This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

IMAGES AND REFLECTIONS:
THE RESPONSE OF THE BRITISH PRESS TO
THE DREYFUS AFFAIRE

presented by

Ricky Lee Sherrod

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in History

Donald Lammers
Major professor

Date 4. XI. 80.

IMAGES AND REFLECTIONS:
THE RESPONSE OF THE BRITISH PRESS TO THE DREYFUS AFFAIRE

By

Ricky Lee Sherrod

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1980

ABSTRACT

IMAGES AND REFLECTIONS:
THE RESPONSE OF THE BRITISH PRESS TO
THE DREYFUS AFFAIRE

By

Ricky Lee Sherrod

The response of the British press to the Dreyfus Affaire is significant in three respects. It illustrates the degree to which the political and educated classes in Britain, despite the differences of opinion and outlook between Liberals, Conservatives, and Radicals, believed in a liberal ethos and looked to liberalism as the creed which would insure the growth of progress and civilization. The anti-Dreyfusards embodied the forces of reaction and illiberalism, and as such, represented a threat to continued liberal progress. Not until the Boer War, immediately following the Affaire, did the British reluctantly begin to realize how harsh their judgment of France had been, and how illiberally they themselves could behave under the right circumstances.

Secondly, it illustrates the alarm which many British liberals experienced over the growing challenge to liberalism in Britain at the end of the century. Some questioned the efficacy of liberalism as a solution to social and economic problems in a modern industrial state. The growth of illiberal opinion dismayed those who had an abiding commitment to liberal values. One way of indirectly attacking the

opponents of liberalism was to use the Affaire as an object lesson in the evil and follies of illiberal ways.

Finally, there were many in Britian who used the Affaire as an opportunity to celebrate the virtues of Anglo-Saxon civilization and culture. Most journalists who wrote about the Affaire adopted a self-congratulatory posture which evidenced a belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority. The liberal and self-flattering approach taken by British journalists led to frequent misunderstandings and misinterpretations of events in France, and the ephemeral deterioration of Anglo-French relations.

The historiography on the Dreyfus Affaire is voluminous. Most of it documents the domestic impact of the Affaire on France. This is only part of the story. The Affaire developed at a unique time in history when transportation and communication advances made it possible for people outside France to observe closely the Dreyfus trials. One British journalist illustrated this truth by writing that there seemed to be more foreign journalists at Rennes than Frenchmen. The things which these journalists wrote about the Affaire had a real, if perhaps minor, impact on the course of events in France. They usually spawned bitterness and resentment in Frenchmen who believed that foreign observers should mind their own business, especially concerning a complex domestic matter like the Affaire. Journalists who heaped abuse upon France did much to promote ill-will between the French and their fellow-Europeans.

Surprisingly, few monographs or articles focus exclusively on the response of foreign nations to the Affaire. This work is the first effort fully to document the response of the British press to the Affaire. It recounts the expressions of opinion across the Channel to events as

they unfolded in France. In this respect, it documents the various images which the British held of their French neighbors. Perhaps more importantly, it reveals reflections of British attitudes, opinions, and values in politically aware and educated circles. The Affaire concentrated thought on several concerns and issues that were of central importance to Europeans at the end of the nineteenth century. It raised questions about the administration of justice in a democratic society. It stimulated anti-Semitism, and evidenced the intolerance that existed for one European ethnic and religious minority. The relationship between Catholicism and the Affaire raised questions about freedom of religion and thought, and the role of religion in society. Anti-Dreyfusism and militarism appeared to challenge constitutionalism and parliamentary political institutions in France, and consequently led to discussion about the future of democratic forms of government in Europe. Finally, it seemed to demonstrate the dangers of militarism and entangling alliances to the peace of Europe. It illustrated to some the folly of trusting in an unpredictable balance of power. Because the Affaire touched upon so many of the issues which were of central concern to late-nineteenth century Europeans, it affords an excellent opportunity to examine British opinion on a wide range of subjects as it was expressed in the press.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express appreciation to the many people who have so generously assisted me in the completion of this work. During my graduate studies at Michigan State University, I have had the privilege of working closely with Donald N. Lammers. His scholarly abilities and critical skills have done much to improve the content and quality of my dissertation. I am also much indebted to Gordon T. Stewart who first conceived the idea of a dissertation about the British response to the Dreyfus Affaire. Additionally, he has offered many valuable suggestions and criticisms. David G. LoRomer's expertise in Continental history has been of inestimable value, helping me to preserve balance in places where I otherwise might have presented an interpretation which was Anglophile to a fault. Ronald D. Means allowed me to pick his brain to supplement my knowledge of French history and Anglo-French relations. Finally, I must thank Warren I. Cohen who has increased my knowledge of diplomatic history. These five men have contributed much to my dissertation. For this, I am most grateful. Any imperfections or errors which remain are, of course, my own responsibility and not theirs.

I also owe thanks to many other individuals for material and moral support. The Inter-Library Loan staff at the Michigan State University Library has been helpful beyond what was required of them. My special thanks goes to Walter W. Burinski. Thomas Wilschutz, my

friend and fellow-student of British history, was always there to listen, or at least pretend to listen, patiently as I struggled to articulate my ideas. This at times certainly must have tested his patience.

I have been most fortunate to have the support of my family throughout my graduate career. Marshall and Cloye Sherrod, while far away from Michigan, were always there with encouraging words. Without their continual financial support, the completion of my studies would have been difficult if not impossible. Thanks also goes to Glen and Evelyn, and Rockie and Linda Keeley for the material support they have given.

Finally, my deepest thanks go to Roxanne and Heather. Heather's periodic intrusions into my daily routine probably helped to preserve my sanity. She refused to let me take the life of a graduate student too seriously. To Roxanne, my typist, critic, helper, companion, and loyal friend, I give the greatest thanks of all. In spite of the many times when I told you, "We have to type another copy," you were always willing to do it over again. How you were able to type so much and work so hard, baby-on-the-way and all, I will never know. How you were able to do it in such a pleasant and positive attitude is an even greater enigma. Thank you for your willingness to postpone the pursuit of your dreams to help me to realize mine. I will always appreciate your support and encouragement through times that were much more difficult for you than me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

> The interest taken in the case was an illustration of the solidarity of the human race—English, Germans, Italians, and men of other nations were all protesting against one of the most devilish acts of all time. . . . History never recorded a more infamous state of affairs. Manchester Guardian 10 September 1899 (from a description of the sermon delivered by Hugh Price Hughes).

> Having had the great prudence to render herself mistress of the telegraph cables, of the great press and of the [news] agencies, she [Great Britain] said what she wnated to say and spread only the 'good seed,' that is to say, that which was profitable to her. The first lesson received by each reader in opening his morning paper—indisputable lesson up to now—was that which taught him the grandeur of England, and taught in a tone which admitted no rejoinder. Gabriel Hanotaux, Études diplomatique: La politique de l'équilibre, 1907-1911, p. 289.

It was the fall of 1899. The famous French physician and member of the Academy of Medicine, Dr. Robin, travelled up a Russian river to La Bessaralué in a primitive steamboat to treat an ailing patient. The vessel in which he rode was rather unsophisticated by the engineering standards of industrially advanced Europe. To prevent excess use and strain on the machinery, the crew rowed on those occasions when the strength of the current did not require the use of the engine. Like the boat, the ship's engineer was, in the eyes of most Europeans, somewhat primitive—a Tartar believed to be not far removed from savagery. One observant passenger noticed Robin's presence and remarked to the engineer,

"Look! that must be a Frenchman!" Casting a glance toward the doctor, the Tartar sarcastically muttered, "Yes! you hail from the country where there is no injustice!"

At the northern tip of Europe, at approximately the same time, the Prince of Monaco contributed to the cause of science in an exploration of polar regions in his yacht, Princess Alice. When the Prince's yacht arrived at Tromsöé, a ship piloted by a Norwegian pulled alongside. Leaning out from the bridge of his vessel, this pilot called to the pilot of the Prince's ship, "What about Dreyfus? What news is there of him?" Even in the most remote parts of the European world, which often remained aloof from the concerns of Continental politics and society, evidence of interest in the domestic turmoil which beset the French at the fin-de-siècle--the Dreyfus Affaire--could be found.[1] Interest in the Affaire existed not only throughout Europe but in the wider world as well.

The press in most Continental states, Great Britain, and the United States avidly charted the dramatic course of the Affaire. From December 1896, when foreign concern about the Affaire began to grow, until the Rennes verdict and the official pardon of Dreyfus, the world press followed the Affaire with increasing interest. During the final two years, major British newspapers like the London Times, the Manchester Guardian, and the Daily Telegraph provided almost daily reports about the domestic problems in France. Indeed, there were many features of the Affaire which attracted worldwide attention. The absence of the diversion of any major European conflict gave foreign observers the leisure and inclination to watch events in France with great interest. In the civilized world outside of France, a consensus that Dreyfus was innocent developed. During the two years prior to June 1899, the question of

revision of Dreyfus' conviction in 1894 became tied to the fate of democracy in France, and the universal issue of liberty and justice for all mankind.

The Affaire appeared to be in microcosm a kind of testing of liberal systems. Such tests were a feature of the late-nineteenth century. Despotism, militarism, anti-Semitism, and imperialism were all powerful forces which threatened the survival of the liberal world at the end of the century. The growing popularity of these forces distressed European liberals who perceived them as inimical to the liberal ethos. Liberals generally supported lawful constitutional government and opposed arbitary rule. They believed in elementary freedoms of press and speech, and the right to assemble and to organize politically. Most of them favored an economy based on free trade in which the market determined prices. They perceived the individual as a functioning social unit within society, and argued that each individual should have the freedom to realize his potential. They believed in the perfectibility of man. Many liberals perceived those individuals who opposed Dreyfus as symbols of the forces which threatened liberalism at the end of the century. They regarded the Affaire as a symptom of the times, a small part of a "dreadful crisis" in which democracy and parliamentary institutions were put on trial. Many liberal observers perceived the Affaire as intimately linked to the fate of liberalism and the "future of civilization."[2] The Affaire was a classical drama--a play in which most liberals saw the forces of truth and justice matched against the forces of falsehood, injustice and retrogression--which nineteenth century advances in transportation and communication enabled virtually all the world to follow. The Affaire, with all of its elements of suspense and drama, with all of

its dramatis personae captured the interest of the civilized world for almost two years. Indeed, the story of the Dreyfus trials is an intriguing one.

Captain Alfred Dreyfus was born in October 1859 into a well-to-do Jewish Alsatian bourgeois family which ran a thriving textile business in Mulhouse. Alfred's driving ambition was to become an officer in the French Army. He was passionately patriotic. His quick mind and proclivity to hard work brought him success at the École Polytechnique and the École de Guerre. In 1892, he graduated ninth in his class from the latter institution. His cold, reserved, and sometimes arrogant manner failed to ingratiate him with his classmates and later his fellow-officers. Many considered him a persona non grata, a bore, and envied his inherited wealth. In spite of the dislike he inspired in some of his fellows, and the mild anti-Semitic prejudice which some of his teachers and colleagues occasionally evidenced, he achieved professional success and familial happiness. His world revolved around family--his wife Lucie and his son and daughter--and career. In 1893, he became the only Jew to serve as a member of the General Staff. From that time until his arrest as a traitor, he was a probationer. Each probationer had to spend six months with each of the four Bureaux of the General Staff, and had easy access to virtually every kind of top level military secret. Dreyfus was hardly a likely candidate to excite the passions of both France and the world.[3] If not for the Affaire, Dreyfus himself admitted that he probably would have passed unnoticed by future historians as just another artillery officer pursuing his career in the French Army. This was not to be. In the eyes of many, the Affaire elevated this rather ordinary Captain to the rank of the Homeric heroes. On occasion, he was

also compared to Job, Socrates, Pucelle, and the victim of Herod and Pilate, Christ.

Near the end of September 1894, a document—the infamous bordereau—arrived at the Second Bureau, the Headquarters of French Military Counterintelligence. Borderaux were itemized lists which described the contents enclosed in a mailing or delivery from one party to another. The recipient could use the bordereau as a check-list to guarantee the receipt of every item. The reason for the interest in the bordereau which came in 1894 was simple. It had been obtained through espionage from the German Embassy in Paris. It was written to the German military attaché, Colonel Max von Schwarzkoppen. Written in French on thin, transparent paper, the bordereau mentioned five items that related to potentially important French military information. After considerable deliberation, officers in the Second Bureau concluded that there was a security leak somewhere in the General Staff. Key members of the General S aff received notification. They decided that the kinds of information mentioned in the bordereau could most easily be obtained by a probationer. Comparing the handwriting on the bordereau to samples of Dreyfus' written work, the chief of the Fourth Bureau, Colonel Pierre-Élie Fabre, discovered a remarkable similiarity between the two. On 15 October, Major Jarquis Mercier du Paty de Clam, also on the General Staff, arrested Dreyfus after making an attempt to extort a confession through bullying and browbeating, and inviting his captive to act honorably by committing suicide. The prisoner was shortly thereafter incarcerated at Cherche-Midi military prison.

In the flurry of activity which followed the news of the arrest, the Italian military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Allesandro Panizzardi,

became alarmed. He had worked with Schwarzkoppen in espionage-related activities, so he telegraphed his German counterpart, asking if Germany had used the service of Dreyfus. French intelligence officers decoded but mistranslated this communication. The initial decipher appeared to be an admission by Panizzardi of past dealings with Dreyfus. Encouraged by this misinformation, Dreyfus' accuser pressed forward.

Dreyfus' court-martial took place on 19-22 December. Popular opinion, strongly influenced by the railing anti-Semitic press, was violently against him. On the final day of the trial, the Minister of War, General Auguste Mercier, secretly and hence illegally, passed to the judges an envelope containing about a half-dozen documents designed to incriminate Dreyfus. On the strength of this information, the verdict of the judges was "guilty as charged." Dreyfus was trasported to Devil's Island (an inhospitable rock two miles long and four hundred yards wide, set in the Caribbean) off the coast of French Guiana in South America. There he remained under austere conditions for the next four years. Meanwhile, in France, the Dreyfus case gradually developed into the Dreyfus Affaire. At times the very security of the Republic appeared in danger. Most Army officers and many leading figures in the Catholic Church diligently labored during these years to maintain the verdict of 1894. Nevertheless, the injustice done to Dreyfus did not remain forever covered.

In August of 1896, Major Marie-Georges Picquart, who had served as the chief of the Second Bureau since July 1895, discovered that the real author of the <u>borderesu</u> was Count Ferdinand Walsin-Esterhazy, a rather unsavory and disreputable battalion commander in the French Army. Esterhazy was of questionable character on several grounds. He had a

weakness for association with financial speculators, loose women, gambling, and was in chronic financial trouble. Esterhazy apparently became a traitor in order to stave off financial difficulties. For a price, he provided Schwarzkoppen with classified military information. When Picquart revealed his discovery to his superiors, they rebuked him and demanded he remain silent. He promised not to carry his secret to the grave and later, after being sent by his superiors to North Africa on a dangerous inspection tour, he chose to reveal his secret. He confided in his friend and attorney, Louis Leblois, but only after receiving assurance that Leblois would not reveal the source of his information. Meanwhile, the publication of the bordereau in Le Matin enabled a stockbroker named Castro, who had had previous financial dealings with Esterhazy and recognized the Count's handwriting, also to identify the Count as the author of the bordereau. Castro notified Mathieu Dreyfus, Alfred's brother and chief advocate. Mathieu publicly charged Esterhazy and generated an outcry which eventually led to Esterhazy's court-martial on 10-11 January 1898. The military tribunal found Esterhazy innocent. Two days later, novelist Émile Zola added a new dimension of excitement and drama to the Affaire.

On 13 January, Zola's "J'Accuse" appeared in Georges Clemenceau's L'Aurore. In an appeal to the President of the Republic, Zola attacked the injustice against Dreyfus and the principal villains, as he perceived them, associated with the Affaire. His invective gave renewed life to the Dreyfusards, whose cause had been weakened by the verdict in the Esterhazy court-martial. It also precipitated his own trial before the court of Assize on 7-23 February. Zola's conviction was in no small way the result of the pressure that the military exerted on the course of

civil justice. Zola was found guilty by an eight-to-four vote. The highest court in the land, the Court of Cassation, later annulled the verdict on technical grounds, allowing Zola to escape to England before his retrial could be held.

Meanwhile, the national elections in May brought a new group of politicians to power. Godfrey Cavaignac became the Minister of War. In July, he spoke before the Chamber of Deputies, forcefully asserting the guilt of Dreyfus based on documents which were shortly thereafter proven to be forgeries. He also brought charges against Picquart, who was dismissed from the Army, arrested, imprisoned, and, in November 1898, court-martialed. In August 1898 it became apparent that the chief document on which Cavaignac based his assertions had been forged by Lieutenant-Colonel Hubert Henry in the Second Bureau. Cavaignac interrogated Henry, who confessed, and had him imprisoned at Mont Valérien. The following day, 31 August, Henry committed suicide. His act made revision imperative. Esterhazy fled to England, and on 3 September, Cavaignac resigned.

In the midst of the Fashoda Crisis of September and October 1898, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation reopened the Dreyfus case. This led to heated charges about the suitability of the Criminal Chamber to judge in this matter, and on 10 February 1899, the Chamber of Deputies passed a law authorizing the three chambers of the Court of Cassation to meet together to review the 1894 court-martial. On 3 June, the United Court of Cassation annulled the verdict against Dreyfus and ordered a new court-martial to be held at Rennes in Brittany.

On 9 June, Dreyfus left Devil's Island and sailed on the Sfax for France. The Rennes court-martial took place 7 August-9 September.

Much to the disappointment of Dreyfusards in France and abroad, the findings of the Court of Cassation, which were favorable to Dreyfus, were not given serious consideration by the seven officers who sat in judgment. Dreyfus was again found guilty by a vote of five to two, but on this occasion, with "extenuating circumstances." Ten days later, Dreyfus received a pardon. Pardon or no, following the Rennes verdict, many men and women outside France vehemently objected to the decision. According to R. D. Mandell, analyst of the foreign reaction to the Affaire, Dreyfus' reconviction brought French presitge to its nadir.

The judgment was denounced in almost every European and American organ of the press, with the exception of French Canada.[4] Not only a Tartar engineer concerned with justice in France, but also liberals throughout the world who hoped for the spread of progress and enlightenment, stood aghast. The Rennes decision shocked the world. Peoples of all creeds and colors—nations as democratic as the United States and as autocratic and anti-Semitic as Russia, and those in between—expressed sympathy for Dreyfus, and indignation and revulsion toward France. In the opinion of some, France had forfeited, by virtue of her national crime, her right to be considered a civilized nation. In terms of moral prestige, it cost the French "at least two Sedans."[5] Dramatic gestures of sympathy for Dreyfus and his wife came from all parts of the world. Why? Because the verdict at Rennes symbolized the victory of retrograde forces. These forces challenged all of those who perceived the nineteenth century as a "Liberal Century," an age of progress, reason, and enlightenment. The liberal revolutions which occurred on the Continent during the nineteenth century encouraged those Europeans who hoped for liberal progress. During this era many Europeans still confidently

believed that the remarkable material progress made during the century—the revolutionary advances in transportation, communication, industrial expansion, and in constitutional government—demonstrated man's ability to unlock the secrets of the universe, to inaugurate a millenial age in which civilization, peace, justice, and progress would rapidly encircle the globe. The savagery, injustice, crime, and war of earlier and less moral centuries would be supplanted by a new and better time. Many looked to France as the nation which would lead the way toward this noble goal. As any people, including the British, would have been in this nationalistic age, the French were quite happy to adopt this self-flattering view.[6]

Since 1789, France had borne the standard of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. As a nation, she belonged to the comity of nations, thoroughly convinced of her civilizing mission, and self-proclaimed world leader, confident of her control if not monopoly on superior ways. She believed herself to be a beacon, an exemplar for the world.[7] But the Affaire shook the confidence of the world in these French claims. It was an affront to world opinion, which was described by one journalist as an Areopagus in embryonic form.[8] It raised serious doubts in the minds of those who wondered if progress, democracy, and justice were concepts which could coexist with the illiberal dimensions in French society which were so apparent between 1894 and 1899. Only after the complete reversal of the Rennes verdict in June 1906 did the Manchester Guardian feel confident to assert a sense of relief. It claimed the acquittal "brings something of comfort to our faith in the triumph of justice."

Reason and justice demanded the acquittal of Dreyfus at Rennes. Many liberal-hearted Europeans, including no small number from France,

perceived his second conviction as a demonstration of the victory of unreason over progress, the rise of anti-democratic, tyrannical elements in a nominally progressive, enlightened society. The verdict exploded the democratic theory of rational man by showing that the "Sovereign" personified as "Public Opinion," at least in France, ceased to follow capable guides, preferring to accept the lies of the anti-Semitic and at least a few of the Catholic organs of the French press. It dramatically demonstrated the dangers which could result from a press which catered to the vulgar tastes of the semi-literate reading public created by the spread of education in nineteenth century Europe. In one respect, the Rennes decision was a victory for the "reptile press."[10]

Indeed, the role of the press was crucial in fueling anti-Semitic sentiment in France. The anti-Semitic furor which accompanied the Affaire raised serious questions about brotherhood, individual freedom, and the rights of man and the citizen in France. It appeared that members of the Jewish religious and ethnic minority were "less equal" than their fellow-citizens.

Some Roman Catholic priests and members of the French aristocratic and military classes—seen by many nineteenth century liberals as atavistic representatives of the old order with its obscurantism, special privileges, and hereditary rights so inimical to democracy and progress—played a major role in obstructing justice for Dreyfus. Both groups smarted to some degree under republican government and in many respects wished for the restoration of some form of monarchical or autocratic rule. Some Protestant foreign observers believed that the Roman Church hoped to use the Affaire as a tool to establish its own resurgence and hold over the minds of the French people. The role played by Catholic

officials in maintaining the sentence which condemned Dreyfus persuaded them that religious freedom in France was in jeopardy.

Critics of the Church also argued that influential priests exerted pressure on French military leaders to keep Dreyfus on Devil's Island. Whether or not French officers acted at the behest of their confessors, some liberals cited the Army's role in the Affaire and its marked popularity in the decade at the end of the century to illustrate the dangers of militarism in a democratic and enlightened nation. "In any army, the rights of the individual must of necessity be subordinated to the collective interests of the whole."[11] Some commentators used the Affaire as an occasion to malign the military service for the evils they associated with large standing armies and government expenditure on weapons. They showed little sympathy for Continental security needs or the anxieties evoked in France by the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War.

Sizeable armies raised by conscription and military alliances—practices in which all large Continental nations were engaged—posed a threat to European peace. They endangered the growth of a brotherhood of free and equal nations which was the cherished ideal of many nineteenth century liberals. The French government, like most other Continental states, supported a system of universal military service. Through an open alliance and a secret military convention, it also joined itself to Russian autocracy in the entente of 1894. The likelihood of this union prior to 1894 seemed small in light of the ideological differences between these two European states. When the alliance became a reality, it not only introduced a disconcerting salient into the world of international affairs, but called into question the legitimacy of republican government in France. The role of the military in the Affaire prompted

fear that the civil government in France was the lackey of generals who pulled the strings behind the scenes. Some foreign observers, remembering Napoleon I and Boulanger, sounded alarms and predicted the imminent fall of the Third Republic. Others believed that counter-revolution--a military coup d'état--was unnecessary since the generals already exercised de facto rule.

Members of the General Staff seemed to have the power to stay justice even in the face of the clearest evidence of Dreyfus' innocence. The litigations against Dreyfus, Esterhazy, Zola, and Picquart all seemed to show that military justice ruled in France. If maintaining the rights of an innocent individual meant tarnishing the honor of the Army, then the individual would suffer. The French were willing to maintain the judgment against Dreyfus by the most extraordinary means. Through use of what many foreign commentators considered "primitive" legal procedure, they gave credence to evidence which probably would not have been seriously considered in the law courts of most western European nations, and accepted the words of witnesses whose testimony was obviously false. Both Henry and Lemercier-Picard, who each forged several of the main documents which incriminated Dreyfus, mysteriously committed suicide before their testimony could be heard. Some of the forgeries on which Dreyfus' guilt supposedly depended were openly denounced by the German and Italian governments. This made no difference. New laws were created to increase the severity of Dreyfus' punishment and to put him at a disadvantage before his judges. On other occasions, his adversaries simply ignored and broke the law. The British, who had updated and revised their own legal system in the 1870s, and who took great pride in their legal traditions and procedures, were not slow to use the Affaire for their

own purposes, namely to argue that English law and the administration of British justice were, if not the finest in the world, certainly superior to their French counterparts.[12]

The British had their own claims on world leadership and civilized ways which likely did much to predetermine their critical if not hostile outlook. As such, they took a special interest in the Affaire. This interest was significant, especially to some contemporaries like Gabriel Hanotaux, the French Foreign Minister at the time of Dreyfus' arrest. These men argued that the British, by virtue of their influence over telegraph lines and foreign news services, virtually controlled world opinion. Whether or not this was true, the British paid careful attention to the Affaire.

In 1898 and 1899, the Affaire prompted debates at the Cambridge Union. It evoked comment from pulpits of Protestant churches and in Synagogues. Allusions, and at times direct references, were made to the Affaire in theaters, music halls, and at private and public gatherings. The prominent novelist David Christie Murray received permission to use Egyptian Hall and its lantern apparatus to deliver a lecture using highly-magnified photographs of the documents which allegedly incriminated Dreyfus. Supported by the endorsement of a dozen of the world's most capable calligraphers, he argued that Dreyfus was not the author of these works. The Personal Rights Association sent encouragement to Picquart. Zola, on the opening day of his trial, received several hundred telegrams from English supporters. News of the Rennes verdict arrived in London on the evening of 9 September. In response that night, the audience at the Alhambra Palace "hooted and hissed" at French ballet dancers.[13]

Sympathy for Dreyfus cut across both party and class lines. Shortly after the verdict at Rennes was announced, on Sunday 17 September, 50,000 to 80,000 British subjects from all classes gathered in Hyde Park, at the behest of the "Dreyfus Demonstration Committee," with banners, bands, and processions for a massive demonstration expressing sympathy for Dreyfus. The organizers of the demonstration argued that their purpose was to object to the injustice perpetuated by a select group rather than to revel in the jingoistic condemnation of the French people as a whole. The Daily Telegraph described the assembly as "a splendid demonstration of national conscience."[14] The non-partisan crowd included a heterogeneous mix of the British population. The Times claimed that most people there were respectable, lower-middle class citizens. There were Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals. From London, there were residents of the fashionable West End who stood alongside of shabbily dressed East Enders. Professionals, merchants, laboring men, soldiers, sailors, and beggars observed and listened. There were also Anglican pastors, Nonconformist ministers, and Catholic priests. All had come to protest. From the platforms in the Park, theologians, politicians, and working men publicly expressed their outrage over French injustice. One indiscreet Frenchman in the crowd, who during the proceedings muttered, "À bas Dreyfus," had to be rescued by a policeman from a hostile contingent of the audience. Not everyone in the crowd was as discriminating as the organizers of the demonstration. Some overly enthusiastic participants used knotted handkerchiefs to assault some young Frenchmen who had come in support of Dreyfus. Following the demonstration, the crowd marched to the French Embassy where they voiced their indignation.

Other meetings occurred in both London and the provinces, showing an intense concern for the fate of Dreyfus. In the East End, populated by the working class, a Dreyfusard meeting took place at the large hall of the Working Lads' Institute. The Executive Committee of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, which represented 60,000 working men, passed a resolution of sympathy for Dreyfus and his wife and dispatched it to President Loubet and Lucie Dreyfus. The Executive Council of the Social Democratic Federation passed a resolution deploring the verdict as "the inevitable outcome of militarism and clericalism not only in France, but in all countries." The Council also protested against any "wholesale and violent denunciation of the entire French nation" which could not be held responsible for the actions of corrupt leadership.[15] At town meetings throughout the nation, public officials passed resolutions of sympathy. From his pulpit at St. James's Hall in London, Hugh Price Hughes, the editor of the Methodist Times and President of the Wesleyan Conference, as well as critic of Jewish immigration to Britain, denounced the Rennes verdict as an act of the devil: the five judges who convicted Dreyfus earned a place beside Judas Iscariot, Pontius Pilate, and Judge Jeffreys. The Committee of the Personal Rights Association sent a letter to Dreyfus and his wife commending him for his admirable attitude during the trial and asserting a belief in his innocence. Queen Victoria received several telegrams from her subjects at home and abroad begging her to encourage the French president to pardon and free Dreyfus. British government officials carefully guarded their public statements about the Rennes verdict. Salisbury, concerned about securing favorable Anglo-French relations, made no open rebukes. In confidential documents, both Victoria and the Prime Minister expressed

the hope that Dreyfus would be acquitted. One historian of the Affaire, Nicholas Halasz, speculates that the Queen may have known that Dreyfus was innocent as a result of her conversations with her grandson the Kaiser.[16]

The Daily Chronicle supervised the collection of 112,000 signatures on an address of sympathy to the Dreyfus family. The foreign editor of the Times, Valentine Chirol, wrote Times journalist Henry Wickham Steed, that his office had been swamped with letters expressing nearly unanimous disgust over the reconviction. The Manchester Guardian also received many letters to the editor. One, from S. A. Gamble, included a message expressing the sympathy of the women of Manchester to Lucie Dreyfus. The Morning Herald created a shilling subscription program to pay for a testimonial to Dreyfus' wife. Other expressions of sympathy for Dreyfus were more active and assertive.

One of the most amusing instances of narrow-minded, popular British excitement and revulsion over the Rennes verdict took place in the Lake Country. At the time of the judgment, the editor of a leading French paper honeymooned there with his American wife. Shortly after the Rennes decision was announced, the irate landlord of the hotel expelled the couple in a "most offensive and brutal manner, on the ground that he would have no 'cursed Frenchmen' staying in his hotel!" Ironically, the editor was one of the first representatives of the French press to denounce the misdeeds of the anti-Dreyfusards. In London, Birmingham, and Manchester, French citizens were physically assaulted, threatened, and some were told to leave the country. Some families dismissed their French maids, and at some schools, French and English children were separated. One business manager of a furniture factory in the Tottenham

Court Road, in opposition to his own business interests, responded to the "prevailing mania" by refusing to hire French artisans, regardless of their capabilities.[17] One final example of this kind of behavior occurred when the Rennes verdict was announced to an excited crowd at the National Liberal Club. An Irish journalist, expressing the position which some of the Roman Catholic organs of the Irish press had taken on the Affaire, asserted that the cad Dreyfus had received what he deserved. He was immediately and forcibly thrown out the door of the club by angry fellow-members.[18]

Some British industrialists and cultural leaders seriously discussed making an organized effort to boycott the Great Exhibition scheduled for 1900 in Paris. The French viewed the Exhibition as an "ecumenical congress . . . of human production," the summit "from which one measures the route of progress." In official publications, the French claimed to perform "a secular mission in the work of the progress of civilization."[19] Some angry British observers believed the Rennes verdict was inconsonant with these claims, and advocated boycott. Punch published several cartoons illustrating such sentiment. There were almost 2,000 exhibitors from Britain and the Empire with places reserved for the Exhibition. For some, the Rennes verdict was grounds for withdrawal. Eggleston Burrows, the Chairman of Vinolia Company, sent the following letter to Colonel Jekyll, the Secretary of the Royal Commission to the Paris Exhibition:

> Sir,—Considering the condition of things in France, the outlook at the present for foreigners to do business there, and the great doubt there is of there being a large influx of important buyers from other countries at the Paris Exhibition, in consequence of its present unpopularity evoked by the verdict at Rennes, it seems to the directors that any large outlay of time and money on the part of this Company

> over the Exhibition in 1900 would not be warranted, and it is therefore their desire to be excused from having an exhibit as arranged.
>
> If things were to assume a normal attitude all round, it would, of course, make a difference, but unfortunately such an event does not appear likely at present.[20]

Other people expressed a concern about the ability of the French to protect the influx of foreign visitors who would attend the Exhibition.

Some outraged citizens insisted that Britain punish France by severing trade relations with her. After the immediate passion of indignation faded, most British citizens concluded that punitive action would hurt not only those responsible for the travesty of justice, but also the many defenders of Dreyfus. Rennes did not justify an indiscriminate boycott of or attack upon France. A meeting between leading British and French scientists at Dover on 16 September exhibited the discriminating attitude found among some British citizens. The Frenchmen were cordially received by their English hosts. The Manchester Guardian praised this gathering as a reminder to "some inconsiderate Englishmen that France is not inhabited solely by persons of the type of Mercier or Esterhazy." While there were some cool heads who sincerely believed these words, those who wrote in the British press were in the minority.

More thoughtful British commentators realized that it was possible that the Court of Cassation would act to overturn the Rennes verdict. In London, the Committee of the International Arbitration and Peace Association deprecated efforts to boycott the Exhibition. Retaliatory action was not likely to free or acquit Dreyfus. Moreover, those who forfeited reservations to show exhibits at the Exposition would quickly be replaced by others wishing to have the empty positions. Only about a dozen British firms actually withdrew their exhibits. Finally, it did not serve British self-interests to impose economic sanctions.

The British were aware that trade war with France would damage not only France but also Britain. The Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Manchester Guardian, the Westminster Gazette, and the Daily Chronicle all objected to a boycott of France. Although the British perceived themselves as disinterested and justice-loving, it is significant and not necessarily surprising that when certain critics had something to lose, words were not followed by actions. The British were, of course, also quickly distracted from the Affaire by the Boer War.[21]

After Dreyfus' official pardon by President Loubet on 19 September 1899, hundreds of congratulatory telegrams came to Dreyfus from England. The pardon effectively curbed further talk about boycotts or sanctions. The "Dreyfus Demonstration Committee" planned and held a banquet on 10 October to celebrate his release. This gathering, held at the Hotel Cecil, attracted individuals from both London and other parts of the nation. The guest list included many prominent British citizens. Although Dreyfusard Georges Clemenceau was absent, he sent a letter expressing his regret for being unable to attend.

British interest in the Affaire was the product of several forces. Not the least of these was the Anglo-French colonial rivalry. J. A. Spender, who during the Affaire edited the evening daily, Westminster Gazette, believed that bad blood between England and France over colonial disagreements distorted the British view of France and disposed the British people to espouse a Dreyfusard position. Specifically, the Fashoda crisis of September and October 1898 disposed the British press vigorously to denounce the French for what Spender perceived as a purely internal French matter. In spite of his efforts to "pour oil on troubled waters"--a thankless task for which he claimed to

be criticized and maligned as an apologist for his French friends--British opinion remained overwhelmingly and stridently Dreyfusard and anti-French.[22] The President of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris, Francophile Sir Thomas Barclay, described England's Dreyfusard sympathies as an "anti-French fever, with a violence only second to that of the anti-Dreyfus fever in France." He argued that the British government and press cooperated in an effort to foment anti-French sentiment by the reporting of the Affaire. He failed to mention, however, Salisbury's concern about improving Anglo-French relations during these years.[23] According to Barclay, "It was quite a common thing in those days [c. 1898] to hear anaemic little London clerks threatening the French nation with 'the lest licking they ever got.'" In the "fetid political atmosphere of the two capitals . . . aggressive anti-French and anti-English tendencies found a congenial soil."[24] Spender concurred, claiming that it was as unpopular to be pro-French at the turn of the century as it became to be pro-German during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Indeed, Fashoda certainly played an important role in shaping British attitudes about France. It seems more than coincidental that the Times, which traditionally supported the administration in power, jettisoned its policy of arguing that Dreyfus was guilty and adopted a Dreyfusard posture simultaneously to the Fashoda crisis. The Manchester Guardian, however, opposed the government's Fashoda policy, yet adopted a policy of defending Dreyfus following Henry's suicide on the eve of the Fashoda crisis.[25] Some organs of the British press supported Dreyfus several months prior to Fashoda. Others continued to believe the French government and Army for some time after October 1898 before finally joining the Dreyfusard chorus. The British fascination

with events in France went beyond the concern of a people for their overseas territories.

A second explanation of the British interest in the Affaire lies in the sense of superiority which many Anglo-Saxons possessed. Events in France gave occasion to take advantage of the French discomfiture and argue the case for British cultural superiority and leadership on the march toward civilization. Some more zealous believers embraced the theories of university professors like Benjamin Kidd and Karl Pearson, who argued that this superiority was something inherently racial. Writing in 1906, Victor Berard, a French observer, argued that the teaching of English sociologists and academicians, influenced by nineteenth century biological conceptions, had "entered into the very bones of the nation," that the "English people . . . [were] steeped in this doctrine . . . in strict keeping with the latest discoveries of science."[26] An editorial which appeared in Anglo-Saxon Review captured the essence of this spirit. After citing the Affaire in France as evidence of political and moral decadence in Latin nations, the author went on to extol the excellence of the Anglo-Saxon race in virtually every field of human endeavor. Anglo-Saxons were the best administrators, rulers over subject races, law-abiding electors, merchants, manufacturers, businessmen, traders, pioneers, conquerors, and colonists. They by nature administered "justice with smaller regard to racial, religious, and social prejudices." In his conclusions, which certainly must have offended his foreign readers, of whom there were many, he complacently accepted the Englishmen's "'superiority,' or rather the inferiority of the unfortunate foreigner" in the hope that the excellence of the race would not be "an excessive strain" upon English modesty.[27]

Whether or not contemporaries believed in the racial superiority of the Anglo-Saxon, many in Britain accepted the argument that the British were, among their fellow-Europeans, first among equals. According to one argument, the British character was not necessarily better in any given area than the character of other European races. The English, with their "dogged, cold, exclusive . . . temperament," were "decidedly inferior" in many ways. The French excelled them in "lucidity, precision, and wit." The Germans had a better physique, as well as greater "patience, discipline, and thoroughness." The Spaniards had greater sobriety, the Russians more humanity, and the Italians more finesse. The "clannish Scotch [sic]" were "equally dogged," and the "capricious Irish" more vivacious and intelligent. The Americans across the Atlantic demonstrated greater inventiveness and versatility. Nevertheless, during the nineteenth century, the British experienced an "increase in population, railway development, seaborne trade, area governed, &c., &c. . . . on a scale absolutely unparalleled elsewhere in ancient or modern times."[28] Some sociologists believed this was true because of the Englishman's remarkable ability to assimilate the virtues of other peoples. Moreover, the English character comprised "a more perfectly developed standard of general excellence" than the other Teutonic peoples of north and western Europe. J. A. Hobson wrote that "even those nations nearest to us in mind and sentiment—German and Scandinavian—we regard on the whole not so excellent as ourselves, comparing their typical characteristics with ours."[29] Examples of this outlook abound in the British commentary produced by the Dreyfus case.

One of the more interesting examples is found in the British descriptions of the "heroes" of the Affaire. Several journalists wrote

as though the British had a monopoly on certain character traits. They repeatedly commented upon the Anglo-Saxon qualities exhibited by Dreyfus and Picquart. G. W. Steevens, who attended the Rennes trial as correspondent for the Daily Mail, wrote brilliant descriptive accounts of the proceedings which included a careful recounting of the appearance of the defendant. Steevens described Dreyfus as "stiff, certainly, and formal—it was well said that he looked more like a German officer than a French—and he denied everthing with emphasis, but without emotion." He endured the weeks of testimony with a stiff upper lip. Only his profile betrayed his Jewish origins. "The French, of course, found him unsympathetic, and certainly he looked stubborn and none too cordial or genial."[30] The Times correspondent at Rennes repeatedly commented on how Anglo-Saxon Dreyfus looked. Had not the defendant been condemned for his zeal, industry, and hard work as a probationer for the General Staff? These, he believed, were English qualities. In 1898, the National Review published the letters from Dreyfus to his wife. Frederick C. Conybeare, one of the most prolific British commentators on the Affaire, argued that these were the words of an innocent, wronged individual. They reflected the poise, pride, self-control, and loyalty to country which would have done credit to an Englishman.

Steevens and Conybeare—both authors of books about the Affaire—also ascribed Anglo-Saxon qualities to Picquart, who, after suffering eleven months in solitary confinement for refusing to violate his conscience and deny the truth, retained "a pleasant, sensible face." He might easily have been "an English provincial builder."[31] Steevens echoed a theme often stressed in National Review: Picquart, like most of the best Frenchmen, came from Alsace. The implications seem to be

that Teutonic influence in this province had mitigated some of the ill effects of what the writer perceived as French degeneracy. Conybeare, who in 1914 wrote a eulogy to Picquart in Cornhill Magazine, lavished praise on the deceased for his exhibition of Anglo-Saxon traits. In humility and modesty, which Conybeare believed reflected the character of the British, Picquart, on his death bed, insisted that there be no speeches made over his tomb. "The one thing which he feared, as in death so in life, was to be applauded by the crowd and made a fuss about. He feared publicity" and self-advertisement.[32]

The self-flattering portraits which Britihs commentators tried to sketch of the Anglo-Saxon race in their analysis of the Affaire did much to embitter Anglo-French relations in the aftermath of the Rennes. Ronald K. Huch, who has analyzed the response of the British press to the Rennes verdict, summarizes its impact by writing, "The Dreyfus affair should have caused Englishmen to reflect on their own society. Instead, most shouted invectives at the 'uncivilized' French, and wrapped themselves in the threadbare cloak of Anglo-Saxon superiority."[33] Indeed, those who celebrated the virtues of Anglo-Saxon racial qualities failed to recognize that those who peopled the British Isles were not a pure racial strain but a mixture of different nationalities which had settled in that region of the world. Just as there was no such thing as an Aryan race, the term "Aryan" being a lingual rather than a racial classification, neither was there an unadulterated Anglo-Saxon people in whose blood resided "superior" racial traits.

The British sense of superiority was the product of material success and achievement, relative political stability during the nineteenth century, and geography. The British enjoyed the fruit of being

the first industrialized nation. While these advantages proved temporary in the long-run, they gave Britain unchallenged supremacy in many domains during much of the century. Politically the British took great pride in what they believed to be their time-tested constitution. Being unwritten, it could change with the times; it was not too abstract. Nineteenth century British historiography generally lauded the consitution as evidence of the political genius of the English people. Most in Britain seemed to accept, if not applaud this notion, as well as the political development of the nation. They believed British ministries had steered a course between the tyranny of the mob characteristic of the democracy found in France and the United States, and Russian autocracy. Insularity bred a sense of apartness, often perceived by the non-British as arrogance, and a belief in special mission or the destiny of England, a counterpart to "Manifest Destiny" in the United States. While this constellation of factors combined in a way which was auspicious for the British during the nineteenth century, changes and advances on the Continent and elsewhere later proved how transient superiority could be.

The first modern scholarly works about British history also contributed to the development of a British superiority complex. The writings of Thomas Macaulay were probably most important in this regard. Writing in the afterglow of the Great Reform Bill of 1832, Macaulay published his History of England in 1848. This Whig interpretation of British history, which included a healthy respect for constitutionalism as well as anti-monarchical and anti-Papist elements, achieved enormous success. It sold 13,000 copies in four months. Given its praise for material progress and the traits of industry, business efficiency, and

enterprise, it is not surprising that Macaulay's work had a strong appeal to the British middle class. More than any other writer of his time, Macaulay provided his countrymen with an experience of self-discovery. He "made the Englishman familiar with his own history."[34] Moreover, he had a formidable impact on British culture and the existing intellectual outlook, on self-perceptions and the British view of political morality. Notwithstanding the revisions spearheaded by historian like Sir Louis Namier in the 1920s and J. H. Plumb in the 1950s, Whig history survived in textbooks into the 1950s. Macaulay helped to create a national identity which influenced Englishmen not only of his own day but afterwards as well. He propagated the idea among his countrymen that the English people of his day were "'the greatest and most highly civilized people' the world had ever seen."[35] According to Macaulay and the many who accepted his views, this auspicious state of affairs made for unrivalled happiness. In fact, Britain was portrayed as the "'nation of the future;' the carrier of values to which all other 'progressive' nations were slowly turning." Those who supported this view perceived the British liberal state as the nation which had achieved the "farthest point yet reached by mankind in its onward quest for perfection."[36] As such, Macaulay and those who followed in his tradition reinforced the sense of apartness which geography had preordained for Britain. The somewhat swaggering mood induced by Macaulay and historians who followed in his Whiggish tradition was one of complacency and self-satisfaction. This school of historians propagated the idea that the Whigs, since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, had been the perennial facilitators of progress. Hence, Macaulay's version of history had a linear quality. It was a view of history as a steady progression towards liberty with

Britain at the forefront. This leads us to a third reason for the British facination with the Affaire.

There existed in Britain, especially during Macaulay's heyday, a certain homogeneity of ideas and outlook which can best be summarized by the term "liberal." In fact, some historians argue that in nineteenth century Britain, more than any other contemporary European nation, there existed a general liberal mentality and a confidence in the perpetual growth and forward march of civilization and progress.[37] Thus, the Affaire was an especially distressing display of a danger which threatened the realization of this dream. Whether or not Britain excelled her fellow-nations in putting liberal values into practice, the basic cast of British society, institutions and thinking during the nineteenth century was liberal. This is not meant to imply that party, class, and religious differences failed to exist. Nor is it meant to suggest the existence of a uniform, perfectly united "national mind." However, during certain epochs there can exist dominant trends or climates of opinion. Robert Wohl's concept of "generational theories" recently elaborated in The Generation of 1914 is instructive in this regard. War, economic depression, material prosperity, or other dramatic experiences through which the members of a given cohort pass often produce similar ideas, expectations, and habits of thought. Members of the same generation often view the world and their environment from a similar perspective. The prosperity which the British enjoyed during the mid-nineteenth century made a lasting mark upon the mid-Victorians. Many British citizens associated the rise of Britain with the liberal values which the political classes put into practice. For them, the liberal Weltanschauung was almost synonymous with Englishness. From the 1840s

to the 1880s a liberalism (which was not, of course, co-terminous with the Liberal Party) enjoyed ascendancy within the political system. During most of the century, the anti-liberals were on the defensive. Certainly, there were different political philosophies and parties, as was reflected in British commentary on the Affaire, but politicians on both Front Benches endorsed liberalism in general terms. As has been its habit, the Conservative Party evolved over time, absorbing many liberal tenets into its own flexible ideology. By the late-nineteenth century, Conservatives basically accepted many liberal ideas including Free Trade, a balanced budget, and responsible government.

Indeed, the British ethos included a wide variety of liberal philosophies. There was a marked emphasis on freedom or liberty, in particular the freedom of the individual to conduct his business without the government intruding. It was generally accepted that the state was a necessary evil. It was commonplace that the government which governs least governs best, that the use of government power should be restricted to those actions which were necessary to preserve justice and the rights of life, liberty, and property. If the British desired limited government, they also insisted that military and religious authority be strictly subordinate to secular authority. They generally supported the rights of the individual regardless of his race or beliefs. They believed in tolerance and the exercise of free will, freedom of thought, and freedom of press. Also popular was the laissez-faire doctrine of unfettered economic competition and a free, self-regulated market. Government restrictions and regulations were anathema, to be tolerated only when absolutely necessary. As is well known, the British continued to cling to a laissez-faire economic policy long after it became

expedient to adopt some form of regulations or tariffs to protect the national interests.

Whether or not liberalism was "the way" to paradise, the British tended to associate it with enlightenment and moral progress. In the minds of many British citizens, interference with the operation of principles of rationalistic or naturalistic individualism was on a par with tampering with eternal, universal, immutable, natural law. To be liberal was to be on the side of progress. Some converted liberalism into a moral dogma. Ignorance and selfishness, which Macaulay and others associated with autocratic kings, aristocrats, and priests, led to the breaking of liberal laws and consequent suffering, unhappiness, waste, want, and misery. The "furtherance of liberal causes was a moral imperative" which, in the end, "could also be relied upon to promote national greatness and commercial prosperity."[38] In the words of one analyst of Anglo-German relations, Raymond Sontag, liberals fought in the name of "scientific self-interest."[39] The spectacular material successes, the wealth, power, and relative social harmony which the British enjoyed during most of the nineteenth century seemed to confirm the belief that the freedoms provided within a liberal society produced both domestic and international triumphs. If this was true, then Britain, so long as she adhered to liberalism would enjoy perpetual supremacy. When the British began to confront formidable obstacles both at home and abroad during the final decades of the century, something seemed awry.

By the 1880s, Germany demonstrated that national success could be realized by means which were far from liberal. The meteoric rise of the German state in the late-nineteenth century challenged the notion that liberalism and the liberal political tradition was a panacea or an

inescapable path to material progress and national success. Germany lacked a liberal political tradition, supported a centralized government and made use of conscription and tariffs. She fielded the most efficient and effective army the world had ever seen and excelled the British in technical ingenuity, administrative efficiency, and material productivity. In spite of, or perhaps better stated, because of these illiberal features of the German nation-state, Germany became the main commercial rival of Britain, threatening the unchallenged supremacy she had enjoyed in virtually every field of endeavor at mid-century. Britain's relative decline in the international sphere forced the British to reappraise the liberal values they had assumed to conform to natural laws leading to success. Perhaps this external challenge would not have been so disturbing had not liberal values simultaneously come under criticism at home.

British historian R. C. K. Ensor described the 1890s as a time of crisis for liberalism. As this was true on the Continent, so it was true in Britain, if perhaps to a lesser degree. "In religion, in social relations, in politics, in business, men grown contemptuous of the old ideals were stridently asserting new ones."[40] To be sure, the British continued to embrace a system of liberal values. There was, however, a general movement or reaction against Victorian liberalism, rationalism, positivism, materialism, and prudery, which, as some began to argue, kept men in bondage. The final decade of the nineteenth century was a time of transition, an unsettled period during which many of the deep-seated assumptious of orthodox liberalism were challenged. Some no longer believed that free choices made by the rational individual pursuing his own interest always resulted in the realization of the public

interest. They doubted the existence of some invisible, guiding natural law which brought harmony out of chaos. Too many indicators within society denied this assumption. By the 1890s, there was an increasing awareness of socio-economic ills, of an urban-social crisis produced by Britain's modern, highly urban and industrial society. Modernity and the march of civilization had brought riches and conscpicuous consumption for some, but this plenty existed alongside of recurring capitalist crises of unemployment, not to mention poverty and disease. Applied liberalism had failed to prevent these ills. Eventually, some lost their faith that the operation of uncontrolled, "natural" economic laws would always bring prosperity. Laissez-faire doctrines, perceived by some as the "creed" of the middle class rather than the common man, seemed somehow inadequate. While providing freedom for some, it limited many. Among others, British Liberal intellectuals T. H. Green, D. G. Ritchie, L. T. Hobhouse, and J. A. Hobson rejected the hostility of their forefathers toward the state and the notion that a minimum of intervention by the state was always the best policy. Some argued that government action was necessary to solve the ills of British society, to promote conditions in which each citizen would enjoy the most fulfilling life and as much freedom as possible without disturbing the freedom of others. The "New Liberals", as these men were called, hoped to convert liberalism into a springboard for political action, to apply a corrective to what they perceived as defective within mid-Victorian liberalism while bringing a liberal point of view to the new social problems of the late-nineteenth century. Less inhibited groups in Britain advocated a variety of socialist solutions for British ills. But during the 1890s, these

anti-liberal ideas represented a minority view, not only within the Liberal Party, but also among the British public as a whole.[41]

Not until the Boer War abundantly demonstrated the failure of Britain in so many areas did the mid-Victorian sense of national self-confidence, which many in Britain valiantly tried to defend at century's end, give way to what Samuel Hynes has termed the "Edwardian frame of minds." The post-war outlook was plagued by depression, pessimism, and openly-expressed anxiety about national decline. But this was not the case, at least to the same degree, during the years when France passed through the Affaire. The coverage which the British gave to the Affaire is one clear indicator of this fact.

The articles about the Affaire in newspapers and journals provide a window through which one can see partial but important reflections of the opinions of the political and educated classes in Britain about some of the most important and pressing issues of the period. At the turn of the century, there were no public opinion polls like those of today. Of course, the demonstration in Hyde Park and the outbursts against French citizens and sympathizers in Britain were testimony to the public indignation over what had been done at Rennes. Beyond these more tangible and conspicuous expressions of sympathy for Dreyfus, evidence of the opinion of the man-on-the-street is rare. Still, one can obtain an imperfect yet revealing idea of popular sentiment in Britain, especially among the educated and political classes, by a careful examination of the press. The press was the main purveyor of foreign news to the British. As such, it exercised some degree of influence over the reading public. It told people about what happened outside their immediate environment and in other societies. Public opinion about foreign events is not,

however, synonymous with commentary in the press. The debate over whether popular opinion was the product of the press or whether the press catered to the tastes and desires of the reading public is one of those "chicken and egg" arguments about which much has been written and little conclusive has been, or perhaps ever can be, said. For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to argue that those things written in the press represented what educated and politically-aware observers saw, or thought they saw, across the Channel. Much can be learned from an examination of the most important, or at least most widely-circulated, periodical journals and weekly newspapers, a selective reading of articles appearing in the daily newspaper press, and finally, the recorded observations of the chief political figures and contemporary historians of France. Albeit, the picture that emerges is partial and subjective. The attitudes expressed were by no means held by all. But such a study at least enables us to distinguish the outlines of British opinion. More importantly, it reveals the perceptions, be they true, false, blurred, or distorted, which the British had of the French at the turn of the century. In fact, many journalists were at once unsympathetic and inaccurate. The British often misinterpreted what they saw. As history was to show, many commentators proved to be poor prophets.

Irrespective of the validity of these "images" or sterotypes of the French, the attitudes expressed by British commentators are important for two reasons. Images have an impact on international relations. They influence the ways in which nations conduct themselves toward one another. Secondly, images are self-revealing. While the image perceived from the outside may be totally false, what the observer sees, or says he sees, tells us important things about the beliefs, assumptions, and

value system of the viewer. In the words of Gordon Wright, "one nation's image of another is in considerable part of a self-image" since judgments also involve comparisons, be they "conscious or not, between 'them' and 'us.'" Viewers are either attracted or repelled by what they see in a foreign land, depending on how the actions perceived conform to or depart from the values and practices deemed appropriate and acceptable. The commentary of the British press on the Dreyfus trials affords an excellent opportunity to demonstrate these points. In the articles about the Affaire, there is an abundance of comment showing British images of France, which in turn are reflections of the dominant beliefs, suppositions and values in Britain at the century's end.[42]

Indeed, a study of the British response to the Affaire reveals many interesting things about British self-perceptions and attitudes regarding the features and concerns that were central to both the Affaire and to Europeans at the fin-de-siècle. The Affaire raised questions about the administration of justice and equality before the law. Some observers used it as an occasion to argue about the degree of personal freedom and autonomy which should exist within a democratic society. It also raised questions about human equality, race relations, and race-hatred. It offered an opportunity to discuss the role of religion in modern, industrial society, and the impact of militarism on international relations.

Finally, it prompted many discussions about the virtues and viability of democratic and republican forms of government. In a unique and dramatic way, the Affaire touched upon and demonstrated the interrelatedness of these distinguishable themes in European history. Naturally, British opinions relating to these themes were conceived and held

within a densely textured cultural universe. They were part of a larger fabric of attitudes, perceptions and ideas which were the product of centuries of national evolution. Hence, the study of what educated British citizens wrote and read about the Affaire will not provide a comprehensive description of the general climate of opinion—the mental universe or as one historian, Caroline E. Playne, has put it, the "pre-War Mind," the "Spirit of the Age"—which existed in Britain as the century drew to a close.[43] It does not reveal all the answers.

Admittedly, even the most exhaustive studies of the temperament, moods, and national mentality of the British people in the decades which preceded World War I are only imperfect and partial sketches. Passions, emotions, and obsessions changed from hour to hour with the ebb and flow of European and world events. At any given time, there were usually many different and conflicting currents of opinion. Discerning the predominant ones is no easy task. Nevertheless, this is no excuse for ignoring the issue, of refusing to discuss what appear to be the most important currents of opinion. There were individual differences in the way British subjects perceived Britain and the larger world, yet at the same time, many in Britain shared certain assumptions about how the world operated. Life in nineteenth century Britain conditioned them to have many common expectations and habits of thought. Hence, in examining expressions of opinion, it is possible to "arrive at [the] approximately correct conclusion," about which opinions were dominant.[44] Thus, a study of the British response to the Affaire is potentially significant in two respects.

This kind of examination fills a conspicuous omission in the enormous body of historiography about the Affaire by detailing the

coverage found in the British press. While references to the British reactions to the Affaire are found in many of the books and articles about Dreyfus, there is no single, in depth study of the response of the British press to the Dreyfus trials. Ronald K. Huch's short article examines the British response to Rennes. His work, however, fails to draw upon the wealth of commentary about the Affaire found in the press prior to September 1899. This dissertation is the most detailed examination available of the British press and its response to the Affaire.

Secondly, a careful analysis of the response to the Affaire is important because British interpretive comment illuminates the opinions that existed at century's end. Because the Affaire concentrated thought upon and dramatized certain issues which were of concern to late-nineteenth century Europeans, the British response to the Affaire made explicit both the anxieties and the conceits of the educated and political classes in Britain. An examination of this response is revealing with respect to aspects of the British public mind, and the state of opinion and thought concerning the master issues of political and social life during the 1890s. It shows some interesting and important reflections of part of an overall British attitude at a given point and in relation to a specific set of events within a national and international environment. During the 1890s, that environment was hostile to liberalism.

As British liberals saw fault lines appear within a system in which they had placed an almost blind faith, a sense of insecurity developed among those who refused to relinquish their trust in a liberalism of mid-Victorian vintage. Liberalism had become a sacred cow. British liberals did not want to admit its flaws and internal contradictions or to admit that the unchallenged supremacy which Britain enjoyed until

about 1870 was neither permanent nor linked to the values which predominated in the mid-Vicotrian era. One is reminded of the quip that "the strength of the British lies in their inability to recognize defeat."[45] Many late-Victorians exhibited a psychological reluctance to recognize the temporary nature of the superiority of Britain in the international community or to acknowledge the relative decline of Britain vis-à-vis other nations. It was not easy for men who staked so much on the liberal ethos to admit the possibility of error. Hence, they sometimes grasped at manifestations which seemed to validate their preconceived and cherished beliefs. For instance, the relief of Mafeking during the early stages of the Boer War brought an outburst of national enthusiasm completely out of proportion to the magnitude of the rescue of this besieged outpost of the Empire. This incident is instructive because it demonstrates in general terms the latent anxieties and self-doubts within British society at approximately the same time as the Dreyfus Affaire. Significantly, the treatment of the Affaire in the British press reflects a subliminal sense of national insecurity. In more specific terms, it exhibits an intense concern about the future of liberalism and the declining popularity of liberal values in both Britain and Europe. It demonstrates the value which was still attached to many of the Gladstonian, laissez-faire principles which had enjoyed acclaim at mid-century and into the 1870s. The commentary of British journalists illuminates both the British view of past traditions and the British concern about the present situation. Had Macaulay lived into the twentieth century, he surely would have been pleased with the Whiggish approach adopted by most of those who analyzed the Affaire from across the Channel. Their analysis included arguments for Anglo-Saxon

superiority, anti-clericalism, liberal governmental structure, and laissez-faire economic policies. The 1890s were, however, quite different from the 1850s.

As the liberal ethos lost some of its appeal, and as critics of liberalism became increasingly vocal in the 1880s and 1890s, those who continued to believe in the liberal way of life felt compelled to defend liberal values from attack. Some British journalists were not hesitant explicitly to associate the Affaire with the illiberal trends at the fin-de-siècle. On occasion they even made allusion in their articles about the Affaire to anti-liberal movements in Britain. Those who did this intended that their readers draw the conclusion that the liberal ethos should be defended. Such a defense of liberal values sometimes led to misapprehensions and misinterpretations.

Criticisms of the French in general and the anti-Dreyfusards in particular frequently included conclusions made without factual support. Indeed, some British journalists wrote as though they needed no evidence. They seemed convinced that anti-Dreyfusism violated "unimpeachable" liberal principles and hence must be in the wrong. Given this point of view, Britain's support of the Dreyfusards was predictable. Whether intentional or unconscious, the approach adopted by the British pressmen shows how the Affaire was used as an occasion to support a value system to which they were laregely committed and which had come under attack at home. Perhaps the writers found it attractive to speak to their illiberal countrymen by use of example, through comment on events in a foreign land. At all events, the anti-liberal currents of opinion in late-nineteenth century Britain created a psychological climate in which liberals were probably more sensitive to criticism and attacks made on

liberal principles, be they at home or abroad. As a result, British commentators not only described the Affaire but converted it into a cause célèbre in defense of liberalism. They presented their case in a hyperbolic way designed to demonstrate the beneficence of liberal ways and the shortcomings of other less enlightened avenues.

Thus, in the eyes of most British observers, or at least the ones who wrote in the press, the Affaire was positive proof that the road toward growth and progress was a liberal one. This presumption was doubly appealing since it seemed to confirm the folly of illiberal ways while also reassuring the British, at a time when their claims to superiority seemed increasingly questionable, that they as the defenders of liberal values and critics of anti-Dreyfusism deserved to be considered as the "true" world leader and principal promoter of civilization and progressive ways. The Affaire demonstrated the fragility of French claims in these respects, and as such, induced both an introspective and comparative mood in Britain. One journalist, J. H. A. MacDonald, who wrote about the Affaire in Blackwood's, observed:

> if France to-day symbolises the condition of the world, then there is much to fear for the future. If what is now springing up rankly in France is germinating throughout the world, then the beginning of a new century may be a rude one, a terrible shaking, the end of which no human foresight can predict. . . . [T]hat which is now seen in France . . . should cause all other nations to look inwards with a single eye, searching whether this boasted light of civilisation may not, as perverted by human conceit and self-confidence, have become a light of which it may be said, "How great is that darkness." [a reference to Matthew 6:23][46]

MacDonald's words help to explain the extensive comment about the Affaire found in the British press. The scope of the analysis made by British journalists is truly noteworthy. Perhaps this study best begins with a brief survey of the press—which was itself simultaneously undergoing a

veritable revolution, or as some have said, the process of democratization and vulgarization--and its treatment of the Affaire. Indeed, the Affaire was like a script written specially for the press of the late-nineteenth century. It provided readers with a seemingly endless sequence of sensational and bizarre events which seemed too incredible to be true. The British press was quick to capitalize on this opportunity.

CHAPTER I

THE PRESS AND ITS PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFFAIRE

> Looking back and reviewing the various influences that helped to bring out the truth in the Dreyfus case there is no doubt that the steadfast devotion of the English Press to the cause of our coreligionist helped materially to bring this remarkable case to its present position. Joseph Prag, The Jewish Chronicle 23 June 1899.

> . . . were this an English case in English courts, there is hardly a newspaper publisher in London who would not be in the gaol. Frederick Greenwood, Blackwood's, "Looker-On," Fall 1899.

In late 1897 and early 1898, the British Press began a sustained coverage of the trial and events related to the Dreyfus Affaire. The liberal assumptions which formed the basis for evaluating events in France gave this analysis a certain homogeneity. A liberal consensus of sorts existed. Moreover, according to J. A. Spender of the Westminster Gazette, the Liberal press "joined in the chorus with the Conservative" and inflamed the jingo or anti-French element within the nation.[1]

This homogeneous quality can be overstated. British journalists wrote from a variety of political, social, and religious editorial views. Newspapers were not neutral channels of communication. The press was not merely a funnel through which objective information was poured into the minds of readers. The editor and his staff had preferences which almost always affected the way in which events were reported and interpreted.

News was sometimes even chosen to produce a "special effect in the reader."[2] Pressmen could direct the attention of their readers to the things which they wanted them to see. The late-nineteenth century British press can be divided into several categories. Editors and journalists who wrote in the political press described events from a particular political point of view. Most papers were either Conservative, Liberal, or Liberal-Radical. By the end of the century a fledgling working class, trade unionist press also existed. Until the mid-1880s, British journalism addressed an intelligent, well-educated, upper class audience. Newspaper articles were primarily political in content. Journalists scrupulously recorded events and speeches in great detail. Articles were often lengthy and dull. The style of presentation--small black type without headings, headlines, or illustrations--was difficult to follow.

Around the middle of the century several developments commenced which eventually enabled innovative journalists to establish a new mass circulation press tailored to the tastes of the common man. The abolition of the stamp duty, and the paper and advertisement taxes occurred in the 1850s and 1860s. Postage rates fell as did the price of newsprint. Transportation and communication advances, combined with the introduction of the wood pulp process also markedly reduced the cost of newspaper production. The invention of the telegraph and telephone enabled pressmen to describe events in even the remote parts of the world. In 1870, the Education Act initiated an era of mass literacy in Britain. This newly-created reading public was, however, a semi-literate body, largely unable to appreciate or understand the existing press. By the 1890s, several enterprising men had exploited the opportunities to create a "New Journalism." While their publications usually adopted a particular political

point of view, they "made little demand upon the intelligence of the reader,"[3] providing sensational accounts of crime, sports, wars, natural disasters, and trivia of general human interest. By changing the traditional style of the paper, providing the reader with "short sentences, short paragraphs, short articles," and putting "everything as far as possible in story form,"[4] publishers found they could attract large numbers of avid readers. These men were often more concerned about maintaining circulation by offering readers sensational copy than providing refined, in depth coverage of events. Although the traditional political press remained more serious than the Yellow press, even the most respected publications sometimes adopted the style and language commonly found in popular publications.

Additionally, some publishers produced papers specially designed for the religious community, including both Christians and Jews. Most major denominations financed their own publications. Finally, some specialized papers and journals were written especially for professional groups or readerships with well-defined tastes or interests. Not surprisingly, each sub-division within the British press perceived and responded to the Affaire from different perspectives.

Most organs of the British press reported the Affaire to readers. Not all of them, however, became interested in the Affaire at the same time, or for the same reasons. Some offered more extensive coverage than others. Journalists drew from a wide variety of sources, and the things which they wrote made an impact both in Britain and in France. If the amount of coverage given to the Dreyfus trials is an indication of public interest, then the Affaire certainly fascinated many British readers.

By the close of the nineteenth century, there was in both Britain and Western Europe a high level of consciousness about what public episodes like the Affaire meant in terms of a nation's political culture and morality. The spread of literacy and the rise of the democratic press intensified this interest. Because of the "astonishing development of the press in the late-nineteenth century" the public was "'newspaper conscious.'"[5] Phenomena like the Dreyfus trials were headline-making events. It was not until late 1897, however, that the majority of British journalists began to question the propriety of what had happened to a rather obscure French artillery captain.

Generally speaking, the British press originally either supported or passively accepted the first conviction of Dreyfus, even if it had been obtained, as some pressmen believed, in rather unconventional if not illegal ways. Reputable politicians and soldiers who supported the original court-martial seemed to have no reason to lie. This remained the general belief as expressed by the press through 1895. Over the next two years, opinions gradually began to shift. Naturally, not every publication adopted a Dreyfusard policy simultaneously, but virtually every organ of the British press supported Dreyfus by the time of his second trial. There were a few in Britain who agreed with G. A. Henty, who left Rennes asserting, "'The man looked and spoke like a spy . . . and if he isn't a spy I'll be damned if he oughtn't to be one.'" A few British journalists even believed at that late date that Dreyfus was guilty. These were in a very small minority.[6]

Regardless of their respective positions on the issue of Dreyfus' guilt or innocence, virtually every major newspaper provided very through coverage of the Affaire during 1898 and 1899. The Times, the Daily Telegraph,

and other London dailies published a daily column which discussed events across the Channel. News about the Affaire was usually appearing on a regular basis in this section of these papers by 1898. During the course of that year, the Dreyfus case became so important that entire articles exclusively devoted to the Affaire began to fill a column and usually more of nearly every day's paper. British readers received a blow by blow description of each new twist to the bizarre, never-ending sequence of events related to Dreyfus. Long articles detailed the major arguments of those who testified at the courts-martial of Esterhazy and Picquart, the trial of Zola, and the deliberations of the United Court of Cassation. For the most part, the British provincial press followed the lead of the London newspapers, especially those which sided with the Dreyfusards.[7] Weekly newspapers in Britain also closely followed the Affaire. Rarely did a week pass without at least some mention of Dreyfus in the review columns which summarized the most important events of the past week. Not infrequently, articles which expanded upon and interpreted the events described in the review were included as well. Finally, during 1898 and 1899, the British periodical press published over sixty articles responding to the Affaire.

British journalists acquired their information in a variety of ways. To be sure, British publications used news agencies like Reuters and the Press Association Special Services. They frequently relied upon and often quoted one another. British journalists also had relatively easy access to France and Frenchmen in a position to know about the intrigues of the Affaire. Information was obtainable if one knew where to go and whom to see. M. P.s like the Francophile Charles Dilke regularly travelled to France and often discussed European affairs over dinner with important

Frenchmen. Dilke, during the years of the Affaire, almost always ate Christmas dinner in Paris with one of the Daily Telegraph's correspondents, Sir Campbell Clarke. Dilke often visited Fernand Labori, the young and aggressive lawyer who defended Dreyfus at Rennes, along with Picquart, Reinach, and Zola.

If information about the Affaire was passed along informally in situations like these, the exchange between editors and journalists of the leading British and French newspapers and journals was more direct. British and French newspaper men maintained regular correspondence with one another. Le Matin made arrangements through Henri de Blowitz, a master of foreign correspondents who worked in Paris for the Times, to have what amounted to almost immediate access to the Times' foreign correspondence. Echo de Paris had a similar understanding with the Daily Telegraph. Yves Guyot, the co-editor of the Dreyfusard Le Siècle, provided the editor of Contemporary Review with an article about the Affaire, as well as furnishing information to the correspondent for the Daily Telegraph. The editors of British publications often had face-to-face contact with important Frenchmen. J. A. Spender made two trips a year to Paris to talk to both journalists and politicians. He found it impossible to gain information from those he considered Anglophobes, like Gabriel Hanotaux and Théophile Delcassé, but was able to establish productive relationships with lower level French officials both at the Quai d'Orsay and the French Embassy in London. He also regularly visited the French journalists and politicians who came to London. Another British editor, W. T. Stead, who launches the popular, Liberal, Nonconformist monthly, Review of Reviews, also visited France during the years of the Affaire. He enjoyed the company of several important persons, including

Clemenceau, who also provided information to the correspondent for the Dreyfusard Daily News, Emily Crawford. Contacts like the ones made by Spender and Stead helped to shape editorial policy about the Affaire. Finally, several British publications opened their columns to both Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard writers from France. The value of information was, of course, limited by the reliability of sources, and during the Affaire it was not uncommon for highly placed persons to pass along misinformation to accomplish their own ends. Even the Times fell victim to this hazard.

Perhaps the most interesting and important gathering of news occurred at a somewhat lower level in the hierarchy of the staff of each paper or journal. The struggle of the British correspondent in France to extract accurate information was indeed a difficult endeavor. If the Dreyfus case appeared to foreign journalists to be shrouded in secrecy, covered and carefully guarded by both the military and the government, there were still individuals who knew what had happened and who were willing covertly to discuss it. The veteran correspondent knew how to exploit these sources, and there was no lack of veterans with an interest in the Affaire. For the Times, there was Blowitz, who had the uncanny knack of gaining entrance or "free access" into virtually every European court, to all of the "forbidden places." He regularly visited chiefs of state, prime ministers, and important politicians. His widely known reputation as a powerful journalist often led European statesmen to seek him out when they desired to have their opinions known. The envious and resentful editor of a Parisian editors' association, Paul de Cassagnac, wrote, "For him, there is no secret in the home or foreign policy of our country. He is told everything."[8]

The Daily Telegraph enjoyed the services of a man with similar powers: their chief travelling correspondent, E. J. Dillon. His father was an Irish revolutionary and his mother was English. He was married to a Russian. His knowledge of Europe, command of European languages (he claimed to speak twenty-six), and personal acquaintance with leading individuals who sat in the chancelleries of Europe made him a valuable asset. He was often mistaken for a native in foreign lands. Dillon's forte was the ability to arrive in a new location just prior to the development there of some event of major consequence. He had what one historian termed a "cloak and dagger" complex and often made use of disguises to gain entrance into restricted areas.[9]

One source of information frequently used by British pressmen was Bernard Lazare, the author of Anti-Semitism: Its History and Its Causes (1894), an influential pamphlet defending Dreyfus, and of a multi-volume history of the Affaire. He provided information for Albert D. VanDam, an historian of the Third Republic and contributor to Saturday Review; Lucien Wolf, the Jewish journalist and authority on international relations, who wrote for Fortnightly Review as well as other important British publications; Joseph Prag of the Jewish Chronicle; and Times correspondent Henry Wickham Steed. The last-named journalist also made use of his contacts with highly placed diplomatic officials.

Just prior to the Rennes court-martial, Italian military attaché Panizzardi provided Steed with a confidential account of his interpretation of events. Panizzardi expressed a desire to testify at Rennes (which he never did) and told him what he could have said. He claimed that Esterhazy had provided Schwarzkoppen with over 170 documents. The German military attaché supposedly showed these to him. Dreyfus' innocence was,

in his opinion, unquestionable. When Steed pressed Panizzardi, asking for the right to quote him in the Times, he regretfully refused. Steed continued to pursue the matter, but Panizzardi's superiors did not allow him to cooperate. In the end, the Times published the information without citing its source.

This was not an uncommon practice, as was shown in the articles published in National Review. Although its sources were rarely named, this monthly obviously had contacts with insiders who knew the intricacies of the Affaire. National Review regularly published detailed and usually accurate information, such as the number of documents purchased by Schwarzkoppen of Esterhazy, the approximate dates of these exchanges, the private conversations of diplomats, military officials, and other principal actors in the Affaire, and even the annual amount budgeted for the French War Office to use for bribery. The monthly's editor, Leo J. Maxse, also claimed to have access to information from an "unimpeachable authority" in Berlin.[10] Whoever their sources were, Maxse and his staff predicted almost a year in advance that revision, if realized, would not provide immediately complete justice for Dreyfus and his supporters.

The grand climax of journalistic interest came, of course, at Rennes. Famous figures from all over the world converged on this small French city to watch seven military judges determine the fate of Dreyfus. Journalists came to record events, photographers to take pictures. Artists came to sketch what they saw. Idlers and trouble-makers came with hopes of witnessing a good bloodletting. Most foreign visitors strongly sympathized with Dreyfus and, in the eyes of many natives, were anti-French. Those papers which had foreign news service sent their best correspondents to cover the trial. The Times used Blowitz's brilliant

young protégé, W. Morton Fullerton, an American graduate of Harvard. The Daily Telegraph sent Dr. E. J. Dillon. The Daily Mail sent veteran correspondent and famous author, G. W. Steevens. Other noteworthy individuals at Rennes included the Lord Chief Justice, Russell of Killowen, sent as Queen Victoria's special observer, and G. A. Henty, the famous author of boys' stories about the Empire. Hotels and cafes lacked the capacity to serve the crowd which came to Rennes. Single rooms went for the exorbitant price of twenty francs a day. The city buzzed with conversations about the Affaire. Only officers and soldiers, forbidden to enter hotels and restaurants or speak about the court-martial, did not talk openly about Dreyfus. Most foreign journalists lodged in the Hotel Moderne. Even though most of the French, whether for or against Dreyfus, resented the presence of such a large foreign contingent, an earnest effort was made to accommodate the press at the trial. At the deliberations of the Court of Cassation, only thirty places were reserved for the press. At Rennes, the judges peered across the courtroom to the long pine tables especially designated for the three to four hundred pressmen allowed to witness the trial during its public sessions. These journalists diligently recorded the proceedings and enjoyed the right to telegraph their stories from a special bureau. They were allowed to circulate about Rennes as they pleased. As they had for the previous two years, British journalists provided eager readers with a comprehensive picture of everything from the most important dramas to the most insignificant and trivial detail.[11]

The intense interest shown by the British press in the Affaire was bound to attract attention in France, as well as Britain. There exist different opinions about the impact of this British commentary. Bernard Lazare argued that the English press was the chief factor in

exposing the lies and forgeries on which Dreyfus' guilt was based and in bringing the eventual decision of the United Court of Cassation. Joseph Prag, who wrote about the Affaire for the Jewish Chronicle in an article entitled "The Influence of the English Press on the Dreyfus Case," commended British journalism for its devotion to the cause of truth and justice. The support rendered to the Dreyfusard cause confirmed the belief that the press in Britain exhibited the world's highest standard of journalism. As Prag observed, it was the Daily Chronicle which, at the behest of Mathieu Dreyfus, revived the flagging Dreyfusard cause on 3 September 1896 by knowingly publishing a bogus report that Dreyfus had escaped from Devil's Island. This behavior is an interesting illustration of the way in which editor H. W. Massingham perceived journalistic responsibility. He believed that the conviction of Dreyfus justified the publication of a false tale, provided that the cause of justice was advanced. The French press quickly republished the story of Dreyfus' escape and interest in the Dreyfus case, which earlier in the year had subsided, was rekindled. This momentous development helped to initiate the sequence of events which finally secured Dreyfus' release in June 1899. It was also a British newspaper, the London Observer, which on 3 October 1898, published the first account of Esterhazy's admission to Observer journalist Rowland Strong the Commandant had written the bordereau. The Times, on 3 June 1899, was the first newspaper to publish a signed confession by Esterhazy indicating his authorship of the incriminating document. Prag maintained that "[a]lmost every English newspaper has helped us in the fight, and lent a hand to unwind the martyr from the meshes of falsehood and forgery in which he had been bound."[12] Claims like those made by Lazare and Prag tended to overemphasize and misinterpret

the significance of the British press vis-à-vis the Affaire. While the Daily Chronicle's article in September 1896 certainly brought Dreyfus back to the attention of the public in France, Mathieu Dreyfus and his supporters were determined men. Had the Daily Chronicle failed to cooperate, they almost certainly would have found another means to revive interest in the prisoner on Devil's Island. The articles which appeared in the Observer and the Times attracted interest, but, like the phony escape account, played a relatively minor role in the scheme of things.

A more accurate assessment of British performance came from the President of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris, Sir Thomas Barclay. He argued that commentary by British journalists, not to mention their presence at Rennes, had an unfortunate and unexpected impact. Far from facilitating Dreyfus' rehabilitation, the Dreyfusard interpretations in the British press made French anti-Dreyfusards more uncompromising than they otherwise might have been. Most of the accounts of the Affaire encouraged British hostility toward France. Across the Channel, the French took great offense at the lengthy diatribes which indicted the whole people of France.[13]

Perhaps the most damning analysis of the behavior of the British press during the Affaire came from Russell of Killowen. Following the Rennes trial, he prepared for the Queen a paper which recounted his experiences and detailed his impressions. He decried the harsh judgment passed by the British press on not only the conspirators and judges against Dreyfus, but on the nation of France as well. The Lord Chief Justice found little good to say about those who extended the guilt of a few to an entire people. In his opinion, the Dreyfusard interpretation espoused by both the British and German presses did Dreyfus a great

disservice. Foreign journalists had furnished the anti-Dreyfusard element in France with ammunition and "corroborative evidence" which allegedly confirmed Dreyfus' guilt. They exacerbated xenophobic sentiment which already existed in France. In a scathing indictment of the conduct evidenced by his own nation's newspapers, Russell wrote:

> It is but just to say that, in its comments during the actual sittings of the Court, the British Press, from the Times upwards or downwards, almost without exception, have indulged in such partisan comment as would have earned for their editors, at the hands of English judges, prompt committal to prison had any such comments been made pending a a trial in England. These comments would have amounted to what is called contempt of Court, which means that they would have had a direct tendency to interfere with the due course of justice.

This business in which the press engaged was especially hazardous since many of the allegations made by British journalists were based on innuendo, false accusation, and evidence as untenable as that used to condemn Dreyfus. Several British publications, for instance, speculated that Henry was actually murdered, and that Maître Labori, Dreyfus' lawyer who was wounded in an attempted assassination during the Rennes trial, was shot by order of the French Army. No evidence or sure proofs of these and other slanderous charges existed. Allegations rested upon the a priori assumption that anyone who testified against Dreyfus was a villain and a scoundrel. The procès verbal, let alone the actual proceedings, of Esterhazy's court-martial, the United Court of Cassation, and Rennes court-martial were extremely complex and difficult to follow. This was particularly true for foreign correspondents who listened to intricate arguments made in a foreign tongue. They had the difficult task of grasping and summarizing the most important points, and telegraphing their stories to the home newspaper office. Given these complexities, even if Dreyfus was innocent, Russell found the sentence which the British press passed

on French public opinion to be unfair. Since few people could form independent judgments in a matter so complex as the Affaire, he argued that there was nothing surprising about Frenchmen believing what those in authority told them. On the contrary, given the position of France in the international environment, it would have been quite remarkable if most of France had not initially been anti-Dreyfusard. Had the British press rightly weighed this consideration, it would have softened the "harshness of its judgment" of the French.[14] As it was, the offensive and intrusive tone of the British press did little to benefit Dreyfus. The French, most of whom seem to have believed that foreign observers should mind their own business at least in regard to the Affaire, took offense at Britain's presumptuous attitude and willingness to comment liberally on how France ought to manage her internal affairs.

Nevertheless, British publications of almost all political persuasions and points of view took exception to what had been done to Dreyfus. The London Times, which usually rendered moderate support to whichever party was in power in Westminster, was among this group. After some initial hesitation, the Times abandoned its conviction that somehow Dreyfus was guilty. As is shown above, the timing of this change in policy approximately paralleled the Fashoda crisis. During the final month of the crisis, the Times adopted an aggressive Dreyfusard position. On 13 October 1898, it published a seven and one-half column letter from the Permanent Under-Secretary for the Home Office, Godfrey Lushington. The Under-Secretary, who was also a barrister, received praise from contemporary journalists for presenting the most impartial and fair-minded summary of the Affaire to date. More importantly, both Lushington's letter and a leading article which appeared on the same day roundly

asserted Dreyfus' innocence. While it is dangerous to dogmatize, and even more hazardous if not totally unrealistic to suggest that official pressure was brought to bear upon the editor of the Times, it is not unlikely that the government's strong opposition to Marchand's mission helped to create a climate of anti-French opinion at Printing House Square. After October 1898, the Times supported the Dreyfusard cause, and spoke strongly on behalf of Dreyfus. Although Fullerton and Blowitz acknowledged the noble efforts of the many Frenchmen who had risked position and reputation to see that justice was done, they condemned the Rennes verdict in excoriating terms. In fact, the excited and condemnatory approach taken by this newspaper was uncharacteristic of the Times. Even after the court-martial and pardon, the Times continued through the rest of the year to publish correspondence relating to the Affaire.

The Conservative press was not so assertive. Conservative publications opposed the Rennes verdict and expressed belief in Dreyfus' innocence, but, in general terms, they wrote with greater restraint than did other divisions within the British press. Their concern about the morality of French actions was not as pronounced as in publications with other political leanings. Their analysis was more dispassionate and objective, and less condemnatory. Conservative journalists were not as quick to indict the French as those with different political affiliations.

Writers for the Daily Telegraph labored to maintain an Olympian point of view. Rather than taking sides, they tried to provide their readers with facts and the different arguments used by both Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. From the arrest and first conviction of Dreyfus, this Conservative daily newspaper acknowledged the difficulty of ascertaining guilt or innocence in a case so shrouded by the authorities in mystery.

Information about the case was extremely difficult to obtain. The Daily Telegraph's "Own Correspondent" regularly complained about the paucity of reliable informants. In the aftermath of Henry's suicide, the Paris correspondent for this newspaper still refused to admit any more than that the ex-Captain Dreyfus had never received "the right to be innocent." Just because Henry's handiwork consisted of forged documents, there was no proof that every other piece of information incriminating Dreyfus was also bogus. He concluded, "I have all along endeavoured to place the case fairly, impartially, and without any favour to one side or the other, before your readers."[15]

Frederick Greenwood, who published a widely read and influential monthly review of events called "The Looker-On" in Blackwood's, frequently wrote about the Affaire. He seemed to be unsure about Dreyfus' guilt or innocence, but he was certain of one thing: the intemperate and unwise character of British criticisms of the French. He used his column to decry the behavior of his fellow-British journalists regarding the Affaire. If the Yellow press in France made wild anti-Dreyfusard accusations based on half-truths and second guesses, so reputable, established British reporters, casting discrimination and restraint to the wind, did the same against distinguished, honorable Frenchmen in politics, the army, and the clergy. For Greenwood, the central concern of the British press seemed not to be the innocence of Dreyfus, but the infamy of his accusers. Like Barclay and Spender, Greenwood was not surprised when Frenchmen of almost every persuasion resented the intrusion of the British press into a domestic concern. He, like Russell, contended that such behavior by editors during a trial in Britain would have landed several publishers in the gaol. Finally, Saturday Review, which espoused a mildly Conservative

editorial policy, exhibited the same tolerance found in Blackwood's and the Daily Telegraph. It warned Britain and the world not to condemn France--especially the largely indifferent general population--too hastily. It firmly delcared that, in time, France would come to her senses and allow for truth and justice to be asserted. Following Dreyfus' acquittal in 1906, it wrote:

> No doubt at the time we English failed to observe the restraint becoming the people of one country in discussing a domestic affair of another. The Dreyfus trial was our affair only on the principle, humani nil a me alienum puto. This did not justify our taking sides passionately in a neighbour's quarrel.

The Conservative journalists who reported the Affaire faced a dilemma of sorts. While most eventually acknowledged Dreyfus' innocence, the adoption of a Dreyfusard position meant compromising certain principles on which late-nineteenth century British Conservatives usually agreed. Generally, the Conservative press exhibited an almost Burkean respect for tradition, authority, order, and established insititutions. Historically, Conservatives accepted the need for reform and change, but also venerated the past. They eschewed the restless spirit of innovation. They endeavored to conserve and protect those features of society which still retained value and reflected the collective wisdom of past generations. Most believed that no single generation enjoyed the right to abolish those inheritances passed on to them by their predecessors. Liberals were usually more willing to enact reform than Conservatives. They generally perceived society as atomistic, the individual being the irreducible unit in social life. In contrast, most Conservatives viewed society as an organic entity, the aggregate of individuals. Conservatives were more willing than Liberals to argue that the individual should be subject to the interests of the community. In France, some anti-Dreyfusards

carried this argument to the conclusion that it was better for a single innocent man to suffer than for the domestic tranquillity of the nation to be disturbed. They preferred domestic stability more than the application of abstract ideas about justice. In opposition to these men, there were Dreyfusards who seemed willing to accept the dissolution of society--revolution if necessary--to guarantee that the innocent victim be set free. In principle, this destructive outlook repulsed those British Conservatives who believed that evolution, which enabled society to change in a positive and orderly fashion, was superior to revolution. Finally, Conservatives usually took a more realistic view of international relations than Liberals. They, more than the Liberals, recognized power as an important element in international politics. Hence, they wished to see France strong enough to prevent German Continental hegemony.

The Conservative concern about the stability of society is often reflected in the articles about the Affaire. Both the Daily Telegraph and Saturday Review, in stark contrast to most other British publications, supported the acquittal of Esterhazy in January 1898. The tendency of the Conservative press was to trust the reasonableness of men administering government, and the honor and honesty of French Army officers. Charges against Dreyfus were seen as serious. He had been accused by twenty-three brother officers and found guilty by seven others. This was done in spite of what Saturday Review believed to be the desire of the Army to spare itself the shame and disgrace of admitting that treason existed within its ranks. Dreyfus' guilt had been publicly proclaimed by two Ministers of War, Mercier and Cavaignac. After Henry's death, Saturday Review acknowledged the need for revision, and recanted its earlier and vehement assertion supporting Esterhazy's acquittal in

January 1898. Nevertheless, the paper retained an almost surprising callousness toward Dreyfus and a pronounced sympathy toward the French "establishment" and people. It refused to "brand the leading men of France as guilty of hideous crime without extenuating circumstances." It tenaciously held to the belief that leaders of the government and military service--that the politicians in four successive ministries--were not monsters willing to "condemn a fellow-creature to undeserved punishment" except for serious raisons d'état. The sacrifice of a single man to preserve and maintain the stability of French society, however deplorable to the British people, probably seemed the most attractive of several undesirable options before French leaders. Following the Rennes verdict, Saturday Review also passed an extraordinary judgment writing, "Innocent or guilty, Captain Dreyfus deserved his fate; but for him, the country would not have been dejected and demoralised for years; but for him, calm, commerce, dividends, would never have been disturbed."[16]

If British Conservatives sympathized with the French in their discomfiture, most of them were unable to countenance the condemnation of a man who appeared to be entirely innocent of treason. Conservatives valued the preservation of order in society, but they also believed in principles of fair play and justice. By the late-nineteenth century, many liberal ideas existed in Conservative circles. Many of those who deserted the Liberal Party in the mid-1880s became a kind of "Whig element" within the Conservative Party. Moreover, as the nineteenth century progressed, many Conservatives gradually came to accept and internalize ideas which were Liberal at the beginning of the century. Blackwood's not only had Greenwood's analysis but also opened its columns to J. H. A. MacDonald and Charles Whibley, whose articles were highly critical of and

uncomplimentary to France. The former excelled at shrillness and emotive condemnations. The only publication which approached MacDonald's tone was National Review. This monthly journal produced more articles on the Affaire than any other periodical publication in Britain. In addition to the hundreds of pages it devoted to the Affaire, including a 64-page special supplement to volume 33, it even advertised additional literature in both French and English for its readers with more than a casual interest in the Dreyfus case.

The National Review was among the first British publications to adopt a stridently pro-Dreyfus position. In its opinion, Dreyfus was indubitably and entirely innocent. In the summer of 1898, when its first articles about the Affaire appeared, the trio of editor Leo J. Maxse, Oxford don and Biblical scholar Frederick C. Conybeare, and Godfrey Lushington, launched a full-scale assault on everything and everyone opposed to Dreyfus' cause. Their articles were liberally seasoned with sarcastic, highly emotive language, Biblical allusions, and razor-sharp, carefully reasoned legal arguments. Their criticisms of the General Staff were often abusive and insulting. The intense interest evidenced in this monthly was a reflection of the personality of Maxse, who was noted for his penchant for whole-heartedly embracing what he believed to be a noble cause. Perhaps more than any other publication, National Review, in a style reminiscent of Macaulay's historiography, saw the Affaire and its principal actors in terms of black and white, good and evil. Moralisms abounded in National Review's analysis of the Affaire. The descriptions of Dreyfus recorded in this journal celebrated his virtues and ignored his human frailties. Maxse, Conybeare, and Lushington portrayed officers on the General Staff and anti-Dreyfusard priests as the incarnation of

evil. They saw their mission as the establishment of the innocence of a single individual, wronged by blind obedience to constituted authority.

National Review's departure from the usual Conservative analysis of the Affaire is understandable in light of the history of the journal during the 1890s. It was purchased by L. J. Maxse's father in 1893. While Conservative in tone, it "was out of tune with the Conservative Party" during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The younger Maxse had "lost faith in the party system and the party press." He criticised the Party for "the collusion which was attendant upon party politics [and] prevented Conservative ideology being put into practice." He suspected that the Conservative press was "under the control of Jews, monopoly capitalists, and wire pullers."[17] Maxse's tendency to perceive events both in and outside of Britain in conspiratorial terms regularly found expression in National Review's interpretation of the Affaire. Many of the articles in his journal posited theories of a clerico-military conspiracy against the Jews and the Republic.

In spite of National Review, on balance the British Conservative papers, moreso than other branches of the British press, took a more realistic view of the Affaire, and recognized the limitations of what a newspaper could do to influence events in a foreign land. This probably stemmed from the Conservative tendency to view the state and systems of justice as an organic product of nature and time. In principle, most Conservatives supported the idea that a state should be left alone to evolve at its own pace. It should not be judged by alien standards. This outlook made Conservatives less harsh than Liberals in their evaluation of the French judicial system and the Dreyfus trials. If perfection was attainable at all, Conservatives usually believed that it was certainly

something which could not be rushed. Hence, the Conservatives tended to take care in the way that criticisms of France were made. Finally, Conservative expectations were not as high as those found among Liberals and Radicals. As a rule, the Conservative was not so confident as his Liberal counterpart about man's perfectibility and the reliability of human reason. This no doubt made Conservatives at once tolerant of French inabilities to measure up to what was perceived by the British as ideal standards, and only mildly surprised--if at all--that the ideal had not yet been achieved. Most Conservatives recognized that vehement criticisms were more likely to engender ill-will than precipitate repentance.

The Liberal press was more prone to criticize than the Conservative press. Liberals tended to see the events and personalities related to the Affaire in terms of right and wrong. In keeping with their tendency to be moralistic about politics, as well as to broadcast their belief in Britain's moral leadership in the world, they, more than the Conservatives, were ready to make judgments about the morality of French behavior. This willingness to indict the French was a reflection of Liberal idealism and confidence, of the conviction that applied rational thought would improve on the past. This confidence sometimes led Liberals to be overly optimistic. For example, in June 1899, when the United Court of Cassation "virtually pronounced Captain Dreyfus an innocent man," somewhat prematurely, the Manchester Guardian proclaimed that France had "emerged triumphant from a titanic struggle for justice and for truth."[18] The Manchester Guardian had great confidence in the flow of progress toward a better, more liberal world. It looked forward to the Rennes court-martial with high expectations. It wrote, "If the debate follows strictly the lines which the verdict of the supreme civil court has laid down for it,

the result cannot be for one moment doubted."[19] When the realization of the ideal was not immediately manifest, Liberals were quick to take offense. They found much about which to be offended in the Affaire. The Manchester Guardian, the Daily News, the Westminster Gazette, and the Daily Chronicle, not to mention most of the Liberal periodicals, objected strongly to the Rennes decision.

One fundamental tenet of nineteenth century Liberal thought was the opposition to arbitrary rule by a restricted group of privileged individuals, most notably aristocrats and clergymen. Stated in a positive way, this meant support of the extension of political rights beyond a monarch or dictator and the traditional ruling class. Although the Liberal Party of the late-nineteenth century smarted under charges that it was the servant of a new but equally restricted group, the British middle class, Liberals were committed to the notion that monarchical or clerico-aristocratic rule was anachronistic. Moreover, they believed that such leadership would lead to the erection of tariff walls which were inimical to Free Trade on which peace and progress depended. Predictably, they threw their support to the preservation, or as some believed, the initial establishment, of republican government in France. The most vocal proponent of this idea was Spectator. This weekly newspaper, renowned for its non-partisan and fair-minded reporting of both domestic and foreign news, departed radically from its usual policy of dispassionate, rational analysis of world news. It not only excelled all others in expounding the supposed racial foibles of the French, but often became hysterical about an impending military coup d'état against the Third Republic. It interpreted contemporary events in terms of the long shadow cast by Napoleon Bonaparte, not to mention Louis Napoleon and Boulanger, and regularly

sounded alarms warning its readers of the certainty of a coup administered by a coterie of generals, who were dissatisfied with the inadequacies of republican rule under lawyers and bourgeois. Spectator frantically called for someone to save the Republic from the generals. Contemporary Review expressed disgust with what was termed the pretense of republican government under the control of a clerico-military combination of strong men. It opened its columns to a trio of French Dreyfusards including Yves Guyot, the co-editor of Le Siècle, Ludovic Trarieux, French senator and minister of justice during the 1890s, and socialist journalist Francis de Pressensé, as well as to British author David Christie Murray. These contributors exhibited an anti-clerical bias. In this regard, the saw role of the Catholic Church as a threat to the existence of the Republic evoked considerable comment in the Liberal press.

In general, the Liberal press tended to be much more sensitive to the religious issues raised by the Affaire than the Conservative press, with, of course, the exception of the anti-Catholic diatribes by Conybeare which appeared in National Review, and the connections posited by Greenwood between the Affaire and the Romanizing of the Anglican Church. In some respects, this is not surprising. Disraeli's characterization of the Anglican Church as the Tory Party at prayer may be amusing, but it held some degree of truth. On the whole, Conservative publications supported the Church of England. Naturally, they had no love for the Catholic Church, but it was a Conservative tendency to blur the distinction between Church and State. Since separation of Church and State was one of the issues raised by the Affaire, Conservative commentators tended to be less outspoken than their Liberal counterparts concerning the religious issues. Indeed, Liberals, who usually came from the Nonconformist tradition, had much to say about the role of religion in the Affaire.

Many Liberals associated Catholicism with the proscription of important liberal ideals including religious freedom, freedom of thought, and separation of Church and State. Spectator, Nineteenth Century, and Contemporary Review, the last-named publication being well-known for its Evangelical editorial policies, expressed doubts that the Catholic Weltanschauung was compatible with liberal institutions. In particular, Spectator cited the Affaire as evidence that Roman Catholicism was more concerned with the re-acquisition of temporal power in worldly politics than the assertion of spiritual leadership in defense of the innocent and the exhibition of Christian love. Spectator argued that the Affaire showed how the long-term influence of Catholicism produced a mentality being submissive to even the most misguided and malevolent leadership. Finally, the Affaire demonstrated how endangered religious freedom was in France since Roman Catholicism apparently had the power to deny justice to an innocent man.

A third concern of the Liberal press stemmed from the Liberal view of international relations. As a rule, Liberals favored an isolationist foreign policy, that is to say avoiding alliances. They supported international cooperation, peace, and Free Trade. The Affaire brought to Liberal minds several concerns about the stability of the international order. The Economist, which had a readership primarily comprised of the commercial middle class, exhibited more concern in this regard than any other Liberal publication. It was particularly worried about the adverse influence of the military system in France and the precarious foundation on which the European alliance system rested. The Affaire demonstrated the dangers of militarism, and the fragility of a balance of power based on alliances. Liberals also believed that the arms build-up stimulated a

belief that force was the best or perhaps the only solution to international differences. Inordinate respect for the Army, as Liberals believed was shown in France by the Affaire, could encourage military adventurers who might lead Europe into a general war which would disrupt trade and encourage the use of brute force for which Liberals had so much contempt. Finally, the prohibitive costs of a military establishment reduced the economic potential of a nation and diverted men and resources from more profitable business pursuits.

Although Liberal sensibilities were offended by what took place in France, it would be a mistake to suggest that all Liberal publications expressed total dismay over the Rennes verdict. Spender's Westminster Gazette adopted a sympathetic editorial policy toward France, in spite of the editor's disapproval of Rennes. The Manchester Guardian, which was probably the most influential Liberal newspaper in Britain, praised those Frenchmen who defended justice, and regularly opened its columns to French readers who defended Dreyfus and spoke in defense of their nation. During the Rennes trial, the Manchester Guardian published a gentle reminder to its readers, admonishing them to be circumspect in evaluating of their neighbor's discomfiture. The same spirit of "fear of war abroad and treason at home" which animated the General Staff in France produced Titus Oates and the Popish Plot of the seventeenth century in Britain. Moreover, in London, Lord George Gordon had, only twelve years before the revolutionary Terror in France, set the example which was imitated by Frenchmen who danced the "Carmongnol" in desecrated churches. The Manchester Guardian concluded, "We are apt to forget that the serenity of English public life dates only from the fall of Napoleon. The same event which assured stability to us endowed France with chronic causes of unrest."[20]

Even though the Manchester Guardian found the verdict at Rennes to be reprehensible, it maintained this generous view toward the nation of France and confined its condemnatory remarks to the reptile press, the Ultramontane priesthood, and the "depraved Parliamentary system which has bred the Merciers and the Boisdeffres." It encouraged the British to remember that in "all of this there is nothing that is typically French, nothing that justified an indictment against a nation. . . . It would be a perverted cult of a man in the street which would identify the French nation with the nameless crowds" truly responsible for French misdeeds. It reminded those who insisted on making "complacent comparisons" that England had enjoyed relative tranquility during the present generation, and could point to no one of the stature of Picquart of Zola, or of hundreds of other Frenchmen in less prominent positions, who risked some or all of what they had. "It has been easy for us, across the Channel, to view the case with clear-sighted detachment. . . . If there is a useful part for foreigners to play in this affair, it is in supporting the Revisionists with our sympathy and admiration."[21]

The Manchester Guardian also called for the pardon and release of the hapless recondemned victim, and encouraged readers not to be dismayed. Taking the long view, it argued that the Rennes verdict would not be the end of the matter. For the moment, the leaders of France had erred, but time would bring the leadership of France back to their senses. The Manchester Guardian heartily welcomed the pardon of Dreyfus and, even though it believed the government could have done much more, viewed this event as a healthy sign. Even Napoleon had mused that courts-martial served no purpose during peacetime. The Manchester Guardian concluded,

"it would be odd if a reform meditated by the great Emperor were, after a century, to be brought about indirectly by Captain Dreyfus."[22]

The Liberal-Radical press shared the Manchester Guardian's optimism that the Affaire might ultimately produce good. In fact, the Liberal-Radical press exhibited an uncommon faith that truth and justice would eventually prevail over the forces of falsehood and retrogression. The Westminster Review consistently maintained that truth was a force too strong to be contained or withheld in France. In Punch, cartoonists S. C. Swain and Linley Sambourne gave artistic expression to these sentiments. The most dramatic of these, entitled "À Bas La Verite!", portrayed Truth rising out of a well labeled "L'Affaire Dreyfus." As she broke through the cover held down by four French generals, she cried, "I must come out." The generals replied, "Not if we know it!"

Fortnightly Review, which in contrast to Spectator maintained its reputation for fair-mindedness and impartiality during the course of the Affaire, also believed in the inexorable power of truth. It expressed its conviction that the truth would become manifest through the exposure of all views. It opened its columns to the Jewish journalist Lucien Wolf, who argued that anti-Semitism helped to propel an unjust crusade against an innocent man. It also featured articles by Frenchmen Pierre de Coubertin and André Godfernaux. The former, who regularly contributed to Fortnightly and claimed to have access to French foreign policy documents unavailable to foreign journalists, roundly asserted the guilt of Dreyfus. The latter predicted that great good would emerge from the ostensible chaos generated by the Affaire. In the October 1899 volume of Fortnightly Review, at a time when many British journalists heaped abuse upon the French because of the Rennes verdict, the journal published two articles

distinguished primarily by moderate, controlled analysis of the meaning of the Affaire. The first, written by "An English Officer," objected to characterizations of the officers on the General Staff as malicious scoundrels. Their chief fault was simply stupidity. They were guilty of misjudgment rather than malevolence. The "English Officer" then provided a sympathetic analysis of the problems within the French Army.

The second article, by H. C. Foxcroft, was an intriguing comparison between the Affaire and the Popish Plot in England during the seventeenth century. Similarly to the argument which appeared earlier in the Manchester Guardian, Foxcroft argued that the English example suggested that "phenomena such as the Dreyfus affair are the natural vent-holes of political passion, the precursors--though not always the immediate precursors--of political reform." The Affaire was probably just on of the "ugly features which disfigure the effervescent stage of political evolution" and as such it would, as Godfernaux suggested earlier, eventually contribute to "a recrudescence of national vigour, an outburst of patriotic energy, a revolution beneficent in its tendency, and an era of national triumph." In conclusion, he gently rebuked his fellow countrymen for their short-sightedness regarding the potentially positive results of the Affaire. The analogy he sketched between the Popish Plot and the Affaire was not commonly brought to mind in England "since the annals of his own country appear to be, in general, the last literary resort of the average Englishman."[23] Foxcroft's thesis is reminiscent of the faith in radical political reform and desire for the equalization of political rights and responsibilities which Radicals had hoped for, believed in, and desired. Perhaps the generous and friendly policy which Fortnightly Review adopted toward the Affaire was also in part a legacy of one of its earliest editors, the

Francophile John Morley, who in the fall of 1899 encouraged British observers to reserve judgment on the French.

Finally, the Liberal-Radical press exhibited a pride in the English legal system. Westminster Review's arguments that the Affaire demonstrated the superiority of English law over French law evoked memories of Radical efforts prior to the legal reforms of the 1870s to trigger the simplification of procedure in English courts of law.

While the Conservative, Liberal, and Liberal-Radical publications had much to say about the Affaire, the fledgling working class, trade unionist press largely avoided mention of Dreyfus. Notwithstanding the Dreyfusard views of individuals like the Marxian socialist leader of the Social-Democratic Federation, H. M. Hyndman, or expressions of working class sympathy for Dreyfus following the Rennes verdict, newspapers which were widely read by this socio-economic group chose to ignore almost completely the domestic turmoil in France. The primary concerns of the British working man were domestic. Events in his own land had a more direct, measurable impact upon his life, and hence attracted his attention more easily than foreign events.[24]

If working class newspapers neglected the Affaire, the Popular or Yellow press did not. The Popular press, like most other British publications, was almost entirely Dreyfusard. As was characteristic of popular journalism of the late-nineteenth century, these papers and periodicals saw the Affaire through the prism of nationalism. As the Yellow press in France was nationalistic, so was the Popular press in Britain. Pressmen who wrote in the Popular press usually adopted a condemnatory style which gleefully expounded perceived French deficiencies in contrast to the stalwart and upright qualities and standards claimed by the British

people. The Daily Mail made use of one of its star correspondents, G. W. Steevens, to cover the Rennes trial. While Steevens refused to indict the whole of the French people, his analysis of the Affaire certainly betrays a complacent satisfaction with being British. Editor of the popular Review of Reviews, W. T. Stead, was in France during the Rennes trial, and later produced an article chiefly distinguished by its scathing criticism of French behavior and the assertion that France was decadent. Even two popular journals which rarely featured articles about politics or international relations commented on the Affaire. Strand, an extensively illustrated monthly of miscellany which featured novelty articles, stories of human interest, and stories for children, published an article by handwriting expert J. Holt Schooling. It included reproductions of the bordereau and samples of Dreyfus' handwriting, and concluded that Dreyfus was certainly innocent. The Argosy, which published fiction and short stories in serial form as well as poems, printed a poem by C. E. Meetkerke shortly after Dreyfus left Devil's Island. It read:

Four years of anguish, bitterness and shame
    Under the sting, the torture and the ban,
And he returns--brought back to peace and fame
    A broken man!

Four weary years of insult, rage and pain!
    Bowed down to earth, with wild eyes full of woe,
The exile comes, absolved--and free from stain
    As driven snow!

Four years! how hard a debt for life to pay!
    What can restore the days in darkness lost?
What future sum of glory can defray
    The cruel cost?

For crime against all human brotherhood
Ah! let his country weep with tears of blood![25]

Meetkerke's lines captured in verse form the intense emotion and passion which other writers for the Popular press put into prose.

Not all popular journals followed suit. One of the rare anti-Dreyfusard articles to appear in the British press was found in the Popular press. The Pall Mall Magazine, a profusely illustrated monthly with a miscellany of articles about widely different topics, provided British readers with perhaps the most direct argument in favor of Dreyfus' adversaries. In June 1899, on the eve of revision, it published an article by Marie Belloc-Lowndes, which included brief but very flattering biographical sketches of ten leading French anti-Dreyfusards. Photographs and drawings of these men appeared with the article, and the author praised them, arguing that they had nothing to gain by their involvement in the Affaire.

Not surprisingly, the Dreyfusard analysis found in the British press was also questioned by a handful of the leading figures in the Catholic Church in Britain. Not the least of these observers were Cardinal Herbert Vaughan, who disseminated his views primarily through his published letters to the Times, and the editor of Month: A Catholic Magazine, S. F. Smith. Although Smith's articles claimed to offer no opinion about the guilt or innocence of Dreyfus, he implicitly condemned the ex-Captain. He mocked those who believed that important, prestigious French officials would knowingly allow an innocent man to be convicted. To demonstrate the point, Smith asked his readers if a combination of violent partisans, including Lord Wolseley, Sir Evelyn Wood, Lord Roberts, Lord Lansdowne, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, John Morley, and other notables would conspire to condemn an innocent English officer of treason. If this was preposterous, so it was to accuse generals Mercier, Billot, Boisdeffre, Pellieux, Zurlinden, Gonse, and politicians Meline, Cavaignac, and Freycinet--"men differing greatly in their attitudes towards politics

and religion, and who have addressed themselves to the case just because it came before them in the regular course of their official work"--of conspiring to destroy Dreyfus.[26]

Month was an anomaly within the Religious press in Britain. Significantly, both Anglican and Nonconformist clergymen rallied around the Dreyfusard banner and gave support. The negative response to Rennes by both Anglicans and Nonconformists should be seen within the context of the crisis through which religion was passing at the time of the Affaire. In general, organized religion was on the defensive during the late-nineteenth century. Churches suffered from attrition, and some Anglican clergymen appeared to be dangerously favorable toward Catholic ritualism. While most Churches experienced a decrease in attendence, the Catholic Church was making what appeared to be a modestly successful come-back. The role of Catholicism in the Affaire was perceived by many as part of an overall program designed by Catholic leaders to recapture lost prestige and influence. The mood was right in Britain to promote anti-clerical sentiment.

On the Sunday following the Rennes verdict, complimentary remarks to Dreyfus were made from the pulpits of St. Paul's Cathedral by Canon Scott Holland, of Holy Trinity Church by Arthur Robins, and of York Minster by Canon Fleming. Subsequent favorable references to Dreyfus were made by the President of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland and by Canon Armitage at St. Margaret's Westminster. Armitage asserted:

> If there has not been no [sic] secret feeling of satisfaction in the humbling of a great rival nation, can we say there has been no secret feeling of satisfaction in the sad complicity of a sister Church, which, to say the least, has not cleared itself of responsibility in the matter? Has there not been a scarcely concealed delight in tracing the connection between Jesuitry in religion and untruthfulness in the Court-martial?[27]

The minister J. F. Stern spoke from Platform No. 6 at the Hyde Park Demonstration, and the hall at the Working Lads' Institute on Whitechapel Road was donated for a pro-Dreyfus meeting by the Superintendent of the Mission connected to the Institute. The Liverpool District Synod, the Weslyan Methodist Synod at Newcastle-on-Tyre, and the Unitarian Congregation of Braintree all passed resolutions of indignation over the Rennes decision and sympathy for the Dreyfus family. So did the Council of Evangelical Free Churches at Little borough. This Council also called for all justice loving people to refuse to visit France until justice was done.

Religious publications exhibited similar sentiments. The Methodist Times, The Baptist, and The Presbyterian expressed dismay over the conduct of the Catholic Church in relationship to the Affaire. The Independent, which spoke for the Congregational Church, supported the assertions of clergyman William Pierce, who made the facile and erroneous claim that "all of Dreyfus's opponents were Catholic and all of his defenders were Protestants."[28] In his 10 September sermon at St. James's Hall, Hugh Price Hughes, "the best known voice of the nonconformist conscience,"[29] concluded by expressing the hope that the British Empire "would take to heart the great lesson to be learnt from this terrible affair, lest some similar infatuation might overwhelm us."[30] Implicit in Hughes' warning was a concern about the growing influence of Catholicism in British religious life at the end of the century. Anglican publications, The English Churchman and Christian World, "were less hostile toward French Catholics, but agreed that such a thing could never have happened in Protestant England." It was one thing for Conservative journalists writing in the secular press to temper their criticisms of the Catholic Church. While

these writers usually supported the Church of England, their commitment to the Church was not the same as the commitment which Anglican clergymen had.

One remaining but important branch of the Religious press in Britain was the Jewish press. Since Dreyfus was a Jew, the fascination of the Jewish press with the Affaire was not surprising. Publications like the Jewish World and the Jewish Chronicle praised the British for their interest in the Affaire and the favorable impact the British press had in terms of producing revisions.

The Jewish Chronicle followed the Dreyfus case with avid interest from the initial court-martial until Dreyfus received acquittal in 1906. Its reports were often complete with photographs of the principal actors in the Dreyfus drama. From the time of the verdict in 1894, articles in this paper proclaimed his innocence. No other British newspaper adopted this position so soon. The interest of the paper's staff in the Affaire was two-fold. These men empathized with the suffering of their "brother" on Devil's Island, and they decried the anti-Semitic explosion which brought mental anguish and in some cases material loss to fellow-Jews in France. They adamantly praised those British publications which supported Dreyfus and disputed the claims of any who argued to the contrary. The Jewish Chronicle regularly published accounts of the expression of press and public opinion in foreign lands. The paper conveyed the impression that all the world save France was Dreyfusard.

Finally, a number of journals designed for special readerships also expounded Dreyfus' innocence. Most of these only printed a single article about the Affaire, but the sympathy for the defendant at Rennes was obvious. The Law Times published an article about the bordereau.

The expensive and high-quality Anglo-Saxon Review, founded and edited by Lady Randolph Churchill and exclusively aimed at an audience of high society readers, called on the Dreyfusard leader-writer from Figaro, S. F. Cornély, to do an article about the Affaire. He trumpeted the innocence of Dreyfus and assured his readers that the convicted Captain would eventually receive justice. Not surprisingly, an editorial in this review used the Affaire as an occasion to contrast what it perceived as Anglo-Saxon excellence and superiority with "French decadence." Academy and Literature, probably the most influential British literary journal of the period, also followed the Rennes verdict with an article expounding Dreyfus' innocence and likening him to Job of the Old Testament.

As the above synopsis shows, diversity existed within the British press. While almost all organs of the press were Dreyfusard, they perceived and reported the Affaire placing emphasis on different dimensions or relationships. Moreover, some publications were less critical of France than others, more inclined to allow for differences in national circumstances and to take a sympathetic wait-and-see approach. In general terms, Conservative publications expressed their views and reported the events in France in a less condemnatory or judgmental tone than the Liberal press. Although Conservatives basically supported liberal principles, their expectations about fallible man's realization of ideals were not as high as the expectations of Liberals. The Liberal press tended to be more quick to judge and more incensed that the liberal, laissez-faire-based Kingdom of Heaven was not as close at hand as Liberals hoped or imagined. The Liberal-Radical press exhibited greater confidence than Liberal publications in the future of liberalism and justice in France. This press tended to argue that the illiberal features of French society

were surface phenomena beneath which great, positive, and progressive changes were developing. The working class, trade unionist press, concerned primarily with domestic events, largely ignored the Affaire viewing it as a matter of interest to rival bourgeois factions in a foreign land. In typical nationalistic form, the Popular press revelled in the domestic grief of France, which was often cited as evidence of French decadence and Anglo-Saxon superiority. The Protestant Religious press used the Affaire as occasion to criticize a rival religious organization. The Jewish press, from the beginning of events in 1894, rallied to support a wronged Jew, and tried to convert the Affaire into an object lesson in the evils of anti-Semitism.

Regardless of the political or religious interpretations which appeared in the different organs of the press, British publications were almost completely unanimous in the assertion that Dreyfus had not received justice. The British press provided its readership with an abundance of comparative and analytical comment about the principles and procedures required to make an effective and equitable legal system. Many British journalists used the Affaire to argue their case for the superiority of their own nation's legal practices and to expound the claim that in France, due process, equity and equality before the law did not exist.

CHAPTER II

THE PATH TO JUSTICE: A COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND FRENCH JUDICIAL PROCEDURES

> . . . the alleged trial [of Zola is a] . . . shock to every generous mind . . . [and] a shameful burlesque the like of which has not been seen in any civilised modern state. Manchester Guardian, 24 February 1898.

> It [the Rennes verdict] is perfectly horrible; and gives the impression that truth and justice are no longer regarded as of any serious importance in France. Salisbury to Queen Victoria, 12 September 1899.

> . . . never has any case more flagrant than that of Dreyfus arisen in the history of jurisprudence. . . . That the conviction of Dreyfus at the first or second court-martial could possibly be regarded as either accidental or the result of an honest error in judgment is entirely outside the range of possibility. "The Dreyfus Case and the Future of France," Westminster Review, October 1899, p. 366.

> We look across our narrow seas and our eyes are riveted with horror on the events which are passing in France. There we gaze . . . on an ominous struggle in which the heroic figures of Justice and of her children Liberty and Truth are being slowly strangled and crushed to death. F. C. Conybeare, "The Dreyfus Affair: Il Caso Dreyfus; or, the Jesuit View." National Review, March 1899, p. 157.

Most foreign observers, including those in Britain, perceived the fundamental issue underlying the Affaire to be one of the administration of "Justice." In fact, the British discussions of elementary notions about due process of law, judicial procedure, and the relationship between civil and military courts as these things related to the Affaire reveal much about British self-perceptions at the end of the century.

During the late-nineteenth century, developments in British historiography stimulated a keen interest in and consciousness about British legal history. Several historians who were popular with the literate public helped to shape British opinion and impressions about English law. The highly honored and respected Bishop William Stubbs contributed to the understanding of English law and legal history, not only through his teaching but also his publications, most notably his Constitutional History (1874-8) which was used extensively by university dons. Other writers expanded upon Stubbs' analysis. A. V. Dicey, wrote Law of the Constitution and Law and Opinion in England. In 1895, Sir Frederick W. Pollock and Frederick W. Maitland completed their classic, History of English Law, the first general history of English jurisprudence. Their work was the culmination of efforts made by a new school of legal historians which arose at mid-century. These writers often employed a comparative perspective, sometimes contrasting the virtues of German law with Roman law portrayed as overly abstract, pedantic, and doctrinaire. They examined the development of customary law in terms of social evolution, as well as history, language, and religion. They often evidenced a healthy reverence and respect for the virtues of English law in comparison to law based on a Roman heritage.

The discussion about English law also surfaced in the contemporary historiography about the Norman conquest. At the end of the century, there existed a debate among historians about the reciprocal influences of Anglo-Saxon and Frankish civilizations. Historians J. R. Green and E. A. Freeman argued that the Anglo-Saxons had a form of trial by jury prior to the Norman invasion. Freeman insisted that the Normans were eventually converted into Englishmen. In fact, the British

were a people who were very proud of their legal traditions and English law. This pride was enhanced by the sweeping legal reforms which the British had enacted during the course of the nineteenth century. Until the 1800s, the legal profession "had guarded the law and the courts down through the ages against all but the most necessary adaptations." Constitutional historian Frederick G. Marcham has described English courts with their overlapping jurisdictions and legal procedures prior to this time as "a museum containing the creations of different periods of English history." Litigation often moved along slowly or in fits and starts. While several pieces of legislation to ameliorate these problems were passed prior to the 1870s, the Judicature Act of 1873 and the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876 amounted to a dramatic overhaul of the British legal system. It rid the system of dilatory, archaic features and "brought forth a great work of reorganization and simplification." In support of these changes, judges "strove to simplify the procedure of the courts" and "used their authority to remove not only conflicts between the rules of equity and those of common law but countless of other hindrances to the administration of justice which had accumulated through the centuries."[1]

When the Affaire developed in France, the British saw it from the perspective of a people who had recently renovated their legal system by enacting what they believed to be liberal and enlightened changes. Not surprisingly, the Affaire confirmed in their own minds the superiority of British justice and legal procedure. This belief compelled some to write as though the British had the wisdom and prerogative to evaluate justice as it was administered in other places in the world. Even as early as December 1894, the Times, which by no means at that point espoused a Dreyfusard position, characterized the secrecy of Dreyfus' trial as a

"vestige of barbarism,"[2] In September 1899, on the day after Dreyfus was pardoned, the Times responded not with praise, but with a commentary on the "backwardness of her [France's] jurisprudence."[3] The coverage which the Times and other organs of the British press gave to the Affaire contained a self-satisfied strain. By implication, the condemnatory analysis of French legal procedures and practices was also the celebration of English law as the highest expression of jurisprudence in the world. Even when it was not explicitly stated, a comparison was implied. This chapter will examine the comparisons made by the British between the administration of justice in Britain and France. Although the arguments varied from one journalist to another, the tone throughout was almost always self-congratulatory.

Some British observers were not inhibited about plainly stating their views. The Times explained the worldwide interest in the Affaire in these terms:

> It is a question of whether justice is administered in France according to the law or outside the law. Questions of persons have nothing to do with it. It is a question of the security of all citizens, and no country in the world has a better right to defend the observance of the law than that focus of individual liberty and inviolability of domicile, England.[4]

In a letter to the editor of Spectator, written by an unidentified reader, one person argued that it was easy for the Anglo-Saxon to maintain a higher standard of justice because his temperament was "more phlegmatic and less prone to rush to extremes" than that of his Gallic neighbors. His diffidence, indifference to criticism, and dispassionate nature allowed him to judge a matter apart from the vanity which, this reader believed, was characteristic of the Frenchman.[5]

Few who commented on the Affaire openly avowed such a racial-determinist position, but there was no lack of observers who cited

specific and well-known cases in British legal history to contrast with justice as it had been administered to Dreyfus and his supporters. One of the central questions tied to the Affaire was the role which the government should play in insuring the triumph of justice. In this regard, a theologian named D. I. Freedman, from Perth, Australia, discussed the Affaire in a lecture which lasted almost two hours. The Australian Colony's Chief Justice, Sir Alexander Onslow, presided over the meeting. Freedman acknowledged that the English were often accused of being self-satisfied and pharisaical, thinking themselves to be, if not perfect, at least much superior to all other peoples. Nevertheless, trials like the ones given to Dreyfus and Zola could never occur in Her Majesty's dominions. Public indignation and the intervention of the House of Commons would prevent it. In support of Freedman, Onslow cited the Cass Case, which occurred in London a few years prior to the Affaire. A policeman, who went beyond the call of duty, acting with great indiscretion, was put on trial for his injudicious behavior. The efforts of a minister who tried to defend him were to no avail. In reference to the remarks of both Freedman and Onslow, the Jewish Chronicle wrote, "It is a comfort to feel that one is an Englishman and that such an offence against good taste and the law would be met with prompt punishment on the other side of the Channel."[6]

In the spring of 1899, Spectator indignantly asked why the French government had not intervened to supervise or at least insure the publication of all materials relevant to the Dreyfus case. It insisted that a British Cabinet would have surely done so, and indeed had done in connection with the Sheffield Trade-Union trials through a special Commission specifically created to reveal the truth and endowed with special powers

of investigation. If Dupuy could inaugurate and insure the passage of a Bill to override the Criminal Chamber, he and his colleagues certainly had the power to make information about the Affaire public.

In Nineteenth Century, J. P. Wallis drew upon an eighteenth century example to demonstrate the power of British civil justice over military law. He praised the "superiority of our judge-made law over foreign codes constructed on the most approved notions of abstract justice." In Britain, judges used their inherent powers when necessary to duly assert the supremacy of the law. In 1746, Chief Justice Willes exacted an apology from a naval court-martial made up of several first officers, who attempted to repudiate authority of his court by passing censure on his judicial conduct. Willes eventually received a written apology from all the officers involved. The document was read in open court, and published in the **periodical,** Gazette. Willes also saw that it was entered "as a memorial" on the court records. His purpose was to dissuade any who might "'set themselves up in opposition to the law, or think themselves above the law . . . for we may with great propriety say of the law as of truth, magna est et proevalebit.'" Wallis suggested that the French would do well to learn from this example.[7]

Perhaps the most common incidents which were compared to the Affaire were those involving forged documents. The Parnell letters, which supposedly demonstrated Charles Stuart Parnell's satisfaction over the slaying of Under-Secretary for Ireland, T. H. Burke, brought Parnell into prominent public view. The exposure of these letters as forgeries, like the exposure of Henry's forgeries a decade later, generated considerable public furor.

For some British journalists, the Affaire brought to mind the notorious Norton case. But for the "colossal vanity of one individual"--Lucien Millevoye--in many of its features it might have been "an exact parallel to it." France was passing through the Siamese crises of 1893 and anti-English sentiment was on the increase. The French were especially susceptible to charges of English perfidy. They were easily excited and suspicious of certain politicians who were believed to sympathize with Britain. A man named Norton, who worked at the British Embassy in Paris, allegedly stole important documents from the British Ambassador's strong box. Like the bordereau, also acquired from a foreign embassy in Paris, the stolen materials revealed distressing news. They supposedly documented several monetary transactions between British officials and French politicians. It appeared that Clemenceau and several of his fellow-politicians were guilty of treason. Norton passed the documents to a French official, Milleroye, who promptly showed them to Prime Minister Charles Dupuy. Both Dupuy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Develle, found the materials interesting and worth submitting to a magisterial investigation. They chose to do this quietly behind the scenes. Millevoye disagreed with this strategy. Hoping to achieve personal acclaim, he read the documents before the Tribune of the Chamber of Deputies. Much to his chagrin, the audience responded to his oration with laughter rather than indignation. Unlike Dupuy and Develle, the deputies believed him to be the dupe of transparent forgeries. Like representatives in the Chamber, officials in the British government also found the Norton forgeries amusing. Similarly, from 1894 through 1899, the Kaiser regarded the forgeries of the French War Office of little import. But in 1898 and 1899, thoughtful British observers wondered what the outcome of the earlier episode would

have been if not for the impatience of Millevoye. Lucien Wolf speculated that Clemenceau, in all probability, could have become "the Dreyfus of his day." The analogy of the Norton case demonstrated that the "demand for compromising documents, like every other demand, creates its own supply, and if the genuine article cannot be produced, the enterprising patriot is not likely to resist the temptation to manufacture a substitute."[8] One final comparison which was occasionally made was between the Affaire and the Tichborne case (1868-74) which centered on the claims of the "lost heir" who came to England from Australia to collect an inheritance of an Earldom. Like the Affaire, the Tichborne case captured the interest of the public for a sustained period of time.

Whatever similarities may be detected between the Affaire and similar legal proceedings in Britain, the Dreyfus trials underscored many of the differences between the French and English legal systems. To begin with, the British did not define the sale of military secrets to foreigners as treason. Even if they had, the soldier guilty of such a misdeed would not appear before a court-martial unless his crime was committed in time of war. Section 41 of the Army Act specified that those subject to military law were under the jurisdiction of courts-martial unless their crime was treason, treason-felony, murder, manslaughter, or rape. Courts of common law were responsible for trying those guilty of these offenses. Even if treason merited a court-martial, Section 70 of the Army Act specified that military trials must be held in an open court. The public could attend and secret inquiry was prohibited. Charges against the accused were to be fully explained to him before the trial. Moreover, he had the right to communicate with his attorney, his witnesses, and friends properly to prepare his defense. Since the trial was open to the

public, the accused could attend the preliminary proceedings. The rules governing evidence were the same as in a civil trial. By French military law, all of these advantages were denied to Dreyfus.

One contributor to Contemporary Review dogmatically asserted that in England, the charge that military judges would base a decision on anything other than legal, legitimate evidence was an unmerited insult. In contrast, he cited Clemenceau who told of a reserve officer who, in spite of his conviction that Dreyfus was innocent, openly admitted that he would condemn the ex-Captain if he were on the tribunal at Rennes. In Westminster Review, E. Austin Farleigh, who caustically described Rennes as "a most lamentable example of distorted ingenuity in the science of prisoner-baiting," compared and contrasted the trial of Major Templer with that of Dreyfus. In the former case, tried in April 1888, British military judges absolved Templer of charges "for scandalous conduct unbecoming an officer in making false statements" to his superior officers, and "divulging secrets as to the construction of military balloons in contravention to the Army Discipline Act." The law allowed a host of interested observers to crowd into the courtroom. If Templer had been found guilty, the judgment of the court-martial was by no means final "until confirmed by a superior authority," which could order revision. Or, as the case against the mutineers on the Bounty demonstrated, a prisoner could be discharged, "on reference by the Crown," by common-law judges who deemed the sentence illegal. Farleigh observed that Dreyfus enjoyed virtually none of the advantages he would have received in an English setting. All or parts of each trial connected with the Affaire took place in camera, and Dreyfus did not learn of the charges against him for several days after his arrest. In an interview with Le Figaro, the

Minister of War, Mercier, confirmed the prisoner's guilt three weeks before the first trial ever occurred. Farleigh expressed the sentiments of many of his fellow journalists when he wrote that this could not "on any imaginable hypothesis, have occurred in this country."[9]

Not all British commentators were so intolerant of military justice in France. Chief Justice Russell readily admitted that military judges, who were men of the sword rather than the law, lacked the technical expertise and aptitude that their civil counterparts had to weigh evidence. Neither had they the same familiarity with the law and legal proceedings. Rather they were "steeped in prejudice and concerned for what they regarded as the honor of the army." French generals believed that it was most important that honor be maintained for reasons of national security. These men still remembered the Franco-Prussian War and the stinging defeat which France had suffered. They recognized the need for a formidable Army which commanded the respect of both Frenchmen and statesmen throughout Europe. Any manifest weakness in the French Army might tempt some leaders outside of France to exert diplomatic or even military pressure upon France. France needed a reliable Army and soldiers who obeyed orders. If the General Staff was discredited, French enlisted men might lose respect for their superiors. If this occurred, the common soldier could not necessarily be counted upon to follow the orders of those in charge. Indeed, both officers and enlisted men were expected to respect all those above them in rank. In the military world, life itself depended on absolute obedience and submission to one's commanders. As evidenced by the officer to whom Clemenceau referred, loyalty to the Army often came before reverence for justice. Some military officers believed the Army to be above the law, and those who did not support the Army were subject

to the charge of disloyalty. In late-nineteenth century France, failure to submit to authority was seen as tantamount to paving the way for another German invasion. Overawed by their superiors who presented them with "flimsy rags of evidence" which were "utterly unreliable," the judges found the defendant guilty. Nevertheless, Russell judged them as "honest men according to their lights."[10]

Moreover, a host of British observers argued that the verdict of the Rennes tribunal cast no aspersions on civil, as distinct from military, justice in France. In fact, the Court of Cassation annulled the verdict of the Court of Assize against Zola and later ruled in favor of revision. According to Russell, it would have acquitted Dreyfus had its members supervised the re-trial. Prior to Rennes, many observers genuinely believed that the court-martial would consider the Court's decision as a mandate to accept Esterhazy as the author of the bordereau and decide nothing more than whether Dreyfus actually provided Germany with the items listed on the document taken from the German Embassy. Additionally, the possibility that the Court of Cassation would eventually overturn the Rennes verdict always existed.[11] But there were many in Britain who doubted that this would occur. These men argued that the French, in contrast to the British, allowed for the primacy of military justice.

In fact, the Affaire afforded British commentators an opportunity to describe in detail several basic differences they perceived between their legal system and the one across the Channel. The Rennes court-martial was a stark contrast to the average English court. The atmosphere of the English Court was like that of a Church; in France, it assumed the air of a theater. G. W. Steevens contrasted the two, asserting that the former was "ostentatiously grim and business-like." English trials took place in a small and dimly lit room with bare walls. A

single judge presided over events, sitting on the bench "like a silent sphinx." The impression was "one of hush and dimness . . . [with] the awful majesty of the law brooding over all." In contrast, the Rennes trial took place in the Hall of the Lycée, which was used for lectures and orchestral concerts. The room had two rows of large windows on each side which allowed the warm August sun to make the indoors almost as bright as it was outside. The walls were painted in "a cheerful buff," and a stage stood at the front of the room. Seven judges--all officers in full military dress--sat on the stage beneath a painting of Christ hanging on the cross. Reporters, generals and officers, civilians, and gendarmes thronged the hall, giving the appearance of a town meeting, a political assembly, "or an assault at arms, or a fancy ball . . . anything except a trial."[12] But comparisons were made of many things besides the outward appearance of the court-martial and English courts of law.

Chief Justice Russell's report to Victoria included a lengthy discussion about the differences between French and English law. Perhaps the most important difference, or at least the one most commented upon by British observers, related to the kinds of evidence admitted in both French civil and military courts of law. French judges considered loose statements or hearsay evidence in a way which was completely foreign to the English judicial system. On the witness stand, French testators legally rehearsed accounts related to them by third parties. Innuendo and gossip, or what the Times correspondent described as "odious and irrelevant tittle-tattle," was considered legitimate evidence.[13] At Rennes twenty or more of the one hundred witnesses testified on the basis of hearsay evidence. In Britain, this kind of testimony was disallowed. Statements of fact supported by trustworthy, cogent, palpable

evidence were required by English law. The French definition of "fact" was much more flexible.

Also in contrast to the English procedure of accepting testimony, Labori made himself a witness on behalf of his client. As the witness Colonel Bertin sat on the stand, Labori recounted a meeting with the Colonel at approximately the time of Dreyfus' first conviction. Over dinner he told Labori that Demange, because he had defended certain spies in the past, was obviously in the service of the German Embassy. Labori found this assertion ridiculous and claimed before judges, jurors, and the audience that his belief in Dreyfus' innocence dated from that encounter. In response to this address, Saturday Review wrote, "Surely seldom anything more remarkable in advocacy ever took place in a court before."[14]

Regardless of the persuasiveness of evidence in Dreyfus' favor, the verdicts--the chosses jugées--of French courts were sometimes very difficult to reverse. Under French law prior to 1895, a convicted man could not be freed unless someone else was convicted for the same offense. One contributor to Blackwood's underscored this feature of the French system by recalling an incident which took place in France in 1852. The mayor of a quiet provincial town was brought to trial for a series of fires which destroyed several houses. In spite of his spotless reputation, "conspicuous honesty and sound republican principles," a jury found him guilty based on the "unsupported testimony of an informer, who swore that he had caught him at his grisly work." Jurors assumed that the mayor's republicanism made him hostile to the administration of Louis Napoleon. He spent the remainder of his life in Cayenne. Shortly after the mayor's deportation, the fires began again. The new mayor--a "lifelong rival and enemy of his predecessor"--made a healthy profit by buying up the burned

locations at a modest cost. In time, the government called for a second trial, but the magistrate sent from Paris deemed it imprudent to reopen the preceding case. Instead, he examined only the second series of fires. During a fit of conscience, the second mayor confessed his crime and admitted his involvement in the earlier fires. While he was incarcerated for the second fires, the presiding judge refused to throw "discredit upon the law, and declined with the utmost dignity to revise a sentence pronounced." Notwithstanding the importunity of the guilty man, the judge defended the honor of France and the inviolability of the law. According to the journalist, forty-seven years later, things had not changed.[15]

In fact, the judges at Rennes seemed to welcome testimony which was transparently false, or faulty. For example, British journalists critical of France had a field day attacking the use of calligraphy as legitimate evidence. They made great sport of what they considered such a preposterous practice. G. W. Steevens was one of the few observers at the trial who claimed to understand the handwriting theories of Bertillon, a statistician who headed the anthropometric department of the police in Paris. Bertillon was the creator of an intricate and complex theory of handwriting indentification. He appeared on several occasions before the courts involved in the Affaire and argued that Dreyfus had intentionally altered his handwriting to imitate that of Esterhazy and was indeed the author of the <u>bordereau</u>. Even the judges at Rennes failed to understand his ramblings, although they courteously listened. Steevens regarded the theory as remarkably clever, but concluded that it could be made to prove anything. Even prior to the Affaire, handwriting experts lacked influence in English courts. For a while the testimony of calligraphers had enjoyed

a favorable reputation, but then "their art like palmistry and astrology fell into disrepute." According to the Saturday Review, they made themselves look so "supremely ridiculous" that they "hardly dare go into the witness-box." The Court of Cassation readily accepted the thesis that Esterhazy was the author of the bordereau. By September 1899, Esterhazy had repeatedly admitted this truth, and he was supported by several of the best handwriting experts from around the world. Saturday Review concluded, "Even if all the experts in the Dreyfus case instead of being divided in opinion were unanimous, it would be iniquitous to condemn a man on mere handwriting evidence."[16]

Those who assailed the use of calligraphy also enjoyed attacking the more traditional testimony presented by Dreyfus' opponents. The French legal system allowed witnesses, whether for or against the defendant, to present their evidence in the form of a speech or address. By law, each witness had the right to speak as long as he wished without being interrupted. Not surprisingly, the system greatly slowed the proceedings and in the opinion of most British observers, made the Rennes trial an exercise in futility. Testators came to the stand in a random and haphazard manner. Instead of hearing witnesses for prosecution and defense in respective order, the judges allowed them to appear mixed together. Steevens compared the testimony made by this procession to a "re-wound musical box" which played the same tune over and over again.[17] Days passed without the production of meaningful evidence. Witnesses droned on for hours, usually including lengthy and irrelevant rhetoric about their past experiences and current opinions. They made unsubstantiated accusations and malicious insults with complete license and impunity. The testimony of only a few--most notably that given by Picquart--seemed to the British to be

appropriate based on English standards. Some believed that the presiding judge, Colonel Albert Jouaust, "felt nothing but respect and sympathy for the witnesses who deposed against Dreyfus; and nothing but antipathy and disdain for those who witnessed in his favour."[18] Saturday Review highlighted the irony of this reverence toward the testimony of soldiers, since the Affaire itself revolved around the accusation against an officer who supposedly committed treason.

At Rennes, Generals Mercier, Roget, and others exploited the opportunity to make their testimony "nothing short of unscrupulous, mean, and vindictive speeches for the prosecution." To the British, Mercier's testimony amounted to an appeal to a military jury, which was indeed susceptible to the plea. He spoke when he wanted to, not asking the permission of the court. He refused to specify the documents which were allegedly provided to Schwarzkoppen by Dreyfus until his second appearance on the witness stand at Rennes. He told the judges that they must choose between him and Dreyfus. He refused to admit errors made by the War Office which had been clearly demonstrated by the Court of Cassation in June 1899. In fact, the court-martial refused to accept any indications of Dreyfus' innocence established by the highest civil court of the land. There was no lack of British journalists who argued that this action relegated civil justice to a subordinate status beneath military courts. Playing on the national prejudices of the judges, Mercier asserted that Schwarzkoppen's regiment in Berlin was commonly known as the Dreyfus Regiment. Chief Justice Russell did note, however, that the license granted to these witnesses would not have been the same had the case been heard before a superior judge in a civil court rather than Jouaust, at the court-martial. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice, who followed the Affaire closely from

beginning to end, concluded "that the case against Dreyfus was supported by no solid evidence."[19]

Part of the difficulty, as perceived by the British, was directly related to the role played by the judge who presided over trials in France. Tribunals like the one at Rennes bestowed upon the judge the right to permit only those questions he deemed appropriate for cross-examination. Moreover, the attorney for the defense and the defendant, who in France could question his own accusers, had to put their questions to the witnesses through the judge. Judges could refuse to ask the question or word it in a different way. Jouaust could and did prevent Labori from asking certain questions of the generals who testified. His re-phrasing of many questions often made the cross-examination process relatively ineffective.

The relative lack of cross-examination was the result of several factors. In contrast to the British practice, the French defendant gave his own evidence to refute the damaging testimony of witnesses. He had the right to speak immediately following each testator. There was also a general disposition--perhaps subliminal--on the part of the military judges to respect the desire of their superior officers and prove the annulment of the Court of Cassation to be in error. Those witnesses who aided this cause often received protection from the probing inquiries of Labori. Finally, cross-examination, which was "always a difficult and dangerous exercise, was in the circumstances very much more so even than usual."[20]

Lack of direct cross-examination was in no small way responsible for the rut into which the proceedings often seemed to be stuck. It also evoked a chorus of criticism from British journalists who perhaps unfairly judged French procedures of cross-examination in terms of English practice.

Conybeare and Lushington of the National Review spearheaded this attack. In reference to the testimony given by General Guadérique Roget, the former commentator asserted, "In one of our courts a cross-examining counsel would have turned him inside out and put him to shame fifty times over." Russell believed that the witnesses against Dreyfus enjoyed greater license than his defenders because of the method of questioning testators. Cross-examination was particularly problematic after the assassination attempt made on Labori on 14 August 1899. Based on the unanimous decision of the seven judges, the trial continued during his eight-day absence. Labori was assisted at Rennes by Dreyfus' counsel in 1894, Edgar Demange, but the two attorneys had agreed in advance to let Labori handle the cross-examination. Labori was more familiar with the latter stages of the case, and was one of the most skilled attorneys at cross-examination in all of France. His aggressive style earned him the contempt of the military judges, and in the long run, probably injured the interest of Dreyfus. He was energetic, given to flamboyant gestures, and exuberant. His sharp and inquiring mind could penetrate bogus arguments. His fiery oratory could expose false testimony. As his comments about Bertin showed, he did not hesitate to attack the integrity or intelligence of a witness. In contrast, Demange questioned witnesses with great care. Many observers believed that his chief goal was to do or say nothing which would offend military sensibilities. Rather than attacking the conduct, or character of testators, he restricted his comments to the argument that proof of Dreyfus' guilt did not exist. He sought to expose the weaknesses and shortcomings of faulty evidence.

British journalists found these developments very instructive. Saturday Review asserted that in England, the fate of a defendant in a

state trial as important as the one at Rennes would not depend upon the health of a single man. Enough junior counsels would have been involved to brief the second in command, making him competent to replace the absent leading attorney. Saturday Review wryly observed that in England, the court would have adjourned had the defendant's chief defender suffered Labori's fate. In an ironic allusion to Shakespeare, Lushington chided Demange for his courteous treatment of members of the General Staff as "'honourable men.'" Labori's absence reduced the chance of effective cross-examination. According to Lushington, the judges continued to allow the generals "one after another . . . to go on and score with, I do not say their evidence, but their denunciations, subject to no check of conscience from within or fear of cross-examination from without." He was incensed when Jouaust and his colleagues ignored opportunities to expose misleading, insufficient, or erroneous testimony. The "so-called cross-examination" allowed by the judges resulted in involving "the Court in frequent contradiction with itself" and caused "important parts of the case to be imperfectly presented to the Court." In summary, Lushington wrote:

> the ineffective mode of cross-examination did much to aggravate the unavoidable but fundamental difficulties of the trial, arising from the absence of the documents mentioned in the bordereau, the previous death of Henry, and the appearance of those who should have been the principal witnesses, Esterhazy and Du Paty de Clam.[21]

He and other British journalists placed much of the blame for the inadequacies of not only the Rennes court-martial, but all of the trials connected with the Affaire, on the shoulders of the judges involved.

During the late-nineteenth century, there were more judges in France than in any other European nation. This did not necessarily guarantee the equitable dispensing of justice. In spite of the

relatively high sum--25 million francs or more per year--allocated for the administration of justice, French judges, unlike their counterparts in the United Kingdom, were not well-paid. To make matters worse, during the nineteenth century, they lost their job security when the government revoked the act which made judges irremovable from their posts. As a result, the high character of the French judicial body declined. It was not uncommon for British journalists to claim that French judges were prejudiced or tools of the government, or both. Prior to the intervention of the Court of Cassation in June 1899, in the eyes of some British writers, Zola's trial at Assize demonstrated this discouraging trend. Conybeare charged that judges Delegorgue and Préivier were brutal bullies. The Saturday Review alleged:

> The Bench is composed of three judges, two of whom are absolute dummies, and the third, judging by his action, seems to possess a type of mind that even the most shameless of Irish Chief Secretaries would deem a disqualification for the post of Deputy Resident Magistrate.

Other journalists argued that the judges yielded to pressure applied by the War Office and restricted the effectiveness of witnesses defending Zola.[22]

National Review poured criticism upon the President of the Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, Quesnay de Beaurepaire, who dramatically resigned his post to protest what he termed preferential treatment given by the Criminal Chamber to Picquart. In England, his action engendered amazement. Maxse charged that he had come onto the Court through the "back-door." Beaurepaire obtained his high judicial post in return for "political services of doubtful character." He was a "restless, dissatisfied, and ambitious man, to whom notoriety was as the breath of his nostrils." The charges which he made against his

colleagues in the Criminal Chamber demonstrated his meanness. If Beaurepaire represented the average quality of the civil judge, military judges were, according to Lushington, no better. When Labori waived his right to present the final defense at the close of the Rennes court-martial, Lushington raged. Dreyfus' attorney feared his appearance would prejudice the court against his client. "What a reproach--more significant than words--on the unfitness of the judges to try this case!" These men who symbolized French justice "could not bear to hear the truth."[23]

If British critics drew examples from the Affaire to argue that the character of French judges was flawed, they also decried the practice of regarding the accused as guilty until he was proven innocent. In France, arrest was tantamount to being condemned. In England the rights of the accused, who was assumed innocent until proven guilty, were more secure. It was the nature of the French system to make full use of police intelligence to accumulate a comprehensive and supposedly cogent body of evidence against the accused. According to J. E. C. Bodley, who toured France for eight years and disseminated his findings to the British in a multi-volume history of France, it was common practice to interrogate the untried prisoner without informing him of charges against him. Expert interrogators often badgered the prisoner, keeping him in isolation, and brow-beating him with threats. Spectator took a lively interest in the issue of assumed guilt, writing, "Where every man is guilty of all crimes until he prove his innocence, it is well to take precautions," since it is the "spirit of the French law . . . to discover beforehand the worst that may be known of all potential breakers of the law." Spectator recoiled at the pratings of leader of the League of

Patriots and royalist supporter, Paul Déroulède, and others who insisted that "the burden of proof against Dreyfus did not lie with this accusers." This was a "monstrous doctrine," especially when the President of the Rennes court-martial refused to allow the examination of those who could provide near-conclusive proof of Dreyfus' innocence: the attachés from Berlin and Rome. In Britain, even though evidence might be very incriminating against the man--even though a "moral certainty" of his guilt existed--the central question was, "Has he been proved guilty?" If this was not the case, the British accepted his acquittal "with perfect composure, or, at most, with a regretful admission that some miscarriages of justice there must be if innocence is to be adequately protected."

Spectator had no quarrel with those who argued that for reasons of state security, certain facts "necessary to sustain a conviction in public Court" should not be revealed. In Britain when, in early 1903, Colonel Arthur Lynch was convicted of treason, Spectator described his crime as "the most serious a citizen can commit." Treason in Britain, however, "is rare." And in stark contrast with the event in France four years before, where political careers and the fate of administrations were linked to the fate of Dreyfus, English trials for treason were divorced from "all political considerations." Moreover, it was not proper to secure the condemnation of the guilty man through use of an irregular of illegal process.[24]

In Blackwood's, J. H. A. MacDonald castigated what he termed the misapplication of action based on raison d'état. This maxim was "sound when soundly applied, but surely it requires a diseased and brutalised imagination before men can be found unblushingly to call for its application in the administration of justice." Submission to martial law

was one thing, but the conscious administration of injustice as one of the "normal functions" of the judicial system was quite another. He summarized his view with the indictment: "If the safety of the nation hangs upon a cord so rotten as this, she [France] must, and that soon, fall into the abyss."[25]

Spectator's analysis of the Affaire evidenced a pronounced admiration of the English legal system and respect for legal technicalities. Although it had little good to say about Zola--especially his insluting and libelous demeanor toward important military officials and his failure to produce any legitimate evidence--it used the occasion of the Zola trial to argue for the superiority of the English way over the French. One contributor wrote:

> Each fresh occasion for reconsidering the Dreyfus case . . . makes us additionally sensible of the blessing of that respect for technical points which is characteristic of English law. There is not one of us perhaps who has not kicked against this respect at one time or another. No doubt it does occasionally lead to a miscarriage of criminal justice. Some piece of evidence is excluded which would have made the case against the prisoner strong where it was weak, and so secured a just conviction in place of an acquittal which left out of account some material fact. The Dreyfus case is an example of the mischief that may follow from that contempt for technicalities which sometimes appears to us to be the proper attitude of those entrusted with the administration of justice.

According to Spectator, the deplorable, chaotic domestic condition of France which the Affaire had produced was the result of disrespect for technicalities. In England, verdicts in criminal cases had a "finality" that was lacking in the trials connected with the Affaire. Securing Dreyfus' conviction by questionable means made up the judgment of 1894 open to debate. Consequently, the continual debate over the question of revision threatened to disrupt French domestic affairs. Spectator observed, "A single condemnation obtained by such expedients as those

resorted to in the Dreyfus case does more harm to sanctity of the chose jugée than a dozen undeserved acquittals on some technical issue."

Following the decision of the Court of Cassation to annul the verdict of 1894, Spectator praised the French judges for their reverence of the law. It proclaimed, it "is the law, the inflexible law, which has triumphed." The decision was based upon the legal code--Article 443 of the Code of Criminal Procedure passed in 1895 which allowed for the Court to intervene in cases where new evidence came to light after the original conviction--which made a re-trial obligatory in light of changed conditions and new evidence. Dreyfus was the recepient of treatment no better and no worse than that received by any other condemned man. The action of the Court was deemed appropriate because it made law rather than opinion supreme. Spectator, which believed that the rule of law was a progressive and positive trait, asserted that this was much to the "relief not only to all the Friends of France, but to all who care that the shadow on the dial of civilisation should not go back." In conclusion, it reflected on the special need for the rule of law in the Dreyfus case. Notwithstanding philosophers who claimed that a "jury tempers the rigidity of the law, and makes it bearable to mankind by a democratic vote," the juries connected with the Affaire consistently sided with the "oppressor" and "submitted to military intimidation, or . . . accepted the argument that patriotism justifies civil crime."[26] In fact, the role played by juries in the Dreyfus trials also evoked considerable British comment of a comparative nature.

The behavior of juries, as perceived by British observers, was often a function of the pressures exerted by the anti-Dreyfusard French press and public opinion hostile toward Dreyfus. In France, the court

lacked summary powers which, in Britain, were conferred by a law relating to contempt of court. Hence, French judges were unable to restrain that section of the press which prejudged Dreyfus and his supporters and pronounced sentences with impunity. Many British journalists decried the conduct of the press, as well as that of prestigious military officers, who bullied and intimidated the jury at the Zola trial. The trial was unfair because the judges, jurors, and witnesses "were not free" to secure justice for Zola, regardless of his guilt or innocence. In scarcely veiled threats, the jurors listened to predictions that acquittal would leave the army "headless" and expose their children "to the massacre at the next invasion, 'which may arrive sooner than you think.'" Generals made addresses "which no witness in England would have been allowed to deliver in Court." They expressed indignation that the honesty, honor, and integrity of the Army had been questioned and impugned. These defenders of the Army spoke as they wished, as though they, the protectors of the nation, rather than the presiding judge, were in control. The General Staff made it clear to the jury that they would resign if Zola was not convicted. They claimed that the acquittal of Zola would discredit the French high command, and French soldiers, lacking confidence in their leaders would fall easy prey to the next foreign aggressor.

Moreover, a juryman could not "shrink back into obscurity" following the trial. The anti-Dreyfusard press made sure that the names of each member of the jury, as well as the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense, were as well known as those of the attorneys involved in the trial. The press also published the addresses of jurors and encouraged the public to exact retribution if the jury acquitted

Zola. At least two popular papers published on a daily basis the names and addresses in large print. In what English judges considered contempt of court, blustering journalists threatened jurors with loss of trade or professional connections if they supported Zola. One woman whose testimony could have supported Zola refused to appear after she was told a bursary for her son would be denied if she appeared. Another lady failed to appear at the last minute because she had been intimidated and literally feared for her life. Zola told British correspondent D. C. Murray that there seemed to be a sudden epidemic of illness among his witnesses.

Jurors faced not only the badgering and cajoling of the generals and the press, but a gallery that "hooted and gesticulated" at the prompting of Déroulède and a boisterous and sometimes violent crowd in the courtyard of the Palais de Justice. The cry of, "À bas Zola!" which came from the mob, no doubt made an impact on the jury. Spectator mused, "God help the nation that considers a judicial matter in such a spirit as this."[27] It appeared to many British journalists that public opinion gone astray was more powerful than the law.

As the Court of Cassation examined the issue of revision, the popular Parisian press launched a herculean effort to discourage any challenge made against the verdict of 1894. The resulting public furor led the Prefect of Police to warn leading Dreyfusards to take precautions and to change their place of residence. Contributors to National Review expressed astonishment that the French, who in cases not connected with Dreyfus normally meted out severe punishment for even the most minor instance of contempt of court which occurred inside the courtroom, allowed "gutter journalists," "military desperadoes" and "cowardly blackguards" to heap vile epithets upon members of the Court. Maxse reported

one example of a vagrant who received a two-year prison sentence for muttering a single obscenity when the judge of the Correctional Police asked for his name. In contrast, critics of the most important judges of the land went unpunished. Some judges received daily threats of assassination. Their critics vilified and held them up to contempt, alleging that they were "traitors, scoundrels, hirelings, Jews, Protestants, or Prussians, according to the taste and fancy of the writer." Even in the Chamber of Deputies, orators made serious charges against the highest judicial officials in the land. For its effort to discover the truth, the Criminal Chamber of the Court found itself "besmirched by ridiculous spite" of Beaurepaire and "openly humiliated" by both the Prime Minister and the Legislature who should have rendered support. Beaurepaire gave an ear to generals who had grievances, and indiscriminately accepted the "tittle-tattle of . . . the lamplighter, the doorkeeper, and the military detective whom the War Office had been pleased to post" in the lobby of his office. National Review accused him of anonymously passing to the press communications "containing scandalous imputations" against his fellow judges. Neither Dupuy nor the government lifted a finger to protect the Court from the "abuse of unspeakable vileness" expounded in the French press.[28]

The unwillingness of the government to intervene led some in Britain to argue that in France, the courts administered justice unequally. Many British journalists found this lack of equality all too apparent and decried the literal changing of laws to increase the severity of Dreyfus' punishment and to reduce his chances of obtaining revision.[29] Prior to Dreyfus' conviction in 1894, someone convicted of his crime would have been deported to New Caledonia, where his wife and

children could later meet him. If he conducted himself well for five years, he could apply for a land grant and begin afresh. Mercier and others pushed to reinstitute the death penalty--abolished by Article 5 of the 1848 Constitution--for treason. While this failed, Dupuy and Mercier persuaded the Chamber to institute a special ex-post facto law which condemned Dreyfus to Devil's Island where his family could not follow. Dreyfus suffered a "living death" on this swampy, hot, insect-plagued tropical island. Temperatures in this torrid zone sometimes reached 113 degrees Fahrenheit. Dreyfus lived in a small stone hut, and was allowed only limited amounts of exercise. His guards were not allowed to talk to him and the Ministries of War and the Colonies carefully monitored his mail. He was to be shot immediately if he attempted to escape. When the Daily Chronicle published the report of his escape in September 1896, the Minister of Colonies, André Lebon, multiplied his prisoner's sorrow by erecting a screen which blocked Dreyfus' view of the sea and by placing him in irons each night. Several British publications provided readers with detailed accounts of the results of this punishment, or as some said, torture. Around his ankles, sores "formed, sanious, putrid, and surrounded by a circle of inflamation." During the day, the wounds began to heal, only to be reopened each evening when the irons were reimposed. For a period of time, his chief overseer, Commandant Denniel, completely stopped the flow of mail to him. During this time, his custodians told him that his family had deserted him, and on one occasion, he received a scurrilous telegram claiming that Lucie had given birth to a child that was not his. Several irate British critics alleged that the Army, lacking the nerve to murder Dreyfus, sought to kill him by increasing the severity of his prison conditions.[30]

Another demonstration of the unequal justice dispensed to Dreyfus was the Esterhazy court-martial. The Manchester Guardian contrasted the treatment of these two soldiers, writing, "Unlike Dreyfus, the accused was to be allowed every opportunity of clearing himself." The Times echoed this sentiment asserting that had the methods used against Dreyfus been equally applied to Esterhazy, the latter would certainly be in jail. Such conduct differed little from that exhibited in pre-revolutionary France when autocratic powers endowed by the lettres de cachet enjoyed great liberties. Other journalists indicted the War Office for preparing Esterhazy's defense and providing daily instruction regarding what he was to say.[31] The judges gave Esterhazy every benefit of the doubt, and unreceptively scrutinized the testimony of witnesses against him. This was so apparent that Picquart, during his testimony, asked whether it was he or the defendant who was on trial. His court-martial was, in the words of Conybeare, "made to order."[32]

The British response to perceived prejudices against Zola and his witnesses at Assize has already been described. It should be said, however, that many British journalists found further cause to cry "unequal justice" when the penalty imposed on Zola was the maximum allowed by law: a year in prison and a fine of three thousand francs.

Significantly, both before and after Zola's trial, foreign officials in Germany and Italy made public statements reassuring the French that they had never dealt with Dreyfus. From the earliest stages of the Affaire, the German Ambassador, Count Münster, advised the French government that Dreyfus was not in the employ of Germany. The Italian Ambassador did the same. National Review even suggested that the Kaiser during the Zola trial, had come close to allowing Schwarzkoppen to

testify. While this did not occur, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Bernhard von Bülow, before the Reichstag on 24 January 1898, formally and categorically denied Germany's association with the ex-Captain. A similar disclaimer was made before the Parliament in Rome. In the summer of that year, the semi-official National Zeitung in Berlin informed the world that no diplomatic difficulty would result from resolving the Affaire.[33] The influence of these foreign voices upon French officials was small.

Perhaps the greatest outcry of the British press came in response to the special law by Dupuy's government which prohibited the Civil Chamber, allegedly sympathetic to the cause of revision, from deciding whether Dreyfus should be retried. French Chief Justice Lebret argued that the exceptional circumstances of the Dreyfus case made special action necessary. Beaurepaire and the anti-Dreyfusards attacked Justice Louis Loew, who chaired the seventeen-man Criminal Chamber, arguing that his favoritism toward Jews and the influence of his German relatives made it necessary to combine the three Chambers. British critics made counter-charges that the anti-Dreyfusards merely wanted to pack the Court, which, in all probability, would work to Dreyfus' disadvantage. The combination was likely to create an anti-revisionist majority. Spectator wrote, "We find it impossible to characterise such conduct . . . except in words from which the Spectator habitually refrains" and described Beaurepaire's "invective" as "demoniac drivel."[34] When a special law was passed, mandating the combination of the three Chambers, many British journalists accused France of intentionally depriving Dreyfus of a fair chance to obtain revision.

When revision was achieved, some critics excoriated the French government for choosing Rennes as the site of the new trial. They argued that this town was selected because of its strong anti-Dreyfusard and anti-Semitic element. In addition to this accusation, one contributor to Contemporary Review charged that the government failed to provide adequate security for Dreyfus' journey to Rennes. An assassination attempt on Dreyfus seemed likely. In this precarious environment, the Minister of the Interior entrusted the defendant's care to a police official named Hennison, who was "known as one of the most uncompromising anti-Dreyfusards in Paris or France!"[35] Although Dreyfus made it to Rennes unharmed, British charges of unequal justice did not diminish.

As contemporary British journalists observed, there were genuine differences between the administration of judicial procedure in Britain and France. The Affaire clearly demonstrated the differences in rules governing admissability of evidence, cross-examination, and the order in which testators appeared. It also threw into sharp relief the French practice of presuming the guilt of the accused. Moreover, it demonstrated that some Frenchmen who were in a position to do so were willing to break their own laws and ignore procedures, and permit irregularities with impunity.[36] The General Staff initiated the arrest of their victim based on insufficient proof. Dreyfus' incarceration in Cherche-Midi prison, not being authorized by the Governor of Paris, was an illegal act. Neither Dreyfus nor Demange saw or heard the evidence on which the conviction of 1894 was actually based. As this became apparent in 1898, British jurists and journalists decried the covert passing of evidence, composed of forgeries and lies, to judges behind the back of a defendant and his attorney.[37] Some observers speculated that the "suicides" of

culprits like Lemercier-Picard and Henry were actually the handiwork of the lackeys of the General Staff.[38] In reference to Henry, the Daily Telegraph's correspondent in Germany wryly observed that prisoners generally did not carry razors in their pockets, especially to their jail cells. Some objected to the illegal solitary confinement of Picquart while he waited to be tried.[39]

One contributor to Spectator decried the actions of the Minister of War, General Émile Zurlinden. The General snatched Picquart, a civilian since his dismissal from the Army in February 1898, away from the jurisdiction of the civil court. By law, the crime for which Picquart was charged--divulging official military information to non-military personnel--made him subject to a Correctional Police tribunal. The journalist concluded, "the Army really holds . . . that it has a right to control its own people and its own affairs without interference." Its action was analogous to Lord Wolseley affecting "to control the procedure of the Queen's Bench." This presumptuous action, which was tolerated by the French, would have made the British "furious."[40] Other journalists expressed horror that perjury like that of Captain Lebrun-Renaud was allowed to go unpunished. Shortly after this officer of the Republican Guard escorted Dreyfus to his degradation, he claimed to have heard Dreyfus confess his guilt. Immediately, his superiors inquired into the matter. When called before both the Prime Minister and Minister of War, he quickly recanted. Under pressure from his fellow-officers, he testified at Rennes, resurrecting the claim that Dreyfus had confessed.[41]

Based on the Dreyfus trials, the contrasts between British and French judicial procedure, and the illegalities which were demonstrated in connection with the Affaire, the British often made sweeping and unfair

generalizations which celebrated British justice and condemned all French judges and the entire French judicial system. Charles Beresford, who wrote for the Pall Mall Magazine, believed that as a race, the Anglo-Saxons possessed an innate sense of honor, justice, and an unwillingness to compromise with the truth. Spectator believed that regardless of the ill side-effects, the innocent man would go free. In fact, the same argument was later made in reference to the French. Twenty-five years after the Affaire, Times correspondent Henry Wickham Steed observed that "the hatred of injustice, which I am inclined to regard as a principal passion of the French people, ended by securing the vindication of his [Dreyfus'] innocenct."[42] Full vindication took time because of the unique nature of the Dreyfus case.

Indeed, the Dreyfus trials were by no means average. If the real worth of a judicial system is expressed as it deals with extreme cases, then the French system of justice certainly demonstrated what Theodor Zeldin calls "the limitations of the French legal system." On the other hand, several British journalists passed judgments on the French judicial structure which were, if not too harsh, certainly lacking in appreciation for the pressures and exigencies under which Frenchmen in the late-nineteenth century lived. In the particular "atmosphere of the time, when spies were seen on every side," the Dreyfus trials were probably as fair as one could expect them to be.[43] G. W. Steevens and writers for the Manchester Guardian argued that the Rennes tribunal, at least, was notably fair and as worthy of trust as a similar body of judges convened in Britain or other European states. Another commentator, British Chief Justice Russell, may possibly have had access to information beyond the reach of the ordinary newspaper correspondent. He certainly surpassed

pressmen in terms of his legal training and ability to grasp legal arguments and procedure. Russell judged that the men who sat on the Rennes court-martial did as well as their training, abilities, and prejudices (which were sincere) allowed. As a rule French military tribunals were reputed to be fair. In fact, judges usually evidenced a "faint professional leaning towards the accused officers if only to protect that 'property right' in the commission." They generally disliked bringing one of their own into disrepute, since this kind of action undermined the enlisted man's respect for the officers. Perjury on the part of the Minister of War and other reputable testators seemed simply absurd. Those who criticized the secrecy of the trial were rather unfair to the French since in England, reasons of state also made it necessary to protect the secrecy of certain documents which, if revealed, could endanger the public welfare.[44]

In a telling rejoinder, Edouard Drumont in Libre Parole reminded the British that if Dreyfus' trial had been conducted in camera, so had the official inquiry into the Jameson Raid. And, interestingly enough, an event in Britain near the turn of the century also bore similarities to the Dreyfus case. A young naval cadet named Archer-Shee became the victim of an erroneous accusation made by naval authorities. He supposedly forged a signature on a postal order. For this misdeed, he was expelled. Only after several years of persistent effort was he able to prove his innocence. Like the Army in France, the British Navy was of great symbolic and material significance in terms of the defense of the nation. Misconduct in either of these organizations implied a threat to national security. In contrast to the Affaire in France, Archer-Shee's case spawned very little popular excitement.[45] H. M. Hyndman, who

believed in Dreyfus' innocence, was among the few in Britain who publicly reminded his countrymen that miscarriages of justice were not unique to France; that in spite of the many comparisons made by Englishmen who were proud of their judicial reforms and heritage, injustice also could occur in Britain. In the weeks after Rennes, not many British commentators were willing to expound this position.

There was no small number of people, both in and outside of France, who charged that the re-conviction at Rennes was directly linked to the fact that Dreyfus was a Jew. In fact, the commentary found in the British press was rich with analysis which shows not only British attitudes toward anti-Semitism, but attitudes about the concept of "race" as it was perceived in the late-nineteenth century. If the British had much to say about the Jew and his predicament in France, they also freely expounded their theories about the character and attributes of the French people. In their articles about the Affaire, British journalists reveal much about their concepts of the rights of ethnic minorities in a democratic society, and "racial" traits which were supposedly inherited.

CHAPTER III

REPORTERS AND RACE

> God created the Jew in order that he might serve as a spy to anybody who was in want of one. Otto von Bismarck quoted in "The Dreyfus Affair: Il Caso Dreyfus; or, the Jesuit View," National Review, March 1899, p. 145.

> Every few years the [French] race seems destined to pass under some sudden and sweeping eclipse of conscience and reason. Frederick C. Conybeare. "Side-Lights on the Dreyfus Case." National Review, October 1898, pp. 257-8.

Europeans of the late-nineteenth century were acutely conscious of race. By the end of the century, pseudo-racial theories like those expounded in 1854 by Count Arthur de Gobineau in The Inequality of Human Races had filtered down in various forms to the masses. It was believed that physical, intellectual, social, and even moral traits resided in and were passed through the blood. Developments in the field of biology during the nineteenth century led some to argue that "ineradicable genetic characteristics . . . translated themselves into different mental and moral capacities, and that some races were superior to others because the immutable character of genetic structure made such superiority permanent." In some circles it became popular to view cultural and biological traits as identical, and the term "'race' came to be seen as the prime determinant of all the important traits of body and soul, character and personality, of human beings and nations." According to the theories, race was genetically determined and individuals could not transcend

genetic limitations. Those who embraced this idea often believed that maintenance of "racial purity" was imperative if the progressive, enlightened, or "superior" races were to survive. They argued that some races were degenerating. Cross-breeding between the races would produce a "contemptible and infertile hybrid," and the deterioration of the superior race.[1] In Britain, this concern was evidences by the mounting interest in eugenics and the health of the British people at the close of the century. Some scholars like Karl Pearson of University College in London warned of impending national deterioration. The nation, or in contemporary terms, race which was the most fit stood the best chance to survive, to win in a struggle between nations for international supremacy. Some, like Walter Bagehot, applied Darwinistic principles to the nation-state system and argued that success justified itself, that might made right. These commentators perceived life in the international arena as competitive. Those who succeeded were superior by virtue of their success. Often these ideas were tinged heavily with racism. Within this context, two important features of the British commentary about the Affaire will be examined in this chapter.

British reportage of the Affaire focused on race in two respects. Virtually every organ of the British press made some assessment of the role which anti-Semitism played in events across the Channel. Opinions varied depending upon which publication or journalists one examines. The first part of this chapter will examine the British coverage of anti-Semitic behavior in France and the importance which various individuals placed on anti-Semitism. One message which emerges in this analysis is of comparative nature and goes beyond the <u>prima facia</u> discussion of French anti-Semitism. Not infrequently, British commentators contrasted

the benevolent environment which Britain provided for Jews with the anti-Semitism which accompanied the Affaire. During most of the nineteenth century, Britain was indeed the most benign environment in Europe for Jews. In no other European state were Jews treated with as much acceptance. British Jews also found it both easy and desirable to assimilate. One contemporary journalist proudly cited the success of the British in assimilating or Anglicanizing the Jews. He maintained that the power to absorb alien peoples was " a peculiar prerogative of the Anglo-Saxon." Others believed that the English were "free from the envy which produces Anti-Semitism," a fact illustrated by the demonstration for Dreyfus in Hyde Park.[2]

While it was not always so explicitly stated, the British commentary evidences the familiar self-congratulatory tone which is outlined in the preceding chapters. On some occasions, the writers seemed almost glad that anti-Semitism existed in France, since it gave them an opportunity to demonstrate the liberal character of British society in comparison to France. They stressed the political, social, and economic opportunities available to enterprising Jews in Britain. Some journalists wrote as though the Jews who lived there had never been the victims of discrimination. Several observers concluded that anti-Semitism was but a single illiberal feature of the French people and their society was ill-suited to progressive, liberal institutions and governmental forms.

In respect to international relations and the issue of national survival, Prime Minister Salisbury argued that nations were either growing or dying. Some journalists applied this principle in their commentary on the Affaire by relegating France to the position of a

declining, decadent race.[3] The second part of this chapter will examine their analysis, and their predictions that certain racial or genetic characteristics precluded French advance and insured the waning of French power and influence. It will explore their discussion of "immutable" racial foibles which some argued determined the course of French history. Again, whether or not each writer intended it to be, the analysis is often both comparative and self-flattering. By implication, and on a few rare occasions, by forthright declaration, the message found in the commentary is that the British were a superior race of people, destined by immutable traits inherent in the blood to excel all other peoples in virtually every field of human endeavor. Some British journalists perceived themselves as the measure by which other races should be evaluated, and used the Affaire to demonstrate their point.

As historians of Anglo-French relations and anthropologists have since demonstrated, the vaguely defined racial categories which nineteenth century observers freely used often prove to be of questionable validity. The inhabitants of nineteenth century Britain were not "racially" distinct or of a "pure blood." The nation was populated by the English, the Norman French, the Welsh, the Scottish, the Irish, and other peoples who had immigrated and assimilated into British society over past millenia. The ethnic composition of France was similar in that several "racial" or ethnic groups which had settled there over the centuries comprised its population. Because of his religious and cultural habits and practices, the Jew in Europe tended to retain his ethnic distinctness, but there is also a problem of identifying the Jews in nineteenth century Britain and France. As Jews in these two nations acquired political and civil rights during the nineteenth century, most

Jews assimilated into society, becoming merely Englishmen or Frenchmen of Jewish religious persuasion. Some even converted to Christianity. Lines of class division also existed within the Jewish community. Those who had assimilated and become successful frequently made concerted efforts to dissociate themselves from poor immigrant Jews. In times when anti-Semitic sentiment flourished, they often tried to ignore criticism and persecution. This was the case in France during the Affaire.[4] The Jews of France tended to lose their identity, and "much of the institutional structure of a separate community was dismantled." Nevertheless, contemporaries imposed a "racial" definition upon those whom they considered Jews. As one historian of the Jewish community in France, Michael R. Marrus, writes, "this was a time when the term 'Jewishness' was widely applied, and could not easily be removed." The "Jew" was allegedly anti-national, cosmopolitan, and without loyalities to a homeland. At times, the anti-Semitic literature produced in France during the time of the Affaire tends to merge the term Jew with all things English, foreign, and anti-French. For purposes of definition, as Marrus does, "we shall consider as Jewish those whom the . . . community at large, both Jews and non-Jews, considered as such."[5]

For some Jews, the Affaire hardened the lines of division between themselves and other Europeans. To these men, it demonstrated that the doctrine of assimilation, the belief that Jewish ethnic communities could and should be absorbed by the populations among whom they lived, was chimerical. In an article which decried the Rennes verdict, Contemporary Review argued that Dreyfus' Jewishness was of central importance in the Affaire. It wrote "Dreyfus, being a Jew, was treated differently from his Christian comrades."[6] These were precisely the sentiments of a

correspondent for the prestigious Viennese daily Neue Freie Presse which catered to an upper-middle class readership. As he had watched Dreyfus' degradation almost five years before, Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist Organization, described the ceremony as his "critical moment of recognition," the point at which he determined that assimilation was not the answer to the Jewish Question.[7] The Affaire and the racial persecution which accompanied it prompted many other Jews, including Zionist leader Max Nordau, also a witness of the degradation, and French Dreyfusard Bernard Lazare to commit themselves to the idea of a national homeland in Israel.

In November 1895, in an effort to promote Zionism and emphasize the common bond between the eight to ten million Jews scattered through the world, Herzl wrote from Paris to say that "when Captain Dreyfus was accused of high treason," all Jews suffered. Indeed during the late-nineteenth century persecution of the Jews in Europe was on the increase. The growing anti-Semitic sentiment which spread across the Continent probably predisposed some in France to more readily assume the guilt of Dreyfus than they would have been in earlier decades. The Dreyfus Affaire in France was but one example of general European phenomenon. Some observers believed the Affaire made "both plunder and slaughter . . . imminently probable." Heralding events to come in the 1930s and 1940s, one contributor to Spectator was "seriously inclined to believe that the twentieth century may yet witness a massacre which will recall the days of Peter the Hermit."[8] Journalist Herbert Bentwich mocked the proponents of assimilation as a solution to the Jewish Question in Europe. At the London Zionist Conference he quipped, "'The famous Sanhedrin, convened by the great Napoleon, abjured the National idea, declaring that "France

is our Zion," but whither has that led them?—to Panama and the Devil's Island.'" In Blackwood's, Zionist proponent Claude Reignier Conder wrote, "In France the medieval cry, 'Mort aux Juifs!' has quite recently been heard again."[9]

Whatever one's opinion about the impact of French anti-Semitism, few British journalists condoned the bigotry and incitement to violence against the Jews which filled the Yellow press in France. Edouard Drumont, the "Rabbi of anti-Semitism," led the attack against Dreyfus and the Jews. During the heights of the Affaire, Drumont sold as many as half a million papers a day. The virulent anti-Semitism in his daily newspaper Libre Parole drew sharp critism. A contributor to Saturday Review described Drumont as the "most sinister figure in Parisian journalism . . . . For anyone who has followed their [Drumont and the Libre Parole] odious career, to criticise them, and keep indignation under control is difficult."[10] The 13 October 1898 edition of the Pall Mall Gazette sarcastically insisted that Drumont was actually a German Jew previously called Dreimond. The National Review decried the falsehoods expounded by Drumont, and asserted that his ultimate goal was the expulsion of both Jews and Protestants from France. In Blackwood's, passages from L'Intransigeant were used to demonstrate the ludicrous grounds on which some French critics condemned the Jew. Vocal nationalist and anti-Semitic pamphleteer Henri de Rochfort's description of Dreyfus at Rennes colorfully illustrated this point. The defendant was "a base Jew with repulsive beard, with lumpy lips, . . . an elephantine nose" and a "repugnant face"—the "ineffable tapir of Rennes." Under such circumstances, the Jew in France simply could not win. The conviction of Dreyfus could only bode ill for the Jews as a group. Enmity against

the Jew had "assumed the proportions of a crusade." Again, to demonstrate his point, the Blackwood's journalist cited the words of another anti-Semite. Max Regis Milano stirred the baser cravings of the Algerian "mob" with his admonition, "'Let us water the Tree of Liberty with the blood of the last Jew.'"[11]

In the London Times and the Jewish Chronicle, as well as other publications which closely followed events in France and the daily developments associated with the Affaire, reports of assaults on Jews in not only France but also Algeria regularly appeared. The Jewish Chronicle provided readers with extremely detailed accounts of events. Indeed, between 1894 and 1899, there was much to report. There were brawls in cafés, duels including one between two barristers, one Protestant and the other Jewish, and even an altercation between a Rabbi and a hawker selling anti-Semitic songs. The publication of Zola's "J'Accuse" in Aurore in January 1898 touched off a wave of anti-Semitic risings and riots in most major French cities. Jewish places of business and synagogues suffered attack, looting, and pillage. Jews found on the streets were assaulted. The violence, unrest, and agitation continued throughout the trial of Zola, and fights even occurred outside the Palais de Justice.

One of the more interesting accounts of anti-Semitic violence appeared in Contemporary Review. D. C. Murray, who observed the Zola trial first-hand, recounted an event he witnessed while standing in the courtyard of the Palais de Justice during the second day. He wrote, "A big man accosted a little man within two yards of me." The following conversation ensued:

> 'Thou carriest,' he said, with apparent placidity—'Thou carriest a nose too long for my taste. Thou art Israelite, ne c'est pas?' The little man shrugged his shoulders and spread his hands, and answered, "But yes, sir, I am a Jew.' The big man hit him on the too long nose, and in a second he was down amongst the feet of the crowd. His face was trodden upon and after a minute, of a murderous scuffle, a score or more of the Civil Guard rescued him, and hustled him, bloody and muddy and ragged, into safety.

Murray admitted that this was not "a fair specimen of the temper of the crowd," but asserted that "there were many such episodes" during the case. Had Zola been acquitted, Murray believed that many more incidents of such brutality would have occurred. "[W]e should have seen 'the red fool-fury of the Seine' again."[12]

British journalists made many assertions—most of them either incorrect or based on partial truths—about the source of French anti-Semitism. During the Affaire anti-Semitism was primarily an urban creed which was espoused by the conservative classes in France.[13] Of course, not all those who were conservative in outlook were also anti-Semitic. Those who blamed Drumont, Guérin, Rochefort and their followers were more accurate than writers who made blanket accusations against Catholicism or the French Army.

Certainly, one institution in France most commonly accused of fomenting anti-Semitism was the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, many members—according to one authority on French Jewry, Robert F. Byrnes, most of the Catholic clergy—were especially susceptible to anti-Semitic sentiment. This was particularly true among country priests who lacked education and suffered persecution at the hands of the Republic. Several British journalists brought pointed accusations against French Catholics as an anti-Semitic group determined to fight the Dreyfusards primarily because Dreyfus was a Jew.[14] If the role they played was a quiet

one behind the scenes, it was nonetheless significant and effective.

No British journalist dogmatically asserted that Pope Leo XIII encouraged anti-Semitism. But many condemned him on the grounds that he did nothing to restrain Roman Catholics who did. Nor did he act upon the appeal made in the name of humanity by Lucie Dreyfus, who petitioned him on behalf of her husband. Her entreaty went unacknowledged. Nevertheless, some journalists, including one writing for the Jewish Chronicle, roundly asserted that the pope had nothing to do with anti-Semitism in France. His subordinates were another matter. Times correspondent H. W. Steed argued that the Vatican received the news of Picquart's denunciation with undisguised pleasure. Henry's suicide and the Court of Cassation's verdict mandating revision "were thought disastrous." In his memoirs, Steed recorded a second-hand account of the response of Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Rampolla, to the Rennes verdict. The day following the decision, the Cardinal received Suzanof, the chargé d'affaires at the Russian legation to the Holy See. "Rubbing his hands with satisfaction, Cardinal Rampolla said, 'This excellent verdict of Rennes settles the matter.'"[15] A modified version of this event—deleting the name of Suzanof—appeared in the Times. Another contributor to the Times, foreign editor Valentine Chirol, in a Biblical analogy accused the Catholics of "passing on the other side." Chirol, who came from a Catholic family and who had attended a Catholic school during his youth, expressed disgust that three priests actually turned away when Labori's wife sought help for her wounded husband at Rennes.[16]

The attitude described by Steed and Chirol certainly emerged clearly in some organs of the Catholic press. British journalists

assailed La Croix, Pelerin, and Civilta Cattolica for publishing some of the strongest, most strident denunciations of the Jews. Many British publications reproduced long sections from these journals to demonstrate the point. According to Conybeare, Civilta Cattolica, an official Jesuit organ, called for the revocation of civil rights for Jews. Not surprisingly, it condemned the Jew on religious grounds. But beyond this, it also encouraged disenfranchisement and the expulsion of Jews from public office; even the retraction of citizenship rights. This Jesuit publication argued that Jews were Jews first and could never be naturalized. Some disturbed British observers feared that the logical conclusion of this mentality would be the eventual elimination of Protestants' civil rights as well.

La Croix, owned by the Fathers of Assumption, was also an organ of the Catholic Church. Contemporary British observers estimated that in 1893, it had a circulation of 180,000. In some parts of France, it was given away to the poor who could not afford it. Present-day historians believe that it was very influential among the Catholic masses. This publication described the Affaire as a "religious case." When Dreyfus was convicted in 1894, it claimed that Lucie had sued for divorce and that his family had abandoned him. After the Rennes decision became public, it asserted, "Justice has been done, Dreyfus has been condemned. . . . As Frenchmen we rejoice over it, as Catholics we praise God for it."[17]

The National Review vehemently argued that a "Catholic connection" existed between Drumont and the French priesthood. Drumont's anti-Semitic campaign through Libre Parole was, according to Conybeare, planned and directed by the Jesuits. To substantiate his claim,

Conybeare referred to a Jesuit named Odelin, who for a while had presided over the Jesuit preparatory school on the Rue de Postes in Paris. Odelin also founded Libre Parole with Jesuit finances and managed it during its early existence. Conybeare asked, "Is it mere coincidence that for several years past Drumont has preached exactly the same doctrine [as in Civilta Cattolica] in the columns of the Libre Parole?" He also posited a relationship between Catholicism and the two publications, Petit Journal and Gazette de la France.[18]

Whether or not these relationships with Petit Journal and Gazette de la France actually existed in the form suspected by Conybeare, he and others believed that Catholic clergymen promoted anti-Semitism by an even more direct means than the use of the press. Catholic priests exercised influence and the power to sway the common man. This was done in part through the control the Church had over French education. Conybeare expressed little surprise at the popular following Libre Parole achieved. The anti-Semitic Confessional schools indoctrinated French children. Young students "had read out to them . . . incitements to murder and civil war." Conybeare wrote that one could "hear their little voices shouting along the streets: Mort aux Juifs, Mort aux Protestants." Maxse supported his colleagues analysis, indicating that Catholic schools used Fleurs de l'Histoire by Theophile Valentin as a common text. In his discussion of the Jews, Valentin wrote:

> The Jews are a cursed race, since they sold our Savior and disowned His blessings. By their religion and their politics they tend to enslave and ruin all nations, and in particular the French, on whom they have alighted like vultures on a rich quarry. They are dangerous and insatiable parasites that lay hands on everything--soil, money, commerce, industry, administration. All means come handy to them in order to divert into their own pockets the sources of wealth--treason, crime, fraud, theft, assassination. . . . they organize themselves in the dark, and hatch their perfidious plots against

> religious as well as civil society--against everything which stands for order, morality, and justice. . . . If the peoples do not take care, they will perish through the Jews.[19]

A contributor to Spectator maintained that "the Frenchman of the lower class is taught in his childhood to believe that the Jew inherits a curse which makes him an enemy of mankind, capable of anything, and the lesson is never unlearned."[20]

Some journalists claimed that priests used thier influence over both Army officers and parishoners to foment an anti-Semitic spirit and insure the conviction of Dreyfus. Most French Army officers in high positions had attended Jesuit schools. These men were usually Catholics, if not in practice, at least in name. Some British observers argued that the Army was not only a military organization but also a clerical agency. Steevens caustically wrote, "Mercier was the very type and mirror of a Jesuit grand inquisitor." More importantly, British journalists repeatedly informed their readers that the Jesuit leader and one time Rector of the School of St. Genevieve, Father du Lac, was the confessor of General Raoul de Boisdeffre, the Chief of the General Staff in 1894, and the anti-Dreyfusard aristocrat, Count Albert de Mun. They implied these relationships had a direct influence on the anti-Semitic attitudes of Boisdeffre and Mun.

Journalists writing for other publications noted the unfairness with which the Jew was treated by the French press and Frenchmen in general. S. F. Cornély, a Dreyfusard and leader writer for Figaro, addressed the upper crust of British society through the Anglo-Saxon Review. He summarized the plight of the Jew in France by describing the Jew's relationship to his nation's system of military service. Anti-Semites demanded that the Jew render military service to France, but

decried the elevation of Jews into the officer corps. This was only one of many examples of the inequality which restricted French Jews at the end of the century. Readers of the British press had ample opportunity to follow the abuse of the Jews through coverage that was given to them in both newspapers and journals. Byrnes includes the traditionally Catholic "professional officer class," which formed an "exclusive corps," among French anti-Semites. These officers comprised a clique within the army known as the "Postards." The name was derived from a Jesuit preparatory school located on the Rue des Postes. At the time of the Affaire, the 300 "Jewish officers in the French army faced social pressure, isolation, and discrimination." Jewish students at the École Polytechnique, were often graded more severely than their Catholic counterparts. This was true for Dreyfus as well as other young Jewish students. Ironically, Picquart, who became one of the most vocal Dreyfusards, gave Dreyfus low scores in cartography and field maneuvers at the École de Geurre. Another instructor, General Pierre de Bonnefond, gave Dreyfus inferior marks for the admitted purpose of keeping Jews out of the General Staff. In spite of Dreyfus' protests to the director of the school, he gained no satisfaction. General Lebelin de Dionne conducted an investigation, concluded that Dreyfus had received unfair treatment, and regretted that nothing could be done. In the end, Dreyfus was quite fortunate. He actually became a member of the General Staff. Other Jews were denied promotion or important positions because of prejudice against them.[22] English observers were not always aware of the closeness shared by this coterie of soldiers and their discriminatory attitude toward non-members. One contributor to the Quarterly Review

exhibited his incredulity over the treatment of Dreyfus, whether Jew or Gentile, by his "brother officers."[23]

In spite of the unequal treatment which Jews sometimes received at French military schools, Dreyfus was indeed the first Jew to obtain a position on the General Staff. It may also be true that consternation over his position as a probationer prompted someone who sat on that august body--most likely Henry--to provide Libre Parole with Dreyfus' name prior to the announcement of his arrest. Nevertheless, the Army was not comprised of raving anti-Semites. Dreyfus' presence on the General Staff belied the charge that the Army was so anti-Semitic that Jews could not advance. As the Manchester Guardian observed, "the taint of Anti-Semitism has not poisoned the whole French army."[24] While Dreyfus' Jewishness possibly encouraged the General Staff to press forward with his arrest and conviction, there were several other major considerations which compelled Mercier and his colleagues to behave as they did. The Minister of War acted to preserve his political career. Failure to deal with treason expeditiously would have jeopardized his position. Once Drumont publicized the arrest and charge against Dreyfus, Mercier had to act quickly to mollify public opinion. As a body, the General Staff was, during the decades following the Franco-Prussian War, highly concerned with maintaining national security and preventing the passing of secret military information to German military attachés or agents. Knowledge that treason had occurred compelled them to find a traitor. Dreyfus was, by virtue of an almost accidental set of circumstances, the unlucky victim. After the Dreyfus case developed into an Affaire, the Army's chief concern was to defend its honor, as well as the Army's institutional interests and its autonomy over military matters

within the State. These were central motives of the high command; not the persecution of the Jews.

If anti-Semitism played a comparatively minor role in influencing the actions of Army chiefs, there were many Catholic priests who had a genuine disdain for the Jews. But many British journalists made too much of these sentiments. Charges of clerical anti-Semitism did not go unanswered in the British press. Those who disputed the arguments of the journalists cited above offered cogent proofs. Editor of Month, S. F. Smith, deflated accusations of critics like Conybeare by also citing Civilta. He quoted a contributor who maintained that there was no reason for anti-Semitism in France. The Jews only amounted to a small portion--0.22% (not including Algerian residents)--of the French population. They were not on the increase, and most of them tended to assimilate, to fuse "with the body of Christians." Smith reminded his readership that Civilta, far from adopting a vehement anti-Semitic editorial policy, rarely even discussed the Jews. The article used by Conybeare was something of an anomaly. Moreover, the denunciation of anti-Semitism or "public allusions to current politics" would have evoked criticism of the Church for intruding into the affairs of state. It would have incited the wrath of civil authorities. He argued that the "Jesuits are in no way responsible for the [anti-Semitic] agitation now going on," that they had no desire to exterminate the Jews. Finally, he demonstrated the shallowness of the connection which Conybeare made between Drumont and Odelin by showing that the priest's financial dealings with Libre Parole no longer existed, and were but brief in the first place.[25]

Herbert Thurston, a Jesuit of twenty-five years who expressed his disapproval of the Rennes verdict publicly in letters to the editor

of Saturday Review, also used the columns of Month to defend Catholicism from the charge of anti-Semitism. After apologizing for Priest Constant's assertions that "ritual murder of Christian children is an intregal part of the Jewish religion," he quoted the letters of Innocent IV, Gregory X, and Martin V "which fully exonerate the Jews from this charge." Although he did not do so, he could have also cited Pius XI and many other pontiffs who reminded good Catholics that they were spiritual Semites. Indeed, Leo XIII, the pope during the Affaire, not only denounced Drumont's anti-Semitic diatribes in Libre Parole, but also reproved Vincent Bailly, editor of La Croix, for his publication's stridently anti-Dreyfusard editorial policy. The pope, like other European public figures, was, of course, apprised of Dreyfus' innocence by German officials.[26]

Catholic clergymen were not the only British observers who objected to the identification of the Church with hatred of the Jews. One British Catholic, J. A. Cunningham, wrote to the editor of Spectator, "It is a gross calumny to say that the Catholic Church, as such, entertains, tolerates, or teaches ill-will towards any race, be it Jew or Gentile." He concluded, "I by no means sympathise with any anti-Jewish prejudice, but heartily condemn it."[27] Even non-Catholics supported these sentiments, some arguing that anti-Semitism was chiefly political, others doubting that the Church had the power and influence to promote the pronounced anti-Semitism extant in France, even if it so desired. Chief Justice Russell summarized the dominant British arguments by writing:

> Indeed, the latest form that these comments [against France] have taken is an attack upon the religion of the mass of the people of France, which is also the religion of a not unimportant section of

> her Majesty's subjects at home and in her empire abroad—to say nothing of it being the religion largely professed in all the civilised communities of the world.[28]

Like Smith, Thurston, and Cunningham, he regarded the judgment of the British press as unfair and inaccurate.

The importance played by hatred of the Jews was also a point of debate among British journalists. A wide range of opinions existed. Some erroneously believed that anti-Semitism was the force which directed the Affaire. In contrast, some correctly argued that it was only one of many important considerations. In the words of one authority, Guy Chapman, anti-Semitism was little more than an "accessory." There "was little substantial anti-Semitism in France." It "played little, perhaps no, part in the arrest of the unhappy victim or in his trial" and tended to excite only in the urban centers like Paris where most French Jews lived.[29]

According to the Jewish Chronicle, which closely followed the Affaire, the driving force was anti-Semitism. The Affaire was "from beginning to end an experiment in anti-Semitism. . . . in short, the exclusive design and work of the Jew-baiters." Far from being a spontaneous outburst, it was the product of calculated anti-Jewish agitation. In an article about Max Nordau's opinions of the Jews in France, the Jewish Chronicle described the conviction of Dreyfus as a plot "woven by anti-Semitic hands," a planned blow designed not by the General Staff, but by anti-Semites. It was part of "the preliminary assault upon the entire Jewish position" intended to identify "the whole body of French Jews . . . with the unfortunate Dreyfus." By so doing, they hoped to involve all Jews in a common fate. To exemplify the significance of French anti-Semitism, a letter to the editor appeared in early

1898, which asked that the French subscriber's paper be folded when mailed so that the word "Jewish" did not appear. The subscriber wrote, "I am compelled to take this precaution as it is most necessary to avert any annoyance from my family, some of whom are in the army and others residing in the midst of the grievous disturbances."

The verdict at Rennes was an expression of anger, the exploitation of an "opportunity to avenge on his [Dreyfus'] head the pent-up hate of centuries." The publication asserted, "We had not gauged the ferocity of racial prejudice" involved in the Affaire until the trial at Rennes. The Affaire was just one more repetition of the "sordid tale . . . [of] an old-world drama. There had been Dreyfuses before." The Dreyfus of 1899 epitomised "the travail and the sufferings which Israel himself . . . had borne almost from the first hour of his national birth, passing from disaster to disaster, and martyrdom to martyrdom." So serious was this renewed assault upon the Jewish race that Chief Rabbi in Britain, Hermann Adler, devoted his sermon of Atonement, 5660, to the "mock trial at Rennes." The Jewish Chronicle published his message. Adler denounced the trial as an "insolent parody of justice which has shocked the moral sensibilities of mankind." It was "the bitterest day in modern Judaism." At the conclusion of the service, he implored the God of Israel to provide brother Alfred Dreyfus with sustenance in his hour of trial. In spite of the central role allegedly played by anti-Semitism in the Affaire, writers for the Jewish Chronicle refused to believe that anti-Semitic theories had taken root in the French mind. They perceived that the French anti-Semitic party was heterogeneous, disunited, and very temporary. If French Jews handled

themselves discretely, the Affaire and anti-Semitism would pass and life would continue as before. This was, of course, an instance of wishful thinking on the part of establishment Jews.

The Jewish Chronicle observed and commended the reserved posture maintained by Jews in France during the turmoil. The newspaper disagreed editorially with Nordau, who condemned French Jews for failing to defend themselves, thereby giving impulse and pretext to a "general crusade" against the Jews. Such combined action would inflame general sentiment against French Jewry, and give credence to the myth of the cosmopolitan Jewish Syndicate. The only rational course was "to hold aloof . . . from the agitation . . . and to refuse to give a racial colouring to the matter." Jews could and should stand together against "injustice, false witness and barbarity," but not against France and Frenchmen. The latter course would "feed the flames of persecution with rejoinder." The former would "allow them to flicker out from lack of fuel." In spite of the persecution triggered by the Affaire, the Jewish Chronicle found a silver lining in the cloud. In rather exaggerated terms, it wrote that for perhaps "the first time in Hebrew history a Jewish martyr . . . enlisted all but unanimous sympathy of Christendom." Moreover, the French provided the world with "an object lesson in the methods and effects of anti-Semitism, and in the national disaster that dogs its footsteps. . . . the spectacle of civil strife, of a humiliated army, of a despised judiciary." Anti-Semitism brought national humiliation. As Adler remarked on Atonement, "the savagery of anti-Jewish hatred, that . . . vile unreasonable sentiment . . . cannot but lead to cruelty and wrong . . . the defiance of law and order, and the violation of truth and dishonor." For Adler, the "cardinal lesson" of the Affaire was

the "peril of unreasoning prejudice, of racial hatred, and of religious ill-will."[30]

While it is not surprising that anti-Semitism was perceived by the Jewish Chronicle as the central feature of the Affaire, the Jews were not the only British citizens who adopted this interpretation. Charles Whibley, who wrote for Blackwood's, was one of the most adamant proponents of the idea that anti-Semitism was the most important element of the Affaire. The contemptuous cry, "À bas les Juifs!," was, he thought, the vocal expression of "the chief element of strife." The Jewish Question was not only "the essence of the Dreyfus case," but at the root of the Panama scandal as well. The primary distinction between the two was that "Panama seemed to involve in dishonour the whole parliamentary system of France;" the Affaire had the potential of being resolved "without bringing disgrace on more than half-a-dozen honest, though misguided, persons."[31] Even if Whibley was incorrect about the primacy of anti-Semitism as the force which created and sustained the Affaire, there were clearly many Frenchmen who believed in a cosmopolitan Jewish Syndicate which exercised its influence in European capital cities.

Several British observers argued that the French, during the years of the Affaire, suffered from xenophobia.[32] In fact, hatred of the English and Germans often rivaled hatred of the Jews. One popular argument in France was that the Jews and Dreyfusards enjoyed the backing of foreign money which came primarily from England. Proponents of this theory often lumped Jews, Protestants, and Englishmen together as part of an anti-French Semitic coalition. Many Frenchmen perceived themselves to be the victims of a Jewish Syndicate's international conspiracy to

subvert their nation. The French press frequently published this charge, even quoting the amounts which had been paid. Mercier claimed that £1,4000,000 had come from England to promote Dreyfus' cause.

Shortly after the Court of Cassation ruled in favor of revision, a Royalist squib, described in National Review, appeared on Paris streets. It ostensibly came from the Dreyfus Syndicate, most notably Zadoc Kahn, the Grand Rabbi of France, and Joseph Reinach, and announced the termination of payments to its foreign supporters. Now that the goal of revision had been reached, they recommended that their foreign patrons find new ways in which their services could be used, presumably in exchange for Jewish gold. In Libre Parole, Drumont claimed that the Dreyfusard position of the Daily News was the result of Lord Rosebery's ownership of that newspaper. Rosebery was married to a Rothschild.

Drumont decried the hold that the "Jewish Press" had over the organs of foreign public opinion. Nowhere, he claimed, was this hold so great as over the English-speaking peoples. Jewish influence in England prevented all but the Dreyfusard version from receiving a fair hearing. England's "alliance with the race of Shem" had made for poor relations with Russia, and the disgraceful Jameson raid which was organized by a Jewish coterie of Lionel Phillips, Alfred Beit, and others. The British government was little more than a "Semite's catspaw."[33] Drumont was not surprised that all of England seemed to be Dreyfusard. Nevertheless, his anti-Semitism was not a universal sentiment. There were many who disagreed with the emphasis that Whibley and the Jewish Chronicle placed on the hatred of the Jew. Injustice was not the driving force behind the agitation in France and the case against Dreyfus but rather an important factor.

Most historians of the Affaire argue that anti-Jewish sentiment was not the most important of its causes. While this is true, the anti-Semitism which spread across Europe at the end of the century almost certainly worked to Dreyfus' hurt. Moreover, the Dreyfus case certainly stimulated hatred of the Jew. Indeed, many contemporary commentators believed that the Affaire encouraged the development of anti-Semitism, and brought it to a new level of intensity. In the words of one author David L. Lewis, anti-Semitism was "both [a] cause and [a] consequence of the Affaire."[34] A contributor to Saturday Review wrote that the "collateral evidence" showed "that anti-Semitism was not altogether without influence upon the initial measures instituted after the discovery of the now famous letter."[35] "[T]he violent altercation which followed the accusation led to a furious outburst of anti-Jewish feeling."[36] The Times correspondent in Paris described the outburst of happiness which accompanied Esterhazy's acquittal as a product of the "subterranean action of Anti-Semitism which has been fermenting among masses of the large towns and threatens sooner or later to lead to an explosion." He viewed the demonstrations following Esterhazy's court-martial not as a vote of confidence for the acquitted defendant, but an expression of joy that the conspiracy of the Jewish Syndicate had been foiled. Anti-Semitism was "dragged into" the Affaire by the middle class in an effort to "excite the mob," but the journalist doubted that it had actually "penetrated the masses." Research done by Stephen Wilson supports this hypothesis.[37] The Anglo-Parisian Journalist of Fortnightly Review maintained that the Army and the press used the Affaire "as a blister to draw the Anti-Semitic movement to a head."[38] Finally, a contributor to Spectator analyzed the seriousness of anti-Jewish behavior in an article entitled

"Is There to be a New St. Bartholomew?" In spite of Drumont's ravings and attempts to incite the mob to assault the Jews, the journalist had doubts that the Jews, or for that matter, the Protestants, were in any serious danger of being massacred. While he acknowledged the Frenchman's proclivity toward excitability, he believed that violent language in France meant much less than it did in England.[39] He concluded that the majority in France was not truly anti-Semitic. Both Arnold White and Lucien Wolf believed that the Affaire had politicized anti-Semitism, making it synonymous with party loyalty for many French politicians. Following the Rennes trial, H. C. Foxcroft, writing in Fortnightly Review, also commented on the political rather than religious origins of French anti-Semitism. He believed it was retaliatory and aimed at a cast which allegedly maintained power within the society. The French were jealous of the influence of the "unscrupulous promoter, the fraudulent stock-jobber, and that degraded class of the money-lending fraternity." The irony of the situation was that the Jews themselves also despised this "sordid fringe upon the skirts of Jewish society." And like the Frenchman, they loathed the members of their race who through wealth and the leverage of power entrenched themselves in "positions of trust for which they . . . [were] totally unfitted." For the Frenchman who experienced the inability to advance socially or occupationally, the Affaire exacerbated the latent, or in some cases overt, anti-Semitic sentiments. Foxcroft compared the "indiscriminate hatred of the modern Frenchman for the Cosmopolitan Jew to the sturdy hatred of our Whig forefathers for the subterranean intrigues of Jesuit internationalism."

Wolf also expressed a similar opinion in Fortnightly Review. In his analysis of "Anti-Semitism and the Dreyfus Case" he referred to incidents in 1888, 1890, and 1895. An Adjutant Chatelain, Lieutenant Jean Bonnet, and a Captain Guillot all went to trial for selling military secrets and documents relevant to national defense. The courts-martial attracted only the passing interest of the press. "Had these men been Jews it would, of course, have been otherwise."

An appreciation of anti-Semitism was imperative if one was to "understand the true inwardness of the Dreyfus case." The predatory "scoundrels of journalism and politics" resurrected "old Judephobe superstitions so beloved of the gobemouches." They played upon the "credulity of the public" and its "thirst for the old legends, . . . superstitions, passions, and salacious tastes" and in so doing, brought anti-Semitism to its lowest level. In a critique of the anti-Semitic press, Wolf challenged the shallowness of Rochefort's arguments. Rochefort, who asserted that it was enough for him that Judas was a Jew, seemed to forget that so was Christ. And like Dreyfus, Jesus was also "the victim of an erreur judiciare."[40] In Wolf's famous essay, "Anti-Semitism," which appeared in the Eleventh Edition of The Encyclopedia Britannica, he concluded that the Affaire represented the climax of the anti-Semitic movement both in France and in Europe.

S. F. Smith, the editor of Month de-emphasized the significance of anti-Semitism and the Affaire. He placed it in a more realistic perspective than most who wrote about it. He observed, "you might imagine that a person with Jewish features could not safely walk the streets" in France. "[A]part from occasional outbursts over unpopular lectures--a thing we are accustomed to in England--it would be hard to find any

evidence of Jews being socially persecuted or ostracized." Inquiries made by the staff of Month gave Smith the confidence to dispute the claims of Conybeare and Yves Guyot, co-editor of Le Siècle and contributor to Nineteenth Century, that "young Jewish students and officers . . . [were] harassed and blackballed by former pupils of Jesuits."[41] Lord Russell expressed a similar view. In his report of the trial, he failed to see "any ground for the suggestion that the prejudice against Dreyfus was at all considerably accentuated by the fact of his being a Jew."[42] In Westminster Review, E. Austin Farleigh reached the essentially sound conclusion that it was totally unfair to charge the officers who convicted Dreyfus with anti-Semitism. These claims were unsustained by any evidence.[43]

Yet, with the exception of observers like Smith, Russell, and Farleigh, the British tended to misunderstand and misinterpret the significance of the anti-Semitism as a feature of the Affaire. The British often erroneously labeled every Frenchman as an anti-Semite and seemed to perceive anti-Semitism as a constant feature within the French milieu. In fact, the anti-Semitic behavior in France during the 1890s was an abberation. Very few British critics reminded their readers that France, in 1791, became the first European nation to grant political emancipation to Jews. Even prior to the Revolution of 1789, French officials exhibited tolerance toward the Jewish population. Technically speaking, French Jews were made equal citizens and guaranteed equal civil and political rights almost 70 years before Anglo-Jewry secured the same legislative guarantees. In spite of arguments like those introduced by Gobineau, Frenchmen generally ignored racist pratings and allowed Jewish assimilation. This spirit of toleration endured during most of

the nineteenth century. If Disraeli rose to the rank of Prime Minister of Britain, a Frenchman of Jewish extraction, Léon Gambetta, became Prime Minister of France in November 1881. French Jews excelled at securing government posts and positions in the French bureaucracy. The system of open competition for entrance into the École Polytechnique enabled as many as twenty in a class of 100 to become officers in the French Army.

During the 1890s, anti-Semitic sentiment temporarily flourished, most notably during the Panama scandal and the Affaire. For a brief moment in time, the anti-Semites were able to clothe themselves "in the garb of order, to pose as the defender[s] of French society against an 'invasion' of outsiders." Almost immediately after the Affaire, anti-Semitic arguments began to lose validity. Few Frenchmen were moved by the anti-Jewish slogans and epithets called by Drumont and his colleagues. Libre Parole's circulation declined, and Drumont lost the influence he had acquired. His financial position gradually deteriorated and he died in poverty during the winter of 1917-1918. Moreover, according to Hannah Arendt, clerical anti-Semitism ended after the Affaire. Other authorities on French anti-Semitism cogently argue that prior to the Dreyfus trials, French socialists were the most strident anti-Semites in the nation. The Affaire freed them of this sentiment.[44]

Considering the harsh judgment which British observers passed upon France for anti-Semitic behavior, it is rather ironic that as anti-Semitism went out of fashion in France, it came into vogue in certain quarters of Britain. The British were not immune to the anti-Semitism which was a feature of European civilization at the close of the century. There was no counterpart to Drumont in Britain. Neither

was there a journalistic organ comparable to Libre Parole. British anti-Semitism existed nevertheless. It is no doubt significant that during the 1890s no British Jew served in the upper echelons of the Navy, which in terms of national security was analogous to the French Army. In contrast, Dreyfus had been a member of the General Staff. Somewhat ironically, some of those who were most vigorous in their support of Dreyfus, the French Jew, were also open in their expression of anti-Semitic feelings toward British Jews. David Lloyd George, who made anti-Semitic references in his campaign speeches and private comments, suppressed his prejudice against the Jew in 1899 when it became a choice between supporting "the traditional French officer class--aristocratic and Roman Catholic" or a Jew who was the victim of a great miscarriage of justice.[45] During his tenure as Prime Minister Lloyd George indicted one of his Cabinet members, Edwin Montagu, a Jew, for being "rattled" by anything and unable to grapple with problems, "as was the manner of his race," when under stressful circumstances.[46] Arnold White, who in the Preface to his book The Modern Jew described Dreyfus as "a hero and a man who adds one more name to the long line of Jewish worthies whose annals adorn the history of the race,"[47] was one of the most vocal anti-Semites in Britain. He argued that Jews could not be absorbed. Socialist leader H. N. Hyndman supported Dreyfus, but decried the behavior of the "capitalist Jew." He articulated his anti-Semitic views in the Social Democratic Federation's publication, Justice. L. J. Maxse, who published in National Review some of the most vitriolic criticisms of Drumont's anti-Semitic pratings, in 1902 invited the "Rabbi of anti-Semitism" to publish an article on the history of the Jews in France. Only two years before the Affaire captured the attention of Maxse, he

opened his journal to "A Quarterly Reviewer" who accused the Jews of leading Europeans to ruin and decadence by encouraging an epirucean life-style. They were, in the writer's opinion, a menace to Christian civilization. The anti-Semitic articles in National Review reflected the outlook of the editor. In fact, Maxse was one of Britain's most vocal critics of the influence of Jews, particularly those from Germany, in British society. He criticized Prince Edward's relationships with Jews like the future king's friend and financial counsel, Sir Ernest Cassel.[48] Finally, Wesleyan clergyman Hugh Price Hughes, who heaped abuse on the Rennes verdict, was one of the many in Britain who sharply opposed the influx of Russian and Eastern European Jews who swelled the population of Anglo-Jewry and undermined the position of British working men at the end of the century.

The anti-Semitic sentiment of these individuals was not unique within British society. The ideas expressed by each of the five men were symptomatic of currents of opinion which grew during the late-nineteenth century. There were some, like H. S. Chamberlain, who included anti-Semitism as part of his pan-German gospel. In 1899, White wrote that British anti-Semitism was "palpably on the increase." The traditional British "practical toleration" and "equality before the law was beginning to give way" to pressures exerted by a small but "avowedly anti-Semitic element in English society." There were "no grounds for anticipating any diminution in the intensity of repugnance displayed" against the Jews.[49] The discussion which led to the Aliens Act of 1905 illustrates White's point. This Act, which restricted the flow of immigrants into Britain, was the culmination of efforts of those who protested the dumping of "poor ragged, diseased . . . human rubbish"

in its "worst form" on "hospitable [English] shores."[50] Critics of unrestricted immigration wanted the "surplusage of Russian and Polish slums" denied entry into Britain.[51] At the Zionist Congress at Basle in 1898, Max Nordau commented on "symptoms of anti-Semitism in England" as expressed by the desire for an Alien Immigration Bill.[52] Gladstonian traditionalists, who viewed free entry into England as a part of Free Trade, objected to such action as "very un-English."[53] Objections were of no avail. In 1905, just one year before the final acquittal of Dreyfus in France, the British government passed the Aliens Act. While this legislation was not aimed exclusively at immigrant Jews, it certainly was perceived by many European Jews as anti-Jewish.

British anti-Semitism received further impulse from the Boer War. In time of war, patriotism and loyalty to nation were regarded as not only virtuous but mandatory. Jewish immigrants were especially suspect since many failed to adopt British nationality. Anti-Semites seldom acknowledged that this was directly related to the prohibitive £5 fee for naturalization. They further criticized the Jews for aspiring to found a Jewish homeland. By the turn of the century, the Zionist movement had achieved some popularity in Britain, and the old epithet of "man without a country" was commonly applied to the Jew. Also popular was the unsubstantiated charge that British Jews shirked their responsibility to defend the Empire by fighting in South Africa.

At a somewhat different level, the writings of J. A. Hobson and others gave rise to the notion that the British were fighting a "Jewish war." According to theory, the war was being waged for the benefit of Uitlanders, commonly perceived as "Jewish" capitalists and international Jewish financiers who controlled South African gold and diamond fields,

the dynamite monopoly, the stock exchange, banking, the liquor trade, and the Johannesburg press. A popular euphemism for Johannesburg became "Jewhannesburg." Hobson and others argued that popular jingo sentiment was the product of an international Jewish syndicate which controlled the "Jewish Press" in Britain. The financial power wielded by Jewish international capitalism supposedly enabled this conspiracy to succeed. This theory was accepted by many in Radical, Labour, and socialist circles. Moreover, as anti-Semitism had been politicized by the Affaire, so it was in Britain when Liberals labeled Liberal-Imperialists and the Conservative administration as the dupes of Jewish financiers. While it is true that anti-Semitism was "never a vehicle for political success" in Britain or France, it is equally true that the British, just like the French, could fall victim to fables about an international Jewish Syndicate which worked to undermine the national interests.[54]

Arguments like these illustrates the concepts which contemporaries had about race. During the years of the Affaire, racial distinctions were made not only between the British and the Jews but also between the British and the French. In 1824, Leopold von Ranke published his History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations. Many nineteenth century observers made this distinction between the Latin and the Teuton in discussions about "immutable" racial traits and national character. Some British commentators believed that there were qualities which were inherently French and others which were uniquely British. One of the most interesting revelations shown in the British commentary on the Affaire is the analysis, or better stated, caricature, of the French national character. Many observers hailed the Affaire as irrefutable evidence that the French nation was decadent and on the road to national

oblivion. This notion of "Latin decadance" was in keeping with the racialist argument which gained popularity among some, both in and outside of France. The plethora of military and diplomatic setbacks suffered by France during the nineteenth century seemed convincing proof of this belief. According to the theory, France, along with Spain and Italy, were old, senile, exhausted and declining nations. They were unable to adapt to modern times. Historian Koenraad W. Swart wrote, "The entire Latin world, it seemed . . . was no longer able to compete with the more enterprising and superiorly organized nations of Northern Europe and the United States and was therefore doomed to decadence." In particular, foreign observers were "outspoken in proclaiming the definitive end of the period of French political and cultural supremacy."[55]

The Affaire seemed to many British observers a very strong proof that the French people were on the decline. In Blackwood's, a contributor wrote that "her [French] civilisation is shown to be a mere external skin, veneering a body corrupt, decaying, and ready to perish."[56] The week prior to the Rennes verdict, a cartoon appeared in Punch entitled "The Degenerates." Five members of the French General Staff were portrayed huddling over a table discussing the secret dossier. In the background, the ghost of Napoleon Bonaparte observed. "Le Petit Corporal" mused, "Vive L'armée! Yes! But it was not with generals like you that I won my campaigns!" Winston Churchill expressed the sentiments of some when, in a letter to his mother in August 1899, he wrote:

> The developments of the Dreyfus case are wonderful. Never since gladiatorial combats were abolished has the world witnessed such a drama--with real flesh and blood for properties. What a vile nation the French are. Nature must vindicate herself by letting them die out.[57]

Not everyone anticipated the extinction of the French race, but it was commonplace to find British commentators descending to what one Francophile contemporary, Sir Thomas Barclay, called "language about France and the French which was quite unworthy of British intelligence."[58] Russell observed this tendency while attending the second trial in Rennes. British commentators maladroitly "extended to the French nation as a whole . . . the charge of a general decadence of moral tone and sense."[59] According to some hyper-critical observers, the Affaire revealed "the repulsive spectacle of an entire people."[60] It was the unfortuante habit of some to indict the French people for what actually was the responsibility of a few politicians, generals, and clergymen, and the mob which was inspired by railing, foul-mouthed journalists writing in the French anti-Semitic press.

Perhaps the most extreme charges made were those couched in terms of race. At the end of the century, there were people who believed that a genetic difference existed between the French and the British. The British Ambassador to France, Sir Edmund Monson spoke of a "'racial' difference" between the two peoples which was "not easily gotten over." Spectator wrote, "The fundamental characteristics of a nation are never obliterated. They may be modified in the course of ages, but they are never destroyed. That is the thought which instinctively comes to mind when one reads about the Dreyfus case." The Affaire was rooted not only in "the European situation," but in the "character of the [French] people." Spectator, above all other organs of the British press, led the way with this argument of racial determinism. Something inherent in the race made French history "a long series of surprises." The

unexpected—for example, the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre or the revocation of the Edict of Nantes—was the norm in France.[61]

Spectator was not alone in expressing such views. In National Review, Conybeare declared:

> Every few years the [French] race seems destined to pass under some sudden and sweeping eclipse of conscience and reason. It is not a few individuals that are then swept off their feet by the current of folly and false sentiment, but the whole nation. In every such access of madness, the educated classes (with a few brilliant exceptions) the very people who should guide and control the masses . . . put themselves at the head and march straight for the particular abyss which yawns before them. How many paroxysms have we not witnessed in French history, fraught with disaster moral and material?[62]

Others believed that events in France illustrated the Frenchman's natural instability. D. C. Murray described the Affaire as "a sort of fever of epigram." In Saturday Review, one journalist described the Dreyfus scandal as a "tempest of unreason" which presented "a spectacle of hysterical instability, of lack of self-control and lack of self-respect which are difficult to discuss without running the risk of a charge of exaggeration."[63] One thoughtful contributor to Contemporary Review highlighted the irony of the Affaire and the changefulness of the French by asserting that in only a matter of years, revision would be achieved, and in response, it would become most difficult to find a Frenchman who claimed ever to have been an anti-Dreyfusard. In fact, the French would wonder why it had been so difficult to obtain revision over such a flagrant violation of justice. Spectator sarcastically speculated that Rochefort, the hero of the day, might easily exchange places with Urbain Gohier, the unpopular author of a book which strongly criticized the military system in contemporary France. These "sudden changes" bemused foreign observers and tempted some to adopt the "hypothesis that

the psychological substratum of the French character is a combination of dramatic and forensic talent with hysteria," and "that the true embodiment of the type . . . is a gifted neurasthenic actress turned special pleader."[64]

During the Affaire, Spectator adopted an editorial policy to explain events in terms of two allegedly immutable traits, "foibles or peculiarities in the French character which differentiate it from that of the Englishman": suspicion and vanity. According to this publication, "preternatural" or abnormal suspicion dictated the course of French history. According to Spectator, it reached its apogee during the Affaire, and was produced by deep-seated racial factors and national evolution. While one contributor to Spectator admitted that "it is not easy to trace its lines of growth," the racial differences between Teuton and Celt played a significant role in fostering the growth of a suspicious nature. Part of the Teutonic character was what the Germans called gemüthlich, or a deep feeling expressed through loyalty and comradeship. The Celtic tribes "developed esprit, clear analytical intelligence, more powerful to dissolve than to construct."

This trait of suspicion was held responsible for introducing confusion into French affairs from the seventeenth century to the time of the Affaire. It was part of the Frenchman's amour propre. This suspiciousness was "almost unreasoning and sometimes even absurd." It made the victim "absolutely impenetrable to reason." Unlike the Englishman, who could control suspicion and refused to "gratify it by injuring others," the French often surrendered to passion and emotion. The Englishman performed his duty, perhaps with "sulliness or concealed indignation," even when it conflicted with his emotional pulls. Passions,

"almost beyond control of the will," governed the Frenchman. They led him to blame disasters and misfortunes on treachery, sometimes devised by foreign enemies, other times plotted by traitors. During the closing years of the nineteenth century, many Englishmen regarded prodito-mania—the morbid belief in the omnipotence of traitors—as a fixed feature of the French ethos.

Englishmen found the allegation that English gold financed the Dreyfus agitation to be ridiculous. In jest, one journalist taunted the French for accepting stories of British bribery expended for Dreyfus, writing that not three Frenchmen in four had "the faintest idea what a million sterling is." Another found the testimony of one witness most amusing. The testator claimed that Dreyfus, while on Devil's Island, had communicated with the outside world by some occult power. That Frenchmen would give credence to such a charge demonstrated the degree to which suspicion gripped the mind of France. To illustrate this point, one journalist quipped that the French, so troubled with nerves, would believe "an unbroken egg has been poisoned. . . . [T]heir imaginations begin to work and they see men as trees walking." He sarcastically wrote that the Englishman who was "told something outside the range of his experience, as a rule stolidly disbelieves it, and . . . refuses to make it a basis of action." His counterpart in France not only believes but "imagines a thousand monstrous thing which might be true if only the bases on which he builds them were not inventions."

In a letter to the editor of Spectator, Admiral Frederick Maxse, a frequent contributor to National Review, described the French as "the most credulous [people] in the world." For this reason, their "yellow

should not be surprised to learn that "all France was in a turmoil from a belief" that France was endangered by "an impending invasion by the people of the Isle of Man." What Maxse did not know was that during the Boer War Harmsworth's Daily Mail, the most noteworthy organ of Yellow journalism in Britain, would sell more papers each day than Drumont did during the Affaire.

One writer claimed that the Picquart Affaire engendered a mood "of angry distrust of all men, of disposition to believe all evils possible." It precipitated "a kind of welter of rage, suspicion, and terror such as we have hardly seen in France since the worst days of the Revolution." It was the same temper which generated the Terror of September 1792.

Terror rather than hate was "the dominant factor" which sustained the Affaire. Notwithstanding the demonstration of French bravery on many battlefields, French history demonstrated that in this state, the Frenchman did not act "foolishly or even cruelly," but wanted to kill. Unless he did, his enemy, so often unseen and only vaguely defined, would surely kill him first. Journalists like Drumont capitalized on this fear by crying "death to the Jew." Spectator argued that during the Terror in revolutionary France, few men really wanted the aristocrat to go to the guillotine. In fact, most pitied them, but the Frenchman was told that unless they died he himself and "all he cared for would most certainly be destroyed." This left the people little alternative. Terror was not unique to the Revolution. Throughout the nineteenth century, France was plunged "into a sort of delirium" by the belief that France was betrayed—betrayed to the "foreigner, to the Jews, to England, to the Bourbons, to the Socialists, to the Devil, and the whole people."

Dreyfus symbolized a "vague danger which no one can exactly describe, but which everyone feels . . . To an excitable people nothing is so alarming as an unknown terror." It exacerbated the fear of espionage and betrayal, the anxiety that some letter in cipher form would be delivered to the enemy. Once this misdeed was done, French cannons would misfire, and the Army would be impotent. This was "the temper in which the whole Dreyfus affair" was conducted. This explained the public appeal of speeches by Déroulède and others like him. One journalist wrote that the text of such oratory "reads to Englishmen like raving, but . . . [is] enthusiastically applauded." The willingness of the crowd to follow a strong lead from the anti-Dreyfusards was confirmation to many British observers that France was "a power with feminine impulses and a man's strength." Her feminine qualities of mind contributed to the second major foible which Spectator claimed was inherent within the French: vanity.

The French were a good-humored race so long as their amour propre was not wounded. If this occurred, they, "like the rest of the Celts," became "the most vindictive of mankind." This explained the relentless drive for vengeance which the Frenchman often made whenever he believed he had been snubbed or belittled. It also explained the tolerance allowed for duels in France, and the tolerance of French juries "for the use of the revolver whenever the quarrel has arisen from sexual offence or suspicion."

Ambassador Monson described the French as "less thick-skinned than ourselves." Regarding the Affaire, the anti-Dreyfusards and members of the General Staff believed that revision and acquittal of Dreyfus would puncture their amour propre. Like a woman in fear of having her

vanity pierced, they would stop at nothing to gain satisfaction, to foil the aims of the Dreyfusards. While the journalists of Spectator were no critics of self-respect, or "the wish to be reputable in one's own eyes," they decried the blending of self-respect with personal vanity and "a passion for self-advertisement." This mixture made the Frenchman discontent "unless his personality looms as large in the eyes of others as in his own." His histrionic tendencies made him long for the applause of his fellows. If he failed to receive what he deemed the appropriate accolades, he felt slighted, much as the actor was startled and upset by hisses from an audience. Indeed, during the Revolution, the most blood-thirsty members of the Committee for Public Safety were "actors who had been hissed." When others were not impressed, the Frenchman took it as a "slap in the face, an insult producing not only pain but nearly unbearable disappointment."

In an analysis of the rowdiness which accompanied the Zola trial, one journalist observed that the Englishman only loses his reserve and betrays his vanity when "a little drunk or a little mad." Unlike the Frenchman, he would not actively seek the sympathy of others. Spectator wrote:

> Where the Frenchman would weep, the Englishman is gloomily sad or sullen. Where the Frenchman is wild with fury, the Englishman is only pale and polite, or, it may be, bitterly sarcastic. Where the Frenchman relieves his feelings with torrents of words, the Englishman curses inaudibly, or is stonily silent even to himself. . . . The Englishman would like to boast like a Southerner, but he cannot do it; he is ashamed of himself if he does it, as he would be if, being in the wrong, he wept and implored his friend or mistress to grant him pardon for his error.

The Englishman did, however, have a vanity peculiar to himself. It often appeared as a "'pride that apes humility,'" which was viewed by the Frenchman as "either illogical or ineffective." One journalist

decried Zola's historionics at his trial. His magniloquent dramatics were but another manifestation of French vanity and self-glorification which betrayed an inner weakness and self-distrust.[65]

Spectator argues that the Frenchman was a "born actor" always desirous of self-assertion. The world was his stage. In "self-laudation," he cried out, "'You shall admire me. See how great I am.'" Although he did not believe in "peacocking," he invariably did it when under provocation. His vanity led him to believe "that the eyes of the world are upon him" and "he cares mightily for the opinion expressed in those eyes." Unfortunately, the self-glorifying Frenchman was actually a vain and "self-distrustful human being, who builds his life on the theory that he needs to be protected at every turn." This underlying insecurity conditioned the French to be especially sensitive to criticism which came from abroad. The Frenchman would "challenge a foreigner for criticism which he will utter himself without a thought of offence."[66]

If there were some few Frenchmen in the 1890s who conformed to the unflattering descriptions sketched by Spectator, the caricatures which abounded in this publication were in many respects gross distortions. Spectator largely failed to recognize the diversity of the French people. It often assumed that the attributes it perceived in the anti-Semites and anti-Dreyfusards were characteristic of almost all who were born in France. In the first place, the French, like the British, were diverse ethnically. This fact alone exploded racial arguments about inherited suspiciousness and vanity. Moreover, there were many Frenchmen who relentlessly supported Dreyfus in the face of determined opposition. A contributor to The Economist summarized nicely by writing that France still contained 38 million "unusually competent people . . .

Collectively France is a courageous nation," even if the Affaire demonstrated that the individual Frenchman showed "little disposition to stand up for a principle against all opposition."[67] The caricature which some British journalists sketched of the Frenchman was often intended to be comparative. When presented with the opportunity, these observers contrasted positive character traits which were labeled as British with unflattering character traits supposedly French. The comparative quality of their comments reflects the high self-image which these journalists had of themselves and of the British people. It testifies to the strength of the belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority.

Writing in Fortnightly Review, Godfernaux reminded British readers that the influences of Britain and France upon one another historically had been reciprocal. He believed that the French spirit of independence, free examination, individual liberty, revolution, and science was an inheritance "from the north."[68] By the same token, the British owed a debt to France for her contributions to the civilized world in art, literature, thought, emotion, and the realm of ideas.

Citing John Morely's study of France, a contributor to Westminster Review maintained that this nation had done more than any other "for human liberty." The fruits of the Great Revolution of 1789 benefited both England and America, and, as the nation which had produced Rousseau, Mirabeau, and Danton, deserved "the admiration of all truly liberal minds." If a miscarriage of justice demonstrated the less attractive side of life in France, it was impossible to deny the magnanimity bravery, and humanitarianism of this people.[69] The world owed a debt of gratitude to the French for this heritage of liberty. The indictment

of a nation for the actions of only a portion of the population seemed a serious misjudgment on the part of the British.

Proclamations of French decadence and decline proved premature as the twentieth century progressed. Far from dropping to the rank of a second-rate power, France, with the aid of the entente powers, remained strong enough to withstand the German onslaught during World War I. More significantly, the British found her reliable enough to conclude the Anglo-French Entente in 1904. Not surprisingly, the British press dropped the racial caricatures of the French as the signing of the Entente drew near.

The British, who were by no means immune to the anti-Semitic currents of opinion which swelled at the end of the century, also tended to misread the significance of anti-Semitism in France. While anti-Jewish sentiment in France reached what was probably an all-time high during the 1890s, the more vehement British critics failed to see the anti-Semitic movement in perspective. It was not as important within the scheme of French history as these observers thought. Rather it was an urban, Parisian phenomenon which largely failed to affect the people in the provinces. And, as it did following World War II, anti-Semitism became unfashionable after the trial at Rennes. There was some anti-Semitic sentiment in the French Army, but this played a rather minor role in terms of the soldiers' attitude toward Dreyfus. Their main concerns were the national security of France and the honor of the Army. The Church, as a whole, was more anti-Semitic than the Army, but even Catholic clergymen who supported anti-Semitism usually were not the ghoulish Jew-haters that some of the more excitable British journalists believed them to be. Whether or not British journalists believed that

the Church was a key fomenter of anti-Semitism, the Catholic concern with the Affaire gave rise to another kind of critical comment. In this analysis, one finds abundance of contemporary views about the role of Catholicism in the Affaire, and more importantly, the role which contemporaries believed religion should play in a free and democratic society and a progressive, enlightened, civilized world.

CHAPTER IV

SPIRITUAL PARAGON OR STRUGGLING TEMPORAL KINGDOM: WHO REALLY PULLED THE STRINGS?

> [I]n my history of the Dreyfus case I pointed to it [the Jesuit Order] as a mainspring of the affair. Frederick C. Conybeare, "The Dreyfus Affair: Il Caso Dreyfus; or, the Jesuit View." National Review, March 1899, p. 140.

> Boisdeffre, the Chief of the État Major, whose guide, philosopher, and friend, the very director of whose conscience, has ever been the Jesuit, Pére du Lac, head of the military school in the Rue des Postes, was himself the centre and organizer of this conspiracy. He pulled the strings. Frederick C. Conybeare, "General de Boisdeffre?" National Review, April 1899, pp. 324-5.

> We are only maintaining against Mr. Conybeare's misrepresentations, that there are no traces in that Jesuit magazine [Civilta] of any bitter and violent spirit. . . . He calls it 'the Hyena of the Vatican,' but he must look elsewhere and nearer home for his hyenas if he wants them. Some people might find a deal of the hyena in his own style of writing and invective. S. F. Smith, "Mr. Conybeare Again." Month, April 1899, p. 412.

This chapter will focus on the British commentary about the Catholic Church and its relationship to the Affaire. The analysis in the press was shaped by two powerful forces in British history: anti-Catholicism and liberalism. The first force had its origin in the Henry VIII's revolt from Rome in the sixteenth century. The king assumed the role of head of the Church of England and representative of the British people to God. In spite of periodic efforts to bring England

back into the Roman Catholic fold, the Church of England remained separate except for a brief period under Mary Tudor. Catholicism took on strong negative political connotations in the late-seventeenth century when the name Jacobite became a term of opprobrium. It became associated with concepts of the divine right of kings and autocratic rule which were believed by many in Britain to be obstacles to political and social progress. Walpole and the Whigs politicized the issue in the eighteenth century by labeling the Tories as treasonous Jacobites. While the political implications of Catholicism were essentially impotent by the late-nineteenth century, and British Catholics enjoyed freedom of religion, an anti-Catholic bias remained. As one modern commentator on Anglo-French relations, René Albrecht-Carrié, has written, "the non-conformist conscience flourished in England and left a powerful imprint upon her development and her people."[1] Both secular and religious publications in Britain almost invariably analyzed the Affaire from a point of view which was critical of Catholicism. The Catholic Church was seen as a competitor by the leaders of other Christian denominations. This was especially so at the end of the century, when a Catholic revival of sorts was taking place in Britain. The growth of Anglo-Catholicism made British churchmen especially sensitive to any effort by the Catholic Church to assert its influence. Some observers perceived the Affaire as an attempt by the Church to obtain greater influence and power than it possessed.

Secular publications were not as concerned with the purely religious issues as with liberal ones. To many in late-nineteenth century Britain, Catholicism and liberalism were incompatible. Most journalists exhibited a healthy respect--some a holy reverence--for the

maxims of separation of Church and State, and freedom of religion. Most liberals believed that the function of the church in society was or ought to be a spiritual rather than temporal one. The church was to comfort and aid the poor, the weak, the victims of injustice; not meddle in worldly politics. Many liberals perceived the Catholic Church as part of the old conservative order which obstructed liberal progress toward the realization of these liberal values. Men of liberal minds in both France and Britain converted the Affaire into a "contest between the forces of righteousness and progress on the one hand and those of bigotry and obscurantism on the other."[2] Catholicism represented the last two qualities. Additionally, many liberals disliked the control which the Church exercised over education. Anti-clerical Europeans often criticized parochial schools which they believed suppressed freedom of thought and examination, and educational and intellectual freedom. They considered this type of education both illiberal and harmful.

Again, British values, the prism through which the British viewed the Affaire, distorted perceptions of events in France. Most British journalists who took an interest in the religious dimension of the Affaire not only misinterpreted the involvement of Catholicism, but also falsely accused the Church as a whole. The Religious press used the Affaire as a bludgeon with which to beat its traditional religious opponent. Some British clergymen made a rather simple-minded characterization of Catholics as anti-Dreyfusards, while they saw free-thinking Protestants as Dreyfusard to a man. Many secular publications also made interpretive errors based on the anti-Catholic bias of journalists and editors. These men posited links between Catholicism and the Affaire in two main respects. They charged that the Catholic clergy

promoted anti-Semitic attitudes wherever it exercised influence. This, of course, is examined above. As this accusation tells only part of the truth, so the second charge leveled by journalists proves, under close scrutiny, to be largely false. Several journalists believed that there existed a clerico-military conspiracy inspired and led by the Church and designed to destroy Dreyfus and in the process fell the Third Republic. According to this second argument, priests encouraged leading Army officers to stand firm and maintain the verdict of 1894. Both the General and the Priest were partners in crime to overturn the political institution which had eclipsed religious and military power. Clergymen believed that the return to a conservative government would increase the power of the Church.

Indeed, there was good reason in the minds of many Catholics for the Church to resent Republican rule in France. Since 1789, one of the central objectives of French republicans had been the reduction of power enjoyed by Catholicism. Through its influence within the educational system and the instruction and teachings passed on by priests and teaching orders, the Church had a strong influence upon "the mind of France."[3] During the final quarter of the nineteenth century, the role of the Church and its influence on public life in France became a frequently debated issue among Frenchmen interested in politics. Opponents of the Church often argued that clericalism represented a traditional mentality which was inimical to modernization and progress. They wanted to limit the functions of the Church, making it the custodian of spiritual rather than temporal concerns. French republicans frequently called for the relaxation of the bonds that linked "Catholicism in their country with

the Roman Curia." They fostered and encouraged that which made "the Church more national and less Roman in spirit." Legislation passed under the governments of Gambetta and Ferry restricted the power of the Church. In fact, the loss of influence experienced by French priests was part of a much larger European phenomenon: the precipitate decline of religious institutions in general.

During the nineteenth century, organized Christian religion was on the defensive. There seemed to be a general apathy and indifference toward religious organizations. Although most Europeans still considered themselves to be Christians, the dramatic social, political, and economic changes, not to mention scientific advance, which occurred during this period made the Church, and its doctrine and faith, seem irrelevant to many. It was not uncommon for parishoners to reject the authority which the Church claimed to have over them. In Britain, there was a noticeable drop in Church attendance. There was a decline in the annual number of Anglican clergymen ordained over the last quarter of the century. Moreover, an increasing number of leading students at Oxford and Cambridge, who in past years had taken Orders, pursued new and attractive secular careers. Nonconformists also had trouble recruiting ministers. In some respects, new secular "religions" like nationalism or socialism supplanted Christianity. These quasi-religious doctrines seemed to be a more suitable guide and creed than that offered by the Church. Robert Byrnes wrote, "An age which put its belief in realism, or in materialism and positivism, was not only irreligious but also antireligious."[4]

Above all other religious denominations, the Catholic Church fought against making concessions to her opponents. Catholic clergymen

diligently worked to make a comeback. One British journalist who observed the efforts of Catholicism to maintain and retain its influence wrote "that revival of clericalism and of priestcraft . . . is one of the features of the time." In fact, in the midst of a trend toward secularization a Catholic revival of sorts occurred in Britain simultaneously with the Affaire in France. At the close of the century, the issue of "Romanising tendencies" was as it had been on many occasions in British history, a matter of concern to leading Anglican clergymen. The offending priests, influenced by the Oxford movement, introduced what conservative Churchmen believed to be ritualistic and ceremonial innovations which were dangerously close to Roman Catholic practices. Critics of these changes warned that they would ripen "into Romanism," lead to the setting up of confessional boxes, the introduction of liturgy and the doctrine of transubstantiation, and end in "sacerdotal domination." In addition to these developments, concerned observers warned that attendance at Catholic Churches was on the increase, that the Jesuits were infiltrating English universities and gaining influence within British society. Some, like Sir William Harcourt, who attacked extreme ritualism, believed a serious danger existed. Many Liberals viewed ritual and the system of obligatory confession as a violation of the individual's right to moral and spiritual freedom and autonomy.

Those ordained as Anglican clergymen during the 1880s and 1890s tended to favor varying degrees of ritualism. In 1888, the Church Association arraigned Dr. Edward King for allowing illegal ritualistic practices in worship services. Four years later, a committee of five leading bishops resolved the case, ruling that five of the seven illegal practices of which King was accused were in fact legal. Many churchmen

considered the ruling "a great victory for the ritualists." While Archbishop of Caterbury Frederick Temple did not believe that the threat of Romanism was serious, many within the "church-going laity" were concerned with what they perceived as encroachments made by Anglo-Catholicism.[5] Indeed, Leo XIII hoped for union with the Church of England during the nineteenth century. Much to his disappointment, the anti-Catholic British reaction to the Affaire reduced the chances that this goal would be achieved. In a conversation with Vincent Bailly, the editor of La Croix, he said:

> I had prepared a letter to the English on the question of union. Because of La Croix I had to stop it. . . . I had a letter from Cardinal Vaughan this morning saying that the anger over Dreyfus has suspended all question of a return to Rome.[6]

The controversy over ritualism and the perceived growth in influence of Anglo-Catholicism conditioned British non-Catholics to use the Affaire as an opportunity to criticize the Catholic Church. In Blackwood's, Greenwood argued that there was a relationship between the leanings of certain Anglican clergymen toward Catholcism and the Affaire. He urged his readers to learn a lesson from the machinations of the "Babylonish Woman" and the "wind of suspicion that blows about the French priesthood." Those who worshipped in the Romanized Anglican churches would find ritual "less commendable after three months' reading of the news-letters from France." Greenwood suspected that "Romanising intruders" were encouraged by the "lessons from la France croyante."[7]

Conybeare argued that it was "the secular policy of the Vatican to strengthen and consolidate the power and authority of its priests by fair means or foul in France or elsewhere." He and others insisted that Catholic leaders used the Affaire as an opportunity to push for reaction

and the reinstitution of the Church as a dominating force in both secular and temporal matters. This gave Conybeare the confidence to identify the priests as the "string-pullers" who operated behind the scenes, carefully managing the Affaire, insuring that Dreyfus would remain on Devil's Island. He laid the "chief blame" for the Affaire on the Church,[8] which had transported France "back into the moral atmosphere of the Borgias."[9] Although Greenwood did not go so far as Conybeare in labeling Catholic officials as the directing force, he also condemned the "decivilising work of the clericals" who showed "a burning animus against Dreyfus from first to last." The priests were to blame for the blinding of the eyes and poisoning of the "minds of the people." Moreover, the Jesuit schools sowed the seeds which produced the "trickery of the generals and the dishonesty of the judges."[10] The relationship between Church and Army was one which several British journalists explored in detail.

Contemporary Review surpassed all British publications in concentrating on the supposed "union of clericalism and militarism." The alliance between "the sword and the cross. . . . [explained] the religious aspect which the Dreyfus affair" assumed. In this partnership, the Church was first among equals. The Army was a "clerical agency" in which "[t]hose men in laced coats, who are caressed in word and deed, are to be trained into obedient instruments." The religious orders of the Church made officers into "her own creatures" by encouraging promising candidates, especially those from aristocratic families, to enter the military colleages. Both Dominicans and Jesuits provided tutoring services to prepare young students to take entrance examinations. In National Review Conybeare, citing several specific examples, claimed

that Jesuits had frequently been convicted of providing their protégés with copies of test questions in advance of examinations. According to these journalists, the Church guaranteed itself a powerful voice in the high echelons of the Army by flooding the military service with loyal Catholic officers. The Army was predominantly and dogmatically Catholic. The Jesuits intended that this remain the case, and encouraged their former students to hound Jews out of the military service. The Affaire afforded an excellent opportunity for this, and between 1894 and 1900, many Jewish officers quit the Army.[11] In contrast, the British Army, according to Captain Philip C. W. Trevor, exhibited a "spirit of religious toleration" unsurpassed by any "community in the world."[12]

Moreover, the British Army was not motivated by any goals of revising domestic political institutions. Contemporary Review insisted that the "worship of the army and the doctrine of the infallibility of its leaders . . . [were] clever moves made by Clericalism for the purpose of seizing la République." It was the intention of Church officials to tear down the Republic and replace it with a monarch or dictator who would submit to Church directives. This goal accounted for the Jesuits' "state of chronic conspiracy" against liberal French institutions and civil society. The Vatican denied responsibility for the machinations against the Republic, but there were British observers who argued that the papacy supported Jesuit intrigue and carefully designed plans when the goals of those actions suited the purpose and real, rather than stated, desires of the Church hierarchy.[13]

An editorial in National Review declared, "If the Vatican continues to sacrifice everything to politics, the time must inevitably

come when English Roman Catholics will have to choose between two incompatible allegiances."[14] In fact, there were several British journalists who expressed concern over the efforts of Catholic officials to regain a position of leverage in worldly politics. In the opinion of some British commentators, the Church had abandoned its spiritual responsibilities and gone whoring after temporal power. Flirtations with European governments and political intriguing were common pursuits of the Church during the late-nineteenth century. The papacy's involvement in political issues reflected its desire for some form of union between civil and spiritual powers. Church officials wanted to turn the clock back to an age when the Vatican enjoyed alliances with political leaders of Europe. In all this, some believed that Catholic policy was both anti-English and a menace to progress and civilization. They perceived papal policy as a reaction to the efforts of Palmerston and Gladstone to encourage Italian unification which, of course, occurred at the expense of the Church's temporal power and political influence. One of the most important organs of papal opinion, Observatore Romano, in the fall of 1899 even argued that British leaders, fearing the growth of Catholicism at home, engineered Italian unification in hopes of diminishing both the temporal and spiritual influence of the papacy. Several British journalists claimed that the Church's quest for worldly power directly related to the position taken by Catholics regarding Dreyfus.

Lamenting the anti-Dreyfusard posture of the Church, Spectator wrote:

> She is a spiritual force or nothing, and no spiritual force having its origin in Christianity can approve the Dreyfus verdict, or tolerate placidly a murderous attack on the Jews which does not even

> pretend to have conversion for its end . . . we may deeply regret that the present Pope has not been able to free himself from certain political influences, and strike out a bolder and more essentially religious course of action for the papacy.

In its "earthy spirit," the Church pursued temporal rather than spiritual goals, refusing to become "a great spiritual force in the world." Although support of Dreyfus might have cost the pope temporary loss of popularity in France, it would have absolved the Church from the sins of abandoning its "spiritual functions" and refusal to accept the separation of Church and State. Apparently, the papacy, hoping to undermine the Italian government, gave tacit support to Italy's "arch-enemy" France. Spectator predicted that the absence of the appropriate spiritual leadership by the Catholic Church would strengthen the influence of the Anglican Church over the English-speaking peoples.[15]

There were some Catholics who wished that the French Army would revolt. "Some sections of the clergy had undoubtedly played a divisive, when not subversive role." The Assumptionists disapproved of Leo XIII's Raillement—the papal Encyclical of 1892 urging French Catholics to recognize and reconcile themselves to the Third Republic. They had a genuine hate for the Republic. They were anxious to place "'Catholic interests in the forefront'" and restore the Church to the power it had enjoyed in earlier centuries. It is imprudent, however, to generalize based on a single group within the Church. Even if all priests were anti-Dreyfusard, which they were not, there were many lay members, though probably not a majority, in the Church who supported Dreyfus. One of the most notable examples was journalist S. F. Cornély, who wrote in both British and French publications. Lancrau deBréon, one of the two judges at Rennes who voted not guilty, was devoutly religious. The Archbishop

of Paris, Cardinal Richard, refused to "lend his prestige" to the anti-Dreyfusard cause when a group of university professors invited him to do so. He argued that "it was not the duty of the Church to interfere." More importantly, the pope had no desire to encourage a military coup. At the Vatican, Dreyfus was of relatively minor importance compared to the concern about the "doctrinal warfare which raged during these years throughout the whole Catholic Church."[16] After the loss of papal territory in 1870, the papacy also had a keen interest in securing international respect. The occupation of Rome "deprived the papacy of its last vestige of temporal power," and in the mind of the popes, eliminated their "geographical independence." Sovereignty over Rome allowed the papacy to retain "moral independence" and to "rule the Universal Church without being accused of subservience to any particular country." When Leo XIII realized that Germany would not "rescue Rome from the hands of Italian usurpers" he pinned his hopes on France. He wanted to exploit the ill-will between France and Italy. These two nations were locked in a trade war at the end of the century, and the French government also resented the entrance of Italy into the Triple Alliance. While Leo XIII hoped for a clericalized Third Republic, his main concern was the acquisition of moral independence gained by liberation from the Italian government.[17] He was not eager to see the French Army overturn the Republic.

Leading British Catholics recognized the fallacies found in the arguments of their Dreyfusard, anti-Catholic countrymen. Most British Catholics kept a low profile, preferring not to comment extensively. Only three articles about the Affaire appeared in the Catholic publication Month. All of these were defensive in nature, rebutting

the accusations made primarily by Conybeare. Conybeare was "in fact, . . . a sort of Drumont in the opposite camp."

In defense of the Church, S. F. Smith, the editor of Month, provided British readers with an alternate view. Addressing those who argued that the Army was a clerico-military extension of the Church, Smith asserted that the "Jesuits are in no way responsible for the agitation now going on." He reminded his readers that admission to the War College was based on competitive examination and not religious affilation. He observed that none of the key members on the General Staff under Boisdeffre in 1894 were former pupils of Jesuit teachers. In 1898, only nine or ten officers out of 180 on the General Staff came from Jesuit schools. Neither were the five past Ministers of War, Billot, Cavaignac, Zurlinden, Chanoine, and Freycinet, pupils of Jesuit mentors. Smith found charges against Pére du Lac, Boisdeffre's confessor, completely unfounded. It was preposterous to think that du Lac would exploit his religious position to influence the actions of Boisdeffre. Equally preposterous was the charge that a Chief of the General Staff would let this kind of influence be exercised. Finally, those who posited a relationship between the Church and the Army forgot that in the very recent past, most young students at the Military College refused to "make open profession of . . . religion" since such an admission exposed them to almost unbearable persecution and ridicule. The tolerant spirit of the late 1890s was a recent development.[18]

Guy Chapman has shown that the Church lacked the power to incite military revolt. Although French officers usually were the products of Catholic rather than state schools, "this no more implies that they were devout than an education at Westminster implies that an English boy is

a classicist or a royalist." The testimony of Major Ducassé before the United Court of Cassation dramatically demonstrated the shallow depth of religious conviction among the officer class. The Major described himself as a "free-thinker" who was "so little clerical" that he married a Protestant. To avoid Catholic formalities, the marriage took place in "a Protestant temple." Most French officers were nominal rather than practicing Catholics. Chapman concludes that in spite "of the legends, clericalism played a minimal part in the promotions."[19]

If the charges against Catholics in general and Jesuits in particular were unfounded, what gave rise to the vehement accusations? Smith argued that they were the product of the controversy in France over control of education. The attack on the Church was "but an incident in the course of a sustained policy" pursued by the enemies of God. Since the 1880s, anti-clericals had made a concerted effort to eliminate "Congregational schools" and make attendance of the state-supported Lycée mandatory. They wanted to replace Catholic education with a system which placed France before God. In spite of the diligent efforts to make life difficult for Catholic teachers, the 1890s witnessed a growing preference on the part of many parents for Catholic schools. Some of these people were practicing Catholics, but others were simply those who retained a fear of God and genuinely believed that a Christian education was superior to the education offered by the Lycée. The anti-clericals observed this "religious reformation" with increasing dismay and determined to stop its advance by "forcible measures." Their goal, according to Smith, was "repealing wholly" the Falloux Laws of 1850, which prevented the suppression of Catholic schools and granted freedom of teaching. "Evidently . . . what the anti-clericals required was a

strong wind to fill their sails, and the prospect of revision of the Dreyfus trial offered itself to them as just the thing wanted." By associating the Jesuits and Catholicism with anti-Semitism and the condemnation of an innocent victim, they hoped to stampede anti-Catholic legislation through the Chamber and "inflict another wound on the Catholic Church and the cause of religious education." Ironically, their efforts began "with a protest against proscribing the Jews" but ended with "a call to proscribe the Jesuits."[20] The Radical assault upon Catholicism in the years after Rennes demonstrated the accuracy of Smith's analysis.

Another British Catholic who defended Rome was the Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Herbert Vaughan. In two letters which he wrote to the Times, Vaughan vigorously disputed charges of Catholicism's responsibility for both the Affaire and the recondemnation of Dreyfus. He argued that Catholics were not the only Frenchmen who were anti-Dreyfusards, and excused the Catholic hierarchy for not taking a more diligent effort in calling for moderation in a situation complex and difficult to understand. In the correspondence which followed, "Verax" and "Vidi", otherwise known as Chirol and Steed, sharply criticized Vaughan's logic and blamed the Church for the demoralization of France.

In fact, most British journalists were not impressed by the arguments which defended French Catholicism. Neither were they receptive to the sweeping charges which laid responsibility for the Affaire exclusively upon the Catholic Church. The Affaire gave rise to several thoughtful and detailed discussions about freedom of religion and the function of religion in the contemporary world. Several British observers believed that religious freedom was at stake. For these

individuals, the Affaire demonstrated that the Catholic Church intended to achieve religious unity in France. In spite of the claims made by Drumont and others--that Frenchmen had no objections to the religious customs and traditions in the Ghetto--some in Britain argued that the Church not only sanctioned religious intolerance, but schemed with government leaders to curb the power of both Protestants and Jews. Some feared the institution of a policy or a civil law which, reminiscent of Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes, would curb religious freedom. Spectator fretted about the government's ability and desire to protect religious liberty and pessimistically reflected, "we may yet under a democratic regime see a people extirpated because they are misbelievers." For many in Britain, the idea of government support of a single denomination or religious sect was positively repugnant and objectionable. A government which was genuinely "for the people" would not cater to the dictates of either Protestant or Catholic officials.[21]

In National Review, Conybeare lambasted Count de Mun for his claim that French Catholics exhibited "respect for other religions than their own." In an effort to evoke the sympathy of British readers, de Mun included references to Gladstone and Cardinal Manning, former head of the Catholic Church in Britain, in his defense of the French Catholic Church. Conybeare found de Mun's appeal to the "'shades of Gladstone and Manning'" both offensive and preposterous. The late Cardinal was not a "Jew-baiter." Rather, he treated British Jews cordially and publicly expressed dissatisfaction at the Tsar's mistreatment of the Israelitish race. Even more surprising was the "profaning" of Gladstone's name. The G. O. M. was the author of a famous pamphlet

which "exposed just these vices of modern Catholicism which are so apparent in the pages of Civilta Cattolica, in the French religious and clerical Press, [and] in the public policy of the Comte de Mun." Gladstone condemned the Holy See for its opposition to liberty of the press, of conscience, of worship, and of speech. He recoiled at the Roman pontiff's refusal to "'come to terms with progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.'" He never retracted the charges brought against the Catholic Church.[22]

Several journalists used the Affaire as an occasion to critique what they perceived as Catholic illiberalism and to praise what they believed to be British religious tolerance. These writers made references to the freedoms enjoyed by Catholics in contemporary Britain. The persecution of Catholics, which was not uncommon at the beginning of the century, no longer existed, and the Roman Church was "not only free but respected."[23] E. J. Dillon, writing in Contemporary Review, expressed this attitude of tolerance in an article commending the "praiseworthy aims" of A. J. Balfour and his effort to establish an Irish Catholic University. The Conservative politician's "noble appeal to Protestants to fling secular religious prejudices to the winds is worthy of a statesman of the twenty-first century." Saturday Review cautioned those who blamed the Affaire on the Roman Church, reminding its readers that unreasoning anti-Catholicism was no better than anti-Semitism.[24]

The Radicals, who secured control of the coalition government under Waldeck-Rousseau in 1899, surprised British observers who had praised their defense of Dreyfus. Theodor Zeldin writes, "the claim of the Dreyfusards, the fight to save Dreyfus was not only a struggle for individual liberty but a fight against clericalism. Chapman depicts

the Radicals as opportunists who struck a successful blow against the Church by throwing their support to the Dreyfusards. The Radicals reasoned that the Affaire was evidence of a clerico-monarchical plot. Under both Waldeck-Rousseau and Emile Combes, they attacked the Church and the religious Orders by proscribing Catholic schools, and enacting legislation which abolished the Concordant of 1801 and separated Church and State. Zeldin argues that "they set France back thirty years by this, refusing to let it go forward to the solution of the problems of the day."[25]

In the years immediately prior to the Affaire, many "monarchists, both Catholic and agnostic, were tired of supporting lost causes" and were ready to support conservative Republicans in an effort to block "left-wing demands" for social legislation and a graduated income tax. France, for the first time since the Commune, seemed ready seriously to consider the existing social problems. "The Affair and its aftermath, however, destroyed this situation." Clerical issues diverted the French from social reform as the parliament wandered for seven years "in an anti-clerical wilderness, where political relationships were forced and retrogressive." Anti-clerical legislation spawned bitterness and sharpened divisions among Frenchmen. It retarded the growth of national solidarity and alienated moderate Catholic opinion.[26] In a somewhat uncharacteristic defense of Catholicism, Spectator criticized the French anti-clericals who exploited the after-effects of the Affaire to attack the Catholic Church. A Bill which denied French Catholics the right of Association eliminated an educational option which some French parents wished to have, and denied the right to worship God after one's own fashion. Although Spectator firmly believed that monastic Associations

were unscriptural, it decried the Bill as "hostile not only to religious liberty, but to the principle of liberty itself. . . . A man does not cease to be a citizen because he is a monk." The anti-clericals sought to "control by law the strictly religious action of another's conscience."[27] Notwithstanding its concern about the principle of religious liberty, Spectator was one of the most vehement critics of Catholicism during the Affaire.

This publication indicted the Church for dereliction of true Christian duty and the "doctrines of Christ." Regardless of the guilt or innocence of Dreyfus, Catholic leaders should have supported "the cause of mercy and truth, to have been on the side of those who place justice and good faith higher than patriotism and national interest." Instead of calling for moderation, charity, goodwill, and righteousness, no leading clergyman stepped forward to "defend the innocent or preach the sacredness of justice." Rather than encouraging a "more Christian spirit," they did nothing to "calm men's passions" or "deprecate violent and inflamatory language," especially that found in the anti-Semitic and anti-Protestant prattle in the Catholic and Yellow press. They ignored the example of Christ who preached the protection of the persona non-grata of His day, the infidel Samaritan. In a "wicked and absolutely un-Christian attitude" Church officials fanned the flames of "prejudice, suspicion, vengeance, cruelty, and hate." Spectator argued that Catholicism missed a marvelous opportunity to use the Affaire to "set Christianity above policy" and purify itself before European Protestants. This failure was especially regrettable since the world was "hungering for" some great spiritual power "to declare in favour of what is right with utter indifference alike to opinion, to material forces, and to

consequences."[28] Instead, as Chirol wrote, clergymen used the "mantle of religion . . . as a cloak to cover a propaganda which is itself an insult to religion." He and many other journalists wondered if the Catholic Church was degenerate. Based on what they perceived as medieval religious intolerance and inhumane attitudes toward Protestants and Jews, they suspected this was true.[29]

If Catholics on the Continent were anti-Dreyfusard, most of their British brethren adopted a different posture. Perhaps the national Dreyfusard environment had greater influence than the Catholic press and Cardinal Vaughan. Even the editor of Month, who strongly suspected that Dreyfus was guilty, openly disagreed with Civilta's indictment of the Jewish people as a race which could not assimilate. If certain Jews exhibited less than acceptable behavior, this was no reason to inculpate the entire race. Smith asserted his desire to maintain positive and uplifting relations with the Jews who were his fellow-countrymen. Opinions expressed by other British Catholics were markedly Dreyfusard. If letters to the editors of British newspapers were an accurate barometer of Catholic opinion, then British Catholics were certainly anxious to dissociate themselves from the Rennes verdict and anti-Dreyfusism. "Anxious Catholics" wrote to the Times expressing their concern that the Affaire might damage their "credit both as Catholics and as Englishmen."[30] Spectator published a letter from J. A. Cunningham and his fellows, Spectator admitted that in spite of clerical anti-Dreyfus agitation on the Continent, "the English Roman Catholics as a body have shown a great deal of spiritual independence and of spiritual sincerity."[31]

The ability of British Catholics to retain their independent judgment was, according to Conybeare, the product of the national, political, and social "medium" in which they lived. As "English subjects, trained like the rest of us in self-government, self-reliance, religious tolerance, and political fair-play," they resisted the mania which afflicted their Continental brethren.[32]

Many British journalists argued that the Catholic world view promoted a blind submission to authority which was considered to be absolute. Since most Frenchmen received education in Catholic schools, a Catholic outlook or mental attitude was common to most French citizens. Not surprisingly, Catholic schools prepared French youth uncritically to accept Church doctrine. They encouraged medieval intolerance for unorthodox views. Established sacred cherished beliefs were not to be questioned.

The Catholics maintained an educational system of intellectual domination which molded, or according to some British observers, mis-shaped the consciences of students, and precluded the formation of independent judgments or opinions. The impoverished inheritance produced by this system was moral deterioration and the creation of emasculated, docile, and obedient children, often incapable of making decisions without consulting a confessor or someone in authority. In the Times, Steed insisted that a Catholic education produces "moral cripples for life."[33] Chirol, who attended a Catholic school during his youth, viciously attacked this environment. He claimed that his mentors encouraged students to report misbehavior of their fellows, which gave rise to tale-bearing, intrigue, and outright lying. The headmaster enjoyed the service of his personal network of spies and informers.

Peepholes in the walls and floors of the school allowed teachers to monitor the activities of their students at all times. Chirol argued that this system had bred the lies, forgeries, falsehoods, and chicanery which created the Affaire. In spite of Cardinal Vaughan's assertions that the French Jesuit school he had attended tolerated none of the antics cited by Chirol, the Times remained an adamant critic of Catholicism's system of education, and involvement in the Affaire.

During the Rennes court-martial, Cardinal Vaughan addressed an audience in Stockport where he praised the Catholic Church for its opposition to the "'inordinate growth of selfish individualism, which was substituted in the sixteenth century for old Catholic policy.'" The material and moral welfare of Britain required the turning back of the Reformation and the return of the British to the "'spiritual subjection to the Pope.'" On 30 August, the Times attacked Vaughan's logic, pointing to the chaotic domestic condition of France, and the lack of material progress in Catholic nations Italy, Spain, and Ireland.[34] In several subsequent articles, the Times explained the anti-Dreyfusard public mind in France as a product of the Catholic outlook, which valued the welfare of the State more than the welfare of the individual.

The emphasis Catholic teachers placed on faith and dogma--some said superstition and false premises--substantiated the doctrine that the end, be it the glory of God or the maintenance of the honor and integrity of the Army, justifies the means. Their illiberal system of mind control aimed at developing the memory, at training students to regurgitate information and pass examination. Students were to accept without question what they were told, rather than exercising their powers of reason or examining the truthfulness of what they were taught. Hence,

they were unable to distinguish truth from error. The lessons learned in the Catholic school instilled a believing mind within students. Even among those who later abandoned ritual, doctrine, and the formal observance of mass, a lasting impression was made. Catholic education shaped and formed the outlook of the nation. The Catholic habit of thought was virtually impossible to eliminate. During the Affaire, even those who outwardly rejected religion were pre-conditioned whole-heartedly to support the government and the Army. This response was not necessarily a malicious one, but what one contributor to Contemporary Review termed "unconscious Machiavellianism."

In the opinion of several commentators, Catholic education produced credulity, a remarkable willingness to believe even the most preposterous tales. One journalist recounted the exploits of Leo Taxil, who concocted a story about the devil visiting Freemason lodges. During one of his visitations, Satan supposedly announced the birth of the grandmother of the anti-Christ. Naturally, she was Jewish. Taxil said that a Catholic woman named Diana Vaughan witnessed this event. She was praised by Church officials and even received the formal blessing of the pope. Much to the chagrin of the Catholic world, in 1896 Taxil publicly announced that his story was a hoax, and that Diana Vaughan did not exist. Nevertheless, Catholic France continued to believe Taxil's practical joke on the Church.

In a letter to the editor of Spectator, A. W. Richardson recalled a conversation he had with a Catholic at a tea party. Richardson asked how the Catholics explained the Church's ill-will toward the Semites since Christ was a Jew. He was told that Christ was not Jewish. When Richardson pressed for an explanation of this point of doctrine, he

learned that good Catholics were not allowed to discuss such matters. Instead, they trusted the Abbé who told them what to believe.

Conybeare cited a letter from a Catholic priest, Abbé Pichot, to demonstrate the connection between Catholicism and anti-Dreyfusism. Pichot was one of the few Dreyfusard Catholic clergymen who openly expressed his convictions. The priest who trained Pichot wrote his former pupil, sympathizing with his well-known views. Yet, in spite of the mentor's pangs of conscience, he supported Dreyfus' condemnation, and refused to state his inner feelings publicly.[35]

British journalists often argued that in Protestant nations citizens were free-thinking individuals, not bound by religious convictions to condemn Dreyfus regardless of the lack of evidence against him. The habit of criticism, self-assertiveness, and self-reliance were all traits believed to be characteristic of Protestants. These qualities led them to judge things according to their own merit. Thus, it came as no surprise that European Protestants tended to support French Dreyfusards. A contributor to Contemporary Review wrote, "To a son of the Reformation there is no authority which can impose itself on him from without and silence the voice of his reason and conscience." Most French Catholics considered this outlook as excessive individualism, "a solvent of all society." Some British observers argued that the Huguenots, skilled in the art of open protest, were the chief advocates of Dreyfus. Unlike their Catholic countrymen, their Protestant habits of thought enabled them to perceive truth and call for justice. Respect for individual freedoms, which made "life worth living," had helped the British to emerge from the "miasmatic mist" of obscurantism which blinded French Catholics.[36]

French Protestants seem to have been more inclined to support Dreyfus than were French Catholics. Unfortunately, some British observers carried this generalization too far and all but argued that religion determined one's position on the Dreyfus case. The Radical assault upon the Catholic Church certainly must have surprised those who assumed that all Dreyfusards were good Protestants with liberal convictions. British observers had other illusions about the part French Catholics played in the Affaire. The tendency to misinterpret the role of the Church was a product of British attachment to liberal values, Britain's historical bias against Catholicism, and a perceived growth in the popularity of Anglo-Catholicism. The commentary on the Affaire showed a respect for three liberal virtues: freedom of religion, freedom of thought, and separation of Church and State. Again, we see the importance of liberal values in late-nineteenth century Britain reflected in this analysis. To the dismay of liberal British observers, Catholicism, as they perceived it, stressed the virtues of "blind" faith, unquestioning and unmerited respect for authority, and the uniqueness of the Roman Church as the one true religion. The Vatican also supported the concept of a united Church and State. These "illiberal" qualities gave some British critics the confidence to conclude that priests were responsible for a dastardly clerico-military conspiracy to kill the Third Republic. Their interpolations were inaccurate. These observers misread the meaning of the Church's attachment to the old conservative order, and assumed that the entire Church plotted to restore Catholicism to a position of great temporal power. The pope desired better relations with France and union with the Church of England, but his chief concern was to win the fight between the Vatican and the Zuirinal. Leo XIII rebuked the

Assumptionists for their strident anti-republican articles in La Croix. There were a few observers, like S. F. Smith, who exposed the shallowness of the arguments about Church-inspired conspiracies and the power of the Priest to dictate the actions of the General. These commentators were in the minority. It was more comfortable for British observers to believe that French Catholics fit into an illiberal mold, that they were uncritical followers of the priests who instructed them to believe in Dreyfus' guilt. Like Yves Guyot, they argued, "this affair proves how difficult it is for Catholic peoples to adapt themselves to liberal institutions."[37]

Those who believed in a Church inspired conspiracy to overturn the Republic were mistaken. Even if Churchmen had wanted to control the Army, they lacked the power to do so. To some British journalists, it was not improbable, however, that Army officers were, on their own, eager to speed the demise of the Republic. This possibility was the focal point of a debate within the British press about the likelihood of a military coup d'etat inspired and directed by the generals involved in the Affaire. It also triggered a discussion about the role of the military service in a democratic society, and the extent to which the Third Republic was democratic and durable.

CHAPTER V

DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS, OR GROWING PAINS OF A REPUBLIC

> . . . the French have found stability, more complete than any that they have attained to during the last hundred years, in a government whose very essence is instability and change. Pierre de Coubertin, "Contradictions of Modern France: The Political Paradox." Fortnightly Review, June 1898, p. 677.

> There is no Republic any more, neither are there Republicans. . . . France is literally in a state of smouldering revolution, which at any moment and in any place may burst into fitful fir and flame . . . [and] bring about such a rough-and-ready realisation of political liberty and equality as has for generations formed the groundwork of British institutions. From Contemporary Review: "The Demoralisation of France." March 1898, p. 325; "The Situation in France." July 1899, p. 41.

> This theory is that some at least of the leading Generals were in a [pre-1894] conspiracy to overthrow the Republic by means of a coup d'état, that this conspiracy was discovered and unmasked, and that the French Army chiefs are now wreaking their vengeance on those [Dreyfus and the Dreyfusards] who have exposed their plot. Spectator, 15 October 1898.

British journalists expressed different ideas about the future of the Third Republic and the role of the military in the Affaire and in French society. This chapter will examine these ideas and what they tell us about British opinion among the political and educated classes at the end of the century. Regardless of the position which each writer espoused, their collective commentary offers an insight into some of the

dominant British beliefs about political institutions and democratic society. It also reveals a people who were pleased with their own political development, political stability, and ability to govern. Articles about the Affaire reflect a belief in the political genius of the Anglo-Saxon people, and a pride in British decentralized local government and the civil freedoms which journalists believed were guaranteed to the British. This commentary is rich with praise for the laissez-faire ethic which emphasized freedom of the individual from "over-government." This analysis had a comparative quality as well. The Manchester Guardian declared that France was about a century and one half behind Britain in terms of governmental development.[1]

Whether they realized it or not, journalists who made such observations indirectly addressed some of the same issues raised by contemporary historians in works about British history in general and the Norman Conquest in particular. Bishop Stubbs, who stimulated interest in English legal history, also offered his readers a detailed history of British constitutional development. Stubbs "belonged to the liberal generation which had seen and assisted in the attainment of electoral reforms in England and of revolutionary and nationalist movements on the Continent." He had studied under

> German scholars who saw in the primitive German institutions the source of all human dignity and of all political independence. He thought he saw in the development of the English Constitution the magnificent and unique expansion of these first germs of self-government, and England was for him 'the messenger of liberty to the world.'[2]

Although Stubbs' "hypothetical reconstruction of primitive Germanic society . . . bore very little relation" to reality, many in Britain accepted the existence of popular assemblied and elections, and "free

and self-governing communities existing from a remote past" among the Teutonic peoples. Notwithstanding the absence of hard evidence, Stubbs postulated the existence of incipient democratic English institutions, and a constitution which early English kings supposedly respected.[3]

Historians like J. A. Freeman and J. R. Green, included these ideas in their interpretation of the Norman Conquest. In contrast to those who believed that the Anglo-Saxons were a stagnant, slumbering people brought to life by the vigorous Normans, they argued that representative government existed before the Conquest. Freeman believed that from "the earliest times till now, England has never been without a national assembly of some kind." The Normans "did not very greatly bring in things which were quite new, but rather strengthened and hastened tendencies which were already at work." The "Old-English institutions" remained, in spite of the Latin centralizing and bureaucratizing tendencies imported by the conquering Normans. William the Conqueror strengthened the monarchy and caused kingship "to be looked on more and more as a possession. . . . Thus the crown became more and more hereditary and less and less elective." Nevertheless, according to Freeman, the Normans failed to make "many formal changes in government and administration" and destroyed "no old institutions or offices."[4] These historians created an intellectual context, a perceptual field in which contemporary journalists lived and wrote. Their work often included unavowed but highly potent ideas about race, culture, and politics. The commentary on the Affaire evidenced their influence.

Some pressmen delighted in drawing contrasts between the stability which contemporary residents of Britain enjoyed during most of the nineteenth century and the instability which was a major feature of

French political life during these same years. Just as the legal reforms of the 1870s shaped the British analysis of French jurisprudence, so the progressive democratization of British society produced by reform bills and acts of 1832, 1867, 1872, and 1884[5] made British analysts quick to object to any movement of France toward a monarchical or dictatorial form of government.

Across the Channel, Dreyfus became an abstraction which represented the Republic to many British observers. They tied together the fates of Dreyfus and the Republic and perceived the Affaire as a testing of political systems, a struggle of republicanism against the forces of reaction--the Monarchy, the Church, and the Army. They took a lively interest in what they perceived as yet another episode in the war between the unstable Republic and the anti-democratic forces which threatened its life and the principles of 1789. They were concerned that counter-revolution might overturn the existing regime. One present-day historian, Robert F. Byrnes, describes the Affaire as "the most serious crisis of modern democratic society faced between" the United States Civil War and the rise of Communist and Fascist dictatorships in Europe during the 1930s.[6] To several British commentators, France seemed to be regressing, abandoning the form of government in which Britain believed and to which she was committed. The threat of a neo-Napoleonic regime haunted some who watched French affairs. Some paranoid observers were simply unable to divorce the memory of Napoleon from their interpretation of the Affaire.

The analysis of the Affaire also reflects a nagging concern about the growth of illiberal opinion in Britain. British journalists, who almost always analyzed the Affaire from a liberal perspective, used

the Dreyfus trials as an object lesson about the follies of a highly centralized system of government, bureaucratization, the restriction of individual liberties, and conscription. By the end of the century, a growing number of individuals questioned the effectiveness of laissez-faire government as a solution to the pressing social and economic problems of the day. In the provinces, the range of authority exercised by local officials who directed "squire-archical" government "expanded considerably." Not only did the degree of local regulation increase, but slowly, "the central government increased in contribution" and gradually "acquired control over the actions of local authorities"[7] as well as public life in general. A trend toward bureaucratization began in the 1870s and continued unabated for the rest of the century, distressing those who recoiled at the thought of eventually adopting an "'un-English' . . . bureaucratic and centralizing approach, modelled in part upon the French practice."[8] These changes "revolutionised the scope and role of government."[9] Finally, there was a concerted effort made by some to reform the War Office and improve the army. These plans frightened those who feared the development of militarism in Britain, Insofar as British journalists raised these issues in their articles about the Affaire, they not only reported events in France, but also made carefully reasoned, if indirect attempts to confute the critics of liberalism at home. This defense of liberal values, as well as the celebration of Britain's constitutionalism, parliamentary government, and political evolution found expression in the discussion about the impact of the Affaire on the fate of the Third Republic.

The opinions expressed in British publications can be divided into three general categories. The first group took a more charitable

view of the French people and the Third Republic than the other two. The interpretations of events in France made by journalists in this group proved to be the most accurate found in the British press. These writers believed that French republicanism could not be judged by British standards, and that the peculiarities of each national tradition made it dangerous to generalize on the basis of what worked in Britain. They disagreed with those who predicted an inevitable military coup d'état, and maintained that the Republic was, in spite of outward appearances, legitimate and strong. To support their argument, they observed that the Army refused to revolt when given several auspicious opportunities to do so. The forces of reaction were moribund. The average Frenchman was a republican with no interest in counter-revolution or the re-establishment of monarchical or dictatorial rule. The forces of justice, progress, and civilization were too great and powerful to be extinguished by a momentary resurgence of the old order. Journalists in the first group predicted that the Republic would endure and that Dreyfus would be rehabilitated. Both predictions proved accurate.

A second group made vitriolic attacks upon the Third Republic, claiming that it was and always had been a sham, the facade of republican government. These journalists wrote lengthy articles about the illiberal and anti-republican features of French government and society. According to these writers, no revolution was necessary since the generals already controlled France. To buttress their arguments, they cited the existence of the Franco-Russian alliance, and the prescription of liberty and the right to privacy in France. Moreover, the common man worshipped the Army which espoused a pronounced anti-republican ethos. Journalists in this group referred to the Affaire as evidence that militarism and

conscription were incompatible with liberal ideals. An "over-developed" military system not only threatened international peace but also restricted domestic economic development. Notwithstanding these criticisms, these journalists expected the coming of better things. Like those in the first group, they looked to the future with optimism, believing that progress and the grwoth of liberal values were inevitable. They predicted the coming of a revolution as a result of the Affaire. It would be a revolution to the Left rather than the Right, and would precipitate the establishment of a genuine Republic. The truly republican element in France would not tolerate the machinations of reaction as they were exhibited during the Affaire.

In contrast, a third group of journalists was pessimistic about the future. They saw the late-nineteenth century as a time of testing for democracy and parliamentary institutions. The forces of reaction were strong enough to turn back the liberal gains made during the century and subdue republican forces in France. The third group sounded alarms, warning that a military coup d'état was impending. Journalists in this group frequently made reference to Napoleon, Louis Napoleon, and Boulanger, and the military tradition of the French. They believed in a grand conspiracy led by the Army and made up of the anti-republican elements in France, and greatly feared that a military take-over was only a matter of time. Not until the denouement following Rennes did most of these journalists concede that revolution was improbable. The Army had remained loyal to the Republic and the French public had finally tired, losing interest in Dreyfus. Throughout the Affaire, this third group of journalists exhibited a vehemently anti-military position. Whenever

possible they portrayed the French Army and its leaders in the worst possible light.

Whatever the difference of opinion between journalists in these three groups, all of them took great pride in the British political heritage and universally agreed upon two things: constitutional, parliamentary, republican government was necessary for peace, prosperity, and happiness; and if France should succumb to the temptation to turn herself over to autocratic rule, no good would result. Some believed that the Republic was the only guarantee Frenchmen had of civil liberties and equal rights before the law.[10]

Before examining each of these positions in detail, it is instructive briefly to examine the history and performance of the Third Republic as it was perceived by those who wrote in the British press. British newspapers rarely missed an oppotunity to record the less becoming proceedings in the Chamber of Deputies. Arguments which sometimes resulted in fisticuffs and turned-over inkstands were described as "circus conflicts."[11] Forgetting somewhat similar incidents which had occurred in the British Parliament, some journalists puzzled over how the business of government could be conducted amidst rancorous and sometimes physically violent debates in the Chamber. The British of the late-nineteenth century had a near-boundless confidence in their own ability to govern themselves. J. A. Hobson believed that this conviction was a part of the British national consciousness, moreso than "in the case of any other nation." He recounted a conversation he heard on the Anglo-Saxon's ability to govern , in which one person asked another if he believed that the English could do a better job of ruling France than could the French. The latter replied in the affirmative,

which according to Hobson, was "a perfectly genuine expression of the real conviction of most Englishmen."[12] During the years of the Affaire, many in Britain, by contrasting the differences between British and French methods of government, perceived the difficulties experienced by the French government as confirmation of Anglo-Saxon genius.

The lack of consensus about the best form of government for the nation complicated the task of governing France. The Third Republic, like Weimar which came forty-eight years later, emerged in the aftermath of an unsuccessful foreign war. Attached to it was the stigma of defeat, the loss of valuable territory, and a large indemnity. Although the Republic existed, there was no clear consensus in France about the form French political institutions should take. The Boulanger episode showed how close France could come to renouncing republicanism, provided the right leader appeared. The French were ready willingly to submit to what one frequent contributor to Fortnightly Review, "An Anglo-Parisian Journalist," described as "servitude."

In this same journal, the anti-Dreyfusard Pierre de Coubertin, who contributed regularly, declared that the French still had "habits of courtly humbug bequeathed . . . by a long tradition of absolute monarchy." While he did not wish for France to rejoin the European monarchical community, Coubertin argued that parliamentarianism would only thrive in places where there was fundamental agreement upon some central principle acknowledged by everyone. Under a monarchy, that principle was loyalism or loyalty to "the person of the sovereign." The Third Republic was unable to evoke "unanimity of sentiment."

The Panama scandal strained the credibility of the Republic and underscored the gulf still existing between the ideal and reality.

France had yet to achieve Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, or for that matter, Justice or "moral greatness." The Affaire placed an additional strain on the Republic. It threw into relief the tension between Order and Freedom, the military and the civil spirits, the "Fatherland and Justice." The Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaimed equal rights and equal justice for all--ideals for which great Frenchmen had "shed their blood" one hundred years before. But revision and the rehabilitation of Dreyfus threatened to discredit the leadership of the Army, thus undermining military discipline, and leaving France in a state of "utter moral disarray." This predicament led Deputy Georges Berry to proclaim, "'Innocent or guilty, Dreyfus must remain on Devil's Isle.'" Two cults, two "incompatible spiritual forces," the "nationalist ideal and the revolutionary ideal," vied for power, and could co-exist in a democracy only "through reciprocal sacrifices and ceaseless compromise."[12]

To some British observers this burden upon the French Republic seemed too much to bear for a republican system fraught with unstable and frequently over-turned ministries, vitriolic political debates, and continual party strife. To be sure, there was a monumental difference between Britain and France regarding the structure of political parties and the making of Cabinets. Britain's long tradition of parliamentary, constitutional government and relatively stable system of political parties disposed most British observers to watch events in France with a critical eye. The Napoleonic tradition, and the French heritage of a strong central government, loosely organized political parties, ever-changing coalition cabinets, and the antics of French Deputies in the Chamber contrasted sharply with what most liberal Englishmen believed

to be a progressive and enlightened political system. Since 1789, revolutionary tremors and frequent changes in forms of government distinguished politics in France. In contrast to political life in Britain where Liberals and Conservatives dominated the system. France suffered from an abundance of factionalized political parties which vied for power. The Dreyfus crisis appeared to be one more incident in a long series of domestic squabbles in which the French battled among themselves, and ran the risk of once again embracing some form of autocratic or dictatorial rule. On the occasion of Prime Minister Dupuy's resignation in June 1899, The Economist devoted considerable attention to the Cabinet-making process in France. Based on the principle of "Republican concentration," Dupuy's successor, Pierre Marie Waldeck-Rousseau, created a new heterogeneous Cabinet composed of members from almost every group in French political life. To reassure moderate republicans that there would be no campaign against the Army, he chose General Gaston de Gallifet, who supervised the execution of the Communards in 1871, as Minister of War. He also included Alexandre Millerand from the "Socialist wing of the Extreme Left." Millerand was the first socialist minister in Europe. The Dreyfus case was responsible for evolving "this seemingly impossible Ministry." This "group system . . . [was] almost fatal to Parliamentary Government" since it rendered political parties "too fluid to afford a Ministry any trustworthy foothold." It allowed important figures in each party to pressure Prime Ministers to include them in the Cabinet. If they were excluded, they could threaten to withdraw important support from the government. Thus, the Cabinet could easily become "a self-appointed Committee which need not of necessity have any programme or any complete coherence." Presidents who

lacked skill in the "fine art" of Cabinet-making found themselves in charge of "a group of jealous and exacting officers, with no authority to hold them together or to insist upon common action." The kind of coalition Cabinet constructed by Waldeck-Rousseau indicated the stressful domestic condition in France. Some British observers argued that such a grouping was only possible in times of war or incipient revolution. It was better described, in the opinion of some, as a committee for public safety.[13] Nevertheless, Waldeck-Rousseau's government became one of the most successful and efficient governments in the history of the Third Republic.

Some of the wiser British observers believed that the perpetual changes of French ministries did not mean what the same occurrence in Britain would have meant. English parliamentary government could not function under such unstable conditions, but in France, republican government without constitutional changes had endured for over a quarter of a century, in spite of the outward appearance of chaos. Coubertin presented British readers with a picture of a strong and legitimate republican government in France. Ironically, the "French have found stability, more complete than any that they have attained to during the last hundred years, in a government whose very essence is instability and change." In spite of ephemeral reactionary interludes, the Republic was durable. It withstood the challenges of the Royalist revolution in 1877 and the dictatorial machinations of Boulangism in the late 1880s. To their credit, the French had inaugurated alliances with the pope and the Tsar, preserved the peace while supporting a sizeable army, restored commercial prosperity, and re-established financial credit.

There existed in French government two paradoxes, one military and one political. Far from being a threat to republicanism, the Army was a stablizing element and a "regulating force" in French political life. While some believed that the Army "would repress democracy," Coubertin believed that it was "subject to the civil power." More importantly, the Army contributed to political stability because the extreme parties willingly made "concessions to prudence and moderation because the interest of the army required it." The "political paradox" was equally important. Between 1789 and 1872, France experienced eight revolutions. The Third Republic proved itself immune to the "habit of revolution" thanks to the "safety-valve" provided by ministerial crises. To foreign observers, instability in the government appeared inimical to republican principles. Although frequent changes of governments were "inconvenient accidents," Coubertin argued that they served a necessary and beneficial purpose. They "helped toward the satisfactory working of the machine [republican government]," and forestalled the erection of barricades in Parisian streets. In spite of frequent ministerial changes, new governments rarely tampered with the legislation enacted by preceding administrations. Coubertin attributed this in part to the permanent official beneath the ministerial level who was "strong enough to oppose his temporary chief, and if he is afraid to oppose him, stable enough to evade his orders and await his fall."

In support of this argument, The Economist asserted that the permanent bureaucracy was the real ruler in France and had been since Napoleon Bonaparte. This stabilizing factor allowed the government to transact business even in the midst of ministerial chaos.[14] If the bureaucracy provided continuity and stability it also restricted

individual freedoms and was often excessive and corrupt. The French government employed more bureaucrats than any government in the world.[15] British critics claimed that French officialism stifled initiative and independence. For these individuals, all the features of government which restricted individual liberties made liberal minds recoil, and called into question the legitimacy of French republicanism.[16]

Diplomat, Ralliés politician, member of the French Academy, and anti-Dreyfusard Eugène-Melchior de Vogüe, reviewed Bodley's France and described the contrast the English author made between the British and French peoples. The English were intolerant of strong central government. "Unlike the Anglo-Saxons of Birmingham and Manchester, who would fly to arms, if one of our prefects were set over them, the Gaul, ever since the days of Julius Caesar had been accustomed to being administered, managed and strongly handled, for the accomplishment of great works."[17] Thus, the burgeoning bureaucracy in France complicated life for Frenchmen. In contrast, England was "the only country in which administrative power effaces itself by instinct in place of asserting itself." Only in Great Britain and her colonial Empire did all Europeans enjoy "absolutely equal rights with Englishmen themselves." There, there was an absence of espionage, "passports, political spies, police bullying, trade protection [and] religious domination." There, one could do whatever he desired within the law, free from "adminstrative censoriousness and meddlesome interference."[18]

Not all British observers—especially those among the first group—agreed that republican government in Britain and France was, or, given different national environments, indeed should be, exactly the same. Indeed, French republican sentiment was strong, even during the

Affaire. Present-day historians argue that there was an "efflorescence of republican ideas" in France during the final quarter of the nineteenth century.[19] John A. Scott believes that by 1870, the masses were generally alienated from dynastic or authoritarian rule. Many other historians believe that the Third Republic "displayed its weakness not before but after the First World War." Prior to the war, the republic founded in 1871 "was more stable than any other form of government that France had known since 1789."[20] Some contemporaries also recognized the Republic's legitimacy and durability. In Anglo-Saxon Review, Cornély argued that contrary to popular stereotypes, the average Frenchman was not always ready to rise in revolt. Charles Whibley wrote that the "cries of Paris"--"Vive l'Armée!," "--la chose jugée," and "À bas les Juifs!"--were "but faintly echoed in the larger world of France."[21] Other journalists asserted their belief that the general population was not anti-republican. Rather, most Frenchmen were moderate republicans who opposed monarachists and socialists. Some British observers argued that the middle class, concerned with high taxation, looked askance at militarism; others claimed that the peasantry disliked the idea of a restored monarchy or Royalist revolt, which, in all probability, would bring the reinstitution of the tithe and the corvée. Saturday Review's correspondent at Rennes commented extensively on the popular apathy and indifference in France following the court-martial. In contrast to the indignant, voiciferous British response after the verdict, the masses exhibited signs of relief and the desire to go on to other things. They had no desire for revolution. But they preferred privately to retain their own convictions and let the soldiers and politicians settle the matter.

To some journalists, the prediction of impending counter-revolution was claptrap. Greenwood taunted those who sounded alarms and claimed the existence of a "joint-stock conspiracy of Bonapartists, Royalists, Boulangists, Jesuits, and Jew-haters" against the Republic. He cited the death and funeral procession of President Félix Fuare. The days in February 1899 following Faure's unexpected death were tense. French and foreign observers anxiously wondered whether his successor would be for or against the Dreyfusards. Much to the dismay of Nationalists and anti-Semites, Emile Loubet, who favored revision of the Dreyfus case, became Faure's replacement. The time seemed auspious for the Right to act. If properly timed and well-organized, a military coup might fell the Republic. In spite of a futile and rather comic effort by Nationalist anti-Semite Paul Déroulède to persuade General Gaudérique Roget to join him and "the people" and lead his troops at Faure's funeral procession in a military coup, no revolution occurred. If there was a conspiracy, the leaders, through lack of preparation, missed an excellent opportunity to attack the Republic. Greenwood concluded, "it seems to show that we in England had been misled by exaggerated representations of the state of things in France. . . . There may be no such conspiracy as the frenzied Dreyfusards accuse the furious anti-Dreyfusards of plotting."[22]

Manchester Guardian buttressed this argument by reminding its readers that the Army missed another excellent opportunity to revolt in June 1899 when a young aristocrat named Christiani assaulted President Loubet at the races at Auteuil. The Anti-Semitic League was responsible for this incident. League officials hoped that Christiani's attack on the President would trigger large-scale brawls. Both police and soldiers

put an end to the disturbance. The "comedy in the Auteuil row" demonstrated the improbability of a military revolution. "Had the army been willing to move, we do not think that the chiefs of the reaction would have resorted to the vulgar outburst" at Auteuil.[23]

French generals did not necessarily like the Republic. Those who were often placed in ministerial posts were contemptuous of parliamentary rhetoric, lawyer-ministers, and the Army's financial dependence upon a civil power. Almost all of them were conservative in outlook. Army officers stood for "order, hierarchy, [and] obedience." They possessed a "different set of values from the republicans, with Catholic officers perpetuating the ideals of the ancien régime."[24]

Even though a number of men with well known republican sentiments "did in fact reach the highest rank in the Army . . . [a] convinced Republican officer was an anomaly." General Galliffet, the Minister of War in 1899 who "made no bones about his loyalty to the Republic . . . was notoriously eccentric."[25] Nevertheless, Galliffet's colleagues, with the exception of Boulangists, were not mortal enemies of republican institutions. Rather they had a history of supporting the regime which was in power, regardless of its political form. Since the founding of the Army as a "permanent institution of state" under Louis XIV, "military men were the docile and disciplined servants of any regime that knew how to govern, how to give orders, even if the soldiers disliked or disapproved of the orders in question." The Army was a non-political organization which took a detached view of political matters. Military affairs were another thing. Since politicians lacked the technical expertise to run the Army, they left this job to professional soldiers. The Army guarded its prerogative and autonomy over the "purely military

matters, involving both the long-term institutional interests of the army, and its ability to discharge its technical mission." The generals left politicians to run the ship of state. An entente of sorts existed between the General and the Politician.

David B. Ralston, who has analyzed the seventy-year relationship between the Third Republic and the French Army, convincingly argues that at "no time during the Dreyfus Affair did the officer corps as a group or in any numerically significant minority contemplate an overt act against the government. . . . the soldiers did no more than grumble menacingly." As there was no clerical conspiracy, so there was no military conspiracy. Just as the Army refused to follow Boulanger, whom most officers considered an undisciplined upstart, so it resisted those who encouraged a military coup d'état in the 1890s. Rumours of military plots abounded. Police records in the French national archives indicate that the gendarmes followed up many leads which implicated the leading generals in plans to overthrow the Republic. If there was a military conspiracy, "no traces of it have been found in contemporary police records, nor was the government ever led to prosecute any soldiers for crimes against the state." This is not to say that the Army was not anti-Dreyfusard. Even as the revisionists began to produce persuasive proofs, most soldiers were unable to fathom the possibility that their chiefs would continue to affirm the guilt of an innocent man. "Faced with the potential implications of the innocence of Dreyfus"--that the Army was led by "not merely stupid but also dishonorable" men--"the officer corps as a whole preferred not even to admit the possibility." The Affaire temporarily upset the "entente between the army and the Republic." Nevertheless, the "time was long past . . . when the French

soldier would think of taking arms against the powers that be, no matter how sorely tried he was by their policies."

The Republic was indeed the ruler of France, and not subservient to the military. The government refused to make any effort to defend the Army against the charges brought against the French system of military service by author Urban Gohier. This was a prelude of things to come. Soldiers accepted the efforts made to republicanize the Army during the decade following the Affaire. They "never wavered or gave the civil authorities within the state any real grounds for doubting their sense of discipline toward the regime or their devotion to the nation."[26] Indeed, a wave of anti-militarism followed the Affaire. The Radicals, who advocated the replacement of the Army with a national militia, used their influence within the Waldeck-Rousseau government to punish the Army for its role in the Affaire. The government retired three members of the French War Board, and relieved several generals of their posts. General Galliffet finally resigned, largely because of the anti-military spirit of the administration. His replacement, General Louis André, a confirmed republican, intended to prevent the Army from running its own affairs. He put the Army through what one historian describes as a "prolonged purgatory."[27] André's appointment precipitated the resignation of two highly placed officers, Generals Delanne and Jamont. Two generals with noted republican loyalties, not to mention less distinguished careers, filled the vacant positions. André altered the system of promotion so that the Ministry of War, rather than the officers, had the power to promote. He initiated measures which eventually reduced the term of military service from three years to two. His subordinates established an espionage system to monitor the religious habits of

officers. They kept a card file on those who attended Mass and those who openly expressed their views against the Republic. The exposure of this spy-system brought about André's dismissal, but by the time this occurred, both the prestige and the morale of the Army had declined.

In the style of Gohier, denunciations of life in the barracks and of military chauvinism appeared in teachers' magazines, and were expressed in the Chamber. As the Radical attacks upon the Church produced negative results, so the campaign against the Army spawned bitterness, distrust, and rancor. Many officers resigned their commissions, and there were only half as many applications after 1900 to the famous military school, St. Cyr, as there had been in the nineteenth century. Guy Chapman summarizes, writing, "Had the Affair been, as it should have been, confined to Mercier, Sandherr, and the Section, it could have been decently wound up." Instead, the "long-term effects of political Dreyfusardism were almost wholly evil. The following wave of anti-militarist and politically conscious pacifism" genuinely weakened the Army.[28] This, much more than the Affaire, reduced the effectiveness of the Army as the defender of the nation, and the potential value of France as an ally. Far from resisting the measures which reduced the potency of the Army, officers, as they usually did, remained loyal to the Republic. There was no serious military plot to overthrow the government either during or after the Affaire.

Just as several British observers accurately predicted that no revolution would be precipitated by the Affaire, so there were several, not the least of whom was Chief Justice Russell, who asserted that Dreyfus would eventually be fully rehabilitated. They warned their countrymen not to act too hastily by striking the name of France from

the role of civilized nations. As the Popish Plot in seventeenth century Britain and the agitation which accompanied it preceded progressive political reform, the Affaire might produce the same positive results. Not all of France was anti-Dreyfusard. Many courageous men stood up to the generals and politicians in spite of all the pressures upon them to hold their peace. Minister of Justice Ludovic Trarieux alluded to this behavior in Contemporary Review writing, "Is there a finer example of citizenship known than this epic resistance to insult, intimidation, and menace, solely by the use of those legal weapons which enabled these voluteer soldiers of duty to make their voices heard?" The Dreyfusards were the "true interpreters of that national spirit which has always shown itself alive to questions of justice and generosity."

In British publications, Godfernaux, Cornély, and Trarieux admonished readers to withhold judgment.[29] The French Dreyfusards promised to bring their fight to a successful conclusion, and argued that the Affaire was best viewed as the signal that a new era of hope and democratic progress in France was soon to arrive. The Affaire had shaken many of France's greatest minds out of complacency and drawn them into the arena of public affairs. It promised to provoke reforms in the Code of military justice and underscored the need for making all evidence in courts-martial public. It demonstrated the dangers of using military attachés for espionage. The excesses of the Yellow press during the Affaire provided a valuable object lesson which encouraged those who hoped for the progress of liberal principles. The expression of all convictions and accusations was healthy since it eventually affirmed the truth and discredited passionate appeals and falsehood, at least to

those with open and rational minds. "This tacit affirmation of the sovereign power of truth, of its slow but invincible force, is the most honourable act of faith of the modern spirit." It demonstrated the "virtues of free examination." Godfernaux predicted a moral and religious transformation as another product of the Affaire, which helped to show "that the age is past when knowledge was concentrated in the hands of a small number, who dictated to the crowd the dogmas before which they had to cow." He expected the Catholic Church would be forced to adopt a more liberal approach.[30]

In retrospect, the cooler heads in Britain, who viewed the Affaire in historical perspective, had a better understanding of its meaning than their fellows who perceived it as the beginning of the end for civilized France. The Republic did indeed survive, and Republican solidarity increased because of the Affaire. In 1914, Sir Thomas Barclay wrote that far from being a near successful reactionary assault on the Republic, the Affaire represented the final effort of desperate nationalist, Boulangist, and reactionary groups to turn back the tide of social and political progress. The Army was not intent on overturning the Republic. Rather, the Army "found itself supported by a coalition of all the anti-republican forces in France and opposed by the government."[31] In the end, those who opposed the Republic were not strong enough to do permanent or serious harm. Times correspondent, Morton Fullerton, writing fifteen years after the trial at Rennes, mused that over the long run, the Affaire had produced positive and healthy advances.[32] Notwithstanding, the anti-clerical and anti-militarist reaction, the Republic survived and Dreyfus did, in fact, receive not

only a full pardon but promotion to the rank of Major. He was also made a Knight of the Legion of Honor.

During the heat of the Affaire, not all British journalists took such a charitable view of the Republic. A second group expounded a very different argument. The editorial policy adopted by Contemporary Review was more critical of the Republic than any other British publication. This journal argued that since the collapse of Louis Napoleon' Empire, the French had a "so-called Republic" which was a bundle of contradictions. Among other things, Contemporary Review cited the Franco-Russian alliance and the unequal justice dispensed to Zola as examples of how the military oligarchy in France sacrificed republican principles. The "sham Republicism" in France differed little from the government administered by Napoleon III since true liberals played no significant roles in governing France. In the midst of the "irreconcilable opposition between theory and reality" Frenchmen enjoyed less genuine freedom than did Germans, Austrians, or even Russians. In France, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity were "synonymous with a system of oppression, corrupt fanaticism, racial hatred, and ignoble espionage to which Turkey alone offers a suitable parallel."

The French version of republican government was an "unnatural union of clerical demagogy and infallible militarism" which was distinguished by its moral cowardice and unwillingness or inability to defend republican ideals. The generals, the guardians of the Republic, used the power "against the very people whom they have sworn to defend" and forced their rule upon the Republic. Instead of bringing France greater security, independence, and self-reliance, it brought a subtle king of bondage. Military bodies under autocratic rule, as in Germany and

Russia, could be controlled by the monarch. But in a republic, the Army was without a master, having power without responsibility. It could be expected to act in its own interests, even at the expense of civil power. In spite of the claim that since Napoleon I, every soldier carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack, an aristocratic cast controlled the Army. Since most Army leaders in France had strong royalist sympathies, Contemporary Review found it no surprise that officers usually preferred some form of strong personal rule, and held the Republic in contempt.[33] Conybeare argued that "a large standing army is barely compatible with genuinely Democratic and Republican institutions."[34]

Many of the British observers who watched the Affaire mistakenly argued that the Army enjoyed superior influence over the civil authorities. National Review frequently charged that no revolution would come in France, since the Army, for all practical purposes was already the non-titled ruler of the nation. If others were not so confident that the Army rather than the Cabinet controlled the country, they were not so sure that the civil powers enjoyed popular respect and trust or possessed the will to govern. One concerned observer wrote, "if the civil power abicates its supremacy, the army will not long remain silent." If nature abhorred a vacuum, so did the generals of France. The writer predicted that they would seize power if the politicians were unwilling to use it to protect the Republic. Many agreed that the Army expected and received the benefit of special exemptions and laws which protected it to a fault. The Affaire created a situation in which generals demanded that the Army be held above reproach or question, and regarded as infallible. Members of the General Staff issued

Spanish-style pronunciamentos and leaned toward Praetorianism, the rule of the Army for its own benefit.

The special liberties granted to the Army gave the generals occasion to demonstrate their incompetence and malevolence before France and the world. Among other things, they sent Picquart, compared to Uriah the Hittite of Biblical fame, to the perilous Tunisian frontier. Some in Britain believed that his was a suicide mission designed to eliminate an undesirable thorn in the side of the General Staff. Repeatedly, on several different witness stands high-ranking officers committed perjury, white-washed forgers and traitors, and evidenced virtually no respect for the truth. A people who highly esteemed an institution which supported such calumny was, in British eyes, highly dangerous.[35]

Some argued that the Army in France was "an object of worship." The people seemed to be given over to a "perverted military spirit" which prompted excited and enthusiastic crowds to throng the sidewalks whenever a military regiment passed down the street. One's patriotism was measured by the degree to which one supported the Army. According to G. W. Steevens, even when the Army suffered defeat, France, like a mother comforting her unsuccessful offspring, continued to love her own. There was a general unwillingness among the French to admit that they as a people had sacrificed so much in material goods and flesh and blood to acquire an inefficient military machine. Because the people did not trust the Deputies and Ministers, they placed their faith in the Army.

Some British observers believed they made the Army an idol before which they were willing to sacrifice all things, including

republicanism.[36] Those who worshipped the Army failed to see that the honor of the General Staff was not the same as the honor of the Army. British critics argued that, ironically, the French, or at least a sizeable portion of the population, believed that generals of low character could lead France to victory in war. The Army could not be held together with lies or by those who sanctioned falsehoods and forgeries. Refusal to hear criticism was a distorted form of patriotism and would in no way insure the safety of the nation. Rather, it imperilled France.[37]

The actions of the French Army were but part of a much larger European phenomenon at the end of the century: the transformation of Europe into a fortified camp. The rise of militarism endangered republican government. Again, British critics used the Affaire as an occasion to critique trends which ran counter to what they perceived as good and proper government. British observers, especailly liberal ones, who were preoccupied with economic progress and growth, found the increasing size and influence of Continental armies to be alarming. Since armies had enormous material power, they were always a potential threat to civil government and liberal society. Not the least of reasons for which the British criticised militarism was the exorbitant cost of operating a large and sophisticated military machine. As technical knowledge increased, nations had to update their weapons in order not to fall behind in an early version of the modern arms race. Innovation and change cost money. So did providing food for the horses of the cavalry, and for troops whom generals wanted healthy and fit for combat. To maintain national armies, legislators who favored strengthening the military fought for taxation, which if enacted placed burdens on European

industry, agriculture, and trade. Many liberals believed this drain on national resources was "stupidly ruining and sterilising . . . at the very time when she [Europe] needs all her forces in order to hold her own against the industrial and commercial competition of the New World."[38]

Material resources were not the only loss. Young men, forced to spend time in the military service, sacrificed potentially productive years during which advance in personal careers was delayed. Conscription, which after 1870 was adopted by all major European powers save Britain, reduced the number of men "disposable for civil labour." The conscript system, which created a nation of soldier-citizens, bred contempt in officers for enlisted men. Officers saw recruits as expendable commodities. If some were lost in war or to disease in inhospitable tropical climates, "'There are always more coming.'" The system provided career officers with "multitudes of temporary slaves." The French adopted the system of conscription as a means to beat the Prussians at their own game. French militarism developed out of a desire to exact revenge. According to some British critics, the French carried to the extreme the disciplinary measures practiced by their opponent across the Rhine. The use of "the whip" was not restrained.

Discipline was made more severe by the habit of French officers to delegate much of their authority over enlisted men to non-commissioned officers while expecting, in turn, to be supported by them. Like Catholicism, the system encouraged blind obedience to superiors, and according to theory, bred the likes of Henry, Esterhazy, de Clam and other unsavory characters. In contrast, British observers argued that discipline in the British Navy promoted positive development of character.

The opponents of the movement at the end of the century to reform the British Army were quick to cite the Affaire and the French Army to demonstrate their case. Opponents of conscription used the Affaire and the lessons it demonstrated as a stick to beat those who called for a more sophisticated and expensive military system. Recalling the mistrust for armies and military dictatorships which dated from Cromwell, they cited the dangers of militarism in a democratic society and the incompatibility of a strong standing army with republican institutions. Conscription and army reform seemed to them inconsonant with the British political heritage. These commentators proudly observed that Britain had no great military machine to maintain and control, lest it turn on its creator, eliminate civil freedoms, and install itself as ruler of the nation. The defects in the French system were good to remember "when many . . . . [were] lamenting the absence of conscription in England."[39] With an obvious pride reflecting national self-satisfaction, Conybeare wrote, "In England . . . we do not need secret societies [in reference to the French Freemasons] in order to secure our elementary civil rights against the tyranny of . . . Praetorian guards."[40]

The intrusions of the military into civil government were by no means the only faults which British critics of the Republic found. Compared to British citizens, Frenchmen enjoyed far fewer civil rights. French citizens were often the victims of violation of the right of domicile. Civil authorities had broad powers which allowed them to restrict freedom of assembly and teaching. They opened mail and examined private papers as they saw the need, and people arrested were subject

to long periods of precautionary detention. Spectator was a leading critic of the police surveillance system in France. It wrote:

> To be known to the police is in England something of a disgrace; in France it is to be a free-born citizen, or an accepted foreigner, and if we do not recognise this striking difference which divides the countries, we shall never understand the miserable intrigue which threatens to destroy our neighbour's self-respect. . . . we are gratified with the strange spectacle of a democracy pledged to a system which would better befit a tyranny of the Middle Ages. . . . And no one protests. . . . it reflects no credit upon the Republic. . . . These restrictions upon the liberty of the subject would cause the wildest uproar in England, which is not a democracy. In France, which boasts the triple watchword—"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"—no infringement upon the rights of the citizen seems to be resented.

Mathieu Dreyfus, who believed himself to be the victim of this system, claimed that he was "shadowed" by the authorities from 1894 through 1899.[41]

Contemporary Review argued that the true republicans in France were suppressed. Those who posed as the great defenders of the Republic—those who used all the appropriate republican jargon—were actually the most dangerous enemies of political liberty. These men were not sincere in their support of republicanism. They used the appellation "republican" better to "succeed with the masses." They were the self-seeking, self-loving "parvenus of democracy." The French seemed destined to follow the politically bankrupt course of Spain. France would lose her "rank and rôle" in the hierarchy of European states; she would descend to the position of "a third-rate power." On her present course, "national decay and death . . . [was] a mere question of time."[42] Yet, in spite of the dismal picture painted by Contemporary Review, this journal proclaimed the imminent coming of better things. Like many liberals of this period the journalists writing in this publication had an abiding faith in the inexorable force of progress and the inevitable victory of liberalism over the old order.

In spite of negative outward appearances, France was "in the throes of a great social revolution." Although the "coming revolution in France" would not necessarily be a violent one, it was sure nonetheless. Thanks to the continuing efforts of Dreyfusards, the people would be roused "from the state of hypnotic sleep" and would see the eventual rehabilitation of Dreyfus as the first step in a much wider movement to restore France to her former greatness and place her once again "in the vanguard of civilisation." Although the liberal element in France lost the battle at Rennes, it would win the war to establish a genuine Republic and quash the retrograde forces which, after the Rennes trial, appeared victorious. The "spirit of dictatorship, which is the shadow of the phantom of the Bonapartes, [will] diminish little by little and gradually fade away."[43]

A third group of journalists expected revolution in France, but one of a very different kind. Many of these individuals perceived the end of the century as a time in which liberalism faltered and the anti-democratic forces on the Continent enjoyed resurgence. The "new imperialism" was in vogue, and reactionaries, all frustrated with the ineffectiveness of parliamentary governments and their slowness to act, benefited from the shift of power to European conservatives. The British, used to and generally favorable toward parliamentary government, watched this trend with concern and alarm. The Manchester Guardian wrote, "In the three great democratic countries [Britain, France, and the United States] democracy is on trial."[44] In France, the Affaire appeared to be the failure of democracy in microcosm. It placed a "great strain on the

democratic process in France."[45] This strain, according to some, would result in the overthrow of the Republic.

Spectator, above all other publications, editorially supported this argument. As early as the debate among Deputies about the reinstitution of the death penalty in 1895, it expressed concerns about the revolutionary rumblings. The "language of frenzy," which in France usually shook the government, distinguished these discussions. The possibility that the Republic might fall greatly distressed Spectator. Its contributors believed that this form of liberal government was by far the best for France. In Benthamite terms, Spectator argued that it produced "the largest measure of security and liberty for the largest number" and kept France "at once contented and peaceful."[46] To demonstrate to its readers the gravity of the situation, Spectator invoked memories of the past century of French history. It encouraged Englishmen to remember the "traditions of the French Army, at least since the arch-Machiavellian ruler, Napoleon." In detail, Spectator described what it perceived as Napoleon's adoption and use of unscrupulous and murderous tactics. For Napoleon, the end justified the means. "Nothing is sacred enough to be respected, as nothing is too immoral to be shunned. . . . [This] is the tradition . . . of the French Army since Napoleon." The Merciers, Gonses, Boisdeffres, and de Clams of the 1890s followed in this notorious tradition by propagating lies, forgeries, and murder.[47] Neither did these generals hesitate to plot against the Republic.

Spectator wrote:

> there is in this Dreyfus affair something more serious still, something which really menaces not only the existing Government of France, but the Republic itself. . . . It is by no means certain

> that this Dreyfus affair will not profoundly affect the view entertained by the whole Army of France in their relation to the Republic. . . . an objectionable system [which they believed] should be swept away. In France the soldiers have no remedy, or think that they have none, except modifying the foundations of the State. . . . [The Affaire] was merely the match that fired the explosion of hatred between bona-fide Republicans . . . and the Army, the Church, and the people. . . . The former are fighting, not for Dreyfus, but against the system which combines a Republican and athiest State with a huge permanent Army and a state-endowed Church.[48]

From the Zola trial through the aftermath of Rennes, Spectator predicted the worst, proclaiming its grave and "anxious sadness as to the stability of the Republic." Until June 1899, it predicted that revision would prompt an immediate military coup d'état. During the proceedings at Assize, it predicted that the Army would play "the prominent and active role." As revision became a more popular cause, the situation became more precarious. Generals resented politicians and civil judges who resurrected the Dreyfus case and questioned the original court-martial. "Humiliated officers . . . [were] not very easy people to manage." Spectator believed that the Army would retaliate for impurtations against the War Office. It speculated that "grave and able officers" must question "whether the time has not arrived when a soldier should again be head of the State, able to restore the Army to its rank among the institutions of France," place the Republic "beneath its heel," and support a new Caesar. Habits of mind developed by Army life precluded a strong belief in parliamentarianism and republicanism. Moreover, the administrations of the Republic had failed to achieve "any great adminstrative or diplomatic success." Republicans had demonstrated their inability to manage the Army, which, under the Republic, had failed to achieve great military success. In such an environment, soldiers would probably "thirst to see a trained soldier at their head."[49]

This false perception of the French milieu led Spectator to perhaps the most interesting, unique, and improbable interpretation of the Affaire. Just as the Yellow press in France expounded the myth of an anti-French Jewish-Freemason-Foreign Syndicate which supported Dreyfus and the Dreyfusard agitation, so Spectator created an equally bizarre and unbelievable hypothesis. Citing the lessons taught by the "distinguished soldier" Louis Napoleon and the "adventurous" Boulanger--that "soldiers do not defend" discredited authority--it argued that prior to 1894 there existed a third plot, an Army-led anti-Dreyfusard conspiracy made up of anti-Semites, traitorous politicians, and the populace, and designed to undermine the Republic. As on the two earlier occasions, several leading generals designed a scheme to topple the government and install a military regime. The hapless Dreyfus stumbled on to and exposed this conspiracy. For this he suffered the vengeance of his superiors. In 1899, Spectator wrote, "This appears to us no impossible hypothesis. . . . why should we suppose that a third and well-organized conspiracy . . . was not in active progress four years ago? . . . Is it not the one hypothesis which throws light on all the facts" and explains the reluctance of the government to publish the contents of the secret dossier which allegedly proved Dreyfus' guilt?[50] While Spectator did not expound this theory for very long, it never retracted its allegation and continued to believe that the Republic was in great peril.

In the midst of this danger, there was one encouraging belief: that France lacked a suitable strong-man to take control. If France was a monarchy in search of a king, there was an "absence of a resolute leader." There was no heir to the Orléanist throne, no Napoleon Bonaparte who stood out above his fellow generals. The Army was in

effect "headless." None of the generals in the 1890s had led the Army to a great victory. Moreover, French generals distrusted one another. The time was certainly opportune for the ascent of some great military man. With grwoing unease, Spectator, in the late 1890s, observed the glorification of the Napoleonic legend and the increase in sales made by street hawkers selling biographies of Napoleon and photographs of the Bonaparte family. But the hesitancy of the Bonaparte family precluded a Bonapartist revolt. Efforts to draft Captain Marchand of Fashoda fame also came to nought. No general seemed willing "to stake his life or liberty for a throne."[51] Even if one had been willing, there was no absolute guarantee that the Army would follow his lead.

Still, there seemed to be no force in France powerful enough to resist a military revolution. And on the 18th Brumaire, the obedience of the Army had been by no means certain. Spectator refused to believe that the cult of Napoleon was dead, and asserted "there is one Napoleon left who is a trained soldier who is available, and against whom no one in France says or knows anything whatever." This unknown man might rise quickly from obscurity and surprise France and all of Europe. Even after the Rennes verdict and the pardon of Dreyfus, Spectator's expectations were not high. One "must abandon hope that this Government [Waldeck-Rousseau's] is strong enough to end the contest between militarism and civil order which for four years has been raging in France." It predicted the continued resentment of soldiers against "the dominion of 'those lawyers' to whom it attributes its present partial defeat."[52]

The years which followed the Affaire proved how inaccurate the ravings and prophecies of Spectator were. The anti-Republicans were

composed of many disparate elements of French society including anti-Semites, Royalists, Bonapartists, Nationalists, Priests, Conservatives, and, of course, Generals. The first group of British journalists who argued that reactionary forces in France were moribund, was essentially correct. The French Right was too weak and too disunited to re-establish dictatorial rule. Indeed, the Republic lived on until 1940. It was not subservient to the Army, rather that Army remained largely as it had been since the reign of Louis XIV: the servant of the government in power. The Army proved its loyalty by refusing to revolt at opportune moments during the Affaire, and submitting to those in the Waldeck-Rousseau administration who did their best to republicanize the military service. If the anti-Dreyfusards made condemnations based on partial or inaccurate information, so did those who refused to take the long view, acted in haste, and predicted the victory of reaction in France. Events disproved these predictions.

Some journalists placed too much emphasis on French anti-Dreyfusard, reactionary groups and the differences between the political systems in Britain and France. They over-emphasized the anti-parliamentary and chaotic elements in French political life. Few writers remembered that these two nations shared the same national-liberal political tradition. Many evaluated the French Republic by British standards which did not always apply. If militarism was a feature of late-nineteenth century French society, it was so in part because the French had a greater need than the British for an army to defend vulnerable borders. French security also required a friend on the Continent. These security needs compelled republican politicians to overlook the ideological differences between Tsarist Russia and republican France,

and conclude the alliance of 1894. The misinterpretation of events in France reflected both pride in British political institutions and the concern British liberals had about growing illiberal sentiment at home. By contrasting the situation in France with political tranquility in Britain, some attempted to argue the case for British political genius. By underscoring the illiberal features of anti-Dreyfusism, journalists tried to draw object lessons for the benefit of those in Britain who had come to question the beneficence and viability of the liberal ethos. If some observers were mistaken or unfair in their criticisms of the Republic, there were others who were partially correct in predicting a silent, bloodless revolution to the Left. It was not politically expedient fully to rehabilitate Dreyfus in 1899. The existing government did what it could by granting him pardon and freedom.

Less than seven years after Rennes, Dreyfus received full acquittal.[53] This heralded the victory of republicanism and demonstrated that France had maintained her integrity during this great testing of her systems. Even before this final act in the Dreyfus drama, the British expressed enough confidence in the Republic to conclude the Entente of 1904. In 1899, very few British observers predicted such an improvement of relations between the French and British governments. Somewhat ironically, the British strongly supported the Dreyfusards, who, when in power, actually weakened the French Army by attempting to republicanize it. In effect, they gave support to those who made their future partner a less effective ally. The Affaire did, of course, have important implications vis-à-vis the European international situation. British journalists were quick to comment in this regard.

CHAPTER VI

THE AFFAIRE AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

> The healthy condition of France is recognised by all intelligent thinkers as a needful factor in Europe. The Economist, 25 February 1899.

> [There is a] new spirit of the age, which . . . tends toward a regime of 'love'. The nations are believed to have become gentler. . . . The horror of the foreigner qua foreigner has almost disappeared, all the peoples tolerating, if they do not like, all visitors who are white and who speak in any intelligible tongue . . . The world, in fact, though far from gentle, has become distinctly gentler, and brutality is no longer confounded with manliness. Spectator, 11 December 1897.

> The nations have more to gain by each others' progress than by the failure of some to improve, and their consequent impotence to arrest the march of others. It is their conscious weakness that makes peoples ill-tempered and jealous, anxious to fish in troubled waters, instead of being chiefly solicitous of friendly alliances and beneficial exchange of commodities. Jewish Chronicle, 26 August 1898.

After 1878, permanent alliances and secret diplomacy became a prominent feature of European international relations. The Affaire had a direct impact on the balance of power and the alliance system in late-nineteenth century Europe. The unstable appearance of the Republic caused some foreign observers to believe that revolution was only a matter of time. Contemporaries speculated that if the revolution was

to the Left, reactionary powers were likely to intervene. If it was to the Right, France might become the aggressor and trigger a general war. There were others who believed that France would embroil Europe in a war to distract her citizens from the Affaire. If France somehow managed to avoid revolution, the behavior of the General Staff had discredited, in the eyes of many European statesmen and military leaders, the French Army as a viable military force. The Affaire altered the weights in the balance of power, making the balance unstable. It weakened the Franco-Russian entente and tipped the balance in favor of the Triple Alliance. British statesmen were pleased by this shift in one respect. The Franco-Russian combination was theoretically aimed at Germany, but in fact, both members of the entente had outstanding imperial differences with Britain and were by no means on the best of terms with her. The entente also threatened British naval superiority in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the weakening of France made German Continental hegemony a real possibility. The British, who preferred to remain "beyond the sphere of the balance,"[1] found this especially distressing since their security was tied to the balance of power on the Continent. Without some power to check German expansion, British independence and the ability effectively to defend the Empire would be imperilled. As William Langer has observed, the British were not as anxious to preserve a balance of power as they were to maintain peace and equilibrium on the Continent. Britain was a "status quo" power. Her material interests would be threatened in any European conflict. She was in "the heyday of her economic prosperity" and had "nothing to gain by war and had a good deal to lose even from a war between other powers."[2] British superiority in international politics seemed to be at stake.

Many British observers also found war distasteful for ideological reasons. The liberal community in Britain looked forward to and expected the coming of a day when nation-states would transcend the barriers of national interests and act in the best interests of the community of mankind. British liberals were quick to notice the danger which militarism--in particular, that which they associated with the Affaire--posed to the realization of love and harmony among nations. Many liberals argued that disarmament would reduce the chance of conflict, and that military spending was both wasteful and unproductive. In early 1898, one of the greatest liberal minds in Britain, William E. Gladstone, then in the final year of his life, reflected on the state of international affairs. The G. O. M. expressed his regret that he had not died years before. He saw "no advance in any causes worth advancing . . . [and] an increase in the conditions that made for instability." To demonstrate his point, he referred to the Dreyfus case in France.[3] Gladstone represented the Cobdenite tradition. He supported a Concert of European powers and arbitration to regulate selfish national interests, and looked askance at those who trusted in entangling alliances and the balance of power. He believed that peace, goodwill, and Free Trade were antithetical to war, the martial spirit, and international rivalry.

Gladstone's liberal idealism and distaste for war and militarism was characteristic of the British analysis of the Affaire and its international implications. This world view made many unsympathetic toward France. Frequently, British journalists demonstrated a marked inability to appreciate the legitimate security needs of France. Britain's insular position made these observers less aware of the realities of international politics than their Continental counterparts. The

British lived in comparative detachment from Continental affairs. They had less of an immediate stake in what took place on the Continent than the main Continental powers. As a result, the British often perceived themselves as disengaged observers who could make judgments about what was right rather than necessary based on national interests. Their analysis of Continental affairs was often moralistic. Continental statesmen, often confronted with limited options when forced to deal with day-to-day problems, sometimes took offense at British comment. In analyzing the Affaire, British journalists made frequent moralizations about the conduct of international relations.

They decried the system of espionage which the Affaire so dramatically demonstrated, and believed that nations should conduct their relations in the open rather than using covert means to undermine the position of neighboring states. The buying and selling of military secrets was not something which gentlemen did. The Affaire also illustrated the dangers of relying upon a balance of power which was always subject to the uncertain shifts and alterations. The Dreyfus imbroglio introduced a disconcerting element into the international system and made European conflict a real possibility.

Some believed that European stability hinged on events in France. Contemporary Review argued that France was "the yeast which leavens the . . . dough of Europe."[4] As such, it was wise for the British to tailor their foreign policy to account for changed circumstances in France. If, as some suspected, France was about to plummet from her prestigious and respected position, leaving a conspicuous power vacuum in Northwestern Europe, Germany would probably upset the balance of power by turning France into a satellite of Berlin.[5] G. W. Steevens

wrote, "the great international result of three years of government by generals is that France has virtually showed herself unfit for war by sea or land--afraid of England, terrified by Germany, the vassal of Russia--all but a second-rate power."[6]

Such a prospect naturally interested the Russians with whom France was allied. Many British observers believed that the Affaire had caused a "palpable weakening of the Franco-Russian Alliance." Some argued that the General Staff, if not the French Army, stood discredited by virtue of its corruption, incompetence, immorality, and military ineptitude. Whether Dreyfus had conveyed classified information to Germany, someone had, and this troubled Russian policy-makers. Tension between the Army and the civil government also made the Tsar's officials uneasy. Some critical observers believed that the damage done to French prestige was worse than the debacle of 1870 when France fell before the Prussian Army. The Economist wrote:

> though almost any State in Europe would in ordinary times be proud of France as an ally, at the present moment they all hesitate to connect themselves with her, partly from motives derived from the general situation, and partly from distrust of her internal condition.

So long as the "final outcome" of the Dreyfus case remained uncertain, the value of France as a military ally was questionable. Even prior to Rennes, Ignatius Zakrewski, the President of the Russian Court of Appeal, published in the Law Journal of St. Petersburg a rebuke of French conduct during the trials connected with the Affaire. Pobiedonosteff, the Procurator of the Holy Synod, argued that the evidence at Rennes showed Dreyfus' innocence. National Review, which carefully monitored the response of the liberal and intellectual Russian community to the Affaire, claimed that the sentencing of Zola was the equivalent

of sending Tolstoy to Siberia. It also interpreted the Russian movement for disarmament at the close of the century as a direct response to anxieties prompted by the Affaire. This movement allegedly reflected Russia's desire not to be unequally yoked to an impotent and corrupt French partner in the event of a European war. Some British observers perceived Delcassé's trip to St. Petersburg in August 1899 as an effort to shore up deteriorating Franco-Russian relations and strengthen the Alliance. The Economist believed that given weakening Franco-Russian ties, France would probably look elsewhere for support since both her Army and government, "unless violently insulted or injured, is [sic] compelled to avoid undertaking any great external enterprises without an ally." Unfortunately for France, because of the Affaire, Continental statesmen saw "no safety in alliance with" her, and Paris was "left for the moment isolated in Europe."

With or without an ally, an unstable France endangered Europe. If France fell into reactionary hands, there would be unsettling political and economic effects. France "would be the suspected foe of every power in Europe." Some argued that the threatened resurgence of the Right in France was part of a general European phenomenon, the growth of militarism. In England, it found expression as jingoism or Imperialism and in France as Nationalism. Given a French military dictatorship, Britain, Germany, and Austria "would all alike anticipate war." Any conflict involving these four major powers would, of course, be a major one.[7]

L. J. Maxse justified Britain's concern with this danger by writing:

> It is impossible for Englishmen to shut their eyes to the amazing chapter of French history which lies open before them, however

> anxious they may be to avoid wounding the susceptibilities of a sensitive and gallant nation. France after all is our nearest neighbour, our mutual relations are continuous, and our contact is world-wide. We cannot escape from one another anywhere. We have an immense stake in her strength and prosperity and are vitally concerned in the stability and well-being of her Government and people. We should be the very first to feel the effects of a political catastrophe to her. . . . On selfish grounds we are entitled to record current events in France, where a handful of military desperadoes seem to be in a fair way to capturing the Republic.

Maxse and his staff feared that the prejudice and passion in France, like seeds borne by the wind, were contagious and might spread to Britain.[8] If France withstood the threat of a military coup, a second danger yet remained. If the Affaire precipitated the establishment of a "Red Republic," the European powers, especially the more autocratic ones, would raise strong objections. Notwithstanding the probable support of the Socialist parties in Germany and Austria, which would benefit from such a development, the European governments would be "so opposed that they will probably all be hostile in a more or less active way."[9]

While many journalists in the British press cautioned readers about the dangerous situation across the Channel, many French observers perceived events in a different light. French Ambassador Paul Cambon sent several dispatches to France expressing his alarm about the possibility of war between Britain and France. Based upon his belief in the waning of Salisbury's influence and the ascendancy of Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, he concluded that after Britain resolved her problems with the Boers, she would turn on the French. Her object would be to supplement her colonial Empire by absorbing several French colonial possessions. Ambassador Monson, among many others, simultaneously predicted an Anglo-French confrontation precipitated by French

chicanery. Prior to Fashoda and the Affaire, most British citizens would probably have guessed that a Franco-German conflict was much more likely.[10]

During the final quarter of the century, the enmity between France and Germany was one of the troublesome features of the European international environment. During the thirty years following the Franco-Prussian War, the desire for protection from Germany and Revanche—the recovering of Alsace Lorraine—was an important element in the shaping of French foreign policy. The Prussian Army dislodged France from the dominant position she had held on the Continent since the seventeenth century. Many Frenchmen wished to redress the balance and re-establish her reputation as a military force of the first rank. Moreover, Bismarck had demonstrated that war paid, at least in terms of using force to make quick territorial gains. For many war became a "purifying and ennobling ideal." The French desire for revenge upon Germany, plus her domestic discomfiture at the turn of the century, introduced a very dangerous salient into international affairs.[11]

In spite of France's domestic difficulties and the consequent shift of the European balance of power against her, she still had "the essential conditions of power," plus a population which many in Britain believed was given to army-worship and a craving for military glory. Expressing its revulsion toward war, and the concern over advances in military technology during the century, Spectator considered the prospects of European conflagration: "It is terrible to think what the slaughter will be like."[12] Others made contrasts between the French and British armies. Unlike their counterparts in France, British officers, who constituted a sort of "social aristocracy," did not wear their

uniforms while off duty. They enjoyed a variety of life not available to French officers. The Frenchman received poor pay and faced "extremely monotonous service" in the provinces where existence was usually dull and dreary. Garrison life provided few amusements. In the overcrowded service, promotion came slowly. There was prestige in being a soldier, but tangible rewards were few. The one hope which sustained a French officer was "the hope of war." Coubertin wrtoe, "if war does not break out his labour is fruitless." Colonial war in Africa and Tonkin helped alleviate the anxieties of French officers, but some foreign observers believed that this was not enough.[13] They argued that the Affaire added a new twist to Anglo-French and Franco-German relations.

National Review believed that the foreign policy pursued by France following 1870 was essentially anti-British. In an 1898 editorial, it observed, "a disturbed France has not infrequently sought relief from internal anxiety by external adventure, and a growing number of her people believe that a sea war would be cheap." This suspicion that France might promote mischief abroad to alleviate her domestic discomfiture was reinforced in the spring of 1898, when Freycinet, the Minister of War, and Lockroy, the Minister of Marine, made speeches before the Chamber of Deputies. Their statements amounted to a departure from Germanophobic foreign policy and appeared to be aimed against Britain. Freycinet informed the Chamber that France was no longer able to keep up with Germany militarily. The superior German population made senseless French efforts to equal her competitor. A few days after Freycinet's announcement, Lockroy enunciated the "new Revanche". He alluded the naval prowess of France and argued that French ingenuity and skill

would compensate for "any numerical disparity in battleships." Since Britain was the only naval power in the world superior to France, Lockroy's words received a cool welcome by British journalists. National Review reached the pessimistic conclusion that, "Henceforward, the Navy will replace the Army as an object of national idolatry, and we shall supplant the Germans as objects of national hatred." France could no longer afford to "cultivate two first class hatreds at once." Nor did she need to since the generation which now served in the French armed services were infants in 1870. They were willing to let by-gones be by-gones.

National Review argued that the prospect of a naval war with Britain seemed much more attractive to most Frenchmen than a land war against Germany. The latter required the "personal service of every able-bodied male" and confronted French peasants with the prospect of a German invasion and occupation. On the other hand a war at sea would not involve conscripts since a land invasion of Britain was most unlikely. It could be "conducted at a safe distance from the man in the street." It would please the peasants who would benefit from price increases for their products. The reactionary classes in France welcomed the idea of a war upon Britain which was "infinitely more odious than Germany, as the centre of political freedom, individual liberty, and an incorruptible justice." Only the vaguely defined "commercial classes" which avoided politics would object to this venture, and by the time they voiced their opinion, it would be too late. Moreover, it would provide French citizens with amusement, with exciting newspaper accounts of naval battles, and the losses were minimal. Even if defeated, "France would lose a few colonies, to which Frenchmen will not go," and a few

ships which in time easily could be replaced. If she won, potential rewards were incalculable. These gains seemed worth the sacrifice of the Navy. It was like a "cheap lottery with few risks and great prizes." In spite of Maxse's arguments there was little indication that the idea of a sea war was taken seriously by many Frenchmen.

National Review argued that the Army was responsible for the anti-British agitation. The General Staff had everything to gain by the new Revanche since the French Navy would bear the brunt of the responsibilities. Consequently, the General Staff tried to inflame public opinion against Britain, hoping that while the Navy battled the British, it could complete its intrigue against the Republic and punish its internal enemies. It encouraged the French press to label Britain as the author of French political misfortunes and catastrophes. National Review found these prospects lamentable since the French and the British were the only "'free and liberal' people in Europe." A war between the two nations "would be a crime against civilization."[14] Indeed, the General Staff and the militarism it represented to some British journalists endangered many of the liberal ideals held dear by British observers.

One undesirable product generated by militarism was the creation of national intelligence networks throughout Europe designed to monitor developments in foreign lands. According to British journalists, only the British remained immune from the spy-mania which took hold of Europeans at the end of the century. Some British journalists argued that Dreyfus was the victim of the atmosphere of espionage which pervaded War Offices on the Continent during the 1890s. Some claimed that in France, the nation most preoccupied with espionage, a

spy-autocracy ruled. Spectator believed that the War Office had an annual allocation of £40,000 for the purpose of employing spies. The French attachment to espionage was the product of several factors. It was a reaction to French carelessness and indifference to German officers who "toured" the frontier in the years prior to the invasion of the Second Empire in 1870. The majority of Frenchmen were unable to accept the belief that their defeat was the result of inadequacies within the Army, the superiority of German soldiers, or a shift in the European balance of power. Instead, they preferred the theory that there was an enemy within; that treachery, anti-French conspiracies, and betrayal were to blame. The use of spies was believed by the French to be necessary for self-protection. The practice also reflected a desire not to be outstripped by advances made in military technology by foreign and potentially hostile powers.

One of the most fascinating theories briefly expounded by some organs of the British press revolved around the espionage which was a feature of the age. During the winter of 1897-1898, Spectator espoused the idea that Dreyfus was indeed guilty, but not of betraying military secrets to the Germans. Baron Bernhard von Bülow's denials to this effect before the Reichstag, as well as statements made by Marquis di Rudini for the Italian government, gave Spectator the confidence to conclude that only Britain or Russia had trafficked in espionage with Dreyfus. Since it was most unlikely that British Ambassador to France, Lord Dufferin, had bribed Dreyfus or any other French officer for military secrets, Spectator concluded that only Russia remained. By the summer of 1898, the Times had adopted this view. In the 27 June edition of the Times, Blowitz argued that France, upon concluding the

Entente with Tsar, provided the Russians with important secret military information. Much to the disappointment of French politicians and Army officers, the Russians, true to what Blowitz described as their inherently secretive nature, failed to reciprocate. They did indeed provide the French with information, but not the kind which the leaders of the Republic desired: in particular, plans in the event of a joint Franco-Russian war against Germany. Upon learning of this predicament, Blowitz posited that the clever and ambitious Dreyfus devised a way to do his country a favor. In exchange for information of little real importance, he hoped to gain classified military information from the Russians. He expected to receive the gratitude of his superiors for his endeavors, but in the end, his plans backfired. When the General Staff learned of his espionage, they were horrified. In an effort to teach the Russians that France "was not prepared to remain a junior partner in the firm," having to use intrigue to gain desired information from her own ally, they made an example of Dreyfus. As for Esterhazy, Blowitz argued that he was merely one of many European agent-provocateurs who laid "traps for foreign military agents to cause their removal from their posts and to make their successors less enterprising." After the Affaire became the business of the world, France could hardly give official acknowledgment to the truth for fear of alienating her needed partner, Russia. For this reason, French officials resisted the reopening of the Dreyfus case. The Times was not the first British publication to discuss this theory of Dreyfus' guilt, but the paper's prestige gave the argument credence which it previously did not enjoy. This credence was short-lived.

On 18 July, the Times published a letter from the co-editor of the Dreyfusard newspaper, Le Siècle, Joseph Reinach, who disputed Blowitz's version of the Affaire. A chorus of British journalists joined Reinach. At the head of the list was Leo Maxse, who devoted an entire article in National Review to exploding what he termed the "Russian Legend." With his characteristic legal-minded logic, he disassembled this "fantastic romance" piece by piece. Maxse asked why the French, so anxious to secure closer union with the Russians, exacted such a stringent penalty from an officer who merely hoped to achieve the desired goal. Moreover, he argued, the exchange of information between the French and Russian Departments of Intelligence was much more free than Blowitz led his readers to believe. If indeed the French provided Russia with so much valuable military information, why would they be tempted to "enter 'illicit' relations with a subordinate member of the état major?" If Dreyfus' crime was the betrayal of secrets to the Russians, Picquart, who certainly would have known this, appeared to be the king of fools for becoming one of the greatest champions of revision. Finally, Russia's "severely-supervised" Novoe Vremya proclaimed its support of revision, thus demonstrating the weakness of Blowitz's theory. This "Russian cock-and-bull story" was the invention of French statesmen--most probably the work of Gabriel Hanotaux--who were desperately seeking to appease the anger of German Ambassador to France, Count Münster. The Ambassador's anger was kindled when the French chose to ignore the official disclaimer of Germany's association with Dreyfus made by von Bülow. Russia's military party tolerated this nonsense as a courtesy to extricate their ally from an uncomfortable impasse. Maxse concluded that the theory was "invented solely for

foreign consumption."[15] Whatever its origins, adoption of this legend was the Times' most important misinterpretation of the Affaire. For reportage like this, Blowitz received criticism from his superiors, including editor G. E. Buckle, in London.

Although the "Russian Theory" was bogus, it was not uncommon for rather prestigious men to be involved in securing classified documents. The practice of espionage was not limited to the traditional kinds of spies. Chief Justice Russell believed that the military attachés, with the exception of Colonel Douglas Dawson in Paris and his British counterparts elsewhere, were little more than paid spies. Their goal was to observe the military activities, maneuvers, and danger signals in the foreign nations where they resided. Attachés interpreted their charge to include the acquisition of cladestine information and confidential documents through fair means or foul. Refusal to accept secrets passed on by traitors was a derogation of duty. In fact, a natural part of wise military preparation included the stealing of documents from foreign embassies, which was a breach of faith as well as a violation of international law, and the cultivation of illicit relations with informers and traitorous soldiers. The intense level at which espionage was practiced on the Continent was shown by stories about veiled ladies and the fact that some gullible British journalists initially believed Esterhazy's claim to be an agent provocateur.

Russell argued that the task of espionage was too demeaning for the gentlemen that attachés were supposed to be. If espionage had to be a feature of international politics, it was more fitting for less honorable agents--those more skilled in intrigue than soldiers--in the employ of the secret service. Russell and many others believed the

system of spying was abominable. It lowered national self-respect and morality. One of the most common justifications for using espionage was self-protection: if one nation used it, then all others must or they would become the victim of foreign intrigue. Critics of the system called for the mutual abandoning of espionage in peace time. The Anglo-Saxon Review preached the need for incorporating this provision into the International Convention on the Laws of War.

The British analysis of the ills of espionage and spies is self-revealing. In contrast to their Continental brethren, British observers were less familiar with and less sensitive to the concept of enemies within and the uncertainties fomented by double agents. Hence, they were not tolerant of the need, be it real or perceived, which Continental nations had to maintain national safety and security. With an almost simplistic, naive hope for international harmony, S. P. Oliver expressed a very common view in Britain when he wrote in the Quarterly Review:

> we can only hope against hope that the practice of officially employing public funds for secret military service, at least within countries where military attachés receive hospitality, may cease altogether. . . . such an arrangement, if practicable, could not fail to prove in every way the inestimable advantage to the international morality of armed Europe.[16]

The British commentary about a different but related feature of the Affaire also tells us much about the values which held sway in Britain at the end of the century. The political and educated classes in Britain were quite opposed to the existence of a strong, domineering army in their own or any other nation. Such a military machine threatened the coming of a millenial age of international peace and harmony. The unique British national experience made the British especially optimistic.

Prior to the air age, Britain did not need a powerful army to protect herself against foreign enemies. The British remained relatively secure in their island fortress, free from foreign invasion for over 800 years by the time the Affaire captured their attention. Britain's natural island position protected the nation from invasion. British citizens of the nineteenth century were unfamiliar with the concept of military defeat and had a difficult time understanding the predicament of a neighboring nation with vulnerable frontiers. The British did not have to depend on an army for protection because they enjoyed the protection of the world's most powerful navy. So long as Britain retained naval supremacy, she was safe. Britain's invulnerability to attack enabled her citizens to take a more hopeful view of the future, and a less realistic view of international relations, than statesmen and citizens on the Continent. In reality, the British were guilty of making false and unequal comparisons between themselves and their European neighbors. They ignored the realities of international politics and were insensitive to the predicaments of Continental states.

While the British criticisms of French militarism showed an intense desire to curb the threat of war and make use of energy and resources for purposes more productive than making bombs and training soldiers, the commentary on the Affaire also demonstrated a failure to appreciate the legitimate security needs of France. Historically, Britain had not known the loss and suffering experienced by the French in time of war. Notwithstanding the new generation of soldiers in the 1890s, the memories of 1870 were very alive in French minds during the Dreyfus trials. Indeed, the importance Frenchmen placed upon Dreyfus was a reflection of their concern with the larger issue of maintaining the

strength of the army and protecting the nation from another defeat. It was very frustrating to the French to read British denunciations of the French desire to retain a strong standing army. Unlike the British, who were surrounded by a giant protective moat, the French lived with an "open frontier, a mere conventional line that can be crossed at a stride, and which is all that lies between" them and an enemy whose ill-will toward France was manifest. The humiliation, loss of prestige and territory, and a large indemnity following the Franco-Prussian War demonstrated this truth. In response to British criticisms, French observers defended their right to maintain sufficient safeguards.

If the British had a right to their navy, so the French had a right to their Army. Just as Frenchmen loved the Army because it provided them with security, so the British loved their Navy, which was even more expensive to maintain than the French military machine. Moreover, Britain would not consider reducing the size and strength of her Navy. This was with good cause. Without naval superiority, Britain lacked the power to defend the Empire or conduct commerce. She was subject not only to invasion but also blockade and subsequent starvation. At the turn of the century, the British imported 60-70 percent of its food supply. In fact, at the turn of the century, many in Britain pushed for greater allocations to increase and upgrade the fleet so that naval superiority could be maintained. There was a bit of hypocrisy in those foreign critics of France who argued, "If you were honestly fond of peace . . . [and] had no other intention than that of defending yourselves in case of attack," a defensive army reminiscent of a National Guard or an organized militia would be sufficient. To these individuals, Coubertin retorted that "an army constructed on those

principles would be so feeble that it would barely defend us against Belgium," let alone Germany. Disarmament was a desirable but "beautiful illusion" so long as France remained "surrounded by foreign armies." Coubertin deemed it quite necessary to provide the French Army "with the only training which can make it strong, that is to say, offensive training."[17]

The British distaste for militarism--at least the army variety--and war did not mean that observers across the Channel disputed the need to maintain national integrity. In fact, those nations which did not would be "swallowed up by greater patriotism of other nations which, have no scruples about preserving their national strength, or indeed of extending their dominion." Nevertheless, a nation could defend itself and still support the cause of international peace. In National Review, Frederick A. Maxse wrote, "As a fact, England is the least aggressive of all the Great Powers."[18] The situation in France was quite different. Spectator, with its paranoia about military coups, believed that the fall of the Republic and the establishment of a neo-Napoleonic administration meant "war, if not a series of wars, and the reduction of France under a despotism which can only be made secure by military glory, a disturbance of all Europe in the interest at once of a single man and of the most pronounced and recognized militarism." Publications for the commercially-minded business classes, like The Economist and Manchester Guardian, feared a reactionary regime in France would mean increased protectionism. This affront to the principles of Free Trade would aggravate international tensions, and the war which would probably result would certainly disrupt international trade.[19] British liberals viewed protection as part of the "vanishing world of aggressive nationalism

and pushing greed." According to liberal theory, tariffs violated natural economic laws and brought sorrow, suffering, and "damage to the material interests" of those who used them.[20] What the British, of course, often failed to mention was that they themselves were, during most of the nineteenth century, the primary beneficiary of Free Trade. Hence, the British argued that far from bringing benefits to France or any other European state, war--the likely product of protectionism--would be the "cause of irreparable injury."[21] Much to the surprise of the vehement critics of France, the Republic did not fall, France did not initiate a Continental or naval war, and France did not descend to the rank of a minor power.

Some more thoughtful observers believed that France might be down, but not for long. They had the foresight to recognize that the French would not tolerate the "obloquy her prominent Generals" brought upon the nation. These men accurately predicted that the more enlightened Frenchmen would work to restore France to an honorable position in the comity of nations, to achieve rehabilitation, and to "efface the memory of the scenes of the last few years." The Economist observed that the telegrams which poured into Britain from France in 1898 and 1899 were not consonant with the history of success enjoyed by the French. Reports about French domestic difficulties could be misleading. The Economist reminded its readers that in a very short time France would again be "an object of anxiety to European statesmen, and a Power with whom alliances are eagerly sought." In almost prophetic words, less than two months after the Rennes verdict The Economist argued that British and French interests were not truly opposed to one another, with the exception of what it termed minor colonial differences of opinion.

According to some historians and contemporary observers, the Dreyfusard, anti-French interpretation of the Affaire in Britain was itself rooted in the Anglo-French colonial rivalry and organically connected to the Fashoda crisis of the fall of 1898. Anglo-French colonial and commercial rivalries dated from the seventeenth century. During the 1890s, British and French interests collided in Newfoundland, the Far East, Siam, Northeast Africa, West Africa, the Nile and Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Madagascar. Some journalists believed that barring the tensions between France and Germany, the European environment was tranquil. On the other hand, the Anglo-French colonial rivalry was the "most menacing thing to world peace." These observers often argued that if France would pursue a policy of consolidation rather than expansion, the tension between these two nations would be ameliorated.[22] Hence, Marchand's mission to Fashoda, which appeared to be an intrusion into territory previously claimed by the British government, aggravated a sensitive situation.

Officials like Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain argued that France had forfeited her right to Egypt and the Nile Valley when she left Britain to assume the burden of administering Egypt. Hence, it was popularly believed in Britain that France was out to humiliate the British and take advantage of her usually conciliatory foreign policy under Salisbury. As such, Marchand's mission was an intolerable affront for which the French must atone. The British press spared no effort to revile the French for their behavior.[23]

In Paris, Ambassador Monson and the British military attaché assumed the worst. Adopting the theme later championed by National Review, they advised Downing Street that Brisson's government would try

and unite the nation and extract itself from the Affaire by diverting national attention to Fashoda and the defense of the nation. The Foreign Minister Delcassé appeared unyielding, and war seemed a likely possibility. Monson warned that the French would use Fashoda as a casus belli. Salisbury disagreed with his men in the field. He proved to be correct. Delcassé wanted a friendly understanding with the British and hoped eventually to draw them into the Franco-Russian alliance. He was not an expansionist or a chauvinist. In fact, in late October 1898, Deputies were too preoccupied with the Affaire to worry about Fashoda. Very few Frenchmen even knew where Fashoda was. Deputies mentioned neither England nor Fashoda in the Chamber, although many were upset over what they perceived as British truculence. The French press did not exhibit the hostile, indignant tone found in Britain with the exception of the Times and Manchester Guardian. Salisbury surprised many both in and outside of Britain by adopting a firm stand and confuting the claim that Britain's fighting days were over. He suspected that Russia would not risk war to preserve French claims in the Nile Valley.[24] Moreover, the Brisson government appeared unstable in light of Henry's suicide and Boisdeffre's subsequent resignation. Its problems were complicated by a workers' strike in Paris and rumors of a mutiny in the officers' corps. Especially after Kitchener's victory at Omdurman, Salisbury saw no need to negotiate. In the end, Marchand withdrew and Britain won the showdown.

There is little question that Fashoda placed the British in an anti-French frame of mind at the same time that the Dreyfus case evolved into an Affaire of worldwide interest. It disposed many organs of the British press to adopt a Dreyfusard interpretation of the Affaire.

Similar to the issue of war debts which distorted the American image of the French in the mid-1920s until 1940, Fashoda spawned anti-French sentiment in Britain. It is a mistake, however, to view British interest and opinion solely as a response to Fashoda. The nature of the Affaire invited comment and comparisons relating to legal systems, attitudes toward race, religion, and political systems. The British used it as an occasion to express their belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority. This kind of commentary probably would have been made even if Fashoda had never occurred.[25] Nevertheless, one of the most interesting comparisons made was intimately tied to colonial issues. It was made between the French and British systems of governing overseas territories. As usual, British practice was made to be the measure of all things great and exemplary. The anti-Semitic outburst in Algeria precipitated this discussion.

One of the most important alleged Anglo-Saxon qualities was the ability to govern, and to govern in the most effective manner. The English people supposedly possessed this capacity more than any other people. Their sense of noblesse oblige and experiences in directing the affairs of a far-flung Empire made them particularly well-suited to rule over a diverse group of peoples. Their competence was "quite irrespective of climatic, racial, or any other considerations."[26] In articles directly related to the Affaire, several journalists cited the attacks on Algerian Jews as evidence that France was unable to keep things in her overseas dominion under control. They derided the French for denying Algerian natives the right to vote, and refusing to provide funds for schools to educate Arabs. After seventy years there, the French had failed greatly to improve conditions in Algeria.

In an article entitled "A Study in Jew-Baiting," Conybeare questioned the wisdom of bringing Algerian representatives into the Chamber, writing, "any idea of the sort is as extravagant as that of directly representing Hindoes at Westminster." Deputies from Algeria were "worse than useless representatives." Moslems had no desire to be represented in the Chamber. Conybeare scorned what he believed were premature efforts to force a system of parliamentary representation upon the Algerian people.

> The analogy would be complete if we forced English common law and rules of procedure upon the country [Egypt], and set up all over it county councils and municipal bodies along the same line as in England. For the French have overlooked the differences of social medium, of language, of popular needs, which divide Algeria from France.

It was ridiculous to impose a French system on the "struggling provinces of Oran, Algiers, and Constatine, broken across by mountain ranges and filled with races that hate each other." The British were more paternalistic than the French in administering their colonies. British colonial adminstrators usually discharged their duties with a philanthropic spirit and a sense of moral obligation which many of these men had developed within the public school system. They did not wish to force the political development of their charges. During the years immediately following World War II, when many colonial residents clamoured for independence, this approach toward colonial rule was still apparent.

Conybeare also lauded the virtues of rule through the man-on-the-spot. This was the common British approach to colonial administration, and in Conybeare's opinion, the highest form of colonial rule. While French administrators were intensely concerned about what occurred in Paris, their British counterparts were often so engrossed

in their work in the field that they were largely oblivious to what was happening in London. The French Ministry of the Interior was responsible for protecting the interests of its 5,000,000 subjects in Algeria. It lacked "staff officers trained to understand" residents of this territory. The "leading-strings pulled from Paris" and meddlesome Parisian bureaucrats hindered government for the benefit of Algerians. Conybeare advised the French to make greater use of the Governor-General, to increase his powers, and to require him and his staff to speak the native tongue as British civil servants in India were required to do. He encouraged the French to set up an Algerian Bureau in Paris, "analogous to the India House in London." It was to be separate from the Ministry of the Interior and part of the Colonial Office. He argued that Algeria, like India, should have a separate budget of its own to be used for matters of Algerian concern and the development of Algerian resources. This measure would increase the colonists' sense of responsibility.

Finally, Conybeare characterized the idea of "assimilating the natives" as absurd. As a rule, the British Colonial Service eschewed interference with the indigenous culture. Unlike the French, British Colonial officials had no intentions of pursuing a policy of cultural imperialism. Like Contemporary Review, which criticized French imperialism and questioned the wisdom of acquiring more territory than one had the ability to colonize, Conybeare reminded France that the French element in Algeria had not increased the way French officials originally had hoped. The lack of surplus population in France made this a foregone conclusion. Moreover, there were few mixed marriages between Christians and Moslems. Indeed, the Moslems wanted to live under their own law

rather than a constitution "based on assimilation of Algeria to France." This was no surprise since French rule, between 1870 and 1899, had brought impoverishment and discouragement to the Arabs.

An editorial in National Review posited a link between the Affaire and colonial policies it considered decadent by recounting a grisly episode which occurred between Niger and Lake Chad. In this region, a French mission under Captains Voulet and Chanoine acquired a notorious reputation for misbehavior and abuse of African residents. National Review did not miss the opportunity to remind its readers that Chanoine was the son of an anti-Dreyfusard War Minister involved in the "conspiracy" against the prisoner on Devil's Island. The French government sent Lieutenant Colonel Klobb and Lieutenant Meunier to replace Voulet and Chanoine. Upon their arrival, Voulet ordered his company to fire on his replacements who both were killed. National Review suggested that the example of military justice in France inspired this cowardly atrocity.[27] Writing in Fortnightly Review, F. A. Edwards mirrored these sentiments in an account called "The French on the Nile." Although French officials denied reports that the Marchand expedition had been massacred in Bahr-el-Ghazal--reports which later proved to be false--Edwards argued, "in this the . . . Government only seems to be following the same policy of concealment of the truth which has raised such a scandal in the Dreyfus case."[28] Any government which countenanced such chicanery was a threat to peace among nations.

In spite of the invective and self-flattering comparisons produced by the British press, the image of France quickly changed after the dust of Rennes settled. Indeed, during the years immediately

following the Rennes trial, the British learned how important a congenial relationship with France could be.

It is interesting to compare the self-sufficient attitude of Britain, as expressed during the years of the Affaire, with expressions of opinion which followed the Boer War. In 1898, National Review mocked those foreign powers who believed that British vacillation and nervelessness made Britain a negligible quantity in the European balance of power. It asserted, "when Great Britain cares to assert herself she carries the day . . . she is capable of refusing to do the bidding of other nations, and has not lost the power of adopting and adhering to a definite policy." Her self-sufficiency and enormous power gave her the right to sit in judgment of her European neighbors and throw her weight into the balance so as to preserve what she defined as the "higher interests of civilization."[29] While these were the words of Maxse and his staff, many other British journalists also believed this to be true.

Fashoda was of central importance in creating this sense of superiority, and self-sufficiency. Near the end of the century, the rise of Germany as Britain's commercial rival, and the establishment of the Franco-Russian entente discouraged some in Britain. These developments, combined with Salisbury's diplomatic failures in the Far East, undermined their faith in isolationist foreign policy. In fact, Britain was in a state of relative decline during the final quarter of the century. Her victory at Fashoda promoted a false and irrational sense of security. Nevertheless, Britain's strong stand against France at Fashoda relieved the anxieties of many. In the words of René Albrecht-Carrié, "Britain could gloat over her success. . . . still

basking in the sun of splendid isolation." She could ride "the top of the wave and contemplate with satisfaction the rapid and extensive spread of the patches of red on the world map."[30] Another authority, Koenraad Swart, concurred, writing: "The workshop of the world, the mother of parliaments, the mistress of the oceans, and the ruler over the largest colonial empire, Victorian England looked with a mixture of condescension and pity on the less fortunate nations of the world."[31]

In the early years of the twentieth century, this attitude changed. Events which immediately followed the Affaire showed what an illusion British superiority was. Many British journalists lost their confidence and self-assuredness. Changed and threatening circumstances led many British statesmen and journalists to relinquish the value they had placed upon isolationism. The Boer War followed hard on the heels of Rennes, and diverted British attention from French affairs. More importantly, it did much to expose the shallowness of the smug, conceited, and self-righteous approach that so many in Britain had taken toward the Affaire. The experience of the Boer War deflated British self-righteousness and made the nation more tolerant of the right of nations to tend to their own affairs, as Britain had tried to do in Southern Africa. It was the great crisis which brought "latent doubts and feelings of insecurity to the surface." It was a "severe jolt," a very real blow "to feelings of national superiority" from which British society "never fully recovered."[32] As the world cried out against the injustice of Rennes, so it vilified what it perceived as uncivilized British oppression and war crimes against the Boers. Ronald Huch writes:

> After condemning the excessive faith 'decadent' Frenchmen had in the military, Britons prepared to fight a senseless war in South Africa

based on a similar faith. Not all Englishmen supported the war, but then not all Frenchmen approved of the Rennes verdict.[33]

Britain, like France during the Affaire, learned what it was to be held in derision by critics from almost all nations. Langer writes, "Few points in recent diplomatic history have been made the subject of so much recrimination as the question of intervention against England in the winter of 1899-1900." Indeed, there was talk of a Continental alliance against the British. In Review of Reviews, W. T. Stead warned his readers that the "'passionate determination to hoist the Union Jack over Pretoria may result in our seeing next year the Tricolour flying--temporarily at least--over the Palace at Westmister.'"[34] No European alliance against Britain developed, but both the French and the Russians took advantage of Britain's commitment in South Sfrica. France occupied some strategically important territories on the Algerian frontier to improve her chances of acquiring Morocco. Russia made a loan to the Persian government which in effect appeared to establish Russian fiscal control over Persia. The Tsar's administration also pressured London to allow Russia to deal directly with Afghanistan in matters pertaining to frontier relations.

If encroachments by rival imperial powers irritated the British, so did the shocking revelations of the deficiencies in the British military system. Before the Boer War, the War Office, the Cabinet, and the press generally believed that the British Army was as powerful and efficient as it had ever been. The need for a General Staff to direct the affairs of the Army was "only dawning on the insular mind." The Army performed dismally during the early stages of the war, suffering almost unbelievable reverses. Britain lost military prestige in the eyes of the world, and the confidence in British military leaders

declined at home. Revelations of the physical deterioration of British working men inducted into the Army challenged notions of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority. It took the British almost 400,000 soldiers and two and one-half years to subdue the two tiny Boer republics. Times South African correspondent L. S. Amery's massive history of the Boer War was largely an appeal for Army reform. Others shared his sentiments. During the first decade of the new century, the government set up three royal commissions to investigate and appraise the condition of the Army. The Conservative administration completely reorganized Britain's land forces. As the century progressed, some called loudly for conscription to put Britain on an equal footing with the Continental nations. British expenditures on the Army and Navy sky-rocketed. Ironically, in light of British criticisms of the Affaire as an example of militarism and its exorbitant and wasteful costs, the increases in early-twentieth century British defense spending outstripped the same type of expenditures by all Continental powers except Russia.[35]

The war was also expensive. At one point, the British supported 315,000 men in South Africa. Expenditures on the war effort drained the imperial treasury. Almost as if to mock those who had piously condemned the French Army for scandalous behavior and ineptitude associated with the Affaire, certain high-ranking British officers "in the sales department of the Army Service Corps" sold surplus military stores to "private contractors and then re-purchased them at much higher prices." If the officers were not engaged in fraud, they certainly were guilty of inefficiency on a "majestic scale."[36]

The war demonstrated Britain's vulnerability and her need for friends if not allies. If Britain lacked the power quickly to subdue

the resistance of two small republics, it appeared she had little chance to resist a hostile major power let alone an anti-British European coalition. Isolation in a world where adversaries were heavily armed was unattractive, and the British became acutely sensitive to potential external threats. During the early-twentieth century, Britain's growing awareness of her "isolation from continental alliances" gave impetus to the proliferation of Edwardian invasion novels such as William Le Queux's The Invasion of 1910. Many similar works appeared during this period. "Ther currency of ideas of national decadence" grew. Some writers, like Tory pampheteer Elliot Mills, drew analogies between the contemporary condition of Britain and the decline of Rome, reflecting what Samuel Hynes describes as the "anxiety and expectation", the "loss of national self-confidence" which was "part of the Edwardian consciousness."[37]

Initially, Britain sought friends outside of Europe. The alliance which Britain concluded with Japan in 1902 reflected a British awareness of the dangers of isolation and the strain which Empire and over-extension of her commitments had placed on her resources. The Anglo-Japanese accord did not represent Britain's renunciation of isolationism. Rather, it expressed the British desire to limit responsibilities and commitments in the Far East and to more freely exercise influence closer to home. Even so, isolation was only splendid so long as the British remained self-sufficient. As the new century progressed, the need for a friend closer to home became apparent. In the British press, articles appeared which stressed the "need to take sides in the game of national interests."[38] During the post-Boer War period, many in Britain slowly began to realize that conflicting national interests existed in the world of international politics. The naiveté, idealism,

and unrealistic expectations--all reflected in the commentary on the Affaire--gave way to a more realistic view of a world where power was a fact of life and competing nation-states formed alliances to obtain goals and insure national survival. Many British statesmen recognized the dangers of isolation in a hostile world and relinquished at least some of their Cobdenite views of foreign policy. As Liberal Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey demonstrated after 1905, even covert military conversations could be sanctioned when Germany appeared to have plans which would disturb Britain's world position. These talks seemed essential if Britain was to have the freedom to decide whether to move troops across the Channel in the event of a general war.

At the turn of the century, some like Joseph Chamberlain believed the solution lay in an Anglo-German rapprochement. German abrasiveness, unpredictability, and exorbitant demands precluded such an arrangement. The British wished for improved relations with Germany, but were unwilling to pay "<u>any</u> price" to realize this goal. Britain's estrangement from Germany helped to make the British receptive to the idea of an entente with France. Several British statesmen believed Germany aimed at Continental hegemony. Many French statesmen, who wished to avoid being on poor terms with Britain and Germany simultaneously, also liked the idea of an Anglo-French accord.[39] The resolution of outstanding Anglo-French colonial conflicts made this possible. In April 1904, Edward VII and President Loubet made the Entente Cordiale a reality.

The remarkable change in the British attitude toward France was in one respect an acknowledgement that vehement anti-French critics of the Affaire had erred, that they failed to judge their neighbor by appropriate standards. Not surprisingly, some journalists re-evaluated

the Affaire with a good deal more compassion and sympathy than they had expressed during the crisis periods of 1898 and 1899. In late 1903, one of the most vocal critics of the French, Spectator, wrote:

> Now that the excitement of the Dreyfus case has gone, the morbid interest which Britain took in her neighbour's affairs has gone with it. Englishmen are not concerned to criticise their neighbour's policy too closely, believing that a man's house is his castle, and that a people are probably the best judges of their own business.

Indeed, Spectator could hardly find enough good things to say about its neighbor across the Channel. Demonstrating that improved Anglo-French relations reflected French domestic, as well as international conditions, it acknowledged that France had outgrown her infatuation with reaction—a quality of mind which during the Affaire Spectator sometimes argued was racially determined—and had become a stable, static element in the European environment. There were some in Britain who perceived signs of political maturity in the developments which took place in early-twentieth century France. Ironically, Spectator had proclaimed in December of 1900, "The Dreyfus case revealed an unexpected solidarity in the French Army." As this publication anticipated the entente and adopted a congenial attitude toward France, the French government's attempt to republicanize the Army reduced the actual value of France as a military ally. With great relief, Spectator described the decline in power of French nationalists. The French received lavish praise for their attitude toward the British, which was described as more sane than it had been in earlier years. Spectator made frequent reference to the historical connections between the British and French peoples, and to examples of fruitful cooperation between the two. It proclaimed the love of the British people for the French.[40] While this changing perception of the French was doubtless related to the resurgence

of republicanism in France, it also testifies to the truth that one's opinion of a neighbor is often a function of his need for that neighbor. As the threat of Germany to British interests grew, so did the British willingness to abandon acerbic criticisms and sterotypes of the French.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

> A Dreyfus Affair may be impossible here; but if so, we should thank the continuity of our traditions rather than flatter ourselves on our own rectitude. Saturday Review, 18 February 1899.

> Fashoda set us reviling our neighbours in terms which naturally excited them to talk just as offensively against Britain. They still felt keenly the smart of wounded national pride when the South African War broke out, and in many parts of France, even at one time in Paris, Englishmen were insulted. The French newspapers wrote about the British reverses with unconcealed delight; they published the grossest calumnies upon our troops. H. "Why Not an Anglo-German Entente?" Fortnightly Review, September 1908, p. 394.

The response of the British press to the Dreyfus Affaire tells us as much or more about the British as the French. One can almost say that the British looked at France and saw Britain. The analysis and criticisms found in journals, weeklies, and newspapers reveals a partial but important picture of the things which were important to British citizens at the close of the nineteenth century. Observers across the Channel saw events through the prism of the British value system. In some ways, this narrowed the perspective of the viewer. Hans J. Morgenthau's observations about the nineteenth century nation-state system are instructive in this regard. During this century, most inhabitants within the individual states viewed their own political aspirations, and philosophical and moral convictions as universal

standards rather than national norms. Nations sought "to clothe their own particular aspirations in the moral purposes of the universe." The European's attachment "to the concept of universal ethics" led him to identify "the morality of his own nation with the commands of supra-national ethics." The different political ideas, modes of development, national cultures, and value systems which existed in nineteenth century Europe made it difficult for nations to see one another objectively. British and French observers witnessing the same set of events often perceived very different things. This sometimes led to misunderstandings and the inability of the people of one nation to comprehend the actions of their neighbors. The underlying framework of British ideas, values, expectations, thought patterns, and self-perceptions formed the criterea by which the British defined truth and by which they judged the French during the Affaire.[1]

The Affaire concentrated thought upon and dramatized some of the master issues of European political and social like in the 1890s. Those who viewed and discussed these issues in the British press did so primarily from a liberal perspective. Some believed that the British more than any other people had perfected and put into practice liberal values. Indeed, their liberalism sensitized them to central issues raised by the Affaire and often compelled them to make explicit their egotism and anxieties. For some, liberalism distorted the understanding of the events in France to the point that the viewer completely misunderstood the significance of what was happening. Perhaps unconsciously these observers often attempted to use events in France to confirm their own conceptions of good and right, and to validate the claim of Anglo-Saxon cultural and, in a few instances, racial superiority. For the

most part, this kind of approach proved to lack insight. More British journalists than not misunderstood the administration of justice and meaning of anti-Semitism in France. They often over-estimated the influence of Catholicism and military authorities upon French political life. And, of course, many completely misjudged the strengths and weaknesses of the Third Republic. Moreover, many British journalists were guilty of simplifying the Affaire by painting the principal actors in terms of black and white, good and evil. In the first place, few Frenchmen, let alone the British, had access to all the facts. Observers both in and outside of France often formed their opinions based on incomplete and inconclusive evidence. In 1898 and 1899, the truth was difficult to ascertain. Even today, there are many aspects of the Affaire which remain mysteries. Secondly, defining heroes and villains was risky business. One authority on French history, Gordon Wright, wisely concludes that the Affaire was "in large part the story . . . of fallible human beings sucked into the maelstrom without quite knowing how they got there."[2]

Few British observers appreciated these complexities. The contemporary historiography on not only English law but also the Norman Conquest made some British observers sensitive to the legal issues raised by the Affaire. In their discussion of the administration of French justice, journalists tended to regard Rennes as the epitome of the legal system in France. All but a few recognized that the Dreyfus trials were not ordinary cases, especially given the position of France in the international environment of the 1890s. Significantly, when national security or imperial interests were involved, the British were as willing as the French to conduct their inquiries <u>in camera</u>. The

case of the naval cadet Archer-Schee illustrated that the British were also capable of falsely convicting a member of the military service.

Some British legal authorities, including Chief Justice Russell, refrained from heaping scorn upon French military judges. In fact, Russell believed the overseers at Rennes performed as well as could be expected, given their legal training and understanding. Others were not so sympathetic. By British standards, Dreyfus certainly did not receive due process of law. The vitriolic analysis of the French legal system occasioned by the Affaire was a testimony to the value the British placed upon the rights of the individual within society. The extensive comparisons made between the English and French legal systems demonstrated the nearly boundless confidence which the British had in the superiority of their legal processes. The legal reforms of the 1870s gave them, in their own minds, the right and the qualifications to dissect and analyze the perceived anachronisms of French jurisprudence. While comparisons of the two legal systems, each rooted in a unique national tradition and the product of different legal histories, were perhaps unfair, the British were certainly accurate in citing the numerous examples of unequal justice for Dreyfus, the Jew, and the flagrant violations of the law which worked to the hurt of the accused and to the benefit of liars, forgers, and murderers.

Only a few British journalists placed primary emphasis on the role which anti-Semitism played in the Affaire. There is little doubt that anti-Semitism played an important role in France during the final six years of the century. Its importance, however, was not as great as the journalists in the Jewish Chronicle and Charles Whibley argued that it was. Conybeare over-valued the anti-Semitic articles appearing

in the Catholic press and consequently argued that the Church was primarily responsible for popular anti-Semitism. Others made too much out of occasional expressions of anti-Semitism in the Army. Few in Britain appreciated the fact that the anti-Semitic behavior of Frenchmen during the 1890s was an abberration. Almost seventy years in advance of Britain, France had become the first European nation to grant her Jews complete political emancipation. Between 1791 and the 1890s, French Jews benefited from the spirit of acceptance and brotherhood in France. Many made contributions to French theater, literature, literary criticism, scholarship, law, and medicine, as well as making their mark in journalism, the military service, and Republican politics. Anti-Semitism sporadically flourished, but during most of the nineteenth century, French Jews were not only persecuted. Many French Jews assimilated fully into French society. When the Affaire had run its course, anti-Semitism once again diminished. Few in Britain anticipated this development. Most contemporaries probably perceived the anti-Semitism connected with the Affaire as part of a general European phenomenon, the more potent and durable anti-Semitism which existed simultaneously in Russia, and Eastern and Central Europe. In fact the anti-Semitism of the late-nineteenth century was also found in Britain.

In spite of the tolerance which Frenchmen usually showed for the Jewish ethnic minority, there were those in Britain who exploited the anti-Semitism associated with the Affaire to praise themselves for their own treatment of Anglo-Jewry. The British at the end of the century generally exhibited more tolerance for the Jews than did their fellow-Europeans. Some over-enthusiastic commentators claimed, however, that

anti-Semitism did not exist in Britain. British behavior supposedly demonstrated the liberal ideal of tolerance for all minority groups.

Events during the opening decade of the twentieth century showed how overdrawn this claim was. During these years, anti-Semitic sentiment grew for political, social, and economic reasons. Lady Warwick complained about the Prince of Wales' introduction of Jews into her social set, "not because we dislike them individually . . . but because they had brains and understood finance. As a class, we did not like brains. As for money, our only understanding of it lay in spending, not in making it."[3] English Marxists often associated capitalism with the Jew. One of the most common sterotypical images of the nineteenth century was that of the rich Jewish money-lender, usurer, banker, and capitalist. Some Europeans believed that the Jew was the creator of monopolies and the controller of the money market. Werner Sombart labeled capitalism as a "Jewish invention."

Members of the shopkeeping lower-middle class were perhaps the most virulent anti-Semites in England. The late-nineteenth century with its "economic failures and depressions" was a time of uncertainty and insecurity for many members of this group. In an effort quickly to discover a simple cause of their discomfiture they sometimes focused their anger upon a scapegoat. It was easy to ignore the deeper underlying forces which eroded their social and economic security, and simple to place the blame upon the capitalist Jew.[4] Shopkeepers and small tradesmen were men of modest means. They resented thoughts of becoming the servant of a Jewish usurer who could suck up their profits through interest.

Other individuals resented the negative impact which they believed that Jewish immigrants had upon the British economy. During the final two decades of the century, thousands of Jews from Eastern Europe and Russia sought refuge from persecutions by moving to Britain. Almost all of these immigrants were working people. They arrived during a time of economic depression. They increased size in the British work force and spawned fears that the standard of living for native workers would plummet. This was particularly the case since immigrant Jews were willing to work for much less than the Englishman. The "public mind" frequently associated Jews with employment under deplorable, cramped, unsanitary working conditions commonly referred to by contemporaries as the sweating system. In addition to perpetuating the sweating system, Jews swelled the size of already congested urban slums.[5] Until the volume of immigrants reached a size which posed a threat to the British working man, Jews who fled from persecution on the Continent were usually regarded sympathetically as refugees rather than competitors.

Finally, many Liberals, Radicals, and socialists in Britain perceived the Boer War as a British effort on behalf of Jewish capitalists, who pulled the strings in South Africa and who largely controlled the British press. Ironically, only months before many British observers had scoffed at the French fantasy of the Jewish Syndicate. Nevertheless, there were those in Britain who quickly adopted a similar belief when British rather than French interests were involved. The development of anti-Semitism during those years which immediately followed the Affaire helped to generate support for an Aliens Act. This Act, passed the year before Dreyfus' rehabilitation, restricted the flow of immigrants into Britain.

The anti-Semitism which flourished in Britain during the early-twentieth century was by no means of the same intensity as the anti-Semitic furor which accompanied the Affaire. It does, however, help to illustrate that many and probably most of those in Britain who both supported Dreyfus and decried French anti-Semitism did so for reasons other than defending a member of an ethnic minority. As the examples of Maxse, Lloyd George, and Hughes illustrate, the motive of at least some was to needle a neighbor who happened to be unpopular at the moment. Ronald Huch observes, "In England, the reaction to the Rennes trial had always been more anti-French than pro-Dreyfus."[6]

If anti-Semitism was not the driving force behind the Affaire, neither was religion. Yet several British journalists underscored the importance which religion played in the Affaire to a fault. These men believed that the role of the Catholic Church in the Affaire was but part of the general resurgence of clericalism at the end of the century. In his monthly column in Blackwood's, Greenwood argued that efforts to revive Catholicism in France had achieved success thanks to the "frightfully demoralised" condition of the "present generation of Frenchmen. . . . The religion which the women never lost has come back to their husbands and sons."[7] Again, this response illustrates the importance of liberal values in British society. A revived Catholic Church threatened two values very dear to British citizens: separation of Church and State, and religious freedom. Efforts of the Catholic Church to regain a foothold in temporal politics were seen as highly irregular and dangerous. Supreme power was to be invested in the secular nation-state rather than some august ecclesiastical body. Proponents of the former conviction vehemently argued for the rights of the

individual to choose to be a Catholic, Protestant, agnostic, or athiest. Moreover, British commentators roundly condemned the habits of mind inclucated by Catholic education and contact with the priest. The emphasis which this instruction placed upon submission to authority restricted one's ability to use and trust his own reasoning powers. It proscribed freedom of thought and examination.

Too often, those who examined the religious dimension of the Affaire failed to recognize, or at least emphasize, the fact that there were Dreyfusards who were also Catholics. There were also Protestants who were anti-Dreyfusards. If letters to editors from Catholic laymen are an indicator of British Catholic opinion, then the majority of believers in Britain were Dreyfusard. On rare occasions, Catholic leaders like S. F. Smith and Cardinal Herbert Vaughan spoke in defense of the Church. The articles by the former clergyman provided perhaps the most dispassionate and objective British analysis of Catholicism's relationship to the Affaire. Smith not only placed the role of the Church in its proper perspective, but also anticipated the Radical assault on the Church following the Affaire. In fact, the issue underlying the Affaire was not primarily a religious one. Those who placed too much stress on religion falsified the primary issues which centered upon justice and republicanism in France.

The commentary upon the Affaire also illustrates the influence of contemporary writing about institutional history and the Norman conquest, and the value which the British placed upon limited representative government and parliamentarianism. This governmental system allowed the majority of adult males to participate either directly or indirectly in the political process and the government of the nation. The Affaire

gave convinced republicans an opportunity to compare and contrast the British system with what they perceived as the overbearing and illiberal political system in France. Many British journalists expressed sharp resentment toward the extensive government control practiced in France. Equally unattractive to the laissez-faire parsuasions of these observers was the expensive bureaucracy which was complicated to deal with and difficult to manage. The system illustrated the dangers of uniformity and overcentralization. Journalists were repulsed by chaotic and sometimes violent parliamentary proceedings in the Chamber. According to the popular theory most extensively elaborated by John E. C. Bodley, the turbulent conditions in the French parliamentary system were the result of the irremediable tension between the legacy of the ancien régime, which was a strong central government, and a system of parliamentarianism based on the English model. The French effort to adopt this foreign form was unsuccessful. Hence, the French political machine was highly unstable and unable to perform the usual and required functions of government.[8] According to Bodley, the French, by virtue of their national temper, were unsuited to parliamentary government.

Not all British observers adopted Bodley's interpretation of the French political system. There were several, though centainly not a majority, who recognized the liberal qualities of the Third Republic. These writers argued that the Republic would endure and Dreyfus would eventually receive justice. In their opinion, the powerful and progressive force of liberalism was too strong to be contained. Contemporary Review, which believed that the Third Republic was a sham, agreed on this point and also predicted the eventual victory of the true

French liberals. The forces of the French Right were too weak and disunited to prevent these developments.

British journalists recoiled at the idea of a return of reactionary forces which would vest the right to rule in the hands of the privileged few, in particular the aristocrats, the soldiers, and the priests. This arrangement would deny equal opportunities to all, and challenged the liberal belief in the value of the meritocracy and the free flow of talent which enabled the individual to achieve maximum self-development.

In its criticism of the French political system, the British press often failed to take into account the pecularities of the French political heritage. 1789 represented a sharp break with the past. From the Great Revolution to the Affaire, and even afterward, the French fought among themselves over who would rule and what form of government was best suited to promote the national well-being. Unlike the British, the French felt greater pressure to adapt immediately, to change their political institutions. The problem became even more complex since there was little consensus in France regarding many fundamental issues. Revolutions rocked the nation in 1830, 1848, and 1871 and administrations changed with alarming frequency. In such circumstances, it is little wonder that France appeared unstable to foreign observers.

British journalists also often overlooked the similarities which existed in the British and French political systems. Both systems had roots in the European national-liberal political tradition. To its discredit, the British press often minimized the influence of liberal statesmen in France. Journalists tended to pigeonhole France with the autocratic and reactionary regimes of Europe. In fact, most Frenchmen

largely accepted liberal values and political institutions. In Contemporary Review, Francis de Pressensé sought to persuade British readers that Britain and France shared a broad community of interests. He wrote:

> on both sides of the Channel and in the whole world, the fate of Liberalism, or, in other terms, the future of civilisation, is absolutely connected with the state of the relations of our two countries. . . . Just now, when the whole of mankind is threatened everywhere with a dreadful crisis, when parliamentary institutions are on their trial, when democracy is hesitating between the noble and manly struggles of freedom and the deceitful tranquillity of despotism, when we see an offensive return of forces we believed dead, such as militarism and that bloody fanaticism—anti-Semitism; when, in England, Imperialism threatens to substitute the intoxications of conquest and material expansion for the noble and proud endeavour of a self-governing democracy; when in France, Nationalism and its unclean blood are perhaps on the eve of strangling freedom, of enslaving justice, and inaugurating a new era of flase glory and military tyranny, there would be no excuse for those of us who with their eyes open should deliberately contribute to a conflict [between Britain and France].[9]

Few British journalists adopted this theme. More commonly, they contrasted British and French political institutions in an effort to demonstrate the superiority of the former.

For all the praise which British journalists gave to their own system of government, it still failed to provide all its citizens with the equal opportunities and advantages which were presumed by the commentary found about the Affaire. The labor unrest of the early-twentieth century in part demonstrated this shortcoming. Moreover, the tumultuous and undignified proceedings which led to the Parliament Bill of 1911 demonstrated that the French had no monopoly on chaotic parliamentary sessions. An important minority within the House of Lords seemed willing to assault parliamentary institutions if that was what it took to preserve the power of the Lords. It is true that the Tory Rebellion failed to bring about reactionary constitutional change in

Britain, but it is also true that the Affaire failed to precipitate a Right wing revolution against the Third Republic. In both Britain and France, the majority supported parliamentary government. Those who sang the praises of laissez-faire and indicted French government control would have been shocked to know the extent to which the British government would exert its influence over the next half-century, creating a welfare state and inaugurating a system of state capitalism. Finally, the Third Republic mocked those who predicted impending revolution from the Right, for it endured another forty years.

If the British valued republican government, so they also valued international peace. The Affaire illustrated to some the rise of reactionary forces--most notably the military--which endangered the growth of the Gladstonian ideal of a peaceful and harmonious world full of sovereign nation-states. Many British observers viewed war as the product of irrational, obsolescent forces personified by the anti-Dreyfusards. The Affaire underscored the hazard of alliances. In spite of those who called for more friendly relations with either Germany or France, and there were several during the 1890s who did, those who wrote about the Affaire seemed convinced that the wisest course was to remain free from commitments to foreign powers. This freedom gave Britain the confidence to fancy herself as the arbiter of Europe, to have the detachment and Olympian objectivity and righteousness which conferred the right to judge the domestic and international dealings of her fellow-nations.

A few British journalists believed that foreigners generally should not say much about the internal matters of other nations, especially regarding delicate issues like the Affaire. They claimed

that it was unwise to make critical judgments. The French seemed to perceive criticism as offensive foreign interference. Frederick Greenwood of Blackwood's observed that "right or wrong intrusions into the domestic quarrels of other people is a natural cause for resentment."[10] Those who extended the guilt of a few to the entire French people evoked much ill-will toward the British.[11] This must have been especially so among the many who identified themselves as "friends of France" and then proceeded in a condescending way to rake their neighbour over fiery coals of prose.[12] Not surprisingly, most pressmen who adopted a relatively objective approach toward the Affaire wrote in the Conservative press. In contrast to Liberals, British Conservatives generally exhibited a cautious, pessimistic restraint, and a distrust for excessive idealism and over-zealousness. This posture often led to a somewhat more accurate interpretation of events in France than one finds in the Liberal press. On the whole, Conservative journalists were more consistently accurate than their Liberal counterparts in the discussion of the meaning of the Affaire. Conservatives had a reasonably realistic view of the impact their commentary would have in France. Many Liberals wrote as though they believed that France obediently would respond to their suggestions which were laden with polemic and exaggeration.

A few British observers scolded their fellows for exaggerating to a fault. Exaggerations led to warped judgments, prejudices, recriminations, denunciations, and the resurrections of old quarrels between Britain and France. They created the appearance of differences between the peoples of each nation, and encouraged the imputation of the worst intentions and designs. British diatribes were not inspired

solely by a love for justice, but that "fatal facility men have for sending their neighbours to the devil for faults which they themselves might have committed."[13] The British could often see clearly to cast the mote out of their neighbor's eye, but were unable to see "the injustices and prejudices at home."[14] To illustrate this point, Ludovic Trarieux and Francis de Pressensé observed that all nations had a national egoism which made them blind to their own faults yet able clearly to perceive the inadequacies of others. The British were intolerant of the pro-Boers; the Russians denied the Finns the right to protest Panslavic proposals which threatened their own interests; the Germans tolerated the Armeian atrocities because of their alliance with the Sultan; and the Americans cast their respect for the rights of nations to the wind to indulge in an orgy of imperialism in the Philippines. And in spite of the contradictions of national principle which each act represented, each nation remained righteous in its own eyes. As Pressensé, Trarieux, and many of their fellow-Frenchmen recognized, in condemning the French, the British often condemned themselves by implication. In mid-February 1899, French Ambassador to Britain, Paul Cambon, reminded his hosts that daily "comment upon the weakness or wickedness of our neighbours is hardly likely to be the means of leading to the good understanding we desire."[15] Those who encouraged a tolerant approach toward France were in the minority. The majority seemed unaware that their criticisms actually endangered peace between Britain and France.

Significantly, the British had a vested and material interest in keeping the peace. Although the British position had slipped in relative terms <u>vis-à-vis</u> Germany, the United States, and other

industrializing nations, Britain still enjoyed the prestige of being first among equals in the comity of nations. She ruled the largest Empire that had ever existed, and possessed the material benefits produced by industrialization, and advances in transportation and communication. Just as France maintained a large Army to guarantee national security, so the British supported the world's largest Navy. British critics who lambasted the French seemed blind to the fact that navalism was as dangerous to international peace as the militarism illustrated by the role of the General Staff in the Affaire. To the British, the one seemed justified and the other did not. The British, whether consciously or unconsciously, could appreciate the security needs of Empire but not of a Continental nation with vulnerable frontiers.

The Franco-Prussian War raised Frenchmen's level of consciousness about this vulnerability and made them susceptible to spy-mania. In this psychological environment, Jews were often the object of suspicion. European anti-Semites often viewed the Jewish population in their nation as an enemy, alien "racial" element. Bismarck once described Jews as "international-Europeans, cosmopolitans, [and] wanderers." A French journalist extrapolated damning conclusions from this hypothesis, writing, "'the soldier recognizes in the Jew the shameless spy who trafficks in the secrets of national defence.'"[16]

Many Jews viewed themselves as a separate people with a national consciousness. Herzl exemplified the bond of unity shared by Jewish people. On 17 November 1895, in an effort to promote Zionism and emphasize the common bond between the eight to ten million Jews scattered throughout the world, he wrote from Paris saying he suffered "when Captain Dreyfus was accused of high treason."[17] He believed that the

Jews were "a united people."[18] George W. Steevens, wryly observed that the unity of the Jewish people at the time of the Affaire came back to haunt the French. Any other prisoner would have quickly faded from public memory while he served his sentence in New Caledonia.

The Jew, and later Dreyfus, became a symbol, a scapegoat for the xenophobic fears which existed in France during the final quarter of the century. Dreyfus' alleged treachery was particularly opprobrious since it endangered the bulwark and defender of France, the Army. This institution was supposedly invincible.[19] The embarrassing defeats it suffered during the nineteenth century were thus seen by many Frenchmen, during the 1890s, as the outcome of betrayal by the Jews. The supposed existence of treachery made Frenchmen believe it all the more important to strengthen the Army. This, in turn, spawned the British fear that France had given herself over to militarism.

Regarding Empire, the anti-Semitic agitation in Algeria gave the British opportunity to extol what they believed to be their superior methods of ruling foreign peoples. As the Affaire drew to a close, the British entered into an imbroglio in Southern Africa which exposed many embarrassing fallacies of reasoning behind their criticisms of the French during the Dreyfus fiasco. The Boer War revealed the deficiencies in not only the British Army, held at bay by the unconventional, guerrilla warfare of the Boers, but exposed the sad state of health in which most recruits, especially those from the laboring classes, were. These revelations called theories of innate Anglo-Saxon superiority into question. They weakened British claims to superior ways and practices, as well as making it appear that the British, at least in the colonial arena, paid only lip-service to liberal values. There seemed to be

very little liberal about the scorched earth policy and concentration camps for women and children. Their experience in Southern Africa showed that in several respects the British refused to see their own shortcomings. They were unwilling to recognize that the diverse principles of liberalism are not always complementary.

In many publications, stories of the Affaire and Britain's troubles in Southern Africa appeared side by side. In Blackwood's, Greenwood argued that the two phenomena were not connected. He warned, however, that the British must reach a reasonable solution with the Boers in the event that the Affaire led to military revolution and dictatorship. Perhaps the British attitude is best captured in Saturday Review's "Notes" of the events of the week. On 19 August 1899, this weekly cited Rennes and Pretoria as the most important current news items. The latter "fills one with impatience touched with disgust" while the former spawned "disgust touched with impatience." The reviewer wrote:

> It is to the credit of English hearts that the suffereings of the prisoner of Rennes and his advocate—which affect English interests not at all—have held their attention more closely than the almost impudent dalliance of President Kruger—though that touches the prestige of England and may mean much to every Englishman.[20]

Reflecting on arguments like these, Liberal politician and opponent of the Boer War, L. T. Hobhouse mused, "the French are keen enough to see the same faults [fallacies, immoralities and dangers in the British temper] in our national determination to take our neighbour's land, suppressing his national life."[21] This inconsistency aggravated Anglo-French tensions.

In fact, there were several British observers, not the least of whom were Sir Mount Stuart Grant-Duff, Sir Charles Dilke, and T. H. S.

Escott, who indicted the Popular press in Europe as a chief fomentor of international ill-will and misunderstandings. Particularly in Britain, where the spread of state-supported education had given birth to a new reading public with common and vulgar tastes, journalists looking for sensational stories often excited popular opinion and sometimes even made it difficult for politicians to pursue the most rational, beneficial course of action. Prime Minister Salisbury had a deep distrust of the press and the pressure it could exert on the government. He spoke of yellow journalism in the most unflattering terms. Indeed, the Yellow press complicated international relations by propagating a variety of distorted views. At times, reports of events overseas bore only slight resemblance to what actually had occurred. Journalists used half-truths and misapplied truths to produce and sell sensational copy. By the end of the century, the press, given the right circumstances, could poison and embitter relations between two states with relative ease.[22] Grant-Duff wrote, "The diplomatists and Foreign Ministers of Europe would get on perfectly well together, and settle their own differences comfortably, but for the new journalists' intermeddling and stirring up international jealousy and spite." Like Gladstone, who, given the international situation in 1898, regretted he had lived so long, he remarked, "It is a disgusting spectacle, which makes me feel thankful that I am seventy years of age."[23]

The Affaire was ready made for the Yellow press. It was a sensational series of never-ending events to titillate the public. Ironically, British commentators from the more serious and respected publications heaped criticism upon the Yellow press in France for its anti-Semitism and anti-Dreyfusard pratings. Yet they too were infected

by the spirit of the age, and their reports of the Affaire came in various shades of yellow. The vehemence of the denunciations of France found in the British press during the Affaire did credit to the most skilled practitioners in the art of yellow journalism. Newspapers and journals with a long-standing tradition of moderation and rational analysis participated in occasional diatribes commonly found in the Daily Mail or the Daily Express. Even papers like the Times and Spectator joined this chorus.

There were limits, however, to the length which some editors would allow their journalists to go. Upon learning of the Rennes verdict, Queen Victoria telegraphed Secretary Michael H. Herbert at the British Embassy in Paris to say: "Thanks for your telegram with the news of this monstrous verdict against this poor martyr. I trust he will appeal against this dreadful sentence." She acted without consulting anyone, and hence her communication passed through the French Ministry of the Interior. The well-connected correspondent for the Times, Blowitz, scooped the telegram and quickly dispatched it to his superiors at Printing House Square. Not wishing to embarrass Her Majesty or, in violation of all good taste, offend French sensibilities unnecessarily, the Times refused to publish Victoria's communication.[24] The French public did not learn of this royal indiscretion for several years.

The momentary and undisclosed behavior of the Times did not compensate for the conduct which the British press as a whole exhibited in 1898 and 1899. The coverage of the Affaire in the British press embittered Anglo-French relations. Far from assisting the Dreyfusard cause, it had an unfortuante impact and gave rise to charges that

Britain was a major partner in the Jewish Syndicate. When the Boer War broke, the French returned kind for kind. French journalists filled their publications with invective and scurrilous cartoons. Some British pressmen dismissed what they termed a childish and hostile reaction as the delayed response to the French loss to Britain at Fashoda. France, as well as other European powers, was supposedly envious of British colonial successes. Others explained the criticism as an expression of concern over French investments in Southern African mining stock. In a telegram to Victoria, Monson cited the abuse, falsehoods, and misrepresentations which the French press poured out on the British. He argued that France used the situation in the Transvaal to retaliate for British criticisms of the Rennes verdict. National Review impugned the Continental press in general and the Temps in particular for what it called anti-British propaganda and distortion of the facts. To demonstrate its case, it reminded its readers that six of the Temps staff helped in fund-raising activities to honor the self-confessed forger, Henry.

In fact, the French were the most virulent critics of the British war effort. But democratic organs of the Continental press, which had previously lauded Britain as the beacon of free and liberal institutions, also decried British intervention against the Boers.[25] To these foreign observers, British actions seemed too harsh and unfair since two such small and seemingly insignificant nations appeared to be no real threat to British interests. While British statesmen certainly understood the importance and strategic value of the Transvaal, especially given the significance of the discovery of large deposits of gold in 1885, the policies pursued by Britain in Southern Africa called into question

Britain's claim to be a beacon of liberalism. Ironically, the vitriolic criticism which the British and French exchanged during the Affaire and the Boer War were poor indicators of the course which Anglo-French relations were to take over the next two decades. Brought together by their mutual interests and the resolution of their colonial differences, both the British and the French presses largely dropped mutual recriminations as the two nations moved toward the entente of 1904.

In retrospect, the response of the British press to the Dreyfus Affaire reveals an unsuspecting nation, self-satisfied but about to encounter a rude awakening. Indeed, the British greatly prized liberal values, and in many respects, allowed for thier implementation and operation in British society. Many liberals failed to see that there were contradictions within the liberal ethos. Far from being the panacea which many liberals believed it to be, liberalism failed to provide the solutions to all of the problems in Britain let alone the world. Internal forces in Britain--forces which operated even during the Affaire--demonstrated the inadequacies of classical, laissez-faire principles in a modern, industrial society. Giving free rein to the individual had failed to provide equal opportunities for every citizen. Rather, it underscored the need for some regulating force to prevent the exploitation of the many by the few. While international Free Trade benefited Britain, it appeared to condemn other nations to a sort of second-class status. A diplomatic revolution of sorts took place during the 1890s. Europeans witnessed the undoing of the Bismarckian system and the extension of the diplomatic game of power politics to include the United States and Japan. Before the final decade of the century, Britain was largely insulated from the vicissitudes of Continental

politics and rivalries, and in possession of a vast colonial Empire. It was often easier for the British to be liberal than their European fellows. But as the century drew to a close, the British found it increasingly difficult to remain aloof from the illiberal pulls at the end of the century and to retain claims on being the sage arbiter and judge of Europe. They found themselves over-extended in terms of their imperial commitments, and without an ally, exposed and vulnerable. The Gladstonian revulsion for alliances, and the British infatuation with splendid isolation gradually gave way to the exigencies of the age.

The British commentary on the Affaire tells us much about popular images of the French at the century's end. But it also is a unique mirror in which we see reflections of British values, beliefs, and attitudes. It unveils a partial, yet important picture of who the British were, what they valued, and what they thought of themselves as they prepared to enter the new century. National circumstances in Britain during most of the nineteenth century allowed the British to conduct their affairs under less duress and with fewer problems than the French. As advances in communications, transportation, and technologies figuratively reduced the size of the world, and as the shortcomings, and contradictions of the British political and economic systems and ideals became exposed, Britain lost her insularity and some of her supreme confidence that British was best. In retrospect, the British judgment of France appears overly harsh and often unfair. The perceptions the British had of the Affaire, while not always correct, were almost always self-revealing. They provide us with images and reflections--images of France and reflections of Britain at a time of crucial importance in the history of both nations and the world. In this, the Affaire provides

us with a novel and valuable insight into life in Britain as the British, for the most part unknowingly, prepared to step from the center of the world stage, and assume a less prestigious and less influential position in the world.

NOTES

NOTES

Introduction

[1]S. F. Cornély, "The Case of Dreyfus--A Judicial Error," Anglo-Saxon Review, September 1899, p. 213. See also pp. 214-5, and "Impressions and Opinions" in the same volume of Anglo-Saxon Review, p. 256. For comment on the interest in the Affaire, see: J. H. A. MacDonald, "France To-Day," Blackwood's Magazine, October 1899, p. 544; "The Demoralisation of France," Contemporary Review, March 1898, pp. 305-6; David Christie Murray, "Some Notes on the Zola Case," Contemporary Review, April 1898, p. 481; Ludovic Trarieux, "After the Dreyfus Case," Contemporary Review, November 1899, p. 661; André Godfernaux, "The Philosophy of the Dreyfus Case," Fortnightly Review, September 1899, p. 371; An English Officer, "The Rennes Verdict and the Dreyfus Case. Its Military Aspect," Fortnightly Review, October 1899, p. 548; H. C. Foxcroft, "The 'Dreyfus Scandal' of English History," Fortnightly Review, October 1899, p. 563; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, March 1898, p. 13; L. J. Maxse, "M. Cavaignac's Vindication of Captain Dreyfus," National Review, p. 815, 820; Frederick C. Conybeare, "The Letters of an Innocent," National Review, September 1898, p. 47; L. J. Maxse, "The Key to the Mystery," National Review, October 1898, p. 274; L. J. Maxse, "Russia and Captain Dreyfus," National Review, November 1898, pp. 365, 373; Godfrey Lushington, "The Scope of the Inquiry," National Review, February 1899, p. 788; Godfrey Lushington, "The Dreyfus Affaire: M. Beaurepaire and M. Dupuy," National Review, March 1899, p. 139; L. J. Maxse, "The Dreyfus Affair: The Sins of the Syndicate," National Review, March 1899, p. 164; Frederick C. Conybeare, "Fresh Evidence on the Dreyfus Case," National Review, June 1898, p. 478; Godfrey Lushington, "The Verdict at Rennes," National Review, p. 201; Marie Belloc-Lowndes, "A Group of Anti-Dreyfusards," Pall Mall Magazine, June 1899, p. 203; W. T. Stead, "Alfred Dreyfus: A Chronicle," Review of Reviews, October 1899, pp. 417, 432; "The Dreyfus Case," Westminster Review, August 1899, p. 123; "The Dreyfus Case and the Future of France," Westminster Review, October 1899, pp. 357-9, 367; The Economist, 10 June; 29 July; 16 September 1899; Jewish Chronicle, 25 February 1898; Manchester Guardian, 24 February 1898 (France was "opposed by the united public opinion of all civilised states."); Saturday Review, 26 February, 10 September 1898; 1 July 1899; and Spectator, 4 March, 10 June, 16 September 1899. Other contemporary observations are found in Frederick C. Conybeare's The Dreyfus Case (London: George Allen, and New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1898), p. viii, and George W. Steevens' The Tragedy of Dreyfus (New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1899), pp. 20-34, 36-40, 42, 44, 48, 57-8, 137.

For comments by present-day historians on the world-wide interest in the Affaire, see: Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy, 1898-1905 (London: Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 59, 89; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, new ed. with added prefaces (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973), p. 91; Guy Chapman, The Dreyfus Trials (London: Batsford, 1972), pp. 139-40, 243; Rose A. Halpern, "The American Reaction to the Dreyfus Case" (M. A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1941), p. 71; Nicholas Halasz, Captain Dreyfus: The Story of a Mass Hysteria (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), pp. 157-8, 210, 218, 241 ("It is no exaggeration to say that the whole civilized world followed Zola's trial with anxiety and distaste. France became an enigma to them. Her moral decay augured ill for the Western civilization of which France for so long had been the vanguard."); Richard D. Mandell, "The Affair and the Fair: Some Observations on the Closing Stages of the Dreyfus Case," Journal of Modern History, September 1967, pp. 255-9, 264; and Louis L. Snyder, The Dreyfus Case: A Documentary History (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973), pp. 343, 361-2.

As the Affaire became a newsworthy item in Britain, many journalists doggedly maintained their right to comment critically about the domestic concerns of France. They argued that the telegraph and telephone had reduced the size of the world, and that the domestic events in faraway nations now had a world-wide audience whether or not it was desired. It was impossible to treat the Dreyfus trials as a purely domestic matter because it involved issues not bound by "space and time." It involved the transcendent issues of human justice, and as such, all mankind had the right to observe and comment. Some justified their comments by arguing that foreign observers did France no service by turning a blind eye and allowing her to pursue a lawless course. (Trarieux, "After the Dreyfus Case," pp. 659-60. See also Cornély, "The Case of Dreyfus," p. 215; Godfernaux, "Philosophy of the Dreyfus Case," p. 377; An English Officer, "Rennes Verdict and the Dreyfus Case," p. 547; Maxse, "Russia and Captain Dreyfus," p. 359; "The Dreyfus Case and the Future of France," p. 359; Manchester Guardian, 4 September 1899; Spectator, 17 October 1903; and R. Barry O'Brien, The Life of Lord Russell of Killowen (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1901), p. 316.)

To some, it seemed rather strange that France, the nation of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, demanded that foreigners mind their own business, since Frenchmen, since 1789, had insisted that all enlightened nations be familiar with French affairs. Critics argued that if France had nothing to hide, she should have no fear of publicity. It did no good for a nation to cover its faults. They would be exposed in the hour of trial no matter how sophisticated the camouflage. In National Review, Conybeare argued that his extensive analysis of the Affaire was the fulfillment of an obligation to future historians. He believed that contemporary observers had the responsibility to record all that they knew while it was still fresh in their minds. (Conybeare, "Sidelights on the Dreyfus Case," National Review, October 1898, p. 266. See also Maxse, "Russia and Captain Dreyfus," p. 373; "Some International Aspects of the Dreyfus Scandal," National Review, February 1899, pp. 731, 736-7; and "Sins of the Syndicate," pp. 157-8.

David L. Lewis, Prisoners of Honor: The Dreyfus Affair (New York: Morrow, 1973), p. 298 maintains that the Russians supported the Rennes verdict passed by their French allies. Perhaps this was the case officially, but the liberal and educated classes in Russia sharply opposed the re-conviction. See MacDonald, "France To-Day," p. 554; Frederick C. Conybeare, "A Clerical Crusade," National Review, February 1899, p. 788; Maxse, "Sins of the Syndicate," pp. 162-3; and "Episodes of the Month," National Review, October 1899, pp. 149-50.

[2]Francis de Pressensé, "England and France," Contemporary Review, February 1899, p. 160.

[3]Steevens, Tragedy of Dreyfus, pp. 40, 44. "The name of Dreyfus is known more widely than those of heroes and sages; yet who knows so much as whether he is handsome or plain, brilliant or stupid, good or bad? He is the most-talked-of man in the world. . . ." For comment on Dreyfus' patriotism, see Frederick C. Conybeare, "The Truth About the Dreyfus Case," National Review, June 1898, p. 546, and Conybeare, "Letters of an Innocent," p. 49.

[4]Lewis, Prisoners of Honor, p. 298. See also Mandell, "The Affair and the Fair," p. 258 (note 37).

[5]Maxse, "Key to the Mystery," p. 274. See also Sir Thomas Barclay, Thirty Years: Anglo-French Reminiscences (1876-1906) (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914), pp. 135-6; Stead, "Dreyfus: A Chronicle," pp. 417-8, 432 ("Dreyfus fades into infinite insignificance compared with the immensity of issues which were raised by his trial."); Spectator, 29 April 1899 (Dreyfus "has been converted into a sort of abstraction."); According to Lewis, Prisoners of Honor, pp. 307, 319, he represented the "historic combat between spokesmen for France of the ancien régime and Jacobin France." The Dreyfusards "cared so little about Dreyfus the human being that they took only formal notice of the rehabilitation ceremony and, thereafter, forgot the man."

[6]Laurence Lafore, The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, New York, and Toronto: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1971), pp. 25-9. See also Robert F. Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France (New York: Fertic, 1969), p. 9; and Barbara W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before War 1890-1914 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 197.

[7]See Henri Brunschwig, French Colonialism 1871-1914 Myths and Realities, intro. Ronald E. Robinson (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964).

[8]Cornély, "Case of Dreyfus," p. 214.

[9]Manchester Guardian, 13 July 1906.

[10]Spectator, 16 September 1899. See also Cornély, "Case of Dreyfus," p. 214.

[11]David B. Ralston, Army of the Republic: Place of the Military in the Political Evolution of France, 1871-1941 (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1967), p. 250

[12]Ronald K. Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," Social Science, Winter 1975, p. 23.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Daily Telegraph, 18 September 1899.

[15]Manchester Guardian, 14 September 1899. See also Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 26.

[16]Halasz, Captain Dreyfus, pp. 157-8. See also Tuchman, Proud Tower, p. 218. "Happy in the consciousness of innocence, the Kaiser was not reluctant to inform visitors and royal relatives that France had convicted an innocent man."

[17]Barclay, Thirty Years, pp. 162-3. Barclay does not identify the editor, but it was probably a man named Lauzanne, who was also a barrister who assisted Zola's attorney Labori in February 1898. See Manchester Guardian, 15 September 1899. See also Tuchman, Proud Tower, p. 261; The Letters of Queen Victoria, A Selection From Her Majesty's Correspondence and Journal Between the Years 1886 and 1901, 3rd series, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1932), p. 396; Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 25; Times, 19 January; 8 February 1898; Saturday Review, 23 September 1899; Spectator, 17 September 1898; and "Episodes of the Month," National Review, December 1898, p. 473.

For specific references to the Great Exhibition and potential trade war, see J. H. A. MacDonald, "The Negative Ruler of France," Blackwood's Magazine, June 1899, pp. 1054-5; MacDonald, "France To-Day," p. 555; "The Dreyfus Case and the Future of France," p. 365; S. C. Swain, "France to Paris," Punch, 30 August 1899; Bernard Partridge, "Something Like a Boycott," Punch, 20 September 1899, p. 138; "Some Further Self-Denying Ordinances," Punch, 20 September 1899, p. 137; Manchester Guardian, 14, 18 September 1899; Spectator, 16 September 1899; The History of the Times, vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 799. J. A. Spender, The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, G. C. B., 2 vols. (London: Hodder and Stroughton, Limited, 1923), p. 239. From the Hotel Klinger, Marienbad, 27 August 1899, C-B wrote to Herbert Gladstone: "The Affaire Dreyfus keeps us interested. Oddly enough nearly all the French Colony here are Dreyfusard."

[18]Saturday Review, 16 September 1899. See also Jewish Chronicle, 11, 18 November 1898. The entire Irish press was not against Dreyfus. Nevertheless, a letter to the Jewish Chronicle claimed that no Irish journal "of any note" called for justice for Dreyfus. The Writer described the Dublin Daily Express as anti-Semitic and Jesuitical with an editor who was a "rebel Nationalist and out-and-out Papist." The paper's anti-Dreyfusard position was believed to be a product of popery. Douglas Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair (London: Blanford Press, 1966), pp. 43-5 offers an explanation for anti-Dreyfusard opinion in

France. His argument applies equally as well to that portion of world opinion which was anti-Dreyfusard. Many people simply assumed that the original arrest of Dreyfus in 1894 was the result of a lengthy inquiry made by the Army. Moreover, the Minister of War, Mercier, publicly "assured the world at large that Dreyfus was guilty." By 1896, when serious questions began to be raised about the propriety of the court-martial, many individuals had already come to accept the long-standing stories about the "enormities and extent of his [Dreyfus'] treason" and of the "fabulous wealth being offered to judges, ministers and generals so that he might be set free." The impact of these stories, which had been encouraged by Dreyfus' opponents for almost two years, was to dissuade many from seriously considering the charges of Dreyfusards. Instead, they preferred to trust in received opinion, supported by both the Army and the government. There seemed to be little reason that the leaders of these two institutions would attempt to deceive the public. And, since the trial was held in secret, only these men were completely equipped to know the whole truth.

[19] Rapport general administrative et technique, v. 1, p. 9 (an 8 volume official report on the Exposition universelle internationale de 1900 à Paris) cited in Mandell, "The Affair and the Fair," pp. 254-5.

[20] Manchester Guardian, 14 September 1899. See also Times, 15 September 1899; Mandell, "The Affair and the Fair," pp. 254, 258; Halpern, "The American Reaction," pp. 40-2, 55-8, 80-2; and Snyder, The Dreyfus Case, pp. 348-50.

[21] Manchester Guardian, 18 September 1899. See also Saturday Review, 23 September 1899; Mandell, "The Affair and the Fair," pp. 261-5; and Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," pp. 22, 25, 27.

[22] J. A. Spender, Life, Journalism and Politics (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1927), pp. 184-5. Notwithstanding Spender's view of the French, his publication also adopted a sympathetic position toward Dreyfus. If Dreyfus was guilty, he deserved life in prison rather than a ten year sentence. Moreover, since in France, imprisonment in a cell counted double, Dreyfus had already served his sentence. R. H. Gretton, A Modern History of the English People, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (London: Grant Richards Limited, 1913), pp. 47, 432. "Jingoism, gratified by the course of the Fashoda incident in 1898, regarded every move made by France as a provocation." See also Andrew, Théophile Delcassé, pp. 91-118.

[23] George W. Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Limited, 1963), pp. 16-7. See also Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 25; and E. A. Benians, Sir James Butler, and C. E. Carrington, eds., The Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. 3 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1959), pp. 490-1. Salisbury's Cabinet was divided in that some members, e.g., Joseph Chamberlain, preferred better relations with Germany while others wished for improved Anglo-French relations. See Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 2. The government could influence public opinion in three main ways:

1) speeches made by leading government officials; 2) provision of information to the press; 3) publication of government blue books.

[24]Barclay, Thirty Years, pp. 136, 161-3. See also Mandell, "The Affair and the Fair," p. 263 (note 69).

[25]J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy at the Close of the Nineteenth Century (London: The Athlone Press, 1964), p. 227. He argues that every newspaper with the exception of the Times and Manchester Guardian was "unnecessarily offensive" toward France during the Fashoda crisis. For a full reproduction of Godfrey Lushington's letter to the Times in support of Dreyfus, see Snyder, The Dreyfus Case, pp. 227-52. See also Manchester Guardian, 15 September 1898, and Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1968), p. 377.

[26]The Right Honorable Viscount Herbert Samuel, Memoirs (London: Cresset Press, 1945), pp. 29, 33-4. See also J. A. Hobson, Imperialism, 3rd ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948), pp. 153-5.

[27]"Impressions and Opinions," pp. 248-9, 253. See also Charles Beresford, "The Anglo-American Entente," Pall Mall Magazine, June 1899, pp. 379-83; and Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 24.

[28]Quorum Pars Fui, "The Balance of Power," Contemporary Review, pp. 594, 599-602.

[29]Hobson, Imperialism, p. 158.

[30]George W. Steevens, "Scenes and Actors in the Dreyfus Trial," McClure's Magazine, October 1899, pp. 521-2. See also Steevens, Tragedy of Dreyfus, pp. 43, 45, 94-5; Chapman, The Dreyfus Trials, p. 230; and Cornély, "Case of Dreyfus," p. 220.

[31]George W. Steevens, "France as Affected by the Dreyfus Case," Harper's Magazine, October 1899, p. 792. See also Frederick C. Conybeare, "General Picquart," Cornhill Magazine, August 1914, pp. 168, 173.

[32]Conybeare, "General Picquart," pp. 168, 173. See also Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, p. 89; and Conybeare, "Sidelights," p. 262. National Review, which emphasized the role of individuals in the Affaire, also lauded the actions of Picquart. This journal often commented on the large number of Alsatians who spearheaded the Dreyfusard crusade.

[33]Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 27.

[34]David Thomson, England in the Nineteenth Century 1815-1914 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited, 1972), pp. 101, 103-5. See also A. J. P. Taylor, Essays in English History (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited, 1976), pp. 55-8, 61. Two noteworth biographies of Macaulay are: John Clive, Macaulay: The Shaping of the Historian (New

York: Alfred A. Knofp, 1973) and Joseph Hamburger, Macaulay and the Whig Tradition (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976). For relevant comments on the views of Lord Acton, see Robert L. Schuettinger, Lord Acton: Historian of Liberty (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1976), pp. 10, 143-4.

[35]Koenraad W. Swart, The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth Century France (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 235-6.

[36]G. R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought 1899-1914 (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California, 1971), p. 28. See also Raymond J. Sontag, Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969), p. ix; and René Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France: Adaptations to a Changing Context of Power (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970), p. 4.

[37]See Edward R. Tannenbaum, 1900: The Generation Before the Great War (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press and Doubleday, 1976), pp. 40-9, 59-60, 311-9; Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, p. 30; Max Mark, Modern Ideologies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), p. 76; and Thomas Frederick Tout, France and England: Their Relations in the Middle Ages and Now (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1922), p. 156.

[38]Searle, Quest for National Efficiency, pp. 27-8. See also Sontag, Germany and England, pp. viii-ix, 13-4; Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, pp. 26-7; Thomson, England in the Nineteenth Century, p. 104; and Robert Eccleshall, "English Conservativism as Ideology," Political Studies, March 1977, pp. 62-83.

[39]Sontag, Germany and England, p. 15.

[40]R. C. K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), p. ix. See also Michael R. Marrus, The Politics of Assimilation: A Study of the French Jewish Community at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 243; Ensor, England, p. 333; Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, p. 6; Searle, Quest for National Efficiency, pp. 29-30; and Swart, Sense of Decadence, pp. x, 254.

[41]Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 4, 17, 24, 247. See also Ensor, England, pp. ix, 333; Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, pp. 6-7, 26-7, 165; Sontag, Germany and England, p. 13; Searle, Quest for National Efficiency, pp. 27, 29-30, 235; Samuel Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. vii, 6-9, 16-7, 24, 53, 56; Caroline E. Playne, The Pre-War Mind in Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928), p. 88; Harold Perkin, "Individualism Versus Collectivism in Nineteenth Century Britain: A False Antithesis," The Journal of British Studies, Fall 1972, pp. 105-18; and Donald Read, England, 1865-1914 The Age of Urban Democracy (London and New York: Longmans, 1979), pp. 240-4.

[42]Gordon Wright, "Sometimes a Great Nation," The Stanford Magazine, Spring/Summer 1980, pp. 18, 23. See also Ember Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914 (New York and London: The Century Company, 1931), p. 15.

[43]Playne, Pre-War Mind in Britain. See also Tannenbaum, 1900, pp. 264-7.

[44]Carroll, French Public Opinion, p. 4.

[45]Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, p. 7. See also Richard Shannon, The Crisis of Imperialism 1865-1915 (St. Albans: Granada Publishing, Limited, 1974), pp. 270, 276; J. A. Thompson, The Collapse of the British Liberal Party: Fate or Self-Destruction? (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1969), p. 44; and Colin Seymour-Ure, The Press, Politics and the Public: An Essay on the Role of the National Press in the British Political System (London: Methuen and Company, Limited, 1968), p. 19

[46]MacDonald, "France To-Day," pp. 550-1. See also Maxse, "The Key to the Mystery," p. 268. Maxse prefaced his article with the following poem:

Do I sleep, do I Dream? Do I wonder and Doubt?
Is things what they seem? Or is wisdom about?
Is our civilization a failure?
Or is the Caucasian played out?

Chapter I

[1]Spender, Life, Journalism and Politics, pp. 184-5.

[2]Seymour-Ure, Press, Politics and the Public, pp. 16-9.

[3]Oron J. Hale, The Great Illusion 1900-1914 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 134-40.

[4]Ensor, England, pp. 310-11.

[5]Carroll, French Public Opinion, p. 10. See also Ensor, England, p. xx.

[6]Tuchman, Proud Tower, p. 259.

[7]Jewish Chronicle, 20 July 1906. See also Conybeare, "Truth About the Dreyfus Case," p. 541; Maxse, "M. Cavaignac's Vindication," p. 833; Conybeare, "Letters of an Innocent," p. 46; Maxse, "Sins of the Syndicate," p. 159; Conybeare, "A Study in Jew-Baiting," National Review, July 1899, p. 784. In its coverage of the Affaire, the provincial British press followed the lead of the London newspapers: Jewish Chronicle, 28 January 1898 (Special Supplement); Oron J. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, With Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914 (New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1940), pp. 31-3.

Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 24. Huch cited the Scheffield Telegraph, Birmingham Gazette, Bradford Observer, Newcastle Chronicle, and St. James Gazette as papers which decried the Rennes verdict.

[8]Frank Giles, A Prince of Journalists: The Life and Times of Henri Stefan Opper de Blowitz (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1974), pp. 184-5, 199-202. For a tribute to Blowitz after his death, see Spectator, 24 January 1903.

[9]Lord Edward F. L. Burnham, Peterborough Court: The Story of the Daily Telegraph (London: Cassell and Company, 1955), pp. 44-6. See also Manchester Guardian, 7 February 1898. D. C. Murray, writing for the Daily News, interviewed Zola prior to his trial in 1898. See Manchester Guardian, 5 June 1899, which mentions unnamed "English and Italian sources."

[10]Maxse, "Key to the Mystery," pp. 269, 282.

[11]Saturday Review, 1 July; 16 September 1899. See also Guy Chapman, The Dreyfus Case: A Reassessment (New York: Reynal, 1955), pp. 286, 297; Chapman, The Dreyfus Trials, p. 230; Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, p. 164; Lewis, Prisoners of Honor, pp. 278-81; Tuchman, Proud Tower, p. 257. So thorough was the coverage the British press gave to the Rennes trial that Saturday Review, 9 September 1899, wrote: "'Our Special Correspondents' were finding the dearth of dramatic incident so depressing that they thought it necessary solemnly to record that the little messenger boy had fallen asleep." Steevens, Tragedy of Dreyfus, pp. 20-34, 36-40, 42, 44, 48, 57-8, 137, offers an excellent description of life as a journalist at Rennes. "It was the object, therefore, of the journalistic world--which appeared to be about 95 per cent. of the population of Rennes; you assumed that every man you met in hotel or café was a journalist--to be on the spot at this sublime moment."

[12]Jewish Chronicle, 23 June 1899. See also Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, p. 116. In the fall of 1896, Mathieu Dreyfus made contact with Thomas Cook Agency in Britain, and with a journalist, Clifford Millage, who worked for the Daily Chronicle, to secure the release of his brother. The story published in the Daily Chronicle supposedly was a reprint of an article which appeared in the South Wales Argus. The Daily Chronicle, which catered to a lower-middle class readership, may have published this story to provide readers with sensational copy. At the time Prag wrote his article, he evidently was not aware that the report of Dreyfus' escape never appeared in the Newport paper. See also Jewish Chronicle, 20 July 1906; Frederick C. Conybeare, "French Military Justice," National Review, November 1898, p. 351; Spectator, 15 October 1898; Snyder, The Dreyfus Case, pp. 70-1; and Paul Cambon, Correspondence, 1870-1924, 3 vols. (Paris: Editions Bernard Grosset, 1940), pp. 28-9.

[13]Barclay, Thirty Years, pp. 136, 161-2.

[14]O'Brien, Lord Russell, pp. 315-8. See also John William Robertson Scott, The Story of the Pall Mall Gazette, of Its First Editor Frederick Greenwood and of Its Founder George Murray Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 318; Gretton, Modern History of the English People, pp. 47, 432; Saturday Review, 19 August 1899; and Frederick Greenwood, "The Looker-On: France: Its Tragic Extravaganza," Blackwood's Magazine, September 1899, pp. 425-7.

[15]Daily Telegraph, 2, 3, 16 September 1898.

[16]Saturday Review, 18 February 1899; 16 September 1899; 14 July 1906.

[17]Colin Holmes, Anti-Semitism in British Society, 1876-1939 (London: Edward Arnold, 1979), p. 71.

[18]Manchester Guardian, 5 June 1899.

[19]Manchester Guardian, 8 August 1899.

[20]Manchester Guardian, 22 August 1899. In 1678, an unsavory character named Titus Oates popularized a bogus story that a Jesuit plot to murder King Charles II was afoot. This "Popish Plot" aimed at replacing Charles with his Catholic brother, James. The Whig Parliament sent several innocent people to their deaths for involvement in the plot. By 1681, the majority of the population no longer believed that a plot had ever existed.

[21]Manchester Guardian, 10 September 1899.

[22]Manchester Guardian, 22 September 1899.

[23]Foxcroft, "'Dreyfus Scandal' of English History," p. 575. See also Barclay, Thirty Years, p. 137; Lewis, Prisoners of Honor, p. 301 (Lewis quotes Sorel, writing: "'The conviction of Dreyfus was the least unpleasant solution for the government.' A regime that had quaked before Guérin and his rowdies in the Rue de Chabrol had no stomach for prosecuting General Mercier. France--even much of Dreyfusard France--was exhausted by the Affair. Furthermore, most Frenchmen flattered themselves that, whatever the Anglo-Saxons and the rest of the world might think, France had not acquitted herself too badly. . . . The majority believed that the ideal dénouement was clemency for Dreyfus, a moratorium on debate, and a general amnesty in time for the Paris Exposition."

The Liberal-Radical press advocated abolition of the death penalty. Spectator, 29 December 1894, used the initial trial of Dreyfus to critique this outlook.

[24]Barclay, Thirty Years, p. 163. See also Tuchman, Proud Tour, pp. 213, 241-6; Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, p. 213; Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 105; and Spectator, 22 January 1898. The French Socialist party initially refused to become involved in the Affaire. Eventually, under the leadership of Jean Jaurès, a sizeable

portion of this party decided to support Dreyfus. Tuchman cites this as the first "collaboration of Socialism with the cause of the bourgeois world. Throughout the Affair the bridge of class enmity was crossed."

[25]C. E. Meetkerke, "The Return to France," The Argosy, July 1899, p. 271.

[26]S. F. Smith, "The Jesuits and the Dreyfus Case," Month: A Catholic Magazine, February 1899, p. 118.

[27]Jewish Chronicle, 15 September 1899.

[28]Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 26.

[29]Read, England, p. 268.

[30]Jewish Chronicle, 15 September 1899.

Chapter II

[1]Frederick George Marcham, A Constitutional History of Modern England, 1485 to the Present (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960), pp. 348, 352. For comment on British historiography in the late-nineteenth century and legal histories, see: W. S. Holdsworth, The Historians of Anglo-American Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), pp. 3-4, 6-7, 9, 15-6, 23-5, 65-71, 78, 80, 96-8, 132, 136, 146; Charles Petit-Dutaillis, Studies and Notes Supplementary to Stubbs' Constitutional History, trans. W. E. Rhodes and W. T. Waugh (Manchester: The University Press, 1923), p. ix; H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles, The Governance of Mediaeval England From the Conquest to Magna Carta (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1963), pp. 1, 22-3, 26; and E. A. Freeman, A Short History of the Norman Conquest of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887), pp. 5, 134-5, 139-40, 144.

[2]Times, 24 December 1894.

[3]Times, 21 September 1899.

[4]Times, 27 January 1898. See also William Barry, "The Trouble of a Catholic Democracy," Contemporary Review, July 1899, pp. 82-5; E. D., "The Situation in France," Contemporary Review, July 1899, p. 50; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, February 1899, p. 615; and Economist, 24 June 1899. In defense of French justice, see Trarieux, "After the Dreyfus Case," p. 659.

[5]Spectator, 26 February 1898; 15 April 1899. See also Tout, France and England, p. 155.

[6]Jewish Chronicle, 23 September 1898. See also Spectator, 30 May 1903.

[7]J. P. Wallis, "Liberty of the Press in France," Nineteenth Century, February 1899, p. 324.

[8]Lucien Wolf, "Anti-Semitism and the Dreyfus Case," Fortnightly Review, January 1898, pp. 145-6. See also L. J. Maxse, "The Only Mystery," National Review, February 1899, p. 807.

[9]E. Austin Farleigh, "The Case of Captain Dreyfus A Comparison of the Procedure of English and French Courts-Martial," Westminster Review, January 1898, pp. 1-3, 5-7. See also Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, pp. 219-20; Chapman, Dreyfus Trials, p. 238; and E. D., "The Situation in France," p. 48.

[10]O'Brien, Lord Russell, pp. 315, 322-3, 325. Compare O'Brien to Lewis, Prisoners of Honor, p. 295. See also Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, p. 318.

[11]O'Brien, Lord Russell, p. 325.

[12]Steevens, "Scenes and Actors," pp. 515-6. See also Saturday Review, 26 February 1898.

[13]History of the Times, p. 798. See also Chapman, Dreyfus Trials, pp. 132 (note 1), 236; Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, p. 172; and Steevens, Tragedy of Dreyfus, pp. 60-4, 77, 96, 147-8, 154-5.

[14]Saturday Review, 26 August 1899.

[15]Charles Whibley, "The Cries of Paris," Blackwood's Magazine, March 1898, pp. 313-4. See also Times, 4 February 1898; "The Demoralisation of France, p. 316; and Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, p. 205.

[16]Saturday Review, 26 August; 2 September 1899. See also J. Holt Schooling, "The Dreyfus Case A Puzzle in Handwriting," The Strand Magazine, December 1897, pp. 784-5; Godfrey Lushington, "The Court-Martial at Rennes," National Review, September 1899, p. 48; Lushington, "Verdict at Rennes," pp. 187-9; Times, 26, 29 August 1899.

[17]Steevens, "Scenes and Actors," p. 516. See also Spectator, 19 August 1899; MacDonald, "France To-Day," p. 552; and Chapman, Dreyfus Trials, pp. 131-2.

[18]Gornély, "The Case of Dreyfus, p. 241.

[19]O'Brien, Lord Russell, pp. 314-5, 319-20. For further comment about the creation of the French judicial system, see Alphonse de Calonne, "The French Judicial System," Nineteenth Century, March 1899, pp. 378, 386. See also MacDonald, "France To-Day," pp. 543, 551; "The Dreyfus Case and the Future of France," p. 357; and Lewis, France and the Dreyfus Affair, pp. 292-3.

[20]Saturday Review, 26 August 1899.

[21]Conybeare, "Fresh Evidence," p. 477. See also Godfrey Lushington, "Special Supplement: The Conspiracy Against Dreyfus," National Review, June 1899, p. 14; Lushington, "Court-Martial at Rennes," pp. 47, 56-7, 62; Lushington, "Verdict at Rennes," pp. 182, 200; and Spectator, 16 September 1899. For comment about the different styles of Demange and Labori, see: O'Brien, Lord Russell, pp. 320-1; Murray, "Notes on the Zola Case," p. 485; Spectator, 19 August 1899; and Steevens, Tragedy of Dreyfus, pp. 104-8.

[22]Saturday Review, 19 February 1898. See also Times, 24 February 1898; S. P. Oliver, "Military Espoinage in France," Quarterly Review, April 1898, p. 543; Wallis, "Liberty of the Press," p. 323; and Calonne, "The French Judicial System," pp. 378, 387-8. For a comparison between Zola and Dreyfus, and Voltaire and Calas, see An Anglo-Parisian Journalist, "A Regenerated France (?)," Fortnightly Review, July 1899, p. 144.

[23]Maxse, "The Only Mystery," pp. 815-6. See also "Episodes of the Month," National Review, February 1899, p. 20; Conybeare, "Fresh Evidence," p. 477; Lushington, "Special Supplement," pp. 30-1; Lushington, "Verdict at Rennes," p. 199. National Review did not make a wholesale indictment of the French judiciary. It acknowledged the rectitude of judges like Paul Bertulus. See Lushington, "Court-Martial at Rennes," p. 62.

[24]Spectator, 22 April; 5 August; 9 September 1899; 22 December 1900; 21, 31 January 1903. For comments about the separation of political and judicial systems in France and Britain, see: Quorum Pars Fui, "The Balance of Power," p. 604; Lushington, "Special Supplement," pp. 58-9; Whibley, "The Cries of Paris," p. 320; and Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, pp. 212-3.

[25]MacDonald, "France To-Day," p. 549.

[26]Spectator, 26 February; 13 August 1898; 10 June 1899.

[27]Spectator, 19, 26 February; 23 July 1898. See also Manchester Guardian, 25 February 1898, which believed that with the exception of Picquart, every witness was "manifestly controlled by an external agency." See Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, p. 198; and Steevens, Tragedy of Dreyfus, pp. 98-101, 182-5.

[28]Maxse, "Russia and Captain Dreyfus," p. 359; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, December 1898, pp. 471, 474; Maxse, "The Only Mystery," p. 813; Lushington, "Beaurepaire and Dupuy," pp. 129-31. See also Economist, 10 June 1899.

[29]MacDonald, "The Negative Ruler of France," p. 1067. See also Steevens, "France as Affected by the Dreyfus Case," p. 797. For a contrast to these observations, see Saturday Review, 22 January 1898.

[30]Maxse, "Russia and Captain Dreyfus," p. 358. See also Maxse, "Key to the Mystery," p. 274; Lushington, "Special Supplement," p. 4.

[31]Manchester Guardian, 17 January 1898. See also Times, 13 January 1898.

[32]Conybeare, "Fresh Evidence," p. 482.

[33]Maxse, "Cavaignac's Vindication," pp. 828-34. See also Conybeare, "Sidelights," pp. 263; Maxse, "Key to the Mystery," pp. 268-70, 282; and Lushington, "Special Supplement," p. 39.

[34]Spectator, 14 January 1899. See also Smith, "The Jesuits and the Dreyfus Case," p. 117; Maxse, "The Only Mystery," p. 811; and Lushington, "Beaurepaire and Dupuy," p. 132, 134, 136-7.

[35]E. D., "The Situation in France," p. 46. See also Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, p. 164.

[36]MacDonald, "The Negative Ruler of France," p. 1058. See also MacDonald, "France To-Day," p. 511.

[37]Chapman, Dreyfus Trials, pp. 37, 42, 61. See also Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, pp. 27, 29.

[38]Lushington, "Special Supplement," p. 25. See also Yves Guyot, "The Dreyfus Drama and Its Significance," Nineteenth Century, January 1899, p. 161

[39]Tricolor, "The Coming Social Revolution in France," Contemporary Review, January 1899, pp. 112-3. See also Spectator, 8 October 1898.

[40]Spectator, 3 December 1898.

[41]Lushington, "Special Supplement," pp. 40-1. See also Lushington, "Verdict at Rennes," p. 189.

[42]Henry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years 1892-1922 A Personal Narrative (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1925), p. 60. See also Beresford, "Anglo-American Entente," p. 381; and Spectator, 24 December 1898; 22 December 1900.

[43]Theodor Zeldin, France 1848-1945 v. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 680.

[44]Spectator, 29 December 1894.

[45]Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, pp. 219-20.

Chapter III

[1]Christine Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), pp. 9, 26-7, 29, 206, 208, 220.

[2]Spectator, 11 December 1897; 12 August 1899; 12 September 1903.

[3]This view of France was not limited to commentary on the Affaire. See Swart, Sense of Decadence, pp. 21-5.

[4]Raphel Patai, ed., The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, vol. 4, trans. Harry Zohn (New York and London: Herzl Press and Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), p. 273. See also Lewis, Prisoners of Honor, pp. 304-5. Interestingly enough, so loyal was Alfred Dreyfus to France that Herzl wrote, "'One can't even guarantee that he would have been on the side of the victim if someone else had suffered the same fate in his place.'" For extensive comment on the tendency of European Jews to assimilate into the national culture, see: Marrus, Politics of Assimilation, pp. 2, 6, 196-7, 203, 206, 212, 221-3, 231, 282-5; Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 103; Tannenbaum, 1900, p. 340; Lloyd P. Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870-1914 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960), pp. 268, 273.

It was more easy for British than French Jews to take an open stand in support of Dreyfus. Marrus suggests that while most French Jews believed Dreyfus to be innocent, only a few gave open support to the Dreyfusards. Most suffered from conflicting loyalties to France and to Dreyfus, the Jew. In contrast, Manchester Guardian, 15 September 1899, reported that synagogues throughout Britain were the locations of expressions of sympathy for Dreyfus. In addition to Chief Rabbi Adler's sermon on Atonement cited in the Introduction, Dr. Salomon, on the same day, at the Manchester Synagogue, said that France was branded with the mark of Cain. At the Synagogue of British Jews, L. M. Simmons publicly questioned the claim that France had on being a civilized nation. See Halpern, "The American Reaction," for comments about the Dreyfusard reaction of Jews in the United States.

[5]Marrus, Politics of Assimilation, pp. 3, 6.

[6]E. D., "The Situation in France," pp. 45-6.

[7]Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), p. 38. See also Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. xv, 85, 117, 120. She cites the Affaire as the catalyst which "gave birth to the Zionist movement—the only political answer Jews have ever found to antisemitism and the only ideology in which they have ever taken seriously a hostility that would place them in the center of world events."

[8]Spectator, 11 December 1897. See also Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 10, 45, 78, 93-4, 132, 155, 229, 248 (note 6).

[9]Claude Reignier Conder, "The Zionists," Blackwood's Magazine, May 1898, pp. 606, 608.

[10]Saturday Review, 10 June 1899. See also Snyder, The Dreyfus Case, pp. 92, 389. Snyder argues that the campaign of the anti-Semitic press in France is comparable only to the anti-Semitic movement in Nazi Germany. He cites Arendt who believed the Dreyfus case was "a prelude to Nazism."

[11]MacDonald, "France To-Day," pp. 548-50. See also Cornély, "The Case of Dreyfus," p. 222. The "anti-Semites howled with rage if the Jews were excused from military service; but they howled with joy if the Jews were indicted from passing the rank of a simple soldier."

[12]Murray, "Notes on the Zola Case," pp. 486-7.

[13]Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, pp. 111, 252-5. For comments about the social class of anti-Semite leaders, see pp. 262, 269, and Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, p. 214.

[14]Byrnes offers an excellent analysis of Catholic anti-Semitism before 1894 in Antisemitism in Modern France, pp. 128, 156, 179-83, 185, 190, 203, 225. He demonstrates that many of Dreyfus' supporters were Catholic, but admits that most French Catholics were anti-Dreyfusard. See also Tuchman, Proud Tower, pp. 218-9; Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, p. 213; Jewish Chronicle, 18 February; 4 November 1898; L. T. Hobhouse and J. L. Hammond, Lord Hobhouse: A Memoir (London: Edward Arnold, 1905), p. 253; Zeldin, France, pp. 679-80; and Manchester Guardian, 13 September 1899 (letter to editor from J. Arthur Cooke).

[15]Steed, Through Thirty Years, pp. 146-7. For further comment on Rampolla, see Maurice Larkin, Church and State After the Dreyfus Affair; The Separation Issue in France (London: Macmillan Company, 1974), pp. 40-1.

[16]Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, pp. 90, 180, regards the Catholic Church as an important promoter of anti-Semitism. See also Lewis, Prisoners of Honor, p. 201; "The Dreyfus Case and the Future of France," p. 368; Spectator, 16 September 1899; Saturday Review, 25 December 1897; and Jewish Chronicle, 29 July; 11 November 1898.

[17]"Episodes of the Month," National Review, March 1899, pp. 169-70. For more information on La Croix, see Larkin, Church and State, pp. 65-70, 72, 76-9; and Chapman, Dreyfus Case, p. 24.

[18]Conybeare, "Clerical Crusade," p. 792. See also Frederick C. Conybeare, "The Dreyfus Affair: Il Caso Dreyfus; or, The Jesuit View," National Review, March 1899, p. 151; and Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, pp. 4, 96.

[19]Conybeare, "Sidelights," pp. 258-9. See also Conybeare, "French Military Justice," p. 356; Conybeare, "The Jesuit View," pp. 151-2, 156 (This article contains condemnations of Drumont's "eulogies of the Inquisition" in the Preface of Abbé Desportes book, Le Meurtre Rituel.)

[20]Spectator, 15 April 1899.

[21]Steevens, "Scenes and Actors," p. 519. See also Tuchman, Proud Tower, p. 219; and Frederick C. Conybeare, "Treason in the French War Office," National Review, December 1898, p. 501.

[22]Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, pp. 111, 252-5.

[23]Oliver, "Military Espionage," p. 544. See also Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, p. 84, who argues that the core of Dreyfusards were Jews.

[24]Manchester Guardian, 8, 25 August 1899. See also Chapman, Dreyfus Case, p. 9; Halasz, Captain Dreyfus, pp. 30-1. Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 104, disagrees with Chapman and Halasz, arguing that the Army was anti-Semitic. Her claims are based on circumstantial rather than documented evidence.

[25]Smith, "The Jesuits and the Dreyfus Case," pp. 113-5, 118, 123-4, 126, 134. See also S. F. Smith, "Mr. Conybeare Again," Month: A Catholic Magazine, April 1899, pp. 406, 409.

[26]Herbert Thurston, "Anti-Semitism and the Charge of Ritual Murder," Month: A Catholic Magazine, June 1898, pp. 567-71, 574. See also Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, pp. 90, 180; Larkin, Church and State, p. 79; and Saturday Review, 21 October 1899.

[27]Spectator, 10 September; 24 December 1898. See also Manchester Guardian, 14 September 1899 letter from NEMO.

[28]O'Brien, Lord Russell, p. 317. See also Saturday Review, 10 September 1898. "The suggested Jesuit intrigues are theories which, unsupported by any testimony, may be passed over as idle speculation."

[29]Chapman, Dreyfus Case, pp. 9, 28. See also Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times: 1760 to the Present (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, and London: John Murray, 1960), p. 321. Wright argues that anti-Semitism probably played a crucial role early in the Dreyfus drama. The General Staff "probably would have abandoned the accusation" if not for Drumont's influence. In contrast to Arendt (see note 24 above), he believes that the role of anti-Semitism was external in the sense that Drumont stirred up popular anti-Semitism thus forcing the General Staff to act; not that the generals acted because they were anti-Semitic.

[30]Jewish Chronicle, 25 February; 30 September; 4 November 1898; 16 June; 15, 22 September 1899; 20 July 1906. See also Arendt, Origins

of Totalitarianism, pp. xii, 47, 94, 104, 107, 115-6. Arendt stresses the central importance of anti-Semitism in the Affaire, claiming that Panama was the true origin of the Dreyfus case. She believed that most people in France were anti-Semitic during the Affaire. See also Saturday Review, 19 July 1899.

[31]Whibley, "The Cries of Paris," pp. 319-20.

[32]Cornély, "The Case of Dreyfus," p. 223. See also "Impressions and Opinions," pp. 251-2.

[33]"Zola, the Dreyfus Case, and the Anti-Jewish Crusade in France," Review of Reviews, March 1898, p. 312. The Anglo-Jewish press became a reality in 1841 when The Voice of Jacob was founded. Shortly thereafter, the Jewish Chronicle went to press. Interestingly enough, three famous Jewish journalists reported on the Dreyfus case between 1894 and 1899: Blowitz of the Times; Theodor Herzl; and Max Nordau. The last two worked for Continental papers and became Zionists. Blowitz was a converted Jew.

In the Jewish Chronicle, 1 September 1899, one correspondent recounted an incident which occurred as he travelled from Paris to the Vosges on a train. It illustrates the French concern with the operations of a Jewish Syndicate. Upon discovering that he was an Englishman, two fellow passengers, both French, asked his opinion of the Affaire. They believed that all French Dreyfusards in public life, with the exception of Casimir-Perier, had been corrupted by money from Rabbis in Bulgaria and Rumania. The journalist disputed this hypothesis, saying that money was more easily obtained in England, and that he, being an English Jew, "had never been asked for a penny in the interest of revision." One of his acquaintances "became much heated, and thought it a pity that foreigners should concern themselves with this question."

Gabriel Hanotaux cabled the French Ambassador in London in early 1898 claiming that the British "'perhaps believe that we are weakened by the Dreyfus Affair. But they are wrong. They see us only through the eyes of the Jewish press.'" (Lewis, Prisoners of Honor, pp. 250-4.) In Spectator, 21 January 1899, one journalist argued that the French reason thus: "'Dreyfus is worrying us here, the English are conquering the Soudan—Adolphe, where is the Soudan?—and there must be some connection between those facts.' Three minutes' reasoning of that kind and the English are the source of all evil, are plotting this, that, and the other, always against France, until from very exhaustion the fit passes off, and the Frenchman, sane again, acknowledges that he has been deceived—by someone else." See also Jewish Chronicle, 4 August 1899; Marrus, Politics of Assimilation, p. 207; and Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 116-7.

[34]Lewis, Prisoners of Honor, p. 325. See also John F. MacDonald, "Memories of Fort Chabrol," Fortnightly Review, March 1911, p. 567. "France, having been restored to order and sanity and having made what reparation she could to Major Dreyfus, would have no more Antisemitism." This was written in reference to the comical attempt of anti-Semite Jules Guérin to resist arrest during the Dreyfus trial at Rennes. Guérin was

among a right-wing group which conspired to overturn the government. The discovery of this rather insignificant conspiracy led to the rounding up of key leaders by French police.

[35] Saturday Review, 25 December 1897.

[36] Saturday Review, 10 September 1898.

[37] Times, 13 January; 8 February 1898. See also Cornély, "The Case of Dreyfus," p. 233; "Impressions and Opinions," pp. 251-2; and Stephen Wilson, "Le Monument Henry: la structure de l'antisemitisme en France, 1898-1899," Annales Economies Sociétés Civilisations, Mars-Avril 1977, pp. 265-91. Wilson demonstrates this point by analyzing the list of contributors to the fund for a monument to Henry.

Approximately three-fourths of the French population lived in rural France and seldom, if ever encountered Jews. See also Claude Levy, "La Presse de province et les elections de 1902: l'exemple de la Haute-Saône," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, 1961, pp. 169-98, who shows that the mass of Frenchmen had little interest in Dreyfus. Wright, France, p. 681, argues that the election of 1898 was fought over bread prices, not Dreyfus.

[38] An Anglo-Parisian Journalist, "France of To-day," Fortnightly Review, November 1898, pp. 818-9.

[39] Spectator, 14 January 1898; 25 March; 25 May; 17 June 1899; 24 January 1903. See also Belloc-Lowndes, "A Group of Anti-Dreyfusards," p. 205; Playne, The Pre-War Mind in Britain, p. 394; "Impressions and Opinions," pp. 253, 257. Frenchmen were "physically indolent" and found "the same delight in strong language as that which the Anglo-Saxon derives from violent action." In France, "hunting down Dreyfusards, by gladiators like M. Rochefort and M. Judet" was a "substitute for our test matches and yacht races."

[40] Foxcroft, "The 'Dreyfus Scandal' of English History," pp. 566-9. See also Wolf, "Anti-Semitism and the Dreyfus Case," pp. 135-9, 141-3; Daily Telegraph, 3, 20 September 1898. Bonnet received only five years in prison. "Had the handwriting of the bordereau resembled that of any other officer but a Jew. . . . the innocent victim of the error would have got off with five or ten years imprisonment at the most."

[41] Smith, "The Jesuits and the Dreyfus Case," p. 128. See also Smith, "Mr. Conybeare Again," p. 409.

[42] O'Brien, Lord Russell, p. 318. See also Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, p. vii.

[43] Farleigh, "The Case of Captain Dreyfus," p. 2. See also Spectator, 16 September 1899; Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, pp. 213-6. Johnson explodes the claim that the Army was totally anti-Semitic by observing that Army officer Maurice Weil, who was a highly placed Jew, enjoyed the powerful protection of the French commander and chief, Félix Saussier. Weil was the subject of criticism and had a reputation

for misconduct. Saussier's patronage was the result of the liaison between Weil's wife and the General. Johnson wryly observed that, while she was Saussier's mistress, she did not sleep with every member of the General Staff.

[44] Marrus, Politics of Assimilation, pp. 1, 203. See also Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, pp. 114-6, 121, 156-7, 160, 163, 167, 225; Arthur Hertzberg, The French Enlightenment and the Jews: The Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 1-2; Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, p. 2; Chapman, Dreyfus Trials, pp. 270-1; Zeldin, France, pp. 681-2; Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 120; Arnold H. White, The Modern Jew (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1899), pp. xvi, 108-10.

Wilhelm Herzog, From Dreyfus to Petain: The Struggle of a Republic, trans. Walter Sorel (New York: Creative Age Press, 1947), pp. 52, 57, posits a link between the anti-Semitism of the Affaire and anti-Jewish actions which occurred in France during the 1930s and 40s. Under the Petain government, anti-Semites "gained another victory, although posthumous, thirty years after the Affair. . . . The Affair seemed to come to new life. . . . It shows how amazingly little had changed. . . . anti-Semitism always remained latent in France." Herzog's analysis, written in 1947, may be sincere, but ignores the tolerance which Jews traditionally received after, and even before, 1791. It reflects the polemic of the age, which is to say the revulsion experienced by the world at the revelation of Hitler's concentration camps.

[45] John Grigg, The Young Lloyd George (London: Eyre Methuen, 1973), p. 260 (note 2).

[46] Trevor Wilson, ed., The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 239.

[47] White, The Modern Jew, pp. viii, xiv.

[48] Holmes, Anti-Semitism in Britain, pp. 71, 82, 228, 232. See also A Quarterly Reviewer, "Emancipation From the Jews," National Review, June 1896, pp. 576-92; and Edouard Drumont, "The Jewish Question in France," National Review, January 1902, pp. 691-702.

[49] White, The Modern Jew, p. xvi. See also Friedrich Hertz, Race and Civilization, trans. A.S. Levetus and W. Entz (New York: Macmillan Company, 1928), pp. xi, 2, 8, 166.

[50] Spectator, 7 March 1903. See also Bernard Gainer, The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905 (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1972), p. 212; Holmes, Anti-Semitism in Britain, p. 220; Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant, pp. 64, 67-9, 275, 279.

[51] Arnold White, "A Typical Alian Immigrant," Contemporary Review, February 1898, pp. 241-50. See also White, The Modern Jew, pp. ix-x.

[52]Spectator, 3 September 1898.

[53]Conder, "The Zionists," p. 601. See also Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant, p. 277.

[54]Holmes, Anti-Semitism in Britain, pp. 12-3, 30-1, 66-70, 81, 233, 225-7. Holmes writes that "the major instances of anti-semitic hostility between 1876 and 1939 . . . grew out of economic and social dislocation when it could be believed that the social system was being undermined." In Britain, "anti-semitism never secured a major policy foothood within the political establishment and where the forces of a stable social-political system could be deployed against those who threatened to make anti-semitism a major issue. . . . At no point between 1876 and 1939 was there evidence of official governmental anti-semitism in Britain and in this respect the experience of Jews in Britain provided a sharp contrast with that in other countries such as Russia before 1919 and Germany and Poland after the First World War." See also Gainer, The Alien Invasion, p. 54; Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 354; Elie Halévy, Imperialism and the Rise of Labour, vol. V, 2nd ed. (New York: P. Smith, 1948-52), p. 372.

[55]Swart, Sense of Decadence, pp. 140, 172, 192, 243-4. See also William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York and London: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935), p. 605; Spectator, 30 September 1899; and Godfernaux, "Philosophy of the Dreyfus Case," p. 375.

[56]MacDonald, "France To-Day," p. 547.

[57]Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, Companion to volume 1, Part 1, 1874-1896, and volume 1, Part 2, 1896-1900 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 1041.

[58]Barclay, Thirty Years, pp. 137, 162.

[59]O'Brien, Lord Russell, p. 317.

[60]"The Demoralisation of France," pp. 317, 323. Actaeon was a classical legendary hunter who, after seeing Artemis or Diana bathing, was changed by her into a stag.

[61]Spectator, 27 November 1897; 17 December 1898; 11 February; 8 April; 30 September 1899.

[62]Conybeare, "Sidelights," pp. 257-8. In somewhat different words, a contributor to the Economist, 16 September 1899, explained the Affaire as a "relapse" of France "into one of her bad moods", which, of course, were "very bad." The nation seemed "given up to a sort of evil spirit, under whose influence whatever good she had in her is temporarily suppressed." Whibley, "The Cries of Paris," p. 318, caustically wrote that given the "variations of the popular temper. . . you may depend upon nothing save clamour and unreason" in Paris.

Jewish Chronicle, 11 February 1898, refused to stereotype the French race because of the behavior of the anti-Semitic, anti-republican members of the nation. In a commentary on the trial of Zola, one contributor wrote, little "light is thrown upon the permanent disposition of the French people by the savage attempts to assault Zola and his sympathizers outside." The writer believed the Boulangist agitation of the late-1880s was largely propelled by paid agitators who shouted most loudly. He found little reason to doubt that the same was true during the Affaire. Those who caused the public disturbance were not average citizens, "the 'man on the street.'"

[63] Saturday Review, 19 February 1898. See also Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, p. 9.

[64] "The Demoralisation of France," pp. 307, 310-1. See also Murray, "Notes on the Zola Case," p. 489; K. V. T., "The Dreyfus Case: A Study of French Opinion," Contemporary Review, October 1898, p. 594; Spectator, 3 December 1898; and Tout, France and England, p. 155.

[65] Spectator, 26 February 1898; 30 September 1899.

[66] Spectator, 27 November 1897; 3, 17 September; 15 October; 5, 26 November; 10, 17 December 1898; 14, 21 January; 15 April; 15 July; 30 September 1899. Jewish Chronicle, 25 February 1898, commented on the suspicious nature of the French who easily "lost their self-control, and with it all notion of truth." The nation suffered "from the suspicion that she has lost control of her destiny." Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 121-9, argues that such a thing as national character, although intangible, exists and consists of qualities of intellect and character. For comments about Gohier, see Spectator, 19 November 1898; 16 September 1899.

[67] Economist, 1 July; 25 November 1899.

[68] Godfernaux, "Philosophy of the Dreyfus Case," pp. 372-88. See also Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, p. 8.

[69] "The Dreyfus Case and the Future of France," pp. 358-9. See also Tout, France and England, p. 159; and Saturday Review, 18 February 1899.

Chapter IV

[1] Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, p. 6. See also Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," pp. 23, 26, for comments about the Religious press and its observations about Catholicism and the Affaire.

[2] Wright, France, p. 324. See also Zeldin, France, p. 679.

[3]Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, p. 27.

[4]Ibid., pp. 27-9, 31. See also Ensor, England, pp. 305-6, 308-9; Read, England, pp. 364-8; Chapman, Dreyfus Case, p. 20; Tannenbaum, 1900, pp. 31, 51, 160-90.

[5]Ensor, England, pp. 306-7. Regardless of the advances made by Catholicism in Britain, neither Greenwood nor the contributors to National Review believed that the conversion of the British people to Catholicism was likely. Conybeare believed that "with very few exceptions" Catholics in Britain were "Englishmen first and Latin Catholics second." See Conybeare, "The Jesuit View," pp. 152-3; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, September 1899, pp. 24-5; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, October 1899, p. 168; Frederick Greenwood, "The Looker-On: Protestantism A Religion and A Polity," Blackwood's Magazine, March 1898, p. 596.

[6]Larkin, Church and State, p. 79.

[7]Greenwood, "A Religion and A Polity," pp. 593-7. For observations concerning the protest in Britain against ritualism, see: "The Ghost-Dance of the French," Blackwood's Magazine, August 1899, p. 159; Frederick Greenwood, "The Looker-On: Reverberations From La France Croyante," Blackwood's Magazine, October 1899, pp. 563-6; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, July 1898, p. 649; Conybeare, "French Military Justice," p. 356; "Episodes of the Month," September 1899, p. 25. In opposition to those who argued that British Catholics enjoyed complete freedom from prejudice, both Thurston, "Anti-Semitism," pp. 561-2, and Smith, "Mr. Conybeare Again," p. 411, believed that anti-Roman prejudice still existed in Britain. Smith cited the anti-Catholic assaults of Conybeare and argued that some in Britain genuinely desired the confiscation of Jesuit properties.

[8]Conybeare, "A Clerical Crusade," p. 787. See also Conybeare, "The Jesuit View," p. 145; Lucien Wolf, Essays in Jewish History, intro. Cecil Roth (London: The Jewish Historical Society of England, 1934), p. 458; W. Morton Fullerton, Problems of Power, new and rev. ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), pp. 109-10, 114; Hobhouse and Hammond, Lord Hobhouse, p. 253. In National Review, Conybeare rebuked his critics in the Times, Literature, The Glasgow Herald, The Outlook, and Pall Mall Gazette. Conybeare's book also drew fire from Spectator, 17 December 1898, and Smith, "Mr. Conybeare Again," pp. 405, 410.

[9]Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, p. 251.

[10]Greenwood, "Reverberations," p. 563. See also K. V. T., "The Dreyfus Case," p. 599; Conybeare, "Sidelights," p. 259; Conybeare, "A Clerical Crusade," pp. 787-91, 799, 803-4; Algernon Charles Swinburne, "After the Verdict—September 1899," Nineteenth Century, October 1899, p. 521; Saturday Review, 9 September; 14 October 1899; and Spectator, 23 September 1899 (letter to the editor from W. K. Gill).

[11]"The Demoralisation of France," pp. 318-9. See also K. V. T., "The Dreyfus Case," pp. 598-9 (which speaks of the alliance "between the sword and the holy water brush."); E. D., "The Situation in France," p. 43; Conybeare, "French Military Justice," pp. 350-, 355; Guyot, "The Dreyfus Drama," p. 171; Saturday Review, 3 June 1899; Herzog, From Dreyfus to Petain, p. 3; and Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, p. 129. In contrast, some observers argued that clericalism did not enjoy the influence that the above writers claimed. See Whibley, "The Cries of Paris," p. 319; Economist, 19 August 1899; and Saturday Review, 21 January 1899, in which Count de Mun challenged Conybeare's allegation that Church officials supplied exam questions to their protégés. He proved that the "charge made in 1876. . . after two inquiries" was declared groundless. De Mun rebuked Conybeare for "his acceptance of second-hand and partial evidence against a great religious body."

[12]Captain Philip C. W. Trevor, "The Catholicism of the British Army," Nineteenth Century, June 1898, p. 957.

[13]"The Demoralisation of France," p. 319. See also Quorum Pars Fui, "Balance of Power," p. 598; E. D., "The Situation in France," p. 43; "The Dreyfus Case and the Future of France," p. 367; and Spectator, 13 July 1903. An Anglo-Parisian Journalist, "France of To-Day," p. 815 claimed that the Vatican denied responsibility for the acts of the Jesuits, but "it has allowed them to espouse its quarrels when it suited the Vatican's policy not to settle them openly by itself." Spectator, 23 July 1898, describes a sensation caused by Dominican priest Didon, who issues a "virtual incitement to a military coup d'état."

[14]Conybeare, "A Clerical Crusade," p. 805. See also Conybeare, "The Jesuit View," p. 153; and "Episodes of the Month," National Review, November 1899, p. 328. See Snyder, The Dreyfus Case, pp. 343-4, for Theodore Roosevelt's endorsement of separation of Church and State in his public statement on the Rennes trial.

[15]Spectator, 11 March; 23 September 1899. See also "The Demoralisation of France," p. 319; Professor Fiamingo, "The Policy of the Holy See," Contemporary Review, pp. 290-8; W. J. Stillman, "The Peace of Europe," Contemporary Review, March 1899, p. 321; Lushington, "Beaurepaire and Dupuy," p. 129; Conybeare, "The Jesuit View," pp. 145, 154; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, December 1899, pp. 477-8; Wilfrid Ward, "Italy I.—Vatican and Quirinal," Fortnightly Review, March 1899, pp. 460-74; and Godfernaux, "Philosophy of the Dreyfus Case," p. 384.

[16]Chapman, Dreyfus Trials, pp. 119, 146, 241.

[17]Larkin, Church and State, pp. 2, 33, 38-41, 69, 79. For Leo XIII's views on the Concordat and Separation of Church and State, see pp. 36-7. See also Chapman, Dreyfus Case, pp. 9, 24, 341. In an effort to improve the position of the Church in France, pope Leo XIII, in the Encyclical of 1892 argued that the Republic was the form of government which seemed to divide Frenchmen least. See Tuchman, Proud Tower,

pp. 219, 221. The pope's policy called the Raillement encouraged French Catholics to "infiltrate and ultimately capture" the Republic. See also Fullerton, Problems of Power, pp. 102-3. Chapman, Dreyfus Trials, p. 146, writes: "For the Vatican, Dreyfus was a minor matter, of the smallest importance in comparison with the doctrinal warfare which raged during these years throughout the whole Catholic Church."

[18]Smith, "The Jesuits and the Dreyfus Case," pp. 113-5, 118, 123-34. See also Smith, "Mr. Conybeare Again," p. 406; Spectator, 1 October 1898; and Halpern, "The American Reaction," pp. 59-60, 92. Halpern argues that American Catholics seemed to be "divided in opinion" concerning the Affaire.

[19]Chapman, Dreyfus Case, pp. 39-40. See also Chapman, Dreyfus Trials, p. 241.

[20]Smith, "The Jesuits and the Dreyfus Case," pp. 128-34. For comments on the Falloux Laws, see Chapman, Dreyfus Case, pp. 18-9.

[21]Spectator, 10 June 1899. See also "The Demoralisation of France," p. 318 (which believed that developments in France heralded the probable "reinstatement of civil punishment of heretics and unbelievers." For comments on the status of Protestants in France, see Spectator, 8, 22 April 1899. In France, Protestants occupied a disproportionate number of positions in the government bureaucracy, that is, in terms of their total of the entire population.

[22]Conybeare, "The Jesuit View," pp. 152-3. In contrast, see Spectator, 17 December 1898.

[23]"Episodes of the Month," National Review, September 1899, p. 24.

[24]E. J. Dillon, "Mr. Balfour's Plea for a Roman Catholic," Contemporary Review, March 1899, p. 455. See also Saturday Review, 21 January 1899.

[25]Zeldin, France, p. 681. See also Larkin, Church and State, pp. 2, 63; Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 60-1; Wright, France, pp. 323-4, 329-30; Chapman, Dreyfus Case, pp. 20, 320-2, 324, 334, 341; and Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, p. 223.

[26]Larkin, Church and State, pp. 1-4.

[27]Spectator, 21, 28 November 1903.

[28]Spectator, 11 December 1897; 14 January; 11 March 1898; 16, 23 September 1899. Conybeare, "Sidelights," p. 261, and "A Clerical Crusade," p. 806, reported a sermon preached by a priest named Coubé in December 1898. Before a "fashionable congregation" he, for an hour, "assailed the Jews with every formula of opprobrium dear to their mediaeval oppressors. . . . And if a tree is to be known by its fruit,

what shall be the judgment of modern Catholic France?" See also Tricolor, "The Coming Social Revolution," p. 114; Times, 14 September 1899; and Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, pp. 314-5.

[29] Times, 7 September 1899.

[30] "Episodes of the Month," National Review, October 1899, pp. 168-70.

[31] Spectator, 24 December 1898; 11 March 1899.

[32] Conybeare, "A Clerical Crusade," pp. 804-5. See also Conybeare, "The Jesuit View," p. 153; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, November 1899, p. 328; Spectator, 8 April 1899 ("Even the Catholics who live amongst us have been trained in the Protestant tradition, as M. Rochefort has been trained in the tradition of Catholicism."

[33] Times, 8 September 1899. See also Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, pp. 312-3. Contrast these views with Fullerton, Problems of Power, pp. 111-3

[34] "Episodes of the Month," October 1899, pp. 163-6. See also Cornély, "The Case of Dreyfus," p. 216; and Tricolor, "The Coming Social Revolution," pp. 120-1. The "education in France is but mental and moral gymnastics."

[35] K. V. T., "The Dreyfus Case," pp. 606-7. See Spectator, 15 April 1899. One reader wrote to editor John St. Loe Strachey, "The mental attitude of the average Frenchman for the French Protestant is the same as that of the average Englishman for the Nonconformist" although this feeling may not manifest itself with so much violence as the kindred feeling of the French for the Protestant. . . . Would it not be well if we remembered a certain lesson about a mote and a beam." Strachey responded to "A Nonconformist" writing, "we do not believe that either they [agnostics] or English Churchmen as a rule entertain for Nonconformists anything like the feeling prevalent in France towards the Huguenots." See also 22 April 1899 (letter to the editor from Joseph G. Alexander).

[36] K. V. T., "The Dreyfus Case," p. 607. See also Conybeare, "The Jesuit View," p. 153.

[37] Guyot, "The Dreyfus Drama," p. 171.

Chapter V

[1] Manchester Guardian, 15 February 1898.

[2] Petit-Dutaillis, Supplementary to Stubbs' Constitutional History, p. ix.

[3]Richardson and Sayles, Governance of Mediaeval England, pp. 22-3. For a contrasting view, see Geoffrey Hill, Some Consequences of the Norman Conquest (London: Elliot Stock, 1904).

[4]Freeman, Short History of the Norman Conquest, pp. 134-5, 137-40, 147.

[5]Ensor, England, p. xxi. The years between 1870 and 1914 "witnessed the conversion of the English government into a democracy."

[6]Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, p. v. See also Marrus, Politics of Assimilation, p. 201; and Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 23.

[7]Marcham, Constitutional History of Modern England, pp. 339, 341, 343-7.

[8]Searle, Quest for National Efficiency, pp. 15-7, 27.

[9]Ensor, England, pp. xxii, 294. See also Sontag, Germany and England, p. 101. For Englishmen, "Red-tape, regulations, restrictions on every detail of life. . . . bureaucratic rule would be intolerable."

[10]Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, p. 1.

[11]Times, 24, 25 January 1898. See also Wright, "Sometimes a Great Nation," p. 18. Andrew Dickson White described French politicians as "acting like a swarm of obscene, tricky, mangy monkeys chattering, squealing, and tweaking one another's tails in a cage. Some of these monkeys I saw performing their antics in the National Assembly. . . ; and it saddened me to see the nobler element in that assemblage thwarted by such featherbrained creatures."

[12]Hobson, Imperialism, p. 160. See also Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, p. 4.

[13]Pierre de Coubertin, "Contradictions of Modern France The Military Paradox," Fortnightly Review, March 1898, pp. 348, 350-1. See also Godfernaux, "Philosophy of the Dreyfus Case," pp. 372, 376-8; Economist, 26 February 1898; 25 February 1899; Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, pp. 22-4; Mark, Modern Ideologies, p. 80; and Fullerton, Problems of Power, pp. 110-1, 114.

[14]Economist, 24 June; 1 July 1899. See also "Episodes of the Month," National Review, July 1898, p. 652; and "Episodes of the Month," National Review, August 1899, pp. 697-8. "Englishmen have been familiarized with the idea of a heterogeneous coalition since the formation of the present Unionist Government, but if we can imagine opening our papers one morning to learn that some such Government as the following had been formed, we can appreciate the astonishment caused in France by the new combination.

Duke of Devonshire	Prime Minister
Lord Kitchener	Minister of War
Lord Kimberley	First Lord of the Admiralty
Mr. Robinson	Home Secretary
Lord Salisbury	Foreign Affairs
Mr. John Burns	President of the Board of Trade
Lord Dufferin	Colonial Minister
Mr. Bowles	Chancellor of the Exchequer
Mr. Herbert Gladstone	Minister of Education
Mr. Sidney Webb	Local Government Board
Mr. C. P. Scott	Minister of Agriculture

. . . . The State was in real danger, so patriotic and public-spirited men, on the initiative of the President, resolved to sink their comparatively minor differences in order to save the situation."

"Episodes of the Month," October 1899, p. 161, observed that the "present Cabinet is composed of the most diverse elements, who, it will be remembered, came together this summer as a committee of public safety to restore justice to the country, a task in which they have completely failed."

[15]Coubertin, "The Military Paradox," pp. 350-3. See also Pierre de Coubertin, "Contradictions of Modern France The Political Paradox," Fortnightly Review, June 1898, pp. 978, 984-5, 989; Godfernaux, "Philosophy of the Dreyfus Case," pp. 371-2.

[16]Alphonse de Calonne, "French Officialism," Nineteenth Century, February 1898, pp. 230-1. See also Spectator, 24 February 1900; 27 September 1902; Albrecht-Carrie, Britain and France, p. 11.

[17]Eugéne-Melchior de Vogüe, "An English View of France," trans. from "La France: Essai sur l'histoire et le fonctionnement des institutions politique francaises: par J. E. Bodley, The Living Age, 7 September 1901, p. 616.

[18]Quorum Pars Fui, "Balance of Power," pp. 594-5.

[19]John A. Scott, Republican Ideas and Liberal Tradition 1870-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 188-9.

[20]Swart, Sense of Decadence, p. 187, makes reference to David Thomson, Democracy in France, The Third and Fourth Republic, 3rd ed. (London, 1958), pp. 112-5, 168, 171-3; Rudolf Albertini, "Die Dritte Republik: Ihre Leistungen und ihr Versagen," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, VI (1955), pp. 492-504; Donald C. McKay, "The Third Republic in Retrospect," Virginia Quarterly Review, 33 (1957), pp. 46-60; Joseph Chappey, Histoire générale de la civilisation d'Occident de 1870 à 1950 (Paris, 1950), vol. 1, pp. 125, 192-3, 216.

[21]"Impressions and Opinions," pp. 249, 253.

[22]Whibley, "Cries of Paris," p. 321. See also Frederick Greenwood, "The Looker-On: France: A Halt on the Road to Revolution,"

Blackwood's Magazine, March 1899, p. 591; Ralston, Army of the Republic, pp. 224-5; Economist, 26 February 1898; 25 February; 10 June; 29 July; 19 August 1899;

[23]Manchester Guardian, 5 June 1899. See also Halasz, Captain Dreyfus, pp. 200-1.

[24]Zeldin, France, pp. 679, 681.

[25]Chapman, Dreyfus Case, pp. 38-9. See also Herzog, From Dreyfus to Petain, pp. 255, 273.

[26]Ralston, Army of the Republic, pp. 4, 203, 208, 220-4, 250, 343, 373, 375. See also Chapman, Dreyfus Case, pp. 9, 37, 41; Manchester Guardian, 19 September 1898; 8 July 1899. In contrast, see Snyder's citation of Jacques Kayser, The Dreyfus Affair, trans. Nora Bickley (New York: Covici-Friede, 1931), pp. 7-11; and Herzog, From Dreyfus to Petain, pp. vi, 3. Herzog describes the Petain Affair as "the belated revenge of the generals for their defeat in the Dreyfus case."

[27]Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 22-3.

[28]Chapman, Dreyfus Case, pp. 14, 321-3, 328-9, 339. See also Ralston, Army of the Republic, pp. 248, 251; Wright, France, pp. 324, 328-9; Carroll, French Public Opinion, p. 191.

[29]Trarieux, "After the Dreyfus Case," pp. 661-2. See also O'Brien, Lord Russell, pp. 324-5; An Anglo-Parisian Journalist, "A Regenerated France(?)," pp. 140, 144, 149-50; Saturday Review, 29 October 1898; and Spectator, 13 May 1899. For comments on the involvement of French intellectuals in the Affaire, see Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, pp. 220-1; and Spectator, 13 May 1899.

As the war in South Africa developed, Spectator, 23 September 1899, published an article entitled "Loyalty and Patriotism" which defended the right of British citizens to object to a war against the Boers. Such men were not necessarily "disloyal and unpatriotic." Although Spectator supported the government, it wrote: "Surely the example of France ought to teach us the awful peril of dubbing men as sans partries merely because they hold an unpopular view."

[30]Godfernaux, "Philosophy of the Dreyfus Case," pp. 380-4. See also Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, p. 164; Seymour-Ure, Press, Politics and the Public, pp. 19-20, 30. In his report to the Queen, Russell argued that the Affaire demonstrated the need for "more complete legal safe-guards and control than now exist" at courts-martial." (O'Brien, Lord Russell, pp. 323-4)

[31]Ralston, Army of the Republic, p. 232.

[32]Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, pp. 222, 224. See also Fullerton, Problems of Power, pp. 85, 110; and Barclay, Thirty Years, p. 138.

[33]"The Demoralisation of France," pp. 307, 310-3, 315, 325. See also Quorum Pars Fui, "Balance of Power," pp. 594-5; K. V. T., "The Dreyfus Case," p. 608; E. D., "The Situation in France," pp. 41-2, 45, 48-9; Spectator, 9 July 1898 ("France, under its superficial democratic forms, is as pure a despotism as Turkey."); Conybeare, "Sidelights," p. 260; Conybeare, "French Military Justice," p. 354; MacDonald, "The Negative Ruler of France," p. 1055.

For comment on the French alliance with Russia, see: Times, 14 January 1898; An Anglo-Parisian Journalist, "France of To-day," p. 818; and Vogüe, "An English View of France," pp. 620-1.

[34]Conybeare, "French Military Justice," p. 355. See also Steevens, Tragedy of Dreyfus, pp. 192-4. France "has invented a new kind of Government—Caesarism without a Caesar."

[35]Economist, 10 June 1899. See also Jewish Chronicle, 30 September 1898; Conybeare, "Sidelights," pp. 253-7; and Spectator, 3 December 1898.

[36]Economist, 16, 23 September 1899.

[37]Conybeare, "Truth about the Dreyfus Case," p. 555.

[38]Coubertin, "The Military Paradox," pp. 341-2, 344-5. See also Spectator, 11 March 1899; 24 January 1903; Economist, 18 March; 10 June 1899; and Jewish Chronicle, 30 September 1898.

[39]Economist, 18 March; 23 September 1899. See also Belloc-Lowndes, "A Group of Anti-Dreyfusards," p. 204. For comment on the debate in Britain about conscription see: Spectator, 24 December 1898; Manchester Guardian, 17 January 1898; Coubertin, "The Military Paradox," p. 345; and C. P. Lynden-Bell, "The Volunteers as a Fighting Force by an Ex-Adjutant," Blackwood's Magazine, May 1898, pp. 641-51.

[40]Conybeare, "Sidelights," p. 262.

[41]Spectator, 22 April 1899. In contrast, see Tout, France and England, pp. 159-60.

[42]E. D., "The Situation in France," pp. 41-2.

[43]Mary James Darmester, "Bodley's 'France,'" Contemporary Review, July 1898, pp. 60-74.

[44]Manchester Guardian, 1 September 1899.

[45]Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, pp. v-vi, 9, 155. See also Spectator, 1 July 1899; 6 December 1902; 21 November 1903.

[46]Spectator, 19 February; 24 September 1898; 14 January 1899.

[47]Spectator, 4 December 1897; 15 October 1898.

[48]Spectator, 4 December 1897; 30 August 1898.

[49]Spectator, 4, 29 December 1897; 15 January; 19, 26 February; 5 March; 9 July; 3, 24, September; 1, 15, 29 October; 3, 10, 24 December 1898; 7, 14, 28 January; 18 February; 19 August; 9 September 1899.

[50]Spectator, 4 December 1897; 15 October; 24 December 1898. See also "Episodes of the Month," National Review, November 1898, p. 314, 316, 317.

[51]Spectator, 15 January; 26 February; 24 September; 22 October 1898; 1 September 1899. See also Times, 17 January; 10 February 1898; Economist, 19 August 1899.

[52]Spectator, 4 December 1897; 19 February 1898; 30 September; 25 November 1899.

[53]Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, p. 42. "The Dreyfus Affair. . . should also be interpreted as one of the glories of France. . . . hundreds and thousands of Frenchmen of every religion, profession, and class rose to denounce iniquity, to demand the rule of law, to defy the powerful corporate bodies, and to put their positions and even their personal safety in peril before enraged mobs. . . . it is to the honor and credit of that generation of Frenchmen that the issue was raised, that it was fought in the open, and that those who wanted the illegal and unjust punishment of an innocent individual were thwarted." See also Wright, France, p. 324 ("One might almost epitomize l'Affaire as 'the shame and glory of modern France.'"); Herzog, From Dreyfus to Petain, p. 1; and Spectator, 21 July 1906.

Chapter VI

[1]Quorum Pars Fui, "Balance of Power," p. 600. See also Grenville, Lord Salisbury, pp. 17, 19, 98, 435. The key elements in Salisbury's foreign policy were: 1) enter no alliances in peacetime; 2) avoid any commitment to go to war; 3) retain a free hand for British diplomacy. Salisbury eschewed secret diplomacy and believed that nations should act in good faith toward one another; "The Demoralisation of France," pp. 311-22; Economist, 26 February 1898; 25 February 1899; Spectator, 22 December 1900; Jewish Chronicle, 13 October 1899.

[2]Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, p. 789. See also Michael E. Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (London: Temple Smith, 1971), pp. 1-2.

[3]Lord Rendel, The Personal Papers of Lord Rendel (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1931), p. 156. See also Sontag, Germany and England, pp. viii, 14-5; and Michael Barker, Gladstone and Radicalism: The Reconstruction of Liberal Policy in Britain 1885-94 (Hassocks, nr. Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1975), p. 249.

[4]"The Demoralisation of France," p. 306. See also Economist, 5 August 1899; and Frederick Greenwood, "The Looker-On: The Revolutionary Prospects in France," Blackwood's Magazine, July 1899, p. 138 ("Military dictatorships in France cannot be accounted favourable to the tranquillity of neighbouring nations."

[5]Economist, 25 February; 1 July; 25 November 1899. ("Great Britain, as an essentially Conservative State with great interest in peace and order" worried about changing circumstances in France.) See also Saturday Review, 9 September 1899; Greenwood, "France: Its Tragic Extravaganza," p. 424; and "Episodes of the Month," National Review, September 1899, p. 7. ("A strong, self-reliant, and formidable France is essential to the maintenance of the balance of power in Western Europe.")

[6]Steevens, "France as Affected by the Dreyfus Case," p. 796.

[7]Economist, 5 August; 16 September; 25 November 1899. See also History of the Times, p. 304. Chirol wrote to Dobson in St. Petersburg in September 1899: "'I hope you will keep your eye on any interesting comments on the Dreyfus sentence. I fear there is no doubt possible as to what the sentence will be. It is awful. Surely even from the most selfish point of view the Russians must recoil at this demoralisation of their "ally."'" See also MacDonald, "France To-Day," pp. 544-5; Greenwood, "France: Its Tragic Extravaganza," pp. 426-7; Spectator, 3 September 1898; Maxse, "Sins of the Syndicate, pp. 162-3, 168; Frederick Conybeare, "General de Boisdeffre?," National Review, April 1899, p. 340; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, May 1899, p. 367; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, September 1899, p. 11; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, October 1899, pp. 151-2.

[8]Maxse, "Cavaignac's Vindication of Captain Dreyfus," p. 815. See also Conybeare, The Dreyfus Case, p. vii.

[9]Economist, 25 November 1899.

[10]Grenville, Lord Salisbury, pp. 428-9. See also History of the Times, p. 798; Frederick Greenwood, "The Looker-On: The Secret of Sir Edmund Monson's Speech," Blackwood's Magazine, January 1899, pp. 155-7; and Stillman, "Peace of Europe," p. 316. "France as a feminine nation, has an hysterical tendency and in kindness should always be treated accordingly—with firmness where definite and vital interests are concerned, but with all possible indulgence for her sensitiveness as to her amour propre. . . . In fact, while the French Government, woman-like, invariably tried the expedient of stepping on England's toes, to see how far to venture, England has invariably yielded and stepped back, only to

find the same expedient resorted to ad infinitum. . . . The firm tone of the speech of Sir Edmund Monson. . . was a symptom of the healthy change in English policy."

[11]"The Dreyfus Case and the Future of France," p. 365. See also Daily Telegraph, 3 September 1899 (The "besetting sin" of the French was termed "a craving for military glory."); Stead, "Alfred Dreyfus," p. 432 (The Affaire is used to illustrate "the consequences of militarism and the results of sacrificing the welfare of a nation to the pursuit of revenge. . . . It is probably not an unfair observation that in the French army the soldier is to the citizen as 5 is to 2."); and Byrnes, Antisemitism and Modern France, pp. 5-6, 36.

[12]Spectator, 11 March; 30 September 1899.

[13]Coubertin, "The Military Paradox," p. 346. See also Tuchman, Proud Tower, p. 201.

[14]"Episodes of the Month," National Review, April 1898, p. 14. See also Maxse, "International Aspects," pp. 738-41; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, April 1899, pp. 187-90; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, August 1899, pp. 870-2; Grigg, Young Lloyd George, pp. 222-3; Pressense, "England and France," pp. 153, 158, 160; and Manchester Guardian, 4 September 1899.

[15]Maxse, "Russia and Captain Dreyfus," pp. 357-73. See also Conybeare, "French Military Justice," p. 340; Maxse, "International Aspects of the Dreyfus Case," p. 734; Maxse, "The Only Mystery," pp. 808-9; Spectator, 24 December 1898. Murray, "Notes on the Zola Case," claimed to receive information from a French Army officer who argued that Russia was "not wholly satisfied as to the condition of the French army" and secretly sought more information about its capabilities. The Russians obtained it from a French officer, but Murray believed that "Dreyfus was certainly not the man." The Daily News also believed the Russian legend. Saturday Review, 29 January 1898, discounted the Russian legend writing: "Why should Russia, which by no possible conjunction of circumstances could ever have to anticipate a sudden collision with France on the land, pay for detains of French mobilisation?"

[16]Oliver, "Military Espoinage in France," pp. 521-2, 528-9, 544-5. See also Whibley, "The Cries of Paris," p. 321; Albert D. VanDam, "The Spy Mania and the Revanche Idea," Fortnightly Review, September 1898, pp. 396-409 (" . . . no Government can resort to a system of habitual, methodical, and far-reaching espionage without being defiled by it."); Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, pp. 46-53, 113-4, 207; and Saturday Review, 19 February; 1 October 1898.

[17]Coubertin, "The Military Paradox," pp. 346, 349. See also Tout, France and England, pp. 156-7; Gretton, Modern History of the English People, p. 47; Spectator, 11 December 1897; 19 February 1898; and Monger, End of Isolation, p. 1.

[18]Frederick A. Maxse, "Judas," National Review, September 1898, p. 107.

[19]Spectator, 11 December 1897. See also Manchester Guardian, 4 September 1899. "The effects of the reaction, whether it utters itself most openly in militarism or in an economic direction cannot be confined within the frontiers of France."

[20]Searle, Quest for Efficiency, p. 28. See also Sontag, Germany and England, p. 13.

[21]Coubertin, "Contradictions of Modern France," p. 345.

[22]Stillman, "Peace of Europe," pp. 311-22. See also Economist, 26 February 1898; 14 January 1899; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, December 1898, p. 460. "We have had necessarily to tolerate a certain amount of superannuated Whiggishness—an echo of Palmerstonian days—on the need of 'an entente cordiale with our nearest neighbour' from personages as little acquainted with the internal condition and outward disposition of France as with that of the Martians. Fortunately England is not inhabited by Rip Van Winkles, and the mass of us refuse to close our eyes any longer to actualities."

[23]H., "Why Not An Anglo-German Entente?," Fortnightly Review, September 1908, p. 394. See also "Episodes of the Month," National Review, November 1899, pp. 302-6, 308.

[24]Grenville, Lord Salisbury, pp. 227-8. See also Lewis, Prisoners of Honor, pp. 250-4; Andrew, Delcassé, p. 215; Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 553-6, 576; and Spectator, 17, 24 September 1899.

[25]Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 24.

[26]Hobson, Imperialism, p. 160.

[27]Conybeare, "A Study in Jew-Baiting," pp. 796, 799-801. See also "Episodes of the Month," September 1899, pp. 9-10; Jewish Chronicle, 11 February 1898; Economist, 2 December 1899; Gaston Donnet, "The French Colonial Craze," Fortnightly Review, December 1898 (The French "collect colonies as connoisseurs collect bric-à-brac or tapestry."); and Pressensé, "England and France," p. 157.

[28]Frederick Augustus Edwards, "The French on the Nile," Fortnightly Review, March 1898, pp. 362-77

[29]"Episodes of the Month," National Review, May 1898, p. 634. In contrast, see Henry M. Stanley (M. P.), "'Splendid Isolation' or What?," Nineteenth Century, June 1898, pp. 869-78.

[30]Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, p. 283. See Read, England, pp. 482, 485; and Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 605, 789.

[31]Swart, Sense of Decadence, pp. 235-6.

[32]Searle, Quest for National Efficiency, pp. 34, 39.

[33]Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 27.

[34]Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, p. 652. See also Swart, Sense of Decadence, pp. 235-6; Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, p. 2; and Monger, End of Isolation, pp. 3-5, 12-3.

[35]Howard, The Continental Commitment, pp. 20-1. See also Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 18-21; Monger, End of Isolation, pp. 8-9, 12-3; Searle, Quest for National Efficiency, p. 34; Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind, p. 17; Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 233; Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, pp. 6, 165; and Andrew, Delcassé, p. 233.

[36]Searle, Quest for National Efficiency, p. 38. See also Monger, End of Isolation, pp. 8-9; and Howard, The Continental Commitment, pp. 11-3.

[37]Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind, pp. 24, 34-5, 40-1, 44, 53.

[38]Spectator, 5 December 1903.

[39]Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France, pp. xii-xiii, 53, 235, 323-5. See also Andrew, Delcassé, pp. 203-5, 214; Searle, Quest for National Efficiency, p. 30; Shannon, Crisis of Imperialism, p. 249. Some wished for closer Anglo-German relations. See Maxse, "The Only Mystery," p. 808; "Episodes of the Month," National Review, August 1899, pp. 867-9; Lushington, "Court-Martial at Rennes," p. 64; and Wright, "Sometimes a Great Nation," p. 18. Salisbury was interested in an Anglo-German rapprochement but did not wish to tie Britain to an autocratic government. Lansdowne was receptive to the idea of an Anglo-French rapprochement, but was no more favorable toward the French than the Germans.

Chapter VII

[1]Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 10, 236-49, 253-5, 323, 330-1.

[2]Wright, France, p. 324. See also Zeldin, France, p. 680; Andrew, Delcassé, p. 60; and Johnson, France and the Dreyfus Affair, pp. 209-10.

[3]Christopher Hibbert, The Royal Victorians: King Edward VII, His Family and Friends (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, pp. 172-3.

[4]Byrnes, Antisemitism and Modern France, pp. 8, 76, 92, 161.

[5]Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant, pp. 64, 67-9, 275, 279.

[6]Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 27.

[7]Greenwood, "Reverberations From La France Croyante," p. 563.

[8]Vogüe, "An English View of France," pp. 615-7, 623. Bodley's "idea is that modern France is suffering under a fatal antagonism between the two principles which govern its public life. . . centralization of authority, which Napoleon inherited from the old régime. . . [and] parliamentarism--that is to say an attempted imitation of English methods of government introduced into an organism which can neither assimilate, nor eliminate that foreign mixture. . . . A parliamentary system, ill-understood and ill-applied, has brought the worst elements to the surface, and paralyzed the nation's vital force."

[9]Pressensé, "England and France," p. 160. See also Fullerton, Problems of Power, pp. 110-3; and "Episodes of the Month," National Review, October 1898, p. 150.

[10]Greenwood, "France: Its Tragic Extravaganza," p. 426. See also Saturday Review, 19 February 1898; Spectator, 20 May 1899; and Times, 22 December 1894.

[11]Chapman, Dreyfus Trials, p. 178.

[12]Conybeare, "Sidelights," pp. 259, 266. See also Maxse, "Russia and Captain Dreyfus," pp. 368, 372; Conybeare, "Truth About the Dreyfus Case," p. 558; Maxse, "Cavaignac's Vindication," p. 834; 9, 23 July; 17 September 1898.

[13]Trarieux, "After the Dreyfus Case," p. 660. See also Economist, 26 February 1898. "The Dreyfus incident, we repeat, is an internal matter of which foreigners know little and should say less."

[14]Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 27.

[15]Saturday Review, 18 February 1898.

[16]Conybeare, "The Jesuit View," p. 145. See also Maxse, "Key to the Mystery," p. 277.

[17]Patai, Diaries of Theodor Herzl, p. 273. For extensive comment on the tendency of British Jews to assimilate into the national culture, see: Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1961), p. 76; Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant, pp. 268, 273; Tannenbaum, 1900, pp. 340, 343; and Charles Whibley, "Disraeli the Younger," Blackwood's Magazine, May 1898, p. 595.

[18]Drumont, "The Jewish Question of France," pp. 699, 701.

[19]Byrnes, Antisemitism in Modern France, pp. 130-8, 147, 153, 155, 324-5, 327, 331-3. See especially pp. 132-6 for a detailed explanation of the causes for the failure of the Union Générale.

[20]Greenwood, "Revolutionary Prospects in France," p. 138. See also Greenwood, "France: Its Tragic Extravaganza," p. 424; and Trarieux, "After the Dreyfus Case," p. 660.

[21]Hobhouse and Hammand, Lord Hobhouse, p. 253.

[22]Sontag, Germany and England, p. xi. See also Carroll, French Public Opinion, pp. 172-3.

[23]T. H. S. Escott, Masters of English Journalism (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911), p. 388. See also Spectator, 6 October 1906 ("We suspect that whenever anything happens to trouble that peace the first prayer of the diplomats is that the newspapers may not get wind of it."); and Pressensé, "England and France," pp. 156-7 ("Great journals, once worthy to lead the destinies of a nation, on account of their feeling of serious responsibility and the broad-mindedness of their politics, do not scruple to make themselves the worst foes of peace.").

[24]Letters of Queen Victoria, p. 396. See also Grenville, Lord Salisbury, pp. 430-1; and Giles, Prince of Journalists, pp. 201-2.

[25]H., "Why Not An Anglo-German Entente?," p. 394. See also Spender, Life, Journalism and Politics, pp. 184-5; Letters of Queen Victoria, p. 402; Grenville, Lord Salisbury, p. 430; Barclay, Thirty Years, p. 135; Economist, 30 September; 4 November; 2 December 1899; and Huch, "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," p. 27. On "Wednesday, September 20, word reached England that the French government had decided to grant Dreyfus a pardon. Almost immediately the furor in England subsided."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

British Journalists and the Affaire

Since this study is of the British press and its treatment of the Dreyfus Affaire, I have drawn extensively from late-nineteenth century British newspapers and the periodical press. The sources on which I have primarily relied are listed below. I have designated newspapers as dailies or weeklies. The monthly and quarterly publications are grouped together and alphabetically arranged. The articles about the Affaire which appeared in the periodical publications are grouped in chronological order beneath the title of each journal.

Newspapers

Dailies

Daily Telegraph

Manchester Guardian

London Times

Weeklies

The Economist

The Jewish Chronicle

Saturday Review

The Spectator

Periodicals

Academy and Literature

"Dreyfus and the Old Testament Hokhmah." 21 October 1899, p. 460.

The Argosy

Meetkerke, C. E. "The Return to France." July 1899, p. 271.

The Anglo-Saxon Review

Cornély, S. F. "The Case of Dreyfus--A Judicial Error." September 1899, pp. 213-45.

"Impressions and Opinions." September 1899, pp. 248-64.

Blackwood's Magazine

Whibley, Charles (published anonymously). "The Cries of Paris." March 1898, pp. 313-21.

Greenwood, Frederick. "The Looker-On: France: A Halt on the Road to Revolution." March 1898, pp. 591-2.

MacDonald, J. H. A. (published anonymously). "The Negative Ruler of France." June 1899, pp. 1052-68.

Greenwood, Frederick. "The Looker-On: The Revolutionary Prospects in France." July 1899, pp. 138-9.

"The Ghost-Dance of the French." August 1899, pp. 149-59.

Greenwood, Frederick. "The Looker-On: France: Its Tragic Extravaganza." September 1899, pp. 424-7.

MacDonald, J. H. A. (published anonymously). "France To-Day." October 1899, pp. 543-55.

Greenwood, Frederick. "The Looker-On: Reverberations From La France Croyante." October 1899, pp. 562-6.

Contemporary Review

"The Demoralisation of France." March 1898, pp. 305-25.

Murray, David Christie. "Some Notes on the Zola Case." April 1898, pp. 481-90.

Guyot, Yves. "The Dreyfus Case." May 1898, pp. 618-27.

K. V. T. "The Dreyfus Case: A Study of French Opinion." October 1898, pp. 593-608.

Tricolor. "The Coming Social Revolution in France." January 1899, pp. 106-22.

Pressensé, Francis de. "England and France: An Examination and an Appeal." February 1899, pp. 153-60.

E. D. "The Situation in France." July 1899, pp. 41-50.

Trarieux, Ludovic. "After the Dreyfus Case." November 1899, pp. 658-62.

Cornhill Magazine

Conybeare, Frederick C. "General Picquart." August 1914, pp. 167-73.

Fortnightly Review

Wolf, Lucien. "Anti-Semitism and the Dreyfus Case." January 1898, pp. 135-46.

Coubertin, Pierre de. "Contradictions of Modern France: The Military Paradox." March 1898, pp. 341-53.

Coubertin, Pierre de. "Contradictions of Modern France: The Political Paradox." June 1898, 677-91.

VanDam, Albert D. "The Spy-Mania and the Revanche Idea." September 1898, pp. 396-409.

An Anglo-Parisian Journalist. "A Regenerated France (?)" July 1899, pp. 140-50.

Godfernaux, André. "The Philosophy of the Dreyfus Case." September 1899, pp. 371-84.

An English Officer. "The Rennes Verdict and the Dreyfus Case: Its Military Aspects." October 1899, pp. 547-62.

Foxcroft, H. C. "The 'Dreyfus Scandal' of English History." October 1899, pp. 563-75.

MacDonald, John F. "Memories of Fort Chabrol." March 1911, pp. 558-67.

Harper's Magazine (U.S. publication)

Steevens, George W. "France as Affected by the Dreyfus Case." October 1899, pp. 792-8.

McClure's Magazine (U.S. publication)

Steevens, George W. "Scenes and Actors in the Dreyfus Trial." October 1899, pp. 515-23.

The Month: A Catholic Magazine

Thurston, Herbert. "Anti-Semitism and the Charge of Ritual Murder." June 1898, pp. 561-74.

Smith, S. F. "The Jesuits and the Dreyfus Case." February 1899, pp. 113-34.

Smith, S. F. "Mr. Conybeare Again." April 1899, pp. 405-12.

National Review

In addition to the articles cited below, National Review published regular summaries of the Affaire in its column "Episodes of the Month."

Conybeare, Frederick C. "The Truth About the Dreyfus Case." June 1898, pp. 541-58.

Maxse, L. J. "M. Cavaignac's Vindication of Captain Dreyfus." July 1898, pp. 814-34.

Conybeare, Frederick C. "The Letters of an Innocent." September 1898, pp. 46-65.

Conybeare, Frederick C. "Side-Lights on the Dreyfus Case." October 1898, pp. 250-67.

Maxse, L. J. "The Key to the Mystery." October 1898, pp. 268-83.

Conybeare, Frederick C. "French Military Justice." November 1898, pp. 337-56.

Maxse, L. J. "Russia and Captain Dreyfus." November 1898, pp. 357-73.

Conybeare, Frederick C. "Treason in the French War Office." December 1898, pp. 496-513.

Maxse, L. J. "Some International Aspects of the Dreyfus Scandal." February 1899, pp. 731-41.

Lushington, Godfrey. "The Dreyfus Case: The Scope of the Enquiry." February 1899, pp. 772-86.

Conybeare, Frederick C. "The Dreyfus Case: A Clerical Crusade." February 1899, pp. 787-806.

Maxse, L. J. "The Dreyfus Case: The Only Mystery." February 1899, pp. 807-17.

Lushington, Godfrey. "The Dreyfus Affair: M. de Beaurepaire and M. Dupuy." March 1899, pp. 129-40.

Conybeare, Frederick C. "The Dreyfus Affaire: Il Caso Dreyfus; or, the Jesuit View." March 1899, pp. 140-58.

Maxse, L. J. "The Dreyfus Affair: The Sins of the Syndicate." March 1899, pp. 158-68.

Conybeare, Frederick C. "General Boisdeffre?" April 1899, pp. 317-40.

Conybeare, Frederick C. "Fresh Evidence on the Dreyfus Case." June 1899, pp. 472-91.

Lushington, Godfrey. "Special Supplement: The Conspiracy Against Dreyfus." June 1899, pp. 1-64.

Conybeare, Frederick C. "A Study in Jew-Baiting." July 1899, pp. 783-801.

Lushington, Godfrey. "The Court-Martial at Rennes." September 1899, pp. 47-64.

Lushington, Godfrey. "The Verdict at Rennes." October 1899, pp. 179-202.

Nineteenth Century

Guyot, Yves. "The Dreyfus Drama and Its Significance." January 1899, pp. 149-72.

Wallis, J. P. "Liberty of the Press in France." February 1899, pp. 315-26.

Calonne, Alphonse de. "The French Judicial System." March 1899, pp. 378-88.

Swineburne, Algernon Charles. "After the Verdict--September 1899." October 1899, p. 521.

Pall Mall Magazine

Belloc-Lowndes, Marie. "A Group of Anti-Dreyfusards." June 1899, pp. 203-11.

Quarterly Review

Oliver, S. P. "Military Espionage in France." April 1898, pp. 521-45.

Review of Reviews (U.S. publication)

"Zola, the Dreyfus Case, and the Anti-Jewish Crusade in France." March 1898, pp. 309-20.

"More Light on the Dreyfus Case." November 1898, pp. 595-6.

"Why Henry Traduced Dreyfus." January 1899, p. 88.

Stead, W. T. "Alfred Dreyfus: A Chronicle." October 1899, pp. 417-32.

The Strand Magazine: An Illustrated Monthly

Schooling, J. Holt. "The Dreyfus Case: A Puzzle in Handwriting." December 1897, pp. 784-8.

Westminster Review

Farleigh, E. Austin. "The Case of Captain Dreyfus: A Comparison of the Procedure of English and French Courts-Martial." January 1898, pp. 1-7.

"The Dreyfus Case." August 1899, pp. 123-7.

"The Dreyfus Case and the Future of France." October 1899, pp. 357-68.

Books on the Dreyfus Affaire

The literature about the Affaire is voluminous. Much has been written about the Dreyfus trials and the impact of the Affaire on France. Below, I have listed those monographs which are most germane to this study. These works comprise only a fraction of the historiography about the Affaire.

Chapman, Guy. The Dreyfus Case: A Reassessment. New York: Reynal, 1955.

_____. The Dreyfus Trials. London: Batsford, 1972.

Conybeare, Frederick C. The Dreyfus Case. London: George Allen, and New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1898.

Halasz, Nicholas. Captain Dreyfus: The Story of a Mass Hysteria. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955.

Johnson, Douglas. France and the Dreyfus Affair. London: Blanford Press, 1966.

Lewis, David L. Prisoners of Honor: The Dreyfus Affair. New York: Morrow, 1973.

Snyder, Louis L. The Dreyfus Case: A Documentary History. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973.

Steevens, George W. The Tragedy of Dreyfus. New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1899.

World Opinion and the Affaire

Many of the monographs on the Affaire include discussions of the reactions outside France to the Dreyfus Affaire. Very few works, however, exclusively are devoted to a study of world opinion and the Affaire, or the reaction in individual states to the Affaire. Richard D. Mandell's "The Affair and the Fair: Some Observations on the Closing Stages of the Dreyfus Case." Journal of Modern History, September 1967, pp. 253-65, is a study of the response of the civilized world to Rennes and the relationship of the Rennes verdict to the Exhibition of 1900. Ronald K. Huch's "British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair," Social Science, Winter 1975, pp. 22-8, also focuses on the response to Rennes. Rose A. Halpern wrote an M. A. thesis at Columbia University entitled "The American Reaction to the Dreyfus Case" (1941). Her work examines American opinion based on an extensive analysis of the United States secular and religious presses during the years of the Affaire. Egal Feldman of the University of Wisconsin/Superior has written a book on American perceptions of France in the late-nineteenth century. In his work, he addresses the American response to the Affaire. His book is to be published by the Wayne State University Press at Detroit in January 1981.

Public Opinion and International Relations

Each of the works below examine either public opinion and the press or public opinion and international relations.

Angell, Norman. The Public Mind Its Disorders: Its Exploitation. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1927.

Boussel, Patrice. L'affaire Dreyfus et la presse. Paris: A. Colin, 1960.

Carroll, Ember Malcolm. French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914. New York and London: The Century Company, 1931.

H. "Why Not an Anglo-German Entente?" Fortnightly Review, September 1908, pp. 394-402.

Hale, Oron J. The Great Illusion 1900-1914. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

_____. Publicity and Diplomacy, With Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914. New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1940.

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 4th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.

Seymour-Ure, Colin. The Press, Politics and the Public: An Essay on the Role of the National Press in the British Political System. London: Methuen and Company, Limited, 1968.

Sontag, Raymond J. Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969.

Thompson, George C. Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, 1875-1880. 2 vols. London: Macmillan and Company, 1886.

Wright, Gordon. "Sometimes a Great Nation." The Stanford Magazine, Spring/Summer 1980, pp. 18-23.

The British Press

A wide variety of material exists on the British press in the late-nineteenth century. It includes memoirs and biographies of the leading journalists of the period, histories of specific newspapers or periodicals, and general histories of the press.

Amery, L. S. My Political Life. 3 vols. London: Hutchison, 1953.

Ayerst, David. Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper. London: Collins, 1971.

Bell, E. Moberly. The Life and Letters of C. F. Moberly Bell. Introduction by Sir Valentine Chirol. London: The Richards Press, Limited, 1927.

Blowitz, Henri Georges Stephan Adolphe de. Memoirs of M. De Blowitz. New York: Doubleday Page and Company, 1903.

Burnham, Lord Edward F. L. Peterborough Court: The Story of the Daily Telegraph. London: Cassell and Company, Limited, 1955.

Churchill, Peregrine, and Mitchell, Julian. Jennie: Ladie Randolph Churchill A Portrait With Letters. London: Collins, 1974.

Ellegard, Alvar. The Readership of the Periodical Press in Mid-Victorian Britain. Göteborg: Götesborgs Universitets Årsskrift, 1957.

Elwin, Malcolm. Victorian Wallflowers. London: Jonathan Cape, 1937.

Escott, Thomas Hay Sweet. Masters of English Journalism. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911.

Fullerton, W. Morton. Problems of Power. New and revised ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.

Giles, Frank. A Prince of Journalists: The Life and Times of Henri Stefan Opper de Blowitz. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1974.

Graham, Walter. English Literary Periodicals. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1930.

Hammond, J. L. C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian. London: G. Bell and Sons, Limited, 1931.

Harrison, Stanley. Poor Men's Guardians: A Record of the Struggle for a Democratic Newspaper Press, 1763-1973. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1974.

The History of the Times. vol. 3. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947.

Jones, Sir Roderick. A Life in Reuters. London: Hodder and Stroughton 1951.

Lee, Alan J. The Origins of the Popular Press in England 1855-1914. London: Croom Helm, 1976.

Leslie, Anita. Jennie: The Life of Lady Randolph Churchill. London: Hutchinson and Company, 1969.

MacDonagh, Michael. The Reporter's Gallery. London, New York, and Toronto: Hodder and Stroughton, 1913.

Mariès, Louis. Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare (1856-1924): Notice Biographique et Bibliographie Critique. New York: Burt Franklin, 1970.

Martin, Ralph G. Jennie: The Life of Lady Randolph Churchill. vol. 2. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971.

Mills, J. Saxon. Sir Edward Cook. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1921.

Pound, Reginald, and Harmsworth, Geoffrey. Northcliffe. London: Cassell, 1959.

Scott, John William Robertson. The Story of the Pall Mall Gazette, of Its First Editor Frederick Greenwood and of Its Founder George Murray Smith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950.

Simonis, H. The Street of Ink: An Intimate History of Journalism. London and New York: Cassell, 1917.

Spender, J. A. Life, Journalism and Politics. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1927.

_____. The Life of the Right Honorable Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, G. C. B. 2 vols. London: Hodder and Stroughton, Limited, 1923.

Steed, Henry Wickham. The Press. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguim Books, Limited, 1938.

_____. Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: A Personal Narrative. 2 vols. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1925.

Storey, Graham. Reuters: The Story of a Century of News-Gathering. Forward by Lord Layton. New York: Crown Publishers, 1951.

Tye, J. R., compiler. Periodicals of the Nineties: A Checklist of Literary Periodicals Published in the British Isles at Longer Than Fortnightly Intervals. Oxford: Oxford Bibliographical Society, 1974.

Whyte, Frederic. Life of W. T. Stead. 2 vols. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1925.

Wilkinson, Henry Spenser. Thirty-Five Years, 1874-1909. London: Constable and Company, 1933.

National Histories

Several general histories of Britain and France during the late-nineteenth century exist. I have relied primarily upon five works. The histories of Britain are: R. C. K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936; R. H. Gretton, A Modern History of the English People. 2nd ed., 2 vols. London: Grant Richards Limited, 1913; and Donald Read, England, 1865-1914: The Age of Urban Democracy. London and New York: Longmans, 1979. The histories of France which I have used are: Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times: 1760 to the Present. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, and London: John Murray, 1960; and Theodor Zeldin, France 1848-1945, vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.

Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth Century Europe

I have used two works which describe the European environment at the end of the century. They are: Edward R. Tannenbaum, 1900: The Generation Before the Great War. Garden City, New York: Anchor Press and Doubleday, 1976; and Barbara W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War: 1890-1914. New York: Macmillan Company, 1966. Tannenbaum discusses the Affaire in the context of European anti-Semitism. Tuchman devotes chapter 4, "Give Me Combat!", to the Affaire and its impact on France. Koenraad W. Swart's The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth Century France. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, offers a good analysis of the fin-de-siècle pessimism which existed not only in France but in other European nations as well. For comment about the British intellectual climate during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the following works are instructive: Samuel Hynes, The

Edwardian Turn of Mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968; Caroline E. Playne, The Pre-War Mind in Britain. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928; G. R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Political Thought 1899-1914. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1971; Reba M. Soffer, "the Revolution in English Social Thought." American Historical Review, December 1970, pp. 1938-64; and Reba M. Soffer, Ethics and Society in England: The Revolution in Social Sciences, 1870-1914. Berkeley: University of California, 1978.

British Political Traditions

The historiography on British political traditions is extensive. For the purposes of this study, I have drawn primarily from the following works.

Barker, Michael. Gladstone and Radicalism: The Reconstruction of Liberal Policy in Britain 1885-94. Hassocks, nr. Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1975.

Blake, Robert. The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1970.

Bullock, Alan, and Shock, Maurice, eds. The Liberal Tradition from Fox to Keynes. New York: New York University Press, 1957.

Clive, John. Macaulay: The Shaping of the Historian. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973.

Dangerfield, George. The Strange Death of Liberal England. New York: Capricorn Books, 1935.

Eccleshall, Robert. "English Conservatism as Ideology." Political Studies, March 1977, pp. 62-83.

Eldrige, C. C. England's Mission: The Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880. London: Macmillan, 1973.

Emy, H. V. Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics 1892-1914. Cambridge: The University Press, 1973.

Freeden, Michael. The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

Freeman, E. A. A Short History of the Norman Conquest of England. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887.

Hamburger, Joseph. Macaulay and the Whig Tradition. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976.

Hill, Geoffrey. Some Consequences of the Norman Conquest. London: Elliot Stock, 1904.

James, Robert Rhodes. Rosebery: A Biography of Archibald Philip, Fifth Earl of Rosebery. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1963.

MacCoby, Simon, ed. The English Radical Tradition 1763-1914. New York: New York University Press, 1957.

MacDougall, Hugh A. The Acton-Newman Relations: The Dilemma of Christian Liberalism. New York: Fordham University Press, 1962.

Matthew, C. G. The Liberal Imperialists: The Idea and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Elite. Oxford: The University Press, 1973.

Pelling, Henry, ed. Challenge of Socialism. London: A. and C. Black, 1954.

Perkin, Harold. "Individualism Versus Collectivism in Nineteenth Century Britain: A False Antithesis." The Journal of British Studies, Fall 1972, pp. 105-18.

St. John-Stevas, Norman. Walter Bagehot: A Study of His Life and Thought Together with a Selection From His Political Writings. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959.

Taylor, A. J. P. Essays in English History. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited, 1976.

Thompson, J. A. The Collapse of the British Liberal Party: Fate or Self-Destruction? Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1969.

Thomson, David. England in the Nineteenth Century 1815-1914. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited, 1972.

White, Reginald James, ed. The Conservative Tradition. London: N. Kaye, 1950.

British Constitutional History

Dicey, A. V. "The Teaching of English Law at Harvard." Contemporary Review, November 1899, pp. 742-58.

Holdsworth, W. S. The Historians of Anglo-American Law. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928.

May, Sir Thomas Erskine. The Constitutional History of England Since the Ascession of George the Third 1760-1860. New standard ed. with a new supplementary chapter 1861-1871, 2 vols. New York: A. C. Armstrong and Sons, 1887.

Marcham, Frederick George. A Constitutional History of Modern England 1485 to the Present. New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960.

Morley, Viscount John. Recollections. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan Company, 1917.

O'Brien, R. Barry. The Life of Lord Russell of Killowen. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1901.

Petit-Dutaillis, Charles. Studies and Notes Supplementary to Stubbs' Constitutional History. Translated by W. E. Rhodes and W. T. Waugh. Manchester: The University Press, 1923.

Richardson, H. G., and Sayles, G. O. The Governance of Mediaeval England from the Conquest to Magna Carta. Edinburgh: The University Press, 1963.

Schuettinger, Robert L. Lord Acton: Historian of Liberty. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1976.

Stephen, Leslie, ed. Letters of John Richard Green. New York: Macmillan, 1901.

Nineteenth Century Attitudes to Race

My general discussion of race and racial theories in the text is based on the works cited below. As is evident, most of these works are not devoted exclusively to this topic. In all works except the ones by Bolt and Hertz, I have selected information about attitudes to race from each book or article. Swart's The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth Century France (cited above) is also instructive in this regard.

Beresford, Charles. "The Anglo-American Entente." Pall Mall Magazine, June 1899, pp. 379-83.

Bolt, Christine. Victorian Attitudes to Race. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971.

Churchill, Randolph S. Winston S. Churchill. Companion to volume 1, part 1, 1874-1896, and volume 1, part 2, 1896-1900. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967.

Hertz, Friedrich. Race and Civilization. Translated by A. S. Levetus and W. Entz. New York: Macmillan Company, 1928.

Mark, Max. Modern Ideologies. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973.

"A New School." Blackwood's Magazine, June 1898, pp. 779-87.

Ranke, Leopold Von. History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations (1494 to 1514). A revised translation by G. R. Dennis with an introduction by Edward Armstrong. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1915.

Statham, H. Heathcote. "The Paris Salons." Fortnightly Review, January 1898, pp. 992-1007.

Europe, Anti-Semitism, and Zionism

Pulzer, Peter. The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria. New York: Wiley, 1964.

Sachar, Howard. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976.

Anti-Semitism in France

Arendt, Hannah. "From the Dreyfus Affair to France Today." Jewish Social Studies, July 1942, pp. 195-240.

_____. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New edition with added prefaces. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973.

Byrnes, Robert F. Anti-Semitism in Modern France. New York: Fertig, 1969.

Drumont, Edouard. "The Jewish Question in France." National Review, January 1902, pp. 691-702.

Hertzberg, Arthur. The French Enlightenment and the Jews: The Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.

Levy, Claude. "La presse de province et les elections de 1902: l'exemple de la Haute-Saône." Revue d'historie moderne et contemporaine, 1961, pp. 169-98.

Marrus, Michael R. The Politics of Assimilation: A Study of the French Jewish Community at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Patai, Raphael, ed. The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl. 6 vols. Translated by Harry Zohn. New York and London: Herzl Press and Thomas Yoseloff, 1960.

Wilson, Stephen. "Le Monument Henry: le structure de l'antisemitisme en France, 1898-1899." Annales Economies Societes Civilisations, Mars-Avril 1977, pp. 265-91.

The Jews in Britain

Some of the works cited below are exclusively devoted to anti-Semitism in Britain. Others are histories of the Jews in Britain. Finally, I have included works which illustrate the attitudes of prominent British citizens toward Anglo-Jewry, Jewish immigration to Britain, and anti-Semitism in France at the time of the Affaire.

Bentwich, Herbert. "The Progress of Zionism." Fortnightly Review, December 1898, pp. 928-43.

Booth, Charles, ed. Life and Labour of the People of London. 9 vols. London: Macmillan Company, 1902.

Conder, Claude Reignier. "The Zionists." Blackwood's Magazine, May 1898, pp. 598-609.

Cowles, Virginia. Edward VII and His Circle. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956.

Dunraven, 4th Earl of. "The Invasion of Destitute Aliens." Nineteenth Century, June 1892, pp. 985-1000.

Dyche, John A. "The Jewish Immigrant." Contemporary Review, March 1899, pp. 379-99.

_____. "The Jewish Workman." Contemporary Review, January 1898, pp. 35-50.

Fraenkel, Josef. Lucien Wolf and Theodor Herzl. London: The Jewish Historical Society of England, 1960.

Gainer, Bernard. The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905. New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1972.

Gartner, Lloyd P. The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870-1914. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960.

Grigg, John. The Young Lloyd George. London: Eyre Methuen, 1973.

Halévy, Élie. Imperialism and the Rise of Labour: A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century. vol. 5, 2nd ed. Translated by E. I Watkin. New York: A. Smith, 1948-52.

Henriques, H. S. Q. The Jews and the English Law. Oxford: The University Press, 1908.

Hobson, J. A. Imperialism. 3rd ed. London: Allen and Unwin, 1948.

_____. Problems of Poverty. London: Methuen and Company, 1891.

Hibbert, Christopher. The Royal Victorians: King Edward VII, His Family and Friends. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1976.

Holmes, Colin. Anti-Semitism in British Society, 1876-1939. London: Edward Arnold, 1979.

Hyamson, Albert M. A History of the Jews in England. London: Methuen and Company, 1928.

Hyde, H. Montgomery. Lord Reading: The Life of Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of Reading. London: Heinemann, 1967.

A Quarterly Reviewer. "Emancipation From the Jews." National Review, June 1896, pp. 576-92.

Reading, The Marquess. Rufus Isaacs: First Marquess of Reading, 1860-1914. 2 vols. London: Hutchinson and Company, Limited, 1950.

Roth, Cecil. "The Court Jews of Edwardian England." Jewish Social Studies, October 1943, pp. 355-66.

Samuel, The Right Honorable Viscount Herbert. Memoirs. London: The Cresset Press, 1945.

Smith, John. "The Jewish Immigrant." Contemporary Review, September 1899, pp. 425-36.

Stein, Leonard. The Balfour Declaration. London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1961.

Whibley, Charles. "Disraeli the Younger." Blackwood's Magazine, May 1898, pp. 583-97.

White, Arnold. "Alien Immigration--A Rejoinder." Fortnightly Review, March 1893, pp. 501-7.

_____. "Europe and the Jews." Contemporary Review, November 1897, pp. 733-42.

_____. The Modern Jew. New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1899.

_____. "A Typical Alien Immigrant." Contemporary Review, February 1898, pp. 241-50.

Wilson, Trevor, ed. The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928. New York: Cornell University Press, 1970.

Wolf, Lucien. Essays in Jewish History. With a memoir and edited by Cecil Roth. London: The Jewish Historical Society of England, 1934.

Zangwill, Israel. "Zionism." Contemporary Review, October 1899, pp. 500-11.

Catholicism in the Nineteenth Century

French Catholicism and the Affaire

Buthman, William C. The Rise of Integral Nationalism in France, With Special Reference to the Ideas and Activities of Charles Maurras. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

Herzog, Wilhelm. From Dreyfus to Petain: The Struggle of a Republic. New York: Creative Age Press, 1947.

Larkin, Maurice. Church and State After the Dreyfus Affair; The Separation Issue in France. London: Macmillan Company, 1974.

British Attitudes to Catholicism

The works cited below are a miscellany of articles which appeared in the British press, a biography of the leading Catholic official in Britain at the time of the Affaire, and the reflections of L. T. Hobhouse.

An Anglo-Parisian Journalist. "France of To-Day." Fortnightly Review, November 1898, pp. 810-20.

Barry, William. "The Troubles of a Catholic Democracy." Contemporary Review, July 1899, pp. 70-86.

Bastite, Ch. "M. Brunètiere." Fortnightly Review, September 1899, pp. 500-9.

Bourrier, André. "The Evangelical Movement Among the French Clergy." Contemporary Review, May 1899, pp. 677-86.

Dillon, E. J. "Mr. Balfour's Plea for a Roman Catholic University." Contemporary Review, March 1899, pp. 445-56.

Fiamingo, Professor. "The Policy of the Holy See." Contemporary Review, February 1899, pp. 290-8.

Greenwood, Frederick. "The Looker-On: Protestantism A Religion and A Polity." Blackwood's Magazine, March 1898, pp. 592-8.

Hobhouse, L. T., and Hammond, J. L. Lord Hobhouse A Memoir. London: Edward Arnold, 1905.

Snead-Cox, J. G. The Life of Cardinal Vaughan. 2 vols. London: Burns, and Oates, 1912.

Trevor, Captain Philip C. W. "The Catholicism of the British Army." Nineteenth Century, June 1898, pp. 957-65.

Ward, Wilfrid. "Italy I.--Vatican and Quirinal." Fortnightly Review, March 1899, pp. 460-74.

The Third Republic

The articles and books cited below offer a wide variety of views concerning the stability of the Third Republic at the time of the Affaire. All views, except that expressed in Scott's monograph, are those of contemporaries.

An Anglo-Parisian Journalist. "Bonapartism." Fortnightly Review, April 1899, pp. 680-93.

Bodley, John Edward Courtnay. Modern France. New York: Macmillan Company, 1898.

Darmester, Mary James. "Bodley's France." Contemporary Review, July 1898, pp. 60-74.

Coubertin, Pierre de. "France Since 1814." Fortnightly Review, December 1899, pp. 977-90.

Calonne, Alphonse de. "French Officialism." Nineteenth Century, February 1898, pp. 230-40.

"Musing Without Method." Blackwood's Magazine, July 1900, pp. 107-15.

Ponsonby, Lady Mary Elizabeth Bulteel, and Ponsonby, Magdalen (ed.) A Lady in Waiting to Queen Victoria Being Some Letters, and a Journal of Lady Ponsonby. New York: J. H. Sears and Company, 1927.

Scott, John A. Republican Ideas and Liberal Tradition 1870-1914. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.

Tearem, (M. P.) "The Military Amateurs." Contemporary Review, March 1898, pp. 335-45.

VanDam, Albert D. Men and Manners of the Third Republic. London: Chapman and Hall, Limited, 1904.

Vogüe, Eugène-Melchior de. "An English View of France (Translated from 'La France: Essai sur l'historie et le fonctionnement des Institutions politiques francaises: par J. E. Bodley)." The Living Age, 7 September 1901, pp. 613-24.

Wolf, Lucien ("Diplomaticus"). "Fashoda and Lord Salisbury's Vindication." Fortnightly Review, December 1898, pp. 1002-14.

The Army and the Third Republic

Challener, Richard D. The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939. New York: Russell and Russell, 1965.

Ralston, David B. Army of the Republic: Place of the Military in the Political Evolution of France, 1871-1941. Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1967.

Tint, Herbert. The Decline of French Patriotism, 1870-1940. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964.

Anglo-French Relations

Barclay, Sir Thomas. Thirty Years: Anglo-French Reminiscences (1876-1906). Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914.

Albrecht-Carrié, René. Britain and France: Adaptations to a Changing Context of Power. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970.

Tout, Thomas Frederick. France and England: Their Relations in the Middle Ages and Now. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1922.

Britain and France in Colonial Politics

Boulger, Demetrius. "Fashoda and the Upper Nile." Contemporary Review, November 1898, pp. 667-73.

Brown, Roger G. Fashoda Reconsidered: The Impact of Domestic Politics on French Policy in Africa, 1893-1898. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1969.

Brunschwig, Henri. French Colonialism 1871-1914 Myths and Realities. Introduction by Ronald E. Robinson. London: Pall Mall Press, 1964.

Decle, Lionel. "The Fashoda Question." Fortnightly Review, November 1898, pp. 665-76.

Donnet, Gaston. "The French Colonial Craze." Fortnightly Review, December 1898, pp. 864-71.

Edwards, Frederick Augustus. "The French on the Nile." Fortnightly Review, March 1898, pp. 362-77.

"The Failure of Our Foreign Policy." Contemporary Review, April 1898, pp. 457-80.

Heussler, Robert. Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service. Forward by John MacPherson and introduction by Margery Perham. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963.

Langer, William. The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902. New York and London: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935.

Louis, William Roger, and Gifford, Prosser, eds. France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Pressensé, Francis de. "England and France." Nineteenth Century, April 1898, pp. 521-33.

Quorum Pars Fui. "The Balance of Power." Contemporary Review, April 1898, pp. 593-608.

Robinson, Ronald, and Gallagher, John (with Denny, Alice). Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1968.

Vivian, Herbert. "The French in Tunisia." Contemporary Review, October 1898, pp. 147-64.

Westlake, Professor. "England and France in West Africa." Contemporary Review, April 1898, pp. 582-92.

Wilkinson, Rupert. Gentlemanly Power: British Leadership and the Public School Tradition; A Comparative Study in the Making of Rulers. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

The Growth of the Martial Spirit and the Coming of the Entente

Andrew, Christopher. Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy, 1898-1905. London: Macmillan Company, 1968.

"The Army Problem: A Proposed Solution." Blackwood's Magazine, January 1898, pp. 147-64.

Arnold-Forster, H. O. "'A Daniel Come to Judgment,' or the War Office on its Trial." National Review, October 1898, pp. 174-91.

_____. "The Army and the Government's Opportunity." Nineteenth Century, March 1898, pp. 345-65.

Balfour, Lt.-Colonel Eustace. "The employment of Volunteers Abroad: A Letter to the Editor." Contemporary Review, November 1899, pp. 759-60.

Barclay, Sir Thomas. Angleterre et France: Fraternite en Guerre Alliance. Avec Avant-Propos par Gabriel Hanotaux. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1916.

Benians, E. A.; Butler, Sir James; Carrington, C. E., eds. The Cambridge History of the British Empire. vol. 3. Cambridge: The University Press, 1959.

Brookfield, Colonel A. M.; Rasch, Major Fred. Carne; Russell, Major-General Frank; and Compton, Lord Alwyne. "The War Office and its Sham Army." Nineteenth Century, January 1898, pp. 1-22.

Cambon, Paul. Correspondence, 1870-1924. 3 vols. Paris: Editions Bernard Grosset, 1940.

DuCane, E. F. "Do We Need an Army for Home Defence?" Nineteenth Century, January 1898, pp. 23-9.

Grenville, J. A. S. Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy at the Close of the Nineteenth Century. London: The Athlone Press, 1964.

Hardie, Frank. The Political Influence of the British Monarchy 1865-1952. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970.

Howard, Michael E. The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two World Wars. London: Temple Smith, 1971.

Lafore, Laurence. The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I. 2nd ed. Philadelphia, New York, and Toronto: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1971.

Lowe, C. J., and Dockrill, M. L. The Mirage of Power. vol. 1. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971.

Lynden-Ball, C. P. "The Volunteers as a Fighting Force by an Ex-Adjutant." Blackwood's Magazine, May 1898, pp. 641-51.

Member of the HQ Staff. "The State of the Army." Contemporary Review, February 1898, pp. 275-81.

Monger, George W. The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Limited, 1963.

Palmer, Arthur V. (Late 79th Highlanders). "A Recruiting Sergeant's Suggestions." Nineteenth Century, January 1898, pp. 30-4.

Rendel, Lord. The Personal Papers of Lord Rendel. London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1931.

Rolo, P. J. V. Entente Cordiale: The Origins and Negotiations of the Anglo-French Agreements of 8 April 1904. London: Macmillan Company, 1969.

Semmel, Bernard. Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Shannon, Richard. The Crisis of Imperialism 1865-1915. St. Albans: Granada Publishing, Limited, 1974.

Stanley, Henry M. (M. P.). "'Splendid Isolation' or What?" Nineteenth Century, June 1898, pp. 869-78.

Stillman, W. J. "The Peace of Europe." Contemporary Review, March 1899, pp. 311-22.

Tuckwell, Gertrude M., ed. The Life of the Right Honorable Sir Charles W. Dilke. 2 vols. London: John Murray, 1918.

The Letters of Queen Victoria, A Selection From Her Majesty's Correspondence and Journal Between the Years 1886 and 1901. 3rd series, 3 vols. London: John Murray, 1932.

Williamson, Samuel R., Jr. The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War 1904-1914. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.