THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II
0N KENYA:
THE ROLE OF EX~SERVICEMEN IN
KENYAN NATIONALISM

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
OKETE J. E. SHIROYA
1968

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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled

THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II ON KENYA: THE

ROLE OF EX'SERVICEMEN IN KENYAN NATIONALISM.

presented by

Okete J. E. Shiroya

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

31.44;.— degree in é__._

Date 1 .4

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ABS TRACT

THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II ON KENYA:
THE ROLE OF EX-SERVICEMEN IN KENYAN NATIONALISM

BY
Okete J. E. Shiroya

In recent years, most studies on many facets of life
in Africa have tended to conclude that WOrld War II had a
tremendous effect on Africa and the Africans. Specifically,
it has been stated that the war had a significant impact on
nationalist movements and political activities in Africa.
The present study is an attempt to investigate the impact of
one aspect of‘WOrld war II, the African ex-soldiers, on polit-
ical development and nationalism in Kenya.

Data was gathered by means of personal interviews with
a randomly selected sample of individual ex—askaris. An
adaptation of "oral tradition" methodology was used in collect-
ing data and in checking its "objectivity" and authencity.
This meant, for instance, that ex-askaris' accounts on a
particular event or experience were compared to and checked
against those of the civilian population; at times the accounts
had to be checked against written evidence from such sources
as wartime official letters, circulars or despatches.

The study covers roughly the period from 1939 to 1963

i.e. from the outbreak of WOrld‘War II to the year of Kenya's

Okete J. E. Shiroya
independence. The first part deals with the recruitment of
Kenya Africans into the British Armed Forces. The next por-
tion examines the wartime experiences of the askaris and how
these influenced askaris' thinking and outlook on life.
Finally. the study deals with the problems of demobilization
and reabsorption: ex-askaris' reaction to civil life and

their participation in anti-colonial or nationalist movements.

Finding and conclusions:

Service in the British Armed Forces, greatly influ-
enced the political thinking of the average askari. Although
not making him into a modern nationalist, it certainly made
him politically more conscious and enlightened than his non-
veteran counterpart.

‘Wartime contacts between African and European troops
tended to lead to the lowering of the prestige of the latter.
On the other hand Africans' military service in foreign lands
and their contacts with non-EurOpean troops tended to sharpen
the Africans' anti-colonial sentiments. When they returned
to civil life, they turned these experiences and observations
into "political weapons" against the colonial rule.

Ex-askaris did not succeed in forming a politically
powerful organization. This was mainly due to the government's
rigid control of ex-askaris' activities. Consequently. their
major contribution to Kenya's nationalism: the spreading of

the newly acquired political ideas, was by individual ex-askaris.

Okete J.E. Shiroya
Even in the mau mau uprising in which eX-askaris played a

significant part, they joined it as individuals.

Recommendations and implications:

The government's rigid control forced the ex-askaris'
"movement" to go "underground" thus forcing ex-askari's to
resort to "covert" tactics in their anti-colonial activities.
Researchers should therefore turn to these covert tactics.
Investigation should emphasize ex-askaris' informal and per-
sonal contacts with the non-veterans. Ex-askaris' political
influence among different social groups becomes evident only
when the subject is approached from this angle. Their influ-
ence in trade unions, co-operative societies, political
parties, teachers' unions, and most important at the village

level, should be investigated.

THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II ON KENYA:

THE ROLE‘OF EX-SERVICEMEN IN KENYAN NATIONALISM

BY
Okete J! E. Shiroya

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1968

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The contributions of advice, financial support,
efforts and encouragement from persons too many to acknow—
ledge in their entirety were made available to me.

To Dr. James Hooker, Doctoral Committee Chairman,
advisor and director of the research, I wish to eXpress my
deepest gratitude for his sympathetic understanding, expert
advice and careful supervision and guidance in the prepara-
tion and writing of this manuscript. He gave advice and
assistance far beyond his professional responsibility; being
able to work with him has been a great privilege for me.

To other members of the committee, Dr. Arthur Adams
and Dr. Warren Cohen, I extend my special thanks and appreci-
ation for their critical comments and suggestions which helped
me complete this work.

I wish to express sincere appreciations to the many
ex-askaris who were most kind and helpful in supplying the
information and data upon which this study is based.

Also I wish to thank the Rockefeller Foundation for
their kind financial support without which neither my doctoral
program, in general, nor this research, in particular, would
have been possible.

Gratitude is expressed to Mrs. Pamela J. Schirado for

ii

the typing of the original manuscript and to Mrs. Jo McKenzie
for typing the final manuscript.

To my loyal friends, colleagues, and relatives—-
especially Dr. M. T. Christian-—who have, in varying ways,
made contributions that this effort might become a reality.

To all mentioned above and any whose names have been
unintentionally omitted, I extend sincere acknowledgement.

I assume full responsibility for any errors that

remain in this manuscript.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF APPENDICES. . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter
I Introduction. . . . . . . . . . .
II Recruitment and.Mobilization. . .
III wartime Treatment and Experiences
IV Demobilization and Reabsorption:
Government Policies and Programs
V Demobilization and Reabsorption:
Alternative Policies and Programs.
VI Conclusion: Ex-Askaris Participation

in Nationalist Movements

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

Page

22

53

102

179

204

254

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix Page

A Ex Arkaris' Organizations
in Kenya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

B ‘WOrld War I and II:
Enlistment Figures. . . . . . . . . . 248

Chapter I

Introduction

Most studies on Africa in recent years have tended
to show that there were sudden and major changes on that con-
tinent immediately following World War II. These studies
give the impression that before 1945 there was "darkness,"
but that after that year there was "light." Specifically,
it is shown that during the years immediately following the
war, Africans were politically more conscious than any other
time before; that they began demanding a greater say and
share in the governing of their countries, and when this
failed they resorted to more direct protests such as the
actual fighting for their national independence.

I found such conclusions rather fascinating and there-
fore I decided to find out exactly what happened in Kenya at
this particular time. I was particularly interested in inves-
tigating the impact made on Kenya's political develOpment by
the ex-askaris -- 98,000 or more of them. (See Appendix B)
0f greatest interest to me was the effect these peOple had on
the political awakening and consciousness of the mass of
Africans; the part they played in the nationalist movements

1

as well as their direct contribution to the fight for their
national independence.

Although I seriously began to think about this tOpic
in 1965, it was not until the summer of 1967 that I actually
embarked on field research. I spent 9 months -- August, 1967-
April, 1968 -- in the field collecting and gathering data. I
spent one month in England and the rest of the time was spent
in East Africa. While in these countries, I visited libraries,
museums, universities and interviewed various scholars inter—
ested in recent African history. However, about fifty to
sixty percent of data upon which this study is based was de—
rived from my interviews and discussions with hundreds of ex-
askaris in Kenya. This meant that these ex-askaris had to
recall events they witnessed or eXperienced some 20 to 25
years ago. For this reason I decided to use the "oral tradi—
tion" method which has become in recent years a very valuable
tool in the study of history of most of the illiterate societies.

To be sure that the information I was getting from
these ex—askaris was balanced, i.e. it was "objective," I
applied a number of techniques of which the following were
only a part: first I visited all provinces in Kenya and made
sure that I interviewed ex-askaris from all major war—theatres,
i.e.~Northeastern Africa, North Africa, the Middle East and

Southeast East Asia. I also made sure that I interviewed

ex-askaris from rural areas as well as those from towns,
those from more "advanced" ethnic groups as well as those
from the "less advanced" ones. I then checked this informa-
tion against what the friends, associates, neighbors or em-
ployers told me about a particular ex-askari or about a
group of them.

In addition, I varied methods of interviewing them.
At times ex—askaris were warned in advance of my coming to
interview them while at other times interviews were impromptu.
Sometimes I interviewed groups consisting of ex-askaris from
all war—theatres, while at other times I would interview
groups consisting of ex-askaris who served in the same area.
Still at other times, I interviewed individual ex-askaris,
while at other times I interviewed them in groups, conducting
the interviews as if they were seminars or discussion groups.

Through this handling of the tOpic there emerged
certain accounts and experiences that were common to most ex-
askaris regardless of where or when they served. In such
cases I found it impractical to document or indicate the
source of my information since such information tended to be
general and can be obtained from any group of ex-servicemen
in Kenya. However, in cases where an experience or an account
tends to be unique to an individual ex-askari or to a group of

men I have furnished the necessary references.

In examining the contribution of ex—askaris to Kenya's
political enlightenment, I started my investigation with the
methods by which Kenya Africans were mobilized or recruited
into British Armed Forces; here I discuss, among other things,
British prOpaganda which these conscripts were deliberately
exposed to and through which the British managed to transform
them into loyal, brave and skillful soldiers. Then I devote
time to discussing askaris' wartime experiences: treatment
by their British officers and other ranks, contacts with non-
EurOpean troops, services in foreign lands, ideas and technical
skills acquired during their service, etc.

The second half of the study concentrates on analyzing
his experiences and life as an ex-soldier: problems and
prospects of demobilization and reabsorption, his reaction to
civil life, the reaction of the public to his return to civil
life, particularly the Eur0pean community in Kenya, and the
treatment meted him.by the government. Finally, I discuss ex-
askaris' organizations -— participation or attempt to parti-
cipate in political, economic and social life of the colony.

My main conclusions are that the average askari re-
turned to East Africa with better general education than his
non—veteran counterpart. He was, for instance, better in-
formed and more politically conscious than his friend at home.

It is not known if ex-askaris would have succeeded in organizing

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tflaemselves into a powerful anti-colonial force had the colonial
gcrvernment in Kenya left them uncontrolled. What is known

‘15; that the government controlled their activities in such a
‘yaqy that they were unable to function in any way as an organ-
ized group.

This in turn forced ex-askaris to join "civilian"
orxganizations which were then in existence and which were
carrying on anti-colonial activities. They were found in
sucfln anti-colonial movements as political parties, trade
unjxans and Mau Mau uprising. Thus in contributing to the
figflat for independence, whether in ideas or in technical
skiIlls, ex-askaris did so not as a group but as individuals.

Although the primary concern of this study is the im-
Pact: of the Second World War on Kenyan nationalism -- specifi—
call){, the role played by the Kenya African ex-serviceman in
the Ipolitical awakening and in the fight for independence —-

a brtief analysis of African nationalism in general, of which
KenYan nationalism is a part, is in order.

Recent studies on African nationalism have shown that
ther‘é are several interpretations and exPlanations of what it
is alhd is not. There are those who feel that there is no such
thinSI as African nationalism, or that if there is, then it is
entity all its own. John Gunther, writing in 1955, stated

that: "The bulk of the Congolese do not think at all in

nationalist terms, i.e., of freedom from Belgian rule, be-
cause they are not educated enough to know what nationalism
is- "1 As late as 1962 this same view was presented, although
in a slightly different manner, by Margery Perham, otherwise
a "liberal" Africanist, who stated that, "We must think of
our territories...as being, after annexation, almost or even
entirely passive in the hands of their new rulers...I traveled
much in Africa between the wars...and yet I never saw any

overt signs of discontent or antagonism; everywhere I met

2
friendliness and eager curiosity."

 

lJohn Gunther, Inside Africa (New York, 1955), p. 666.
Gunther contradicted himself on the same page when he said,
"The Belgian system works well and organized discontent does
not exist.... There are, however, by official statistics
some 3,800 political prisoners in the Congo -- not an incon-
siderable number.

 

2Margery Perham, The Colonial Reckoning (London, 1951) ,
PP- 33-34. In her next statement, she showed her bias in
favour of the colonial administration when she stated that,
"There were very occasional and very local disorders, gener-
ally almost reflex actions of individual tribes against some
local grievance." This is the line colonial rulers took
Whenever there was any resistance or rebellion against their
rule_ For instance, the Portuguese take the same stand in
Angola and Mozambique today (1968) . These resistance movements
were termed "local," "tribal" and said to be engineered by a
"small band of possessed natives." This kind of distortion of
the Sc0pe, aim and strength of African nationalism led to
CFocker's conclusion that: "if recent history is any indica-
tlon. the more nationalism is repressed the more it grows."

W' R- Crocker, Self-Government for the Colonies (London, 1949).
Po 85.

Secondly there are those who View African nationalism
as something which simply happened or came out of nowhere
during the inter-war period. "The two decades separating
World War I from World War II were formative years of African
nationalism —- if the seeds of African nationalism were sown
in the two decades between wars, they matured with astonishing
speed after 1939."3 Their view is that there was no African
nationalism before World War I. However after World War I,
they say, African nationalism began to grow, although many
peeple were not aware of this fact: "0n the surface, little
was to be seen, but pressures and aspiration were building up
that broke loose with astonishing force following the end of

hosti lities in 1945 . "4

Then there is the "evolutionary school" which views
Afrixzan nationalism as having gone through the stages of birth,
QrOWflth and maturity. Colin Leys observed that, "Nationalism
is reeally a natural evolution with a fixed cycle of growth.

and what we are witnessing [in Africa) is an inevitable

\

, 3T. Walter Wallbank, Contemporary Africa, Continent
wnsition (Princeton, 1956), pp. 51—52. Wallbank con-
Cluded that "in the twenty years before 1939 there were hardly
any manifestations of African nationalism..."

4Ibid., p. 51.

 

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culmination of it..."5 Viewed from this angle, the time of
annexation of the African land by aliens becomes the "birth-
day" of African nationalism, and its growth takes place
during the period of colonial rule. Its maturity is reached
on " Independence Day. "

Finally, there are those who view African nationalism
as being in no way different from other nationalisms. Hans
Kohn and Wallace Sokolsky have observed that "The manifesta-
tions of nationalism differ widely according to the cultural
traditions and the social structure of the pe0ple involved.
Yet with all due difference, the state of mind [italics mine]
which manifests itself in nationalism is similar everywhere,
in EurOpe, in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America."6 It
W°u1d therefore appear that those who view African nationalism

as totally different from other nationalisms have concerned

 

 

Colin Leys, "Nationalism in Africa," The Listener,
LXIII, No. 1627 (June 2, 1960), 961-963. This school of
tholight characterizes African nationalism as having evolved
from "incipient" to "mature" or "deve10ped" nationalism}
from "traditional" to "modernist and more thoroughgoing
nationalism," its growth "gradual" and its continuity
Tgeometric." See Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism
“was Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964
,(Cambridge, Mass., 1955), and James S. Coleman, "Nationalism
1n TrOpical Africa," American Political Science Review (June,
1954) . pp. 404-426.

. 6Hans Kohn and Wallace Sokolsky, African Nationalism
% Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1965), p. 8.

 

 

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themselves with the analysis of its manifestation and expres-
sion, i.e., strategies and tactics employed in the fight for
national independence, and not the idea or philosophy of
African nationalism. They have not analyzed African national—
ism as a "state of mind," that is to say as a national senti-
ment, the idea of freedom, the spirit of independence, the
rejection of exploitation and Oppression, and Opposition to
injustice and subordination. This was articulated by Colin
Leys when he observed that "the central idea of these African
nationalisms is not fundamentally different from that of other
nationalisms -- the idea that foreign dominance, in this case
white dominance, should come to an end, and that Africans
should rule themselves. 'Africa for the Africans,‘ 'Freedom,‘
'Self-government Now' -- these slogans sum it up more effi-
ciently than pages of explanation."7
If we accept the view that social justice and a "place
in the sun" are goals men stubbornly pursue within the frame-
work of revolutionary nationalism, then we begin to understand
numerous "national" struggles that went on in Africa both be-
fore and after Eur0pean settlement, struggles among Africans
themselves and later between Africans and EurOpean settlers.
-It is only when we realize this that Sithole's statement be-

cxmmes relevant: "African nationalism roots back into history,

 

 

7Leys, Op.cit., p. 961.

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and without this historical foundation, the seemingly sudden
African nationalism becomes inexplicable. There are chain
causes which may be traced back to pre-EurOpean days of
Africa."8

Because pre-EurOpean struggles are outside the sc0pe
of the present study, we shall confine ourselves to colonial
Africa. What has been stated in the previous two paragraphs
can be supported by recent studies which have shown that the
"fight for national independence -- the fight for freedom"
started immediately following the imposition of foreign rule
on the Africans, and continued until national or political
independence was achieved. Endless wars of "pacification"
which the colonial powers were forced to wage against what
has been called African "primary resistance" -- that is to
say, the very earliest struggle against the imposition of
colonial rule —- occurred frequently and everywhere in Africa

throughout the colonial period.

 

8Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism (London,
1959), p. 19. See J. M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of National—

ism in East Africa," The JOurnal of African History, IX, I
(1968), pp. 119-146. Notice his reference to two aspects of
.African nationalism: "spontaneous element" of pOpular initia-
tive and the "conscious element" of direction and control by
IPOlitical leaders. It would appear that most analysts have
<=0nfined themselves to the latter and have totally neglected
‘therformer. It is to the former that Kohn and Sokolsky refer
when they speak of "residual nationalism." Kohn and SOkolsky,
SEL;E$E., p. 8. Crocker had the same thing in mind when he
Stated that "the foregoing survey...has been sufficient to
1L14ustrate the existence of (African) nationalism as a force
Which can no longer be neglected. It is primordial." Crocker,

5220\1’6. p. 84.

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Historiography of African nationalism is as contro-
versial today as the idea of African history was several
years ago. One is reminded of a statement made in 1963 by
Iuofessor Trevor R0per, then Chairman of the Faculty of
History at Oxford University that: " [British undergraduates]
seduced always by the changing breath of journalistic fashion
<kmmnd that they should be taught African history. Perhaps
in.future there will be some African history to teach. But
ifizpresent there is none, there is only the history of the
ENIOpeans in Africa. The rest is darkness ... and darkness
is not a subject of history."9 He has been accused of having
Practiced "intellectual imperialism."10 However, today, five
Years later, African history and its study are taken for granted.

Until recently most studies on African nationalism
have either shown that there is no such thing as African
nationalism or if its existence is admitted, then the asser-
tion is made to the effect that it is a thing of its own.
that it has no features which it shares commonly with other
nationalisms. However, very recent studies have thrown new

light on this subject and like the case of African history,
__‘___
9Quoted by Stanley Diamond in his article, "Perspec-

tive.of Political Anthropology" in Stanley Diamond and Fred
Burke (eds.), The Transformation of East Africa (New York,

1966). p. e.

loIbid.

12

African nationalism may soon be taken for granted.

These studies have certainly illuminated this subject,
hence the remarks that "The Black Revolutionary, particularly
in its latest phase, has challenged all previous interpreta-
tions of the history of black peOple, not only in the United
States but everywhere in the Western World and in Africa."

In Africa, such studies have mostly been confined to the gen-
eral area of East and Central Africa. There is no doubt that
basic conclusions in these studies can and do apply to most
parts in Africa. Through thorough re-examination of such
themes as the African reaction, response and resistance to
the colonial rule, a new trend in the interpretation of the

. . . . 12 .
history of African nationalism has emerged. It is shown

 

llGeorge Rawick, "The Historical Roots in Black

Liberation," Radical America, II, No. 4 (July-August, 1968)
p. l.

12J. M. Lonsdale, "Rural Resistance and Mass Political
Mobilization Among the Luo of Western Kenya," East African
History Conference, Dar es Salaam, 1965 (mimeo.); Alison
Redmayne, "Mkwawa and the Hehe wars," Journal of African
History, IX, 3 (1968), 409-436. A. B. Davidson, "African
Resistance and revellion against the imposition of colonial
rule," in Emerging_Themes in African History, ed. T. O. Ranger
(Nairobi, 1968); J. Iliffe, "The effects of Maji-Maji Rebel-
lion on German occupation policy in East Africa," British
and German Colonialism in Africa, ed. P. Gifford and W. R.
Louis (Yale, 1968); J. Iliffe, "The organization of the Maji-
Maji Rebellion," Journal of African History, VIII, No. 3
(1967) T. O. Ranger, "Revolt in Portuguese East Africa:
the Nakonde rising of 1917," in St. Antony's Papers, No. 5,
ed. K. Kirkwood (London, 1963); T. O. Ranger, Revolt in
Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7 (London, 1967).

can.

 

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13

that "resistance" movements were indeed a manifestation of
nationalism, i.e. struggle for freedom, and that there is
continuity and connection between the earliest resistance
movements and the latest nationalist movements, which al-
legedly emerged from nowhere in the 'fifties or 'sixties.
In Professor Ranger's words, "Many scholars have employed a
rather rigid periodization in their application to African
nationalist historiography. The period of resistance is
followed by hiatus; then arises the new leadership."13

The new school focuses on and stresses continuity in
the struggle for freedom. The fight might take on new and
various forms but the goal remains always the same: freedom
from domination. This assertion is based on the assumption
that "revolution" or "struggle" was not a new phenomenon in
the African experience; as in any other human society, revolu-
tion was part of life centuries before the period of colonial
rule: "History of Africa like that of any part of the world
is essentially the story of social change. The colonial period
is but one of Africa's many revolutionary ages. . . The pro-

cess of change in African history is an ongoing one."l4

 

13T. O. Ranger, "Connexions Between 'Primary Resist-
ance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and
Central Africa," Part I, Journal of African History, IX, 3
(1968) ' p. 443.

14JOhn Lonsdale, "The Emergence of African Nations,

A Historiographical Analysis," African Affairs, Vol. 67,
No. 266 (January, 1968), pp. 13 and 28.

 

 

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14

The continuity of the struggle, the necessity and
ianxartance of resistance movements to the nationalist move-
ments, which the new school emphasizes in the history of
African nationalism, is illustrated by what Rawick has said
about the black revolution in the New World: "The pre-
revolutionary activity was a necessary predecessor to the
Haitian revolt; and without Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vessey
anti Nat Turner, there could have been no Fredrick.Douglas,,
Ra}: Brown, Malcolm X and Eldridge Cleaver."15 The new school
rejects as false the common belief that the African responded
Passively to the establishment of colonial rule on that con-
tinent. This is attested to by the large number of primary
reSiistance movements that were organized and carried out
throughout colonial Africa. Walter Rodney has remarked that:

It would be impossible to enumerate various
popular uprisings -- small and large -- which
took place in Angola in the twentieth century.
They were unceasing, breaking out in one place
and then another. What is equally significant

is the persistance of these incidents long after
the Second World War.

Nowhere in Africa was EurOpean colonial admin—
istration accepted without struggle, so in this
respect Angola was no exception.16

Once any resistance movement was crushed by the colonial

f(Dit‘ces, the "nationalist leaders" would go underground until
\

15Rawick, Op.cit., p. 4.

16Walter Rodney, "EurOpean activity and African re-
action in Angola," in Aspects of Central African History (ed.),
'P. O. Ranger (London, 1968), p. 65.

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conditions became once more favorable for the launching of

a fresh struggle. Sometimes they employed new strategies

(x: ferms of struggle. Hence Lonsdale's conclusion that "the
apparent African passivity was not passivity at all, but
rather a continuing search for effective political and social
fkbxnnulae even if at a local level."17 Supporting this con-
<:liision, Rawick has elevatedittoapply not just to black revolu-
tions but to revolutions everywhere: "The Oppressed continu-
alLLyrstruggle in the forms of their own choosing and surprise
all. mankind when they transform the day-to-day struggle into

monumental revolutionary deeds."18

These studies have shown that those African groups
who militarily resisted EurOpean colonization, even though
they were eventually subdued, retained pride in themselves,
and to this day idealize the leaders who led them into such
Wars. At any rate, African "rebellions" did much to shatter
the early EurOpean attitude of masterful complacency. The
importance and connection of these struggles to nationalist
moVements is evident throughout Africa. Hence Ranger's
conclusion:

It will be seen therefore that there is a

long ancestry behind the attention currently paid
by nationalist leaders to the heroic myths of

l7Lonsdale, Op.cit., p. 22.
18Rawick, Op.cit., p. 14.

16

primary resistance. When a man like Nelson
Mandera seeks inspiration in tales 'of the wars
fought by our ancestors in defence of the father-
land' and sees them not as part merely of tribal
history, but 'as the pride and glory of the en-
tire African nation) he is echoing the response
of many of his predecessors.19

From the foregoing, we can safely conclude that African
nationalism -- the idea of freedom -- was not dependent on
scune "future event" such as EurOpean colonialism, World War I
or World War II. Reverend George Gay —- writing as an historian
-- inas correct when he wrote that, "WOrld war II did not give
‘biacth.to the spirit of independence, but rather gave expres—
Si£xn to that spirit which was already there."20 Those other
(“ltlside influences which allegedly gave birth to African
nationalism can be viewed in the same light. Seen in this
:Lisjht, the transformation which was brought about by the
Western impact in Africa has been an indispensable precondi-
tidon for the realization and victory of African nationalism
-§£E§ not for its birth or rise. Through this transformation,
African nationalism began to express and manifest itself in
.new ways.

During the "primary resistance" stage, Africans had
olbposed colonial rule as relatively small "national" groups

(€E.g., language or ethnic groups); but later they organized

\—

19Ranger, Op.cit., p. 445.

2Oouoted by Sithole, Op.cit., p. 26.

 

l7

themselves into larger national groups. Their nationalism
moved from what Kohn and Sokolsky called "residual" level
(i-e., ethnic) to multi-ethnic or territorial level: Ghana,
Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Congo, etc. Earlier the Africans
had opposed colonial rule with traditional African weaponry
and military organization; later they employed modern weaponry
and modern military organization. While they had used tradi-
tional Chiefs' councils to negotiate settlements with the
colonial administrations, they later agitated for freedom and
independence through modern news media and modern political
Parties and trade unions.

Because of the Western impact, the African found a new
way in which to express his nationalism. It became a new
"tool" or "language" through which he could effectively com-
mu«nicate and carry on a dialogue with the colonial administra-
tiOn. Expressed in these modern terms, African nationalism
asSumed a new status -- indeed, a new force -- which colonial
administrations could no longer ignore and with which they
had to reckon.

It can be stated that as long as African nationalism
e"(Pressed itself through African traditional symbols, it failed
to disrupt colonial rule. But once it modernized its tactics
and strategies, it began to express itself effectively and in

the end it disrupted the colonial rule, i.e., it achieved its

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goal -- national independence. In order to defeat modern
colonialism, African nationalism had to employ modern ways
and means.21

Some criteria or qualifications have been used in
judging African nationalism in order to show that it is unique.
For instance, it has been said that in any one African nation
peeple do not share a common language, history, culture,
religion, environment and way of life.22 Recent studies,
however, have shown that these features, conditions, beliefs
or criteria need not necessarily be there in order for a

People, anywhere in the world, to call themselves a nation.

 

 

21In his book The World and the West (London, 1953) ,

A: Toynbee talks about this a great deal. Giving Japan as an
exaIIfl‘ple he stated that, "The Japanese were prompters ...
opting for, and acting on, this alternative policy of holding

eir own against the West by learning how to use and make the
latest types of Western weapons." p. 53. Margery Perham's
Paraphrasing Toynbee's general statement made it clearer,
St3"5‘0nger and more precise: "The subjected groups have strug-
gled to take over from the West their instruments of power in
Order to turn them against the West, to regain their inde-
perIdence and to rebuild their own shaken societies. Japan
s’howed the way..." Perham, Op.cit., p. 11.

, 22See Perham, Op.cit., p. 26. "The astonishing fact
18 that nearly all the new African nations lack all these
e].-elttents except a common territory." Compare this with a
911': cular letter from the West African National Secretariat
in 1947 which stated, amongst other things: "Common prob-
ems, common sufferings, and common heritage have made the

p e0ple of West Africa one in spite of attempts by our detrac-
Org to pitch us against each other..." Quoted in Crocker,

2m; p. 88.

19

Professor Boyd Shafer has listed ten of these beliefs and

cc>r1cluded that:
All of these beliefs or conditions need not
always be present in the same degree and combina-
tion. The Swiss may stress their common history
and their common defense so much that they do not
need the fiction of a common race or the tie of
one language.23
There are numerous examples of this nature from both
(3113. and new nations. If, for instance, "race", "stock" or
"nationality" were used as a condition or qualification for
a Insation, then Britain would not be a nation, because Britons
1T1 IEreland, Wales, Scotland and England belong to different
national or language groups or "racial stocks." In the United
States of America there are Asian-Americans, African—Americans
and EurOpean-Americans. In the last grouping there are Anglo-
Saxons and non-Anglo-Saxons; these two large groupings can be
ful1"ther subdivided into particular EurOpean "stocks": French,
Itfillians, Germans, English, Dutch, Swedes, etc. Yugoslavia
143 another good example. There is no such thing as a YUgoslav
l"Stinguage. There are five major national and language groups
311:1 about twenty national and language minorities. Turning
.tt3 .Asia, Vietnam offers an excellent example: there are at

24

‘lEEEist five major national groups in Vietnam. The Masai are

\

23Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality
(New Yor , 1955). p. 9.

24Major national and language groups in YUgoslavia
Eirea: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins.
:1 Vietnam they are: Kinh, Tho, Nung, Muog, Man, etc.

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tc> anya and Tanzania what the Basques are to France and

Sp>aain.25

These examples of nation states demonstrate the com-
pfiLeaxity of the term nationalism. Shafer, Crocker, Kohn and
Sokolsky seem to agree that what nationalism is or is not de-
pends on one's definition of it. Thus Crocker has said,
"Cieufinitions of nationalism are as numerous as the definitions
<>f5 Ipoetry";26 perhaps this is an overstatement. Professor
Shafer's analysis of modern nationalism calls for serious con-
Sideration:

Nationalism is what the nationalists have
made it; it is not a neat, fixed concept but a
varying combination of beliefs and conditions...
It may be in part founded on myth but myths like
other errors have a way of perpetuating themselves
and becoming not true but real. The fact is that
myth and actuality and truth and error arezinex—
tricably intermixed in modern nationalism.

One may also say that intellectuals, in addition to
nationalists, have made nationalism what it is today. National-

IJSDH carries a different meaning if its interpretation is either
\

25This illustrates how at times both old and new
1u§tions are faced with similar problems: "United in heritage,
:f‘lided politically, the seven Basque provinces occupy por-
3~0ns of France and Spain. Of 870,000 Basques, some 750,000
:L‘fe in Spain. Spanish Basque separatists agitate for a
r‘?1:urn to their ancient independence. Last spring demonstra-
:L<>ns paralyzed San Sebastian." National Geographic, Vol.
34, No. 2 (August, 1968), p. 246.

26
27

Crocker, Op.cit., p. 84.
Shafer, Op.cit., p. 7.

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broad or narrow. In his study of African nationalism
Hodgkin uses the term nationalistic in a broad sense by

which it means:

Any organization or group that explicitly
asserts the rights, claims and aspirations Of a
given African society (from the level of the langu-
age group to that Of 'Pan-Africa') in Opposition
to EurOpean authority, whatever its institutional
form or Objectives.2

Analysis Of African nationalism, in this study, has
Ineeeri‘based on the above-mentioned assumptions. Since Kenyan
nationalism is an‘aspect of African nationalism, it was neces-
sary to analyze African nationalism in general before turning
tc’ I<enyan nationalism in particular. The primary concern of
t31€3 study is to analyze the role of the African ex-soldiers
iJl 1:he political awakening and in the fight for independence

' . . . . . 29
in Kenya -— their contribution to nationalism in Kenya.

\

28Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa
(New York, 1957), p. 23.

29Those who need detailed analysis of nationalism in

Kenya in general are referred to an excellent study by C. G.

Roseberg and J. Nottingham, The Myth of 'Mau Mau' (New York,

E966) . My analysis is restricted to the role Of ex-askaris
‘that nationalism.

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Chapter II
Recruitment and Mobilization

The method by which men are brought into any army
as soldiers may influence the way they regard their govern-
ment, their country, their peOple and even the enemy against
whom they are fighting. If we know something about the
methods by which Africans were brought into the British Army.
we might begin to understand what role they might have played
after the war. As late as 1952 Lt.—Col. J. R. Carbonell.
With reference to African soldiers in World War II, stated
that: "They were typical mercenaries -- Awkward they may
haVe been, but fight they did, and what is more tO the point,

. 1
belng the ultimate Object Of infantry they killed."
\

1A portion of Lt.-COl. J.R. Carbonell's letter to and
(Ango'tled by Lt.-Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett in his book The King's
Ce§lcan Rifles: A Study in the Military History Of East and
1911\tra1 Africa 1890-1945. (Aldershot: Gale and Polden Ltd.,
L156) See also Colin Leys, "Nationalism in Africa," lh_e_
\s‘tener, LXIII, NO. 1627 (June 2, 1960), p. 961, where a

21-1119 nationalist Albert Tevoedge from Dahomey is quoted as
Ving said that " In the name 0 Africa, mercenary soldiers

:Ebe drafted to fight in North Africa, as shock trOOps, in the
tack on the life and liberty of other weak peOple..." Com-
gi‘t‘e this with James Baldwin's statement that "Black soldiers
‘3 simply hired mercenaries Of a chaotic and irresponsible

l):'_:Qnomy, which as it cannot employ Negroes in any other way
. Eifers to send them out to die." Quoted by Robert E. Staples

1",“ his article "Black Mercenaries in Vietnam, " in Liberator,
0l. 8, NO. 2 (February 1968), p. 10.

22

23

The Official position on this matter was revealed
by the East Africa Conunand when it stated that, "Let us not
forget that the tens Of thousands Of African soldiers serving
in this war came only with the haziest knowledge of the issues
at stake and that, in all cases, they came as volunteers."

One way by which we can establish whether or not
African soldiers volunteered to join the Army or whether they
jOined it as mercenaries is to examine methods used in re-
CrI-‘Iiting them into the Army. Interviews with ex-servicemen
rEVeal various methods by which these young men were intro—
duced into the Army. Some of them recall that they were
"captured" by their chiefs -— on District Commissioner's
orders -- and told to join the Army. Others recall that they

wer e at labour recruiting centers when they were "ordered to

\

2East Africa Command, The Infantry Of the East Africa

c°\“"1'l‘land, 1890-1944. (Nairobi, not dated), p. 1. It is
argued further that the African "wanted to help the war ...
and earn much honour and civilization." See Russell Small-
wood's article, "Native Military Development in East Africa,"
Wortnightly, CLXII, NO. 935 (New series)" (November,
f0 4), 314-319. He says that East Africans answered a call
D J: volunteers." See Britain. Hansard's Parliamentary
Ef§§1§5§§ (Lords), CXLIV (1946-47), 678: It is implied here
at the African soldier volunteered to join the British
W11 y; "there were those, tOO, and with them the Jeremiahs,
thQ said that the African would not be willing to fight for
Q British Colonial Empire. Their croaking was stilled
fol? ever --- in a time when we were incapable Of putting
p:‘Z‘sture upon them to join our cause, they flocked to our

Slleandard..."

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24

get into the lorry" so that they "may be taken to the place
of wor " only to find that they ended at a military training
depot.3 Some state that their EurOpean employers, most of
whom were farmers, selected them from the rest of the men
and forced them "to get Onto the military lorry which was
standing there waiting for us."4 There are those who state
that they were removed from school by force and ordered to
join the Army:

They came to our school and measured our
heights ... any boy who was 435 feet or taller was
ordered to report to the Chief the following day ...
from the Chief's center we were taken to the mili-
tary training depot."5

Although the majority of the soldiers were conscripted
into the Army, as shown in the preceding paragraph, a small

min(brity volunteered to join the Army. Some Of the volunteers
\

3This same method Of Obtaining recruits by trickery
was employed by British military authorities in East Africa
dFring World War I. Savage and Munro noted that " In the

Ell-.1811 district of Nyanza almost a quarter Of a century after
e Outbreak Of the war [WWI], the district commissioner re-
E?rted that the local peOple still recall how the administra-
iion secured porters in the early months Of the war by trick-

an: the young men into coming into the station to cut grass

then enrolling them as porters." See Savage and Munro,

W- p. 317.

Obt 4Force was also used by recruiting British teams in
st Gining askaris in WI. One Of the government OffiCials
reated in his report that "Lately in order to fulfill labour

c3:1:1isitions, force has had to be applied; i.e. the young men
have been rounded up during the night." See South Kavirondo,
5911\ua1 Report, 1914-15.

. 5Quite a number of ex-askaris throughout Kenya told me
Slmilar stories although this particular one was told by Ruphas
Pfiholi when I interviewed him on February 8, 1968 at Kakamega,

enya.

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admit that they joined the Army because " Italians and Germans
were preparing to invade and conquer our country." Some
volunteered because "the king Of Abyssinia, the only African
king in the whole Of Africa, needed more African soldiers
from other parts of Africa in order to defeat Italian in-
Vaders." Others volunteered because they were unemployed and
they thought that tO serve in the army was just "another one
Of the EurOpean jobs."6 Still others volunteered because
they had heard that "once you join the army you need not worry
about: paying poll tax." There are those who volunteered be-
cause they had been told that those who volunteered would not
be Sent to the front line but that those who waited for con-
SCfixation would be "sent straight to the front line where the
fighting was the fiercest." However, all these volunteers
agree on one point: conditions were so difficult that they
were left with no other alternative but to "volunteer." Most
of them admitted that they volunteered to join the Army be-
cause "we were tired of dodging conscription by hiding away
from government and military authorities ... we knew that the
chiefs would eventually catch up with us and that the conse-

quehces would be graver ... we therefore decided to 'volunteer
\

6Compare this with Robert E. Staples, Op.cit., p. 11.
‘ s .more American black youths enlist in the armed serVices
beQause this frequently represents the best Opportunity they

have in life . "

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to join the Army."7

From this information, it is incorrect to state as
the East Africa Command stated, that "in all cases, they came
as volunteers." It can be said that a very small number
VOlunteered to join the Army; but even then we have to ex-
Plain in this case what is meant by a "volunteer." Nor is
it correct tO refer to these soldiers as mercenaries. They
were not mercenaries in the conventional sense Of the term.
Mercenaries usually sign contracts with their employers, they
usually understand terms Of their employment, and most impor-
tant. they are always "soldiers of fortune," i.e., they expect
to earn a large sum of money for their military services.
None of these conditions applied to African trOOps.

In pre-World War I campaigns such as the Ashanti and
somali, British colonial authorities tended to recruit soldiers
from the "warrior tribes" and from the least modernized ethnic
groups. As Professor Schleh has pointed out:

The British officers in the field had long

experienced a preference for the "martial races"
in recruiting for colonial forces. They Often

\

re 7Hiding from authorities did not help Africans escape
r Qruitment for both wars. During recruitment for WWI it was
eDorted that " flight to the bush country was one Of the few
QQpholes left Open, but it had many drawbacks —- problems of
fQQd and water supply, separation from families, and the ever-
PI:‘Qsent possibility Of being discovered in a government
sweep." See Savage and Munro, Op.cit., p. 337.

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27

viewed Western education as spoiling potential
recruits and favored working with men from the
least Westernized hinterlands. The average
African soldier was illiterate and remained so."

The myth that "non—warrior tribes" were incapable Of
fighting a modern war had a lot to do with how British mili-
tary authorities went about recruiting soldiers for the Army

during World War I and II. Between 1939-1940 the majority
0f recruits were Wakamba (the Kamba) . They were forced to
turn to other ethnic groups because there were no more Kamba
men for drafting; as one Official put it: "The Kamba tribe
is Supplying most Of our needs for Kenya at present but its

man-power is not inexhaustible and if good material is avail-

able elsewhere use might be made of it."9

The question Of man-power forced the British authori-
ties to look elsewhere for "good material'' and they found it

first among the "Samburu, Markwet and Elgeyo tribes." BY the
\

8Eugene P. A. Schleh, "Post-service Careers Of

A{Erican World War Two Veterans: British East and West Africa
with particular Reference to Ghana and Uganda." Unpublished
Ph-ZD. dissertation (Yale University, 1968), p. 11. "The
Salrljburu I saw will please the G. O. C. General Officer Com-
ma‘rlding because they are entirely uneducated savages. Few
of them even speak Swahili." See a letter from the Chief
1\Ia'hive Commissioner (referred tO hereafter as C.N.C.), Rift
Va:Lley, 10 February, 1940, Kenya National Archives (referred

to hereafter as KNA) MD/4/5/136/27(70) .

9Letter from Jinja Training Center to Provincial
cQllzitnissioner (referred to hereafter as P.C.), Rift Valley,
14 December, 1939, KNA. MD/4/5/136/27 (70).

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erud of 1940 these "tribes" were recruited for King's African
Rjgfles on a large scale because they were considered most
smnitable: they were "warrior tribes" and they were the least
Westernized.

During the first year or two of hostility, British
miljstary authorities tried to find justification for recruit-
ing <>n a large scale outside the Kamba "tribe." Services in
the lKing's African Rifles were regarded as some kind of a
Punishment and the Army itself was considered to be a "cor-
rectional institution." The Samburu, once more, have provided
us ijLth a good example: "The young men in Samburu have not
beell ibehaving themselves lately. I consider it would be an
excellent thing to recruit for the King's African Rifles among
the young Samburu."10 So wrote the District Officer working
among the Samburu.

At first members of agricultural "tribes" were not
regarded as "good material" for the King's African Rifles.
Thulis a circular letter from the East Africa Force stated that
'w3eriamas are agriculturalists and could not therefore be ex-

11 .
pthed to produce likely gunners." This is how agricultural
\

10Letter from District Officer Laikipia Samburu,

Emuruti to P.C., Rift Valley, 22 September, 1939, KNA. MD/4/
/136/27 (70).

11Letter from East Africa Forces to C.N.C., 23 Sept-
ember, 1940, KNA. MD/4/5/136/27 (70).

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groups throughout East Africa were regarded by British mili-
tary authorities. However, later on when more recruits were
needed than the "warrior tribes" could provide, the British
authorities found a justification for recruiting among agri-
culturalists. In the case of Geriamas they found themselves
jOining the war on "geographical grounds": "The Giriamas
live in a hot and moist country and would do best in similar
country."12 For one reason or another the officials managed
to introduce agricultural tribes into the King's African
Rifles, on a large scale.

By the end of 1941 the policy of recruiting from
"martial races" had virtually been abandoned and recruitment,
on a. large scale, was being carried on throughout Kenya among
mos-t. if not all, ethnic groups, although a few regions re-
mailled most favoured hunting grounds for Army recruits.

This massive and all-out recruitment of men for the
King's African Rifles throughout Kenya alarmed civil agencies.
Because all able-bodied men were being conscripted into the
Army, non-military agencies began to experience a serious and
acIl‘te shortage of labour. EurOpean farmers were the first to
be‘ affected. For instance, the Kenya Tea Growers Association
Sent a letter to the Government complaining about the unfair

pz'i‘fictices on the part of military authorities:

\—

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Ibid.

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"In the event of conscription for Pioneer
and Labour Corps being resumed, this should be
carried out on a population basis, as far as pos-
sible, in the reserves as this Association under-
stands that the recruiting in Nyanza Province was
on a higher percentage basis than any other Prov-
ince in the colony."

Numerous complaints along the same line were sent to
the (Government by various farmers' organizations throughout
Kenywa: dairy, sisal, wheat, coffee, etc. Farmers had one of
the estrongest, in fact, the strongest lobby in the colony and
in't11e Legislature. For this reason their complaints were
bOUnd to be taken seriously, as indeed they were. In and
for' tiheir own interest, they put great pressure on the Kenya
GoVernment (it should be remembered that a large number of the
Legislature members were themselves farmers) until the Govern-

ment yielded to their demands:

In view of the reports from labour difficul-
ties which many farmers are experiencing . . .
His Excellency the Governor is now able to announce
that arrangements have been made with the Governors
of Uganda and Tanganyika and military authorities
where by all recruiting in Kenya for East African
(Military Labour Service and the African Auxiliary
Pioneer Corps {East Africa) will be suspended until

early in 1942.

13Letter from the Kenya Tea Growers Association to
°.~1\1 c., 6 November, 1941, KNA. 1413/4/5/140/27 (70).

14"Government and Labour Shortage," East Africa
—3E§3ndard, October 4,1941. Reports from World War I show that
ma~83ive and all-out recruitment among East Africans attained
alarming and serious prOportions: "As regards replacements
tile future was looking gloomy, since the Civil Administrations

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British military authorities had abandoned their
policy of "selective recruitment" to that of "all-out re-
cruitment" among the tribes of East Africa. They needed
more Africans in uniform and these greater numbers could not
be obtained solely from "martial races." The Chief Secretary
in Dar es Salaam spoke for the rest of the British officials

in East Africa when he declared that "the present methods of

recruiting are inadequate and must be changed forthwith."15

It can be accurately stated that these words ushered in a new
Policy: the policy of "all-out" recruitment throughout East
Africa.

This shift was necessary because of "the hard-pressed
white man-power of the Empire," thus the increase of black

troops "offered an Opportunity for reducing the burden" on
\

0f . British East Africa (i.e., Kenya) ... and Uganda were un-
a1“linens in declaring that further demands on native tribes
would probably end in an uprising and additional operations.
n this quandry an appeal was made to the Portuguese Govern-
ment to allow recruiting north of latitude 22..." See "Re-
iort on the period from August 4, 1914 to September 15, 1919
ey Lt.-Col. O. F. Watkins, C.B.E., D.S.O., presented Sept-
d‘F‘ber 30,1919," Director of Military Labour to B.E.A. EXpe-
ltionary Force (Typescript) , University College Nairobi
(hereafter referred to as U.C.N.) HD-RPA/F/l/Z.

C 15From Chief Secretary (referred to hereafter as
‘8 -), Dar es Salaam, 19/9/1940, to P.C.‘s Tanganyika KNA.
BID/<J./5/136/27 (70).

..w-V'fi‘
.pv‘

Hflvn

fituw

7-;
P
9‘? e
U‘ ‘

I
.1
a.

no
(I)
h

A!
. ...
'u

 

32

European man—power. It is also argued that by 1941 the

African soldier in the field and on the firing line had

proved himself; he had demonstrated that he was a brave,

skillful and able soldier. This made his services more appre-

ciated and needed than ever before. Hence General Platt's

conclusion: "So it became our bound duty to deve10p native

manpower to the £1111."l7

Military authorities began to recruit among Western-

ized peOples for this same reason. They needed the know—how

of the schooled African. Many hundreds of clerks, artisans

and drivers were needed, not to mention schooled men to serve

as communications operators, artillerymen, medics, etc. Mili-

tary authorities needed these peOple in large numbers and

therefore they were forced to turn from less to more Western-

lzéd peOples . 18

This large increase of African recruits to the King's

African Rifles was Opposed by a large section of EurOpeans

\
l6Gen. Sir. William Platt, "Studies in Wartime Organ-

;zation: (6) East African Command," African Affairs, XLV,
°~ 178 (January, 1946), p. 29.

f l7Ibid., p. 31. See KNA. MD/4/5/140/27 (70), a letter
r0111 G.H.Q. Middle East Forces, 18 March, 1942, to Chief Sec-

retary (hereafter referred to as C.S.) to the Governors' Con-

ference, Nairobi, in which a request was made for more African

tr90ps to the Middle East: " It is a platitude to say that

131.118 war is becoming one of manpower ... examine the possi-
11ity of making still further large contributions..."

18Schleh, Op.cit., p. 12.

33

both in EurOpe and in Africa. This, of course, was not any-

thing new. Opposition to the participation Of African troops

in European conflicts had been raised before on several oc-

casions. France was bitterly criticized by other EurOpean

nations for having used African trOOps in Europe against
Germans and Russians; for compelling "him to kill or be

killed in the white man's quarrel."

To train a man for war is to train him in violence.
This was the crux of the matter: it was the underlying factor

in all this Opposition and debate on African participation

in EurOpean wars. It had been argued that great involvement

and wide participation by Africans in these wars would destroy

EuI‘Opean prestige. It was further argued that military train-

ing could provide ex-servicemen with the means and the know-

how to translate his new appraisal Of EurOpeans and of them-

Sel‘Tes into direct, immediate and destructive action.20

\

This

19Norman Angell. "France and the Black Power," The
:iflemporary Review, CHI (February, 1922), 2267229. The .
ticle concluded that the use of Black troops 1n EurOpe "1s
dangerously like the introduction of slavery for military
pm35‘E>oses." See also Britain. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates
lgLol‘ds) , CXLIV (1946-47), 678: Here reference is made to the
ea~":ed debates that went on regarding the participation of
A15:t‘ican soldiers in European wars. “The African has made his
debut into 20th century war: he has shown himself to be a
soldier of courage and capacity. When this war started a very
Eatural doubt existed as to whether he could take his place in
he hideous tempo and complexity of the modern battlefield.
Egose doubts were dispelled in Abyssinia, Madagascar and on
. e battlefields of Burma."

20Schleh, Op.cit., p. 9.

34

was the general View of EurOpeans particularly those in

East, Central and South Africa. This was especially true of
the periods before and after World War I and II. During the
actual hostility, when African trOOps were needed to help de-
fend EurOpean empires, this view changed somewhat; but as

soon as the hostility ended this line of thought was resumed
and expressed Openly both in private and public circles. Thus
Daniel F. Malan, the former Prime Minister of the Union of
South Africa stated in 1954 that EurOpeans of his country
could not "afford to militarize the African natives ... why
should we give them weapons? The French, in their African
territories, trained a great many natives between the 2 WOrld
Wars. These natives went to EurOpe, and now they are back to
Africa. But what they saw doesn't make themlove the European.
They're a danger to the white man..."21 This statement is at
variance with that made by Prime Minister Jan C. Smuts, de-
livered at the height of the Second World War. In that speech
entitled "Retreat from Segregation" he in effect declared an

end to segregation in South Africa: "Isolation has gone and

 

21"Why South Africans Want Stricter Segregation,"
interivew with Daniel F. Malan, United States News and World
Report, XXXVI, April 16, 1954, p. 61. See Donald S. Roth-
child's article "The Effects Of MObilization in British
Africa," Duquesne Review (Fall, 1959), p. 6, in which he
stated, referring to Malan's statement, that "It represents
accurately the lengths to which EurOpean apprehensions Of

military training for Africans go during periods when no
crisis threatens the African scene."

~
"3'
k ..

.
*‘A

1....

an...

cw.-

(I)
(u

k)
I '-

.
"7:1
"vt.

‘ ‘vi.

 

 

 

35

I am afraid segregation has fallen on evil days too."22

Because Malan was not speaking at the height of a
world war that threatened the very survival of his country
and peOple he could afford, in 1954, to make such a state-
ment. On the other hand, Smuts made his at the height of
World War II; his major concern was to win the war and thus
save the country, ensure its survival and the safety of his
peOple. He needed black soldiers -- to defend, fight for,
protect and safeguard his country —- and he was prepared to
renounce, although only as a tactic, any law, tradition or
custom that would prevent their full support and loyalty to
his war aims. Although this case demonstrates European
mentality in South Africa, it was nevertheless very typical
of EurOpeans, in varying degrees, throughout colonial Africa:
during the war the African soldier was a friend to the Euro-
pean community; after the war, he became a "danger" to that
community.23

It can be stated that Kenyan soldiers, like their

 

22Edward Roux. Time Longer than Rope (London, 1949),
p. 314. Nobody took Smuts' statement seriously. By 1945 he
was once more speaking the truth: "It was fixed policy to
maintain white supremacy." (See Cape Times, March 15, 1945).
Quoted in African Transcripts, NO. 4, July 1945, p. 120.

 

23One Official suggested that because the ex-soldiers
were an "undisciplined lot, giving dumb insolence to the Dis-
trict Officer" they should on resuming civil life continue to
be watched and supervised by military Officers. See "The Re-
turned ASkari: Problem of DemObilization in East Africa,"
The Times (London, August 21, 1945), p. 5.

ORV!

“U.

..-A

v on.

:‘a.
L2,,“

.
onu.

“an,

a“"
\u‘

w...

“m.

e“

 

 

36

fellow African soldiers elsewhere, were neither mercenaries

nor volunteer soldiers in World War II. They were, at the

time of joining the army, conscripts. As it is always the

case with conscripts, the rate of desertion (euphemistically

called "over-stayed leave" by the military authorities)

among Kenyan soldiers was high. It was reported at one time

that as many as 15,000 Kenyan soldiers had "over—stayed leave"

and that the military authorities took energetic measures to
24

round them up and send them back to war.

Perhaps the African soldier in World War II, at dif-
ferent times and places, was a conscript as well as a mer-
cenary. Moyse-Bartlett was closer to the point when, refer-
ring to African soldiers in Southeast Asia, he stated that:

It must be realized that the attitude of an
African askari serving so far from home was essen-
tially that of a mercenary soldier. This did not
imply any lack of interest in the cause for which
he fought, in so far as he was able to understand
. . . 2
1t, or any failure in loyalty.

Africans might have joined the army as conscripts:

they might have shown "an attitude of mercenary soldiers" but

 

24See African Transcripts, No. 7 (January 1946), p. 31.
2SBartlett, Op.cit., p. 680. See Britain. Hansard's
Parliamentary_Debates (Lords), CXLIV (1946-47), 680: In some
British circles, African soldiers were regarded as mercenaries.
Lord Tweedmuir speaking in the House of Lords on December 5th,
1946, noted that the inclusion of great numbers of African
soldiers in British Armed Forces, would be the solution to the
shortage of man-power in war time, because "in Africa there is
a great reservoir of stalwart men who have shown that they have
not only courage, but capacity as soldiers in 20th century war-
fare."

 

37

one thing is clear: after a few months in the service, most
African soldiers went through a kind Of transformation --
they were transformed into committed and loyal British
soldiers with an interest in the cause for which they fought.

Through intensive prOpaganda the British succeeded in
mObilizing African recruits from mere conscripts into loyal,
committed and gallant British soldiers. At first, this prOpa-
ganda was intended to convince the African soldier that he
joined the army in order to defend his fatherland. They were
told that the invasion of their homeland by the Italians was
imminent and inevitable. In this respect the invasion by
Italy of Ethiopia served as a good example of what the British
were talking about. All news media -- the radio, the press
and the Chiefs' councils (Barazas) -- conveyed to the Africans
the dangers of the impending Italian invasion. Therefore
African young men were urged and called upon to defend their
homeland. The African, as a result of this propaganda, felt
that he had a stake in the war: he had to fight for his own
survival.

As long as North Eastern Africa remained the only
major war theatre in which East African soldiers fought, this
argument made some sense. Yet the British used the same
argument when East Africans were sent to fight in the Middle

East and Southeast Asia. It is interesting to note that long

38

after the Italians had been defeated in North Eastern
Africa, Major General Fowkes told those soldiers who went to
fight on foreign soil that their wives, children, friends and
homes "will never be fully safe until the armies Of the Ger-
mans and the Japanese have been beaten and shut up too ...
although they are a little farther away the Germans and the

Japanese are worse enemies Of askaris than the Italians ever

26
were . "

However, under these circumstances, this type of argu-
ment was not quite convincing to Africans. The British had
to Shift the emphasis from the defense Of the fatherland to
the defense of a cause, an idea, a principle. A cause could
be defended anywhere: it could be defended on one's own
fatherland or on a foreign territory. In this they succeeded
because most African soldiers came to believe that they were

defending and dying for a cause. As the East Africa Command

remarked at the height of the war:

It is part of the inevitable price of liberty
that men must suffer and sometimes die, so that
the cause may go forward. The African soldier has

\

1 26Major General Fowkes' statement quoted by K.G. Dower
Sh his book Askaris at War in Abyssinia (Nairobi, East African
. tandard Ltd., not dated), p. 55. Interviews with ex-soldiers
Kenya show that they were told that German laws were bar-
mfitic, "an eye for an eye," and that under German rule African
Q11 would be castrated. "We had been told our country was
:reatened with invasion by the Germans and Italians, whom we
IQuld imagine to be the worst monsters on earth," see Waruhiu
tote, 'Mau Mau' General (Nairobi, 1967), p. 14.

.qq
.-

v“

n-
l)

e
In"
as.

(D

‘I:

‘u .

39

shown on countless occasions that he is ready to
suffer -- and if necessary to die gallantl¥7--
as any other soldier of any race or creed.

Africans were no longer recruited for the direct pro-
tection of their home territory or fatherland, but to defend
a cause elsewhere.28 The African soldier was loyal, committed
and fought gallantly -- and if necessary died fighting -- for
a cause. Through calculated and intensive prOpaganda the
British succeeded in convincing the African soldier that they
were fighting for the same reason and against a common enemy,
that British victory meant victory for the Africans; it meant
freedom, peace and prosperity for the soldier and his peOple.
At the same time, it was stressed that German victory meant
enslavement, Oppression and poverty for the African.

For the sole purpose of disseminating prOpaganda in-
formation, the East Africa Command began to publish a weekly
news review as a supplement to their East Africa Command

General Routine Orders. At first it appeared under the name

of "Credit Side" and later it changed its name to "Off Parade."

 

7 I

East Africa Command, The Infantry of the East Africa
Command 1890-1944 (NairObi, East Africa Standard Ltd., not
dated), p. 30.

28African soldiers were called upon to defend an
"international cause, variously defined and expressed but
usually called by some such phrase as 'the preservation of
liberty and democracy,'" See C. G. Roseberg, Jr. and J.
NOttingham, The Myth of 'Mau Mau' (New York, 1966, p. 191.

 

40

In either case the primary aim was to "bring entertainment
and information on world affairs to the trOOps in outlying
areas of the Command." The information in these weekly news
reviews was to be used as the basis for lectures, talks, con-
versation and radio broadcasts to and among the trOOps.
Germans, Italians and Japanese were featured in these
weekly news reviews as the "bad guys" while the British and
Americans were the "good guys."29 It was emphasized that
"aggressor nations" had caused the war and that the British
were simply defending themselves -- in EurOpe, in Africa and
elsewhere. One report stated that, "This kfll-in' war will
end only when the world gangsters have been wiped out ... we
will not be satisfied until the beastly disease Of Nazism

and Fascism is cleaned from the face of the Earth."

 

29These were some of the headlines that appeared in
these news reviews in connection with the Axis Forces: "Japs
are not super men," "Germans do not like their allies," "Ger-

mans are scientifically setting about to exterminating the
Polish nation," "Evil things being done by the Nazi." For
the Allied Forces the following appeared: "Epics Of British

Bravery," "British and American air superiority," "The British
nation can be relied upon," "Turkish journalist paid tribute
to people of Britain," "East Africans [British Forces] are

welcome in Madagascar." See East Africa Command General
Routine Orders published between January 1942 and December 1943.
It is a fact that British and American trOOps were
equally exposed to intensive prOpaganda. But there is a dif-
ference: British troops were British citizens while African
trOOps were British "subjects." There was another difference:
prOpaganda specifically aimed at the African soldier tended
to emphasize Hitler's racism.

 

30See "Credit Side" NO. 12 in East Africa Command
General Routine Orders, NO. 219 (February 2, 1943).

 

41

This type of prOpaganda had its desired and direct
effect on the African troops. Most of them came to believe
that Germans were truly their "natural" enemies. That the
soldiers thought, believed and acted in this manner was re-
flected in the many letters they wrote back home.31 Contents
of these letters are supported by interviews with ex-soldiers
who agree that "by listening to what our British Officers
told us about the Germans, I came to hate them the Germans
to their bones." The mood of East African soldiers in the
Middle East was captured by a Kenya soldier in a letter he

sent back home:

DO not listen to aanody but listen to what
I write to you. The German has started the war
upon Britain... Germany is a wild nation looking
for war... NOw the British is lion-hearted, a
big fight is taking place, and Germany shall be
beaten.

Another Kenya soldier wrote:

We are working hard and we are assailing the
enemy day and night. Our enemies will soon be in
Germany and we will surprise the tyrant... Don't
be angered when you pay higher prices ... it is
war time and we must all accept inconveniences.
Even here an orange costs a shilling.

 

3lMilitary authorities in East Africa carried out
strict mail censorship. At times some letters would be read,
translated, COpied and filed. COpies of some of these letters
are available in Kenya National Archives, Nairobi.

32Quoted in "Credit Side" NO. 23 in East Africa Com-
mand General Routine Orders, NO. 200 (October 12, 1942).

33KNA. MD/4/5/ll6/24 (69): Censorship Reports (African),

42

Positive effect (from the point of View of British
military authorities) of prOpaganda among African soldiers
was manifested in various ways. Many songs which were sung
by askaris, especially marching songs, showed a marked pro-
British prOpaganda influence. Note its influence in these
marching songs:34

We are suffering because Of war

Things are hard to get

But Kenya is still the country of the King

And Mussolini could not enter

Have you ever seen the war

Wake up or you will lose your peOple.

The following song was sung first by Nyasaland (Malawi)
askaris: but later it was sung by most East African askaris
in all war theatres:

We don't know where we are going

But we are going away

Perhaps we are going to Kenya

We are sorry we are leaving home,
But this is war. Time of trouble.

 

1943. (East Africa Command Special Censorship summary on
mail written by E. A. personnel in the Middle East. The Re-
port is based on mail Of approximately 30,000 letters. The
mail bore dates ranging from 27 March to 5th May,1943) A
soldier from vganda wrote that "We are sure to beat our

enemy and after conquering him we shall have freedom under
our King George VI." Another one from the same country wrote

that "It won't be many months before I come to you because
the "mshenzi" Swahili for barbarous German is being badly
beaten without loss to our Government... There is no danger
except for the Indian Japan (sic) but he can do nothing as
he has nothing."

34See Gerald Hanley, Monsoon Victory (London, Collins,
1946), pp. 142 and 164. Most of the songs by the East African
trOOps were sung in Swahili. I have reproduced the two songs

as they appear, in translated form, in Hanley's boOk.

43

Young men are going away to war.

We go to defend Kenya and AFRICA.

Because the ENEMY is near.

Time of trouble.

Whether it was in the letters they wrote back home
or in songs they sang, East Africans demonstrated that they
were committed to a cause.35 Judging by these examples just
given above, those views held by most African soldiers were
to a very large extent colored by British prOpaganda to
which they were subjected.36

In addition to those prOpaganda methods previously
cited, the British military authorities used African chiefs
for disseminating prOpaganda among African soldiers. For
instance, chiefs from East African territories were sent to

the Middle East and to Southeast Asia as the "spokesmen" for

37 ,
the civilian population in East Africa. In actua11ty they

 

35Seen in this light, Morse Bartlett's statement makes
a lot of sense: "Though their African soldiers' attitude
may have been primarily that of mercenary soldiers, it is
wrong to assume that the change of principle went unrealized
among the askaris, or that its implications were without ef-
fect." Bartlett, op.cit., p. 685.

36As we have demonstrated by these examples, ideas or
contents in askaris' letters and songs were similar to those
which appeared in official news media which conveyed Official
anti-AxiSWprOpaganda.

37sixteen East African Chiefs visited trOOps in Burma
and sounded "their frame of mind, requirements, etc...." See
East African Standard, NOvember 2, 1945, quoted in African
Transcripts, NO. 7 (January, 1946), p. 31. For the Middle
East, see East Africa Standard (n.d., newspaper clippings),
KNA.MD 4/5/65-1. Reference is made to five East African

chiefs who visited the Middle East.

 

44

were British agents with the sole purpose of spreading
British prOpaganda among East African troops serving in these
foreign lands. Chief Amoth from what was then Central NYanza
District in Kenya, in his speech to the trOOps in the Middle
East stated that:
If you were asked to ahead into EurOpe, I

want the name sent to me of any man who is afraid...

A11 peOple at home are wanting to join up ... I

visited Tanganyika when it was ruled by Germans and

I know from my experience the advantages of British

rule. I have seen in the desert tours the destruc-

tion of war: we do not want that destruction to come

to our villages.38

He was speaking for the other chiefs on that tour when

he made this statement. It should be understood that most
East African chiefs, and especially those who were chosen and
sent to visit trOOps, were, for Obvious reasons, strong sup-
porters Of British war policies and aims. It was no surprise
that the General Commander in the Middle East made the fol-
lowing Observations in connection with the chiefs' attitude
toward the war and African trOOps: "I felt that loyalty to
King and Government which exists strongly in East Africa was

39
reflected in the way the chiefs handled the councils."

While the African soldier was being told that his

 

38KNA. MD 4/5/137/27 (70), letter from Captain F.E.R.
Ross, G.H.D., Middle East Forces, October 3, 1943, to East
Africa Command, Nairobi.

39Ibid.

45

homeland would have a more just form of government -- which
meant democracy or self-rule and which should not be confused
with independence -— after the war, he was personally promised
a better and fuller life after the war. Financial aid was
promised: funds with which to begin business in trade or any
other commerical enterprise; land or settlement and employment
were also promised to the soldiers: "we will find jobs for
those who don't want to work on their farms or who don't wish
to be self-employed."40
When the time came the British authorities in East
Africa failed to honour these promises: "We were badly let
down . . . the Government cheated us . . . and when we demanded
these things, they called us enemies of the state."41 All the

Government could do at this time was to deny that it ever made

, 42 . .
such promises. Th1s, Of course, was not true. It might be

 

Typical accounts by many ex—askaris in Kenya. How—
ever, a group of Nandi ex-soldiers whom I interviewed on
February 22, 1968 at Kapsabet had the best account.

41Ibid.

42It is true that toward the end of the war British
military authorities, through a project called "Lectures to
TrOOps," tried to correct the sweeping statements and promises
they had made: but it was too late. These revised and belated
lectures were designed to put the East African war effort in
its "right perspective" and to give some idea Of post-war
develOpment and what "it is reasonable to expect." See
"Lectures to Troops," KNA. MD/4/5/80—I.

46

argued that these promises were part of the war prOpaganda to
promote British war aims: but to deny that they were ever
made is far from the truth. That these promises were made is
evident from information Obtained by interviewing ex-soldiers,
which in turn has been strongly supported by documentary evi-
dence. If anything at all, one learns from these interviews
and studies that the soldiers refused to be oversold on these
promises: they were certainly suspicious and skeptical about
these statements. They could not take the authorities seriously
on these matters because experience had taught them that the
Government had never "kept any of its promises to the Africans."
They refused to believe that the Government would act differ-
ently in their case.43
The British Government realized at the very beginning
of the war that loyalty of the East African civilian pOpulation

was just as important to its war aims as that Of the trOOps.

Consequently civilian pOpulation was not exempted from a

 

3For detailed and excellent analysis see Rothchild,
Op.cit., p. 6 with quotations from Great Britain, Report of
The Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast,
1948. See also Gerald Plange's statement (he was war cor-
respondent in India and editor of the Daily Echo) quoted in
Schleh, Op.cit., p. 106. Compare these analyses with "Negroes
in 'the Nam'" by Thomas JOhnson: and "The Returning Vet" by
P. Pierce and P. Bailey in Ebony, VOl. XXIII, NO. 10 (August,
1968), pp. 31—40 and 145-151.

47

barrage of prOpaganda. They were told that Britain was in-
vincible and that her soldiers were in East Africa for the
sole benefit of the East Africans. Eventually, African
civilians came to know the truth of the matter: they at

least came to know that Britain could be defeated. They be-
came dubious as to the ultimate British victory, especially
after the defeat of France, the fall Of Moyale and the British
Somaliland. Radio broadcasts from Italian occupied territories
were transmitted to British East Africa. This of course
alarmed the British because these broadcasts were spreading
anti—British propaganda in East Africa.

The first reaction was to stOp Africans from listening
to such radio news broadcasts. Consequently, listening to
such broadcasts was declared unlawful. This was ineffective
because the Government found it impossible to enforce such a
law. It was decided instead that Italian propaganda should be
fought with British counter-prOpaganda. The Governor of Kenya,
for instance, made special broadcast news to "Indian and
African communities in Kenya" in which he stated among other
things: "Our soldiers and our airmen may be relied upon to
fight bravely and protect us adequately and with God's help

we shall win."44

 

For the first time Africans learned that a repre-
sentative Of the British Government (Serikali) could ask for

"help from God." Until then they had been told that Britain

48

With this broadcast, counter-prOpaganda became an
Open and official policy of the Government. Four months
later (October, 1940), intelligence reports by Kenya Police
Department showed that Italian prOpaganda via radio was a
"threat to the security of the state." The report concluded
that there was only one solution: calculated, well planned
and organized counter-prOpaganda. The Commissioner of Police
warned that "prOperly conducted prOpaganda would help enor-
mously ... there is no question that counter-prOpaganda is
essential."45

Uganda Government had made its own investigations and

concluded that effects of Italian prOpaganda in East Africa

 

was invincible and they had believed it. However, a month
before the Governor's news broadcast (May, 1940), it had be-
come apparent to the Africans that all was not well within
the British Empire, at least not in Kenya, because Kenya
Government had drawn up "plan for evaCuating areas which

may in certain eventualities become the scene of military
Operations." These plans and arrangements were being made on
behalf of EurOpean and Indian communities only: those in west-
ern Kenya would proceed to Uganda and those in southern and
south eastern Kenya were to proceed to Tanganyika (now Tan—
zania). See circular from the Secretariat, Nairobi, 6 May,
1940, to all P.Cs, Kenya: KNA. DC/EBU/lO/4. See "Evacuation
of School Children" KNA.DC/EBU/lO/5.

Arrangements were not made for evacuating or protect-
ing Africans. In case Of enemy attack, "Chiefs should do all
possible to shelter their peOple from violence ... to bear in
mind that they are suffering under temporary disabilities,
Waiting for the day when his forces will drive out the enemy....
SEe circular from P.C. Central Province, 13 July, 1940, to all
DoC.'s in Central Province: KNA. DC/EBU/10/4.

45KNA. MCI/8/7/118-I, letter to C.S., Nairobi,
? October, 1940 .

49

were"already of a character demanding restriction or rigorous
counter-action." In view of this the Government suggested
that counter-prOpaganda in Swahili be made available in East
Africa with "strength, frequently and appeal" which would
suffice "to outdo the enemy transmission."46

By January 1941 East African Governments had intensi-
fied their counter—prOpaganda machinery. Practically all
"native”broadcasts were based on war news items and matters
related and concerned with the war. Some officials questioned
this practice and wondered whether it was really the correct
approach. Some felt that the broadcasts "would be far more
valuable if the time was divided into news and prOpaganda of
educational value." This idea of "balanced programme" was
later suggested to the Secretary Of State for Colonies, not
as a matter of principle but "in order to Obtain and maintain
native interest." Because of the monotony and dull nature of
such broadcasts, Africans had stOpped listening to them.
Thus the Government was forced to do something to these broad—

casts in order to make them appealing and attractive to

Africans.

 

46KNA. MCI/8/7/122, letter to C.S. to the Governors'
Conference, Nairobi, ? October, 1940.

47KNA. MCI/7/8/118-II, letter from Governor of Kenya,
? January, 1941, to Secretary Of State for Colonies.

50

PrOpaganda campaigns were further intensified by
the introduction into prOpaganda machinery of motion pictures.
These were organized and Operated by the MObile PrOpaganda
Unit Of the East Africa Command. Their stated aim in showing
these films was "emphatically not recreating ... but to encour-
age an intensified war effort by the civilian population."48
These war films would create "fear, mingled with wonder at
the incredible inventiveness of the EurOpeans ... and show
horror at the destructiveness of CEurOpean] bombs."49 Thus
through fear Of the EurOpean might, the Uhit hOped to turn
the African civilian pOpulation into loyal supporters Of the
British war aims.

Of all the aspects of British prOpaganda that which
capitalized on Hitler's racism was the most emphasized and
preached about. Along with this, Officials promised the

civilians all sorts of "develOpments" and reforms in return

for their help in defeating Hitler. Except in details, it was

 

48 . . . . . .
A. G. D1ckson, "Stud1es 1n War-time Organization:

(3) Mobile PrOpaganda Uhit, East Africa Command," African
Affairs, XLIV, NO. 174 (January, 1945), p. 9.

49Ibid., p. 10. In addition to these films, military
shows and exhibitions were organized in various parts of Kenya
for Africans to see and appreciate British weapons and other
military equipment. Military parades were organized in dif-
ferent centers, all over Kenya during which time soldiers
would demonstrate to civilians the destructive nature of
weapons and machines. This was another way of creating "fear
and wonder" in the African mind.

 

‘M-

T.

so.

31'

 

 

51

the same story the military authorities had told askaris. As
Crocker has correctly observed:

There was launched amongst the colonial peOple
a barrage of propaganda on the necessity to beat
Hitler because of Hitler's racism, accompanied by
promises about the Century of Common Man and ...
Freedoms for all the little peOple ... the doctrine
was proclaimed that 'the tOp priority is to raise
the standard of life.‘ The colonial subjects were
informed that they should as a right, have certain
social services ... Grandiose lans for economic
develOpment were foreshadowed.

A host of orators from both military and civil branches
Of the Government made these sweeping statements about pros-
perity and "full stomach" for all after victory was achieved.
In retrospect, all these statements were made simply to justify
the cause for the Allied nations: it was clear and simple
prOpaganda aimed at winning the loyal co-Operation of the

51
Africans during the war.

 

W. R. Crocker, Self-Government for the Colonies
(London, 1949), p. 18. See Ndabaningi Sithole, African
Nationalism (London, 1959), p. 20: he points out that colonial
peOple were taught to fight and die for freedom rather than
live and be enslaved by Hitler. He concludes that they
learned this lesson well, because when the war ended Africans
began to direct their "British-aroused anti-domindation spirit
against the Allied Powers." Africans reminded the British
what they had learned: 'YOu said it is wrong for the Germans
to rule the world. It is also wrong for the British to dom-
inate Africans.‘ See also T. W. Wallbank, Contemporary_Africa:
Continent in Transition (Princeton, 1956), p. 52: and Marlin L.
Kilson, Jr., "Behind the Mau Mau Rebellion," Dissent, III,
No. 3 (Summer, 1956), p. 272.

51Russell Smallwood, "Native Military Development in
East Africa," The Fortnightly, CLXII, No. 935 (January, 1944),

p. 314.

 

52

Like the soldiers, the civilians were not oversold
to these promises: they remained skeptical and cautious about
these statements. Well informed Africans such as Kakembo
dismissed the whole idea:
If the British Government is sincere in what
they say, if this is not war-time prOpaganda ...
let the Government ... instruct the people in the
necessary things and fit them with the necessary
equipment of modern civilized life.
The intention here was not to debate whether or not
British propaganda should have been used in Africa or else-
where. Nor was the aim to compare British prOpaganda and
that of other nations. The aim here was to try to answer the
question: 'Why would Oppressed and colonized peOple fight so
bravely for their colonial masters? How could these con-
scripts turn into loyal and committed British soldiers?‘ It
has been shown here that part Of the answer lies in British
prOpaganda and propaganda methods in Africa during the war.

The next section deals with what and how the askari performed

in the war.

 

52Robert H. Kakembo, An African Soldier Speaks
(London, The Livingstone Press, 1947), p. 12. Kakembo was a
Regimental Sergeant Major, 7th Kings' African Rifles and Army
Education Corps. He was born in Buganda Province of what was
then Uganda Protectorate. He was a pan-Africanist. He in-
tended to publish his book in 1944 but the British Government
refused to allow him because it was "too radical." A c0py of
the typescript (1944) of his book can be found in Kenya
National Archives, DC/NN.6/l.

 

Chapter III

Wartime Treatment and Experiences

One aspect of the war which appears to have influ-
enced the askari's thinking on social, political and economic
matters was the picture he had of himself as a soldier. Al—
though not as important, the picture others had of him greatly
influenced his thinking and ideas, also.

Interviews with ex-soldiers ShOW‘What they believed --
and still believe today (1967) -- that they contributed more
than their share to the British victory in World war II. When
the war ended and the askaris returned to East Africa, they
claim that they demanded "more political, economic and social
rights" from the Government in return for the great contribu-
tion they had made to the defeat of Hitler. Ex-soldiers main-
tained that they had "paid their dues" by fighting Hitler.

Askaris started forming these Opinions at the height
of the war. When one askari wrote back to his home from North
Africa stating that, "know that the enemy is at last cleared

from Africa and I'm proud of being one of the brave men who

did it,"1 he captured he mood of the majority of African soldiers.

 

l
KNA. MD/4/5/ll6/24 (69), Censorship Reports (African),

53

54

They felt the same way when they beat the Italians in North
Eastern Africa and later when they beat the Japanese in
Southeast Asia.

British peOple in general, and British Government
officials in particular, greatly appreciated the askaris' con-
tribution to and support of British war efforts. This fact
was directed and publicly communicated to African soldiers by
officials from both military and civil branches of the British
Government. As General Platt was to remark later, "Eulogies
had been passed to him askari in the press, in public-Speaking
by Governors and Generals, and in Parliament."

EthiOpia was the scene of the first significant set-

back to Axis plans for world power. Askaris insist to this

 

1943. See George Kinnear's article, "Askari Are Making Their
own Post-War Plans," East African Standard (July 10, 1945).
Referring to askaris, he wrote, "They know that they are not
just Africans, but recognized as part of a great modern army
of many races contributing equally to the great victory. They
know they have achieved much as individuals and as a group."

2See E. E. Sabben-Clare, "African Troops in Asia,"
African Affairs, Vol. 44, NO. 177 (October, 1945), p. 155.
Sabben-Clare, then a D. C. in Tanganyika, visited East African
trOOps serving in Asia: later he wrote: "Taken all in all,
the military record of the African in the Far East is one
which they may be proud of."

3General Sir William Platt, "Studies in War-time
Organization," op.cit., p. 30.

55

day that they played a major and crucial role in driving
Italians from EthiOpia. This, they insist, was recognized
by British military authorities and that the honors they
won from them are a testimony to their "outstanding perform-
ance." These allegations are supported by what Major General
FoWkes said: "The decisive factor in the fall of Gondar in
EthiOpia was the resolution and determination of our African
trOOps.... Our African soldier has proved himself superior,
men to man, to Italian."4

From the Southeast Asia war theatre came the following
statement made by General Slim as he addressed one of the
decorating parades: "The 11th East African Division had ...
the honor of achieving what up then had been considered im-
possible. It was thought that no major formation could move
or fight in the worst possible jungle country through a mon-
soon. They did it."5

The General Headquarters, Middle East Forces, reported

 

4 .
Quoted by K. C. Gander Dower in his boOk ASkaris at
War in Abyssinia (NairObi, East African Standard Ltd.), p. 54.

5Quoted by Bartlett, Op.cit., p. 682. See E. E.
Sabben-Clare, Op.cit., p. 155: "It is doubtful whether any
but African trOOps could have made such good progress as the
East Africans during 1944 monsoon in the Kabaw Valley or the
West Africans through the numberless tidal creeks and swamps
of the Arakan."

56

that: "You have probably heard from various sources how the
E. A. A. A. P. C. company have, from the start, given a very
favourable impression of being capable units and they are ex-
tremely valuable to us."6

These eulogies and praises on behalf of the askaris,
led many Africans to believe that the EurOpean had, at last,
gained better and greater knowledge of Africa and the African.
Consequently, Africans expected a lot better treatment from
the EurOpeans after the war.7

African soldiers excelled in their performance partly
because of the intensive training they had received. Never
had the African soldier been so highly trained in the use of

modern weapons and equipment of all kinds. Military units of

all arms and services --anmmmedcars, artillery, engineers,

 

6Letter to C. S. to the E. A. Governors' Conference,
NairObi, 18 March, 1942. KNA. MD/4/5/l40/27 (70). Askaris
received praise from non-Government sections of the public.
See KNA. MD/4/5/65-I, East African Standard (newspaper cuttings,
n.d.). The missionaries stated that "NO tribute could be too
high for the work these men have done on behalf of the British
Commonwealth." They maintained this position throughout the
war. See Andrew B. Doig, "The Christian Church and DemObili-
zation in Africa," The International Review of Missions, XXXV,
No. 90 (April, 1946). p. 174.

7Kakembo wrote that: "The EurOpean is seeing Africa
and Africans for himself instead of being fed on lies made
as black as possible to convey a picture of the dark contin-
ent of Africa as it is generally known in EurOpe and Africa."
Kakembo, Op.cit., p. 5.

5‘

in

57

ordance, signals, service corps, infantry and medical -— were
badly needed and had to be raised, equipped and trained to
serve overseas.

Naturally some of the conservative elements within
EurOpean communities in Africa were unhappy about these
eulogies that were being bestowed on African soldiers. A
"native" soldier, they said, did not deserve such praise. To
Su<=h criticisms the East Africa Command had one clear and

d1]: ect answer:

Only those who have had the handling and train—
ing of these men can testify to the astonishing man-
ner in which they have shown their resourcefulness,
adaptability and bravery in action.

However, British authorities seem to have held this
pc>licy of eulogizing askaris only temporarily. It can be demon-
S"Crated that this position was firmly adhered to at the height
61E the war when the askaris' full support was needed. Towards
the end of the war the British authorities began to steer away

stem this "liberal" policy to a more "conservative" one. For
instance, they instituted a project by the name of "Lectures
t9 Troops" which was designed to put the East African war effort

3‘11 its right perspective. The stated aim and objective of this

bl:‘oject was to
\

8The Infantry of the East Africa Command 1890-1944,

m” p. 31.

58

... correct the perspective of the askaris in re-
gard to the part they have played in the war and
the reasons why they went to war. They are too

apt to say: 'We won the war for King George, what
are we going to get?‘9

This meant, in effect, that they were going to "correct" or

"review" or simply deny some of the things they had promised
to do, on behalf of the askaris, after the war.

Askaris were reminded that East Africa was fortunate
in being spared direct damage, and that this was so because
Britain defended her. On the other hand, it was pointed out
to them that "British homes and factories had been damaged."

Afr ican soldiers were reminded that they were fighting for

the benefit of their peOple as well as for their own personal
91$;le10
\

9See "Lecture to TrOOps," KNA. MD/4/5/80—I.
‘ 10This was of course a far cry from the days of eulo-

Eles, promises and propaganda to the askaris. A number of

QO‘ks written after the war had undavourable remarks on
§§karis. See Monsoon Victory, p. 142: "Askari is unimagina-
1::'~Ve and insensitive compared to EurOpean soldier ... because
Q15 his askari's natural development." Also see Moyse-Bartlett, 9p
N” p. 864: Compared to a European soldier, an askari was
bunpredictable and naturally slower -...- easily thrown off

aGlance."
Vv . These unfavourable comments are in conflict with the eye-
Sltness reports and " field notes" taken on the battle grounds.
age East African Standard (newspaper cuttings, n.d.) , KNA. MD/
3/5/65—1: It was reported that "there seems to be something
About soldier's life which appeals to these East African men."
h :Eter an attack by enemy aircraft one British officer reported
Shfit "their behavior and discipline under very trying circum-
V‘Fénces is to be admired. He proves himself to be keen and
2 lgilant." See reports to C. S. to the Governors' Conference,

1/3/1942, KNA. MD/4/5/140/27 (70).

59

Propaganda and eulogies aside, there were realities

of everyday life to be faced. Askaris and their British

officers had to relate to and interact with each other as

persons. This interaction created some practical problems

which had to be dealt with on a day-to-day basis. For instance,
there were the wages to be earned, and orders as well as respon-

Sibilities to be given and taken. The underlying factor in

these matters was the fact that the army leaders -- generals,
officers and sergeants -- were invariably EurOpeans, while the
soldiers were Africans. The former belonged to the "colonizing"
group while the latter belonged to the "colonized." Therefore,

in most cases, European—African relationship in the army was
Very much patterned after that which existed between them in
inil life.

This is another way of trying to answer the question:

V"That treatment did African soldiers receive from their Euro-

pean comrades-in-arms during the war? Answers to this ques-

1tion are important in the understanding of the mood of the ex-
goldier, because the askari's opinion of the British authori-
ties, both during and after the war, depended on how he was

\Qetually treated or how he thought he was treated by the British.

I‘Iis opinion also depended on why he thought the British treated

l.1131m the way they did.

Although it had always been known in some British circles

60

1:1121t most askaris had very strong feelings about some aspects
()1? 'the treatment they received from the British military
Eititihorities, it was not until 1943 that the askaris managed
t:c> ;present their case Openly to the highest ranking military
(Difjficials in East Africa. Those serving in the Middle East
asserhthhat has been referred to as a "very important and
T1j.sstoric" petition to the East African Commanding Officers.
UVfLee document stated among other things that:

There are a few things which keep on worrying
our minds and tend to detract us from our one aim
of defending Freedom ... Since we left our country,
East Africa, our minds have not been happy... we
are now serving in foreign countries, in the same
way that a European or an Indian when he comes to
work in our country his salary must be twice as
much as that of a native in our country ... where
are our wages?

If one is a soldier of our Great Empire, there
should be no such discrimination as that of saying
'because this is a EurOpean and this is an Indian
and this is an African' ... perhaps we are not well
treated because we have noEAfricafi] leaders of our
own.

If one offers himself to become His Majesty's
soldier and agrees to his Government that he is pre—
pared to meet his death, if necessary, is it right
that this man should be treated like a slave? ...
If this color-bar cannot be removed, it would be
better for us to be returned to our country and
wait for a war in Africa only, rather than be sent
to foreign places .... l

\

11KNA. MD/4/5/137/27 (70). A petition, 1943, to the
Efist African Commanding Officers. Interviews with veterans
1E World War I indicate that treatment accorded to them was
Ss‘leuilar to that given to those who served in World war II.
{lrjblis is supported by an official account which stated in
bé-:rt: "Where a medical officer had to deal with White and

61

The document concluded by asking the Government to

" remove such slave treatment." Askaris said that they could

not understand why His Majesty's soldiers were "subjected to

such hardships" which made them "wish to die rather than

live." The importance of this document is the fact that it

Showed clearly that askaris were keenly aware of some of the

Political and economic problems that faced them and their

countrymen. They demanded equal if not better economic and

pOILitical opportunities; they also began to think seriously

if the solution to some of these problems did not lie in dev-

e loping African leadership to bargain with the British mili-

tary authorities. It is also important because in subsequent

thestigations by the British authorities, it proved to have
been a very representative of the askari mood, not just in

that one company but in the entire Middle East Forces.

\
Black patients the latter suffered ... when tentage or blan-
kets or transport or food or medicines were scarce, the white
patient who was convalescent was apt to be given preference
before a black man in a critical condition." See Lt.-Col.
atkins, "Report to the British East African Expeditionary
Orce on the Period from August 4th, 1914 to September 15th,

9 19 . " UCN. HD-RPA/F/l/Z .
See KNA. MD/4/5/137/27 (70): Report to C. S. to the
:E?<>vernors' Conference, Nairobi, March 31, 1943. It is stated
at certain drugs were not issued to African trOOps, Simply

Qaecause they were Africans, while the trOOps were serving in

eylon.

12KNA. MD/4/5/137/27 (7o : Letter to c. s., Entebbe,
The letter conc uded that the "Jo—Luo and

Elfirch 18, 1943. . _
e Tanganyikas" held similar views to those contained in the

QQcument ... and that they were felt by all membersoof the
QQmpany and that "it was not intended to be the petition of a

9am only, but Of everyone."

a.\~

..z'

v.1.

A‘u

.3

.w,‘

vi

:
‘ :~(

A...

 

62

Even more important was the fact that the petition occasioned
a series of investigations which confirmed that grievances
contained in the document were felt by most askaris serving
in East Africa and Southeast Asia.

The reaction and position of the Governments of the
three East African Territories was summed up by the British
Resident in Buganda who said:

It seems to me that the points raised amount
more or less to exact equality of treatment both
as regards food, amenities, pay, liquor and general
freedom of movement, for all persons without dis-
crimination of race, who are doing the same type of
work. I have not myself a great deal of sympathy
for demands put forward.

One of the things that made askaris resentful and
bitter about the way they were being treated was the obvious
diSparity which existed between wages earned by British and
A:Erican soldiers. The pay rates for Africans were very much
lower than for the British soldiers. Naturally enough, since
Z\Zlfricans were fighting side by side with the British, many of
them demanded equal pay. Military authorities, however, re-

3 e<2ted these demands stating that the African soldier had
less good reason for "his grumbles" than any other group "for
he was at the beginning of the war, and he has remained through—
Q131%; it, in a better position financially than those Africans

G‘Q'jmg agricultural or other work at home."14

 

13Ibid.
l4Sabben-Clare, op.cit., p. 156.

 

nu ;

~I“

l

\

hAfi

ku

‘
Li
“A

~ ,

.‘_

63

According to interviews with askaris, this same
argument was invariably used whenever African soldiers de-
manded any improvement in their situation. They insist
that it was on this basis that many of their "rights" --
such as higher salaries, better facilities and adequate re-
sources and supplies -- were denied them. If, for instance,
they asked for an extra pair of military boots, they would
receive the following reaction from the British officers:

How many of you even knew the use of boots
before you joined the army? You did not know
anything about boots. You should be thankful

for the one pair you now own.

It was always the same hostile response whenever "we asked or

demanded our rights."15

When compared with troops from other areas of the
British Commonwealth, African trOOps, as a group, received
the lowest pay. However, within the African group itself,
there were great differences in pay. Within the English-
speaking African trOOps, for instance, trOOps from West Africa
a411:3 the High Commission Territories in South Africa received
higher pay than their fellow-soldiers from East Africa. On
the average, an East African soldier received a total of Shs.

2 6/— (about $3.87) a month, while a soldier from the High
\

15Sebi S. Fadamullds account when I interviewed him

111 Nairobi on November 10, 1967. This was typical. Many ex-
% Qldiers all over Kenya related similar accounts.

64

Commission Territory received Shs. 72/- (about $10.00) a
month.16

Interviews with East African ex-soldiers support the
above-mentioned official estimates. They stated that an in-
fantry askari (average askari) received Shs. 28/- a month,
While a tradesman askari (carpenter, artisan, engineer, etc.)
received Shs. 60/— a month. Regimental Sergeant-Major (R.S.M.)
was the highest rank in the army that an askari could ever h0pe
to attain. Naturally, he was the highest paid askari; for
example, an infantry (R.S.M.) received Shs. 150/- a month and
a tradesman (R.S.M.) received Shs. 160/- a month.

Interviews with ex-askaris revealed another belief
which is very prevalent among them. Most ex-soldiers said:
"We did the fighting and the dying, while the British officers
simply commanded." They immediately explained this statement
by saying that each Company (120-130 askaris) had one British

officer and that a Batallion (1000-1200 askaris) had 10 to 12

British officers. They also admit that on many occasions

 

1 . .
6KNA. MD/4/5/65-I: Letter to Governor, Nairobi,

May 28, 1942. The East African soldier received "6d. a day
pay and 4d. remittance" while the soldier from the High Com-
mission territories received "9d. a day pay, 9d. in remit-
tance and 9d. accumulating in pay books." In the same file,
see also "Extracts from the Proceedings of the Man Power
Conference held at Nairobi on 30th September, 1942."

‘7“

I.

fly

¥~

\. a...

:9

....

' t . c v I 1“ Cu 1 ‘ I
aU TL A v .nd 3 -.L :u
a L- . KU a b o ,u u Huh 3!; H

 

65

when conditions were so "unbearable and intolerable" they
considered or actually planned a rebellion against the few
British officers that commanded them.

They offer several reasons why a rebellion would and
could not have been successful. In the first place, they say
that most of them through prOpaganda had become "committed
loyal British soldiers" who would not have thought of rebel-
ling against the British. The average askari saw himself as
"a soldier of the Great Empire ... His Majesty's soldier" and
therefore he could not think of rebelling against authority.
There were also those promises and rights which he would get
after the war. These great ideas kept the soldier in line.
Secondly, they say that many of them came to realize that in
order for any revolt to succeed they had to have as many
askaris in the Air Force and in the Navy as they had in the
Army. "If the rebellion succeeded, how could we, for instance,
have travelled from the Middle East or Southeast Asia to East
Africa without the use of ships or planes?"

Thirdly, they stated that "no revolt succeeds without
planning" and yet in the army they were not permitted to as-
semble -- there was no freedom of assembly -- therefore could
not "organize for any action." They recall that the British
were very keen and strict on discouraging any "unnecessary

meetings" among soldiers. For instance, they recall that they

66

were forced to wear their uniforms on all off-duty trips and
that during such trips they were forbidden to associate with
soldiers from other Companies, including their fellow East
African soldiers. Fourthly, they say that they were most of
the time without their weapons, that weapons were always kept
away from them under lock and key and only handed to them just
before they attacked or they were attacked. They realized
that without their weapons their revolt would not be success-
ful. They recall that the British were so much worried about
what to do in order to prevent askaris from learning how to
make a gun that askaris were not allowed to learn how to re-
pair or clean their own guns. Ex-soldiers say that in each
Company there was only one askari whose sole duty was to clean
and repair guns; as for the rest, their business with the gun
was only one: to use it.

Finally, most askaris would never have thought of a
revolt because "we did not want to experience what the 1st
and 2nd Pioneer Corps experienced." Almost every ex-askari
has heard of the sad story that befell the "lst and 2nd
Pioneer Corps -- all of them from Kenya." According to most
ex-soldiers, these peOple reached Moyale (a town on the
EthiOpia-Kenya border) and refused to obey orders from their
British officers. They actually staged a strike. They told

the officers: "We came to fight using guns but not to dig

67

ditches, clear bushes and build roads." British officers
ordered askaris from I‘5 K.A.R. and 6 K.A.R., all of them
from Kenya" to break the strike; but they refused because
they did not want to kill "their brothers." Nyasaland
(Malawi) soldiers obeyed orders and thereupon broke the strike.
When it ended so many soldiers from the "1st and 2nd Pioneer
Corps" had been killed that the East Africans decided never to
strike again unless "we are sure that nobody will obey orders
to kill his own brother." Apparently, this resolution was
taken seriously because they did not recall any other big
strike which took place following the "sad events at Moyale."l7
As the war went on and the askaris continued to
receive this type of treatment -- "slave treatment" as they
called it -- they began to have second thoughts about their
British comrades—in-arms. They began to wonder whether
African and British soldiers were actually fighting for the

same thing. Under such trying conditions askaris had to re-

examine most of what they had learned through prOpaganda.

 

171 did not find any written evidence to support this
oral account. In all my interviews, this was a classic ex-
ample of oral tradition or history. As in most cases of this
sort, details differed; but the core of the account always re-
mained the same. Most ex-soldiers, in various parts of Kenya
and who served in different war theatres remembered something
about the "sad event" in Moyale. The other important thing
to remember about this account is that the askaris really be—
lieved it; and I have no doubt that it influenced their
thoughts and actions during the war.

 

:5

s.»

‘\s

68

When, for instance, one askari was asked by one of
the visiting British officers what he was fighting for (he
was in Southeast Asia), he said: "To get more land for
Kingi George [King George3."18

Another askari protested when being told in a lecture
that he was fighting for democracy. He was fighting for King
George, he said, and if he was fighting for democracy, he must
have extra pay.19 Most marching songs, sung by askaris, re-
flected the official line of thought with regard to the war;
however, when the askaris began to have second thoughts on
British war aims, they started to sing what seemed to be
counter-propaganda songs. One such song consisted of these
words:20

Swahili:

Unaona tunachek wa watu weupe,
Wanaziri zao hawambii watu wengine.

 

l8Gerald Hanley, Monsoon Victory (London: Collins,
1946), p. 73.

19E. E. Sabben-Clare, op.cit., p. 157. The soldier
implied that "democracy" meant "equality." How could one
fight for democracy (equality) and at the same time fail to
practice it? If soldiers are fighting for democracy then
they must practice it among themselves and that (democratic)
equal pay would be the "place to start from."

20Ex-askaris said that toward the end of the war, there
were "many anti-British songs composed and sung by askaris

everywhere." Implied in this particular song was the fact
that the African was fighting in the wrong war -- that while

the EurOpeans knew what they were fighting for (their secrets),
the African did not know these things. They could not be his
secrets since he did not know them. Therefore the EurOpean
must be laughing at the African because he (the African) is
fighting for something that is not his.

A.

;
e
m

~'

av;

in

NA
‘vu

.‘e

‘5

69

English (translation):

See, white peOple (must) be laughing at us,
They have their secrets which they don't
reveal to other people.

Many ex-soldiers believe that it was during this
period -- when they were "revolting" against their bad treat-
ment by preaching and singing anti-British propaganda -- that
suspicion and distrust between them and the British authori-
ties was, for the first time, openly expressed by both sides.
The suSpicion and distrust, ex-askaris say, develOped into
"enmity between us" after demobilization.

Another common belief among ex-askaris is the one con-
nected with the "high death tolls" among African soldiers.
They believed very strongly that British officers actually
executed askaris. They have all sorts of "eye-witness" ac-
counts of the alleged killings. While they gave all kinds of
reasons why they thought these events happened and under what
conditions they occurred, there was one particular version of
these accounts that was remembered and repeated by most ex-
soldiers regardless of where they served. They seemed to be-
lieve that the following conditions and circumstances generally
led to askaris being executed:

If say a Company of 100 askaris is attacked
and 95 askaris are killed by the enemy, the remain-
ing 5 will be executed by the British officers so
that they do not go back to the camp to tell others

of the terrible death of those 95, thus frightening
and lowering the morale of those who remained at the

7O

camp. The officers would then report that such

and such a Company moved to a different camp or

location.2

Some of the accounts which ex-askaris give concerning

their enemy in Southeast Asia -- the Japanese -- have racial
overtones. For instance, some of the ex-askaris who served
in Southeast Asia believed that Japanese soldiers were "most
reluctant“ tokill African soldiers.22 They insist that they
killed askaris only when it was absolutely necessary, such
as on the battle grounds or simply as a matter of self-defense.
0n the other hand, when askaris were on patrol duties or simply
carrying out reconnaisance work, the Japanese spared them their

lives even if they had every opportunity to kill them.23

 

21Again, this is one of those oral accounts for which
I do not have any written evidence. I have included these
accounts in my study not because they are "true" or "false" --
I do not have enough information or evidence as of now to make
me believe one thing or the other —— but because the ex-askari
strongly believed in these accounts and their perceptions of
the British peOple were definitely influenced by these beliefs.
0n the other hand, accounts of this nature are not infrequent
in racially mixed wars. The most recent example is the war in
Vietnam. See "The Returning Vet," Ebony, Vol. XXIII, No. 10
(August 1968), p. 151. It is reported that a black American
ex-soldier who served in Vietnam told "eye-witness accounts of
bladk GI's being executed by white officers."

22See waruhiu Itote, "Mau Mau" General (Nairobi, 1967),
p. 24. He states that Japanese always fired on "our leaders,
the British officers. He goes on to say that "EurOpeans
covered their faces with black boot polish" because they did

not want to "stick out." At that particular time, it was
"safer" to be black. Compare these views with those of some of
the black American soldiers in Vietnam. Some of them believe
that the Viet Cong is most reluctant to kill them simply because
they are "members of the black race." See Ebony, XXIII, No. 10

(August, 1968), pp. 32 and 120.
23Apparently military authorities recognized the fact

71

Ex-soldiers also stated that the Japanese prisoners of war
always reminded them that they were "fighting on the wrong
side." They would then tell them that "Asians and Africans
must coOperate to drive EurOpeans out of Asia and Africa.
"We Japanese are driving them out of Asia; you should go back
to Africa and drive them out."

These racial problems that arose between EurOpean
soldiers or officers and African soldiers should not be taken
to mean that there was never sincere and genuine friendship,
trust and co-operation between the two groups. Ex-askaris
would be the first ones to agree that there were moments or
days or even months when suSpicion and distrust between
Africans and EurOpeans would and could not exist. Ex-soldiers
admit that such friendship was, in general, experienced only
when it was a "matter of life or death." Itote's statements
are very representative of what most ex-askaris say about
integration in the army:

Among the shells and bullets, there had been

no pride, no air of superiority from our European
comrades-in-arms ... we drank the same tea, used

 

that it was "safer" for an African soldier to do patrol and
reconnaisance work. Therefore more and more African soldiers
were assigned to do the work, a responsibility which, hitherto,
was invariably for "EurOpeans only." See Bartlett, Op.cit.,

p. 682: "African platoon commanders and the N.C.O.'s did
excellent partrol work, a duty that took excessive toll of

the omparatively few British ranks."

72

the same water and lavatories, and shared the
same jokes. There were no racial insults, no
references to 'niggers,‘ 'baboons' and so on.
The white heat of battle had blistered all that
away and felt only our common humanity and our
fate either death or survival.

In matters of formal education and training askaris
received a different type of treatment. There is a general
belief among peOple in East Africa (both Africans and Euro—
peans) that the average askari increased his level of educa-
tion during the service. Investigation has shown that most
of those who were illiterate when they joined the army re—
mained so throughout their military career. Most African
soldiers did not receive training in reading or writing.
What most of them received was training in practical skills
because these skills were needed in the army.

Whether the African soldiers should or should not

receive education was fiercely argued and debated by most

 

24Itote, Op.cit., p. 27. In recent history, black
and white Americans in Vietnam have proved this point. See
The Nation, Vol. 205, No. 1 (July 3, 1967), p. 9. It was re-
ported that close friendships between "white and colored"
soldiers were frequent under combat conditions, but in the
big base, camps or off duty, the "old prejudice returned."
For additional accounts, see Whitney M. Young, Jr., "When
Negroes in Vietnam Come Home," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 234,
No. 1405 (June, 1967), pp. 63-64. See also Thomas A. Johnson,
"Negro Expatriates Finding Wide Opportunity in Asia," New York
Times (April 30, 1968), p. 18.

Racial insults: Ex-askaris recall that peOple in Asia
wanted to know "if you have tails and if you eat peOple, that
is what your British officers tell us." See New York Times

(April 29, 1968), "White Americans in Vietnam" tell other .
foreigners as well as the Vietnamese that "Negroes have tails"
and that they refer to them ("Negroes") as "animals."

73

Britons, just as the recruitment of massive numbers of
Africans into the British Armed Forces had been debated.
There were those who argued that history had proved that
education turns most men into better soldiers. They there-
fore recommended the kind of education that would direct
askaris "into valuable channels."25 0n the other hand, there
were those who were Opposed to the whole idea of educating
askaris. They argued that Africans were influenced more by
indirect than by direct means, and that "didactic teaching
is foreign to them."26
When in 1941 the East African Governments decided to
form the East African Army Education Corps, it was obviously
influenced by some of these prevailing phiIOSOphies of edu-
cation. However, it seemed that those advocating education
for the askaris had won the battle, except that the type of
education the officials had in mind for the African soldiers
was one designed to direct them "into valuable channels," not

from the point of view of the askaris but from that of the

British authorities. The type of education which was

 

5 . . .
General Sir William Platt, "Studies in War-time
Organization,“ Op.cit., p. 31.

26KNA. MD/4/5/lSl-I/27 (70): "Welfare Economy and
the Significance of Education among Askari serving in Ceylon"
(June, 1943). See also Smallwood, Op.cit., p. 316: the as-
sertion that an askari's mind is like that of a child.

74

recommended was that which would

improve the askari as a soldier and potential

junior leader and to instil conceptions of

citizenship which will be Of value when he

leaves Army. The subjects ... the war, the

East African campaign, regimental history and

duties of citizenship and social life.

The first target given was the production of two
African Education instructors per infantry batallion. Later
a conscious effort was made by British regimental commanders
to encourage Africans to take lessons in reading and writing.
This sort of encouragement was given only to a few selected
askaris whose training in special practical skills required
that they be literate. Above all, the encouragement was given
to those who had already had some elementary lessons in read-
ing and writing -- those who were semi—functionally literate.
In a way, they were receiving further training in literacy.
0n the other hand, the majority of those who were completely
illiterate were never given a fresh start in such lessons.
Therefore, most of the African soldiers had to be con—

tent with the Opportunities in practical training because war

conditions had created a great demand for this type Of training.

It can therefore be said that most askaris received their

 

27KNA. MD/4/5/151-I/27 (70): Letter to C. S.,

Nairobi, November 25, 1941. See Kakembo, Op.cit., p. 6.

He Opposed the idea of education for "junior leader" because
that would mean that Africans become "mere good servants for
the whites."

75

vocational training because the war had created a functional
need for technically trained personnel. 0n the other hand,
there was no pressing need for those who could read and
write. As a result, the military authorities did not see any
necessity in training an African in an area that would not
add to his skills as a soldier. Had literacy been considered
functionally needed for the army, no doubt most askaris would
have had adequate training in reading and writing.

Ex—askaris recall that those who could speak some
English when they joined the army were encouraged to speak it
and take further training in it. This was so because they
were needed as translators for the British military personnel.
Because they were providing this service, they received
preferential treatment, especially with regard to pay. Because
of this treatment, many soldiers were eager to start learning
English. British authorities anticipated the problem of
having to deal with the thousands of askaris who would come
to demand higher pay because they could speak English, and
therefore passed strict regulations forbidding any askari

who was not a registered English speaker to speak it.28

 

281 have no written evidence for this, but the majority
of ex-askaris believe that this is what happened. They say

that registered English-speakers wore the letter "E" on their
uniforms to distinguish t em from non-English-speakers. Ex-

askaris believe that all this was due to the fact that British

wished to keep their secrets to themselves, because "the ma-
jorit of us were forbidden to learn En lish; and those who
knew it were branded so that the Britis officers would not

say a word in their presence, for fear that we might hear what
they were discussing, thus learn about EurOpean secrets i.e.

British war aims."

76

We can safely conclude that the average askari was
illiterate when he joined the army and was still so when he
got out. Apart from practical skills he did not get anything
more except that which he got in the form Of prOpaganda during
"lectures to trOOps" sessions.

This section's primary concern is to examine the
askaris' war-time experiences. In a way, it will endeavor to
answer the question: What lessons did they learn in the army?
Of course, askaris acquired a number of practical and modern
skills which were essential to them as soldiers. However,
the emphasis will not be on these practical skills; it will
be on the new ideas and values they acquired -— the new
loyalties, identities, impressions, attitudes, sentiments, etc.
that they acquired during the war. Above all, this chapter
will examine the influence which these experiences might have
had on the political and nationalistic awareness of the askari.

The most important change which took place in the mind
of the askari as a result Of his war—time experiences would
seem to be his re-evaluation of the British in particular, and
EurOpeans in general. This change was not, by any means, con-
fined Or unique to World war II askaris. Their predecessors,
the World War I askaris, had to a certain extent undergone
very much the same change. Lloyd-JOnes summed up their eXpe-

riences and how they were affected by them:

77

Without doubt the African soldiery has been
greatly impressed by the ability and tenacity of
the German leaders. Hitherto the askari was in-
clined, and was perhaps encouraged to believe,
that Englishmen were immeasurably superior to all
EurOpeans, and that EurOpeans were a race of super-
men. Now though still retaining this confidence
in his English leaders, he is puzzled or rather
unsettled. EurOpeans of types quite new have ap-
peared, and he knows that, though eventually suc-
cessful, the British Empire had to fight desper—
ately for its very existence.

If this could be said of the askari in World War I,
then a lot more should be said in connection with the World
War II askari. The former came into contact with just one
type of enemy -- the German. Almost all of the askaris in
World War I were illiterate and their military services did
not take them outside East Africa. On the other hand, a fair
percentage of World War II askaris could read and write both
in Swahili and English; about one third of them served outside
East Africa. They fought against, and later evaluated, not
just the Germans but the Italians and the Japanese as well.
Finally the world of 1910 was less enlightened than the world
of 1930 and 1940. For instance, East Africa was, during the
first decade of this century, by comparison far less politi-

cally mature than the East Africa of three or four decades

later.

 

29W. Lloyd-Jones, Kingls African Rifles (London,
1926), p. 224.

 

78

In view of this, askaris in WOrld War II were im-
pressed by what the Germans, Italians and Japanese had done
to the British world power and prestige. Above all, they
were proud of themselves because they had enabled the British
to defeat their enemies. "We did the fighting. Without us
Britain would be a German or Italian or Japanese colony."
They began to feel that they had proved themselves by defend-
ing somebody else. Askaris recall that as the war was draw-
ing to a close, they liked to talk a lot about their role in
the war: "If we have fought this hard to defend others, we
can fight even harder to defend ourselves."

In short, the African soldier began to question the
whole idea Of the British or any other European deciding for
him what kind of life he should lead. He searched for but
did not see or find any special qualification that gave the
(Mzungu) EurOpean the right to rule over him. Interviews
with ex-askaris indicate that thoughts and questions of this
type pre-occupied their minds during the war. That contention
has been supported by Official on-the-spot reports by those
who worked and lived with them. One of such accounts was
that by Capt. E. Broadbent, Who reported among other things:

It is a safe generalization that formerly
they CAfrican soldiers] came into contact with
only three types: Officials, traders and mis-

sionaries. Now they realize that there are much
greater differences of upbringing, education and

79

and status among white peOple than they were previ-

ously aware of. In this respect, as many others,

they had a new sense of values, which make them

less ready to accept without demur the Opinions

and decisions Of EurOpeans.

These new experiences amounted to nothing less than

a "revolution" in the thinking of the askari. Back home --
in the "Reserve" -- the D.C. had simply regarded him as a
"native;" now he regarded himself, and was regarded by his
Officers and comrades-in-arms, as a great soldier. Back
home, he was only familiar with a select group Of British
"gentlemen and ladies;" in the army he came into contact with
an assorted group Of Britons under very different and trying
conditions. As one ex-askari told me: "The war forced the
British to st0p pretending that they were something else ...
something different from human beings."31 This could have
been said by any ex-askari. This revolution which occurred

in the mind of the askari was summed up by one of the African

nationalists when he wrote that:

 

30Capt. Eric Broadbent, "Africans in India," Letter
in The Spectator, CLXXIII, No. 6070 (OctOber 27, 1944), p.
384. See Leys, Op.cit., p. 961.

31Man to man, askaris despised British soldiers.
They say that they would not like to have a British soldier
in their platoon because during a crisis or when the "going
is roug " he is a liability. They particularly noted that a
British rank could not stand "rain, heat, jungle, hunger,
thirst," that they could not walk a mile and that they wor-
ried too much about their lives. See also Moyse-Bartlett,

Op.cit., p. 682: Officers said that EurOpean soldiers were
clumsy in the jungle, therefore a liability.

80

During the war the African came into contact
with practically all the peOples of the earth. He
met them on a life-and-death-struggle basis. He
saw the so-called civilized and peaceful and order-
ly white peOple mercilessly butchering one another
just as his so-called savage ancestors had done in
tribal wars. He saw no difference between the
primitive and the civilized man. In short, he saw
through EurOpean pretensions that only Africans
were savages. This had a revolutionizing psycho-
logical impact On the African.32

Experiences that led to this re-thinking and re-evalu-
ation on the part Of the askari were many and varied. Some of
the askaris wrote to their friends about their experiences and
from their letters we are able to learn something about what
they saw, thought and did while in the service. The most
pOpular subject in these letters was the way Of life of the
inhabitants Of their host countries. There was a marked tend-
ency for them to make comparisons between the new life in the
army and the old life they knew back home. Most of the letters
quoted herein were sent from the Middle East.33 The following
are portions of two different letters:

The Arabs are very poor and we are much richer
than they are. They sleep outside and have no
houses, so that begging is their duty. They are
very cunning.

The French peOple [Syrians] have nothing to

eat and have plenty of diseases. They even eat the
food we throw away.

 

32Sithole, Op.cit., p. 19.

33KNA. MD/4/5/ll6/24 (69): Special Censorship ...
(E.A.) Personnel in Middle East.

81

The next most popular subject was the relationship
between askaris and the British personnel. It is quite
clear from these letters that they did not like Kenya Euro-
peans. The other type Of EurOpean whom they did not like
was the English as opposed to the Irish or to the Scottish.
Surprisingly enough, askaris found South African EurOpeans
very friendly. Here are excerpts from letters written by
three different soldiers:

I am very annoyed with the EurOpeans we have
now, they are no good at all -- they are very bad
indeed.

Here Egypt there is no racial discrimination:
we feed on the same food, eat at the same tables
and so with dressing ... our uniform is the same

as that worn by the Officers.

Here all races have the same privileges, and
we got rid of Kenya EurOpeans.

Askarisvuze fond of evaluating their host countries.
They used to point out both bad and good aspects Of the
country in question. They always admired the cities because
they were "owned" by the inhabitants themselves and not by
"strangers or foreigners as in our country." Letters from
three soldiers read in part:

Egypt is a very bad country ... it has never
rained not a single drOp. NO tree, no grass is

seen here, just bare sand.

All the daily man's necessities are found in
this Great Capitol -- Cairo.

82
I am far away in India. It is a bad place.
Since we arrived we have been in great trouble.34

For security reasons the use Of certain information
or names when writing letters was forbidden. However, askaris
always found a way by which such information would be communi-
cated to their friends back home. A good example of this was
when they were in the Middle East. They communicated ideas
to their friends back home by making references to the Bible:

I cannot tell you where we are, we have been
forbidden to mention where we are; but it is the
place where Jesus Christ was crucified ... and we
reached the place where he was born, too.

It is true that askaris were surprised at and disturbed
by the extent of poverty in some parts of the Middle East and
the Far East. It is also true that they were amazed with what
the peOple in these countries had in their own big cities.
They recall that, in general, the local peOple, the inhabitants
themselves, were running the show in these towns. Ex-soldiers
remember that these peOple were free and more independent in
their business life than the Africans were in their own cities
and towns. They also noticed that big stores and banks were
owned and controlled by the local peOple. As a result Of this

observation, most askaris began to think in terms of becoming

economically independent once the war was over. However, they

 

34KNA. MD/4/5/116/24 (69): Special Summary on 11
(E.A.) Division Mail from Ceylon, 13 June, 1943 to 19 June,
1943.

83

realized that the time to start planning and organizing was
not after the war but in the course of it. Therefore, as

far back as 1943, askaris in various groups had started plan-
ning for their post—war economic life.

These groups or societies, though mainly "tribal" in
structure and appeal, were not confined to formations in
Southeast Asia or in the Middle East. Some of them had rami-
fications in Ceylon and East Africa. Among Uganda askaris,
for instance, a society called "Buganda Bewayo" was one of
them. This society pledged to find "better jobs and salaries
and better social conditions and trading Opportunities" for
Africans. They agreed that what their organization needed
in order to succeed was "money, unity and trust—worthiness."

In another section of uganda, the "New Busoga Asso-
ciation" was started with the primary aim of improving the
"conditions of the peOple" after the war. It went even a step
further by setting a membership fee at 25 and, for its motto
it had: "Not to be dragged backwards but to be a good road

35

for uganda to follow." In Kenya the "Wakamba Soldiers'

Society" appealed for funds to build a school in their area.

 

35Luo ex-askaris claimed that "Luo Ohala" (Luo Busi-
ness) which was started by Luo soldiers while they were serv-
ing in Southeast Asia was the forerunner of the Luo Thrist
and Trading Corporation.

36George Kinnear, "Askari are making Their Own Post-
war Plans," East Africa Standard (July 10, 1945). See news-
paper cuttings of this in Kenya National Archives MD/4/5/80-I.

84

In making all these plans, askaris were quite aware
Of the prOblems ahead. They realized that there would be
the question of capital and trained man—power. They always
said, "There are very many of us {askaris} who can do this
and that kind of work because Of the training we have re-
ceived." In case of the lack of trained man-power, they were
prepared to import the necessary know-how from "America,

Italy, Britain and Poland."37

As for the capital, they
planned to raise as much money as they could by themselves;
however, they realized that savings from their meagre incomes
would be far from enough for the realization of their great
plans. Their highest hOpes, therefore, were in their Govern-
ment: "We hOpe to get a big loan from the Government because
we will be working for the benefit of our country as a whole."
Those who accuse the ex-soldiers of not having thought
sufficiently of where the capital would come from are simply
ignoring the importance these peOple attached to the question
Of money or capital. Askaris always discussed the two ques—
tions of capital and know-how. "The only other thing is
money," they would always caution each other. Writing in

1945, George Kinnear caught the askari mood when he observed

that:

 

37Ibid.

85

The guiding central theme is unity backed
by money and a desire for progress Of themselves,
their country and peOple in directions comparable
‘with the bustle and prosperity and employment
they have seen abroad.38

The more the askari tried to find answers to what
was going to be his post-war economic life, the more he
found himself faced with numerous political questions. Again
it was from Asia that the first Official report was received
warning East African Governments Of the "dangers" of exposing
the askaris to the political situation in Asia. As early as
1943, one Army Chaplain who had lived with askaris for some
time and who had, no doubt, observed their movements and
listened to their speeches, warned that:
The whole concept of political rule is being
modified by Observation and discussion of condi-
tions in Ceylon. Prolonged contact with the politi-
cal situation in India and Ceylon may induce corre-
sponding sentiments with regard to the administra-
tion in East Africa. The prOblems in Africa are
complex enough without introducing further reaction
from the East.
Interviews with ex-askaris have supported this observa-
tion. Most of what the askari got in the way of political

education was through conversations, discussions and Observa-

tions. Although the askari found that Arabs and Indians, for

 

381bid.

39KNA. MD/4/5/151-I: "welfare Economy and Signifi-
cance of Education Among Askari Serving in Ceylon." (June,
1943), by an Anmy Chaplain.

86

instance, were generally poor, there were individuals and
groups among them who had attained positions or ranks or
status that no Africans, either in the army or back in Africa,
would have dreamed Of attaining. Askaris could not understand
why in Africa individuals or groups of individuals were not
given the same rights or Opportunities. They were determined
to be the first, after the war, to demand these rights for
themselves and for their peOple.

In India, for instance, askaris saw that besides great
numbers of individuals belonging to the depressed castes and
classes whose standards of living were visibly inferior to
their own, there were nevertheless innumerable "men of color"
who had attained positions of trust and responsibility. In
the Army, for example, they Observed hundreds of commissioned
Officers Who lived on terms of equality with their British
colleagues; yet Africans did not have a single commissioned
Officer. This must have encouraged them to desire similar
Opportunities and wider educational facilities which would
enable them to realize these conditions.40

In some cases askaris made intellectual rather than
eye Observations. Whenever this happened they were forced to

discard the old beliefs and acquire new ones. Ex-askaris have

innumerable accounts of this type of Observation. A good

 

40Broadbent, Op.cit., p. 384.

87

example is that of Bildad Mwaganu Kaggia who said that be-
cause Of his visit to the Middle East he began to see
Christianity in a different light:

Having been to the Middle East I looked at
Christianity in a different way ... I saw the
establishment Of foreign religion through missions
as a stepping-stone to colonialism and I therefore
thought that the first move in the struggle for
independence must be liberate our peOple from
foreign religious beliefs.41

Equally important -- if not more important —- were the
new ideas that askaris acquired by holding discussions and
conversations with foreigners. Again there are many askaris
whose ideas were changed by this process. Typical are the
experiences Of one ex-soldier. When Warahiu Itote42 was
serving in Asia, he remembers three most important conversa-
tions, with foreigners, that had a great impact on him.

He remembers an English soldier who wanted to know,
among other things, what the Africans were fighting for in
World War II. The Englishman reminded him that he (the
Englishman) was fighting to preserve the national independence
of England and Of the British Empire. He could not see why

the Africans were fighting to protect the British Empire in-

stead of fighting to free themselves. He concluded by saying:

 

41Quoted in Myth of "Mau Mau," Op.cit., p. 192.

42 .
ItOte, OEOClt.’ ppo 1.0-1.3.

88

"Years from now, maybe, your children will fight a war to
preserve the national independence of your country, but be-
fore that it's up to you to see that they get an independence
in the first place, so they can preserve it later."

On another occasion he had the Opportunity to meet
and discuss issues with a black American soldier. The latter
talked about color-bar in America as well as the history Of
Haiti, pointing out that in Haiti black men had fought and
won freedom from Napoleon. He concluded by telling him that:
"I know you will suffer in future if you do not have your own
freedom ... White Christians are fighting each other right now,
so don't you worry when they tell you not to fight for your
own freedom ... Heroes in this war will be EurOpeans. If you
want to be heroes, why don't you fight for your own countries."
Later on Itote remarked that listening to that American had
been to him like being in school and that the American had
been a good teacher at an important moment in Itote's life.

Finally, he held a conversation with an Indian in
Calcutta and in the course of it the Indian admitted that
Indians were fighting for others in the war, but that in re-
turn they had received a promise of independence. He there-
fore wished to know what promise the Africans had received.
When he learned there had been no promise, he said, "YOu

were colonized because you had no education and no weapons

89

to match the EurOpeans. Now some of you have got education
and some of you know how to use EurOpean weapons -- is there
anything else you have got to wait for?"

There is not the time and space to give more personal
accounts of this type. Interviews with ex-soldiers showed
that revolutionizing experiences such as this were quite com-
mon in the army. Askaris say that conversations with black
Americans had the strongest impact on their lives. Next in
importance were the discussions they held with soldiers from
India, Mauritius and the Seychelles Islands. Also cited as
important, although very rare, were the meaningful talks they
held with Italian and Japanese prisoners of war.

There is a general belief in some cirlces, especially
in East Africa, that only those askaris who could speak and
read some English benefited from international conversations;
and that since there were so few askaris of this type, the
influence from such discussions was limited. ASkaris found a
natural and practical solution to this: those who spoke
English reported whatever relevant news they got from each
discussion to those who could not speak it. Admittedly they
missed the details of the discussion but never the central
theme. Conversation centered around colonialism, color-bar,
jobs, freedom, salaries, war casualties, etc. Most important,

they came to know something about what was recommended as the

90

best way of solving these problems.

It was not always true that those who could Speak
and write English were politically more radical than those
who could not. Again this is not the place to discuss the
relationship between literacy and political radicalism; but
interviews with ex-askaris revealed that those who belonged
to the radical group, according to the conventional use Of
the term "radical", belonged to both the literate and illiter-
ate groups. In fact, the literate tended to be less radical
since they received somewhat special and better treatment
because they were able to read and write English. It should
also be remembered that politization or radicalization of a
person does not so much depend on his ability to read as on
what he reads. Most of the literature that was available to
the askari was not the revolutionizing type, since its aim
was to prOpagate anti-German and pro-British prOpaganda.

It should be concluded that one's political awareness
was not always determined by one's level of education or rank
in the army. The Askari's life in the army and his personal
experiences, exposed him to new ideas, loyalties and senti-

ments.43 He came to realize that the new world in which he

 

43R. Fane, "The Return Of the Soldier: East Africa,"
Journal Of the Royal African Society, Vol. 43, NO. 171
(April, 1944), p. 57.

91

found himself was not the type of world in which he could
survive or even fit simply as a member of a "tribe." Time

and again it had been pointed out to him that he was defend—
ing the British Empire, a larger unit, and not just England.
It began to dawn on him that the modern man defends greater
entities such as Empires, Nations, Republics, etc. and not
"tribes." Because he was faced with these realities, he

began to think Of something greater44 that he could defend in
the same manner the British were defending their Empire. He
began to search for a new entity to which he could attach his
loyalty and with which he could identify. When it came to
making the decision as to what this entity should be, many
askaris came up with different ideas, although not necessarily
mutually exclusive. There is a group which thought that the
solution lay in territorial nationalism, in which case terri-
tories such as Tanganyika, uganda, Kenya, etc. would become
nations; some thought that regional nationalism was the answer
-- by this they meant that East Africa would become the nation;
still others thought that continental nationalism was the
answer —- the idea that there should be one African nation.45

Most askaris decided in favour of territorial national-

ism. Interviews with ex-soldiers show that during their

 

44Doig, Op.cit., p. 176.
45African Transcripts, NO. 5 (September, 1945), p. 171.

92

military careers most Kenya askaris felt, for the first time,
that they were Kenya Africans, as Opposed to feeling that
they were just members Of a "tribe." Once more Itote's com—
ments will serve as an example of hOW'mOSt Kenya soldiers

felt:

Perhaps most important, I had become conscious
of myself as a Kenya African, one among millions
whose destinies were in the hands of foreigners,
yet also one who could see the need and the respon-
sibility of changing the situation.

As an experience, this emotional force Of territorial
nationalism.was not confined to Kenya askaris. Those from
NYasaland (Malawi) began to speak of "dzikho la Nyasaland."46
Soldiers from Tanganyika (Tanzania) identified themselves with
Tanganyika as a whole: "We are all Tanganyika men here."
Soldiers sought to weaken, and eventually, break ethnic bar-
riers, partly because of philOSOphical reasons and partly be-
cause Of practical ones. Ex-askaris came to believe that
there were different EurOpean "tribes." They gave Britain as

an example of a nation in which different "tribes" lived.

They also learned something about antagonism that existed

 

46George A. Shepperson, "External Factors in the Dev-
elOpment of African Nationalism, with Particular Reference to
British Central Africa," Phylon, XXII, No. 3 (Fall, 1961),
p. 220.

47Russell Smallwood, "Native Military DevelOpment in
East Africa," The Fortnightly, CLXII, NO. 935 (New series)
(November, 1949), pp. 314-319.

93

among them. They concluded that if the Irish, the English,
the Scottish and the Welsh could live in one country, then
African "tribes" should be able to live together. Therefore
askaris decided to be the first both in removing ethnic bar-
riers and in promoting territorial unity.

Some askaris thought of even larger political units
than territories. Many askaris entertained the idea of one
African nation. These Pan-Africanists argued that since
Africa was the home Of the black race, it should evolve into
one black nation. Admittedly only a few of the African
soldiers seriously thought Of the possibility Of such unity.
However, the influence of such ideas was observable and notice-
able among most soldiers, hence Capt. Broadbent's remarks:

Of the immense importance ... is the acquisi-
tion by these native trOOps of a new pride of race,
a consciousness which is almost akin in essence to
a sense of nationality.48

Some soldiers thought that the idea Of race was not
strong enough in itself to create and hold a nation together;
together with the idea of race must be considered that Of
common history. In this respect, they emphasized recent
African history -- the history of the relationship between

Africans and Europeans in Africa. They concluded that they

were deprived of their freedom because they were Africans,

 

48Broadbent, Op.cit., p. 384.

94

and that in order to reclaim the lost freedom they must unite
as a peOple. One Of the Africans wrote that:
It will be recorded by history that it was
during the war that the Africans started to
think more in terms of a race than as a tribe ...
we suffer the same privations -- we are treated
in the same way.

African soldiers found that their common history as
Africans was also shared by other blacks outside Africa.
Therefore, there began to develOp among black soldiers --
Africans and black Americans —— a kind of "pan-blackness“
which until then had been unknown among black soldiers.

While "pan—Africanism" aimed at political union among Africans,
"pan-blackness" aimed at creating awareness among blacks,
throughout the world, of their common interest. It is true
that the majority of black soldiers did not fully comprehend
the meaning of these ideas although they were extremely sensi-
tive about them.50 Kakembo's observations have been supported
by the information Obtained from other ex-soldiers. He wrote,
"We have begun to think together as a race. We are concerned

When we hear of some misfortunate happening to Africans in

. . 5
some part Of Africa or outSide." 1

 

49Kakembo, Op.cit., p. 5.

50
Kinnear, Op.cit.

51
:Kakembo, Op.cit., p. 5.

95

Discussions between black Americans and Africans
were not always centered around political problems. At times
they were centered around personal and individual problems.
Americans, for instance, promised to send for their African
friends after the war, so that they could get education in
America and then return to Africa to help their peOple. They
discussed the possibility Of importing the "Negro know-how"
into Africa for the purpose of helping modernize African
societies.52

According to askaris, black Americans were Of immedi-
ate and practical use to them in yet another way. Americans
sympathized with askaris because of their extremely low pay.
Askaris recall that in some cases Americans would take a
group of African soldiers, with their pay-bOOks, to their
British Officers and demand higher pay for askaris. They
also remember that these same Americans used to come to their
help whenever there was any misunderstanding at the camp be—
tween them (Africans) and their British Officers. Even more
widespread among ex-soldiers are accounts about African de-
serters who were helped to escape by black Americans. Most

of these deserters, so the askaris say, went to America with

the aim Of getting some form of training and then returning

 

52 . .
Kinnear, op.c1t.

96

to Africa to help fellow-Africans.53

Because askaris were receiving this sympathy and sup—
port from Americans, British officers at first discouraged,
and later forbade, any further meetings between these two
groups Of soldiers.54 waever, this succeeded only in pre-
venting African soldiers from visiting American camps; Ameri-
cans continued to visit askaris since the British did not have
control over American soldiers.

Although African soldiers tried to minimize their
ethnic and regional differences by emphasizing their similari-
ties, the relationship between them was not always cordial.
There remained a good deal of misunderstanding and suspicion.
Professor Schleh's study showed that there was still ethnic
animosity between the Tive and Hausa ex-servicemen in Ghana.
He found the same situation between the Banyoro and Baganda
in Uganda.55 In my investigation in Kenya, I found that the
situation there was very much similar tO what he found in the

other two countries.

 

531 did not come about any Official or written evi—
dence to support these accounts; however, ex-soldiers very
strongly believe in them.

54See M. KOinange, The People Of Kenya Speakibr
Themselves (Detroit, 1955), p. 42: A statement is made to
the effect that "Negro GI's" were not allowed to mix with
Kenyans of any race when American trOOps were stationed near
Nairobi during World War II.

 

55Schleh, op.cit., p. 204.

97

HOwever, when pressed on this issue, ex-askaris are
very quidk in Offering this explanation: they point out that
ethnic interests or rights are not necessarily in conflict
with national unity. And as if to prove that they learnt
their lessons well from their Irish or Scottish friends,
they immediately Offer Britain as an example Of a nation in
which "tribal" and national obligations exist side by side.

As for ethnic solidarity during the war, they quickly
point out that they deserve credit for the amount of under-
standing they were able tO promote among themselves. They re-
call that, even under military conditions, British Officers
continued to emphasize traditional animosities among different
ethnic groups. Thus, in Kenya, the Luo—Baluyia, Nandi-Kisii
and Masai-Kikuyu traditional differences were capitalized
upon. In spite of all these difficulties, askaris say that
they found it possible to weaken ethnic barriers.

As for regional differences, West and East Africans
afford an excellent example. Ex-soldiers say that the British
enforced strict separation between them. waever, just in
case they happened to meet, the West Africans had been told
that the East Africans were less civilized because they did
not speak English, and that association with them was out Of

the question. On the other hand, the East Africans were told

98

that West Africans were cannibals;56 naturally, there was

to be no association with them unless one wanted to lose
one's life. Because of this doctrine of "divide and rule,"
East and West African soldiers remained ignorant of each
other. It is small wonder that East Africans say that they
knew and liked black American soldiers better than they did
their felloweWest Africans. It would not be surprising if
West African ex-servicemen said the same thing about the East
Africans.

It is, of course, understandable why the British
military authorities discouraged any solidarity between dif-
ferent ethnic or regional groups. It was not in their interest
for the soldiers to exchange ideas, political or otherwise, re-
garding British rule in their respective parts of Africa.

There was also the question Of the treatment they received
in the army; the British would not be anxious to see them

exchange ideas on this very touchy and immediate problem. It

 

56That they were "cannibals" was just one of the
many horrible things that West African soldiers were supposed
to be. Some civilians in East Africa still believe these
stories. It was not the first time that cannibalism had been
used to keep Africans apart. Throughout East Africa, com-
munities had been kept apart because of alleged cannibalism.
It is interesting to note that when African soldiers went
to Asia, Asians were warned for one reason or another to
stay away from them. See Broadbent, Op.cit., p. 384.

99

is only when one recognizes these unfavourable conditions
for the promotion of any ethnic or regional solidarity that
one begins to understand why African ex—servicemen demand
credit for the little, but meaningful, solidarity they man-
aged tO achieve among themselves during the war.

Those who blame or criticize ex-soldiers for not
having used Opportunities they had in the army for their
political education, should remember that the British did not
aim at creating African nationalists; their aim was to train
soldiers who would bravely and loyally defend the British
Empire. Professor Schleh, in a way, gave African soldiers
credit for having made some progress in spite Of unfavourable
conditions under which they were trying to promote some under-
standing among themselves. Although his remarks were meant
specifically for Uganda and Ghana, I believe that they hold
true for other parts of Africa. He made these keen observations:

Here one can recall that the military's inten-
tion was to create loyalty to King and Emperor

‘ or to field officers; that any results along

the latter lines [understanding among dif-
ferent ethnic groups, etc:) were unplanned
side-effects of a policy designed for military
efficiency.57

In concluding this section, one point should be empha-

sized: there was a direct relationship between the askari's

war-time experiences and his civilian -- particularly political --

 

57
Schleh, Op.cit., p. 203.

100

activities after the war. For one thing, these experiences
exposed him to the value of discipline, Obedience and or-
ganization. Army life prepared him to accept responsibili-
ties both as a leader and as a follower. He had learned
that he could fight and, if necessary, die for a cause
greater than that of a family or an ethnic group; in other
(words, he had learned to fight for an idea, for a principle.
Most important, these experiences transformed him from a
"tribesman" into a black or African nationalist. Admittedly,
he might have not fully grasped the real implications of his
newly acquired ideas; nevertheless he had accomplished some-
thing for himself by the mere fact that he had acquired them,
that he had thought and talked about them, and that he had
believed them.

The reason for his believing in these ideas was not
the most important thing. What mattered was that he had
equipped himself with a new psychological and emotional force.
Acquiring this new force put him in a much better position,
at least when it came to appreciating political agitation,
than his civilian counter-part who had never been in the
service. Referring specifically to Malawi soldiers during
World War II, G. Shepperson made an important conclusion
which applies to Kenya ex-askaris as well:

For some ... it might have been sentimental
rather than political; but it created a mould

101

which would endure and into which politics could

be poured when the right mixture was ready after

the war.58

Kenya askaris did not have to wait long for the right

mixture of politics. It had already been mixed for them be-
cause, while they were busy fighting and dying, British offi-
cials in Kenya were planning how effectively and efficiently
the askari would be reduced from one Of the great soldiers of
the Empire to a "tribesman" in the African "Reserves." Offi-
cials were able to plan efficiently for this because of various
predictions that were made in connection with what was believed
would be the way the returning soldier would think, behave and

act. What these predictions were and what followed them are

the main topics of the next section.

 

58G. Shepperson, “External Factors..." op.cit., p. 220.

Chapter IV

Demobilization and Reabsorption:
Government Policies and Programs
During the war, most Europeans in Africa became

gravely concerned about the askari because Of the wide range
Of experiences to which he was being exposed. They all won-
dered what type of person the soldier would be after the war.
Almost every EurOpean was somewhat .apprehensive about the
fact that these askaris had been trained in violence. They
wondered if the soldiers would resort to violence, after the
war, as a means by which to challenge the EurOpean position
in Africa; hence Gerald Hanley's Observations: "Many white
peOple in Africa asked: 'What are they going to be like when
they come back? Difficult?”1

However, what concerned most EurOpeans was not so much

the fact that askaris had been trained in violence as the fact

 

lHanley, Op.cit., p. 75. Compare this with what has
been said about black American soldiers in Vietnam: Whitney
M. YOung, Jr., "When the Negroes in Vietnam Come Home,"
Harper's Magazine, Vol. 234, No. 1405 (June, 1967), pp. 63-
69; Karl H. Purnell, "The Negro in Vietnam," The Nation,
Vol. 205, NO. 1 (July 3, 1967), pp. 8-10; Thomas A. JOhnson,
"The U.S. Negro in Vietnam," The New York Times (April 29,
1968), pp. 1 and 16.

102

103

that they had acquired new ideas and a new sense of values.
They had learned that askaris would return to civil life
after a great widening of their experience and after the en-
joyment of better living conditions. The realization that
the African had acquired habits of modern living worried
EurOpeans because they very well knew and understood what
that would mean; it would mean fierce competition between
Africans and EurOpeans for the limited economic resources
which, until then, had been reserved for EurOpeans only.

This is how a typical civilian EurOpean regarded the
askari. The EurOpean in the military service regarded him in
a slightly different manner. In the army he lived and fought
side by side with the African soldier; and, at times, his
life depended on the askari's COOperation and performance.

He therefore began to sympathize with the askari's situation.
He wondered what kind of political, economic and social life
the askari would lead after the war. He realized and felt
that the askari deserved reward for his necessary contribution
and help. Some thought that this had to be done not because
it was a reward but because it was an Obligation that had to
be met or answered. This, it was argued, was due to and be-
cause of the new and different outlook on life which the
askari had acquired.

As early as 1941, a number of British officers held

104

these views because by then African soldiers had "proved"
that they were able, loyal and brave soldiers. However,
these views were popularized only at the height of the war
when askaris' full support and COOperation were required.

It is therefore small surprise that it was the military
authorities who, during the war, were the first in seeking
reassurance from civilian authorities that askaris would get
better and special economic, political and social Opportuni-
ties after the war. As early as 1943 the military authorities
went on record as having recommended that the askari return
to "an Africa with wide sc0pe and more facilities after the
war."

While the military authorities were predicting that
askaris would need a better standard of life, civilian authori-
ties seemed to be convinced that they would return to their
Old way of life without any difficulties. Predictions as to
what kind of life askaris would like to lead after the war
were contained in a report put out by Kenya Government in
1944. Although the Government recognized that askaris had
been exposed to modern living conditions, its major conclu-
sion and recommendation was that "the majority of them will

return to their old work as agriculturists" and that if any

 

2KNA. MD/4/5/137/27 (70): Letter to East Africa
Command, March 10, 1943.

105

improvement had to be made in their standard of living it
would have to be made in "their own homes."3 Some Govern-
ment officials thought that the idea of re-settling ex-
askaris in the "Reserves" was most realistic and practical,
since most Of them would not seek paid employment because
they "are lazy unenterprising persons who might not want to
be employed."4

While some Of the military authorities believed that
askaris should return to "an Africa with wide sc0pe and more
facilities," which meant that askaris would settle in any
place in the territory which would offer them a better stand—
ard of living, civilian administrators planned to return
these peOple to specific areas -- "their homes" -- where
facilities for modern living were very much limited.

This, as we shall see later, was the first Open blunder
which the Kenya Government made in dealing with its returning
askaris. The idea started in somebody's mind; it then became
a prediction; and later it actually became the policy Of the
Government: the idea that the ex-askari must be socialized
back into just another "native"; otherwise he would become

difficult and unruly. When, for instance, the Government was

 

3Kenya, Preparation of Development Plans: Secretariat
Circular Letter, NO. 44 (April 29th, 1944).

4KNA. DC/EBU/lO/S: Letter to P. C. Central Province,
December 30, 1944.

 

106

recommending that askaris should go back to agricultural
life, they actually meant peasant or subsistence farming,
and not modern farming. When they talked Of "their homes,"
what they had in mind was the "African Reserves" or the
"tribal" lands.

By the end of 1944, therefore, the Government had
publicly made its position on the question of returning soldiers
quite clear: in spite of a great widening of their experience,
they would be treated in the same way the rest of the Africans
were being treated. A few EurOpeans, of course, saw the
danger that was ahead if such a policy was carried out.

George C. Turner (then Principal of Makerere College, Uganda)

spOke for this group when he wrote that, "War is doing what

some peOple fear: 'It is putting ideas into the African's

head.’ And it will be futile to treat him as though those

ideas were not there."5
waever, this was the view of a very small minority.

For the majority of EurOpeans -- especially Kenya settlers --

it was the duty and responsibility Of the Government to see

that askaris were "smoothly" demObilized from great soldiers

and heroes of World War II into "natives," just as it had

been possible for them to be mobilized from reluctant "tribes-

men" into brave, skillful and loyal soldiers. The importance

 

5Kenya: Progress Report on Demobilization (February,
1944).

107

of this point cannot be overemphasized. It was the most im-
portant factor which determined the future relationship be-
tween ex-soldiers and the Colonial Government in Kenya. It
was on this basis that the Government determined which project
suited ex-soldiers and which one did not. Projects that
tended to prepare the ex-askari for rural and agricultural
life were most encouraged; those that tended to prepare him
for life outside the "Reserves" or for paid employment in
towns tended to be least encouraged.

As it was pointed out earlier in this study, the edu-
cational program that was recommended for the askari during
his military service was such that would train him.to become
a "junior leader" after the war; therefore the average Euro-
pean expected ex-askaris to be "junior partners" in the
building of Kenya.

Hand in hand.with these various predictions came the
plans and arrangements to reabsorb soldiers into civilian
life after the war. On the basis of these predictions, recom-
mendations were made and programs set up in preparation for
the day when the soldiers would return to civilian life. In
October 1940, the Government appointed a committee to advise
steps to be taken for the formulation of vocational training
for demObilized EurOpean men and women. A similar committee

for Asians was appointed in JUne, 1941; and a sub-committee

108

was appointed in June, 1942 to deal with the Africans.5
Later a short preliminary progress report on demObilization
was submitted to the Government in July, 1943, which indicated
that existing arrangements for reabsorption of members of the
Armed Forces Of "all races left much to be desired."6

The Government responded to this report by submitting
prOposals for consideration by the Legislative Council for
the appointment of a DevelOpment and Reabsorption Authority
which would collaborate with the Commissioner of Labour and
the Demobilization and Civil Reabsorption organizations so as
to ensure that sufficient attention was given in the matter of
employment of men and women discharged from the services.7

By the end of 1944, it had become quite clear to the
Government that ex-soldiers would not find paid employment as
skilled and semi-skilled employees. A survey of departmental
needs for skilled employees had shown that there were only
limited Opportunities in that area. And as one District Com-
missioner noted: "I would submit it is a colony wide problem
rather than a District one. Those that cannot be absorbed in

trades outside the District will have to become farmers within

 

5Kenya: Prggress Report on Demobilization (February,
1944).

6Ibid.

7Preparation of Development Plans (29th April 1944).

109

the District."8

He made correct Observations because as it turned
out later he had actually spoken on behalf of every District
Commissioner in the Colony. His conclusions became the of-
ficial policy of the Government. Each and every District
Commissioner had to see to it that when "his ex-askaris"
returned from the service they were re—settled in their respective
districts in their "tribal" lands.

This policy fitted in very well with the prOposed
post—war develOpment plan for the Veterinary Department
which stated that the national income of Kenya must be won
from the land: "Since Kenya is predominantly an agricultural
country ... agricultural develOpment must come first. Social
uplift, political emancipation and other refinements should
follow."9

However, for many EurOpeans one most important ques-
tion had not been answered: what position would the ex-soldier
occupy in the political affairs Of the country? It should be

pointed out once more that in the Opinion of many EurOpeans,

 

8KNA. DC/EBU/lO/S: Letter to P.C. Central Province,

December 1, 1944. Also see KNA. DC/NFD5/1/7: I'Coast Prov-
ince 5 Year DevelOpment Plan 1944." Recommended that askaris
should be returned to the Districts after discharge.

9Post War Develppment Plan for the Veterinary Depart-
ment (August, 1944).

110

the returning soldiers were a group of "difficult" men, and
therefore EurOpeans found it "desirable at this stage to know

the ultimate destiny of the African."10

It was pointed out
that the African's political growth, or any other advancement,
must depend entirely upon his responses to EurOpean lead and
example. It was therefore the duty of the EurOpeans during
the "succeeding decades" to educate the African "in the broad-
est sense toward becoming a better citizen."1

As the war was drawing to a close, Kenya Government
had a very clear picture of how it wished to deal with its
returning African soldiers. First, it defined for him what
kind of society he was going to live in; secondly, the Govern-
ment had defined for him the type of social, political and
economic life for which he could hope.

On the basis of these predictions, the Government con-
cluded that an unemployed askari would be difficult; but that
an employed one would be content with life and therefore easy
to control. The type was not the question; the important thing
was that the askari should and must be employed, or at least

be occupied. Once again the Government failed to take into

consideration the wide range of experiences to which these

 

l . .
oKNA. PC/NFD5/l/4: "Nyanza PrOVince Five Year Dev-

elOpment Plan" (Kisumu, 1944).

ll .
Ibid.

111

peOple had been exposed. This deliberate refusal on the part
of the government to recognize that the average askari was "a
concrete symbol of the new African"12 was at the root of all
the difficulties that arose between the ex-servicemen and
Government Officials.

These speculations were ended long before demobiliza-
tion had been completed. Those who had been warning the Gov-
ernment that the returning askari would be a symbol of the
New African were proved right when in February, 1946, as the
demObilization was just short of the halfway mark, it seemed
desirable for the military officials to visit the areas in
which the large numbers of ex-soldiers had been discharged,
with a view to ascertaining their reactions to their return
to civilian life. These visits brought officials face to face
with the newly demObilized askaris whose memories about their
military services were still fresh. They patiently listened
to askaris' questions, complaints and demands. A record of
the major demands and complaints was kept by the Government
and has become one of the most important documents on the
question of ex-servicemen in Kenya. The document is to the
postwar era what the petition from askaris serving in the
Middle East was to the period of the war. If the 1943

document showed that askaris were getting politicized, that

 

12African Transcripts, NO. 5 (September, 1945), p. 170.

112

of 1946 showed that they were more politicized and articulate
than during the war. The tour took Officials to various parts
of Kenya, and in about a week they had managed to give audi-

ence to about 10,000 ex-askaris. The following were the Dis-

tricts which were visited:13
Kericho 80
Kakamega 2,500
Kisumu 200
Kangundu 800
Sianthani 200
Tawa District, H. O. 2,800
Fort Hall 1,500
Nyeri, Karatina, and Kitui 2,000

Total 10,080

At the end of the tour, officials agreed that ex—askaris were
frustrated and bitter. They also agreed that the ex-soldiers
seemed to have similar demands or questions regardless of where
they served during the war and regardless of what District in
Kenya they came from. Because the report is so important, I
would like to quote it at length. Note the undoubtedly
political, economic and social implications in askaris' de-
mands and questions.

In Burma, General Fowkes told us that we had fought

well, and that on our return our DC's would meet all

our requirements. Where are all the surplus Army

vehicles going to? In the army we were told that we
would be able to purchase Old Army lorries freely.

 

l3Kenya: Labour Department Annual Report 1946, p. 28.
See also "Interim Report on African Demobilization" given on
February 28, 1946. KNA. MAA/2/1/49-I.

113

We see them being sold to Indians in great quantities.
You Europeans seem to be in two groups -- those in
the military, who promise us many things, and those

in civil life who now say the Opposite.

In the army we gave answers to questionnaire stating
what work or what training we would like on discharge.
What action is being taken on this?

YOu say 'where is the money to come from,‘ but there
was plenty of money for war -- why is it not forth-

coming for peace?

Why was the ex-servicemen with a good long service
record not made use of in the Government?

We have heard of and appreciate schemes for the skilled
ex-soldier, but What was being done for the ordinary
combatant?

Why do we get so few opportunities of asking questions
at Baraza Chiefs' Councils ? We have many questions
to ask but our mouths are stopped.

When we bring a case before a Tribunal we are told we
are swollen headed ... we wish tO have soldier members
of Local Native Council, and of Tribunals.

We want more hospitals and schools.

When would livestock control cease?

We want Clubs which we can run ourselves, and which can
be meeting places just as they have in England.14

Obviously, the officials did not have the answers to
all of these questions. They had, however, noticed that
askaris made these demands because, as they put it, Of their

great contribution to British victory. In the Officials'

 

l4KNA. MAA/2/1/49-I: "Interim Report on African
Demobilization."

114

judgement, such a belief was dangerous for it would only en-
courage the ex-soldiers to be more difficult to deal with.
Therefore their first responsibility was to destroy this
belief among the askaris:
It was not only the ex-askari who had helped

to win the war. Civilians who had stayed behind,

and helped to grow food, had made their contribu-

tion, and comparatively speaking, the ex-servicemen

were better off."15
This indeed was an important Official pronouncement which later
develOped into the Government policy. It was used in denying
ex-askaris most of their claims and demands. If there was any
group that needed aid because of its contribution toward vic-
tory, it was the civilians and not the ex-soldiers, because
the soldiers were "better Off" due to their military services.
During their military careers askaris claimed that they had
been promised loans with which they would begin their own
business after the war. The touring team made clear to them
that there were no loans for the askaris although they assured
them that "only those who had sufficient money to start shOps"l6
would be given elementary training in business administration.
The bulk of ex-askaris was advised to work either on their

farms or on “someone else's land producing crOps and food."

For the most part, however, the touring team failed to respond

 

 

 

 

115

to most of the askaris' questions that required specific
answers; instead the officials gave general answers that were
not of any immediate use to the frustrated and bitter askari:
"Because Of your greater knowledge, your travels and experi-
ence, your greater strength, I look tO you to be leaders Of
your tribe ... Turn your strength and knowledge to the good
Of your tribe..."18

The importance of the tours did not lie in how the
Officials handled the askaris' questions; rather it lay in
the fact that it gave the Government an Opportunity to assess
the reactions of the ex—servicemen to civilian life. They had
learned that the ex-askari was bitter and frustrated: but,
above all, they had learned that he was determined to see
that his demands were met in one way or another.

Although, in their report to the Chief Secretary, the
touring officials would admit that the average ex—serviceman
was more advanced than most of the peOple in the "African
Reserves," including some Of the Government Officials, they
still recommended and insisted that askaris on returning to
civilian life must return to these "tribal“ lands. They Ob-
served that "Often it will mean the impact Of an Afridanu --
educated and widely travelled -— on an administration which in

some respects has not progressed with him."19

 

18Ibid.
19KNA. MAA/2/l/49-I, Speech by Director Of Man Power
and Civil Reabsorption Officer.

116

In spite Of this fact, Government Officials had no
intention of abandoning their war-time policy on demobiliza-
tion which had been based on speculatory information. That
information said, in part, as we have seen that ex-askaris
would seek to return to their pre-war social,politica1 and
economic life. And on this basis they would be demObilized
from loyal British soldiers into loyal British subjects re-
siding in the "Reserves": that was the policy and had to be
carried out.

If this policy was to succeed, it was recommended that
early action be taken in order to forestall "unhealthy unrest,"
as a result of askari's impact on his "tribal community."
Measures which were to be taken in order that the negative
impact Of the ex-askari could be avoided were among other
things, "closer administration, welfare and develOpment."20
It looked as if the Government had, at last, found the answer
to the question: how does one keep an enlightened ex-soldier
in the "Reserves?" First, one must control him through closer
administration which meant supplying the "Reserves" with addi-
tional administrative officers such as the District Officers
and Reabsorption Officers. Secondly, one must cater to his
social life by building social centers and promoting sports

and games; and thirdly, one must teach him better methods Of

 

20Ibid.

117

agriculture not for the production Of better crOps but for
the conservation of soil and natural resources.

Most ex-askaris were opposed to these Government
policies and Government-sponsored programs because, as they
put it, these things were not in their best interest. They
were not in their best interest because they were not intended
to help them achieve their goal, which was a higher and better
standard of living. Thus Kakembo wrote that:

I would like to urge our trustees to direct
their mind not to a plan for getting rid Of the
demObilized soldier as quickly as possible, but
to the laying of a new foundation for society --
now.

This demonstrates clearly how far apart the views of
the Government and ex-servicemen were regarding post-war
Africa. Ex—askaris planned for and looked forward to a new
Africa, while the Government was busy preparing to re-settle
him in the old Africa -- rural, agricultural and "tribal"
Africa.

The importance of this point cannot be over-emphasized.
These Opposing views about the direction into which post-war
Africa should move became one Of the underlying factors in
the relationship between ex-askaris and the Government. The

question which the ex—askari was asking was this: was he going

to define his own life or was the Government going to do it for

 

21
Kakembo, Op.cit., p. 6.

118

him? The answer was not long in coming: the Government
meant and continued to define, for the ex-askari, what kind
Of life he was going to live.

By the time demObilization started, East African Gov—
ernments had instituted the Civil Directorate of Demobiliza-
tion specifically for giving information to the soldiers re-
garding the intentions of their own Governments and to provide
in-training Of a specialized type for suitable ex—Army trades-
man of all races on inter-territorial lines.22

Kenya Government set up the DevelOpment and Reconstruc-
tion Authority (DARA) which was to meet post-war conditions
and the primary problems of develOpment and reconstruction.

It was, however, responsible to the Governor for the co-
ordinated execution of approved develOpment and reconstruc-
tion plans.

In practice it was found that facilities for the train-
ing of EurOpeans and Asians were not available in East Africa,
and therefore the Government had to look to Britain and South
Africa for assistance. However, meanwhile it recommended that
Egerton School of Agriculture at Njoro (Kenya) be expanded for
the training Of EurOpeans in agriculture. As for the training

of Indians in agriculture, the Government agreed to go into

 

22KNA. MFD/lZ/l9/l65-II, "The East African Govern-
ments Need Training Staff."

119

partnership with the Government of Tanganyika (Tanzania) in

a training school Which was to be started at Morogoro (Tan-
zania). As regards African training, the Government estab-
lished two main training centers: Kenya Center "B" Kabete
Technical and Trade School was established for training indi-
viduals who would set up individual businesses in their vil-
lages or be employed by firms or farmers in rural areas. In
4 years, i.e., 1946-1949, it had trained 283723 ex-servicemen
-- blacksmiths, carpenters, plumbers, tailors, etc. Kenya
Center "C" Jeanes School was established for skilled men pre-
paring for primarily Government employment. During the same

24 ex-soldiers -- teachers, welfare

period, it trained 813
workers, agricultural instructors, health inSpectors, etc.

From 1946 to 1949 about 3,700 men (4% of the total of
veterans in Kenya) had been trained at the two centers and had
taken posts in civilian life. In Uganda at least 6,500 veterans
received vocational or professional training in reabsorption

courses; this was approximately 8% of the total number of

veterans in Uganda.25 The aim here is not to discuss the

 

23Kenya, Labour Department Annual Reports 1946, 1947,
1949. See Schleh, Op.cit., p. 77.

24Annual Report of the Welfare Organization Kenya
Colony 1949 (NairObi, Government Printer, 1950), p. 14.
See also Schleh, Op.cit., p. 78.

 

25Schleh, Op.cit., p. 76.

120

mechanics of these projects. The discussion centers around
the economic and political benefit, if any, of these centers
to the trainees.

It should be pointed out at the outset that in the
Opinion of the majority Of the ex-soldiers, the idea Of fur-
ther training in vocational and professional schools was a
failure. Interviews with ex—soldiers revealed that there were
too few training centers; What the training offered was, in
most cases, inadequate; and that the total number Of ex-ser-
vicemen who went through them was too small to have any
significant value. This view has been supported by statements
made by some of the contemporary Officials in Kenya Government
itself.26

From enquiries made while askaris were serving, it was
apparent that most of them hOped to establish themselves in
civil life in their trade. However, when the East African
Governments enquired regarding absorption capacity Of the ter-
ritories they found that Opportunities for paid employment
were limited: "The figures showed that in comparison with
the number who would be seeking training, only a few would,

even if they were given further training, find employment or

 

26 .
Kenya: Labour Department, Bulletin, No. 1 (May,

1947), p. 31: Training for the majority, especially, the
infantry ex-askari not available.

121

be able to earn a living as a private tradesman."27

The Government had these statistics on employment Op-
portunities long before demobilization started, yet they con-
tinued to prepare tens of thousands Of African soldiers for
further training at the end of the war. As late as January 1,

1945, the Director of Training in an article in East African

 

Standard could still write that "in the majority Of trades
the African will need further training ... and a much wider
knowledge of the subject is required."

As soon as the soldiers returned to civil life, they
demanded paid employment or further training, that they had
been promised during the war. Publicly, officials told them
that the majority Of them were ill-prepared for paid employ-
ment or for further training. They therefore told the askaris
that only "first class" tradesmen would undergo further train-
ing. Privately, however, Officials understood thoroughly what
the problem was. They knew that according to employment sta-
tistics, a system of selection for training had to be intro-
duced because it would have been "uneconomic to train more

men than could possibly be absorbed into the various trades."

 

27KNA. MAA/2/l/49—I: Letter to Under Secretary Of
State for the Colonies, May 6, 1947.

zégbig. See also in the same file: "Interim Report

on African Demobilization."

122

Therefore it was recommended that each of the three East
African territories plan its training so that over a three
year period its centers could produce a supply of trained
men in selected trades approximately equal to the numbers
that the territory was thought to be capable of absorbing.

As noted above, this forced Kenya Government to en-
roll only a small fraction (4%) of the veterans for further
training. One would have thought that the few ex-soldiers
fortunate enough to be enrolled in these vocational schools
would have received the best and most advanced training pos-
sible. The government training courses were "mostly designed
for simple skills such as mat-weaving or improvement in agri-

cultural technique and hygiene."29

One would also expect
these trainees to be thoroughly qualified in their trades by
the time they finished their training since they were dealing
with simple skills; yet by the time they finished their train-

ing they were still "half-baked."3O

 

29African Transcripts, NO. 7 (January, 1946), p. 32.

3OKNA. MFD/lZ/19/l65-II: Letter to Major F. W.
Cavendish-Bentinck, July 5, 1947. This issue was very
fiercely debated among Government officials themselves; and
at times between Government officials and private employers.
An Official Of the African Central Employment Bureau stated
that: "In the U.K. unskilled men are given as little as 3
months training (in the building trades) and then are sent
to work with contractors for a further period of 21 months.
During this time they are still regarded as being in training.

"If employers in this Colony were prepared to regard

123

While the Government claimed that it was selecting
"first class" tradesmen for advanced training, in fact it
gave inadequate training in elementary skills. As a result
of this double weakness in these government-sponsored pro-
grams, a good number Of those who received the training did
not get jobs. One other reason why some of these ex-Kabete
trainees did not get jobs was that there were no Opportuni-
ties for paid employment for them.31

Nevertheless, the sharpest criticism which was dir-
ected at these programs was the one connected with the number
Of ex-askaris that benefitted from them. Four per cent was
too small a figure for the ex-servicemen themselves, as well
as the Colony as a whole, to have gained anything from such
programs. It was pointed out that those who managed to go
for the training were "in such small numbers as to be of

little material use"32 to Kenya.

It would appear from this analysis that these programs

 

ex—Kabete ex-askari who had further training at Kabete train-
ees in the same light they would be doing a service to the
community as a whole." Kenya: Labour Department, Bulletin,
VOl. II, No. l (1948), p. 38. See also Kenya: African
Affairs, Report 1946-47, p. 55, "The Center has never aimed
at turning out completely trained artisans..."

31See statement by Director of Training in East
African Standard (January 31, 1945); newspaper clippings
available: KNA. MFD/lZ/l9/l65-II.

32Letter to F. W. Cavendish-Bentinck, Op.cit.

124

were instituted primarily for political and not for economic
purposes. Any economic value that was derived from them was
a by—product. If we remember the Government's conclusion
that an unemployed ex-soldier would be "difficult" then we
realize the value Of these centers. They were for the few
that would slip out Of the "Reserves" into towns; and if they
find no employment in towns they must be taken to these voca—
tional schools before they get out of hand. This was not
unique in Kenya; in Uganda it was found that "the programs
were invaluable as 'a cooling Off' period."33 They served
the same purpose for Kenya. As one Observer put it, with
special reference to Kenya, the programs served as "mainte-
nance of morale during the period before mustering out."34
It was important that the ex-soldier should be kept in such
programs until the political climate changed or, at least
until their memories of military service were no longer so
vivid and fresh. Professor Schleh was correct when he stated
that:
Inherent in the discussions was fear of politi-
cal disruption. Above all others, veterans who con-
gregated in urban areas seeking employment, if un-

successful, would provide dissatisfied recruits for
anti-colonial movements.35

 

33Schleh, Op.cit., p. 87.

34African Transcripts, NO. 7 (January, 1946), p. 32.

35Schleh, Op.cit., p. 58.

125

Like most political programs, they were publicity
or prOpaganda projects aimed at making the ex-askari in
particular and the African in general believe that the Gov-
ernment was seriously interested in the welfare of the ex—
askari. This prOpaganda about Kenya having solved its ex-
soldiers' problems by instituting special programs reached
other English—speaking territories who wished to benefit
from Kenya's experience. The Governor of Nigeria36 wrote to
Governor of Kenya wishing to know the exact special ex-askari
programs that Kenya Government had employed in solving ex—
soldiers' problems. Kenya's Governor in reply said that they
did not have any special programs for their ex—askaris; that
their ex-askaris were regarded just like any other African.

So far we have been dealing with what the Government
tried to do or actually did for the 4% of its veterans. Mainly,
we have been dealing with the section of the veterans that
hOped to get or actually got paid employment. ‘We must turn now
to the question of the majority of the veterans who went back
to the "Reserves."

Kenya Government was well aware of the difficult
living conditions which the majority (95%) of its veterans
would, after the war, encounter in the "Reserves." As one

of the prominent correspondents connected with the East Africa

 

36KNA. MAA/2/1/49-I: Letter to Governor of Nigeria,
July 19, 1948.

126

Command wrote in the London Times:

It is questionable how many of these thou-
sands who have been jerked out of their traditional
environment and had their entire outlook on life
and the world changed will be content to return to
the dominance of illiterate old chiefs and that
standard of living that an eroded, barren environ-
ment and an overcrowded peasant existence alone
render possible.37 [Italics mine]

 

In spite of this knowledge that the ex-soldier's out-
loOk on life had drastically changed, and that the "Reserves"
could only offer them peasant existence, the Government in-
sisted that the ex-askaris return to those areas, and as the
same correspondent just referred to Observed:

The civil administrations ... want to see them
absorbed back into tribal life with the least fuss
and inconvenience.

The Government was able to think along such lines be-

cause it was convinced that the problem of reabsorption was

 

37
"The Returned Askari: Problem of Demobilization in

East Africa," London Times, August 21, 1945, quoted in African
Transcripts, NO. 5 (September, 1945), p. 170. Between July
and September 1945, many periodicals and newspapers were pre-
occupied with the problems of demObilization. See "Post-war
Reconstruction in East Africa: Vocational Training Of
Africans," East African Standard (July 13,1945); "Governments'
Advice to East African ASkari: Comprehensive Statement on
Post-war Employment Problems," East Africa and Rhodesia (Aug-
ust 16, 1945); "East Africa's Plans for Released Soldiers;
Training to be Given at Special Centres," East Africa and
Rhodesia (August 23, 1945); "Africa Demobilizes," African
World (August 25, 1945); "Askari Teach New Ways to East
African," The Crown Colonist (September, 1945).

 

 

3BIbid.

127

neither an economic nor a political one, but that it was a
social problem. The Government regarded the demobilization
Of so "many thousands of native askari ... as the greatest
social problem ... for East Africa since the abolition of

slavery."39

Since the problem.was a social one, all the
Government needed to do, so the officials thought, was to
institute social welfare programs that would meet askaris'
social needs. In short, the Government believed that What
the ex-askari did not gain in his economic and political life
would be compensated for in his social life. This, of course,
did not reflect a new trend in thinking on the part of the
Government, because as early as 1944 it had decided that the
major contribution Of the askari when the war ended would be
"social develOpment Of their villages."40

In view Of this, upon demObilization askaris were to
be stOpped from drifting into towns because they were regarded
as being invaluable material for helping in the establishment
Of "social centres and assisting generally in rural develOp-
ment" in the districts.41

Although most Of the problems in rural and village

life were economic and political, Government Officials acted

 

39Ibid.

4OKNA. PC/NFD5/1/7: "Coast Province 5 Year DevelOp-
ment Plan" (1944), p. 149.

411bid.

128

on the assumption that it was "the extreme barrenness of
recreation that constitutes the biggest factor in the decay

42 And since it had been concluded that

of village life."
"rural or village life” would be the pattern of African life
"for years to come," it seemed logical for the Government to
conclude further that the best thing to do was to institute
social welfare programs. The idea that tOp priority must be
given to social develOpment was not arrived at overnight; it
took the Government a long period of time to deve10p it. It
was based on the assumption that the African "will always"
prefer the life in the "Reserves." What was required in such
areas were things such as sports, choirs, and games, and not
things that were on "the purely utilitarian side," such as
those the Medical and Agricultural Departments seemed to be
anxious to do.43

There was also another practical justification for
establishing these social develOpment projects. It was re-
peatedly stated that during the war the askari had been used
to modern social amenities and it was, therefore, concluded
that the most practical thing to do after the war would be

to build social develOpment schemes throughout the country

specifically for the use of ex-askaris. As one contemporary

 

2Dickson, "Studies in War-time Organization...,

p. 14.

43Ibid.

 

129

observer noted:

None of us Who tOOk part in the develOpment of
information and recreation rooms in the army will
forget the askari's growing enthusiasm for them,
the happy centre of life they came to be ... Here
is a valuable instrument that could easily be or—
ganized at strategic centres throughout a terri—
tory ... These community centres would leave ample
room for develOpment of all kinds of youth work,
which would seem an essential part of the future
of African society.44 [Italics mine:]

 

It was on this basis that the Government recommended
that the develOpment Of Social Welfare Information and Mass
Education Scheme "was of the greatest importance to the African

community."45

Through this the Government hOped that Africans
would be able to understand the nature of and the reason for

the "Government's agricultural, economic and develOpment
policy.46 This was considered most important because, accord-
ing to the Government, it would have meant economic or political
disaster "unless the African mind can be brought to the pitch

of being able to comprehend the broad requirements of the

rehabilitation and develOpment program."47 From this point

 

44Doig, Op.cit., p. 179. See also Kenya: Education
Department, Annual Report 1946 (Nairobi, 1948), p. 7. The
Government hOped that askaris' wartime experiences would lead
to "considerable social progress in the future."

45Kenya, Summary Of the Report Of the Development
Committee (NairObi, 1946), p. 9.

46Ibid.

47Ibid., p. 5.

130

on, it would appear that the Government focused its attention
on and stressed the importance Of "bringing the African mind
to the pitch" rather than the actual building of the commun-
ity centres and providing the said social services to the ex-
askaris. To do this to the African mind, the Government hOped
to turn once more to propaganda. As one former Provincial
Commissioner stated, "such drastic changes are likely to en-
counter difficulties, therefore well directed and skillfully
planned prOpaganda should not be overloOked."48
In February, 1946, Provincial Commissioners in Kenya
held a meeting to discuss the problems of reabsorption of ex-
servicemen into civilian life. It is not surprising that the
most important item on their agenda was "prOpaganda and prOpa-
ganda methods." They concluded that the increase of adminis-
trative staff in the districts was an absolute necessity. "It
was the considered view Of the PC's that no other method of
prOpaganda was satisfactory or efficacious as oral prOpaganda

by the PC's and DC's."49

 

48A. M. Champion, "Native Welfare in Kenya" (1945),

p. 32. KNA. MAA/2/1/24. He recommended that various methods
of spreading prOpaganda be used. "All the services at our
disposal, the Officers and staff of all Government Depart-
ments, by printed and spOken word, the schools, the hospital,
the cinema and even the pulpit."

49KNA. MAA/2/1/49-I: Extracts from Minutes of the
Meeting of PC's Held on 29th, 30th and 31st January and 1st
February, 1946.

131

The Government was quick in responding to these pro-
posals. A month later, after having reiterated that the ques-
tion of the smooth reabsorption Of the ex—askaris was a matter
of the first importance, the Government "had agreed that, as
a means of assisting DC's, additional staff shall be provided
... in the form of Reabsorption Officers and African Reabsorp-
tion Assistants."50

Although by mid-1947 the Government would report that
"social welfare is new to the African, and at first came under
a certain amount Of suspicion,"51 this was only part of the
problem. In the first place, there were too few community
centres in the "Reserves" to serve ex-askaris, let alone
Africans as a whole. Moreover, in some cases it meant walking
twenty or more miles to get to the nearest community or social
centre. However, a great majority Of Africans did not show in-
terest in most of the courses which were being offered at these
centers because, as one Government report concluded, "much
attention is being paid to team games and athletics."52

That the African did not show great enthusiasm in what

was being Offered is understandable. TO him these courses were

 

50KNA. MAA/2/1/49-I: Circular to all PC's, March 8,

1946. 51
Kenya: Labour Department, Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 1

(May, 1947), p. 31.

52Ibid.

132

completely irrelevant to those economic, social and political
problems which faced him in the "Reserves." The Government
had promised that the establishment of social centres would
bring progress to rural areas. In the first place, ex-askaris
were disappointed because there were not enough community cen-
tres built for them; and secondly, they were disappointed be-
cause the few centres that the Government was able to establish
Offered either irrelevant courses or inadequate services.
While these programs seemed to be failing, at least
from the point of view Of the ex-askari, the number Of Euro-
peans on the local administrative staff kept growing at a
rapid pace. Interviews with the ex-askaris revealed the
presence Of too many EurOpeans in the "Reserves" at this time
was not in the best interest Of the reabsorption projects.
Many Africans questioned the motive of these EurOpeans and
wondered if they were really that interested in the welfare
of the African. Most of them concluded that EurOpeans were
in the African areas not for the interest of Africans, but
for their own interest. As a result of this, most ex-askaris
remained indifferent or refused to co-Operate. As the East
African Commission Report noted:
With the ending Of the war the momentum Of
government activities increased. Technical officers
and their assistants penetrated to the remotest vil—

lages. But, at present, suspicion remains a great
deterrent to progress, and everything possible must

133

be done to overcome it.53

That is how bad the situation was. When those Re-
absorption Officers flocked into the "Reserves" to help the
African understand "problems Of develOpment," the results
were exactly the opposite. We might conclude that these
projects and programs were to a large extent a failure. How-
ever, before we come to such a conclusion, we would want to
know What the Government's aim was in recommending and insti-
tuting these projects. From the point of view of the adminis-
tration, the projects were a great success because through
them the Government accomplished its goal, i.e., "smooth" re-
absorption. In the administration's eyes, any project that con—
tributed to "smooth" reabsorption was a successful one.

The idea that “smooth" reabsorption must be achieved
at any cost was not anything new. The Government began plan-
ning for it when the war was still in progress. It was, however,
articulated in 1946 after the Man Power and Civilian Reabsorpe
tion Officer had visited the newly demObilized ex-askaris and

had ascertained their reactions to civilian life.54 He

 

53Britain, East African Royal Commission 1953-1955
Report (London, 1955), p. 427.

54KNA. MAA/2/1/49-I. Letter to Chief Secretary. It
stated among other things: "There is a natural reaction and
they [bx-askaris] are searching for a peg upon which to hang
their discontent. So far as they can see, it is the Civil
Government, through its local representative, the D.C., which
is responsible."

134

recognized the fact that the target of the frustrated and
bitter ex-askaris would be the Government. Therefore the
Government must act fast and do everything in its power to
avoid this by ensuring "smooth" reabsorption. After his tour
of the "Reserves," he wrote that:
Any organization for reabsorption must maintain
close contact with the ex-soldier in the early stages
Of his reabsorption, and until such time as adminis-
tration, through an increase in strength and by means
Ofpprgpaganda, welfare, etc. had adjusted itself to
this new element [italics miné] . This contact can,
I suggest, be best achieved by making full use of
staff available, i.e. EurOpean Dispersal Officers,
Family Remittance Officers and the like.

His recommendations were immediately adOpted by the
Government and were later formulated into official policy of
the administration. From that point on, additional EurOpean
officers were sent to Provincial and District administrations
in order to help in bringing about "smooth" reabsorption using
any means, especially prOpaganda. The Government was aware
of the fact that, seen from the African point of view, some of
these reabsorption projects were a complete failure; however,
it realized that it needed these projects as "cooling-off"
occupations, if not for anything else, until the Government
was strong enough to deal with the "difficult" ex-servicemen.

From this analysis, we can safely conclude that voca-

tional training and social welfare programs were both conceived

 

551bid.

135

by the Government for one and the same reason: they both

 

served a politicalgpurpose. They were "cooling-off" services
aimed at making the ex—askari believe that the Government was
truly and sincerely interested in his welfare; while, in fact,
the Government was only biding its time and meanwhile growing
stronger so that, in the end, it could if necessary control
the "unruly element" among the ex-askaris with assurance and
confidence.

The bulk of the ex-servicemen, however, returned to
their respective rural areas and started farming just as they
had done before they joined the army. Very few ex-servicemen
were alloted new plots by the Government —- the number is too
small to call for any consideration. As regards Government
loans for progressive farming, the ex-askari, like his civilian
fellow African, was not qualified to receive such aid, so the
question Of loans was completely out of the picture.

The situation was further complicated by the introduc—
tion in Kenya of a new agricultural policy. In 1946 the Gov-
ernment set up a program Which gave priority to promoting the
"prOper utilization of the soil, water and forest."56 Main
goals of the policy were to stabilize the soil and to restore

and maintain fertility. As the Government pointed out, through

 

56Kenya. African Development in Kenya 1946-1955:
Land, Livestock and Water (NairObi, 1955).

136

this policy it hOped to accomplish: "soil conservation and
reclamation, good husbandry and extended veterinary services
together with the develOpment and conservation of water re-
sources and the prOper develOpment of the colony's forest
estate."57 This was a conservation-oriented program rather
than a production-oriented one. It hit the Africans harder
than it did the EurOpeans because, as the Government was quick
to point out, the European land was in better condition than
the African land.

In practical terms, it meant that the African Spent
more of his time carrying out "conservation measures" on his
farm, while the EurOpean produced goods from his farm. This
is why the "save—the-soil-campaign of the years immediately
following the war'.‘58 was felt and resented more by Africans
than by EurOpeans.

Save-the-soil policy was in effect for ten years, i.e.
1946-1955. It was not until the end of the ten-year plan
(1955) that the Government reversed this trend. It called
the ten-year plan "unrealistic" and recommended that "in the
present planning period more attention can be paid to the

problem Of improving methods of farm management."59 At last,

 

57Kenya. Report of the Development Committee (Nai-
robi, 1946).

58Kenya. Sessional Paper No. 51, 1955: The DevelOp—
ment Programme 1954-1959 (Nairobi, 1955), p. 27.

59Ibid.

137

the Government realized the damage which this policy was
inflicting on the Colony's agricultural development. For the
African, however, there was not very much he could do except,
accept the fact that for the last ten years agricultural dev-
elOpment in his area had been markedly retarded by an ill-
conceived policy.

Therefore in agricultural develOpment, as in vocational
training and social welfare projects, the Government was only
interested in stOp-gap or “cooling-Off" measures. These mea-
sures, it must be admitted, produced the desired effect. During
the first several months of demobilization official reports re—
garding reabsorption were quite Optimistic and encouraging.

By the end of 1947, the Government declared publicly that re-
absorption had been "smooth," and that, in effect, it was com-
pleted. The Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza Province, reported
that by the end of 1946 he had welcomed "back home" some 35,000
demObilized askaris. HOwever, he noted that "many Of the ex-
soldiers have found conditions a little different after their
period of expatriation, but they have behaved exemplarily."60
Central Province reported that "it is universally true to say
that by the end of the year [1947] there was no distinguish-

61
able difference between the ex-askari and his civilian brother."

 

60Kenya: African Affairs Department, Report (1946-
1947), p. 3.
61

Ibid.

138

HOwever, some of these reports seemed to be contra-
dicting themselves. This served as an indication that every-
thing was not well with reabsorption. For instance, the Gov-
ernment stated that "the majority of ex—soldiers resumed very
thankfully their pre-war roles," however in the same paragraph
it was stated that "few of the applicants [for assistance] had
resources, experience and capital commensurate with their ambi-
tions, and gradually the disappointed, who were many, settled
down to their former way of life."62 It is difficult to believe
that the same group of peOple could be thankful and at the same
time disappointed. One more example of these Opposing views
was the report from Central Province. This report noted that
by 1947 reabsorption had been successfully completed; and yet
in the same report the following comment appeared: "The events
of 1947 in Central Province conformed to a pattern. The
pattern ... is one of political unrest... This extremely un-
comfortable condition became evident immediately after the war
and grew in intensity during 1946."63

These sensational and overly Optimistic official re-
ports were, evidently, used for publicity and prOpaganda pur-
poses. We must realize that for Kenya Government, reabsorption

was a crisis; and like any government faced with a crisis, it

 

621bid.
63Ibid.

139

tried to emphasize the positive side of reabsorption; con-
versely, it de-emphasized the negative side. That propaganda
was one of the means by which “smooth" reabsorption was
achieved is evident from the foregoing discussion. From the
point of view of the Government, "smooth" reabsorption meant
the administration's ability to control the life of the ex-
askaris in such a way that the latter would not cause any
"unrest," political or otherwise, which would disrupt British
rule in Kenya. The question was not whether these reabsorp-
tion measures were in the interest of the ex-askari; rather
the question was if they were or were not in the interest of
the Government. Anything that promoted reabsorption measures
was encouraged and that which interfered with it was discour-
aged Or stopped.64
Therefore when assessing the success or failure Of re-
absorption programs, we must always remember What the aim Of
the Government was in instituting them. Were they intended
to benefit the Government or Africans? were they supposed to
meet African political, economic and social demands? The fact
Of the matter is that the primary concern of the Government

was the achievement of "smooth" re-settlement of ex-askaris;

 

64Kenya. Report of Native Affairs 1946-1947 (1949),
p. 3. The Government could boast of "its well-designed
machinery for demobilization."

140

any other outcome would have to be incidental or simply a by-
product of the main concern. "Smooth" reabsorption did not
mean the meeting of ex-askaris' demands; it meant controlling
their "unrest" without meeting their demands. Four years
after the war, P. W. Harris, then Chief Native Commissioner,
stated clearly and exactly what the administration had done
in order to bring about “smooth" reabsorption:
Immediately following the war, Provincial teams

and District teams consisting of the Officers of the

Administration, and of departments stationed in the

areas concerned, were set up and it was the zeal and

drive of those Officers which enabled progress to be

made in practically every sphere, in spite Of the

difficulties Of political activity and economic in—
stabilipy.65 (Italics mine.)

 

From the point of view of the Government, giant progress
had been made through its well-designed machinery, i.e. the
Officers of the administrations and departments. But Africans
and their sympathizers regarded these "Provincial Teams and
District Teams" as a "great deterent to progress."66 Inter-
views with ex-askaris showed that they had known all along
that these projects were not meant to benefit them. They

stated that "courses" which were Offered in music (actually

 

651bid., p. 2.

66East African Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, p.
427. See also Champion, Op.cit., p. 32. He states that
Africans did not readily co-Operate with the Government be-
cause "they still distrust our motives."

141

mere singing), dancing and games as the main part of the
social welfare program could not solve their major problems
which were political, social and economic in nature. Kakembo
spoke for the rest Of the ex-askaris when he wrote:
It regrets me to say that with the exception of

a few things done or being done here and there, the

general attitude of our trustees is still just to

quietly amble along, with no sign of hurry.

Up until now we have been dealing with those programs
through which the Government planned to assist the ex—askaris.
We can at least say that the Government had good intentions,
that it made positive gestures in trying to do something about
the plight of the ex-askari. The government might not have
been fully interested in seeing an African make progress, but
at least it denied him this right in a rather indirect and
subtle way; that is to say, they used, among other things,
propaganda in denying him his rights.

Consideration must now be given to those programs or
areas in which Opportunities for progress were firmly, system-
atically and Openly denied the ex-askari. This, in effect,
amounted to outright, rigid and stringent control by the Gov-
ernment of the ex-askari's political, economic and social life.

Before we analyze the means employed by the Government in con-

trolling his life, let us briefly examine the mentality or

 

67Kakembo, Op.cit., p. 6.

142

"political philOSOphy" of the average European in both pre-
and post-war Kenya. The type of social and political system
which most EurOpeans wished to establish in Kenya was first
conceived around the turn of the 20th century; and fifty or
sixty years later most EurOpeans still espoused these beliefs
and ideas. Until Kenya's Independence Day, the average Euro-
pean in Kenya believed firmly in what Sir Charles Eliot had
said about Kenya and the Kenya Africans at the turn of this
century:
We are not destroying any Old interesting sys-
tem, but simply introducing order into blank, unin-
teresting brutal barbarism.68

This type of thinking was amplified and articulated
by Kenya EurOpeans immediately following World War I. The type
of Kenya they hOped and planned for after World War I was a
Kenya that did not have any room for the African; it was the
type of Kenya that would disregard Africans' aspirations and
interests. Perhaps by understanding the way they visualized
a post-World War I Kenya, we might begin to understand why
Kenya EurOpeans decided to control develOpment in Kenya so
firmly after World‘War II.

In 1919 a report was published by Kenya EurOpeans

which summed up their views on what kind of social system they

 

68Quoted by Fred Majdalany in his book State of Emer-
gency: Full Story of Mau Mau (London, 1962), p. 15.

143

wished to establish in Kenya. In the 1950's, and even be-
yond, as I shall shortly demonstrate, the majority of the
EurOpeans still held these views. The report stated among
other things:

British East Africa [Kenya] from the white
man's point of view is a young country just enter-
ing, after twenty-one years of adolescence, the
adult period of serious ideals, enterprise and
develOpment... In a land possessing vast hordes
of coloured subject peoples, two requirements appear
prominently as essentials to the permanency of the
White man's rule. The first, is the necessity for
creating Openings that will comfortably support a
sufficient number of members Of the dominating race
to enable it to hold its own in perfect safety, no
matter what crises may arise, without recourse to
outside assistance; and secondly, that these over-
lords shall prove their superior civilization by
being a powerful brotherliness, undivided by those
economic disputes and divergencies of interests that
have split and shaken the solidarity of even the
most progressive and democratic sections of the race
in other parts of the Empire.

Now if this young country can adapt in respect
to its main industries, i.e. those of land, that will
permanently amalgamate and identify the interests of
its white inhabitants and make them pull cordially
together it will stay ahead of all competitors in
the tug-Of-war for white pOpulation that must take
place at the close Of the war.

This was the Kenya desired by most Europeans at the
end Of World War I. They did not wish less at the end of WOrld
War II. That this would be the case was predicted by many Ob-
servers both in and outside Kenya. Judging from what had

happened after World War I, many Observers concluded, quite

 

9Kenya. Report of the Land Settlement Commission
(Nairobi, 1919), p. 93.

144

correctly, that life for Africans would be made even more
difficult after World war II than it was after the First
World War. One critic noted that:
We may expect reverberations ... since the en-

trenched interests of EurOpean settlers are inimical

to the growth of native African strength, economic

and political. Those interests have enforced a

relatively low ceiling on aspirations of the non-

European population in the past.70

The "settler problem" has made the history of Kenya

quite unique and different from that of its neighbours. It
remained a problem from the early days of EurOpean settlement
to the day that country attained its independence. As two of
the most authorata’tive scholars on Kenya nationalism have stated:
"Post-war i.e. World War II nationalism in Kenya develOped in
an environment marked by the efforts of settler leaders."71
This meant that any African political or nationalist organiza—
tion was met with well organized and powerful settler interest.
African nationalists were a danger to the "established order
of the State" and, therefore, must be dealt with quickly and

firmly; they must be shown "their place." From the settlers'

point of view, the "good native" was the one who was willing

 

70African Transcripts, No. 5 (September, 1945),
p. 170.

 

71Fred G. Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya" in
Transformation of East Africa, Stanley Diamond and Fred G.
Burke, eds. (New York, 1966), p. 189.

145

and ready to learn from the European by watching his "civil-
ized" way of life. The "good natives" would be civilized by

the "proximity and example of the settlers."72

They would be
taught to know "their place" and to accept the status of a
docile and complidnt working-class.

Above examples illustrate the continuity Of uncompro-
mising settler mentality among Kenya EurOpeans from the earli-
est days Of their settlement in Kenya to early 1960's. It
shows clearly that the thinking of the average EurOpean in
Kenya was greatly influenced by the "political philos0phy" of
men such as Sir Charles Eliot. Referring to Eliot's ideas and
their impact on Kenya, Fred Majdalany wrote (in 1960) that:

It is of historic interest that his doctrines --
which were fundamental to Kenya's thinking for the
next fifty years -- were an early and symptomatic
example of what was to become of the Colony's be-
setting and recurring weakness, failure of imagina-
tion, for the doctrine of white supremacy was to
persist long after it had been renounced by the
British Government itself as obsolete.

Such was the political philOSOphy that prevailed in
Kenya as World War II was drawing to a close. In view of this,

Kenya could not be classified with any other country in Africa

except South Africa and Rhodesia. It was therefore small wonder

 

72Majdalany, Op.cit., p. 15.

73Ibid., p. 16. The 1923 White Paper "Indians in
Kenya" stated that primarily Kenya was an African territory
and therefore the interests of the Africans must be para—
mount.

146

that ex-askaris were greeted with such rigid and stringent
controls.

These controls were basically measures taken by the
Government to ensure that the EurOpean community in Kenya
would maintain and strengthen its power. Their aim was to
keep the African from gaining any power; this meant that
EurOpeans were prepared to go to any length to make sure that
they had the power and the African did not. One way by which
power could be maintained was through EurOpean population --
the greater the number of EurOpeans, the better the chances
for maintaining power. This is why Kenya Europeans preferred
Italian prisoners of war to their own African ex-soldiers Who
had helped defend the British Empire. They would Open Oppor-
tunities to Italians rather than to ex-askaris. This issue
was fiercely debated in Kenya. A few Europeans, led by the
Director of Man Power, were Opposed to the idea, and recom—

74 By June 1945, the

mended that Italians be repatriated.
question of Italian co-Operators had become so controversial
that it had to be referred to the British Government in London.
But before that, the Director of Man Power wrote to one of

the most powerful agricultural organizations in Kenya:

Responsible farmers are stating that the re-
tention Of the good type of Italian co-Operators

 

74There were about 30,000 Italian co-Operators in
Kenya; see East African Standard, February 28, 1946.

147

is more or less essential for even the long term

production policy. To allow, however, such a

policy would be deserving of a maximum adverse

criticism. It would be pandering to the individ-

ual, under an exaggerated excuse of national inte-

rests, whilst being most unfair to the British

and Empire ex-servicemen who would find themselves

in the position of being 'outed' in peace by the

very peOple whom they defeated in the war.75

Supporters of this policy argued that experience in
the war years of prosperity in farming and certain industries
appeared to show that there was a need for the "white working
class type of man." However, it was argued that in practice
the need was only temporary because the askari coming baCk from
the war, with his added experience and training, would give a
far better service to Kenya farmers and industry than was the
76
case before the war.
From the point of view of the majority of EurOpeans in

Kenya, especially the settlers, the Directorate of Man Power
had taken a dangerous path that would undermine EurOpean posi-
tion. Settlers' Opposition to these recommendations was firm
and immediate: "Farmers have been somewhat nervous for some

time past that their production would be seriously affected

were such a hiatus to occur."77 HOwever, farmers were not

 

75KNA. MD/4/5/129—I/26 (70): Letter to Secretary to
Agricultural Production and Settlement Board, June 22, 1945.

76Ibid.

77KNA. MD/4/5/129-I/26 (70); Letter to Ag. Chief
Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 14, 1945.

148

prepared to stOp at that. They sent their complaints to the
British Government through Kenya's Chief Secretary. It would
appear that the latter was under settlers' pressure when he
presented their case to the Colonial Office in London. At any
rate, he did not present a strong case for the Africans as the
Director of Man Power had done. He simply stated that:

Representations have been made by Kenya farmers
for the retention until last in the order of repatria-
tion of Italians who are doing key-jObs...

The Kenya Government considers that this decision
will be detrimental to the colony's production and war
effort, whilst it might also hinder the plans for the
reabsorption of African-servicemen into civil life.

It is hOped that the trade training which the African

soldier has had during his service in the Forces will

go a long way fitting him to take the place of the

Italian, but it is recognized that special training

courses will be required to fit him for civilian

needs.78

Thus the dispatch decided the case in favor of the set—

tlers. All they were wishing for was for the Government to
agree with their allegations that the ex-servicemen were not
fully qualified to be fitted into the key—jobs; that his war-
time training could not be readily converted into use, in
civilian life, without further training. Farmers' pretext
that ex-askaris were "half-baked" tradesmen had, in effect,

been sanctioned by the Government. From this point on, private

employers, including farmers, would refuse to employ an ex-askari

 

78KNA. MD/4/5/129-I/26 (70); Dispatch to Secretary
of State for the Colonies, July 14, 1945.

149

on account of his sub-standard training.79

While it was alleged that the ex-askari was denied
employment because of his inadequate training, and that work
on the farms required skilled labourers, it was reported that
by 1946 there were 1400 Italian prisoners of war employed on
farms in Kenya and that at least half of them were unskilled
labourers.8

As previously stated, the wish and dream of the average
EurOpean in Kenya was to make Kenya appear as "EurOpean" as
possible. It would therefore appear that EurOpeans in Kenya,
especially farmers, decided to promote Italian interest because
they recognized Italian success and strength would eventually
strengthen and consolidate EurOpean power in Kenya.

However, there was a second reason why settlers pre-
ferred Italian labourers to African labour. As a contempo-
rary observer noted: "there seem to be far too many EurOpeans
who are dependent on their Giovannis and want to keep them as

long as possible."81 Most Italians in Kenya at that time were

 

79One of the farmers wrote that: "The suggestion that
trained, experienced and skillful Italian artisans and farm
hands can be replaced by irresponsible, inexperienced, hastily
trained natives is too unrealistic to merit comment." KNA.
MD/4/5/129-I/26 (70); Letter to Chief Secretary, August 28,
1946. 80 .

KNA. MD/4/5/129-I/26 (70); Letter to Deputy Chief

Secretary, NairObi, July 19, 1946.

81KNA. MD/4/5/129-I/26 (70); Letter to c. N. c.,
June 19, 1945.

150

classified as either prisoners of war or as co-Operators.
Settlers took advantage Of this situation and created cheap
labour out of these helpless foreigners. It was because of
this that farmers, as individuals and as a group, fought so
hard for the retention of Italians in Kenya after the war.
There develOped a heated debate among EurOpeans them-
selves -- settlers against non-settlers -- on this very issue.
This would, of course, be expected since the only group that
was really benefiting; from the cheap labour was the farm com-
munity. The non-farmers' position was reflected in an article
in East African Standard which stated among other things:
As was the case of German prisoners Of war
in England, the man retained should be paid in

full wages for the job. There should be no ques-
tion of the individual farmer gaining by the deal.

82

In taking this position, the Opposition did not have
African interest at heart. It did so solely on behalf of
Italian labourers. For instance, they did not demand repatria-
tion of Italians so that Africans could get employment. In
this respect, the debate among EurOpeans was about a "family
misunderstanding" which did not concern itself with African

interest. .Many Italian co-Operators were never repatriated;

they remained and lived in Kenya indefinitely. As a matter of

 

82"Position of P.O.W. Co-Operators," East African
Standard (February 28, 1946).

 

151

fact, some of them who had been repatriated were later re-
admitted to Kenya. A clear example of this was the Govern-
ment's statement, made in 1947, that "early in the year, the
Government decided to readmit up to 200 Italian ex-prisoners
of war and internees to take up employment in vacancies in
work which was of national importance and of an urgent nature."83
Publicly the Government claimed that these peOple were
needed because of their skills or trades, that they were needed
in key—jobs. In short, the Government argued that Italians
were retained in or returned to Kenya on economic grounds. The
truth of the matter is that Italians received this treatment
not so much for economic reasons as for political ones. Euro-
peans, understandably, attached great importance on their pOpu-
lation; hence the decision that Italians should be retained.
They realized that the greater their number in Kenya, the better
the chances for their continued domination of life in Kenya.
This becomes clear when we examine what was happening
to other EurOpeans in Kenya. In the case of Italians, the Gov-
ernment could use economics as an argument for their being re-
tained in or returned to Kenya. But what pretext could they
give when they invited the Zionists and the British ex-service-
men to go and settle in Kenya? In this particular case, and

there were several cases of this nature, Kenya Government could

 

83Kenya. Labour Department: Annual Report 1947, p. 23.

 

152

not hide the fact that the invitation and the intended settle-
ment were politically motivated. As Fred G. Burke has observed:
Instead of the British compensating African
troops for service during the war ... 3,300,000
acres of Kenyan land was offered to the Zionists
as a home for the Jews. Furthermore, Kenyan land
was Offered to British ex-servicemen but not to
their African comrades.
lEx-askaris reaction to all this was predictable. The
Director of Man Power had warned that if Italians were retained,
ex-askaris would feel "outed" in peace by the very people whom
they had defeated in the war. This is exactly what happened.
Consequently, ex-askaris felt that the Government, in doing so,
regarded them as "worse enemies than Italians." For years,
Africans had been demanding a greater participation in the
life -- economic, political, social, etc. -— of the Colony;
they had hOped after the war more Opportunities would be ex-
tended to them. Yet the Government was prepared to frustrate
them by denying them these opportunities even if it meant im-
porting EurOpean personnel to Kenya in order to block or pre-
vent a greater participation of the Africans in the affairs
of the Colony. Above all, Kenya's most important problem --
land -- became more pressing than at any other time in the

past. It is ironical that at the very time EurOpeans were

being invited to come and settle in Kenya, some Of the Kenya

 

84 .
Burke, Op.c1t., p. 208.

153

Africans were landless because some of the "Reserves" were
already over-pOpulated. The Government was well aware of
this fast growing problem; a good example of this was the re—
port from Central Province in which officials stated that "the
basic problem for solution ... is one of excess pOpulation."85
One would expect that some of the land for which Euro-
peans were being invited, would have been used for the settle-
ment of the increasing number of landless Africans, but the
Government would not do that. Instead it imported EurOpeans
to Kenya and exported Kenya Africans to other parts of Africa.
Thus an Official from Central Province recommended that:
"something might be done by encouraging migration to Tangan—

yika."86

Indeed the Government adOpted this recommendation
and consequently some Kenya Africans were sent to settle in
Tanganyika (Tanzania).

Thus the Government succeeded in controlling askaris'
great plans of settling and farming in Kenya "White" Highlands.
On the other hand, the Government had weakened its age-old

argument that EurOpeans settled in Kenya because the land was

allegedly empty and that Africans did not really want the land.

 

When the Government refused to allow Africans -- especially
85KNA: "Post—war Five Year DevelOpment Plan,
Central Province," p. 15.
86

Ibid., p. 16.

154

ex-servicemen -- to settle in some of the empty areas in the
"White" Highlands, it did not have a good excuse for doing so.
Interviews with ex-askaris revealed that they were
extremely bitter and sensitive about this. They reasoned as
follows: at the turn of the century, EurOpean settlers took
land from their grand-fathers because the latter were helpless
and powerless; but that World War II veterans who had had
widening experience and better knowledge of Europeans could
not, in a post-Second-WOrld-War Kenya, sit back and let the
EurOpean rule and dominate Kenya in the same way he had done
for the past fifty years. The veterans insisted that they
were not as helpless or powerless as their grand-fathers and
therefore decided that something should be done to change
the situation.87
The Government used loans, taxes and credits as ways
of controlling ex-soldiers' economic activities. In the early
years of the war it had become evident to the Government that
more money would have to be spent on general develOpment in
Kenya after the war if ex-servicemen had to continue enjoying
the standard of living to which they had become accustomed

during the war. Most EurOpeans, of course, were Opposed to

the idea of spending public funds on African develOpment.

 

87See KOinange, Op.cit., p. 62; Reference is made to
"our land was given to Italians and Germans after World War
II."

155

Instead they suggested that Africans -- especially ex-askaris
-- must be taxed for this develOpment. Taxes would have been
raised in 1944 had the officials not been warned against pos-
sible unrest among the ex-askaris if such a plan were effected.
The Government therefore adOpted recommendations contained in
the report from Nyanza Province which had stated that: "In-
creased taxation at thisstage, which would take effect during
the demObilization period, might be interpreted by returning
African soldiers as directed toward taking from him his earn-
ings accumulated while defending the Empire, and might have
serious repercussions."88
Ex-askaris insist that the Government stifled their
business activities by refusing to extend loans and credits
to them. There were hundreds of thousands of African soldiers
who had saved money during the war, men who had learned the
value and beauty of work. They were prepared to form trading
companies, co-operative societies, to run private firms or
keep shOps. And as one contemporary Observer remarked, "All

89 Ex-

these men will loOk up to the Government for help."
askaris stated that military authorities had assured them the
Government would give them help in the form of loans and credits

so that they could begin private business. Evidently most

 

88KNA. PC/NFD5/1/4, "Nyanza Province Five Year Devel-
Opment Plan" (1944).

89Kakembo, Op.cit., p. 14.

156

ex-askaris put their hOpes in such promises because, as they
quickly pointed out, they realized that their meagre savings
would not be enough for starting the "big" businesses they
had in mind.

After the war the Government did not extend the prom-
ised aid to ex-askaris. In fact, loans to Africans as a whole
were unknown until 1950, and even then the number of Africans
receiving these loans was negligible. A good example of this
is what was known as "Agricultural Credit." As late as 1950
it was reported that "the use of credit by the African agri—
cultural community is still On a very small scale... At the
outset, however, we must state emphatically the dangers inher-
ent in any attempt to make credit available in an agricultural
community at that stage of develOpment."90 Loans for non-
agricultural enterprises were even harder to obtain since
Africans were encouraged to get into no other industry but
farming.

Here ex-askaris encountered the usual argument used by
the Colonial Government in denying the colonized peOple their
rights; the Government could not help in the develOpment of
African agriculture because it was still at a "backward" level.
Yet the develOpment was at this level because of lack of capi—

tal. The African was caught up in a vicious cycle. Only the

 

90Kenya: Report of Committee on Agricultural Credits
for Africans (Nairobi, 1950), p. 5.

 

157

Government could break the cycle; but it chose not to because
it was in the Government's interest that the African should
remain there.

In spite of this vicious cycle, and although the Gov-
ernment could refer to African "Reserves" as "barren environ-
ment," the ex-askari was expected by the Government to maintain
the high standards of living he had become used to during his
military career. It was made clear that he should not expect
these standards to be maintained by a "benevolent and omnipotent
Government," but that he should "do what is necessary to con-

tribute to the progress himself."91

Having refused to spend
public money either directly or indirectly in the develOpment
of African areas, the Government turned around and put the
responsibility of develOping these areas on the African pOpu-
lation. "If as we hOpe he [the African} is increasingly to
enjoy the emenities of civilized life ... he must be prepared
to shoulder the responsibilities, financial as well as social,
Which these privileges entail."92

While Africans were being reminded that develOpment

and progress in their areas depended on their own efforts and

finances, the Government was doing everything in its power to

 

91Sabben-Clare, Op.cit., p. 156.

92Fane, Op.cit., p. 60.

158

deve10p EurOpean areas using public funds.93

European farmers
and businessmen had always received loans from the Government.
For instance, after World War I, most EurOpeans who arrived
in Kenya without enough capital to deve10p their land, received
loans from the Government. The question of such Government
loans was referred to in 1919 in a report which stated among
other things: "The only body that has a direct interest in
keeping him [hewly arrived EurOpean] on the land will be the
state ... the state will in his or its own interests be com-
pelled to lend him his develOping capital."94
This was simply to reiterate and confirm a practice
that was already in progress. During World War II, the Govern-
ment made sure that when the war ended and the askaris returned
to the "Reserves," they would be excluded from agricultural
loans or credits. The test came in 1942 when an ordinance to
provide for the increased production Of crOps in Kenya was

passed.95 For the purpose of granting loans, the ordinance de-

fined a farmer as "any EurOpean or Indian or any body corporate

 

93Kenya: The Development Programme 1954-1957. Ses-
sional Paper NO. 51 of 1955. 1955, p. 28.

4Kenya: Report of the Land Settlement Commission
(Nairobi, 1919), p. 93.

95The reference here is on "The Increased Production
of CrOps Ordinance, 1942."

159

engaged in the business of farming, is the registered owner
or leasee or land granted or leased by the Crown under an
agricultural use..." African farmers -- at whatever level
of farming -- were not considered as farmers. And yet the
Land and Agricultural Bank of Kenya, from which these Euro-
pean and Indian farmers received loans, was not a private
bank but a bank that dealt with public funds. This remained
effective long after the war and was responsible for the fail-
ure and frustrations which the majority of the would-be ex-
askari farmers experienced.

Through these controls on public loans the Government
was able to retard African develOpment while at the same time
speeding up that Of the EurOpeans. In 1949, for instance,
when the ex-serviceman with his fellow African was being advised
to develop his own area, using his own "effort and finance,"
the EurOpean community was develOping their areas with public
funds: "The jump of five places achieved by EurOpean settle—
ment arises from the fact that EurOpean Agricultural Settlement
(Amendment) Ordinance provided for the establishment, in 1949,
of a revolving fund oijl.6 million as of 1st April, 1950."96

Africans, especially the ex-askaris, insist that there

was yet another way by which the Government controlled the

 

96Kenya: The Development Programme 1954-1957. Ses-
sional Paper No. 51 of 1955. 1955, p. 26.

160

circulation of money in the "Reserves." They firmly believe
that the Government purposely "robbed" ex-askaris of their
money by selling them army vehicles that were too old to run;
but which the Government claimed to have reconditioned.
Ex-askaris say that this was not only "robbery" but
it was "deceit" as well. According to what they were promised
during the war, these vehicles were supposed to be sold to
them at the lowest possible price. The price was supposed to
be so low that the whole transaction would, in effect, be con—
sidered a reward or a gift for the ex-askari's contribution to
British victory. It is true that many ex-soldiers lost their
savings by buying the old army lorries which "simply died on

97

the roads" after a short period Of time. Nationalist leaders

capitalized upon this loss and made it one of the major griev-
ances against British rule in Kenya. That the issue was
"politicized" is Obvious from the following remarks by one of
the Kenya nationalists:

During the 1939-1945 war, Africans were able
to make some money ... and EurOpeans were worried
how to reduce this African money circulating in
the reserve. As soon as the war was over a secret
plan was made to sell to Africans reconditioned
military vehicles on terms of cash without credits...
Africans who wanted to better their economic posi-
tion fell into this trap and within a very short
time every road was covered with lorries that did
not really last long... African earnings returned

 

97 ,
Schleh, Op.Cit., p. 46.

161

to the EurOpeans through these reconditioned
lorries.

There is no question that the lorries were in very
poor conditions and that they had "a short life."99 However,
part of the problem was that since the African could not pur-
chase these lorries on credit terms, he was forced to use the
whole of his savings on purchasing them, and when they broke
down he could not repair them since he did not have any money
left for this purpose.

African economic nationalism found itself on a collision
course with Indian commercial activities in East Africa. During
their military careers, ex—askaris were quite aware of the com-
mercial strength of Indians in East Africa. As far back as
1944, after having Observed that African soldiers were saving
money with the aim of beginning their own business at the end
of the war, R. Kakembo made these significant remarks:

They will want to help to save them from the
rich Indian traders —— the middle men who have
over-run East Africa.100
The first thing the Government wished to do was to con-

trol the number of traders by issuing licenses to businessmen.

At first, it appeared as if the major reason for this move was

 

98KOinange, Op.cit., p. 17.

99Kenya: African Affairs Department, Annual Report
1948 (Nairobi, 1950), p. 51.

100Kakembo, Op.cit., p. 14.

162

. . . 101
the fact that many "ex-serVicemen Wished to start buSiness,"

and that this control would aid them in entering business.

Soon it became evident that the question of ex-service-
men entering business was not the main reason for trade li-
censing. The principal justification for taking this step
was that by "its means positive equilibrium can be maintained
between supplies available."102 This did not immediately or
directly affect or involve ex-askaris. It was to control sup-
plies between Indian and European traders. Indians demanded
that trade licensing be abolished while the EurOpeans pressed
for its continuation. The Government sided with the EurOpean
traders, which meant that trade licensing would continue until
post-war conditions had improved.103

The African retail trader was left unprotected against
Indian wholesale merchants. As the Government Observed, "The
retailers' greatest difficulty is to purchase trade goods on

a wholesale market, and it is in this field that co—Operation

. 104
can be of the greatest assistance." NO doubt the Government

 

101KNA. MAA/2/l/49-I: circular to all PC's. March 18.

1946.
lozIbid.

103KNA. MAA/2/1/49-I; Letter to Chief Secretary,
March 12, 1946.

104Kenya: African Affairs Department, Annual Rpport
1948, p. 50.

163

was aware of the problems that faced ex-askari traders. It
addressed itself to these problems; but it did not do much
to alter the situation. When it is remembered that Africans
did not get Government loans when they entered the business
world, it becomes obvious that by now he had two major ob-
stacles in his commercial undertakings: first, he had insuf-
ficient capital, and secondly, he was at the mercy of the
wholesale market. As Professor Schleh noted:

Such competition added to burdens imposed by
insufficient experience and resources, resulted in
hundreds of commercial failures... Africans who
survived in trade were generally still not prepared
to compete with Asian merchants on the latter's
home grounds, the urban market, and most Often estab-
lished themselves in rural areas, frequently on a
very small scale.

However, carrying out trade in the rural areas had its
own problems. For example, there were so many retail shOps in
these areas that it became uneconomical to Operate them, and
eventually the weaker traders, and they were many, were forced

. 106
to drOp out of buSiness altogether. In some rural areas,
the entire group of African traders dropped out only to be
. 107
replaced by Indian traders.

In this matter of economic competition between the

Asian and African communities in Kenya, the EurOpean community

 

105Schleh, Op.cit., pp. 53-54.

106Kenya: African Affairs Department, Annual Report
1948, p. 50.

107Ibid., p. 51.

164

was, to a certain extent, in alliance with the African group.
This was so partly because EurOpeans envied the dominant role
the Asian community was playing in the commercial life of the
colony; and partly because they wished to transfer to, or at
least to share with, the Indian the guilt of exploiting
Africans. Some EurOpeans suggested that Kenya was the land

of EurOpeans and Africans, and not Indians; that the Indians
should either return to India or else relinquish their economic
positions and Opportunities to ex-askaris.108 Many EurOpeans
came to believe that if Indians acted according to these sug-
gestions then ex-askaris' reabsorption problems would be
solved immediately. Most Europeans realized that unrest among
ex-askaris would be disastrous to their privileged position

in Kenya; that is why some of them were willing to sacrifice
Indian interests if that meant the retention of the EurOpean
easy way of life in Kenya.

It was argued that it was the Indian and not the Euro-
pean who was occupying "African" jObs; and therefore before
Africans could get any jobs or economic Opportunities, the
Indian must make room for him. Archdeacon L. J. Beecher said

that:

 

108See Fane, Op.cit., p. 57. She warned that "the

situation is complicated by the fact that in many of the jobs
for which the returning African soldier might be fitted,
competent Asians are securely ensconced."

165

Perhaps the biggest question which arises here

is whether or not the Indian trader and artisan will

be prepared to give place to them and allow (dare

one hOpe even encourage them?) to fulfill their

ambition to exercise their technical skills which

they have acquired during their service in the

army.n109

The Government also controlled ex—askaris' political

activities. The aim here was to exclude him from participating
in the affairs of the Government. A number of EurOpeans thought
that the African soldier on demObilization would join the exist-
ing African local government machinery, should he desire to
participate in the political affairs of the colony. HOwever,
there were those who were totally Opposed to this idea. In
1945 the Director of Man Power could write that "I still men—
tion that there is an Objection to the employment of these ex-
soldiers as additional 'Native Headmen.'"110 According to him,
the reason for the objection was "an administrative" one; never-
theless, there is reason to believe that the Objection was on
"ideological" rather than "administrative" grounds. As we have
seen elsewhere in this study, the returning soldier had sup-

posedly acquired "bad" ideas during the service, and consequently,

had become "difficult;" therefore he was not "qualified" to

 

109A. L. J. Beecher, "The East African"Political
Scene: The East African Prospect," African Affairs, XLV,
No. 180 (July, 1946), p. 149.

110KNA. MFD/lZ/l9/l65-II; Letter to Chief Secretary.
September 20, 1945.

‘v-e/

166

join the Government for he might use his position to spread
the "bad" ideas among his fellow Africans.

So when the askaris returned to civil life, only a
few Government officials suggested that the educated ex-askaris
be absorbed into the government as members of the "tribal"
police force, members of tribunal courts, clerks, etc. How-
ever, the Government policy was that such men should be care-
fully picked so that only those with a "good military record"
could be employed by the administration. They were quick in
pointing out that it would be dangerous to hire too many ex-
servicemen for local administration. One official warned
that: "There is a move to identify the educated ex-soldier
with the administration ... but this for Obvious reasons must
be a very slow process."111 On the assumption that ex-service-
men might become "difficult" chiefs, clerks, etc., the Govern-
ment kept most of these men out of the Government machinery.

However, the most effective way by which the Government
controlled or stOpped ex-askaris from gaining power, political
or otherwise, even in the "Reserves," was by alienation of
these men from the civilian pOpulation. Ex-askaris believe
that in this case, as many other cases, the Government used
its doctrine of "Divide and Rule" by sowing suspicion, mis-

trust and hatred between ex-servicemen and the rest Of the

 

111KNA, MAA/2/l/49-I; "Interim Report on African
Demobilization," February 28, 1946.

167

African pOpulation.

Ex-servicemen said that the Government spread prOpa-
ganda among the civilians that ex-soldiers would take land
from them by force, if necessary, since they had the power
of "money and the gun," that ex-askaris had become dangerous
killers and murderers and, therefore, they must be avoided or
at least must be carefully watched. Chiefs were told that if
they did not watch ex-askaris, they would "overthrow" the
chiefs and occupy their positions.

Studies in the reabsorption of Malawi ex-servicemen
have shown that the Government there carried out some form Of
anti-ex—servicemen prOpaganda. A. G. Dickson found out that
"Nyasaland" Railways protested against ex-askaris refusing to
show their tickets. The police complained that ex-askaris
"won't walk" and that the medical Officers were afraid Of ex-
askaris bringing venereal diseases into the "Reserves."112
In Kenya the story was more or less the same. Ex-askaris have
accounts to this effect, and there is written evidence to sup-
port this. We can infer this from the type of complaints ex-
askaris brought before the Government. For instance, the Gov-
ernment reported that ex-askaris had complained that "when we

bring a case before a tribunal we are told we are swollen

 

112Dickson, Op.cit., p. 14.

168

113
headed" and that they had a lot of things to say in Chiefs'
. 114
counCils, but "our mouths have been stOpped."
In 1945 an article written by a correspondent con-
nected with the East Africa Command reflected the typical Euro-
pean reaction to the return of African soldiers to civilian
life:
The return of the askari today helps little to
give stability to such a society. With his slouch
hat perched on his head (but still with a belief in
magic planted firmly in his heart), he cuts only too
often the figure of an undisciplined lout, giving
dumb insolence to District Officers, flouting the
authority of the chief ... The return of those men

in their thousands ... and without their officers ...
may well jeOpardize the whole fabric of indirect rule.

115

It will be seen from the foregoing that for the ex-
aSkari, life was extremely difficult for the first one or two
years of his civilian life. He found a hostile EurOpean com—
munity and a suspicious African group. Ex-askaris correctly
attributed this to the administration and let the Government
know their feelings about this situation. As the Director of
Man Power reported, "They now feel they are strangers in their
own homes and to their own administration. They feel that

there is a wide gulf between them and the civilian authorities...

So far as they can see, it is the Civil Government, through

 

113KNA. MAA/2/l/49-I; "Interim Report on African
Demobilization," February 28, 1946.

114Ibid.

115"The Returned Askari," Times (London), August 21,
1945; quoted in African Transcripts, No. 5 (September, 1945),

p. 171.

 

169

its local representative, the D.C., which is responsible."116

Ex-askaris were well aware of the game the Government was
trying to play with them. They realized that the aim of the
Government was to create as many problems and institute as
many controls as possible in order to frustrate them in every
possible way.

The Government used educational Opportunities as an
additional control on the advancement of ex-askaris. By 1942
the Government had already made plans for furthering education
of EurOpean soldiers once the war ended. It decided that "it
will be necessary to make generous provision for overseas
bursaries on demObilization and suggest that at least 50 per
cent of such bursaries be awarded to men and women to enable
them to Obtain qualifications which are required in pensionable
posts in Government departments."117 At this particular time
further education and training for the would-be Asian and
African ex-servicemen were not discussed or even considered.

In 1945 the Government reiterated its interest in grant-
ing scholarships to ex-servicemen for further education and
training. At this time the Government was prepared to consider

further education not just for EurOpean ex-servicemen, but for

 

116KNA. MAA/2/l/49-I; "Interim Report on African
Demobilization," February 28, 1946.

117Kenya. Progress Report on Demobilization. NO- 2.
January, 1945.

170

Asian and African ex-servicemen as well. HOwever, the Govern-
ment was quick in defining, for each of these groups, what
"further education" meant for them. For EurOpeans and Asians,
further education meant "education beyond the secondary school
standard" and for the Africans it meant "education beyond the
primary school standard."118 Once more the line had been
drawn for the ex-askari; he had been reminded that the only
education that was good for him was that Which would keep him
in "his place," that which would train him to become a "junior
partner" in Kenya's develOpment.

By 1948, at least 80 bursaries had been awarded to
EurOpean ex-servicemen, one bursary to an Indian ex-serviceman
and none to African ex—servicemen. Interviews with ex-askaris
show that quite a number of educated ex-askaris applied for
these bursaries. The Government, as usual, was ready to ex-
plain why African ex-servicemen did not qualify for these
bursaries: "A number of applications have been received from
Africans and attempts made to obtain vacancies, in all but
one case to date, it has been found that they lack certain

requisite academic qualifications."119

 

118Kenya: Labour Department. Annual Report, 1946

(NairObi, 1948), p. 38.

ll91bid. See KNA. MFD/12/19/l65—IV; Letter to Ac-
countant General, Entebbe, March 4, 1949. Three ex-askaris
received bursaries to enable them to pursue further education

171

Interviews with ex-askaris show that the argument by
the Government that they lacked certain requisite academic
qualifications was not convincing to them. They reasoned
that when the Government needed them in the defense of the
Empire, it found them "qualified" for training in almost
everything -- in everything that would make them better soldiers.
Therefore, they could not understand why, after the war, they
could not "qualify" for training in anything, especially if
it is remembered that the best of the educated ex-servicemen
were the ones who were applying for these Opportunities for
further education and training.

Ex-askaris were naturally quite bitter about this
treatment. Their views and reactions can be summed up by
what a recent observer has said about black American soldiers
fighting in Vietnam. Although the two cases are quite differ—
ent, reactions to them, surprisingly enough, are almost similar.

With a hOpe that these problems would be avoided when black

 

at Makerere College. The college received a total Of Shs.
8280/—. The recipients were:

Murigu Ndoria 2760/—
Matheri Njoroge 2760/-
Paul Ngei 2760(-

Shs. 8280/-

See also (same file) Sebastian Michael Ogutu (ex—askari)
who studied engineering at Loughborough College, England.

172

American soldiers return from Vietnam, the observer stated that:
The sad fact is that what has limited their
advance in the Army also handicaps them in trying
to better their education in civilian life... For
men who have graduated cum laude in life-and-
death examinations of self-discipline, profession—
al skill, and, above all, hope, ambition and new
maturity, this criterion is no longer valid. It
would be a tragic mistake if those capable and
potentially outstanding young men were judged
simply on the basis of their previous high-school
records in their aspirations to higher or technical
education.

There is a general belief that EurOpean settlers were
fully responsible for keeping the ex-askari in "his place,"
i.e. they were the ones who denied ex-soldiers better Oppor-
tunities. The settler's responsibility is only part of the
story. Indeed they were vocal and direct in denying ex-
askaris their legitimate rights; but other EurOpeans, in-
cluding Government officials, were just as responsible, although
they might have been more subtle and indirect in carrying out
the same policies and practices. Non-settlers might have used
different strategies, but all EurOpeans had one common goal
in mind: pre-eminence of EurOpean interest in Kenya.

Again these controls were not unique to Kenya. Ex-
servicemen all over colonial Africa received more or less the

same treatment. In Kenya, for Obvious reasons, these controls

were more thorough, more rigid and more strict. We have already

 

120Young, Jr., Op.cit., p. 65.

173

made reference to ex-soldiers in Nyasaland (Malawi). The
situation in West Africa was not very much different, either.
Taking Nigeria as an example, the policy of Nigerian Colonial
Government toward its ex-soldiers was reflected in the remarks
of one of the Government officials who said: "It appears to
be quite widely held that the ex-serviceman has had his oppor-
tunity ... not without profit to himself ... and that now he
should take a back seat."121

This view that the ex—soldier should have been grateful
to British Government for having recruited him into the Army
was prevalent among British peOple in Africa. Ex-servicemen
were reminded that they had, among other things, made tremen-
dous economic gains by serving in the British Army. They were
therefore expected to return to civilian life and quickly
settle down without making further demands on the Government.
In Kenya, for instance, when the ex-soldiers demanded aid from
the Government, they were quickly told that "It was not only
the ex-askari who had helped to win the war. Civilians who
had stayed behind and helped to grow food had their contribu-
tion; and comparatively speaking, the ex—servicemen were better

off."122 [Italics mine{)

 

121Nigeria, Annual Reports for the Northern, Western,
Eastern Provinces and the Colony 1946 (Lagos, 1947), p. 26;
quoted in Schleh, Op.cit., p. 94.

122KNA. MAA/2/l/49-I; "Interim Report on African
Demobilization," February 28, 1946.

174

The foregoing is a brief analysis of how EurOpeans
controlled ex-askaris' contribution to economic, political
and cultural nationalism in Kenya. Quite understandably,
EurOpeans were out to stOp any organized or formal progress
or "African development" that had any signs of nationalism.

In a way, the British succeeded in thwarting these national-
istic tendencies on the part of the ex-askaris. In short,
they made conditions unfavourable for the ex-askaris to organ—
ize effectively and make direct contribution to nationalism
in Kenya. Indeed, as I hOpe to demonstrate later, it is one
of the main conclusions of this study that the major contribu-
tion which ex-servicemen made to Kenya nationalism was not in
direct and organized form, but in an unorganized and indirect
way. Because the contribution took this form, because it mani—
fested itself in this manner, it was less Obvious, although
quite effective in its own right. Again I wish to emphasize
the fact that although it toOk a less Obvious form, it was
nevertheless a very important aspect in the fight for Kenya's
national independence.

That ex-askaris' direct, organized and formalized
"resistance" or nationalism was effectively controlled during
the years immediately following the war was something that
Kenya Government did not deny. They could report later that

reabsorption of ex-soldiers had been "smooth" and successful.

175

Needless to say, this was the Government's interpretation Of
how reabsorption had been implemented. For the ex—askaris,
reabsorption had been a totalzfiulure; it failed because, as
they put it, through it they had been betrayed by the Govern-
ment -— a government for which they had fought so loyally and
bravely, and for which many of them had lost their lives.

One of the tOp ranking Officers in Kenya Government --
Chief Native Commissioner -- explained later on exactly how
these rigid controls by the Government brought about "smooth"
reabsorption:

During the war there had been much speculation
as to the effect which the many thousands of ex-
soldiers would have on post-war Kenya. Many hoped
that they would have a profound progressive influence
on the civil life of their communities, while others
pessimistically predicted that they would constitute
an unruly element in the Native Areas beyond the
powers of the Chief or Local Authorities to control.

In the event, neither happened exactly as pre-
dicted... Lack of skill, and more often lack of
application [italics mine], prevented many of them
from earning the rewards that they considered their
due....

 

Adversaries of nationalism have called it all sorts of
names and have expressed it in various ways. In this particular
case the phrase "progressive influence" meant "nationalism,"
and "unruly element" meant "nationalists." As it is clear

from what the C.N.C. said, the Government was fully aware of

 

123Kenya. Report of Native Affairs 1946—1947
(Nairobi, 1949), p. 2.

176

this and was therefore prepared to control or curb it in
whatever form it appeared -- whether in the form of economic
nationalism, political nationalism, cultural nationalism, etc.,
it had to be controlled. In order to control it, the Govern-
ment made sure that ex-askaris found it almost impossible to
apply or make use of their newly acquired skills and ideas.
Ex—askaris must have been embittered and frustrated
by these policies and practices. Toward the end of the war,
however, most of them had managed to convince themselves that
in a post-war Kenya, there would be struggle between EurOpeans
and ex-soldiers, that settlers would try to control or curb
their progress and develOpment. However, they had hoped that
the Government would always sympathize with them in recogni-
tion of their contribution to the defense of the Empire and
help them in their competition with settlers. So when, after
the war, the very Government they had hOped would help them,
allied itself with settlers, and ex—askaris simply lost hOpe
in the Kenya system as it was then constituted. Kakembo spOke
for the rest of the East African askaris when just before
World War II ended, he stated that:
It will be grand to have finished the war; but
that will not be the end of life. Men will look back
home and think of their future. They will ask them-
selves, many of them, whether they have really been

fighting for a good home, good food, good government
and peace Of mind. The Government must step in and

177

raise the spirits of men whose lives have been
broken and gone forever.124 (Italics mineg)

 

The Government chose not to side with the ex-service-
men. It was a government of and for the EurOpeans and there-
fore it decided to ally itself with the European community.

The British authority forgot its promises to these ex-service-
men when they were "Imperial" soldiers, i.e. when the Empire
needed them for its very survival. Not all Europeans in Kenya
were enemies of the ex-askari. In the next chapter we shall
examine some of the recommendations made by "friends" of ex-
askaris. This group had their own alternative suggestions and
views as to how problems of rehabilitating ex-askaris should
be tackled and eventually solved. The group consisted of a
handful of individuals from the Kenya Government and individual
EurOpean professionals; but the majority were EurOpean intel—
lectuals from both inside and outside Kenya, and the rising
Kenya African nationalists.

All of these people had one thing in common: they sym-
pathized with the ex-askari. They Offered suggestions and
recommendations for alternative programs which they hOped
would solve reabsorption problems in Kenya. In short they
were Opposed to the type of policies and programs the Govern-

ment was trying to follow in attacking the problem.

 

124Kakembo, Op.cit., p. 14.

178

However, the Kenya Government, which was under the
full control of EurOpean settlers, turned a deaf ear to these
recommendations; instead they came up with programs that were
aimed at frustrating the ex-askari, programs that stifled his
progress rather than aiding him.

When Kenya Government instituted programs that impeded
rather than aided or facilitated ex—askari advancement, it was
not because it lacked the relevant or necessary information;
it was not through ignorance. The Government instituted them

in spite of the facts, because it chose to do so.

Chapter V

Demobilization and Reabsorption:
Alternative Policies and Programs
The Kenya Government, later, admitted that reabsorp-
tion programs had failed to solve major and basic problems
confronting ex-askaris. Writing in 1962 and commenting speci-
fically on events in Kenya during the years immediately follow—
ing demobilization, Fred Majdalany concluded that:
Only the African (five and a half million by
this time) seemed to be left out in the cold. For
the second time in twenty years he had experienced
the 'emancipation' Of war... Now what was there
for him back in his country? The same Old bwana
to shout at him ... not enough jobs to go round
for the likes of him, and if he did get the work,
it would be for pitifully lowwages.l
He was simply confirming a fact which many observers,
including those within the Kenya Government, had noted in con-
nection with demobilization and reabsorption problems in that
country. It is true that duringthe first year or two after
demObilization the Government fiercely defended its reabsorp-
tion policies and the resulting programs. After that period,

however, individual members and some departments of the Gov-

ernment were forced to admit publicly that reabsorption policies

 

lMajdalany, Op.cit., p. 23.

179

180

and programs had failed. The Labour Department issued a re-
port in 1947 which clearly showed why and where the Government
had failed, and what the Government did and did not do to save
the situation. The report stated in part:

No one should be under the impression that re-
absorption is proceeding smoothly and that the ex-
soldier is reverting once more into his pre-war
civilian status... There is little of a construc-
tive nature going on in the Reserve which can hold
and fire the imagination of the ex-soldier ... we
have so far kept the ex-soldier quiet ... and we
have prevented him from causing general dissatis-
faction and disturbances in his community, but we
have ... only scratched the surface of the more
difficult task of imparting his experience to
others ... [italics mine}.

We have, however, built up considerable bitter-
ness among the rank and file of ex-soldiers by fail-
ing to provide them with any means, orewen the hOpe
Of such means ... This bitterness is real, and no
mere talk will suffice to eradicate it ... this bit-
terness may descend to posterity in the native mind
as a typical example of exploitation.

 

In a way, the Government was reflecting its own weak-
ness. It was admitting, by making such "confessions," that it
had actually failed and wronged the ex-askaris. It had failed
because it had refused to implement alternative programs which
were recommended by better informed individuals and groups.
These observers had warned the Government -- both during and
after the war -- that reabsorption projects would be doomed

to failure if they were conducted along the lines prOposed by

 

2Kenya: Labour Department, Bulletin, No. I, May,
1947 (NairObi, 1947), pp. 28-30.

181

the administration. In the words of a contemporary critic:

The observer is perhaps first impressed by

the great gaps which exist between (i) the rich

field data revealed to the scientist ... and the

slender knowledge the administration appears to

possess; and between (ii) the basis of informa-

tion on which administration is conducted and

the much wider basis it could utilize if tech-

nical help were sought.

There is no question that the Government had knowledge
of these facts. By 1943, Kenya Government itself was so much
interested in understanding what kind of life the returning
soldiers would like to lead that it set up a sub-committee to
study this problem. On completion of its survey, the sub-com-
mittee came up with the following findings: that askaris'
repute had definitely improved as a result of the war, and
that his capacity for taking responsibility and skilled work
had "surprised those who knew him only as a manual labourer;"
that he had shown his worth and that it would not be surprising
if he expected to see it acknowledged. As for his standard
of living, the sub-committee concluded that "his desires will
be such that he will not generally be content with the low
4

standard with which most Africans were content before the war."

To those EurOpeans who had been saying that askaris

 

3W. E. Stanner, "The Kitui Kamba: A Critical Study
Of British Administration" (not dated, in KNA), p. 104.

4Kenya: Post-war Employment Committee and Report of
the sub-Committee on Post-war Employment of Africans (NairObi,
1943), p. 5.

182

"will rush to their homes" after the war, it was clear from
the report that this would depend on one's age. The Older
ones "with a wife and a family and stake in the land and
owning stock“ would desire to remain at home. It was further
stated that the second factor which would influence askaris
would be the training they would have had in the army; that
skilled men would gravitate to centres of employment. It con-
cluded that, "provided the life an African can lead in his
own home meets most of his needs we think it is the life he
will choose to live."5

If the Government had formulated its reabsorption
policies on the basis of these recommendations, perhaps results
would have been different. However, this was not the only
realistic information the Government had about the soldiers.
It was, also, aware of the fact that the African soldiers had
contributed a lot to the British war effort and to her final
victory. Above all the Government knew that British military
authorities had recognized the contribution on the part of the
askari and that they had honoured him, praised him and promised
him a better life after the war. All this gave askaris new
hOpes and ambitions for a better and fuller life. Lt.-Gen.

Sir William Platt once told the askaris that:

 

5Ibid., p. 6.

183

You have earned a high reputation in your
actions that resulted in the destruction of the
Italian East African Empire. You are now moving
to another field of action. Difficult tasks lie
ahead of you. In facing them remember that not
one of your homes and not one of your people will
be safe to lead a life of peace and liberty until
forces of evil are finally subdued. The future
of your children depends on you. GO forth knowing
that your cause is right.6

"Orders of the day“ such as this were not infrequent
during the war. They were issued to askaris by high ranking
British military officers whenever they had the Opportunity
to do so. It is not always easy to control ambitions, aspira—
tions and hOpes of peOple to whom such great honours have been
bestowed and to whom so many promises have been made. There-
fore the Government knew that the ex-askaris deserved special
consideration and regard; they had earned it through life-
and-death struggles.

However, it was not just the military leadership which
sought a better life for the ex-askari. Some individuals from
the general public, and they were many, warned the Government
to do everything in its power in order to reward the ex-askaris
for their contribution in the defense of the Empire. These
people sympathized with the African soldier, and always re-

minded the Government that a fair share of the victory was-

the right of the ex-soldier. In the words of one of the

 

6Quoted by Kenneth G. Dower in his boOk The King's
African Rifles in Madagascar (written for East Africa Command,
Nairobi, n.d.), pp. 13 & 59.

184

contemporary writers:
if the African should prove a very difficult per-
son to handle and guide after this war, we are
responsible. It may be difficult for history to
approve our leadership of the African in these
past years unless we can prove to him in the days
to come that 'peace hath her Victories no less
renowned than war.‘7
There were those within the general public who regarded
the power of the settlers as the greatest threat to ex-askaris'
advancement and progress. This group warned the Government
that before askaris could realize their legitimate aspirations
after the war, the Government had to make sure that the askaris
were protected against the settlers. At least the power of
the settlers had to be controlled, weakened or destroyed.
This was necessary if these programs, to meet anddeal with re-
absorption problems, were to be effective. As long as the set-
tlers had this massive power, the ex-askaris would find it
impossible to make progress either for themselves or for their
peOple because progress would be against the settlers' interest.
The situation was articulated by Stanner when he wrote that:
The desire shown in the prewar period by power-
ful sections Of the colonists of Kenya to hold aloof
in their highland fastness from a world fast taking
on an undesirable shape and form of mind, will in the
postdwar world be a dangerous and destructive anach-
ronism ... the dream so dear to so many colonial hearts

of Kenya, as a white man's country on the mode which
the greater part of the colonists from 1920 to 1940

 

7Doig, Op.cit., p. 182.

185
had in mind is likely to become only a dream of
a cloud cuckoo.8 [Emphasis minéD

Had the Government seriously taken recommendations
such as this -- and there were many -- Kenya's reabsorption
problems would have definitely taken a different direction;
perhaps for the better, from the point of view of the ex-
soldier. Nevertheless, the power of the settlers was never
disrupted and so when the askaris returned to civil life, they
found a well organized settler section determined to hold onto
their power and thus keep the ex-askaris in "their place."

The critics of the administration's policy on reabsorp-
tion based their argument on the fact that they knew and under-
stood ex-askaris better. Most Of them had visited or lived
with askaris during their military service. Critics insisted
that by instituting such inadequate and make-shift projects,
the Government had ignored askaris' contribution to British
victory and their newly acquired standards.

Ex-askari sympathizers argued that ex-askaris' wide
experiences in the army had, in many incidences, shaped them
into better leaders, planners and organizers as well as better
workers. "The African ex-soldier has achieved a degree of

intelligence rarely seen before"9 and therefore could not

 

8Stanner, Op.cit., p. 104.

9KNA. MAA/2/l/49-I, Circular from Man Power and Civi-
lian Reabsorption Officer, February 28, 1946.

186

appreciate the inadequate programs the Government was offer-
ing him. It was therefore concluded that "with his health
and intelligence,“ the ex-askari deserved better treatment,
greater Opportunities and more careful handling.10
One basic point the critics put forth was that ex—
askaris as man-power -- as a resource —- had not been fully
utilized. While the Government referred to ex-soldiers as
potential "trouble-makers" or an "unruly element," the critics
of the administration's policy regarded the return of the
askaris to civilian life as "an Opportunity ... to effect a

11 These Opposing views marked one

real economic advance."
of the major differences between Government officials and
their Opponents.

Critics recognized the fact that before ex-askaris
could fully utilize their talents, certain basic changes had
to be made. They argued that the ex-askari's outlook on life
had changed drastically and therefore he could not be forced
to return to the "Reserves" where living conditions were in-
ferior. They pointed out that the ex—askari was ready and
willing to be hired for paid employment; however, they were

quick in warning the Government and private employers that

"he is not going to work for the same wages, or under the

 

187

same conditions of housing and feeding, etc., as before ...
not on present day conditions."12
With this kind of reasoning, the problem of reabsorp-
tion assumed completely new dimensions. It ceased to be an
"ex-askari problem;" instead it was recognized for what it
indeed was —- a “EurOpean problem." In the words of a con-
temporary observer: "The main pillars of colonial activity
in Kenya so far have been almost wholly EurOpean privileges

and profit"13

and this was the problem, so the critics insisted.
If askaris' legitimate aspirations were to be realized, then
"EurOpean privileges and profit" must end. This was the main
cause of most of the problems in Kenya. It was clear that the
EurOpean would have to learn that the situation had changed,
and that ex-askaris would want to share fully in the develOp-
ment of Kenya. Referring specifically to employers who would
import foreign labor to Kenya rather than use ex-askari labor,
critics insisted that "employers, too, will have to be educated."
In spite of these constructive criticisms, despite
these prOposals and suggestions which might have offered alter—

native and better programs for the advancement of the ex-askaris,

the Government continued to carry out its pro-EurOpean policy.

 

12Ibid.

l3Stanner, Op.cit., p. 104.

l4KNA. MAA/2/1/49-I; Circular from Man Power ...
Officer, Op.cit.

188

It is within this context, against this background, that the
following remarks by one of the British Officials who served
and lived with askaris in India during the war, becomes rele-
vant. He warned EurOpeans, especially those in Africa:
It would be an unhappy thing to make of men

who have served the Empire so well a disillusioned

and subversive element in their own country in the

years immediately following the war.15

Critics were warning the administration of the danger

that indeed must come if such a policy were not replaced by one
which would consider the interests of all the communities re-
siding in Kenya. The Government was being reminded that the
denial of Opportunities to ex-soldiers could create antagonism
because they would interpret the Government's intentions as
being hostile to them: "It will be regarded as yet another
instance of the exploitation of the African by a white set-
tler. It is bound to give rise to a feeling of unrest on the

16 They also argued that the unrest, if

part Of the African."
it came would be more disruptive than ever, because the ex-
soldier having fought so hard for a cause for someone else,

would be moved and determined to fight even harder for his own

survival. Because of his wartime experiences, critics insisted,

 

15Anthony G. Saville, Letter in African Affairs, XLV,
NO. 179 (April, 1946), p. 98.

16KNA. MAA/2/l/49-I; Circular from Man Power ;.;
Officer, Op.cit.

189

the ex—soldiers were nationalists. They had seen how others
lived and how they fought, and died if necessary, for what
they believed. Above all, it was the "age of nationalism;"
nationalism was sweeping through the entire colonial world,
and Kenya could not escape it. Hence EurOpeans in Kenya had
to come to terms with the rising African nationalists. In
the words of one of the Kenya Government Officials: "Modern
conditions do not allow us to stand still: we advance, or
we are destroyed."17

One of the main reasons for the failure of reabsorption
programs was the fact that the Government was unwilling to al-
locate money for their develOpment. Theoretically, plans and
policies seemed feasible; but in actuality, they were empty
pronouncements designed for publicity and prOpaganda purposes.
Referring generally to East Africa, but to Kenya specifically,
the East African Royal Commission made the following Observa-
tions in connection with post—war develOpment in East Africa:
"What is important is not that there should be develOpment
plans; but that there should be capital resources available to
promote expansion."18 I

In 1946 when soldiers were returning to civil life and

the Government was publicly declaring its plans for "massive"

 

17Ibid.
18East African Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report,
Op.cit., p. 398.

190

develOpment in Kenya, it was confidentially known that such
massive develOpment was not contemplated, and that the pos-
sibility of such develOpment indeed was very slim. For
instance at that time, the DevelOpment Committee would report
that "with the limited funds available ... it is not possible
to recommend any more extensive or intensive develOpment,"19
and that the recurrent expenditure might have to be diminished
"for no other reason than the shortage of finance."20
Nevertheless, the problem was more complicated than
this. It was not always true that there was a lack of funds
in the colony. The problem was Often one of allocation of
these funds. Almost invariably, capital for develOpment was
spent on develOping projects in EurOpean areas. From 1944 on,
Kenya received££250,000 annually from Britain; this financial
aid was specifically designated for the general develOpment
of the Colony.21 Instead of spending the money on those criti-
cally needed improvements in the colony, especially in African
areas, the Government spent most of the money develOping Euro-

pean areas or projects. What was most disturbing from the

 

19Kenya, Report of the Development Committee 1946
(Nairobi, 1946), p. 35.

20Ibid.
21Kenya: Preperation Of Development Plans:

Secretariat Circular Letter No. 44 Of 29th Appil, 1944
(Nairobi, 1944).

191

point of view of the African and his sympathizers was the fact
that the Government refused to spend such funds on crucial
projects in African areas and instead spent it in EurOpean
areas on what might be termed "luxury" projects. For instance,
the Government stated in one of its reports that "The slow
progress made with the medical ... programmes was mainly due
to the higher priority given to the construction of staff quar-
ters and Government offices."22 Reports of this nature were
not uncommon in Kenya in those days.
It was also pointed out that the Government was not
interested in the African progress or advancement since it
did not have an organized plan by which such progress could
be brought about. In 1945, A. M. Champion made special refer-
ence to this situation. He called for "the formulation and
putting into practice of a plan or mode of life leading to a
higher standard Of living socially, economically, culturally
and morally than which now Obtains and to make life worth
living for the African."23
During the years immediately following the war, the
Government did nothing to improve the situation so that by

1950 signs of "unrest" were evident in most parts of Kenya,

especially in towns. An article which appeared in "Baraza"

 

22Kenya: The Development Programme 1954-1957: Ses-
sional Paper No. 51 of 1955 (Nairobi, 1955).

23Champion, Op.cit., p. 32.

192

(June 3, 1950) summed up post-war problems in East Africa,
with special reference to Kenya. Since it is important and
relevant, it is here quoted at length. It stated among other
things:

we believe that although the immediate cause
of the recent strike in Nairobi was political agi-
tation ... and although the immediate cause of
murders in Suk country was political agitation
masquerading as religion, the deep underlying
cause was one, and that cause was a plain matter
of s. d."

The real issue ... is the country's ruling wage-
rates ... the feeling of frustration caused by dif-
ferential rates of pay for members of the different
races.

In raising the cry of 'Communist' or 'Dini ya
Msambwa' or 'Bataka Union' or what-have-you, the
real issue becomes fogged and peOple tend to forget
it. They begin to think all is well -- and they
could not be more mistaken. This is the root cause
of all the bother, and must be put right. Who is
to start the ball rolling, obviously, the Government.
They are the largest single employers of labour, from
skilled and qualified to unskilled and unqualified,
and have a duty to set examples.

But above all, let the Governments and let the
employers ... see that the present wage structure in
East Africa is simply asking for trouble.

Even though the Government was aware of the fact that
more important and pressing reabsorption prOblems had not been
touched, let alone solved, it continued to act as if these
problems did not exist. This policy of remaining indifferent
or ignoring pressing problems was, by 1950, still in practice.
As the article just quoted pointed out, the administration and

those who supported it simply preferred to think that all was

well, while in fact the opposite was true.

193

In short, ex-askaris' organized or formal contribu-
tion to Kenya's develOpment was minimal. This was so because
EurOpeans, especially the Government, kept them out Of the
modern exchange economy, modern political machinery and
modern social dynamics. That was the price the colony had
to pay for assigning tOp priority to political objectives and
relegating other objectives, such as economic and social, to
secondary positions. A report by the East African Commission
pointed out the weak spots in Kenya's develOpment policy which
had made the solution of the colony's post—war problems impos-
sible. In order for the administration to deal effectively
with develOpment problems,

the pattern of economic relationship now typified
by EurOpean employers on one side and African
labourers on the other, must be replaced by a com-
mon objective ... only thus can the economic and
political dangers which threaten East Africa be
avoided. Without the develOpment Of African pro-
ductive capacity, the relatively isolated modern
exchange economy of EurOpeans and Asians is not
viabie.24

In the matters concerning loans to Africans, the report
reminded those who argued that loans would not be made, or more
generally, that the African was incapable Of utilizing resources

productively; that they were in effect saying that a transition

from the restrictive subsistance economy to the modern exchange

 

24E. A. R. Commission 1953-1955 Report, op.cit.,
p. 398.

194

economy was not possible "except under compulsion." The
Commission insisted that to argue in this way was to argue
contrary to the observed facts that the "indigenous" peOples
in many areas were making great effort to acquire money in-
come and that they showed considerable aptitude in utilizing
their money resources effectively over a wide range of acti-
vities.25 In concluding, it noted that:
The economy and social policies must be based

on the realization that the development of East

Africa basically depends on the extent to which

the indigenous population can ... be integrated

into the world economy.26

Such recommendations were, of course, in direct conflict

with Kenya's develOpment policy; indeed, they threatened Euro-
pean easy life in Kenya. Kenya Government speaking, naturally,
on behalf of the settlers, quickly and firmly rejected most of
these recommendations. In Uganda and Tanzania (then Tanganyika),
reaction was slow and mild. This goes a long way to illustrate
how the thinking of EurOpeans in Kenya was worlds apart from
that of Europeans in the rest of East Africa. In short, as
late as 1956, EurOpeans in Kenya still believed that Kenya was
a "white man's country." This was made quite clear when the

Governor of Kenya, commenting on the East African Commission

report, stated that:

 

25Ibid., p. 81.

26Ibid., p. 414.

195

Such disagreement as we have expressed with
the Commission's recommendations is due, in most
cases, to one of two reasons; either we do not
consider their prOposals ... are likely to be
successful in economic terms, or we feel that
the Commission have under-estimated the probable
psychological impact of the economic changes and
that the time is not yet ripe for the removal of
those safe-guards which have developed over the
last half century.27 [Italics mine.)

 

When the Government took this rigid position, it con—
firmed once and for all its alliance with the settler section
of the EurOpean community in Kenya, in its exploitation and
Oppression of the African. It became clear to everyone, in-
cluding those who had until then refused to believe that there
was such a relationship, that Kenya Government and the settlers
were one and the same thing. This position also proved that
the main objectives of the Government were not to develop
Kenya as a whole, but to give special and tOp priority to
EurOpean develOpment. That is to say, it was first and fore-
most interested in safe—guarding EurOpean privileged position
and power.

This explains why the Government of Kenya had deliber—
ately frustrated ex-askaris by instigating the keep-ex-askari—
in-his—place campaigns with which he was greeted on demobiliza-

tion and which continued to limit and control his advancement

 

27KAN. "Despatch from the Governor of Kenya Comment-
ing on East Africa Royal Commission 1953—1955 Report," Febru-
ary, 1956.

196

during the period immediately following demobilization. The
Government was interested only in maintaining "safe-guards"
through which EurOpeans had assumed their power, and not in
the progress of or the high standard of living for the ex-
askaris. EurOpeans were prepared to maintain, and if neces-
sary defend, the status quo rather than institute reforms that
might weaken or undermine their powerful position. As C. Ros-
berg and J. Nottingham observed: "With the failure on this
level to achieve substantial reform, militant leaders and
covert organizations assumed the dominant role in challenging
European and colonial control."28 Referring specifically to
ex—askaris, F. Majdalany noted that they too became militant
and revolutionary when they realized that the Government was
not ready to institute any meaningful reforms. He wrote that
ex-askaris began "listening to the growing body of educated
African politicians who raved and ranted about independence
and African nationalism and the legitimate aspirations of the
African peOple."29

Up to this point our discussion has been centred
around the EurOpean reaction to the return of African soldiers
to civil life. Let us turn to the ex-askaris' reaction to

civil life. As a group, ex-askaris were allowed to channel

 

28Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., p. 189.

29Madja1any, Op.cit., p. 23.

197

their complaints and grievances through one Government-
sponsored ex-servicemen organization: the King's African
Rifles and East African (Kenya) Old Comrades' Association.
(See Appendix A) Immediately following the war, members of
the association were almost entirely British ex-servicemen
living in Kenya. However, ex-askaris were allowed and encour-
aged to join as full members. Interviews with ex-askaris in-
dicate that toward the end of the war, their officers had in-
formed them Of the existence of the organization and its will-
ingness to accept ex-askaris as members. Ex—askaris say that
they were assured that the association would be the "final
court of appeal" for them in situations in which civilian
authorities were unable or unwilling to meet ex-askaris' de-
mands. For this reason quite a number of African soldiers
became members of the association long before the war ended.
According to ex-askaris, membership fee was five shillings.3O
From ex-askaris' accounts, they understood this to
mean that the organization would, during reabsorption, fight
for their rights and legitimate aspirations -- political,
economic, social, etc. However, when they returned to civil
life, they found that the organization was more or less a

"social" organization and therefore unable to assist them in

 

30Mr. Francis Soi, an ex-askari himself, had the best
account on this issue when I interviewed him on January 25,
1968 at Machakos, Kenya.

198

securing their economic or political rights. Those who joined
the association discovered that they really did not have any
voice in what was being discussed, and that most of what was
being discussed was neither useful nor relevant. For this
reason the number of ex-askaris who joined the organization
was extremely small. At any rate, very few of those who
joined ever became active members, because while the organiza-
tion was centred in Nairobi with branches in several towns in
Kenya, the majority of ex—servicemen as we have already seen
were in the "Reserves;" thus great distances between the towns
and the "Reserves" almost prevented them from participating in
the affairs of the association.

Because the association failed to address itself to
ex-askari problems and because it was strongest in the cities,
especially in Nairobi; groups Of ex-askaris in various parts
of Kenya started thinking along the lines of forming an inde-
pendent and separate association which would address itself
to the needs of all ex-askaris. Ex-askaris claim that these
attempts failed because the Government would not grant per—
mission to found an independent association. They stated that
the Government insisted that there was only one official ex-
servicemen organization and that all ex-servicemen in the
colony were welcome to join it. Although the ex-askaris could

point out that the organization was controlled by British

199

ex-servicemen and that it was not being run in the interest
of the ex-askari, the Government still refused to grant them
permission to form their own organization. As early as 1946
disagreement between the Government and the ex—askari on this
issue was evident because of their demand, and complaint to
the Government that "We want Clubs, which we can run ourselves."3l
In spite of this cry, ex—servicemen were not permitted
to organize and run their own clubs. It was not until 1953
that a separate ex-servicemen's association was registered by
the Government. However, one thing was clear: although sepa-
rate from the Government-sponsored one, it was not to be inde-
pendent Of the Government. Nevertheless, "the Nyanza African
Ex-Servicemen's Organization and British Legion, African Sec-
tion" was established in Kisumu in that year. One suspects
that the reason why the Government granted permission for its
registration was its connection with the British Legion; with-
out this "alliance," possibilities of its being registered
would have been very slim. In such cases, the Government was
quite sure that the organization would be watched and its
activities controlled, thus minimizing possibilities of "sub—
versive" activities. However, its registration appeared to
have been cancelled in 1958 for a reason which was known only

to the Government. This meant that between 1958 and 1961

 

31KNA. MAA/2/l/49—I, Circular from Man Power ...
Officer, Op.cit.

200

there was just one registered ex-servicemen's organization.
However, in 1960 application for registration by an organ-
ization which called itself "Kenya African Ex—Servicemen's
Union" was refused by the Government. Between 1962 and 1963
the colonial Government in Kenya had granted registration to
two separate ex-askari organizations: "North Nyanza African
Ex-Servicemen's union" registered on July 12, 1962 and "Kenya
Ex-Servicemen Union" registered on March 13, 1963. Since in—
dependence, Kenya has granted registration to one more ex-
servicemen's organization: "National Ex-Servicemen Union of
Kenya" which was registered on July 8, 1964.32
From the foregoing, it becomes clear that in the 1940's
and 1950's the Government encouraged ex-askaris to join the
Government-sponsored ex-servicemen association and discouraged
them from forming any rival organizations. From the Govern-
ment's point of view, to allow the formation of such organiza-
tions would be unwise because they might be turned into anti-
colonial and, therefore, anti—government "political" clubs.
It was not until 1961, two years before Kenya gained its inde-
pendence, the colonial Government reversed its policy and be-

gan granting registration for the formation of ex-askari organ-

izations. The Government had no reason to worry any more

 

32For detailed information on these organizations see
the following documents in the Office of the Registrar Of

Societies (Kenya Government): File Nos. 5310, 3162, 3043,
4403, 371 and 3219.

201

about political repercussions from ex-askaris' activities,
because in another year or two Kenya would be independent.
In spite of this, the Government would still insist that ex—
askaris' organizations must not be "political," that their
only Objective must be "promotion of unity and understanding
among ex-servicemen."33

Because ex-askaris organizations, as such, did not
exist, because they were rigidly controlled by the Government
between 1946 and 1961, their direct impact on Kenyan political
events and nationalism seems to have been rather slight. When
they were finally allowed to organize -- after a period Of
roughly 15 years -— it was too late for their political or
economic activities to have any significant impact on Kenya.
By then "civilian" organizations, such as political parties
(Kenya African National Union and Kenya African Democratic
Union were the two most important political parties at this

time) were already very strong and effective as anti-colonial

 

33TO make sure that these organizations would not en-
gage in "political" debates, the organizations were supposed
to state in writing when applying for registration that they
would never engage in politics, that the Government could
send its representative to any of the meetings, if it so de-
sired, and that a c0py of the minutes taken at every meeting
must be sent to the Government. It should be noted that King's
African Rifles and East African (Kenya) Old Comrades' Associ-
ation on February 15, 1966 changed its name to Kenya Armed
Forces Old Comrades' Association. However, long before that
it had formed an Employment Bureau through which it tried to
find employment for ex-askaris. Between 1963 and 1967 only
about 25% of ex-askaris who sought employment through the
Bureau were able to get any employment.

202

organizations, for it had become apparent that in a year or
two the country would be independent. Therefore when ex-
askaris began to organize in the 1960's, their aim was not

so much the disruption of colonial rule in Kenya as to try

to organize themselves so that when independence finally came,
they would have a voice in independent Kenya.

Perhaps the situation would have been different had
the Government allowed the ex-askaris to organize themselves
along these lines immediately following the war. Interviews
with ex-askaris indicate that as soon as they returned to
civil life, the first thing they wished to do was to meet,
organize and plan -- on a colony—wide basis -- what they
should do for themselves and for Kenya. As we have seen,
the Government at first discouraged such meetings and later
actually outlawed them. Solidarity and the "comrade—in-arms"
feeling among ex-askaris was frowned upon by the Government.
The Government eventually launched campaigns against it and
came very close to destroying it. Ex-servicemen were reminded
that their complaints should be sent to the Government either
through their District Commissioners or through the Government—
sponsored ex-servicemen's association.

This is to say that ex-askaris major contribution --
political, economic, social, etc. —- the Kenya was not chan—

neled through ex-askaris' organizations. Because of the

203

Government's rigid control on ex-askaris' organized or group
behavior, their major contribution seems to have been on
individual or a small group basis, i.e. in indirect and in-
formal ways. Individual ex—soldiers, in most cases because
of their war-time experiences, played significant and impor-
tant roles in anti-colonial movements and activities. The

next chapter deals with that aspect of the ex—askari.

Chapter VI

Conclusion: Ex-askaris' Participation
in Nationalist Movements

Ex-askaris did not succeed in forming a colony—wide
organization through which they could voice their demands and
complaints. Thus they were unable, as a group, to contribute
to or influence economic or political develOpment. They never
managed to organize themselves so effectively that the colonial
government had to reckon with them as a united front or force.
Ex-soldiers themselves knew this and they would be the first
ones to admit that their newly acquired skills and ideas were
not fully utilized after demobilization.

As stated above, ex-soldiers contend that this failure
was due to the Government's policies which aimed at frustrating
them by denying them their legitimate rights and the utiliza-
tion of their talents. This, in a sense, is an answer to
those who inqure as to what use the ex-askaris put their newly
acquired knowledge when they returned to civil life. This
should also be considered by those colonial officials who
supposedly were disappointed at the ex-askaris' failure to
contribute to the progress and develOpment in the "native

Reserves." Professor Schleh was quite correct in remarking

204

205

that: "Colonial administrators expressed disappointment that
the return of veterans did not lead to immediate (and 'posi-
tive') transformation of their home societies. What they saw,
or what they failed to see, was, in part, the result of the
success in their own colonial administrator's resettlement
efforts."l
Ex—askaris' reaction or attitude to all this was one
of bitterness and resentment towards the Government, the feel-
ing that they had been betrayed, left out and forgotten. How-
ever, ex-askaris were not the first nor the last group to have
had these feelings. Apparently, throughout history, veterans
of major wars have felt the same way. A recent article in
Ebony illustrates this point:
By 1800, the war services of the Revolutionary
War veterans had been forgotten and the sons and
daughters Of the bladk veterans of 1776 had been ex-
cluded from the prizes their fathers had helped to
win. Richard Allen, the churchman and pioneer black
leader, cried out against the betrayal of the dream,
citing an old poem:
God and a soldier all men adore
In the time of war and not before;
When the war is over and all things righted
God is forgotten and the soldier slighted.2

Again there is no intention here to confuse bladk Amer-

ican soldiers in the Revolutionary War with the African soldiers

 

lSchleh, op.cit., p. 100.

2"These Truly are the Brave," Ebony, Vol. XXIII,
No. 10 (August, 1968), p. 169.

206

in World War II. However, there seems to be one aspect which
was common to both groups: the feeling that they had not been
rewarded for their contribution to the victory. At any rate,
this attitude was obviously widespread among ex-askaris in
East Africa.

For the purpose of making their demands listened to
and their impact felt, ex—askaris turned to other forms of
organizations and tactics. In small groups and as individuals,
ex-askaris began to influence non-veterans, the mass. It must
be admitted at the outset that it is difficult to assess the
impact made by the greatest bloc Of exservicemen, those who
did not become political activists. It is true, however, that
"their most widespread role and again, the most difficult to
evaluate with precision, was as general agents of political
develOpment."3 It was easier for ex-askaris to transmit
ideas as individuals than it was for them, due to government
policies, to do so as an organization. They might have needed

capital before they could practice their trades or before they

 

3Schleh, Op.cit., p. 99. That it is difficult to
assess the impact simply means that it involves a lot of
work; it does not mean that it is impossible. The basic in-
formation about the askari's life before and after the war:
This might involve interviewing, among others, his friends,
his employers, his co-workers, his comrades-in-amms, resi-
dents in his village and, of course, the ex-soldier himself.

207

could make use of their technical skills; they might have
needed licenses before they could convene meetings; but these
obstacles were not placed in their way when they engaged in
private discussions or conversations. It was mainly through
these private contacts that ex-askaris managed tO have their
greatest impact on the non-veterans, the mass. The most valu—
able "gift" the ex-askaris brought back to their non—veteran
brothers was the ideas they had acquired while in the service.
As C. Leys has observed: "Apart from playing a large role in
these organizations i.e., nationalist and political organiza-
tions ... what counted most was ideas which they brought
11mg. " 4 [Italics mine .3
As we have seen elsewhere in this study, askaris under-
went numerous new experiences while they were in the army so
that when they returned home to civilian life they had a lot
to share with their friends and relatives. Discussions cen-
tered around actual military Operations, countries they visited
and the peOple they met; but the most pOpular subject of dis-
cussion was their relationship with or their new evaluation of
(wazungu) Europeans. Doig was correct in stating that:
This African who has envisaged the development
Of his own future has become a shrewd Observer and
critic of EurOpeans and EurOpean ways of life and we
have definitely fallen in prestige. He has seen the

moral weakness of our civilization often in distres—
sing ways and never again will he accept the white

 

4Leys, op.cit., p. 961.

208

man at face value. In future any one who would be

a leader of African society must win his place by

his own character and worth... He will have many

ideas in his head, not all of them acceptable to

the white man.5

There are those who have doubted the far-reaching ef-

fect which the lowering of EurOpean prestige had on the African
thinking. One is left with the impression the effect was tre-
mendous, in fact, revolutionary. The colonial EurOpean at-
tached too much importance to his prestige. This meant almost
everything to him. It was a strong "weapon" in his hand, a
powerful force with which he had conquered the African psyche.
Through it, colonial EurOpeans had launched and won a kind of
psychological warfare over the Africans; this was shattered

by World War II experiences. That is why EurOpeans, correctly

and understandably, felt that they had lost some power while

 

5Doig, Op.cit., p. 176. Compare this with a report
in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) in which a small number Of
Europeans who were governing that country "on prestige" were
warned about the returning ex-soldier who would no longer
recognize this, because of his contacts with "white enemies,
despised Asians and egalitarian British other ranks." The
report noted that although only a small number was exposed
to this, they would still cause ferment on their return to
civil life. It concluded that: "Automatic white prestige
as a mechanism of adjustment will continue to serve for years,
but its fate is ultimately sealed." (Italics mine:) For
this information see Sec/Misc/62, "Demobilization and Reset-
tlement of Africans" (COpy Of memo on reabsorption signed by
one H. McDowell, Lusaka (ll/ll/42) entitled "some Psycho-
logical aspects Of Resettlement"). I am indebted to Dr.
James HoOker, my major academic advisor, for this information.
The material is part of a large collection Of data and notes
which he collected during his field research in what was then
Northern Rhodesia.

209

the Africans felt that they had gained some of it. Things
were never quite the same after WOrld War II; at least the
"weapon's" efficiency had been reduced, if not actually lost.
HOw correct was McDowell's remark (see footnote 5) that its
fate was ultimately sealed. As one ex-askari put it, "It was
like breaking into a securely locked and guarded building
supposedly filled with previous things like gold, only to find
that it was empty."6

In short, ex-askaris had learned and observed that
without modern technology, "a EurOpean was no better than an
African." They believed it; and they carried this belief, to
their friends and relatives. They had Observed that suffering
was not a black man's monOpoly (the impression which colonial
EurOpeans tried to create). In the war they saw the brutality
of all -- especially, how EurOpeans killed and tortured each
other. They had heard that Haiti had "defeated" France and
that EthiOpia had "defeated" Italy. Japan was used as an

example of a non-EurOpean nation which almost conquered the

British Empire "had we not been called upon to defend it" so

ex-askaris claim.7

 

6Mr. Kiplagat Arap Tarus said this in his interview

on February 26, 1963, at Kapsabet, Kenya. Many ex-soldiers
said the same thing in their own words, but Mr. Tarus' words

were Outstanding.

7This claim, which no doubt made ex-askaris as well
as non-veterans very proud of themselves, was also expressed
by ex-soldiers in Zambia who claimed that only they were

210

There is no doubt that ex-askaris spread new ideas
among non-veterans. The difference lay in the way theypre-
sented their information: some ex-askaris were more SOphisti-
cated than others, in any case they were still performing the
same job. The typical feeling of most ex-askari in Kenya can
best be represented by What one of them has written:

The older men thought this was wild talk and
only calculated to make things more difficult. .EEE
we younger men from the army italics mine and from
the new schools saw it as a realistic and Open pos-
sibility if only we could unite the country and if
all Our fellow-Africans could believe us when we
told them what we had seen. [Italics mine] When
could they learn that the whole world was not like
Kenya; indeed that Kenya was one of the last outposts
of feudalism, racialism and minority privilege and
domination? When would they understand that things
could be changed and within our lifetime?8

 

It is true that exposure of African soldiers to massive
and superior modern arms tended to make askaris "fear" Euro-
peans. However, this was welcomed by most askaris as a chal-
lenge. First, they would have to buy or manufacture modern
weapons; secondly, they would employ guerilla warfare tactics.
It is no surprise that during the Mau Mau uprising, ex—
soldiers found pistols and bullets their most treasured pos-

sessions9 and that they were required to show others "the

 

victorious -— the comparison here is with the British soldiers.
See Sec/Misc/66, "Public Opinion," December 7, 1942, BrOken
Hill. Once more I am grateful to Dr. James HoOker for allow-
ing me to use his notes.

8Itote, Op.cit., p. 39.
9Ibid., p. 48.

211

'jungle' methods used by the Japanese in Burma."10

The ex-askari might capitalize upon the sights he had
seen and the tales he had to tell, which, temporarily at least,
kept the interest of his neighbors focused on him. No
doubt the information added to the general political awaken-
ing which was then taking place in Kenya. Though the Govern-
ment banned all public and political meetings by Africans during
the Mau Mau uprising, this information kept most Africans politi-
cally alive. When political parties reappeared in the late
'fifties the ordinary African was ready to support and co-
operate with these organizations because he had come to know
exactly for what they were fighting and who their political
enemy was.

How exactly were the ex—servicemen able to do this?

One way by which they did this was through their occupational
choices. A few ex-soldiers managed to build their own shops,
others became teachers, clerks, carpenters, etc. Those who
became teachers, for instance, spread these ideas to their
fellow non-veteran teachers. This was also true of other
occupations. Even more important was the role which shOps
played within a given community. What Professor Schleh has
said about this situation in Uganda applies very well to Kenya:

The African bus and freight service was an im-
portant vehicle for the dissemination Of ideas which

 

lOIbid., p. 51.

212

were then the subjects of debate and analysis in
the roadside 'clubs' and African dukas ["shops"3 .
The economic aspects of the concern might indeed
be secondary to its value in terms of a center of
'political' activity for the surrounding community.

In most cases, information was passed from one person
to another or from one group to another in the traditional
network of personal word-of—mouth communication. This mode of
communication should not be underestimated. Recent studies
have shown that even in a highly advanced and develOped society,
the dissemination of any new idea "depends not only on the pub—
licity it is given in the mass media but also on conversation
and discussion about it among people, face-to-face."12

The use of this type of communication, i.e., word-of-
mouth, is more widespread and more efficient in less develOped
societies than in advanced ones. It was the most pOpular,
practical, and at times, the only way these ideas could be con-
veyed or dispersed among the East Africans. The dissemination
took basically two forms: planned, conscious "political" edu-
cation, where ex-askaris' objective was to influence their
listeners politically; and the unplanned form where the ex—

askaris would tell their tales for fun or enjoyment, and it

was left to the individual listener to draw out any conclusion

 

llSchleh, Op.cit., p. 56.

12Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Communications and DevelOp-
ment," in myron Weiner (ed.), Modernization: The Dynamics of
Growth (New YOrk, 1966), p. 101.

213

he desired. In either case, the listeners were bound to be
influenced; at least, they became more politically enlightened
than before.

Throughout history, when faced with crises, men have
acted or spoken in the name of a greater "cause," i.e. they
tend to be nationalistic or altruistic, whatever the case
might be. Ex-askaris were no exception to this "human rule."
In spreading anti-colonial ideas, they did so, to a certain
extent, in the name Of a greater "cause" -- they were educating
the non-veterans politically so that they could fight for Kenya
and Africa. However, they also engaged in these activities
for their own personal reasons. Hence the correctness Of the
assertion that "The African ex-askari wants an outlet for
these skills and qualities he has developed for the good of
his country and perhaps even more for his own advancement."13

In recent wars, that in Vietnam again furnishes us
with an excellent example of What we have been discussing
above. It has been shown that black American veterans are
transmitting the ideas they acquired while fighting in Vietnam,
and that they use the same methods and have the same motives
in doing so:

It may be that the most seriously listened to

black men in the united States to-day are the thou-
sands of veterans returning from action in Vietnam.

 

13Doig, Op.cit., p. 175.

214

One of the reasons for this is their feeling,

readily evident in their conversation, that they

have 'paid their dues' and are now ready to col-

lect from the American society for which they

have caught hell.l4

That ex—askaris were very eager to share their new

experiences with kin is beyond doubt. As we saw previously,
this desire to share ideas and experiences was evident in the
letters askaris wrote home from foreign lands. When they re-
turned to civil life, this same eagerness was evident every-
where they went in the country. Oral accounts from ex-askaris
have been supported by what was reported in a contemporary
newspaper: "Many of the East African natives were full of
strange sights they had seen when on leave in Cairo, Jeru-

salem, Baghdad, Damascus and many other places in the Middle

. . . . . 1
East, most of them familiar place names to Christian Africans."

 

14Pierce and Bayley, Op.cit., p. 145.

l5KNA. MD/4/5/66. "Askari of Pioneer Corps Return
from Mid-East" (Newspaper cuttings without date and no name
of newspaper). Comparison between other countries and East
Africa was a pOpular tOpic of discussion between ex-soldiers
and non-veterans. If a country was more advanced or richer
than East Africa, the ex-askaris expressed a desire to emu-
late the peOple; when the case was to the contrary, it would
cause pride, for East Africa, on the part of the ex-askari.
In either case, the ex—soldier ended up feeling "national—
istic." As far as the civilians were concerned, the tales
they heard about other countries and peOples amounted to
nothing less than "revolutionary" ideas.

This should be expected of civilians since the soldiers
themselves were "shocked" by what they heard about or saw in
these countries. For instance, one of the leading Kenyan ex—

askaris was shocked when he heard that Jerusalem was in Pales-
tine, "for I had always believed that Jerusalem to be in
Heaven." See Itote, Op.cit., p. 13. '

215

The foregoing demonstrates clearly the validity of
the assertion that, "The organization and tactics employed
by African leaders to change this restrictive situation in
Kenya took various forms, both overt and covert."l6 It can
be concluded that individual ex-askaris or those in small
groups used "covert" tactics in contributing to political
awakening in Kenya. For this reason, we would do well to
loOk for ex-askaris' contribution to Kenya's nationalism not
in "overt" organizations such as the ex-servicemen's associa-
tion, but in some other areas in which individuals or small
groups, using their wartime experiences, contributed to Kenya's
struggle for national independence. In Kenya, these indivi—
duals and small groups, either consciously or unconsciously,
shouldered the responsibility of transmitting the ideas, thus
proving Broadbent's words prophetic. In 1944, using West
African trOOps as an example, he had observed that:

Few readers have considered what the effects will
be upon the future develOpment of West African soldiers
during their stay in India. There is hardly a class or
tribe in the four colonies of British West Africa which
is not represented among these native trOOps who though
for the most part unlettered, have unique gifts of Ob-
servation and perception. They have been quick to form
Opinions which they will take back to West Africa and

which, one ventures to think, will have a widespread
influence there.

 

16Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., p. 119.
l7Broadbent, op.cit., p. 384.

216

This applied equally to East African trOOps. All
ethnic groups, in fact all villages, in Kenya were represented;
and when askaris returned to civil life their reappearance
was felt by everyone in the colony.

But this was not the only role that ex-askaris played.
Spreading of ideas went hand in hand with the actual involve-
ment and participation in various anti-colonial movements
which were going on in Kenya at that time. There are numerous
tales -- some of which have become part of Kenya's "oral tradi-
tion" -- told by ex-askaris about the things they did, and the
measures they took to change the restrictive situation which
the cOlOnial rule had imposed on Kenya. A number Of these ac-
counts have been supported by written evidence and the follow-
ing accounts will serve as an example Of this. An article in

New Africa (March, 1947) captioned: "Kenya Government Breaks

 

Mombasa Strike -- Askari soldiers shot down at Gilgil" tells
part of the story of ex-askaris as participants in the fight
for the African rights:

The general strike of African labour in Mombasa,
Kenya ... came to an end on January 25th after two
weeks during which practically every African worker
in the city stOpped to work... The strike was re-
portedly led by a group of African ex-servicemen
[italics mine] and the general demand was for in-
crease Of wages and lower rents and better living
conditions.

Elsewhere in Kenya at a military base at Gilgil,
five askari soldiers were killed and eleven wounded
early in January following the refusal of a large

217

number Of the soldiers to obey orders of their com-

manding officers. The action was in protest against

delay in their release from services. Fourteen so-

called ringleaders were placed under arrest and held

for trial following the shooting.18

Although only a few such incidents were reported in
the local newspapers or by the Government, however, one is in—
clined to believe ex-askaris' accounts that there were frequent
incidents of this nature. For propaganda purposes, the Govern-
ment -- as all colonial governments did then and do now -- re-
fused to regard these heppenings as signs or manifestations
Of nationalism. They quickly dismissed them as "local" inci-
dents, which were started by a few frustrated ex-askaris. Con—
fidentially, the Government regarded these heppenings as signs
of impending danger. Consequently, it always took the neces-
sary steps to avert these dangers. The aim of the Government
was to prevent solidarity among ex-soldiers which might lead
to the collective use of their new skills and ideas in anti-
colonial activities. It succeeded in preventing the formation
of a militant ex-askari organization. However, ex-askari
sought and found alternative means by which they challenged
the colonial rule.
Using frustration as a "spur," ex-askaris began chan-

neling their energies into civilian anti-colonial activities.

In Dr. Burke's words, "Frustration of this nature, the acquis-

 

18New Africa, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (March, 1947), p. 5.

 

218

ition of organizational skills acquired during the war ... all
contributed to a movement to establish a Kenya-wide political
organization."19 It was not just national politics which
attracted ex—servicemen. There was a quickening interest in
public affairs, a desire to have more control over local matters.
It was not always easy for ex-askaris to climb the
political ladder. First of all there was the anti—ex-askari
prOpaganda. This tended to alienate ex-askaris from their
fellow-Africans. The conditions of the war had brought a
ferment of ideas and in almost every village there was hostil-
ity between civilians, especially the elders, and the ex-
soldiers. These elders had a large following, but they were
far out of sympathy with those younger men, of whom the ex-
askaris were typical, who were at the same time the most impor-
tant and the least attractive element in village or rural life.
It might be said that councils of chiefs were democratic in
the sense that they seemed to represent the bulk of the pOpu-
lation, but in doing so, the creative minority was excluded

from both power and influence.21

 

19Burke, Op.cit., p. 208.

20J. C. D. Lawrence, The Iteso: Fift Years of Change
in a Nilo-Hamitic Tribe of Uganda (London, 1957 , p. 38.

211. C. Jackson, Advance in Africa: A Study in Com—
munity Development in Eastern Nigeria (London, 1956),
p. 59.

20

219

In assessing the participation of ex-askaris in anti-
colonial movements, local and historical factors which influ-
enced the growth, sc0pe and direction of such movements must
be considered. In his study of the West and East African ex-
servicemen, Professor Schleh correctly Observed that:

Recruitment Of veterans as a group into modern
nationalist movements and mass parties depended on:
existing levels of political develOpment at the time
when ex—servicemen cohesion was most possible...

In those territories where active parties devel-
Oped only later, the 'era of the servicemen' had
passed. Parties rising in the 1950's did draw on
individual veterans under a different title (e.g.
trade unionist, teacher or co-operative member), but
the effort of opganizing veterans per se would have
been of possible value only if other functional groups
could not have been found.22 [Emphasis mine]

The type Of European settlement, the percentage of the
EurOpeans in the population and their "ideology" directly af-
fected the involvement and participation of ex-servicemen in
nationalist or political activities. Some of the differences
which existed between the activities and organizations of the
West African ex-servicemen and those of the East Africans were
mainly due to this factor. Even within East Africa itself,
this accounts for the differences that existed between differ-
ent territories. While, for instance, Kenya Government suc-

ceeded in controlling overt ex—askaris' organizations, it

failed to control the covert tactics to which ex-askaris were

 

22
Schleh, Op.cit., p. 104.

220

forced to resort. In short, rigid control succeeded only in
making ex-askaris more resolute and more militant. At times,
ex—askaris were simply reacting to what the Government was
doing to them as a group. Thus Itote writes that the strug—
gle for independence was taken up by Kenyans among whom were
ex-askaris "whose outlook had been changed radically by their
service overseas and who had survived death and much hardship
in the cause of a colony which now seemed determined to block
and humiliate them at every Opportunity."23 At other times,
ex-askaris in Kenya Opposed the colonial rule not because it
denied them their rights as a group, but because the future
of Kenya, indeed the destiny of the Africans, seemed to be in
the hands of foreigners. With special reference to ex-askari
young men, Itote wrote that:
The militant spirit among younger men was

fostered by attitudes and actions of the EurOpean

settlers at this time. They had proclaimed a

"Kenya Plan" which was nothing more nor less than

a scheme for taking over the country and ruling

it on South African apartheid lines. This pam-

phlet was widely circulated among our group and

read out even to those who were illiterate. It

had a profound effect on our thinking and on our
plans. 4

These same EurOpean attitudes and actions made the non-
veteran Africans in Kenya more receptive to ex-askaris'

"teachings" than their counterparts in the neighbouring terri-

 

23Itote, Op.cit., p. 38.

24Ibid., p. 39.

221

tories. These feelings tended to polarize issues and com—
munities in Kenya. EurOpean community was pitted against
African community; African interest clashed with EurOpean
interest. This, of course, was nothing new except, that at
this time, the struggle was sharper and fiercer than before.
As a result of this, there was considerable cohesion among
Africans that had not been known in Kenya in recent history.
It made it easier for the flow of information from African
"leaders" -— especially the ex-servicemen -- to the African
mass. This is why the impact of ideas spread by ex—servicemen
cannot be lightly dismissed. This light dismissal might be
valid for other territories, it seems that Kenya's case was

quite different: ex-askaris, at all levels, spread their

 

ideas; the ideas received sympathetic response from non-
veterans because Of the rigid policies the Government was
carrying out at this time.

NO impression should be created that the ex—askari
was constantly seeking or waiting to play the role of a leader.
He was just as much a leader as he was a follower. War-time
experiences and frustrations during the reabsorption period
made ex-askaris a "natural focal point for any general move-

ment against authority."25 Because the Government had failed

 

25Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturb-
ances in the Gold Coast 1948, Colonial No. 231 (London, 1948),
p. 7, quoted by Rothchild, op.cit., p. 6.

222

to address itself to their problems, ex-askaris began to look
for alternative means by which their aspirations would be
realized. For many of them, politics seemed to be the answer:
"He sought new means to express his sense of grievance.
Whether he found himself at Odds with traditional authorities
upon returning to his village or simply discontent with employ-
ment Opportunities, he seemed to find in political action --
even agitation -— some satisfaction for his pent-up frustration."2
On the other hand, it was easier to mobilize ex-askaris
into an anti-colonial movement partly because they were antag-
onized by the Government and partly because they were used to
discipline; at least they knew and understood what fighting
for a "cause" meant. Above all, they could be mobilized by
simply calling upon them. Their special knowledge and train-
ing made them a unique and special group. Itote remembers
that when the responsibility of training future "Mau Mau"
fighters was placed on him, he was told:
You learnt many things in the army ... now you
can lead our peOple... If you had died in Burma no
one would have remembered you. But should you die
tomorrow in our struggle, you will die for your own
peOple and your name will live in our hearts.27

In stating that the ex-askari transmitted ideas to his

non—veteran fellow-African and that he joined and participated

 

26Rothchild, Op.cit., p. 6.
27Itote, Op.cit., p. 46.

223

in anti-colonial activities, it should not be interpreted to
mean that the result of large-scale African service in British
forces during WOrld War II was the radical transformation Of
the troops into modernized, politically active citizens with

a national Outlook. It has been shown previously that the
British aimed at mObilizing African soldiers into loyal, brave
and skillful soldiers and not into African nationalists. It
has also been shown that when the war ended, the British aimed
at demObilizing African soldiers into loyal British subjects
and not into African nationalists. What has been shown here,
however, is the fact that in spite of all this, the average
ex-askari in East Africa -- particularly in Kenya where the
struggle between EurOpeans and Africans was most intense --
was, comparatively speaking, more advanced than his non-veteran
counterpart. Thus Professor Schleh has concluded that: "This
exposure [service in British forces] moved them up on a scale
of social mobilization and increased their potential for re-
cruitment into political activism."28 In Kenya, the desire and
determination to participate in anti—colonial activities was
fostered by the attitudes and actions of the EurOpeans at the
time of reabsorption Of the ex-askari into civil life.

As for the difference in political impact Of World War

I veterans and World War II veterans, the following observations

 

28Schleh, Op.cit., p. 204.

224

can be noted. In the first place, the World War I veteran
returned to a Kenya that was, comparatively speaking, less
advanced -- politically, economically, socially, etc. —— than
his World War II comrade. Therefore when World War I veterans
returned, they seemed to be the most "advanced" and modern
group among the Africans. For this reason, they tended to
occupy positions of leadership without any serious competition
from other functional groups. Although Opportunities were
rare, this tendency was particularly true in political leadership.
The situation was quite different for the World War II
veteran. In 1946 Kenya was in many ways far more advanced
than in 1919. In the inter—war years African organizations
were formed which began to advance the African cause in more
effective ways than ever before. These assumed all kinds of
names: clubs, societies, labour unions and independent churches.
Whenever they were formed, they represented a precise response
to the challenge of colonial rule. They were both an urban
and a rural response -- both "tribal" and "atribal." In
Rotberg's words: "The associations were led by men who had
drifted to the cities... Gradually they sought redress for
wrongs to their peOple. They learnt vulnerabilities Of whites.
They learnt to deal with the white man on his own terms; they

agitated, drove shady bargains, talked and wrote."29

 

29Robert I. Rotberg, "The Rise of African National-
ism: The Case of East and Central Africa," World Politics,
Vol. XV, NO. 4 (October, 1962), p. 78.

225

Therefore when askaris returned to civilian life
after World War II, there were already leaders in the civi-
lian pOpulation. TO make the matter worse, most ex-askaris
lacked one of the most valuable and vital attributes for
receiving and holding power: formal education. The few that
had formal education vied very well, and at times did better
than, non—veterans of the same academic qualifications. This
meant that most of those who lacked any training in formal
education remained behind in the race for personal advance-
ment in economic, social or political spheres. The importance
of formal education at this particular time in the history of
the continent has been stressed by Oliver and Page:

During this period a new generation of Africans
was putting itself to school, and from it a few were
to emerge equipped not merely for participation but
for leadership in the new Africa. Some white men in
Africa began to speak scornfully of 'troused blacks'
and 'handfuls of examination—bred students;' yet ...
their appearance was the most important event in Afri-
can history.30

In part, this is the answer to those who wish to know
why fewaieaders emerged out of World War II veterans than
emerged from those of World War I. In Kenya, as we have

already seen, ex—servicemen were forced to join civilian

anti-colonial organizations;31 but their chances of assuming

 

3ORoland Oliver and J. D. Page, A Short History Of
Africa (Baltimore, 1962), p. 215.

31We do not know if during the "era of the ex-service-

226

leadership were limited partly because most of them lacked
formal education and partly because they were regarded as
"newcomers" to these organizations. Therefore, they could
not be given leadership in organizations which regarded them
in this light. However, an ex-askari, solely on his wartime
experience and knowledge, was far better off in such organi—
zations than a non-veteran member who had attained the same
level of formal education. The ex-askaris were always next
in rank to the leaders and wielded a lot Of influence in such
organizations.

It was not just the ex-askaris themselves who were a
major factor in the fight for Kenya's independence. Their
service in the British forces itself became an issue on which

African leaders, especially the rising nationalists, challenged

 

men“ ex-askaris in Kenya would have organized themselves into
a strong political group had the Government not interfered
with them; but we know that on their return to civil life
many of them joined the Kenya Africa Union which was, at that
time, the most important political organization among Africans
in the whole colony. Even "The Forty Group" which Operated
mainly in Nyeri and Fort Hall was not exclusively for ex-
soldiers although many of its members were ex-askaris. Short-
ly after 1949 it had disappeared and apparently most of its
members had joined KAU. Most ex-askaris would have preferred
militant organizations, but they had no choice except to join
the "old" organizations. An example of this is Itote's views
of KAU in those days: "In 1946, I had joined the Kenya
African Union (KAU). Although many of us had great hOpes for
this organization, past experience had taught us that it
might well not be enough. Still, it was the only public and
national political organization we had." See Itote, Op.cit.,
p. 38.

227

the Government. As early as 1945, Sauti ya Mwafrika, organ

 

of the Kenya African Union, published among its correspond-
ence the following letter from one Mwaniki Mugweru:

The African Soldier has sacrificed his life
for our King-Emperor. He has fought many battles
in various battlefields in Abyssinia, Middle East
and Far East. He has fought these battles under
the same conditions as the white man. Now the war
is over. Everyone is happy and awaits to see what
will happen.

This war has taught the African a lesson --
that all peOple in this world must be accorded
equal treatment irrespective of their colour and
race provided they do things equally as the others.
The African ex-soldier who is now staying at home has
a very uncertain future. He has been made to consider
himself nothing more than cheap labour in the civilian
market. Nothing specific has been planned for him.
Those are the thanks he has received for the sacrifice
of his life to defend his country.

In his historic baraza His Excellency the Governor
pointed out at Kisumu that this war is not the white
man's war but it is a war against slavery. The African
has therefore fought for the freedom Of mankind. But
the freedom for which he has fought cannot be seen and
that is why some Nyanza Africans told His Excellency
that this war has nothing to do with them.because they
knew that after the war the African peOple would not
benefit anything.

If the African is going to be frank, he would query
the gratitude of the White man in this country. This is
evidenced from the treatment given to the African soldier
just now. The African soldier has no land reserved for
him where he could go and farm. Some time ago His Ex-
cellency invited South Africans to come and settle in
Kenya on the grounds that they served in East Africa,
but the African soldier served in many battlefields with
the South African soldier. Now the war for equality of
mankind is over. Will the African reap the benefit
thereof?32

 

35§auti Ya Mwafrika (OctOber 15, 1945), quoted in
African Transcripts, NO. 9 (May, 1946), p. 84.

228

That service in the British forces would be an issue
upon which anti-colonial elements would capitalize had been
expected by the Government when it stated that: "With his
[i.e. ex-askari's] help which we can hOpe to obtain through
sympathetic handling, we may have a measure of success, with
his Opposition, which is only too easily come by, and yhigh
is capable of unlimited exploitation by those who wish us ill,
we shall indeed go through a bad period."33 (Italics minez)

As an issue it was not just confined to World War II;
it went, at least, as far back as World War I. One way in
which World War I was connected with World War II was the par-
ticipation of some of the World War I veterans in World War II.
They served in all war theatres including the Middle East.34
There was another link between the First World'War and the
Second World War: when the war brOke out in 1939, bitter
memories of the hardship and suffering experienced during the
First World War were still lingering in the minds of many
East Africans. "The memory of these terrible events lived on
in the traditions and folk-lore of the Africans, and as Europe,
a quarter of a century later, began to move towards war once

again, the old fears revived."35

 

33KNA. MAA/2/l/49-I; "Interim Report on African
Demobilization," February 28, 1946.

34See East African Standard (n.d.), news clippings
in KNA. MD/4/5765-I.

35D. C. Savage and J. F. Munro, "Carrier Corps Re-
cruitment in_the British East Africa Protectorate," JOurnal
of African HlstOEY1 VII, 2 (1966), p. 341.

229

Participation of the Africans in World War I was a
political issue in East Africa throughout the 'twenties and
the 'thirties. In 1927 the East African Governments tried
to appease ex-soldiers by building "war memorials" in recog-
nition of their contribution to British victory over the

36

Germans in East Africa. In the 'thirties the question of

the
war pensions remained a thorn in the side Of/Government so

that when the war broke out, the issue had not been resolved.37
In the inter—war years, Africans made a big issue of
their participation in World War I. They used it as leverage
in trying to force the colonial Government in Kenya to insti-
tute some reforms which would enhance African progress and
advancement. By the time the Second World war broke out,
the Government had done very little in instituting these
reforms.
In the course of World War II, the Africans pressed
the Government even harder for reforms. At this particular
time, they used their participation and contribution to both

wars as their bargaining point. The Government needed the

cOOperation and support of the Africans in its war aims and

 

36"Notes from Documents on the Carrier Corps and the
German East African Campaign" (Typescript), UCN/HD-RPAeF/l/B.
(See original copy in Tanzania National Archives, Dar es
Salaam, Secretariat File, Ref.‘Wl/U-l93519

37Savage and Munro, Op.cit., p. 340.

230

efforts; for this reason it was forced to at least listen

to African demands for reforms. Various African groups took
this Opportunity to voice their complaints. Most of them
spoke fearlessly and made direct demands. In 1942 one of
such groups -- the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association --
sent a memorandum to the Governor Of Kenya signed by its
chairman, J. S. Nyende, which stated among other things:

With regard to the request of the war supplies
of income, we beg to state Your Excellency that, we
have concentrated ourselves on Offering any support
at all we could to our Government in every require-
ment'... We request that some of the natives who
are able to enlarge their cultivations be given cer-
tain loans from the Agricultural Land Bank ... ip;
creasing our produce is essential in the support of
.33; [author's emphasis] -- after all rich EurOpeans
get loans.

In the war of 1914-18, we were given various
verbal assurances by Government Officials ... that
if we could help His Majesty to win the war, our
numerous grievances would be considered and complied
with as soon as peace was restored. When the war was
over, after we have helped with all our effort and
might and every sacrifice of person and prOperty, none
of the assurances was fulfilled. But in spite of such
good assurances: our Lands were taken and distributed
to the EurOpean ex-soldiers including the enemy subj-
ects; and we were ordered to work for them at a re-
duced rate of pay. Our Protectorate status was re-
duced to a Crown Colony without Reference to us.

In the present war your representatives have
asked us to help in men and prOperty without a word
of protest or murmur ... Due to the experience gained
in the result of the war of 1914 to 1918, we earnestly
request YOur Excellency that, while we are still amidst
us, you should consider that this time we should be
provided with a written assurance concerning our Lands,
war widows and orphans; and the general well-being, etc.
We request that this assurance be handed over to our
Head-Chiefs that are to be for preservation.38 [Italics mine]

 

38KNA. MAA/2/5/101. The Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare

231

In doing this, Kenya Africans had chosen an issue
that was vital to Africans in other territories. In 1944,
Africans in Nyasaland (Malawi), for instance, had demanded
through their Nyasaland African Association that "We beg to
state that we have served loyally in any war which His Maj-
esty ... has asked our boys to serve and we think this is
the time that we should ask for justice ... we ask you to
give us the right to speak for our peOple be it in the mis-
sion [church] councils or in the bodies that govern our
country... We have paid for the price and we must be com-
pensated accordingly."39

By the time the war ended, specifically during the
period immediately following demobilization, when most ex-
soldiers were bitter because they were unemployed as well as
poor, the issue had become so vital and central that, in Kenya,
it was second only to that of the land. From that time on,
these issues became the two most important and pressing po-

litical questions in the entire colony. That this was the

case is shown by the number of African leaders who constantly

 

Association, Nyanza Province Memorandum Presented to H. E.
the Governor on 13th February, 1942.

39la/l423: Minutes of a Meeting of a Committee Of
Nyasaland African Association, let January, 1944, quoted in
Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa:
The Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1965). In 1942, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) African could

232

referred to the question Of African participation in "Euro—
pean war." An example of the points they stressed are here
stated in the bitter remarks made in the early 'fifties by
an Old ex—chief who Observed that:

I can remember when the first EurOpean came to
Kenya. I workedaflong side your father (pointing to
a European) ...

In the First WOrld War you asked our young men
to go to fight with the British against the Germans
and many were killed. In the Second World War you
came again and asked us to fight the Germans and
the Italians, and our young peOple were again ready
to go.

Now there are Italians and Germans in Kenya and
they can live and own land in the Highlands from
which we are barred, because they are white and we
are black.40

SO the ex-askari both as a participant and as an
"issue" was helping in the struggle for Kenya's freedom. In
spite of all these demands, the Government refused to institute
any meaningful reforms. Sweeping reforms, which the national-
ists were demanding for the Government, would have meant the
paving of the way, by the Government, for Kenya's freedom.

It was not prepared to go that far because "the colonial goal

 

demand that, "We Africans are not good enough to be sold
articles by the European storekeepers, but if Northern Rho-
desia [Zambia] is invaded by the enemy, will only the Euro-
pean storekeepers fight to drive them out or will we Africans
be expected to do so?" See Sec/Misc/66, "Public Opinion,"
Broken Hill, 7 December, 1942. Once again I am indebted to
Dr. James HoOker for this information.

40Quoted in Mbiyu KOinange, The PeOple of Kenya
Speak for Themselves (Detroit, 1955), p. 62.

233

in Kenya was not to create an African state."41 African
leaders had hOped that through peaceful negotiations, the
Government would institute reforms that would be satisfactory
to the majority of the poeple in the colony; therefore "with
the failure on this level to achieve substantial reform,
militant leaders and covert organizations assumed the dominant
role in challenging EurOpean and colonial control."42

The Government refused to compromise even on the most
modest reforms. Many peOple in Kenya, including those ex-
servicemen who were politically alert, gave up the hOpe that
Kenya's problems would be solved politically or by peaceful
negotiations. As the majority of the politically conscious
ex-askaris began to reflect on their military careers, they
were forced to remember Kakembo's ideas stated: "Having
fought for liberty, equality and for freedoms expressed in
the Atlantic Charter, we are determined not to remain behind
in the world's race."43

Those ex-askaris who thought seriously along such
lines decided to carry the struggle for Kenya's freedom beyond

the negotiating table. As soldiers, they had been trained in

violence both in terms of technological skills and in ideas;

 

4J'Rosberg and Nottingham, Op.cit., p. 189.
421bid.
43

Kakembo, op.cit., p. 14.

234

therefore they decided to turn to violence -- to a military
solution -- believing that the Colonial Government in Kenya
had left them no alternative, no choice, but to resort to

violent means.44

The Mau Mau uprising was the main result
of this resolution. One is reminded of George Kinnear's re-
marks made in 1945 with special reference to the returning
askari: "If it turns out that his ideas are on the wrong
lines then there is nobody to blame except his authorities
who have failed."45
It is not within the sc0pe of this study to discuss
whether or not these ideas were on the "wrong or right lines."
But one thing is clear: exiaskaris played an important role
in the Mau Mau uprising. The full story of their role in the
uprising is yet to be told; but there is already enough infor-
mation to show that, indeed, ex-askaris played an important

part in it. Itote's book ('Mau Mau' General), for instance,

has thrown some light on this subject. No doubt there were

 

44The colonial Government and its supporters were

"surprised" when violence was resorted to. Compare this with
Purnell's remarks that: "Having been taught that it is pos-
sible to fight and even die for a cause of freedom, these
veterans [black American ex-soldiers] are coming home deter-
mined to receive fair and equal treatment. The tragedy is
that an unconcerned and uninformed public will be taken by
surprise if they resort to the violence they learned in
Vietnam." Purnell, op.cit., p. 10.

45Kinnear,_o_p_._g_i_p.

235

many others like him whose stories have not yet been, and
might never be, written. However, there is no doubt that a
core of ex-servicemen furnished the necessary skills both
technological and organizational as well as the "ideology"
on which the "revolutionary army" depended. Kilson has cor-
rectly pointed out that:

Furthermore, many Africans now enjoyed the know-
ledge Of modern warfare (particularly guerrilla war-
fare, learned in Burma) and the ability to master
modern arms. In fact, they were even capable of manu-
facturing their own arms from rudimentary household
equipment, as evidenced by Mau Mau arms captured by
the British forces. Thus the post-war African pos-
sessed some of the ideological and practical require-
ments necessary for moving an Oppressed peOple along
lines of armed rebellion.46

Elsewhere in East Africa, ex-askaris have at one time
or another, played very significant roles in their respective
countries. They were certainly important in the revolution in

. . 47
Zanzibar as has been shown in John Okello's book. In the
final confrontation between Kabaka and Uganda Government, it
has been reported that the majority Of those in Kabaka's force

were ex-askaris.48

 

46Ki1son, Op.cit., p. 273.
47John Okello, Revolution in Zanzibar (Nairobi, 1967).

48See M. Crawford Young, "The Obote Revolution,"
African Report, Vol. XI, No. 6 (June, 1966), pp. 8-14. In
French-speaking Africa, the Algerian case seems to support
this generalization. See Franz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism
(New York, 1965). When shooting occurred in Cleveland, Ohio
(USA) in August 1968, it was reported that "a former Ranger
sergeant in Korea...had organized a small band Of militants
called the Black Nationalists of New Libya" and that they had

started the shooting. See Newsweek, Vol. LXXII, NO. 6 (Aug-
ust 5, 1968), pp. 24-26.

236

It is one of the main conclusions of this study that

the returning askari introduced new ideas to East Africa. The
reference here is not to such modern ideas as Communism,
Socialism, Democracy, etc. The ideas we are referring to are
those that the askari learned as a result of his day-to-day
contacts with other peOple, i.e. those he learned from his
own personal experience. As a result Of this, the askari
started to reassess others as well as himself. It was not
through radical ideas; he had never heard of those. The
"simple" knowledge did it: the political history of other
peOples or the knowledge of the "causes" for which other
peOple have fought wars or the realization that he was one of
the "greatest soldiers on Earth" or simply through the re-
evaluation Of his "colonial master." Someone else might not
find such ideas "revolutionary" or "radical;" but to the
African under colonial rule —— specifically the colonial rule
in Kenya -- these ideas were enlightening —- they made him
politically conscious.

Services in the British Armed Forces tended to make
askaris "nationalistic." It certainly promoted a feeling of
"territorial nationalism," hence such remarks as "We are all
Tanganyikans," etc. Although ethnic hostilities could (and
can) still be found among ex-askaris, veterans tend to be

more "rational" about these problems than their non-veteran

237

counterparts. In Kenya, for instance, most ex-servicemen's
organizations, at least on paper, since they were never allowed
to be politically active, tended to organize themselves on
colony-wide rather than on ethnic lines.

Ex-askaris did not succeed in forming their own power—
ful organizations, hence the failure to produce their own
"political" leaders. This was partly due to the Government's
policy and partly due to African civilian organizations such
as political parties or trade unions which, at the time of
demobilization, were already carrying out anti-colonial acti-
vities. Therefore individual ex—askaris who wished to con-
tribute to the fight had no choice but to join "civilian" or-
ganizations. They usually never became leaders of such move-
ments although they were influential and prominent members.

Technical and practical skills learned in the army
were not put to full use by the majority of ex-askaris. The
economy could not absorb them, i.e. they could not be hired
by someone else or they did not have the capital with which
to begin private business. However, those who joined the
Mau Mau uprising made full use of their technical and organi-
zational skills, thus distinguishing themselves, in the up-

rising, as an essential and indispensable group.

APPENDIX A

Ex Askaris' Organizations in Kenya

This section is based on the information Obtained
from Files Numbers 371, 3043, 3162, 3219, 4403 and 5310 at
the Office Of the Registrar of Societies, Kenya Government,
Nairobi. Notice the mushrooming of ex-servicemen's organi—
zations in the early 1960's. This, in part, is due to the
lifting of the ban on political organizations by the Govern—
ment; it was also due to the anxiety on the part of the ex-
servicemen as to what would become of their "interests" when
Kenya became independent. They were organizing so that when
that time came they would be powerful enough to defend their
"interests." Many ex-askaris must have been disappointed at
the results because what emerged was not one united body but
several “powerless" ex-askaris' organizations.

I. KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES AND EAST AFRICAN FORCES (KENYA)
OLD COMRADES ASSOCIATION. (File 3219)

This was the first ex-soldiers' organization in Kenya.
It remained the only one until 1953 when the second organiza—
tion was founded. It was closely affiliated with the Govern-
ment although not under its sponsorship. Originally, it was
intended only for the British ex-soldiers living in Kenya; but
after World war II, ex-askaris were encouraged to join it.

238

239

Aims and Objectives, 1960 (18,000 members)

1. To bring about the unity of all those ex-service-
men whatever their rank or race who have served,
at any time, in any branch Of East African
military forces of Kenya.

2. To assist them, their widows and dependents in
all their difficulties, in pension matters, in
the relief of distress, in finding employment
and in re-establishing them on their return to
civil life.

3. TO foster and organize re-unions and functions.

On 2nd November, 1966, it changed its name to Kenya

Armed Forces Old Comrades Association (K.A.F.O.C.A.).

Office-Bearers, 1966 (20,000 members)

 

Chairman, Brigadier Ndolo
Vice Chairman, Colonel J. K. Mulinge
Executive Committee:
The Chairman and the Vice Chairman
Lt. Col. Kakenyi
Lt. Col. J. K. Nzioka
Major Birgen
Secretary/Treasurer, J. A. Campbell
The organization has an employment bureau (Kenya Armed

Forces Old Comrades Association Employment Bureau) which

240

assists ex-askaris in finding employment. PrOportionately
very few ex-askaris have been able to find employment through
this organization. Part Of the reason is that the bureau
Operates only in Nairobi while the majority of ex-askaris
live on their farms hundreds of miles from Nairobi.

Only a small percentage (10%r25%) Of those who applied
actually got the jobs through the bureau. The number of ap-
plicants is extremely small when it is remembered that about

98,000 Kenyans participated in World War II.

The number of ex-askaris who applied
for jobs through the Bureau*

 

 

 

 

NO. of No.
applicants actually employed
Occupation Feb. 1963-July 1966 Feb. 1963-July 1966
Watchmen (Headmen,eth 1844 724
Drivers (vehicle
mechanics, etc.) 899 209
Clerks (telephone Opera-
tors, etc.) 278 116
Domestics (cooks, etc.) 432 147
Artisans (tinsmiths, etc.) 421 88
Total 3874 1284
No. of No.
applicants actually employed
Feb. 1963-Jan. 1967 Feb. 1963-Jan. 1967
Watchmen 2009 607
Drivers 944 190
Clerks 299 108
Domestics 463 130
Artisans 438 46

Total 4153 1081

241

No. of No.
applicants actually employed
July 1965-Nov. 1967 Ju1y 1965-Nov. 1967

 

Watchmen 2000 250
Drivers 1000 200
Clerks 400 125
Domestics 600 200

Total 4000 775

 

*See "Monthly Record Figures O.C. A/27" at the
K.A.F.O.C.A. Bureau Office, Nairobi, Kenya

II. THE NYANZA AFRICAN EX-SERVICEMEN'S ORGANIZATION AND
BRITISH LEGION, AFRICAN SECTION. (File 371)

It was first registered by the Government in 1953 with
its Head Office at Ndori Junction, Post Office AsembO-Bay.
Its Objectivespjl953)
To promote mutual understanding and unity between ex-
servicemen and those who are not ex—servicemen in the
Province. This will help widows and orphans.
Anticipated Property
Dispensary, Ferry Boat, Garage, African Liquor shOps
everywhere in the colony, Transport Lorry, Posho Mill
and some which are not mentioned.
Aims and Objectives (1957)
1. To co-Operate with Government by offering inde-
pendent opinion on any questions affecting the ex—
servicemen in representation in Councils or Gov-

ernment works in the colony.

242

2. Building school for ex-servicemen's children

where they could be taught at reduced fees.

3. Shall do trades of any kind in the whole Kenya

Colony.

Kenya's political climate seems to have been reflected
in what the above organization called its "aims and objectives."
In 1953 the Objectives were less political owing to the Mau Mau
uprising which was then in progress and which had caused the
Government to declare a state Of emergency in Kenya. It was
unsafe and unwise for any African organization to be overtly
"political." The uprising Officially ended in 1957, hence
the political overtones in the "aims and objectives" which
were formulated in that year.

Office—Bearers

President, Okeyo Ogara

Secretary, F. 0100 Odero

Chairman, Cpt. S. Ogola Okuku

Total Annual Membership

 

Year Membership
1953 1185
1954 1390
1955 1565
1956 ?

1957 ?

1958 250

The Government cancelled the registration of the above

organization on 6 October, 1958 (which meant that they were

243

officially barred to hold any meetings anywhere in the Colony).

III. KENYA AFRICAN EX¢SERVICEMEN'S UNION. (File 3043)

This particular organization was never recognized by
the Government. Application for its registration was refused
by the Government on 13 December, 1960.

Office-Bearers

President, A. Magina Magina

Peter W. Obanda

Laban Mucka

W. Rading

James Kinyanjui

Aims and Objectives
1. To promote unity among ex-soldiers. To bring
understanding between ex-soldiers and those
still serving and the public.
2. Build independent schools.
3. To encourage self-help and co-Operation among
ex-servicemen particularly in the matters of
improving their economic conditions by means of

better trade.

IV. THE NORTH NYANZA AFRICAN EX-SERVICEMEN'S UNION. (File 3162)

It was officially registered by the Government on

244

12 July, 1962. It seems as if it had been functioning as an
unregistered "society" since 1960. Its registered address
was (is) Kyavakali Market, Plot No. 14; its mailing address
was (is) Post Office Box 126, Maragoli.
Aims and Objectives 1960 (250 membere)
1. Employment of ex-servicemen.
2. Improve living conditions of exeservicemen in
the way of loans (a) Buildings [shops] (b) Farming
(c) Trade.
Office-Bearers 1962 (? members)
President, Herman Indusa, P.O. Box 39, Maragoli
Robert Shago, P.O. Box 144, Maragoli
Zakayo Asamba, P.O. Box 39, Maragoli

Office-Bearers 1963 (70 members), Mailing address: Kyava-
kali Market, P.O. Box 126, Maragoli, North Nyanza

President, Robert Shago
Sgn. zakayo Asamba
Herman Indusa
Organizing Secy., Laban Kitungulu
Chegero
Joram Kiziiri
Office-Bearers 1964 (700 members)
President, James Mukhwana, P.O. Box 290, Kagamega
Vice President, Joshua Kitakwa, P.O. Box 188, Maragoli

Gen. Secretary, M. Robert Aseri, P.O. Box 290, Kakamega

245
Deputy Secretary, Clement Chiboli, P.O. Box 56,
Kakamega

Ass't. Deputy Sec'y., William Mumbo, P.O. Box 290
Kakamega

Treasurer, Benjamin Libese, P.O. Box 188, Maragoli

Assistant Treasurer, JOseph Chiekelo, P.O. Box 188,
Maragoli

Nat'l. Organizing Sec'y., Henry Ingunzi, P.O. Box 290,
Kakamega

V. KENYA EX-SERVICEMEN UNION. (File 4403)
The organization was officially registered by the Gov—
ernment on 26 March, 1963.
Office Bearers
President, Alex Oloo (Magina Magina)
Vice President, Laban Onyango
General Secretary, Eliud Onyango
Assistant Secretary, Robert Mbogwa
Treasurer, Hatsan Mohamed
Office-Bearers - Western Branch
Chairman, M.A.W. Ekaya
Vice Chairman, W. Khachina
Secretary, P.O. Mutsoli
Vice Secretary, J. Nambwaya
Treasurer, H. Washiali

Vice Treasurer, Z. Musungu

Organizing Secretary, W. Mumbo

246

Office-Bearers - Ramisi Branch, Kwale District
Chairman, Albert Ominde
Vice Chairman, J. Khamisi
Secretary, P. V. Oplot Odeke
Assistant Secretary, Richard Oluoch
Organizing Secretary, Korinel Mwai
Treasurer, William S. Tinazile
Assistant Treasurer, S. Mashiri

Executive Officer, S. Oniya

VI. NATIONAL EX-SERVICEMEN UNION OF KENYA. (File 5310)
It was Officially registered by the Government on
8 July, 1964. However, it had been functioning as an unregis-
tered body for at least a year when J. N. Osore and J. Indidi
Waga served as its Chairman and Secretary respectively. Its
registered Office was Kaloleni Social Hall, Kisumu, and its
mailing address was (is) Post Office Box 105, Kisumu.
Office—Bearers, February, 1964 (1000 members)
President, J.S.P. Okeyo Ogara
A. Aloo Magina Magina
Arap Koria, P.O. Box 19, Kapsabet
Ex. Sgt. P. Orinda Mboya, Post Office Homa Bay
Office—Bearers, June, 1964 (1358 membere)

President, J.S.P.O. Ogara, P.O. Box 105, Kisumu

247

P. Orinda Mboya

Jackton K. Kamto

Sebi Siruru, Kibira, Nairobi

W. Maunda Obaka, Bukhayo, P.O. Busia

Office-Bearers, 1966 (no membership record)

 

President, J.S.P.O. Ogara, Trader

Vice President, W. Munyao Kini, Trader, P.O. Box
Machakos

Gen. Secretary, J. Kokaka Ogundu, Trader, P.O. Box
105, Kisumu

Ass't. Sec'y., Bernard Karie, Trader, P.O. Box 30199,
Nairobi

Treasurer, Sebi Fadamulla, Trader, P.O. Kibira,
Nairobi

Ass't. Treasurer, JOhn Asalache, Inspector of Police,
P.O. Box 105, Maragoli

There are no lists for the names of Office-bearers
for the years 1965 and 1967. However, the record shows that

there were 2225 members in 1965 and 2238 in 1967.

APPENDIX B

World War I and II: Enlistment Figures

In 1942 the Government tried to analyze, on an ethnic
basis, the number of Kenya Africans who had until then been
drafted into the Armed Forces. The following figures were
submitted by the Officer Commanding, Military Records, for the

month of January 1942.*

Luo 11,270
Bantu Kavirondo (Luyia) '5,570
Kisii 1,505
Nandi 978
Lumbwa 1,275
Akikuyu 5,581
Akamba 11,024
Meru 722
Embu 207
Masai 70
Teita-Taveta 747
DigO-Duruma 418
Giriama 798
Swahili—Bajune 159
Marakwet-Elgeyo 340
Turkana-Suk 47
Kamasia lll
Somali 145
Other N.F.D. Tribes 343
Miscellaneous 41

Total 41,351

 

*KNA. DC/EBU/lO/S. Circular from the Secretariat,
Nairobi, February 18, 1942, "Recruitment for the Armed Forces,
Tribal Composition and Analysis."

In June, 1945, recruitment figures were based on what

the East Africa Command called "Districts in Kenya." The

248

 

249

following were the results**

Giriama 468
Teita-Taveta 431
Pare 781
Kamba 14,470
Masai 237
Kikuyu 13,921
Meru 2,185
Kericho 2,240
Kisumu 13,605
Luo 20,602
Embu 658
Kisii 2,397
Kapsabet 1,205
Marakwet-Elgeyo 584
Kamasia 253
Turkana and Suk 318
N.F.D. Tribes 461
Somali 165
Nandi 1,205
Bajun 211

Total 89,857

 

**KNA. MD/4/5/80-I. Circular from H.Q. East Africa
Command, June 23, 1945. The use of "Kisumu" and "Luo" is
confusing; perhaps what is meant here is that "Kisumu-Luo"
means Nyanza Province excluding Kisii. There is also con-
fusion with regard to the use of "Nandi" and "Kapsabet."

Another source of information regarding the number of
soldiers recruited in East Africa during World War II is the
telegram, July 25, 1947, from Civil Director and Demobiliza—
tion and Training East Africa to Civil Reabsorption Officer
giving information on military previously sent to the Secre—
tary Of State for Colonies. The telegram reads:***

Question (1) Numbers of men and women members of

colonial Forces who were mobilized
during the 1939-1945 war.

 

***Uganda National Archives, F23/335 VI.

250

Answer:

Total number of men and women enlisted

 

 

 

 

the total
ENLISTMENT figure is given instead.

 

As adequate records of the mobilization
figures are not available,

 

 

 

 

during the 1939-1945 war is 333, 224.
Territorialiy eplit as follows:
Europeans Asians Africans Total
Kenya 3,100 1,500 98,238 102,838
Uganda 600 900 76,166 77,666
Tanganyika 1,006 210 86,003 87,219
N. Rhodesia 1,700 14,579 16,279
Nyasaland 700 29,890 30,590
Extra-territorial 25 18,607 18,632
Total 7,131 2,610 323,448 333,224
Question (2) Numbers who actually served outside
their particular colony.
Answer: Europeans Asians Africans Total
Kenya 2,000 500 61,500 64,000
Uganda 300 220 50,500 51,020
Tanganyika 424 194 70,600 71,218
N. Rhodesia 800 8,800 9,600
Nyasaland 400 15,200 15,600
Extra-territorial 25 8,000 8,025
Total 3,949 914 214,600 219,463
Question (3) Casualties sustained in the case of
each colony and Branch Of service.
Answer: Casualties include killed in action, died
Of wounds, death from battle accidents
and death from normal causes and diseases.
Europeans Asians Africans Total
Kenya 176 35 2,935 2,687
Uganda ll 4 1,935 1,950
Tanganyika 25 19 2,358 2,402
N. Rhodesia 49 26 75

 

 

251

Nyasaland 9 156 165
Extra-territorial l8 ___ 350 368
Total 288 58 7,301 7,647

 

World War I Recruitment Figures
A. Total number of men raised in East Africa during the war

or the campaign against German East Africa:

 

 

 

 

Native Native
Europeans Combatants non-combatants
Kenya
Uganda 2,300 24,000 400,000
Zanzibar
Nyasaland 800 10,000 200,000
Total 3,100 34,000 600,000

 

B. Men raised in East Africa and were killed or died of wounds

or diseases during the campaign:

 

 

 

Native Native
Europeans Combatants non-combatants
Kenya
Uganda 175 3,000 44,000
Zanzibar
Nyasaland _pg, 1,500 4,000
Total 235 4,500 48,000

 

C. Total number of casualties (exclusive of Indian and

African followers) up to 15th December, 1918, were:

 

.foigepe Other ranks
Killed and died of disease 397 9,051
Wounded 480 7,294
Missing and Prisoners 30 911

Total 907 17,256

 

252

"Followers"

Killed, died: Indians 286
Africans 42,318

Wounded: Indians 11
Africans 1,322

Missing: Indians 13
Africans 622
Total 44,572*

 

*See "Askari Statue Dar es Salaam" (typescript),
UCN/HD-RPA/F/l/B (1) or original COpy in Tanzania National
Archives, Secretariat File, Ref. W1/A/23428. Above recruit-
ment figures are based on the information Obtained from this
document.

World War I figures have also been analyzed on dis-

trict basis (for Kenya only, then known as British East Africa):

Carrier copps recruitment by districts,
1915-1918**

Nyanza Province

 

 

 

Central North South Kericho
1914-1915 4,572 4,372 8,917 78
1915-1916 8,888 7,459 6,822 719
1916-1917 5,604 6,469 9,558 269
1917-1918 8,922 10,036 8,758 68
Kenya Province

Fort Hall Nyeri Embu Meru Chuka
1914-1915 ? ? ? 500 ?
1915-1916 2,021 2,774 ? ? ?
1916-1917 2,296 3,671 2,027 216 ?
1917-1918 4,098 5,940 4,200 3,500 1,097

253

Ukamba Province

 

Machakos Kitui Kiambu
1914-1915 477 ? NOne
1915-1916 1,618 3,064 1,598
1916-1917 4,285 3,885 2,515
1917-1918 4,915 3,470 2,552

Seyidie (Coast) Province

Mombasa Teita Vanga Malindi Rabai
1915-1916 952 Exempt 64 439 fine)
1916-1917 1,763 Exempt 482 62 1,163
1917-1918 2,175 2,648 473 ? 2,256

 

**These figures are based on the information derived
from Donald C. Savage and J. Forbes Munroe, "Carrier Corps
Recruitment in the British East Africa Protectorate, 1914-
1918," JOurnal Of African History, VII, 2 (1966), pp. 323
and 338.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following is only a partial list Of the refer-
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The bulk of the data was derived from numerous inter-
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254

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Rothchild, Donald S. "The Effects of MObilization in British
Africa," Duquesne University, Institute of African
Affairs, Reprint No. 2, 1959. Reprinted from
Duquesne Review (Fall, 1959).

 

Sabben-Clare, E. E. "African TrOOps in Asia," African Affairs,
XLIV, No. 177 (October, 1945), 151-157.

Savage, Donald C. and Munro, J. Forbes. "Carrier Corps
Recruitment in the British East Africa Protectorate
1914-1918," JOurnal of African History, VII, No. 2
(1966), 313—342.

Saville, Anthony G. Letter in African Affairs, XLV, NO. 179
(April, 1946), 98.

Shepperson, George A. "External Factors in the DevelOpment
of African Nationalism, with Particular Reference to
British Central Africa," Phylon, XXII, No. 3 (Fall,
1961), 207-225.

Smallwood, Russell. "Native Military DevelOpment in East
Africa," The Fortnightly, CLXII, NO. 935 (New Series)

263

Staples, Robert E. "Black Mercenaries in Vietnam,"
Liberator, VIII, No. 2 (February, 1968), 1.

 

Young, M. Crawford. "The Obote Revolution," Africa Report,

Young, Whitney M., Jr. "When Negroes in Vietnam Come Home,"
Harper's Magazine, 234, No. 1405 (June, 1965), 63-64.

 

Newspaper and Periodical Series

Africa

Africa Today

African Affairs

African Digest

African Transcripts

Africa Report

East Africa and Rhodesia

The New African

Journal of Modern African Studies
JOurnal of African History

 

 

 

The following newspapers and periodicals were directly rele-
vant to this study:

East African Standard, daily and weekly, 1918-1964.
Kenya Weekly News, 1940-1963.

Mwalimu Annual, 1945—46.

Baraza, 1940-1952.

 

In the years immediately following the end of the war but
prior to the Emergency (Mau Mau uprising) in 1952, a large
number of vernacular papers were published at different
times. Whenever I was fortunate to find Old cOpies, they
were of great benefit to me. Among these papers were:

Mumenyereri

Sauti ya Mwafrika
Mwaraniria
Mucemanio

Nyanza Times
Radio Posts
Ramogi

Gikuyu Times
Muthamaki

Mwalimu

 

264

Unpublished Reports

Champion, A. M. "Native Welfare in Kenya." 1945. (in KNA)

Cliffe, L. "Nationalism and Reaction to Enforced Agricul-
tural Improvement in Tanganyika during the colonial
period," Proceedings of the Conference of the East
African Institute of Social Research, January, 1965.
(Mimeo .)

Lonsdale, J. M. "Rural Resistance and Mass Political Mobili-
zation Among the Luo of Western Kenya," East African
Historical Conference, Dar es Salaam, 1965. (Mimeo.)

Ngeny, S. Arap. "Nandi Resistance to Establishment of British
Administration, 1893-1906," Research Seminar Paper,
Dar es Salaam, November 1965 (Mimeo.)

Schleh, Eugene P. A. "Post-service Careers of Africa World
War Two Veterans: British East and West Africa with
Particular Reference to Ghana and Uganda." Unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968.

Stanner, W. E. "The Kitui Kamba: A Critical Study of British
Administration." n.d. (in KNA)

"Welfare Economy and the Significance of Education Among
Askari Serving in Ceylon." 1943. (in KNA)
Interviews
August, 1967 - April, 1968
A partial list of the Africanists interviewed:
Bennett, George. Oxford University.
Coleman, James S. University College, Nairobi.
Lonsdale, JOhn M. Cambridge University.
McIntosh, Brian G. university College, Nairobi.

Mazrui, Ali A. Makerere university College.

265
Moyse—Bartlett, Lt. Col. H. Folkestone, Kent, England
(written interview).

Munro, J. Forbes. University of Glasgow, Glasgow
(written interview).

Nottingham, John. East Africa Publishing House, Nairobi.
Ogot, Bethwell A. University College, Nairobi.

Rosberg, Carl G. University College, Dar es Salaam.
Schleh, Eugene P. G. Gorham State College, Maine.

Shepperson, George. University Of Edinburgh (written inter-
view).

Were, Gideon. University College, Nairobi.

A partial list of the ex-askaris interviewed: (See Appendix A)

Omengo, N. Abonyo. P.O. Box 260, Kitale

Aholi, Ruphas. P.O. Box 290, Kakamega
Chumo, M. K. A. P.O. Box 309, Kericho

Fadamulla, Sebi

Kibira, Nairobi

Itote, W. National Youth Service, Nairobi
Kayaga, Clement P.O. Mogoma via Kisii

Arap, Koria P.O. Kapsabet

Mngeno, Tiongit A. P.O. Box 840 Eldoret

Munyao, William P.O. Machakos

Mwamba, Naftali P.O. Nyaribari Chache Location,

Ndolo, Brigadier

Box 290, Kisii

H.Q., Nairobi

266

Simat, Bundotich P.O. Box 30, Eldoret
Soi, Francis P.O. Machakos

Tarus, Arap Kiplagat P.O. Box 30, Kapsabet