723 at Tynton, Glamorgan— shire, and died in 1791 at Hackney. A book of Memoirs of his life was written by his nephew, William Morgan, in 1815, and there is a good modern biography b Roland Thomas (Richard Price, Clarendon Press, 1924 . (R ix) The latter book is the biography of Price's life as a preacher. As an Arian Dissenter, Price pastored churches in London, Stoke-Newington, and Hackney for almost fifty years. His theological View was that although Jesus Christ died for the sins of all men who would believe in him, he was not of the same substance as God the Father. Furthermore, although Jesus Christ was deity, and hence 8 9 should be worshipped, he was not co-equal with the in- finite God. Thus his View, although Unitarian, should be differentiated from the Unitarian view that holds that Jesus was merely a great humanitarian whose ethical pre— cepts should be followed. In addition to being a minister, Price was a mathe- matician, a statistician, an insurance expert, an econo- mist, a tax expert, a political theorist and an ethical philos0pher. He is regarded as the founder of modern life insurance. His Observations 9g Reversionary Payments and his tables of mortality based on Northampton registers provided the first sound statistical basis for payments by life insurance societies of annuities and other rever— sionary payments. For a more thorough understanding of Richard Price, let us examine his background somewhat more in detail. The Torchbearer 9; Freedom, by Carl Cone, is my main bio— graphical source. Rees Price was a dissenting minister living in Brid— gend near Cardiff in Wales. After the death of his first wife, he married Catherine Richards, a woman twenty years younger than himself and the daughter of a Bridgend physi- cian. She and Rees Price had two daughters, Sarah and Elizabeth. Ridhard was their only son, born on February 23, 1723. As a child, RiChard was accustomed to daily family devotions that included scriptural readings, prayers, and 10 the Singing of psalms. Richard's first teacher was a family governess. 'Later, he studied under the tutorship of a neighbor named Peters, who eventually entered the ministry. Afterward, Richard entered a school in Bridgend, where he studied briefly under a tyrannical schoolmaster. Next, he attended school at Neath under the Rev. Joseph Simmons. Two years ' later, he withdrew from that school and entered the academy of Samuel Jones in Pentwyn in the shire of Carmartnen. This man Jones was an Arian minister. Under his teaching, Price accepted the views of this heterodox theolOgical position. When Price's father learned of his son's heresy, he withdrew him from Pentwyn and sent him, in 1738, to an approved dissenting school, Talgarth Academy, in Brecon— shire. Here, at the age of 15, Richard Price studied logic and metaphysics, the classical languages, theology, pneuma- tolOgy, Jewish and.Christian antiquities, ethics, Scrip- ture, and mathematics. Here was a curriculum similar to those available at Oxford and Cambridge, universities which did not admit Dissenters. Rees Price died on June 28, 1739 and willed his son Richard 400 pounds. Richard promptly gave the entire sum to his mother so that she could care for herself and his two sisters. Richard continued his education at Talgarth, where his annual expense for tuition, room and board came lonly to five pounds. On June 4, 1740, Richard's mother died. Shortly thereafter, Price decided to enter the 11 ministry. At the age of 17, Richard left Talgarth Academy and went to London. His uncle Samuel helped him to find a room, over a barber shop, and gave him money for his meager needs. Richard entered Coward's Academy in London, a school supported entirely by a trust fund of 150,000 pounds left by the late William Coward, a Dissenter who had died in 1738. Isaac Watts was a member of the Board of the Coward Trust. He befriended Price and helped him gain admission to the school, which was located in Tenter- alley, Moorfields, at London. Later, it was moved to Hox- ton, where it remained until it closed in 1785. Price studied at Coward's Academy from 1740-1744. Richard studied under John Eames, a man whom Isaac Watts called "the most learned man I ever knew." He had taught for over thirty years when he and Price met each other. Although he taught every subject in the curriculum, Eames's specialities were mathematics and science. Eames had become a member of the Royal Society through the in— fluence of Isaac Newton. Once, Price received a gift of ten pounds from a friend of the academy for his mathematical proficiency, a gift which he sent immediately to his two sisters. When Eames became ill, in 1741, Price studied under James Densham. Under Densham, he became proficient in logic, geography, trigonometry, algebra, physics, conic sections, statistics and economics all in one winter. 12 At the academy Price studied Hebrew, several branches of philosophy, theology, oriental religion, economics, mathe— matics, anatomy, statistics, pastoral care, and elocution. Price's formal education was therefore thorough in spite of the harsh laws which made it impossible for a Dissenter to enter Oxford or Cambridge. The Toleration Act of 1689 discriminated against Roman Catholics, Unitarians, and Dissenters, but in spite of this discrimination, the Dis- senter had it much better in Price's day than in those of his grandfather and his own father. Upon his graduation from Coward's Academy in 1744, Price was ready to enter the ministry. He was ordained ~as a minister at the age of 21. Price became a family chaplain in the home of Streatfield, a rich Dissenter who lived in Stoke Newington, a suburban area four miles north of London. Price became a friend of the family of Sir Thomas Abney, one of the founders of the Bank of England and the Lord Mayor of London in 1700, and his elderly un- married daughter, Lady Elizabeth. Price also made friends of the Rogers family, who attended his services. With Streatfield's permission, Price preached before several congregations. Price was able to assist the Rector at the Presby— terian chapel of Dr. Samuel Chandler, the Old Jewry Chapel. Ridhard's uncle, Samuel Price, was a friend of Chandler's and influenced him to accept Richard. Dr. Chandler was a Bible scholar and a powerful, forceful preacher. He was 13 a liberal Calvinist who tolerated Price's Arianism. Al— though the two men agreed on politics, and had little difference on religion, they did not get along well with each other. It was claimed that Dr. Chandler resented the pOpularity which Price gained with the congregation. Chandler criticized Price's "Methodist fervency" in the pulpit. Price tried so intensely to correct his manner— isms that he fell into the Opposite fault of restraint. Since the congregation disliked Price's new manner of preaching, Chandler fired him. Apparently Price never bore any ill will toward Dr. Chandler. Price himself realized his lack of grace and fluency in the pulpit. His raspy voice magnified his other faults as a speaker. Yet, later in life, he became a highly successful preacher because of the excellent subject matter of his sermons, his sincerity, humility, and his earnestness of demeanor. Also his audiences were much larger because of his later fame as a writer. Price read methodically and widely during his chap- lain apprenticeship and took excellent notes on his read— ing. His thoroughness in taking notes was shown by the accuracy of his writings, which were very well documented. In 1756, Price's uncle, Samuel Price, and Streatfield both died. Each man remembered Price in his will. Rich— ard inherited Streatfield's money and his Uncle Samuel's house in Leadenhall Street. Price used his money for his bare necessities, giving extensively to charity. He also l4 helped finance Joseph Priestly's scientific experiments. Priestly, a fellow Dissenter, and Richard Price became life-long friends. _In 1756, Price also met Sarah Blundell. They fell in love immediately and were married on June 16, 1757, in the Anglican Church, as required by the Hardwicke Marriage Act of 1753, a law which forbade marriage outside the Anglican rites. Sarah herself had inherited several thousand pounds and her father's house in Cheapside. Price and his bride resided on a noisy street in Hackney, two miles northeast of London. Sarah remained an Anglican even though Richard was a Dissenting minister. In 1758, the Prices moved to Stoke Newington, where they lived for the next thirty years. He pastored the Chapel on the Green as morning and afternoon preacher. In December 1762, he accepted the additional responsibility of evening preacher to the Presbyterian congregation in Poor Jewry Lane and gave up the afternoon service at Stoke Newington. The Poor Jewry congregation was splitting up because of internal strife. A short time later, Price re— jected an offer from a large Presbyterian congregation at Lewin's Mead, Bristol. His rejection was based on his wife's desire to live nearer to London and its more in~ tellectually stimulating atmosphere. As already mentioned, Price was not an entirely successful preacher during his early years in the ministry. His thought was excellent but he was not a good speaker and 15 he lacked warmth. His appearance also detracted from his effectiveness. He was short, thinly built, had a deter— mined chin, a long large nose, and heavy, black eyebrows. His hair became gray in his thirties. He could not re- store unity to the splitting congregation at the Poor Jewry Chapel and his congregation at Newington was very small. In spite of these discouraging circumstances and thought of giving up, Price remained in the ministry be- cause of his personal assessment of its importance. In 1770 Price accepted the post of morning preacher at the Gravel-Pit Meeting House in Hackney, a position of considerable prestige. Also it was more attractive to Price since it had a larger and more harmonious congrega— tion than did his prior appointments. Price resigned at Poor Jewry Lane and shifted the Stoke Newington service from morning to evening. His new appointment marked Price as a prominent and leading dissenting minister. By the time of the American Revolution, his churches were always filled and overflowing. Often so many people came that they could not find standing room. One of the young members of Price‘s congregation was a child named Samuel Rogers. In his book, The Poems 2; Samuel ngers, Rogers writes concerning his childhood in— spiration. It was an inspiration evoked by Joseph Priest- ley and Richard Price: Guides of my life! Instructors of my youth! Who first unveil'd the hallow'd form of Truth; Whose every word enlighten'd and endear'd, In age beloved, in poverty revered; (PSR 295-96) 16 They in their glorious course the guides of Youth, ‘7 whose language breathed the eloquence of Truth; Whose life, beyond perceptive wisdom, taught, The great in conduct, and the pure in thought. (PSR 317) Samuel Rogers a so called Richard Price "one of the gentlest and purest Spirits the eighteenth century pro— duced." (ELSR 119) Although his ministerial duties were of primary im— portance to him, Price nevertheless enjoyed throughout his adult life a considerable amount of leisure, which he could devote to study and to writing. In the early years of his ministerial apprenticeship, he made careful and methodical studies of Plato, Aristotle, Butler, Locke, Berkeley u 9 Hume, Hutcheson, Reid, Descartes, Cudworth, Malebranche, Clarke, and Balguy. Price was a slow, methodical worker, reading carefully rather than widely and superficially. He took elaborate notes upon his readings and pondered over them afterwards. In 1758 the first edition of his only work in ethics, the Review 9: the Principal Questions 9: Morals, appeared. Subsequent editions were published in 1769, 1787, and 1948. Much more will be said about this book in Chapters III, IV, and V. In 1759 Price published a pamphlet, Britain's Hapmi— Eggg. His Four Dissertations was published in 1767 with later editions in 1768, 1772, 1777 and 1811. That some of his works were published several times indicates the popu- larity of these writings. In addition to these writings 17 just mentioned, the diversity of Price's interests is in~ dicated by the following titles: Observations 93 Reversion— ary Payments, published in 1771, 1772, 1773, 1783, 1792, 1803, 1812; Appeal 39 the Public 2g the National Debt, 1772; Observations 9g the Nature 9: Civil Liberty, 1776; Additional Observations 9n Civil Liberty, 1777; Observa— piggglgg the Importance gf_the American Revglgtion, 1777, 1784; Free Discussion pf Materialism, 1778; g Sermon, 1779; Essay 93 Population, 1779; Facts: Addressed £9 Landholders, etc., 1780; State 9f Public Debts, 1783; Sermons 9g Chris— tian Doctrine, 1786, 1788, 1794, 1815; Evidence for Im— provement, 1787; and Discourse pg the Love 9: Our Countpy, 1789. Throughout Price's diversity of interests, as indi- cated by these writings, there is an implicit assumption that man has a right to liberty in the realm of morals, politics, religion, etc., a right that emanates from God himself. In his writings Price gives advice on how best to secure and maintain this "God—given freedom" in every area. In his Review, Price was especially interested in combating the devastating, skeptical conclusions drawn by David Hume in his Inquiry into the Principles 9: Morals (1751). Price asserts: I do not care at all what follows from Mr. Hume's assertion that all our ideas are either impressions, or copies of impressions, . . . [this assertion] is, I think destitute of all proof; supposes when applied . . . the point in question. . . . (R 42-43) 18 Nevertheless Price, is did Kant at a later time, acknowl- edges his debt to Hume: . . . I cannot help adding . . . that I owe much to the philosophical writings of Mr. Hume which I studied early in life. Though an enemy to his skep- ticism, I have profited by it. By attacking with great ability, every principle of truth and reason, he put me upon examining the ground upon which I stood, and taught me not hastily to take anything for granted. (R 14) It is interesting to note that after Hume read Price's Review, he asked the publisher Cadell to invite to dinner as many as possible of his literary Opponents, including Price. The two men became inseparable friends and visited one another frequently in order to continue their philosOphical discussions. Carl Cone comments that . . . Hume appreciated Price's efforts to blast his skepticism, for as a logician he simply had to proceed from his premises to his conclusions, and he was not at all happy over the spectacular and appalling effects of his skepticism upon both philosophy and religion. Then too, he welcomed Price's gentlemanly tone and conduct. (TBF 27) Another interesting feature of Price's writings is his treatment of religion. In 1767, the first edition of his Four Dissertations was published by Cadell. These four were "On Providence"; "On Prayer"; "On the Reasons for Expecting That Virtuous Men Shall Meet after Death in a State of Happiness"; "On the Importance of Christianity, the Nature of Historical Evidence, and Miracles." 19 In "On Providence," Price attacked the Deistic View that God created the universe and stepped aside to let it go on without his intervention. Price held that The course of nature is nothing but his power, exert- ing itself everywhere according to fixt rules, in order)to answer the best ends. (Four Dissertations, 173-4 Price held that man is finite and therefore is "in the dark" concerning the purposes of Providence. (FD 160) Price believed in and practiced prayer. Price held that prayer is a solemn address to God, the Governor of the world. He believed that in prayer we should express our gratitude, confess our sins, and request happiness for ourselves and others. We must pray regularly, Price main— tained, in a "plain, serious, and simple" manner. (FD 504) Finally, Price held that virtuous men would recOgnize their friends in Heaven. Thus we must live virtuously and establish friendships with good men. The whole matter of faith in a future life, itself, was miraculous. Thus Price believed that Hume's presupposition upon which he had discredited the nature of the evidence for believing in miracles should not be accepted. He held that Hume's presuppositions were themselves nothing but commitments of faith in a direction opposite to that of Price's. Price agrees with anyone who would argue that miracles contradict the usual expectation of events. It is true for Price, however, that while miracles were im- probable and could not be predicted, these events were 20 not impossible. Even though Hume's comrituent of faith was to a contrary prOposition, as Price argues, Price holds that it was equally tenable to place one's faith in the divine origin of the Bible and in the omnipotence of God. The "uniformity of nature" was an assumption without certain proof. Rather this principle of uniformity was only an assumption, based merely on a high degree of prob— ability, according to Price. Any degree of probability, however great, could admit exceptions, Price contends. In the first edition of the Four Dissertations Price attacked Hume's arguments as "poor SOphistry." He apolo- gized to Hume who read his book and promised to delete it from later editions. Hume received a COpy of the second edition, published in 1768, and in a letter to Price he expressed "wonder at such scrupulosity in one of N . Price's profession," according to William Morgan's Memoirs. Besides gaining for him the admiration of David Hume, the book also gained Price the honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity from Marischal College, Aberdeen, on August 7, 1767. On April 24, 1781, Dr. Price, D.D., joined George Washington as both men received the honorary LL.D. degrees from Yale University. On January 30, 1782, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston extended membership to Price. Price was elected a member of the American PhiIOSOphical Society of Philadelphia on January 28, 1785. In 1786 Harvard's President, President Joseph Willard 21 mailed Price a catalOg of Harvard graduates in gratitude for the gift of Price's book, Observations on the America Revolution, to Harvard in 1784. In 1785, President John Nheelock of Dartmouth College also conveyed his gratitude to Price concerning Price's similar gift of a c0py of this same book to Dartmouth. No account of Price's life would be complete without some mention of his political views. Price believed that civil law should express the will of the supreme authority in the nation. The supreme authority, Price maintained, is the people which includes every individual. Thus obedience to law meant obedience to one's own will. Since it was self—determined, this would be a moral act. Fur— hermore, if law should express the will of the sovereign peOple, and if the good citizen always strove for freedom, then it would be immoral to fail to resist tyranny. Dis- obedience to law was wrong only when the law represented the will of the peOple. Obviously there are many diffi— culties to this revolutionary doctrine. Is it not pos- sible that even in a given community the majority of the peOple might tyrannize over the minority in the expression of laws? Price considers neither the majority nor the minority. Needless to say, however, his views were re— ceived favorably both in France and in the United States by the apologists for the revolutions. 22 His Observations on the American Revolution strongly Support the cause of American liberty in the Revolutionary War. Speaking of complete liberty Price says: The Author of nature has planted in the human mind principles and feelings which will Operate in oppo— sition to any theories that may seem to contradict them. . . . Overt acts of injustice, violence or defamation, come properly under the cognizance Of civil powers. (OAR 30) In a letter to Benjamin Rush dated June 26, 1783, Price says, . . . From a regard to the general rights of mankind and a conviction that all dominion of one country Over another is usurpation and tyranny, I have always defended, as far as I have been able, the cause of America and opposed the late wicked war; and in doing this, I have gone thro' much abuse and some danger in this country. The struggle has been glorious on the part of America. . . . I think it one of the most important revolutions that has ever taken place in the world. It makes a new Opening in human affairs which may prove an introduction to times of more light and liberty and virtue than have been yet known. This must be the consequence, if the United States can avoid the infection of European vices, and establish forms Of government and a plan of poli— tical union that shall be perfectly favourable to a universal liberty, and prevent future wars among themselves. Should this happen, they will without doubt be the refuge of mankind, and a great part of the world will endeavour to participate in their happiness. I wish I was capable of advising and assisting them. Were I to attempt this what I should recommend, with particular earnestness, would be, a total separation of religion from state policy, and allowing an open field for improvement by a free dis— cussion of all speculative points, and an equal pro- tection, not only of all Christians, but of all honest men of all Opinions and religions. I see, with the greatest pleasure, that the new forms Of government are in this respect liable to but few Objections. (TBF 107—108) In a letter to Benjamin Franklin dated April 6, 1784, Price expressed similar sentiments to those contained in 23 his other letters. Indeed I look upon the revolution there as one of the most important events in the history of the world. . . . (TBF 158) In November 1785, when George Washington read a copy of Price's Observations gp_the American Revolution, he asked Benjamin Vaughan to extend his gratitude to Richard Price. The statement said, G. Washington presents his most respectful compliments to Dr. Price. With much thankfulness he has received, and with the highest gratification he has read, the doctor's excellent observations on the importance of the American Revolution, and the means of making it a benefit to the world. lost devoutly is it to be wished that reasoning so sound should take deep root in the minds of the revolutionists. . . . For the honorable notice of me in your address, I pray you to receive my warmest acknowledgments, and the assur— ances of the sincere esteem and respect which I enter- tain for you. (TBF 164) Price believed that in order to preserve liberty, we must have men of virtue in governmental positions. These men must not allow national corruption to corrupt them. They must be bent on the goal of preserving freedom of eX— pression. In addition to virtue they must have knowledge. Virtue without knowledge makes enthusiasts; and knowl— edge without virtue makes devils; but both united ele- vates to the top of human dignity and perfection. We must, therefore, if we would serve our country, make both these the objects of our zeal. (DLC l7) Ignorance is the parent of bigotry, intolerance, ger— secution and slavery. Inform and instruct mankind and these evils will be excluded. Remove the dark- ness in which they envelope the world, and their usurpation will be exposed, .heir power will be sub— verted, and the world emancipated. (DLC 24) If we see our country threatened with calamity, let us warn it. If we see our countrymen proud and in— sensible to the rights of mankind, let us adionish 24 them. If the demon of corruption is poisoning the springs of legislation, and converting the securities of public liberty into instruments of slavery, let us point out to them the shocking mischief; and endeav- ‘ our to recover them to a sense of their danger . . . and if no one would neglect the little in his power, much might be done. (DEC 3) It might be said that Price's advice might be applied as effectively today as it could have been then. It has already been remarked that Price wps more than just a preacher, philOSOpher, and political theorist. Of great interest is his contribution to mathematics and life insurance. Mathematics had fascinated Price ever since his studies under John Eames. Price's friend, the Reverend Thomas Bayes, died in April, 1761. Bayes had devoted himself to a particular problem in the doctrine Of chances. Price completed the work and sent the finished product, the problem and its solution, to the council of the Royal Society on November 10, 1763. In December the paper was read before the society and published in the Philosophical Transactions. It was entitled "An Essay toward Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances." Price's problem was as follows: Given the number of times in which an unknown event has happened and failed [to happen]: Recuired the chance that the probability of its happening in a single trial lies somewhere between any two [speci— fied] degrees of probability that can be named. (TBF 38) Price held that the solution gave only certain broa limits between which the probability lay and not the exact probability. It was impossible to find the exact PO U1 probability. In 1764 Price submitted "A Demonstration of the Sec— ond Rule in the Essay towards the Solution of a Problem in the Doctrine of Cnances," published in the Philosophi— cal Transactions, Vol. LIII. This paper was an improvement over his first paper in that he attempted to narrow the limits of probability. As a result of this second paper, Price was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society on Decem- ber S, 1765. This was all he more a mark of distinction for Price since he was a Dissenter and the Royal Society seldom admitted anyone who was not an Anglican. Most of Price's mathematical interests lay in the doctrine of probability as applied to life expectancy. His advice was sought by a group of men who were inter— ested in the mathematical approach to life insurance. Thus he became involved with annuities, mortality tables, pOpulation, public finance and statistics. Prior to Price there was no exact knowledge of the rates of mortality and life expectancy in England. Price's Observatigns 9n Reversionary Payments was published in 1771. Price had reviewed the literature available concern— ing insurance problems. His foremost authority upon this topic was Edmund Halley, the famous mathematician and astronomer who, in 1693, devised a table of mortality based upon statistics of births and funerals in Breslau from 1687 to 1691. His treatment of the subject was quite inadequate but showed an acquaintance with the major 26 aspects of the problem, according to Price. That the facts must be known about the life expectancies of all age groups was the most important issue involved. Before Price's book, Observations on Reverslgnary Payments, was published, Price had written apaper, "Observations on the PrOper Method of Calculation of the Values of Reversions depending on Survivorships," which was published in the Philosophical Transactions in 1770. In his book, Price discusses the elimination of the national debt and his solution to the problem of the national debt, the "Sinking Fund," as well as the topics of annuities and reversionary payments. In the conclusion to his Observations 9g,§§z§;- agonary Payments, Price expresses his hope that in.the future more accurate records of vital statistics would be kept. These more accurate records would . . . give the precise law according to which human life wastes in its different stages; and thus supply the necessary data for computing accurately the values of all life-annuities and reversions. (ORP 211) It should be pointed out that Price's contribution to the statistical side of life insurance was considerable and that his conclusion shows that he believed that if he had access to better statistical records, his method would have worked accurately. And indeed it would. Consider Price's Table for Northampton Life Expect- ancy and mortality. Price calculated the life expectancy of a person born in Northampton as 28.83 years. In order to allow for migration the corrected figure was 26.41 27 years. His Northampton Table was used by the Equitable Insurance Company of the nineteenth century and the Bri- tish government in its issuance of annuities in 1789. It was the case that Price's table overestimated the death rate during the younger ages and underestimated the death rate during the older ages. Price did not consider the large number of unregistered births and had no accurate figures on migration. Since Price's knowledge of’these statistics was severely limited, it does not seem just to blame him for underestimating the average life expectancy. At the time his table was compiled, the life expectancy was most likely closer to thirty years than to 26.41. Equitable Life Insurance Company blamed Price for over- charging the English peOple over 2,000,000 pounds in eleven years! In fairness to Price, however, it must be said that his table was a vast improvement over previous tables. It is possible that the English people might have paid far more money unnecessarily had it not been for Price. His mistakes were due to a lack of adequate data and not to his procedures. It is interesting to note that Price drew moral con- clusions from his work in computing life expectancy. Price says that the worst scourges of mankind were . . the off-spring of tenderness, the luxury, and the corruptions introduced by the vices and false refinements of civil society. . . . Let us then value more the simplicity and innocence of a life agreeable to nature; and learn to consider nothing as savageness but malevolence, ignorance, and wickedness. (ORP 280-81) 28 Price's own surveys of rural sections such as Holy Cross near Shrewsbury (a country parish in Brandenbury) and Pais de Vaud, as compared to urban areas such as London, Berlin, and Vienna, Showed life expectancy to be greater in the rural areas. His conclusion was that man has freedom to choose in which area he would live and he says, therefore, Let us then, instead of charging our Maker with our miseries, learn more to accuse and reproach our- selves. (ORP 366) Price's concept of the ideal society was a nation of small prOperty holders and yeomen farmers, a concept simi- lar to that held by his friend, Thomas Jefferson. PeOple in the country were healthier than peOple who lived in cities for two reasons: they did not have the foulness of the city air, and the luxuriousness and irregularity of town life. In.addition to stimuLation of subsequent work in the statistics of life insurance, Price's work became well- known in his own life time, with many beneficial results. Several annuity societies were dissolved because their officers discovered the inadequacy of their own plans. Many societies were reorganized and thus many investors were saved from financial losses, disappointments and hardships. In addition to attracting interest in England, Price's Observations pg Reversionary Payments also attracted considerable interest in America. John Win— thrOp, a mathematics professor at Harvard, spoke of it and of its author in flattering terms. President Joseph 29 Willard, of Harvard, asked Price about the mortality rate among clergyman and professors. Price confirmed Willard's hypothesis that clergyman and teachers have a higher life expectancy than the average. He also showed that the life expectancy of the average woman is higher than that of the average man but that male births outnumber female births about 14-13. Also of some interest to the student of American History is the fact that a Continental Congres- sional subcommittee, composed of Hamilton, Madison, and John Rutledge, used Price as their authority on the commu- tation of half pay for military officers who retired. The issue was whether it was advisable to retire them with half pay for life or with full pay for six years. Even- tually the United States ad0pted a policy of retiring its military officers with half pay for life. The records in- dicate that these Americans assumed their hearers to be thoroughly familiar with Price and that everyone respected his authority . Price insisted that although unsound insurance schemes were a great evil, they were mere "bubbles" in comparison to the national debt. (ORP xx) This was the "Grand National Evil." This evil was "mortgaging poster- ity and funding for eternity.” (ORP xx) His solution to the National Debt remained the all important "Sinking Fund." If the National Debt should remain, Price be- lieved that it would impoverish the nation, destroy the moral fiber of the people, endanger the constitutional 30 system, and eliminate the spirit of liberty. In some way this Sinking Fund was to utilize the powers of compound interest and a constant application of the annual surplus in addition to "the interest of all the sums redeemed by it, to the purpose of discharging the public debts." Both Chauncy and the Earl of Shelburne believed that Price had "clearly demonstrated how a nation that wanted to could avoid national bankruptcy.” (MHSP 1903, 266-67) In spite of having many friends on both sides of the Atlantic, Price also had his enemies,who were opposed to his support for the American and French Revolutions. Years after Price was dead, attacks were still being made upon him. In l797 the Anti-Jacobin published the follow- ing poem: Let our vot'ries then follow the glorious advice, In.the Gunpowder Legacy left us by Price, Inflammable matter to place grain by grain And blow up the State with the torch of Tom Paine. (TBF 197) John Wolcot, who published under the pen name of Peter Pindar, wrote, There, in respect to Kings not over-nice, That Revolution-sinner Doctor Price: Whose Labours, in a most unoourtly style, Win not, like gentle Burke's, the Royal smile. (TBF 197) Two months after Price's death, Horace Walpole wrote of the brutalities inflicted upon the royal family after the flight to Varennes as cruelties 31 . . . which nobody but the French and Dr. P ice could be so shameless as to enjoy. (T3? 98 Of course, in fairress to Price, it must be said that he did not know of the excesses of the French Revolution. Price was far from being ixsensitive to man's inhumanity to man. This fact was apparently overlooked by those critics who were writing under the heat of overwrought and inflamed emotions. Consider another famous critic, the Rev. John Wesley. He was considerably kinder to Richard Price when he said that "Dr. Price is a very sin— cere man but sincerely wrong," and a man who "wrote with an upright intention." (TBF 83) Wesley criticized Price for the latter's support of the American Revolution. Wesley believed that since the colonists had religious freedom to worship in the established churches, and as much representation as many others throughout England, which was none, they had no just complaint for which to revolt. Fortunately Price's concept of liberty went much farther than that envisaged by John Wesle k1 It must be said that the sentiments expressed by those in favor of Price by far outnumbered the others. This was especially true in France and in the United States. He was offered honorary citizenship in the United States, an offer which he rejected. In death as in life it is readily apparent that Price was a figure of considerable controversy. 32 In February, 1791, while conducting a funeral ser- vice at Bunhill—Fields, Price caught a cold. In spite of his cold he conducted another funeral and his cold became more acute. On Sunday, February 20, 1791, Price preached his last sermon. The following Wednesday he had a high fever. In spite of all that his physician could do to help, Price became increasingly ill. His friend Joseph Priestly and others lamented that Price had neglected his cold in favor of preaching. Priestly, on.March 11, re— joiced that Price was in no immediate danger. On March 25 there was hope that Price would recover. The London Chronicle for March 26-29 stated: Dr. Price lies dangerously ill at his house in Hack- ney. His complaint is a strangury. (TBF 199) Priestly was worried When in April there seemed less chance to recover. Horace Walpole wrote that Dr. Price is dying . . . fortunate omen . . . for those who hope to die in their beds too. (THE 199) On April 18, 1791, Price became much weaker and shortly after midnight he died, "praising God for his goodness." (TBF 200) Contrary to his expressed desires, Price's friends gave him a public funeral. Joseph Priest— ley was one of his gmfljtmmutxms ind a dissenter named Rev. Kippis preached at the cemetery. On May 1, 1791, Priestley delivered the funeral oration at the Gravel-Pit Meeting House. 33 Commenting on these sermons, Carl Cone says, Their eulogies, like those that came from various societies in France, seem extravagant, but they were not unmerited, despite the verdict of history. For, unless he has the rare qualities of 3. Franklin, and some good fortune, a person suCh as Price is hardly likely to catch public fancy and win a hero's laurels in a revolutionary age. (TBF 200) CHAPTER III PRICE'S EPISTEKOLOGICAL THEORY There is nothing in this Treatise, which I wish more I could engage the reader's attention to, or which, I think, will require it more, than the first Chapter, and particularly the second Section of it. If I have failed here, I have failed in my chief design. . . . The point which I have endeavoured to prove in the last section of the Chapter I have mentioned, must appear so plain to those who have not much studied the question about the foundation of Morals, or who have not before viewed it in the light in which I have placed it, that, I fear, it will be difficult for them not to think that I have trifled in bestow- ing so much pains upon it. And.indeed my Own conviction is so strong on this point, that . . . it should be rendered necessary to use many arguments to shew, that right and wrong, or moral good and evil, signify somewhat really true of actions, and not merely sensations. (R 3-4)1 This is Price's original estimate of the seventeen pages in his only work in philos0phy, his Review 9§_§hg Principal Questions in Morals, the first edition, which contains his epistemological theory. In order to deter— mine the origin of our ideas of right and wrong, Price first discusses the origin of ideas in general; he then applies that general theory to form an account of moral ideas in particular. In perhaps no other philosopher does the relationship of ethics and epistemology come out more clearly than in Richard Price's first edition of the Review. lThe Preface from which this is taken is omitted from the original Third Edition. (R 3) Reasons for its omis- sion are to be given later. (See pp. 53, 61.) 34 35 Price's epistemology insists that the senses are not the sole source of new ideas, but that reason, or intel- lect, or understanding, also contribute such ideas. Price begins his argument by specifically taking exception to John Locke. He argues in support of his position by criticizing the "commonly held Opinion" that "SENSATION AND REFLECTION have been commonly reckoned the sources of all our ideas: . . ." (R 17) Locke, who re- presents this view, was the object of Price's criticism because he was possibly the most prominent British pro- ponent of this position and also because Price admires Locke's "excellent flgggy." (R 17) Price maintains that Locke is not . . sufficiently clear or explicit on this subject. It is hard to determine exactly What he meant by sen- sation and reflection. (R 17) Price does not overlook Locke's explanation of sensa— tion and reflection. If by sensation . . . we understand, the effects arising from the impressions made on our minds by external objects; and by the latter, the notice the mind takes of its own Operations; it will be impossible to derive some of the most important of our ideas from them. (R 17- 18) At this point, by implication Price points to another source of ideas. Why should these two faculties be con- sidered the sole source? Price emphasizes the fact that he is concerned "here almost constantly" (R 18n) with simple ideas and their origination. He is not concerned with complex ideas which 36 may be the product of imagination operating upon simple ideas otherwise derived. In his-criticism of Locke, Price says that Locke might have meant by sensation and reflection either (a) that all simple ideas are "derived immediately from these two sources . . ." (R 18) or (b) that these two so-called sources "furnish us with all these subjects, materials and occasions of knowledge, comparison, and internal percep- tion." (R 18) Price gives the following arguments against these two possible interpretations. Price argues that the prOposition that all simple ideas are "derived immediately from these two sources," must be incorrect because some of the most important of our simple ideas cannot be thought of as arising in sensa— tion, nor even in reflection. Price holds that both re— flection and Sense presentE1particular forms to the mind; but can— not rise to any general ideas. It is the intellect that examines and compares the presented forms, that rises above individuals to universal and abstract ideas; . . ." (R 19) The proposition that these two so-called sources "furnish us with all these subjects, materials and occa- sions of knowledge, comparison and internal perception," (R 18) may at first glance and in some manner of speaking be true. Perhaps initially these two sources do provide ". . . us with all these subjects, materials and occasions of knowledge, comparison and internal perception." (R 18) Price avers, "This, however, by no means renders them in 37 any proper sense, the sources of all our ideas." (R 18) Although Price holds that the mind is possessed of another faculty, namely, the understanding, he notes that it is not apparent that Locke considers the mind to be possessed of any other faculty than sensation and reflection. Only by the faculty of the understanding do we discern truth, compare all the objects of thought, and judge of them. But even more important is the fact that the understanding "is a spring of new ideas." (R 18) Let us consider first that the understanding is a faculty distinct from those of sensation and reflection, and second that the understanding "is a spring of new ideas," (R 18) all of which are simple. At the outset, Price largely ignores any possibility that the faculty of the understanding might be identified with that of reflection or of imagination. He argues mainly that the understanding is distinct from the faculty of sensation. But his disregard le ideas, or original and uncompounded perceptions of the mind.’ But his list of physical notions strays far from this original intention." (R xvii) Price thinks that it is quite easy to discover the true origin of the ideas which he disc sses. (R 29) In— tuition is their source. It would be difficult to "try to deduce them from the common sources . . ." However, ". . . this is the very conclusion some have drawn." (R 29) Thes "common sources" (according to these mistahen writers), include sense, reflection and experience of con- stant conjunction. Since the senses fail to present us with any of these ideas, and since we not only have such ideas, but find that these ideas involve necessity, their origin must lie in some faculty other than the senses. Price joins th Cambridge Platonists, Ralph Cudworth and Henry More, in holding that these concepts of cause and effect and these other ideas, space and duration, etc., are presupposed in the mind's judgment of sense perception and not derived from them. We have noticed that Price opened his consideration of epistemology by taking exception to the position of Locke. He holds that it is absolutely necessary to estab— lish his view that the understanding contributes new ideas, which include moral ideas. Price's attack is first di- rected aaainst the empiricist contention that general V 49 ideas are constructed from particulars by comparing, con— neoting, and generalizing. Following Plato's Theaetetus and Cudworth's The True Intellectual System g: the Uni- verse, Price holds the highest type of knowledge is con— oerned with archetypes, which Cudworth calls universals and Plato calls forms. Whereas sense experience applies mainly to the less perfect knowledge of particulars, "In- stinct is a still lower and more imperfect means of sup— plying the same defect of knowledge." (R 28-29) But with respect to universal ideas, . . . if we have no such ideas, or if they denote nothing real besides the qualities of our own minds; I need not say into what an abyss of scepticism we are plunged. (R 29) Furthermore, . . . our abstract ideas . . . most properly . . . belong to the understanding. They are, undoubtedly, essential to all its Operations; every act of judg- ment implying some abstract or universal idea. Were they formed in the mind in the manner generally re- presented, it seems unavoidable to conceive that it has them at the very time it is supposed to be em— ployed in forming them. Thus; from any particular idea of a triangle, it is said we can frame the general one; but does not the very reflexion said to be necessary to this, on a greater or lesser triangle, imply, that the general idea is already in the mind? How else should it know how to go to work, or what to reflect on? (R 29-30) David Hume held that when we discovered a resenblanoe among several objects that we often behold we may apply the same name to each object regardless of the differences we may observe in the degree of their quantity and quality. (Treatisg, I, VII) Price's rejoinder stipulates, 50 That the universality consists in the idea; and not merely in the name as used to signify a number of particulars resembling that which is the immediate object of reflexion, is plain; because, was the idea to which the name answers and which it recalls into the mind, only a particular one, we could not know to what other ideas to apply it, or what particular ob— jects had the resemblance necessary to bring them within the meaning of the name. A person, in reading over a mathematical demonstration, certainly is con— scious that it relates to somewhat else, han just that precise figure presented to him in the diagram. But if he knows not what else, of what use can the demonstration be to him? How is his knowledge en— larged by it? Or how shall he know afterwards to what to apply it? (R 30) Thus a particular idea is simply incapable of representing other particulars of the same species. Should resemblance be considered a condition for subsunption in a class, it may be said that a universal concept must be present to determine the degree of resemblance of a particular image for its inclusion in a class. The condition of subsump- tion is not a matter of mere caprice. Price charges that Hume (R 29h) and other nominalists who deny that we have any abstract ideas, run into "a capital error" in that they "confound the understanding with the imagination and deny reality and possibility to every thing the latter cannot conceive, however clear and certain to the for— mer." (R 31-32) The imagination is closely allied to the senses whereas the understanding is distinct. All that can be pictured in the imagination, as well as all that we take notice of by our senses, is in— deed particular. And whenever any general notions are present in the mind, the imagination, at the same time, is commonly engaged in representing to itself some of the particulars comprehended under them. But it would be a very strange inference from hence, 51 that we have none but particular ideas. As well almost might we conclude, that we have no other notion of anything than of its name, because they are so associated in our minds that we cannot sepa~ rate them; or of the sun, than as a white, bri5ht circle, such as we see in the heavens, because this ima2e(is 3t to accon:pany all our tqou~aus of R 305 efainst empirical views on uni— _I 'w To sum up Price’ 8 erg ument versals, we can do no better than to quote Price as he refers to Cudrorth with obvious approval. (1) The Opinion that universal ideas are formed out of particular ones, by sepzarating common from indi— viduating circumstances, this writer, . . . [3nd— wortfi) rejects. . . . And the ct? er Opinion (2) that they are only sin5ular ideas annexed to a common term; or, in other words, names without any meaning; (held formerly by those, who were therefore called Nominalists, and of late revived). . . _is~ . . . false. . . . (R Bl) Thus Price holds that neither Locke in the first case, nor Hume (and Berkeley) in the second case, are able to ex— plain the concept of "resemblance" within the framework of their own epistemological theories. According to Price, universal concepts must be independent of the senses and of necessity ori5inate in the understanding. After having enumerated several ideas which he be— lieves to originate in the understandin5, Price classified all simple ideas. (R 38) Before proceeding with Price's classification of ideas, however, it seems appropriate to turn to a couple of other matters pertinent to a better understanding of Price. Raphael believes that although Price rejects nominal- ism, Price ". . . is not . . . crc 3 red to embrace a J .L N 5 theory of innate ideas such as Cudworth's." (R xiv) That Raphael has incorrectly interpreted Price at this point will become obvious as we continue. It will be seen that Price adheres quite closely to Cudworth. Cudworth's epistemOIOgy is summed up by Fowler and Wilson in a short statement sufficient for our purpose in the Principles 9: Cudworth's system admits of a brief and easy state- ment. The main thesis of his 'Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality' is that there exist in the mind of man a number of ideas . . . entirely independent of sense and matter, not derived from the external world, either directly or indirectly, but part of the furniture, so to Speak, of the mind itself. These ideas are immutable, for they are common to all minds, being of the very nature or essence of mind, so that it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of any mind as being without them. Moreover, they are eternal, for they have existed from all eternity in the mind of God, even when there was no other mind in existence. Amongst these ideas are the ideas of 'Mcral Good and Evil, Just and Un— just,’ which are, therefore, eternal and immutable, not 'alterable by mere Will or Cpinion,‘ even though that will be the will of God himself. (PM 37) To support his misinterpretation of Price's relationship to Cudworth, Raphael also calls attention (R xv) to Price's footnote: According to Dr. Cudworth, abstract ideas are implied in the 005noscitive power of the mind; which, he says, contains in itself virtually (as the future plant or tree is contained in the seed) general notions of all things, which are exerted by it, or unfold and dis— cover themselves as occasions invite and prOper cir— cumstances occur. This, no doubt, many will very freely condemn as whimsical and extravagant. I have, I own, a different opinion of it; but yet, I should not care to be obliged to defend it. It is what he thought, Plato meant by making all knowledge to be Reminiscence; and in this, as well as other respects, he mates the human mind to resemble the Divine; to ‘ . ‘A "'1' I V' " ‘ ' V" 7- ’\ v" ‘ ‘1’ "‘ ' s“ I ' ' . 1. ' ‘u' ' r“ 1-;1 3 wnicn.tau3 ideas eaartynvdreawnsion.of EJLL‘tJlAvs (3y l.‘ 53 e«sw3 ntinl, and not to be derived from any foreig source. . . . what is true of mind in 3e1er3il, ar particularly of that first and all— disses in; mind from which all inferior mines sprung and of which they participate, 'tis reasonable to think true, in a lower de 3ree also of these inferior minds, and of their ideas and knowledge. (R 31) :5 d y.— Althou3h Price is in complete agreement with Cudworth, (R 30—31) the theory of innate ideas had become so unU;Ovu- lar in his own time, mainly by reason of Locke's attack upon innate ideas, that Price did not care to be obli3ed to proeose and defend the theory of innatism. (R Bl) If the NeOplatonic position should be fitted to the View that ideas are immediate objects of the understiniine when it thinks, then what the mind sees are its own ideas, its own modifications, and the relations which these ide_s have to each other such as certain truths or prOpositions. Price not only 3reatly sCL ired Cudworth but also Dr. Thomas Reid, D.D., a persistert and very early critic of Hume. In certain instances, however, Price objects to both Hume and Reid. In one instance, Price exclaims, "I am always mortified when I find, that my sentiments are different from those of . . ." Dr. Reid. (Note C, R 280) Note C begins by quoting Price's footnote on page 39. 'It should be observed, that I have all along endeavoured to avoid speaking3 of an idea as an image in the mind of the object we think of. A writer of 1For Price, 'idea' has two uses. (1) Its preper use is to signify the act of apprehending, which act is a modification of the mind and (2) Its imprOper use, but a use difficult to 3st alon3 without, is 'idea' as the gn- ject of apprehension. (R 39n) 54 deep reflexion has charged this language with laying the foundation of all modern scepticism. §§§_Dr. Reid's Enquiry into the human mind 9p the principles 9: common Sense.‘ I am always mortified when I find, that my sen— timents are different from those of the writer to whom I have now referred. Mr. Hume makes the immed- iate object of the mind in perception to be the same with perception itself, and thus annihilates all external existence. Dr. Reid, if I understand him, asserts (in his Enguiry, &c. and also in his Essays 9p the intellectual pgwers gfi Egg) that there is no such object, and thus seems to me to annihilate all perception. When we investigate the properties of triangles or circles, are there not objects, indepen— dent of our minds, then present to them? We call these objects ideas. This word generally signifying the apprehension or conception of an object, it is imprOperly used to signify the object itself of con— ception; but the poverty of language obliging us to this, it must be excused; and care must be taken not to be misled by it, as I think Mr. Hume and some other writers have been. In such instances we call, I have said, the ob— jects present to our minds, ideas. If ideas have no existence, and nothing is present to our minds when we contemplate these objects, does it not follow that We hen contemplate nothing? The same enquiry may be made with respect to our perception of external ob— jects. These objects themselves not being present, if perceived, they must be perceived by ideas of them. Nor will it follow from hence, that we can have no assurance of the existence of external objects. All ideas imply the possibility of the existence of cor— respondent objects; and our belief of the actual existence of the objects of sense, we may resolve into impressions on our senses forcing belief at the moment of the impression, in a manner we cannot ex- plain. And this may be done to more advantage on the supposition of ideas than without it. For scep— ticism seems to be less favoured by supposing that, in perception by our senses, there is something dis— tinct from the mind and independent of it really per— ceived, than by supposing that there is nothing then perceived. . . . The truth . . . would carry us higher than we are willing to go, and imply a pre- sence of the Deity with us and dependence upon him more close and constant and necessary, than we are apt to suspect or can easily believe. (R 281, Note C) It is explicit that,in R ESn, Price rejects the definition of idea as "the object of conception" in favor of the dc- finition of idea as "the apprehension or conception of an object." This is th act of apprehending or conceiving. In the long quotation from R 291, Note C, he seems to re- ject Reid's view that there is no object, properlv Spenx- ing, but only the mind act. 30 Price prefers to call this object an id a in this note. These "ideas imply the (D ssibility of he ex Mt nce of corre.‘w,r\ phi, Nigel-I’d 107 . . . the universal law of rectitude, though in the abstract idea of it always invariably the same, must be continually varying in its particular demands and obligations. (R 165) Rectitude . . . is the same authority that enjoins, the same eternal reason that commands in them all. Virtue thus considered, is necessarily one thine. (R 165, also fn. 165, reference to Meno) Certainly, in what Price calls the general idea of virtue, we note he considers it to entail the six heads of virtue. Furthermore, the six heads of virtue, as we have defined them, have a direct relationship to the agent's Eu ..--— perception of rectitude in the particular cases, "and the situations of agents and objects . . ." (R 165), which are constantly changing. The general idea of virtue, then, might be interpreted as the attachment to reason's percep- tion of the universal law of rectitude as a rule and an end. The six heads of virtue would be, according to Price, six different aspects of conformity to the univer— sal law of rectitude as reason perceives rectitude as its rule and end. Just how virtue can be considered a simple, intuited, idea instead of a complex idea, when it entails simple ideas of the six heads of duty, is a question simi— lar to the one which arises from Price's other claim, which we noted in Chapter III, that gauge is a simple idea and yet contains the idea of Eggeg. .Furthermore, the implication is that Price considers these heads of virtue to be intuited as self-evident modes of virtuous conduct. This is quite difficult to accept in light of the fact 103 that they often interfere with each other. (R 166) Price asserts to the contrary, . The principles themselves, it should be remem— bered, are self-evident; and to conclude the contrary, or to assert that there are no moral distinctions, because of the obscurity attending several cases wherein a competition arises between the several principles of morality, is very unreasonable. (R 168) and, . . . though the heads of virtue before-mentioned agree thus far in requiring the same course of action, yet they often also interfere. Though upon the whole, or when considered as making one general system 9; plan 93 conduct, there is a strict coincidence between them, yet in examining single acts and articular cases, we find that they lead us contrary ways. (R 1&3 ' —““3 We have already noticed that Price considers the prob- lem of whether rightness or wrongness is evident with ref— erence to classes or kinds of actions or motives-—giving general principles or rules—-or whether only the moral character of particular actions is known by intuition. The former is now commonly known as "rule morality," the latter as "act morality." Price deals with the problem by considering the multiple bearing of several heads of virtue on one act. We have noticed also that Price holds that all heads of duty are modifications of the same thing—~virtue. For example, "An act of justice may be also an act of gratitude and beneficence; and whatever any of these oblige us to, that also Eléil.t0 God requires." (R 166) Price holds that these duties ". . . to gain assent, need only to be understood." Their truth "appears as 109 irresistibly as the truth of those which are the founda— tion of Geometry." (R 169) When we consider particular cases, however, these principles often interfere with one another. The principle of self-love often interferes with that of benevolence. Moreover, these two principles inter- fere with others in particular cases. Price's solution holds, . . . in order to discover what is right in a case, . we ought to extend our views to all the different i heads of virtue, to examine how far each is con- f cerned, and compare their respective influence and demands; and that at the same time they often inter- . fere; a second source of insuperable difficulties e~ will appear. It is not alone sufficient to satisfy us that an action is to be done, that we know it will be the means of good to others: we are also to con— sider how it affects ourselves, what it is in regard to justice, and all the other circumstances the case may involve must be taken in, and weighed, if we would form a true judgment concerning it. In reality, before we can be capable of deducing demonstrably, accurately and particularly, the whole rule of riaht in every instance, we must possess universal and un- erring knowledge. It must be above the power of any finite understanding to do this. (R 170) It seems that after due consideration of the different heads of duty, and all other circumstances, we are to in- tuit what reason perceives to be right in the given situa- tion even though the action may not be objectively right. The action may not be objectively right since as finite beings we are incapable of deducing the whole rule of right in every instance. Only the infinite being with universal and unerring knowledge could be objectively right in every instance. The virtue of the finite being is assured, however, if his motive which determines the 110 action conforms to his perception of rectitude as applied to the particular case. It seems that Price's virtues of piety, gratitude, justice and veracity constitute a system of rule intuition— isn whereas his virtues of beneficence and prudence consti- tute a system of act morality.l Earlier we mentioned that Price's ethics in his six heads of virtue was deontoloai- cal even though the consideration of benevolence and prudence introduces teleological considerations. The com— petition of virtues would seem always to be between these two sets of virtues, and between prudence and benevolence. At the end of Chapter VII, Price considers the objec— tion to intuitionism which is based on the considerable difference in the moral practices in different ages and countries. Price says, ". . . the diversity of men's sen- timents concerning moral matters . . ." is explained as practical errors of men which have ". . . plainly arisen from their speculative errors; from their mistaking facts or not seeing the whole of a case." (R 171) Men err in judgment, imagination, and reasoning. Men would not hold that others have no speculative reason— ing powers because they arrive at false Opinions. Price holds that education, custom and prejudice all darken the 1The introduction of beneficence and prudence in Price's ethical system allows for tele0105ical considera— tions. Insofar as any system of ethics allows for rules as the sole consideration of whether an act is right or wrong, however, it is deontic. More will be said on this topic in Chapter VI. 111 action of reason, and that moral judgments differ with age, maturity, and circumstances. These factors account for a lack of uniformity of agreement between intuitionists. This lack of uniformity of agreement seems to be one of the weaker spots in ethical intuitionism. Price, however, offers as interesting an explanation for this weakness as any intuitionist with which I am acquainted. Nevertheless, it is to be remembered that in spite of the fact that intuitionism is subject to criticism, Price maintains the view that practical errors have resulted from speculative errors, "mistaking the facts, or not see— ing the whole of a case." (R 171) Thus the degree of practical virtue of the rational agent is directly propor- tional to "the degree of regard or disregard, of attachment or the want of attachment to truth and rectitude . . ." (R 200) as the agent perceives them to be. (4) Degrees of Virtue and Degrees of Right and Wrong . . . 'the degree of regard, of attachment or the want of attachment to truth and rectitude evidenced by actions, is what determines the judgment we make of the degree of moral good and evil in them.‘ External actions are to be considered as signs of the motives and views of agents. We can, in general, infer the latter from the former with sufficient certainty. But when this happens to be impracticable, we are rendered incapable of forming any judgment of the merit or demerit of actions. (R 200-201) The major discussion of "degrees of virtue" is found in Chapter IX. However, certain references to "degrees of virtue" are to be found in other parts of the Review. In order really to understand what Price intends by "degrees 112 of virtue," our proposed definition of virtue and the dis— tinction between virtuous acts and virtuous age nts should be recalled. These proposed definitions are listed below: Virtuous agent =df an agent disposed to be governed by the motive of rectitude for its own sake, i.e. as a rule and end (R 184), as rectitude is perceived by reason. Virtuous act 2 df an act which proceeds from the agent's intention of adhering to rectitude as rule and end, (the only moral motive) as perceived by reason. (R 184) Turning aga in to degrees of virtue, Price thinks that men who neglect their duty to God are less virtuous than those who do their duty to God. Similarly, individuals who neglect their duty to other men, or to themselves, are more gr less virtuous depending upon the degree of eglect (omission) or commission of their duty. Whatever good any person does, or whatever degree of real virtue he possesses, he is sure in some way or other, to be the better for. (a 1445 True and genuine virtue must be uniform and universal. Nothing short of an entire good character can avail to our acceptance. (R 165-166) Partial virtue of an agent, says Price, is defective and inconsistent. (R 165) If a person lives in neglect of any one of his duties, this person is a . . . rebel against reason, and an apostate from righteousness and order, as if he neglected them all. . . To trans gress in one point (I mean habitually and wilfully) is to throw off effectually our alle- giance, and to trample on the whole author- ity . . . (R 165) Price holds that the . . . virtue of an agent is always less in proportion to the degree in which natural temper and pro Densities fall in with hise actions, instinctive principles 115 operate, and rational reflexion on what is right to be done, is wanting. (R 195) In other words, Price is saying that since other considera— tions diminish the degree of attachment to the only moral motive, rectitude for the sake of rectitude, the virtue of an agent is diminished to a preportionate degree. Similar- ly, it might be maintained, an action, i.e. an external event, which originates from considerations other than the moral motive alone, rectitude for the sake of rectitude, is not a virtuous action (an action which is subjectively right). Even though this action should prove to be objec- tively right, it would merit little praise. When secular interest, love of fame, curiosity, re~ sentment, or any of our particular prOpensions con— spire with virtue in exciting to an action, it is in the same prOportion virtuous as the apprehension of its rectitude influenced to it, which can never be accounted much, when the action is known to fall in with the bent and humour of our minds and the current of our "assions. (R 201) Unless the action were motivated by an attachment to recti- tude (the degree of attachment being directly preportional to the degree of virtue of the action), it would have no moral worth. However, if all temptations should fail to hinder our determination to perform an action because it is right, "the virtue must be greatest." (R 2C1) Com- plete attachment to the motive of rectitude for the sake of rectitude, as perceived by reason, renders the virtue of the agent "the greatest." Furthermore, hat action which originates from this motive, in spite of all tempta- tions to the contrary, would likewise "be greatest." 114 On the other hand, ". . . the same circumstances which diminish the virtue of any action, increase the vice in omitting it, and vice versa." (R 202) Thus Price puts virtue and vice on a more or less qualitative continuum. Price takes exception to Hutcheson's method for com— puting degrees of virtue. It may be worth observing, how very deficient Dr. Hutcheson's manner of computing the morality of actions is. . . . he gives us this general Canon. 'The virtue is as the moment of good produced, diminished or increased, by the private interest concurring with or Opposing it, divided by the ability.‘ (R 208-209) Price holds that Hutcheson has tried to maintain that benevolence is the whole of virtue and has omitted the virtues of promoting private happiness and duty to Deity. If, instead of benevolence, we substitute, in the rules he has given, regard pg right, or attachment to virtue and duty they will, I think, be in the main just. (R 2095 Ultimately, the degree of virtue of an agent (like the degree of virtue of an act), is directly preportional to the agent's degree of rational attachment to his per— ception of rectitude and inversely preportional to the degree in which prOpensities, inclinations, and instincts operate to reinforce his attachment to what is right to be done. The degree of virtue of an agent does not depend upon the difficulties and inconveniences attendant to perform- ing actions which are subjectively right, although these difficulties often show defects in the character. 115 Now it may be asked whether it is possible for any finite rational being to be completely Virtuous. From the standpoint of virtue as practical, it might be possible. From the standpoint of a subjectively right action, that an agent may always act according to reason's perception of rectitude as the sole motive, it is possible. From the standpoint of objectively right actions, however, it is impossible. Except an agent could have an infinite knowl— edge, and be perfectly rational, he could not have a per— fect knowledge of rectitude. Thus Price had to distinguish between two types of virtue, "Absolute Virtue," and "Prac- tical Virtue." This distinction was made in order to explain that even a finite rational being is capable of being considered virtuous. This distinction will be ex— pounded in a following section. We have noted that a consideration of "Degrees of Virtue" leads Price to consider "Degrees of Right and Wrong." While "Degrees of Virtue and Vice" apply both to agents and actions, "Degrees of Right and Wrong" apply only to actions. It is actions which are either right or wrong. We have already preposed tentative definitions of :subjectively right act and objectively right act. Only 'the act which is subjectively right is a virtuous act. [Recording to our definition, we defined a right act in :rts two senses as follows: 116 i. Subjectively right act =df an act which proceeds from the agent’s motive to adhere to reason's perception of rectitude for the sake of rectitude. ii. Objectively right act =df an act (the real event produced) which adheres to rectitude, in the absolute sense, regardless of whether it proceeds from rectitude as the moral motive. Right and wrong vary with degree as predicable of actions insofar as they are classified under the heads of virtue and vice, according in part to the circumstances which further qualify and classify the actions. Price, it should be said, uses right and wrong as synonyms for fit- ness and unfitness, respectively. From the different natures, properties, and positions of different objects result necessarily different relative fitnesses and unfitnesses; different produc- tive powers; different aptitudes to different ends, and agreements or disagreements among themselves. What is there absurd or exceptionable in saying, likewise, that from the various relations of beings and objects, there result different obligations of conduct. (R 128-29) Fitness is a variable property, like weight or number. Just as some things are heavier than others and the objects in some sets more numerous than those in other sets, so some actions are more fit than other actions; also, if we compare a certain fit (i.e., right) action with another ‘unfit (i.e. wrong) action, it will sometimes be the case 'that the fit action is gggg fit than the unfit action is uuafit. In other words, there are degrees of rightness and inrongness. But this does not make right and wrong to be Inelational properties. They are, according to Price's use Of" "right" and "wrong," absolute rather than relational 117 properties. Of course, what determines the degree of rightness or wrongness of an action might include the relation of the moral agent to certain other objects; i.e., the circum- stances. E.g., one and the same (kind of) action vis_é vis_ a certain child might be more fit if the agent was the child's father than it would be if the agent was not a relative of the child. But that the determinants of right- ness include relations and circumstances does not make rightness to be a relational property. It is still an absolute (but variable, i.e. more and less) property of actions. All actions are right only to the degree to which they correspond to rectitude, as the agent perceives rec— titude to be his end and rule, for a given act. To the degree that actions are influenced by other considera— tions, they are correspondingly less right and more wrong. Only the being who possesses infinite knowledge will al- ways perform actions in which the degree of rightness will complete (100% right). Also only this infinitely rational being is capable only of acts where the subjective and objective senses of right will always be the same. This is true since only this infinitely rational being is cap- zable of perceiving rectitude perfectly in every action. 118 (5) Essentials of a Good Character Although only the being who is infinitely rational and powerful perceives rectitude perfectly, in order to have gggd character, a finite moral agent should be reason- able and disposed to be governed by his perception of rec— titude as his sole moral motive. When inferior prOpensi- ties and appetites overpower reason, vice results. The a! stronger our perception of rectitude becomes, the stronger g the character becomes as reflection increasingly and more : carefully judges, examines, directs, and controls the appe— ‘ Lil tites and prOpensities. Acting according to reason's per- ception of rectitude should be the finite moral agent's governing motive for his entire life. Only by obedience to the law of rectitude, as perceived by reason, is the agent characterized as virtuous. Only then is it possible most fully to develop the truly highest and noblest charac— ter. If then we would know our own characters, and deter— mine to which class of men we belong, the good or the bad; we must compare our regard to everlasting truth and righteousness with our regard to friends, credit, pleasure, and life; our love of God and moral excellence with our love of inferior objects, the dominion of reason with the force of appetite and find which prevail. Until the rational part gets the victory over the animal part, and the main bent of the heart is turned towards virtue; until the principles of piety and goodness obtain in some degree the supremacy, and the passions have been made to resign their usurped power, we are within the confines of vice and misery. (R 218) 119 . . . the ruling passion . . . denominates the charac- ter. The ruling love of power, fame, and distinction, denominates a man ambitious; the ruling love of pleas— ure, a man p: pleasure; of money, a covetous man. And in like manner, the ruling love of God, of our fellow-creatures, and of rectitude and truth, denomi- nates a man virtuous. (R 219) Price gives four criteria of how we may know that the love of virtue, essential to good character, is predominant in us. (1) If virtue and conscience rule within us, they will present themselves as objects of thought most fre— quently and unavoidably. It becomes the utmost considera- tion in settling all our schemes and resolutions. (2) The predominance of virtue will be exhibited in "actual rac— tice, or in the course pf the life and conversation. . . . The strength of inward affections is always in proportion to their effects on the external conduct." (R 220) A good character is never one in which virtue is partial. (3) "In order to determine whether the love of virtue is predominant in us, it is proper further to enquire, what degree of delight we have in it." (R 222) (4) Another characteristic of good character is ". . . a constant desire to improve.” (R 224) A good character becomes increasingly better as the degree of superiority of the attachment to reason's perception of rectitude in- creases. True goodness must be a growipg thing. All habits by time and exercise gain strength. It is not to be imagined, that he has sound principle of virtue in him, who is not concerned about confirming them to the utmost, and obtaining a total victory over all the enemies of his happiness and perfection. (R 224) ‘ -‘ A A; ‘----‘.\_.J. 5’- 120 Price adds that he has a "melancholy prospect of the condition of mankind." (R 230) The majority of mankind is neither truly good nor £3311 pad. "True goodness . . . is by no means so common as we could wish; and that indif- ference and carelessness which we see in a great part of mankind, must be utterly inconsistent with it." (R 230) Since true goodness is not widespread, it is obvious that Price expects the majority of mankind to perform actions that may be right to a degree, wrong to a degree, depend- ing upon the degree of indifference and carelessness of each moral agent. Finally, it might be noted briefly that for both Price and Aristotle, in the formation of good character, habituation is important. Also both men hold that one who practices virtue derives pleasure from it if virtue be- comes a stable part of his character. But an important difference ends their similarities. Whereas Price holds that it is the duty of reason to perceive rectitude as a motive to moral action, Aristotle defines virtue as a disposition or habit which enables an agent to perform a certain act well. Also with respect to certain virtues, piety, gratitude, justice and veracity, Price has a deontological system of ethics whereas Aris— totle's system is the "arctetic" type of ethics which avoids rules and principles. For Aristotle, the concept of duty as an attachment to reason's perception of recti— tude would be completely foreign. 121 Much more might have been said about Price, especially with respect to the relation of morality to the Divine Nature, God's Moral Government, etc. But these are doc- trines of natural religion and not of ethics. Although much more might have been said about Price's similarities to seVeral classical philosophers, which we noted earlier 1 I; was not properly the topic for this dissertation, as de— lineated in Chapter I, we have also noted several simi— larities of Price's views to those of Kant. In keeping with one of our purposes, a brief treatment of some of WWfi {Mt-xi; .1 PMAHB these similarities will be given in the next chapter. CHAPTER VI PRICE AND IMEANUEL KANT In previous chapters we have noticed a number of similarities between the views of Richard Price and Immanuel Kant. In Chapter I, several writers were quoted who commented on the similarities between the two philos- 0phers. Fowler and Wilson express agreement with those writers who discern similarities between Price and Kant. Those who are familiar with the writin s of Kant (which are posterior to those of Price will recog- nise many points of resemblance, both in the funda- mental ideas and in the modes of expression. Amongst these are the exaltation of reason; the depreciation of the affections; their unwillingness to regard the 'partial and accidental structure of humanity,’ the 'mere make and constitution of man,‘ as the basis of morality, in other words to recognise ethical dis— tinctions as relative to human nature; the ultimate and irresolvable character of the idea of Rectitude; the notion that the Reason imposes this idea, as a law, upon the Will, becoming thus an independent spring of action; liberty or 'the power of acting and determining;' the importance attached to Reason as a distinct source of ideas; and, it may be added, the discrimination (so celebrated in the philos0phy of Kant) of the moral (or practical) and the specu— lative understanding (or reason). In addition to these similarities of doctrine, other similarities of background have been suggested by Pro— fessor Henry S. Leonard: (1) Price was born in 1723. Kant was born in 1724. So they are as near to being contemporaries as any two philOSOphers could be. 1Principles 9: Morals, p. 70. 122 123 (2) They are both making rationalist reactions to the views of David Hume, so in a sense they have a common aim, both in epistemology and in value theory. Kant tells us that it was "Hume who awoke me from my dogmatic slum- ber."l Similarly, Price states, . . . I owe much to the philOSOphical writings of Mr. Hume which I studied early in life. Though an enemy to his skepticism, I have profited by it. By attack- ing with great ability, every principle of truth and reason, he put me upon examining the ground upon which I stood, and taught me not hastily to take any- thing for granted. (R 14) (3) On the other hand, even though contemporaries and possessed of a common aim, Price's reaction antedates Kant's by twenty to thirty years: Price Kant Review, 1st edition-—1758 Critique pi Pure Reason—-1781 2nd edition--l769 Prolegomena -—l783 3rd edition--l787 Metaphysics pf Morals --1785 died --1791 Critique 9: Practical Reason --179O died --1804 (4) I know of no evidence that Price was acquainted with Kant's work, either in epistemology or in ethics, nor that Kant used or knew Price's work. At least this conclu- sion seems tenable after a check of the indexes of the com- plete works of Kant, in several editions, fails to disclose any reference to Richard Price. Finally, no less an author- ity on Kant than Lewis Beck White, in his book, A Commentary 1Critigue pf Pure Reason, p. 12. 124 on Kant's Critioue pf Practical Reason, asserts, "There is no evidence that Kant knew of . . . Price." (CKCPR 41h) Thus, even though Price and Kant were contemporaries and both thinkers reacted to Hume, who was born 1711, and published his Treatise-—1738, Inquiry Concerning Knowledge--1748, Enquiry Concerning Morals--l751, and died--l776, their reactions were completely independent of one another. ri-v ‘- But their reactions were near enough to the time of Hume so as not to be seriously affected by intervening reac- tions1 and/or developments. It is impossible to be certain concerning the reason why Price anticipates similar positions developed in Kant in so many respects. One reason may be their common Pro— testant backgrounds.2 Schilpp claims, So far from finding Kant’s early Pietistic up—bringing a handicap for the development of his more fruitful ethical ideas, we discovered that it was largely re— sponsible for Kant's deep sense of the worth of the 1It is noteworthy that both men also reacted to Hut— cheson, Shaftesbury, Locke and Berkeley in addition to Hume. 2Rader, Melvin, Ethics gag iha Human Community, p. 144. "Reared in a pious family, he was deeply imbued with the spirit of Protestant ethics and religion. . . . In his insistence that every human being is an end in himself, he expressed in philos0phical terms the Christian doctrine of the infinite intrinsic worth of the human soul . . ." It would seem, then, that this claim by Rader, supported by Kelsen and Schlipp, deserves to be noticed. 125 individual man as a self-conscious and responsible moral agent, and for his growing recognition of the social implications in this doctrine of the dignity of human nature. (KPE 88) Hans Kelsen goes even further in his claim that Kant's ethical theory . . . can be regarded as the most perfect expression of the classical doctrine of natural law as it evolved in the seventeenth and eighteent centuries on the basis of Protestant Christianity. Also Kelsen asserts that Kant's personality was so deeply rooted in Christianity that he was unable to emancipate himself completely from metaphysics.2 While it is true that many thinkers of the eighteenth century had a Protestant background, not every thinker was as deeply influenced by Protestant Christianity as Kant and Price. Both men, for example, originally intended to become ministers. Although Kant revolted in part against his Pietistic training, many of its principles were influ- ences in the formulation of his theory of ethics. Much more could be said to support this contention, such as their reverence for the Bible, as indicated by their re- spective testimonies concerning it as well as their quota- tions from it. In spite of all these similarities, how- ever, the fact remains that both men were able to develop a system of secular ethics almost totally independent of revealed religion. Price, it is true, discusses piety as one of the "chief heads of duty." He goes much farther 1General Theory pf Law and State, trans. A. Wedberg (Harvard: Cambridge, Mass., 1949), p. 444. 2Ibid., p. 445. 126 in his sermons by claiming that the "God of Natural ReligiOn is the God of Christianity."1 Incidentally, Immanual Kant also speaks of our relationship to God: Our bearing towards God must be characterized by reverence, love and fear—~reverence for Him as a holy lawgiver, love for his beneficent rule, and fear of Him as a just judge. We show our reverence by regarding His law as holy and righteous, by due respect for it, and by seeking to fulfill it in our disposition. We may honour a person outwardly, but reverence springs from the disposition of the heart. The moral law is in our eyes worthy of the highest esteem and honour. When, therefore, we think of God as its au hor, we must honour Him in terms of supreme moral wor h, and while we may be struck with wonder in contemplating God and overawed by His greatness and infinity, while we may be conscious of our little— ness before Him, our reverence can take no other than the moral form. (LE 97) Turning to certain features of their ethical systems, we note that many doctrines of Price and Kant are quite similar. Many superficial comparisons of these two the— ories might be made. In order to go into any degree of depth, however, it is necessary to restrict the issues to be treated to a small number. These issues include the similarities of Price and Kent on the relation of duty and inclination, decntology, and the conflict of the duties, especially of veracity with prudence and benevolence. We have already noted in Chapter V that Price in- sists that an action which springs from instinctive desire has no moral significance. This View is essentially iden— tical to Kant's view. Kant's view is illustrated by _:- 1; Sermon a3 Hackney, p. 17. 127 , 1 rance to the concept of duty. ,. (a Ft (U According to Kant, only when a rational agent per- forms an action from pure respect for duty is his action considered moral. Inclination is never the determining ground of a moral action. The virtuous rational agent is resolved to act from duty regardless of his inclination. It is not the case that he does his duty only if he hap- If h ,- na- pens to be inclined to this particular action. It is pos~ sible that his inclination may be in accordance with duty—- ._ - "v: .‘s-‘_- __~ _ ._.'. not always counter to duty. It is the case, however, that 11" _> if the person should act from inclination, and it by chance coincides with duty, that action is of no moral significance. The action is called amoral. It is neither moral nor immoral. Many writers have misinterpreted Kant as holding that an action done from duty must always mili— tate against inclination and, therefore, be unpleasant. Th is is definitely a misinterpretation of Kant' 3 ethics.2 The position which Kant holds is that the coincidence of action with inclination is not of moral significance. It is whether the action originates from duty alone, aside from any consideration of inclination as a motive, which determines the moral value of the action. On the other 1It is assumed that the reader will be acquainted with Kant' 8 major ethical works such as his Metaphysigg of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. This allows the writer to utilize _Kant' s Lectures on Ethics which are very important, but not well known, in part of this chapter. 21:1 H 71' - n. ncier, athics and the human Community, pp. 143— 159. 128 hand, if an action is contrary to duty, it is considered immoral. Kant, like Price holds that only with respect to the "holy will," will duty and inclination always be iden- tical. With the wills of finite agents, however, inclina— tion is often contrary to duty. Moreover, men are charac— terized by freedom and are not predetermined to obey the universal moral law of rectitude. Price is very close to the position of Kant on the relation of inclination to duty. In illustrating his position, Price gives an.example which was also used by Kant. Perhaps the most Kantian.passage in Price's entire Review is the following: . . . instinctive benevolence is no principle of virtue, nor are any actions flowing merely from it virtuous. As far as this influences, so far some- thing else than reason and goodness influences, and so much I think is to be subtracted from the moral worth of any action or character. . . . the tender— ness of parents for their offspring, a fond mother's exposing her life to save her child, and all actions proceeding from the nearer attachments of nature appear to have as much less moral value, as they are derived from natural instinct, and less attended with reflexion on their reasonableness and fitness. As long as this reflexion is wanting, it is in a moral account indifferent, whether the action pro- ceeds, from moral affection or any other affec— tion. (R 191-192) Kant also speaks of the example of the mother whose duty it is to love and care for her child. If the mother loves and cares for her child from mere inclination and affection, however commendable the action may be, it has no moral sig- .nificance. (TB 282) Herein the inclination corresponds to duty. Duty, however, is not the motive. However, if the 129 woman loves and cares for her child because it is her duty, not merely because of inclination or instinct, even though inclination corresponds to duty or even if it con— flicts with duty, the action is considered mggal; not amoral as in the case where inclination corresponds to duty, nor immoral where inclination conflicts with duty. That this doctrine is not only held by both men, but illustrated by virtually the same example, is the most amazing example of the similarity of Price and Kant to each other. Another similarity, at which we have hinted, is that both systems of ethics are deontological. Yet they are sufficiently different to warrant more exploration. We have noted, in Chapter V, that Price lists six heads of. virtue: piety, gratitude, benevolence, prudence, veracity and justice. Kant does not include piety among his ethi- cal duties, and even though he would not object to the principles entailed by the other virtues, gratitude, benevolence, prudence, veracity and justice, he does not call them "heads of virtue" as does Price. In Chapter V, we have noted that Price seems to have a deontological system of ethics with respect to the vir- tues of piety, gratitude, justice and veracity. (R 166) Although the virtues of beneficence and prudence are end- oriented or teleological virtues, Price fits them into his deontOIOgical system as duties. (R 166) We are to be benevolent and prudent because it is our duty, avers 130 Price, and not because it is our inclination to be benevo- lent and prudent. We re to be benevolent and prudent not because we gain pleasure thereby but only because they are our duties. But benevolence and prudence are simply teleological. In being benevolent one must be teleologi- cally oriented in one's decision concerning a particular act. But in Price's system, '“‘ "duty for duty's sake" is the sole moral motive and, there- fore, one is to be deontologically oriented in one's de- < cision as to whether to be benevolent and prudent. Cases of conflict would always be between the teleological and “we non-teleological virtues and between the virtues of pru— dence and beneficence. Since the virtue of veracity is usually a test-case between deontological ethics and otter types, a consideration of the treatment of veracity by K9 nt and Price is in order. Kant's treatment of the vir- tue is far more interesting than Price's. In discussing "TRUTI ULNE SS," (LE 224) Kant also gives his observations on several related topics such as "the white lie, mental reservation, equivocation, the need for frankness, and the right not to be spied upon." While it is commonly known that Kant is against lying, it is not as commonly known that Kant considers lying to be only one species of falsehood. Prior to considering the types of falsehood, in his Lectures 9g Ethics, Kant holds that in keeping a secret the best mode of expres sing one's self is a "prudent reserve." (LE 225) A man should 131 not be totally silent (completely reserved) for this is an extreme. The Opposite eytreme is rcsrecented by the "per- son who is loquacious . . ." (L3 226) Kent considers both tendencies to be weaknesses. Although both tendencies, the disposition to be mute and the disposition to be loquacious, are weaknesses, neither disposition runs counter to duty. On the other hand, since a lie (mendacium) is immoral, the 5-3 disposition to lie should be corrected. Kant continues to discuss the subject of lying: If I announce my intention to tell what is in my mind, ought I knowingly to tell everything, or can I I keep anything back: If I indicate that I mean to speak va my mind, and instead of doing so make a false declara- tion, what I say is an untruth, a falsiloquium. But there can be falsiloguium even when people have no right to assume that we are expressing our thoughts. It is possible to deceive without making any state- ment uhatever. I can make believe, make a demonstra- tion from which others will draw the conclusion I want, thoudh they have no right to expect that my action will express my real mind. In that case I have not lied to them, because I had not undertaken to express my mind. I may, for instance, wisa peOple to think that I am off on a journey, and so I pack my luggage; peOple draw the conclusion I want them to draw; but others have no right to demand a declara— tion of my will from me. . . . Again, I may make a false statement (falsiloquium) when my purpose is to hide from another what is in my mind and when the latter can assume that such is my purpose, his own purpose being to make a wrong use of the truth. Thus, for instance, if my enemy takes me by the throat and asks where I keep my money. I need not tell him the truth, because he will souse it; and my untruth is not a lie (mendacium) because the thief knows full well that I will not, if I can help it, tell him the truth and that he has no right to demand it of me. But let us assume that I really say to the fellow, who is fully aware that he has no right to demand it, because he is a swindler, that I will tell him the truth, and I do not, am I then a liar? He has deceived me and I deceive him in return; to him, as an individual, I have done no injustice and he cannot complain; but I am none the less a liar in 132 that my conduct is an infringement of the rights of humanity. It follows that a falsiloquium can be a mendacium--a lie--especially when it contravenes the right of an individual. Although I do a man no in— justice by lying to him when he has lied to me, yet I act against the right of mankind, since I set my- self in Opposition to the condition and means through which any human society is possible. . . . Not every untruth is a lie; it is a lie only if I have expressly given the other to understand that I am willing to acquaint him with my thought. . . . But if we were to be at all times punctiliously truthful we might often become victims of the wickedness of others who were ready to abuse our truthfulness. (LE 227-228) Kant argues that since men are often malicious in- stead of always being well-intentioned, "to be punctilious— ly truthful is often dangerous." (LE 228) Thus the "con- ception of the white lie" is ". . . enforced upon us by necessity--a difficult point for moral philos0phers." (LE 228) Kant states that ". . . if necessity is urged as an excuse it might be urged to justify stealing, cheating and killing, and the whole basis of morality goes by the board." (LE 228) But in order to explain the only justi— fication for a white lie, Kant says, Consider, for example, the following case. A man who knows that I have money asks me; 'Have you any money on you?’ If I fail to reply, he will conclude that I have; if I reply in the affirmative he will take it from me; if I reply in the negative, I tell a lie. What am I to do? If force is used to extort a con— fession from me, if my confession is imprOperly used against me, and if I cannot save myself by maintain- ing silence, then my lie is a weapon of defence. The misuse of a declaration extorted by force justifies me in defending myself. For whether it is my money or a confession that is extorted makes no difference. The forcing of a statement from me under conditions which convince me that imprOper use would be made of it is the only case in which I can be justified in telling a white lie. (LE 228) 133 Although a white lie is justified only under condi- tions where an "imprOper use would be made of it . . .", avers Kant, a lying promise, with the intention to cheat, cannot be justified. Kant distinguisdes a lying promise from "a breach of faith." A "breach of faith is a true promise which is not kept." A true promise is always 1 morally praiseworthy for the intention is pure--even wner (D there is a breach of faith, for sometimes circumstances beyond the control of the promiser interfere with the ful- fillment of true promises. Also in the section on "TRUTHFULKESS," Kant philos— 0phizes on the command, "Judge not others!" and on the evil of spying. The moral disposition of others are for God to judge, but we are competent judges of our own. We cannot judge the inner core of morality: no man can do that; but we are competent to judge its outer manifesta- tions. In matters of morality we are not judges of our fellows, but nature has given us the right to form judgments about others and she also has ordained that we should judge ourselves in accordance with judgments that others form about us. . . . (LE 230) Kant deplores Spying. He declares, Everyone has a right to prevent others from watching and scrutinizing his actions. The spy arrogates to himself the right to watch the doings of strangers; no one ought to presume to do such a thing. . . . It is very mean to lie in wait and spy upon a friend, or on anyone else, and to elicit information about him from menials by lowering ourselves to the level of our inferiors, who will thereafter not forget to regard themselves as our equals. Whatever militates against frankness lowers the dignity of man. In- sidious, underhand conduct uses means which strike at the roots of society because they make frankness impossible; it is far viler than violence; for against violence we can defend ourselves, and a violent man 154 who spurns meanness can be tamed to goodness, but the mean rOgue, who has not the courage to come out into the Open with his roguery, is devoid of every vestige of nobility of character. (LE 231—232) So far, Kant has expressed sentiments with which, for the most part, Price would agree. Kant's approval of the "white lie" in his Lectures 92 Ethics, and his unusual application of the distinction between falsehood as iglgi— loguium and falsehood as mendacium, constitute Kantian doctrine that is not generally attributed to Kant. Never- theless, these distinctions render his doctrines, found in the Metaphysics 2f Morals and his Critigue 9: Practical Reason, capable of being understood in a different light. In defense of Kant, it might be argued that one maxim of duty is often limited by another maxim of duty.1 (This, incidentally, is a view similar to Price's view of the interference of the "chief heads of virtue.") For example, we have noted that in Kant's view, in Lectures 2g Ethics, Kant urges the necessity of prudence. He also contrasts the prerequisites of prudence and morality. Prudence requires a good understanding, morality a good will. If our conduct as free agents is to have moral goodness, it must proceed solely from a good will. . . . But while a sound understanding is re- quisite to prudence, to morality what is re uisite is a will which is simply good in itself. LE 18) lFor Kant, maxims are limited by the formal principle of the categorical imperative. Although maxims are not deducible from a general law, they are "regarded as those subjective laws which merely have the Specific character of gniversal legislation, . . ." (KTE li-lii) and (KTE 299 . -: -. ‘. r-W WWI-it! fififij A -" 135 Apparently, for Kant, prudence could not be considered to be moral unless each maxim of action springs from the good will. Moreover, the question arises as to how it is pos— sible that the good will could give rise to a maxim of telling a white lie even when the queStioner would have no right to the truth and when he intends to make an im— 1 . But Since Kant condones the use prOper use of the truth. of the white lie in this case, it might be asked if he could extend its application to benevolence. We have already offered a definition of benevolence for Richard Price.2 "Benevolence is the disposition to be governed by the motive of rectitude, as perceived by reason, in promoting the happiness of others." Kant says,3 Acts which have in View the welfare of another and are prompted by and prOportioned to his wants are acts of kindness. . . . they are acts of benevolence if they alleviate real needs; . . . (LE ZBSY These acts of kindness are called magnanimous, if they entail the sacrifice of an advantage; . . . and if they alleviate the extreme necessities of life they are acts of charity. (LE 235) Incidentally, Kant avers that if all men would perform their duty of charity, there would be no poor people. 1Kant is unwilling to permit a white lie in his later works. 2 . . Price's View of benevolence seems to be much more inclusive than Kant's view. 3In Part II of The Metaphysics g; Morals, Kant's "The Doctrine of Virtue" is divided into two parts: "PART OTB: Duties to Oneself" and "PART TWO: Duties of Virtue to Other Men." These two parts correspond, roughly, to what Price calls prudence and benevolence respectively. 136 Poverty would have been eliminated. Turning to the issue of the conflict between the duties of benevolence and veracity, one wonders why Kant does not make allowance for the "white lie" as he did earlier in his teaching career in the case where the other person would make improper use of the truth. That he does not appear to allow for the use of the white lie under any condition is indicated by his controversy with Benjamin . l . Constant, a French philosopher. Constant argued that it is right to tell a lie to a would-be murderer in order to . . - . . 2 save his intended Victim. Says Constant, The moral principle that it is one's duty to speak the truth, if it were taken singly and uncondition- ally, would make all society impossible. We have the proof of this in the very direct consequences which have been drawn from this principle by a German philos0pher, who goes so far as to affirm that to tell a falsehood to a murderer who asked us whether our friend, of whom he was in pursuit, had not taken refuge in our house, would be a crime. (KTE 361) Kant replies, The French philos0pher opposes this principle in the following manner, . . . "It is a duty to tell the truth. . . . To tell the truth then is a duty, but only towards him who has a right to the truth. But lImmanuel Kant, "On A Supposed Right to Tell Lies :from Benevolent Motives," Kant's Critique 2: Practical Reason and other Works on The Theogy 9; Ethics (Trans. by ' homas K. Abbott), 5th edition London: Longmans, Green, and Co.), 1898, p. 361. 21t is interesting that Kant appeals to consequences, i.e. the intended victim might escape as a result of tell— ing the truth whereas he might be killed if he should tell a lie since the intended victim might slip out unnoticed. (KTE 363) This appeal to consequences as justification for telling the truth is a teleolOgical consideration. 137 no man has a right others." (KTS 362) to a truth that injures But, continues Kant, ". . . the first question is whether (KTE 362) a man--in cases where he cannot avoid answering Yes or No—-has the right to be untruthful." Kant's answer is categorically no. Kant argues that if the man tells a benevolent lie, he may ". . . become punishable even by civil laws." (KTE 362) An example of this would be the case where the victim should have departed from the howse unobserved, and the murderer should find him as a result of the lie. (KTE 362) Kant declares, To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is there- fore a sacred unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any expediency. (KTE 363) The duty of truthfulness makes no distinction between persons to whom one has this duty and to whom one can exempt himself from this duty; rather, it is an unconditional duty which holds in all circum- stances. (KTE 365 The duty to tell the truth is a formal duty which holds true independently of any circumstances, according to Kant. He might have defended his theory better if he had maintained tha it should be universalized that "everyone . . . 1 should lie in order to save an innocent man from murder." 1 At least this suggestion would seem to be compatible with the categorical imperative, "Act only on that maxim whereby you could at the same time will that it should be— come a universal law." (TE 302—18) It would also conform to the second statement of the categorical imperative with respect to the intended victim: "Act :0 as to treat human— ity whether in your own person or in that cf another always as an end and never as a means only." Also it seems that it would not conflict with the principle of the autonomy of the will in legislating universal laws for 138 Then it would have at least been consistent with his for- mer view shown by the introduction of the white lie in order to save oneself from an extortion of a confession by one who would have no right to the truth. But for some reason Kant did not do this. Certainly, not many people who love the truth could agree with Kant at this point. It is apparent also that possibly Kant changed his View in even condoning a "white lie," between the time that he wrote his Lectures 2Q_Ethics, and his later writings. If, however, his Lectures on Ethics, as we have noted, should be too hastily accepted as his definitive view on the per— missibility of the white lie to those individuals who have no right to the truth, without knowing his later works, then his views on lying would seem to be inconsistent with each other. Lewis White Beck suggests an alternative explanation of the Kant-Constant controversy. He claims that Kant errs when he sometimes thinks ". . . of rules as valid without regard to circumstances, . . ." (ACKPR 80) In a footnote, however, he comments, "Recent studies have con- vincingly shown the relevance of circumstances to rules in Kant's ethics; . . ." (ACKPR 80) At this point we should remember that circumstances also have an important itself. See Ross's book, Kant's Ethical Theory_for an alternative interpretation of this suggestion. "Any indi- vidual act is an instance of a class of acts which is a species of a class of acts which is a species of a still wider class." (p. 32) 139 role to play in Price's theory of ethics. It seems that Kant's Lectures on Ethics, later com- piled in book form, were given between the years 1775 and 1781. (LE xi) Machurray comments, To the student of Kant the present volume has a threefold importance. It enables him to form some opinion of the material out of which Kant's system— atic theory of morals was built, as it existed at the time . . . before the unifying ideas of his Metaphysic of Morals had been properly defined. In the second place, the lectures contain a great deal of material, particularly in the discussion and definition of leading ideas, which helps considerably towards the interpretation of the maturer and more authoritative works. Lastly, they reveal Kant as a practical moralist, applying his mind earnestly to the detail of conduct, and supremely concerned with the social effects of his moral teaching, in a way that none of his more speculative writings can hope to do. From the lectures we can form a concrete idea of Kant's own conception of the good life. (LE xi—xii) If philosophers were better acquainted with Kant's Lec- tures gn,Ethics, as well as his other writings, they might not be guite as prone to criticize Kant, as does Rader, for example, for his formalism. Rader says, The weakest part of Kant's ethical . . . philoSOphy is his formalism. This leads him to neglect consid— erations of welfare and the rights of the individual. It is ultimately inconsistent with his belief in freedom and in man as an end in himself. (EHC 159) Of course Rader's criticism of Kant, which is so typical of criticisms against Kant, has considerable merit if con- strued to be directed against Kant's position in his con- troversy with Constant. In fact, if we judge Kant by his maturer works, it is a COgent criticism. 140 It is difficult to determine how Price would deal with the Kant-Constant controversy. At least from the Review, it is apparent that Price loves truth and truth— fulness. Nevertheless his approach to the Kant-Constant controversy would be considerably different from Kant's. Clearly Kant is unwilling to justify the use of the white lie under any conditions in his controversy with Constant. In keeping with his first statement of the categorical imperative, Kant could not with consistency universalize the maxim of lying. Unlike Kant, however, Price's approach to lying would not appeal to the criterion of universaliz- ing the maxim of lying. Price considers the virtues of veracity, prudence and benevolence to be self-evident duties which are intuited by the understanding. If he should have considered the Kant-Constant controversy, he would have recognized a com— petition between the duties of veracity and benevolence. In this case of the interference between these two virtues, Price would examine the circumstances and possible conse- quences as his understanding perceives them to be. I be— lieve hat Price would perceive that benevolence would be the stronger of the two conflicting duties in this "compe— tition" of duties. In fact the duty of veracity would be greatly out-weighed by tle duty of benevolence. Ultimately, hen, if Price were confronted with this choice, my conjec— ture is that he would resolve the conflict by perceiving (intuiting) the right action to be to tell the Ihite lie 141 in order to save the innocent victim from a would—be murderer. Only by telling the "white lie" would he be doing his "duty for the sake of duty," i.e. he would be acting according to his perception of rectitude. "Recti- tude for the sake of rectitude" is the sole moral motive. I draw this conclusion not because of Price's great love for his fellow-man. I offer this conjecture only because I believe that Price would perceive that to tell the "white lie" in this situation would be his intuited reso- lution of the conflicting virtues. It would be what he perceived to be the right action. Of course it is true that an examination of other characteristics of Price's personality might support our conclusion of what Price would do in a given situation. I believe that a human being would rank higher in Price's estimation than an ab- stract principle such as Kant's principle of universality. It appears that he is much less subject to the charge of 1 Price would certainly respect Kant~ formalism than Kant. for his stand and would hold that Kant's act of telling the truth, with respect to a "competition" between the virtues of veracity and beneficence in the Kant-Constant controversy, would be an example of practical virtue. On the other hand, if Price should tell a white lie in order 1It appears that Price was much more practical than Kant in respect to human beings. This is seen especially-- as will be shown in the remainder of this chapter-—in the way the two men conduct themselves in face of restrictive authority. 142 to foil the intention of the would-be murderer, he could also claim the white lie to be an example of an act which would be practically virtuous.l We might also appeal to Price's insistence on politi- cal as well as individual freedom to reinforce our inter- pretation of Price. Even though Price was an Englishman, and considered himself to be a loyal citizen, we have noted, "fl” in Chapter II of this dissertation, that he supported the cause of American liberty from England's tyranny. The life and liberty of the American colonists were at stake. In spite of intense social and political opposition, Price LWW continued to aid the cause of the Americans even though he corresponded under the number "176" in order to keep his identity a secret from political authorities. (TBF 93) Similarly, I believe that he would have used any means to aid the intended murder victim—-even the white lie. Kant, on the other hand, obeyed Kaiser Frederick Wilhelm II when he was ordered not to write on the subject of religion.2 (KTE x1) Kant believed that it was his unconditional duty to submit to political authority even though he too was in sympathy with the American and French Revolutions. The difference in the approach to obeying authority shows a lPrice says, "Truth and right in all circumstances, require one determinate way of action; . . ." but differ— ent persons judge differently. (R 167-168) . 2When Frederick Wilhelm II died, in 1797, "Kant re- garded himself as free, and published his Contest of the Faculties . . ." (KTE xli) 143 basic difference in attitude toward obeying general rules. Price would obey directives which he believed to corres- pond to rectitude whereas Kant would obey authoritative directives unconditionally because he believed it a duty to obey authority--regardless of the consequences. Says Kant, To deny one's inner conviction is mean, but in such a case as this silence is the duty of a subject; and, although a man must say only what is true, it is not always a duty to say all the truth publicly.l (KTE x1) In his reply to the king, Kant declared that to avoid suspicion, he "as his Majesty's most loyal subject," would Fifi? elm”..- Mza‘fil. m H, O be "solemnly engaged to refrain from writing or lecturing on religion, natural or revealed."2 Abbot says, The words, "as your Majesty's most loyal subject," were inserted with the intention of limit his engagement to the life of the king, . . . KTE xl-xli) Although I do not claim that Kant and Price would find a direct application of their political views, with respect to obeying authority, to their positions that might be taken on the Kant-Constant controversy, I suggest that it is a possibility. A pattern of how peOple react in one situation might enable a spectator to infer how they might react in another. 1This quotation was found on a slip of paper after his death. Apparently, Kant mentioned the King's order to no one. 2It apparently never occurred to Kant that he could have continued to write under an anonymous name or a num- ber as did Price. In fact I believe that Kant would have considered such a practice to conflict with duty and would, therefore, be immoral. Certainly, Kant could not have uni- versalized the maxim of disobeying authority without a contradiction. 144 Much more could be said about similarities between Kant and Price. Many issues could be raised. We have undertaken, however, a comparison of a limited number of points. Other issues would constitute an undertaking for another thesis.1 Before closing, however, a few more words might be said about the position of Kant as he is usually understood. We have noted the excessive formalism and abstract- ness of Kant's categorical imperative and his position that it is immoral to violate a universal rule for the sake of consequences. Morality is never determined by consequences. Nor is morality determined by inclinations according to Kant in his more famous works. At least this is the way in which he is usually interpreted. Price is very close to Kant's position on morality,but he does not formulate the categorical imperative. It is my view that Kant fails to discern the incom- patibility of the first and second statements of his cate- gorical imperative.2 In expounding his second statement, the principle of humanity, Kant insists that a moral agent should improve his own moral and rational nature and also 1Some of the other similarities mentioned by Fowler and Wilson, for example, seem worthy of further investiga- tion. 2The two statements of the categorical imperative are listed: First, "Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Second, "Always act so as to treat humanity whether in your own person or in that of another always as an end and never as a means only." 145 promote the happiness of others. Price would agree with Kant even though he did not formulate the second statement of the categorical imperative as does Kant. This state- ment raises teleological considerations, appeals to con- sequences, whereas the first statement of the imperative stresses universality, rectitude for the sake of rectitude, a deontic principle.. The first principle, in certain situations, could be universalized to eliminate all the goodness in the universe. Of course Price does not state a categorical imperative and would probably be much less prone than Kant to accept such a statement of universality. Instead, Price would probably say, when duties conflict, each person is obligated to act according to his perception of right, i.e. moral intuition. In conclusion, I quote Oliver Johnson who rightly criticizes this type of ethical theory: If we appeal to the deontologist's own standard for the judgment of theories in ethics--moral insight-- the answer seems inescapable: Their theory must be rejected. Rather than elucidating our non-theoreti- cal moral convictions, this theory, I should contend, would render these convictions finally meaningless. For if one can fulfill his duty in the full meaning of that term and yet through his action leave the world in a worse condition than had he not acted at all, what significance can the notion of duty or moral obligation have? If such an action could be right, would we not have just as much reason for urging people to act wrongly as rightly? And if this be true, can any meaningful distinction be drawn between right and wrong? (RG 128-29) CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION This study has investigated the life and philos0phic work of Richard Price, a philos0pher who, for the most part, has been too long neglected and unheralded. An ex- pository account of his life and works, and his epistemo- logical and ethical theories, has been given. It is of considerable interest to note Price's multi- farious interests not only in philosophy, but in the010gy, the Christian ministry, economic and political theory, and in life insurance expectancy, statistics and mathematical probability. We have noticed the a priority of Price's philosophy in both his ethics and in his metaphysics. Although his arguments are interesting, his claims to what can be known a priori in the realm of physics seem excessive in the light of the develOpments of modern science. The develop— ments of multiple dimensional theories of geometry and space have replaced Newtonian three-dimensional space which Price believed to be a priori. Price's claims to a priority are far more excessive than those of Kant. It should be noted, however, that even if every example which Price uses should prove to be in error, his theory of in— tuitionism is not necessarily proven to be incorrect. In fact, his epistemological intuitionism could be a correct view in spite_of many faulty applications. 146 147 Another point of interest is Price's View that the understanding immediately perceives simple ideas in both the realm of metaphysics and ethics. We have introduced the distinction between abstract idggg or concepts as "essence, number, identity, diversity, sc.," (R 19) on the one hand, and propositional ideas on the other hand, to alleviate the confusion into which Price falls as a re result of lumping all these together as ideas-~simple ideas at that. We have also noted that Price fails to differentiate ideas-—which later were distinguished by ~.:._~ —- ‘- Kant as percepts and concepts--from one another. ‘4 '1' An interesting topic for future study would be a com- parison of Price with modern intuitionists. A modern philos0pher whom he most closely resembles in certain re— spects is W. D. Ross. Without going into great detail, among the positions which resemble one another in the systems of Price and W. D. Ross are the distinction between pgimapiggig and actual duties, the distinction between subjective and pp— ‘ective, i.e. the abstract senses of right, and the view held in common by both men as to how the right action, among alternatives, is determined, namely, that an agent is morally obligated to perform the act which he thinks to be most morally suitable to the circumstances as the agent thinks them to be. This writer believes that the life and works of Richard Price have raised problems and issues, many of 148 which are not yet fully resolved. It may be asked, for example, whether any system of a priori ethics really accounts for the findings of sociologists and anthro- pologists. I am not suggesting that one has to abandon intuitionism's valid insights, which it may have. As an alternative to the g priori ethics of Price and Kant, Fowler and Wilson suggest that only an "g posteriori method" in ethics ". . . is able to prove its efficacy in regard to morals." (pp. p;§,, 115) Furthermore, they say, In the history and growth of the human race it finds most of the materials necessary for its inductions, and for answering the various problems which a moral— ist is concerned to solve. . . . What is man? Of what improvement is he capable? . . . the nature of moral obligation, the nature and extent of human freedom . . . (pp. 933., pp. 115-116) It is noted, however, that a posteriori ethics could never give the universality and certainty which Price and Kant desire. Another comment should be made which applies directly to intuitionists. Professor W. K. Frankena has asserted that unless the modern intuitionists attempt to explain in a satisfactory way ". . . non-empirical concepts, . . . g priori propositions, non—descriptive properties, prac- tical reason," they no longer "deserve a hearing."1 It is fortunate that he uses the word modern in describing intui- tionism for I am certain that he is well aware that Richard Price, who anticipates certain features of modern l"Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century," Philosophical Review, Vol. IX, No. 1 (1950), p. 46. 149 intuitionism, has not even thought about some of these concepts. Of considerable interest is Price's treatment of the idea of rectitude, or right. Price holds that all valid, obligatory, legal and moral claims are posterior to recti- tude, that rectitude is presupposed by all valid positive laws, moral rules, and justice itself. The understanding intuitively perceives right, rectitude, as a simple idea. In spite of Price's lofty views on morality, a concluding comment is in order. If right-—rectitude--is a simple idea, as Price claims, it may be asked how it is possible that the ideas of goodness, and of good and ill desert, are constituents of'right? Yet Price claims that they are,even though he does not explain how this is possible. In Chapter VI we considered certain similarities between Price and Kant. Although the two men did not know each other or each other's works, several similarities in their ethical systems appear. We noted the similarities on the doctrine of the relation of duty to inclination and the law of rectitude. We also noticed certain similarities on their doctrines of virtue and the conflict of duties. The fact that Kant allows for a white lie under any condi— tion was a fact unknown to this writer prior to this study. It was seen, however, that Price's distinction between the absolute and practical virtue of actions, allows each 150 individual to determine (according to circumstances) the act which would be right for him. This distinction allows for a difference in actions which individuals would per- form under given circumstances, and even though none should be absolutely virtuous, they could each be practi- pplly_virtuous. This doctrine allows for the integrity of each individual since each moral agent is responsible only to act according to his perception of rectitude-—imperfect as it may be. Kant, I believe, would not allow for this distinction since the categorical imperative, for him, makes no exceptions. It holds as a formal, universal prin- ciple which Kant feels is the same for all rational beings. Just how he could allow for telling a "white lie" to a person who would have no right to the truth, and would misuse it, but not make allowance for the use of the white lie in order to save the life of another person (since a lie can never be sanctioned by the categorical imperative with respect to benevolent motives), is a glaring incon— sistency in his moral doctrine. Both Price and Kant contribute a system of deontic ethics. Price does not consider the Kant—Constant issue, but if he did he could uphold both thinkers as prOposing acts of practical virtue. It is my conjecture that Price would agree with Constant. Finally, it might be asked how non-empirical (p pp;— ori) ideas of virtues can be, as Price says, "self-evident" WWI-mesa— 'i 151 and yet conflict. Price's explanation is not entirely satisfactory. What he calls "self-evident” is not always self—evident. Much more could be said. The system of natural theology might have been discussed for it is quite similar for both Price and Kant. Further study of the concept of p priori knowledge as treated in the systems of Price and Kant would be valuable. All of these doctrines, however, seem to lie beyond the SCOpe of this present undertaking on ethics. Both thinkers will undoubtedly prove of con— siderable interest to future generations of philos0phers whether they approve or disapprove of Kant and Price. To these future generations we commend the study of ethics in general, and Kant and/or Price in particular, as an activity of dignified endeavor. We especially recommend the study of Price and/or Kant as a background for modern intuitionism. Finally, it is my Opinion that a theory of ethics is needed to do justice to the acceptable points in any ethi- cal theory which is amenable to experience. Even the theories of Price and Kant, as lofty in moral precepts as they are, both fall short at this point. Any theory that is worthy of consideration today must consider the conse— quences of actions as determining, at least in part, their moral worth. BIBLIOGRAPHY Items marked with an asterisk were not consulted in preparing this dissertation, but were referred to by authors that were consulted. Aqvist, Lennart. 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