


THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS AND
EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
William Burt Lauderdale
1967

THESIS



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS
AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

presented by

WILLIAM BURT LAUDERDALE

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

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ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

by William B. Lauderdale

In the search for a principle which can serve as the basis for developing consistent educational practices, philosophers of education have attempted to connect broad philosophic systems to educational practice. Their writings generally represent an attempt to derive educational practice from philosophic systems such as idealism, realism, and pragmatism.

A great deal of confusion has been engendered because some philosophers of education have written about educational practices which "seem" to follow from philosophic systems without indicating what kind of connection is being used to relate the system to the practice. The conclusions which accrue from such an approach represent nothing more than guesses, and a reasonable and coherent position is never attained.

In some instances, writers have concerned themselves with the nature of the connections used, but confusion is often maintained because of a lack of appreciation among

writers for the variety of approaches which exist in the literature. Further, where writers have shown an appreciation for the variety of approaches regarding the nature of connections, they have, in some cases, chosen connections which are inadequate.

The task of this dissertation is twofold. It is first to promote a more meaningful dialogue among philosophers of education by synthesizing, clarifying, and, where warranted, criticizing the most significant methods which have been used to connect philosophic systems to educational practice. The distinct methods that are analyzed come under the headings of logical implication, situational implication, and psychological implication.

The second task of this dissertation is to defend an approach which directs the concern away from the problem of "educational implication" by seeking a method whereby philosophic systems can be used to guide educational practice. The connection which is proposed and defended in this dissertation is best represented as a series of steps which can be identified as a process of thought. These steps are as follows:

1. A philosophic system insists on the relevance of some questions and the irrelevance of others.

2. Given any question, there is a set of statements that are relevant to the question (i.e., sensible and hence can be

considered appropriate answers) and a set of statements that are irrelevant to the question (i.e., not sensible and hence can be considered inappropriate answers).

3. A school practice is guided by a philosophic system when appropriate answers to questions relevant to that system constitute the basis of that school practice.

4. If a statement which is the basis of a school practice is not a member of the set of appropriate answers, then in this case the school practice is not guided by the philosophic system.

The dissertation deals at length with the way in which a philosophic system may be used to determine the relevance of a question. Attention is also given to indicating the grounds on which one determines the sensibleness of an answer to the question.

The dissertation ends with four illustrations which demonstrate the meaning and significance of the thesis.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS
AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

By

William Burt Lauderdale

A THESIS

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1967

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
I. THE RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY.	1
II. AN ANALYSIS OF CONTRASTING CONCEPTIONS OF "EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATION"	10
Formal Logic as a Concept of "Connection"	10
Situational Implication as a Concept of "Connection"	18
Pragmatic Implication as a Concept of "Connection"	31
The Quest for Reasonableness.	39
The Quest for Necessity	47
III. PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES-- THEIR PROPER RELATIONSHIP	54
Thesis.	54
Introductory Remarks	54
The Thesis Stated.	54
The Logic of the Thesis.	56
The Fundamental Defining Characteristics of Realism	62
A Common Commitment.	62
Sensation and the Faculty of Reason.	68
The Essence of Man	70
The Fundamental Defining Characteristics of Pragmatism.	73
The Rejection of Rationalism	73
The Organism and the Total Environ- ment.	76
The Mind and Symbolism	79
Knowledge and Truth.	81
IV. DEMONSTRATING THE PROPER CONCEPT OF "CONNECTION"	87
The Method of Demonstration	87
A Pragmatic Question	89
A Rejection by Realism	93

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

CHAPTER	Page
A Realistic Question and a Rejection by Pragmatism	97
A Concern with the Organism . . .	98
A Concern with the Environment. .	99
A Concern for "All the Students".	104
Conclusion.	108
BIBLIOGRAPHY	110

CHAPTER I

THE RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

The twentieth century American way of life is the product of over two thousand years of changing thought, belief, and value patterns. This way of life does not represent the culmination or the final resolution of Western thought. It is but a temporary pattern of human association. But whatever this American way of life is or may become, it will never be able to divorce itself from its heritage. To understand this way of life, our way of life, demands that we have an understanding of the historical-cultural setting out of which it evolved. The beliefs to which we hold a commitment, and which constitute the rationale for our most fundamental actions, are but reinterpretations of ideas belonging to the past. The formulation and the clarification of these ideas define the task of the discipline of philosophy. Karl Jaspers notes why the task of contemporary philosophy demands a sensitivity to past ideas.

Since the basic questions of philosophy grow, as practical activity, from life, their form is at any given moment in keeping with the historical situation; but this situation is part of the continuity of tradition. The questions put earlier in history are still ours;

in part identical with present ones, word for word, after thousands of years, in part more distant and strange, so that we make them our own only by translation. The basic questions were formulated by Kant with, I felt, moving simplicity: 1. What can I know? 2. What shall I do? 3. What may I hope? 4. What is man? Today these questions have been reborn for us in changed form and thus become comprehensible to us anew also in their origin. The transformation of these questions is due to our finding ourselves in the kind of life that our age produces.¹

The basic questions of western philosophy have evolved from and been formulated in terms of broad frameworks called philosophic systems. Such systems are constructs which facilitate inquiry. They categorize concerns in such a way as to allow for restricted investigation of such areas as the nature of reality, values, mind, etc. But systems also allow for a macroscopic view of a total philosophy. This "whole" view provides a context whereby the specific areas of inquiry acquire new significance in that the way in which these limited concerns relate to each other gives further meaningfulness to their nature. These systems maintain a flexibility which allows for an understanding of points of differentiation among specific philosophers who may share a common orientation in the way they perceive the universe, but who interpret and create unique meanings within this general framework.

These various philosophic systems have provided the framework out of which our most basic democratic commitments

¹Karl Jaspers, "Existenzphilosophie," found in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 139.

have evolved. Democracy is a social theory. It is an unique expression of a pattern of human association which sets the social structure out of which each man may fulfill his human potentialities.

Institutions are the organized means, established by men, which function to fulfill the societal goals which are specified by the social theory. As social theories differ, so too must the institutions which accommodate them differ. Since a democratic social theory stipulates a particular way of life, democratic institutions must emulate the proper structure through which such a social theory may be fulfilled. If institutions are to facilitate efficiently those ends which define the characteristics of the particular social theory, those charged with the development of institutions must be cognizant of the social theory itself. And since the democratic idea can be understood best through an understanding of the general philosophic frameworks out of which it evolved, those charged with the development of democratic institutions must be aware of the significance and proper utilization of those broad philosophic frameworks.

As we are able to re-evaluate our democratic ends in light of our present social-physical environment by the use of broad philosophic frameworks,² so too can we reinterpret our institutionalized means through these same frameworks.

²Examples of this kind of endeavor are abundant. Dewey's Democracy and Education (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916), represents a reinterpretation of democratic ends, but his

Education is one of the major institutions in our democratic society. It is an institution of such dynamic importance that failure to succeed in its function is a sufficient condition for the failure of the society itself. Various methods of investigating ways of clarifying education's proper role in facilitating a democratic society have been proposed. In the search for such methods, serious scholars, who are sensitive to the role played by broad philosophic systems in the development of the democratic idea, have sought a means of developing guidelines for educational practices by drawing implications for education directly from the philosophic systems themselves. They have seriously sought to connect broad philosophic systems to educational practices. But what manner of legitimate connection can be said to exist between these two phenomena? The answers the scholars give to this question are varied and the meanings which they attach to such concepts of "connection" are confusing. To illustrate the dynamics of this confusion, we need

reinterpretation is a direct outgrowth of and can only be understood in terms of his pragmatic orientation. This is why his best critics do not attack the democratic ends he proposes so much as they attack his pragmatic philosophy, e.g., see Alexander Meiklejohn's Education Between Two Worlds (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1942). Meiklejohn here attacks Dewey's pragmatism by developing a rationale for idealism. He then uses this idealistic orientation as the basis not only for criticism of Dewey but also for the development of a democratic social theory of his own. To try to understand either Dewey's or Meiklejohn's democratic social theory without an understanding of the two philosophic systems which serve as the ultimate rationales for these theories is an exercise in futility. Dewey's and Meiklejohn's divergent democratic social theories are merely manifestations of their commitments to divergent philosophic systems.

only refer to an example taken from the literature of philosophy of education.

Harry Broudy asks that we derive our own philosophy of education from a philosophic position such as idealism, realism, etc.³ and Sidney Hook would have us believe that such a stand encourages us to perpetuate garrulous absurdities.⁴ Mr. Hook asserts that educational practices cannot be logically derived from a philosophic commitment. Joe Burnett then corrects Mr. Hook by asserting that Mr. Broudy, read in context, obviously did not mean "logical" in the traditional sense, but in a Deweyan sense of "situational implication."⁵ This is but an example of the confusion that pervades the situation at the present time.

So that a fruitful dialogue might take place among philosophers of education, the task of clarifying the various meanings attached to the concept of "educational implication" ought to be pursued. One of the major tasks of this dissertation, then, will be to analyze the major positions relative

³H. S. Broudy, "How Philosophical can Philosophy of Education Be?" The Journal of Philosophy LII (Oct. 27, 1955), p. 617.

⁴S. Hook, "The Scope of Philosophy of Education," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring, 1956), p. 148.

⁵J. R. Burnett, "Some Observations on the Logical Implications of Philosophic Theory for Educational Theory and Practice," Philosophy of Education Society, Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 1958), p. 52.

to the concept of "educational implication." The general topic of this dissertation is the relation of theory to practice, and since this topic has great scope, it is necessary that limitations be stipulated initially as to what is to be analyzed. A meaningful and important research project can be done on this problem by using three major criteria which limit the areas of concern to: (1) ideas about the relation of broad philosophic systems to educational practice; (2) writings of philosophers of education who have attended specifically to this problem; and (3) writings of twentieth century philosophers of education.

Actually, such criteria leave us with much material to be reviewed which represents a meaningful and current interpretation of the problem under discussion. These criteria are realistic and meaningful because there has been a renewed and somewhat unique effort by twentieth century philosophers of education to deal specifically with the problem of the relation of philosophic systems to educational practice, and also because these educators have utilized the whole of the western tradition of philosophy in their investigations of the problem. An application of these three criteria allows for the categorizing of the research into three major approaches. The review of the literature will be organized around an investigation of these three approaches.

The first approach, and the one most frequently found in the literature, is that which identifies the relation of

philosophic systems to educational practice as one which is logical in the formal sense of the word. Such an approach attempts the deduction of educational practice from broad philosophic frameworks such as idealism, realism, and pragmatism. The use of such logical inferences has been perpetuated primarily by the writers of textbooks on the philosophy of education.⁶ The critics of such an approach have been very vocal and the controversy which has ensued has been an important one in philosophy of education. The second approach, an approach most recently defended by Joe Burnett, involves a concept of "connection" most accurately termed "situational implication." Burnett's thesis is essentially a re-statement of John Dewey's method of logic. Since Dewey's writings concerning the problem have been much more extensive, the treatment of "situational implication" in this dissertation will focus on them. The final approach to be analyzed represents the most recent innovation on the problem. This concept involves a highly psychological approach. Its major advocate, Hobert Burns, has termed it the concept of "pragmatic implication."

The task of chapter II is the clarification and criticism of these three approaches to the problem of the proper

⁶Examples of pervasively used texts which use such an approach are: Van Cleve Morris, Philosophy and the American School (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961); J. Donald Butler, Four Philosophies (New York: Harper and Brothers: Publishers, 1957); Rupert C. Lodge, Philosophy of Education (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947).

connection between philosophic systems and educational practice. This review of the literature will set the context for chapter III of this dissertation, which is the formulation, by this writer, of a concept of "connection" distinct from those concepts reviewed in chapter II. Chapter IV contains four illustrations which demonstrate the meaning of the concept defended in the dissertation.

The very subject matter of this dissertation presupposes as relevant the responsibility of the philosopher of education in our society to provide a direction for educational activities which support and allow for the fulfillment of a democratic state. And further, it recognizes as a legitimate endeavor the concern of those scholars who have attempted to discover educational practices which are appropriate to a democratic social theory by seeking a direct connection between the broad philosophic systems and educational practice. If ever we are to tap the potential of the philosophic systems to guide educational practice, utilizing appropriately any insights gained from such inquiry, it is imperative that we continue to seek an understanding of the nature of the connection which exists between philosophic systems and educational practice. The purpose of this dissertation is to participate meaningfully in such an inquiry and the author hopes that a review of the literature in this area and the advancement of a proposal which redirects the concern of

"educational implication" will make a contribution toward a resolution of the problem of the proper connection between philosophic systems and educational practice.

CHAPTER II

AN ANALYSIS OF CONTRASTING CONCEPTIONS OF "EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATION"

Formal Logic as a Concept of "Connection"

Before dealing with the concept of "logical implication" specifically, it is important to take note of a statement concerning the general nature of the problem that confronts us. Such a statement is available, and it stands as one of the most famous and often quoted articles dealing with our concern in this dissertation. The reference here is to "Philosophy and Science in the Western World; A Historical Overview" by Edward H. Reisner.¹ The article demands inspection here because its content relates so directly to our present area of inquiry and because of the high level of scholarship which the work attains. However, the aspect of Reisner's article which interests us is really tangential to the main purpose for which the work was written.

The author had as his purpose the presentation of a historical survey in which he placed on a time-line the

¹E. H. Reisner, "Philosophy and Science in the Western World; A Historical Overview," Philosophies of Education, Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 9-37.

evolvment of five major philosophic systems. This task completed, he entered into an afterthought in which he addressed himself to the question of the meaningfulness of these philosophic systems in the development of a philosophy of education.

The presumption has been too easily accepted that there is a unitary correspondence between a metaphysical principle and a philosophy of education which might be thought of as logically derivable from it. It is the opinion of the writer that such unitary relationship cannot be substantiated, and from a given metaphysical core a considerable variety of educational philosophies may and actually has been developed.²

To substantiate this latter claim, he illustrates how the same general metaphysical outlook of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas produced widely variant ethical values with widely divergent educational principles. According to Reisner, this example of a common metaphysical outlook producing divergent educational principles illustrates the difficulty of deriving educational practice from a broad philosophic system. Reisner goes on to indicate the variables which are responsible for the difficulty. He notes:

... one cannot draw a philosophy of education out of an abstract metaphysical system because a philosopher, as human being, elaborates upon the metaphysical principle in creating his total world frame, and he does so in terms of his own time and place and personal preferences.³

Reisner is maintaining that the cultural setting of the philosopher sets the context of his experience, and what the

²Ibid., p. 32.

³Ibid., p. 34.

philosopher experiences has the effect of determining, to some extent, his attitudes and personal preferences. These latter conditions are quite independent of the metaphysical formula to which he claims allegiance and yet they directly affect the implementation of that formula.

Metaphysical formulas are abstract and are therefore empty until they are filled in with content which is and must be drawn out of experience.⁴

It is in light of these considerations that Reisner justifies his doubt that there is a unitary relationship between a metaphysical position and educational consequences, the latter being said to be derived from the metaphysical position.

The lack of unitary relationship that Reisner makes reference to cannot reasonably be contested and although other writers have utilized the fact in a way quite different from Reisner, his statement does an admirable job of setting the context for inquiry into their positions. Before we address ourselves to their statements, however, it seems appropriate to level a criticism, not at Reisner's description of the lack of unitary relationship, but at the fact that his concept of unitary relationship is unnecessarily confining. To pursue this point, let us translate his contention into specific symbols.

Allow M_1 to represent a general metaphysical outlook.

⁴Ibid., pp. 36-37.

Allow M_2 to represent a general metaphysical outlook distinct from M_1 .

Allow P_1 to represent an educational principle.

Allow P_2 to represent an educational principle distinct from P_1 .

Reisner asserts that since two philosophers, who accept a common metaphysical outlook, promote divergent educational principles, a unitary correspondence between a metaphysical principle and educational practice cannot be substantiated. Transferring this assertion into our symbols, Reisner is making the claim, by direct inference, that when a unitary correspondence exists in such a way that $M_1 \supset P_1$ the same correspondence could not result in a case where $M_1 \supset P_2$. This claim is totally unnecessary in that it is an unduly narrow concept of unitary correspondence which demands that identical conclusions be drawn from common premises. The rigors of logic allow for the distinction between implication and identity, and the necessity of the logic which exists in the formula $M_1 \supset P_1$ still allows for the validity of saying $M_1 \supset P_2$, so long as P_1 and P_2 do not contradict each other.

In light of this, the common metaphysical outlook of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas could produce widely variant ethical values without necessarily doing violence to the rules of formal logic. The arguments here are not meant to support the thesis that the ethical values of these three philosophers were logically derived from a metaphysical principle, but

merely that the arguments of Reisner do not negate the possibility that they were so derived.

There have been other authors who have also expressed doubt that there exists a logical connection between philosophic systems and educational practices, basing their doubts on the fact that historically, a variety of philosophic systems have been used to defend the same educational practices.⁵ But again, support for such doubt cannot be based on the fact that there is something illogical about a variety of philosophic systems implying common educational practices. To return to the use of our symbols, there is nothing logically inconsistent in stating that $M_1 \supset P_1$ and $M_2 \supset P_1$.

To summarize then, one cannot claim that the rules of formal logic have been violated merely by showing that various philosophic systems have been used to support common educational practices, or that common philosophic orientations have been used to support a variety of educational practices.

We can now turn to the arguments of Hobert Burns, who deals with the problem of connecting philosophic systems to educational practices on a much more specific and detailed basis than does Reisner. According to Burns, his general aim is to do a critical analysis of the problem of "educational implication," and he begins by inquiring into the meaning of "educational implication" as it has been defined by various

⁵One example in defense of this position can be found in Max Wingo's The Philosophy of American Education (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1965), pp. 12-14.

authors. The first position that he investigates is that position which defines "educational implication" as "logical implication," i.e., that position which holds that the connection between philosophic systems and educational practices is a logical one.

After taking some time to describe the nature of the relationship between a premise and a conclusion, as it is construed in formal logic, Burns states:

Yet, it cannot be defensibly maintained that the connection between philosophy and educational practice meets the requirements of formal logic, as this first possible meaning of "educational implication" would suggest, because there is simply no formal way by which the philosopher of education can logically deduce specific educational practices from metaphysical, epistemological, or axiological premises.⁶

The most blatant thing about the above quote is that the argument is circular. Burns is saying merely that one cannot claim that the connection is logical because there is no way to logically make the connection. Besides the evident circularity of this argument, the conclusion that Burns draws is ambiguous and the fact of the ambiguity is crucial.

Does Burns mean that at the present time no such formulation of logic has been discovered, or is he saying that in terms of the nature of logic there can be no way to draw such conclusions? If he means the former, his assertion is true and he leaves open the fact that the problem may be merely a technical one. If he means the latter, the assertion is not

⁶Hobert W. Burns and Charles J. Brauner (ed.), Philosophy of Education: Essays and Commentaries (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1962), p. 357.

justifiable in terms of any adequate arguments presented, i.e., he does not make a case that would allow such a conclusion to be considered warrantable. Burns does state that an appropriate concept of "educational implication" must make possible inferences from actions and beliefs and not just inferences from proposition to proposition. But, even though formal logic finds its domain only in the latter relationships, what part such inferences will play in the establishment of a proper connection between formal philosophies and educational practices is yet to be determined.

Obviously, it is crucial that we decide whether the problem is a technical one or whether strict symbolic logic is just by nature not utilizable in a concern with the concept of "educational implication." How we see the problem determines the philosophic questions that we would ask, and we must require of ourselves the greatest caution in our commitment to the applicability or nonapplicability of logic. In the discipline of mathematics, for example, had Gödel found questions involving mathematical propositions to be relevant only in a closed formal system and had he not questioned the relevance of the system itself, his findings and hypotheses concerning the nature of non-resolvable propositions would never have come into being. When warranted (as is the case at this point in philosophy of education) let us allow the problem of the possible fruitfulness of formal logic in the establishment of a meaningful connection between philosophic systems

and educational practices remain an open question. As Robert Wilhoyte notes:

Educational philosophers, in general, believe in applying the principle of parsimony or in using Occam's razor. Sometimes the repeated and proper application of these logical tools may leave no simple or unified concept after the pruning has been completed. This does not mean that we should not prune. It either means that there was no central theme there in the first place or that our techniques of pruning are by no means perfect. We cannot say that there is no core of meaning in the phrase "philosophy and philosophy of education are logically related"; i.e., we cannot reduce the phrase to a contradiction, but neither should we accept the prima facie meaning. Thus, if the tools of logical analysis do not clarify the meaning of certain phrases and/or statements, we must seek better tools; for what is today not indeterminate, but merely undetermined, may be determined tomorrow.⁷

In light of the evidence presented, it is reasonable to maintain a skepticism about the existence of a logical relationship between philosophic systems and educational practice. It is unwarranted to deny, as Burns does, the fact that formal logic may ultimately play an important role in the solution of the problem of the nature of the relationship between philosophic systems and educational practice. A concept of "connection" in philosophy of education which is more explicitly developed than that of formal logic is the concept of "situational implication." It is to this latter concept that we now turn our attention.

⁷Robert L. Wilhoyte, "Is it Meaningful to Assert that Philosophy and Philosophy of Education are Logically Related?" Educational Theory, Vol. 15, no. 1 (January, 1965), p. 18.

Situational Implication as a
Concept of "Connection"

The previous section of this dissertation was concerned with logical implication in the formal sense. By definition then, the problem has been confined to the relationship of propositions to propositions. Situational implication goes beyond such confines in an attempt to develop a proper concept of "connection."

The word "relation" is used to cover three very different matters which in the interest of coherent logical doctrine must be discriminated. (1) Symbols are "related" directly to one another; (2) they are "related" to existence by the mediating intervention of existential operations; (3) existences are "related" to one another in the evidential sign-signified function. That these three modes of "relation" are different from one another and that the use of one and the same word tends to cover up the difference and thereby create doctrinal confusion, is evident.⁸

Whereas the advocates of a strictly logical connection focus on number one above, the defenders of situational implication focus on the second kind of relationship. Philosophers of education adhering to this second approach do not demean the importance of investigating the relations of propositions to propositions. They note that such a concern is highly important in that reasoning and discourse are dependent on the development and understanding of what Dewey calls the proper relation of symbol-meanings. The logical relationships of symbols, however, and the application of such symbols to the

⁸John Dewey, Logic (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938), p. 55.

arena of human activity are two distinct problems. The latter problem has existential reference and, therefore, demands a quality of relations distinct from that of formal logic in the same way that the development of a mathematical system, which involves only a concern for the relation of symbol-meanings, and the application of mathematical symbol-meanings to the discipline of physics are two distinct activities.

It is the application of symbols to existential situations that is of concern when connecting philosophic systems to educational practice. Formal logic, according to those adhering to the situational view, is therefore an inadequate approach. To clarify this situational view, we will begin by noting Dewey's answer to Stephen Pepper's criticism of Dewey's theory of esthetics.

Mr. Pepper refers to an attempt on his part at one time to derive a theory of esthetics, at least in outline, from the "implications of the general pragmatic attitude in the face of relevant facts," and being led thereby to predict what a good pragmatist would say upon the subject. I cannot charge Mr. Pepper with trying to deduce, in a way opposed to pragmatic empiricism, esthetic theory from general premises in isolation from experienced subject-matter.⁹

Any connection then will have to be made with reference to propositions as they relate to existential situations. Experience becomes a legitimate factor in determining the kinds of connections that are made and since the connecting

⁹Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey (Chicago: Northwestern University, 1939), p. 549.

must be done "in the face of relevant facts," arbitrary connections are denied as legitimate. Further, it will become evident that the process of properly connecting propositions to existential situations requires an understanding of the form of experimental logic in general. A clarification of this form is our next task.

Where formal logic is concerned with the relations between different forms of propositions, experimental logic is concerned with the mode of thinking that effects certain consequences in human behavior. The general consequence sought after is primarily the acquisition of knowledge which allows a person to resolve problematic situations efficiently.¹⁰ The actual form of the logical process is therefore relative to the situational context.

In other words, the actual process of inquiring generates the logical principles which govern it. The laws of logic do not spring from the nature of reason as such. They are developed in the process of inquiring, and especially in the process of scientific thinking.

Through inquiring we obtain "warranted beliefs," beliefs that can be relied on because they can be verified experimentally. The best warranted beliefs, says Dewey, are the laws of science. Thus the principles of logic state the methods of science, and logic itself is the methodology of science. That is to say, logic formulates, refines, and systematizes the methods of inquiry that practicing scientists have found to be most effective.

How does Dewey define inquiry? It is, he says, "the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its

¹⁰The general philosophic rationale which lends support to and clarifies the meaning of this statement is included in Chapter III, part III of this dissertation.

constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole." In other words, inquiring is the resolving of a problematic situation.¹¹

Kneller adds that:

Since, for Dewey, the principles of logic are products of time and place, they are subject to change. As science progresses, it opens up new fields of inquiry and develops new methods to inquire into them. When it does, logic itself must be modified accordingly,...¹²

Generally, the pattern of inquiry which serves to explain experimental logic is conceived as a number of steps of effective thought process. They are as follows: first, thinking arises as a response to an indeterminate situation. Whenever an organism finds itself in a tensional situation, it naturally attempts to re-establish a state of equilibrium. Second, the organism must recognize and identify the nature of the problem which is causing the tensional situation. Third, the factors involved in the problem must be organized in a way which allows for the determination of the relevancy of facts in the situation and the hypothesizing of possible solutions to the problem. The hypotheses (the plans of action) issue from and are to be considered in light of the facts which are deemed relevant to the problematic situation. This reasoning process requires not only a knowledge about the existing situation, but speculation, based on this knowledge,

¹¹George F. Kneller, Logic and Language of Education (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 41.

¹²Ibid., p. 42.

about the state of some future situation if certain plans of action were instituted. The hypotheses therefore are evaluated in a functional way, i.e., their worth is judged in terms of their predictable success in resolving the problematic situation. The fourth step is the carrying out of a plan of action. It is this actual experimentation which either validates or denies a hypothesis as appropriate to the situation. The last step is the verification of the hypothesis. If the plan of action does resolve the problematic situation, then the hypothesis is considered valid. An expression of the knowledge gained is called a warranted assertion. All that a knowledge claim maintains is that if certain steps are taken under such and such conditions, it is warranted to assert that such and such will be the consequence.

Obviously, this process is more complex than this succinct statement of the basic logical form would indicate. For example, all situations are unique, but many situations have common elements which allow for certain warranted assertions to be directly relevant to a variety of conditions. Also, the actual processes of investigating create new problems and new insights into problems, which open new areas of investigation. Indeterminate situations are themselves not compartmentalized. They overlap and are continually created and sometimes are only partially resolved. But the complexity of the organism's relation to its environment or the subtle

fashion required of the organism to cope intelligently with the environment should not deter us from recognizing the meaningfulness and importance of the basic guidelines for action that the logic of experimentalism affords.

The very meaning of situational implication is couched within the basic framework of experimental logic. As L. M. Brown points out, this form of implication has nothing to do with logical necessity, but rather indicates the probability of certain consequences being effected as a result of certain actions performed. Observation, based on past experience, facilitates the formulation of generalizations which can be used for affecting certain consequences and in this way for controlling, to some extent, the environment.¹³ More specifically, situational implication means that resolutions to problematic situations are implicit within the situation itself, in that knowledge of the causal conditions within a situation provides clues to predictable consequences which can be used to improve the relationship of the organism to its environment.¹⁴

An illustration of the meaningfulness of situational implication could be selected from many levels of concern.

¹³L. M. Brown, General Philosophy in Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 71-73.

¹⁴Because of the similarity between situational implication and ordinary inductive inference, a clarification of their basic difference seems necessary. As we have already noted, situational implication has a direct concern with the relevancy of hypotheses. The appropriateness of a hypothesis

The levels could range from international situations to individual relations. An illustration selected from any level would represent a unique problematic situation not only in the kind of causal conditions relevant to it, but also in the complexity and scope of the conditions which must be taken into account in order to deal with it. This writer chooses to illustrate the concept of situational implication by the use of the problematic situation of the school dropout in the American society.

An article in the Saturday Review by Bernard Bard contains an excellent critique of the general approach that our society is taking in trying to resolve the problem of increasing dropout rates.¹⁵ The general problematic situation is this: with modern technology demanding higher levels of training, a person without a meaningful high school education is unlikely to find appropriate employment, and his failure in this area will lead to his becoming a socially maladjusted and delinquent individual.

is judged in terms of its potential to resolve problematic situations, resulting in an improved relation of the organism to its environment. The meaning of a pragmatically improved environment (see Chapter III, part III of this dissertation) is therefore not only a concern of situational implication but happens to be a distinctly moral consideration. Ordinary inductive inference has no such moral dimension as a part of its structure. The fact that a part of the process, referred to as situational implication, concerns the selection of legitimate hypotheses based on pre-established intended consequences, not only distinguishes situational implication from ordinary inductive inference but makes it a distinctly pragmatic notion.

¹⁵Bernard Bard, "Why Dropout Campaigns Fail," Saturday Review, September 17, 1966, pp. 78-79, 95-97.

We have already stated that knowledge of the situation provides clues to hypotheses which will aid in the intelligent treatment of the problem. Such clues serve the dual function of restricting appropriate hypotheses, thus aiding in the identification of what would be considered unintelligent treatment of the problem. To illustrate how the knowledge of causal factors within the situation can serve to eliminate a hypothesis as appropriate, consider the fact that we know that dropouts frequently have been classroom failures. In light of this, to hypothesize that merely returning the dropout to school will aid in the resolution of the problematic situation is absurd. Subjecting young people to situations in which they have already failed will most likely increase their frustration and solidify further their feelings that an education is worthless. Rather than resolving the problematic situation, such action increases the probability of the person rejecting all formal education and becoming a future deviant within society. By taking into account this one simple factor within the total situation, the hypothesis that the problematic situation can be resolved merely by getting the young dropout back in the school is rejected.

But furthermore, we have stated that resolutions to problematic situations are often implicit within the situation itself. An illustration of this point can be expressed by using the same problem. The theorem known as the self-fulfilling prophecy can be employed to characterize a condition

relevant in the dropout situation. Robert K. Merton gives the following definition of the self-fulfilling prophecy:

The first part of the theorem provides an unceasing reminder that men respond not only to the objective features of a situation, but also, and at times primarily, to the meaning this situation has for them. And once they have assigned some meaning to the situation, their consequent behavior and some of the consequences of that behavior are determined by the ascribed meaning.¹⁶

Translating this theorem into our concern with the dropouts, when the potential dropout perceives himself as being defined by teachers and administrators as a school failure, he tends to react negatively to the total school situation. This reaction fosters antagonisms which increase the probability of the prophecy of failure being fulfilled. A knowledge of this condition existing within the situation provides a clue to the formulation of a hypothesis which might prove effective in resolving the problematic situation. If the potential dropout, or the dropout who has returned to school, could be truthfully informed that his past records were unavailable to his present teacher, the grounds for his perception of being defined as a failure would be negated. This would alleviate, in some cases, the intensity of the negativism that the dropout has toward the school situation, and would thereby diminish the probability of his being a school failure.

¹⁶Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1964), pp. 421-22.

Experiments which are based on this hypothesis have been undertaken and the success achieved by withholding records from teachers has, according to Bard, national implications. One program in Washington, D. C., found that students who normally would be classified as hopeless, worked quite effectively when they found out that their transcripts were not a part of the school files.

Knowing that their past records of failure had, in effect, been erased the dropouts gave themselves a clean slate and made good.¹⁷

These illustrations make clear that situational implication is inherently a part of the more inclusive form of experimental logic. The fruitful implications drawn from the dropout situation were, for example, dependent on a correct analysis of the nature of the problem confronted (step two of experimental logic) and the determination of which facts were relevant to a situation (step three of experimental logic). But even after this analysis was made, the final connection of this knowledge to the plans of action proposed was not automatic. In recognition of this point, Joe Burnett states:

... At the same time it should be noted that it may be impossible to specify the sufficient conditions for adequate or "correct" connection--this for the reason that there seems to be something involved in the connection of theory to practice which is closely akin to the "inductive leap." The connection process appears to be more of an imaginative or psychological "art" than a strict, logical process.¹⁸

¹⁷Bard, op. cit., p. 96.

¹⁸J. R. Burnett, "Some Observations on the Logical Implications of Philosophic Theory for Educational Theory and

In terms of the situational view, Burnett's statement is both feasible and appropriate. Just as in the philosophy of science, a distinction must be made between the process of discovery of hypotheses and the process of validating hypotheses, so too must the situational view make the same distinction. How a scientist "hits" upon a certain hypothesis is an empirical problem and so deals only with matters of fact. There is, however, a logic of validation of hypotheses which scientists use. This logic consists of a set of normative statements that are rules which are used to determine the degree of acceptability of a hypothesis. When one talks about the scientific method, he is talking about the method of validating hypotheses regardless of how they were discovered. The method of connecting theory to practice, according to the situational view, cannot be fully explained because the method of discovery of educational hypotheses cannot be fully explained and is not open to logical validation.

Even though the sufficient conditions for proper connections cannot be stipulated, the necessary steps which are inherent in the general definition of situational implication, and which indicate the procedures necessary for effective implications being drawn from situations, are as follows:

Practice," Philosophy of Education Society, Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 1958), p. 54.

First, a unique and problematic situation is analyzed by the techniques appropriate to the social sciences. Second, the knowledge gained from this analysis is used, along with generally validated scientific hypotheses, to predict an educational practice which will resolve the problematic situation. This latter prediction (which connects theory to practice) is in the form of a hypothesis which is the result of an "inductive leap." Third, the hypothesis rendered is validated in terms of its success at producing intended consequences.

Thus we have a cursory description of the meaning of "situational implication," but there is some confusion in the literature as to the proper use of this concept of "connection." It is necessary then to comment on the limitations of its utility in the solution to the problem of the relationship of philosophy to educational practice.

As a proponent of the concept of "situational implication," Joe Burnett states:

... One can say that the most general statements of metaphysics and epistemology do have implications for specific practices if, and only if, there is established a connection between them and statements of empirical practice which permits of valid process.¹⁹

It is clear, however, that the characteristics which define situational implication are different than those which would be involved in connections appropriate to philosophic systems which are fundamentally opposed to pragmatism.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 53.

For example, one proposition which is basic to Dewey's pragmatic philosophy is that human behavior becomes intelligent in terms of the total organism's ability to resolve problematic situations. Also, each situation the organism faces is unique.

Properly understood, intelligence is merely an unusually flexible and finely adjusted habit whose function is to improve the organism's relation to its environment.²⁰

This pragmatic way of viewing the world is very much reflected in the concept of "situational implication." Finding unique existential situations central to the process of valid connection and interpreting the truth of the connection in terms of purposes formulated by man are highly pragmatic notions. What about a philosophic system that focuses on universal truths as well as on human purposes being guided by the natural order of the universe? Surely this latter system could not accommodate a connection which is defined in terms of propositions contradictory to the system's most basic commitments.

The author of this dissertation is very critical of Burnett's statement that various philosophic systems can be connected to empirical practices by the use of "situational implication." Rather, situational implication renders appropriate connections only when connecting a pragmatic philosophic system to empirical practices. Burnett's

²⁰W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1952), p. 950.

attempt to connect anti-pragmatic philosophic systems to empirical practices by the use of a pragmatic concept of "connection" is totally invalid.

What is needed, if the relationship between philosophic systems and educational practice is to be discovered, is a concept of "connection" which is inclusive enough to describe the relation between any philosophic system and educational practice. In Chapter III of this dissertation, the author will attempt to define such a concept of "connection." This definition will encompass situational implication in terms of its contribution toward rendering pragmatic educational proposals, but the concept will also be broad enough to encompass any philosophic system. The problem is one of discovering a definition that will indicate that which is common to all connections between any philosophic system and educational practice. Before such a definition is attempted, however, there is one more concept of "connection" that has been developed with enough clarity and sophistication to warrant our attention.

Pragmatic Implication as a Concept of "Connection"

This last meaning of the connection between formal philosophies and educational practice is that concept of "educational implication" to which Hobert Burns holds a commitment. The whole basis of his concept of "implication" revolves around the concept of purposive behavior. That is to say,

the actions of men are connected and make sense only as they relate to those belief systems to which men hold commitments.

... the beliefs of an individual are the causal conditions of his actions; in this sense his actions are implied by his beliefs, and his beliefs are to be inferred from his actions.²¹

The connection here, put simply, is that the relationship of a belief system of a man to the practices in which he indulges is a causal relationship, properly referred to as a "psychological connection." The beliefs are presupposed by the actions and can be judged in terms of meaningfulness and consistency only in a pragmatic means-end sense. A man acts in a certain way because of his belief that the act will have a certain predictable consequent.

To illustrate this concept of "implication," Burns notes that the interrogation by Sherlock Holmes of a witness to a crime, implies that Holmes believes the witness to have information relevant to the solution of the crime. In fact:

... it [this belief of Holmes--this psychological presupposition] is a necessary condition, for if he did not believe that his witness could possibly produce some relevant information about the crime, Holmes simply would not bother to interrogate him.²²

What Burns is saying here is that the question, "why is Holmes interrogating the witness?" presupposes the proposition "Holmes believes the witness to have information relevant to the solution of the crime." This proposition, according to Burns, is a presupposition because the act of interrogation

²¹Burns, op. cit., p. 360.

²²Ibid., p. 361.

would be pointless if the proposition were not true. As a result, Burns claims a condition of necessity existing between the proposition concerning the belief of Holmes and the question concerning the act of interrogation.

An analysis of Burns' total position must begin by noting that Burns cannot here claim a condition of necessity existing between belief and action because the proposition concerning Holmes' belief is not a presupposition of the question concerning the act of interrogation. Let it be noted that:

A presupposition of a given question is any proposition whose truth is necessary to the validity of the question; that is, any proposition such that if it were false the question would be unintelligible.²³

Now a true presupposition of the question, "why is Holmes interrogating the witness?" is simply "Holmes is interrogating the witness." Obviously, if the presupposition here is false, the question is unintelligible, i.e., if Holmes is not interrogating a witness, it is unintelligible to ask why Holmes is interrogating a witness. However, the proposition, "Holmes believes the witness to have information relevant to the solution of the crime" could be false and the question would still be intelligible. That is, if one knew that Holmes did not believe that the witness had information relevant to the solution of the crime, it would still make sense to ask why he was interrogating the witness.

²³Henry S. Leonard, Principles of Right Reason (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957), p. 35.

It is, for example, an empirical possibility that Holmes was interrogating the witness because the witness was a beautiful woman with whom Holmes wanted to become acquainted in order to gain a social entree. Even though this is inappropriate to the scene as a lay spectator views it, if one is to take the total situation into account, one has to know, as Burns points out, the "knowledge of the actor's purposes and the situation in which he acts."²⁴ Here then we must become a sophisticate, for what would be inferred in the interrogation scene by the ordinary observer might be quite different from what would be inferred by Holmes' psychiatrist if the latter were watching the proceedings.

The point here is that the proposition that Burns offers concerning the belief of Holmes may be true or false and the question concerning Holmes' act of interrogation is still intelligible. This being the case, the proposition is not a presupposition of the question. This is not to say that there is no causal connection between the beliefs and actions of Holmes. However, the act may be caused by an infinite variety of beliefs but the act itself presupposes none of these beliefs. Since Burns claims there is a necessary connection between Holmes' belief and action, on the basis that the former is a presupposition of the latter, we can reject his argument concerning the necessity of the connection. Stated

²⁴Burns, op. cit., p. 363.

positively, Burns, using his present arguments, cannot claim a necessary condition existing between the propositions concerning the beliefs and actions of Holmes.

But the dismissal of Burns' claim that his concept of "connection" is based on a condition of necessity does not constitute an adequate reason for avoiding a further and more intense investigation of his total position. To continue then, one crucial aspect of Burns' concept of "connection" involves his commitment that inferences are to be drawn from beliefs to action on the basis of psychological causality and behavior is to be interpreted in a pragmatic means-end sense. His position here is also untenable.

An act may be psychologically consistent with a person's belief system and yet inconsistent with pragmatic reasonableness. For example, a psychologist may analyze a person's belief system about a committed act and explain why the person committed the act and show that the behavior was consistent even though the act itself might have been quite irrational. It makes perfect sense to hear a psychologist in criminal court announce that it would be valid to predict that a defendant, if allowed to remain in society, would exhibit a most consistent behavior and continue to commit a most irrational crime. In this case, would Burns ask that the judge draw inferences from beliefs to actions on the basis of consistent psychological causality or on the basis that men usually act pragmatically? Burns cannot ask that the judge do both and still render one decision.

The confusion which Burns fosters here is primarily the result of his tendency to espouse a subjectivistic psychology and a pragmatic philosophy. To illustrate his subjectivistic psychological approach, we need only go back to the example concerning Sherlock Holmes, where Burns attempts to draw inferences in terms of Holmes' belief system. Burns states that Holmes simply would not bother to interrogate the witness if he did not believe that his witness could possibly produce some relevant information about the crime. Like all subjectivists, Burns looks to the belief system of the actor in order to draw inferences for interpreting behavior. As explained by one subjectivist:

... at the instant of behaving, each person's actions seem to him to be the best and most effective acts he can perform under the circumstances. If, at that instance, he knew how to behave more effectively, he would do so.²⁵

Accommodating this approach, Combs and Snygg go on to delineate two of the basic defining characteristics of their subjectivistic approach. The two characteristics are (1) that actions are a result of the actor's belief system at the instant of behaving, and (2) that interpretations of such actions are entirely confined to an analysis of the actor's belief system at the instant of behaving. It is important to note that when Burns analyzes situations in an effort to understand and interpret human behavior, he always confines

²⁵Arthur W. Combs and Donalg Snygg, Individual Behavior (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 17.

his analysis to the same two criteria which are used by the subjectivists, Combs and Snygg.

John Dewey, on the other hand, looks to the total situation in order to explain behavior. Dewey's approach attempts to interpret behavior on the basis of the relationship of the total biological-social organism to the physical environment. This allows him to evaluate behavior in terms of the resultant change in the total situation. Dewey is therefore an outspoken critic of subjectivistic psychologies. He claims that they are not only un-pragmatic but also, in the end, they sanction pathological behavior.

... situations that are disturbed and troubled, confused or obscure, cannot be straightened out, cleared up and put in order, by manipulation of our personal states of mind.²⁶

If Burns is opposed to the subjectivistic position that Dewey is criticizing, he nowhere develops a rationale to counter such a charge. On the contrary, his insistence that (1) a man acts in a certain way because of his belief that the act will have a certain predictable consequence, and (2) finds this to be an appropriate condition from which to draw legitimate connections from beliefs to actions, forces Burns into the subjectivistic camp. His afterthought that a man ordinarily acts rationally (in a pragmatic sense) is not only a generalization without empirical support, but also is a generalization that can hardly be considered an adequate

²⁶Dewey, op. cit., p. 106.

rationale against Burns being placed in the subjectivistic camp.

If Burns is going to develop a consistent and meaningful concept of connection, he is going to have to reject either his phenomenological approach to psychology and adopt a more scientifically oriented social psychology, or he is going to have to relinquish his demand that behavior be interpreted in a pragmatic means-end sense.

Thus far in this section, the writer has challenged Burns' position on two counts. It has been charged that Burns' psychological connection cannot be characterized in any sense as a necessary connection, and further, this writer has asserted that Burns' position is basically incompatible with the pragmatic philosophy.²⁷ These criticisms however, are not sufficient to warrant a dismissal of any further consideration of Burns' position. On the contrary, Burns has made a real contribution in his attempt to attack the problem of "educational implication" by seeking a psychologically causal connection. He has indicated his awareness that many scholars will tend to reject his position because of a current bias in educational philosophy against the development of philosophic commitments on psychological grounds.

²⁷Because of the confusion engendered by Burns' practice of using "pragmatic implication" and "psychological implication" interchangeably, and because this writer finds Burns' position to be inappropriate to pragmatism, future reference to Burns' position in this dissertation will be designated by the term "psychological implication."

But regardless of whether or not this bias exists, it behooves us to investigate one more aspect of Burns' position.

In the next section, we will not be concerned with whether his concept of "connection" can be characterized by a condition of necessity, or whether his position is compatible with pragmatism, but rather with a concern for the fundamental problem involved in validating any connection between philosophic systems and educational practice, when that connection is based on psychological causality.

The Quest for Reasonableness

Hobert Burns' use of "psychological implication" is meant to include the fact that inferences must be made between beliefs and actions as well as from proposition to proposition. This not only recognizes the present inadequacy of symbolic logic to solve our particular problem, but also reflects the need for a more pervasive and complex sense of "educational implication" than would be contained in any purely symbolic structure. The complexity of the task is most dramatically made clear as one recognizes the moral nature of education. The normative dimension of all beliefs and actions involving concepts in education forces the philosopher of education into the problem of discovering the relationship between descriptive and normative statements.

All of these considerations are recognized by Burns as relevant to the problem at hand. He is correct in this recognition. His own commitment to this relationship being

explained in terms of "psychological implication" is, as we have seen, open to criticism when he further maintains that the relationship must also be interpreted in light of rational behavior. To pursue this point, let us consider the general basis of "psychological implication." Burns notes:

To say, then, that philosophy implies educational practices is to say that an educator follows some set of educational procedures because he believes certain things about the universe and man; if he believed other things then, to be psychologically consistent, he would follow other practices. Perhaps this type of connection is one defensible explanation of the nature and function of the "educational implication."²⁸

It might be well to look at this statement from the point of view of another scholar who has taken seriously a commitment involving a psychologically causal relationship between descriptive and normative statements. The reference here is to the work of Charles L. Stevenson in Ethics and Language.

Stevenson begins the task of clarifying the meaning of ethical terms by concerning himself with questions dealing with the nature of ethical agreement and disagreement. Disputes in ethics revolve around two distinct kinds of disagreements.

The two kinds of disagreement differ mainly in this respect: the former [disagreement in belief] is concerned with how matters are truthfully to be described and explained; the latter [disagreement in attitude] is concerned with how they are to be favored or disfavored, and hence with how they are to be shaped by human efforts.²⁹

²⁸Burns, op. cit., p. 361.

²⁹Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (Clinton, Mass.: The Colonial Press, Inc., Issued as a Yale Paper-bound, 1960), p. 4.

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An acknowledgement of the appropriateness of this distinction renders inadequate the Burns' proposal which precedes it. An educator follows some set of educational procedures not only because he believes certain things about the universe and man, but because he holds those beliefs in a certain way. The way in which he favors or disfavors these things determines, in part, the educational procedures he will find appropriate. Even though Burns openly acknowledges the normative dimension of educational statements, he does not take into account the role of attitudes as being a significant factor in understanding the function of "educational implication." His analysis of the concept of "implication" is thereby rendered inadequate. The dynamics of this inadequacy is apparent in the following example.

By way of illustrating the second type of pragmatic implication, imagine a high-school disciplinarian interrogating an unruly pupil about some missing school property. On the basis of his actions we can infer three sets, or kinds, of propositions: (1) psychological propositions about the beliefs and anticipation of the actor, (2) empirical propositions about the antecedents and consequents of the act, and (3) conditional propositions about the empirical conditions needed if the intended consequences of the act are to be realized.³⁰

Note that there is nothing mentioned about the attitude of the high-school disciplinarian toward the act of interrogating, toward unruly pupils, or toward missing school property. Yet, the establishment of the connection between beliefs and actions is dependent on the supplying of "reasons

³⁰Burns, op. cit., p. 363.

for" the act which can be justified or validated in a pragmatic means-end sense. Burns applies the following rule:

... the general rule governing propositions pragmatically implied from an act is that such propositions come to be the conditions of rational action in that specific situation; or put in terms of tollendo tollens again, if these propositions are false then the act itself is pointless.³¹

Now surely the disposition of the disciplinarian in the previous example would affect his actions. If his attitude could be characterized as one similar to a Cotton Mather, the "point of" or the "reasons for" his act would be held with an intensity quite distinct from a person with essentially the same beliefs but with a more permissive attitude. How that act of interrogation would be carried out would be, to a great extent, dependent on the attitude of the disciplinarian.

None of this is to indicate that beliefs and attitudes are or can be analyzed as totally separate entities. As Stevenson points out, one's attitude affects one's beliefs and what one believes clearly makes a difference in one's attitude. However, it must be made clear that an analysis of a person's acts, in order to draw propositions which will make sense and have meaning in terms of the purposiveness of the act, will have to take into account the person's attitude toward the object with which he is interacting. To demand of a person that he supply adequate reasons for his actions, and

³¹Ibid., p. 364.

at the same time show no appreciation for his disposition toward the object he is interacting with, is to miss an extremely important aspect in the determination of purposive activity.

To summarize the concern at this point, Burns (1) does acknowledge that education is moral in nature and (2) does acknowledge that educational terms have emotive meaning. At the same time he claims that (1) the connection between beliefs and actions is one which is causal in nature, (2) that it is primarily psychological, and (3) that propositions about an actor's belief are part of the psychological inference. This writer, however, would submit that an allegiance to all of these factors demands that one's disposition toward an object be taken into account in order to explain adequately an actor's behavior. His disposition toward the object will determine, in part, the way in which he reacts to the object.

The basis of "psychological implication" is dependent on an ability to infer a person's beliefs from the character of his actions. Further, empirical propositions about the "reasons for" an act are also implied by the character of the act. Such propositions are but scientific explanations which can be validated. Explanations of this sort take the form of assertions about an actor's state of mind, and like all psychological statements, they are "open to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, whether introspective or

behavioristic."³² But if an adequate explanation of an actor's behavior must take into account not only that which he believes, but his attitude, the question arises: are propositions about an actor's attitude subject as well to validation by empirical methods?

Charles L. Stevenson attends specifically to this problem and he renders a significant contribution to our concerns by noting not only the fact that ethical disagreements can involve disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude, but also that, owing to these distinct kinds of disagreement, the methods used to support ethical judgments demand a distinction. The choice of the method used is itself an ethical judgment. It becomes clear, however, that the nature of the method chosen is related to the nature of the disagreement. For instance, disagreement in belief is often subject to resolution by the utilization of knowledge, reason, and inquiry. But as Stevenson also notes:

... if any ethical dispute is not rooted in disagreement in belief, then no reasoned solution of any sort is possible.³³

He goes on to show that some disagreements in attitude can be resolved in a related way in light of the fact that attitudes can be changed by changing beliefs. In this case:

Such a procedure is characteristic of rational methods, ... But there are other ways of altering a man's attitude--ways that are not mediated by reasons which change

³²Stevenson, op. cit., p. 26.

³³Ibid., p. 138.

beliefs. Like all psychological phenomena, attitudes are the outcome of many determining factors, and beliefs figure as but one set of factors among others. To the extent that the other factors are subject to control in the course of an argument, and so may contribute to changes in man's attitudes, they both can be and are used as a means of securing ethical agreement. Such procedures constitute the "nonrational methods" of ethics,...³⁴

Although Burns calls our attention to the fact and importance of emotive meaning in educational terms, it is Stevenson who notes that the approaching of ethical judgments is not analogous to the approaching of scientific judgments because ethical judgments must take emotive meaning into account. Burns neither acknowledges nor disputes this latter fact; he merely alludes to the existence of emotive meaning in educational terms.

The "reasons for" an act in a psychologically causal context must consider irrational factors if an explanation of the act is to be adequate. This is true whether one consults the hypotheses of a Freudian who deals with biological characteristics in a social context or a phenomenologist who talks about reasonableness being arbitrary as a method of justification. Burns is therefore wrong when he states that the "assumption of rational action is necessary if one expects to understand and explain human behavior;..."³⁵ On the contrary, not only must irrational factors be taken into account in an analysis of human behavior, but an analysis of the justification for those acts by the actor must also take into account

³⁴Ibid., p. 139.

³⁵Burns, op. cit., p. 364.

nonrational methods of that justification. Attitudes do affect how one acts, and attitudes are not subject to validation by rational means. The impact of this is exemplified by Stevenson as he addresses himself to the concept of validity as it relates to ethical disagreements.

There are certain aspects of ethical arguments--and very important ones--to which questions about validity are obviously relevant. If an ethical argument applies formal logic,..., it will be valid or invalid in whatever sense the logic is valid or invalid. If it uses empirical reasons, the inductive support given to them in their turn (as distinct from the support given by the reasons to the ethical judgment) may be called valid or invalid in whatever sense the empirical methods used are valid or invalid. Thus when ethics uses the methods of logic or science directly, the ordinary canons of validity remain in full operation.

On the other hand, validity has nothing to do with persuasive methods. It is cognitively nonsensical to speak either of 'valid or invalid' persuasion. If one is led by the excitement of persuasion into making logical errors, it is the logic, and not the persuasion, that is invalid.³⁶

To summarize our arguments to this point, we began by noting, with the aid of the writings of C. L. Stevenson, that moral disagreements arise not only because of disagreements in belief but also because of disagreements in attitude. However, the formation of attitudes is dependent on such non-rational methods as persuasion, e.g., the use of emotively charged words by one person, in an attempt to change the attitude of another person. The validation of attitudes is not subject then solely to logical analysis and therefore, the validation of moral arguments is not subject solely to logical analysis.

³⁶Stevenson, op. cit., pp. 152-53.

This writer contends that Stevenson's arguments are directly applicable to Burns' concept of "pragmatic implication." Central to the Burns' thesis is the view that since people behave in a way which they can rationally justify, their beliefs can be implied from their behavior. But this writer holds, with Stevenson, that such justification must take into consideration attitudes which are formed non-rationally and therefore such justification is not subject solely to logical analysis. Burns' characterization of "pragmatic implication" as a concept that can be analyzed in logical terms alone, is therefore false. For it follows that if the ability to imply beliefs from actions is dependent on an understanding of the "reasons for" the action, and if the "reasons for" an act cannot be analyzed solely on logical grounds, then the relationship between beliefs and action cannot be analyzed solely on logical grounds. From the preceding arguments, it can be concluded that all psychologically based concepts of "educational implication," which find their validation dependent on an analysis of the "reasons for" people behaving the way they do, will have to take into account nonrational factors in the validation of the concept.

The Quest for Necessity

One of the most succinct and at the same time valuable confrontations with the problem concerning us is leveled by Robert Guttchen in an article called "The Quest for Necessity."

Through a criticism of Burns, Guttchen develops a thesis that must be taken most seriously. He first agrees with Burns in his commitment to the position that a strict logical deduction from metaphysical premises to educational directives is impossible. He disagrees with Burns, however, in that, according to Guttchen, such a recognition does not force us into a search for another mode of a logically necessary relationship between philosophy and practice.

To do so is to be seduced by criteria which may be appropriate to mathematics and science, but which have never been appropriate for philosophy....³⁷

Guttchen's first argument in his case against the concept of "necessity" in the context of our problem is not his most cogent but one which remains worthy of consideration. It is an argument which seems to stand in reverence before the famous commitment of J. S. Mill to open inquiry and the need for the clash of ideas. Guttchen condemns Burns for seeking the methodology by which philosophy guides practice inasmuch as such a request is considered by Guttchen as misdirected and misleading. The search for a single methodology is inappropriate in the face of the desirability for maintaining philosophy as the area where conflicting methods can clash, this clash having as its consequence a more rigorous and fruitful methodology. Guttchen notes that philosophers differ as to the choice of what are important issues, and he therefore

³⁷R. Guttchen, "The Quest for Necessity," Philosophy of Education Society, Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 1964), p. 52.

holds that there should be little reason to expect agreement on methods.

One could be justifiably critical of Guttchen's line of thinking here. His type of argument has been utilized by others and has gained some popularity, specifically in criticisms of the endeavors of absolutistic system-builders in philosophy. But it is difficult for this writer to find the logic of announcing open inquiry and condemning as misdirected that type of inquiry aimed at finding a universal method. If one is concerned with open inquiry of conflicting methodologies, it would seem that he would promote rigorous investigation into those conceptual frameworks aimed at the development of a universal method. This is not to say that the universal method is not to be subject to conflict with plans promoting multiple methodologies. It is merely to say that to label as inappropriate the investigation of the pursuit of the method is thereby to propose something far short of open inquiry.

Guttchen's second argument against Burns' position is most basic and important. Guttchen criticizes the notion of setting the problem of the relationship of philosophy to educational practices in the framework of "implication." The concept of "implication" finds its meaning most appropriately related to formal logic, where the meaning of the concept is subject to the most rigorous and limited control. To cast our problem in the mold of the context of the distinct disciplines of logic and mathematics

... introduces ideas and criteria relevant to one realm of discourse into another domain where they are simply not applicable. To take implications from philosophy and apply them to education, in anything but the loosest sense, would require a degree of system and formal rigor on the side of the philosophic formulation which philosophic formulations never achieve. This is unavoidable, given the nature of philosophic problems.³⁸

This argument of Guttchen's has great merit. The various authors quoted in this dissertation have generally rejected the notion that the relationship between formal philosophy and educational practice is logical in the strict sense of the word. However, their continual use of the terms and concepts most appropriate to the framework of formal logic has at times led to more confusion than clarity. Writers in many instances are unable to grasp others' positions as a direct result of confusion initiated by loose usages of concepts ordinarily associated with problems and disciplines which are quite distinct from the problems confronted when dealing with the proper connection between philosophy and educational practice.

But Guttchen's unwillingness to set our problem in the framework of "implication" has a major advantage beyond pure linguistic clarity. The framework or the context of a problem does affect what we think about as well as how we think about it. The problems incurred when one borrows the terms of a discipline such as formal logic and tries to transpose them to our concern (the relationship of philosophy to

³⁸Ibid., p. 53.

educational practice) might very well be problems which are unnecessary and yet are problems distinct from mere language confusion.

Simply stated, the framework of our thinking, which is largely governed by our language, determines to a great extent that which is to be considered a problem, the nature of that problem, as well as what questions are to be considered relevant to that problem. The frame of reference of formal logic can inappropriately structure the questions by which we would seek to resolve the problem of the relationship between philosophy and educational practice. One calls forth that frame of reference of formal logic when one structures the concern around the concept of "implication." As Guttchen suggests, we might better structure our thinking around the question of how philosophy guides educational practice rather than ask questions dealing with how educational practice may be implied from formal philosophy. The value of the question as Guttchen asks it is that it leads us away from the limitations of a language appropriate to describing the relationship of propositions to propositions, which is the limited domain of formal logic.

It is interesting to note that Burns specifically attempts to deal with the concept of "educational implication," and his endeavors, in this context, lead him to construct his questions around another concept most appropriate to the discipline of formal logic, i.e., the concept of "necessity."

His claim is that a worthwhile connection between philosophy and educational practice will demand that that connection incorporate the condition of necessity. A statement of Guttchen's criticism of Burns' demand for this condition of necessity is provocative and is written in a manner succinct enough to allow its complete presentation here. Guttchen begins his statement by quoting Burns.

'... if the 'educational implication' is not characterized by the quality of necessity, it must be said that philosophy plays no directive role in education; and then educators must find some other source of educational directives, some other justifying source for educational practice.'

For as he says, if we weaken the criterion of necessity, then,

'... any and all educational practices could be valid while any or all philosophy is unnecessary to guide the conduct of the educational enterprise.'

But this claim is either tautological or false. If "necessity" and "unnecessary" are meant as two forms of the same term, then the claim is tautological. Then Burns is merely asserting that if there is no necessary relation between philosophy and education, there is no necessary relation between philosophy and education. But if he means to offer more than a tautology, that is, if he is referring to logical necessity, on the one hand, and to "unnecessary" in its ordinary sense as superfluous or useless, on the other, then his claim is false. For what we are being told amounts to claiming that if x does not imply y, then x is superfluous or useless to y. Hence, because a given theory of value does not logically imply what purposes should be pursued by the schools, on this argument we would have to dismiss it as useless in framing curricula.

It is hard to imagine anyone arguing that the relation between philosophic doctrines and educational directives should be illogical. But the concern that logical criteria control that relation is not equivalent to insisting upon the criterion of necessity. Most of us have given up the demand for necessity in most domains--in everything, in fact, except for formal relations among

symbols. To demand necessity in our context is to ask that a philosophic doctrine yield logical determination for a set of educational directives. This is so whether the necessity is construed as strict formal implication, material implication, situational implication, or pragmatic implication.³⁹

Mr. Guttchen has here provided us not only with cogent arguments which tend to release us from the bind of finding a necessary connection between formal philosophy and educational practice, but also with a rationale for encouraging us to seek a meaningful connection in a new context. In line with this thinking, we find the task of Chapter III in this dissertation to be the development of a concept of connection between formal philosophy and educational practice which will render basic philosophic concepts more meaningful in the guiding of educational practice.

³⁹Guttchen, ibid., pp. 53-54.

CHAPTER III

PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES-- THEIR PROPER RELATIONSHIP

Thesis

Introductory Remarks

In Chapter II, we found three distinct ways of viewing the concept of "educational implication." The writer of this dissertation, as a result of an analysis of these positions, has chosen to change the context of the problem, in line with Guttchen's proposal, and seek the fashion in which philosophic systems can be said to guide educational practice. Since the validity of Guttchen's general proposal was defended in Chapter II, the task now becomes one of stating the nature of the concept of "connection" that will be defended in this dissertation. The final task will be one of utilizing that concept to indicate in what way it is a meaningful concept of "connection" in the establishment of a proper relationship between philosophic systems and educational practice.

The Thesis Stated

The position defended in this dissertation holds that a philosophic system determines what are to be considered

relevant questions when one is involved in the task properly referred to as philosophizing about education. If, for example, philosophy purports to inquire into and make some commitment as to the nature of man, then such a commitment will set the context whereby criteria are established for judging the relevance of questions about the proper development of man. A clarification of such a process will be forthcoming in the exposition which demonstrates the nature of the connection that is defended in this dissertation. Accordingly, a philosophic system insists on the relevance of some questions and the irrelevance of others, and further, given any question, there is a range of meaningful answers and a range of irrelevant or nonsensical answers. Thus, by the question asked we determine the range of statements which would be sensible answers, but the question, by its very nature, would not imply a particular answer. Any sensible answer can be regarded as a legitimate basis for an educational practice in terms of the philosophic system itself.

Thus, a range of educational practices may be found to be appropriate to the question, with the question itself being determined as relevant by the philosophic system. If an educational practice occurs, and if it is not found meaningful in terms of the relevant question, then we could say that the relevant question and therefore the philosophic system are not guiding that practice.

Put tersely:

1. A philosophic system insists on the relevance of some questions and the irrelevance of others.

2. Given any question, there is a set of statements that are relevant to the question (i.e., sensible and hence can be considered appropriate answers) and a set of statements that are irrelevant to the question (i.e., not sensible and hence can be considered inappropriate answers).

3. A school practice is guided by a philosophic system when appropriate answers to questions relevant to that system constitute the basis of that school practice.

4. If a statement which is the basis of a school practice is not a member of the set of appropriate answers, then in this case the school practice is not guided by the philosophic system.¹

The Logic of the Thesis

As was mentioned in Chapter II, this thesis is meant to accommodate the Guttchen proposal that philosophers of education avoid the framework of "implication" and find irrelevant the demand for "necessity" when dealing with our problem. The thesis therefore aims at finding a way in which philosophic

¹The writer is aware that abstractions can become unintelligible if they are not occasionally tied to a concrete illustration. However, the inherent complexity of this thesis demands that a rather lengthy series of illustrations be given if these abstractions are to be made meaningful. The context of Chapter IV of this dissertation is made up of four such illustrations.

systems can be said to guide educational practice. Guttchen is careful, however, to point out that the connection cannot be illogical. The question arises then: is it possible that the connection represents a logical process which is not characterized by a concept of "necessity" and is not cast in a framework of "implication"? If such is the case, in what sense is the process to be considered logical?

James E. McClellan divides the concept of "logical" into its Technical and Primordial Meanings. The Technical Meaning of "logical" was discussed in Chapter II of this dissertation under the heading of formal logic.

Whenever we talk about a logical connection in its Technical Meaning, we are discussing the demonstrable truth value of a compound statement within a determinate system of statements.²

McClellan goes on to state that:

The comparable Primordial Meaning of "logical" is obvious. "That was a logical course of action." "Your argument sounds logical, but I am unconvinced." "There was a logical development in painting from Ingres to Picasso." "The force of the drama must come from an inner logical unity." The number and range of examples can be expanded indefinitely. But how can this Primordial Meaning of "logical" be described? C. I. Lewis puts it this way:

'If we inquire what it means to be rational, the reply is likely to be given, in terms of our tradition of western thought, by some reference to inference and logical validity. But perhaps we should do better to consult our own sense of ourselves, and should then find an answer in terms of our capacity for foresight and the

²James E. McClellan, "The Logical and the Psychological: An Untenable Dualism?" in B. Othanel Smith and Robert H. Ennis (ed.), Language and Concepts In Education (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1961), p. 154.

direction of our action by it. ... Rationality, in this sense, is not derivative from the logical: rather it is the other way about. The validity of reasoning turns upon, and can be summarized in terms of, consistency. And consistency is, at bottom, nothing more than the adherence throughout to what we have accepted; or to put it in the opposite manner, the non-acceptance now of what we shall later be unwilling to adhere to. We are logically consistent when, throughout our train of thought, or our discourse, we nowhere repudiate that to which we anywhere commit ourselves. Thinking and discoursing are important and peculiarly human ways of acting. Insofar as our actions of this sort are affected with concern for what we may later think or wish to affirm, we attempt to be consistent or rational; and when we achieve this kind of self-accord, then we are logical....³

The process by which a philosophic system guides educational practice, according to the thesis of this dissertation, is logical in the Primordial Meaning. Philosophic systems have been fruitful in organizing human thinking and discourse precisely because they represent consistency in the categorization of statements about knowledge. It is not surprising then that such systems can be used as grounds for determining relevant questions in that the validity of the questions can be judged in regard to their consistency and intelligibility in terms of the total structure which the systems represent.

The answers to the relevant questions must also be logical in the Primordial Meaning. The specific method used to validate what are sensible answers must be consistent with the total philosophic system. For example, pragmatism finds the scientific method valid, but questions arising from a

³Ibid., pp. 153-154.

system incorporating revelation may find the use of the scientific method inappropriate as an instrument for determining the sensibleness of an answer to the question.

The sufficient grounds for judging a specific answer as sensible cannot be given here. A general guiding principle can be stated and that is: the method for judging an answer as sensible is a valid method if, and only if, it is intelligible, rational, and consistent with the philosophic system which determined the question relevant. C. I. Lewis noted that our train of thought must nowhere repudiate that to which we anywhere commit ourselves, and once a philosophic system stipulates a commitment, no method of validating the sensibleness of a conclusion from that system can be inconsistent with the system. To say then that educational practices logically follow from a philosophic system is to interpret the concept of "logic" as a legitimate movement of thought, i.e., a movement which is intelligible, rational, and therefore, consistent.

The thesis of this dissertation represents a logical process in the Primordial Meaning, but the reader will find little use of the word "logic" in the forthcoming discussion. A discussion of the logical relationship between philosophic systems and educational practice is avoided in favor of a discussion of how the former guides the latter. This is done only to keep our thinking free from inappropriate association of concepts usually connected to the term "logic." The task

now becomes one of clarifying, through example, the way in which philosophic systems guide educational practice.

The approach to an adequate demonstration of the meaningfulness of such a concept of "connection" must involve a general description of the defining characteristics of at least two philosophic systems. The writer has chosen to use two systems that have been significant not only in the guiding of the thinking of western man, but also in terms of their dynamic effect on the changing character of education generally and American education specifically. The two systems to be described are those of realism and pragmatism.

L. M. Brown, in his discussion of "educational implication," faced the same problem as this writer in that he too found it necessary to attempt a description of different philosophic systems before he could demonstrate his concept of "connection." Such a task was not central to the point of his thesis, but such an exposition was necessary as a tool to be used to illustrate his definition of "educational implication." The problem is to write succinct definitions of the philosophic systems that do not do violence to the scope and variety of positions which fall within the domain of each system. It is therefore important that the purpose of the presentation be clear to the reader, in order that he does not expect what is not intended and what is not necessary. This demands a cautionary note to the reader, and this writer finds that the statement of limitations written by Brown is appropriate to this dissertation.

To prevent misunderstanding, it is important to realize first that the intention is not to attempt complete expositions of the [two] philosophies. Certainly a sketch of each system will not give an adequate impression of the grounds some individuals may have for accepting it and in this sense will not justify the philosophy to others. But the plan is simply to discuss some of the main viewpoints of each of the [two] systems so that there may be a clearer understanding of the reasoning involved in references to their educational implications. Second, it is admitted that some of the educational implications illustrated are extreme cases which not all educational philosophers would draw. But again, in order to demonstrate the nature of the thought involved in educational implications, it seems pointless to distinguish between extreme and moderate examples, for fallacy or validity will apply equally to the same form of argument, and extreme examples may succeed in making the point all the more emphatically.⁴

The section following the description of the two philosophic systems will begin by demonstrating the way in which pragmatism finds relevant a question, any reasonable answer to which can serve as a basis for a school practice. It will then be shown in what way this question is inappropriate to realism, and how any answer to such a question, if utilized as a basis for a school practice, would be detrimental to a realistic school program. It will then be shown how realism finds relevant a question, any reasonable answer to which can serve as a basis for a school practice. It will then be shown in what way this question is inappropriate to pragmatism, and how any answer to such a question, if utilized as a basis for a school practice, would be detrimental to a pragmatic school program.

⁴L. M. Brown, General Philosophy in Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 76.

Such an exposition should serve to demonstrate the process which defines the relationship between philosophic system and educational practice in terms of the stated thesis defended in this dissertation. Such an exposition should serve to demonstrate one way of meaningfully asserting that philosophic systems are able legitimately to guide educational practice. But let us now turn to our immediate concern, which is the giving of a general description of the defining characteristics of the two philosophic systems.

The Fundamental Defining Characteristics of Realism

A Common Commitment

The immediate task which confronts us involves an analysis aimed at discovering what makes the realistic position distinct from all other philosophic systems; our focus is on the realist's notion concerning the relationship of the knower to the known, the subject to the object. But first, more general considerations must be taken into account in order that what we focus on will be in its proper perspective within the total realistic context. The first thing to note about the realist's general position is their metaphysical orientation which revolves around the distinction made between the subject and the object. This orientation is a result of their commitment to a universe of real entities which exist whether or not they

are apprehended by a person.⁵ The epistemological dimension which rises blatantly from such a commitment then revolves around the relationship of the subject to that universe and the realist's major problem, therefore, centers on how the act of knowing is united with the existent reality.⁶ The ethical thesis of realism holds that the knowledge which we do attain of the universe,

... especially that which treats of human nature, can provide us with immutable and trustworthy principles for the guidance of individual and social action. All men share common traits which determine vague tendencies in every child. These tendencies must be realized together in an orderly way if human life is to be really fulfilled.⁷

The above considerations, which revolve around the principle of independence, i.e., the principle that a thing can exist outside of the knowledge process, define that which is common to all realists. Variations among realists exist, but the principle of independence is a common bond among them.⁸ The variations center around the problems concerning what it is that we can really know about that reality, and before we

⁵John Wild, "Education and Human Society: A Realistic View," Modern Philosophies and Education, the Fifty-fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 17.

⁶Ibid., p. 18.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Frederick Breed, "Education and the Realistic Outlook," Philosophies of Education, The Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 93.

can make clear the dynamics of that which they hold in common, we must investigate their area of disagreement.

Both the common commitments as well as the difference among the realists were foreshadowed by the philosophic inquiry of Aristotle. As a part of his endeavor, Aristotle made an attempt to nullify the gap which exists between the experience of a person and the universe which lies outside of him. An understanding of Aristotle's position on this point must begin by noting the distinction he makes between form and matter.

In the more naturalistic phases of his thought Aristotle regards Form and matter as correlative; Forms are always embodied in matter, and matter is always formed.⁹

Charles W. Morris goes on to note that:

mind becomes the Form of all Forms, the locus of Forms "in" the Form of a living organism.¹⁰

If forms are embodied in matter, and matter is always formed, there is no reality of mind (the locus of form) without content or matter. This represents in Aristotle the integration of mind and nature in opposition to mind as substance.

In this doctrine, whatever may be the difficulties in the conception of Form, there is no doubt but that mind, as characterizing a soul, is an emergent in the world process, and not a substance differing in kind from that process. Because of its origin, mind has the closest possible relation to the body, to the objects of mind, to the social life of man and to nature. On this view things are not intrinsically mental, nor is there any mind apart from or before the apprehension of the Form of the thing. Hence the typically Aristotelian doctrine

⁹Charles Morris, Six Theories Of Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1932), p. 17.

¹⁰Ibid.

that the mind is the thing when it is thought, a doctrine which reappears in the writing of both new and critical realists. Mind would appear to have nothing of its own, drawing its entire content from nature. Mentality resides in the relation which the apprehended Form assumes in the presence of the Form of the apprehending organism.¹¹

But just as the critical realists find fruit in Aristotle's providing a foundation for substantive theories of mind, those realists who regard mind as substance find fruit in Aristotle's logical separation of some forms from matter. W. D. Ross makes this notion explicit in his analysis of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Ross states:

Finally in man, the most highly organized or formed of the animals, there is superadded a form which is not the principle of structure of the body or of any part of it, uses no bodily organ, and can survive the body. This is the reason, or, more precisely, the active reason--that mysterious entity which supports the thinking of the passive reason. One stage higher come the intelligences which move the planetary spheres--pure substances not united with body at all, but operating on their respective spheres ab extra. And highest of all is the pure substance which is God.¹²

Charles Morris further notes that:

Aristotle in the last resort so emphasizes the uniqueness of thought that its relation to nature and to experience remains an enigma. In spite of the relational and functional suggestions, it is the conception of mind as substance which finally triumphs.¹³

Aristotle therefore set the context for a common commitment among realists as well as for the divergence of positions

¹¹Ibid., p. 18.

¹²W. D. Ross, Aristotle (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1963), p. 166.

¹³Morris, op. cit., p. 20.

in realism. The evolution of the varieties and extremes within the system which deal with the problems involved in the relationship of subject to object extend from philosophic objectivism which has pure reason extending beyond sense perception, to forms of subjectivism which hold that a new quality is imposed on an object as a result of one's thinking about the object. Synthesizing these extremes is a most difficult task, but it is a task which drew the attention of the scholar, George Santayana. His arguments are worthy of our attention.

Santayana, like Breed, first notes that the scope of the realistic position develops from the most fundamental and common commitment which is that there is a world which exists apart from experience and that this world is in some way knowable. That extension, however, ranges in scope from those who, like Kant, hold that experiences are merely appearances of the "thing-in-itself" (the ding an sich) to those naïve realists who hold that what we experience is a literal revelation of that objective world.

Santayana however cautions us against the hasty conclusion that these two positions are positively contradictory. For the naïve realist to identify appearance and reality rather than, as the critical realist, to oppose appearance and reality, is not to say that appearance is the reality of an external object. What the naïve realist is saying is that the essence of the appearance of the object is identical to the essence of the underlying reality (substance) of the object. Both

tendencies in realism do agree that the object itself and the appearance of it are distinct. The variations between the positions occur in the interpretation of the degree of similarity between the data of thought and the intrinsic quality of the subject matter. The spread of commitment involving this latter problem extends from the position of the similarity being great to the position of the identity of essence. The naïve realist does not identify the mind with the object, only the intuited essence with the essence of the object.

The two tendencies in realism are therefore perfectly consistent, and truly complementary: the one tends to separate appearance from substance (the underlying reality) only in existence; the other tends to identify them only in essence.¹⁴

And so the varieties of realism find a common thread in this epistemological aspect which revolves around a commitment to the fact that knowledge is transitive and relevant. Transitivity is an acknowledgement that an underlying reality can be chosen and identified by the mind. Relevance is an acknowledgement that there is similarity between the appearance of the object and the object itself. The positions do vary as to the degree of similarity of essence between the object and the appearance of the object. The differences within a context of realism are in this way overshadowed by the common commitment to a way of knowing which renders the epistemological stand of the realist distinct from that of other systems.

¹⁴George Santayana et al., Essays in Critical Realism (New York: Peter Smith, 1941), p. 166.

Sensation and the Faculty of Reason

In order to bring the level of generalization down and give our concern more focus, it becomes necessary to sketch the general position of realism in terms of the place of experience in the attainment of a knowledge of the underlying reality. The context for this task has been set rather poetically by George Santayana.

Belief in experience is the beginning of that bold instinctive art, more plastic than the instinct of most animals, by which man has raised himself to his earthly eminence: it opens the gates of nature to him,....¹⁵

The beginning of the process of the attainment of a knowledge of reality is the utilization of the sense organs. But to begin to clarify the specific meaning of this, one must first recall that to Aristotle the principle of matter does not define the nature of an object so much as does that object's form. Aristotle speaks of his own position when he states:

But from another point of view we may think of the nature of a thing as residing rather in its form, that is to say, in the "kind" of thing it is by definition.¹⁶

Our senses have the power to apprehend individual external facts. They are limited by this ability to apprehend only the material aspect of the individual object, and therefore

¹⁵George Santayana "Belief in Experience," found in William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken (ed.), Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 422.

¹⁶Aristotle, The Physics ii. 1. 193a 29-30.

the nature of the object or the nature of causality that exists between objects is the domain of a faculty distinct from sense.

To conceive the nature of an object of reality is to extract, by the use of the mind, the form of the object, since the underlying reality finds its nature in the form of the object. The nature of the object is not given by the mind but it resides in the form of the object and must therefore be abstracted from the object. In the same way, the nature of the connections between objects, i.e., the principle of cause and effect, must be discovered by the utilization of the reasoning powers of the mind. One cannot perceive causality through the senses. One can observe and chronicle the behavior of objects as they occur in a series of events, but the generalizations which allow one to explain the relationships which exist between objects demands the use of an abstractive faculty, i.e., the faculty of reason.¹⁷

Reason extracts the essence of the material object. Sense may apprehend a black automobile but only reason can abstract the universal blackness which exists apart from the particular automobile. Reason grasps something about the object formally which the senses cannot grasp--that is, both faculties apprehend the same object materially but reason

¹⁷John Wild, Introduction To Realistic Philosophy (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1948), pp. 451-52.

abstracts the immaterial from the object, this latter function not being in the potential of the senses. Grasping the essence of an object allows the mind to class objects in nature according to their common essence. One recognizes, metaphysically speaking, the natural structure of the universe, and it is only by the use of reason that one can reflect on the particular forms of the object that are sensed and abstract the universal forms of the objects which stand apart from the particular accidents of experience.

The Essence of Man

Aristotle held that each and every thing in the universe has an essence which is its defining characteristic and which is understood in terms of its purpose or function.¹⁸ Within the universe there exists a hierarchy of natures or functions with man situated at the apex and attempting through contemplation to gain knowledge or understanding of nature and its complex of purposes.

The function of man then is an activity of soul in accordance with reason, or not independently of reason. Again the functions of a person of a certain kind, and

¹⁸It should be noted that to speak of function in this way is not to be confused with the pragmatic concept of function. In realism, the nature of an object is not given by man in terms of the use to which he puts the object, as is the case in the pragmatic notion. Rather, the nature of the object is discovered in terms of its function as implied within the total system of functions which exist independently of man's knowledge of those functions. See Harry Broudy's Building A Philosophy of Education (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), pp. 140-41.

of such a person who is good of his kind e.g., of a harpist and a good harpist, are in view generically the same, and this view is true of people of all kinds without exception, the superior excellence being only an addition of the function; for it is the function of a harpist to play the harp, and of a good harpist to play the harp well.^{19,20}

Aristotle goes on in Book X of The Nicomachean Ethics:

If then the reason is divine in comparison with the rest of Man's nature, the life which accords with reason will be divine in comparison with human life in general. Nor is it right to follow the advice of people who say that the thoughts of men should not be too high for humanity or the thoughts of mortals too high for mortality; for a man, as far as in him lies, should seek immortality and do all that is in his power to live in accordance with the highest part of his nature, as, although that part is insignificant in size, yet in power and honour it is far superior to all the rest.²¹

Also, each aspect of the total fundamental universe has an internal tendency to fulfill itself. Action in accord with its fulfillment is right action.

In the case of the intellect itself, which, as a power of knowing, naturally tends toward the possession of truth as its perfection, the habit of knowledge is good by reason of conformity to the natural tendency of the cognitive power, and the habit of error is bad by reason of violation of that tendency.²²

¹⁹Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics i. 7. 1098a 7-10.

²⁰It should be noted that the quote in footnote 19 is, because of its lucidity, from the translation by J. E. C. Welldon in The Nicomachean Ethics (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1923), p. 16. This note is made because Welldon has the quote occurring in chapter 6 rather than chapter 7, but the correct placement for the quote is given in footnote 19.

²¹Aristotle, op. cit., x 7. 1177b 29-1178a 1.

²²Mortimer J. Adler, "In Defense Of the Philosophy Of Education," Philosophies of Education, The Forty-First Year-book of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 243.

We will find this axiological dimension in realism to be a most pertinent and dynamic concern in this dissertation. But one thing more must be mentioned in terms of a necessary distinction between the senses and the mind, as seen by the realist. Not only is it crucial to the realist's position but its consequences are also dynamic in terms of a discussion of the educational process. It is imperative to note that the senses, being psycho-physical in nature, are restricted as a form of cognition by material conditions. The mind, being immaterial and unrestricted in nature, is not bound by or within a physical organ. Through use, the mind, which is separate from the body, grows rather than deteriorates in its ability to assimilate the immaterial. Again we turn to Aristotle.

Observation of the sense-organs and their employment reveals a distinction between the impassibility of the sensitive and that of the intellective faculty. After strong stimulation of the sense we are less able to exercise it than before, as e.g., in the case of a loud sound we cannot hear easily immediately after, or in the case of a bright colour or a powerful odour we cannot see or smell, but in the case of mind, thought about an object that is highly intelligible renders it more and not less able afterwards to think objects that are less intelligible: the reason is that while the faculty or sensation is dependent upon the body, mind is separable from it.²³

²³Aristotle, De Anima iii. 4. 429a 29 - 429b 4.

The Fundamental Defining Characteristics
of Pragmatism

The Rejection of Rationalism

Having completed the general remarks pertaining to the defining characteristics of realism, one must outline a similar text for the philosophy of pragmatism. One might begin such an analysis by noting the statement by Aristotle concerning the separation of the faculty of reason from the phenomena of sensation. This dualism is one characteristic that distinguishes realism from pragmatism. Dewey for example, in his chapter in Creative Intelligence, attacks not Aristotle in particular but rationalism and traditional empiricism in general, by utilizing arguments which purport to show this reason-sensation dualism to be inappropriate. Dewey is committed to the belief that any philosophy which holds reason to be extra-empirical is a philosophy doomed to failure. Dewey's case is based on his acceptance of the fact "that thought is an intrinsic feature of experience."²⁴ Furthermore, it is upon these grounds that his arguments against a mind-body dualism take shape.

The recognition that reflection is a genuine factor within experience and an indispensable factor in that control of the world which secures prosperous and significant expansion of experience undermines historic rationalism as assuredly as it abolishes the foundations of historic empiricism.²⁵

²⁴John Dewey et al., Creative Intelligence (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917), p. 23.

²⁵Ibid., p. 25.

The criticism of the traditional separation between the faculty of reason and the faculty of sensation leads Dewey immediately to a criticism of possibly a more fundamental separation which realism makes. Dewey finds this more fundamental distinction to be false and highly detrimental to fruitful philosophic inquiry. That distinction is one that is made by all forms of realism--the distinction between the subject and the object, between a person and an external world.

The major disagreements among the various schools of realism centered around the problems concerning what it is that we can know about the external world, but the fact of an external world existing apart from the person is as fundamental and pervasive a commitment as can be found among realists. It is a commitment which realists put to great use. Dewey denies the existence of the problem of what it is that we can know about the external world in that he denies that a separation can be made between the person and the external world.

The essential thing is that the bearer was conceived as outside of the world; so that experience consisted in the bearer's being affected through a type of operations not found anywhere in the world, while knowledge consists in surveying the world, looking at it, getting the view of a spectator.²⁶

Dewey goes on:

But if the assumption that experience is something set over against the world is contrary to fact, then the problem of how self or mind or subjective experience or

²⁶Ibid., p. 31.

consciousness can reach knowledge of an external world is assuredly a meaningless problem. Whatever questions there may be about knowledge, they will not be the kind of problems which have formed epistemology.²⁷

This dissertation proposes that an understanding of the nature of the connection between philosophic systems and educational practice revolves around the concept of relevant questions which are determined relevant by the defining characteristics of the philosophic systems themselves. The commitment that different philosophic systems promote different educational practices is based on the fact that various philosophic systems differ as to what they consider to be relevant questions and what they consider to be irrelevant questions. In line with this proposal, we find Dewey, in his chapter in Creative Intelligence, implicitly calling our attention to the importance of investigating the relevancy of questions as they relate to philosophic systems. Dewey is contending that the questions which arise out of the clear separation of the knower from the known are questions which the pragmatist finds to be irrelevant and inappropriate and therefore detrimental to fruitful inquiry.

Dewey further maintains that whether one is from the camp of the objectivist or from that of the subjectivist is of no significance since both camps set off the knower from the world to be known. This false distinction breeds inappropriate questions which in turn breed false answers.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 31-32.

The significant distinction is no longer between the knower and the world; it is between different ways of being in and of the movement of things; between a brute physical way and a purposive, intelligent way.²⁸

Before we demonstrate the consequences, in terms of educational practices, which result from this distinction between pragmatism and realism, it would be well to pursue a bit further the positive position of pragmatism. A presentation of the grounds for the above pragmatic commitment should give scope and substance to the general defining characteristics of pragmatism, and in that way set the context for demonstrating how pragmatism guides educational practice to proposals which are distinct from those supported by realism.

The Organism and the Total Environment

The world seems mad in pre-occupation with what is specific, particular, disconnected in medicine, politics, science, industry, education. In terms of a conscious control of inclusive wholes, search for those links which occupy key positions and which effect critical connections is indispensable. But recovery of sanity depends upon seeing and using these specifiable things as links functionally significant in a process. To see the organism in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems which haunt philosophy. And when thus seen they will be seen to be in, not as marbles are in a box but as events are in history, in a moving, growing never finished process.²⁹

The above quotation represents possibly the most notable and basic commitment of the pragmatic position. This commitment which is defined in terms of an understanding of human

²⁸Ibid., p. 59.

²⁹John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1929), p. 295.

behavior has a concern with the relationship of the human organism to its total social-physical environment. To understand the individual is to understand the transaction that takes place between the organism and its total environment. And from this context issues understanding of the variety of phenomena which explain man's place and function in the universe, the phenomena to which all philosophy basically attends.

Dewey's remarks earlier in this section attacking the reason-sensation dualism exemplify this concern with the transactional situation as being the only ground for understanding human behavior. The belief that thought is an intrinsic feature of experience does need some clarification in that it is basic to the total pragmatic position and expresses well the transactional view. One might begin such a clarification by referring to the meaning of the concept of experience. Experience, according to Dewey:

is the entire organic agent-patient in all its interaction with the environment, natural and social. The brain is primarily an organ of a certain kind of behavior, not of knowing the world. And to repeat what has already been said, experiencing is just certain modes of interaction, of correlation, of natural objects among which the organism happens, so to say, to be one.³⁰

In line with this, thinking is an intra-organic response of the organism to a problematic situation. It arises as a result of the organism finding itself in a tensional situation

³⁰John Dewey, Creative Intelligence, pp. 36-37.

with its social-physical environment. If thinking is a way of behaving when an organism confronts a tensional situation, then thinking can only be understood in terms of the total relationship which develops between an organism and its environment. This includes the concern for the biological response as well as the culturally modified response. These latter phenomena place recognition on the fact that man is a social animal and that that which is known as intellectual behavior extends from organic behavior. However, it is set in a context which must necessarily take into account the cultural environment. This total response produces patterns of behavior which function to resolve the tensional situation. Let us be careful at this point not to confuse this intellectual behavior with some kind of activity of an extra-empirical faculty which the organism has and which is usually referred to as a mind. Rather, what is meant by intellectual behavior in pragmatic terms is merely that a response of the organism is one which has characteristics of being a directed tendency to resolve the problematic situation. In summary then:

Dewey regards thinking (a) as a response, occasioned by difficult and tensional situations, and (b) as productive of patterns of behaviour appropriate to meet the actual situations that prevail.³¹

³¹Maurice Cornford, In Defence Of Philosophy (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1950), p. 178.

The Mind and Symbolism

But our considerations of the concept of thinking must necessarily include or lead into an investigation of the nature of mind as understood in pragmatic terms. We recall that the realist talked about thinking as an activity of the faculty of reason. Such is not the case with the pragmatist. Dewey illustrates the difference between realism and pragmatism in a discussion concerning the nature of the process of thinking. He believes that it is a mistaken idea that thinking arises as a result of

the fact that in each human being is a "mind" whose business it is just to "know"--to theorize in the Aristotelian sense; but rather, that it starts from an effort to get out of some trouble, actual or menacing.³²

There is no mind to know. To the pragmatist, mind is not some independent faculty, nor is it some substance finding a basis in the brain or the nervous system. Rather, mind is a certain kind of human behavior. It is, first of all, a kind of behavior which involves language, a communication between human beings. We shall see that the language process is the source of symbolism, and that symbolism, or rather man's ability to symbolize, is the clue to what makes man distinct from all other animals; it is the clue to understanding the nature of mind.

³²John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1916), p. 23.

George H. Mead, an authority in such pragmatic concerns, would have us focus first on the function of language, if we are to understand mind in the pragmatic sense. According to Mead, the language process can arouse the ability, in the person speaking, to take the role of the person he is speaking to and to call forth in himself the potential response that he is calling for in the other individual. The use of symbols allows a person to address another, while at the same time he addresses himself, anticipates the other's response and acts in terms of that anticipated response. Animals other than man can gesture to each other, but that gesture is not a symbol because it has significance only to the other and not to the animal gesturing.

Gestures may be either conscious (significant) or unconscious (non-significant). The conversation of gestures is not significant below the human level, because it is not conscious, that is, not self-conscious (though it is conscious in a sense of involving feelings or sensations). An animal as opposed to a human form, in indicating something to, or bringing out a meaning for, another form, is not at the same time indicating or bringing out the same thing or meaning to or for himself; for he has no mind, no thought, and hence there is no meaning here in the significant or self-conscious sense. A gesture is not significant when the response of another organism to it does not indicate to the organism making it what the other organism is responding to.³³

The gesture then becomes a symbol only when the individual gesturing is stimulated himself in the same way that he is stimulated when others gesture to him. This, only man can do,

³³George H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 81.

and this is done through speech. Symbolization is meaningless unless it is directed at others in a way in which all participants' behavior is affected as a result of communication between them. Symbols and self arise then in social situations and symbols are therefore social in nature. Mind to the pragmatist arises then only in the social process. It was stated earlier that mind was a type of human behavior. To be more specific, when, under certain social conditions, events attain symbolic status, the mind can be said to have emerged; for mind is the symbolic functioning of events.

Knowledge and Truth

In the section on realism, we found all concerns to extend from a commitment to the principle of independence between the subject and the object. The common commitment for all pragmatists however is that the human organism participates in the functioning of its universe in such a way that explanation of any behavior must take into account the nature of the activity of the organism in the total social-physical environment. A discussion of the concept of knowledge re-emphasizes and gives scope to this pragmatic principle. Again, in attending to the problem of knowledge, Dewey directly attacks the spectator theory which sets the individual apart from reality and which attempts to explain how that individual can come to know that reality.

The spectator theory of knowing may, humanly speaking, have been inevitable when thought was viewed as an exercise of a "reason" independent of the body, which by means of purely logical operations attained truth. It is an anachronism now that we have the model of experimental procedure before us and are aware of the role of organic acts in all mental processes.³⁴

Knowledge, to Dewey, is understood as that which it is warranted to assert, since knowledge is the product of scientific inquiry which provides rules of action in any attempt to resolve tensional situations in which the human organism might find itself in relation to its social-physical environment. Again we find the pragmatic philosophy celebrating the phenomenon of activity in explaining its conceptual framework.

What has been said helps to explain why the term "warranted assertion" is preferred to the terms belief and knowledge. It is free from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it involves reference to inquiry as that which warrants assertion. When knowledge is taken as a general abstract term related to inquiry in the abstract, it means "warranted assertibility." The use of a term that designates a potentiality rather than an actuality involves recognition that all special conclusions of special inquiries are parts of an enterprise that is continually renewed, or is a going concern.³⁵

So there is no seeking of a "known" which can be said to correspond to a "real" object. When one attains knowledge, one does not have a picture of the universe. Rather, one has attained tentative rules of action for the predicting of consequences which can be used efficiently in the resolution of a problematic situation. This is not to say that there

³⁴John Dewey, The Quest For Certainty (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1929), p. 245.

³⁵John Dewey, Logic (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938), p. 9.

are not objects or things outside of the subject; it is merely to say that the meaning and nature of these objects is dependent on the way in which they function in the purposeful activity of the human organism. Dewey criticizes those philosophies that take a position on the concept of knowing which is antagonistic to this experimental theory of knowing. In relation to these philosophies, Dewey notes that

They spring from the assumption that the true and valid object of knowledge is that which has being prior to and independent of the operations of knowing. They spring from the doctrine that knowledge is a grasp or beholding of reality without anything being done to modify its antecedent state--the doctrine which is the source of the separation of knowledge from practical activity. If we see that knowing is not the act of an outside spectator but of a participator inside the natural and social scene, then the true object of knowledge resides in the consequences of directed action. When we take this point of view, if only by way of a hypothesis, the perplexities and difficulties of which we have been speaking vanish. For on this basis there will be as many kinds of known objects as there are kinds of effectively conducted operations of inquiry which result in the consequences intended.³⁶

Such considerations lead us to an understanding of the pragmatic concept of truth which itself takes on meaning in terms of human activity. If to know is to have attained certain rules for action in the resolution of a tensional situation, then truth can be characterized as those ideas which do in fact resolve the situation. If an idea is intended to resolve a problematic situation; if competent experimental inquiry has allowed one to predict that the idea will resolve the

³⁶John Dewey, The Quest For Certainty, pp. 196-97.

problematic situation; if that idea is used in the manipulation of the environment in terms of the purposes intended; if the predicted consequences do occur and the problematic situation is resolved, then the predicted consequences are verified and the idea can be said to be true.

One more thing should be mentioned about this conception of truth. In the section on realism in this dissertation, it was stated that the axiological commitment was an extension of the metaphysical as well as the epistemological commitment. Man's knowledge of the nature of the universe could, in these terms, provide him with principles for guiding human behavior. So too the axiological commitment of the pragmatist extends from his metaphysical and epistemological commitment. To clarify this, we must first refer to the above discussion as to the nature of knowledge and truth as the pragmatist sees it and then extend these same arguments to the realm of value. To quote Sayers and Madden:

The present-day experimentalist position (the pragmatism developed by Dewey, G. H. Mead, and others) holds that a belief to be true must afford an impartial and reliable account of an experimental finding regarding a specified condition-consequence relationship. It makes possible a warranted assertion of fact. Truth, from the experimental point of view, "serves human purposes in this circumscribed and specified manner," whether it be in the area of man's technological, aesthetic, moral, or religious interests.³⁷

³⁷Ephraim V. Sayers and Ward Madden, Education and the Democratic Faith (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959), pp. 200-01.

So a "good" idea is one which works in terms of verified prediction in concert with human purposes toward the resolution of a problematic situation. In other words, values are a form of knowledge which are to be tested in experience.

... values arise when desired things, acts, relations are judged to be worthy of being desired (that is, desirable) on the basis of a consideration of the conditions and consequences which accompany the achieving and enjoying of them. The increase, the refinement, and the deepening of people's values are therefore dependent upon the increase, refinement, and deepening of reflective inquiry and hence of meanings as instruments of control in experience.³⁸

The phrase "instruments of control in experience" reflects a concern which is central to the pragmatic philosophy. Pragmatism is a philosophy which puts great emphasis on the dynamics of change in the relation of a person to his social-physical environment. As was evident in the discussions of intelligence, truth, and knowledge, one of the major criteria which was used to evaluate the relationship between the organism and its environment was the criterion of control. A person who is able to respond to a situation in a manner which allows him to control the objects of nature in accord with humanly developed purposes is the kind of person whom the pragmatic honors. Value then is placed on (1) the instruments which can be developed to aid in the control of nature, and (2) the experiences people have which allow them to use efficiently these instruments of control.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 167-68.

The concept of growth defines the process indicated in number two above. Continued growth then becomes the end by which human development is evaluated. "There is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth"; "education has no end beyond itself"; and "education is all one with growing" are Deweyan phrases which exemplify the importance placed by the pragmatist on the concept of growth. Those experiences are to be valued which contribute to a more sophisticated control of the environment in terms of the contemporary social context. Speaking about American education and the pragmatic philosophy, John Childs notes:

The growth of the child is "the end," but both the meaning and the means of that growth must be developed in the context of this social situation of change and conflict. The adequacy of every program of education will be tested by the contribution that it makes to the resolution of these conflicts within the present patterns of American civilization.³⁹

With this brief description of the axiological dimension of pragmatism, we end the general description of the defining characteristics of both realism and pragmatism. The utilization of pragmatism and realism in the guidance of educational practice is the topic of the next section of this dissertation.

³⁹John L. Childs, American Pragmatism and Education (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1965), p. 298.

CHAPTER IV

DEMONSTRATING THE PROPER CONCEPT OF "CONNECTION"

The Method of Demonstration

There is no doubt that the conclusions arrived at in this section will in some ways be disputable. We recall that the thesis of this work is that the defining characteristics of a philosophic system determine that certain questions are relevant as one considers the problems of education, and that the reasonable answers to these questions constitute the basis for educational practices that can then be said to be a consequence of the philosophic system itself. This section will thus determine educational practices that are said to be pragmatic in nature and alternative educational practices that are said to be realistic in nature. There are readers who will contend that a specific practice is not an appropriate pragmatic or realistic practice, or at least is not appropriate without qualifications not required in this work. Such assertions are inevitable. Noting why they are inevitable is of course important to this dissertation.

The important point is that dispute over whether a practice is appropriate to a philosophic system is inevitable because of the fact that the defining characteristics of any

one system are in dispute. This dissertation further emphasizes that the sophistication of the employment of relevant and fruitful educational practices is dependent on further inquiry and sophistication as to the proper nature of the systems themselves. But it must be further emphasized that the general guidelines of different systems which have been developed, do in a major way contribute to the guiding of educational practice. For example, that Dewey and James disagree as to the nature of the object of knowledge does not represent as critical a conflict as that James disagrees with Kant in terms of the nature of the object of knowledge.

In the same way, the particular educational practices, which will in this section be defended in terms of either realism or pragmatism, should demonstrate the general opposition of the systems as guides to educational practice. However, disputes about specific educational practices do occur between philosophers of education who support the same philosophic system. The point is, though, that such disputes are less critical than those disputes which occur between philosophers of education who support opposing philosophic systems. The following discussion should demonstrate the importance of this point.

To demonstrate the nature of the connection between a philosophic system and an educational practice, we will utilize one basic area of concern of education: curriculum. We will demonstrate the thesis of the dissertation by utilizing one question which is found to be relevant to pragmatism

but which is irrelevant in terms of realism. We will then show how this disagreement between the two philosophies results in distinct school curricula. Secondly, we will show how a question found to be relevant to realism is irrelevant in terms of pragmatism and how this disagreement results in distinct school curricula.

A Pragmatic Question

In confronting the task of developing a school curriculum, a pragmatist involves himself in a series of basic questions which he considers not only relevant but also crucial to his endeavor. Among the most important of these questions is this one: in what way can the community be encouraged to take part in the actual selection of the school's curriculum? Our immediate concern here will be an attempt to make clear the reasons why this question is particularly relevant to a pragmatist.

The school, the pragmatist recognizes, finds appropriate to its character and nature the providing of an environment where knowledge is attained by those in attendance. In fact, the curriculum of the school is basically the school's program of providing sequentially organized knowledge. We recall that pragmatism found knowledge, involving activity related to scientific inquiry, producing rules for action in accord with predicted consequences. Practical activity must be involved and behavior of the individual must be modified.

The individual must participate if knowledge is to be attained. Participating involves thinking and thinking involves mind and mind arises only in a social context. The way in which a student participates is then dependent on the nature of the social context. If knowledge comes about only in a tensional situation between the student and the social-physical environment, then the type of knowledge, i.e., the specific rules for action that are relevant to the situation are obviously dependent on the nature of the tensional situation. The nature of the tensional situation is a function of the total social context, and if the organized experiences within the school are to be meaningful to those in attendance, then the extra-school experiences must be taken into account.

Certainly, in some ways, the teacher ought to be a very capable person for identifying and co-ordinating the activities of the pupils in order that the students confront meaningful situations in terms of coping with problems. This competency demands of the teacher an ability to interpret the social conditions in which the students reside. The teacher must grasp what are meaningful, and appropriate problems which should be confronted in order that knowledge be extended and that growth take place in his students.

It is just as obvious, however, that interpretation of the social conditions and an evaluation of the proper direction for growth are also functions of broad participation within the social context. The social situation of the community is the fundamental context in which the children

live: it is the major context from which one must draw meaningful school experiences. If knowledge of these broad social situations is itself a function of participation within the situation, then these broad social conditions can only be grasped and interpreted by the very participants within the social context, i.e., the members of the local community itself.

As the pragmatist has pointed out, curriculum development involves the planning of experiences, but it is also necessary that evaluation of these experiences be made. This evaluation must be made in terms of desirable growth. As we have noted, growth is not a function of the organism but of the established relationship between the organism and the total social-physical environment. Evaluation of the experiences is also then a function of, and determined by, the nature of the broad social context in which the major social problematic situations arise. It is through participation within the broad social context that meaningful evaluation of experiences can be made, which itself demands then that those participating in this context, i.e., the members of the local community, participate also in the evaluation of the experiences which occur in the school.

The foregoing discussion is aimed at demonstrating not only how the question asked by the pragmatist is relevant as a result of his general philosophic commitment, but also specifically how it relates to his concept of knowledge.

To the question of community participation and the way a community can be encouraged to take part in the actual establishment of the curriculum, there is a range of meaningful answers and a range of irrelevant or nonsensical answers. To illustrate one reasonable answer to such a question, we might merely describe one instrument that has been used to accomplish the objectives implied by the question. That instrument is a program, instituted by the school, of distributing a comprehensive questionnaire to determine the general public's evaluation of various components of the school's present curriculum.¹ This program not only serves to provide a beginning point of reappraisal but also suggests new curricular directions that would likely be supported. It has the possibility of arousing public interest and serving as an entry point for establishing lines of communication between the public and the school.

When the questionnaire is handled in such a way as to make clear that the intent of the school is ultimately to use the opinions of the public in the developing of a new curriculum, the significance of the questionnaire stimulates the public not only to cooperate in answering the questions seriously, but also to set the context whereby more direct

¹An analysis of the use of such questionnaires is described by B. Othanel Smith, William O. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores in their chapter "Diagnosing the School-Community Situation." This chapter appears in their book Fundamentals of Curriculum Development (Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Company, 1957), pp. 477-98.

associations can be made for further participation by the local public in curriculum development.

Such is an example of a reasonable answer to the initial question, a question which was found relevant in terms of the defining characteristics of pragmatism. The question makes sense only as it relates to the fundamental commitment of pragmatism. Therefore an answer to the question ultimately finds its meaningfulness only as it relates to the pragmatic philosophy. If the meaningfulness of the question asked by the pragmatist is dependent on his fundamental pragmatic commitment, and if the answer to the question is generated by the question asked, then the philosophy itself can be said to be the guide for the program instituted. It can also be shown how the program (the resulting answers to the initial question) can further serve as a basis for school practice. For if we took our example one step further and showed how the actual curriculum developed was affected by the will of the locale public, i.e., the actual experiences which occurred in the school were a direct result of community participation, then it can be legitimately said that pragmatism guided, in a very direct way, the actual curriculum that was instituted.

A Rejection by Realism

It is now appropriate to show in what way a realist finds the question as to how one might encourage the community to get involved in curriculum development, to be inappropriate and if considered relevant, to be detrimental to the

development of a proper curriculum.² To be more correct, and to give a broad outline of the section on realism, let us state the proposition thus: if one considered realism to have the following defining characteristics, one would consider the above question inappropriate:

1. There is a "natural" structure or order in the universe independent of our wishing, feeling or desiring.
2. There is a "natural" structuring or way of living characteristic of "human being."
3. These structures can be apprehended by human knowing as they are in themselves.
4. The results of such knowledge disclose the norms for individual life and social organization.³

²Since the connection defended in this dissertation is not characterized as a necessary one (see pp. 57-61), there is the possibility that a question deemed irrelevant now, could, at some future date, be defended as relevant. This writer, however, has deliberately chosen questions whose relevance is not only defensible in terms of the defining characteristics of a particular philosophic system, but also questions that have consistently been considered either relevant or irrelevant in the literature of a particular philosophic system. In terms of the question concerning community participation in curriculum development, realists have continually developed a more sophisticated and logical rationale for their basic philosophic commitments, and have used these commitments to guide their proposals concerning curriculum development. They have not found it feasible to seek the aid of the lay community in their endeavor to discover truth, or to apply that truth to concrete educational proposals. There is no inherent contradiction in having the realist seek the aid of the lay community in these endeavors, any more than there is an inherent contradiction in having physical scientists seek the aid of the lay community in discovering an adequate inertial guidance system for space vehicles. Neither of these groups, however, has found it to be a reasonable approach, and reasonableness, not logical necessity, is the criterion used for justifying all connections made in this dissertation.

³These realistic principles serve not only to refocus our concern with the defining characteristics of realism but also to provide a synthesis of the position put forth in the section on realism. The above principles are taken from Harry Broudy's article "Implications of Classical Realism for Philosophy of

Now curricula are established, as we have seen, in order to attain knowledge. Knowledge, to the realist, is not a function of the beliefs of the local public but is rather the apprehending of the natural structure of the universe. For this reason, the kinds of experiences that would be promoted in the school would be a function of the nature of the universe and the nature of the organism itself. The logic of the structure of the universe is not determined by the relationship which exists between an acting organism and its social-physical environment, but rather is given a priori and is merely to be chosen and identified by the mind. If the subject stands apart from the object and if experiences are to be arranged so as to facilitate that subject apprehending as true a copy of that object as possible, then the experiences to be used must take into account the structure of the organism and the structure of the universe.

Such understanding allows one to select which objects in the universe are capable of being apprehended through the senses by the organism. Such understanding is a function not only of the nature of the objects of the universe but also of the level of physiological development of the organism itself. The sophistication of the senses themselves determine those objects to which they can respond. But according to the section on realism, the true nature of the object is

Education," which is found in the book edited by Hobert Burns and Charles Brauner entitled Philosophy of Education (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1962), p. 254.

apprehended only when the form of the object is extracted by the use of the powers of reason. The ability to apprehend the form of the object is then not only a function of the nature of the object and the level of physiological development of the organism, but also a function of the level of sophistication of the faculty of mind. The relating then of those particular accidents of experience that can be adequately sensed by the organism in such a way as to lead to the abstracting of the essence of the object by the use of reason, and the relating of these to the nature of the universe is the proper function of the curriculum. All of this demands an understanding of the organism and the structure of the universe.

What are to be considered appropriate experiences then for students in order that they attain knowledge of the universe (a true copy of the nature and order of the objects as well as the nature of the relationships between objects), demands a great deal of information about both the organism and the structure of the universe. Such information is partially but substantially discovered through scientific measures. Such information obviously includes explanations which are supplied by both the social and the physical sciences. And as the level of verification of hypotheses increases in both of these disciplines, the effectiveness of our being able to predict which experiences would be most appropriate in terms of providing for a meaningful acquisition of knowledge by the students will increase.

An appeal to the scientific community for such descriptive information is a most appropriate appeal. An appeal to a local lay populace for hypothesizing and verification of such information is, to the realist, inappropriate. The latter appeal would constitute the total misuse of a proper concept of authority. The realistic position obviously renders questions pertaining to the encouragement of a local community to participate in curriculum development to be irrelevant and therefore inappropriate. The answers supplied by the scientific community, answers that would constitute the basis for selection of appropriate experiences, would differ from the answers supplied by a local lay populace. The curriculum supported by hypotheses issuing from the scientific community in the total realistic context would differ from the curriculum which developed through active local participation. For these reasons, a realistic curriculum will ultimately differ greatly from a pragmatic curriculum.

A Realistic Question and a Rejection by Pragmatism

In the task of developing a school curriculum, one of the questions that has plagued realists is this one: at what level in the school program can the classics in western literature be meaningfully presented to all students? To show how such a question is relevant to the defining characteristics of realism, it will be mandatory to take into account and discuss several of the basic commitments of realism.

But first it might be well to define, in general terms, what is meant by a classical work.

A classical work is a masterpiece in the liberal arts which is as aesthetically well done as it is perceptive in its search for truth. It is complex and amenable to various interpretations. This is not to say that the work is merely ambiguous, but rather it is to note that the problems that the work deals with are complex and render questions significant and of enough scope to demand analysis at the level where interpretation will vary. These significant questions that the work deals with are the ultimate questions that have always and will always demand of man the most provocative kind of inquiry.⁴

A Concern with the Organism

The question above is a relevant question to the realist for several reasons. The first thing to note about the question is again the implied concern with the students' level of sophistication in terms of the faculty of reason. Because of the complexity of issues involved in the classics, an understanding of and the ability to abstract, by the use of reason, the essence of the phenomena involved, demands a disciplined mind. And the actual development of such a mind

⁴This definition of the classics represents a partial synthesis of the description contained in the 1952 Catalogue of St. John's College. The description of the classics contained in this catalogue is found in Harry Broudy's book, Building a Philosophy of Education, op. cit., pp. 197-98.

can be accomplished by the organized and guided study of the classics, from their most basic to their most sophisticated ideas.

There is no concern here for a student's having confronted a problematic situation, demanding for its resolution information contained in the classics. The relevant question presupposes a need for involvement in the classics which does not wait upon the possible arising of a tensional situation whereby the classics could in some way accommodate a resolution of such a situation. And so, the first concern expressed by the question deals with the maturity of mind as a faculty and not with the nature of the relationship existing between an organism and its social-physical environment.

A Concern with the Environment

The first concern expressed by the question then relates to maturity of mind, a concern which makes sense as a result of seeing the mind as a faculty. The second concern expressed by the question deals with the nature of the environment. According to the section describing the defining characteristics of realism, which pointed to a commitment of a "natural" structure to the universe, the classics then make sense as appropriate material for a curriculum only in that they represent the most penetrating analysis of that structure.

If the aim of the curriculum is to provide experiences whereby the truest copy of that structure of the universe is

implanted on the minds of students, and if the classics represent inquiry which has resulted in the most perceptive and enlightened apprehension of that structure, then what better way to accomplish the former than by exposing the students to the latter? The efficiency of the program is based on the premise that a true interpretation of the "natural" structure will be facilitated by having the student deal with an investigation of that structure as the great minds themselves have coped with such inquiry. To review, a realist is committed to the fact (1) of there being a "natural" structure, (2) that that structure can be known as it is in itself; (3) that that structure has been best interpreted by the great minds; (4) that the knowledge of that structure will be instructive in showing people how to live a fruitful life. It is through such commitments that the initial question finds not only its relevance, but also its significance.

But it should be clear that none of the commitments just mentioned can accommodate the general beliefs of the pragmatist. There is no value attached to the apprehending of a "natural" structure of the universe when there is no such structure. There is no knowledge to be apprehended and held in suspension in order to facilitate fruitful behavior in the future. Rather, knowledge arises through participation, modifying the immediate relationship between the organism and its social-physical environment. The concern with the environment by the pragmatist is to be explained in

situational terms that arise in the immediate experience of the organism. That is why the defining characteristics of pragmatism find relevant those questions which deal directly with situations and meaningful relationships between organisms and environments, and which find questions dealing with interpretations of a priori environment to be irrelevant and inappropriate.

If a school curriculum should be developed which includes a study of the classics at a time when it is determined that the student's faculty of mind is sophisticated enough to grasp meaningful interpretations of the natural structure of the universe as contained in the classics, then the school practice can be said to have been guided in its formulation by the use of the philosophy of realism. To be more specific, if, as a result of the question asked, data are collected which indicates that students who are in the eleventh grade are capable of responding meaningfully to a study of "Othello," and this information becomes the basis for instituting the reading and interpreting of "Othello" in the public school curriculum, this practice can be said to result from a commitment to the philosophy of realism. To put it another way, a commitment to the defining characteristics of realism found relevant a question, a reasonable answer to which included the basis of the practice of the reading and interpreting of "Othello." In this way, realism can be said to have been used to guide the instituting of the legitimate practice of

reading and interpreting "Othello" in the eleventh grade. The instituting of this practice is detrimental to a legitimate curriculum in pragmatic terms on the grounds that the question which needs to serve in the capacity of rendering the practice meaningful was itself inappropriate, rendering the practice inappropriate.

But let us also emphasize here another aspect of the thesis of this dissertation. We noted in the statement of the thesis that certain appropriate answers to a relevant question determined by one philosophic system may well be the appropriate answer to a relevant question determined by a different philosophic system. To translate this assertion to our example, a pragmatist may at some point direct the experiences of a group to the work of "Othello." It may occur that a tensional situation will find appropriate for resolution an investigation of the thoughts expressed in "Othello." The use of these thoughts will be different for the pragmatist than for the realist in that the use will predictably be appropriate to a certain kind of modification of the behavior of the students. The result of the proper use of "Othello" in pragmatic terms is to create a new structure of the universe in which the students reside. The result of the proper use of "Othello" in realistic terms is to allow the student to apprehend an already existing structure. The end toward which the use of "Othello" is aimed is different, and to change that end demands a change in the way the work is

utilized. The means (the way in which one approaches "Othello") must accommodate the end toward which the means is intended.

This discussion is meant to go beyond merely demonstrating the complexity of the issues involved. It is to show that "Othello" can be used in a realistic curriculum as well as in a pragmatic curriculum. However, the mere knowledge that "Othello" is used by the realist as well as by the pragmatist does not sufficiently describe the experiences actually involved in such a study to warrant the assertion that the curricula at that point are the same. The experiences involved in the two curricula using the same work are most likely not the same.

However, even if one could demonstrate that the situation occurred where "Othello" was approached in the same manner with the same methods and the same interpretations by teachers representing both philosophies, and further that this manner accommodated two different reasons for inclusion in the curriculum and accommodated the attainment of two different ends, the thesis of this dissertation is still not nullified. It certainly seems unlikely that such a situation would arise, but since the concept of "connection" being defended in this dissertation deals with "if-then" statements and not "if and only if" statements, such a situation would remain only a coincidence and not a disconfirming instance to the thesis.

A Concern for "All the Students"

Pragmatism has been a philosophy whose exponents have become the twentieth century vanguard for an education that touches the lives of all of the youth in our society. But as our section on community participation indicated, the pragmatist also believes that the nature of the educational experiences provided ought to vary in terms of the specific social situation in which the school is located. To take seriously the proposal that the local community participate in the development of the school's curriculum is to take seriously the fact that differing communities should have schools with different curricula. But if there exists a perfect statement which can be offered as representing a diametrically opposed position to this relativistic pragmatic commitment, it is the succinct and often celebrated statement made by Robert M. Hutchins. This is a quotation which finds much favor in the eyes of realists.

Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. Knowledge is truth. The truth is everywhere the same. Hence education should be everywhere the same. I do not overlook the possibilities of differences in organization, in administration, in local habits and customs. These are details. I suggest that the heart of any course of study designed for the whole people will be, if education is rightly understood, the same at any time, in any place, under any political, social, or economic conditions.⁵

⁵Robert M. Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 66.

The realist, like the pragmatist, is generally concerned with the education of all the youth. But where the pragmatist found central to the concern of the school the differing characteristics of men in terms of their different social context, the realist finds central to the concern of the school that which is common to all men. In realistic terms, we found that in the natural structure of the universe, man stands at the apex of that structure by virtue of his essence, i.e., his ability and capacity to reason. It is this defining characteristic of man that establishes the guidelines for the fundamental scope of the formal curriculum.

The realistic notion does not deny physiological or psychological differences in men. Nor does the realist deny differences in intellectual capacities among men. He merely notes that man's function as a human being does not change as a result of such differences, and the function of the school is to allow all men to fulfill their nature. The school must, however, take into account that the level of attainment of that nature will differ among men. In terms of our specific example, to note that some men will grasp the significance of "Othello" to a greater extent than will other men does not allow one to legitimately conclude that those of lesser capacities do not deserve and could not profit from a study of "Othello." The dignity of man, derived from his essence as a creature of reason, demands a development of his nature to whatever degree his specific capacities would allow.

To the extent that the classics provide an approach to such intellectual development, to that extent ought all men be exposed to the classics.

As we have already noted, an understanding of the natural structure of the universe does disclose for man the norms for right behavior. Understanding man's tendency to be reasonable as a part of that natural structure is to understand the morality of providing experiences which would accommodate that tendency. The rationale for including the classics in the curriculum must utilize criteria which take into account the nature of the mind as a reasonable faculty along with the nature of the classics as representing the best examples of the workings of that mind. It should also be noted that crucial to this rationale is the fact that the classics also represent an expression of the perennial human problems that each man in every era must confront.

To allow, however, as the pragmatist does, a man's immediate social context to become the central factor in determining a proper curriculum, is to recognize as legitimate many school situations where experiences demanding inquiry into the classics have not been and will not be confronted. To see immediate situations as central and relevant in the determination of which kinds of experiences the school will promote may ultimately require the exclusion of the classics.

The realist does not leave the determination of the need for such experiences as the classics provide to a criterion

as tenuous as the nature of an individual's immediate social context. For a school to shirk its responsibility to the development of the natural tendency of all of its students in favor of resolving immediate tensional situations is to violate its very function. In the end, such a school provides experiences not appropriate to its rightful function and not necessary to the fulfillment of its rightful function. Such a school, to the realist, is supporting a program which is nothing less than immoral.

One more thing must be said about the relevance of the initial question asked which, we recall, pertained to the level of education where the classics may be meaningfully presented to the students. Aristotle noted in De Anima that thought about a highly intelligible object renders the mind more able to think about objects that are less intelligible. The classics, representing thought about the most intelligible objects, aid in reasoning about a great variety of things in a more intelligible manner. It is true that the capacities of individuals will vary in such a way as to make relevant a concern for the level of intelligibility of thought that can be meaningfully confronted by any one student at any one time. Such a recognition demands a concern for the correlating of a specific classic and its level of intelligibility of thought to the level of maturity of the mind of the student. It is such a recognition that renders the initial question relevant. The major point in this section of the dissertation

is that, even though the varying capacities of individual students may be taken into account in determining which classics are to be used at what times, the question as to which students should study the classics is not appropriate. Thus the schools, in recognition of the importance of that which is common to all men, will provide the context at some time whereby all men will think those highly intelligible thoughts that find their best expression in the classics.

Conclusion

The nature of the connection which exists between a philosophic system and educational practices is described in this dissertation as a process, specifically a process involving legitimate movements in thought. It is a process which focuses its concern on questions, recognizing that for questions to be involved in legitimate movements of thought, they must be relevant. But this condition analytically requires a context by which the relevancy of questions can be judged. The context utilized in this dissertation has been the defining characteristics of the philosophic systems.

Stated positively, the connection which exists between philosophic systems and educational practices may be defined as the process which (1) judges the relevancy of questions pertaining to educational practices by the utilization of the defining characteristics of philosophic systems, (2) seeks reasonable answers to these relevant questions, and (3) allows

these answers to serve as a basis for establishing educational practices. Such a process defines the way in which philosophic systems can be said to guide educational practice.

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