"UNION DEMOCRACY", A LIMITED REPLICATION: THE CASE OF AN ARGENTINIAN PRINTING UNION

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

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1974

"UNION DEMOCRACY", A LIMITED REPLICATION: THE CASE OF AN ARGENTINIAN PRINTING UNION

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THE PRESENT COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IS A LIMITED REPLICATION OF THE WELL-KNOWN STUDY BY LIPSET, TROW, AND COLEMAN, "UNION DEMOCRACY". IT WAS CARRIED OUT IN AN ARGENTINIAN PRINTING UNION -THE UNIÓN OBRERA GRÁFICA CORDOBESA (UOGC). THIS LOCAL GROUPS PRINTERS FROM THE CITY OF CÓRDOBA, ONE OF THE SECOND LARGEST IN ARGENTINA.

THE RESEARCH CENTERED ON THOSE FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRESENCE OF DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS IN EACH UNION. IF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (ITU) WAS CHARACTERIZED -GIVEN ITS TWO-PARTY SYSTEM- AS A DEMOCRATIC TYPE OF ORGANIZATION, THE UOGC MIGHT BE SEEN -GIVEN THAT ONE-GOVERNING GROUP HAS PERMANENTLY CONTROLLED THE UNION- AS AN OLIGARCHIC ONE.

FOLLOWING UNION DEMOCRACY'S ANALYSIS, THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OCCUPATION, THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNION, AND THE ECONOMICS OF THE INDUSTRY WERE CONSIDERED THE MAIN FACTORS RELATED WITH THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL

SYSTEMS OF THE ITU AND THE UOGC.

WITH RESPECT TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OCCUPATION, IN BOTH CASES AN OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS SINGLED OUT, SHOWING A FORMAL AND INFORMAL CHARACTER IN THE ITU, ONLY AN INFORMAL ONE IN THE UOGC. EVENTHOUGH RELATIONSHIPS WERE GENERALLY WEAKER AMONG CÓRDOBA PRINTERS, SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE COMMUNITY FURTHERED UNION POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN BOTH ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, WHILE IN THE ITU THE SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS OF PRINTERS WORKED COUNTER THE STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRESENCE OF OLIGARCHIC PATTERNS, IN THE UOGC IT WOUD SEEM THEY DID NOT PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF OLIGARCHIC TENDENCIES.

ANOTHER FACTOR LINKED TO THE TYPE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM IN EACH UNION WAS THE STRUCTURE OF PRINTING INDUSTRY, PARTICULARLY THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE DEGREE OF CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE INDUSTRY. WITH RESPECT TO THE DIVISION OF LABOR, SIMILAR INCOME AND STATUS, AND ABSENCE OF SKILL DIFFERENCES, WERE FEATURES OF THE TRADE IN NEW YORK AND CÓRDOBA. IN THIS SENSE, BOTH UNIONS WERE CHARACTERIZED AS "COMMUNITY OF EQUALS". ON THE OTHER HAND, ABSENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL RATIONALIZATION AND CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP WAS ALSO A COMMON FEATURE TO BOTH INDUSTRIES. HOWEVER, IN THE ITU THE PRESENCE OF A UNION UNIT -THE

CHAPEL-, WHOSE OFFICERS WERE REPRESENTATIVES OF DIFFERENT SHOPS, PROVIDED SOURCES OF POWER INDEPENDENT FROM THE ADMINISTRATION, WHILE THAT WAS NOT THE CASE IN THE UOGC.

MOVING FROM THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNION, IT WAS FOUND THE SAME DIFFERENCE: EVEN WHEN THE REQUIREMENTS OF MATERIAL SECURITY AND SECURITY OF STATUS WERE PRESENT IN THE ITU AND THE UOGC, THE FORMER WAS CHARACTERIZED BY THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF AUTONOMOUS UNION POSTS, WHILE SUCH WAS NOT THE CASE OF THE LATTER. AS A RESULT, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT POWER IN THE UOGC WAS BASICALLY DETERMINED BY POSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY, WHILE INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER WERE SINGLED OUT IN THE ITU. IN SPITE OF THESE DIFFERENCES, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT IN THE UOGC THE STATUS SECURITY OF A POTENTIAL OPPOSITION WAS DIFFICULT TO BE THREATENED.

AT THE END OF THE ANALYSIS, IT WAS ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT THE UOGC'S ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, WHERE COMPETING INTERNAL CURRENTS -WITHIN THE GOVERNNING GROUP- REPLACED THE ITU'S TWO-PARTY SYSTEM, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AN OLIGARCHIC TYPE OF ORGANIZATION. IT WAS FINALLY CONCLUDED THAT IF IT IS NOT THE FORMAL NATURE OF A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM WHAT CHARACTERIZES UNION DEMOCRACY, BUT THE PRESENCE OF

COMPETING DIFFERENTIATED POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS SHOWING CERTAIN DEGREE OF PERMANENCY, THEN LIPSET ET.AL. APPROACH SHOULD BE REFORMULATED IN ORDER TO ALLOW COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SYSTEMATIC THEORY.

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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

PHILOSOPHY DOCTOR

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

1974

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

SINCE THIS RESEARCH BEGAN, AROUND JULY 1968, TWO INSTITUTIONS ALLOWED ME TO CARRY OUT THE FIELD-WORK WHILE I WAS TEACHING THERE: THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, AT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF CÓRDOBA, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, AT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF TUCUMÁN, BOTH IN ARGENTINA. LATTER ON, THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AT MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, SUPPORTED ME WITH A TEACHING ASSISTANTSHIP TO CONTINUE MY STUDIES AND THE ANALYSIS AND WRITING OF THE DISSERTATION. TO ALL OF THEM I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL.

I AM PARTICULARLY INDEBTED TO PHILIP MARCUS, MY THESIS DIRECTOR, AND TO WILLIAM FORM, MY FIRST ADVISER AT MSU, BECAUSE OF THEIR INVALUABLE GUIDANCE AS TEACHERS AND THEIR PATENCY AS FRIENDS. ALSO, I WANT TO THANKS ALL THE SUGGESTIONS I RECEIVED FROM THE OTHER MEMBERS OF MY COMMITTEE: VINCENT SALVO, JAMES MCKEE, AND HARRY PERLSTADT.

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SECTION I - INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT WORK IS TO REPLICATE, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, UNION DEMOCRACY[1] STUDY IN AN ARGENTINIAN PRINTING UNION: THE UNIÓN OBRERA GRÁFICA CORDOBESA -UOGC, CÓRDOBA'S LOCAL WITHIN THE FEDERACIÓN ARGENTINA DE TRABAJADORES DE LA IMPRENTA -FATI. FIVE HUNDRED MILES SOUTHWEST FROM BUENOS AIRES, THE CITY OF CÓRDOBA WITH A POPULATION OF 800,000 PEOPLE IS THE SECOND LARGEST IN THE COUNTRY, TOGETHER WITH THE CITY OF ROSARIO. A PROCESS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BEGAN IN THIS CITY FIFTEEN YEARS AGO WITH THE INSTALATION OF TWO MAIN AUTOMOBILE PLANTS, FIAT AND KAISER-RENAULT. TOGETHER WITH THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, THE SERVICE SECTOR CONSTITUTES ANOTHER IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF CÓRDOBA'S LABOR FORCE. IN A COUNTRY CHARACTERIZED BY A PREDOMINANT MIDDLE-CLASS, CÓRDOBA IS NO EXCEPTION. LAWYERS AND DOCTORS HAVE CONSTITUTED THE MAIN PROFESSIONS FOR A LONG TIME (CÓRDOBA IS KNOWN AS "THE DOCTORAL CITY"), WHILE TECHNICAL STUDIES -LIKE ENGINEERING, ACCOUNTING, ETC.- HAVE RAPIDLY INCREASED DURING THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS. ON THE OTHER HAND, TRADITIONAL PATTERNS HAVE REMAINED FAIRLY STRONG IN THE

CITY, WITH ITS COLONIAL STYLE AND THE STILL POWERFULL PRESENCE OF THE CHURCH. IN THIS SENSE, THE SOCIAL SETTING OF CÓRDOBA PRINTERS COULD BE CONSIDERED A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF THE COEXISTENCE OF A URBAN, FAIRLY MODERN AND INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT, TOGETHER WITH STRONGLY TRADITIONAL SECTORS.

FOR COMPARATIVE PURPOSES, WE WILL TAKE AS A GIVEN THE THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION PROPOSED BY LIPSET ET.AL. IN THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (ITU). AS A GENERAL RULE, AND WHENEVER POSSIBLE, WE WILL TRY TO FOLLOW THEIR RESEARCH STRATEGY, POINTING OUT THE NECCESSARY DIFFERENCES WHICH COULD ARISE AS A RESULT OF THE PECULIARITIES OF THE NEW RESEARCH SETTING. THIS WILL ALLOW US A DETAILED COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE ITU AND THE UOGC.

HOWEVER, OUR STUDY WILL RISE SOME QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO LIPSET ET.AL. APPROACH. WE WILL POINT OUT SOME LIMITATIONS OF THEIR DEFINITION OF OLIGARCHY, AND WE WILL SUGGEST THAT A BROADER CONCEPTION WILL HELP TO SPECIFY DIFFERENT STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS ASSOCIATED WITH DETERMINED POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN TRADE-UNIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE THINK THIS WIDER PERSPECTIVE WILL THROW SOME LIGHT ON THE LIMITATIONS OF A FORMAL DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY AS THE STRUGGLES OF A PERMANENT TWO-PARTY SYSTEM.

1. DEMOCRACY AND OLIGARCHY IN TRADE UNIONS

THE FACTORS THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE LACK OF DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS, ACCORDING TO LIPSET, TROW, AND COLEMAN, ARE THE FOLLOWING:

(1) "LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATIONS GIVE UNION OFFICIALS A NEAR MONOPOLY OF POWER" [2]. THREE PROCESSES ARE DISTINGHISHED:

(1.A) "UNIONS, LIKE ALL OTHER LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATIONS, TEND TO DEVELOP A BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE" [3];

(1.B) "CONTROL OVER THE FORMAL MEANS OF COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION IS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HANDS OF THE OFFICIALS" [4];

(1.C) MOST UNIONS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY "THE ADMINISTRATION'S ALMOST COMPLETE MONOPOLY OF POLITICAL SKILLS" [5];

(1.D) AS A RESULT, MOST UNIONS ARE ALSO CHARACTERIZED BY "THE ABSENCE OF THOSE SKILLS AMONG THE RANK AND FILE" [6].

(2) CONDITIONS INDUCE LEADERS TO STAY IN OFFICE:

(2.A) TO BECOME A UNION OFFICIAL HAS A HIGH STATUS, COMPARED TO HIS FORMER POSITION AS A WORKER [7];

(2.B) A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM LEADS TO

INSECURITY OF TENURE [8];

(2.C) OFFICIALS TRY TO ELIMINATE DEMOCRACY IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEIR HIGH STATUS POSITIONS [9].

(3) "MEMBERS DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN UNION POLITICS" [10]:

(3.A) "APATHY OF THE MEMBERS IS THE NORMAL STATE OF AFFAIRS" [11];

(3.B) UNION MEMBERS MUST SPEND MOST OF THEIR TIME IN OTHER TYPE OF ACTIVITIES (RECREATIONAL, ETC.) [12];

(3.C) "MOST TRADE UNIONS (...) ARE CONCERNED WITH TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS, WHICH CANNOT BE OF DEEP INTEREST TO THE AVERAGE MEMBER" [13];

(3.D) POTENTIAL OPPOSITION IS GENERALLY DISCOURAGED ON THE BASIS THAT OPPOSITIONISTS CAN "BE DENOUNCED FOR HARMING THE ORGANIZATION AND HELPING THE ENEMY" [14].

IN SPITE OF ALL THESE GENERAL TENDENCIES, THE AUTHORS FOUND THAT THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (ITU) [15] HAS MAINTAINED A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM FOR HALF A CENTURY. AS THEY NOTED, "IT IS THE ONLY AMERICAN TRADE

UNION IN WHICH ORGANIZED PARTIES REGULARLY OPPOSE EACH OTHER FOR ELECTION TO THE CHIEF UNION POSTS, AND IN WHICH A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM HAS BEEN INSTITUTIONALIZED" [16]. THIS FACT LED THEM TO CHOOSE THE ITU AS A DEVIANT CASE, WHOSE STUDY SHOULD PROVIDE CLUES FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE FUNCTIONING OF OLIGARCHIC MECHANISMS WITHING LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATIONS. IN THE ITU MANY OF THESE MECHANISMS WERE NOT FOUND, "OR IF PRESENT THEIR EFFECTS ARE GREATLY MITIGATED BY OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE SYSTEM" [17]. HENCE, THE AUTHORS POINTED OUT THAT FUNDAMENTALLY THEIR ANALYSIS "IS DIRECTED AT SPECIFYING THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE ITU AND THE PRINTING INDUSTRY WHICH WORK AGAINST OLIGARCHIC MECHANISMS, AND A SPELLING OUT THE PROCESSES BY WHICH THEY CONTRIBUTE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE UNION DEMOCRACY" [18]. IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THE ITU'S UNIQUE POLITICAL SYSTEM, THE AUTHORS VIEW THE UNION AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM, "FOCUSING ON ITS CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES AND LOOKING FOR THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE OCCUPATION, THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNION, AND THE ECONOMICS OF THE INDUSTRY WHICH IN THEIR INTRICATE INTERRELATIONS OPERATE TO SUSTAIN THE NETWORK OF INSTITUTIONS, BEHAVIOR, AND SENTIMENTS COMPOSING THE UNION'S INTERNAL POLITICAL SYSTEM" [19].

ON THE BASIS OF UNION DEMOCRACY'S CONCEPTUALIZATION, IT COULD BE OBSERVED THAT THE UNION ORGANIZATION OF CÓRDOBA PRINTERS, THE UOGC, WOULD HAVE SHOWN DURING MOST OF ITS

HISTORY -IN CONTRAST WITH THE ITU- AN OLIGARCHIC POLITICAL SYSTEM [20]. THAT IS, ONE GROUP, THE LISTA ROSA,

(1) CONTROLS THE ADMINISTRATION,

(2) HAS RETAINED POWER ALMOST INDEFINITELY [21], AND

(3) HAS RARELY FACED ORGANIZED OPPOSITION.

HOWEVER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT UNION DEMOCRACY'S ANALYSIS, OLIGARCHIC TENDENCIES SHOULD HAVE NOT DEVELOPED IN THE UOGC:

(1) THE UOGC COULD HARDLY BE CONSIDERED A "LARGE-SCALE" ORGANIZATION:

(1.A) ITS MEMBERSHIP IS APPROXIMATELY 500 MEMBERS, ABOUT 1/20 OF THE NEW YORK LOCAL;

(1.B) THE UNION DOES NOT HAVE FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO PAY OFFICIALS, WHO HAVE JUST BEGUN TO RECEIVE A SMALL COMPENSATION [22];

(1.C) GIVEN THAT OFFICIALS CANNOT LEAVE THEIR JOBS, THEY HAVE TO WORK IN THE UNION WHEN THEIR WORKDAY IS OVER;

(1.D) OFFICIALS DO NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE FORMAL MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, BECAUSE THE UNION DOES NOT HAVE ANY;

(1.E) THE DIFFERENCE IN POLITICAL SKILLS BETWEEN THE OFFICIALS AND THE RANK AND FILE IS SLIGHT, BECAUSE THE UNION DOES NOT HAVE A PROFESSIONAL, FULL-TIME ADMINISTRATION.

(2) IN THE UOGC, CONDITIONS SHOULD NOT INDUCE LEADERS TO STAY IN OFFICE:

(2.A) IT COULD BE THOUGHT THAT THE UNION OFFICIAL HAS NOT MOVED UP IN THE STATUS HIERARCHY BY BECOMING AN OFFICIAL: HIS INCOME IS THE SAME AS THAT OF ANY OTHER WORKER;

(2.B) GIVEN THAT THE UOGC IS A SMALL LOCAL WITH A LIMITED PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL UNION POLITICS, IT COULD BE ASSUMED THAT THE OFFICIAL'S PRESTIGE IS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN THE PRESTIGE OF ANY OTHER PERSON IN THE TRADE. THIS IS MORE SO IF WE REMEMBER THAT ALL THE OFFICIALS CONTINUE WORKING AT THE TRADE;

(2.C) AS A RESULT OF THIS SITUATION, THE LEADERSHIP SHOULD NOT FEEL THE NECESSITY OF ELIMINATING DEMOCRACY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ITS STATUS.

WE CAN SEE THAT MOST OF THE FACTORS SINGLED OUT IN <u>UNION DEMOCRACY</u> AS LEADING TO THE EMERGENCE OF OLIGARCHIC PATTERNS IN A UNION ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE UOGC. HOWEVER, THE UOGC WOULD HAVE SHOWN SUCH AN OLIGARCHIC PATTERN [23]

DURING MOST OF ITS HISTORY. FURTHER MORE, SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIPS SINGLED OUT BY LIPSET ET AL TO EXPLAIN THE ARISING OF THE ITU'S DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM SEEM TO BE WORKING IN THE UOGC'S CASE. IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UNION DEMOCRACY'S PROCEDURE, WE WILL BEGIN THE ANALYSIS OF THOSE RELATIONSHIPS IN SECTION 11 OF THE PRESENT WORK.

1.1 DEMOCRACY OR OLIGARCHY IN THE UOGCY

THROUGHOUT THE PRESENT WORK, THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY WILL BE USED IN THE SENSE PROPOSED BY LIPSET ET.AL., THAT IS, TO INDICATE THE PRESENCE OF INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER, THE EXISTENCE OF PERMANENT OPPOSITION, THE PREVALENCE OF A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM. THIS PROCEDURE WAS REQUIRED BY THE PROPER NATURE OF OUR REPLICATION STUDY. HOWEVER, THE CONCEPTUALIZATION REQUIRES SOME QUALIFICATIONS, AND SEVERAL CRITICISMS HAVE BEEN RAISED AGAINST SUCH AN APPROACH:

1) GIOVANNI SARTORI HAS POINTED OUT THAT "THE TERM DEMOCRACY INDICATES BOTH A SET OF IDEALS AND A POLITICAL SYSTEM" [24]. IN UNION DEMOCRACY IT SEEMS THAT WHILE THE NATURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS EMPHASIZED, THE IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS ARE OVERSHADOWED. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EMPIRICAL DETERMINATION OF "DEMOCRATIC" IDEALS IS AS PROBLEMATIC AS THE SELECTION OF "DEMOCRATIC" POLITICAL

SYSTEMS.

2) IN HIS DISCUSSION, SARTORI NOTES THAT

> "... A MACRODEMOCRACY IS NOT SOME KIND OF ENLARGEMENT OF A MICROPROTOTYPE. THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPERTIES HAVE VERY LITTLE, IF ANYTHING, IN COMMON, AT LEAST IN THE SENSE THAT VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND SMALL POLITICAL UNITS PROVIDE NO CLUES FOR UNDERSTANDING A MODERN POLITICAL DEMOCRACY" [25].

SO, UNION DEMOCRACY'S ATTEMPT "TO ILLUMINATE THE PROCESSES THAT HELP MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY IN THE GREAT SOCIETY BY STUDYING THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE SMALL SOCIETY OF THE ITU" [26] WOULD BE A MISLEADING EFFORT.

3) ANOTHER PROBLEMATIC ASPECT REFERS TO THE PRESENCE OF "INTERMEDIATE STRUCTURES". TOCQUEVILLE, DURKHEIM, KORNHAUSER, LIPSET, WOULD BE AMONG THE AUTHORS FOR WHOM, AS SARTORI NOTES, "DEMOCRACY PRESUPPOSES THE BACKBONE OF AN 'INTERMEDIATE STRUCTURE' OF INDEPENDENT GROUPS AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS" [27]. HOWEVER, SARTORI OBSERVES THAT "ONE SHOULD BE WARY OF CONSIDERING THIS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR ANY STAGE OF DEMOCRACY" [28]. ONE THING IS THE NECESSITY OF THE PRESENCE OF AN "INFRASTRUCTURE" FOR THE ARISING OF DEMOCRACY, ANOTHER THING THE PROBLEM OF THE PERMANENCY OF DEMOCRACY.

4) ANOTHER QUESTION IS RELATED WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF A PARTICULAR TYPE OF STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT. THIS POINT HAS BEEN STATED BY FAUNCE:

> "THERE IS A VARIETY OF STRUCTURAL FORMS THAT MAY CONTRIBUTE TO ACHIEVING DEMOCRATIC OBJECTIVES. INDEXES OF DEMOCRACY THAT MEASURE THE EXISTENCE OF PARTICULAR STRUCTURAL FORMS MAY OR MAY NOT BE MEASURES OF THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES. FURTHER ANALYSIS IS NEEDED OF THE VARIABLES THAT DETERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENT STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS IN ACHIEVING AND SUSTAINING UNION DEMOCRACY" [29].

THAT IS, THE ITU'S POLITICAL SYSTEM WOULD BE ONE POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT AMONG SEVERAL OTHERS.

5) A FINAL PROBLEM REFERS TO THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS. SARTORI, FOLLOWING LIPSET, MENTIONS THAT IT IS "PROLONGED EFFECTIVENESS WHICH GIVES LEGITIMACY TO A POLITICAL SYSTEM" [30]. BUT, HE ADDS THAT "THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEMOCRACY DEPENDS FIRST AND FOREMOST ON THE EFFICIENCY AND SKILL OF ITS LEADERSHIP" [31]. ON THE OTHER HAND, LIPSET ET AL SUGGEST THAT A "REPRESENTATIVE" LEADERSHIP CAN ARISE BASICALLY IN A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM. THERE IS NO PROOF, HOWEVER, THAT THE EFFICIENCY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS OF LEADERSHIP DEPENDS ON A DETERMINED TYPE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM. AS J. SEIDMAN NOTES WITH RESPECT TO THE PROBLEM OF EFFICIENCY:

> "IF THEY (UNIONS) ARE TO BE MERELY EFFECTIVE STRIKING AND COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING AGENCIES, THEN IT IS BEST FOR THEM TO BE DISCIPLINED BODIES AIDED BY EXPERTS IN THE NEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS. IF THEY ARE TO BE EFFICIENT SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS AND NOTHING MORE, THEN A BUREAUCRACY TO PROSECUTE GRIEVANCE CASES, REPRESENT MEMBERS BEFORE WELFARE OR OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, AND THE LIKE IS ENOUGH" [32].

THE PURPOSE OF THE PRECEEDING DISCUSSION WAS TO POINT OUT THAT IF THE NATURE OF OUR STUDY LEADS US TO CLOSELY FOLLOW UNION DEMOCRACY'S ANALYSIS, IT DOES NOT IMPLY AN ACRITICAL ATTITUDE. IN THE LAST SECTIONS OF THIS WORK WE WILL ATTACK SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS WHICH WERE SCHEMATICALLY PRESENTED HERE.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UOGC

AS AN INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATION, IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESENT HISTORICAL NOTE IS BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESENT AND PAST UNION OFFICIALS, WITHOUT THE HELP OF A WRITTEN ACCOUNT. FURTHERMORE, IT SHOULD BE ADDED THAT THESE ARE PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN -OR STILL ARE- INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLES OF THE UNION, WHOSE BIASES CAN BE EASILY ASCERTAINED WHILE READING THEIR DESCRIPTIONS OF THE "HISTORICAL FACTS". AS A GENERAL RULE, WE HAVE TRIED TO RESTRAIN OURSELVES TO PRESENTING THEIR CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS, WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THEM.

WHILE DESCRIBING THE HISTORY OF THE ITU, LIPSET ET AL NOTED THAT "IN MOST COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN WORLD, PRINTERS WERE AMONG THE FIRST WORKERS TO FORM PERMANENT LABOR UNIONS"[33]. THEY ADDED THAT "AMERICAN PRINTERS WERE NO EXCEPTION"[34]. NEITHER WERE ARGENTINIAN PRINTERS. ONE OF THE FIRST UNIONS IN THE COUNTRY WAS FORMED BY PRINTERS, AND THEY WERE ALSO

THE FIRST TO ORGANIZE A STRIKE. ROBERTO J. PAYRÓ, A WRITER, DESCRIBED BUENOS AIRES PRINTERS AS "THE MOST INDEPENDENT AND MILITANT CLASS THAT HAS EVER EXISTED IN OUR CAPITAL" [35]. THEIR FIRST ORGANIZATION WAS THE SOCIEDAD TIPOGRÁFICA BONAERENSE (TYPOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY OF BUENOS AIRES), FOUNDED ON MAY 25, 1857. ITS GOALS WERE "TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TYPOGRAPHICAL ART" [36], "TO HELP MEMBERS WHO WERE ILL OR HANDICAPED FOR WORKING" [37], "TO PROTECT THOSE WHO NEED A JUST SUPPORT" [38], AND "TO OBTAIN GOOD REMUNERATIONS FOR PRINTERS, RELATIVE TO THEIR APTITUDES AND KNOWLEDGE" [39]. THIS INITIAL ORGANIZATION HAD THE CHARACTER OF A CORPORATIVE, MUTUAL AID, BENEVOLENT SOCIETY.

THE FIRST UNION AS SUCH WAS THE UNIÓN DE TIPÓGRAFOS (TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION), FOUNDED IN 1876. "... THE UNIÓN DE TIPÓGRAFOS EMERGES IN THE LABOR STRUGGLES OF THE COUNTRY AS THE FIRST ORGANIZATION OF SALARIED WORKERS WHOSE PRECISE OBJECTIVES ARE THOSE OF THE MODERN LABOR UNION" [40]. BY THAT TIME, WORK IN PRINT SHOPS WAS OF A COMPLETE ARTISAN CHARACTER. THE FIRST STRIKE IN THE COUNTRY, PROMOTED BY THE UNIÓN DE TIPÓGRAFOS, TOOK PLACE IN 1878. ITS PURPOSE WAS TO ACHIEVE SALARY IMPROVEMENTS, BETTER WORKING CONDITIONS, AND THE LIMITATION OF THE HOURS OF WORK. THE STRIKE LASTED MORE THAN A MONTH. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IN THE COUNTRY THAT SALARY WAS DETERMINED THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING [41]... WITH THE STRIKE DISAPPEARS THE UNIÓN DE TIPÓGRAFOS, AS A

RESULT OF A DECISION OF THE UNION ITSELF, BECAUSE ITS ENDS WERE CONTEMPLATED IN THE SOCIEDAD TIPOGRÁFICA BONAERENSE. HOWEVER, "THE SOCIEDAD TIPOGRÁFICA BONAERENSE CONTINUES BEING, AFTER THIS EPISODE, AN EXCLUSIVELY MUTUAL AID ORGANIZATION, AS IT HAD BEEN DURING THE TWENTY YEARS PREVIOUS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIRST ARGENTINIAN LABOR UNION. NOTWITHSTANDING, IF DURING ITS EXISTENCE IT MAINTAINED ITS SPECIFIC MUTUAL AID CHARACTER, IT CONTINUED BEING THE PROGENITOR OF UNION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE COUNTRY"[42].

AROUND 1900, TWO ORGANIZATIONS OF PRINTERS WERE FORMED: THE SINDICATO GRÁFICO (PRINTING UNION), CONTROLLED BY SOCIALISTS, AND THE FEDERACIÓN DE ARTES GRÁFICAS (FEDERATION OF GRAPHIC ARTS), CONTROLLED BY ANARCHISTS. THE LATTER ONE WAS FORMED BY UNIONS BASED ON THE DIFFERENT CRAFTS WITHIN PRINTING INDUSTRY (TYPOGRAPHERS, LINOTYPE OPERATORS, ETC.), AND THESE INTEGRATED THE FEDERATION. THE SINDICATO GRÁFICO, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS NOT CHARACTERIZED BY A SPECIFICATION OF CRAFTS. IN 1906 BOTH UNIONS UNITE WITHIN THE FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA BONAERENSE (PRINTING FEDERATION OF BUENOS AIRES). THE FEDERATION WAS FORMED ON THE BASIS OF CRAFT UNIONS. THEY MAINTAINED THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION, WITHOUT INTERFERENCE OF POLITICAL FACTORS. ANARCHISTS AND SOCIALISTS WERE PREDOMINANT IN THE UNION. IN 1911 THE SOCIALISTS ACHIEVED CONTROL OF THE UNION ADMINISTRATION, AND THE DISTINCTION OF CRAFTS DISAPPEARED FROM THE

ORGANIZATION.

BY THAT TIME, THERE ARE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATION. IN 1927 THIS IDEA IS REALIZED IN THE FEDERACIÓN OBRERA POLIGRÁFICA ARGENTINA (ARGENTINIAN POLYGRAPHIC LABOR FEDERATION). IT LASTED A SHORT PERIOD, UNTIL 1929 OR 1930. THE SOCIALIST PREDOMINANCE CONTINUES DURING THIS TIME. IN 1928, THE UNIÓN DE LINOTIPISTAS, MECÁNICOS Y AFINES (MACHINE, LINOTYPE OPERATORS, AND RELATED CRAFTS UNION) ORGANIZED AS A RESULT OF A COLLECTIVE CONTRACT SIGNED BY THE FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA BONAERENSE, DENYING A DIRECT AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION FOR THE SPECIFIC CRAFTS. SOME LEADERS SAID THAT THIS GROUP OF PEOPLE CONSIDERED THEMSELVES A PRIVILEGED GROUP WITHIN THE INDUSTRY, AND THAT THEIR UNION WAS DESTROYED BY THE FEDERATION. OTHER LEADERS MENTIONED THAT WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT IN 1939 A CONVERGENCE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THE UNIÓN DE LINOTIPISTAS, MECÁNICOS Y AFINES AND THE FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA BONAERENSE, ON THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT BY MEANS OF WHICH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATION WAS MODIFIED, PROVIDING THE DIFFERENT CRAFTS WITH ACTIVE AND DIRECT REPRESENTATION. FROM 20 MEMBERS OF THE UNION ADMINISTRATION, 10 WERE ELECTED ON GENERAL ELECTIONS, AND THE OTHER 10 WERE ELECTED ON THE BASIS OF CRAFTS [43]. ONE UNION LEADER MENTIONED IN AN INTERVIEW THAT THOSE ELECTED ON THE BASIS OF CRAFTS HAD A MORE SYNDICALIST ORIENTATION. ANOTHER EX-UNION MEMBER POINTED OUT THAT UNTIL 1946 THE

FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA BONAERENSE WAS A MINORITARIAN ORGANIZATION WHICH INCLUDED ONLY THE MOST SKILLED CRAFTS IN THE INDUSTRY: LINOTYPE OPERATORS AND TYPOGRAPHERS FROM THE BIG NEWSPAPERS, LINOTYPE AND MACHINE OPERATORS AND TYPOGRAPHERS FROM THE LARGER SHOPS [44].

A NATIONAL MEETING OF LOCALS FROM DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY TOOK PLACE ON JULY, 1941. IN THIS MEETING WAS FORMED THE PRESENT FEDERACIÓN ARGENTINA DE TRABAJADORES DE LA IMPRENTA - FATI (ARGENTINIAN FEDERATION OF PRINTING WORKERS). ITS INITIAL ACTIVITIES WERE DEVOTED TO OBTAIN REGIONAL COLLECTIVE CONTRACTS IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE. ONE UNION OFFICIAL NOTED THAT IT WAS ORGANIZED ON THE BASIS OF SYNDICALIST PRINCIPLES, WITH DIFFERENT CURRENT OF THOUGHTS CONVERGING ON SUCH AN IDEAL. HE ADDED THAT THE FEDERATION'S LEADERSHIP WAS INTEGRATED BY MEN WHO REPRESENTED THOSE DIFFERENT CURRENT OF THOUGHTS, EVEN WHEN THE INITIAL "DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES" -WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS OF A RELATIVE VALUE AND INSPIRED ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL LABOR ASSOCIATIONS- HAD A CLEAR SOCIALIST. MARXIST TONE [45]. THE "DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES" POINTS OUT:

> "CONSIDERING: THAT THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY, BASED ON THE EXPLOITATION OF MAN BY MAN AND ON THE PRIVATE PROPERTY OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE, IS UNJUST BECAUSE A PRIVILEGED MINORITY ENJOY ALL THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL ADVANTAGES, WHILE THE GREAT MAJORITY THAT INTEGRATES THE

WORKING CLASS -THE PRODUCERS OF SOCIAL GOODS- LIVES IN CONDITIONS OF INDIGENCE; AND CONSIDERING THAT THE PRESENT POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL ORGANIZATION TENDS TOWARDS THE PERPETUATION OF SUCH AN INJUSTICE.

THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRINTING WORKERS OF ARGENTINA,
DECLARE:
THAT THIS UNJUST SOCIAL ORGANIZATION MUST BE REPLACED BY A SOCIETY BASED ON THE COLLECTIVE PROPERTY OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE; THAT UNTIL THIS TIME COMES. IT IS THE DUTY OF THE WORKING CLASS TO JOINTLY FIGHT IN ORDER TO ATTENUATE THE EFFECTS OF THAT INJUSTICE: THAT BOTH OBJECTIVES WILL BE ONLY ACHIEVED THROUGH A PERMANENT STRUGGLE OF WORKERS AGAINST THEIR EXPLOITERS, AND THAT THE SUCCESS OF SUCH A STRUGGLE MUST BE BASED ON A COLLECTIVE AND SOLIDARY ACTION AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, THEY DECIDE TO CREATE -FOR SUCH A PURPOSE- THE FEDERACIÓN ARGENTINA DE TRABAJADORES DE LA IMPRENTA (FATI)" [46].

IN ANOTHER INTERVIEW, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT IN THE MEETING WHERE THE FATI WAS FOUNDED, THE SKILLED PERSONNEL PREDOMINATED, AND ONLY THE SUPERIOR AND MORE SKILLED CRAFTS WERE ORGANIZED. HE ADDED THAT THOSE GROUPS DOMINATED THE UNION UNTIL 1949, KEEPING THE ORGANIZATION UNDER THEIR CONTROL UNTIL THAT TIME BECAUSE SUCH LABOR ARISTOCRACY WAS NOT PENETRATED BY PERONISM. IN THAT YEAR -HE CONTINUED- PERONISM BREAKS IN THE PRINTERS' SCENE, AND THE GREAT MASSES OF THE LARGER SHOPS ARE ORGANIZED: BOOKBINDERS, APPRENTICES, UNSKILLED WORKERS, PRINTERS FROM ALL THE SMALL AND MEDIUM SHOPS JOIN THE UNION. THERE IS A MASSIVE ADHERENCE TO THE UNION [47]. ANOTHER SOURCE MENTIONED THAT

THE CONVENTION OF 1941, WHERE THE FATI WAS FOUNDED, WAS AN EMOTIONAL ONE, I.E., THAT A PURE SYNDICALIST ORIENTATION PREDOMINATED -WITH AN INTERNAL LINE OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM-, AND THAT THE PRINTERS' ORGANIZATION WAS FORTIFIED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE MAJORITY OF PRINTERS. HE THINKS THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FATI WAS CHARACTERIZED BY "DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM" [48].

IN THE ELECTIONS OF 1948 IN THE BUENOS AIRES' LOCAL -THE FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA BONAERENSE- THE PERONISTS WON THE CONTROL OF THE UNION. THE FATI MOVED ITS HEADQUARTERS TO THE ROSARIO'S LOCAL [49], AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA ROSARINA (PRINTING FEDERATION OF ROSARIO) BECAME THE FATI'S GENERAL SECRETARY. IN 1949 A STRIKE ORGANIZED FROM OUTSIDE THE UNION BY THE NON-PERONIST FRACTION OF THE BUENOS AIRES' LOCAL TOOK PLACE, AND IT LASTED A MONTH. THE FATI ORGANIZED A GENERAL STRIKE TO SUPPORT BUENOS AIRES' PRINTERS. THIS STRIKE WAS ORGANIZED AGAINST THE PERONIST LEADERSHIP. AN EX-PRINTER SUGGESTED THAT THE STRIKE HAD A MANIFEST GOAL OF OBTAINING ECONOMIC VINDICATIONS, BUT THAT THE LATENT GOAL WAS A POLITICAL ONE. HE ADDED THAT THE STRIKE WAS VIOLENTLY SUPPRESSED BY THE PERONIST REGIME, AND THAT THE OLD LEADERSHIP WAS MOVED OUT WHILE THE UNION WAS KEPT UNDER THE INTERVENTION OF THE CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DEL TRABAJO - CGT (GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR) FOR MANY YEARS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT

DURING THIS PERIOD PERONIST ORGANIZATIONS AMONG THE RANK-AND-FILE WERE CREATED, AND AS A RESULT, THE UNSKILLED, INDIFFERENTIATED MASS VOTED FOR PERONISM. HE CONCLUDED THAT BETWEEN 1949 AND 1955 (WHEN A COUP OVERTHREW THE PERONIST REGIME) THE OLD GENERATION WAS DISAPPEARING AND THE NEW ONES WERE MOBILIZED UNDER THE PERONIST FERVOUR [50]. ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW WAS THAT THE FEDERATION KEPT ITS INDEPENDENCE DURING THE PERONIST REGIME UNTIL 1950, AND THAT THOSE WERE THE YEARS WHEN THE UNION WORKED MOST, OBTAINED MANY LABOR CONQUESTS, AND WAS PERSECUTED THE MOST [51].

AFTER THE STRIKE OF 1949, THE REPRESENTATION OF PRINTERS IN ALL THE COUNTRY WAS ASSUMED BY THE FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA BONAERENSE (BUENOS AIRES' LOCAL), WHILE A NEW NATIONAL ORGANIZATION SUPPORTED BY THE PERONIST REGIME WAS CREATED: THE FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA ARGENTINA (ARGENTINIAN PRINTING FEDERATION). AN EX-UNION LEADER POINTED OUT THAT IN ORDER TO RECOVER THE "LOST PRESTIGE", THE PERONIST INTERVENTION THROUGH THE NEW FEDERATION SIGNED A NATIONAL COLLECTIVE CONTRACT BY MEANS OF WHICH MANY IMPORTANT IMPROVEMENTS WERE OBTAINED FOR PRINTERS. THE CONTRACT ALSO ESTABLISHED THAT THE UNION FEES SHOULD BE DIRECTLY PAID BY THE OWNERS TO THE NATIONAL FEDERATION BY RETAINING THE CORRESPONDING FEES FROM THE WORKERS' SALARIES. THAT IS -HE CONCLUDED-, THE NEW ORGANIZATION WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A

COMPLETE "CENTRALISM" [52].

IN 1955, AFTER THE OVERTHROWN OF PERÓN'S REGIME, THE NATIONAL FEDERATION IS AGAIN INTERVENED. THE NEW ELECTIONS ARE WON BY THE LISTA ROSA (ROSE LIST), WHICH REPRESENTS THE OLD LEADERSHIP MOVED OUT DURING THE FIRST PERONIST INTERVENTION. ONE RESPONDENT SUGGESTED THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE LAW, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENTATION OF LISTS IN THE UNION, AND NOT IN THE PLACE OF WORK. THIS SOURCE ADDED THAT IN THIS WAY THE LABOR ARISTOCRACY COULD RECOVER THE CONTROL OF THE UNION TOGETHER WITH A PERONIST MINORITY WHICH FINALLY LEFT THE UNION ADMINISTRATION. THE SAME SOURCE NOTED THAT WORKERS FROM THE CITY'S NEWSPAPERS SUPPORTED THE LISTA ROSA, WHILE THE WORKERS FROM THE SUBURBAN AREAS WERE ABSENT FROM THE ELECTION PROCESS [53]. A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW WAS THAT AFTER THE 1955 COUP, A MORE FEDERALIST, DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATION WAS ACHIEVED. IN 1957, THE FATI WAS REORGANIZED IN CÓRDOBA ON THOSE BASES. EACH LOCAL UNION BEGAN TO RECEIVE THE CORRESPONDING FEES INSTEAD OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION. THE ONLY THING KEPT WAS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON A NATIONAL BASIS [54].

ON NOVEMBER, 1966, THE PERONISTS RECOVERED ONCE MORE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BUENOS AIRES' LOCAL. ONE RESPONDENT OBSERVED THAT THIS WAS THE RESULT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW, GIVEN THAT IN 1958 THE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS' LAW WAS RESTABLISHED AND IT RULED THAT THE ELECTORAL

PROCESS IN UNIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN THE WORK PLACE. DURING SOME YEARS THE LAW WAS NOT REALLY ENFORCED IN THE BUENOS AIRES' LOCAL, BUT THAT OCCURRED IN 1966 [55]. HOWEVER, ANOTHER OPINION WAS THAT NEITHER THE UNION LAW NOR THE PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS' LAW WERE CLEAR WITH RESPECT TO THE FORM ELECTIONS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT, SO THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED WAS CONSIDERED LEGAL [56]. ON THE OTHER HAND, AN EX-UNION LEADER SUGGESTED THAT THE LISTA ROSA LOST THE 1966 ELECTIONS BECAUSE OF AN INTERNAL DIVISION WHICH ALLOWED THE VICTORY OF PERONIST SECTORS [57].

UNTIL NOW, WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH THE GENERAL HISTORY OF PRINTERS AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, WITH THE LARGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT LOCAL: THE FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA BONAERENSE (PRINTING FEDERATION OF BUENOS AIRES). WITH RESPECT TO THE HISTORY OF CÓRDOBA PRINTERS, IT CAN BE TRACED BACK TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PRESENT CENTURY. A SINDICATO GRÁFICO (PRINTING UNION) WAS ORGANIZED BY THAT TIME, BUT IT HAD A SHORT LIFE. SEVERAL ATTEMPTS OF REORGANIZATION TOOK PLACE, WHILE PRINTERS BEGAN TO STRUGGLE FOR BETTER SALARIES AND EIGHT HOURS OF WORK. THE SINDICATO DE ARTES GRÁFICAS (GRAPHIC ARTS UNION) WAS THE NEW ORGANIZATION. AS A UNION OFFICIAL SUGGESTED, IT NEVER HAD A DETERMINED POLITICAL ORIENTATION, BUT ANARCHO-SYNDICALIST GROUPS PREDOMINATED AND, AFTER A WHILE, SOCIALIST GROUPS ACHIEVED SOME INFLUENCE [58]. IN 1917 AN IMPORTANT NATIONAL STRIKE

OF RAILROAD WORKERS AFFECTS THE COUNTRY. PRINTERS PARTICIPATE IN CÓRDOBA AND THEY ARE REPRESSED. AS A RESULT, THE ORGANIZATION DISAPPEARS. IN 1918 THERE IS AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT OF REORGANIZATION. IN 1923 OR 1924 THE SINDICATO DE ARTES GRÁFICAS BEGINS TO ACT AGAIN, AND IN 1928 THEY ACHIEVE A VERY IMPORTANT CONQUEST: THE EIGHT HOURS JOURNEY.

THE UNION LASTS UNTIL 1930, WHEN A MILITARY COUP TAKES PLACE AND THE ORGANIZATION IS CLOSED. BETWEEN 1930 AND 1934 THERE ARE SEVERAL ATTEMPTS OF REORGANIZATION. A UNION LEADER POINTED OUT THAT IN THOSE YEARS SOME COMMUNIST GROUPS BEGAN TO PREDOMINATE IN THE TRADE, TOGETHER WITH DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS [59]. IN 1934 A GROUP OF PRINTERS DECIDE TO REORGANIZE THE UNION AND TO TRY TO MAINTAIN IT. THE NEWSPAPER EL OBRERO GRÁFICO (THE PRINTER), PUBLISHED BY THE BUENOS AIRES' LOCAL, REMEBERS THAT PROCESS IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: "ON APRIL 7, 1934, A GROUP OF PRINTERS DECIDE THE CREATION OF THE UNION ORGANIZATION IN THE TRADE. TO FULFILL THIS PURPOSE, THEY FORMED A PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH HAD THE TASK OF GROUPING ALL THE PRINTERS OF CÓRDOBA CITY. THIS TASK REQUIRED A LONG TIME, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE APATHY PREVAILING IN THE TRADE GIVEN THE OWNERS AND STATE PERSECUTION. HOWEVER, THE MEN WHO LED WHAT BY THAT TIME WAS THE SINDICATO DE ARTES GRÁFICAS PERSISTED ON THEIR ATTEMPT AND, MOVING FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER WITH THE UNION ADMINISTRATION BEHIND THEM, ACHIEVED

BY THE MIDDLE OF 1935 THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE PRINTERS' UNION ORGANIZATION" [60].

THE FIRST IMPORTANT PRINTERS' STRIKE OCCURS IN 1935, BUT IT IS DEFEATED AS A RESULT OF THE ORGANIZERS' LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND POLICE REPRESSION [61]. SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO REORGANIZE THE UNION TAKE PLACE FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. A UNION OFFICIAL MENTIONED THAT THE FIRST RESULTS WERE MORE CROWDED MEETINGS AND A MANIFEST INTEREST ON THE PART OF THE WORKERS TO VINDICATE THEIR RIGHTS. HE ADDED THAT IN 1936 BEGAN THE TRUE STAGE OF UNION ORGANIZATION AMONG CÓRDOBA PRINTERS, BECAUSE IN THAT YEAR MEETINGS WERE CARRIED OUT WITH MORE THAN 50 MEMBERS AND THE FIRST EFFECTIVE CONQUESTS WERE ACHIEVED [62]. BY THAT TIME, PRINTERS WERE ALREADY ORGANIZED WITHIN THE UNIÓN OBRERA GRÁFICA CORDOBESA -UOGC.

AROUND 1940, AS IT WAS POINTED OUT, BEGAN THE EFFORTS TO REORGANIZE THE NATIONAL FEDERATION, WHERE THE UOGC ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. IN 1942, THE UNION CARRIED OUT A SURVEY ABOUT THE WORKING CONDITIONS OF CÓRDOBA PRINTERS. ON APRIL, 1942, THEY REQUIRED SALARY INCREASES AND OBTAINED APPROXIMATELY 100% IMPROVEMENTS. THIS WAS PRECEDED BY LONG DISCUSSIONS AND THREATS OF STRIKE. ON MAY 3, 1942, THEY GOT THE OWNERS' AGREEMENT AND SIGNATURE ON THE FIRST COLLECTIVE CONTRACT IN THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. THE JOURNEY OF SIX HOURS FOR UNHEALTHY PLANTS WAS ESTABLISHED IN ALL SHOPS [63].

During the Peronist regime, they maintained their independence until 1950. Before that, the union was controlled by the Lista Rosa, "where different currents of thought were united on the basis of a declared exclusive trade-union ideal" [64]. In 1950 the old leadership is moved out by a manouver of the Confederación General del Trabajo -CGT, and the secretary general of the UOGC was imprisoned. As a result of all these processes, the UOGC became a dependent section of the Federación Gráfica Argentina (Argentinian Printing Federation), the new national organization created after the CGT's intervention of the FATI. On October 11, 1955 -after the fall of Perón's regime-, a general meeting decides to recover the character of autonomous union local, and to readopt the denomination of Unión Obrera Gráfica Cordobesa -UOGC.

2.1 Internal Conflicts in the FATI and the UOGC

The presence of lines of conflict between Argentinian printers can be traced back to their first organizational attempts, particularly within the Buenos Aires' local [65]. The political cleavage between anarcho-syndicalists and socialists is as old as the history of the Argentinian labor movement itself. The printers were no exception.

HOWEVER, THIS CONFLICT SEEMS TO ASSUME AMONG THEM A SPECIFIC CHARACTER: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE SUPPORTERS OF A UNION BASED ON THE DIFFERENT CRAFTS WITHIN PRINTING TRADE -THE ANARCHO-SYNDICALISTS-, AND THE SUPPORTERS OF A UNION WITHOUT CRAFT DISTINCTIONS -THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS. THIS LATTER STRUGGLE SOMETIMES LED TO SEPARATIST ATTEMPTS, SUCH AS THAT OF THE LINOTYPE OPERATORS, WHO FORMED THE UNIÓN DE LINOTIPISTAS, MECÁNICOS Y AFINES [66]. OF COURSE, IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE TO WHAT EXTENT THE CONFLICT ON THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OVERLAPS THE CONFLICT ON THE OCCUPATIONAL STATUS DIMENSION [67].

IN THE CASE OF THE UOGC, CONFLICTS HAVE BEEN PRACTICALLY ABSENT FROM THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY. AS IT WAS POINTED OUT, MOST OF THEIR HISTORY IS CHARACTERIZED BY THEIR WILL TO UNITE, TO FORM AND MAINTAIN A PERMANENT ORGANIZATION, AND IT SEEMS THAT THESE EFFORTS HAVE EXCLUDED THE DEVELOPMENT OF WELL DEFINED POLITICAL CLEAVAGES. THIS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BUENOS AIRES AND CÓRDOBA PRINTERS CAN BE BETTER SEEN IN THE CASE OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PERONIST SECTORS AND THE LISTA ROSA. WE HAVE NOTED THAT THIS CONFLICT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH CERTAIN POINTS OF VIEW, INVOLVED THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE SUPPORTERS OF A COMPLETE, MASSIVE PARTICIPATION OF ALL PRINTERS IN UNION AFFAIRS, AND THE SUPPORTERS OF A UNION CONTROLLED BY THE MOST SKILLED PERSONNEL. IF THESE

CONSIDERATIONS ARE ALSO DIFFICULT TO BE CONFIRMED, IT IS CLEAR THAT IS NOT THE SITUATION AMONG CÓRDOBA PRINTERS, WHO HAVE PERMANENTLY FAVOURED A HIGH DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION [68]. IT HAS TO BE REMEMBERED THAT IN 1950 THE UOGC'S ADMINISTRATION WAS MOVED OUT BY A MANOUVER OF THE CGT, GIVEN THAT THE PERONIST SECTORS WERE UNABLE TO ORGANIZE A SUCCESSFUL OPPOSITION. FURTHERMORE, IN 1955 -AFTER THE FALL OF PERÓN'S REGIME- THE UOGC RECOVERED ITS AUTONOMY AND, AS A RESULT, THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE FATI AND THE BUENOS AIRES' LOCAL DID NOT FUNDAMENTALLY AFFECT THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CÓRDOBA PRINTERS.

AS A CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENT HISTORICAL NOTE, IT CAN BE OBSERVED THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RELATIVELY ACTIVIST AND MILITANT LABOR MOVEMENT OF CÓRDOBA, THE ABSENCE OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND THE PRESENCE OF A "ONE-LIST-SYSTEM" HAS BEEN A PERMANENT FEATURE IN THE UOGC, EVENTHOUGH THE POLITICAL PROCESS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL -AND WITHIN THE LARGEST AND MOST INFLUENTIAL LOCAL, THE FEDERACIÓN GRÁFICA BONAERENSE- HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY SYSTEMATIC CONFLICTS AND, SINCE 1946, BY A PERMANENT, SOMETIMES SUCCESSFUL OPPOSITION.

SECTION II - METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

3. REASONS FOR REPLICATION

IT HAS TO BE POINTED OUT THAT THE CENTRAL ATTEMPT OF OUR WORK IS NOT CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS. HOWEVER, THE COMPARATIVE, INTER-SOCIETAL ASPECT IMPOSED ITSELF AS A NECESSARY PROCESS. WE WERE CONFRONTED WITH THE PARTICULAR SITUATION THAT THE STUDY REQUIRED A LOCAL PRINTING UNION IN ANOTHER SOCIAL SETTING WHICH COULD BE THE BEST TEST FOR UNION DEMOCRACY'S THEORY. FORTUNATELY, WE FOUND A VERY INTERESTING CASE: AN ARGENTINIAN LOCAL UNION, THE UOGC, WHICH IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT IN UNION DEMOCRACY MIGHT HAS BEEN SEEN AS A DEMOCRATIC TYPE OF ORGANIZATION, AND THAT, INSTEAD, SEEMED TO BE CHARACTERIZED BY OLIGARCHIC PATTERNS.

WE HAVE NOTED THAT OUR ATTEMPT IS NOT CENTERED ON THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT SOCIETIES. OUR UNIT OF ANALYSIS, FOR REPLICATION PURPOSES, IS A LOCAL UNION WITHIN THE PRINTING TRADE. HOWEVER, AT VARIOUS STAGES OF THE RESEARCH, SOCIETAL DIFFERENCES ARE INTRODUCED. WHEN WE DISCUSS THE POLITICAL PROCESS WITHIN A UNION, THE POLITICAL PROCESS AT THE SOCIETAL LEVEL CANNOT BE IGNORED. IT MUST BE

POINTED OUT THAT WHEN WE MOVE FROM THE UNION LEVEL TO THE SOCIETAL LEVEL WE ARE ONLY SUGGESTING PLAUSIBLE HYPOTESIS WHICH COULD EXPLAIN A PARTICULAR RELATIONSHIP OR PROCESS. WE DO NOT ATTEMPT HERE TO MEASURE VARIABLES AT THE SOCIETAL LEVEL, WHICH WOULD BE FAR BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE PRESENT WORK. WE DO NOT ASSUME INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN BOTH PROCESSES. IT IS ONLY A STRATEGY FOR ANALYSIS.

THIS REPLICATION STUDY HOPES TO OVERCOME SOME OF THE PROBLEMS SINGLED OUT IN UNION DEMOCRACY'S METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX [69]. THERE, THE AUTHORS MENTIONED THAT WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE ALTERNATIVE OF EITHER CARRYING OUT AN INTENSIVE ANALYSIS OF A SINGLE CASE OR AN EXTENSIVE AND MORE SUPERFICIAL EXAMINATION OF MANY CASES, THE FORMER WAS CHOSEN [70]. WE EXPECT THAT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR COMPARISONS OPENED BY THE STUDY OF AT LEAST ANOTHER LOCAL IN A DIFFERENT COUNTRY COULD THROW SOME LIGHT ON THOSE ASPECTS WHICH "ARE INVARIANT FOR THE SINGLE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE" [71], PARTICULARLY BECAUSE "AN INTERNAL ANALYSIS WILL NOT ORDINARILY BE AS EXHAUSTIVE" [72] AS THE COMPARATIVE ONE. THIS ISSUE IS EVEN MORE RELEVANT IF WE REMEMBER THAT THE MAIN INVARIANT ASPECT IN THE ITU IS THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM ITSELF, AND THAT, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UOGC SEEMS TO BE CHARACTERIZED BY AN OLIGARCHIC TYPE OF ORGANIZATION. FURTHERMORE, THE INTRODUCTION OF BROAD SOCIETAL DIFFERENCES IN THE ANALYSIS COULD ALSO EXPAND THE COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVE: CÓRDOBA'S POPULATION IS APPROXIMATELY 10% OF NEW YORK'S; ITS DEGREE OF URBANIZATION AND MODERNIZATION IS, OF COURSE, FAR BEHIND FROM THAT OF NEW YORK, EVEN THOUGH IT IS A HIGHLY URBANIZED SETTING; THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IS FAIRLY RECENT AND THE PRESENCE OF TRADITIONAL ELEMENTS IS STILL POWERFULL; FINALLY, THE POLITICAL TRADITION OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE HAS BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY ALTERED SINCE 1930 [73].

3.1 RESEARCH POPULATION

THE PRESENT WORK CONSIDERED AS ITS UNIT OF ANALYSIS THE UNION ORGANIZATION OF CÓRDOBA PRINTERS: UNIÓN OBRERA GRÁFICA CORDOBESA -UOGC, A MEMBER OF THE FEDERACIÓN ARGENTINA DE TRABAJADORES DE LA IMPRENTA -FATI. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT REPLICATION PURPOSES, THE STUDY WAS CARRIED OUT THROUGH SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE CÓRDOBA LOCAL. THE SOURCE OF DATA WAS A RANDOM SAMPLE SELECTED FROM UOGC'S MEMBERS.

DIFFERENT FROM UNION DEMOCRACY STUDY, OUR SAMPLE WAS NOT A TWO-STAGE STRATIFIED RANDOM SAMPLE. IN UNION DEMOCRACY, "FIRST SHOPS WERE SELECTED, THEN MEN WITHIN SHOPS" [74]. WE ALSO STRATIFIED SHOPS INTO THREE SIZE GROUPS, SMALL, MEDIUM, AND LARGE, ON THE BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF WORKERS IN EACH

SHOP. BUT, WE INCLUDED ALL THE LARGE AND MEDIUM SHOPS, AND AROUND 70% OF THE SMALL ONES. AS A RESULT OF THE ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS INFORMATION, WE OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS A GROUP OF SHOPS WITH A RANGE OF 3 TO 12 WORKERS, ANOTHER WITH A RANGE OF 30 TO 35, AND FINALLY, ONE WITH 60 OR MORE. SO, WE DETERMINED THAT A SMALL SHOP SHOULD HAVE 2 TO 19 WORKERS, A MEDIUM SHOP 20 TO 39, AND A LARGE ONE 40 OR MORE [75]. THIS DIVISION ALLOWED US TO HAVE IN THE LATTER GROUP ALL THE CITY'S NEWPAPERS, AND IN THE MEDIUM AND SMALL CATEGORIES THE MOST AND LESS IMPORTANT SHOPS RESPECTIVELY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNION'S EVALUATION. THE SAMPLE IN TERMS OF THE SHOP SIZE CATEGORIES IS GIVEN BELOW (THE PROPORTIONS FOR THE MEDIUM AND SMALL GROUPS WERE INCREASED, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN HIGHER FIGURES FOR COMPARATIVE PURPOSES):

SHOP SIZE	SAMPLE	POPULATION (UNION MEMBERS IN EACH GROUP)
LARGE	83 (30%)	277
MEDIUM	26 (40%)	66
SMALL	32 (40%)	82
	141	425

FOLLOWING UNION DEMOCRACY'S METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS, NO STATISTICAL TEST IS INTRODUCED IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA [76]. ONLY TABLES ARE USED FOR THE PRESENTATION OF DATA, AND, FOR THIS REASON, UNION DEMOCRACY'S FIGURES AND DIAGRAMS ARE PUT IN TABLE-FORM. IN THE DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL

RELATIONSHIPS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF FREQUENCIES FOR BOTH THE ITU AND THE UOGC ARE ALWAYS PRESENTED.

3.2 PROBLEM OF QUESTIONNAIRE TRANSLATION

WE HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED THAT THE STUDY WAS CARRIED OUT THROUGH SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS. FUNDAMENTALLY, THE QUESTIONNAIRE WE USED WAS A TRANSLATION OF UNION DEMOCRACY'S. WE ADDED SOME QUESTIONS SUGGESTED BY TWO SOURCES: ALAIN TOURAINE'S LA CONSCIENCE OUVRIÈRE, AND T. DI TELLA ET AL'S SINDICATO Y COMUNIDAD [77].

FORTUNATELY, MOST TRANSLATION PROBLEMS OF UNION DEMOCRACY'S QUESTIONNAIRE WERE EASILY SOLVED, GIVEN THAT THE MAJORITY OF ITS QUESTIONS HAD BEEN ALREADY TRANSLATED -OR EQUIVALENT ONES PROPOSED- AND USED IN OTHER WORKS. THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM REFERRED TO QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE INTERNAL POLITICAL PROCESSES IN THE ITU. IN THIS CASE, WE HAD TO USE ALTERNATIVE QUESTIONS ADAPTED TO THE SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE UOGC. A COPY OF THE SPANISH VERSION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE APPEARS AS AN APPENDIX AT THE END OF THIS STUDY.

THE INTERVIEWS THEMSELVES WERE ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF TO TWO HOURS, AND WERE CONDUCTED AT THE INTERVIEWEE'S HOME. THE QUESTIONNAIRES WERE ADMINISTERED FROM MAY TO

AUGUST, 1970.

3.3 CONSTRUCTION OF INDICES

THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDICES WAS KEPT AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY UNION DEMOCRACY [78]. OF COURSE, SOME MODIFICATIONS WERE IMPOSED BY THE PECULIARITIES OF THE DIFFERENT SOCIAL SITUATIONS AND THE DIFFERENT HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES. A DESCRIPTION OF THE INDICES CONSTRUCTED ON THE BASIS OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS IS PRESENTED:

3.3.1 INDEX OF PARTICIPATION (OR ACTIVITY) IN UNION POLITICS

ITEMS: Q. 39A HAVE YOU EVER HELD ANY UNION OFFICE OR SERVED ON A UNION COMMITTEE?
Q. 39D (IF NOT) HAVE YOU EVER RUN FOR ANY UNION OFFICE?
Q. 41A HOW MANY ELECTIONS DID YOU VOTE IN SINCE YOU JOINED THE UNION?
Q. 51 HAVE YOU WORKED FOR THE ELECTION OF ANY CANDIDATE IN THE LAST TWO LOCAL ELECTIONS?

CODE:	DISTRIBUTION
1. POSITIVE RESPONDE TO ALL THREE QUESTIONS	6
2. POSITIVE RESPONSE TO ANY TWO OF THREE QUESTIONS	31
3. POSITIVE RESPONSE TO ANY ONE OF THREE QUESTIONS	53
4. NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO ALL THREE QUESTIONS	44
5. FAILED TO ANSWER ANY OF THE THREE QUESTIONS	7
	141

THIS INDEX WAS DICHOTOMIZED BETWEEN (1-3) AND (4); ALL THOSE CODED (5) WERE DISCARDED. THOSE CODED (1-3) WERE CALLED ACTIVE, AND THOSE CODED (4) INACTIVE.

3.3.2 SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX

ITEMS: Q. 58 NOW, THINK OF ALL THE PLACES WHERE YOU ARE LIKELY TO SEE OTHER PRINTERS OFF THE JOB. HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU SAY YOU SPEND TIME WITH OTHER PRINTERS OFF THE JOB?
- NEVER?
- LESS THAN ONCE A MONTH?
- ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH?
- ONCE OR TWICE A WEEK?
- NEARLY EVERY DAY?

(DICHOTOMIZED BETWEEN "ONCE OR TWICE A WEEK", CODED 1, AND "ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH", CODED 0).

Q. 57A DO YOU EVER VISIT ANY OTHER PRINTERS AT THEIR HOMES, OR DO ANY PRINTERS COME TO YOUR HOME?

Q. 57B (IF YES) VERY OFTEN, OCCASIONALLY, OR RARELY? (DICHOTOMIZED BETWEEN "OCCASIONALLY", CODED 1, AND "RARELY", CODED 0).

Q. 63A WOULD YOU THINK OF YOUR THREE CLOSEST FRIENDS -IT DOESN'T MATTER WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PRINTERS. NOW, JUST TELL ME THEIR FIRST NAMES SO WE DON'T GET THEM MIXED UP.

Q. 63B (ASKED FOR EACH FRIEND) WHAT IS HIS OCCUPATION? (DICHOTOMIZED BETWEEN NO PRINTERS AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS AND AT LEAST ONE PRINTER AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS).

Q. 690 WITH WHOM DO YOU ACTUALLY SPEND MORE OF YOUR FREE TIME -OTHER PRINTERS OR THOSE OUTSIDE THE TRADE?
(DICHOTOMIZED BETWEEN "THOSE OUTSIDE THE TRADE", CODED 0, AND "EQUALLY WITH BOTH GROUPS", CODED 1).

CODE:		DISTRIBUTION
1.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 4	9
2.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 3	25
3.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 2	45
4.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 1	42
5.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 0	16
6.	NO ANSWER IN ANY OF FOUR QUESTIONS	4
		141

THIS INDEX WAS DICHOTOMIZED BETWEEN (1-3) AND (4,5), THAT IS, HIGH AND LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS; OR TRICHOTOMIZED (1,2), (3), AND (4,5), THAT IS, HIGH, MEDIUM, AND LOW.

3.3.3 INDEX OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY -OR INDEX OF NON-ACCEPTANCE OF PREVAILING SOCIAL STRUCTURES.

ITEMS: Q. 29B WHAT DO YOU THINK THE UNIONS SHOULD DO:
- ONLY TO IMPROVE THE LIFE CONDITIONS OF WORKERS
- ALSO TO HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON MORE GENERAL ISSUES OF THE COUNTRY
- AND, FURTHERMORE, TO ASSUME A POLITICAL STANDPOINT IN CERTAIN CASES.

(DICHOTOMIZED BETWEEN "ALSO TO HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON MORE GENERAL ISSUES OF THE COUNTRY", CODED 1, AND "ONLY TO IMPROVE THE LIFE CONDITIONS OF WORKERS", CODED 0).

Q. 54 IN ORDER TO DEFEND LABOR INTERESTS, WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT?
- MORE IMPORTANT THE UNION
- MORE IMPORTANT THE POLITICAL PARTIES
- BOTH ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT
- NO ONE IS IMPORTANT

(DICHOTOMIZED BETWEEN "MORE IMPORTANT THE POLITICAL PARTIES" OR "BOTH", CODED 1, AND "MORE IMPORTANT THE UNION" OR "NO ONE IS IMPORTANT", CODED 0).

Q. 56A IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH IS THE FINAL GOAL OF THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT?
- TO OBTAIN THE PROGRESSIVE EMBETTERMENT OF THE LABOR SITUATION
- ALSO TO OBTAIN A DEGREE OF ENTERPRISES' CONTROL,
- TO PREPARE, FINALLY, A SOCIAL REVOLUTION.

(DICHOTOMIZED BETWEEN "TO OBTAIN A DEGREE OF ENTERPRISES' CONTROL", CODED 1, AND TO OBTAIN THE PROGRESSIVE EMBETTERMENT OF THE LABOR SITUATION", CODED 0).

CODE:		DISTRIBUTION
1.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 3	6
2.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 2	27
3.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 1	50
4.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 0	55
5.	NO ANSWER IN ANY OF THREE QUESTIONS	3
		141

THIS INDEX, FOR COMPARATIVE PURPOSES, WAS USUALLY TRICHOTOMIZED IN THE ANALYSIS, WITH HIGH AS (1,2), MEDIUM AS (3), AND LOW AS (4). THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS INDEX AND UNION DEMOCRACY'S IS THAT THE PRESENT ONE IMPLIES A CERTAIN "DIRECTIONALITY", THAT IS, IT CAN BE ASSOCIATED WITH A "LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE" DIMENSION. GIVEN THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR RESEARCH ALL THE "POLITICALLY SENSITIVE" ITEMS WE COULD USE WERE CONTAMINATED BY CERTAIN DEGREE OF DIRECTIONALITY, WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO USE AN INDEPENDENT "LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE" INDEX.

3.3.4 INDEX OF PARTICIPATION IN PRINTERS' SOCIAL ACTIVITIES (WITHIN THE UNION)

ITEMS: Q. 66A HAVE YOU EVER PARTICIPATED IN ANY UNION ACTIVITIES, TEAMS, CULTURAL AFFAIRS, OR IN OTHER REUNIONS COMPOSED MOSTLY OF PRINTERS?
- FOOTBALL OR BASKETBALL TEAMS
- CHESS
- OTHER SPORTS
- CULTURAL AFFAIRS

(CODED 1 IF PARTICIPATED IN AT LEAST ONE, CODED 0 IF NONE).

Q. 66B DO YOU ATTEND MEETINGS REGULARLY, OCCASIONALLY, OR VERY SELDOM? (CODED 1 IF ATTENDED "OCCASIONALLY" AT LEAST ONE ACTIVITY, CODED 0 IF ATTENDED "VERY SELDOM" ALL OF THEM).

Q. 66C DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF VERY ACTIVE, MODERATELY ACTIVE, OR QUITE INACTIVE? (CODED 1 IF "MODERATELY ACTIVE" AT LEAST IN ONE, CODED 0 IF "QUITE INACTIVE" IN ALL OF THEM).

Q. 66D HAVE YOU EVER HELD OFFICE IN THE GROUP? (CODED 1 IF HELD OFFICE AT LEAST IN ONE, CODED 0 IF NONE).

Q. 67A HAVE YOU EVER ATTENDED ANY PRINTERS SOCIAL AFFAIRS?

Q. 67B (IF YES) IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS?

Q. 67C HOW MANY?

(CODED 1/2 IF RESPONDENT ATTENDED ANY PRINTERS SOCIAL AFFAIRS AT LEAST ONCE WITHIN THE LAST FIVE YEARS?.

CODE:		DISTRIBUTION
1.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 4 OR 4 1/2	10
2.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 3 OR 3 1/2	32
3.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 2 OR 2 1/2	19
4.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 1 OR 1 1/2	13
5.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 1/2	38
6.	ALL THOSE WITH A SCORE OF 0	29
		141

THIS INDEX WAS DIVIDED BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS IN UNION SOCIAL ACTIVITIES (1-4) AND NON-PARTICIPANTS (5,6), OR BETWEEN ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS (1,2), INACTIVES (3,4), THOSE WHO ATTENDED SOCIAL AFFAIRS (5), AND NON-PARTICIPANTS (6). THE DIFFERENCE WITH UNION DEMOCRACY'S INDEX OF PARTICIPATION IN PRINTERS' FORMAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IS THAT THE PRESENT ONE REFERS TO ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNION, GIVEN THAT THE UOGC DOES NOT HAVE FORMAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE THE UNION ITSELF.

SECTION III - THE SOCIAL SETTING OF TRADE-UNION DEMOCRACY

INTRODUCTION,- IN THIS CHAPTER, THE ROLE OF SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS -FORMAL AND INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY- WILL BE DISCUSSED. THE FORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY, AS NOTED IN UNION DEMOCRACY, REFERS TO THE PRESENCE OF PRINTERS' EXCLUSIVE SOCIAL CLUBS IN THE ITU. IN THE UOGC, IT WILL BE OBSERVED THAT SUCH EXCLUSIVE CLUBS DO NOT EXIST AND THAT, INSTEAD, FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION TAKE PLACE. THIS REFERS TO SPORTS PROMOTED BY THE UNION, OR BY CÓRDOBA PRINTERS THEMSELVES WITH CERTAIN SUPPORT FROM THE UNION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CLUBS TO WHICH THEY MAY BELONG ARE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE MEMBERSHIP CAN BE COMPOSED OF PEOPLE FROM DIFFERENT TRADES.

A SIMILAR CHARACTERISTIC IN BOTH UNIONS IS THE PRESENCE OF AN INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY, GIVEN THAT NEW YORK AND CÓRDOBA PRINTERS TEND TO BE HIGHLY INVOLVED IN SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH FELLOW WORKERS. IN BOTH CASES, INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY APPEARS INTIMATELY ASSOCIATED WITH INVOLVEMENT IN UNION ACTIVITIES. IN THIS PART OF THE ANALYSIS, THE MAIN VARIABLES CONSIDERED ARE DEGREE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS, INTEREST IN UNION POLITICS, ATTENDANCE AT UNION

MEETINGS, AND TALKING ABOUT UNION POLITICS.

AT THE END OF THE CHAPTER, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL ACTIVITY AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IS DISCUSSED FROM A THEORETICAL POINT OF VIEW, WHILE THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IS CARRIED OUT IN THE NEXT CHAPTER. AT A THEORETICAL LEVEL, UNIONS ARE CONSIDERED AS SOCIAL SYSTEMS WITH THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A MASS SOCIETY, WHERE INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER ARE VITAL FOR THE SUSTAINING OF UNION DEMOCRACY. CONSIDERING THAT THE UOGC IS A RELATIVELY SMALL ORGANIZATION FACILITATING DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ITS MEMBERS, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF SUCH INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER IS NOT AS IMPORTANT AS IN THE ITU.

4. SECONDARY ORGANIZATION AND TRADE-UNION DEMOCRACY

LIPSET ET AL HAVE NOTED THAT A UNIQUE FEATURE OF THE ITU IS THE PRESENCE OF:

(1) A VAST NETWORK OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS. THESE GROUPS WHOSE FORMAL FUNCTIONS ARE PRIMARILY SOCIAL -AND WHICH CONSTITUTE WHAT THE AUTHORS CALL THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY- "DEVELOPED WITHOUT ANY FORMAL CONNECTION WITH THE UNION" [79].

(2) ON THE OTHER HAND, "THE FORMAL COMMUNITY OF PRINTERS' CLUBS IS PARALLELED BY AN INFORMAL ONE" [80]. THIS IS SO BECAUSE:

(2.A) "PRINTERS SPEND A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF THEIR LEISURE TIME WITH OTHER PRINTERS" [81] AND BECAUSE

(2.B) "THERE IS ALSO MORE SOCIALIZING AMONG PRINTERS ON THE JOB THAN WE FIND IN MOST OCCUPATIONS" [82]. THIS LATTER FACT IS A RESULT OF:

(2.B.1) THE CRAFT NATURE OF PRINTING AND

(2.B.2) THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NIGHT WORK.

(2.B.3) FINALLY, THE AUTONOMY OF PRINTERS IN THE PRINT SHOPS ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO THEIR FREEDOM TO ENGAGE IN SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THEMSELVES.

WITH RESPECT TO THE ARGENTINIAN SITUATION, MOST SMALL LOCALS DO NOT HAVE EXCLUSIVE FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THEIR OWN, AS IN THE CASE OF THE ITU'S CLUBS. THE CLUBS CÓRDOBA PRINTERS MAY BELONG TO ARE NOT ONLY INTEGRATED BY PRINTERS, BUT BY ALL THOSE WHO LIVE IN THE SAME "POPULAR BARRIO". AS DI TELLA ET AL HAVE POINTED OUT WITH RESPECT TO CHILEAN MINE WORKERS: "IN MORE PRIMARY COMMUNITIES (...), FRIENDSHIPS WILL BE BASED MORE ON FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIPS, OR RELATIONSHIPS AMONG NEIGHBORS, OR AMONG THOSE WHO PRACTICE THE SAME SPORT OR GO TO THE SAME BAR OR CAFÉ" [83]. THE UOGC, THEN, IS NOT CHARACTERIZED BY THE PRESENCE OF EXCLUSIVE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, CÓRDOBA PRINTERS PARTICIPATE IN A SERIES OF FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION ITSELF [84].

WE HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT THAT A FORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY DOES NOT ARISE AMONG UOGC MEMBERS, BUT WE THINK AN INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD BE SINGLED OUT. THAT IS, CÓRDOBA PRINTERS SEEM TO HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS, EVEN WHEN THEY DO NOT HAVE EXCLUSIVE FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS OTHER THAN THE UNION ITSELF. LIPSET ET AL NOTE THAT "WITHOUT DATA ON OTHER WORKERS IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHETHER THERE ARE MORE OF THESE INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG PRINTERS THAN THERE ARE IN OTHER OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS" [85]. HOWEVER, ANOTHER STUDY CARRIED OUT AMONG CÓRDOBA AUTOMOBILE WORKERS ALLOWED US TO SEE THAT PRINTERS TENDED TO BE MORE SATISFIED WITH THEIR OCCUPATION AND TO RELATE MORE WITH FELLOW WORKERS [86]. ALSO, AS IN THE ITU, THE CRAFTMANSHIP OF CÓRDOBA PRINTERS -THEY ARE THE CONTROLLERS OF THE WORK PACE-, AND THE COMRADERIE ENGENDERED BY NIGHT WORK, SHOW THAT THERE SHOULD BE MORE SOCIALIZING AMONG THEM THAN IN OTHER OCCUPATIONS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF EXCLUSIVE CLUBS, WE CAN SAY THAT NEW YORK AND CÓRDOBA PRINTERS "... BOTH ON AND OFF THE JOB, (...), IN THE PRINT SHOPS, AND IN INFORMAL GET TOGETHERS (...) ARE ENGAGED IN A VARIETY OF INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER" [87].

THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA FOR THE ITU SHOWS THAT "IN GENERAL, THOSE MEN WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY, WHETHER INFORMALLY OR FORMALLY,

ARE ALSO THOSE WHO ARE INVOLVED AND ACTIVE IN THE UNION" [88]. THE SAME RELATIONSHIP TAKES PLACE IN THE UOGC, BUT WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITY IN THE INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY ALONE. IT CAN BE SEEN IN THE THREE TABLES THAT TENDENCIES

TABLE 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER PRINTERS AND INTEREST IN UNION POLITICS.

A) UOGC

	SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX			
	LOW			HIGH
	0	1	2	3-4 (x)
PERCENT "EXTREMELY" OR QUITE INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS	(5) 31 %	17 40 %	20 44 %	18 53 %
TOTAL CASES	16	42	45	34

B) ITU (PAGE 80)

	SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX				
	LOW				HIGH
	0	1	2	3	4
PERCENT "EXTREMELY" OR "QUITE" INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS	(3) 7 %	(35) 41 %	(37) 39 %	(28) 53 %	(14) 55 %
TOTAL CASES	41	86	95	53	25

(x) IN TABLES 1, 2 AND 3, THE HIGHEST POINTS IN THE INDEX OF SOCIAL RELATIONS ARE GROUPED TOGETHER, BECAUSE VERY FEW CASES FELL IN THE LAST ONE, NUMBER 4.

TABLE 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER PRINTERS AND ATTENDANCE AT UNION MEETINGS.

A) UOGC

	SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX			
	LOW			HIGH
	0	1	2	3-4
PERCENT WHO ATTENDED THREE OR MORE MEETINGS IN THE PAST YEAR	(2) 13 %	(8) 19 %	(12) 27 %	(10) 29 %
TOTAL CASES	16	42	45	34

B) ITU (PAGE 81)

	SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX				
	LOW				HIGH
	0	1	2	3	4
PERCENT WHO ATTENDED THREE OR MORE MEETINGS IN THE PAST YEAR	(21) 52 %	(50) 59%	(60) 63%	(37) 71%	(20) 80%
TOTAL CASES	41	86	95	53	25

TABLE 3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER PRINTERS AND TALKING ABOUT UNION POLITICS.

A) UOGC

	SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX			
	LOW			HIGH
	0	1	2	3-4
PERCENT WHO TALK "MUCH" ABOUT UNION POLITICS	-	(8)	(10)	(10)
	-	19 %	22 %	29 %
TOTAL CASES	16	42	45	34

B) ITU (PAGE 83)

	SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX				
	LOW				HIGH
	0	1	2	3	4
PERCENT WHO TALK "MUCH" ABOUT UNION POLITICS	(5)	(30)	(30)	(24)	(14)
	12 %	35 %	32 %	45 %	55 %
TOTAL CASES	41	86	95	53	25

ARE THE SAME, EVENTHOUGH THE RELATIONSHIP IS MUCH STRONGER IN THE ITU [89].

GIVEN THAT PRINTERS WHO ARE SOCIALLY ACTIVE WITH PEOPLE IN THE TRADE ARE ALSO THOSE WHO TEND TO BE MORE POLITICALLY INVOLVED, LIPSET ET AL ASK: "JUST WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE PRINTERS' COMMUNITY AND THE ACTIVE POLITICAL LIFE ON THE UNION?" [90]. BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM FROM AN EMPIRICAL POINT OF VIEW, THE AUTHORS SUGGEST A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO EXPLAIN SUCH A RELATIONSHIP.

4.1 THE MASS SOCIETY

LIPSET ET.AL., FOLLOWING EMIL LEDERER, NOTE THAT ALL TYPE OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS "HAVE A DEFINITE FUNCTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRACY" [91]. FOR LEDERER, "A SOCIETY WITHOUT A MULTITUDE OF ORGANIZATIONS INDEPENDENT OF STATE POWER HAS A HIGH DICTATORIAL AS WELL AS REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL" [92]. AS LIPSET ET.AL. POINT OUT, LEDERER DESCRIBED THIS TYPE OF SOCIETY AS A MASS SOCIETY, OR "THE STATE OF THE MASSES" [93]. ACCORDING TO UNION DEMOCRACY'S AUTHORS, THE EARLIEST ATTEMPT TO SPECIFY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICS WAS CARRIED OUT BY ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. THEY SUMMARIZE THE ARGUMENT IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

"THE EXISTENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS THUS SERVES TWO NEEDS OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. THEY ARE A SOURCE OF NEW OPINIONS INDEPENDENT OF THE STATE AND A MEANS OF COMMUNICATING THESE NEW SUGGESTIONS TO A LARGE SECTION OF THE CITIZENRY. TWO OTHER IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS ARE THE TRAINING OF MEN IN THE SKILLS OF POLITICS AND THE CONSEQUENT INCREASE IN THEIR ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS" [94].

ACCORDING TO THESE AUTHORS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER A UNION AS A SECONDARY, MEDIATING ORGANIZATION "BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE" [95], BUT THEY WILL CONSIDER IT "AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM IN ITS OWN RIGHT" [96]. HENCE, THEIR TASK IS TO SEE TO WHAT EXTENT A STATE OF THE MASSES OR A COMPLEX STRUCTURE OF INTERCALATED SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE SINGLED OUT IN THE UNION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM. FOR THEM, MOST LARGE UNIONS "APPROXIMATE THE STATE OF THE MASSES" [97]. GIVEN THAT GENERALLY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE UNION ADMINISTRATION AND THE RANK-AND-FILE ARE NOT MEDIATED BY SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS. THE ITU, OF COURSE, APPEARS AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE.

HOWEVER, THE AUTHORS OBSERVE THAT THE NECESSITY OF MEDIATING SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS TO SUSTAIN DEMOCRACY IS LIMITED BY THE SIZE OF THE SYSTEM WE ARE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION. THAT IS, THE ABSENCE OF MEDIATING GROUPS BETWEEN THE MEMBERS AND THE LEADERSHIP DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY AN UNDEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION WHEN SUCH AN ORGANIZATION IS A SMALL ONE: "... IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE IS A LIMITING

SIZE BELOW WHICH ORGANIZATIONS CAN ACT DEMOCRATICALLY WITHOUT ANY GROUPS MEDIATING BETWEEN THE MEMBERS AND THE ASSOCIATION" [98]. THE AUTHORS ADD:

> "IN OUR JUDGMENT THESE LIMITS ARE DETERMINED BY THE POSSIBILITIES OF COMMUNICATION. AS LONG AS AN INDIVIDUAL CAN REACH EVERY MEMBER OF A GROUP PERSONALLY AND THE GROUP IS SMALL ENOUGH FOR MEN TO KNOW AND JUDGE THE WORK AND POLICIES OF THEIR LEADERS THROUGH FIRSTHAND OBSERVATION, DEMOCRACY CAN FLOURISH. AND IN FACT MANY SMALL UNION LOCALS ARE HIGHLY DEMOCRATIC. (SMALL UNIONS ALSO CANNOT USUALLY GIVE THEIR LEADERS MUCH INCOME OR SOCIAL STATUS, SO THE LEADERS ARE LESS TEMPTED TO MAINTAIN POWER AT THE COST OF RESTRICTING DEMOCRACY)" [99].

TO A GREAT EXTENT, IT SEEMS THAT THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE CASE OF THE UOGC.

AS A RECAPITULATION OF THEIR DISCUSSION, LIPSET ET.AL. NOTE THAT SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS -AS DESCRIBED IN THE "MASS SOCIETY" APPROACH-, IN ORDER TO FULFILL THEIR MEDIATING ROLE MUST HAVE SOURCES OF POWER "<u>INDEPENDENT</u> OF THE CENTRAL BODY" [100] AND THE POWER ITSELF -WITH RESPECT TO THAT CENTRAL BODY- "MUST BE CONSIDERABLE" [101].

THROUGHOUT OUR WORK, WE WILL BE LOOKING FOR THESE INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY MIGHT PLAY A DIFFERENTIAL ROLE IN THE ITU AND THE UOGC.

5. THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION.- AFTER THE THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRINTERS' SOCIAL COMMUNITY AND THE ITU'S POLITICAL SYSTEM, THE AUTHORS OF UNION DEMOCRACY "APPROACH THE QUESTION EMPIRICALLY" [102].

THEY DISTINGUISHED THE "SHORT-TERM" AND THE "LONG-TERM" PROCESSES. IN THE SHORT-TERM PROCESS, THE AUTHORS FOUND THAT IN THE ITU INFORMAL ACTIVITIES IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY INDUCED PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS. THIS LATTER ANALYSIS WAS NOT CARRIED OUT IN THE UOGC, SO RELATIONSHIPS WERE COMPARED IN THE LONG-RANGE PROCESS ALONE. THE MAIN VARIABLES CONSIDERED IN THIS CHAPTER WERE AGE, DEGREE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS, INVOLVEMENT IN UNION POLITICS, LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (OR REJECTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES), DEGREE OF LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM, PARTICIPATION IN CLUBS OR FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION. OTHER VARIABLES INTRODUCED IN THE ANALYSIS WERE TALKING ABOUT UNION POLITICS, KNOWING POLITICS OF BEST PRINTER FRIENDS, HAVING PRINTERS FRIENDS ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS, CLASS SELF-IDENTIFICATION, AND "CLASS SOLIDARITY" WITH RESPECT TO STRIKES.

COMPARING DIFFERENT AGE LEVELS WITH INVOLVEMENT IN

SOCIAL RELATIONS AND IN UNION POLITICS, IT IS OBSERVED IN BOTH UNIONS THAT PRINTERS BECOME ACTIVE IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY BEFORE THEY BECOME ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS. IN ORDER TO ANALYZE THE DIFFERENTIAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF PRINTERS, AN INDEX OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY IS INTRODUCED. THEN, THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY, ACTIVITY IN UNION POLITICS, AND INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIAL RELATIONS IS POINTED OUT. THE ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT WHILE IN THE ITU PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES PROMOTE INTEREST IN UNION POLITICS AMONG MEN LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY, THIS EFFECT IN THE UOGC WAS VERY SMALL. THIS RESULT IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL CLIMATES IN BOTH UNIONS.

IN ORDER TO STUDY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY AND PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS AMONG MEN HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY, AN INDEX OF LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM WAS INTRODUCED IN UNION DEMOCRACY. IN CÓRDOBA, THE SAME ALTERNATIVE INDEX OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (OR INDEX OF REJECTION OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES) WAS USED, GIVEN THAT IT IMPLIED CERTAIN DEGREE OF POLITICAL DIRECTIONALITY. IT WAS SINGLED OUT THAT IN THE ITU THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY SERVED THE FUNCTION OF MOTIVATING THE IDEOLOGICALLY SENSITIVE CONSERVATIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN UNION POLITICS, WHILE IN THE UOGC SUCH AN EFFECT TOOK PLACE

AMONG THE IDEOLOGICALLY SENSITIVE LIBERAL-RADICALS. IT IS HYPOTESIZED THAT THE LOWER POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE UOGC SEEMED NOT ENOUGH AS TO MOTIVATE THOSE PRINTERS LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (THE MOST CONSERVATIVES), WHILE, ON THE OTHER HAND, MOST MEN HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (OR LIBERAL-RADICALS) WERE NOT DIRECTLY MOTIVATED TO PARTICIPATE IN UNION POLITICS, REQUIRING THE MOTIVATIONAL FORCE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY.

AT THE END OF THE CHAPTER, THE QUESTION IS RAISED OF WHY IN THE UOGC THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF THE MOST LIBERAL-RADICAL PRINTERS DID NOT PROMOTE THE FORMATION OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION AGAINST A LEADERSHIP WITH A "CENTRIST" ORIENTATION IN THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS FINALLY SUGGESTED THAT THE ANSWER COULD BE FOUND IN AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL COMPOSITION OF THE LISTA ROSA, A TASK THAT WILL BE ATTEMPTED AT LATER STAGES OF THIS STUDY.

5.1 THE SHORT-TERM PROCESS

THE AUTHORS BEGIN NOTING THAT "FORMALLY THERE IS NO RELATION BETWEEN THE ORGANIZED PRINTERS' COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM"[103], AND THAT "THE PRINTERS' CLUBS ARE EXPLICITLY NONPOLITICAL OR EVEN ANTIPOLITICAL"[104]. HOWEVER, THEY FOUND THAT A CONNECTION EXISTS BETWEEN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND UNION POLITICS IN THE ITU. THE PROCESS

GOES AS FOLLOWS:

> "AFTER MEN ENTER THE TRADE, SOME ARE MOTIVATED OR EVEN PUSHED INTO TAKING PART IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY. A HIGH DEGREE OF INTERACTION WITH FELLOW UNIONISTS IN TURN SERVES TO MOTIVATE THEM TO GREATER INTEREST AND PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS" [105].

THE AUTHORS OBSERVE THAT THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY IS NOT THE ONLY ROUTE LEADING TO PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS: THERE ARE SEVERAL INTERRELATED PROCESSES WHICH "TEND TO REINFORCE ONE ANOTHER" [106]. THEY LIST THREE OTHER MEANS: 1) POLITICAL INTEREST, 2) SPECIFIC IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION, AND 3) DESIRE TO SATISFY PERSONAL AMBITIONS" [107].

IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THEIR HYPOTHESIS, LIPSET ET AL DISTINGUISHED THE "SHORT-TERM" AND THE "LONG-TERM" PROCESSES. IN THE "SHORT-TERM" THEY TOOK INTO ACCOUNT A SIX MONTH PERIOD, DURING WHICH ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN THE ITU. THEY INTERVIEWED A SAMPLE OF PRINTERS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS AND SENT THEM A QUESTIONNAIRE AFTERWARDS. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS TASK WAS IMPOSSIBLE IN THE UOGC, GIVEN THAT ELECTIONS WERE NOT HELD DURING THE TIME WE WERE CARRYING OUT THE FIELD WORK. THE ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT-TERM PROCESS IN THE ITU ESTABLISHED THAT

> "REGARDLESS OF THE MANIFEST PURPOSES OF THOSE WHO TAKE PART IN THE FORMAL OR INFORMAL ACTIVITIES OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY, THESE ACTIVITIES DO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN INCREASING THE KNOWLEDGE AND INVOLVEMENT IN UNION POLITICS OF PREVIOUSLY INACTIVE OR RELATIVELY UNINTERESTED PRINTERS" [108].

LIPSET ET.AL. FINALLY OBSERVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO EXTEND THEIR ANALYSIS TO A LONG-TERM PROCESS. HENCE, OUR TASK WILL BE TO COMPARE THE LONG-TERM ANALYSIS IN THE ITU AND THE UOGC.

5.2 THE LONG-RANGE PROCESS

AS THE AUTHORS POINT OUT, "THE CLOSEST APPROXIMATION TO THE LOGIC OF A LONG-TERM ANALYSIS IS TO COMPARE THE BEHAVIOR OF UNION MEMBERS AT DIFFERENT AGE LEVELS" [109]. IF THE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SHORT-TERM PROCESS HOLD ALSO IN THE LONG-RANGE, "THEN MORE YOUNGER MEN THAN OLDER MEN SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY WITHOUT BEING ACTIVE POLITICALLY" [110]. THESE RELATIONSHIPS ARE SHOWN IN TABLES 4 AND 5.

TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGE AND BEING HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS.

A) UOGC

	AGE			
	BELOW 30	30-40	40-50	50-60 (x) 60+
PERCENT HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	(17) 59 %	(25) 60 %	(22) 51 %	(14) 52 %
TOTAL CASES	29	42	43	27

B) ITU (PAGE 100)

	AGE				
	BELOW 30	30-40	40-50	50-60	60 +
PERCENT HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	(7) 39 %	(32) 36 %	(37) 28 %	(22) 20 %	(9) 16 %
TOTAL CASES	18	90	134	111	55

(x) IN TABLES 4 AND 5, THE CATEGORIES 50-60 AND 60 + WERE GROUPED TOGETHER BECAUSE VERY FEW CASES FELL IN THE LAST ONE, 60 OR MORE YEARS OF AGE.

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGE AND BEING ACTIVE IN POLITICS.

A) UOGC

	AGE			
	BELOW 30	30-40	40-50	50-60 60 +
PERCENT ACTIVE IN POLITICS	(10) 34 %	(28) 67 %	(33) 77 %	(19) 70 %
TOTAL CASES	29	42	43	27

B) ITU (PAGE 100)

	AGE				
	BELOW 30	30-40	40-50	50-60	60 +
PERCENT ACTIVE IN POLITICS	(2) 11 %	(29) 31 %	(44) 31 %	(55) 47 %	(24) 39 %
TOTAL CASES	19	93	141	116	61

BOTH IN THE ITU AND THE UOGC, THE SAME TENDENCY IS EXPRESSED BY THE DATA: "THE PEAK OF OCCUPATIONAL SOCIAL ACTIVITY, (...), IS AMONG A YOUNGER AGE GROUP THAN IS THE PEAK OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY" [111]. THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT IN THE ITU OCCUPATIONAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES ARE BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL, WHILE IN THE UOGC THEY ARE ONLY INFORMAL, OR THEY CAN FORMALLY TAKE PLACE EITHER WITHIN NON-EXCLUSIVE CLUBS OR IN THE UNION. TABLE 6 ALLOWS US TO SEE THAT INFORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES ARE THE

TABLE 6. PLACES WHERE UOGC'S MEMBERS MORE PROBABLY MEET.

WHERE DO YOU GENERALLY GET TOGETHER?

AT HOME	(26)	18,43 %
IN THE BAR	(45)	31,91
IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD CENTER	(2)	1,41
IN THE CLUB	(3)	2,12
IN THE UNION	(26)	18,43
IN OTHER PLACE (STREET, STADIUM, ETC.)	(9)	6,38
DO NOT MEET	(28)	19,85
OMITED, DON'T ANSWER	(2)	1,41
N	(141)	100 %

TABLE 6.1 FORMAL AND INFORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES AMONG UOGC'S MEMBERS.

FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES	31	22 %
INFORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES	80	57 %
DO NOT MEET, DON'T ANSWER	30	21 %
N	141	100 %

PREDOMINANT ONES AMONG CÓRDOBA PRINTERS: 57% MEET IN THEIR HOMES, OR IN A BAR, OR IN OCCASIONAL ENCOUNTERS. THE SECOND ROUTE IS THE UNION: 18% SAID THEY MEET THERE. NON-PRINTER CLUBS PRACTICALLY HAVE NO INFLUENCE: ONLY 4% GET TOGETHER IN THESE NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS. IT HAS TO BE POINTED OUT THAT WHILE DATA IN UNION DEMOCRACY "STRONGLY SUGGESTS (...) THAT MEN BECOME ACTIVE AND INVOLVED IN THE PRINTERS' COMMUNITY BEFORE THEY BECOME ACTIVE AND INVOLVED IN POLITICS" [112], IN THE UOGC THE RELATIONSHIP APPEARS TO BE LESS MARKED. HOWEVER, THE TENDENCY REMAINS THE SAME. ANOTHER OBSERVATION IMPOSED BY THE DATA IS THAT ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES RELATED TO INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIAL RELATIONS AND UNION POLITICS ARE HIGHER IN THE UOGC. WHILE HIGHER FIGURES IN THE SOCIAL RELATIONS VARIABLE ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE FACT THAT CÓRDOBA PRINTERS SEEMED TO PARTICIPATE MORE IN THE INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY THAN ITU'S MEMBERS, THIS IS NOT SO WITH REFERENCE TO ACTIVITY IN UNION POLITICS. IN THE ALTERNATIVE INDEX OF ACTIVITY IN UNION POLITICS WE USED, WE INTRODUCED AN ITEM REFERRED TO PARTICIPATION IN UNION ELECTIONS. THIS ITEM ALLOWED US TO OBTAIN HIGHER FIGURES IN THE DIMENSION OF UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY, AND SERVED WELL TO DISCRIMINATE AMONG UOGC'S MEMBERS. HOWEVER, IT REQUIRES MORE INVOLVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE MEMBERS TO CONTRIBUTE TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS IN THE ITU THAN TO VOTE IN GENERAL UNION

ELECTIONS IN THE UOGC. AS A RESULT, GIVEN THAT FREQUENCIES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY ARE ARTIFICIALLY HIGHER IN THE UOGC ONLY RELATIVE COMPARISONS ARE IMPORTANT.

THE DATA IN BOTH TABLES (4 AND 5) ALSO "SUGGEST AN ADDITIONAL STAGE IN THE PROCESS -THAT MEN WHO GROW OLDER AND REDUCE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO REMAIN ACTIVE AND INTERESTED IN POLITICS" [113]. LIPSET ET AL CONCLUDE THAT "UNION POLITICAL INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT HAVE A SELF-MAINTAINING FUNCTION, EVEN AFTER THE STIMULUS AND SUPPORT OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY CEASES" [114]. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THAT IT IS NOT OTHER FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH AGE WHICH DETERMINE THE HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG NEW YORK'S OLDER PRINTERS, THE AUTHORS COMPARED THE "REPORTED PAST PARTICIPATION IN PRINTERS' CLUBS AND PRESENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY AT THE SAME AGE LEVELS" [115]. IN THIS WAY, THEY SUPPORTED THE INITIAL RELATIONSHIP THAT IT IS THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY WHICH INDUCES POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

THIS LATTER STEP COULD NOT BE FOLLOWED ON THE BASIS OF OUR DATA, GIVEN THAT -AS IT WAS POINTED OUT- CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS DO NOT HAVE THE ITU'S EXCLUSIVE CLUBS. HENCE, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE SELF-MAINTAINING FUNCTION OF POLITICAL INTEREST IN THE ITU CANNOT BE SPECIFICALLY DISCERNED IN THE UOGC: IT CAN ONLY BE SUGGESTED THAT COULD

BE THE CASE. ANYWAY, OUR MAIN ARGUMENT IS NOT AFFECTED: EVEN IF OTHER FACTORS COULD BE CO-DETERMINING THE HIGH POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF OLDER PRINTERS, IT REMAINS THE CASE THAT INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS WORK IN THE DIRECTION OF INDUCING UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

5.3 THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (OR NON-ACCEPTANCE OF PREVAILING SOCIAL STRUCTURES).

LIPSET ET.AL. ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: "HOW ARE WE TO ACCOUNT FOR THOSE MEN WHO, WHILE DEEPLY INVOLVED SOCIALLY WITH OTHER PRINTERS, ARE NOT INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS, OR WHO, WHILE ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS, HAVE FEW OTHER SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH PRINTERS?" [116]. THE AUTHORS CONSIDER THAT BOTH GROUPS ARE "IMPORTANT FOR UNDERSTANDING THE WHOLE SYSTEM" [117]. THEY SUGGEST THAT THESE MEN "ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD PRINCIPALLY IN TERMS OF THE TWO FACTORS OF GENERALIZED POLITICAL AWARENESS AND SPECIFIC IDEOLOGY" [118].

THE MOST CRUCIAL FACTOR IN THE DIFFERENTIAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF PRINTERS -ACCORDING TO LIPSET ET.AL.- "IS A GENERAL SENSITIVITY TO THINGS POLITICAL" [119]. THAT IS, MEN WAY DIFFER IN THEIR CONCERNS WITH IDEOLOGY WHILE PARTICIPATING IN POLITICS, OR SOME MEN MAY THINK IN MORE IDEOLOGICAL TERMS THAN OTHERS, OR THEIR POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS MAY BE BASED MORE ON OTHER TYPE OF MATTERS [120]. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE

WHO WERE THESE MEN, THE AUTHORS CONSTRUCTED AN INDEX OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY. "IT IS OPERATIONALLY ONLY A MEASURE OF THE PROPENSITY OF MEN TO VIEW POLITICS IN IDEOLOGICAL TERMS (REGARDLESS OF DIRECTION)" [121]. HOWEVER, THEY OBSERVE THAT A RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND POSITIVE ORIENTATION TOWARDS POLITICS, AS WELL A REJECTION OF IDEOLOGY AND LACK OF INTEREST IN UNION POLITICS.

IN OUR CASE, THE ALTERNATIVE INDEX WE USE IMPLIES A CERTAIN "DIRECTIONALITY", THAT IS, IT CAN BE ASSOCIATED WITH A "LIBERAL (RADICAL)-CONSERVATIVE" DIMENSION. THIS IS A RESULT OF THE FACT THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR RESEARCH ALL THE "POLITICALLY SENSITIVE" ITEMS WE COULD USE WERE CONTAMINATED BY CERTAIN DEGREE OF DIRECTIONALITY [122]. OUR INDEX IS ALMOST SIMILAR TO THAT FORMULATED BY DI TELLA, BRAMS, REYNAUD, AND TOURAINE IN THEIR WORK SINDICATO Y COMUNIDAD [123], WHO NOTE THAT "THE INDEX DOES NOT EXACTLY COINCIDE WITH AN EVENTUAL INDEX OF LEFTISM, EVENTHOUGH IF COULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH IT" [124]. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT DI TELLA ET AL BUILT THIS INDEX AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO UNION DEMOCRACY'S "INDEX OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY". THEY NOTE THAT THEY HAVE CALLED IT "INDEX OF NON-ACCEPTANCE OF PREVAILING SOCIAL STRUCTURES", BECAUSE IT SHOWS "A TENDENCY OF THE RESPONDENT TO REJECT THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES, BY MEANS OF THE ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES THAT APPEAR TO HIM AS THE EASIEST AND MOST EXPECTABLE WITHIN THE LOGIC (...) OF THE PREVAILING SOCIAL SYSTEM" [125].

TABLES 7 AND 8 SHOW THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIAL RELATIONS, FOR BOTH UNIONS:

TABLE 7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND INTEREST AND ACTIVITY IN UNION POLITICS.

A) UOGC

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
PERCENT ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(33) 60 %	(31) 62 %	(25) 76 %
TOTAL CASES	55	50	33

B) ITU (PAGE 103)

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
PERCENT ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(27) 23 %	(68) 31 %	(55) 57 %
TOTAL CASES	117	220	97

TABLE 8. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND BEING HIGH (1, 2) ON SOCIAL RELATIONS.

A) UOGC

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
PERCENT HIGH (1, 2) ON SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX	16 29 %	10 20 %	10 30 %
TOTAL CASES	55	50	33

B) ITU (PAGE 103)

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
PERCENT HIGH (1, 2) ON SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX	(23) 20 %	(62) 28 %	(28) 29 %
TOTAL CASES	117	220	97

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY SEEMS CLEAR IN BOTH CASES, ALTHOUGH LESS MARKED IN THE UOGC. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS NOTED IN UNION DEMOCRACY -AND THE SAME HAPPENS IN THE UOGC-, THAT FINDINGS SUGGEST THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIAL RELATIONS SEEMS TO BE AN INCONSISTENT ONE. AS LIPSET ET AL SUGGEST, "IT IS POSSIBLE THAT INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOCIAL COMMUNITY AFFECTS SOME PRINTERS MORE THAN OTHERS, AND THAT VARIATIONS IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY MIGHT BE THE CLUE TO THIS DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT" [126]. IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE POSSIBLE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT OF INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES ON DIFFERENT LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY, CONTROL BY SOCIAL RELATIONS IS INTRODUCED IN TABLE 9:

TABLE 9. EFFECT OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTICIPATION IN INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER PRINTERS AND PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS.

A) UOGC

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY					
	LOW		MEDIUM		HIGH	
	LOW SOC. REL.	HIGH SOC. REL.	LOW SOC. REL.	HIGH SOC. REL.	LOW SOC. REL.	HIGH SOC. REL.
PERCENT ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(12) 60 %	(21) 60 %	(16) 62 %	(14) 64 %	(6) 55 %	(17) 85 %
TOTAL CASES	20	35	26	22	11	20

B) ITU (PAGE 104)

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY					
	LOW		MEDIUM		HIGH	
	LOW SOC. REL.	HIGH SOC. REL.	LOW SOC. REL.	HIGH SOC. REL.	LOW SOC. REL.	HIGH SOC. REL.
PERCENT ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(12) 23 %	(13) 26 %	(19) 22 %	(52) 42 %	(16) 48 %	(39) 61 %
TOTAL CASES	53	50	88	123	33	61

INTERESTING RESULTS ARE FOUND IN BOTH CASES. IN THE ITU,

> "THERE IS ALMOST NO DIFFERENCE (3%) IN LEVEL OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY BETWEEN THOSE HIGH AND LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG THE MEN LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY. THOSE HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY DO REFLECT THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS (13%); BUT THE GREATEST EFFECT (20 %) IS FOUND AMONG THE MIDDLE GROUP IN THE SCALE OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY: THE MEN WHO NEITHER SEE UNION POLITICS WHOLLY FROM AN IDEOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT NOR ARE COMPLETELY INSENSITIVE TO IDEOLOGICAL PARTY POSITIONS" [127].

IN THE UOGC'S CASE, DATA SHOW THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN LEVEL OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG THOSE LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY WHEN WE CONTROL BY SOCIAL RELATIONS. A VERY SMALL DIFFERENCE (2%) APPEARS AMONG THE MIDDLE LEVEL OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY; BUT A CLEAR DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT OF THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS IS SHOWN BY THOSE HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (30%).

IN ORDER TO SPECIFY THE WAY IN WHICH THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY "OPERATES TO ESTIMULATE POLITICAL INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT" [128], LIPSET ET.AL. CONSIDER THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE GROUP LOWEST IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY. THEY NOTE THAT THIS IS AN INTERESTING CASE, BECAUSE "INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS HAVE NO INFLUENCE ON THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS (TABLE 9) WHILE CLUB MEMBERSHIP SEEMS TO HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE (TABLE 10)" [129].

TABLE 10. RELATIONSHIP OF CLUB TO PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS AMONG THE THREE IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS.

ITU (PAGE 105)

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY					
	LOW		MEDIUM		HIGH	
	CLUB MEMBERS	NON-MEMBERS	CLUB MEMBERS	NON-MEMBERS	CLUB MEMBERS	NON-MEMBERS
PROPORTION ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(9) 41 %	(16) 19 %	(26) 41 %	(41) 28 %	(22) 63 %	(30) 52 %
TOTAL CASES	22	86	64	146	35	58

UOGC: RELATIONSHIP OF FORMAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS (WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION) TO PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS AMONG THE THREE IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS.

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY					
	LOW		MEDIUM		HIGH	
	PARTICIPANTS	NON-PARTICIPANTS	PARTICIPANTS	NON-PARTICIPANTS	PARTICIPANTS	NON-PARTICIPANTS
PROPORTION ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(17) 63 %	(16) 57 %	(16) 64 %	(15) 60 %	(13) 93 %	(12) 63 %
TOTAL CASES	27	28	25	25	14	19

TO UNDERSTAND THIS DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT, THE AUTHORS SUGGEST THE HYPOTHESIS THAT IN THE ITU "ATTITUDES TOWARDS UNION POLITICS ARE ONE OF THE DECISIVE FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE CHOICE OF FRIENDS" [130]. THEY ADD THAT THOSE HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY WILL TEND TO HAVE FRIENDS WITH SIMILAR POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS, WHILE THE LOW GROUP WILL TEND TO CHOOSE FRIENDS AMONG THOSE EQUALLY UNINTERESTED IN POLITICS [131]. THEY SUPPORT THIS HYPOTHESIS SHOWING THAT A

TABLE 11. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND TALKING UNION POLITICS.

A) UOGC

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
PERCENT WHO TALK POLITICS "MUCH"	(5) 9 %	(8) 16 %	(15) 45 %
TOTAL CASES	55	50	33

B) ITU (PAGE 106)

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
PERCENT WHO TALK POLITICS "MUCH"	(39) 33 %	(86) 39 %	(68) 70 %
TOTAL CASES	117	220	97

TABLE 12. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND KNOWING UNION POLITICS OF PRINTER FRIEND.

ITU (PAGE 106)

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
PROPORTION WHO KNOW POLITICS OF AT LEAST ONE OF TWO BEST PRINTER FRIENDS	(40) 34 %	(169) 77 %	(83) 86 %
TOTAL CASES	117	220	97

UOGC: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND HAVING A PRINTER FRIEND OR VERY ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS.

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
PERCENT WHO HAVE AT LEAST ONE PRINTER FRIEND FAIRLY OR VERY ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(18) 33 %	(18) 36 %	(18) 55 %
TOTAL CASES	55	50	33

STRONG RELATIONSHIP EXISTS "BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND PROPENSITY TO DISCUSS UNION POLITICS" [132] (TABLE 11): THE FINDING THAT THOSE LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY "DO NOT EVEN KNOW THE POLITICS OF ONE OF THEIR BEST FRIENDS" [133] (TABLE 12) LEADS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION. HOWEVER, THEY FOUND THAT FORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS "HAVE A GREAT EFFECT IN STIMULATING POLITICAL INTEREST" [134].

THE AUTHORS EXPLAIN THIS FACT ON THE BASIS THAT INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG MEN WHO ARE NOT POLITICALLY INTERESTED MAY NOT INVOLVE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS, WHILE THIS IS NOT THE CASE IN THE FORMAL RELATIONS WHICH TAKE PLACE IN THE PRINTERS' CLUBS. "THE CLUBS, THE MEN WHO ARE ACTIVE IN THEM, AND THE TALK AND ACTIVITIES IN WHICH THEY ENGAGE ARE RELATIVELY INDEPENDENT OF THE SENTIMENTS OR DESIRES OF ANY GIVEN MEMBER" [135]. SO, THOSE WHO JOIN THE CLUBS "WILL FIND THAT A LARGE PROPORTION OF ITS MEMBERS ARE INVOLVED IN AND TALK ABOUT POLITICS" [136]. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THESE CONSIDERATIONS AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF CERTAIN EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES, THE AUTHORS POINT OUT THAT IN THE ITU "MEN COME TO THE CLUBS FOR SOCIAL REASONS, BUT THEREBY ALSO BECOME A CAPTIVE AUDIENCE FOR THE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS" [137].

IN WE TURN NOW TO THE UOGC'S CASE, WE CAN SEE THAT INFORMAL RELATIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

OF THOSE LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (TABLE 9), WHILE FORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS -PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION- HAVE ONLY A SMALL EFFECT (6%), AS SHOWN IN TABLE 10. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SAME HYPOTHESIS ABOUT ATTITUDES TOWARDS UNION POLITICS AND CHOICE OF FRIENDS SUGGESTED BY LIPSET ET AL SEEMS A PLAUSIBLE ONE IN THE UOGC. TABLE 11 SHOWS THAT AMONG UOGC'S MEMBERS THERE IS ALSO A STRONG RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND PROPENSITY TO DISCUSS UNION POLITICS, WHILE TABLE 12 SHOWS THAT THOSE LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY HAVE THE LOWER PERCENTAGE OF INTIMATE FRIENDS, OR ONLY FRIENDS, WHO ARE VERY ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS. FURTHERMORE, TABLE 13 SHOWS THAT THEY ARE LESS INFORMED ABOUT THE NAMES OF UNION OFFICIALS [138].

TABLE 13. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND KNOWING NAMES OF THREE OFFICIALS IN UOGC'S ADMINISTRATION.

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
PERCENT WHO KNOWS NAMES OF THREE OFFICIALS	(30) 55 %	(34) 68 %	(24) 73 %
TOTAL CASES	55	50	33

IN THE UOGC, AS IN THE ITU, "WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT

THE PRINTER FRIENDSHIPS OF THE IDEOLOGICALLY INSENSITIVE TO AFFECT THEIR POLITICAL (...) INTEREST" [139]. HOWEVER, THIS IS ALSO TRUE WITH RESPECT TO FRIENDSHIPS WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES IN THE UNION. WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN THAT IN THE ITU MEN LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY ARE GREATLY AFFECTED IN THEIR POLITICAL INTEREST BY PARTICIPATING IN PRINTERS' CLUBS. THIS EFFECT IN THE UOGC IS A VERY SMALL ONE, EVEN MORE SO IF WE REMEMBER THAT MOST FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION, WHICH COULD PROMOTE POLITICAL INTEREST MORE OPENLY THAN THE ITU'S CLUBS. HOW CAN WE UNDERSTAND THIS DIFFERENT ROLE OF FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES IN THE ITU AND THE UOGC? IT SEEMS TO US THAT THIS FACT IS RELATED WITH THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL CLIMATES IN BOTH UNIONS. THE PRESENCE IN THE ITU IF A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM, OF A SUCCESSFUL OPPOSITION, OF VERY ACTIVE ELECTORAL CONTESTS, HAVE PROMOTED AN INTEREST IN POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WITHIN PRINTERS' CLUBS, AND THIS LED THE POLITICAL ACTIVISTS TO LOOK FOR A "CAPTIVE AUDIENCE" -AND EVENTUAL SUPPORTERS- WITHIN THOSE SAME CLUBS. THIS IS NOT THE CASE OF THE UOGC. THERE, THE PRESENCE OF A ONE-LIST SYSTEM, THE ABSENCE OF OPPOSITION, THE ROUTINE CHARACTER OF UNION ELECTIONS, HAVE NOT PROMOTED POLITICAL INTEREST AND DISCUSSIONS TO

SUCH AN EXTENT AS TO MOBILIZE THE POLITICALLY UNINTERESTED PRINTERS.

IF WE TURN OUR DISCUSSION TO THOSE MEN HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY, IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ITU AND THE UOGC ALSO EMERGE. LIPSET ET.AL. NOTE THAT PARTICIPATION IN PRINTERS' CLUBS AFFECTS LESS THOSE HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY THAN IT AFFECTS THE MIDDLE OR LOWER GROUPS. THEY EXPLAIN THIS PHENOMENON ON THE BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTION:

> "IF ONE IS HIGHLY RESPONSIVE TO ISSUES AND IDEAS IN POLITICS, THEN THE ADITIONAL STIMULATION PROVIDED BY SOCIAL RELATIONS IS NOT IMPORTANT. THE PRINTER WITH A STRONG IDEOLOGICAL BENT IS MOTIVATED TO PARTICIPATE IN UNION POLITICS. HE HAS LESS NEED OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY TO INFORM HIM OF ISSUES AND TO AWAKEN HIS POLITICAL INTERESTS" [140].

HOWEVER, AS THESE AUTHORS THEMSELVES OBSERVE,

> "GIVEN THE ASSUMPTION THAT THESE MEN ARE MORE LIKELY TO TALK ABOUT POLITICS THAN ANY OTHER GROUPS IN THE SAMPLE, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE FINDING THAT HIGH RATES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY DID NOT LEAD TO GREATER INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS" [141].

IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE THIS PROBLEM, THE AUTHORS INTRODUCED AS A CONTROL VARIABLE THE DEGREE OF LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM AMONG THE DIFFERENT GROUPS IN THE SCALE OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY [142]. THEY FOUND THAT LIBERALISM OR CONSERVATISM AFFECTS THE DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION IN

UNION POLITICS OF THOSE HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY. THAT IS, THE HIGHLY POLITICALIZED LIBERAL IS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO BE DIRECTLY LED TO PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS THAN THE HIGHLY POLITICALIZED CONSERVATIVE. GIVEN THAT THE VALUES OF THE LATTERS "ARE MORE NEARLY ALLIED TO THOSE OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY THAN THOSE OF MILITANT UNIONISM, THESE IDEOLOGICALLY SENSITIVE CONSERVATIVES MAY EVEN TEND TO DISSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY" [143]. PRESSING THEIR ANALYSIS, THE AUTHORS FOUND THAT IT IS AMONG CONSERVATIVES HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS THAT THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY PLAYS A ROLE. THEIR DATA [144] SHOW THAT THE LATTER PARTICIPATE IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN THE LIBERALS WHO ARE HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS. THEY POINT OUT THAT EVENTHOUGH "THE SMALL NUMBER OF CASES AVAILABLE FOR ANALYSIS PRECLUDES ANY DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS" [145], IT WOULD SEEM THAT

> "CONSERVATIVES COME TO PARTICIPATE IN UNION AFFAIRS THROUGH FIRST PARTICIPATING IN THE NONPOLITICAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY, WHILE LIBERALS AND RADICALS ARE MOTIVATED MORE DIRECTLY BY THEIR VALUES TOWARDS PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS AND ARE NOT DEPENDENT ON SOCIAL RELATIONS AS AN ACTIVATING FORCE" [146].

IT WAS SHOWN IN TABLES 9 AND 10 THAT IN THE UOGC MEN HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY WERE THE MOST AFFECTED

IN THEIR DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS BY THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY. THAT IS, IT SEEMS THAT INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCCUPATIONAL

TABLE 14. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTICIPATION IN INFORMAL AND FORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY AND POLITICAL INTEREST, AND ACTIVITY, FOR MEN HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY.

UOGC:

	HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY			
	INFORMAL SOCIAL REL.		FORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS	
	HIGH	LOW	PARTICIPANTS	NON-PARTICIPANTS
ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(17) 85 %	(6) 55 %	(13) 93 %	(12) 63 %
N	20	11	14	19

COMMUNITY WOULD TEND TO PROMOTE UNION POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ONLY AMONG THOSE WHO ARE HIGHLY INTERESTED IN POLITICS, BECAUSE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE UOGC WOULD BE NOT ENOUGH TO MOTIVATE THOSE PRINTERS LESS INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT OUR SCALE OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY TENDS TO PARALLEL A "LIBERAL (OR RADICAL)-CONSERVATIVE" SCALE, AND, THEREFORE, THOSE LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY COULD BE CONSIDERED ALSO THE MOST CONSERVATIVE ONES. THESE MEN LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (OR CONSERVATIVES) MAY

TABLE 14.1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTICIPATION IN INFORMAL AND FORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY AND POLITICAL INTEREST, AND ACTIVITY, FOR MEN LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY.

A) UOGC

	LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY			
	INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS		FORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS	
	HIGH	LOW	PARTICIPANTS IN UNION SOC. ACTIV.	NON-PARTICIPANTS
ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(21) 60 %	(12) 60 %	(17) 63 %	(16) 57 %
N	35	20	27	28

B) ITU (PAGE 107)

	LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY			
	INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS		CLUB MEMBERS	
	HIGH	LOW	YES	NO
ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(13) 26 %	(12) 23 %	(9) 41 %	(16) 19 %
N	50	53	22	86

-AS SUGGESTED BY LIPSET ET.AL.- "TEND TO DISSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY." EVEN WHEN OUR DATA ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE IN THIS SENSE, THEY SHOW A TENDENCY OF THE MIDDLE AND LOW IDEALOGUES (THE MORE CONSERVATIVES) TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES MORE WITH THE MIDDLE CLASS (TABLE 15), AND TO EXPRESS A LOWER DEGREE OF "CLASS SOLIDARITY"

TABLE 15. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM (ON THE SCALE OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY) AND SELF-IDENTIFICATION WITH THE MIDDLE CLASS, AMONG UOGC'S MEMBERS.

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY	
	HIGH (MORE RADICALS)	LOW AND MIDDLE (MORE CONSERVATIVES)
SELF-IDENTIFICATION WITH THE MIDDLE CLASS	(14) 42 %	(53) 50 %
TOTAL CASES	33	105

TABLE 15.1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM (ON THE SCALE OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY) AND "CLASS SOLIDARITY" WITH RESPECT TO STRIKES, AMONG UOGC'S MEMBERS.

	LEVELS OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY	
	HIGH (MORE RADICALS)	LOW AND MIDDLE (MORE CONSERVATIVES)
PERCENT WHO THINK STRIKES SHOULD BE ALWAYS SUPPORTED	(20) 67 %	(43) 41 %
TOTAL CASES	33	105

WITH RESPECT TO STRIKES (TABLE 15.1), WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE QUESTION: "DO YOU CONSIDER THAT STRIKES SHOULD BE ALWAYS SUPPORTED, INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ISSUES, OR THAT THEY SHOULD BE ONLY SUPPORTED IN CERTAIN CASES?".

IF THESE TENDENCIES ARE PRESENT, THE SMALL EFFECT OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY ON THE DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS AMONG THOSE UNINTERESTED UOGC'S MEMBERS CAN BE SEEN AS A LOGICAL, PREDICTABLE RESULT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT COULD BY HYPOTHESIZED THAT THE HIGHLY POLITICALIZED LIBERALS (OR RADICALS), THAT IS, THOSE HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY, SEEM TO NEED MORE MOTIVATION THAN THE ITU'S HIGHLY POLITICALIZED LIBERALS TO BE INDUCED TO TRANSFORM THEIR ORIENTATIONS INTO ACTION. THIS FUNCTION, AS OUR DATA WOULD TEND TO SUGGEST, COULD BE PERFORMED BY THE UOGC'S OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY.

AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF THE ITU'S OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY, RELATED TO "THE POLITICAL ACTIVATION OF THE IDEOLOGICALLY SENSITIVE CONSERVATIVES BY THE CLUBS" [147] IS FINALLY SINGLED OUT BY LIPSET ET AL:

> "SINCE THE LEISURE SYSTEM RECRUITS POLITICALLY AWARE CONSERVATIVES WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE NOT BE ACTIVE IN THE UNION AND ITS POLITICS, IT HELPS ESTABLISH A BALANCE BETWEEN CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS IN UNION POLITICS" [148].

IN THE UOGC'S CASE, THE POLITICAL ACTIVATION TAKES PLACE AMONG THE IDEOLOGICALLY SENSITIVE LIBERALS (OR

MORE RADICAL) WHO, GIVEN THE LOW POLITICAL CLIMATE WITHIN THE UNION, SEEM TO NEED THE MOTIVATIONAL FORCE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY. TO WHAT EXTENT THIS DIFFERENCE CAN BE CONSIDERED A DECISIVE FACTOR TO EXPLAIN THE ABSENCE OF A DEMOCRATIC TWO-PARTY SYSTEM (OR OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION) IN THE UOGC? THE LISTA ROSA COULD BE GENERALLY CHARACTERIZED AS "CENTRIST" IN THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM OF THE COUNTRY. THEREFORE, THE POLITICAL ACTIVATION OF THE HIGH-LIBERAL (OR RADICAL) IDEALOGUES BY THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD HAVE EVENTUALLY LED TO THE ARISING OF AN OPPOSITION. THE HISTORICAL ABSENCE OF ORGANIZED OPPOSITION DOES NOT IMPLY BY ITSELF THE LEGITIMACY OF THE "ONE-LIST" SYSTEM: ONLY 5% OF THE SAMPLE CONSIDERED SUCH A SYSTEM ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE UNION. THE GREAT MAJORITY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE PRESENCE OF AN OPPOSITION "LIST", BECAUSE "IT ALLOWS THE POSSIBILITY OF SELECTING THE BETTER ONE", OR BECAUSE "IT COULD AVOID THE PERPETUATION OF ONE GROUP", OR BECAUSE "IT INCREASES THE INTEREST IN ELECTION CONTEXTS". MOST OF THESE POINTS OF VIEW, HOWEVER, WERE FORMULATED AT AN ABSTRACT, THEORETICAL LEVEL, WITHOUT CONCRETE CRITICISMS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION, WHOSE EFFECTIVENESS WAS GENERALLY GRANTED.

THESE CONSIDERATIONS LED US TO AN ALTERNATIVE QUESTION: WHY THE POLITICAL ACTIVATION OF THE MOST IDEOLOGICALLY

CONCERNED LIBERAL-RADICALS HAVE NOT PROMOTED THE ARISING OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION, WHILE A MORE CONSERVATIVE ORIENTATION IS SUPPOSED TO PREDOMINATE IN THE UNION? THE MORE PLAUSIBLE ANSWER TO THIS PROBLEM CAN BE FOUND IN A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL COMPOSITION AND PROCESSES WITHIN THE LISTA ROSA, AND IN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ITS LEADERSHIP. SUCH AN ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, WILL BE CARRIED OUT AT A LATTER STAGE OF THIS STUDY. AT THIS MOMENT, WE CAN LEAVE THE QUESTION OPENED, IN THE SAME WAY AS IN UNION DEMOCRACY:

> "BUT WHAT IS A SUFFICIENT BASE FOR AN OPPOSITION PARTY IN TRADE UNIONS? HOW MUCH PARTISAN ACTIVITY WOULD CONSTITUTE 'SUFFICIENT' COMPETITION IN THE MARKET PLACE OF IDEAS? WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF RANK-AND-FILE INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN A UNION? IN SHORT, WHAT ARE THE MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL UNION DEMOCRACY?" [149].

AS THE AUTHORS NOTE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION AT THIS POINT, "AND CERTAINLY NOT BY AN INSPECTION OF ANY ONE UNION BY ITSELF" [150]. WHAT THEY CAN SAY IS THAT "THE INDEPENDENT PRINTERS' ORGANIZATIONS CLEARLY WORK COUNTER TO THE STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS WHICH MICHELS IDENTIFIED AS INHERENT IN LARGE SCALE ORGANIZATIONS AND ON WHICH HE BASED HIS IRON LAW" [151]. THEY FINALLY ADD THAT

> "THE ITU REPRESENTS A CASE IN WHICH THE SECONDARY ASSOCIATIONS WHICH TOCQUEVILLE SAW AS NECESSARY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM DO EXIST, AND THESE GROUPS, TOGETHER WITH OTHER PATTERNS WHICH CHARACTERIZE PRINTING AS CRAFT AND INDUSTRY,

> FUNCTION TO SUPPORT THE PARTY SYSTEM WHICH IS THE ITU'S MOST STRIKING CONTRIBUTION TO THE TRADE-UNION MOVEMENT" 152.

IN OUR CASE, THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS MUST BE SINGLED OUT: FIRST, AS IT HAS BEEN NOTED, THE UOGC IS NOT A LARGE SCALE ORGANIZATION; THEREFORE, THE STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS IDENTIFIED BY MICHELS SHOULD NOT BE WORKING HERE. SECOND, INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG PRINTERS AND FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNION PROMOTE A HIGHER DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION AMONG GROUPS WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED AS THE EVENTUAL SUPPORTERS OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION. THIRD, THE POSSIBLE THEORETICAL ADVANTAGES OF THE PRESENCE OF AN OPPOSITION"LIST" HAVE NOT BEEN RULED OUT BY CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS. FINALLY, MANY OF THE OTHER PATTERNS WHICH ARE CHARACTERISTIC OF PRINTING AS CRAFT AND INDUSTRY AND THAT, ACCORDING TO LIPSET ET AL, CONTRIBUTE TO SUPPORT THE ITU'S PARTY SYSTEM, SEEM TO BE ALSO PRESENT IN THE UOGC. THE DISCUSSION OF THESE PATTERNS WILL REQUIRE NOW OUR ATTENTION.

6. DETERMINANTS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY: I

INTRODUCTION.- THE PRESENT CHAPTER IS CONCERNED WITH THE CONDITIONS WHICH PRODUCED THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY IN BOTH UNIONS, AND THEIR DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS.

IT IS OBSERVED THAT PRINTERS IN THE ITU AND THE UOGC ACCORD HIGH STATUS TO THEIR OCCUPATION. AS A RESULT, NEW YORK PRINTERS TEND TO ASSOCIATE MORE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE AND REJECT OTHER MANUAL WORKERS, WHILE CÓRDOBA PRINTERS ALSO REJECT THE LATTER BUT TEND TO ASSOCIATE MORE WITH FELLOW WORKERS. THIS DIFFERENTIAL PATTERN IS ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENT STRUCTURAL POSSIBILITIES TO MAKE FRIENDS IN EACH CASE.

THE FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TENDENCY OF NEW YORK PRINTERS TO RELATE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE WERE RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, FATHER'S OCCUPATION, EDUCATION, AND THE NUMBER OF GENERATIONS THE PRINTER'S FAMILY HAS BEEN IN AMÉRICA. IN THE UOGC, ONLY FATHER'S OCCUPATION AND EDUCATION WERE CONSIDERED. IT WAS FOUND AS A PLAUSIBLE HYPOTHESIS IN BOTH CASES THAT THE MARGINAL STATUS OF PRINTING AS AN OCCUPATION WAS ONE OF THE MAIN DETERMINANTS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY.

ANOTHER FACTOR -NOT RELATED WITH THE STATUS OF PRINTING- ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN

OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS JOB SATISFACTION. A LARGE MAJORITY IN BOTH CASES EXPRESSED A HIGH DEGREE OF LIKING FOR THEIR JOB. OTHER INDICATORS OF JOB SATISFACTION WERE OCCUPATIONAL AND JOB PREFERENCES, AND THE PATTERNS OF SPENDING LEISURE TIME WITH OTHER PRINTERS. AGAIN, RESULTS WERE CONSISTENT IN BOTH CASES.

IT WAS FINALLY CONCLUDED THAT INTEREST IN AND SATISFACTION WITH PRINTING PLAYED A SIMILAR ROLE IN THE ITU AND THE UOGC, EVEN THOUGH DATA WERE NOT AS STRONG IN THE LATTER AS IN THE FORMER.

6.1 THE INTERNAL ANALYSIS APPROACH

EVEN THOUGH EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT "THE ITU'S POLITICAL SYSTEM IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY", [153] LIPSET ET AL NOTE THAT "THE QUESTION STILL REMAINS, WHY DO PRINTERS HAVE AN OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY?" [154] THAT IS, ONE THING IS TO POINT OUT THAT A RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, ANOTHER THINK IS TO IDENTIFY "THE CONDITIONS WHICH GENERATE THE COMMUNITY" [155]. IN TRYING TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION, THE AUTHORS AFFIRM, "WE ARE TAKING A STEP TOWARD ANSWERING THE QUESTION WHY THE ITU IS A DEMOCRATIC UNION" [156]. IN THE UOGC'S CASE, THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH GENERATE THE COMMUNITY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO A DISCUSSION

OF THE POSSIBLE DIFFERENTIAL FACTORS WHICH COULD EXPLAIN THE PRESENCE OF A ONE-LIST SYSTEM IN THE UNION.

GIVEN THE LIMITATIONS FOR CARRYING OUT A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONS, THE AUTHORS SUGGEST THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH OF AN INTERNAL ANALYSIS. "THUS IF WE SEEK THE DETERMINANTS OF A BEHAVIOR PATTERN -IN THIS CASE, ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY- WE CAN COMPARE INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE UNION WHO DIFFER WIDELY WITH RESPECT TO THIS BEHAVIOR PATTERN AND SO FIND OUT WHAT CHARACTERISTICS ARE RELATED TO IT" [157].

IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO SPECIFY THE DETERMINANTS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE AUTHORS ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO THE QUESTION OF "WHY MEN SELECT AND ARE SELECTED BY ONE GROUP OF ASSOCIATES RATHER THAN ANOTHER" [158]. THEY OBSERVE THAT IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE PATTERNS OF LEISURE-TIME BEHAVIOR, FACILITATING AS WELL AS MOTIVATING VARIABLES MUST BE DISTINGHISHED. THAT IS, SOME PRINTERS MAY BE INVOLVED IN A SITUATION (LIKE NIGHT WORK) WHICH FACILITATES SOCIAL RELATIONS, BUT THEY MIGHT NOT BE MOTIVATED TO DO SO. OR, CONVERSELY, THEY MAY BE MOTIVATED TO ASSOCIATE WITH FELLOW WORKERS, EVENTHOUGH THERE CAN BE STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS FOR HIS PARTICIPATION. OF COURSE, AS THE AUTHORS NOTE, THERE ARE FACTORS WHICH COULD PERFORM BOTH FUNCTIONS. HOWEVER, THEY THINK "THIS

DISTINCTION WILL HELP CLARIFY THE MECHANISMS WITH LEAD TO THE CHOICE OF ONE ALTERNATIVE RATHER THAN THE OTHER" [159].

6.2 THE STATUS OF PRINTING

LIPSET ET.AL. POINT OUT THAT THE HISTORY OF PRINTING IN MOST OF THE WORLD SUGGESTS THAT PRINTERS HAVE CONSIDERED THEMSELVES AS THE ARISTOCRATS OF LABOR, "AS SOMEWHAT HIGHER THAN OTHER SKILLED WORKERS" [160]. THIS IS RELATED WITH THE FACT THAT HISTORICALLY "LITERACY WAS CONFINED TO MEMBERS OF THE MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASSES" [161] AND THAT "THE NECESSARILY LITERATE PRINTERS WERE ACCORDED FAR HIGHER STATUS THAN OTHER PRESUMABLY LITERATE MANUAL WORKERS" [162]. IN THE CASE OF ARGENTINIAN PRINTERS, WE HAVE NOTED IN OUR HISTORICAL NOTE THAT SUCH AN ARISTOCRATIC SELF-PERCEPTION WAS NOT ALIEN TO THEM.

THE QUESTION REMAINS, AS NOTED BY LIPSET ET.AL., IF THIS SITUATION STILL EXISTS. THE AUTHORS THINK THAT SUCH IS THE CASE, ON THE BASIS OF CERTAIN GENERAL EVIDENCES. WE THINK THAT THIS COULD BE ALSO TRUE OF ARGENTINIAN PRINTERS, BUT TO A LOWER EXTENT, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THEIR REMUNERATIONS HAVE NOT INCREASED AS THAT OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, AND THEY ARE PERMANENTLY COMPLAINING ABOUT THEIR LOWER SALARIES.

IF WE RECOGNIZE THIS DIFFERENTIAL SITUATION OF

PRINTERS WITHIN THE WORKING-CLASS, THE QUESTION ARISES, "HOW DOES THIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRINTERS AND OTHER WORKERS AFFECT THE SOCIAL LIFE OF PRINTERS?" [163]. THE AUTHORS OF UNION DEMOCRACY THINK THAT IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: "A PRINTER IS FACED WITH THE CHOICE OF MINGLING SOCIALLY WITH MEMBERS OF MIDDLE-CLASS-STATUS GROUPS, WITH OTHER MANUAL WORKERS, OR WITH PRINTERS. TO ASSOCIATE WITH WORKERS MAY MEAN AN ACCEPTANCE OF LOWER STATUS AND ALSO A LOWER CULTURAL LEVEL" [164]. THEREFORE, "WHILE THE PRINTERS PRESUMABLY WILL TEND TO REJECT OTHER MANUAL WORKERS, MIDDLE-CLASS PERSONS MAY TEND TO REJECT PRINTERS AS FRIENDS SINCE THEY ARE MANUAL WORKERS" [165]. AS A RESULT, "PRINTERS WILL TEND TO ASSOCIATE MORE WITH EACH OTHER THAN WILL WORKERS WHO DO NOT POSSESS THIS AMBIGUOUS STATUS" [166].

GIVEN THE LACK OF DATA TO ANALYZE THE STATUS SOCIALLY ACCORDED TO PRINTERS, THE AUTHORS TRY TO MAKE SOME INFERENCES ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINTERS' SELF-PERCEPTIONS. IN THIS SENSE, THEY USE A QUESTION WHERE ITU'S MEMBERS ARE REQUIRED TO COMPARE THE PRESTIGE OF THE MOST SKILLED CRAFTS (LIKE COMPOSITORS AND TYPESETTERS) WITH THAT OF PRESSMEN, SUPPOSED TO BE LESS SKILLED. (THE LATTERS, IN FACT, "ARE SKILLED IN THEIR OWN RIGHT IN THE OPERATION OF THE COMPLEX PRINTING PRESSES" [167]). THE AUTHORS FOUND THAT 64 % STATED THAT THEY HAD HIGHER PRESTIGE THAN

PRESSMEN, WHO WERE CONSIDERED MERELY AS MACHINE OPERATORS. IN OUR CASE, THIS COMPARISON WAS NOT POSSIBLE. MANY PRESSMEN CONSTITUTED OUR SAMPLE, AND WITHIN THE CATEGORIZATION USED BY THE UNION THEY WERE CONSIDERED SKILLED PERSONNEL. FURTHERMORE, A HIGH PROPORTION OF PRINTERS MOVE FROM ONE TASK TO ANOTHER IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHOP REQUIREMENTS, AND THEY CAN BE WORKING EITHER AS TYPOGRAPHERS OR PRESSMEN WITHIN SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WE HAD WAS TO ASK THEM TO COMPARE THEMSELVES WITH JOURNALISTS. OF COURSE, WE KNEW THEY WERE ACCORDED A HIGH STATUS BY PRINTERS, SO MORE IMPORTANT FOR US WERE THE REASONS ADUCED BY UOGC'S MEMBERS IN THEIR EVALUATIONS. HOWEVER, NEAR 25% CONSIDERED THEMSELVES AS HAVING EQUAL OR HIGHER STATUS THAN JOURNALISTS. THE GENERAL PATTERN OF ANSWERS IN THIS SENSE WAS THAT PRINTING IS AN ART, THAT IT IS A PROFESSION IN ITS OWN RIGHT (AS IT IS JOURNALISM), AND THAT THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT PEOPLE SEE THE WORK OF THE JOURNALIST BUT NOT THAT OF THE PRINTER. ON THE OTHER HAND, THOSE WHO ACCORDED HIGHER STATUS TO JOURNALISTS MENTIONED MOST OF THE TIMES FACTORS RELATED WITH SOCIAL STATUS, SUCH AS THE JOURNALIST'S CONTACT WITH "IMPORTANT PEOPLE", OR THEIR HIGHER EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, AND NOT FACTORS RELATED WITH DIFFERENCES IN THE NATURE OF THE JOB ITSELF. OF COURSE, THE HIGHER PAY AND SECURITY OF JOURNALISTS WAS ALWAYS ACKNOWLEDGED. TO A GREAT EXTENT, THIS SEEMS TO BE ALSO

THE ORIENTATION OF ITU'S MEMBERS: "MANY SEEM TO THINK OF PRINTING, (...), AS A REAL CRAFT OR ART AND ARE WILLING, ON PURELY TYPE-OF-WORK BASIS WITH NO CONSIDERATION OF PAY AND SECURITY, TO COMPARE IT WITH JOBS OF MUCH HIGHER STATUS" [168].

AS PRINTERS STILL SEEM TO PERCEIVE THEIR TRADE AS ABOVE OTHER SKILL TRADES, LIPSET ET.AL. OBSERVE THAT THEY SHOULD TEND "TO ASSOCIATE MORE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PERSONS OR WITH PRINTERS, AND LESS WITH OTHER WORKERS" [169]. IN THE ITU'S CASE, THEY FOUND THAT THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE "THREE BEST FRIENDS" OF THE 412 MEN IN THEIR SAMPLE WAS THE FOLLOWING: "OF THE 1,236 FRIENDS NAMED, 35% WERE PRINTERS, 21 % PROFESSIONALS, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, AND INDEPENDENT BUSINESS OWNERS, 20% WHITE-COLLAR OR SALES EMPLOYEES, AND ONLY 25% OTHER MANUAL WORKERS" [170]. AS THE AUTHORS POINT OUT, IT IS DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE THESE DATA WITHOUT COMPARATIVE STATISTICS FROM OTHER OCCUPATIONS. HOWEVER, THEY THINK THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT OTHER MANUAL WORKERS WILL SHOW THE SAME FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS AS PRINTERS DO.

IN THE UOGC, THE DISTRIBUTION OF FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS WAS THE FOLLOWING: OF THE 387 FRIENDS NAMED, 60% WERE PRINTERS, 27% WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS, AND 13% OTHER MANUAL WORKERS. IF WE CONSIDER AS "MIDDLE-CLASS" THE PROFESSIONALS, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, INDEPENDENT BUSINESS

OWNERS, AND WHITE-COLLARS OR SALES EMPLOYEES WHO ARE FRIENDS OF ITU'S MEMBERS, WE CAN SINGLE OUT THE FOLLOWING DIFFERENCES WITH FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS IN THE UOGC: CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS TEND TO ASSOCIATE MORE AMONG THEMSELVES THAN NEW YORK PRINTERS (60% AGAINST 35%); THE FORMER TEND TO ASSOCIATE LESS WITH MIDDLE-CLASS GROUPS THAN THE LATTER (27% AGAINST 41%); FINALLY, CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS TEND TO ASSOCIATE LESS WITH OTHER MANUAL WORKERS THAN NEW YORK PRINTERS (13% AGAINST 25%).

THE AUTHORS OF UNION DEMOCRACY NOTE THAT "THE FACT THAT ALMOST TWO-TIRDS OF THE NONPRINTER FRIENDS OF THE PERSONS OF THE SAMPLE ARE NOT MANUAL WORKERS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT PRINTERS AS A GROUP WHERE POSSIBLE WOULD PREFER TO BE ACCEPTED AS MEMBERS OF THE MIDDLE CLASS" [171]. THEY OBSERVE THAT EVENTHOUGH A LARGE GROUP ASSOCIATES WITH OTHER MANUAL WORKERS, THIS "DOES NOT NECESSARILY DISPROVE THE HYPOTHESIS, FOR THESE DATA REPRESENT NOT ONLY WHAT THE PRINTERS PREFER BUT ALSO WHAT IS AVAILABLE" [172].

IT SEEMS TO US THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SPECIFY EMPIRICALLY WHEN FRIENDSHIPS ARE PREVENTED FROM FOLLOWING A DETERMINED PATTERN. IN THE UOGC WE CAN ONLY OBSERVE, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRECEDING EVIDENCE, THAT PRINTERS SEEM TO PREFER TO ASSOCIATE AMONG THEMSELVES, TO SELECT MIDDLE CLASS GROUPS AS A SECOND CHOICE, AND TO AVOID FRIENDSHIP

WITH OTHER MANUAL WORKERS.

6.3 THE PREFERENCES OF PRINTERS

LIPSET ET.AL. SUGGEST -AS IT WAS POINTED OUT- THAT PRINTERS ARE MORE MOTIVATED TO ASSOCIATE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS GROUPS AND, ALTERNATIVELY, WITH OTHER PRINTERS RATHER THAN WITH OTHER MANUAL WORKERS. IN ORDER TO ANALYZE THE HYPOTHESIS THAT PRINTERS TEND TO AVOID FRIENDSHIP WITH OTHER MANUAL WORKERS, THE AUTHORS CONSIDER THE RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION, "IF YOU HAD YOUR CHOICE, WOULD YOU RATHER SPEND YOUR FREE TIME WITH OTHER PRINTERS OR WITH PEOPLE NOT IN THE TRADE?". THEY OBSERVE THAT THE EXPRESSION "PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT IN THE TRADE" IS A VAGUE ONE, AND THAT PRINTERS WILL UNDERSTAND IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REFERENCE GROUP THEY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. THE AUTHORS SUGGEST THAT "IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THOSE WHOSE NON-PRINTER FRIENDS ARE PRIMARILY WORKERS WILL THINK OF THESE WORKERS WHEN THEY ANSWER THE QUESTION, WHILE MEN WHOSE NONPRINTER FRIENDS ARE IN MIDDLE-CLASS NONMANUAL OCCUPATIONS WILL THINK OF THOSE FRIENDS IN ANSWERING THE QUESTION" [173]. THAT IS, IF PRINTERS ACTUALLY FIND MIDDLE-CLASS FRIENDS WILL BE LESS INDUCED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY THAN WILL THOSE WHOSE FRIENDS ARE IN LOW-STATUS OCCUPATIONS.

TABLE 16. PROPORTION OF PRINTERS WITH VARYING FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS WHO PREFER TO SPEND THEIR FREE TIME WITH NONPRINTERS.

A) UOGC
16.1

MEN WHO HAD NO PRINTERS AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS (FRIENDS' STATUS)

	ALL HIGH STATUS	INTERMEDIATE AND MIXED	ALL MANUAL OR LOW STATUS (*)
PROPORTION WHO PREFER TO SPEND FREE TIME WITH NONPRINTERS	(13) 76 %	(5) 71 %	(2) 50 %
TOTAL CASES	17	7	4

B) ITU (PAGE 126)
16.1

MEN WHO HAD NO PRINTERS AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS (FRIENDS' STATUS)

	ALL HIGH STATUS	INTERMEDIATE AND MIXED	ALL MANUAL OR LOW STATUS (*)
PROPORTION WHO PREFER TO SPEND FREE TIME WITH NONPRINTERS	(19) 54 %	(41) 47 %	(17) 39 %
TOTAL CASES	35	87	43

(*) IN THE ITU, "LOW-STATUS NONMANUAL" REFERS TO WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS AND SALESMEN.
"HIGH-STATUS" INCLUDES PROFESSIONS, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES, AND INDEPEND. BUSINESSMEN" (PAGE 127).
IN THE UOGC, "LOW-STATES REFERS TO MANUAL WORKERS.
"HIGH-STATES" INCLUDES ONLY WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS OR SALES AND SERVICES EMPLOYEES.

A) UOGC
TABLE 16.2

MEN WHO HAD ONE PRINTER AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS
(FRIENDS' STATUS)

	BOTH NON-MANUAL	ONE OR BOTH MANUAL
PROPORTION WHO PREFER TO SPEND FREE TIME WITH NONPRINTERS	(8) 73 %	(9) 69 %
TOTAL CASES	11	13

B) ITU (PAGE 126)
TABLE 16.2

MEN WHO HAD ONE PRINTER AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS
(FRIENDS' STATUS)

	BOTH NON-MANUAL	ONE OR BOTH MANUAL
PROPORTION WHO PREFER TO SPEND FREE TIME WITH NONPRINTERS	(18) 51 %	(20) 27 %
TOTAL CASES	35	75

A) UOGC
TABLE 16.3

MEN WHO HAD TWO PRINTERS AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS
(FRIENDS' STATUS)

	NON-MANUAL	MANUAL
PROPORTION WHO PREFER TO SPEND FREE TIME WITH NONPRINTERS	(10) 67 %	(5) 56 %
TOTAL CASES	15	9

B) ITU (PAGE 126)
TABLE 16.3

MEN WHO HAD TWO PRINTERS AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS
(FRIENDS' STATUS)

	NON-MANUAL	MANUAL
PROPORTION WHO PREFER TO SPEND FREE TIME WITH NONPRINTERS	(18) 42 %	(8) 20 %
TOTAL CASES	43	41

IN TABLE 16 WE CAN SEE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE NONPRINTER FRIENDS OF PRINTERS IN BOTH SAMPLES, AND THE TENDENCIES OF THESE PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH FELLOW WORKERS. TABLE 17 SHOWS HOW THE

TABLE 17. PROPORTION OF PRINTERS WITH VARYING FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS WHO DO NOT TAKE PART IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY.

A) UOGC
TABLE 17.1

MEN WHO HAD NO PRINTERS AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS

(FRIENDS' STATUS)

	ALL HIGH STATUS	INTERMEDIATE AND MIXED	ALL MANUAL OR LOW STATUS
PROPORTION WHO DO NOT TAKE PART IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY	(5) 29 %	(1) 14 %	- -
TOTAL CASES	17	7	4

B) ITU (PAGE 127)
TABLE 17.1

MEN WHO HAD NO PRINTERS AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS

(FRIENDS' STATUS)

	ALL HIGH STATUS	INTERMEDIATE AND MIXED	ALL MANUAL OR LOW STATUS
PROPORTION WHO DO NOT TAKE PART IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY	(22) 67 %	(53) 60 %	(21) 53 %
TOTAL CASES	33	88	40

A) UOGC
TABLE 17.2

MEN WHO HAD ONE PRINTER AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS
(FRIENDS' STATUS)

	BOTH NON-MANUAL	ONE OR BOTH MANUAL
PROPORTION WHO DO NOT TAKE PART IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY	(3) 27 %	(3) 23 %
TOTAL CASES	11	13

B) ITU (PAGE 127)
TABLE 17.2

MEN WHO HAD ONE PRINTER AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS
(FRIENDS' STATUS)

	BOTH NON-MANUAL	ONE OR BOTH MANUAL
PROPORTION WHO DO NOT TAKE PART IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY	(23) 68 %	(36) 48 %
TOTAL CASES	34	75

T-A

A) UOGC
TABLE 17.3

MEN WHO HAD TWO PRINTERS AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS
(FRIENDS' STATUS)

	NON-MANUAL	MANUAL
PROPORTION WHO DO NOT TAKE PART IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY	(2) 13 %	(1) 11 %
TOTAL CASES	15	9

B) ITU (PAGE 127)
TABLE 17.3

MEN WHO HAD TWO PRINTERS AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS
(FRIENDS' STATUS)

	NON-MANUAL	MANUAL
PROPORTION WHO DO NOT TAKE PART IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY	(20) 51 %	(15) 41 %
TOTAL CASES	39	37

ASSOCIATIONS ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY.

LIPSET ET.AL. POINT OUT THAT THEIR DATA STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT THE PRINTERS WITH LOW-STATUS NONPRINTER FRIENDS (MANUAL WORKERS) TEND TO PREFER TO ASSOCIATE MORE WITH PRINTERS THAN THOSE WHOSE NONPRINTER FRIENDS ARE IN HIGH-STATUS OCCUPATIONS. THE AUTHORS CONSIDER THAT THIS INDICATES THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THEIR ASSUMPTION THAT THE HIGH SELF-PERCEPTION OF THEIR STATUS BY PRINTERS WILL LEAD THEM TO ASSOCIATE MORE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE, AND, WHEN NOT POSSIBLE, WITH PRINTERS. IN THIS SAME SENSE, THEY POINT OUT THAT TABLE 17 SHOWS THAT PRINTERS WHO DO NOT BELONG TO CLUBS OR ATTEND PRINTERS' SOCIAL AFFAIRS TEND TO ASSOCIATE WITH NONMANUAL WORKERS.

WITH RESPECT TO THE UOGC, WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT 60 % OF THE FRIENDS NAMED BY PRINTERS IN THE SAMPLE WERE FELLOW WORKERS. HENCE, WE HAVE ACTUALLY FEW CASES FOR EACH OF THE NONPRINTER FRIENDS' STATUS CATEGORIES. WITH THIS OBSERVATION IN MIND, WE CAN SEE THAT OUR DATA TEND TO SUGGEST THE SAME TENDENCIES SINGLED OUT BY LIPSET ET.AL., EVENTHOUGH THE RELATIONSHIPS ARE MUCH LESS MARKED THAN IN THE ITU. DATA IN TABLE 17, WHICH REFERS TO PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION, IS TOO WEAK, BECAUSE ONLY 29 PRINTERS IN THE SAMPLE REPORTED NOT TO BE PARTICIPANTS AT ALL. ANYWAY, THESE DATA DO NOT

CONTRADICT THE FINDINGS IN TABLE 16, WHILE THEY TEND TO ADD A SLIGHT SUPPORT. THEREFORE, IF UNION DEMOCRACY'S ASSUMPTIONS ARE SOUND, OUR DATA WOULD INDICATE THAT UOGC'S MEMBERS HAVE LESS POSSIBILITIES OF ASSOCIATING WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PERSONS -EVEN WHEN THEY COULD BE MOTIVATED TO DO SO- AND THAT, ALTERNATIVELY, THEY ARE LED TO RELATE WITH FELLOW WORKERS.

THE REASONING GOES AS FOLLOWS:

ASSUMPTIONS: (1) THE HIGH-STATUS SELF-PERCEPTION OF PRINTERS WILL LEAD THEM -WHENEVER POSSIBLE- TO ASSOCIATE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE;

(2) IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO ASSOCIATE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE, CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS WILL PREFER TO ASSOCIATE WITH OTHER PRINTERS;

EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS: (3) CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS SHOW A STRONG TENDENCY TO ASSOCIATE WITH FELLOW WORKERS;

(4) THEY SHOW A SIMILAR STRONG TENDENCY TO AVOID FRIENDSHIP WITH LOW-STATUS PEOPLE (MANUAL WORKERS);

(5) DATA SUGGEST THAT THOSE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS (NONMANUAL WORKERS) NON-PRINTER FRIENDS HAVE LESS DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY;

THEREFORE:

INTERPRETATIVE HYPOTHESIS: (6) THE FACT THAT CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS ASSOCIATE MORE WITH FELLOW WORKERS COULD BE DETERMINED BY THE ABSENCE OF POSSIBILITIES TO ASSOCIATE WITH HIGH-STATUS MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE.

6.4 THE OPPORTUNITIES OF PRINTERS

LIPSET ET.AL. POINT OUT THAT UP TO THIS POINT THEY "HAVE NOT ASKED -NOR ANSWERED- THE QUESTION, HOW DOES IT HAPPEN THAT SOME PRINTERS ASSOCIATE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PERSONS WHILE OTHERS ASSOCIATE WITH PRINTERS OR OTHER MANUAL WORKERS?" [174]. THEY CONSIDER THAT WITH THE PREVIOUS INFORMATION ABOUT HOW DIFFERENT OPPORTUNITIES ARISE, "WE MAY UNDERSTAND HOW DIFFERENT PRINTERS DEVELOP DIFFERENT FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS" [175].

IN THEIR ANALYSIS, THE MAJOR FACTOR RELATED WITH THE OPPORTUNITIES OF PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS GROUPS WAS RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION. PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, AND JEWISH COMMUNITIES WERE EQUALLY REPRESENTED IN THE SAMPLE AS IN NEW YORK. IT IS KNOWN THAT THESE GROUPS TEND TO ASSOCIATE WITH FELLOW RELIGIOUS-GROUP MEMBERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE AUTHORS NOTE, IN NEW YORK MOST CATHOLICS ARE IN MANUAL JOBS, MOST JEWS ARE IN NONMANUAL MIDDLE-

CLASS OCCUPATIONS, AND PROTESTANTS ARE EQUALLY DISTRIBUTED IN BOTH GROUPS. THE AUTHORS, THEN, ASSUME THAT "CATHOLICS TEND TO EVALUATE STATUS WITHIN A WORKING-CLASS FRAME OF REFERENCE IN WHICH PRINTING IS ACCORDED HIGH STATUS, WHILE JEWS EVALUATE STATUS WITHIN A MIDDLE-CLASS FRAMEWORK, IN WHICH PRINTING IS RATED MUCH LOWER" [176]. THEIR DATA SUPPORT THE ASSUMPTION THAT JEWS ARE MORE MIDDLE-CLASS ORIENTED THAN THE OTHER GROUPS, AS WELL AS THE HYPOTHESIS THAT "CATHOLIC PRINTERS, HAVING LESS CHANCE OF FINDING CATHOLIC NONMANUAL WORKERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH, ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE ACTIVE IN THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY THAN ARE JEWS" [177].

THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN OUR STUDY, BECAUSE ALMOST ALL THE ARGENTINIAN POPULATION IS CATHOLIC, PARTICULARLY AT THE WORKING-CLASS LEVEL. UNFORTUNATELY, NEITHER AN ALTERNATIVE FACTOR WHICH COULD PERFORM A SIMILAR FUNCTION WAS POSSIBLE TO SPECIFY IN THE UOGC.

LIPSET ET.AL. SINGLED OUT THREE OTHER VARIABLES AS DETERMINANT OF THE PRINTERS' STATUS FRAME OF REFERENCE AND THE AVAILABLE POOL OF FRIENDS: "FATHER'S OCCUPATION, EDUCATION, AND THE NUMBER OF GENERATIONS ONE'S FAMILY HAS BEEN IN AMERICA" [178]. TABLES 18 AND 19 SHOW THE DIFFERENT FAMILY AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF ITU AND UOGC'S MEMBERS.

TABLE 18. FAMILY BACKGROUNDS OF PRINTERS IN THE ITU AND THE UOGC.

FATHERS' OCCUPATION	ITU	UOGC
NONPRINTER MANUAL WORKER	49 %	38 %
NONMANUAL OCCUPATIONS	34 %	39 %
PRINTERS	17 %	13 %
ORFANS, NATURAL SONS, DON'T KNOW		10 %
	434	141

TABLE 19. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION AND VARIOUS CHARACTERISTICS OF PRINTERS.

A) UOGC

	GRAMMAR SCHOOL	SOME HIGH SCHOOL HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATE SOME COLLEGE (*)
JOB ASPIRATIONS:		
PRINTING	(43) 49%	(25) 47 %
OTHER MANUAL	(16) 18%	(3) 6 %
NONMANUAL	(20) 23%	(16) 30 %
THREE BEST FRIENDS PREDOMINANTLY NONMANUAL	(13) 15%	(18) 34 %
TOTAL CASES	88	53

(*) NOTE: WE CONDENSED IN THIS CATEGORY "HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATES" AND "SOME COLLEGE" BECAUSE THERE ARE ONLY 5 OF THE FORMER AND 4 OF THE LATTER.

TABLE 19. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION AND VARIOUS CHARACTERISTICS OF PRINTERS.

B) ITU (PAGE 131)

	GRAMMAR SCHOOL	SOME HIGH SCHOOL	HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATE	SOME COLLEGE
JOB ASPIRATIONS				
PRINTING	54 %	43 %	41 %	31 %
OTHER MANUAL	13 %	16 %	13 %	12 %
NONMANUAL	33 %	42 %	45 %	59 %
THREE BEST FRIENDS				
PREDOMINANTLY NON MANUAL	20 %	38 %	38 %	63 %
N	(117)	(149)	(80)	(57)

IT CAN BE SEEN IN BOTH CASES THAT "THE BETTER EDUCATED A PRINTER IS, THE MORE LIKELY HE IS TO DESIRE A NONMANUAL POSITION IF HE WERE STARTING HIS CARRER ALL OVER AGAIN AND TO HAVE MIDDLE-CLASS PERSONS AMONG HIS THREE BEST FRIENDS" [179].

THE AUTHORS POINT OUT THAT OTHER DATE (WHICH THEY DO NOT REPRODUCE) ALSO SHOW THAT "THE PRINTERS WHOSE FATHERS WERE PRINTERS OR IN NONMANUAL OCCUPATIONS TEND TO HAVE A MIDDLE-CLASS FRAME OF REFERENCE, WHILE PRINTERS WHOSE FATHERS WERE MANUAL WORKERS HAVE A WORKING-CLASS FRAME OF REFERENCE" [180]. ALTHOUGH TENDENCIES ARE NOT VERY ACCENTUATED, OUR DATA SHOW A SIMILAR PATTERN. CÓRDOBA'S

TABLE 20. RELATHIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY BACKGROUND OF UOGC'S MEMBERS AND SELF-IDENTIFICATION WITH THE MIDDLE-CLASS

	FATHERS' OCCUPATION	
	PRINTERS AND NONMANUAL	MANUAL WORKERS
PERCENT WHO SELF-IDENTIFY WITH THE MIDDLE-CLASS	(40) 55 %	(24) 44 %
TOTAL CASES	73	54

TABLE 21. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY BACKGROUND OF UOGC'S MEMBERS AND HAVING PREDOMINANTLY NONMANUAL (MIDDLE-CLASS) NON-PRINTER FRIENDS AMONG THREE BEST FRIENDS.

	FATHERS' OCCUPATION	
	PRINTERS AND NONMANUAL	MANUAL WORKERS
PRINTERS WHO PREFER PREDOMINANTLY NON-MANUAL NON-PRINTER FRIENDS	(26) 36 %	(16) 30 %
TOTAL CASES	73	54

TABLE 22. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY BACKGROUND OF UOGC'S MEMBERS AND PREFERENCE FOR NONMANUAL JOBS.

	FATHERS' OCCUPATION	
	PRINTERS AND NONMANUAL	MANUAL WORKERS
PERCENT WHO PREFER NONMANUAL JOBS IF STARTING ALL OVER AGAIN	(26) 36 %	(17) 31 %
	73	54

PRINTERS WHOSE FATHERS WERE PRINTERS OR IN NONMANUAL OCCUPATIONS TEND TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES MORE WITH THE MIDDLE-CLASS THAN PRINTERS WHOSE FATHERS WERE MANUAL WORKERS (TABLE 20); ALSO, THEY SEEM MORE INCLINED TO HAVE MIDDLE-CLASS PERSONS AS BEST FRIENDS (TABLE 21), AND TO HAVE SLIGHTLY MORE ASPIRATIONS FOR NONMANUAL JOBS (TABLE 22), THAN PRINTERS WHOSE FATHERS WERE MANUAL WORKERS. (LIPSET ET.AL. ALSO DETERMINED THAT "THE LONGER ONE'S FAMILY HAS LIVED IN AMERICA, THE MORE LIKELY IT IS THAT A PRINTER HAS ABSORVED THE MIDDLE-CLASS NORMS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY" [181]. WE COULD NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THIS FACTOR, GIVEN THAT IT SEEMS DIFFICULT TO SPECIFY IN THE ARGENTINIAN CASE A PROCESS OF ASSIMILATION OF MIDDLE-CLASS NORMS).

6.5 THE MARGINAL-STATUS HYPOTHESIS RESTATED

WE HAVE SEEN THAT THE MARGINAL STATUS OF PRINTING AS AN OCCUPATION SEEMS TO BE A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE PROPENSITY OF PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH FELLOW WORKERS. THE BASIC REASONING UNDERLYING UNION DEMOCRACY'S ANALYSIS CAN BE RECAPITULATED AS FOLLOWS:

ASSUMPTIONS: (1) "ASSOCIATION IS A FUNCTION OF TWO FACTORS, MOTIVATION AND OPPORTUNITY" [182];

(2) "PRINTERS REGARD THEMSELVES AS THE ELITE AMONG MANUAL WORKERS" [183] AND

(3) "THEY ARE BETTER EDUCATED AND MORE LIKELY TO HAVE MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURAL TASTES THAN OTHER MANUAL WORKERS" [184];

PROPOSITIONS: (3) PRINTERS "WHO ARE ABLE TO FIND MIDDLE-CLASS FRIENDS WILL HAVE LESS DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY THAN THOSE WHOSE NONPRINTER FRIENDS ARE LARGELY IN LOW-STATUS OCCUPATIONS" [185]. ON THE OTHER HAND,

(4) "THEIR STATUS POSITION WILL MOTIVATE PRINTERS AS A GROUP NOT TO ASSOCIATE WITH OTHER MANUAL WORKERS, WHOM THEY WILL CONSIDER OF LOWER STATUS" [186];

(5) "THE REJECTION OF OTHER MANUAL WORKERS AS STATUS EQUALS IS IN TURN RELATED TO THE PROPENSITY OF PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH ONE ANOTHER" [187]: "THOSE STATUS ORIENTED PRINTERS WHO DO NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OR THE ABILITY TO ASSOCIATE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PERSONS WILL PREFER TO ASSOCIATE WITH OTHER PRINTERS RATHER THAN WITH MANUAL WORKERS" [188];

EMPIRICAL PROPOSITIONS: (6) PRINTERS WITH MANUAL WORKER FRIENDS ARE "MORE LIKELY TO PREFER ASSOCIATION WITH

PRINTERS THAN THOSE WITH FRIENDS IN NONMANUAL OCCUPATIONS" [189].

(7) "AND SIMILARLY, AS THE FIGURES SHOW, THE MEN WHO DO NOT BELONG TO PRINTERS' CLUBS OR ATTEND OCCUPATION-LINKED SOCIAL AFFAIRS TEND TO BE INDIVIDUALS WHO ASSOCIATE WITH PERSONS IN NONMANUAL OCCUPATIONS" [190].

THEORETICAL GENERALIZATION: (8) THE (MARGINAL) STATUS OF PRINTING APPEARS AS ONE OF THE MAIN DETERMINANTS OF THE PRESENCE OF AN OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY. ("IT SHOULD BE CLEAR, HOWEVER THAT THIS ANALYSIS PER SE DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY NECESSARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATUS OF PRINTING AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY. TO COMPLETELY VERIFY THE HYPOTHESIS ABOUT PRINTING AND FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS WOULD REQUIRE COMPARABLE DATA ON THE LEISURE-TIME PATTERNS OF A NUMBER OF OCCUPATIONS, WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE" [191]).

THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN THE UOGC'S CASE IS THAT EVEN WHEN SOME EVIDENCE SUGGESTED THAT ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PRINTERS COULD BE A FUNCTION OF MOTIVATION, WE COULD NOT DETERMINE EMPIRICALLY THE INFLUENCE OF OPPORTUNITY. WE

ONLY POINTED OUT, AS AN INTERPRETATIVE HYPOTHESIS, THAT THE STRONG TENDENCY OF CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH ONE ANOTHER (GREATER THAN IN THE ITU) COULD BE INDUCED BY THE LACK OF STRUCTURAL POSSIBILITIES TO RELATE WITH HIGH-STATUS MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE. IN GENERAL, WE THINK THAT THE THEORETICAL GENERALIZATION CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATUS OF PRINTING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY IS A PLAUSIBLE HYPOTHESIS IN BOTH CASES.

LIPSET ET.AL. NOTE THAT THE SAME LOGIC OF ANALYSIS WAS FOLLOWED IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE WAYS DIFFERENT PRINTERS DEVELOP DIFFERENT FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS. THEIR REASONING CAN BE RECAPITULATED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

ASSUMPTION: (1) "THE EXTENT TO WHICH PRINTERS TOOK ONE OF THE THREE PATHS OF ASSOCIATION OPEN TO THEM WOULD BE RELATED TO THEIR OPPORTUNITY AND MOTIVATION" [192];

PROPOSITION: (2) "FACTORS SUCH AS RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, EDUCATION, PARENTAL STATUS, AND RECENCY OF IMMIGRATION WOULD AFFECT BOTH THE MOTIVATION OF PRINTERS TO SEEK OUT FRIENDS OF HIGHER STATUS AND THE POOL OF AVAILABLE FRIENDS" [193];

EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATION: (3) "RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION PROVED TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE VARIABLE AFFECTING BOTH MOTIVATION AND OPPORTUNITY" [194].

WITH RESPECT TO THE UOGC, THE ONLY TWO FACTORS WE SINGLED OUT AS AFFECTING THE PRINTERS' FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS WERE EDUCATION AND FATHER'S OCCUPATION. IT HAS TO BE OBSERVED THAT THE EFFECTS OF THESE VARIABLES REFER MORE TO THE MOTIVATION THAN TO THE OPPORTUNITIES OF CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH ONE ANOTHER.

6.6 IDENTIFICATION WITH PRINTING

LIPSET ET.AL. NOTE THAT "ANOTHER FACTOR QUITE INDEPENDENT OF THE STATUS OF PRINTING WHICH MIGHT LEAD PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH FELLOW WORKERS IS JOB SATISFACTION" [195]. THAT IS, PRINTERS WHO ARE INTERESTED IN THEIR WORK WILL PROBABLY TEND TO ASSOCIATE MORE WITH FELLOW WORKERS THAN THOSE WHO DISLIKE THEIR WORK.

ONE MEASURE OF JOB SATISFACTION USED IN UNION DEMOCRACY, AS WELL AS IN OUR OWN RESEARCH, IS THE PRINTERS' RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION: "ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, HOW DOU YOU LIKE PRINTING AS AN OCCUPATION?" THE ANSWERS FROM BOTH GROUPS (ITU AND UOGC) ARE TABULATED IN TABLE 23.

TABLE 23. HOW WELL PRINTERS IN THE UOGC AND THE ITU LIKE THEIR OCCUPATION.

	UOGC	ITU
JOB SATISFACTION:		
LIKE IT VERY MUCH	79 %	73 %
LIKE IS FAIRLY WELL	16 %	23 %
DISLIKE OR FEEL INDIFFERENT	4 %	4 %
N	141	434

THE AUTHORS CONSIDERED AS ANOTHER INDICATION THE RESPONSES TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: "IS THERE ANY OCCUPATION YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE OTHER THAN THE ONE YOU NOW HAVE, EITHER IN OR OUTSIDE THE PRINTING TRADE?" WE USED THE SAME QUESTION, AND TABULATIONS FOR BOTH THE ITU AND THE UOGC ARE LISTED IN TABLE 24. IN BOTH CASES, A LARGE MAJORITY (64%) PREFERRED TO REMAIN IN PRINTING.

TABLE 24. OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES OF UOGC'S MEMBERS, EITHER IN OR OUTSIDE THE PRINTING TRADE.

OTHER WITHIN PRINTING	(13)	9.21 %
OTHER MANUAL	(11)	7.80 %
NONMANUAL	(3)	2.12 %
INDEPENDENT SMALL BUSINESS PROFESSIONAL	(22)	15.60 %
REMAIN PRESENT ONE	(91)	64.53 %
DON'T KNOW	(1)	0.70 %
	(141)	99.96 %

TO CONTINUE WITH THIS LINE OF ANALYSIS, LIPSET ET.AL. ADDRESSED THEMSELVES TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:: "WHAT IS IT ABOUT PRINTING THAT PRINTERS LIKE?" [196]. ONE OF THE OBVIOUS INDICATORS CHOSEN BY THESE AUTHORS WAS THE ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE PRINTERS THEMSELVES (TABLE 25). IN BOTH CASES,

TABLE 25. WHAT IT IS ABOUT PRINTING THAT PRINTERS IN THE UOGC AND THE ITU LIKE.

	UOGC	ITU
REASONS FOR LIKING PRINTING:		
LACK OF MONETARY	19 %	38 %
CREATIVE ASPECTS	19 %	37 %
PAY AND SECURITY	2 %	29 %
EDUCATIONAL	9 %	21 %
WORKING CONDITIONS	7 %	21 %
PRESTIGE	-	6 %
THEY FEEL FAMILIARIZED	17 %	-
OTHER	23 %	18 %
DON'T KNOW, DON'T ANSWER	4 %	-
N	(*) 141	434

(*) IN THE UOGC'S CASE, WE CONSIDERED ONLY THE PRINTERS' FIRST CHOICE.

ANSWERS RELATED WITH INTRINSIC REWARDS OF THE JOB ARE PREPONDERANT. THE AUTHORS NOTE THAT A MEANINGFUL ASPECT IS THAT ONLY 11% REFERRED TO "WAGES OF WORKING CONDITIONS AS THEIR SOLE REASON FOR LIKING PRINTING" [197]. IN THE UOGC, 9% ANSWERED IN THE SAME WAY. AS LIPSET ET.AL. OBSERVE, "ONE IS STRUCK HERE BY THE FEELING THAT AMONG THESE MEN 'THE

INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP' IS NOT DEAD. WORK ITSELF CAN BE REWARDING"[198].

THESE AUTHORS CONSIDERED THAT THIS DISCUSSION IS RELEVANT GIVEN THEIR ASSUMPTION THAT POSITIVE ATTITUDES TO ONE'S WORK INDUCE SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE SAME TRADE. THOSE MEN WHO ARE INTERESTED IN THEIR WORK WILL PROBABLY TAKE THE JOB INTO THEIR LEISURE ACTIVITIES. TABLE 26 SHOWS THAT

TABLE 26. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIKING PRINTING AND PREFERRING TO SPEND LEISURE TIME WITH PRINTERS.

A) UOGC

	DEGREE OF LIKING FOR PRINTING		
	LIKE IT VERY WELL	LIKE IT FAIRLY WELL	DISLIKE IT OR ARE INDIFFERENT
PERCENT PREFERRING COMPANY OF OTHER PRINTERS	(30) 27 %	(5) 22 %	(1) 20 %
TOTAL CASES	112	23	5

B) ITU (PAGE 140)

	DEGREE OF LIKING FOR PRINTING		
	LIKE IT VERY WELL	LIKE IT FAIRLY WELL	DISLIKE IT OR ARE INDIFFERENT
PERCENT PREFERRING COMPANY OF OTHER PRINTERS	(210) 66 %	(54) 56 %	(6) 40 %
TOTAL CASES	319	96	15

TABLE 27. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIKING PRINTING AND ACTUALLY SPENDING LEISURE TIME WITH PRINTERS

(UOGC)

	DEGREE OF LIKING FOR PRINTING	
	LIKE IT VERY WELL	LIKE IT FAIRLY WELL, INDIFFERENT OR DISLIKE IT.
PERCENT WHO ACTUALLY SPEND LEISURE-TIME WITH OTHER PRINTERS	(19) 17 %	(4) 14 %
TOTAL CASES	112	28

IN THE ITU "LIKING PRINTING IS CLEARLY CORRELATED WITH PREFERRING TO SPEND TIME WITH FELLOW WORKERS" [199]. EVEN WHEN OUR DATA SHOW THE SAME TENDENCY, DIFFERENCES ARE VERY SMALL. THE PROBLEM WITH THIS QUESTION WAS THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR RESEARCH MANY PRINTERS SEEM TO HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT "PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT IN THE TRADE" REFERRED ALSO THEIR OWN FAMILIES.

ANOTHER INDICATOR OF JOB SATISFACTION CONSIDERED IN UNION DEMOCRACY WAS THE PRINTERS' JOB PREFERENCES. EVENTHOUGH DATA IS NOT REPRODUCED BY THE AUTHORS, THEY OBSERVE THAT IN THE ITU "THOSE WHO DESIRED TO REMAIN IN PRINTING IF THEY HAD A CHOICE OF JOBS WERE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO PREFER PRINTERS AS LEISURE-TIME ASSOCIATES AND TO ACTUALLY SPEND MORE TIME WITH OTHER PRINTERS THAN WERE

THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE THE TRADE"[200]. AS IT IS SHOWN IN TABLES 28 AND 29, THE SAME RELATIONSHIPS HOLD

TABLE 28. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIKING TO REMAIN IN PRINTING AND PREFERRING PRINTERS AS LEISURE-TIME ASSOCIATES

(UOGC)

	JOB PREFERENCES	
	REMAIN IN PRINTING IF HAD A CHOICE	WOULD LIVE THE TRADE
PERCENT PREFERRING COMPANY OF OTHER PRINTERS	(20) 31 %	(15) 21 %
TOTAL CASES	64	73

TABLE 29. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIKING TO REMAIN IN PRINTING AND ACTUALLY SPENDING LEISURE-TIME WITH PRINTERS.

(UOGC)

	JOB PREFERENCES	
	REMAIN IN PRINTING IF HAD A CHOICE	WOULD LIVE THE TRADE
PERCENT ACTUALLY SPENDING LEISURE-TIME WITH OTHER PRINTERS	(12) 19 %	(11) 15 %
TOTAL CASES	64	73

IN THE UOGC, ALTHOUGH THE TENDENCIES WITH RESPECT TO ACTUAL ASSOCIATION (TABLE 29) ARE VERY SLIGHT: APPROXIMATELY 19% OF THOSE WHO WANT TO REMAIN IN PRINTING ACTUALLY ASSOCIATE WITH PRINTERS, WHILE THOSE WHO WANT TO LEAVE THE TRADE REACH 15%.

THE AUTHORS OF UNION DEMOCRACY CONSIDER THAT A WAY OF TESTING THE ASSUMPTION "THAT MEN WHO HAVE A POSITIVE CRAFTSMAN ORIENTATION TO THEIR JOBS WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO TALK ABOUT THEIR WORK"[201] IS "BY COMPARING THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF THOSE MEN WHO GAVE CRAFTSMAN REASONS FOR LIKING PRINTING WITH THE MINORITY WHO LIKE THEIR WORK BUT CITE ONLY ECONOMIC REASONS"[202].

TABLE 30. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORIENTATION TO PRINTING AS AN OCCUPATION AND PROPENSITY TO TALK ABOUT PRINTING WITH NONPRINTERS.

A) UOGC

	REASONS FOR LIKING PRINTING	
	CRAFTMAN REASONS	ECONOMIC REASONS ONLY
TALK ABOUT PRINTING WITH NONPRINTERS	(32) 60 %	(8) 67 %
N	53	12

B) ITU (PAGE 141)

	REASONS FOR LIKING PRINTING	
	CRAFTMAN REASONS	ECONOMIC REASONS ONLY
TALK ABOUT PRINTING WITH NONPRINTERS	(178) 65 %	(24) 52 %
N	274	46

LIPSET ET.AL. OBSERVE THAT "CRAFTSMEN" TEND TO LINK THEIR INTEREST IN PRINTING WITH THEIR SOCIAL RELATIONS OUTSIDE THE TRADE. THEY POINT OUT THAT THE INTEREST IN DISCUSSING CRAFT MATTERS MAY LEAD SOME PRINTERS TO SEEK SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH FELLOW WORKERS. "INTEREST IN AND SATISFACTION WITH THE OCCUPATION, THEREFORE, ARE PROBABLY STRONG MOTIVATING AS WELL AS STRONG FACILITATING FACTORS IN THE PROPENSITY OF PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH EACH OTHER: MOTIVATING IN THE SENSE THAT PRINTERS WILL WANT TO FIND FRIENDS WITH THE SAME INTERESTS, AND FACILITATING IN THAT THE OCCUPATION ITSELF WILL SERVE AS A FRUITFUL SUBJECT OF COMMON INTEREST FOR THEM WHEN THEY GET TOGETHER" [203]. THE AUTHORS INDICATE THAT FURTHER EVIDENCE FOR THESE ASSUMPTIONS IS SHOWN IN TABLE 31.

TABLE 31. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORIENTATION TO PRINTING AS AN OCCUPATION AND PROPENSITY TO ASSOCIATE WITH OTHER PRINTERS.

A) UOGC

	REASONS FOR LIKING PRINTING			
	CRAFTMAN REASONS		ECONOMIC REASONS ONLY	
HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH PRINTERS (x)	(32)	60 %	(6)	50 %
HAVE TWO OR MORE PRINTER FRIENDS	(33)	62 %	(5)	42 %
PREFER SOME PRINTERS AMONG FRIENDS	(39)	74 %	(7)	58 %
N	53		12	

(x) HIGH AND MEDIUM GROUPS WERE COMBINED FOR THIS TABLE.

B) ITU (PAGE 142)

	REASONS FOR LIKING PRINTING			
	CRAFTMAN REASONS		ECONOMIC REASONS ONLY	
HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH PRINTERS (x)	(160)	59 %	(15)	33 %
HAVE TWO OR MORE PRINTER FRIENDS	(87)	32 %	(10)	22 %
PREFER SOME PRINTERS AMONG FRIENDS	(170)	66 %	(23)	50 %
N	271		46	

(x) HIGH AND MEDIUM GROUPS WERE COMBINED FOR THIS TABLE.

IN THE UOGC'S CASE, IT SEEMS THAT FINDINGS ARE NOT COMPLETELY CONSISTENT. IN TABLE 30, IT CAN BE SEEN THAT THOSE PRINTERS WITH AN ECONOMIC ORIENTATION TO THEIR OCCUPATION TEND TO TALK MORE ABOUT PRINTING WITH NONPRINTERS THAN THOSE WITH A CRAFTMAN ORIENTATION. HOWEVER, THE "CRAFTSMEN" TEND TO ASSOCIATE MORE WITH PRINTERS, AND TO PREFER PRINTERS AMONG THEIR FRIENDS. ONE POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION FOR THIS INCONSISTENCY IS THAT, GIVEN THE DOMINANT CHARACTER OF THE "WAGE ISSUE" IN THE UOGC, THE ECONOMIC ORIENTED PRINTERS -WITHOUT BEING AS INTERESTED IN THEIR OCCUPATION AS THOSE WITH A CRAFTMAN ORIENTATION- WOULD TEND TO TALK MORE ABOUT PRINTING OUTSIDE THE TRADE, ASSUMING THAT "TALKS ABOUT PRINTING" ARE PERVADED BY THE WAGE ISSUE.

IN GENERAL, AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PROPENSITY TO TALK ABOUT PRINTING WITH PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE TRADE, IT CAN BE OBSERVED THAT INTEREST IN AND SATISFACTION WITH THE OCCUPATION SEEM TO PLAY A SIMILAR ROLE IN THE UOGC AS IN THE ITU. THAT IS, THEY ALSO APPEAR IN THE UOGC'S CASE AS MOTIVATING -AND PERHAPS FACILITATING- FACTORS WHICH INDUCE SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS.

7. DETERMINANTS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY: II

INTRODUCTION.- CONTINUING WITH THE ANALYSIS INITIATED IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTER, TWO OTHER IMPORTANT DETERMINANTS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE DISCUSSED NOW: THE SUBSTITUTE SYSTEM FOR HIRING PRINTERS FOR EXTRA LOAD WORK, AND THE FACT THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF PRINTERS WORK NIGHTS. THE PRINCIPAL VARIABLES CONSIDERED HERE WERE WORK SHIFT, PREFERENCE FOR WORK SHIFT, DEGREE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS, HAVING PRINTER FRIENDS, PARTICIPATION IN PRINTER AND NON-PRINTER CLUBS, AND VISITING PRINTERS AT THEIR HOMES.

IT IS OBSERVED IN THE ITU THAT THE RANDOM SYSTEM FOR HIRING SUBSTITUTES IMPLIES THAT PRINTERS USUALLY STAY WAITING IN A LOCAL BAR OR IN UNION HEADQUARTERS, FURTHERING IN THIS WAY SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH FELLOW WORKERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WORKER IS THE OWNER OF THE JOB, HE HIMSELF SELECTS HIS SUBSTITUTE, AND THIS CONSTITUTE ANOTHER WAY OF INDUCING SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG ITU'S MEMBERS. THESE MECHANISMS ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE UOGC, GIVEN THAT EXTRA WORK IS CARRIED OUT BY OVERTIME AND CÓRDOBA PRINTERS HAVE STABILITY IN THEIR JOBS. THE HIRING POWER RESTS ON THE OWNERS. ALTERNATIVELY, IT IS POINTED OUT THAT THE PROCEDURES FOR PERFORMING EXTRA LOAD WORK OPEN NEW AVENUES WHICH COULD PROMOTE SOCIALIZING ON THE JOB.

ANOTHER AGENCY INDUCING SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG NEW YORK PRINTERS IS APPRENTICE SCHOOL. IN THE UOGC, THERE ARE NO FORMAL SCHOOLS AND THE CRAFT IS LEARNED AT THE TRADE. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THIS SYSTEM WILL HAVE STRONGER SOCIALIZING EFFECTS IN THE UOGC AS COMPARED WITH THE ITU.

WITH RESPECT TO NIGHT WORK, IT IS OBSERVED THAT THERE ARE MORE PEOPLE IN THIS SHIFT IN THE ITU THAN IN THE UOGC. IN BOTH CASES, NIGHT WORK INDUCES SOCIALIZING AMONG PRINTERS. HOWEVER, WHILE NIGHT WORKERS IN THE ITU SEEM TO BE LESS INVOLVED IN NONPRINTER ORGANIZATIONS AND MORE INVOLVED IN ORGANIZATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PRINTING, THE REVERSE APPEARS TO BE THE CASE IN THE UOGC. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE ITU'S MEMBERS WHO WORK NIGHTS SHARE AFTERWORK ACTIVITIES IN DOWNTOWN BARS, CÓRDOBA PRINTERS TEND TO RELATE WITH EACH OTHER AT THEIR HOMES.

IN SPITE OF THESE DIFFERENCES, IT IS FINALLY OBSERVED THAT THE PATTERN IS SIMILAR IN BOTH UNIONS: THE SYSTEM FOR HIRING SUBS AND NIGHT WORK ARE IMPORTANT FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRESENCE OF AN OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY.

7.1 EDUCATION, MECHANIZATION, AND THE DECLINE OF THE PRINTERS' COMMUNITY

LIPSET ET AL OBSERVE THAT EVEN WHEN THE HIGH STATUS OF PRINTERS AND THEIR POSITIVE ORIENTATIONS TO THEIR JOBS HAVE

BEEN SINGLED OUT AS TWO OF THE MAIN FACTORS RELATED WITH THE PRESENCE OF AN OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY AMONG PRINTERS, THERE SEEM TO BE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE EFFECTS OF THESE FACTORS TEND TO DIMINISH. THAT IS, "THE WIDENING OF POPULAR EDUCATION, REDUCING THE STATUS CLAIM OF THE PRINTER, AND THE INCREASED MECHANIZATION OF PRINTING, LIMITING HIS VARIETY IN WORK, INDICATE THAT THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY MIGHT BE LESS SIGNIFICANT TODAY THAN IN THE PAST" [204]. THE AUTHORS NOTE THAT ON THE BASIS OF AN IMPRESIONISTIC JUDGEMENT, THEY THINK THAT THERE HAS BEEN A DECLINE.

WE DO NOT KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THIS COULD BE THE CASE OF THE UOGC. IF THE EFFECTS OF THE WIDENING OF POPULAR EDUCATION COULD HAVE BEEN THE SAME, THIS IS NOT TRUE WITH RESPECT TO MECHANIZATION. THE INDUSTRY HAS REMAINED FAIRLY TRADITIONAL IN THAT SENSE, AND MOST PRINT SHOPS ARE STILL OPERATING WITH VERY OLD -ALMOST OBSOLETE- MACHINERY. THE FEW CHANGES INTRODUCED HAVE NOT IMPLIED A SIGNIFICANT TRANSFORMATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PRINTERS AND THEIR TOOLS. THAT IS, CÓRDOBA PRINTERS CAN BE STILL CONSIDERED AS TRUE CRAFTMEN, AND THEY MAY STILL FIND VARIETY IN WORK.

IN SPITE OF THE SUGGESTED DECLINE OF THE ITU'S OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY, LIPSET ET.AL. POINT OUT THAT "TWO UNIQUE FACTORS, APART FROM STATUS AND CRAFT PRIDE, CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE MORTAR TO KEEP THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY

TOGETHER" [205]. THEY ADD THAT "THESE ARE THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH MEN SECURE AND MAINTAIN EMPLOYMENT IN A PRINT SHOP, AND THE FACT THAT A LARGE PROPORTION OF PRINTERS WORK NIGHTS" [206].

7.2 THE SUBSTITUTE SYSTEM

AS THE AUTHORS POINT OUT, PRINTING INDUSTRY IS CHARACTERIZED BY THE FLUCTUATION OF WORK LOADS ON DIFFERENT PERIODS OF TIME. WHEN WORK IS HEAVIER, THE "EXTRA LOADS ARE FILLED BY SUBSTITUTES AND BY OVERTIME" [207]. THE HIRING OF SUBS IS CARRIED OUT EVERY DAY THROUGH A LOTTERY PROCEDURE HANDLED BY THE CHAPEL CHAIRMAN, AND THIS IMPLIES THAT PRINTERS HAVE TO SHOW UP EVERY DAY. THOSE WHO ARE NOT ELECTED IN ONE SHIFT AND HAVE TO WAIT, GENERALLY GO TO UNION HEADQUARTERS OR A LOCAL BAR WHERE THEY SOCIALIZE. "IN ALL THESE WAYS THE SUBS ARE THROWN TOGETHER THROUGHOUT THEIR ENTIRE SUBSTITUTE PERIOD" [208].

THERE IS ANOTHER METHOD OF HIRING SUBS WHICH ALSO WORKS AS A FORCE FOR ASSOCIATION. LIPSET ET. AL. OBSERVE THAT WHEN A JOB-HOLDER FOR WHATEVER REASON TAKES A DAY OFF, "THE JOB HOLDER HIMSELF DETERMINES WHO WILL REPLACE HIM. THE EMPLOYER HAS NO CONTROL OVER THE HIRING IN THIS CASE, NOR DOES THE UNION" [209]. THE AUTHORS NOTE THAT THE RESULT OF THIS PROCEDURE IS THAT SUBS ARE INDUCED TO MAKE FRIENDS

AMONG OTHER PRINTERS IN THE SHOP, AND TO TRY TO KNOW AS MANY PRINTERS AS POSSIBLE IN DIFFERENT SHOPS.

NEITHER OF THESE TWO PROCEDURES TAKE PLACE IN CÓRDOBA'S PRINTING INDUSTRY. EXTRA LOAD WORK IS CARRIED OUT BY OVERTIME AND ALMOST ALWAYS BY REGULAR WORKERS IN THE SHOP. JOB-HOLDERS ARE NOT OWNERS OF THEIR JOB, AND THEY HAVE ALMOST NO INFLUENCE IN DETERMINING WHO WILL REPLACE THEM. THE HIRING POWER FUNDAMENTALLY RESTS ON THE EMPLOYERS AND, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, ON THE HANDS OF THE FOREMEN [210].

IN A GENERAL WAY, WE CAN POINT OUT THAT IN CÓRDOBA'S PRINTING INDUSTRY THERE IS NO A SUBSTITUTE SYSTEM WHICH COULD WORK AS A FORCE FOR ASSOCIATION IN THE SAME WAY AS IN THE ITU. HOWEVER, IF THE PROCEDURES FOR CARRYING OUT EXTRA LOAD WORK IN THE UOGC DO NOT DIRECTLY FURTHER SOCIAL RELATIONS <u>OFF THE JOB</u>, ON THE OTHER HAND IT SEEMS TO PROVIDE AVENUES TO INCREASE SOCIALIZING <u>ON THE JOB</u>. THIS CAN HAPPEN IN THREE WAYS: FIRST, REGULAR WORKERS WHO WORK OVERTIME CAN BE IN CONTACT WITH THEIR FELLOW WORKERS A LONGER PERIOD; SECOND, WORKERS FROM DIFFERENT SHIFTS CAN GET IN CONTACT WITH ONE ANOTHER; AND THIRD, SOMETIMES WORKERS FROM DIFFERENT SHOPS -WHEN THEY ARE CARRYING OUT EXTRA WORK IN SHOPS OTHER THAN THEIR OWNS- CAN ALSO RELATE WITH FELLOW WORKERS.

IN <u>UNION DEMOCRACY</u> IT IS MENTIONED THAT "ANOTHER SOCIALIZING AGENCY WHICH AFFECTS MANY PRINTERS IS

APPRENTICE SCHOOL"[211]. THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE SCHOOLS, AS THE AUTHORS POINT OUT, IS THAT CLASSMATES NEVER SEPARATE AFTER COMPLETING THEIR TRAINING. MANY OF THEM BECOME FELLOW UNION MEMBERS IN THE SAME CITY. IN CÓRDOBA THERE ARE NO FORMAL MEANS OF LEARNING THE CRAFT; THE APPRENTICE TRAINING TAKES PLACE AT THE TRADE. MOST OF THE TIMES THE APPRENTICES BECOME WORKERS WITHIN THE SAME SHOP WHERE THEY LEARNED THE CRAFT. HENCE, FRINDSHIPS COULD BE EVEN MORE LONG-LASTING THAN IN THE ITU. THAT IS, IT COULD BE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOCIALIZING EFFECTS OF THE APPRENTICE SYSTEM ARE STRONGER AMONG CÓRDOBA THAN NEW YORK'S PRINTERS.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE AVAILABLE DATA DO NOT ALLOW US TO SPECIFY THE PRECISE ROLE OF THESE MECHANISMS IN FURTHERING SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS. HOWEVER, WE CAN AT LEAST CONCLUDE THAT THESE MECHANISMS DO WORK IN THE DIRECTION OF SUPPORTING AND STRENGTHENING THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY.

7.3 NIGHT WORK

LIPSET ET.AL. OBSERVE THAT "MANY PRINTERS MUST WORK NIGHTS AND WEEK ENDS, THUS BREAKING THE NORMAL PATTERN OF FAMILY LIFE AND LEISURE LIFE"[212]. IN THE NEW YORK LOCAL 45% WORK NIGHTS, WHILE 21% DO SO IN THE UOGC. THERE ARE ALSO 8.5% WHO WORK IN INTERMEDIATE SHIFTS, WHILE 5%

ACTUALLY WORK IN THE THREE SHIFTS.

IN THE ITU, AS THE AUTHORS NOTE, IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE SPENT SOME TIME IN THE NIGHT SHIFT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE RIGHT TO A DAY JOB. "THUS, ALMOST EVERY PRINTER HAS SPENT SOME TIME ON THE NIGHT SHIFT" [213]. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE UOGC DOES NOT HAVE SUCH A REQUIREMENT, AND THAT A LOWER PROPORTION WORK NIGHTS THERE, IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT THE INFLUENCE OF NIGHT WORK ON SOCIAL RELATIONS WILL BE LESS WIDESPREAD IN THE UOGC AS COMPARED WITH THE ITU.

CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF NIGHT WORK ARE THE DISRUPTIONS OF NORMAL LEISURE ACTIVITIES, THE AUTHORS CONCLUDE THAT NIGHT WORKERS MUST LIMIT THEIR SOCIAL RELATIONS TO THOSE PEOPLE WHO ARE IN THE SAME SITUATION. "FOR A PRINTER THE POOL OF OTHER NIGHT WORKERS MOST EASILY AVAILABLE TO HIM IS OTHER PRINTERS. PRINTERS WORKING ON A NIGHT SHIFT WILL THUS SEEK OUT OTHER PRINTERS AND BECOME INVOLVED IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY" [214].

DATA INDICATE IN BOTH CASES THAT NIGHT WORK INDUCES PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH ONE ANOTHER (TABLE 32).

TABLE 32. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORK SHIFT AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY

A) UOGC

	NIGHT WORKERS		DAY WORKERS	
HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	(13)	31 %	(20)	22 %
TWO OR MORE PRINTER FRIENDS	(30)	71 %	(44)	48 %
TOTAL CASES	42		92	

B) ITU (PAGE 134)

	NIGHT WORKERS		DAY WORKERS	
HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	(60)	30 %	(54)	23 %
TWO OR MORE PRINTER FRIENDS	(76)	38 %	(63)	27 %
MEMBERS OF PRINTERS' CLUBS	(72)	36 %	(61)	26 %
TOTAL CASES	200		234	

(THE FACT THAT NIGHT WORK DOES NOT INDUCE FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UOGC IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH OUR EXPECTATIONS, BECAUSE THE SCHEDULE OF THESE ACTIVITIES SUPERIMPOSES WITH THE INTERMEDIATE AND NIGHT SHIFTS).

LIPSET ET.AL. SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY THAT NEW NIGHT WORKERS WILL TRY TO KEEP THEIR PREVIOUS SOCIAL RELATIONS, AND THAT THEY WILL LATER ADJUST TO THEIR NEW SITUATION. TABLE 33 SHOWS THAT ITU AND UOGC'S MEMBERS WHO WORK NIGHTS

TABLE 33. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PREFERENCE FOR NIGHT OR DAY WORK AMONG NIGHT WORKERS, AND INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER PRINTERS.

A) UOGC

	NIGHT WORKERS WHO	
	PREFER DAYS	PREFER NIGHTS
HIGH SOCIAL RELATIONS	(6) 27 %	(7) 35 %
N	22	20

B) ITU (PAGE 154)

	NIGHT WORKERS WHO	
	PREFER DAYS	PREFER NIGHTS
HIGH SOCIAL RELATIONS	(15) 22 %	(42) 37 %
N	70	114

AND PREFER THE NIGHT SHIFT TEND TO BE MORE INVOLVED IN SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER PRINTERS THAN THOSE NIGHT WORKERS WHO PREFER A DAY JOB. ON THE OTHER HAND, TABLE 34

TABLE 34. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIME SPENT ON NIGHT SHIFT AND SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH PRINTERS.

A) UOGC

	PROPORTION OF CARRER ON NIGHT WORK			
	LESS THAN 50 %		MORE THAN 50 %	
	PRESENT DAY WORKERS	PRESENT NIGHT WORKERS	PRESENT DAY WORKERS	PRESENT NIGHT WORKERS
PROPORTION HIGH (12) ON SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX	(15) 26 %	(1) 10 %	(2) 22 %	(11) 38 %
TOTAL CASES	57	10	9	29

B) ITU (PAGE 156)

	PROPORTION OF CARRER ON NIGHT WORK							
	NONE		1/2 -		1/2 +		ALL	
	PRESENT DAY WORKERS	PRESENT NIGHT WORKERS	PRESENT DAY WORKERS	PRESENT NIGHT WORKERS	PRESENT DAY WORKERS	PRESENT NIGHT WORKERS	PRESENT DAY WORKERS	PRESENT NIGHT WORKERS
PROPORTION HIGH (12) ON SOCIAL RELATIONS INDEX	(5) 15 %	-	(35) 23 %	(6) 27 %	(8) 29 %	(24) 30 %	-	(38) 43 %
TOTAL CASES	34	-	154	21	27	79	-	89

SHOWS THAT IN BOTH CASES THE LONGER PRINTERS HAVE BEEN IN THE NIGHT SHIFT, "THE MORE LIKELY THEY ARE TO EVIDENCE A HIGH LEVEL OF LEISURE-TIME SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH PRINTERS"[215]. IN THE UOGC, 38 % OF PRESENT NIGHT WORKERS WHO HAVE BEEN MORE OF HALF OF THEIR CARRER ON A NIGHT SHIFT TEND TO BE HIGHLY INVOLVED IN SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER PRINTERS, WHILE ONLY 10 % OF THE PRESENT NIGHT WORKERS WHO HAVE BEEN LESS THAN HALF OF THEIR CARRER IN A NIGHT SHIFT SHOW THE SAME PATTERN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESENT DAY WORKERS WHO HAVE BEEN LONGER IN THE NIGHT SHIFT SEEM TO BE SLIGHTLY LESS ADAPTED TO THEIR NEW SITUATION THAN PRESENT DAY WORKERS WHO HAVE BEEN LESS THAN HALF OF THEIR CARRER ON A NIGHT SHIFT: 26 % OF THE FORMER ARE HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS, AGAINST 22 % OF THE LATTER. AS LIPSET ET.AL. POINT OUT, "IT IS CLEAR FROM THE ABOVE DATA THAT PAST EXPERIENCE ON THE NIGHT SHIFT CONTINUES TO AFFECT MEN'S SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AFTER THEY LEAVE IT"[216].

THE AUTHORS ALSO NOTE THAT "THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PROCESSES WHICH UNDERLIE THE PROPENSITY OF NIGHT WORKERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH PRINTERS"[217]. ONE OF THESE PROCESSES REFERS TO THE FACT THAT DAY WORKERS HAVE MORE POSSIBILITIES OF PARTICIPATING IN MASS ENTERTAINMENTS, NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS OUTSIDE THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY. DATA FOR THE ITU SHOW (TABLE 35)

TABLE 35. RECRUITMENT OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE UOGC'S SOCIAL ACTIVITIES AND MEMBERS OF NONPRINTERS' CLUBS FROM DAY AND NIGHT SHIFTS.

	PARTICIPANTS IN THE UOGC'S SOCIAL ACTIVITIES ONLY		MEMBERS OF NONPRINTER GROUPS ONLY	
PRESENT SHIFT				
DAYS	(41)	67 %	(6)	55 %
NIGHTS	(17)	28 %	(4)	36 %
PROPORTION OF CARRER ON SHIFT				
MOST ON DAYS	(45)	74 %	(7)	64 %
MOST ON NIGHTS	(16)	26 %	(4)	36 %
N	61		11	

ITU (PAGE 155): RECRUITMENT OF MEMBER OF PRINTERS' AND NONPRINTERS' CLUBS FROM DAY AND NIGHT SHIFTS.

	MEMBERS OF PRINTERS' CLUBS ONLY		MEMBERS OF NONPRINTER GROUPS ONLY	
PRESENT SHIFT				
DAYS	(26)	36 %	(95)	61 %
NIGHTS	(47)	64 %	(60)	39 %
PROPORTION OF CARRER ON SHIFT				
MOST OF DAYS	(40)	55 %	(119)	77 %
MOST OF NIGHTS	(33)	45 %	(36)	23 %
N	73		155	

THAT "WHILE NIGHT WORKERS TAKE LESS PART IN NONPRINTER ORGANIZATIONS, THEY TAKE MORE PART IN ORGANIZATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PRINTING THAN DO DAY WORKERS"[218].

IF IN THE UOGC WE CONSIDER PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION, WE CAN SEE (TABLE 35) THAT TENDENCIES ARE JUST THE REVERSE. THIS CAN BE EASILY UNDERSTOOD IF WE REMEMBER THAT GENERAL ACTIVITIES IN UNION HEADQUARTERS USUALLY TAKE PLACE FROM 6.30 P.M. TO 10.30 P.M., PERIOD WHICH SUPERIMPOSES WITH THE INTERMEDIATE AND NIGHT SHIFTS. FURTHERMORE, GAMES LIKE SOCCER -THE MOST POPULAR ONE- ARE USUALLY ORGANIZED ON SUNDAY MORNINGS, WHICH ALSO AFFECTS THE NIGHT WORKERS' CHANCES FOR PARTICIPATION. THEREFORE, WE CAN POINT OUT THAT IN THE UOGC NIGHT WORK ONLY INDUCES INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG PRINTERS. THAT IS, NIGHT WORK APPEARS AS A SUPPORT OF THE INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY ALONE.

A SECOND ELEMENT OF NIGHT WORK WHICH INDUCES SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH FELLOW WORKERS REFERS TO ITS EFFECTS ON FAMILY RELATIONS. THAT IS, NIGHT WORKERS, WHO "ARE NOT EXPECTED TO CONFORM" TO FAMILY SCHEDULES, TEND TO PARTICIPATE MORE IN AFTERWORK ACTIVITIES THAN DAY WORKERS[219]. THE AUTHORS OBSERVE THAT "SOME OF THE DATA SHOW THAT WORKING NIGHTS DOES DISRUPT NORMAL FAMILY SCHEDULES, MAKING THE PRINTER FREER TO ASSOCIATE ON HIS OWN"[220].

IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM, PRINTERS WERE ASKED IF THEY VISITED WITH FELLOW WORKERS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT

TABLE 36. EFFECT OF NIGHT WORK ON HOME VISITS.

A) UOGC

	NIGHT WORKERS	DAY WORKERS
DO YOU EVER VISIT OTHER PRINTERS AT THEIR HOMES? YES	(29) 69 %	(53) 58 %
N	42	92

B) ITU (PAGE 157)

	NIGHT WORKERS	DAY WORKERS
DO YOU EVER VISIT OTHER PRINTERS AT THEIR HOMES? YES	(141) 71 %	(178) 76 %
N	199	234

THE GENERAL PATTERN WHICH SHOWS NIGHT WORKERS PARTICIPATING MORE IN AFTERWORK ACTIVITIES, LIPSET ET.AL. SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD "EXPECT THAT NIGHT WORKERS, THOUGH THEY GENERALLY ASSOCIATE MORE WITH PRINTERS, DO NOT VISIT THEM AS OFTEN AT HOME. THAT IS, IN THIS ONE AREA OF ASSOCIATION AMONG

PRINTERS, NIGHT WORKERS SHOULD ASSOCIATE LESS THAN DO DAY WORKERS" [221]. AS SHOWN IN TABLE 36, THIS SEEMS TO BE THE CASE IN THE ITU, EVENTHOUGH -AS THE AUTHORS THEMSELVES NOTE- THE DIFFERENCES ARE SMALL.

WITH RESPECT TO THE UOGC, IT CAN BE OBSERVED THAT FINDINGS TEND IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION. HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT THIS IS THE TENDENCY WE SHOULD HAVE EXPECTED, PARTICULARLY ON THE BASIS OF UNION DEMOCRACY'S REASONING ITSELF. THE AUTHORS ARE NOT QUITE SPECIFIC AT THIS POINT ABOUT WHY HOME VISITS SHOULD DEVIATE FROM THE GENERAL TENDENCY WHICH SHOWS NIGHT WORKERS ASSOCIATING MORE WITH FELLOW PRINTERS. THE DISRUPTION OF THE NIGHT WORKERS' FAMILY SCHEDULES DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY CANNOT VISIT ONE ANOTHER AT THEIR HOMES. THE AUTHORS THEMSELVES NOTE THAT "THE NIGHT WORKER CUSTOMARILY DOES NOT GO TO WORK FOR MANY HOURS AFTER HE HAS RAISEN. HE MAY AND OFTEN DOES ARRANGE TO MEET HIS FRIENDS DOWNTOWN BEFORE WORK" [222]. WE THINK THAT THEY COULD MEET AT THEIR HOMES AS WELL. HENCE, IN THE UOGC'S CASE IT CAN BE OBSERVED THAT THE EFFECT OF NIGHT WORK ON HOME VISITS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE HYPOTHESIS THAT NIGHT WORK IS A SUPPORT OF THE INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY.

A FINAL FACTOR DISTINGUISHED BY THE AUTHORS IS THE DIFFERENT PACE OF WORK IN EACH SHIFT. IN THE NIGHT SHIFT "THE PACE OF WORK IS MORE RELAXED" [223] AND "SUPERVISION

IS LESS STRICT"[224]. ALL THESE ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTE TO FACILITATE SOCIALIZING ON THE JOB. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO DATA AVAILABLE TO DISCUSS THESE OBSERVATIONS, WE THINK THOSE RELATIONSHIPS SHOULD BE THE SAME IN BOTH CASES, THE ITU AND THE UOGC.

7.4 CONCLUSIONS

LIPSET ET.AL. CONCLUDE THAT THE FOLLOWING "ARE SOME OF THE FACTORS WITHIN PRINTING WHICH SEEM TO MAKE FOR A HIGH DEGREE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG PRINTERS"[225]:

1. "PRINTERS HAVE BEEN AND ARE AMONG THE ELITE MANUAL OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN TERMS OF SOCIAL STATUS. THE MARGINAL (...) STATUS OF PRINTING SEEMS TO BE ONE FACTOR WHICH HAS BEEN UNIQUE TO PRINTING ALL THROUGH ITS HISTORY AND HAS BEEN OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IN MOTIVATING PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH ONE ANOTHER"[226].
2. "THE CRAFT ASPECT OF PRINTING GIVES PRINTERS A BASIC GROUND OF COMMON INTEREST, WHICH IS PROBABLY NOT THE CASE IN MOST OTHER MANUAL OCCUPATIONS"[227].
3. "THE UNION'S SUBSTITUTE SYSTEM OPERATES TO HEIGHTEN INTERACTION AMONG PRINTERS, FIRST THROUGH MOTIVATING PRINTERS TO SHOW UP FOR WORK EVERY DAY, AND SECOND THROUGH THE FACT THAT A SUBSTITUTE'S CHANCES FOR EMPLOYMENT ARE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE NUMBER OF FRIENDS THAT HE HAS

AMONG REGULAR SITUATION HOLDERS"[228].

4. "FINALLY, THE NIGHT WORK (...) TENDS TO INCREASE PRINTERS' ASSOCIATIONS WITH EACH OTHER. IT REDUCES PRINTERS' OPPORTUNITIES TO ASSOCIATE WITH NONPRINTERS OR TO TAKE PART IN NEIGHBORHOOD ACTIVITIES AND MASS ENTERTAINMENT:..., IT HABITUATES HIM TO OCCUPATION-LINKED LEISURE ACTIVITIES ..."[229].

WE HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED TO WHAT EXTENT THESE FACTORS PLAY A SIMILAR ROLE IN CÓRDOBA'S PRINTING INDUSTRY. AS A WAY OF CONCLUSION, WE CAN SINGLE OUT THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

1. THE MARGINAL STATUS OF PRINTERS APPEARED AS A POSSIBLE MOTIVATING FACTOR TO INDUCE SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG UOGC'S MEMBERS. WE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS LIKELY TO BE PLAYING A FACILITATING ROLE AS WELL, EVENTHOUGH WE COULD NOT ADD EMPIRICAL SUPPORT TO OUR HYPOTHESIS AS IT WAS DONE IN <u>UNION DEMOCRACY</u> ON THE BASIS OF THE DIFFERENTIAL FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS OF THE THREE RELIGIOUS GROUPS.
2. IN THE UOGC WE CANNOT TALK OF A "SUBSTITUTE SYSTEM" FOR CARRYING OUT WORK LOAD. WE CAN ONLY NOTE THAT THE PROCEDURE TO FULFILL EXTRA-WORK REQUIREMENTS IS OVERTIME, AND THIS INDIRECTLY PROVIDES AVENUES TO FURTHER SOCIAL RELATIONS <u>ON THE JOB</u>. IT CAN BE EASILY ASSUMED, HOWEVER, THAT SOCIAL RELATIONS ON THE JOB PROVIDE GROUNDS TO

CONTINUE ASSOCIATION OFF-THE JOB.

3. FINALLY, THE NIGHT WORK TENDS TO PROMOTE PRINTERS' ASSOCIATION WITH FELLOW WORKERS, BUT FUNDAMENTALLY AT THE LEVEL OF THE INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE HAVE NOTED THAT FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION GENERALLY SUPERIMPOSE WITH THE NIGHT WORKERS' JOB SCHEDULES. WHILE THE ITU'S NIGHT WORKERS PARTICIPATE MORE IN THE PRINTERS' EXCLUSIVE CLUBS, THE UOGC'S NIGHT WORKERS TEND TO VISIT EACH OTHER MORE FREQUENTLY AT THEIR HOMES.

BEFORE ATTEMPTING A GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN BOTH UNIONS, WE WILL ANALYZE THE INCIDENCE OF A LATTER FACTOR SINGLED OUT IN UNION DEMOCRACY AS LEADING TOWARD DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRINTING INDUSTRY.

8. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRINTING INDUSTRY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

INTRODUCTION.- THE DISCUSSION IN THIS CHAPTER IS CONCERNED WITH THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND UNION POLITICS. TWO MAIN ASPECTS SINGLED OUT IN THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY ARE THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE DEGREE OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION. SIMILAR INCOME AND STATUS, AS WELL AS LACK OF SKILL DIFFERENCES, ARE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRADE IN NEW YORK AND CÓRDOBA.

ALSO, THE INDUSTRY IN BOTH CASES IS DESCRIBED AS BEING SCARCELY RATIONALIZED TECHNOLOGICALLY AND NOT CONCENTRATED IN OWNERSHIP. AN IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE ITU IS THE PRESENCE OF A UNION UNIT CALLED THE CHAPEL, WHOSE OFFICERS -REPRESENTATIVES OF DIFFERENT SHOPS- ARE ELECTED ANNUALLY. IT IS OBSERVED THAT THESE UNITS ARE AUTONOMOUS FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, AND CONSTITUTE A STRUCTURAL SUPPORT OF THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE ITU. IN THE UOGC, THE ALTERNATIVE UNIT, THE SHOP COMMITTEES OR SHOP REPRESENTATIVES, ARE DEPENDENT ON THE UNION ADMINISTRATION, AND THEIR POLITICAL ROLE APPEARS AS AN IRRELEVANT ONE.

AN IMPORTANT VARIABLE INTRODUCED IN THE ANALYSIS IS THE SHOP SIZE RANGE. IN BOTH UNIONS, BUT STRONGER IN THE ITU, IT IS OBSERVED THAT LARGE SHOP MEN TEND TO BE MORE

ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS. SOME OF THE FACTORS WHICH COULD ACCOUNT FOR THE LOWER POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF THE SMALL SHOP PRINTERS ARE THE PRESENCE OF PATERNALISTIC RELATIONSHIPS IN MOST SMALL SHOPS, TOGETHER WITH THE FACT THAT MANY OWNERS ARE UNION MEMBERS AND WORK AT THE TRADE IN THE SMALLER SHOPS. IN THE LARGER SHOPS, IT IS OBSERVED THAT MANAGEMENT IS REMOTE AND THE UNION NEAR AND IMPORTANT. IN GENERAL, ITU'S MEMBERS IN THE LARGER SHOPS TEND TO SEE THE UNION AS AN AVENUE FOR OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY, WHILE THOSE IN THE SMALL SHOPS SHOW AN ORIENTATION TOWARD MANAGEMENT. IN THE UOGC'S CASE, NEITHER LARGE- NOR SMALL-SHOP MEN PERCEIVE THE UNION AS AN AVENUE FOR MOBILITY, GIVEN THAT UNION OFFICIALS ARE NOT HIGHER IN INCOME OR STATUS, AND THAT THEY CONTINUE WORKING AT THE TRADE. PRESSING THE ANALYSIS, IT IS FOUND THAT LARGE SHOPS IN CÓRDOBA MOBILIZE INTO UNION POLITICS PRINTERS WITH UNION ORIENTATIONS AND THOSE WHO REJECT THE OCCUPATION AS A MOBILITY CHANNEL.

AN INDIRECT WAY IN WHICH LARGE SHOPS IN BOTH UNIONS INDUCE INVOLVEMENT IN UNION POLITICS IS THROUGH AFFECTING RELATIONSHIPS ON THE JOB. LARGE SHOPS ARE OBSERVED TO PROVIDE MORE VOLUNTARY RELATIONSHIPS, GIVEN THEIR WIDER POOL OF POSSIBLE FRIENDS AND THE HIGHER FREEDOM FOR SOCIALIZING ON THE JOB. AS A RESULT, PRINTERS WITH STRINGENT CRITERIA FOR FRIENDSHIP SELECTION (LIKE THE LIBERAL-RADICALS) HAVE BETTER CHANCES OF FINDING PRINTERS WHO MIGHT SHARE

THEIR POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS IN THE LARGER SHOPS. FURTHERMORE, IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT ON-THE-JOB SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THESE SHOPS SEEMED TO RESEMBLE POLITICAL ARENAS WHERE UNION AFFAIRS ARE FREQUENTLY DISCUSSED. HOWEVER, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHOP SIZE AND UNION POLITICS SEEMED TO BE RATHER A CURVILINEAR ONE. IN THE ITU AND THE UOGC, PRINTERS IN THE MIDDLE-SIZE SHOPS EMERGED AS THE MOST INVOLVED IN UNION POLITICS. IN THESE SHOPS, ENOUGH SELECTION IS POSSIBLE FOR CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS DEVELOPMENT, BUT TO AN EXTENT THAT ALLOW RANK-AND-FILE EXPOSITION TO PRINTERS ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS.

THROUGHOUT THE ANALYSIS IN THE PRESENT CHAPTER, THE FOLLOWING VARIABLES WERE CONSIDERED: SHOP SIZE, ACTIVITY IN UNION POLITICS, ASPIRATIONS TO OWN SHOP, ASPIRATIONS TO BECOME A FOREMAN OR UNION OFFICER, ASPIRATIONS FOR WHITE-COLLAR OCCUPATIONS, HAVING BEST PRINTER FRIEND IN OWN SHOP, POLITICAL ATTITUDES (IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY, LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM), DEGREE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS, AND INTEREST IN UNION POLITICS.

8.1 ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS

LIPSET ET AL TURN NOW "FROM THE PRINTERS' LEISURE-TIME OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE UNION'S POLITICAL SYSTEM TO THE WORK LIFE OF PRINTERS" [230].

AS THE AUTHORS NOTE, "THE PATTERNS OF OWNERSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY, WHICH DEFINE WORK RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION, ARE PART OF THE MODERN WORKER'S ENVIRONMENT, TO WHICH HE CAN RESPOND AND ADAPT WITHIN A NARROW RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES, BUT WHICH HE CANNOT EASILY CHANGE OR SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT" [231]. THEY ASSUME THAT IT IS THE ORGANIZATIONAL OR STRUCTURAL FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE -TO A CERTAIN EXTENT- THE BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES OF WORKERS. ONE MAIN STRUCTURAL FACTOR DISCUSSED BY THEM IS THE WAY THE INDUSTRY IS ORGANIZED. TWO IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY WHICH SEEM RELATED TO UNION POLITICS WERE SINGLED OUT: "THE DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG THE MEN WHO MAKE UP THE UNION, AND THE DEGREE OF PHYSICAL CONCENTRATION AND CENTRALIZED OWNERSHIP IN THE INDUSTRY" [232].

8.2 THE DIVISION OF LABOR

FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, THE MAIN ASPECT OF THE DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG NEW YORK PRINTERS IS THAT "ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ITU SHARE A ROUGHLY COMMON INCOME AND STATUS" [233]. MOST OF THE PRINTERS ARE SKILLED WORKERS, AND EVEN WHEN SOME JOBS REQUIRE MORE SKILL THAN OTHERS, THESE DIFFERENCES DO NOT LEAD TO "SHARP CLEAVAGES AMONG PRINTERS" [234]. ALSO, THE AUTHORS NOTE THAT THE SKILL DIFFERENCES "DO NOT COMMAND ANY APPRECIABLE DIFFERENCE IN PAY AND STATUS" [235].

THEREFORE, THE AUTHORS CONCLUDE, "THE ITU IS ..., INSOFAR AS THIS IS POSSIBLE, A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS, AND THERE IS CONSEQUENTLY NO 'UNDERPRIVILEGED' GROUP IN THE UNION" [236].

IN THE CASE OF CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS, THE SAME SITUATION TAKES PLACE. THEY ARE SKILLED WORKERS, WITHOUT IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN SKILL AMONG THEM. AS IN THE ITU, UOGC'S MEMBERS FUNDAMENTAL SKILL IS COMPOSING OR SETTING TYPE, WITH THE DIFFERENCE THAT PRESSMEN ARE ALSO INCLUDED IN THE UNION AS SKILLED WORKERS, WHAT IS NOT THE CASE OF THE ITU. ANOTHER DIFFERENCE IS THAT WHILE IN THE ITU THE GROUP OF MACHINISTS WHO SERVICE THE PRINTING MACHINES ARE CONSIDERED AS UNSKILLED WORKERS, IN THE UOGC THEY ARE PERCEIVED AS SKILLED WORKERS IN THEIR OWN RIGHT. THE EXCEPTION IN THE UOGC IS A SMALL GROUP OF UNSKILLED BOOKBINDERS.

TOGETHER WITH THE ABSENCE OF SKILL DIFFERENCES, CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS ALSO SHARE ALMOST SIMILAR INCOME AND STATUS. INCOME DIFFERENCES MAY ARISE BECAUSE A PRINTER COULD HAVE TWO JOBS IN THE TRADE, OR BECAUSE HE COULD WORK MANY EXTRA-HOURS. THE SAME HAPPENS WITH THE BONUSES RECEIVED BY NEW YORK PRINTERS. HOWEVER, NEITHER IN THE ITU NOR THE UOGC IMPORTANT WAGE SCALE DIFFERENCES ARE WRITTEN INTO THE CONTRACTS. HENCE, WE COULD AFFIRM THAT LIKE THE ITU, THE UOGC SEEMS TO BE A "COMMUNITY OF EQUALS".

8.3 Organization of the Industry and the Role of the Chapel

In Union Democracy New York's printing industry is described as composed of small and medium-sized shops. The latter ones include newspapers and commercial shops. The commercial or book-and-job shops print books, magazines, etc.. This is a task which is almost absent in Córdoba's printing industry. One or two attempts to publish a weekly news magazine failed, and now is published one only twice a month. Books are very seldom printed in Córdoba. These few books are usually printed by the University of Córdoba's print shop, whose workers are not members of the UOGC.

The authors observe that union book-and-job shops in New York employ about 4,500 ITU members, while newspapers employ about 3,500 ITU members. Book-and-job shops in Córdoba employ about 200 UOGC's members, while newspapers employ about 250 UOGC's members.

Lipset et.al. note that "In every shop employing three or more members of the ITU, union law requires the organization of a union unit, traditionally called a chapel. Each chapel elect officers, and holds regular shop meetings" [237]. In the UOGC's case, union law establishes that "In shops employing more than three

WORKERS, A SHOP REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE NOMINATED IN ORDER TO REPRESENT THE SHOP IN THE UOGC ... . IN SHOPS EMPLOYING MORE THAN TEN WORKERS, THE SHOP REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE A COMMITTEE OF FIVE WORKERS, ... IN BOTH CASES, THE NOMINATIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN SHOP MEETINGS WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE UOGC'S HEADQUARTERS UNDER UNION OFFICIALS' CONTROL" [238].

IN THE ITU, CHAPEL OFFICERS ARE ELECTED IN ANUAL ELECTIONS WHICH ARE HOTLY CONTESTED [239]. THE CHAPEL IN THE ITU IS AN INDEPENDENT, AUTONOMOUS UNIT: "THE CHAIRMEN OF THE ITU CHAPELS HAVE A RELATIVELY INDEPENDENT POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE LOCAL UNION ADMINISTRATION" [240]. LIPSET ET. AL. ADD THAT "THE POLITICAL AUTONOMY OF THE CHAPEL AND THE CHAPEL CHAIRMAN IS ONE OF THE IMPORTANT STRUCTURAL SUPPORTS OF THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL LIFE OF THE UNION" [241]. IN THE UOGC, IN SPITE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL AUTONOMY WITHIN THE NATIONAL FEDERATION, THE SHOP REPRESENTATIVES ARE NOT INDEPENDENT. THEY ARE ELECTED BY THE MEMBERS OF THEIR SHOPS IN A MEETING CONTROLLED BY THE UNION. GENERALLY, MOST OF THE SMALL AND MIDDLE-SIZE SHOPS DO NOT FULFILL THE REQUIREMENT OF CHOOSING A REPRESENTATIVE. SHOP MEETINGS ARE IRREGULARLY CARRIED OUT. THE PERIODS FOR THE ELECTION OF SHOP REPRESENTATIVES ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY SCHEDULED IN THE UNION LAW, NEITHER THE LIMITS OF PERIODS THEY CAN HOLD OFFICE. WHEN ELECTIONS

TAKE PLACE, THEY ARE NEVER CONTESTED. NO IMPORTANT POLITICAL ROLE IS ATTRIBUTED TO SUCH A POSITION. THIS COULD BE IN PART A RESULT OF THE FACT THAT IN SHOPS WITH MORE THAN TEN WORKER REPRESENTATION IS IN THE HANDS OF A COMMITTEE OF FIVE MEMBERS, WHICH WILL LIMIT INDIVIDUAL ASPIRATIONS -AND POSIBILITIES- FOR UNION LEADERSHIP. CONTRARY TO THE ITU, IN OUR OWN RESEARCH VERY FEW CASES OF ACTUAL OR PAST SHOP REPRESENTATIVES FELL IN THE SAMPLE.

TWO FACTORS ARE SINGLED OUT AS DETERMINANTS OF THE CHAPEL IN THE ITU: THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRINTING INDUSTRY AND THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNION. WITH RESPECT TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY, LIPSET ET.AL. OBSERVE THAT IT "IS NEITHER HIGHLY RATIONALIZED TECHNOLOGICALLY NOR CONCENTRATED IN OWNERSHIP"[242]. HENCE, DISPUTES IN A CHAPEL DO NOT EXPAND THROUGHOUT THE INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE, WHICH IMPLIES THAT THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE CHAPEL IS NOT DANGEROUS FOR THE UNION[243].

CÓRDOBA'S PRINTING INDUSTRY IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF NEW YORK: IT IS LESS RATIONALIZED TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IT IS NOT CONCENTRATED IN OWNERSHIP. HOWEVER, LIPSET ET.AL. POINT OUT THAT THERE ARE MANY UNIONS WITHIN DECENTRALIZED INDUSTRIES "WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED OLIGARCHIC, ONE-PARTY STRUCTURES"[244]. THIS IS A RESULT OF THE FACT THAT "PROMOTION IN MOST UNIONS OCCURS <u>WITHIN</u> THE UNION HIERARCHY, AND COMES IN LARGE PART AS A REWARD FOR PAST LOYALTY"[245].

WE WILL SEE LATER TO WHAT EXTENT THIS IS THE CASE OF THE UOGC.

THE INDEPENDENCE AND POWER OF THE CHAPEL CHAIRMAN IN THE ITU, SUGGEST THE AUTHORS, "IS AT LEAST AS MUCH A CONSEQUENCE OF THE OPERATION OF THE UNION'S TWO-PARTY SYSTEM"[246]. THEY POINT OUT THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AUTONOMY OF THE CHAPEL CHAIRMAN AND THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A FUNCTIONAL ONE: "THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE CHAPEL, WHICH COULD ONLY EXIST IN A DEMOCRATIC UNION, CONTRIBUTES TO THE MAINTENANCE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNION"[247]. IN THE UOGC, THE ABSENCE OF SHOP REPRESENTATIVES IN MANY SHOPS, THE IRREGULARITY OF SHOP MEETINGS, THE IRRELEVANT POLITICAL ROLE OF COMMITTEES REPRESENTING THE LARGER SHOPS, THE INDIRECT CONTROL EXERCISED BY THE UNION ADMINISTRATION, ALL THESE FACTORS TEND TO SUGGEST THAT SHOP MEETINGS COULD HARDLY BE CONSIDERED AS STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS PROVIDING INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER, OR EVENTUAL BASES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION.

8.4 THE RELEVANCE OF SHOP SIZE

IN THE ITU, INITIAL INDICATIONS ABOUT THE HIGHER DEGREE OF UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF PRINTERS IN LARGE SHOPS WERE LATTER SUPPORTED BY THE DATA. IN THE UOGC, THE DATA

TABLE 37. PROPORTION OF NEW IN DIFFERENT-SIZED SHOPS WHO HAVE ENGAGED IN SOME UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY RECENTLY.

A) UOGC

	SHOP SIZE	
	SMALL (3-39)	LARGE (40-OR MORE)
PROPORTION ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(36) 62 %	(55) 66 %
TOTAL CASES	58	83

B) ITU (PAGE 171)

	SHOP SIZE			
	3-10	11-30	31-100	100 +
PROPORTION ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(15) 23 %	(24) 24 %	(33) 40 %	(82) 45 %
TOTAL CASES	66	99	83	182

DO NOT ALLOW US TO CARRY OUT AS DETAILED AN ANALYSIS AS IN UNION DEMOCRACY. HOWEVER, GROUPING TOGETHER THE SMALL AND MIDDLE SHOPS, WE HAVE A RANGE OF 2 TO 35, WHICH IS ALMOST THE RANGE CONSIDERED SMALL BY LIPSET ET.AL.. AS IT IS SHOWN IN TABLE 37, PRINTERS IN THE LARGER SHOPS TEND

TO BE SLIGHTLY MORE ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS THAN THOSE IN THE SMALLER ONES.

LIPSET ET.AL. ASK THEN: "WHAT ASPECTS OF SHOP SIZE HELP ACCOUNT FOR THE HIGHER LEVELS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF LARGE SHOP MEN? THROUGH WHAT MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES DOES SHOP SIZE OPERATE TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT, AND HOW DO THESE PROCESSES DIFFER IN LARGE AND SMALL SHOPS?"[248]. THE AUTHORS CONSIDER IN THEIR DISCUSSION THREE MAIN ELEMENTS WITHIN THE PRINTER'S WORK ENVIRONMENT: THE EMPLOYER, THE SHOPMATES, AND THE UNION.

8.5 SHOP SIZE AND WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

THE FOLLOWING FACTORS ARE SINGLED OUT BY LIPSET ET.AL. AS POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF THE LOWER POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF SMALL-SHOP MEN:

1. IN SMALL SHOPS, WORKERS HAVING MUCH CONTACT WITH THEIR EMPLOYERS ARE INVOLVED IN PATERNALISTIC RELATIONSHIPS. ("THE PERSONAL TIES OF SMALL-SHOP MEN WITH THEIR EMPLOYERS TEND TO WEAKEN THEIR IDENTIFICATION WITH ORGANIZATIONS PREDICATED ON A CONFLICT OF INTERESTS BETWEEN WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS"[249]).
2. "IN MANY SMALL PRINT SHOPS THE OWNER HIMSELF IS A UNION MEMBER, AND IN THE SMALLEST SHOPS HE MAY EVEN WORK AT

THE TRADE IN THE OLD CRAFT TRADITION OF THE MASTER SURROUNDED BY HIS JOURNEYMEN" [250].

3. ON THE OTHER HAND, "THE PRINTER IN THE LARGE SHOPS IS ONE WORKER AMONG MANY", AND THE FOREMAN "IS MORE LIKELY TO BE PERCEIVED AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF MANAGEMENT THAN AS A FELLOW WORKER" [251], EVENTHOUGH HE IS USUALLY A MEMBER OF THE UNION;

4. "IN THE LARGER SHOPS MANAGEMENT IS REMOTE AND THE UNION IS NEAR, VISIBLE, AND IMPORTANT; IN THE SMALL SHOPS THE UNION IS REMOTE AND THE OWNER AND FOREMAN BULK LARGE" [252].

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THIS LATTER POINT, THE AUTHORS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE PROXIMITY OF THE OWNER IN SMALL SHOPS WILL INDUCE PRINTERS TO ASPIRE TO THE SAME STATUS. FURTHERMORE, THEY ADDED THAT PRINTERS IN SMALL SHOPS ALSO HAVE BETTER CHANCES OF EITHER BECOMING A FOREMAN OR INSTALLING HIS OWN SHOP THAN PRINTERS IN THE LARGER SHOPS. TABLE 38 SHOWS THAT 42 % OF PRINTERS IN SMALL SHOPS SAY

TABLE 38. PROPORTION OF MEN IN DIFFERENT-SIZED SHOPS SAYING THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO OWN THEIR OWN SHOP.

A) UOGC

	SHOP SIZE	
	SMALL	LARGE
PROPORTION WANTING TO OWN SHOP	(43) 74 %	(54) 65 %
TOTAL CASES	58	83

B) ITU (PAGE 173)

	SHOP SIZE		
	3-30	31-200	200 +
PROPORTION WANTING TO OWN SHOP	(68) 42 %	(34) 28 %	(38) 26 %
TOTAL CASES	162	120	145

THEY WOULD LIKE TO OWN THEIR OWN SHOPS, AGAINST 28 % AND 20 % OF THOSE IN LARGER SHOPS. ALSO, THE AUTHORS POINT OUT THAT "ABOUT TWICE AS GREAT A PROPORTION OF MEN IN SMALL SHOPS, AS IN LARGE (40 % COMPARED WITH 20 %) SAY THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO BE A FOREMAN"[253].

IN THE CASE OF CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS, IT CAN BE NOTED THAT:

1. PATERNALISTIC RELATIONSHIPS ARE A GENERAL FEATURE OF ANY TYPE OF SMALL WORK ORGANIZATION IN THE COUNTRY;
2. PROBABLY MORE FREQUENTLY THAN IN NEW YORK, IN MANY SMALL SHOPS IN CÓRDOBA THE OWNER HIMSELF IS A UNION MEMBER, AND HE WORKS TOGETHER WITH HIS EMPLOYEES;
3. WHAT LIPSET ET.AL. SAID ABOUT THE CLOSENESS OF THE UNION PRESENCE IN LARGE SHOPS AND THE REMOTENESS OF SUCH A PRESENCE IN THE SMALL ONES, SEEMS TO US TO BE A GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF WORK ORGANIZATIONS, WHATEVER THE INDUSTRY AND ITS SITE.

IN TABLES 38 AND 39, WE CAN SEE THAT WHILE PRINTERS IN THE SMALLER SHOPS TEND TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN OWNNING

TABLE 39. PROPORTION OF MEN IN DIFFERENT-SIZED SHOPS PREFERRING TO BE A FOREMAN.
(UOGC)

	SHOP SIZE	
	SMALL	LARGE
PROPORTION PREFERRING TO BE A FOREMAN	(17) 29 %	(29) 35 %
TOTAL CASES	58	83

THEIR OWN SHOPS (74 % COMPARED WITH 65 %), THEY SEEM LESS INTERESTED IN BECOMING A FOREMAN (29 % COMPARED WITH 35 %) THAN PRINTERS IN THE LARGER SHOPS. THIS DIFFERENCE WITH UNION DEMOCRACY WAS WITHIN OUR EXPECTATIONS, BECAUSE MOST OF THE SMALLER SHOPS IN CÓRDOBA DO NOT HAVE FOREMAN. "THERE IS NO FOREMAN HERE", WAS A TYPICAL ANSWER OF SMALL-SHOP MEN WHEN THEY WERE ASKED IF THEY PREFERRED TO BE A FOREMAN OR A UNION OFFICER. THAT IS, THE FOREMAN POSITION SEEMED TO BE OUT OF THEIR RANGE OF IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITIES FOR OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY.

LIPSET ET.AL. ASK TO WHAT EXTENT THE HIGHER INCLINATION OF SMALL-SHOP MEN TO PREFER TO OWN THEIR OWN SHOPS IS NOT A RESULT OF THE FACT THAT THEY COULD BE MORE INTERESTED

TABLE 40. (UOGC) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHIP SIZE AND ASPIRATIONS FOR WHITE-COLLAR (NONMANUAL) OCCUPATIONS.

	SHOP SIZE	
	SMALL	LARGE
PERCENT WHO ASPIRE TO WHITE-COLLAR OCCUPATIONS	(20) 34 %	(28) 34 %
TOTAL CASES	58	83

IN SELF-EMBETTERMENT. THEY FOUND THAT SUCH IS NOT THE CASE, BECAUSE "ABOUT THE SAME PROPORTION OF SMALL- AND LARGE-SHOP MEN -ONE-QUARTER- NAMED SOME NONMANUAL OCCUPATION WHEN ASKED WHAT OCCUPATION THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE" [254]. HOWEVER, PRINTERS IN LARGE SHOPS WHO HAD

TABLE 41. SHOP SIZE, AND FOREMAN-VS.-UNION-OFFICER PREFERENCE AMONG MEN WHO ASPIRE TO WHITE-COLLAR OCCUPATIONS.

A) UOGC

PREFER TO BECOME	SHOP SIZE: SMALL		SHOP SIZE: LARGE	
FOREMAN	(7)	35 %	(9)	32 %
UNION OFFICER	(3)	15 %	(4)	14 %
NEITHER	(7)	35 %	(12)	43 %
"DON'T KNOW" AND NO ANSWER	(3)	15 %	(3)	11 %
TOTAL CASES	20		28	

B) ITU (PAGE 175)

PREFER TO BECOME	SHOP SIZE: 3-30		SHOP SIZE: 30 +	
FOREMAN	(25)	53 %	(27)	39 %
UNION OFFICER	(11)	23 %	(31)	45 %
NEITHER	(8)	18 %	(9)	13 %
"DON'T KNOW" AND NO ANSWER	(3)	6 %	(2)	3 %
TOTAL CASES	47		69	

WHITE-COLLAR ASPIRATIONS TENDED TO OPT FOR UNION OFFICER, WHILE PRINTERS IN SMALL SHOPS WITH THE SAME ASPIRATIONS TENDED TO OPT FOR FOREMAN (TABLE 41). THE AUTHORS OF UNION DEMOCRACY SUGGEST THAT THE EXISTENCE OF A HIGH PROPORTION OF MANAGEMENT-ORIENTED PRINTERS IN SMALL SHOPS IS EXPLAINED BY A DOUBLE PROCESS: THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OWNERS AND WORKERS, AND THE SELECTIVE RECRUITMENT OF PRINTERS WITH PREVIOUS MANAGEMENT ORIENTATIONS BY THE SMALL SHOPS. FURTHERMORE, THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE WITHIN THE SMALL SHOPS "REINFORCES THE VALUES AND ORIENTATION TOWARD MANAGEMENT AND AWAY FROM UNION ACTIVITY WHICH THESE MEN MAY BRING WITH THEM" [255].

TABLE 41 SHOWS THAT IN THE UOGC, SMALL-SHOP PRINTERS WITH WHITE-COLLAR ASPIRATIONS TEND SLIGHTLY TO OPT MORE FOR FOREMAN (35%) THAN LARGE-SHOP PRINTERS (32.14%). ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS PRACTICALLY NO DIFFERENCE IN PREFERENCE FOR UNION OFFICER AMONG WHITE-COLLAR ASPIRANTS IN THE SMALLER AND LARGER SHOPS. FINALLY, IT CAN BE SEEN THAT WHITE-COLLAR ASPIRANTS IN LARGE SHOPS TEND TO REJECT MORE THE AVENUES FOR MOBILITY WITHIN THE OCCUPATION: 43% IN THE LARGE SHOPS AGAINST 35% IN THE SMALLER ONES WOULD NOT OPT FOR EITHER FOREMAN OR UNION OFFICER.

IN TABLE 39 WE HAD SEEN THAT UOGC'S MEMBERS IN THE LARGER SHOPS PREFERRED MORE TO BECOME A FOREMAN THAN THOSE IN THE SMALLER SHOPS. ALSO, WE HAD OBSERVED -TABLE 40-

THAT THERE IS PRACTICALLY NO DIFFERENCE IN WHITE-COLLAR ASPIRATIONS BETWEEN LARGE- AND SMALL-SHOP MEN. HOWEVER, IF WE KEEP WHITE-COLLAR ASPIRATIONS CONSTANT -TABLE 41-, IT IS THE PRINTERS IN THE SMALLER SHOPS WHO SHOW A SLIGHTLY HIGHER PREFERENCE FOR BECOMING A FOREMAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE REMEMBER THAT WE HAD POINTED OUT THAT ONE POSSIBLE REASON FOR THE LOWER INTEREST OF SMALL-SHOP MEN TO BECOME FOREMAN WAS THE FACT THAT SUCH A POSITION WAS ALMOST NONEXISTENT WITHIN THE SMALLEST SHOPS, AND THAT IT SEEMED THAT PRINTERS WITHIN THOSE SHOPS CONSIDERED THE FOREMAN POSITION BEYOND THEIR RANGE OF ACTUAL POSSIBILITIES. BUT, PRINTERS WITHIN THOSE SAME SHOPS WHO HAVE ASPIRATIONS FOR MOBILITY TEND TO BE AS INTERESTED, AND EVEN MORE, IN BECOMING A FOREMAN THAN PRINTERS IN THE LARGER SHOPS. IT COULD BE HYPOTHESIZED THAT THEIR MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS INCLUDE THE FOREMAN POSITION AS AN ACTUAL, POSSIBLE OPTION.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WE CAN OBSERVE THAT OUR EXPECTATIONS THAT PRINTERS IN THE SMALLER SHOPS WOULD TEND TO ASPIRE MORE TO BECOME A FOREMAN (IN THE SAME SENSE AS THEY WERE MORE INCLINED TO OWN THEIR OWN SHOPS) WERE NOT UNSOUND. WHEN THE FOREMAN POSITION SEEMS TO BE PERCEIVED AS A POSSIBLE OPTION, PRINTERS IN THE SMALLER SHOPS SHOW HIGHER ASPIRATIONS. WE DO NOT KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THE SMALLER SHOPS IN CÓRDOBA'S PRINTING INDUSTRY MAY SELECTIVELY RECRUIT MANAGEMENT-ORIENTED MEN

BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESENCE OF SUCH A PROCESS IS ONLY SUGGESTED IN UNION DEMOCRACY, WHILE NO DATA SUPPORT THE STATEMENT.

ANOTHER OBSERVATION SUGGESTED BY TABLE 41 IS THAT PRINTERS WHO ASPIRE TO WHITE-COLLAR OCCUPATIONS IN BOTH GROUPS OF SHOPS SHOW AN EQUAL LOW INTEREST IN BECOMING AN UNION OFFICER. THIS CAN BE A RESULT OF THE FACT THAT UNION OFFICIALS ARE NOT HIGHER IN STATUS OR INCOME WITH RESPECT TO A REGULAR WORKER, AND THAT THEY HAVE TO CONTINUE WORKING IN THE TRADE TO MAKE A LIVING. THAT IS, PRINTERS WITH MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS -EITHER IN THE LARGER OR SMALLER SHOPS- WOULD HARDLY PERCEIVE THE UNION AS PROVIDING AN OCCUPATIONAL CARRER.

AS A FINAL OBSERVATION, LIPSET ET.AL. ASK IF "THE DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF MANAGEMENT-ORIENTED MEN IN SMALL SHOPS WHOLLY ACCOUNT FOR THE LOWER RATES OF UNION ACTIVITY AND INVOLVEMENT" [256] THEY ARE TRYING TO EXPLAIN. THEY NOTE THAT WHEN MANAGEMENT ORIENTATIONS ARE HELD CONSTANT (TABLE 42), PRINTERS IN LARGE SHOPS CONTINUE SHOWING HIGHER LEVELS OF ACTIVITY IN UNION POLITICS.

TABLE 42. PROPORTION OF MEN IN LARGE AND SMALL SHOPS WHO ARE ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS (UNION-MANAGEMENT JOB ASPIRATIONS HELD CONSTANT).

A) UOGC

SHOP SIZE AND UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY CONTROLLING ON MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS.

	MEN WHO WOULD RATHER BE UNION OFFICER		MEN WHO WOULD RATHER BE FOREMAN		MEN WHO WOULD LIKE TO BE NEITHER	
	LARGE SHOP	SMALL SHOP	LARGE SHOP	SMALL SHOP	LARGE SHOP	SMALL SHOOP
PERCENT ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(12) 86 %	(9) 75 %	(16) 55 %	(9) 53 %	(22) 67 %	(13) 54 %
TOTAL CASES	14	12	29	17	33	24

B) ITU (PAGE 176)

	MEN WHO WOULD RATHER BE UNION OFFICER		MEN WHO WOULD RATHER BE FOREMAN		MEN WHO WOULD LIKE TO BE NEITHER	
	30 +	30 -	30 +	30 -	30 +	30 -
PERCENT ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(54) 59 %	(13) 32 %	(29) 39 %	(12) 15 %	(31) 37 %	(12) 36 %
TOTAL CASES	91	41	78	81	84	33

IN THE UOGC'S CASE, HOLDING UNION-MANAGEMENT ORIENTATIONS CONSTANT HELPS US TO SPECIFY THAT IT IS THE UNION-ORIENTED PRINTERS, AND THOSE WHO REJECT AVENUES WITHIN THE OCCUPATION FOR MOBILITY, WHO ARE MORE WIDELY MOBILIZED INTO UNION POLITICS BY THE LARGER SHOPS. IT IS ONLY WHEN MANAGEMENT ORIENTATIONS PREVAIL THAT THE EFFECTS OF WORKING IN LARGER SHOPS ARE MINIMIZED: 55.2% OF MANAGEMENT-ORIENTED PRINTERS IN LARGE SHOPS AND 53% IN SMALL ONES ARE ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS.

AS A RESULT OF THE PREVIOUS DISCUSSION, LIPSET ET.AL. NOTE THAT WHILE SHOP SIZE AFFECTS UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY "IN PART THROUGH THE GREATER TENDENCY OF SMALL SHOPS TO CONTAIN MEN WITH PRO-MANAGEMENT ASPIRATIONS AND ORIENTATIONS, SHOP SIZE ALSO AFFECTS THE LEVEL OF UNION ACTIVITY AND INVOLVEMENT THROUGH AFFECTING THE RELATIONS OF ITU MEMBERS WITH EACH OTHER IN THE SHOP" [257].

8.6 ON-THE-JOB SOCIAL RELATIONS

THE AUTHORS BEGIN THEIR ANALYSIS INTRODUCING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY GROUPS. THEY NOTE THAT SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE WORK SITUATION ARE NOT NECESSARILY PRIMARY GROUP RELATIONS. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, OBSERVE THE AUTHORS, WORK RELATIONS ARE INVOLUNTARY, GIVEN THAT THERE ARE LIMITED STRUCTURAL POSSIBILITIES IN THE

WORK SITUATION TO DEVELOP CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONS. THAT IS, THE LESS THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE AVAILABLE ON THE JOB, THE LESS THE POSSIBILITIES OF FINDING FRIENDS WITH COMMON INTERESTS AND, THEREFORE, THE LOWER THE POSSIBILITIES THAT SUCH RELATIONSHIPS WILL CRYSTALLIZE IN INTIMATE AND PERMANENT FRIENDSHIPS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, ON-THE-JOB SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE LARGER SHOPS "ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE VOLUNTARY THAN IN THE SMALLER SHOPS, FIRST BECAUSE THERE ARE SIMPLY MORE MEN TO CHOOSE FROM, AND SECONDLY, BECAUSE THE WORK SCHEDULES IN LARGER SHOPS ARE NOT AS TIGHT, AND THEIR ECONOMIC MARGIN OF OPERATION NOT AS NARROW, AS IN THE SMALL SHOPS" [258].

TABLE 43. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHOP-SIZE AND PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OF PRINTERS SEEN OFF THE JOB.

A) UOGC

	SHOP SIZE		
	SMALL (3-20)	MEDIUM (20-40)	LARGE (40+)
PROPORTION OF MEN WHOSE TWO BEST PRINTER FRIENDS ARE BOTH IN OWN SHOP.	-	(3) 12 %	(16) 19 %
TOTAL CASES	32	26	83

B) ITU (PAGE 186)

	SHOP SIZE				
	3-10	11-30	31-100	101-200	200 +
PROPORTION OF MEN WHOSE TWO BEST PRINTER FRIENDS ARE BOTH IN OWN SHOP.	(11) 22 %	(23) 25 %	(28) 37 %	(19) 58 %	(76) 60 %
TOTAL CASES	52	91	75	33	126

TABLE 43 SHOWS THAT PRINTERS WORKING IN LARGER SHOPS TEND TO HAVE MORE INTIMATE FRIENDS IN THE SHOP THAN THOSE WORKING IN SMALLER ONES. THE AUTHORS SUGGEST THAT THESE FINDINGS TEND TO CONFIRM THE ASSUMPTION THAT "MEN HAVE MORE INTIMATE SOCIAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER PRINTERS IN LARGE PLANTS THAN THEY DO IN SMALL ONES" [259]. IN THE UOGC, EVEN WHEN FIGURES ARE TOO LOW IN THE DIFFERENT CELLS, DATA SHOW THE SAME TENDENCY. IN ORDER TO INCREASE FIGURES, WE

TABLE 43.1 (UOGC) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHOP SIZE AND PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OF PRINTERS SEEN OFF THE JOB.

	SHOP SIZE		
	SMALL	MEDIUM	LARGE
PROPORTION WITH AT LEAST ONE PRINTER FRIEND IN OWN SHOP	(8) 25 %	(12) 46 %	(40) 48 %
TOTAL CASES	32	26	83

DETERMINED IN TABLE 43.1 THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SHOP SIZE AND HAVING AT LEAST ONE BEST PRINTER FRIEND IN THE SHOP,

TABLE 43.2 (UOGC)

	SHOP SIZE		
	SMALL	MEDIUM	LARGE
PROPORTION OF MEN WHOSE TWO NON-INTIMATE PRINTER FRIENDS ARE BOTH IN OWN SHOP	(4) 13 %	(11) 42 %	(50) 60 %
TOTAL CASES	32	26	83

AND IN TABLE 43.2 THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SHOP SIZE AND HAVING NON-INTIMATE PRINTER FRIENDS IN THE SHOP. IT CAN BE SEEN THAT THE PREVIOUS TENDENCIES REMAIN IN THESE TABLES. (OF COURSE, IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO SPECIFY IN TABLE 43.2 TO WHAT EXTENT THE HIGHER NUMBER OF NON-INTIMATE PRINTER FRIENDS IS NOT A MERE RESULT OF THE HIGHER NUMBER OF MEN IN THE LARGER SHOPS).

LIPSET ET.AL. POINT OUT THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN GROUPS OF PEOPLE WITHIN SHOPS WHOSE REQUIREMENTS FOR FRIENDSHIPS ARE VERY STRINGENT. THESE MEN WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE FRIENDS WITH SIMILAR INTERESTS IN SMALL SHOPS WHERE THE AVAILABLE POOL OF FRIENDS IS VERY LIMITED. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS, THE AUTHORS NOTE, REFERS TO THE FACT THAT UNION MEMBERS HAVE DIFFERENT POLITICAL VALUES. IN THIS SENSE, THE AUTHORS SUGGEST THAT "THE LIBERALS AMONG PRINTERS ARE MORE INTERESTED IN POLITICS, BOTH NATIONAL AND UNION, THAN ARE CONSERVATIVES. LIBERALS, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO USE SIMILARITY IN POLITICAL BELIEF AS A CRITERION FOR FRIENDSHIP, WHILE CONSERVATIVES SHOULD BE LESS SELECTIVE"[260].

TABLE 44. FOR LARGE-SHOP AND SMALL-SHOP MEN: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND HAVING BEST FRIENDS IN SAME SHOP.

A) UOGC

	SHOP SIZE			
	SMALL		LARGE	
	HIGH IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (MORE-LIBERAL-RADICALS)	LOW IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (MORE CONSERVATIVES)	HIGH IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (MORE LIBERAL-RADICALS)	LOW IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (MORE (CONSERVATIVES)
PROPORTION WITH TWO BEST PRINTER FRIENDS IN OWN SHOP	(1) 3 %	(1) 5 %	(7) 15 %	(8) 24 %
TOTAL CASES	35	22	48	33

B) ITU (PAGE 184)

	SHOP SIZE			
	SMALL		LARGE	
	LIBERALS	CONSERVATIVES	LIBERALS	CONSERVATIVES
PROPORTION WITH TWO BEST PRINTER FRIENDS IN OWN SHOP	(19) 33 %	(30) 51 %	(44) 47 %	(68) 69 %
TOTAL CASES	58	59	94	99

TABLE 44 SHOW THAT IN THE ITU AND THE UOGC, LIBERAL-RADICAL PRINTERS TEND TO HAVE A LOWER PROPORTION OF CLOSE FRIENDS INSIDE THE SHOPS THAN THE MOST CONSERVATIVE ONES [261]. AS IT CAN BE OBSERVED WITH RESPECT TO THE UOGC, VERY FEW CASES FALL IN THE SMALL-SHOP CELLS. IT IS IN THE LARGER SHOPS THAT THE TENDENCY IN THE DATA CAN BE SEEN MORE CLEARLY: 24.24% OF THE MOST CONSERVATIVES, AS COMPARED WITH 14.58% OF THE MOST RADICALS, ARE ABLE TO SELECT THEIR BEST FRIENDS IN THEIR OWN SHOPS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNION DEMOCRACY, THE FOLLOWING RELATIONSHIPS CAN BE SINGLED OUT IN ORDER TO SUMMARIZE THE PRESENT DISCUSSION:

1. A) THE NUMBER OF PRINTERS IN THE SHOP: ----------->
   B) THE PRINTERS' PHYSICAL LOCATION: ----------->
   C) THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WORK PROCESS: ----------> MORE MEN AVAILABLE FOR SOCIAL RELATIONS ON THE JOB.
   D) THE FREEDOM ON THE JOB FOR SOCIALIZING. ----------->

2. MORE MEN AVAILABLE FOR SOCIAL RELATIONS ON THE JOB ----------> MORE "VOLUNTARY" SELF-SELECTED RELATIONS

3. IF VOLUNTARY SELF-SELECTION OF FRIENDS IN THE SHOPS IS MORE LIKELY ----------> THESE RELATIONSHIPS MAY TEND TO BE BASED "ON A WIDER RANGE OF SHARED INTERESTS AND VALUES" (262).

4. IF RELATIONSHIPS ARE BASED ON SHARED INTERESTS ----------→ IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT "THESE RELATIONSHIPS WILL BE ELABORATED AND INTENSIFIED OVER TIME INTO CLOSE AND GENUINE FRIENDSHIPS" (263).

5. IF A MAN IS STRINGENT TO SELECT FRIENDS ----------→ IT WILL BE LESS LIKELY THAT HE WILL FIND THEM IN A LIMITED POOL.

AS IT IS POINTED OUT IN UNION DEMOCRACY, MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR FRIENDSHIPS DEVELOPMENT TAKE PLACE IN THE LARGER SHOPS. THE LATTER HAVE: A) A WIDER POOL OF AVAILABLE PRINTERS FOR VOLUNTARY SELECTION OF FRIENDS; B) MORE FREEDOM FOR SOCIALIZING ON THE JOB; AND, FINALLY, C) PRINTERS WITH STRINGENT CRITERIA FOR FRIENDSHIP (LIKE THE LIBERAL-RADICALS) HAVE MORE POSSIBILITIES OF FINDING OTHER PRINTERS WHO SHARE THEIR INTERESTS AND VALUES IN THE LARGER SHOPS.

8.7 THE POLITICAL RELEVANCE OF ON-THE-JOB SOCIAL RELATIONS

LIPSET ET.AL. NOTE THAT THE DIFFERENTIAL FRIENDSHIP RELATIONS WE FIND IN THE SMALLER AND LARGER SHOPS CAN "HELP PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL ANSWER TO THE QUESTION, WHY ARE MEN IN LARGE SHOPS MORE ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS THAN MEN IN SMALL SHOPS?" [264]. THE AUTHORS REMEMBER THAT SOCIAL RELATIONS ON

THE JOB IN LARGE SHOPS HAVE THE CHARACTER OF POLITICAL ARENAS FOR THE DISCUSSION OF UNION POLITICS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN THE SMALL SHOPS SOCIAL RELATIONS ARE MORE INVOLUNTARY AND THEY "TEND TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMAL ARENAS FOR THE DISCUSSION OF UNION AFFAIRS" [265].

TABLES 45 AND 46 WOULD SUGGEST THAT "WHERE THESE INFORMAL POLITICAL ARENAS EXIST (...) THEY ACT BOTH INDEPENDENTLY AND CUMULATIVELY TO STIMULATE AND SUSTAIN THE POLICAL INVOLVEMENTS OF THEIR PARTICIPANTS" [266]. THIS IS ALSO THE CASE OF THE UOGC: CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS WHO ARE HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS TEND TO PARTICIPATE MORE AND TO BE MORE INVOLVED AND INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS IN THE LARGER SHOPS. IN THE SMALLER SHOPS, DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT ARE SLIGHT BETWEEN THOSE HIGH AND LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS (3% IN TABLE 45), OR INEXISTENT (17% IS SHOWN BY BOTH GROUPS IN TABLE 46).

TABLE 45. ACCESS TO ONE OR BOTH MAJOR INFORMAL ARENAS OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION (OFF THE JOB AND WITHIN THE LARGEST SHOPS), AND PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS.

A) UOGC

	SHOP SIZE			
	SMALL SHOP		LARGE SHOP	
	HIGH OR MEDIUM IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	HIGH OR MEDIUM IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS
PROPORTION ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(18) 62 %	(17) 59 %	(34) 68 %	(17) 59 %
TOTAL CASES	29	29	50	29

B) ITU (PAGE 187)

	SHOP SIZE			
	SMALL SHOP		LARGE SHOP	
	HIGH OR MEDIUM IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	HIGH OR MEDIUM IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS
PROPORTION ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS	(18) 22 %	(13) 18 %	(77) 51 %	(33) 33 %
TOTAL CASES	82	74	151	100

TABLE 46. ACCESS TO ONE OR BOTH MAJOR INFORMAL ARENAS OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION, AND INTEREST IN UNION POLITICS.

A) UOGC

	SHOP SIZE			
	SMALL		LARGE	
	HIGH OR MEDIUM IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	HIGH OR MEDIUM IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS
PROPORTION "EXTREMELY" INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS	(5) 17 %	(5) 17 %	(8) 16 %	(1) 3 %
TOTAL CASES	29	29	50	29

B) ITU (PAGE 188)

	SHOP SIZE			
	3-30		30 +	
	HIGH OR MEDIUM IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	HIGH OR MEDIUM IN SOCIAL RELATIONS	LOW IN SOCIAL RELATIONS
PROPORTION "EXTREMELY" INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS	(24) 29 %	(17) 23 %	(62) 41 %	(31) 31 %
TOTAL CASES	82	74	151	100

8.8 Size of Shop and Involvement in Union Politics: A Curvilinear Relationship

On the basis of a dichotomy between smaller and larger shops, it was implied in Union Democracy that the relationship between shop size and political involvement was a linear one. That is, it was suggested that when shop size increases, the printers' involvement in union politics also increases.

The authors ask now to what extent the linear relationship holds true "for the whole size range" [267] covered by their sample. They think that there is evidence to show that is not the case, and the reasons for this.

Tables 47 and 48 show that when more refined distinctions are made within the shop size variable, "the actual relationship between the size of the work unit and participation in union affairs turns out to be curvilinear rather than linear" [268].

TABLE 47. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIZE OF SHOP AND ACTIVITY IN UNION POLITICS.

A) UOGC

	SHOP SIZE		
	SMALL	MEDIUM	LARGE
PROPORTION ACTIVE IN POLITICS	(16) 50 %	(20) 77 %	(55) 66 %
TOTAL CASES	32	26	83

B) ITU (PAGE 218)

	3-10	11-20	21-30	31-100	101-200	201-400	400 +
PROPORTION ACTIVE IN POLITICS	(15) 23 %	(12) 24 %	(12) 24 %	(33) 40 %	(18) 50 %	(35) 47 %	(28) 39 %
TOTAL CASES	66	49	50	83	36	75	71

TABLE 48. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIZE OF SHOP AND INTEREST IN UNION POLITICS.

A) UOGC

	SHOP SIZE		
	SMALL	MEDIUM	LARGE
PROPORTION "EXTREMELY" INTERESTED	(2) 6 %	(8) 31 %	(9) 11 %
TOTAL CASES	32	26	83

B) ITU (PAGE 219)

	SHOP SIZE						
	3-10	11-20	21-30	31-100	101-200	201-400	400 +
PROPORTION "EXTREMELY" INTERESTED	(14) 21 %	(12) 24 %	(17) 34 %	(38) 46 %	(17) 46 %	(22) 30 %	(21) 30 %
	66	49	50	83	36	75	71

IN OUR CASE, DATA DO NOT ALLOW US TO OBTAIN SO REFINED A BREACKDOWN WITHIN THE SHOP SIZE VARIABLE AS IN UNION DEMOCRACY. HOWEVER, IF WE DISTINGUISH THE CATEGORIES SMALL, MEDIUM, AND LARGE, WE CAN SEE THAT OUR DATA TEND TO SUGGEST A SIMILAR PATTERN. THAT IS, PRINTERS IN MIDDLESIZE SHOPS APPEAR AS THE MOST INVOLVED AND INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS.

THE EXPLANATION OFFERED IN UNION DEMOCRACY IS BASED ON THE AUTHORS' PREVIOUS ANALYSES:

(1) IT WAS SHOWN THAT INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS OFF THE JOB AMONG PRINTERS DID NOT INDUCE POLITICAL INTEREST AMONG THOSE LEAST SENSITIVE TO UNION POLITICS. THIS WAS A RESULT OF THE SELECTIVITY OF UNINTERESTED PRINTERS TO ASSOCIATE WITH MEN AS POLITICALLY INSENSITIVE AS THEMSELVES.

(2) ON THE OTHER HAND, IDEOLOGICALLY INSENSITIVE PRINTERS WHO BELONGED TO UNION CLUBS TENDED TO BE MORE INVOLVED IN UNION POLITICS THAN NONMEMBERS. THIS WAS A RESULT OF INVOLUNTARY EXPOSITION TO POLITICAL STIMULATION.

(3) IN THE CASE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS ON THE JOB, THE AUTHORS NOTED THAT IN THE SMALL SHOPS THEY WERE HIGHLY INVOLUNTARY AND DID NOT FUNCTION AS A POLITICAL ARENA.

(4) IN CONTRAST, THE LARGE SHOPS ALLOWED SELF-EVALUATION, AND INDUCED CLOSE RELATIONS AMONG SHOPMATES WITH

SIMILAR INTERESTS WHICH, IN TURN, FURTHERED PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS.

(5) ON THE BASIS OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, LIPSET ET.AL. CONCLUDE: "JUXTAPOSING THESE TWO ANALYSES, IT MAY BE SUGGESTED THAT SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG PRINTERS ARE MOST LIKELY TO STIMULATE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AMONG MEN WHO ARE INITIALLY UNINTERESTED IN POLITICS WHERE THERE IS ENOUGH SELECTION POSSIBLE IN THE CHOICE OF ASSOCIATES SO THAT THE RELATIONSHIPS ARE LIKELY TO RIPEN INTO CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS, AND YET LITTLE ENOUGH SELECTIVITY IN THE RELATIONSHIPS TO ENSURE THAT MEN WHO ARE LITTLE INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS ARE EXPOSED IN PERSONAL WAYS TO MEN WHO ARE HIGHLY INVOLVED IN UNION POLITICS. THESE CONDITIONS APPEAR TO BE BEST FULFILLED IN THE MEDIUMSIZED SHOPS" [269].

IN THE CASE OF THE UOGC, WE NOTED THAT:

(1) INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS OFF THE JOB DID NOT INDUCE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AMONG THOSE LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY.

(2) FORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS HAD ONLY A SMALL EFFECT ON THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF THOSE IDEOLOGICALLY INSENSITIVE PRINTERS. WE SUGGESTED THAT THE ABSENCE OF OPPOSITION AND POLITICAL CONSTESTS IN THE UOGC, THE ROUTINE CHARACTER OF UNION ELECTIONS, HAD NOT PROMOTED

POLITICAL INTEREST AS TO MOBILIZE UNINTERESTED PRINTERS.

(3) THE PATTERN OF SOCIAL RELATIONS ON THE JOB WAS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE ITU: THE SMALL SHOPS DID NOT FUNCTION AS POLITICAL ARENAS, WHILE THE LARGEST ONES PROVIDED A WIDER POOL FOR SELECTION OF FRIENDS WITH SIMILAR INTERESTS, AND, THEREFORE, FAVORED INVOLVEMENT IN UNION POLITICS.

(4) GIVEN THAT CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS DO NOT HAVE EXCLUSIVE CLUBS WHICH COULD PLAY A SIMILAR POLITICAL ROLE AS IN THE ITU, THAT IS, TO MOBILIZE THE LEAST INTERESTED MEN, AN ALTERNATIVE ENVIRONMENT SEEMS TO BE REPRESENTED BY THE MIDDLE-SIZED SHOPS. IN THEM, ENOUGH SELECTION IS POSSIBLE AS TO INDUCE CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS, BUT TO A EXTENT THAT ALLOW EXPOSITION TO MEN HIGHLY INVOLVED IN UNION POLITICS. IN THIS SENSE, UNION DEMOCRACY'S HYPOTHESIS SEEMS TO BE ALSO A PLAUSIBLE ONE IN THE UOGC.

SECTION IV - UNION POLITICS IN OPERATION: LEADERSHIP AND THE PROBLEM OF OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION.- IN CHAPTER 9, ANOTHER IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM SUGGESTED IN UNION DEMOCRACY IS DISCUSSED: THE PRESENCE OF INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER AND STATUS FOR THE ARISING OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION. A MAIN FACTOR IN THE ITU IS THE PRESENCE OF A WIDE POOL OF POTENTIAL UNION ACTIVISTS, AS A RESULT OF THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE OCCUPATION AND, BASICALLY, OF THE PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF AUTONOMOUS FIRST- AND SECOND-LINE UNION POSTS. STRUCTURALLY, THE SAME CONDITIONS WHICH WORK TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE POOL OF UNION ACTIVISTS IN THE ITU SEEMED TO BE PRESENT IN THE UOGC. HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT THE UNION ORGANIZATION HAS NOT PROVIDED AVENUES FOR MOBILITY AND IT HAS NOT DEVELOPED A LARGE NUMBER OF AUTONOMOUS UNION POSTS SUGGESTED THAT SUCH A POOL WOULD TEND TO BE SMALLER IN THE UOGC.

IT IS ALSO OBSERVED THAT OPPOSITION GROUPS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SUPPORT MUST NOT ENDANGER THE PRINTER'S MATERIAL SECURITY NOR HIS SECURITY OF STATUS. IN BOTH UNIONS, CHARACTERIZED AS "COMMUNITY OF EQUALS", A POTENTIAL OPPOSITION IS NOT THREATENED IN ANY OF THOSE WAYS. HOWEVER,

WHILE IN THE ITU -CONTRARY TO MICHELS' PREDICTIONS- POWER, STATUS, AND INCOME ARE NOT BASICALLY DETERMINED BY POSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY, IN THE UOGC THIS IS TRUE ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE LATTER TWO FACTORS. THAT IS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY IS ALMOST THE SOLE DETERMINANT OF POWER IN THIS UNION.

9. LEADERSHIP IN THE UOGC AND THE ITU

I: REQUIREMENTS OF THE SYSTEM

LIPSET ET AL NOTE THAT THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION PRODUCED BY THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY IS ONLY ONE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM. THEY SUGGEST THAT SUCH A SYSTEM ALSO REQUIRES LEADERS WITH INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER AND INDEPENDENT BASES OF STATUS [270]. THAT IS, "DEMOCRATIC POLITICS REQUIRES THAT THE OPPOSITION BE STRONG ENOUGH TO SUCCESSFULLY RESIST BEING CRUSHED BY ANY ARBITRARY ACTION OF THOSE IN POWER; IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES A SOCIAL ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH OPPOSITION IS CONSIDERED LEGITIMATE AND NOT PROPERLY THE TARGET FOR REPRESSIVE ADMINISTRATION ACTION" [271].

IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM, LIPSET ET AL SINGLED OUT TWO INTERRELATED QUESTIONS:

"1. WHAT FACTORS TEND TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE POOL OF POTENTIAL UNION ACTIVISTS?" (272)

"2. UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WILL SOME OF THESE POTENTIAL ACTIVISTS BE ENABLED TO TAKE PART IN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION GROUPS OR PARTIES WITHIN A UNION?" (273).

9.1 FACTORS AFFECTING THE NUMBER OF POTENTIAL UNION ACTIVISTS

AFTER POINTING OUT THE FACT THAT THE ITU IS A TYPE OF UNION ORGANIZATION WHERE MANY LEADERS ARE NEEDED AND MANY ASPIRANTS ARE FOUND, THE AUTHORS ASK WHY THERE SHOULD BE MORE POTENTIAL ACTIVISTS IN THE ITU THAN IN OTHER UNIONS. LIPSET ET AL SUGGEST THIS COULD BE THE RESULT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

(1) THE CRAFT CHARACTER OF PRINTING, WHOSE HIGH REWARDS AND SOCIAL STATUS INDUCE MEMBERS TO CONCIDER THE OCCUPATION A SATISFYING SPHERE OF ACTIVITY.

(2) ALSO, MOST PRINTERS SEE THEIR OCCUPATION AND RELATED INSTITUTIONS AS REWARDING OUTSIDE WORKING HOURS.

(3) THE HIGH JOB SATISFACTION AMONG PRINTERS TENDS TO KEEP THEM WITHIN THE OCCUPATION AND LIMITS "THE MOBILITY OF AMBITIOUS AND TALENTED MEN OUT OF THE OCCUPATION" [274].

(4) THE GREAT REWARDS IN INCOME AND SECURITY OF PRINTING TURN AWAY ASPIRATIONS FROM THE UNCERTAINTY OF OTHER OCCUPATIONS. "AND IT

IS PRECISELY THE MOST AMBITIOUS MEN, THE MEN WHO ARE THE MOST LIKELY TO ASPIRE TO LEADERSHIP STATUS IN THE UNION, WHO ARE THUS SAVED FOR THE UNION. IN OTHER MANUAL OCCUPATIONS THE POTENTIAL LEADERSHIP IS OFTEN LOST BEFORE IT EVER ENTERS UNION AFFAIRS BECAUSE OF THE GREATER REWARDS OFFERED BY OTHER OCCUPATIONS" [275].

(5) THE RELATIVELY LIMITED CHANCES FOR MOBILITY WITHIN THE OCCUPATION AND THE HIGHER POSSIBILITIES FOR MOBILITY WITHIN THE UNION ARE ALSO IMPORTANT FACTORS WHICH WORK TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE POOL OF POTENTIAL UNION ACTIVISTS.

(6) A POSITIVE ORIENTATION TO UNION POLITICS IS SOMETIMES THE RESULT OF "HAVING BEEN 'BORN INTO' THE UNION. A SIGNIFICANT MINORITY OF THE UNION'S MEMBERS, 17%, ARE THE SON OF PRINTERS, WHILE 30% HAVE RELATIVES OTHER THAN A FATHER IN THE OCCUPATION. MANY OF THE LEADERS OF THE ITU ARE RECRUITED FROM THE RANKS OF PRINTER FAMILIES" [276].

(7) ANOTHER FACTOR SINGLED OUT BY THE AUTHORS IS THE PRESENCE OF A LEFT POLITICAL IDEOLOGY -ALTHOUGH VERY LIMITED IN THE ITU- WHICH BY ITSELF INDUCES UNION PARTICIPATION.

(8) THE ABOVE FACTORS -SUGGEST THE AUTHORS- COULD LEAD TO PARTICIPATION IN UNION POLITICS

INDEPENDENTLY OF THE UNION'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE. HOWEVER, THEY NOTE THAT THERE IS ONE IMPORTANT MECHANISM WHICH INCREASES THE POOL OF POTENTIAL ACTIVISTS AND IS FUNDAMENTALLY A PRODUCT OF THE UNION'S DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE: "THE LARGE NUMBER OF FIRST- AND SECOND-LINE UNION POSTS IN CHAPELS AND LOCAL UNION COMMITTES, WHICH BREED UNION ACTIVISTS BY DRAWING MEN INTO THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE UNION" [277].

THE AUTHORS POINT OUT THAT WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THE AUTONOMY OF THE POSITIONS, AND NOT THEIR MERE NUMBERS.

IN THE CASE OF THE UOGC, IT CAN BE OBSERVED THAT:

(1) THE CRAFT CHARACTER OF THE TRADE AND ITS REWARDING ASPECTS SEEMED TO BE AS STRONGER AS IN THE ITU.

(2) FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS, CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS ALSO FOUND THE OCCUPATION REWARDING OUTSIDE WORKING HOURS.

(3) IT COULD BE SUGGESTED THAT HIGH JOB SATISFACTION SHOULD MAINTAIN UOGC'S MEMBERS WITHIN THE OCCUPATION, IN THE SAME WAY AS IN THE ITU. HOWEVER,

(4) IT HAS TO BE POINTED OUT THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE GREAT INCOME REWARDS OF NEW YORK'S PRINTERS, EVENTHOUGH THEY MAY HAVE HIGHER SECURITY ON THE JOB. ON THE OTHER HAND, UOGC'S MEMBERS ARE NOT

CONFRONTED WITH MANY OCCUPATIONS OFFERING BETTER REWARDS; THE FEW OCCUPATIONS WHICH COULD PLAY SUCH A ROLE (AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY) ARE MORE INSECURE THAN PRINTING, WHERE MEN HAVE THE DEFENSE OF THEIR CRAFTMANSHIP, WHICH REQUIRES A RELATIVELY LONG PERIOD OF TIME TO BE ACHIEVED.

(5) AS PREVIOUS ANALYSES HAVE SHOWN, THE UNION ORGANIZATION OF CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS DOES NOT OFFER HIGHER POSSIBILITIES FOR MOBILITY THAN THE OCCUPATION ITSELF.

(6) THE EFFECT OF FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIPS ON BECOMING UNION OFFICIAL SHOULD BE LOWER IN THE UOGC: ONLY 4% OF UOGC'S MEMBERS ARE THE SON OF PRINTERS, WHILE 25% HAVE RELATIVES OTHER THAN A FATHER IN THE OCCUPATION. THE LEADERSHIP IN THE UOGC IS OLD -SOME OF THEM ARE THE FOUNDERS OF THE UNION- AND THE NEW LEADERS ARE NOT RECRUITED FROM PRINTER FAMILIES.

(7) GIVEN THE TRADITION OF ARGENTINIAN PRINTERS, THE PRESENCE OF A LEFT POLITICAL IDEOLOGY SEEMS TO BE STRONGER IN THE UOGC THAN IN THE ITU, AND THIS COULD BE AN INDEPENDENT FACTOR INDUCING UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS.

(8) THE MAIN FACTOR WHICH LIPSET ET AL CONSIDER TO BE A SPECIFIC PRODUCT OF THE DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE OF

THE ITU, THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF AUTONOMOUS UNION POSTS, IS RELATIVELY ABSENT IN THE UOGC. WE HAVE SEEN THAT EVEN AVAILABLE POSITIONS SUCH AS SHOP REPRESENTATIVE ARE NOT FILLED IN MANY CASES.

AS A RESULT OF THE PRECEDING DISCUSSION, WE CAN SEE THAT EVEN WHEN THEORETICALLY MOST OF THE FACTORS WHICH WORK TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE POOL OF UNION ACTIVISTS IN THE ITU ARE ALSO PRESENT IN THE UOGC, TWO BASIC DIFFERENCES SUGGEST THAT SUCH A POOL WOULD TEND TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY SMALLER IN THE LATTER CASE:

(1) THE UNION ORGANIZATION OF CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS HAS NOT PROVIDED ATTRACTIVE AVENUES FOR MOBILITY, AND

(2) THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNION HAS NOT DEVELOPED A LARGE NUMBER OF AUTONOMOUS UNION POSTS WHICH COULD PROVIDE A SETTING FOR THE TRAINING OF POTENTIAL LEADERS OTHER THAN THE UNION ADMINISTRATION ITSELF.

9.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE RECRUITMENT OF ACTIVISTS TO OPPOSITION GROUPS

LIPSET ET AL POINT OUT THAT ALL THE FACTORS MENTIONED ABOVE LED PRINTERS TO SEE THE UNION AS A REWARDING AREA OF ACTIVITY, WITH THE IMPLICATIONS THAT THE POOL OF

POTENTIAL ACTIVISTS COULD BE WIDENED IN THIS WAY. HOWEVER, THE AUTHORS OBSERVE THAT THE QUESTION REMAINS: "BUT HOW DO POTENTIAL LEADERS BECOME ACTUAL LEADERS? WHAT LEADS SOME OF THEM TO ALLY THEMSELVES WITH A GROUP WHICH IS OPENLY IN OPPOSITION TO THE INCUMBENT UNION ADMINISTRATION?" [278]. THE AUTHORS ADD THAT A SUCCESSFULL AND PERMANENT OPPOSITION GROUP, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SUPPORT COMPARABLE TO THAT OF THE INCUMBENTS, NEEDS THAT "SUCH SUPPORT BY A UNION MEMBER SHOULD NOT ENDANGER (1) THE MAN'S MATERIAL SECURITY NOR (2) HIS SECURITY OF STATUS". [279].

9.2.1 MATERIAL SECURITY

THE AUTHORS CONSIDER THAT CONTINUITY OF OPPOSITION CAN BE FUNDAMENTALLY MAINTAINED ON THE BASIS OF THE ECONOMIC SECURITY OF THE OPPOSITIONISTS. THEY ARGUE THAT ALTHOUGH CLASSIC ECONOMIC THEORY AND MARXIST THEORY AGREE THAT THE OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY IS A BASE FOR POLITICAL SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE, "NEITHER OF THESE TRADITIONS GAVE MUCH THOUGHT TO THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE PROPERTY-LESS EMPLOYEE WITHIN HIS OWN CLASS ORGANIZATIONS" [280]. THAT IS, THE AUTHORS ASK THAT WILL ENSURE THE MATERIAL SECURITY OF THOSE WHO WORK FOR THEIR POLITICAL PREFERENCE WITHIN THE UNION, AND WHO WILL PROTECT THEM FROM THE LEADERSHIP IF THEY OPPOSE IT.

IN THE ITU, IT IS THE UNIVERSALITY OF RULES GOVERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF JOBS AND THE FACT THAT JOBS ARE "USUALLY OBTAINED DIRECTLY FROM THE SHOP" [281] THAT "INSULATES THE JOB MARKET FROM ADMINISTRATIVE MANIPULATION" [282].

IN THE UOGC'S CASE, WE NOTED THAT THE WORKER HAS STABILITY IN HIS JOB, AND THAT THE UNION ADMINISTRATION HAS NO CONTROL ABOUT THE HOLDING OF JOBS BY CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS. THAT IS, THE UOGC'S LEADERSHIP HAS NO MECHANISM AVAILABLE TO THREATEN AND DISCOURAGE THOSE WHO COULD EVENTUALLY ORGANIZE A PERMANENT OPPOSITION.

9.2.2 SECURITY OF STATUS

THE AUTHORS OF UNION DEMOCRACY CONSIDER THAT EQUALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE CONTINUITY OF OPPOSITION IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SECURITY THAT ACTIVE WORK AGAINST THE INCUMBENT ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT IMPLY "A MARKED LOSS OF PRESTIGE AND STANDING IN THE UNION" [283].

TWO MAIN FACTORS ARE SINGLED OUT BY LIPSET ET AL AS POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF STATUS SECURITY IN THE SUPPORT OF AN OPPOSITION PARTY:

(1) "THAT THERE NOT BE TOO GREAT A GAP IN STATUS BETWEEN UNION OFFICERS AND THE RANK AND FILE" [284]; AND

(2) "THAT THERE BE INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF STATUS FOR UNION LEADERS OUTSIDE THE UNION ADMINISTRATION" [285].

AS THE AUTHORS OBSERVE, MOST UNIONS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY SHARP DIFFERENCES IN STATUS BETWEEN REGULAR WORKERS AND UNION OFFICERS. THIS STATUS DIFFERENTIAL -ADD THE AUTHORS- "SERVES TO JUSTIFY THE LEADER'S MONOPOLIZATION OF POWER IN THE UNION WHICH HIS POSITION IN THE UNION HIERARCHY ONLY MAKES POSSIBLE" [286]. ON THE OTHER HAND, BECOMING A UNION OFFICIAL REPRESENTS UPWARD MOBILITY, WHILE DEMOCRACY IMPLIES INSECURITY OF TENURE. HENCE, CONCLUDE THE AUTHORS, MOST UNION OFFICIALS WILL TRY TO CONTROL THE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. IF LEADERS ARE DEFEATED, IT IS DIFFICULT THAT THEY WILL RETURN TO THE RANK AND FILE'S STYLE OF LIFE. AS A RESULT, DEFEATED OFFICE HOLDERS WILL NOT INCREASE THE POOL OF TRAINED POTENTIAL LEADERS, BUT THEY WILL MOVE OUT OF THE OCCUPATION.

IN SPITE OF ALL THESE GENERAL TENDENCIES, LIPSET ET AL HAVE NOTED THAT THE ITU SHOWS A DIFFERENT PATTERN:

(1) IT CAN BE CONSIDERED A "COMMUNITY OF EQUALS", WITHOUT IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN INCOME AND STATUS BETWEEN WORKERS AND UNION LEADERS.

(2) TOGETHER WITH THE HIGH WAGES OF REGULAR PRINTERS, THERE EXISTS THE FACT THAT THE PROCEDURES TO RAISE UNION OFFICIAL SALARIES REQUIRE A REFERENDUM OF THE WHOLE MEMBERSHIP.

(3) GIVEN THAT PRINTING IS A TRADITIONALLY SKILLED HIGH STATUS TRADE AMONG THE MANUAL OCCUPATIONS, IT INDUCES WORKING PRINTERS TO CONSIDER THEIR UNION OFFICIALS AS STATUS EQUALS.

(4) ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WORK OF UNION OFFICIAL IS NOT GENERALLY ATTRACTIVE TO THE SKILLED PRINTER "WITH PRIDE IN HIS CRAFT"[287].

(5) AS A RESULT, RETURN TO THE RANKS DOES NOT IMPLY LOSS OF STATUS OR REWARDS, NEITHER IT IMPLIES FEELINGS OF REPUDIATION, BECAUSE TURNOVER IN OFFICE IS A COMMON FEATURE IN THE ITU.

(6) UNIONS WITH WIDE STATUS GAP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND RANK AND FILE TEND TO CONVERT THE UNION ADMINISTRATION INTO A POLITICAL MACHINE. ON THE CONTRARY, "A UNION (LIKE THE ITU) WHICH DRAWS ITS MEMBERS FROM AN OCCUPATION WHOSE STATUS IS EQUAL TO OR HIGHER THAN THAT OF UNION LEADER SHOWS LESS TENDENCY TO DEVELOP A STRONG AND COHESIVE ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICAL MACHINE"[288]. THEREFORE, "POLITICS IN THE ITU BECOME FAR LESS A MATTER OF MACHINE DISCIPLINE AND FAR MORE THE FREE INTERPLAY OF IDEAS, ISSUES, AND PERSONALITIES"[289].

(7) FINALLY, THE AUTHORS OBSERVED THAT THE PRESENCE OF INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF STATUS -OUTSIDE THE UNION HIERARCHY- FOR POTENTIAL UNION LEADERS IS A BASIC

REQUIREMENT FOR THE PERMANENCY OF OPPOSITION. THEY NOTED THAT THIS PROBLEM IS INTIMATELY RELATED WITH MICHELS' ANALYSIS OF OLIGARCHY: "MICHELS' ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATION IS IN PART A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION WITHIN LARGE DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH DRAW THEIR MEMBERS FROM THE WORKING CLASS. IF WE LOOK AT THE BASES OF THIS STRATIFICATION SYSTEM WE SEE THAT MICHELS ASSIGNS GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE FACTOR OF 'POSITION WITHIN THE FORMAL ORGANIZATION HIERARCHY' AND TREATS OTHER VARIABLES OF STRATIFICATION, SUCH AS POWER, ACCORDED STATUS, AND INCOME, AS LARGELY DEPENDENT UPON AND DERIVED FROM THIS POSITION WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY" [290]. THE AUTHORS SUGGEST THAT IN THE ITU, WHERE THE IRON LAW IS NOT WORKING, POWER, STATUS, AND INCOME ARE NOT BASICALLY DETERMINED BY POSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY. THE SOURCE OF PRESTIGE IS SHARED BY THE UNION ADMINISTRATION, THE CHAPEL, AND THE PRINTERS' SOCIAL ORGANIZATION. "OR PUT IN TERMS OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION, THESE INDEPENDENT STRUCTURES CREATE ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF STATUS FOR PRINTERS OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE BUREAUCRACY, THUS NULLIFYING ONE OF THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING MICHELS' IRON LAW" [291].

WITH RESPECT TO THE UOGC, THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS ARE SUGGESTED BY OUR PREVIOUS ANALYSES:

(1) LIKE THE ITU, THE UOGC COULD BE ALSO CONSIDERED A "COMMUNITY OF EQUALS".

(2) IT WAS EQUALLY POINTED OUT THAT UNION OFFICIALS ARE NOT REMUNERATED FOR THEIR SERVICES. HENCE NO CONTROL BY THE RANK AND FILE IS NECESSARY IN THIS SENSE.

(3) THE TRADITIONAL CRAFTMANSHIP OF PRINTERS WAS ALSO OBSERVED IN THE UOGC. GIVEN THAT UOGC'S LEADERS HAVE NOT MOVED UP IN THE STATUS HIERARCHY, THE RANK AND FILE MAY -EVEN MORE THAN IN THE ITU- CONSIDER THEMSELVES AS STATUS EQUALS WITH THE UNION OFFICIALS.

(4) THE MONOTONOUS WORK IN THE UNION ADMINISTRATION MAY ALSO BE NOT ATTRACTIVE TO THE MAJORITY OF CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS, EVENMORE IF SUCH WORK IS NOT REMUNERATED.

(5) IF WE REMEMBER THAT UNION OFFICIALS IN THE UOGC CONTINUE WORKING AT THE TRADE IN ORDER TO MAKE A LIVING, RETURN TO THE RANKS SHOULD NOT IMPLY LOSS OF STATUS OR REWARDS.

(6) GIVEN THAT IN THE UOGC THERE SHOULD NOT BE DIFFERENCES IN STATUS BETWEEN UNION OFFICERS AND THE RANK AND FILE, POLITICS COULD BE ALSO CHARACTERIZED, AS IN THE ITU, BY THE FREE INTERPLAY OF IDEAS, ISSUES, AND PERSONALITIES. THAT IS, IF

THERE ARE NO INTEREST DIFFERENCES EVENTUAL CLEAVAGES COULD BE EXPRESSED IN IDEOLOGICAL TERMS.

(7) AS WE HAVE NOTED, THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY IN THE UOGC IS NOT A SOURCE OF STATUS OR INCOME. HOWEVER, IT IS THE BASIC DETERMINANT OF POWER IN THE UNION. SHOP MEETINGS AND COMMITTES DO NOT PERFORM THE SAME ROLE AS IN THE ITU, WHILE THE HIGH DEGREE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS AMONG CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS EXPRESSED ITSELF ONLY IN AN INFORMAL WAY, WITHOUT PROVIDING FORMAL AVENUES WHICH COULD ACT AS SOURCES OF POWER OTHER THAN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY.

EVEN WHEN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY IS A BASIC SOURCE OF POWER IN THE UOGC, THE STATUS SECURITY OF A POTENTIAL OPPOSITION IS DIFFICULT TO BE THREATENED: THERE IS NO STATUS GAP BETWEEN OFFICERS AND RANK AND FILE, OFFICERS DO NOT RECEIVE REMUNERATIONS FOR THEIR SERVICES AND THEY CONTINUE WORKING AT THE TRADE, THOSE WHO COULD BE EVENTUALLY DEFEATED WOULD NOT CHANGE THEIR STYLE OF LIFE. DEMOCRACY, THAT IS, INSECURITY OF TENURE, SHOULD NOT BE A MOTIVATING FORCE TO INDUCE INCUMBENT OFFICIALS TO ALTER THE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

10. LEADERSHIP IN THE UOGC AND THE ITU

II: THE SYSTEM AT WORK

INTRODUCTION.- THE ANALYSIS IN THIS CHAPTER IS CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE CHANNELS OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT IN BOTH UNIONS. IT IS OBSERVED THAT IN THE ITU -AS COMPARED WITH THE UOGC- THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNION AND OCCUPATION PROVIDE A LARGER NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF RANK-AND-FILE SUPPORT.

IN THE UOGC, THESE SOURCES ARE MORE LIMITED AND THE MAIN MECHANISM FOR LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT IS A PROCESS OF COOPTATION FROM THE TOP. THIS IMPLIED A PROCESS OF SHARING OF DECISION-MAKING WHILE ACTUAL POWER REMAINED A EXCLUSIVE RESOURCE OF THE GOVERNING GROUP.

10.1 CHANNELS OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT

IN UNION DEMOCRACY IT IS OBSERVED THAT "THE SPECIFIC CHANNELS OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT ARE NOT THEMSELVES DETERMINANTS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM; THEY ARE AMONG ITS CONSEQUENCES, BUT ARE IN THAT IMPORTANT CLASS OF CONSEQUENCES WHICH ALSO HELP TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM" [292].

IN THE ITU, THE SEQUENCE GENERALLY FOLLOWED BY MOST ACTIVE LEADERS IN THEIR CAREER IN THE UNION CAN BE ROUGHLY DESCRIBED THROUGH THIS PATTERN [293]:

(1) EARLY AND REGULAR ATTENDANCE AT LOCAL UNION MEETINGS.

(2) INTEREST AND ACTIVITY IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE CHAPEL.

(3) ELECTION TO CHAPEL OFFICE.

(4) APPOINTMENT TO MINOR LOCAL UNION COMMITTEES OR POSTS.

(5) MEMBERSHIP AND ACTIVITY IN A UNION POLITICAL GROUP OR PARTY.

(6) MEMBERSHIP AND ACTIVITY IN A "NONPOLITICAL" PRINTERS' CLUB OR ORGANIZATION.

(7) APPOINTMENT TO PAID FULL-TIME LOCAL OFFICE.

(8) ELECTION TO THE LOCAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

AN IMPORTANT FACT OF INTERNAL POLITICS IN THE ITU IS THAT OPPOSITION CAN BE BASED ON A PERMANENT UNION PARTY, AND NOT SIMPLY ON A TRANSITIONAL FACTION. THIS IS THE RESULT OF THE EXISTENCE OF INDEPENDENT PRINTERS' ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE ALWAYS ACTIVE AND SO CAN "GIVE AN OPPOSITION A SOURCE OF STRENGHT TO WHICH IT CAN RETURN TIME AND AGAIN FOR BOTH LEADERSHIP AND RANK-AND-FILE SUPPORT" [294].

IN A GENERAL WAY, IT CAN BE NOTED THAT IN THE ITU THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNION AND OCCUPATION ARE THE MAIN DETERMINANTS OF THE PATTERN OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT.

10.2 THE PROCESS OF COOPTATION IN THE UOGC

THE PRINCIPAL AVENUES FOR ACHIEVING LEADERSHIP STATUS IN THE UOGC ARE FAR MORE LIMITED THAN IN THE ITU. THREE BASIC CHANNELS CAN BE SINGLED OUT:

(1) EARLY PARTICIPATION IN THE FOUNDATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE UNION.

(2) REGULAR ATTENDANCE AT UNION MEETINGS.

(3) PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION, OR IN UNION COMMITTEES.

(4) INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATION IN GENERAL.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ROLE OF MEMBERSHIP IN A UNION POLITICAL PARTY WHICH IN THE ITU LED TO APPOINTMENT AS A PAID FULL-TIME OFFICIAL IS REPLACED IN THE UOGC BY A PROCESS OF COOPTATION FROM THE TOP.

PHILIP SELZNICK, IN HIS STUDY OF THE TVA, PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING DEFINITION OF COOPTATION: "COOPTATION IS THE PROCESS OF ABSORVING NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE LEADERSHIP OR POLICY-DETERMINING STRUCTURE OF AN ORGANIZATION AS A MEANS OF AVERTING THREATS TO ITS STABILITY OR EXISTENCE" [295]. SELZNICK DISTINGHISHES TWO TYPES OF COOPTATION, FORMAL AND INFORMAL. "WHEN THERE IS A NEED FOR THE ORGANIZATION TO PUBLICLY ABSORB NEW ELEMENTS, WE SHALL SPEAK OF FORMAL COOPTATION. THIS INVOLVES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OPENLY AVOWED

AND FORMALLY ORDERED RELATIONSHIPS. APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICIAL POSTS ARE MADE, CONTRACTS ARE SIGNED, NEW ORGANIZATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED -ALL SIGNIFYING PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS OF DECISION AND ADMINISTRATION" [296]. WITH RESPECT TO INFORMAL COOPTATION, IT CAN BE UNDERSTOOD AS "A RESPONSE TO THE PRESSURE OF SPECIFIC CENTERS OF POWER WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. ... THE ORGANIZATION FACED WITH ITS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, OR THE LEADERSHIP FACED WITH ITS RANKS, MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THESE OUTSIDE ELEMENTS. THEY MAY BE BROUGHT INTO THE LEADERSHIP OR POLICY-DETERMINING STRUCTURE, MAY BE GIVEN A PLACE AS A RECOGNITION OF AND CONCESSION TO THE RESOURCES THEY CAN INDEPENDENTLY COMMAND" [297]. THE AUTHOR ADDS THAT THOSE WHO ARE IN A POSITION TO ENFORCE DEMANDS ARE MORE INTERESTED IN THE SUBSTANCE OF POWER AND NOT IN ITS FORMS.

BOTH ASPECTS OF THE PROCESS OF COOPTATION CAN BE OBSERVED WITH RESPECT TO THE LISTA ROSA: THE LEADERSHIP HAS GIVEN PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS OF DECISION-MAKING WITHOUT TRANSFERRING ITS ACTUAL POWER. IN SO DOING, THE BASES OF LEGITIMACY WERE WIDENED, WHILE THE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE LEADERSHIP AND THE RANK-AND-FILE WERE FACILITATED.

LIPSET ET AL NOTED, AS WE HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, THAT THE CHANNELS OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT ARE AN IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE BUT NOT DETERMINANTS OF THE PARTY

SYSTEM IN THE ITU. IN THE UOGC, THE PROCESS OF RECRUITMENT TO POSITIONS IN THE UNION HIERARCHY, THE SYSTEM OF LEADERSHIP, SEEMS TO PLAY A MORE INDEPENDENT FUNCTION IN SHAPING THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNION.

IT IS FINALLY SUGGESTED IN UNION DEMOCRACY THAT TOGETHER WITH THE STRUCTURAL BASIS, AN OPPOSITION ALSO "NEEDS TO BE GRANTED THE MORAL RIGHT TO EXIST AND TO FUNCTION" [298]. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF LEGITIMATION IS ALSO REQUIRED IN THE UOGC, GIVEN THAT WHILE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENTIATION HAS BEEN A CHARACTERISTIC OF CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS, IT DID NOT FURTHER THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERMANENT FACTIONAL DIVISIONS OR PARTY ORGANIZATIONS BUT, INSTEAD, IT INDUCED A PROCESS OF COOPTATION AND SHARING OF DECISIONMAKING.

11. THE NORMATIVE CLIMATE OF UNION POLITICS: LEGITIMACY OF THE POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS IN THE UOGC AND THE ITU

INTRODUCTION.- THE BASES OF LEGITIMACY OF THE PREVAILING POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN BOTH UNIONS ARE DISCUSSED AT THIS POINT. THE AUTHORS OF UNION DEMOCRACY SUGGEST THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE EXISTENCE OF INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN A UNION. THESE SOURCES OF POWER MUST BE ENDURING AND NOT LIMITED TO CRISIS SITUATIONS. SUPPORT IN CRISIS SITUATIONS MAY LEAD TO FACTION FORMATION, BUT POLITICAL PARTIES -LIKE THOSE OF THE ITU- REQUIRE PERMANENT BASES OF POWER. ALSO, THE PARTIES -AS THE AUTHORS POINTED OUT- NEED TO BE DEFINED AS LEGITIMATE.

IT IS OBSERVED THAT THE NORMS OF LEGITIMACY, STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY ITU'S MEMBERS AND LEADERS, ARE DEPENDENT ON THE POWER SOURCES ON WHICH THEY REST, THAT IS, THEY DO NOT DETERMINE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. THE ATTEMPTS TO VIOLATE THE RULES OF THE GAME BY REPRESSING AN EVENTUAL OPPOSITION WOULD IMPLY THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BASES ON WHICH THE OPPOSITION RESTS -THE ITU'S SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS-, AND THIS TASK APPEARED AS A VERY DIFFICULT ONE.

WHILE UOGC'S MEMBERS PERCEIVED AT AN ABSTRACT LEVEL THAT THE EXISTENCE OF PERMANENT, ORGANIZED OPPOSITION WOULD BE HEALTHY FOR THE UNION, AT A MORE EMPIRICAL LEVEL THEY CONSIDERED THE PRESENT POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AS BEING VERY EFFECTIVE.

A MAIN ASPECT OF THE UOGC'S LEADERSHIP SYSTEM WAS OBSERVED TO BE THE PRESENCE OF SEVERAL INTERNAL CURRENTS, ASSOCIATED WITH GENERAL IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS OR POLITICAL POSITIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES OR GROUPS IN THE LARGER SOCIETY. PERSONAL OBSERVATION AND CONVERSATION WITH UNION OFFICERS SUGGESTED THE HYPOTHESIS THAT COOPTATION OF MEMBERS TO UNION POSTS PROMOTED BY AN INTERNAL CURRENT SEEMED TO BE RELATED WITH COOPTATION WITHIN THE POLITICAL GROUP OR PARTY OUTSIDE THE ORGANIZATION.

IT WAS FINALLY NOTED THAT THE HISTORICAL TRADITION OF THE UOGC'S GOVERNING GROUP -THE LISTA ROSA- AND THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LARGER SOCIETY IMPLIED A PROCESS OF POLITICAL COMPROMISES AND POLITICAL CONVERGENCE WHICH DISCOURAGED THE FORMATION OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION AND GRANTED LEGITIMACY TO THE PREVAILING SYSTEM IN THE UNION.

11.1 Legitimacy of Opposition: Factions and Parties

Lipset et al point out that organized internal opposition, in order to function as a union political party, must be accorded legitimacy by the incumbent administration and by the majority of the membership. If such is not the case, the opposition group will be a faction but not a party. The characteristics of both organizations, suggest the authors, are quite different.

In order to analyze the problem of the legitimacy of opposition in the ITU, Lipset et al consider it important to study how the absence of a legitimate internal opposition is explained and justified in other unions.

11.2 The Cult of Unity

The authors note that ordinarily union members do not see as desirable the permanent opposition of groups criticizing the administration. This combative point of view, suggest Lipset et al, is related with the historical position of the labor movement with respect to external enemies. Many unions even explicitly prohibit the existence of factions or other opposition groups. "The objective insecurity of workers' organizations and their

VULNERABILITY TO THEIR ENEMIES HAVE MADE WORKER SOLIDARITY ALMOST THE FIRST LAW OF SURVIVAL FOR THEIR VARIOUS DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS"[299]. THE AUTHORS THINK THAT THIS POSITION IS SUPPORTED IN THE MARXIAN ANALYSIS WHICH WOULD POINT OUT THAT POLITICAL DIFFERENTIATION COULD ONLY EXIST ON THE BASIS OF DIFFERENCES IN MATERIAL INTERESTS. WHILE DIFFERENCES IN INTERESTS -THIS ANALYSIS WOULD SUGGEST, ACCORDING TO LIPSET ET AL- EXIST ONLY BETWEEN ECONOMIC CLASSES, UNION MEMBERS ARE SUPPOSED TO HAVE THE SAME CLASS INTERESTS, AND, AS A RESULT, THERE COULD NOT BE STRUCTURAL BASIS FOR ORGANIZED OPPOSITION WITHIN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS.

IN GENERAL, THE RATIONALE OF "COMMON CLASS INTERESTS" IS FREQUENTLY USED BY UNION LEADERS TO CHARACTERIZE AS "DIVISIVE FACTIONS" THOSE GROUPS WHO CHALLENGE THE INCUMBENT ADMINISTRATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, LIPSET ET AL OBSERVE THAT "MOST MEMBERS ARE PASSIVE EXPECTATORS OF FACTIONAL FIGHTS IN THEIR UNIONS, AND THEY ARE GENERALLY LESS INTERESTED IN WHO WINS THEM THEN THAT THEY BE OVER, IN THE BELIEF THAT ANY STABLE ADMINISTRATION, EVEN A BAD ONE, IS PREFERABLE TO THE WEAKNESS AND DISUNITY THAT RESULTS FROM A PROLONGED FACTIONAL FIGHT"[300].

11.3 FROM FACTION TO PARTY

IN ACCORDANCE WITH LIPSET ET AL, UNION DEMOCRACY IS

NOT A RESULT OF INDIVIDUAL WISHES ON THE PART OF THE MEMBERS OR LEADERS, BUT HAS ITS ROOTS IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE. AS THE AUTHORS HAVE POINTED OUT, THE LEGITIMACY OF OPPOSITION RESTS ON INDEPENDENT AND PERMANENT BASES OF POWER. IF SUCH BASES ARE DESTROYED, THE UNION CAN BE FUNDAMENTALLY WEAKENED. "THE EXISTENCE OF INDEPENDENT AND ENDURING SOURCES OF POWER AND SUPPORT WITHIN THE UNION MEMBERSHIP -SUGGEST THE AUTHORS-, IS A NECESSARY IF NOT A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGITIMATE AND EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION IN A TRADE UNION"[301].

THE EXPLORATION OF THIS HYPOTHESIS, THEY ADD, IMPLIES THE MORE GENERAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH AN EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION DEVELOPS, AND THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH AN EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION BECOMES A LEGITIMATE ONE IN THE UNION. THE AUTHORS NOTE THAT THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS:

"(A) THAT EFFECTIVE OPPOSITIONS IN TRADE UNIONS ARE RARE."

"(B) THAT AN EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION IS MOST LIKELY TO ARISE IN A SITUATION WHERE THE ORDINARY CONCENTRATION OF POWER AND STATUS IN THE HANDS OF THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN DISRUPTED."

"(C) THAT SUCH A DISRUPTION USUALLY OCCURS IN CONNECTION WITH SOME ORGANIZATIONAL CRISIS".

"(D) THAT SUCH ORGANIZATIONAL CRISES ORDINARILY GENERATE FACTIONAL, I.E., ILLEGITIMATE,

OPPOSITION GROUPS, BUT DO NOT CREATE THE KINDS OF ENDURING INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER AMONG THE MEMBERS ON THE BASIS OF WHICH AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION CAN ACQUIRE THE LEGITIMACY OF A PARTY"[302].

BY "CRISIS" THE AUTHORS MEAN "ANY LARGE DISRUPTION OF ROUTINE IN THE LIFE OF THE UNION", SUCH AS HARDFOUGHT STRIKES OR WIDE-SPREAD UNEMPLOYMENT OF ITS MEMBERS[303]. IT IS ON THE PERIODS OF CRISIS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION POLICIES TEND TO BE QUESTIONED, AND THE RANK AND FILE TEND TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE UNION. IT IS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THAT THOSE WHO OPPOSE THE INCUMBENT LEADERSHIP MAY FIND LARGE SUPPORT IN THE RANKS. HOWEVER, SUCH SUPPORT WILL PROBABLY HAVE ONLY A TRANSITIONAL CHARACTER. AS THE AUTHORS OBSERVE, "THE KIND OF SUPPORT ONE CAN ATTRACT FROM THE RANK AND FILE IN A CRISIS SITUATION IS ALMOST A <u>TRANSIENT</u> SUPPORT, LINKED TO THE SPECIFIC CRISIS WHICH HAS ALERTED AND ACTIVATED THE MEMBERSHIP"[304]. THAT IS, IF A LEADER DOES NOT GAIN OFFICE IN ORDER TO INSTITUTIONALIZE HIS POWER AND STATUS, HIS SUPPORT IN THE RANKS WILL BE LIMITED ONLY TO THE PERIOD OF CRISIS[305].

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN <u>FACTION</u> AND <u>PARTY</u>, POINTS OUT THE AUTHORS, IS THAT THE FORMER IS IN REVOLT AND "STAKE ALL ON ONE OR TWO BIG ISSUES THAT STIR UP THE RANK AND FILE ON THE RARE OCCASIONS OF CRISIS", AND SEEKS POWER "SOLELY

ON THE SPONTANEOUS BUT TRANSCIENT SUPPORT OF AN UNDIFFERENTIATED MASS MEMBERSHIP ON THESE OCCASIONS OF CRISIS"[306]. ON THE CONTRARY, OPPOSITION ORGANIZED IN A PARTY IS NOT IN REVOLT, AND CONTINUOUSLY CHALLENGES THE INCUMBENT ADMINISTRATION, EITHER IN TIMES OF LABOR PEACE OR IN TIMES OF STRUGGLE.

FINALLY, THE AUTHORS NOTE THAT THE ITU'S PARTIES, DIFFERENT FROM FACTIONS, "ARE DEFINED AS LEGITIMATE"[307]. THE NATURE OF THIS LEGITIMACY IS WHAT THEY WILL TRY TO ANALYZE.

11.4 WHAT PARTY LEADERS THINK OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

THE AUTHORS CONSIDER THAT "THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PARTY SYSTEM IN THE ITU SHOWS ITSELF IN THE APPROVAL BY MOST ITU MEMBERS AND LEADERS OF THE CONTINUING EXISTENCE OF ORGANIZED GROUPS OF MEMBERS WHICH WORK OPENLY TO DEFEAT AND REPLACE THE INCUMBENT INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION"[308]. THEY ADD THAT THERE IS NO IMPORTANT GROUP IN THE MEMBERSHIP WHICH DEFINES ITSELF AGAINST THE PARTY SYSTEM.

INTENSIVE INTERVIEWS WITH LEADERS OF BOTH PARTIES SHOWED THAT IN SPITE OF THE STRONG OPPOSITION OF ONE GROUP AGAINST THE OTHER, THE MAJORITY OF THEM ENTHUSIASTICALLY

DEFENDED THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM. FURTHERMORE, THE AUTHORS HAVE OBSERVED THAT INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OPPOSING PARTY LEADERS, LIKE DRINKING TOGETHER, "DISCIPLINES PERSONAL SENTIMENTS TO THE NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNION'S POLITICAL SYSTEM" [309].

11.5 ARE LEGITIMACY NORMS INDEPENDENT OF THE STRUCTURAL BASE?

IN SPITE OF THEIR FUNCTION AS SUPPORT OF THE PARTY SYSTEM, THE NORMS OF LEGITIMACY OF OPPOSITION -SUGGEST THE AUTHORS- CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INDEPENDENT, DETERMINATIVE FACTOR OF THE ITU'S POLITICAL SYSTEM. "WITHOUT THE DIVERSITY OF POWER SOURCES ON WHICH IT RESTS, THE NORM OF LEGITIMACY OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION COULD NOT BY ITSELF MAINTAIN THE PARTY SYSTEM AS A LIVING POLITICAL PROCESS" [310].

THE AUTHORS CONSIDER THAT THE FACT THAT THERE ARE FEW DEVIATIONS FROM THE NORM IS ONLY IN PART EXPLAINED BY THE INFLUENCE OF THE NORM ITSELF. TO A LARGE EXTENT -ADD LIPSET ET AL- IT IS AN ADAPTATION TO THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES -LIKE LOSS OF SUPPORT- WHICH WILL RESULT FROM THE VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF THE GAME [311]. IN THIS SITUATION, MEMBERS WHO FEEL RESENTMENT MAY CHANNEL THEIR SENTIMENTS "INTO COLLECTIVE ACTION THROUGH CLUBS, CHAPELS,

AND AUTONOMOUS LOCALS WHICH ARE NOT CONTROLLED BY THE UNION ADMINISTRATION"[312].

IT IS OBSERVED BY THE AUTHORS THAT ANY INCUMBENT GROUPS IN THE UNION ATTEMPTING TO REPRESS THE OPPOSITION WILL HAVE TO DESTROY THE BASES OF THE OPPOSITION ITSELF, THAT IS, ITS INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER. HOWEVER, THE REPRESSION OF SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS LIKE SPORT TEAMS, APOLITICAL CLUBS, AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IS NOT AN EASY TASK. SO, CONCLUDE LIPSET ET AL, THESE INDEPENDENT STRUCTURES ARE MUCH LESS VULNERABLE TO LEADERSHIP CONTROL AND REPRESSION THAN THE OPPOSING PARTY UNDER ATTACK.

11.6 THE LEGITIMACY OF OPPOSITION AND UNION LAW

AT THIS POINT, THE AUTHORS NOTE WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE A PARADOX. UNION LAW NOT ONLY DOES NOT GUARANTEE THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION TO OPPOSE THE INCUMBENTS IN THE ITU, BUT IT "FLATLY AND EXPLICITLY PROHIBITS SUCH ORGANIZATION"[313]. THEY ADD THAT IT IS WITHIN A CONTEXT OF POWER THAT "A LEGAL SYSTEM HAS EFFECTIVE MEANING"[314].

LIPSET ET AL CITE INSTANCES OF ORGANIZATIONS WITH DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS AND OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENTS, WHILE THE ITU IS JUST THE REVERSE CASE. THIS CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE LEGITIMACY OF ORGANIZED

OPPOSITION IS NOT CONSIDERED BY ITU'S LEADERS AS A SIGNIFICANT ONE. AS THE AUTHORS POINT OUT, THEY CONSIDER SUCH A CLAUSE "DEAD LETTER", WHICH HAD ONLY A HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATION IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE "SECRET SOCIETIES", INTERNAL GROUPS WHO WERE THREATENING THE INTEGRITY OF THE UNION. ON THE CONTRARY, "CURRENT PARTIES ARE RECOGNIZED TO BE NOT A THREAT BUT AN ELEMENT OF STRENGTH IN THE UNION" [315].

11.7 INTERNAL CURRENTS IN THE "LISTA ROSA"

THE ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT IN THE UOGC SUGGESTS THAT: (1) THE MEMBERS PERCEIVE A HIGH DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE OCCUPATION, COMPARED WITH THEIR PERCEPTIONS

TABLE 49. WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY AMONG ARGENTINIAN WORKERS?

HIGH SOLIDARITY	(36)	25.54 %
FAIRLY HIGH SOLIDARITY	(70)	49.64 %
FAIRLY LOW SOLIDARITY	(27)	19.14 %
NO SOLIDARITY AT ALL	(6)	4.26 %
DON'T KNOW, NO ANSWER	(2)	1.42 %
	N (141)	100 %

OF THE SITUATION AMONG ALL ARGENTINIAN WORKERS: WHILE 48 % ANSWERED THAT AMONG PRINTERS EXISTS A HIGH DEGREE

TABLE 50. WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY AMONG CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS?

HIGH SOLIDARITY	(68)	48.23 %
FAIRLY HIGH SOLIDARITY	(57)	40.43 %
FAIRLY LOW SOLIDARITY	(12)	8.51 %
NO SOLIDARITY AT ALL	(3)	2.12 %
DON'T KNOW, NO ANSWER	(1)	0.71 %
	N (141)	100 %

OF SOLIDARITY, ONLY 25.5% GAVE THE SAME ANSWER WITH RESPECT TO ARGENTINIAN WORKERS IN GENERAL (TABLES 45 AND 46). EXAMPLES OF SOLIDARITY REFERRED BASICALLY TO "HELP IN THE CASE OF ILLNESS OR ACCIDENT", "PARTICIPATION IN UNION MEETINGS", AND "UNITY DURING STRIKES".

TOGETHER WITH THESE ORIENTATIONS, AS WE NOTED ELSEWHERE, ONLY 5% OF THE MEMBERSHIP EXPRESSED NEGATIVE ATTITUDES WITH RESPECT TO THE PRESENCE OF ANOTHER OPPOSITION LIST. MOST OF THEM, WE POINTED OUT, FOUND THAT COMPETENCE AND STRUGGLE FOR ACHIEVING UNION POSTS WAS HEALTHY FOR THE ORGANIZATION AS A WHOLE.

WE CAN SEE THAT WHILE ON THE ONE HAND CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS IDENTIFY A HIGH DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY AND UNITY WITHIN THE UNION -EXPLICITLY NOTED BY THEM WHILE INDICATING EXAMPLES OF SOLIDARITY-, ON THE OTHER HAND THEY TEND TO PERCEIVE AS DESIRABLE FOR THE UNION THE PRESENCE OF AN

ORGANIZED OPPOSITION.

(2) MORE THAN FACTIONS OR PARTIES, WHAT CHARACTERIZES THE UOGC'S LEADERSHIP -THE LISTA ROSA- IS THE PRESENCE OF SEVERAL INTERNAL CURRENTS, WHICH RESPOND TO GENERAL IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS, LIKE ANARCHO-SYNDICALISM, OR POLITICAL POSITIONS CORRESPONDING TO THOSE OF SOME POLITICAL PARTIES WITHIN THE LARGER SOCIETY -LIKE THE PARTIDO RADICAL, A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY. THESE CURRENTS ARE GENERALLY IDENTIFIED WITH THE PERSON OF THOSE LEADERS WHO HAVE TRADITIONALLY CONTROLLED THE UNION THROUGH THE LISTA ROSA. GIVEN THAT THE UNION IS SUPPOSED TO BE A "NONPOLITICAL" OR "NONPARTISAN" ORGANIZATION -"POLITICS FROM THE DOOR OUT", AS SOME LEADERS USE TO SAY-, NO "OVERT" POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IS CARRIED OUT BY THE LEADERSHIP. HOWEVER, AN ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM IS THE PROCESS OF COOPTATION, BY MEANS OF WHICH EACH LEADER OR GROUP WILL TRY TO FIND SUPPORTERS. IF THE LEADER OR GROUP BELONGS TO A POLITICAL PARTY IN THE LARGER SOCIETY, IT IS HIGHLY POSSIBLE THAT THE SUPPORTER COOPTED BY SUCH LEADER OR GROUP WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION POSTS WILL BE ALSO COOPTED AS A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL PARTY [316].

THE FOLLOWING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UOGC'S INTERNAL CURRENTS AND FACTIONS AND PARTIES MUST BE POINTED OUT:

(A) THE INTERNAL CURRENTS ARE NOT POLITICALLY DIFFERENTIATED AS INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS OR

GROUPS, LIKE PARTIES AND FACTIONS.

(B) DIFFERENT FROM FACTIONS, THEY TEND TO BE MORE OR LESS PERMANENT, EVENTHOUGH NOT TO THE SAME DEGREE AS THE ITU'S PARTIES.

(C) LIKE THE ITU'S PARTIES, AND DIFFERENT FROM FACTIONS, INTERNAL CURRENTS ARE NOT IN REVOLT AND DO NOT SEEK POWER ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE SUPPORT THEY COULD OBTAIN IN CRISIS SITUATIONS.

(D) THEY CONTINUOSLY LOOK FOR A LARGER CONTROL OF THE LISTA ROSA, BY MEANS OF THE PROCESS OF COOPTATION AND WITHOUT OVERTLY CHALLENGING THE ADMINISTRATION POLICIES, GIVEN THAT THEY SHARE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

(E) FINALLY, THE UOGC'S INTERNAL CURRENTS ARE DEFINED AS LEGITIMATE AT THE LEADERSHIP LEVEL.

THIS LATTER POINT LEADS US TO THE QUESTION: WHAT IS THE BASIS OF LEGITIMACY OF THE POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN THE UOGC?

11.8 LEADERS AND MEMBERS ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS THE UOGC'S "ONE-LIST" SYSTEM

IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT REGULAR RANK-AND-FILES IN THE UOGC ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY INFORMED ABOUT THE INTERNAL POLITICAL DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN THE LISTA ROSA.

AT AN EMPIRICAL LEVEL, THEY RECOGNIZED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNION ADMINISTRATION, WHILE AT AN ABSTRACT LEVEL THEY THOUGHT AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION WOULD BE HEALTHY FOR THE UNION. WHEN ASKED IF THE PRESENCE OF "OPPOSITION LISTS" WOULD BE ADVANTEGEOUS FOR THE ORGANIZATION AS A WHOLE, THEY ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE GRANTING AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM HAD BEEN HIGHLY EFFECTIVE, BECAUSE IT OBTAINED MANY SOCIAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE MEMBERSHIP. THAT IS, FROM A MORE CONCRETE POINT OF VIEW THE SYSTEM WAS NOT QUESTIONED.

AT THE LEADERSHIP LEVEL, THE HISTORICAL TRADITION OF THE LISTA ROSA SEEMS TO HAVE INTRODUCED SOME ELEMENTS OF IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE WITHIN THE UNION ADMINISTRATION. OUR INTERVIEWS WITH SOME PAST AND PRESENT MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION POINT IN THIS DIRECTION. TWO BASIC CONSIDERATIONS CHARACTERIZED THEIR ANSWERS: 1) THERE SHOULD NOT BE PARTISAN POLITICS WITHIN THE UNION, AND, 2) PRINTERS ASSOCIATIONS HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN A CONGLOMERATE OF IDEAS, OF DIFFERENT IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS, AND THEY SHOULD CONTINUE BEING SO IN THE FUTURE. FURTHERMORE, INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN LEADERS OF DIFFERENT CURRENTS ARE INTENSIVE IN THE UOGC, GIVEN THAT THEY GENERALLY TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION ITSELF. IT COULD BE SUGGESTED THAT THESE RELATIONSHIPS "DISCIPLINE PERSONAL SENTIMENTS" IN THE SAME WAY AS IN THE

ITU.

11.9 THE LEGITIMACY OF LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL CONVERGENCE IN THE UOGC

IN OUR HISTORICAL NOTE, WE OBSERVED THAT TRADITIONALLY THE LISTA ROSA WAS BASICALLY FORMED BY ANARCHO-SYNDICALISTS AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS. THIS WAS THE RESULT OF THE PREDOMINANCE OF SPANIARD AND ITALIAN IMMIGRANTS WITHIN THE TRADE, WHO BROUGHT WITH THEM THESE IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS TO THE COUNTRY. LATER ON, LIBERALS AND SOME COMMUNIST GROUPS ACHIEVED INFLUENCE IN THE UNION.

ONE OF THE POSSIBLE REASONS THAT THESE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES DID NOT LEAD TO POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF OPPOSITION LISTS CAN BE RELATED TO THE FACT THAT CÓRDOBA PRINTERS WERE PERMANENTLY FIGHTING IN ORDER TO GET ORGANIZED AND TO MAINTAIN THEIR ORGANIZATION. WHEN THEY WERE CONCRETING THEIR EFFORTS TO FORM A PERMANENT ORGANIZATION, WORLD WAR II WAS BEGINNING. IN SPITE OF THEIR IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES, PRINTERS UNITED IN A TYPE OF "ANTI-FACIST" FRONT, ON THE BASIS OF CERTAIN AMBIGUOUS DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. WITH THE END OF THE WAR, THEY HAD TO UNITE AGAINST WHAT THEY CONSIDERED TO BE A NATIONAL VERSION OF FACISM: PERONISM. WHILE MOST OF THE WORKING CLASS BEGAN TO SUPPORT PERONISM, THE LISTA ROSA

KEPT ITS INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONTROL OF THE UNION UNTIL IT WAS INTERVENED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN 1949.

PRINTING WAS AN OLD CRAFT, THERE WERE NOT FORMAL MEANS OF LEARNING THE TRADE, THE INDUSTRY HAD NOT HAD AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT IN CÓRDOBA, SALARIES WERE NOT ATTRACTIVE, FEW PEOPLE WERE ENTERING THE TRADE. BY THIS WAY, THE OLD LEADERSHIP COULD MAINTAIN THE CONTROL OF THE UNION, SINCE THEY RECOVERED THE ADMINISTRATION IN 1955. DIFFERENT FROM BUENOS AIRES, WHERE MANY UNSKILLED YOUNG PEOPLE JOINED THE UNION, IN CÓRDOBA THE TRADE WAS FUNDAMENTALLY CONSTITUTED BY OLDER, SKILLED PRINTERS. AS A RESULT, THE OLD IDEOLOGICAL TRADITIONS WERE MAINTAINED -TO A CERTAIN EXTENT- WITHIN THE LISTA ROSA IN CÓRDOBA. FURTHERMORE, LATTER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COUNTRY, CHARACTERIZED BY THE UOGC'S LEADERSHIP -AMONG MANY OTHERS- AS THE RETURN OF OLIGARCHIC GOVERNMENTS, LED TO A POLITICAL CONVERGENCE OF THE TRADITIONAL IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS IN THE UNION, TOGETHER WITH SOME NEW PERONIST GROUPS.

THE ANALYSIS OF THIS PROCESS HELPS US UNDERSTAND THE INTERESTING QUESTION WE RAISED EARLIER IN THIS WORK: HOW THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF THOSE HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (THE MORE RADICAL ONES) DID NOT FURTHER THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION IN THE UOGC, WHOSE LEADERSHIP HAD BEEN CHARACTERIZED AS "CENTRIST" IN THE

POLITICAL SPECTRUM OF THE COUNTRY.

ONE RESULT OF THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL CONVERGENCE IS THAT "IDEOLOGICAL COMPROMISES" ARE NECESSARY. PRINTERS HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY BECAME COOPTED WITHIN THIS POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE LISTA ROSA. THAT IS, THE MORE RADICAL IDEOLOGICAL OR POLITICAL CURRENTS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE HISTORICALLY SUPPORTED EITHER ALLIANCES OR COMPROMISES, ON THE RATIONALE THAT THEY STRENGTHENED THE PERMANENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ORGANIZATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS IN THE NATURE OF THESE COMPROMISES THAT THEY SHOULD BE EXPRESSED THROUGH A "CENTRIST" POLITICAL POSITION. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, UNION DEMOCRACY'S CONSIDERATIONS APPLY HERE: "IT APPEARS THAT A PARTY SYSTEM IS A LUXURY THAT ONLY A RELATIVELY SECURE UNION CAN AFFORD. UNDER EXTERNAL ATTACK THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL UNITY IS SO GREAT SO OVERRIDING AS COMPARED WITH THE ISSUES OF INTERNAL POLITICS THAT THE CALL FOR UNITY, COUPLED WITH THE DEFINITION OF INTERNAL OPPOSITION AS TRAITOROUS, MAKES A LOYAL AND LEGITIMATE INTERNAL OPPOSITION ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE" [317].

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF EACH INTERNAL CURRENT IN THE UOGC DEPENDS -TO A CERTAIN EXTENT- ON THE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL GROUPS OR PARTIES FROM OUTSIDE THE ORGANIZATION. THE MOST ENDURING

INTERNAL CURRENTS ARE THOSE CONNECTED WITH THE HISTORICALLY PREVAILING POLITICAL GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS IN THE LARGER SOCIETY. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF ANARCHO-SYNDICALISTS IN THE UOGC, WHOSE POLITICAL STRENGTH WAS RELATED WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN ARGENTINA. THE POLITICAL ARAISING OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATS, COMMUNISTS, AND SOCIALISTS TOOK PLACE ON THE BASIS OF THE DISPLACEMENT OF ANARCHO-SYNDICALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT.

IF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS ARE SOUND, IT COULD BE HYPOTHESIZED THAT THE FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE FUNCTIONING OF THE HISTORICALLY INSTITUTIONALIZED POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN THE UOGC ARE RELATED NOT ONLY WITH THE STRUCTURE OF THE OCCUPATION AND THE UNION, BUT ALSO WITH THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICS IN THE LARGER SOCIETY. ONCE IN EXISTENCE THE "ONE-LIST" SYSTEM AND ITS INTERNAL CURRENTS -PRODUCED BY A SPECIFIC SET OF HISTORICAL EVENTS- AN IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE WAS THAT THE PROCESS OF COOPTATION BECAME THE MAIN CHANNEL OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT, FUNCTIONALLY INTERRELATED WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PREVAILING SYSTEM. HOWEVER, THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF EACH INTERNAL CURRENT -THE BASIS OF EQUILIBRIUM WITHIN THE "ONE-LIST" SYSTEM- SEEMS TO BE ONLY TO A LIMITED EXTENT DETERMINED BY THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF UNION POLITICS ITSELF, AND TO A GREAT EXTENT BY THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICS IN THE

LARGER SOCIETY.

11.10 Opposition and Union Law in the UOGC

Union Law in the UOGC does not explicitly consider the right of association of Córdoba's printers, but it guarantees the rights of minority groups to share the union administration. From eleven members who constitute the administrative committee, eight should correspond to the list which obtained the simple majority in the elections, and three to the list which obtained at least 15% of the votes casted in such election.

It can be seen that no contradiction should arise between the UOGC's legal system and the eventual organization of permanent opposition.

SECTION V - CONCLUSIONS

12. A Final Overview

AT THIS STAGE OF THE WORK, A FINAL APPROACH TO THE DATA WILL REQUIRE OUR ATTENTION AS WE TRY TO POINT OUT CONSISTENCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN OUR FINDINGS AND THOSE OF UNION DEMOCRACY.

WE BEGAN THE ANALYSIS DISCUSSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS AND TRADE-UNION DEMOCRACY. A FIRST OBSERVATION WAS THAT A FORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY DID NOT TAKE PLACE AMONG CÓRDOBA PRINTERS, BUT THAT AN INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY DID ARISE AMONG THEM. IN THE ITU, AS WELL AS IN THE UOGC, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT INVOLVEMENT IN THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY INDUCED ACTIVITY IN UNION POLITICS. IN BOTH ORGANIZATIONS, THOSE HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS EXPRESSED THEMSELVES AS EXTREMELY OR QUITE INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS, THEY TENDED TO ATTEND MORE FREQUENTLY MEETINGS IN THE UNION, AND TO TALK MORE ABOUT UNION POLITICS. IN ALL THESE CASES, THE RELATIONSHIPS WERE WEAKER IN THE UOGC. IF WE MOVE FROM ONE UNIT OF ANALYSIS TO ANOTHER, FROM INDIVIDUAL ORIENTATIONS AND BEHAVIOR TO THE IMMEDIATE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT, THE DIFFERENT STRENGHT OF THESE RELATIONSHIPS

COULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL CLIMATES IN BOTH UNIONS. THE PERMANENT AND ACTIVE ELECTION CONTESTS IN THE ITU MIGHT PROMOTE INTEREST IN UNION POLITICS TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN IN THE UOGC, WHERE ELECTIONS ARE MERELY A ROUTINARY PROCESS.

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REQUIRED SPECIFICATIONS AT THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LEVEL. THE THEORY OF MASS SOCIETY UNDERLYING UNION DEMOCRACY'S APPROACH SUGGESTED THE HYPOTHESIS THAT SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS MUST PLAY A MEDIATING ROLE BETWEEN THE LEADERSHIP AND THE MASSES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY, AND THAT TO FULFILL SUCH A ROLE THESE MEDIATING UNITS SHOULD PROVIDE INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER. THIS REQUIREMENT SEEMED TO BE LESS STRINGENT IN THE UOGC, GIVEN ITS CHARACTER OF SMALL-SCALE ORGANIZATION OFFERING THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ITS MEMBERS.

AT THE EMPIRICAL LEVEL, IT WAS SHOWN IN BOTH UNIONS THAT SOCIAL RELATIONS INDUCED UNION POLITICAL ACTIVITY, BUT WHILE IN THE ITU THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY MOBILIZED THE PREVIOUSLY UNINTERESTED PRINTERS, IN THE UOGC IT WAS THE INTERESTED PRINTERS WHO WERE MOBILIZED INTO UNION POLITICS. SOCIAL ACTIVITIES IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY WERE MAINLY INFORMAL IN THE UOGC'S CASE, AND THEY TOOK PLACE MOSTLY THROUGH VISITS AT HOME WITH FELLOW WORKERS.

THE PRECEDING ANALYSIS DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY SOME PRINTERS HIGHLY INVOLVED SOCIALLY WITH FELLOW WORKERS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS OR, IF ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS, WERE SCARCELY RELATED SOCIALLY WITH OTHER PRINTERS. IN ORDER TO STUDY THIS PROBLEM, THE DEGREE OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AMONG PRINTERS WAS INTRODUCED AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE. FINDINGS IN BOTH CASES WERE HIGHLY CONSISTENT. IN THE ITU AS WELL AS IN THE UOGC, PRINTERS HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY TENDED TO BE MORE INVOLVED IN SOCIAL RELATIONS AND MORE ACTIVE IN UNION POLITICS. IT WAS OBSERVED THAT INVOLVEMENT IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY AFFECTED PRINTERS IN A DIFFERENT WAY, ACCORDING TO THEIR DEGREE OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY. WHEN CONTROLLING BY SOCIAL RELATIONS, IN THE ITU IT WAS THE MIDDLE GROUP IN THE SCALE OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY THAT WAS MOST AFFECTED BY SOCIAL ACTIVITIES. IN THE UOGC, IT WAS THE GROUP HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY THE MOST AFFECTED BY THOSE ACTIVITIES. WITH RESPECT TO FORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONS, IT WAS SHOWN IN THE ITU THAT THE GROUP LOW IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY, NOT AFFECTED BY THE INFORMAL COMMUNITY, WAS HIGHLY INFLUENCED BY PARTICIPATING IN THE PRINTERS' EXCLUSIVE CLUBS. IN <u>UNION DEMOCRACY</u> IT IS NOTED THAT IN THE CLUBS PRINTERS NOT INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS BECOME A CAPTIVE AUDIENCE FOR THE POLITICAL

ACTIVISTS. IF IN THE UOGC WE CONSIDER THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE UNION, IT IS AGAIN OBSERVED THAT PRINTERS HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY ARE ALSO THE MOST AFFECTED BY THE FORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARDS UNION POLITICS AND CHOICE OF FRIENDS WAS HIGHLY CONSISTENT WITH FINDINGS IN THE ITU: THOSE UOGC'S MEMBERS HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY SHOWED A STRONGER TENDENCY TO TALK UNION POLITICS AND TO HAVE POLITICALLY ACTIVE PRINTERS AMONG THEIR BEST FRIENDS. MOVING AGAIN FROM ONE UNIT OF ANALYSIS TO ANOTHER, FROM INDIVIDUAL ORIENTATIONS TO THE POLITICAL CLIMATE OF THE UNION, WE POINTED OUT THAT THE ABSENCE OF OPPOSITION IN THE UOGC DID NOT PROMOTE INTEREST IN UNION POLITICS AS TO MOBILIZE THE POLITICALLY UNINTERESTED PRINTERS, WHILE THOSE WHO SHOWED SUCH AN INTEREST SEEMED TO NEED THE ADDITIONAL MOTIVATION OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY. FURTHERMORE, IT WAS LATTER OBSERVED THAT THE PROCESS OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT IN THE UOGC WAS COOPTATION FROM THE TOP, AND IT COULD BE HYPOTHESIZED THAT IT IS A FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE PERMANENCY OF SUCH A SYSTEM CERTAIN DEGREE OF APATHY AMONG THE RANK-AND-FILE.

INTRODUCING AN INDEX OF LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM, THE AUTHORS OF <u>UNION DEMOCRACY</u> SINGLED OUT THAT THE

OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY BASICALLY MOBILIZED POLITICALLY AWARE CONSERVATIVES, LEADING TO A BALANCE BETWEEN CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS (WHO TENDED TO PARTICIPATE IN A MORE DIRECT WAY) IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF THE ITU. IN THE UOGC, WE NOTED THAT THE SCALE OF IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY TENDED TO PARALLEL A LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE, AND SO IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE LOW IDEALOGUES (MORE CONSERVATIVES) DISSOCIATED THEMSELVES FROM UNION POLITICS AND IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES WITH THE MIDDLE-CLASS WHILE EXPRESSING A LOWER DEGREE OF "CLASS SOLIDARITY". THE QUESTION REMAINED OF WHY THE MOBILIZATION OF THE GROUP HIGH IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY (MORE RADICALS) DID NOT PROMOTE THE ARISING OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION AGAINST THE "CENTRIST" POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE GOVERNNING GROUP -THE LISTA ROSA. LATER IN THE RESEARCH, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT THE PRESENCE OF INTERNAL CURRENTS SHARING DECISION-MAKING WITHIN THE LISTA ROSA, THEIR HISTORY OF POLITICAL COMPROMISES TOGETHER WITH THE PROCESS OF COOPTATION, WERE ALL STRUCTURAL FACTORS WORKING AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION.

AT THIS STAGE OF THE ANALYSIS, IT IS CONCLUDED IN UNION DEMOCRACY THAT THE SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS OF PRINTERS WORKED COUNTER THE STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS WHICH ACCORDING TO MICHELS SHOULD INDUCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF OLIGARCHIC PATTERNS IN LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATIONS.

FINDINGS IN THE UOGC -A RELATIVELY SMALL-SCALE ORGANIZATION- SUGGEST THAT THE PRESENCE OF SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT BY THEMSELVES ELIMINATE THE EVENTUAL OLIGARCHIC TENDENCIES IN A UNION. IN THE UOGC DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN MEMBERS WERE POSSIBLE, PRINTERS WERE HIGHLY INVOLVED IN THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY, BUT A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, AS DEFINED BY LIPSET ET AL, HAS NOT ARISED THERE.

THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY ON THE ITU AND UOGC'S POLITICAL SYSTEMS WAS POINTED OUT. THE QUESTION EMERGED THEN ABOUT WHAT WERE THE FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRESENCE OF AN OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY IN EACH UNION. IN BOTH CASES, PRINTERS RANKED HIGH THEIR TRADE AS COMPARED WITH OTHER SKILL TRADES. IN THE ITU, PRINTERS TENDED TO ASSOCIATE MORE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE, THEN WITH FELLOW WORKERS, AND FINALLY WITH OTHER MANUAL WORKERS. THE FIRST PREFERENCE OF UOGC'S MEMBERS WAS OTHER PRINTERS, THEN MIDDLE-CLASS WORKERS, AND FINALLY OTHER MANUAL WORKERS. FINDINGS IN <u>UNION DEMOCRACY</u> WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE HYPOTHESIS THAT PRINTERS, GIVEN THEIR HIGH STATUS PERCEPTION, WOULD PREFER TO ASSOCIATE MORE WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE WHENEVER POSSIBLE. WE SUGGESTED THAT THE DIFFERENCES IN OUR FINDINGS WERE RELATED WITH THE LIMITED POSSIBILITIES THAT CÓRDOBA PRINTERS HAD OF

MINGLING SOCIALLY WITH MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE, BUT THAT THIS FACT WAS WORKING IN THE DIRECTION OF STRENGHTENING THEIR OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY, EVEN MORE THAN IN THE ITU.

THE DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF ASSOCIATION AMONG ITU'S MEMBERS WERE RELATED IN UNION DEMOCRACY TO RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, THE NUMBER OF GENERATIONS THE PRINTER'S FAMILY HAS BEEN IN AMÉRICA, FATHER'S OCCUPATION, EDUCATION, AND JOB SATISFACTION. WE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR CASE THE FIRST TWO FACTORS. WITH RESPECT TO THE REMAINING ONES, DATA TENDEND TO BE HIGHLY CONSISTENT, ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL EDUCATIONAL LEVEL WAS HIGHER AMONG NEW YORK PRINTERS. IT WAS FINALLY CONCLUDED THAT THE MARGINAL STATUS OF PRINTERS SEEMED TO BE AN IMPORTANT DETERMINANT OF THE PRESENCE OF AN OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY NOT ONLY IN THE ITU BUT ALSO IN THE UOGC.

TWO OTHER FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRINTERS' OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY WERE THE SYSTEM FOR HIRING EMPLOYEES AND THE FACT THAT MANY PRINTERS WORKED NIGHTS. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT IN THE UOGC THE ITU'S SUBSTITUTE SYSTEM DID NOT TAKE PLACE, BUT THAT ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FULFILLED A SIMILAR FUNCTION. WITH RESPECT TO NIGHT WORK, DATA WAS RELATIVELY CONSISTENT, WITH THE DIFFERENCE THAT NIGHT WORK DID NOT INDUCE FORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES AMONG

UOGC'S MEMBERS, BECAUSE THE SCHEDULE FOR THESE ACTIVITIES SUPERIMPOSED WITH THE INTERMEDIATE AND NIGHT SHIFTS. ALTERNATIVELY, CÓRDOBA PRINTERS TENDED TO MEET MORE AT THEIR HOMES, AS COMPARED WITH NEW YORK PRINTERS. IN THIS SENSE, IT CAN BE SEEN THAT THE STRENGH OF THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY IN CÓRDOBA WAS BASED ON INFORMAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, WHICH WAS MORE FUNCTIONAL FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PROCESS OF COOPTATION AS THE PRINCIPAL MECHANISM FOR LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT. PERMANENT PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS, LIKE THE ITU'S EXCLUSIVE CLUBS, WOULD CONSTITUTE AN AVENUE FOR WIDE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION, NARROWING THE LEADERSHIP'S EFFECTIVENESS TO IMPLEMENT THE COOPTATION PROCESS.

AS WE MOVE FROM THE OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY TO THE STRUCTURE OF PRINTING INDUSTRY, WE FIND A NOTHER FACTOR LINKED TO THE TYPE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM IN EACH UNION. TWO ASPECTS WERE CONSIDERED, THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE INDUSTRY. SIMILAR FEATURES WERE THE CHARACTERIZATION OF BOTH UNION AS "COMMUNITY OF EQUALS", TOGETHER WITH THE LACK OF CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP IN BOTH INDUSTRIES. THE MAIN DIFFERENCE WAS THAT THE UOGC'S ALTERNATIVE TO THE ITU'S CHAPEL DID NOT PROVIDE INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER.

AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY REFERED TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHOP SIZE AND DEGREE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY. IN BOTH CASES, PRINTERS IN LARGER SHOPS TENDED TO BE MORE INVOLVED IN UNION POLITICS. SPECIFYING THE ANALYSIS IN THE UOGC, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PRINTERS WHO WERE WIDELY MOBILIZED INTO UNION POLITICS BY THE LARGER SHOPS WERE THOSE HOLDING UNION ORIENTATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THOSE WHO REJECTED THE OCCUPATION AS A MOBILITY SOURCE. IN THE ITU, IT WAS THE LARGE-SHOP MEN WITH EITHER UNION OR MANAGEMENT ORIENTATIONS -THOSE WHO LOOKED INTO THE OCCUPATION FOR THEIR MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS- WHO TENDED TO BE MORE INVOLVED IN UNION POLITICS. THAT IS, THE LARGER SHOPS PRODUCED A WIDER POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN THIS LATTER CASE.

IN A GENERAL WAY, ON THE JOB SOCIAL RELATIONS IN BOTH INDUSTRIES WERE SIMILARLY AFFECTED BY THE LARGER SHOPS, PROVIDING A WIDE POOL OF AVAILABLE FRIENDS WHICH ALLOWED PRINTERS WITH STRINGENT CRITERIA FOR FRIENDSHIP SELECTION (LIKE LIBERAL-RADICALS) TO HAVE BETTER POSSIBILITIES OF FINDING FELLOW WORKERS WITH SIMILAR INTERESTS AND VALUES. PRESSING THE ANALYSIS, IT WAS FOUND IN BOTH CASES THAT THE MIDDLE-SIZED SHOPS SEEMED TO PROVIDE THE BEST ENVIRONMENT FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF THE LEAST INTERESTED MEN. THESE SHOPS REPRESENTED AN APPROPIATE COMBINATION OF

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR SELECTION OF FRIENDS AND EXPOSITION TO POLITICALLY ACTIVE PRINTERS. AS A RESULT, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHOP SIZE AND INVOLVEMENT IN UNION POLITICS TENDED TO BE A CURVILINEAR ONE. DATA SUPPORTED THIS HYPOTHESIS MORE STRONGLY IN THE ITU. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHOP SIZE AND UNION POLITICS COULD HAVE DIFFERENTIALLY AFFECTED THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN EACH UNION WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO EVALUATE, GIVEN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE AVAILABLE DATA IN BOTH CASES.

THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION PRODUCED BY THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS CONSIDERED IN UNION DEMOCRACY AS ONLY ONE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM. THE AUTHORS OBSERVED THAT EQUALLY IMPORTANT WAS THE PRESENCE OF LEADERS WITH INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER AND INDEPENDENT BASES OF STATUS. THE DISCUSSION SHOWED THAT MANY OF THE FACTORS INCREASING THE SIZE OF THE POOL OF UNION ACTIVISTS IN THE ITU SEEMED TO BE ALSO PRESENT IN THE UOGC. HOWEVER, TWO BASIC DIFFERENCES SUGGESTED THAT SUCH A POOL WOULD TEND TO BE SMALLER IN THE UOGC: THE UNION HAS NOT PROVIDED ATTRACTIVE AVENUES FOR MOBILITY, AND ITS POLITICAL STRUCTURE HAS NOT DEVELOPED A LARGE NUMBER OF AUTONOMOUS UNION POSTS WHICH COULD PROVIDE

TRAINING FOR POTENTIAL LEADERS INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ADMINISTRATION ITSELF. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE REQUIREMENTS OF MATERIAL SECURITY AND SECURITY OF STATUS FOR POTENTIAL OPPOSITIONISTS WERE PRESENT IN BOTH CASES. HOWEVER, AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE SINGLED OUT WAS THAT WHILE IN THE ITU POWER WAS NOT BASICALLY DETERMINED BY POSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY, SUCH WAS THE CASE IN THE UOGC. IN SPITE OF THIS DIFFERENCE, WE SUGGESTED THAT THE STATUS SECURITY OF A POTENTIAL OPPOSITION IN THE UOGC WAS DIFFICULT TO BE THREATENED, GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF A STATUS GAP BETWEEN LEADERS AND RANK-AND-FILE. WE FINALLY CONCLUDED THAT THE EVENTUAL THREAT OF DEMOCRACY, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT COULD IMPLY INSECURITY OF TENURE, SHOULD NOT INDUCE UOGC'S LEADERS TO ALTER THE OPERATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

THE CHANNELS OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT WERE CONSIDERED AS IMPORTANT FACTORS RELATED WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF THE SPECIFIC POLITICAL SYSTEM IN EACH UNION. AS COMPARED WITH THE ITU, WE SINGLED OUT A RELATIVELY SMALLER NUMBER OF AVENUES FOR ACHIEVING LEADERSHIP STATUS IN THE UOGC. THE PROCESS OF COOPTATION FROM THE TOP SEEMED TO HAVE LESS REQUIREMENTS IN THIS SENSE THAN THE ITU'S COMPETING POLITICAL PARTIES. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CHANNELS OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT WERE CAUSE OR CONSEQUENCES OF THE PREVALENCE OF A DETERMINED POLITICAL SYSTEM IN EITHER THE ITU OR THE UOGC REMAINED AS AN OPENED QUESTION.

WHILE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENTIATION WAS COMMON TO THE ITU AND THE UOGC, IN THE LATTER SUCH DIFFERENTIATION DID NOT INDUCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERMANENT PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AS IN THE ITU. INSTEAD, INTERNAL CURRENTS WITHIN THE GOVERNING GROUP, NOT DIFFERENTIATED AS INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS WHILE MAINTAINING CERTAIN DEGREE OF PERMANENCY, CONSTITUTED THE ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE UOGC. AS THE ITU'S PARTY SYSTEM, THE INTERNAL CURRENTS WERE DEFINED AS LEGITIMATE AT THE LEADERSHIP LEVEL. THE DIFFERENCE WITH THE ITU WAS THAT THE RANK-AND-FILE AT AN ABSTRACT LEVEL POINTED OUT THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION, WHILE AT A MORE CONCRETE LEVEL THEY RECOGNIZED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR LEADERSHIP, AND PERCEIVED A HIGH DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY AND UNITY WITHIN THE UNION.

AT THE END OF OUR OVERVIEW, THE QUESTION ARISES: GIVEN THE PRESENCE OF INTERNAL CURRENTS WHICH RELATIVELY COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER FOR RANK-AND-FILE IDENTIFICATION WITH THEIR GROUPS, GIVEN THE LEGITIMACY OF THE POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AT THE LEADERSHIP LEVEL, AND GIVEN THE RECOGNITION ON THE PART OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS LEADERSHIP, TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD WE SPEAK OF OLIGARCHIC PATTERNS IN THE UOGC?

FINDINGS IN THE UOGC HAVE SUGGESTED THAT:

(1) INDEPENDENT OF ITS POLITICAL SYSTEM, THE LEADERSHIP'S IDEOLOGY HAS BEEN UNDERLINED BY THE LIBERTARIAN-DEMOCRATIC VALUES OF ANARCHO-SINDICALISM, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM, AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY.

(2) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE UNION CAN BE ONLY UNDERSTOOD BY REFERRING IT TO THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICS AT THE LEVEL OF THE LARGER SOCIETY.

(3) IN THE UOGC, THE PRESENCE OF INTERMEDIATE STRUCTURES SEEMED LESS NECESSARY THAN IN THE ITU, BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MEMBERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESENCE OF AN INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS SINGLED OUT. GIVEN THAT POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENTIATION WAS NOT EXPRESSED IN THE ORGANIZATION OF AN INDEPENDENT, PERMANENT OPPOSITION, THIS COULD BE RELATED -TO A CERTAIN EXTENT- WITH THE ABSENCE IN THE UOGC OF THE ITU'S INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER, LIKE THE CHAPEL AND THE PRINTERS' CLUBS.

(4) HOWEVER, IF THE PRESENCE OF INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER, LIKE THE CHAPEL AND PRINTERS' CLUBS, IS NOT CONSIDERED AS A NECESSARY STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNION DEMOCRACY

(IN THE FORM OF A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM), IT COULD BE THOUGHT THAT CONDITIONS IN THE UOGC -AS WE NOTED THROUGHOUT OUR STUDY- MIGHT HAVE LED TO THE ARISING OF THAT TYPE OF DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.

(5) THE FACT THAT THE UOGC'S LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN CONSIDERED HIGHLY EFFECTIVE BY ITS OWN MEMBERS WOULD TEND TO SHOW THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE MEMBERSHIP ARE REPRESENTED IN THE UNION ADMINISTRATION. THAT IS, LACK OF INDEPENDENTLY ORGANIZED OPPOSITION DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY -AS LIPSET ET AL SUGGEST- UNREPRESENTATIVE ACTION ON THE PART OF THE LEADERSHIP.

(6) FINALLY, IF IT IS NOT THE MERE FORM OF A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM WHICH CHARACTERIZES UNION DEMOCRACY, BUT THE PRESENCE OF DIFFERENTIATED POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS WHICH ARE FAIRLY PERMANENT AND OPPOSE ONE ANOTHER WITHIN THE RULES OF THE GAME, THEN LIPSET ET AL'S APPROACH IS IN NEED OF REFORMULATION.

12.1 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

LIPSET ET AL NOTE THAT THE SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS THEY HAVE CARRIED OUT IS AN STATIS ANALYSIS WHICH SHOWS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM AND

STRUCTURAL FACTORS AT THE PRESENT TIME. THEY ADD THAT THIS TYPE OF ANALYSIS DOES NOT SHOW "THE PROCESS WHICH ENABLED THE SYSTEM TO REACH MORE OR LESS STABLE EQUILIBRIUM"[318]. THE SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF AN ORGANIZATION WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY A CERTAIN DEGREE OF STABILITY, BUT IT DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE SYSTEM IN A PROCESS OF CHANGE, IT DOES NOT CONSIDER THE DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS THIS SYSTEM COULD HAVE FOLLOWED IF SOME FACTORS IN THE SITUATION HAD OCCURRED DIFFERENTLY. IT IS THIS ASPECT -CONCLUDE THE AUTHORS- WHICH REQUIRES THE PERSPECTIVE OF A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS. IN THIS SENSE, THE AUTHORS HAVE TRIED TO SHOW HOW "THE EXISTENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE ITU IS LARGELY THE RESULT OF THE CONVERGENCE OF A SET OF EVENTS, EACH OF WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO OR DETRACTS FROM THE CONTINUING STABILITY OF THE SYSTEM"[319].

THE INTERRELATIONS OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE UOGC HAVE SHOWN THAT:

(1) THE PROBLEMS AND STRUGGLES INVOLVED IN THEIR ATTEMPTS OF ORGANIZATION LED CÓRDOBA'S PRINTERS TO OVERCOME THEIR IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES IN ALLIANCES AND COMPROMISES, WHICH INDUCED A PROCESS OF POLITICAL CONVERGENCE.

(2) THE BEST MECHANISM AVAILABLE TO THE DIFFERENT INTERNAL CURRENTS TO OBTAIN SUPPORTERS WAS THE PROCESS OF

COOPTATION, BY MEANS OF WHICH THEY DID NOT WEAKENED THE UNITY OF LEADERSHIP.

(3) THE STRUCTURE OF THE OCCUPATION AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JOB PROVIDED AN INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY WHICH ACTED AS A MAIN AVENUE FOR THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF PRINTERS HIGHLY INTERESTED IN UNION POLITICS.

(4) THE OCCUPATION DID NOT PROVIDE INTERMEDIATE STRUCTURES WHICH COULD ACT AS INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER, LIKE THE ITU'S CHAPEL AND EXCLUSIVE CLUBS. THIS APPEARED TO BE A PLAUSIBLE REASON TO EXPLAIN WHY INTERNAL CURRENTS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES IN INDEPENDENT FACTIONS OR PARTIES.

(5) IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE LEADERSHIP DID NOT ATTEMPT TO FAVOR INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER -LIKE THE CHAPEL-, AS A MEANS OF MAINTAINING THE CONTROL OF THE UNION THROUGH THE COOPTATION PROCESS.

(6) FINALLY, THE STRENGTH OF THE INTERNAL CURRENTS IN THE UNION TENDED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL GROUPS OR PARTIES CONNECTED WITH THEM.

12.2 CONCLUSIONS

THE AUTHORS OF UNION DEMOCRACY POINTED OUT IN THEIR

CONCLUDING REMARKS THAT THEIR "ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS RELATED TO DEMOCRACY IN THE ITU HAS POINTED TO CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH DEMOCRACY MAY BE INSTITUTIONALIZED IN LARGE-SCALE PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS"[320]. AS THEY OBSERVED, THEIR STUDY HAS NOT DISPROVED MICHELS' THEORY; INSTEAD, IT HAS GIVEN EMPIRICAL SUPPORT TO HIS ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OLIGARCHIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND THE MONOPOLIZATION OF POWER BY THE INCUMBENT ADMINISTRATION[321].

IN OUR CASE, WE THINK OUR REPLICATION STUDY HELPED SPECIFY THE STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS SINGLED OUT BY LIPSET ET AL AS LEADING TO DEMOCRATIC POLITICS. IT SEEMS THAT IT IS NOT THE MERE PRESENCE OF AN OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY PLAYING A MEDIATING ROLE BETWEEN THE LEADERSHIP AND THE RANK-AND-FILE THAT WILL INHIBIT THE MONOPOLIZATION OF POWER, BUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COMMUNITY PROVIDES POLITICAL ARENAS WHICH WILL INDUCE WIDE MOBILIZATION OF THE MEMBERSHIP. SO, IT COULD BE SUGGESTED THAT MORE IMPORTANT THAN AN INFORMAL OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITY WERE THE FORMAL RELATIONSHIPS TAKING PLACE IN SECONDARY ORGANIZATIONS LIKE THE ITU'S EXCLUSIVE CLUBS, WHICH FULFILLED THE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS POSTULATED BY THE AUTHORS.

ANOTHER SET OF SPECIFICATIONS WERE IMPOSED BY THE ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY: IT SEEMS THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT IS NOT MERELY THE CRAFT NATURE OF PRINTING, THE TYPE OF DIVISION OF LABOR OR THE

DEGREE OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION, BUT THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF UNION POSTS WHICH COULD PROVIDE INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF POWER. THAT IS, THE FACT THAT POSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY MAY DETERMINE INCOME AND STATUS IS NOT AS CRUCIAL AS WHEN THESE POSITIONS ARE THE SOLE POWER SOURCE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, EQUALLY IMPORTANT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENDURING PATTERNS OF LEADERSHIP RECRUITMENT AND OF A DETERMINED POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM WERE THE SPECIFIC SET OF HISTORICAL EVENTS SURROUNDING THE STRUGGLES OF THE UNION. THESE SET OF EVENTS, OF COURSE, WERE NOT INDEPENDENT FROM THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE COUNTRY. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERMANENCY OF INTERNAL CURRENTS IN THE UOGC AND THE STRENGTH OF THE ASSOCIATED POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE LARGER SOCIETY POINT IN THIS DIRECTION.

A FINAL QUESTION RAISED BY OUR STUDY WAS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE STRUCTURAL FORM OF A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM WAS NECESSARILY THAT PROPOSED BY LIPSET ET AL. IN THEIR CONCLUSIONS, THESE AUTHORS CALLED FORTH A DEFENSE OF THEIR POSITION THAT IN ORDER TO CHARACTERIZE A STRUCTURAL FORM AS DEMOCRATIC, AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION, A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM SHOULD PREVAIL.

IT SEEMS TO US THAT THIS POSITION OF LIPSET ET AL COULD BE ALSO THE OBJECT OF THE GENERAL CRITIQUE RAISED BY AREND

LIJPHART AGAINST POLITICAL SCIENTISTS COMMITTED TO THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: "THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, IN THE BROAD SENSE OF THE TERM, HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN A MAJOR FIELD OF RESEARCH IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. THIS IS HARDLY SURPRISING, SINCE THE BULK OF POLITICAL RESEARCH HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT BY SCHOLARS LIVING AND WORKING IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES AND COMMITTED TO THE IDEALS OF DEMOCRACY. AS A RESULT, THE EMPIRICAL AND NORMATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN CLEARLY SEPARATED AND, PARTICULARLY WHILE THE CONTRAST BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES AND TOTALITARIAN REGIMES LOOMED LARGE IN THE MINDS OF POLITICAL SCIENTISTS, THE COMPARATIVELY MINOR QUESTION OF DIFFERENT QUALITATIVE DEGREES OF DEMOCRACY WAS OVERWHELMED BY IT" [322].

IT IS THE RECOGNITION OF THESE COMPARATIVE PROBLEMS AND THE EXISTENCE OF DIFFERENT QUALITATIVE DEGREES THAT LED AUTHORS LIKE ROBERT DAHL [323] OR DONALD DEVINE [324] TO PROPOSE ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS LIKE THAT OF "POLYARCHY". THE PROBLEMS POSITED BY OUR OWN STUDY OF THE STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS AND FORM OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE UOGC SUGGEST THE IMPORTANCE AND AT THE SAME TIME THE NECESSITY OF THE RECENT TRENDS TOWARD AN EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY.

NOTES

SECTION I

CHAPTER 1

1. LIPSET, S.M., TROW, M.A., AND COLEMAN, J.S. UNION DEMOCRACY. GARDNER CITY, NEW YORK: DOUBLEDAY AND CO., 1956; P. 8
2. ID., P. 8
3. ID., P. 8
4. ID., P. 8
5. ID., P. 9
6. ID., P. 9
7. ID., P. 10
8. ID., P. 10
9. ID., P. 10
10. ID., P. 10
11. ID., P. 10
12. ID., P. 10
13. ID., P. 11
14. ID., P. 12
15. REFERRED AS ITU THROUGHOUT THE REST OF THE WORK.
16. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 2
17. ID., P. 12
18. ID., P. 13
19. ID., P. 14
20. WE USE THE TERM "OLIGARCHIC" IN THE SAME SENSE AS IN UNION DEMOCRACY. IN A LATER STAGE OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS, SOME QUALIFICATIONS WILL BE MADE ABOUT THIS CHARACTERIZATION OF THE UOGC AS AN OLIGARCHIC ORGANIZATION.
21. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A PERIOD FROM 1950 TO 1955, IN WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WAS MOVED OUT BY A MANOUVER OF THE CGT, CONTROLLED BY PERONISM. IN THIS SENSE, SEE OUR HISTORICAL NOTE, IN CHAPTER 2 OF THE PRESENT WORK.
22. FROM A PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH A UOGC'S LEADER.
23. SEE NOTE 20.
24. SARTORI, GIOVANNI. "DEMOCRACY", IN INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, VOL. IV. NEW YORK: MACMILLAN COMPANY AND THE FREE PRESS, 1968: P. 112
25. ID., P. 113
26. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., P. XII
27. SARTORI, G. OP. CIT., P. 119
28. ID., P. 119
29. FAUNCE, WILLIAM A. "SIZE OF LOCALS AND UNION DEMOCRACY", IN W.A. FAUNCE (ED.), READINGS IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY. NEW YORK: MEREDITH PUBLISHING COMPANY, 1967; P. 411
30. SARTORI, G. OP. CIT., P. 119
31. ID., P. 119
32. SEIDMAN, JOEL. BOOK REVIEW OF "UNION DEMOCRACY", IN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, VOL 61 (JULY 1955-

(MAY 1956); P. 630

CHAPTER 2

33. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 18
34. ID., P. 18
35. MAROTTA, SEBASTIÁN. EL MOVIMIENTO SINDICAL ARGENTINO (TWO VOLUMES). BUENOS AIRES: EDICIONES "LACIO", 1961; P. 10 (MY OWN TRANSLATION).
36. ID., P. 12
37. ID., P. 12
38. ID., P. 12
39. ID., P. 12
40. ID., P. 15
41. FROM A PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH UNION OFFICIALS AND EX-LEADERS OF THE CÓRDOBA LOCAL AND THE NATIONAL FEDERATION. (MY OWN TRANSLATION).
42. ID.
43. ID.
44. ID.
45. ID.
46. FEDERACIÓN ARGENTINA DE TRABAJADORES DE LA IMPRENTA. ESTATUTO. BUENOS AIRES, 1963; P. 2
47. FROM A PERSONAL INTERVIEW.
48. ID.
49. ID.
50. ID.
51. ID.
52. ID.
53. ID.
54. ID.
55. ID.
56. ID.
57. ID.
58. ID.
59. ID.
60. EL OBRERO GRÁFICO. BUENOS AIRES: AUGUST, 1966.
61. FROM A PERSONAL INTERVIEW.
62. ID.
63. ID.
64. ID.
65. ID.
66. ID.
67. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT MOST OF THIS HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IS BASED ON PERSONAL INTERVIEWS, WHICH ONLY ALLOW IMPRESIONISTIC JUDGEMENTS.
68. MOST PRESENT AND PAST UNION OFFICIALS SUGGESTED THIS

POINT, POINTING TO THE DIFFERENT CAMPAIGN EFFORTS CARRIED OUT IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE MEMBERSHIP.

SECTION II

CHAPTER 3

69. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., APPENDIX I; PP. 470-92
70. ID., P. 478
71. ID., P. 479
72. ID., P. 479
73. WE USE THE EXPRESSION "LIBERAL DEMOCRACY" TO CHARACTERIZE A PERIOD -(1910-1930)- WITHOUT PERMANENT MILITARY INTERVENTIONS OR COUPS D'ETAT.
74.
75. THE SHOP SIZE CATEGORIES IN UNION DEMOCRACY WERE THE FOLLOWING: SMALL, 3-20 MEN; MEDIUM, 21-99 MEN; AND LARGE, 100 + MEN; P. 486
76. THE AUTHORS POINT OF VIEW IS STATED IN APPENDIX I, PART B: "STATISTICAL PROBLEMS"; PP. 480-85
77. SEE APENDICES IN TOURAINE, A., LA CONSCIENCE OUVRIÈRE, PARIS: EDITIONS DU SEUIL, 1966, AND DI TELLA, T. ET AL, SINDICATO Y COMUNIDAD, BUENOS AIRES: EDICIONES DEL INSTITUTO, 1967.
78. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT. APPENDIX I, PART C: "SPECIFIC PROBLEMS"; PP; 485-92

SECTION III

CHAPTER 4

79. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 78.
80. ID., P. 78
81. ID., P. 78
82. ID., P. 79
83. DI TELLA, T., BRAMS, L., REYNAUD, J.D., TOURAINE, A. SINDICATO Y COMUNIDAD. BUENOS AIRES: EDICIONES DEL INSTITUTO, 1967; P. 225
84. THIS REFERS TO SEVERAL SOCIAL ACTIVITIES PROMOTED BY THE UNION, OR EITHER CARRIED OUT BY PRINTERS THEMSELVES WITH SOME SUPPORT FROM THE UNION.
85. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 79
86. SEE IN THIS SENSE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO LEVELS OF JOB SATISFACTION: GALE, RICHARD P. INDUSTRIAL MAN IN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AUTOMOBILE WORKERS. UNPUBLISHED PH.D. DISSERTATION, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, 1968; P. 284.

87. LIPSET, S.M. ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 81
88. ID. P. 81
89. IN UNION DEMOCRACY, DATA IS PRESENTED (P. 84) TO SHOW THAT THOSE HIGH IN SOCIAL RELATIONS ALSO TEND TO READ MORE THE UNION'S NEWSPAPER. FOR THE OBVIOUS REASON THAT THE UOGC DOES NOT HAVE ANY FORMAL MEANS OF COMMUNICATION, SUCH A RELATIONSHIP IS NOT DISCUSSED HERE.
90. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 81
91. ID., P. 82
92. ID., P. 82
93. ID., P. 82
94. ID., P. 85
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99. ID., P. 87
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102. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 92
103. ID., P. 92
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113. ID., P. 101
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115. ID., P. 101
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117. ID., P. 101
118. ID., P. 101
119. ID., P. 101
120. ID., P. 101
121. ID., P. 102
122. THIS INDEX IS DESCRIBED IN SECTION II.
123. DI TELLA, T. ET AL, OP. CIT., P.
124. ID., P. 368 (MY OWN TRANSLATION).
125. ID., P. 368 (MY OWN TRANSLATION).
126. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 105

127. ID., P. 106
128. ID., P. 107
129. ID., P. 107
130. ID., P. 107
131. ID., P. 107
132. ID., P. 107
133. ID., P. 107
134. ID., P. 107
135. ID., P. 108
136. ID., P. 108
137. ID., P. 109
138. WHILE IN UNION DEMOCRACY PRINTERS WERE ASKED ABOUT THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF PRINTER FRIENDS, THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE UOGC: THE "POLITICAL CULTURE" THERE -AND IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE- SUGGESTS THAT THE POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF FRIENDS SHOULD NOT BE TALKED ABOUT.
HENCE, WE ALTERNATIVELY ASKED THEM IF THEY KNEW THE NAMES OF UNION OFFICIALS. GIVEN THE PREVALENCE OF A "ONE-LIST" SYSTEM, THIS QUESTION SEEMED TO US A MOST APPROPIATE ONE.
139. ID., P. 107
140. ID., P. 110
141. ID., P. 110
142. ID., P. 110
143. ID., P. 110
144. THIS RELATIONSHIP IS SHOWN IN FIGURE 15, P. 112, IN UNION DEMOCRACY.
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146. ID., P. 111
147. ID., P. 112
148. ID., P. 112
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153. LIPSET, S.M. ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 118
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200. ID., P. 140 (FOOTNOTE 17)
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204. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 143
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209. ID., P. 145
210. TOTHE EXTENT THAT THE FOREMAN HAS CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES IN FINDING PEOPLE FOR THE SPECIFIC JOB.
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217. ID., P. 155
218. ID., P. 155
219. ID., P. 156
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221. ID., P. 157 (UNDERLINED IN THE ORIGINAL).
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237. ID., P. 163
238. UNIÓN OBRERA GRÁFICA CORDOBESA. ESTATUTO Y REGLAMENTO DE LA CAJA ASISTENCIAL. CÓRDOBA, 1964; PP. 11-12
239. LIPSET, S.M., ET AL, OP. CIT., P. 164
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